Opinion ID: 799364
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Decision to Reconsider Plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial

Text: The grant of a new trial (in civil cases) is a non-final, non-appealable order. See Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 34, 101 S.Ct. 188, 66 L.Ed.2d 193 (1980); Latino v. Kaizer, 58 F.3d 310, 314 (7th Cir.1995). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) provides that non-final orders may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties' rights and liabilities. FED.R.CIV.P. 54(b); see also Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. v. United States, 320 U.S. 1, 47, 63 S.Ct. 1393, 87 L.Ed. 1731 (1943). Because the grant of a new trial is an interlocutory order and thus subject to revision by the district court, the district court has the discretionary authority to reconsider a new trial order. See Gallimore v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 635 F.2d 1165, 1170-72 (5th Cir.1981); see also Peterson v. Lindner, 765 F.2d 698, 704 (7th Cir.1985) (stating that a judge has the power to reconsider an interlocutory order at any time before final judgment). Here, Judge Chang did not err by deciding to reconsider the new trial order. [3] He properly relied on the order's interlocutory status as giving him the authority to reconsider and revise it. Judge Chang also stated that, under the law of the case doctrine, judges should refrain from reopening issues decided in earlier stages of the case absent extraordinary circumstances. See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817, 108 S.Ct. 2166, 100 L.Ed.2d 811 (1988); United States v. Harris, 531 F.3d 507, 513 (7th Cir.2008). We have recognized, however, that the law of the case doctrine is discretionary and does not preclude a district court from reopening a decided issue. See Harris, 531 F.3d at 513; see also Avitia v. Metro. Club of Chicago, Inc., 49 F.3d 1219, 1227 (7th Cir. 1995) (referring to the doctrine as no more than a presumption, one whose strength varies with the circumstances). [4] We nevertheless advise judges that, because litigants have a right to expect consistency even if judges change, the second judge should abide by the rulings of the first judge unless some new development, such as a new appellate decision, convinces him that his predecessor's ruling was incorrect. Fujisawa Pharm. Co. v. Kapoor, 115 F.3d 1332, 1339 (7th Cir.1997); see also Brengettcy v. Horton, 423 F.3d 674, 680 (7th Cir.2005) (noting that the law of the case doctrine is less controlling when the disputed issue is not presented in precisely the same way to the later judge). Judge Chang correctly determined that the law of the case doctrine applies with less force in this case since the prior order was interlocutory and since a new development occurred: defendants had not been given the opportunity to respond to the initial new trial ruling and thus Judge Chang was confronted with the first adversarial presentation of the new trial issue. Additionally, although Judge Chang did not preside over the trial, he was well equipped to reconsider the new trial grant. Judge Chang aptly recognized that he had a freer hand in reconsidering the ruling because Judge Shadur did not rely on first-hand observations of the witnesses' demeanor, body language, or tone of voice. Judge Shadur relied on his common-sense notion of the case (i.e., that the tip was too good to be true), rather than on any in-court observations. Thus, Judge Chang possessed both the authority and the ability to reconsider the new trial order. Because we conclude that Judge Chang properly exercised his discretion in deciding to reconsider the grant of the new trial, we now must consider whether Judge Chang acted within his discretion in reinstating the jury's verdict in favor of defendants.