Opinion ID: 1807546
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: whether department retained jurisdiction of the issue of permanent total disability.

Text: SDCL 1-26-37 states: An aggrieved party or the agency may obtain a review of any final judgment of the circuit court under this chapter by appeal to the Supreme Court. The appeal shall be taken as in other civil cases. The Supreme Court shall give the same deference to the findings of fact, conclusions of law and final judgment of the circuit court as it does to other appeals from the circuit court. Such appeal may not be considered de novo. In appeals from decisions of administrative agencies, this court makes the same review of the agency's decision as did the circuit court. Hanson v. Penrod Constr. Co., 425 N.W.2d 396, 397 (S.D.1988); Lee v. Dept. of Health, 411 N.W.2d 108 (S.D. 1987). Whitney contends that Department has continuing jurisdiction to determine the issue of an award of permanent total disability between the parties because that issue was not addressed in the stipulation and order. This requires us to address a question of law and makes the decision of the circuit court fully reviewable. Hanson, supra . In 1985, the stipulation entered into between the parties agreed to, and AGSCO's carrier paid, a lump-sum amount of $11,138.40, which equals a fifteen percent impairment of the whole body as determined by Dr. Berkebile. (As was noted earlier, this was later modified by Dr. Berkebile to twenty percent, which was then paid by the carrier.) The document, prepared by Whitney's counsel, was styled a Stipulation and Order and contains a Department Order merely reciting that it approved the foregoing agreement. At the time the stipulation was entered into, Whitney was working for Pacer Corporation on a part-time basis and the physical limitations of his back were known to everyone. A few months thereafter, Pacer refused to hire him on a full-time basis because he was diagnosed as having silicosis, rather than because of his back problems. It was not until after Pacer refused to hire him that he began to look elsewhere for employment. He claims that, because he was unable to find employment, he is entitled to payment for permanent total disability from AGSCO under the odd-lot doctrine. See Barkdull v. Homestake Mining Co., 317 N.W.2d 417 (S.D.1982). By virtue of SDCL 62-7-33, Department has continuing jurisdiction to adjust any payment from the original injury based upon a change of condition occurring since the last award. Call v. Ben. & Protec. Order of Elks, 307 N.W.2d 138 (S.D.1981); Middleton v. City of Watertown, 70 S.D. 158, 16 N.W.2d 39 (1944). Where the claimant fails to show a change in condition, a final compensation award becomes res judicata with regard to the condition of the injured employee at the time the award is entered. Call, supra ; Stowsand v. Jack Rabbit Lines, 75 S.D. 11, 58 N.W.2d 298 (1953). However, we have recognized that administrative agencies have the power to reserve jurisdiction. Call, supra . We apply the following analysis in these situations. [] If, either by the form of the [department's] order or by express statutory provision, continuing jurisdiction has been reserved over an award, it does not achieve finality and is therefore not subject to the limitations on reopening applicable to final awards, such as the requirement of showing a change of condition. 307 N.W.2d at 139 (citing 3 Larson Workmen's Compensation Law § 81.53 (1976)). The stipulation and order contains no provision in form or otherwise, addressing retention of jurisdiction over issues not addressed and more specifically over the issue of permanent total disability. However, the agreement does provide in salient part: If Employee's percent disability increases as a result of such working injury in the future, Employer shall be responsible to pay Employee such additional compensation as is medically determined to be applicable and in compliance with the statutes in affect at the time of the initial injury. If additional medical treatment is required in the future as a result of such injury, Employer shall be obligated to pay such future medical expenses[.] (Emphasis added.) We generally agree with the rationale of the circuit court with regard to the interpretation of the Stipulation and Order that Whitney and Department failed to properly reserve Department's jurisdiction with respect to any further claim for permanent total disability other than that related to the April, 1984, injury. However, as the trial court stated: The language in the Stipulation and approval did not lack finality. On the contrary, the Stipulation clearly permitted increased benefits only if Whitney's percent disability increased or if he required further medical treatment as a result of his working injury. The award did not contain language which left open a pending issue. An agreed stipulation entered into between employer and employee, which is filed and approved by Department, may have the effect of a final determination. Salmon v. Denhart Elev., 72 S.D. 110, 30 N.W.2d 644 (1948). We conclude that Department's failure to reserve jurisdiction, especially when considering the specific provisions of the stipulation, renders those issues res judicata absent a showing of change of condition. Call, supra ; Stowsand, supra .