Opinion ID: 1628512
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Juror LindseyMotion for mistrial

Text: After the jury returned a guilty verdict on three counts of rape and one count of sexual abuse, it recessed for the evening. The next morning, the bailiff approached the trial court with information that juror Jonathan Lindsey was having a problem with the guilty verdict. When questioned outside the presence of the other jurors, juror Lindsey advised the trial court that he had never been a juror before and that he felt that he should have stood up and stayed strong ... instead of giving in to everybody else (on the jury). He related that he became troubled during his drive home from the courthouse and had just this real bad feeling in me that I had made a bad decision. The colloquy between the trial court and juror Lindsey continued as follows: TRIAL COURT: Now, yesterday when the jury returned to the courtroom and I asked you if you had reached your verdict and then I read off your verdicts, then I asked if this was the jury's verdicts. JUROR: And, I agreed with everybody, yes, sir. TRIAL COURT: And, at that time did you have some reservations that you needed to advise the court of? JUROR: Not really because we had just walked out of the jury room and I'm not saying that they intimidated me. I'm not saying that I felt intimidated by the other jurors or anything; and I'm not saying that the decision I made was because of their decision, really; but I mean it's just that I didn't feel like I should lay down a guilty verdict; but after sitting there talking to them and, you know, they were all telling me all the reasons why I should say he was guilty and all the reasons why they felt he was guilty, and it was just more than TRIAL COURT: At the time you heard all that how did you feel? JUROR: At the time they were telling all that I thought, Well, okay, then he's guilty of all this stuff; and, you know, If ya'll feel this way and this is why y'all feel this way, then I should feel this way, too; but then after I left the courtroom, it was a totally different feeling so far as I was concerned and I didn't feel that way at all. The attorneys were permitted to question juror Lindsey as follows: ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: Your Honor, I think before we go any further that we ought to ask him this question. Did you have an abiding conviction were you satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Jeff Davis was guilty? JUROR: No. ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: You did not have an abiding conviction of his guilt? JUROR: No. PROSECUTOR: Did you tell the court you did when he asked you? JUROR: Yes, I did. PROSECUTOR: I believe earlier you made the statement that at first you had doubts and then the other eleven jurors said to you to look at this and look at this and look at this, and then you JUROR: And, after looking at that I was in agreement; but later when I left I was thinking, I don't like what I just did, and doubt started to creep in. PROSECUTOR: On your way home? JUROR: That's correct. PROSECUTOR: But, after deliberating with the other eleven jurors and after the other eleven suggested to you that you look at A, B, C, and D, you began thinking that based upon their life's experiences and what they've been through and what they are saying, I can see that? JUROR: Right. ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: At that point were you convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of Jeff Davis? JUROR: Beyond a reasonable doubt? PROSECUTOR: At that point. ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: At that point did you have an abiding conviction in the truth of the charge? JUROR: Yes, I did at that point. ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: All right. After the questioning of juror Lindsey concluded, the appellant moved for a mistrial on the ground that the verdict was not the result of an impartial consideration and that the reason given by the juror as to how he reached his verdict was unfair in nature. Before addressing the precise issue before us, we must emphasize that A.R.E. Rule 606(b) only permits inquiry into whether any external influence or information could have played a part in the jury's verdict. The purpose of this rule is to balance the freedom of secret jury deliberations with the ability to correct an irregularity in those deliberations. Borden v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co., 287 Ark. 316, 698 S.W.2d 795 (1985). While the appellant did not object to the testimony regarding juror Lindsey's mind and emotions, it is apparent when reviewing the excerpted colloquy above that the inquiry at times delved into the improper area of juror Lindsey's mind and emotions. However, for purposes of our reviewing the appellant's argument on appeal, it is clear from juror Lindsey's testimony that no other juror intimidated him and that no extraneous prejudicial information influenced his decision. Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-89-130(c)(3) (1987) provides that the trial court may grant a new trial when a verdict rendered against the defendant has been decided by lot or chance. We have held that a verdict reached by the jury through a compromise of their views is not a verdict by lot but is a fair expression of their views. Blaylack v. State, 236 Ark. 924, 370 S.W.2d 615 (1963). The reasoning of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals is particularly helpful on this point: Persuasion and compromise are the processes by which juries are intended to reach their decisions. Otherwise, jurors would be polled directly after the close of trialnot allowed to discuss the case among themselves to arrive at a verdict acceptable to them all. Smith v. Lockhart, 946 F.2d 1392, 1395 (8th Cir.1991). When making its ruling on this issue, the trial court observed that juror Lindsey had stated that, at the time the verdict was returned, he had an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge. When considering all the circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial.