Opinion ID: 1418050
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Misrepresentation of past or existing facts

Text: In Wyoming, the facts which constitute the offense of obtaining property by false pretenses are: (1) the pretenses; (2) their falsity; (3) the fact of obtaining the property by reason of the pretenses; (4) the knowledge on the part of the accused of their falsity; and (5) the intent to defraud. Haines v. Territory, 3 Wyo. 167, 13 P. 8, 12 (1887). See, Martins v. State, 17 Wyo. 319, 98 P. 709 (1908); and Anderson v. State, 27 Wyo. 345, 196 P. 1047 (1921). It is sufficient if the pretense proved to be false was a controlling part of the moving causes inducing the owner to part with his property  regardless of the presence of other inducing statements which may have been true. Haines v. Territory, supra, 3 Wyo. at p. 176, 13 P. at 13. In all of the above-cited cases, there were findings of misrepresentations of past or existing facts, thus avoiding the necessity to determine whether a promise of future action could constitute a pretense under the statute. The issue was raised but not addressed in Martins v. State, supra, since the court found therein that false statements and acts in regard to the accused's purported ownership of a bank check gave rise to misrepresentations of existing and past facts. The threshold inquiry, then, is whether appellant made any false representations of past or existing facts. If he did, we need only address the further issue of reliance and it would not be necessary to consider the proper rule as to promises of future action. There are two representations which are immediately evident from Brigg's testimony: (1) that appellant was going to use the money for an insurance bond; and (2) that Briggs would have his money back in ten days to two weeks. Both of these representations contemplate action in the future, and do not, therefore, constitute statements of past or existing facts. Implicit in these statements, however, is a representation of the present need for an insurance bond and a representation that $50,000.00 was presently needed for its purchase. The State failed to supply any evidence of the falsity of these implied representations in its case-in-chief. We have held, however, that even if this is true, when a defendant takes the stand he can supply the missing evidence, and that on appeal this court must look at all of the evidence. Newell v. State, Wyo., 548 P.2d 8, 14 (1976), and Neel v. State, Wyo., 452 P.2d 203, 204, rehearing denied 454 P.2d 241 (1969). When the defendant took the stand in this case, he testified that there was no such thing as an insurance bond in the car business. There being evidence, therefore, that the defendant knew there was no such thing as an insurance-bond requirement and that he impliedly represented such a need, the jury was justified in finding the defendant guilty of the crime of false pretenses. Furthermore, it is apparent that Briggs relied, at least in material part, on this representation in making the second $50,000.00 loan. The State would have us hold that the appellant's prior behavior in regard to the first loan  presumably his prompt repayment of that loan  constituted a past or existing fact upon which Briggs relied. While it is true that appellant's prior behavior was a past fact, and that Briggs may well have relied upon that fact, we fail to see how appellant misrepresented that fact in the course of obtaining the second $50,000.00 loan. Furthermore, it is certainty true that at the time of the second loan, appellant had promptly repaid a previous loan. We fail to see how this prior behavior can lay the basis for a false pretense. Nevertheless, we hold that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the defendant's conviction. Since we base this holding on the presence of a false representation of past or existing fact, we have no occasion to consider whether a representation of future action can lay the basis for a charge of obtaining property by false pretenses.