Opinion ID: 2337155
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Felony information

Text: While the first point on appeal is couched as a denial of a motion for directed verdict, the thrust of the assertion of error is the caption of the felony information. Appellant was charged with capital murder, burglary as a class B felony, and theft of property. Count I of the information alleged that appellant and Hinkston, his accomplice, during the commission of the offense of Burglary and in the course and furtherance of that felony, [caused] the death of Lisa G. Lewis under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life[.] In Count II, the felony information charged that appellant committed the offense of burglary when he did enter or remain unlawfully in the residence of Lisa G. Lewis with the purpose of committing the offense of Theft of Property... (emphasis added). Count III of the information alleged that appellant did take or exercise unauthorized control over the property, an automobile valued in excess of $2,500, of Lisa G. Lewis, with the purpose of depriving the owner thereof. Appellant never challenged the felony information before trial. When appellant moved for a directed verdict at the end of the State's case-inchief, appellant argued that the State failed to prove the offense of capital murder because there was no offense of burglary in Arkansas. He further argued that Arkansas distinguishes between the offenses of residential burglary and commercial burglary, and that the information was void for vagueness. Appellant's counsel stated: As to Count I, Capital Murder, our first motion for a directed verdict deals with the charge, itself. The information alleges that during the commission of a burglary[,] it's the defense's position, that there is no charge of burglary in the State of Arkansas. When the legislature met in 1993, under Acts 442 and 552, they created the acts of commercial burglary and residential burglary. Those are the two criminal offenses in Arkansas. There is no criminal offense of burglary, anymore. For that reason, it is void for vagueness; that it does not apprize [sic] a person of ordinary intelligence of what the law in the State of Arkansas is, because there is no offense of burglary. The State responded by stating that the felony information refers to residential burglary because the information refers to the act of entering and remaining in the residence of Lisa G. Lewis for the purpose of stealing property. The trial court denied appellant's motion. Appellant renewed his motion on the same grounds at the close of the evidence, and the court again denied his motion. Here, appellant does not attack the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, but argues that the offense was not properly captioned in the information. Appellant admits in his brief that [t]here is no doubt that the State proved the elements of Residential Burglary[.] Appellant draws a distinction between residential burglary and commercial burglary. See Ark.Code Ann. § 5-39-201(a)(1), (b)(1) (Repl.1997). The felony information under which appellant was charged clearly states that appellant and his accomplice entered Ms. Lewis's residence and that the offense was a class B felony. A nonjurisdictional challenge to the sufficiency of an information must be raised prior to trial to be preserved for appellate review. McNeese v. State, 334 Ark. 445, 976 S.W.2d 373 (1998); Sawyer v. State, 327 Ark. 421, 938 S.W.2d 843 (1997). A directed-verdict motion is not a substitute for a timely-made motion to dismiss an allegedly insufficient information. See Williams v. State, 331 Ark. 263, 962 S.W.2d 329 (1998). Appellant's attempt to challenge the information was untimely, and more importantly, appellant could have requested that the State file an amended complaint prior to trial. For these reasons, we affirm the trial court's denial of appellant's directed-verdict motion.