Opinion ID: 35615
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Refusal to voir dire or instruct jury about parole eligibility

Text: 19 Jones next asserts that the trial court violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by refusing to voir dire or instruct the jury about his eligibility for parole in the event of a life sentence. We find that neither claim has merit. 20 This Court has repeatedly found that a capital murder defendant does not have a constitutional right to question venire members regarding Texas parole law. Collier v. Cockrell, 300 F.3d 577, 584 (5th Cir.2003) (citing Wheat v. Johnson, 238 F.3d 357, 362 (5th Cir.2001)). It is thus clear that the trial court's refusal to voir dire the jury about Jones's parole eligibility did not violate his rights under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments. 21 Jones's claim regarding the court's refusal to instruct the jury about parole law must also fail. In Simmons v. South Carolina, the Supreme Court held that, in states where a defendant is ineligible for parole if given a life sentence, the Due Process Clause requires an instruction about parole law at the punishment phase of the trial. 512 U.S. 154, 156, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 129 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994) (plurality opinion); see also Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 166, 120 S.Ct. 2113, 147 L.Ed.2d 125 (2000) (The parole-ineligibility instruction is required only when, assuming the jury fixes the sentence at life, the defendant is ineligible for parole under state law.). In line with Simmons, this Court has held that a parole instruction is constitutionally warranted only when: (1) the state argues that the defendant represents a future danger to society; and (2) the defendant is legally ineligible for parole. See, e.g., Woods v. Cockrell, 307 F.3d 353, 361-62 (5th Cir.2002); Wheat, 238 F.3d at 361. 22 The capital offense serving as the basis of Jones's conviction occurred on April 13, 1993. Under Texas law governing capital offenses committed between September 1, 1989, and August 31, 1993, a defendant who receives a life sentence becomes eligible for parole when actual time served equals thirty-five years of confinement. See TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.18, § 8(b)(2) (Vernon 1993), repealed by TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 508.145(b) (Vernon 1998). Because Jones would have been parole-eligible if the jury had sentenced him to life in prison, he enjoyed no constitutional right to instruct the jury on Texas parole law. We conclude that the state court's decision not to reverse Jones's conviction on the ground that the trial court refused to voir dire or instruct the jury on parole eligibility did not constitute an unreasonable application of federal law.