Opinion ID: 1636806
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 23

Heading: Dr. Martell as Expert Witness

Text: During the penalty phase of the Appellant's trial, the State called Dr. Daniel Martell as a rebuttal witness and sought to qualify Dr. Martell as an expert in forensic neuropsychology. [9] During voir dire of Dr. Martell, the State elicited testimony that Dr. Martell obtained both his master's degree and his Ph.D. at the University of Virginia and completed a forensic internship at Bellevue Hospital in New York City. After his internship, he was awarded a postdoctoral fellowship to do advanced study and research in forensic neuropsychology. From this fellowship, Dr. Martell founded the Forensic Neuropsychology Laboratory at Kirby Forensic Hospital in New York City, where he remained as director for the next eight years. Dr. Martell then joined the clinical faculty at the Neuropsychiatric Institute at UCLA and also engaged in private consultation practice. Throughout his career, Dr. Martell has authored numerous papers outlining the relationship between neuropsychology and criminal law and has limited his professional practice to forensic neuropsychology. Dr. Martell testified that board certification was currently unavailable in the field of forensic neuropsychology and there is no professional association for forensic neuropsychologists. Dr. Martell admitted that, although there is Board Certification and Recognition in the field of neuropsychology, he has never applied for board certification in the field of neuropsychology. On this basis, the Appellant, while conceding Dr. Martell's qualifications as an expert witness in the field of psychology, objected to his qualification as an expert in the field of forensic neuropsychology. The trial court overruled the objection, accepting Dr. Martell's qualifications as an expert in the field of forensic neuropsychology. The Appellant now challenges this ruling, alleging that an expert is competent to testify `only as to matters within the limited scope of his or her expertise and licensure.' Appellant's Brief at 260 (citing Bolton v. CNA Ins. Co., 821 S.W.2d 932, 935 (Tenn.1991)). He contends that the State never sufficiently established that Dr. Martell was an expert in the field of `forensic neuropsychology.' Appellant's Brief at 261. The determination of the qualifications of an expert witness and the relevancy and competency of expert testimony are matters generally entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Anderson, 880 S.W.2d 720, 728 (Tenn.Crim.App.), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn.1994); see also Tenn. R. Evid. 104(a). This court will not overturn the trial court's decision absent a clear abuse of discretion. Anderson, 880 S.W.2d at 728 (citing State v. Williams, 657 S.W.2d 405, 411 (Tenn.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1073, 104 S.Ct. 1429, 79 L.Ed.2d 753 (1984)). Rule 702 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence provides that in order to testify as an expert and thus be permitted to give conclusions and opinions on a matter involving scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge, a witness must possess sufficient `knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.' Neil P. Cohen et al, Tennessee Law of Evidence § 7.02[4] at 7-21 (emphasis added). The witness may acquire the necessary expertise through formal education or life experiences. Id. However, the witness must have such superior skill, experience, training, education, or knowledge within the particular area that his or her degree of expertise is beyond the scope of common knowledge and experience of the average person. Id. (citations omitted). The record in the present case clearly establishes that forensic neuropsychology is a recognized sub-specialty of psychology regardless of the availability of board certification in this area. It is equally clear that Dr. Martell is more than qualified to testify in this area of practice. Moreover, the issue of whether the courts of this state recognize experts in the area of forensic neuropsychology is not an issue of first impression. The courts of this state have previously permitted experts to testify in this area. See, e.g., Coe v. State, 17 S.W.3d 193, 205 (Tenn.), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1034, 120 S.Ct. 1460, 146 L.Ed.2d 344 (2000) (defense presented Dr. Walker as expert witness in field of forensic neuropsychology); Victor James Cazes v. State, No. 02C01-9801-CR-00002 (Tenn.Crim.App. at Jackson, Dec. 8, 1999) (Dr. Martell testified as expert in field of forensic neuropsychology). Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in qualifying Dr. Martell as an expert in forensic neuropsychology. [10] B. Cross-Examination of Dr. Martell Prior to Dr. Martell's testimony, the Appellant requested that he be permitted to question Dr. Martell regarding a letter written by Dr. Martell in 1997 to the United States Department of Justice. Relying upon Rule 405 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence as grounds for the letter's admission, he argues that the letter was relevant to the witness' credibility and bias. The eight-page letter was Dr. Martell's request for a Department of Justice investigation into an incident that had led to rumors of unprofessional and possibly illegal conduct by Dr. Martell in a federal death penalty case. [11] In his letter, Dr. Martell repeatedly asserted his innocence of any wrongdoing and sought an investigation so that he could receive a letter of exoneration from the Department of Justice. Specifically, he emphasized that these allegations had damaged his professional reputation and threatened his financial status. The allegations concerned an affidavit Dr. Martell had signed in a federal case. This affidavit was discussed by the attorneys and the judge in chambers. [12] Dr. Martell was denied the opportunity to hear the allegations or to defend himself if needed. In denying admission of Dr. Martell's letter, the trial court found, in relevant part: It says I must determine that the questions are proposed in good faith rather than an effort to place before the jury unfairly prejudicial information supported only by unreliable rumors. I'm going to determine that there is no reasonable factual basis for that inquiry. The Appellant challenges the trial court's ruling, asserting that this information was admissible to show Dr. Martell's credibility and goes to the prospect of bias. Like other evidentiary rulings, an appellate court reviews a trial court's ruling under Tenn. R. Evid. 608(b) using an abuse of discretion standard. See Ingram v. Earthman, 993 S.W.2d 611, 639 (Tenn.App.1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 986, 120 S.Ct. 445, 145 L.Ed.2d 362 (1999); State v. Blanton, 926 S.W.2d 953, 959-60 (Tenn.Crim.App.1996). Character evidence may be used in limited circumstances to impeach a witness. See Tenn. R. Evid. 404(a)(3) (evidence of character of witness admissible as provided in Rules 607, 608 and 609). However, extrinsic evidence of conduct other than criminal conviction may not be used to attack the character of a witness. See Tenn. R. Evid. 608(b). Accordingly, Dr. Martell's letter was properly excluded as extrinsic evidence of Dr. Martell's character. Moreover, certain conditions must be satisfied before allowing inquiry on cross-examination of the witness about specific instances of conduct probative solely of truthfulness or untruthfulness. See Tenn. R. Evid. 608(b). First, upon request, the court must hold a hearing outside the jury's presence and must determine that the alleged conduct has probative value and that a reasonable factual basis exists for the inquiry. See Tenn. R. Evid. 608(b)(1). If these requirements are met, the court must then determine that the conduct, within limited exceptions, must have occurred no more than ten years before commencement of the action or prosecution. See Tenn. R. Evid. 608(b)(2). In the present case, the court determined that no reasonable factual basis existed for the Appellant's inquiry. We agree. The Appellant offered no evidence of conduct by Dr. Martell evidencing untruthfulness. Rather, the only proof offered was a letter written by Dr. Martell requesting exoneration because of false rumors. The letter itself is not proof of Dr. Martell's untruthfulness. Where there is no factual basis for an inquiry into prior conduct of a witness, the court shall bar any such attempt to interrogate a witness based on mere speculation or rumor. See State v. Philpott, 882 S.W.2d 394, 404 (Tenn.Crim.App.1994)(An attempt to communicate by innuendo through questions which are answered in the negative is impermissible when the questioner has no evidence to support the question.); see also State v. Bowling, 649 S.W.2d 281, 283 (Tenn.Crim.App.1983); Neil P. Cohen et al., Tennessee Law of Evidence § 6.08[7][d]. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in preventing inquiry into Dr. Martell's letter to the Department of Justice. Finally, we fail to see how the letter written by Dr. Martell establishes that Dr. Martell is biased in favor of the State or prejudiced against the Appellant. See Tenn. R. Evid. 616. This issue is without merit.