Opinion ID: 2400452
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Pine Street v. Irish Shipping, Ltd.

Text: The claim of Pine Street against Irish Shipping is based upon an alleged breach of Irish Shipping's contract of carriage with Irish Sugar Co., Ltd., under which Irish Shipping agreed to transport on board the vessel Irish Spruce 10,089 one hundred pound bags of sugar from Dublin, Ireland, to Baltimore. The contract consisted of a short form bill of lading between Irish Shipping and Irish Sugar Co., Ltd., the shipper and consignee. It is conceded that the bill of lading was effectively endorsed to Pine Street, thereby investing Pine Street with the contractual rights of the consignee. The short form bill of lading incorporated by reference the provisions of Irish Shipping's long form bill of lading. The long form bill provides, in pertinent part: The Carrier shall be under no liability whatsoever for loss or delay of, damage or expense to, goods howsoever caused, or wheresoever occurring when such loss or damage arises prior to the loading on, and/or, subsequent to the discharge from the Ocean vessel, notwithstanding any custom of the port to the contrary.    The Carrier may commence discharge immediately upon arrival of the ship and continue day and night, Sundays and holidays included, any custom of the port notwithstanding. The goods shall be taken from alongside the ship by the Consignees or Receivers, who shall pay all dues, including tonnage and shed dues, and all landing charges on the goods, and the Carrier shall not be responsible for delivery to marks or numbers. If the Consignees or Receivers fail to take the goods from alongside as and when the same are discharged the Carrier, his servants or agents shall be at liberty, but shall not be bound to, land the same, or put them into craft or store in any place whatsoever at the risk and expense of the Owner of the goods and shall thereby fully discharge the Carrier's obligation hereunder to deliver the goods and the Carrier shall have a lien upon the same for all costs and expenses incurred thereby. The Carrier or his agents may, however, in the Carrier's option, effect the reception and porterage of the goods on delivery at his or their tariff Rates, and at the sole risk and expense of the Owners of the goods. Further, the Consignees or Receivers shall indemnify the Carrier against all costs, expenses and liabilities whatsoever which may be incurred by the Carrier whether under compulsion or otherwise, in respect of the shifting, segregation, sorting, cleaning, piling, storage or disposal of the goods while in shed or on quay after discharge from the ship. (Emphasis supplied.) Pine Street contends that Irish Shipping failed to make a proper delivery of the sugar cargo by discharging it at a pier which was contaminated by accumulations of antimony dust. It further argues that mere discharge of the sugar onto the pier apron  a narrow area constituting the perimeter of the pier  did not effect a delivery of the goods, and that Irish Shipping was responsible for the losses sustained by Pine Street prior to the expiration of free time. Irish Shipping contends, on the other hand, that the Chesapeake Operating Company was the agent of Pine Street. Thus, it argues, a proper delivery was achieved by delivering the sugar to the custody of Chesapeake on the pier apron which was dust-free. An action for breach of an ocean bill of lading is governed by federal maritime law. Armour & Co. v. Ft. Morgan S.S. Co., 270 U.S. 253, 259, 46 S.Ct. 212, 70 L.Ed. 571 (1926); Ex parte Easton, 95 U.S. 68, 72, 24 L.Ed. 373 (1877); David Crystal, Inc. v. Cunard Steam-Ship Co., 339 F.2d 295 (2d Cir.1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 976, 85 S.Ct. 1340, 14 L.Ed.2d 271 (1965); North American Smelting Co. v. Moller S.S. Co., 204 F.2d 384 (3d Cir.1953); Skibsaktieselskapet Siljestad v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 957 (Ct. Claims 1960). An action for failure to deliver cargo pursuant to the bill of lading is a maritime action, even where the alleged breach occurs subsequent to discharge of the cargo on a pier. Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800 (2d Cir.1971); David Crystal, Inc. v. Cunard Steam-Ship Co., supra, 339 F.2d 295. Where an action within the federal maritime jurisdiction is brought in a state court under the saving to suitors clause of § 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 76-77, 28 U.S.C. 1333, the state court ordinarily must apply federal maritime law. Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale, 358 U.S. 625, 79 S.Ct. 406, 3 L.Ed.2d 550 (1959); Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409, 74 S.Ct. 202, 98 L.Ed. 143 (1953); Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 249, 63 S.Ct. 246, 87 L.Ed. 239 (1942); Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger, 259 U.S. 255, 259, 42 S.Ct. 475, 66 L.Ed. 927 (1922); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 159, 40 S.Ct. 438, 64 L.Ed. 834 (1920); Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372, 38 S.Ct. 501, 62 L.Ed. 1171 (1918); Frazier v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 206 Md. 434, 448, 112 A.2d 221 (1955); Standard, Etc. v. Ruckert Ter. Corp., 193 Md. 20, 24, 65 A.2d 304 (1949). The rights and duties of the parties with respect to the bill of lading are controlled by the provisions of The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA), 46 U.S.C. 1300 et seq., and by the Harter Act, 46 U.S.C. 190 et seq. The provisions of COGSA are applicable from the time the goods are loaded on to the time when they are discharged from the ship. 46 U.S.C. 1301(e). The Harter Act controls the period of time after discharge of the cargo from the vessel. See Caterpillar Overseas, S.A. v. S.S. Expeditor, 318 F.2d 720, 723 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 942, 84 S.Ct. 347, 11 L.Ed.2d 272 (1963). Specifically, the Harter Act forbids the insertion in any bill of lading or shipping document any clause, covenant, or agreement whereby it, he, or they shall be relieved from liability for loss or damage arising from negligence, fault, or failure in... proper delivery of any and all lawful merchandise or property committed to its or their charge. Any and all words or clauses of such import .. . shall be null and void and of no effect. 46 U.S.C. 190. In the instant case, it is clear that the provisions of Irish Shipping's long form bill of lading, to the extent that those provisions may purport to relieve it from liability for an improper delivery, are null and void under 46 U.S.C. 190. See David Crystal, Inc. v. Cunard Steam-Ship Co., supra, 339 F.2d at 297. Thus, notwithstanding anything in the contract of carriage, Irish Shipping remained responsible for the cargo until there was a proper delivery. As it is undisputed that the damage to the cargo occurred after its discharge, it must be determined whether there was a proper delivery prior to the contamination of the sugar. A carrier's duty with respect to its cargo is ended when the carrier discharges the cargo onto a fit pier and gives due and reasonable notice to the consignee of the goods so as to afford him a fair opportunity to remove the goods or put them under proper care and custody. The Eddy, 5 Wall. 481, 18 L.Ed. 486 (1866); Calcot, Ltd. v. Isbrandtsen Company, 318 F.2d 669 (1st Cir.1963); North American Smelting Co. v. Moller S.S. Co., 204 F.2d 384 (3d Cir.1953); Kinderman & Sons v. Nippon Yusen Kaisha Lines, 322 F. Supp. 939, 941 (E.D. Pa. 1971). Thus, actual delivery to the consignee or owner of the cargo is not required. Kinderman & Sons v. Nippon Yusen Kaisha Lines, supra, 322 F. Supp. at 941. Delivery to an agent of the consignee who is authorized to assume possession of the goods is sufficient. Calcot, Ltd. v. Isbrandtsen Company, supra, 318 F.2d at 672. In our view, the trial court correctly determined that a proper delivery took place when Irish Shipping discharged the sugar cargo on the pier apron into the custody of the Chesapeake Operating Company. In 1969, prior to the arrival of any of Pine Street's sugar, Pine Street had entered into an agreement with Chesapeake by which Chesapeake agreed to store the sugar shipped to Chesapeake's pier. The agreement provided for ordinary storage charges rather than charges based on demurrage rates which are typically assessed for storage beyond the free time period. Prior to the arrival of the Irish Spruce on May 13, 1970, Chesapeake had assumed custody and stored for the benefit of Pine Street prior shipments of sugar. Chesapeake continuously received instructions from Pine Street with respect to the sugar for a period of at least two months prior to the arrival of the Irish Spruce. On the day that the Irish Spruce sugar arrived, Pine Street received notice of the arrival and telephoned Chesapeake with instructions concerning the sugar cargo. The following confirmatory letter was written: Chesapeake Operating Company 32 South Street Baltimore, Maryland 21202 Attention: Mr. M.E. Curles Dear Sirs: Confirming our telephone conversation of today, we would appreciate it if you would arrange to make deliveries from the Irish Spruce cargo, during the free time of that vessel, instead of from the Irish Poplar. This would apply to all open orders which are picked up during that time and also on any new orders which we may send you, to the extent that it is possible. Very truly yours, PINE STREET TRADING CORPORATION L.A. Schupp The personnel of the Irish Spruce exercised no control as to the removal of the cargo from the pier apron into the shed. There is no evidence of any antimony dust on the pier apron. Under these circumstances, we conclude that delivery to Pine Street occurred when the cargo was stacked upon the pier apron by Chesapeake. Thereafter, Chesapeake assumed custody of the goods as agent for Pine Street. Consequently, the judgment in favor of Irish Shipping should stand.