Opinion ID: 693416
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Entry into the Lenzes' House

Text: 27 Once within that ambit, Paskewitz infringed upon a reasonable expectation of privacy when she entered the Lenzes' house. Citizens' security in their houses lies at the core of the Fourth Amendment. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 683, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961). However, Paskewitz contends, correctly in our opinion, that Desirae consented to the entry. 8 Valid consent legitimates an otherwise unconstitutional search. E.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2045, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). Anyone who possesse[s] common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected may consent to the search of another's property. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171, 94 S.Ct. 988, 993, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974). 28 The authority which justifies the third-party consent does not rest upon the law of property ... but rests rather on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched. 29 Id. n. 7. Matlock's third-party consent rule applies even when a present subject of the search objects. See, e.g., United States v. Donlin, 982 F.2d 31, 33 (1st Cir.1992); United States v. Childs, 944 F.2d 491, 495 (9th Cir.1991); J.L. Foti Constr. Co. v. Donovan, 786 F.2d 714, 717 (6th Cir.1986); Donovan v. A.A. Beiro Constr. Co., 746 F.2d 894, 899 n. 4 (D.C.Cir.1984); United States v. Baldwin, 644 F.2d 381, 383 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981); United States v. Bethea, 598 F.2d 331, 335 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 860, 100 S.Ct. 124, 62 L.Ed.2d 81 (1979). 30 To our knowledge, no federal court of appeals has yet explicitly addressed the capacity of minors to give third-party consent. 9 We hold that minors may so consent. Fourth Amendment rights, unlike rights attendant to due process, do not guarantee a fair and impartial determination of truth; rather, they protect the interest of the citizen to be let alone. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 242, 93 S.Ct. at 2056 (quoting Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416, 86 S.Ct. 459, 465, 15 L.Ed.2d 453 (1966)). Thus, the subject of a Fourth Amendment-violative search need not be aware of her right to refuse to give knowing and voluntary consent. Id. at 249, 93 S.Ct. at 2059. However, the circumstances surrounding the consent must demonstrate that it was voluntarily given, free of duress or coercion. Id. 31 Four reasons support our holding that minors may give third-party consent. First, privacy is an intuitive interest, and legal sophistication is not required even for adults to give valid consent. Id. Hence, minors need not necessarily be presumed incapable of knowing consent. Second, the list of factual considerations bearing upon the voluntariness of the consent is open-ended. See id. The youth of the consenter, with its attendant vulnerability to coercion, is certainly among them. Cf. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 600, 68 S.Ct. 302, 304, 92 L.Ed. 224 (1948). This individualized assessment obviates the need for a categorical rule to protect subjects of searches from subtle coercive tactics to secure a minor's consent. Third, consent searches serve a legitimate purpose that is properly balanced against the cost of limiting a minor's ability to consent. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 228-29, 93 S.Ct. at 2048-49. This balancing counsels against a bright-line rule prohibiting minor consent. Finally, the rationale behind third-party consent involves no notion of agency. Rather, the third-party consent rule recognizes that sharing space with another lessens the expectation of privacy in that space. See J.L. Foti Constr. Co., 786 F.2d at 717. This compromise of the expectation of privacy is no less the case for a minor co-occupant than for an adult. 32 In this case, the summary judgment record shows that there is no dispute about Desirae's authority to consent to Paskewitz's entry into the house. Desirae effectively resided with the Lenzes, because the duplex in which the Lenzes and Desirae lived had been made one house. Desirae had free access to the living room; indeed, Donald testified that [a]nything in that house is Mickey's [Desirae's] and as far as I'm concerned including the house. (Donald Lenz Dep. at 109.) This undisputed evidence of shared residence and access establishes Desirae's authority to consent. Cf. United States v. De Parias, 805 F.2d 1447, 1458 (11th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 916, 107 S.Ct. 3189, 96 L.Ed.2d 678 (1987). 33 Furthermore, no fact issue remains whether Desirae consented to Paskewitz's entry. All parties agree that Desirae entered the living room with Paskewitz, and Donald testified that Desirae and Paskewitz entered holding hands. Although the parties dispute whether Desirae was upset or not at the time, no evidence indicates that Paskewitz or Winburn in any way coerced Desirae into admitting them into the house. Nor does any evidence suggest that in the circumstances a child of Desirae's age would have felt coerced into letting Paskewitz enter to assist in selecting clothes. The undisputed evidence of conduct indicating consent and the absence of any evidence of coercion or duress eliminate any fact issue as to valid consent. Summary judgment was thus appropriate for Paskewitz on the claim based on her entry into the Lenzes' house. 34