Opinion ID: 2175548
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The judge's findings.

Text: In order to assess the judge's disposition of the indemnity issue, it is necessary to set forth his findings in some detail. In the text of his order, the judge wrote as follows: The court is satisfied, based on the evidence presented at trial and through Dr. McGlamry's deposition, that it preponderates in favor of a finding that both R. & G. and Howard were negligent in the care they rendered to plaintiff, and that the negligence of both R. & G. and Howard constituted proximate causes of plaintiff's injuries. In this regard, the court credits and finds persuasive the testimony of: (1) Dr. Patricia Schultz that she prescribed a custom-molded shoe with a plastizote insole for plaintiff; (2) plaintiff's expert, Dr. Peter Cavanaugh, that the shoe provided by R. & G. failed to comply with the prescription and violated the standard of care applicable to an orthotist such as R. & G.; and (3) plaintiff's experts, Dr. Clark Miller and Dr. David Morowitz, that, to a reasonable medical certainty, the ulcers on plaintiff's foot were caused or complicated by the R. & G.supplied improperly fitting shoe, that they could have been resolved without the amputation of plaintiff's foot if Howard had hospitalized her on July 9, 1985, and that the standard of care applicable to Howard required such hospitalization. Consequently, the court concludes that R. & G. is entitled to judgment against Howard for contribution on its cross-claim, and that contribution should be assessed pro rata, i.e., that R. & G. should be entitled to a credit in one half the amount of the verdict. See Martello v. Hawley, 112 U.S.App.D.C. 129, 132, 300 F.2d 721, 724 (1962). (Emphasis added). In a footnote, however, the judge added, in pertinent part, the following: R. & G. asserts in its memorandum in support of its cross-claim, relying on law from other jurisdictions, that it not only is entitled to a credit against plaintiff's verdict based upon the settlement reached between plaintiff and Howard, but that it is entitled to full indemnification from Howard because any original injuries which R. & G. caused plaintiff were profoundly worsened by Howard.... Assuming without deciding that under District of Columbia law there conceivably might arise circumstances where a tortfeasor who proximately caused a plaintiff's injuries would be entitled to full indemnification from another joint tortfeasor who also proximately caused such injuries, this plainly is not such a case. There is no basis in the evidence to conclude that Howard's conduct worsened plaintiff's injuries; to the contrary, the evidence shows that R. & G.'s conduct plainly would have led to the amputation of plaintiff's foot had Howard never entered the picture. Here, the evidence shows that R. & G. and Howard were joint tortfeasors, that they were both guilty of active negligence in their care of plaintiff, and that their negligence concurred in causing her injury. See Nordstrom v. District of Columbia, 213 F.Supp. 315, 320 (D.D.C.), rev'd on other grounds, 117 U.S.App. D.C. 165, 327 F.2d 863 (1963). (Emphasis added). We must, of course, approach the judge's findings with appropriate deference. A judgment may not be set aside except for errors of law unless it is plainly wrong and without evidence to support it. D.C.Code § 17-305(a) (1989); see also Super.Ct.Civ.R. 52(a). The question is not whether this court would have found the facts as the trial court did, but rather whether on the entire evidence we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Cahn v. Antioch University, 482 A.2d 120, 128 (D.C.1984) (quoting Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123, 89 S.Ct. 1562, 1576, 23 L.Ed.2d 129 (1969)). The problem here, however, is that if we defer to the judge's finding in the text, we must ignore his footnote; if we defer to the footnote, we contravene the finding in the text. The internal inconsistency which we have discerned in the judge's findings is identified in the underscored language which we have quoted above. The judge's explicit statement in the text that the ulcers could have been resolved without amputation if Howard had exercised due care cannot reasonably be reconciled with his remark in the footnote that there was no basis in the evidence to conclude that Howard's conduct worsened plaintiff's injuries, and that R. & G.'s conduct plainly would have led to the amputation of plaintiff's foot had Howard never entered the picture. It appears from the judge's finding in the text regarding Howard's negligence that, as a result of Howard's failure to hospitalize Ms. Brown, a patient who was readily treatable without amputation in July became one whose leg had to be amputated in October. This was surely a worsening of her condition, whether it resulted from Howard's affirmative acts or from its failure to act. Moreover, if Howard had not entered the picture, Ms. Brown would presumably have been treated by some other doctor or podiatrist, and we must presume that there would have been no malpractice Cf. F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Williams, 59 App.D.C. 347, 348, 41 F.2d 970, 971 (1930) (legal presumption is that due care was exercised). Thus, according to the judge's finding in the text, there would have been no amputation for which R. & G. could be held responsible. [17]