Opinion ID: 6356952
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Confrontation Clause and Testimonial Evidence

Text: Whether the admission and use of the autopsy report in this case-without accompanying testimony from its author-violated Brown's rights under the Confrontation Clause is a question of law, for which our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. See Yohe , 79 A.3d at 530 . Prior to Crawford , the United States Supreme Court was of the view the Confrontation Clause did not bar the admission of out-of-court statements that fell within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule or that bore a particularized guarantee of trustworthiness. Crawford , 541 U.S. at 40 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , citing Ohio v. Roberts , 448 U.S. 56 , 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980) (Confrontation Clause does not bar admission of unavailable witness's statement against criminal defendant if statement bears adequate indicia of reliability-to meet adequate indicia of reliability test, evidence must either fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception or bear particularized guarantee of trustworthiness). In Crawford , however, the Court sought to align its Confrontation Clause analysis with the original intent of the framers who, according to the Court, were concerned about abuses of the civil-law mode of criminal procedure; in particular, the Court referenced the introduction into evidence of ex parte examinations such as the confession of Sir Walter Raleigh's alleged accomplice in Raleigh's trial for treason. Crawford , 541 U.S. at 50 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 . The Crawford Court determined the historical record supported the proposition the framers would not have permitted the admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial, and held that such statements could be admitted only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine. Id. at 59 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 . Ultimately, the Crawford Court held the playing of a tape-recorded  statement at trial, in which the criminal defendant's wife who did not testify on the grounds of marital privilege described to police the circumstances of the defendant's stabbing a victim, violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. Subsequent to Crawford , the Court held statements to police are testimonial, and thus subject to Confrontation Clause restraints, when their primary purpose is to establish or prove past events for purposes of proof at a criminal trial: Without attempting to produce an exhaustive classification of all conceivable statements-or even all conceivable statements in response to police interrogation-as either testimonial or nontestimonial, it suffices to ... hold as follows: Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution. Davis v. Washington , 547 U.S. at 822, 126 S.Ct. 2266 . After Davis , the High Court considered a number of cases in which the challenged statements or affidavits took the form of scientific or forensic reports or certificates. In Melendez-Diaz , the Court considered a Massachusetts trial court's admission into evidence at a criminal trial for drug trafficking of certificates reporting the forensic analysis of the composition and quantity of substances seized from the defendant. 557 U.S. 305 , 129 S.Ct. 2527 . As required by Massachusetts law, the certificates were sworn to before a notary public and were offered into evidence at trial as prima facie evidence the substance seized was a specific quantity of cocaine. Id. at 308 , 129 S.Ct. 2527 . The defendant objected on the basis of Crawford , claiming the analyst who prepared the certificates was required to testify if the certificates were to be admitted into evidence. The objection was overruled, the defendant was convicted of cocaine distribution and his conviction was upheld on appeal. The High Court granted certiorari to determine whether the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights had been violated. The Court held [t]he 'certificates' are functionally identical to live, in-court testimony, doing 'precisely what a witness does on direct examination,'  and thus were testimonial in nature. Id. at 310-11 , 129 S.Ct. 2527 , quoting Davis , 547 U.S. at 830, 126 S.Ct. 2266 . Moreover, the Court held admission of the certificates of analysis without the author's live testimony violated the Confrontation Clause because the certificates fell into the core class of testimonial statements identified in Crawford . Melendez-Diaz , 557 U.S. at 310 , 129 S.Ct. 2527 . Significantly, the certificates of analysis were  'made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial,'  and under Massachusetts law, the sole purpose of the certificates was to provide evidence about the composition and quantity of the analyzed substance. Id. at 311 , 129 S.Ct. 2527 , quoting Crawford , 541 U.S. at 52 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 . The Court rejected the state's argument the certificates were admissible without supporting testimony because they simply reflected the resul[t] of neutral, scientific testing; the Court held this argument was little more than an invitation to return to our overruled decision in Roberts , ...  which held that evidence with 'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness' was admissible notwithstanding the Confrontation Clause. Melendez-Diaz , 557 U.S. at 317 , 129 S.Ct. 2527 , quoting Ohio v. Roberts , 448 U.S. at 66 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 . The Court reiterated, To be sure, the Clause's ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.... Id. , quoting Crawford , 541 U.S. at 61-62 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 . In Bullcoming , decided two years after Melendez-Diaz , the High Court reviewed the admissibility of a BAC report authored and signed by a non-testifying analyst. The report was introduced at trial for the substantive purpose of proving the truth of the matter asserted by its out-of-court author, namely, that the defendant had a BAC level of 0.21, which was the central question at the defendant's trial, and was dispositive of his guilt. The report was introduced through the testimony of a surrogate analyst. The New Mexico Supreme Court held the surrogate's testimony was adequate to satisfy the requirements of the Confrontation Clause. The issue before the High Court was whether the Confrontation Clause permits the prosecution to introduce a forensic laboratory report containing a testimonial certification-made for the purpose of proving a particular fact-through the in-court testimony of a scientist who did not sign the certification or perform or observe the test reported in the certification. Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 652 , 131 S.Ct. 2705 . The High Court ruled the Confrontation Clause precludes such practice, holding the Clause does not tolerate dispensing with confrontation simply because the court believes that questioning one witness about another's testimonial statements provides a fair enough opportunity for cross-examination. Id. at 662 , 131 S.Ct. 2705 . New Mexico argued the affirmations of the surrogate analyst were nontestimonial because they were not adversarial or inquisitorial but simply observations of an independent scientist made according to a non-adversarial public duty, and thus, the Confrontation Clause was not implicated. Id. at 664 , 131 S.Ct. 2705 . The Court summarily noted it is inescapable  Melendez-Diaz le[aves] no room for that argument[.] Id. at 663 , 131 S.Ct. 2705 . In concurrence, Justice Sotomayor, who provided the fifth vote for the majority decision to hold Bullcoming's Sixth Amendment rights were violated, wrote separately to highlight 1) why she viewed the BAC report at issue to be testimonial-specifically because its 'primary purpose' is evidentiary, and 2) to emphasize the limited reach of the Court's opinion. Id. at 668 , 131 S.Ct. 2705 (Sotomayor, J. concurring). Justice Sotomayor noted the BAC report had a primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony and opined the formality of the BAC report further suggests its evidentiary purpose. Id. at 670 , 131 S.Ct. 2705 (Sotomayor, J. concurring), citing Michigan v. Bryant , 562 U.S. 344 , 366, 131 S.Ct. 1143 , 179 L.Ed.2d 93 (2011) (formality/informality can shed light on whether particular statement has primary purpose of use at trial). Noting Bullcoming was materially indistinguishable from the facts considered in Melendez-Diaz, Justice Sotomayor then highlighted some of the factual circumstances that this case does not present. Id. at 672, 131 S.Ct. 2705 (emphasis in original). Among other things, Justice Sotomayor explained Bullcoming was not a case in which an expert witness was asked for his independent opinion about underlying testimonial  reports that were not themselves admitted into evidence. Id. at 673 , 131 S.Ct. 2705 , citing F.R.E. 703 (facts or data of a type upon which experts in the field would reasonably rely in forming an opinion need not be admissible in order for expert's opinion based on the facts and data to be admitted). Shortly after Bullcoming , the High Court decided Williams v. Illinois , supra , a divided opinion in which the Court sought to further refine its articulation of the primary purpose test under the alternate factual scenario envisioned only hypothetically in Bullcoming by Justice Sotomayor. Williams involved a rape prosecution in which an expert testified she obtained a DNA profile report from an independent lab based on a semen specimen taken from a vaginal swab of the victim. The lab report was not introduced into evidence. The expert testified she compared the DNA profile contained in the lab report to the defendant's recorded DNA profile and concluded it was a match. The defendant challenged the expert's testimony which relied upon the lab report on the basis the report's admission without testimony from its author violated the Confrontation Clause. The plurality opinion, authored by Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Kennedy and Justice Breyer, relied in part on F.R.E. 703 and held, [o]ut-of-court statements that are related by the expert solely for the purpose of explaining the assumptions on which that opinion rests are not offered for their truth and thus fall outside the scope of the Confrontation Clause. Williams , 567 U.S. at 58 , 132 S.Ct. 2221 . Alternatively, the plurality applied the primary purpose test to conclude the underlying lab report was itself non-testimonial, and thus beyond the reach of the Confrontation Clause, because the report did not identify the defendant, was not inherently inculpatory, and was created before any suspect was identified. Id. The plurality opined the report is very different from the sort of extrajudicial statements, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, and confessions, that the Confrontation Clause was originally understood to reach. Id. The report was sought not for the purpose of obtaining evidence to be used against petitioner, who was not even under suspicion at the time, but for the purpose of finding a rapist who was on the loose. Id. The plurality thus opined the lab report differed from the certificates of analysis and BAC reports in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming , which were created for the sole purpose of providing evidence against a particular defendant and were used to establish the truth of the matter asserted. The plurality concluded the defendant's Sixth Amendment confrontation right was not violated and explained: This conclusion is entirely consistent with Bullcoming and Melendez-Diaz . In those cases, the forensic reports were introduced into evidence, and there is no question that this was done for the purpose of proving the truth of what they asserted: in Bullcoming that the defendant's blood alcohol level exceeded the legal limit and in Melendez-Diaz that the substance in question contained cocaine. Nothing comparable happened here. Id. at 79 , 132 S.Ct. 2221 . 9 In a dissenting opinion, Justice Kagan, joined by Justice Scalia, Justice Ginsberg  and Justice Sotomayor, maintained [u]nder our Confrontation Clause precedents, this is an open-and-shut case. Williams , 567 U.S. at 119 , 132 S.Ct. 2221 (Kagan, J. dissenting). Citing Crawford , Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming , the dissent maintained the independent lab analyst who prepared the DNA profile report, to which the defendant's DNA sample was compared, was a witness against the defendant whom the defendant had a right to confront. The dissent offered  '[o]ur precedent[s] cannot sensibly be read any other way.'  Id. at 125 , 132 S.Ct. 2221 , quoting Bullcoming , 564 U.S. at 663 , 131 S.Ct. 2705 . Turning to our own jurisprudence, this Court addressed whether the admission of a toxicology report in a DUI case violated the defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause in Yohe . The defendant's blood sample was tested three times by several analysts from one lab using two different methods, as per routine lab practice. Dr. Blum, a toxicologist, and the assistant lab director responsible for the lab's quality assurance controls, received the raw data from the analysts who performed the tests, reviewed the demographic information, verified the appropriate tests were conducted, evaluated the chain of custody, and compared the individual test results to arrive at a BAC result which he set forth in a toxicology report summarizing the test results. Yohe , 79 A.3d at 523-24 . Dr. Blum signed the report electronically, certifying its content and his own participatory role in reviewing the data and ensuring its accuracy. Id. at 524 . At Yohe's trial, the report showing his BAC to be .159 was admitted into evidence through Dr. Blum's expert testimony. Yohe objected to the admission of the report and to Dr. Blum's testimony on the basis they violated his right to confrontation because the specific lab technicians who actually performed the tests did not testify. The objections were overruled, and Yohe was convicted of DUI and sentenced. On post-sentence motions, however, the trial court held the toxicology report was a testimonial statement requiring production at trial of the analysts who actually performed the underlying tests so that the defendant could confront them. Id. at 525-26 . The Commonwealth appealed to the Superior Court, arguing Dr. Blum was in fact the analyst who derived the actual BAC result from his comparison of the readings of the underlying tests conducted under differing methods. The Superior Court agreed Dr. Blum (rather than the original lab technicians) was the witness the defendant had a right to confront, and reversed the grant of a new trial. On appeal, this Court analyzed the relevant precedent from the High Court, viewing with caution the fragmented decision in Williams where there was no single rationale to explain the result which garnered a majority. 79 A.3d at 536 . This Court noted the narrowest ground for the decision in Williams was the conclusion that the DNA profile report from the independent lab was not testimonial. However, four Justices disagreed with that conclusion and the remaining Justices could not agree about why the report was not testimonial. Thus, this Court considered whether Dr. Blum's toxicology report was testimonial by comparing it to the facts of the testimonial statements considered in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming [,] id. at 537 , and easily concluded the toxicology report was testimonial. Id. The Court then considered whether Dr. Blum was the appropriate analyst to appear at trial for purposes of protecting Yohe's  rights under the Confrontation Clause. The Court noted Dr. Blum had extensive supervisory involvement in utilizing the information supplied by his subordinates and highlighted his unique role as the only individual who engaged in the critical comparative analysis of the results of the various tests performed to determine the defendant's actual BAC. Id. at 540 . The Court surmised the facts distinguished the case from Bullcoming where the surrogate witness had no opinion concerning the defendant's BAC, [r]ather the testifying witness merely read the analyst's report into evidence and offered no independent opinion about the defendant's blood alcohol levels. Id. at 541 , citing Bullcoming , 564 U.S. at 662 , 131 S.Ct. 2705 . Thus, the Yohe Court determined the defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause were not violated because the author of the toxicology report was the analyst who testified at trial and was available for cross-examination. Id.