Opinion ID: 1314867
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: constructive possession and constructive delivery of marihuana

Text: Pursuant to W.Va.Code, 60A-4-401(a), delivery of a controlled substance is unlawful. [4] Pursuant to W.Va.Code, 60A-4-401(c), possession of a controlled substance is unlawful. [5] Specifically, it is unlawful pursuant to W.Va.Code, 60A-4-401(a), to manufacture, deliver or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver a controlled substance, and this section provides various felony and misdemeanor penalties depending upon the controlled substance involved. On the other hand, unlawful possession of a controlled substance is a misdemeanor pursuant to W.Va.Code, 60A-4-401(c). Furthermore, constructive possession of marihuana and constructive delivery of marihuana are concepts recognized in West Virginia law. Constructive possession of marihuana was recognized by this Court in State v. Dudick, 213 S.E.2d 458 (W.Va.1975). Constructive delivery is recognized by statute. W.Va.Code, 60A-1-101(f). [6] In Dudick, supra, this Court reversed the defendant's conviction in the Circuit Court of Monongalia County, West Virginia, of possession of a controlled substance. The indictment and conviction of the defendant in circuit court were the result of marihuana being found by police officers during a search of an apartment in Morgantown, West Virginia, in 1973. The defendant and another person were in the apartment when the marihuana was seized. The defendant was not a resident of the apartment. This Court in Dudick rejected the theory that mere presence upon premises in which a controlled substance is found raises a presumption against the defendant of unlawful possession. Rather, this Court stated that the following instruction, given to the jury in Dudick, is a correct statement of the law: [7] The Court instructs the jury that possession of marijuana is the conscious and intentional physical possession giving the Defendant immediate and exclusive control over marijuana. The offense of possession of marijuana also includes constructive possession if the State can establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant had knowledge of the marijuana and that it was subject to his dominion and control. Under the facts of this case, the State has not shown that Metro Dudich [sic] had actual physical possession of any marijuana when he was arrested. Therefore, before there can be a conviction in this case, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Metro Dudich [sic] knew that there was marijuana where the police officers found it and that Metro Dudich [sic] exercised dominion and control over it. 213 S.E.2d at 467. In view of the above, the defendant asserts that the Fayette County Circuit Court committed error in reading to the jury State's amended instruction no. 2. This instruction stated as follows: The court instructs the jury that possession and delivery as stated in the indictment in this matter specifically includes constructive possession and transfers of a controlled substance. The court further instructs the jury that a constructive possession and transfer is the transfer of a controlled substance either belonging to an individual or under his control by some other person or agency at the instance or direction of the individual accused of such constructive possession and transfer. Therefore, if the jury believe from the evidence in this case beyond a reasonable doubt that there was the possession and transfer of marihuana to Marvin Griffith in July 1978, by some person at the direction of the defendant and if the jury believe that such marihuana belonged to Jimmy Rector or was under his control and direction, then the jury should find the defendant, Jimmy Rector, guilty of possession and delivery of a controlled substance, to-wit, marihuana. It should be noted that neither the language of this instruction nor the indictment, both of which permitted the jury to find the defendant guilty of possession and delivery of marihuana, follow the provisions of W.Va.Code, 60A-4-401. Throughout the trial the language of W.Va.Code, 60A-4-401, was not followed. See Syl. pt. 2, State v. Beck, No. 14549 (W.Va. July 17, 1981). For example, State's amended instruction no. 1, combining possession and delivery as a single, felony offense does not follow the language of W.Va.Code, 60A-4-401. As indicated above, possession and delivery are treated separately in W.Va.Code, 60A-4-401, and had that section been followed in the trial, some of the problems now before this Court could have been avoided. Therefore, this Court is of the opinion that the trial court committed error in the giving of State's amended instruction no. 2. Specifically, the possession and delivery (transfer) of a controlled substance are separate offenses, possession being an offense pursuant to W.Va.Code, 60A-4-401(c) and delivery or possession with the intent to deliver being an offense pursuant to W.Va.Code, 60A-4-401(a). [8] Accordingly, constructive possession and constructive delivery of a controlled substance arise from separate offenses and should have been defined separately in the instructions to the jury. The giving of this instruction was error. It is reversible error for a trial judge to instruct a jury in a criminal trial of a defendant charged with a marihuana violation that the defendant may be found guilty of possession and delivery of a controlled substance when such instruction considers possession and delivery of a controlled substance as a single offense. Citing Syl. pt. 3, State v. Bolling, 246 S.E.2d 631 (W.Va.1978), this Court stated in Syl. pt. 3, State v. McCormick, 277 S.E.2d 629 (W.Va.1981): [I]nstructions in a criminal case which are confusing, misleading, or incorrectly state the law should not be given.