Opinion ID: 1121458
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Cumulative Impact of Misconduct

Text: We have found no instances of prosecutorial misconduct. To the extent that the use of the Mendocino County jail report to cross-examine Dr. Raffle may have been error, we have found no prejudice resulting therefrom. For these reasons, we do not address defendant's arguments premised upon the cumulative, prejudicial impact of the alleged penalty phase errors.
(55) Defendant next contends that his constitutional rights of due process and equal protection were violated by the trial court's ruling denying his request to address the jury in allocution during the penalty phase. We reject defendant's claims. This court repeatedly has held that a capital defendant has no right to address the penalty phase jury in allocution. ( People v. Nicolaus, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 583; People v. Keenan (1988) 46 Cal.3d 478, 511 [250 Cal. Rptr. 550, 758 P.2d 1081]; People v. Robbins (1988) 45 Cal.3d 867, 888-890 [248 Cal. Rptr. 172, 755 P.2d 355].) Defendant presents no persuasive reason for this court to reconsider its prior rulings. The recent decision of the Ninth Circuit in Boardman v. Estelle (9th Cir.1992) 957 F.2d 1523 does not persuade us to reach a different result. In that case, the Ninth Circuit held that the failure to permit a noncapital defendant who requests to speak in allocution to do so violates federal due process rights. However, in our Robbins decision, we found Ashe v. State of N.C. (4th Cir.1978) 586 F.2d 334, 336, a similar federal ruling, to be distinguishable. We wrote: In the noncapital sentencing context, a defendant does not generally have an opportunity to testify as to what penalty he feels is appropriate. Accordingly, Ashe might be correct in saying a defendant may not be denied that opportunity when he requests it. The sentencing phase of a capital trial, on the other hand, specifically provides for such testimony. The defendant is allowed to present evidence as well as take the stand and address the sentencer. Given this, we fail to see the need, much less a constitutional requirement, for a corresponding `right to address the sentencer without being subject to cross-examination' in capital cases. ( People v. Robbins, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 889.) Finally, defendant cites no authority for his equal protection argument and we perceive no merit in it.
(56a) Defendant asserts that the trial court did not properly discharge its duty in ruling on his automatic motion for modification of the verdict. (ง 190.4, subd. (e).) Defendant contends that: (1) the prosecutor argued improper factors in aggravation; (2) the trial court relied upon these improper factors; and (3) the trial court improperly considered a probation report. We reject each of defendant's claims. Defendant's claims of prosecutorial misconduct, however, are essentially a rehash of his previously rejected complaints about the prosecutor's argument to the jury. We need not again address the reasons why the prosecutor's references to the knife fight, the possibility the defendant participated in more than one of his brother's burglaries, the callousness of the defendant immediately following the crime and the possibility of sodomy do not rise to the level of misconduct. Furthermore, defendant's complaints regarding the prosecutor's specification of five aspects of the crime that rendered it particularly aggravated are meritless. The prosecutor listed these aspects as follows: The first aspect is the innocence and vulnerability of the 15 year old victim. The second aspect is the Defendant's admission that he weighed the advantages and disadvantages of killing before doing the killing. The third is the meanness of the sex crime. The fourth is the brutality of the killing itself. And the fifth is the Defendant's callousness toward the victim and the crime immediately afterward. Each of these aspects of the crime was properly argued and considered by the court pursuant to section 190.3, factor (a). Defendant also contends that the court improperly considered the circumstances of the crime under factors (b) and (c) of section 190.3. We have reviewed the record and find no support for defendant's claim. The court properly found the absence of prior force and violence and prior felony convictions rendered factors (b) and (c) mitigating. In the course of this discussion, the court reiterated its belief that the force and violence associated with the crime itself was an aggravating factor under factor (a). Defendant further contends that the trial court was improperly influenced by the prosecutor's argument relating to the possibility of sodomy. The only mention by the court of this issue is found in its recitation of the testimony of Dr. Boyd Stephens regarding the physical evidence of the crime. The trial court correctly summarized the physical evidence and Dr. Stephens's opinion that the evidence relating to anal intercourse was inconclusive. This brief reference by the court to the issue of sodomy does not indicate that the court's decision was influenced by this possibility; rather, the trial court's comments reveal that it understood the inconclusive nature of the testimony on this issue. Even if this brief reference to the physical evidence could be deemed to show some minuscule amount of improper influence, we find no reasonable possibility that the error affected the trial court's decision. (See People v. Fauber (1992) 2 Cal.4th 792, 867 [9 Cal. Rptr.2d 24, 831 P.2d 249].) Defendant next contends that the trial court took an impermissibly narrow view of section 190.3, factor (k), because the court only referred to the fact that the defendant was a non-violent person in its discussion of that factor. Contrary to defendant's assertion, the record reveals that the trial court carefully considered all of the evidence presented by both sides. Under these circumstances, we find a previous observation applicable to the case at hand: Although the trial court did not expressly mention the mitigating evidence referred to by defendant, there is no indication ... that the court ignored or overlooked such evidence. ( People v. Ruiz (1988) 44 Cal.3d 589, 625 [244 Cal. Rptr. 200, 749 P.2d 854], italics in original.) Finally, defendant contends that the trial court erred by considering the probation report before it ruled on his motion under section 190.4. The record establishes that the court did review the report, but agreed that, during the section 190.4 proceedings, certain portions of the report, including the summary of the offense, the statements of the next of kin, and the case evaluation, would not be considered pursuant to stipulation by counsel. [42] In considering the report, the court erred. (E.g., People v. Lewis, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 287.) (57) But even when the trial court has considered such extraneous information in ruling on the application, we assume there has been no improper influence on the court, absent specific evidence to the contrary. [Citations.] ( People v. Fauber, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 866.) (56b) The record in this case demonstrates that the trial court's review of the probation report resulted in no prejudice to the defendant. Other than to note that the portions of the report that were not excluded by stipulation had been considered, the court made no express reference to the report in its written decision. The decision reflects the court's familiarity with the mandate of section 190.4, subdivision (e) that its determination be based upon the evidence and guided by the aggravating and mitigating circumstances referred to in that section. The court reviewed each of the potential aggravating and mitigating factors and gave detailed reasons based upon the evidence presented during the trial for determining the nature of and weight attributable to each factor. From our review, it is clear that trial court relied upon the evidence submitted at trial to reach its conclusion and placed great weight upon the circumstances of the crime. We find no reason for reversal.
(58a) Defendant argues that his sentence is unconstitutionally disproportionate both in comparison to those convicted of similar offenses and in relation to his own culpability. We find no merit in defendant's claims. (59) As we have previously observed, `[i]ntercase' proportionality review is not required by the federal Constitution [citation], and we have consistently declined to undertake it [citations]. ( People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 476 [6 Cal. Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388].) Defendant provides no reason for us to depart from our prior holdings. We have held, however, that the imposition of the death sentence is subject to intracase review to determine whether the penalty is disproportionate to a defendant's personal culpability. (E.g., People v. Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 476.) (58b) Relying upon People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 479-482 [194 Cal. Rptr. 390, 668 P.2d 697], defendant claims that his youth, lack of prior adult criminality, and drug-induced state of mind at the time of the crime renders the death sentence disproportionate to his crimes. Our review of the facts convinces us that the death penalty is not disproportionate to defendant's true culpability. Defendant raped and then, to avoid being reported to the police for his crime, stabbed and bludgeoned to death a defenseless 15-year-old girl. After the attack, he took with him one of the victim's wine coolers and proceeded to drink it. He formulated a story, which included reporting his finding of the victim's body, that he stuck with until after his arrest. During the trial, the jury was fully apprised of all the factors properly bearing upon whether defendant was eligible for, and deserved, the death penalty, including the defendant's relative youth, lack of adult criminality and state of mind at the time of the crime. [N]othing in the prior decisions of this court, or of the federal courts, suggests that his punishment is constitutionally disproportionate to `the offense' or `the offender.' [Citation.] ( People v. Adcox (1988) 47 Cal.3d 207, 275 [253 Cal. Rptr. 55, 763 P.2d 906].)
Conceding that this court has previously rejected these claims, defendant summarily raises 13 issues, apparently to preserve them for future litigation. Defendant has not convinced us that any of these issues require reconsideration. We, therefore, list below our disposition of defendant's contentions followed by dispositive authority.
2. The trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury regarding which section 190.3 factors are aggravating and which are mitigating. (E.g., People v. Raley, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 919.) 3. The trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury that it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that death is the appropriate penalty. (E.g., People v. Marshall (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907, 935-936 [269 Cal. Rptr. 269, 790 P.2d 676].) 4. The trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury that it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravation outweighed mitigation. (E.g., People v. Raley, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 919-920.) 5. The 1978 death penalty statute is not unconstitutional because it fails to require: (a) written findings; (b) proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the aggravating factors; (c) jury unanimity on aggravating factors; (d) a finding that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt; (e) a finding that death is the appropriate punishment beyond a reasonable doubt; and (f) a procedure to permit meaningful evaluation of the sentencer's discretion. (E.g., People v. Tuilaepa, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 595.) 6. The trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury that the sentence of life without parole means that the defendant will never be considered for parole. (E.g., People v. Gordon (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1277-1278 [270 Cal. Rptr. 451, 792 P.2d 251].) 7. The trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury to consider affirmatively all sympathetic mitigating factors, mercy and nonstatutory mitigation. ( People v. Cox, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 681; People v. Caro, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 1067.) 8. Defendant's due process rights were not violated by the use of the rape charge to: (a) qualify defendant for a first degree murder charge on a felony-murder theory; (b) qualify defendant for death eligibility under section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17); and (c) enhance aggravation in favor of death under section 190.3, factor (a). (E.g., People v. Marshall, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pp. 945-946.) 9. The trial court did not err by failing to instruct that the no sympathy instruction embodied in CALJIC No. 1.00, given at the guilt phase, did not apply at the penalty phase. (E.g., People v. Adcox, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 265.) 10. The trial court's instruction on extreme mental disturbance did not violate defendant's right to have the jury consider all mitigating factors. (E.g., People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 163 [10 Cal. Rptr.2d 554, 833 P.2d 561].) 11. The 1978 death penalty statute did not deprive defendant of the benefit of the Determinative Sentencing Act in violation of due process and equal protection. (E.g., People v. Marshall, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pp. 945-946; People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1330 [248 Cal. Rptr. 834, 756 P.2d 221].) 12. The trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury that lack of mitigation does not constitute aggravation. (Cf. People v. Ashmus, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 1004-1005.) 13. The 1978 death penalty statute is not unconstitutionally vague by instructing the jury in terms of section 190.3, factor (a) (circumstances of the capital crime) and section 190.3, factor (i) (defendant's age at time of crime), without further clarification. These unadorned factors do not preclude meaningful and guided distinctions between those murders that warrant the death penalty and those that do not. ( People v. Tuilaepa, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 594-595.)
The judgment is affirmed in its entirety.