Opinion ID: 2585993
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Placing Privileged Communications at Issue

Text: The first way in which a client might impliedly waive the attorney-client privilege is to place privileged communications at issue. The rationale for an implied waiver in those circumstances is that the law will not permit a client to use as a sword the protection which is awarded him as a shield. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. DiFede, 780 P.2d 533, 544 (Colo.1989). In other words, if a client asserts a claim or defense that depends upon privileged information, she cannot simultaneously use the privilege to keep that information from the opposing party. In order to waive the privilege in this manner, the client must commit some affirmative act that places the privileged information at issue. Madera, 112 P.3d at 691-92. Accordingly, we have held in several cases that, where a client asserts a defense or a claim based on the propriety of advice given by her attorney, she waives the privilege with respect to that advice. See, e.g., Stone v. Satriana, 41 P.3d 705, 710 (Colo. 2002) (When a client brings a malpractice allegation, the attorney-client privilege is deemed impliedly waived.); Morse, 180 Colo. at 54, 501 P.2d at 1331 (holding that, if a client testifies to the alleged incompetence of counsel, the client waives the attorney-client privilege); Sickich, 935 P.2d at 73 ([B]ecause defendant put in issue what advice he did or did not receive from counsel, as well as his own understanding of the proceedings, he waived the attorney-client privilege with respect to his discussions with counsel on these topics.). Similarly, in Madera, a criminal defendant entered a plea agreement but then later sought to withdraw his plea, claiming that he did not understand the implications of his plea because of ineffective assistance of counsel. See 112 P.3d at 689. We held, on those facts, that Madera waived the attorney-client privilege with respect to communications with his counsel regarding the sentence he would face by pleading guilty. Id. at 691. In this case the trial court held, and Trujillo argues to this Court, that Gomez took an affirmative act sufficient to impliedly waive the attorney-client privilege when she entered into a plea agreement with the district attorney and promised to provide truthful testimony. Trujillo first contends that, simply by entering into the plea agreement, Gomez waived the attorney-client privilege with respect to all previously confidential statements that related to the subject matter of her plea agreement. We are aware of no authority, nor has Trujillo identified any such authority, that would support the proposition that a defendant waives the attorney-client privilege simply by entering into a plea agreement. In fact, our decision in Madera supports a contrary proposition. In Madera, we found that the defendant had put the advice he received from his attorney at issue by claiming ineffective assistance of counsel with regard to his plea agreement. 112 P.3d at 692. The key fact in Madera, however, was that he challenged the adequacy of the advice that he had received in conjunction with the plea agreement. Id. at 689. We in no way suggested that simply entering into the plea agreement waived the privilege between Madera and his counsel. In this case, unlike the defendant in Madera, Gomez has not challenged the propriety of her plea nor the adequacy of her representation in any way. We therefore hold that she did not impliedly waive the attorney-client privilege simply by entering into a plea agreement. Nor are we persuaded by Trujillo's second argument namely, that Gomez impliedly waived the attorney-client privilege because she put her credibility at issue by agreeing to provide truthful testimony. We hold that agreeing to provide truthful testimony in conjunction with a plea agreement does not effect a waiver of the attorney-client privilege. Indeed, to hold otherwise could have unintended consequences that could dramatically diminish the protections of the attorney-client privilege. Every witness who offers trial testimony under oath has an obligation imposed by law to tell the truth. See § 18-8-502, C.R.S. (2006) (defining the crime of perjury in the first degree). In light of this legal obligation, if we were to conclude that Gomez waived the attorney-client privilege by agreeing to provide truthful testimony, our decision would be tantamount to holding that every witness waives the attorney-client privilege with respect to all communications with his attorney about the subject of his testimony. We cannot countenance such a broad interpretation of implied waiver of the attorney-client privilege. We therefore hold that neither the fact that Gomez entered into the plea agreement nor the fact that she promised to provide truthful testimony constitutes an affirmative act that impliedly waived the attorney-client privilege.