Opinion ID: 3064136
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Government’s Use of Hembree’s Testimony

Text: Hembree finally argues that Pinkerton should have objected to questions that the government asked on cross-examination which suggested that the pooling of money to purchase cocaine for personal use can constitute possession with intent to distribute. Hembree also argues that Pinkerton should have objected to a similar line of argument during the government’s closing. To establish a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 846, the government must prove that 19 two or more persons agreed to violate the narcotics laws and that the defendant was a knowing participant in the agreement. United States v. Pintado, 715 F.2d 1501, 1503 (11th Cir.1983). In Hardy, the government charged the defendant with violating this provision because the defendant personally used cocaine, hosted parties attended by drug users and suppliers, helped a friend purchase cocaine for the defendant and the friend’s joint personal use, and gave another friend a small amount of cocaine on one occasion. 895 F.2d at 1334. We held that the facts that the defendant possessed and shared a small amount of cocaine did not support an inference that the defendant entered into a prior agreement with certain unnamed persons to distribute cocaine. Id. Likewise, in Dekle, we held that evidence of a buyer-seller relationship, even when the buyer repeatedly purchased cocaine from the seller and sometimes shared the cocaine with friends, was insufficient to establish that the buyer and seller had a joint criminal objective to distribute cocaine to third parties. 165 F.3d at 829-30. Hembree, however, reads Hardy and Dekle as forbidding the government from arguing that personal use of cocaine can support the existence of an ongoing conspiracy to distribute cocaine. He contends that Pinkerton rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to object to this line of argument. We disagree and conclude that Hembree has failed to show that Pinkerton’s described conduct was 20 deficient.10 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. As an initial matter, we disagree with the factual premise of Hembree’s argument. The record does not support Hembree’s contention that the government suggested Hembree’s admitted conduct of buying cocaine to use personally and to share with friends was alone sufficient to establish his guilt for the crime charged. Specifically, Hembree testified that he, Kelli Hembree, and five or six friends would “pool” their money, purchase “eightballs” of cocaine from Greg Lake and Nodie Lake, “dump [the cocaine] on a plate,” and snort the cocaine. Hembree also stated that he would occasionally pick up an extra eightball for one of his friends to take home. On these points, Hembree and the government’s counsel engaged in the following line of questions and answers: A I would – I would purchase more than one [eightball] for my friends, and I – if it’s – if that’s selling [cocaine], then that’s what I was doing. Q Well, has – has your attorney shared with you the definition of distribution for federal law enforcement purposes and what the jury will hear down the road? A Yes, sir. Q The transfer of possession from one person to another – A Yes, sir. 10 The government argues that this matter is beyond the scope of the COA. It appears, however, that the question certified, whether Pinkerton should have argued that Hembree’s conduct supported a simple-possession conviction only, is broad enough to encompass Hembree’s argument on appeal that Pinkerton was ineffective for failing to object to the government’s characterization of his testimony. Further, Hembree’s argument on appeal, rather than the argument described in the COA, is the argument that Hembree presented to the magistrate and district court. 21 Q – with or without any financial [remuneration]? A Yes, sir. That’s correct. Q So you were transferring cocaine from one person to another? A Yes, sir. Q You don’t deny that? A No, sir. Q But the key denial is that it didn’t happen after July 17th of 1997, right? A Absolutely. Q Because if you can convince the jury of that, you walk out those doors a free man? The government stopped short of suggesting that Hembree’s post-1997 purchase of cocaine for personal use and to share with friends was an admission of guilt to his involvement in a conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine. The government also argued in its closing that Hembree’s testimony supported his guilt. However, the government explicitly argued that Hembree’s testimony was inculpatory because he admitted to involvement in a trafficking scheme before 1997 and to obtaining cocaine to give to friends after 1997. Therefore, the government did not argue that giving cocaine to his friends alone was sufficient to establish Hembree’s guilt, but rather that Hembree’s testimony established his continued participation in the conspiracy within the limitations period. We also disagree with Hembree’s argument that Hardy and Dekle preclude the government from arguing that personal use of cocaine can support the existence of an ongoing conspiracy to distribute cocaine. Our case law does not bar the 22 government’s argument regarding Hembree’s testimony, and therefore Pinkerton did not have a clear reason to object. In Hardy and Dekle, we held that evidence of a buyer/seller relationship did not support an inference that the defendant entered into a prior agreement with certain unnamed persons to distribute cocaine. Hardy, 895 F.3d at 1334; Dekle, 165 F.3d at 829-30. We did not hold that a buyer/seller relationship cannot be characterized as continued activity within an already existent conspiracy. See id. In the instant case, unlike in Hardy and Dekle, the government did not argue that Hembree’s testimony, alone, was sufficient to infer that Greg Lake and Hembree had made an agreement to distribute cocaine. Rather, the government argued that Hembree had admitted to his involvement in the conspiracy with Greg Lake and others by testifying that he traveled to Miami to retrieve cocaine in 1996. The government argued that the jury should use Hembree’s testimony concerning his continued acquisition of cocaine from the Lakes and his use of cocaine with his friends to conclude that Hembree still was involved in this already existent conspiracy after 1997.11 Therefore, because the 11 On direct appeal, we explained: Not only did [Hembree] sell cocaine for his supplier, Greg Lake, he also sold cocaine to Dr. Malamos, who in turn gave Hembree prescriptions for pain medications. Furthermore, Hembree and his coconspirators entered the narcotic[s] business in part to fund their addictions to cocaine and prescription pain medications. Hembree’s ongoing drug use and his interaction with his coconspirators while consuming drugs was a vital part of the conspiracy. 23 government did not make the argument rejected by this Court in Hardy and Dekle, it did not mistate the law in manner that a reasonable attorney would have a basis to object. 12 Because the evidence does not demonstrate that Pinkerton’s conduct was deficient or prejudicial in the manner claimed, Hembree did not establish that he received constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s decision finding no ineffective assistance of counsel as to this matter.