Opinion ID: 802339
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The District Court’s Exclusion of Pozo’s

Text: Testimony 21 Before trial, the District Court had ruled that the government would be permitted under Rule 404(b) to introduce Pozo’s testimony that Bergrin counseled him to murder a witness. As the Court noted at that time, “[t]he factual similarities” between that incident and the Kemo murder are “striking,” and the “evidence is highly probative of Bergrin’s intent with respect to [the Kemo murder].” (Joint App. at 10.) Although the Court thought the admission of that testimony “carrie[d] a risk of undue prejudice,” it concluded “that [the] prejudice [was] insufficient to substantially outweigh its high probative value” and noted that it would “mitigate the risk of prejudice by providing a proper limiting instruction.” (Id.) At trial, however, even after Bergrin told the jury in his opening statement that he would not have made the statements to which Pozo would testify and declared that he had been acting legitimately as an attorney in representing Baskerville, the Court turned about and ruled that the evidence was inadmissible. We agree with the government that the reasons given for that change reflect an abuse of discretion. this case to be reassigned and will ask that the severance rulings be revisited, see infra Part II.C, we need not determine the propriety of the Second Severance Order and therefore do not decide whether we have appellate jurisdiction to review it. 21 We review a “district court’s decision regarding the admissibility of evidence … for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Higdon, 638 F.3d 233, 238 (3d Cir. 2011). 34 Rule 404(b), as we have noted, provides that “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that … the person acted in accordance with the character,” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1), but the Rule permits such evidence “for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident,” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). To be admissible under Rule 404(b), then, evidence of uncharged crimes or wrongs must have a proper evidentiary purpose. “A proper purpose is one that is ‘probative of a material issue other than character.’” United States v. Green, 617 F.3d 233, 250 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 686 (1988)); see United States v. Johnson, 199 F.3d 123, 128 (3d Cir. 1999) (stating that Rule 404(b) evidence is proper “if relevant for any other purpose than to show a mere propensity or disposition on the part of the defendant to commit the crime” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). As long as evidence offered under Rule 404(b) satisfies that criterion, we favor its admission. Johnson, 199 F.3d at 128. Of course, such evidence may be excluded if “its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of … unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. We have also emphasized that limiting instructions may be appropriate when admitting Rule 404(b) evidence. See Green, 617 F.3d at 249 (noting that a limiting instruction should be given where requested).
Insufficient Evidence to Establish That Pozo’s Testimony Was Truthful 35 As the District Court correctly explained, one step in evaluating whether to admit Rule 404(b) evidence is to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to conclude that the crime, wrong, or other act in question actually occurred, because “similar act evidence is relevant only if … the act occurred and … the defendant was the actor.” Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 689. Applying that inquiry to Pozo’s proffered testimony, however, the Court made its own credibility assessment, saying that there was “nothing to document what actually was spoken at that time in those few little sentences that the Government contends would show that Mr. Bergrin was attempting [to] … you know, to murder the witness.” (Joint App. at 21.) Owing to the lack of independent corroboration, the Court decided that “Mr. Pozo’s best recollection” would not suffice. (Id.) That was an error of law. In Huddleston v. United States, the Supreme Court expressly rejected the “level of judicial oversight” that the District Court applied here in excluding Pozo’s testimony. 485 U.S. at 688. It said, rather, that Rule 404(b) evidence need only be supported by sufficient evidence for a jury to be able to “reasonably conclude that the act occurred and that the defendant was the actor.” Id. at 689. A court’s task in that regard is simply to decide, in accordance with Rule 104(b), “whether the jury could reasonably find th[ose] facts … by a preponderance of the evidence.” 22 Id. at 690; see Fed. R. 22 Thus, although the standard of proof in criminal cases requires a greater showing than a preponderance of proof, evidence of a contested fact may be admissible towards that greater burden when the “evidence in the case” permits a 36 Evid. 104(b) (“When the relevance of evidence depends on whether a fact exists, proof must be introduced sufficient to support a finding that the fact does exist.”). Importantly, the Supreme Court instructed that, in making that determination, trial courts must not “weigh[] credibility” or “make[] a finding.” Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 690. By discounting Pozo’s testimony based on a lack of corroboration and questions about credibility, the Court usurped the jury’s role. See United States v. Dillon, 532 F.3d 379, 391 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Rule 104(b) does not require corroboration. It only requires that the district court consider the witness’s testimony and determine that a reasonable jury could [make the required] find[ing] by a preponderance of the evidence … .” (internal footnote omitted)); Siegel, 536 F.3d at 319 (“Evidence is [sufficiently] reliable for purposes of Rule 404(b) ‘unless it is so preposterous that it could not be believed by a rational and properly instructed juror.’” (citation omitted)); cf. United States v. Haut, 107 F.3d 213, 220 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting that it “is a basic tenet of the jury system that it is improper for a district court to substitute[ ] [its] judgment of the facts and the credibility of the witnesses for that of the jury” (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). While Pozo’s credibility and motivation for testifying may be open to question, his testimony itself was sufficient to permit a jury to reasonably conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Bergrin did the things that Pozo said he did. See United States v. Bailey, 990 F.2d 119, 123 (4th Cir. 1993) (explaining that a witness’s testimony should not be precluded “simply because jury to “reasonably find the … fact … by a preponderance of the evidence.” Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 690. 37 it is in conflict with or contradicted by other testimony” or is offered by a “witness [who] has an unsavory past,” as those “are merely circumstances for the jury to consider”). Consequently, the Court was obliged to permit a jury to consider that testimony, provided it was otherwise admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Substantially More Prejudicial Than Probative The District Court did not believe that Pozo’s testimony was otherwise admissible, because, under Rule 403, the Court determined that the testimony was cumulative and confusing, and that the prejudice from it substantially outweighed any probative value. All of those conclusions are problematic. To begin with, it is not clear that the Court applied the proper test under Rule 403, because, at times, it spoke simply in terms of “prejudice” to Bergrin. (Joint App. at 23.) It must always be remembered that unfair prejudice is what Rule 403 is meant to guard against, that is, prejudice “based on something other than [the evidence’s] persuasive weight.” United States v. Cruz-Garcia, 344 F.3d 951, 956 (9th Cir. 2003); see United States v. Starnes, 583 F.3d 196, 215 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[U]nfair prejudice does not simply mean damage to the opponent’s cause.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Assuming the Court was using the term “prejudice” as shorthand for “unfair prejudice,” we are examining the kind of balancing decision to which we would ordinarily accord great deference. See United States v. 38 Kellogg, 510 F.3d 188, 197 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting that if “judicial self-restraint is ever desirable, it is when a Rule 403 analysis of a trial court is reviewed by an appellate tribunal” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). In general, a Rule 403 decision will not be reversed unless the “analysis [undertaken] and resulting conclusion” is “arbitrary or irrational.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, unfortunately, the District Court’s Rule 403 analysis was arbitrary, in that it was based on the same legally flawed credibility determination that led the Court to conclude that Pozo’s testimony was inadmissible without independent corroboration. Pozo, as the District Court saw it, “would be another witness, a drug dealer who is claiming at some point some conversation occurred.” (Joint App. at 25.) Assessing his proffered testimony in that light, the Court characterized it as having a “minimum degree [of persuasiveness] … with respect to intent.” (Id.) An assumption about how the jury would view Pozo’s credibility was, however, an improper basis for discounting his testimony’s probative value. See United States v. Welsh, 774 F.2d 670, 672 (4th Cir. 1986) (“[A]s a general rule, the credibility of a witness has nothing to do with whether or not his testimony is probative with respect to the fact which it seeks to prove.”); 22 Charles Alan Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and Procedure § 5214 (4th ed. 1996) (“[I]t seems relatively clear that in the weighing process under Rule 403 the judge cannot consider the credibility of witnesses.”). And that errant starting point likewise tainted the Court’s conclusion that the jury would be confused by Pozo’s testimony indicating that Bergrin told him to “take out” a cooperating witness. The 39 only possible confusion, if it can be called that, would arise from discrediting the source of the testimony. 23 Stripped of improper credibility assessments, Pozo’s proffered testimony is – as the District Court initially observed when saying it would be admissible – highly probative of Bergrin’s guilt, because the factual similarities between the Pozo Plot and the Kemo murder truly are “striking.” (Joint App. at 10.) Pozo was a drug dealer represented by Bergrin around the same time as the Kemo murder, and he was prepared to testify that Bergrin suggested that he kill a witness. Pozo’s testimony is, therefore, powerfully suggestive of Bergrin’s intent in passing Kemo’s identity on from Baskerville to Curry. It is likewise relevant to deciding whether Bergrin uttered the words “No Kemo, no case,” and, if he did, what he meant. 24 23 Nor was the testimony, as the District Court suggested, cumulative. After all, the Court itself recognized that the credibility of the primary witnesses against Bergrin on the Kemo Murder Counts is open to question. See supra note 19. Pozo’s testimony would therefore have added much “to the probative force of the other evidence in the case,” and “contribut[ed] to the determination of truth,” United States v. Williams, 81 F.3d 1434, 1443 (7th Cir. 1996), and so it cannot properly be said to be “cumulative,” United States v. Brown, 597 F.3d 399, 406 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (stating evidence should only be deemed “cumulative” when the “evidence on one side is so full that no jury that rejected it would be likely to change its mind because of the introduction of the proffered evidence” (citation omitted)). 24 The District Court itself recognized that intent was a key issue in the case in its colloquy excluding Pozo’s 40 In sum, we conclude that the District Court’s ruling excluding Pozo’s testimony cannot “be reconciled with a sound exercise of discretion,” United States v. Gatto, 924 F.2d 491, 501 (3d Cir. 1991), and, accordingly, must be vacated. 25 testimony under Rule 403. (See Joint App. at 20-21 (“[O]ne of the biggest contentions in this case is if the statement ‘No Kemo, no case’ was made, what exactly does that mean.”).) But Bergrin argues that his intent is not at issue with respect to the Kemo Murder Counts, because his primary defense is that he never attended the meeting in which he allegedly said “No Kemo, no case.” We disagree. Bergrin’s insistence that he did not say those words does not mean the jury will not have to consider them. It is for the jury to decide whether he said them. Moreover, as we have just noted, the question of Bergrin’s intent is not only relevant to determining what “No Kemo, no case” may mean, but also to ascertaining Bergrin’s purpose in telling Curry who the witness against Baskerville was. 25 Pozo’s proffered testimony was proper Rule 404(b) evidence, and, as we have made plain, our review of the record thus far reveals no sound basis upon which it should have been precluded from the government’s case on the Kemo Murder Counts under Rule 403. We nevertheless leave it to the new judge to whom this case will be assigned to conduct his or her own balancing under Rule 403 if the government again seeks to prove the Kemo Murder Counts using evidence of the Pozo Plot. With respect to the Esteves Plot, we agree with the government that the District Court observed an unwarranted 41 analytical distinction between a “prior bad act” and a “subsequent bad act,” reasoning that the latter “looks more like evidence that is being offered to show that the accused is a ‘bad guy,’ someone with the propensity to commit criminal acts.” (Joint App. at 60.) Rule 404(b) refers to evidence of crimes, wrongs, or other acts, saying nothing about whether the act in question is a “prior” or “subsequent” act. That makes sense because light can be shed on motive, intent, and the other issues listed in Rule 404(b)(2) as much by a subsequent course of behavior as it can by a prior one. Cf. Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 686 (referring to “similar acts evidence under Rule 404(b)” (emphasis added)). So although we once questioned, in dicta “[t]he logic of showing prior intent or knowledge by proof of subsequent activity,” United States v. Boyd, 595 F.2d 120, 126 (3d Cir. 1978), the District Court erred to the extent it dismissed the probative value of subsequent act evidence. See United States v. McGilberry, 620 F.3d 880, 886 (8th Cir. 2010) (“Rule 404(b) draw[s] no distinction between prior and subsequent acts that would support different analyses … .” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Rutkoske, 506 F.3d 170, 177 (2d Cir. 2007) (“The courts of appeals mostly agree that the admission of subsequent acts under Rule 404(b) is governed by the same four-part test as prior acts … .”); United States v. Mohr, 318 F.3d 613, 617 (4th Cir. 2003) (“Rule 404(b) … covers evidence of both prior and subsequent acts.”); United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1283 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he standard for evaluating the admissibility of a subsequent bad act under Rule 404(b) is identical to that for determining whether a prior bad act should be admitted under this Rule.”); United States v. Echeverri, 854 F.2d 638, 645 (3d Cir. 1988) (“We do not 42 dispute that there may be cases in which evidence of subsequent wrongful acts may properly be admitted under Rule 404(b)”); United States v. Alker, 260 F.2d 135, 157 (3d Cir. 1958) (stating that “prior and subsequent acts … substantially similar to the subject matter forming the basis of the indictment [that] are probative to negate the inference that the crucial conduct was … innocent”). Unlike the District Court’s ruling with respect to the Pozo Plot, however, the District Court’s decision to exclude evidence of the Esteves Plot was not clearly rooted in a flawed premise. Indeed, the Court spoke at length about its concerns regarding the nature of the Esteves Plot evidence, (see, e.g., Joint App. at 38 (explaining that if “there was a conviction, I would believe … that that conviction was the result of the Esteves evidence, because I don’t see how they could humanly put that out of their mind and the purposes of the cautionary instruction would be and then weigh the rest of this case accordingly”)), and we cannot glean whether or not its Rule 403 balancing was tainted by the mistaken distinction it drew between subsequent and prior acts. Thus, it is difficult to tell whether or not the Court’s judgment is entitled to the deference ordinarily accorded a Rule 403 decision. See Kellogg, 510 F.3d at 197 (stating the general maxim that “judicial self-restraint” is desirable “when a Rule 403 analysis of a trial court is reviewed” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). However, because we will be reassigning this case and directing the new district judge to determine afresh the admissibility of the Esteves Plot evidence, see infra Part II.C, we need not tackle the issue at this juncture. It suffices to say that, in considering that issue on remand, the judge should bear in mind that subsequent act evidence may be properly admitted under Rule 404(b), although Rule 403 43