Opinion ID: 848612
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: RESTORATION OF RIGHTS IS AN ELEMENT OF MCL 750.224f(2)

Text: Section 2 of the felon-in-possession statute indicates the circumstances under which a person convicted of a specified felony may possess a firearm. MCL 750.224f(2). One of the requirements contained in that statute is that the defendant must have had his right to possess a firearm legally restored. But in this case, the prosecution argues that it need not show that restoration has not occurred in order to establish the elements of the crime. Rather, it asserts that it is defendant who bears that burden. Neither the language nor the structure of the statute supports the prosecution's contention. [8] MCL 750.224f(2) provides: A person convicted of a specified felony shall not possess, use, transport, sell, purchase, carry, ship, receive, or distribute a firearm in this state until all of the following circumstances exist: (a) The expiration of 5 years after all of the following circumstances exist: ( i ) The person has paid all fines imposed for the violation. ( ii ) The person has served all terms of imprisonment imposed for the violation. ( iii ) The person has successfully completed all conditions of probation or parole imposed for the violation. (b) The person's right to possess, use, transport, sell, purchase, carry, ship, receive, or distribute a firearm has been restored pursuant to section 4 of Act No. 372 of the Public Acts of 1927, being section 28.424 of the Michigan Compiled Laws. [Emphasis added.] In interpreting MCL 750.224f(2), our goal is to give effect to the Legislature's intent. People v. Koonce, 466 Mich. 515, 518, 648 N.W.2d 153 (2002). We start with the language of the statute itself. The language of MCL 750.224f(2) demonstrates a clear intent to include among the prosecution's proofs a showing that the right to possess a firearm was not restored to the defendant.
The Legislature has demonstrated that it knows how to create an exception, and it created one in subsection 4 of the very statute in question. MCL 750.224f(4) provides: This section does not apply to a conviction that has been expunged or set aside, or for which the person has been pardoned, unless the expunction, order, or pardon expressly provides that the person shall not possess a firearm. [Emphasis added.] By using the term unless, it demonstrated its intent to create an exception. [9] Unless is an exclusionary term. By contrast, in subsection 2 of the felon-in-possession statute, the Legislature chose not to use an exclusionary term. Instead, it used the phrase until all. Looking at the definition of until helps demonstrate that until all is an inclusive phrase. The definition is 1. up to the time that or when; till. 2. before . . . 3. onward to or till . . . Random House Webster's College Dictionary (2001). Applying this definition to the statute, the defendant is guilty of the offense of felon in possession only if he (1) was convicted of a specified offense and (2) possessed a firearm before (a) the passage of five years from the time he paid all pertinent fines, or he served his term, or he successfully completed all conditions of probation or parole, or (b) his right to possess a firearm was not restored. MCL 750.224f(2). Therefore, to prove the crime, the prosecution must demonstrate that the possession occurred before one of the specified events. If the prosecution fails to prove this, it has not met the burden created by the Legislature. The result would be quite different had the Legislature chosen to use an exclusionary term like unless. Unless is defined as 1. except under the circumstances that . . . 2. except; but; save[.] Random House Webster's College Dictionary (2001). Substituting this word into the statute would change the statute's meaning, so that the prosecution would need to prove only that the defendant (1) had been convicted of a specified offense and (2) possessed a firearm. The defendant would be left to produce evidence that, more than five years before, he had (1) paid all pertinent fines, (2) served his term, (3) successfully completed all conditions of probation and parole, and that (4) he currently had the right to possess the firearm. Hence, the difference in the burden of production on the prosecution and on the defense is enormous depending on whether until introduces an element or an exception. Accordingly, we should assume that the decision to use until rather than unless was carefully made. We presuppose that the words the Legislature uses have a purpose. And we should not speculate that it inadvertently used one word or phrase when it intended another. The chosen wording is presumed intentional. Detroit v. Redford Twp., 253 Mich. 453, 456, 235 N.W. 217 (1931). When writing this statute, the Legislature demonstrated a clear knowledge of how to create an exception, but it chose not to do so. Its use of the term until is a strong indication that it intended the restoration of rights to be a contingent element of the offense. Because the Legislature chose to use the term until, the prosecution bears the burden of production for MCL 750.224f(2). Here the prosecution failed to present any evidence that defendant's right to possess a firearm had not been restored. And it made no effort to show that any of the three other factual circumstances listed in MCL 750.224f(2) had not occurred. Hence, it did not satisfy its burden, and defendant's convictions were in error.
The majority asserts that MCL 776.20 controls this case and holds that it requires that defendant bear the burden of production regarding the restoration of the right to possess a firearm. MCL 776.20 provides: In any prosecution for the violation of any acts of the state relative to use, licensing and possession of pistols or firearms, the burden of establishing any exception, excuse, proviso or exemption contained in any such act shall be upon the defendant but this does not shift the burden of proof for the violation. MCL 776.20 comes into play only after the prosecution proves all the elements of a crime. Therefore, for the majority's argument to have merit, I would have to accept the conclusion that MCL 750.224f(2)(b) is an exception. As discussed above, this conclusion is implausible given the language and structure chosen by the Legislature. I find MCL 776.20 inapplicable to this case. I believe that, if the Legislature had intended MCL 776.20 to apply, it specifically would have used a term contained in that statute. Alternatively, it would have used its often repeated term until, or a similarly clear expression, to create an exception or a proviso. The words exception, [10] excuse, [11] proviso [12] or exemption [13]  in MCL 776.20 apply to situations where all the elements of a crime have been established. Once the prosecution has satisfied all the elements, it is for the defendant to produce evidence showing the existence of a circumstance excusing him from culpability. [14] An example of a situation in which MCL 776.20 would apply can be seen in MCL 750.224f(4): This section does not apply to a conviction that has been expunged or set aside, or for which the person has been pardoned. . . . This subsection creates an exception to the felon-in-possession crime. Under MCL 776.20, the defendant would have the burden of producing evidence to prove the exception. [15] In MCL 776.20, the Legislature demonstrated its ability to use the terms exception, excuse, exception, and proviso. But in 750.224f(2), it used none of them. It could have stated in MCL 750.224f(2): A person convicted of a specified felony shall not possess, use, transport, sell, purchase, carry, ship, receive, or distribute a firearm in this state providing the following circumstances do not exist. Or: A person convicted of a specified felony shall not possess, use, transport, sell, purchase, carry, ship, receive, or distribute a firearm in this state, except when all of the following circumstances exist. Or: A person convicted of a specified felony shall not possess, use, transport, sell, purchase, carry, ship, receive, or distribute a firearm in this state, but the person is excused when the following circumstances exist. Instead of any of these or other wordings, the Legislature chose to use until all. I believe this is a strong indication that it intended that MCL 776.20 should not apply to MCL 750.224f(2). In interpreting statutes, we are reluctant to assume that the Legislature wrote what it did by accident or error. But this is what the majority presumes in its holding today. I support giving effect to the Legislature's chosen phrasing rather than changing it to fit within MCL 776.20. [16] The existence of MCL 776.20 does not alter what the prosecution has to prove in order to obtain a conviction for felon in possession. But reading MCL 750.224f(2)(b) as a proviso does shift the burden of production from what the Legislature intended, because it turns what is an element of the crime into a proviso.
The prosecution relies on People v. Pegenau [17] to support its argument. This reliance is misplaced. In Pegenau, the defendant was charged with unlawful possession of Xanax and Valium pursuant to MCL 333.7403(1). [18] People v. Pegenau, 447 Mich. 278, 281, 523 N.W.2d 325 (1994). The only question at trial was whether the defendant had a valid prescription, which would exclude him from prosecution under the language of MCL 333.7403 and MCL 333.7531. [19] Pegenau, supra at 282, 523 N.W.2d 325. This Court held that the burden of proof regarding the existence of a valid prescription was on the defendant. Pegenau is distinguishable from the present case because MCL 333.7403 expressly uses a term creating an exception. In fact, MCL 333.7403 uses the term unless. As discussed above, unless is defined as 1. except under the circumstances that . . . 2. except; but; save[.] Random House Webster's College Dictionary (2001). Because an exception is specifically created, the defendant bears the burden of production under MCL 333.7531. In contrast, MCL 750.224f(2) does not provide an exception or exemption to felon-in-possession prosecutions. The Legislature did not use a term that would create an exception. It used the inclusive phrase until all. Therefore, the subsections are elements of the crime rather than exceptions, and MCL 776.20 does not apply. Pegenau is inapplicable and is in clear contrast to this case. Therefore, I find it of no support to the prosecution's argument.
The majority finds People v. Henderson [20] persuasive on the issue whether restoration of the right to possess a firearm is an element of felon in possession. I believe that this decision does not aid the majority's position. [21] Moreover, I find that Henderson was wrongly decided. Henderson dealt with MCL 750.227, which, at that time, provided: Any person who shall carry a dagger, dirk, stiletto or other dangerous weapon except hunting knives adapted and carried as such, concealed on or about his person, or whether concealed or otherwise in any vehicle operated or occupied by him, except in his dwelling house or place of business or on other land possessed by him; and any person who shall carry a pistol concealed on or about his person, or, whether concealed or otherwise, in any vehicle operated or occupied by him, except in his dwelling house or place of business or on other land possessed by him, without a license to so carry said pistol as provided by law, shall be guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than five years, or by fine of not more than two thousand five hundred dollars. The Henderson Court concluded that, as regards the facts of that case, the only elements of the crime were: (1) the defendant was carrying a pistol and (2) he was in a vehicle operated or occupied by him. It ruled that the language without a license to so carry said pistol did not add an element to the offense. People v. Henderson, 391 Mich. 612, 616, 218 N.W.2d 2 (1974). This conclusion cannot be correct. If only two elements existed, the sole defenses available to a defendant would be (1) that he did not carry a pistol or (2) that he was not in a vehicle with it. Whether the defendant was licensed to carry that pistol would not matter. He would be guilty of the crime, even though licensed, because he (1) carried a pistol (2) in a vehicle. It is obvious that there is a third key element. It is found in the statute's language without a license. [22] My interpretation is strengthened by the fact that, in writing MCL 750.227, the Legislature did not use any of the terms listed in MCL 776.20. The clause without a license is not prefaced by anything signaling or otherwise phrased to signal that it constitutes an exception, excuse, proviso, or exemption. Contrast this with the language except in his dwelling house or place of business or on other land possessed by him that is also contained in the statute. The Legislature knew how to create an exception, excuse, proviso, or exemption when it wrote MCL 750.227. And, in fact, it did so in that statute by explicitly using the term except. But it did not use any of those terms with respect to the lack of a license. Again, the Legislature's choice of wording should not be presumed accidental. Redford Twp, supra at 456, 235 N.W. 217. To rule as it did, the Henderson Court had to read words into the statute. Specifically, it had to read in some form of exception, excuse, proviso, or exemption before the language without a license. But this violates the well-established rule of statutory construction that a court cannot read into a statute what is not there. AFSCME v. Detroit, 468 Mich. 388, 412, 662 N.W.2d 695 (2003). [23] Therefore, the Henderson Court failed to construe the language actually chosen by the Legislature. Instead, it added language to change the burden of production. The majority today falls into the same trap. And in doing so, it violates its own repeatedly stated rule of statutory construction.
The justices of the majority have departed from their own rules of statutory construction in construing MCL 750.224f(2). During this very court term, most of the same justices stated: Fundamental canons of statutory interpretation require us to discern and give effect to the Legislature's intent as expressed by the language of its statutes. If such language is unambiguous, as most such [sic] language is, we presume that the Legislature intended the meaning clearly expressed-no further judicial construction is required or permitted, and the statute must be enforced as written. [ Garg v. Macomb Co. Community Mental Health Services, 472 Mich. 263, 281, 696 N.W.2d 646 (2005) (citations and quotation marks omitted).] There is no suggestion that the majority finds the language in MCL 750.224f(2) ambiguous. Hence, it violates its own rules of statutory interpretation when it relies on decisions in sister states to interpret the intent of the Michigan Legislature. Under the majority's judicial philosophy, reference to outside material is of no value in the face of a clear text. Moreover, the citation of the annotation at 69 A.L.R.3d 1054 adds nothing to the majority's analysis of the statute in this case. The decisions cited in the annotation are based on widely divergent statutory language in other states. Because that language is so different from the language of MCL 750.224f(2), conclusions in the annotation are of no assistance in determining what the Michigan Legislature intended when enacting our statute. Beyond this, at least some of the cases cited in the annotation demonstrate that a legislature can create an easily recognizable exception or proviso when it desires to do so. For example, the Pennsylvania statute provides that no person shall carry a firearm in public ` unless . . . such person is licensed to carry a firearm[.]' Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 250 Pa.Super. 330, 332, 378 A.2d 961 (1977), quoting 18 Pa Consol Stat 6108 (emphasis added). Clearly the Michigan Legislature could have done what the Pennsylvania legislature did: it explicitly created an exemption. [24] Furthermore, even under the analysis offered by the majority, Henderson was wrongly decided. One thing the majority and I agree about in the instant case is that an exception, excuse, proviso, or exemption has to be clearly indicated by the language of the statute. In the statute before us, MCL 750.224f(2), the majority argues that the word until introduces a proviso. In contrast, the statute involved in Henderson contains nothing preceding the language without a license that could be argued to introduce an exemption, excuse, proviso, or exemption. [25] Therefore, I believe that, under the majority's analysis, Henderson must be found to have been wrongly decided. In addition, its reliance on Henderson contradicts the majority's analysis discussing exceptions, excuses, provisos, and exemptions. In the end, Henderson offers nothing supportive of the majority's construction of MCL 750.224f(2). Again, the Legislature knows how to use the terms exception, excuse, proviso, or exemption. And it knows how to create exceptions by the use of the term unless, as it has repeatedly done throughout the Penal Code. But the Legislature chose not to use any of those terms in either MCL 750.224f(2) or MCL 750.227, the statute analyzed in Henderson. I would not turn a blind eye to those choices. Instead, I would enforce the statutes as the Legislature wrote them. In this case, it requires finding that the restoration of the right to possess a firearm is an element of the offense of felon in possession.
The prosecution asserts that, if it must initially go forward with evidence that defendant's right to possess a firearm has not been restored, its burden of proof will be rendered too difficult. It argues that, to make this showing, it would have to obtain certificates showing no restoration of defendant's right to possess firearms from all eighty-three counties in Michigan. I believe that this is a wildly exaggerated approach to the situation. Normally, to satisfy MCL 750.224f(2), the prosecution would have to show simply that five years had not passed since the defendant served his term or completed probation or paid his fines. Only if none of those situations existed would it become necessary to address whether the right to carry a firearm had been restored. And then, in almost every case, the prosecution could show that the defendant resided in one or two counties while eligible to have the right restored and that those counties had not restored the right. My reading of the statute requires more proofs from the prosecution then it would prefer. But the fact that it may find difficulty in proving a crime does not provide a reason for this Court to rewrite the law to change the Legislature's intent. I am satisfied that the language of the statute demonstrates that a showing of no restoration of the right to possess a firearm is an element of the crime. Hence, the burdens of production and persuasion are on the prosecution.
A consistent textualist would have to admit that no language in MCL 750.224f(2) or MCL 750.227 creates an explicit exception, excuse, proviso, or exemption. At most, those statutes could be read to infer an exception or proviso by adding words to them. By finding an exception and a proviso, the majority violates its textualist philosophy. Its holding today seems to require that any time words can be added to a statute to form an exception or proviso, those words should be added. Surely, this does not give effect to the text of the statute as written. Rather, it reads into the statute what the Legislature did not include and perhaps chose not to include. Not only is this inconsistent with the majority's plain language textualist approach, it also violates the rule of lenity. Courts have long held that any ambiguity regarding the scope of criminal statutes must be resolved in favor of lenity. Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 830-831, 94 S.Ct. 1262, 39 L.Ed.2d 782 (1974), quoting Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812, 91 S.Ct. 1056, 28 L.Ed.2d 493 (1971). This is part of the time-honored rule that penal statutes are construed in favor of the defendant. As Chief Justice Marshall of United States Supreme Court stated in 1820: The rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly, is perhaps not much less old than construction itself. It is founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals; and on the plain principle that the power of punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial department. It is the legislature, not the Court, which is to define a crime, and ordain its punishment. [ United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat) 76, 95, 5 L.Ed. 37 (1820).] I believe that a court may go beyond the text of a statute when it is ambiguous or when serious questions arise regarding the reasonable meaning of its language. But when weighing the words of a criminal statute, the court must place on the scales the rule of lenity. This rule requires that the statute be construed strictly in favor of the defendant. Here, the majority disregards the language contained in MCL 776.20 and effectively finds that, if certain words are added to form an exception or proviso, the statute should be read that way. This interpretation violates the rule of lenity. Far from reading the statute in favor of defendant, it requires that the statute be read to disfavor him. I believe that my interpretation of the statute best gives effect to the Legislature's intent. And it best adheres to the long-established tradition of applying the rule of lenity to criminal statutes. The majority's construction violates the spirit of the rule of lenity. And it turns a hardened eye on the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals. . . . Wiltberger, supra at 95. Instead of following this longstanding rule, the majority focuses on the potential burden placed on the prosecution. I continue to adhere to the rule of lenity. Therefore, I would hold that the prosecution bears the burden of production regardless of whether it might, at times, find that burden difficult.