Opinion ID: 1060999
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: particular vulnerability

Text: The State argues that the trial court properly enhanced the defendant's sentence because the 70-year-old victim was particularly vulnerable. The defendant maintains that the Court of Criminal Appeals correctly held that there was no evidence in the record to show that this victim was particularly vulnerable. The Legislature has determined that a sentence may be enhanced if a victim of the offense was particularly vulnerable because of age or physical or mental disability... . Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114(4). In State v. Adams, 864 S.W.2d at 35, we provided a framework for application of this factor: [T]he vulnerability enhancement relates more to the natural physical and mental limitations of the victim than merely to the victim's age... . The factor can be used ... if the circumstances show that the victim, because of his age or physical or mental condition was in fact `particularly vulnerable,' i.e., incapable of resisting, summoning help, or testifying against the perpetrator. (Emphasis added; citations omitted). We stressed that the determination of whether the factor applied was a factual issue to be resolved by the trier of fact on a case by case basis. Similarly, in State v. Kissinger, 922 S.W.2d 482, 487 (Tenn. 1996), we again linked the vulnerability to proof of a mental or physical limitation that created an inability to resist, a difficulty in calling for help, or a difficulty in testifying against the perpetrator. Although it is not difficult to imagine cases in which the victim's age, whether very young or very old, may seem to equate with vulnerability, we chose in Adams not to presume such a conclusion in any case. [3] Moreover, because Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114(4) does not speak to specific ages, but rather to vulnerability, we could not create a bright-line rule. Thus, we concluded that the State bears the burden of proving the victim's limitations rendering him or her particularly vulnerable. State v. Adams, 864 S.W.2d at 35; see also State v. Hayes, 899 S.W.2d 175 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). In determining whether the State has met its burden, the trial court must consider a number of factors and must make factual findings. It should consider whether evidence in the record with regard to the victim's age or physical and mental attributes demonstrated an inability to resist the crime, summon help, or testify at a later date. See e.g., State v. Clabo, 905 S.W.2d 197 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995)(factor properly applied where child victim of sexual offense suffered from learning disability); State v. Buckmeir, 902 S.W.2d 418 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995)(factor proper where defendant knew victim had passed out from drinking and was unable to resist the commission of a sexual offense); State v. McKnight, 900 S.W.2d 36 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994)(factor properly applied where victims of sexual acts were very young, lacked family support, and looked to defendant for friendship and approval). Such evidence, whether lay or expert testimony, must relate to the victim's physical or mental capacity at the time of the crime and not at the time of trial or sentencing. See State v. Raines, 882 S.W.2d 376 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994)(court erred in applying factor based on its observations of victim's frail physical stature at some undetermined point in the past). The evidence need not be extensive and additional weight may be given to the age of the victim in those cases where a victim is extremely young or old. Nonetheless, the State must prove the factor is applicable and there must be evidence in the record in addition to the victim's age. The dissent contends that our interpretation ignores the plain meaning of the statute, which it finds to be plain, clear and unambiguous. Yet the dissent, unable to hold that a 70-year-old person is particularly vulnerable as a matter of law, offers no plain or clear guidance on when the factor applies or what ages will be presumed particularly vulnerable. Instead, to support its presumption, the dissent cites age and circumstances, specifically observing that the victim lived alone, and speculating on the apparent absence of home security systems or guard dogs. This interpretation, we believe, is far from a plain meaning or a bright-line test and would likely yield more arbitrary and disparate results than the analysis in Adams , which relates age with physical or mental limitations. Moreover, because the Legislature has stated that an enhancement factor must be appropriate for the offense, the court must necessarily consider the nature of the offense and the manner in which it was committed. For example, a perpetrator of a crime of violence may prey upon a different type of vulnerability than would someone who committed crimes of misrepresentation or fraud. Thus, a victim with a severe physical disability may not be particularly vulnerable to bribery or theft. See State v. Seals, 735 S.W.2d 849, 853 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987)(elderly, infirm victim not particularly vulnerable where defendant stole checks from victim's mailbox). Similarly, the offense may be committed in such a manner as to make the victim's vulnerability irrelevant. In State v. Butler, 900 S.W.2d 305 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994), for example, the defendant shot and killed an elderly woman. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that although the victim had a physical disability and used a walking cane, the State failed to show that the victim's vulnerability was a factor in the commission of the offense because no victim, regardless of his or her physical or mental traits, could have resisted the offense committed in that manner. In short, the court must consider all of the facts and circumstances of the offense in determining whether the particular vulnerability factor is appropriate for the offense. The dissent asserts that this statement is a suspect proposition unsupported by authority. To the contrary, as we have already discussed, the Legislature has predicated the application of any enhancement factor on it being appropriate for the offense. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114. The cases we have cited from the Court of Criminal Appeals merely recognize this limitation expressed by the Legislature. Moreover, the dissent's fear that -114(4) may never be used to enhance where the defendant uses a gun is unfounded. The use of a gun or other deadly weapon, if not an element of the offense, is a separate basis for enhancement under Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114(8). It may also be a relevant consideration in the application of enhancement factors -114(10), no hesitation in committing a crime where risk to human life is high, or -114(16), offense committed where potential for bodily injury to a victim was great. In applying these factors to this case, we note that the trial court made no findings of fact beyond its mere recitation that the victim was particularly vulnerable. Without question, this 70-year-old victim living alone was vulnerable to the type of offense committed by the defendant. We do not hold nor do we believe otherwise. Yet given the inherent ambiguity in attempting to determine vulnerability solely from one's age, we are unwilling to engage in potentially unfounded presumptions. A person's age alone may have little or no bearing on size, strength or vitality. Thus, unless the State produces evidence of physical or mental limitations at the time of the offense, along with proof of the victim's age, it cannot be presumed that the victim was particularly vulnerable based solely on her age. Accordingly, we conclude, as did the Court of Criminal Appeals, that there is insufficient evidence in this record to support application of this factor.