Opinion ID: 793659
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Evidence of Other Reinforcing Emails

Text: 140 Quattrone also questions the exclusion of what he terms evidence of similar reinforcing emails to establish that Quattrone had a practice of responding to (or forwarding on) emails from subordinates in an attempt to achieve compliance with CSFB directives. Appellant Br. 95-97; Reply Br. 48-49. Quattrone argues that the evidence 38 should have been admitted pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) as proof of prior acts in order to establish Quattrone's innocent intent. Specifically, Quattrone contends that his prior acts were relevant to establish that when he sent the Endorsement Email roughly twenty-four hours after beginning to draft his response, he did not act with deliberate, corrupt intent. Instead, he merely reinforced the message of a fellow employee: follow the document retention policy. The district court excluded the evidence on the ground that the emails were insufficient to establish within the meaning of Federal Rule of Evidence 406 a habit of reflexively responding to subordinates' email suggestions. 141 Rule 404(b) deals with a specialized but important application of the general rule excluding circumstantial use of character evidence. Consistently with that rule, [ i.e. Rule 404(a),] evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove character as a basis for suggesting the inference that conduct on a particular occasion was in conformity with it [in essence propensity reasoning]. However, the evidence may be offered for another purpose, such as proof of motive, [intent,] opportunity, and so on, which does not fall within the prohibition. FED. R. EVID 404, Adv. Cmte Notes, 1972 Proposed Rules, Note to Subd. (b). While prosecutors generally employ prior bad acts evidence, sometimes defense counsel seize upon the standard to admit useful prior act evidence. See, e.g., id., Adv. Cmte. Notes, 1991 Amendments. To be admissible under Rule 404(b) the evidence must serve a non-propensity purpose. See, e.g., United States v. Aboumoussallem, 726 F.2d 906, 911-12 (2d Cir. 1984) (evidence that co-conspirators had duped other couriers into carrying drugs admissible to prove defendant was duped where charge was knowingly importing drugs, subject to Rule 403 balancing). 142 We conclude that because the similar reinforcing emails were not competent Rule 404(b) evidence, the trial court did not err in excluding them. 39 Quattrone seeks to justify the emails on the basis that they establish his intent and disavows that the evidence is relevant only for propensity purposes. But propensity would be the only basis for justifying the evidence. The emails relate to Quattrone's intent only if one could infer that Quattrone acted in conformity with past patterns of shooting off quick emails to subordinates. The inference, of course, is that Quattrone must have done so for innocent purposes. This is a clear example of the propensity reasoning that Rule 404(a) prevents. Dubbing the emails circumstantial evidence of Quattrone's intent merely obfuscates the analysis — they are relevant only if an inference is drawn that Quattrone acted in conformity with a character trait or habit. 40 VI. Remand to Another Judge 143 Quattrone's final request is that any further proceedings below be reassigned to a different judge. Quattrone contends that the trial judge is no longer impartial with regard to his case and that numerous [media] observers have already questioned the impartiality of the district court. Appellant Br. 101 (footnote omitted). The government counters that Quattrone's claims are insufficient to meet the standard necessitating remand to another judge and argues forcefully that Quattrone's complaints are based upon a media campaign orchestrated to present the trial judge in a negative light. Appellee Br. 122. Furthermore, the government argues that certain remarks by the court that could be considered intemperate are insufficient grounds for reassignment and notes that this is Quattrone's third attempt to obtain a new trial judge. Appellee Br. 122-23. While we question the significance of the numerous observers['] accounts cited by Quattrone's counsel, 41 we ultimately conclude that on remand the interests of all involved would best be served by another judge. We further note that our action does not imply any personal criticism of the trial . . . judge. United States v. Robin, 553 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir.1977) (per curiam) (denial of rehearing en banc). 144 In order [t]o reassign a case on remand, we [must] find that `the facts might reasonably cause an objective observer to question [the judge's] impartiality. U.S. v. Londono, 100 F.3d 236, 242 (2d Cir.1996) (quoting Pescatore v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 97 F.3d 1, 21 (2d Cir.1996)) (alteration in original). Yet we may also remand to another judge absent such proof of partiality where reassignment is advisable to preserve the appearance of justice. Robin, 553 F.2d at 10 (discussing standard as factor but characterized as separate ground for remand in Londono ). 145 This case has already endured two full trials before the same dedicated jurist. In our view, the contentions of the parties in this difficult and complex matter have taken a toll on all involved. We conclude that the better decision is that the case be reassigned to another judge upon remand. While we have considered the government's arguments and do not find evidence that the trial judge made any inappropriate statements leading us to seriously doubt his impartiality, portions of the transcript raise the concern that certain comments could be viewed as rising beyond mere impatience or annoyance. Ultimately we believe that the interest and appearance of justice are better served by reassignment.