Opinion ID: 2604616
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Unlawful Arrest in Practice

Text: Modern judicial decisions have adopted procedures to deter unlawful search and seizure ( see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 1691-92, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 84 A.L.R.2d 933 (1961) (adopting the exclusionary rule to curb illegal police conduct in making unwarranted and unreasonable searches and seizures)) as well as to deter police conduct which induced innocent men to commit crimes. See State v. Smith, 101 Wash.2d 36, 42, 677 P.2d 100 (1984) (Entrapment occurs only when ... the accused is lured or induced into committing a crime he had no intention of committing.). Also see Chevigny, The Right to Resist an Unlawful Arrest, supra at 1149 (Policemen sometimes threaten to `get' a defendant.... If the arrest is unlawful, a personal element makes it doubly provocative, and suggests that the police may have entrapped the resisting defendant into a crime he would not otherwise have committed.). Allowing police to arrest wrongfully and then prosecute the victim for righteous resistance is wrong for the same reason entrapment is wrong. It was only the injustice of the police misconduct that induced the outraged victim to resist. Judge Schultheis of the Court of Appeals, Division Three, characterized such behavior as outrageous police misconduct and in possible violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment so as to shock the judicial conscience. State v. Valentine, 75 Wash.App. 611, 625, 879 P.2d 313 (1994) (Schultheis, J., dissenting), review granted, 128 Wash.2d 1001, 907 P.2d 298 (1995); see also State v. Lively, 130 Wash.2d 1, 921 P.2d 1035, 1044-49 (1996). However, as the majority opinion here attests, the conscience of many jurists is not easily shocked. Many courts have set the bar so high that only giants may leap to state a due process claim based on outrageous police misconduct, which `is not established merely upon a showing of ... even flagrant misconduct on the part of the police....' State v. Myers, 102 Wash.2d 548, 551, 689 P.2d 38 (1984) (quoting United States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460 (D.C.Cir., 1983) (emphasis added)). No published Washington opinion, save State v. Lively, 130 Wash.2d 1, 921 P.2d 1035, 1044-49 (1996), ever overturned a conviction on this ground because it must be shocking to the universal sense of justice. Lively, 921 P.2d at 1049 (Durham, C. J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432, 93 S.Ct. 1637, 1643, 36 L.Ed.2d 366 (1973)). Therefore I would prefer the more direct route of reliance upon common law precedent than to rest my analysis on an appeal to judicial conscience, which seems quite resilient at times. At oral argument the city admitted its officers would repeat the same conduct if this kind of factual circumstance ever arose again. Oral argument (3/27/96) tape 1. There is no acknowledgment of wrongdoing, let alone remorse. And the majority provides no incentive for contrition. Nevertheless, the majority suggests victims of illegal arrest should not be allowed to resist by physical force because their rights can be `Vindicated through legal processes.' Majority op. at 1297 (citation omitted). But this claim misses the mark: the rights of the victim have already been violated by the illegal arrest. The remaining question is whether the victim who instinctively resists the injustice is to be doubly wronged by suffering the second indignity of a criminal conviction. If Vindication means the alleged police aggressor is subject to even-handed prosecution (not just his victim), I hear the applause of one hand clapping. At oral argument the state admitted that not even internal disciplinary action had been taken against these officers and none is appropriate. Oral argument (3/27/96) tape 1. Moreover, in practice the victim of a wrongful arrest may sue for damages; however, usually he cannot afford an attorney while, inevitably, the government wrongdoer is provided a full defenseat taxpayer expense. While criminal prosecution of those resisting arrest is common, prosecution of officers abusing their authority is rare. The police department itself does the preliminary investigation of possible abuse and usually the case will not go forward unless the department so recommends. See Alison L. Patton, Note, The Endless Cycle of Abuse: Why 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is Ineffective in Deterring Police Brutality, 44 Hastings L.J. 753, 787 (1993) (The [internal investigative] division is located within the police departmentthe investigators are police officers, and the entire process is concealed from the public.) A recent study reveals of all alleged instances of police misconduct, prosecution occurred in only one quarter of 1% of the cases. Laurie L. Levenson, The Future of State and Federal Civil Rights Prosecutions: The Lessons of the Rodney King Trial, 41 UCLA L.Rev. 509, 535 (1994). Additionally, in the very few cases actually prosecuted, the fact that the police themselves conducted the initial investigation coupled with the code of silence often renders effective prosecution impossible. Here Officer Yates conducted the internal investigation. RP (3/5/92) at 146. Yates was the same officer who had words with Valentine the night before; the one who reportedly said, We're going to get you; the one who applied the carotid hold which rendered Valentine unconscious before he went to the emergency room; and the one who told other officers, we're going to kill him. RP (3/5/92) at 197. And the same prosecutor who would defend the government in a civil suit has little incentive, if not an outright conflict, to pursue criminal remedies against a wrongdoer who is employed by the client who must bear ultimate financial responsibility. The majority should not hold its breath until we see the light at the bottom of the hole it has dug.