Opinion ID: 2362254
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Expenses of Production of Records

Text: The Commissioner also challenges the Chancellor's order that the State bear the expenses of the production of the records subject to the subpoena. The Commissioner contends that T.C.A. § 67-1-1305, [5] which permits some exercise of discretion by him in determining the reasonableness and necessity of expenses incurred in responding to a subpoena, applies and that the Chancellor erred in awarding First Bank expenses under T.C.A. § 45-10-109. This provision of the Financial Records Privacy Act states: In all judicial proceedings the reasonable expenses of a financial institution in producing records in response to a subpoena shall be taxed as costs, without regard to the amount of any bond, and in all other instances, the issuer shall pay such financial institution's reasonable expenses incurred in complying with such subpoena. The financial institution shall submit to the issuer, either with the records or within thirty (30) days after delivering the records, a statement as to its charges for preparing and delivering the records. Charges by the financial institution at rates which do not exceed those established by the Internal Revenue Service of the Treasury Department of the United States of America shall be deemed reasonable unless otherwise determined by the appropriate court after notice and a hearing. We do not think that these two provisions are necessarily inconsistent. T.C.A. § 67-1-1305 does give the Commissioner some degree of discretion in determining the amount of expenses be paid, but both this section and T.C.A. § 45-10-109 are mandatory. The Commissioner does not have the authority to refuse to pay reasonable and necessary expenses under T.C.A. § 67-1-1305, which is clearly phrased in terms of  shall be reimbursed, and T.C.A. § 45-10-109 expressly permits the reasonableness of expenses to be submitted to a court for ultimate determination. Under either statute, reasonableness and necessity could be resolved by a court if the parties could not come to some agreement. While T.C.A. § 45-10-109 does presume that expenses not in excess of the rates of reimbursement established by the Internal Revenue Service are reasonable, this is only a presumption, unless otherwise determined by the appropriate court after notice and a hearing. General Brand conceded in oral argument that should the Commissioner abuse his discretion under T.C.A. § 67-1-1305, the party seeking reimbursement of expenses could obtain review of the Commissioner's determination in court. Consequently, a repeal or amendment by implication is not involved where any fair and reasonable construction will permit the statutes to stand together. Metropolitan Government of Nashville v. Hillsboro Land Co., Inc., supra, 222 Tenn. at 440, 436 S.W.2d at 854. Since there is no dispute as to the actual amount of these expenses in the instant case, we will not further address this issue at this time.