Opinion ID: 1801755
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of evidence of defendant's prior rape

Text: Defendant claims the admission of evidence concerning his rape of Christa B. was unduly prejudicial under the standards set forth in People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903 [89 Cal.Rptr.2d 847, 986 P.2d 182] ( Falsetta ), and violated his rights to due process of law and a fair trial under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The People moved in limine to admit Christa B.'s testimony concerning defendant's rape of Christa, and documentary evidence concerning his conviction of that offense. This evidence was offered to prove motive, intent, a common design, and lack of consent by the victim (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b)) and to demonstrate defendant's propensity to commit sexual assaults (Evid. Code, § 1108), thereby establishing that he raped and murdered the victim. Defendant moved in limine to exclude evidence of the prior offense, arguing that the earlier incident and the charged conduct lacked sufficient similarity to establish identity or a common plan or scheme (Evid. Code, § 1101), and that the probative value of this evidence was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect (Evid. Code, § 352). Defendant also moved for a new trial, based in part upon the assertedly erroneous admission of evidence concerning his rape of Christa B. The trial court ruled the evidence was admissible under both sections 1101 and 1108 of the Evidence Code, and subsequently denied the motion for a new trial. [17] Defendant contends the trial court erred in two respects. First, he asserts the court failed to exercise its discretion, because it assertedly did not consider the factors relevant to an evaluation of whether the prejudicial effect of evidence of a prior sexual offense outweighs the probative value of such evidence. Second, he claims the trial court abused its discretion by concluding that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect. (2) With respect to his first contention, defendant faults the trial court for focusing upon the similarity of the prior and the charged offensesa relatively irrelevant factor, in his viewand for failing to discuss other factors identified in Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at page 917. [18] The similarity of the offenses, however, was central to the court's evaluation of whether the evidence tended to prove motive, intent, a common design, defendant's identity as the perpetrator, or the victim's lack of consent, under Evidence Code section 1101. ( People v. Kelly (2008) 42 Cal.4th 763, 782-784 [68 Cal.Rptr.3d 531, 171 P.3d 548] ( Kelly II ); People v. Balcom (1994) 7 Cal.4th 414, 423-424 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 666, 867 P.2d 777] ( Balcom ); People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 393-406 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 646, 867 P.2d 757] ( Ewoldt ).) In addition, the degree of similarity is relevant to the evaluation of whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect under Evidence Code section 1108. ( Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 917.) Finally, defendant's memorandum of points and authorities in opposition to the admission of the evidence focused principally upon the asserted absence of sufficient similarity. Thus, it is no surprise that the trial court's comments were directed to that issue. With respect to relevant factors not mentioned by the trial court, we note that a court need not expressly weigh prejudice against probative value or even expressly state that it has done so, if the record as a whole shows the court was aware of and performed its balancing function under Evidence Code section 352. ( People v. Taylor (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1155, 1169 [113 Cal.Rptr.2d 827, 34 P.3d 937].) The record reflects that the court performed its duty to balance the probative value of this evidence against its prejudicial effect. [19] Defendant's second contentionthat the trial court abused its discretion in concluding the probative value outweighed the prejudicial effectalso fails. Under the abuse of discretion standard, `a trial court's ruling will not be disturbed, and reversal of the judgment is not required, unless the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.' [Citation.] ( Hovarter, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1004; see also People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 862 [48 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 141 P.3d 135] ( Rogers ) [abuse of discretion standard applies to admission of evidence under Evid. Code, § 1101]; People v. Wesson (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 959, 969 [41 Cal.Rptr.3d 883] [abuse of discretion standard applies to admission of evidence under Evid. Code, § 1108].) (3) Defendant's challenge is narrow. He urges that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence under Evidence Code section 1108, because its probative value assertedly was outweighed by its prejudicial effect. [20] In a case in which a defendant is accused of a sexual offense, Evidence Code section 1108 authorizes the admission of evidence of a prior sexual offense to establish the defendant's propensity to commit a sexual offense, subject to exclusion under Evidence Code section 352. (Evid. Code, § 1108, subd. (a); Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 911.) We find nothing arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd in the trial court's ruling that evidence of defendant's prior offense was admissible to prove his propensity to commit the charged sexual offense. The probative value of the evidence was strong. First, the two sexual assaults shared many similarities. Defendant was acquainted with both victims before the assaults, and therefore may have chosen them because they would be more inclined to grant him access to their homes, where the assaults occurred. Both attacks occurred late in the evening after defendant socialized and ingested drugs with the victims, suggesting they were induced to let down their guard. Both victims were physically small in stature and therefore less able to resist a physical assault. The hands of both victims were pinned above their heads. Both victims were strangled. Defendant threatened to slice Christa B.'s throat, and Miller's throat was cut. Second, the prior offense occurred only four years earlier, and defendant had been incarcerated for much of the intervening time. Finally, the independent sources of the evidence, particularly the police detective's testimony that Christa contemporaneously reported the same details of the prior offense that were set forth in her testimony at defendant's trial, increased the probative value of the evidence. (See Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 917.) The risk of undue prejudice was minimal. Because defendant was convicted of the prior rape and sentenced to prison, the jury would not be tempted to convict [him] simply to punish him for the other offenses, and . . . the jury's attention would not be diverted by having to make a separate determination whether defendant committed the other offenses. [21] ( Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 917.) There also was little likelihood the jury would be distracted from its principal inquirywhether defendant raped and murdered Miller. Nor do we find it likely the jury would be confused by the different standards of proof pertaining to the issue of whether defendant committed the prior acts (preponderance of the evidence) and whether he committed the current offenses (beyond a reasonable doubt); all juries in criminal proceedings in which evidence of uncharged conduct is admitted under Evidence Code section 1108 are called upon to apply these two different standards. Contrary to defendant's contention, we perceive no reason why the required analysis would have been particularly confusing in this case because of the circumstance that the victim of the prior rape testified, whereas the charged rape was proved through circumstantial evidence. Although evidence of the prior offense would elicit a negative emotional response from the jurors in this case, it was less inflammatory than the charge that defendant raped, strangled, and cut the throat of Patricia Miller while her children slept upstairs. (See People v. Demetrulias (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 19 [45 Cal.Rptr.3d 407, 137 P.3d 229] [the court noted, in evaluating any undue prejudice from evidence admitted under Evid. Code, § 1101, that the prior offense involved a serious assault, but the charged offense was murder].) Finally, in any case in which evidence of other acts committed by a defendant is admitted, the defendant will face the decision whether to testify concerning the prior acts or to remain silent. Contrary to defendant's contention, this circumstance does not render such evidence unduly prejudicial. A defendant is faced with this choice whenever evidence is admitted that he or she personally could rebut. In the course of addressing the asserted undue prejudice, defendant contends it was improper to admit evidence establishing that he choked Christa B., because choking is not a sexual offense within the meaning of Evidence Code section 1108. It is irrelevant whether all of the evidence concerning defendant's assault upon Christa B. was admissible under Evidence Code section 1108, because defendant fails to establish that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence under Evidence Code section 1101. Similarly, he asserts it was improper to admit evidence of a prior sexual offense to prove that he committed the nonsexual offense of murder. Again, defendant fails to establish that the evidence of the sexual assault was not admissible under Evidence Code section 1101 to prove the commission of a murder. Moreover, this evidence was relevant to the offense of felony murder, with rape as the underlying offense. ( People v. Story (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1282, 1285 [91 Cal.Rptr.3d 709, 204 P.3d 306] [a murder committed during the course of a rape is a sexual offense within the meaning of Evid. Code, § 1108].) Finally, contrary to defendant's contention, it is irrelevant that the elements of the offense of rape are distinct from the elements of murder. The issue under Evidence Code section 1101 was whether the evidence tended to prove that defendant committed the crimes with which he was charged; it was not necessary that the evidence establish identical criminal offenses. In sum, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's conclusion that the probative value of this evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect in establishing defendant's propensity to commit the charged sexual offense. (Evid. Code, § 1108.) Because defendant has declined to engage in an analysis focused on whether the evidence of his prior crimes was admissible under Evidence Code section 1101 to prove a common scheme, a motive, or that defendant did not believe the sexual act was consensual, we have no occasion to address whether the evidence of his prior crimes was sufficiently similar to the charged offenses to authorize its admission for these purposes, or whether the prejudicial effect of this evidence outweighed each purpose for which it was offered. (See Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 402-407.) We decline defendant's invitation to reconsider our decision in Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th 903, and to hold that the admission of evidence under Evidence Code section 1108 to establish a defendant's propensity to commit a sexual offense violates his or her due process rights. Not only has defendant failed to convince us that section 352 is not an adequate safeguard against the admission of unduly prejudicial evidence, but he also has not established that the evidence admitted in the present case was not independently admissible under section 1101. ( Balcom, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 423-424; Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 393-406.) Finally, with respect to defendant's claims of constitutional error, we note that [t]he `routine application of state evidentiary law does not implicate [a] defendant's constitutional rights.' [Citation.] ( Hovarter, supra, 44 Cal.4th 983, 1010.)