Opinion ID: 77801
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Change of Venue Due to Pervasive and Prejudicial Pretrial Publicity

Text: Gaskin argues that he was denied a fair and impartial jury because the trial court denied his motions to change venue due to pervasive and prejudicial pretrial publicity. We have previously summarized the standards that apply to this issue: The trial court may be unable to seat an impartial jury because of prejudicial pretrial publicity or an inflamed community atmosphere. In such a case, due process requires the trial court to grant defendant's motion for a change of venue. This does not mean, however, that a defendant is entitled to a change of venue whenever potential jurors have been exposed to the facts of the case. It is not required that jurors be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved. In these days of swift, widespread and diverse methods of communication, an important case can be expected to arouse the interest of the public in the vicinity, and scarcely any of those best qualified to serve as jurors will not have formed some impression or opinion as to the merits of the case. This is particularly true in criminal cases. To hold that the mere existence of any preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused, without more, is sufficient to rebut the presumption of a prospective juror's impartiality would be to establish an impossible standard. It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court. A defendant is entitled to a change of venue if he can demonstrate either actual prejudice or presumed prejudice. To find the existence of actual prejudice, two basic prerequisites must be satisfied. First, it must be shown that one or more jurors who decided the case entertained an opinion, before hearing the evidence adduced at trial, that the defendant was guilty. Second, these jurors, it must be determined, could not have laid aside these preformed opinions and rendered a verdict based on the evidence presented in court. If a defendant cannot show actual prejudice, then he must meet the demanding presumed prejudice standard. Prejudice is presumed from pretrial publicity when pretrial publicity is sufficiently prejudicial and inflammatory and the prejudicial pretrial publicity saturated the community where the trials were held. The presumed prejudice principle is rarely applicable, and is reserved for an extreme situation. Where a petitioner adduces evidence of inflammatory, prejudicial pretrial publicity that so pervades or saturates the community as to render virtually impossible a fair trial by an impartial jury drawn from the community, jury prejudice is presumed and there is no further duty to establish bias. Meeks v. Moore, 216 F.3d 951, 960-61 (11th Cir.2000) (emphasis added) (block quotations, citations and alterations omitted); see also Coleman v. Kemp, 778 F.2d 1487 (11th Cir.1985). Gaskin argues that prejudice should be presumed in this case because of the widespread dissemination of prejudicial and inflammatory material throughout the community. [3] Gaskin argues that pretrial publicity regarding his case saturated the rural community of Flagler county where the crimes were committed and where he was tried. The Daytona Beach News-Journal published articles which focused on Gaskin's culpability and on the heinous nature of the crimes. The articles also connected Gaskin to another murder and contained statements of law enforcement officials about the case. The trial commenced less than six months after the murders occurred. Gaskin claims that 92% of potential jurors and 11 of the 12 jurors at trial had read newspaper accounts of the crime. However, this case is not the type of extreme situation for which we reserve a finding of presumed prejudice. Gaskin does point to articles published in the local newspaper that may have been somewhat prejudicial or inflammatory. However, he does not present strong enough evidence that prejudicial and inflammatory pretrial publicity saturated the community. See Coleman, 778 F.2d at 1537 ([T]he burden placed upon the petitioner to show that pretrial publicity deprived him of his right to a fair trial before an impartial jury is an extremely heavy one.); Henyard v. McDonough, 459 F.3d 1217, 1242 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam); Spivey v. Head, 207 F.3d 1263, 1270 (11th Cir.2000). Accordingly, the Florida Supreme Court's determination that Gaskin's motion for change of venue was properly denied was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, United States Supreme Court precedent. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).