Opinion ID: 1442968
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jurisdiction and Federal Legislative Authority over the CNMI

Text: Zheng contends her convictions are invalid because the federal government lacked authority to prosecute her. Whether the federal government had authority to prosecute Zheng is a legal question that we review de novo. See United States v. Phillips, 367 F.3d 846, 854 (9th Cir.2004) (jurisdictional issues are reviewed de novo); United States v. Mateo-Mendez, 215 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir.2000) (questions of law are reviewed de novo). Zheng argues the criminal statutes used to convict her do not apply to the CNMI because they were enacted pursuant to Congress's authority under the commerce clause or the territorial clause and neither the commerce clause nor the territorial clause applies to the CNMI. To understand this argument, it is necessary to briefly discuss the history and relationship of the CNMI with the United States. The Northern Mariana Islands became a possession of the United States in 1944, during the war with Japan, when the United States invaded Saipan. In 1975, the Northern Mariana Islands and the United States reached an agreement to create a political union between the Islands and the United States. This agreement was the Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union with the United States of America (the Covenant). 48 U.S.C. § 1801. The Covenant became law in 1976 and became completely effective in 1986. The Covenant defines the CNMI's legal and political relationship with the United States. Covenant §§ 101-105; United States ex rel. Richards v. De Leon Guerrero, 4 F.3d 749, 754 (9th Cir.1993). The Covenant gives the people of the CNMI the right to local self-government, and enables the U.S. federal government to enact legislation applicable to the CNMI as long as the legislation can be made applicable to the states or if the legislation expressly names the CNMI. Covenant §§ 103, 105. Section 501 of the Covenant lists specific provisions of the U.S. Constitution that apply to the CNMI. [2] Zheng argues § 501 is an exclusive list of the provisions of the U.S. Constitution that apply to the CNMI. Because neither the commerce clause nor the territorial clause are included in § 501, Zheng contends they do not apply to the CNMI. Zheng relies upon Fleming v. Dept. of Public Safety, to support her argument. 837 F.2d 401, 405 (9th Cir.1988) (overruled on other grounds by Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989)). In Fleming, we held that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to the CNMI because the Eleventh Amendment was not included in the list of constitutional provisions set forth in § 501. Id. at 405. In Fleming, Lawrence Fleming sued the CNMI Department of Public Safety, alleging that the department deprived him of his due process and equal protection rights, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, by the way it handled his application to become a police officer. Id. at 403. The department argued it was immune from suit because Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity applied to the CNMI. Id. at 405. We disagreed and concluded the CNMI does not enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity because the Eleventh Amendment is conspicuously absent from § 501 of the Covenant. Id. We reasoned, From the specificity with which the applicable provisions of the United States Constitution are identified, it is clear that the drafters considered fully each constitutional amendment and article for inclusion in the Covenant. That they deliberately declined to include the eleventh amendment unequivocally demonstrates their desire that the Commonwealth not be afforded eleventh amendment immunity. Id. In the present case, Zheng argues that the commerce clause and territorial clause are like the Eleventh Amendment. Because they are not included in § 501, Zheng contends they do not apply to the CNMI. Zheng then reasons the U.S. government lacked jurisdiction to prosecute her for sex trafficking and her other offenses because the criminal statutes she was convicted of violating were enacted pursuant to Congress's power under the commerce clause or territorial clause. We disagree with Zheng's reasoning. The issue of whether the commerce clause or territorial clause apply to the CNMI is misleading. Section 501 sets forth constitutional provisions that are applicable within the Northern Mariana Islands as if the Northern Mariana Islands were one of the several States .... Unlike the Eleventh Amendment, the commerce clause and the territorial clause generally are not constitutional provisions that apply to the states. [3] These are constitutional provisions that apply to the United States Congress. Whether the commerce clause and territorial clause apply to the CNMI does not affect the authority of Congress to enact legislation applicable to the CNMI. Section 501 does not include a single constitutional provision that involves Congressional authority to legislate. If we adopted Zheng's interpretation of Fleming, Congress would have no authority to enact legislation applicable to the CNMI whatsoever. Such a result is nonsensical and conflicts with § 105 of the Covenant, which expressly provides, The United States may enact legislation in accordance with its constitutional processes which will be applicable to the Northern Mariana Islands.... See Cook Inlet Native Ass'n v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1471, 1474 (9th Cir.1987) (stating sections of a statute should not be interpreted to render another part inoperative or to defy common sense). Section 105 assumes there are constitutional processes that would enable Congress to legislate for the CNMI. [4] We agree. Accordingly, we hold Congress has the authority to enact legislation applicable to the CNMI. This authority is not limited by the exclusion or omission of constitutional provisions in § 501 of the Covenant. While the commerce clause provides a constitutional basis for Congress's legislative authority in the Commonwealth, the Covenant does limit Congress's legislative power. De Leon Guerrero, 4 F.3d at 754. Pursuant to § 501(a) of the Covenant, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421 and 2314 are applicable to the CNMI because they were enacted before the Covenant's 1978 effective date, and are applicable to the several states and Guam. See United States v. Taitano, 442 F.2d 467, 468-69 (9th Cir.1971) (affirming transportation for prostitution conviction involving transportation of victims to Guam). By contrast, 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) was enacted after the Covenant's effective date. For legislation enacted after the Covenant's effective date, we balance the federal interests served by the legislation against the degree of intrusion into local affairs. See De Leon Guerrero, 4 F.3d at 755. In this case, the balance tips in favor of applicability because the federal government's significant interest in combating international sex trafficking through United States territories outweighs the intrusion into the CNMI's local affairs. Congress may criminalize conspiracy, sex trafficking, foreign transportation for prostitution, and transportation of persons in execution of fraud in the CNMI as it does in the states. Thus, we conclude the federal government had authority to prosecute Zheng for committing the above crimes.