Opinion ID: 297147
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: issues

Text: 11 While appellants assign a variety of reasons for reversal of the judgment of the trial court, we hold that two principal questions are involved: (1) are the orders in question reviewable, and (2) if reviewable, is this court permitted to substitute its judgment for that of the military authorities as to the necessity for the orders in question? 12 (1) Following the decision in Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 73 S. Ct. 534, 97 L.Ed. 842 (1953), many courts seemed to confuse jurisdiction with scope of review. However, to say that an action is non-reviewable is not the equivalent of saying that the appropriate court lacks jurisdiction to review. Although the scope of review in cases such as this involving military matters is extremely limited, that does not mean that any military action is beyond the reach of the courts. Smith v. Resor, 406 F.2d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1969). Therefore, in a strict sense, the orders before us are not non-reviewable. The phrase non-reviewability is properly ascribed to the scope of review, rather than jurisdiction to review. The Orloff case supports this view. 13 (2) The appellants claim that the orders here under scrutiny violate their freedoms of speech and religion under the First Amendment. Initially, we note that these rights are not absolute. Regulation as to the time, place, and manner of such rights is proper when reasonably related to a valid public interest. Sellers v. Regents of the University of California, 432 F.2d 493, 499 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied 401 U.S. 981, 91 S.Ct. 1194, 28 L.Ed.2d 333 (1971). The record before us leaves no doubt but that the orders in question could be justified in terms of a reasonable regulation of First Amendment activity. While the evidence implicating the appellant Jones may be somewhat thin, we hold it to be sufficient. 14 Moreover, persons in command of a military post, such as appellees, have wide discretion as to whom they may exclude from their posts. This discretion will be disturbed only upon a showing that the grounds for exclusion were patently arbitrary or discriminatory. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers, etc. v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 81 S.Ct. 1743, 6 L.Ed.2d 1230 (1961). True enough, Cafeteria Workers involved a restaurant worker on the base, rather than a minister. However, we can find no valid reason why the logic employed in Cafeteria Workers should not be applied to the facts before us. In the totality of circumstances presented by this record, it cannot be said that the actions of appellees, in excluding appellant ministers from the respective posts, were patently arbitrary or discriminatory. Cafeteria Workers makes it clear that access to a military reservation is a matter within the sound discretion of the commander of the post. Any review of this discretion, other than to determine whether the action was patently arbitrary or discriminatory, is precluded by the logic of both Cafeteria Workers and Orloff. 15 We are not here concerned with Sixth Amendment rights and express no view as to the result if those rights were involved. 16 Appellees' motion to dismiss on the ground that the appeals are moot is denied. The judgment of the lower court, in each case, is Affirmed.