Opinion ID: 867577
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Joinder of Armenta and Vicari counts

Text: ¶ 28 The defendant filed a motion to sever the Armenta counts from the Vicari murder charge. After hearing argument, Judge Velasco issued a minute entry denying the defense motion to sever, with no explanation. On the record, the trial judge stated that his decision was based on motive. The motion was re-stated based on the weakness of Armenta's identification of her attacker. The state argued that there was other evidence of identity. At that point, the trial judge once again denied the motion to sever. A denial of severance is reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Murray, 184 Ariz. 9, 25, 906 P.2d 542, 558 (1995).
¶ 29 It is unclear from the record which subsection of Rule 13.3(a) [2] of our Rules of Criminal Procedure formed the basis for the trial judge's determination allowing consolidation of the Vicari murder with the Armenta kidnaping and aggravated assault. Ariz. R.Crim. P. 13.3(a). We will briefly discuss each of the subsections. ¶ 30 Cases joined under Rule 13.3(a)(1) must be severed upon request unless the evidence on the joined count would be admissible in a separate trial on the other count. Ariz. R.Crim. P. 13.4(b). In other words, since the defendant requested severance, subsection (a)(1) could not support consolidation unless the trial judge believed the evidence was cross-admissible. [3] ¶ 31 As to Rule 13.3(a)(2), the state now concedes that the Vicari murder and the Armenta crimes did not involve the same conduct. Further, although the prosecutor argued for joinder under 13.3(a)(3) at trial, the state acknowledges on appeal that under our current Ives standard, such joinder would not be appropriate. State v. Ives, 187 Ariz. 102, 106-08, 927 P.2d 762, 766-68 (1996). This means the only unanswered question is whether the Vicari and Armenta offenses were otherwise connected together in their commission under Rule 13.3(a)(2). ¶ 32 The otherwise connected together in their commission language addresses whether evidence of the two crimes was so intertwined and related that much the same evidence was relevant to and would prove both, and the crimes themselves arose out of a series of connected acts. See State v. Williams, 183 Ariz. 368, 375-77, 904 P.2d 437, 444-46 (1995) (murder of first victim consolidated with armed robbery and attempted murder of second victim where attempted murder occurred after the murder, and by the defendant's own statements was to silence a witness who he believed had implicated him in the first murder); State v. Comer, 165 Ariz. 413, 418-20, 799 P.2d 333, 338-40 (1990) (murder and armed robbery of one victim consolidated under Rule 13.3(a)(2) and (3) with series of crimes perpetrated on victims two and three where temporal proximity existed between the two sets of crimes and they were a series of events connected by the common purpose of obtaining money and supplies); State v. Martinez-Villareal, 145 Ariz. 441, 446-47, 702 P.2d 670, 675-76 (1985) (two murder charges properly joined with burglary charge where the murder weapons came from the burglary). ¶ 33 The crimes against the two victims here were not intertwined. The Vicari murder and the Armenta kidnaping and assault were not provable by most of the same evidence, and they did not arise out of a series of connected acts. As far as we can discern from this record, the criminal acts against Vicari were quite distinct from those against Armenta. ¶ 34 In addition, in Ives we clarified that the term common scheme or plan was to be interpreted narrowly so as to define the distinction between same or similar character and common scheme or plan. Ives, 187 Ariz. at 107-08, 927 P.2d at 767-68 (We adopt this narrower definition because any other result blends Rule 13.3(a)(1) ... and Rule 13.3(a)(3) ... beyond recognition. If common scheme is merely a `visual connection' manifested by `similarities where one would expect differences,' Rule 13.3(a)(3) becomes a detour around defendant's right to sever offenses joined because they are similar.). ¶ 35 Likewise, Rule 13.3(a)(2) should be interpreted narrowly. We reject the state's suggestion that Rule 13.3(a)(2) is a catch-all for cases in which some logical connection exists between unrelated crimes. Viewing otherwise connected together in their commission as a catch-all would similarly make Rule 13.3(a)(2) a detour around defendant's right to sever offenses joined because they are similar. Id. ¶ 36 Under the foregoing standard, we find the trial judge's decision to deny severance an abuse of discretion.
¶ 37 The trial judge noted identity and motive stemming from the evidence of other acts as his reasons for allowing consolidation. Other acts evidence must be evaluated under Rule 404(b) of the Rules of Evidence. [4] For other act evidence to be admissible, it must be shown by the clear and convincing standard that the act was committed and that the defendant committed it. State v. Terrazas, 189 Ariz. 580, 582, 944 P.2d 1194, 1196 (1997). ¶ 38 The identity exception to Rule 404 is applicable only where the pattern and characteristics of the crimes ... are so unusual and distinctive as to be like a signature. State v. Stuard, 176 Ariz. 589, 597, 863 P.2d 881, 889 (1993) (citations omitted); see also State v. Jackson, 186 Ariz. 20, 27, 918 P.2d 1038, 1045 (1996) ([T]he modus operandi of and the circumstances surrounding the two crimes must be sufficiently similar as to be like a signature.) (citations omitted). ¶ 39 Here, very little is known about what happened to the murder victim because her body has never been found. She was a nineteen-year-old college student seen in a bar with the defendant. Two days later her severed arms were discovered in a dumpster. It is unknown if she was sexually assaulted prior to being murdered or what the cause or circumstance of death may have been. Tabitha Armenta was a thirty-five-year-old street prostitute involved with drugs when she was detained by a man against her will, threatened with a knife, and ultimately released. Her attacker threatened to cut her up and leave her or scatter her body. He rubbed a knife on her body and told her that threatening women excited him. ¶ 40 In addition, there is insufficient evidence regarding the Vicari murder to conclude that the crimes against the two victims were so unusual and distinctive as to be like a signature. Stuard, 176 Ariz. at 597, 863 P.2d at 889 (citations omitted). There is no evidence in this record to indicate that Vicari was sexually assaulted or that her attacker was sexually gratified by threatening women. We know neither the extent to which Vicari was injured prior to her death nor the cause of death. We do know that she was not released unharmed. ¶ 41 Any connection between the two crimes is attenuated at best. The most that can be said is that each occurred in Tucson at the end of 1992, each involved a female victim, and a knife or knives were utilized by the perpetrator(s) at some point during commission of the crimes. These few factors are insufficient to suggest a signature crime. Arizona law requires a more clear connection to support a Rule 404 exception based on identity. [5] ¶ 42 Motive, also indicated by the trial judge, is another exception to the general rule that other act evidence is generally inadmissible. Ariz. R. Evid. 404(b). The state argued that both the Vicari murder and the Armenta crimes were sexually motivated and involved the defendant's desire to terrorize, rape, kill, and dismember women. The state cited the defendant's many statements to family members, cellmates, and others of having picked up women, having threatened them with a knife or machete, and having thought about killing the victims to support its sexual motivation theory. The prosecutor argued this connection in closing argument, saying Vicari was probably also raped, both Armenta and Vicari were brunette[s] with blue eyes, and defendant's fantasies about picking up a young girl and cutting her up is exactly what happened to [Vicari]. ¶ 43 These are statements that essentially amount to aberrant sexual propensity evidence under Evidence Rule 404(c) which cannot be admitted, much less argued, without specific findings. [6] The defendant was not charged with a sexual offense regarding Vicari. His general threats to do harm have little probative value when not specifically directed at a particular victim. State v. Hughes, 189 Ariz. 62, 71, 938 P.2d 457, 466 (1997); State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 593, 858 P.2d 1152, 1196 (1993). Without more, the state has not satisfied the requisite burden by which to justify Rule 404(c) findings. Therefore, evidence introduced in support of the Armenta counts should not have been admitted in the Vicari murder trial. ¶ 44 It is reasonably clear that the state's evidence in support of the Armenta counts does no more than raise an inference that the defendant acted in conformity with a negative view of women ... [and] this type of evidence is prohibited by Rule 404(a). Hughes, 189 Ariz. at 71-72, 938 P.2d at 466-67. Because evidence of these separate crimes was not cross-admissible under Rule 404, and joinder was not permitted under Rule 13.3(a), severance of the counts relating to Vicari and Armenta was denied in error. [7]