Opinion ID: 588163
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Falsity and Materiality of Swindall's Statements and Ambiguity of the AUSA's Questions

Text: 127 Swindall next argues that, with respect to each count of the indictment, the government failed to prove the essential elements of perjury: that Swindall knowingly made false statements that were material to the grand jury investigation. Swindall also argues that, as a matter of law, some of his statements could not be false because the questions were fundamentally ambiguous. 31
128 We review a jury's determination of the falsity of statements made to a grand jury to determine whether a reasonable jury could so conclude beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. United States v. Abrams, 568 F.2d 411, 417 n. 25 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 903, 98 S.Ct. 3089, 57 L.Ed.2d 1133 (1978). 32 129 Swindall argues that the statement for which he was convicted in Count Seven--that the $150,000 check he received from LeChasney on September 25, 1987, had nothing to do with the proposed $850,000 deal with Agent Mullaney was literally true because there was a clear distinction between the $150,000 LeChasney check and the Mullaney cash. Swindall admitted, however, that he signed a document stating that I ... have this day received the sum of One Hundred and Fifty Thousand Dollars ($150,000.00) as an advance upon a real estate loan upon my residence ... the total amount of the loan to be Eight Hundred and Fifty Thousand Dollars ($850,000.00). (Emphasis added.) Swindall attempted to explain that, despite his signing of this document, the $150,000 check from LeChasney was an entirely separate loan agreement. Evidence further connecting the check to the larger deal, however, included that (1) Swindall discussed the check with Agent Mullaney as one of a series of $150,000 payments, and (2) after the larger deal fell through, Swindall returned the check and LeChasney stopped payment on the check. We hold that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Swindall's statement was false.
130 Swindall contends that, as a matter of law, he cannot be convicted for making the false statements charged in Count Two because the AUSA's questions were fundamentally ambiguous. 33 We note first that [t]he burden is on the questioner to pin the witness down to the specific object of the questioner's inquiry. Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 360, 93 S.Ct. 595, 601, 34 L.Ed.2d 568 (1973). 131 When a line of questioning is so vague as to be 'fundamentally ambiguous,' the answers associated with the questions posed may be insufficient as a matter of law to support [a] perjury conviction. United States v. Manapat, 928 F.2d 1097, 1099 (11th Cir.1991) (quoting United States v. Lighte, 782 F.2d 367, 375 (2d Cir.1986)). Review is de novo. See Manapat, 928 F.2d at 1099. 132 When, however, a question is only arguably ambiguous and  'an answer would be true on one construction of [the] question but false on another' ... the defendant's understanding of the question is a matter for the jury to decide. United States v. Bell, 623 F.2d 1132, 1136 (5th Cir.1980) 34 (quoting United States v. Slawik, 548 F.2d 75, 86 (3d Cir.1977)). In such a situation, we review under the same sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard used for a jury's determination of falsity. See Bell, 623 F.2d at 1136. Further, the fact that some ambiguous questions were asked does not preclude a perjury conviction. 'If the response given was false as the defendant understood the question, his conviction is not invalidated by the fact that his answer to the question might generate a number of different interpretations.'  Lighte, 782 F.2d at 375 (2d Cir.1986) (quoting United States v. Williams, 552 F.2d 226, 229 (8th Cir.1977)). 133 Swindall stresses particularly that the question contained in the following colloquy was ambiguous: 134 Q: Do you have a specific recollection about engaging in a conversation wherein it was discussed a money trail or the ramifications of the money trail from Mike's [Agent Mullaney's] sources to ultimately you and what potential liability would exist or you would be exposed to?A: No. Only in the sense that I said, would you do the deal, would you do it, if you were in my shoes? That's my recollection. 135 (Allegedly false declaration underlined.) 136 A question or phrase is ambiguous as a matter of law when it 'is not a phrase with a meaning about which men of ordinary intelligence could agree, nor one which could be used with mutual understanding by a questioner and answerer unless it were defined at the time it were sought and offered as testimony.'  Manapat, 928 F.2d at 1100 (quoting United States v. Lattimore, 127 F.Supp. 405, 410 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 232 F.2d 334 (D.C.Cir.1955)). To demonstrate the degree of ambiguity here, defense counsel on cross-examination asked Agent Mullaney the exact same question set out above. The agent stated that he was not sure whether he understood it. 137 Although this question standing alone indeed appears to be ambiguous, we are unconvinced that it was so ambiguous as to have removed from the jury the issue of the falsity of Swindall's answer. First, parsing this question into its essential elements, we see that the AUSA asked whether Swindall engaged in a conversation in which it was discussed what his potential liability would be if a money trail connected him with the undercover agent's investors. That Swindall correctly understood this to be a question about whether he discussed the liability to which he was exposing himself by taking the cash was evidenced by his answer: No. Only in the sense that I said, would you do the deal, would you do it, if you were in my shoes? 138 Second, a review of the question in the context of the line of questioning that preceded it indicates that it was, in fact, rather precise. The AUSA first asked a series of questions about whether Swindall had first discussed the illegality of the deal and then discussed using LeChasney as a buffer to shield him from liability. The AUSA asked Swindall five times 35 if Swindall had discussed using LeChasney as a buffer, and each time Swindall evaded answering the question. Finally, the AUSA divided the question into two parts: first, did Swindall discuss his potential liability, and second, did he discuss using LeChasney as a buffer. In this context, it is our view that a person of ordinary intelligence would understand the question. 139 Swindall answered that he did not recall any specific discussion about protecting himself from liability. The government played for the jury, however, a tape in which Swindall stated that there's no question in this transaction that I am basically using Charles as my buffer, and where Charles gets his money is his business, his problem. We find that the question was at most arguably ambiguous and that there was ample evidence for the jury to determine either that Swindall understood the question, or that his answer was false with respect to any reasonable construction of the question.
140 Swindall argues that the government failed to prove that the false statements charged in Count Three were material. A statement is material if it is capable of influencing the grand jury's investigation. To the extent that truthful answers might assist the grand jury's investigation, false statements are material notwithstanding an abundance of evidence facilitating access to the truth. United States v. Corbin, 734 F.2d 643, 654 (11th Cir.1984) (citations omitted). Further, the statement need not be material to any particular issue but may be material to any proper matter of inquiry. Abrams, 568 F.2d at 420. Materiality is a legal question subject to de novo review. United States v. Molinares, 700 F.2d 647, 653 (11th Cir.1983). 141 Count Three charged Swindall with falsely stating that he walked away from [the deal], basically, after the Greenbriar meeting. Swindall argues that this statement is not material because he admitted later in his testimony that after Greenbriar I was back in it. We agree with the district court that this statement is material because, if believed, it would have steered the grand jury away from inquiry into later money-laundering discussions. Swindall's subsequent testimony that the negotiations continued did not diminish the materiality of the earlier false statement and did not qualify as a recantation. See 18 U.S.C. § 1623(d); United States v. Scrimgeour, 636 F.2d 1019, 1024 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878, 102 S.Ct. 359, 70 L.Ed.2d 188 (1981). 36 142