Opinion ID: 2395334
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Specific Allegations

Text: Having established the legal standards that guide our decision, we now turn to our evaluation of the statements made by respondent at the VACJ hearings. We must determine whether some or all of the challenged statements were false or deceptive. [4] The statements can be divided into two groups: the first group consists of statements in which respondent denied that she had accused anyone of wrongdoing or mismanagement, and the second consists of statements in which she denied secretly taping meetings or conversations. We consider each group of statements in turn.
A hotly contested subject at the VACJ hearings was Judge Gretkowski's claim that respondent was lying to the public in the media, particularly with respect to her allegations of county wrongdoing. In her testimony, respondent denied that she had made allegations of wrongdoing or mismanagement, arguing that those words were used by the press and by Judge Gretkowski, but not by her. The Board found that several of the statements she made in this context were false or deceptive. Respondent argues that the Board took the statements out of context. She also claims that the challenged statements were expressions of her opinion and therefore should not be the basis for discipline. As a general matter, we agree with respondent that the Board did not fully consider the context of the statements. For example, the Board found the following two similar statements to be misleading or deceptive: I have never alleged wrongdoing or mismanagement. . . . . I have never publicly charged or privately charged mismanagement at the court. Respondent made both of these statements as she attempted to explain that she personally had never used the words wrongdoing or mismanagement. The first statement, which comes early in respondent's testimony, appears in the following context: I want you to know that nowhere in press coverage, nowhere ... have I ever used the words wrongdoing or mismanagement. The words are there, but I am not the one saying them. I have never alleged wrongdoing or mismanagement. We do not agree with the Board that this statement amounts to a blanket denial that [respondent had] alleged conduct amounting to wrongdoing or mismanagement in her `It's My Turn' article. The context of the testimony makes plain that respondent was merely denying that she had used those specific words in her article or other contacts with the press. Similarly, the second statement is part of respondent's lengthy discussion of various newspaper articles and editorials. She was again trying to explain that she had never used the word mismanagement, a fact that the Board accepted as true. Given this context, and keeping in mind that misconduct must be proven by clear and convincing evidence, we cannot find that these statements were deceptive. Next, the Board took issue with respondent's response to a question posed by her attorney during a discussion of certain county funds that respondent had wanted moved to an account bearing a higher rate of interest. After a review of the dispute over the funds, the following exchange took place: [Attorney]: Were you charging anybody with corruption or doing something wrong? [Respondent]: Of course not. I have never charged anybody with wrongdoing. The question and answer can fairly be read as referring to the specific dispute over the interest rate for the county funds, and in that context, respondent's answer was true. Although respondent had argued that the funds should be placed in a different account as a policy matter, such a policy dispute cannot be equated with an allegation of wrongdoing or corruption. We do not accept the Board's finding that this statement was false, deceptive, and misleading. At another point in the hearings, respondent discussed her problem with the use of capital construction or fire fund monies in the county budget. She did not approve of the transfer of these funds for other uses, but noted that there is no evidence to indicate that this transfer of monies was secret or under the table. Shortly thereafter, she stated: At no time have I alleged that there is secrecy or lack of accountability. . . . In no way did the article meant [sic] to imply or accuse. I put down the facts that state law prohibits. The Board found the reference to lack of accountability to be deceptive and misleading, apparently because of respondent's assertion in her It's My Turn article that assistant judges have unchecked power to spend. As we consider this statement in the context of the fire fund discussion, we do not agree with the Board's finding. Respondent's concern in this matter was that use of the funds violated state law, not that the transaction was hidden or secret. Nor do we agree with the Board that respondent's denial that the article meant to imply or accuse was misleading. The Board supports its finding by stating that [respondent] meant to imply [in the It's My Turn article] that a violation of the law had taken place. But respondent explains the statement as a continuation of her earlier point: that she had not suggested or implied that the use of the fire fund monies was secret or corrupt. As the statement is incomplete and grammatically unclear, it is open to multiple interpretations; we are unable to find by clear and convincing evidence that the Board's interpretation is the correct one. Near the end of the hearings, in response to a question from a member of the investigating committee, respondent returned again to discussing the newspaper article and the media's misuse of the words wrongdoing and corruption. She concluded: [T]here is no question, those words permeate the press. But I never said them. There was no intention on my part in writing that article to imply any wrongdoing at all. The Board found that this statement was false, deceptive, and misleading. The Board relied on respondent's use of the article to support a Judicial Conduct Board complaint against Judge Gretkowski as evidence that respondent intended to imply wrongdoing of some sort. Finding that respondent's statement was knowingly false or deceptive is a difficult task. To do so, we would have to find that respondent intended her article to imply wrongdoing, despite her protests to the contrary. As we have elsewhere noted, imposing disciplinary sanctions on the basis of an implication may raise intractable problems of perception and interpretation. Bryan, 164 Vt. at 595, 674 A.2d at 797. The problem we identified in Bryan is far more pronounced in this context. Respondent is not charged with concealing or lying about specific facts, but with lying about what she meant to say when she expressed her opinion in a newspaper editorial. A half-dozen different readers of the article might have a half-dozen different interpretations of its meaning, but who among them could say conclusively that a particular interpretation is the one respondent intended? None of us is privy to respondent's inner thoughts as she drafted the article. Absent this psychic connection, we are hard-pressed to find that respondent lied when she explained what she meant to say in the article. Cf. In re Kiley, 74 N.Y.2d 364, 547 N.Y.S.2d 623, 625, 546 N.E.2d 916, 918 (1989) (court unable to conclude that judge dissembled at disciplinary hearing when he gave his subjective intentions for engaging in particular conduct at issue). We note, moreover, that respondent has given a plausible explanation for her statement. She maintains that she defines wrongdoing as synonymous with corruption, and uses it to refer to acts done for personal gain or with evil intent. Although, as she expressed in the article, she believed that certain county practices were unwise and possibly illegal, she did not believe that those practices were motivated by evil or corrupt intent. Respondent's personal definition of wrongdoing has support. The Oxford dictionary lists a number of definitions for wrongdoing: [t]ransgression of or offense against the moral or established law; reprehensible action or behavior; evil-doing, misdoing; misconduct. XX Oxford English Dictionary 654 (2d ed.1989). Thus, wrongdoing may refer to simple misconduct or a violation of law, but it may also carry the stronger negative connotation of immorality or evil upon which respondent relies. With respect to the Judicial Conduct Board complaint, she states that she felt obligated to report possible violations of the Code by Judge Gretkowski, but did not believe that Judge Gretkowski had acted corruptly or with evil intent. As we have previously discussed, judges may violate the Code despite their subjective good faith. In light of respondent's explanation, and the difficulty inherent in determining respondent's subjective intentions, we are unable to find by clear and convincing evidence that this statement was false or deceptive.
We now turn to respondent's statements denying that she secretly taped conversations. Fortunately, resolution of this matter is not complicated by the same problems of interpretation and subjective intentions that we confronted earlier. One of the allegations considered at the VACJ hearings was Judge Gretkowski's claim that respondent secretly taped conversations and meetings. Although she admitted one instance in which she secretly taped a meeting, respondent otherwise flatly denied the allegation. During her statements and testimony at the VACJ hearings, respondent repeatedly defended herself against this charge: Except for one incident which you will hear about tomorrow I have never, ever taped an individual without letting them know first that I have taped. . . . . [Attorney]: Judge, at any other time since you have been an Assistant Judge have you secretly taped any meetings? [Respondent]: Never. . . . . And I want to tell you that in no way, shape or form did I ever, ever alter any tape; in the same way I am telling you I have never taped a conversation where I didn't think the person knew that I was taping. Ironically, respondent herself produced the evidence that suggests that she did, in fact, secretly tape a conversation. At the VACJ hearing, respondent submitted a number of transcripts of meetings and conversations that she had taped, presumably because the discussions related to the various allegations covered at the hearings. One transcript recorded a conversation between respondent and Probate Judge Susan Fowler. Judge Fowler testified before the Board that she was not aware that this conversation had been taped. Based on this testimony and the content of the tape recording, the Board found the first of the above statements to be false, deceptive, and misleading. The Board did not make such a finding with respect to the other two statements. [5] Obviously, respondent does not dispute that she taped the conversation, nor does she dispute that she never orally told Judge Fowler that their conversation was being recorded. She argues, however, that her tape recorder was on her desk in plain view during the meeting, and that she reasonably assumed that Judge Fowler knew that the tape was running. She also emphasizes that she voluntarily produced the transcript of the meeting at the VACJ hearings, where she was defending herself against the charge that she taped people secretly  an action that makes little sense unless she thought that Judge Fowler was aware of the taping. Overall, however, the evidence leads us to conclude that respondent secretly taped the meeting. The tape begins while respondent and Judge Fowler are walking upstairs together, although respondent's transcription does not reflect this part of the conversation. Respondent explains this by saying that she must have accidentally turned on the tape recorder, which was in her pocket, and that she did not realize what had happened until she later listened to the tape. This claim is not credible. If respondent did not know the recorder was already running, she would have had to turn the recorder on  or attempt to do so  when she and Judge Fowler reached the office. At that point she would have realized that it was already running. Respondent's claim is also at odds with Judge Fowler's testimony that she did not see a tape recorder during the meeting. Because of the conflicting testimony, we must weigh the credibility of the witnesses  a task made more difficult by the fact that this Court did not hear the witnesses firsthand. The Board, which was in the best position to evaluate the witnesses, found Judge Fowler's testimony to be credible. We agree. Unlike respondent, Judge Fowler had no stake in these proceedings and thus no motive for dishonesty. Moreover, the tangible evidence  that is, the contents of the tape  supports Judge Fowler's account. First, neither respondent nor Judge Fowler mention the tape recorder during the conversation. We consider it highly unlikely that Judge Fowler would have noticed respondent remove the tape recorder from her pocket and set it on the desk, and make no comment. Second, Judge Fowler spoke rather freely during the conversation, discussing the sensitive topic of possible legal action against respondent. Again, we think it unlikely that Judge Fowler would have spoken in this way had she known the conversation was being recorded. For these reasons, we accept as true Judge Fowler's testimony that she did not see a tape recorder during the conversation. According to Judge Fowler, upon entering the office she looked around the room and on respondent's desk for a tape recorder, because she had been advised [that respondent] taped meetings. She did not see one, although she did recall that the room was not unpacked and quite cluttered. It is nearly impossible to square this testimony with respondent's claim that she removed the tape recorder from her pocket and placed it on her desk. We would have to believe that, as the two women continued to converse with no noticeable break in the conversation, respondent removed the tape recorder from her pocket, fiddled with it, and set it on her desk  yet Judge Fowler observed nothing. Judge Fowler also testified that the last part of the conversation took place in the hallway, not in the office. According to Judge Fowler, after respondent signed some vouchers for computers for the probate court, Fowler left the office and began walking down the hallway to the elevator. Respondent then came out of her office and down the hall, seeking to ask Judge Fowler a few more questions about possible legal action against respondent. Judge Fowler testified that at this point respondent stood very close to her, and appeared intense, anxious, and agitated. She also testified that no tape recorder was visible while they spoke in the hallway. According to respondent, this final exchange occurred in her office, not in the hallway. As evidence, she points to the brief pause in the conversation, arguing that Judge Fowler would not have had time to walk from the office to the elevator during those few seconds. Regardless of how far down the hallway Judge Fowler walked, however, the tape supports Fowler's testimony that she left the office and respondent followed and called after her. Standing alone, each of respondent's explanations  that the early part of the conversation was taped by accident, that she had the tape recorder in plain view on her desk, and that Judge Fowler was mistaken about the conversation in front of the elevator  might be plausible. Strung together, however, the overall story is simply not credible. We are asked to believe that after respondent met Judge Fowler on the way upstairs, the tape recorder in her pocket accidentally turned on; that upon entering the office, respondent took out the tape recorder and attempted to turn it on, then set it on the desk without being observed by Judge Fowler, even though Judge Fowler was looking for a tape recorder; and that Judge Fowler's detailed and clear recollection of the conversation in the hallway was entirely mistaken. The inescapable conclusion is that respondent taped the conversation between Judge Fowler and herself without letting Judge Fowler know, either by telling her or by placing the tape recorder in plain view. We therefore find that respondent knowingly made false statements at the VACJ hearings. All three statements quoted above are inconsistent with respondent's surreptitious taping of her meeting with Judge Fowler. Unlike the Board, we see no meaningful differences among the statements. Although phrased differently, each statement was essentially a denial of the allegation that respondent had taped other people without their knowledge. Based on the facts found above, respondent must have known that these denials were false. Cf. In re Carver, 192 Wis.2d 136, 531 N.W.2d 62, 68 (1995) (judge disciplined for denying that defendant had contacted court or asked for special treatment, where evidence showed that defendant had written to judge and asked for his assistance). We agree with the Board that making these false statements violated Canons 1 and 2A of the Code of Judicial Conduct.