Opinion ID: 2371937
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Testimony of John Bentley

Text: The appellants sought to present the testimony of John Bentley, an expert in accident reconstruction. Once again, the appellees objected to such testimony based upon a failure to respond to discovery requests. The trial of this matter began on July 12, 1994. At an in camera hearing, it was determined that the counsel for the appellees received a letter on June 21, 1994, stating that Bentley might be used as an expert witness to rebut the testimony of Lonnie Buie, an accident expert expected to be called as a witness by the Graces. Counsel for the appellees asserted that the week before the trial the appellees asked for the opportunity to take Bentley's deposition, but he was out of town. Mr. Bentley's deposition was taken the night before the trial. Counsel for the appellants stated he was hired last Tuesday to try this lawsuit and we invited John [Bentley] as soon as we could. The trial court concluded it was unfair to wait until the day before trial and provide an expert in this type of case. The trial court commented that it had become a fad for plaintiff's lawyers to hire an expert and call him a consultant and play a game until right up before trial. Subsequently, the appellants attempted to present the testimony of Bentley in rebuttal of the testimony of Lonnie Buie. Lonnie Buie, Jr., an electrical engineer, testified that based upon the lack of deformation of the filament within the bulb, it was his opinion the white stern light on the party barge was not on at the time of the collision. Buie stated that a heated filament is more pliable, and tests have established that on impact, if the light is on, it will elongate. During cross-examination by counsel for the appellants, Buie testified that if a bulb filament is deformed, then it was on at the time of the accident. Buie further stated that when the ski boat hit the canopy of the party barge, the element of the light would have deformed had it been on. The appellants asserted that the testimony of Bentley would rebut the testimony of Lonnie Buie with respect to whether the force applied to the canopy was sufficient to deform the bulb. First, the appellants assert that the appellees knew nineteen days before trial that Bentley would be called as an expert witness, and the appellees did in fact take Bentley's deposition. The appellants rely upon Banks v. Jackson, supra , where we noted that last-minute depositions are not unique in trial preparation. In Banks , however, we simply held the trial court's decision allowing the testimony was not an abuse of discretion. The trial court has broad discretion in matters pertaining to discovery. Id. Also, the opposing party in Banks was informed of the substance of the testimony which would be offered by the expert, including his opinions. Second, rebuttal testimony must rebut the testimony advanced by the other side and should not consist of testimony which might have been advanced as proof in chief. Phillips v. McAuley, 297 Ark. 563, 764 S.W.2d 424 (1989). The exclusion of testimony offered on rebuttal is within the discretion of the trial court. See Wilkins v. El Dorado & Wesson R.R., 282 Ark. 236, 668 S.W.2d 6 (1984). More significantly, the appellants did not make a proffer of the testimony which Mr. Bentley would have presented. Counsel for appellants simply asserted that Bentley's testimony would rebut the testimony of Lonnie Buie. It is well established that in order to challenge a ruling excluding evidence, an appellant must proffer the excluded evidence so we can review the trial court's decision, unless the substance of the evidence is apparent from the context. A.R.E.Rule 103(a)(2); Davis v. State, 319 Ark. 460, 892 S.W.2d 472 (1995). In the instant case, there was no proffer and the substance of the answer is not apparent. There is no way of even knowing if Mr. Bentley's testimony would have been inconsistent with Mr. Buie's testimony. Accordingly, this argument is not preserved for review. Affirmed. HOLT, C.J., and BROWN, J., concur. DUDLEY, J., not participating.