Opinion ID: 2096207
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Lannan's Claim

Text: Finally, we turn to the facts of appellant's trial to determine whether the adoption of Rule 404(b) requires reversal in this case. Donald Lannan, age twenty-three at the time of his arrest, was charged with one count of child molesting, a class C felony. Ind. Code Ann. § 35-42-4-3(c) (West 1986). The charging information alleged that on June 17, 1989, he engaged in sexual intercourse with V.E., age fourteen. At trial, V.E. testified that she was spending the evening at her grandmother's house. She shared a room with T.W., her cousin of similar age. V.E. said Lannan came into the room and asked T.W. to mess around with him, but T.W. refused. V.E. said Lannan then had intercourse with her. T.W. testified that she was in the bedroom when Lannan came in late at night, and that Lannan had fondled her before moving on to V.E. She testified that Lannan was naked, and that he had removed V.E.'s shorts. T.W. also said she heard V.E. telling Lannan to stop because it hurt. Both girls also testified about an incident in Lannan's truck during the summer of 1988 in which he allegedly fondled both of them. And V.E. told the jury of submitting to sex with Lannan on at least three other occasions after the crime alleged. This testimony was neither detailed nor lengthy. V.E. said it happened once at defendant's grandmother's house, at Aunt Belinda's, and at her house after defendant and his wife Debbie had moved in with V.E.'s family. If he didn't do it with Debbie, he would came over and did it and had intercourse with me, she said. Record at 193. Testimony as to all of these uncharged acts was admitted pursuant to the depraved sexual instinct exception. Under the new rule announced today, this was an insufficient basis for admitting evidence of uncharged misconduct. As we noted above, however, it does not necessarily follow that all testimony revealing uncharged misconduct was inadmissible. T.W.'s eyewitness account of the crime  including her allegation that Lannan fondled her before having intercourse with V.E.  helped complete the story of the crime in a way that incidentally revealed uncharged misconduct. Hence, her allegations as to Lannan's misconduct in the house were admissible under the theory of res gestae. See Wilson v. State, (1986), Ind., 491 N.E.2d 537. The testimony regarding the incident in Lannan's truck is more troublesome. Had the State filed an additional count (or counts) charging Lannan with fondling V.E. (or both girls), their testimony would have been admissible as direct evidence of a fact in issue. However, these crimes and V.E.'s allegations of additional instances of intercourse were uncharged. As such, given our abandonment of the depraved sexual instinct exception, our inquiry is whether these prior acts were admissible under any 404(b) exception. We can find none without forcing a square peg in a round hole. In determining whether the introduction of this evidence warrants reversal, we must assess the probable impact of the evidence upon the jury. Timmons v. State (1992), Ind., 584 N.E.2d 1108. Ordinarily, evidence of uncharged crimes of the character introduced in this case could be said to have a major impact on the jury. Today we are persuaded otherwise, however, in large measure because of the testimony of Alfred Sage, an uncle of V.E. and T.W. Sage testified that in May 1990, Lannan drove to the home where the molest occurred and shouted, I'm going to f   them again. Record at 274. This declaration, coupled with the victim's testimony and T.W.'s corroboration, leads us to conclude that the impact of this other evidence on the jury was not of sufficient weight to require reversal. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court. DeBRULER, DICKSON, and KRAHULIK, JJ., concur. GIVAN, J., concurs in result with separate opinion.