Opinion ID: 2105313
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 25

Heading: The Impeachment of Jessica Cox

Text: It is difficult to doubt that Jessica Cox was a companion or accomplice in the murders of Mr. and Mrs. Walters, regardless of when those murders may have occurred, whether it was on the early morning of February 20, later that day or evening, the next day, Friday, or even the next day, Saturday. Ms. Cox, for one thing, knew where the safe was located. The prosecution's theory was that she lied to her fiancé and others about being kidnapped because, as she testified, she was afraid to tell [Allen Fair] because [she] was afraid to tell anybody because [she] was scared for [her] life. However, when an engaged woman goes to a motel room of a man whom she has just met in a bar and spends the night in his company, some explanation for the woman's activity may be needed, lest her fiancé draw an obvious conclusion as to what they did there. And, when the kidnapping lie is exposed, a story linking her Wednesday overnight companion to the Walters murders serves the same purpose. What the jury did not hear was how readily Ms. Cox has lied to law enforcement authorities in the past, and how her current testimony fits the pattern of previous lies. One prior occasion excluded by the trial court was that Ms. Cox had, some ten years previously, at age 12 or 13, stolen her stepfather's truck and had an accident. After the accident she called the police and reported that she had been kidnapped, providing extremely elaborate details including a description of the person who kidnapped her, how the accident occurred, and how she had been injured in the accident. Based on Ms. Cox's false report an individual was arrested and brought to the Camden County sheriff's department. As the suspect was about to be booked, Ms. Cox confessed to fabricating the entire story. A second lie is recounted in her deposition, where Ms. Cox acknowledged lying to law enforcement authorities about going to a man's motel and being raped, a story she later recanted. Wolfe's trial counsel did not try to impeach on this lie, but in view of the trial court's ruling excluding the first incident, such an attempt probably would have been futile. In Missouri, witnesses may be impeached by showing their bad character for truth and veracity, and this character may be shown by specific acts of misconduct as to truth and veracity. See JOHN O'BRIEN, MISSOURI LAW OF EVIDENCE section 5-7 (3d ed.1996) (discussing cases). Specifically, a prior false report to law enforcement authorities is relevant on the issue of Ms. Cox's credibility. As the court said in State v. Williams, 492 S.W.2d 1 (Mo.App.1973): If she cannot be trusted to make a truthful report to authorities, the jury may reasonably infer that she cannot be trusted on the witness stand. 492 S.W.2d at 6. Similarly, in State v. Summers, 506 S.W.3d 67 (Mo.App.1974), the court noted that matters affecting the credibility of witnesses are always relevant and material particularly so when the state's case rests on the testimony of self-confessed accomplices. Id. at 73; see also 3A WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE sections 982 and 985 (Chadbourn revision 1970); cf. FED. R. EVID 608(b). Both instances of prior lying are relevant, and, because they are admitted by the witness in sworn testimony, they do not call for extrinsic proof. Trial courts are given discretion in determining the scope of cross-examination, principally so that the trial court can keep the examination inquiry focused on relevant issues and to avoid having trials within trials on past conduct that would seem to be collateral. See State v. Isa, 850 S.W.2d 876 (Mo. banc 1993); State v. Kirk, 636 S.W.2d 952 (Mo. banc 1982); State v. Dunn, 577 S.W.2d 649 (Mo. banc 1979). But, as the principal opinion notes, impeaching testimony should be confined to the real and ultimate object of the inquiry, which is the reputation of the witness for truth and veracity. State v. Williams, 337 Mo. 884, 87 S.W.2d 175 (1935). Though trial courts are granted discretion in determining the scope of cross-examination, discretion without limits is lawlessness. As the court in Summers concluded, discretion cannot be used to insulate error arising from undue restriction of the right of cross-examination as to relevant and material matters. 506 S.W.2d 67 at 73. It adds nothing to say that these prior lies are too remote-that is a matter for the jury to decide when determining what weight to give them. State v. Williams, 922 S.W.2d 845, 853 (Mo.App. 1996). Prior instances of false reports to the police are certainly relevant and, thus, are proper subjects for cross-examination. See Williams, 492 S.W.2d at 5-6. Cross-examination on matters relevant to a witness's credibility is not only a right afforded by our common law of evidence, but is guaranteed by the confrontation clause of article VI of the United States Constitution. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986). Because Missouri's common law cases afford the cross-examination sought by Wolfe in this instance, it is not necessary to reach the confrontation issue. The principal opinion in section III discusses impeachment by showing of prior bad acts, which differs from the kind of impeachment sought here. The principal opinion focuses on case law addressing prior bad acts of a witness, e.g., a charge of second-degree murder in State v. Lockhart, 507 S.W.2d 395 (Mo.1974), rather than on case law that establishes impeachment by showing bad character for truth and veracity through evidence of specific prior acts of untruthfulness, as in the false report to authorities in Williams, 492 S.W.2d at 6. If Ms. Cox's prior acts had involved prostitution, or the commission of a violent act, they would not be allowed because they do not bear on the issue of character for truth and veracity. O'BRIEN, supra, section 5-7. Thus the authorities discussed in the principal opinion are correct, but do not apply to the current case. The exclusion of Ms. Cox's prior lies certainly is prejudicial. Without this character background, the jury could well conclude that her false kidnapping story was simply occasioned by her fear of defendant Dannie Wolfe. With the proper impeachment, the jury might conclude that she is inclined to tell such lies even to authorities when she is in a difficult situation, such as the present instance when an explanation is needed as to what she was doing when she stayed out all night with Dannie Wolfe.