Opinion ID: 787446
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: UBK's Contentions

Text: 32 UBK offers alternate grounds on which it argues we should affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment, both of which were presented to and rejected by the district court. See Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Ludwig, 426 U.S. 479, 481, 96 S.Ct. 2158, 48 L.Ed.2d 784 (1976) (`[T]he appellee may, without taking a cross-appeal, urge in support of a decree any matter appearing in the record, although his argument may involve an attack upon the reasoning of the lower court or an insistence upon matter overlooked or ignored by it.') (quoting United States v. Am. Ry. Express Co., 265 U.S. 425, 435, 44 S.Ct. 560, 68 L.Ed. 1087 (1924)). 33 UBK first argues that the November Amendment is invalid under the terms of the original Consultancy Agreements because it was not signed by the Asset Managers. Paragraph 13 of the Consultancy Agreements states that no modification or amendment or provision of this Agreement shall be effective unless the same shall be reduced to writing and signed by the parties. [A 659] Although an Asset Manager signed each Consultancy Agreement along with RLS and UBK, the whereas clause in Paragraph E states that the Asset Manager execut[ed] this Agreement for the sole purpose of evidencing its agreement to pay the amounts and at the times contemplated by Clause 2 hereof [detailing commission payments]. [A 655] Reading Paragraph 13 in light of Paragraph E, the district court found ambiguity as to whether the signature of the Asset Managers would be required for modification that did not affect the Asset Manager's obligations. The court thus denied UBK's motion for summary judgment insofar as based on that ground. 34 We agree with the district court. In addition to Paragraph E's limitation on the Asset Managers' role, we note that other passages appear to contemplate treating only RLS and UBK as parties with rights under the contract. For example, the paragraph governing termination allows that the agreement may be terminated by either UBK or RLS at any time, but makes no provision for termination by the Asset Manager. [A 648] The contract also addresses waiver of any breach by either party, implying that only two entities are parties with rights under the contract. [A 651] We conclude that the district court correctly denied UBK's motion for summary judgment on this ground. 35 Finally, UBK argues that RLS's interpretation of the November Amendment would impermissibly impose obligations on the Asset Managers without their assent because it would require the Asset Managers to provide an extra year of commissions. This would be so, according to UBK's argument, because the Asset Managers are the source of the funds used to pay RLS. Like the district court, we reject the argument. Id. at -6. The Asset Managers were contractually obligated to make the payments in question to UBK. Accordingly, these payments became the property of UBK, and the November Amendment did not impose obligations on the Asset Managers to which they had not consented. We see no merit in this argument.