Opinion ID: 183831
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Step Two of the Alameda Books Framework: Casting Doubt

Text: The district court erred, however, by granting summary judgment at the second step of the Alameda Books analysis based on the Andrus and Hinckley declarations, because that court treated these declarations as actual and convincing enough to justify summary judgment despite their obvious and important shortcomings, and because the court did not consider the declarants' facial bias. To provide context for this holding, it is instructive to review how we have dealt with similar adult-entertainment cases reaching this stage of the Alameda Books framework. Although we have interpreted the Supreme Court's Alameda Books decision on several occasions, we have yet to hold that a plaintiff has succeeded in casting doubt on the city's evidence or rationale. It emerges from these cases that to succeed in casting doubt on a city's evidence or rationale, a plaintiff must do more than point to a municipality's lack of empirical evidence, Ctr. For Fair Pub. Policy, 336 F.3d at 1168, or challenge the methodology of the municipality's evidence, Gammoh v. City of La Habra, 395 F.3d 1114, 1126-27 (9th Cir.2005). When a municipality offers multiple rationales in support of an ordinance, the plaintiff must address each one. See Fantasyland Video, Inc. v. Cnty. of San Diego, 505 F.3d 996, 1002 (9th Cir.2007); World Wide Video v. City of Spokane, 368 F.3d 1186, 1196 (9th Cir.2004). The Sixth Circuit has explained that the plaintiffs bear a heavier evidentiary burden in attempting to cast doubt than the municipality does in justifying the ordinance at the outset, and that the plaintiffs' burden will not be carried by anecdotal or unsystematic evidence. Richland Bookmart v. Knox Cnty., 555 F.3d 512, 527-28 (6th Cir.2009). An important common element in these cases with respect to the second step of Alameda Books is that to successfully cast doubt on a municipality's rationale, a plaintiff must offer not merely evidence, but actual and convincing evidence. See Fantasyland Video, Inc., 505 F.3d at 1001 (citing Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 439, 122 S.Ct. 1728). Such evidence must do more than challenge the government's rationale; it must convincingly discredit the foundation upon which the government's justification rests. Imaginary Images, Inc. v. Evans, 612 F.3d 736, 747 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Giovani Carandola, Ltd. v. Bason, 303 F.3d 507, 516 (4th Cir.2002)). We are not satisfied that the plaintiffs' evidence in this case was actual and convincing enough to justify summary judgmentand we emphasize that the procedural posture here was summary judgment. The district court did not explicitly reach a contrary conclusion. Rather, the court dismissed the lack of specific factual foundation in the declarations, did not mention that they contain lengthy passages of identical text and did not discuss at all the facial bias of the declarants. Rather, the district court seemed to opine that no evidence must yield to some evidenceno matter how superficially frail and unexaminedto support a summary judgment. The district court's failure to take into account as part of its explicit analysis the bias of the plaintiffs' witnesses was a significant oversight. [10] The credibility of witnesses is almost categorically a trial issue, see SEC v. M & A West, Inc., 538 F.3d 1043, 1054-55 (9th Cir.2008), which means that, if bias is an evident factor, summary judgment is not generally indicated. The existence of credibility issues on material questions means that plaintiffs cannot short-circuit the actual and convincing language of Alameda Books and its progeny by seeking to have their case resolved at summary judgment. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 254, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)([I]n ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the judge must view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden.). If this actual and convincing language is to be meaningful, the district court must consider whether the plaintiffs have complied with it before resolving the case in their favor. This means considering inter alia the patent biases of the plaintiffs' witnesses, since evidently biased testimony is not generally convincing. See United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52, 105 S.Ct. 465, 83 L.Ed.2d 450 (1984). Here, the extent to which the Andrus and Hinckley declarations are convincing is diminished by their obvious self-interest: one declarant is the vice-president of a party to this litigation, and the other is the president of a Southern California company that installs adult arcades, including those owned by the plaintiff. The content of the declarations strikes us as plausible, but the sources are necessarily suspect. Moreover, as the City has argued, the Andrus and Hinckley declarations actually establish very little. Neither declarant offers any empirical data in support of his conclusion. Their testimony amounts to a conclusory assertion that they work in the industry, and we should take them at their word that adult arcades could not survive as stand-alone businesses because they would be perceived as too seedy. We do not see any support, other than the ipse dixit of the declarants, for the asserted relationship between the seediness of an adult entertainment venue and its ability to stay in business. This lack of substantiation is more problematic when viewed in the context of the arcades' profitability, as demonstrated in Vanita Spaulding's financial analysis. The Spaulding analysis showed the arcades to be profitable in their present forms, a relevant step in a more in-depth examination of their performance in isolation. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the City, the plaintiffs' two declarations are weakened by their not insignificant verbatim repetition and are affected by obvious bias. The district court should have at least recognized the bias problem in determining whether they successfully cast doubt on the City's rationale for its Ordinance. At trial, the frailties of this evidence and its conformity to the actual and convincing standard of the Alameda Books framework present an issue of material fact that might be examined, but summary judgment is not indicated. [11]