Opinion ID: 781964
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Fourth Amendment Standard

Text: 15 We disagree with Wiley that the Warden was required to have probable cause to conduct a lawful search of Wiley's vehicle. Wiley was employed as a teacher at the Institution while his car was parked in a restricted area within the confines of the Institution. This case falls squarely under the Ortega decision and thus should be analyzed under the reasonable suspicion standard. 16 The Fourth Amendment prohibits the government from undertaking unreasonable searches and seizures of individuals and their property. U.S. Const. amend. IV. Ordinarily, a Fourth Amendment search must be supported by probable cause. See New Jersey v. TLO, 469 U.S. 325, 340, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985). The fundamental precept of the Fourth Amendment, however, is that a search must be reasonable, and although both the concept of probable cause and the requirement of a warrant bear on the reasonableness of a search, ... in certain limited circumstances neither is required. Id. (quoting Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 277, 93 S.Ct. 2535, 37 L.Ed.2d 596 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring)). Ultimately, the determination of the standard of reasonableness governing any specific class of searches requires balancing the individual's legitimate expectations of privacy and personal security with the government's need for effective methods to deal with breaches of public order. Id. at 337, 105 S.Ct. 733. Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated that where a careful balancing of governmental and private interests suggests that the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops short of probable cause, we have not hesitated to adopt such a standard. Id. at 341, 105 S.Ct. 733.
17 In Ortega, the Supreme Court defined such a category of searches. There, the Court addressed the appropriate Fourth Amendment standard for a search of a public employee's office by a public employer in areas in which the employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 107 S.Ct. 1492. The Court recognized that public employees have legitimate privacy interests in the private objects they bring to the workplace. Id. at 721, 107 S.Ct. 1492. However, requiring a government employer in these instances to obtain a warrant would impede the efficient and proper operation of the workplace. Id. at 723, 107 S.Ct. 1492. The government's interest in the efficient and proper operation of the workplace, id., persuaded the court that on balance, despite the intrusion on individuals' privacy, a probable cause requirement would impose intolerable burdens on public employers. Id. at 724, 107 S.Ct. 1492. The Court therefore held that, at least with regard to workplace searches by a public employer of a government employee where the search is either for noninvestigatory, work-related purposes or investigations of work-related misconduct, the government need only demonstrate reasonableness under all the circumstances to justify the constitutionality of the search. Id. at 725-26, 107 S.Ct. 1492. This reasonableness inquiry in turn encompasses two inquiries: (1) whether the action was justified at its inception, i.e., whether there were  reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct, id. at 726, 107 S.Ct. 1492 (emphasis added) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)); and (2) whether the search as actually conducted was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place. Id. at 726, 107 S.Ct. 1492 (quoting TLO, 469 U.S. at 341, 105 S.Ct. 733).
18 In holding that workplace searches undertaken either for noninvestigatory work-related purposes or to investigate work-related misconduct may be predicated on reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause, the Court in Ortega defined the workplace as those areas ... that are related to work and are generally within the employer's control. 480 U.S. at 715, 107 S.Ct. 1492. As an example, at a hospital, the hallways, cafeteria, offices, desks, and file cabinets, among other areas, are part of the workplace. Id. at 715-16, 107 S.Ct. 1492. However, personal possessions on workplace territory, such as closed personal luggage or a handbag, would not necessarily be considered part of the workplace context. Id. at 716, 107 S.Ct. 1492. 19 Wiley contends that Ortega is inapplicable to this case because his car was like a closed briefcase or suitcase that under Ortega might not be in the workplace. We disagree. Wiley's car was parked in the Institution's parking lot, which was on agency property, adjacent to the Institution, and available to accommodate employees and visitors of the Institution. The agency maintained control over the parking lot, as evidenced by the notice posted at the entrance of the parking lot advising visitors and employees that [a]ll persons entering upon these premises are subject to routine searches of their person, property ( including vehicles ), and packages (emphasis added). Unlike a situation in which a public employee brings a closed suitcase to work without any expectation that it would be searched, Wiley was on notice that his car could be searched. Therefore, Wiley's car, as situated in the Institution's parking lot, was within the workplace as set forth in Ortega.
20 The Ortega Court also limited its holding to searches undertaken (1) for noninvestigatory work-related purposes or (2) to investigate work-related misconduct. Id. at 725-26, 107 S.Ct. 1492. The Court distinguished these sorts of searches from those searches seeking to find evidence of criminal misconduct, id. at 721, 107 S.Ct. 1492, reasoning that public employers are hardly in the business of investigating the violation of criminal laws. Id. at 722, 107 S.Ct. 1492. The Court expressly declined to address the appropriate Fourth Amendment standard when an employee is being investigated for criminal misconduct or breaches of other nonwork-related statutory or regulatory standards. Id. at 729 n. , 107 S.Ct. 1492 (emphasis added); see also Cerrone v. Brown, 246 F.3d 194, 201 (2d Cir.2001) ([ Ortega ] did not disturb the well-settled rule that probable cause is required for criminal investigations.). 21 Wiley argues that, in contrast to the search in Ortega, the search conducted by the Warden in this case was not an investigation simply to unearth evidence of work-related misconduct, but one with possible criminal implications requiring the existence of probable cause to sustain the search's legality. Wiley alleges that the correctional officers who conducted the search could have arrested him. However, in looking to ascertain whether the investigation is criminal in nature, the proper focus is not on the positions or capabilities of the persons conducting the search, but rather the reason for the search itself. See United States v. Fernandes, 272 F.3d 938, 943 n. 3 (7th Cir.2001) (analyzing the case pursuant to Ortega because, while the prosecutor ordering the search of Fernandes's office was in the business of investigating the violation of ... criminal laws, the search itself was not a criminal investigation, but rather undertaken to ensure that the work of the agency [was] conducted in a proper and efficient manner (quoting Ortega, 480 U.S. at 723, 724, 107 S.Ct. 1492)). Wiley argues that he could have been arrested pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1791, which provides for fines or imprisonment for providing or attempting to provide prohibited objects, including firearms, to a prison inmate. However, Wiley does not provide any evidence to indicate that the Warden ordered the search in view of § 1791. 22 Rather, the facts of this case indicate that the search of Wiley's car was an internal investigation for purposes of maintaining security and order in the Institution. The Bureau of Prison's Standards of Employee Conduct, Program Statement 3420.08, prohibits employees at the Institution from introducing contraband into or upon the grounds of any federal penal or correctional institution, or taking or attempting to take therefrom, anything whatsoever without the Warden's knowledge and consent.... The initial impetus for the search was the OIA memorandum, which requested that the Warden investigate the matter locally and forward a report of his findings to the OIA in Denver. The memorandum also informed the Warden that upon receipt of his report, the matter would be considered closed unless the Warden was requested to provide additional information. The memorandum thus signals that the purpose of the search of Wiley's car was not to ferret out possible criminal activity but to uncover workrelated misconduct in an internal investigation by the agency. 23 In conclusion, because the search of Wiley's car was a workplace search undertaken to investigate possible work-related misconduct, we agree with the Board that the search should be analyzed pursuant to the reasonable suspicion standard articulated in the Ortega decision.
24 Moreover, the prison context in this case raises special considerations that persuade us that the search only need be supported by reasonable suspicion. The core requirement of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness under all the circumstances. See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989). Determining reasonableness of a particular search is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests. Id. (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979)). First, we examine Wiley's personal privacy interests as well as the nature of the intrusion on his privacy interests. The Board determined, and it is not disputed, that Wiley had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his car. However, Wiley's expectation of privacy was mitigated by the conspicuous sign posted at the entrance of the Institution parking lot indicating that his vehicle was subject to search. Additionally, the nature of the search of Wiley's vehicle was not as intrusive as other types of searches, such as body cavity searches, that have been upheld as reasonable in light of recognized government interests. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 132 L.Ed.2d 564 (1995). Next, we consider the nature and immediacy of the governmental concern at issue. Id. at 660, 115 S.Ct. 2386. Here, the government's interest in controlling the entry of guns and other dangerous weapons into the Institution is readily appreciated. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987) (A state's operation of a prison presents `special needs' beyond normal law enforcement that may justify departures from the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements.). Upon balancing the intrusion on Wiley's Fourth Amendment interests against the agency's substantial interest in maintaining the security of the Institution, we conclude that the agency needed only to demonstrate that the Warden had reasonable grounds to suspect that Wiley kept a gun in his vehicle parked in the Institution's lot.