Opinion ID: 186796
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Threshold Issues Regarding Jurisdiction and the Scope of Review

Text: 13 Before undertaking our review of appellant's challenge to the summary judgments in favor of appellees, we must first consider two threshold issues. First, the District of Columbia and Sergeant Murray argue that this court lacks jurisdiction to consider the District Court's May 26, 2005 judgment in their favor, because, in his notice of appeal, appellant challenged only the judgment in favor of the United States. Second, the United States argues that, because appellant never provided the District Court with a statement of genuine issues in support of his opposition to summary judgment as required by Local Civil Rule 7(h), the facts as presented by appellees stand uncontroverted. For the reasons noted below, we reject each of these claims in turn. 14
15 Murray seeks dismissal of the appeal against him on jurisdictional grounds, claiming that appellant failed to file timely notice of appeal. See FED. R.APP. P.3. In particular, he contends that appellant filed two notices of appeal, neither of which purported to appeal the District Court's May 26, 2005 grant of summary judgment in his favor. Therefore, according to Murray, this court lacks jurisdiction, because appellant failed to designate the judgment, order, or part thereof being appealed. FED. R. APP. P. 3(c)(1)(B). 16 Appellant, acting pro se, filed two documents titled Notice of Appeal, one apparently self-created and the other using a court template. Joint Appendix (J.A.) 113-15. The second notice refers to the date of the order of summary judgment in favor of the United States, but by its language appeals from an order in favor of [the] United States of America and the District of Columbia. J.A. 115. This was clearly adequate to satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3. 17 In Martinez v. Bureau of Prisons, 444 F.3d 620 (D.C.Cir.2006), we recognized jurisdiction where we could reasonably discern that a would-be appellant wished to appeal multiple orders although his notice of appeal referred only to a single order. The court, cognizant of the fact that appellant was proceeding pro se,  held that his intention to appeal from both rulings of the district court [could] be fairly inferred from his notice of appeal and no appellee [was] prejudiced. Id. at 623. The same is true here. On appeal, Sergeant Murray is represented by the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, who has presented [his] arguments and shown no evidence that [he] would be prejudiced if appellant's challenges to the [May 26, 2005] order were addressed by this court. Id. 18 On the record here, we can easily infer appellant's intent to appeal both orders of the District Court with respect to both current appellees, so Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c)(1)(B) does not bar his appeal. See also 16A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3949.4 (3d ed. 1999) (Defects in the wording of the notice of appeal are generally overlooked if the true intentions of the appellant can fairly be ascertained, if the courts have not been misled, and if the other parties have suffered no prejudice.). 19
20 The United States argues that Appellant neither provided a statement of genuine issues in support of his opposition to summary judgment as required by Local Civil Rule 7(h), nor urged a different standard. Accordingly, given Appellant's omission, the District Court was not presented with any factual issues properly in dispute. And, because Appellant failed to argue that a different standard should be applied, he waived this new argument on appeal. Br. for Appellee United States at 13 (internal citation omitted). This is a specious argument. The United States readily concedes that the District Court did not treat Appellee United States' statement of material facts not in dispute as conceded, [but] instead, reviewed Appellant's claims on the merits in light of the evidence presented by the parties. Id. at 17. This concession says it all. 21 Rule 7(h) permits, but does not require, the District Court to assume that facts identified by the moving party in its statement of material facts are admitted, unless such a fact is controverted in the statement of genuine issues filed in opposition to the motion. LCVR 7(h). Appellant filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, but the filing did not conform to the standards of the rule. The District Court, however, did not limit its consideration to, or treat as admitted, the facts contained in appellees' statement of material facts. In assessing appellees' motions for summary judgment, the District Court acted within its discretion in reviewing the entire record. 22 This circuit has long upheld strict compliance with the district court's local rules on summary judgment when invoked by the district court. Burke v. Gould, 286 F.3d 513, 517 (D.C.Cir.2002); see also Jackson v. Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, 101 F.3d 145, 150-51 (D.C.Cir.1996) (discussing Rule 7(h)'s predecessor rule). But when, as here, the local rule does not require the district court to enter judgment because of the nonmoving party's default in complying with the local rule, Burke, 286 F.3d at 518, we review the grant of summary judgment in light of [the] requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, id. at 519-20. We therefore reject the claim by the United States that the facts as presented by appellees stand uncontroverted. 23 C. Because There Is a Genuine Dispute As to a Material Fact, Appellees Are Not Entitled to Summary Judgment 24 We review de novo the District Court's grant of summary judgment to appellees, viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to appellant. To survive a motion for summary judgment, the party bearing the burden of proof at trial — in this case, appellant — must provide evidence showing that there is a triable issue as to an element essential to that party's claim. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The principal legal issue in this case is whether the officers who inflicted severe bodily harm on appellant violated his rights by using more force than was reasonably necessary. The question that we face is whether appellant has provided sufficient evidence to show that there is a genuine issue of material fact with respect to this legal claim. 25 The parties agree that appellant's FTCA assault and battery claim is governed by District of Columbia law. They also agree that the controlling legal standard governing a claim against police officers for assault and battery is set forth in Etheredge v. District of Columbia, 635 A.2d 908 (D.C. 1993): 26 A police officer has a qualified privilege to use reasonable force to effect an arrest, provided that the means employed are not in excess of those which the actor reasonably believes to be necessary. Moreover, any person, including an officer, is justified in using reasonable force to repel an actual assault, or if he reasonably believes he is in danger of bodily harm. Use of deadly force, however, is lawful only if the user actually and reasonably believes, at the time such force is used, that he or she (or a third person) is in imminent peril of death or serious bodily harm. 9