Opinion ID: 3179278
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exclusion of Defense Expert Testimony

Text: Masters contends that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding as irrelevant the proffered expert testimony of a witness familiar with prison culture. The Court of Appeal rejected a similar challenge to this relevancy ruling in Johnson‘s and Woodard‘s appeal. (Johnson, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at pp. 786– 791; see also People v. McDowell (2012) 54 Cal.4th 395, 426–427 [discussing Johnson].) We reach the same conclusion here. 44 During the guilt phase, Masters sought to introduce the testimony of John Irwin, a sociologist who studied prison culture and prison social organizations. Outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel made an offer of proof that Dr. Irwin could describe what prison life was like. Dr. Irwin would testify that prisoners often create elaborate fantasies and embellish their accomplishments. Dr. Irwin would also testify that prisoners often falsely claim to have committed criminal acts and often provide to the authorities information about criminal acts committed by others in exchange for some sort of benefit. The trial court ultimately sustained the prosecutor‘s relevance objection to Dr. Irwin‘s proposed testimony, finding that the proffered evidence addressed only prison conditions generally and did not specifically relate to Masters, Johnson, Woodard, or any witness. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Dr. Irwin‘s proffered testimony. The trial court did not doubt that Dr. Irwin possessed sufficient education or experience as to qualify as an expert in prison conditions, or that his knowledge of prison conditions was sufficiently beyond common experience. Rather, the trial court found that there was no logical connection between the proffered testimony and Masters‘s case. For example, the trial court stated that it did not see the relevance of Dr. Irwin‘s proffered testimony ―unless he knows it for a fact that it was Mr. Masters who lied when he wrote [the report that incriminated him].‖ The trial court saw no relevance in Dr. Irwin‘s proposed testimony because it was too generalized and speculative, and did not demonstrate any tendency to prove that Masters had lied: ―We‘re not having a sociological study in this courtroom about what happens in prisons.‖ As the trial court correctly noted, Masters failed to link Dr. Irwin‘s proffered testimony to any of the defendants. Although the proffered testimony referred to prison conditions generally, it did not establish that Dr. Irwin had reviewed the 45 specific facts of the case and had formed an opinion about it. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the link between Dr. Irwin‘s proffered testimony and Masters‘s case too speculative. Masters‘s reliance on People v. McDonald (1984) 37 Cal.3d 351 is misplaced. In McDonald, the defendant proffered expert psychological testimony about the reliability of eyewitness identification, which the trial court excluded. (Id. at p. 361.) We held that the trial court had abused its discretion because the eyewitness identification in that case was a key factor that was not substantially corroborated by other evidence, and the proffered testimony was not likely to be fully known or understood by the jury. (Id. at p. 377.) McDonald does not help Masters because the expert in that case had reviewed the various eyewitnesses‘ identification and intended to highlight psychological factors that might have affected their specific identifications. (Id. at p. 362.) Here, by contrast, Masters‘s proffered testimony failed to indicate any particular factors that tended to prove that he, Johnson, or Woodard had falsely admitted to participating in Sergeant Burchfield‘s murder. Masters contends that the trial court‘s ruling implied that Dr. Irwin could not testify unless he offered an opinion as to the credibility of a particular witness, which likely would have invaded the province of the jury. But that is not a necessary implication of the trial court‘s ruling. The trial court simply determined that the proffered testimony did not indicate any specific factors associated with any person involved with the case and would have invited the jury to speculate based on generalized notions about prison conditions. To the extent Masters contends that Dr. Irwin was an expert in gang sociology and therefore should have been permitted to testify on that basis, the proffered evidence did not demonstrate that Dr. Irwin had specialized knowledge or experience with the BGF or any other gang associated with the case. 46 Finally, Masters notes that Dr. Irwin was permitted to testify as an expert in prison culture and conditions in People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 293–294. In Ayala, however, Dr. Irwin testified during the penalty phase; the conditions of that defendant‘s confinement were plainly relevant to his case in mitigation. The relevance of such evidence at the guilt phase is another matter. And, as noted, Dr. Irwin did testify on Masters‘s behalf during the penalty phase. C. Exclusion of Evidence of Another Prison Gang’s Possible Involvement in the Murder Masters contends that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding evidence that implied that Crips members actually murdered Sergeant Burchfield.
Defense counsel sought to examine a correctional officer about various notes found in the prison that claimed responsibility for Sergeant Burchfield‘s murder. These notes were turned over to the prison‘s investigators but were apparently lost. Outside the presence of the jury, the officer testified that he recalled one such note was found in a section of the prison different from where Sergeant Burchfield was murdered. Its opening salutation was ―cuz,‖ which was a term predominantly used by Crips members to refer to each other. The note said, in pertinent part, ―We killed the dog,‖ which the officer understood to refer to Sergeant Burchfield‘s murder. The officer also saw at least 10 other notes claiming responsibility for Sergeant Burchfield‘s murder. The trial court precluded the officer from testifying about the note, finding that its author and origins were unknown and that it might have been written merely to confuse the investigation. Although the precise legal basis for the trial court‘s ruling is unclear from the record, the court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of this note. As an out-of-court statement offered for the truth of the matter it stated, the contents 47 of the note were hearsay, which generally is inadmissible. (Evid. Code, § 1200.) Masters argued in the trial court that evidence of the note was nonetheless admissible as a declaration against the author‘s penal interest. (See id., § 1230.) As the trial court observed, however, the note‘s author and origins were unknown, so the note lacked sufficient indicia of reliability as to be admissible on that basis. To the extent Masters contends that the 10 notes were circumstantial evidence that prisoners often falsely admit to crimes they did not commit, there was no evidence establishing the author‘s identity. And, as discussed previously with respect to the proffered expert testimony, generalized evidence that prisoners sometimes lie would have been too speculative to be admissible. (See Evid. Code, § 210.)
Some Crips members believed that prison staff had helped a rival gang kill one of its members named Montgomery. As noted, immediately after Sergeant Burchfield‘s murder, someone yelled, ―Let‘s get another one for Montgomery.‖ Defense counsel sought to examine a correctional officer about whether Montgomery had been a leader in the Crips. The trial court twice sustained the prosecutor‘s objections that the defense had failed to establish an adequate foundation for the questions. The officer eventually testified that sometime after Sergeant Burchfield‘s murder he had ―heard‖ Montgomery had been a leader in the Crips. Defense counsel asked the officer if he knew as of the time of the trial whether Montgomery was a Crips leader, but the trial court sustained the prosecutor‘s relevance objection. Even if we were to assume the trial court‘s rulings were an abuse of discretion, Masters cannot show prejudice because the officer testified that he heard Montgomery had been a leader in the Crips, and no contrary evidence was 48 presented. Willis also testified Crips members had expressed a desire to murder a correctional officer as revenge for Montgomery‘s death. That the court‘s ruling prevented the officer from testifying whether he knew Montgomery was a leader of the Crips did not prevent Masters from arguing that Crips members had the opportunity and motive to murder Sergeant Burchfield. Nor was the weight of the evidence significantly diminished by the lack of confirmation of Montgomery‘s undisputed status as a leader in the Crips. D. Admission of Evidence of the BGF’s Philosophy Masters contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of the BGF‘s ―extremist, violent and revolutionary‖ philosophy. The prosecutor sought to introduce into evidence material related to the BGF‘s membership, organization, customs, and practices. The trial court ultimately permitted the prosecutor to introduce more than 20 documents, some which were redacted before being provided to the jury. As noted, Willis also testified as an expert about the BGF. ―A trial court may exclude otherwise relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will be unduly prejudicial. ([Evid. Code], § 352.) ‗Prejudice,‘ as used in Evidence Code section 352, is not synonymous with damaging. [Citation.] Rather, it refers to evidence that uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias against the defendant as an individual, and has little to do with the legal issues raised in the trial.‖ (McCurdy, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 1095.) Masters extensively litigated at trial the introduction of this evidence and on appeal asserts in a footnote that ―in particular‖ 25 exhibits ―were erroneously admitted.‖ These exhibits consist almost entirely of notes written or possessed by Masters, Johnson, Woodard, Evans, or other BGF members. 49 Masters‘s broad assertion that all of these documents were ―irrelevant but highly inflammatory‖ is not supported by argument or authority, and he articulates specific challenges to only a few pieces of evidence as ―representative of the inflammatory content of the documents.‖ Notwithstanding his objections at trial to specific documents on various grounds, we are hesitant to consider on appeal Masters‘s conclusory assertion that all of the gang-related evidence was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. (See People v. Booker (2011) 51 Cal.4th 141, 171 (Booker) [declining to ―hazard a guess‖ for the basis of the defendant‘s claim on appeal when around 100 photographs were admitted into evidence at trial].) Masters expressly challenges the admission of a note in his handwriting that described a violent philosophy of the ―black underclass‖; a handwritten document found in Johnson‘s cell entitled ―Organizational Structure‖; a handwritten note in Woodard‘s possession that discussed a race-based revolution; and a typewritten document in Woodard‘s possession entitled ―Subject: Ideology.‖ The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence because, if believed, they tended to prove the intent and motive of Masters, Johnson, or Woodard. These exhibits, while damaging to Masters, were not unduly prejudicial because they were directly related to the legal issues raised in his trial and did not tend to evoke an emotional bias against him. Even if we were to assume that Masters has not abandoned on appeal his challenge to the remaining evidence, his contention would lack merit because our independent review of the admitted exhibits reveals no reversible error. As explained below, much of the evidence relating to the BGF‘s philosophy was relevant to demonstrate the existence and motive of the conspiracy to attack Sergeant Burchfield and was not unduly prejudicial. In People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 299, we held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of BGF activity to which the 50 defendant had no connection. We held that ―[t]he court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the prosecution to explore the nature of prison-gang life in order to elucidate its theory of the case, at least insofar as such testimony was necessary to furnish the jury a context for understanding that theory.‖ (Ibid.) Here, although Masters offered to stipulate that he was a member of the BGF, thereby eliminating the need to prove that fact, the prosecutor was still required to demonstrate the existence of the conspiracy to murder Sergeant Burchfield and Masters‘s role in the conspiracy. (Cf. Booker, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 171 [a prosecutor cannot be forced to accept a stipulation that deprives the state‘s case of its persuasiveness].) The BGF‘s beliefs were relevant evidence of its members‘ motivation to form the conspiracy. For example, Willis testified that Willie Redmond said he ―wanted to start a war by striking, start it off by striking police.‖ And the material introduced by the prosecutor, if believed, tended to prove that the BGF‘s violent philosophy was consistent with the conspiracy that Masters and others had formed. The trial court made a painstaking effort to exclude evidence of the BGF‘s beliefs that were irrelevant or unduly prejudicial. For example, the trial court excluded evidence concerning events from the 1970s in which African American prisoners at San Quentin attacked prison and court staff. Even if we were to assume that the trial court improperly admitted some evidence related to the BGF that should have been excluded, Masters cannot establish that a more favorable outcome would have been reasonably probable had some of this evidence been excluded. (See Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.) Other, properly admitted evidence established the existence of the conspiracy and Masters‘s role within it. For example, Willis testified about the planning meetings he had with Masters and other BGF members; Evans testified that Masters had 51 admitted he voted in favor of the plan to murder Sergeant Burchfield; and a note in Masters‘s handwriting detailed the attack. To the extent Masters contends that evidence concerning the BGF violated his First Amendment rights to free speech and association, we are not persuaded. Because Masters‘s membership in the BGF was relevant to the issues in his case, the introduction of this evidence did not impermissibly burden his First Amendment rights. (See People v. Bivert (2011) 52 Cal.4th 96, 117–118.) E. Nondisclosure of Evidence of Witness Bias Masters contends that the prosecutor failed to fully disclose the benefits Bobby Evans received in exchange for his testimony. Masters also contends that the trial court abused its discretion by not allowing him to reopen his case to further examine Evans about this subject. As noted, Evans testified that Masters, Johnson, and Woodard admitted to him their respective roles in the conspiracy to murder Sergeant Burchfield. Evans testified that Masters voted in favor of the plan to murder Sergeant Burchfield. Evans did not testify under a grant of immunity. At trial, Evans admitted he was awaiting sentencing in Alameda County after pleading guilty to attempted robbery in exchange for a sentence of ―no more than 16 months state prison time,‖ and that 16 months was ―a solid figure.‖ He testified that because he had committed this crime while on parole, his parole had been revoked, and he agreed to serve an additional year on his underlying sentence for violating his parole. After Evans had pleaded guilty, he contacted James Hahn, a parole agent for the Department of Corrections, and offered to disclose information in exchange for protection from the BGF. Agent Hahn made no guarantees but said he might be able to do a favor for Evans ―sometime down the line.‖ 52 Evans testified that in an effort to reduce the amount of time he would serve in prison, he wanted to spend as much time as possible before sentencing in local custody: ―I‘m [going to] put my sentence off until the time runs out. [¶] . . . [¶] The time has almost ran out now so whatever happens after that, happens.‖ Evans‘s sentencing hearing had been repeatedly postponed. He denied that anyone from the Department of Corrections had spoken to his sentencing judge. Evans testified that he did not anticipate receiving anything for testifying, including a reduction in his pending sentence. Even if with good-time and worktime credits, due to the parole violation, Evans anticipated that he had around six more months to serve. Around two months later, during jury deliberations, Masters learned that after Evans had testified, he had been granted probation at his sentencing hearing. Masters, Johnson, and Woodard moved to reopen to present evidence of Evans‘s sentence. Outside of the jury‘s presence, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing at which it heard testimony from Evans‘s attorney, Agent Hahn, and Alameda County Deputy District Attorney William Denny, who had been assigned to prosecute Evans‘s attempted robbery case. Under the terms of Evans‘s plea bargain, he was to serve his sentence for the attempted robbery conviction and parole violation concurrently. Agent Hahn stated that before the start of Masters‘s trial, he had made no promises to Evans other than that the Department of Corrections would ―take care of his safety and security.‖ The prosecutor in Masters‘s case had told Denny that no promises would be extended in exchange for Evans‘s testimony. Evans‘s attorney had expressed concern about Evans‘s safety to the Alameda County sentencing judge. Evans had expressed concern for his safety to Agent Hahn. Agent Hahn had told Evans that it would be possible for Evans to serve his 53 time outside of California. Agent Hahn told Evans he would attempt to postpone his sentencing hearing so that he would not be sent to state prison. Neither Denny nor the sentencing judge had made any representations to Evans concerning his testifying against Masters. Denny, however, testified that Alameda County Deputy District Attorney‘s Office had an unwritten policy to come to a generalized understanding regarding a defendant‘s testimony, ―but not really word it specifically . . . until after the testimony‖; ―[t]he better practice [was] not to make a deal before testimony.‖ Agent Hahn and Alameda County Deputy District Attorney Russell Giuntini had asked Denny to delay the sentencing hearing; Agent Hahn made the request specifically to delay Evans‘s commitment to state prison. In a letter to Evans‘s sentencing judge, the prosecutor in Masters‘s case stated that his office had not made a deal for Evans‘s testimony. Eventually, Giuntini told Denny to suggest that the Alameda County court sentence Evans to credit for time served because he was ―close to release anyway on a 16-month state prison sentence.‖ At his sentencing hearing, Evans received credit for ―something like‖ 203 days of actual custody and was placed on probation for three years. Because of the parole violation, Evans remained in the local jail. After Evans testified, Agent Hahn requested that Evans be released from custody for the remainder of his sentence for the parole violation. Shortly thereafter, Evans was released from jail to Agent Hahn‘s custody. In an in camera hearing, Evans‘s attorney testified that Evans did not seem concerned by the possibility that he might have to return to state prison. Evans had told his attorney that he believed his sentences for both the crime and the parole violation would ―be taken care of.‖ The trial court estimated that if Evans had been sentenced to 16 months, and after accounting for various credits, he still would have had to have serve around four more months in prison. 54 In ruling on the motion to reopen, the trial court found that Agent Hahn‘s assurances to Evans, for the most part, had been disclosed to Masters before the start of trial. The trial court found that to the extent assurances regarding Evans‘s safety and postponing his sentencing hearing were not disclosed before the start of trial, they were effectively disclosed during Evans‘s testimony. The court reasoned that Evans‘s desire for safety and the repeated postponement of his sentencing hearing led to the conclusion that the postponements were occurring to satisfy Evans‘s safety concerns. Because Masters failed to demonstrate that any promises were made to Evans that not had been previously disclosed or revealed at trial, the court denied Masters‘s motion to reopen his case. On appeal, Masters first contends the prosecutor failed to disclose to him the benefits Evans received in exchange for his testimony. ― ‗In Brady [v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83], the United States Supreme Court held ―that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.‖ [Citation.] The high court has since held that the duty to disclose such evidence exists even though there has been no request by the accused [citation], that the duty encompasses impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory evidence [citation], and that the duty extends even to evidence known only to police investigators and not to the prosecutor [citation]. Such evidence is material ― ‗if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.‘ ‖ [Citation.] In order to comply with Brady, therefore, ―the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government‘s behalf in the case, including the police.‖ ‘ ‖ (People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 175 (Letner and Tobin).) As such, the prosecutor has a duty to ―disclose to the 55 defense and jury any inducements made to a prosecution witness to testify and must also correct any false or misleading testimony by the witness relating to any inducements.‖ (People v. Phillips (1985) 41 Cal.3d 29, 46.) For a defendant to obtain relief under Brady, ― ‗ ―[t]he evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.‖ [Citation.] Prejudice, in this context, focuses on ―the materiality of the evidence to the issue of guilt and innocence.‖ [Citations.] Materiality, in turn, requires more than a showing that the suppressed evidence would have been admissible [citation], that the absence of the suppressed evidence made conviction ―more likely‖ [citation], or that using the suppressed evidence to discredit a witness‘s testimony ―might have changed the outcome of the trial‖ [citation]. A defendant instead ―must show a ‗reasonable probability of a different result.‘ ‖ [Citation.]‘ [Citation.] We independently review the question whether a Brady violation has occurred, but give great weight to any trial court findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.]‖ (Letner and Tobin, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 176.) Nothing in the record before us indicates that the prosecutor personally knew of any agreement between Evans and Agent Hahn. But because the prosecutor had a duty to learn of any possible inducements made by law enforcement officers or other agents of the state, we consider this information to be in the prosecutor‘s possession for Brady purposes. The record indicates that Evans and Agent Hahn entered into an agreement in which Evans agreed to provide information in exchange for efforts to keep him safe, that is, to not return him to state prison. Evans pleaded guilty to obtain a relatively short prison term, and Agent Hahn took steps to postpone his actual sentencing, which resulted in Evans serving his sentence in the relative safety of 56 the Alameda County jail. As part of that plan, Agent Hahn also took steps to rescind the sentence for Evans‘s parole violation, which also prevented Evans from returning to state prison. Agent Hahn did not personally contact Evans‘s sentencing judge, but Agent Hahn did contact Denny, who acted in conformity with the agent‘s requests. Although Agent Hahn never promised Evans specific results, he did promise to make efforts that would benefit Evans and in fact did make such efforts. By the time Evans testified at Masters‘s trial, Evans‘s sentencing hearing had twice been postponed, which presumably led Evans to believe that Agent Hahn had kept his end of the bargain. Masters correctly notes that the jury never heard about Evans‘s early release. The issue before us, however, is whether the omissions by Evans and Agent Hahn were material, that is, whether there was a reasonable probability of a different result had the full extent of the agreement been disclosed to Masters. Notably, the prosecutor disclosed to Masters before the start of trial that the Department of Correction had agreed to ―take care‖ of Evans‘s ―safety and security.‖ At trial, Evans, a convicted felon, acknowledged that he had offered information about the BGF in exchange for the hope of receiving ―a favor.‖ Evans testified that his plan was to maximize his time in the Alameda County jail to avoid being exposed to BGF members in state prison and that the repeated postponement of his sentencing hearing was in conformity with his plan. Thus, the gist of the agreement — information in exchange for safety — was known to Masters and heard by the jury. Moreover, Evans testified that he agreed to be sentenced to no more than 16 months for both the attempted robbery and parole violation. The shorter sentence actually imposed on Evans was consistent with the terms of his original plea bargain and therefore did not necessarily represent a benefit outside the 57 bounds of his anticipated sentence. Accordingly, Evans‘s release from jail did not materially alter what the jury already knew about his inducement to testify. Evans‘s testimony served only to confirm Willis‘s testimony. In addition, Evans‘s credibility was thoroughly attacked at trial, and the jury was well aware of his other criminal acts in addition to his attempted robbery conviction. We also observe that the jury learned of the particulars of the omitted evidence at the penalty phase and reached a death verdict despite its ability to consider lingering doubt as a mitigating factor. (See § 190.3, factor (k).) Accordingly, additional evidence of the benefits Evans received was not material to the guilt verdict. Masters also contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to reopen his case to permit him to present this additional evidence concerning Evans‘s testimony. ―A ‗motion to reopen [is] one addressed to the [trial] court‘s sound discretion.‘ [Citation.] In determining whether an abuse of discretion occurred, the reviewing court considers four factors: ‗ ―(1) the stage the proceedings had reached when the motion was made; (2) the defendant‘s diligence (or lack thereof) in presenting the new evidence; (3) the prospect that the jury would accord the new evidence undue emphasis; and (4) the significance of the evidence.‖ ‘ [Citation.]‖ (Homick, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 881; see §§ 1093, 1094.) As noted, the trial court ruled that the benefits Evans received were either disclosed before the start of the trial or revealed during it. Even if we were to assume that Masters had been diligent in investigating and presenting evidence of the benefits Evans received, the additional evidence of the agreement was not so significant that we may conclude the trial court abused its broad discretion by declining to reopen the case during jury deliberations. As discussed, the prosecutor disclosed to Masters before the start of his trial that the Department of Corrections had assured Evans that it would take care of his safety. Evans 58 testified that he sought to avoid returning to state prison and that the repeated postponements of his case caused that to happen. In addition, Evans‘s criminal history gave the jury ample reason to question his credibility and motivations. Evans‘s testimony was not the only evidence of Masters‘s guilt: Willis also implicated him. Masters also implicated himself by writing at least one note that admitted his participation in the conspiracy to murder Sergeant Burchfield. Thus, the additional evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing was not materially different than what the jury already knew. F. Recess During Jury’s Deliberations Masters contends that the trial court erred by adjourning for nine court days during the winter holidays. The Court of Appeal rejected a similar contention regarding the adjournment in Johnson‘s and Woodard‘s appeals. (Johnson, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at pp. 791–794.) Before the start of trial in August 1989, the trial court indicated its intent to be in recess after December 15, 1989 and to resume proceedings on January 2, 1990. Excluding weekends and holidays, the court intended to be in recess for nine court days. No party objected. The trial court informed the jury of its plan. As it became apparent that the presentation of evidence would be finished before the start of the recess, the defense said it was ―a little bit concerned‖ about the possibility that the parties might make their closing arguments before the recess but the court might not instruct the jurors until after it. On December 1, the trial court affirmed its plan to be in recess after December 15; Masters did not object. Following argument and instruction, the case was submitted to the jury on December 7. The jury deliberated until December 15 and was in recess over the holidays as planned. Deliberations resumed after the New Year‘s holiday. 59 The Attorney General contends this claim is forfeited on appeal. We agree; Masters failed to object at trial to the recess. (See People v. Gray (2005) 37 Cal.4th 168, 226 [citing Johnson, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th. 778]; People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 561–562 (Bolden) [same]; People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1162 (Gutierrez) [same].) Masters did express concern about the recess separating the arguments from the instructions, but he did not object to the recess itself. The length of the recess under these circumstances did not excuse him from objecting. (See Gray, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 226 [338-day hiatus between guilt and penalty phases].) Even if we were to consider this contention on the merits, we are not persuaded the trial court abused its discretion. The trial court‘s decision to be in recess during the traditional holiday period was announced well in advance so the court, the parties, and the jurors could plan accordingly. Altering the schedule likely would have caused hardship for at least some of the jurors. The court repeatedly admonished the jury not to consider the case outside of deliberations. Moreover, Masters has not established any possibility that the break in deliberations was prejudicial. (See Bolden, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 561–562 [no prejudice in the jurors not deliberating for six court days during the December holiday period]; Gutierrez, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 1162 [no prejudice in eightcourt-day recess during deliberations].)