Opinion ID: 820615
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Mr. Little

Text: Mr. Little also raises a number of issues on appeal. He argues that his convictions should be reversed because: (1) the District Court quashed his subpoena seeking production of his interview with police; (2) the District Court erroneously admitted certain evidence and, in any event, the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; (3) the AUSA’s closing argument was so inflammatory as to require reversal; and (4) cumulative error denied him a fair trial.
The government’s investigation into the Coconut Grove drug ring involved the cooperation of CIs. In September 2008, one of the CIs was killed. Miami police took the lead in investigating the homicide, and at one point interviewed Mr. Little in connection with the case. Based on information obtained from the government through pre-trial discovery, Mr. Little anticipated that the homicide would factor into this case. Thus, in October 2008, Mr. Little sought production of information related to the Miami Police Department’s investigation. Specifically, Mr. Little wanted a copy of the recording of his police interview. Mr. Little believed that The First 48, a 24 Case: 10-14332 Date Filed: 02/14/2013 Page: 25 of 41 reality TV show, possessed a copy and requested a subpoena be served on its producers—A & E Television Networks, LLC (AETN) and ITV Studios, Inc. (ITV)—pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17. The subpoena requested production of “[a]ll photographs, video and/or audio recordings of interviews of [thirty named individuals including Larry Little], made in connection with the filming of The First 48, in relation to the homicide investigation concerning [the CI].” The District Court granted Mr. Little’s request in part, ordering that the subpoena be issued, but that all documents and materials be “receive[d] [by the court] and review[ed] . . . in camera to make a determination that production of the materials to [Little] is appropriate under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(c).” Upon receipt of the subpoena, AETN and ITV filed a motion to quash, acknowledging that they had a tape of Mr. Little’s interview, but asserting that they were shielded from having to produce the tape by the qualified journalists’ privilege. The District Court granted this motion, holding that Mr. Little had failed to make the required showing to overcome the qualified journalists’ privilege. On appeal, Mr. Little argues that this was an abuse of discretion because he “met the test articulated by the Eleventh Circuit to overcome [the] . . . privilege.” In the alternative, he suggests that application of the qualified journalists’ privilege in this instance violated his right to compulsory due process. 25 Case: 10-14332 Date Filed: 02/14/2013 Page: 26 of 41 We review a District Court’s decision to quash a Rule 17 subpoena for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Silverman, 745 F.2d 1386, 1397 (11th Cir. 1984). Our Circuit recognizes a qualified privilege for journalists, allowing them to resist compelled disclosure of their professional news gathering efforts. This privilege shields reporters in both criminal and civil proceedings. United States v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487, 1504 (11th Cir. 1986) (applying privilege in criminal racketeering trial); Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721, 726 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041, 101 S. Ct. 1759 (1981) (applying privilege in civil libel suit).9 In granting AETN’s and ITV’s motion to quash Mr. Little’s Rule 17 subpoena, the District Court applied the test articulated in Caporale, where we said “that information may only be compelled from a reporter claiming privilege if the party requesting the information can show that it is highly relevant, necessary to the proper presentation of the case, and unavailable from other sources.” 806 F.2d at 1504. The District Court determined that Mr. Little did not make the evidentiary showing necessary to overcome the privilege because (1) the recorded interrogation sought was not “highly relevant” to Mr. Little’s case to the extent that he was charged with “offenses relating to a drug conspiracy, not a homicide” and “the drug transactions occurred nearly a year after the homicide”; and (2) Mr. 9 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), we adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down before October 1, 1981. 26 Case: 10-14332 Date Filed: 02/14/2013 Page: 27 of 41 Little “failed to establish that he [could] not obtain the information from other sources, such as the police who conducted the interviews.” The court did not address whether the recordings were “necessary to the proper presentation of [Mr. Little’s] case.” Caporale, 806 F.2d at 1504. On appeal, Mr. Little contests each of the District Court’s findings. Even if we credit Mr. Little’s argument that the District Court erred in determining that the interrogation video was not highly relevant to his defense, his claim still fails because he has not established that the materials were unavailable from another source. For reasons unknown to us, Mr. Little never attempted to get the interview from the agency that conducted it—the Miami Police Department— until August 18, 2010, almost two months after his trial was over. Miami police maintained a copy of the interview, and the record indicates that the District Court stood willing to enforce a subpoena against the Police Department. Thus, because Mr. Little failed to demonstrate that the interview was otherwise “unavailable from other sources,” the District Court did not abuse its discretion in quashing his motion to compel from AETN and ITV. Mr. Little’s alternative argument—that his convictions should be overturned because the test articulated in Caporale is not consistent with the Sixth Amendment’s “right to compulsory process”—is equally unpersuasive. The Sixth Amendment guarantees that a criminal defendant shall “have compulsory process 27 Case: 10-14332 Date Filed: 02/14/2013 Page: 28 of 41 for obtaining witnesses in his favor.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. But before there can be a violation of the right to compulsory process, a criminal defendant must “establish some colorable need” for the evidence to be compelled. Cf. Hoskins v. Wainwright, 440 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1971) (“The right to compulsory process is not absolute, and a state may require that a defendant requesting such process at state expense establish some colorable need for the person to be summoned, lest the right be abused by those who would make frivolous requests.”). Mr. Little never requested that the District Court subpoena the interview from the Miami Police Department. That being the case, Mr. Little cannot “establish some colorable need” for why he required that the interview be obtained from AETN and ITV, rather than the Miami Police Department. See id.
Mr. Little points to a number of evidentiary issues that he claims require reversal of his convictions. Because the effect of certain purported errors is compounding, we consider errors associated with each offense of conviction in turn.
At the conclusion of the government’s case-in-chief, Mr. Little moved for judgment of acquittal on his conspiracy charge. The District Court denied his motion. Mr. Little argues that this was error because there was insufficient 28 Case: 10-14332 Date Filed: 02/14/2013 Page: 29 of 41 evidence to sustain his conspiracy conviction. He also contends that his conspiracy conviction should be reversed because the District Court abused its discretion in denying his motion for mistrial based on the admission of impermissible Rule 404(b) evidence. At trial, Mr. Little advanced the same theory of defense as Mr. Capers, specifically that he was a user of crack cocaine and “therefore did not knowingly and willfully possess the drugs with the intent to distribute after they were obtained or knowingly and willfully conspire[] with others to distribute after the drugs were obtained.” In the light most favorable to the government, however, the evidence was sufficient to convict Mr. Little of conspiracy for the same reasons that it was sufficient to convict Mr. Capers. Like Mr. Capers, Mr. Little engaged in more than just “petty juggling.” Four co-conspirators independently testified that Mr. Little purchased significant amounts of crack in Coconut Grove and resold it to outsiders. Continuing this theme, Jimmy Tucker testified that he fronted drugs to Mr. Little, and that Little paid him back with the profits he earned by reselling them. Also, co-conspirator George Merrill testified that Mr. Little brought him customers, including the CI, on at least fifteen occasions during the time period of the conspiracy. Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the jury’s verdict, it was reasonable for the jury to infer from this evidence that Mr. Little was aware of the 29 Case: 10-14332 Date Filed: 02/14/2013 Page: 30 of 41 conspiracy and its object, and that he knowingly and voluntarily participated in it. Therefore, sufficient evidence existed to sustain his conviction for Count 1. Likewise we reject Mr. Little’s Rule 404(b) argument as to his conspiracy conviction. Although the District Court admitted testimony from cooperating witnesses that Mr. Little engaged in a number of drug transactions between 2007 and 2009 that did not result in substantive charges, we have already explained that Rule 404(b) only applies to “extrinsic evidence.” See Edouard, 485 F.3d at 1343. Each of the “violation[s]” alleged by Mr. Little involved testimony about uncharged criminal conduct relating to the distribution of drugs during the time period of the alleged conspiracy. This evidence was not “extrinsic” to Mr. Little’s case, and therefore not subject to the same requirements for admission as Rule 404(b) evidence. Id. Therefore, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion for mistrial.10
Distribute Crack on July 28 and August 3, 2009 Mr. Little was convicted of two counts of possessing with intent to distribute five grams of crack cocaine (Counts 37 and 38). For each of those counts, he argues that the District Court erroneously admitted certain exhibits, and that 10 Mr. Little also suggests that his “right to due process” was violated when the District Court admitted evidence of these uncharged transactions. However, Mr. Little failed to brief this argument, or to offer any explanation at all as to why this would be the case. Thus, we will not consider this undeveloped claim here. See Holland, 677 F.3d at 1066. 30 Case: 10-14332 Date Filed: 02/14/2013 Page: 31 of 41 without these exhibits, the evidence was not sufficient to prove that he committed the offenses alleged. 1) Count 37, Possession with Intent to Distribute Crack on July 28, 2009 For Count 37, the government offered as evidence video and audio recordings of Mr. Little shepherding the CI to Otis Walker’s house, where the CI purchased drugs from Walker. Over Mr. Little’s objection that the government had failed to establish that the recording devices were in proper working order, the District Court received these exhibits into evidence. Mr. Little points to this as error. “We review the district court’s admission of evidence for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Trujillo, 146 F.3d 838, 843 (11th Cir. 1998). “Even where an abuse of discretion is shown, non-constitutional evidentiary errors are not grounds for reversal absent a reasonable likelihood that the defendant’s substantial rights were affected.” United States v. Range, 94 F.3d 614, 620 (11th Cir. 1996) (quotation marks omitted). Generally, “the trial judge has broad discretion in determining whether to allow a recording to be played before the jury.” United States v. Biggins, 551 F.2d 64, 66 (5th Cir. 1977). Still, “the party introducing a tape into evidence has the burden of going forward with sufficient evidence to show that the recording is an 31 Case: 10-14332 Date Filed: 02/14/2013 Page: 32 of 41 accurate reproduction of the conversation recorded.” United States v. Sarro, 742 F.2d 1286, 1292 (11th Cir. 1984). In order to authenticate a taped recording, the government, in a criminal case, must show: (1) the competency of the operator; (2) the fidelity of the recording equipment; (3) the absence of material deletions, additions, or alterations in the relevant part of the tape; and (4) the identification of the relevant speakers. Id. “If there is independent evidence of the accuracy of the tape recordings admitted at trial, we shall be extremely reluctant to disturb the trial court’s decision even though at the time that decision was made the government had not carried its particularized burden of going forward.” Biggins, 551 F.2d at 67. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the July 28 recording. Mr. Little’s argument that the government failed to produce evidence of the “the fidelity of the recording equipment” is contradicted by the record. DEA Agent Vattiato testified that he supplied the CI with audio-only and audio/video equipment on July 28 and that the audio/video equipment was operating correctly. Although Vattiato did not testify that the audio-only equipment was also operating correctly, he did testify that he had the opportunity to watch the audio/video recording, that the events in that recording were “encompassed” in the audio-only recording, and that each recording “match[ed] the surveillance that [he] observed that day.” From this testimony the District Court could infer that the audio-only equipment was also working properly. 32 Case: 10-14332 Date Filed: 02/14/2013 Page: 33 of 41 Although the District Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the audio and video recordings of the July 28 transaction, we must still consider whether it abused its discretion by denying Mr. Little’s motion for judgment of acquittal for lack of sufficient evidence. Friske, 640 F.3d at 1290–91. Mr. Little argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of possession with intent to distribute crack on July 28 because the government failed to prove the element of possession. Specifically, he contends that the government cannot prove actual possession because “the cocaine was beyond [his] control” at all times during the transaction, and the government cannot prove constructive possession because he was forced to wait outside while the CI purchased the drugs inside Otis Walker’s house, and the drugs were “clearly not under [his] direction or control.” We agree with Mr. Little that, on this record, the government failed to prove the element of possession. It is clear from the video that the CI purchased the drugs directly from Otis Walker and, thus, that they were never in Mr. Little’s actual possession. It is equally clear that Mr. Little was forced to wait on Otis Walker’s porch as Walker conducted the transaction with the CI inside.11 To prove constructive possession, “the government must produce evidence showing 11 The government concedes that “Little was not allowed in Walker’s house” during the drug deal. Otis Walker emphasized this point in his testimony at trial when he explained that he forced Mr. Little to wait on the porch “[b]ecause he didn’t come to spend no money.” 33 Case: 10-14332 Date Filed: 02/14/2013 Page: 34 of 41 ownership, dominion, or control over the contraband itself or the [location] in which contraband is concealed.” Wright, 392 F.3d at 1273 (quotation marks and alterations omitted). Walker’s demand that Mr. Little stay outside, and Little’s acquiescence to that demand, defeats any claim that Little exercised ownership, dominion, or control over these drugs, or the location where they were concealed. Cf. United States v. Clavis, 956 F.2d 1079, 1089 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that evidence was insufficient to prove constructive possession where the defendant was in jail at the time the drugs were seized from his residence). The government’s failure to prove that Mr. Little possessed the drugs at issue in Count 37 does not end our inquiry, however, because Mr. Little was also charged with aiding and abetting the distribution of narcotics on July 28, and the jury was instructed on an aiding and abetting theory. To convict under a theory of aiding and abetting, the Government must prove: (1) the substantive offense was committed; (2) the defendant contributed to and furthered the offense; and (3) the defendant intended to aid in its commission. United States v. Tagg, 572 F.3d 1320, 1324 (11th Cir. 2009). Additionally, our precedent provides that “in a prosecution for aiding and abetting possession of [narcotics] with intent to distribute, there must be evidence connecting the defendant with both aspects of the crime, possession and intent to distribute.” United States v. Longoria, 569 F.2d 422, 425 (5th Cir. 1978). 34 Case: 10-14332 Date Filed: 02/14/2013 Page: 35 of 41 Mr. Little does not contest that a substantive offense occurred here. Instead, he contends that the government cannot prove the remaining elements required to convict him on an aiding and abetting theory because “[m]ere presence is all the evidence showed in this transaction.” Mr. Little’s argument fails. As previously discussed, Mr. Little was aware of and involved in the conspiracy to distribute crack in Coconut Grove, along with Otis Walker 12 and Mr. Frederick. The audio and video recordings are definitive that after meeting each other on the street, Mr. Little walked the CI to Mr. Walker’s house, where the CI requested that Mr. Little get Walker’s attention. Mr. Little then knocked on Otis Walker’s door, thereby initiating the transaction. When Mr. Walker opened the door, the CI asked if Walker “could help [him] out with something good,” at which point Walker and the CI each entered the house, closing the door behind them. Once inside, the video shows the CI purchasing crack from Mr. Walker. Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, it was reasonable for the jury to infer from this evidence that Mr. Little intentionally and successfully shepherded the CI to Mr. Walker’s residence for the purpose of purchasing crack, and that a crack transaction was completed. This was enough to prove that Mr. Little intentionally “contributed to and furthered” Mr. Walker’s possession and distribution of narcotics, see Tagg, 572 at 1324, and to connect him to each 12 Mr. Walker was an indicted co-conspirator who testified at trial that he received crack from Mr. Burke and Mr. Frederick. 35 Case: 10-14332 Date Filed: 02/14/2013 Page: 36 of 41 element of Walker’s offense, see Longoria, 569 F.2d at 425. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to convict Mr. Little of Count 37 on a theory that he aided and abetted the distribution of the drugs involved in that count. 2) Count 38, Possession with Intent to Distribute Crack on August 3, 2009 Over Mr. Little’s objection for lack of sufficient foundation, the government also introduced audio and video recordings of the alleged drug transaction between Little and the CI at the Bermuda Market on August 3, 2009. These recordings capture fragments of conversations between Mr. Little and the CI, the sound of money being counted, and Mr. Little’s statement “I’ll go get 14.” After that, Mr. Little is seen walking away. Agents testified that soon after he walked away, he came back. Agents also testified that they later recovered fourteen dime bags of crack from the CI. Mr. Little argues again here that the audio and video recordings should not have been admitted into evidence because the government failed to lay a proper foundation. For the reasons that follow, we find this argument to have merit. For the August 3 transaction, the government offered little proof of the fidelity of the recording equipment. The extent of the evidence was Miami Police Officer Jose Mercedes’s testimony that he gave the equipment to the CI before the buy, recovered it after the buy, and then gave it to a colleague for conversion to a CD. Although the government offered proof that agents independently observed 36 Case: 10-14332 Date Filed: 02/14/2013 Page: 37 of 41 the meeting between the CI and Mr. Little, thus corroborating the video portion, neither Mr. Little nor the CI testified about this transaction and there was no independent testimony to corroborate the audio of the encounter. Because there was no testimony about the fidelity of the audio equipment, Sarro, 742 F.2d at 1292, and no independent evidence of the accuracy of the audio recordings, Biggins, 551 F.2d at 67, the District Court should not have admitted the audio portion of the tape. Compare United States v. Brown, 587 F.3d 1082, 1093 (11th Cir. 2009) (“[W]here the agent laying the foundation can testify he or she heard the original conversation that was being recorded and that it is the same as the one being played at trial, this also provides sufficient evidence of authenticity.”). Establishing that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the audio recording, however, is not the end of the inquiry. Even if [an evidentiary] ruling constitutes an abuse of discretion, it will result in reversal only if the error was not harmless. An error is harmless unless there is a reasonable likelihood that it affected the defendant’s substantial rights. Stated another way, nonconstitutional error will be harmless unless the court concludes from the record as a whole that the error may have had a ‘substantial influence’ on the outcome of the proceeding. United States v. Bradley, 644 F.3d 1213, 1270 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Here, we are not convinced that the District Court’s admission of the audio had a substantial influence on the outcome of Mr. Little’s case. This is because in 37 Case: 10-14332 Date Filed: 02/14/2013 Page: 38 of 41 addition to the audio recording, the jury had: (1) the authenticated video recording of the meeting between Mr. Little and the CI; (2) the agents’ testimony that they independently observed that meeting; and (3) the agents’ testimony that they prepared the CI for a controlled buy from Mr. Little, and that after the meeting they recovered fourteen dime bags of crack from the CI. In the light most favorable to the government, this evidence was sufficient to conclude that Mr. Little possessed and distributed the drugs at issue in Count 38. We also reject Mr. Little’s argument that the District Court erred in admitting the fourteen dime bags recovered from the CI on August 3 because this evidence was not relevant. Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact of consequence more or less probable than it would be without the evidence, Fed. R. Evid. 401, and relevant evidence is generally admissible, Fed. R. Evid. 402. Here, the dime bags of crack recovered from the CI following the controlled buy were relevant because they tended to prove that Mr. Little possessed and distributed narcotics on August 3, as alleged in Count 38.
Mr. Little also contends that the AUSA’s closing argument was “so improper so as to warrant reversal.” Mr. Frederick joins this argument. “Reversal on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct requires that the misconduct be so pronounced and persistent that it permeates the entire atmosphere of the trial.” 38 Case: 10-14332 Date Filed: 02/14/2013 Page: 39 of 41 United States v. Woods, 684 F.3d 1045, 1065 (11th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks omitted). “For a claim of prosecutorial misconduct relating to the closing argument to be successful, the argument must be improper and prejudicial to a substantial right of the defendant.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). “A defendant’s substantial rights are prejudiced if there is a reasonable probability that, but for the improper remarks, the outcome of the trial would have been different.” Id. Mr. Little and Mr. Frederick draw our attention to the following “inflammatory” remarks, limited to the AUSA’s rebuttal argument: (1) “When deals are made in hell, there are no angels present. And there are no angels in this case, not the witnesses, not the defendants”; and (2) “If [co-conspirators testifying for the government] are truthful and credible about one event, why are they untruthful and uncredible about another? Solely because it incriminates them? Well, that may be because they’re the devils in hell together.” These remarks do not require us to reverse Mr. Little’s and Mr. Frederick’s convictions. In context, it is clear that these remarks were not “intended to place [the defendants] on a demonic plane” as Mr. Little argues; instead they were offered to rebut defense counsels’ assertions in closing argument that the government’s witnesses lacked credibility. In any event, there is little likelihood that “but for [these] improper remarks, the outcome of the trial would have been 39 Case: 10-14332 Date Filed: 02/14/2013 Page: 40 of 41 different,” given the weight of the evidence against Mr. Little and Mr. Frederick. Woods, 684 F.3d at 1065.
Finally, Mr. Little argues that his convictions should be reversed because cumulative error rendered his trial “fundamentally unfair.” We are not persuaded. For reasons explained, the only errors alleged by Mr. Little that stand up to scrutiny are: (1) the District Court’s admission of the audio recording of the August 3, drug transaction; and (2) the prosecutor’s remarks on rebuttal. Individually, these errors were harmless as they related to Mr. Little’s convictions, given the strength of the government’s case. The cumulative effect of these errors on the jury’s verdict was also harmless, given the length of the trial, and the strength of the government’s case. See Baker, 432 F.3d at 1223 (“The total effect of the errors on the trial will depend, among other things, on the nature and number of the errors committed; their interrelationship, if any, and combined effect; how the district court dealt with the errors as they arose (including the efficacy—or lack of efficacy—of any remedial efforts); the strength of the government’s case, and the length of trial.”) (quotation marks and alteration omitted). 40 Case: 10-14332 Date Filed: 02/14/2013 Page: 41 of 41