Opinion ID: 77403
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The District Court Properly Declined to Apply the Fast-Track Downward Departure.

Text: 6 Anaya-Castro argues that the district court erred when it failed to apply the four-level downward departure for two reasons. First, Anaya-Castro argues that the failure to depart resulted in an unreasonable sentence because it created a sentencing disparity that should have been remedied by the discretion of the district court under Booker. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). Second, Anaya-Castro argues, for the first time on appeal, that the availability of the fast-track departure in some districts but not others violates the equal protection guarantee of the Due Process Clause. See U.S. Const. amend. V. 7
8 Anaya-Castro argues that the availability of the fast-track departure in some districts but not others creates a sentencing disparity between defendants prosecuted in participating districts and those in non-participating districts. Anaya-Castro argues that this disparity reflects a failure to consider the requirement of the sixth factor in section 3553(a): the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). Anaya-Castro contends that, because the district court failed to consider this factor, his sentence is unreasonable. We disagree. 9 We begin our inquiry of the reasonableness of a sentence by determining whether the district court correctly calculate[d] the range provided by the Guidelines. Talley, 431 F.3d at 786. The parties agree that the guidelines range was correctly calculated, and Anaya-Castro concedes that the failure of the Northern District of Georgia to participate in the early disposition program forecloses the fast-track departure. See U.S.S.G. § 5K3.1. We thus proceed to the second inquiry: whether the district court considered the [section 3553(a)] factors to determine a reasonable sentence. Talley, 431 F.3d at 786. 10 We conclude that the district court properly considered each of the section 3553(a) factors and imposed a reasonable sentence. Section 3553(a) enumerates several factors that must be considered to determine a reasonable sentence, and the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6), is one of them. See Morales-Chaires, 430 F.3d at 1131. At the sentencing hearing, the district court considered Anaya-Castro's arguments relating to the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the adequacy of a sentence within the guidelines, and guidelines policy considerations. See id. § 3553(a)(1), (2), (5). The district court also considered the applicable guidelines range, see id. § 3553(a)(4), and concluded that a sentence at the bottom of the guideline range was reasonable. 11 Any disparity created by section 5K3.1 does not fall within the scope of section 3553(a)(6). When Congress directed the Sentencing Commission to allow the departure for only participating districts, Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, Pub.L. No. 108-21 § 401(m)(2)(B), 117 Stat. 650, 675 (2003), Congress implicitly determined that the disparity was warranted. See United States v. Sebastian, 436 F.3d 913, 915-16 (8th Cir.2006). Anaya-Castro's interpretation of section 3553(a)(6) conflicts with the decision of Congress to limit the availability of the departure to participating districts, id., and erroneously elevates one factor above all others, see Morales-Chaires, 430 F.3d at 1131. 12 We are not alone in reaching this conclusion. Every circuit court to decide this issue has found that section 3553(a)(6) does not require the district court to depart based on the availability of the departure in only some districts. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Martinez, 442 F.3d 539, 542 (7th Cir.2006); Sebastian, 436 F.3d at 915-16; United States v. Marcial-Santiago, 447 F.3d 715, 718-19 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Hernandez-Cervantes, 161 Fed.Appx. 508, 512 (6th Cir. 2005) (unpublished). We join them. Because the district court adequately and properly considered the [section] 3553(a) sentencing factors and the advisory Guidelines range, we conclude that the sentence was reasonable. United States v. Scott, 426 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th Cir.2005). 13 2. The Refusal of the District Court to Grant Anaya-Castro the Benefit of Section 5K3.1, as a Matter of Equal Protection, Was Not Plain Error. 14 Anaya-Castro next argues that the sentencing disparity between defendants prosecuted in participating districts and those in non-participating districts violates the equal protection guarantee of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See U.S. Const. amend. V; Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500, 74 S.Ct. 693, 695, 98 L.Ed. 884 (1954). Because Anaya-Castro did not present this argument to the district court, we review for plain error. Nash, 438 F.3d at 1304. To meet his burden, Anaya-Castro must show (1) an error occurred, (2) the error was plain, and (3) the error affected substantial rights. Id. (quoting United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1088 (11th Cir.2003)). If these three criteria are met, we may reverse for plain error if it `seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.' Id. (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 730-32, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1776, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993)). 15 Although other courts have concluded that the disparity does not violate equal protection, see Marcial-Santiago, 447 F.3d at 719; United States v. Melendez-Torres, 420 F.3d 45, 52-53 (1st Cir.2005), we need not reach this question because any error would not be plain. As we have repeatedly recognized, an error cannot meet the `plain' requirement of the plain error rule if it is not clear under current law. United States v. Chau, 426 F.3d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir.2005) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting United States v. White, 416 F.3d 1313, 1319 (11th Cir. 2005)). When the explicit language of a statute or rule does not specifically resolve an issue, there can be no plain error where there is no precedent from the Supreme Court or this Court directly resolving it. Id. (quoting United States v. Lejarde-Rada, 319 F.3d 1288, 1291 (11th Cir.2003)). Anaya-Castro fails to identify any precedent, binding or otherwise, that has held that the limited availability of the fast-track departure violates equal protection. Because Anaya-Castro is unable to meet his burden to show plain error, his argument fails.