Opinion ID: 1110800
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicability of Henderson v. Alabama Power Co.

Text: At the time Henderson was decided, § 6-11-21 provided: An award of punitive damages shall not exceed $250,000, unless it is based upon one or more of the following: (1) A pattern or practice of intentional wrongful conduct, even though the damage or injury was inflicted only on the plaintiff; or (2) Conduct involving actual malice other than fraud or bad faith not a part of a pattern or practice; or (3) Libel, slander, or defamation. Justices Maddox, Houston, and Steagall dissented in Henderson, and the soundness of the holding in that case has continued to be questioned by other Justices. See, e.g., Ex parte Apicella, 809 So.2d 865 (Ala.2001); Oliver v. Towns, 770 So.2d 1059 (Ala.2000); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Vinson, 749 So.2d 393 (Ala.1999) (Houston, See, Lyons, and Brown, JJ., concurring specially); and Tuders v. Kell, 739 So.2d 1069 (Ala.1999). Linda argues that as a consequence of the Legislature's enactment of Act No. 99-358, Ala. Acts 1999, and Act No. 2001-344, Ala. Acts 2001, the version of § 6-11-21 in effect at the time Henderson was decided (hereinafter former § 6-11-21) was repealed by implication and therefore cannot be revived. Act No. 99-358 comprehensively amended former § 6-11-21. Section 1 of Act No. 99-358 reads as follows: Section 1. Section 6-11-21, Code of Alabama 1975, is amended to read as follows: § 6-11-21. (a) Except as provided in subsections (b), (d), and (j) in all civil actions where an entitlement to punitive damages shall have been established under applicable laws, no award of punitive damages shall exceed three times the compensatory damages of the party claiming punitive damages or five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000), whichever is greater. (b) Except as provided in subsection (d) and (j), in all civil actions, where entitlement to punitive damages shall have been established under applicable law against a defendant who is a small business, no award of punitive damages shall exceed fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) or 10 percent of the business' net worth, whichever is greater. (c) `Small business' for purposes of this section means a business having a net worth of two million dollars ($2,000,000) or less at the time of the occurrence made the basis of the suit. (d) Except as provided in subsection (j) in all civil actions for physical injury wherein entitlement to punitive damages shall have been established under applicable laws, no award of punitive damages shall exceed three times the compensatory damages of the party claiming punitive damages or one million five hundred thousand dollars ($1,500,000), whichever is greater. (e) Except as provided in Section 6-11-27, no defendant shall be liable for any punitive damages unless that defendant has been expressly found by the trier of fact to have engaged in conduct, as defined in Section 6-11-20, warranting punitive damages, and such defendant shall be liable only for punitive damages commensurate with that defendant's own conduct. (f) As to all the fixed sums for punitive damage limitations set out herein in subsections (a)[,] (b) and (d), those sums shall be adjusted as of January 1, 2003, and as of January 1 at three-year intervals thereafter, at an annual rate in accordance with the Consumer Price Index rate. (g) The jury may neither be instructed nor informed as to the provisions of this section. (h) This section shall not apply to class actions. (i) Nothing herein shall be construed as creating a right to an award of punitive damages or to limit the duty of the court, or the appellate courts, to scrutinize all punitive damage[s] awards, ensure that all punitive damage[s] awards comply with applicable procedural, evidentiary, and constitutional requirements, and to order remittitur where appropriate. (j) This section shall not apply to actions for wrongful death or for intentional infliction of physical injury. (k) `Physical injury' for purposes of this section, means actual injury to the body of the claimant proximately caused by the act complained of and does not include physical symptoms of the mental anguish or emotional distress for which recovery is sought when such symptoms are caused by, rather than the cause of, the pain, distress, or other mental suffering. ( l ) No portion of a punitive damage[s] award shall be allocated to the state or any agency or department of the state. Section 4 of Act No. 99-358 states that the amended version of § 6-11-21 (new § 6-11-21) applies only to cases filed more than 60 days after the effective date of Act No. 99-358, which was June 7, 1999. Act No. 2001-344 incorporated new § 6-11-21 into the Code of Alabama 1975, on May 1, 2001, omitting any reference to former § 6-11-21. Under well-settled Alabama law, when a statute is amended or revised, the old statute is impliedly repealed to the extent that it is in conflict with the new statute. For example, in Allgood v. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co., 196 Ala. 500, 501, 71 So. 724, 724-25 (1916), this Court stated: 1. `Where an amendment is made that changes the old law in its substantial provisions, it must, by a necessary implication, repeal the old law so far as they are in conflict. And where a new law, whether it be in the form of an amendment or otherwise, covers the whole subject-matter of the former, and is inconsistent with it, and evidently intended to supersede and take the place of it, it repeals the old law by implication.' 36 Cyc. 1082(D); Scott v. Simons, 70 Ala. 352 [(1881)]; Ogbourne v. Ogbourne, 60 Ala. 616 [(1877)]; Cahall v. Citizens' etc., Ass'n, 61 Ala. 232 [(1878)]; Lemay v. Walker, 62 Ala. 39 [(1878)]. 2. `Generally speaking, where a statute is amended so as to read as follows, the amendatory act becomes a substitute for the original, which then ceases to have the force and effect of an independent enactment; but this does not mean that the original is abrogated for all purposes, or that everything in the later statute is to be regarded as first enacted therein. On the contrary, the better and prevailing rule is that so much of the original as is repeated in the later statute without substantial change is affirmed and continued in force without interruption; that so much of the act as is omitted is repealed; and that any substantial change in other portions of the original act, as also any matter which is entirely new, is operative as new legislation.' 36 Cyc. 1083(2); O'Rear v. Jackson, 124 Ala. 298, 26 South. 944 [(1899)]; In re Estate of Prime, 136 N.Y. 347, 32 N.E. 1091, 18 L.R.A. 713 [(1893)]; Moore v. Mausert, 49 N.Y. 332 [(1872)]; Pacific, etc., Co. v. Joliffe, 2 Wall. 450, 69 U.S. 450, 17 L.Ed. 805 [(1864)]; Murdock v. Memphis, 20 Wall. 590, 617, 22 L.Ed. 429 [(1874)]; Bear Lake, etc., Co. v. Garland, 164 U.S. 1, 17 Sup.Ct. 7, 41 L.Ed. 327 [(1896)]; Great Northern Ry. Co. v. United States, 155 Fed. 945, 84 C.C.A. 93 [(1907)], affirmed in 208 U.S. 452, 28 Sup.Ct. 313, 52 L.Ed. 567 [(1908)], citing many other cases. See also Fletcher v. Tuscaloosa Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 294 Ala. 173, 176-77, 314 So.2d 51 (1975), quoting with approval the first paragraph of the excerpt from Allgood set out above. In Mitchell v. Walden Motor Co., 235 Ala. 34, 36, 177 So. 151, 153 (1937), this Court stated: The general rule as to the construction of statutes thus amended is well settled and given recognition in Allgood v. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co., 196 Ala. 500, 71 So. 724 [(1916)], wherein is the following quotation here applicable: `Generally speaking, where a statute is amended so as to read as follows, the amendatory act becomes a substitute for the original, which then ceases to have the force and effect of an independent enactment ... that so much of the act as is omitted is repealed.' This Court stated in Fletcher: Repeal by implication is admittedly not a favored rule of statutory construction, but in State v. Bay Towing and Dredging Company, 265 Ala. 282, 289, 90 So.2d 743, 749 (1956), we find: `In Alabama, the law governing implied repeals is well-settled and the cases on this point are singularly consistent. See 18 Ala. Dig., Statutes, Key 159 & 160. A concise statement of the rule is contained in City of Birmingham v. Southern Express Co., 164 Ala. 529, 538, 51 So. 159, 162 [(1909)]: `Repeal by implication is not favored. It is only when two laws are so repugnant to or in conflict with each other that it must be presumed that the Legislature intended that the latter should repeal the former.... `Implied repeal is essentially a question of determining the legislative intent as expressed in the statutes. Ex parte Jones, 212 Ala. 259, 260, 102 So. 234 [(1924)]. When the provisions of two statutes are directly repugnant and cannot be reconciled, it must be presumed that the legislature intended an implied repeal, and the later statute prevails as the last expression of the legislative will. Union Central Life Insurance Co. v. State, 226 Ala. 420, 423, 147 So. 187 [(1933)]; Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Farmers' Hardware Co., 223 Ala. 477, 479, 136 So. 824 [(1931)].' As noted, section 1 of Act No. 99-358, which enacted new § 6-11-21, states: Section 6-11-21, Code of Alabama 1975, is amended to read as follows. As also already noted, this Court stated in Allgood, 196 Ala. at 501, 71 So. at 724, and again in Mitchell, 235 Ala. at 36, 177 So. at 153: ... `Generally speaking, where a statute is amended so as to read as follows,  the amendatory act becomes a substitute for the original, which then ceases to have the force and effect of an independent enactment ... that so much of the act as is omitted is repealed.' (Emphasis supplied.) Although section 4 of Act No. 99-358 provided that the new § 6-11-21 applied to actions commenced 61 days after the effective date, section 5 provided that the Act became effective immediately upon its passage and final approval by the governor. As of the effective date of the Act, former § 6-11-21 was invalidated. That no statutorily imposed punitive-damages cap was in place from either the June 7, 1999, effective date, until 61 days later presents no anomaly; the Legislature would have understood that the punitive-damages cap of former § 6-11-21 was not in effect, given this Court's opinion in Henderson approximately six years earlier. This Court noted in Wright v. Turner, 351 So.2d 1, 4 (Ala.1977), the long-standing maxim of statutory construction that a reviewing court is bound to presume that the legislature, when amending a statute, was aware of the judicial construction placed upon it and that, absent indications of intent to the contrary, the legislature did not see fit to change such judicial construction in the court of the amendment. See also Ex parte Alabama Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 683 So.2d 952, 956 (Ala.1996). Accordingly, former § 6-11-21 would not be revived even if we overruled Henderson, and we, therefore, have no occasion to address that possibility further in this case.