Opinion ID: 3159792
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mr. Plancarte’s Claims

Text: i. Claims One, Two, Four, and Five—Procedural Default According to Mr. Plancarte, the district court erred by finding he could not overcome his procedural default on claims one, two, four, and five. He does not contest that these claims are subject to procedural default, but he advances two arguments to excuse his default.3 First, Mr. Plancarte contends both his trial counsel and his counsel on direct appeal were constitutionally ineffective. Specifically, he claims his trial counsel “negligently acceded to” the prosecutor’s and trial judge’s “collusive pursuit to direct a verdict for the State,” Aplt. Br. at 7, and failed to present an adequate alibi defense at trial. He also argues the district court “invalidly divested” him of his “‘counsel of choice’ in breach of the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 11. And his appellate counsel, he argues, failed to raise some of his most compelling grounds for reversal, such as prosecutorial misconduct. Even assuming Mr. Plancarte’s trial counsel was ineffective, her ineffectiveness does not bear on whether Mr. Plancarte can show “cause” and “prejudice” for failing to exhaust his claims on direct appeal or in state post-conviction proceedings. Counsel’s 3 Mr. Plancarte’s only attempt to argue against default is a summary assertion that the “district court simply erred in finding that Claim Two (prosecutorial misconduct) was procedurally barred.” Aplt. Br. at 19. He offers no law or facts to support this position. - 15 - actions at trial are independent from, and are logically unconnected to, whether Mr. Plancarte adequately pursued remedies available to him only once trial had concluded. Her conduct is therefore not a cause that can excuse Mr. Plancarte’s procedural default. In some cases, ineffectiveness of appellate counsel can establish cause for a procedural default. Edwards, 529 U.S. at 451. But as the district court observed in its March 10, 2015 order, “the claim that appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective must itself be exhausted in the state courts.” ROA at 459 (citing Edwards, 529 U.S. at 453). Mr. Plancarte does not suggest the district court was mistaken when it found he failed to exhaust a claim of appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness in his state post-conviction motions. Appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness therefore cannot excuse Mr. Plancarte’s procedural default. Second, Mr. Plancarte may be arguing his default should be excused because denying his habeas application would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Under McQuiggin and Schlup, an applicant seeking to invoke this exception to procedural default based on claims of actual innocence must present new evidence making it more likely than not that no reasonable juror would convict him. The district court found Mr. Plancarte had presented no new evidence, other than “conclusory assertion[s]” of innocence. ROA at 460. On appeal, Mr. Plancarte points to nothing in the record to suggest the district court’s conclusion was in error. Mr. Plancarte therefore cannot pass through the McQuiggin/Schlup innocence “gateway” to escape his procedural default. See Cummings, 506 F.3d at 1224 (holding petitioner could not overcome - 16 - procedural bar because he “failed to come forward with any such [new] evidence, and thus cannot establish his claim of actual innocence”). Mr. Plancarte has not shown that reasonable jurists could debate the district court’s determination that claims one, two, four, and five were procedurally defaulted. We deny a COA on these claims. ii. Claims Three, Six, and Seven—Merits Mr. Plancarte appears to contend he was entitled to relief on the merits of claims two (prosecutorial misconduct), three (ineffectiveness of trial counsel), four (the trial court’s alibi instruction), and seven (the photo array). For the reasons explained directly above, the district court did not need to reach the merits of claims two and four, which Mr. Plancarte procedurally defaulted. We therefore consider only the district court’s merits resolution of claims three and seven. 1) Claim Three: Ineffectiveness of Trial Counsel The district court sorted Mr. Plancarte’s numerous claims of attorney error into three categories. According to the district court, Mr. Plancarte assert[ed] that counsel failed to: (a) conduct an adequate investigation of an alibi defense and to secure videotapes of business premises that would have corroborated the defense; (b) tender a theory of the case instruction, but instead accept[ed] the instruction proffered by the prosecution; and (c) move for a judgment of acquittal on the basis of alibi. [Mr. Plancarte] further maintain[ed] that defense counsel labored under an actual conflict of interest that prevented counsel from adequately representing him at trial. ROA at 671 (citations omitted). The district court laid out the Strickland standard and reviewed the state courts’ application of that standard to Mr. Plancarte’s various claims. - 17 - It also discussed Cronic and determined the state courts had not erred by failing to analyze Mr. Plancarte’s claims under the rubric articulated in that case. On appeal, Mr. Plancarte asserts he suffered an “actual denial of counsel under Cronic’s ‘presumptive prejudice’ criterion” because after a “fifteen-month period where the State flagrantly denied a vested right to counsel outright, the Court conceded, then handpicked alternate defense counsel,” who failed, among other things, to present a robust alibi defense. Aplt. Br. at 11. Mr. Plancarte has offered no factual background to assist us in understanding this claim. He has pointed to nothing in the record to suggest the trial court’s replacement of his initial counsel with an alternate rose to the level of a Cronic violation. The district court concluded the state court’s failure to apply Cronic was not contrary to and did not involve an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Mr. Plancarte has not shown reasonable jurists could debate the correctness of this conclusion. To the extent Mr. Plancarte also challenges the district court’s determination that the state courts reasonably applied Strickland, he has failed to develop that argument with sufficient argument or legal authority. See Murrell v. Shalala, 43 F.3d 1388, 1389 n.2 (10th Cir. 1994) (“[A] few scattered statements . . . [and] perfunctory complaints fail to frame and develop an issue sufficient to invoke appellate review.”). He does not identify the errors in the district court’s conclusion that trial counsel’s performance was neither deficient nor prejudicial. Nor does he address in any way the deference federal habeas courts owe to state court adjudications of federal constitutional claims. Notwithstanding his pro se status, Mr. Plancarte has therefore failed to carry his burden of showing - 18 - reasonable jurists could debate whether the district court erred. See Pinson, 584 F.3d at 975. In any event, our review of the record reveals no substantial denial of Mr. Plancarte’s constitutional rights. Reasonable jurists could not debate the district court’s resolution of claim three, and we therefore deny a COA on this issue. 2) Claim Six: State Court Evidentiary Hearing Mr. Plancarte appears to argue the district court erred by dismissing claim six, which challenged the state post-conviction court’s failure to hold an evidentiary hearing. As the district court explained, a claim that state courts misapplied state law relating to post-conviction procedures does not present a federal question that is cognizable under § 2254. See Sellers v. Ward, 135 F.3d 1333, 1339 (10th Cir. 1998) (“Assuming the contention is correct and the Oklahoma court mistakenly construed the [post-conviction] statute, the error is one of state law not cognizable in habeas corpus because federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.” (quotations omitted)). Mr. Plancarte has not demonstrated that reasonable jurists could debate whether he made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. To the extent Mr. Plancarte also argues the district court erred by denying his request for a federal evidentiary hearing, he fares no better. Under § 2254(e)(2): If [an] applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings, the [federal district] court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the applicant shows that (A) the claim relies on— (i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or - 19 - (ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and (B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense. Mr. Plancarte does not identify any newly retroactive rule of constitutional law that would entitle him to an evidentiary hearing, nor does he maintain any of the factual allegations in his habeas application could not previously have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. Accordingly, reasonable jurists could not debate the district court’s determination that there has been no showing, much less a “substantial” showing, of the denial of a constitutional right. We therefore deny a COA on claim six. 3) Claim Seven: The Suggestiveness of the Photo Array The district court recited the due process standard for assessing photo arrays, exhaustively reviewed the state courts’ consideration of Mr. Plancarte’s claim, ROA at 681-85, and determined “the state appellate court reasonably determined that the pre-trial identification procedure was not impermissibly suggestive so as to give rise to a substantial likelihood of misidentification,” id. at 685 (quotation omitted). Mr. Plancarte does not directly challenge that conclusion. Instead, he asserts the victims’ identifications of him were “specious” and “attained via contrived methods.” Aplt. Br. at 5. Specifically, he seems to suggest a local newspaper reporter conspired with the Denver police and the district attorney to pressure the victims into falsely identifying Mr. Plancarte. He further claims B.T. and M.S. picked Mr. Plancarte out of the array only - 20 - after “being prodded by the detective and/or coached via family members off-camera.” Aplt. Br. at 25. Mr. Plancarte offers no evidence to substantiate these allegations. He therefore fails to demonstrate that reasonable jurists could debate whether the district court correctly concluded the state courts’ decisions were not contrary to and did not involve an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law under 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1). We therefore deny a COA on claim seven.