Opinion ID: 1850321
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Even Under the Majority's New Standard, the Trial Court Committed Error.

Text: ¶ 81. In reversing the bright-line sequestration rule in capital cases, the majority adopts the standard set forth in Gladney v. Clarksdale Beverage Co., 625 So.2d 407, 414 (Miss.1993) and finds no error in the manner in which the trial court handled this matter, nor in its ruling. Contrary to the majority's assertion, the trial court made no findings of fact or law on this issue, and simply did not follow the procedures set out in Gladney. ¶ 82. First, the majority holds that under Gladney it was the trial court's duty to decide whether it was reasonably possible that this communication altered the verdict. However, the judge made no determination as to whether the juror's violation of the sequestration order warranted a mistrial. She stated only that her concern was preserving whatever evidence there may be on this issue. The defendant did not raise the issue at trial or in his post-trial motions, and it is simply untrue that the trial court obviously decided that Batteast's cell phone calls did not alter the verdict. Because the trial court never issued a ruling on the matter, it failed to fulfill its required duty. ¶ 83. Second, Gladney makes repeatedly clear that jurors will not be heard to give evidence as to their own misconduct, but will be heard to give evidence concerning the misconduct of others calculated to be influential to the verdict. Id. at 414 (citing Schmiz v. Illinois Central Gulf R.R. Co., 546 So.2d 693, 695 (Miss.1989)). This same rule is clearly set out in our Rules of Evidence: [A] juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon his or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing him to absent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning his mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. M.R.E. 606(b). Accordingly, the trial court also erred in asking Batteast to testify regarding her own misconduct. ¶ 84. Our trial courts need and deserve clear standards, especially when fundamental constitutional rights are implicated. See Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 85 S.Ct. 546, 13 L.Ed.2d 424 (1965) (holding that juror misconduct violates a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury); Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 87 S.Ct. 468, 17 L.Ed.2d 420 (1966) (holding that juror misconduct may also violate a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him). Today's holding provides little direction for trial judges who may be faced with juror misconduct in capital cases.