Opinion ID: 2588732
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Reasonable Compensation

Text: Finally, we turn to the substantive issue whether Mohr was denied the reasonable compensation to which he was entitled. HRS § 802-5 provides that court-appointed private counsel shall receive reasonable compensation for fees, the amount to be determined and certified by the court, based on the rate of $40.00 an hour for out-of-court services, generally subject to a maximum fee of $2,500.00 for appeals to the supreme court or intermediate appellate court. Payment in excess of the maximum provided may only be made when the court in which the representation was rendered certifies that the amount of the excess payment is necessary to provide fair compensation and that the payment is approved by the administrative judge of such court. See HRS § 802-5(b). Every review of a fee request requires a conscientious and dispassionate analysis of the evidence presented by an attorney in support of his or her claim. As previously stated, such analysis is a judicial process like any other original proceeding in which evidence is taken and law is applied. Therefore, in reviewing Mohr's request, we consider the time sheets submitted by Mohr, including the description of services performed. We also examine documents in the record for evidentiary support that the hours spent reasonably reflect the work performed. [2] As previously stated, Mohr requested compensation in the amount of $1,412.00 for 35.5 hours of out-of-court services. Pursuant to Hawai`i Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAP) Rule 53(a), Mohr specifically requested compensation for: (1) 2.0 hours of client contact; (2) 21.3 hours for research; and (3) 10.9 hours for other, which included reading and drafting court documents. [3] The ICA order granted Mohr's request for 2.0 hours of client contact, but reduced compensation for research to 2.2 hours and compensation for writing and reading to 3.1 hours. For the reasons that follow, we hold that the ICA abused its discretion in granting Mohr compensation for 7.3 of the 35.3 hours requested. In reviewing Mohr's time sheet and request, we note that the total amount requested was greater than the number of hours documented by 1.1 hours. Moreover, Mohr requested 3.0 hours of compensation related to motions to extend the time to file the opening brief, an order to show cause as to why Mohr failed to timely request transcripts, and letters from the clerk of the court informing Mohr that the time to file the opening brief had expiredall of which were due to Mohr's lack of diligence. It would be patently unreasonable to compensate a court-appointed attorney for work not documented or for time spent on motions, responses to show cause orders, or letters issued by this court that were a direct result of the attorney's failure to represent his or her client in a timely and professional manner. Furthermore, we have reviewed the quality and quantity of documents submitted to this court by Mohr on behalf of Powers during his appointment in this case in order to determine whether the ICA's award of 7.3 hours is reasonable compensation for the services Mohr actually performed. The overall quality of the documents filed by Mohr on behalf of Powers is inconsistent with the amount of time Mohr claims to have spent in researching and drafting them. Moreover, Mohr's worksheet contain large quantities of time for relatively simple tasks. For example, Mohr documented 3.7 hours for the preparation of Powers's one-page statement of jurisdiction which, substantively, consisted of the following: Comes now Defendant-Appellant, through counsel, and pursuant to Rule 12.1, H.R.A.P., and for his Statement Of Jurisdiction submits the following: 1. The jurisdiction of this Court is based on Rule 3, H.R.A.P., and H.R.S. 641-11. 2. A timely Notice of Appeal was filed on May 20, 1998. (R.A. Vol. II at 111-12) from the Judgement filed on May 8, 1998. (R.A. Vol. II at 90-95) 3. Defendant pled guilty to one count of promoting dangerous drug, third degree (H.R.S. 712-1243) and was sentenced to an open five year term of incarceration (R.A., Vol. II at 90-95) which he is presently serving. Mohr's entire opening brief is less than three pages long, consists of little more than one page of a partial procedural history, and is devoid of any material facts. In the argument section, Mohr concurs with the State. . . that the instant appeal[ ] [is] interlocutory in nature and that [t]he State should have moved long ago to dismiss the instant appeal[ ] [because Powers had not obtained leave of court as required under HRS § 641-17]. Mohr then asserts that, in the alternative, he would file an Anders brief [4] because [Mohr] finds the issue Powers has urged on appeal without merit and wholly frivolous. Ultimately, Mohr ends his argument with a request to withdraw as counsel. It has been and continues to be the policy of this court not to permit Anders briefs. We think the better policy is to require counsel to remain an advocate for the client. In furtherance of this policy, this court will not sanction a court-appointed attorney if, after taking into account the totality of the circumstances, arguments raised reflect zealous advocacy on behalf of the client. This policy reposes advocacy with counsel and judging with the court. Notwithstanding that policy, and presumably because the policy has not heretofore been published, the ICA cited to Anders in Carvalho v. State, 81 Hawai`i 185, 192, 914 P.2d 1378, 1385 (App.1996), stating that, [e]ven if trial counsel, after personal and conscientious examination of the record, concluded that . . . an appeal would be frivolous, he would still be required to file an `Anders brief' on Petitioner's behalf before filing a motion to withdraw[.] To the extent that Carvalho may be viewed as conflicting with this court's policy regarding Anders briefs, it is hereby overruled. Due to this court's policy regarding Anders briefs, as well as Mohr's failure to present any argument whatsoever on Powers's behalf, Mohr's opening brief was stricken on January 25, 1999. Although the amended brief reflects some research in the form of string citations to bare assertions, no legal analysis or argument is presented. We note that Mohr's work sheets often indicated such vague descriptions as research o.b. or draft o.b. Although we recognize that providing adequate representation can include research conducted on potential issues not ultimately presented in the final brief, we cannot speculate as to what those potential issues might have been, and, in the absence of a more specific description, we are left with only the evidence available in the record, i.e., the actual documents filed, to determine whether the compensation requested is reasonable. Given the record in this case, it would be patently unreasonable to grant Mohr the full number of hours requested in conjunction with the research and drafting of the opening brief and amended opening brief. Notwithstanding the foregoing, and the fact that the remaining hours documented by Mohr are equally susceptible to reduction, the number of hours for which the ICA granted compensation was also unreasonable. For example, the order indicates that Mohr was awarded 2.2 hours for research. Under the category research Mohr documents the following tasks: 6/2/98 Read and research three (3) volumes of trial court filestake notes 6/3/98 Continue research trial court files 7/7/98 Supreme court file room to research court file/record on appeal 7/7/98 Research and draft statement of jurisdiction 7/8/98 Research S.C. file for court reporters for transcripts for appeal 7/8/98 Research trial court file and draft request for transcripts 7/13/98 Research/draft Defendant's statement of jurisdiction 10/9/98 Research O.B. [Opening Brief] 12/28/98 Read/research A.B. [Answering Brief] 2/19/99 Research amended O.B. All of the foregoing tasks are necessary to provide adequate appellate representation. Mohr attested to the fact that he performed the above tasks in his fee request, and we have no basis for determining that these tasks were not completed. Thus, the determination of reasonableness must be based solely on an assessment of whether the number of hours documented is reasonable for the tasks performed. We agree with the ICA that the 21.3 hours requested is unreasonable in this case. However, based on our review of the record in this appeal, it is equally unreasonable to expect an appellate attorney who was unfamiliar with the case to review a three-volume (875 page) trial court record [5] and a supreme court record, draft a transcript request and a statement of jurisdiction, and research the opening brief, amended opening brief, and the answering brief, all in 2.2 hours. Accordingly, we have no choice but to conclude that the ICA abused its discretion in granting Mohr only 2.2 of the 21.3 hours requested for research. Having thoroughly reviewed the record on appeal, Mohr's request for fees, and the supporting documentation attached thereto, we believe that Mohr has demonstrated that 15.35 hours is reasonable compensation for the services he performed in this appeal. Accordingly, we grant Mohr's request for fees in the amount of $614.00 (15.35 hours × $40.00 per hour). Finally, although concurring with the result of this case, both Justice Ramil and Justice Acoba write separately to express their concerns regarding the inadequate hourly rate paid to court-appointed private counsel under HRS § 802-5. While Justice Ramil urge[s] the Hawai`i legislature to increase the hourly rate paid to court-appointed private counsel under HRS § 802-5, J. Ramil, concurring op. at 12, 32 P.3d at 658, Justice Acoba opines that it is incumbent upon the Hawaii State Bar Association to . . . [work] toward[s] revision of the appointed counsel fee schedule. J. Acoba, concurring and dissenting op. at 16, 32 P.3d at 662. The concurrences filed in this appeal compel us to state that, although we might agree with Justice Ramil's and Justice Aboba's opinions on this matter, this appeal is not the appropriate forum for expressing them. First, the task before us in this appeal is solely to review the appropriateness of the ICA's denial of fees to Mohr based on the reasonableness of the fees requested and the services performed. As stated previously, Mohr requested compensation in the amount of $1,412.00 for 35.5 hours of services rendered at a rate of $40.00. As is clear from our analysis, the disposition of this certiorari proceeding requires nothing more than a straightforward assessment of whether the amount approved by the ICA is reasonable in light of the representation afforded. Therefore, the reasonableness of the hourly rate is not relevant to the outcome of this appeal. [6] Second, where an issuesuch as the reasonableness of the hourly rate paid to court-appointed attorneyshas not been raised in an appeal, it is more appropriate for members of the Bar or the general public to lobby the legislature than for this court to do so in the guise of a judicial disposition. Moreover, this court cannot overcome the limitations of the present judicial forum by, in effect, lobbying the members of the Hawai`i State Bar to, in turn, lobby the legislature. In defending the use of this appeal to express his opinion regarding the inadequacy of the hourly rate, Justice Ramil cites to eight cases as historical examples of courts . . . not [having] hesitated to call legislative attention to statutes in need of amendment. J. Ramil, concurring op. at 13, 32 P.3d at 659. However, the cited cases are inapposite because each called to the legislature's attention a statutory issue that was directly relevant to the resolution of the case. For example, in Mitchell v. State, Dept. of Educ., 85 Hawai`i 250, 942 P.2d 514 (1997), the issue was whether an employee's stress-related injury resulting from disciplinary action taken by the employer in response to an employee's misconduct is a compensable injury under HRS § 386-3 (1985). Mitchell, 85 Hawai`i at 254, 942 P.2d at 518 (bold emphasis added). This court concluded that section 386-3 did not exclude such injuries and mentioned that the legislature could amend the section if it so chose. Similarly, the issue in Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 118 S.Ct. 805, 139 L.Ed.2d 830 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) was whether there is an exception to criminal liability under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 for a false statement that consists of the mere denial of wrongdoing, the so-called exculpatory no. Title 18 of the U.S.C., § 1001, prohibits the making of a false statement within the jurisdiction of a federal agency. A majority of the United States Supreme Court concluded that there was no exception. Justice Ginsburg agreed but wrote separately to call attention to the extraordinary authority Congress, perhaps unwittingly, has conferred on prosecutors to manufacture crimes. Brogan, 522 U.S. at 408, 118 S.Ct. 805 (emphasis added). As explained previously, the issue in the case at bar is the reasonableness of the fees requested with respect to the services performed NOT the reasonableness of the hourly rate. Stated differently, Mohr has appealed only the application of the statute to his request; he has not challenged the statutory rate to be applied. Because all of the cases cited by Justice Ramil called to the legislature's attention a statutory issue that was directly relevant to the case, they are clearly distinguishable from the situation here. Accordingly, Justice Ramil's citation to Brogan, Mitchell, and the other six cases is not persuasive. The cases cited by Justice Acoba in support of calling the hourly rate to the attention of the Bar are similarly unpersuasive. See J. Acoba, concurring and dissenting op. at 16-17, 32 P.3d at 662-663. Moreover, we believe that there is an important distinction between calling attention to statutory questions or conflicts raised in cases and lobbying for statutory amendments consistent with the court's point of view. Prudential rules of judicial self-governance properly limit the role of the courts in a democratic society. Cf. Trustees of OHA v. Yamasaki, 69 Haw. 154, 171, 737 P.2d 446, 456 (1987); Life of the Land v. Land Use Commission, 63 Haw. 166, 172, 623 P.2d 431, 438 (1981) (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975)). One such prudential rule is that the use of judicial power to resolve public disputes . . . should be limited to those questions capable of judicial resolution and presented in an adversary context. Yamasaki, 69 Haw. at 171, 737 P.2d at 456 (citation omitted). Another such rule is that, even in the absence of constitutional restrictions, [courts] must still carefully weigh the wisdom, efficacy, and timeliness of an exercise of their power before acting, especially where there may be an intrusion into areas committed to other branches of government.  Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Although, generally, issues concerning prudential rules of self-governance arise in cases where justiciability is at issue, self-governance and the proper role of the courts preclude this court not only from considering a case, but also from considering any issue that is not properly before it. We do not have the prerogative, as Justice Acoba asserts, to discharge . . . our individual judicial obligations in our written opinion[s], see J. Acoba, concurring and dissenting op. at 17, 32 P.3d at 663, where the case on appeal does not bring the issue squarely before this court. To refrain from doing so represents an exercise in judicial self-restraint, not a shirking of judicial responsibility. James Madison, speaking on the notion of checks and balances in a democratic society, wrote that, [i]n framing a government which is to be administered by [the people] over [the people], the great difficulty lies in this: You must first enable the government to controul [sic] the governed; and in the next place, oblige it to controul itself. The Federalist Papers No. 51 (J. Madison). Although judicial review serves as a check on the unconstitutional exercise of power by the executive and legislative branches of government, the only check upon [the judicial branch's] exercise of power is [its] own sense of self-restraint. U.S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 78-79, 56 S.Ct. 312, 80 L.Ed. 477 (1936) (Stone, J., dissenting). For that reason, alone, judicial self-restraint is surely an implied, if not an expressed, condition of the grant of authority of judicial review. Justice Ramil's and Justice Acoba's decision to utilize the disposition of this case to urge a statutory amendment to the hourly rate is, in our view, in complete disregard of that implied condition. Lastly, we note that, despite Justice Acoba's assertion that no more appropriate avenue for the discharge of our individual judicial obligations exists than through our written opinion[s], see J. Acoba, concurring and dissenting op. at 17, 32 P.3d at 663, the members of this court are not limited to their individual written opinions in meeting their judicial obligations. The Revised Code of Judicial Conduct (the Code) provides that a judge may appear at a public hearing before an executive or legislative body on matters concerning the law, the legal system, and the administrative of justice. The Code also provides that a judge may serve on a governmental committee or commission or other governmental position that is concerned with issues of fact or policy on matters regarding the improvement of the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice. Clearly, more appropriate avenues than evangelizing-by-opinion are indeed available. [7] We agree with Justice Acoba that it is our obligation, if not [our] duty to make known any barriers to the proper administration of justice. J. Acoba, concurring and dissenting op. at 16, 32 P.3d at 662. However, we believe equally that it is our duty to apply self-restraint in the exercise of judicial authority. Because the issue raised in this appeal is solely the reasonableness of the fees requested based on the services performedas opposed to the reasonableness of the statutory hourly rate and other avenues are available to make known the effect that the hourly rate may have on the administration of justice, this appeal is not an appropriate forum for addressing the hourly rate.