Opinion ID: 2999783
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Inadequacy of the Indictment

Text: Humphreys next claims that the indictment was inadequate with respect to the commerce element. But since its allegation that “the firearm had traveled in interstate commerce prior to the defendant’s possession of the firearm” is at the heart of the issue raised and nothing else is required, see United States v. Hubbard, 61 F.3d 1261, 1269 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. McCarty, 862 F.2d No. 05-3172 7 143, 145-46 (7th Cir. 1988), we conclude, and Humphreys acknowledges, that he is really challenging the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) as applied to him. In Humphreys’s view, “recent Supreme Court precedent” demands that § 922(g) be interpreted to require a “substantial effect” on commerce rather than the “minimal” nexus we have considered constitutionally sufficient. That argument, however, is one that we have repeatedly rejected. See Van Sach, 458 F.3d at 703; United States v. Williams, 410 F.3d 397, 400 (7th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 1182 (2006); United States v. Peterson, 236 F.3d 848, 852 (7th Cir. 2001). Because § 922(g)(1) “requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm ‘in or affecting commerce,’ [it] represents a valid exercise of congressional authority under the Commerce Clause.” Williams, 410 F.3d at 400.