Opinion ID: 1789377
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Suppression of Statements to the Police

Text: In Philmore's first claim on appeal, he challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress various statements he made to law enforcement before he was charged with the first-degree murder of Perron. First, Philmore claims that his statements were not freely and voluntarily given under the Fifth Amendment because Philmore believed that he would not receive the death penalty if he cooperated with authorities. Second, Philmore contends that Assistant Public Defender John Hetherington provided ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment in allowing Philmore to give multiple statements to authorities in which he gradually implicated himself in Perron's abduction and murder. On November 14, 1997, Philmore was arrested for trespassing on posted land after the police apprehended him and Spann in the orange grove following the high-speed chase in Perron's Lexus. On November 15, 1997, Detective Gary Bach, who was the lead investigator in the Indiantown bank robbery, interviewed Philmore after reading him his Miranda [12] rights. Philmore agreed to waive his rights and admitted that he was in Indiantown at the time of the bank robbery, he was in the bank, and he was in the Subaru that was used as a getaway car. Philmore then stated that he would speak to Detective Bach again, but first wanted to speak with an attorney. Detective Bach terminated the interview, and some time later that day, Hetherington was appointed to represent Philmore. [13] From November 18 through November 26, 1997, Philmore, in the presence of Hetherington, provided the police with several statements in which he ultimately confessed to the murder and abduction of Perron. However, Hetherington was not present for two statements that were given in conjunction with polygraph examinations. Philmore was provided Miranda warnings and signed a waiver before providing each statement. On December 16, 1997, Philmore agreed, again in the presence of Hetherington, to go before the grand jury and confess his involvement in the abduction and shooting of Perron. Philmore filed a pretrial motion seeking to suppress the statements he made while in custody and the admission of evidence obtained from those statements. Philmore contended that he was deprived of the right to effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment because Hetherington failed to protect Philmore's right to remain silent. Philmore also contended that based upon counsel's ineffectiveness, any statements made were not freely and voluntarily given under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Furthermore, Philmore contended that his statements were not freely and voluntarily given because he believed that if he gave a full and honest statement, he would not be subject to the death penalty. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing and ultimately denied Philmore's motion to suppress the statements made to law enforcement on November 18, November 21, and November 26, 1997, but granted the motion with regard to the statements made during the polygraph exams on November 20 and November 23, 1997. The court explained: [T]he Court finds that with competent assistance of counsel, the Defendant gave free and voluntary statements on November 18th, 1997, November 21st, 1997, and November 26, 1997. The Court specifically finds that there were no promises made to the Defendant in exchange for his testimony, and there were no threats made, no coercion made to the Defendant in order to get him to make the statements, that he did so on his own free will and again in the presence of a competent counsel as contemplated under the constitution. With regards to the statements made during the polygraph examination, the Court agrees with Mr. Bauer's recitation of the facts that any free and voluntary waiver of the presence of Mr. Hetherington was specifically conditioned on being questioned and answers given consistent with those that were given during the statements. Moreover, the detective as well as Mr. Hetherington testifiedthat protocol wouldn't allow Mr. Hetherington in the room. And while the Court's aware of the written waiver of the Defendant, it's the Court's view that that does not equate to a free and voluntary waiver of counsel during the time of the polygraph examination. Accordingly, the Motion to Suppress is denied as it relates to the statements made to law enforcement on November 18th, '97, November 21st, '97, November 26th, '97, is granted as it isrelates to any statement made while with law enforcement in the polygraph room outside of the presence of Mr. Hetherington. The trial court later denied Philmore's motion to suppress as it related to the December 16, 1997, grand jury testimony. Turning to the Fifth Amendment issue, we conclude that Philmore's statements were freely and voluntarily given. This Court recently explained that appellate courts accord a presumption of correctness to a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress with regard to the trial court's determination of historical facts, but must independently review mixed questions of law and fact that ultimately determine constitutional issues arising in the context of the ... Fifth Amendment. Connor v. State, 803 So.2d 598, 608 (Fla.2001). A review of the testimony and evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing in this case supports the trial court's finding that the statements were freely and voluntarily made. Philmore contends that the only reason he provided statements to the police is because he believed that if he cooperated, he would avoid the death penalty. At the evidentiary hearing on this issue, Hetherington testified that he never made a quid pro quo agreement with Philmore that if Philmore cooperated with police, he would avoid the death penalty. Furthermore, Assistant State Attorney Thomas Bakkedahl testified at the evidentiary hearing that he refused to discuss pleas or charging decisions with either Philmore or Hetherington until he knew what the truth was in this case. Even Philmore conceded at the evidentiary hearing that no one gave him any promises as to the consequences of his cooperation with the police. Rather, Philmore contended that he was led to believe that if he cooperated, he would not face the death penalty. This Court has held that [s]tatements suggesting leniency are only objectionable if they establish an express quid pro quo bargain for the confession. Bruno v. State, 574 So.2d 76, 79-80 (Fla.1991). Moreover, Philmore admitted at the evidentiary hearing that Miranda warnings were administered before he gave each statement, and that he knowingly waived his Miranda rights in writing before giving each statement. Furthermore, Philmore stated that he never told the police while they were administering Miranda warnings that either Hetherington or Bakkedahl had promised him anything in exchange for his cooperation. The trial court concluded that there were no promises or threats made to Philmore in exchange for his testimony, and that Philmore provided statements to the police based upon his own free will. We agree. Therefore, because Philmore freely and knowingly waived his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent in this case, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying Philmore's motion to suppress his statements on Fifth Amendment grounds. As for Philmore's ineffective assistance claim under the Sixth Amendment, we decline to review this claim at the direct appeal stage. The claim is denied without prejudice to reraise the claim in a rule 3.850 motion. See McKinney v. State, 579 So.2d 80, 82 (Fla.1991) (Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are generally not reviewable on direct appeal but are more properly raised in a motion for postconviction relief.); Kelley v. State, 486 So.2d 578, 585 (Fla.1986) (same). Therefore, we deny Philmore relief on this claim.