Opinion ID: 778006
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Eighth Amendment Claim Based Upon Excessive Force

Text: 21 The district court correctly noted that prison guards who maliciously and sadistically use force against an inmate violate contemporary standards of decency even if the resulting injuries are not significant. Smith II, 1999 WL 178539, at  (internal quotations omitted). However, after noting that Smith could establish an Eighth Amendment violation even absent evidence of serious physical injuries, the district court then focused exclusively on the severity of Smith's injuries in denying his claim. The court stated: 22 Even assuming that plaintiff could show that defendants acted with the requisite state of mind, the Court concludes that the alleged wrongdoing by defendants was not objectively harmful enough to establish a constitutional violation. Initially, the Court notes that the injuries suffered by plaintiff were relatively minor. 23 .... 24 Additionally, accepting as true plaintiff's version of the facts, including being handcuffed, punched, kicked, and thrown into cabinets and walls, and given the slight injuries suffered by plaintiff, the Court finds that the incident between plaintiff and defendants involved a de minimis use of force that was not repugnant to the conscience of mankind. 25 Id. at . Thus, although the court acknowledged that the absence of severe injuries did not preclude Smith's Eighth Amendment claim as a matter of law, the court concluded that the evidentiary value of the absence of injuries was too compelling to ignore. See id. Citing Smith's alleged attack on Mensinger, the court also noted that the record shows that defendants reasonably perceived plaintiff to be a threat and the need for application of force was apparent. Id. at . 26 We begin our analysis of that ruling with the Supreme Court's decision in Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992). There, an inmate sued prison guards under § 1983 alleging that they had used excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment even though he had not suffered serious injuries during the alleged assault. The Court therefore had to decide whether the use of excessive physical force against a prisoner may constitute cruel and unusual punishment when the inmate does not suffer serious injury. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 4, 112 S.Ct. 995 (emphasis added). The Court answer[ed] that question in the affirmative. Id. 27 We applied the teachings of Hudson in Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102 (3d Cir. 2000). There, an inmate sued four prison guards under § 1983 alleging that they had beaten him in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Although the undisputed medical evidence showed that the plaintiff suffered only a few scratches on his neck and hands, he testified that he was repeatedly punched in the head, stomped about the back and neck, slammed into a cell wall, choked, threatened, and nearly rendered unconscious. All of this was allegedly done while he was handcuffed. See Brooks, 204 F.3d at 104. In reviewing the claim, we noted that it was apparent that the type of vicious, prolonged attack alleged by Brooks would have resulted in far greater injuries than those which he indisputably sustained. Id. at 105. Nonetheless, we reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment, stating: [a]ccepting Brooks's allegations as true, as we must, a jury could find that the defendants acted not merely in good-faith to maintain or restore discipline, but rather out of malice for the very purpose of causing harm. Id. at 109. 28 The district court dismissed Smith's claims before we decided Brooks. Accordingly, the court did not have the benefit of that analysis when, in denying Smith's claims here, it focused almost exclusively on the lack of a serious physical injury.... Smith II, 1999 WL 178539, at , quoting Eppers v. Dragovich, No. 95-7673, 1996 WL 420830, at  4 (E.D.Pa. July 24, 1996). It is now clear that the district court erred in focusing so narrowly on the absence of serious injuries in deciding if Smith could establish a claim based upon excessive force. As we clearly stated in Brooks, the Eighth Amendment analysis must be driven by the extent of the force and the circumstances in which it is applied; not by the resulting injuries. 29 Requiring objective or independent proof of minor or significant injury, would ignore this teaching and place protection from injury, instead of protection from wanton force, at the hub of the Eighth Amendment. 30 Brooks, 204 F.3d at 108, citing Moore v. Holbrook, 2 F.3d 697, 700 (6th Cir.1993). 31 Nevertheless, it is true that the Eighth Amendment does not protect an inmate against an objectively de minimis use of force. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9-10, 112 S.Ct. 995. Rather, as noted above, the pivotal inquiry in reviewing an inmate's § 1983 claim for excessive force is whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. Brooks, 204 F.3d at 106, citing Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7, 112 S.Ct. 995. However, injuries are only one of several factors that a court must consider in answering that question. 32 In determining whether a correctional officer has used excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment, courts look to several factors including: (1) the need for the application of force; (2) the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used; (3) the extent of the injury inflicted; (4) the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as reasonably perceived by responsible officials on the basis of facts known to them; and (5) any efforts made to temper the severity of the forceful response. 33 Brooks, 204 F.3d at 106, citing Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7, 112 S.Ct. 995. Therefore, de minimis injuries do not necessarily establish de minimis force. 34 If we were to adopt the District Court's reasoning, a prisoner could constitutionally be attacked for the sole purpose of causing pain as long as the blows were inflicted in a manner that resulted in visible (or palpable or diagnosable) injuries that were de minimis. 35 Brooks, 204 F.3d at 108. 36 We do not, of course, suggest that a fact finder could not consider the de minimis nature of injuries along with all of the other circumstances in concluding that the force that was employed could not have risen to the level required for an Eighth Amendment violation. A properly instructed fact finder could, after considering all of the evidence, conclude that Smith's injuries were so minor that the defendants' account of the incident is more credible than Smith's, and/or that the force used was not of constitutional dimension. That may have been exactly what the district court did here. However, that is an issue of fact to be resolved by the fact finder based upon the totality of the evidence; it is not an issue of law a court can decide. 4 37 Punching and kicking someone who is handcuffed behind his back and under the control of at least six prison guards as he is being thrown into cabinets and walls is repugnant to the conscience of mankind, absent the extraordinary circumstances necessary to justify that kind of force. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 10, 112 S.Ct. 995. Smith alleges he was the victim of an unprovoked and unjustified beating. The district court dismissed his Eighth Amendment claims, noting that the record shows that defendants reasonably perceived plaintiff to be a threat and the need for the application of force was apparent. Smith II, 1999 WL 178539, at . The court reached that conclusion in part because it found that Smith had created a disturbance by  allegedly punching C.O. Mensinger twice in the eye, as well as continually struggling with the defendants.... Id. (emphasis added). However, Smith alleges that he was handcuffed behind his back during the disturbance, and he maintains he did not hit Mensinger or struggle with the guards as they punched and kicked him, and rammed his head into the wall. If we accept Smith's version of the facts as true, as we must, there was simply no justification for the defendants' conduct, and the district court's ruling to the contrary can not stand. 5 38 Defendants argue that we should nevertheless affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of Officers Androshick, McCole, Zubris, and Jones because Smith concedes that he is not sure that they participated in the beating at all. However, the fact that Smith has acknowledged that he could not see those defendants during the beating neither negates their involvement nor their liability as a matter of law. Smith testified: Officer Yurkiewicz, Zubris, Androshick, McCole, Jones, all of them was in back of me and they were pushing my head, right, into the cabinets in the wall, cabinets and walls. And then after that, I was knocked to the floor. App. at 166 (emphasis added). He further testified: ... the full force of all the guards [was] behind me, they rammed my head into the cabinet and into the wall ... No, I didn't say he [Yurkiewicz] did. I said all of them. Id. at 168 (emphasis added). That testimony is sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to each of those defendants. See Brooks, 204 F.3d at 109. 39 Moreover, it is undisputed that all of the named officers were in the vicinity at some point when Smith alleges he was beaten. The extent of each officer's participation is thus a classic factual dispute to be resolved by the fact finder. Accordingly, we will vacate the judgment in favor of defendants Novitsky, Yurkiewicz, Androshick, McCole, Zubris, and Jones and remand the matter for further proceedings.