Opinion ID: 1974568
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: ii-c

Text: Defendant raises a third foundational point on appeal: that the Maine statute's provision for elimination of nonconforming signs by amortization is unconstitutional because it violates substantive due process of law [14] and effectuates a taking of defendant's property without payment of just compensation for it. Well settled case law shows these claims to be unfounded. The contention that a statute enacted as a purported exercise of a state's police power is unconstitutional, as violative of substantive due process of law, precipitates three inquiries: (1) whether the objective of the exercise of the police power is legitimately within the scope of police power action; (2) whether the means employed are appropriate to the achievement of the objective; and (3) whether the manner in which the power is exercised is arbitrary or capricious. State v. Rush, Me., 324 A.2d 748 (1974); see also Inhabitants of Boothbay v. National Advertising Company, Me., 347 A.2d 419 (1975). Evaluated in these respects, the Maine statute is constitutional, as in conformity with the requirements of substantive due process. Its stated purposes  promotion of highway safety, protection of public investment in highways, and enhancement of natural scenic beauty  are commonly recognized as legitimate police power objectives. See State v. National Advertising Company, supra ; Inhabitants of Boothbay v. National Advertising Company, supra ; Suffolk Outdoor Advertising Company v. Hulse, 43 N.Y.2d 483, 402 N.Y. S.2d 368, 373 N.E.2d 263 (1977); Markham Advertising Company v. State of Washington, 73 Wash.2d 405, 439 P.2d 248, app. dism'd. 393 U.S. 316, 89 S.Ct. 553, 21 L.Ed.2d 512, reh. den. 393 U.S. 1112, 89 S.Ct. 854, 21 L.Ed.2d 813 (1969); 81 A.L. R.3d 486, 509-15. Moreover, as we held in Inhabitants of Boothway, supra, and State v. National Advertising Company, supra , resort to amortization to eliminate nonconforming billboard signs is an appropriate method to achieve the goals that are, in the context now before us, legitimate objectives of the exercise of the police power. As we interpret defendant's position on this point, defendant is not really challenging the particular manner of amortization, as here applied, as unreasonable. [15] The claim is, rather that the statutory provision is constitutionally invalid on its face because it mandates amortization when federal funds are unavailable to assist in the payment of just compensation. Such facial attack must be rejected in light of the overwhelming precedential authority to the contrary already discussed. Lastly, to resort to amortization is not arbitrary or capricious action. As we decided in State v. National Advertising Company, supra , use of amortization to remove signs when federal funding is unavailable to defray the cost to the State of paying just compensation, or when just compensation is not required by the federal standard of effective control, reasonably furthers the permissible State objective of conserving State fiscal resources. Turning to defendant's contention that the Maine statute is an unconstitutional taking of property without just compensation, we find the ground for rejecting this claim in our disposition of a similar challenge to a municipal ordinance regulating off-premises signs. In Inhabitants of Boothbay v. National Advertising, supra , the challenged ordinance banned off-premises billboards and advertising signs visible from the public way. The erection of new nonconforming signs was prohibited. As to those in existence on the date the ordinance became effective, a 10 month period was fixed during which the signowner could amortize the investment. In response to the signowner's challenge that the ordinance effected an unconstitutional taking of property, we held: [t]he consequences of the instant ordinance are not a taking; the billboard is neither condemned, nor is it seized and dedicated to the public purpose. Rather, the ordinance requires the (defendant) and others similarly situated to refrain from the use or maintenance of their property in a manner which that enactment determines to be injurious and unlawful under the police power. Id. at 424. In addition, we further noted that to succeed in an attack on the ordinance as an unconstitutional taking of property the signowner must make a showing that the governmental action substantially impaired or vitiated a property interest. We held that no such showing had been made. Here, defendant has similarly failed to demonstrate that the statute effected an unconstitutional taking of property. There was no seizure of property for dedication to public use. Defendant's property interest in the signs, relative to their cost and intrinsic value, was not diminished by the regulation; the signs could be removed and re-erected in an area legally authorized. Alternatively, they could be converted for salvage value. Also, the five year period of amortization here allowed was far more advantageous to defendant than the merely nine month tolerance period fixed by the ordinance in Boothbay. Defendant has offered no evidence to show that the length of the amortization period was insufficient to permit adequate recoupment of defendant's investment in the signs or that it was arbitrary in any other respects.