Opinion ID: 2121874
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Simple Negligence

Text: In order to state a cause of action for negligence, a plaintiffs complaint must establish that defendant owed plaintiff a duty, that defendant breached that duty, and that plaintiffs injury was proximately caused by the breach. ( Curtis v. County of Cook (1983), 98 Ill.2d 158, 162, 74 Ill.Dec. 614, 456 N.E.2d 116.) A motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a pleading. ( Aguilar v. Safeway Insurance Co. (1991), 221 Ill.App.3d 1095, 1100, 164 Ill.Dec. 418, 582 N.E.2d 1362.) In determining the legal sufficiency of a complaint, all well-pleaded facts are taken as true and all reasonable inferences from those facts are drawn in favor of plaintiff. ( Sharps v. Stein (1980), 90 Ill.App.3d 435, 438, 45 Ill.Dec. 742, 413 N.E.2d 75.) However, mere conclusions of law or fact unsupported by specific factual allegations in a complaint are disregarded on a motion to dismiss. ( Groenings v. City of St. Charles (1991), 215 Ill.App.3d 295, 299, 158 Ill.Dec. 923, 574 N.E.2d 1316.) On appeal, a reviewing court must determine whether allegations of the complaint, when viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, are sufficient to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted. McCauley v. Chicago Board of Education (1978), 66 Ill.App.3d 676, 677, 23 Ill.Dec. 464, 384 N.E.2d 100. At common law, municipalities in Illinois owed no duty to the public to supply police or fire protection. ( Santy v. Bresee (1984), 129 Ill.App.3d 658, 661, 84 Ill.Dec. 853, 473 N.E.2d 69.) This public duty rule prevented a plaintiffs recovery for negligence. ( Porter v. City of Urbana (1980), 88 Ill.App.3d 443, 445, 43 Ill.Dec. 610, 410 N.E.2d 610.) This common law protection afforded municipalities became embodied in statutory immunities granted under the Tort Immunity Act. (The Illinois Constitution of 1970 abolished the doctrine of sovereign immunity [e]xcept as the General Assembly may provide by law. Ill. Const. 1970, art. XIII, § 4.) The Tort Immunity Act provides: § 4-102. Neither a local public entity nor a public employee is liable for failure to establish a police department or otherwise provide police protection service or, if police protection service is provided, for failure to provide adequate police protection or service, failure to prevent the commission of crimes, failure to detect or solve crimes, and failure to identify or apprehend criminals. Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 85, par. 4-102. § 4-107. Neither a local public entity nor a public employee is liable for an injury caused by the failure to make an arrest or by releasing a person in custody. Ill. Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 85, par. 4-107. An exception to both the common law public duty rule and the statutory immunities has evolved where the actions of the municipality's agent showed a special relationship with the plaintiff that created a duty different from the duty owed to the general public. ( Gardner v. Village of Chicago Ridge (1966), 71 Ill.App.2d 373, 380, 219 N.E.2d 147 (finding special duty exists to exercise reasonable care where police call plaintiff into position of peril).) This court has created a four-part test to determine whether plaintiffs can avail themselves of the special duty exception: (1) The municipality must be uniquely aware of the particular danger or risk to which plaintiff is exposed; (2) there must be specific acts or omissions on the part of the municipality; (3) the specific acts must be affirmative or willful in nature; and (4) the injury must occur while the plaintiff is under the direct and immediate control of municipal employees or agents. Burdinie v. Village of Glendale Heights (1990), 139 Ill.2d 501, 508, 152 Ill.Dec. 121, 565 N.E.2d 654. The trial court dismissed the action because Betty and John were not under the direct and immediate control of the officers. Plaintiffs argue that their complaint satisfies the direct and immediate control element based on allegations that the officers were in control of the scene and the building where the attack on Betty and John occurred. In particular, plaintiffs argue that Officer Horka's control over the other officers, Jane, and other potential rescuers satisfies the control prong. This court has interpreted the control element to require that the public employee initiates the circumstances which create the dangerous situation. ( Burdinie, 139 Ill.2d at 525-26, 152 Ill.Dec. 121, 565 N.E.2d 654.) Applying this standard, this court has found the control element satisfied where an officer ordered a driver to halt in an active traffic lane and then directed her to inspect her license plate where she was injured. Leone v. City of Chicago (1993), 156 Ill.2d 33, 40, 188 Ill.Dec. 755, 619 N.E.2d 119; see also Gordon v. County of Jackson (1992), 231 Ill.App.3d 1017, 173 Ill.Dec. 562, 597 N.E.2d 270 (officer initiating dangerous situation by bringing intoxicated, unrestrained man known to be violent to a hospital); Anthony v. City of Chicago (1988), 168 Ill.App.3d 733, 119 Ill.Dec. 554, 523 N.E.2d 22 (firefighter initiating dangerous situation by ordering civilian to assist by opening elevator door); Brooks v. Lundeen (1977), 49 Ill.App.3d 1, 7 Ill.Dec. 262, 364 N.E.2d 423 (officers initiating dangerous situation by ordering motorist to park next to road block when speeding motorist was approaching); Gardner v. Village of Chicago Ridge (1966), 71 Ill.App.2d 373, 219 N.E.2d 147 (officer initiated dangerous situation by bringing witness to identify four defendants who proceeded to beat witness). We find that plaintiffs' complaint does not allege sufficient facts to show that Betty and John were under the direct and immediate control of defendants. Defendant police officers did not initiate the circumstances that created the danger to Betty and John. The officers did not bring the intruder to the plaintiffs' home or order the children to remain there. Plaintiffs were not called into a position of peril by the police. Therefore, the police did not owe plaintiffs a special duty different from the duty owed the general public. Plaintiffs' argument that control of the scene satisfies the control element is unavailing. Police and fire departments, as paramilitary organizations, are by their nature expected to exercise control over a scene requiring their services. The public duty rule and the statutory immunities granted police officers rest on the sound public policy that municipalities undertake these services without becoming insurers. Applying the plaintiffs' definition of the control element would cause the exception to swallow the rule and would make municipalities liable for simple negligence whenever officers respond to an emergency. The public duty rule protects against just this sort of paralyzing liability. We find that the special duty rule as discussed strikes the proper balance between the interests of the municipality and the public. Where the municipality's agent does not initiate the circumstances that creates the dangerous situation, the control element is not satisfied and no special duty can come into existence. Therefore, plaintiffs' count alleging simple negligence on behalf of Betty and John against the defendant police officers and their municipalities was properly dismissed by the trial court.