Opinion ID: 767990
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Production and Rebuttal

Text: 34 Because Cline has successfully made a prima facie showing, we next must consider the rebuttal phase: did St. Paul satisfy its burden of producing a nondiscriminatory reason for the non-renewal, and can Cline meet her burden of establishing that this reason was a mere pretext? The district court concluded that St. Paul satisfied its burden of articulating a nondiscriminatory reason. It also concluded that Cline did not demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to whether that reason was pretextual. While we agree with the first conclusion, we disagree with the second. 35
36 First, we agree with the district court that St. Paul successfully articulated a nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. The burden on St. Paul is to rebut the presumption of discrimination by producing evidence that the plaintiff was rejected . . . for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254. This is a burden of production; although [t]he defendant need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons, it must raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff. Id. To do this, the defendant must clearly set forth . . . the reasons for the plaintiff's rejection, and that explanation must be legally sufficient to justify a judgment for the defendant. Id. at 255. 37 St. Paul satisfied this burden by asserting that it did not renew Cline's contract because she violated her clear duties as a teacher by engaging in premarital sex. This conclusion squares with Boyd and Ganzy, where schools articulated similar reasons as their motivation for termination. See Boyd, 88 F.3d at 414 (agreeing with the district court's conclusion that the defendant articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason by stating that it fired plaintiff Boyd not because she was pregnant, but for engaging in sex outside of marriage); Ganzy, 995 F. Supp. at 359 (stating that the defendant-school discharge[d] its burden of production when it stated that Ganzy violated its religious teachings by engaging in premarital sexual activity). As in those cases, St. Paul has simply explain[ed] what [it] has done [and] produce[d] evidence of legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. 38
39 The presumption of discrimination having been rebutted, the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of specificity, with Cline shouldering the burden of demonstrat[ing] that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-56. This burden merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination. Id. Once again, therefore, Cline must answer the ultimate question: did St. Paul discriminate against her becauseshe was pregnant, or for engaging in sex outside of marriage in violation of the school's moral code? Boyd, 88 F.3d at 414; see also Ganzy, 995 F. Supp. at 349; Dolter, 483 F. Supp. at 270. 40 Because Cline enjoys a full and fair opportunity to make this showing, Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, she can pursue several avenues of discovery. First, she can show intentional discrimination directly by showing that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer than the reason the employer proffered. Id. at 256. Second, she can indirectly show pretext by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. Id. In the pregnancy discrimination context in particular, Cline also may show that St. Paul enforced its premarital sex policy in a discriminatory manner--against only pregnant women, or against only women. See Boyd, 88 F.3d at 414. This is because a school violates Title VII if, due purely to the fact that [w]omen can become pregnant [and] [m]en cannot, Ganzy, 995 F. Supp. at 344, it punishes only women for sexual relations because those relations are revealed through pregnancy. See also Vigars v. Valley Christian Ctr., 805 F. Supp. 802, 808 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (stating that an anti-premarital sex policy violates Title VII if it is enforced solely through observing pregnancy, because such a policy subjects only women to termination for something that men would not be, and that is sex discrimination, regardless of the justification put forth for the disparity). In other words, a school can not use the mere observation or knowledge of pregnancy as its sole method of detecting violations of its premarital sex policy. 41 In assessing Cline's attempts to show pretext, the district court far too hastily sided with St. Paul. Factually, this case is a tightly-waged battle. Cline presented a variety of concrete evidence casting into doubt the reason St. Paul proffered--that it decided not to renew her contract because she had violated its blanket policy against premarital sex--and raising an issue of fact as to whether the treatment was due to her pregnancy. Most importantly, she presented evidence that the school continued to view her as sufficiently qualified to teach: the complimentary evaluation (mentioning both her personal and professional life), its consideration of other options for some time before opting to terminate her, and Father Willman's suggestion in the record that things might have worked out differently had Cline notified him of her pregnancy sooner. She also produced some evidence showing that the school may have focused more on the fact of her pregnancy than her sexual activity. For instance, she testified to conversations and produced statements in which school officials explicitly discussed her pregnancy rather than her sexual actions. Finally, Cline adduced evidence that the policy was not applied equally among men and women. St. Paul officials acknowledged in their depositions that Cline's pregnancy alone had signaled them that she engaged in premarital sex, and that the school does not otherwise inquire as to whether male teachers engage in premarital sex. At oral argument, counsel for St. Paul conceded that it was only Cline's pregnancy that made it evident that she had engaged in premarital sex. These admissions raise an issue of material fact as to whether St. Paul enforces its policy solely by observing the pregnancy of its female teachers, which would constitute a form of pregnancy discrimination. 42 No doubt, St. Paul may have sharp retorts to many of Cline's factual claims. Indeed, many of its responses could well convince a trier of fact of its case. But at this stage in the trial, the district court's and our role is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. To do so, the court must look at theevidence and make all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Cline. See National Enterprises, Inc., 114 F.3d at 563. If, in that light, the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, a trial--and not summary judgment--is warranted. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Observed in a light most favorable to her, Cline has clearly offered evidence sufficient to leap this hurdle. 43 The district court's contrary conclusion reflects an errant approach to the summary judgment stage. At each step of its analysis, rather than drawing inferences in Cline's favor, the court credited St. Paul's account over Cline's. For instance, the court rebuts Cline's statements that conversations with Fr. Willman centered on her pregnancy by finding that Fr. Willman has explained that plaintiff's pregnancy was significant only because it accurately demonstrated her decision to have premarital sex. J.A. at 338. This disagreement is a crucial dispute over a key material fact; rather than reserving it for the trier of fact to resolve, the court has favored the school's explanation. St. Paul asks us to do the same throughout its brief. 9 This and other examples of crediting St. Paul's factual contentions amid a genuine factual dispute fly in the face of the Supreme Court's warning that the district court must not weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter at the summary judgment stage. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. 44 Finally, St. Paul's frequent reliance on Boyd, which concluded that Boyd's claim did not survive the rebuttal stage, does not help its argument here; indeed, that case bolsters Cline's arguments. In Boyd, this Court did not review an order of summary judgment, but affirmed a bench trial decision. Its affirmance on the merits therefore provides no support for St. Paul's arguments that Cline is not entitled to a trial at all. The fact that the parties in this case have waged vigorous factual disputes over the central factors the Boyd Court considered in its holding--namely, whether the school applied its standards in a discriminatory manner, and whether the school's policy was based on pregnancy or premarital sex--underscores that in this case there is indeed a genuine dispute over the most important material facts. This further highlights the district court's error in granting summary judgment.