Opinion ID: 2454056
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Is Eserjose's confession admissible under article I, section 7?

Text: ¶ 25 Turning to the confession at issue in this case, we note that the circumstances surrounding Eserjose's confession are significantly different from those in Harris. Notably, in Harris, the suspect first confessed in his home, at a time when the Fourth Amendment violation was ongoing. See Harris, 495 U.S. at 16, 110 S.Ct. 1640. Although the confession was determined to be inadmissible, the suspect had `let the cat out of the bag by confessing' and was not `thereafter free of the psychological and practical disadvantages of having confessed.' State v. Erho, 77 Wash.2d 553, 561, 463 P.2d 779 (1970) (quoting United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540, 67 S.Ct. 1394, 91 L.Ed. 1654 (1947)). The United States Supreme Court did not consider what effect the suspect's first confession might have had on his willingness to sign a second confession at the police station because, as we have seen, it determined that he was in lawful custody at that point. Eserjose, on the other hand, was not questioned in his home, and so the voluntariness and admissibility of his confession at the sheriff's office was not compromised by a prior confession. Id. Like the defendant in Vangen, Eserjose maintained his innocence until he was informed that Paragone had confessed, which suggests that it was this information, not the illegal arrest, that induced the confession. ¶ 26 The constitutional violation in this case, moreover, was much less flagrant than the violation in Harris. The record in Harris disclosed that the New York City police routinely violated Payton as a matter of departmental policy in order to circumvent state law, which provided that an arrest warrant could not be issued until an accusatory instrument was filed and prohibited police from questioning a suspect without an attorney once such an instrument had been filed. See Harris, 495 U.S. at 25 n. 2, 110 S.Ct. 1640. Here, by contrast, the arresting officers entered Eserjose's home with consent, and only exceeded the scope of consent when they entered the upstairs hallway. ¶ 27 The circumstances of Eserjose's arrest are also noticeably different from those in Mariano, the case from Hawaii, where the court held that the suspect's confession was `fruit of the poisonous tree' because the record of his interrogation revealed an unsophisticated suspect still crying and emotional and still viscerally impressed by the circumstances of his illegal arrest.  Mariano, 114 Hawai`i at 282, 160 P.3d 1258 (emphasis added). Unlike the situation in Mariano, here there is no indication that Eserjose was viscerally impressed by the circumstances of his illegal arrest. Indeed, given that Eserjose's father invited the deputies into the house, the fact that the deputies did not have an arrest warrant might have made no impression at all. Their illegal entry certainly lacked the quality of purposefulness and the obvious impropriety identified in Brown. Brown, 422 U.S. at 605, 95 S.Ct. 2254. The application of the Brown factors here leads to the conclusion that Eserjose's confession was `sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint.' Id. at 602, 95 S.Ct. 2254 (quoting Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 486, 83 S.Ct. 407). ¶ 28 The dissent asserts, however, that Eserjose's confession must be suppressed in order to remedy the constitutional violation that occurred, i.e., the unlawful arrest. The problem with this argument is that it assumes that the confession is a product of the violation. The dissent takes this for granted with its erroneous view that the legality of the arrest determines the legality of custody and says that a confession obtained during an illegal seizure should be excluded. Dissent at 188 (emphasis added). The flaw in the dissent's position is that Eserjose did not confess during the course of an illegal seizure. Rather, he confessed during the lawful custodial interrogation that occurred after the illegal seizure had ended. As we have observed, the Fourth Amendment allows police to detain a suspect outside his home on the basis of probable cause alone. Watson, 423 U.S. at 424, 96 S.Ct. 820. Thus, while the warrantless arrest was illegal, once Eserjose was outside his home, the ensuing custody was lawful because the arresting officers had probable cause to believe that he had committed a felony. See Harris, 495 U.S. at 17-18, 110 S.Ct. 1640. As the United States Supreme Court said in Harris, there could be no valid claim here ... that the warrantless arrest required the police to release [the suspect] or that [the suspect] could not be immediately rearrested if momentarily released. Id. at 18, 110 S.Ct. 1640. [11] Since the officers had probable cause before the arrest, that probable cause, not being based on anything they observed during the arrest, was untainted by the warrantless arrest. ¶ 29 The dissent suggests that the status of custody is ... different under article I, section 7 because of its authority of law requirement. Dissent at 187-88, 187. Like the United States Supreme Court, however, this court has held that police may detain a suspect in a public place on the basis of probable cause alone. State v. Solberg, 122 Wash.2d 688, 696, 861 P.2d 460 (1993) (An arrest warrant is not required in such circumstances under either the federal or state constitutions.). Thus, if police officers have probable cause to believe that a person has committed a felony, they have the authority of law required by article I, section 7 to keep that person in custody. [12]