Opinion ID: 853859
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Clues of Intent in Other Statutes

Text: BAPAC counters with its own indicators of legislative intent. It argues that even as to ambiguous statutes, we must give effect to the intent of the legislature. Lehman, 690 N.E.2d at 702. As noted above, the General Assembly substantively amended Indiana Code § 3-5-2-37 in 1997, [9] but did not change the influence language. At the same time, the legislature added a section to the Code in which it included express advocacy language. [10] According to BAPAC, the addition of the express advocacy language in § 3-9-3-2.5 illustrates the legislature was aware of the difference between influence and expressly advocate. BAPAC argues: [I]ts decision not to include this test in Ind.Code § 3-9-2-37(a) when it was amending the statutewhile at the same time adding this test to Ind.Code § 3-9-3-2.5shows that the General Assembly did not intend for Indiana's definition of PAC to be restricted to express advocacy groups. . . . If it had meant to define PAC as an organization that expended funds for express advocacy only, it would have said so explicitly, just as it did in Ind.Code § 3-9-3-2.5, rather than use the term influence. (Appellant's Br. at 16.) This argument's flaw is that it asks us to assume the legislature intended that influence in Ind.Code § 3-5-2-37 mean something broader than express advocacy, and did so after Buckley was handed down. This requires us to assume an unconstitutional intent. As a general rule, Unconstitutional intention will not be attributed to the legislature if reasonably avoidable. Price v. State, 622 N.E.2d 954, 963 (Ind.1993) (citing Conter v. Commercial Bank of Crown Point, 209 Ind. 510, 513-14, 199 N.E. 567, 569 (1936)). This brings us to the canon that seems weightiest for today's purposes.