Opinion ID: 205743
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence of Guilty Pleas

Text: The foundation of the Supreme Court's decision in St. Cyr is its conclusion that when aliens plead guilty to crimes, they do so in reliance on the immigration consequences of their pleas based on the law as it then exists. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 322, 121 S.Ct. 2271. If Gallegos-Vasquez was convicted of his 1989 misdemeanors after trials rather than pleas, St. Cyr does not help him. See Armendariz-Montoya v. Sonchik, 291 F.3d 1116, 1121-22 (9th Cir.2002). The government argues that Gallegos-Vasquez failed to prove that his 1989 misdemeanor convictions were based on guilty pleas. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d) (2005) (alien shall have the burden of establishing that he or she is eligible for any requested benefit or privilege). The government points out that the conviction documents are not in the record and contends that Gallegos-Vasquez never affirmatively stated that the convictions were based on guilty pleas. Contrary to the government's contention, Gallegos-Vasquez said, through counsel, at the hearing before the IJ that his misdemeanor convictions were based on pleas. The IJ asked Gallegos-Vasquez's counsel to confer with Gallegos-Vasquez to determine if he knew what a guilty plea was and if he remembered making such pleas. Counsel responded with the following proffer from Gallegos-Vasquez: He basically proffered that all his convictions were through plea. He states that he does know what his trial is. The trial is when there is [sic] 12 people in a jury. I asked him them [sic] if there was any testimony taken, and he said there wasn't. So I believe he knows what a trial is, and I believe he knows that he, oh, there's another thing. He said the reason why he took the plea, is was [sic] because he was given such a short time. And so I believe he knows what a plea is, he knows what a trial is, and that he is competent to explain that he only received pleas. We regard Gallegos-Vasquez's statements through counsel as clear evidence that his misdemeanor convictions were based on guilty pleas. We recognize that there was no documentary evidence of Gallegos-Vasquez's misdemeanor convictions in the record before the IJ and the BIA in his reopened proceedings. But the BIA was willing in 1998, at the urging of the government, to enter a removal order against Gallegos-Vasquez based on these convictions when the only evidence was Gallegos-Vasquez's statements through counsel admitting the facts underlying them. The government cannot now contend that Gallegos-Vasquez's statements through counsel about these same convictions should be disregarded. Gallegos-Vasquez's statements are conclusively supported by the very brief periods of time between his offenses and his convictions. The BIA found in its 1998 removal order that Gallegos-Vasquez's March 15, 1989, misdemeanor convictions for receiving known stolen property and hit and run with property damage were based on crimes committed on March 2, 1989. His July 31, 1989, misdemeanor conviction for taking a vehicle without consent or vehicle theft was based on a crime committed on July 27, 1989. At oral argument before us, the government could not explain how a criminal trial could have been concluded thirteen days after the crimes in the first case, and four days after the crime in the second case. The simple answer is that they could not have been. We therefore conclude that the evidence compels the finding that Gallegos-Vasquez pled guilty in March and July 1989 to misdemeanor convictions for receiving known stolen property and for taking a vehicle without consent or vehicle theft.