Opinion ID: 492644
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pitt's Discharge of Jackson

Text: 13 Appellees make no contention that Jackson has failed to establish a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas method of proof. We note that (i) he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) he was employed as one of Pitt's in-house attorneys and was qualified for that position; (iii) he was discharged from that position; and (iv) his co-workers, who are white, were not discharged. The district court correctly found that Jackson established a prima facie case. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824; Bellissimo v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 764 F.2d 175, 179-80 (3d Cir.1985) (A plaintiff alleging a discriminatory firing need only show that he [or she] was fired from a job for which he [or she] was qualified while others not in the protected class were treated more favorably.... Proof of discharge will establish a prima facie showing in a Title VII suit.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1035, 106 S.Ct. 1244, 89 L.Ed.2d 353 (1986). Jackson, in other words, carried his initial burden of showing actions taken by the employer from which one can infer, if such actions remain unexplained, that it is more likely than not that such actions were 'based on a discriminatory criterion illegal under [Title VII].'  Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2949, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978) (Furnco) (quoting International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1866, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977)); cf. EEOC v. Hall's Motor Transit Co., 789 F.2d 1011, 1015 (3d Cir.1986) (an employer's decision to discharge an employee may superficially appear to be justified by legitimate business reasons and yet [may] have been motivated by racial prejudice). 14 Under McDonnell Douglas, appellees have also fulfilled their ensuing burden of production to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Jackson's dismissal. 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824. The summary judgment record now before us includes depositions, affidavits, documents and other evidence supporting appellees' position that Jackson was simply a poor performer, Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 21, who was, accordingly, dismissed from his job. 2 15 The true dispute in this appeal concerns the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas method of proof: Has Jackson introduced sufficient evidence to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue whether appellees' proffered justification is merely a pretext for discrimination? Furnco, 438 U.S. at 578, 98 S.Ct. at 2950. The district court concluded that Jackson's record evidence does not create such an issue; it f[ound] no evidence of racial animus but on the contrary not[ed] abundant instances of unsatisfactory work performance [by Jackson that Sullivan] might reasonably regard as sufficient cause for discharge.... Jackson, No. 85-0264, mem. op. at 2 (W.D.Pa. June 11, 1986). 16 We reject the district court's conclusion. The record, including Jackson's lengthy deposition, contains more than a scrap of evidentiary material to support h[is] argument. Alizadeh v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 802 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir.1986). Instead, throughout nearly 700 transcript pages, Jackson's deposition in numerous ways calls into question appellees' claims that Jackson was dismissed for performance deficiencies. Jackson's basic position is that he never received any complaints about--and, indeed, that he was often complimented for--his legal work during his years at Pitt. E.g., App. at 59, 427, 482-84, 527 (Deposition of Matthew E. Jackson, Jr.). Jackson also claims that Sullivan in particular never made specific complaints or gave Jackson facts about anything, id. at 234 (same); that Sullivan, after discharging Jackson, began to solicit complaints about his work by calling numerous individuals at Pitt, id. at 352 (same); that Sullivan, after discharging Jackson, was seen walking around the halls like a wild man, id. at 283 (same), talking about he was going to ruin [Jackson's] reputation and destroy [him], id. at 286 (same); and that Sullivan told Jackson's attorney that [Sullivan] would ruin and destroy [Jackson,] ... something to the effect that [Jackson] would never be able to practice law in Pittsburgh again. 3 Id. at 360-61 (same). As a whole, such record evidence is more than sufficient to support the reasonable inference that Sullivan's criticisms of Jackson's performance are post hoc concoctions. It also suffices to support an inference that Sullivan orchestrated a campaign to get rid of Jackson because he is black. In refusing to draw such obvious inferences, and thus in entering summary judgment for appellees, it appears that the district court invaded forbidden territory that is reserved for a factfinder at trial. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Videfreeze Corp., 540 F.2d 1171, 1178 (3d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053, 97 S.Ct. 767, 50 L.Ed.2d 770 (1977). 17 Additionally, as to the substantive legal tasks that appellees allege Jackson mishandled during his years of employment at Pitt, Jackson counters with claims that he was not the lawyer who was responsible for some of the matters in question, App. at 111-12 (Deposition of Matthew E. Jackson, Jr.), and that Sullivan refused Jackson's requests to bring in outside counsel to handle other specialty matters. Id. at 546-50 (same). In addition, Jackson claims that he was the only attorney in the office who had no secretary, id. at 63-64; 87, 96, 137, 542 (same), and that he alone was denied the assistance of less-experienced legal staff members who were otherwise available. Id. at 205-06, 542-44 (same). Such evidence supports the reasonable inference that Jackson was treated less favorably than his white colleagues in ways that could explain any deficiency in his performance. Cf. Bellissimo, 764 F.2d at 180 (trial court finding that Ms. Bellissimo proved pretext was clearly erroneous because [she] failed to make any showing of disparate treatment and because [defendant] proved that its male attorneys were treated the same as she in the disputed areas). It suffices, in short, to raise a genuine issue of fact whether Jackson's dismissal really had anything at all to do with his performance. 18 We make no claim to believe or to disbelieve Jackson's evidence. That, we emphasize, is wholly the province of the factfinder at trial. See Bushman, 798 F.2d at 660 (While plaintiff's credibility may be challenged by opposing counsel at trial, it is not the function of the court to assume the role of the fact finder upon summary judgment.); Graham v. F.B. Leopold Co., Inc., 779 F.2d 170, 173 (3d Cir.1985) (What the district court chooses to infer or chooses not to infer is simply not relevant to consideration of a summary judgment motion.); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 540 F.2d at 1178 ([i]t is the function of the trier of fact alone ... to evaluate contradictory evidence). We do note, and by reciting the deposition evidence in such detail we mean to demonstrate, however, that a factfinder reasonably could conclude that appellees' position is mere pretext. Jackson's opposition to the summary judgment motion was therefore not based only upon t[he] bare-bone allegations in h[is] brief and pleadings.... Alizadeh, 802 F.2d at 113; cf. Sola v. Lafayette College, 804 F.2d 40, 45 (3d Cir.1986) (affirming summary judgment where plaintiff produced no evidence [beyond her allegations] that she was denied tenure in part based on her gender); accord Kephart v. Institute of Gas Technology, 630 F.2d 1217, 1218 (7th Cir.1980) (per curiam) (affirming summary judgment for employer in age discrimination case where the subsidiary facts plaintiff put forward as evidence ... [gave] no indications of motive and intent, supportive of his position, to put on the scales for weighing [--i]t was a wholly empty case), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959, 101 S.Ct. 1418, 67 L.Ed.2d 383 (1981); Pierce v. New Process Co., 580 F.Supp. 1543, 1546 (W.D.Pa.) (granting summary judgment for employer in age discrimination case where plaintiff [was un]able to present any facts to indicate pretext or discriminatory intent), aff'd, 749 F.2d 27 (3d Cir.1984). It was, rather, based upon his own evidence and comprehensive testimony, and was sufficient to withstand the motion for summary judgment. See J.E. Mamiye & Sons, Inc. v. Fidelity Bank, 813 F.2d 610, 617 (3d Cir.1987) (where reasonable minds could differ[,] ... an issue of material fact remains ... for the trier of fact); Miller v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 797 F.2d 727, 732 (9th Cir.1986) (race discrimination plaintiffs relied upon evidence including their declarations to survive employer's summary judgment motion); Walters v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 645 F.Supp. 100, 102 (D.Mass.1986) (plaintiff's contentions ... [placed] the underlying facts ... sufficiently in question that summary judgment is not warranted) (emphasis added). 19 Appellees' central argument in this appeal--a position that the district court appeared to adopt in granting their motion for summary judgment--is that Jackson's deposition, because it is his only record evidence, is insufficient to create a genuine factual issue on the ultimate question of race discrimination. This position relies upon our decision in Molthan v. Temple Univ., 778 F.2d 955 (3d Cir.1985), affirming the entry of judgment for the defendant in a Title VII sex discrimination suit. In Molthan, we agree[d] with the district court that no evidence was adduced from which a jury could reasonably have inferred that sex discrimination played any part in the denial of [plaintiff's] promotion, and we concluded that plaintiff's evidence there was insufficient as a matter of law to warrant any [such] inference.... Id. at 962. We did not hold, however,--contrary to appellees' assertions at oral argument before this Court--that a discrimination plaintiff must offer some evidence other than [his or] her own subjective belief or put on at least one other witness other than [himself or] herself before his or her case will survive motions for summary judgment and/or directed verdict, 4 and we explicitly reject any intimations to the contrary. There is simply no rule of law that provides that a discrimination plaintiff may not testify in his or her own behalf, or that such testimony, standing alone, can never make out a case of discrimination that will survive a motion for summary judgment. 20 In today's climate of public opinion, blatant acts of discrimination--the true smoking guns--can easily be identified, quickly condemned and often rectified in the particular settings where they occur. Much of the discrimination that remains resists legal attack exactly because it is so difficult to prove. Discrimination victims often come to the legal process without witnesses and with little direct evidence indicating the precise nature of the wrongs they have suffered. That is one of the reasons why our legal system permits discrimination plaintiffs to prove [their] case[s] by direct or circumstantial evidence. United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714 n.3, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 1481 n. 3, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983) (emphasis added); accord Maxfield v. Sinclair Int'l, 766 F.2d 788, 791 (3d Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1057, 106 S.Ct. 796, 88 L.Ed.2d 773 (1986); Lewis v. University of Pittsburgh, 725 F.2d 910, 919 n.10 (3d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 892, 105 S.Ct. 266, 83 L.Ed.2d 202 (1984). This record, unlike that in Molthan, contains both circumstantial evidence and Jackson's direct evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that Jackson's performance as a lawyer was not deficient, that appellees' claims to the contrary are mere pretext, and that race discrimination played a role in Jackson's discharge. 5 Therefore, because the issue of pretext turns on [Jackson']s credibility[, it] is not appropriate for resolution on a summary judgment motion. Chipollini, 814 F.2d at 901; accord Pollock v. American Tel. & Tel. Long Lines, 794 F.2d 860, 865 (3d Cir.1986) (where record contains more than simple accusations and speculation[,] ... there is sufficient evidence to put [the employer's] motivation in issue); cf. Attorney Gen. of the United States v. Irish People, Inc., 796 F.2d 520, 523 (D.C.Cir.1986) (per curiam) (Bork, Scalia and Gesell, JJ.) (affidavits from [nonmovant organization's] officers and staff, which District Court dismissed ... as conclusory and lacking particularity, ... were adequate to raise a genuine issue of fact in light of the nature of the Attorney General's evidence and the issue involved).