Opinion ID: 1377776
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Motor Vehicle Division's Shift of Position.

Text: The MVD, as appellant, stated in its blue brief in the Court of Appeals:  Former 486.221 governs Dooney's suspension. This was not a typing mistake. Later in a footnote it said: ORS 486.221 does not apply to all suspension or revocations of drivers' licenses. It does govern here. Dooney, in his red brief in the Court of Appeals responded as follows: Dooney does not necessarily agree that a clear reading of former ORS 486.221 applies as MVD concedes, but if it does, State v. Tooley, supra , clearly established that former ORS 486.221 provides the right to a presuspension hearing. The only question remaining would, therefore, revolve around the sufficiency of the notice of intent to suspend. Dooney argues, however, that he is afforded a separate and distinct right to a presuspension hearing, apart from what may be afforded by former ORS 486.221, under former ORS 482.540(2). That statute provided in part that MVD was to allow:    a 20-day period after the mailing of said notice to request in writing a hearing    if no request is filed within the 20-day period, the division shall thereupon suspend the license.... (Emphasis by Dooney.) MVD, as petitioner in this court, abandons its position that former ORS 486.221 governs Dooney's suspension and states: The Division suspended Dooney's license pursuant to ORS 482.540 which, along with ORS 482.560(3), requires the opportunity for a pre-suspension hearing. [1] I would not allow MVD to change its position in this court. It should be required to keep the position that it took in the Court of Appeals. If ORS 486.221 applied to Dooney's suspension, then Tooley controls and the MVD is a clear loser, because the notice did not advise Dooney that he was entitled to a presuspension hearing.