Opinion ID: 77609
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Timeliness of Sexual Harassment Claim

Text: 14 The magistrate judge granted Louisiana-Pacific summary judgment on Chambless's sexual harassment claim, dismissing it as untimely. We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Weeks v. Harden Mfg. Corp., 291 F.3d 1307, 1311 (11th Cir. 2002). Summary judgment is appropriate only if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV.P. 56(c). 15 Discrete acts of harassment actionable as unlawful employment practices, such as Louisiana-Pacific's failure to promote and retaliation, fell within the limitations period. However, the non-discrete acts making up her hostile work environment claim — which are not individually actionable — fell outside the limitations period. 1 The magistrate judge determined that timely discrete acts of discrimination could not save untimely non-discrete acts, relying on Porter v. California Department of Corrections, 419 F.3d 885, 892-93 (9th Cir.2005). 16 In National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002), the Supreme Court set forth general principles to determine whether timely acts can save non-timely acts. It held that discrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred, even when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113, 122 S.Ct. 2061. The limitations period begins running the day the discrete act occurs. Id. In contrast, hostile work environment claims continue to occur over time. Id. at 117, 122 S.Ct. 2061. Thus, the entire time period of the hostile environment may be considered by a court for the purposes of determining liability if an act relating to the claim occurred within the filing period. Id. at 120, 122 S.Ct. 2061. 17 Where the discrete act is sufficiently related to a hostile work environment claim so that it may be fairly considered part of the same claim, it can form the basis for consideration of untimely, non-discrete acts that are part of the same claim. The pivotal question is whether the timely discrete acts are sufficiently related to the hostile work environment claim. Here, the discrete acts do not meet that test. The circumstances surrounding Louisiana-Pacific's failure to promote and retaliation against Chambless do not suggest that those discrete acts were the same type of discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that characterized the untimely allegations. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993). The timely discrete acts are thus not part of the sexual harassment hostile work environment claim and therefore cannot save the earlier, untimely acts that comprise that claim. 18 Once the magistrate judge dismissed the federal sexual harassment charge, Chambless was required to establish some other underlying tort in order to prevail in her state law claims for negligent training, supervision, and retention. See Univ. Fed. Credit Union v. Grayson, 878 So.2d 280, 291 (Ala.2003) (noting that a party alleging negligent supervision and hiring must prove the underlying wrongful conduct). Chambless argues that certain discriminatory acts that she alleged constituted assault and battery and invasion of privacy. The statute of limitations for those torts is two years. ALA.CODE § 6-2-38( l ), (n) (1975). The alleged acts that Chambless argues constituted assault and battery and invasion of privacy occurred more than two years prior to the date she filed her complaint, rendering them untimely. Chambless thus failed to prove an underlying state or federal tort. The magistrate judge properly dismissed the state law claims. 19 III. Magistrate Judge's Jurisdiction over Retaliation Claim 20 Chambless argues that she did not expressly consent to the magistrate judge's jurisdiction over her retaliation claim, as she did for her earlier action, and that consolidation of her complaints did not cure that defect. She concludes that the magistrate judge lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the second complaint and it should be remanded for trial before an Article III judge. 21 Although we have required that consent to a magistrate judge's jurisdiction be express and on the record, Rembert v. Apfel, 213 F.3d 1331, 1334 (11th Cir.2000), the Supreme Court held in Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580, 123 S.Ct. 1696, 155 L.Ed.2d 775 (2003), that consent to a magistrate judge's jurisdiction can be inferred from a party's conduct during litigation. Id. at 582, 123 S.Ct. 1696. The Court refused to adopt a bright-line rule requiring express consent, instead accepting implied consent where . . . the litigant or counsel was made aware of the need for consent and the right to refuse it, and still voluntarily appeared to try the case before the Magistrate Judge. Id. at 589-90, 123 S.Ct. 1696. 22 Chambless consented to the magistrate judge's jurisdiction over her original case and thus knew of the need for consent and the right to refuse it. She made no objection to the magistrate judge's jurisdiction over her retaliation claim for eight months, waiting instead until six days prior to trial. Eight months of continual participation in pretrial proceedings justifies the inference of consent from a litigant aware of the need to consent. 23 AFFIRMED.