Opinion ID: 693389
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fait Accompli

Text: 25 The Hospital contends that because the Union received notice of the revised scrub policy, and because the Union failed to promptly request that the employer bargain over the matter, the Union waived its right to bargain. See YHA, Inc., 2 F.3d at 173. The Hospital points out that the Union had knowledge of the Hospital's intent to change the scrub policy on July 22-23, the dates the letters were sent out, and roughly five weeks prior to when the planned action would go into effect on September 1. 26 With respect to waiver, a union may waive its statutory right to bargain, but such waiver must be clear and unmistakable. Centra, Inc., 954 F.2d at 371. 27 Waiver will be found if the evidence shows that the Union received sufficient notice of the proposed change, and yet failed to protest or demand bargaining on the issue. The Board requires proof of clear and unequivocal notice such that Union's subsequent failure to demand bargaining constitutes a conscious relinquishment of the right to bargain. 28 YHA, Inc., 2 F.3d at 173. 29 The ALJ concluded, however, that even if the letters were sufficient to confer actual notice to the Union of the revised scrub policy, the Hospital did not intend to enter into good-faith bargaining, and therefore, the Union could not have waived its bargaining rights. If a policy is implemented too quickly after notice is given, or an employer has no intention of changing its mind, the notice constitutes nothing more than informing the union of a fait accompli. Centra, Inc., 954 F.2d at 372 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Notice of a fait accompli is simply not the sort of timely notice upon which the waiver defense is predicated. Id. (citations omitted). 30 In the instant case, there is substantial evidence in the record to support the Board's decision. In each of the communications to the employees, the scrub policy change was stated in definite terms. The Hospital's first letter stated that it would no longer furnish surgical scrub suits.... Moreover, the second communication stated that the policy ... has changed and the change affects all departments. Given the language of these communications, the Union was left with the impression that the Hospital was not willing to enter into good-faith bargaining. The ALJ stated that [n]either of these communication[s] suggests that the notice was of a tentative or preliminary proposal. Rather, each was a pronouncement of a final and unqualified decision. 31 Furthermore, the Hospital bypassed the Union and its representatives by communicating directly with the employees. The ALJ noted that this form of direct communication sent a strong signal that the [Union] had no effective role to play in [the Hospital's] pre-determined process. The ALJ also noted that when the Union did attempt to raise the scrub policy change, it was conveyed to the Union that the issue was non-negotiable. According to the ALJ, therefore, the decision was already cast in stone and any request by the Union would have been futile. 32 Because notice of the new scrub policy to the Union amounted to a fait accompli, the Union did not forego an opportunity to bargain on the scrub issue. Essentially, the Hospital did not, in good faith, give the Union an opportunity to bargain. Consequently, we find that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's determination that the unilateral termination of the scrub policy was an unfair labor practice. 33 2. Whether the Hospital violated the Act by reducing the number of 7/70 staff teams to zero. 34 The Union contended, and the Board/ALJ concluded, that when the Hospital reduced the number of 7/70 teams to zero without notifying or conferring with the Union, the Hospital unilaterally altered the wages, hours and other conditions of employment of bargaining unit members in violation of the Act. For example, because nurses who had elected the 7/70 shift worked only 70 hours for 80 hours pay, the elimination of the program increased the number of hours worked without a commensurate increase in wages. 35 The Hospital contends, however, that its decision to reduce the number of 7/70 teams to zero was clearly within its express rights under the CBA. The primary provision upon which the Hospital relies, Article 46, Sec. 1, provides: 36 Assignments to the Seventy Hour Shift will be made by the Director of Nursing in cooperation with the employees involved. The Director of Nursing will decide the number of assignments and the work areas that will be under the Seventy Hour Shift.... 37 The Hospital argues, therefore, that it had discretion to reduce the 7/70 nursing teams to zero, and its decision to do so was a specifically reserved right under the CBA. 38 When an employer and union bargain about a subject and memorialize that bargain in a collective bargaining agreement, they create a set of rules that govern their future relations. Unless the parties agree otherwise, there is no continuous duty to bargain with respect to a matter covered by the contract. Thus, we are bound to enforce lawful labor agreements as written. See NLRB v. United States Postal Serv., 8 F.3d 832, 836 (D.C.Cir.1993). 39 On the other hand, an employer commits an unfair labor practice if, without bargaining to impasse, it effects a unilateral change of an existing term or condition of employment. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 82 S.Ct. 1107, 8 L.Ed.2d 230 (1962). Thus, our issue becomes whether the Hospital acted pursuant to a right under the CBA, or rather, whether the Hospital attempted an unlawful unilateral modification. The Board's interpretation of contract terms is subject to de novo review. Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 201-03, 111 S.Ct. 2215, 2223, 115 L.Ed.2d 177 (1991). 40 The ALJ in the instant case found that the 'reduction to zero' decision was, in essence, an elimination of the program which consequently resulted in mass layoffs and altered wages, hours, and conditions of employment for bargaining unit members. The ALJ concluded that, although Article 46 permits hospital management to determine the specific number of nurses assigned to the 7/70 program, it neither states nor implies that management may unilaterally abolish the program altogether. 4 We disagree. Rather, we agree with the Hospital that elimination of the special shift program was clearly within the Hospital's authority. The language of Article 46 is clear and unambiguous in granting authority to the Hospital to determine the number of shifts, including zero, in the 7/70 program. 5 Consequently, the Hospital's actions with respect to the 7/70 shift program were not in violation of the Act.