Opinion ID: 1096608
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Denial of Cause Challenges to Prospective Jurors

Text: In his first claim, Conde asserts that the trial court erred in denying cause challenges to six prospective jurors, thus forcing him to use peremptory challenges to strike five of those six and to forgo using the same peremptory challenges to strike the sixth and others who served on the jury. He alleges that voir dire questioning revealed significant doubt as to the ability of each challenged juror to set aside any bias regarding the death penalty and impartially render a penalty-phase recommendation. In response, the State asserts that each challenged prospective juror demonstrated impartiality and the ability to render a recommendation based upon the evidence presented. A trial court has great discretion when deciding whether to grant or deny a challenge for cause based on juror competency. Barnhill v. State, 834 So.2d 836, 844 (Fla.2002), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 123 S.Ct. 2281, 156 L.Ed.2d 134 (2003). This is because trial courts have a unique vantage point in their observation of jurors' voir dire responses. Therefore, this Court gives deference to a trial court's determination of a prospective juror's qualifications and will not overturn that determination absent manifest error. Hertz v. State, 803 So.2d 629, 638 (Fla. 2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 963, 122 S.Ct. 2673, 153 L.Ed.2d 846 (2002). Where a prospective juror is challenged for cause on the basis of his or her views on capital punishment, the standard that a trial court must apply in determining juror competency is whether those views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of a juror's duties in accordance with the court's instructions and the juror's oath. Id. (citing Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985)). In a death penalty case, a juror is only unqualified based on his or her views on capital punishment, if he or she expresses an unyielding conviction and rigidity toward the death penalty. Barnhill, 834 So.2d at 844. The first challenged venireman we address here is prospective juror Groom. During voir dire questioning, Groom initially stated that he felt the death penalty should be mandatory in some circumstances, but upon further questioning, he stated that he could follow the court's instructions to weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances in deciding what sentence to recommend. Groom's answers as a whole do not present an unyielding conviction and rigidity toward the death penalty. Rather, his answers indicate that he felt his penaltyphase recommendation would depend upon the facts presented to him and the court's instructions. Where, as here, a prospective juror initially states that one who murders should be executed but later states that he can follow the law upon court instruction, the trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying a cause challenge. Barnhill, 834 So.2d at 845. We therefore do not find manifest error with regard to this juror. [6] The second challenged prospective juror, Loida Hernandez, was repeatedly questioned by defense counsel as to whether she would automatically recommend the death penalty if Conde were found guilty. To each question, Hernandez answered consistently that she would need to evaluate the evidence as presented. It is therefore clear that Hernandez's answers did not present an unyielding conviction and rigidity toward the death penalty but, rather, suggested that she would go into both phases of trial with an open mind. The third challenged venireman was prospective juror Huey, who responded appropriately to initial questioning by the trial judge and prosecutor about his ability to wait until the second phase of trial and listen to evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances before reaching his final recommendation. Thereafter, the following defense inquiry took place: [Defense Counsel]: You put down on your questionnaire that you believe regarding the death penalty ... that murderers give up their right to live.... Explain what you mean by that. [Huey]: Well, anyone that would be found guilty of taking someone else's life I think gives up their right to live. I believe an eye for an eye. [Defense Counsel]: Now, let's assume... you come to believe beyond any reasonable doubt that Mr. Conde is guilty of having killed Rhonda Dunn ... with premeditation, which is first degree murder. In your mind, would that mean that he should receive the death penalty? [Huey]: ... I believe that I can decide based on the aggravating or mitigating circumstances whether life imprisonment or the death penalty should be the appropriate choice. .... [Defense Counsel]: Now, the Court read a statement to the jurors in which he said that Mr. Conde was arrested for the homicide of six people.... Would you believe that once you hear that information that your belief regarding the forfeiture of a life would be even stronger? .... [Huey]: I would certainly consider that an aggravating circumstance. [Defense Counsel]: Would there be any way for you to be able to disregard that? [Huey]: No. At that point, the prosecution objected, and the trial court instructed Huey that the other five homicides would not be presented as evidence of aggravation and that the jury would be instructed not to consider such as an aggravating circumstance. Conde's counsel was then allowed to ask the question again, to which Huey responded that it would be hard to disregard the evidence of the other five homicides. Finally, Huey was asked whether his belief in an eye for an eye would interfere with his ability to sit as a juror and engage in the weighing process, to which he responded, No, it would not. Huey's answers regarding his willingness to consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances sufficiently indicated that he was prepared to perform his duties as a juror and undertake the weighing process at the end of the penalty phase. After receiving further instruction from the judge, Huey answered honestly that it would be difficult for him to disregard the existence of five other murders in sentencing Conde, but Huey also firmly stated that his personal belief in an eye for an eye would not impair his ability to perform his duties as a juror. We do not find that the trial court abused its discretion or that there was manifest error with regard to this juror. The fourth challenged venireman was prospective juror Owens. Defense counsel asked her only two questions regarding the death penalty, to which she answered that if it were proven beyond a reasonable doubt that a person committed first-degree murder, she would automatically be in favor of the death penalty. Thereafter, Owens was excused from the courtroom, and defense counsel moved to strike for cause. However, on the basis of Bryant v. State, 601 So.2d 529 (Fla.1992), the prosecutor urged that the appropriate procedure where a prospective juror expresses an opinion which indicates a substantial inability to properly perform a juror's duties is for either the trial judge or the prosecutor to make sure the prospective juror can be an impartial member of the jury. The trial court called Owens back into the courtroom, and following further inquiry, Owens stated that she would wait and listen to all the mitigating and aggravating factors before agreeing to the death penalty. On the basis of Bryant, the trial court correctly engaged in this additional questioning of the juror. See id. at 532; Reaves v. State, 639 So.2d 1, 4 (Fla.1994). We do not find manifest error with regard to Owens. The fifth challenged venireman, prospective juror Rolle, told the trial court that she believed the use of the death penalty was appropriate in cases of cold blooded murder but said she could wait to make an appropriate recommendation until after the evidence was presented. However, in questioning by defense counsel, Rolle persisted in her view that she could not recommend anything but the death penalty if the State proved Conde had killed six people. The final colloquy between Rolle and defense counsel went as follows: [Defense Counsel]: Would it matter whether he even had a reason? Would it matter to you? [Rolle]: It still would matter, but it depends. If it was self defense or his life was on the line or something like that, I would say maybe life. [Defense Counsel]: ... [O]ther than self defense, once you have found him guilty, again are you saying that that means that the ball game is over? It doesn't matter what personal reason he had? It doesn't matter what kind of childhood he had, none of those things matter? It is just if he killed those people, that is it? [Defense Counsel]: Is that what you are saying? [Rolle]: Yes. Because I would want to know why would he kill these people? What did they do to him? And if he just, you know, without a reason, just hate women or, whatever, that is my answer, yes. Defense counsel then moved to strike Rolle. In response, the prosecutor argued that mitigation is the reason behind a crime, and therefore Rolle appeared willing to consider mitigating circumstances. The trial court denied the motion for cause without further questioning of Rolle. As noted above, where a prospective juror's answers suggest incompetency to be a juror, rehabilitation by the prosecutor or judge is the proper next step. Reaves, 639 So.2d at 4. Here, however, the trial judge denied defense counsel's motion to strike for cause without clarifying on the record whether mitigation was actually a reason that Rolle could weigh in accord with the court's instructions. However, we find any error with regard to this prospective juror to be harmless. Where an appellant claims he was wrongfully forced to exhaust his peremptory challenges because the trial court erroneously denied a cause challenge, both error and prejudice must be established. In order to establish prejudice, an appellant must identify a specific juror whom he otherwise would have struck peremptorily. Trotter v. State, 576 So.2d 691, 693 (Fla.1990). Here, Conde has identified a specific juror, Fuentes, whom he would have struck if he had not expended his peremptory challenges. However, where a trial court has awarded additional peremptory challenges to a defendant, each such additional challenge is treated as having replaced one that was expended on a juror who should have been but was not struck for cause. See Overton v. State, 801 So.2d 877, 889 (Fla.2001); Cook v. State, 542 So.2d 964, 969 (Fla. 1989). Here, the trial court awarded Conde two peremptory challenges in addition to those normally allotted. Thus, in order to show reversible error, Conde needed to present error in the denial of cause challenges as to three prospective jurors. We do not find that error. Accordingly, we find the trial court's denial of the cause challenge against Rolle to be harmless error. [7] The final challenged prospective juror was Fuentes, who was selected to serve on the jury after the defense used all available peremptory challenges, including two additional challenges awarded by the trial court. In response to defense questioning, Fuentes said that he believed the death penalty would be appropriate in the majority of first-degree murder cases. Thereafter, the trial judge further questioned Fuentes. In that colloquy, Fuentes stated he would listen to the mitigating and aggravating evidence, and if the mitigating evidence outweighed the aggravating evidence, he could recommend a life sentence. Under Reaves, the trial judge's questioning of Fuentes was the appropriate procedure to be followed. As noted in Johnson v. State, 660 So.2d 637, 644 (Fla. 1995), it is not unusual for counsel to elicit strong responses that prospective jurors would genuinely reconsider once they were instructed on their legal duties. Here, Fuentes gave a strong response to defense questioning. However, the final colloquy between the trial judge and Fuentes provides support for the conclusion that his views would not prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror and that he would be willing to follow the court's instructions and the juror's oath. We do not find manifest error with regard to this juror. In conclusion, we find that manifest error has not been shown with regard to the trial court's denial of cause challenges to prospective jurors Groom, Hernandez, Huey, Owens, and Fuentes. As for prospective juror Rolle, although there should have been further questioning, prejudice has not been shown.