Opinion ID: 2581040
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Trial Court Abused its Discretion when it Failed to Enter Specific Findings of Fact or Articulate in its Oral Opinion the Child Relocation Factors

Text: This court reviews trial court decisions dealing with the welfare of children for abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of McDole, 122 Wash.2d 604, 610, 859 P.2d 1239 (1993). Abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision is manifestly unreasonable or based upon untenable grounds or reasons. State v. Brown, 132 Wash.2d 529, 572, 940 P.2d 546 (1997). A court's decision is manifestly unreasonable if it is outside the range of acceptable choices, given the facts and the applicable legal standard; it is based on untenable grounds if the factual findings are unsupported by the record; it is based on untenable reasons if it is based on an incorrect standard or the facts do not meet the requirements of the correct standard. In re Marriage of Littlefield, 133 Wash.2d 39, 47, 940 P.2d 1362 (1997). This court recently applied abuse of discretion [w]here a trial court has determined, based on affidavits alone, that adequate cause does not exist to justify a full hearing on a petition to modify a parenting plan. In re Parentage of Jannot, 149 Wash.2d 123, 125, 65 P.3d 664 (2003). Even though this court applied such a deferential standard of review, we remanded Jannot for an articulation on the record of the reasons for denying a full hearing. Id. at 129, 65 P.3d 664. Even though Jannot applied the same deferential standard of review that the Court of Appeals applied here, Jannot indicates that a trial court must articulate on the record the reasons behind its determinations. In reviewing whether the trial court abused its discretion, we first consider whether trial courts must consider all of the child relocation factors. We hold that they must. The factors are conjunctive because and separates factors 10 and 11. The factors are equally important because they are neither weighted nor listed in any particular order. RCW 26.09.520. Finally, consideration of all the factors is logical because they serve as a balancing test between many important and competing interests and circumstances involved in relocation matters. [9] Particularly important in this regard are the interests and circumstances of the relocating person. Contrary to the trial court's repeated references to the best interests of the child, the standard for relocation decisions is not only the best interests of the child. As stated by Division One of the Court of Appeals: Rather than contravening the traditional presumption that a fit parent will act in the best interests of the child,... the relocation statute establishes a rebuttable presumption that the relocation of the child will be allowed. Thus, the act both incorporates and gives substantial weight to the traditional presumption that a fit parent will act in the best interests of her child. The burden of overcoming that presumption is on the objecting party, who can prevail only by demonstrating that the detrimental effect of the relocation upon the child outweighs the benefit of the change to the child and the relocating person. RCW 26.09.520. Moreover, the relocation statute provides specific guidance for trial courts considering orders restraining or permitting relocation of the child. Rather than containing a general statement of the best interests of the child standard ..., RCW 26.09.520 contains 11 specific factors for the trial court to consider at a hearing to determine whether relocation of the child will be permitted.[ [10] ] Osborne, 119 Wash.App. at 144, 79 P.3d 465. We adopt this reasoning and hold that trial courts must determine whether the detrimental effect of the relocation outweighs the benefit of the change to the child and the relocating person. RCW 26.09.520. We further require that trial courts must consider each of the child relocation factors. These requirements will ensure that trial courts consider the interests of the child and the relocating person within the context of the competing interests and circumstances required by the CRA. We next consider the manner in which trial courts must document their consideration of each child relocation factor. Ideally, trial courts will enter findings of fact on each factor. Findings of fact play a pivotal role upon review: [t]he purpose of findings on ultimate and decisive issues is to enable an appellate court to intelligently review relevant questions upon appeal, and only when it clearly appears what questions were decided by the trial court, and the manner in which they were decided, are the requirements met. Schoonover v. Carpet World, Inc., 91 Wash.2d 173, 177, 588 P.2d 729 (1978). This court addressed whether a trial court erred in failing to enter specific findings of fact on each statutory factor in In re Marriage of Croley, 91 Wash.2d 288, 290-93, 588 P.2d 738 (1978). Therein, this court found that the trial court did not err in failing to enter such findings because substantial evidence was presented on each factor, the trial court's oral opinion and written findings of fact reflected that it considered each factor, and the trial court complied with CR 52(a)(2)(B). Id. at 291-92, 588 P.2d 738. When this court considers whether a trial court abused its discretion in failing to document its consideration of the child relocation factors, we will ask two questions. Did the trial court enter specific findings of fact on each factor? If not, was substantial evidence presented on each factor, and do the trial court's findings of fact and oral articulations reflect that it considered each factor? Only with such written documentation or oral articulations can we be certain that the trial court properly considered the interests of the child and the relocating person within the context of the competing interests and circumstances required by the CRA. The trial court abused its discretion because it failed to satisfy either of these methods of documenting its consideration of the child relocation factors. It failed to satisfy the first method because it did not enter specific findings of fact on each child relocation factor. It failed to satisfy the second method because the record does not reflect that substantial evidence was presented on each child relocation factor, and the trial court's written findings and oral ruling do not reflect that it considered each factor. Without a discussion of each child relocation factor in the trial court's findings or oral opinion, the trial court's conclusory findings that the detrimental effects of the relocation outweigh the benefit of the change to the child and Petitioner, and [a]fter analysis of the factors for consideration outlined in RCW 26.09.520, the court has determined Respondent has rebutted the presumption that the relocation should be permitted are insufficient because we cannot review the trial court's application of the facts to the child relocation factors. CP at 72. In other words, we cannot review the trial court decision because its basis is unclear. We reverse the Court of Appeals. [11]