Opinion ID: 367144
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The status of appellant Bean.

Text: 29 Bean contends that where at least one complainant in the present case Juanita Davenport, See n.1 Supra, otherwise in compliance with the ADEA, timely files notice of intent to sue with the Secretary, that complainant may bring suit on behalf of similarly situated employees who have consented to join the action under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), even though such similarly situated employees have not individually filed notice to sue pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 626(d). 11 Crocker responds that each complainant in an ADEA action must individually fulfill the section 626(d) notice requirements. The district court agreed with Crocker and dismissed Bean from the action. 30 We hold that the ADEA authorizes grievants who have complied with section 626(d) to bring representative actions pursuant to section 216(b) on behalf of similarly situated employees, who may not have individually filed notice of intent to sue with the Secretary. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the district court dismissing Bean from the action. 31 In his concurring opinion in Evans, Mr. Justice Blackmun noted that the ADEA is a remedial statute that is to be liberally construed and suggested that it should be read in such a manner as to give full recognition to that remedial character. Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, supra, concurring opinion, ---- U.S. at p. ----, 99 S.Ct. at p. 2076 (Blackmun, J.). The ADEA's broad remedial purposes of prohibiting arbitrary age discrimination and of promoting the employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age are best served by an interpretation of 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) that permits similarly situated complainants to join in an action as unnamed parties so long as a named plaintiff has complied with the notice requirements of 29 U.S.C. § 626(d). 12 32 In addition, cases dealing with class actions under the remedial legislation of Title VII lend support to the view that unnamed grievants seeking to participate in actions under similar remedial legislation, such as the ADEA, need not individually comply with the notice requirements of 29 U.S.C. § 626(d). The statute permitting class actions under the ADEA establishes a procedure for opt-in classes 13 requiring the written consent of parties desiring to join the action, while a Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b) opt-out class action may be maintained under Title VII. 14 Nonetheless, the law developed under Title VII provides a useful analogy in interpreting the ADEA. In a Title VII representative suit, unnamed class members need not individually bring a charge with the EEOC as a prerequisite to joining the litigation. Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1968). See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 414 n.8, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975). In light of this background, the Supreme Court's footnote to its comment in Evans that resort to administrative remedies in deferral States by individual claimants is mandatory, not optional(,) becomes quite significant. Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, supra, --- U.S. at ----, 99 S.Ct. at 2073. That footnote in Evans reads: 33 This rule, of course governs only claims for individual relief, such as the present case. Nothing in our decision in anywise disturbs the rule of Albemarle v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 414 n.8, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 2370 n.8, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975), concerning the rights of unnamed parties in plaintiff class actions. (Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, supra, --- U.S. at ----, n.6, 99 S.Ct. 2073 n.6.) 34 We interpret this comment as suggesting that unnamed parties in a class action under the ADEA may join in the litigation without having personally complied with the notice requirements of 29 U.S.C. § 626(d). 35 Further, the purpose underlying the notice requirement of section 626(d), to allow the Secretary to promptly seek to eliminate any alleged unlawful practice by informal methods of conciliation, conference, and persuasion (,) may be met without requiring each potential grievant to file notice of intent to sue. The collective notice to sue filed with the Department on February 13, 1975, by several named discharged Crocker employees on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, alerted the Secretary of possible ADEA violations by Crocker affecting not only those employees whose names appeared on the notice, but also affecting other older persons discharged by Crocker at approximately the same time. The Secretary and Crocker were put on notice that the discrimination charges encompassed a pattern of unlawful conduct transcending an isolated individual claim and that they should act accordingly. See Burgett v. Cudahy Co., 361 F.Supp. 617 (D.Kan.1973). Such notice gave the Department the opportunity to informally mediate and conciliate the dispute between Crocker and both named and unnamed complainants before litigation of the grievance commenced. 15 Consequently, Bean's inclusion as a member of the class neither compromises the purpose of the notice of intent to sue nor in any way prejudices Crocker. 36 Our determination that Bean may be included in the class action would also permit Hardtke and the other named complainants to join in this action as employees similarly situated to Juanita Davenport, who has complied with the ADEA requirements for bringing a discrimination claim. The district court deemed Ms. Davenport a proper plaintiff, and she could bring her action in a representative capacity for others who are similarly situated and who have Consented to join the action as unnamed members of a class. 37 Accordingly, we remand this cause to the district court with instructions to vacate the dismissal of the action against all named appellants except Bean, to permit Bean to participate in the lawsuit as a party similarly situated to the named representative appellants, and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.