Opinion ID: 2333180
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Olson Bears The Burden Of Proving Prejudice From The Officer's Extraneous And Erroneous Warning.

Text: The State concedes that if misinformation supplied by the police reasonably induced an arrestee to refuse the test, then the evidence of the refusal should be suppressed. But the State argues that [m]isinformation provided by the police is not actionable unless it induced a [DWI] arrestee into refusing to submit to the chemical test. The court of appeals agreed with this argument, concluding: Olson never offered to prove that he indeed relied to his detriment on the erroneous information about a five-year `look back' for prior convictions when he made his decision to refuse the breath test. But Olson counters that, contrary to the court of appeals' decision, [t]here should be no requirement that [he] `prove' he would have done something differently. The State primarily relies on Hernandez v. State [27] and Graham v. State [28] to support its argument that Olson must show that he was prejudiced by the incorrect statement of the penalty for refusal, but these cases are not dispositive. Hernandez concerned an arrestee's right to obtain an independent blood test. [29] After Hernandez submitted to the request that he take a breath test, he exercised his right to obtain an independent blood test. [30] The arresting officer informed Hernandez that Fairbanks Memorial Hospital was the only facility available to perform the test because it was late at night. [31] At the hospital, a receptionist statedincorrectlythat the hospital's test was inadmissible in court. [32] Hearing the receptionist's statement, Hernandez looked to the arresting officer for clarification, but the officer only shrugged his shoulders. [33] Hernandez interpreted the officer's response as an affirmation of the receptionist's statement. [34] He waived his right to the blood test and he was convicted of DWI. [35] The superior court found that Hernandez was in fact dissuaded from seeking the independent testand thus prejudicedby the false information he received and by the officer's subsequent conduct. [36] The issue on appeal was whether Hernandez's reliance on the arresting officer's response was reasonable. The court of appeals held that if Hernandez reasonably relied on the officer's conduct, the State should be held accountable . . . for the fact that the officer's conduct was a substantial factor in dissuading Hernandez from pursuing his right to an independent blood test. [37] The arrestee in Graham refused the breath test after being read her Miranda rights. [38] She claimed that the officer's Miranda warning [39] that she had the right to remain silent and that anything said may be used against [her] confused her about the right to refuse to take the test or answer questions about whether she was refusing to do so. [40] Given the circumstances in Graham, we held: [W]here an arrested person refuses to submit to a breathalyzer test, the administering officer must inquire into the nature of the refusal and, if it appears that the refusal is based on a confusion about a person's rights, the officer must clearly advise that person that the rights contained in the Miranda warning do not apply to the breathalyzer examination.[ [41] ] But we also explained that [t]he defendant motorist . . . has the burden of showing that he or she was in fact confused by the officer's statements. [42] Hernandez and Graham were cases where arrestees claimed to be subjectively confused by the officer's statements or conduct. Viewing the facts of those cases objectively, the court concluded that some people may have been confused by the circumstances whereas others would not. Under those circumstances, we required the defendants to show that they were actually confused by the officer's statement or conduct. Olson's case is different. There is no reason to suspect he was confused by the misinformation about penalties for refusal. The meaning of the officer's warning was not ambiguous or unclear; it was simply incorrect. As Olson points out, [t]here is no dispute that [he] was provided with incorrect information that would have misled anyone. We agree that the pre-printed form provided an objectively clearalbeit wrongstatement that would have prevented a reasonable person who had prior DWI convictions within the ten-year look back period from making a knowing and intelligent decision about refusal. The Hernandez and Graham requirement for showing subjective confusion does not apply here; Olson was objectively misinformed. Even though the cases regarding subjective confusion do not control in this case, we still must determine who bears the burden of proving prejudice when an arrestee is objectively misinformed by the police. Olson argues that he should not have the burden of proving that he would have done something differently because he was squarely within the class of defendants who would reasonably be misled by the misinformation: he had two DWI convictions within the preceding ten, but not five, years, and the implied consent form erroneously informed him that refusal was a misdemeanor, not a felony, for a person with this history. The State responds that Olson is claiming that the misinformation negated his refusal, but Olson should be required to plead and prove those facts that entitle him to relief. The State points to two policy reasons to support its position: (1) if Olson does not have to prove prejudice, he would receive a substantial windfall [even though] the misinformation he received played no role in his decision to refuse to submit to the chemical test; and (2) proof of Olson's motivation for refusing to submit is singularly available to him. We have never directly addressed this issue before, but other jurisdictions that have considered it require arrestees to show a causal connection between an officer's extraneous and erroneous statement and the arrestee's decision to submit to testing. [43] In Cuthbertson v. Kansas Department of Revenue, the holder of a commercial driver's license was arrested on suspicion of DUI while driving a noncommercial vehicle. [44] The arrestee received all the statutory notices required by law, which covered only the effect that refusing or failing the test would have on the arrestee's noncommercial license. [45] The officer in Cuthbertson was not required to inform the arrestee of the potential penalties associated with his commercial license, but the officer did so anyway. [46] Unfortunately, the extraneous information the officer provided was incorrect. [47] The arrestee argued that his driving privileges should be fully reinstated because he was incorrectly advised about the effect failing the test would have on his commercial license. The Kansas Court of Appeals disagreed. It explained: [The officer] was not required to provide any information to Cuthbertson regarding the collateral damage to his [commercial driver's license]. . . . However, once [the officer] dove into the pool of gratuitous information, his responses are required to be correct statements of the law. Even in this situation, however, we revert to the fact that we are not dealing with statutorily mandated notices. The consequence is that Cuthbertson must demonstrate prejudice, which he cannot, in order to show reversible error.[ [48] ] Olson was correctly informed of the statutorily-required warning, i.e., that refusing the breath test was a crime. It was only in regard to the supplemental piece of informationthe length of the look back period used to determine whether refusal constituted a misdemeanor or a felonythat incorrect information was provided. We join those jurisdictions holding that under these circumstances the arrestee must prove that he or she was prejudiced by the mistake. [49] Indeed, the standard of review section in Olson's brief acknowledges [a] defendant who reasonably and detrimentally relies on incorrect legal advice in deciding to refrain from acting should not be criminally punished for that failure to act. (Emphasis added). Olson has the burden of proving prejudice from the officer's misstatement; the question remains whether Olson satisfied this burden. The State contends that Olson did not argue that he was actually prejudiced by the implied consent form's misinformation and the court of appeals agreed. Both observed that Olson did not explicitly testify that he would have made a different decision if he had been given correct information. But Olson argues on appeal that his contention in superior court was that he was prejudiced by the police officer's incorrect warning. Olson's motion to dismiss argued: There is no doubt that [Olson] was misled as to the consequences of his refusal to take a chemical test and there is no doubt that because of his prior criminal record it had a direct impact upon his ability to make a knowing and intelligent decision as to whether to refuse or not refuse the chemical test. Olson's motion to suppress added: Had [Olson] been correctly informed of the consequences, he would have known that he would be facing a felony as opposed to a misdemeanor charge. He would have certainly given greater consideration to his decision knowing that the consequence of his refusal [was] a felony versus a misdemeanor. We agree with the State and the court of appeals that Olson presented no evidence that he in fact misapprehended the potential class of offense he faced when he refused, but we have never before stated that defendants in Olson's position are required to do so. We cannot fault Olson for not putting forward this evidence because we have not previously said that it is required. Because we now hold that it is Olson's burden to prove that he was prejudiced by the extraneous and incorrect information the officer provided him, we remand this case to give Olson an opportunity to make such a showing. The superior court may allow additional evidence or hold new hearings as it deems necessary.