Opinion ID: 773559
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine and Standing

Text: Grendell also claims that an application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine 1 ensures his standing in this case. In District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983) 2 , Feldman challenged in state court 3 a District of Columbia bar admission rule which required bar applicants to submit proof of graduation from an American Bar Association accredited law school. Feldman, a bar certified lawyer in both Virginia and Maryland, received his legal education through a program of structured apprenticeship endorsed by the state of Virginia. See id. at 465, 103 S. Ct. 1303. Given his unusually high qualifications, Feldman sought immediate admission to the District of Columbia bar, or in the alternative, a waiver of the bar admission rule and an opportunity to sit for the bar examination. Id. at 467, 468-69, 103 S. Ct. 1303. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals eventually upheld the bar admission regulation and dismissed the case. Feldman then brought suit in federal court, arguing that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals had acted unconstitutionally. The federal district court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See id. at 470, 103 S. Ct. 1303. The Supreme Court agreed, noting that a federal district court has no subject matter jurisdiction over state supreme court proceedings that are judicial in nature, and that review of such proceedings is available only in the United States Supreme Court. See id. at 476, 103 S. Ct. 1303 (citing 28 U.S.C. §1257). The Supreme Court then stated that a judicial inquiry is when the court was called upon to investigate, declare, and enforce liabilities as they [stood] on present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist. Id. at 479, 103 S. Ct. 1303 (internal quotes and citation omitted). Consequently, Feldman could not make a collateral attack in federal district court on the District of Columbia Court of Appeals decision to dismiss the bar application, since that decision involved whether Feldman would be qualified for an exception to the bar application rule under those specific facts. See id. at 480-81, 103 S. Ct. 1303. However, the Supreme Court then drew a distinction between state court determinations that were judicial in nature, and those that were legislative, ministerial or administrative. Id. at 479, 103 S. Ct. 1303. Under such a distinction, a review of the state court decision denying the particular bar application might run afoul of federalism, but a general challenge to the constitutionality of the bar admission rule would not. Id. at 482-83, 103 S. Ct. 1303. This is because a general constitutional challenge would not require a district court to review a final state-court judgment in a judicial proceeding; rather, the district court may simply be asked to assess the validity of a rule promulgated in a nonjudicial proceeding. Id. at 486, 103 S. Ct. 1303. Consequently, a district court would have subject matter jurisdiction to assess a general constitutional challenge to a state court rule. See id. at 487, 103 S. Ct. 1303. As noted earlier, Grendell's initial complaint sought a TRO to prevent the enforcement of sanctions imposed by the Ohio Supreme Court in State of Ohio ex rel. Grendell. Recognizing that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine likely barred federal district court review of the imposition of sanctions -- as that would involve lower federal court review of the Ohio Supreme Court's judgment in State of Ohio ex rel. Grendell -- Grendell voluntarily amended this initial complaint to a general constitutional challenge to Rule XIV, § 5. Given this conformity with the strictures of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the district court reasoned that if the Supreme Court expressly stated that applicants for admission to the bar have standing to bring a general constitutional challenge to the bar admission rule in Feldman, then Grendell must have standing to bring a general constitutional challenge to Rule XIV, § 5 in this case. Sargus Opinion and Order of 11/5/99, J.A. at 45. 1 We disagree. As an initial matter, the district court's assertion that, in Feldman, the Supreme Court found that the litigants had standing, is imprecise. This Court recognizes that Feldman expressly found that the district court in that case has subject matter jurisdiction over [the general constitutional challenge] of [Feldman's] complaint[]. Feldman, 420 U.S. at 487. Given that standing is an essential component of jurisdiction in the federal courts, see e.g. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-51 (1984), it is understandable that the district court in this case would conflate such language with an explicit finding of standing. However, the central holding of Feldman is that jurisdictional statutes, such as 28 U.S.C. § 1257, prohibit federal district court review of a state supreme court judgment, but do not limit the jurisdiction of the federal district court as it relates to general constitutional challenges of state court rules. In this context, then, the Supreme Court's statement concerning subject matter jurisdiction in Feldman is most naturally read as a conclusion concerning the proper jurisdictional scope of constitutional challenges to state court rules, and should not be read as implicating the standing of a litigant seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. 2 Such a construal of the holding in Feldman is also consistent with prior precedent. As the Supreme Court has previously noted, when questions of jurisdiction have been passed on in prior decisions sub silentio, this Court has never considered itself bound when a subsequent case finally brings the jurisdictional issue before us. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 535 n. 5 (1974). This is especially true as it relates to the issue of standing, perhaps the most important of [the jurisdictional] doctrines. FW/PBS v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990). Accordingly, the Supreme Court's determination inFeldman concerning a federal district court's subject matter jurisdiction over a general constitutional challenge, made without comment as to the standing of the litigants, cannot be construed as implying that all general constitutional challenges made in recognition of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine confer standing on those litigants. Indeed, other circuit courts have refused to endorse the notion that a claim's conformity with the strictures of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine absolves a litigant from establishing proper standing. See Landers Seed Co., Inc. v. Champaign Nat'l Bank, 15 F.3d 729, 732 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that if the plaintiff sought review of a state court verdict in lower federal court, theRooker-Feldman doctrine barred jurisdiction; and if the plaintiff sought only declaratory and injunctive relief in recognition of the Rooker-Feldman limitation, it would not have standing to sue); Facio v. Jones, 929 F.2d 541, 544-45 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that a plaintiff did not have standing to seek declaratory relief, since under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine he was [u]nable to attack the final [state court] default judgment rendered against him, and he could not show that he will again be subject to the [state court] default provisions which would give rise to an actual controversy). 3 Even if this Court were to construe the Supreme Court's language in Feldman as an implication that the litigants had achieved standing, the facts of that case are clearly distinguishable from the present case. In Feldman, the plaintiff made a general constitutional challenge to the District of Columbia bar application rule. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 487 n. 18. While not permitted to challenge the District of Columbia Court of Appeals decision to deny his application, Feldman could nevertheless reapply to sit for the District of Columbia bar examination. As the Tenth Circuit notes, Feldman still had an interest in practicing law in the state or district involved and therefore had standing to assert that the restrictive bar admission rules should be declared unconstitutional. Facio, 929 F.2d at 545. Said differently, because Feldman was prohibited from admission to the bar, he was subject to the continuing, present adverse effects necessary to establish standing for declaratory and injunctive relief. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983). 4 In this case, however, Grendell cannot establish such continuing, present adverse effects. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine and 28 U.S.C. § 1257 effectively foreclose review of the Ohio Supreme Court's decision to impose sanctions in State of Ohio ex rel. Grendell in the lower federal courts. Accordingly, such sanctions are final, and cannot be overturned even if Rule XIV, § 5 is later held facially unconstitutional. See Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Trs. of the UMWA Combined Benefit Fund, 249 F.3d 519, 523-24 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting that a change in decisional law on constitutional grounds is rarely an extraordinary circumstance meriting relief from final judgment). As noted earlier, Grendell also has not established that the Ohio Supreme Court has threatened sanctions against him in the cases from which he voluntarily withdrew or any other case currently before that Court. Accordingly, he is not subject to the continuing harm of Rule XIV, § 5, and therefore lacks standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief. 5 As a final note, although we take a dim view of Grendell's claim that Rule XIV, § 5, on its face, violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, we reach our conclusion in this case solely on the issue of standing. As this Court will not issue advisory opinions, we decline to comment on the merits of Grendell's constitutional claim. See Johnson v. Turner, 125 F.3d 324, 336-37 (6th Cir. 1997) (noting that the standing requirement has been construed to prohibit advisory opinions).