Opinion ID: 1878632
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: fourth-degree assault

Text: Appellant contends that Fourth-Degree Assault is a lesser-included offense of First-Degree Robbery, and thus, the trial court committed reversible error when it refused to instruct on Fourth-Degree Assault. An offense is a lesser offense of a charged offense when: (a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or (b) It consists of an attempt to commit the offense charged or to commit an offense otherwise included therein; or (c) It differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a lesser kind of culpability suffices to establish its commission; or (d) It differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less serious injury or risk of injury to the same person, property or public interest suffices to establish its commission. [11] Appellant claims that Fourth-Degree Assault was established by proof of the same or less than all of the facts required to establish the commission of the Robbery charge, and therefore, under section (a), it was a lesser-included offense of Robbery. Section (a) codifies into Kentucky law the test set forth in Blockburger v. United States [12] for determining if a person may be convicted for more than one offense as a result of a single course of conduct, i.e., the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not. [13] In other words, if `each statute requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not,' the offenses are not the same under the Blockburger test. [14] Accordingly, in applying the Blockburger test, we must focus[] on the proof necessary to prove the statutory elements of each offense, rather than on the actual evidence to be presented at trial. [15] But before applying the Blockburger test to a multi-purpose criminal statute, the court must construct from the alternative elements within the statute the particular formulation that applies to the case at hand. [16] It should rid the statute of alternative elements that do not apply. It must, in other words, treat a multi-purpose statute written in the alternative as it would treat separate statutes. The theory behind the analysis is that a criminal statute written in the alternative creates a separate offense for each alternative and should therefore be treated for double jeopardy purposes as separate statutes would. After this process of statutory reformulation is applied to the statutes in the case before it, a court then determines whether the two offenses in question should be characterized under Blockburger as distinct offenses authorizing cumulative sentences. [17] Therefore, in the present case, the critical question is whether Robbery with the physical injury aggravator requires proof of an additional fact that Fourth-Degree Assault does not and vice versa. A person commits Fourth-Degree Assault when[ ] (a) [h]e intentionally or wantonly causes physical injury to another person; or (b) [w]ith recklessness he causes physical injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument. [18] Although both the First-Degree Robbery statute and the trial court's instructions in this case require proof of a theft, which is an additional fact not required for conviction of Fourth-Degree Assault, the Fourth-Degree Assault statute does not require proof of an additional fact not required for violation of the First-Degree Robbery statute as formulated for this case. This point is illustrated by a side-by-side comparison of the elements of the First-Degree Robbery statute as formulated for this case and the applicable elements of the Fourth-Degree Assault statute: First-Degree Robbery Statute Fourth-Degree Assault Statute (1) In the course of committing a theft (1) Intentionally or wantonly (2) Use physical force (2) Cause physical injury to another person (3) With intent to accomplish the theft (4) Cause physical injury to a person not a robbery participant Thus, from a review of the above comparsion, it is clear that Fourth-Degree Assault was established by proof of less than all of the facts required to establish the commission of the First-Degree Robbery charge, and therefore, under KRS 505.020(2)(a), as Appellant contends, it was a lesser-included offense of First-Degree Robbery. [19] But, we disagree with Appellant's contention that because Fourth-Degree Assault was a lesser-included offense, he was automatically entitled to an instruction on Fourth-Degree Assault. Appellant does not dispute that he stole Evans's purse, and the evidence is undisputed that Appellant's assault of Evans occurred during his escape from the theft of her purse. That is clearly robbery, not separate offenses of theft and assault as Appellant contends. We do not believe that the jury could have reasonably doubted Appellant's guilt of robbery, and yet believe beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of Fourth-Degree Assault. [20] For this reason, the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct on Fourth-Degree Assault as a lesser-included offense.