Opinion ID: 4562743
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Culpability of Individual Defendants

Text: We began with these Defendants as a group, but “[e]ach defendant’s liability must be assessed individually based on his own actions.” Binay v. Bettendorf, 601 F.3d 640, 650 (6th Cir. 2010). At issue is whether Hart has plausibly alleged unconstitutional conduct by each of the City and County Defendants. We have developed frameworks to analyze policework conducted, as in this case, in teams. Officers may stop (and arrest) individuals only if certain preconditions are met: “(1) the officer taking the action must act in objective reliance on the information received; (2) the officer providing the information must have facts supporting the level of suspicion required; and (3) the stop must be no more intrusive than would have been permissible for the officer requesting it.” United States v. Lyons, 687 F.3d 754, 767 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. Williams, 627 F.3d 247, 252–53 (7th Cir. 2010)). At this stage of the litigation, much of the necessary information is lacking. According to the complaint, Parker (County), Rathbun, and Holtz (both City) bear responsibility because they conducted the two arrests. All three argue that they relied on the MSP—but, as noted, they acted without affirmative instruction from the MSP, and their unexplained reliance on the MSP’s database must at this stage be considered reckless. Rathbun and Holtz add that they also relied on Parker’s assertion that Hart “had failed to verify his address.”6 But the Act instructs officers to pursue arrests only “if the legal requirements for obtaining a warrant are satisfied.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 28.728a. Parker’s statement that Hart had not verified his address does not itself satisfy those legal requirements; nothing in the complaint hints that Hart was unaffected by the 2011 amendments or that he was not homeless. At this stage, we may not assume that Rathbun and Holtz were excused from responsibility for verifying these critical facts. (6th Cir. 2012)). At the motion to dismiss stage, we do not know enough about the officers’ knowledge at the time of Hart’s arrest to determine, as a matter of law, whether the officers were reckless in relying solely on the database. 6Holtz also argues that he was not involved in Hart’s arrest. We do not consider his assertion at this stage of the proceedings, as it contradicts the complaint. Nos. 18-1305/1307 Hart v. Hillsdale Cty., Mich., et al. Page 15 This leads us to County Defendants Wahtola and Leva, the two named “registration officials” under SORA. That title implies a thorough grounding in SORA. It is plausible that once Wahtola or Leva enters someone into the system, other officers reasonably assume that the necessary background work has been completed. It is also plausible that Wahtola or Leva, as registration officials, categorized Hart’s conviction as “Adult,” introducing the error upon which other officers relied. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 28.727 (explaining the process by which local registration authorities collect information and forward it to the MSP). Though Wahtola and Leva are the most removed from the arrests, their position may indicate that they are the ones who should have “ha[d] facts supporting the level of suspicion required.” Lyons, 687 F.3d at 767. Attempting to pull apart the web of reliance at the motion to dismiss stage is impossible. The district court tried to winnow the pool of responsible defendants early in the proceedings but ended up reversing its dismissal of the State Defendants because the City and County Defendants argued that the responsibility lay with them. Winnowing the defendants is not possible until an evidentiary record is developed.