Opinion ID: 1711656
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Causal Negligence

Text: Although Cavanaugh proceeded on the theories that Andrade was negligent for continuing the chase and negligent in the operation of the vehicle, the case was properly submitted to the jury solely on the question of negligent operation. The jury answered yes to the following special verdict question: At and immediately prior to the accident of January 13, 1989, was the defendant, Robert Andrade, negligent with respect to the operation of the motor vehicle. The jury also found that such negligence was a cause of the accident. Cavanaugh argues that the jury could have properly found Andrade negligent because: (1) Andrade was driving too fast for conditions; (2) Andrade's speed may have caused Zergoski to drive faster; and (3) Andrade was following too closely. Additionally, Cavanaugh's complaint alleged that Andrade was negligent with respect to lookout and management and control of his vehicle. The court of appeals noted that there was testimony in the record that Andrade's speed may have been too fast for conditions and that the roads were slippery with patches of ice. It concluded that this provided sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of negligence. Cavanaugh, 191 Wis. 2d at 260. Although it is necessary to discuss Andrade's alleged negligence in the operation of his vehicle in order to set the framework for determining whether such negligence was causal, we need not decide the issue of negligence based on the facts of this case. Because we conclude that the issue of causation is dispositive, we decline to further consider whether the evidence supports the jury's finding of negligence. See Oakley v. Fireman's Fund of Wisconsin, 162 Wis. 2d 821, 832 n. 9, 470 N.W.2d 882 (1991) (Wisconsin appellate courts need not decide an issue if the resolution of another issue is dispositive). Turning to the question of causation, we first address the evidence of negligence identified by both the court of appeals and Cavanaugh that Andrade engaged in excessive speeds or speeds too fast for conditions. As discussed above, reliance on this evidence is misplaced because it relates directly to Andrade's discretionary decision to continue the high-speed pursuit. We next look to Cavanaugh's remaining arguments in support of the jury's verdict which properly relate to Andrade's alleged negligence in the physical operation of his vehicle. He asserts that Andrade failed to maintain management and control, was following too closely, and failed to maintain proper lookout. However, the fact that Andrade's vehicle was between one-half and one block behind Zergoski at the time of the accident and did not make any physical contact with either vehicle undercuts those arguments because they lack the causal connection necessary between the alleged negligence and Cavanaugh's injuries. For example, Cavanaugh argues that the jury could have determined that Andrade was negligent in the operation of his vehicle with respect to management and control. The duty of management and control requires a driver to keep his or her vehicle under control so that when danger appears, the driver may stop, reduce speeds, change course, or take other proper means to avoid injury or damage. Wis. JICivil 1105. Here, Andrade did not collide with either vehicle. Cavanaugh also alleged that Andrade was following too closely. However, the nearest that any witness placed Andrade's vehicle behind Zergoski's vehicle at the time of the collision was one-half block. Operators of vehicles should space themselves at a distance that will ensure proper braking and reaction time in the event that the preceding vehicle slows or stops. See Wis JICivil 1112 Operation of Automobile Following Another. This court has previously recognized that the purpose of holding a trailing driver to a proper distance is to keep him in position to stop or so control his car as to prevent him from doing injury because of the action of the car ahead, whatever be the cause of that action.... Northland Ins. Co. v. Avis Rent-A-Car, 62 Wis. 2d 643, 648, 215 N.W.2d 439 (1974)(quoted source omitted). Since Andrade did not collide with the preceding vehicles, any evidence regarding proper distances for braking or reaction time to prevent injury is irrelevant to the question of causation. Cavanaugh's claim that the jury could have determined that Andrade was negligent as to lookout is also unpersuasive. A driver has the duty to exercise ordinary care to keep a careful lookout ahead and about him or her for other vehicles that may be within or approaching the driver's course of travel. Wis JICivil 1055. Again, even assuming arguendo that Andrade was negligent in this respect, such negligence was not causal because Andrade did not collide with either vehicle. Andrade's failure to maintain proper lookout could not be a substantial factor in the accident because it would have occurred regardless of Andrade's negligent lookout. [18] Based on the above, we conclude that there is no credible evidence in the record for a reasonable jury to find that any alleged negligence of Andrade with respect to the physical operation of his motor vehicle was a substantial factor in causing the accident. Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals' decision affirming the jury's verdict finding Andrade 2% causally negligent and direct the circuit court to grant Andrade's motion for judgment notwithstanding the jury's verdict.