Opinion ID: 1388240
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Enhancement for Career Offender Status

Text: Finally, defendant argues that he should not have received an offense level enhancement for his status as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). If the district court had not applied this enhancement, the total offense level would have been 33 rather than 34. [3] Based upon this reduced offense level, the advisory Guidelines range would have been 235 to 293 months rather than 262 to 327 months. [4] Section 4B1.1(a) provides the following: A defendant is a career offender if (1) the defendant was at least eighteen years old at the time the defendant committed the instant offense of conviction; (2) the instant offense of conviction is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense; and (3) the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense. Defendant does not argue that he did not satisfy the first two requirements for career offender status; rather, he argues that he did not possess the requisite predicate felony convictions. The district court found that defendant qualified as a career offender based upon his two state felony convictions for aggravated assault and his state felony conviction for reckless endangerment. We review de novo a district court's conclusion that a crime qualifies as a predicate offense for the career-offender designation. United States v. Skipper, 552 F.3d 489, 491 (6th Cir.2009). First, defendant claims that his two aggravated assault convictions arose out of the same incident and therefore should have been considered a single offense. The provisions of U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 are applicable to the counting of convictions under the career offender provisions of the Guidelines. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 cmt. n. 3. At the time of defendant's sentencing hearing in 2006, § 4A1.2 provided that [p]rior sentences imposed in unrelated cases are to be counted separately. Prior sentences imposed in related cases are to be treated as one sentence. [5] Application Note 3 explained the method for determining whether cases were related: Prior sentences are not considered related if they were for offenses that were separated by an intervening arrest (i.e., the defendant is arrested for the first offense prior to committing the second offense). Otherwise, prior sentences are considered related if they resulted from offenses that (1) occurred on the same occasion, (2) were part of a single common scheme or plan, or (3) were consolidated for trial or sentencing. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 cmt. n. 3. Here, the record does not clearly indicate whether defendant's two aggravated assault convictions constituted separate convictions for career offender purposes. According to the PSR, both of these convictions were based upon conduct that occurred on the same dayJuly 9, 1991. There is no indication of any intervening arrest; in fact, the convictions appear to have stemmed from the same incident in which defendant and another individual caused bodily injury to two other individuals. [6] Defendant was also sentenced for both offenses on the same day. Finally, it appears from the transcript of the sentencing hearing that both the government and the district court assumed that these offenses only constituted a single conviction. In fact, the government maintained at the sentencing hearing, and the district court seemed to agree, that defendant's Tennessee conviction for reckless endangerment qualified as the second predicate felony conviction for purposes of career offender status. [7] Defendant challenges this finding on appeal, contending that reckless endangerment does not constitute a crime of violence under Tennessee law. Under the Guidelines, a crime of violence is defined as follows: [A]ny offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that (1) has as an element the use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, or (2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). Under the categorical approach for determining whether a prior conviction constitutes a crime of violence under § 4B1.2(a), we must look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definitionnot the facts of the underlying offenseto determine whether that definition supports a conclusion that the conviction was for a crime of violence. [8] United States v. Bartee, 529 F.3d 357, 359 (6th Cir.2008); see also James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 201-02, 127 S.Ct. 1586, 167 L.Ed.2d 532 (2007). In a case where the statutory definition is ambiguous and where a defendant has pleaded guilty, we may also consider the charging document, written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant assented. Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005); see also Skipper, 552 F.3d at 492; Bartee, 529 F.3d at 359. Under Tennessee law, reckless endangerment is committed by one who recklessly engages in conduct that places or may place another person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-103(a). The offense becomes a felony when committed with a deadly weapon, TENN.CODE ANN. § 39-13-103(b), which includes a motor vehicle, State v. Wilson, 211 S.W.3d 714, 719 (Tenn.2007). This offense does not fall within the language of § 4B1.2(a)(1) because it does not involve the use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, and it clearly does not involve burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, [or] use of explosives under § 4B1.2(a)(2). Accordingly, the offense can only be considered a crime of violence if we conclude that it otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another under § 4B1.2(a)(2). This court has previously held that a Tennessee conviction for felony reckless endangerment constitutes a violent felony for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) because no scenario exists in which an individual could commit felony reckless endangerment without creating a serious risk of harm to others. United States v. Bailey, 264 Fed. Appx. 480, 482 (6th Cir.2008). More recently, however, this court remanded a case to the district court for resentencing where the district court had determined that felony reckless endangerment in Tennessee constituted a crime of violence under § 4B1.2(a). United States v. Johnson, No. 06-6545, 2009 WL 224036, at  (6th Cir. Jan.30, 2009). The Johnson court reasoned that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Begay v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 1581, 170 L.Ed.2d 490 (2008), makes clear that the presence of a serious potential risk of physical injury alone is not sufficient to establish that the conviction is a `crime of violence' under the `otherwise' clause of USSG § 4B1.2(a)(2). Johnson, 2009 WL 224036, at . Indeed, the Supreme Court in Begay stated that the ACCA's listed examplesburglary, arson, extortion, or crimes involving the use of explosivesillustrate the kinds of crimes that fall within the statute's scope. Their presence indicates that the statute covers only similar crimes, rather than every crime that `presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.' Begay, 128 S.Ct. at 1584-85 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(iii)). Thus, the Court concluded that the clause only covers crimes that are roughly similar, in kind as well as in degree of risk posed, to the examples themselves. Id. at 1587. Because the crime of driving under the influence did not involve the kind of purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct as the listed examples, the Court held that it fell outside the scope of the ACCA's violent felony definition. Id. at 1586, 1588. Even more recently, in Chambers v. United States, the Court held that the Illinois offense of failure to report to a penal institution did not constitute a violent felony, noting that the elements of the crime were a far cry from the purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct potentially at issue when an offender uses explosives against property, commits arson, burgles a dwelling or residence, or engages in certain forms of extortion. ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 687, 692, 172 L.Ed.2d 484 (2009) (citing Begay, 128 S.Ct. at 1586) (internal quotation marks omitted). After Begay, this court has held that the career offender provision of the Guidelines also should be limited to crimes that are similar in both kind and in degree of risk to the enumerated examplesburglary of a dwelling, arson, extortion, or crimes involving the use of explosives. Bartee, 529 F.3d at 363. We agree with this court's decision in Johnson and conclude that, insofar as the district court determined that defendant's Tennessee reckless endangerment conviction qualified as a crime of violence under the Guidelines, there was insufficient evidence for it to do so. Although it is hardly debatable that the elements of felony reckless endangerment in Tennessee present[ ] a serious potential risk of physical injury to another, § 4B 1.2(a)(2), the offense does not clearly involve the type of purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct as burglary, arson, extortion, or the use of explosives, Begay, 128 S.Ct. at 1586. [9] Rather, on its face the statute criminalizes only reckless conduct. See TENN.CODE ANN. § 39-13-103(a); see also United States v. Gray, 535 F.3d 128, 132 (2d Cir.2008) (holding that a similar reckless endangerment statute under New York law is not a crime of violence because it does not criminalize purposeful or deliberate conduct). Accordingly, we reverse and vacate defendant's sentence and remand to the district court for resentencing on the limited issue of whether defendant was entitled to a career offender enhancement in light of Begay. We do so despite the fact that the Supreme Court decided Begay after defendant was sentenced, and despite the fact that defendant did not object to consideration of the offense as a predicate felony before the district court. Because defendant did not object, our review is limited to determining whether the district court committed plain error. Skipper, 552 F.3d at 491; see also United States v. Barnett, 398 F.3d 516, 525 (6th Cir.2005) (noting that plain error review applied where the defendant did not challenge his sentence before the district court, but where Booker subsequently made the Guidelines advisory); United States v. Heikes, 525 F.3d 662, 664 (8th Cir.2008) (When the Supreme Court changes the law while a defendant's case is pending on appeal, the plain error principle applies.); United States v. Spells, 537 F.3d 743, 748 (7th Cir.2008) (noting that plain error review applies where the Supreme Court issues an applicable decision post-sentencing, but during a pending appeal). To establish plain error, a defendant must show the following: (1) that an error occurred in the district court; (2) that the error was plain, i.e., obvious or clear; (3) that the error affected defendant's substantial rights; and (4) that this adverse impact seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. United States v. Koeberlein, 161 F.3d 946, 949 (6th Cir.1998). In this case, the plain error standard has been satisfied. Because defendant's reckless endangerment conviction does not on its face constitute a crime of violence under Begay, there was error under the current law. See United States v. Rogers, 118 F.3d 466, 471 (6th Cir.1997) (To review for plain error, first we must determine whether there was error under current law. (emphasis added)). This error is plainthat is, clear or obvious because Begay clearly altered the requirements for an offense to qualify as a predicate felony under the otherwise clause of § 4B1.2(a). See Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997) (holding that where the law at the time of trial was settled and clearly contrary to the law at the time of appeal . . . it is enough that an error be `plain' at the time of appellate consideration). Indeed, prior to Begay, it was sufficient if the conduct encompassed by the elements of the offense, in the ordinary case, present[ed] a serious potential risk of injury to another. James, 550 U.S. at 208, 127 S.Ct. 1586; see also Bailey, 264 Fed.Appx. at 482. There was no requirement that the offense be similar, in kind as well as in degree of risk posed, to the listed examples in § 4B1.2(a)(2). Begay, 128 S.Ct. at 1587; Bartee, 529 F.3d at 363. This error affected defendant's substantial rights by potentially increasing the advisory Guidelines range from 235 to 293 months to a range of 262 to 327 months. See Barnett, 398 F.3d at 529 (holding that the possibility of receiving a lower sentence after Booker affected a defendant's substantial rights); United States v. Oliver, 397 F.3d 369, 380 (6th Cir.2005) (holding that a more severe sentence affected the defendant's substantial rights); cf. United States v. Bostic, 371 F.3d 865, 877 (6th Cir.2004) (holding that the district court's sentencing error affected the government's and the United States citizens' substantial rights because it drastically reduced [the defendant's] sentence). It is apparent from the record that there was a reasonable probability defendant would have received a more favorable sentence had the district court properly calculated the Guidelines range. The district court noted that a sentence within the guideline range was appropriate, Sentencing Tr. at 16, J.A. at 190, and sentenced defendant near the middle of the potentially improperly-calculated Guidelines range. If, on remand, the district court concludes that defendant does not qualify as a career offender, defendant could receive a sentence at least seven months shorter than his original sentence. Further, the PSR does not clearly indicate any alternative qualifying predicate offensesalthough defendant has a rich criminal history, each of his other offenses appears to be a misdemeanor or also does not appear to qualify as a crime of violence. Finally, as to the fourth prong of the plain error standard of review, such an error in the calculation of the sentencing range seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. See United States v. Story, 503 F.3d 436, 440 (6th Cir.2007); Oliver, 397 F.3d at 380; United States v. Goward, No. 06-2586, 2009 WL 512685, at  (6th Cir. Mar.2, 2009). Moreover, we note that at least one of our sister circuits has already reached the same conclusion as we do today. See United States v. Davidson, 551 F.3d 807, 808 (8th Cir.2008) (holding that [u]nder current law, it was plain error for the district court to conclude that Davidson's commission of tampering by operation was a crime of violence); United States v. Heikes, 525 F.3d 662, 664 (8th Cir.2008) (holding that Begay entitled the defendant to plain error relief because his three DWI convictions do not qualify as violent felonies under the ACCA). The government argues that if defendant had objected to the conclusion that reckless endangerment constituted a predicate felony, it could have presented additional evidence establishing that the conviction did qualify as a crime of violence. The district court may consider any of this additional factual evidence on remand, provided, of course, that it is limited to the charging document, written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant assented. [10] Shepard, 544 U.S. at 16, 125 S.Ct. 1254. The government may also offer evidence of any other separate predicate felonies, provided they were felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense and were sustained prior to defendant's commission of the instant offense of conviction. [11] U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(c). Because we remand to the district court for resentencing, we need not address defendant's other, more general objections to the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence. Moreover, we express no opinion as to the length of defendant's sentence on remand; of course, any sentence imposed by the district court including any variance from the properly calculated advisory Guidelines range-will be reviewed under the same deferential reasonableness standard with which we review all sentences. See Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 591.