Opinion ID: 759696
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Merits of Bloomer's Claim

Text: 26 We review de novo a district court's decision to deny habeas relief on the merits of a petition. See Nelson v. Walker, 121 F.3d 828, 833 (2d Cir.1997). To succeed on his ineffective assistance claim, Bloomer must satisfy both elements of a two-prong test. He must show (1) that his counsel's performance was deficient and (2) that this deficient performance prejudiced the defense. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). This test applies to challenges to the effectiveness of both trial and appellate counsel. See Abdurrahman v. Henderson, 897 F.2d 71, 74 (2d Cir.1990). 27
28 To determine whether an attorney's representation of a criminal defendant is deficient, courts apply an objective standard of reasonableness, which includes a consideration of all the circumstances surrounding the attorney's actions. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052. In evaluating the evidence, courts must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 29 Despite this strong presumption, our review of the record suggests that the representation afforded by Bloomer's attorney fell short of being objectively reasonable. Although an attorney is not usually faulted for lacking the foresight to realize that a higher court will subsequently identify a defect in jury instructions similar to those used at his client's trial, see, e.g., Gaston v. Whitley, 67 F.3d 121, 123 (5th Cir.1995) (failing to object to a jury instruction in light of the state of the law is not deficient performance), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1023, 116 S.Ct. 2561, 135 L.Ed.2d 1078 (1996); Walker v. Jones, 10 F.3d 1569, 1573 (11th Cir.1994) (characterizing as reasonable an attorney's failure to object to instructions since the state's courts had rejected similar claims, and the Supreme Court had yet to rule on the issue), an attorney nonetheless may be held responsible for failing to make such an objection when precedent supported a reasonable probability that a higher court would rule in defendant's favor. Cf. Mayo v. Henderson, 13 F.3d 528, 533-34 (2d Cir.1994) (involving failure to raise Rosario claim on appeal); Claudio v. Scully, 982 F.2d 798, 805 (2d Cir.1992) (involving failure to rely on New York constitutional law during a pretrial appeal of an order declining to suppress defendant's confession). We focus our attention therefore on the state of the law as it existed at the time of Bloomer's trial and appeal. 30 In Delibac, even though we held that the three deficiencies in the district court's jury instructions were constitutionally sufficient, we did note that [o]nce again, a district court has failed to heed our repeated warnings against embellishing upon the standard instruction. 925 F.2d at 614. In Birbal, where we reviewed the jury instructions for plain error, we commented that while the [first three] errors in [the same district court's] reasonable-doubt instruction may not have been 'obvious' at the time we took note of them in Delibac, our identification of them as error at that time certainly made them 'obvious' thereafter. 62 F.3d at 463. Delibac was decided in February 1991--14 months before Bloomer's criminal trial. 31 In addition, we held in Birbal that the charge encountered obvious error in instructing jurors that they may rather than must acquit if the prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt: 32 Since [In re] Winship [, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) ], few elements of due process have been clearer than the necessity of informing the jury that, to convict, it must find each defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of every element charged. 33 Birbal, 62 F.3d at 463. Consequently, we are troubled by the failure of Bloomer's attorney to object at trial to any of these clear and previously identified errors. 34 Even were we to conclude that defense counsel acted reasonably at trial, we would be faced with serious concerns about his representation on direct appeal. As noted above, the errors in the jury charge were clearly established in Supreme Court and Second Circuit precedent. While the instructions given at trial were oral, the record on appeal captured them in print, and no reasonable explanation has been advanced as to why petitioner's attorney failed to recognize the problems on direct appeal and seek plain error review. 35 Further, the presumption of reasonableness afforded an appellate attorney can be overcome if he neglected to raise significant and obvious issues while pursuing substantially weaker ones. See Mayo, 13 F.3d at 533. In the instant case, petitioner's counsel raised a number of challenges on direct appeal that lacked merit, including challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, various evidentiary rulings, and the district court's denial of Bloomer's motion for a new trial based on newly-discovered evidence. See Spencer, 4 F.3d at 118. In the circumstances presented there, these claims had little chance of success because of the great deference afforded the jury's verdict and the wide discretion possessed by the district court on the other issues. Moreover, that the defects in the jury instructions were not only obvious according to Birbal 's plain error review, but also would have resulted in a reversal, suggests that the attorney's failure to raise an objection falls below an objective standard of reasonable professional conduct. 36 This view of the record comports with the principles underlying Strickland. As the Supreme Court stated, [t]he purpose [of the effective assistance guarantee of the Sixth Amendment] is simply to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial. 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Despite the deference owed counsel for strategic decisions, it seems unlikely that Bloomer received a fair trial when his attorney never questioned the validity of jury instructions that were clearly constitutionally deficient. 37 In conclusion, the materials before us suggest that Bloomer received constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in his previous proceedings. However, our cases require that except in highly unusual circumstances, the assertedly ineffective attorney should be afforded an opportunity to be heard and to present evidence, in the form of live testimony, affidavits, or briefs. Sparman v. Edwards, 154 F.3d 51, 52 (2d Cir.1998); see United States v. Dukes, 727 F.2d 34, 41 n. 6 (2d Cir.1984). There is no indication in the record that Bloomer's previous counsel was given such an opportunity. Hence, we remand to the district court to allow Bloomer's previous counsel an opportunity to be heard, and subsequently to make a finding in the first instance as to Bloomer's claim of ineffective assistance. 38
39 Deficient Performance? 40 A defendant cannot succeed on an ineffective assistance claim unless he can show that a reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the result of his proceeding would have been different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. In other words, the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt. Id. at 695, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 41 But we will presume prejudice when a jury instruction on reasonable doubt is found to be constitutionally deficient. See Birbal, 62 F.3d at 461. Harmless error analysis is inappropriate in such circumstances because [t]here being no jury verdict of guilty-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt, the question whether the same verdict of guilty-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt would have been rendered absent the constitutional error is utterly meaningless. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 280, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993). While the Sullivan analysis originates in cases directly reviewing jury instructions, rather than in ineffective assistance cases based on a failure to object to defective jury instructions, the force of its reasoning and its conclusion apply equally here. 42 Although the government concedes that the jury charge given at Bloomer's trial contains the same language with which we found fault in Birbal, it argues that Bloomer was not prejudiced because the error was ameliorated by the numerous times (at least 17) where the original district judge gave proper reasonable doubt instructions. For that reason, the government continues, any reasonable probability that the jury convicted petitioner using the wrong standard was eliminated. We rejected a similar argument in Birbal, where we stated that the erroneous instruction was only partially ameliorated by the court's correct [reasonable doubt] instruction several sentences earlier. 62 F.3d at 460. Because the conflicting instructions must have left the jury uncertain of the standard it was charged with applying, we held that such a jury was insufficiently prepared to carry out its constitutional mandate to resolve all reasonable doubts before adjudging the defendants guilty. Id. Significantly, none of the district court's correct reasonable doubt instructions in the instant case was styled as a curative instruction that would alert the jurors that they should disregard the incorrect instruction. Accordingly, we do not find that the correct instructions--however numerous they may be--suffice to overcome the damage done by the district court's conflicting, incorrect instruction. 43 Finding that the reasonable doubt instructions given at petitioner's trial were infected with the same constitutional deficiencies as those identified in Birbal, we conclude Bloomer suffered prejudice from his counsel's failure to object to these instructions or to challenge them on appeal regardless of the strength and quantity of evidence against him. As a consequence, if on remand the district court concludes that Bloomer's previous counsel's performance was deficient, Bloomer will succeed on his ineffective assistance claim.