Opinion ID: 1331504
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prosecution Witness/Bailiff

Text: Appellant asserts that error was committed by allowing Deputy R.L. Bennett, who testified on behalf of the State, to escort jury members into the jury room and to operate the metal detector that was at the entrance to the court room. Immediately after the jury was impaneled, Appellant's trial counsel objected to the entire jury panel based on Deputy Bennett's contact with the jurors. The trial court held an in camera hearing to address the amount of contact Deputy Bennett had with the jurors. In explanation of the extent of the contact, Deputy Bennett testified to the following: Witness: I was told to set up the metal detector outside of the doors. So I set it up. Court: Who told you to do that? Witness: I think it was Danny Pearson said that it had been requested that I set up the metal detector. Court: He didn't say who requested that? Witness: No, he didn't. Not that I can recall. Court: Did you set it at the entrance to this courtroom? Witness: Yes, sir. Court: Do you remember if any jurors passed through that detector? Witness: No, sir. I didn't run any jurors through the detector. Court: None at all? Witness: Not through the detector. Court: Well, I take it the jurors c[a]me to this courtroom while you had the detector? Witness: They were sitting in the hallway. Court: Did you tell them to sit in the hallway or did they just sit on the chairs? Witness: They were sitting in the chairs there. It got to be quite a few of them. So I took them down there to the jury room. Court: And left them? Witness: Right. I took them to the jury room. And once it got filled, I put the rest in the law library. Court: Is that the extent of what you did? Witness: Yes, sir. Court: Did you give them any orders or anything like that? Witness: No, I just told them if they were jurors, to go down to the end of the hallway, last door on the right. To support his contention that he was denied a fair trial as the result of Deputy Bennett serving as both witness and bailiff, Appellant relies on syllabus point three of State v. Kelley, 192 W.Va. 124, 451 S.E.2d 425 (1994), in which this Court held: A defendant's constitutional rights to due process and trial by a fair and impartial jury, pursuant to amendment VI and amendment XIV, section 1 of the United States Constitution and article III, sections 10 and 14 of the West Virginia Constitution are violated when a sheriff, in a defendant's trial, serves as a bailiff and testifies as a key witness for the State in that trial. The issue of whether constitutional error occurred in this case is determined under Kelley by examining first, whether Deputy Bennett was serving as a bailiff while performing the duties described above, and second, whether the testimony he provided at trial was that of a key witness with regard to securing Appellant's conviction. That the metal detection and escorting functions performed by Deputy Bennett are prototypical of actions performed by a bailiff cannot be disputed. What is disputed, however, is whether the amount of time Deputy Bennett was involved in these functions was significant enough to spark the concerns at issue in Kelley. Appellant argues that the contact that Deputy Bennett had with the jurors in escorting them down the hall to either the jury room or the library was ingratiating in nature and contributed to giving him an aura of credibility when he took the stand and testified. 192 W.Va. at 130, 451 S.E.2d at 431. Conversely, the State contends that the limited contact Deputy Bennett had with the jurors was not sufficient to raise constitutional concerns, as was the case in Kelley where the officer involved served as bailiff throughout the entirety of the trial proceedings. Given the unusual situation of having a witness also serve as the bailiff, [4] the trial court instructed the sheriff in Kelley that he was not to converse with the jurors and that his contact with the panel was to be limited to escorting the jury members in and out of the courtroom and transporting messages between the jury and the court. [5] Because the record failed to indicate that the officer acted other than as instructed, this Court found no per se constitutional violation based on the sheriff serving as the bailiff during the trial. Of more concern to this Court was the role of the sheriff in his capacity as a State's witness and the weight his testimony may have carried in obtaining a conviction. 192 W.Va. at 129, 451 S.E.2d at 430. We viewed this issue as the more critical stage of analysis because of the sheriff's role as an investigating officer in this case. Id. at 129, 451 S.E.2d at 430. In examining the role the sheriff occupied as a witness in Kelley, we looked to the extent of his involvement with the investigation of the case. As the first officer on the scene, the sheriff in Kelley obtained possession of the murder weapon and he attended to the victim. At trial, the sheriff's testimony included a description of the events at the scene, [6] as well as the fact that the defendant twice confessed to the sheriff to shooting the victim. [7] We determined in Kelley that the sheriff's testimony was corroborative and cumulative of other evidence presented at trial. Due to the scope and persuasiveness of his testimony, however, we could not conclude that the sheriff's testimony was that of a minor witness. 192 W.Va. at 129-30, 451 S.E.2d at 430-31. As was the case in Kelley, the officer involved in this case was the first officer who arrived on the scene. Deputy Bennett was there for fifteen to thirty minutes before Deputy Carl Peterson arrived and took over the investigation. Before Officer Peterson's arrival, Deputy Bennett secured the scene; called for an ambulance; took several Polaroid photographs of the crime scene; and retrieved one shell casing. He also took statements from two witnesses. At trial, the most important piece of non-cumulative evidence that Deputy Bennett testified to was the chain of custody with regard to the shell casing. This issue, standing on its own, however, is not sufficient under the facts of this case to render Deputy Bennett a key witness under the reasoning of Kelley. In reaching our decision in Kelley, we discussed a number of both federal and state court decisions in which the impact of a prosecution witness also serving as bailiff was examined. One of those decisions was Strickland v. State, 784 S.W.2d 549 (Tx.App. 1990), a case in which a sheriff who served as the bailiff at trial testified to the chain of custody of certain pieces of evidence. In concluding that no constitutional violations occurred, the Texas appellate court reasoned that the sheriff could not be considered a key witness because his testimony was not a significant factor in arriving at a conviction. 192 W.Va. at 128, 451 S.E.2d at 429 (discussing Strickland ). As we emphasized in Kelley, there is no automatic requirement that mandates the reversal of a conviction whenever a witness for the State comes into contact with the jury. 192 W.Va. at 127, 451 S.E.2d at 428 (quoting Gonzales v. Beto, 405 U.S. 1052, 1054-55, 92 S.Ct. 1503, 31 L.Ed.2d 787 (1972)). Instead, what is required is a factual analysis that focuses on the length and degree of contact between the jury and the witness, as well as an inquiry into whether the witness provided testimony that was crucial to the conviction, or merely formal in nature. In those cases where the testimony involved was `confined to some uncontroverted or merely formal aspect of the case for the prosecution,' the testimony is typically not viewed as crucial. 192 W.Va. at 127, 451 S.E.2d at 428 (quoting Gonzales, 405 U.S. at 1054-55, 92 S.Ct. 1503). Rather than being concerned with the `brief encounters' that are often inevitable between witnesses and jury members, the type of contact that initially prompts inquiry into the issue of whether the defendant was provided a fair trial is present when the contact is close and sustained due to the bailiff being the official guardian of the jurors. 192 W.Va. at 127, 451 S.E.2d at 428 (quoting and discussing Gonzales, 405 U.S. at 1054-55, 92 S.Ct. 1503). And, to constitute an issue which rises to the level of constitutional significance, the bailiff/witness's testimony must be crucial to the conviction. 192 W.Va. at 127, 451 S.E.2d at 428. As we explained in Kelley, the type of contact that raises constitutional flags exists where the jurors have a close and continual association . . . with key witnesses that le[a]d[s] to a relationship that fostered jurors' confidence and deprived the defendant of his constitutional right to trial by an impartial jury. 192 W.Va. at 130, 451 S.E.2d at 431 (discussing Gonzales ). We cannot conclude, under the holding and reasoning of Kelley, that the limited contact that Deputy Bennett had with the jurors in this case resulted in the jury viewing him as their official guardian. See id. And, despite Deputy Bennett being the first officer on the scene, the subject matter of his testimony was corroborative and cumulative as Deputy Peterson, the investigating officer, testified to the scene of the crime and the events surrounding the investigation at trial. As far as the chain of custody testimony with regard to the single shell casing that Deputy Bennett retrieved, that testimony was essentially uncontroverted and constituted a formal aspect of the State's case. [8] Because we conclude that the testimony of Deputy Bennett was not that of a key witness within the meaning of Kelley, we do not find that Appellant's constitutional rights were violated by virtue of Deputy Bennett's involvement in this case as both a prosecution witness and a bailiff.