Opinion ID: 2510525
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: District Court's Failure to Address Pro Se Motions

Text: The court appointed David Reed to represent the defendant on August 22, 2002. On October 22, 2002, the defendant filed a pro se Motion for Relief of Court Appointed Counsel arguing: (1) that the attorney/client relationship had deteriated [ sic ] and gotten off to a wrong start, leaving the defendant with no confidence in his counsel's representation; (2) that counsel had breached the duty and obligation owed to the defendant by failing to protect his interests and defend him with the required professional skill and energy needed; (3) that a conflict of interest existed between the defendant and counsel based on the reasons listed and his letters to counsel which were never answered; and (4) that his constitutional rights to effective assistance of counsel would be violated if Reed continued as his counsel. The defendant did not serve Reed with a copy of this motion, nor was it addressed at the preliminary hearing on October 30, 2002. On October 31, 2002, the defendant sent a letter to the clerk of the district court inquiring about his motion for relief of court-appointed counsel that he had filed which has not been put to use. The letter stated that he would like to fire Reed and wanted Reed terminated off of my case, summarized the claims set forth in his motion, and asked why he had not received a new attorney. A handwritten note at the bottom of the letter stated: We filed your motion for new attorney on 10-22. You were in court yesterday, but we don't know if you discussed this or not. Only the Judge can make a change. On November 6, 2002, the defendant filed three pro se motions to suppress, a motion for discovery, a motion for writ of habeas corpus, and a motion to proceed pro se. The latter motion asked the court that he be able to proceed as pro se and retain the attorney as consultant in an advisery [ sic ] capacity. Wyandotte County District Judge J. Dexter Burdette sent Reed a letter dated November 7, 2002, which provided in relevant part: Attached please find correspondence forwarded to this office from your client, Mr. Vann. Would you please contact your client and explain to him that this Court does not entertain motions filed by defendants when they have an attorney. These motions should be filed by their attorney when deemed appropriate. After consulting with your client, if it is determined that you desire a hearing on this matter, contact my office and one will be scheduled. The only attachment to this letter in the record is the defendant's October 31, 2002, letter to the clerk of the district court, which identified defendant's contentions regarding his conflict with counsel and his desire that a new attorney be appointed. On the first day of trial, the prosecutor reminded the court that the defendant had filed pretrial motions. The trial judge responded that he ordinarily did not hear pro se motions when the defendant has representation; however, if the defendant wanted to talk them over with his attorney and have him bring them before the court, he would hear them. The court asked the prosecutor what the motions were, and he replied: They're all bare bones motions to suppress any blood evidence, witness testimony, I mean, things that don't make any sense to the State, Your Honor. The Court responded: I see them in the file and I see that Judge Burdette wrote him concerning them, . . . and that Mr. Reed has in fact filed similar motions in this case, which I assume have been heard. Have your motions all been heard for discovery? Reed answered, Yes, Your Honor, and stated that he did not have any more motions. The defendant did not say anything to the court regarding his motions at this time. The defendant first raised the issue of his pro se motions for new counsel before the court at the motion for new trial hearing: THE DEFENDANT: . . . Furthermore, Your Honor, I would like to address to the Court about a motion that was filed October 22 in which this motion was filed for relief of court-appointed counsel, Mr. David Reed. I can get this out of here for you. Here it is, Your Honor. But for the last four months, Your Honor, I have been trying to get this man dismissed from this case due to the irreconcilable differences that cannot be compromised, due to the fact of the conflict of interest. I believe that this man did not represent me with the proper representation when it came to trial. I don't know how this goes, Your Honor, but this motion was filed and yet it was not entertained. And I can't go to trial. THE COURT: We took up pretrial motions the day of trial. If you had a problem you should have brought it up at that time. THE DEFENDANT: I was informed that it was not in my best interests to do that. THE COURT: Well, but the motion is filed. After we go to sentencing, Mr. Vann, I'll appoint the appellate public defender to represent you on your appeal. And you won't have Mr. Reed anymore. Mr. Reed is perfectly competent to handle your sentencing. THE DEFENDANT: There's no way I could get a different attorney? THE COURT: I told you when theafter sentencing I will appoint the appellate public defender to handle your appeal. Mr. Reed is competent to handle your sentencing. At sentencing, the defendant again brought up the issue of his pro se motion for new counsel: Then I have a motion that was filed about the ineffective assistance of counsel which was filed October 22. I also have letters here to Kathleen Collins complaining about it. Then she told me to bring it up in the court. And I brought it up to Judge Burdette. He said he wouldn't entertain the motions unless it was filed by my attorney. And I was about to fire my attorney so I was forced to go to trial due toyou know, we have a conflict of interest between me and my attorney, which I feel, hey, that's a violation right there. How can I have a fair trial if I have somebody not defending me to the best of their ability, or representing me to the best of their ability? The district court ignored defendant's questions and proceeded to sentencing. Before the Court of Appeals, the defendant argued the district court erred in refusing to consider his motions to discharge counsel and to allow him to proceed pro se. The panel rejected this argument, reasoning: Vann's claim of a conflict of interests was contained in a handwritten pro se motion filed before his preliminary hearing. He had multiple opportunities thereafter to bring it to the court's attention but failed to do so. The trial court's duty to inquire into a claimed conflict of interests arises only when the court is advised of the claim. When the issue of pro se motions was first raised immediately before trial, Vann stood mute when the State characterized the motions as simply repetitive discovery motions that had already been ruled upon. His posttrial assertion of the motion was simply too late. A defendant cannot lay in the weeds on such a significant issue that should be addressed well before trial and wait until after an unsuccessful trial outcome to raise it for the first time. Similarly, Vann's posttrial assertion of his motion to proceed pro se was untimely. As noted in State v. Hollins, 9 Kan. App. 2d 487, 489, 681 P.2d 687 (1984): `A defendant can assert the right to self-representation only by waiving the right to counsel, and, unlike the right to counsel, the right to self-representation can be waived by mere failure to assert it.' Here, Vann apparently considered his motion to proceed pro se as his `Get Out of Jail Free' card. He filed it, failed to serve it on his counsel, failed to seek a hearing, stood silent when the court inquired about unresolved pretrial motions, and waited until after conviction to bring it to the court's attention. Vann, slip op. at 7-8.