Opinion ID: 3051730
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Plain Language and Context of the Statute

Text: Require a Joint Return for Relief Under § 6015(f) Christensen argues that § 6015(f) is available to spouses who face joint liability under community property laws but do not file a joint return. We disagree. In light of the plain language of § 6015 and the context of the statute, we conclude that § 6015(f) is available only to spouses who file a joint return.4 “The starting point for any statutory interpretation is the language of the statute itself.” Singh v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 969, 977 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). “When we look 4 We thus agree with the holding of the Tax Court in Raymond v. Comm’r, 119 T.C. 191 (2002), although we reach the same result by a slightly different analysis. See id. at 196-97 (relying on administrative pronouncements by Commissioner and legislative history, rather than plain language and context of statute). CHRISTENSEN v. CIR 4209 to the plain language of a statute in order to interpret its meaning, we do more than view words or sub-sections in isolation. We derive meaning from context, and this requires reading the relevant statutory provisions as a whole.” Carpenters Health & Welfare Trust Funds v. Robertson (In re Rufener Constr.), 53 F.3d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). In addition, we look to the language of the statutory scheme as a whole to interpret the particular statutory provision. W. Coast Truck Lines, Inc. v. Arcata Cmty. Recycling Ctr., Inc., 846 F.2d 1239, 1242 (9th Cir. 1988). [5] Here, our first indication of the statute’s scope is set forth in the title of § 6015: “Relief from joint and several liability on joint return.” 26 U.S.C. § 6015 (emphasis added); see also Singh, 499 F.3d at 977 (“Although statutory titles are not part of the legislation, they may be instructive in putting the statute in context.”) (citation omitted). By using this title, “Congress must have intended to introduce the subject that was to follow:” relief for spouses who file joint returns. Moldo v. Matsco, Inc. (In re Cybernetic Servs., Inc.), 252 F.3d 1039, 1050 (9th Cir. 2001) (using statute’s title as an interpretation tool). [6] Next, comparing the language of the statute’s subsections, we note that § 6015(f) does not explicitly require the filing of a joint tax return as a procedural requirement for relief,5 whereas § 6015(b) and (c) do. Compare 26 U.S.C. § 6015(b)(1)(A) (allowing relief if, inter alia, “a joint return has been made for a taxable year”), and id. § 6015(c)(1) (limiting joint liability where, inter alia, “an individual who has made a joint return for any taxable year elects application of 5 “Under procedures prescribed by the Secretary, if — (1) taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the individual liable for any unpaid tax or any deficiency (or any portion of either); and (2) relief is not available to such individual under subsection (b) or (c), the Secretary may relieve such individual of such liability.” 26 U.S.C. § 6015(f). 4210 CHRISTENSEN v. CIR [the] subsection”), with id. § 6015(f) (allowing equitable relief for individuals who do not qualify for relief under subsections (b) or (c), without reference to a joint return). The language in § 6015(e) and (h), however, implies a joint return requirement for § 6015(f). For example, § 6015(e) directs the Tax Court to “establish rules which provide the individual filing a joint return but not making the election under subsection (b) or (c) or the request for equitable relief under subsection (f) with adequate notice and an opportunity to become a party . . .” 26 U.S.C. § 6015(e)(4). Similarly, § 6015(h) refers to the non-petitioning spouse in a § 6015(f) claim, to whom notice must be sent, as “the other individual filing the joint return.” 26 U.S.C. § 6015(h)(2). This language indicates that Congress anticipated a joint return where a spouse petitions for relief under § 6015(f). Christensen contends that if we were to interpret § 6015(f) to require a joint filing, the requirements of § 6015(b) and (f) would be essentially the same. We should avoid an interpretation that would render the subsections redundant. See Spencer Enters., Inc. v. United States, 345 F.3d 683, 691 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting the “cardinal rule of statutory interpretation that no provision should be construed to be entirely redundant”) (citation omitted). However, even with a joint filing requirement, relief under § 6015(f) is distinct from relief under § 6015(b). For relief under § 6015(b), a taxpayer must show an understatement of tax attributable to his or her spouse and a lack of knowledge about the understatement. 26 U.S.C. § 6015(b)(1)(B)-(C). By comparison, a taxpayer may qualify for relief under § 6015(f) for an understatement or an underpayment and need not show lack of knowledge. Id. § 6015(f) (addressing liability for “any unpaid tax or any deficiency (or any portion of either)”). Thus, requiring a joint filing under both § 6015(b) and (f) does not render either subsection redundant. See United States v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 457 F.3d 1009, 1015-16 (9th Cir. 2006) (concluding that an overlap in some requirements between subsections does not create redundancy). CHRISTENSEN v. CIR 4211 [7] Finally, we view the language of § 6015(f) in the context of the overall statutory scheme. W. Coast Truck Lines, Inc., 846 F.2d at 1242; In re Cybernetic Servs., 252 F.3d at 1050-51. Congress enacted similar equitable relief provisions in § 66(c) and § 6015(f) simultaneously, with the passage of the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998. See Pub. L. 105-206, § 3201(a)-(b), 112 Stat. 685, 734-40. Both statutes provide relief for innocent spouses and separated spouses. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 66(a), (c), id. § 6015(b), (c), (f). We assume that these separate provisions, passed under the same act, each have a “proper application distinct from and harmonious with that of the other.” Wood v. A. Wilbert’s Sons Shingle & Lumber Co., 226 U.S. 384, 389 (1912); see also Spokane Indian Tribe v. United States, 972 F.2d 1090, 1094 (9th Cir. 1992) (adopting the statutory interpretation “which can ‘most fairly be said to be . . . harmonious with its scheme and with the general purposes that Congress manifested’ ”) (citation omitted). As its title explains, § 66 addresses “Treatment of community income.” Section 6015 addresses “Relief from joint and several liability on Joint Return.” Taken together, the similar and separate equitable provisions indicate that Congress intended spouses facing joint liability from community property laws to seek equitable relief under § 66(c) and spouses facing joint liability from joint tax returns to seek equitable relief under § 6015(f).6 6 Our conclusion is consistent with the Commissioner’s administrative pronouncements expressly requiring the filing of a joint return as a precondition to equitable relief under § 6015(f). See Treas. Reg. § 1.6015-4 (as amended in 2002) (“A requesting spouse who files a joint return . . . and who does not qualify for full relief under § 1.6015-2 or 1.6015-3 may request equitable relief under this section.”); see also Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003 WL 21708514, § 4.01 (listing filing of a joint return as one of several “threshold conditions” for equitable relief under § 6015(f)). Because this case may be decided based on the plain language and context of the statute, however, we need not consider what level of deference, if any, should be accorded these administrative pronouncements. See Metro Leasing & Dev. Corp. v. Comm’r, 376 F.3d 1015, 1024 & nn.10-11 (9th Cir. 2004). 4212 CHRISTENSEN v. CIR [8] We conclude that the plain language and context of the statute support a conclusion that relief under § 6015 is limited to spouses who file a joint return. C. The Legislative History of § 6015 Does Not Reveal a Contrary Congressional Intent Even though the plain language and context of the statute indicate a joint return requirement, we may look to see if the legislative history clearly expresses a contrary intent. See Adams v. Bowen, 872 F.2d 926, 928-29 (9th Cir. 1989) (reviewing legislative history despite statute’s unambiguous language and concluding that nothing in the history compelled a contrary reading of the statute). The conference report accompanying the enactment of § 6015 discusses equitable relief for spouses who file joint returns: The conferees do not intend to limit the use of the Secretary’s authority to provide equitable relief to situations where tax is shown on a return but not paid. The conferees intend that such authority be used where, taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold an individual liable for all or part of any unpaid tax or deficiency arising from a joint return. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 105-599, at 254 (1998). The language in § 6015(f) mirrors the language in the conference report allowing the Secretary to provide “equitable relief” from “any unpaid tax or any deficiency.” The report suggests that Congress assumed a joint return as a prerequisite to equitable relief under § 6015(f). Christensen argues that the report’s reference to “equitable relief” describes relief under § 6015(b), not (f). The language in § 6015(b), however, does not include the term “equitable relief” and applies only to “an understatement of tax.” Thus, the reference to “equitable relief” from joint returns logically CHRISTENSEN v. CIR 4213 relates to § 6015(f), not to § 6015(b). Accordingly, the language in the conference report expresses a legislative intent consistent with our conclusion that equitable relief under § 6015(f) is available only if a joint return is filed.