Opinion ID: 1866240
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Did the trial court err in striking for cause a juror who was irrevocably committed to vote against the death penalty regardless of the facts and circumstances presented?

Text: On voir dire examination, a female juror stated that she had conscientious scruples against the infliction of the death penalty; and that she had strong feelings about sending somebody to jail or giving them the death penalty. She said: Q. I would assume that the lesser of the two would be to send someone to jail, so are you sure that you couldn't sentence someone to death? A. I am positive. Q. You are positive you couldn't return a verdict recommending the death penalty, is that correct? A. Yes, sir. The prospective juror qualified her feeling against the death penalty by saying that, if a person had killed several people she probably could vote for the death penalty. Also, she vacillated some when interrogated by the appellant's attorney. She responded further: Q. I see. So a murder in the process of a robbery you could not vote for the death penalty under any circumstances, is that correct? A. (Juror nodded)       Q. No question in your mind about that? You could not follow the law if the law was that you are to consider the death penalty and you decide on whether or not it's a bad enough case, and you couldn't even consider it if it was just one person killed? A. If someone killed someone else, like I said, out of fear because they had robbed a store, no. Q. I'm not asking you in self-defense or anything like that. Self-defense we wouldn't be here. He wouldn't have pled guilty. A. (Juror nodded negatively). Q. Your answer is still no, you could not consider it? A. (Juror nodded negatively). Q. Under any circumstances? A. (Juror nodded). The principle involved here was stated in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968). It has been followed many times, and recently in Edwards v. State, 413 So.2d 1007 (Miss. 1982), where the Court said: First argument made relates to the exclusion of juror Hibler on the ground of conscientious scruples against the death penalty. Juror Hibler was asked by the circuit judge if she could follow the testimony and instructions of the court although the verdict could result in the death penalty; juror Hibler said, I couldn't. Upon this state of juror Hibler's voir dire examination, she was excused and the defendant urges reversible error under Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968). Having categorically stated that she couldn't follow the testimony and instructions of the court, we think that the juror was correctly excluded. The fact that upon questioning by defense counsel, Hibler stated she would try to be a fair juror did not qualify her in this case. Similar argument was made in Edwards v. State, supra, n. 1, but there the sentence was life imprisonment whereas here the sentence is death. Thus, the two cases are not precisely analogous. For an excellent explanation of the proper method of bringing the death penalty to the attention of the special venire in capital cases, see Armstrong v. State, 214 So.2d 589 (Miss. 1968). [413 So.2d at 1009]. See also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1969); Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478, 89 S.Ct. 1138, 22 L.Ed.2d 433 (1969); Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262, 90 S.Ct. 1578, 26 L.Ed.2d 221 (1970). In Irving v. State, 361 So.2d 1360 (Miss. 1978), we said: Following Witherspoon, this Court considered the procedure to be employed by trial judges in Myers v. State, 254 So.2d 891 (Miss. 1971). That procedure follows: `The proper method of bringing the death penalty to the attention of the special veniremen is for the trial judge to inform them that they have been summoned as veniremen in a capital case and that a verdict of guilty could result in the infliction of the death penalty. The judge should then ask them if any member of the panel has any conscientious scruples against the infliction of the death penalty, when the law authorizes it, in proper cases, and where the testimony warrants it. If there are those who say that they are opposed to the death penalty, the trial judge should then go further and ask those veniremen, who have answered in the affirmative, whether or not they could, nevertheless, follow the testimony and the instructions of the court and return a verdict of guilty although that verdict could result in the death penalty, if they, being the judges of the weight and worth of the evidence, were convinced of the guilt of the defendant and the circumstances warranted such a verdict. Those who say that they could follow the evidence and the instructions of the court should be retained, and those who cannot follow the instructions of the court should be released. The mere fact that a venireman is opposed to the death penalty does not disqualify him as a juryman, if he can do his duty as a citizen and juror and follow the instructions of the court, and where he is convinced of the defendant's guilt he can convict him although the verdict of the jury may result in the death penalty's being inflicted upon the defendant.' (Emphasis added). Armstrong v. State, Miss., 214 So.2d 589, at 593. 254 So.2d at 893-894. [361 So.2d at 1360]. We are of the opinion that there is no merit in the first assignment.