Opinion ID: 2519714
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: common law duties

Text: ¶ 11 Young initially contends that the District had an affirmative common law obligation to inform Salt Lake City of dangerous conditions of which it had knowledge existing at the crosswalk. He further argues that the District had a common law duty to provide both a crossing guard and flashing warning lights at the crosswalk the night of the PTS conference. We conclude that the District owed Young none of the aforementioned duties because it did not have a special relationship with him at the time of the accident. ¶ 12 In reaching this conclusion, we note that to prevail upon a negligence claim under Utah law, a plaintiff must establish, among other things, that the defendant owed him or her a duty of care. Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985); Lamarr v. Utah State Dep't of Transp., 828 P.2d 535, 537 (Utah Ct.App.1992). Absent a showing that the defendant owed any duty, the plaintiff's claim has no merit, and he or she may not recover. Rollins v. Petersen, 813 P.2d 1156, 1159 (Utah 1991). ¶ 13 Ordinarily, a person has no affirmative common law duty to protect another from harm. Gilger v. Hernandez, 2000 UT 23, ¶ 15, 997 P.2d 305. There is an exception to this general rule, however, where a special relationship exists between the parties. Id. Here, Young claims that he had a special relationship with the District at the time he sustained his injury. We disagree. ¶ 14 To be certain, a special relationship may arise between a school district and a child attending one of its schools. See Pratt v. Robinson, 39 N.Y.2d 554, 384 N.Y.S.2d 749, 349 N.E.2d 849, 852 (1976). The extent of this relationship is limited to the district's custody over that child, however. Id.; see also Norton v. Canandaigua City Sch. Dist., 208 A.D.2d 282, 624 N.Y.S.2d 695, 697-98 (N.Y.App.Div.1995) (stating that the district's duty is limited by time and space). Indeed, when a school district has custody of a child, it acts as a substitute for the student's parents or guardian, Norton, 624 N.Y.S.2d at 697-98, and has a custodial duty of protection, Pratt, 384 N.Y.S.2d 749, 349 N.E.2d at 852. As the Restatement puts it, by taking custody of the child, the district has deprived [the child] of the protection [from] his parents or guardian. Therefore, [it] ... is properly required to give him the protection which [he has lost]. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 320 cmt. b. By comparison, when a school district lacks custody, it has no protective obligation and no special relationship exists. Id.; see also Norton, 624 N.Y.S.2d at 697-98. Accordingly, we must ascertain whether the District had custody of Young at the moment he was injured. We hold that it did not. ¶ 15 Our conclusion in this respect is based on several considerations. First, Young's elementary school had adjourned for the day, and he had been released into the care of his parents. Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841, 908 P.2d 143, 149 (1995) (noting that the child was not in the district's custody because his school had adjourned for the day and his parents had resumed control over his well-being). Second, Young's injury did not occur on premises within the District's control. Rather, Salt Lake City had the responsibility to maintain the crosswalk at which Young was injured. Cf. Norton, 624 N.Y.S.2d at 697-98 (stating that a school district's duty to a child is limited by time and space). As such, the District had no authority to regulate traffic at or near the crosswalk and could not have ordered any alterations or enhancements in the traffic signals governing the area. Lastly, at the time he sustained his injury, Young was not participating in a curricular, or extra-curricular, school-sponsored event; he was simply in the process of traveling to such an event. Cf. Pratt, 384 N.Y.S.2d 749, 349 N.E.2d at 853 (explaining that the district lacked custody once it safely dropped off a student at his bus stop just like it would lack custody if the child had been hurt while walking home from a neighborhood school). ¶ 16 Given that the District did not have custody of Young at the time he suffered his injury, it lacked a special relationship with him at that time. The general rule that one has no affirmative common law duty to protect another from harm thus remained in effect. Consequently, we conclude that the District had no common law duty to inform Salt Lake City of dangerous conditions existing at or near the crosswalk, to request a crossing guard, or to provide flashing warning lights. [6] ¶ 17 Chief Justice Durham disagrees with this conclusion, arguing that three other factors should be considered in determining whether a special relationship existed and that the District actually had custody over Young because he was within its orbit of control. In our view, however, the three additional factors she identifies as pertinent to whether Young had a special relationship with the District (i.e., the foreseeability of the harm, Young's dependence on the District for safety, and the ease with which the District could have satisfied its obligation) are irrelevant to the question at issue. Foreseeability of harm does not address whether the District possessed a special relationship with Young because even if a dangerous condition was certain to cause harm, that fact, standing alone, reveals nothing about the relationship between the two parties. [7] Likewise, the ease with which a party may fulfill a duty is irrelevant to whether a special relationship exists because that question assumes a party already has a duty. The inquiry thus begs the question we are seeking to resolve (i.e., whether a duty exists). Finally, the dependence Young and his mother allegedly placed on the District has no relevance to whether a special relationship existed because any dependence they might have had hinges on whether the District had custody of Young or control over the street. Indeed, just because a district has a special relationship with a student at school, does not mean that a special relationship exists at all times. Pratt, 384 N.Y.S.2d 749, 349 N.E.2d at 852. Because the District had no ability to implement safety measures governing the city street and lacked custody of Young, we conclude that no special relationship existed. Cf. Cannon v. Univ. of Utah, 866 P.2d 586, 589 (Utah Ct.App.1993) (holding that the plaintiffs, who were en route to a basketball game, were not business invitees of the University of Utah at the time of their accident, and therefore had no special relationship with it, because they were injured on a city street, not university property). ¶ 18 We also disagree with Chief Justice Durham's opinion because it would dramatically expand tort liability. Indeed, despite the fact that the District had no authority to erect street signage, activate the flashing warning signals, or put crossing guards in place, she proposes that the District be made liable for failing to request that the city implement safety measures. It would be a dramatic expansion of tort liability, however, to suggest that Party A, which has no authority to implement safety measures, is nevertheless liable for Party B's failure to implement such measures simply because Party A failed to request that Party B do so. Moreover, although Chief Justice Durham attempts to place a geographic limitation on the duty she would establish, we see no reason why the application of her test would restrict the duty to areas adjacent to a school. For instance, if a group of elementary students lived in an apartment complex a mile away from their school and their principal learned about a hazardous condition near that complex that was likely to cause harm, all the elements of her test would be satisfied. Specifically, the students would be dependent on the principal for their safety, the harm would be foreseeable, and the District could easily satisfy its obligation by calling the city. Hence, the duty that Chief Justice Durham would create is incapable of being construed narrowly and would make it difficult, if not impossible, for courts of this state to apply any disciplined analysis from one case to the next. ¶ 19 We are similarly unpersuaded by her public policy argument that if no duty is imposed here there is little hope that accidents such as this will be prevented, even though we too are extremely concerned with the protection of young children. In our opinion, the best opportunity to prevent accidents of this type rests with the entity that controls the street and therefore is authorized to implement safety measures, the automobile drivers, and the person who had custody of Young. Regardless, we think that any decision to expand liability to schools for failing to request that cities correct unsafe conditions on city-owned streets is a matter better left to the legislature.