Opinion ID: 787077
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Goodman's Challenges to Her Convictions

Text: 12
13 Goodman first argues that her conviction must be reversed because the court improperly allowed the government to introduce evidence of other acts in the form of her 1996 bankruptcy petition. See Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). 3 However, the government did not introduce the petition as evidence of an act at all. Rather, the challenged evidence came in as a statement used to rebut Goodman's denial of her personal credit problems in 1996: 14 Q. [by the government] And whatever the causes of the problems may have been, the problem essentially was that you owed a lot of money personally at that time? 15 A. Not a lot of money, no. 16 Q. Isn't it true, Miss Goodman, that on May 24th, 1996, you owed well over $100,000 to creditors? 17 A. Not to my knowledge. 18 Once Goodman denied owing over $100,000 to creditors, 4 the bankruptcy petition — containing a prior, sworn, contradictory statement made by a party witness — became admissible under three evidentiary rules. See Fed.R.Evid. 613 (prior statement of a witness); Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(1)(A) (prior inconsistent statement given under oath subject to a penalty of perjury); Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2) (admission by a party opponent); see also United States v. Parsons, 646 F.2d 1275, 1277-78 (8th Cir.1981) (admitting bankruptcy petition as an admission by a party opponent under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)). 19 Goodman relies on United States v. Bensimon, 172 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir.1999). We find the analogy unpersuasive. In that case, we reaffirmed our rejection of `[p]overty as proof of motive' and stated that a petition for bankruptcy is not in and of itself evidence of a specific and immediate financial need such that it would be relevant to showing [a defendant's] motive. 172 F.3d at 1129 (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 172 F.3d 1104, 1108-09 (9th Cir.1999)). At trial in Bensimon, the government also argued that the bankruptcy petition showed that Bensimon was trying to start a new after bankruptcy by assuming the identity of [another]. Id. We held that the district court, in admitting the bankruptcy petition for that purpose, had overlooked the prejudice that may occur when the prosecution in a criminal case is allowed to introduce evidence of a prior illegal, fraudulent act by the defendant. Id. 20 Neither Bensimon's prohibition against evidence of poverty as proof of motive nor its concern about the use of bankruptcy petitions as evidence of a prior illegal, fraudulent act by the defendant is implicated here. The government did not argue that bankruptcy motivated Goodman's illegal conduct. Nor did the government argue that there was anything fraudulent or illegal in Goodman's initial filing, or later withdrawal, of the bankruptcy petition. Instead, the petition was introduced for the narrow purpose of showing a prior inconsistent statement. 21 In these circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the bankruptcy petition. 22
23 In United States v. Mostella, 802 F.2d 358, 361 (9th Cir.1986), we recognized that a trial judge's discretion to participate in the examination of a witness, although broad, is not unlimited: 24 It is entirely proper for [a judge] to participate in the examination of witnesses for the purpose of clarifying the evidence, confining counsel to evidentiary rulings, controlling the orderly presentation of the evidence, and preventing undue repetition of testimony. 25 A trial judge's participation may, however, overstep the bounds of propriety and deprive the parties of a fair trial. This court will order a new trial, however, only if the record discloses actual bias on the part of the trial judge or leaves the reviewing court with an abiding impression that the judge's remarks and questioning of witnesses projected to the jury an appearance of advocacy or partiality. 26 (Citations and internal quotation marks omitted.) 27 Here, the trial judge's examination of Goodman went beyond clarifying the evidence. Although the trial judge's participation in the examination of Goodman was, in our view, inappropriately extensive and suggestive of the court's own conclusion about Goodman's credibility, it does not warrant reversal for plain error. Mostella held that the judge's participation in the examination of a witness did not warrant reversal particularly in light of the judge's specific instruction that the jury disregard testimony elicited by the judge's examination of a witness. Id. at 362. Similarly, in United States v. Sanchez-Lopez, 879 F.2d 541, 553 (9th Cir.1989), when reviewing a trial judge's remarks for plain error, we stated that any possible adverse impact was obviated by the [curative] instruction given by the court. Even in cases where a judge's participation in a trial is extreme, that participation generally does not warrant reversal if a later curative instruction is given. United States v. Parker, 241 F.3d 1114, 1119 (9th Cir.2001). 5 28 Here, before either party presented any evidence, the district court read to the jury a detailed instruction regarding questions and comments from the bench: 29 During the course of the trial I may occasionally ask questions of a witness in order to bring out facts which may not be fully covered by the testimony. You are not to consider my questioning of a witness, even if it may become lengthy, as an indication of what I feel about the case in general or the testimony of that witness in particular. 30 After closing arguments, the district court again stressed that no question of mine, no admonition of mine to any counsel, no ruling that I have made on any evidence is to suggest in any way what verdict I think you should find. In the light of the emphasis that cases like Mostella and Sanchez-Lopez place on curative instructions, the court's instructions to the jury — both before and after the questioning — lead us to conclude that the judge's participation did not prejudice Goodman. 31 Our conclusion is reinforced by the context in which the court's questions occurred. Before the judge questioned Goodman about Bowler's understanding of her involvement with Elite Investments, Bowler herself testified that she had no idea that Defendants had obtained or used a business line of credit in her name. Every other individual victim of Defendants' fraudulent scheme testified similarly that he or she was unaware of involvement with the fictitious companies, and each denied authorizing Defendants to forge documents, secure credit, or make charges against those lines of credit. 32 In view of that testimony, as well as the court's curative instructions, it is highly unlikely that, here, a substantial right of a defendant [was] affected. Sanchez-Lopez, 879 F.2d at 551. Thus, we hold that the trial judge's participation in the examination of Goodman did not constitute plain error requiring reversal. 33