Opinion ID: 2321422
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ownership and Use of Intertidal Lands in the United States

Text: [¶ 17] Not surprisingly, the extent of the public's rights of access to, and use of, the intertidal zone has been the subject of litigation in many states, producing diverse results. In several eastern coastal states, including Connecticut and Maryland, the state, rather than the upland owner, owns the intertidal zone in trust for the public, up to the mean high-water mark. See, e.g., Bloom v. Water Res. Comm'n, 157 Conn. 528, 254 A.2d 884, 887 (1969) (The state, as the representative of the public, is the owner of the soil between high- and low-water mark upon navigable water where the tide ebbs and flows.); Van Ruymbeke v. Patapsco Indus. Park, 261 Md. 470, 276 A.2d 61, 64-65 (1971) (stating that private landowners bordering tidal waters own to the mean high-water mark); West v. Slick, 313 N.C. 33, 326 S.E.2d 601, 617 (1985) (In North Carolina private property fronting coastal water ends at the high-water mark and the property lying between the high-water mark and the low-water mark known as the `foreshore' is the property of the State.); see also Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrines: Classifications of States, Property Rights, and State Summaries, 16 Penn St. Envtl. L. Rev. 1, 4-5 (2007). [¶ 18] In Maine, Massachusetts, and Virginia, states whose common law was influenced by colonial ordinances from the 17th Century, see Craig at 4, private property immediately adjacent to the ocean extends past the mean high-water demarcation to the mean low-water mark, a historical artifact of the British and colonial attempts to encourage commercial wharf development at private expense. See Bell v. Town of Wells (Bell I ), 510 A.2d 509, 513-15 (Me.1986); Trio Algarvio, 795 N.E.2d at 1150-51; Taylor v. Commonwealth, 102 Va. 759, 47 S.E. 875, 879-80 (1904); see also State ex rel. Buckson v. Pa. R.R. Co., 267 A.2d 455, 459 (Del.1969) (recognizing that private ownership extends to the mean low-water mark of the foreshore); Craig at 33-35, 61-62, 64-67, 105-08. [9] [¶ 19] In addition to the differing forms of intertidal land ownership, the scope of the public's right to use this specific land also varies significantly among the coastal states. In New Hampshire, where the private ownership only extends to the high-water mark, the public may access the intertidal lands not only for fishing and navigation, but also for all useful purposes, including recreational uses. Opinion of the Justices, 139 N.H. 82, 649 A.2d 604, 608-09 (1994) (quotation marks omitted) (citing other New Hampshire authority). Other states view the public trust rights in the intertidal regions much more narrowly. In Delaware, a state that mirrors Maine in providing for private land ownership to the mean low-water mark, the public trust rights in the intertidal region are restricted to fishing and navigation, and there is no right of the public to walk along the beach or to engage in recreational activities. See Groves v. Sec'y, Dep't of Natural Res. & Envtl. Control, No. 92A-10-003, 1994 WL 89804, at , 1994 Del.Super. LEXIS 80, at  (and cases cited therein). [¶ 20] In Massachusetts, Virginia, and Maine, colonial ordinances, which were created primarily during the 17th Century and drew from English common law, continue to influence the scope of the public's right to cross the intertidal region in order to reach the ocean. See Bell I, 510 A.2d at 514; Trio Algarvio, 795 N.E.2d at 1151-52; Taylor, 47 S.E. at 880. In these states, the public trust rights generally have been articulated in terms of activities that involve or are incidental to obtaining sustenance or economic benefits through the harvesting of the sea, usually summarized as fishing, fowling, and navigation. See, e.g., Bell II, 557 A.2d at 173; Moot v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 448 Mass. 340, 861 N.E.2d 410, 412 (2007); Evelyn v. Commonwealth of Va. Marine Res. Comm'n, 46 Va.App. 618, 621 S.E.2d 130, 133-34 (2005). [¶ 21] On the west coast, the development of the common law uses of the intertidal zone has been more generous to the public. For instance, the Supreme Court of California adopted a flexible approach and held that the public trust rights could include uses beyond traditional public uses such as fishing and navigation. Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal.3d 251, 98 Cal.Rptr. 790, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (1971). The court reasoned, The public uses to which tidelands are subject are sufficiently flexible to encompass changing public needs. Id. The court specifically considered the growing public recognition that one of the most important public uses of the tidelands ... is the preservation of those lands in their natural state. Id. [¶ 22] In short, there is no uniform system of intertidal land ownership in the United States and no single interpretation of the circumstances under which the public may cross the intertidal lands to reach the ocean. Yet what is common among all legal constructs is the premise that the public may use the intertidal lands in some form to obtain access to the ocean and tidal water.