Opinion ID: 599244
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The EPA's Interpretation of RCRA

Text: 35 In assessing the validity of the EPA's interpretation of RCRA, we apply the principles set forth in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2781-83, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). Under the Chevron analysis, judicial review of an agency's interpretation of a statute committed to its administration is limited to a two-step inquiry. At the first step, we inquire whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. Id. at 842, 104 S.Ct. at 2781. If we then reach the unmistakable conclusion that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, our inquiry ends there, Ohio v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 441 (D.C.Cir.1989). Courts must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. at 2781. 36 However, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, we proceed to the second step of the Chevron analysis. Id. At that step, we defer to the agency's interpretation of the statute if it is reasonable and consistent with the statute's purpose. Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States EPA, 919 F.2d 158, 162-63 (D.C.Cir.1990). [W]e are not free to 'impose our own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation.'  Nuclear Info. Resource Serv. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 969 F.2d 1169, 1173 (D.C.Cir.1992) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. at 2782) (internal brackets omitted). Applying that test to the EPA's interpretation of section 6002 to permit an incidental purchase exception, we conclude that the Agency's interpretation survives both steps of the Chevron analysis. 37
38 The NRC argues first that Congress has clearly spoken on the question at issue and that the incidental purchases exception is contrary to Congress's clear mandate. Section 6002 of RCRA provides: 39 [A] procuring agency shall comply with the requirements set forth in this section and any regulations issued under this section, with respect to any purchase or acquisition of a procurement item where the purchase price of the item exceeds $10,000 or where the quantity of such items or of functionally equivalent items purchased or acquired in the course of the preceding fiscal year was $10,000 or more. 40 42 U.S.C. § 6962(a) (emphasis added). The NRC argues that the text of the Act is clear: There is no limiting language in the statute regarding the purpose for which the funds were appropriated or the goal of the contract. The NRC points out that the statute uses the inclusive term any to describe the universe of purchases or acquisitions that fall within the statute's ambit. The NRC further notes that the incidental purchases exception does not appear in the Act. 41 We, however, agree with the EPA that the statutory language does not clearly preclude the interpretation allowing the incidental purchases exception. Section 6002 incorporates the term procuring agency, which the Act defines as 42 any Federal agency, or any State agency or agency of a political subdivision of a State which is using appropriated Federal funds for such procurement, or any person contracting with any such agency with respect to work performed under such contract. 43 42 U.S.C. § 6903(17) (emphasis added). We agree with the EPA that this statutory language permits, if not compels, the conclusion that while every federal agency is a procuring agency subject to the guidelines, state and local agencies, and government contractors, are procuring agencies within the meaning of the statute only to the extent that they expend appropriated funds for ... procurement under the contract or act with respect to work performed under such contract. Id. At the very least, there is sufficient ambiguity in the language of the statute that it cannot be said that Congress has directly spoken to the propriety of an incidental purchases exception to RCRA. Thus we find no merit in the NRC's claim that the Administrator's interpretation is without authorization and contrary to the clear intent of Congress. Petitioner's Br. at 28. 44
45 The NRC argues that even if we find that Congress's intent is not clear, the Administrator's incidental purchases exception is unreasonable in light of the statutory language, the legislative history, and the administrative record. See NRDC v. EPA, 822 F.2d 104, 111 (D.C.Cir.1987) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-45, 104 S.Ct. at 2781-83 (agency interpretation must be reasonable in light of the language, legislative history, and policies of the statute)). The NRC maintains that the legislative history of RCRA evidences a congressional purpose inconsistent with the incidental purchases exceptions. The NRC cites a House Report in which the House of Representatives expresses its intent to use federal purchasing power to provide a stimulus which has the potential for motivating other levels of government and private industry to use greater amounts of recovered materials. H.R.Rep. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1976), reprinted in1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238, 6289, and a conference report to the 1984 amendments stating that the influence which the Federal government can exert through its purchasing power to stimulate demand of and use of recovered materials should be exercised more vigorously. H.R.Rep. No. 1133, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 121 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5576, 5692. 46 These general statements do not do the work the NRC wishes them to do. Nothing in the legislative history indicates a congressional purpose as to the scope of applicability of these regulations, let alone the permissibility of an incidental purchases exception under the Act. In addition, there is nothing in the reports to suggest that Congress intended no exceptions other than the $10,000 floor. 47 The EPA argues the incidental purchases exception is permissible under step two Chevron analysis. The EPA reminds us that the statutory definition of procuring agency makes clear that a nexus must exist between an item purchased by a contractor or non-federal agency and the contract or other federal funding agreement. Respondent's Br. at 14. We agree. Further, the legislative history, by distinguishing between the direct effects of section 6002, and its indirect effects, supports the EPA's position that its interpretation is consistent with congressional purpose. Relevant portions of the House Report state: 48 The Committee believes that the use of federal purchasing power to provide this stimulus [referring to the establishment of adequate markets for the ... recovered materials] represents a constructive use of government power which has potential for motivating other levels of government and private industry to use greater amounts of recovered materials.... 49 ... Federal guidelines, standards and specifications used in connection with Federal grants and other Federal assistance to State and local governments can be an important stimulus for those governments and for private industry to adopt a pro-recovered materials policy. 50 H.R.Rep. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1976) (emphasis added), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238, 6289. Thus, the legislative history, for what it is worth, is consistent with the EPA's position that the primary impact of its guidelines on nonfederal entities is through a stimulus, and that the guidelines apply with binding force to state and local governments and private industry only when they purchase items with federal funds directly for use by the federal government or in federally funded contracts. 51 The EPA's interpretation thus reasonably furthers purposes addressed in the legislative history. While petitioner's interpretation may present a permissible alternative construction of the statute, it is not our task to weigh alternative understandings. As the Supreme Court noted in Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 470 U.S. 116, 105 S.Ct. 1102, 84 L.Ed.2d 90 (1985), in a decision upholding the EPA's interpretation of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (1988): 52 We need not find that [the EPA's] is the only permissible construction that EPA might have adopted but only that EPA's understanding of this very complex statute is a sufficiently rational one to preclude a court from substituting its judgment for that of the EPA. 53 Id. at 125, 105 S.Ct. at 1107 (internal citation omitted). As with the Clean Water Act, so with RCRA. We conclude that EPA's interpretation of RCRA is a rational one, and we will not substitute either our judgment or NRC's.