Opinion ID: 860955
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: issues

Text: A. A high school principal consciously disregarded his school district's position regarding a legal issue, as stated to him on four occasions by the district's attorney. As a result, the school board suspended the principal for lack of professional judgment pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 37-9-59 (1990), which permits suspension for incompetence, neglect of duty, immoral conduct, intemperance, brutal treatment of a pupil or other good cause. The question is whether lack of professional judgment can qualify as other good cause under § 37-9-59. B. In setting aside the school board's action, the Chancery Court based its decision on the constitutionality of the principal's decision to allow a student to recite a prayer over the school's intercom system. Did the Chancery Court err by not applying the standard of review mandated by state law and instead basing its decision on an issue that was not before the court? C. Was the school board's decision to suspend the principal supported by substantial evidence and not arbitrary or capricious? ¶8. The Board's points of error are combined as they all deal with the issue of whether the suspension of Knox was properly overturned on appellate review by the Chancery Court. The primary issue in the present appeal centers around whether the Board acted within the authority granted it by Miss. Code Ann. § 37-9-59 in suspending Knox for his actions in permitting the reading of the prayers. In spite of the fact that the present case tangentially involves the much-litigated and discussed issue of the constitutionality of school prayer, the present case is in actuality one of statutory interpretation. Miss. Code Ann. §37-9-59, Suspension or removal of principal or teacher; prohibited grounds for denying employment or reemployment, provides that: For incompetence, neglect of duty, immoral conduct, intemperance, brutal treatment of a pupil or other good cause the superintendent of schools may dismiss or suspend any certificated employee in any school district. This Court noted in Madison County Board of Education v. Miles, 173 So.2d 425 (Miss. 1965) that the legislative intent in enacting this section was to make teachers and principals reasonably secure in their jobs and subject to removal only for serious causes. ¶9. In Merchant v. Board of Trustees of Pearl Mun. Separate School. Dist, 492 So.2d 959 (Miss. 1986) this Court affirmed the dismissal by a school board of a coach for a variety of insubordinate actions, including repeated violations of school financial policies. Specifically, this Court found that the coach had failed to account for monies belonging to the system by selling football jerseys to senior members of the team without authority and without turning the money into the district. Merchant, 492 So.2d at 963. This Court noted that: Considering in the aggregate the matters outlined above, we have no authority to reverse. No objective observer could doubt that there was before the School Board substantial credible evidence suggesting the correctness of each finding. Nor could an objective observer dispute that the Board, considering these findings in the aggregate, could reasonably have concluded that incompetence, neglect of duty, and insubordination justif(y) dismissal within Miss. Code. Ann. §37-9-59 (Supp. 1985). Merchant, 492 So.2d at 963. ¶10. In Byrd v. Greene County School Dist., 633 So.2d 1018 (Miss. 1994), this Court reversed the termination by a school district of a teacher's employment based on a financial crisis in the school district. This Court agreed with the teacher that the other good cause under § 37-9-59 is triggered only by personal misconduct on the part of the teacher and accordingly reversed the school district's dismissal of the teacher. Byrd, 633 So.2d at 1023. In Spradlin v. Board of Trustees of Pascagoula Mun. Separate School Dist., 515 So.2d 893 (Miss. 1987), this Court affirmed the dismissal of an administrator based on a single misrepresentation which the administrator had made to the school board regarding a failure to comply with purchasing requirements. Spradlin, 515 So.2d at 897. ¶11. In the present case, the conduct by Dr. Knox arguably did not rise to the level of the insubordinate, given that he was never directly ordered by one of his superiors to not permit the prayers to be read over the intercom. However, Dr. Knox can be said to have demonstrated a lack of judgment in having the prayer read in face of serious concerns expressed by the school district's attorney that said activities could result in costly litigation for the school district. The Board argues that such a lack of professional judgment should be held by this Court to constitute other good cause permitting a school board to suspend a principal or teacher. The term lack of professional judgment, however, is so broad as to be almost meaningless as a grounds for suspension or dismissal, and it is thus proper for this Court to instead examine the specific actions of Dr. Knox in the present case. ¶12. The Board is correct in asserting that the present case does not center around the issue of the constitutionality of prayer in schools. The Board is further correct in arguing that the Chancellor was incorrect in apparently basing his ruling in part upon his own strongly held personal views regarding prayer in school and a number of other issues irrelevant to the issue of whether the School Board exceeded its statutory authority in suspending Knox. The Chancellor's ruling is replete with the Chancellor's personal views regarding the alleged decline in moral values in this country's schools and a litany of other social and political issues. ¶13. The fact that the Chancellor gave improper weight to the issues surrounding the constitutionality of prayer in schools does not mean that his ruling in overruling the School Board's actions was incorrect. The dismissal of Dr. Knox by the Board should be affirmed if said action was supported by substantial evidence and was therefore not arbitrary and capricious, and this Court must also consider the intent of the Legislature in limiting the grounds for suspension or termination of a principal. ¶14. In the view of this Court, the actions of Dr. Knox in disregarding the legal advice of the staff attorney and proceeding to have the school prayers read in spite of a lack of any urgency for doing so, constitutes other good cause in support of his suspension by the School Board. In this age of litigious students and parents and of shrinking school budgets, a school district must have the ability to control its employees in such a manner as to protect itself from having to defend against lawsuits which may arise from the conduct of a principal or teacher. ¶15. The school environment is unique with regard to the extent to which decisions by principals and teachers can give rise to lawsuits on constitutional and other legal grounds. The funds spent by a school district in responding to legal challenges constitute resources that could be spent much more productively in the education of students. A holding by this Court reversing the Board's suspension of Knox could have the harmful effect of encouraging actions by principals or teachers who desire to use their position to promote their own political, social or religious agendas or who merely desire to gain publicity for themselves. A holding by this Court excusing Dr. Knox's actions because he had not been specifically ordered to disallow the prayers could also set a harmful precedent by allowing teachers or principals to conduct sensitive activities as long as they had not been specifically ordered not to do so by their superiors. ¶16. This Court noted in Hoffman v. Board of Trustees, East Mississippi Junior College, 567 So.2d 838 (Miss. 1990) that: Our scope of review in these matters is quite limited. We accept our duty of deference to the hearing officials and this is no different when those officials are the ultimate legal authority for the school district. We look to see whether the decision of the Board is supported by substantial evidence, was arbitrary or capricious, was beyond the power of the Board to make, or violated some statutory or constitutional right of the complaining party. . . . Most assuredly, by way of contrast, the test is not what we would have decided had we been the trier of the issues in dispute. Hoffman, 567 So.2d at 842. It can not be said that the Board's actions in dismissing Knox were arbitrary or capricious where Knox permitted the reading of the school prayers in spite of specific advice from the school district attorney that said actions were unconstitutional and had the potential to subject the school district to considerable expenses. ¶17. There are undoubtedly emergency situations in which a principal is required to make a hasty decision regarding an important matter without guidance from the school district officials, but the present case does not involve such a situation. It is true that the incident in question was an isolated one, and Dr. Knox's actions did not have the potential of placing any students in any real danger. This Court's holding in Spradlin, however, indicates that the misconduct in question need not constitute a course of conduct, nor need any danger to the students arise as a result of the misconduct in question. Accordingly, the suspension of Dr. Knox by the School Board is affirmed and the chancellor's ruling is reversed.(1) ¶18. REVERSED AND RENDERED. SULLIVAN, P.J., PITTMAN, BANKS AND McRAE, JJ., CONCUR. DAN LEE, C.J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY ROBERTS AND SMITH, JJ. MILLS, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.