Opinion ID: 723924
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Shifting Burdens of Proof

Text: 20 The disposition of employment discrimination actions is governed by standards of proof set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798, 802-05, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1822, 1824-26, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), which are intended progressively to sharpen the inquiry into the elusive factual question of intentional discrimination, Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n. 8, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094-95 n. 8, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). The aggrieved employee bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824. This burden is light. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. at 1093-94. Where the alleged discrimination arises from an employer's refusal to hire the plaintiff, for example, a prima facie case may rest upon proof that the plaintiff (1) is a member of a protected class, (2) applied for the subject position and was qualified to hold it, (3) was rejected, and (4) the position thereafter remained open and defendant continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824. As discussed in greater detail below in Part II B., this final requirement can be satisfied in different ways. Id. at 802 n. 13, 93 S.Ct. at 1824 n. 13. 21 If the plaintiff successfully proves a prima facie case, a presumption of unlawful discrimination arises. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254, 101 S.Ct. at 1094; see also St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 508-520, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2747-54, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). The burden of production then shifts to the employer, which must articulate a legitimate reason for the challenged employment decision, see Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254, 101 S.Ct. at 1094; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824, and, if it does so, plaintiff must be allowed to show that the proffered reason was pretextual, and that the real reason was discriminatory. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 515, 113 S.Ct. at 2751-52. The factfinder must decide whether plaintiff carried her ultimate burden of persuasion with respect to whether the defendant intentionally discriminated against her based on the unlawful criterion. Id. at 511, 113 S.Ct. at 2749. These shifting burdens of proof apply in this case involving alleged discrimination on account of gender. 22 Connecticut General argues that plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case because she was not discharged and because she did not show that her position remained open following her alleged termination and that defendant continued to seek other applicants. Defendant also declares that plaintiff was unable to demonstrate that its proffered nondiscriminatory reason--deficient performance--was pretextual. II Gender Discrimination--Prima Facie Case A. Discharge From Employment 23 One of the elements of a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge, as one might expect, is that the employee was discharged. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (unlawful employment practice to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual ... because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin). This element may be satisfied by a showing of an actual or a constructive discharge. See Lopez v. S.B. Thomas, Inc., 831 F.2d 1184, 1188 (2d Cir.1987); Pena v. Brattleboro Retreat, 702 F.2d 322, 325 (2d Cir.1983).1. Whether Actual Discharge Issue is Reviewable 24 An actual discharge, in the context of Title VII as in other contexts, occurs when the employer uses language or engages in conduct that would logically lead a prudent person to believe his tenure has been terminated. NLRB v. Trumbull Asphalt Co., 327 F.2d 841, 843 (8th Cir.1964) (Blackmun, J.); see also NLRB v. Hale Mfg. Co., 570 F.2d 705, 708 (8th Cir.1978) (whether an employee has been discharged depends on the reasonable inference an employee could draw from what her employer said); NLRB v. Ridgeway Trucking Co., 622 F.2d 1222, 1224 (5th Cir.1980) (same); NLRB v. Hilton Mobile Homes, 387 F.2d 7, 9 (8th Cir.1967) (same); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 592 F.2d 595, 604 (1st Cir.1979) (Hale test generally accepted). Inquiry focuses on the reasonable perceptions of the employee, not on whether formal words of firing were in fact spoken. See Ridgeway Trucking, 622 F.2d at 1224; Trumbull Asphalt, 327 F.2d at 843. 25 Connecticut General maintains Chertkova waived the actual discharge argument by failing to present it to the district court. Concededly, plaintiff's filed papers did not clearly present the issue. Plaintiff did, however, draw the trial court's attention to evidence relevant to that issue. She pointed out that the evidence showed that the defendant engaged in a continuing course of conduct of taking adverse employment actions against her, beginning with negative performance evaluations, continuing with pre-probation and probation status, and ending in defendant's announced intention to terminate her employment. 26 Setting forth these facts should have sufficiently alerted the district court that the possibility of an actual discharge might have precluded summary judgment. Although we ordinarily will not review an issue the district court did not decide, whether we do so or not is a matter within our discretion. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120-21, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 2877-78, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976). We think this case an appropriate one for exercising discretion to entertain the actual discharge argument. Based upon the materials presented in the parties' motion papers, the purely legal question of whether summary judgment was warranted with respect to the required showing of a discharge may be properly evaluated. See Bornholdt v. Brady, 869 F.2d 57, 68 (2d Cir.1989) (entertaining argument where district court's attention was directed to the facts pertinent to the argument and only legal questions were at issue); Rebaldo v. Cuomo, 749 F.2d 133, 137 (2d Cir.1984) (circumstances make it appropriate to entertain argument on appeal not raised below), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1008, 105 S.Ct. 2702, 86 L.Ed.2d 718 (1985). 2. Merits of Actual Discharge Issue 27 We decide now whether there exists a genuine factual question respecting actual discharge, an issue both parties argue on appeal. Plaintiff insists she was discharged when defendant made a final termination decision set forth in a letter to her dated March 6, 1992. She further declares that even if defendant did not officially discharge her, she was not welcome to return and did not return to her job. She maintains it is irrelevant that defendant continued to pay her disability benefits after she stopped going to work. Finally, she argues that defendant's letter dated August 16, 1994--prepared after this litigation commenced, and which she did receive--effected a discharge. 28 Although the March 6, 1992 letter clearly did not terminate Chertkova's employment when first prepared because it was not delivered to plaintiff, a reasonable jury might find an actual discharge occurred then. First, defendant does not adequately counter plaintiff's evidence suggesting that defendant led her to believe she was not welcome to return. Chertkova states that defendant ignored a claim for disability benefits made six months after she stopped coming to work, and that one of defendant's employees called her at home and asked her insulting questions relating to her symptoms, but was uninterested in discussing plaintiff's working environment. Further, during this period Connecticut General turned aside plaintiff's efforts to reestablish communication with it. 29 These facts, along with the events preceding plaintiff's decision to leave--for example, the 1991 coaching sessions where O'Neil told her You are not going to be here! and Quirk's surreptitious solicitation of negative feedback in March 1992--lead us to conclude that a reasonable person in Chertkova's shoes might have thought she was in fact discharged after March 6, 1992, despite the fact that she had not received her official letter of termination. Defendant relies on proof indicating that plaintiff, after March 6, took advantage of benefits and programs available only to employees. But such evidence does not dispose of the issue of actual discharge. Assuming it is relevant to plaintiff's reasonable perceptions of defendant's actions and words, it simply suggests the issue is disputed. Moreover, the termination letter of August 16, 1994--although delivered after the litigation began--would clearly have effected a termination if the employment relationship had indeed lasted that long, a question that must be resolved by the factfinder. 30 The foregoing discussion makes clear that material issues of fact remain genuinely disputed. As such, to grant summary judgment would require a court to decide a disputed fact--something beyond its compass at this stage of the litigation. See Gallo, 22 F.3d at 1224. Thus, the question of whether Chertkova was actually discharged is not susceptible on this record to resolution by summary judgment. 3. Constructive Discharge 31 For similar reasons, we think summary judgment inappropriate with respect to the issue of constructive discharge. Constructive discharge of an employee occurs when an employer, rather than directly discharging an individual, intentionally creates an intolerable work atmosphere that forces an employee to quit involuntarily. See Pena, 702 F.2d at 325. Working conditions are intolerable if they are so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in the employee's shoes would have felt compelled to resign. Lopez, 831 F.2d at 1188 (quoting Alicea Rosado v. Garcia Santiago, 562 F.2d 114, 119 (1st Cir.1977)). 32 In the present case, Chertkova presented evidence sufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment on the question of constructive discharge. That proof reveals plaintiff's working conditions were made intolerable by O'Neil, her supervisor, and by his boss, Craig May. O'Neil yelled at her in insulting terms during the coaching sessions purportedly aimed at improving her communication skills, telling her, What do you hope for? Do you think you are going to outlive us? There is no chance! You are not going to be here! He also told plaintiff she was too expensive, and mocked her when she attempted to explain she was at the bottom of the pay range for her position. 33 In addition, plaintiff's proof allows the inference that she was treated arbitrarily and severely criticized despite her strong performance. A factfinder could infer, from the facts set forth in the affidavits and deposition testimony, that plaintiff was among the most competent employees in the Operations Engineering department and that although her interpersonal skills once left something to be desired, they had improved and were perfectly adequate. Further, although she had successfully completed probation, she was told she would be fired immediately if, over the course of two years, she did not maintain satisfactory performance levels, demonstrate satisfactory behavior, and improve her listening skills, which might be viewed as using her undoubted technical competence at work so long as she only listened and never spoke. 34 We recognize that a disagreement with management over the quality of an employee's performance will not suffice to establish a constructive discharge. See, e.g., Stetson v. NYNEX Serv. Co., 995 F.2d 355, 360 (2d Cir.1993). But here there is more than a disagreement over quality. Plaintiff's evidence suggests her supervisor engaged in a pattern of baseless criticisms, said she would not be around, and that she would be fired instantly if she did not meet certain ambiguous behavior objectives. In Lopez, we held that telling plaintiff he would be fired following probation, no matter what he did to improve his allegedly deficient performance, was sufficient alone to support a finding of constructive discharge. See 831 F.2d at 1188. Similarly, a reasonable person in Chertkova's position might have inferred from the circumstances, including the onslaught of unfounded criticism coupled with the threat of immediate termination, that she was compelled to leave. 35 An inference that the conditions were intolerable is further bolstered by the fact that plaintiff's former supervisor, Patricia Endweiss, was terminated for reasons similar to those that allegedly formed the basis for O'Neil's disapproval of plaintiff. Moreover, the timing of Chertkova's nervous breakdown--although the cause is disputed--suggests a connection between plaintiff's work conditions and her decision to leave. Although the factfinder ultimately may or may not decide that Chertkova reacted reasonably, a finding of constructive discharge would be supported by the fact that plaintiff had a breakdown on the day before her discharge letter was to be delivered. 36 The evidence, in addition, would also allow a factfinder to conclude that May and O'Neil deliberately created unbearable working conditions for the purpose of forcing Chertkova out of the company. One former employee--Melanie Konicki--stated in an affidavit that creating intolerable conditions to force unwanted employees to quit was a recognized practice of defendant's managers. Connecticut General dismisses this evidence as irrelevant because Konicki had no personal knowledge of how plaintiff was treated, but her statement lends support to plaintiff's theory that her supervisors--who were defendant's managers--engaged in such tactics. She was told nearly a year before the March 1992 termination letter that she would not survive there. Were the communication skills problems and other alleged performance deficiencies indeed concocted by May and O'Neil--a permissible inference based upon the evidence described above--a factfinder might further find that plaintiff's managers actively sought to compel her to resign. 37 The district court ruled that plaintiff's proffered proof of the following work conditions was insufficient to establish a constructive discharge: (1) her disagreement with her managers' evaluation of her work performance; (2) cold treatment by her supervisors; (3) managers' failure to give her a performance award; and (4) that she was overworked. We think this summary of the evidence understates the severity of the conditions to which plaintiff claims she was subjected. Chertkova presented evidence indicating not only that she was treated coldly and arbitrarily, but also (among other things) that her supervisor yelled at her, told her she would not survive, and held over her like a sword of Damocles a threat of immediate termination. 38 It is true that if only one of the work conditions enumerated by the district court were present, it might not be enough to demonstrate constructive discharge. Certain factors, standing alone, are legally insufficient to support constructive discharge. See, e.g., Stetson, 995 F.2d at 360 (dissatisfaction with assignments; employee's perception of undue criticism or excessive monitoring; difficult or unpleasant conditions); Pena, 702 F.2d at 325 (disagreement with work plan). But the effect of a number of adverse conditions in the workplace is cumulative. A constructive discharge occurs if a reasonable person subjected to the same conditions as the plaintiff would have felt compelled to step down. Because a reasonable person encounters life's circumstances cumulatively and not individually, it was error to treat the various conditions as separate and distinct rather than additive. Viewed as a whole, the facts in the case at hand, if proven, would permit a finder of fact to conclude that Chertkova was forced to resign. 39 For all these reasons, and in view of our prior decisions holding that the plaintiff's burden of establishing a prima facie case in a discrimination suit is de minimis, see, e.g., Chambers, 43 F.3d at 37, the district court's grant of summary judgment on the issue of constructive discharge may not stand. B. No Requirement to Find Other Applicants 40 We turn next to defendant's contention that the plaintiff must show that the defendant kept the position open after Chertkova's termination and continued to seek other applicants. Because it contradicts established precedent, we decline to adopt this proposition. As noted earlier, in presenting a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge the plaintiff must present proof that her discharge occurred in circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination on the basis of her membership in that class. Chambers, 43 F.3d at 37; see also Woroski v. Nashua Corp., 31 F.3d 105, 108 (2d Cir.1994); Stetson, 995 F.2d at 359. This fourth element of the prima facie case may be satisfied in a variety of ways. 41 The circumstances that give rise to an inference of discriminatory motive include actions or remarks made by decisionmakers that could be viewed as reflecting a discriminatory animus, see Ostrowski v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Cos., 968 F.2d 171, 182 (2d Cir.1992), preferential treatment given to employees outside the protected class, see Washington v. Garrett, 10 F.3d 1421, 1434 (9th Cir.1993), and, in a corporate downsizing, the systematic transfer of a discharged employee's duties to other employees, Gallo, 22 F.3d at 1225, or a pattern of recommending the plaintiff for positions for which he or she is not qualified and failure to surface plaintiff's name for positions for which he or she is well-qualified, Cronin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 46 F.3d 196, 205 (2d Cir.1995). A plaintiff might also rely upon the fact that the defendant, following plaintiff's termination, continued to seek applicants to fill the position, Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 996 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 829, 106 S.Ct. 91, 88 L.Ed.2d 74 (1985), or, more generally, upon the timing or sequence of events leading to the plaintiff's termination, Chambers, 43 F.3d at 37. 42 As the cited cases make clear, there is no unbending or rigid rule about what circumstances allow an inference of discrimination when there is an adverse employment decision. Although the Supreme Court held in McDonnell Douglas that a prima facie case may include evidence that the position remained open and the defendant continued to seek applicants, it also noted that [t]he facts necessarily will vary in Title VII cases, and the specification [in that case] of the prima facie proof required from respondent is not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situations. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n. 13, 93 S.Ct. at 1824 n. 13. Hence, contrary to defendant's assertion, the fourth element set forth in McDonnell Douglas is a flexible one that can be satisfied differently in differing factual scenarios. 43 Defendant avers that Meiri establishes that the viability of a discriminatory discharge claim depends upon evidence that the plaintiff's position remained open and that the employer continued to seek other applicants. But Meiri, a case in which the plaintiff claimed she had been terminated because of her religious beliefs, does not support such a rule. The district court had rejected a Title VII claim because the plaintiff had not been replaced by someone outside the protected class. Meiri, 759 F.2d at 994. Noting that such a requirement was too mechanistic and conflicted with the policies underlying Title VII, we held the appropriate inquiry should have been whether the employer continued to seek applicants to fill the position. Id. at 996. As we made clear, however, this inquiry was appropriate only because although the employer sought a replacement, the position was eliminated before a replacement could be hired. Such circumstances were sufficient to support an inference of discrimination, and [t]he fact that the position was ultimately eliminated did not sound a death knell to Meiri's Title VII claim. Id. 44 In addition, as Meiri stated, [t]he elements of proof in employment discrimination cases ... were intended only to promote the general principle that a Title VII plaintiff must carry the initial burden of offering evidence adequate to 'raise[ ] an inference of discrimination.'  Id. (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2949-50, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978)) (alteration in Meiri ). Thus, it was error ritualistically to require Chertkova to present evidence that her position remained open and that the employer continued to seek other qualified applicants. 45