Opinion ID: 2977396
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Martin-Hunley tapes

Text: In reviewing the trial court’s decision to exclude the Martin-Hunley tapes from the guilt/innocense phase of the trial,4 the Tennessee Supreme Court explicitly applied Chambers. Thus, the question is whether it unreasonably applied Chambers or arrived at a conclusion contrary to Chambers. The state court again focused on the fact that the Martin-Hunley tapes were cumulative evidence and did “not exonerate [West], who was present, participating, aiding and abetting and his defense that his participation was commanded at gun point by Martin would not have been corroborated by the excluded evidence.” West, 767 S.W.2d at 396. The court also noted that in Chambers, the would-be declarant, McDonald, was available for cross examination, whereas the would-be declarant in West’s case, Martin, was unavailable to the State or to West because Martin invoked his 4 The trial judge ruled that West could introduce the Martin-Hunley tapes at the sentencing phase (in accordance with Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979)). However, the trial judge cautioned that if West admitted those tapes, he would also allow the State to introduce recordings of Martin’s statements to the police, which implicated West. West subsequently chose not to introduce the tapes during the sentencing phase. Nos. 05-5132/6219 West v. Bell Page 24 Fifth Amendment rights. Thus, the Tennessee Supreme Court had adequate grounds to distinguish the Martin-Hunley tapes from the evidence in Chambers. The decision, therefore, was neither contrary to or an unreasonable application of Chambers. C. Prosecutorial Misconduct West alleged several instances of prosecutorial misconduct grouped into four categories: (1) the prosecutor deliberately misinformed the jury that the law was “selfexecuting” and that choosing or not choosing the death penalty was not their responsibility; (2) the prosecutor claimed that defense counsel was attempting to deceive or mislead the jury; (3) the prosecutor called West a liar and expressed his personal belief that West was a liar; and (4) the prosecutor asserted inflammatory facts not supported by the evidence. We address the first category of alleged misconduct separately, and the last three jointly. 1. The role of the jury in determining a capital sentence
West objected to the following statements made by the prosecutor during closing argument: The decision you are going to be called upon to make obviously is very serious, it is one of the most serious you will ever make. But, on the other hand, if you will listen to what the Judge tells you the law is, you will see that it is not necessarily a difficult decision in that sense. In the application of the law. Because the law provides certain guidelines, certain perimeters within which you are to consider the verdict, your secondary verdict in this case. . . . See, the law in Tennessee, and the law of the land, in this sense, is selfexecuting, in the sense that the law mandates, requires a death sentence in certain situations, unless it is outweighed by other factors. The law is clear. Your responsibility once again is to weigh proof, to make a finding of fact, apply the applicable law to those facts and the law provides the punishment, not you, not you. You do not set punishment Nos. 05-5132/6219 West v. Bell Page 25 in this case, per se. You make decisions based upon fact and the law, self-executing, based upon your weighing the facts. ... Was [the mitigating evidence] enough to outweigh torture, the depravity, the atrociousness, and all of the other things the State contends it has shown? See. You have to weigh them. That is your function. And if the State tips the scales and proves those things to you beyond a reasonable doubt, and what you heard for the defendant today doesn’t outweigh this . . . then the penalty is death. That is the law. That is the law. As the law states, and the Judge will tell you this, once the State proves aggravating circumstances, one or more, beyond a reasonable doubt, if they are not outweighed by mitigating circumstances the defendant shows you, the punishment shall be death. That is a matter of law. It is a matter of law. I am not going to stand here and tell you that that is an easy application of the law, because it is not. It is a difficult application. But, just keep in mind, you don’t impose the sentence, the law provides the sentence, you are merely finders of fact. ... In this case, the State feels like justice in its purest form, once again, would be best served by the administration of the law. West argues that these comments were constitutionally impermissibly under Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
In Caldwell, the Supreme Court held that “it is constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant’s death rests elsewhere.” Id. at 328-29. On direct appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court addressed West’s claims and agreed that the statements were inappropriate: We agree that the district attorney’s statements that “the law is self-executing”, that the law “provides the punishment, not you”, and the concluding statement that “you don’t impose the sentence, the law provides the sentence, you are merely finders of fact”, violate Caldwell. Such statements minimize the jury’s role and allows [sic] them to feel that the responsibility for a death sentence rests elsewhere. Nos. 05-5132/6219 West v. Bell Page 26 West, 767 S.W.2d at 399. The court then analyzed whether the violations were harmless, and determined that they were: We are of the opinion that the three or four brief erroneous characterizations of the jury’s role in determining the appropriateness of a death sentence were sufficiently corrected by the trial judge and the accurate portions of the district attorney’s and the defendant’s arguments stressing the proper responsibility of the jury. These clarifying measures contrast sharply with the situation in Caldwell . . . where the trial judge endorsed the prosecutor’s remarks. Thus we find that the errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 399-400.
Because the Tennessee Supreme Court concluded that the prosecutor’s statements during closing arguments did violate Caldwell, but were nevertheless harmless, the relevant “clearly established federal law” is both Caldwell and the harmless error rule of Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993). See Fry v. Piller, 127 S. Ct. 2321 (2007); Wilson v. Mitchell, 498 F.3d 491, 503 (6th Cir. 2007). Brecht requires a court to ask “whether the error had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1945)). The comment made by the prosecutor here is distinguishable from the comments at issue in Caldwell. In Caldwell, the prosecutor told the jury that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of a death sentence did not rest with them but rather with the appellate court which would later review the case. See 472 U.S. at 325. Additionally, the judge also told the jury that its decision would automatically be reviewed by the State Supreme Court. Ibid. By contrast, the prosecutor in this case clearly told the jury that it was the prosecutor’s duty to prove aggravating factors and the jury’s duty to weigh the evidence and then decide if there were aggravating factors and if those factors were outweighed by any mitigating circumstances. The judge also instructed the jurors that it was their duty to fix West’s punishment as either death or life Nos. 05-5132/6219 West v. Bell Page 27 imprisonment and that each one must decide whether any mitigating circumstances were sufficiently substantial to outweigh the aggravating circumstances. The Tenth Circuit reviewed a set of comments similar to the ones challenged here in Parks v. Brown, 860 F.2d 1545 (10th Cir. 1988) (en banc), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990). There, the prosecutor told the jury: But, you know, as you as jurors, you really, in assessing the death penalty, you’re not yourself putting Robyn Parks to death. You just have become a part of the criminal-justice system that says when anyone does this, that he must suffer death. So all you are doing is you’re just following the law, and what the law says, and on your verdict -- once your verdict comes back in, the law takes over. The law does all of these things, so it’s not on your conscience. You’re just part of the criminal-justice system that says that when this type of thing happens, that whoever does such a horrible, atrocious thing must suffer death. Now that’s man’s law. But God’s law is the very same. God’s law says that the murderer shall suffer death. So don’t let it bother your conscience, you know. Parks, 860 F.2d at 1549. The Tenth Circuit concluded “that Caldwell is inapplicable here because ‘none of the [prosecutor’s] comments could have had the effect of misleading the jury into thinking that it had a reduced role in the sentencing process.’” Parks, 860 F.2d at 1550 (quoting Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 184 n.15 (1986)). The prosecutor’s comments in Parks were more akin to the comments in this case than were the comments at issue in Caldwell. In Parks, as here, there was no erroneous statement that appellate review relieves the jury of its obligations. Indeed, the prosecutor’s comment in Parks that the decision to sentence a man to death is “not on your conscience” may be more troubling than the prosecutor’s comments at issue here. Furthermore, as both the state court and the district court noted, the trial judge corrected the statements that allegedly minimized the jury’s role. West, 767 S.W.2d at 399-400; West, No. 3:01-cv-91, slip op. at 78. For these reasons we hold that it was not unreasonable, under Caldwell and Brecht, for the Tennessee Supreme Court to conclude that the prosecutorial error in regard to minimizing the role of the jury did not have a Nos. 05-5132/6219 West v. Bell Page 28 “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s” imposition of West’s capital sentence. 2. The prosecutor: claimed that defense counsel was attempting to deceive or mislead the jury; called West a liar; and made inflammatory remarks not supported by the evidence a. The alleged misconduct West alleges that during his closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury that the defense counsel was attempting to mislead or confuse the jury on eleven separate occasions. Of those eleven instances, ten involved variations of the phrase “[t]hat is an attempt to blow a little smoke in your eyes,” or “[a]nother attempt to throw a little sand in your eyes.” In the eleventh instance the prosecutor referred to one of defense counsel’s arguments as an “attempt that defense counsel has made in this case, in order to confuse you . . . .” West also objected to statements made during the prosecution’s closing in which the prosecutor called West a liar. “Now you are a gifted liar, Mr. West. You are not just a liar . . . .” West also objects to several other statements made during closing arguments:  Can you believe that he had the audacity to say that Sheila Romines consented to have sex with him . . . the most ludicrous, cruel lie that has ever been told in Union County history.  I guess the truth is not important, at least to Mr. West.  He said that Ronnie [Martin] took the knife and killed both women. We know that that is a lie. We know that that is a lie. Finally, West argues that the prosecutor made the following inflammatory comments not supported by the evidence:  [I don’t] know whether West or Martin, or both, had taken anything other than alcohol.  Are we going to turn Stephen West loose, let him escape from responsibility for the crimes that he has committed, because he and Mr. Martin were able to successful dispose of the murder weapons or successfully wash the blood off the murder weapons. Nos. 05-5132/6219 West v. Bell Page 29  [A]fter the butchery, [West and Martin] go in and clean themselves up before they leave. West objects to several comments in which the prosecutor speculated as to Martin and West’s actions during the commission and cover-up of the crime, arguing that they were not supported by the record. We do not repeat them all here as they are explored in detail in the district court opinion. West, No. 3:01-cv-91, slip op. at 117-20. b. Procedural default and fair presentment The State argues that West procedurally defaulted in challenging the first and third sets of statements by failing to raise them in the state court proceedings as “federal constitution violations.” Appellee’s Br. 43. While it is true that West cited only state law in those arguments, there are other ways in which he could have fairly presented his constitutional claim to the state courts. See Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 32. As we stated in McMeans v. Brigano, 228 F.3d 674 (6th Cir. 2000): This court has noted four actions a defendant can take which are significant to the determination whether a claim has been “fairly presented”: (1) reliance upon federal cases employing constitutional analysis; (2) reliance upon state cases employing federal constitutional analysis; (3) phrasing the claim in terms of constitutional law or in terms sufficiently particular to allege a denial of a specific constitutional right; or (4) alleging facts well within the mainstream of constitutional law. Id. at 681. West’s allegations in regard to the first set of statements were sufficiently particular and well within the mainstream of constitutional law. West specifically stated that the prosecutor’s comments about defense counsel attempting to mislead the jury were “highly prejudicial and improper.” He used the same phrase in objecting to the prosecutor’s statements that were allegedly unsupported by the record. Though this statement was not close to an invocation of the Supreme Court’s standard for judging prosecutorial misconduct, it was evocative of language that we articulated in United States v. Leon, 534 F.2d 667 (6th Cir. 1976). As we stated in Leon, we evaluate claims of prosecutorial misconduct using four factors, including “whether the remarks tended to mislead the jury or to prejudice the accused.” Id. at 679. See United States v. Carroll, Nos. 05-5132/6219 West v. Bell Page 30 26 F.3d 1380, 1384 (6th Cir. 1994) (explaining Leon). Indeed, in Leon, the court found that the remarks at issue were “improper and highly prejudicial,” Leon, 534 F.2d at 678, the very same phrase used by West. As for West’s arguments about the second set of statements, West quoted from State v. Smith, 456 A.2d 16 (Me. 1983), explicitly noting that the state case was citing a federal case, United States v. Gonzalez Vargas, 558 F.2d 631 (1st Cir. 1977). West also cited United States v. Bess, 593 F.2d 749 (6th Cir. 1979). We accordingly hold that West fairly presented his federal claims to the state court and that he is not procedurally barred from pursuing those claims here. c. State-court analysis The state court analyzed West’s claim under state law, relying on State v. Buck, 670 S.W. 2d 608, 609 (Tenn. 1984) and State v. Beasley, 536 S.W.2d 328 (Tenn. 1976), which held that a prosecutor’s argument should be supported by evidence introduced at trial and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence and that a lawyer’s personal opinion as to the credibility of a witnesses should not be injected into argument. However, as the state court noted, Beasley cited with approval a number of cases in which the courts refused to find misconduct when the prosecutor’s reference to a “lying” defendant or defense witnesses was supported by evidence in the record. West, 767 S.W.2d at 394. The court ultimately found that some of the prosecutor’s references had “borderline support” and could “through reasonable inference [] be drawn from evidence” and that some were not based upon evidence or proper inferences therefrom. For example, the comment that he didn’t “know whether Mr. West or Mr. Martin, or both, had taken anything other than alcohol,” was unsupported. Id. at 394-95. The state court also acknowledged that, under state law, it was “improper for the district attorney to tell the jury that defense counsel was ‘trying to throw sand in the eyes of the jury’ and ‘blowing smoke in the face of the jury.’” West, 767 S.W.2d at 395. The court dismissed the weight of the improper comments, however, holding that “viewed in the context in which the improper remarks occurred and in light of the overwhelming evidence of Nos. 05-5132/6219 West v. Bell Page 31 defendant’s guilt the instances of prosecutorial misconduct were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Ibid.
Again, the issue is whether the state court decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Under the relevant Supreme Court precedent, prosecutorial misconduct is grounds for reversal if that conduct “‘so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’” Darden, 477 U.S. at 181 (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)). The appropriate standard for review on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct alleged in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is “the narrow one of due process, and not the broad exercise of supervisory power.” Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 642. “We do not possess supervisory powers over state court trials.” Byrd v. Collins, 209 F.3d 486, 529 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Cook v. Bordenkircher, 602 F.2d 117, 119 n.5 (6th Cir. 1979), for the proposition that “it is the responsibility of the [state courts] to police their prosecutors; we have no such authority.”). As we explained in Byrd: In making this determination, we must bear in mind that the touchstone of due process analysis . . . is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor. Therefore, even if the prosecutor’s conduct was undesirable or even universally condemned, it does not constitute a due process violation unless the conduct was ‘so egregious so as to render the entire trial fundamentally unfair. Indeed, our case law demonstrates the extreme nature of prosecutorial misconduct required for a federal court to issue the writ. 209 F.3d at 529 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). It is improper to personally attack defense counsel or argue that counsel is attempting to mislead the jury. Broom v. Mitchell, 441 F.3d 392, 412-13 (6th Cir. 2006). A prosecutor should not give his own opinion as to the credibility of witness. Hodge v. Hurley, 426 F.3d 368, 378-79 (6th Cir. 2005); see also Caldwell v. Russell, 181 F.3d 731, 737 (6th Cir. 1999) (“Ordinarily, a prosecutor may not express a personal opinion concerning the guilt of the defendant or the credibility of trial witnesses, because such personal assurances of guilt or vouching for the veracity of witnesses by the state’s Nos. 05-5132/6219 West v. Bell Page 32 representative exceeds the legitimate advocate’s role by improperly inviting the jurors to convict the defendant on a basis other than a neutral independent assessment of the record proof.”); United States v. Carroll, 26 F.3d 1380, 1387-89 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Dandy, 998 F.2d 1344, 1353 (6th Cir. 1993). Nevertheless, this does not mean that the prosecution cannot attack the defendant’s credibility or even assert that the defendant is lying. As we explained in United States v. Francis, 170 F.3d 546 (6th Cir. 1999): This Court has held that a prosecutor may assert that a defendant is lying during her closing argument when emphasizing discrepancies between the evidence and that defendant’s testimony. To avoid impropriety, however, such comments must reflect reasonable inferences from the evidence adduced at trial. Again, misconduct occurs when a jury could reasonably believe that the prosecutor was, instead, expressing a personal opinion as to the witness’s credibility. Id. at 551 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Assessing West’s claims therefore is a two-step process. First, the court must determine whether a prosecutor’s conduct and remarks were improper. Second, the court must determine whether the conduct warrants habeas relief. The four factors considered when evaluating whether relief is warranted are: (1) “the degree to which the remarks complained of have a tendency to mislead the jury and to prejudice the accused;” (2) “whether they are isolated or extensive;” (3) “whether they were deliberately or accidentally placed before the jury;” and (4) “the strength of the competent proof to establish the guilt of the accused.” Pritchett v. Pitcher, 117 F.3d 959, 964 (6th Cir. 1997). The Tennessee Supreme Court used a similar set of factors from Buck in assessing West’s claims on direct appeal. The Buck factors are: Nos. 05-5132/6219 West v. Bell Page 33 (1) “the conduct complained of viewed in context and in light of the facts and circumstances of the case;” (2) “the curative measures undertaken by the Court and the prosecution;” (3) “the intent of the prosecutor in making the improper statement;” (4) “the cumulative effect of the improper conduct and any other errors in the record;” and (5) “the relative strength or weakness of the case.” 670 S.W. 2d at 609. Though the Tennessee Supreme Court did not walk through each of the factors, it clearly applied them. The district court gave a more detailed analysis of the alleged misconduct. Both courts came to the conclusion that the misconduct did not amount to reversible error. We agree. While it is true that the prosecutor asserted his personal opinion as to West’s credibility, the error was harmless given the evidence submitted to the jury that West had contradicted himself on numerous occasions and had given varying accounts of crimes. The same is true for the prosecutor’s comments that defense counsel was intentionally misleading the jury. As the district court pointed out, the state’s closing argument took up thirty pages of trial transcript. While there were eleven instances of inappropriate comments, none were lengthy; they were all short asides. As for the comments allegedly not supported by the record, many of them were actually supported. For example, West complains of the prosecutor’s speculation about West and Martin cleaning the murder weapon. However, one of West’s statements to the police was read to the jury by Agent Scott. In that statement West had stated, “I wiped off the guns and took them to the mother’s bedroom.” J.A. 1732. The district court opinion explores more of the allegedly-unsupported statements, demonstrating that many of the inferences were based on testimony and evidence in the record and we need to repeat the analysis here. Moreover, even if every statement was not fully supported, the comments at issue could hardly be said to have “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the Nos. 05-5132/6219 West v. Bell Page 34 resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Darden, 477 U.S. at 181. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of relief on prosecutorial misconduct.