Opinion ID: 1335850
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Substantial Alimony

Text: We now proceed to address the issue of substantial alimony. The defendant contends she was entitled to substantial alimony in view of the nonincome-generating capacity of some of the marital property distributed to her. The family law master concluded [t]he [p]laintiff is found to have the ability to pay substantial alimony, if appropriate. (Emphasis added.) Notwithstanding this finding, the family law master went on to conclude only nominal alimony would be appropriate because the defendant received sufficient equitable distribution to maintain a lifestyle approaching the standard of living to which she ha[d] grown accustomed. As previously discussed, the circuit court rejected alimony outright. The Legislature established in W.Va.Code, 48-2-16(b) (1984), sixteen factors which must be considered in determining the amount of alimony. The record in this case demonstrates the family law master ably took into consideration all the statutory criteria, except the fifth criterion, in making his decision on the issue of alimony. The circuit court's final order and the record fail to show that it considered any of the statutory criteria in determining that no alimony should be awarded. [17] The decision to grant or deny alimony is reviewed by this Court for an abuse of discretion. Although discretion gives the family law master a range of choices, it is not without limit. An abuse of discretion occurs in three principal ways: (1) when a relevant factor that should have been given significant weight is not considered; (2) when all proper factors, and no improper ones, are considered, but the family law master in weighing those factors commits a clear error of judgment; and (3) when the family law master fails to exercise any discretion at all in issuing the order. We are unable to determine from this record that the family law master or the circuit court gave adequate consideration to one of the significant factors in the alimony determination. As we stated in Burnside, 194 W.Va. at 275, 460 S.E.2d at 276, [f]indings of facts are adequate only if they are sufficient to indicate the factual basis for the ultimate conclusion. If an order lacks adequate detail, the case will be remanded for additional specificity. (Citation omitted.) Of course, we do not mean to suggest that in all cases a family law master must consider all relevant factors before exercising its discretion. To be specific, it is not necessary to make specific findings as to each statutory factor recited but only those applicable and appropriate to the case. Burnside, 194 W.Va. at 275 n. 30, 460 S.E.2d at 276 n. 30. In considering the amount of alimony to be awarded, the fifth criterion of W.Va.Code, 48-2-16(b), provides that consideration must be given to [t]he distribution of marital property to be made ... insofar as the distribution affects or will affect the earnings of the parties and ... their need to receive alimony[.] We have not had previous occasion to examine this particular provision. This provision requires a reasonable analysis of the manner in which the distribution of marital property affects the earnings of the parties. The defendant contends, and the record supports her assertion, that neither the family law master nor the circuit court made an analysis to determine the amount of actual income the defendant could plausibly generate from the marital assets distributed to her. There was merely an assumption that, because the property distribution included substantial liquid and non-liquid assets, the defendant would be able to maintain the style of life she was accustomed to during the marriage. The statute requires more than an assumption, it commands analysis and then application. We, therefore, feel compelled to remand the issue of substantial alimony back to the lower court for a specific, factual analysis of the income-generating capacity of the defendant's marital property, insofar as whether or not it is sufficient to maintain her at the standard of life she was accustomed to during the marriage. Where the marital property is shown to be lacking in sufficient income-generating capacity, more than nominal alimony may be appropriate. In considering the impact of assets received as a result of equitable distribution on the amount of alimony to be awarded, it is appropriate to consider not only the earning capacity of that property but also the economic security created by the equitable distribution of that property to the party. We pointed out in Bridgeman v. Bridgeman, 182 W.Va. 677, 680, 391 S.E.2d 367, 370 (1990), that [a]s a general rule, a significant alimony award is more appropriate after a long marriage than after a short one. The parties here were married from 1956 until the decree entered on April 2, 1993. We believe this may properly be considered a long marriage.