Opinion ID: 2633615
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Under The Cliffdale Assocs. Objective Consumer Test, The Determination Of A Deceptive Omission Is One For The Trier Of Fact, Thereby Rendering Summary Judgment Inappropriate.

Text: The Courbats do not allege that the waiver itself is deceptive; rather, they urge that the deceptive practice at issue was the booking agent's failure to inform them of the waiver requirement during the negotiation and execution of the underlying contract. [10] Nevertheless, if any deceptive omission occurred with respect to the negotiation and execution of the original contract, the operation of HRS § 480-12, see supra note 1, would render both the original contract and the waiver, signed afterward, void. [11] Thus, the waiver's survival depends on the trier of fact's determination as to whether the omission of the waiver requirement during Island Incentives, Inc.'s booking process was deceptive and therefore in violation of HRS § 480-2. The application of an objective reasonable person standard, of which the Cliffdale Assocs. test is an example, is ordinarily for the trier of fact, rendering summary judgment often inappropriate. Amfac, Inc. v. Waikiki Beachcomber Inv. Co., 74 Haw. 85, 107, 839 P.2d 10, 24 (1992), cited in Casumpang v. ILWU Local 142, 108 Hawai`i 411, 425, 121 P.3d 391, 405 (2005); Arquero v. Hilton Hawaiian Village LLC, 104 Hawai`i 423, 433, 91 P.3d 505, 515 (2004). Inasmuch as the term `reasonableness' is subject to differing interpretations . . ., it is inherently ambiguous. Where ambiguity exists, summary judgment is usually inappropriate because `the determination of someone's state of mind usually entails the drawing of factual inferences as to which reasonable [minds] might differ.' Amfac, Inc., 74 Haw. at 107, 839 P.2d at 24 (quoting Bishop Trust Co. v. Cent. Union Church, 3 Haw.App. 624, 628-29, 656 P.2d 1353, 1356 (1983)). Reasonableness can only constitute a question of law suitable for summary judgment `when the facts are undisputed and not fairly susceptible of divergent inferences' because `[w]here, upon all the evidence, but one inference may reasonably be drawn, there is no issue for the jury.' Id. at 108, 839 P.2d at 24 (quoting Broad & Branford Place Corp. v. J.J. Hockenjos Co., 132 N.J.L. 229, 39 A.2d 80, 82 (1944) (brackets in original)). `[A] question of interpretation is not left to the trier of fact where evidence is so clear that no reasonable person would determine the issue in any way but one.' Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 212 cmt. e (1981) (brackets in original)). See also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 212(2) (1981 and Supp. 2005) (A question of interpretation of an integrated agreement is to be determined by the trier of fact if it depends on the credibility of extrinsic evidence or on a choice among reasonable inferences to be drawn from extrinsic evidence .) (Emphasis added). There is no genuine issue of material fact regarding the failure to disclose the waiver requirement during negotiation of the original tour contract, but we cannot say that, applying the Cliffdale Assocs. test, reasonable minds could draw only one inference as to the materiality of that omission to reasonable consumers contemplating the transaction. Therefore, the question whether a waiver requirement would be materially important in booking a horseback tour remains one for the trier of fact. Because a genuine issue of material fact, resolvable only by the trier of fact, remains in dispute, the grant of summary judgment on the HRS ch. 480 claim was erroneous. We therefore vacate the circuit court's May 13, 2002 judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.