Opinion ID: 1406027
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Farid's Confiscation Claims

Text: Farid has also raised § 1983 claims regarding the confiscation of certain papers and personal effects from his cell. The District Court found that this claim, unlike his vagueness challenge, was not administratively exhausted. We agree. The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires a prisoner petitioner to exhaust such administrative remedies as are available before filing suit in federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The Supreme Court has made clear that the PLRA's exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002). Here, Farid concededly has not exhausted his administrative remedies. Farid argues, however, that his confiscation claim is intertwined with his challenge to the disciplinary hearing, which was administratively exhausted. He says that he reasonably believed that the claims were so interrelated that he could not be expected to distinguish them. See Giano v. Goord, 380 F.3d 670, 679 (2d Cir.2004). This argument is unavailing. We agree with, and affirm, the District Court's finding that Farid's concern here is not confiscation as a constituent element of the disciplinary hearing, but rather confiscation as part of a scrutiny that arose in light of his political and organizational activities. Farid I, 2003 WL 23018805, at  (emphasis added). That is because [t]he act of confiscation was not a constituent aspect to the disciplinary hearing, and instead involved discrete events outside the purview of a disciplinary hearing, [events] that should have been grieved through the IGP. Id. Since it was not, Farid's confiscation claim cannot be heard by us.