Opinion ID: 1707183
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: whether the trial court erred in sustaining the objection to the questioning of witness sherry lynn wilson concerning the arrest of tammy giles, the victim's mother, and in placing conditions upon the ability of the defense to call tammy giles as an adverse witness.

Text: ś 230. Evans argues that the trial court erred in sustaining the State's objection to the cross-examination of defense witness Sherry Lynn Wilson, therefore prohibiting Evans from questioning Wilson about the arrest of Tammy Giles, Beatrice's mother. The record reveals that defense counsel conceded that Evans intended to call Tammy Giles as an adverse witness. As a result, the trial court ruled that questioning regarding the arrest of Tammy Giles as an accessory before the fact to sexual battery should be developed through Giles and not Wilson. ś 231. Evans now argues there was no legal basis for the ruling by the trial judge and that the fact that the defense intended to call Giles as an adverse witness should not have precluded questioning Wilson about Giles' arrest. Despite his argument regarding the thwarted cross-examination of Wilson, Evans cites no authority to support his contentions. An assignment of error, unsupported by any authority, `lacks persuasion' on review. Williams v. State, 684 So.2d 1179, 1202 (Miss.1996) ( quoting Johnson v. State, 626 So.2d 631, 634 (Miss.1993)); Smith v. State, 430 So.2d 406, 407 (Miss. 1983); cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1033, 111 S.Ct. 694, 112 L.Ed.2d 685 (1991). ś 232. The record reveals the trial court denied Evans' attempted cross-examination of Wilson on the grounds of relevancy. A trial judge enjoys a great deal of discretion as to the relevancy and admissibility of evidence. Unless the judge abuses his discretion so as to be prejudicial to the accused, the Court will not reverse this ruling. Fisher v. State, 690 So.2d 268, 274 (Miss.1996)( quoting Shearer v. State, 423 So.2d 824, 826 (Miss.1982)). ś 233. Relevant evidence is defined by M.R.E. 401 as evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. However, [a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the ... needless presentation of cumulative evidence. M.R.E. 403. ś 234. Defense counsel argued that he wished to question Wilson about Giles' arrest, however, during the bench conference counsel admitted that he intended to call Giles as an adverse witness. The trial court then ruled that the information sought by counsel should be inquired about by questioning Giles, rather than Wilson. Having voiced their intentions to call Giles as an adverse witness, this line of questioning of Wilson was clearly cumulative and was properly excluded by the trial court. There was no abuse of discretion. ś 235. Evans also argues that the trial court placed legally-insupportable conditions on the defendant's ability to call Giles at the guilt-innocence phase of the trial. Evans wished to call Giles to testify as to her statements made to law enforcement during August 1991 wherein Giles indicated that she allowed her daughter to go with Evans and perform sexual favors in order to obtain money for the family. Specifically, Evans argues that the trial court ruled that the defense could call Giles only if she conceded the facts in her police statements, and not if the defense merely intended to cross examine her with those statements, which he termed hearsay. ś 236. After completing its case-in-chief, the State made a motion in limine seeking to prohibit the defense from calling witnesses Brad Necaise and Tammy Giles on the ground that the testimony of these witnesses was irrelevant. After entertaining argument on the motion, the trial court overruled the State's motion as to Necaise, but partially granted the motion with regard to Giles. During the argument on the motion, defense counsel addressed the relevancy of Giles' testimony as follows: It all goes to the question of inveiglement. The mother allowed the child to go, she knew what she was going for, and the point is what we're getting at is we're attacking the underlying felony in this matter of kidnapping. That there was a consensual letting the child go regardless of the homicide aspect of this. There is the underlying felony of kidnapping which we have a right to introduce evidence concerning the issue of whether or not there was in fact inveiglement of the victim in this matter. ś 237. In response to argument by the State that parental consent was irrelevant to the kidnapping of a child over the age of ten years of age pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-53, defense counsel additionally argued that: The statement by Tammy Giles says that Beatrice Routh on her own came up with the idea of going with Mr. Evans for the purpose of obtaining money, that she disagreed with her but she allowed her to go. That this was something thatâ that according to the mother, was dreamed up in the mind of the victim. And it goes to show the victim's state of mind in this thing and her intentions and the intentions of her mother. They discussed the matter. After hearing argument by counsel, the trial court indicated that their were hearsay problems with Giles' testimony. Specifically, the trial judge voiced his concerns over whether Giles would admit or deny the content of her prior statements. The court stated: If she says that that's fine, but if she doesn't say that on the stand I'm looking at an issue as the ground rules have been laid by Mr. Smith that he anticipates, or Mr. Martin, one or the other, he anticipates attacking her with this 12, 14-day old statement in the event she doesn't say that. So I agree with you on the first part. If she comes up here and swears that's what was in the girl's mind at that time that's fine, but I don't know as to whether or not you can attack her. When asked by the trial judge exactly what Giles was expected to testify to, defense counsel indicated that Giles had refused to speak to them. The trial judge then directed the district attorney to instruct Giles to speak with defense counsel. Defense counsel spoke with Giles, and announced they would not call her during the guilt-innocence phase, but would do so during the sentencing phase. ś 238. No proffer as to the content of Giles' testimony was made nor was a definite ruling secured from the trial judge on this issue. From the record, the trial court did not deny Evans the right to call Giles as an adverse witness, but rather simply made cautionary observations about the hearsay problems with testimony defense counsel sought to elicit from Giles. After speaking with Giles, defense counsel announced that they would not call Giles. ś 239. In Gayten v. State, 595 So.2d 409, 413 (Miss.1992), this Court held that the failure to seek a definitive ruling on objections or to seek corrective action by the defendant waives the issue for the purposes of appeal. See also Cole v. State, 525 So.2d 365, 369 (Miss.1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 934, 109 S.Ct. 330, 102 L.Ed.2d 348 (1988), reh'g denied, 488 U.S. 1023, 109 S.Ct. 826, 102 L.Ed.2d 815 (1989); Cummings v. State, 465 So.2d 993, 996 (Miss.1985). Moreover, this Court has repeatedly held that when testimony is excluded at trial, a record must be made of the proffered testimony in order to preserve the point for appeal. Gates v. State, 484 So.2d 1002, 1008 (Miss.1986). In Settles v. State, 584 So.2d 1260, 1265 (Miss. 1991), this Court stated if a proffer is required in the face of an erroneous ruling, surely no less is required to preserve the issue where no ruling is made. Evans' failure to seek a definite ruling by the trial court combined with the lack of a proffer of Giles' testimony waives this issue. This issue is without merit.