Opinion ID: 1181051
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Instructions and Argument on the Jury's Consideration of Mitigating Evidence and Its Exercise of Sentencing Discretion

Text: As explained above, the jury was presented with extensive mitigating evidence from a number of defense witnesses and experts. Thereafter, it was instructed in the unadorned language of former CALJIC Nos. 8.84.1 and 8.84.2. As we explained in People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512, 536-544 [220 Cal. Rptr. 637, 709 P.2d 440], and People v. Allen (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1276-1277 [232 Cal. Rptr. 849, 729 P.2d 115], such instructions, together with the arguments of counsel, may mislead the jury about the scope of its sentencing inquiry, or its sentencing discretion to decide whether death is appropriate in a given case. In all such cases tried under the former instructions, we review the record to determine the likelihood that the jury was misled in either respect. Undertaking such an inquiry here, we find no error.
(10) Although the court did not have the benefit of our decision in People v. Easley (1983) 34 Cal.3d 858 [196 Cal. Rptr. 309, 671 P.2d 813], and hence did not give the expanded factor (k) (§ 190.3, factor (k)) instruction called for in that case ( id., at p. 878, fn. 10), it showed remarkable prescience by giving the following instruction immediately after former CALJIC No. 8.84.1: Evidence has been produced concerning the following: [defendant's] deprived childhood; his incarceration in mental hospitals in juvenile prisons from age 11 on; the lack of treatment for identified problems concerning aggression and sex; his release into society in spite of repeated offenses; his assistance and testimony for the prosecution in the Palm Springs child molesting case. The fact that he voluntarily confessed and assisted the prosecution in the cases in which he is charged. Any or all of the above may be considered as mitigating circumstances.... In this phase of the case you may consider sympathy and pity in determining whether to show mercy and compassion. Sympathy and pity can be considered as mitigating factors. In addition, both counsel confirmed the jury's duty to consider defendant's proffered evidence as mitigating circumstances in its penalty determination. The prosecutor told the jury it was undisputable that defendant's character evidence did constitute mitigating circumstances, but stressed that the weight to be given that evidence was to be decided by the jury. (See Allen, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 1276.) Similarly, defense counsel placed great emphasis on defendant's character and background evidence, and expressly defined extenuating circumstances as anything that you find that points to life imprisonment as opposed to ... death. Viewing the instructions and arguments as a whole, we conclude that a reasonable jury would not have been led to believe that the proffered mitigating evidence was to be ignored. We therefore find no factor (k) error.
(11) Nor do we conclude a reasonable jury would have been misled to believe (i) its sentencing responsibility was to be discharged by a mere counting of aggravating and mitigating factors, or (ii) that it was permitted to arrive at its sentencing decision without having to exercise its moral discretion and decide whether death is the appropriate penalty for this offense and offender. ( Allen, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 1276-1277.) As to the first consideration, we note that the prosecutor did not suggest that the jury's weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors called for a mechanical counting as opposed to a qualitative comparison. Indeed, he told the jury otherwise: You have the right to attach whatever weight and significance you want as a jury to any particular factor, and you may find that one or two of the mitigating factors far outweigh five aggravating factors.... Defense counsel echoed this theme: It's not simply ... a matter of numbers.... [Y]ou as an individual juror can find that [`any one factor that argues for life'] justifies the sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole. And that's no matter what other factors you find in aggravation.... As to the second consideration, we believe the jury properly understood its discretion and responsibility to determine whether death is appropriate in the context of the weighing process. The prosecutor told the jury: It is only you, and it is your exclusive [province] as the jury to decide what weight that you are going to attach to any of the mitigating and aggravating circumstances in this particular case, and then to involve yourselves as you will in the balancing process, that will ultimately lead you to the decision as to what punishment you as a jury will render in this case against the defendant.... Similarly, defense counsel further reinforced this point: [Y]our choice is never mandatory. There is no mandatory penalty that has to be imposed. Each of you as individuals will ultimately have to wrestle with that, ultimately have to decide in your own mind what the appropriate punishment is. He repeated that the ultimate question for the jury to decide was whether death was the appropriate punishment, and concluded by telling the jury it could impose death only if it was absolutely sure [it was] doing the right thing ... and that it was the right punishment, the only possible punishment. In light of the foregoing, we simply cannot imagine that a reasonable jury would have been misled about its moral discretion and sole responsibility to decide whether death is appropriate in this case.