Opinion ID: 4025929
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: July 26 E-mail

Text: Dumas argues, and the district court concluded, that the July 26 e-mail was sent by Holbrook not as a private citizen, but as an employee pursuant to his official duties. In support, the district court cited several circumstances. R. 29, Order at 10, Page ID 317. First, Holbrook used his official Village e-mail account, sent the e-mail to firefighters he supervised, and signed it “Fire Chief.” Second, the e-mail warned the employees that they “could potentially be out of a 5 Unfortunately, there is little evidence directly from Dumas explaining her motivations. She did not file an affidavit and was not deposed. When the extant record materials are viewed as a whole, however, they clearly indicate that the July 26 e-mail was the trigger. This understanding is corroborated by the fact that the parties’ briefing below focused almost exclusively on it. And our review of the district court’s ruling is properly confined to the record made below. - 11 - Case No. 15-4334, Holbrook v. Dumas job.” Third, in his letter to Mayor Mitchell, Holbrook explained that his job required him to “play both Fireman and Chief to my employees” and that he sent the e-mail to employees because he felt it was their right to know about the potential for losing their jobs, recognizing that they had families to support and it could be difficult to find another job quickly. Additionally, Holbrook expressly conceded in his deposition that he sent the information to employees in his “role as fire chief.” R. 19-1, Holbrook Dep. at 44–45, Page ID 124. In concluding that Holbrook communicated pursuant to his official duties, not as a citizen, the district court distinguished Lane v. Franks. In Lane, an employee testified pursuant to subpoena in a criminal prosecution about matters he learned of in the course of his employment. The Court concluded his testimony was speech “as a citizen” even though it concerned his duties as an employee because the speech was not ordinarily within the scope of his duties. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2379. The district court explained its reasoning as follows: The critical question “. . . is whether the speech at issue is itself ordinarily within the scope of an employee’s duties.” Lane, 134 S.Ct. at 2379. Here there is no dispute that Holbrook learned about the insurance situation as a result of his position as Fire Chief. But the determinative question is not how he learned the information, but what he said, where and how he said it, and when he spoke about that information. His own words in the email demonstrate that he communicated the information to his firemen because he was their chief, and he felt he had an obligation to inform them of the situation and that they could be without a job in the near future. R. 29, Order at 14, Page ID 321 (emphasis in original). The district court also distinguished Westmoreland v. Sutherland, 662 F.3d 714 (6th Cir. 2011), where an employee who was off duty and not in uniform spoke during a public comment period at a city council meeting. Finding nothing in the record supporting the claim that he spoke pursuant to his official duties, the court held that he spoke as a citizen. Id., 662 F.3d at 719. Here, in contrast, as the district court noted, the factual record is quite different. The - 12 - Case No. 15-4334, Holbrook v. Dumas instant record is replete with evidence that Holbrook sent the July 26 e-mail in his role as Fire Chief, not simply as a concerned citizen. If, instead of sending the e-mail to his employees from his official e-mail account because he felt duty-bound to do so as Fire Chief, “Holbrook had appeared at the [Village] Council meeting, off duty and not in uniform, and publicly commented about ramifications on his department of a potential loss of insurance coverage,” the district court noted, the question would have been closer. R. 29, Order at 11–12, Page ID 318–19. Holbrook insists the district court’s conclusion is in error. He attacks it on several fronts, all unsuccessfully. First, he contends the e-mail message informed employees about the impending cancellation of the Village’s liability insurance, a subject not ordinarily within the scope of the Fire Chief’s duties. He concedes that the potential loss of the employees’ jobs was a concern, but argues this was a by-product of the loss of insurance. Inasmuch as the cancellation of insurance was precipitated, he contends, by Dumas’s style of management—because it “spawned a large number of actions” against the Village—the e-mail is said not to be addressed only to intra-departmental personnel issues. The district court addressed this argument and, considering the “content, form and context” of the e-mail, concluded Holbrook was speaking as Fire Chief to his employees on a personnel issue. R. 29, Order at 14–15, Page ID 321–22. Citing Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 423–24, the court held such communication was not protected and that Dumas therefore had the right to take corrective action if she believed the communication was inflammatory or misguided. Id. In this we find no error. Holbrook’s attempt to recast the purpose of the e-mail is understandable, but is simply not supported by the record. Yes, the notice of insurance cancellation was attached and was referred to in the body of the message, but the purpose of the e-mail is evident in the text of the message. Holbrook, as Fire Chief, wanted to alert his - 13 - Case No. 15-4334, Holbrook v. Dumas employees as soon as possible to a development he just learned about that potentially jeopardized their employment. He urged them to attend the upcoming Village Council meeting—ostensibly to show their concern about their jobs and to witness how the Council responded to the challenge posed by the notice of insurance cancellation. That this evident purpose was the actual purpose of the communication finds manifold confirmation in the record, from Holbrook himself. From the outset—in his written answers to Dumas, in his letter to Mayor Mitchell, in his deposition testimony, and in his affidavit—Holbrook consistently explained and defended his actions by emphasizing employees’ right to know about this threat to their continued employment, for their benefit. See R. 19-1 Ex. B, Holbrook’s Answers No. 5, Page ID 137; R. 19-1 Ex. C, Letter to Mayor, Page ID 139; R. 19-1, Holbrook Dep. at 37–38, Page ID 121–22; R. 22-8, Holbrook Aff. at ¶ 5, Page ID 235–36. Neither the text of the e-mail message nor the factual record as a whole supports Holbrook’s present characterization of the e-mail’s purpose as reflecting a citizen’s concern about mismanagement in Village government. Among the factors we consider in determining whether an employee’s speech was made pursuant to his official duties rather than as a citizen are the ordinary scope of the employee’s duties, the impetus for the speech, the setting, the audience, and the subject matter of the speech. Handy-Clay v. City of Memphis, Tenn., 695 F.3d 531, 540 (6th Cir. 2012); Weisbarth, 499 F.3d at 546. All of these factors support the district court’s conclusion. Holbrook sent the e-mail as Fire Chief, from his official e-mail account, to fire department employees, informing them of a development potentially affecting their employment, out of a sense of duty to them and concern for their well-being. In all these respects, the factual record is undisputed. Holbrook contends that his having sent the e-mail from his official account does not necessarily disqualify the communication from First Amendment protection. Indeed, not “all - 14 - Case No. 15-4334, Holbrook v. Dumas speech within the office is exposed to restriction” by the employer. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421. That Holbrook used the Village e-mail account to communicate is not dispositive. What is important is that he communicated, as he conceded, with fire department employees in furtherance of his responsibilities as Fire Chief. “Restricting speech that owes its existence to a public employee’s professional responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen.” Id. at 421–22. But Holbrook maintains he did not share the information because he was Fire Chief, but because the employees had the right to know. This after-the-fact “clarification” is hardly persuasive. To the extent Holbrook means to suggest he communicated merely as a concerned friend or citizen, not as Fire Chief, the clarification is directly contradicted by the fact that he signed the e-mail as “Fire Chief,” and by Holbrook’s explicit admissions in his letter to Mayor Mitchell, R.19-1 Ex. C, Page ID 139, and in his deposition testimony, R. 19, Holbrook Dep. at 37–38, 44–45, Page ID 124. Holbrook cannot now substantiate his claim of error simply by contradicting, in legal argument, his previous statements in the factual record that formed the basis for the district court’s ruling. See Aerel, S.R.L. v. PCC Airfoils, L.L.C., 448 F.3d 899, 908– 09 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that a party cannot create a genuine issue of fact sufficient to survive summary judgment simply by contradicting his previous sworn statement). Moreover, Holbrook expressly recognized in his deposition testimony that the employees’ “right to know,” from him in particular, was a function of his obligation to tell them as their Chief. R. 19, Holbrook Dep. at 38, Page ID 123. Even if Holbrook was not specifically required by his job duties to send the July 26 e-mail, it is clear that the communication “owed it existence” to his responsibilities as Fire Chief. This is enough to render it speech “pursuant to his duties” as a public employee and not speech “as a citizen.” See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421–22; - 15 - Case No. 15-4334, Holbrook v. Dumas Alomari v. Ohio Dep’t of Public Safety, 626 F.App’x 558, 567–68 (6th Cir. 2015); Keeling v. Coffee Cty, Tenn., 541 F.App’x 522, 528 (6th Cir. 2013); Weisbarth, 499 F.3d at 544. Accordingly, we find no error in the district court’s holding that Holbrook communicated pursuant to his official duties and that his speech was therefore not protected.