Opinion ID: 109401
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Possession Provisions

Text: Another potential effect of civil determinations under the Alabama law will be to deter all the acts proscribed by the statute with respect to the material declared obscene. This is precisely what the statute is meant to do, and generally the Constitution does not assure that acts may be performed with safety in connection with material judicially declared obscene. This is not true, however, with respect to the mere possession of obscene material. The Act has two provisions that affect possession of obscene material. One provision renders possession of mailable matter known . . . to have been judicially found to be obscene under this chapter a misdemeanor subject to a possible fine of $500 and up to six months' imprisonment, or both. § 4 (2). This provision is invalid because the First Amendment prohibits States from regulating possession unrelated to distribution or public exhibition. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557 (1969). The other provision affecting possession of obscene material, § 15, provides that the possession of any three of the things enumerated in . . . [§ 4] (except the possession of them for the purpose of return to the person from whom received) creates a rebuttable presumption that they are intended for dissemination, and the burden of proof that their possession is for the purpose of return is on the possessor. At the least this presumption shifts to defendants the burden of going forward with the evidence on the issue of possession for the purpose of distribution; and if the possessor seeks to explain possession on the ground that he is holding the materials for return, he has the burden of proof on the issue. Mere possession of obscene material for personal use may not be penalized. The obvious danger in creating a presumption that possession is for the purpose of dissemination is that lawful possession will be penalized or that persons will refrain from lawfully possessing arguably protected material. The man who knows that he must bring forth proof and persuade another of the lawfulness of his conduct necessarily must steer far wider of the unlawful zone than if the State must bear these burdens. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 526 (1958). The Alabama law poses a particular hazard in this regard, because the presumption takes effect once the defendant is shown to have possessed any three of the things enumerated in § 4. The things enumerated in § 4 are nonmailable obscene matter and mailable matter judicially declared obscene under the Act. Apparently, the presumption would come into play if a person possessed one copy of three different works which fit the statute's description. This would in effect limit persons to the unregulated possession of a maximum of two things in their libraries. But even if the presumption were to apply only upon proof of possession of three copies of the same item, it might result in punishment and deterrence of lawful activity, since the right to possess obscene material for personal use is not limited to one or two copies of each item. Juries are not so ingenuous that they will fail to draw reasonable inferences from the possession of multiple copies of obscene works. There is no necessity to add to the weight of such evidence presumptions and shifts in the burden of proof which jeopardize the exercise of free speech. I concur insofar as the conviction of petitioner is reversed. MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL joins this opinion. MR. JUSTICE STEWART joins all but Part III of this opinion.