Opinion ID: 6319949
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Alleged Failure to Inform Kitts of the

Text: Consecutive Sentence Kitts contends that her plea was invalid because she was not informed of the mandatory, consecutive two-year sentence that attached to the aggravated identity theft count. At the changeof-plea hearing, the district court asked the government to state the maximum statutory penalties that applied to Kitts. The prosecutor recited as follows: With respect to investment adviser fraud in violation of 15, United States Code, Section 80b, incarceration for five years; supervised release for three years; a fine of $250,000 or twice the gross gain or loss, whichever is greater; a mandatory special - 10 - assessment of $100; restitution; and forfeiture to the extent charged in the information. With respect to wire fraud in violation of 18, United States Code, Section 1343, incarceration for 20 years, a five-year term of supervised release, and the same fine and restitution and forfeiture and special assessment I just mentioned. With respect to aggravated identity theft in violation of 18, United States Code, 1028A, mandatory term of incarceration of two years, which shall not be concurrent with any other term of imprisonment imposed under any other provision of law; one year of supervised release; a special assessment of $100 per count; restitution; and forfeiture to the extent charged in the information. (Emphasis added). The court then asked Kitts if she understood that as to each of the counts I have the authority to give you a term of imprisonment of[,] on Count One, the investment adviser fraud, of up to five years; on Counts Two through Five, the wire fraud counts, up to 20 years; and as to the identity theft charge, a minimum mandatory sentence of two years? Kitts replied in the affirmative. Thereafter, the district court again referred to the minimum mandatory sentence of two years on Count Six when explaining the role of the sentencing guidelines. Kitts was thus expressly told by the prosecutor that the sentence attached to Count Six was both mandatory and consecutive. As we have previously held, the fact that the maximum possible penalties are communicated to the defendant by the prosecutor, rather than the court, is not an error. See United States v. Yazbeck, 524 F.2d 641, 643 (1st Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (To satisfy [Rule 11], the record must show that the defendant - 11 - was personally advised of the sentence provided by law . . . . This does not mean that a judge may never rely on the prosecutor . . . to state in open court the relevant statutory provision or to conduct portions of the required inquiry. (citations omitted)); see also United States v. Raineri, 42 F.3d 36, 40 (1st Cir. 1994) (noting that district judges often rely heavily . . . on the prosecutor to provide the court with a description of statutory penalties).4 There was no error here. 2. The Alleged Failure to Inform Kitts of Elements of the Charges Kitts argues that her guilty plea was deficient because she was not adequately informed of the elements of the wire fraud and aggravated identity theft charges.5 This claim is belied by the record. 4 Kitts also claims that she was not informed that she would be responsible in all cases for 'losses' not in fact suffered by [her] investor-clients. Presumably, Kitts refers to the fact that her clients would be reimbursed by an insurance policy. It is evident from the record, however, that Kitts was informed several times that the charges carried the possibility of restitution and that, in response to inquiry from the district court, Kitts averred that she understood that prospect. Moreover, the law on this point is unmistakable. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(1)(B) (In no case shall the fact that a victim has received or is entitled to receive compensation with respect to a loss from insurance or any other source be considered in determining the amount of restitution.). 5 It is unclear if Kitts also intends this argument as a challenge to the information or as part of her ineffective assistance of counsel theory. Any challenge to the information has been waived. We have held with monotonous regularity that an unconditional guilty plea effectuates a waiver of any and all independent non-jurisdictional lapses. United States v. Cordero, - 12 - Under Rule 11, the court must ensure that the defendant understands 'the nature of each charge' to which [she] is pleading guilty. United States v. Cruz-Rivera, 357 F.3d 10, 13 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(G)). In certain circumstances, the reading of the indictment may be sufficient to fulfill this obligation. Id. During the plea colloquy, the district court recited the list of counts charged in the information, stating the count number, statutory section, and nature of the charge, and asked whether Kitts understood the charges against her. She stated that she did. In addition, the district court ascertained that Kitts had received a copy of the information and had an opportunity to discuss the charges with her attorney. The information itself contains the statutory language setting forth the elements of the wire fraud and aggravated identity theft charges and a statement of the relevant facts: On or about the dates below, in the District of Massachusetts and elsewhere, the defendant, [Kimberly Kitts], having devised and intending to devise a scheme and artifice to defraud, and for obtaining money and property by means of materially false and fraudulent pretenses, representations and promises, did transmit and cause to be transmitted by means of wire communication in interstate commerce, writings, signs, signals, pictures, and sounds, for the purpose of executing the scheme and artifice, as follows: 42 F.3d 697, 699 (1st Cir. 1994). Such a waiver includes alleged defects in the information. See United States v. Urbina-Robles, 817 F.3d 838, 842 (1st Cir. 2016). As we have already addressed Kitts's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we address this argument under Rule 11 only. - 13 - Count Date (on From To Item No. or about) 2 6/25/2013 Financial Marquis Wire transfer of Consulting Acct, TD $75,000 from account Firm Bank, MA of Client A to Account, Marquis Consulting NJ Account 3 7/2/2013 Financial Marquis Wire transfer of Consulting Acct, TD $87,500 from account Firm Bank, MA of Client A to Account, Marquis Consulting NJ Account 4 10/4/2013 Financial Marquis Wire transfer of Consulting Acct, TD $50,000 from account Firm Bank, MA of Client A to Account, Marquis Consulting NJ Account 5 5/22/2017 Financial Marquis Wire transfer of Consulting Acct, TD $125,000 from Firm Bank, MA account of Clients B Account, and C to Marquis NJ Consulting Account . . . On or about May 22, 2017, in the District of Massachusetts and elsewhere, the defendant, [Kimberly Kitts], did knowingly possess and use, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person, to wit, the name[] and brokerage account number of Client[] B, during and in relation to the crime of wire fraud . . . . The terms of the information are clear, the court satisfied itself that Kitts was competent to plead, Kitts confirmed that she had an opportunity to discuss the charges with her attorney, and, after hearing the charges against her, Kitts stated that she understood them. In these circumstances, we reject Kitts's claim that she was not adequately informed of the elements - 14 - of the wire fraud and aggravated identity theft charges. See United States v. Ramirez-Benitez, 292 F.3d 22, 27 (1st Cir. 2002) (finding no error where [t]he terms of the indictment alone sufficed to put [defendant] on notice of the charge . . . . [Defendant] admitted he understood the charge and the court found him competent to plead); see also United States v. DíazConcepción, 860 F.3d 32, 36-37 (1st Cir. 2017) (holding that the fact that the district court did not explain a specific element of the charged crime was not an error in violation of Rule 11). 3. The Factual Sufficiency of the Charges Kitts asserts that her conduct, as described at the change-of-plea hearing, arguably . . . did not violate 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (wire fraud) and 18 U.S.C. § 1028A (aggravated identity theft), and hence the court should not have accepted her plea. We disagree.
Kitts argues that the theft charged in Count Five was complete when she received the $125,000 check from her clients' account6 and, therefore, the fact that she subsequently initiated an interstate wire transfer to deposit the check does not amount to wire fraud.7 To prove wire fraud, the government must show 6 This was a joint account of Clients B and C. Kitts purports to offer a similar argument about Counts Two, 7 Three, and Four, but she develops the argument only with respect to Count Five. Accordingly, we focus only on those facts - 15 - . . . [defendant's] knowing and willful participation in a scheme to defraud and the use of interstate wires to further that scheme. United States v. Tum, 707 F.3d 68, 72 (1st Cir. 2013). In support of her theory that her conduct did not amount to wire fraud, Kitts relies on Kann v. United States, 323 U.S. 88 (1944), in which the Supreme Court overturned a conviction for mail fraud after concluding that [i]t cannot be said that the mailings in question were for the purpose of executing the scheme. Kann, 323 U.S. at 94. In that case, the defendants had cashed several checks at banks different from the drawee banks, triggering the depository banks (those that had cashed the checks) to mail the checks to those drawee banks to collect the funds. Id. at 9092. The mailings between the banks were the basis for the mail fraud charge. Id. at 90-91. The Court rejected this theory of mail fraud, explaining that the mailings at issue occurred after [t]he persons intended to receive the money had received it irrevocably. . . . It was immaterial to them, or to any consummation of the scheme, how the bank which paid or credited the check would collect from the drawee bank. Id. at 94. Here, as the government notes, [t]he interstate wiring of $125,000 . . . was an integral part of the fraudulent scheme . . . as the fraud was not complete until at least when Kitts underlying Count Five. See, e.g., Rodríguez v. Mun. of San Juan, 659 F.3d 168, 175 (1st Cir. 2011). - 16 - received the stolen funds into her own Marquis Consulting account. Kitts's conduct, as recounted at the change-of-plea hearing, clearly satisfied the statutory requirements for wire fraud.
The aggravated identity theft statute requires that Kitts, during and in relation to a felony violation enumerated in subsection (c), knowingly transfer[red], possesse[d], or use[d], without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person. 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). The list of felonies in subsection (c) includes any provision in chapter 63 (relating to mail, bank, and wire fraud). Id. at § 1028A(c)(5). Although the broader identity theft statute proscribes the same type of identity theft, that is, knowingly transfer[ing], possesses[ing], or us[ing], without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person, id. at § 1028(a)(7), that statute only requires that the identity theft be in connection with[] any unlawful activity that constitutes a violation of Federal law, or that constitutes a felony under any applicable State or local law, id. Therefore, the charge of aggravated identity theft, in contrast to simple identity theft, applies when the theft is connected to a specific felony from the statutory list in subsection (c). Given that we have already rejected Kitts's claim that her conduct did not constitute wire fraud, a crime listed in subsection (c), the key inquiry here is whether Kitts knowingly - 17 - transfer[red], possesse[d], or use[d], without lawful authority, a means of identification of one of her clients. Id. at § 1028A(a)(1) (emphasis added). Kitts argues that, as she had signing authority for her clients, her use of her client's signature cannot constitute identity theft. We confronted a similar argument in United States v. Ozuna-Cabrera, 663 F.3d 496, 497-99 (1st Cir. 2011), where we considered the requirements of aggravated identity theft in relation to a defendant who had purchased a passport and social security card and attempted to use them to apply for a new passport. Ozuna-Cabrera claimed that, because he had purchased the means of identification from a willing seller, he was not using it without lawful authority. Id. at 498. We rejected that argument, concluding that Congress intended § 1028A to address a wide array of identity crimes, and not only those iterations involving conventional theft. Id. at 500. Significantly, we explained that regardless of how the means of identification is actually obtained, if its subsequent use breaks the law . . . it is violative of § 1028A(a)(1). Id. at 499. In light of our holding in Ozuna-Cabrera, Kitts's conduct clearly constituted aggravated identity theft. The basis for the aggravated identity theft charge is the $125,000 theft - 18 - from Clients B and C.8 Kitts used Client B's name and account number to request a $125,000 check from Clients B and C's brokerage account, payable to her own account. She then deposited these funds into her Marquis Consulting Account, which she used to pay her personal expenses -- conduct well beyond any lawful authority given to her by her clients to use their accounts. Thus, her challenge to the factual basis for her plea to the aggravated identity theft charge fails.9