Opinion ID: 2159886
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Finding of Reasonable Fear of Bodily Injury

Text: [¶ 13] The protection from abuse statute's definition of abuse includes [a]ttempting to place or placing another in fear of bodily injury through any course of conduct, including, but not limited to, threatening, harassing or tormenting behavior. 19-A M.R.S.A. § 4002(1)(B). Hawthorne does not challenge the court's finding that his course of conduct constituted threatening, harassing or tormenting behavior under section 4002(1)(B). He contends, however, that the court was unjustified in finding that Kate was in fact in fear of bodily injury because [t]here is not a single incident in the seven years of living together wherein [he] threatened to use or did use physical force on any person, and that kicking the car could not give rise to a finding that Kate had a reasonable fear of bodily injury. According to Hawthorne, Kate's testimony that she was afraid because she did not know what he would do next differs from a reasonable fear that he might inflict bodily injury upon her. [¶ 14] Smith contends that the record, which includes circumstantial evidence of a course of conduct by Hawthorne, supports the court's finding that Kate was in reasonable fear of bodily injury. According to Smith, the evidence demonstrated that from the evening of August 31 to the next evening Kate's conflict with Hawthorne was escalating and was abusive. [¶ 15] Our function in reviewing the trial record is not to draw our own factual inferences and conclusions. Rather, our review of factual findings is limited to an investigation of the record to determine whether competent evidence exists to support the trial court's factual conclusions. Stickney v. City of Saco, 2001 ME 69, ¶ 13, 770 A.2d 592, 600. The `clearly erroneous' standard is not based merely on the trial court's ability to judge the demeanor and credibility of live witnesses, but also on a recognition of the trial court's particular expertise in fact finding and its proper institutional role. Casco N. Bank v. JBI Assocs., Ltd., 667 A.2d 856, 859 (Me.1995). [¶ 16] The deferential standard of clear error is particularly appropriate in actions for protection from abuse where the trial court's ability to observe the witnesses invariably plays a part in its assessment of the impact a particular person's words and actions had upon another person. Appellate review is naturally limited by the written record's inability to fully convey each witness's appearance, body language, stature, speech patterns, degree of eye contact, and numerous other non-verbal cues. The clearly erroneous standard requires us to be mindful of this limitation when, as here, we review a trial court's reasonableness determination in connection with the subjective fear experienced by a child. [¶ 17] There was competent evidence in the record supporting the court's conclusion that Hawthorne's conduct, culminating with his kicking Kate's car in fact placed Kate in fear of bodily injury. She testified it made her scared, that she didn't know what he was gonna do next, and that she didn't know if he was gonna come try to get [her]. Additionally, as the court concluded, her locking the doors of the car was an outward manifestation of her fear. A fact finder may draw reasonable inferences from circumstantial evidence that a victim was put in fear. State v. Marden, 673 A.2d 1304, 1312 (Me.1996) (fact finder may draw reasonable inferences from circumstantial evidence that victim was put in fear without direct evidence of victim's fear). [¶ 18] The court's findings also reflect that it recognized that Kate's fear needed to be reasonable for there to be abuse. The testimony of Kate, her father, and Kate's school counselor provided competent evidence supporting the finding that Kate's fear of bodily injury from Hawthorne was reasonable. Once Hawthorne physically struck Kate's car, it was objectively reasonable for her to fear that he might direct his escalating anger and physical aggression toward her. The Legislature recognized that domestic violence is often manifested in the form of a pattern of escalating abuse when it enacted the protection from abuse statute. 19-A M.R.S.A. § 4001(1) (1998). [2] In addition, physical aggression toward inanimate objects  manifested here by Hawthorne kicking Kate's car  is often a precursor to violence between household members. See Bruce J. Winick, Applying the Law Therapeutically in Domestic Violence Cases, 69 UMCK L. REV. 33, 54-55 (2000) (listing destruction of the victim's property as a risk factor that correlates with future abusive behavior) (citing Janet A. Johnson et al., Death by Intimacy: Risk Factors for Domestic Violence, 20 PACE L. REV. 263, 282-83 & n. 89 (2000)). Both the escalating nature of Hawthorne's anger and his display of physical aggression towards Kate's car support the conclusion that Kate's fear of bodily injury was, under all of the circumstances, reasonable. [¶ 19] As the trier of fact, the court was not obliged to accept Hawthorne's characterization of the events. [3] Indeed, the trial court was justified in rejecting most or all of Hawthorne's characterization of his actions based upon its separate finding that his written notes to Kate demonstrated immature and hateful behavior. Similarly, the fact that there was no evidence that Hawthorne threatened to use or used physical force against Kate, on this or any prior occasion, does not compel the conclusion that there was no abuse. [¶ 20] Our protection from abuse statute recognizes that if a defendant engages in a course of conduct that is threatening, harassing or tormenting, the conduct can cause the victim to be placed in fear of bodily injury even if the defendant has not verbally threatened violence or committed actual acts of violence against the victim. See 19-A M.R.S.A. § 4002(1)(B). We conclude that the trial court's finding that Kate reasonably feared bodily injury as a result of Hawthorne's course of conduct is supported by competent evidence in the record.