Opinion ID: 1387721
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Defense Counsel's Incompetence

Text: Defendant complains of various acts or omissions on trial counsel's part which assertedly demonstrated his incompetence. Nothing on the face of the record, however, discloses that counsel failed to act in a reasonably diligent and competent fashion, resulting in the loss of a potentially meritorious defense or adversely affecting the defense of the case. (See People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 584 [189 Cal. Rptr. 855, 659 P.2d 1144]; People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 425 [152 Cal. Rptr. 732, 590 P.2d 859 2 A.L.R.4th 1].) (12) Defendant first argues that trial counsel should have moved to sever the burglary count from the robbery/murder counts, so that the same jury would not hear testimony regarding all these crimes. (See Williams v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 441, 447-454 [204 Cal. Rptr. 700, 683 P.2d 699].) The burglary count was based on the three hanging lamps found in defendant's car following the searches previously discussed. The evidence disclosed that, at some time during the weekend immediately preceding the robbery/murder, someone had broken into several houses at a construction site at Miraflores Park in San Pedro and had stolen three light fixtures later identified as the ones found in defendant's trunk. Although defense counsel failed to move to sever the burglary count from the remaining counts, such omission might well have been based upon counsel's reasonable assumption that such a motion would have been denied. Defendant concedes that the counts originally were properly joined, involving felonies of the same statutory class. (See § 954.) Moreover, evidence of the burglary was relevant to the robbery/murder charges, placing defendant in the San Pedro area during the time when these latter offenses were committed. (See Williams, supra, at pp. 448-449 [cross-admissibility of evidence ordinarily dispels any possibility of prejudice from denial of severance].) Finally, neither the burglary charge nor the robbery/murder charges were particularly weak, thus making it unlikely that joinder was intended to produce a conviction which otherwise might not have been obtainable. ( Id. at pp. 453-454.) Thus, it is not reasonably probable that defense counsel's omission resulted in any substantial prejudice to defendant's case. (13) Defendant also contends that trial counsel failed to raise a hearsay objection to Officer Burkman's testimony regarding victim Castro's identification of defendant at the live pretrial lineup. (See Evid. Code, § 1238, subd. (c); People v. Mayfield (1972) 23 Cal. App.3d 236, 241 [100 Cal. Rptr. 104].) Counsel's omission could not have prejudiced defendant, however, because (as he acknowledges) the same testimony readily could have been presented by victim Castro himself, who identified defendant at trial. Indeed, the availability of Castro for this purpose may have convinced trial counsel that any objection to Officer Burkman's testimony would have been pointless. (14) Defendant suggests that counsel's inept cross-examination of prosecution witnesses frequently elicited harmful responses. Cross-examination is, of course, fraught with risk  the most skilled examiner can seldom predict precisely what responses will be forthcoming. Our review of the record in this context discloses no conduct on counsel's part which demonstrates his incompetence. (15) Likewise, counsel's failure to object to various photographs of victim Estrada cannot be deemed prejudicial incompetence. In a murder case, such photos are routinely offered and admitted for various purposes, such as to demonstrate the method or manner of death, the type of wounds, the position of the body or bodies, and other possibly relevant circumstances. Although it is unclear whether all of the photos involved here were relevant to any contested issues in the case, defendant does not contend that they were particularly gruesome. In light of the overwhelming evidence of petitioner's guilt of the murder charge, however, any error in admitting them was harmless. (See People v. Turner (1984) 37 Cal.3d 302, 320-321 [208 Cal. Rptr. 196, 690 P.2d 669].) Accordingly, counsel's failure to object to their admission cannot be deemed prejudicial incompetence. (16) Defendant asserts that counsel improperly failed to object to asserted prosecutorial misconduct in referring to a fact not in evidence, namely, victim Castro's identification of defendant at the preliminary hearing. As previously discussed, however, the asserted misconduct was harmless, and defense counsel's decision not to object cannot be deemed prejudicial. (17) Finally, defendant asserts that trial counsel's closing argument at the guilt phase was disorganized and often incoherent. We have examined the record in this regard, and although counsel showed instances of confusion or misstatement, his argument was certainly within the range of reasonable competence expected of an attorney responsible for defending a murder charge supported by overwhelming evidence, including the eyewitness testimony of one of the victims. We conclude that defendant has failed to establish the incompetence of his trial counsel.