Opinion ID: 2545530
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Should Densley have received credit for his Guard service?

Text: ¶ 22 Densley requests one month of retirement service credit for each of his summer camps and one-quarter month of credit for each of his weekend drills. In light of our holding above, we need not decide whether service in the Guard is active federal service. Since there is no question in this case that Guard training and drills are service in the armed forces, both fall within the reach of RCW 41.40.170(3). That is the end of our inquiry as to the summer training camps; Densley is entitled to one month of service credit for each of the three summer camps. ¶ 23 However, Densley faces another hurdle before he can receive credit for his weekend drills with the Guard or for the one-day physical examination. In 1972, retirement service credit was earned only when ten days or more were worked in any given calendar month. Former RCW 41.40.010(9) (1969). [2] The weekend drills in which Densley participated amount to only two days of service each month. Because of that, Densley would not have been entitled to service credit in 1972 for any of his weekend drills. ¶ 24 In 1991, the legislature amended RCW 41.40.010(9)(a), (b) to provide one-quarter service credit month of service for less than seventy hours [of work] in any calendar month. LAWS of 1991, ch. 343, § 6(9)(a), (b). A full service credit month was still provided for full time work for seventy hours or more in any given calendar month. RCW 41.40.010(9)(a). These provisions are retained in the present version of RCW 41.40.010(9). Under the new version, Densley would have earned one-quarter service credit month for each of his weekend drills [3] and for his one-day physical examination. Densley asks us to apply the 1991 amendment retroactively. ¶ 25 As a general proposition, courts disfavor retroactivity. State v. T.K, 139 Wash.2d 320, 329, 987 P.2d 63 (1999) (citing In re Estate of Burns, 131 Wash.2d 104, 110, 928 P.2d 1094 (1997)). A statute is presumed to operate prospectively unless the Legislature indicates that it is to operate retroactively. Id. (citing Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 264-66, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994); State v. McClendon, 131 Wash.2d 853, 861, 935 P.2d 1334 (1997); Burns, 131 Wash.2d at 110, 928 P.2d 1094; Adcox v. Children's Orthopedic Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 123 Wash.2d 15, 30, 864 P.2d 921 (1993); In re Dissolution of Cascade Fixture Co., 8 Wash.2d 263, 272, 111 P.2d 991 (1941)). This presumption can only be overcome if (1) the Legislature explicitly provides for retroactivity, Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 270, 278, 114 S.Ct. 1483; (2) the amendment is `curative,' In re F.D. Processing, Inc., 119 Wash.2d [452,] 461-62[, 832 P.2d 1303 (1992) ]; or (3) the statute is `remedial,' McClendon, 131 Wash.2d at 861, 935 P.2d 1334. T.K., 139 Wash.2d at 332, 987 P.2d 63. ¶ 26 Densley claims that the 1991 amendment is explicitly retroactive. He points out that RCW 41.40.010 and the 1991 amendment were reenacted in 1993. LAWS of 1993, ch. 95, § 8. The same act that reenacted them stated, This act applies on a retroactive basis to members for whom compensation and hours were reported under the circumstances described in sections 1 through 6 of this act. LAWS of 1993, ch. 95, § 9. A portion of section 2 covered service credit for interruptive military service. Laws of 1993, ch. 95, § 2(3), (4). Thus, the 1993 act appears to make the quarter-month-credit system apply retroactively to interruptive military service. However, it does not apply the 1991 amendment retroactively to non-interruptive military service, such as the service at issue here. ¶ 27 Densley argues, additionally, that the 1991 amendment should be considered a remedial statute. A remedial statute is one which relates to practice, procedures and remedies. . . . McClendon, 131 Wash.2d at 861, 935 P.2d 1334 (citing F.D. Processing, 119 Wash.2d at 463, 832 P.2d 1303; Miebach v. Colasurdo, 102 Wash.2d 170, 181, 685 P.2d 1074 (1984)). Such a statute will generally be applied retroactively, unless it affects a substantive or vested right. Id. However, Densley wants this amendment applied retroactively precisely because it provides him with a new substantive right: it would provide him with service credit to which he was not previously entitled. It would also provide him with credit that public employees working in the 1970s would not have received and cannot now receive, a disparity that the Court of Appeals has previously tried to avoid. See Strong v. Dep't of Ret. Sys., 61 Wash.App. 457, 461, 810 P.2d 974, review denied, 117 Wash.2d 1021, 818 P.2d 1098 (1991). The 1991 amendment gave part-time workers a substantive right to partial service credit. Consequently, we cannot conclude it was remedial legislation ¶ 28 Because the 1991 amendment was neither remedial nor explicitly retroactive, it would be inappropriate to apply it retroactively. Accordingly, we affirm DRS' denial of additional retirement service credit for Densley's weekend drills and the one-day physical examination.