Opinion ID: 761275
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Defendant's Accountability for Forty Kilograms of Cocaine

Text: 35 The defendant next contends that only six kilograms of cocaine should have been attributed to him for purposes of determining his base offense level because he allegedly did not know that the three unopened suitcases contained cocaine and that the district court erred in holding him accountable for forty kilograms of cocaine. In holding Lezine accountable for all forty kilograms under section 1B1.3 of the guidelines, the court found Lezine's contention that he did not know what was inside the three suitcases not credible and highly unlikely. The court ruled that, under the law of this Circuit, it was reasonably foreseeable for Lezine to know that the other suitcases contained a controlled substance and that Lezine was responsible for the entire shipment. 36 In reviewing the trial court's ruling, factual findings will be overturned only if they are clearly erroneous, while the interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines is subject to review de novo. See United States v. Lozoya-Morales, 931 F.2d 1216, 1218 (7th Cir.1991). Thus, the district court's determination as to the amount of drugs attributable to the defendant will be upheld unless it is clearly erroneous. See United States v. Corral-Ibarra, 25 F.3d 430, 437 (7th Cir.1994). 37 Section 2D1.1 of the guidelines stipulates that the base offense level for a defendant convicted of possessing with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 is set by the Drug Quantity Table. For the possession of at least five, but less than fifteen kilograms of cocaine, the base offense level is 32. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(3). For the possession of at least fifteen, but less than fifty kilograms, the base offense level is 34. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(4). In this case, the district court was asked to consider whether the six kilograms of cocaine delivered to the informant or the entire forty kilograms contained in all four suitcases found in the hotel room were attributable to the defendant. 38 Even if a defendant claims to be unaware that he is transporting a certain quantity of contraband, the guidelines provide that he can nonetheless be held responsible for the conduct of his co-conspirators. Specifically, section 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) states that, in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity, all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity factor into the determination of the base offense level (emphasis added). Furthermore, commentary to the guidelines specifies that, in cases involving controlled substances, the defendant is accountable for all reasonably foreseeable quantities of contraband that were within the scope of the criminal activity that he jointly undertook. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, Commentary 2. This Court has adopted this guideline principle without reservation: 39 [T]he law of this circuit, which dictates that a defendant in a drug conspiracy is responsible not only for the drugs with which he was directly involved but also for any drugs reasonably foreseeable in connection with the criminal conduct that he agreed to undertake in furtherance of the conspiracy while he was a member of the conspiracy, flies in the face of [the defendant's] argument that he should be liable for only the cocaine directly attributable to him. See Nichols v. United States, 75 F.3d 1137, 1141 (7th Cir.1996) (citing U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)). A defendant is responsible for the acts of his co-conspirators if those acts (1) were reasonably foreseeable to the defendant and (2) were in furtherance of the conspiracy. See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 1183-84, 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946). The rule in Pinkerton, known as the aggregation rule, allows the district court to aggregate all the quantities of drugs involved in an entire, basic scheme of multiple defendants when it determines an individual defendant's base offense level. United States v. Taylor, 72 F.3d 533, 547-48 (7th Cir.1995) (citations and internal quotations omitted). This Court has repeatedly adopted the Supreme Court's Pinkerton standard. For example, in United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d 1494, 1503 (7th Cir.1993), the defendant was arrested for distributing 358 pounds of marijuana, but was later convicted by the trial court for being part of a conspiracy that distributed between 3,000 and 4,000 pounds of marijuana. This Court, implicitly adopting the Pinkerton rule, held that the amount of narcotics considered in sentencing a co-conspirator for a given conspiracy includes not only the amount involved in the transactions ... but also those that were reasonably foreseeable, reflecting the fact each conspirator is responsible for the acts and offenses of each one of his co-conspirators committed in the furtherance of the conspiracy. Id. at 1502 (citation and internal quotation omitted). In affirming the trial court's conviction, the Court concluded that the defendant was not hired to help off-load a single shipment [of marijuana] but was an active participant in the drug conspiracy. He aided in harvesting and transporting three or four loads of marijuana, was present at another delivery ... and knew of other conspirators involved. Id. at 1503 (internal quotation omitted). 40 Gray-Bey v. United States, 156 F.3d 733, 740-41 (7th Cir.1998). This Court has previously held that conduct of a coconspirator can be considered reasonably foreseeable to a particular defendant if that defendant has demonstrated a substantial degree of commitment to the conspiracy's objectives, either through his words or his conduct. United States v. Edwards, 945 F.2d 1387, 1393-94 (7th Cir.1991). As our sister circuit observed, a defendant who conspires to transport for distribution a large quantity of drugs, but happens not to know the precise amount, pretty much takes his chances that the amount involved will be quite large. United States v. De La Cruz, 996 F.2d 1307, 1314 (1st Cir.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 936, 114 S.Ct. 356, 126 L.Ed.2d 320 (1993). 41 In the case under consideration, the defendant maintains that he did not know that the suitcases he was transporting contained cocaine. Even if we were to give credence to Lezine's claim that he did not know of the contents of the suitcases before arriving in Chicago, he certainly knew after Patel opened the first bag. By leaving the remaining suitcases in his hotel room and by involving himself in the distribution of the first six kilograms, Lezine demonstrated a substantial commitment to the intended distribution of the entire shipment required by Edwards. By declining to distance himself from Patel after he allegedly discovered Patel's true intentions, the possibility that the scope of his agreement with Patel involved the disposal of all forty kilograms of cocaine was reasonably foreseeable. 42 Furthermore, the trial judge found Lezine's statement that he did not know the contents of the suitcases not credible, and Lezine has supplied nothing to convince this Court otherwise. Section 1B1.3(a)(1)(A) of the guidelines states that a defendant must be held accountable for all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant. In the situation where a defendant knowingly transports a suitcase containing illegal drugs, he is accountable for all the contraband regardless of whether he knows its amount or type. See Taylor, 72 F.3d at 541 (citing U.S.S.G. 1B1.3). [I]n a drug distribution case, according to the Guidelines Commentary, quantities and types of drugs not specified in the count of conviction are to be included in determining the offense level if they were part of the same course of conduct or part of a common scheme or plan as the count of conviction. Id. (citation, internal footnote, and internal quotations omitted); see also United States v. Garcia, 66 F.3d 851, 859 (7th Cir.1995); United States v. de Velasquez, 28 F.3d 2, 5-6 (2nd Cir.1994). This Court defers to the sentencing court's credibility determination because the presiding judge is in the best position to evaluate a witness's verbal as well as nonverbal behavior. See United States v. Edwards, 115 F.3d 1322, 1325 (7th Cir.1997). Since the trial judge made the determination that Lezine knew he was transporting contraband from Las Vegas to Chicago, Lezine is accountable for the full forty kilograms as he aided and willfully caused the transport of all forty kilograms under section 1B1.3(a)(1)(A) of the guidelines. 43 In sum, under section 1B1.3 of the guidelines, we agree with the trial court's finding that Lezine is accountable for forty kilograms of cocaine because of his direct participation in the drug conspiracy including, but not limited to, his transportation and distribution of the entire shipment. Furthermore, the distribution of the full forty kilograms of cocaine was a reasonably foreseeable result of the conspiracy pursuant to this Court's standard in Gray-Bey.