Opinion ID: 693427
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Standards of Liability and Review.

Text: 15 It is now settled that to prove a willful violation of the FLSA within the meaning of Sec. 255(a), it must be established that the employer either knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the statute. McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 133, 108 S.Ct. 1677, 1681, 100 L.Ed.2d 115 (1988); see also Frasier v. General Elec. Co., 930 F.2d 1004, 1008 (2d Cir.1991). It follows that [i]f an employer acts unreasonably, but not recklessly, in determining its legal obligation, ... its action ... should not be ... considered [willful]. McLaughlin, 486 U.S. at 135 n. 13, 108 S.Ct. at 1682 n. 13. 16 Waldbaum made four arguments to the district court concerning why its conduct was not willful. Each was rejected except Waldbaum's contention that it believed in good faith that all of the Employees were bona fide executives within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. Sec. 213(a)(1) and the regulations promulgated thereunder, see supra notes 5 and 6, and only this argument is presented for our consideration on appeal. The district court found that Waldbaum's belief was unreasonable but not reckless under case authority existing at the time of the violations. See Reich, 833 F.Supp. at 1046-48. 17 Invoking Martin v. Selker Brothers, Inc., 949 F.2d 1286, 1292 (3d Cir.1991), the Secretary contends that [w]hether [Waldbaum's] knowledge or intent constitutes willfulness is a question of law subject to plenary review. Waldbaum responds by citing a number of cases, including our decisions in Benjamin v. United Merchants & Manufacturers, Inc., 873 F.2d 41, 44 (2d Cir.1989), and Russo v. Trifari, Krussman & Fishel, Inc., 837 F.2d 40, 43 (2d Cir.1988), for a clearly erroneous standard of review. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a). The difference in this case is more apparent than real, because the underlying facts are not in serious dispute, and the question presented is essentially the evaluation to be made of those facts. Cf. Reich v. New York, 3 F.3d 581, 587 (2d Cir.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1187, 127 L.Ed.2d 537 (1994); Malcolm Pirnie, 949 F.2d at 614. In any event, assuming that the more stringent clearly erroneous standard applies, we deem it satisfied because we are left with the 'definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed'  in the district court's resolution of the willfulness issue. Inwood Lab., Inc. v. Ives Lab., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 855, 102 S.Ct. 2182, 2189, 72 L.Ed.2d 606 (1982) (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 542, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948)). 18