Opinion ID: 709030
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Other Sufficiency Arguments

Text: 41 Several appellants argue that the government did not sufficiently plead and did not prove a pattern of racketeering activity because it failed to prove at least two predicate acts within the five-year statute of limitations. We reject all of these contentions, addressing below only those issues properly briefed. 42 Carlton Darden and Noble Bennett both argue, without any citation to authority, that the narcotics conspiracy 4 charged by the government as a predicate act in Counts I and II of the Superseding Indictment is identical to the RICO conspiracy and, as such, is not a proper predicate act under the statute. The Superseding Indictment charges that the appellants conspired to possess, distribute, and possess with the intent to distribute cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and pentazocine in violation of federal and state law. The elements of this offense differ from the elements of the RICO offenses charged by the indictment, see supra pp. 1517-18, and this offense clearly constitutes a predicate act under the RICO statute, see 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1961(1)(A), (D) (1988). Cf. United States v. Scarpa, 913 F.2d 993, 1008 (2d Cir.1990) (holding that narcotics conspiracy had sufficient nexus with RICO charges to serve as predicate act). The jury found that the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Lewis, Seals, Amerson, Bennett, Darden, and Williams had engaged in a narcotics conspiracy that continued from 1978 to 1992. The jury's verdict is supported by the great weight of the evidence, and thus this assignment of error does not provide a basis for relief for any of the appellants. 43 Darden and Bennett also argue that the government failed to prove that they engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity, one of the essential elements of a RICO offense. In Bennett's case, the jury found that the government had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Bennett was involved in the JLO's narcotics conspiracy, that he possessed cocaine on three separate occasions, and that he possessed cocaine with the intent to distribute cocaine on one occasion. The evidence is sufficient to support the jury's findings on these charges. Bennett's primary argument is that simple possession of cocaine cannot serve as a predicate act under the RICO statute. We agree. The statute specifically lists a number of drug-related offenses that constitute predicate acts for purposes of the RICO statute. See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1961(1)(A), (D) (1988). Applying the time-honored rule of inclusio unius est exclusio alterius (the inclusion of one is the exclusion of another), it is apparent to us that mere possession is not a predicate act under the RICO statute. Bennett, however, is not aided by this argument. A pattern of racketeering activity consists of at least two predicate acts, although two may not be sufficient. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 n. 14, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 3285 n. 14, 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985). In this case, however, Bennett's two predicate acts (participating in the narcotics conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute), along with the other evidence of Bennett's intimate participation in the JLO, see supra pp. 1519-20, conclusively establish that Bennett engaged in the pattern of racketeering activity charged by the government. 44 In Darden's case, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove a pattern of racketeering activity. While RICO may not be broad enough to encompass the actions of every defendant who commits two proscribed racketeering acts, we think that Darden's involvement in the attempted murders of Rochelle Bartlett and Lidell Bud Green, his possession with the intent to distribute cocaine on numerous occasions from 1987 to 1989, and his leadership in the T's and blues trade, each of these activities having been established by sufficient evidence at trial, constitute a pattern of racketeering activity within the meaning of the RICO statute. The acts are all related to his participation in the JLO, and they represent a consistent desire to further the JLO's activities. 45 In addition to these arguments, Darden adds the contention that his prosecution was barred by the general federal five-year statute of limitations, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3282 (1988), which is applicable to prosecutions brought under the RICO statute, United States v. Vogt, 910 F.2d 1184, 1195 (4th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1083, 111 S.Ct. 955, 112 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1991). A prosecution under Sec. 1962(c) (Count I) is barred by the statute of limitations unless the defendant committed a predicate act within five years of the indictment. United States v. Salerno, 868 F.2d 524, 534 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 907, 109 S.Ct. 3192, 105 L.Ed.2d 700 and 493 U.S. 811, 110 S.Ct. 56, 107 L.Ed.2d 24, 25 (1989). In a prosecution under Sec. 1962(d) (Count II), an indictment is timely if the conspiracy had not accomplished or abandoned its objectives more than five years before the date of the indictment. United States v. Rastelli, 870 F.2d 822, 838 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 982, 110 S.Ct. 515, 107 L.Ed.2d 516 (1989). Because we conclude above that sufficient evidence supports the jury's finding that Darden committed a predicate act, possession with intent to distribute cocaine, as late as 1989, his statute-of-limitations arguments are foreclosed. The original indictment in this case was returned by the Grand Jury on January 9, 1991, only two years after Darden had committed a predicate act in furtherance of the JLO's continuing RICO conspiracy. 46 Like Darden, Carla Seals argues that the government failed to produce sufficient evidence of predicate acts to prove that she engaged in the charged pattern of racketeering activity. The jury found that Seals had possessed cocaine with the intent to distribute it on June 28, 1987, and that she participated in the JLO's narcotics conspiracy. The evidence supports the jury's findings. These two predicate acts, along with the other evidence of Seals's involvement with the JLO, see supra pp. 1522-23, establish the requisite pattern of racketeering activity. 47 Gerald Hopkins argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he participated in the attempted murder of Andrea Patton. Even if we were to agree with Hopkins, the government still proved that Hopkins engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity. On appeal Hopkins does not challenge the jury's findings that he possessed cocaine with the intent to distribute it on June 28, 1987, and May 3, 1988; conspired to murder and murdered Deputy Sheriff Antar Tiari; and conspired to murder Gerald Patton. Even so, we hold that the evidence is sufficient to prove that Hopkins attempted to murder Andrea Patton. Hopkins claims that only the incredible testimony of Ronnie Thomas links Hopkins with the crime. Credibility is, of course, a matter within the province of the jury, and there is nothing in the record that would show Thomas's testimony to be inherently incredible. Moreover, Hopkins's assertion is patently false. Michael Lewis testified that Hopkins fired shots at the car in which Andrea Patton was riding. The testimony of Thomas and Lewis thus establishes Hopkins's participation in the attempted murder of Andrea Patton. 48 Finally, Jerry Lewis argues that the government failed to show that [Lewis] managed, supervised or directed a RICO enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. Lewis's Brief at 136. This argument actually consists of three separate arguments: (1) the evidence was insufficient to show a pattern of racketeering activity; (2) the evidence was unfairly obtained through plea bargains; and (3) the evidence does not satisfy the direction test of Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 178-80, 113 S.Ct. 1163, 1170, 122 L.Ed.2d 525 (1993). The latter two arguments are addressed elsewhere in this opinion. See infra pp. 1548-49, 1541-43. Lewis's sufficiency argument is specious. The evidence overwhelmingly supports the jury's findings that Lewis conspired to possess, distribute, and possess with the intent to distribute cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and pentazocine in violation of federal and state law; possessed pentazocine with the intent to distribute it on three occasions; possessed cocaine with the intent to distribute it on one occasion; aided and abetted the distribution of cocaine in November 1990; conspired and attempted to murder Rochelle Bartlett; conspired and attempted to murder Bud Green; conspired to murder and murdered Deputy Sheriff Antar Tiari; conspired to murder and murdered Bruce Hat Henry; conspired to murder and murdered Count Johnson; and conspired to murder and murdered David Kiki Grady. All of these predicate acts were committed in furtherance of the JLO's interests, and they conclusively establish that Lewis engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity.