Opinion ID: 372938
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Photographic Display.

Text: 26 Cueto contends that the government's use of a particular photographic identification procedure at trial constituted hearsay and also violated Cueto's due process rights. 27 At trial the Government attempted to show that Cueto had accompanied Bavosa in various stages of preparation for the robbery by presenting three neutral witnesses who had allegedly seen the two men together. The first witness, Will Senkowicz, owned the Boca Raton Motel where the two men allegedly stayed the night before the robbery. He testified that FBI agent Heaney asked me, he showed me this photograph and asked me if I seen this person before. I looked at it, I said I told him I'm sorry but I couldn't be very sure about it. Record at 109. Later during direct examination the Government asked Senkowicz to look around the courtroom and to state whether he could identify one of the persons that he had seen around the Boca Raton Motel. Before Senkowicz could answer, defense counsel objected that the issue should be considered outside the jury's presence. The judge sustained the objection. Record at 116. The Government did not make any further attempts to have Senkowicz identify Cueto. 28 After Senkowicz stepped down, the judge held a bench conference at which he explained that the Government could ask a witness to make an in-court identification after the Government had developed a proper predicate: So if there is a predicate based upon the fact that he has known this man and he can establish it, certainly he could point him out in the courtroom. Record at 130. 29 Despite this invitation from the judge, the Government did not ask any other witness except Bavosa to make an in-court identification of Cueto. The second neutral witness, Frank Kosiba, rented the Monte Carlo getaway car to Bavosa, who was accompanied by another man. He testified that he had identified some photographs shown to him by the FBI agents, but he did not indicate the identity of the person photographed. Record at 131, 137. The third neutral witness, Robert Lamar, sold some flares to Bavosa and another man at Sears. He testified that he had identified some photographs shown to him by the agents, but he did not identify the people in the photographs except to describe what they purchased. Record at 150-54. 30 Each of these three neutral witnesses testified that he had identified a photograph, but none of the witnesses indicated who the photograph depicted. The Government attempted to link the witnesses' statements to Cueto by presenting the testimony of FBI agent Williamson, who had shown the photographs to the witness Kosiba. Agent Williamson testified that he showed two photographs to Kosiba at the car agency. He said that Kosiba correctly identified the person in one photograph as Cueto, but that Kosiba erroneously identified the person in the second photograph, which depicted Bavosa. Record at 157-58. Defense counsel objected and said that this identification was made pursuant to an improper display and constituted hearsay. Record at 158-59. The judge allowed the testimony to stand, and later denied the defendant's motion for a mistrial because of this improper identification testimony. The Government did not present any testimony about who appeared in the photographs that Senkowicz and Lamar had identified. 31 The trial judge properly concluded that the identification procedure did not constitute hearsay. A witness's in-court testimony that he had previously identified a photograph is not hearsay because of Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(1)(C), which excludes such testimony from the definition of hearsay. See Anderson v. Maggio, 555 F.2d 447, 449-50 (5th Cir. 1977). An FBI agent's statement that the defendant was the person portrayed in the photograph that the witness identified is also permissible. United States v. Harden, 469 F.2d 65 (5th Cir. 1972), Cert. denied, 410 U.S. 985, 93 S.Ct. 1512, 36 L.Ed.2d 182 (1973). The agent's statement corroborating the witness's testimony that he identified the photograph that the agent showed him is not hearsay. See United States v. Lewis, 565 F.2d 1248, 1250-52 (2d Cir. 1977), Cert. denied, 435 U.S. 973, 98 S.Ct. 1618, 56 L.Ed.2d 66 (1978). These authorities are premised, however, on the supposition that the initial photographic display satisfies due process standards. 32 The due process standard for reviewing photographic identification procedures constitutes a two-part test. The court must first decide whether the photographic display was impermissibly suggestive. If the court concludes that the display was suggestive, it must then determine whether the procedure creates a substantial likelihood of misidentification. Reliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony. Hudson v. Blackburn, 601 F.2d 785, 788 (5th Cir. 1979); Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977). 33 In this case agent Williamson showed Kosiba only two photographs: a single photograph of Cueto and a single photograph of Bavosa. The agent did not present Kosiba with an array of similar photographs depicting different individuals. For purposes of identification at trial, the Government's display involving only a single photograph of each defendant in the case is impermissibly suggestive. See Hudson, 601 F.2d at 788 (a single photograph display is one of the most suggestive methods of identification and is always to be viewed with suspicion.). Compare United States v. Diecidue, 603 F.2d 535, 565 (5th Cir. 1979) (photographic display of seven different individuals held not suggestive for identification of single defendant). 34 Once we find that a photographic display is impermissibly suggestive, the factors that determine the reliability of the identification include the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness' prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation. Manson, 432 U.S. at 114, 97 S.Ct. 2243. The reliability of the photographic identification in this case is very weak, especially with regard to the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness, Kosiba. Kosiba never made an in-court identification of Cueto. In cases such as Manson and Hudson courts have relied upon clear and positive in-court identifications by the witnesses as an important factor to show the reliability of suggestive photographic displays. In those cases the witnesses were exposed to suggestive displays only before the trial as a means of preparing for a later in-court identification. In this case the improper photographic display constituted the witness' only identification of the defendant at the trial itself. Even though the trial judge expressly encouraged the Government to use in-court identification once a predicate was established, Kosiba was apparently so uncertain of his identification of Cueto that the Government elected not to have him attempt an in-court identification of the defendant. 35 Kosiba's uncertainty is also revealed by the testimony of agent Williamson, who showed him the photographs. Despite the suggestiveness of the display, Williamson testified that Kosiba correctly identified only one of the two photographs that Williamson showed to him. Kosiba incorrectly identified the photograph of Bavosa, whom Kosiba said he had met on several previous occasions. Record at 136. Unlike the witnesses in Manson and Hudson, Kosiba gave no detailed description of the defendant and could not otherwise show the accuracy of his identification of Cueto. Because the photographic display was impermissibly suggestive and the witness' testimony does not reveal that his identification of the defendant was otherwise reliable, we conclude that Cueto's due process rights were violated when this evidence was admitted against him. 36