Opinion ID: 2529919
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Validity of the Services by Publication

Text: ¶ 99 When personal jurisdiction is obtained in a proceeding under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 2006)), that jurisdiction continues until the matter is resolved. In re M.W., 232 Ill.2d at 428-29, 328 Ill.Dec. 868, 905 N.E.2d 757; In re Abner P., 347 Ill. App.3d 903, 908, 283 Ill.Dec. 304, 807 N.E.2d 1145 (2004). Thus, when personal jurisdiction is obtained prior to adjudication, it is not necessary to reestablish that jurisdiction prior to termination. Relying on this rule, the appellate court below held that the September 2006 service by publication was valid and, therefore, there was no need to address the validity of the November 2007 publication notice: We find the trial court obtained personal jurisdiction over respondent by publication prior to adjudication. Since service by publication was valid, the court acquired personal jurisdiction over respondent for the entire proceeding. In re Abner P., 347 Ill.App.3d 903, 908 [283 Ill.Dec. 304], 807 N.E.2d 1145, 1150 (2004). Thus, we need not address the issue of service by publication at the time of termination. No. 4-10-0267, slip op. at 14 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). ¶ 100 Before this court, both respondent and the State recognize that respondent was twice served by publication and that the validity of the November 2007 notice will only be at issue if respondent can first establish the invalidity of the September 2006 notice. The majority, however, does not distinguish between the two publication notices. Instead, the majority conducts its analysis as if respondent was served only once and then, at the conclusion of its opinion, holds that this single service by publication was invalid because no diligent inquiry was conducted. Supra ¶ 85 (Because the requisite diligent inquiry was not performed, the State's service by publication was defective and did not confer personal jurisdiction to the trial court, rendering its judgment void.). ¶ 101 In so holding, the majority relies on facts that have no relevance to the adequacy of the September 2006 notice. For example, the majority notes that a separate child support complaint was filed against respondent in McLean County while the termination action was proceeding. The majority concludes that the Department failed to follow up on personal information regarding respondent attached to the complaint and for this reason, as well as others, that the Department failed to conduct the required diligent inquiry. Supra ¶ 80. However, the child support complaint was not filed until November 6, 2007, over a year after the first publication notice was issued. Thus, the complaint can have no bearing on the validity of the diligent inquiry conducted prior to the issuance of the September 2006 notice. ¶ 102 The validity of the two publication notices should be addressed separately. Like the appellate court, I would first consider whether the September 2006 notice was valid and then, if necessary, consider the validity of the November 2007 notice.