Opinion ID: 1847816
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Equitable Lien Theory

Text: The remaining theory argued by the Bank in support of the trial Court's decree is that of an equitable lien. At first blush, taking the strongest tendencies of the evidence favorable to the Bank's position, in light of the ore tenus rule, we were inclined to the view that the equitable lien impressed by the decree below in favor of the Bank against Mrs. Costanza's interest in the property was sustainable, at least to the extent of the new money (i. e., the last loan of $10,000). Our further study of well-established equitable lien principles, however, constrains us to reach a contrary conclusion: The fatal weakness of the Bank's contention for an equitable lien consists in the total failure of the evidence to establish any equitable grounds for the intercession of a court to impress a lien against Mrs. Costanza's real property as security for any portion of Mr. Costanza's debt to the Bank. Those well-established `equitable lien' principles alluded to above are contained in a rather long line of Alabama cases. See, e. g., Robbins v. Bell, 285 Ala. 124, 229 So.2d 511 (1969); Title Insurance Company v. Ward, 279 Ala. 24, 181 So.2d 93 (1965); Murphy v. Carrigan, 270 Ala. 87, 116 So.2d 568 (1959); Rhodes v. Schofield, 263 Ala. 256, 82 So.2d 236 (1955), and other cases cited therein. Although arising under multiple and varying circumstances, these cases stand for the rule that a court is authorized to exercise its equity power to impress a lien upon real property as security for a debt only where the person against whose interest the lien is declared and enforced is guilty of some wrongdoing in procuring the loan or service by which the debt is created. Our cases make clear that, whether the equitable grounds essential to give the equitable lien principle a field of operation are expressed in terms of fraud, unclean hands, or unjust enrichment mere passive conduct on the part of the party against whose interest the lien sought is not sufficient. Our careful review of the record fails to disclose any conduct on the part of Mrs. Costanza which even approaches any culpability of the nature required to invoke the operative effect of the equitable lien doctrine. REVERSED AND REMANDED. TORBERT, C. J., and ALMON, EMBRY and BEATTY, JJ., concur.