Opinion ID: 2626256
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Matters of Evidence

Text: The question remains whether the prosecutor's inquiry and Maluia's response  when correctly characterized as solicitous of evidence relating to Kepa's and Ahakuelo's possible bias  were proper and admissible. I conclude that they were.
Rules 401, 402 and 403 of the Hawai'i Rules of Evidence (HRE) govern the admissibility of Maluia's testimonial evidence. Our starting point is the foundational concept of relevance defined in HRE Rule 401: Relevant evidence means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Guided by that definition, HRE Rule 402 demarcates general guidelines for the admissibility of relevant evidence: All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitutions of the United States and the State of Hawai'i, by statute, by these rules, or by other rules adopted by the supreme court. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. Finally, HRE Rule 403 accords the trial courts broad discretion to exclude relevant evidence after balancing competing considerations of probity, economy, and fairness: Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. For the reasons that follow, I believe that Maluia's testimonial evidence was properly placed before the jury under the aforementioned principles of relevance and admissibility.
Maluia's testimony that he knew of no reason why Kepa and Ahakuelo would make up a story against [him] satisfied the relevancy requirement of HRE Rule 401. We uniformly recognize that [t]he credibility of a prosecuting witness in a criminal case is always relevant, State v. Okumura, 78 Hawai'i 383, 399, 894 P.2d 80, 96 (1995) (quoting State v. Liuafi, 1 Haw.App. 625, 630, 623 P.2d 1271, 1275 (1981)), insofar as evidence of bias, interest, or motive has at least some tendency to aid the jury in assessing the probative value of the [witness's] testimony. 1 McCormick on Evidence § 29, at 109 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed.1999). Such was the case here, as Maluia's testimony was reflective of Kepa's and Ahakuelo's credibility, and made their eyewitness accounts of the crime more probable of belief.
Because Maluia's testimony was relevant, the circuit court was correct in adjudging the evidence admissible under HRE Rule 402. In this regard, I perceive no constitutional, statutory, or rule-based mandate that would require the statement's exclusion.
Finally, the circuit court's decision to admit Maluia's testimony passes muster under HRE Rule 403. Acknowledging that `the delicate balance between probative value and prejudicial effect,'... `lies largely within the discretion of the trial court,' Kaeo v. Davis, 68 Haw. 447, 454, 719 P.2d 387, 392 (1986) (quoting State v. Iaukea, 56 Haw. 343, 349, 537 P.2d 724, 729 (1975)), I perceive no abuse in striking the balance to favor admissibility here. Given the circumstances, the nominal prejudice inuring from Maluia's testimony did not substantially outweigh its probative value in assisting the jury's weighing of Kepa's and Ahakuelo's rendition of events.
As Maluia's testimony arose on cross-examination, the scope of the prosecutor's questions must have complied with HRE Rule 611(b). The Rule provides: Cross-examination should be limited to the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the credibility of the witness. The court may, in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into additional matters as if on direct examination. Because cross-examination is essential to satisfying the basic truth-seeking function of a trial, we accord the trial courts broad discretion in administering HRE Rule 611(b). State v. Balisbisana, 83 Hawai'i 109, 114, 924 P.2d 1215, 1220 (1996) (The scope of cross-examination is generally within the sound discretion of the trial court.); see also State v. Pokini, 57 Haw. 17, 22, 548 P.2d 1397, 1400 (1976) (same). That discretion is not abused when a trial court subjects a defendant who testifies in his own defense to cross-examination as to any matter pertinent to, or having a logical connection with the specific offense for which he is being tried. State v. Culkin, 97 Hawai'i 206, 220-221, 35 P.3d 233, 247-248 (2001) (quoting Pokini, 57 Haw. at 22, 548 P.2d at 1400). Nor does a court exceed its authority by granting counsel leeway in framing their questions on cross. See HRE R. 611(b) (The court may, in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into additional matters as if on direct examination.). The latitude accorded those questions stems from the nature of cross-examination. Specifically, [c]ounsel often cannot know in advance what pertinent facts may be elicited on cross-examination. For that reason it is necessarily exploratory; and the rule that the examiner must indicate the purpose of his inquiry does not, in general, apply. Knapp v. Wing, 72 Vt. 334, 340, 47 A. 1075; Martin v. Elden, 32 Ohio St. 282, 289. It is the essence of a fair trial that reasonable latitude be given the cross-examiner, even though he is unable to state to the court what fact a reasonable cross-examination might develop. Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 692, 51 S.Ct. 218, 75 L.Ed. 624 (1931). In this case, the prosecutor sought to develop information on Kepa's and Ahakuelo's credibility  a matter made relevant by their testimony at Maluia's trial. Because the issue was pertinent to and had a logical connection with the offense for which Maluia was charged, see Culkin, 97 Hawai'i at 220-221, 35 P.3d at 247-248, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in permitting Maluia to be examined on that topic.