Opinion ID: 1161819
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the doctrine of assumption of risk

Text: The defense of assumption of risk is relatively new to the common law, [3] and the typical case of risk assumption draws either from a status relation or a contract between the parties. [4] The root of the defense, which evolved in the master/servant or employer/employee context, was used by employers to protect the emerging industries of the 19th century from claims of employment-related injuries. [5] The decisions held that the employee was free to contract for service to be rendered and, because of his status he assumed all risks of harm other than hazards stemming from the employer's failure to provide a safe place to work. [6] This aspect of risk assumption survives today mainly in situations where a plaintiff either expressly agrees that the defendant will be held blameless for the plaintiff's failure to exercise due care for his protection in certain circumstances, [7] or where the defendant does not owe a duty of care to the plaintiff. [8] In the former, the plaintiff expressly consents to relieve the defendant of an obligation of conduct to him and to take the chance of injury from a known risk arising from what the defendant is to do or leave undone. [9] In the latter instance, the defendant would not be negligent because he owes no duty to the plaintiff. [10] A classic example of this type of risk assumption is afforded by a fan injured while attending a sports event. [11] The fan is deemed to have consented that the game may be played without taking any precautions to protect him from stray balls, and the law takes notice of the existence of a special relational duty between the fan and the owner. Another aspect of risk assumption arises from Roman law and is the source of much confusion. This concept is encapsulated in the maxim volenti non fit injuria, which means: If one, knowing and comprehending the danger, voluntarily exposes himself to it, though not negligent in so doing, he is deemed to have assumed the risk and is precluded from recovery for the resulting injury. The maxim is predicated upon the theory of knowledge and appreciation of the danger and voluntary assent. [12] A subjective standard is applied in evaluating a plaintiff's knowledge, comprehension and appreciation of the risk. [13] The touchstone of the assumption-of-risk defense is consent to harm and not heedlessness or indifference. In the context of general negligence law, it is not true that in every case where the plaintiff voluntarily encounters a known danger he necessarily consents to any future negligence of the defendant. A pedestrian who crosses the street in the middle of a block through a stream of traffic traveling at excessive speed cannot be deemed to consent that the drivers shall not use care to watch for him and avoid running him down. On the contrary, he is insisting that they shall. [14] This is simply a case for application of contributory negligence. A plaintiff may expose himself to potential harm and not consent to relieve the defendant of any future duty to act with reasonable care. [15] The defense of risk assumption is proper in the relational context previously mentioned but it should not be allowed as a substitute for what is in reality contributory negligence. In sum, where neither the law, status, nor contract calls for the application of some relational duty between the parties, which is distinct from that imposable by general negligence, neither assumption of risk nor consent to injury may be inferred in a negligence-based tort suit from a mere face-to-face chance encounter of one stranger with another. [16]