Opinion ID: 6536511
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Yu's federal 1983 claims.

Text: Yu asserts that the district court erred in dismissing his claims for alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. section 1983 as untimely. The district court determined that the last possible date of accrual of Yu's claims was October 2, 2013, when his last administrative appeal with the university was denied. Defendants concede this was the date of accrual for purposes of this appeal. Yu contends, however, that the date of accrual falls between March 13, 2016, and March 26, 2016, because that is the time period when he received expert opinions that laid the foundation of his due process and breach of contract claims. Thus, Yu argues the receipt of expert opinions gave him, for the first time, the requisite knowledge and awareness of his injury. We disagree with Yu's analysis. Statutes of limitation play an important role in litigation. As stated by the U.S. Supreme Court: Statutes of limitation, ... in their conclusive effects are designed to promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared. The theory is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitation and that the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342 , 348-49, 64 S.Ct. 582 , 88 L.Ed. 788 (1944). See also Gabelli v. S.E.C., 568 U.S. 442 , 448-49, 133 S.Ct. 1216 , 185 L.Ed.2d 297 (2013). In 42 U.S.C. section 1983 actions, courts generally apply the corresponding state-law statute of limitation for personal injury torts. City of Rancho Palos Verdes, Cal. v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113 , 123 n.5, 125 S.Ct. 1453 , 161 L.Ed.2d 316 (2005) ; Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 280 n.6, 114 S.Ct. 807 , 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994) ; Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 , 280, 105 S.Ct. 1938 , 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985). This Court applies the two-year statute of limitation set forth in Idaho Code section 5-219(4) to section 1983 actions. McCabe v. Craven, 145 Idaho 954 , 957, 188 P.3d 896 , 899 (2008). Under this statute, an action to recover damages for personal injury must commence within two years of the occurrence, act or omission complained of. I.C. § 5-219(4). Accordingly, Yu's 42 U.S.C. section 1983 claims all fall under this two-year statute of limitation. Although the length of the statute of limitation is governed by Idaho law, federal law governs the date on which a section 1983 cause of action accrues. McCabe, 145 Idaho at 957 , 188 P.3d at 899 . As stated by the U.S. Supreme Court, accrual occurs when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action ... that is, when the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 , 388, 127 S.Ct. 1091 , 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007) (internal quotations and brackets omitted). In other words, a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that forms the basis of his cause of action. Bradford v. Scherschligt, 803 F.3d 382 , 387 (9th Cir. 2015). Yu seems to be advocating for the discovery rule, an age-old doctrine where accrual is delayed until the plaintiff has 'discovered' his cause of action.  Gabelli v. S.E.C., 568 U.S. 442 , 449, 133 S.Ct. 1216 , 185 L.Ed.2d 297 (2013) (internal quotations omitted). The discovery rule typically applies in cases of fraud, such as where deceptive conduct prevents a plaintiff from knowing he was defrauded. See, e.g., Gabelli v. S.E.C., 568 U.S. 442 , 449, 133 S.Ct. 1216 , 185 L.Ed.2d 297 (2013). Not only has Yu failed to allege or provide any evidence of fraud or concealment concerning his dismissal, Yu's reliance on the date of discovery is misplaced. The knowledge requirement for a section 1983 action falls on the date when there is knowledge of an injury by the claimant , not the date when a specific theory of relief is identified by counsel. For example, in the Ninth Circuit, a federal claim accrues at the time a plaintiff learns of his injury-when plaintiffs recognize harm and know the identity of the tortfeasor, even if additional harm arises later on. Doe, 7 v. Josephine Cnty., 697 F. App'x 567 , 568 (9th Cir. 2017) ; Bradford, 803 F.3d at 387 . Contrary to well-established case law, Yu's argument rests on his claim accruing at the time he discovered additional legal theories , namely breaches of contract and violations of due process. It is clear from the record, however, that Yu was aware of his injury since at least October 2, 2013, when the graduate school dismissed him from ISU at the end of his appellate process. Because Yu filed his action in state court on February 21, 2018, roughly four years and six months after his dismissal from ISU, his federal claims are time-barred by the two-year statute of limitations.