Opinion ID: 2967883
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Prior Conviction Aggravators

Text: This leaves us with the government’s argument that the indictment is not defective as to either the first-degree murder counts or the kidnapping-resulting-in-death counts because both categories of crimes carry the sentence of death as the statutory maximum and because two of the statutory aggravators found by the jury — Higgs’s prior conviction for a violent felony involving a firearm and Higgs’s prior conviction for a serious federal drug offense — fall within the Apprendi and Almendarez-Torres exception for prior convictions. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490; Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 226-27 (1998). In a nutshell, the government contends that the indictment is not defective because these prior conviction aggravators, both of which were found by the jury and either of which rendered the offenses death eligible, are not required to be alleged in the indictment to authorize imposition of the maximum penalty of death. We agree. In Almendarez-Torres, the Supreme Court was squarely presented with the question of whether a federal indictment must allege the fact of a prior conviction to expose a defendant to an enhanced sentence. Under 8 U.S.C.A. § 1326(a), a deported alien who returned to the United States without special permission was subject to imprisonment for up to two years. Under subsection (b) of the same statute, how22 UNITED STATES v. HIGGS ever, such a deported alien could be imprisoned for up to twenty years if the initial deportation was subsequent to a conviction for commission of an aggravated felony. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 226 (internal quotation marks omitted). As framed by the Court, the issue was whether th[e] latter provision defines a separate crime or simply authorizes an enhanced penalty. If the former, i.e., if it constitutes a separate crime, then the Government must write an indictment that mentions the additional element, namely, a prior aggravated felony conviction. If the latter, i.e., if the provision simply authorizes an enhanced sentence when an offender also has an earlier conviction, then the indictment need not mention that fact, for the fact of an earlier conviction is not an element of the present crime. Id. at 226. The court held that subsection (b) was a penalty provision, which simply authorizes a court to increase the sentence for a recidivist. It does not define a separate crime. Consequently, neither the statute nor the Constitution required the Government to charge the factor that it mentions, an earlier conviction, in the indictment. Id. at 226-27. The distinction between prior convictions and other facts that might expand a penalty range, first made in Almendarez-Torres, was addressed by the Court again in Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999). In the wake of its recognition of the constitutional concerns raised by the diminishment of the jury’s significance by removing control over facts determining a statutory sentencing range, the Court reiterated that Almendarez-Torres stands for the proposition that not every fact expanding a penalty range must be stated in a felony indictment. Jones, 526 U.S. at 248 (emphasis added). The Court explained: [T]he precise holding [in Almendarez-Torres] that recidivism increasing the maximum penalty need not be so charged . . . rested in substantial part on the tradition of regarding recidivism as a sentencing factor, not as an element to be set out in the indictment. The Court’s repeated emphasis on the distinctive significance of recidivism leaves UNITED STATES v. HIGGS 23 no question that the Court regarded that fact as potentially distinguishable for constitutional purposes from other facts that might extend the range of possible sentencing. See [523 U.S.] at 230 (At the outset, we note that the relevant statutory subject matter is recidivism); ibid. (With recidivism as the subject matter in mind, we turn to the statute’s language); id. at 243 (First, the sentencing factor at issue here — recidivism — is a traditional, if not the most traditional, basis for a sentencing court’s increasing an offender’s sentence); id. at 245 (distinguishing McMillan [v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986)] in light of the particular sentencing factor at issue in this case — recidivism). One basis for that possible constitutional distinctiveness is not hard to see: unlike virtually any other consideration used to enlarge the possible penalty for an offense, . . . a prior conviction must itself have been established through procedures satisfying the fair notice, reasonable doubt, and jury trial guarantees. Id. at 248-249. And, in Apprendi, the Court again distinguished the recidivism at issue in Almendarez-Torres from the hate crime enhancer before it: Whereas recidivism does not relate to the commission of the offense itself, New Jersey’s biased purpose inquiry goes precisely to what happened in the commission of the offense. Moreover, there is a vast difference between accepting the validity of a prior judgment of conviction entered in a proceeding in which the defendant had the right to a jury trial and the right to require the prosecutor to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and allowing the judge to find the required fact under a lesser standard of proof. 530 U.S. at 496 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 488 (noting that Almendarez-Torres turned heavily upon the fact that the additional sentence to which the defendant was subject was the prior commission of a serious crime and explaining that [b]oth the certainty that procedural safeguards attached to any ‘fact’ of prior conviction, and the reality that Almendarez-Torres did not challenge the accuracy of that fact in his case, mitigated the due pro24 UNITED STATES v. HIGGS cess and Sixth Amendment concerns otherwise implicated in allowing a judge to determine a fact increasing punishment beyond the maxi- mum of the statutory range. (internal quotation marks omitted)). Higgs acknowledges the Supreme Court’s recidivism exception to the Apprendi mandate, but asserts that the Court’s holding in Ring has placed on shaky ground the Almendarez-Torres proposition that prior convictions that increase the maximum penalty need not be alleged in the indictment, much like the defendant in Ring alleged that Walton’s holding was irreconcilable with Apprendi’s reasoning. That may or may not be so, but we are not at liberty to conclude that AlmendarezTorres is irreconcilable with Ring and grant him relief. Nor would we do so in view of the fact that the Ring Court specifically reserved the question of whether a judge may find the fact of prior convictions to be an aggravating circumstance in the death penalty context: Ring’s claim is tightly delineated: He contends only that the Sixth Amendment required jury findings on the aggravating circumstances asserted against him. No aggravating circumstance related to past convictions in his case; Ring therefore does not challenge Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), which held that the fact of prior conviction may be found by the judge even if it increases the statutory maximum sentence. Ring, 536 U.S. at 597 n.4. Until the Supreme Court overrules Almendarez-Torres, we are bound to follow its holding. The indictment against Higgs alleged crimes for first-degree murder and kidnapping resulting in death, all of which authorized a sentence of life imprisonment or death. By virtue of the FDPA, life imprisonment is the maximum sentence that may be imposed unless the facts support a finding of at least one enumerated statutory aggravating factor. However, while statutory aggravators must be alleged in the indictment, submitted to the jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt, current Supreme Court jurisprudence excepts from this mandate the fact of a prior conviction. The Fifth Amendment Indictment Clause does not require an indictment to allege prior convictions that expose a defendant to an enhanced penalty. UNITED STATES v. HIGGS 25