Opinion ID: 2016011
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Consideration of Unproven Offenses

Text: The State contends Sailer failed to preserve error because he failed in his brief to state how the issue was preserved for review, with references to the places in the record where the issue was raised and decided. Iowa R.App.P. 14(a)(5). We find Sailer's error preservation record is minimally sufficient and elect to proceed to the merits.
As noted above, a sentence imposed by the district court will not be overturned unless we find an abuse of discretion or a defect in the sentencing procedure, such as the consideration by the district court of impermissible factors, which Sailer alleges here. Loyd, 530 N.W.2d at 713. Specifically, Sailer contends the district court improperly considered unproven offenses detailed in Aldredge's victim impact statement in determining the sentence to be imposed. Sailer argues that the record of the sentencing proceeding clearly demonstrates the court considered unproven offenses in determining the appropriate punishment. Sailer points to the statement made by the court in support of its sentence that [t]he court has considered the amount of the financial loss to the victim of this offense. We have noted previously that [w]e will set aside a sentence and remand a case to the district court for resentencing if the sentencing court relied upon charges of an unprosecuted offense that was neither admitted to by the defendant nor otherwise proved. State v. Black, 324 N.W.2d 313, 315 (Iowa 1982); accord State v. Sinclair, 582 N.W.2d 762, 765 (Iowa 1998). This rule prohibits a sentencing court from imposing a severe sentence for a lower crime on the ground that the accused actually committed a higher crime ... even if the prosecutor originally charged the higher crime and reduced the charge. State v. Thompson, 275 N.W.2d 370, 372 (Iowa 1979). This rule similarly prohibits a sentencing court from relying on additional, unproven, and unprosecuted charges when no facts before the court show the charges are valid and the defendant does not admit the additional charges. State v. Messer, 306 N.W.2d 731, 732-33 (Iowa 1981). We first must ascertain whether the district court did indeed rely on unprosecuted or unproven offenses in determining Sailer's sentence. As our court of appeals has previously noted, [i]n order to overcome the presumption the district court properly exercised its discretion, there must be an affirmative showing the court relied on ... improper evidence. State v. Dake, 545 N.W.2d 895, 897 (Iowa App.1996) (citing State v. Ashley, 462 N.W.2d 279, 282 (Iowa 1990)). We have considered this issue several times before and find that the circumstances in which we have concluded the sentencing court did rely improperly on unproven or unprosecuted offenses are not comparable to the circumstances in the case at bar. For example, in State v. Sinclair , we vacated the defendant's sentence and remanded for resentencing because the court clearly considered three earlier charges of operating while intoxicated that had been dismissed when sentencing the defendant. The court stated as follows when giving its reasons for the sentence imposed: ... I have to under the law sentence you as a first offense because that's what it was, and [ ] you weren't convicted on the other three. But I believe that I can take into consideration that there was a problem because you were arrested for some type of alcohol-related incident and that for some reason maybe they couldn't prove you guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and that's why those were dismissed, and the Court has to take that into consideration. That this is a first, but you've had three prior arrests. Sinclair, 582 N.W.2d at 765. We found this statement by the district court clearly indicated it took prior unprosecuted offenses into consideration when setting the defendant's sentence. Id. In State v. Gonzalez, 582 N.W.2d 515, 516 (Iowa 1998), we found the following statement clearly showed the sentencing court considered charges that had been dismissed: [T]he concession provided in the plea agreement provides for actually the dismissal of, what would probably be easily provable, five additional counts, so there is a substantial concession that's already been made to the defendant. Accordingly, we vacated the defendant's sentence and remanded for resentencing. A statement made by the sentencing court in State v. Black also led our court to the conclusion that the court considered unproven offenses when determining the defendant's sentence: The fact that you pled guilty to the charge of Indecent Exposure cannot and does not belie the fact that the State in return for the plea dismissed a Burglary charge.... The Court cannot and will not ignore the factual basis which gives rise to this charge. Black, 324 N.W.2d at 315. Based on this statement, we vacated the defendant's sentence and remanded the case to the district court for resentencing. We find this case similar to State v. Phillips, 561 N.W.2d 355 (Iowa 1997), in which we upheld a defendant's sentence on appeal despite the fact that a victim impact statement disclosed other possible offenses. In Phillips, the defendant pled guilty to third-degree sexual abuse. At the sentencing hearing, the victim's father made an oral victim impact statement, during which he referred to sexual predators and asserted the defendant had fed those children alcohol. Phillips, 561 N.W.2d at 357. The defendant contended the court impermissibly relied on those statements in determining his sentence. The trial court listed several reasons for the sentence imposed, none of which pertained to the statements made by the victim's father. We discern[ed] no reliance on improper factors based on the statement and affirmed the sentence imposed. Id. at 359. In State v. Sumpter, 438 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1989), victim impact statements from the victim's aunts and uncles were allowed by the sentencing court. Although we concluded the aunts and uncles were not among the group of persons allowed to give such statements, we found the defendant suffered no prejudice because he did not prove the court impermissibly relied on the statements. We noted the defendant's assertion that the victim impact statements 'could very possibly' have affected the court's judgment was an insufficient predicate for a finding of error. Sumpter, 438 N.W.2d at 9. In the case at bar, when listing its reasons for imposing the maximum allowable sentence, the court stated: The Court has considered in this sentence all of the matters contained in the pre-sentence investigation report. The Court has considered the amount of the financial loss to the victim of this offense. The Court has specifically considered that the defendant received a special conditional discharge of twelve months in 1994 on a charge of theft. From this statement, we are unable to discern any reliance on improper factors which would overcome the presumption that the district court properly exercised its discretion. Rather, the court's statement appears to merely list sentencing factors which must be considered pursuant to the Iowa Code. Section 901.5 provides that: After receiving and examining all pertinent information, including the presentence investigation report and victim impact statements, if any, the court shall consider the following sentencing options. The court's statement reveals that it took into consideration the presentence investigation report, the victim impact statement, and the defendant's prior conviction, all of which are permissible factors for consideration at sentencing. See Iowa Code §§ 901.2, .5. The statement that the court considered the amount of the financial loss to the victim does not prove the court relied on unproven offenses in formulating the sentence. Without further proof the court considered Aldredge's discussion of unproven offenses in the victim impact statement for an improper purpose, we take this statement at face value to mean the court merely considered the impact on the victim when setting the sentence. Another statement made by the district court during the sentencing proceeding gives us further confidence that the court did not improperly consider unproven offenses in determining Sailer's sentence. In ruling on Sailer's motion to exclude impact statements, the court stated as follows: The motion assumes that a sentencing court, a sentencing judge, cannot determine what letters and what portions of which letters are irrelevant to the sentencing decision. A victim impact statement will be considered by the Court in those portions of it which are relevant to the sentencing decision. We firmly believe that this statement illustrates the district court knew its sentencing discretion was limited to charges actually proven or admitted. We place great confidence in judges to follow this mandate and will not assume a judge failed to do so without clearer evidence than what Sailer presents in the case at bar. We construe the district court's statement regarding the financial loss to the victim to be merely a reference to consideration of the victim impact statement in general as required by Iowa Code section 901.5. We do not believe, as Sailer urges, that this statement reveals the district court improperly considered unproven offenses in determining the sentence. As we noted in the previous section, it is essential to the purpose of the victim impact statement that the victim be given an opportunity to fully convey the impact a crime has had. Although this may at times result in the airing of allegations which are unproven, we trust that our district courts, when weighing such statements as part of the sentencing determination, will filter out improper or irrelevant evidence. Without any clear evidence to the contrary, we assume the district court did so in the case at bar.