Opinion ID: 622017
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Denial of Requested Jury Instructions

Text: Smith requested jury instructions informing the jury that “[a] government agent cannot serve as the second party in a conspiracy to distribute drugs” and “[t]here can be no conspiracy established by proving a mere buyer-seller relationship between the defendant Jonearl Smith and the purchaser, officer Ron Goodwyn.” (Supp. R. Vol. 1, Part 2 at 286-87.) The district court refused the requested instructions. Error, Smith claims, because the only evidence of the alleged conspiracy was his sale of crack cocaine to Goodwyn on two occasions. According to him, refusing the requested instructions led the jury to wrongfully believe he entered into a conspiracy to sell crack cocaine with Goodwyn. We review a district court’s refusal to give a requested instruction for abuse of discretion. In assessing whether the district court exercised its discretion properly, 8 Importantly, the jury was instructed that a defendant may withdraw from a conspiracy if he shows “some affirmative action taken to disavow or defeat the purpose of the conspiracy.” (R. Vol. 1 at 156.) It was also told it could “consider evidence of an individual’s imprisonment during the course of the conspiracy on the issue of withdrawal.” (Id.) Despite these instructions and hearing evidence in the form of a stipulation that Smith had been in prison for almost thirteen years of the fifteen-year conspiracy, the jury nevertheless found him guilty on Count 28. As stated above, the evidence supports the jury’s implicit conclusion that Smith’s imprisonment did not constitute withdrawal. - 25 - we review the jury instructions de novo to determine whether, as a whole, they accurately state the governing law and provide the jury with an accurate understanding of the relevant legal standards and factual issues in the case. A defendant is entitled to an instruction on his theory of the case if the instruction is a correct statement of the law, and if he has offered sufficient evidence for the jury to find in his favor. United States v. Crockett, 435 F.3d 1305, 1314 (10th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). Smith does not contest the legal accuracy of the instructions given on Count 2. Rather, he believes his requested instructions were necessary to prevent the jury from convicting him based on a supposed conspiracy with Goodwyn. “It is settled law in this circuit that proof of the existence of a buyer-seller relationship, without more, is inadequate to tie the buyer to a larger conspiracy.” See United States v. Williamson, 53 F.3d 1500, 1518 (10th Cir. 1995) (quotations omitted). However, this rule only applies to the buyer. See United States v. Flores, 149 F.3d 1272, 1277 (10th Cir. 1998) (explaining “the purpose of the buyer-seller rule is to separate consumers, who do not plan to redistribute drugs for profit, from street-level, mid-level, and other distributors, who do intend to redistribute drugs for profit, thereby furthering the objective of the conspiracy”; concluding the buyer-seller rule did not apply to defendant who was not a purchaser but a seller of drugs) (quotations omitted); see also United States v. Fox, 902 F.2d 1508, 1514 (10th Cir. 1990) (“We have held that proof of the existence of a buyer-seller relationship, without more, is inadequate to tie the buyer to a larger conspiracy. One who merely purchases drugs or other property from a conspirator does not thereby become a member of the conspiracy. The reason is that guilt remains individual and personal, even as respects conspiracies, and is not a matter of - 26 - mass application.”) (citations and quotations omitted). In this case, Smith was the seller in the drug transactions with Goodwyn. Thus, the evidence did not support giving the requested “buyer-seller relationship” instruction. As to the other requested instruction, it correctly states the law. See United States v. Barboa, 777 F.2d 1420, 1422 (10th Cir. 1985) (“[T]here can be no indictable conspiracy involving only the defendant and government agents or informers.”). However, even assuming the court erred in not giving the instruction, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Smith, 888 F.2d 720, 723 (10th Cir. 1989) (failure to give a requested jury instruction is reviewed for harmless error; “[i]n doing so, we must determine whether we can declare a belief that failure to give [a requested instruction] was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”) (quotations omitted); see also United States v. Schuler, 458 F.3d 1148, 1156 (10th Cir. 2006) (“Reversal of a conviction is warranted only where the failure to give an instruction is prejudicial in view of the entire record.”). Contrary to Smith’s contention and as demonstrated above (see Section III(B)), the government’s evidence of Smith’s participation in the alleged conspiracy consisted of more than just his drug transactions with Goodwyn; it showed he conspired with other Crips members, including Byrd, Wade and Profit, to distribute crack cocaine. D. Denial of Evidentiary Hearing on Jury Misconduct The jury began its deliberations on March 30, 2009. On April 8, 2009, the jury informed the court it had reached a verdict on sixteen counts but were at an impasse on - 27 - the remaining eighteen counts.9 The court then gave a modified Allen10 instruction. On the afternoon of April 14, 2009, the jury informed the court that “after strongly considering [the Allen instruction],” it had reached a verdict on twenty-six counts but were still at an impasse on eight counts. (Supp. R. Vol. 1, Part 2 at 305.) The court did not answer the jury’s question. The next morning, the jury returned a verdict on all but six counts.11 Immediately after the jury’s verdict was accepted and the jury discharged, the court allowed the jury to meet with counsel from both sides to discuss the case. At that time, the presiding juror provided a typed letter to government’s counsel thanking them and praising them for their handling of the case. The juror also offered to meet with government’s counsel to discuss the case, jury deliberations and “anything else that may help you in an effort to rid this cancer in our society.” (Supp. R. Vol. 1, Part 2 at 321.) The next day, another juror sent an e-mail to a co-defendant’s counsel. The e-mail stated in relevant part: To be perfectly honest, when I entered deliberations, I was prepared to vote 9 The indictment alleged thirty counts. However, because some counts pertained to more than one defendant, while others applied only to one defendant, the number of “counts” or findings the jury had to make was thirty-four. 10 See Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501 (1896). 11 It is unclear from the record whether the jury continued to deliberate after informing the court on the afternoon of April 14th that it had reached a verdict on all but eight counts or before the verdict was taken on April 15th. The record only indicates the question was written at 2:35 pm on the 14th and the court took the verdict the next morning at 8:30 am. The fact the ultimate verdict was rendered on all but six counts indicates further deliberations may have occurred either on the afternoon of the 14th or the morning of the 15th, unless the jury’s letter included a miscalculation. - 28 - everyone not guilty. It was with a heavy heart that I made some of the decisions I made, especially in regards to your client. I came to the quick realization that apparently my view of the law was different tha[n] most of the other jurors, and ironically that of the law itself. I ultimately had to make my decision on the law, even though I did have a hard time believing some of the witnesses, especially when there was nothing else to back it up. (Supp. R. Vol. 1, Part 2 at 322.) Relying on the letter from the presiding juror, Smith moved for a new trial or at the very least an evidentiary hearing based on juror misconduct, namely, juror bias in favor of the government. He claimed the fact the letter was typed showed it was written prior to the close of deliberations. And its contents revealed the presiding juror was biased in favor of the government, going so far as to call him and the Crips organization a “cancer in our society.” (Supp. R. Vol. 1, Part 2 at 321.) According to Smith, that bias, considered in conjunction with the e-mail from another juror to a co-defendant’s counsel, demonstrated the jury was pressured into reaching the verdict it did. The court denied relief. It noted the verdict was split between hung counts and guilty and not guilty verdicts and reasoned: To speculate that the presiding juror became a pseudo-prosecutor based upon his comments in his letter overlooks the verdict that was returned because the presiding juror had to vote to acquit on several charges. As such, the post-trial communication by the jurors certainly do[es] not rise to the level of misconduct, and do[es] not merit setting the verdict . . . [a]side. (R. Vol. 1 at 290-91.) Smith renews his juror misconduct arguments here. He again claims the district court should have granted a new trial or at the very least held an evidentiary hearing to determine whether there was actual bias. - 29 - “We review the denial of a motion for new trial based upon juror misconduct for an abuse of discretion.” United States v. Simpson, 950 F.2d 1519, 1521 (10th Cir. 1991). The relevant inquiry is “whether actual bias existed or whether the circumstances compel an imputation of inherent bias to the juror as a matter of law such that the misconduct has prejudiced the defendant to the extent that he has not received a fair trial.”12 United States v. Lawrence, 405 F.3d 888, 903 (10th Cir. 2005). “The trial court’s decision as to how to proceed in response to allegations of juror misconduct or bias will [also] not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.” United States v. Youts, 229 F.3d 1312, 1320 (10th Cir. 2000). However, “[w]hen a party’s suggestion that a jury is biased is not frivolous, the district court ordinarily should undertake an adequate inquiry into the questions of whether the bias actually existed and whether it was prejudicial.” United States v. Bradshaw, 787 F.2d 1385, 1390 (10th Cir. 1986) (quotations omitted). We see no abuse of discretion—either in the court’s denial of the motion for new trial or its failure to hold an evidentiary hearing. First, to the extent the presiding juror’s letter touches on a matter occurring during jury deliberations, it is not admissible under Rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Benally, 546 F.3d at 1231 (juror’s testimony concerning racial bias during jury deliberations prohibited by Rule 606(b)). Even assuming we could consider the letter, it indicates a distaste for gang activity. 12 In Remmer v. United States, the Supreme Court held: “In a criminal case, any private communication, contact, or tampering directly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial about the matter pending before the jury is, for obvious reasons, deemed presumptively prejudicial . . . .” 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954). Because there is no claim of juror tampering during trial, prejudice is not presumed. - 30 - Distaste for those who violate the law does not mean a juror disregarded his solemn obligation to determine whether the accused was, in fact, a lawbreaker. There is no indication the presiding juror exercised bias during deliberations. Indeed, as the court pointed out, the jury, including the presiding juror, acquitted Smith and his co-defendants on some charges. Moreover, it is pure speculation the letter was authored during deliberations. Given that the court took the verdict early on the 15th, the juror could have typed the letter after deliberations concluded on April 14.13 E. Subsequent Vacation of Smith’s Predicate Act Convictions On April 17, 2007, two years before the trial in this case, Smith pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to one count of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute and two counts of distribution of a controlled substance (Case No. 0610237-01-MB). The three counts were based on Smith’s two drug transactions with Goodwyn in June 2006 and the finding of crack cocaine in the gas cap of Smith’s vehicle in October 2006. The plea agreement contained no promise the government would not file any additional charges against Smith arising out of the conduct to which he was pleading guilty.14 Smith was sentenced to 150 months imprisonment, which was later reduced to 125 months based on the retroactive application of the amendments to the crack cocaine sentencing guidelines. 13 As stated previously, we are prohibited from considering the juror’s e-mail to co-defendant’s counsel under Rule 606(b). In any event, the letter does not indicate the presiding juror pressured that juror into finding in favor of the government; indeed, it indicates that juror made her decisions based on the law. 14 Such promise is typical in most plea agreements. - 31 - After pleading guilty, Smith was indicted in this case and his three convictions were used as predicate acts. After unsuccessfully seeking to have the charges in this case dropped based on his plea and convictions in Case No. 06-10237-01-MB, Smith moved to vacate the three convictions in Case No. 06-10237-01-MB based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Namely, he claimed his attorney had told him his plea in Case No. 06-10237-01-MB would prevent him from being charged in this case and had he known otherwise, he would not have pled guilty. On July 19, 2010, while Smith was awaiting sentencing in this case, the court granted Smith relief in Case No. 06-10237-01-MB, vacating his three convictions and setting the case for trial. Smith subsequently moved to dismiss the case on double jeopardy and collateral estoppel grounds; the motion was denied. We affirmed. See United States v. Smith, No. 11-3062, 2011 WL 6739424, at  (10th Cir. Dec. 23, 2011) (unpublished). Prior to sentencing in this case, Smith argued his RICO conspiracy conviction should be set aside because his convictions on the underlying predicate acts had been vacated. It is unclear whether the district court formally ruled on the issue as the record contains no such ruling. Nevertheless, the court obviously denied relief as it sentenced Smith on Count 2. Smith repeats his argument here. He says to be convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1926(d), the government must prove he knowingly agreed to facilitate the commission of two or more acts. At trial in this case, the government alleged the three drug transactions as the predicate acts against Smith and used his convictions to prove them. Because the jury could have based its verdict on Count 2 on the now vacated convictions, Smith says - 32 - his conviction on Count 2 cannot stand. While Smith raised this issue in a sentencing memorandum (his first opportunity to raise the issue after his convictions were vacated), it is essentially an argument for judgment of acquittal. Our review is de novo. United States v. Eaton, 260 F.3d 1232, 1236 (10th Cir. 2001). We see no error. In Salinas, the Supreme Court said there is no requirement in § 1962(d) of an overt act. 522 U.S. at 63. Therefore, a defendant can be guilty of RICO conspiracy under § 1962(d) even though he himself “does not . . . commit or agree to commit the two or more predicate acts” required to prove the substantive offense. Id. at 65. Thus, the fact Smith’s convictions on the predicate acts were vacated does not preclude his RICO conspiracy conviction given the evidence showed other Crips members committed various predicate acts and Smith knew about and agreed to facilitate them, namely, he obtained crack cocaine from a drug house maintained by Lonnie Wade and Elton Profit (Racketeering Act 39) and engaged in a conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of crack cocaine (Racketeering Act 43). See id. at 66. Moreover, the government did not use Smith’s convictions to establish his predicate acts. Instead, it called witnesses to do so. Indeed, it was Smith, not the government, who introduced evidence of his convictions of these predicate acts. The - 33 - government’s evidence, independent of Smith’s prior convictions, sufficiently established the predicate acts. AFFIRMED. Entered by the Court: Terrence L. O’Brien