Opinion ID: 1206069
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: issues raised by defendant shoffner

Text: In his first assignment of error, defendant Shoffner also argues that the trial court erred by granting the State's motion for joinder and by denying his motions for severance made prior to trial and during trial. Specifically, defendant Shoffner argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motions to sever because his defense and the defense of defendant Workman were in direct conflict and, therefore, antagonistic. In State v. Pickens, 335 N.C. 717, 440 S.E.2d 552 (1994), we stated: The existence of antagonistic defenses will not, standing alone, warrant a severance. State v. Lowery, 318 N.C. 54, 59, 347 S.E.2d 729, 734 (1986). On the other hand, the fact that the evidence may be substantial against a defendant will not preclude severance where joinder denies a defendant a fair trial. The test is whether the conflict in defendants' respective positions at trial is of such a nature that, considering all of the other evidence in the case, defendants were denied a fair trial. Lowery, 318 N.C. at 59, 347 S.E.2d at 734, quoting Nelson, 298 N.C. at 587, 260 S.E.2d at 640. Pickens, 335 N.C. at 725, 440 S.E.2d at 556 (citations omitted). Based upon our review of the transcript, we cannot agree with defendants' characterization of their defenses as antagonistic. Defendant Workman's defense at trial was twofold. First, he argued he was not criminally responsible for premeditated and deliberated murder because he suffered from ADD, aggravated by alcohol use, which rendered his actions involuntary. Workman contended that a robbery/murder script, that when places get robbed, witnesses have to be killed, had been implanted in his mind and that when he heard two screams inside Carlton's Grocery, the combination of his ADD and the robbery/murder script caused him to panic; his actions became automatic and he killed Mr. Drake. Defendant Workman did not deny that he also killed Mrs. Drake, although he presented evidence that he had no memory of the events regarding her murder. Alternatively, defendant Workman contended that even if he was in control of his actions on the night of the murder, his ADD rendered him completely incapable of premeditation and deliberation. Defendant Shoffner's defense, on the other hand, was simply that defendant Workman took him completely by surprise when Workman killed Mr. and Mrs. Drake. Neither defendant pointed a finger toward the other and claimed the other was the actual killer. Rather, both defendants quite harmoniously agreed that defendant Workman's hand held the knife used to kill the victims. Under these circumstances, we conclude that these defenses are wholly different, not irreconcilable and not antagonistic. Cf. Pickens, 335 N.C. at 728, 440 S.E.2d at 558-59 (error to deny defendant's motion to sever where each defendant presented antagonistic evidence that the other defendant, or some other third party, was the actual shooter). Defendant Shoffner further argues he suffered prejudicial error from the consolidation of his trial with defendant Workman's trial. First, defendant Shoffner contends that the testimony of Janet Terry was inadmissible under Bruton, which prohibits the admission of incriminating statements made by nontestifying codefendants. The holding of Bruton is based on the right of a litigant to confront the witnesses against him. Consequently, if testimony is admitted under the hearsay rule, or as an exception to it, there is no right of confrontation[,] and Bruton does not prohibit the use of such testimony. State v. Willis, 332 N.C. 151, 167, 420 S.E.2d 158, 165 (1992). While Bruton involved the in-custody confession of a nontestifying codefendant, we have applied its holding to the extrajudicial admissions, or statements, of a nontestifying codefendant. See, e.g., State v. Spaulding, 288 N.C. 397, 219 S.E.2d 178 (1975), death sentence vacated, 428 U.S. 904, 96 S.Ct. 3210, 49 L.Ed.2d 1210 (1976); State v. Jones, 280 N.C. 322, 185 S.E.2d 858 (1972). Janet Terry testified at trial that she overheard defendant Shoffner say that he and defendant Workman were going up the road to get some money. Terry, who could not identify at trial which defendant was speaking, next heard one defendant say, Who do you know up the road that has some money? The other defendant replied, I don't know anybody. I guess we'll just have to rob somebody. We conclude this testimony was properly admitted under recognized exceptions to the general prohibition against the admission of hearsay testimony, and thus, no violation of Bruton occurred in this instance. If defendant Shoffner was the defendant who said, I guess we'll just have to rob somebody, this statement was properly admitted, as it is a statement of a party opponent and admissible under Rule 801(d) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence, which provides for the admission of a statement if it is offered against a party and it is ... his own statement. N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 801(d) (1992). Further, if defendant Shoffner was the one who asked, Who do you know up the road that has some money? then his acquiescence in defendant Workman's response that he guessed they would have to rob someone was an implied admission and properly admitted under Rule of Evidence 801(d)(B). See id. ; State v. Hardy, 293 N.C. 105, 235 S.E.2d 828 (1977) (a statement made in a person's presence under such circumstances that the person would naturally be expected to deny the statement if it is untrue is admissible as an implied admission and is not barred by Bruton ). Terry's testimony concerning the conversation she overheard between defendants was properly admitted at trial, as the statements, though hearsay, fell under well-recognized exceptions to the rule barring hearsay. Because no right to confrontation exists when testimony is admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule, the holding of Bruton was not violated. Defendant Shoffner further contends under this assignment of error that defendant Workman's cross-examination of Detective Pitts concerning Janet Terry's trial testimony was improperly admitted. During the police investigation of the Drakes' murders, Detective Pitts interviewed Terry about the conversation she overheard between defendants. In this interview, Terry identified defendant Shoffner as the defendant who said, I guess we'll just have to rob somebody. At trial, however, Terry testified she could not remember which defendant made this statement. Inconsistent prior statements are admissible for the purpose of shedding light on a witness's credibility, State v. Whitley, 311 N.C. 656, 663, 319 S.E.2d 584, 589 (1984), and when the prior statement relates to material facts in the witness's testimony, extrinsic evidence may be used to prove the prior inconsistent statement, id. We have defined material facts as those facts relating to matters pertinent and material to the pending inquiry. Id. In the present case, the cross-examination of Detective Pitts demonstrating Terry's prior inconsistent statement was proper extrinsic evidence of a material fact. This information was a vital portion of the State's case against both defendants, as it demonstrated that defendants had discussed a robbery shortly before the murders at Carlton's Grocery. As such, it constitutes a material fact within the context of this particular trial. We conclude that the cross-examination on this point was properly admitted, without violating Bruton, as it showed a prior inconsistent statement made by Terry. Defendant Shoffner next argues that certain out-of-court statements made by defendant Workman were improperly admitted through the testimony of defendant Workman's expert witness, Dr. Wood, and that these statements incriminated defendant Shoffner in violation of Bruton. Specifically, defendant Shoffner contends that Dr. Wood should not have been allowed to testify that after hearing two screams, defendant Workman allegedly panicked and committed the murders. By this testimony, defendant Shoffner asserts defendant Workman was allowed to state through his surrogate, Dr. Wood, that [defendant] Shoffner planned the Carlton's robbery and physically assaulted Mrs. Drake. We disagree that the testimony given by Dr. Wood was sufficiently specific to actually implicate defendant Shoffner. Dr. Wood's testimony did not identify defendant Shoffner, or any other person, as having screamed. Further, we disagree that the plain inference from the screams was that defendant Shoffner had attacked Mrs. Drake at the front of the store. Defendant Shoffner himself testified that he and Mrs. Drake screamed, but that they screamed after, and because, defendant Workman had attacked Mr. Drake with the fish fillet knife. By this testimony, it is apparent that defendant Shoffner had no objection at trial to the jury hearing evidence that defendant Shoffner was in fact one of the people who screamed inside Carlton's Grocery. We further note that defendant Shoffner declined, once after Dr. Wood's direct examination and again after his redirect examination, to question Dr. Wood concerning any aspect of the testimony he gave in front of the jury. Based upon the circumstances as developed at trial, we conclude Bruton was not violated by the admission of Dr. Wood's testimony in this regard. Defendant Shoffner further proposes that he was improperly tainted by evidence received under Rule of Evidence 404(b), which evidence defendant Shoffner contends was admissible only as to defendant Workman. At trial, the State called Diana Stewart, assistant manager of Hampton's Grocery. Stewart testified that defendants were inside the store playing pinball the afternoon of the murder. Stewart went outside to sweep and saw defendant Workman walk straight to my pocketbook and he was sticking his hand inside my pocketbook. Stewart opened the door to come back inside, and when the bell on the door sounded, defendant Workman pulled his hand out of Stewart's pocketbook. During cross-examination of Stewart, defendant Shoffner elicited testimony from her that he was not near defendant Workman when Workman put his hand in Stewart's pocketbook. In light of this cross-examination, even assuming the admission of this testimony as to defendant Shoffner was prejudicial, we nevertheless conclude there is no reasonable possibility that had the testimony not been received, a different result would have been reached at trial. N.C.G.S. § 15A-1443(a) (1988). Finally, defendant Shoffner argues he should not have been placed on trial for his life pursuant to Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982), in that forcing him to trial before a death-qualified jury, when the evidence against him was both quantitatively and qualitatively different from his codefendant who was the undisputed murderer, unfairly increased his chances of conviction. In Enmund, the United States Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment forbids the imposition of the death penalty on a defendant who aids and abets a felony in the course of which a murder is committed by others ... [when the defendant] does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or that lethal force will be employed. Id. at 797, 102 S.Ct. at 3376, 73 L.Ed.2d at 1151. In Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 107 S.Ct. 1676, 95 L.Ed.2d 127 (1987), the Court refined the holding in Enmund and stated that major participation in the felony committed, combined with reckless indifference to human life, is sufficient to satisfy the Enmund culpability requirement. Tison, 481 U.S. at 158, 107 S.Ct. at 1688, 95 L.Ed.2d at 145. Defendant Shoffner was found guilty of two counts of felony murder. At his capital sentencing proceeding, conducted in accord with N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000, the trial court instructed that before the jury could recommend that defendant Shoffner be sentenced to death, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant Eddie Wayne Shoffner killed or attempted to kill the victim or intended to kill the victim or intended that deadly force would be used in the course of the felony or was a major participant in the underlying felony and exhibited reckless indifference to human life. This instruction is in full accord with Enmund and Tison, as well as with the pattern jury instructions. See N.C.P.I.Crim. 150.10 (1995). The record further reflects that the jury answered the Enmund issue, submitted on the Issues and Recommendation as to Punishment form as to both counts of felony murder as Issue One-A, no. The jury, following its instructions, accordingly recommended that defendant Shoffner be sentenced to life imprisonment for both counts of felony murder. We detect no hint of error in the trial court's instructions or the jury's procedure in this regard. As to defendant Shoffner's argument that his risk of conviction was unfairly increased because he was tried before a death-qualified jury, we rejected this argument in State v. Kirkley, 308 N.C. 196, 302 S.E.2d 144 (1983), overruled on other grounds by State v. Shank, 322 N.C. 243, 367 S.E.2d 639 (1988), when we held that death-qualifying a jury does not result in a guilt-prone jury and does not deny a defendant the right to a fair trial and fair sentencing proceeding. Defendant Shoffner advances no reason why we should depart from our prior precedent regarding this issue; accordingly, this assignment of error, in its entirety, is overruled. In his second assignment of error, defendant Shoffner contends it was error for the trial court to allow Janet Terry to testify when the State allegedly failed to provide defendant Shoffner with Terry's statements as required by N.C.G.S. § 15A-903(a)(2). Defendant Shoffner also proposes that his right to due process was infringed by the alleged discovery violation. The criminal discovery statute in question, N.C.G.S. § 15A-903(a)(2), requires the State, upon motion by a defendant, [t]o divulge, in written or recorded form, the substance of any oral statement relevant to the subject matter of the case made by the defendant. N.C.G.S. § 15A-903(a)(2) (1988). The State is required to divulge the substance of the statement no later than 12 o'clock noon, on Wednesday prior to the beginning of the week during which the case is calendared for trial. Id. Determining whether the State failed to comply with discovery is a decision left to the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Jackson, 340 N.C. 301, 317, 457 S.E.2d 862, 872 (1995). A trial court is not required to impose any sanctions for abuse of discovery orders. State v. Weeks, 322 N.C. 152, 171, 367 S.E.2d 895, 906 (1988). Janet Terry told police that she overheard a conversation between defendants in which defendant Shoffner said he and defendant Workman were going up the road to get some money. Defendant Workman said, Who do you know up the road that has some money, and defendant Shoffner replied, I don't know anybody. I guess we'll just have to rob somebody. On 10 September 1993, the State presented defendant Shoffner with a document setting out the substance of oral statements made by defendant Shoffner; statement number nine contained the following statement: We will have to rob someone. Although defendant Shoffner concedes there is no general obligation on the part of the State to provide the names of witnesses prior to trial, see State v. Harris, 323 N.C. 112, 371 S.E.2d 689 (1988), he appears to contend that the State's discovery response was both inherently misleading and inadequate to satisfy the State's discovery obligation because nothing more concerning the conversation Terry overheard was divulged. We cannot agree. N.C.G.S. § 15A-903(a)(2) only requires the State to divulge the substance of a defendant's oral statement. This the State did. Defendant was not entitled to a description of the facts and circumstances surrounding these statements. Harris, 323 N.C. at 122, 371 S.E.2d at 695. We conclude the trial court did not err in determining that the State had fully complied with its discovery obligations in this instance. We further conclude that due process did not, in this case, require the State to disclose any more information than it did, and this assignment of error is overruled. In another assignment of error, defendant Shoffner argues it was error for the trial court to deny defendant Shoffner's motion to dismiss the two first-degree murder charges against him on the grounds of insufficiency of the evidence. Because the jury found defendant Shoffner guilty of two counts of first-degree murder solely on the theory of felony-murder, premised upon the felony of attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon, we do not address defendant Shoffner's contention that there was insufficient evidence upon which the jury could have found him guilty of premeditated and deliberated murder. Felony murder is a murder committed in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of certain felonies including those committed or attempted with the use of a deadly weapon. State v. Cook, 334 N.C. 564, 570, 433 S.E.2d 730, 733 (1993); see N.C.G.S. § 14-17 (1993). Attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon is the unlawful attempt to take personal property from another or in another's presence by the use or threatened use of a firearm or other dangerous weapon which threatens or endangers the life of another. See N.C.G.S. § 14-87(a) (1993); State v. Allison, 319 N.C. 92, 352 S.E.2d 420 (1987). In order to gain convictions against both defendants, particularly with respect to defendant Shoffner, the State proceeded under the theory of concerted action. A defendant may properly be found guilty of first-degree felony murder where he knowingly engages in the commission of a dangerous felony and where a killing takes place. State v. Reese, 319 N.C. 110, 145, 353 S.E.2d 352, 372 (1987). We have set forth the law governing motions to dismiss countless times: If there is substantial evidencewhether direct, circumstantial, or bothto support a finding that the offense charged has been committed and that the defendant committed it, the case is for the jury and the motion to dismiss should be denied. State v. Locklear, 322 N.C. 349, 358, 368 S.E.2d 377, 383 (1988). Substantial evidence is that evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the State, and the State must receive every reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence. Any contradictions or discrepancies arising from the evidence are properly left for the jury to resolve and do not warrant dismissal. State v. King, 343 N.C. 29, 36, 468 S.E.2d 232, 237 (1996) (citations omitted). The evidence at trial tended to show that defendant Workman and defendant Shoffner were together the afternoon of the Drakes' murders. Numerous witnesses testified regarding defendants' attempts to sell various items for money. Another witness testified that one of the defendants stated that they were running short on money. Yet another witness testified that she overheard defendant Shoffner say that he and defendant Workman were going up the road to get some money. This witness then heard one of the defendants say, Who do you know up the road that has some money? To which the other defendant replied, I don't know anybody. I guess we'll just have to rob somebody. Shortly thereafter, both defendants arrived at Carlton's Grocery. Stephan Poplin witnessed the defendants' quick exit from the store. Upon entering the store, Poplin heard the buzzer on the cash register sounding and noticed that the register was lying on its side. Mrs. Drake was found in the front of the store clutching her pocketbook to her chest. Both victims' throats had been cut with a thin, very sharp knife. Defendant Workman had purchased a fish fillet knife that very afternoon. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the State and drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor, we conclude the evidence against defendant Shoffner was sufficient for the jury's consideration and determination. From the evidence, the jury could reasonably infer and find as fact that defendants Workman and Shoffner needed money; went up the road to rob the grocery store; and during the course of the robbery, murdered the Drakes. The trial court, therefore, did not err by denying defendant Shoffner's motion to dismiss. This assignment of error is overruled. In his last assignment of error, defendant Shoffner argues that he was prejudiced by Chad Viars' allegedly improper cross-examination testimony. The cross-examination at issue transpired, in part, as follows: Q. How hard was Shoffner trying to sell this vest to you? A. He justhe madeShoffner made the request Borrow the damn money from your mom like he might have been desperate for money. (Emphasis added.) Defendant Shoffner objected and moved to have the testimony stricken. The trial court overruled the objection and denied the motion to strike. Defendant contends Viars' testimony that he might have been desperate for money was irrelevant under Rule of Evidence 401 and was highly prejudicial under Rule of Evidence 403. We conclude, however, that Viars' testimony was admissible as a short-hand statement of fact. See, e.g., State v. Hunt, 325 N.C. 187, 381 S.E.2d 453 (1989) (witness testimony that defendant responded to a coconspirator's remarks with a long glance like he had better shut up admissible as a shorthand statement of fact); State v. Dawson, 278 N.C. 351, 180 S.E.2d 140 (1971) (witness testimony that defendant seemed to be joking about it was admissible as a shorthand statement of fact). Opinion evidence is always admissible when the facts on which the opinion or conclusion is based cannot be so described that the jury will understand them sufficiently to be able to draw their own inferences. 1 Kenneth S. Broun, Brandis and Broun on North Carolina Evidence § 178 (4th ed.1993). The weight to give Viars' testimony that defendant Shoffner might have been desperate for money was for the jury to decide. Even assuming error as to this particular statement, we conclude defendant Shoffner still would not be entitled to relief. Other evidence tended to show defendant Shoffner needed money the day of the murder, e.g., he pawned a microwave. Further, he was overheard participating in a conversation with defendant Workman in which one or the other stated they would have to go up the road and rob somebody. There is no reasonable possibility that absent this one remark by Viars, the result of the trial would have been different. N.C.G.S. § 15A-1443(a). This assignment of error is overruled. In conclusion, having carefully reviewed the record and each of defendants' assignments of error, we hold that defendants received a fair trial, free of prejudicial error. NO ERROR.