Opinion ID: 532642
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Summary-Judgment Review of the Denial of Qualified Immunity

Text: 23 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291, we review a district court's denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity de novo because the availability of qualified immunity necessarily is a question of law. Waldrop, 871 F.2d at 1032 n. 1; Rich, 841 F.2d at 1561; see Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 530, 105 S.Ct. at 2817; Jasinski v. Adams, 781 F.2d 843, 846 (11th Cir.1986) (per curiam). Determination of jurisdiction actually must be preceded by review of the qualified-immunity, summary-judgment motion denied by the district court in order to determine that material factual questions do not exist as to the identified legal issue. If questions of material fact are present, then the district court properly denied summary judgment, and we are without jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291 to review that decision since the case will proceed to trial for resolution of those factual questions. See Goddard, 847 F.2d at 769; Riley v. Wainwright, 810 F.2d 1006 (11th Cir.1986) (per curiam), petition for reh'g denied per curiam, 810 F.2d 1007 (11th Cir.1987). 15 24 The Supreme Court explicitly has guided our review of a district court's denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity: 25 An appellate court reviewing the denial of the defendant's claim of immunity need not consider the correctness of the plaintiff's version of the facts, nor even determine whether the plaintiff's allegations actually state a claim. All it need determine is a question of law: whether the legal norms allegedly violated by the defendant were clearly established at the time of the challenged actions or, in cases where the district court has denied summary judgment for the defendant on the ground that even under the defendant's version of the facts the defendant's conduct violated clearly established law, whether the law clearly proscribed the actions the defendant claims he took. 26 Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 528, 105 S.Ct. at 2816. 27 In Rich v. Dollar, 841 F.2d 1558 (11th Cir.1988), this court utilized Supreme Court direction and explicated the analysis for summary judgment based upon qualified immunity. Defendants-appellants Barfield, Turner and Garner must establish both that they are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law through qualified immunity and that no genuine issues of fact relevant to those questions of law exist. Rich, 841 F.2d at 1562; Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 56(c). In order to avoid summary judgment, plaintiff-appellee Hudgins must demonstrate either that defendants-appellants are not entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law or show a genuine issue of material fact upon which a question of law turns. Rich, 841 F.2d at 1562 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)); Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 56(e). Corresponding to the opposition of any summary-judgment motion, plaintiff-appellee Hudgins, confronted with an appeal from a denial of a motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, may not rely on the facts in her complaint, but she must counter the factual showing supporting defendants-appellants' motion for summary judgment so as to raise genuine issues of material fact. Rich, 841 F.2d at 1562 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-49, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2509-10, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). 28
29 Rich recognized that the Supreme Court established its objective-reasonableness test for determining qualified or good-faith immunity in Sec. 1983 actions in order to eliminate difficulties encountered by district courts in determining subjective good faith of defendant government officials. Rich, 841 F.2d at 1563; see Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815-19, 102 S.Ct. at 2736-39; Waldrop, 871 F.2d at 1036. Under this test, set forth in Harlow, the conduct of defendant public officials is measured against  'clearly established law,'  consisting of statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person should have known. Rich, 841 F.2d at 1563 (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. at 2738). Relying upon the proof allocation enunciated in Zeigler v. Jackson, 716 F.2d 847 (11th Cir.1983) (per curiam), Rich delineates the two-part analysis for application of the Harlow/Mitchell objective-reasonableness test for qualified immunity as follows: 30 1. The defendant public official must first prove that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred. 31 2. Once the defendant public official satisfies his burden of moving forward with the evidence, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show lack of good faith on the defendant's part. This burden is met by proof demonstrating that the defendant public official's actions violated clearly established constitutional law. 32 Rich, 841 F.2d at 1563-64 (citing Zeigler, 716 F.2d at 849). 33
34 We must determine if defendants-appellants were acting within their discretionary authority when they voted not to re-elect Hudgins as Ashburn city clerk for 1986. Former Fifth Circuit cases, 16 hold that a government official proves that he acted within the scope of his discretionary authority by showing  'objective circumstances which would compel the conclusion that his actions were undertaken pursuant to the performance of his duties and within the scope of his authority.'  Rich, 841 F.2d at 1564 (quoting Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1121 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981)); see Douthit v. Jones, 619 F.2d 527, 534 (5th Cir.1980). In this case, the council members-defendants did not re-elect plaintiff Hudgins as Ashburn city clerk at their first regular meeting of 1986, on January 2, 1986. The election of the city clerk as well as other city officials who hold their office for one year is mandated to occur at the first regular city-council meeting by the Ashburn Code Sec. 4.1. All council members have submitted affidavits that they voted or abstained from voting for the city clerk for 1986 pursuant to the Ashburn Code, which provides that the city clerk is to be elected annually. In accordance with the objective dictates of the Ashburn Code, we conclude that defendants-appellants Barfield, Turner and Garner have met their burden of showing that they were acting within the scope of their discretionary authority as Ashburn city-council members when they did not re-elect Hudgins by voting for McLeod as city clerk. See Rich, 841 F.2d at 1564; Zeigler, 716 F.2d at 849. 35
36 Once defendants-appellants have shown that their alleged unlawful action was within their discretionary authority, the burden shifts to plaintiff Hudgins to demonstrate lack of good faith or that defendants-appellants' action violated clearly established statutory or constitutional law. Rich, 841 F.2d at 1564; Zeigler, 716 F.2d at 849; see Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, 202 S.Ct. at 2738. Rich derives from Mitchell two subparts to the second step of the Zeigler/Rich analysis in order to clarify the determination as to whether or not plaintiff has met her burden of showing bad faith by demonstrating that defendant officials violated clearly established law. Rich, 841 F.2d at 1563-64 (citing Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 528, 105 S.Ct. at 2816). First, the court must ascertain whether or not the subject, applicable law was clearly established when defendants' action occurred. 17 Rich, 841 F.2d at 1563-64 (citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. at 2738). Second, the court must determine if a genuine issue of fact exists as to defendants' engaging in conduct violative of that clearly established law. Rich, 841 F.2d at 1563-64 (citing Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 528, 105 S.Ct. at 2816). 37
38 [O]ur cases establish that the right the official is alleged to have violated must have been 'clearly established' in a more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense: The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). We must decide if the Ashburn Code was clearly established when defendants-appellants voted not to re-elect Hudgins as city clerk on January 2, 1986. The Ashburn Code provides that the city council at their first regular meeting of the year will elect the city clerk, other city officers and department heads, who shall hold their office for one year until their successors are elected. Ashburn, Ga., Code art. IV, Sec. 4.1. The initial consideration for statutory interpretation is the statutory language, which is conclusive absent a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 2056, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980); United States v. Rawlings, 821 F.2d 1543, 1545 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 979, 108 S.Ct. 494, 98 L.Ed.2d 492 (1987). If the statute is clear on its face, we need not examine additional sources of guidance. Seaboard Sys. R.R. v. I.C.C., 827 F.2d 699, 701 (11th Cir.1987); see United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 606, 106 S.Ct. 3116, 3121-22, 92 L.Ed.2d 483 (1986); Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Financial Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 368, 106 S.Ct. 681, 685-86, 88 L.Ed.2d 691 (1986); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 2527, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981); Rawlings, 821 F.2d at 1545; National Wildlife Fed'n v. Marsh, 721 F.2d 767, 773-74 (11th Cir.1983). 39 We conclude that the Ashburn Code Sec. 4.1 is explicit and unambiguous in directing the city council at its first regular meeting of the year to elect the city clerk for a term of one year and that the elected city clerk will hold office until a successor is elected for the following year. As adopted in 1983, the Ashburn Code states that it supersedes all ordinances not included or recognized by reference therein. Hudgins' contention that the 1982 Plan was not included in the Ashburn Code because she failed to send it to the printers with the 1983 Ashburn Code revisions is without merit. The Ashburn Code has not been amended subsequent to its adoption to incorporate the 1982 Plan. This court or the district court would be acting contrary to stated legislative intent, after sufficient time for amendment, to find the 1982 Plan incorporated in the Ashburn Code and, thereby, applicable to Hudgins. We hold that the Ashburn Code art. IV, Sec. 4.1 was clearly established when defendants-appellants voted not to re-elect Hudgins as city clerk for 1986 at the first regular meeting of the city council for that year. 18 40
41 Having concluded that the Ashburn Code was clearly established, we must determine if a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether or not defendants-appellants' action violated any of Hudgins' statutory or constitutional rights which a reasonable city-council member would have known. 19 See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. at 2738; Harrell v. United States, 875 F.2d 828, 830-31 (11th Cir.1989); Rich, 841 F.2d at 1563-64. As defendants-appellants have stated in individual affidavits, their vote on January 2, 1986, for the city clerk was pursuant to the Ashburn Code Sec. 4.1, which directs the city council at their first regular meeting of the year to elect the city clerk as well as other city officers and department heads for a one-year term. We can find no fault or irregularity with the legislative action of voting for city clerk on January 2, 1986, by the Ashburn city council generally or by defendants-appellants specifically. 20 Therefore, we hold that defendants-appellants' electing McLeod as city clerk for 1986 did not violate Hudgins' statutory rights under the Ashburn Code. 42 Having found that defendants-appellants' legislative action of voting not to re-elect plaintiff-appellee as city clerk for 1986 violated no statutory rights of Hudgins under the clearly established Ashburn Code, we also have performed the constitutional analysis. We have determined that the 1983 Ashburn Code affords Hudgins no right to continued employment as Ashburn city clerk. 21 Furthermore, we have concluded that the 1982 Plan, from which she claims a property interest in her continued employment, was not effective on January 2, 1986, and, accordingly, that it is inapplicable to her. Therefore, Hudgins has no ascertainable Fourteenth Amendment property interest in her continued employment as city clerk, and it was neither unconstitutional for defendants-appellants, as city-council members, not to re-elect her as city clerk for 1986, nor for the city council not to give her procedural due process of notice and a hearing. 22
43 Plaintiff-appellee Hudgins had to show a genuine issue of material fact that defendants-appellants' voting not to re-elect her by electing another as city clerk for 1986, pursuant to the clearly established Ashburn Code, violated some statutory or constitutional right accruing to her in order to prevent summary judgment for defendants-appellants on the basis of qualified immunity. Rich, 841 F.2d at 1562, 1565. Extensive discovery has been completed in this case, and Hudgins has not shown a genuine issue of material fact to avoid summary judgment in favor of defendants-appellants. See Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 56(e); Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526, 105 S.Ct. at 2815; cf. Jasinski, 781 F.2d at 846, 849-50 (Because issues of material fact became evident during discovery, denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity was proper.). Accordingly, we hold as a matter of law that plaintiff-appellee has failed to carry her burden of showing that defendants-appellants' voting not to re-elect her as Ashburn city clerk for 1986 violated any statutory or constitutional right to which she was entitled. Rich, 841 F.2d at 1564-66. Summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity in their individual and official capacities should have been entered for defendants-appellants Barfield, Turner and Garner, who were acting within their scope of discretionary authority. Id. at 1566. 44 Therefore, we REVERSE the district court's denial of summary judgment to defendants-appellants and REMAND with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of defendants-appellants Barfield, Turner and Garner in their individual and official capacities on the basis of qualified immunity and to conduct further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 23