Opinion ID: 591130
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Enhancement of the Lodestar.

Text: 38 The district court applied a fifty percent multiplier to a portion of the attorneys' hours. Judge Pieras gave two reasons. First, he cited the quality of service (extremely high) and the degree of success (very great). Second, he found that the lawyers' fees were contingent on success and that the aleatory nature of the engagement warranted an enhancement to compensate for the risk of nonpayment. We approach this phase of our inquiry mindful that determining whether a particular type of enhancement to a lodestar is legally viable involves mainly a question of law. Thus, appellate review of such determinations is plenary. 7 See, e.g., Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 972 F.2d 453, 457 (1st Cir.1992) (holding that claimed errors of law are subject to plenary review); Brewer v. Madigan, 945 F.2d 449, 452 (1st Cir.1991) (same). 39 1. Exceptional Performance/Results Enhancement. The Supreme Court has stated that, in some cases, the lodestar may not actually represent a reasonable attorneys' fee, and thus, may require upward adjustment. See Blum, 465 U.S. at 897, 104 S.Ct. at 1548; Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435, 103 S.Ct. at 1940. But, we have repeatedly cautioned that such enhancements will be rare. See, e.g., Wildman v. Lerner Stores Corp., 771 F.2d 605, 610 (1st Cir.1985). The exception is a tiny one--and we will not permit it to eclipse the rule. 40 While some precedent holds out the possibility of enhancing the lodestar for exceptional performance and results, see, e.g., Blum, 465 U.S. at 896-901, 104 S.Ct. at 1547-1550; Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435, 103 S.Ct. at 1940; Conservation Law Found. of N.E., Inc. v. Secretary of the Interior, 790 F.2d 965, 971 (1st Cir.1986); Wildman, 771 F.2d at 610, more recent cases go a long way toward dampening this option. For example, in Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 106 S.Ct. 3088, 92 L.Ed.2d 439 (1986) (Delaware Valley I ), the Supreme Court counselled: 41 Because considerations concerning the quality of a prevailing counsel's representation normally are reflected in the reasonable hourly rate, the overall performance ordinarily should not be used to adjust the lodestar, thus removing any danger of double counting. 42 Id. at 566, 106 S.Ct. at 3098. In the same case, Justice White wrote that the lodestar figure includes most, if not all, of the relevant factors constituting a 'reasonable' attorneys' fee, and it is unnecessary to enhance the fee for superior performance in order to serve the statutory purpose of enabling plaintiffs to secure legal assistance. Id. Thereafter, we ventured to say that Delaware Valley I made clear that adjustments are not to be given in reward for stellar performance. Hall v. Ochs, 817 F.2d 920, 929 (1st Cir.1987). 43 To be sure, both Delaware Valley I and Hall contain language intimating that there exists a strong presumption, not an outright ban, against exceptional performance/results enhancements. See Delaware Valley I, 478 U.S. at 566, 106 S.Ct. at 3098 ([O]verall performance ordinarily should not be used to adjust the lodestar....) (emphasis supplied); Hall, 817 F.2d at 929 ([E]xceptional performance is generally a function of the competence and experience that is reflected in the reasonable hourly rate....) (emphasis supplied). We have no occasion to probe these hypothetical possibilities today. Even if there may be some few cases where a combination of sterling performance and exceptional results could conceivably justify a premium fee, this case would not fulfill the necessary criteria. 44 The court below awarded full, current rates to Lipsett's counsel--rates which we believe adequately reflected the lawyers' superior skills and the superb results obtained. Although we do not gainsay either the strength of the attorneys' performance or the magnitude of their triumph, we see nothing in the record that indicates that the services and results overshadowed, or somehow dwarfed, the lodestar. In short, the lodestar fee, unembellished, represented the reasonable attorneys' fee assured by section 1988. Thus, an enhancement cannot be justified on the grounds of exceptional service and results. 45 2. Contingency Enhancement. At the time this case was decided below, this circuit allowed enhancement for risk of nonpayment in exceptional contingent-fee cases if certain criteria were met. See Cortes-Quinones v. Jimenez-Nettleship, 842 F.2d 556, 564 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 823, 109 S.Ct. 68, 102 L.Ed.2d 45 (1988); Wildman, 771 F.2d at 614. In its most recent pronouncement on the subject, however, the High Court has effectively foreclosed such enhancements, ruling that enhancement for contingency [under fee-shifting statutes] is not permitted. City of Burlington v. Dague, --- U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 2638, 2643, 120 L.Ed.2d 449 (1992). That ends the matter. Although the federal fee-shifting statutes at issue in Dague were provisions of the Solid Waste Disposal Act and Clean Water Act, respectively, the Court's reasoning applies full bore to the Fees Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, a fee-shifting statute which, in the Court's words, contains language ... similar to the statutes at issue in Dague. --- U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 2641. We hold, therefore, that when a prevailing party seeks an attorneys' fee award in a civil rights case in pursuance of the Fees Act, enhancement of the lodestar because of counsel's risk of nonpayment is not permitted. 46 This ruling brings down the final curtain on plaintiff's attempt to retain the enhancement awarded by the court below. In granting the enhancement, the court reasoned that these attorneys would not have received any payment had the suit not been successful. The Supreme Court has now made it pellucidly clear, however, that such risks should play no part in enhancing a lodestar fee. To the extent that the risk stems from the legal and factual merits of the claim, ... the consequence of awarding contingency enhancement ... would be to provide attorneys with the same incentive to bring relatively meritless claims as relatively meritorious ones. Id. --- U.S. at ---- - ----, 112 S.Ct. at 2641-42. Thus, insofar as the lower court's enhancement accounted for the risk of nonpayment, its decision created precisely the kind of skewed incentive that the Supreme Court has flatly rejected. By the same token, to the extent that the risk of loss can be attributed to the difficulty of establishing the merits of the claim, this difficulty is already reflected in the lodestar. Id. --- U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 2641. 47 3. Summary of Enhancement Issues. We decline the temptation to cart coal to Newcastle. In this case, the lodestar, properly computed, exceeded half a million dollars. That substantial figure fully accounted for (a) the time and skill needed to address the rigors of this admittedly complex case, (b) the significant victory the plaintiff achieved, and (c) the contingent nature of the attorneys' employment. Whether we take the district court's rationales together or separately, we must conclude that the court erred in enhancing the lodestar.