Opinion ID: 2526152
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The City Had Absolute Immunity Under Section 4-106(b)

Text: Because Lowe was an escaping prisoner, and he caused plaintiffs' injuries when he crashed into their vehicle, the City was immune under section 4-106(b). Again, this provision immunizes local governments and their employees for injuries inflicted by an    escaping prisoner. If the jury verdict were to be upheld, then the City unquestionably would be held liable for injuries inflicted by an escaping prisoner. Plaintiffs attempt to avoid this result by arguing that section 4-106(b) does not cover Oliva's conduct or the conduct of the pursuing officers, and it is that conduct for which plaintiffs are seeking to hold the City liable. Plaintiffs argue that their case is about the City's conduct through its officersin failing to properly restrain Lowe initially and then in recklessly pursuing him through the streets of Chicago. We agree with the City that this is mere semantics designed to avoid a clearly applicable immunity. According to plaintiffs' own complaint, their injuries were suffered when Lowe ran a red light and crashed into their vehicle. According to the complaint, plaintiffs suffered severe, and permanent injuries, both externally and internally. These injuries were inflicted by an escaping prisoner, and plaintiffs are attempting to recover damages for these injuries. Moreover, plaintiffs' argument could essentially render section 4-106(b) a nullity. Anytime a prisoner escapes from custody, a plaintiff would likely be able to point to some failure by those responsible for keeping the prisoner in custody. Indeed, on what other basis would a plaintiff injured by an escaped or escaping prisoner seek to hold a local government or its employees liable if not for its conduct in allowing the prisoner to escape or in attempting to apprehend the prisoner? If a plaintiff injured by an escaping prisoner could plead around section 4-106(b) merely by arguing that his case was really about the conduct of those who let the prisoner escape, then it is difficult to see how section 4-106(b) would have any real effect. This could not have been the legislature's intent. We also assume that the legislature realized that any escaping-prisoner situation would involve pursuit by law enforcement officers. The legislature chose not to focus on the conduct of law enforcement officials in enacting this section, but rather worded it broadly to provide immunity for all injuries inflicted by escaping prisoners. Plaintiffs' injuries were inflicted by an escaping prisoner, and they cannot avoid section 4-106(b) by arguing that their case was really about something else.