Opinion ID: 1277356
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion for an Advisory Jury or, Alternatively, a Hearing Pursuant to Evidence Code Section 402

Text: Prior to the commencement of trial, defendant moved to impanel an advisory jury or, alternatively, to conduct a hearing pursuant to Evidence Code section 402 for the purpose of determining whether the penalty phase jury should consider evidence of unadjudicated criminal activity, most notably the evidence linking defendant to Shelah's murder. The trial court denied defendant's request, instead requiring the prosecution to make a foundational offer of proof. The prosecution made its offer to the satisfaction of the trial court. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion. His position is unpersuasive. The trial court was not required to engage either in the time-consuming process of impaneling an advisory jury, or conducting an evidentiary hearing that might have required witnesses to testify once at the hearing and again at the penalty phase. The trial court correctly determined that a juror at the penalty phase was entitled to consider other crimes evidence in aggravation that he or she found to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d 57, 97-98, 241 Cal.Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127.) Contrary to the implication inherent in defendant's contention, the jury need not have unanimously agreed that the prosecution met its burden of proof as to the other crimes evidence before a single juror could consider that evidence. (See People v. Stankewitz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 106, 270 Cal.Rptr. 817, 793 P.2d 23; People v. Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 99, 241 Cal.Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127.) Unanimity was mandated only with regard to the final determination as to penalty. ( People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 773-774, 239 Cal.Rptr. 82, 739 P.2d 1250.) The jury was so instructed.