Opinion ID: 3008909
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Effect of THCLA on Estate of French Analysis

Text: It is undisputed that Parents failed to comply with the pre-suit notice and certificate of good faith provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated sections 29-26-121 and 122. See Weismark, 2014 WL 5511773, at . Moreover, after a thorough review of the trial court‟s ruling on Ms. Weismark‟s motion to dismiss, we agree with the Court of Appeals that “[n]othing in the trial court‟s written order or oral ruling indicates that the trial court considered the standard outlined in Estate of French in dismissing the complaint.” Id. at . The trial judge relied solely on the plain language of Tennessee Code Annotated sections 29-26-101, -121, and -122 to determine that all causes of action alleged in the complaint were covered by the THCLA. Specifically, the trial court stated that the THCLA is “very broad” and encompasses Parents‟ claims because they relate to the provision of “health care services” by a “health care provider” as those terms are defined by statute. Thus, the resolution of this appeal depends on whether our decision in Estate of French has been statutorily abrogated by the Tennessee Civil Justice Act of 2011. When determining the meaning of statutes, our primary goal “is to carry out legislative intent without broadening or restricting the statute beyond its intended scope.” Johnson v. Hopkins, 432 S.W.3d 840, 848 (Tenn. 2013) (quoting Lind v. Beaman Dodge, Inc., 356 S.W.3d 889, 895 (Tenn. 2011)). We presume that every word in a statute has meaning and purpose and that each word‟s meaning should be given full effect as long as doing so does not frustrate the General Assembly‟s obvious intention. Id. Words “„must be given their natural and ordinary meaning in the context in which they appear and in light of the statute‟s general purpose.‟” Id. (quoting Mills v. Fulmarque, Inc., 360 S.W.3d 362, 368 (Tenn. 2012)). When a statute‟s meaning is clear, we “„apply the plain meaning without complicating the task‟ and enforce the statute as written.” Id. (quoting Lind, 356 S.W.3d at 895). Finally, we presume that the Legislature knows the law and makes new laws accordingly. Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 527 (Tenn. 2010). Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-101(a)(1) defines health care liability action as “any civil action. . . alleging that a health care provider or providers have caused an injury related to the provision of, or failure to provide, health care services to a person, regardless of the theory of liability on which the action is based.” Furthermore subsection 101(a)(2) defines a health care provider as “[a] health care practitioner licensed, authorized, certified, registered, or regulated under any chapter of title 63 or title 68. . . .” Finally, subsection 101(c) makes “[a]ny such civil action or claim [] subject to this part regardless of any other claims, causes of action, or theories of liability alleged in the complaint.” Giving every word in this section its full effect and plain meaning, we hold that section 29-26-101 establishes a clear legislative intent that all civil actions alleging that a covered health care provider or providers have caused an injury related to the provision -10- of, or failure to provide health care services be subject to the pre-suit notice and certificate of good faith requirements, regardless of any other claims, causes of action, or theories of liability alleged in the complaint. Furthermore, we are mindful of the fact that the Tennessee Civil Justice Act of 2011 was enacted mere months after this Court‟s decision in Estate of French. Under the canons of statutory construction, we presume that the Legislature was aware of this Court‟s decision in Estate of French and acted accordingly in passing an act that rendered it effectively moot. We need not engage in further statutory interpretation in the face of this clear legislative edict. Thus, we hold that the “nuanced” approach for distinguishing ordinary negligence and health care liability claims as outlined in Estate of French has been statutorily abrogated. Applying the clear language of the THCLA to Parents‟ complaint, we conclude that the allegations contained therein meet the definition of a health care liability action as defined in section 29-26-101(a)(1). Parents‟ complaint alleges that Ms. Weismark “is a licensed clinical social worker.” Social workers are a group licensed and regulated under title 63 of the Tennessee Code. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-23-105 (2010 & Supp. 2014). Thus, Ms. Weismark meets the definition of a “health care provider” under section 29-26101(a)(2). Parents recognized Ms. Weismark‟s status as a health care provider when they relied upon the Juvenile Court‟s order as affording them a right to seek access Ms. Weismark‟s treatment records of M.L. Specifically, Parents alleged at Paragraph 8 that the Juvenile Court‟s order provided them with “the right to receive copies of the child‟s medical, health or other treatment records directly from the physician or health care provider who provid[ed] such treatment. . . .” Additionally, Parents‟ complaint is rife with allegations relating to Ms. Weismark‟s provision of health care services to M.L. Paragraph 9 of the complaint alleges that Ms. Weismark “did an intake for counseling for [M.L.]”. Paragraphs 17 and 18 allege that Ms. Weismark did not have consent to counsel M.L. Paragraph 25 alleges that M.L. “has been harmed emotionally in not being allowed to counsel with her [p]arents” and that Parents “will seek an independent mental health examination of the child to assess the harm caused by failing to counsel with them towards reunification.” Paragraph 26 of the complaint alleges that “the secreted counseling with [M.L.] is the direct and proximate harm and injury to [parents] and [M.L.].” Paragraph 29 alleges that Ms. Weismark “should be keenly aware that providing this secret counseling for the child is a gross deviation from the standard of care.” Finally, Paragraph 31 alleges that “[Parents] would show that [Ms.] Weismark is negligent in providing health services without following the parameters of the court order by notifying [parents] and allowing them to participate in said counsel.” (Bold in original) (second emphasis added). Thus, because Parents‟ complaint alleges negligence in the provision of health care services by a covered health care provider, it is subject to the THCLA “regardless of any other claims, causes of action, or other theories of liability alleged in the complaint.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-101(c). Because Parents failed to comply with the pre-suit notice and -11- certificate of good faith requirements of the THCLA, dismissal of their complaint is appropriate.