Opinion ID: 1804268
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Nature of the Interests Protected

Text: Although there is substantial overlap with defamation, proponents often argue that an important distinction lies in the nature of the interests sought to be protected. As the Restatement explains, it is not ... necessary to the action for invasion of privacy that the plaintiff be defamed. It is enough that he is given unreasonable and highly objectionable publicity that attributes to him characteristics, conduct or beliefs that are false, and so is placed before the public in a false position. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E cmt. b. For the tort of false light, the standard is whether the statement is highly offensive to a reasonable person. Id. § 652E(a). Conversely, a defamatory statement is one that tends to harm the reputation of another by lowering him or her in the estimation of the community or, more broadly stated, one that exposes a plaintiff to hatred, ridicule, or contempt or injures his business or reputation or occupation. Standard Jury InstructionsCivil Cases (No. 00-1), 795 So.2d at 55. The use of a different standard, which is the main distinction between the elements of false light and defamation, is the theoretical mechanism for protecting the two different interests at issue. A false light plaintiff must prove that the publicity would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, whereas a defamation plaintiff must prove injury to his or her reputation in the community. As explained by the Ohio Supreme Court in recognizing false light, in defamation cases the interest sought to be protected is the objective one of reputation, either economic, political, or personal, in the outside world. In privacy cases the interest affected is the subjective one of injury to [the] inner person. Welling v. Weinfeld, 113 Ohio St.3d 464, 866 N.E.2d 1051, 1057 (2007) (emphases added) (quoting Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 173 W.Va. 699, 320 S.E.2d 70, 83 (1984)). We acknowledge the nature of the interests to be protected is always a relevant concern in deciding whether to recognize a cause of action. As we stated in Cason, it is the Court's duty in this realm to ensure that there is protection of the individual in the enjoyment of all of his inherent and essential rights and to afford a legal remedy for their invasion. 20 So.2d at 250. Therefore, if there is a unique interest that could be protected by false light, that certainly might be one reason for deciding to recognize the tort. However, if the interest is not unique and is adequately addressed by defamation, then that would militate against the need for the tort. In this instance, although the standard may be different in principle, it may be a distinction without a difference in practice because conduct that defames will often be highly offensive to a reasonable person, just as conduct that is highly offensive will often result in injury to one's reputation. See Bueno, 54 P.3d at 902. As noted by the Colorado Supreme Court: We believe that recognition of the different interests protected rests primarily on parsing a too subtle distinction between an individual's personal sensibilities and his or her reputation in the community. In fact, the United States Supreme Court trampled any such subtleties in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 97 S.Ct. 2849, 53 L.Ed.2d 965 (1977). `The interest protected' in permitting recovery for placing the plaintiff in a false light `is clearly that of reputation, with the same overtones of mental distress as in defamation.' Id. at 573, 433 U.S. 562, 97 S.Ct. 2849, 53 L.Ed.2d 965 (quoting Prosser, supra, at 400.). ... False statements that a plaintiff finds highly offensive will generally either portray that plaintiff negatively or attack his conduct or character. At the same time, publicized statements that are disparaging and false satisfy the elements of defamation. Thus, the same publications that defame are likely to offend, and publications that offend are likely to defame. Bueno, 54 P.3d at 902 (citation omitted). Moreover, the interests are even less distinct when considering the fact that a false light plaintiff may also recover damages for harm to his reputation, even though false light originally existed to compensate a plaintiff for an injury to their inner and personal feelings or emotional distress. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652H, cmt. a. This mirrors the harm that defamation law seeks to prevent, which has led some courts to conclude that while the torts are theoretically dissimilar, they are almost identical when put into practice. See, e.g., Cain, 878 S.W.2d at 581 ([M]any, if not all, of the injuries redressed by the false light tort are also redressed by defamation.). In fact, in states such as Florida, which do not require damage to reputation as a predicate to a defamation action, there may be no distinction in recoverable damages. Compare Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Ane, 458 So.2d 239, 242-43 & n. 3 (Fla.1984) (quoting Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 460, 96 S.Ct. 958, 47 L.Ed.2d 154 (1976), which notes that States could base [defamation] awards on elements other than injury to reputation, such as personal humiliation and mental anguish and suffering) and In re Standard Jury Instructions (Civil Cases 89-1), 575 So.2d 194, 198 (Fla.1991) (same) with Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652H, cmt. b (stating that a plaintiff in an invasion of privacy action can recover damages for emotional distress or personal humiliation). Therefore, absent such a distinction, most injuries capable of being remedied by false light could also be remedied by defamation. Cain, 878 S.W.2d at 581. On the other hand, the very fact that false light is defined in subjective terms is one of the main causes for concern because the type of conduct prohibited is difficult to define. Unlike defamation, which has a defined body of case law and applicable restrictions that objectively proscribe conduct with relative clarity and certainty, false light and its subjective standard create a moving target whose definition depends on the specific locale in which the conduct occurs or the particular sensitivities of the day. Bueno, 54 P.3d at 903-04. As we now discuss, utilizing a subjective standard that fails to draw reasonably clear lines between lawful and unlawful conduct may impermissibly restrict free speech under the First Amendment. Cain, 878 S.W.2d at 584.