Opinion ID: 1933373
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Qualified immunity: objective legal reasonableness.

Text: Even if Durso had violated Taylor's right to due process, we hold that he had qualified immunity for his actions. The availability of the doctrine of qualified immunity depends upon the objective legal reasonableness of his conduct. Harlow, supra, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. at 2738; Davis, supra, 468 U.S. at 191, 104 S.Ct. at 3017. The critical question is whether Durso reasonably could have believed that he had authority not to readmit Taylor while the adult charges were pending, notwithstanding the hearing officer's ruling that Taylor could not be transferred involuntarily. The issue is a legal one, focusing on the objective legal reasonableness of the official's action when measured against clearly established law. Harlow, supra, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. at 2738. With respect to any claim based upon alleged due process violations arising out of Durso's initial actions excluding Taylor from school, Taylor's rights were not so clearly established. The uncertainty surrounding appellant's right to the protections outlined in Goss because of the absence of any statutory right to an education for one of appellee's age undercuts any showing that Taylor's rights were clearly established. Moreover, it was not objectively unreasonable for the school to take action to make alternative arrangements for Taylor's education under the totality of the circumstances. Durso had observed Taylor arrested for a serious felony on a complaint of a fellow-student. The arrest occurred on the school grounds when Taylor had in his possession a prohibited weapon. It was surely reasonable for Durso to conclude that Taylor's presence at Wilson during the pendency of the adult criminal charges posed the threat of disrupting the academic environment, particularly in light of the reactions and demonstrations by the students and the reaction of the complaining witness which were reported to the principal. It is also significant to a determination of objective reasonableness of Durso's decision that the assistant superintendent agreed with Durso's decision to make alternative arrangements for Taylor's education, and the Board, finding no explicit rule to meet the exigencies of the situation, immediately adopted a rule for prehearing, involuntary transfer. It was also reasonable for appellant to believe that the hearing officer lacked the authority to overrule Durso's non-disciplinary decision that Taylor should be placed on home-study while the adult charges were pending because Durso's decision was different from the decision reached by the hearing officer, which concerned Taylor's involuntary transfer. Appellant's failure to follow an order before issuance of the written decision and which was susceptible of an alternative interpretation as to its scope was not so arbitrary as to violate due process. Pollnow, supra, 757 F.2d at 501. There was in effect no explicit regulation excluding this discretionary action. Therefore, Taylor's one-day exclusion following the hearing officer's decision cannot be regarded as violating a clearly established right. Since Durso did not violate a clearly established policy about which a reasonable person would have known, the broad immunity accorded school officials bars the federal claims. Mitchell, supra, 472 U.S. at 528, 105 S.Ct. at 2816-17; Pollnow, supra, 757 F.2d at 501. Therefore, appellant's motion for summary judgment should have been granted on appellee's federal claim on the basis of qualified immunity, and appellee's request for discovery on this issue pending disposition of the immunity claim should have been denied.