Opinion ID: 182627
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The district court's denial of Ashraf's motion for a judgment of acquittal

Text: We now turn to the merits of Ashraf's appeal. The district court's denial of Ashraf's motion for a judgment of acquittal is reviewed by us de novo, and we must affirm the district court's decision if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, would allow a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Mabry, 518 F.3d 442, 447-48 (6th Cir.2008) (brackets and citation omitted). In conducting this review, we give the government the benefit of all inferences that could reasonably be drawn from the testimony. United States v. Villarce, 323 F.3d 435, 438 (6th Cir.2003) (citation omitted). Ashraf puts forth two arguments as to why there was insufficient evidence to convict him of willfully failing to obtain the travel documents necessary for his removal from the United States.
His first argument is that the jury's split verdict on similar counts necessarily means that the jury rejected the government's theory that Ashraf willfully refused to obtain the travel documents. Three of the four counts against Ashraf accused him, under 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a)(1)(B), of willfully failing to make a timely application in good faith for travel documents based on individual meetings that he had with three different ICE agents. The jury convicted Ashraf on counts two and four (corresponding, respectively, to his July 22, 2008 meeting with ICE agent Kevin Hardy and his October 7, 2008 meeting with ICE agent James Schubert), but acquitted him on count three (which was based on his September 9, 2008 meeting with ICE agent Brandon Brown). The government correctly argues, however, that even if these three incidents were substantially similar as far as the charges against Ashraf are concerned, the jury's disparate verdicts on these counts do not render the two guilty verdicts invalid. As the Supreme Court held in United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 105 S.Ct. 471, 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984), there is no reason to vacate [the] respondent's conviction merely because the verdicts cannot rationally be reconciled. Id. at 69, 105 S.Ct. 471 (rejecting lower court decisions holding that an acquittal on the predicate felony necessarily indicated that there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction at issue). This court has reasoned that a jury that inconsistently convicts [a] defendant of one offense and acquits him of another is as likely to have erred in acquitting him of the one as in convicting him of the other. Juries are permitted to acquit out of compassion or compromise or because of their assumption of a power which they had no right to exercise, but to which they were disposed through lenity. United States v. Lawrence, 555 F.3d 254, 261-62 (6th Cir.2009) (setting aside the district court's reversal of the jury's death sentence where the jury imposed a life sentence on another count arising out of the same incident) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Inconsistent verdicts are not generally a reason for overturning a conviction because a criminal defendant already is afforded protection against jury irrationality or error by the independent review of the sufficiency of the evidence undertaken by the trial and appellate courts. Powell, 469 U.S. at 67, 105 S.Ct. 471; see also United States v. Ruiz, 386 Fed.Appx. 530, 533 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that a defendant's protection against an inconsistent verdict lies in an independent review of the sufficiency of the evidence (citing Powell, 469 U.S. at 67, 105 S.Ct. 471)). Both Lawrence and Ruiz recognize limited exceptions to the rule that inconsistent verdicts are generally held not to be reviewable. Lawrence, 555 F.3d at 262. These exceptions, however, are not applicable to the present case. Lawrence holds that it is only when jury verdicts are marked by such inconsistency as to indicate arbitrariness or irrationality that relief may be warranted. Id. at 263 (emphasis omitted). Because the counts at issue in the present case deal with three wholly separate incidents, there is simply no way to know for sure what motivated the jury's allegedly inconsistent verdicts regarding these counts. As was the case in Lawrence, [t]o the extent the differences in the jurors' . . . findings remain unexplained and may give rise to speculation, the fact remains that there is no evidence that any arbitrary factor `most likely' influenced the bottom line verdicts. Id. at 268 (citation omitted). The exception in Ruiz is also inapplicable because it applies where the two counts at issue are mutually exclusive. Ruiz, 386 Fed.Appx. at 533 (holding that even if two counts are interdependent, as long as they are not mutually exclusive, inconsistent jury verdicts should not be overturned). Because the three counts that Ashraf claims are inconsistent are based on wholly separate visits by different ICE agents, thus allowing for the possibility that he was guilty on less than all of these counts, Ruiz 's exception does not apply in the present case. Ashraf is therefore not entitled to an acquittal based on the jury's divergent verdicts.
Ashraf's second argument regarding his motion for a judgment of acquittal is that his efforts to challenge his removal were reasonable in light of the manner he was treated by immigration authorities. Although he is not suggest[ing] that [he] should win on the merits regarding his immigration claims, he argues that because he act[ed] in good faith in seeking the remedies he seeks, the jury was precluded by the `proper steps' and `good faith' definitions given to them by the Court from convicting Mr. Ashraf on any count alleged in the indictment.
Ashraf misinterprets the good-faith and proper-steps prongs that are contained in 8 U.S.C. § 1253. As the district court correctly stated during a hearing concerning the proposed jury instructions, the government need not prove that Ashraf failed to act in good faith when he failed to execute the travel documents. The government is required to prove that he acted willfully. . . . Congress intended that the application itself had to be in good faith . . . rather than [that the] refusal could be in good faith. An examination of the plain text of the statute and the overall statutory scheme regarding the removal of aliens makes clear that Ashraf's proposed good-faith exception does not exist. See United States v. Adeyinka, 205 Fed.Appx. 238, 241 (5th Cir.2006) (The statute's good faith exception does not apply to those who willfully and knowingly violate its terms. The good faith language simply applies to those who try to comply with the statute in `good faith' but nevertheless fail to obtain documents in a timely manner.). Moreover, the provision in 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a)(2) that relieves an alien from liability for taking any proper steps for the purpose of securing cancellation of or exemption from such order of removal is intended to prevent the alien from being prosecuted on the basis of his or her attempts to contest removal. Adeyinka, 205 Fed.Appx. at 241 (holding that the proper-steps exception is intended to prevent the government from prosecuting an alien who challenges deportation. This exception does not apply to Adeyinka because by refusing to sign the documents, Adeyinka was not challenging his deportation.). The provision, therefore, does not exempt an alien from his or her obligation to apply in good faith for the documents necessary for departure. Ashraf criticizes the government's reliance on Adeyinka because it is an unreported decision from another circuit, but he cites no authority in support of his own interpretation of the statute. Moreover, Adeyinka 's interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1253 appears to us as the most logical reading of the statutory text. The United States Code provides aliens subject to removal proceedings with specific instructions on how to contest their removal, such as 8 U.S.C. § 1252's provisions for judicial review of removal orders. In contrast, 8 U.S.C. § 1253, the statutory section at issue in the present case, imposes certain obligations on aliens facing removal. Although aliens may contest their removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252, such efforts do not abrogate the obligations imposed by 8 U.S.C. § 1253. See Adeyinka, 205 Fed. Appx. at 241. Section 1253's proper-steps exception, in other words, prevents Ashraf's efforts to challenge his removal from being used as evidence of his failure to obtain his travel documents. But by the same token, his attempts to have his removal reversed do not excuse him from his statutory obligation to make a good-faith effort to obtain travel documents at the request of the ICE agents. And the jury was properly instructed according to these legal principles. Ashraf's complaints concerning how the government dealt with his immigration issues are simply not relevant to the present appeal. In fact, he acknowledges that [i]t is not suggested that Mr. Ashraf should win on the merits regarding his immigration claims. Ashraf instead limits his argument to the claim that his subjective beliefs about the purported invalidity of his removal provided him with a good-faith basis for refusing to assist the government in obtaining the documents that were necessary for his removal. But as the district court explained, I'm not insensitive to the fact the defendant believes he has been dealt a wrong by immigration authorities, however, any wrongs that may or may not have occurred prior to the issuance of the final order of removal, or final removal order, are not at issue here.