Opinion ID: 4035366
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Unlawful Arrest by Harris

Text: Zimmerman alleges that Harris violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights by arresting him without probable cause and by arresting him and requiring him to post bond for a Class C misdemeanor. For the reasons assigned hereinafter, we conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment in Harris’s favor on Zimmerman’s unlawful arrest claim. A. Probable Cause to Arrest for Evading Arrest or Detention Zimmerman was arrested for Evading Arrest or Detention. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 38.04. “For warrantless arrests, the test for whether the ‘police 5 officer had probable cause to arrest is if, at the time of the arrest, he had knowledge that would warrant a prudent person’s belief that the person arrested had already committed or was committing a crime.” Mangieri v. Clifton, 29 F.3d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir. 1994) (alterations omitted) (quoting Duckett v. City of Cedar Park, 950 F.2d 272, 278 (5th Cir. 1992)). “Even law enforcement officials who reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present are entitled to immunity.” Haggerty v. Tex. S. Univ., 391 F.3d 653, 656 (5th Cir. 2004) (emphasis in original) (quoting Mendenhall v. Riser, 213 F.3d 226, 230 (5th Cir. 2000)). A person violates Texas’s evading detention statute “if he intentionally flees from a person he knows is a peace officer . . . attempting lawfully to arrest or detain him.” TEX. PENAL CODE § 38.04(a). A person cannot be convicted of evading detention unless an officer had reasonable suspicion or probable cause to detain the suspect for a crime other than evading that arrest. See Jenkins v. State, 454 S.W.3d 712, 714-15 (Tex. App. 2015). Zimmerman does not deny that he intentionally fled from a police officer, but argues that Harris was not “lawfully” attempting to arrest or detain him. Harris responds that he had reasonable suspicion to detain Zimmerman to investigate potential charges of disorderly conduct, obstruction of a highway or other passageway, and public intoxication. “Although an officer’s reliance on a mere ‘hunch’ is insufficient to justify a stop, the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002) (citations omitted) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)) (citing United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). In Texas, a person commits the offense of disorderly conduct if he, inter alia, “abuses or threatens a person in a public 6 place in an obviously offensive manner” or “fights with another in a public place.” TEX. PENAL CODE § 42.01(a)(4), (a)(6). The offense of obstructing a highway or other passageway can be committed by “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly” obstructing a highway, street, or sidewalk. TEX. PENAL CODE § 42.03(a)(1). The Texas public intoxication statute is violated if a person “appears in a public place while intoxicated to the degree that the person may endanger [himself] or another.” TEX. PENAL CODE § 49.02(a). Public intoxication and disorderly conduct, when committed as described here, are Class C misdemeanors. See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 42.01(d), 49.02(c). Obstructing a highway is a Class B misdemeanor. TEX. PENAL CODE § 42.03(c). Here, Zimmerman testified that he had consumed five or six alcoholic beverages over the course of the evening in question, and that he and another man stopped to face each other in the middle of a street, engaged in a heated “standoff” that did not come to blows. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Zimmerman, the evidence shows that Harris saw Zimmerman and another man facing each other in a confrontational manner in the middle of the street for several seconds. Even while drawing permissible inferences in Zimmerman’s favor, the evidence supports a conclusion that Harris reasonably suspected Zimmerman of criminal activity—disorderly conduct or obstructing a passageway. Under these circumstances, Harris had the authority to make an investigatory stop. Further, Zimmerman testified he fled once he saw Harris’s vehicle. Because Harris’s reasonable suspicion of criminal activity supported a lawful stop, Zimmerman’s flight together with the altercation witnessed by Harris was an objectively reasonable basis for Harris to believe he had probable cause to arrest Zimmerman for evading detention. Cf. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (“unprovoked flight upon noticing the police” was one factor among the totality of circumstances supporting 7 reasonable suspicion of criminal activity); United States v. Wadley, 59 F.3d 510, 512 (5th Cir. 1995) (“[I]n combination with other facts and circumstances, flight from an officer may create probable cause where the defendant persistently attempts to evade capture.”). B. Arrest for a Class C Misdemeanor Zimmerman also claims that his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were violated when he was arrested and required to post bond for a Class C misdemeanor. 1 Zimmerman’s unlawful arrest claim must be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment, not the Fourteenth Amendment. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (applying Fourth Amendment to excessive force claim). The Supreme Court has made clear that a citizen’s Fourth Amendment rights are not violated when he is lawfully arrested on a nonjailable offense. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001) (“If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.”). Moreover, we have held that “requiring a defendant charged with a non-jailable offense to post bond insures that he will appear for trial” and does not violate the defendant’s constitutional rights. Gladden v. Roach, 864 F.2d 1196, 1200 (5th Cir. 1989). We therefore find Zimmerman’s unlawful arrest claim without merit.