Opinion ID: 178472
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Summary Judgment on Post-Termination Claims

Text: The district court granted summary judgment on Stiefel's post-termination claims, reasoning that after Stiefel was laid off, he failed to take the steps necessary to give Bechtel a chance to rehire him. We agree. Bechtel's collective bargaining agreement with the Union generally required that Bechtel hire ironworkers based on referrals from the Union. Stiefel admitted that he did not attend roll calls for several months after being laid off and thereafter missed roll calls many, many times for personal reasons. Because he remained at the bottom of the out-of-work list, he was never referred to Bechtel through the normal Union referral process and Bechtel never had a chance to hire him. Stiefel argues that attending the roll calls would have been futile, citing statements by Bechtel employees that Bechtel would not rehire Stiefel until he could obtain a medical release with no work restrictions. Most of these statements were inadmissible hearsay, as the speakers who made them were not involved with or responsible for hiring decisions. Cf. Fed. R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(D). The only apparent exceptions were statements by John Fanto, manager of Bechtel's safety department, related by David Peabody, another ironworker who had approached Fanto about rehiring Stiefel. According to Peabody, Fanto stated that it was Bechtel's policy . . . when someone was injured, not to rehire them until they had a doctor's release, and that such a release must state that there are no restrictions, because there's no light duty at [the power plant]. Bechtel does not dispute that this evidence is admissible as an admission of a party opponent. Under the facts of this case, however, this evidence was not sufficient to defeat Bechtel's motion for summary judgment. We have held in the Title VII context that an employee can prevail in an employment discrimination action without applying for the job if he can show that he was a potential victim of unlawful discrimination and that he would have applied for the job had it not been for those discriminatory practices. Gutowsky v. County of Placer, 108 F.3d 256, 260 (9th Cir.1997) (quoting Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 367-68, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977)) (alteration omitted). In such cases, a court may conduct a subjective evaluation into whether applying would have been futile, Bouman v. Block, 940 F.2d 1211, 1222 (9th Cir.1991), in which the plaintiff must demonstrate a reasonable belief that the employer was so biased that resort to its procedures would have been futile. Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1179 (9th Cir.2003). This futile gesture doctrine, born of our Title VII jurisprudence, applies to ADA plaintiffs because Congress specifically intended that Teamsters `futile gesture' reasoning be applied to ADA claims. Pickern v. Holiday Quality Foods, 293 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir.2002) (citing H. Rep. No. 101-485(II) at 82-83 (1990) (The Committee intends for this doctrine to apply to this title.); S.Rep. No. 101-116 at 43 (1989)). Nonetheless, Stiefel's futile gesture argument fails because it was not supported by his own sworn deposition testimony. Stiefel testified that he was kept away from the hiring hall by personal obligations and schedule conflicts. He confirmed this twice under direct questioning. He said nothing about not attending the meetings because of a belief that it would have been futile. Moreover, Stiefel admitted that Bechtel accommodated the disabilities of other employees. An employer may be liable for discriminating against a single employee in spite of its own generally followed anti-discrimination policy, but Stiefel's knowledge of the company's practice of accommodating disabilities undercuts the reasonableness of his claimed belief that it would have been futile to try to get rehired through the Union referral process. Where a plaintiff does not identify other victims of the discrimination he alleges and testifies only to logistical reasons for his own decision not to seek rehiring, it cannot be said that an application would have been a useless act serving only to confirm [his] knowledge that the job he wanted was unavailable to him. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 367, 97 S.Ct. 1843. Stiefel has not offered sufficient facts that would support a reasonable belief that [Bechtel] was so biased that resort to its [hiring] procedures would have been futile. Holly D., 339 F.3d at 1179. Stiefel points out that an addendum to the collective bargaining agreement allows Bechtel to request manpower from the Union[ ] by identifying . . . the names of previously employed individuals. He argues that Bechtel should have rehired him through this alternate channel, and that Bechtel knew he wanted to be rehired because he submitted personal history questionnaires. [5] But Stiefel was not the only ironworker who wanted to be hired. The ironworkers who presented themselves for hiring by attending the roll calls wanted to be hired, too. Stiefel does not explain why Bechtel was required affirmatively to favor him by asking for him by name even though he had not been referred by the Union in the usual way. The evidence indicates, moreover, that Bechtel did request Stiefel by name from the Union on August 15, 2006, and that Stiefel did not appear for employment in response to the request. The district court cited what it described as undisputed evidence in the form of a requisition form sent by Bechtel to the Union specifically requesting several ironworkers by name, including Stiefel. Stiefel now argues that the document was fabricated, but that was an argument that should have been made to the district court. More to the point, Stiefel himself testified that the Union's business agent called him about a job at the power plant in August 2006. Although he did not recall the agent mentioning the requisition from Bechtel, that testimony, including the timing of that call, corroborates the requisition form and supports the district court's conclusion, based on undisputed evidence, that Bechtel did make a request for Stiefel by name. Unfortunately, as Stiefel testified, the Union agent then told him to forget it because Stiefel did not have a hundred percent medical release. But the Union agent's advice cannot be attributed to Bechtel. Even if Stiefel did not appear for hiring based on the agent's perception that Bechtel required a hundred percent release, that is not itself sufficient, in light of other evidence described above, to persuade a reasonable jury that Stiefel held a reasonable belief that Bechtel had such a policy or would not have hired Stiefel and accommodated his disability if Stiefel had in fact appeared.