Opinion ID: 2248973
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: under color of law

Text: In addition to permanently residing in the United States, an alien who seeks PRUCOL status must live in the United States under color of law. As we have noted, both the Labor Department and the Department have promulgated regulations which interpret PRUCOL in a way that limits the ability of amnesty-eligible aliens such as Castillo or Jimenez to claim under color of law status for the purposes of receiving unemployment benefits. Under both Department and Labor Department regulations, legalized aliens such as Castillo and Jimenez would not be eligible to begin accumulating unemployment wage credits until each had reached lawful permanent resident status. (Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 1-86, Change 1 (Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration Feb. 16, 1989) (unpublished); 56 Ill.Adm.Code § 2905.15 (1991) (Illinois Department of Employment Security).) Both agencies base their position on the fact that the Act does not include the lawfully present for purposes of performing such services language found in FUTA section 3304(a)(14)(A). Although both agencies are apparently willing to conclude that Castillo and Jimenez are lawfully present for purposes of performing services, neither agency is willing to admit that Castillo and Jimenez are permanently residing in the United States under color of law. We believe that the PRUCOL language of our statute allows, and Federal court decisions require, a broader interpretation of under color of law than that offered by either the Labor Department or the Department. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit carefully considered the proper scope of the under color of law language in the Holley v. Lavine decision: The phrase [under color of law] encircles the law, its shadows, and its penumbra. When an administrative agency or a legislative body uses the phrase `under color of law' it deliberately sanctions the inclusion of cases that are, in strict terms, outside the law but are near the border. ( Holley, 553 F.2d at 849-50.) Subsequently, the Second Circuit added: The scope of [PRUCOL]    is not clear from the language employed. Instead, the phrase is designed to be adaptable and to be interpreted over time in accordance with experience, developments in the law, and the like. In this sense the phrase is organic and fluid, rather than prescriptive or formulaic. We agree wholeheartedly with the    characterization of [PRUCOL] as `both expansive and elastic.' As [has been] observed, `On its face, by its reference to under color of law, the language    invites dynamic interpretation by both courts and the administrative agency charged with the statute's enforcement to determine the statute's application in particular cases in the light of developments in the country's immigration policy.' Berger v. Heckler (2d Cir.1985), 771 F.2d 1556, 1571. Castillo and Jimenez cite extensive case law from other State courts as persuasive authority in support of their claim that they were living in the United States under color of law as of IRCA's effective date. In each of these decisions a reviewing court has given PRUCOL a broader interpretation than that suggested by either Department or Labor Department regulation. In some of these cases, claimants for a government benefit had not received personal assurances from INS that they would not be deported, but were found to be a member of a class of aliens covered by an INS policy or statutory mandate not to deport. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Solis (Fla.1991), 580 So.2d 146 (INS practice of not deporting Nicaraguan asylum applicants confirms PRUCOL status); Industrial Comm'n v. Arteaga (Colo.1987), 735 P.2d 473, 480 (PRUCOL status based on operating instruction of the INS prohibiting deportation); Lapre v. Department of Employment Security (R.I.1986), 513 A.2d 10, 12 (INS decision not to deport combined with instructions to applicant on how to regain permanent residence status confers PRUCOL status); Division of Employment & Training v. Turynski (Colo.1987), 735 P.2d 469 (moratorium established by Federal government prohibiting deportation of class in which claimants were members gives PRUCOL status); Gillar v. Employment Division (1986), 300 Or. 672, 676-81, 717 P.2d 131, 135-37 (Federal statute prohibited alien's deportation until Attorney General made certain findings in his case; alien found to be PRUCOL); Rubio v. Employment Division (1984), 66 Or.App. 525, 674 P.2d 1201 (INS routine renewal of voluntary departure period while applicant waited for pending permanent resident status conferred PRUCOL status). In other cases, courts have found color of law status based on INS's intention not to deport, even when that intention was inferred simply from INS's failure to take steps toward deportation after it had knowledge of the alien's presence in the United States. Antillon v. Department of Employment Security (Utah 1984), 688 P.2d 455, 459; Cruz v. Commissioner of Public Welfare (1985), 395 Mass. 107, 114, 478 N.E.2d 1262, 1266; In re St. Francis Hospital (1979), 71 A.D.2d 110, 422 N.Y.S.2d 104, aff'd (1981), 53 N.Y.2d 825, 440 N.Y.S.2d 185, 422 N.E.2d 830; Alfred v. Florida Department of Labor & Employment Security (Fla.App.1986), 487 So.2d 355, 357. The Department distinguishes these decisions based upon the act that in each case the alien seeking PRUCOL status had been known to the relevant authorities during the time period at issue. The Department argues that until an amnesty-eligible alien has come forward and made himself known to INS, it is unreasonable to conclude that such person lived in the United States under color of law. We believe it is significant, however, that for six months after IRCA's passage neither Castillo nor Jimenez could have come forward to claim amnesty because INS neither distributed forms nor accepted applications until the last day Congress allowed, May 5, 1987. This is despite the fact that INS was empowered by Congress to begin accepting adjustment applications on the date of IRCA's passage, November 6, 1986. Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 12-87, Change 1 (Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration Sept. 28, 1988), 54 Fed.Reg. 10114 (1989). We have found only two tribunals which have squarely addressed the issue Castillo and Jimenez bring to us. In In re Barazas a claimant for unemployment benefits argued that while he was in the process of meeting the requirements of the amnesty legislation, but before he actually filed his claim for amnesty, he should be considered to be in the United States under color of law. ( In re Barazas (Or.Emp.Div.1988), No. 88-P-843.) The referee hearing the claim noted that Congress had conferred a special status on amnesty-eligible aliens and agreed that Barazas was PRUCOL from IRCA's effective date even though Barazas was not individually known to INS until his amnesty claim was filed. A different result was reached in Brambila v. Board of Review (1990), 241 N.J.Super. 216, 574 A.2d 992, rev'd on other grounds (1991), 124 N.J. 425, 591 A.2d 605. In Brambila, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, held that applicants for legalization who claimed amnesty after their base periods were not PRUCOL at the time work was performed. Although the claimants before the court had applied for amnesty and had been given work authorization, the court denied the claimants' unemployment benefits. The court based its decision, in part, on the fact that Labor Department regulations prohibit INS from giving retroactive effect to an alien's amnesty claim until the alien has been granted lawful temporary resident status. ( Brambila, 241 N.J.Super. at 220, 574 A.2d at 995.) We note, however, that the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed Brambila on appeal, specifically avoiding the PRUCOL issue. Brambila, 124 N.J. at 432, 591 A.2d at 609. We think that it is significant that the Labor Department, in publishing its Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 12-87, Change 1 (Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration Sept. 28, 1988), 54 Fed.Reg. 10113 (1989), changed its regulatory posture to allow States whose law contains the lawfully present for purposes of performing services category of aliens to treat amnesty-eligible aliens as being lawfully present from the date of IRCA's passage, regardless of when during the statutory window an alien presented his claim for legalization. This change was made in recognition that aliens could not claim legalized status under IRCA until May 5, 1987. If it is conceded that Castillo and Jimenez were lawfully present for the purposes of performing services from the date of IRCA's passage, it makes no sense to say that Castillo and Jimenez were not also under color of law as of such date. We find this to be the case because, as used in the Act, the under color of law prong of PRUCOL is a less restrictive requirement than the lawfully present requirement set out in FUTA. This is supported by the fact that PRUCOL is a broad, fluid term, not prescriptive or formulaic. ( Berger, 771 F.2d at 1571.) Once an alien is determined to be both permanently residing in the United States and lawfully present here, we believe it is only logical to also conclude that such alien is PRUCOL. In addition, although we express no opinion as to the specific rationale of any of the holdings cited from other State jurisdictions, we believe that due to the comprehensive reform Congress meant for IRCA to effect, and considering the expansive reading the Federal courts have given PRUCOL, Castillo and Jimenez present a more compelling case for PRUCOL status than many of the aliens granted PRUCOL status in these cases. Again, the appellate court's opinion deserves reiteration: Congress' commitment to aliens such as plaintiffs is demonstrated by the unique protections afforded them under IRCA. Legalization of a qualified alien under IRCA is mandatory. (8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a) (1986).) Also, although the application period for filing for amnesty did not begin until some time after IRCA's effective date, aliens apprehended before the application period commenced and aliens apprehended during the first 11 months of the application period could not be deported, were to be granted authorization to engage in employment and were to be granted an `employment authorized' permit, provided they could establish a prima facie case of eligibility. (8 U.S.C. § 1255a(e) (1986).) Moreover, IRCA provided that its amendment to the [Nationality Act] which made it unlawful to hire, recruit or refer unauthorized aliens does not apply to aliens, like plaintiffs, who were employed prior to IRCA's effective date. It is apparent that Congress intended to and did provide special protections to aliens such as the plaintiffs in this case. (Emphasis added.) 207 Ill.App.3d at 809, 152 Ill.Dec. 717, 566 N.E.2d 404. As the appellate court noted, any other interpretation of PRUCOL vis-a-vis IRCA would produce an anomalous result. Had Jimenez and Castillo been discovered by the INS after November 6, 1986, each would have been directed to apply for amnesty and neither would have been subject to deportation. As far as the Department was concerned at the time, at least, both men after apprehension would have been recognized as being PRUCOL. (207 Ill. App.3d at 808, 152 Ill.Dec. 717, 566 N.E.2d 404.) But following IRCA's passage INS had no reason to apprehend either Jimenez or Castillo because Congress specifically proclaimed that neither could be deported. We believe the only reasonable interpretation of PRUCOL is for that phrase to include aliens like Jimenez and Castillo who made timely claims of amnesty under IRCA's legalization scheme.