Opinion ID: 30177
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whelan's state law claim

Text: 18 Defendants argue that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing Whelan's common law fraud claim without prejudice. Defendants contend that Whelan's first statement of common law fraud occurred with its request for amendment of a final judgment, and neither Defendants nor the court was on notice of any state law claim. Defendants maintain that Whelan, having named RICO as the basis for its recovery, should be limited to RICO. 19 A motion to alter or amend a final judgment, when filed within ten days from the date the original judgment issues, is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). Edward H. Bohlin Co., Inc. v. Banning Co., Inc., 6 F.3d 350, 353 (5th Cir.1993). The decision by the district court to amend its judgment is reviewed for abuse of discretion and need only be reasonable. Id. 20 The district court amended its judgment because it concluded Whelan's second amended complaint might state a claim for common law fraud. We accept the court's refusal to evaluate the complaint under the Rule 9 mandate of particularity, which would apply only if the claim were being adjudicated in federal court. Reviewing the decision to amend, we ask only whether the court reasonably could conclude that the complaint stated a pendent claim for common law fraud. In assessing whether the court was reasonable, we look to Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 21 Pleadings must be construed as to do substantial justice. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(f). The Rules require only `a short and plain statement of the claim' that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 103, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). 22 Our reading of the complaint satisfies us that the district court did not abuse its discretion in amending its judgment. We do not intend to say that allegations sufficient to support pendent claims for common law fraud inhere in every RICO claim. Neither is our ruling based on the adequacy of Whelan's allegations in stating a claim for fraud; we leave to the state court the task of evaluating the substance of Whelan's fraud complaint. Our review of the complaint is for the limited purpose of evaluating whether the district court could reasonably have concluded that the complaint gave Defendants fair notice of what Whelan's claims were. Because we conclude that it could, we find no abuse of discretion.