Opinion ID: 1923817
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did trial court properly instruct the jury on the issue of entrapment?

Text: Although the testimony is unsatisfactory, the jury could have believed Furman's assertions he cajoled defendant, by the use of entreaties based on close personal friendship, to procure the cocaine sold to Anderson. Thus the defense of entrapment was raised in this case. The entrapment instruction (number 21) submitted by trial court generally followed Iowa State Bar Association Uniform Criminal Jury Instruction 213. But the court was confronted with an additional element that instruction does not address: the law officers' use of a third party (Furman). We considered this factor in State v. Tomlinson, 243 N.W.2d at 554, and State v. Ostrand, 219 N.W.2d at 512. Pursuant to the rationale of those cases, trial court instructed the jury that entrapment cannot result merely from the inducements of a private individual. But the problem arose in attempting to follow the principal holding in those decisions: that if law officers use an individual to help them arrange the commission of a crime by another person, the officers cannot disclaim inducements offered by such individual in the course of his or her efforts for the officers. Trial court, modifying the uniform instruction, used the following language: However, if law enforcement officers utilize an individual to help them arrange the commission of a crime by a particular person to whom the officers direct the individual the officers cannot disclaim the inducements such individual offers in the course of his efforts for the officers simply because he was a private citizen or unaware that he was being so utilized. (Emphasis supplied.) In this case the law officers had no knowledge of this defendant, even after enlisting Furman's aid in procuring cocaine, until the first purchase was made. Thereafter they were concerned with making larger purchases, and the evidence reflects they knew defendant was Furman's source. This situation was not considered in Tomlinson and Ostrand, where the law officers knew of the defendants' identities when utilizing the third parties to make the buys. Defendant by exception and argument preserved the alleged error in instruction 21. He asserted it required him to generate a jury question on entrapment by some showing that Anderson utilized Furman to make a buy from a particular person (defendant), to whom the officers directed Furman. Defendant contended this instruction was prejudicial, and that it was an erroneous statement of law that unduly restricted the entrapment doctrine. He argued the law officers set Furman in motion to obtain drugs from whomever he could procure them, and that they had to know Furman would be going into the street to buy them from persons they did not know. Consequently, defendant argued, the State could not disclaim the methods Furman employed to obtain the cocaine. We think defendant's exception should have prevailed, and that instruction 21 contained an erroneous statement of the law insofar as it required, for entrapment, that law enforcement officers utilizing a third party to help them arrange the commission of a crime must direct the third party to a particular target individual. This holding is supported by Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 78 S.Ct. 819, 2 L.Ed.2d 848 (1958), where the defendant claimed entrapment by the activities of a government informer awaiting sentencing on his own drug conviction. The informer repeatedly requested narcotics from the defendant, claiming he was suffering from withdrawal. Defendant, who was undergoing addiction treatment, obtained drugs, which they shared. Thereafter the informer reported defendant to government agents, who set up the observed sales for which defendant was prosecuted. Id. at 371, 78 S.Ct. at 820, 2 L.Ed.2d at 850-51. At trial the government agents professed ignorance of the prior methods by which the informant obtained the drugs from defendant. The Sherman Court observed, The Government cannot make such use of an informer and then claim disassociation through ignorance. Id. at 375, 78 S.Ct. at 822, 2 L.Ed.2d at 852. Similarly, when the government stakes a third party with money as a free agent to buy drugs, it cannot disclaim the third party's conduct in the transaction. The likelihood the defendant thus selected by the third party may have been the object of undue pressure that would cause a normally law-abiding person to violate the law is surely as great as the case in which the government directs the third party to a particular individual. Our conclusion instruction 21 was erroneous in this regard does not end our inquiry. Not all errors in trial, even those of constitutional stature, necessarily dictate a reversal. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22, 87 S.Ct. 824, 827, 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 709 (1967); State v. King, 256 N.W.2d 1, 12 (Iowa 1977). An accused is only entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect one. Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 432, 92 S.Ct. 1056, 1060, 31 L.Ed.2d 340, 345 (1972); State v. Kelsey, 201 N.W.2d 921, 927 (Iowa 1972). An error in instructing the jury does not necessitate reversal unless it is prejudicial. See State v. Jacoby, 260 N.W.2d 828, 836 (Iowa 1977); State v. Chatterson, 259 N.W.2d 766, 771 (Iowa 1977). Turning to the directed to a specific person language in the instruction, it is apparent it effectively deprived defendant of his entrapment defense as to count II, based on the first cocaine purchase. But as to counts I and III, grounded on the second and third transactions, the evidence was clear the law officers knew of defendant, knew he was Furman's supplier, and set up Furman to make the purchases from defendant. The jury could not reasonably have found otherwise, and the instruction's unnecessary language and requirement, under this record, could not have prejudiced defendant. The error thus requires us to reverse and remand for new trial as to count II. We find no reversible error on this ground as to counts I and III.