Opinion ID: 173199
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Time Limit Set By Court

Text: The government asserts the district court unreasonably restricted the time allowed for it to present its case at trial. They claim that, as a practical matter, the district court limited the government to approximately five days to present its evidence which effectively excludes the government's presentation of evidence and is therefore reviewable under 18 U.S.C. § 3731. See United States v. McVeigh, 106 F.3d 325, 330 n. 3 (10th Cir.1997) (§ 3731 can apply to rulings which, though nominally outside the scope of the statute, have the practical effect of orders clearly covered. Specifically, orders directing the government to take action and specifically providing for the exclusion of related evidence in the event of noncompliance have been deemed conditional suppression orders and thereby brought within a liberal construction of the statute. (citations and quotations omitted)). Trial courts are permitted to impose reasonable time limits on the presentation of evidence to prevent undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Life Plus Int'l v. Brown, 317 F.3d 799, 807 (8th Cir.2003) (quotations omitted). [T]he district court constantly produces legal product and manages trials and, therefore, is somewhat of an expert in the time that is required to conduct litigation. Case v. Unified Schl. Dist. No. 233, Johnson County, Kan., 157 F.3d 1243, 1256 (10th Cir.1998) (addressing court's expertise to determine appropriate attorney fees). Nonetheless: [I]t may be an abuse of the trial court's discretion to exclude probative, non-cumulative evidence simply because its introduction will cause delay, and any time limits formulated in advance of trial must be fashioned with this in mind. Such limits should be sufficiently flexible to accommodate adjustment if it appears during trial that the court's initial assessment was too restrictive. Life Plus, 317 F.3d at 807 (quotations omitted). When there is an objection to the exclusion of evidence as a result of time limits, the record must show a proper basis or explanation by the district court for the exclusion. Harris v. Chand, 506 F.3d 1135, 1141 (8th Cir.2007). The parties estimated the case would take eight weeks. Without consulting the parties, and over their objections, the district court allotted each side ten days, including cross-examination. It did not explain why it imposed the limitation and did not address how it would consider time spent on motions, bench conferences and other matters. Although the court implied the time limit was inflexible and would not be changed regardless of what evidence may be properly admitted, its position was taken prior to our ruling on the first issue. The district court is aware of the government's need to present its case  as is its right  as well as the potential for serious constitutional violations if unreasonable limitations are imposed on the defendant's opportunity to defend against the charges. See United States v. Janati, 374 F.3d 263, 273-75 (4th Cir.2004) (addressing the appropriate balance between the district court's right to manage trials and the government's right to prove its case); see also United States v. Rodriguez-Felix, 450 F.3d 1117, 1121 (10th Cir.2006) (The right to present a defense is anchored in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and the Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process. (quotations omitted)). Because our resolution of the first issue alters the scope of the evidence to be presented at trial, we decline to address the second issue.