Opinion ID: 3008475
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: standard of review

Text: In reviewing a verdict for legal sufficiency, we credit evidence that supports the verdict if reasonable jurors could, and disregard contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not. City of Keller v. Wilson , 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005). A challenge to the legal sufficiency of evidence will be sustained when, among other things, the evidence offered to establish a vital fact does not exceed a scintilla. Id . at 810 (citing Robert W. Calvert, “No Evidence” & “Insufficient Evidence” Points of Error , 38 Tex. L. Rev . 361, 362-63 (1960)). Evidence does not exceed a scintilla if it is “‘so weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion’“ that the fact exists. Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway , 135 S.W.3d 598, 601 (Tex. 2004) (quoting Kindred v. Con/Chem, Inc. , 650 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex. 1983)). B Application Suberu points to the following evidence as supporting a finding that Kroger lacked probable cause: 1. Kroger’s failure to check Suberu’s explanation with the pharmacy technician before initiating criminal proceedings; 2. Inconsistencies in Karrah Parkey’s testimony regarding whether she saw Suberu with a cart; and 3. Suberu’s testimony that she did not have a cart. Starting with the first item, it is well settled that a private citizen has no duty to investigate a suspect’s alibi or explanation before reporting a crime. Richey , 952 S.W.2d at 518 (citing Marathon Oil Co. v. Salazar , 682 S.W.2d 624, 627 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.)). If the acts or omissions necessary to constitute a crime reasonably appear to have been completed, a complainant’s failure to investigate does not negate probable cause. Id . Thus, the fact that no one investigated Suberu’s explanation is not evidence that probable cause was lacking. The second item is irrelevant to whether Kroger had probable cause, because none of the Kroger employees spoke to Karrah Parkey before Moody initiated criminal proceedings. Parkey’s credibility does not affect whether Kroger, at the time it called the police, reasonably believed Suberu was guilty of shoplifting. Accordingly, this evidence must be disregarded. Suberu relies primarily on the third item—her testimony that she did not have a cart. In contrast to the criminal case, however, here the question is not whether Suberu had a cart, but whether Kroger reasonably believed she did. See Richey , 952 S.W.2d at 517; Akin , 661 S.W.2d at 920-21. Wier, Belton, and Helwig each testified that they observed Suberu leaving the store with a cart containing items she had not purchased. The law presumes that Kroger honestly and reasonably acted on the basis of these observations in reporting Suberu to police. See Richey , 952 S.W.2d at 517; see also City of Keller , 168 S.W.3d at 817 (discussing legal sufficiency where the fact finding examined concerns what a party knew or why it took a certain course). Kroger contends that Suberu’s evidence is legally insufficient to rebut this presumption. We agree. To rebut the probable cause presumption, Suberu had to produce evidence that the motives, grounds, beliefs, or other information upon which Kroger acted demonstrate that it did not reasonably believe Suberu was guilty of shoplifting. See Richey , 952 S.W.2d at 518; Akin , 661 S.W.2d at 920. While Suberu’s evidence supports the jury’s determination—consistent with her acquittal—that she did not steal groceries, it does not establish the absence of probable cause. The criminal law presumes Suberu’s innocence and presents the State with a heavy burden of proof for a conviction, because it is more important that the guilty occasionally go free than for the innocent to be jailed. In re Winship , 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). The civil law presumes Kroger’s good faith and requires Suberu to rebut this presumption, because it is more important that a private citizen report an apparent subversion of our laws than for the wrongly accused to attain monetary redress from the accuser. [6] These presumptions provide benchmarks with which to evaluate this case. Suberu’s acquittal does not prove that Kroger lacked probable cause, just as her arrest does not prove her guilt. Her acquittal is not evidence, then, that she was unjustifiably subjected to criminal proceedings; it shows only that the government did not prove her guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Watts , 519 U.S. 148, 155 (1997). Because probable cause is presumed, Suberu was required to produce evidence that Kroger initiated her prosecution on the basis of information or motives that do not support a reasonable belief that she was guilty of shoplifting. See Richey , 952 S.W.2d at 518; Akin , 661 S.W.2d at 920. If there was no such evidence, Kroger is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Suberu was Kroger’s regular customer, yet she introduced no evidence of, for example, prior bad relations, preexisting debt, racial animus, or any private motivation to harm her. There is no evidence that, on the night in question, Wier, Belton, and Helwig caucused prior to Suberu’s detention; nor is there evidence that there was time for them to confer before recounting their similar observations to Moody. Further, there is no evidence that Kroger withheld exculpatory information from the police or capriciously enforced its shoplifting policy against customers. Although the critical question in this case was Kroger’s state of mind, Suberu produced no evidence that Kroger initiated her prosecution on the basis of something other than a reasonable belief that she was guilty. See City of Keller , 168 S.W.3d at 829-30. Suberu’s testimony does no more than create a surmise or suspicion that Kroger did not believe she was guilty of shoplifting, because it merely invites speculation that Kroger framed her and lied to the police. This conclusion, however, is no more probable than the proposition that Kroger’s employees, each independent of the others, mistakenly believed they observed the commission of a crime. We have cautioned that, “[e]vidence that is so slight as to make any inference a guess is in legal effect no evidence.” Ridgway , 135 S.W.3d at 601 (citing Lozano v. Lozano , 52 S.W.3d 141, 148 (Tex. 2001)). Unless there is evidence rebutting the presumption of probable cause, a prosecution resulting from eyewitness identifications that turn out to be incorrect or, at least, insufficient to warrant a conviction, does not satisfy the exacting requirements for a plaintiff to prevail in a malicious prosecution case. [7] In sum, the jury could reasonably conclude, based on her acquittal and her testimony, that Suberu did not, in fact, steal groceries. Without more, however, Suberu’s innocence is insufficient to support a finding that Kroger lacked probable cause. Courts must be especially careful in malicious prosecution cases to ensure that sufficient evidence supports each element of liability. Otherwise, the fourth element (innocence) automatically swallows the fifth (lack of probable cause) and sixth (malice) elements of this claim.