Opinion ID: 1918974
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Mental Health Act

Text: Section 342 [] of this Act provides: Whenever any person charged with crime, upon production or appearance before the court, appears to be mentally ill [] or in need of care in a mental hospital, the court shall designate a responsible person to apply for his commitment, or for his commitment for observation, treatment and diagnosis, by order of such court. . . . Mental illness is defined in § 102(11) as: . . . an illness which so lessens the capacity of a person to use his customary self-control, judgment and discretion in the conduct of his affairs and social relations as to make it necessary or advisable to be under care.  In Commonwealth v. Moon, 383 Pa., supra, this Court stated that the definition of the term mental illness as hereinabove quoted is, under the circumstances set forth in the Act, broader than the term legal insanity. Defendant is not within the terms of the Mental Health Act for two reasons: (1) he admittedly is not mentally ill or in need of care in a mental hospital and (2) he has not elected, nor has the Court or anyone in his behalf elected, nor has the Court appointed a person or a commission to proceed in accordance with the Mental Health Act to invoke the relief provided for in and by that Act, viz., commitment to a mental hospital. Instead, defendant has chosen to proceed by way of habeas corpus before trial, invoking, not the aforesaid Mental Health relief, but the Common Law test, which he attempts to broaden by incorporating in and adding thereto the definitions of mental illness set forth in the Mental Health Act. We are of the opinion that the common law test and the provisions of the Mental Health Act are complementary and the Act applies (a) only where mental illness as defined in the Mental Health Act exists, and (b) where the alleged criminal is in need of hospitalization and commitment thereunder. In other words, the common law test is, in situations such as the present, broader than the tests contained in the Mental Health Act, in that it is possible there may be reasons for a stay of proceedings, other than that of statutory mental illness. Nevertheless, we are constrained to hold that defendant is not entitled at this time (1) to a discharge from the indictment for murder, or (2) to a stay of proceedings under the aforesaid common law test or under the Mental Health Act. This defendant (we repeat) is able to comprehend his position as one accused of murder, is fully capable of understanding the gravity of the criminal proceedings against him, and is as able to cooperate with his counsel in making a rational defense as is any defendant who alleges that at the time of the crime he was insane or very intoxicated or completely drugged, or a defendant whose mind allegedly went blank or who blacked out or who panicked and contends or testifies that he does not remember anything. We further note that defendant contends on the one hand that his amnesia is permanent (although the lower Court wisely refused to find this as a fact); and on the other hand, that criminal proceedings be stayed until such time as he recovers his memory. If in fact the condition of amnesia is permanent, defendant's contention (1) would require Courts to hold that such amnesia will permanently, completely and absolutely negate all criminal responsibility and (2) will turn over the determination of crime and criminal liability to psychiatrists, whose opinions are usually based in large part upon defendant's self-serving statements, instead of to Courts and juries, and (3) will greatly jeopardize the safety and security of law-abiding citizens and render the protection of Society from crime and criminals far more difficult than ever before in modern history. Unless an accused is legally insane, the law is not and should not be so unrealistic and foolish as to permanently free, without acquittal by a Judge or a jury, a person against whom a prima facie case of murder is made out. Today it is too often forgotten (1) that the law was established and exists principally for the protection and safety of Society, and (2) that in order to accomplish this principal objective, [] men and women who commit crimes or who are a menace to Society have to be confined in prison or in a mental hospital. This not only provides sorely needed protection for law-abiding citizens while the imprisonment or the confinement lasts, but imprisonment also acts as a deterrent to prospective criminals. We further note that Cummins is not entitled to bail. Pennsylvania Constitution, Art. I, § 14; Commonwealth ex rel. Alberti v. Boyle, 412 Pa. 398, 195 A. 2d 97. However, the grant or denial of bail is an appealable order. Order affirmed. Mr. Justice JONES concurs in the result. Mr. Justice ROBERTS concurs in the result on the ground that petitioner has set forth no facts and made no allegations entitling him to relief at this stage of the proceedings by writ of habeas corpus.