Opinion ID: 419738
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Post Arrest Statements

Text: 25 Appellant Rosado claims that Judge Duffy, who presided at appellants' pre-trial suppression hearing, erred in not suppressing certain statements that he made to DEA agents on June 6, 1981, and statements made to Assistant United States Attorney Romatowski on June 8, 1981. See United States v. Rubio, 526 F.Supp. 171 (S.D.N.Y.1981). Specifically, Rosado contends that with regard to the June 6 statements, the government failed to establish that he had knowingly and intelligently waived his right to remain silent under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). This claim arises from the fact that the agent who testified that he gave the Miranda warnings to Rosado on June 6th, when questioned at the suppression hearing, failed to remember if Rosado stated that he understood the Miranda warnings. Rosado also contends that his June 8 statements, which preceded his arraignment by about three and one half hours, were inadmissible as the product of an unreasonable pre-arraignment delay. We do not agree with either contention, and therefore, we affirm the findings of the court below. 26 While it is true that the government has the burden of demonstrating that a defendant has knowingly waived his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 475, 86 S.Ct. at 1628, both the Supreme Court and this circuit have recognized that an express statement by the defendant is not necessary to establish such a waiver. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979); United States v. Boston, 508 F.2d 1171 (2d Cir.1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001, 95 S.Ct. 2401, 44 L.Ed.2d 669 (1975). As the Supreme Court stated in Butler, in at least some cases waiver can be clearly inferred from the actions and words of the person interrogated. 441 U.S. at 373, 99 S.Ct. at 1757. Here, with reference to the June 6th statements, the district judge found that Rosado had waived his Miranda rights despite the agent's inability to recall whether Rosado stated he understood the warnings. The judge stated: 27 At the hearing, Rosado impressed me as a man well capable of understanding his rights and asserting them. Far from being the pliant victim which he asserts in his moving papers, it is clear that he understands his rights and was in full command of his faculties when he made the statements which he now seeks to suppress. 28 526 F.Supp. at 174. Also, the district judge found that there was no credible evidence that Rosado was coerced into making any statements through physical or mental abuse, or that he was subjected to protracted interrogation. Id. The district judge found that Rosado had voluntarily waived his right to remain silent; this was supported by his evaluation of the actions and words of the accused, and was not clearly erroneous. 8 See United States v. Isom, 588 F.2d 858, 862 (2d Cir.1978); United States v. Burgos, 579 F.2d 747, 750 (2d Cir.1978); United States v. Boston, 508 F.2d at 1175. 29 Appellant's argument concerning the June 8 statements presents a different issue. Rosado contends that his statements to the Assistant United States Attorney, given two days after his arrest, should have been suppressed because of an unreasonable weekend pre-arraignment delay which is proscribed by Fed.R.Crim.P. 5(a) and 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3501(c) (1976). We agree with Judge Duffy's finding that there was no purposeful postponement of arraignment, and no lengthy, hostile, or coercive interrogation which caused the appellant prejudice. Therefore, we affirm the judge's denial of the motion to suppress the June 8 statements. 30 This court has recognized that a lapse of hours between arrest and arraignment, standing alone, does not require the exclusion of a statement made during the period. See, e.g., United States v. Isom, 588 F.2d at 862; United States v. Burgos, 579 F.2d at 750; United States v. Collins, 462 F.2d 792, 795-96 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 988, 93 S.Ct. 343, 34 L.Ed.2d 254 (1972); United States v. Marrero, 450 F.2d 373, 376-78 (2d Cir.1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 933, 92 S.Ct. 991, 30 L.Ed.2d 808 (1972); United States v. Price, 345 F.2d 256, 261-62 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 949, 86 S.Ct. 404, 15 L.Ed.2d 357 (1965). In Marrero, we stated that [i]t is not the lapse of time but the use of the time, when the commissioner or magistrate is unavailable, to employ the condemned psychologically coercive or third degree practices [of interrogators] which is proscribed. 450 F.2d at 376. Although section 3501(c) speaks of delays no greater than six hours between arrest and arraignment, the length of pre-arraignment delay is but one of the factors to employ in evaluating the voluntariness of a confession. Id. at 378. Here, the district court found that there was no evidence that Rosado was subjected to protracted interrogation or threatened or cajoled into making a statement to the government's attorney. On Saturday, June 6, Rosado was not subjected to any undue questioning after his arrest processing; he was not questioned at all on June 7; and he was only questioned by the government's attorney for 30 minutes on Monday, June 8. Hence, the district court's finding, with reference to the delay issue, that Rosado's statements on June 8 were voluntary acts and not the product of a lengthy or hostile interrogation, was not clearly erroneous. 31 Rosado also contends that the district court misinterpreted Fed.R.Crim.P. 5(a) when it found that an arraignment of the appellants on the day of arrest was impractical. Rule 5(a) states that [a]n officer making an arrest ... without a warrant shall take the arrested person without unnecessary delay before the nearest available federal magistrate or, in the event that a federal magistrate is not reasonably available, before a state or local judicial officer authorized by 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3041. Rosado contends that a Saturday arraignment was not impracticable since he could have been arraigned before either a state or local judge, or in the alternative, before the same district judge who granted the warrants to search appellants' apartment and the blue canvas bag found in appellants' automobile. 32 Clearly, the preferable course would have been compliance with Rule 5(a) and section 3501(c). Since it is undisputed that the Rule was not complied with, we must determine what, if any, prejudice the defendant suffered by reason of the delay. Rosado's responses to the questioning on June 8 consisted not of a confession but rather of exculpatory statements. He stated that he had gone to the Holiday Inn on June 6 to meet a Mexican interested in selling gold, not drugs. He stated that he did not have a job, that he did not take drugs, and that he did not own a safe deposit box. These statements, by themselves, did not implicate the appellant in any wrongdoing and did not cause prejudice to his defense. In light of the obvious concern about coercion contemplated by the Supreme Court in McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 63 S.Ct. 608, 87 L.Ed. 819 (1943); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957), and their progeny, some prejudice to the defendant must be demonstrated as a part of the defendant's effort to have his statements suppressed due to pre-arraignment delay. We do not find such prejudice in this case; consequently, the failure to observe the arraignment time requirement, standing alone, does not serve as a sufficient basis to suppress Rosado's exculpatory statements. 33 Although we agree that the circumstances herein give no indication of a coercive custodial interrogation, we announce our serious concern that lengthy delay could, under different circumstances, be used for unlawful and coercive interrogation, as well as deny a defendant the right to prompt arraignment. There is authority for the proposition that lodgng overnight does not constitute unnecessary delay in arraignment, United States v. Isom, 588 F.2d at 862-63; United States v. Ortega, 471 F.2d 1350, 1362 (2d Cir.1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 948, 93 S.Ct. 1924, 36 L.Ed.2d 409 (1973); United States v. Marrero, 450 F.2d at 378. Nevertheless, although we feel constrained by the holding of Marrero and its progeny, our discomfort increases in direct proportion to the length of necessary pre-arraignment delay attributable to the unavailability of a judicial officer, even on weekends. 34 Still, it is clear to us that, except for the quite reasonable periods of time actually spent in processing and in routine questioning, the hours between arrest and arraignment herein were spent mainly in lodging at the MCC while awaiting arraignment. We hold therefore that, on this occasion, the delay was not unnecessary for purposes of Fed.R.Crim.P. 5(a) nor unreasonable for purposes of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3501(c). The statements made to the prosecutor on June 8 were thus properly admitted at trial.