Opinion ID: 2157448
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Referendum Petitions.

Text: Section 1. Contents.  A referendum petition may ask for a referendum to the people upon any law enacted by the general court which is not herein expressly excluded. Section 2. Excluded Matters.  No law that relates to religion, religious practices or religious institutions; or to the appointment, qualification, tenure, removal or compensation of judges; or to the powers, creation or abolition of courts; or the operation of which is restricted to a particular town, city or other political division or to particular districts or localities of the commonwealth; or that appropriates money for the current or ordinary expenses of the commonwealth or for any of its departments, boards, commissions or institutions shall be the subject of a referendum petition. Thus, if St. 1971, c. 1071, is a law which may be made the subject of a referendum petition (G.L.c. 4, § 1), the effective date of § 2 would have been February 9, 1972. Art. 48 of the Amendments to the Constitution of the Commonwealth, The Referendum, I. If not subject to referendum, the effective date of § 2 would have been December 11, 1971. G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 4, § 1. Whether St. 1971, c. 1071, is a law subject to referendum depends upon whether it is a law relating to the powers, creation or abolition of courts. Art. 48 of the Amendments to the Constitution of the Commonwealth, The Referendum, III, § 2. The chief thrust of c. 1071 is not directed at the judiciary. It is true, of course, that by virtue of the Superior Court's general criminal jurisdiction (G.L.c. 212, § 6, as amended), the legislation does, at least, indirectly relate to the powers ... of courts. [3] In another context, this court has stated: A general law covering a subject disconnected with courts in its main features does not come within the prohibition of ... art. 48 ... because, in an incidental and subsidiary way, the work of the courts may be increased or diminished or changed. Horton v. Attorney Gen. 269 Mass. 503, 511. Accord, Cohen v. Attorney Gen. 354 Mass. 384, 387. Article 48 of the Amendments to the Constitution of the Commonwealth, The Referendum, III, gives to the people a general power to review by referendum any law enacted by the Legislature which is not expressly excluded. Any law relating to the powers ... of courts would be an exception to this general power of referendum. Exceptions to a general law, whether statutory or constitutional, should be strictly construed. Opinion of the Justices, 254 Mass. 617, 620. State v. Forney, 108 Ohio St. 463, 467. We think that a reasonable construction of powers ... of courts would encompass a statute which expressly confers or restricts a court's jurisdiction. For instance, G.L.c. 212, § 6, as amended, which states that the Superior Court shall have original jurisdiction of all crimes could be characterized as a law relating to the powers ... of courts and hence not subject to referendum. On the other hand, a statute making certain specified acts or omissions criminal (or repealing such a statute) would not be included within the phrase powers ... of courts because it does not relate to jurisdiction. The cases of Commonwealth v. Sacco, 255 Mass. 369, 411, and deLeo v. Childs, 304 F. Supp. 593, 596 (D. Mass.), further illustrate the line we are attempting to draw. In the Sacco case, the court stated in effect that St. 1922, c. 508, which empowered the Superior Court to grant motions for new trials at any time before sentence, was a law relating to the powers of courts. In the deLeo case, the Massachusetts long arm statute, G.L.c. 223A, inserted by St. 1968, c. 760, was also held to relate to the powers of courts. Sections 2 and 3 (as amended) of G.L.c. 223A begin with the words A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person. In both the Sacco and the deLeo cases, the pertinent statutes referred directly to the powers of the court. In the instant case, the effect of c. 1071 on the powers ... of courts is only incidental. It seems obvious that a contrary holding would be against the public policy of the Commonwealth, as expressed both in St. 1971, c. 1071, and the preamble to St. 1972, c. 2, in regulating the possession and sale of drugs. Public policy is a basic source of law when no previous decision or rule of law is applicable. The failure to leave regulated the sale and possession of drugs for any period of time could have a serious impact on the public health and safety of the citizens of the Commonwealth. Opinion of the Justices, 254 Mass. 617, 619. We therefore hold that St. 1071, c. 1071, is a law subject to the Referendum. Thus, § 2 of this act would have become effective on February 9, 1972, ninety days after approval. Consequently, St. 1972, c. 2, was a timely amendment which delayed the effective date of § 2 of c. 1071 until July 1, 1972. The foregoing disposes of question 1. 2. Because of our disposition of question 1, we do not treat with question 2. 3. We answer question 3 in the affirmative for the reasons stated in our disposition of question 1. There is a further reason to hold that the Superior Court has jurisdiction to try and punish the defendant. As herein above stated the acts and the indictments occurred prior to December 11, 1971. The defendant concedes that G.L.c. 94, §§ 212 and 212A, were in effect at the time of arrest and indictments. The basis of his motion to dismiss in the Superior Court, argued on February 3, 1972, was that there are no laws presently in effect which place criminal sanctions on the unlawful possession or sale of heroin. Therefore, the defendant argued, the Superior Court had no power to try, convict and punish him. General Laws c. 4, § 6, as amended, provides, in part: In construing statutes the following rules shall be observed, unless their observance would involve a construction inconsistent with the manifest intent of the law-making body or repugnant to the context of the same statute:... Second, The repeal of a statute shall not affect any punishment, penalty or forfeiture incurred before the repeal takes effect, or any suit, prosecution or proceeding pending at the time of the repeal for an offence committed, or for the recovery of a penalty or forfeiture incurred, under the statute repealed  (emphasis supplied). We stated in Nassar v. Commonwealth, 341 Mass. 584, 589, that [t]he general intention of c. 4, § 6, Second, is to preserve, even after legislative change of a statute, the liability of an offender to punishment for an earlier act or omission made criminal by the statute repealed in whole or in part. In the Nassar case, as here, both the acts and the indictments occurred before the earliest possible repeal date. Accord, Commonwealth v. Benoit, 346 Mass. 294, 296. 4. The case is remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion. So ordered.