Opinion ID: 767180
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The district court's treatment of the evidence.

Text: 33 The Shumways argue that the district court erred in treating as undisputed the Forest Service's claims that their mill sites had changed, were strewn with junk, and that cleanup would cost $150,000. The district court rejected Mr. Shumway's affidavit on the ground that it was self-serving and conclusory and rejected an affidavit by a Mr. Clay Richard Thorne on the ground that he failed to allege personal knowledge. The district court said that the Shumways had submitted no evidence contradicting the government's evidence that much of the material on the mill sites was scrap or junk. This evidence was material both to whether the Forest Service had authority to order the Shumways to remove the material, and to the amount of a reasonable bond. Because the Shumways had a possessory right to their mill sites, they were not only permitted, but until their right to a patent vested, required to use and occupy the mill sites for milling purposes, 59 and were entitled to have a residence, equipment, materials, tools, and other property on the site incident to milling operations. 60 34 Regarding the things on the property, the district court was bound, on summary judgment, to determine only whether there was a genuine issue of material fact, and was not empowered to weigh the evidence or determine the truth of the matters asserted. 61 When a respondent to a motion for summary judgment submitsproper affidavits by individuals with personal knowledge and other cognizable and significantly probative evidence, such that a reasonable juror drawing all inferences in favor of the respondent could return a verdict in the respondent's favor, the judge must treat that fact as genuinely at issue. 62 35 Mr. Shumway's affidavit was of course self-serving, as the district court noted. And properly so, because otherwise there would be no point in his submitting it. That an affidavit is self-serving bears on its credibility, not on its cognizability for purposes of establishing a genuine issue of material fact. If the affidavit stated only conclusions, and not such facts as would be admissible in evidence, 63 then it would be too conclusory to be cognizable, but Mr. Shumway's affidavit was not inadmissible for failure to state facts. It does state facts. 36 Mr. Shumway swears in his 1995 affidavit to a number of material facts for which personal knowledge and competence is established by the affidavit. He says the operations conducted on my mill sites have not substantially changed over the last 15 years, and I process ore on a regular basis at the mill site in the same manner I have done for the last 15 years. As to the things on the site, he says All of the equipment and materials stored on the mill sites have been or were incidental to the milling operations including my horse which I use to ride the perimeter fence of my mill sites and to ride into the wilderness (no vehicles are allowed) to inspect mines that are in the wilderness area. These statements are all such facts as would be admissible in evidence on Mr. Shumway's testimony, so the district court erred in disregarding them. They must be taken as true for purposes of determining whether there is a genuine issue of fact precluding summary judgment. 37 As for Mr. Thorne, he established competence as an expert witness on some matters and personal knowledge on others. He says in his affidavit that he is the president of an environmental consulting, cleanup and testing firm, has mined himself in the same area since the early 1970s, has testified in state and federal courts as a mining expert, and personally inspected the Shumway mill site with a Stanford University biochemist he employs. He swears that I have personally processed many tons of ore from my own mining operations through the Shumway mill site, and I have personal knowledge that many other mining interests in the area have utilized the Shumway mill site for processing or assaying of their ore. As to the alleged junk, Mr. Thorne says I have inspected the equipment located on the Shumway mill site and in my estimation the usable mining equipment alone has a replacement value for mining purposes of no less than $400,000.  After describing his familiarity with the Shumway mill sites since their inception, Mr. Thorne says there has been no substantial change whatsoever in the Shumway mill site operation nor has there been any increase in environmental damage at all for the past several years. As to the tailing ponds, Mr. Thorne says I have personally inspected the terrain  and states and explains his opinion that there is little if any risk of environmental contamination because of where they are located, even considering the 100 year flood level. He says the chemicals are properly stored, and hazardous chemicals are used only in the laboratory, which is properly constructed with a cement floor. All this is based on what Mr. Thorne swears in his affidavit he saw with his own educated eyes. His affidavit shows affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to these matters and that it is made on personal knowledge. 64 The district court therefore erred in disregarding it. 38 The Shumways also submitted evidence attached to their brief on appeal, showing that in contrast to the government's new estimates of $150,000 to $200,000 to clean up the site, 75 to 100 times the original bond requirement, they had obtained an actual bid to do the work for $13,115. Because this was not submitted to the district court when it considered the summary judgment motion, it can have no bearing on whether the district court erred. 65 We therefore decide the case without considering it. The evidence erroneously excluded matters, as we explain below. 39