Opinion ID: 2552508
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admissibility of I.Q. Test/Mental Age Assessment

Text: ¶ 17 Defendant next contends that Wright's testimony was inadmissible because the I.Q. test and mental age assessment upon which Wright relied in forming his opinion do not meet the inherent reliability requirement as set forth in State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989). We conclude that defendant's reliance on Rimmasch is mistaken. ¶ 18 Initially, it is important to note that Wright did not attempt to submit these assessments into evidence, but relied on them solely as two of many bases for his conclusions. Much of what experts rely upon in formulating opinions is inadmissible evidence. However, experts are called into court to give their expert opinions, and they must be allowed to explain the foundation for that opinion. Patey v. Lainhart, 1999 UT 31, ¶ 33, 977 P.2d 1193; see also United States v. Farley, 992 F.2d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir.1993); Hickok v. G.D. Searle & Co., 496 F.2d 444, 447 (10th Cir.1974). Thus, our inquiry is not whether the I.Q. test and mental age assessment were themselves admissible evidence, but whether Wright could properly use these tests along with other factors in making his ultimate conclusions as to the victim's ability to comprehend a sexual relationship. The admission of expert testimony is governed by Utah Rule of Evidence 703, which provides: The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence. Defendant argues that the inherent reliability standard set forth in Rimmasch in conjunction with rule 703 is the appropriate measure of whether Wright could properly rely upon these mental assessments in forming his opinion. We disagree. ¶ 19 We held in Rimmasch that while rule 703 is the general rule for the admission of all expert testimony, where expert testimony is based upon novel scientific principles or techniques, courts should apply the inherent reliability standard. See Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 396. Here, there is no plausible claim that the type of expert testimony offered by the prosecution was based on novel scientific principles or techniques. In fact, our case law recognizes a long history of using I.Q. tests, see, e.g., State v. Dutchie, 969 P.2d 422, 428 (Utah 1998) (I.Q.testing); Gardner v. Holden, 888 P.2d 608, 612 (Utah 1994) (I.Q.testing); State v. Mabe, 864 P.2d 890, 891 (Utah 1993) (I.Q.testing); State ex rel. Winger v. Davis, 558 P.2d 1311, 1314 (Utah 1976) (I.Q.testing); State ex rel. Mario A., 30 Utah 2d 131, 134, 514 P.2d 797, 799 (1973) (I.Q.testing); State ex rel. Pilling v. Lance, 23 Utah 2d 407, 411, 464 P.2d 395, 397 (1970) (I.Q.testing), and mental age assessments, see, e.g., State v. Hallett, 856 P.2d 1060, 1063 (Utah 1993) (mental age assessment); State v. Murphy, 760 P.2d 280, 281 (Utah 1988) (mental age assessment). Thus, reliance on Rimmasch is misplaced. ¶ 20 The appropriate standard is set forth in State v. Clayton, 646 P.2d 723 (Utah 1982): [O]nce the expert is qualified by the court, the witness may base his opinion on reports, writings or observations not in evidence which were made or compiled by others, so long as they are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in that particular field. The opposing party may challenge the suitability or reliability of such materials on cross-examination, but such challenge goes to the weight to be given the testimony, not to its admissibility. Id. at 726 (emphasis added); see also Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832, 839 (Utah 1984). The inquiry, then, is whether there was evidence supporting the trial court's ruling that these types of tests are of the sort experts in Wright's field reasonably and regularly rely upon. ¶ 21 As an MRP, special education teacher, and director of Medallion Manor, Wright writes and implements programs individually tailored to disabled individuals to help them achieve their full potential. In doing so, he uses the evaluations of social workers, psychologists, doctors, and psychiatrists in tailoring a program that best meets the capabilities and needs of the individual client. Wright specifically stated that he regularly uses standardized I.Q. tests and mental age assessments made by psychologists as a factor in determining what each individual is capable of achieving and how to best meet those educational goals. Such testing is necessary for MRPs in writing their programs and is required of facilities such as Medallion Manor to meet their licensing mandates. ¶ 22 Defendant has offered no evidence to contradict the common usage of such tests by MRPs, and as mentioned above, our case law demonstrates the oppositethat use of such tests by experts testifying as to the mental capabilities of disabled individuals is reasonable and regular. ¶ 23 Defendant also argues that the I.Q. test and mental age assessment were impermissible bases of opinion because Wright did not conduct the testing himself. Yet Utah Rule of Evidence 703 states that [t]he facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. Rule 703 clearly permits expert opinion to be based on information made known to the expert, not only on information perceived by the expert. For example, in Gardner v. Holden, 888 P.2d 608 (Utah 1994), testimony given by an expert as to the defendant's judgment or ability to reason that was based on a number of psychological and medical records, none of which were performed by the expert, was admissible. See id. at 618-19. Thus, under our case law, it is not necessary for experts to have perceived all aspects of their testimony personally.