Opinion ID: 6351649
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Trujillo-Tucson’s Invocation

Text: ¶42 In my view, the meaning of Trujillo-Tucson’s request: “Am I able to get a phone call [pause] to my lawyer, [E.K.]?” was unequivocal and unambiguous. Thus, no further interpretation is needed. See Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 529 (1987) (“Interpretation is only required where the defendant’s words, understood as ordinary people would understand them, are ambiguous.”). We do not require suspects to use talismanic language to ask for an attorney during interrogation. See Kutlak, ¶ 24, 364 P.3d at 206. And because many people, including many suspects, do not speak like lawyers or judges, I believe a reasonable law enforcement officer standing in an interrogation room, waiting for the interrogation of a suspect to resume, would understand that Trujillo-Tucson was asking, “Can I call my lawyer?” Put another way, it is difficult to imagine that there could be any alternative interpretations of Trujillo-Tucson’s request. ¶43 The majority nonetheless surmises that the question could have been understood as a logistical one about “what options would generally be available.” Maj. op. ¶ 25. But, applying that logic, even the clearest invocation if asserted in 5 the form of a question—like “Can I call my lawyer?”—could be understood to be posing merely a logistical query. ¶44 And even if you parse Trujillo-Tucson’s request—like an Oxford don—the meaning is just as apparent. “Am I able,” is the present tense of “to be able.” That is, it is the equivalent of “can I,” which is a manner of asking for permission. Can, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ can [permalink forthcoming] (defining “can” as, among other things, to “be enabled by law, agreement, or custom”). In United States v. Hunter, 708 F.3d 938, 943–44 (7th Cir. 2013), the Seventh Circuit observed that the word “can” had consistently been interpreted in that jurisdiction to imply immediacy: All three defendants [in the cases Hunter analyzed] asked questions of a police officer who had previously read the defendants their Miranda rights. Instead of using a word like “should” or “might,” which would suggest that the defendants were still undecided about whether they wanted a lawyer, all three defendants used the word “can.” The defendants’ choice of the word “can,” by definition, means that they were inquiring into their present ability to be “able to” obtain a lawyer or to “have the opportunity or possibility to” obtain a lawyer. (quoting Can, Oxford Dictionaries Pro Online, http://english.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/can?region=us&rskey=OBo6r G&result=1 (last visited Feb. 26, 2013)). I see no reason to depart from this sound reasoning here. 6 ¶45 Perhaps it is the question’s fairly obvious meaning that prompts the majority to acknowledge that Trujillo-Tucson’s words—standing alone—“could be” construed as a request for counsel. Maj. op. ¶ 21. But it nonetheless concludes that in light of the totality of the circumstances a reasonable officer would not have understood Trujillo-Tucson’s question as a request for counsel. Id. It reaches this conclusion by zeroing in on what it describes as Trujillo-Tucson’s casual tone, calm demeanor, confidence with the officers, and familiarity with the criminal justice system. Id. at ¶ 28. The majority then goes on to suggest that because Detective Tuttle did not advise Trujillo-Tucson of his Miranda rights, and because Detective Tuttle told Trujillo-Tucson that he was not the lead detective, and because Detective Tuttle was not interrogating Trujillo-Tucson at the time of the invocation, a reasonable officer would not have understood Trujillo-Tucson to be invoking his right to counsel. Id. at ¶¶ 25, 28. The majority’s logic implies a troubling proposition: that a reasonable officer would not have understood the invocation because Detective Tuttle was not in charge of the investigation and the invocation did not occur during active interrogation. Id. at ¶ 28. This, to my mind, is where the majority veers off track. 7 B. Davis’s Objective Test Applies to the Question of Whether a Reasonable Officer Would Have Heard a Suspect’s Invocation, an Issue of First Impression ¶46 This case raises an important issue of first impression: If a suspect makes an otherwise unambiguous and unequivocal statement that he wishes to have counsel present, is that invocation rendered ambiguous and equivocal because an officer may have failed to hear or understand it? The two state courts that have addressed this issue have employed the “reasonable police officer” standard in this context for the reasons explained in Davis—the objective standard avoids difficulties of proof and provides guidance to interrogating officers—but it also protects suspects’ Fifth Amendment rights without unduly burdening law enforcement. Chavarria-Cruz, 784 N.W.2d at 362–63; Cox, 641 S.W.3d at 118. ¶47 In Chavarria-Cruz, the Minnesota Supreme Court reiterated that Davis’s objective standard applies both when evaluating the suspect’s words and their manner in speaking them, and thus the Davis standard applies even when “the question is whether a suspect’s words were spoken loudly enough to be heard.” Chavarria-Cruz, 784 N.W.2d at 362. In that case, the detective described the suspect as “very soft spoken” with a “pronounced” accent and did not remember the suspect using the word “lawyer” during the interview. Id. at 360. But he admitted at the motions hearing that he could understand the reference to a lawyer on the tape recording of the interview. Id. at 360. The district court concluded that the 8 detective subjectively did not hear the request and, accordingly, denied the suspect’s request to suppress the statement. Id. at 361. ¶48 On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, explaining that the district court’s subjective test would “essentially creat[e] an exception to the objective, ‘reasonable officer’ analysis for cases where the officer testifies that the suspect’s statement was spoken too quietly to be heard.” Id. at 362. The court further reasoned that maintaining the objective test when assessing a suspect’s manner—including the audibility of the suspect’s statement—imposed no new burdens on law enforcement, who already had an incentive to “ensur[e] that all of the suspect’s words are clear and audible” to the investigating officer. Id. The court, thus, elaborated that “[a] ‘reasonable officer’ is one with ordinary hearing abilities who has taken steps to ensure that clear communication can occur between the officer and the suspect” and is “attentive to the suspect’s answers to questions.” Id. at 363. ¶49 In Cox, the Kentucky Supreme Court likewise concluded that Davis’s objective test applied to the same issue of first impression we address in this case. 641 S.W.3d at 118. The Kentucky court adopted much of Chavarria-Cruz’s reasoning, including its additional contours for what constitutes a reasonable officer: such an officer will (1) have ordinary hearing abilities; (2) ensure clear 9 communication with the suspect; and (3) be attentive to the suspect’s answers. Id. at 120–21. ¶50 When the question is whether an officer would have understood a suspect invoked the right to counsel (as distinguished from having heard the invocation), we employ Davis’s “reasonable police officer” standard. We follow this approach because it “avoid[s] difficulties of proof” and “provide[s] guidance to officers conducting interrogations.” Davis, 512 U.S. at 458–59; see Kutlak, ¶¶ 15–16, 23, 364 P.3d at 204, 206 (noting the Davis standard is an objective standard and discussing the rationale for the Davis approach). This “objective approach protects suspects’ Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination without placing any special burden on law enforcement,” and its extension to evaluating the manner or audibility of a suspect’s speech strikes the same balance. ChavarriaCruz, 784 N.W.2d at 362. As other jurisdictions have recognized, officers conducting investigations already have “a strong interest in facilitating effective communication in order to gather information.” Id. “That interest includes ensuring that all of a suspect’s words are clear and audible . . . and paying careful attention to the suspect when they speak.” Id. ¶51 For these reasons, in cases involving a claim—like the one in this case—that an officer may not have heard an invocation, I would apply the Davis objective test, consistent with the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence and our own, to determine 10 if a reasonable officer, with ordinary hearing abilities, would have heard a suspect’s invocation of the right to have counsel present. See Davis, 512 U.S. at 458–59; see also Kutlak, ¶ 23, 364 P.3d at 205–205 (reiterating our court’s application of the Davis standard). ¶52 And, at first blush, it appears the majority has followed this path. Though it does not articulate the pertinent legal standard, it concludes that “given the crosstalk that occurred, it is not clear that a reasonable officer under the circumstances would have heard the latter portion of Trujillo-Tucson’s question when he asked not just for a phone call but for a phone call to a lawyer.” Maj. op. ¶ 25 (emphasis added). But that is the sum total of the majority’s objective reasonable officer analysis (to the extent it purported to apply that standard).5 ¶53 Applying the objective reasonable officer standard here, I would look to Trujillo-Tucson’s ongoing one-on-one interaction with Detective Tuttle in the interrogation room, and the quiet environment in which the request was made.6 I view the crosstalk as fleeting. Trujillo-Tucson looks at Detective Tuttle and begins 5 That may be because it ultimately concludes that even if Detective Tuttle heard the request, a reasonable officer would not interpret Trujillo-Tucson’s question as a request for counsel. 6 In a louder, more chaotic situation, the outcome—applying an objective standard—might well be different. 11 “Am I able to get a phone call.” Then he pauses. Detective Tuttle answers “yeah” just as Trujillo-Tucson finishes “to my lawyer [E.K.].” The officer’s “yeah” does not last long enough to cover the end of Trujillo-Tucson’s sentence. ¶54 I would also consider whether Detective Tuttle was focused and engaged or distracted. To my way of thinking, it is important here that when the detective was patting Trujillo-Tucson down and did not hear or understand him, the detective immediately followed up—asking “What’s up?” not once, not twice, but six times—to make sure that he heard or understood what Trujillo-Tucson had said. It is just as important here, that Detective Tuttle picked up a cell phone and looked at it just as Trujillo-Tucson started to invoke. This is important because it shows that the detective was distracted at this critical moment. It also provides more context for Trujillo-Tucson’s request to call his lawyer. A request by a suspect to call his lawyer upon seeing a detective pull out a cell phone does not seem logistical or equivocal, it seems specific and unambiguous. ¶55 Under these circumstances, I would conclude that a reasonable officer alone in a quiet interrogation room, waiting for interrogation to resume, in the midst of interacting with a suspect, who was speaking at an unquestionably audible volume, would have heard Trujillo-Tucson’s request for his lawyer, E.K. 12 C. Under the Supreme Court’s and Our Precedent, It Does Not Matter that Trujillo-Tucson Invoked to Someone Other Than the Lead Detective ¶56 In concluding that a reasonable officer would not have understood that Trujillo-Tucson was invoking his right to have counsel present, the majority gives great weight to the fact that Detective Tuttle told Trujillo-Tucson that he was not the lead detective, that Detective Tuttle was not the officer who gave TrujilloTucson his Miranda advisement, and that Detective Tuttle was not asking Trujillo-Tucson questions at the time Trujillo-Tucson asked to call his lawyer, E.K. Maj. op. ¶¶ 25, 28. It also points to Detective Tuttle directing TrujilloTucson to Detective Rogers to ask if Trujillo-Tucson is being booked in. Id. at ¶ 25. To be sure, the meaning of Trujillo-Tucson’s words might have been even more obvious if uttered to the lead detective in the midst of interrogation. But it doesn’t follow that his question was ambiguous just because he asked a different detective while they were waiting for the interrogation to resume.7 This view seems to suggest that ambiguity is injected into every invocation made under less than the most obvious circumstances. This approach seems like a slippery slope 7 It is undisputed in this case that Trujillo-Tucson was subject to custodial interrogation, as defined by our jurisprudence, at the time he uttered the statement in question and thus that Miranda’s Fifth Amendment protections applied. 13 that is particularly ill-suited to the countless ways that invocation plays out in the real world. What about invocations that are made at the scene to arresting officers, or blurted out pre-Miranda advisement, or during booking, or during a break in active interrogation? ¶57 I am aware of no legal authority that supports what seems to be the majority’s underlying assumption that different officers have differing degrees of responsibility vis-à-vis Miranda. See United States v. Kelsey, 951 F.2d 1196, 1199 (10th Cir. 1991) (We find no merit in the Government’s argument that Edwards should not apply because the officers to whom Kelsey made his request for counsel were not the officers who later questioned him.). This argument has been rejected by the Supreme Court, the Tenth Circuit, and this court. Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 687–88 (1988); United States v. Scalf, 708 F.2d 1540, 1544 (10th Cir. 1983) (“[O]nce a suspect has invoked the right to counsel, knowledge of that request is imputed to all law enforcement officers who subsequently deal with the suspect.”); People v. Vigoa, 841 P.2d 311, 314 (Colo. 1992) (applying Roberson); see also People v. Vasquez, 155 P.3d 588, 591 (Colo. App. 2006) (“Later interrogators are charged with the knowledge of a suspect’s invocation of his right to counsel because of the presumption that the suspect considers himself unable to deal with the pressures of custodial interrogation without legal assistance.”). 14 D. Under the Supreme Court’s Precedent and Kutlak, Trujillo-Tucson Invoked His Right to Counsel. ¶58 So, can the majority’s analysis stand if the only basis for concluding that Trujillo-Tucson’s request was equivocal and ambiguous was his casual tone, calm demeanor, confidence with the officers, and familiarity with the criminal justice system? I conclude it cannot, particularly if you examine the context in which the request was made. To begin, I agree with the majority that when officers brought Trujillo-Tucson into the interrogation room, he initiated what seems to be casual conversation with Detective Tuttle. But, in my view, there is an important shift in the interaction between the two men shortly before Trujillo-Tucson asks to call his attorney. ¶59 That is, in the video- and audio- recordings, you can see and hear TrujilloTucson begin to assess the gravity of the situation. First, he asks if he is being booked in. Then, after being directed to have a seat at the table in the interrogation room, he asks, “So, what allegations are enough to arrest someone?” When Detective Tuttle answers, “You [inaudible] have probable cause,” Trujillo-Tucson is silent for several moments and then looks Detective Tuttle in the eye and asks, “Am I able to get a phone call to my lawyer, [E. K.]?” In that moment, TrujilloTucson displayed no indecision whatsoever. ¶60 The majority, however, turns that lack of indecision on its head to argue that Trujillo-Tucson’s confidence and certainty render his request to call his 15 attorney equivocal. In my view, however, under the Supreme Court’s case law and our own, confidence and certainty in a request have traditionally weighed in favor of finding a request to be unequivocal and unambiguous. And, indeed, Trujillo-Tucson’s invocation here was more certain, more immediate, and stronger than statements that the Supreme Court has found evoked a certain and present desire for counsel under the Fifth Amendment. ¶61 For example, in the case that gives us the rule that both the majority and I apply today, Edwards, the Court concluded that the suspect’s statement, “I want an attorney before making a deal,” unambiguously “expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel.” 451 U.S. at 478, 484. There, the suspect made this statement well into the interrogation, after he had waived his Miranda rights, and his phrasing even appeared to condition his request on another action—making a deal. See id. at 478–79. Yet the Supreme Court concluded this statement was sufficiently clear to unambiguously invoke the suspect’s right to counsel. Id. at 484.