Opinion ID: 626941
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Google's In-House Studies and Google's Corporate Designees

Text: The record also includes various in-house studies conducted by Google to analyze user confusion (if any) associated with ads using [trademark] terms. J.A. 4362. One of the studies showed that the likelihood of confusion remains high when trademark terms are used in the title or body of a sponsored link appearing on a search results page. J.A. 4366. The study recommended that the only effective [trademark] policy ... is: (1) [to] [a]llow [trademark] usage for keywords; (2) [but] not allow [trademark] usage in ad texttitle or body. Id. And, in fact, Google's official policy change in 2004 that continued to prohibit trademark usage in ad text was based, in part, on these internal studies. The district court concluded these studies were not evidence of actual confusion because the studies did not test consumer impressions of the ROSETTA STONE mark specifically, but of a broad cross-section of 16 different brand names of varying strengths. We conclude that these studies, one of which reflected that 94% of users were confused at least once, are probative as to actual confusion in connection with Google's use of trademarks; indeed, Google determined that there was [n]o difference between strong and weak trademarks with respect to confusion. J.A. 4375. Additionally, when testifying on behalf of Google as its Rule 30(b)(6) designees, two of Google's in-house trademark attorneys were shown a Google search results page for the keyword phrase Rosetta Stone, and they were unable to determine without more research which sponsored links were authorized resellers of ROSETTA STONE products. The district court rejected this evidence as proof of actual confusion because the testimony appeared to the district court to reflect a mere uncertainty about the source of a product rather than actual confusion. Rosetta Stone, 730 F.Supp.2d at 544. [U]ncertain[ty about] the origin of a product, however, is quintessential actual confusion evidence. Sara Lee Corp., 81 F.3d at 466. The district court should have accepted it as evidence of actual confusion for summary judgment purposes; whether it is entitled to enough weight to carry the day on the ultimate issue is a matter for trial.