Opinion ID: 1193565
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: variance between the offense charged in the indictment and the instructions to the jury

Text: The indictment used the language of shooting with the intent to kill and wound. Instructions to the jury followed the statutory language of shooting with intent to kill or wound. The defendant maintains that the wording of the indictment sets the state's burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt both intent to kill and intent to wound. The defendant further contends that he was misled by the indictment and tailored his defense anticipating the prosecution would attempt to prove both the intent to kill and wound Ms. Hoinoski. This court has addressed both the purposes of indictments and the effects of errors in form. In Thomas v. State, 522 P.2d 528, 530 (Alaska 1974), we stated: [A]n indictment should be read in the light of common sense and should not be vulnerable to attack for technical defects. The fundamental purposes of the indictment are to furnish the accused with a description of the charge against him to enable him to prepare his defense and to permit him to claim double jeopardy in the future should he again be charged with the same offense. (footnotes omitted) Criminal Rule 7(c) further provides, in part, that: No indictment is insufficient ... which does not tend to prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant. The defendant is analytically correct in his assertion that the plain meaning of the indictment, phrased in the conjunctive, on its face, appears to increase the burden of proof required by the language of the disjunctively-worded statute. The indictment's language appears to require that the state prove both an intent to kill and an intent to wound the victim. Where the indictment is phrased in the conjunctive, courts have, for the most part, treated such phrasing as though it were in the disjunctive, finding proof of any of the specifications sufficient for conviction. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has stated: The allegation of ... acts in the conjunctive is the proper way to allege several acts constituting a single offense committed in violation of a single statute. To charge the offense in the disjunctive (as it appears in the strict language of the statute), that the accused did one thing or the other, would make the indictment bad for uncertainty, so it is necessary to connect them with the conjunctive and before evidence can be admitted as to more than one act. Then a conviction follows if the testimony shows the accused to be guilty of any one of the acts charged. [39] This rationale is of questionable merit. If to charge in the disjunctive renders the indictment of the grand jury bad for uncertainty, the same problem would be presented by the verdict rendered by the petit jury. We do not believe that the issue may be resolved by such a generalization. There are instances when such a variance would be fatal; and others, when it would not affect any substantial rights of an accused. We must look first to the purpose of the indictment. As stated in Thomas v. State, supra , the purpose is to give the defendant notice of the charge against him so as to enable him to prepare his defense and to permit him to claim double jeopardy in the future should he again be charged with the same offense. Secondly, we must be assured that the conviction conforms to due process and that all twelve jurors actually agreed on facts justifying the conviction. There can be no question that Christie received adequate notice of the charge against him. There is no ambiguity as to the incident involved, and he is in a position to claim double jeopardy if again charged with the offense of shooting with intent to kill or wound arising out of this incident. Further, we find no violation of due process here. Assuming for the moment that six jurors believed him to have the intent of wounding Ms. Hoinoski; and six, the intent of killing. In either event, he would be guilty of the charge, and those finding the intent to kill would have necessarily found an intent to wound. One cannot kill by shooting without wounding. There is no reasonable possibility of a less than unanimous verdict as to the salient facts required for a finding of guilt. A similar situation was presented in People v. Pierce, 26 Ill. App.3d 550, 325 N.E.2d 758 (1975), aff'd, 62 Ill.2d 223, 341 N.E.2d 705 (Ill. 1976). The defendant's indictment recited that he lewdly fondled and touched the complainant (emphasis added). The statute, however, used the language fondling or touching (emphasis added). The court found no error because the words fondling and touching involved the same criminal act. Id. at 766. While there can be touching without fondling, there cannot be fondling without touching. The case is analogous to shooting with intent to kill or wound in that there can be an intent to wound without an intent to kill, but there cannot be an intent to kill by shooting without an intent to wound. In Pierce, as here, there was no possibility of a less than unanimous verdict. [40] Under the facts of this case, [41] we find no fatal variance between the indictment and the charge.