Opinion ID: 76570
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Liquidated Damages Are Mandatory

Text: 6 The Wiretap Act creates the following civil remedy: 7 [A]ny person who intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication ... shall be punished... or shall be subject to suit.... 8 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a). The accompanying damages provision states, 9 (a) In general. — Except as otherwise provided in section 2511(2)(a)(ii), any person whose wire, oral, or electronic communication is intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally used in violation of this chapter may in a civil action recover from the person or entity which engaged in that violation such relief as may be appropriate. 10 . . . 11 (c) ... 12 (2) In any other action under this section, the court may assess as damages whichever is the greater of — 13 (A) the sum of the actual damages suffered by the plaintiff and any profits made by the violator as a result of the violation; or 14 (B) statutory damages of whichever is the greater of $100 a day for each day of violation or $10,000. 15 18 U.S.C. § 2520(c)(2) (emphasis added). 16 We begin our construction of [section 2520(c)(2)] where courts should always begin the process of legislative interpretation, and where they often should end it as well, which is with the words of the statutory provision. Harris v. Garner, 216 F.3d 970, 972 (11th Cir.2000) (en banc). Section 2520(c)(2) grants a district court the authority to award liquidated damages with the term may. [T]he primary legal sense of may is ordinarily termed the `permissive' or `discretionary' sense. Black's Law Dictionary 993 (Deluxe 7th ed.1990). The words the court may assess appear clear enough to truncate our analysis, but the Supreme Court has explained that this language is not always determinative. 17 Although `may' could be read as permissive ... the mere use of `may' is not necessarily conclusive of congressional intent to provide for a permissive or discretionary authority. Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Construction Co., 529 U.S. 193, 198, 120 S.Ct. 1331, 146 L.Ed.2d 171 (2000). The word `may,' when used in a statute, usually implies some degree of discretion. This common-sense principle of statutory construction is by no means invariable, however, and can be defeated by indications of legislative intent to the contrary or by obvious inferences from the structure and purpose of the statute. United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 706, 103 S.Ct. 2132, 76 L.Ed.2d 236 (1983); Black's Law Dictionary 993 (In dozens of cases, courts have held may to be synonymous with shall or must, usually in an effort to effectuate legislative intent.). 18 Before it was amended in 1986, the Wiretap Act stated that [a]ny person whose communication is intercepted ... shall ... be entitled to recover actual damages.... 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (emphasis added). Congress then changed the mandatory term shall to the term may, which suggests that Congress intended an award of damages to be discretionary. Because changes in statutory language generally indicate[] an intent [of Congress] to change the meaning of the statute, United States v. NEC Corp., 931 F.2d 1493, 1502 (11th Cir.1991), we conclude that Congress intended to delete the mandatory aspect of awarding damages under section 2520(c)(2). Where the words of a later statute differ from those of a previous one on the same or related subject, the Congress must have intended them to have a different meaning. Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1439, 1444 (D.C.Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1010, 109 S.Ct. 795, 102 L.Ed.2d 786 (1989). 19 The contrasting language that Congress used in subsection (c)(1) provides additional support for our conclusion. Section 2520(c)(1), which provides smaller damages for the interception of certain communications that are not encrypted or scrambled, states that the court shall assess damages, but the very next subsection, (c)(2), which provides larger damages for all other cases, uses the term may. Based on this juxtaposition, it is clear that Congress intended the award of larger damages under subsection (c)(2) to be within the discretion of the trial court. As we have previously stated, when Congress uses different language in similar sections, it intends different meanings. Iraola & CIA, S.A. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 232 F.3d 854, 859 (11th Cir.2000). The plain meaning of the statute, therefore, controls. See United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, 489 U.S. 235, 242, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989). 20 Whether damages under section 2520(c)(2) are discretionary or mandatory is an issue that has divided our sister circuits. The Seventh Circuit was the first to address this issue, and it held that the language of section 2520(c)(2) requires trial courts to award damages to prevailing parties under the Wiretap Act. Rodgers v. Wood, 910 F.2d 444, 448 (7th Cir.1990). The Seventh Circuit stated that the term may is ambiguous and there is nothing in the legislative record explaining why Congress made the change from the word `shall' to the word `may.' In the absence of any such statement, we are hesitant to read a grant of discretion to the district courts where none had been permitted in the past. Rodgers, 910 F.2d at 448. Since then, the Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits have rejected this analysis and held that an award of damages under section 2520(c)(2) is discretionary based on the change in the plain language of section 2520(c)(2). Nalley v. Nalley, 53 F.3d 649, 652 (4th Cir.1995); Dorris v. Absher, 179 F.3d 420, 429 (6th Cir.1999); Reynolds, 93 F.3d at 434. 21 We agree with the perspective of the Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits that the decision of Congress to change the language of section 2520(c)(2) was deliberate. The use of the term may is plain and means that an award of damages under section 2520(c)(2) is discretionary. The contrary view of the Seventh Circuit is based on a method of statutory interpretation — a change in plain language is meaningless unless explained in legislative history — that appears to us backwards. 22 The Seventh Circuit also offered as a more conclusive reason for its decision that the mandatory award of smaller damages under subsection (c)(1) defeats an inference that Congress intended to grant district courts the discretion to decide the cases in which the more severe penalties should attach. Rodgers, 910 F.2d at 448. As we explained above, the use of the discretionary term may in subsection (c)(2), in reference to the award of larger damages, in contrast with the mandatory term shall in subsection (c)(1), in reference to the award of smaller damages, leads us to the opposite conclusion of the Seventh Circuit. We agree with the logic of the other circuits that Congress chose to make the award of [larger] damages discretionary, given the potential of the law to bring financial ruin to persons of modest means, even in cases of trivial transgressions. Reynolds, 93 F.3d at 435; Nalley, 53 F.3d at 653 (Congress could just as well have intended to grant district courts the discretion to accord similar leniency toward other less serious violators of the Act.).