Opinion ID: 201905
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Government's Appeal from Olivero's Sentence

Text: 99 The government asks that Olivero's sentence be vacated and the matter be remanded for resentencing. First, the government argues that the district court erred in holding that Apprendi precluded it from finding a drug quantity above 499 grams (particularly in the face of evidence that Olivero was responsible for a considerably greater quantity of cocaine). Second, the government argues, the court erred in declining to follow the Guidelines in order to punish the prosecution for what the court considered to be impermissible fact bargaining. Specifically, the government takes issue with the court's decision to a) deny a firearms enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1), even though it found that the facts warranting the enhancement had been shown by a preponderance of the evidence, and b) grant a reduction in Olivero's offense level under § 3B1.2(a) for being a minimal participant, when it was clear that Olivero was not a minimal participant. 100 Olivero, a prime actor in the conspiracy, received only a 48-month sentence in the face of a statutory maximum of 20 years. 11 The overall conspiracy involved possession with intent to distribute 260 kilograms of cocaine. 101
102 Olivero and 20 other defendants in this case were indicted on December 20, 2001. Before trial, there was a flurry of plea bargaining activity: in all, 15 of the 21 defendants pled guilty, seven on the very eve of trial. Green, 346 F.Supp.2d at 325. 103 On July 10, 2002, the probation office was asked to prepare a pre-plea presentence report for Olivero. Evidently this judge of the district court orders such pre-plea presentence reports as a matter of course. See id. at 279 (This court has burdened an already strained probation office by ordering pre-plea presentence reports in virtually every case as the best defense to illegal fact bargaining.). The pre-plea presentence report was prepared on October 29, 2002. It discussed the possibility of a minimal-role reduction for Olivero, but rejected it as not warranted on the evidence. It did not mention that Olivero had possessed a firearm. 104 On October 14, 2002, the U.S. Attorney sent to Olivero's attorney the plea agreement that they had negotiated, and Olivero and his attorney signed the document on October 30, 2002. In the proposed agreement, there was no mention of a weapon or a weapons enhancement, and the government agreed not to oppose a minimal participant downward adjustment pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(a). At the time, the government was also negotiating agreements with a number of co-defendants. 105 The proposed deal fell through on November 1, 2002, just before trial was to begin on November 4. Olivero withdrew from the deal when, at the hearing on acceptance of the plea, the court informed him that a plea would likely result in his immediate remand to custody. Green, 346 F.Supp.2d at 325. Olivero went to trial. Switching from its position during the plea agreement, the government presented evidence at trial tending to show that Olivero's role in the offense was more than minimal and connecting Olivero to a handgun whose ownership was in dispute. The jury returned its verdict, finding Olivero guilty, on December 12, 2002. 106 The post-conviction presentence report, dated April 10, 2003, states that a handgun was found in Olivero's bedroom, along with ammunition, 14.4 grams of cocaine, a scale, and a money-counting machine. Under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1), this meant a two-level enhancement applied. 12 The Probation Office took the position that an adjustment for minimal role in the offense was not warranted. 107 The court first found Olivero responsible for at least 499 grams of cocaine, which led to a base offense level of 24. The court explained that because the jury left Olivero's drug quantity space blank on its verdict form, the jury must have found that the prosecution failed to prove as to him a quantity of 500 grams or more beyond a reasonable doubt. The court further stated that under Apprendi, a judge could not find a higher drug quantity on his own, by a mere preponderance of evidence. 108 Second, the court found that Olivero in fact possessed a gun in furtherance of the crime, but it declined to impose a sentence enhancement, citing what it viewed as the government's improper fact-bargaining, that is, an improper inconsistency between the government's willingness to ignore the gun enhancement as part of a plea agreement and its request for the gun enhancement after trial. The district court emphasized that the pre-plea presentence report did not mention a firearm. The court stated that the prosecution knew that a weapon had been found in Olivero's room before the preplea was entered into, and rejected the prosecution's argument that the facts necessary to prove gun possession became clearer as the prosecution prepared for and ultimately conducted the trial. 13 As a result, the court punished the prosecution by refusing to enhance the sentence, even though the April 10, 2003 post-conviction presentence report had recommended the two-level U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) firearm enhancement. 109 Third, the court addressed Olivero's role in the offense. If a defendant is a minimal participant in criminal activity, his offense level is to be decreased by four levels. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(a). If he is a minor participant, the reduction is two levels, and if his role is somewhere in between, the reduction is three levels. Id. § 3B1.2. The court awarded Olivero a 4-point minimal-role reduction. It found that the government had offered to recommend this reduction as part of the proposed plea agreement and, in the court's view, had engaged in improper fact-bargaining by taking different positions. 14 In essence, the court stated, the prosecution's change of position had burdened Olivero's right to insist on a jury trial. 110 Based on these calculations, Olivero's Guidelines sentencing range was 33 to 41 months. The court departed upwards by seven months because Olivero was in with these people and not some bit player and because the conspiracy was extraordinarily extensive and dangerous — facts it considered not sufficiently reflected in the Guidelines range. 111 The defendant had not advanced the arguments used by the district court to deny the gun enhancement or to grant the minimal participant downward departure. From what we can tell of the record, Olivero did not allege that the prosecution was retaliating against him for insisting on trial, much less offer any evidence in support of such a claim. Instead, the court raised the fact-bargaining issue sua sponte. It also placed the initial burden on the prosecution to explain itself. 15 112 On June 18, 2004, after the defendants had appealed their convictions and jurisdiction over their cases was in this court, the district court, sua sponte, published an 80-page advisory opinion (which it styled as a sentencing memorandum) in which it expanded upon its reasons for sanctioning the government. See Green, 346 F.Supp.2d 259. 113
114
115 The district court post- Booker may determine drug quantity for purposes of sentence enhancements under the Guidelines. The district court's Apprendi rationale for limiting its consideration of drug quantity was simply a wrong guess as to the direction the law would take. The district court was not constrained by the jury's verdict, as it thought it was, to finding less than 500 grams of cocaine. Instead, it could (and should) have found Olivero responsible for the amount of cocaine established by a preponderance of the evidence against him — though of course, the ultimate sentence may not exceed the statutory maximum of 20 years. That alone is reason to vacate the sentence and to remand. 116 We go on to address the government's claims of Guidelines and statutory error. See Antonakopoulos, 399 F.3d at 76. 117
118 The district court offered three rationales for its reduction of Olivero's sentence as a punishment of the prosecution for unconstitutional or illegal fact bargaining. The first rationale was that the defendant's right to trial by jury was impermissibly burdened by the government's change in position on the firearm enhancement and minimal role adjustment between plea bargaining and trial. The second was that the punishment was justified because the government somehow deceived the court. The third was that the Guidelines prohibited the government from doing what it did and the appropriate sanction was to give the defendant a lower sentence. 119 The court was attempting to address some aspects of the pre- Booker mandatory guidelines system which it considered particularly unfair and to address the power given to the prosecution by the Guidelines. The court is also passionate about protecting the right to trial by jury. That the court felt strongly is evidenced by the fact that it acted sua sponte: Olivero did not seek a reduction in his sentence on any of these grounds. 120 Booker's rendering of the Guidelines advisory (subject to restraints for reasonableness) may alleviate some of the concerns which motivated the court. In this case, however, none of the district court's rationales justify the sentence it imposed. 121
122 The term fact bargaining has been used loosely to cover a variety of situations, from affirmative misrepresentations to a court to more benign agreements by counsel to base sentencing on other factors. Fact bargaining may arise when there are different views of the facts, counsels' ability to prove them, and their consequences. See, e.g., Sarner,  Fact Bargaining Under the Sentencing Guidelines: The Role of the Probation Department, 8 Fed. Sent. R. 328, 1996 WL 671569, at  (Counsel for both sides must assess their prospects for success before a jury, based on a wide variety of conflicting factors that develop during the government's investigation and as available defenses. That the truth appears somewhere in between, after the dust has settled, is a world view shared by most criminal practitioners.... The basic assumption behind plea and fact bargaining is that criminal conduct, like human behavior in other contexts, is never black and white.). 123 Many of the district court's objections are to the inevitable artifacts and consequences of plea bargains. Those consequences have been accepted as beneficial to society and raise no constitutional concerns. Plea bargaining is an essential part of our criminal justice system and is a highly desirable part for many reasons. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971); accord Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977). Plea bargaining takes place between the prosecution and the defense, and does not involve the court. 124 There are very few rules imposed on the prosecution as to plea bargaining with the defense, save that it may not coerce a plea. For example, Rule 11(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which governs Plea Agreement Procedure, says next to nothing on how plea negotiations are to be carried out and does not reach the question of what the attorney for the government and the attorney for the defendant can say to each other. 1A C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 175.1 (3d ed.1999) (discussing former Rule 11(e), predecessor to Rule 11(c)). 125 While the government may not coerce a defendant into an involuntary plea, the government has a wide latitude in how it reaches a plea. 16 See id. For example, the prosecutor may insist, as a condition of a plea, that the defendant waive all appellate rights. See United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14, 21-23 (1st Cir.2001). The prosecution may insist on a waiver of rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). Under some circumstances, the prosecution may refuse to disclose certain kinds of exculpatory material to the defendant in the course of plea bargaining. See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 633, 122 S.Ct. 2450, 153 L.Ed.2d 586 (2002). And if the negotiations are not successful, due process is not violated if the prosecutor carries out threats made during the negotiations that the defendant will be reindicted on a more serious charge which will bring higher penalties. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365, 98 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978). 126 Defendants who plead guilty will receive a benefit in sentencing over those who do not, in both charge bargaining and fact bargaining situations. Because they benefit, they neither have any constitutional claim nor have any interest in asserting a claim that their agreement is unconstitutional, unless the plea is involuntary. 17 See id. at 363, 98 S.Ct. 663 (Plea bargaining flows from `the mutuality of advantage' to defendants and prosecutors, each with his own reasons for wanting to avoid trial. (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970))). 127 The fact that the defendant who pleads gets a benefit over those who go to trial and are convicted is a necessary artifact of any plea bargaining regime. The law long ago determined there was nothing unconstitutional or illegal about any burden on trial rights caused by such a differential. While confronting a defendant with the risk of more severe punishment clearly may have a `discouraging effect on the defendant's assertion of his trial rights, the imposition of these difficult choices [is] an inevitable' — and permissible — `attribute of any legitimate system which tolerates and encourages the negotiation of pleas.' Id. at 364, 98 S.Ct. 663 (quoting Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 31, 93 S.Ct. 1977, 36 L.Ed.2d 714 (1973)). The Supreme Court has unequivocally recognize[d] the constitutional propriety of extending leniency in exchange for a plea of guilty and of not extending leniency to those who have not demonstrated those attributes on which leniency is based. Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 224, 99 S.Ct. 492, 58 L.Ed.2d 466 (1978); see also id. at 223, 99 S.Ct. 492 (There is no doubt that those homicide defendants who are willing to plead non vult may be treated more leniently than those who go to trial, but withholding the possibility of leniency from the latter cannot be equated with impermissible punishment as long as our cases sustaining plea bargaining remain undisturbed.). [A]fter trial, the factors that may have indicated leniency as consideration for the guilty plea are no longer present. Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 801, 109 S.Ct. 2201, 104 L.Ed.2d 865 (1989) (citing Brady, 397 U.S. at 752, 90 S.Ct. 1463). It is clear that [t]he fact that those who plead generally receive more lenient treatment, or at least a government recommendation of more lenient treatment than co-defendants who go to trial, does not in and of itself constitute an unconstitutional burden on one's right to go to trial and prove [one's] case. United States v. Rodriguez, 162 F.3d 135, 152 (1st Cir.1998). 128 There is a different concern, of constitutional dimension, that the government not act vindictively in retaliation against the exercise of rights by a defendant. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). But the Pearce line of decisions deals with circumstances different from Olivero's case and arises in the context of 1) resentencing in a second trial after the defendant has obtained a new trial by appeal or collateral attack or 2) resentencing after the defendant has successfully withdrawn a guilty plea. See Pearce, 395 U.S. at 725, 89 S.Ct. 2072 (Due process of law, then, requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial.); Smith, 490 U.S. at 795, 109 S.Ct. 2201. 129 The Supreme Court has said that how the government acts during plea bargaining raises no vindictiveness concerns, but only concerns of whether the plea was voluntary. 18 Indeed, in Bordenkircher, the Court held that the due process concerns expressed in the Pearce line of cases about punishment or retaliation are simply not present in a plea bargaining situation. [I]n the `give-and-take' of plea bargaining, there is no such element of punishment or retaliation so long as the accused is free to accept or reject the prosecution's offer. 434 U.S. at 363, 98 S.Ct. 663. Here, the defendant withdrew from the plea agreement, so the knowing and voluntary test under Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), does not come into play. 19 130 Even assuming there is, post- Bordenkircher, some role for a vindictiveness analysis in this situation, see United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 380 n. 12, 384, 102 S.Ct. 2485, 73 L.Ed.2d 74 (1982); Smith, 490 U.S. at 802-03, 109 S.Ct. 2201, the concern is with prosecutorial vindictiveness, not with the possibility that defendants face some burden on the right to trial in the form of a risk of a higher sentence. See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27-28, 94 S.Ct. 2098, 40 L.Ed.2d 628 (1974); cf. Johnson v. Vose, 927 F.2d 10 (1st Cir.1991). The district court focused on burden on a defendant's trial rights and did not find vindictiveness. Indeed, there was no basis for a conclusion either that Olivero's rights to trial were burdened or that he was the subject of vindictiveness. 20 A defendant simply has no right to a sentence, after trial, that is as lenient as a sentence he could have had earlier in a plea bargain. See McMillian v. United States, 583 F.2d 1061, 1063 (8th Cir.1978) (Appellant's claim, is, in essence, that a trial court is bound by the most favorable offer as to sentence made by the prosecutor during the course of plea negotiations, regardless of whether that offer is accepted or rejected by the defendant. This claim is fatuous.). 131
132 The district court had a separate set of concerns — that the prosecution provide it with accurate information for sentencing purposes, both during the hearing on the plea and at sentencing after the trial. The court was disturbed because during the plea bargaining process no mention was made to it or to the probation office of the firearm in Olivero's bedroom. 21 Of course, it was both the prosecution and the defense which kept silent. 133 The district court felt its position was justified by the Guidelines Policy Statement on Stipulations set forth at § 6B1.4, which provides: 134 (a) A plea agreement may be accompanied by a written stipulation of facts relevant to sentencing. Except to the extent that a party may be privileged not to disclose certain information, stipulations shall: 135 (1) set forth the relevant facts and circumstances of the actual offense conduct and offender characteristics; 136 (2) not contain misleading facts; and 137 (3) set forth with meaningful specificity the reasons why the sentencing range resulting from the proposed agreement is appropriate. 138 U.S.S.G. § 6B1.4; see also Green, 346 F.Supp.2d at 278 n. 69 (citing U.S.S.G. § 6B1.4(a)(2) & cmt.); id. at 328 n. 363 (same). 139 It is likely that the policy statements in Chapter Six of the Guidelines Manual, like those in Chapter Seven, are advisory, not mandatory. See Ellis v. U.S. Dist. Court ( In re Ellis ), 356 F.3d 1198, 1214-15 (9th Cir.2004) (en banc) (Kozinski, J., concurring) (arguing that the policy statements in Chapter Six of the Guidelines Manual are only hortatory, in part because Chapter Six, like Chapter Seven, is made up entirely of policy statements and their commentary and contains no guidelines); United States v. O'Neil, 11 F.3d 292, 301 n. 11 (1st Cir.1993) ([W]e today join six other circuits in recognizing Chapter 7 policy statements as advisory rather than mandatory.). Treating the policy statement as advisory recognizes the difficulty of enforcement of any such rule. In any event, the policy statement provides no justification for a court to sentence a defendant on any basis other than the facts before it, much less does it provide a justification for a court to disregard the facts before it as a remedy for the government's earlier failure to provide all the facts. 140 The proposition, implicit in the court's view, that sentencing would be better if there were utter candor and complete disclosure as to all points by the prosecution is itself problematic. Counsel should not affirmatively misstate the material facts at sentencing. See United States v. Casas, 425 F.3d 23, 39-41 (1st Cir.2005). Still, there is a line, admittedly ambiguous, between an affirmative misrepresentation of facts presented at sentencing and how prosecutors (and defendants) handle unclear or less provable facts. See Gardner & Rifkind, A Basic Guide to Plea Bargaining Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 7 Crim. Just. 14, 16 (Summer 1992) (The stipulation cannot contain misleading facts.... Where facts are unclear or unascertainable, the parties may agree on some form of them without further justification or explanation to the court. (citation omitted) (citing U.S.S.G. § 6B1.4(a)(2))). 141 Even if the prosecutor knew and could prove a gun enhancement at the time of the plea bargain, that fact would not make a difference to our analysis. No misrepresentation was made; rather, there was an omission, helpful to the defendant, which was an implicit part of the bargain. Rule 11(c)(1)(B) expressly contemplates that the attorney for the government can agree with the defendant's request that a sentencing factor does or does not apply, though this is not binding on the court. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(1)(B). It was under that rule that Olivero's plea was tendered. If the defendant and the government have agreed on a sentence free of a possible enhancement, there is a significant question as to why they should be burdened with an obligation to disclose the evidence supporting the enhancement at a plea hearing. The obligation imposed by the Rule is to disclose the plea agreement. Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(2). 142 A system of mandatory disclosure of all possible information at a plea hearing would not usually help defendants. Moreover, the costs of monitoring compliance with such a mandatory disclosure system are high, and many of the efficiencies created by plea bargaining would be lost. It would also lead to the blurring of roles. After all, the federal rules prohibit involvement by a trial judge in plea bargaining. This is true whether through the front door or the back. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(1) (An attorney for the government and the defendant's attorney ... may discuss and reach a plea agreement. The court must not participate in these discussions.); cf. 1A C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 175.1 (3d ed. 1999) (That the defendant has accepted a bargain proposed by the prosecutor creates no constitutional right to have the bargain specifically enforced. `A plea bargain standing alone is without constitutional significance ....' (quoting Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507-08, 104 S.Ct. 2543, 81 L.Ed.2d 437 (1984))). In short, what happened here involved the artifacts of a system which is well accepted. While Congress and the Supreme Court could have chosen to structure matters differently, they have not. 143 The district court was correct to condemn any deception of the court. 22 But here, no claim of deception of the court is possible. The court, at the time of sentencing, did have all the facts before it on which to impose a sentence, and Olivero had fair notice of the issues. The prosecution had put on evidence at trial showing Olivero's ownership of the gun; Olivero in turn had pointed the finger at another defendant. The evidence was reviewed in the post-conviction presentence report, with Olivero objecting to the suggestion that he owned the gun and the probation office defending its stance. At sentencing, ownership of the gun was discussed yet again. The same abundance of evidence and debate characterized the issue of Olivero's role in the offense, culminating in the court's conclusion that Olivero was assuredly not some bit player or casual hanger-on, but rather was in with these people. There can be no suggestion that at the time of sentencing, the government was deceiving the court by hiding evidence of any sort, whether inculpatory or exculpatory. 23 The prosecution does not argue that it has a right to lie to a court and it did not do so here. 144
145 The court also referred to other provisions of the Guidelines themselves as imposing an obligation on the government to disclose all information at the stage a court is considering a plea and not to change its position thereafter. This misreads the Guidelines. One argument from the Sentencing Guidelines is that § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct) specifies that the base offense level and adjustments be based on all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant and all harm that resulted from those acts. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A), (3). There is no claim that the government did not provide such information at sentencing. Ironically, the district court sanctioned the government because it did advance exactly such evidence of relevant conduct at sentencing. By its terms, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 concerns what the court should do with the information before it at sentencing and does not create a set of sanctions against the government. 146 The other Guidelines concern arises from Application Note 1 to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.8 (Use of Certain Information), which simply makes it clear that that particular Guideline does not authorize the government to withhold information from the court. In any case, there is no evidence here that Olivero provided self-incriminating information that the prosecution withheld from the court, so § 1B1.8 is inapplicable. 147
148 The prosecution's conduct here transgressed no norm, constitutional or legal. There was no cause to punish the prosecution at all. We defer until some other case the question of whether a district court may ever reduce a defendant's sentence as a sanction against the government for its conduct in earlier negotiating a plea which is not accepted. But we do note that the sentencing objectives set by the statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2), refer to punishment of the offender, deterrence of crime, protection of the public, and rehabilitation. 149 The sentencing of Olivero is vacated and the matter is remanded to the district court. Olivero thus will be resentenced in a post- Booker regime in which the Guidelines are no longer mandatory. We have reversed each of the rationales relied on by the district court, in the government's sentencing appeal, as a matter of law. This means that any reliance upon them at resentencing would be inherently unreasonable. See Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 765-66.