Opinion ID: 764675
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Transit Authority's Liability

Text: 18 The district court granted judgment as a matter of law to the Transit Authority. In examining a defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law ... the district court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmovant and grant that party every reasonable inference that the jury might have drawn in its favor. Stagl v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 117 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir.1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). A district court may grant a judgment as a matter of law ... only if no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party. See id. And when reviewing the grant of such a judgment, we apply the same standards. See Maiorina v. United States Mineral Prods. Co. ( In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig.), 52 F.3d 1124, 1131 (2d Cir.1995). 19 A plaintiff suing a municipal authority under § 1983 must prove that the constitutional wrong complained of resulted from the municipal authority's official policy. See Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). As a result, the theory of respondeat superior does not apply to make municipalities liable when one of their officials commits a constitutional tort. See id. at 694. But [w]here an official has final authority over significant matters involving the exercise of discretion, the choices he makes represent government policy. See Rookard v. Health & Hosps. Corp., 710 F.2d 41, 45 (2d Cir.1983). 20 Our review of the record leads us to conclude that Clue and Little presented no persuasive evidence (1) that a policy against New Directions existed within the Transit Authority or (2) that Johnson had final authority such that her retaliatory acts could be deemed Transit Authority policy. 21 The only suggestion of a policy comes from Johnson's alleged comment that she was brought here, meaning to Labor Relations, to take care of us to clean [New Directions] up. But that isolated and ambiguous comment is simply not enough to justify a finding that the Transit Authority had placed her in her job so that she could act against New Directions. Nor can we assume a policy from the fact that Johnson mentioned to her superiors her intention to suspend Clue and Little for violating the release time policy. There is no evidence in the record that Johnson's superiors were aware that Clue and Little were members of New Directions when Johnson suspended the two union officials. As a result, even if their silence is, perhaps appropriately, taken as approval, it cannot constitute approval of a retaliatory policy, but only of Johnson's intent to apply certain rules strictly. 22 There is also no evidence that Johnson had final authority that enabled her to establish retaliatory policies. There is some dispute as to whether she could have, on her own, decided to enforce strictly the release time program rules. She testified that she could, but also testified that she checked with her superiors before acting. Even if she did, as she claimed, have final authority to decide to institute a strict enforcement of policies established by others, this is the most that her claim could amount to. There is no evidence of any sort that she could not be overruled by her superiors if she sought by her actions to suspend employees out of a retaliatory motive. 4 On the facts of this case, therefore, Johnson's authority did not constitute the kind of final authority that under Monell permits the attribution of her retaliatory motive to the Transit Authority. We therefore affirm the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' Monell claim. 23 The judgment of the district court is, therefore, affirmed in part and reversed in part.