Opinion ID: 213882
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Waiver of the statute of limitations.

Text: This court has held that defendants can expressly waive the bar to prosecution established by the statute of limitations. United States v. Cooper, 956 F.2d 960, 961-62 (10th Cir.1992). We review de novo the question of whether a defendant's express waiver of the statute of limitations is enforceable. See United States v. Leyva-Matos, 618 F.3d 1213, 1217 (10th Cir. 2010) (reviewing de novo the question whether a defendant's waiver of his appellate rights in a plea agreement is enforceable); see also Cooper, 956 F.2d at 961-63 (applying the de novo standard of review to assess whether defendant's guilty plea waived the statute of limitations). Flood's convictions on Counts V and VI of the second superseding indictment for securities fraud are based on conduct that occurred [o]n or about June 29, 2002. Aplt.App. at 332. The applicable statute of limitations required the government to file the relevant charging documents within five years after the commission of these offenses. 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a). As the initial indictment charging Flood with these offenses was filed on July 25, 2007, after the applicable limitations period had run, Flood contends that the statute of limitations bars her prosecution for these offenses. However, pursuant to the S/L Agreement Flood executed, the initial indictment filed on July 25, 2007 was within the extended period of limitations. Specifically, the S/L Agreement provided that [t]he period of limitations [applicable to any and all potential federal criminal charges arising out of Flood's activities in connection with ClearOne] that would otherwise expire from June 25, 2007 through July 26, 2007, is tolled and is extended until July 26, 2007. Aplt.App. at 293. While Flood concedes that she executed the S/L Agreement and that the S/L Agreement purported to waive the statute of limitations until July 26, 2007, she argues that this waiver was defective. To validly waive the statute of limitations, Flood asserts that the waiver must occur in open court and must specifically identify the rights waived. We reject these arguments and conclude that the S/L Agreement constituted a valid waiver of the statute of limitations. This court has noted that an express waiver of the statute of limitations most likely occurs when the defendant perceives waiver will work to ... her advantage. Cooper, 956 F.2d at 962. In effect, the defendant's waiver of the statute of limitations, in proper circumstances, is a binding agreement not to object to the filing of charges beyond the period of limitations. Id. In the S/L Agreement, Flood agreed that she w[ould] not argue that any federal criminal charges ... are barred by a statute of limitations which expired any time during the period of June 25, 2007 through July 26, 2007, and the government agreed to afford Flood the opportunity for a pre-charging conference. Aplt.App. at 293. The S/L Agreement also stated that Flood entered the agreement freely and voluntarily, after full and careful thought, with the advice of counsel, and with a full understanding of ... [her] rights. Id. at 294. Thus, Flood entered into a valid agreement waiving the applicable statute of limitations. We decline to impose an open court requirement on the waiver of the statute of limitations. When recognizing that a defendant can expressly waive the bar on prosecution established by the statute of limitations, this court cited to decisions in other circuits involving express waivers. See Cooper, 956 F.2d at 961 (citing United States v. Meeker, 701 F.2d 685, 687 (7th Cir.1983), and United States v. Wild, 551 F.2d 418, 424-25 (D.C.Cir.1977)). Both Meeker and Wild involved written waivers of the applicable statutes of limitations without any mention of the waivers occurring in open court. See Wild, 551 F.2d at 420 (concluding that defendant validly waived the statute of limitations by executing both a written waiver the defendant's attorney prepared, which was then delivered to law enforcement, and another waiver prepared by law enforcement); Meeker, 701 F.2d at 686 & n. 2 (concluding that short-term, government drafted waivers of the statute of limitations that all targets of the grand jury investigation executed independently after consultation with legal counsel constituted valid waivers). Flood's primary argument for imposing an open court requirement on a waiver of the applicable statute of limitations is flawed. Flood improperly equates the waiver of the statute of limitations to the waiver of an indictment, asserting that a waiver of the statute of limitations necessarily waives the defendant's right to a timely indictment. As a result, Flood mistakenly argues that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(b), which requires that a defendant waive prosecution by indictment in open court and after being advised of the nature of the charge and of the defendant's rights, applies in the context of waivers of statutes of limitations. As the government notes, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(b) permits the government to prosecute an individual for an offense without obtaining a grand jury indictment when the defendant waives the right to prosecution by indictment. This rule is inapplicable in Flood's case because the government did prosecute Flood pursuant to a grand jury indictment. Therefore, the issue of whether prosecution by indictment was properly waived is not presented in this case. We similarly reject Flood's argument that the waiver in the S/L Agreement was defective because it failed to identify the specific constitutional rights she waived. First, we note that the written waiver agreement in Wild did not identify any specific constitutional rights waived. See 551 F.2d at 420 n. 3. Second, Flood's argument proceeds from the mistaken premise that the waiver of the statute of limitations involves, or is interrelated with, the waiver of a constitutional right. As a result, Flood improperly incorporates the legal framework for the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights, arguing that waiver of the statute of limitations requires proof of the `intentional [...] abandonment of a known right or privilege.' Aplt. Br. at 54 (alteration added) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)). However, the limitations period in this case is imposed by federal statute, rather than by the Constitution. See Wild, 551 F.2d at 424-25 (distinguishing the waiver of a constitutional right from the waiver of a statutory right such as the statute of limitations). Further, the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that can be waived if it is not asserted at trial. United States v. Gallup, 812 F.2d 1271, 1280 (10th Cir.1987). In contrast, constitutional rights cannot be so waived.