Opinion ID: 2779092
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Separation ofPowers

Text: The doctrine of separation of powers 'preserves the constitutional division between the three branches of government' and ensures that the activities of one branch do not 'threaten or invade the prerogatives of another.' In re Estate of Hambleton, 181 Wn.2d 802,817,335 P.3d 398 (2014) (quoting State v. Elmore, 154 Wn. App. 885, 905, 228 P.3d 760 (2010)); Zylstra v. Piva, 85 Wn.2d 743, 750, 539 P.2d 823 (1975). The legislature violates separation of powers when it applies the law to an existing set of facts, affect[ s] the rights of parties to the court's judgment, .. . interfere[s] with any judicial function, or adjudicates facts. Lummi Indian Nation, 170 Wn.2d at 263. The legislature is occasionally disappointed with our interpretation of a statute, and it may amend statutes within its sphere of authority and may sometimes apply the amended statute retroactively; however, the legislature may not retroactively reverse decisions of this court or interfere with any judicial functions. Hale v. Wellpinit Sch. Dist. No. 49, 165 Wn.2d 494, 509-10, 198 P.3d 1021 (2009). [W]hen the legislature passes a statute premised on finding an adjudicative fact or if 11 Cornelius v. Dep 't of Ecology No. 88317-3 it interferes with someone's previously litigated vested rights, it may violate separation of powers. Lummi Indian Nation, 170 Wn.2d at 264-65. Cornelius first claims that by adjudicating facts, the PCHB interpreted the MWL in the manner we stated in Lummi Indian Nation would violate the separation of powers doctrine. In that case, we were careful not to prejudge whether water rights holders could bring a successful as-applied challenge if their previously adjudicated water rights were sufficiently affected by the MWL. See id. at 265. But Cornelius's as-applied challenge is a thinly veiled facial challenge, and it fails. Cornelius argues that when the PCHB applied the MWL in this case, it changed the past status of WSU' s water rights-rights that had already been relinquished by operation of law though not yet memorialized by Ecology or in a court opinion. He claims that because WSU' s two certificates were not issued specifically for municipal water supply purposes, WSU's failure to use the water for more than five years prior to 2003 relinquished WSU's water rights. Appellants' Opening Br. at 2224. And because, he contends, WSU' s rights were relinquished through nonuse, the PCHB ran afoul of the separation of powers doctrine by applying the MWL and chang[ing] that legal conclusion. Id. at 19-20. We disagree. Retroactive application of a statute does not necessarily violate separation of powers-there must be some interference either with vested rights or with the prerogatives of another branch of government. Hale, 165 Wn.2d at 507-1 0; 12 Cornelius v. Dep 't of Ecology No. 88317-3 Lummi Indian Nation, 170 Wn.2d 262. In Lummi Indian Nation, we already held that retroactively applying the MWL does not violate the constitution-including RCW 90.03.560, the amendment that allows for water rights to be relabeled using the new definition ofmunicipal water supply purposes. 170 Wn.2d at 260-63, 272. We found that allowing this statute to apply retroactively is a legislative policy decisionconfirming existing rights-not a factual adjudication. Id. at 264-65. Although we stated that retroactive application of this statute could unconstitutionally disturb previously litigated adjudicative facts, we must be faced with previously litigated adjudicative facts in order to find an as-applied constitutional violation. Here, there are no previously litigated adjudicative facts regarding WSU's past water rights. Accordingly, there is no way that the PCHB violated the separation of powers doctrine by applying the MWL to WSU' s certificates-there were no adjudicative facts the PCHB could have upset. I d. at 265. The PCHB merely applied the MWL definition to WSU in the current adjudication. That is the precise general application of the MWL we found constitutional in Lummi Indian Nation. I d. at 260-63, 272. Cornelius would have us overrule Lummi Indian Nation in all but name. Cornelius would have us rule that the purpose of use stated on water right certificates must control-that only certificates stating a municipal purpose can be treated as municipal. That holding would invalidate RCW 90.03.560 on its face and overrule 13 Cornelius v. Dep 't of Ecology No. 88317-3 Lummi Indian Nation, where we held that the new definition of municipal water supply purposes applies retroactively, even to rights that were not originally labeled municipal. Id. at 268-69. RCW 90.03.560 demonstrates that the legislature foresaw that too much weight might be placed on the characterizations of water rights holders and water rights use on certificates issued before municipal was defined. The legislature created a mechanism to fix this problem. The statute states in relevant part: When requested by a municipal water supplier or when processing a change or amendment to the right, the department shall amend the water right documents and related records to ensure that water rights that are for municipal water supply purposes, as defined in RCW 90.03.015, are correctly identified as being for municipal water supply purposes. This section authorizes a water right or portion of a water right held or acquired by a municipal water supplier that is for municipal water supply purposes as defined in RCW 90. 03.015 to be identified as being a water right for municipal water supply purposes. RCW 90.03.560 (emphasis added). Thus, the legislature recognized that some water rights had been issued for municipal purposes under nonmunicipallabels and provided a simple mechanism to fix that problem. And as we held in Lummi Indian Nation, allowing this statute to apply retroactively is a legislative policy decisionconfirming existing rights-not a factual adjudication. 170 Wn.2d at 264-65. This case exemplifies the labeling problem the legislature sought to resolve in passing RCW 90.03.560. When the relevant certificates were issued in 1962 and 1963, Ecology did not have a reason to be precise about distinguishing municipal 14 Cornelius v. Dep 't of Ecology No. 88317-3 and domestic uses because municipal water supply purposes was undefined and the legislature did not give municipal suppliers an exemption from relinquishment until 1967. See id. at 255-56; LAWS OF 1967, ch. 233, § 14 (currently codified as RCW 90.14.140). Thus, Ecology could have issued domestic supply certificates to entities that were functionally municipal and vice versa. That is clearly the case here. WSU is a major public university that provides on-campus housing for thousands of residents. The relevant certificates give WSU the right to pump over 971 million gallons of water per year to service its large population, and Ecology's report prepared in 1962 in response to WSU' s permit application for Certificate No. 5070-A specifically states that the recommended quantity is based on the anticipated amount required for 15,000 students. Ex. A-11, at 2. Moreover, it is undisputed that WSU's water system far exceeds the necessary number of residential service connections to qualify as a municipal water supplier under the current definition ofmunicipal water supply purposes. It makes no sense to say that in 1962 and 1963, Ecology issued WSU the right to pump over 971 million gallons of water per year but never intended WSU to use that water for municipal purposes. We refuse to elevate form over substance and overrule Lummi Indian Nation. The PCHB correctly confirmed WSU's existing water rights by applying RCW 90.03.560. Under that statute, WSU is deemed to have always been a municipal 15 Cornelius v. Dep 't of Ecology No. 88317-3 supplier, and that determination does not violate separation of powers because it upsets no adjudicative facts.