Opinion ID: 372467
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Little v. Claytor

Text: 18 Appellant Little retired from the regular Navy in October 1973. Shortly thereafter, in December, 1973, he secured employment with Sperry Flight Systems, a company that sells aircraft equipment to private corporations and the military. He submitted a DD Form 1357 on October 1, 1975, followed by a more detailed version on October 22, in which he described himself as Sperry's Mid-Atlantic representative. 19 The Judge Advocate General's Office informed Little in a letter dated January 15, 1976 that it required more information to determine whether he was violating 18 U.S.C. § 281 or 37 U.S.C. § 801(c). The letter warned that although disclosure was voluntary, failure to comply with the request might lead to an investigation, and that in any event JAGN might submit the disclosures to other agencies for possible use in administrative, criminal, or civil proceedings. 20 Little answered by resubmitting a copy of the October 22 form. The JAGN in turn requested additional information, but Little did not respond. 21 Little resigned from Sperry Flight Systems on March 20, 1976. Later that year, the Navy Investigation Service completed a study of Little's employment with Sperry and the Service concluded that Little had occupied a sales position and that his March resignation was prompted by his unsatisfactory job performance. On February 4, 1977, JAGN wrote to the Commander of the Navy Accounting and Finance Center expressing its opinion that Little violated 37 U.S.C. § 801(c) throughout the period of his employment as a sales representative for Sperry Flight Systems, basing its conclusion in part on information from his DD Form 1357. 22 Little filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief on March 2, 1977. He challenged 37 U.S.C. § 801(c) as unreasonably restricting his opportunities for earning a living, imposing an excessive forfeiture in violation of the Eighth Amendment, unlawfully discriminating between retired regular officers and retired reservists, constituting a bill of attainder and containing unconstitutionally vague language. He also alleged that the Defense Department's requirement that he submit a DD Form 1357 violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and his rights under the Privacy Act. 23 Shortly after the filing of this complaint, the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia informed appellant's counsel that the Judge Advocate General of the Navy had reviewed appellant's DD Forms 1357 and determined that the information available did not justify the conclusion that appellant had violated 37 U.S.C. § 801(c), despite earlier indications to the contrary. This representation was followed a year later by an opinion by the Navy Comptroller that there is insufficient evidence to support a finding that CDR Little was employed in violation of 37 U.S.C. § 801(c). 24 The District Court dismissed Little's constitutional challenge to 37 U.S.C. § 801(c) on May 15, 1978, on the ground that his alleged present injury (is) remote and speculative. The Court dismissed the self-incrimination and Privacy Act claims against the new DD Form 1357 under the authority of the ruling in the Hoker case. 9 As to whether the old DD Form 1357 violated the Privacy Act, the Court ruled that appellees did not violate the Privacy Act in soliciting information under the old form and that the damage claim accordingly must fail. 10 The District Court did find, however, that the old form violated the privilege against self-incrimination and it enjoined appellees from using information from that form against appellant in civil or criminal proceedings. This appeal followed the District Court's denial of Little's motion for reconsideration.