Opinion ID: 196984
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Legal Analysis: The Safety Valve Provision

Text: 58 Appellant Pacheco-Rijos argues that the sentencing court erred in declining to grant her relief from the mandatory minimum sentence for the drug trafficking in which she admits she was involved. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f); U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2. The government responds that the sentencing court appropriately determined that she was not entitled, in the first instance, to relief from the mandatory minimum, and that, in any event, the district court's decision does not amount to clear error. 59 We review for clear error the district court's factual determinations with respect to whether the appellant was entitled to relief from the mandatory minimum under U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2. United States v. Rodrguez, 60 F.3d 193, 195 n. 1 (5th Cir.) (court's refusal to apply § 5C1.2 is a factual finding reviewed for clear error), cert. denied, --- U.S.----, 116 S.Ct. 542, 133 L.Ed.2d 446 (1995); see also United States v. Montanez, 82 F.3d 520, 521 (1st Cir.1996). 60 We begin our examination with an observation. The review is complicated by the paucity of detail in the record below and our concern for two obvious mistakes in the sentencing hearing which shaped the outcome: first, that the district court wrongly believed that the plea agreement was a binding one and Pacheco-Rijos was arguing for an outcome for which she had not negotiated; and second, that the PSR somehow supported the government's position on Pacheco-Rijos' cooperation, when it did not. 61 When Congress enacted the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, it passed into law a safety valve provision which permits judicial departures for some low-level, first-time offenders who otherwise would face mandatory minimum sentences. Pub.L. No. 103-322 § 80001, 108 Stat. 1796, 1985 (1994) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 3553). 22 62 Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), a defendant may avoid the mandatory minimum and be sentenced below the applicable guideline term, if he or she meets the five requirements set forth in the provision. The section provides in pertinent part: 63 ... the court shall impose a sentence ... without regard to any statutory minimum sentence, if the court finds at sentencing, after the Government has been afforded the opportunity to make a recommendation, that:(1) the defendant does not have more than 1 criminal history point, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; 64 (2) that defendant did not use violence or credible threats of violence or possess a firearm or other dangerous weapon (or induce another participant to do so) in connection with the offense; 65 (3) the offense did not result in death or serious bodily injury to any person; 66 (4) the defendant was not an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of others in the offense ...; and (5) not later than the time of the sentencing hearing, the defendant has truthfully provided to the Government all information and evidence the defendant has concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the same course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan, but the fact that the defendant has no relevant or useful other information to provide or that the Government is already aware of the information shall not preclude a determination by the court that the defendant has complied with this requirement. 67 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f); see also U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2 (authorizes sentence below the mandatory minimum for specific offenses, subject to compliance with section 3553(f)); Montanez, 82 F.3d at 521 (discussion of the aims of the legislation). Notably, whether there is a binding plea agreement or, as here, a non-binding agreement, if it is determined that a defendant has met the five requirements of the provision, the judge is required to set aside the mandatory minimum and sentence the defendant under the Guidelines. 68 In this case, the district judge denied application of the safety valve provision, focusing only on the issue of Pacheco-Rijos' cooperation. 23 Apparently accepting the government's argument that the facts which could be gleaned from the PSR supported denying application of section 3553(f)(5), the judge determined that Pacheco-Rijos did not deserve relief from her mandatory minimum sentence because she had failed to cooperate fully. In so deciding, he also stressed that Pacheco-Rijos had not negotiated for relief from the mandatory minimum in her plea agreement, an agreement which, as noted above, he incorrectly believed to be binding. 69 Section 3553(f)(5) requires that defendants truthfully provide the government no later than at sentencing all the information they have regarding the offense or offenses that were part of the same course of conduct or part of a common scheme or plan. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5); U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2. 70 Questions with respect to the scope of both a defendant's duty to provide information--and the very nature of that information--have already confronted this Court. In United States v. Wrenn, 66 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1995), we held that where the only disclosure to the government was made inadvertently--and through the government's own efforts to intercept the defendant's conversations--that defendant could not be said to have provided the information to the government. Further, the Wrenn Court noted that where the defendant had indicated that he knew the identity of customers involved in a drug trafficking enterprise, but he refused to provide any names, it certainly was not erroneous for the district court to determine that the defendant had failed to provide all information which he concededly had. Id. 71 The question of scope was further addressed in United States v. Montanez, 82 F.3d 520 (1st Cir.1996), in which this Court confronted a slightly different question: whether the requirement that a defendant truthfully provide all information established an affirmative duty on the part of that defendant to offer himself or herself up to the government for debriefing. Id. at 522-523. While we determined that section 3553(f)(5) does not require that much, 24 we agreed with the district court that what the defendant provided in that case was patently inadequate. For although Montanez agreed that he was supplied drugs that he then delivered, he offered no plausible reason why he did not provide the government with the names of his drug suppliers. Under the circumstances, we found that Montanez did not disclose information that he might reasonably be expected to possess, nor persuasively explain its absence. Id. at 523; see also Wrenn, 66 F.3d at 3. 72 This case is not like Wrenn or Montanez. In a submission by her counsel, included as part of her PSR, Pacheco-Rijos explained the limits of her involvement in the conspiracy: She was a passive participant, knowing that drugs were stored in the house and doing little to stop it. She said that she never handled the drugs, nor was she aware of the firearms. 73 That characterization was never objected to nor explicitly contradicted by the government. Furthermore, it appears to have been accepted by the probation department whose amended report recommended granting Pacheco-Rijos a two-level adjustment as a minor participant and specifically characterized her as a passive member of the conspiracy. 74 While it is entirely possible that a minor participant in the criminal activities might know more than her designated role suggests, the government offered nothing concrete to so indicate. In this case, as distinguished from Wrenn or Montanez, the government did not rebut a facially plausible tale of limited involvement by pointing to information this defendant must have known; there was no allegation that this defendant knew the names of drug suppliers or customers and refused to indicate those names. There was no specific information the government alleged that Pacheco-Rijos had and failed to provide. 75 The government cannot assure success simply by saying, We don't believe the defendant, and doing nothing more. If it could, it would effectively eliminate the self-conscious difference between the safety valve provision, U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2, which obligates the district court to determine if the defendant has truthfully provided all information, see Montanez, 82 F.3d at 523, and the substantial assistance provision, U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, which permits, upon the government's motion and at the court's discretion, a downward adjustment for certain defendants who have provided substantial assistance to the government. 25 76 In the PSR, there was one conceivable basis for the government's position, a basis which, standing alone, is wholly inadequate: that because Pacheco-Rijos shared living quarters with other co-defendants, 26 she must have had more information than she provided to the government. 77 Section 3553(f)(5) does not invite such speculation. If mere conjecture based on personal relationships could bar application of section 3553(f)(5), in all cases where minor participants knew others more involved, the safety valve provision would be beyond their grasp. Such a result was not intended by Congress and cannot be permitted here. Therefore, district court's bare conclusion that Pacheco-Rijos did not cooperate fully, absent either specific factual findings or easily recognizable support in the record, cannot be enough to thwart her effort to avoid imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence. 27 78 Accordingly, we vacate the sentence and remand this case for the purpose of allowing the district court to revisit this issue and clarify the record by filing supplemental findings. 28 In the event that the court finds its initial calculation in error, it should so identify and return, as well, to the issue of other adjustments, if appropriate, under the Guidelines.