Opinion ID: 1199787
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Legal principles governing the claim of Massiah error.

Text: (3) In Massiah, supra, 377 U.S. 201, the United States Supreme Court held that once an adversarial criminal proceeding has been initiated against the accused, and the constitutional right to the assistance of counsel has attached, any incriminating statement the government deliberately elicits from the accused in the absence of counsel is inadmissible at trial against that defendant. ( Id., at pp. 206-207 [12 L.Ed.2d at pp. 250-251]; In re Wilson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 950.) In order to prevail on a Massiah claim involving use of a government informant, the defendant must demonstrate that both the government and the informant took some action, beyond merely listening, that was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks. ( Kuhlmann v. Wilson (1986) 477 U.S. 436, 459 [91 L.Ed.2d 364, 384, 106 S.Ct. 2616].) Specifically, the evidence must establish that the informant (1) was acting as a government agent, i.e., under the direction of the government pursuant to a preexisting arrangement, with the expectation of some resulting benefit or advantage, and (2) deliberately elicited incriminating statements. (See Depree v. Thomas (11th Cir.1991) 946 F.2d 784, 793-794; U.S. v. York (7th Cir.1991) 933 F.2d 1343, 1357; McCleskey v. Zant (11th Cir.1989) 890 F.2d 342, 348, and fn. 7; United States v. Geittman (10th Cir.1984) 733 F.2d 1419, 1427.) (4) Where the informant is a jailhouse inmate, the first prong of the foregoing test is not met where law enforcement officials merely accept information elicited by the informant-inmate on his or her own initiative, with no official promises, encouragement, or guidance. ( People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1240 [275 Cal. Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159].) In order for there to be a preexisting arrangement, however, it need not be explicit or formal, but may be inferred from evidence that the parties behaved as though there were an agreement between them, following a particular course of conduct over a period of time. ( U.S. v. York, supra, 933 F.2d at p. 1357.) Circumstances probative of an agency relationship include the government's having directed the informant to focus upon a specific person, such as a cellmate, or having instructed the informant as to the specific type of information sought by the government. ( Id., at p. 1356.) As to the second prong, that of deliberate elicitation, actual interrogation by an informant is not required in order to satisfy this element. ( United States v. Henry (1980) 447 U.S. 264, 270-273 [65 L.Ed.2d 115, 122-124, 100 S.Ct. 2183].) Thus, where a fellow inmate, acting pursuant to a prearrangement with the government, stimulate[s] conversation with a defendant relating to the charged offense ( Id., at p. 273 [65 L.Ed.2d at p. 124]), or actively engages the defendant in such conversation (see In re Wilson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 954), the defendant's right to the assistance of counsel, as defined by Massiah, is violated.