Opinion ID: 450747
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: cherry's consent to the second search

Text: 36 At the suppression hearing before Cherry's second trial, the sole basis the government asserted for the admission of the pistol, bullets, and pistol case discovered above Cherry's ceiling was the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule. This may have been so because in Cherry I we stated that Cherry's consent to the second search was the unlawful product of the government's inquiry regarding the gun. 733 F.2d at 1132 n. 15. On remand, this statement--clearly implying that Cherry's consent was tainted as the fruit of the Miranda violation--became the law of the case and prevented the parties from reconsidering the effect of the consent apart from that taint. Similarly, since the second search was clearly conducted in response to Cherry's description of the location of the evidence supplied immediately following the Miranda violation, the application of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine to the Miranda violation no doubt discouraged the parties from arguing that consent was not needed to perfect the search. On appeal, the government for the first time defends the district court's admission of the pistol and other items on the additional ground that, contrary to our statement in Cherry I, the search of the ceiling above Cherry's barracks was (1) not tainted by the Miranda violation and (2) conducted pursuant to Cherry's valid consent under the fourth amendment. Although it is our practice to treat as conclusive the prior determinations by this court of issues presented in earlier appeals of the same case, we have stated that such a rule is not an inexorable command and should not be followed when  'controlling authority has since made a contrary decision of the law applicable to such issues.'  Daly v. Sprague, 742 F.2d 896, 900 (5th Cir.1984) (quoting White v. Murtha, 377 F.2d 428, 431-32 (5th Cir.1967)); see also United States v. McClain, 593 F.2d 658, 664 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 918, 100 S.Ct. 234, 62 L.Ed.2d 173 (1979). Because we find that, in light of the recent Supreme Court case of Oregon v. Elstad, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985), our statement in Cherry I no longer reflects the current state of the law, we are compelled at this juncture to reconsider the validity of Cherry's consent to the second search under both the fourth and the fifth amendments and remand for appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law. 17 37 Oregon v. Elstad concerned whether a confession made after the police gave a suspect proper Miranda warnings is inadmissible on the ground that the police had earlier obtained an unwarned admission from the suspect. In considering the issue with respect to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, 18 the Supreme Court initially noted that a violation of Miranda is not a violation of the fifth amendment itself. Rather, Miranda established a nonconstitutional prophylactic rule, the violation of which creates an irrebutable presumption of coercion that is applicable in only a limited number of circumstances. For instance, while the presumption requires suppression of unwarned statements for purposes of the prosecution's case-in-chief, the presumption does not bar introduction of the incriminating statements for impeachment purposes on cross-examination. 19 When an unwarned statement is used in situations where the presumption does not apply, the primary criterion of admissibility [remains] the 'old' due process voluntary test. Id. at ----, 105 S.Ct. at 1293 (citations & quotations omitted). Based on the foregoing and relying heavily on Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974), the Court then held that, where there is no actual infringement of a suspect's constitutional rights, mere departures from the Miranda rule did not require the exclusion of derivative evidence. 20 This principle was stated to be applicable regardless of whether the alleged fruit of a noncoercive Miranda violation is an article of evidence or the accused's own voluntary testimony. Said the Court: 38 Because Miranda warnings may inhibit persons from giving information, this Court has determined that they need be administered only after the person is taken into custody or his freedom has otherwise been significantly restrained. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S., at 478 [86 S.Ct., at 1630]. Unfortunately, the task of defining custody is a slippery one, and policemen investigating serious crimes [cannot realistically be expected to] make no errors whatsoever. Michigan v. Tucker, supra, [417 U.S.,] at 446 [94 S.Ct., at 2364]. If errors are made by law enforcement officers in administering the prophylactic Miranda procedures, they should not breed the same irremediable consequences as police infringement of the Fifth Amendment itself. It is an unwarranted extension of Miranda to hold that a simple failure to administer the warnings, unaccompanied by any actual coercion or other circumstances calculated to undermine the suspect's ability to exercise his free will so taints the investigatory process that a subsequent voluntary and informed waiver is ineffective for some indeterminate period. Though Miranda requires that the unwarned admission must be suppressed, the admissibility of any subsequent statement should turn in these circumstances solely on whether it is knowingly and voluntarily made. 39 Id. at ----, 105 S.Ct. at 1292. 40 Our statement in Cherry I that Cherry's consent to the second search was the tainted product of the violation of his Miranda rights does not survive the Supreme Court's holding in Elstad. While Cherry's confession and other incriminating statements remain inadmissible under the prophylactic rule, the validity of Cherry's consent and the admissibility of the derivative evidence depend solely on whether they are the product of an actual violation of a constitutional right. With respect to the fourth amendment, the government asserts that Cherry's consent was voluntary and not causally related to Cherry's initial illegal arrest. We discuss this argument infra and remand for appropriate fact findings. With respect to the fifth amendment, the government is silent, perhaps in reliance on the district court's finding at the first suppression hearing that Cherry's incriminating statements were voluntary and thus not violative of the fifth amendment. 21 However, because the district court did not adopt or even refer to this finding at the second suppression hearing, we also remand the issue whether Cherry's description of the location of the pistol or confession were violative of the fifth amendment. If the district court finds such a violation, it must then determine whether the violation tainted the subsequent consent or, if consent was unnecessary, whether the violation otherwise tainted the evidence found in Cherry's ceiling. 22
41 In arguing that Cherry's consent to the search of the ceiling above his barracks was voluntary under the fourth amendment, the government relies principally on Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973), and United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980). In these cases, the Supreme Court held that the voluntariness of a consent to search is to be determined by the totality of all the circumstances. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 557, 100 S.Ct. at 1879. Neither of these cases, however, dealt with a situation in which the consent at issue was made subsequent to an illegal arrest. We have held that under these circumstances the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine applies and therefore voluntariness is merely a threshold requirement. United States v. Robinson, 625 F.2d 1211, 1220 (5th Cir.1980); see also Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 690, 102 S.Ct. 2664, 2668, 73 L.Ed.2d 314 (1982); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 217, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 2259, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979). Moreover, it is well established in this circuit that, in attempting to prove voluntary consent following an illegal arrest, the government bears a heavier burden than when consent is given after a legal arrest. United States v. Melendez-Gonzalez, 727 F.2d 407, 414 (5th Cir.1984); United States v. Ballard, 573 F.2d 913, 916 (5th Cir.1978); United States v. Jones, 475 F.2d 723, 730 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 841, 94 S.Ct. 96, 38 L.Ed.2d 77 (1973). 42 Under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, in addition to proving voluntariness, the government must show a sufficient break in events to undermine the inference that the consent to search was caused by the fourth amendment violation. Oregon v. Elstad, --- U.S. at ----, 105 S.Ct. at 1292. The focus on the causal connection between the illegality and the consent serves the policies and interests of the fourth amendment because, when the causal connection is close, not only is exclusion of the evidence more likely to deter similar police misconduct in the future, but also use of the evidence is more likely to compromise the integrity of the courts. Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 218, 99 S.Ct. at 2259; see also Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. at 690, 102 S.Ct. at 2667; Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 599, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 2259, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975). The Supreme Court, however, has consistently refused to adopt a per se or but for rule that would render inadmissible any evidence obtained through a chain of causation with the illegal arrest; rather, whether the link between the illegality and the evidence requires the application of the exclusionary rule must be determined by balancing the rule's policies with  'the strong interest ... of making available to the trier of fact all concededly relevant and trustworthy evidence which either party seeks to adduce.'  United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 278, 98 S.Ct. 1054, 1061, 55 L.Ed.2d 268 (1978) (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 450-51, 94 S.Ct. at 2367). 43 In Brown v. Illinois, the Supreme Court identified several factors to be considered in determining whether a consent to search was obtained by exploitation of the illegal seizure: (1) [t]he temporal proximity of the arrest and the [consent], (2) the presence of intervening circumstances, and (3) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. 422 U.S. at 603-04, 95 S.Ct. at 2261-62; see also Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 218, 99 S.Ct. at 2259. The relative importance of each of these factors in any particular case of course depends on the circumstances of that case. When the challenged item is the result of a volitional act, for example, often the primary criterion is whether the act was sufficiently one of free will to purge the primary taint. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 108-09, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 2563, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980); United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 276-78, 98 S.Ct. at 1060-61. Even in such cases, however, attenuation analysis must take into account all facts that have some impact on the strengths of the respective interests. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. at 108-09, 100 S.Ct. at 2563; 3 W. Lafave, Search and Seizure Sec. 11.4(a) (1978); J. Hall, Search & Seizure Sec. 22:2-:3 (1982). 44 At oral argument, the government suggested that, because at least by the time Cherry consented to the second search probable cause existed for his detention, attenuation analysis need not be applied to the facts of this case. Citing the Third Circuit case of United States ex rel. Wright v. Cuyler, 563 F.2d 627 (3d Cir.1977), in support of its claim, the government apparently argues that the intervening advent of probable cause for Cherry's detention was per se sufficient to render the consent free from taint. 23 This argument is without merit. The acquiring of probable cause by the police between an illegal arrest and a suspect's consent to search neither logically breaks the causal chain between the two as a matter of course nor in view of the purposes of the exclusionary rule necessarily attenuates that relation to the point that the evidence need not be excluded. As we have seen, the theory underlying the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine is that, when there is a close causal connection between the prior police misconduct and the availability of the challenged evidence, the evidence should be suppressed since the deterrent value of exclusion outweighs the competing interest in having all probative evidence put before the factfinder. If a suspect's consent to search following an illegal arrest were to be free from taint merely because at the moment of consent his detention was lawful, regardless of the egregiousness of the fourth amendment violation or its role in obtaining the consent, arrests made without probable cause would be encouraged, especially in those cases where the police have strong reason to believe that they will obtain probable cause at some point in the investigation independently of the unlawful detention. The intervening discovery of probable cause to support a suspect's detention, by itself, cannot assure in every case that the Fourth Amendment violation has not been unduly exploited. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. at 603, 95 S.Ct. at 2261. 45 Yet, while we decline to hold that the curing of an illegal arrest purges the taint of a subsequent consent as a matter of law, we think that the intervening acquisition of probable cause is an important attenuating factor in the analysis. To the extent that a suspect's consent to search is attributable to his lawful detention and not the prior illegal arrest, the causal connection between the initial illegality and the consent is weakened. As a result, the balance of competing interests underlying the exclusionary rule correspondingly tips in favor of a finding of attenuation and the admission of the derivative evidence. See United States v. Manuel, 706 F.2d 908, 911-12 (9th Cir.1983) (treating advent of probable cause as one intervening factor in attenuation analysis); United States v. Nooks, 446 F.2d 1283, 1287-88 (5th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 945, 92 S.Ct. 299, 30 L.Ed.2d 261 (1971); cf. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 92 S.Ct. 1620, 32 L.Ed.2d 152 (1972) (taint purged from lineup following illegal arrest because of intervening hearing before magistrate at which suspect was advised of rights and the alleged arrest was converted into lawful detention). 24 46 Because the validity of a consent to search obtained by the police subsequent to an illegal arrest is an issue that must be resolved in the first instance by the district court, see United States v. Robinson, 625 F.2d at 1220; United States v. Wilson, 569 F.2d 392, 397 (5th Cir.1978), we vacate the judgment of the district court and remand the issue, along with the fifth amendment issue described above, to the district court for complete findings and conclusions under the appropriate standards. If the district court determines that Cherry's consent to the second search was voluntary within the meaning of the fourth amendment and untainted by Cherry's prior illegal arrest or by a violation of the fifth amendment, the judgment must be reinstated. If the district court finds otherwise, it must suppress the evidence and discharge the defendant.