Opinion ID: 740029
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Delay Before the First Trial

Text: 19 Eight years after the mail bomb killed Wilkerson, a grand jury indicted Ross and Manning for the first time. This delay occurred because of a postal inspector's error. The box that delivered the bomb contained thumb prints that the inspector mistook for palm prints. When the inspector received Manning's fingerprints in 1981, he did not compare them with the prints on the box. He believed that they could not match because those on the box belonged to a palm and Manning's were of fingers and a thumb. Eight years later, the inspector received Manning's fingerprints for a third time, this time along with his palm print. While comparing the print card with the discovered prints, the inspector realized that the box indeed carried a thumb print and that it belonged to Manning. Shortly thereafter, Manning and Ross were indicted (along with Rochelle Manning, who has since died). 20 Assuming without deciding that the inspector's mistake was negligent, we must determine whether the delay caused Ross actual prejudice. Moran, 759 F.2d at 782-83. 21 Ross contends that the delay prejudiced his trial because during the intervening eight years his son and potential witness, Peter Ross, died. Ross presented evidence at trial that Peter not only was friends with Manning but worked with Ross and could have made the two telephone calls from the office to Manning. Ross strongly implied that his son (who he claimed had a darker side and a drug problem) may have been involved in the bombing. He claims that Peter's testimony would have established Peter's relationship with Manning (and Ross's lack thereof) and that it would have established that if anyone called Manning from the Bill Ross Realty office on June 30, it would have been [Peter], not his father. Ross also claims that Peter's testimony would have impeached the testimony of Marilyn Annis, testimony that linked Manning and Ross as at least acquaintances. Finally, Ross complains of prejudice because the government argued that Ross pointed the finger at his late son, who could not defend himself, as a convenient way of avoiding guilt; Ross argues that the presence of Peter at trial would have bolstered his defense, not belied it. 22 All this prejudice is speculative. A defendant claiming preindictment delay carries a heavy burden of showing actual prejudice that is definite and not speculative. Moran, 759 F.2d at 782; United States v. Butz, 982 F.2d 1378, 1380 (9th Cir.1993). In fact, this court wondered in Moran whether lost testimony can ever constitute actual prejudice given its generally speculative nature. Moran, 759 F.2d at 782. 23 Although Ross claims that Peter would have established that if anyone called Manning from the Bill Ross Realty office it would have been [Peter], he does not claim to know that Peter in fact called Manning from the office on that day or any other. Ross also contends that Peter would explain that he was friends with Manning and that Ross was not. First, testimony that Peter and Manning knew each other was given by three other witnesses, thus Ross was not prejudiced by Peter's inability to provide this cumulative testimony. Second, given that other evidence established Ross and Manning as at least acquaintances, Ross's claim that Peter would explain that the two did not know each other is speculative at best. 24 Everything that Ross claims Peter would have testified to is either speculative or cumulative. There is no proof that Peter's absence at the first trial caused actual prejudice to Ross's defense. 25 Because no actual prejudice occurred, we need not weigh the reasons for the delay versus its length. Moran, 759 F.2d at 781. 26