Opinion ID: 6496175
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Prehn Has For Cause Protections.

Text: ¶36 The State argues that Prehn does not have for cause protections and can be removed at the pleasure of the Governor. According to the State, this result is required under a plain reading of the statutes and under the Wisconsin Constitution. We again disagree. 20 No. 2021AP1673 ¶37 Under Wis. Stat. § 17.07(3), [s]tate officers serving in an office that is filled by appointment of the governor for a fixed term by and with the advice and consent of the senate . . . [may be removed] by the governor at any time, for cause. Members of the DNR Board must be nominated by the Governor and confirmed by the senate; they serve fixed terms. Wis. Stat. §§ 15.07(1)(a), 15.34(1) & (2)(a). By the plain text of § 17.07(3), DNR Board members who have undergone this appointment process are entitled to for cause protections. ¶38 As alleged in the complaint, Prehn was lawfully nominated by the Governor and confirmed by the senate in 2015 to a fixed, six-year term. DeBruin, 343 Wis. 2d 83, ¶11. As a member of the DNR Board, he is therefore entitled to for cause protection. He still lawfully occupies the office of DNR Board member, despite the fact that his term has expired; because there is no vacancy in his position, he cannot be replaced by provisional appointment. Thompson, 22 Wis. 2d at 293; 63C Am. Jur. 2d Public Officers and Employees, supra ¶28; 67 C.J.S. Officers, supra ¶28; Wis. Stat. §§ 17.03, 17.20(2)(a). Therefore, Prehn under Wis. Stat. § 17.07(3) is a [s]tate officer who currently serv[es] in an office that is filled by appointment of the governor for a fixed term by and with the advice and consent of the senate. As a holdover, he still may be removed only for cause. § 17.07(3). ¶39 This is in line with the common law principle that public officers have the same rights and responsibilities when they are lawful holdovers as they do when they hold office prior 21 No. 2021AP1673 to expiration of their terms. 63C Am. Jur. 2d Public Officers and Employees, supra ¶28, § 149 (A holdover officer has all the authority to act in that capacity and receive compensation and also continues as the incumbent of the office); 67 C.J.S. Officers, supra ¶28, § 155 ([T]he period of . . . holding over is as much a part of [the incumbent's] tenure of office as the regular period fixed by law and [t]he office is held by the same title and by as high and lawful a tenure after the prescribed term . . . as before and during such term). ¶40 Our plain reading of Wis. Stat. § 17.07(3) is also supported by our decision in Moses v. Bd. of Veterans Affairs, 80 Wis. 2d 411, 259 N.W.2d 102 (1977). In that case, an officer was nominated by the Governor and confirmed by the senate to serve as the Secretary of Veterans Affairs as required by statute. Id. at 415. After the secretary was appointed, the Legislature amended the governing statute to make appointments to the position of secretary the decision of the Board of Veterans Affairs alone. Id. Under Wis. Stat. § 17.07, after the amendment of the statute, secretaries of Veterans Affairs could be removed at the pleasure of the Board of Veterans Affairs. Id. The board argued that they could therefore remove the officer who currently held the position without cause. The Wisconsin Supreme Court disagreed. Id. at 415-16. The court explained that § 17.07 describes for cause protections in terms of the individual officer who is subject to appointment. Id. at 416-17. Even though under existing statutes the Secretary of Veterans Affairs could be appointed only by the board, the 22 No. 2021AP1673 current officeholder had already undergone nomination and senate confirmation and lawfully held office. Id. Thus, under § 17.07, the officeholder was subject to for cause protections. Id. As we explained, [a]s long as [the current Secretary of Veterans Affairs] remains an officer appointed by the governor, confirmed by the senate, he remains removable from office only by the governor, for cause. Id. at 416. ¶41 Moses' understanding of Wis. Stat. § 17.07 is readily applicable here. Prehn was an officer who, to hold appointed office on the DNR Board, was nominated by the Governor and confirmed by the senate. Moses, 80 Wis. 2d at 416-17 (quoting Wis. Stat. § 17.07 (1977-78). He remains in this position as a lawful holdover. Thompson, 22 Wis. 2d at 293; 63C Am. Jur. 2d Public Officers and Employees, supra ¶28; 67 C.J.S. Officers, supra ¶28; Wis. Stat. §§ 17.03, 17.20(2)(a). As an officeholder who underwent confirmation procedures, while Prehn remains on the DNR Board he can be removed by the Governor only for cause. § 17.07(3). ¶42 The State argues that Wis. Stat. § 17.07 must be read to permit Prehn's removal at the Governor's pleasure because, if Prehn has for cause protection, the statute would violate the separation of powers under the Wisconsin Constitution. According to the State, providing Prehn for cause protection would improperly limit the ability of the Governor to select a DNR Board member who has similar views on policy. The State argues this would prevent the Governor from control[ling] the execution of the law as required by the Wisconsin Constitution. 23 No. 2021AP1673 ¶43 In making this argument, the State predominantly cites federal caselaw on the removal power of the United States President. See, e.g., Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 591 U.S. ___, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). While these cases may be foundational to properly understanding the President's authority to remove federal officials in the executive branch, they lend only limited support to structure, meaning, and original understanding of the Wisconsin Governor's removal power. ¶44 To properly confirm the meaning of the Wisconsin Constitution, we consult historical evidence such as the practices at the time the constitution was adopted, debates over adoption of a given provision, and early legislative interpretation as evidenced by the first laws passed following the adoption. Halverson, 395 Wis. 2d 385, ¶22; see, e.g., Koschkee v. Taylor, 2019 WI 76, ¶¶22-32, 387 Wis. 2d 552, 929 N.W.2d 600 (providing analysis on the history and meaning of the Wisconsin Constitution's provision on the authority of the Superintendent of Public Instruction); Johnson v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶¶28-33 (analyzing the meaning of the apportionment clause in the Wisconsin Constitution for legislative districts). But the State here presents no historical research or explanation to allow us to fully interpret the Wisconsin Constitution and its original meaning. Given that the State is arguing that Wis. Stat. § 17.07, as 24 No. 2021AP1673 plainly read, would be unconstitutional, this lack of fully developed argument is fatal to the State's position. See Soc'y Ins. v. LIRC, 2010 WI 68, ¶27, 326 Wis. 2d 444, 786 N.W.2d 385 (The challenger [in a constitutional claim] has the burden of proof.); Mayo v. Wis. Injured Patients and Fams. Comp. Fund, 2018 WI 78, ¶25, 383 Wis. 2d 1, 914 N.W.2d 678 ([W]e presume that . . . statute[s] [are] constitutional.); Halverson, 395 Wis. 2d 385, ¶26 (rejecting a challenge to the admission of evidence made by a criminal defendant who argued for the application prophylactic right under the Wisconsin Constitution, explaining that the defendant provide[d] no textual or historical basis for his challenge); Serv. Employees Int'l Union Local 1 v. Vos, 2020 WI 67, ¶73, 393 Wis. 2d 38, 946 N.W.2d 35 (explaining that our analysis under the Wisconsin Constitution was limited to the claim[s] developed before us). We have no obligation to develop or construct arguments for parties or construct a historical record in support of the State's constitutional claim. Id., ¶24. ¶45 The lack of a complete historical record is significant here because, from the court's independent research, it appears that the power of the Wisconsin Governor to control the occupancy of public offices within administrative agencies is far less robust than that of the United States President. ¶46 The Wisconsin Constitution, adopted in 1848, divides government power into three separate branches, each 'vested' with a specific core government power. Id., ¶31 (citing Gabler v. Crime Victims Rights Bd., 2017 WI 67, ¶11, 376 Wis. 2d 147, 25 No. 2021AP1673 897 N.W.2d 384); see also Wis. Const. art. IV, § 1 (The legislative power shall be vested in a senate and assembly.); id., art. V, § 1 (The executive power shall be vested in a governor.); id., art. VII, § 2 (The judicial power of this state shall be vested in a unified court system.). To exercise this vested power, the legislature is tasked with the enactment of laws; the governor is instructed to 'take care that the laws be faithfully executed'; and courts are empowered to adjudicate civil and criminal disputes pursuant to the law. Vos, 393 Wis. 2d 38, ¶31 (citing Wis. Const. art. IV, § 17; id., art. V, § 4; id., art VII, §§ 3, 5, 8, 14). ¶47 A separation-of-powers analysis ordinarily begins by determining if the power in question is core or shared. Vos, 393 Wis. 2d 38, ¶35. Core powers are those given by the constitution to a single branch, such that no other branch may take up those powers and use [them] as [their] own. Id. (quoting another source). Shared powers, meanwhile, lie at the intersections of these exclusive core constitutional powers. State v. Horn, 226 Wis. 2d 637, 643, 594 N.W.2d 772 (1999). The branches may exercise power within these borderlands but no branch may unduly burden or substantially interfere with another branch. Id. at 644. ¶48 Wisconsin's constitution, and the separation of powers principles embodied in it, was the product of constitutional conventions in 1846 and 1848. Ray A. Brown, The Making of the Wisconsin Constitution (Part I), 1949 Wis. L. Rev. 648, 655 n. (1949) (noting that although the constitution framed by the 1846 26 No. 2021AP1673 convention was ultimately rejected, the essential details of the 1848 constitution followed closely the rejected predecessor and that the 1846 convention brought sharply into focus the vital political, economic and social issues of the period). The records from both conventions reveal that the authority to appoint those whom the Governor supported was limited under the Wisconsin Constitution. With respect to the 1846 convention, it has been noted: The governor was to be elected for a two-year term and was given a comparatively small salary. He was given a veto, which could only be overridden by a two-thirds vote by each chamber of the legislature, but otherwise his powers were quite limited. In particular, he was given no appointive powers: convention delegates made it clear they did not want the governor to exercise extensive patronage. Joseph A. Ranney, Trusting Nothing to Providence: A History of Wisconsin's Legal System 51 (1999) (emphasis added). Similarly, at the 1848 convention, it seemed to be assumed by the delegates that the governor would have no appointive power. Ray A. Brown, The Making of the Wisconsin Constitution (Part II), 1952 Wis. L. Rev. 23, 34 (1952). But see id. at 34 n.34 (noting that the legislature nevertheless could confer the appointive power on the governor). ¶49 Consistent with the understanding our constitutional framers had in mind, the first compilation of the Wisconsin Statutes assigned the Governor only modest responsibilities to control who held public offices. For example, the Governor could appoint individuals to fill certain positions that were 27 No. 2021AP1673 administrative in nature. See § 57, ch. 9, Laws of 1849 (notaries public); § 2, ch. 23, Laws of 1849 (state librarian); § 1, ch. 61, Laws of 1849 (out-of-state land commissioners); § 1, ch. 143, Laws of 1849 (out-of-state agents to demand fugitives from other jurisdictions); § 2, ch. 156, Laws of 1849 (state printer). In addition, the Governor was assigned responsibility to fill vacancies in various offices. See § 11, ch. 11, Laws of 1849 (vacant statewide offices); § 13, ch. 11, Laws of 1849 (vacant local officers); § 5, ch. 18, Laws of 1849 (vacant positions on the board of regents). These statutes, enacted immediately after the 1848 constitution was ratified, reveal a circumscribed understanding of the Governor's appointment power. ¶50 In contrast, the understanding of the Wisconsin Constitution that prevailed at the time of its ratification contemplated a strong role for the Legislature in appointment decisions. Turning again to Wisconsin's first statutory compilation following ratification, we see both close legislative scrutiny of appointments made by the Governor and direct legislative appointments. First, although the Governor could remove certain officers for cause during a recess of the Legislature, his power to fill the resulting vacancy was subject to close legislative review: All officers . . . who are or shall be appointed by the governor, by and with the advice and consent of the senate . . . may, for official misconduct, or habitual or willful neglect of duty, be removed by the governor upon satisfactory proofs, at any time during the recess of the legislature, and the vacancy filed 28 No. 2021AP1673 by appointment made by him, until such vacancy shall be regularly supplied; but no such appointment shall extend beyond twenty days after the commencement of the next meeting of the legislature. § 8, ch. 11, Laws of 1849. Thus, dating back to the founding of our state, the Governor has never had expansive ability to control who held public offices in administrative agencies. The powers of removal and appointment were limited. ¶51 Further, we see that the Legislature itself exercised the appointment power at the State's founding. Under the 1849 statutes, the board of regents governing the University of Wisconsin did not consist of members appointed by the Governor as it does today. Compare Wis. Stat. §§ 15.07(1)(a) & 15.91 with § 4, ch. 18, Laws of 1849. Instead, its members were elected by the senate and the assembly to six-year terms. § 4, ch. 18, Laws of 1849. This reveals that the Governor was never understood to wield an exclusive power over the appointment and selection of administrative offices. To the contrary, the Legislature retained a strong hand in most appointment decisions, both by overseeing the Governor's use of his limited appointment power and by making appointments itself. ¶52 Under this record, the restriction of the Governor's removal power for DNR Board members does not present constitutional concerns. Reviewing the structure of the DNR, the Governor is not completely excluded from exercising control 29 No. 2021AP1673 over the makeup of DNR public officials.4 The DNR Secretary must be nominated by the Governor and confirmed by the senate, but unlike the Board, the Secretary serve[s] at the pleasure of the governor. Wis. Stat. § 15.05(1)(c). By statute, the Secretary wields [a]ll of the administrative powers and duties of the department. § 15.05(1)(b). Further, the Secretary promulgate[s] rules for administering the department and performing the duties assigned to the department with the approval of the board. Id. The Secretary, over whom the Governor has direct control, exercises aspects of executive power. See Koschkee, 387 Wis. 2d 552, ¶28 (describing administrative roles such as the oversight and charge of something with the power of direction as executive . . . in nature); Horn, 226 Wis. 2d at 650 (reasoning that the administrative process . . . directed to the correctional and rehabilitative processes of the parole and probation system was vested in the executive branch); Vos, 393 Wis. 2d 38, ¶¶59-60 (explaining that the administration of offices such as coroners, registers of deeds, district attorneys, [and] sheriffs were executive functions). ¶53 The DNR Board is tasked with regulatory, advisory and policy-making, not administrative, responsibilities. Wis. Stat § 15.05(1)(b). Although more circumscribed than the We do not hold that the Governor must exercise control 4 over the makeup of DNR administrative positions under the Wisconsin Constitution. Even if that were required under the Wisconsin Constitution, the structure of the DNR provides the Governor control and influence in the makeup of DNR offices. 30 No. 2021AP1673 Governor's control over the Secretary, the Governor still retains influence over the makeup of the DNR Board. See Vos, 393 Wis. 2d 38, ¶60 ([A]dministrative agencies are considered part of the executive branch. (quoting Koschkee, 387 Wis. 2d 552, ¶14)). As previously explained, the Governor may nominate a replacement to DNR Board members once their terms expire. Subject to the advice and consent of the senate, the Governor has ability to select who holds office on the DNR Board for six-year terms. Wis. Stat. §§ 15.07(1)(a), 15.34(1) & (2)(a). The people's elected representatives in the senate may accept or reject the Governor's nominees, but the Governor undoubtedly has wide discretion in whom he chooses for nomination. See Jensen v. Wis. Elections Bd., 2002 WI 13, ¶10, 249 Wis. 2d 706, 639 N.W.2d 537 (explaining the Legislature is tasked to perform constitutional responsibilities as representatives elected by the people to make . . . political and policy decisions). As has been true since the enactment of the Wisconsin Constitution, the Governor may of course work with the senate to obtain a mutually satisfactory outcome on appointments and selections for administrative offices. As explained above, at the time the Wisconsin Constitution was enacted, it appears that the Governor's authority to control the occupancy of public offices was narrowly limited; the Governor, for instance, had no inherent appointment power. ¶54 Furthermore, although the Governor does not have a free hand to control who sits on the DNR Board, the Governor has authority to remove DNR Board members for cause while they 31 No. 2021AP1673 serve in office. Wis. Stat. §§ 15.07(1)(a), 15.34(1), 17.07(3). Whenever there is a vacancy on the DNR Board, the Governor may make a provisional appointment, who exercises all the authority of a DNR Board member until acted upon by the senate. Wis. Stat. § 17.20(2)(a). Public offices with different responsibilities, operating in agencies with different structures, may present constitutional issues or concerns not present in the present suit. Nonetheless, with the available record and the lack of developed argumentation on the part of the State, we cannot conclude that for cause protections for DNR Board members violate the Wisconsin Constitution. ¶55 While [w]e must be assiduous in patrolling the borders between the branches, based on the available record we have before us, we cannot conclude that providing Prehn for cause protection so offends the separation of powers that he must as a matter of law be removable at the Governor's pleasure. Tetra Tech EC, Inc. v. DOR, 2018 WI 75, ¶45, 382 Wis. 2d 496, 914 N.W.2d 21 (lead op.). Without any showing that Wis. Stat. § 17.07 violates the Wisconsin Constitution, we must follow the statute's plain language. Until his successor is nominated and confirmed by the senate, Prehn may be removed only for cause. Neither the quo warranto nor declaratory relief requested by the State is warranted.