Opinion ID: 181294
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Is the Plan Language Ambiguous?

Text: Under New York law, as in most states, whether a contract term is ambiguous is a question of law. Tenorio v. Tenorio, 70 A.D.3d 812, 894 N.Y.S.2d 143, 144 (N.Y.App.Div.2010). A term is deemed ambiguous when it is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation. Discovision Assocs. v. Fuji Photo Film Co., Ltd., 71 A.D.3d 488, 898 N.Y.S.2d 11 (N.Y.App. Div.2010) (quoting Evans v. Famous Music Corp., 1 N.Y.3d 452, 458, 775 N.Y.S.2d 757, 807 N.E.2d 869 (2004)). When a term becomes, within a certain industry, a term of art, courts are to apply the technical meaning of the term instead of any other plain meaning in general society. See Madison Avenue Leasehold, LLC v. Madison Bentley Assocs. LLC, 30 A.D.3d 1, 811 N.Y.S.2d 47, 52 (2006); Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 798 (6th Cir.2005). The majority opinion recognizes Dow Corning's argument that the term breast implant is a term of art, Maj. Op. at 773, but then dismisses that argument by concluding that the Plan is ambiguous as to whether the term was used in a technical or more ordinary sense in the Plan, id. I believe the majority opinion's dismissal of Dow Corning's argument is both legally and factually flawed. Legally, the New York courts have already rejected the majority opinion's perceived conflict, holding that a term of art automatically trumps any ordinary meaning. Madison Avenue Leasehold, LLC, 811 N.Y.S.2d at 52. If, as Dow Corning claims, the term breast implant is a term of art, then we are bound to apply that term of art in our interpretation of the Plan. Dow Corning's argument is supported by the undisputed evidence that the medical community and the FDA both considered tissue expanders to be an entirely separate product from breast implants. The doctors who perform procedures using these products know what a breast implant is and know that a tissue expander is not a breast implant. Likewise, breast implant means something very specific to the FDA, which has the authority to regulate all medical devices and has chosen to regulate breast implants but not tissue expanders. Appellee also argues that it should not be required to accept the term of art because the members of the Claimants' Advisory Committee are not in the medical device community, and wouldn't have understood the specific meaning of the term. In making this argument, however, Appellee fails to mention that each claimant was represented by counsel, and their counsel cannot be so easily classified as ignorant of the legal ramifications of the document they ratified. Appellee's argument also ties into the factual flaw in the majority opinion's dismissal of Dow Corning's term-of-art argument. Specifically, the district court, Appellee, and now the majority opinion all struggle to contrive a conflict between technical meaning and ordinary meaning when, in my opinion, no such conflict exists. It is unreasonable to suppose, as the majority opinion does, that any reasonable lay person would consider tissue expanders to be breast implants; the term breast implants has not only achieved term-of-art status among the medical community, but also among the public at large. I have no doubt that if one hundred average Americans were approached on the street and asked to define a breast implant, none would describe a tissue expander. If a tissue expander were then described to them, and they were asked if a tissue expander was a breast implant, the vast majority would say no. Only lawyers and others who favor hyper-technical definitions might be inclined to include tissue expanders in the definition of breast implants, and I am convinced they would only do so after a significant amount of consideration and parsing of the terms. Common sense and New York law compel the conclusion that the term breast implant unambiguously excludes tissue expanders, as a matter of law, and I would reverse the district court's determination to the contrary. Because the majority opinion fails to consider New York law and, consequently, arrives at the opposite conclusion, I respectfully dissent.