Opinion ID: 1589788
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Instruction Embodying the Theory of Defense

Text: ¶ 163. Our standard for review for the denial of jury instructions is as follows: Jury instructions are to be read together and taken as a whole with no one instruction taken out of context. A defendant is entitled to have jury instructions given which present his theory of the case; however, this entitlement is limited in that the court may refuse an instruction which incorrectly states the law, is covered fairly elsewhere in the instructions, or is without foundation in the evidence. Chandler v. State, 946 So.2d 355, 360 (Miss.2006) (quoting Ladnier v. State, 878 So.2d 926, 931 (Miss.2004)). ¶ 164. Goff contends that the trial court, by refusing his submitted instruction D-16, denied him the only opportunity he had for the jury to consider his theory of defense. Goff's theory of defense is that Brandy's husband, James, not Goff, killed Brandy. In support of this contention, Goff points to his own statement to police, admitted as Exhibit 70, that it must have been Brandy's husband that killed her. Goff also points to James's alleged history of domestic violence and the testimony of Detective Lambert. ¶ 165. Submitted instruction D-16 provides: I charge you, members of the jury, that one charged with a crime is permitted to introduce evidence, in exoneration of himself, which if believed by the jury will tend to show that some other person committed the offense charged. In order to justify an acquittal, the totality of any evidence offered to show the guilt of another need not be of such strength as to warrant a finding by the jury that such other did, in fact, commit the crime charged. If the jury believes there is evidence which reasonably tends to show that some other person committed the crime charged, and this evidence, when considered with all the other evidence in the case, generates a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury as to whether the Defendant is the perpetrator of the criminal act, the Defendant must be acquitted. ¶ 166. The trial court denied the instruction, stating, I believe it's improper comment by the Court upon the weight of the evidence. That will be refused. ¶ 167. We find that the trial court did not err in denying instruction D-16 for the following two reasons: (1) the instruction is without foundation in the evidence, and (2) the instruction is covered fairly elsewhere in the instructions. ¶ 168. In addition to his own statement to police that James must have been the one who killed Brandy, Goff offers that James, during his testimony, admitted to a past domestic incident involving Brandy. James's testimony on cross-examination was as follows: BY COUNSEL FOR GOFF (DEEN): You said you were having marital problems. Right? BY JAMES: Correct. BY COUNSEL FOR GOFF (DEEN): And that you were on again, off again with her. Is that right? BY JAMES: We had split up one time before. This would be the second time. BY COUNSEL FOR GOFF (DEEN): Was it in 2004 you had split up? BY JAMES: I would say 2003. BY COUNSEL FOR GOFF (DEEN): Was that over domestic violence that ya'll split up? BY JAMES: No, sir. BY COUNSEL FOR GOFF (DEEN): It had nothing to do with that? BY JAMES: No, sir. BY COUNSEL FOR GOFF (DEEN): Was that ever a problem in your household? BY JAMES: Direct problem, no. BY COUNSEL FOR GOFF (DEEN): Sir? BY JAMES: Direct problem, no. BY COUNSEL FOR GOFF (DEEN): A direct problem. But there was a problem with fights and stuff with ya'll, wasn't there? BY JAMES: There was disagreements and arguments, yeah. BY COUNSEL FOR GOFF (DEEN): Physical fights. BY JAMES: Physical fighting, no. BY COUNSEL FOR GOFF (DEEN): The law never was called to your house? BY JAMES: One time. BY COUNSEL FOR GOFF (DEEN): How close was that to when, to August of 2004 that the law was called to your house because of fighting going on there. BY JAMES: Three or four years ago. ¶ 169. The record also shows that the jury heard evidence that the investigators reviewed James's phone records, which corroborated his whereabouts at the time of Brandy's murder, and took photographs of his body, prior to excluding him as a suspect in the matter. In sum, Goff failed to establish a sufficient evidentiary foundation to warrant this instruction. ¶ 170. Further, the jury also was properly instructed elsewhere in the instructions, when it was told that it could convict Goff of capital murder only if the State proved, beyond a reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence, each and every element of the crime. This was set out in instruction S-2A, which provided: The Defendant, Joseph Bishop Goff, has been charged in the indictment with the crime of Count I: Capital Murder for having killed Brandy S. Yates during the commission of the felony crime of Robbery of Brandy S. Yates. If you find from the evidence in this case, beyond a reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence: (1) Joseph Bishop Goff, on or about August 27, 2004, in George County, Mississippi; (2) did willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and without authority of law and not in necessary self-defense; (3) with or without any design to effect the death, kill and murder Brandy S. Yates, a human being; (4) at a time when Joseph Bishop Goff was engaged in the commission of the felony crime of Robbery, by taking the personal property of Brandy S. Yates in her presence or from her person against her will by violence to the person of Brandy S. Yates; then you shall find the Defendant, Joseph Bishop Goff guilty of Capital Murder. If the State has failed to prove any one or more of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence, then you shall find the Defendant, Joseph Bishop Goff not guilty of Capital Murder. ¶ 171. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that this assignment of error is without merit.