Opinion ID: 1381383
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Testimony Regarding Appellant's Refusal to Respond to Police Interrogation.

Text: Appellant was twice given his Miranda warnings, once just after police arrived at the scene and again at the police station. On both occasions, he indicated his willingness to discuss the incident without an attorney. Appellant contends that the trial court committed reversible error by admitting defendant's statement indicating his desire not to answer questions about what he did to Vivian after he forced her to disrobe and touched her. We agree that the trial court erred by denying Franklin's motion in limine to exclude the statement. It is constitutionally impermissible to admit evidence of a defendant's invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege to remain silent. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975); Miranda, supra 384 U.S. at 468, n. 37, 86 S.Ct. at 1624, n. 37. See also, Bernier v. State, 96 Nev. 670, 614 P.2d 1079 (1980); Vipperman v. State, 92 Nev. 213, 547 P.2d 682 (1976). We believe, however, that this issue is also governed by the harmless error standard. See, e.g., Shepp v. State, 87 Nev. 179, 484 P.2d 563 (1976); Bernier and Vipperman, supra . Several factors support a finding that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The prosecution did not emphasize the silence or use it to overtly foment an adverse inference of guilt in the minds of the jury. See Shepp, supra . Appellant's refusal to answer came in the midst of an unbroken chain of voluntary statements. See State v. Walker, 306 Minn. 105, 235 N.W.2d 810 (1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 950, 96 S.Ct. 3172, 49 L.Ed.2d 1187 (1976). Finally, as we have already determined, other evidence of appellant's guilt was overwhelming; the reference to his silence on one question likely had little impact on the jury. The jury found appellant guilty of attempted sexual assault, not sexual assault. That finding could reasonably be based on Franklin's statements to the detective prior to his refusal to answer the one specific question. The jury apparently did not infer from Franklin's silence any more wrongdoing than that to which he voluntarily admitted. We conclude that the error in admitting evidence of appellant's silence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We decline to address appellant's remaining assignments of error, which we find to be without merit. GUNDERSON, C.J., SPRINGER and MOWBRAY, JJ., and ZENOFF, [5] Senior Justice, concur.