Opinion ID: 2652135
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Kielpikowski Declaration

Text: Under Veterans Court Rule 35(e), a motion for reconsideration is required to “state the points of law or fact that the party believes the Court has overlooked or misunderstood.” Vet. App. R. 35(e)(1). Dixon argues that the Veterans Court misinterpreted this rule when it concluded that it barred him from introducing a declaration from his VA psychiatrist, Kielpikowski, supporting reconsideration of the decision denying his equitable tolling claim. DIXON v. SHINSEKI 11 According to Dixon, introduction of the Kielpikowski declaration comports with Rule 35(e) because it establishes that the Veterans Court “misunderstood” the letter Kielpikowski submitted when Dixon filed his initial motion seeking equitable tolling. Specifically, the declaration is intended to clarify that when Kielpikowski originally stated that Dixon’s “severe” psychiatric and physical disabilities rendered him “unable to attend [to] or focus on” the filing of his appeal, J.A. 137, he meant that those conditions “directly resulted in his inability to timely file a notice of appeal with [the Veterans] Court,” J.A. 179. The Veterans Court determined, however, that Dixon was precluded from introducing Kielpikowski’s declaration, reasoning that he had no right to “augment[] the record” when submitting his motion for reconsideration. 4 Order Denying an Extension of Time, slip op. at 1. In the court’s view, Rule 35(e) requires that a motion for reconsideration “be based on the record at the time of the decision upon which reconsideration or panel review is sought.” Id. We conclude that the Veterans Court erred to the extent that it concluded that Rule 35(e) imposes an absolute prohibition on the submission of clarifying evidence in support of reconsideration of an equitable tolling decision. 4 An attorney from the VA originally informed LeBoeuf that the VA’s Touhy regulations precluded Kielpikowski from submitting his declaration. Under certain circumstances, the Touhy regulations prevent VA employees from providing expert testimony. 38 C.F.R. § 14.801; see also Parson v. Chet Morrison Contrs., LLC, No. 12-0037, 2013 WL 5961099, at  (E.D. La. Nov. 7, 2013). Those regulations, however, are inapplicable where, as here, the VA “is a party” to the proceedings. 38 C.F.R. § 14.801(b)(2)(i). 12 DIXON v. SHINSEKI Such an interpretation is contrary to the court’s own precedent which recognizes that, under certain circumstances, introduction of clarifying evidence is necessary for “a full and fair consideration of [a veteran’s] equitable tolling request, including assessment of all relevant facts.” McCreary v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 86, 91 (2006); see also Leonard v. Shinseki, No. 12-1953, 2013 WL 1200783, at  (Vet. App. Mar. 26, 2013) (granting a veteran’s motion for reconsideration of a decision denying equitable tolling and allowing him “to submit information or evidence about the circumstances that prevented his timely filing” of a notice of appeal); Henderson v. Nicholson, No. 05-0090, 2006 WL 4029376, at  (Vet. App. Dec. 4, 2006), related proceeding at Henderson v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 217 (2008), aff’d sub nom. Henderson v. Shinseki, 589 F.3d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc), rev’d and remanded Henderson II, 131 S. Ct. 1197 (“Henderson I”) (granting a veteran’s motion for reconsideration and expressly allowing him “to submit additional evidence” supporting his equitable tolling claim); Ashley v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 307, 309 (1992) (permitting the government to submit additional evidence, in the form of a “belated” declaration from a VA employee, in support of its motion for reconsideration). As Dixon correctly notes, an interpretation of Rule 35(e) which imposes a blanket prohibition on the introduction of clarifying evidence serves to “punish some of the most vulnerable litigants in the Veterans Court—unrepresented veterans whose illnesses, often related to their military service,” prevent them from fully apprehending the prerequisites for establishing entitlement to equitable tolling of section 7266(a)’s filing deadline. In Henderson II, a unanimous Supreme Court rejected the view that the 120-day time limit for appealing to the Veterans Court posed an inflexible jurisdictional barrier. 131 S. Ct. at 1205-06. Although the Court noted that “the time for taking an appeal from a district court to a court DIXON v. SHINSEKI 13 of appeals in a civil case has long been understood to be jurisdictional,” id. at 1205, it explained that “[t]he contrast between ordinary civil litigation . . . and the system that Congress created for the adjudication of veterans’ benefits claims could hardly be more dramatic,” id. at 1205-06. The Court stated that “[t]he solicitude of Congress for veterans is of long standing. And that solicitude is plainly reflected in the [Veterans’ Judicial Review Act], as well as in subsequent laws that place a thumb on the scale in the veteran’s favor in the course of administrative and judicial review of VA decisions.” Id. at 1205 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In the Court’s view, “[r]igid jurisdictional treatment of the 120-day period for filing a notice of appeal in the Veterans Court would clash sharply with” the unequivocally pro-claimant scheme created by Congress for reviewing veterans’ disability claims. Id. at 1206. A rigid prohibition precluding a veteran from presenting clarifying evidence on his entitlement to equitable tolling would likewise “clash sharply” with the proclaimant veterans’ adjudicatory system. A mechanistic bar on the introduction of clarifying evidence on motion for reconsideration of an equitable tolling decision imposes an exacting and unreasonable standard, one that has no place in an adjudicatory system intended to be “unusually protective of claimants,” id. at 1204 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). See Sneed v. Shinseki, 737 F.3d 719, 726-28 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (emphasizing that the equitable tolling doctrine should not be applied in a narrow and inflexible manner); see also Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396 (1946) (“Equity eschews mechanical rules; it depends on flexibility.”). Many veterans seeking equitable tolling suffer from very significant psychiatric and physical disabilities. See, e.g., Henderson II, 131 S. Ct. at 1201 (veteran suffered from paranoid schizophrenia); Barrett v. Principi, 363 F.3d 1316, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Barrett I”) (veteran 14 DIXON v. SHINSEKI suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder and experienced flashbacks and hallucinations). These veterans, moreover, are often unrepresented when they file motions seeking equitable tolling and therefore may have difficulty fully apprehending the prerequisites required to satisfy the Veterans Court’s three-part equitable tolling standard. 5 See Forshey v. Principi, 284 F.3d 1335, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc) (emphasizing that an unrepresented veteran “should not be punished for his failure to recognize subtle factual or legal deficiencies in his claims” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). To impose a harsh and inflexible prohibition against the introduction of clarifying evidence on motion for reconsideration would “be both ironic and inhumane,” Barrett I, 363 F.3d at 1320, because the very conditions for which a veteran seeks equitable tolling will not infrequently be the same conditions which prevent him from adequately articulating the factual and legal bases of his equitable tolling claim. See Canales v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 755, 758 (2d Cir. 1991) (considering a supplemental affidavit in support of a claimant’s motion for relief from judgment on a decision denying equitable tolling of the deadline for appealing the denial of a Social Security disability claim and explaining that “the very disability that forms all or part of the basis for which the claimant seeks benefits may deprive her of the ability to understand or act upon 5 The Veterans Court has adopted a three-part test to determine whether equitable tolling based on extraordinary circumstances is warranted: “First, the extraordinary circumstance must be beyond the [veteran’s] control. Second, the [veteran] must demonstrate that the untimely filing was a direct result of the extraordinary circumstances. Third, the [veteran] must exercise ‘due diligence’ in preserving his . . . appellate rights.” Checo v. Shinseki, 26 Vet. App. 130, 133 (2013) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). DIXON v. SHINSEKI 15 notice of available administrative procedures” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Nunnally v. MacCausland, 996 F.2d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (emphasizing that equitable tolling provisions should not be applied in a manner that is contrary to the “substantive purposes” of a remedial statutory scheme). Significantly, the Veterans Court’s resolution of equitable tolling claims differs markedly—in form and substance—from its resolution of other disability claim issues. As an appellate tribunal, the court generally does not engage in fact-finding, but instead reviews the board’s factual determinations for clear error. See 38 U.S.C. § 7261; Washington v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 362, 366 (2005) (“The Board’s determination of service connection is a question of fact that the Court reviews under the ‘clearly erroneous’ standard of review.”). In the equitable tolling context, however, the Veterans Court must “independently weigh the facts” and determine, on a case-bycase basis, whether a veteran has established that a mental or physical disability, or other circumstance beyond his control, prevented him from filing a timely notice of appeal. Bove, 25 Vet. App. at 143. Because the period relevant to the equitable tolling inquiry occurs after the board has rendered a final decision denying a veteran’s disability claim, the Veterans Court must frequently “seek facts outside the record before the Board” in evaluating whether equitable tolling is warranted. Id. Given that the Veterans Court must make equitable tolling determinations without the benefit of a fully developed record from the board—and must frequently make such determinations based on the submissions from unrepresented veterans who suffer from significant psychiatric and physical disabilities—an initial decision denying equitable tolling may be grounded on an incomplete or inaccurate understanding of the extent to which a veteran’s disability precluded him from filing a timely notice of appeal. As McCreary recognizes, the language 16 DIXON v. SHINSEKI used in the submissions of unrepresented veterans can sometimes be “inartful” and fail to adequately describe the circumstances which prevented the timely filing of a notice of appeal. 20 Vet. App. at 91. Accordingly, in certain circumstances, the introduction of clarifying evidence on motion for reconsideration may be necessary to permit the court to fully evaluate the factual predicate of a veteran’s equitable tolling claim. See Barrett II, 466 F.3d at 1046 (emphasizing that a veteran is due a “full and fair hearing” on his entitlement to equitable tolling). This court is precluded from reviewing factual determinations bearing on a veteran’s equitable tolling claim. Leonard v. Gober, 223 F.3d 1374, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Accordingly, a motion for reconsideration filed with the Veterans Court generally provides a veteran with his “one shot” to challenge the factual determinations underlying an equitable tolling decision and to identify the “points of . . . fact that [he] believes the Court has overlooked or misunderstood.” Vet. App. R. 35(e)(1). Imposing an absolute prohibition on the introduction of clarifying evidence in situations in which such evidence is necessary to establish that the Veterans Court “misunderstood” the facts surrounding the untimely filing of an appeal could therefore deprive a veteran of any meaningful opportunity to correct any factual errors in an equitable tolling decision.