Opinion ID: 490091
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Interpretation of Facility

Text: 25 Section 3004(u) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 6924(u) (Supp. III 1985), requires owners and operators to take corrective action for all releases of hazardous waste or constituents from any solid waste management unit at a treatment, storage or disposal facility ... regardless of the time at which waste was placed in such unit. To implement section 3004(u) in its regulatory scheme, the EPA promulgated 40 C.F.R. Sec. 264.101 (1986), which provides in pertinent part that [t]he owner or operator of a facility seeking a permit for the treatment, storage or disposal of hazardous waste must institute corrective action ... for all releases of hazardous waste or constituents from any solid waste management unit at the facility, regardless of time at which waste was placed in such unit. In its preamble to the Final Rule, the EPA stated that, based on its examination of congressional intent underlying section 3004(u), it would be interpreting the term facility as used in section 264.101 as not limited to those portions of the owner's property at which units for the management of solid or hazardous waste are located, but rather extend[ing] to all contiguous property under the owner or operator's control. 50 Fed.Reg. at 28,712 (emphasis added). 26 The Industry Petitioners challenge this definition of facility. They claim that the Agency's definition is incompatible with the plain language of section 3004(u) and is inconsistent with congressional intent. Alternatively, they contend that, in the absence of congressional intent to the contrary, the Agency is bound to employ the definition of facility it promulgated in 1980, codified at 40 C.F.R. Sec. 260.10 (1986). We disagree. We find that the plain language of section 3004(u) does not require the use of the Industry Petitioners' definition of facility. We also reject the claim that the EPA was somehow bound to employ its prior definition of facility. Employing standard tools of statutory construction, we find the EPA's definition of facility for purposes of section 264.101 to be consistent with section 3004(u) and with the congressional intent underlying the 1984 Amendments. Moreover, even if congressional intent were inconclusive on this point, we would uphold the Agency's interpretation as reasonably filling in gaps left by Congress when it enacted the 1984 Amendments.
27 The Industry Petitioners first urge that the EPA's definition of facility is inconsistent with the directive in section 3004(u) to take corrective action at a treatment, storage or disposal facility. They argue that the word at clearly shows an intent to limit the duty to take corrective action only to contiguous land ... used for treating, storing, or disposing of hazardous waste. 40 C.F.R. Sec. 260.10 (1986). However, this would virtually nullify the requirement, to take corrective action for releases from any solid waste management unit. Under the Industry Petitioners' view, the only way a duty would attach to take corrective action for releases from a solid waste unit would be if that solid waste unit happened to be on the contiguous land ... used for ... hazardous waste. 28 We fail to see how the use of the word at in section 3004(u) clarifies, in any way, the meaning to be placed on the word facility. It certainly does not require the use of the Industry Petitioners' definition. Moreover, looking at section 3004(u) as a whole, it appears that employing the Industry Petitioners' definition would render the duty to take corrective action for releases from solid waste management units virtually meaningless. Absent some affirmative showing that Congress intended to achieve such an anomalous result, we are not persuaded that the EPA misconstrued the statutory language.
29 The Agency argues that its interpretation of the word facility in this context, if not mandated by the plain wording of section 3004(u), is consistent with the congressional scheme underlying the 1984 Amendments. It notes first that the broad purpose underlying this aspect of the 1984 Amendments was to relieve future burdens on the Superfund program. See H.R.REP. NO. 198, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 20, 61, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.NEWS 5576, 5579, 5620 (House Report). As the House Report stated: Unless all ... releases ... at permitted facilities are ... cleaned up ... many more sites will be added to the future burdens of the Superfund program.... The responsibility to control such releases lies with the facility owner and operator and should not be shifted to the Superfund program, particularly when a final permit has been requested by the facility. Id. at 61, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.NEWS at 5620. The Agency also reasons that, since section 3004(v), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 6924(v) (Supp. III 1985), clearly employs a broader concept of a facility than does the section 260.10 definition, one can reasonably assume a similarly broad meaning of facility was intended in section 3004(u). 30 Section 3004(u) was enacted out of congressional concern that current EPA regulations do not address all releases of hazardous constituents from solid waste management units at facilities receiving permits under section 3005(e). This could likely result in a situation of EPA issuing a final permit to a facility which is causing ground water contamination from inactive units, without the permit addressing that contamination in any way. House Report at 60, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.NEWS at 5619; see also Conference Report at 92, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.NEWS at 5663. Section 3004(u), in essence, creates the broad duty to take corrective action as a quid pro quo to obtaining a permit. Given this purpose, it appears that the EPA's construction of facility is fully consistent with congressional intent. 31 This view is further confirmed by section 3004(v), which requires an owner or operator to use best efforts to take corrective action beyond the facility boundary. The provision is satisfied if the owner or operator is unable to obtain the necessary permission to undertake such action. Clearly, facility is used in section 3004(v) to describe all of the property under the control of the owner or operator. We have no reason to assume that Congress intended a different meaning of facility in section 3004(u). 32 We can find no basis for overturning the EPA's interpretation of facility in this case. Indeed, even if we were unable to discern congressional intent after employing traditional tools of statutory construction, UAW v. Brock, 816 F.2d at 765 n. 5 (D.C.Cir. April 24, 1987), we would still uphold the Agency's interpretation. It is clear to us that, to the extent there is  'any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress,'  Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2782, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231, 94 S.Ct. 1055, 1072, 39 L.Ed.2d 270 (1974)), the Agency has acted to fill that gap in a way that is rational and not inconsistent with the 1984 Amendments. Accordingly, we must respect the interpretation of the agency to which Congress has delegated the responsibility for administering the statutory program. INS v. Luz Marina Cardoza-Fonseca, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 1222, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987). 33 3. The Agency is not Required to Employ Its Prior Definition in Construing a New Congressional Enactment 34 The Industry Petitioners next contend that, in any event, i.e., without regard to the reasonableness of the EPA's current interpretation, the Agency is bound by its prior rulemaking to employ the initial definition of facility. This argument is wholly without merit. 35 The Industry Petitioners apparently have failed to recognize that the Agency has not changed its prior definition of facility; the EPA will continue to use the section 260.10 definition in construing other regulatory and statutory provisions under the RCRA. This case is thus unlike International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 474 v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 697, 712 n. 65 (D.C.Cir.1987), and Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers International Union v. NLRB, 806 F.2d 269, 273-74 (D.C.Cir.1986), each of which involved a change in an agency's interpretation of a statutory provision. Even in those cases, however, the agencies were not bound to follow their prior views, but simply had to supply a justification for abandoning their prior positions. Here, the Agency has interpreted newly enacted statutory language, so it is hardly surprising that EPA officials did not feel constrained by the previously existing definition of facility. Furthermore, and most importantly, the EPA adequately explained its reasons for departing from the section 260.10 definition, thus making clear the reasonableness of its position. See 50 Fed.Reg. at 28,712. 36 4. The Agency Will Not be Exceeding its Authority 37 The Industry Petitioners fear that, as a result of the Agency's interpretation of facility, the EPA will be free to intrude into their production processes and those areas of their properties not used for the management of solid waste. However, by its terms, section 264.101 is limited to releases from solid waste management units. Indeed, in the preamble to the Final Rule, the EPA specifically addressed the Industry Petitioners' concerns. The Agency stated that it did not believe that section 3004(u) applie[d] to spills that cannot be linked to solid waste management units. For example, a spill from a truck travelling through a facility would not constitute a release from a solid waste management unit. 50 Fed.Reg. at 28,713-14. 38 We fail to comprehend any legitimate basis for the Industry Petitioners' asserted fears. Nothing in section 264.101 as written, or as the Agency has stated that it will be applied, would result in the Agency exceeding its authority under the Act. 39