Opinion ID: 6277155
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The KTCA

Text: Enacted in 1979, the KTCA transformed the law regarding governmental tort liability in Kansas. Prior to its enactment, Kansas had adhered to the common law doctrine of governmental immunity, which generally shielded cities, counties, and the state from liability when their employees acted negligently or wrongfully. As this court has explained, 'The doctrine of governmental immunity was held to exempt governmental entities from privately instituted civil suits without the expressed consent of the sovereign. The doctrine was founded upon the belief the courts, which derived their power from the sovereign, could not have been empowered to enforce such authority against the sovereign; that the king could do no wrong, nor could he authorize such conduct while acting in his sovereign capacity, for no man can do by his agents and officers that which he cannot do by himself. Under the doctrine of immunity for governmental officers, the common law recognized the necessity of permitting public officials to perform their official duties free from the threat of personal liability.' Collins v. Heavener Properties, 15 Inc., 245 Kan. 623, 628, 783 P.2d 883 (1989) (quoting Siple v. City of Topeka, 235 Kan. 267, 169-70, 679 P.2d 190 [1984]). The KTCA modified this common-law doctrine and essentially subjected governmental entities to vicarious liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior, making such entities liable for the tortious conduct of their employees in the same way that a private employer would be. Westerbeke, The Immunity Provisions in the Kansas Tort Claims Act: The First Twenty-Five Years, 52 U. Kan. L. Rev. 939, 944 (2004). The general rule of liability is set forth in K.S.A. 75-6103(a), which provides: Subject to the limitations of this act, each governmental entity shall be liable for damages caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any of its employees while acting within the scope of their employment under circumstances where the governmental entity, if a private person, would be liable under the laws of this state. Consistent with K.S.A. 75-6103(a), we have frequently observed that liability is the rule and immunity is the exception under the KTCA. Soto, 291 Kan. at 78. Yet, the exceptions to the general rule of liability are numerous and confirm there has been no wholesale rejection of immunity by the Kansas Legislature. Robertson v. City of Topeka, 231 Kan. 358, 360, 644 P.2d 458 (1982); see also Mendoza v. Reno County, 235 Kan. 692, 693, 681 P.2d 676 (1984) (There are, however, numerous exceptions to this general rule of liability which 'indicates there has been no wholesale rejection of immunity by the Kansas Legislature.'); McAllister and Robinson, The Potential Civil Liability of Law Enforcement Officers and Agencies, 67 J.K.B.A. 14, 16 (September 1998) (noting KTCA is far from a complete relinquishment of sovereign immunity from suit). The KTCA enumerates 24 specific exceptions from liability. Among those exceptions, the one most relevant to our analysis is the discretionary function immunity provided under K.S.A. 75-6104(e), which states: 16 A governmental entity or an employee acting within the scope of the employee's employment shall not be liable for damages resulting from: .... (e) any claim based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a governmental entity or employee, whether or not the discretion is abused and regardless of the level of discretion involved. K.S.A. 75-6104 further clarifies that [t]he enumeration of exceptions to liability in this section shall not be construed to be exclusive nor as legislative intent to waive immunity from liability in the performance or failure to perform any other act or function of a discretionary nature. C. Meaning and Scope of the KTCA's Discretionary Function Immunity Provision To determine whether K.S.A. 75-6104(e) bars Schreiner's tort claims, the Court must determine whether [defendants'] alleged tortious conduct occurred during the performance of a discretionary function. Stead v. U.S.D. No. 259, 92 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1113 (D. Kan. 2015). A governmental entity bears the burden to establish immunity under this exception. Williams, 310 Kan. at 795 (citing Soto, 291 Kan. 73, Syl. ¶ 5). But this framework begs the question: What constitutes a discretionary function? The KTCA does not define the term discretionary function, and the legislative history offers no insight into the intended meaning. However, K.S.A. 75-6104(e) is patterned after a provision in the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) that likewise carves out immunity for discretionary functions. Carpenter v. Johnson, 231 Kan. 783, 785, 649 P.2d 400 (1982); Robertson, 231 Kan. at 360. And we have previously looked to the 17 interpretation of the FTCA's discretionary function exception in construing the meaning of K.S.A. 75-6104(e). See Robertson, 231 Kan. at 360-62. K.S.A. 75-6104(e)'s federal counterpart provides that the FTCA's liability provisions do not apply to: Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2018). The FTCA's discretionary function exception applies only to those acts that 'involv[e] an element of judgment or choice.' United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322, 111 S. Ct. 1267, 113 L. Ed. 2d 335 (1991) (quoting Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536, 108 S. Ct. 1954, 100 L. Ed. 2d 531 [1988]). But not every act involving an element of judgment will qualify for immunity. Rather, [b]ecause the purpose of the exception is to 'prevent judicial second-guessing of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in tort,' . . . the exception 'protects only governmental actions and decisions based on considerations of public policy.' [Citations omitted.] Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 323. Even so, courts have not narrowly construed the immunity provision to apply only to those decisions made by personnel at the planning or policy-making level of government (to the exclusion of decisions made by personnel at the operational or management level of government). 499 U.S. at 325. Indeed, government employees at the operational and management level frequently exercise discretion based on, or in furtherance of, established policy considerations. Thus, whether the FTCA's discretionary 18 function exception applies depends not on 'the status of the actor' but rather 'the nature of the conduct.' 499 U.S. at 325. We have interpreted K.S.A. 75-6104(e) in a similar fashion, recognizing it is the nature and quality of the discretion exercised, rather than the status of the employee, that determines whether certain acts or omissions are entitled to immunity. See Soto, 291 Kan. 73, Syl. ¶ 6 (In deciding whether the discretionary function exception of the Kansas Tort Claims Act applies, it is the nature and quality of the discretion exercised which should be the focus rather than the status of the employee exercising the discretion.). This construction is bolstered by the Legislature's 1987 amendment to K.S.A. 75-6104(e), which clarified that discretionary function immunity would apply regardless of the level of discretion exercised. L. 1987, ch. 353, sec. 3. Thus, to determine whether a government employee's function or duty is discretionary for the purposes of the KTCA, courts must ask whether the judgment of the governmental employee is of the nature and quality which the legislature intended to put beyond judicial review. Bolyard v. Kansas Dept. of SRS, 259 Kan. 447, 452, 912 P.2d 729 (1996). 'The more a judgment involves the making of policy[,] the more it is of a nature and quality to be recognized as inappropriate for judicial review.' Thomas v. Board of Shawnee County Comm'rs, 293 Kan. 208, 234, 262 P.3d 336 (2011) (quoting Kansas State Bank & Tr. Co. v. Specialized Transportation Services, Inc., 249 Kan. 348, 365, 819 P.2d 587 [1991]). However, '[KTCA] immunity does not depend upon the status of the individual exercising discretion and thus may apply to discretionary decisions made at the operational level as well as at the planning level.' Thomas, 293 Kan. at 235 (quoting Westerbeke, 52 U. Kan. L. Rev. at 960). 19 D. Police Investigations and Reasonable Suspicion Determinations Fall Within the Scope of K.S.A. 75-6104(e) With this analysis in mind, we turn to the conduct in question. Schreiner's tort claims arose from the officers' investigation of a citizen's report of suspicious activity and, more specifically, their determination that the totality of the circumstances created reasonable suspicion to detain Schreiner during the investigatory process. We have consistently found the investigatory methods and procedures employed by governmental employees to be matters requiring the exercise of judgment and discretion. Soto, 291 Kan. at 85 (noting by way of example that the precise steps to be taken . . . to verify personally identifying information, the manner of conducting an investigation, and the people to whom social workers converse in supervising child placements are discretionary functions); see also Awad v. United States, 807 Fed. Appx. 876, 880 (10th Cir. 2020) (unpublished opinion) (manner in which law enforcement agents conduct their investigation and identify suspects involves elements of judgment or choice). Likewise, an officer's determination whether reasonable suspicion exists is an inherently discretionary process. Before officers decide to detain or stop a person, they must evaluate the totality of the circumstances and determine whether reasonable suspicion exists—a judgment officers make based largely on their experience and training. See Lowery, 308 Kan. at 366. As such, law enforcement's reasonable suspicion determination necessarily entails the exercise of judgment and discretion. See Thomas, 293 Kan. at 234-35 (whether a particular judgment requires a government employee to use his or her expertise is a factor relevant to determining whether a particular act is discretionary); see also Odom v. Wayne Co., 482 Mich. 459, 476, 760 N.W.2d 217 (2008) (characterizing officers' exercise of judgment to determine whether there is reasonable suspicion to investigate as a discretionary, rather than ministerial, act); Beattie v. Smith, 20 543 Fed. Appx. 850, 860 (10th Cir. 2013) (unpublished opinion) (applying Kansas law and finding officers' determination that probable cause existed based on their investigation of a report of potential criminal activity is a discretionary function); Magnan v. Doe, Civil No. 11-753 (JNE/SER), 2012 WL 5247325, at  (D. Minn. 2012) (unpublished opinion) (The determination of whether sufficient reasonable suspicion is present to detain a person or seize property is a discretionary decision made by police officers.). Moreover, an officer's exercise of this discretion in the field implicates matters of policy sufficient to invoke K.S.A. 75-6104(e). For one, officers investigating potential crimes, like Hodge and Smith, are acting within the scope of their employment to provide police protection, a traditional governmental function. See Woods v. Homes & Structures of Pittsburg, Kansas, 489 F. Supp. 1270, 1296 (D. Kan. 1980). Where the conduct in question relates to the performance of traditional governmental functions, we have typically found the conduct to be sufficiently policy-oriented to remove it from judicial second-guessing and place it within the scope of K.S.A. 75-6104(e). See, e.g., Bolyard, 259 Kan. at 455 (SRS's placement decision to protect child's welfare); Mills v. City of Overland Park, 251 Kan. 434, 446-48, 837 P.2d 370 (1992) (law enforcement officers' decision not to detain intoxicated patron); Robertson, 231 Kan. at 362-63 (law enforcement officers' decision to remove homeowner from premises rather than trespasser). Furthermore, law enforcement's authority to detain third parties has been established as a matter of policy through K.S.A. 22-2402(1). That statute provides that, [w]ithout making an arrest, a law enforcement officer may stop any person in a public place whom such officer reasonably suspects is committing, has committed or is about to commit a crime. (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 22-2402(1). As the Court of Appeals observed, the statute's use of the term may is significant because it reflects the discretionary nature of an investigatory stop—law enforcement officers have the choice 21 to stop someone when reasonable suspicion exists, but they are not required to do so. See Schreiner, 55 Kan. App. 2d at 54. And, as previously noted, an officer's determination whether reasonable suspicion exists inherently requires an exercise of discretion based on the officer's experience and training. Because the Legislature defined this authority (and related conditions and limitations) in statute, we presume the exercise of such powers to be sufficiently grounded in governmental policy to fall within the scope of K.S.A. 756104(e). See Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 324 (When established governmental policy, as expressed or implied by statute . . . allows a Government agent to exercise discretion, it must be presumed that the agent's acts are grounded in policy when exercising that discretion.). Finally, the investigation of a report of criminal activity requires officers to make informed judgments on a variety of other policy-related matters. These decisions include, for example, whether the potential threat to public safety and the totality of the circumstances justify detention of a suspect, what investigative techniques are most appropriate, and what resources to allocate to a particular investigation. In turn, these discretionary decisions are grounded in economic, political, and social policy considerations. See Awad, 807 Fed. Appx. at 881 (describing how federal agents' decision whether to investigate, as well as decisions concerning the nature and extent of an investigation, are subject to economic, political, and social policy considerations). For these reasons, we conclude that an officer's decision whether and how to investigate a crime, along with their reasonable suspicion determination, require the type of policy-based judgments the Legislature intended to insulate from tort liability under the discretionary function exception in K.S.A. 75-6104(e). 22 E. The Lack of Reasonable Suspicion Does Not Preclude Discretionary Function Immunity Schreiner and the dissent contend that our holding on the issue of privilege, i.e., that defendants lacked objectively reasonable suspicion to detain Schreiner under Fourth Amendment standards, forecloses discretionary function immunity as a matter of law. They reason that law enforcement officers lack discretion to violate the Fourth Amendment, or K.S.A. 22-2402(1) for that matter, and thus those provisions stripped defendants' conduct of its discretionary nature. But whether defendants, in fact, correctly determined that reasonable suspicion existed under Fourth Amendment standards is a red herring. Here, our task is to properly construe the KTCA. And the plain language of K.S.A. 75-6104(e) simply does not support a rule that precludes discretionary function immunity any time a court determines, in hindsight, that the government employee's judgment was erroneous, mistaken, or otherwise constituted an abuse of discretion. The plain language of K.S.A. 75-6104(e) extends discretionary function immunity to government employees exercising or failing to exercise a discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused. The plain meaning of this phrase signifies that the Legislature intended immunity to apply to discretionary functions even when the exercise of discretion could be characterized as erroneous, mistaken, or even unconstitutional. See Shivers v. United States, 1 F.4th 924, 930 (11th Cir. 2021) (construing similar language under FTCA and concluding that there is nothing in the statutory language that limits application of this exception based on the 'degree' of the abuse of discretion or the egregiousness of the employee's performance; Congress could have adopted language that carved out certain behavior from this exception—for example . . . a constitutional violation, but did not do so); Linder v. United States, 937 F.3d 1087, 1091 (7th Cir. 2019) (rejecting plaintiff's argument that no one has discretion 23 to violate the Constitution; nothing in the language of the FTCA suggests that some discretionary but tortious acts are outside the FTCA while others aren't); Kiiskila v. United States, 466 F.2d 626, 627-28 (7th Cir. 1972) (plaintiff's exclusion from Fort Sheridan was based upon Colonel Nichols' exercise of discretion, albeit constitutionally repugnant, and therefore excepted her claim from the reach of the [FTCA] under 28 U.S.C. § 2680[a]). In other words, the key inquiry under K.S.A. 75-6104(e) is not about how poorly, abusively, or unconstitutionally the employee exercised his or her discretion but whether the underlying function or duty itself was a discretionary one. Shivers, 1 F.4th at 931 (interpreting discretionary function immunity under FTCA). Consistent with this interpretation, we have held that the breach of a legal duty does not necessarily foreclose discretionary function immunity under the KTCA. See Soto, 291 Kan. at 80 ([I]f there is a duty owed [and breached], the discretionary function exception to liability is not necessarily barred as a defense.); Schmidt v. HTG, Inc., 265 Kan. 372, 392, 961 P.2d 677 (1998) (Although governmental entities do not have discretion to violate a legal duty, we have not held that the existence of any duty deprives the State of immunity under the discretionary function exception.). After all, a tort, by definition, involves the breach of a legal duty. See Mills, 251 Kan. at 445 (A tort is a violation of a duty imposed by law.). If all alleged breaches of a legal duty foreclosed immunity under K.S.A. 75-6104(e), that provision would never apply in common-law tort actions and K.S.A. 75-6104(e) would be rendered meaningless. See Soto, 291 Kan. at 80. Such an interpretation cannot withstand scrutiny under our traditional canons of construction. See In re Marriage of Traster, 301 Kan. 88, 98, 339 P.3d 778 (2014) (court favors statutory constructions that give effect to every part of a legislative act and do not render any portion thereof useless). Therefore, even if Hodge and Smith were mistaken, their reasonable suspicion determination was still a discretionary function immune from tort liability. The Tenth Circuit's analysis in Awad is instructive on this point. There, Awad sued the federal 24 government for negligence, false arrest, and false imprisonment after United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents mistakenly identified him as the perpetrator of a crime and arrested him. The government invoked discretionary function immunity under the FTCA, and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the government. On appeal, Awad argued the DEA agents lacked probable cause to arrest him and thus discretionary function immunity did not apply because the constitutional violation deprived the agents of discretion. The Tenth Circuit was unconvinced that the immunity question turned on the correctness of the agents' probable cause determination: [P]robable probable cause is a constitutional requirement of any arrest, but Awad cites nothing that requires DEA agents to follow a 'prescribe[d] course of action' in gathering probable cause and identifying a suspect. Indeed, deciding whether probable cause has been established involves discretion and judgment; the requirement for probable cause to exist does not make the ultimate, evaluative decision non-discretionary. Even if they were mistaken, the DEA agents made a discretionary determination that probable cause to arrest Awad existed. Awad's insistence that their initial evaluation was wrong does not inform this debate; it is irrelevant to our analysis. [Citations omitted.] Awad, 807 Fed. Appx. at 880-81. Awad makes clear, the focus of our inquiry under K.S.A. 75-6104(e) is not on whether the officers correctly determined that the reasonable suspicion requirement had been met. Rather, the relevant inquiry is whether the underlying act was discretionary in nature. See Shivers, 1 F.4th at 931; Linder, 937 F.3d at 1091. Consistent with Awad, we held in Robertson that K.S.A. 75-6104(e) applies even where a court's post-hoc analysis reveals that law enforcement made mistakes or errors in judgment while exercising discretionary authority. There, defendant summoned police officers to his house to remove a trespasser, but rather than remove the trespasser, the 25 officers ordered Robertson to leave. Soon after, the trespasser set fire to Robertson's house. Robertson sued the officers for negligence, but we held that the officers' on-thescene decisions, made in the absence of mandatory guidelines, were entitled to discretionary function immunity, even if those decisions appeared erroneous in hindsight. Robertson, 231 Kan. at 362-63. We explained: It would be virtually impossible for police departments to establish specific guidelines designed to anticipate every situation an officer might encounter in the course of his work. Absent such guidelines, police officers should be vested with the necessary discretionary authority to act in a manner which they deem appropriate without the threat of potentially large tort judgments against the city, if not against the officers personally. .... Failure to distinguish between the time frame in which police officers are required to take action and the factual situation presented to the court by a claimant in his petition, as here, could lead to disastrous results. The court is in the position of a Monday-morning quarterback. The facts with which the court must deal are established. The critical time material to the exercise of judgment by the police officers was at the scene of the incident . . . . In our opinion the legislature did not intend to impose on police officers the obligation to ascertain the true state of the facts within such limited time frame at their peril. The police officers were not required to exercise judgment at their peril. This interpretation of the discretionary function exception in the Kansas Tort Claims Act gives it substance. 231 Kan. at 362-63. Granted, we have held that discretionary function immunity does not apply when a clearly defined mandatory duty exists. Schreiner and the dissent suggest the Fourth Amendment and K.S.A. 22-2402 create such a mandatory duty. Contrary to their assertions, the reasonable suspicion requirement cannot be characterized as a clearly defined mandatory duty. Such a mandatory duty may arise from agency directive, caselaw, or statute. Montgomery v. Saleh, 311 Kan. 649, 664-65, 466 P.3d 902 (2020) (citing Soto, 291 Kan. at 80). And it must leave[] little to no room for individual 26 decision making, exercise of judgment, or use of skill, and qualify[] a defendant's actions as ministerial rather than discretionary. Thomas, 293 Kan. at 235. In other words, a clearly defined mandatory duty is one that completely governs or prescribes the required course of conduct under the circumstances, leaving no room for governmental employees to exercise independent discretion or judgment. Undoubtedly, both the Fourth Amendment and K.S.A. 22-2402 require officers to have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before detaining a person. But neither provision sets forth a mandatory process or protocol that officers must follow in determining whether reasonable suspicion exists under the totality of the circumstances. Nor has the Legislature or police department undertaken the almost certainly impossible task of delineating every possible set of facts which may give rise to reasonable suspicion and committing them to policy. Thus, the officers' reasonable suspicion determination remains an inherently discretionary process that is not subject to or controlled by any clearly defined mandatory duty. In fact, here, both the district court and the Court of Appeals majority concluded that Hodge and Smith did have reasonable suspicion to detain Schreiner. While anecdotal, the lower courts' decisions illustrate why the reasonable suspicion requirement is not properly characterized as a clearly defined mandatory duty. Cf. Shivers, 1 F.4th at 931 (Eighth Amendment contains no specific directive as to inmate classifications or housing placements and plaintiff's allegations of an Eighth Amendment violation cannot demonstrate a breach of a mandatory duty sufficient to overcome discretionary function immunity under the FTCA). In accord with Shivers, Linder, Awad, and Robertson, we read the plain language of K.S.A. 75-6104(e) to leave no room for a statutory construction exposing officers to tort liability if their in-the-moment judgment fails to satisfy after-the-fact constitutional scrutiny. To effectively perform their core governmental functions, K.S.A. 75-6104(e) requires law enforcement officers be afforded discretion to determine the existence of reasonable suspicion based on their experience and training, free from the deterring 27 influence of potential tort liability. The Legislature left no room for the extra-textual constitutional-claims exclusion for which Schreiner and the dissent advocate. See Shivers, 1 F.4th at 930. Accordingly, we hold that Hodge's and Smith's conduct falls within the scope of K.S.A. 75-6104(e), even though our post-hoc analysis reveals that the officers were mistaken in their judgment regarding the existence of reasonable suspicion. However, this does not mean that officers may engage in any type of investigatory conduct with impunity. K.S.A. 75-6104(e) grants immunity from liability for damages arising from the officer's exercise of discretion. The term 'discretion' imparts the exercise of judgment, wisdom and skill, as distinguished from unthinking folly, heady violence and rash injustice. Hopkins v. State, 237 Kan. 601, 612, 702 P.2d 311 (1985). Thus, the phrase whether or not the discretion is abused in K.S.A. 75-6104(e) does not insulate malicious or wanton conduct because such conduct reflects the absence of discretion, not its abuse. Hopkins, 237 Kan. at 612 (If the officers acted needlessly, maliciously or wantonly, resulting in injury to the plaintiff's property, the officers acted outside the protection of the act.); see Barrett v. U.S.D. No. 259, 272 Kan. 250, 264, 32 P.3d 1156 (2001); Moran v. State, 267 Kan. 583, 596, 985 P.2d 127 (1999); Taylor v. Reno County, 242 Kan. 307, 309, 747 P.2d 100 (1987); Beck v. Kansas Adult Authority, 241 Kan. 13, 33, 735 P.2d 222 (1987). Liability for wanton or malicious conduct is consistent with the rule of liability at common law. Under the common law, personal liability was imposed on officers who maliciously or wantonly injured a person or his property even though the officers were engaged in a governmental function. Hopkins, 237 Kan. at 611; see Beck, 241 Kan. at 27. We have recognized that the Legislature did not intend the KTCA to extinguish liability for a breach of these common-law duties. 237 Kan. at 611. For these reasons, the KTCA's discretionary function immunity does not insulate officers from liability for damages arising from wanton or malicious conduct. 28 Additionally, the KTCA does not insulate officers from potential liability arising from the breach of a specific duty owed to an individual. Under the common-law public duty doctrine, a law enforcement officer's general duty to preserve the peace was considered a duty owed to the public at large, rather than to any specific person, and officers were immune from claims arising out of the performance or nonperformance of their general duties. Conner v. Janes, 267 Kan. 427, 429, 981 P.2d 1169 (1999); Westerbeke, 52 U. Kan. L. Rev. at 969. However, if an officer had a special relationship with the plaintiff or owed a specific duty to that individual, the officer could be liable for breaching that specific duty. 267 Kan. at 429; see also Williams, 310 Kan. at 788 (To warrant an exception to the public duty doctrine, a plaintiff suing a governmental entity must establish either a special relationship or a specific duty owed to the plaintiff individually.). Because the common law did not insulate officers from liability for damages arising from negligent performance of a specific duty, the Legislature did not intend K.S.A. 75-6104(e) to apply to such conduct. See Hopkins, 237 Kan. at 611 (Neither the courts nor our legislature, in passing the [KTCA], extended the mantle of immunity beyond the boundaries of protection previously recognized under the common law.). Here, however, the summary judgment record confirms that neither of these exceptions to discretionary function immunity applies. As for the breach of a specific duty, Schreiner never alleged the existence of a special relationship with defendants. See Williams, 310 Kan. at 788-89 (discussing types of relationships which may give rise to government entity's specific duty). Nor did he allege any undertaking or conduct giving rise to a specific duty. See Dauffenbach v. City of Wichita, 233 Kan. 1028, 1033, 667 P.2d 380 (1983) (specific duty may arise if government agent performs affirmative act that causes injury or makes specific promise or representation that creates justifiable reliance). And the summary judgment evidence does not establish any of the circumstances that customarily create a special relationship or give rise to a specific duty on the part of law enforcement. See, e.g., Carl v. City of Overland Park, Kan., 65 F.3d 29 866, 869 (10th Cir. 1995) (mandatory police policy governing vehicle pursuits gave rise to specific duty); Hendrix v. City of Topeka, 231 Kan. 113, 137, 643 P.2d 129 (1982) (police officers may be liable for failure to provide promised protection to informant or for excessive use of force during arrest). Rather, the record confirms the officers were responding to a citizen's call regarding suspicious activity and investigating the same in furtherance of their general duty to preserve the peace and prevent crime. Law enforcement officers are immune from tort claims arising from the performance/nonperformance of such general duties. Conner, 267 Kan. at 429. Likewise, the record reveals no evidence of wanton, let alone malicious, conduct. Wanton behavior requires: 'something more than ordinary negligence, and yet . . . something less than willful injury; to constitute wantonness, the act must indicate a realization of the imminence of danger and a reckless disregard and complete indifference and unconcern for the probable consequences of the wrongful act. It is sufficient if it indicates a reckless disregard for the rights of others with a total indifference to the consequences, although a catastrophe might be the natural result.' Soto, 291 Kan. at 82 (quoting Saunders v. Shaver, 190 Kan. 699, 701, 378 P.2d 70 [1963]). Neither the district court findings nor the summary judgment record suggests Hodge or Smith acted wantonly or maliciously. As the Court of Appeals observed: [W]e note that Schreiner was never arrested, or handcuffed, nor was he frisked by Officer Hodge. From this record, it is clear that no voices were raised toward Schreiner and no foul language or epithets of any kind were directed toward him by any officer. While wanton conduct of a government employee is not covered by discretionary function immunity, there is simply no evidence that Officer Hodge (or Sergeant Smith) acted wantonly in this case. See Soto, 291 Kan. at 81-82. To the contrary, this record shows that both officers acted with professional restraint. Schreiner, 55 Kan. App. 2d at 60. 30 Schreiner does not controvert this evidence or challenge the relevant district court findings. In conclusion, we hold that Officer Hodge and Sergeant Smith lacked reasonable suspicion to detain Schreiner. Nevertheless, the officers' detention and investigation of Schreiner, along with their reasonable suspicion determination, were discretionary functions implicating matters of policy. Therefore, the officers are entitled to discretionary function immunity under the KTCA. The plain language of K.S.A. 756104(e) makes clear that this immunity applies even though the officers' reasonable suspicion determination was incorrect under the facts. In the absence of any evidence establishing wanton or malicious conduct or a breach of a special duty owed to Schreiner, the district court and Court of Appeals properly concluded that the officers are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. This holding does not deprive Schreiner of a remedy for constitutional violations. Under federal law, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018) creates a cause of action for money damages based on a violation of any constitutional right under color of state law, including unconstitutional searches and seizures. Slayton v. Willingham, 726 F.2d 631, 635 (10th Cir. 1984). Schreiner asserts no such claim in this action. Further, the Legislature did not create the KTCA to address such constitutional violations—the KTCA only addresses liability for state tort law claims against government officials where a private person or entity would be liable in the same circumstances. See K.S.A. 75-6103(a) (limiting liability to damages caused by negligent or wrongful acts or omissions of government officials acting within the scope of their employment under circumstances where the governmental entity, if a private person, would be liable under the laws of this state); Linder, 937 F.3d at 1090 (What's more, the theme that 'no one has discretion to violate the Constitution' has nothing to do with the Federal Tort Claims Act, which does not apply to constitutional violations. It applies to torts, as defined by state law—that is to 31 say, 'circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.' The Constitution governs the conduct of public officials, not private ones. [Citation omitted.]). And private persons are not generally liable for violations of constitutional rights, removing such claims from the reach of the KTCA. Morse v. North Coast Opportunities, Inc., 118 F.3d 1338, 1340 (9th Cir. 1997) (private individuals not generally liable for violations of constitutional rights unless action attributable to the government). This leaves Schreiner with the traditional state law tort theories he pled under the KTCA. Under the circumstances, K.S.A. 75-6104(e) grants the officers immunity from those claims. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed; the judgment of the district court is affirmed. BEIER, J., not participating. MICHAEL E. WARD, Senior Judge, assigned.1