Opinion ID: 772239
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hardship on Employers

Text: 91 The majority also understates the extent to which a bargaining order imposes a hardship on SD&A. The majority contends that recognition by this court that forced bargaining is a hardship would lead logically to the conclusion that an interim bargaining order is never appropriate. Maj. Op. at 1420. This is not so. Under Miller, when the Regional Direc-tor demonstrates that it is likely to prevail on the merits, we presume irreparable injury. Miller, 19 F.3d at 460. Consequently, in those cases involving truly egregious unfair labor practices and obvious majority support for the union, an interim bargaining order would be appropriate. 1 In cases such as this one, Miller commands the district court to exercise sound discretion in balancing the hardships on the parties. Id. at 461. The exercise of sound discretion requires consideration of all the hardships on both sides of the scale. 92 Contrary to the majority's assertion, forced bargaining weighs more heavily on the employer than the union. The posture of the litigants in this case is persuasive evidence of that fact. The union, supported by the Regional Director, seeks a bargaining order. The company opposes one. The union, for good reason, would not consider such an order a hardship. A primary purpose of a labor union is to negotiate contracts on behalf of its members. The successful culmination of this process presumably yields benefits to the employees (in the form of higher wages and improved conditions of work) and for the union (in the form of additional dues paying members). Generally, a union must first convince employees that they would benefit from such negotiations before it may bargain on their behalf. In the present case, the union wishes to forego this preliminary step and have this court order the employer to recognize and bargain with the union. Such an order, far from being a hardship, relieves the union of its obligation to secure the support of the employees. Its lawyers will have accomplished what its organizers could not. From the union's perspective, the remaining uncertainty as to whether a final contract will be signed is preferable to the dual uncertainty of whether the employees will desire the union's assistance and whether the employer will ultimately sign a contract. 93 The employer's perspective of a bargaining order is quite different. SD&A's primary purpose is not to negotiate with a union, it is to solicit donations on behalf of its clients. The diversion of resources from that purpose to collective bargaining is an unwelcome, albeit a sometimes necessary, hardship. A bargaining order would require the employer to bargain collectively and in good faith with the union. This obligation, in turn, requires the employer to invest time and resources, including the hiring of counsel, the preparation of materials necessary for meaningful discussions of terms and conditions of employment, and the presence and participation in negotiations of high level employees. 94 Congress has determined that the benefits of collective bargaining justify imposing these obligations on an employer when employees have freely chosen to be represented by a union. 29 U.S.C. S141. The duty to negotiate with a union that may or may not ultimately be certified, however, must be considered a burden on the employer in the context of a 10(j) petition. Scott v. Expresso Limousine Service, Inc., 1993 WL 181474 at 8 (N.D. Cal 1993) (The potential for wasted resources engendered by a bargaining order outweighs any hardship the union might suffer by having to wait for a decision from the NLRB.) Where the alleged ULPs were relatively minor (as is the case here) and there is no evidence of continuing violations, this hardship is not justified. Wilson v. Hart Ski Mfg. Co., 472 F. Supp. 484, 486 (D.Minn 1979) (where there is no evidence of continuing anti-union activity, the Board's final order will therefore be as effective as an interlocutory order of this court); Hoffman v. Laser Tool, Inc., 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2465 (D.Conn 1995) (discontinuation of illegal activity a significant factor  influencing court to conclude that bargaining order unwarranted). 95 In conclusion, the Regional Director's request for a bargaining order is based on the allegation of an improper grant of benefits to employees and several minimal violations of the Act. [T]he strength of the government's showing on the likelihood of prevailing on the merits will affect the degree to which it must prove irreparable injury. Miller at 459 (citing United States v. Nutricology, Inc., 982 F.2d 394 (9th Cir. 1992)). Given the minimal nature of the alleged violations, the lack of evidence of continuing violations, a bargaining order's inherent interference with the core statutory rights of employees, and the additional burden a bargaining order imposes on the employer, I conclude that the balance of hardships does not tip in favor of the board. The majority's alternative conclusion simply ratifies the Board's long-held view that bargaining orders should be liberally granted as remediesdespite evidence that a new election would suffice.  J. J. Newberry Co., 645 F.2d at 154. Notes: 1 Both Levine v. C&W Mining Co., 610 F.2d 432 (6th Cir. 1979) and Seeler v. Trading Port, Inc., 517 F.2d 33 (2nd Cir. 1975), relied on by the majority, involved far more egregious behavior than that alleged against SD&A. In Seeler, twenty union supporters were permanently laid off. In Levine, the district court found the apparent discharge of employees who were leaders in the organization of the union and threats of business closure. See also, NLRB v. Electro-Voice, Inc., 83 F.3d 1559, 1565 (7th Cir. 1996) (nine union supporters fired after union presented a letter demanding recognition).