Opinion ID: 2514340
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: New York Procedures

Text: In addition to the Kansas procedures that were available to M.P., Kansas law grants full faith and credit to any proceedings or actions taken under the laws of another state. K.S.A. 38-1114(d). Hence, under the unique facts of this case, M.P. could have availed himself of legal protections available in New Yorkthe state of his domicile, the location of the child's conception, N.T.'s location when M.P. first learned of the pregnancy, and the location to which N.T. promised to return. This means M.P. could have utilized the putative father registry as discussed in Lehr, 463 U.S. 248, 103 S.Ct. 2985. See Matter of Robert O., 80 N.Y.2d 254, 590 N.Y.S.2d 37, 604 N.E.2d 99 (father who failed to, inter alia, register with putative father registry cannot vacate adoption even though unaware of child's birth). In addition, New York allows paternity proceedings to be instituted during the pregnancy of the mother. 29A Judiciary, Family Court Act § 517 (McKinney 1999). M.P.'s use of these procedures might not have guaranteed he would receive notice in Kansas. Yet, cases from other jurisdictions illustrate that a putative father may develop a liberty interest or at least strengthen his argument that he has a liberty interest by attempting to utilize the procedure of his home state even though the mother moved to another state. For example, in Pena v. Mattox, 880 F.Supp. 567 (N.D.Ill.1995), both the father and mother were residents of Illinois. The mother was taken to Indiana to give birth, and the child was placed for adoption in Indiana. The father did not know of the child's birth or the initiation of adoption proceedings. When he became aware of the adoption he brought an action for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for other causes of action. The federal court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, finding the father did not have a liberty interest because he failed to seize opportunities to develop a relationship with his child. 880 F.Supp. at 570-74. In reaching this conclusion, the court concluded the fact the putative father now may stand ready to accept the responsibilities of a father was not a sufficient basis for the court to find a constitutionally protected liberty interest. 880 F.Supp. at 574. Instead, what was determinative was that the father failed to use the procedures of either Indiana or Illinois. The court noted the father could have brought a paternity action in Illinois, his home state, as soon as he was aware of the pregnancy and before the mother and her family prevented him from knowing about the child's location or adoption. In addition, he had several procedures available to him in Indiana, including a registry and paternity proceedings. 880 F.Supp. at 572-73. Responding to the father's arguments regarding the procedural and substantive difficulties he would have faced if he pursued these procedures, the court stated: It is important to note that this Court does not measure the constitutional interests present in this case by asking whether [the father] could have successfully established and protected his parental rights, however defined or limited. In the proper analysis, our focus is on the process established and available to [the father] to assert his rights in Illinois and Indiana, not on whether [he] could have succeeded in obtaining custody, visitation or any other rights of a parent. 880 F.Supp. at 573. Ultimately, his failure to act promptly meant he lost the wondrous opportunity and massive responsibilities of fatherhood. 880 F.Supp. at 574. In a second case involving the procedures of multiple states, Heidbreder v. Carton, 645 N.W.2d 355 (Minn.2002), the mother moved from Iowawhere the child was conceived-to Illinois and later Minnesotawhere the child was born and placed for adoption. Although the mother maintained e-mail contact with the father, she did not tell him where she was and instructed her family and friends not to give him any information about her location. The father was aware of the pregnancy and had expressed his desire that the child not be placed for adoption. The mother had told him she would never do this. The father met with an attorney to discuss visitation and child support, and the two of them discussed hiring a private investigator to find the mother. The father, however, took no steps to locate the mother. Nor did he initiate a paternity action or register with the Iowa Declaration of Paternity Registry. In filling out the birth certificate information, the mother left blank the space for the father's name. Adoption proceedings were initiated, and the adoptive parents took the child home from the hospital. Thirty-one days after the child's birth, the natural father learned of the birth. Through a website, the father learned of the Minnesota Fathers' Adoption Registry and completed and mailed the necessary forms. The forms were postmarked 31 days after the birth; the law required fathers to register within 30 days of the birth. Alternatively, if a father filed a paternity action within 30 days of the child's birth and the action was still pending at the time of an adoption, he would gain rights in the adoption. The father in Heidbreder had not taken this step. Because the father had failed to avail himself of the legal remedies in a timely fashion, the Minnesota Supreme Court held he was not entitled to notice of the adoption proceeding. 645 N.W.2d at 366-67, 369-70. Although the focus of the decision was on the father's failure to comply with Minnesota requirements, the court also noted that the father could have taken steps in his home state of Iowa to assert paternity. Exercising the option would have put [the father] in a position to argue he established a sufficient commitment to warrant due process protections even if there were procedural problems with fully prosecuting such an action in the mother's absence from the jurisdiction. 645 N.W.2d at 376. The court also discussed the impact of the Iowa registry. The court noted that if the father had registered in Iowa he would not have automatically been entitled to notice in the Minnesota proceeding but, like with the paternity action, it might have created a due process interest. Although the court did not decide the question because the father had not registered in Iowa, it stated: If registration with an adoption registry in any state is, by itself, sufficient to demonstrate a substantial commitment to the child, then arguably a putative father is entitled to due process protection regardless of whether state law recognizes such registration. 645 N.W.2d at 376 n. 16. In contrast, where a father utilized the procedure of his home state, even though unsuccessfully, the court held he had established a liberty interest. In In re M.N.M., 605 A.2d 921 (D.C.1992), the mother hid the location of the child and the adoption proceeding from the natural father. One week after the child's birth, the father filed a paternity action which led to him deposing the natural mother and the child's natural grandfather (the mother's father) in a futile attempt to determine where the adoption proceeding was filed. Having a suspicion the proceeding was filed in the Washington, D.C., area, the natural father sent letters to judges in Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia. Based upon these efforts and attempts to protect his legal rights, the court held the father had established a liberty interest. See 605 A.2d at 927-30.