Opinion ID: 889516
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether the District Court erred in granting the State's motion to change venue.

Text: ¶ 9 The District Court presented three grounds for transferring venue to Lewis and Clark County: (1) that Flathead County was not the proper county under § 25-2-126(1), MCA; (2) that Flathead County was not the proper county under § 2-4-702(2), MCA; and (3) that changing venue to Lewis and Clark County would serve the convenience of the witnesses and the ends of justice. BNSF challenges all three grounds. We find the third ground presented by the District Court dispositive. ¶ 10 Section 25-2-201(1), MCA, requires a district court to transfer venue when the county designated in the complaint is not the proper county. This provision was the apparent authority for the District Court's first two grounds for transferring the case. A decision made pursuant to this provision is subject to interlocutory appeal, or an appeal prior to final ruling on the case. M.R.App. P. 6(3)(f) (In civil cases, an aggrieved party may appeal from the following, provided that the order is the court's final decision on the referenced matter: . . . [f]rom an order granting or denying a motion to change venue on the basis that the county designated in the complaint is not the proper county. . . .). ¶ 11 Section 25-2-201(3), MCA, requires a district court to transfer venue when the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted by the change. This provision was the apparent authority for the District Court's third basis for transferring the case. Unlike a decision made pursuant to § 25-2-201(1), MCA, a discretionary decision made pursuant to § 25-2-201(3), MCA, is not subject to interlocutory appeal. State v. Pegasus Gold Corp., 270 Mont. 32, 38-39, 889 P.2d 1197, 1201 (1995). ¶ 12 Here, the District Court's determination that transferring venue to Lewis and Clark County would promote the convenience of the witnesses and the ends of justice was an independent and sufficient basis for its ruling. There is no question that Lewis and Clark County is a proper venue for this case. Section 25-2-126(1), MCA. So even assuming arguendo that Flathead County is also a proper venue for this case, the District Court still had authority under § 25-2-201(3), MCA, to transfer the case as it did. This decision is not subject to interlocutory appeal. Pegasus, 270 Mont. at 38-39, 889 P.2d at 1201. Further, while BNSF cites three cases where this Court considered appeals of venue rulings under § 25-2-201(3), MCA, prior to final judgment ( Yellowstone County v. Drew, 2007 MT 130, 337 Mont. 346, 160 P.3d 557, In re Lake County's Obligation for Operating Costs of the Fourth Judicial District v. Hutchin, 223 Mont. 55, 724 P.2d 183 (1986), and Yeager v. Foster, 146 Mont. 330, 406 P.2d 370 (1965)), such cases are not controlling here because in those cases the parties did not raise and the Court did not address the issue before us now: the propriety of an interlocutory appeal of a district court's ruling under § 25-2-201(3), MCA. In keeping with our holding in Pegasus, we decline to address BNSF's arguments that the District Court erred in transferring venue on convenience and justice grounds. ¶ 13 Because the District Court's ruling under § 25-2-201(3), MCA, is not subject to interlocutory challenge, BNSF's appeal is dismissed. We concur: MIKE McGRATH, C.J., JAMES C. NELSON, MICHAEL E WHEAT and BRIAN MORRIS, JJ.