Opinion ID: 1172254
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Batson's proposed jury instruction on defense of others was properly rejected by the district court.

Text: At trial, Batson offered the following instruction regarding the defense of others: It is lawful for a person who, as a reasonable person, has grounds for believing and does believe that bodily injury is about to be inflicted upon his spouse to protect that individual from attack. In doing so he may use all force and means which such person believes to be reasonably necessary and which would appear to a reasonable person, in the same or similar circumstances, to be necessary to prevent the injury which appears to be imminent. The district judge rejected this instruction, and the only instruction which mentioned the words self-defense or defense of another stated: If evidence of self-defense or defense of another is present, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense or in defense of another. If you find that the State has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense or defense of another, you must find the defendant not guilty. In other words, if you have a reasonable doubt whether or not the defendant acted in self-defense, your verdict must be not guilty. Batson asserts that the lower court erred in rejecting his proposed defense of others instruction because a defendant in a criminal case is entitled, upon request, to a jury instruction on his theory of the case so long as there is some evidence, no matter how weak or incredible, to support it. Roberts v. State, 102 Nev. 170, 172-73, 717 P.2d 1115, 1116 (1986). He asserts that because Batson and Donna presented evidence that Batson was acting in Donna's defense, the proffered instruction was warranted because the jury received no other instruction on what constituted self-defense or defense of another. We agree with Batson that a defendant in a criminal case is entitled to a jury instruction on his theory of his case; however, the proposed instruction must correctly state the law. Barron v. State, 105 Nev. 767, 773, 783 P.2d 444, 448 (1989). The state asserts that Batson's defense of others instruction did not correctly state the law in that [t]he proposed instruction would have allowed Mr. Batson to use force to prevent Tygard from lawfully detaining [Donna]. It would, in essence, allow any husband to rescue his spouse from the lawful clutches of the law. (Emphasis added.) Whether (and under what conditions) an individual can exert force against a police officer in the defense of others is a question of first impression in Nevada. Today we hold that a person may defend another only where that person has witnessed a police officer's unlawful and excessive use of force, and only where the individual being rescued is facing imminent and serious bodily harm at the hands of the police officer. [3] See Commonwealth v. French, 531 Pa. 42, 611 A.2d 175, 179 (1992). Furthermore, an individual acting in defense of another against a police officer may only use that force reasonably necessary to remove the threat of imminent serious bodily harm to that other person. See State v. Smits, 58 Wash.App. 333, 792 P.2d 565, 569 (1990). [I]t has been held that where the defendant in a criminal case proves facts or circumstances to excuse his act which otherwise would in and of itself be a crime, or the specific issue is one of criminal intent, such as where there is a claim of . . . self-defense. . ., ordinarily an affirmative instruction should be given. 75B Am.Jur. Trial § 1259 (1992). However, the settling of jury instructions was not reported in the record on appeal, and there is no record that Batson objected, nor is there any rationale for why Batson's counsel did not submit an alternate jury instruction. The jury was at least instructed that defense of another was a complete defense to the crime charged, and this general statement was more favorable to Batson than the language of the standard we adopt today. [4] Moreover, Batson has not sustained [his] burden of showing that a different result would have been obtained had the proposed instruction been given. Barron, 105 Nev. at 777, 783 P.2d at 451. Furthermore, Batson's testimony was that he fell into Officer Tygard and his wife, not that he hurt Officer Tygard in defense of his wife. We conclude that, on the instant facts, even if the jury had been given a definition of the theory of defense of others which properly stated the law, the jury would have still found Batson guilty. Therefore, Batson's claim must fail.