Opinion ID: 2624530
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: CRE 401 and 403

Text: Although Greenlee's statements are not hearsay, they must also satisfy other standards of admissibility, including relevancy. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Hood, 802 P.2d 458, 467 (Colo.1990). To be admissible, evidence must be relevant under CRE 401 and not unfairly prejudicial under CRE 403. Evidence is relevant where it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. CRE 401. Relevant evidence need not prove conclusively the proposition for which it is offered, ... but it must in some degree advance the inquiry. 2 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Federal Evidence, § 401.04[2][b] (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed.2008). It is within the province of the trial court to determine if evidence is relevant, and that decision will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. People v. Ibarra, 849 P.2d 33, 38 (Colo.1993). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. Id. Greenlee's state of mind was the sole issue at trial. Accordingly, whether he knowingly shot the victim was a fact of consequence to determination of the action. Greenlee's statement two months prior that he planned to shoot a woman and hide her body in a remote location has a tendency to make it more probable that he knowingly shot the victim. Though Greenlee's words are not direct evidence of his state of mind, his statements are circumstantial evidence that he formed the necessary mental state to commit the charged offense. See People v. Quintana, 882 P.2d 1366, 1374 (Colo.1994) (holding that defendant's statements that he would kill other people, not involved in the offense at issue, were probative of his ability to form the intent to commit first-degree murder); see also United States v. Tecumseh, 630 F.2d 749, 752 (10th Cir.1980) (upholding the admission of defendant's statements that he was a murderer and could kill the victim with a gun because the statements were probative and relevant to prove premeditation and malice aforethought). A jury could reasonably infer that, because Greenlee recently thought about shooting and killing a woman under remarkably similar circumstances to the actual events, [4] he formed that mental state before the victim was shot and then fulfilled the plan by hiding her body. This is especially true when the plan evidence is coupled with Greenlee's statements in a letter written several months after the shooting. Greenlee wrote to a friend, expressing his enjoyment of the book A Simple Plan [5] because he loved when the murder plan came together. In doing so, Greenlee stated, [W]hich is, of course, how I got in this mess anyway. That Greenlee talked about his plan before the shooting and then later hinted that a murder plan is what got him in trouble makes it more likely that he knowingly shot the victim. Accordingly, Greenlee's statements two months before the shooting are relevant under CRE 401 to prove his mental state. Relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.... CRE 403. Colorado Rule of Evidence 403 strongly favors the admission of relevant evidence, so the evidence should be given its maximum probative value and minimum prejudicial effect. Quintana, 882 P.2d at 1375. Evidence is unfairly prejudicial where it introduces into the trial considerations extraneous to the merits, such as bias, sympathy, anger, or shock. People v. Dist. Court, 869 P.2d 1281, 1286 (Colo. 1994). Greenlee argues the evidence is not reliable, and therefore it is unfairly prejudicial. Greenlee points to the testimony of two witnesses, suggesting that their conflicting recollections about Greenlee's statements cause the evidence to be inadmissible. [6] However, the reliability of lay witness testimony goes to the weight given to the evidence by the fact-finder, not to its admissibility. In re the Interest of J.E.B., 854 P.2d 1372, 1376 (Colo.App.1993); see also Gordon v. Benson, 925 P.2d 775, 778 (Colo.1996) (explaining that a jury can believe all, part, or none of a witness's testimony, regardless of contradictory evidence); People v. Barker, 189 Colo. 148, 149, 538 P.2d 109, 110 (1975) ([T]he jury is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses.). Greenlee also contends that the time between the statements and the shooting is sufficient to make the statements inadmissible. Contrary to this argument, remoteness in time generally impacts the weight, not the admissibility, of relevant evidence. Fletcher v. People, 179 P.3d 969, 974 (Colo.2007); People v. Trefethen, 751 P.2d 657, 659 (Colo.App. 1987). Moreover, remoteness in time is less significant under the facts in this case because the relevance of Greenlee's statements is not dependant on the timing of the statements. Cf. Fletcher, 179 P.3d at 975 (explaining that a sexual assault victim's prior sexual activity (or lack thereof) is relevant to show the cause of an injury, but is admissible only if it occurred within the time it takes such an injury to heal). The short period of nine weeks between Greenlee's statements and the shooting is not sufficient to lessen the probative value of his statements, so we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence. See id. at 974 (The question of whether evidence is too remote is within the trial court's discretion....). In sum, we find no colorable argument that the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. Thus, Greenlee's statements are admissible under CRE 401 and 403.