Opinion ID: 811960
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Searches of the Minivan

Text: White says that each search of the minivan, the first by Trooper Butler and the second by Sergeant Bachtell, violated his constitutional rights. He claims that he possessed a legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of the locked document box, the closed backpack, and the red plastic store bag. Accordingly, he asserts, the contents of each container should have been suppressed, as well as all subsequent fruits of the investigation based on the contents of those containers. We reject those arguments because White lacks standing to challenge the search of the minivan. A person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in a place where he has no right to be. In Rakas v. Illinois, the Supreme Court stated: 4 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “This Court reviews the District Court‟s denial of a motion to suppress for clear error as to the underlying factual findings and exercises plenary review of the District Court‟s application of the law to those facts.” United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 336 (3d Cir. 2002). 6 [A] “legitimate” expectation of privacy by definition means more than a subjective expectation of not being discovered. A burglar plying his trade in a summer cabin during the off season may have a thoroughly justified subjective expectation of privacy, but it is not one which the law recognizes as “legitimate.” His presence … is “wrongful”; his expectation is not one that society is prepared to recognize as “reasonable.” 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, White challenges the search of a van that he did not own and that had been stolen from its rightful owner. Although we have not previously addressed the right of a defendant to challenge the search of a stolen car, we have held that “the driver of a rental car who has been lent the car by the renter, but who is not listed on the rental agreement as an authorized driver, lacks a legitimate expectation of privacy in the car unless there exist extraordinary circumstances suggesting an expectation of privacy.” United States v. Kennedy, 638 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 2011). And we added that no such expectation of privacy exists where the individual “borrows [the] rental car without the permission or knowledge of the owner.” Id.; see also United States v. Jones, 430 F. Supp. 219, 224 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (holding that defendant “had no standing to contest the search of [his companion‟s] trunk and the laundry bag” contained therein), aff’d without op., 591 F.2d 1337 (3d Cir. 1979) (unpublished table opinion). Although we have not reached the question before, it is hardly surprising that several other courts have held that the possessor of a stolen vehicle lacks standing to challenge a search of the vehicle. See United States v. Tropiano, 50 F.3d 157, 161 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[I]t [is] obvious that a defendant who knowingly possesses a stolen car has 7 no legitimate expectation of privacy in the car.”); United States v. Lanford, 838 F.2d 1351, 1353 (5th Cir. 1988) (the possessor of a stolen vehicle has no standing to object to its search); United States v. Hensel, 672 F.2d 578, 579 (6th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (“[T]he defendant lacked standing to challenge the search of the truck because he had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the stolen vehicle or its contents.”); United States v. Sanchez, 635 F.2d 47, 64 (2d Cir. 1980) (defendant who did not show either that he owned the car or possessed it with permission of the owner lacked constitutionally protected interest in car). We likewise reject White‟s claim that he had a legitimate right of privacy in the contents of the stolen minivan, and so we hold that he had no standing to object to the search of the car,5 see Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12 (stating that where an individual‟s “presence … is „wrongful[,]‟ his expectation [of privacy] is not one that society is prepared to recognize as „reasonable‟”), or its contents, see United States v. Wellons, 32 F.3d 117, 119 (4th Cir. 1994) (“One who can assert no legitimate claim to the car he was driving cannot reasonably assert an expectation of privacy in a bag found in that automobile. … A person who cannot assert a legitimate claim to a vehicle cannot reasonably expect that the vehicle is a private repository for his personal effects, whether 5 Even if White had standing, however, his assertion that the officers lacked authority to search would fail. Because Trooper Butler had probable cause to believe the vehicle was stolen, he had probable cause to search it for evidence relating to the theft, including in the box, the backpack, and the plastic store bag. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982) (holding that if police have probable cause to search any part of a vehicle, they may search all compartments, containers, and packages within that portion of the vehicle that may contain the item sought because “[t]he scope of a warrantless search of an automobile … is not defined by the nature of the container in which the contraband is secreted[, but] … by the object of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be found”). 8 or not they are enclosed in some sort of a container, [including personal luggage].” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The District Court therefore did not err in denying White‟s motion to suppress the evidence discovered during the searches of the minivan.