Opinion ID: 3014406
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: 2002). The District Court further stated that SABIC had been violating the March As threshold matters, ExxonMobil 2000 Stipulation since August 1, 2000, by challenges our appellate jurisdiction and allowing SHARQ to operate its reactors the timeliness of SABIC’s appeal. We above 17.4 weight percent condensed. Id. conclude that our appellate jurisdiction is at 390. The District Court did not address proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) S A B IC’s arg um ent, advanced in because the June 2002 Order is effectively opposition to ExxonMobil’s Motion to an injunction. And we conclude that Dismiss, that to practice the SCM-T SABIC’s appeal was timely because it was process a reactor has to employ both filed within the 30-day appellate window elements of either patent, not just operate that began with the issuance of the June above 17.4 weight percent condensed. 2002 Order. A. We have appellate jurisdiction SABIC moved for reconsideration under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). of this decision, while ExxonMobil, As the June 2002 Order is an seizing on the District Court’s statement interlocutory decision of the District Court, that SABIC had violated the March 2000 its appealability is governed by 28 U.S.C. Stipulation, moved for the District Court to § 1292. Section 1292(a)(1) provides enforce that Stipulation. On June 5, 2002, appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory the District Court denied SABIC’s motion orders “granting, continuing, modifying, f o r r e c o nsideration and gr a nte d refusing or dissolving injunctions, or ExxonMobil’s motion to enforce the r e f using to dissolv e or m odif y March 2000 Stipulation. This action—the injunctions.” Thus, our appellate June 2002 Order— did not address jurisdiction is proper under § 1292(a)(1) if SABIC’s argument that only by practicing the June 2002 Order is an injunction. both elements of one of the patents would its affiliate be violating the March 2000 An order need not have the “literal Stipulation’s terms. characterization” of an injunction for 4 § 1292(a)(1) to apply, as long as it has the Order imposes an equitable remedy against same practical effect. Hershey Foods SA BIC , whose noncompliance is Corp. v. Hershey Creamery Co., 945 F.2d punishable by contempt. See Cohen, 867 1272, 1276 (3d Cir. 1991). We have F.2d at 1465; see also Harley-Davidson, previously defined an injunctive order as Inc. v. Morris, 19 F.3d 142, 146 (3d Cir. one that is “[1] directed to a party, [2] 1994) (“Failure to obey a court judgment enforceable by contempt, and [3] designed is an indirect contempt . . . .” (citing to accord or protect ‘some or all of the Black’s Law Dictionary 319 (6th ed. substantive relief sought by a complaint’ in 1990))). Third, the June 2002 Order was more than a temporary fashion.” Cohen v. “designed to accord or protect some or all Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Med. & of the substantive relief sought by a Dentistry of N.J., 867 F.2d 1455, 1465 n.9 complaint.” In its amended counterclaims, (3d Cir. 1989) (en banc) (quoting W right ExxonM obil sought substantive relief that & Miller, et al., Federal Practice and included a declaration of ownership of the Procedure § 3922 (1977)); see also ’749 patent, one of the patents for the Hershey Foods, 945 F.2d at 1277 (“[I]n SCM-T process. The June 2002 Order order to be an injunction for purposes of § enforced the parties’ stipulated agreement 1292(a)(1), the order must grant part of the that neither SABIC nor its affiliates would relief requested by the claimant and must practice the SCM-T process, as defined by b e i m m e d i a t el y e n f o r c ea b l e b y the ’749 and ’304 patents, until ownership contempt.”). In contrast, “[o]rders that in rights to them are established. In this no way touch on the merits of the claim context, the June 2002 Order was but only relate to pretrial procedures” are “designed to accord or protect some or all not interlocutory injunctions within the of the substantive relief sought” by meaning of § 1292(a)(1). Hershey Foods, ExxonMobil in its amended counterclaims, 945 F.2d at 1277 (citing Switzerland namely, the right, as its purported owner, Cheese Ass’n v. E. Horne’s Market, Inc., to exclude SABIC and its affiliates from 385 U.S. 23 (1966)). ownership or practice of the ’749 patent. 4 Thus the June 2002 Order is, in effect, an We conclude that the June 2002 injunction appealable under 28 U.S.C. § Order satisfies the three Cohen factors for 1292(a)(1). an effective injunction appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). First, because the June 2002 Order requires that “SABIC 4 shall fully comply with the terms of the We reject as groundless ExxonMobil’s March [2000] Stipulation, which are argument that only the relief sought in the incorporated herein by reference,” it is Fourth Amended Counterclaim (which was expressly directed to a party. Second, by dismissed), as opposed to the amended granting ExxonMobil’s motion to enforce counterclaims as a whole, could have been the March 2000 Stipulation, the June 2002 the substantive relief protected by the June 2002 Order. 5 Finally, we reject ExxonM obil’s B. SABIC’s appeal was timely. argument that SABIC must demonstrate Under Federal Rule of Appellate “serious, perhaps irr eparable Procedure 4(a)(1)(a), a party has 30 days consequences” from the June 2002 Order after an order is entered in which to file an in order to sustain an appeal. ExxonM obil appeal. SABIC filed its Notice of Appeal points to Carson v. American Brands, Inc., on June 21, 2002, within the same month 450 U.S. 79 (1981), in which the Supreme that the District Court entered the June Court stated that “[u]nless a litigant can 2002 Order. But ExxonMobil construes show that an interlocutory order of the the June 2002 Order as a reinstatement of district court might have a ‘serious, the previously-vacated order enforcing the perhaps irreparable, consequence,’ and March 2000 Stipulation,5 and argues that that the order can be ‘effectually the reinstatement of a previously vacated challenged’ only by immediate appeal, the order cannot revive an expired appeal general congressional policy against period. Thus, ExxonMobil suggests, p i e ce m e a l r e v i e w w i l l p r e c l u de SABIC’s 30-day period in which to appeal interlocutory appeal.” Id. at 84 (citing the enforcement of the March 2000 Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, Stipulation began to run on April 3, 2000, 348 U.S. 176, 181 (1955)). But we have the day the District Court entered the since recognized that Carson required the March 2000 Stipulation as an order. We showing of a “serious, perhaps irreparable do not agree. consequence” in the context o f determining the appealability of an order ExxonM obil relies on tw o denying injunctive relief. Cohen, 867 F.2d cases—West v. Keve, 721 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. at 1467. We have consistently refused to 1983), and Hall v. Commonwealth Mental require such a showing of an enjoined Health Center, 772 F.2d 42 (3d Cir. party appealing an order granting an 1985)—in support of its argument that the injunction. See Casey v. Planned reinstatement of a previously vacated order Parenthood of S.E. Pa., 14 F.3d 848, 855 cannot revive an expired appellate period. (3d Cir. 1994) (“Unlike a denial, a grant of Both cases miss the mark here. In West injunctive relief subjects the losing party to and Hall we rejected as untimely appeals contempt, and provides some or all of the from reinstated, previously vacated orders. relief sought by the claimant, two of the But in both of those cases, unlike here, a key features we identified in Cohen as justifying an interlocutory appeal.”); Ross v. Zavarella, 916 F.2d 898, 902 (3d Cir. 5 Recall that the District Court entered 1990); Cohen, 867 F.2d at 1467. Thus, the Stipulation as an order on April 3, because the June 2002 Order granted 2000, but vacated the “so ordered” injunctive relief, SABIC need not show notation a year later. Saudi Basic Indus. “serious, perhaps irreparable consequence” Corp. v. ExxonMobil Corp., No. 98-4897 to sustain its appeal. (D.N.J. Apr. 26, 2001) (order). 6 party sought reinstatement of an earlier and did so simultaneously. This case judgment for the express purpose of presents circumstances not present in West reviving an appellate window. In West, and Hall, and therefore is not controlled by our holding rejecting the timeliness of their holdings. such an appeal was expressly limited to In summary, we reject that circumstance: ExxonMobil’s argument that SABIC’s We hold, therefore, that appeal period began on April 3, 2000, the because the avowed purpose day the District Court entered the March of the Rule 60(b) motion in 2000 Stipulation as a court order. SABIC this case was to extend the may appeal from the June 2002 Order time for appeal, it had to enforcing a previously vacated stipulation meet the time limitations of order. That appeal, filed within 30 days of Rule 4(a). We expressly do the June 2002 Order, is timely. not decide whether a Rule