Opinion ID: 6351468
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Absolutely.”

Text: Never theless, respondent testified his memory of the 1970-1975 time period, between his father’s illness and the termination of his son’s chemotherapy treatment, is “very hazy to me.” Respondent told of the anguish associated with his son’s cancer treatment and stated: “I don’t think that I was capable of making the kind of judgment I would feel capable of making now.” “Q. You, nevertheless, accept full responsibility for the occurrences with [A]? A. I want to make that very clear, that — that I am not attempting, by this, in any way escape that responsibility. The responsibility, that culpability, the shame, the humiliation is mine. It is mine.” Respondent’s counsel also submitted exhibits marked W Ex 2 through 7 (originals of all exhibits are attached to the notes of testimony) consisting of a list of civic and pro bono professional activities respondent has undertaken without reimbursement and letters from clients and others lauding respondent and thanking him for his work. Although Disciphnary Counsel objected to admission of the letters, and such objection may have technical merit at least, the letters were represented as unsohcited, spontaneous expressions and were received as relevant to respondent’s present standing in the community. On cross-examination, respondent acknowledged that in January, 1970, respondent’s father loaned [A] $10,000 to begin his bail bond agency, with the understanding [A] was to make monthly payments on the loan and, in addition, to pay respondent’s father $1,000 a month as a retainer to represent the agency. [A] made only a few payments on the loan, and paid nothing on the retainer. Respondent ultimately wrote off the debt as uncollectible because “he [A] said he could not pay the loan payments, but he would try to refer some criminal cases to me.” (NT 388) Disciphnary Counsel asked: “Q. I see. Was there any relationship between the fact that [A] had sent you cases and your forgiveness of the debt? [Objection to question overruled.] A. That is hard to answer because I really, I really didn’t — it is true, I didn’t enforce the debt.” Respondent seemed generally honest and forthright on cross-examination and did not “duck” his responsibility for what had occurred. He acknowledged he had “done something wrong” and “had violated the Canons of Ethics of [his] profession.” However, he also contended that “[a]t no time was any client charged more than that client would have been charged had there been no such arrangement with [A]” and “I don’t believe that any client was ever harmed by that arrangement...” 30 D.B. 80 10 Respondent in 30 D.B. 80 presented three witnesses in addition to himself. Dr. [M], a child psychiatrist, met respondent in November; 1970, in connection with treatment of respondent’s then four-year-old son, who suddenly began falling down and was unable to walk for no apparent physical reason. After some improvement, the child’s symptoms became more severe in the fall of 1971 and he was hospitalized. Dr. [M] felt the child was suffering from “aprepsychotic or psychotic reaction, very severe emotional disturbance, which was interfering with his general functions as a human being.” In late 1971, the then five-year-old sometimes lost control of his bowel and bladder and had strange body movements. His speech sometimes was stuttering and other times he wouldn’t talk at all. Extensive physical tests were done and nothing organic was found. Dr. [M] characterized respondent at this time as being “preoccupied with his son’s well being.” Then respondent’s mother died suddenly in February, 1972, and respondent’s father was chronically ill. These events, according to Dr. [M], “heightened [respondent’s] despair.” The son’s condition did not improve and in late 1972 institutionalization of the child was even considered. Dr. [M] began in the spring of 1972 to treat respondent personally for psychiatric and emotional problems arising out of his son’s illness. [M] described respondent during the period as “clinically depressed.” Respondent’s father died in 1973. Respondent’s son began walking sporadically in late 1973, continued to improve in 1974, and by 1975 was attending public school full time, although at the time of hearing he was still seeing Dr. [M]. Also testifying on behalf of respondent was [N], one of the criminal defendants represented by respondent, upon whose case a referral fee was paid to [A]. [N] was charged with criminal homicide. He didn’t know a referral fee was paid at the time it was paid, although he knew of the referral fee at the time of hearing. But [N] testified: “I feel, you know, I trusted [respondent] 100 percent. I feel that he gave, gave me, you know, the best,” and stated that his entire family uses respondent for all their legal work. [N] testified that had he known of the referral fee being paid to the bondsman it would not have changed his opinion of respondent’s devotion to [N’s] case. [O] also testified. In 1979, she engaged respondent to represent her nephew who was charged with simple assault and homicide. She testified she worked closely with respondent in his defense of her nephew and when asked if she would hesitate to recommend respondent to a prospective client, [O] stated: “No, I would recommend him highly. I think he’s an exceptional individual. I think he works very hard for any individual and any client. I think he is extremely honest and ethical and I would recommend him with no reservation.” Respondent testified on his own behalf. He graduated from law school in 1966, worked for a law firm for two years, and then became an Assistant [ ] County Public Defender. He had always wanted to be a trial lawyer. He was first assistant Public Defender when he resigned in 1970 to devote full time to a partnership he had formed in 1969 with respondent in 29 D.B. 80. In August, 1971, the three respondents herein merged their practices. This respondent first met [A] after the new partnership was formed and he became aware of the prior relationship of [A] and respondent in 28 D.B. 80. Respondent was asked: “Q. . . . when was it that or through whom was it that you first learned of the fee-splitting practice to which you have admitted? A. When did I learn of it? Q. Yes. A. I didn’t learn of it. I was a part of it. It wasn’t, it wasn’t a matter of learning. It is the crucial question. It is why we’re here, and I know that that’s involved in this situation. I don’t think that I learned of it. I think that I knew they had a relationship before we formed the business. I think I said in my narrative, and still think, that is the way it was. We were approached by [B], and there were other people that worked there, but [B] had stated at some point that they wanted a new — they wanted a new relationship. He was the one who was doing most of the legwork for [A] at that time. When I say ‘he approached,’ I don’t remember whether he approached me, [or the other respondents], but it was understood that this is the way in which he wanted to do business at that particular point in time. I just can’t remember specifically how. Q. Prior to you personally meeting with [B], were you aware that any fee-splitting was going on? A. No. Q. All right. A. I was aware that referrals were going back and forth when we formed the law firm, but I was not aware of any fee-splitting that was going on. Q. What was the conversation with [B] that alerted you to the practice that we’re here about? A. I don’t remember a specific conversation, I just remember that it was said, whether it was to me [or one of the other respondents] I can’t remember at this time, but it was said do you want to do business? Pay for it. That’s what everybody else is doing that does business with bail bondsmen, words to that effect. And this is the way you want to do it, you know, to continue the relationship, that I am doing more of the work than [A] is and I want you to split fees. Q. How long had the three of you been in business together physically when this conversation occurred with [B]? A. Within a few months, I believe. I couldn’t pinpoint the exact date, but I knew from the checks that they started pretty — the end of September. At least that’s when the first check was documented. So it had to happen the first couple months, obviously.” Respondent frankly admitted that when he became aware of the practice of fee-splitting he knew it violated the Canons of Ethics. With respect to the decision made by the partnership to pay referrals by check and report same to the IRS, respondent testified: “It probably had to do with an innate ability of either sizing somebody up in terms of just if this is the way we were going to do business, and made a conscious design to do business this way, I knew it wasn’t right. I said to myself, and I don’t remember whether I said it to the other people or not, at that particular time, I said but I am not going to fool around here with this stuff. If they want to do business in this way, I am going to submit forms to the Internal Revenue Service. I don’t want any cash payments and transactions going back and forth here.” (NT 465) Respondent became understandably emotional when he discussed his son’s serious health problem and stated: “I was absolutely obsessed with what was happening and had no idea how to grasp onto it. It took about a year, a year and a half, with consultations with people all over — the United States. Finally, we were able to get a hold of this thing.” (NT 469) Respondent’s “relief” he said was trying cases and wrapping himself up in somebody else’s problems. Nevertheless, he frankly acknowledged: “. . . it [his son’s problem] did not at all interfere with my function to know. It was still a violation of the Disciplinary Rules. So, I an not coming from left field on this thing. I didn’t — with the illness of my son, it wasn’t like I knew or that I was wrapped up in this and I didn’t know what was going on. I knew what was going on. I was just totally preoccupied trying to figure out what in God’s name had taken place here because nobody in the United States seemed to be able to figure out what was wrong with my kid.” Although respondent contended his judgment was affected by his son’s difficulties, he acknowledged that he wasn’t talking “about insanity or knowing right from wrong” and that “I should have absolutely known better.” Respondent was asked: “Q. Did you stop to appreciate the seriousness of the fee-splitting practice? A. I didn’t stop to appreciate anything at that period of time. I went through years — not days, not weeks, not months — years of not being able to talk about anything else with my wife. So that what ended up happening is here after enough years, all we did was work on this kid’s illness. Q. . . . as aresult of this business coming into the firm from [A], how many cases did you actually participate — handle yourself? A. Of the cases, I think there was about ten cases that I handled over that period of time. I know there’s nine listed in that sheet. I put down nine or ten cases that I handled at that period of time.” Most of the [A] cases respondent handled were drug cases and respondent contended each client received adequate representation and excessive fees were never charged. Respondent signed many of the [A] checks but that is because he was located close to the secretary and routinely signed most of the checks. The signature on the check to [A] bore no relation to who handled the case. Respondent acknowledged, however, that he knew what the checks were for. Respondent stated that, aside from the instant matter, he has never had a disciplinary complaint lodged against him. Respondent described his feelings when the [A] involvement became public by way of the newspaper publicity: “It was much, much more than embarrassment. It was — I mean — it was for a time very detrimental to me, extremely detrimental. There was more than one article and there was a lot of things being alluded to in our legal community and outside of the legal community. There were background checks being done by FBI agents and things of that nature that it certainly was not only embarrassing to myself and my family, but it frightened me terribly, especially with the kind of work that I am in and knowing what the ramifications are of that type of investigation.” Respondent’s partnership terminated in April, 1976. Although respondent had done mostly personal injury work when a partner with the other respondents herein, since 1976 he has concentrated on criminal work and over half of his cases are referred by other lawyers. Respondent testified, with respect to possible effects of this disciplinary proceeding: “I am deeply concerned that any exposure or any publicity that would create that type of a position would certainly, in my opinion, have a harmful effect or could have a harmful effect on my ability to continue to practice law in that area, which is referrals from other lawyers.” Respondent conceded he never considered walking away from the firm because of the fee-splitting practice, but contended: “. . . I did not have the appreciation of the seriousness of what I was into at that particular time. I lacked a lot of maturity and experience. I like to think, now looking back, that it had a great deal to do with my son’s illness. I can’t answer that. I know I’m here presenting it as a defense in terms of mitigation as to what happened. I know my thinking was clouded at that time, but I didn’t have a real good conscious appreciation of the seriousness of what was happening. My thinking was, was impaired by youth, being young and personal problems that I was having at that particular period of time. It was stupid. “. . . I certainly knew what the heck we were doing at that particular time in terms of, you know, having the same Code of Ethics, as far as that is concerned.” In closing, respondent stated: “It couldn’t happen today because I wouldn’t let it happen. I am an ethical lawyer, which says that, in my own sense and values, which I have today, I have respect for the Code of Ethics. It is obvious that I didn’t have that respect back in 1971 to 1974 as to what was going on. I enjoy practicing law. I think I’m very lucky because I do mostly every day what I like to do. I consider that extremely lucky, that is, as a lawyer. It wouldn’t happen again, couldn’t happen again. I wouldn’t let it happen again. I went through a very, very, very trying period of time during — it is coincidental, and I know [the respondent in 28 D.B. 80] had the same thing with the cancer of his son, we used to spend a lot of time crying in the beer. “There are different situations. I am in a different phase of my life. I am not saying to you that you shouldn’t punish me because it happened seven years ago, between seven and ten years ago. I would like to think that I brought in [N] here because he symbolized that whether the case came in as a fee-split or came in like [O] came in, I represented her nephew, I gave it the same effort. “I think that I am a good lawyer. I think I have a lot of integrity. I think I’m ethical. I consider it a privilege to continue to practice law in the same fashion. I am truly sorry that I was so stupid in 1971 for all of the different reasons that went on at that particular period of time. It would not happen again.” On cross-examination respondent was asked: “Q. Is there any doubt in your mind that it [the decision to pay referral fees to bondsmen] was clearly understood and agreed to by all three? A. Absolutely. It absolutely was clearly understood by all three.” Respondent was asked by Assistant Disciplinary Counsel if the reason the firm paid the bondsmen by check was so they could deduct those amounts from the firm’s income. Respondent replied that the amounts were deducted from the firm’s income, but the reason checks were used was “to obey the law.” Respondent said when the bondsmen received the 1099 forms: “. . . this really aggravated these guys. That’s when they started sending it to all the other lawyers, because they got these forms from the Government saying you owe us taxes on this money and that upset the hell out of them ...” Respondent discussed what he perceived to be the purpose of the Rule he was charged with violating and discussed why the practice he engaged in was wrong. He acknowledged that splitting fees with nonlawyers “aside from the Code of Ethics, . . . .is not the appropriate way for a professional to conduct himself.” 29 D.B. 80 Respondent in 29 D.B. 80 presented no other witnesses in his mitigation hearing, but testified on his own behalf. Respondent graduated from law school in 1966. He is active in the American and [ ] County Bar Associations and several weeks before the mitigation hearing was invited to join the American Board of Criminal Lawyers, an organization joined only upon recommendation and invitation. Respondent was two years out of law school when he formed a partnership with the respondent in 30 D.B. 80; the two of them merged with the third respondent in mid-1971 and that firm dissolved in 1976. Since then, respondent has been a sole practitioner limiting his practice exclusively to trial work, 70 percent of which is criminal. During 1971 through 1974, respondent was trying between 75 to 80 criminal cases per year, of which approximately 20 were cases referred by [A] (82 cases in all during the period). Respondent supplied a fist of the 82 “[A]” cases, showing the client’s name and other particulars. Respondent testified that once the case was referred: “ . . the bondsman had no further input into whether or not we represented a client or whether or not the client chose to retain us or how we handled the case. That was none of their affair, that was none of their business. And, as I say, there were many clients who chose not to retain us or clients who chose not to choose us after the prehminary hearing or other various stages of the trial. So, once the client was introduced to us, that was the end of the bondsman’s involvement in the attorney-client relationship.” Respondent testified that he had a relatively standard fee for drug cases, which comprised 90-95 percent of the [A] referrals. He charged $250 for the prehminary hearing and $500 for the trial, and the fee to the client was the same whether or not a referral fee was paid to [A]. Respondent testified: “ . . . I think it would be, I have always felt this way, I think it would be grossly unfair to charge A client more money than you would charge client B for a comparable case because you had to share the fee with somebody else. I have never done that. I never would do that.” Respondent further testified: “In terms of the quality of representation, I have always prided myself on being a good criminal lawyer. I think that I enjoy a good reputation in the community. I have always attended seminars. I have always kept up with whatever is current in the field. I find it, being involved in these national associations, it’s been very educational to me to meet with lawyers from other parts of the country and find out how cases are being handled in other places. I have always prided myself on being very well prepared and handling a case professionally.” “... As a criminal lawyer, I, I am basically a nonjudgmental person, and I súpose that is one reason why I am able to specialize in criminal law and many other lawyers are not able to. It’s very rare that someone comes to me with a case that I feel that I can’t handle because it bothers me morally, ethically or philosophically. I have a difficult time with sex cases. I don’t, I don’t do much of that kind of work. I know that there were some cases referred from the [A] Agency that were particularly heinous rape cases or involving child molesting or that type of thing. I just felt that I really couldn’t, couldn’t go into court and give it my all. So, I found that I had turned down some of those kind of cases and I probably would in the recent past have turned down some of those, too. But basically, we were not basically — there was no obligation for us to accept any case that was referred in by the [A] Agency, just as there was no obligation for any person they referred in to use our services.” When asked why he agreed to pay referral fees to bondsmen, respondent replied: “Well, needless to say, I have had a lot of time to think about why we conducted business in this manner. It seems to me that there was really no conscious thought process, that this was either a proper or an improper way to do business. I can only tell the Committee that almost every one that I was in daily contact with, who was handling criminal cases, was doing business in this way. It wasn’t a secret — it wasn’t something that was particularly hushed up. People seemed to be doing it fairly openly. And I am sure that I always realized that it was a violation of the Code of Ethical Conduct, I am sure I always realized that, but never consciously thought about it because it seemed to be one of those things that nobody paid much attention to. “This was even more so amongst people I knew who were handling personal injury cases at the time. The lawyers I worked for conducted business this way. “When we joined with [respondent in 28 D.B. 80], his father, who was a highly respected and successful lawyer, conducted business this way. And I guess I really didn’t consciously think that this is improper and we shouldn’t do it. I haven’t conducted business this way since we stopped doing business with the [A] Agency. I certainly wouldn’t do it today. I am sure I realized it was unethical at the time. It just seems that everybody was doing it and it wasn’t a practice that anyone was particularly concerned about.” Respondent farther suggested that the criminal defendants referred by [A] needed counsel (if it wasn’t an elective situation whether or not to retain counsel) and by referral to respondents’ firm they got “competent, effective representation” and “weren’t charged anything additional by way of fee ...” Although respondent stated he clearly knew ethical rules were being violated he “always felt that no one was being harmed” (NT 551; 553) and, moreover, “that this was in some way a service to these people” because the lawyers (respondents and others) to whom [A] referred them “are good, competent lawyers, skillful lawyers.” Respondent wasn’t sure that the choice to file 1099 forms with the IRS was “a real conscious process.” He said: “There just didn’t seem to be any reason to handle this surreptitiously.” He thought [A] wasn’t happy about being paid by check but [A] had no “input” on the matter. Respondent had no knowledge at the time in what way other lawyers were paying the referrals. On cross-examination, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel probed respondent’s understanding of the reason for the rule prohibiting fee-splitting. Respondent rather frankly admitted: “. . . I have a lot of trouble finding a serious justification for the rule. I don’t wish to get into a philosophical argument with you about the rule. It is on the books. I have always been frank to admit that I violated it. I have a lot of trouble perceiving its justification. I suppose I did some research on it some time ago and I think that the early historical underpinnings for the rule was that it was perceived to be unseemly for a professional person to share a fee with a non-layperson, (sic) I think that was the historical underpinning for the rule. I think that today it is more difficult to justify. (NT 556) Respondent did not think that failure to tell the client about the referral fee breached any duty of fidelity a lawyer owes to his client, unless the client paid more because of the referral fee. But, on the other hand, he did find objectionable the practice other lawyers engaged in (which was allegedly widespread) of receiving a kickback on fees the client paid for a bond. Assistant Disciplinary Counsel then offered into evidence, pursuant to Disciplinary Board Rule 89.151(b)(9), the hearing committee report and report and recommendation of the Disciplinary Board in a prior disciplinary proceeding against this respondent, docketed at no. 29 D.B. 77. That proceeding involved conduct which apparently occurred in the period 1974-1976, and as a result of said conduct respondent was charged with violations of Title 18 USC §401(1) and (2) and entered a plea of guilty in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. (PE 7; hearing committee report, page 4) In the disciplinary proceeding, respondent was found by the board to have violated Disciplinary Rules 1-102(A)(4), 1-102(A)(5), 7-102(A)(6) and 7-102(A)(7) and was subjected to public censure by the Supreme Court in September, 1978. Respondent addressed the matter of the prior disciplinary proceeding. He stated that it arose from an isolated incident in which respondent became involved beginning in 1974. Respondent did not deny engaging in the conduct and the disciplinary hearing was only to determine the appropriate form of discipline. Respondent testified: “. . . The prior misconduct was something that I considered to be very serious and I felt that — that the imposition of public censure was very appropriate in that particular case. “The thing that I would like the committee to understand is it is very difficult for me, I think to say, is that public censure really bothered me. It is something that I took very seriously. I was very troubled by my conduct in that incident. I was very troubled by being publicly censured by the Supreme Court, although I did feel that it was certainly appropriate, if not lenient, discipline. “Although it is something that happened, the public censure part of it is something that happened and received really very — a lot of publicity in this city because I’ve — I’ve always managed to get in the newspapers a lot because of the cases that I try. And I think it really received a lot of prominence. It is really something that even though it happened three years ago, I’ve never stopped carrying it around with me. I hope it is, at some point, it will be something that I can put far behind me, but I haven’t been able to yet. It is just something that I took very seriously and I always carry it around in my head. “I hope that that won’t be a reason for the Committee to consider imposing a public discipline in this case, when it might otherwise consider private. I don’t know. I don’t want to be presumptuous, and I hope I am not speaking out of turn, but I — I feel that if I don’t speak up, I will be upset that I didn’t at some later point. I just wanted to try to kind of put it into perspective.” The parties had filed rather extensive briefs after the initial hearing, going essentially to the issues of “staleness” and “selective prosecution,” but no briefs were filed after the mitigation hearings. It was alleged in the Petitions for Discipline that the conduct of respondents violated Disciplinary Rules 2-103(B), 2-103(C) and 3-102(A). As to each of respondents, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel suggested that the committee recommend public censure as the appropriate form of discipline.