Opinion ID: 1959906
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Judgment of Acquittal on the Burglary Charge

Text: The defendant argued on appeal that the trial justice erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on the burglary charge. Specifically, defendant argued that the prosecution failed to present legally sufficient evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he entered Tess's dwelling place with the intent of sexually assaulting her. The defendant claimed that the best that could be inferred from the evidence presented is that he connived to be alone with Tess to seduce her, and any inference of a felonious intent was impermissibly speculative. We disagree with both arguments. In considering a motion for judgment of acquittal, a trial justice must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, without weighing the evidence or assessing the credibility of the witnesses, in fact giving full credibility to the state's witnesses, and draw therefrom all reasonable inferences consistent with guilt.    If the totality of the evidence so viewed and the inferences so drawn would justify a reasonable juror in finding a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the motion for judgment of acquittal must be denied.    In reviewing a trial justice's denial of such a motion, this Court applies the same standard as the tribunal below. State v. Snow, 670 A.2d 239, 243 (R.I. 1996). The defendant was indicted on the crime of burglary in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-8-1, which incorporates the common law definition of the crime. State v. O'Rourke, 121 R.I. 434, 436, 399 A.2d 1237, 1238 (1979). Burglary at common law is the breaking and entering the dwelling-house of another in the nighttime with the intent to commit a felony therein, whether the felony be actually committed or not. State v. Hudson, 53 R.I. 229, 230, 165 A. 649, 650 (1933). See also State v. Ranieri, 586 A.2d 1094, 1103 (R.I.1991); O'Rourke, 121 R.I. at 436, 399 A.2d at 1238. In applying this definition to the facts of this case, the evidence is clear that defendant had been with Tess during thenight and had witnessed her extremely intoxicated condition. Yet, he schemed to be alone with her. Virtually unconscious, Tess had been carried to bed by Eddie, who turned off the lights and closed the bedroom door. There is no evidence that defendant asked permission to enter Tess's room, or knocked on the door, or attempted to wake her. Rather, the record reflects that Tess in no way gave her consent to entry, but woke to find defendant having sexual intercourse with her. Eddie testified that the next day, defendant called Eddie and insisted that he was not at the house the previous night, and in a later conversation, defendant told Eddie that he was sorry for raping the victim. See State v. Lamoureux, 573 A.2d 1176, 1181 (R.I.1990) (It is reasonably obvious that intent may only be determined in the ordinary course of events by the subsequent actions of the accused.). Our review of the record persuades us that although reasonable minds could differ, a reasonable juror might infer from the evidence that defendant entered the bedroom late that night intending to take advantage of Tess's helpless state to engage in intercourse with her, regardless of her consent. The defendant countered that Tess was conscious outside the party that night because she not only conversed with [defendant] but subsequently recalled their conversation. [3] He further pointed out that Tess remembered going to the car wash at one point and even recalled what kind of car washthey used. He noted that Eddie testified that the victim got out of the car and went into [the] house [in which the party was held] to use the bathroom [4] and that Eddie admitted that he asked [the victim] if she wanted to go home and she said no, she was all right and wanted to stay. After careful review of the transcript describing these events, we are of the opinion that none of the evidence is inconsistent with Tess being extremely intoxicated while defendant was aware of that fact and was intent on sexually assaulting her when he entered the house and the bedroom. We are not persuaded that enough time had passed since she was sick to negate any inference that [defendant] would have believed she was feeling the full effects of the alcohol when he went into the house, as defendant contended, given that there is no evidence of how much time elapsed before he entered her bedroom. The defendant cited the cases of State v. Moran, 699 A.2d 20 (R.I.1997); State v. Williams, 461 A.2d 385 (R.I.1983), and State v. Woods, 821 P.2d 1235 (1991) to support his position that the evidence of intent here was too weak or equivocal to support a conviction. In Williams, we held that the trial justice erred in denying the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal on the charge of receiving stolen property  a ring  because there was no evidence to show that the defendant knew at the time he received it that the ring had been stolen. Williams, 461 A.2d at 388. The distinction between that case and the case at bar is that in Williams at most the evidence might have shown a strong suspicion that after defendant received the ring, he learned from a qualified appraiser that the ring in his possession was worth a considerable amount of money. Here, however, there is sufficient evidence that defendant already had the requisite mental state at the critical time of breaking and entering. Moreover, the evidence of the defendants' guilt in Moran and Woods was not as compelling as was the evidence in this case. Finally, defendant alleged that a finding of guilt would constitute an impermissible pyramiding of inferences, citing State v. Dame, 560 A.2d 330, 334 (R.I.1989); In re Derek, 448 A.2d 765, 768 (R.I.1982), and State v. Alexander, 471 A.2d 216, 218 (R.I.1984). In this case, however, there was no pyramid. Rather, felonious intent could be inferred from facts that were unambiguous and capable of providing proof of defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.