Opinion ID: 780799
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: means of booting

Text: The fourth step of claim 8 reads: 70 a means of booting said digital computer, said means of booting including a first set of commands, said first set of commands resident on said storage device of said digital computer for booting said digital computer, and a second set of commands resident on a storage device external to said digital computer for booting said digital computer. 71 '593 patent, col. 196, lines 19-25. The district court concluded that this was a means-plus-function limitation because the language referring to two sets of commands states only the location of the commands and is insufficient to define the structure that performs the function of booting. Altiris, 160 F.Supp.2d at 1288. Altiris argues the recitation of the first and second set of commands is sufficient structure. Altiris reasons that commands are structure in the form of software that will boot the computer. We disagree. 72 Although commands represent structure (in the form of software), it is not sufficient structure to perform the entirety of the function. The claim language uses including — an open term — which suggests that the two sets of commands are not sufficient structure; rather, something else is needed. In addition, the claim only recites commands ... for booting and states a location. This is really a restatement of means of booting; the commands are still described solely in functional terms and one must still refer to the specification to determine the structure of those means or commands. In the cases where we have found sufficient structure in the claims, the claim language specifies a specific physical structure that performs the function. Envirco Corp. v. Clestra Cleanroom, Inc., 209 F.3d 1360, 1365, 54 USPQ2d 1449, 1452-53 (Fed.Cir.2000) (holding sufficient structure was recited where the limitation was second baffle means because it used the word baffle (a physical structure) and the claim described the particular structure of this particular baffle); Rodime PLC v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 174 F.3d 1294, 1303-04, 50 USPQ2d 1429, 1435-36 (Fed.Cir.1999) (holding a claim recited sufficient structure where the limitation was positioning means and the claim provid[ed] a list of the structure underlying the means); Cole v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 102 F.3d 524, 531-32, 41 USPQ2d 1001, 1006-07 (Fed.Cir.1996) (holding that the limitation perforation means for tearing was not a means-plus-function claim because the word perforation constituted sufficient structure). Here, merely pointing out that the relevant structure is software rather than hardware is insufficient. As stated above, because commands ( i.e., software) is so broad as to give little indication of the particular structure used here and is described only functionally, one must still look to the specification for an adequate understanding of the structure of that software. This is unlike the cases cited above, wherein the exact structure used to accomplish the function appears in the claim language. E.g., Envirco Corp., 209 F.3d at 1365, 54 USPQ2d at 1452-53. For this reason, we uphold the court's determination that the presumption that the claim is a means-plus-function claim was not rebutted. 73 Having concluded that means of booting is a means-plus-function limitation, we turn now to its proper construction. The district court's identification of the function as the process of booting the computer is unchallenged. Altiris does challenge the court's identification of the corresponding structures in the specification. The court construed the first set of commands to include the normal operating system on the computer and the customized MBR or equivalent, two operating systems, and communications software. Altiris, 160 F.Supp.2d at 1288. The court construed the second set of commands to include batch files, commands, or instructions on the server. Id. 74 As to the first set of commands, Altiris argues the court erred by failing to allow for equivalents to the elements (other than the customized MBR) described, by failing to include a normal MBR as a corresponding structure, and by requiring two operating systems in addition to a normal operating system. First, under § 112 every structure disclosed in the specification and its equivalents should be considered. Thus, the court erred in only including the equivalents of the custom MBR in its construction. Second, a look at the specification indicates that Altiris is also clearly correct that only two operating systems are required (one normal and one automation), not a normal operating system and two others, as the court concluded. The third and most contentious issue is whether the specification described the use of a normal MBR as part of the first set of commands. The specification does mention the use of a normal MBR saved on the computer's hard drive to boot the computer. '593 patent, col. 5, lines 55-60. Thus, the normal MBR clearly is a set of commands resident on said storage device of the digital computer. Symantec, nonetheless, argues that the specification makes clear that the custom MBR must be used as a part of every boot sequence. Again, however, the description of the preferred embodiment is not a sufficient reason for so limiting the claims. We hold the district court erred and we construe the first set of commands to include each of the following and its equivalents: the normal operating system on the computer, another automation operating system, a customized or a normal MBR, and communications software. 75 As to the second set of commands, Altiris argues error in the court's limit of the commands to those present on the server. Once again, we agree with Altiris. The patent describes locating the second set of commands on an external disk drive unit attached to a network server, id., col.6, lines 66-67, making it clear that the commands can be located on a server or a storage device connected to a server. The patent also describes locating the commands on another processor or drive within the computer if the computer is used without a network connection or a server. Id., col. 5, lines 29-32. It is clear, then, that the specification describes locating the commands on a secondary processor or storage device within the individual computer. Symantec argues that even if such structures were disclosed, they were not claimed because a processor or drive within the computer, cannot be said to be external to said digital computer. Id., col. 196, lines 24-25. Altiris responds that claim 8 recites only a single processor and a single long-term storage device, and therefore anything other than that is external. We resolve this in favor of Altiris, in large part because Symantec's argument on this point is so brief as to be unhelpful. We therefore construe the second set of commands to include batch files, commands, or instructions on a storage device other than the main processor and long term storage device present in the digital computer. 76