Opinion ID: 1253262
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: background and course of proceedings

Text: ¶ 3 Petitioner C.R. is the natural mother of three children involved in this case: M.R., A.R., and C.P. In early 1996, A.R. and C.P. were living with petitioner. M.R. was not living with petitioner, but M.R.'s probation officer, Steven Ha, believed that M.R. might be visiting petitioner. On the evening of January 2, 1996, Ha, accompanied by M.R.'s natural father, R.R., and a social worker, went to petitioner's house. [1] When Ha arrived at petitioner's house, about 8:30 p.m., he saw A.R. and C.P., then ages nine and seven, respectively, riding their bicycles on the street in front of the house. When questioned about the whereabouts of petitioner, A.R. stated she had last seen her mother that morning before school, and C.P. said he had not seen his mother for a couple of days. [2] Because it appeared that no one was supervising the young children, Ha contacted the Salt Lake Police Department. ¶ 4 Officer Matt Larsen arrived at petitioner's house around 9:00 p.m. A.R. told Larsen that her mother's boyfriend was watching them and had been in and out of the house that day, but A.R. did not know where he was at that time. C.P. stated that his mother's boyfriend might be across the street. Larsen approached petitioner's house and noticed that the front door was open and the screen door was shut. Larsen knocked on the door and, when no one answered, entered the house to try and determine if there was anyone there, ... to have a look around and see what the living conditions were like, to see if anyone was present to watch the children. Larsen looked in a bedroom in the house and saw a glass pipe and a wood pipe on a shelf inset in the bed's headboard. Based on his experience and training, Larsen recognized the pipes as the type used to smoke heroin, cocaine, or marijuana. Cf. State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah 1986). The pipes had apparently been used and contained residues. Larsen completed a cursory search of the house and found no one inside. He did not open any closets, drawers, or other closed areas of the house. ¶ 5 Larsen left the house and reported what he had found. A drug canine unit arrived and conducted a more comprehensive warrantless search. Various sexual devices were found in petitioner's bedroom drawer, but no other contraband was located. For approximately two hours there were at least three police vehicles parked outside the house, and, at one point, there were six vehicles, some marked and some unmarked. Some police officers remained on the scene until at least 11 p.m., but no one ever approached to identify himself or herself as an adult responsible for watching the children. [3] ¶ 6 The Division of Child and Family Services (DFCS) placed the children in shelter care pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-301 (Supp.1995). On January 5, the State filed a verified petition alleging that A.R. and C.P. were neglected as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-2(16) (Supp.1995) (repealed 1996). [4] In support of its petition, the State alleged that petitioner had left the children home unattended for an unreasonable amount of time and that a search of the house revealed drug paraphernalia and sexual devices in areas readily accessible to the children. Although the State's petition originally alleged that petitioner had neglected both A.R. and C.P., it was revealed at the outset of the juvenile court hearing that petitioner did not have custody of A.R. and that A.R.'s father, who did have legal custody, had agreed to a voluntary transfer of custody to A.R.'s grandparents. Consequently, the hearing proceeded on the sole issue of custody of C.P. ¶ 7 Petitioner moved to suppress all evidence discovered during the warrantless searches of her house. The juvenile court denied the motion. The court held that civil child protection proceedings were neither criminal nor quasi-criminal in nature and therefore the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule did not apply. ¶ 8 At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court ruled that based upon the testimony of the witnesses and other evidence presented ... [, C.P.] is a neglected child in that the child lacked proper parental care by reason of the faults or habits of the parents, guardians or custodians, and/or the child's parent, guardians, or custodians failed or refused to provide necessary care for his health, safety, morals, or well-being. The juvenile court stated that its decision was based primarily on the fact that petitioner had left the children alone for an extended period of time and failed to arrange for a responsible adult to watch them. With respect to the boyfriend, who petitioner claimed was watching the children, the court stated: [The children] haven't seen Mom since the morning, yet I don't know what anyone would expect the police or Mr. Ha or anyone to believe, especially when they go into the home and they see drug paraphernalia and drugs out in plain view, and the children basically not knowing where their mother is at. Certainly [the boyfriend] probably should have shown some responsibility, but he didn't, and the bottom line is the neglect doesn't necessarily go to you by not being there, but the neglect goes to you for allowing somebody like [the boyfriend] to be there allegedly or purportedly to care for these children. ¶ 9 Petitioner appealed. The Court of Appeals stated that the warrantless searches of petitioner's house violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution as applied to officers of the state of Utah by the Fourteenth Amendment. [5] See State in re A.R. & C.P., 937 P.2d 1037, 1042 (Utah Ct.App.1997). The court ruled that Larsen had no facts before him justifying a warrantless search of [petitioner's] home  the children were outside of the house and in no immediate danger, and DCFS could have taken custody of the children. Id. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court's ruling that the exclusionary rule does not apply to child protection proceedings. Relying on Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), the court observed that the primary function of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct in the context of criminal investigations. The Court of Appeals cited several cases holding that motions to suppress evidence in civil child protection proceedings were not appropriate. See, e.g., In re Robert P., 61 Cal.App.3d 310, 132 Cal.Rptr. 5, 12 (1976); In re Diane P., 110 A.D.2d 354, 494 N.Y.S.2d 881, 885 (N.Y.App.Div.1985). Based on such cases, the court held that the exclusionary rule should not apply because the deterrent effect of excluding improperly obtained evidence is not furthered in civil proceedings intended to protect children. See State in re A.R. & C.P., 937 P.2d at 1043-44.