Opinion ID: 2506956
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Merger Doctrine and Second Degree Felony Murder

Text: (6) Although today we reaffirm the constitutional validity of the long-standing second degree felony-murder rule, we also recognize that the rule has often been criticized and, indeed, described as disfavored. (E.g., Patterson, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 621.) We have repeatedly stated, as recently as 2005, that the rule `deserves no extension beyond its required application.' ( People v. Howard, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1135.) For these reasons, although the second degree felony-murder rule originally applied to all felonies ( People v. Doyell, supra, 48 Cal. at pp. 94-95; Pike, What Is Second Degree Murder in California?, supra, 9 So.Cal. L.Rev. at pp. 118-119), this court has subsequently restricted its scope in at least two respects to ameliorate its perceived harshness. First, [i]n People v. Ford (1964) 60 Cal.2d 772, 795 [36 Cal.Rptr. 620, 388 P.2d 892], the court restricted the felonies that could support a conviction of second degree murder, based upon a felony-murder theory, to those felonies that are `inherently dangerous to human life.' ( Hansen, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 308.) Whether a felony is inherently dangerous is determined from the elements of the felony in the abstract, not the particular facts. ( Patterson, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 621.) This restriction is not at issue here. Section 246 makes it a felony to maliciously and willfully discharge a firearm at an . . . occupied motor vehicle . . . . [5] In Hansen, supra, at pages 309-311, we held that shooting at an inhabited dwelling house under section 246 is inherently dangerous even though the inhabited dwelling house does not have to be actually occupied at the time of the shooting. That being the case, shooting at a vehicle that is actually occupied clearly is inherently dangerous. But the second restrictionthe merger doctrineis very much at issue. The merger doctrine developed due to the understanding that the underlying felony must be an independent crime and not merely the killing itself. Thus, certain underlying felonies merge with the homicide and cannot be used for purposes of felony murder. The specific question before us is how to apply the merger doctrine in this case. In this case, the Court of Appeal divided on the question and on how to apply our precedents. But the majority and dissent agreed on one thingthat the current state of the law regarding merger is muddled. We agree that the scope and application of the merger doctrine as applied to second degree murder needs to be reconsidered. To explain this, we will first review the doctrine's historical development. Then we will discuss what to do with the merger doctrine and, ultimately, conclude that the trial court should not have instructed on felony murder.
(7) The merger doctrine arose in the seminal case of Ireland, supra, 70 Cal.2d 522, and hence sometimes is called the  Ireland merger doctrine. In Ireland, the defendant shot and killed his wife, and was convicted of second degree murder. The trial court instructed the jury on second degree felony murder with assault with a deadly weapon the underlying felony. We held the instruction improper, adopting the so-called `merger' doctrine that had previously been developed in other jurisdictions. ( Id. at p. 540.) We explained our reasons: [T]he utilization of the felony-murder rule in circumstances such as those before us extends the operation of that rule `beyond any rational function that it is designed to serve.' ( People v. Washington (1965) 62 Cal.2d 777, 783 [44 Cal.Rptr. 442, 402 P.2d 130].) To allow such use of the felony-murder rule would effectively preclude the jury from considering the issue of malice aforethought in all cases wherein homicide has been committed as a result of a felonious assaulta category which includes the great majority of all homicides. This kind of bootstrapping finds support neither in logic nor in law. We therefore hold that a second degree felony-murder instruction may not properly be given when it is based upon a felony which is an integral part of the homicide and which the evidence produced by the prosecution shows to be an offense included in fact within the offense charged. ( Id. at p. 539.) [6] We next confronted the merger doctrine in a second degree felony-murder case in Mattison, supra, 4 Cal.3d 177. As we later described Mattison 's facts, [i]n that case, the defendant and the victim both were inmates of a correctional institution. The defendant worked as a technician in the medical laboratory. He previously had offered to sell alcohol to inmates, leading the victim, an alcoholic, to seek alcohol from him. The defendant supplied the victim with methyl alcohol, resulting in the victim's death by methyl alcohol poisoning. [¶] At trial, the court instructed on felony murder based upon the felony of mixing poison with a beverage, an offense proscribed by the then current version of section 347 (`Every person who wilfully mingles any poison with any food, drink or medicine, with intent that the same shall be taken by any human being to his injury, is guilty of a felony.') (4 Cal.3d at p. 184.) The defendant was convicted of second degree murder. ( Hansen, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 313.) The Mattison defendant argued that the offense of administering poison with the intent to injure is an `integral part of' and `included in fact within the offense' of murder by poison within the meaning of Ireland, supra, 70 Cal.2d 522. ( Mattison, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 185.) We disagreed. The instant case . . . presents an entirely different situation from the one that confronted us in Ireland. The facts before us are very similar to People v. Taylor (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 57 [89 Cal.Rptr. 697], in which the victim died as a result of an overdose of heroin which had been furnished to her by the defendant. The defendant was convicted of second degree murder and the question presented was whether application of the felony-murder rule constituted error under Ireland. . . . [T]he Taylor court concluded that application of the felony-murder rule was proper because the underlying felony was committed with a `collateral and independent felonious design.' ( People v. Taylor, supra, 11 Cal.App.3d 57, 63.) In other words the felony was not done with the intent to commit injury which would cause death. Giving a felony-murder instruction in such a situation serves rather than subverts the purpose of the rule. `While the felony-murder rule can hardly be much of a deterrent to a defendant who has decided to assault his victim with a deadly weapon, it seems obvious that in the situation presented in the case at bar, it does serve a rational purpose: knowledge that the death of a person to whom heroin is furnished may result in a conviction for murder should have some effect on the defendant's readiness to do the furnishing.' ( People v. Taylor, supra, 11 Cal.App.3d 57, 63.) The instant case is virtually indistinguishable from Taylor, and we hold that it was proper to instruct the jury on second degree felony murder. ( Mattison, supra, 4 Cal.3d at pp. 185-186.) In People v. Smith (1984) 35 Cal.3d 798 [201 Cal.Rptr. 311, 678 P.2d 886], the defendant was convicted of the second degree murder of her two-year-old daughter. We had to decide whether the trial court correctly instructed the jury on second degree felony murder with felony child abuse (now § 273a, subd. (a)) the underlying felony. We reviewed some of the felonies that do not merge but found them distinguishable. ( People v. Smith, supra, at p. 805.) We explained that the crime at issue was child abuse of the assaultive variety for which we could conceive of no independent purpose. ( Id. at p. 806.) Accordingly, we concluded that the offense merged with the resulting homicide, and that the trial court erred in instructing on felony murder. Our merger jurisprudence took a different turn in Hansen, supra, 9 Cal.4th 300. In that case, the defendant was convicted of second degree murder for shooting at a house, killing one person. The trial court instructed the jury on second degree felony murder, with discharging a firearm at an inhabited dwelling house (§ 246) the underlying felony. The majority concluded that the crime of discharging a firearm at an inhabited dwelling house does not `merge' with a resulting homicide so as to preclude application of the felony-murder doctrine. ( Hansen, supra, at p. 304.) We noted that this court has not extended the Ireland doctrine beyond the context of assault, even under circumstances in which the underlying felony plausibly could be characterized as `an integral part of' and `included in fact within' the resulting homicide. ( Id. at p. 312.) We discussed in detail Mattison, supra, 4 Cal.3d 177, and People v. Taylor, supra, 11 Cal.App.3d 57, the case Mattison relied on. We agreed with Taylor 's rejection of the premise that Ireland 's `integral part of the homicide' language constitutes the crucial test in determining the existence of merger. Such a test would be inconsistent with the underlying rule that only felonies `inherently dangerous to human life' are sufficiently indicative of a defendant's culpable mens rea to warrant application of the felony-murder rule. [Citation.] The more dangerous the felony, the more likely it is that a death may result directly from the commission of the felony, but resort to the `integral part of the homicide' language would preclude application of the felony-murder rule for those felonies that are most likely to result in death and that are, consequently, the felonies as to which the felony-murder doctrine is most likely to act as a deterrent (because the perpetrator could foresee the great likelihood that death may result, negligently or accidentally). ( Hansen, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 314.) But the Hansen majority also disagreed with People v. Taylor, supra, 11 Cal.App.3d 57, in an important respect. We declined to adopt as the critical test determinative of merger in all cases language in Taylor indicating that the rationale for the merger doctrine does not encompass a felony `committed with a collateral and independent felonious design.' ( People v. Taylor, supra, 11 Cal.App.3d at p. 63; see also People v. Burton (1971) 6 Cal.3d 375, 387 [99 Cal.Rptr. 1, 491 P.2d 793].) Under such a test, a felon who acts with a purpose other than specifically to inflict injury upon someonefor example, with the intent to sell narcotics for financial gain, or to discharge a firearm at a building solely to intimidate the occupantsis subject to greater criminal liability for an act resulting in death than a person who actually intends to injure the person of the victim. Rather than rely upon a somewhat artificial test that may lead to an anomalous result, we focus upon the principles and rationale underlying the foregoing language in Taylor, namely, that with respect to certain inherently dangerous felonies, their use as the predicate felony supporting application of the felony-murder rule will not elevate all felonious assaults to murder or otherwise subvert the legislative intent. ( Hansen, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 315.) Hansen went on to explain that application of the second degree felony-murder rule would not result in the subversion of legislative intent. Most homicides do not result from violations of section 246, and thus, unlike the situation in People v. Ireland, supra, 70 Cal.2d 522, application of the felony-murder doctrine in the present context will not have the effect of `preclud[ing] the jury from considering the issue of malice aforethought . . . [in] the great majority of all homicides.' ( Id., at p. 539.) Similarly, application of the felony-murder doctrine in the case before us would not frustrate the Legislature's deliberate calibration of punishment for assaultive conduct resulting in death, based upon the presence or absence of malice aforethought.. . . [T]his is not a situation in which the Legislature has demanded a showing of actual malice (apart from the statutory requirement that the firearm be discharged `maliciously and willfully') in order to support a second degree murder conviction. Indeed, as discussed above, application of the felony-murder rule, when a violation of section 246 results in the death of a person, clearly is consistent with the traditionally recognized purpose of the second degree felony-murder doctrinenamely the deterrence of negligent or accidental killings that occur in the course of the commission of dangerous felonies. ( Hansen, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 315.) Hansen generated three separate opinions in addition to the majority opinion. Justice Werdegar authored a concurring opinion arguing that the operative test for the merger doctrine is whether the underlying felony was committed with a `collateral and independent felonious design.' ( Hansen, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 318.) She concurred in the judgment because [t]he evidence in this case supports the conclusion defendant entertained a collateral and independent felonious design under Mattison and Taylor, namely to intimidate Echaves by firing shots into his house. ( Ibid. ) Justices Mosk and Kennard each authored separate concurring and dissenting opinions. They would have concluded that the underlying felony merged with the resulting homicide, thus precluding use of the felony-murder rule. Justice Kennard argued that the prosecution's evidence did not show that defendant had any independent felonious purpose for discharging the firearm at the Echaves residence. That conduct satisfies this court's definition of an assault. ( Hansen, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 330.) People v. Tabios (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1 [78 Cal.Rptr.2d 753] involved the same issue as this casewhether shooting at an occupied vehicle under section 246 merges with the underlying homicide. Relying on Hansen, supra, 9 Cal.4th 300, the Court of Appeal found no merger. ( People v. Tabios, supra, at p. 11.) In Robertson, supra, 34 Cal.4th 156, the issue was whether the trial court properly instructed the jury on felony murder based on discharging a firearm in a grossly negligent manner. (§ 246.3.) As we later summarized, [t]he defendant in Robertson claimed he fired into the air, in order to frighten away several men who were burglarizing his car. ( People v. Randle (2005) 35 Cal.4th 987, 1005 [28 Cal.Rptr.3d 725, 111 P.3d 987] ( Randle ).) Robertson concluded that the merger doctrine did not bar a felony-murder instruction. ( Robertson, supra, at p. 160.) Its reasons, however, were quite different than Hansen 's reasons. The Robertson majority reviewed some of the cases discussed above, then focused on Mattison, supra, 4 Cal.3d 177. We said that the Mattison court believed that finding no merger under its facts was consistent with the deterrent purpose of the felony-murder rule, because we envisioned that application of the felony-murder rule would deter commission of the underlying inherently dangerous crime. ( Id. at pp. 185, 186.) Although a person who has decided to assault another would not be deterred by the felony-murder rule, we declared, a defendant with some collateral purpose may be deterred. The knowledge that a murder conviction may follow if an offense such as furnishing a controlled substance or tainted alcohol causes death `should have some effect on the defendant's readiness to do the furnishing.' ( Id. at p. 185.) ( Robertson, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 170-171.) We noted that Mattison, supra, 4 Cal.3d 177, focused on the fact that the underlying felony's purpose was independent of or collateral to an intent to cause injury that would result in death. ( Robertson, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 171.) Then we explained, Although the collateral purpose rationale may have its drawbacks in some situations ( Hansen, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 315), we believe it provides the most appropriate framework to determine whether, under the facts of the present case, the trial court properly instructed the jury. The defendant's asserted underlying purpose was to frighten away the young men who were burglarizing his automobile. According to defendant's own statements, the discharge of the firearm was undertaken with a purpose collateral to the resulting homicide, rendering the challenged instruction permissible. As Justice Werdegar pointed out in her concurring opinion in Hansen, a defendant who discharges a firearm at an inhabited dwelling house, for example, has a purpose independent from the commission of a resulting homicide if the defendant claims he or she shot to intimidate, rather than to injure or kill the occupants. ( Hansen, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 318 (conc. opn. of Werdegar, J.).) ( Ibid. ) In Robertson, the Court of Appeal had said that application of the merger doctrine was necessary in order to avoid the absurd consequence that `[d]efendants who admit an intent to kill, but claim to have acted with provocation or in honest but unreasonable self-defense, would likely have a stronger chance [than defendants who claimed I didn't mean to do it] of being convicted of the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter.' ( Robertson, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 172-173.) We responded: The asserted anomaly identified by the Court of Appeal is characteristic of the second degree felony-murder rule in general and is inherent in the doctrine's premise that it is reasonable to impute maliceor, more precisely, to eliminate consideration of the presence or absence of actual malicebecause of the defendant's commission of an underlying felony that is inherently and foreseeably dangerous. [Citations.] Reliance on section 246.3 as the predicate offense presents no greater anomaly in this regard than such reliance on any other inherently dangerous felony. ( Id. at p. 173.) Thus, the Robertson majority abandoned the rationale of Hansen, supra, 9 Cal.4th 300, and resurrected the collateral purpose rationale of Mattison, supra, 4 Cal.3d 177, at least when the underlying felony is a violation of section 246.3. Robertson generated four separate opinions in addition to the majority opinion. Justice Moreno's concurring opinion agreed that the refusal to apply the merger doctrine was correct under the current state of the law, but he was concerned whether the court should continue to adhere to the second degree felony-murder doctrine at all. ( Robertson, supra, at pp. 174-177.) Justice Brown argued in dissent that the second degree felony-murder rule should be abandoned entirely. ( Robertson, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 186-192.) In a separate dissent, Justice Kennard disagreed that defendant's claimed objective to scare the victim was a felonious purpose that was independent of the killing. ( Robertson, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 178.) She noted with approval that the majority, without explanation, abandon[ed] the rationale of the Hansen majority, and it return[ed] to the independent felonious purpose standard, which it had criticized in Hansen, supra, 9 Cal.4th 300. ( Id. at p. 180.) That was the test she had advocated in Hansen. ( Ibid. ) But she believed that the majority misapplied that test. An intent to scare a person by shooting at the person is not independent of the homicide because it is, in essence, nothing more than the intent required for an assault, which is not considered an independent felonious purpose. [Citation.] Two examples of independent felonious purpose come to mind: (1) When the felony underlying the homicide is manufacturing methamphetamine, the intent to manufacture this illegal drug is a felonious intent that is independent of the homicide, thus allowing the manufacturer to be convicted of murder if the methamphetamine laboratory explodes and kills an innocent bystander. (2) When the underlying felony is possession of a destructive device, the intent to possess that device is an independent felonious intent, allowing the possessor to be convicted of murder if the device accidentally explodes, killing an unintended victim. But when, as here, a defendant fires a gun to scare the victim, the intended harmthat of scaring the victimis not independent of the greater harm that occurs when a shot fired with the intent to scare instead results in the victim's death. ( Id. at p. 183.) In sum, it makes no sense legally to treat defendant's alleged intent to scare as `felonious' when such an intent is legally irrelevant [to guilt of the underlying felony] and when the jury never decided whether he had that intent. ( Ibid. ) Justice Werdegar also dissented, arguing that the underlying felony merged with the resulting homicide. She said she would like to join in the majority reasoning, which is consistent with my Hansen concurrence. But sometimes consistency must yield to a better understanding of the developing law. The anomalies created when assaultive conduct is used as the predicate for a second degree felony-murder theory (see dis. opn. of Kennard, J., ante, at pp. 180-182) are too stark and potentially too productive of injustice to be written off as `characteristic of the second degree felony-murder rule in general' (maj. opn., ante, at p. 173). It simply cannot be the law that a defendant who shot the victim with the intent to kill or injure, but can show he or she acted in unreasonable self-defense, may be convicted of only voluntary manslaughter, whereas a defendant who shot only to scare the victim is precluded from raising that partial defense and is strictly liable as a murderer. The independent and collateral purposes referred to in Mattison must be understood as limited to nonassaultive conduct. In circumstances like the present, the merger doctrine should preclude presentation of a second degree felony-murder theory to the jury. ( Robertson, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 185 (dis. opn. of Werdegar, J.).) In Randle, supra, 35 Cal.4th 987, the trial court, as in Robertson, instructed the jury on second degree felony murder, with discharging a firearm in a grossly negligent manner the underlying felony. ( Randle, supra, at p. 1004.) We found the instruction erroneous under the facts. Here, unlike Robertson, defendant admitted, in his pretrial statements to the police and to a deputy district attorney, he shot at Robinson [the homicide victim]. . . . [¶] The fact that defendant admitted shooting at Robinson distinguishes Robertson and supports application of the merger rule here. Defendant's claim that he shot Robinson in order to rescue [another person] simply provided a motive for the shooting; it was not a purpose independent of the shooting. ( Id. at p. 1005.) In People v. Bejarano (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 975 [57 Cal.Rptr.3d 486], as in People v. Tabios, supra, 67 Cal.App.3d 1, and this case, the trial court instructed the jury on second degree felony murder, with shooting at an occupied vehicle under section 246 the underlying felony. The court concluded that the collateral purpose requirement of Robertson, supra, 34 Cal.4th 156, and Randle, supra, 35 Cal.4th 987, applied. The facts of this case show that appellant discharged the firearm once, intending to shoot the motor vehicle's occupants, rival gang members, and not intending merely to frighten them. The bullet, however, struck and killed an unintended victim, the driver of another vehicle. ( People v. Bejarano, supra, at p. 978.) Relying primarily on Randle, supra, 35 Cal.4th 987, the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court erred in instructing on felony murder. Thus, Randle controls this case, the predicate felony merged with the homicide, and the trial court erred in instructing the jury on second degree felony murder based on discharging a firearm at an occupied motor vehicle in violation of section 246. ( People v. Bejarano, supra, at p. 990.) The most recent significant development is the Court of Appeal's opinion in this case. The majority noted that People v. Tabios, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th 1, had relied on Hansen, supra, 9 Cal.4th 300, in finding no merger, but then it also noted that this court returned to the Mattison collateral purpose rationale in Robertson, supra, 34 Cal.4th 156. After reviewing other recent cases, it stated, From this muddled state of the law, we discern the rule to be that second degree felony murder is applicable to an assaultive-type crime, such as when shooting at a person is involved, provided that the crime was committed with a purpose independent of and collateral to causing injury. Since the Supreme Court could have upheld instruction on felony murder in Randle on the basis that most homicides are not committed by negligently discharging a gun and did not, we conclude the collateral purpose rule is the proper test of merger in these types of cases. Regarding whether a collateral purpose exists in this case, the Court of Appeal majority noted that it had held defendant's statement that he had fired the gun `to scare them' should have been excluded. Without defendant's statements about firing the gun, the majority concluded, there was no admissible evidence of a collateral purpose by defendant or any of his companions. Indeed, the reasonable inference is that one who shoots another at close range intends to harm, if not to kill. Thus it found the court erred, prejudicially, in instructing on second degree felony murder. In dissent, Justice Nicholson agreed with the majority that the present state of the law is muddled. But he concluded that this court has not overruled Hansen, supra, 9 Cal.4th 300, and found that case, rather than Robertson, supra, 34 Cal.4th 156, or Randle, supra, 35 Cal.4th 987, to be on point. He believed that the only rule that can be gleaned from Robertson and Randle is that the collateral purpose rationale applies to cases involving a violation of section 246.3, which this case does not. Accordingly, he would have held that merger is inappropriate when the underlying offense is a violation of section 246.
The current state of the law regarding the Ireland merger doctrine is problematic in at least two respects. First, two different approaches currently exist in determining whether a felony merges. Hansen, supra, 9 Cal.4th 300, which we have never expressly overruled, held that a violation of section 246, at least when predicated on shooting at an inhabited dwelling house, never merges. Robertson, supra, 34 Cal.4th 156, and Randle, supra, 35 Cal.4th 987, held that a violation of section 246.3 does merge unless it is done with a purpose collateral to the resulting homicide. If Hansen, on the one hand, and Robertson and Randle on the other hand, are all still valid authority, the question arises which approach applies here. People v. Tabios, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th 1, relied on Hansen to conclude that shooting at an occupied vehicle under section 246 never merges. People v. Bejarano, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th 975, relied on the more recent Robertson and Randle opinions to conclude that the same felony does merge unless accompanied by a collateral purpose. The Court of Appeal here, rather understandably, divided on the question. This court has never explained whether Hansen retains any viability after Robertson and Randle and, if so, how a court is to go about determining which approach to apply to a given underlying felony. Second, Randle, when juxtaposed with Robertson, brings into sharp focus the anomaly that we noted in Robertson and accepted as inherent in the second degree felony-murder rule, and that we noted in Hansen and avoided by concluding that the merger doctrine never applies to shooting at an inhabited dwelling house. In combination, Robertson and Randle hold that, when the Hansen test does not apply (i.e., at least when the underlying felony is a violation of § 246.3), the underlying felony merges, and the felony-murder rule does not apply, if the defendant intended to shoot at the victim ( Randle ), but the underlying felony does not merge, and the felony-murder rule does apply, if the defendant merely intended to frighten, perhaps because he believed the victim was burglarizing his car ( Robertson ). This result is questionable for the reasons discussed in the separate opinions in Robertson. Moreover, as we discuss further below, the Robertson and Randle approach injected a factual component into the merger question that did not previously exist. (8) In light of these problems, we believe we need to reconsider our merger doctrine jurisprudence. As Justice Werdegar observed in her dissenting opinion in Robertson, sometimes consistency must yield to a better understanding of the developing law. ( Robertson, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 185.) In considering this question, we must also keep in mind the purposes of the second degree felony-murder rule. We have identified two. The purpose we have most often identified is to deter felons from killing negligently or accidentally by holding them strictly responsible for killings they commit. ( People v. Washington, supra, 62 Cal.2d at p. 781.) Another purpose is to deter commission of the inherently dangerous felony itself. ( Robertson, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 171 [the second degree felony-murder rule is intended to deter both carelessness in the commission of a crime and the commission of the inherently dangerous crime itself]; Hansen, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 310, 311, 314.) We first consider whether Hansen, supra, 9 Cal.4th 300, has any continuing vitality after Robertson, supra, 34 Cal.4th 156, and Randle, supra, 35 Cal.4th 987. In Robertson and Randle, we unanimously rejected the Hansen test, at least when the underlying felony is a violation of section 246.3. Although Hansen avoided the problems inherent in the Robertson approach by simply stating the felony at issue will never merge, we see no basis today to resurrect the Hansen approach for a violation of section 246.3. Indeed, doing so would arguably be inconsistent with Hansen 's reasoning. Hansen explained that most homicides do not involve violations of section 246, and thus holding that such homicides do not merge would not subvert the legislative intent. ( Hansen, supra, at p. 315.) But most fatal shootings, and certainly those charged as murder, do involve discharging a firearm in at least a grossly negligent manner. Fatal shootings, in turn, are a high percentage of all homicides. Thus, holding that a violation of section 246.3 never merges would greatly expand the range of homicides subject to the second degree felony-murder rule. We adhere to Robertson and Randle to the extent they declined to extend the Hansen approach to a violation of section 246.3. (9) But if, as we conclude, the Hansen test does not apply to a violation of section 246.3, we must decide whether it still applies to any underlying felonies. The tests stated in Hansen and in Robertson and Randle cannot both apply at the same time. If Hansen governs, the underlying felony will never merge. If Robertson and Randle govern, the underlying felony will always merge unless the court can discern some independent felonious purpose. But we see no principled basis by which to hold that a violation of section 246 never merges, but a violation of section 246.3 does merge unless done with an independent purpose. We also see no principled test that another court could use to determine which approach applies to other possible underlying felonies. The court in People v. Bejarano, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th 975, implicitly concluded that Robertson and Randle now govern to the exclusion of the Hansen test. We agree. The Robertson and Randle test and the Hansen test cannot coexist. Our analyses in Robertson and Randle implicitly overruled the Hansen test. We now expressly overrule People v. Hansen, supra, 9 Cal.4th 300, to the extent it stated a test different than the one of Robertson and Randle. Doing so also requires us to disapprove of People v. Tabios, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th 1. But the test of Robertson, supra, 34 Cal.4th 156, and Randle, supra, 35 Cal.4th 987, has its own problems that were avoided in Hansen but resurfaced when we abandoned the Hansen test. Our holding in Randle made stark the anomalies that Justices Kennard and Werdegar identified in Robertson. On reflection, we do not believe that a person who claims he merely wanted to frighten the victim should be subject to the felony-murder rule ( Robertson ), but a person who says he intended to shoot at the victim is not subject to that rule ( Randle ). Additionally, Robertson said that the intent to frighten is a collateral purpose, but Randle said the intent to rescue another person is not an independent purpose but merely a motive. ( Robertson, supra, at p. 171; Randle, supra, at p. 1005.) It is not clear how a future court should decide whether a given intent is a purpose or merely a motive. The Robertson and Randle test presents yet another problem. In the past, we have treated the merger doctrine as a legal question with little or no factual content. Generally, we have held that an underlying felony either never or always merges (e.g., People v. Smith, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 805 [identifying certain underlying felonies that do not merge]), not that the question turns on the specific facts. Viewed as a legal question, the trial court properly decides whether to instruct the jury on the felony-murder rule, but if it does so instruct, it does not also instruct the jury on the merger doctrine. The Robertson and Randle test, however, turns on potentially disputed facts specific to the case. In Robertson, the defendant claimed he merely intended to frighten the victim, which caused this court to conclude the underlying felony did not merge. But the jury would not necessarily have to believe the defendant. Whether a defendant shot at someone intending to injure, or merely tried to frighten that someone, may often be a disputed factual question. Defendant argues that the factual question whether the defendant had a collateral felonious purposeand thus whether the felony-murder rule appliesinvolves an element of the crime and, accordingly, that the jury must decide that factual question. When the merger issue turns on potentially disputed factual questions, there is no obvious answer to this argument. Justice Kennard alluded to the problem in her dissent in Robertson when she observed that the jury never decided whether he had that intent [to frighten]. ( Robertson, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 183.) Because this factual question determines whether the felony-murder rule applies under Robertson and Randle, and thus whether the prosecution would have to prove some other form of malice, it is not clear why the jury should not have to decide the factual question. (10) To avoid the anomaly of putting a person who merely intends to frighten the victim in a worse legal position than the person who actually intended to shoot at the victim, and the difficult question of whether and how the jury should decide questions of merger, we need to reconsider our holdings in Robertson, supra, 34 Cal.4th 156, and Randle, supra, 35 Cal.4th 987. When the underlying felony is assaultive in nature, such as a violation of section 246 or 246.3, we now conclude that the felony merges with the homicide and cannot be the basis of a felony-murder instruction. An assaultive felony is one that involves a threat of immediate violent injury. (See People v. Chance (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1164, 1167-1168 [81 Cal.Rptr.3d 723].) In determining whether a crime merges, the court looks to its elements and not the facts of the case. Accordingly, if the elements of the crime have an assaultive aspect, the crime merges with the underlying homicide even if the elements also include conduct that is not assaultive. For example, in People v. Smith, supra, 35 Cal.3d at page 806, the court noted that child abuse under section 273a includes both active and passive conduct, i.e., child abuse by direct assault and child endangering by extreme neglect. Looking to the facts before it, the court decided the offense was of the assaultive variety, and therefore merged. ( Smith, supra, 35 Cal.3d at pp. 806-807.) It reserved the question whether the nonassaultive variety would merge. ( Id. at p. 808, fn. 7.) Under the approach we now adopt, both varieties would merge. This approach both avoids the necessity of consulting facts that might be disputed and extends the protection of the merger doctrine to the potentially less culpable defendant whose conduct is not assaultive. This conclusion is also consistent with our repeatedly stated view that the felony-murder rule should not be extended beyond its required application. ( People v. Howard, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1135.) We do not have to decide at this point exactly what felonies are assaultive in nature, and hence may not form the basis of a felony-murder instruction, and which are inherently collateral to the resulting homicide and do not merge. But shooting at an occupied vehicle under section 246 is assaultive in nature and hence cannot serve as the underlying felony for purposes of the felony-murder rule. [7] We overrule People v. Robertson, supra, 34 Cal.4th 156, and the reasoning, although not the result, of People v. Randle, supra, 35 Cal.4th 987. This conclusion means the trial court erred in this case in instructing the jury on the second degree felony-murder rule. [8] We now turn to a consideration of whether this error was prejudicial.