Opinion ID: 1620467
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Clear and Convincing

Text: Whether evidence of a subsequent act is clear and convincing requires more than a preponderance of the evidence but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Weber v. Anderson, 269 N.W.2d 892, 895 (Minn.1978). The clear and convincing standard is met when the truth of the facts sought to be admitted is highly probable. Id. The court of appeals held that the clear and convincing standard was not met in this case because N.G.'s testimony was uncorroborated. According to the court of appeals, the uncorroborated testimony of a victim cannot be clear and convincing because the victim may have fabricated the second complaint against the defendant to bolster her own testimony about the charged offense. Kennedy, 572 N.W.2d at 61. We see no reason why a victim's Spreigl testimony must be corroborated in order to meet the clear and convincing standard. See State v. Volstad, 287 N.W.2d 660 (Minn.1980). In fact, this court has on numerous occasions admitted Spreigl evidence supported only by the testimony of the victim in the Spreigl offense. See e.g., State v. Wermerskirchen, 497 N.W.2d 235 (Minn.1993); State v. DeBaere, 356 N.W.2d 301 (Minn.1984). The rationale for admitting such uncorroborated evidence is clear: if a sexual assault victim's testimony alone is sufficient to establish proof beyond a reasonable doubt  a much higher standard  it should be enough to satisfy the clear and convincing requirement. See Minn.Stat. § 609.347, subd. 1 (1996) (providing that [i]n a prosecution under sections 609.342 to 609.346, the testimony of a victim need not be corroborated.); see also State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 608 (Minn.1984); State v. Kinyon, 268 N.W.2d 78, 78 (Minn.1978). Therefore, we see no reason why corroboration of the Spreigl victim's testimony is necessary as a matter of law to meet the clear and convincing standard. The court of appeals also held that Spreigl evidence of an incident occurring after the charged offense should be scrutinized even more strictly than similar evidence of an incident occurring prior to the charged offense. See Kennedy, 572 N.W.2d at 64 (citing State v. Elvin, 481 N.W.2d 571, 575 (Minn.App.1992) pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 29, 1992)). We disagree. This court made it plain in State v. Lynard, 294 N.W.2d 322 (Minn.1980), that the principles governing [ Spreigl ] evidence are the same whether [the other crime, wrong or act] occurs before or after the offense charged. Id. at 323 (citation omitted). This means that evidence of other crimes, including subsequent ones, may be admitted for a proper purpose   . Id. at 323 (citations omitted). The procedural safeguards are designed to ensure that all Spreigl evidence, whether concerning a prior or subsequent incident, is subjected to an exacting review. We therefore see no reason why evidence of a subsequent act should be scrutinized more closely than evidence of a prior act. There is also no merit to Kennedy's argument that the clear and convincing standard was not met because the trial court did not hear N.G.'s actual testimony concerning the Spreigl incident before deeming it clear and convincing. As we stated in State v. Lindahl, 309 N.W.2d 763 (Minn.1981): We are not prepared to establish any requirement that the state call the Spreigl witnesses to testify at the hearing to determine the admissibility of the Spreigl evidence. The trial court has broad discretion in determining whether or not to require this in a particular case and defendant is always free to challenge the exercise of that discretion on post-trial appeal. Id. at 766; see also State v. Kasper, 409 N.W.2d 846, 847 (Minn.1987) (stating that the trial court and appellate court's are always free to grant relief, when appropriate, if the evidence adduced was not what the prosecutor led the trial court to expect.). Here, the court allowed the state to submit an offer of proof in the form of a memorandum in support of admitting the other-crime evidence. This memorandum detailed the facts to which N.G. would testify. The trial court then conducted a hearing in which each side argued the admissibility of the evidence. While the court did not require that N.G. testify at this hearing, the circumstance in this case made that unnecessary. The court already had the opportunity to judge N.G.'s credibility during her testimony regarding the charged offense, had an offer of proof detailing the facts to which N.G. would testify, and had in its possession N.G.'s videotaped statements to social workers regarding the incident. The trial court, considering all of these factors, did not abuse its discretion in relying upon the state's offer of proof rather than requiring N.G.'s testimony.