Opinion ID: 310289
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Electronic Surveillance Issues.

Text: 60 Much of the long history of this case revolves around certain instances of electronic surveillance and the claims (1) that they were unlawful and (2) that proper procedure was not taken to determine whether evidence used at trial was tainted by any of them. 61 The alleged offenses occurred after Nasser had left government service. The government was, however, required to prove that earlier, while still an employee, Nasser had participated in the Hauff and Circella tax matters. It happens that the government had conducted electronic surveillance of Nasser while still employed, 5 and appellants argue they should have been given an opportunity to learn whether the surveillance led to any of the proof the government produced. 62 The verdict in this case was rendered July 9, 1966. Just before trial, the district court had held that the surveillance did not involve a trespass and was not unlawful, applying the rules as understood before Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576, decided December 18, 1967. 63 On July 11, 1968, in the course of defendants' appeal, but on motion of the government, this court vacated the judgment and remanded the cause to the district court, so that there might be in camera inspection of the electronic surveillance to determine whether the convictions had been tainted by the use of improperly obtained evidence. 6 64 While the matter was again before the district court, the Supreme Court decided that Katz was not to be applied retroactively. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 89 S.Ct. 1030, 22 L.Ed.2d 248 (1969). 65 Again applying pre-Katz principles, the district court held that the electronic surveillance, with one untainted exception, had been lawful and reimposed sentences. Defendants again appealed. 66 In 1962 and '63, agents of the Internal Security Division of the service, in the course of an investigation of Nasser, installed a microphone in his IRS office and attached a C clamp to his office phone from which his office and telephone conversations were transmitted to an office of the investigating agents. They also installed a pen register on Nasser's home phone which recorded the numbers of outgoing calls. Certain interviews between agents and Nasser and Hauff were surreptitiously recorded. 67 On remand, the district court found that Nasser, but not Hauff, had standing to challenge the bugging device in Nasser's office, and that it was lawful because no trespass had been committed in planting it. See Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 62 S.Ct. 993, 86 L. Ed. 1322 (1942). 68 The district court found that Nasser but not Hauff had standing to challenge the pen register. It found the pen register had been installed in violation of federal wiretapping law, 47 U.S.C. Sec. 605 (1964). It ordered that the products of this device be given to Nasser and an adversary hearing held to determine the question of taint, under Alderman. At the hearing, the court found no taint, and the finding is presently not challenged. 69 The district court held that each defendant had standing to challenge any recorded interviews in which he was a participant. But it found these interviews lawful under the principles in force before Katz, because a government agent could record a conversation with a defendant without his knowledge and not violate his Fourth Amendment rights. This ruling is not challenged, and its merit need not be considered. 70 Appellants here maintain their original assertion that the surveillance of Nasser's office was an indiscriminate search in violation of the fourth and fifth amendments, and that the district court should have ordered production of the materials and granted a hearing on the question of taint. See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 83 S.Ct. 1381, 10 L.Ed.2d 462 (1963); cf. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 91 S.Ct. 1122, 28 L.Ed.2d 453 (1971). 71 As to the primary issue of whether the agents trespassed when planting the electronic devices, defendants emphasize that Nasser's office was assigned to him for his exclusive use, making the entry of the agents, unauthorized by him, a trespass. 72 We agree with defendants that a government office as well as one in the private sector is not a public area, and trespass can be committed against the one who occupies the office. This is illustrated in United States v. Blok, 88 U.S.App.D.C. 326, 188 F.2d 1019 (1951), where a supervisor's consent to a search by local police of a government employee's desk for evidence of a crime unrelated to the employee's work was held invalid under the fourth amendment. 73 In so doing, however, the court said, 74 No doubt a search of it without her consent would have been reasonable if made by some people in some circumstances. Her official superiors might reasonably have searched the desk for official property needed for official use. 75 We believe this element of work-relatedness is where the trespass line must be drawn. The surveillance in the present case was undertaken by representatives of IRS to determine whether its work was being properly performed by an IRS employee in the areas assigned to him for the purpose of such work. We conclude, because of the relationship of the surveillance activity to the work Nasser was to perform that there was no trespass involved and that under the law as it stood before Katz, there was not an unreasonable search and seizure within the fourth amendment. 76 In United States v. Collins, 349 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U. S. 960, 86 S.Ct. 1228, 16 L.Ed.2d 303 (1966), the warrantless search of a Customs Service employee's jacket by Customs agents for emeralds stolen from Customs mail was held reasonable: 77 We have no doubt that the search of defendant's work area, including the surface and interior of his desk, conducted by Customs Agents McDonnell . . . was a constitutional exercise of the power of the Government as defendant's employer, to supervise and investigate the performance of his duties as a Customs employee. . . . The agents were not investigating a crime unconnected with the performance of defendant's duties as a Customs employee. 78 The late entry of electronic surveillance into fourth amendment doctrines requires that we analogize seized words to seized persons, papers and effects. Here the words seized were related and part of Nasser's official function, and by analogy were things related to Nasser's official duties. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 51, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967). 79 Appellants rely on this court's decision in United States v. Hagarty 7 holding that an intercepted conversation between Nasser and Hagarty could not be used to convict Hagarty. Although Hagarty (without the benefit of Desist) applied Katz retroactively, appellants argue that portions of Hagarty were independent of Katz in holding that the IRS could not conduct electronic surveillance of its own employee in his assigned office, for the purpose of detecting his failures to perform his duties. We conclude, however, that any discussion in Hagarty which might be so interpreted was predicated on Katz principles, and that, by reason of Desist, does not govern transactions occurring before December 18, 1967, the date of the Katz decision. 80 Appellant Hauff raised the issue that the government not only must report in full all instances and surrounding circumstances of electronic surveillance which it discloses, but must also affirmatively deny that the defendant was subjected to any other electronic surveillance. And where the government admits to eavesdropping and is prepared to argue its legality, appellant maintains he is entitled to an adversary hearing at which he may cross-examine the government witness. 81 Appellant relies on a general reading of Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 89 S.Ct. 961, 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969), for the claim that the government must formally and affirmatively state that it has disclosed in full. 82 We do not find this in Alderman because that case dealt with the procedure to be followed when an illegal search has come to light. Id. at 183, 89 S.Ct. at 972. Furthermore, the rationale of Alderman was not 83 . . . lack of confidence in the integrity of government counsel or the trial judge, but only [that] the in camera procedures at issue there would have been an inadequate means to safeguard a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. Taglianetti v. United States, 394 U.S. 316, 317, 89 S.Ct. 1099, 1101, 22 L.Ed.2d 302 (1969). 84 The problem of insuring access to information in the hands of the government which it has a duty to disclose would be an important issue in a proper case. But we do not believe this is the case, both because the appellant came forward with no substantial basis for doubting that the government engaged in unreported unlawful eavesdropping, 8 and because we have reviewed the record of the suppression hearing and find, in the testimony, reason to believe that the government did disclose in full. 85 Summarizing so far, we agree with the government that the records produced from the bugging device in Nasser's office need not be disclosed to appellants; the questions concerning the pen register materials have been resolved; and there is no challenge with respect to recordings of interviews between appellants and representatives of the government. 86 Appellants do not press, on appeal, the argument made in the district court that the interception of telephone messages in Nasser's office by means of the C clamp violated 47 U.S.C. Sec. 605 and entitled Nasser to a taint hearing on the material. Accordingly, we do not decide the point. 87 After the trial, appellants discovered Administrative Circular No. 41 from the Secretary of the Treasury, dated June 9, 1961. It states a policy against monitoring telephone calls to or from Department offices, and provides that the right to use mechanical or electronic recording equipment shall be subject to prior approval of the Secretary or the Under Secretary. The government counters with a memorandum from the Secretary, dated June 20, 1961, which asks that chiefs of Treasury enforcement agencies be advised that Administrative Circular No. 41 is not intended to affect investigative techniques currently employed by them in pursuance of their responsibility under existing laws and regulations. 88 In the absence of material amplifying those two documents, we conclude that Circular No. 41 was not directed at surveillance in the course of internal investigations such as employed in Nasser's office. 89