Opinion ID: 3010668
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: The fundamental principles of long arm jurisdiction are extremely familiar and, since they have been repeated countless times in the jurisprudence, little will be served by 7 rescribing them at any length here. In brief, to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, a federal court sitting in diversity must undertake a two-step inquiry. First, the court must apply the relevant state long-arm statute to see if it permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction; then, the court must apply the precepts of the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. In New Jersey, this inquiry is collapsed into a single step because the New Jersey long-arm statute permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction to the fullest limits of due process. See DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 284 (3d Cir. 1981). This being the case, the New Jersey Supreme Court has made it clear that New Jersey courts look to federal law for the interpretation of the limits on in personam jurisdiction. Mesalic v. Fiberfloat Corp., 897 F.2d 696, 698 n.5 (3d Cir. 1990). Personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause depends upon the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977). Physical presence within the forum is not required to establish personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985). Instead, the plaintiff must show that the defendant has purposefully directed its activities toward the residents of the forum state, see id. at 472, or otherwise purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). Where, as here, the plaintiff 's cause of action is related to or arises out of the defendant's contacts with the forum, the court is said to exercise specific jurisdiction. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall , 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984).2 In order for specific jurisdiction to be _________________________________________________________________ 2. If the plaintiff 's claim does not arise out of the defendant's contacts with the forum, the court is said to exercise general jurisdiction. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 & n.9. To establish general jurisdiction over a defendant, the contacts must be shown to becontinuous and systematic. See id. at 416. Imo does not contend that the New Jersey courts could exercise general jurisdiction over Kiekert. 8 properly exercised under the Due Process Clause, the plaintiff must satisfy a two-part test. First, the plaintiff must show that the defendant has constitutionally sufficient minimum contacts with the forum. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985). Second, for jurisdiction to be exercised the court must determine, in its discretion, that to do so would comport with`traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'  See Vetrotex, 75 F.3d at 150-51 (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)). Although this case raises some interesting issues regarding the application of the fair play and substantial justice standard, we need not reach them since, as we discuss below, Imo has not met its burden of demonstrating Kiekert's minimum contacts with the forum. We note initially that specific jurisdiction will not lie here on the basis of Kiekert's alleged contacts with the forum alone, for (as we detail in the margin) they are far too small to comport with the requirements of due process. 3 Since (Text continued on page 11) _________________________________________________________________ 3. In brief, Imo argues that specific jurisdiction can be premised on the following contacts: (1) the June 17 letter from Kiekert to First Boston; (2) the July 8 letter from Kiekert to Roltra; (3) the two phone calls from Imo's general counsel in New Jersey to Kiekert; and (4) the August and September face-to-face meetings in Toronto and Germany. Although neither of Kiekert's letters were sent to New Jersey, Imo asserts that Kiekert certainly knew that its correspondence would both be transmitted to Imo in New Jersey and cause injury to Imo there. Appellant's Br. at 19. Similarly, Imo contends that Kiekert knew that the face-to-face meetings, though occurring outside the United States, would result in injury to Imo in New Jersey. We believe that these contacts, considered as a whole, are insufficient to demonstrate, even at a minimal level, that Kiekert has purposefully directed its activities toward the forum or has purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting its activities within the forum. The weight of authority among the courts of appeal is that minimal communication between the defendant and the plaintiff in the forum state, without more, will not subject the defendant to the jurisdiction of that state's court system. For instance, this court in Carteret Savings Bank, 954 F.2d at 149, noted that some minimal correspondence alone will not satisfy minimum contacts. This conclusion has been reached by a number of the other circuits, and we respect the weight of this authority. See, e.g., 9 Stover v. O'Connell Associates, Inc., 84 F.3d 132, 137 (4th Cir.), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 117 S. Ct. 437 (1996) (Ordering a product or service by telephone from a company in a different state does not subject the customer to that state's jurisdiction.); Far West Capital, Inc. v. Towne, 46 F.3d 1071, 1077 (10th Cir. 1995) (It is well-established that phone calls and letters are not necessarily sufficient in themselves to establish minimum contacts.); Reynolds v. Int'l Amateur Athletic Fed., 23 F.3d 1110, 1119 (6th Cir. 1994) (The use of interstate facilities such as the telephone and mail is a secondary or ancillary factor and cannot alone provide the minimum contacts required by due process.) (quoting Scullin Steel Co. v. National Railway Utilization Corp., 676 F.2d 309, 314 (8th Cir. 1982) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Cote v. Wadel, 796 F.2d 981, 984 (7th Cir. 1986) (finding insufficient a handful of letters and phone calls exchanged between plaintiff and defendant). In the present case, not only are the communications limited in quantity, but there is not even one direct act ofentry into New Jersey by Kiekert -- the letters were sent to Italy and New York, the phone calls were placed by Imo itself, and the meetings were held in Canada and Germany. While in some cases there might be merit to the argument that correspondence sent to a third-party outside the forum which foreseeably would wind up within the forum could weigh in favor of a finding of specific jurisdiction being properly exercised, in the present case we are not persuaded that the Kiekert letters provide such weight. The same must be said for the two phone calls, which strike us as purely unilateral conduct by Imo. See Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253 ([T]he unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State.). There is also an aspect of foreseeability that we believe is missing in this case. The Supreme Court has concluded thatforeseeability alone has never been a sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause . . . . [T]he foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is . . . . that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295-97 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted). We do not believe that it was reasonably foreseeable to Kiekert that its connection with New Jersey was such that that it should reasonably have anticipated being haled into court there. From Kiekert's perspective, it entered into a License Agreement with an Italian company in Germany, which was to be governed by German law. Imo took no part at all in these contract negotiations. It was perfectly reasonable, 10 this is an intentional tort case, we must consider whether the application of Calder v. Jones, supra, can change the outcome. Generally speaking, under Calder an intentional tort directed at the plaintiff and having sufficient impact upon it in the forum may suffice to enhance otherwise insufficient contacts with the forum such that the minimum contacts prong of the Due Process test is satisfied. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 780 (1984). We therefore concentrate our minimum contacts discussion below on the Calder test.