Opinion ID: 2351793
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Child Support Continuing Jurisdiction Long Arm Statute Inapposite

Text: The first certified question to this Court relates to whether the Family Court has been properly interpreting the continuing jurisdiction provisions of 13 Del.C. § 513 to allow notice of a petition for modification of a child support order to be served on a nonresident obligor by a means other than the Delaware long arm statute. 10 Del.C. § 3104. The Delaware long arm statute sets forth the circumstances under which a Delaware court may exercise in personam jurisdiction over a non-resident party. See 10 Del.C. § 3104. Under the long arm statute, service of process on a non-resident is accomplished by service upon the Secretary of State. See 10 Del.C. § 3104(d). Then, within 7 days following return of service or filing of proof of nonreceipt of notice, a plaintiff must send the non-resident a copy of the process and complaint by registered mail. Id. The statute governing enforcement and modification of child support orders does not include or incorporate by reference the procedures of the long arm statute for effectuating service on non-resident parties. See 13 Del.C. § 501 et seq. Rather, section 513(d)(1) of Title 13 provides: The [Family] Court shall have continuing jurisdiction to modify prospectively an order of child support entered by the Court including orders issued prior to March 31, 1987, so long as the obligated parent has a duty of support under this chapter, Chapter 6 or Chapter 15 of this title and at least 1 of the parents or the child whose support is at issue resides in the State. 13 Del.C. § 513(d)(1). [3] The Father argues that § 513(d)(1) only gives the Family Court subject matter jurisdiction over subsequent modifications of a child support order entered by the Family Court. The Father submits that § 513(d)(1) does not alleviate the Family Court's obligation to satisfy the due process minimum contacts test in order to exercise in personam jurisdiction over a non-resident obligor. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). Therefore, the Father contends, the Family Court was required to utilize the procedures set forth in the Delaware long arm statute in order to properly exercise in personam jurisdiction over him with respect to the Mother's petition for modification of a child support order. See 10 Del.C. § 3104. The proper construction of the continuing jurisdiction provisions of 13 Del.C. § 513 presents this Court with a question of first impression. [4] The highest court in every other state that has considered the issue, however, has held that a trial court has continuing jurisdiction to enforce or modify its own child support order against a non-resident obligor. [5] Similarly, those highest state courts have concluded that due process does not require compliance with the provisions of a long arm statute in such circumstances. We agree. The purpose of the long arm statute is to obtain jurisdiction over a non-resident party. However, with regard to petitions to enforce or modify its orders of child support, the Family Court does not need to acquire jurisdiction through the long arm statute. The United States Supreme Court has held that if a judicial proceeding is begun with jurisdiction over the person of the party concerned, it is within the power of a state to bind him by every subsequent order in the cause. Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228 U.S. 346, 353, 33 S.Ct. 550, 552, 57 L.Ed. 867 (1913). [6] The filing of a petition for a modification of child support in the court which entered the order is not the institution of an independent proceeding or the commencement of a new action. It is ancillary or incidental to the original action. [7] The continuing jurisdiction of the Family Court cannot be defeated by a party's moving from the state. [8] Once the Family Court obtains jurisdiction over the parties to a child support proceeding, that jurisdiction continues throughout all subsequent proceedings which arise out of the original action. [9] Id. See also 13 Del.C. § 614. [10] We hold that the Family Court has continuing subject matter and in personam jurisdiction over non-resident child support obligors with regard to petitions to modify its own orders. Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228 U.S. 346, 353, 33 S.Ct. 550, 552, 57 L.Ed. 867 (1913). See 13 Del.C. § 513(d)(1) and (e). The Family Court's continuing jurisdiction over its own child support orders obviates the need to comply with the requirements of the long arm statute in a subsequent modification proceeding. Accordingly, we answer the first question in the affirmative.