Opinion ID: 2633019
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Supreme Court's clarification of Almendarez-Torres in Jones, Apprendi, and Cunningham.

Text: One year later, in Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 248, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999), the Court clarified its holding in Almendarez-Torres, as follows: [ Almendarez-Torres ], decided last Term, stands for the proposition that not every fact expanding a penalty range must be stated in a felony indictment, the precise holding being that recidivism increasing the maximum penalty need not be so charged. In this regard, Almendarez-Torres stressed the history of treating recidivism as a sentencing factor, and noted that, with perhaps one exception, Congress had never clearly made prior conviction an offense element where the offense conduct, in the absence of recidivism, was independently unlawful. Id. at 235, 118 S.Ct. 1219. The Court then distinguished Jones from Almendarez-Torres by observing that (1) Jones was concerned with the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial and not alone the rights to indictment and notice as claimed by the defendant in Almendarez-Torres, and (2) Almendarez-Torres rested in substantial part on the tradition of regarding recidivism as a sentencing factor, not as an element to be set out in the indictment. Jones, 526 U.S. at 248-49, 119 S.Ct. 1215; see id. at 232, 119 S.Ct. 1215 (Because of features arguably distinguishing this case from [ Almendarez-Torres ], we granted certiorari, . . . and now reverse.). One basis for that possible constitutional distinctiveness is not hard to see: unlike virtually any other consideration used to enlarge the possible penalty for an offense, and certainly unlike the factor before us in this case, a prior conviction must itself have been established through procedures satisfying fair notice, reasonable doubt, and jury trial guarantees. Id. at 249, 118 S.Ct. 1219. A little over a year after Jones was decided, the Court in Apprendi expressly declined to address the issue of whether the indictment in that case was sufficient pursuant to its decision in Almendarez-Torres, inasmuch as the Fifth Amendment right to presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury was not implicated by the issues raised by the parties in Apprendi. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477 n. 3, 120 S.Ct. 2348; [2] but see id. at 489 n. 15, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (The indictment must contain an allegation of every fact which is legally essential to the punishment to be inflicted.). In Cunningham, the Supreme Court referred to its Almendarez-Torres decision in passing when it recited its holding in Apprendi. See Cunningham, 549 U.S. at ___, 127 S.Ct. at 864. Similar to Apprendi, however, Cunningham likewise implicated the federal constitution's jury-trial guarantee, 549 U.S. at ___, 127 S.Ct. at 860, and not the Fifth Amendment's presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477 n. 3, 120 S.Ct. 2348.