Opinion ID: 1122947
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Juror Coercion

Text: The state did not challenge the timeliness of the post-verdict motions raising coercion in the trial court, but does challenge the timeliness of one of those motions here. If the motions were untimely, the trial court had no jurisdiction to entertain them on the merits. See State v. Hickle, 133 Ariz. 234, 239, 650 P.2d 1216, 1221 (1982); State v. Hill, 85 Ariz. 49, 53-54, 330 P.2d 1088, 1090-91 (1958). We do not reach the issue of timeliness of the post-trial motions, because a fair reading of the record indicates that counsel for both defendants did, at trial and in a timely fashion, request mistrials based upon the juror's failure to affirm the verdicts and the events flowing therefrom. In any event, in State v. Lautzenheiser, 180 Ariz. 7, 881 P.2d 339 (1994), we held that it is fundamental error whenever a judge improperly influences or coerces a verdict. Id. at 10, 881 P.2d at 342. Therefore, a finding of coerciveness would support a finding of fundamental error. However, as we have pointed out, in this case counsel adequately preserved the issue of coercion through their motions for mistrial. Accordingly, we review the trial court's denial of the motions for mistrial for clear abuse of discretion. State v. Murray, 184 Ariz. 9, 35, 906 P.2d 542, 568 (1995), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 2535, 135 L.Ed.2d 1057 (1996); State v. Stuard, 176 Ariz. 589, 601, 863 P.2d 881, 893 (1993). The test of coerciveness is whether the trial court's actions or remarks, viewed in the totality of circumstances, displaced the independent judgment of the jurors. State v. McCutcheon, 150 Ariz. 317, 320, 723 P.2d 666, 669 (1986); see Lautzenheiser, 180 Ariz. at 9, 881 P.2d at 341; State v. Roberts, 131 Ariz. 513, 515-16, 642 P.2d 858, 860-61 (1982).
The trial court continued to poll the remaining jurors after Juror No. 1 had failed to affirm the verdict. [3] The Eleventh Circuit has established a per se rule of reversible error when a trial court continues polling the jury once a juror has failed to indicate agreement with the verdict. United States v. Spitz, 696 F.2d 916, 916-17 (11th Cir.1983). Spitz relied on the United States Supreme Court case of Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448, 47 S.Ct. 135, 71 L.Ed. 345 (1926), which did not involve polling but did condemn inquiry into the numerical division of the jury during deliberations. According to the Brasfield Court: [T]he inquiry [into numerical division] itself should be regarded as a ground for reversal. Such procedure serves no useful purpose that cannot be attained by questions not requiring the jury to reveal the nature or extent of its division. Its effect upon a divided jury will often depend upon circumstances which cannot properly be known to the trial judge or to the appellate courts and may vary widely in different situations, but in general its tendency is coercive. 272 U.S. at 450, 47 S.Ct. at 135-36. Arizona case law also condemns inquiry into the numerical division of a reportedly deadlocked jury. Continuing the polling process in this case once a problem was known had the effect of revealing the numerical division, in this case eleven to one. However, like other courts, [W]e do not accept the Brasfield per se rule, believing that the totality of the circumstances rule is more just and sensible. Roberts, 131 Ariz. at 516, 642 P.2d at 861; see also United States v. Fiorilla, 850 F.2d 172, 175-76 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 966, 109 S.Ct. 492 (1988); Amos v. United States, 496 F.2d 1269, 1273 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 896, 95 S.Ct. 174, 42 L.Ed.2d 140 (1974); United States v. Brooks, 420 F.2d 1350, 1354 (D.C. Cir.1969). Nonetheless, the fact that the numerical division of the jury was revealed can be an important factor when considering the totality of the circumstances. In State v. McCutcheon , we said: When the numerical division is known, particularly if the division is lopsided, encouraging the jury to decide can amount to coercion. 150 Ariz. at 320, 723 P.2d at 669. Disclosing the numerical division will not always indicate a coerced verdict. In Roberts, we found that the trial court did not coerce the jury into pronouncing a guilty verdict, even though it asked for the numerical division before sending the jurors back for further deliberations. 131 Ariz. at 515-16, 642 P.2d at 860-61. In Roberts, however, the trial court specifically asked not to be told which side had the majority before being informed that the split was eleven to one. Id. at 515, 642 P.2d at 861. Also, the sole dissenter in that case was not identified to the court. Id. Here, Juror No. 1 was singled out twice during the polling process as the only juror who did not agree with the verdict. Once the numerical division was known, the trial court repeatedly told her, once in open court, and thereafter in their private meeting, that she would have to decide whether she agreed with the guilty verdicts. The court sent her a clear message that being undecided was unacceptable. It never explained to her that an inability to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt could be considered as a disaffirmation of the verdict.
We have regularly condemned ex parte communications between judge and jury. See, e.g., State v. Rich, 184 Ariz. 179, 180-81, 907 P.2d 1382, 1383-84 (1995); Perkins v. Komarnyckyj, 172 Ariz. 115, 117, 834 P.2d 1260, 1262 (1992); State v. Koch, 138 Ariz. 99, 106-07, 673 P.2d 297, 304-05 (1983). The United States Supreme Court has noted: Any ex parte meeting or communication between the judge and the foreman of a deliberating jury is pregnant with possibilities for error.... [E]ven an experienced trial judge cannot be certain to avoid all the pitfalls inherent in such an enterprise. First, it is difficult to contain, much less to anticipate, the direction the conversation will take at such a meeting. Unexpected questions or comments can generate unintended and misleading impressions of the judge's subjective personal views which have no place in his instruction to the jury  all the more so when counsel are not present to challenge the statements. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 460, 98 S.Ct. 2864, 2885, 57 L.Ed.2d 854 (1978). We believe the Court's concerns apply equally to any contact between a judge and any member of a deliberating jury. In the view of the California Supreme Court, when a trial judge knows how many jurors stand on each side of the ultimate issue of guilt and urges the jury to return a verdict it creates in the jury the impression that the court, which has also heard the testimony in the case, agrees with the majority of jurors. Coercion of the jurors in the minority clearly results. People v. Carter, 68 Cal.2d 810, 69 Cal. Rptr. 297, 442 P.2d 353, 357 (1968). We fear that the trial court in this case inadvertently created an atmosphere of coercion when it repeatedly communicated the implicit message to the lone hold-out juror that being undecided about a guilty verdict was unacceptable. The problem was further exacerbated by the supplemental instructions given to the jury before being returned for further deliberations. These instructions informed the jurors, including the lone unconvinced juror, that it was their duty to consider the evidence for the purpose of arriving at a verdict and that [y]ou should not hesitate to change an opinion if you are convinced it is erroneous. The only verdict that could have realistically appeared within reach to the sole indecisive juror was a guilty verdict. [4] Whenever possible, trial courts should avoid ex parte communications with jurors, even at a juror's request and even if counsel consent. This, of course, is particularly true during jury deliberations. The possibility of coercion or other error is too great. When the polling of a jury presents a potential problem, Rule 23.4 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure provides the safest alternatives: If the responses to the jurors do not support the verdict, the court may direct them to retire for further deliberations or they may be discharged. Of course, a trial judge has discretion to make discreet inquiries of the jury as a whole to decide whether the jury is deadlocked or whether further deliberations might be useful. See Roberts, 131 Ariz. at 516, 642 P.2d at 861; State v. McAnulty, 184 Ariz. 399, 404-05, 909 P.2d 466, 471-72 (App. 1995). That was never done here. Recent amendments to our jury rules provide guidance and suggestions to trial courts faced with potentially deadlocked juries. See Ariz. R.Crim. P. 22.4, effective December 1, 1995, and Comment thereto. From all indications, Juror No. 1 requested the meeting with the judge in the hope that it would help her decide how she should vote or to explain her reservations about the verdict. Under the circumstances of this case, the private meeting between judge and juror was antithetical to a juror's responsibility to make independent decisions. No matter how hard the judge tried to avoid it, some type of influence and coercion was inevitable. We therefore hold, under the totality of the circumstances, that because it is sufficiently clear the jury process was contaminated, the trial court abused its discretion when it denied defendants' motions for mistrial based on coercion. ISSUES WHICH MAY ARISE AT RETRIAL