Opinion ID: 1472584
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Protected Interest Privilege

Text: Appellees argue that Ms. Watts' affidavit and Mrs. Oparaugo's statement are conditionally privileged as statements made to advance protected interests. To qualify for the protected interest privilege, the communication must be one made in good faith upon a subject `in which the party communicating has an interest or in reference to which he has, or honestly believes he has, a duty to a person having a corresponding interest or duty....' Smith v. District of Columbia, 399 A.2d 213, 220 (D.C.1979) (quoting May Dep't Stores Co. v. Devercelli, 314 A.2d 767, 773 (D.C.1973) (footnote omitted)). Appellees acknowledge that although `[this] qualified privilege is a complete defense to libel, ... the defense is lost by the showing of malice.' Columbia First Bank v. Ferguson, 665 A.2d 650, 656 (D.C.1995) (quoting Mosrie v. Trussell, 467 A.2d 475, 477 (D.C.1983)). The complaint alleges that appellees acted with malice in publishing the defamatory material. Appellant alleged that appellees' purpose was to bring[] disgrace, shame and humiliation upon him and otherwise belittl[e] his reputation in the community. Further, he alleges that they acted with knowledge of the falsity of their statements. If the statement is determined to be privileged, then appellant will have the burden of proving that appellees acted with malice. Id. (citing Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Holland, 367 A.2d 1311, 1314 (D.C.1977)). Whether a person acts with malice is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury. Alfred A. Altimont, Inc. v. Chatelain, Samperton & Nolan, 374 A.2d 284, 290 (D.C.1977) (citation omitted). Therefore, dismissal of the amended complaint on the grounds of the asserted protected interest privilege would be premature on the present record. For the foregoing reasons, the case is reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded.