Opinion ID: 2625375
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Probability of prevailing prong

Text: As mentioned earlier, if a court ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion concludes the challenged cause of action arises from protected petitioning, it then determines whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim. ( Equilon, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 67, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 507, 52 P.3d 685.) To satisfy this prong, the plaintiff must state[ ] and substantiate[ ] a legally sufficient claim. ( Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 412, 58 Cal. Rptr.2d 875, 926 P.2d 1061.) Put another way, the plaintiff `must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.' ( Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester (2002) 28 Cal.4th 811, 821, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 19, 50 P.3d 733 ( Wilson ).) [10] The Court of Appeal here ruled that Jarrow had not met its burden under the probability of prevailing, or merits, prong of the anti-SLAPP statute. [11] In petitioning for review, Jarrow specified the question whether, assuming the anti-SLAPP statute applies, a malicious prosecution claim predicated, as this one is, on an underlying suit that was terminated on summary judgment with a finding of insufficient evidence should be deemed, as a matter of law, to satisfy the statute's merits prong. Jarrow points out that the minute order memorializing the trial court's disposal of LaMarche's cross-complaint states that no competent evidence of harmful activity by Jarrow or damages to LaMarche's business had been presented. [12] According to Jarrow, this summary judgment ruling with its findings alone should be sufficient, as a matter of law, to satisfy the anti-SLAPP statute's merits prong. We disagree. The entry of summary judgment for the defense on an underlying claim on grounds of insufficient evidence does not establish as a matter of law that the litigant necessarily can state[ ] and substantiate[ ] ( Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 412, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 875, 926 P.2d 1061) a subsequent malicious prosecution claim. First, contrary to Jarrow's assertion, defense summary judgment on the underlying claim does not establish lack of probable cause as a matter of law. `Counsel and their clients have a right to present issues that are arguably correct, even if it is extremely unlikely that they will win....' ( Sheldon Appel Co., supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 885, 254 Cal.Rptr. 336, 765 P.2d 498, quoting In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637, 650, 183 Cal. Rptr. 508, 646 P.2d 179.) Accordingly, there is probable cause if, at the time the claim was filed, any reasonable attorney would have thought the claim tenable. ( Sheldon Appel Co., supra, at p. 886, 254 Cal.Rptr. 336, 765 P.2d 498.) Plainly, a claim that appears arguably correct or tenable when filed with the court may nevertheless fail, as LaMarche's did, for reasons having to do with the sufficiency of the evidence actually adduced as the litigation unfolds. [13] As defendants point out, every case litigated to a conclusion has a losing party, but that does not mean the losing position was not arguably meritorious when it was pled. ( Wilson, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 824, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 19, 50 P.3d 733.) And just as an action that ultimately proves nonmeritorious may have been brought with probable cause, successfully defending a lawsuit does not establish that the suit was brought without probable cause. (See id. at pp. 819-820, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 19, 50 P.3d 733; Roberts v. Sentry Life Insurance, supra, 76 Cal. App.4th at p. 383, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 408.) Second, obtaining summary judgment for the defense on the underlying claim does not necessarily establish the malice element of a subsequent malicious prosecution claim. Jarrow asserts it does in this case, because, even after an opportunity for discovery, no competent evidence was adduced to support the underlying claim. The trial court's no competent evidence finding was not quite so sweeping. (See fn. 12, ante. ) But even assuming Jarrow characterizes the record correctly, the asserted conclusion does not follow. Merely because the prior action lacked legal tenability, as measured objectively ... without more, would not logically or reasonably permit the inference that such lack of probable cause was accompanied by the actor's subjective malicious state of mind. ( Downey Venture v. LMI Ins. Co. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 478, 498, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 142, citing Sheldon Appel Co., supra, 47 Cal.3d at pp. 885-886, 254 Cal.Rptr. 336, 765 P.2d 498.) We therefore reject, as did the Court of Appeal, Jarrow's suggestion that its having obtained summary judgment on the cross-complaint in the underlying litigation establishes as a matter of law, for the purposes of section 425.16, the merits of its malicious prosecution claim. Nor does the record afford any other basis for our gain-saying the Court of Appeal's conclusion on this point.