Opinion ID: 1266115
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Deference to the Guidelines

Text: The Supreme Court explained in Gall that the Guidelines range is not presumptively reasonable, but generally acts as the initial benchmark in crafting a sentence. Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 596-97. A sentencing judge factors in the Guidelines range to secure nationwide consistency, id. at 596, because the Sentencing Commission develops the Guidelines to `reflect a rough approximation of sentences that might achieve § 3553(a)'s objectives' in the heartland of cases. Kimbrough, 128 S.Ct. at 574 (quoting Rita, 127 S.Ct. at 2465). In the normal course, the Commission's discrete institutional role is to formulate the Guidelines through a detailed empirical approach by surveying national sentencing practices, pre-Guidelines sentencing practices, judicial decisions, other data, or comments from participants and experts in the field. See Kimbrough, 128 S.Ct. at 574 (citing Rita, 127 S.Ct. at 2465 (explaining that the Commission has the capacity the courts lack to make these empirical determinations)). However, if the Commission does not act in its characteristic role, then a sentencing judge can give those Guidelines less deference, even in a mine-run case, because they fail[] properly to reflect § 3553(a) considerations. [10] Kimbrough, 128 S.Ct. at 574-75 (quoting Rita, 127 S.Ct. at 2465). Kimbrough concluded that the Commission did not act in its institutional capacity in the crack cocaine context, and we believe that it similarly did not do so in the fast-track context. The [Sentencing] Commission implemented [Congress's] directive at section 401(m)(2)(B) of the PROTECT Act regarding early disposition programs by adding a new policy statement at [Guidelines § ] 5K3.1, but in doing so it also openly expressed its criticism, specifically the potential for unwarranted sentencing disparity based on geography. Sentencing Commission Report, at 79. The Commission stated: The Department of Justice requested that the Commission implement the directive regarding the early disposition programs in section 401(m) of the PROTECT Act in a similar unfettered manner by merely restating the legislative language.... The Commission notes that implementation of the directive in this manner has the potential to create unwarranted sentencing disparity. ... Defendants sentenced in districts without authorized early disposition programs, however, can be expected to receive longer sentences than similarly-situated defendants in districts with such programs. This type of geographical disparity appears to be at odds with the overall Sentencing Reform Act goal of reducing unwarranted sentencing disparity among similarly-situated defendants. . . . . .... [T]he Commission cannot determine the full impact of fast track programs on the departure rate because fast track departures are documented in various ways by the judicial districts that have such programs. Id. at 66-67, 79-80 (emphases added). Cf. Kimbrough, 128 S.Ct. at 568 (indicating that the Sentencing Commission immediately used the 100-to-1 ratio to define base offense levels for all crack and powder offenses, but in a Commission report later determined that the crack/powder sentencing disparity is generally unwarranted and `fails to meet the sentencing objectives set forth by Congress' in the Sentencing Reform Act). Indeed, it appears that, absent a downward variance, defendants sentenced in non-fast-track districts who would have been eligible for fast-track treatment in fast-track districts receive longer sentences then their fast-track counterparts simply by virtue of the geographic district where they are prosecuted. Cf. Kimbrough, 128 S.Ct. at 566 (noting that the 100-to-1 ratio yields sentences for crack offenses three to six times longer than those for powder offenses involving equal amounts of drugs). Moreover, the implementation of fast-track districts appears to be uneven. See U.S. Sentencing Commission, 2007 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics, at 183, 216 (2007 Sourcebook); see also United States v. Gramillo-Garcia, 632 F.Supp.2d 837, 839-41 (N.D.Ill.2009) (stating that, based on statistical information provided by the Government for fiscal year 2003, the Western District of Washington, a fast-track district, has less than one illegal reentry case per prosecutor per year, and in other fast-track districts, such as Oregon, Idaho, Nebraska, and North Dakota, each AUSA on average handles only two or three illegal reentry cases per year). For example, in the District of Nebraska, which is a fast-track district, immigration offenses comprised 11.77% of all sentences, while in the Northern District of Florida, which is a non-fast track district, immigration offenses comprised 20.94% of all sentences. 2007 Sourcebook, at 183, 216; see also Stephanos Bibas, Regulating Local Variations in Federal Sentencing, 58 Stan. L.Rev. 137, 145-58 (2005) (discussing unjustified sentencing variations based on fast-track programs and noting that some districts that process large numbers of immigration cases employ fast-track programs, while other districts with similar or heavier loads, such as the Southern District of Florida, do not offer these programs); Jane L. McClellan & Jon M. Sands, Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Policy Paradox of Early Disposition Programs, 38 Az. St. L.J. 517, 523 (2006) (In some districts with a high rate of immigration cases, such as the District of Nevada, ... the New York districts, [certain] Florida districts, and certain divisions in the Southern District of Texas, there are still no fast-track plea offers.). These statistics lead us to question whether all approved fast-track districts actually have overwhelming immigration caseloads, which is what Congress appears to have accepted as a given in enacting the PROTECT Act's sanctioning of such programs. The Sentencing Commission has also observed that reliable data documenting the effect of these programs is difficult to ascertain. See, e.g., Sentencing Commission Report, at 62-70. Consequently, it does not appear to be clear to the Commission (based on its limited statistical analysis), nor is it evident to us, why some districts have fast-track programs while others do not. [11] Like the crack/powder cocaine ratio in Kimbrough, the fast-track departure scheme do[es] not exemplify the Commission's exercise of its characteristic institutional role in developing the Guidelines. Kimbrough, 128 S.Ct. at 575 (explaining the same for the crack cocaine Guidelines). In authorizing a departure for defendants in fast-track districts only, the Commission did not systematically evaluate the issue before implementing the fast-track Guideline. Cf. id. at 567, 575 (explaining that, in formulating the crack cocaine Guidelines, the Commission did not use this empirical approach.... Instead, it employed the 1986 [Anti-Drug Abuse] Act's weight-driven scheme to set 100-to-1 ratio offense levels for crack and powder cocaine ... in line with the 1986 Act). Rather, it quickly adopted the congressional language. Cf. id. Accordingly, as the First Circuit Court explained in Rodriguez, the [G]uidelines and policy statements embodying these judgments deserve less deference than the sentencing guidelines normally attract, and, as a result, may produce a sentence that is greater than necessary to provide just punishment in a particular case under the § 3553(a) factors. 527 F.3d at 227 (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Kimbrough, 128 S.Ct. at 574-75 (explaining that the Guidelines are not binding and in the crack cocaine context a district court may vary even in a mine-run case). In sentencing a defendant for illegal reentry in a non-fast-track district at step 3, a sentencing court must make an individualized assessment based on the facts presented, and judge their import under § 3553(a). Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 597. We entrust this sentencing discretion to the district court because it is most familiar with the details of the offender and the offense that set the basis for the sentence. See id. at 597-98. The court may have a disagreement with the Guidelines range because it believes that it does not represent the heartland of cases. See Kimbrough, 128 S.Ct at 574-76. Nevertheless, it must still give meaningful consideration to the sentencing goals, and, in particular, the command to impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in subsection (a)(2)the so-called parsimony provision. Id. at 570-71; see also Spears, 129 S.Ct. at 842-43. We also note that § 3553(a)(5) discusses any pertinent policy statement [that is] issued by the Sentencing Commission. The Commission's criticism of the disparity created by fast-track programs could be considered by a district court under this factor as well. And in sentencing a defendant below the Guidelines range, it would not be unreasonable for a court to take into account the lower, departure-based fast-track range and use it as a barometer in crafting the appropriate sentence. See Spears, 129 S.Ct. at 842-43. Finally, we address the argument that affording district courts discretion on this issue will create even more ad hoc sentencing disparity in the system. We are not convinced that this discretion would result in further disparity. In any event, we disagree that the possibly greater disparity perceived would justify proscribing the discretionary authority of a sentencing judge. As Kimbrough explained, [t]o reach an appropriate sentence, these disparities must be weighed against the other § 3553(a) factors and any unwarranted disparity created by the crack/powder ratio itself, or in this case the uneven implementation of fast-track programs in certain jurisdictions that create disparate sentences for similarly culpable defendants. Id. Moreover, a district court is not afforded unfettered discretion in sentencing defendants. It is constrained by our procedural and substantive reasonableness review, and a variant sentence that is based solely on a fast-track disparity, particularly if it is below the four-level departure authorized by Congress in fast-track districts, might be unreasonable in our view.