Opinion ID: 765858
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Use of Treason Guideline as Analogy

Text: 356 The defendants contend that the District Court erred in determining that the treason guideline, U.S.S.G. § 2M1.1, provides a suitable analogy to the seditious conspiracy offense charged in Count One. Before considering the merits of that contention, we consider the standard of review. The applicable provision of the statute governing our jurisdiction to review sentences provides that where a sentence is imposed for an offense for which there is no applicable sentencing guideline, the reviewing court shall set aside the sentence and remand if it determines that the sentence is plainly unreasonable. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f)(2). The reviewing court is also required to vacate a sentence and remand if the sentence was imposed in violation of law. Id. §3742(f)(1). These provisions create an ambiguity as to whether the task of the reviewing court is to turn directly to the sentence and determine whether it is plainly unreasonable, or should first consider whether the sentencing court used a correct analogy and, if persuaded that it did not, vacate the sentence as imposed in violation of law. 357 In United States v. Cefalu, 85 F.3d 964 (2d Cir. 1996), we concluded that where section2X5.1 of the Guidelines obliges the sentencing judge to apply the most analogous guideline, we would determine first whether there is a sufficiently analogous guideline, and if not, whether the sentence is plainly unreasonable. Id. at 966. See United States v. Miller, 116 F.3d 641 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing Cefalu in applying U.S.S.G. §2E1.1, comment. (n.2), concerning federal offense analogous to state law crime serving as predicate for RICO offense). Cefalu also makes clear that the sentencing judge's selection of a sufficiently analogous offense under section2X5.1 involves the application of a guideline to the facts, a determination to which we will give due deference as required by 18 U.S.C. §3742(e). 31 Cefalu, 85 F.3d at 968 n.6; see Miller, 116 F.3d at 677. 358 The defendants challenge the District Court's selection of the treason guideline as an analogy on several grounds. First, they contend that the Court did not merely find the offense of treason analogous to their offense but equated their offense with treason. See Brief for Elhassan at 29. This argument then refers to the defendants' earlier contention that the Government's use of the seditious conspiracy charge to allege levying war circumvents the constitutional limitations on prosecution of treason. We have rejected that contention in Part I(A), supra, but our upholding of the use of section 2384 to charge a seditious conspiracy to levy war does not necessarily mean that it is lawful to use the offense of treason as an analogy in order to impose on those convicted of seditious conspiracy a penalty prescribed for treason. After all, the distinctions between the offense of seditious conspiracy and the offense of treason, on which we relied in Part I(A), included the fact that treason is punishable by life imprisonment and even death, whereas the maximum statutory penalty for seditious conspiracy is 20 years. There is a surface plausibility to the defendants' contention that if seditious conspiracy to wage war against the United States is not treason for purposes of encountering the constitutional limitations on the prosecution of treason, then such a seditious conspiracy cannot be punished by using the treason guideline as an analogy. 359 Judge Mukasey made the following response to the defendant' point. First, he pointed out that since the Sentencing Commission punished treason committed by waging war as the most serious form of treason and assigned it the highest punishment range allowable as a mandatory sentence, it is reasonable to infer that the Commission would have wanted those who commit seditious conspiracy by waging war to receive the maximum penalty available under the seditious conspiracy statute. Tr. 5-8 (Jan. 16, 1996). We agree with that point, but it serves to support only the 20-year sentences that were imposed on Count One. 360 What remained to be considered is why the defendants could lawfully be punished for more than 20 years, especially those defendants, unlike Rahman and Nosair, who were not convicted of an offense carrying a maximum statutory penalty of life. Judge Mukasey's answer was that punishments in excess of 20 years were being imposed on these defendants only because they have violated other statutes as well. Id. at 10-11. That response is correct, but does not answer the defendants' challenge to the use of the treason guideline. It is true that the consecutiveness of the defendants' sentences that carried their cumulative punishment above 20 years could not have occurred unless they had been convicted of other counts. And it is also true that Judge Mukasey faithfully applied the provisions of U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(d) in imposing consecutive sentences on some of the other counts. But the key link in his sentence calculations was his use of the treason analogy of section2M1.1(a)(1) to set the defendants' base offense level for Count One (seditious conspiracy) at 43, i.e., life imprisonment (subject only to slight adjustments for some of the defendants). 32 It was that level 43 (or the adjusted levels close to it) that provided the target toward which the cumulation of sentences on other counts could then reach. Though Judge Mukasey emphasized that the defendants are not being punished for treason, Tr. 10 (Jan. 16, 1996), the Guidelines' prescribed offense level (and consequent punishment) for treason by waging war was in fact a major determinant of their ultimate sentences. 361 What makes the defendants' point especially troubling is that some of the other counts that were available for consecutive sentences in order to approach the treason offense levels--Count Five (overall bombing conspiracy) and Count Six (Spring 1993 attempted bombing) and perhaps others--involved conduct that was part of the seditious conspiracy. Though the offenses charged in Counts Five and Six are not lesser included within the offense charged in Count One, since each includes an element not required for conviction on Count One, they were nonetheless used to enhance the punishment for Count One above the statutory maximum for that count. The Guidelines themselves normally seek to preclude that result by sensibly requiring that certain related offenses be grouped so that the convictions for those offenses do not increase the sentence on the most serious offense within the group. See U.S.S.G. §3D1.3(a). And Counts Five and Six were placed with Count One within a single group. But the limitation that normally results from grouping was overridden in this case by the combination of assigning a treason offense level to the Count One offense and then applying the consecutive sentence provisions of section5G1.2(d) to all counts, including Counts Five and Six. 362 After careful consideration, we conclude that the use of the guideline for treason tantamount to waging war against the United States as analogous to the conduct of the defendants constituting the Count One offense was authorized by the Guidelines and did not violate any protected right of the defendants. As a matter of language and logic, treason by waging war is surely analogous to the offense of a seditious conspiracy that includes as a goal levying war against the United States. Nothing in the Guidelines precludes either the use of the treason analogy or the sentence calculations that resulted from it. Indeed, the Guidelines call for precisely the calculations that Judge Mukasey made, once the treason guideline was selected. The Commission could have provided that sentences on any offenses grouped for purposes of section3D1.2 are exempt from the consecutiveness requirement of section5G1.2, but it has not done so. We see neither a statutory bar to the treason analogy nor a constitutional bar. We can be certain that the Framers, in imposing procedural limits on the prosecution of the offense of treason, never contemplated the Sentencing Guidelines. But as long as those procedural limits are observed when the substantive offense of treason is prosecuted, we do not believe that they are applicable to the determination of punishment for what we have held to be the distinct offense of seditious conspiracy, even when a goal of that conspiracy is waging war against the United States. 363 Nor do we believe, apart from regulatory, statutory, or constitutional limits, that the use of the treason analogy is unjust. To plan the waging of war against the United States is manifestly a grievous assault on the American people, meriting extremely serious punishment. Of the defendants who did not commit an offense subject to life imprisonment, the treason analogy contributed to sentences ranging from 30 years to 57 years. When one considers the huge scale of death and destruction contemplated by the defendants as part of their war against the United States, those sentences are neither plainly unreasonable under the statute governing our review, see 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f)(2), nor unjust under any more generalized standard. 364 The defendants' argument seems to assume that level 43, the highest guideline level, which calls for life imprisonment, is reserved for those who commit treason and is generally applied to all who commit treason. Both points are incorrect. Level 43 also applies to those who commit a premeditated killing, see U.S.S.G. §2A1.1, or commit certain felonies, including arson, that result in death, see, e.g., id. §2K1.4(c). Furthermore, persons who commit treason are not necessarily sentenced under section 2M1.1(a)(1). That guideline applies only to those whose conduct is tantamount to waging war against the United States. If the conduct of a person convicted of treason is not tantamount to waging war against the United States, the sentence level is determined under subsection (a)(2) of the treason guideline by the offense level applicable to the most analogous offense. 365 Judge Mukasey reasoned that subsection (a)(1) of the treason guideline, calling for the Guidelines' highest level of punishment, is applied not so much because of the offense of treason as because the conduct was of the most serious kind, (see U.S.S.G. § 2M1.1, Commentary), conduct that is tantamount to waging war against the United States. Because the defendants had engaged in similar conduct, Judge Mukasey found this guideline sufficiently analogous under U.S.S.G. § 2X1.5. 366 Judge Mukasey repeatedly emphasized that the defendants were not being sentenced or punished for treason, Tr. 8 (Jan. 16, 1996), and that, notwithstanding the guideline level of 43, they could not be sentenced to more than 20 years for the crime of seditious conspiracy. 367 We agree with Judge Mukasey's reasoning. The defendants were neither convicted of treason nor punished for treason. In view of the fact that their offense involved waging war against the United States, the guideline covering treason tantamount to waging war against the United States was found most analogous. Even though most analogous, that guideline would not be applied unless it was sufficiently analogous. U.S.S.G. § 2X5.1. We agree with Judge Mukasey's conclusion that the defendants' conduct satisfied both tests. 368 The defendants raise other objections to the treason analogy. Elhassan contends that use of the treason guideline analogy renders the statutory maximum sentence for seditious conspiracy a mandatory minimum sentence. That consequence, he argues, runs contrary to both the Sentencing Commission's aversion to mandatory minimum penalties, see United States Sentencing Commission, Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System 27-30 (1991), and Congress's intention to include individual offense characteristics in the guideline calculus. United States v. Voss, 956 F.2d 1007, 1011 (10th Cir. 1992). Neither point has merit. Whatever the Commission's view might be concerning statutory mandatory minimum sentences, it has made clear its intention that a total punishment, calculated under section3D1.4 is to be imposed via consecutive sentences, as long as other counts are available, even though that punishment exceeds the statutory maximum for the offense conduct on which the total punishment is based. See U.S.S.G. §5G1.2(d). 369 The argument based on Congressional intent fares no better. This argument is presumably based on the provision of the Sentencing Reform Act that purports to require sentencing judges to consider the history and characteristics of the defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). The difficulty is that Congress, perhaps endeavoring to satisfy the contending forces that battled during the evolution of the Sentencing Reform Act, also required sentencing judges to consider the nature and circumstances of the offense, id., and the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense ... and to provide just punishment for the offense, id. §3553(a)(2)(A). Use of the treason guideline analogy manifestly reflect[s] the seriousness of the defendants' offense. Moreover, as we made clear in United States v. Merritt, 988 F.2d 1298, 1306-07 (2d Cir. 1993), considerations relating to the history, circumstances, and character of the defendant can be taken into account in appropriate cases by departure. 370 Elhassan and Hampton-El, on behalf of all defendants, contend that other guidelines provide a better analogy than the treason guideline. They suggest the appropriateness of the guideline for arson by use of explosives, see U.S.S.G. 2K1.4, which they contend better fits their particular conduct in the offense. What they overlook is that they were convicted not just of planning to destroy property by use of explosives, but of conspiracy to wage a war of mass killing and destruction against the United States. Moreover, the Guidelines issue on appeal is not whether some other guideline would also have served as an appropriate analogy; it is the two part test whether the guideline for treason by waging war against the United States was both the most analogous offense guideline and sufficiently analogous to the criminal conduct of the defendants. See U.S.S.G. §2X5.1. The defendants' conduct fully justified Judge Mukasey's selection of the guideline for treason tantamount to waging war as the most analogous offense guideline. 371 Elhassan, on behalf of all defendants, also contends that using the treason guideline as a sentencing analogy obliterates the distinction that Congress has drawn between treason as a substantive offense and seditious conspiracy as a conspiracy offense. The Guidelines provide an adequate response. One of the virtues of the Guidelines is their calibrated prescription of punishments for substantive and conspiracy offenses. Before the Guidelines, prosecutors could hope to enhance sentences above statutory maximums by charging defendants with both conspiring to commit a crime and the substantive offense of committing it, and judges sometimes rewarded that expectation by imposing consecutive sentences for both offenses. See, e.g., Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1954); Sanders v. United States, 415 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Accardi, 342 F.2d 697, 701 (2d Cir. 1965). The Guidelines substantially ended that practice by providing that a conspiracy offense and the substantive offense that was the sole object of the conspiracy are to be grouped together, see U.S.S.G. §3D1.2 & comment 4 (n.2), and sentences for the two offenses will normally not be consecutive, except to the extent necessary to reach the total punishment for the most serious of the grouped counts, see U.S.S.G. §5G1.2(d). It is true that the Guidelines equate the offense level for the substantive and conspiracy offenses, see id. §2X1.1(a). But they also provide a three-level reduction for a conspiracy where the conspirators did not complete the acts necessary for successful completion of the substantive offense that was the object of the conspiracy. See id. §2X1.1(b)(2), a reduction the Government agrees is to be applied individually to each defendant. See Letter of Patrick J. Fitzgerald, Asst. U.S. Atty., to Judge Mukasey (Jan. 16, 1996). With these provisions in place, it was entirely valid to use the guideline for a substantive offense as an analogy for a conspiracy offense. 372 2. Whether Each Defendant Was Found to Have Agreed to Levy War for Purposes of Sentencing 373 The defendants contend, in an argument developed primarily by El-Gabrowny, that even if the treason guideline is available for use in sentencing those convicted of a seditious conspiracy that includes as one of it goals the waging of war, the treason guideline may not be applied to any one defendant unless the sentencing judge finds that the defendant agreed to wage war. They further contend that the requisite findings were not made. The Government does not appear to dispute the premise of the argument, recognizing the subtle point that, under the Guidelines, [t]he principles and limits of sentencing accountability ... are not always the same as the principles and limits of criminal liability. U.S.S.G. §1B1.3, comment. (n.1) (emphasis added). Cf. Salinas v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 469, 475-78 (1997) (criminal liability for RICO conspiracy does not require defendant's agreement to commit two predicate acts). But the Government maintains that Judge Mukasey properly accepted the jury's verdict as a determination that all of the defendants had conspired to wage war against the United States. 374 The treason guideline prescribes a base offense level of 43 if the conduct is tantamount to waging war against the United States. U.S.S.G. § 2M1.1(a)(1) (emphasis added), and Judge Mukasey was fully entitled to use the treason guideline as an analogy based on his view that the conduct of each defendant was tantamount to waging war. The evidence established that each defendant joined either the plot that resulted in the bombing of the World Trade Center or the plot to bomb major New York City tunnels and bridges, or both plots. Such activity, with its potential for massive loss of lives (beyond the six deaths that actually occurred at the World Trade Center bombing), could not be found to be other than conduct tantamount to waging war. Judge Mukasey made it abundantly clear how serious he considered the defendants' conduct. He relied not only on the jury's verdict but on the underlying evidence, which he properly concluded fully supported the verdict. 3. Challenges to Consecutive Sentences 375 A subtext to the defendants' attack on the use of the treason guideline analogy is a challenge to the District Court's imposition of consecutive sentences on counts other than Count One to reach or approach the total punishment resulting from that analogy, at least to the extent that the statutory maximums on counts of conviction permitted. Though we agree that the guideline on consecutive sentencing authorizes precisely the stacking of sentences that occurred in this case, see U.S.S.G. 5G1.2(d), we encounter some uncertainty as to whether such stacking was required. That uncertainty arises from 18 U.S.C. § 3584, which provides: 376 Imposition of Concurrent or Consecutive Terms.--If multiple terms of imprisonment are imposed on a defendant at the same time, or if a term of imprisonment is imposed on a defendant who is already subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment, the terms may run concurrently or consecutively, except that the terms may not run consecutively for an attempt and for another offense that was the sole object of the attempt. 377 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) (emphasis added). 33 Thus, the statute appears to accord the District Judge discretion as to consecutiveness, with an exception for some instances of attempts. 378 Moreover, section 3584(b) seems to underscore the discretionary nature of the decision as to consecutiveness by identifying the factors the sentencing judge is to consider: 379 Factors To Be Considered in Imposing Concurrent or Consecutive Terms.--The court, in determining whether the terms imposed are to be ordered to run concurrently or consecutively, shall consider, as to each offense for which a term of imprisonment is being imposed, the factors set forth in section 3553(a). 380 18 U.S.C. § 3584(b). Section 3553(a) sets forth several factors, including the kinds of sentence ... as set forth in the guidelines that are issued by the Sentencing Commission. Id. §3553(a)(4). 381 Despite the statutory provisions, the Guidelines prescribe a precise regime for the decision as to consecutiveness of terms imposed on multiple counts. Unless the offense statute requires consecutiveness, see U.S.S.G. §5G1.2(a), the sentencing judge first calculates the total punishment called for by the Guidelines. See id. §5G1.2(b). Next, the sentencing judge notices whether that total punishment called for by the Guidelines is within or above the statutory maximum for the count carrying the highest maximum. See id. §5G1.2(c). If the total punishment is less than the highest count maximum, the judge first imposes the total punishment on that count, then imposes the total punishment, up to the statutory maximums, on all other counts, and then specifies that the sentences on the other counts run concurrently with the sentence on the count carrying the highest maximum. See id. If the total punishment called for by the Guidelines exceeds the statutory maximum for the count carrying the highest maximum, the judge imposes consecutive sentences, but only to the extent necessary to make the combined sentences on all counts equal to the targeted total punishment. 34 See id. §5G1.2(d). 382 In our case, Judge Mukasey faithfully applied section 5G1.2. For example, as to defendant El-Gabrowny, Judge Mukasey first determined that the total punishment called for by the Guidelines was life imprisonment. Since the count with the highest statutory maximum (Count One) carried a maximum of 20 years, he imposed sentences of 20 years on Count One, maximum sentences of 3 years on each of Counts Twenty to Twenty-Three (total, 12 years), and 5 years on each of Counts Twenty-Four to Twenty-Eight (total, 25 years). He then ran all sentences consecutively to approach the targeted total punishment of life, resulting in a sentence of 57 years. The Judge noted that, had the Guidelines not restricted his discretion, he would have sentenced El-Gabrowny to a total of 33 years. See Tr. 147-49 (Jan. 17, 1996). The Judge did not explicitly consider whether he had the authority to make a downward departure. 383 At first glance, it might seem that the restrictions on discretion as to concurrency, prescribed by section 5G1.2, permissibly restrict the grant of discretion set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3584, in precisely the same manner as many other aspects of the Guidelines restrict the statutory discretion of sentencing judges. For example, most criminal statutes specify that a defendant may be punished to a term of not more than a specified maximum term, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) (not more than twenty-five years for armed bank robbery), thereby authorizing a sentence anywhere between zero and the maximum, yet the Guidelines specify a precise offense level for the criminal conduct, which corresponds to a narrow sentencing range. 384 Another example where the Guidelines restrict statutory sentencing discretion concerns the decision whether to impose a fine. The statute states that [a] defendant who has been found guilty of an offense may be sentenced to pay a fine, 18 U.S.C. § 3571 (emphasis added), and specifies several factors to be considered [i]n determining whether to impose a fine. See id. §3572(a)(1), (3), (4) (emphasis added). However, the Guidelines state that [t]he court shall impose a fine in all cases, except where the defendant establishes that he is unable to pay and is not likely to become able to pay any fine, U.S.S.G. §5E1.2(a) (emphasis added). Similar to the governing statute, the Guidelines specify relevant considerations, including the defendant's ability to pay and any restitution that the defendant is obligated to make, see id. §5E1.2(d)(2), (4), but the Guidelines make the considerations relevant only to the amount of the fine, rather than to the decision whether to impose a fine, see id. §5E1.2(d). See United States v. Corace, No. 97-1437, 146 F.3d 51, 56 (2d Cir. 1998). 385 The argument for permitting section 5G1.2 to restrict the discretion authorized by section 3584 is strengthened by the fact that one of the factors in section 3553 that section 3584 directs sentencing judges to consider is the kinds of sentences ... set forth in the guidelines. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4). Arguably, a consecutive sentence is a kind of sentence within the meaning of section 3553(a)(4), although the word kind might be confined to such categories as imprisonment, fine, probation, and supervised release. 386 In any event, the three circuits that have considered the tension between section 3584 and section 5G1.2 have all ruled that the sentencing judge retains some discretion to run sentences concurrently, though such discretion may be exercised only by use of the departure authority. See United States v. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754 (1st Cir. 1995); United States v. Lail, 963 F.2d 263, 264 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Martinez, 950 F.2d 222, 226 (5th Cir. 1991). These rulings do not permit a broad discretion from section 3584 to trump section 5G1.2; they simply permit a departure if the standards for a departure are met, i.e., the sentencing judge finds that the case presents an aggravating or mitigating circumstance, of a kind or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission ... . See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). 387 On a closely related issue, our Court has ruled that in circumstances where section 5G1.2 requires concurrent sentences, the sentencing judge has discretion to make an upward departure in order to impose consecutive sentences. See United States v. Weng Yu Hui, 83 F.3d 592, 593-94 (2d Cir. 1996). Other circuits have made the same ruling. See United States v. Quinones, 26 F.3d 213, 216 (1st Cir. 1994); United States v. Perez, 956 F.2d 1098, 1103 (11th Cir. 1992); United States v. Pedrioli, 931 F.2d 31, 32 (9th Cir. 1991). Just as there is discretion to depart upward to impose consecutive sentences where the guidelines call for concurrency, we believe there is discretion to depart downward to sentence concurrently where the guidelines call for consecutive sentencing. 35 388 El-Gabrowny's case presents a mitigating circumstance, at least to a degree, not adequately considered by the Sentencing Commission. Though the Commission considered the possibility that the total punishment called for by the Guidelines on one or more counts might exceed the statutory maximums, thereby normally requiring consecutive sentences on other counts to reach, or at least approach, the total punishment, see U.S.S.G. §5G1.2(d), there is no reason to think that the Commission gave adequate consideration to the extent to which such a sentence could be extended by multiplication of essentially duplicative charges for a single criminal act. For resisting the agents in front of Saleh's apartment, El-Gabrowny received three sentences of three years each--two for assault and one for impeding a search. For having the five false Nosair family passports in his pocket, El-Gabrowny received six sentences--one of three years for possession of five false identity documents and five of five years each for possession of each of five false passports. Had the prosecutor drafted the charges to include a count of false identity documents for each of the five instead of grouping them in one count, El-Gabrowny's sentence would have been 69 years instead of 57. We believe the prosecutor's ability to lengthen sentences in these circumstances simply by adding essentially duplicative counts, each describing the same criminal conduct, is a circumstance that was not adequately considered by the Sentencing Commission when it devised the formula for consecutive sentencing under § 5G1.2(d). It therefore establishes a permissible basis for downward departure. If the concept of heartland means anything, see U.S.S.G. Ch. 1, Pt. A, §4(b), this combination of unusual circumstances is outside of it. 389 The remaining issue on this point is whether Judge Mukasey understood that he could make a departure from consecutiveness in El-Gabrowny's case and declined to do so as a matter of discretion, or thought he lacked departure authority. We have generally assumed that sentencing judges are aware of their departure authority, see United States v. Brown, 98 F.3d 690, 694 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Rivers, 50 F.3d 1126, 1131 (2d Cir. 1995), but have not made that assumption where the judge's option turns on an obscure point of law or where the judge's sentencing remarks create ambiguity as to whether the judge correctly understood an available sentencing option. United States v. Sweeney, 90 F.3d 55, 58 (2d Cir. 1996). The departure authority here has not previously been settled in this Circuit, and Judge Mukasey's sentencing remarks, if anything, imply that he thought he lacked departure authority. After explaining the 33-year sentence he thought was appropriate for El-Gabrowny, he stated, I do not believe that the guidelines leave me free to impose that sentence. Tr. 149 (Jan. 17, 1996). 390 El-Gabrowny argued at sentencing the unfairness of running all of his sentences consecutively, though he did not precisely urge a departure. We will not require service of 24 more years than a sentencing judge tells us he wishes to impose, just because the defendant might not have used precisely the right words to express his objection. Resentencing, unlike retrial, imposes no great burden on the court system and makes only the slightest inroad on finality. We retain discretion to review novel or complex sentencing issues that were not properly preserved in the trial court. We consider El-Gabrowny's claim to present a sufficiently novel and complex issue, and we have proceeded accordingly. 36 See United States v. Kingdom (U.S.A.), Inc., 157 F.3d 133, 135-36 (2d Cir. 1998); see also United States v. Leung, 40 F.3d 577, 586 n.2 (2d Cir. 1994) (correction of sentencing error usually entails fewer demands on judicial system than correction of trial error). 4. Inchoate Offense Reduction 391 El-Gabrowny contends that he was improperly denied an inchoate offense reduction under U.S.S.G. §2X1.1(b)(2). He argues that Judge Mukasey denied him the reduction because of his link to the completed bombing of the World Trade Center, but did not make a finding as to whether that bombing was within the scope of the agreement entered into by El-Gabrowny. Judge Mukasey made three statements arguably relevant to this matter, all said in the context of rejecting El-Gabrowny's claim for a minor role adjustment under U.S.S.G. §3B1.2(b). The day before sentencing he said that El-Gabrowny held passports which were apparently to be used in connection with a breakout attempt connected to the World Trade Center. Tr. 42 (Jan. 16, 1996). At sentencing, he said that El-Gabrowny's contact with Ayyad, Salameh, with others, indicate he was integral to Nosair's contact with the outside world and Nosair was integral to the World Trade Center bombing. Tr. 148 (Jan. 17, 1996). He also stated that El-Gabrowny was aware that those passports were something that the agents would show up [for] and seek to find. As a result it is clear that he took them out of his apartment. Id. We assume that his abbreviated comments are meant to indicate that Judge Mukasey believed El-Gabrowny to have played a participating role in the World Trade Center bombing. 392 As Judge Mukasey stated, the record shows that El-Gabrowny was in contact with the actual bombers, Ayyad and Salameh, in the weeks leading up to the bombing. We infer that Judge Mukasey was alluding to Ayyad's phone call to El-Gabrowny as Ayyad was making arrangements to purchase the hydrogen gas for the bomb, Salameh's use of a driver's license with El-Gabrowny's address on it when renting the Ryder truck used in the bombing, and El-Gabrowny's accompaniment of both Ayyad and Salameh to visit Nosair in prison in the weeks leading up to the attack. 393 However, Judge Mukasey did not make specific findings linking El-Gabrowny to the bombing such that we can affirm the denial of an inchoate offense reduction. We do not determine whether El-Gabrowny is entitled to an inchoate offense reduction; rather, particularized findings of his link to a completed bombing are required to permit proper review of the denial of his claim. 5. Role-in-the-Offense Adjustment 394 The Guidelines provide for a four-level reduction in offense level for a defendant who plays a minimal role in concerted activity, U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 comment. (n.1), or a two-level reduction for a minor participant in criminal activity, id. § 3B1.2(b). A reduction will not be available simply because the defendant played a lesser role than his co-conspirators; to be eligible for a reduction, the defendant's conduct must be minor or minimal as compared to the average participant in such a crime. See United States v. Ajmal, 67 F.3d 12, 18 (2d Cir. 1995). The District Court's finding that a defendant did not play a minor or minimal role will not be reversed unless clearly erroneous. See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 78 F.3d 808, 814 (2d Cir. 1996). 395 Saleh and Khallafalla contend that in rejecting requests made by several defendants 37 for mitigating role reductions, the Court overread the jury verdict in stating that the jury through the verdict found all defendants willing to do whatever was necessary to accomplish the goals of the conspiracy. Tr. 44 (Jan. 16, 1996). The guilty verdict on Count One, they point out, does not preclude the possibility that any one conspirator played a minor or minimal role in the conspiracy. 396 The defendants mischaracterize the District Court's reasoning. In denying their motions, the Court stated: 397 The issue is whether . . . any of those people is significantly less culpable than the average participant in the conspiracy that is charged in this indictment and the conspiracy on which the jury returned a guilty verdict, and I don't believe any of them is. . . . The facts proved at trial indicated that each of them was willing to do what it was that was necessary for him to do. The argument that I have to consider a worldwide army and then consider each defendant a mere speck in the worldwide army I don't think is convincing. The fact is that each of them through the verdict was found to have been willing to do what it was that was necessary for him to do to accomplish the goals of the conspiracy. For that reason, th[e motions] are going to be denied. 398 Tr. 43-44 (Jan. 16, 1996) (emphasis added). The Court referred not only to the jury's verdict but explicitly to the facts proved at trial. Role adjustments were not improperly grounded on the jury's verdict. 399