Opinion ID: 2098657
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prior identifications by the victim

Text: In the District of Columbia courts, a prior inconsistent statement is not regarded as hearsayand is therefore admissible (assuming it is not barred for some other reason)if the declarant testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination, and if the prior statement was made under oath subject to the penalty of perjury. D.C.Code § 14-102(b) (2001); see Bell v. United States, 790 A.2d 523, 528-529 (D.C.2002). Appellants argue that the admission of Gibson's prior statements identifying them as the robbers was error because there was no substantial inconsistency with his testimony at trial except for his inability or unwillingness to identify them directly from the witness stand. Though appellants concede that other statements of identification made by Gibson might have been generally admissible under section 14-102(b), they contend that in this case any seeming inconsistency was the result of an honest mistake or a mere waning of memory on Gibson's part. When Gibson testified that he could not remember having recognized the two robbers, the court allowed the prosecutor to confront him with his prior grand jury testimony (which was, of course, under oath) and other statements in which he had identified Lewis and Price. Gibson admitted that he was not at all hesitant in his identifications when testifying before the grand jury and that, barely a week before trial, he had not expressed any confusion or uncertainty about who the robbers were. Indeed, he acknowledged that, in all [of his] conversations with the prosecutor before trial, he had identified the robbers as JB and Rodney, that is, Jonathan Price and Rodney Lewis. All of this was laid before the jury in a manner consistent with section 14-102(b), while Gibson was on the witness stand and available for cross-examination. Indeed, as the government points out, both defense attorneys cross-examined him about the inconsistency between his testimony and his prior statements of identification, strivingin vain, as it turned outto erode jury confidence in the credibility of those prior identifications. Appellants' arguments to the contrary are foreclosed by section 14-102(b). As for Gibson's statements to the police, the prosecutor, and others, which were not covered by section 14-102(b)(1) because they were not under oath, we hold that they were properly admitted under section 14-102(b)(3), which provides for the admission of an identification of a person made after perceiving the person, so long as the identifying declarant testifies at trial and is available for cross-examination. Insofar as those statements went beyond mere identifications and included information about the crime itself, the trial court ruled, and we agree, that such information was needed to put the identifications in context and to clarify each appellant's individual role in the robbery. See Porter v. United States, 826 A.2d 398, 410 (D.C.2003) (prior descriptions of the offense itself may be admissible to the extent necessary to make the identification understandable to the jury); accord, Brown v. United States, 840 A.2d 82, 89 (D.C.2004) (citing Porter and other cases). On this record we can find no abuse of discretion and no legal error in the court's decision to allow the jury to hear about the prior identifications or in the manner in which this was done. See, e.g., David v. United States, 957 A.2d 4, 8-9 (D.C.2008); Bell, 790 A.2d at 529; Sparks v. United States, 755 A.2d 394, 400 (D.C.2000); see also United States v. O'Malley, 796 F.2d 891, 899 (7th Cir.1986) (interpreting FED. R.EVID. 801(d)(1), which is essentially identical to D.C.Code § 14-102(b)).