Opinion ID: 584172
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Missouri Recreational Use Statute

Text: 10 The Missouri Recreational Use Statute generally immunizes a landowner from liability when an individual is injured while on the land for recreational purposes. See Mo.Ann.Stat. §§ 537.346 and 537.347 (Vernon 1988). 4 This landowner immunization does not apply, however, when (1) the government either acted maliciously or practiced gross negligence by failing to warn against a dangerous condition, or (2) the government merely negligently failed to warn or guard against an ultrahazardous condition. Under either alternative, the statute applies only if the government knew or should have known of the dangerous or ultrahazardous condition. 5 Noting that no Missouri case law has interpreted this legislation, the district court concluded that the government's operation of the dam was not malicious or grossly negligent and thus held that the Missouri Recreational Use Statute insulated the government from liability here. The district court did not discuss the statute's second exception relating to ultrahazardous conditions. 11 We first consider whether the government acted maliciously or practiced gross negligence by failing to warn or guard against the danger of releasing the dam waters. 6 Missouri's Recreational Use Statute has not been interpreted by the Missouri appellate courts. 7 Moreover, the statute does not define gross negligence or malicious, so we must look to other Missouri law to determine the meaning of these two terms.
12 As a general rule, the Missouri courts do not distinguish between negligence and gross negligence, as such, since they do not recognize degrees of negligence. Warner v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 428 S.W.2d 596, 603 (Mo.1968) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). While the courts have not recognized degrees of negligence in dealing with the common law, the [Missouri] General Assembly has not found itself so restricted.... Duncan v. Missouri Bd. for Architects, Professional Engineers & Land Surveyors, 744 S.W.2d 524, 532 n. 4 (Mo.Ct.App.1988) (identifying statutes that establish a gross negligence standard). Resultingly, the Missouri courts have been forced to articulate a definition of gross negligence. Even so, the Missouri courts have thus far expressly defined gross negligence only in the context of a professional licensing case. See id. at 533. In Duncan, gross negligence was defined in the licensing context as an act or course of conduct which demonstrates a conscious indifference to a professional duty. Id. This definition was not formulated by the court itself but rather was proposed by a professional licensing commission. The court nonetheless upheld the definition utilized by the commission. Id. Duncan's approval of the conscious indifference standard conforms with other Missouri case law which, while not establishing a definition of gross negligence, nonetheless equates gross negligence with a reckless disregard for proper conduct. See, e.g., O'Brien v. B.L.C. Ins. Co., 768 S.W.2d 64, 70, 75 (Mo.1989) (en banc). 13 While we are not dealing with a licensing situation here, we find Duncan instructive. As noted earlier, the Missouri attorney general's office had repeatedly notified the Corps of Engineers concerning the faults and potential dangers of the Table Rock Dam warning system. Despite this persistence, the Corps of Engineers took no corrective measures until after Robert Henderson's death. This neglect raises a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the government was guilty of gross negligence, or in the parlance of Duncan, whether the government demonstrated a conscious indifference regarding the safe release of waters through Table Rock Dam. Accord Umpleby v. United States, 806 F.2d 812, 816 (8th Cir.1986) (reversing summary judgment where there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the United States willfully or maliciously failed to warn of a dangerous condition in violation of North Dakota's Recreational Use Statute); see also Mandel v. United States, 719 F.2d 963, 967 (8th Cir.1983) (reversing summary judgment on the same grounds under the Arkansas Recreational Use Statute). Thus, summary judgment is not appropriate for Henderson's gross negligence claim. This ruling is particularly compelled when it is recalled that a case is not suitable for summary judgment where there are undisputed facts from which different ultimate inferences might reasonably be drawn and as to which reasonable persons might disagree. Mandel v. United States, 719 F.2d 963, 968 (citing United States v. Diebold, 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 994, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962)).
14 As noted earlier, the Missouri courts have not yet interpreted that state's Recreational Use Statute nor does the statute itself define malicious. The Supreme Court of Missouri, however, has provided a comprehensive review of malice under Missouri law. See Sanders v. Daniel Int'l Corp., 682 S.W.2d 803 (Mo.1984) (en banc). In reviewing an action for malicious prosecution, Sanders delineated three degrees of malice: malice in fact, malice in its legal sense, and malice in law. Id. at 807-08 (citations omitted). Malice in fact is founded in ill will, 'and is evidenced by an attempt to vex, injure, or annoy another.'  Id. at 807 (quoting Davis v. Hearst, 160 Cal. 143, 116 P. 530, 537 (1911)). According to Sanders, malice in its legal sense, or legal malice, has a broader meaning [than malice in fact and] ... embraces any improper or wrongful motive, and could include conduct which is so reckless or wantonly and willfully in disregard of one's rights that a trier of fact could infer from such conduct bad faith or malo animo. Id. at 807-08 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). Finally, malice in law merely requires a showing that a defendant committed a wrongful act without just cause or excuse. Id. at 808. 15 While helpfully defining these three degrees of malice, the Missouri courts offer little guidance as to which standard applies here. In Sanders, however, the Supreme Court of Missouri relied upon the legal terms wanton and willful to define malice in its legal sense. Id. at 808. Because other states deploy terms in their recreational use statutes similar to those used by Sanders to define legal malice--see, e.g., Neb.Rev.Stat. § 37-1005 (1988) (willful or malicious); N.D.Cent.Code § 53-08-05 (1989) (willful or malicious); and S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 20-9-16 (1991) (willful or wanton)--we believe that were the issue before the Supreme Court of Missouri, it would equate malicious in Missouri's Recreational Use Statute with malice in its legal sense. While the threshold for establishing legal malice is not as extreme as malice in fact, to satisfy it, there still must be  'a general wickedness or intent on the part of a person; a depraved inclination to do harm, or to disregard the rights or safety of mankind generally.'  Sanders, 682 S.W.2d at 808 (quoting N. Newell, Newell on Malicious Prosecution 239 (1892)). 16 Henderson has offered no evidence indicating that the government neglected to improve the dam warning system in the hope that someone would suffer because of the system's inadequacies. Without such evidence, no genuine issue of material fact infers that the government intended to harm Robert Henderson or others. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's ruling that there are certainly no facts to indicate that [the government] was malicious.
17 The government can also violate Missouri's Recreational Use Statute if it negligently failed to warn of an ultrahazardous activity. See Mo.Ann.Stat. § 537.348(1) (Vernon 1988). To ascertain whether Henderson has an action under this provision of the Recreational Use Statute, we must determine whether the operation of the dam could qualify as an ultrahazardous condition. No Missouri case law has examined whether the operation of a dam is an ultrahazardous activity. Both parties therefore urge us to apply section 520 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts for determining whether the release of water through the dam was an ultrahazardous activity. We accept this invitation. Section 520 provides: 18 § 520. Abnormally Dangerous Activities 19 In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the following factors are to be considered: 20 (a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels of others; 21 (b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great; 22 (c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care; 23 (d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage; 24 (e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and 25 (f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes. 26 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520 (1977). 27 Earlier, we reviewed Henderson's claim that the government acted maliciously and negligently by not improving the dam warning system, which the government knew was inadequate. Under Henderson's theory, had the government acted responsibly, the tragedy underlying this case would not have occurred. In other words, Henderson contends that the government could have eliminated the risk [of harm] by the exercise of reasonable care. 28 Now, however, Henderson urges that the release of waters through the dam was an ultrahazardous activity. By definition, the risk intrinsic in an ultrahazardous activity cannot be eliminated (thus justifying the customary imposition of strict liability). Therefore, Henderson cannot successfully claim that the government acted maliciously or practiced gross negligence in operating the dam and then turn around and successfully claim that operating the dam was an ultrahazardous activity. At this juncture in the life of the case, however, we are not reviewing the ultimate success of Henderson's respective claims. Instead, we are determining whether Henderson's claim that the dam operation was an ultrahazardous activity can survive summary judgment. 29 In light of the considerations outlined by the Restatement, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the release of water through the dam was an ultrahazardous activity. Rapidly releasing water through a dam creates a sudden surge of water and a rising water level, which together result in a high degree of risk of harm, as evidenced by Robert Henderson's death and the near accidents that preceded his tragedy. See Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 520(a) (1977). That the harm resulting from this risk will be great is obvious: rushing and rising water can leave substantial, and oftentimes tragic, damage in its wake. See Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 520(b) (1977). Whether reasonable care could have eliminated the risk of harm here is not so easily determined. At this juncture in the proceedings, the record has not been developed regarding whether a warning system could have been reasonably installed which would have overcome the factors, such as weather, high wind, and the location of downstream fishermen, which resulted in the warning system failing to alert persons below the dam that water was being released through the dam. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520(c). 8 30 This latter consideration of whether the risk created by the operation of the dam can be eliminated by reasonable care is the crucial factor in determining whether the operation of the dam is an ultrahazardous activity. The government's failure to respond to the complaints concerning the dam warning system suggest that an adequate warning system could not reasonably be installed and support Henderson's claim that the operation of the dam was an ultrahazardous activity. This factual issue cannot be resolved on summary judgment. See Mandel v. United States, 719 F.2d at 968 ([A] case is not suitable for summary judgment where there are undisputed facts from which different ultimate inferences might reasonably be drawn and as to which reasonable persons might disagree.) (citing United States v. Diebold, 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 994, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962)); see also Hendricks v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. Co., 709 S.W.2d 483, 493-94 (Mo.Ct.App.1986) (ruling that trial court inappropriately permitted an expert witness to express an opinion regarding whether a railroad crossing was unusually dangerous because none of the factors relied on by the expert in framing his opinion exceeded the understanding of the jurors who could determine for themselves whether the crossing was unusually dangerous).