Opinion ID: 2387024
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Rejection of an instruction on lesser included offenses

Text: Defendant contends the trial court should have instructed the jury concerning second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter in connection with the charge of the murder of Timothy McVeigh. (11) [I]t is the `court's duty to instruct the jury not only on the crime with which the defendant is charged, but also on any lesser offense that is both included in the offense charged and shown by the evidence to have been committed.' [Citation.] ( People v. Gutierrez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 789, 826 [89 Cal.Rptr.3d 225, 200 P.3d 847].) [W]hen the evidence unquestionably establishes that the defendant is guilty of a serious, violent offensebut leaves some doubt with respect to an element that would justify conviction of a capital offensethe failure to give the jury the `third option' of convicting on a lesser included offense would seem inevitably to enhance the risk of an unwarranted conviction. [¶] Such a risk cannot be tolerated in a case in which the defendant's life is at stake. ( Beck v. Alabama (1980) 447 U.S. 625, 637 [65 L.Ed.2d 392, 100 S.Ct. 2382].) To warrant [an instruction on a lesser included offense], there must be substantial evidence of the lesser included offense, that is, `evidence from which a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt' that the defendant committed the lesser offense. [Citation.] Speculation is insufficient to require the giving of an instruction on a lesser included offense. [Citations.] In addition, a lesser included instruction need not be given when there is no evidence that the offense is less than that charged. [Citation.] ( People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 174 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 485, 6 P.3d 150].) Defendant fails to identify any evidence that would support a finding of either second degree murder or voluntary manslaughter. Instead, he relies upon the circumstance that the prosecutor requested instructions concerning second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter to protect the record. When pressed by the court to explain how the jury might find these offenses, the prosecutor expressed concern that a juror might conclude that defendant did not enter the Alpha Beta market to commit a burglary, or defendant did not take any money. The trial court stated that it would not give the requested instructions, based upon its assessment of the evidence. According to defendant, the prosecutor's statement was not speculationit was the opinion of the man prosecuting the case, and [i]t was not speculation for [the prosecutor] to opine that the jury might believe that a robbery had not taken place or that if it had, it was incidental to the murder. The prosecutor's opinion, however, is not evidence, and there is no evidence in this case to support a conclusion that the individual who entered the store wearing a wig, and who quickly proceeded to a cash register and pointed a gun at the clerk, did not enter the store with a felonious intent, or a conclusion that the individual did not rob Rambo, or a conclusion that the killing of McVeigh did not occur in the course of these felonies. The only issue was whether defendant was the individual who killed McVeigh in the course of these felonies, because whoever was the perpetrator was guilty of felony murder. (§ 189.) Therefore, there was no evidence to support the giving of instructions on the lesser included offenses of second degree murder or voluntary manslaughter.