Opinion ID: 2973258
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Conspiracy to Engage in Retaliatory Discharge

Text: Feathers’s claim against Willamette for conspiracy to engage in retaliatory discharge fails because he presents no evidence that Willamette conspired with Benchmark to discharge him for -7- No. 04-5069 Feathers v. Willamette Indus. filing for workers’ compensation benefits. Feathers argues that the following items demonstrate the existence of a conspiracy between Benchmark and Willamette: (1) the safety meeting held by Benchmark and Willamette on March 18, 2001, (2) the subsequent letters stating that Feathers was banned from the work site, and (3) and the “close knit” relationship between Feathers and Benchmark. These interactions between Benchmark and Willamette, however, do not support the existence of an agreement “‘between two or more persons to accomplish by concert an unlawful purpose, or to accomplish a purpose not in itself unlawful by unlawful means.’” Brown v. Birman Managed Care, Inc., 42 S.W.3d 62, 67 (Tenn. 2001) (quoting Chenault v. Walker, 36 S.W.3d 45, 52 (Tenn. 2001)). Instead, they merely show the normal relations between two companies engaged in a business relationship. When there is a serious accident involving a contractor’s employee on the premises of another company, it is reasonable for the two companies to meet, investigate the accident, and take appropriate remedial action. Even if Feathers did produce evidence that Willamette engaged in a conspiracy, his claim must fail because he has not raised any issue of material fact as to his claim that Benchmark terminated him for seeking workers’ compensation benefits. “It is a general rule that a conspiracy cannot be made the subject of a civil action, unless something is done which, without the conspiracy, would give a right of action. The damage done is the gist of the action, not the conspiracy.” Greene v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 882, 887 (W.D. Tenn. 1999) (quoting Tenn. Pub. Co. v. Fitzhugh, 52 S.W.2d 157, 158 (Tenn. 1932)). Thus, unlike under criminal conspiracy, -8- No. 04-5069 Feathers v. Willamette Indus. “if the claim underlying the allegation of civil conspiracy fails, the conspiracy claim must also fail.” Levy v. Franks, 159 S.W.3d 66, 82 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). In this case, Feathers’s underlying claim against Benchmark fails because he has not satisfied his burden to establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge. To establish a prima facie case, Feathers must provide evidence establishing the following elements: (1) [t]he plaintiff was an employee of the defendant at the time of the injury; (2) the plaintiff made a claim against the defendant for workers’ compensation benefits; (3) the defendant terminated the plaintiff’s employment; and (4) the claim for workers’ compensation benefits was a substantial factor in the employer’s motivation to terminate the employee’s employment. Anderson v. Standard Register Co., 857 S.W.2d 555, 558 (Tenn. 1993). Feathers has shown that he was an employee of Benchmark at the time of his injury, that he made a claim against Benchmark for workers’ compensation benefits, and that Benchmark terminated his employment. The first three elements of his retaliatory discharge claim are thus satisfied. Feathers has not, however, produced any evidence that his workers’ compensation claim was a substantial factor in Benchmark’s decision to terminate his employment. In support of his claim for retaliatory discharge, Feathers points to two pieces of evidence. First, he argues that “a nexus exists between the occurrence of the compensable injury sustained by Feathers and the timing of his being banned from . . . Willamette’s premises. The timing of his termination by Benchmark after returning to work with no restrictions on his activities is also noteworthy . . . .” On this point, -9- No. 04-5069 Feathers v. Willamette Indus. Feathers analogizes his case to Sasser v. Averett Express, Inc., 839 S.W.2d 422 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992). In Sasser, a truck driver was discharged within hours after settling his workers’ compensation claim for three times more than the workers’ compensation carrier originally offered. 839 S.W.2d at 427. The court held that material evidence supported the jury’s verdict that the employer discharged the driver in retaliation for his workers’ compensation claim. Id. In addition to the timing of the discharge, the court noted that the manager who terminated the driver had previously called the driver a “two-face liar” and a “back stabber” when he learned of the suit and that the employer’s witnesses’ testimony at trial regarding witnesses’ reasons for discharging the driver differed from their testimony during discovery. Id. The present case is distinguishable from Sasser. Unlike in Sasser, Feathers does not allege that Benchmark management expressed displeasure upon learning of his workers’ compensation claim. Nor does he allege that Benchmark employees changed their reasons for discharging him. Most importantly, the timing of Feathers’s termination is completely different from that in Sasser because it raises no inference that he was terminated for filing a workers’ compensation claim. Feathers was not immediately discharged after Benchmark learned of a large workers’ compensation award. On the contrary, he was only terminated after Willamette—within its rights—banned him from the Kingsport facility3 and, four months later, he turned down other work because the locations 3 The contract between Benchmark and Willamette provides that “safety requirements will be strictly enforced and that continued disregard of these and other applicable safety rules and regulations by the Contractors’ employees will result in a request that such employees be removed from the construction site.” J.A. at 279. - 10 - No. 04-5069 Feathers v. Willamette Indus. were out-of-town. Feathers does not explain how Benchmark could have continued employing him when he was banned from the Kingsport site and when he rejected Benchmark’s other projects. Feathers also tries to establish a causal link between his claim for workers’ compensation and his termination by arguing that the accident was not his fault and that Willamette’s subsequent investigation was “flawed.” This argument fails, however, because the accuracy of the investigation and Feathers’s culpability in the accident are irrelevant to his claim. As the district court stated, [T]he issue is not whether Willamette was wrong or right, or justified or unjustified, in concluding that Mr. Feathers was cavalier regarding matters of safety. Nor is it of any relevance whether Willamette’s investigation was flawed, or whether it reached the right or wrong conclusions concerning the cause of the accident. Any actions by Willamette are irrelevant to Feathers’s retaliatory discharge claim against Benchmark because Willamette did not terminate Feathers. Instead, the issue is whether Benchmark terminated Feathers in retaliation for filing a workers’ compensation claim. As previously stated, Benchmark terminated Feathers only after he rejected the work it offered. Feathers thus presents no evidence that his claim for workers’ compensation benefits was a factor in causing his discharge. “[I]n order to get to the jury, there must be some proof of causation other than the facts showing employment, the exercise of rights under the workers’ compensation act, and a subsequent discharge.” Thomason v. Better-Bilt Aluminum Prods., Inc., 831 S.W.2d 291, 293 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992). Because Feathers fails to raise any genuine issues of - 11 - No. 04-5069 Feathers v. Willamette Indus. material fact as to his retaliatory discharge claim against Benchmark, no genuine issue of material fact exists as to Feathers’s conspiracy claim against Willamette.