Opinion ID: 440528
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Participation in Conspiracy

Text: 103 It is well established that close association with a co-conspirator or mere presence at the scene of a crime is insufficient evidence of knowing participation in a conspiracy. United States v. Vera, 701 F.2d 1349, 1357 (11th Cir.1983). Thus, Tiedeberg's close association with appellant, Tortoriello, and his presence in the hotel room is insufficient evidence of knowing participation in a conspiracy. 104 Furthermore, we have consistently and strongly emphasized that presence followed by flight is inadequate proof of actual and knowing participation in a conspiracy. United States v. Lopez-Ortiz, 492 F.2d 109, 115 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1052, 95 S.Ct. 630, 42 L.Ed.2d 647 (1974). It is, therefore, clear that evidence of Tiedeberg's presence in the hotel room, shrug of his shoulders, uh-huh, uh-hah, aw-haw, yep conversation, frisk of Agent McShane, search of the hotel room, and flight after hearing a large bang on the hotel room door, is not sufficient to sustain Tiedeberg's conspiracy conviction. 105 After evaluating this evidence in a light most favorable to the government, we conclude that a reasonable trier of fact could not find beyond a reasonable doubt that Tiedeberg intended to join, or associate himself with the objectives of, the conspiracy. 106 We, therefore, hold that the government has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Tiedeberg had the requisite criminal intent to commit the offense charged. In the absence of substantial evidence to connect Tiedeberg with the illegal agreement, and in the absence of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each element of the offense charged, we reverse Tiedeberg's conviction. Tiedeberg may be guilty of some offense, but not conspiracy to transport stolen paintings interstate.