Opinion ID: 2582487
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: Photographs of Victims' Possessions

Text: ¶ 78 Yates argues that the trial court improperly admitted exhibit 339, a photograph of victim Shawn Johnson's car. The car was recovered from the East Sprague corridor, but the photograph was taken at the police vehicle processing station. The State explains that, on the night of Johnson's disappearance, she told her roommate that she was going out to make some money through prostitution; thus, the photograph of the car established that she did in fact have a car, and therefore had a ready means to arrive at her destination. Br. of Resp't at 156. The relevance of the photograph is marginal at best, but it is difficult to imagine how the photograph of Johnson's car could have been more than marginally prejudicial, in light of the many other photographs admitted as evidence of Yates's murder of Johnson. CP at 4461-62, listing Exs. 327-38 (including such photographs as Close-up of Body, Close-up of Victim's Head, Close-up of Knots in Plastic Bag). ¶ 79 Yates also claims that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting photographs of a jacket found in Yates's house. The Mickey Mouse jacket belonged to Christine Smith, the woman whom Yates attempted to murder but who managed to escape after being shot in the head while performing oral sex on Yates in the back of his van. Two photographs show the jacket hanging in the closet, and the third and fourth photographs are of the front and back of the jacket. While Yates is technically correct that Smith left the jacket behind after he shot her, the photographs support the State's position that Yates kept Smith's property, an action consistent with his alleged robbery of his murder victims. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the photographs of Smith's jacket hanging in Yates's closet. ¶ 80 We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's admission of the three contested autopsy photographs, the in-life photographs of the Spokane victims, and the photographs of Smith's jacket. ¶ 81 9. Summary Chart of Evidence. This court has recognized that [t]he use of demonstrative or illustrative evidence is to be favored. Lord, 117 Wash.2d at 855, 822 P.2d 177. A chart summarizing the evidence  especially where the evidence is complex and established by multiple witnesses  can appropriately assist the jury. Id. While the trial court has wide latitude in determining whether or not to admit demonstrative evidence, the court must make certain that the summary is based upon, and fairly represents, competent evidence already before the jury. Id. The court ensures that the prosecution's summary chart is substantially accurate . . . by allowing the defense full opportunity to object to any portions of the summary chart before it is seen by the jury. Id. at 856, 822 P.2d 177. Additionally, to guard against the possibility that the jury will treat the summary as additional evidence, the trial court must instruct the jury that the chart is not itself evidence, but is only an aid in evaluating the evidence. Id. ¶ 82 Yates argues that the trial court improperly permitted the State to use exhibit 544, a large summary chart of the State's evidence regarding the Spokane County and Pierce County crimes. The chart, approximately 7½ feet by 13 feet, listed the names of the 13 victims horizontally across the top, with 15 categories of evidence listed vertically down the left side. [28] During the course of the State's case, information regarding the evidence was posted on the chart after the evidence was presented. Before the additions were revealed to the jury, the trial court permitted the defense to contest the accuracy of the new information. Additionally, the court repeatedly instructed the jury that the chart itself was not evidence, and the chart did not go to the jury room during deliberations. ¶ 83 Yates does not assert that the trial court failed to apply the safeguards set forth in Lord, but he claims that the chart was nonetheless inaccurate in three particulars. First, he contends that, because one of the evidence categories was Cause of Death, the chart should not have listed among the victims across the top of the chart, Christine Smith, the woman who survived after Yates shot her in the head. However, as the State points out, the notation entered under Smith's column was Gunshot wound to head (survived). Ex. 544. Moreover, because the State called Smith as a witness at trial, the defense cannot rationally claim that the chart could have misled the jury into thinking that Yates had succeeded in killing Smith as well. Second, Yates claims it was misleading to enter yes in the Clothing Removed/Missing category for victim Zielinski. The State's evidence established that Zielinski's body was found clothed only in a short one-piece dress pulled up to her upper torso area, with her socks, panty hose, and a boot found a short distance away. Third, Yates argues that the yes entered in the same category for Mercer was also inaccurate, but here again, the record supports the notation. Mercer's body was found nude dumped in some blackberry bushes, and while some of her clothing had been thrown on top of her body, her brassiere, tank top, and shoes were missing. ¶ 84 Yates has failed to show that the chart was not substantially accurate. Lord, 117 Wash.2d at 856, 822 P.2d 177. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by permitting the State to use exhibit 544, the summary chart of evidence. ¶ 85 10. Prosecutorial Misconduct. Yates claims that the prosecutor made several improper remarks during questioning and closing argument in the guilt phase, as well as during closing argument in the penalty phase. To prevail on his claim of prosecutorial misconduct, Yates bears the burden of proving, first, that the prosecutor's comments were improper and, second, that the comments were prejudicial. State v. McKenzie, 157 Wash.2d 44, 52, 134 P.3d 221 (2006). A prosecutor's improper comments are prejudicial only where `there is a substantial likelihood the misconduct affected the jury's verdict.' Id. (quoting Brown, 132 Wash.2d at 561, 940 P.2d 546). A reviewing court does not assess [t]he prejudicial effect of a prosecutor's improper comments . . . by looking at the comments in isolation but by placing the remarks `in the context of the total argument, the issues in the case, the evidence addressed in the argument, and the instructions given to the jury.' Id. (quoting Brown, 132 Wash.2d at 561, 940 P.2d 546).