Opinion ID: 1928806
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Ethical Concerns

Text: Olive next asserts that certain provisions of section 27.711 and the contract, on their face, would compel an appointed attorney to violate ethical duties with respect to the representation of a death row client. We find Olive's arguments unpersuasive. First, we address the provisions in the statute which address repetitive, frivolous or successive claims. [8] Olive maintains that adhering to these provisions would cause him to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct. Specifically, Olive asserts that these restrictions would prohibit him from acting as a zealous advocate by, for example, preventing him from asserting a claim based on a change in the law applicable retroactively, or arguing for the expansion or modification of existing law. This contention lacks merit because the rules themselves prohibit a lawyer from asserting frivolous or successive claims. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.850; R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-3.1. Moreover, the claims which he asserts he would be unable to present are not claims which would be deemed frivolous, successive or repetitive. Resultantly, this contention is wholly without merit. [9] With respect to the provision directed to the scope of representation, Olive again maintains that compliance therewith would trigger a violation of his ethical obligations as an advocate. [10] We have previously addressed and rejected a similar argument in State ex rel. Butterworth v. Kenny, 714 So.2d 404 (Fla.1998). In that case, we reviewed the attorney general's petition to prevent CCRC attorneys representing death row inmates from filing civil actions in federal court on behalf of their respective clients. In that case we ultimately concluded: In creating CCRC and the right to representation for capital defendants in postconviction relief proceedings, the Florida legislature has made a choice, based on difficult policy considerations and the allocation of scarce legal resources, to limit the representation of CCRC by (1) prohibiting that representation from extending to representation during trials, resentencings, proceedings commenced under chapter 940, or civil litigation,  § 27.7001 (emphasis added); and (2) providing that such representation shall be for the sole purpose of instituting and prosecuting collateral actions challenging the legality of the judgment and sentence imposed.  § 27.702(1) (emphasis added). In our view, the statute empowers CCRC with the authority to challenge the validity of a capital defendant's conviction and sentence only through traditional postconviction relief proceedings in criminal and quasi-criminal proceedings. Kenny, 714 So.2d at 408. Because the Legislature created this registry of attorneys to alleviate CCRC's workload, it is clear that registry attorneys stand in a position similar to CCRC lawyers. It is further clear that the Legislature obviously sought to impose the same restrictions on the scope of representation by both types of capital collateral attorneys. Given our conclusions in Kenny (i.e., upholding the same restrictions on representation by CCRC), and taking into account that those same restrictions were imposed on registry attorneys by the Legislature, we find no compelling reason to reach a different result in this case. Thus, we uphold these restrictions on the scope of representation based on the reasoning in Kenny. Finally, we address Olive's challenge to the provision of the contract dealing with access to records. [11] Olive suggests that this proviso in the contract would force him to violate his clients' confidences by requiring him to turn over privileged or confidential documents. The contract clearly does not contemplate such result. Rather, this provision of the contract refers to public records  subject to  chapter 119, Florida Statutes (1987), and in Kight v. Dugger, 574 So.2d 1066, 1069 (1990), we squarely held that: [F]iles in the possession of CCR in furtherance of its representation of an indigent client are not subject to public disclosure under chapter 119. To hold otherwise would subject the records of a defendant who is unable to retain private collateral representation to public disclosure while those of a defendant represented by private counsel would be immune from such disclosure. We find no reason to not extend the holding and rationale in Kight to registry attorneys who stand in a corresponding position with CCR (currently CCRC) attorneys. This view was admitted by respondent Maas when he acknowledged that the public access provision of the contract is limited by our holding in Kight. See Answer Brief of Appellee at 18 n. 9. Thus, adopting the reasoning in Kight, and extending it to apply to registry attorneys, we conclude that files in the possession of registry attorneys in furtherance of their representation of indigent postconviction clients are similarly not subject to public disclosure pursuant to chapter 119.