Opinion ID: 2089228
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: denial of relief

Text: We turn first to the issue whether the district court erred when it dismissed the appellant's cause of action and denied the relief he requested. The appellant's first two assignments of error are essentially addressed to the appellant's claim that he proved his entitlement to the relief requested. Underlying the issue, however, are the more fundamental questions whether, and under what circumstances, the equitable remedy of expunction is within the jurisdiction of the district court. Juridically, jurisdiction of a court of equity refers to two distinct concepts: (1) the power of a court to render a valid decree and (2) the propriety of granting the relief sought. Doe v. Comdr., Wheaton Police Dep't, 273 Md. 262, 329 A.2d 35 (1974). Assuming, arguendo, that expunction is available as an equitable remedy, the first question is under what circumstances the power of a court to expunge may be invoked. Most of the reported cases that address the propriety of expunction as an equitable remedy have done so in the context of arrest records, rather than police reports. In cases upholding the theory of `inherent equitable power to expunge,' the expunction of such records is a process of weighing the interests of society and of the individuals involved. In re Interest of P.L.F., 218 Neb. 68, 71, 352 N.W.2d 183, 185 (1984). Courts which recognize an inherent power to expunge arrest records have tempered this power by requiring that it be exercised sparingly and only in extraordinary circumstances. Toth v. Albuquerque Police Dept., 123 N.M. 637, 944 P.2d 285 (1997). See, e.g., Camfield v. City of Oklahoma City, 248 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir.2001); United States v. Schnitzer, 567 F.2d 536 (2d Cir.1977); In Interest of E.C., 130 Wis.2d 376, 387 N.W.2d 72 (1986); Bradford v. Mahan, 219 Kan. 450, 548 P.2d 1223 (1976); Journey v. State, 850 P.2d 663 (Alaska App.1993), aff'd 895 P.2d 955 (Alaska 1995); State ex rel. Peach v. Tillman, 615 S.W.2d 514 (Mo.App.1981); People v. Michael L., 80 Misc.2d 292, 362 N.Y.S.2d 989 (1975). Notably, no court has questioned the legitimacy or importance of the government's interest in obtaining and retaining records dealing with individuals who pass through our criminal justice system, none has viewed inherent judicial authority to expunge as a power to be used routinely, and none has suggested that the government's interest in maintaining accurate criminal histories can be outweighed in any but exceptional circumstances. See Journey, supra . The logic upon which this requirement is based is that while expunction may be available as an equitable remedy, that remedy may only be properly invoked where the court is afforded with authority to act, by the need to remedy the invasion of legally protected rights. See, In Interest of E.C., supra ; Bradford, supra . While the judicial remedy of expunction may be inherent, and not dependent upon express statutory provision, it exists to vindicate substantial rights provided by statute as well as by organic law. See Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C.Cir. 1974). Where constitutional questions are involved, the litigant has the right to raise them in a court of equity and such court has the right to consider them. Doe, supra . In cases to which a statutory scheme does not extend, however, the court's inherent power is limited to instances where the petitioner's constitutional rights may be seriously infringed by retention of his or her records. In re R.L.F., 256 N.W.2d 803 (Minn.1977). For instance, a number of courts have ordered expunction of local police records as an appropriate remedy in the wake of police action in violation of constitutional rights. Police Comm'r of Boston v. Municipal Court of the Dorchester District, 374 Mass. 640, 374 N.E.2d 272 (1978). Federal courts have ordered expunction of arrest records where the arrests were made in violation of the constitutional rights of the individuals arrested. See, e.g., Menard, supra (individual arrested and held without probable cause); Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938 (D.C.Cir. 1973) (mass arrests, without probable cause, of thousands of individuals protesting American military involvement in Southeast Asia); United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734 (5th Cir.1967) (arrests used to intimidate minority voters in violation of Voting Rights Act). Assuming, then, that expunction is an available remedy for a court of equity, the issue facing this court is whether the appellant's evidence, taken as true as required by our standard of appellate review, establishes the extraordinary circumstances necessary for expunction to be ordered. Because the appellant's evidence, taken as true, fails to establish the invasion of a legally protected right, we conclude that the appellant did not prove the extraordinary circumstances that would be necessary to support an order expunging the police investigative reports at issue. The appellant's brief argues that the retention by the LPD of the police reports presents violations of (1) his right to liberty as protected by the Due Process Clause and (2) his right to privacy. We first note that these claims were not clearly articulated by the appellant in his pleadings or at trial. Generally, an issue not presented to the trial court may not be raised on appeal. Menkens v. Finley, 251 Neb. 84, 555 N.W.2d 47 (1996). However, it appears that the district court, evidently being of a generous disposition, nonetheless evaluated the appellant's pleadings and evidence to determine if the appellant's rights to privacy or due process had been violated. Therefore, we consider each argument in turn. The appellant argues that the LPD's retention of the police reports deprives him of liberty without due process of law, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. However, the only injury identified in the appellant's petition is harm to his reputation. It is well established that an injury to reputation alone is not enough to create a liberty interest, protected by the Due Process Clause, apart from some more tangible interests such as employment. Benitez v. Rasmussen, 261 Neb. 806, 626 N.W.2d 209 (2001). See, Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 111 S.Ct. 1789, 114 L.Ed.2d 277 (1991); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976). Although the appellant expands upon his due process argument on appeal, the appellant's operative petition clearly does not allege a violation of a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. The purpose of pleadings is to frame the issues upon which a cause is to be tried, and the issues in a given case will be limited to those which are pled. Alegent Health Bergan Mercy Med. Ctr. v. Haworth, 260 Neb. 63, 615 N.W.2d 460 (2000). Given the appellant's failure to plead, and the failure of the evidence presented at trial to substantiate, the deprivation of any protected liberty interest, we find the appellant's alleged due process claims to be without merit. The appellant did not specifically plead a violation of his right to privacy either, but the district court, in overruling Casady's and Leuenberger's demurrers, concluded that the appellant's petition alleged facts that would support a finding that the appellant's right to privacy had been violated. The evidence presented at trial, however, failed to show such a violation. The appellant's argument is premised on the possibility that the police investigative reports will be disseminated and cause him harm. In the first place, we note that the uncontradicted evidence presented at trial indicates that the police reports are not public records and are disseminated only to other law enforcement agencies or when subject to legal process. Moreover, in Paul, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a claim that a plaintiff's right to privacy had been violated by the dissemination of the fact that he had been arrested for shoplifting. The Court recognized that `zones of privacy' may be created by more specific constitutional guarantees and thereby impose limits upon government power. 424 U.S. at 712-13, 96 S.Ct. 1155. However, the Court concluded that the plaintiff's claim [was] based, not upon any challenge to the State's ability to restrict his freedom of action in a sphere contended to be private, but instead on a claim that the State may not publicize a record of an official act such as an arrest. None of our substantive privacy decisions hold this or anything like this, and we decline to enlarge them in this manner. 424 U.S. at 713, 96 S.Ct. 1155. See, also, Scheetz v. The Morning Call, Inc., 946 F.2d 202 (3d Cir.1991) (information contained in police report not protected by constitutional right of privacy); J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080 (6th Cir.1981) (interest asserted in nondisclosure of juvenile court records not protected by constitutional right to privacy); Roth v. Reagen, 422 N.W.2d 464 (Iowa 1988) (entry in child abuse registry not violation of constitutionally protected privacy interest); Loder v. Municipal Court, 17 Cal.3d 859, 553 P.2d 624, 132 Cal.Rptr. 464 (1976) (limited retention and dissemination of arrest records does not violate right of privacy). In the instant case, the evidence does not indicate, and the appellant does not argue, that the police investigative reports at issue were generated in violation of the appellant's constitutional rights. While the appellant sought to impeach the information in the reports, he does not claim, and the evidence would not support concluding, that the investigation was undertaken in bad faith or that the reports were the result of actionable police misconduct. Compare, United States v. Schnitzer, 567 F.2d 536 (2d Cir.1977); United States v. Linn, 513 F.2d 925 (10th Cir.1975); Toth v. Albuquerque Police Dept., 123 N.M. 637, 944 P.2d 285 (N.M.App.1997); State ex rel. Peach v. Tillman, 615 S.W.2d 514 (Mo. App.1981) (cases holding expunction of arrest record not appropriate where arrest was lawful). While the appellant claims that the information contained in the police investigative reports is embarrassing to him, those reports do not contain confidential information and explicitly exonerate the appellant of any illegal conduct. The appellant's argument essentially appears to be that he is entitled to have the reports expunged because some of the conclusions are wrong and because the appellant believes the investigating officer did not conduct a complete investigation. This claim, however, does not support a finding that a legal right of the appellant has been invaded. Accepting the appellant's argument would require the judiciary to become the arbiter of what is and is not good police work, and to edit police reports to remove conclusions over which there is disagreement. This is simply not an appropriate judicial function. Police reports summarize the facts surrounding an event and constitute a necessary log of police activity. See State v. L.K., 359 N.W.2d 305 (Minn.App.1984). The hallmark of our system of government calls for the preservation of accurate official records rather than suppression of information. Spock v. District of Columbia, 283 A.2d 14 (D.C.App.1971). If a record of involvement with criminal process is expunged, the traces literally vanish and no indication is left behind that information has been removed. Com. v. Roberts, 39 Mass.App. 355, 656 N.E.2d 1260 (1995). Therefore, it is possible that the judicial editing of history could produce a greater harm than that sought to be corrected by the expunction of certain information from a police report. See Camfield v. City of Oklahoma City, 248 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2001). Given the uncontradicted testimony of Casady regarding the utility of these police reports to the LPD, the commands of a government of laws require that this court confine its acts within the scope of judicial power recognizing the coequal powers of the other branches of government. See Mulkey v. Purdy, 234 So.2d 108 (Fla.1970). The reservation of possible judicial review of police records in cases of overriding equitable considerations, based on the violation of established legal rights, is to provide a remedy in the rare case where extraordinary circumstances so warrant. See id. Because the appellant's evidence in this case, taken as true, failed to establish such circumstances, we conclude that the district court did not err in dismissing the appellant's cause of action. The appellant's first two assignments of error are without merit.