Opinion ID: 510217
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Citisource Bribes and Kaplan's RICO Convictions

Text: 160 As explained supra (Background Parts A, B(5); Discussion Part A(2)), Kaplan was charged with, and convicted of, two RICO predicate acts: the payment of a bribe to Lindenauer in the form of Citisource stock and the payment of an identical bribe to Manes. Kaplan proffers two contentions as to why these bribes cannot support his RICO convictions. First, he argues that his transfer of Citisource stock to Manes and Lindenauer does not constitute two predicate acts under RICO because they were part of a single act or criminal transaction and could not be separately prosecuted or punished under New York law. Second, Kaplan argues that, even if the Citisource bribes were two predicate acts, they did not constitute a pattern of racketeering activity. We find the first contention to be without merit but reserve decision on the second pending in banc review of a similar issue in an unrelated case. 161
162 New York's Criminal Procedure Law contains several provisions governing double jeopardy that go[ ] much farther and provid[e] greater protections than do the federal and New York Constitutions. N.Y.Crim.Proc.Law Sec. 40.10 practice commentary (1981). In contending that the Citisource bribes cannot constitute two predicate acts, Kaplan relies in part upon N.Y.Crim.Proc.Law Sec. 40.20(2) (McKinney 1981), which provides that in general [a] person may not be separately prosecuted for two offenses based upon the same act or criminal transaction. A criminal transaction for the purposes of Section 40.20 163 means conduct which establishes at least one offense, and which is comprised of two or more or a group of acts either (a) so closely related and connected in point of time and circumstance of commission as to constitute a single criminal incident, or (b) so closely related in criminal purpose or objective as to constitute elements or integral parts of a single criminal venture. 164 Id. Sec. 40.10(2). Kaplan submits that these provisions preclude the Citisource bribes from constituting separate predicate acts. He also contends that under N.Y. Penal Law Sec. 70.25(2) (McKinney 1987), which bars the imposition of consecutive sentences on a person for two or more offenses committed through a single act or omission, or through an act or omission which in itself constituted one of the offenses and also was a material element of the other, the Citisource bribes are punishable only as a single offense and cannot constitute separate predicate acts. 165 However, state procedural rules such as those relied upon by Kaplan are irrelevant under RICO. 6 [R]acketeering activity under RICO includes any act ... involving ... bribery ... which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1961(1)(A) (Supp.IV 1986). In United States v. Paone, 782 F.2d 386, 393 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882, 107 S.Ct. 269, 93 L.Ed.2d 246 (1986), --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 3261, 3262, 97 L.Ed.2d 761 (1987), we observed that this language was not intend[ed] to incorporate the various states' procedural and evidentiary rules into the RICO statute but was instead meant to define, in a more generic sense, the wrongful conduct that constitutes the predicates for a federal racketeering charge. We thus held in Paone that the RICO statute did not incorporate for purposes of a RICO predicate crime a New York rule forbidding convictions based on uncorroborated accomplice testimony. Id. at 394. In reaching this conclusion, we emphasized that appellant's reading of 'chargeable' would result in precisely the same criminal act, proscribed by the laws of two states, being the basis of a RICO violation in one state but not in the other--simply because of differences in what are essentially procedural rules. Id. at 393. 166 Paone controls here. New York's rules governing double jeopardy and consecutive sentencing do not affect the generic definition of the crime of bribery. Instead, they are essentially procedural rules governing prosecutions for all crimes in New York. It is not disputed that the bribe to Lindenauer was chargeable and punishable under New York law, as was the bribe to Manes. Each was thus a bribe under New York's definition of bribery, even though they both could not be (we assume, see supra note 6) separately charged and punished. Because the definition of bribery is unaffected, the two bribes to Manes and Lindenauer remain chargeable under State law and punishable for the purposes of RICO and constitute separate predicate crimes. See United States v. Licavoli, 725 F.2d 1040, 1046-47 (6th Cir.) (murder and conspiracy to commit murder could serve as two separate predicate acts even though defendants could not have been charged with and punished for both crimes under Ohio law), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1252, 104 S.Ct. 3535, 82 L.Ed.2d 840 (1984). 167
168 Having thus determined that the Citisource bribes properly constitute two predicate acts, we must reach Kaplan's alternative contention that the two Citisource bribes do not constitute a pattern of racketeering activity under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1961(5) (1982). In making this argument, Kaplan relies heavily upon the now-famous footnote fourteen in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985), in which the Supreme Court suggested in dictum that two predicate acts, while necessary to establish a pattern of racketeering activity, might not be sufficient to do so. Id. at 496 n. 14, 105 S.Ct. at 3285-86 n. 14; see 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1961(5) ( 'pattern of racketeering activity' requires at least two acts of racketeering activity). In particular, Kaplan points to the Sedima footnote's quotation of the following language from the Senate Report on RICO: 169 The target of [RICO] is thus not sporadic activity. The infiltration of legitimate business normally requires more than one racketeering activity and the threat of continuing activity to be effective. It is this factor of continuity plus relationship which combines to produce a pattern. 170 473 U.S. at 496 n. 14, 105 S.Ct. at 3285-86 n. 14 (quoting, with emphasis added, S.Rep. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1969)). According to Kaplan, the Citisource bribes cannot constitute a pattern of racketeering activity because they arose from a single conversation with Lindenauer and were accordingly an isolated incident of unitary character lacking the continuity to which the footnote in Sedima referred. 171 Our full court has, however, on its own motion granted rehearing in banc in United States v. Indelicato, Nos. 87-1085, 87-1215 (2d Cir. argued June 13, 1988), to address a contention substantially similar to Kaplan's. Since the panel has found Kaplan's other claims regarding his RICO convictions to be without merit, see supra Parts A(2), C(1); infra Part D(1), we will reserve our decision on whether Kaplan's RICO convictions should stand until Indelicato is decided.