Opinion ID: 1995436
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence: Aggravated Assault

Text: Finally, Young argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction for aggravated assault and supported nothing more than a conviction for simple assault. A person commits the offense of aggravated assault if: (1) By any means, that person knowingly or purposely causes serious bodily injury to another person; or (2) Under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life, that person intentionally or knowingly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of serious bodily injury to another person, and thereby causes serious bodily injury. D.C.Code § 22-404.01(a). `[S]erious bodily injury' is construed to mean injury that involves a substantial risk of death, unconsciousness, extreme physical pain, protracted and obvious disfigurement, or loss or impairment of a bodily member or function. Jackson v. United States, 970 A.2d 277, 279 (D.C.2009) (citations omitted). Young argues that there was no evidence to establish that he caused Short serious bodily injury or that he intended to cause Short seriously bodily injury, knew that it would result from his conduct, or knowingly engaged in conduct that created a grave risk of serious bodily injury or manifested an extreme indifference to life. On the contrary, Dezma Chase, Cunningham's mother, and Donnice Tyler, both of whom witnessed the assault and identified appellants at trial, both testified that Young repeatedly and forcefully struck Short with his fists. Chase specifically testified that Young hit [Short] with his fist in the chest. Chase also testified that Young jumped on Short. [3] Intent can rarely be proved directly, and must often be discerned from the surrounding circumstances. Gray v. United States, 585 A.2d 164, 165 (D.C.1991) (citation omitted). Given the testimony from Chase and Tyler, the evidence was sufficient to show that, at a minimum, Young knowingly engaged in conduct which created a substantial risk of . . . extreme physical pain to Short. See Bolanos v. United States, 938 A.2d 672, 677 (D.C.2007) (citation omitted). Such evidence satisfies the mens rea element of the aggravated assault statute. Further, although the evidence also had to be sufficient to show that Young caused Short serious bodily injury, it met that test under standards of co-principal liability adopted by our decisions. Although no aiding and abetting instruction was given, no such instruction is necessary in order for the acts of one principal in furtherance of a crime to be imputed to another principal. Hazel v. United States, 353 A.2d 280, 283 (D.C.1976). [4] The government presented sufficient evidence that Young committed one of the necessary elements of aggravated assault, i.e., knowingly engag[ing] in conduct which create[d] a grave risk of serious bodily injury, [5] as a co-principal with Owens and Cunningham. Therefore, the acts of Owens and Cunningham that caused serious bodily injury are imputed to Young. See Green v. United States, 608 A.2d 156, 159 (D.C.1992) (appellant could be convicted of unlawful possession of cocaine under accomplice liability theory even though he had not actually or constructively possessed the drugs and had merely led an undercover police officer to the person who sold him the drugs); Hazel, supra, 353 A.2d at 283. Since the evidence is sufficient to show that the joint actions of Young, Owens, and Cunningham caused Short's death, it is sufficient to support Young's conviction for aggravated assault. Affirmed.