Opinion ID: 2981540
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Talal v. White

Text: The district court’s order and the magistrate’s report and recommendation did not specify whether White counted as a strike. However, if it counts as a strike, we may affirm the district court on this basis. See Frazie v. McGinnis, No. 99-1164 1999 WL 1253054, at  (6th Cir. Dec. 16, 1999) (citing City Mgmt. Corp. v. U.S. Chem. Co., 43 F.3d 244, 251 (6th Cir. 1994)) (stating that a court may affirm the district court’s judgment on any grounds supported by the record). In White, Taylor brought constitutional claims under the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Talal v. White, No. 09-5707, at 2 (6th Cir. July 14, 2010). The case went to a jury, which returned verdicts for the defendants. Id. at 3. Taylor then moved for a new trial on the basis of withheld evidence and perjury, and moved for a transcript at government expense. Id. at 4 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 753(f), which allows a district court to grant a plaintiff’s motion for a transcript at government expense by certifying that the appeal is “not frivolous (but presents a substantial question)”). After finding that the appeal did not present a substantial question, the district court denied the motion for a transcript at government expense. Id. The district court also denied the motion for a new trial. Id. On appeal this court held that the appeal did not present a substantial question and therefore denied the motion for a transcript at government expense. Id. The court then affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion for a new trial. Id. The court held that Taylor’s claims were unsubstantiated without a transcript, but did not rule out the possibility that Taylor could have prevailed on his appeal had he obtained the transcript and had it contained evidence of perjury. Id. -9- No. 10-6411 Taylor v. First Medical Management, et al. Section 1915(g) includes by its own language those appeals that were dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The plain language seemingly limits the application of a strike to dismissals by only speaking of dismissals. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Additionally, if an appeal were frivolous, the court would be required under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) to dismiss it. The other circuits presented with the question of whether an affirmance can count as a strike have held that a court should not impose a § 1915(g) strike for an appeal when the original appellate court declined to implicate § 1915(g) reasons. See Thompson v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 492 F.3d 428, 436-37 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Ali v. Howard, 353 F. App’x 667, 668 (3d Cir. 2009); Owens, 487 F.3d at 563; Michaud v. City of Rochester, No. 00-1263, 2000 WL 1886289, at  n.1 (1st Cir. Dec. 27, 2000); Jennings v. Natrona Cnty. Det. Ctr. Med. Facility, 175 F.3d 775, 780 (10th Cir. 1999); Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383, 387-88 (5th Cir. 1996). The language of the opinion does not indicate that the court found the appeal to be frivolous. Because the court did not dismiss the case under § 1915(g), White does not count as a strike.5 We move to the final case considered by the district court, Talal v. Myers.