Opinion ID: 1774411
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Construction of LSA-R.S. 14:143

Text: In drafting LSA-R.S. 14:143, the legislature was aware of the constitutional implications of preempting a significant part of Louisiana local governments' criminal jurisdiction. Thus, to specify the scope of the statute's effect, the legislature utilized a number of terms which are defined in the constitutional article dealing with local governments. See La. Const. Art. VI, § 44. We now turn to those definitions to assist us in our construction of the statute. A [g]overning authority is the body which exercises the legislative functions of the political subdivision. La. Const. Art. VI, § 44. A [p]olitical subdivision is a parish, municipality and any other unit of local government... authorized by law to perform governmental functions. Thus, LSA-R.S. 14:143 by its express terms is aimed at the legislative branch of local government. [12] Compare LSA-R.S. 40:1796 ([n]o governing authority of a political subdivision shall enact... any ordinance or regulation more restrictive than state law concerning ... firearms or ammunition). From the legislature's choice of these terms, viewed in light of the statute's purpose, we conclude that the legislature intended that the preemption of a local ordinance under this statute be accomplished through a facial challenge of the ordinance as written, and not from one or more case-by-case adjudications based upon particular facts. A corollary to this conclusion is that any ordinance which falls within the preemptive scope of the statute cannot be given a saving construction; rather, if the ordinance, according to its plain language, presents a substantial risk that a prosecution under it will place a defendant in jeopardy so as to bar a subsequent state felony prosecution, that ordinance must fall. We reach this determination because of the need for uniformity in this area (a need which substantiates the State's interest), as well as the practical difficulties of having trial judges prophesy upon an empty record the evidence and argument to be proffered in any given proceeding. Having determined that the preemption under LSA-R.S. 14:143 is limited to a facial comparison of the municipal ordinance and comparable state felony statutes, we must next consider what municipal ordinances fall within its scope. It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the statute is meant to preempt any penal ordinance which is sufficiently similar to a state felony statute as to constitute the same offense for double jeopardy purposes. Therefore, we look to double jeopardy jurisprudence to discover a standard by which we may determine whether an ordinance is preempted under the statute. Under LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 596, Double jeopardy exists in a second trial only when the charge in that trial is: (1) Identical with or a different grade of the same offense for which the defendant was in jeopardy in the first trial, whether or not a responsive verdict could have been rendered in the first trial as to the charge in the second trial; or (2) Based on a part of a continuous offense for which offense the defendant was in jeopardy in the first trial. [13] See U.S. Const. amend. V (nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb); La. Const. Art. I, § 15 ([n]o person shall be twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense ). [14] In determining whether two prescribed offenses constitute the same offense for double jeopardy purposes, Louisiana courts have applied two different standards, the same evidence test and the Blockburger or same elements test. State v. Fontenot, 408 So.2d 919, 921 (La.1981). The same evidence test focuses upon the actual physical and testimonial evidence necessary to secure a conviction. [15] Under the same evidence test, [i]f the evidence required to support a finding of guilt of one crime would also have supported conviction of the other, the two are the same offense under a plea of double jeopardy, and a defendant can be placed in jeopardy of only one. State v. Steele, 387 So.2d 1175, 1177 (La.1980). The `same evidence' test depends upon the proof required to convict, not the evidence actually introduced at trial. State v. Knowles, 392 So.2d 651, 654 (La. 1980) ( citations omitted ). See also State v. Jones, 642 So.2d 252, 254 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1994): State v. Roblow, 623 So.2d 51, 56 (La.App. 1 Cir.1993). Thus, under the same evidence test our concern is with the evidential focus of the facts adduced at trial in light of the verdict rendered, i.e. how the evidence presented goes to satisfy the prosecution's burden of proof. [16] State v. Miller, 571 So.2d 603, 606 (1990); State v. Powell, 598 So.2d 454, 470 (La.App. 2 Cir.1992), writ denied, 605 So.2d 1089 (La.1992). Although the primary test employed by Louisiana courts to determine whether double jeopardy lies for any given prosecution, the same evidence test provides no workable standard for the preemption of ordinances under LSA-R.S. 14:143. This is because, by its very nature, the same evidence test requires that at least one trial be completed so that a trial judge may compare the evidence offered to convict the defendant at the first trial with that which the prosecution intends to offer at the second trial. [17] Since double jeopardy under the same evidence test revolves around how particular facts are utilized at trial, this test does not lend itself to the sort of facial statutory comparison which we find LSA-R.S. 14:143 mandates. A different result obtains when the Blockburger or same elements test, employed by the United States Supreme Court to determine when two offenses are the same for double jeopardy purposes, is considered. United States v. Dixon, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 125 L.Ed.2d 556 (1993). See also Peter J. Henning, Precedents in Vacuum: The Supreme Court Continues to Tinker with Double Jeopardy, 31 Am.Crim. L.Rev. 1 (1993). The Blockburger test, first articulated in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), requires a comparison of the elements of the statutes under which a defendant is charged. After the statutory elements are compared, if each statute requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not then those statutes do not define the same offense for double jeopardy purposes. People v. Mendoza, 190 Colo. 519, 549 P.2d 766, 769 (1976) ( En Banc ) ( citations omitted ). [18] Application of the Blockburger test serves the purpose of LSA-R.S. 14:143 well, in that it provides a straightforward method of determining whether, on its face, a municipal ordinance constitutes the same offense as a state felony statute. We thus hold that a trial court, when faced with a challenge to a municipal ordinance on the ground that it is preempted by LSA-R.S. 14:143, should apply the Blockburger test. [19] If the trial court finds that the elements of that municipal ordinance establish the same offense as any felony offense established by the legislature, i.e. that the municipal ordinance and the comparable state statute do not each require proof of a fact that the other does not, then that municipal ordinance is preempted and must be declared void. See Note 18, supra. In addition, the entire range of lesser-included offenses contemplated by the municipal ordinance or the state statute should be considered in this analysis; if any hypothetical combination suffices to constitute the same offense under Blockburger, the entire ordinance must fall. Id.