Opinion ID: 1316031
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Purpose of Medical Monitoring Cause of Action

Text: In Bower v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation, 206 W.Va. 133, 522 S.E.2d 424 (1999), this Court recognized a cause of action for medical monitoring costs. See Syl. pt. 2, id. (A cause of action exists under West Virginia law for the recovery of medical monitoring costs, where it can be proven that such expenses are necessary and reasonably certain to be incurred as a proximate result of a defendant's tortious conduct.). [5] Succinctly stated, [a] claim for medical monitoring seeks to recover the anticipated costs of long-term diagnostic testing necessary to detect latent diseases that may develop as a result of tortious exposure to toxic substances. Bower, 206 W.Va. at 138, 522 S.E.2d at 429. In other words, a claim for medical monitoring is essentially `a claim for future damages.' Id., 206 W.Va. at 138-39, 522 S.E.2d at 429-30 (quoting Ball v. Joy Techs., Inc., 958 F.2d 36, 39 (4th Cir.1991)). The injury sustained by the plaintiff seeking medical monitoring is `the exposure itself and the concomitant need for medical testing.' Bower, 206 W.Va. at 139, 522 S.E.2d at 430 (quoting Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 977 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted)). Stated otherwise, The `injury' that underlies a claim for medical monitoringjust as with any other cause of action sounding in tortis `the invasion of any legally protected interest.' Bower v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 206 W.Va. 133, 139, 522 S.E.2d 424, 430 (1999) quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 7(1) (1964). The specific invasion of a legally protected interest in a medical monitoring claim[ ] consists of a significantly increased risk of contracting a particular disease relative to what would be the case in the absence of exposure. 206 W.Va. at 142, 522 S.E.2d at 433. State ex rel. Chemtall Inc. v. Madden, 216 W.Va. 443, 455-56, 607 S.E.2d 772, 784-85 (2004). Accord Bandy v. Trigen-Biopower, Inc., No. 3:02-CV-459, 2006 WL 5321815, at  (E.D.Tenn. May 5, 2006) (The de minimus `physical injury' of ingesting a harmful substance can sufficiently satisfy the physical injury or manifestation rule so as to justify the award of ... medical monitoring. (citation omitted)); Barnes v. The American Tobacco Co., Inc., 989 F.Supp. 661, 665 (E.D.Pa. 1997) ([T]he injury that a person claims under a medical monitoring cause of action is the cost of the medical care that will, one hopes, detect that injury.... This injury is similar to a claim for damages to a person that could be asserted in a traditional negligence or strict liability action. (internal quotations and citations omitted)); Donovan v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 455 Mass. 215, 225-26, 914 N.E.2d 891, 901 (2009) (When competent medical testimony establishes that medical monitoring is necessary to detect the potential onset of a serious illness or disease due to physiological changes indicating a substantial increase in risk of harm from exposure to a known hazardous substance, the element of injury and damage will have been satisfied and the cost of that monitoring is recoverable in tort.). A medical monitoring plaintiff is compensated for such injury, or made whole, by requiring the defendant responsible for the plaintiff's exposure to toxic substances to compensate the plaintiff for the expenses of the medical monitoring incurred by the plaintiff: It is difficult to dispute that an individual has an interest in avoiding expensive diagnostic examinations just as he or she has an interest in avoiding physical injury. When a defendant negligently invades this interest, the injury to which is neither speculative nor resistant to proof, it is elementary that the defendant should make the plaintiff whole by paying for the examinations.  Bower, 206 W.Va. at 139, 522 S.E.2d at 430 (quoting Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816, 826 (D.C.Cir.1984) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)). See also Bower, 206 W.Va. at 142, 522 S.E.2d at 433 (Liability for medical monitoring is predicated upon the defendant being legally responsible for exposing the plaintiff to a particular hazardous substance.). Accordingly, `the cost of medical surveillance is a compensable item of damages' when the elements of a claim for medical monitoring have been satisfied. Bower, 206 W.Va. at 141, 522 S.E.2d at 432 (quoting Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 106 N.J. 557, 606, 525 A.2d 287, 312 (1987)). Accord Bower, 206 W.Va. at 142, 522 S.E.2d at 433 (`[F]uture medical monitoring ... is ... a compensable item of damage when liability is established[.]' (quoting Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal.4th 965, 1007, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 550, 578, 863 P.2d 795, 823 (1993) (en banc))). Cf. Bower, 206 W.Va. at 142, 522 S.E.2d at 433 (Medical monitoring must be available in order to be a necessary, compensable item of damages.).