Opinion ID: 2980063
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Palmer’s civil rights action

Text: On October 14, 2008, Palmer filed a complaint against the City of Cleveland, Lieutenant Miller, Detectives Hall and Davis, and other named defendants in federal district court. In her Amended Complaint, Palmer states claims for (1) Count I: malicious prosecution and illegal attachment; and (2) Count II: unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. In April 2009, Palmer moved for summary judgment on her Fourth Amendment seizure of property claim. The defendants opposed her motion for summary judgment and also filed a separate motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). In this motion, the defendants argued, in relevant part, that “Palmer’s claims under Section 1983 are all time-barred by Ohio’s two-year statute of limitations for claims brought under Section 1983.” The district court granted summary judgment for defendants on both of Palmer’s claims, finding them both barred by the statute of limitations. Rodriguez, 619 F. Supp. 2d at 480-81. Palmer subsequently sought, and the district court granted, a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) - 15 - Nos. 09-3679, 09-3799 Rodriguez v. City of Cleveland certification. The district court concluded that there was “no just reason for delay[ing]’ Palmer’s appeal” of the grant of summary judgment. Palmer now appeals. Because this is an appeal from the district court’s denial of qualified immunity, with more proceedings to follow, our jurisdiction is limited to the consideration of issues of law. See McKenna v. City of Royal Oak, 469 F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir. 2006). Indeed, “a defendant, entitled to invoke a qualified immunity defense, may not appeal a district court’s summary judgment order insofar as that order determines whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a ‘genuine’ issue of fact for trial.” Johnson, 515 U.S. at 319-20. III. Search of M & M did not violate Rodriguez’s rights under the Fourth Amendment Qualified immunity is warranted under Count I, because the individual defendants did not violate Rodriguez’s Fourth Amendment rights when they searched M & M pursuant to C.C.O. § 601.15. This is so even though the defendants had received an anonymous tip about a stolen dump truck on M & M’s lot. State actors sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are generally afforded qualified immunity, which means that “government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982). Qualified immunity applies if, “considering the allegations in a light most favorable to the party injured, a constitutional right has [not] been violated.” Estate of Carter, 408 F.3d at 310 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). That is the case here. - 16 - Nos. 09-3679, 09-3799 Rodriguez v. City of Cleveland Pursuant to C.C.O. § 601.15, the individual defendants had the authority to search M & M’s lot. That ordinance provides, For the purpose of locating stolen motor vehicles and/or stolen motor vehicle parts, the Chief of Police, or his authorized representative, may inspect any motor vehicle, as defined in RC 4501.01 and may inspect any motor vehicle part that has been marked with an identifying number by the manufacturer, situated in the City of Cleveland in any . . . service garage, repair shop, . . . auto sales lot, vehicle leasing or rental lot, motor vehicle salvage facility, scrap metal processing facility, auto wrecking yard, junk yard, or other similar establishment, and may inspect the title, registration, vehicle identification number, or license plates of the vehicle in order to establish the rightful ownership or possession of the vehicle or vehicle part. C.C.O. § 601.15(a). Rodriguez does not appear to challenge the facial constitutionality of this ordinance, which provides for warrantless administrative inspections of businesses in the automotive and salvage industries. Indeed, both this court and the Ohio Court of Appeals have upheld C.C.O. § 601.15 against facial constitutional challenges. Term Auto Sales, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 54 F.3d 777, 1995 WL 308988, at -5 (6th Cir. May 18, 1995) (per curiam); State v. Grays, No. 82410, 2003 WL 22972240, at -4 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2003); see also State v. Zinmeister, 501 N.E.2d 59, 63-65 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985) (upholding, against facial constitutional challenge, predecessor to current version of C.C.O. § 601.15). Furthermore, the Supreme Court upheld a similar New York statute against Fourth Amendment challenge in New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 708-18 (1987). The individual defendants’ pre-search suspicion that Rodriguez possessed a stolen dump truck did not render their warrantless administrative search of M & M invalid. This conclusion finds support in United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983), where the Supreme Court concluded that customs officers had not offended the Fourth Amendment when, pursuant to a federal - 17 - Nos. 09-3679, 09-3799 Rodriguez v. City of Cleveland statute, those officers boarded a sailboat in a shipping channel and asked to see the sailboat’s documentation. Id. at 580-83, 592-93. While onboard the sailboat and examining its documentation, one of the customs officers detected an odor of burning marijuana; “[l]ooking through an open hatch, [that officer] observed burlap-wrapped bales that proved to be marijuana.” Id. at 583. The officers subsequently discovered that more than 5800 pounds of marijuana had been stashed “in almost every conceivable place” on board the sailboat. Id. The boat’s passengers were ultimately convicted of several charges related to the importation and possession with the intent to distribute of marijuana. Id. at 583. On appeal to the Supreme Court, “[t]he only question presented . . . concern[ed] the validity of the suspicionless boarding of the vessel for a document inspection.” Id. at 584 n.3. The Court rejected, in a footnote, the passengers’ contention that, because the customs officers “were accompanied by a Louisiana State Policeman, and were following an informant’s tip that a vessel in the ship channel was thought to be carrying marijuana, they may not rely on the statute authorizing boarding for inspection of the vessel’s documentation.” Id. The Court explained that its acceptance of such an argument “would lead to [an] incongruous result,” id.; indeed, the Court saw “little logic in sanctioning such examinations of ordinary, unsuspect vessels but forbidding them in the case of suspected smugglers,” id. (quoting United States v. Arra, 630 F.2d 836, 846 (1st Cir. 1980)); see also Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978) (“[T]he fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.”) - 18 - Nos. 09-3679, 09-3799 Rodriguez v. City of Cleveland In cases more factually analogous to this one, other federal circuits have concluded that an officer’s suspicion as to the presence of a stolen vehicle did not render unconstitutional the initiation of a warrantless administrative inspection of an automotive repair- or salvage-related business. For example, in Bruce v. Beary, 498 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2007), an Auto Theft Unit officer had received a complaint from an individual who had allegedly purchased a vehicle with a suspicious VIN from a particular auto body repair shop and salvage yard. Id. at 1235-36. After receiving this complaint, the officer and his supervisor set out to search the repair shop/salvage yard pursuant to a Florida statute that “permits a warrantless physical inspection of” such businesses “during normal business hours ‘for the purpose of locating stolen vehicles.’” Id. at 1236 (quoting Fla. Stat. § 812.055). In a subsequent civil rights action, the owner of the repair shop/salvage yard asserted that, “from the inception, the search of the [business] was not a routine administrative inspection, but rather an ordinary criminal raid, undertaken with suspicion of a particular crime and implemented to discover and seize evidence of that crime.” Id. at 1240. Although the Eleventh Circuit recognized “that the administrative search exception [should] not be allowed to swallow whole the Fourth Amendment,” id. at 1241, that court concluded that the inception of the warrantless administrative inspection at issue nonetheless passed constitutional muster, id. at 1242.18 Noting that “[t]he Supreme Court has 18 Though that court found the search of the repair shop/salvage yard acceptable in its inception, the Eleventh Circuit held that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the search was unreasonable in its execution. Bruce, 498 F.3d at 1248. The court noted that “administrative searches are an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, but they are not an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s requirement for reasonableness.” Id. at 1243 (citing Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598-99 (1981)). Still, the search in that case was “conducted by 20 officers over a period of eight hours” and involved a SWAT-like invasion of the premises with - 19 - Nos. 09-3679, 09-3799 Rodriguez v. City of Cleveland made quite clear that an administrative search is not rendered invalid because it is accompanied by some suspicion of wrongdoing,” the Eleventh Circuit determined that the complaint the officers had received did not generate the probable cause necessary to support an application for a search warrant. Id. Lacking “direct criminal suspicion of wrongdoing,” the officers had “validly invoked their statutory authority to” search the repair shop/salvage yard. Id. Under similar circumstances, the Fifth Circuit also upheld an administrative search. In United States v. Thomas, 973 F.2d 1152 (5th Cir. 1992), a state agent had tracked a particular salvage vehicle to a particular salvage yard and had then conducted a warrantless administrative inspection of that salvage yard pursuant to a state statute. Id. at 1155. The proprietor of the salvage yard, who had been convicted of several counts of falsifying vehicle identification numbers and of trafficking in motor vehicles with such falsified numbers, challenged the constitutionality of the warrantless administrative inspection on appeal. Id. In response to the proprietor’s challenge, the Fifth Circuit held that “[a]dministrative searches conducted pursuant to valid statutory schemes do not violate the Constitution simply because of the existence of a specific suspicion of wrongdoing.” Id. at 1155-56; see also Club Retro, L.L.C. v. Hilton, 568 F.3d 181, 198 n.7 (5th Cir. 2009) (noting that an “administrative search cannot be pretextual,” but “[a]n officer’s suspicions about criminal wrongdoing do not . . . render an administrative inspection pretextual”). the search and detention of employees, making it much more invasive than the search at issue in this case. Id. at 1244. - 20 - Nos. 09-3679, 09-3799 Rodriguez v. City of Cleveland The Tenth Circuit has similarly held that where officers “lacked probable cause to think that any specific criminal conduct had occurred,” but “had a vague suspicion that the kind of criminal activity the administrative scheme was directed towards detecting—car theft—had occurred or might be evident at [a particular] salvage yard . . . [t]here [was] nothing unconstitutional in embarking upon an administrative inspection with that degree of criminal suspicion.” United States v. Johnson, 408 F.3d 1313, 1321 (10th Cir. 2005). At the same time, the Tenth Circuit “cautioned, however, that the evidence of criminal activity cannot be so compelling that police have, in essence, probable cause to believe that specific criminal conduct has occurred.” Id. Rodriguez himself maintains that the anonymous tip about the stolen dump truck did not provide the individual defendants with probable cause, or even reasonable suspicion, to justify a search of M & M’s premises. Even though the individual defendants suspected wrongdoing before they searched M & M, that suspicion did not render their warrantless administrative inspection pretextual, and thus, invalid. The individual defendants’ initiation of the search at M & M, therefore, did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The situation in Jacob v. Township of West Bloomfield, 531 F.3d 385 (6th Cir. 2008), relied upon by the district court, was very different. The district court cited Jacob to support the contention that “when officials target a particular individual for an inspection and when that inspection carries ‘with it the very real threat of criminal sanctions,’ . . . the inspection is criminal in nature—necessitating a warrant—and not administrative.” Rodriguez, 619 F. Supp. 2d at 479. However, the Jacob case involved entry by a land ordinance enforcement officer onto the curtilage of the plaintiff’s residential property to inspect the area for violations of a local land use ordinance - 21 - Nos. 09-3679, 09-3799 Rodriguez v. City of Cleveland that the plaintiff had violated multiple times in the past. Jacob, 531 F.3d at 387-88. In Jacob, this court recognized the high expectation of privacy in the curtilage of a person’s home, and “considered [the] distinction between criminal and merely administrative investigations.” Id. at 389-90 (citing Widgren v. Maple Grove Twp., 429 F.3d 575 (6th Cir. 2005)). This case, in contrast, involves the search of the business premises of a closely-regulated industry. Further, the ordinance at issue falls within the acceptable overlap between administrative schemes and penal laws. See Burger, 482 U.S. at 712-13 (stating that “a State can address a major social problem both by way of an administrative scheme and through penal sanctions,” and that “an administrative scheme may have the same ultimate purpose as penal laws, even if its regulatory goals are narrower,” when considering a search pursuant to a similar provision permitting searches of junkyard businesses). Accordingly, the individual defendants’ administrative search fell within the confines of the Fourth Amendment, which entitles them to qualified immunity as to this claim. IV. Seizure of property did not violate Rodriguez’s rights under the Fourth Amendment The individual defendants did not violate Rodriguez’s clearly established Fourth Amendment rights by the seizure without probable cause of tow trucks that had not been stolen.19 Qualified immunity is warranted even if a constitutional violation has occurred if the right violated was not 19 We need not address the stolen dump truck nor the seizure of various tools. The district court found, on the basis of Rodriguez’s evidence, that the individual defendants never towed or confiscated the stolen dump truck from M & M. See Rodriguez, 619 F. Supp. 2d at 471. Moreover, on appeal, Rodriguez does not appear to address the constitutionality of the seizure of his various tools, e.g., the ten-ton floor jack, the blue tool chest, etc., which defendants contend were contraband or evidence of crime. - 22 - Nos. 09-3679, 09-3799 Rodriguez v. City of Cleveland clearly established, Estate of Carter, 408 F.3d at 310 (citing Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201), and we may proceed directly to that inquiry in appropriate cases. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). “The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Livermore v. Lubelan, 476 F.3d 397, 404 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198-99 (2004)). Assuming, without necessarily deciding, that the seizure of the tow trucks violated Rodriguez’s Fourth Amendment rights, the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity nonetheless because there was a reasonable basis to believe that they had the authority to impound Rodriguez’s tow trucks for violations of local licensing laws. While lawfully on M & M’s premises to conduct a warrantless administrative inspection, Lieutenant Miller apparently noticed that the tow trucks returning to M & M along Harvard Avenue lacked external identification markings in violation of C.C.O. § 677A.10; nor did the tow trucks have the proper license tags on their bumpers, a violation of C.C.O. § 677A.04. Detective Davis apparently confirmed for Lieutenant Miller that none of the tow trucks returning to M & M were licensed by the City of Cleveland—a violation of C.C.O. § 677A.02(a). And, in fact, Rodriguez conceded during his deposition testimony that M & M’s tow trucks were never licensed by the City of Cleveland. Pursuant to C.C.O. § 677A.99, any of these violations of Chapter 677A is a second-degree misdemeanor. The individual defendants contend that they impounded the tow trucks because of these various violations, and pursuant to C.C.O. § 405.02, which authorizes the impounding of vehicles - 23 - Nos. 09-3679, 09-3799 Rodriguez v. City of Cleveland under a number of circumstances including: “[w]hen any vehicle is parked on any street or other public property and displays illegal plates or fails to display the currently lawfully required license plates,” or “[w]hen any vehicle has been operated by any person who is driving without a lawful license or while his license has been suspended or revoked.” C.C.O. § 405.02(d), (i). Published Ohio cases have apparently not applied or construed this ordinance; therefore, it cannot be said that a limited interpretation of the ordinance has been clearly established. Moreover, Rodriguez does not contest that C.C.O. § 405.02 is a facially valid ordinance, and this court’s decision in Wolfel v. Morris, 972 F.2d 712 (6th Cir. 1992), supports the conclusion that the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because they reasonably relied on a facially valid local ordinance.20 Although it is not clear that the M & M tow trucks were “parked,” as that term is defined by local ordinance or that all (or any) of the vehicles were being operated by persons driving without valid personal licenses, when Lieutenant Miller noticed that these tow trucks lacked the proper license tags, the individual defendants could still have reasonably understood C.C.O. § 405.02 as authorizing the impoundment of M & M’s tow trucks. Significantly, both subsections give officers the ability to impound vehicles because of licensing violations. Accordingly, there was a reasonable basis for 20 Wolfel involved prison guards’ seizure as contraband of signature pages for petitions circulated among prison inmates, which the guards believed violated a facially valid state regulation. Wolfel, 972 F.2d at 714. Though this court found the regulation to be unconstitutionally vague as applied to these plaintiffs, we held that the prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity for their actions. Id. at 719. The prison guards’ “interpretation of that regulation to cover the events at issue was . . . in error,” but this court could not “say that no reasonable official . . . could not have thought that the regulation provided sufficient notice that the prisoners’ actions were punishable.” Id. Thus, the prison officials had “reasonably relied on and applied valid regulations,” and were “entitled to qualified immunity for their actions.” Id. at 720. - 24 - Nos. 09-3679, 09-3799 Rodriguez v. City of Cleveland the defendants to believe that they had the authority, under this ordinance, to impound Rodriguez’s tow trucks, whether or not that belief was actually correct under a strict interpretation C.C.O. § 405.02. Rodriguez contends that, because he complied with state licensing requirements, he was not obligated to comply with the City of Cleveland’s licensing requirements, and that the individual defendants, therefore, lacked the authority to impound his tow trucks. But that is not clearly the case. Rodriguez cites City of Cleveland v. Fox, 761 N.E.2d 126 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001), as support for his contention. In Fox, the Ohio Court of Appeals reversed a tow truck driver’s conviction for violating C.C.O. § 677A.14, which requires that “[e]very person driving a tow truck shall be licensed.” Id. at 126, 129 (alteration in original). The Ohio Court of Appeals concluded that 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1)21 preempted all local regulation of towing companies. Id. at 128. Moreover, the court of appeals held that none of the statutory exceptions to that general preemption provision applied to save Cleveland’s licensing requirements from preemption—although § 14501(c)(2)(A)22 reserved the power of promulgating safety regulations for the states, that exception did not extend to the 21 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) states, Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3), a State, political subdivision of a State, or political authority of 2 or more States may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier (other than a carrier affiliated with a direct air carrier covered by section 41713(b)(4)) or any motor private carrier, broker, or freight forwarder with respect to the transportation of property. 22 Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A), the general preemption provision in § 14501(c)(1) “shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” - 25 - Nos. 09-3679, 09-3799 Rodriguez v. City of Cleveland states’ political subdivisions. Id. Finding Cleveland’s licensing requirements preempted, the Ohio Court of Appeals declined to decide whether C.C.O. § 677A.14 “constitute[d] safety regulations that would fall within [§] 14501(c)(2)(A)’s exception to preemption.” Id. Approximately one year after the Ohio Court of Appeals’ decision in Fox, however, the United States Supreme Court effectively overruled that decision. In City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Service, Inc., 536 U.S. 424 (2002), the Supreme Court held “that § 14501(c) does not bar a State from delegating to municipalities and other local units the State’s authority to establish safety regulations governing motor carriers of property, including tow trucks.” Id. at 428. (emphasis added). The Supreme Court “express[ed] no opinion,” though, as to whether the City of Columbus’s regulation of tow truck companies, at issue in Ours Garage, “in whole or in part, qualif[ied] as [an] exercise[] of ‘safety regulatory authority’ or otherwise f[e]ll within § 14501(c)(2)(A)’s compass.” Id. at 442. It appears that neither the Supreme Court, this court, nor any Ohio court has since decided whether local tow truck licensing requirements “qualify as exercises of ‘safety regulatory authority’” such that § 14501(c)(2)(A)’s exception to federal preemption applies. Nor do we need to decide this issue today; the mere fact that it has not been settled is sufficient to resolve the qualified immunity issue in this appeal. Thus, Cleveland’s tow truck licensing requirements are not clearly preempted by federal law. It is less clear, however, whether Cleveland’s requirements are preempted by Ohio law. Section 4921.30 of the Ohio Revised Code states, Any person, firm, copartnership, voluntary association, joint-stock association, company, or corporation, wherever organized or incorporated, that is engaged in the - 26 - Nos. 09-3679, 09-3799 Rodriguez v. City of Cleveland towing of motor vehicles is subject to regulation by the public utilities commission as a for-hire motor carrier under this chapter. Such an entity is not subject to any ordinance, rule, or resolution of a municipal corporation, county, or township that provides for the licensing, registering, or regulation of entities that tow motor vehicles. This provision went into effect on March 31, 2003—well before the incidents at issue in this case. However, the City of Cleveland apparently “maintains that Ohio’s attempt to preempt cities in this area is unconstitutional under the Home Rule doctrine of the Ohio Constitution, and [Cleveland] continues to enforce its tow truck regulations.” In March 2009, the City of Cleveland filed a declaratory judgment action in the Court of Common Pleas for Cuyahoga County, Ohio, seeking to clarify whether Ohio Rev. Code § 4921.30 does, in fact, infringe upon Cleveland’s Home Rule authority. It appears that no state court has yet ruled on this issue. Because it is not clear whether Cleveland’s tow truck licensing requirements are preempted by federal or state law, and because those requirements were apparently still on the books in July 2006, it was not objectively unreasonable for the individual defendants in this case to enforce those requirements by impounding the tow trucks. See Wolfel, 972 F.2d at 719; cf. Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37-38 (1979) (concluding, in a different context, that “ [a] prudent officer . . . should not have been required to anticipate that a court would later hold the ordinance unconstitutional”). Accordingly, the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for their actions in impounding M & M’s tow trucks. Rodriguez also asserts that the continued detention of his property, after its initial seizure, violates the Fourth Amendment, but this also is not clearly the case. The citations Detective Davis - 27 - Nos. 09-3679, 09-3799 Rodriguez v. City of Cleveland issued on July 14, 2006, for violations of C.C.O. § 677A.02, ordered Rodriguez to appear at the Cleveland Municipal Court on July 28, 2006. At some point, those charges were dismissed, but the date of dismissal is not entirely clear from the record. In his affidavit, Rodriguez asserts that, on July 26, 2006, his “criminal defense counsel, by certified letter, made a demand to [Lieutenant Miller] for the return of all vehicles not subject to criminal allegations.” But, according to that affidavit, “all of the vehicles not subject to any criminal allegations continued to be held in the physical custody of the City of Cleveland until August 27, 2006[,] and thereafter.” This statement, however, makes the questionable suggestion that the impounded vehicles were not subject to any criminal allegations, but we have already determined that they were impounded according to local ordinance because they lacked the required markings. On August 28, 2006, Rodriguez’s counsel moved the Court of Common Pleas for Cuyahoga County, Ohio, for an order releasing the tow trucks. Although the state court granted Rodriguez’s motion on August 29, 2006, the state court subsequently set aside that order and required the re-seizure of the tow trucks.23 By September 10, 2006, Rodriguez and Palmer had rescinded their earlier agreements for the sale of M & M. Thus, Rodriguez no longer had a possessory interest in the vehicles after that date and cannot claim a violation of his rights in the property’s detention after September 10, 2006. 23 According to the docket from the criminal case against Rodriguez, his emergency motion for the return of personal property was granted on August 29, 2006. However, on September 7, 2006, the court vacated and set aside that order pending consideration of the State’s motion for reconsideration of the August 29 motion. Accordingly, the tow trucks continued to be held pursuant to court order past the date of rescission of the contract for the sale of M & M. Rodriguez does not dispute the enforceability of these court orders, but instead suggests that the defendants kept his property in violation of said orders. This, however, appears not to be the case. - 28 - Nos. 09-3679, 09-3799 Rodriguez v. City of Cleveland Assuming the tow trucks continued to be held, because of the aforementioned licensing violations, at least until the rescission of the contract for the sale of M & M, the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity with respect to their refusal to release them.24 Pursuant to C.C.O. § 405.05, the owner of a lawfully impounded vehicle has the following three options: (1) The owner . . . shall pay a towing charge of twenty-five dollars ($25.00) for an ordinary tow or thirty-five dollars ($35.00) for a dolly tow, all outstanding fines for violating provisions of this Traffic Code, and a storage fee of three dollars ($3.00) for each day or part thereof the vehicle is impounded after the first twenty-four hours. Upon such payment, the vehicle shall be released. (2) The owner . . . shall furnish a bond in an amount as set by rule of the Municipal Court. Such bond shall be upon the condition that such owner or other person appear in the Municipal Court to answer the violation which caused the vehicle to be impounded. The date for such appearance shall be scheduled when the bond is posted. Upon the posting of such bond, the vehicle shall be released. (3) The owner . . . shall request a probable cause hearing. The hearing shall take place on the day after such owner or other person is given written notice to the Cleveland Police Division Vehicle Impound Unit of his intention to challenge the towing. If, however, such day is a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday, the hearing will be held on the next day which is not a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday. Rodriguez, however, did not exercise any of these options. Instead, Rodriguez admits only that his “criminal defense lawyer, by certified letter, made a demand to defendant Miller for the return of all vehicles not subject to criminal allegations forthwith.” Rodriguez appears to assume that the 24 No evidence in the record conclusively establishes when these licensing charges were dismissed. The plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proof in showing that the defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity. Gardenhire v. Schubert, 205 F.3d 303, 311 (6th Cir. 2000). Rodriguez has failed to meet that burden here by failing to produce any evidence of the date on which the licensing charges were dismissed, or that the defendants continued to retain the tow trucks at issue after such a dismissal. Instead, Rodriguez relies almost entirely on the lack of probable cause in the initial seizure of the property, but this court has already rejected that argument. - 29 - Nos. 09-3679, 09-3799 Rodriguez v. City of Cleveland vehicles were confiscated in connection with his criminal charges of receiving stolen property and should have been released because they were obviously not stolen, but the trucks were actually impounded for licensing violations and this impoundment did not violate clearly established law. Thus, the officers are entitled to qualified immunity on this Fourth Amendment claim. V. Seizure of Rodriguez did not violate the Fourth Amendment As to Rodriguez’s seizure of person claims, the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for their arrest of Rodriguez on July 7, 2006, because they had probable cause to believe that he had received stolen property.25 The Fourth Amendment “permits an officer to arrest a suspect without a warrant if there is probable cause.” DeFillippo, 433 U.S. at 36. The Supreme Court has consistently stated that “‘probable cause’ to justify an arrest means facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.” Id. at 37. However, “the Fourth Amendment does not require that a police officer know a crime has occurred at the time the officer arrests or searches a suspect,” United States v. Martin, 289 F.3d 392, 400 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Strickland, 144 F.3d 412, 415 (6th Cir. 1998)); see also DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 36 (stating that “the kinds and degree of proof and the procedural requirements necessary for a conviction are not prerequisites to a valid arrest”); 25 Although the district court did not clearly discuss Rodriguez’s seizure of person claims as distinct from his seizure of property claims, the defendants did address the seizure of person claims in their joint motion for summary judgment. - 30 - Nos. 09-3679, 09-3799 Rodriguez v. City of Cleveland rather, “[p]robable cause requires only the probability of criminal activity,” Criss v. City of Kent, 867 F.2d 259, 262 (6th Cir. 1988). In the instant case, the facts and circumstances within the defendants’ knowledge at the time they arrested Rodriguez on July 7, 2006, warranted their belief that Rodriguez had committed a crime. Ohio law provides, “No person shall receive, retain, or dispose of property of another knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the property has been obtained through commission of a theft offense.” Ohio Rev. Code § 2913.51(A). Before the defendants searched M & M’s premises on July 7, 2006, Detective Hall had received an anonymous tip from a former longtime M & M employee that a white dump truck on M & M’s side lot was stolen. In addition to this anonymous tip, the individual defendants knew that Rodriguez had the key that unlocked the gate to the side lot where the white dump truck was, in fact, located. The truck’s condition was somewhat suspicious, in that it no longer had a steering column and there were cut marks where there had once been equipment. Moreover, when the defendants ran the dump truck’s VIN through their computer system, they determined that it had been reported stolen from Medina within the last six months. “For centuries courts have instructed juries that an inference of guilty knowledge may be drawn from the fact of unexplained possession of stolen goods.” Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 843 (1975). If a jury can permissibly find guilty knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt on the basis of such an inference, then surely the defendants in this case could, on the basis of a similar inference, reasonably believe that Rodriguez had committed a crime in order to establish probable cause for his arrest. See Criss, 867 F.2d at 262 n.1 (citing Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 311-12 - 31 - Nos. 09-3679, 09-3799 Rodriguez v. City of Cleveland (1959)) (noting that “[t]he quantum of proof required to establish probable cause is significantly lower than that required to establish guilt”). Probable cause was not defeated by the fact that an M & M employee gave Detective Hall what was purportedly a receipt for the purchase of the stolen dump truck. In Criss, where the civil rights plaintiff had allegedly explained to the defendant arresting officers that his roommate, not he, had stolen the street signs found in their apartment, id. at 260-61, we determined that probable cause supported the plaintiff’s arrest nonetheless, id. at 263. We reasoned, A suspect’s satisfactory explanation of suspicious behavior is certainly a factor which law enforcement officers are entitled to take into consideration in making the determination whether probable cause to arrest exists. A policeman, however, is under no obligation to give any credence to a suspect’s story nor should a plausible explanation in any sense require the officer to forego arrest pending further investigation if the facts as initially discovered provide probable cause. Id. (citations omitted). Indeed, “[t]o hold otherwise would be to allow every suspect, guilty or innocent, to avoid arrest simply by claiming ‘it wasn’t me.’” Id. Even if Rodriguez could prove that he had paid money for the stolen dump truck, he still could have been guilty of receiving or retaining property of another knowing that it had been stolen. After all, paying money for stolen property does not make the property any less stolen. Furthermore, the fact that the state trial court judge ultimately dismissed the charges against Rodriguez does not mean that the defendants lacked probable cause to arrest him in the first place. See DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 36. Because the defendants had probable cause to arrest Rodriguez on July 7, 2006, they did not violate Rodriguez’s Fourth Amendment rights, and they are therefore entitled to qualified immunity as to this claim. - 32 - Nos. 09-3679, 09-3799 Rodriguez v. City of Cleveland The defendants also had probable cause to arrest Rodriguez on July 13, 2006. By that time, the defendants had already arrested Rodriguez once in connection with his possession of the stolen dump truck. In addition, the defendants had received a tip from the same informant, allegedly a former employee who called in the tip before the initial administrative search, that one of M & M’s tow trucks had a stolen engine. Moreover, the defendants had confirmed that one of M & M’s tow trucks, which had been impounded one week earlier, did in fact have an engine that had been reported stolen. These facts were sufficient to warrant the defendants’ belief that Rodriguez had knowingly received stolen property, i.e., the stolen engine. Because the defendants had probable cause to arrest Rodriguez on July 13, 2006, they are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim as well. In sum, because the defendants lawfully searched M & M’s premises pursuant to C.C.O. § 601.15, because the defendants reasonably relied on facially valid local ordinances in impounding and detaining M & M’s tow trucks, and because the defendants had probable cause to arrest Rodriguez on July 7 and July 13, 2006, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Rodriguez’s Fourth Amendment search and seizure claims.26 26 Count IV, which alleges false arrest and false imprisonment in violation of the Fourth Amendment, overlaps with Rodriguez’s claims for unreasonable seizure of person (Count I) and malicious prosecution (Count X). Accordingly, the analysis of those two claims controls the analysis of this claim. Because the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on each of those two claims, the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim as well. - 33 - Nos. 09-3679, 09-3799 Rodriguez v. City of Cleveland VI. Official immunity for alleged intentional omission of exculpatory information to secure indictments The individual defendants are absolutely immune from Rodriguez’s claim of intentional omission of exculpatory information to secure indictments (Count V) because Rodriguez relies solely on Detective Hall’s testimony in making this claim.27 Though the lower court denied summary judgment on this claim, its reasoning for so holding is not entirely on point.28 Moreover, Rodriguez’s claim relies on Detective Hall’s grand jury testimony and other “various testimonies” during the course of the criminal case, as opposed to his non-testimonial actions. Hall’s argument for absolute witness immunity finds support in this circuit’s precedent. “It is well-settled that witnesses are granted absolute immunity from suit for all testimony provided in judicial proceedings.” Spurlock v. Satterfield, 167 F.3d 995, 1001 (6th Cir. 1999). This includes testimony before a grand jury, Grant v. Hollenbach, 870 F.2d 1135, 1139 (6th Cir. 1989), and more informal forms of testimony such as depositions and affidavits, see Todd v. Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Co., 434 F.3d 432, 439-40 (6th Cir. 2006). Accordingly, because Rodriguez’s intentional omission of 27 The district court concluded that there are “genuine issues of material fact about whether some or all of the Defendants withheld exculpatory information in order to indict Plaintiff Rodriguez.” Rodriguez, 619 F. Supp. 2d at 484. However, because Rodriguez only brought Count V against Detective Hall, only Detective Hall can be liable on this claim. 28 The district court treated Rodriguez’s intentional omission of exculpatory information to secure indictments claim as “identical” to Rodriguez’s claim of malicious prosecution and continued unlawful detention in Count X, Rodriguez, 619 F. Supp. 2d at 484 n.21, but it is not clear that these claims are actually identical and the district court did not cite any authority in support of its conclusion that they are. - 34 - Nos. 09-3679, 09-3799 Rodriguez v. City of Cleveland exculpatory information to secure indictments claim is premised on Detective Hall’s testimony, Detective Hall is absolutely immune from civil liability. Our interlocutory jurisdiction to consider Hall’s claim of absolute, rather than qualified, immunity follows from Moldowan v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351 (6th Cir. 2009). In Moldowan, a police officer claimed an entitlement to absolute witness immunity on interlocutory appeal in a federal civil rights action. See id. at 371. We acknowledged in Moldowan that, “[u]nlike qualified immunity, the denial of a defense of absolute witness immunity generally is not immediately appealable because the ‘lack of interlocutory appeal from denials of witness immunity does not imperil [a] substantial public interest.’” Id. at 371 (quoting Kelly v, Great Seneca Fin. Corp., 447 F.3d 944, 949 (6th Cir. 2006)). Because it was a police officer who had claimed an entitlement to absolute witness immunity in Moldowan, however, and because that police officer had provided the disputed testimony during a criminal proceeding, we “conclude[d] that the balance of interests at issue in th[at] case differ[ed] dramatically from the interests implicated by the denial of [absolute witness] immunity in Kelly,” where we had declined to exercise interlocutory jurisdiction. Id. at 371. We then explained in Moldowan that “the interests implicated by the district court’s denial of [the police officer’s] testimonial immunity claim[] are sufficiently akin to those implicated by the denial of public official immunity to support interlocutory review.” Id. at 372. Indeed, [e]xposing police officers . . . to suit based on testimony they deliver as part of their official duties and on behalf of the state undoubtedly implicates their ability to exercise their discretion and potentially inhibits them from performing their duties. Unlike the parties before us in Kelly, “[s]ection 1983 lawsuits against police officer witnesses, like lawsuits against prosecutors, could be expected with some frequency. Police officers testify in scores of cases every year, and defendants often will - 35 - Nos. 09-3679, 09-3799 Rodriguez v. City of Cleveland transform resentment at being convicted into allegations of perjury by the State’s official witnesses.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 343 (1983)). Because we concluded in Moldowan that we had interlocutory jurisdiction to review a district court’s denial of absolute immunity where the witness claiming that immunity was a police officer who had testified for the state in a criminal trial, we likewise have interlocutory jurisdiction to consider whether Detective Hall is entitled to absolute immunity for his testimony, and, as discussed above, he is absolutely immune from civil liability. VII. Qualified immunity for alleged retaliation and harassment in violation of the First Amendment The individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Rodriguez’s claim alleging police retaliation and harassment for the filing of this civil lawsuit, in violation of the First Amendment, because there is no evidence in the record that any of the individual defendants participated in the allegedly harassing and retaliatory conduct. At most, the record evidence suggests that some unidentified Cleveland police detectives and police officers took the allegedly harassing and retaliatory actions—the evidence does not show that it was the individual defendants in this case. For example, Rodriguez related in an affidavit that, in August 2008, unnamed “Cleveland Police Detectives” asked Rodriguez’s then-current employer about tow trucks that the employer had purchased from Rodriguez. Similarly, in February 2009, “members of the Cleveland Police Department Vehicle Inspection Unit, including but not limited to Sergeant Keith Larson,” who is not a defendant in this case, instructed Rodriguez’s commercial landlord not to allow Rodriguez to - 36 - Nos. 09-3679, 09-3799 Rodriguez v. City of Cleveland remove his vehicles from a rented premises. After Rodriguez applied for a tow truck driver’s license, moreover, he “received a letter from Dorothy Michalko, from the Division of Assessments and Licenses from the City of Cleveland”—also not a defendant in this case—disapproving his license application without giving any reason for the disapproval. Rodriguez has put forth no evidence to suggest that Detective Hall, Detective Davis, or Lieutenant Miller was involved in any of these (or, for that matter, any other) allegedly harassing and retaliatory episodes. It was, therefore, error for the district court to conclude that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on this claim. In denying qualified immunity, the district court noted, The Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on this claim because the identities of the officers involved in the allegedly harassing and retaliatory activities have not been determined . . . . With this argument, the Defendants necessarily concede that there are genuine issues of material fact regarding the involvement of the Defendants in the abovementioned incidents. Rodriguez, 619 F. Supp. 2d at 484. We recognize that a court of appeals ordinarily lacks jurisdiction to consider fact-related disputes on interlocutory appeal. Johnson, 515 U.S. at 307, 319-20. Specifically, “a defendant may not appeal a district court’s summary judgment order insofar as that order determines whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a ‘genuine’ issue of fact for trial.” Id. at 319-20. However, the Supreme Court, in Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007), recognized a narrow exception to this jurisdictional rule. In Scott, despite the district court’s finding that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, id. at 376, and despite the court of appeals’ affirming that decision after adopting the plaintiff’s view of the facts on interlocutory appeal, id. at 376, 378, the Supreme Court reversed, concluding that no reasonable - 37 - Nos. 09-3679, 09-3799 Rodriguez v. City of Cleveland jury could have believed the plaintiff’s side of the story, id. at 378-81, 386. In reaching that conclusion, the Supreme Court relied on a videotape of the relevant events, included as part of the record, that “blatantly contradicted” the plaintiff’s version of the facts. Id. at 378-80. The Supreme Court explained that, “[a]t the summary judgment stage, facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a ‘genuine’ dispute as to those facts.” Id. at 380. Where, as in Scott, the nonmoving party’s “version of events is so utterly discredited by the record that no reasonable jury could have believed him,” a court of appeals “should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Id. at 380. In an effort to reconcile the Supreme Court’s decision in Scott with the rule in Johnson, “this Court has concluded that ‘where the trial court’s determination that a fact is subject to reasonable dispute is blatantly and demonstrably false, a court of appeals may say so, even on interlocutory appeal.” Moldowan, 578 F.3d at 370 (quoting Wysong v. City of Heath, 260 F. App’x 848, 853 (6th Cir. 2008)). “However, Scott’s exception [to the rule in Johnson] applies only to the ‘rare’ case at the ‘outer limit’ where a district court makes a ‘blatan[t] and demonstrabl[e] error.’” Landis v. Phalen, 297 F. App’x 400, 404 (6th Cir. 2008) (alteration in original) (quoting Wysong, 260 F. App’x at 853). That is precisely the case here. Rodriguez has advanced only allegations, unsupported by factual evidence, that Detectives Hall and Davis and Lieutenant Miller harassed and retaliated against him. This “court’s duty to view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant does not require or permit the court to accept” as true “mere allegations that are not - 38 - Nos. 09-3679, 09-3799 Rodriguez v. City of Cleveland supported by factual evidence.” Chappell v. City of Cleveland, 585 F.3d 901, 906 (6th Cir. 2009). Moreover, to withstand a properly supported motion for summary judgment, plaintiff must do more than rely merely on the allegations of her pleadings or identify a “metaphysical doubt” or hypothetical “plausibility” based on a lack of evidence; she is obliged to come forward with “specific facts,” based on “discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits,” showing that there is a genuine dispute for trial. Id. at 912 (citing Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)). Accordingly, Rodriguez’s unsupported allegations do not create a genuine issue of material fact as to the individual defendants’ involvement in the allegedly harassing and retaliatory incidents. The district court’s determination that the extent of the individual defendants’ involvement “is subject to reasonable dispute” is, therefore, on this factual record, “blatantly and demonstrably false.” Moldowan, 578 F.3d at 370 (quoting Wysong, 260 F. App’x at 853). Rodriguez has put forth no evidence whatsoever that Detectives Hall and Davis and Lieutenant Miller harassed and retaliated against him in violation of his First Amendment rights; therefore, we need not adopt his unsupported version of events. Rodriguez has not shown that Detectives Hall and Davis and Lieutenant Miller violated his First Amendment rights and they are, thus, entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. VIII. Qualified immunity for alleged malicious prosecution and continued unlawful detention without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment The individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Rodriguez’s malicious prosecution and continued unlawful detention claim. A federal malicious prosecution “claim encompasses wrongful investigation, prosecution, conviction, and incarceration.” Barnes v. Wright, - 39 - Nos. 09-3679, 09-3799 Rodriguez v. City of Cleveland 449 F.3d 709, 716 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Thacker v. City of Columbus, 328 F.3d 244, 259 (6th Cir. 2003)). Further, “the subset of malicious prosecution claims which allege continued detention without probable cause must be pursued and analyzed under the Fourth Amendment.” Gregory v. City of Louisville, 444 F.3d 725, 750 (6th Cir. 2006). To prevail on such a claim, “it is clear that a plaintiff must show, at a minimum, ‘that there was no probable cause to justify [his] arrest and prosecution.’” Thacker, 328 F.3d at 259 (alteration in original) (quoting Darrah v. City of Oak Park, 255 F.3d 301, 259 (6th Cir. 2001)). As discussed above, there was probable cause to arrest Rodriguez on both July 7 and July 13, 2006. Moreover, “it has been long settled that ‘the finding of an indictment, fair upon its face, by a properly constituted grand jury, conclusively determines the existence of probable cause for the purpose of holding the accused to answer.’” Barnes, 449 F.3d at 716 (quoting Higgason v. Stephens, 288 F.3d 868, 877 (6th Cir. 2002)). Because Rodriguez “was indicted pursuant to a determination made by the grand jury, he has no basis for his constitutional claim.” Higgason, 288 F.3d at 877. Thus, the defendants did not violate Rodriguez’s rights in prosecuting or detaining him and they are, therefore, entitled to qualified immunity. IX. Qualified immunity on alleged supervisory liability of Lieutenant Miller for Fourth Amendment violations Lieutenant Miller is entitled to qualified immunity on Rodriguez’s supervisory liability for Fourth Amendment violations claim because that claim is premised on the search of M & M, Rodriguez’s two arrests, and the seizure of his property, all of which comported with the Fourth Amendment. Because Rodriguez brought this supervisory liability claim against Lieutenant Miller only, neither Detective Hall nor Detective Davis can be held liable under the theory of supervisory - 40 - Nos. 09-3679, 09-3799 Rodriguez v. City of Cleveland liability—there are no such allegations pending against them. A theory of supervisory liability requires a civil rights plaintiff to demonstrate more than a supervisor’s mere passivity in the face of a subordinate’s alleged unconstitutional action. Indeed, “liability under § 1983 must be based on active unconstitutional behavior and cannot be based upon ‘a mere failure to act,’” Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting Salehpour v. University of Tennessee, 159 F.3d 199, 206 (6th Cir. 1998)), or the “mere right to control employees,” Gregory, 444 F.3d at 751. Since there was no unconstitutional behavior on the part of either Lieutenant Miller or his subordinates, however, in effecting Rodriguez’s arrests and the seizures of his property, Lieutenant Miller is entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.