Opinion ID: 2371447
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Controlling Precedent

Text: Elgar's theory of the case is that the provision became operative under these facts because her assailants were the de facto drivers of the taxi. The plaintiff reasons that although she was the one physically driving the car, she was doing so at the direction of her passengers, effectively rendering them the taxi's operators. We will assume for the purposes of our review that neither of these two assailants was insured to operate the taxi. According to plaintiff, when she was assaulted by these two individuals, they were effectively operating and controlling an uninsured motor vehicle, and she is entitled to insurance payment for the injuries she suffered during that accident. This Court has ruled on the scope and application of uninsured motorist insurance provisions three times. The first in time is General Accident Insurance Company of America v. Olivier, 574 A.2d 1240 (R.I.1990), in which a passenger in a vehicle that was involved in a collision with an uninsured vehicle was shot and killed by the driver of the uninsured vehicle after an officer at the scene directed her to stand near a parked police cruiser. The Superior Court entered a declaratory judgment in favor of the insurance company on the grounds that the passenger was not an occupant of the motor vehicle at the time she was shot. We reversed on appeal because the decedent was a passenger of an insured motor vehicle at the time the collision with the uninsured vehicle occurred, and it was her status as a passenger that had her standing in the path of that fatal bullet. Id. at 1242. We further held that because the shooting was, from her perspective, an unforeseen and unfortunate incident, her death was caused by an accident within the meaning of the policy. Id. Finally, we determined that the question of whether decedent's death arose out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the uninsured vehicle turned on whether there was a substantial nexus between the injury and the uninsured vehicle, not whether the vehicle itself was the instrumentality of those injuries. Id. We noted that uninsured motorist provisions should be construed liberally because their function is to extend coverage broadly. Id. (citing Valdes v. Smalley, 303 So.2d 342 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1974)). In Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tavarez, 754 A.2d 778 (R.I.2000), a seventeen-year-old boy in an insured motor vehicle was shot and killed by assailants operating an uninsured motor vehicle. We affirmed a Superior Court ruling that the decedent's estate was entitled to the benefits of his policy's uninsured motorist provision. The decedent's death directly resulted from his assailant's use of an uninsured motor vehicle as the platform from which the decedent was shot. Id. at 780. The operation of the vehicle created a nexus between the uninsured motor vehicle and the fatal injury to the decedent. Id. at 780-81. Conversely, in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Steele, 747 A.2d 1013 (R.I. 2000) (mem.), the insured complainant (Steele) was sitting in her car when a masked gunman approached her vehicle on foot and violently assaulted her. After assaulting her, the gunman threw Steele to the ground and drove away in her car. Steele sought to recover under the uninsured motorist provision of her policy, and the Superior Court entered summary judgment on her behalf. We reversed, holding that Steele failed to present evidence of any nexus between her injuries and the operation of an uninsured vehicle. Id. at 1014. In so doing, we cautioned that there are reasonable limitations on the construction of G.L.1956 § 27-7-2.1 [2] and uninsured motorist provisions issued thereunder in order to protect insurers from groundless claims. Steele, 747 A.2d at 1014. Such limitations include the requirement that an insured present credible evidence that his or her injury was caused by the owner or operator of an uninsured    vehicle before a recovery of benefits will be allowed. Ladouceur v. Hanover Insurance Co., 682 A.2d 467, 470 (R.I.1996) (per curiam). We agree with the Superior Court that Steele controls in this case, and that National is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Olivier, Tavarez, and Steele all hold that there must be a nexus between the occupant or operation of an uninsured motor vehicle and the insured party to recover under an uninsured motorist provision in his or her policy. As the trial justice correctly perceived, no such nexus exists here because, simply put, there is no uninsured motor vehicle involved in this tragedy. Elgar's assailants were passengers in the car she was driving. They were not physically operating the taxi or any other vehicle, and did not become the de facto operators of her vehicle merely because they were directing her to a specific location. As was the case in Steele, in which coverage was denied, there was only one vehicle involved  the insured's. An insurance policy is a contract with terms that must be construed in accordance with their plain and ordinary meaning. See Employers Mutual Casualty Co. v. Pires, 723 A.2d 295, 298 (R.I. 1999) (per curiam). A condition precedent to recovery under the uninsured motorist provision is that the insured must be entitled to recover damages from the owner or driver of an `uninsured motor vehicle.' Accordingly, the plain and ordinary meaning of the terms further erodes plaintiffs argument. Black's Law Dictionary 495 (6th ed.1990) defines a driver as a person actually doing driving, whether employed by owner to drive or driving his own vehicle. This definition clearly describes Elgar's role in the taxi. A passenger is a person who gives compensation to another for transportation.    [O]ne who is being carried by another for hire, on other occasions, the word is interpreted as meaning any occupant of a vehicle other than the person operating it. Id. at 1123. This definition perfectly describes Elgar's assailants that evening and destroys any pretension that they should be considered the drivers of the taxi for purposes of recovery under the uninsured motorist provision. [3] The Intermediate Court of Appeals of Hawaii has passed on a situation similar to the one presented here. In So v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 81 Hawaii. 110, 912 P.2d 607-08 (Ct. App.1996), the plaintiff was a taxi driver who was stabbed by her passenger and who attempted to recover under the uninsured motorist provision of her employer's insurance policy. The defendant, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, filed a summary judgment motion arguing that the uninsured motorist benefits did not apply because an uninsured vehicle was not involved in the injuries suffered by [p]laintiff. Id. at 608. Based on policy language practically identical to the insurance provision at issue here, the Court held that: The policy clearly contemplates that any harm suffered by the insured `results' from an uninsured motor vehicle. Plaintiff was stabbed by his passenger Lowrie. The only vehicle involved when Plaintiff was injured was his taxi, which is covered by his policy and does not qualify as an uninsured motor vehicle. Therefore, Plaintiff is not entitled to uninsured motorist benefits under his business auto insurance policy. Id. at 608-09. Likewise, Elgar's taxi was the only vehicle involved in this incident. The plaintiffs argument is premised on a logical inconsistency: she is asserting that the car she was driving was insured by National and that she may recover under that policy. At the same time, she is asserting that the taxi was an uninsured motor vehicle within the meaning of that policy at the time she was attacked. Our policy of according broad construction to uninsured motorist provisions notwithstanding, one vehicle cannot simultaneously be insured and uninsured for purposes of recovery under the uninsured motorist provision of the insurance contract.