Opinion ID: 2554473
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Misleading Conduct

Text: [¶ 14] An individual's statements may be declared to be involuntary if the police mislead the individual during an interrogation as to that individual's constitutionally protected right against self-incrimination. See McConkie, 2000 ME 158, ¶ 10, 755 A.2d at 1078. In McConkie, we held that when an individual makes incriminating statements in response to explicit and false police assurances of confidentiality, those statements are deemed not voluntary and must be suppressed. Id. ¶ 11, 755 A.2d at 1078-79. In that case, during a noncustodial interrogation about alleged unlawful sexual contact, a police detective affirmatively told McConkie that any information he provided during the interview would `stay[] confidential.' Id. ¶ 4, 755 A.2d at 1077 (alteration in original). The detective also stated that the allegations were really not such a big deal and that [McConkie was] going to go back home [that day] and that [was] going to be it. Id. ¶ 3, 755 A.2d at 1077 (alteration in original). The detective allowed McConkie to believe, throughout the interview, that his statements were confidential, and the detective made no effort to correct the false impression. Id. ¶ 4, 755 A.2d at 1077. [¶ 15] We concluded that McConkie's statements to the police should have been suppressed because, although McConkie was not in custody and was not entitled to a Miranda warning, see Miranda v. Ariz., 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the detective was nonetheless not at liberty to affirmatively mislead McConkie as to his constitutionally protected right against self-incrimination. McConkie, 2000 ME 158, ¶ 10, 755 A.2d at 1078. We refused to condone affirmative conduct by a state actor attempting to mislead a suspect regarding his constitutionally protected right to remain silent and the consequences of speaking, and conclude[d] that the admission at trial of the statements derived as a result of that conduct caused McConkie's trial to be fundamentally unfair and a violation of due process. [7] Id. ¶ 11, 755 A.2d at 1079. [¶ 16] Here, the detective was similarly not at liberty to mislead Dodge regarding confidentiality. See id.; Poblete, 2010 ME 37, ¶ 24, 993 A.2d at 1110; Sawyer, 2001 ME 88, ¶ 9, 772 A.2d at 1176. Therefore, the statements Dodge made after the initial brief assurance of confidentiality but before the correction of that misimpression must be suppressed, and we affirm the court's order suppressing those statements. See McConkie, 2000 ME 158, ¶ 11, 755 A.2d at 1078-79.