Opinion ID: 147231
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Similar Form of Release

Text: The government argues that community control is a similar form of release to probation. The government relies on Florida law to inform its interpretation. Chapter 948 of the Florida Statutes, entitled Probation and Community Control, defines probation as a form of community supervision requiring specified contacts with parole and probation officers. Fla. Stat. § 948.001(5). The same statute defines community control as a form of intensive, supervised custody in the community, including surveillance on weekends and holidays, administered by officers with restricted caseloads. Fla. Stat. § 948.001(2). The statute explains that [c]ommunity control is an individualized program in which the freedom of an offender is restricted within the community, home, or noninstitutional residential placement and specific sanctions are imposed and enforced. Id. Florida considers community control to be a hybrid concept, less restrictive than prison, but more severe than probation. Bacon v. State, 620 So.2d 1084, 1086 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). It is undisputed that Florida recognizes probation and community control as separate and distinct punishments. See State v. Mestas, 507 So.2d 587, 588 (Fla.1987); Zack v. State, 753 So.2d 9, 25 (Fla.2000). However, the question before us is not whether they are the same punishment. Rather, it is whether they are similar forms of release. Florida considers both probation and community control to be discretionary alternatives to imprisonment. See Fla. Stat. § 948.011 (when the defendant's offense is punishable by both fine and imprisonment, the trial court may, in its discretion, impose a fine upon him or her and place him or her on probation or into community control as an alternative to imprisonment.). Both are conditional forms of release subject to revocation. See Fla. Stat. § 948.06. Florida law lumps together probation, community control, parole, [and] conditional release as postprison release supervision. See Fla. Stat. § 394.927(2). However, state law merely informs our analysis of what is, ultimately, a federal issue. The Sentencing Guidelines must be interpreted in accordance with federal law, even when the Guidelines refer to some event occurring in state court. See United States v. Glover, 154 F.3d 1291, 1294 (11th Cir.1998). The Guidelines apply to prior convictions from all fifty states, in addition to federal, foreign, tribal and military courts. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1 cmt. backg'd. As such, there is inevitably variation in the terminology utilized by the individual jurisdictions. Therefore, we look to the substance of the punishment, rather than its title. This circuit has yet to interpret the term community control. However, other circuits' decisions provide some guidance. Although the issue was uncontested, the Sixth Circuit agreed that a community corrections sentence is sufficiently analogous to probation to warrant the application of § 4A1.2(k)(1). [4] United States v. Wheeler, 330 F.3d 407, 411, n. 5 (6th Cir. 2003). When faced with an uncategorized term, the Seventh Circuit compared the purpose of probation and the purpose of Illinois's conditional discharge and found they were sufficiency analogous to warrant the application of the Guidelines. [5] United States v. Caputo, 978 F.2d 972, 976-77 (7th Cir.1992). Under the Sentencing Guidelines, probation is a sentence in and of itself. U.S.S.G. § 5B1.1 intro. cmt. Probation may be used as an alternative to incarceration, provided that the conditions imposed serve the statutory purposes of sentencing. See id. Those statutory purposes include promoting respect for the law, providing just punishment for the offense, achieving general deterrence, and protecting the public from further crimes by the defendant. Id. Likewise, Florida's community control contains rules, requirements, conditions, and programs that are designed to encourage noncriminal functional behavior and promote the rehabilitation of the offender and the protection of the community. See Fla. Stat. § 948.01(3)(b). We have held that the primary purpose of probation is rehabilitation, the accomplishment of which will serve to protect the public. United States v. Gaskell, 134 F.3d 1039, 1045 (11th Cir.1998) (quoting United States v. Engelhorn, 122 F.3d 508, 512 (8th Cir.1997)). Probation allows the government to oversee an offender's rehabilitation while giving federal courts the authority to incarcerate the offender if he or she violates any of the stated conditions. See id. We find that Florida's community control program serves a similar purpose. In comparing community control to probation, both are alternative, community-based methods to punish offenders in lieu of incarceration. Both are discretionary forms of release subject to revocation. Both release the offender into the community subject to stated conditions and require extensive government supervision to ensure compliance. Both contain conditions specifically designed to rehabilitate the offender and promote respect for the law while simultaneously protecting the public. We recognize that probation and community control have some minor differences, but examination of the content of both reveals strong similarities in their purpose and application. Based on those similarities, we find that they are similar forms of release as contemplated by the Sentencing Guidelines. Therefore, we find that community control is sufficiently analogous to probation to warrant the application of U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(k).
Wright argues that his conviction is unconstitutional and must be vacated because his possession of a firearm and ammunition did not substantially affect interstate commerce. He notes that every subsection of § 922 limits the statute to interstate or foreign commerce, except for § 922(g), which extends the statute to the possession of a firearm that is in or affecting commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Wright asserts that Congress has intended to reach purely intrastate commerce by this section of the statute, which is beyond its power derived from the Commerce Clause and therefore, unconstitutional. Wright concedes that he did not raise this argument below but argues that plain error relieves him of that burden. Generally, we review de novo the constitutionality of a statute because it is a question of law. See United States v. Cespedes, 151 F.3d 1329, 1331 (11th Cir. 1998). However, we review Wright's challenge regarding the constitutionality of § 922(g) for plain error because he raises it for the first time on appeal. See United States v. Jones, 289 F.3d 1260, 1265 (11th Cir.2002). Plain error occurs if (1) there was error, (2) that was plain, (3) that affected the defendant's substantial rights, and (4) that seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. The government responds that Wright fails to demonstrate plain error because this court has already held that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is not constitutionally invalid under the Commerce Clause. United States v. Nichols, 124 F.3d 1265, 1266 (11th Cir.1997). We agree. Nichols rejected an identical constitutional challenge to § 922(g)(1) that the term commerce is not defined as interstate or foreign commerce. 124 F.3d at 1266. In making that determination, we reviewed the Supreme Court's holding in Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 571, 97 S.Ct. 1963, 1967, 52 L.Ed.2d 582 (1977). Specifically, we noted that the passage `in or affecting commerce' indicates a Congressional intent to assert its full Commerce Clause power. Id. We also noted in United States v. McAllister, that § 922(g)(1) is not an unconstitutional exercise of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. 77 F.3d 387, 389 (11th Cir.1996). Accordingly, we reject Wright's challenge to the constitutionality of § 922(g). Wright further contends that § 922(g) is unconstitutional as applied because mere possession of a firearm and ammunition does not substantially affect interstate commerce. However, § 922(g) only requires that the government prove some minimal nexus to interstate commerce, which it may accomplish by demonstrat[ing] that the firearm possessed traveled in interstate commerce. United States v. Scott, 263 F.3d 1270, 1274 (11th Cir.2001). Here, the government established that the firearms involved in Wright's offense were manufactured outside of Florida, the state in which the offense took place. Thus, the firearms necessarily traveled in interstate commerce and therefore satisfied the minimal nexus requirement. Accordingly, we find no merit in Wright's assertion that § 922(g) is unconstitutional as applied to him.