Opinion ID: 2408540
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Weighing the Value of Lives

Text: Kenley challenges the prosecution's argument weighing the value of the victims' lives against the value of his life. The prosecutor argued: Ladies and gentlemen, the right of the innocent to live far outweighs the right of the guilty not to die. And I ask you whose life has more value herethe Defendant's or Ronnie Martin Felts. Kenley contends that this is precisely the argument which was found to be prejudicially erroneous in State v. Storey, 901 S.W.2d 886 (1995). In Storey , the prosecutor argued: Why do we have the death penalty? The reason we have the death penalty is because the right of the innocent people to live outweighsby huge leaps and bounds, outweighs the right of the guilty not to die. The right of the innocent completely outweighs the right of the guilty not to die, and, so, it comes down to one basic thing. Whose life is more important to you? Whose life has more value? The Defendant's or [the victim's]? Id. at 902. In Storey , we noted that the argument misstated the law because it simplified the death penalty to one basic thing. Id. The balancing of the value of lives argument was couched in the inference that the only purpose of the death penalty was to balance the lives. Id. This argument potentially misled the jury into believing that the only inquiry required was whether the value of the victim's life exceeded the value of defendant's life. Taken in whole, that argument is clearly erroneous because the duty of the jury includes considering all of the evidence, applying the law as it is instructed, and balancing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Furthermore, in Storey , we held that the prosecutor's argument erroneously lumped all persons found guilty of murder into one category. Id. In this case, the balancing of the value of lives was not labeled the one basic thing or couched in terms of it being the sole purpose of the death penalty. The jury was not potentially misled into believing that its only inquiry was the balancing of the value of lives. In fact, the argument in this case was immediately preceded by the prosecutor's discussion of balancing aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Additionally, the prosecutor did not erroneously lump all persons found guilty of murder into one category. Because the prosecutor discussed the balancing of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and did not minimize the death sentence inquiry to one basic thing, the prosecutor's argument allowed the jury's decision to rest on an individualized inquiry of the character and record of this individual offender, Kenley. See Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 7, 114 S.Ct. 2004, 2009, 129 L.Ed.2d 1 (1994). The argument was not improper. State v. Copeland, 928 S.W.2d 828, 843 (Mo. banc 1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 981, 136 L.Ed.2d 864 (1997). Counsel was not ineffective for failing to make a useless objection. Sutherland, supra, at 380.