Opinion ID: 2634253
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Conflict-Free Counsel

Text: The public defender's office cannot argue the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel against itself. Murphy v. People, 863 P.2d 301, 305 n. 11 (Colo.1993); see also McCall v. Dist. Court, 783 P.2d 1223, 1227 (Colo.1989). Under Rule 1.10 of the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct, imputed disqualification applies with equal force to court-appointed attorneys. See People ex, rel. Peters v. Dist. Court, 951 P.2d 926, 932 (Colo.1998). Although a defendant does not have a constitutional right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings, Murphy, 863 P.2d at 301 n. 9, the trial court has authority to appoint counsel in Crim. P. 35(c) proceedings. Duran v. Price, 868 P.2d 375, 379 (Colo.1994). Here, following Close I, the trial court appointed the public defender's office to represent Close in the post-conviction proceedings he pursued through the trial court, the court of appeals, and this Court in Close III. After our decision in Close III, the trial court invoked the time bar of section 16-5-402 and summarily refused to consider any exception to its application. It reasoned that Close had brought a Crim. P. 35(c) motion pro se after the court of appeals' decision in Close I, thereby demonstrating that he had not been prevented from filing a Crim. P. 35(c) motion within the time period for bringing a timely post-conviction claim. However, the trial court appointed the public defender's office to represent Close in post-conviction proceedings. The trial court has authority to appoint alternative defense counsel to represent Close, if the stated factual basis and alleged conflict of interest are sufficient to warrant pursuit of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim involving the public defender's office. See People v. Mills, 163 P.3d 1129, 1133 (Colo.2007). Thus, the issue of justifiable excuse or excusable neglect in this case turns on the public defender's failure to raise Nguyen when it could have done so in the timely-filed Crim. P. 35(c) proceedings it litigated on Close's behalf leading up to our decision in Close III. Most significantly, at stake in this case is a thirty year sentence reduction for a youthful offender, who the trial court itself recognized was being harshly but mandatorily sentenced under the pre- Nguyen statute. The public defender's office could have made the Nguyen argument when appointed to represent Close in his post-conviction proceedings following Close I. See People v. Hickey, 914 P.2d 377, 378-79 (Colo.App.1995). In People v. Duke, the court of appeals remanded a case to the trial court for appointment of conflict-free counsel to litigate whether post-conviction counsel's failure to file a timely Crim. P. 35(b) motion constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, which would excuse a late filing of the motion. 36 P.3d 149, 153 (Colo.App.2001); see also Swainson v. People, 712 P.2d 479, 480 (Colo. 1986). Likewise, ineffective assistance of counsel in Crim. P. 35(c) proceedings is colorable grounds for appointment of conflict-free counsel and a trial court hearing on justifiable excuse and excusable neglect.
The Public Defender's Failure to Raise Nguyen Is Colorable Grounds for a Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel The central thrust of Close's Crim. P. 35 motions now before us concerns the applicability of Nguyen to Close's case. Moreover, the four certiorari issues in this appeal revolve around the applicability of Nguyen. In Nguyen, a decision issued following Close's conviction, we held that equal protection under the law is violated if attempted second-degree assault is treated as an automatic crime-of-violence, because attempted first-degree assault is not an automatic crime-of-violence. 900 P.2d at 41. We struck the crime-of-violence sentencing provision as it applied to second-degree assault, defined in section 18-3-203(1)(b), C.R.S. (1995). Close was convicted under section 18-3-203(1)(b), the same statute at issue in Nguyen. The same crime-of-violence sentence enhancer that was struck down in Nguyen, as a violation of equal protection, was applied to Close's conviction and sentence. See § 18-3-203(2)(c), C.R.S. (1986). The jury convicted Close of six counts of assault in the second-degree. The charging document, the jury instructions relating to second-degree assault, and the verdict forms in Close's case all identify that Close was convicted of assault in the second-degree. [2] At the time Close was convicted of assault in the second-degree, the statute included attempted assault. Section 18-3-203(1)(b), C.R.S. (1986), stated: A person commits the crime of assault in the second degree if . . . [w]ith intent to cause bodily injury to another person, he causes or attempts to' cause such injury to any person by means of a deadly weapon. . . . In Nguyen, we relied on a line of Colorado cases dating back to 1977 and before [3] to hold that the second-degree assault statute, section 18-3-203, violated the equal protection guarantees, because it imposed a harsher penalty for less serious criminal conduct than did the first-degree assault statute, section 18-2-202. 900 P.2d at 40. For this application of pre-existing law, Nguyen cited to People v. Bramlett, 194 Colo. 205, 210, 573 P.2d 94, 97 (1977), and other cases, [4] that stand for the proposition that a lesser offense cannot be punished more seriously than a greater offense. In Bramlett, we held unconstitutional a sentencing scheme that provided for a greater penalty for first-degree assault then criminally negligent homicide. Id. at 210, 573 P.2d at 97. In Nguyen, the prosecution did not contest the application of pre-existing law under the Bramlett equal protection line of cases. 900 P.2d at 37. Instead, the disagreement we resolved in Nguyen concerned the appropriate remedy for the equal protection violation. Id. at 38. The prosecution argued, and we agreed, that the appropriate remedy was to strike the crime-of-violence sentence enhancement in section 18-3-203(2)(c), as applied to Nguyen's conviction. Id. at 41. We reject the prosecution's argument that Close's case can be differentiated from Nguyen because bodily injury, a basis for crime-of-violence sentencing, was a fact before the jury in Close's case. The prosecution's argument misses the crucial fact that, given the circumstances of his case, Close's jury returned a verdict of second-degree assault on an instruction that included attempted assault. [5] Thus, based on the jury verdict, the jury instructions, and the complaint, Nguyen is applicable to Close's six second-degree assault convictions. In view of Nguyen, and its reliance on the Bramlett line of cases, the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel in this case is not simply a matter of missing a case citation; rather, it involves a constitutional holding directly applicable to Close's case defining the parameters of his sentence. The allegation that counsel failed to inform the court of the constitutional limitations of Close's sentence, which in turn resulted in a sentence twice the constitutionally permissible level, is within the standard for measuring ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Accordingly, we determine, as a matter of law, that Close has alleged facts which, if true, would establish justifiable excuse or excusable neglect, and therefore merit a hearing. The trial court must appoint conflict-free counsel to investigate and pursue potential relief, from operation of the postconviction time bar, at a trial court hearing, based upon the justifiable excuse or excusable neglect exception of section 16-5-402(2)(d) and a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure of the public defender's office to raise the applicability of the Nguyen decision to Close's sentence. [6]