Opinion ID: 2136954
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Arrest, Search, and Seizure

Text: In his next assignment of error, Schwartz claims that the district court erred in overruling his pretrial motion to suppress the gun, holster, money, and cash register receipts discovered as the result of his being stopped, searched, seized, and arrested, all of which he claims to have been illegal. The State contends that Schwartz waived the issues presented, as his motion to suppress this evidence was overruled prior to trial, and he failed to timely and specifically object to the reception of the complained-of evidence at the trial itself. Schwartz lodged no objection against the testimony that he was in fact arrested. Likewise, no claim was made at trial that the gun, money, and receipts were the result of an illegal search, seizure, or arrest; the trial objections to these items were based on a claimed lack of foundation and relevance. Schwartz did, however, object to testimony that the police had found an empty holster on the seat of the pickup truck, on the ground that such evidence was illegally obtained; although this objection was overruled, the State made no further effort to pursue this line of inquiry. Since Schwartz' pretrial motion to suppress was overruled and he failed to specifically object to the receipt of such evidence at trial on the ground that it was illegally obtained, Schwartz' claim of error has indeed been waived. See State v. Mahlin, 236 Neb. 818, 464 N.W.2d 312 (1991). In any event, the district court did not err in overruling Schwartz' motion to suppress. Schwartz begins his argument in support of his motion by claiming that Waskowiak had no probable cause to stop the pickup truck in which he was a passenger. The reality is that the investigatory stop of the pickup truck is sanctioned by statute. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 29-829 (Reissue 1989) provides, in relevant part: A peace officer may stop any person in a public place whom he reasonably suspects of committing, who has committed, or who is about to commit a crime and may demand of him his name, address and an explanation of his actions. When a peace officer has stopped a person for questioning pursuant to this section and reasonably suspects he is in danger of life or limb, he may search such person for a dangerous weapon. If the peace officer finds such a weapon or any other thing the possession of which may constitute a crime, he may take and keep it until the completion of questioning, at which time he shall either return it, if lawfully possessed, or arrest such person. In applying this section to investigatory stops of vehicles, this court has been mindful of U.S. Supreme Court pronouncements regarding the fourth amendment to the federal Constitution, such as those found in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). See, e.g., State v. Gross, 225 Neb. 798, 408 N.W.2d 297 (1987); State v. Pierce and Wells, 215 Neb. 512, 340 N.W.2d 122 (1983); State v. Nowicki, 209 Neb. 640, 309 N.W.2d 89 (1981). From these cases emerges the rule that an investigatory stop will be upheld if justified by an objective manifestation that the person stopped is, has been, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity. See Gross, supra . In this case, Waskowiak testified that he stopped the pickup truck because it answered the description of a vehicle reported to have been involved in an area robbery a mere 15 minutes earlier. Given these circumstances, there is no merit to Schwartz' argument that the investigatory stop was not justified by an objective manifestation that the persons stopped had recently been engaged in criminal activity. Schwartz also makes much of the fact that the record does not establish whether he was arrested before, during, or after the search of the pickup truck or perhaps after the clerk's identification. The only thing that is clear from the record is that Schwartz was arrested at some time after the stop of the pickup truck. Thus, we first examine the situation as if Schwartz had been arrested immediately upon his discovery in the pickup truck. The question, under that assumption, becomes whether there then existed probable cause to arrest him. The test of probable cause to support a warrantless arrest is whether at the moment the facts and circumstances within the arresting officers' knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to justify a prudent person in believing the defendant had committed or was committing an offense. State v. Twohig, 238 Neb. 92, 469 N.W.2d 344 (1991). Schwartz claims that an arrest prior to the clerk's identification could not be sustained under this standard because the record is silent as to whether Waskowiak at that time had any knowledge of the robber's description. While Waskowiak's testimony does not specifically indicate that he was then aware of the robber's description, several facts of record support an inference that he was so informed. The record shows that the clerk related the perpetrator's description to Kosmicki, who subsequently broadcast some information over his police radio. The record further reflects that Waskowiak had heard a radio transmission regarding the robbery. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Waskowiak, upon first making contact with the driver of the pickup truck, asked the color of her passenger's hair. These facts, when considered in conjunction with the fact that red hair was the predominant feature of the description of the robber, support an inference that Waskowiak was aware of the robber's description as he made the investigatory stop. Under the foregoing definition of probable cause, it must be said that where a person answering the description of a suspected robber is found in a vehicle answering the description of the vehicle suspected in the same robbery, there exists probable cause to support a warrantless arrest of the suspected robber. When that finding is coupled with this court's holdings that prior to arrest of the occupants a vehicle may be searched pursuant to a lawful investigatory stop to the extent necessary to secure the safety of the investigating officers, see, Gross, supra, and Pierce and Wells, supra, the actual time of arrest becomes less important. A prearrest search of the pickup truck was warranted under Gross, supra, and Pierce and Wells, supra, because the officers were dealing with an investigatory stop of a vehicle suspected to have been used in an armed robbery. Logic dictates that as the arrest was not made until after the legal search pursuant to an investigatory stop, and as sufficient probable cause existed prior to the search to sustain a warrantless arrest, any such arrest subsequent to the search or identification is also supported by probable cause. Thus, regardless of when the arrest was actually made, it was supported by probable cause. Likewise, irrespective of whether the search and seizure were made prior to or subsequent to the arrest, they too were proper.