Opinion ID: 2240503
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: issues

Text: Defendant's first assignment of error is the trial court's refusal to grant his motion for a change of judge. On September 4, 1975, the defendant waived formal arraignment and entered a plea of not guilty to both charges. A motion for change of judge was filed with the trial court on January 15, 1976. Following a hearing, the motion was denied. Defendant concedes his motion was not timely under Ind.R.Cr.P. 12 which requires the defendant to file such a motion within ten days of his plea. Nevertheless, he argues that his motion should have been granted. Defense counsel cites Beck v. State, (1961) 241 Ind. 231, 171 N.E.2d 696, for the proposition that a defendant can move for a change of judge whenever bias or prejudice is discovered. Defendant, however, overlooks that the Court in Beck, found the right to a change of judge exists for recently learned prejudice upon a proper affidavit for change   . (Emphasis added.) 241 Ind. at 234-235, 171 N.E.2d at 698. Here, the defendant did not satisfy the requirements of the fourth paragraph of Ind.R.Cr.P. 12, which provides an exception to the general deadline and which states in pertinent part: Provided, however, that if the applicant first obtains knowledge of the cause for change of venue from the judge or from the county after the time above limited, he may file the application, which shall be verified by the party himself specifically alleging when the cause was first discovered, how it was discovered, the facts showing the cause for a change, and why such cause could not have been discovered before by the exercise of due diligence   . While defendant's application was verified and did allege newly discovered bias, it did not disclose when or how the alleged bias was first discovered, the facts warranting a change, or showing why such cause was not discovered earlier. This Court has previously recognized that a trial court may properly deny such an application where it contains none of the required allegations. Meyers v. State, (1977) Ind., 364 N.E.2d 760. Additionally, Defendant recognizes that the trial court's ruling on a motion for change of judge will be set aside only for abuse of discretion. Ind.R.Cr.P. 12; Cade v. State, (1976) 264 Ind. 569, 348 N.E.2d 394. Defendant urges, however, that the trial court did, in fact, abuse its discretion. To support this, the defendant argues that the evidence at the hearing supported his motion and, therefore, that he was entitled to a change of judge. Contrary to Defendant's contention, the record of the hearing shows that the defendant could not relate any specific allegations of prejudice or bias. His chief complaints were that his co-defendant's bond was lower than his own and that he did not believe he could get a just sentence if found guilty. It has been stated: It is incumbent upon the Appellant to show a clear abuse of discretion by the trial court. Cade, supra, 264 Ind. at 575, 348 N.E.2d at 399. The defendant has failed to show such abuse.