Opinion ID: 1925404
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Robertshaw

Text: Responding to a mailed solicitation from Ficker, Ms. Robertshaw, on April 18, 2005, retained Ficker to represent her in connection with a charge of driving under the influence of alcohol and several associated traffic offenses, including an open container violation. The agreed fee was $599. Along with asigned retainer agreement and a credit card authorization for $300, as a deposit on the fee, Ms. Robertshaw sent two trial notices to Fickerone showing a trial date of June 2, 2005 at 8:45 a.m. in the District Court in Glen Burnie for the DUI offense, and the other showing trial on the other charges on June 9, 2005 at 1:15 p.m., also in the Glen Burnie court. Immediately upon receipt of those documents, Ficker mailed to the clerk of the District Court in Glen Burnie his appearance and a motion to consolidate the two cases. The motion was granted, but, for whatever reason, a copy of the order granting the consolidation never reached Ficker's office, so his records continued to show two trial dates, one June 2 and one June 9. Robertshaw knew that Ficker would attempt to consolidate the two cases, and she awaited word from him as to when she would need to appear. She called several times and left voice-mail messages; those calls were not returned. On one occasion, she reached Ficker, who said he was in his car, did not have her file with him, and that, when he got the information, he would advise her. Robertshaw received no further information from Ficker or his office until June 8, when she received a call from Mark Kosko, an associate attorney in Ficker's office. Kosko was one of two associates in Ficker's office. There was no assignment system in the office under which cases were assigned when the file was opened. Rather, Kosko would review the firm's master calendar and assign to himself the cases he said he could handle, which would usually take place about two weeks before the scheduled trial date. [2] Kosko reviewed Robertshaw's file during the last week of May. He was scheduled to go on vacation for a week, commencing May 30, 2005, and thus knew that he would be unavailable for the trial scheduled for June 2. He instructed the office staff to check on the June 2nd trial date but was unsure whether that had occurred before he left for vacation. Kosko returned to work on June 6, and, at some point, determined that a trial remained scheduled for June 9. The call to Ms. Robertshaw on June 8 was the first and only communication with the client. In that conversation, according to Kosko, Ms. Robershaw advised him of only one relevant prior conviction. Although, in response to discovery, the State's Attorney's Office had informed Ficker by letter that Robertshaw had two prior alcohol-related convictions and that letter was in the file, Kosko, assuming that the letter was a boilerplate cover letter failed to read the entire letter and thus was unaware of the two convictions. He was prepared to try the case or negotiate a plea agreement in the belief that his client had only one prior conviction. When he learned about the second conviction from the prosecutor on the afternoon of trial, he negotiated a plea deal, without discussing the matter with Ms. Robertshaw, under which she would plead guilty to driving while impaired as a subsequent offender, and the State would dismiss the remaining charges. That arrangement would likely result in jail time for Ms. Robertshaw. Kosko then located Robertshaw in the lobby and told her of the State's offer. This was the first meeting they had. They had not previously discussed the prospect of jail time. Ms. Robertshaw was upset at the prospect, and she waffled on whether she wanted to serve the time on consecutive days or over weekends. Ultimately, she was sentenced to ten days in jail, to be served over five weekends. Upon these findings, Judge Debelius concluded that Ficker had shown a complete absence of thoroughness and preparation in his representation of Ms. Robertshaw, which amounted to a violation of MRPC 1.1 (Competence). The judge found as well that, in failing to properly examine the discovery materials, which would have alerted him to the two prior convictions, and failing to prepare Robertshaw and communicate viable options to her in advance of trial, Ficker violated MRPC 1.3 (Diligence) and 1.4 (Communication with client). Judge Debelius noted that there was a complete absence of communication between Ficker and Robertshaw between April 20 and June 8, despite her numerous attempts to contact him. Finally, the judge concluded that Ficker had violated MRPC 5.1 by failing to have in place a system whereby cases were immediately assigned to a particular attorney within his office when the cases first came in, and instead, allowing particular attorneys to assign themselves cases two weeks prior to trial. . . . That practice, the judge added, fostered an environment where rules regarding diligent representation and communication with clients were almost inherently violated and was especially egregious in light of the fact that, as a condition to Ficker's reinstatement in 1998, this Court required that he ensure that cases are assigned in a reasonable and timely manner to allow the attorney assigned to do adequate preparation. . . .