Opinion ID: 1057949
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: R. Vaughn: Additional Issues

Text: R. Vaughn argues that Sindle was ineffective by failing to investigate adequately and prepare for the pre-trial motion to suppress the gun found at the residence in Alabama. Specifically, R. Vaughn argues that Sindle should have called his Alabama relatives as witnesses at the suppression hearing to establish standing to challenge the validity of the search warrant. If Sindle had put on such proof, he could have challenged the search as exceeding the scope of the warrant, thereby preventing the introduction of the gun into evidence. The trial court at the post-conviction hearing credited Sindle's testimony that R. Vaughn had told him unequivocally not to involve his relatives in the case and that it was for this reason that Sindle did not call the relatives to testify at the suppression hearing. The trial court found R. Vaughn's testimony to the contrary to be not credible. Because of the deference given to the trial court's findings of fact, particularly with regard to issues of credibility, see Burns, 6 S.W.3d at 461, we hold that the evidence presented at the post-conviction hearing does not preponderate against the trial court's finding that Sindle's conduct with respect to the motion to suppress was not deficient. Therefore, R. Vaughn has failed to satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test, which requires the petitioner to show that counsel's actions were so deficient as to fall below the objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Furthermore, R. Vaughn failed to show prejudice. Even if the gun had not been introduced into evidence, there were multiple eyewitnesses who identified him as one of the shooters.
R. Vaughn argues that Sindle was ineffective by failing to object to the jury instructions on the definition of knowingly with respect to the second degree murder charge. The trial court instructed the jury: For you to find the defendant guilty of this offense [of second degree murder] the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of the following essential elements: 1. That the Defendant unlawfully killed the alleged victim; and 2. That the Defendant acted knowingly. Knowingly means that a person acts knowingly with respect to the conduct or the circumstances surrounding the conduct when the person is aware of the nature of the conduct or that the circumstances exist. A person acts knowingly with respect to the result of the person's conduct when the person is aware that the conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. R. Vaughn relies on State v. Keith T. Dupree, No. W1999-01019-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 91794 (Tenn.Crim.App. Jan. 30, 2001), and State v. Page, 81 S.W.3d 781 (Tenn.Crim.App.2002). In Page , the Court of Criminal Appeals interpreted the definition of knowingly, holding that second degree murder is strictly a result of conduct offense, and a jury instruction allowing a jury to convict based only upon awareness of the nature of the conduct or circumstances surrounding the conduct improperly lessened the State's burden of proof. 81 S.W.3d at 788. Page was decided six years after R. Vaughn's trial. We agree with the post-conviction court that Sindle cannot be held ineffective for failing to anticipate Court of Criminal Appeals' holding with regard to the jury charge on the mens rea of knowingly. Moreover, in State v. Faulkner, 154 S.W.3d 48, 59 (Tenn.2005), this Court limited the holding in Page , concluding that [t]he superfluous language in the `knowingly' definition did not lessen the burden of proof because it did not relieve the State of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted knowingly.
R. Vaughn makes several arguments with respect to witnesses. First, he argues that Sindle was deficient for not interviewing all of the State's witnesses. He argues that this conduct falls below the standard for adequate trial preparation that was discussed in Baxter , namely that a defense attorney should ensure that all available defenses are raised by interviewing not only his own witnesses but also those that the government intends to call, when they are available. 523 S.W.2d at 933. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that Sindle was not deficient in this respect because he reviewed the State's discovery, and he also watched parts of J. Vaughn's trial in which many of the same witnesses were called and cross-examined. We agree. Moreover, R. Vaughn has failed to show any prejudice  he offered no evidence at the post-conviction hearing as to the benefit that such additional interviews would have provided. Second, R. Vaughn argues that Sindle failed to adequately establish his alibi defense. R. Vaughn argues that Sindle was deficient for only calling one alibi witness, Robin Malone (Malone), whose testimony was then impeached with a prior inconsistent statement. Malone testified that she saw R. Vaughn outside a club called Big Robert's, which is approximately two to three blocks from Wing-Its, immediately before hearing shots fired. However, the State offered rebuttal testimony from Detective Susan Morrow who had interviewed Malone before the trial, and according to Morrow, Malone stated that she had seen R. Vaughn running on Blythe Street immediately after hearing shots fired. Blythe Street is not next to Big Robert's, but is in the general area behind Wing-Its. Sindle explained at the post-conviction hearing that before he decided to call Malone as a witness, he specifically asked her if she had given any prior statements, which she denied doing. Sindle found Malone to be a credible witness and attempted to ensure that she had not given any other information to the police. Given these circumstances, the fact that she was then impeached by an inconsistent statement does not make Sindle's decision to call her as a witness deficient. Again, tactical choices made by counsel are given deference and the courts must not measure trial counsel's deficiency by 20-20 hindsight. Cooper, 847 S.W.2d at 528. R. Vaughn also contends that Sindle should have called Sammy Alexander (Alexander) as a witness because Alexander's testimony would have cast doubt on the credibility of one of the State's key eyewitnesses, Keith Goodrich (Goodrich). At J. Vaughn's trial, Alexander testified that Goodrich had told him that the shooters were wearing ski masks. Sindle chose not to call Alexander as a witness. He explained that there were credibility problems with many of the witnesses, and he had to decide whether Alexander would do more harm than good to the defense. Alexander had previously been convicted of voluntary manslaughter. Thus, Sindle's decision not to call him as a witness was a legitimate tactical decision that does not deviate from the prevailing professional norms. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Finally, R. Vaughn argues that Sindle was ineffective for failing to call Walker. However, the post-conviction court found that Walker's testimony was inadmissible, and also found that Walker did not make a credible witness. Great weight is given to a trial court's assessment of credibility, see Burns, 6 S.W.3d at 461, and the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's findings.
R. Vaughn asserts that Sindle failed to develop information with respect to other suspects, namely Charles Crenshaw (Crenshaw). According to R. Vaughn, Crenshaw was shot by one of the victims on a prior occasion. Pretrial, the trial court ruled that Detective Morrow could be asked if she had developed any other suspects in the case, but she could not be asked about specific names. The post-conviction court found that Sindle concluded that if he had pursued a line of questions about other possible suspects, Detective Morrow would have responded that all the evidence pointed to your client. Therefore, Sindle's decision not to delve into the issue was a strategic one, which we will not second-guess on appeal. See Cooper, 847 S.W.2d at 528. Furthermore, R. Vaughn failed to show how he was prejudiced, as neither Charles Crenshaw nor Detective Morrow testified at the post-conviction hearing.
R. Vaughn argues that Sindle should have requested a sequestered jury. In response, Sindle testified that, with a sequestered jury, there is the risk that the jury will not take its time with the evidence in a rush to get home. The post-conviction court found that the jury was questioned extensively about whether it had read or heard about the case, and none of the jurors had. The Court of Criminal Appeals correctly affirmed the holding of the trial court that Sindle's decision not to request a sequestered jury was a tactical decision based upon a number of valid considerations. Furthermore, R. Vaughn has not shown that this was an unreasonable strategy, nor has he shown any prejudice.
R. Vaughn argues that Sindle was ineffective for failing to offer mitigating evidence during sentencing. Sindle testified that, while he could have argued some mitigating factors, his arguments would have lacked any validity. The trial court agreed and rejected all of the factors suggested by the defendant. As the Court of Criminal Appeals held, because no mitigating factors apply, Sindle was not deficient for failing to offer mitigating evidence at the sentencing hearing, and R. Vaughn has not shown how he was prejudiced by Sindle's failure to offer such proof.
Finally, R. Vaughn argues that Sindle was ineffective for failing to object or to request a mistrial when Detective Morrow violated a motion in limine by testifying that R. Vaughn had been incarcerated. At the post-conviction hearing, Sindle explained that the reference was very brief and that he did not want to draw the jury's attention to it by objecting. He did not request a mistrial because he had an alibi witness, and he thought it was in R. Vaughn's best interest to continue with the trial. The Court of Criminal Appeals did not find Sindle deficient in this regard and held that, even assuming a showing of deficient performance, R. Vaughn failed to show prejudice because the most he could expect was an instruction to the jury to disregard the reference. We agree.