Opinion ID: 44149
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Faragher/Ellerth Affirmative Defense

Text: If an employee has established a hostile-environment sexual-harassment claim but no tangible employment action was taken, an employer “may raise an 16 affirmative defense to liability or damages, subject to proof by a preponderance of the evidence.” Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765, 118 S. Ct. at 2270. To establish the affirmative defense, Lowe’s must show that (1) it “exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior,” and (2) that Olson “unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by [Lowe’s] or to avoid harm otherwise.” Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807, 118 S. Ct. at 2293; see Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765, 118 S. Ct. at 2270 (same). “Both elements must be satisfied for the defendant-employer to avoid liability, and the defendant bears the burden of proof on both elements.” Frederick v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 246 F.3d 1305, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). Further, the first element of the affirmative defense has two prongs: (1) reasonable care to prevent sexual harassment and (2) reasonable care to correct sexual harassment. Id. at 1314. We readily conclude that Lowe’s has satisfied the prevent prong of the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense. Lowe’s clearly exercised reasonable care to prevent sexually harassing behavior by promulgating and effectively disseminating several fairly extensive anti-harassment policies to employees. Lowe’s policies 17 enabled employees to bypass harassing supervisors and provided several different avenues for employees to report sexual harassment.17 The more difficult question is whether Lowe’s has established the second prong of the affirmative defense: that Olson unreasonably failed to take advantage of Lowe’s preventative and corrective opportunities.18 In defining the contours of what it means to reasonably use the complaint procedures and, thereby, properly report sexual harassment, this Court has identified two elements that must be satisfied. Olson must have complained to the appropriate person at Lowe’s. See Madray, 208 F.3d at 1300 (“This inquiry is facilitated by the identification of the ‘appropriate Company representative’ to whom employees should register their complaints in the [employer’s] sexual harassment policy”); Breda v. Wolf Camera & Video, 222 F.3d 886, 889 (11th Cir. 17 See Walton v. Johnson and Johnson Servs., Inc., 347 F.3d 1272, 1287 (11th Cir. 2003) (“The company’s anti-harassment policy provides an alternative channel for making complaints other than the harassing supervisor.”); Madray, 208 F.3d at 1299 (determining that the sexualharassment policy in the case was sufficient “because the procedures did not require that the employee complain to the offending supervisor or through the supervisor’s chain of command and the procedures provided multiple avenues of lodging a complaint to assessable, designated representatives”). 18 As stated in Faragher, “while proof that an employee failed to fulfill the corresponding obligation of reasonable care to avoid harm is not limited to showing an unreasonable failure to use any complaint procedure provided by the employer, a demonstration of such failure will normally suffice to satisfy the employer’s burden under the second element of the defense.” Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-808, 118 S. Ct. at 2293. 18 2000) (“Through its policy, the employer has given the designated person explicit actual authority to handle the complaints.”). Second, if Hall was an appropriate person under Lowe’s complaint procedures, Olson’s conversations with Hall must be sufficient to put Lowe’s on notice of the sexual harassment. See Coates, 164 F.3d at 1364.