Opinion ID: 2355008
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Predominance and Superiority

Text: The final argument made by Lenders is that the trial court's conclusions of law on the criteria of predominance and superiority are inadequate and fail to comply with this court's mandate in Lenders I . Particularly, Lenders asserts that on remand the trial court made no change in its conclusion of law on predominance. Lenders also asserts that the trial court's post-remand conclusion of law on superiority is inadequate. In Lenders I, 353 Ark. 339, 107 S.W.3d 157, this court set out the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law in their entirety. Those concerning predominance and superiority were contained in a single paragraph: 11. The common issues raised in the Plaintiff's complaint would predominate throughout the class and a class action is the superior method with which to address the issues raised in this case. Id. at 347, 107 S.W.3d at 161. After reviewing the order in toto, this court held that it was insufficient and gave the following examples of its insufficiency: The order does not state what the trial court found to be questions of law or fact common to the class. Nor does the order explain why or how the common issues would predominate over individual issues. Likewise, the order does not state why a class action in this case is the superior method for adjudicating the claims. Rather, in conclusory fashion, the order merely states that the common issues raised in the complaint predominate and that a class action is the superior method for addressing these issues. It does not address the argument made by Lenders that a class action is not superior because identifying the potential members of the class will require a closing-transaction-by closing-transaction analysis. Id. (emphasis added). Lenders relies on this highlighted language to support its argument that the current certification order is also insufficient. We do not agree. As stated in Lenders I , Rule 23 does not require the trial court to conduct a rigorous analysis; rather, the trial court must undertake enough of an analysis to enable us to conduct a meaningful review of the certification issue. Lenders misconstrues the foregoing language as a directive by this court for the trial court to answer specific questions posed by this court. It was not our intention to create a laundry list of things for the trial court to consider. Rather, we were simply emphasizing that the order, as a whole, [fell] short of the requirements of Rule 23. Id. In short, we view the foregoing language as merely setting examples of how the trial court's order could have been made sufficient. We now turn to Lenders's arguments regarding the elements of predominance and superiority.