Opinion ID: 1058076
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Allegedly Race-based Peremptory Challenges

Text: We first address Defendant's contention that his constitutional rights were violated by the prosecution's exercise of peremptory challenges to certain potential jurors. Defendant asserts in his appellate brief that the State struck eight jurors on the basis of their race in violation of his equal protection rights under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). The State responds that no violation occurred because the basis of each challenge was race-neutral. In Batson , the United States Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause [of the United States Constitution] forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race.... Id. at 89, 106 S.Ct. 1712. The Court crafted a three-pronged analysis for determining whether the suspect challenges were impermissibly based on the potential juror's race. At the outset, the defendant must establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination. [4] In doing so, the defendant may rely solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges at the defendant's trial. Id. at 96, 106 S.Ct. 1712. That is, the defendant need not prove a past pattern of racially discriminatory jury selection practices by the prosecution. Id. at 92-93, 106 S.Ct. 1712; cf. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 223, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965), overruled in part by Batson, 476 U.S. at 91-92, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (recognizing that an inference of purposeful discrimination may be raised on proof that the prosecution struck qualified blacks in case after case, whatever the circumstances, whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or the victim may be...). Once the defendant makes out a prima facie case, the State has the burden of producing a neutral explanation for its challenge. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. 1712. This explanation must be a clear and reasonably specific account of the prosecutor's legitimate reasons for exercising the challenge. Id. at 98 n. 20, 106 S.Ct. 1712. However, the race or gender neutral explanation need not be persuasive, or even plausible. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767-68, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995). `Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.' Id. at 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769 (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) (plurality opinion)). If a race-neutral explanation is provided, the trial court must then determine, from all of the circumstances, whether the defendant has established purposeful discrimination. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, 106 S.Ct. 1712. The trial court may not simply accept a proffered race-neutral reason at face value but must examine the prosecutor's challenges in context to ensure that the reason is not merely pretextual. See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005) ( Miller-El II ). In that case, the Court reiterated that the rule in Batson provides an opportunity to the prosecutor to give the reason for striking the juror, and it requires the judge to assess the plausibility of that reason in light of all evidence with a bearing on it. Id. at 2331. If the trial court determines that the proffered reason is merely pretextual and that a racial motive is in fact behind the challenge, the juror may not be excluded. Woodson v. Porter Brown Limestone Co., 916 S.W.2d 896, 903 (Tenn. 1996). As this Court has noted in the past, determination of the prosecutor's discriminatory intent or lack thereof turns largely on the evaluation of the prosecutor's credibility, of which the attorney's demeanor is often the best evidence. State v. Smith, 893 S.W.2d 908, 914 (Tenn. 1994). We accord a trial court's findings in this regard great deference and will not set them aside unless clearly erroneous. Woodson, 916 S.W.2d at 906; see also Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n. 21, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (Since the trial judge's findings in [this] context ... largely will turn on evaluation of credibility, a reviewing court ordinarily should give those findings great deference.). For this reason, [t]he trial judge must carefully articulate specific reasons for each finding on the record, i.e., whether a prima facie case has been established; whether a neutral explanation has been given; and whether the totality of the circumstances support a finding of purposeful discrimination. Woodson, 916 S.W.2d at 906. In this case, defense counsel objected at trial to the State's peremptory challenge of five potential jurors: Ms. Ida Ferguson, Mr. Everette Woods, Ms. Phyllis McKinnie, Ms. Willie Heard, and Ms. Helen Pruitt. The record indicates that all of these persons are African-American; Defendant is Caucasian. [5] Before this Court, Defendant alleges that the prosecution improperly excluded eight African-American venire persons, [6] adding Mr. Johnny Hudson, Ms. Gertrude Gibbs, and Ms. Linda Pirtle. Defendant's argument as to these additional three venire persons is waived because Defendant failed to object to the State's challenges to these three persons in a timely fashion. See State v. Peck, 719 S.W.2d 553, 555 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1986). This Court is not bound to grant relief to a party who fails to take whatever action was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error. Tenn. R.App. P. 36(a). In this case, Defendant had the opportunity at trial to object to each and every one of the State's peremptory challenges, thereby giving the trial court the opportunity to assess the constitutionality of the State's choices. Defendant did not do so with respect to Mr. Hudson, Ms. Gibbs, and Ms. Pirtle. Accordingly, he will not now be heard to complain about the State's challenges to these three venire persons. See State v. Johnson, 980 S.W.2d 414, 419 (Tenn.Crim.App.1998). We will, therefore, limit our examination of Defendant's race-based Batson claim to the five venire persons previously named.