Opinion ID: 1163421
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Use of Gonzales's Statements for Impeachment

Text: While Gonzales was being treated in the hospital for an injury he received during his arrest, he was interrogated by police in violation of his Miranda rights. The court excluded his statements in the state's case-in-chief, but ruled them admissible to impeach under Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971). Gonzales argues that the statements should have been excluded for all purposes because his medical condition at the time rendered all of his statements involuntary. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2416, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978) ( [A]ny criminal trial use against a defendant of his involuntary statement is a denial of due process of law.). Gonzales argues that he could not take the stand in his own defense. In State v. Conner, 163 Ariz. 97, 103, 786 P.2d 948, 954 (1990), we held that by choosing not to testify, a defendant waives his right to challenge the court's pretrial ruling that statements made in violation of Miranda would be admissible to impeach. The same policy considerations that led to the result in Conner are present here. The admission of involuntary statements is subject to harmless error analysis. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 295, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1257, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991). Without the defendant's testimony, however, we are unable to determine whether error is prejudicial. The state may choose not to use a statement. Requiring the defendant to testify ensures that the reviewing court is presented with an actual, rather than hypothetical, injury. Conner, 163 Ariz. at 103, 786 P.2d at 954. It also prevents defendant from `cynically manufacturing a basis for a possible appeal by falsely alleging that the threat of impeachment alone deterred him from testifying.' Id. (citation omitted). Whether the impeaching statement was obtained in violation of Miranda or was involuntary, prejudice is hypothetical when the defendant does not testify. We hold that by choosing not to testify, Gonzales waived his right to claim that the trial court erroneously ruled involuntary statements admissible to impeach. Even if not waived, we agree with the trial court's voluntariness finding. Our inquiry is whether the confession was the product of a rational intellect and a free will. Mincey, 437 U.S. at 398, 98 S.Ct. at 2416. Gonzales was in the hospital having his wound cleaned. He was not strapped down, sedated, or incoherent. In fact, he stated that the pain from his wound kept his head clear. (R.T. of Jan. 16, 1991, at 78). Gonzales understood and responded to the questions and even asked questions about statements he believed his girlfriend had made. Gonzales's will was not overborne. This case is not like Mincey where the defendant was in intensive care, confined to bed, in extreme pain, heavily sedated, confused, incoherent, and eventually unconscious. Gonzales's statements were not coerced. The trial court did not err in ruling them admissible to impeach.