Opinion ID: 2548554
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Attorney Misconduct in Closing Argument

Text: When presentation of the evidence is concluded in a civil trial, unless the case is submitted to the jury on either side or on both sides without argument, the plaintiff must commence and may conclude the argument. (Code Civ. Proc., § 607, par. 7.) In conducting closing argument, attorneys for both sides have wide latitude to discuss the case. ``The right of counsel to discuss the merits of a case, both as to the law and facts, is very wide, and he has the right to state fully his views as to what the evidence shows, and as to the conclusions to be fairly drawn therefrom. The adverse party cannot complain if the reasoning be faulty and the deductions illogical, as such matters are ultimately for the consideration of the jury.'' [Citations.] `Counsel may vigorously argue his case and is not limited to Chesterfieldian politeness.' [Citations.] `An attorney is permitted to argue all reasonable inferences from the evidence....' [Citation.] `Only the most persuasive reasons justify handcuffing attorneys in the exercise of their advocacy within the bounds of propriety.' [Citation.] ( Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co. (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 757, 798-799, 174 Cal.Rptr. 348.) The same rules apply in a criminal case. (See People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 819, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673.) An attorney who exceeds this wide latitude commits misconduct. For example, [w]hile a counsel in summing up may indulge in all fair arguments in favor of his client's case, he may not assume facts not in evidence or invite the jury to speculate as to unsupported inferences. ( Malkasian v. Irwin (1964) 61 Cal.2d 738, 747, 40 Cal.Rptr. 78, 394 P.2d 822.) Nor may counsel properly make personally insulting or derogatory remarks directed at opposing counsel or impugn counsel's motives or character. ( Garden Grove School Dist. v. Hendler (1965) 63 Cal.2d 141, 143, 45 Cal. Rptr. 313, 403 P.2d 721.) Additional examples abound; these are but a few. (See 7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Trial, § 227, p. 260 et seq.) Allstate contends Herzog's reference to the trial court's permitting jurors to claim unearned service credit constituted misconduct in two respects. First, Allstate claims counsel's argument was an improper appeal to the jurors' self-interest. Second, Allstate claims counsel suggested the manner in which the Cassims documented their alleged fire losses and postfire living expenses had judicial approval.
An attorney's appeal in closing argument to the jurors' self-interest is improper and thus is misconduct because such arguments tend to undermine the jury's impartiality. ( People v. Pitts (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 606, 696, 273 Cal.Rptr. 757 [it is improper to appeal to the self-interest of jurors or to urge them to view the case from a personal point of view].) For example, in Du Jardin v. City of Oxnard (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 174, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 48, the city delivered a dumpster to the local school district. The dumpster had a dangerous hole in the floor, which district employees saw but did not fix. The plaintiff, a maintenance worker for the district, sued the city after he was injured when he accidentally stepped into the hole. In closing argument, the city's attorney argued that `[w]hen a public agency, be it a school or a library or a hospital is held liable for the admittedly negligent conduct of other people [presumably referring to the school district's employees], we just have to sit back and start counting the public services that will disappear when we hold a public entity liable for the negligence of other persons.' ( Id. at p. 177, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 48.) The Court of Appeal held this argument was misconduct: Counsel had appealed directly to the jurors' personal passions and prejudices. This is not a situation where remarks were focused on some corporate entity or on a litigant. Instead, these salvos struck at the heart of the jurors' pocketbooks. ( Id. at p. 179, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 48.) Similarly, in People ex rel. Dept. of Public Works v. Graziadio (1964) 231 Cal. App.2d 525, 42 Cal.Rptr. 29 ( Graziadio ), a case involving eminent domain, the Court of Appeal found an attorney committed misconduct when he suggested in closing argument that the jury should view the question of just compensation from the personal point of view as a taxpayer. ( Id. at p. 533, 42 Cal.Rptr. 29.) The appellate court held such argument was improper because it appeal[ed] to [the jurors'] self-interest, which violates the fundamental concept of an objective trial by an impartial jury. ( Id. at p. 534, 42 Cal. Rptr. 29.) Contrary to Allstate's contentions, Herzog's argument did not appeal to the jurors' personal self-interest. Unlike in the cases cited above, nothing in the challenged argument suggested the jurors were themselves personally or financially at risk if they returned a verdict in Allstate's favor. The argument implied neither that a verdict for Allstate would somehow invalidate the trial court's direction that jurors could sign in for service on days when no court session was scheduled nor that a judgment for Allstate would render the jurors personally liable for defrauding their employers were they to do as the court had suggested. This case is thus distinguishable from Du Jardin v. City of Oxnard, supra, 38 Cal. App.4th 174, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 48, where the argument in question suggested a verdict for the city would result in reduced public services for all (including the jurors), and from Graziadio, supra, 231 Cal.App.2d 525, 42 Cal.Rptr. 29, where the argument suggested the jury should not be overly generous in awarding compensation because the money ultimately would come from taxpayers such as themselves. The Court of Appeal below did not directly address the concern of juror self-interest, but instead construed Allstate's contention to be that Herzog's argument was an impermissible variant of the so-called golden rule argument, in which counsel asks jurors to put themselves in the plaintiff's shoes and ask what compensation they would personally expect. (See Beagle v. Vasold (1966) 65 Cal.2d 166, 182, fn. 11, 53 Cal.Rptr. 129, 417 P.2d 673; Loth v. Truck-A-Way Corp. (1998) 60 Cal. App.4th 757, 765, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 571.) [4] The Court of Appeal found that, by his argument, plaintiff's counsel placed at least some of the jurors in the shoes of the Cassims when he thinly intimated they [the jurors] had committed a fraud by not going to work while collecting pay on days when the court was not in session. Counsel knowingly exploited the fact that many employers would have refused to pay for jury service on those days when the jury was not in session even though the jurors had `been given credit' for appearing. Therefore, when the jurors retired to deliberate, they were conscious of the fact that whatever else the Cassims had done, it was no worse than what the jurors, with the court's approval, had done. The appellate court thus found Herzog had improperly suggested that if the Cassims had intentionally misrepresented their living expenses, the jurors who had signed in for jury service when court was not in session had engaged in similar misrepresentation. The evil of such argument is that it risks converting the jurors from impartial decision makers into personal partisans. As one appellate court explained: The appeal to a juror to exercise his subjective judgment rather than an impartial judgment predicated on the evidence cannot be condoned. It tends to denigrate the jurors' oath to well and truly try the issue and render a true verdict according to the evidence. (Code Civ. Proc., § 604.) Moreover, it in effect asks each juror to become a personal partisan advocate for the injured party, rather than an unbiased and unprejudiced weigher of the evidence. ( Neumann v. Bishop, supra, 59 Cal.App.3d at pp. 484-485, 130 Cal.Rptr. 786.) Although Herzog's argument, perhaps ill advisedly, asked the jurors to consider their personal experience in the courtroom in reaching their verdict, the argument could not have converted them into partisan advocate[s] for the Cassims. The clear point of the argument was that people do not commit the type of intentional misrepresentation that would void an insurance policy if they misrepresent something at the direction of someone in authority (presumably, in this case, invoking plaintiffs' reliance on Thompson's advice that they reconstruct living expense receipts as best they could). Herzog never urged the jurors to put themselves in the Cassims' position or to view the case from the Cassims' personal perspective. We thus find the disputed argument was not improper for either appealing to the jurors' self-interest or urging them to decide the case subjectively rather than objectively.
The Court of Appeal found Herzog's argument was misconduct for a second reason. Relying on Sanguinetti v. Moore Dry Dock Co. (1951) 36 Cal.2d 812, 228 P.2d 557 ( Sanguinetti ), the appellate court concluded Herzog had committed misconduct by arguing the Cassims' asserted misrepresentations in their claims of losses and living expenses were equivalent to the misrepresentations the trial court condoned when it authorized jurors to claim credit for days when no court sessions took place. As the Court of Appeal majority reasoned: Here, in a case where fraud in an insurance claim was a primary issue in the case, counsel for plaintiff[s] went right to the fact that the jurors had been essentially cheating their employers. When counsel made reference to the fact that some of the jurors might be accused of cheating[,] there was no question he was letting the jurors know that the court had no objections to the procedure. When the objection was [not] sustained there was nothing else [defense] counsel could do except object again which would have had the effect of drumming home to the jury that the court thought a little cheating was permissible. (Fn.omitted.) As the appellate court recognized, Sanguinetti, supra, 36 Cal.2d 812, 228 P.2d 557, provides a useful precedent. In that case, the plaintiff sued to recover for injuries he suffered while working on the defendant's tugboat. At the close of the plaintiff's case, his attorney moved in the presence of the jury to increase the prayer for damages from $50,000 to $75,000. After argument by the parties outside the jury's presence, the trial court granted the motion. The defendant then moved for a mistrial, claiming the plaintiff's counsel had committed misconduct by moving to increase the damages in front of the jury. The trial court denied the motion. After both sides rested, the trial court instructed the jury that damages could not be in excess of $75,000. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of $75,000. ( Id. at pp. 815-816, 228 P.2d 557.) This court reversed and remanded for a new trial. While admitting that no direct California authority prohibited the practice, we held that moving before the jury, after the production of evidence, to increase the prayer for damages should be unhesitantly condemned and stricken down. ( Sanguinetti, supra, 36 Cal.2d at p. 819, 228 P.2d 557.) We explained that if the trial court grants such a motion, the implied message is that the trial court believes the increased damages are warranted by the evidence. Because the trial court's views would necessarily have undue weight with the jury, implying the trial court approves of some portion of a litigant's case is improper. (Cf. People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 353, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708 [trial court commits misconduct if, by its remarks, it create[s] the impression it is allying itself with the prosecution].) The Court of Appeal in Neumann v. Bishop, supra, 59 Cal.App.3d 451, 130 Cal.Rptr. 786, cited Sanguinetti, supra, 36 Cal.2d 812, 228 P.2d 557, with approval. In closing argument in Neumann, the plaintiff's attorney suggested the superior court would not have accepted his lawsuit for filing unless the amount of damages prayed for had qualified for the monetary jurisdiction of the court. ( Neumann, supra, at p. 486, 130 Cal.Rptr. 786.) In addition, counsel implied that the trial court had approved or endorsed the testimony of his expert witnesses; in fact, the court had simply approved his right to present such experts. ( Ibid. ) The appellate court found the plaintiff's counsel had committed misconduct in his argument because it is improper and misconduct for counsel to argue that his case or some aspect thereof has judicial approval. ( Id. at p. 485, 130 Cal.Rptr. 786.) The court then found any misconduct was harmless on the facts of the case. The reasoning of Sanguinetti, supra, 36 Cal.2d 812, 228 P.2d 557, and Neumann v. Bishop, supra, 59 Cal.App.3d 451, 130 Cal. Rptr. 786, suggests plaintiffs' counsel may have ventured into improper argument by implying the trial court had endorsed the Cassims' alleged misrepresentation in presenting Allstate with reconstructed and allegedly inflated receipts for their living expenses. Such endorsement could be inferred, Herzog arguably implied, because any misrepresentation by the Cassims was analogous to the court-approved practice of jurors falsely signing in for jury service. However, we need not decide whether Herzog improperly suggested his clients' actions had judicial approval because, as we explain below, even if he did commit misconduct, [5] it was harmless.