Opinion ID: 1850556
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the nature of the proscribed conduct

Text: The majority contends that in considering the factor of the nature of the proscribed conduct, case law indicates that multiple charges under a single statute are permissible if the facts underlying the charges are either separated in time or are of a significantly different nature. The majority contends that in this case the nature. The majority contends that in this case the offenses are separated in time in that each 120-day period of failure to provide support was alleged to have occurred in a separate calendar year. However, as Judge Cane noted in his dissent, this argument is unpersuasive because these allegedly distinct offenses were arbitrarily imposed by the state in its charging. Grayson, 165 Wis. 2d at 571 (Cane, J., dissenting). The defendant did not embark on a new course of action during each period, but rather simply continued as he had before. The only reason why the distinct time intervals exist are because the State arbitrarily imposed them. This court has stated that [a] defendant ought not be charged, tried or convicted for offenses that are substantially alike when they are a part of the same general transaction or episode. State v. Eisch, 96 Wis. 2d 25, 34, 291 N.W.2d 800 (1980). Furthermore, a central question to be asked in evaluating the nature of the conduct is whether the `defendant can be said to have realized that he has come to a fork in the road, and nevertheless decides to invade a different interest ....' Eisch, 96 Wis. 2d at 36 (citation omitted). Applying these principles, the nature of the proscribed conduct also weighs in favor of the defendant's interpretation of the statute. As the defendant suggests, many state courts, in contexts unrelated to double jeopardy concerns, have referred to nonsupport as a continuing offense. See State v. Greenberg, 16 N.J. 568, 109 A.2d 669, 674 (1954); Day v. State, 481 P.2d 807, 808 (Okl. Ct. App. 1971); State v. Tahash, 280 Minn. 507, 160 N.W.2d 139, 141 (1968). This court has itself suggested that nonsupport is a continuing offense. See Watke v. State, 166 Wis. 41, 47 (1917). Furthermore, in Taylor v. State, 710 P.2d 1019 (Alaska App. 1985), the Alaska court, in discussing a similar issue as involved in this case, found that nonsupimproper to charge the defendant with a separate violation for each month of missed payments. Id. at 1024. These references to nonsupport as a continuing offense support the defendant's interpretation of the statute. The defendant also contends that the reason why case law views nonsupport as a continuing offense is because nonsupport is a crime of omission and there are no distinct acts that can be compared to determine whether the defendant had sufficient time to reflect and form a new mens rea. His argument is persuasive. Any distinction between multiple counts is based on arbitrary time divisions, such as this case where the state did not charge at 120-day intervals, but rather in year intervals. Thus, there is no clear point at which a defendant can be said to have come to a fork in the road and nevertheless decided to invade a different interest.