Opinion ID: 2582262
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Taylor's Probation Status

Text: During recross-examination, defendant sought to impeach Taylor with a felony conviction for welfare fraud and evidence that a couple of weeks ago, she had been placed on probation for drug possession in Santa Clara County. He argued that her probation status was relevant because of differences between her redirect testimony and her previous statements. The prosecutor responded that there was no evidence Taylor was attempting to curry favor with the prosecution. Until he questioned Taylor at trial, he had not spoken with her since the preliminary hearing. The court admitted Taylor's conviction but excluded her probation status as more prejudicial than probative. The ruling was within the court's discretion. There was neither evidence nor offer of proof that Taylor had spoken with anyone in law enforcement about the case around the time of her placement on probation or thereafter. The court did not bar defendant from seeking to show that Taylor had received benefits or promises for her testimony; it only prohibited evidence of her probationary status untethered to any specific showing that it could have affected her testimony. (See People v. Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1050-1051, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 607, 988 P.2d 531.) In short, defendant has failed to demonstrate that the prohibited cross-examination would have produced `a significantly different impression of [the witness's] credibility. . . .' [Citation.] Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion. ( Id. at p. 1051, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 607, 988 P.2d 531.)