Opinion ID: 2521559
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Liberty and procedural interests arising from the findings and Doe's set-aside

Text: Suspending the imposition of sentence requires that there be circumstances in mitigation of the punishment, or that the ends of justice will be served. [64] An order setting aside a conviction reflects a substantial showing of rehabilitation. [65] The superior court twice carefully considered Doe's circumstances, in 1989 and 1991, when it suspended imposition of sentence. It determined that Doe's offense was not serious and that he did not pose a risk to the community. When the superior court set aside Doe's conviction in 1994, it issued him a certificate that stated that the defendant is discharged by the court without imposition of sentence and that [j]udgment of conviction is hereby set aside. The set-aside thus rewarded Doe for satisfying the obligations imposed on him by the superior court, based on the confirmation that he did not pose a threat of reoffending. As Doe's opening brief cogently argues, a set-aside recipient has already had to demonstrate that he does not fall in [the] category of high risk for a reoffense: The core legislative finding underlying enactment of the original Registration Act itself is that sex offenders pose a high risk of reoffending after release from custody, section 1, ch. 41, SLA 1994. For individuals with set-asides, the court has already made a two-step longitudinal assessment of the likelihood of a reoffense. The court in making the initial determination to suspend imposition of sentence has evaluated the individual's background and offense and decided the defendant deserves a chance to show that he or she has `reformed' and therefore should be rewarded with a clean record. The offender, following a jail term if the court chooses to require it, is then put on probation for an extended period (in John Doe's case, nearly five years) to give the authorities ample opportunity to monitor his risk of reoffending following release from custody. The court thus has had the chance to check the accuracy of its earlier prediction; if there has been a violation of the conditions of probation, then the conviction will not be set aside. Thus, any individual who has been given a set-aside has already had to demonstrate that he does not fall into that category of high risk for a reoffense. (Footnotes omitted.) Doe's set-aside was consequently founded on judicial findings that he presented no significant risk to the community. These findings, with respect to his 1987 conduct and his conviction, were final and unchallenged. With respect to his responsibilities flowing from his conviction, they preclude subsequent reconsideration whether he posed a significant risk of committing the same offense again. Further, the findings resulted in the superior court's entry of the set-aside order. This was a final and unappealed judicial act. Doe's opportunity to have his conviction set aside if he satisfied the conditions the superior court imposed was a crucial element of the order suspending the imposition of his sentence. After he satisfied the conditions, [66] confirming the court's prior findings that he was unlikely to reoffend, the set-aside created a settled expectation that the state would not subsequently use the conviction that was set aside as a basis for imposing brand-new affirmative burdens on him. The now-confirmed findings and set-aside conferred on Doe a fundamental right to be let alone with respect to the conviction that was being set aside. [67] After the court set aside his conviction, Doe no longer had the status of a convicted person. [68] There may be unresolved questions about the full effect of setting aside a conviction. But, at a minimum, the status of a person whose conviction has been set aside differs greatly from that of a person whose conviction has not been set aside, because the set-aside recipient has now been placed in the category of persons expressly or implicitly found to pose little threat of committing new crimes. The SIS findings and 1994 set-aside clearly give rise to interests in liberty and fair procedural treatment that merit constitutional protection.