Opinion ID: 2637971
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Should the heightened pleading standard apply?

Text: Long contends that the Court of Appeals applied the wrong analysis in its determination regarding qualified immunity and urges this court to analyze the qualified immunity issue using a heightened pleading standard. In Van Deelen v. City of Eudora, Kan., 53 F. Supp.2d 1223 (D. Kansas 1999), a pro se plaintiff alleged that an investigator working for the Douglas County District Attorney's office knowingly made a false determination that probable cause for plaintiff's arrest existed and then knowingly filed a false complaint. The United States District Court for the District of Kansas said: `In the context of a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, ... the qualified immunity defense is limited to the pleadings,' and `the allegations in the complaint and any reasonable inferences ... from them' are drawn in favor of the plaintiff. [Citation omitted.] In this context, the court applies `a heightened pleading standard, requiring the complaint to contain specific, non-conclusory allegations of fact sufficient to allow the district court to determine that those facts, if proved, demonstrate that the actions take were not objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law.' [Citations omitted.] Once this defense is raised, the plaintiff `may amend his complaint to include additional specific, non-conclusory allegations of fact sufficient to allow the district court to determine immunity.' 53 F. Supp.2d at 1232-33. In a discussion of the procedures available to federal trial judges when handling § 1983 and other claims involving examination of an official's state of mind, the United States Supreme Court stated: When a plaintiff files a complaint against a public official alleging a claim that requires proof of wrongful motive, the trial court must exercise its discretion in a way that protects the substance of the qualified immunity defense. It must exercise its discretion so that officials are not subjected to unnecessary and burdensome discovery or trial proceedings. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 597-98,140 L. Ed.2d 759, 118 S. Ct. 1584 (1998). Because the purpose of the qualified immunity is to spare prosecutors the costs and burdens of baseless claims, many courts felt it was not unreasonable to require plaintiffs to plead specific, nonconclusory allegations of fact, which if proven, would demonstrate a violation of clearly established law. McCormick correctly asserted at oral argument that the Tenth Circuit decision in Currier v. Doran, 242 F.3d 905, 916 (10th Cir. 2001), nullified the heightened pleading standard used previously in Tenth Circuit federal courts under Breidenbach v. Bolish, 126 F.3d 1288, 1292 (10th Cir. 1997). Long had requested this court to apply Breidenbach in this case. In Currier, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals performed a review of the Supreme Court case of Crawford-El, 523 U.S. 574, and concluded: [T]his court's heightened pleading requirement cannot survive Crawford-El. There is no relevant difference between the D.C. Circuit's heightened burden of proof at summary judgment and this court's heightened pleading requirement which justifies the continuing viability of the latter after Crawford-El.... Like the D.C. Circuit's heightened burden of proof, this court's heightened pleading requirement was based on Harlow. See Breidenbach, 126 F.3d at 1292. Nevertheless, as the Supreme Court made clear in Crawford-El, neither the holding nor the reasoning of Harlow, a qualified immunity case, warranted a change in the requirements of a plaintiff's affirmative case. 242 F.3d at 916. Therefore, following the lead of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in regard to the procedure to be used when a § 1983 violation is claimed, this court will not impose the heightened pleading standard.