Opinion ID: 1969802
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 34

Heading: 26, b.90, b.213, b.226, e.2)

Text: Defendant raises several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and one of prosecutorial misconduct in connection with references to search warrants in the course of the trial. Defendant claims that trial counsel should have moved in limine to preclude references to the search warrants in the presence of the jury. Defendant also claims that trial counsel should have objected to police testimony that the search of James Davis's home was executed pursuant to a search warrant. Finally, defendant claims that the prosecutor's reference to the issuance of a search warrant for defendant's telephone records constituted an impermissible reference to a judicial finding of probable cause that defendant was involved with the murder of Maria Marshall. We find those claims to be without merit. They have in common the proposition that the jury should be shielded from knowledge that search warrants have been issued in a criminal matter because the prior judicial determination of probable cause may influence the jury to assume guilt. We are aware of no authority in support of such a rule. We are satisfied that a properly instructed jury will not presume guilt based on the issuance of a search warrant. We note, moreover, that the fact that a warrant was issued might necessarily be put before a jury in order to establish that the police acted properly. Defendant's reliance on State v. Milton, 255 N.J. Super. 514, 605 A. 2d 757 (App.Div. 1992), is misplaced. That case dealt with a prosecutor's reference to a search warrant that had the capacity to mislead the jury. Defendant does not claim that any reference to search warrants in these proceedings was misleading, and we are satisfied from our own review of the record that the references of which defendant complains were accurate. The balance of the claims in this category allege errors or omissions of trial strategy in connection with the search warrants, and assert that the errors deprived defendant of the effective assistance of counsel. Defendant claims that trial counsel erred in calling Investigator Mahoney as a defense witness to establish police procedure for obtaining a search warrant, because that testimony necessarily disclosed to the jury the probable-cause determination. Defendant also claims that trial counsel erred in not objecting to evidence seized in the search of Davis's house because the affidavit in support of the warrant application contained false testimony. With regard to calling Investigator Mahoney, we find that counsel was not ineffective. Counsel called Mahoney to establish that the contents of a sealed envelope seized from defendant were omitted from an inventory made by the investigators. That omission is the basis for several other claims defendant has raised on PCR review. Trial counsel cannot be faulted for attempting to lay the foundation for claims on which defendant now relies. We find that counsel's examination of Mahoney was a legitimate strategic choice. Furthermore, neither Mahoney nor counsel directly mentioned the probable-cause determination in the course of the examination. In view of our holding that the jury's awareness of a search warrant did not cause an impermissible inference of guilt, Mahoney's testimony concerning the search warrant was harmless. We also find no merit to the claim that trial counsel should have challenged the Davis search warrant. Despite defendant's general allegations that the affidavit on which the warrant was based contained false testimony, defendant has not specified which of the averments in the challenged affidavit were false. Nor has it been demonstrated that probable cause would have been lacking had the alleged false swearing been stricken. Defendant's claim that the affidavit relied on information that could only have been within the knowledge of a dead person appears to have no basis in the record.