Opinion ID: 891859
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: permissible state policies which justify population deviations

Text: {27} When called upon to draw a redistricting map, a court acts in equity and may adopt a plan submitted by a party, modify such a plan, or draw its own map. See O'Sullivan v. Brier, 540 F.Supp. 1200, 1202-03 (D.C.Kan.1982). The most fundamental tenet of judicial administration and independence is that the process must be fair, and it must [also] appear to be fair. See Peterson v. Borst, 786 N.E.2d 668, 673 (Ind.2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This concept of judicial independence, that judges decide the merits of a case based on the facts and the law before them, without fear or favor, is particularly important in this area, which is fundamentally a political dispute. As Justice Felix Frankfurter observed in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 554, 66 S.Ct. 1198, 90 L.Ed. 1432 (1946), [t]he one stark fact that emerges from a study of the history of [legislative] apportionment is its embroilment in politics, in the sense of party contests and party interests. Thus, his strong recommendation was that [c]ourts ought not to enter this political thicket. Id. at 556, 66 S.Ct. 1198. Unfortunately, because of the inability of our sister branches of government to find a way to work together and address the most significant decennial legislation to affect the voting rights of the adult citizens of our State, the judiciary in New Mexico finds itself embroiled in this political thicket. {28} Because the redistricting process is embroiled in partisan politics, when called upon to draw a redistricting map, a court must do so with both the appearance and fact of scrupulous neutrality. Peterson, 786 N.E.2d at 673. To avoid the appearance of partisan politics, a judge should not select a plan that seeks partisan advantage. Thus, a proposed plan that seeks to change the ground rules so that one party can do better than it would do under a plan drawn up by someone without a political agenda is unacceptable for a court-drawn plan. See Wilson v. Eu, 1 Cal.4th 707, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 379, 823 P.2d 545, 576-77 (1992) (in bank) (rejecting plans submitted by the parties because each had calculated partisan political consequences, the details of which were unknown, leaving no principled way for the court to choose between the plans, while knowing that the court would be endorsing an unknown but intended political consequence if it chose one of the plans). {29} A court's adoption of a plan that represents one political party's idea of how district boundaries should be drawn does not conform to the principle of judicial independence and neutrality. Peterson, 786 N.E.2d at 673. Although some courts are indifferent to political considerations such as incumbency or party affiliation, Burling v. Chandler, 148 N.H. 143, 804 A.2d 471, 474 (2002) (per curiam), other courts question the wisdom of such indifference, Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 753, 93 S.Ct. 2321 (It may be suggested that those who redistrict and reapportion should work with census, not political, data and achieve population equality without regard for political impact. But this politically mindless approach may produce, whether intended or not, the most grossly gerrymandered results.). {30} The district court heard several of the parties' expert witnesses testify about court-drawn plans and partisan neutrality. One of the executive's expert witnesses who testified in this case agreed that a court should not select a plan that gives one political party a partisan advantage. Dr. Keith Gaddie testified that how political balance is shifted by the court plan when compared to the baseline map is an important consideration. Dr. Theodore Arrington also testified that when courts draw redistricting plans, there is more partisan balance and more competitive districts. Dr. Thomas Lloyd Brunell, the executive's other expert witness, put it more bluntly: [c]ourts ... try not to advance the purposes or the ability of one party to really elect a lot more people than the status quo.... Whether these experts would have expressed concern about Executive Alternative Plan 3 is not known because they had testified before this plan was introduced into evidence. {31} Despite our discomfort with political considerations, we conclude that when New Mexico courts are required to draw a redistricting map, they must do so with the appearance of and actual neutrality. The courts should not select a plan that seeks partisan advantage. As was evident from the numerous plans drawn in this case, parties are capable of drawing maps that seek to give themselves a partisan advantage. This was true even when the party was able to maintain de minimus population deviations. When a court is required to draw a redistricting map, it is a desirable goal for the court to draw a partisan-neutral map that complies with both the one person, one vote doctrine and the requirements of the Voting Rights Act. To accomplish this goal, partisan symmetry may be one consideration. Although partisan asymmetry is not a reliable measure of unconstitutional partisanship, League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 548 U.S. at 420, 126 S.Ct. 2594, it should be considered as a measure of partisan fairness in electoral systems, id. at 466, 126 S.Ct. 2594 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In addition, maintaining the political ratios as close to the status quo as is practicable, accounting for any changes in statewide trends, will honor the neutrality required in such a politically-charged case. Districts should be drawn to promote fair and effective representation for all, not to undercut electoral competition and protect incumbents. It is preferable to allow the voters to choose their representatives through the election process, as opposed to having their representative chosen for them through the art of drawing redistricting maps. We believe that consistent and non-discriminatory application of historic legislative redistricting policies, in conjunction with limited flexibility in the court's search for ideal population equality, will be effective tools in drawing redistricting maps that avoid partisan advantage. In applying these rules, a court may be well advised to employ the services of an expert under Rule 11-706 NMRA. {32} However, because redistricting is primarily the responsibility of the State Legislature, courts must look at previous plans and policies when drawing redistricting maps. Even plans that pass the Legislature but fail to be enacted into law, such as House Bill 39, are due thoughtful consideration. See Sixty-Seventh Minn. State Senate v. Beens, 406 U.S. 187, 197, 92 S.Ct. 1477, 32 L.Ed.2d 1 (1972). Thoughtful consideration is important because redistricting ordinarily involves criteria, policies, and standards that have been publicly deliberated by both the legislative and the executive branches of government in the exercise of their political judgment. More importantly, it is during the legislative process that the public regularly participates by commenting on policies and plans and observing the legislators deliberate the virtues of different policies and plans during open meetings. The Legislature is the voice of the people, and it would be unacceptable for courts to muzzle the voice of the people simply because the Legislature was unable, for whatever reason, to have its redistricting plan become law. {33} Adhering to policies adopted by the Legislature gives effect to the will of the majority of the people and is permissible in redistricting litigation. See White, 412 U.S. at 795-96, 93 S.Ct. 2348. Other courts have looked to state policies when drawing a redistricting plan. Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine, 387 F.Supp.2d 1035, 1042 (D.S.D.2005) (directing that a court should apply traditional state districting principles); Arizonans for Fair Representation v. Symington, 828 F.Supp. 684, 688 (D.Ariz.1992), aff'd, 507 U.S. 981, 113 S.Ct. 1573, 123 L.Ed.2d 142 (1993) (a court may look to several neutral criteria in drawing a redistricting plan that is politically fair); Alexander v. Taylor, 51 P.3d 1204, 1211 (Okla.2002) (Widely recognized `neutral redistricting criteria' may be considered when drawing a redistricting map.). {34} The bipartisan New Mexico Legislative Council adopted guidelines which set forth policies that are similar to policies that have been recognized as legitimate by numerous courts. Testimony during the trial revealed that these guidelines, or other guidelines very similar in substance, have been followed in New Mexico since 1991. These guidelines were followed by the court in Jepsen, and should be considered by a state court when called upon to draw a redistricting map. The policies set forth in the guidelines that are relevant to state districts include: b. State districts shall be substantially equal in population; no plans for state office will be considered that include any district with a total population that deviates more than plus or minus five percent from the ideal. ... d. Since the precinct is the basic building block of a voting district in New Mexico, proposed redistricting plans to be considered by the legislature shall not be comprised of districts that split precincts. e. Plans must comport with the provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, and federal constitutional standards. Plans that dilute a protected minority's voting strength are unacceptable. Race may be considered in developing redistricting plans but shall not be the predominant consideration. Traditional race-neutral districting principles (as reflected below) must not be subordinated to racial considerations. f. All redistricting plans shall use only single-member districts. g. Districts shall be drawn consistent with traditional districting principles. Districts shall be composed of contiguous precincts, and shall be reasonably compact. To the extent feasible, districts shall be drawn in an attempt to preserve communities of interest and shall take into consideration political and geographic boundaries. In addition, and to the extent feasible, the legislature may seek to preserve the core of existing districts, and may consider the residence of incumbents. {35} Some comment is necessary regarding these guidelines. Single-member districts are required by Section 3(C), Article IV of the New Mexico Constitution. Districts designed with contiguous precincts that are as compact as practicable are intended to comply with the requirements of NMSA 1978, Section 2-7C-3. Compactness and contiguity are important considerations because these requirements help to reduce travel time and costs. These considerations make it easier for legislative candidates to campaign for office, and once they are elected, to maintain close and continuing contact with the people they represent. It has also been suggested that compactness and contiguity greatly reduce, although they do not eliminate, the possibilities of gerrymandering. Daniel D. Polsby & Robert D. Popper, The Third Criterion: Compactness as a Procedural Safeguard Against Partisan Gerrymandering, 9 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 301, 326-34 (1991). {36} Similarly, considering political and geographic boundaries furthers our representative government. Minimizing fragmentation of political subdivisions, counties, towns, villages, wards, precincts, and neighborhoods allows constituencies to organize effectively and decreases the likelihood of voter confusion regarding other elections based on political subdivision geographics. See Prosser v. Elections Bd., 793 F.Supp. 859, 863 (1992). {37} With respect to the legislative policy of preserving communities of interest, we recognize that this criterion may be subject to varying interpretations. We interpret communities of interest to include a contiguous population that shares common economic, social, and cultural interests which should be included within a single district for purposes of its effective and fair representation. See O'Sullivan, 540 F.Supp. at 1204. The rationale for giving due weight to clear communities of interest is that [t]o be an effective representative, a legislator must represent a district that has a reasonable homogeneity of needs and interests; otherwise the policies he supports will not represent the preferences of most of his constituents. Prosser, 793 F.Supp. at 863. {38} Incumbency considerations present their own difficulties. The United States Supreme Court in Karcher, 462 U.S. at 740, 103 S.Ct. 2653, held that the legislative policy of avoiding contests between incumbents was included among legitimate objectives, which on a proper showing could justify minor population deviations. See also White, 412 U.S. at 791, 93 S.Ct. 2348 ([I]n the context of state reapportionment... the fact that `district boundaries may have been drawn [to] minimize[] the number of contests between present incumbents does not in and of itself establish invidiousness.') (quoting Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 89 n. 16, 86 S.Ct. 1286, 16 L.Ed.2d 376 (1966)); Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 752, 93 S.Ct. 2321. However, incumbency protection cannot be justified if it is simply for the benefit of the officeholder and not in the interests of the constituents. League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 548 U.S. at 403, 126 S.Ct. 2594. {39} In summary, we interpret United States Supreme Court precedent to permit courts encumbered with the responsibility to draw redistricting maps to be guided by legislative policies underlying state plans to the extent the policies do not violate either the constitution or the Voters Rights Act. Perry v. Perez, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 132 S.Ct. 934, 941-42, 181 L.Ed.2d 900 (2012) (per curiam). A court is not required to rigidly adhere to maximum population equality as long as the court can enunciate the state policy on which it relies in deviating from the ideal population. By only deviating for enunciated state policy reasons, the court complies with the constitution and furthers the state's interests. In this case, we interpret the district court to have concluded that it was bound to a plus-or-minus one-percent population deviation with the sole exception of addressing the requirements of the Voting Rights Act. This conclusion does not conform to our view of the proper legal standard to be applied in redistricting cases as articulated above. Thus, we remanded this matter to the district court to draw its own redistricting map to avoid, to the extent possible, partisan bias, and to determine whether it could implement legitimate state policies by employing a more flexible approach to ideal population equality without departing from constitutional considerations.