Opinion ID: 195440
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion for Clarification

Text: 2 We think it apparent that defendants decided not to appeal Count 14 because of an error at trial that may have worked to their benefit. All parties concede that the jury mistakenly was not asked to identify which of the six firearms at issue in this case--ranging from machine guns to handguns--underlay its guilty verdict on Count 14. The district court recognized the error at sentencing and, as a consequence, refused to impose the 30-year prison term mandated under Sec. 924(c) for use of machine guns, instead imposing only the five-year term set for less serious firearms. 2 3 By removing Count 14 from their appeal, the defendants took a calculated risk. If they had challenged that charge successfully, a new trial would have been required and they might have been acquitted. On the other hand, they might have been convicted again, without error, based on a jury finding that they had used a machine gun or other serious weapon in attempting the robbery. A 30-year sentence necessarily would follow. Five of the six defendants evidently felt that, all things considered, the chance of acquittal was outweighed by the risk of the longer sentence. 3 The Motion for Clarification asks that we recognize, and permit, this choice. 4 The government's response to the clarification motion is twofold. First, it points out that if we grant defendants' motion and leave the Count 14 conviction undisturbed, we must address the government's sentencing challenge and should find that defendants are subject to the 30-year sentence. Second, the government vehemently asserts that we should deny the motion, arguing that the Count 14 conviction may not stand in the face of our decision that serious, reversible error occurred at trial. 4 The government contends that such an inconsistency disserves the interests of justice, that the defendants should not be permitted to control sentencing options in such a manner, and that we have the authority to reverse the Sec. 924(c) convictions notwithstanding the defendants' decisions against appealing. 5 After considering the various possible outcomes, and the policies at stake, we have concluded that it would be at least inappropriate, and probably a violation of double jeopardy principles, for us to vacate defendants' unappealed convictions on Count 14 and order that they be retried on that charge. The government cites no case in which a court has taken the extraordinary step of reaching beyond the charges before it on appeal to invalidate a conviction that neither party has challenged. 6 The government relies instead on what we believe is wholly inapposite caselaw on sentencing. This precedent establishes that an appellate ruling invalidating a sentence, or reversing on some, but not all, counts of an indictment may implicate the trial judge's comprehensive, interdependent imposition of a penalty and thus require resentencing on all counts. See United States v. Pimienta-Redondo, 874 F.2d 9, 16 (1st Cir.1989) (en banc). The case before us presents a vastly different question. Rather than seeking re-evaluation of a defendant's punishment in light of changed circumstances, the government asks that we put the issue of defendants' guilt on Count 14 to another jury. The government presumably makes this request because it wants another chance to elicit a specific finding that defendants used or carried automatic weapons, which in turn would require a longer sentence. The government's unilateral pursuit of a retrial strikes us as directly at odds with the double jeopardy prohibition against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 381, 109 S.Ct. 2522, 2525, 105 L.Ed.2d 322 (1989). 7 Neither the inconsistency of excluding Count 14 from a retrial nor the defendants' controlling their sentence on that count by ensuring that it will be determined finally in the course of this appeal is particularly troubling. Our system of justice is not a precise and mechanical operation and, indeed, that is one of its virtues. We permit inconsistent verdicts in certain circumstances, see, e.g., United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 105 S.Ct. 471, 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984), and the fact that defendants may have fared better than perhaps they would have in an error-free trial does not seem reason enough to compel retrial against their will, compromising the principle of finality embodied in the double jeopardy clause. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 2225, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977); United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 343, 95 S.Ct. 1013, 1022, 43 L.Ed.2d 232 (1975). 8 We therefore conclude that defendants' Motion for Clarification should be granted, and that Count 14 may not be retried. 5 Consequently, we must consider the government's challenge to the sentence imposed on that charge. As we discuss below, our review of the record and caselaw persuades us that the district court acted properly and that the five-year terms must be affirmed.