Opinion ID: 4526201
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The MEML

Text: ¶14. Neither party disputes that there was a state of emergency in effect at the time of the accident and that MDOT’s actions were undertaken in response to the governor’s emergency proclamation, thus implicating the MEML. MDOT asserts that because an accident occurred during a declared state of emergency and because MDOT’s emergency-management activities failed to constitute willful misconduct, it is entitled to immunity under the MEML. ¶15. The Musgroves rely on a Mississippi Court of Appeals case’s definitions and interpretation of “reckless disregard” and “willful misconduct” to support their claim that “liability for willful misconduct under MEML appears to be the same as liability for reckless disregard under MTCA.” See Herndon v. Miss. Forestry Comm’n, 67 So. 3d 788 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011).4 But these definitions from Herndon undermine rather than support the Musgroves’ position. The Herndon court defined “reckless disregard” as “more than mere negligence, but less than an intentional act.” Herndon, 67 So. 3d at 796 (internal quotation 4 In Herndon, the Court of Appeals found that the Mississippi Forestry Commission (MFC) was immune both under the MTCA and the MEML because, although the employee’s conduct “may have been negligent,” the conduct did not constitute “reckless disregard of safety” or “willful misconduct.” Herndon, 67 So. 3d at 795. 7 marks omitted) (quoting Giles ex rel. Giles v. Brown, 31 So. 3d 1232, 1237 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009)). The court then defined “[w]illful misconduct” as “misconduct committed voluntarily and intentionally.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Willful misconduct, Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009)). This Court has explained “willful misconduct”: “Where the misconduct is wilful, there is an intentional injury.” Mason v. Shook, 240 Miss. 478, 486, 127 So. 2d 658, 661 (1961). These definitions establish that the two terms are distinct and that they are by no means identical or interchangeable. Reckless disregard is something less than an intentional act, which is the kind of act that is required to show willful misconduct. Nothing in the record demonstrates or even suggests an intention on the part of MDOT to harm the Musgroves or other motorists by the placement of limestone on the surface of a state highway during a winter-storm emergency. The Musgroves’ contention that the reckless-disregard standard from the MTCA and the willful-misconduct standard from the MEML are the same is without merit. ¶16. MDOT cites the Mississippi Court of Appeals case Parsons v. Mississippi State Port Authority at Gulfport to demonstrate how the MTCA does not override the MEML. See Parsons v. Miss. State Port Auth., 996 So. 2d 165 (Miss. App. Ct. 2008).5 “Statutes on the same subject, although in apparent conflict, should if possible be construed in harmony with each other to give effect to each.” Parsons, 996 So. 2d at 169 (citing Roberts v. Miss. 5 The issue before the appeals court in Parsons was “whether the [MTCA had] supersed[ed] the [MEML],” and the court found that the two should be “read in conjunction with each other” and that the MTCA did not supersede the MEML. Parsons, 996 So. 2d at 166, 169. The court also held, “the two statutes can be read together to provide immunity for the state and its agencies for its activities during times of emergency management while simultaneously being exempt from liability under the MTCA.” Id. at 169. 8 Republican Party State Exec. Comm., 465 So. 2d 1050, 1052 (Miss. 1985)). The Parsons court found that the MTCA did not override the MEML because the MEML “provides immunity to the state and its agencies for liability occurring during emergency situations.” Id. The MEML is a more narrow immunity statute than the MTCA, is applicable only in emergency situations, and can be defeated only by willful misconduct. ¶17. MDOT cites three federal cases that demonstrate how negligent acts in emergency situations do not constitute willful misconduct under the MEML. See Ecker v. United States, No. 1:07-cv-1101-HSO-JMR, 2009 WL 10706019 (S.D. Miss. May 6, 2009); Estate of Martin ex rel. Echoles v. United States, No. 1:08-cv-157-HSO-JMR, 2010 WL 2985471 (S.D. Miss. 2010); Lindsey v. Miss. State Port Auth., No. 1:06-cv-656-LG-RHW, 2006 WL 5209293 (S.D. Miss. 2006). Ecker and Martin involved a National Guard member who caused an automobile wreck while acting in response to a state of emergency. The federal district court in both cases found that there was “insufficient evidence indicating any willful misconduct” and granted immunity under the MEML. Ecker, 2009 WL 10706019, at ; Martin, 2010 WL 2985471, at . The Musgroves argue that these three cases are inapplicable because the plaintiffs there could not prove willful misconduct. While these federal cases are not binding on this Court, we find them persuasive. They correctly describe the way in which MEML immunity protects the state and its agencies from liability for negligent acts during a state of emergency, absent willful misconduct. The Musgroves have failed to adduce evidence proving that MDOT’s actions amounted to willful misconduct, not unlike the plaintiffs in the three federal cases. 9 B. Does MDOT have immunity for its placement of the limestone material on the road and its failure to warn of a dangerous condition? ¶18. The facts of this case implicate the MEML, which requires a finding of willful misconduct on the part of the state agency to foreclose MEML immunity. The question becomes whether MDOT’s placement of the limestone material on the road and its failure to warn amount to willful misconduct. The Musgroves argue that MDOT’s actions do constitute willful misconduct because: 1) MDOT “wrongfully” placed the limestone material on the road and did so without erecting warning signs and 2) MDOT “wrongfully” placed the limestone material on the road and “failed to clean up the gravel after having been warned about the dangerous condition it posed after having been alerted to the fact that another wreck had occurred earlier that same day.” ¶19. The Musgroves contend that MDOT’s acts of placing the limestone material on the road constituted willful misconduct because MDOT should not have placed the material on a highway leading into a curve without putting up warning signs. Again, “willful misconduct” is “misconduct committed voluntarily and intentionally.” Herndon, 67 So. 3d at 796 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Willful misconduct, Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009)). The Musgroves have failed to provide evidence demonstrating that MDOT’s placement of the limestone material and subsequent failure to warn was misconduct committed voluntarily and intentionally. “The party opposing the motion must be diligent and may not rest upon mere allegations or denials in the pleadings but must by allegations or denials set forth specific facts showing there are genuine issues for trial.” 10 Davis, 869 So. 2d at 401 (citing Richmond, 692 So. 2d at 61). MDOT’s placement of the material on the roadway was not governmental misconduct because MDOT was acting in response to the governor’s proclamation to “discharge their emergency responsibilities as deemed necessary as set forth in the State of Mississippi’s Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan.”6 Although MDOT intended for the limestone gravel to be placed on the road, its purpose was to make the road safer in keeping with the proclamation, not to cause harm intentionally. ¶20. MDOT was acting during a declared emergency, and its placement of the limestone and failure to warn of its presence could have been, at most, negligent conduct, which is the sort of tortious activity or inactivity for which the MEML shields state agencies from liability. It was the legislature’s express intent that the MEML would “provide for the rapid and orderly provision of relief” in emergency situations.7 Miss. Code Ann. § 33-15-2(2) 6 The Mississippi Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP) provides sixteen Emergency Support Function Annexes (ESFs), which identify the specific activities required to support each numbered function and specify the agencies and organizations that are responsible for performing those activities. Miss. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, Miss. Comprehensive Emergency Mgmt. Plan (Dec. 2017), https://www.msema.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/10/2018-State-CEMP-Basic-Plan.pdf. While the ESFs name and describe the specific tasks, they do not describe the detailed procedures to perform them. Id. One of the ESFs is the Transportation Response Annex, which names MDOT as the primary agency and lists several support agencies. One of the support agencies is the Mississippi Highway Safety Patrol, which, under the plan and during an emergency situation, “[a]ssume[s] responsibility for detouring traffic away from sites that have experienced severe infrastructure damage (traffic regulation and control).” Miss. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, Miss. Emergency Support Function #1 - Transportation Response Annex (Rev. June 2017), https://www.msema.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/2018_ESF_01.pdf. 7 “It is the intent of the Legislature to reduce the vulnerability of the people and property of this state . . . to provide for the rapid and orderly provision of relief to persons and for the coordination of activities relating to emergency preparedness, response, recovery 11 (Rev. 2010). The MEML gives state agencies freedom to deploy their emergencymanagement responsibilities rapidly and focus on “reduc[ing] the vulnerability of the people and property of this state,” free of concern about potential liability for negligent acts. Miss. Code Ann. § 33-15-2(2) (Rev. 2010). The trial court found that MDOT has a duty to maintain the roads at all times and there was “nothing to suggest that duty is diminished or somehow altered during an emergency situation.” But the legislature’s stated intent makes it unmistakably clear that the MEML does alter such duties during emergency situations. MDOT’s failure to place signs that warned of the gravel may have been negligent, but it did not rise to the level of willful misconduct. Therefore, that omission, even if misconduct, was clothed in the formidable armor of the MEML’s immunity provision. ¶21. The Musgroves argue also that there was willful misconduct by MDOT for having knowledge of a prior accident that occurred in the same general location as the Musgroves’ accident and by not placing warning signs after receiving this knowledge. But the Musgroves have failed to provide any specific facts to support their allegation that MDOT knew of the prior accident. The party opposing the motion cannot rest upon mere allegations and denials, but must provide “specific facts showing there are genuine issues for trial.” Davis, 869 So. 2d at 401 (citing Richmond, 692 So. 2d at 61). The Musgroves say that a “Mississippi Highway Patrolman confirmed that a wreck had taken place in the same location earlier in and mitigation among and between agencies and officials of this state . . . .” Miss. Code Ann. § 33-15-2(2) (Rev. 2010). 12 the day on which the Musgrove[s] were injured.”8 But the trooper’s testimony establishes merely that the Mississippi Highway Safety Patrol had knowledge of the prior accident; it does not establish that MDOT had knowledge of the prior accident. ¶22. MDOT’s placement of the limestone material on the road and its failure to warn of its presence did not constitute willful misconduct. Therefore, MDOT is entitled to MEML immunity. II. Whether the trial court erred by applying MTCA standards instead of the MEML’s willful-misconduct standard. ¶23. The Musgroves argue that the trial court correctly found that “genuine issues of material fact exists [sic] concerning [MDOT’s] liability under MTCA, from which it does not have liability under MEML,” because MDOT’s failure to warn subjected it to liability under MTCA. We find that the trial court erred by applying the wrong legal standard. ¶24. It appears the trial court undertook an MTCA analysis without being asked to do so.9 MDOT’s motion for summary judgment was based on the MEML, not the MTCA.10 The trial 8 According to the CEMP, the Mississippi Highway Safety Patrol during an emergency situation assumes the responsibilities of traffic regulation and control. Patrolman Holmes testified that he had been at the scene of an earlier accident just sixty yards away from where the Musgroves’ accident occurred. 9 The trial court may have applied the Brantley v. City of Horn Lake, 152 So. 3d 1106 (Miss. 2014), standard correctly; but this Court overruled Brantley in Wilcher v. Lincoln County Board of Supervisors, 243 So. 3d 177 (Miss. 2018), thereby reestablishing the public-policy function test. 10 It is apparent from the MDOT’s motion for summary judgment and the Musgroves’ response in opposition to MDOT’s motion for summary judgment that neither party raised the MTCA as an issue. In MDOT’s motion for summary judgment, it raised MEML immunity as a defense and, alternatively, asserted there was no duty owed to the Musgroves. In the Musgroves’ response, they argued that 1) MEML immunity did not apply because the 13 court mistakenly injected questions based on the MTCA into the discussion. In truth, the MTCA has nothing to do with this case. ¶25. The Musgroves are correct that this case bears some similarity to Wilcher v. Lincoln County Board of Supervisors, in which this Court found the governmental entity was liable because its actions created the dangerous condition and it failed to warn of the condition it had created. Wilcher v. Lincoln Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 243 So. 3d 177, 188 (Miss. 2018). But Wilcher is distinguishable from the Musgroves’ case because Wilcher did not occur under emergency circumstances that triggered the MEML. Id. But for this accident’s having occurred during a declared state of emergency, the Musgroves’ Wilcher argument might have had merit. ¶26. The trial court should not have applied the MTCA; its focus should have been on whether a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether MDOT’s conduct constituted willful misconduct.