Opinion ID: 1975189
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Heading: The Extent to Which the Declaration is Really Against the Declarant's Penal Interest

Text: In determining whether a declaration against penal interest is trustworthy, the trial court must ascertain the extent to which the statement is against the declarant's penal interest. See Henson v. United States, supra . Some proffered declarations will no doubt be excluded because the statement, although facially against the declarant's penal interest, could not subject the declarant to criminal liability. Under these circumstances, the non-existence of potential criminal liability poses no deterrent to falsification. Where the declarant has already been convicted of a crime before making the declaration and only the possibility of a longer period of incarceration exists as a deterrent to fabrication, some courts have deemed the extent of the penal interest insufficient to guarantee the accuracy and trustworthiness of the statement. See Henson v. United States, supra ; United States v. Dovico, 380 F.2d 325 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 944, 88 S.Ct. 308, 19 L.Ed.2d 302 (1967). Similarly, where the declarant makes a statement after acquittal and double jeopardy is a bar to further prosecution, penal liability may not be sufficiently implicated to be admissible. Moreover, a statement rendered under a grant of immunity presents similar weaknesses. See United States v. Gonzalez, 559 F.2d 1271, 1273 (5th Cir.1977) (statement made under offer of immunity lessens reliability). See Note, Declarations Against Penal Interest: Standards of Admissibility Under an Emerging Majority Rule, supra at 157-58. Undoubtedly there will be proffered declarations in which portions are inculpatory, other portions are neutral or collateral as to the declarant's penal interest, and still other portions are self-serving or exculpatory. As a preliminary matter, the trial judge must determine that the statement is not so colored by the exculpatory portions as to render the statement as a whole exculpatory, i. e., not so far tended to subject him to . . . criminal liability, Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(3). After this initial inquiry, the extent to which the relevant portions of the statement are against the declarant's penal interest must be determined. While we are not called upon here to decide whether all of a statement containing a declaration against penal interest is admissible, compare 5 Wigmore, supra § 1465, at 271 (would allow in full statement) with McCormick, supra § 279, at 675-77 (would allow in only disserving and collateral portions), at a minimum the disserving portions are admissible. United States v. Barrett, 539 F.2d 244, 252 (1st Cir.1976) (admitting collateral portion along with inculpatory portion); People v. Leach, 15 Cal.3d 419, 441, 124 Cal.Rptr. 752, 767, 541 P.2d 296, 311 (1975) (excluding any portion of a statement against penal interest not itself specifically disserving to the interests of the declarant); State v. Abrams, 140 N.J.Super. 232, 356 A.2d 26 (App.Div.1976), aff'd 72 N.J. 342, 370 A.2d 852 (1977) (whole statement admissible). Factors to be considered include the extent to which collateral portions are tied up with or implied by the inculpatory portions. See Note, Declarations Against Penal Interest: Standards of Admissibility Under an Emerging Majority Rule, supra at 165-68. Examination of the above considerations reveals that the corroboration requirement of the rule we announce today involves no fixed criteria. The three factors discussed above are not exhaustive and no one factor will be dispositive. Often the presence of one factor will be instructive as to whether there exists a sufficient guarantee of trustworthiness. In other cases a more complete inquiry will be required. Beyond the preceding discussion, we find it unnecessary to set forth the myriad of factual alternatives which may satisfy the corroboration requirement of declarations against penal interest. Such judgments are better left to the determination of the trial court. The circuits have expressed conflicting views as to the proper scope of appellate review of trial court rulings on the admissibility of declarations against penal interest. The Fifth Circuit has adopted a clearly erroneous standard. See United States v. Bagley, supra at 166-67. The Second and Ninth Circuits have adopted an abuse of discretion standard. See United States v. Guillette, supra at 745; United States v. Satterfield, supra at 690. We are in agreement with the views expressed in the Fifth Circuit. The trial court's conclusion that a statement is against the declarant's penal interest is clearly a legal question. However, the determination of whether a statement was made and whether the declaration is trustworthy both involve the application of a legal standard to factual findings. The trial court must assess the credibility of the witness repeating the statement and examine all the evidence before ruling. Such a procedure is not unlike the factual and legal findings the trial court must make when considering issues such as voluntariness of a waiver of Miranda rights, see, Peoples v. United States, D.C.App., 395 A.2d 41, 43 (1978), voluntariness of confessions, see Taylor v. United States, 380 A.2d 989, 992 (1977), and the consent to search, see Crisafi v. United States, D.C.App., 383 A.2d 1, 4 (1978). Accordingly, in reviewing the trial court's ruling on the admissibility of declarations against penal interest, we will not disturb the trial court's findings unless they are clearly erroneous. See D.C.Code 1973, § 17-305(a).