Opinion ID: 314135
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The EPA response to the Remand

Text: In this case, EPA made no written submission as to the additional comments made by petitioners. Our remand was ordered, as to Northwestern, on October 31, 1972. All that EPA did was to comply with the mandate that the analysis of Mr. Striker be added to the certified record. It may be that EPA considers Mr. Striker's analysis invalid  but we have no way of knowing this. As the record stands, all we have is Mr. Striker's repudiation of the test data, without response. The purpose of our prior remand cannot be realized unless we hear EPA's response to his comments, and the record must be remanded again, for that purpose. We are not establishing any broad principle that EPA must respond to every comment made by manufacturers on the validity of its standards or the methodology and scientific basis for their formulation. In the case of the Striker presentation, however, our prior remand reflects this court's view of the significance, or at least potential significance, of this presentation. If this were a private lawsuit, we might reverse the order under appeal for failure of its proponent to meet the burden of refutation or explanation. Since this is a matter involving the public interest, in which the court and agency are in a kind of partnership relationship for the purpose of effectuating the legislative mandate, we remand. This agency, particularly when its decisions can literally mean survival of persons or property, has a continuing duty to take a hard look at the problems involved in its regulatory task, and that includes an obligation to comment on matters identified as potentially significant by the court order remanding for further presentation. Manufacturers' comments must be significant enough to step over a threshold requirement of materiality before any lack of agency response or consideration becomes of concern. The comment cannot merely state that a particular mistake was made in a sampling operation; it must show why the mistake was of possible significance in the results of the test. This was certainly done by Mr. Striker, who on the basis of some extensive mathematical calculations stated: It is my personal opinion that the particulate matter emissions of .202 pounds in test 1 per ton of kiln feed reported in the summary sheet on Page vii and again on Page 6 of Exhibit 4-A is grossly erroneous, and that the correct emission of particulate matter is in the neighborhood of .404 pounds per ton of kiln feed. In order that rule-making proceedings to determine standards be conducted in orderly fashion, information should generally be disclosed as to the basis of a proposed rule at the time of issuance. If this is not feasible, as in case of statutory time constraints, information that is material to the subject at hand should be disclosed as it becomes available, and comments received, even though subsequent to issuance of the rule  with court authorization, where necessary. This is not a requirement that the rule be suspended, though the court may consider an application for stay based on probability of success and furtherance of the public interest. Virginia Petroleum Jobbers v. F.P.C., 104 U.S.App.D.C. 106, 259 F.2d 921 (1958). Conversely, challenges to standards must be limited to points made by petitioners in agency proceedings. To entertain comments made for the first time before this court would be destructive of a meaningful administrative process. There are claims made in this court which were not presented to EPA. For example, petitioner Portland Cement Association states in its brief, [68] in regard to the first set of tests at the Dragon Cement Plant: Mistakes and conditions occurred which prevented the test from using observed, measured values. Encrusted solids were thought to cause a high reading in Run 1 so lower readings from other tests were substituted. The area of a duct was calculated rather than measured due to the presence of deposits. And liquid from Run 3 was erroneously poured into a beaker from Run 2. From the reference supplied in petitioner's brief, we discern that this criticism of testing procedure was based upon data released on the testing after the 45 day period of comment had passed, and so there was no opportunity at that time to bring this sampling error to the attention of the agency. However, our October 1972 remand gave EPA an opportunity, in its updating and ongoing reexamination, to make a specific comment on petitioner's objection to the Dragon plant test. Instead, only the comment of Mr. Striker was presented. Ordinarily, we would not consider comments not presented to EPA. But here there was belated disclosure by EPA of back-up testing, and remand will be necessary concerning the Striker criticism. Accordingly, we will provide that EPA should, on remand, consider the contentions presented in briefs to this court, though not previously raised, unless EPA explains why they are not material. It will be for EPA, on the remand, to examine the relevancy and import of petitioners' criticisms of the Administrator's methodology.