Opinion ID: 782464
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Mr. Andis's Appeal

Text: 27 Having reviewed this Circuit's approach to the waiver of appellate rights, we now examine Mr. Andis's argument that in spite of his waiver we should allow him to appeal the conditions of his supervised release. We find that the challenged conditions do not constitute an illegal sentence and, as such, dismiss his appeal. 28 It is undisputed that the scope of Mr. Andis's waiver includes the conditions of his supervised release, 7 and he does not claim that the waiver was entered into unknowingly or involuntarily. There is also no allegation that the district court failed to comply with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 in accepting Mr. Andis's guilty plea. Accordingly, we may consider Mr. Andis's appeal only if our failure to do so would constitute a miscarriage of justice. 29 Mr. Andis attempts to make this showing by arguing that the conditions of his supervised release constitute an illegal sentence. Specifically, he claims that the district court imposed five illegal conditions on his supervised release: 30 (1) prohibition from contact with children under the age of 18 without prior written permission of the probation officer and immediate reporting to the probation officer of any unauthorized contact with children under the age of 18; 31 (2) prohibition on engaging in any occupation, business or profession where he has access to children under the age of 18 without prior written approval of the probation officer; 32 (3) prohibition on loitering within 100 feet of schools, parks, playgrounds, arcades or other places frequented by children; 33 (4) submission to search of his person, residence, office, or vehicle by a probation officer based upon reasonable suspicion of contraband or evidence of a violation of conditions of release; and 34 (5) prohibition on the purchase or maintenance of a post office box or other type of private mailbox without written approval of the probation officer. 35 Were this appeal to address the length of Mr. Andis's imprisonment, we would simply need to review the length of time authorized by statute to determine whether his sentence was legal and his appeal should be summarily dismissed based on his waiver. Mr. Andis, however, is appealing the conditions of his supervised release. The statutory provision states: 36 The court may order, as a further condition of supervised release, to the extent such condition— 37 (1) is reasonably related to the factors set forth in section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D); 38 (2) involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary for the purposes set forth in section 3553(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D); and 39 (3) is consistent with any pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(a); 40 any condition set forth as a discretionary condition of probation in section 3563(b)(1) through (b)(10) and (b)(12) through (b)(20), and any other condition it considers to be appropriate. 41 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). 42 This statutory provision provides the district court with broad discretion to impose conditions the court considers to be appropriate in setting a term of supervised release. United States v. Bass, 121 F.3d 1218, 1223 (8th Cir.1997). If an appeal waiver did not exist, this Court would examine the conditions of Mr. Andis's supervised release under an abuse of discretion standard. See United States v. Scott, 270 F.3d 632, 635 (8th Cir.2001) (describing the standard used to determine if a district court abused its discretion in imposing the conditions of supervised release); United States v. Kent, 209 F.3d 1073, 1075-78 (8th Cir.2000) (finding that the district court abused its discretion); Bass, 121 F.3d at 1223 (same); United States v. Prendergast, 979 F.2d 1289, 1293 (8th Cir.1992) (same). However, in this case, Mr. Andis's appeal waiver prevents this Court from reviewing the conditions of his supervised release and determining whether the district court abused its discretion in imposing those conditions. 43 This result is consistent with a recent case from the Seventh Circuit, United States v. Sines, 303 F.3d 793 (7th Cir. 2002), where that court addressed an almost identical issue. Like Mr. Andis's Agreement, Mr. Sines's plea agreement contained an appeal waiver. Mr. Sines pled guilty to bank fraud, but because of a prior conviction for sexual exploitation of a minor, the district court also imposed conditions of supervised release that included attendance at a sex-offender treatment program and periodic polygraph testing. The defendant appealed, claiming that he had already completed an intensive sex-offender treatment program and that he had not engaged in any illegal contact with a minor in over ten years. Therefore, he argued, the conditions of his supervised release were not reasonably related to his rehabilitation or to the protection of the public. The Seventh Circuit refused to consider Mr. Sines's arguments and held that the appeal waiver in the plea agreement made the conditions of his supervised release unreviewable. 44 Where a defendant, like Mr. Andis, does not claim that he failed to enter into an appeal waiver knowingly and voluntarily, or that the supervised release conditions constituted a miscarriage of justice because they were based on some constitutionally impermissible factor, such as race, the conditions are not subject to review on appeal. Accordingly, Mr. Andis's appeal is dismissed.