Opinion ID: 51679
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Qualifying Prior Convictions

Text: Second, Ubele asserts the district court erred in designating him as an armed career offender because the record did not support that he had three prior convictions to qualify him as an armed career criminal. Specifically, Ubele argues that two of the alleged qualifying prior convictions do not constitute separate offenses. According to Ubele, therefore, the Government failed to prove the existence of the prior convictions by a preponderance of the evidence. 3 As an initial matter, we note Ubele’s objection was to the fact of having three convictions, not to the character of the convictions. Thus, Shepard v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1254 (2005), which limits the sources a district court may consider when looking at the underlying facts of a prior conviction, does not apply. See United States v. Cantellano, 430 F.3d 1142, 1147 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1604 (2006). By contrast, “[t]he fact of a prior conviction clearly may be found by the district court.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the district court did not err in relying on the PSI to determine whether Ubele had three prior convictions. To qualify as an armed career criminal, the defendant must violate 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and have “three previous convictions by any court . . . for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions different from one another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). Enhancement under the statute requires three temporally distinct crimes, but convictions need not be obtained on separate occasions. United States v. Jackson, 57 F.3d 1012, 1018 (11th Cir. 1995). “[S]o long as predicate crimes are successive rather than simultaneous, they constitute separate criminal episodes for purposes of the ACCA.” United States v. Pope, 132 F.3d 684, 692 (11th Cir. 1998). 4 A preponderance of the evidence supports that Ubele had three separate convictions for the purposes of the ACCA. According to the PSI, Ubele’s indictment showed that Ubele was charged with distributing cocaine on January 13, 1989, and with trafficking in cocaine on January 19, 1989.1 The PSI further stated that pursuant to a plea agreement, Ubele was ultimately allowed to plead guilty to two counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. Ubele submitted no evidence to rebut the PSI. Although the January 13, 1989, and January 17, 1989, crimes were charged in the same indictment and sentenced at the same time, they are two separate criminal episodes for purposes of the ACCA because the crimes were successive rather than simultaneous. See Pope, 132 F.3d at 692, Jackson, 57 F.3d at 1018. Thus, a preponderance of the evidence supports there were two separate crimes and the district court did not err in applying the ACCA to enhance Ubele’s sentence.