Opinion ID: 1196629
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: liability of defendants

Text: (13a) Plaintiffs contend that the evidence they presented established that Reliez Creek has itself become a public work and, for that reason, City is liable in inverse condemnation for any damage it inflicts on their property. They argue that the Court of Appeal erred both in analyzing this claim under a substantial evidence standard of review, failing to recognize that public use is a question of law, and in concluding that City had not exercised control over the creek. (14) When trial is to the court, Code of Civil Procedure section 631.8 permits the court to grant a motion for judgment made by the defendant after plaintiff has completed presenting evidence. Since the trial court must weigh the evidence and may draw reasonable inferences from that evidence, such rulings are normally reviewed under the substantial evidence standard, with the evidence viewed most favorably to the prevailing party. However, if the facts are undisputed the reviewing court may make its own conclusions of law based on those facts. It is not bound by the trial court's interpretation. ( Torrey Pines Bank v. Hoffman (1991) 231 Cal. App.3d 308 [282 Cal. Rptr. 354].) Public use is a question of law, however, and, when the factual issues on which that question turns have been resolved, must be decided by the court. The Court of Appeal stated the standard as simply one according deference to the findings of the trial court, which are to be upheld if supported by substantial evidence. (13b) Nonetheless, we agree with the conclusion that plaintiffs did not establish that defendants, or any of them, exercised control over Reliez Creek and thereby transformed it into a public work or improvement. The evidence did not establish either an express or an implied acceptance of the drainage easements. [21] The evidence that on occasion City assisted residents by removing fallen trees from the creekbed, on request of the owners and with permission to cross their property in doing so, would not support an inference that City was exercising control over the watercourse. The contrary is the more reasonable inference. Repair of the Sizeler outfall was not an exercise of authority over the creekbed itself except insofar as City held an easement for the outfall. The evidence did not establish an exercise of control by any of the remaining defendants. County and District assisted the private riparian owners in obtaining federal financing and in design of the sheet pile structure, but those owners acknowledged responsibility for the structure. The public entities' sponsorship was required to obtain financing, but no intent to exercise control or to incorporate the creek into a unified public drainage system is reflected by that involvement. The evidence that CalTrans constructed a box culvert in the creekbed viewed in light of the purpose for which it was constructed  to support the roadbed for Highway 24, which would otherwise have collapsed into the creekbed  and the effort to dissipate any increase in volume and velocity of the stream water demonstrate an intent to avoid interference with the creek, not to exercise control over it. Utilizing an existing natural watercourse for drainage of surface water runoff and requiring other riparian owners to continue to do so does not transform the watercourse into a public storm drainage system. A governmental entity must exert control over and assume responsibility for maintenance of the watercourse if it is to be liable for damage caused by the streamflow on a theory that the watercourse has become a public work. (See, e.g., Souza v. Silver Development Co. (1985) 164 Cal. App.3d 165 [210 Cal. Rptr. 146].) We conclude, therefore, that regardless of the standard of review the Court of Appeal applied, it correctly upheld the trial court's rejection of plaintiffs' claim that Reliez Creek has become a public work or improvement, or has been incorporated into City's drainage system. It remains a privately owned natural watercourse.
The Court of Appeal held that, assuming the natural watercourse rule did not shield defendants, plaintiffs could not prevail insofar as they sought recovery from CalTrans and BART (which was a defendant only in the inverse condemnation cause of action) because they failed to establish that the facilities of these defendants were a substantial concurring cause of the downstream property damage and did not negate the possibility that urbanization generally would have resulted in the damage suffered by plaintiffs regardless of the actions of these defendants. [22] The facilities owned by CalTrans and BART, the court reasoned, had been completed 14 years before the 1981-1982 storms, at a time when the watershed from which the runoff originated was less developed. Defendants could not be liable for damage occurring subsequently when third parties over whom the defendants had no control added additional runoff to the stream. The trial court also found, and the Court of Appeal agreed, that plaintiffs' evidence was insufficient to establish that, assuming those defendants could be held liable for damage caused by discharge of surface water runoff into Reliez Creek, either CalTrans or BART was a substantial concurring cause of the damage suffered by plaintiffs. The evidence showed that BART owns only 3.5 acres in the Reliez Creek watershed. CalTrans occupies 22.4 acres. Together these entities occupy 25.9 acres or 1.1 percent of the watershed, and accounted for approximately 9.2 percent of the increase in surface water runoff over that which would have occurred even absent development or improvement of the property. The combined contribution of BART and CalTrans to the increased runoff due to urbanization in a 100-year storm, however, would be 6.7 percent of the total increase attributable to urbanization, and in a 2-year storm would be 7.2 percent. Those defendants would contribute less than 1 percent of the peak flow in a 100-year storm. The trial court concluded, based on these figures, that BART was responsible for only 0.02 percent of the runoff. The trial court and the Court of Appeal concluded that the evidence did not support the opinion of plaintiffs' experts that the runoff generated by these defendants' improvements was a substantial cause of plaintiffs' damage. They reasoned that the facilities of these defendants had been in place for 14 years at that time, during which period there had been no creekside damage attributable to those facilities. These defendants had constructed a structure engineered to dissipate the velocity and energy of the water which was channeled through their culvert above Condit Road. One of plaintiffs' experts inspected the creekbank between Condit Road and the culvert in the mid-1980's and found it to be completely different from the bank below the road with little evidence of bank failure. The expert was less positive as to whether the damage would have occurred without the contribution of both BART and CalTrans to the stream flow, but plaintiffs also failed to establish the proportion of damage attributable to CalTrans runoff from CalTrans property. Therefore, the Court of Appeal held, even assuming that together the BART/CalTrans runoff caused part of the damage, [23] there was no basis in the evidence for a determination of CalTrans or BART share of liability. Plaintiffs argue that the failure to apportion responsibility for the damage is irrelevant because defendants are subject to joint and several liability. (15) We have held otherwise, however, with respect to apportionment of liability for damage caused by drainage of surface waters. In Mehl v. People ex rel. Dept. Pub. Wks. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 710, 718 [119 Cal. Rptr. 625, 532 P.2d 489], we held that a plaintiff in inverse condemnation must establish the proportion of damage attributable to the public entity from which recovery was sought. Because the plaintiff did not differentiate the damage allegedly caused by runoff from a state freeway, from that caused by natural flow and by the county's efforts to deal with increased flow, we reversed the judgment stating: In these circumstances, it [is] essential to differentiate between the responsibility of the state and the county for the overall damage. ( Ibid. ) (16) Moreover, even were we to assume that the evidence was sufficient to establish that increased runoff from the property of either of these defendants was a substantial cause of plaintiffs' damage and to permit an apportionment, plaintiffs' failure to demonstrate that these defendants acted unreasonably, or that plaintiffs themselves acted reasonably to protect their property, precludes recovery. City is liable under section 19 of article I of the California Constitution for the damage suffered by plaintiffs only if the additional surface water runoff created by its improvements, i.e., paved streets and other public areas, or the manner in which it collected and discharged surface water runoff into Reliez Creek was both unreasonable and a substantial cause of the damage to plaintiffs' property. The evidence does not support a finding of liability under those criteria. Plaintiffs did offer expert testimony that runoff from City streets was a substantial cause of the creekside damage. However, there is no evidence that City acted unreasonably in the construction of its improvements and, significantly, no evidence that plaintiffs themselves took reasonable measures to prevent the erosion of their creek banks. Therefore, assuming that the evidence would support inferences favorable to plaintiffs with regard to the cause of their injury, they cannot prevail on their tort causes of action against City. That being so, we need not consider here whether a riparian property owner who has altered the natural drainage has a continuing obligation to monitor the impact of the runoff from the property as urbanization occurs, and, if necessary, to take steps to avoid damage if the changed conditions indicate that the runoff may be a substantial cause of future damage.
Plaintiffs claim that the Court of Appeal also erred in upholding the nonsuit granted County and District by the trial court on the ground that neither owned or exercised control over any of the public works that may have contributed to plaintiffs' damage. They note that there was evidence that County maintained at least one road in the watershed that drained into Reliez Creek as late as 1980, and argue further that ownership and control are not essential to their nuisance and trespass causes of action. There is no error. Since the claim that Reliez Creek was part of a public drainage system fails, plaintiffs' alternative theory that discharge of surface water runoff into Reliez Creek caused their damage must be considered. Plaintiffs point to no evidence that county owned property abutting Reliez Creek at the time plaintiffs suffered damage, however, and District never owned any of the properties which drain into Reliez Creek. These defendants are not liable for damage caused by runoff from property owned by others (see Preston v. Goldman (1986) 42 Cal.3d 108, 125-126 [227 Cal. Rptr. 817, 720 P.2d 476]), and if the claim is that county is liable as a nonriparian owner for runoff from its roads which eventually reached Reliez Creek, it also fails. The evidence did not establish that any damage was attributable to that runoff. Neither of these defendants could be found liable for maintaining a dangerous condition on public property, or found to have interfered with plaintiffs' use and enjoyment of their property (Civ. Code, § 3479), or to have interfered with their exclusive possession by contributing to the stream bank erosion. Therefore, while the Court of Appeal did not refer to the nuisance and trespass causes of action, it did not err in affirming the judgment for County and District. Giving plaintiffs' evidence all the weight to which it is entitled, and drawing all legitimate inferences favorable to plaintiffs from that evidence, it is not sufficiently substantial to support a verdict for plaintiffs on those causes of action. (See Ewing v. Cloverleaf Bowl (1978) 20 Cal.3d 389, 395 [143 Cal. Rptr. 13, 572 P.2d 1155].) The same is true with regard to the theory urged in this court, that by enforcing a City ordinance governing drainage and contracting with City to undertake and/or advise on erosion control, District became responsible for plaintiffs' damage. Plaintiffs direct us to no evidence that tied any act of enforcement or performance of District's contract with City to the damages suffered by plaintiffs in 1981-1982. [24] We also reject plaintiffs' argument that the Court of Appeal erred in holding that County is not subject to tort liability as a party exercising ownership and control of the creekbed. County's participation in sponsoring the application for federal funding of the sheet pile structure had no effect on ownership of the creekbed for purposes of establishing the tort liability of an owner of real property. Finally, we note with regard to both tort and inverse condemnation liability that the evidence reflects no efforts by plaintiffs themselves to protect their properties once it became apparent that erosion of the creek bank was occurring.