Opinion ID: 76334
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Prior Consistent Statements Under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(1)(B)

Text: 80 Drury advances two arguments in support of his assertion that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to allow his son Don to testify regarding a statement Drury made subsequent to his arrest. First, he contends that the statement was admissible under Rule 613(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence as a prior consistent statement that may be used for rehabilitation when the statement has a probative force bearing on credibility beyond merely showing repetition. See United States v. Pierre, 781 F.2d 329, 333 (2d Cir.1986). Drury claims that Don's testimony would have rebutted the government's charge that he fabricated the role-playing story and is probative of his credibility on this issue. Second, Drury argues that under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(1)(B), his statements to his son should have been admitted because they were made before he had the motive or opportunity to fabricate a story. See Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(1)(B). Drury avers that the district court abused its discretion by simply applying a temporal litmus test, determining that since the statements were made after the arrest Drury possessed a motive to fabricate and the statements were not admissible. See United States v. Prieto, 232 F.3d 816, 822 (11th Cir.2000) (rejecting a bright line rule that motive to fabricate necessarily and automatically attaches upon arrest). 81 A district court is granted broad discretion in determining the admissibility of a prior consistent statement under Fed. R.Evid. 801(d)(1)(B) and will not be reversed absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion. Id. at 819 (citing United States v. Reed, 887 F.2d 1398, 1405 (11th Cir.1989)). 82 The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Drury's request to admit his son's testimony regarding the alleged prior statements. First, contrary to Drury's assertions, Rule 613(b) is inapplicable to the facts of this case. That rule is pertinent only where a party seeks to introduce extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness.... Fed.R.Evid. 613(b). Drury's proffered statement was not a prior inconsistent statement; rather, it was consistent and, therefore, Rule 613(b) does not apply. Second, Drury's reliance upon Rule 801(d)(1)(B) 20 and Prieto for the proposition that the district court abused its discretion by applying a temporal litmus test to the proffered statements is also misplaced. It is true that in Prieto, 232 F.3d at 820, we declined to adopt a bright line, per se rule [under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(1)(B)] barring the admission of any prior consistent statements made by a witness following arrest. But we also stated that whether a witness had a motive to fabricate when [the] prior consistent statements were made is plainly a question of fact to be resolved by the trial court based precisely on the particular circumstances of an individual case. Id. at 821. Here, after reviewing the proffered statement, the district court concluded that [i]n my view, the conditions established by this case of the admissibility of such a statement have not been established here. While a more detailed set of findings on this topic would have eased our inquiry, the record provides ample support for the district court's determination that Drury, subsequent to his arrest, had adequate motive and opportunity to fabricate the story that he allegedly told his son. See id. at 821. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not clearly abuse its discretion in this regard.