Opinion ID: 1420029
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (BFOQ) Defense

Text: Employer next argues that, even if [Employer] ... had the intention to discriminate against Shaw, its business necessities justified its actions because there were no reasonable accommodations or feasible alternatives to hiring a replacement. (Emphasis omitted.) We disagree. HRS § 378-3(2) (1993) provides in relevant part: Exceptions. Nothing in this part shall be deemed to ... [p]rohibit or prevent the establishment and maintenance of bona fide occupational qualifications [BFOQ] reasonably necessary to the normal operation of a particular business or enterprise, and that have a substantial relationship to the functions and responsibilities of prospective or continued employment. (Emphasis in original.) Thus, the language of HRS § 378-3(2) indicates that the BFOQ defense is limited to instances where sex discrimination is: (1) reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business; and (2) substantially related to the functions of the position in question. Based upon the plain language of HRS § 378-3(2) and the legislative history underlying our employment discrimination law discussed above, the statute prohibits the use of general subjective employment standards and mandates BFOQs that are objective and verifiable. Together with the term occupational, the substantially related clause indicates that these objective and verifiable BFOQs must concern job-related skills and aptitudes. By modifying qualification with occupational, the legislature narrowed the BFOQ defense to qualifications that affect an employee's ability to do the job. [12] Despite the language of the BFOQ defense, Employer argues, in essence, that its small size (two employees) justifies its no-leave policy. This contention is inconsistent with our interpretation of the BFOQ defense. Employer's decision to discharge Shaw and subsequent refusal to reinstate her was unrelated to her ability to fulfill the duties of office manager. In fact, at the time Shaw sought reinstatement on October 23, 1992, the record indicates that Shaw, who had mastered seventy-five to eighty percent of the duties of office manager, was more qualified and experienced than either of her subsequent replacements, who had no experience. Because the action taken against Shaw was unrelated to her ability to perform the job, the BFOQ defense is inapposite and does not protect Employer. Employer also argues that HRS § 378-2(1)(A) should not be applied to two-person employers because it relegates them (1) to the impossible feat of finding and training an inexperienced temporary worker or (2) the unreasonable obligation of one person performing two jobs for seven weeks. We disagree. In enacting the employment discrimination law, the legislature intended that all employers, regardless of size, be subjected to its provisions. HRS § 378-1 (1993) provides in relevant part: Employer means any person, including the State or any of its political subdivisions and any agent of such person, having one or more employee, but shall not include the United States. (Emphases added.) Based upon this language, Employer's contention is without merit. In addition, we note that Employer would not have worsened its position had it reinstated Shaw as required by HAR § 12-46-108. Although Employer cites the high learning curve of the position as a justification for its actions against Shaw, both Funari and Wolfert were inexperienced in the area. In contrast, Shaw had mastered seventy-five to eighty percent of the office manager's duties and could have feasibly resumed her duties at the time she sought reinstatement on October 23, 1992. Therefore, we hold that the circuit court correctly upheld the Commission's conclusion that the actions against Shaw were not justified by a BFOQ.