Opinion ID: 4582231
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: analysis

Text: [1-4] Parents have a fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children 1 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106(3) (Cum. Supp. 2018). 2 See Neb. Ct. R. App. P. § 2-111(B)(1) (rev. 2017). 3 Eric H. v. Ashley H., 302 Neb. 786, 925 N.W.2d 81 (2019). - 10 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 307 Nebraska Reports STATE ON BEHALF OF TINA K. v. ADAM B. Cite as 307 Neb. 1 that is constitutionally protected. 4 Establishment and continuance of the parent-child relationship is the most fundamental right a child possesses to be equated in importance with personal liberty and the most basic constitutional rights. 5 In recognition of this important relationship, the parental preference principle establishes a rebuttable presumption that the best interests of the child are served by placing custody of a minor child with his or her parent. 6 Under the parental preference principle, absent proof that a parent is unfit or has forfeited the right to custody, a parent may not be deprived of the custody of a minor child. 7 [5] While the best interests of the child remain the lodestar of child custody disputes, a parent’s superior right to custody must be given its due regard, and absent its negation, a parent retains the right to custody over his or her child. 8 In Windham v. Griffin, 9 we touched on the relationship between the parental preference principle and the best interests standard. We stated, “While preference must be given to a biological or adoptive parent’s superior right to custody where the parent is not unfit and has not forfeited his or her parental rights, a court also considers the child’s best interests in making its custody determination.” 10 Significantly, we characterized cases where best interests of the child defeated parental preference as being “exceptional.” 11 [6,7] Turning to the instant case, we begin with consideration of Tina’s fitness as a parent. The district court found 4 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 147 L. Ed. 2d 49 (2000). 5 Uhing v. Uhing, 241 Neb. 368, 488 N.W.2d 366 (1992). 6 In re Guardianship of K.R., 304 Neb. 1, 932 N.W.2d 737 (2019). 7 Id. 8 In re Guardianship of D.J., 268 Neb. 239, 682 N.W.2d 238 (2004). 9 Windham v. Griffin, 295 Neb. 279, 887 N.W.2d 710 (2016). 10 Id. at 290, 887 N.W.2d at 718. 11 Id. - 11 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 307 Nebraska Reports STATE ON BEHALF OF TINA K. v. ADAM B. Cite as 307 Neb. 1 that she was a fit parent, and Jo does not challenge that finding. Parental unfitness means a personal deficiency or incapacity that has prevented, or will probably prevent, performance of a reasonable parental obligation in child rearing and that has caused, or probably will result in, detriment to a child’s wellbeing. 12 Evidence of parental unfitness should be focused upon a parent’s ability to care for a child, and not any other moral failings a parent may have. 13 Evidence of a parent’s past failings is pertinent only insofar as it suggests present or future faults. 14 The evidence showed that at the time of trial, Tina had a residence and employment, was not using or selling drugs, and was actively involved in Destiny’s life. Upon our de novo review, we agree with the court that Tina “is now a fit person to care for Destiny.” [8-10] Next, we consider forfeiture. The district court did not explicitly make a finding as to whether Tina forfeited her superior right to custody, but implicit in its decision is that she did not. Parental rights may be forfeited by substantial, continuous, and repeated neglect of a child and a failure to discharge the duties of parental care and protection. 15 Clear and convincing evidence of such neglect must be shown in order to overcome the parent’s superior right. 16 And we have stated that allowing a third party to take custody, even for a significant period of time, is not the equivalent to forfeiting parental preference. 17 Under our jurisprudence, we agree that the evidence does not establish forfeiture by Tina of her parental preference. 12 In re Guardianship of K.R., supra note 6. 13 See In re Interest of Lakota Z. & Jacob H., 282 Neb. 584, 804 N.W.2d 174 (2011). 14 Id. 15 Windham v. Griffin, supra note 9. 16 See Farnsworth v. Farnsworth, 276 Neb. 653, 756 N.W.2d 522 (2008). 17 See Windham v. Griffin, supra note 9. - 12 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 307 Nebraska Reports STATE ON BEHALF OF TINA K. v. ADAM B. Cite as 307 Neb. 1 [11-13] It is important to differentiate Jo’s status from Tina’s status as a biological parent. It is undisputed that Jo stood in loco parentis to Destiny. In loco parentis is a common-law doctrine that gives standing to a nonparent to exercise the rights of a natural parent when the evidence shows that the nonparent’s exercise of such rights is in the child’s best interests. 18 In order to stand in loco parentis, one must assume all obligations incident to the parental relationship. 19 But in loco parentis status is not equivalent to status as a parent. 20 Such status does not entitle a person to all the same rights that a legal parent would enjoy. 21 In loco parentis status does not, by itself, eclipse the superior nature of the parental preference accorded to biological or adoptive parentage. 22 We recently noted that Windham rejected an invitation to view the parent and nonparent as being on equal footing and to determine custody by reference to best interests alone. 23 Thus, Tina retains a superior right to custody of her child as compared to Jo. Here, the district court found that the parental preference was negated by evidence that it was in Destiny’s best interests to remain with Jo. In so finding, that court emphasized our language in Windham that the parental preference could be “negated by a demonstration that the best interests of the child lie elsewhere.” 24 But in Windham, we did not articulate a standard for when the best interests of a child lie elsewhere. Instead, we stated that “[a]lthough we are aware of instances where courts have determined that the best interests of the 18 Jennifer T. v. Lindsay P., 298 Neb. 800, 906 N.W.2d 49 (2018). 19 Id. 20 Whilde v. Whilde, 298 Neb. 473, 904 N.W.2d 695 (2017). 21 See id. 22 Jennifer T. v. Lindsay P., supra note 18. 23 See In re Guardianship of K.R., supra note 6. 24 Windham v. Griffin, supra note 9, 295 Neb. at 288, 887 N.W.2d at 717. - 13 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 307 Nebraska Reports STATE ON BEHALF OF TINA K. v. ADAM B. Cite as 307 Neb. 1 child defeated the lawful parent’s preference, we view these cases as exceptional.” 25 [14] Although Windham did not articulate a standard for the exceptional case, we cited a New Jersey case 26 therein that did so. In Watkins v. Nelson, 27 the New Jersey Supreme Court declared that the exceptional circumstances standard “always requires proof of serious physical or psychological harm or a substantial likelihood of such harm.” The Watkins court explained that the standard was “designed to reduce or minimize judicial opportunity to engage in social engineering in custody cases involving third parties.” 28 We agree with this articulation. We now refine our articulation in Windham to clarify that in order for exceptional circumstances to negate the parental preference principle, there must be proof of serious physical or psychological harm to the child or a substantial likelihood of such harm. The district court relied on language in Windham, but it did not have the benefit of this refined standard. Thus, it is unsurprising that the court’s order did not speak in terms of serious physical or psychological harm or a substantial likelihood of such harm. The court stated that it agreed with Hansen’s conclusions that “it would be detrimental to move Destiny from Gretna and [Jo]” and that “it would be a serious undoing and one that Destiny might not be able to handle.” But we cannot determine whether the court abused its discretion when it applied an incomplete and unrefined standard. 29 Accordingly, we reverse, and remand for reconsideration under the elucidated standard for exceptional circumstances. 25 Id. at 290, 887 N.W.2d at 718. 26 Watkins v. Nelson, 163 N.J. 235, 748 A.2d 558 (2000). 27 Id. at 248, 748 A.2d at 565. 28 Id. at 252, 748 A.2d at 567. 29 See, Eric H. v. Ashley H., supra note 3; State v. McGuire, 301 Neb. 895, 921 N.W.2d 77 (2018). - 14 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 307 Nebraska Reports STATE ON BEHALF OF TINA K. v. ADAM B. Cite as 307 Neb. 1 We leave to the district court’s discretion whether to allow for the expansion of the existing record.