Opinion ID: 474874
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Denial of Coercion Instruction.

Text: 112 Allen's defense before, during, and after his trial was that he was coerced into violating the law as a result of the reputation and threats of the chief witness for the prosecution, Jesse Stoneking. However, the district court refused to give any coercion instruction and specifically rejected Allen's offered Instruction Number 11, which is based on Seventh Circuit pattern instruction No. 4.05. 7 113 While generally the defense of coercion, compulsion or duress is an issue of fact to go to the jury, United States v. McKnight, 427 F.2d 75, 77 (7th Cir.1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 880, 91 S.Ct. 124, 27 L.Ed.2d 118 (1971), in order to become entitled to a jury instruction on the defense, the defendant must present sufficient evidence with respect to each element of the defense. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 414-15, 100 S.Ct. 624, 636-37, 62 L.Ed.2d 575 (1980); United States v. Mauchlin, 670 F.2d 746, 748 (7th Cir.1982). Defining what is a sufficient amount of evidence to bring an issue to the jury has historically depended on both the specific facts of the crime and of the defense. But it is clear that the defendant need not prove his case: he need only meet a minimum standard of evidence. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. at 415, 100 S.Ct. at 637. The law of this circuit is that a defendant is entitled to have the jury consider any theory of defense which is supported by law and has some foundation in the evidence even though such evidence may be weak, insufficient or of doubtful credibility. United States v. Brown, 785 F.2d 587, 590 (7th Cir.1986) (quoting United States v. Patrick, 542 F.2d 381, 386 (7th Cir.1976)); United States v. Lehman, 468 F.2d 93, 108 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 967, 93 S.Ct. 273, 34 L.Ed.2d 232 (1972). 114 The traditional tests for determining the sufficiency of the evidence requires the defendant to establish two elements: (1) immediacy of a threat of severe bodily injury or death which can be avoided only by committing a crime, United States v. Mauchlin, 670 F.2d at 748; United States v. Stevison, 471 F.2d 143 (7th Cir.1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 950, 93 S.Ct. 1933, 36 L.Ed.2d 411 (1973); and (2) the existence of no reasonable legal alternative to violating the law. United States v. Brown, 785 F.2d at 590; United States v. Quilty, 741 F.2d 1031, 1033 (7th Cir.1984); United States v. Trapnell, 638 F.2d 1016, 1030 (7th Cir.1980). 8 Applying those two standards to this case, we find that while Allen's evidence focused on the coercion issue, there was little evidence of an immediate threat or an inability to avoid violating the law. Allen testified that he was afraid of Stoneking's connections in the crime world and afraid of Stoneking's general reputation for killing and violence. Allen claimed, though it is not clear from where in the taperecorded conversations, that Stoneking threatened Allen and his sister if Allen did not build the bomb. Allen was afraid to go to the police, again because of Stoneking's alleged connections. Allen testified that the threats, if they existed, were vague and had no immediate time-frame. There was no evidence in the taperecorded conversations that Stoneking had such contacts with law enforcement officials that Stoneking would learn if Allen went to the police to complain. Allen did not allege that he knew Stoneking was involved with the government, nor did he allege that he had any knowledge of Stoneking's role as a government informant. Allen did allege that Stoneking disguised his voice to sound like Allen and had pretended to be Allen in a telephone conversation with Allen's sister. Thus, Allen presented very little evidence that he was actually faced with an immediate threat that left him no alternative but to violate the law. Moreover, because the testimony and evidence in support of Allen's sole theory of defense did go to the jury, and because of the wide discretion afforded the trial judge, we hold that a jury instruction was not mandated. 115 The prosecution argues that at trial they made clear that one exchange in particular between Stoneking and Allen demonstrated that no injury was imminent and thus there was no coercion: 116 Q. Well did you make the statement during the first meeting on July 14, 1983, If I tell you I'm going to do something, I'm going to do it. If I don't want to do it, if I feel leery about it ... Stoneking: Right. [Allen:] I'll tell you. Stoneking: That is your business, right. Did that exchange take place? 117 A. I made that statement. 118 Q. That if you didn't want to do it, if you felt leery about it, that you wouldn't do it, isn't that right? 119 A. In answered your question. [sic] 120 Q. And didn't Mr. Stoneking say, That is fine. That is exactly the way we like it? 121 A. He said something similar to that. 122 With this testimony in mind, the record indicates that the district court weighed the slight evidence offered and declined to give the coercion instruction, making a comment that could be interpreted as a finding that Allen was a less credible witness than Stoneking. 123 This approach causes concern for three reasons. First, credibility determinations are jury considerations. Even if any comment by the district court could be interpreted as a credibility finding, it was not before the jury, and because there is no evidence that it was a determinative factor in the decision, it alone cannot be held to be error. If it was a finding that went to credibility and a determinative factor in the decision, we would be required to reverse. 124 Second, in order to receive an instruction on coercion the defendant need only meet a minimal showing, and that evidence should be taken as true. Thus, in most contexts, it is inappropriate to weigh the defendant's evidence against the prosecution's evidence to make the determination whether or not to give a coercion instruction. Therefore, the above quoted exchange between Stoneking and Allen that was brought out at trial should not have been a factor in deciding whether or not an instruction should be given. The district court's task is to examine the defendant's evidence alone, assume it could be believed by the jury, and then determine if it is sufficient enough to require an instruction. The record shows that the district court properly did not weigh the exchange that the prosecution asserts shows a lack of coercion against the defendant's evidence of coercion, but that the court based its holding solely on the defendant's evidence. That evidence is so minimal that we affirm the district court's refusal to give a coercion instruction. 125 Third, in our recent case of United States v. Brown, 785 F.2d at 589-90, one factor in the decision was that while the district court did not give a coercion instruction, all the testimony and evidence in support of the defendant's insanity and necessity defenses was presented to the jury. In this case the defendant attempted to corroborate his testimony with that of his sister but the district court refused to allow the testimony into evidence after Allen made an offer of proof as to the subject matter of that testimony. When the essential facts of a case are not in dispute and the defendant's sole theory of defense is coercion, the district court should use particular care in denying the defendant a jury instruction when not all the relevant evidence the defendant offered has been admitted. In this case, the offer of proof that set out what defendant's sister would testify to demonstrated that the testimony was only repetitive of what the jury had already heard. The defendant only alleged that his sister's testimony would corroborate his own and thus bolster his credibility--but credibility is irrelevant when determining whether or not to give an instruction. If there was any allegation that the evidence not admitted was not repetitive and was important to the theory of the defense, then its exclusion would be error. Because there is no harmless error possible on the refusal to give a necessary instruction, we would be forced to reverse. But in this case, Allen sought only to buttress the credibility of his allegations, not add to them, and thus the refusal to allow his sister to testify is an insufficient ground to reverse the court's refusal to give a coercion instruction. 126 However this remains a troublesome matter. While Allen's theory of defense was, to use the language of Patrick, weak, insufficient or of doubtful credibility, 542 F.2d at 386, it is difficult to find that it does not have some foundation in the evidence. Id. (emphasis added). But it is clear that this circuit has interpreted some, even in the Patrick case itself, to mean more than just the mere existence of a foundation in the evidence. See generally, United States v. Brown, 785 F.2d at 590; United States v. Quilty, 741 F.2d at 1033; United States v. Trapnell, 638 F.2d at 1030. While factual comparisons between cases are inherently subjective, this precedent, and the district court's wide discretion, lead us to hold that there was no reversible error in denying Allen's coercion instruction.