Opinion ID: 1372053
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: strict products liability and breach of implied warranty

Text: At trial the jury found that the defendant was negligent, that it was strictly liable to the plaintiff, and that it had breached its implied warranty to the plaintiff, that in all of these matters there was proximate cause, and that defendant was liable in damages to plaintiff. The jury also found that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent and that plaintiff's negligence was also a proximate cause of its damage. On the basis of these findings the District Court ruled that plaintiff's contributory negligence barred its recovery on all three counts. The law of strict products liability essentially began with MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), in which the New York Court of Appeals held the manufacturer of an automobile liable to the driver for his injuries sustained when the vehicle's wheel collapsed because the wheel had been made with defective wood. The MacPherson case mandated that a manufacturer of a product is liable to a subsequent user even in the absence of privity between the manufacturer and the user if the product is negligently made and of the type which would place life and limb in peril when negligently made. Id., 111 N.E. at 1053. Many states adopted the MacPherson rule, as did Utah in Hooper v. General Motors Corp., 123 Utah 515, 260 P.2d 549 (1953). In 1959, when addressed with a products liability case in Webb v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation, 9 Utah 2d 275, 342 P.2d 1094 (1959), this Court referred to the MacPherson doctrine in upholding the plaintiff's theory of recovery for injuries sustained from defects in a gun manufactured by the defendant. The evidence reviewed in Webb did not disclose any negligence on the part of the defendant in the manufacture of the product. Nevertheless, plaintiff sought recovery under the now well-established doctrine which imposes liability upon the manufacturer for injuries resulting from defects in such a product when it is used in accordance with its intended purpose. Id., 342 P.2d at 1096. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1962), was the benchmark for the law of strict products liability by holding that the manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being. Id., 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700, 377 P.2d at 900. In speaking for the California Supreme Court, Justice Traynor reasoned that strict products liability should be adopted, commenting: ... to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves. Id., 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701, 377 P.2d at 901. In 1965, Section 402A, the Restatement (Second) of Torts (Sec. 402A) adopted the Greenman rule, and reads as follows: (1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold. (2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although (a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and (b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller. An able historical development of tort law leading up to strict liability is given in the majority opinion in Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal.3d 725, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 383-384, 575 P.2d 1162, 1165-1166 (1978) where it states, inter alia: ... Tort law has evolved from a legal obligation initially imposed without fault, to recovery which, generally, was based on blameworthiness in a moral sense. For reasons of social policy and because of the unusual nature of defendants' acts, liability without fault continued to be prescribed in a certain restricted area, for example, upon keepers of wild animals, or those who handled explosives or other dangerous substances, or who engaged in ultrahazardous activities. Simultaneously, and more particularly, those who were injured in the use of personal property were permitted recovery on a contract theory if they were the purchasers of the chattel or were in privity. Subsequently, liability was imposed in negligence upon the manufacturer of personalty in favor of the general consumer... . Evolving social policies designed to protect the ultimate consumer soon prompted the extension of legal responsibility beyond negligence to express or implied warranty... . Warranty actions, however, contained their own inherent limitations requiring a precedent notice to the vender of a breach of the warranty, and absolving him from loss if he had issued an adequate disclaimer. General dissatisfaction continued with the conceptual limitations which traditional tort and contract doctrines placed upon the consumers and users of manufactured products, this at a time when mass production of an almost infinite variety of goods and products was responding to a myriad of ever-changing societal demands stimulated by wide-spread commercial advertising. From an historic combination of economic and sociological forces was born the doctrine of strict liability in tort. We, ourselves, were perhaps the first court to give the new principle judicial sanction. In Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897, ... we fastened strict liability on a manufacturer who placed on the market a defective product even though both privity and notice of breach of warranty were lacking. We rejected both contract and warranty theories, express or implied, as the basis for liability. Strict liability, we said, did not rest on a consensual foundation but, rather, on one created by law. The liability was created judicially because of the economic and social need for the protection of consumers in an increasingly complex and mechanized society, and because of the limitations in the negligence and warranty remedies. Our avowed purpose was to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturer that put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves. ... Subsequently, the Greenman principle was incorporated in section 402A of the Restatement Second of Torts, and adopted by a majority of American jurisdictions. From its inception, however, strict liability has never been, and is not now, absolute liability. As has been repeatedly expressed, under strict liability the manufacturer does not thereby become the insurer of the safety of the product's user... . As will thus be seen, the concept of strict products liability was created and shaped judicially. In its evolution, the doctrinal encumbrances of contract and warranty, and the traditional elements of negligence, were stripped from the remedy, and a new tort emerged which extended liability for defective product design and manufacture beyond negligence but short of absolute liability. [Emphasis in original; most citations omitted.] Since Greenman, this Court has had little contact with the strict products liability concept. [4] In Simpson v. General Motors Corporation, 24 Utah 2d 301, 470 P.2d 399 (1970), and Parker v. General Motors Corporation, 28 Utah 2d 385, 503 P.2d 148 (1972), we declined to review strict products liability because the issue was not properly before the Court. Finally, in Perkins v. FitWell Artificial Limb Co., 30 Utah 2d 151, 514 P.2d 811 (1973), without expressly adopting strict products liability, this Court applied its logic, indicating that assumption of the risk (in this case, the use of a defective crutch by one who knew of the defect) is a defense to it. When the user of a defective product knows, or in the exercise of ordinary care should know, of the defect in a product and of the danger inherent therein, the doctrine of strict liability in tort should not apply to harm occurring to the purchaser after such knowledge. Id., 514 P.2d at 812, 813. The instant case presents an appropriate opportunity for us to adopt the strict products liability doctrine and we do so in the language of Section 402A, noted ante. Defendant mass-produced the joists and made the defective welds in its own plant, and when the defendant painted the welds there was no reliable way of testing their quality. There is credible, substantial evidence in this record, which the jury chose to believe, that defendant sold products in this case in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to plaintiff; that defendant engaged in the business of selling such products, which reached plaintiff without substantial change from the time they left defendant; and that these products caused physical harm to plaintiff and its property. Was there, then, a valid defense to strict liability here? The District Court ruled that plaintiff's contributory negligence was a defense to the strict liability, implied warranty, and negligence actions. We do not address the matter of defendant's negligence, nor the matter of plaintiff's contributory negligence as it relates to defendant's negligence, as the counts sounding in strict liability and implied warranty are dispositive in this case. Defendant claims that the contributory negligence consisted of Hahn's erecting the structure of the mall in a negligent manner  girders and columns were out of plumb and there was a lack of shims under the joists  and that Hahn's negligence was imputed to plaintiff; that plaintiff's contributory negligence also consisted of its failure to hire inspectors to observe this negligently erected structure; and that these negligent acts also caused the roof collapse. Defendant does not claim, as noted in its brief, that this is a case where ... plaintiff failed to discover a defect in Armco's bar joists, nor a case where plaintiff discovered the defect and proceeded unreasonably to use the product in the face of a known danger... . We hold there are two defenses to strict products liability, namely, (1) misuse of the product by the user or consumer (see comment g to Sec. 402A); [5] and (2) knowledge of the defect by the user or consumer, who is aware of the danger and yet unreasonably proceeds to make use of the product, i.e., assumption of risk. (See comment n to Sec. 402A). [6] And we further hold that the defenses of misuse and assumption of risk must relate to the defective product and cannot be extended to cover conduct by the user or consumer unrelated to that product. We need not  and do not  reach the issue here, because of the unavailability to defendant of either of these two defenses, of whether comparative principles [7] should apply in strict products liability cases, where one of these two defenses lies, in order to diminish recovery by plaintiff, or whether proof by defendant of one of these two defenses bars recovery altogether. [8] The jury also found defendant had breached its implied warranty of merchantability to the plaintiff and that such breach proximately caused plaintiff damage. The elements of both actions are essentially the same [9] and analysis for the purpose of determining defenses to breach of implied warranty parallels that for strict products liability. Therefore, the same defenses discussed under strict products liability are available under breach of implied warranty.