Opinion ID: 2585937
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Alaska Sales and Service's Cross-Appeal

Text: On cross-appeal, Alaska Sales and Service argues that the superior court erred by failing to remand four issues to the arbitrator: (1) attorney's fees and costs for the proceedings before the superior court; (2) the postjudgment interest rate; (3) the method of tender of the rescission deed; and (4) the proper form of the rescission deed. Although an arbitrator may retain jurisdiction, such jurisdiction is generally limited to [q]uestions over the application of a remedy, [53] the resolution of which is necessary to ensure compliance with the award. [54] A superior court need not remand issues that have already been resolved unambiguously, or that are only tangentially related to the award. [55] For this reason, whether the superior court erred by failing to remand these issues depends on whether remand was necessary to ensure that the award be carried out properly.

Alaska Sales and Service first claims that the award of attorney's fees and costs during the confirmation process should have been decided by the arbitrator, noting that the arbitration provision in the contract gives the arbitrator authority to assess the costs of arbitration, including legal/accountant's fees and costs against the non-prevailing party. The arbitrator exercised his power to assess the costs for arbitration under this provision in a detailed, and unambiguous, section of the summary of all awards. But the award of fees and costs made by the superior court did not involve the costs of arbitration and did not implicate any ambiguous portion of the arbitrator's award. Because it was an award for costs incurred only in proceedings before the superior court, after the arbitrator had already issued his opinion, it fell entirely outside the scope of the arbitrator's award. This is explicitly recognized by AS 09.43.140, which provides that [c]osts of the application [to confirm or modify an arbitration award] and of the proceedings subsequent to the application, and disbursements may be awarded by the court.
Alaska Sales and Service further claims that the superior court erred by failing to grant it full attorney's fees and costs when the arbitration clause required the full cost of arbitration to be paid by the non-prevailing party. [56] As noted above, the proceedings in the superior court were separate from the arbitration proceedings. This court held in Marathon Oil Co. v. ARCO Alaska, Inc . that where the language of the attorney's fee clause suggests that the parties were referring only to the arbitration itself when they agreed to each bear their own costs, [57] the clause does not apply to post-arbitration proceedings. The same conclusion applies to this case, for the applicable clause in the arbitration agreement states that the arbitrator shall assess the costs of arbitration, including legal/accountant's fees and costs against the non-prevailing party. The parties argue extensively about whether the superior court should have followed Alaska Civil Rule 82 in awarding fees, but AS 09.43.140 gives the superior court broad discretion to award, or decline to award, fees in confirmation proceedings. Granting post-arbitration attorney's fees in accordance with Civil Rule 82 was appropriate, [58] and for this reason, we affirm the award of attorney's fees.
Alaska Sales and Service next argues that the superior court erred in following the arbitrator's decision to award postjudgment interest at 3.75% per annum because [t]he arbiter did not establish a post[]judgment interest rate or indicate whether the post-award rate should apply if the award was reduced to judgment. But, as Kinn and Singletary correctly note, the arbitrator's award of 3.75% interest until all amounts were paid effectively established this as the postjudgment interest rate. The superior court's award of 3.75% postjudgment interestrelative to the arbitrator's judgment, not its own [59] was therefore nothing more than a confirmation of this portion of the arbitrator's decision. Because Alaska Sales and Service has not established that there was any ambiguity in the arbitrator's decision, or that remand is necessary to properly enforce the award, we hold that the superior court did not err in adhering to the arbitrator's postjudgment interest rate.
Alaska Sales and Service alleges that the portion of the arbitrator's award specifying how the deed of rescission is to be tendered was ambiguous, and that the superior court erred by choosing a particular method of tender. The superior court's revised final judgment states that once [d]efendants, or any individual or combination of [d]efendants, have partially satisfied this judgment by paying [the purchase price minus accrued rents], Alaska Sales shall execute a warranty deed conveying title to the defendant or defendants who paid this judgment for the two parcels of real property. The relevant portion of Davis's decision stated that [t]he property must be deeded back to [Kinn and Singletary] by warranty deed, and ordered Kinn and Singletary to repay the plaintiffs the purchase price of the property. [60] In the summary of all awards, the arbitrator commented in a footnote that, until there is a closing for the return of the property, and the amounts awarded to [Alaska Sales and Service] are paid, interest will continue to accrue at the rates I awarded. [61] Alaska Sales and Service claims that this is ambiguous because it does not indicate whether the entire award must be paid at the time of the closing, or just the purchase price of the property. But this footnote actually draws a distinction between the closing and the payment of interest on remaining unpaid sums. For this reason, the language of the arbitration award was not ambiguous, and remand is not necessary for the proper enforcement of the award. [62] Since the superior court's order does not differ materially from the arbitrator's order with regard to the method of tender, we affirm the judgment of the superior court on this issue.
Finally, Alaska Sales and Service claims that the definition of the term property that the arbitrator directed the parties to use in the rescission deed is ambiguous and should be remanded to the arbitrator. Specifically, the definition of property used in the original property contract, and used by the superior court, includes all of the improvements, structures, fixtures, facilities, installations and equipment in, on[,] over or under the [l]and. Although Alaska Sales and Service claims that this creates tension with the arbitrator's award, the arbitrator's discussion of this issue is perfectly consistent with both the contract and the superior court's revised final judgment: VMI requests that the definition of the property to be returned to it in rescission include the fixtures. Property, as that word is used in Paragraph 45 of the award[,] is defined as it is in the Contract for Sale of Real Property. However, personalty attached to the property sold separately by Mr. Kinn, Mr. Singletary or VMI to [Alaska Sales and Service] from the sale of the real estate would not, of course, be part of the rescission; unless the consideration paid by [Alaska Sales and Service] for these items was returned as well. The arbitrator simply held that a particular category of personal propertyitems unrelated to the underlying real property [63] that had been treated separately in the first transactionwould be treated the same way in the rescission deed. The enforcement of this portion of the award does not require a remand to the arbitrator, as no ambiguity is evident on the face of the statement, and the superior court's use of the original contract language does not conflict with the arbitrator's legal conclusion regarding the appropriate award. For this reason, we affirm this portion of the superior court's decision.