Opinion ID: 494133
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Robilotto's Claims

Text: 11 Robilotto's primary contention on appeal is that the government's Hobbs Act charge failed to state a criminal offense and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction on that charge. We disagree. 12 The Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1951, proscribes extortion affecting interstate commerce, as well as attempts and conspiracies to do so. Extortion, as defined in the Act, means the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence or fear. Id. Sec. 1951(b)(2). Wrongfully induced fear includes fear of economic loss that would result from work stoppages or strikes. United States v. Clemente, 640 F.2d 1069, 1078 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 820, 102 S.Ct. 102, 70 L.Ed.2d 91 (1981); United States v. Palmiotti, 254 F.2d 491, 495-96 (2d Cir.1958); United States v. Postma, 242 F.2d 488, 493 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 922, 77 S.Ct. 1380, 1 L.Ed.2d 1436 (1957); United States v. Varlack, 225 F.2d 665, 669 (2d Cir.1955); see also United States v. Capo, 817 F.2d 947, 951 (2d Cir.1987) (in banc) (listing elements of wrongfully induced fear of economic loss). 13 In United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 93 S.Ct. 1007, 35 L.Ed.2d 379 (1973), the Supreme Court carved out a labor exception to the traditional law of extortion codified in the Hobbs Act. United States v. Zappola, 677 F.2d 264, 269 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 866, 103 S.Ct. 145, 74 L.Ed.2d 122 (1982). The Court held that, in a labor context, the Hobbs Act does not apply to the use of force to achieve legitimate labor ends. Enmons, 410 U.S. at 401, 93 S.Ct. at 1010. However, the Supreme Court emphasized that when labor union officials use force for a wrongful purpose, e.g., to obtain wages for imposed, unwanted, superfluous and fictitious services of laborers, prosecution would be appropriate under the Hobbs Act. Id. at 408, 93 S.Ct. at 1014 (quoting United States v. Green, 350 U.S. 415, 417, 76 S.Ct. 522, 524, 100 L.Ed. 494 (1956)). 14 Although Robilotto faults the district court's failure to charge the jury with regard to his so-called Enmons defense, he does not urge reversal of his conviction for Hobbs Act conspiracy on that ground. Rather, Robilotto asserts that his conviction should be reversed based on his contention that Enmons demonstrates the inapplicability of the Hobbs Act to the instant case. Robilotto's argument is unconvincing. 15 Apparently conceding that the cover drivers were both superfluous and fictitious, Robilotto argues that the demand to pay cover drivers was neither imposed upon, nor unwanted by, Universal because Universal eventually agreed to pay the cover drivers. However, Universal consented to payment of those salaries only after threats of labor unrest made by Civitello and later by Robilotto. Under Robilotto's singularly circular logic, once Universal consented to making extortionate payments upon pain of labor strife, that consent would then evidence Universal's willingness to accept the previously unwanted contract term. At most, Universal's subsequent agreement to hire the cover drivers demonstrates only that appellants' extortion was successful. Moreover, the cover drivers at issue here, for the most part, were not members of the union, performed no work, and were incapable of performing the jobs that they purportedly were covering. It would be difficult to imagine a more obvious instance of imposed, unwanted, superfluous and fictitious labor services. See United States v. Green, 350 U.S. 415, 417, 76 S.Ct. 522, 524, 100 L.Ed. 494 (1956). Appellants' attempts to force Universal to hire cover drivers clearly fall within the type of illegitimate labor activity proscribed in Green. We hold, therefore, that the Hobbs Act indictment against appellants stated a criminal offense, and that the exception envisioned in Enmons for legitimate union activity is inapplicable to the instant case. 16 Robilotto also claims that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for Hobbs Act conspiracy. Under the well-established standards for challenges to sufficiency of the evidence, a defendant bears a heavy burden. United States v. Losada, 674 F.2d 167, 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1125, 102 S.Ct. 2945, 73 L.Ed.2d 1341 (1982). A jury's verdict will be sustained if there is substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to the government, to support it. United States v. Nersesian, 824 F.2d 1294, 1324 (2d Cir.1987) (citation omitted). The reviewing court must credit every inference that could have been drawn in the government's favor, United States v. Giraldo, 822 F.2d 205, 213 (2d Cir.1987) (citation omitted), and must affirm the conviction as long as, from the inferences reasonably drawn, the jury might fairly have concluded guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, id. (citations omitted). Robilotto has failed to meet this burden. 17 The evidence adduced at trial amply supports Robilotto's conviction for Hobbs Act conspiracy. The evidence demonstrates that Brown was induced to pay for unwanted cover drivers by direct threats of labor unrest from coconspirator Civitello. Brown testified that he agreed to pay the cover drivers solely because he feared costly work stoppages. There was ample evidence that Robilotto exploited this fear by threatening Gray and Slusser with work stoppages when they expressed Universal's desire to discontinue payments to no-show cover drivers. Gray testified that he feared labor strife as a result of Robilotto's threats. The evidence also sufficiently established that Robilotto knowingly joined the conspiracy to extort money from Universal. Robilotto was the business agent for the union on the film and assigned Civitello to be the job steward for the film. Upon learning that Universal no longer wished to pay for the unwanted cover drivers, Robilotto repeated Civitello's extortionate threats to Universal in strong terms. In light of the foregoing and of all of the evidence presented, the jury was entitled to infer that Robilotto was acting in concert with Civitello as part of a conspirational agreement to extort money from Universal. See United States v. Alessi, 638 F.2d 466, 475-76 (2d Cir.1980). 18
19 Robilotto contends that his conviction under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1954 should be overturned because there was insufficient evidence that he exercised control over the Health and Welfare Fund, and that loans extended solely to Spagnola should not have been included in the charges against him. We disagree. 20 Section 1954 prohibits an agent or officer of an employee organization, any of whose members are covered by an employee welfare benefit plan, from receiving any ... loan, money, or thing of value because of or with intent to be influenced with respect to, any of [his] actions, decisions, or other duties relating to any question or matter concerning such plan. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1954. This statutory proscription extends to all persons who exercise control, direct or indirect, authorized or unauthorized[,] over the fund, United States v. Palmeri, 630 F.2d 192, 199 (3d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 967 & 983, 101 S.Ct. 1484 & 1520, 67 L.Ed.2d 616 & 819 (1981); see United States v. Friedland, 660 F.2d 919, 925 (3d Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 989, 102 S.Ct. 2268, 73 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1982), including business agents of a local union who exercise influence over employee welfare benefit funds. Palmeri, 630 F.2d at 198-200. 21 Undisputed evidence demonstrated that Robilotto, as business agent for Local 294, was a union officer or agent covered by section 1954 and that the Health and Welfare Fund was an employee welfare benefit plan within the purview of the statute. Robilotto contends essentially that there was no evidence that he wielded sufficient influence to cause Health and Welfare Fund deposits to be made at the Fulton County National Bank. His argument fails for two reasons. First, section 1954, on its face, does not necessarily require proof that the malefactor actually possessed the ability to influence a welfare fund's investment decisions. The statute prohibits a union officer from accepting anything of value because of or with intent to be influenced with respect to any of his actions, decisions or duties concerning the fund. This statutory language has been interpreted to proscribe acceptance of payment with the stated purpose of exercising one's influence ..., regardless of capacity to do so. United States v. Soures, 736 F.2d 87, 90 (3d Cir.1984) (construing Friedland, 660 F.2d at 925-26), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1161, 105 S.Ct. 914, 83 L.Ed.2d 927 (1985); cf. United States v. Romano, 684 F.2d 1057, 1064 (2d Cir.) (statute prohibits receipt of things of value resulting from union pension fund investment decisions, regardless whether receipt involved corrupt transaction), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1016, 103 S.Ct. 375, 74 L.Ed.2d 509 (1982). The evidence adduced at trial amply demonstrates that Robilotto's stated intention was to influence the Health and Welfare Fund's investment decisions when he accepted the loans from Moyses. Moyses testified that Robilotto told him in a telephone conversation that Health and Welfare Fund certificates of deposit would be transferred to the bank and that Herbert Bender, a Health and Welfare Fund official, would call to arrange the transfer. This testimony amply supports the jury verdict. 22 Second, the evidence adduced at trial clearly supports a finding that Robilotto did, in fact, influence the Health and Welfare Fund's investment decisions. Moyses testified that, shortly after his telephone conversation with Robilotto, Bender left a message for Moyses stating that a deposit of $300,000 would be wired to the Fulton Bank. That deposit was made in December 1981. On two later occasions, the Health and Welfare Fund made deposits of $100,000 after Robilotto and Spagnola were advised that further deposits were necessary to obtain additional personal loans. 23 Robilotto contends that, because Moyses referred in his testimony to Robilotto's promise to supply union funds in exchange for loans, the evidence failed to show that Robilotto promised Health and Welfare Fund deposits. However, it is obvious from even the most cursory review of the testimony that Moyses used the terms union funds and Health and Welfare Funds interchangeably. Moreover, Moyses testified at one point that Robilotto claimed to have arranged for deposits to be made from the Health and Welfare Fund. See Trial Transcript at 1324. There is a clear pattern of demands for loans, followed by promises of deposits, followed closely by deposits of Health and Welfare Fund assets. 24 Robilotto's claim that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury verdict under section 1954 involving the loans to Spagnola requires scant discussion. Contrary to Robilotto's contention, the evidence clearly shows that Robilotto was the central figure in the loan scheme--he initiated the entire scheme, knowingly enabled Spagnola to obtain loans contingent upon Health and Welfare Fund deposits, participated in discussions regarding the Spagnola loans, and received the proceeds from some of them. Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to convict Robilotto as a principal. In addition to Robilotto's receipt of the proceeds of some of the loans, his ability to control the disposition of loans to Spagnola can be considered a thing of value under section 1954. See United States v. Schwartz, 785 F.2d 673, 681 (9th Cir.) (Congress clearly intended the scope of thing of value to include intangibles), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 290, 93 L.Ed.2d 264 (1986); cf. United States v. Girard, 601 F.2d 69, 71 (2d Cir.) (phrase thing of value generally is construed to cover intangibles), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 871, 100 S.Ct. 148, 62 L.Ed.2d 96 (1979).
25 Robilotto contends that the predicate acts relating to the bank loans, charged in both the substantive RICO and RICO conspiracy counts, were insufficiently related to Local 294, the charged RICO enterprise. Therefore, according to Robilotto, because only one other predicate act--the Hobbs Act charge--properly could be alleged as part of a pattern of racketeering activity, his RICO convictions must be reversed. We reject Robilotto's contentions. 26 Under section 1962(c), it is unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1962(c). Conspiracies to violate section 1962(c) also are proscribed. Id. Sec. 1962(d). Unions expressly are included in the statutory definition of the term enterprise. Id. Sec. 1961(4) (1982). Although the statute itself does not specify the degree of interrelationship between the pattern of racketeering and conduct of the enterprise's affairs, United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47, 54 (2d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961, 101 S.Ct. 3109, 69 L.Ed.2d 971 (1981), we previously have identified two situations that would fall within the statutory proscription: first, when a defendant is enabled to commit the predicate offenses solely by virtue of his position in the enterprise or involvement in or control over the affairs of the enterprise, id. (emphasis added); or second, when the predicate offenses are related to the activities of that enterprise, id. See United States v. LeRoy, 687 F.2d 610, 617 (2d Cir.1982) (section 1962(c) does not require that predicate acts be in furtherance of the enterprise), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1174, 103 S.Ct. 823, 74 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1983); see also United States v. Provenzano, 688 F.2d 194, 200 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1071, 103 S.Ct. 492, 74 L.Ed.2d 634 (1982); cf. United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1332-33 (5th Cir.1983) (adding requirement that predicate acts had some effect on the enterprise), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005, 104 S.Ct. 996, 79 L.Ed.2d 229 (1984). 27 Robilotto argues that the government failed to demonstrate a nexus between the bank loans procured as a result of promises of Health and Welfare Fund deposits and the affairs of Local 294. However, there was abundant evidence that the Fulton County National Bank extended the loans to Robilotto and Spagnola solely because Robilotto claimed, as a result of his position as a business agent for Local 294, to have the ability to secure large deposits from the Health and Welfare Fund. As discussed above, the evidence strongly supports the conclusion that Robilotto, in fact, used his influence to secure the Health and Welfare Fund deposits. Clearly, therefore, the charges relating to the bank loans properly were included as predicate acts, and Robilotto's substantive RICO and RICO conspiracy convictions were appropriate.