Opinion ID: 2595083
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Special Circumstance Finding on Conspiracy Conviction

Text: The jury convicted defendant not only of the first degree murder of Esther Alvarado, but also of conspiring to murder her, and it found the financial gain special circumstances true as to both the murder and the conspiracy to murder. The trial court sentenced defendant to life imprisonment without possibility of parole for the crime of conspiracy to commit murder. Defendant argues that the special circumstances listed in section 190.2, including murder for financial gain, do not apply to the crime of conspiracy. This issue also arose in People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 614, 38 P.3d 461. There, the Attorney General conceded that our law did not authorize a special circumstance finding and death sentence for the crime of conspiracy to commit murder. (Id. at pp. 171-172, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 614, 38 P.3d 461; but see id. at p. 173, 115 Cal. Rptr.2d 614, 38 P.3d 461 (cone. opn. of Baxter, J.) [stating that whether special circumstance allegations can accompany a charge of conspiracy to commit murder presents a close and difficult question].) Here, the Attorney General does not concede the issue. We therefore address its merits. California's conspiracy law states that when two or more persons conspire to commit murder, the punishment shall be that prescribed for murder in the first degree. (§ 182, subd. (a), italics added.) The Legislature added that language a half century ago. (Stats.1955,' ch. 660, § 1, p. 1155.) At that time, the punishment for murder was described in former section 190, which stated in pertinent part: Every person guilty of murder in the first degree shall suffer death, or confinement in the state prison for life, at the discretion of the jury trying the same; or upon a plea of guilty, the court shall determine the same .... (Stats .1927, ch. 889, § 1, p.1952.) In 1955, therefore, the punishment for conspiracy to commit murder was death or life imprisonment, at the discretion of the jury or the court. But defendant and the Attorney General both assume that the Legislature, when it said the punishment for conspiracy to commit murder shall be that prescribed for murder in the first degree, did not intend to fix the penalty permanently at the punishment for first degree murder as it existed in 1955, but rather intended to incorporate by reference changes in the penalty for first degree murder occurring after that time. We agree. [W]here a reference to another law is specific, the reference is to that law as it then existed and not as subsequently modified, but where the reference is general, ... `the reference is to the law as it may be changed from time to time.' ( People v. Anderson (2002) 28 Cal.4th 767, 779, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 587, 50 P.3d 368, citing Palermo v. Stockton Theatres, Inc. (1948) 32 Cal.2d 53, 58-59, 195 P.2d 1.) Because section 182 refers generally to the punishment prescribed for murder in the first degree, it incorporates whatever punishment the law prescribed for first degree murder when the conspiracy was committed. The current law fixing the penalty for first degree murder was enacted by voter initiative in 1978. Subdivision (a) of section 190, enacted as part of that initiative, describes the punishment for first degree murder: Every person guilty of murder in the first degree shall suffer death, confinement in state prison for life without the possibility of parole, or confinement in the state prison for a term of 25 years to life. The penalty to be applied shall be determined as provided in Sections 190.1, 190.2, 190.3, 190.4, and 190.5. Subdivision (a) of section 190.2 states: The penalty for a defendant who is found guilty of murder in the first degree is death or imprisonment in the state prison for life without the possibility of parole if one or more ... special circumstances has been found ... true .... (Italics added.) Thus, current law prescribes death and life imprisonment without possibility of parole as punishments for first degree murder, but only when a special circumstance has been found true. Absent a special circumstance finding, the punishment for first degree murder is imprisonment for a term of 25 years to life. Because the punishment for conspiracy to commit murder is the punishment ... prescribed for murder in the first degree (§ 182, subd. (a)), the punishment for conspiracy to commit murder can be death or life imprisonment without parole only if a special circumstance may be alleged and found true as to that crime. Whether the special circumstances in section 190.2 apply to the crime of conspiracy to murder is a question of statutory construction. In construing statutes, we seek to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent. ( People v. Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605, 621, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 356, 927 P.2d 713.) We begin with the text of statutes because the words used are generally the most reliable indicator of legislative intent. (Ibid.) We find nothing in the wording of the statutes governing special circumstances indicating that the voters who enacted the 1978 death penalty law intended that the special circumstances would apply to the crime of conspiracy to commit murder or indeed to any crime other than murder. The crime of conspiracy to commit murder is nowhere mentioned in the text of the 1978 death penalty initiative measure, and the initiative's provisions rather strongly imply that special circumstances may be charged and found true only as to the crime of murder. For example, subdivision (a) of section 190.1 states:  If the trier of fact finds the defendant guilty of first degree murder, it shall at the same time determine the truth of all special circumstances charged .... (Italics added.) We assume the electorate understood that application of special circumstances to the crime of conspiracy to murder would have practical significance only when the conspirators did not succeed in killing their intended victim. If they did kill the victim, the conspirators could be charged with murder, and the special circumstance could be alleged for that crime. The prosecution would gain no apparent advantage in charging special circumstances also as to the separate of crime of conspiracy to murder. Under Penal Code section 654, a defendant may not be punished for both the murder and the conspiracy ( People v. Moringlane (1982) 127 Cal. App.3d 811, 819, 179 Cal.Rptr. 726); in any event, the punishments of death and life without possibility of parole may only be imposed on a defendant once. Thus, the 1978 electorate would have no reason to want the special circumstances adopted by the 1978 initiative to be applicable to a successful conspiracy to commit murder. We consider, then, whether there is any basis to conclude that the electorate intended to make capital punishment available for those engaged in an unsuccessful conspiracy to commit murder. To determine the voters' intent, we consider the analyses and arguments in the official ballot pamphlet for the election at which the 1978 death penalty initiative was adopted. (See People v. Rizo (2000) 22 Cal.4th 681, 685, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 375, 996 P.2d 27; People v. Birkett (1999) 21 Cal.4th 226, 243, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 205, 980 P.2d 912.) Like the text of the initiative itself, the analyses and arguments in the official ballot pamphlet for the election at which the 1978 death penalty initiative was adopted contain no mention of the crime of conspiracy to commit murder and no suggestion that the special circumstances enumerated in section 190.2 would apply to the crime of conspiracy to commit murder or to any crime other than murder. Another aid in determining legislative intent is the history and background of the measure ( People v. Birkett, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 232, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 205, 980 P.2d 912), including the wider historical circumstances of its enactment ( Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1387, 241 Cal.Rptr. 67, 743 P.2d 1323; accord, County of Santa Clara v. Perry (1998) 18 Cal.4th 435, 442, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 738, 956 P.2d 1191). In 1978, when the electorate adopted the current death penalty law, it was unclear whether the federal Constitution permitted imposition of the death penalty for the crime of conspiracy to murder. Just the preceding year, in Coker v. Georgia (1977) 433 U.S. 584, 97 S.Ct. 2861, 53 L.Ed.2d 982 (Coker) , six justices of the United States Supreme Court had held that imposing the death penalty for rape was cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the federal Constitution. (Coker, at p. 592, 97 S.Ct. 2861 (plur.opn.); id. at p. 600, 97 S.Ct. 2861 (cone. opns. of Brennan, J. & Marshall, J.).) Although the high court did not expressly hold that the Eighth Amendment prohibits capital punishment for all crimes not resulting in death, the plurality stressed that the crucial difference between rape and murder is that a rapist does not take human life. (Coker, at p. 598, 97 S.Ct. 2861.) The same day on which it decided Coker, the high court, in a one-paragraph per curium opinion, vacated a death sentence for the crime of aggravated kidnapping, stating that the sentence was cruel and unusual punishment. ( Eberheart v. Georgia (1977) 433 U.S. 917, 97 S.Ct. 2994, 53 L.Ed.2d 1104.) We assume the electorate is aware of relevant judicial decisions when it adopts legislation by initiative. ( People v. Clark (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583, 602, 268 Cal. Rptr. 399, 789 P.2d 127; People v. Burton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 843, 861, 258 Cal.Rptr. 184, 771 P.2d 1270.) Thus, we assume that in 1978, when it adopted the current death penalty law, the California electorate was aware of the United State Supreme Court's then recent decisions in Coker, supra, 433 U.S. 584, 97 S.Ct. 2861, 53 L.Ed.2d 982, and Eberheart v. Georgia, supra, 433 U.S. 917, 97 S.Ct. 2994, 53 L.Ed.2d 1104, raising serious doubts that the federal Constitution permitted the death penalty for any offense not requiring the actual taking of human life. It is reasonable to infer that the electorate, having this knowledge, intended to ensure the constitutionality of death penalty law by restricting capital punishment to the crime of first degree murder. Further, it is reasonable to infer that the electorate intended to accomplish this restriction by authorizing the special circumstances that would establish eligibility for capital punishment only for murder in the first degree, as indicated by the wording of subdivision (a) of section 190.1 stating that a trier of fact would determine the truth of a special circumstance allegation only [i]f the trier of fact finds the defendant guilty of first degree murder .... We also assume the voters are aware of punishments for comparable California crimes when they adopt punitive legislation. In November 1978, when the initiative death penalty law was enacted by the electorate, the penalty for most forms of attempted willful and premeditated murder was five, six, or seven years. (Former § 664, subd. 1, as amended by Stats.1976, ch. 1139, § 265, p. 5137; see §§ 187, 189, former § 190, as added by Stats.1977, ch. 316, § 5, p. 1256.) September 1978 legislative amendments had increased that punishment, effective January 1, 1979, but only to five, seven, or nine years (former § 664, subd. (1), as amended by Stats.1978, ch. 579, § 27, p.1986; Stats.1978, ch. 1166, § 2, p. 3771). Years later, the Legislature further increased the punishment for attempted willful and premeditated murder, but only to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole (former § 664, subd. (1), as amended by Stats.1986, ch. 519, § 2, p. 1859), where it remains today. (§ 664, subd. (a).) Though conspiracy is often punished more severely than attempt, it seems unlikely the voters intended to allow the death penalty for a conspiracy to murder, which requires only a conspirator's overt act in furtherance of the murderous plot (§ 184), at a time when the maximum punishment for attempted willful and premeditated murder, which requires a direct, though ineffectual, premeditated murderous act (§ 21a), was five, seven, or nine years in prison. This further supports our conclusion that the special circumstances in section 190.2 do not apply to conspiracy to murder. Two additional rules of statutory construction also favor the conclusion that the special circumstances adopted by the 1978 death penalty law do not apply to crimes, like conspiracy to commit murder, that do not require the actual taking of human life. When determining the scope of an initiative, we assume that the voters intended the measure to be valid and construe it to avoid `serious' doubts as to its constitutionality if that can be done `without doing violence to the reasonable meaning of the language.' ( San Francisco Taxpayers Assn. v. Board of Supervisors (1992) 2 Cal.4th 571, 581, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 245, 828 P.2d 147.) Here, a construction of the 1978 death penalty law as permitting capital punishment for an offense like conspiracy to commit murder that does not require the actual taking of human life would raise a serious constitutional question. Since the United States Supreme Court's 1977 decisions in Coker, supra, 433 U.S. 584, 97 S.Ct. 2861, 53 L.Ed.2d 982, and Eberheart v. Georgia, supra, 433 U.S. 917, 97 S.Ct. 2994, 53 L.Ed.2d 1104, there have been no executions in this country for crimes that did not involve the victim's death. (See Note, What if the Victim is a Child? Examining the Constitutionality of Louisiana's Challenge to Coker v. Georgia (2000) 2000 Ill. L.Rev. 347, 360.) As a result, whether the federal Constitution bars imposition of the death penalty for crimes not resulting in death remains an unresolved issue. (See State v. Polk (La. 1979) 376 So.2d 151 [relying on Coker and Eberheart, to invalidate law imposing the death penalty for aggravated kidnapping]; State v. Gardner (Utah 1997) 947 P.2d 630 [relying on Coker to invalidate law imposing the death penalty for aggravated assault by a prisoner serving a sentence for a felony of the first degree]; but see State v. Wilson (La.1996) 685 So.2d 1063 [distinguishing Coker to uphold law imposing the death penalty for rape of a child under the age of 12].) The issue continues to be the subject of considerable scholarly debate. (See, e.g., Note, Murdering Innocence: The Constitutionality of Capital Child Rape Statutes (2003) 45 Ariz. L.Rev. 197; Broughton, On Horror's Head Horrors Accumulate: A Reflective Comment on Capital Child Rape Legislation (2000) 39 Duq. L.Rev. 1; Note, What if the Victim is a Child? Examining the Constitutionality of Louisiana's Challenge to Coker v. Georgia (2000) 2000 Ill. L.Rev. 347; Fleming, Louisiana's Newest Capital Crime: The Death Penalty for Child Rape (1999) 89 J.Crim. L. & Criminology 717; Bailey, Death Is Different, Even on the Bayou: The Disproportionality of Crime and Punishment in Louisiana's Capital Child Rape Statute (1998) 55 Wash. & Lee L.Rev. 1335; Higgins, Is Capital Punishment for Killers Only? (Aug.1997) 83 A.B.A. J. 30; Comment, Coker v. Georgia: Disproportionate Punishment and the Death Penalty for Rape (1978) 78 Colum. L.Rev. 1714; Comment, Death Penalty for Rape (1977) 91 Harv. L.Rev. 123.) A survey published by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the statistical agency of the United States Department of Justice, lists no state with a law allowing the death penalty for conspiracy to murder. But several states, as well as the federal government, have laws authorizing the death penalty for other crimes that do not necessarily involve the victim's death, such as treason, espionage, air piracy, aggravated kidnapping, and rape of a child. (Snell and Maruschak, Capital Punishment 2001, Bur. of Justice Statistics Bull, Dec. 2002, p. 2, [as of June 2, 2003].) Because the constitutionality of laws imposing the death penalty for crimes not necessarily resulting in death is unresolved, and because we do not know of any state that allows a sentence of death for conspiracy to murder, we are reluctant to find that the electorate intended to authorize the death penalty for that offense absent clear evidence, of which we have found none, of that intent. The last rule of statutory construction we consider is known as the rule of lenity. This rule states that when two reasonable interpretations of the same provision stand in relative equipoise, i.e., ... resolution of the statute's ambiguities in a convincing manner is impracticable, we construe the provision most favorably to the defendant. ( People v. Jones (1988) 46 Cal.3d 585, 599, 250 Cal.Rptr. 635, 758 P.2d 1165; see also People v. Avery (2002) 27 Cal.4th 49, 58, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 403, 38 P.3d 1.) Here, as we have seen, the 1978 death penalty law is most plausibly construed as not authorizing the charging of special circumstances for the crime of conspiracy to commit murder. But even if such a construction were no more plausible than the alternative, the rule of lenity would add decisive weight in favor of that construction. Accordingly, we hold that under sections 182 and 189 through 190.2, the punishment for conspiracy to commit murder is the punishment for first degree murder without special circumstances.