Opinion ID: 2634746
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: implied elements of a crime

Text: ¶ 12 Courts have articulated nonstatutory elements of crimes under certain circumstances. For example, in Boyer, this court held that the State was required to prove guilty knowledge in a prosecution for delivery of a controlled substance. State v. Boyer, 91 Wash.2d 342, 344, 588 P.2d 1151 (1979). We rested our holding on our conclusion that the legislature would not have intended a strict liability crime when even a postal carrier would be guilty of the crime were he innocently to deliver a package which in fact contained a forbidden narcotic. Id. Similarly, this court held almost 100 years ago that, despite statutory silence, an essential element of robbery was the fact the property was taken from the possession of another. State v. Hall, 54 Wash. 142, 144, 102 P. 888 (1909). The court found this element implied by a near eternity of common law and the common understanding of robbery. Id. Generally, we have concluded that nonstatutory elements are implied either because they fit within longstanding principles of law or are derived from our reasoned judgment as to legislative intent. E.g., Boyer, 91 Wash.2d at 344, 588 P.2d 1151; Hall, 54 Wash. at 144, 102 P. 888. ¶ 13 Miller primarily rests his argument that the validity of a no-contact order is an element of the crime upon several Court of Appeals cases which deemed validity an implied element. Because we conclude that validity is not an element and out of respect for the opinions of the Court of Appeals (which, we believe, came to a correct result in both instances), we turn to a closer examination of those cases. ¶ 14 In Edwards, Division One reversed a felony conviction for violation of a no-contact order on the grounds that the duration of the order was not clear on its face and therefore the defendant could have reasonably believed it had expired at the time of the alleged violation. See City of Seattle v. Edwards, 87 Wash.App. 305, 307, 311, 941 P.2d 697 (1997). Finding that the defendant was essentially deprived of notice of the duration of the order, the court concluded that the State had not established the validity of the underlying order and vacated the conviction for failure to prove this implicit element of the crime. Id. at 308, 941 P.2d 697. We agree to some extent. In Edwards, the order was vague and was inadequate to give the defendant notice of what conduct was criminal and what conduct was innocent. The court was rightly loath to allow a person to be convicted under such circumstances. See generally Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897) (noting that even the bad man is entitled to be able to predict what conduct might be forbidden). ¶ 15 Subsequently, Division Two was faced with a similar issue in State v. Marking, 100 Wash.App. 506, 997 P.2d 461 (2000). There the relevant statutes required that no-contact orders inform the person that [y]ou can be arrested even if any person protected by the order invites or allows you to violate the order's prohibitions. Marking, 100 Wash. App. at 509, 997 P.2d 461 (quoting former RCW 10.99.040(4)(d)(1997)). Unfortunately, this statutorily required language did not appear on the no-contact order, and Marking apparently believed that he was not in violation of the no-contact order because the victim had consented to the contact. Marking, 100 Wash.App. at 508, 997 P.2d 461. ¶ 16 The Court of Appeals concluded that the statutory language was mandatory. Id. at 512, 997 P.2d 461. It accordingly held that the no-contact order was invalid because it did not comply with express mandatory statutory requirements, thus plainly presenting the question of whether a man could be convicted of a felony for violating an invalid order. Id. at 511-12, 997 P.2d 461. ¶ 17 Thus again, the court concluded that the order provided insufficient evidence that a crime had been committed and the conviction could not be sustained. Division Two held that [t]he validity of a protective order is an implicit element of the crime of violation of such order. Id. at 509, 997 P.2d 461 (emphasis added) (citing Edwards, 87 Wash. App. at 308, 941 P.2d 697). ¶ 18 Because both the Edwards and the Marking courts referred to the validity of the court orders as implied elements, the issue for subsequent courts has been couched in terms of whether the validity of the no-contact order was an element of the crime, to be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. But in Carmen, Division One determined that evaluation of the underlying no-contact order was properly a question of law for the judge, not of fact for the jury. State v. Carmen, 118 Wash.App. 655, 665, 77 P.3d 368 (2003), review denied 151 Wash.2d 1039, 95 P.3d 352 (2004); but see State v. Arthur, 126 Wash.App. 243, 244, 108 P.3d 169 (2005) (rejecting Carmen. ). Carmen rested in part on the comparative expertise of a judge to make reasoned judgments about the legal authority by which predicate no-contact orders were issued. Carmen also noted, properly, that [t]he very relevancy of the prior convictions depended upon whether they qualified as predicate convictions under the statute. If they had not so qualified, the jury never should have been permitted to consider them. Carmen, 118 Wash.App. at 664, 77 P.3d 368. ¶ 19 In the case below, the Court of Appeals attempted to harmonize these holdings by not questioning whether the validity of the order was an element of the crime but by simply concluding that it should be decided by the trial court. ¶ 20 We respectfully disagree with the Court of Appeals and hold that the validity of the no-contact order is not an element of the crime. To the extent the cited cases are inconsistent, they are overruled. First, as discussed above, valid does not appear in relevant sections of the statute, RCW 26.50.110. Accordingly, the existence of a valid court order is not a statutory element of the crime. The legislature likely did not include validity as an element of the crime because issues concerning the validity of an order normally turn on questions of law. Questions of law are for the court, not the jury, to resolve. Hue, 127 Wash.2d at 92, 896 P.2d 682. ¶ 21 We also decline to find that the validity of the order is an implied element of the crime. While we are inclined to believe that the Court of Appeals reached appropriate results in Marking and Edwards, issues relating to the validity of a court order (such as whether the court granting the order was authorized to do so, whether the order was adequate on its face, and whether the order complied with the underlying statutes) are uniquely within the province of the court. Collectively, we will refer to these issues as applying to the applicability of the order to the crime charged. An order is not applicable to the charged crime if it is not issued by a competent court, is not statutorily sufficient, is vague or inadequate on its face, or otherwise will not support a conviction of violating the order. The court, as part of its gate-keeping function, should determine as a threshold matter whether the order alleged to be violated is applicable and will support the crime charged. [4] Orders that are not applicable to the crime should not be admitted. If no order is admissible, the charge should be dismissed. ¶ 22 We recognize that there may also be issues of the sufficiency of the evidence of a violation of an order based upon the specific facts of the case. Issues of sufficiency relating to the order may be argued and resolved in the same manner as any other question relating to the sufficiency of the evidence. [5]