Opinion ID: 3172726
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Counts Two through Five: The State Law Claims

Text: While Snyder rests the bulk of his argument on the viability of his revised federal theories, his state law claims were also a victim of the defendants' renewed summary judgment motion. Snyder II, 2015 WL 758546 at -2. Snyder does not contest the entry of summary judgment on his abuse of process and malicious prosecution claims, but he does argue that the district court erred in granting the defendants' motion with respect to his civil conspiracy claim and his claim under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act. We therefore address these arguments in turn. 1 According to the district court's scheduling order, amended pleadings were due in this case by December 31, 2010. Snyder moved for leave to make the amendment at issue almost four years later on December 3, 2014. - 12 -
The district court found that Snyder's civil conspiracy count failed as a matter of law because [a] claim for civil conspiracy requires a showing of an underlying tortious act, which Snyder had failed to make. Id. at  (citing Garvin v. Hampden Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, No. 3:05-CV-30102-MAP, 2008 WL 877797, at  (D. Mass. Mar. 27, 2008)). Although this is an incomplete statement of the law, the district court's resolution of the case is unaffected. Massachusetts recognizes two types of civil conspiracy. Taylor v. Am. Chemistry Council, 576 F.3d 16, 34 (1st Cir. 2009). One, based on section 876 of the Restatement [(Second) of Torts], is a form of vicarious liability for the tortious conduct of others. Id. The plaintiff is thus required to prove an underlying tort. Id. at 35. The other, drawn from the common law, amounts to a very limited cause of action in Massachusetts for civil conspiracy based on the defendants' allegedly unique ability to exert a 'peculiar power of coercion' when acting in unison. Jurgens v. Abraham, 616 F. Supp. 1381, 1386 (D. Mass. 1985) (quoting Fleming v. Dane, 22 N.E.2d 609, 611 (Mass. 1939)). Under the latter theory, the wrong suffered by the plaintiff is in the particular combination of the defendants rather than in the tortious nature of the underlying conduct. Kurker v. Hill, 689 N.E.2d 833, 836 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998). - 13 - Collusive behavior among market competitors is a good example of one of those rare instances in which it is the act of agreeing that constitutes the wrong. See, e.g., Neustadt v. Emp'rs Liab. Assurance Corp., 21 N.E.2d 538, 539–41 (Mass. 1939) (discussing nature of such a conspiracy in the context of claim that insurers unlawfully combined with each other). From the complaint through the 2014 appeal and on into the second round of summary judgment, Snyder has consistently and squarely cast his case as being of the first type, which does require proof of an underlying tort. Snyder alleged, for example, that the defendants conspired to retaliate against Snyder and deny him equal protection of the laws, and that they were engaged in a civil conspiracy to commit tortious conduct. Snyder has thus waived the opportunity to assert the second type of conspiracy by eschewing such an argument until the instant appeal. See Aetna Cas. Sur. Co. v. P & B Autobody, 43 F.3d 1546, 1564 (1st Cir. 1994) (finding the question waived when [d]espite the fact that the pleading was sufficient to state a claim of ['coercive'] civil conspiracy, . . . Count X was tried and the jury was ultimately instructed on a . . . quite different 'civil conspiracy' cause of action). And because, as explained in this opinion, he has no underlying tort, his conspiracy claim fails. - 14 -
On the last page and one-half of his complaint, Snyder asserted a claim under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, §§ 11H, 11I. This claim incorporated all of the allegations and theories of liability asserted in the federal claims. They make no reference to any theory of liability based on notions of either free speech or excessive fines. Nor do they add any factual allegations that might point to or support any such theories of liability. Specifically, there is no allegation that would suggest that any fine imposed was excessive, nor is there any allegation that the retaliatory campaign alleged was based on anything other than Collura's firing. Finally, Snyder raised no such theories in opposing the motion to dismiss, nor did he otherwise raise them in response to the original motion for summary judgment until after discovery closed. Accordingly, for the same reasons that we affirm the dismissal of the federal claims, we reject as well Snyder's effort to assert state law versions of those same claims. And the same logic leads us to reject Snyder's late attempt to assert two other state-law rights: the right to impartial interpretation of the laws, Mass. Const. pt. 1, Art. XXIX, and the right to access the courts, id. Amend. XLVIII, pt. 2, § 2 ¶ 3. Snyder's complaint did, however, fairly raise one state law theory of liability not incorporated in the section 1983 count. - 15 - His complaint asserts that the conduct of the defendants as described in the complaint violated a state law right to own land and use and enjoy it for his comfort and profit without harassment and unlawful interference. Apart from its cameo role in the complaint, this theory was never again discussed by Snyder beyond brief references in his briefs submitted to us now and in his opposition to the renewed motion for summary judgment. In support of this claim on appeal, Snyder does no more than point, in passing, to a Massachusetts case holding that the plaintiffs stated an MCRA claim by alleging that a neighborhood group's threatening and aggressive opposition to the construction of a tennis court, when the proposed construction violated no zoning law, impinged upon the plaintiffs' constitutionally-secure property rights. Bell v. Mazza, 474 N.E.2d 1111 (Mass. 1985); see also Ayasli v. Armstrong, 780 N.E.2d 926, 941 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002) (Rapoza, J., dissenting) (noting that in Bell, the plaintiffs complied with all relevant regulations and were without fault in the development of their land. (citing Bell v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Cohasset, 437 N.E.2d 532 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982))). While we are skeptical that Snyder's complaint could fairly be read to state such a claim,2 Snyder's wholly inadequate briefing on this point precludes our review of its merits. 2 In Bell, the Supreme Judicial Court was clear that MCRA liability did not attend the pursuit of legal rights absent - 16 - It is a settled appellate rule that issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived. United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990). As we have noted, [i]t is not enough merely to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to do counsel's work, create the ossature for the argument, and put flesh on its bones. Id. This rule is commonly deployed . . . against ancillary arguments tossed carelessly against the wall in the hope that one might stick. United States v. Zayas-Ortiz, 808 F.3d 520, 524 n.1 (1st Cir. 2015). Through perfunctory briefing, Snyder has waived this arm of his complaint.