Opinion ID: 172400
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Due Process Before Termination

Text: To assess whether an individual was denied procedural due process, courts must engage in a two-step inquiry: (1) did the individual possess a protected interest such that the due process protections were applicable; and, if so, then (2) was the individual afforded an appropriate level of process. Montgomery v. City of Ardmore, 365 F.3d 926, 935 (10th Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The City officials do not contest that Riggins enjoyed a protected property interest in his employment. The only question is the level of process to which he was entitled to protect that property interest. An essential principle of due process is that a deprivation of life, liberty or property `be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.' Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985) (citation omitted). The Supreme Court has described the root requirement of the Due Process Clause as being that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property interest. Id. (citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379, 91 S.Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971) (emphasis in original)). This principle requires `some kind of a hearing' prior to the discharge of an employee who has a constitutionally protected property interest in his employment. Id. (citation omitted). For government employees, such a hearing requires: (1) oral or written notice [to the employee] of the charges against him; (2) an explanation of the employer's evidence; and (3) an opportunity [for the employee] to present his side of the story. Montgomery, 365 F.3d at 936 (citing Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546, 105 S.Ct. 1487); see also Langley v. Adams County, 987 F.2d 1473, 1480 (10th Cir.1993). A full evidentiary hearing is not required prior to an adverse employment action. West v. Grand County, 967 F.2d 362, 367 (10th Cir.1992). Instead, the individual entitled to due process protection needs only to be given notice and an opportunity to respond. Id. We have upheld as sufficient to meet these requirements informal proceedings, such as pretermination warnings and an opportunity for a face-to-face meeting with supervisors, see Seibert v. University of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center, 867 F.2d 591, 598 (10th Cir.1989), and even a limited conversation between an employee and his supervisor immediately prior to the employee's termination, see Powell v. Mikulecky, 891 F.2d 1454, 1459 (10th Cir. 1989). The objective of the process is an initial check against mistaken decisions essentially, a determination of whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the charges against the employee are true and support the proposed action. West, 967 F.2d at 367 (citation omitted). [2] The City officials argue that under these cases, Riggins was entitled to notice of the proposed termination, an explanation of the evidence against him, and an opportunity to respondall of which he received. See Tonkovich v. Kansas Bd. of Regents, 159 F.3d 504, 521 (10th Cir.1998). In response, Riggins contends the January 26, 2005 letter discharged him. He thus argues the hearings afforded to him took place after he was terminated and could not cure the lack of adequate pretermination process. But that is not the case. Riggins's allegations do not establish, on this record, that the City discharged him prior to the City Manager's hearing in May 2005. As an initial matter, the process afforded to Riggins more than adequately satisfied due process requirements. Based on the City's policy, Riggins was provided the opportunity for a three-step review process, pursuant to which he was given written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the evidence, and several opportunities to present his side of the story. [3] Our cases do not require a more elaborate process than that. [4] For example, in Powell, we concluded that the pretermination process accorded with the requirements established in Loudermill  when an employee was terminated during a meeting after he was asked and admitted to having had unauthorized communications. 891 F.2d at 1459. Although Powell was not informed that he was under investigation prior to the meeting, we found that he received oral notice of the charges when he was confronted at the meeting, he admitted to the allegations, and he was not entitled to any pre-notification notice or to a delay between the notice and opportunity to respond. Id. Similarly, in West, we concluded the meetings and consultations in that case satisfied constitutional mandates when the totality of the circumstances indicated West knew in advance of her termination that the county attorney proposed to eliminate her job, and she had several pretermination opportunities to discuss her potential termination with the new county attorney and other county officials. 967 F.2d at 367-38 (emphasizing that [p]laintiff was not fired out of the blue. Plaintiff was not fired for reasons that he did not know. Plaintiff was not fired without being given the `opportunity to present his side of the story.' (citing Seibert, 867 F.2d at 599)). The record amply confirms the City officials extended Riggins these procedural rights. Goodman's January 26, 2005 letter notified Riggins that he had made an initial decision to terminate him, and informed him of the reasons for his termination and the basis for it. The letter also instructed him on his rights to appeal and identified the City's policies that allowed him to contest the proposed termination prior to his termination becoming effective. The letter stated that only after an appealif requestedwould a final decision be made. Aplt.App. at 86. Riggins took advantage of these procedures, submitting testimony and documents through counsel. These procedures stemmed from the City's employee manual that plainly sets forth the process and advises that discharge will not occur until the culmination of the appeals. While Riggins contends the letter constituted discharge, he ignores the plain language of the letter and the City policies which it references, asking us to construe them in a way that means the opposite of what they say. The record is replete with language demonstrating the proposed termination was not final: proposed termination; effective ... February 7; prior to a final decision regarding your employment, you may request a hearing with me, and you may appeal my decision; following the hearing, I will make my final decision; you will have the opportunity to explain or rebut; the decision of the City Administrator at Step 3 will be final and binding on the parties; [p]rior to any final decision regarding dismissal, you will be given the opportunity to request a hearing before your department director. Aplt.App. at 86, 96, 241. In the face of this language, Riggins points to nothing that would support a contrary interpretation. On the other hand, the parties' conduct after Goodman's letter confirms that both sides interpreted the letter to mean that Riggins could contest Goodman's initial decision before the proposed termination would become effective. Riggins met with Goodman and marshaled arguments and evidence responding to the reasons set forth by Goodman as the basis for discharge. During the appeal process, the City maintained him on administrative leave. [5] And nothing in the record suggests that he was removed from the City's employee rolls or that the City took steps to discontinue his benefits or change his employment status until the conclusion of step three of the process. Due process requires nothing more. It is true Goodman recommended to City officials that Riggins be terminated prior to sending the January 26, 2005 letter. But nothing requires a municipal employer to hold a hearing prior to the initial decision to terminate a position; rather, a hearing is required before employees are actually deprived of their jobs. That is, a hearing is required before the employee is deprived of any significant property interest. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542, 105 S.Ct. 1487. In other words, due process is required not before the initial decision or recommendation to terminate is made, but instead before the termination actually occurs. See Jackson v. St. Joseph State Hosp., 840 F.2d 1387, 1391 (8th Cir.1988) (Due process ... does not require predecision hearings. It only requires an opportunity to be heard prior to the termination of benefits.). [6] To hold otherwise would ignore the reality that supervisors make termination decisions for myriad reasons. A policy like the one here that allows for supervisors to make an initial recommendation to terminate based on certain charges, and to have a superior approve of that initial recommendation, provides more, not fewer, protections for public employees. However one characterizes them, the City's policies build in substantial protections for employees prior to the loss of jobs or benefits. Finally, even assuming some lack of certainty existed as to the meaning of the January 26 letter and whether there was a constitutional violation concerning pretermination due process, qualified immunity would still be appropriate. Riggins cannot show that clearly established law rendered the process implemented by the City officials here unconstitutional. The notification of a decision to terminate at a future date along with the reasons for termination, followed by a three-step process designed to give several layers of review, does not offend clearly established law. See Gann v. Cline, 519 F.3d 1090, 1092 (10th Cir.2008) (explaining that qualified immunity shields officials from damages actions unless their conduct was unreasonable in light of clearly established law). A right is clearly established when, at the time of the alleged violation, the contours of the right [were] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. Id. A plaintiff can demonstrate that a constitutional right is clearly established by references to cases from the Supreme Court, the Tenth Circuit, or the weight of authority from other circuits. Id. To determine whether the law was clearly established, we look to the relevant precedents at the time of the challenged actions and the obviousness of the violation in light of them; we do not force public officials to guesson pain of personal liability for damageshow the law will have developed by the time their actions are scrutinized in federal court. Milligan-Hitt v. Bd. of Trs. of Sheridan County, 523 F.3d 1219, 1233 (10th Cir.2008). Moreover, the plaintiff `must demonstrate a substantial correspondence between the conduct in question and prior law allegedly establishing that the defendant's actions were clearly prohibited.' See Medina v. City of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (citation omitted). Although the plaintiff need not show that the specific action at issue has previously been held unlawful, the alleged unlawfulness must be `apparent' in light of preexisting law. Id. (citation omitted). Applying these principles, no clearly established law would clearly advise the defendants that their conduct or implementation of the City's process here violated Riggins's due process rights. A reasonable city official would not conclude that these policies and the process afforded Riggins as set forth in Goodman's letter denied him the right to challenge the charges against him. In conclusion, because the City officials afforded Riggins adequate procedural protections prior to the deprivation of his property interest in employment, he cannot assert a cognizable violation of a constitutional right or that the City officials violated clearly established law. The City defendants are therefore entitled to qualified immunity.