Opinion ID: 845584
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Are MRPC 3.5(c) and MRPC 6.5(a) Unconstitutionally Vague?

Text: Mr. Fieger next argues that whatever the other constitutional shortcomings of MRPC 3.5(c) and MRPC 6.5(a), they are unconstitutionally vague because a lawyer cannot know ahead of time which of his or her remarks might run afoul of the rules. Such a challenge cannot be successfully advanced here because there is no question that even the most casual reading of these rules would put a person clearly on notice that the kind of language used by Mr. Fieger would violate MRPC 3.5(c) and MRPC 6.5(a). To invite the sodomization of a judge, with a client's finger, a plunger, or his own fist, and to invite a judge to kiss one's ass are statements that do not come close to the margins of the civility or courtesy rules. [24] While MRPC 3.5(c) and MRPC 6.5(a) are undoubtedly flexible, and the AGC will exercise some discretion in determining whether to charge an attorney with violating them, perfect clarity and precise guidance have never been required even of regulations that restrict expressive activity. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 794, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989). A statute or rule is not required to define an offense with mathematical certainty. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972). Because statutes and rules are presumptively valid, they `are not automatically invalidated as vague simply because difficulty is found in determining whether certain marginal offenses fall within their language.' Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 757, 94 S.Ct. 2547, 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974) (citation omitted). If civility and courtesy rules can ever satisfy constitutional muster, as we believe they can, it is beyond peradventure that the comments at issue in this case clearly violated such rules. Mr. Fieger also argues that his remarks are political speech and thus fit within the protection afforded campaign speech in In re Chmura (After Remand), 464 Mich. 58, 72-73, 626 N.W.2d 876 (2001) ( Chmura II ). In Chmura II we considered the propriety of a variety of remarks made by an incumbent judge during a reelection campaign that had served as the basis for sanction by the Judicial Tenure Commission of our state. We concluded in light of the First Amendment that the judge's statements were all constitutionally protected. [25] But, the Chmura II political context is entirely missing here. There was no political campaign underway nor was Mr. Fieger attempting by his comments to participate in such a campaign. [26] Thus, Chmura II offers no safe harbor for Mr. Fieger. See, also, In re Palmisano, 70 F.3d 483, 487 (C.A.7, 1995) (courts may require attorneys to speak with greater care and civility than is the norm in political campaigns). Not only was Mr. Fieger's speech not campaign speech, it was not political speech of any kind. In discussing political speech, the United States Supreme Court has stated: The freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment. [ Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-102, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940).] The First Amendment was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484, [77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498] (1957). [ Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 421, 108 S.Ct. 1886, 100 L.Ed.2d 425 (1988).] To invite the sodomization of a judge, with a client's finger, a plunger, or one's own fist, and to invite a judge to kiss one's ass can hardly be considered an interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes. Resort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution. . . . Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-310, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940). [27] Mr. Fieger further urges that his remarks should receive the same broad protection the First Amendment was found to provide in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). We disagree because this is an attorney discipline matter and more restrictive rules are permissible in such a circumstance. In Sullivan, the United States Supreme Court created a high standard of proof for a public official seeking civil damages for defamation. Damages can only be recovered if the public figure can prove by clear and convincing evidence that the offending statements were made with knowledge that they were false or with reckless disregard of their falsity. Yet here, we deal with a matter of professional discipline. There is no civil action, and, thus, Sullivan is inapplicable. [28] Nor are the interests that prompted Sullivan at all in evidence here. Whereas Sullivan was designed to further robust public discussion in the press, and to avoid the chilling effects on the media of defamation or libel lawsuits predicated upon mere mistakes or inaccuracies in reporting, neither of these constitutional concerns is implicated by court rules allowing the sanctioning an attorney for crude or vulgar language directed against a judge in a pending proceeding. Further, that the First Amendment is not offended by Michigan's disciplinary rules is suggested by Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, supra at 1071, 111 S.Ct. 2720 where the United States Supreme Court stated: It is unquestionable that in the courtroom itself, during a judicial proceeding, whatever right to free speech an attorney has is extremely circumscribed. An attorney may not, by speech or other conduct, resist a ruling of the trial court beyond the point necessary to preserve a claim for appeal. Even outside the courtroom, a majority of the Court in two separate opinions in the case of In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 79 S.Ct. 1376, 3 L.Ed.2d 1473 (1959), observed that lawyers in pending cases were subject to ethical restrictions on speech to which an ordinary citizen would not be. [Citations omitted; emphasis added.] Gentile, supra at 1073, 111 S.Ct. 2720 also held that in analyzing whether an ethics rule violates a lawyer's First Amendment rights, the court must engage in a balancing process, weighing the State's interest in the regulation of a specialized profession against a lawyer's First Amendment interest in the kind of speech that was at issue. These state interests include promoting the respect of the courts by the citizenry and maintaining the integrity of the judicial process so as to enhance compliance with adjudications. Further, in a system with hundreds of judges, each of whom is subject to popular election, the state also has an interest in limiting attorney comment that takes the form of personal attacks on judges, because a system in which intimidating attacks are permitted fosters the risk of eventually realizing the intended effect of such attacks: a potentially cowed judiciary. In Sawyer, the United States Supreme Court considered an order affirming the suspension of an attorney from practice because of her attack on the fairness and impartiality of a judge. The plurality opinion, which found the discipline to be improper, concluded that the comments had not in fact impugned the judge's integrity. But Justice Stewart, who provided the fifth vote for reversal of the sanction, observed in his concurring opinion that he could not join any possible intimation that a lawyer can invoke the constitutional right of free speech to immunize himself from even-handed discipline for proven unethical conduct . . . . Sawyer, supra at 646, 79 S.Ct. 1376. He concluded that [o]bedience to ethical precepts may require abstention from what in other circumstances might be constitutionally protected speech. Id. at 646-647, 79 S.Ct. 1376. As observed, pursuant to Gentile, supra at 1073, 111 S.Ct. 2720 to assess the constitutionality of a rule of lawyer discipline, a court must weigh the state's interests in support of the rule against an attorney's First Amendment interests in the kind of speech at issue. In this case, we must balance Mr. Fieger's right to criticize judges as he did, using foul and vulgar language, against the state's interest in the maintenance of a system of lawyer discipline that imposes some measure of limitation on such language. Before undertaking this balancing process, it may be appropriate to consider this Court's demonstrated solicitude for lawyer speech, and in particular this lawyer's freedom of speech, by reviewing how we struck the balance with Mr. Fieger in an earlier professional disciplinary matter. In Grievance Administrator v. Fieger, 469 Mich. 1241 (2003), we declined to review a dismissal by the ADB of an AGC claim that Mr. Fieger had violated MRPC 8.2(a) when he accused a county prosecutor of covering up a murder because the ADB arguably had considered Mr. Fieger's accusations to constitute a comment or opinion on the office holder's performance of his duties. As a result, Mr. Fieger was found not to be subject to sanction for his statement. Although Mr. Fieger's comment was an irresponsible and baseless comment, and altogether unfair to the prosecutor, [29] this Court gave every benefit of the doubt to Mr. Fieger in its interpretation of what he had meant to communicate by his statement. However, there can be no similar benefit to any doubt in the current case in which Mr. Fieger has uttered the crudest and most vulgar statements concerning judges in a pending lawsuit. As the United States Supreme Court stated in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942), quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra at 309-310, 60 S.Ct. 900 `Resort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution . . . .' There is no reasonable construction of Mr. Fieger's remarks that could lead to the conclusion that these were mere comment on the professional performance of these three judges of the Court of Appeals. To call a judge a jackass, a Hitler, a Goebbels, a Braun and to suggest that a lawyer is declar[ing] war on them and that the judge should [k]iss [the lawyer's] ass, or should be anally molested by finger, fist, or plunger, is, to say the least, not to communicate information; rather, it is nothing more than personal abuse. We conclude that such coarseness in the context of an officer of the court participating in a legal proceeding warrants no First Amendment protection when balanced against this state's compelling interest in maintaining public respect for the integrity of the legal process. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968). MRPC 3.5(c) and MRPC 6.5(a) did not preclude Mr. Fieger from expressing disagreement with the judges in his case, and they did not preclude criticism, even strong criticism, from being directed toward these judges; rather, they only precluded him from casting such disagreement and criticism in terms that could only bring disrepute on the legal system. The limited restriction placed by the rules on Mr. Fieger's speech is narrowly drawn and is no greater than is necessary to maintain this state's longstanding and legitimate interests in the integrity of its legal system. Chmura I, supra. As the United States Supreme Court stated in In re Snyder, supra at 647, 105 S.Ct. 2874: All persons involved in the judicial processjudges, litigants, witnesses, and court officersowe a duty of courtesy to all other participants. The necessity for civility in the inherently contentious setting of the adversary process suggests that members of the bar cast criticisms of the system in a professional and civil tone. It is also the case that our civility and courtesy rules serve to vindicate this Court's interest in the good moral character of the lawyers it has licensed to serve as officers of the court. [30] Implicit in being an officer of the court is the recognition that `obedience to ethical precepts may require abstention from what in other circumstances might be constitutionally protected speech.' Gentile, supra at 1071, 111 S.Ct. 2720 (citation omitted). [31] Mr. Fieger's comments then are not protected under his various theories of vagueness, of political speech, or of public-figure comment. It is important, however, to reiterate that we are not now, nor have we ever in the past, suggested that judges are beyond criticism. [32] As we stated in Attorney General v. Nelson, supra at 701, 249 N.W. 439: An attorney owes devotion to the interests of his clients. He should be zealous in the maintenance and defense of their rights, and should be in no way restrained in the discharge of such duty by fear of judicial disfavor. But at the same time he should be at all times imbued with the respect which he owes to the court before whom he is practicing. It is of the utmost importance to the preservation of our system of government that our people have confidence in the integrity of our courts. The point is that lawyers have an unquestioned right to criticize the acts of courts and judges. In re Estes, 355 Mich. 411, 414, 94 N.W.2d 916 (1959). Moreover, there is no prohibition on a lawyer engaging in such criticism even during the pendency of a case. There are limitations only on the form and manner of such criticism, limitations that serve compelling interests within our constitutional and legal systems. [33] Because Mr. Fieger does not contest that MRPC 3.5(c) and MRPC 6.5(a) were in fact violated if the questions he has raised on appeal are decided unfavorably to him, given our answers to these questions, he must now be viewed as having violated both rules. We close by quoting the following remarks of the Ohio Supreme Court nearly a century ago when faced with the same duty to deal with a misbehaving lawyer as we are today: When a man enters upon a campaign of vilification he takes his fate into his own hands and must expect to be held to answer for the abuse of the privilege extended to him by the constitution. An attorney of more than twenty years' standing at the bar must be presumed to know the difference between respectful, fair and candid criticism, and scandalous abuse of the courts which gave him the high privilege, not as a matter of right, to be a priest at the altar of justice. [ In re Thatcher, 80 Ohio St. 492, 669, 89 N.E. 39 (1909).] It is for all these reasons that we conclude that Mr. Fieger's vulgar and crude attacks on three members of our Court of Appeals were not constitutionally protected and that he is subject to professional discipline for having made them.