Opinion ID: 2340040
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The standard and its application

Text: Simply put, appellant argues that Article 23 of the Declaration of Rights, as implemented by the statute and rule, [14] provides no rational basis for foreclosing the defendant's right to appellate review of the legal sufficiency of the evidence absent a motion for judgment of acquittal. (quoting appellant). This contention is without merit. In determining the constitutional validity of Art. 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, as implemented by Art. 27, § 593 of the Code and Md. Rule 4-324, we need only apply the level of scrutiny commonly referred to as the rational basis test. [15] This level of inquiry involves an assessment of the enactment under attack so as to determine whether the law has a rational basis which justifies the inequality springing from it. Davidson v. Miller, 276 Md. 54, 69, 344 A.2d 422 (1975). Only if the means chosen by the law-making body are wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective will the enactment be struck down. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961). Thus, the constitutionality of a legislative enactment may be upheld against an equal protection attack when any state of facts reasonably [can be] conceived to justify it. Id. at 426, 81 S.Ct. at 1105. See Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 99 S.Ct. 383, 58 L.Ed.2d 292 (1978). See generally L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law §§ 16-2 to -3 (1978). At the core of our analysis lies what we think is the critical distinction between criminal cases tried before a jury and criminal cases tried before the court. That distinction provides the underlying rationale for treating the former, under Art. 27, § 593 and Md. Rule 4-324, different from the latter, under Md. Rules 886 and 1086. In the latter, viz, a criminal case tried before the court, Md. Rules 886 and 1086 provide that an accused may have his insufficiency contention reviewed on appeal without the accused having first made a motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of all the evidence. The reason for this is clear, and has been set forth by our predecessors in Lambert v. State, 196 Md. 57, 68, 75 A.2d 327 (1950). There, the Court in referring to Criminal Rule 7(c), precursor to Md. Rules 886 and 1086, found the Rule to be enacted: for the purpose of preventing a possible miscarriage of justice by permitting the determination of one judge to take away the life or liberty of an accused without a review by any other tribunal. A moment's reflection makes it evident that an undeniable purpose of Rules 886 and 1086 is to preclude the possibility that an arbitrary conviction will be entered by a single judge where the evidence sustaining the defendant's conviction is insufficient at law. The basic demands of due process and fundamental equity mandate that appellate review of such cases be provided. However, in the former, viz, a case tried before a jury, a panel of jurors passes on the evidence proffered at trial below, in exercise of its duty to act as judges of the law and fact. Not only is a judge present at trial to review an insufficiency contention if a motion for judgment of acquittal is properly made, but the jury panel as well ultimately considers and weighs the evidence once the case is submitted to it by the trial judge. Thus, the concern that a single judge will precipitate a miscarriage of justice in sustaining a conviction on insufficient evidence is simply of less import in a case tried before a jury. Consequently, basic demands of due process and fundamental principles of equity do not necessitate that an accused be provided an inherent and absolute right to appellate review of an insufficiency contention in such a trial. That is not, however, to say that an accused may not seek review of his contention that the evidence sustaining his conviction was insufficient on appeal from a jury trial. Indeed, as we have discussed, an accused may seek such review, but only if the issue has been properly reserved, i.e., by moving for judgment of acquittal at the close of all the evidence. Significantly, Art. 27, § 593 in conjunction with Md. Rule 4-324 provides a distinct, rational procedure whereby the trial judge, at the time the motion for judgment of acquittal is made and before the case is permitted to go to the jury, is given an opportunity to examine exactly what it is that the criminal defendant claims is lacking or what point has been overlooked. This in turn allows the trial judge to either reopen the case and permit the State to cure the deficiency, or conclude that the evidence is insufficient and grant the motion, or deny the motion and permit the case to go to the jury. Such procedure affords the trial judge with a proper and reasonable opportunity at an appropriate time to take necessary and vital action in the handling of a case. The effective administration of justice contemplates, we think, such a procedure whereby claimed deficiencies are properly disposed of at the trial level, rather than at the appellate level. In conclusion, we hold that Art. 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, as implemented by Art. 27, § 593 of the Code and Md. Rule 4-324, is constitutionally valid. Our disposition herein of the appeal renders appellant's evidentiary argument moot. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT. McAULIFFE, J., concurs in the result.