Opinion ID: 186961
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Business Practices

Text: 27 Galvin makes two related arguments based upon evidence of business practices. She first notes that, according to the Waltrip affidavits, the Crowell Ash Drug Store sold only Lilly's brand of DES in the 1960s; therefore, when Keller purchased her DES, she must have received Lilly's product. The second argument is more complicated. Although her doctor's written prescription is not available, her labor and delivery record suggests he prescribed her Stilb 25 mg, which Galvin contends would allow a reasonable juror to conclude the underlying prescription did not specify a particular brand. Other evidence suggests Lilly wholesalers provided Lilly products to pharmacies when they received orders for drugs not specified by brand name. Finally, Waltrip in his affidavit states the Crowell Ash Drug Store ordered its DES from Pennington Wholesale Drug, which was a Lilly wholesaler. Galvin claims this evidence would make it reasonable for a juror to infer that Keller's doctor prescribed DES without specifying a brand, which led the Crowell Ash Drug Store to order DES from Pennington without specifying a brand, which then caused Pennington to provide DES manufactured by Lilly. 28 Both theories depend upon the Waltrip testimony, which the district court correctly held was inadmissible pursuant to Rule 56(e). As previously mentioned, Waltrip did not become a pharmacist until 1967 and he does not suggest he was personally familiar with the Crowell Ash Drug Store's stocking practices in 1964-65. Although his supplemental affidavit notes that upon arriving at the drugstore in 1967, he talked to and took instructions from other pharmacists and observed the practices and procedures of the store, as they existed in the years prior, that demonstrates only that Waltrip's knowledge of practices in 1965 is based upon inadmissible hearsay. 29 Galvin suggests Waltrip's statement is reducible to admissible form as evidence of a routine practice, presumably pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 406. 4 Even if it is, that would not cure Waltrip's lack of personal knowledge for the relevant time. 5 Galvin assumes Waltrip could reasonably infer the Crowell Ash Drug Store's stocking practices in 1967 were the same as its practices in 1965, but she cites no authority supporting this counter-intuitive proposition, nor has she presented any evidence suggesting the practice did not change in the interim. Merely to assume a practice in 1967 to have been the same as it was in 1965 is not reasonable, and we accordingly find the Waltrip testimony unhelpful to Galvin in opposing summary judgment. 30 So to say is not, as Galvin claims, to g[ive] Lilly the benefit of the inference that the drugstore underwent a revamping or overhaul of its regular practices of ordering and stocking. We adopt a neutral posture, inferring neither change nor continuity at the drugstore. Still, a reasonable juror must have some reason to believe the practice followed in 1967 was the same as the practice followed in 1965. Galvin has provided none, and thus has failed to carry her burden as the plaintiff.