Opinion ID: 3037195
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Disparate-Treatment Claim

Text: Mr. Berry asserts a disparate-treatment claim under Title VII based on the Department’s refusal to allow him to use the Red Bluff Room for prayer meetings. In order to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment, Mr. Berry must show that “(1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for his position; (3) he experienced an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated individuals outside his protected class were treated more favorably, or other circum14 Although Mr. Berry questions the adequacy of the Department’s reasons for limiting his speech, he does not allege that they are pretexts for other concerns. 4900 BERRY v. DEP’T OF SOCIAL SERVICES stances surrounding the adverse employment action give rise to an inference of discrimination.” Peterson, 358 F.3d at 603. If Mr. Berry meets his burden of establishing a prima facie case, then under the McDonnell Douglas approach, the Department must offer a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for denying him use of the Red Bluff Room. Bodett, 366 F.3d at 744. Mr. Berry would then be entitled to show that the Department’s given reason is a pretext. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804. Mr. Berry’s disparate-treatment claim is not persuasive. First, the evidence does not support his contention that similarly situated employees were treated differently. The only evidence in the record concerning the use of the Red Bluff Room by a social organization of employees was that a group held a first meeting to organize a “Relay for Life” walk to raise money for cancer research. The Department, however, determined that this was a nonbusiness-related activity and prohibited the group from using the Red Bluff Room. This is exactly what happened to Mr. Berry. The Department determined that because Mr. Berry’s use was not business related, he could not use the Red Bluff Room. Second, even if we accept — as the district court did — that Mr. Berry has established the prima facie elements for his disparate treatment-claim as it relates to prayer meetings, the Department has presented a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for not allowing him to use the Red Bluff Room, and Mr. Berry has not shown that this reason was a pretext. The Department declined to allow Mr. Berry to use the Red Bluff Room for prayer meetings, and appears not to have allowed other employees to use the room for nonbusiness-related activities, because it does not want to convert the room from a nonpublic to a public forum. This is a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason. See May v. Evansville-Vanderburgh Sch. Corp., 787 F.2d 1105, 1111 (7th Cir. 1986) (affirming a ban on religious meetings by teachers on school property before school opened). BERRY v. DEP’T OF SOCIAL SERVICES 4901 [12] Thus, Mr. Berry’s effort to meet the fourth prong of a disparate-treatment claim rests solely on the Department allowing birthday parties and baby showers in the conference room. We do not think that permitting such business-related social functions supports either an inference that similarly situated individuals were treated more favorably or an inference of discrimination. As we have previously stated, we perceive a difference between business-related social functions and religious meetings. (See Part III.C, supra.) As long as the distinction is reasonable, it appears that is all that the Supreme Court requires. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 808 (“The Government’s decision to restrict access to a nonpublic forum need only be reasonable; it need not be the most reasonable or the only reasonable limitation.” (emphasis in original)). Furthermore, there is no suggestion that other employees (other than the Relay for Life group) have been granted use of the Red Bluff Room for a use similar to that sought by Mr. Berry. Finally, the Department makes a reasonable argument that opening up the Red Bluff Room to religious meetings by all employees who requested such a meeting would be an undue hardship. Indeed, in Forbes, the Supreme Court noted that “the prospect of cacophony” that might result from allowing all who sought to participate in a nonpublic forum might well force the closure of the forum. 523 U.S. at 681. The Red Bluff Room is not a public forum, and we do not read the applicable Supreme Court decisions as requiring that the Department choose either to allow Mr. Berry to hold prayer meetings or to discontinue allowing business-related social functions in the conference room.15 15 In her plurality opinion in Kokinda, Justice O’Connor observed: If anything, the Service’s generous accommodation of some types of speech testifies to its willingness to provide as broad a forum as possible, consistent with its postal mission. The dissent would create, in the name of the First Amendment, a disincentive for the Government to dedicate its property to any speech activities at all. 4902 BERRY v. DEP’T OF SOCIAL SERVICES [13] In sum, the record reflects that: (1) the Department declined to allow Mr. Berry to use the Red Bluff Room for prayer meetings for a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, to maintain the room as a nonpublic forum; (2) Mr. Berry has not shown that this reason was a pretext for some discriminatory reason; and (3) Mr. Berry has not shown that other employees who sought to use the conference room for similar purposes were allowed to do so.16 Accordingly, we agree with the district court that Mr. Berry’s claim of disparate treatment is not supported by the record.