Opinion ID: 3168556
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mr. Sanchez’s Claim

Text: This appeal grew out of an investigation into a 2009 burglary and sexual assault of an 8-year-old girl. Four detectives (Joe Ryan Hartley, Ryan Wolff, Mike Duffy, and Heather Mykes) and an investigator (Michael Dickson) participated in the investigation. In carrying out the investigation, the detectives and investigator interviewed Mr. Sanchez, an 18-year-old with substantial cognitive disabilities. After lengthy interviews, Mr. Sanchez confessed to the burglary but not the sexual assault. The confession led the district attorney to charge Mr. Sanchez with burglary and sexual assault. Based in part on this confession, multiple judges found probable cause, resulting in pretrial detention. Mr. Sanchez alleges that his confession was false, explaining that he confessed only because his disabilities prevented him from understanding what was happening during the interviews. A subsequent medical examination supported Mr. Sanchez’s explanation, and the district attorney dropped the charges in April 2012. After dismissal of the charges, Mr. Sanchez sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing that the defendants had committed malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth Amendment by using a false confession to institute legal process and cause continued pretrial detention. The defendants moved for dismissal, and the district court denied the motion. The defendants then brought this interlocutory appeal, arguing that 3 the district court should have ordered dismissal based on qualified immunity and the statute of limitations. These arguments do not justify reversal. Mr. Sanchez’s factual allegations are sufficient to overcome qualified immunity at the pleadings stage, and we lack appellate jurisdiction on the issue involving the statute of limitations. II. We engage in de novo review of the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. In considering the defense of qualified immunity, we engage in de novo review. Peterson v. Jensen, 371 F.3d 1199, 1201-02 (10th Cir. 2004). This review is based on our standards for dismissal and qualified immunity. Under the standard for dismissal, we assume that all of the allegations in the complaint are true and view the reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Mr. Sanchez. Anderson v. Suiters, 499 F.3d 1228, 1232 (10th Cir. 2007). In applying this standard to the defense of qualified immunity, we consider whether Mr. Sanchez’s factual allegations and related inferences show the violation of a clearly established constitutional right. Lybrook v. Members of Farmington Mun. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 232 F.3d 1334, 1337 (10th Cir. 2000). 4 III. Mr. Sanchez adequately pleaded the violation of a clearly established constitutional right. Mr. Sanchez argues that the complaint stated a constitutional violation by alleging that the detectives and investigator had used a confession that they knew was untrue. We agree. A. Mr. Sanchez alleged the violation of a constitutional right. In the complaint, Mr. Sanchez brings a § 1983 claim against the defendants for malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth Amendment. In our view, Mr. Sanchez adequately pleaded the violation of a constitutional right. 1 According to Mr. Sanchez, the detectives and investigator sought legal process based on the confession even though they either knew the confession was untrue or recklessly ignored that possibility. If Mr. Sanchez’s allegation is credited, it would involve a constitutional violation, for we have held that the Fourth Amendment prohibits officers from knowingly or recklessly relying on false information to institute legal process when that process results in an unreasonable seizure. Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 1292, 1298-99 (10th Cir. 2004). Therefore, Mr. 1 “Under our cases, a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim includes the following elements: (1) the defendant caused the plaintiff’s continued confinement or prosecution; (2) the original action terminated in favor of the plaintiff; (3) no probable cause supported the original arrest, continued confinement, or prosecution; (4) the defendant acted with malice; and (5) the plaintiff sustained damages.” Wilkins v. DeReyes, 528 F.3d 790, 799 (10th Cir. 2008). 5 Sanchez’s factual allegations, if proven, would entail a Fourth Amendment violation. The defendants do not dispute that in the abstract, the Constitution is violated when an officer knowingly or recklessly uses false information to institute legal process. See Appellants’ Reply Br. at 19 (conceding that the defendants “do not argue it is constitutional to knowingly use false statements”). Instead, the defendants present five reasons that the complaint fails to allege violation of a constitutional right for purposes of Section 1983 2: 1. Section 1983 does not permit recovery for malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment. 2. In the complaint, Mr. Sanchez did not adequately allege knowledge or recklessness. 3. Mr. Sanchez’s only possible claim is for false imprisonment, not malicious prosecution. 4. A malicious-prosecution theory could implicate the District Attorney, but not the detectives or the investigator because they could not have decided to prosecute Mr. Sanchez. 5. Mr. Sanchez has not alleged conduct that would shock the conscience. 2 The appeal was brought by all defendants, including the Douglas County Board of County Commissioners and the Douglas County Sheriff’s Office. But qualified immunity is available only to defendants sued in their individual capacities. Langley v. Adams Cty., 987 F.2d 1473, 1477 (10th Cir. 1993). Thus, the district court’s ruling on qualified immunity affected only the individual defendants, not the board of county commissioners or the sheriff’s office. 6 We reject each argument. 1. Under § 1983, an arrestee can recover for malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment. The defendants argue that § 1983 might allow recovery for malicious prosecution based on violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, but not the Fourth Amendment. We disagree, for we have repeatedly recognized a cause of action under § 1983 for malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Myers v. Koopman, 738 F.3d 1190, 1194 (10th Cir. 2013) (discussing a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment); Wilkins v. DeReyes, 528 F.3d 790, 797 (10th Cir. 2008) (same); Taylor v. Meacham, 82 F.3d 1556, 1560-61 (10th Cir. 1996) (same). The defendants point to two opinions in arguing that § 1983 does not allow recovery for malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment: Mondragón v. Thompson and Rehberg v. Paulk. The defendants’ reliance on these opinions is misguided. The defendants first argue that under Mondragón v. Thompson, 519 F.3d 1078 (10th Cir. 2008), a malicious prosecution resulting in legal process is actionable under the Fourteenth Amendment as a deprivation of procedural due process, but is not actionable under the Fourth Amendment. It is true that Mondragón recognized the existence of a § 1983 maliciousprosecution claim based on the Fourteenth Amendment. Mondragón, 519 7 F.3d at 1083. In dictum, we questioned whether the same claim could also be based on the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1083 n.4. In subsequent cases, however, we squarely addressed this question, recognizing a cause of action under § 1983 for malicious prosecution based on the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Myers v. Koopman, 738 F.3d 1190, 1194 (10th Cir. 2013). Our dictum in Mondragón does not negate our more recent pronouncements recognizing such a cause of action under § 1983. The defendants also argue that reliance on the Fourth Amendment is precluded by Rehberg v. Paulk, U.S. , 132 S. Ct. 1497 (2012). But Rehberg does not bear on our issue. There the Supreme Court held only that “a grand jury witness,” including a law-enforcement officer, “has absolute immunity from any § 1983 claim based on the witness’ testimony.” Rehberg, 132 S. Ct. at 1506. Mr. Sanchez’s allegations relate to the defendants’ conduct before Mr. Sanchez was charged, not testimony before a grand jury. Thus, Rehberg does not undermine our precedents allowing recovery under § 1983 for malicious prosecution based on violation of the Fourth Amendment. In our view, a cause of action exists under § 1983 for malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 8 2. The complaint contains sufficient allegations of knowledge or recklessness. To state a claim for a Fourth Amendment violation, Mr. Sanchez bears the burden of alleging facts indicating not only that the confession was untrue, but also that the defendants either knew that the confession was untrue or recklessly disregarded that possibility. See Wolford v. Lasater, 78 F.3d 484, 489 (10th Cir. 1996) (“It is a violation of the Fourth Amendment for an arrest warrant affiant to ‘knowingly, or with reckless disregard for the truth,’ include false statements in the affidavit.” (quoting Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155 (1978))). Relying on this burden, the defendants argue that Mr. Sanchez failed to allege facts indicating knowledge that the confession was untrue or reckless disregard of this possibility. We disagree. On this issue, we must determine whether Mr. Sanchez has plausibly alleged the defendants’ knowledge or reckless disregard for the truth. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (holding that to survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Thus, “a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of [the alleged] 9 facts is improbable, and ‘that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.’” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)). Mr. Sanchez satisfied this standard. In the complaint, he provided factual allegations and details that would plausibly indicate that the defendants either knew the confession was untrue or acted in reckless disregard of the truth. For example, Mr. Sanchez alleged these six facts in the complaint: 1. The victim of the sexual assault gave a description of her attacker that did not suggest Mr. Sanchez. According to the victim, the attacker was roughly 40 years old, weighed about 190 pounds, had no tattoos, and had brown hair parted down the middle. See Appellants’ App’x at 109. Mr. Sanchez was only 18 years old, weighed only about 130 pounds, had prominently displayed tattoos on both arms, and had buzz-cut red hair. See id. The detectives and investigator knew that Mr. Sanchez did not fit the victim’s description of the perpetrator. See id. at 111 (Detectives Wolff and Hartley), 114 (Detectives Duffy and Mykes), 118 (Investigator Dickson). 2. Mr. Sanchez has pronounced cognitive and developmental disabilities and IQ test scores in the 60s and 70s. These disabilities cause Mr. Sanchez to engage in noticeably unusual behavior. See id. at 108-09. 3. In interviews with the defendants, Mr. Sanchez had significant difficulty understanding and responding to questions. See, e.g., id. at 110-12, 114-15. 4. Mr. Sanchez’s unusual behavior in the interviews was amplified by fatigue. He had been awake for over 30 hours by the end of the interviews, and he repeatedly told the defendants that he was tired and spoke with his eyes closed. See id. at 113-14, 117. 10 5. The detectives and investigator noticed Mr. Sanchez’s unusual behavior. At one point, two detectives asked Mr. Sanchez if he was simply saying what they wanted to hear. See id. at 112 (Detectives Wolff and Hartley). One of the detectives wrote that Mr. Sanchez had difficulty remembering details of his supposed crimes and had given vague answers. See id. (Detective Wolff). Two other detectives suspected intoxication, asking Mr. Sanchez to take a urine test to verify that he was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol. See id. at 116 (Detectives Mykes and Duffy). And the investigator observed that Mr. Sanchez was behaving unusually and experiencing difficulty answering questions. See id. at 119 (Investigator Dickson). 6. Mr. Sanchez was unable to give any details regarding his involvement in the crime. Instead, Mr. Sanchez simply agreed to the details suggested to him. At one point, Mr. Sanchez agreed to an untrue detail that the investigator had posed (that Mr. Sanchez had climbed into the victim’s second-story window with a ladder). As the investigator knew, no ladder was found at the scene. See id. at 122. These alleged facts plausibly support the required inference of the defendants’ knowledge or recklessness. In oral argument, defense counsel suggested that the complaint does not contain sufficient factual allegations to support an inference of knowledge or recklessness against the investigator. Oral Argument at 31:40-33:10. We disagree. The complaint alleges that (1) the investigator noticed Mr. Sanchez’s abnormal behavior and inability to provide any detail about the burglary and sexual assault and (2) Mr. Sanchez agreed to a detail about the crime that the investigator knew was untrue. These allegations plausibly support the required inference that the investigator 11 knew that the confession was untrue or recklessly disregarded this possibility. 3. The initial warrantless arrest of Mr. Sanchez does not ` invalidate Mr. Sanchez’s claim of malicious prosecution. Our case law distinguishes between seizures based on whether they are imposed with or without legal process. Though both types of seizures implicate the Fourth Amendment, seizures imposed pursuant to legal process generally trigger claims for malicious prosecution, while seizures imposed without legal process generally trigger claims for false imprisonment. Myers v. Koopman, 738 F.3d 1190, 1194 (10th Cir. 2013). Based on this distinction, the defendants argue that Mr. Sanchez could assert only a false-imprisonment claim because he was arrested and detained without a warrant. This argument is foreclosed by Wilkins v. DeReyes, 528 F.3d 790 (10th Cir. 2008). There we recognized a cause of action under § 1983 for malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth Amendment for seizures that occur after a warrantless arrest. Wilkins, 528 F.3d at 798. “If arrested without a warrant . . . a plaintiff can challenge the probable cause determination made during the constitutionally-required probable cause hearing,” which must occur after the initial warrantless arrest. Id. (citation omitted). A plaintiff who brings such a challenge “would state a Fourth 12 Amendment violation sufficient to support a § 1983 malicious prosecution cause of action.” Id. at 799. Our holding in Wilkins forecloses the defendants’ argument that Mr. Sanchez is confined to a false-imprisonment claim because he was arrested without a warrant. It is true that the defendants initially arrested Mr. Sanchez without a warrant and, therefore, without legal process. But after this warrantless arrest, there were multiple judicial determinations of probable cause to detain Mr. Sanchez on all of the pending charges. Based on this legal process, Mr. Sanchez spent an additional 125 days in jail. Under Wilkins, Mr. Sanchez’s theory states a valid claim under § 1983 for malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and Mr. Sanchez’s initial warrantless arrest is immaterial to the validity of this claim. See id. 3 4. The malicious-prosecution theory is not confined to the District Attorney. The defendants also argue that the malicious-prosecution claim must be confined to the District Attorney because he was the official who decided to prosecute. The defendants provide no support for this argument, and it is invalid under Pierce v. Gilchrist. There we held that a malicious- 3 After releasing Mr. Sanchez, the district court imposed pretrial restrictions. The defendants argue that restrictions on movement did not qualify as a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. We need not address this argument because the jailing for 125 days constituted a seizure. 13 prosecution theory would lie against a forensic analyst even though she did not (and could not) decide to prosecute: [The forensic analyst] cannot “hide behind” the fact that she neither initiated nor filed the charges against [the plaintiff]. The actions of a police forensic analyst who prevaricates and distorts evidence to convince the prosecuting authorities to press charges is no less reprehensible than an officer who, through false statements, prevails upon a magistrate to issue a warrant. In each case the government official maliciously abuses a position of trust to induce the criminal justice system to confine and then to prosecute an innocent defendant. Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 1293 (10th Cir. 2004); see also Stonecipher v. Valles, 759 F.3d 1134, 1147 (10th Cir. 2014) (“Of course, the fact that a government lawyer makes the final decision to prosecute does not automatically immunize an officer from liability for malicious prosecution.”). Like the forensic analyst in Pierce, the four detectives and investigator would incur liability under a malicious-prosecution theory if they knowingly or recklessly used false information to institute legal process. 5. The shock-the-conscience standard does not bear on Mr. Sanchez’s Fourth Amendment claim. The defendants argue that Mr. Sanchez has not pleaded facts that would shock the conscience. But this argument is irrelevant because Mr. Sanchez did not need to plead facts that shock the conscience. 14 The “shock the conscience” standard governs claims involving substantive due process. Ruiz v. McDonnell, 299 F.3d 1173, 1183 (10th Cir. 2002). Reliance on this standard is mistaken because Mr. Sanchez has not invoked substantive due process. Instead, he invokes the Fourth Amendment. For a claim under the Fourth Amendment, Mr. Sanchez need not plead facts that shock the conscience. See Frohmader v. Wayne, 958 F.2d 1024, 1027 (10th Cir. 1992) (“The due process standard is more onerous than the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard since the former requires, in addition to undue force, personal malice amounting to an abuse of official power sufficient to shock the conscience.”).