Opinion ID: 4565276
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of Request for Preliminary Injunction

Text: Ms. Donahue first argues that the district court erred in denying her request for a preliminary injunction. She fails to acknowledge, however, that she previously filed an interlocutory appeal from the district court’s denial of her request for injunctive relief, and this court affirmed the district court’s decision. See Donahue, 2019 WL 2359370, at . We therefore conclude that Ms. Donahue’s argument is barred by the law-of-the-case doctrine. Under that doctrine, “when a court rules on an issue of law, the ruling should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case.” Fish v. Schwab, 957 F.3d 1105, 1139 (10th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted), petition for cert. filed, No. 20-109 (U.S. July 28, 2020). And “the decision of the appellate court establishes the law of the case and 6 ordinarily will be followed by both the trial court on remand and the appellate court in any subsequent appeal.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). While some preliminary-injunction decisions do not establish law of the case, we have held that “a fully considered appellate ruling on an issue of law made on a preliminary injunction appeal becomes the law of the case for further proceedings in the trial court on remand and in any subsequent appeal.” Id. at 1140 (internal quotation marks, brackets and ellipsis omitted). In denying her request for preliminary injunctive relief, the district court determined that Ms. Donahue “ha[d] identified no evidence of irreparable injury, as all of the allegations in [her] motion occurred in the past. [Ms. Donahue] no longer lives in the school district, and has not indicated that she intends to return.” R., Vol. I at 350. In her appeal, Ms. Donahue “argue[d] that her allegations of past misconduct are adequate to establish irreparable harm, even though she no longer lives in the school district and has not shown an intent to return.” Donahue, 2019 WL 2359370, at . But we held that “allegations of past harm are inadequate to establish irreparable harm,” because “[t]he purpose of a preliminary injunction is not to remedy past harm but to protect plaintiffs from irreparable injury that will surely result without their issuance.” Id. (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). Our fully considered appellate ruling on a legal issue—that allegations of past harm cannot establish irreparable harm—is law of the case on the denial of Ms. Donahue’s request for a preliminary injunction. 7 B. Applicability of the Administrative Procedures Act In district court, Ms. Donahue argued that she was not bringing an action for judicial review under the IDEA, but instead she was bringing an action for judicial review under the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. The court rejected her argument, explaining that the APA “applies to review of federal agency decisions—not state agency decisions.” R., Vol. I at 344. For support, the court cited to the APA’s definition of “agency,” which is “each authority of the Government of the United States.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(b)(1). The APA provides that “[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.” Id. § 702 (emphasis added). In her appellate brief, Ms. Donahue argues that the district court erred in determining that the APA only applies to federal agencies. She cites to two state cases—one from Arkansas and one from Iowa—that involved the applicability of state administrative procedure acts to state agency action. See Aplt. Br. at 9 (citing Ark. State Bd. of Educ. v. Purifoy, 731 S.W. 2d 209 (Ark. 1987) and Lewis Cent. Educ. Ass’n v. Iowa Bd. of Educ. Exam’rs, 625 N.W. 2d 687, 690 (Iowa 2001)). Those cases have no relevance here as they did not involve the ability of a party aggrieved by state agency action to seek judicial review under the federal APA. Ms. Donahue also cites to Kelley v. Metropolitan County Board of Education of Nashville & Davidson County, 372 F. Supp. 528 (M.D. Tenn. 1973), to support her argument. But that case involved “acts by federal officers that were alleged to be 8 unconstitutional.” Id. at 537. Specifically, the third-party plaintiffs, who were members of the City Council with children attending Nashville public schools, alleged that federal officers who were charged with providing federal assistance under the Emergency School Assistance Program “to fund transportation expense and the purchase of buses pursuant to court-ordered desegregation plans,” refused to provide funds in accordance with that program. Id. at 533. The district court concluded it did have jurisdiction over the action against the federal officers under the APA and 28 U.S.C. § 1361. Id. at 540. The Kelley decision does not support Ms. Donahue’s argument that the APA applies to state agency action; rather, Kelley involved a claim against federal officers charged with implementing a federal program. 6 The district court did not err in determining that the APA does not apply to Ms. Donahue’s request for judicial review of state agency action. C. Dismissal of the Individual Respondents and the State Board of Education The district court dismissed all of the individual respondents and the Kansas State Board of Education after concluding that they were not proper parties to an 6 In this section of her brief, Ms. Donahue also argues that she is entitled to judicial review under a state statute. She contends that the actions of the state agency “are reviewable under the Kansas Judicial Review Act [KJRA], which is an act created under the Kansas Administrative Procedure Act.” Aplt. Br. at 10-11. She further contends that “the KJRA is virtually identical to [the APA]” and she asserts “that pendant jurisdiction should apply.” Id. at 11. As the district court explained in its order, “[i]f [Ms. Donahue] had asked for judicial review in state court, the KJRA would have governed the action. But it does not govern procedure in federal court.” R., Vol. I at 345-46 (citations omitted). Ms. Donahue’s argument fails to 9 IDEA action for judicial review. The court determined that Ms. Donahue and the District were the only proper parties. Ms. Donahue argues that the district court erred in this determination and that additional parties may be added to her petition for judicial review. We conclude this issue is moot. As noted above, Ms. Donahue failed to raise any argument challenging the court’s August 2019 order dismissing her petition for judicial review for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Because the dismissal of her petition for judicial review stands unchallenged and therefore no parties could be added to that petition, it would be impossible for this court to grant any effective relief on this issue. See Ind v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 801 F.3d 1209, 1213 (10th Cir. 2015) (“In deciding whether a case is moot, the crucial question is whether granting a present determination of the issues offered will have some effect in the real world. When it becomes impossible for a court to grant effective relief, a live controversy ceases to exist, and the case becomes moot.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). D. Dismissal of Claims Other than Claim for Judicial Review Ms. Donahue asserts that her “claims against the collective defendants were not yet presented” and “[t]o dismiss claims that had not yet been presented, was premature and violated [her] substantive right to due process.” Aplt. Br. at 14. She fails to explain, however, what claims she had not yet presented that were dismissed acknowledge the court’s decision on this issue and likewise fails to demonstrate that she is entitled to judicial review in this action under the KJRA. 10 or how her due process rights were violated. She also provides no citations to the record or legal authority for this argument. We conclude this portion of her argument is too conclusory to preserve appellate review. See Burke, 935 F.3d at 1014 (“Cursory statements, without supporting analysis and case law are inadequate to preserve an issue.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Ms. Donahue has therefore waived this portion of her argument by not adequately briefing it. See id. (“[A]n appellant may waive an issue by inadequately briefing it.”) Ms. Donahue further asserts that she was only required to file a form petition and she should be allowed to amend her petition. Ms. Donahue did file a motion for leave to amend her petition to add new parties—the District, Ms. Chappell and Mr. Allison. The district court granted that motion. Ms. Donahue never asked the court for leave to amend her petition to add additional claims. Given these circumstances, there would be no reason for the court to sua sponte grant her leave to amend her petition when she made no request for that relief. Ms. Donahue also refers to the local rule governing review of agency actions and argues that she was only required to file a simple petition. 7 But the court did 7 A petition for judicial review of agency action can be a simple petition. See D. Kan. R. 83.7.1(a)(1). But if Ms. Donahue was seeking to bring additional claims for relief other than a claim for judicial review, then she was required to file a pleading that contained “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. App. P. 8(a)(2). Other than her request for a preliminary injunction, which has already been resolved, Ms. Donahue’s petition did not set forth a short and plain statement of any other claim showing she was entitled to relief. See R., Vol. I at 151-52. 11 consider her claim for judicial review under the IDEA consistent with Rule 83.7.1 of the local rules for the District of Kansas. Finally, although not addressed in this section of her brief, Ms. Donahue argues that “the court incorrectly determined that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985 claims are not allowed in relation to the administrative hearings under IDEA 2004, which are governed by the APA (1983 claims are permitted in APA cases).” Aplt. Br. at 17. First, we have already determined that the APA does not apply to Ms. Donahue’s claim for judicial review of state agency action. Second, although Ms. Donahue’s petition for review did reference §§ 1983 and 1985, other than the request for preliminary injunctive relief, the petition did not include any allegations about the individual respondents’ conduct. See R., Vol. I at 151-52. To the extent Ms. Donahue was seeking relief under § 1983 for IDEA violations, the district court correctly determined that “§ 1983 is not a proper avenue for IDEA violations.” R., Vol. I at 344 (citing Padilla ex rel. Padilla v. Sch. Dist. No. 1 in City & Cty. of Denver, 233 F.3d 1268, 1272 (10th Cir. 2000)). In Padilla, we explained that “§ 1983 may not be used to remedy IDEA violations.” 233 F.3d at 1274. To the extent Ms. Donahue was seeking relief under § 1983 or § 1985 for non-IDEA violations, she failed to allege any facts to support those claims and therefore those claims were properly dismissed. 12 E. Dismissal of Ms. Donahue’s Minor Child and Denial of Motion to Appoint Counsel The district court determined that—to the extent Ms. Donahue sought to proceed on behalf of her minor child—she was not permitted to do so because she was proceeding pro se. As the court explained, “[a] pro se plaintiff may not represent another party—even her own child.” R., Vol. I at 342 (citing Meeker v. Kercher, 782 F.2d 153, 154 (10th Cir. 1986)). The court therefore dismissed any claims on behalf of Ms. Donahue’s minor child. The court also overruled Ms. Donahue’s objection to the magistrate judge’s denial of her motion for appointment of counsel. Ms. Donahue asserts that she was “denied . . . the right to counsel.” Aplt. Br. at 15. The district court explained that the magistrate judge “reasonably applied the factors of Long v. Shillinger, 927 F.2d 525, 527 (10th Cir. 1991) and recognized there is no constitutional right to appointed counsel in civil actions.” R., Vol. I at 343. Long identifies the factors courts should consider to determine if the denial of counsel would result in fundamental unfairness. 927 F.2d at 527. The district court concluded that “there is no indication that denial of counsel in this case would be fundamentally unfair.” R., Vol. I at 343. Without any citation to legal authority or the record, Ms. Donahue argues that it was fundamentally unfair to deny her motion to appoint counsel. She also argues—again without citation to legal authority—that “[u]nder federal law, the minor child is entitled to legal representation as part of due process, to understand the charges, to face the accusers, to have a day in court to answer for the alleged criminal 13 activity.” Aplt. Br. at 15-16. We conclude Ms. Donahue waived her challenges to the dismissal of her minor child and the denial of her motion to appoint counsel by failing to adequately brief them. See Burke, 935 F.3d at 1014. F. Denial of Recusal Motion Ms. Donahue states that she “filed a motion for recusal for [J]udge O’[H]ara based on her family history with his previous law firm Shughart Thompson, and Kilroy.” Aplt. Br. at 16. But she does not argue for reversal based on the allegations of bias involving her family and Judge O’Hara’s law firm that she raised in her recusal motion; instead, she argues that allegations of bias against Judge O’Hara involving an unidentified complainant demonstrate he has a clear bias. Compare Supp. R. at 5-6 with Aplt. Br. at 16. But Ms. Donahue is raising this argument for the first time on appeal and “[w]e ordinarily deem arguments that litigants fail to present before the district court but then subsequently urge on appeal to be forfeited.” Havens v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 897 F.3d 1250, 1259 (10th Cir. 2018). “Typically, such arguments ‘may form a basis for reversal only if the appellant can satisfy the elements of the plain error standard of review.’” Id. (quoting Richison v. Ernest Grp., Inc., 634 F.3d 1123, 1130 (10th Cir. 2011)). Ms. Donahue, however, did not argue for plain-error review of her new argument in her appellate brief and we have explained that “the failure to argue for plain error and its application on appeal— surely marks the end of the road for an argument for reversal not first presented to the district court.” Richison, 634 F.3d at 1131. We therefore conclude that Ms. Donahue has effectively waived her new argument and we decline to review it at 14 all. See Havens, 897 F.3d at 1261. Consequently, we uphold the magistrate judge’s denial of Ms. Donahue’s recusal motion on the grounds stated in the order denying the motion.