Opinion ID: 1119024
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Multiple Retroactive Trial Extensions

Text: Petitioner contends CrR 3.3(d)(8) does not authorize retroactive granting of multiple trial extensions. [56] In this case, the trial court on August 4, 1992 granted multiple extensions retroactively to extend the trial date from July 21, 1992 to August 5, 1992. Respondent argues the trial court acted within its discretion in retroactively granting such extensions under CrR 3.3(d)(8). [57] CrR 3.3(d)(8) provides for extension of time by the court when unavoidable or unforeseen circumstances exist beyond the control of the court or the parties: [ E ]ven if the time for trial has expired, may extend the time within which trial must be held for no more than 5 days exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, or holidays unless the defendant will be substantially prejudiced in his or her defense.... If the nature of the unforeseen or unavoidable circumstance continues, the court may extend the time for trial in increments of not to exceed 5 days exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, or holidays unless the defendant will be substantially prejudiced in his or her defense. (Emphasis added.) CrR 3.3(d)(8) provides initially for only one extension of five days, even if the time for trial has expired, when unforeseen or unavoidable circumstances exist beyond the control of the court or parties and the defendant is not substantially prejudiced. But, when the unforeseen or unavoidable circumstance continues, the trial court may then extend the time for trial in increments of not to exceed five days. The plural word increments implies more than one extension. It follows, then, that CrR 3.3(d)(8) authorizes the court to grant multiple retroactive trial extensions to meet the speedy trial requirement. But because CrR 3.3(d)(8) does not directly address retroactive granting of multiple trial extensions, we must determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting multiple trial extensions retroactively. This court has stated that: [58] Where the rules are unclear, the defendant is not prejudiced by a minor delay, and the defendant has not informed the prosecutor of his or her intent to rely on the rules before the speedy trial period has expired, we will not direct a dismissal of the charges. Rule CrR 3.3(d)(8) does not clearly address multiple retroactive trial extensions. But Petitioner Carson has not shown the delay prejudiced his defense. The delay of twelve days, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays and holidays, was minor. Petitioner did not inform the prosecutor of his intent to rely on the speedy trial rule until August 3, 1992, thirteen days after expiration of the speedy trial period. The trial court did not err in denying Petitioner's motion to dismiss and acted within its discretion in retroactively granting multiple trial extensions.