Opinion ID: 1114651
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: gubernatorial immunity

Text: Governor Fordice alleged that he was immune from judicial review when exercising his veto power. We disagree finding that to hold such a position in this state would disrupt our entire established system of checks and balances in government. To do so would be to give an unbridled reign of power to a branch of government that would answer to no one. Sound jurisprudence and our constitution dictate that we cannot allow this to happen in Mississippi. Several states have rejected attempts by a governor to avoid judicial review of the manner in which he exercised his veto power. In State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 86 N.M. 359, 524 P.2d 975 (1974), the Supreme Court of New Mexico stated: We fully agree that the exercise of the veto power requires judgment and discretion on the part of the Governor and that he cannot be compelled by the Legislature or by this Court to exercise this power or to exercise it in a particular manner. We do not agree, however, that the manner in which the Governor exercises the power is beyond judicial review or judicial control, if the manner in which it is exercised is beyond the Governor's constitutional authority. The power of veto, like all other powers constitutionally conferred upon a governmental officer or agency, is not absolute and may not be exercised without any restraint or limitation whatsoever. The very concept of such absolute and unrestrained power is inconsistent with the concept of checks and balances, which is basic to the form and structure of State government created by the people of New Mexico in their constitution, and is inconsistent with the fundamental principle that under our system of government no man is completely above the law. We find the logic in State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick , to be sound and illustrative of the manner by which government is to be conducted, and we hold that the Governor is not immune from suit in exercising his veto powers and not beyond judicial review by this Court. Nevertheless, we will not question his judgment in lawfully exercising his veto power, but we must be available to adjudicate the question whether the manner of its exercise exceeds constitutional parameters. Governor Fordice additionally alleged that he was immune from suit because the legislator plaintiffs lacked standing. We disagree. Under article III, § 2 of the United States Constitution, the federal courts limit review to actual cases and controversies. Such restrictive language is not found in the Mississippi Constitution. Therefore, we have been more permissive in granting standing to parties who seek review of governmental actions. Van Slyke v. Board of Trustees, 613 So.2d 872, 875 (Miss. 1993). We have ruled that parties have standing to: sue or intervene when they assert a colorable interest in the subject matter of the litigation or experience an adverse effect from the conduct of the defendant, or as otherwise authorized by law. State ex rel. Moore v. Molpus, 578 So.2d 624, 632 (Miss. 1991). In an action between state legislators and the Governor, this Court has addressed the usurpation of executive authority by the legislative branch in Alexander v. State By and Through Allain, 441 So.2d 1329 (Miss. 1983). We stated: The executive, legislative and judicial departments of the state all serve the same constituency and are, of course, subject to and bound by the terms of the same state constitution. The interpretation of the constitution becomes the duty of the judicial department when the meaning of that supreme document is put in issue. Id. at 1333. In the case sub judice, Bryan, Endris and Horhn, as legislators and taxpayers, had standing to bring suit since they asserted a colorable interest in the litigation. Individual legislators had standing to bring the instant action under well established case law. See Van Slyke v. Board of Trustees, 613 So.2d 872, 875 (Miss. 1993); Board of Trustees v. Van Slyke, 510 So.2d 490 (Miss. 1987); Dye v. Hale, 507 So.2d 332 (Miss. 1987); See State ex rel. Moore v. Molpus, 578 So.2d 624 (Miss. 1991). Their votes on these bills were adversely affected by the Governor's vetoes. The Attorney General had standing in his official capacity to intervene in this suit on behalf of the State. See State ex rel. Moore v. Molpus, 578 So.2d at 632.