Opinion ID: 2590812
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the issue regarding the trial court's permitting the witness to assert the privilege against self-incrimination is cognizable on appeal

Text: The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment because it found that the trial court erred in permitting Jonathan to assert the privilege against self-incrimination and, for this reason, also erred prejudicially in admitting his preliminary hearing testimony. Originally, defendant did not argue the trial court erred in this regard but did so only after the Court of Appeal raised the issue on its own motion and solicited briefing from the parties. That defendant did not himself raise the issue on appeal is understandable. He was precluded from doing so by his failure to preserve the point by appropriate objection in the trial court.... ( People v. Rogers (1978) 21 Cal.3d 542, 547, 146 Cal.Rptr. 732, 579 P.2d 1048.) Defense counsel originally suggested that the court should appoint an attorney to advise Jonathan regarding the privilege against self-incrimination. Moreover, even after the court did appoint an attorney for Jonathan, defense counsel argued that Jonathan had to be given immunity. He also argued that he could cite any immunity to challenge Jonathan's credibility in front of the jury. Indeed, he said that Jonathan's attorney should know that there was evidence implicating Jonathan in the murder itself. Later, even though Jonathan was represented by his own attorney, defense counsel answered a question from the district attorney by saying that Jonathan would not testify unless immunized for the murder as well as for a violation of Penal Code section 148.5. Implicit in all of these statements was that Jonathan's testimony would be self-incriminating. Defendant never objected to the court's permitting Jonathan to assert the privilege. We have long held that a party who does not object to a ruling generally forfeits the right to complain of that ruling on appeal. (E.g., People v. Simon (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1082, 1103, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 25 P.3d 598, and cases cited.) Specifically, a defendant who fails to object to a court's permitting a witness to assert the privilege against self-incrimination may not challenge the ruling on appeal. ( People v. Malone (1988) 47 Cal.3d 1, 34-35, 252 Cal.Rptr. 525, 762 P.2d 1249; People v. Dimitrov (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 18, 31-32, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 257.) This bar is but an application of the general rule that questions relating to the admissibility of evidence will not be reviewed on appeal in the absence of a specific and timely objection in the trial court on the ground sought to be urged on appeal. (See Evid.Code, § 353....) ( People v. Rogers, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 548, 146 Cal.Rptr. 732, 579 P.2d 1048.) Defendant argues that he did object at trial to admitting Jonathan's preliminary hearing testimony. He did do so, but on different grounds. He never objected to the trial court's permitting Jonathan to assert the privilege. The grounds on which defendant did object, which are not before us on review, are not forfeited, but this particular ground is. A verdict or finding shall not be set aside, nor shall the judgment or decision based thereon be reversed, by reason of the erroneous admission of evidence unless: [¶] (a) There appears of record an objection to or a motion to exclude or to strike the evidence that was timely made and so stated as to make clear the specific ground of the objection or motion .... (Evid.Code, § 353, italics added.) In accordance with this statute, we have consistently held that the defendant's failure to make a timely and specific objection on the ground asserted on appeal makes that ground not cognizable. ( People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 22, 164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468 [objection on ground that questions were leading does not preserve appellate argument that the evidence was impermissible evidence of other crimes]; see also People v. Rogers, supra, 21 Cal.3d at pp. 547-548, 146 Cal.Rptr. 732, 579 P.2d 1048.) Defendant also argues that Penal Code section 1259 permits him to raise this question. It does not. That section provides: Upon an appeal taken by the defendant, the appellate court may, without exception having been taken in the trial court, review any question of law involved in any ruling, order, instruction, or thing whatsoever said or done at the trial or prior to or after judgment, which thing was said or done after objection made in and considered by the lower court, and which affected the substantial rights of the defendant. The appellate court may also review any instruction given, refused or modified, even though no objection was made thereto in the lower court, if the substantial rights of the defendant were affected thereby. (Italics added.) This section distinguishes claims of instructional error, which may be asserted even without objection if they affect the defendant's substantial rights, from other claims of error, which require a trial objection. (See, e.g., People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 505-506, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 45, 40 P.3d 754.) Defendant also argues that his attorney was acting in his general capacity as an officer of the court, and not in his capacity as defense counsel, when he suggested the court appoint an attorney to represent Jonathan and argued that Jonathan was entitled to immunity. He may have been so acting when he originally suggested the court appoint counsel for Jonathan (a point we need not consider in detail). Simply suggesting that the witness might need an attorney did not cause this claim to be forfeited. Rather it was defendant's failure ever to object on this ground that makes it not cognizable on appeal. The issue that the Court of Appeal addressed may not, for the reason stated, be reviewed in this appeal. ( People v. Rogers, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 548, 146 Cal.Rptr. 732, 579 P.2d 1048.) Moreover, as we explain, even if the issue were reviewable, we would find no error under the specific facts that confronted the trial court.