Opinion ID: 2527819
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Count ISection 24-1.6(a)(1)(3)(A)

Text: Count I of the information charged defendant with aggravated unlawful use of a weapon based on carrying an uncased, loaded and immediately accessible firearm in his vehicle in violation of section 24-1.6(a)(1)(3)(A) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1)(3)(A) (West 2004)). Section 24-1.6(a)(1)(3)(A) provides: (a) A person commits the offense of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon when he or she knowingly: (1) Carries on or about his or her person or in any vehicle or concealed on or about his or her person except when on his or her land or in his or her abode or fixed place of business any pistol, revolver, stun gun or taser or other firearm; [and]    (3) One of the following factors is present: (A) the firearm possessed was uncased, loaded and immediately accessible at the time of the offense[.] 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1)(3)(A) (West 2004). Thus, to prove aggravated unlawful use of a weapon under this section, there must be evidence that the firearm was (1) uncased, (2) loaded, and (3) immediately accessible. Defendant contends that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed an uncased gun where the uncontested evidence established that the gun was fully encased inside a closed, latched compartment. [1] Accordingly, defendant maintains that his conviction cannot be sustained under count I. In Diggins, we were called upon to interpret the meaning of the word case as used in the unlawful use of weapons statute, although with reference to the exceptions contained in paragraph (c) of section 24-1.6. [2] Looking to the plain and ordinary definition of case ( Diggins, 235 Ill.2d at 55, 335 Ill.Dec. 608, 919 N.E.2d 327), we concluded that the center console of a vehicle is a case ( id. at 58, 335 Ill.Dec. 608, 919 N.E.2d 327). As such, the defendant's conduct in Diggins, storing two unloaded handguns in the center console, fell within the exception outlined in paragraph (c). Accordingly, we found that the trial court erred in refusing the defendant's proposed jury instruction based on that section and erred in refusing to permit the defendant to argue the console was a case in his closing argument. Id. at 58, 335 Ill.Dec. 608, 919 N.E.2d 327. We remanded the cause for a new trial because a factual question remained as to whether the handguns were enclosed since there was conflicting evidence on whether the console was closed or ajar. Id. at 58, 335 Ill.Dec. 608, 919 N.E.2d 327. In this case, the gun was retrieved from the back armrest, which Officer Gonzalez himself described as a compartment. As with the front seat console in Diggins, we conclude that this backseat armrest, which contained a cover and latch, falls within the meaning of a case under section 24-1.6. Moreover, the evidence is undisputed that the armrest was closed and latched. As such, the gun was enclosed in a case. Because the firearm was enclosed in a case, the State failed to prove every element of the offense of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon as outlined in section 24-1.6(a)(1)(3)(A). Accordingly, a conviction for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, as charged in count I, cannot stand. Although defendant's conviction for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon cannot stand under count I, our inquiry does not end here. The jury returned a general verdict of guilty. It is well established in Illinois that where an indictment contains several counts arising out of a single transaction and a general verdict is returned, the effect is that the defendant is guilty as charged in each count to which the proof is applicable. People v. Cardona, 158 Ill.2d 403, 411, 199 Ill.Dec. 667, 634 N.E.2d 720 (1994). See also Hiner v. People, 34 Ill. 297, 304 (1864) (a rule of uniform application is that a general verdict may be sustained, although some counts are faulty, if there be one good count). Thus, we must determine whether defendant's conviction may be sustained under count II.