Opinion ID: 2304700
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: Consequential Crimes Offense Divided Into Degrees

Text: The second contention raised by Chance in this appeal relates to the Superior Court's instructions to the jury with regard to Chance's liability as an accomplice in view of Delaware's adoption of Section 274. A similar problem was addressed by this Court in Travis v. State, Del.Supr., No. 199, 1993, 1993 WL 541923 Moore, J. (Dec. 22, 1993) (ORDER). Not only are the facts of the fatal assault in Travis similar to the Chance proceeding, but the Travis jury also sent out a note during deliberations containing questions about accomplice liability. Travis and a co-defendant Anderson were charged with Murder in the First Degree in the beating and kicking death of an adult male. Id. While the victim was lying on the ground, Travis kicked him. Id. At the same time, Anderson beat the victim repeatedly on the head with a baseball bat. Id. The Travis jury was instructed on accomplice liability under Section 271(2)(b) with regard to Murder in the First and Second Degree, and Manslaughter. Id. During its deliberations, the jury in Travis inquired as to whether a defendant could be found guilty as an accomplice to a lesser-included crime than the crime committed by the principal. Id. The jury in Travis also asked: Does being an accomplice require the Defendant to have a [conscious] intent to commit the crime committed by the principal? Id. In Travis, the Superior Court answered both jury questions in the affirmative. Id. The answer to the first question was clearly correct. 11 Del.C. § 274. On appeal, Travis contended that the Superior Court incorrectly answered the second question in the affirmative. Travis had not presented that issue to the Superior Court. Therefore, that claim was reviewed by this Court for plain error. See Del.Supr.Ct.R. 8. In Travis, this Court determined that, because Delaware's prior construction of accomplice liability had survived the enactment of Section 271, an accomplice is not required to have intended the consequential offense committed by the principal. Travis v. State, Del.Supr., No. 199, 1993, Moore, J. (Dec. 22, 1993) (ORDER). This Court concluded that, although the second question should have been answered in the negative, as Travis argued, the Superior Court's response caused Travis no prejudice because the erroneous instruction actually placed a higher burden on the State than it had under 11 Del.C. § 271. Id. Thus, the Superior Court's incorrect instruction actually aided, rather than prejudiced, Travis, and this Court held there was no plain error. Id.