Opinion ID: 763759
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: F. Soto

Text: 90 Likewise, F. Soto was charged with obstruction of justice for using physical force against an individual known as Curly with intent to hinder, delay and prevent him from communicating to federal law enforcement officers about Latin King drug operations. The only testimony showing F. Soto committed this racketeering act was that of Jesse Rodriguez, a Latin King member. Jesse Rodriguez testified that he was arrested for drug charges in January 1994 because Curly had informed police about his drug trafficking operations. Thus, Jesse Rodriguez testified that he asked F. Soto to beat down Curly for being an informant. On cross-examination, Jesse Rodriguez further stated (1) that F. Soto confessed to him that he had beaten down Curly; and (2) that Curly told him that he had been beaten down. The only other witness who testified regarding this predicate racketeering act was an FBI agent who was working with local police on the investigation of the Latin Kings and Jesse Rodriguez's drug activities. The agent informed the court that Curly was in fact an informant who provided information on Jesse Rodriguez's drug operation, but that he did not have any knowledge that Curly had been beaten up by F. Soto. Thus, F. Soto argues that the uncorroborated testimony of Jesse Rodriguez, regarding F. Soto's confession and Curly's statement, is insufficient, without more, to prove that the beating of Curly ever occurred, or even if it occurred, that F. Soto took part in it. We disagree. 91 In addition to the general principles noted above in reviewing sufficiency of the evidence claims, we have recognized that [a] conviction may be sustained on the basis of the testimony of a single accomplice, so long as that testimony is not incredible on its face and is capable of establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Gordon, 987 F.2d 902, 906 (2d Cir.1993) (citing United States v. Parker, 903 F.2d 91, 97 (2d Cir.1990)). Any lack of corroboration of an accomplice's or co-conspirator's testimony goes merely to the weight of the evidence, not to its sufficiency, and a challenge to [t]he weight is a matter for argument to the jury, not a ground for reversal on appeal. United States v. Roman, 870 F.2d 65, 71 (2d Cir.1989). In this case, we find that the record reflects that Jesse Rodriguez's testimony regarding the beat down of Curly was not incredible on its face. Therefore, we will not disturb the jury's findings with respect to the weight of the uncorroborated co-conspirator testimony. C. Evidence of Conducting a RICO Enterprise 92 Antuna and Cruz argue that the government failed to demonstrate that they conducted or participated in the affairs of the Latin Kings enterprise as required for a RICO conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). We disagree. 93 In Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 113 S.Ct. 1163, 122 L.Ed.2d 525 (1993), the Supreme Court held that  'to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of [an] enterprise's affairs,' [as required by] § 1962(c), one must participate in the operation or management of the enterprise itself, id. at 185, 113 S.Ct. 1163, and at a minimum must play some part in directing the enterprise's affairs, id. at 179, 113 S.Ct. 1163. The Court recognized that those who operate or direct a RICO enterprise sufficient to conduct its affairs are not limited to upper management, but might also be lower rung participants in the enterprise who are under the direction of upper management. Id. at 184, 113 S.Ct. 1163. 94 Under the Reves operation-management test, even if a defendant is not acting in a managerial role, we have held that he can still be liable for directing the enterprise's affairs if he exercised broad discretion in carrying out the instructions of his principal. Napoli v. United States, 45 F.3d 680, 683 (2d Cir.1995). However, we have noted in United States v. Viola, 35 F.3d 37 (2d Cir.1994), that the simple taking of directions and performance of tasks that are 'necessary or helpful' to the enterprise, without more, is insufficient to bring a defendant within the scope of § 1962(c). Id. at 41. 95 In the present case, Antuna and Cruz argue that RICO liability does not extend to them because there is no evidence to show that they played any part in directing the affairs of the Latin Kings' enterprise. They analogize their circumstances to those of the appellant in Viola. In that case, a janitor and handyman for the kingpin of a RICO enterprise transported stolen goods to buyers and returned most of the proceeds from the sales of such goods to the kingpin. The janitor acted under the direction of the kingpin and without discretionary authority in carrying out such orders. This Court found that although the janitor's acts might have contributed to the success of the RICO enterprise, he simply did not come within the circle of people who operated or managed the enterprise's affairs. Id. at 43. Therefore, [a]lthough Reves still attaches liability to those down the 'ladder of operation' who nonetheless play[ed] some management role ... § 1962(c) liability cannot cover [the janitor for he] ... was not on the ladder at all, but rather, as [the kingpin's] janitor and handyman, was sweeping up the floor underneath it. Id. 96 Here, the record makes clear that Antuna and Cruz were both on the ladder, rather than under it. First, they killed A. Diaz, a suspected informant, at the behest of Latin King leaders. In addition, Antuna and Cruz's decision to kill White and thereby eliminate a potential witness to the A. Diaz murder demonstrates that they had discretionary authority in carrying out the instructions of their principals. Accordingly, we find that there was sufficient evidence that Antuna and Cruz had roles in directing the affairs of the Latin Kings' enterprise to support their RICO convictions. 97 D. Evidence of Pattern of Racketeering Activity 98 Antuna, Cruz and F. Soto argue that the evidence was insufficient to sustain their RICO convictions because the government failed to show that they engaged in the Latin Kings' enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity as required by 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). We disagree. 99 In order to have been engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity, the government must prove that (1) the defendant committed at least two predicate acts of racketeering within ten years of one another, see 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988); (2) that these racketeering predicates are interrelated; and (3) that they reveal continued, or the threat of continued, racketeering activity, see H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 236-39, 109 S.Ct. 2893, 106 L.Ed.2d 195 (1989). The requirements of relatedness and continuity prevent the application of RICO to isolated or sporadic criminal acts. See United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370, 1375-76, 1381-82 (2d Cir.1989). Relatedness may be established by showing that the predicate acts have  'the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission.'  H.J., Inc., 492 U.S. at 240, 109 S.Ct. 2893 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1988)). The continuity prong of a RICO pattern is both a closed- and open-ended concept, referring either to a closed period of repeated conduct, or to past conduct that by its nature projects into the future with a threat of repetition. Id. at 241, 109 S.Ct. 2893. 1. Antuna and Cruz 100 In the present case, the jury found that the pattern of racketeering activity committed by Antuna and Cruz under the RICO count consisted of three predicate acts of racketeering: (1) participation in the Latin Kings drug conspiracy; (2) conspiracy to murder and the murder of A. Diaz; and (3) the murder of White. Antuna and Cruz contend that there was insufficient evidence that they participated in the drug conspiracy and, more particularly, that Cruz joined the charged conspiracy to do so. Further, Antuna and Cruz argue that the murders of A. Diaz and White are insufficient to constitute a RICO pattern because the murders were simultaneous acts committed in a single episode and there was no external evidence of continued, or threat of continued, racketeering activity stemming from the event. These contentions are without merit. 101 It is apparent that there was sufficient evidence that Cruz was a member of the Latin Kings and that he and Antuna conspired to distribute drugs for the gang. Moreover, the evidence indicates that they murdered A. Diaz to eliminate a suspected informant who threatened Latin King drug dealers, and they murdered White to eliminate a witness to A. Diaz's murder. Thus, their predicate acts meet the relatedness requirement because such acts had the same participants and the same purpose, that is, to further the drug conspiracy. 102 Regarding the continuity requirement, this Court has noted that [t]he nature of the enterprise may ... serve to show the threat of continuing activity. Where the enterprise is an entity whose business is racketeering activity, an act performed in furtherance of that business automatically carries with it the threat of continued racketeering activity. Indelicato, 865 F.2d at 1383-84. Here, we find that the continuity requirement is met because the murders and the nature of the Latin King enterprise clearly demonstrated a threat of continuity. The Latin Kings were engaged in racketeering activities, in particular, drug trafficking and related violence. The murder of a suspected informant and the simultaneous murder of an innocent bystander directly carried with it the threat of continued drug trafficking and associated violence to protect the gang's narcotics operations and members. See United States v. Simmons, 923 F.2d 934, 951 (2d Cir.1991) (noting that where RICO murders were partly intended to maintain discipline within a drug gang and to protect its narcotics operation, the very nature [of] these acts threatened repetition and thereby satisfied the continuity prong of the pattern requirement.). Accordingly, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence that Antuna and Cruz were engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity to sustain their convictions under § 1962(c). 2. F. Soto 103 The jury found that F. Soto committed the following three predicate acts of racketeering under the RICO count: (1) participation in the drug conspiracy; (2) conspiracy to murder three individuals in retaliation for being shot himself; and (3) obstruction of justice by tampering with an informant known as Curly to prevent him from communicating with federal law enforcement regarding Latin King drug operations. F. Soto argues that the government failed to present evidence that he committed two of his three predicate acts, conspiracy to murder and tampering with an informant, and, therefore, his remaining predicate act, drug conspiracy, is not sufficient by itself to constitute a pattern of racketeering activity to support his RICO conviction. We disagree. 104 First, we have already determined above that there was sufficient evidence to support his predicate act of obstructing justice. Second, there was ample evidence showing that F. Soto conspired to murder three individuals. Moreover, testimony of co-conspirators, when viewed in the light most favorable to the government, demonstrated that F. Soto requested and solicited the drive-by-shooting by asking for authorization from Latin King leaders and requesting retaliatory action from other Latin King members. F. Soto also aided and abetted the venture by identifying the targets and their whereabouts. Finally, such testimony showed that F. Soto knowingly and intentionally joined in a conspiracy to murder the people who shot him. We therefore conclude that the evidence was sufficient to show that F. Soto engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity under the RICO count. 105 F. Soto was also charged under four VICAR counts with conspiring to murder, and aiding and abetting in the assault of three individuals, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a). For the same reasons set forth in the above paragraph, we find that there was sufficient evidence to sustain F. Soto's VICAR convictions. 106 E. Evidence of Maintaining or Increasing Position in the RICO Enterprise 107 Antuna, Cruz and Morales contend that the evidence was insufficient to sustain their VICAR convictions for aiding and abetting, conspiring to commit or committing murders, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a). Specifically, they argue that there was insufficient evidence to show that they committed these violent crimes for the purpose of maintaining or increasing their positions within the Latin Kings' enterprise under § 1959(a). 108 In order to prove that conspiring to murder or murder was  'for the purpose of ... maintaining or increasing [a] position in' a RICO enterprise, the government is required to prove, inter alia, that the defendant's general purpose in committing the crime of violence was to maintain or increase his position in the enterprise. Thai, 29 F.3d at 817 (ellipses in original) (citing Concepcion, 983 F.2d at 381). As to the motive requirement, [s]elf-promotion need not have been the defendant's only, or even his primary, concern, if [the act] was committed 'as an integral aspect of membership' in the enterprise. Id.(quoting Concepcion, 983 F.2d at 381). Thus, the motive requisite is satisfied if  'the jury could properly infer that the defendant committed his violent crime because he knew it was expected of him by reason of his membership in the enterprise or that he committed it in furtherance of that membership.'  Id.; see United States v. Polanco, 145 F.3d 536, 540 (2d Cir.1998), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 119 S.Ct. 803, 142 L.Ed.2d 664 (1999); United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 940 (2d Cir.1993). 1. Antuna and Cruz 109 In this case, it is clear that Antuna and Cruz were members of the Latin Kings at the time of the A. Diaz and White murders, and that they conspired to commit and committed these murders as part of and in furtherance of their membership in the Latin Kings enterprise. The evidence amply supports that Antuna and Cruz killed A. Diaz because the Latin Kings suspected he was an informant who could harm the enterprise's narcotics operations. Similarly, they killed White to eliminate him as a witness to their murder of A. Diaz performed in furtherance of the drug conspiracy. Indeed, Antuna summed up his motive after he was arrested when his girlfriend told him that Morales would not see her. Antuna stated that you go all out for the Family and this is how they repay you. 110 Although conceding that the motive element might have been established as to Antuna, Cruz argues that there was no evidence that he was a member of the Latin Kings or shared Antuna's motive. This claim is without merit. The evidence reveals that Cruz was a member of the gang and that he was a close associate of Antuna's. Moreover, the evidence demonstrates that Antuna's and Cruz's actions on the night of the murders were clearly part of a premeditated plan to accomplish a shared objective, that is, to eliminate a threat to the Latin Kings' drug trafficking. We conclude therefore that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that Antuna and Cruz committed the A. Diaz and White murders in order to maintain or increase their positions in the Latin Kings enterprise. 2. Morales 111 Morales was charged with conspiring to murder, and aiding and abetting the murder of, Latin King Alex Aponte. On appeal, Morales argues that the murder of Aponte occurred solely because of a personal vendetta of Dante Bond, one of Aponte's murderers. Morales further contends that there was insufficient evidence to prove that he aided, abetted and conspired to murder Aponte to maintain or increase his position in the Latin Kings, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a). Morales' argument is groundless. 112 Taken in the light most favorable to the government, the evidence showed that on December 14, 1992, Morales authorized Latin King Michael Folch and his non-Latin King associate, Bond, to kill Aponte. At the time, Folch, Bond and Aponte sold drugs for Morales on a Latin King drug block at Yale Street in Bridgeport operated by Morales on behalf of Burgos. Folch and Bond urged the killing of Aponte because he had robbed Eggy, a street seller on Yale Street, who fought with Bond over who was going to deal drugs on the block, and had threatened Bond's life. Since Bond was not a Latin King because he was African American, he requested Morales' permission to kill Aponte. Morales authorized Bond and Folch to murder Aponte. That night Folch and Bond went to Morales' apartment and Morales supplied them with guns. Folch and Bond later shot and killed Aponte. From this evidence, the jury could properly infer (1) that Aponte's actions posed a threat to the drug block; (2) that Morales sanctioned the murder of Aponte because it was expected of him as one of the highest ranking Latin King leaders to protect the block's drug business; and (3) that Morales' failure to do so would have undermined his leadership position within the Latin Kings. See Thai, 29 F.3d at 817-18; Rosa, 11 F.3d at 340-41. Therefore, we find there is ample evidence from which the jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Morales participated in the murder to maintain or increase his position in the Latin Kings enterprise and to further its narcotics operations. 113