Opinion ID: 1430326
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: procedural error in permitting the felony-murder instruction to stand

Text: Assuming an evidentiary basis for application of the felony-murder rule, there is no doubt that the State had the right to charge the defendant alternatively and to go to the jury on alternative charges or theories. Section 46-11-404(1), MCA, provides in part: An ... information ... may charge ... different statements of the same offense ... under separate counts... . The prosecution is not required to elect between the different offenses or counts set forth in the ... information ... It is clear, therefore, that although there would be but one offense in relation to the death of each person, a jury could have returned a verdict finding defendant guilty under the purposely or knowingly theory or under the felony-murder theory, or under both theories. But the crucial issue here is that the State had no right to present both theories to the jury in the absence of charges initially informing the defendant that he was charged under both theories. If the State desired to amend the information before trial and include an alternative count of felony-murder, it had the right to do so. In fact, section 46-11-403, MCA, entitled Amending the Charge, sets forth the procedure for amending an information. But no effort was ever made to amend the charges before the trial, or for that matter, at any time. With the statutory background of sections 46-11-404(1) and 46-11-403, MCA, in mind, I fail to see how a possible felony-murder conviction can be based upon a theory not charged in the information. There is no indication in the record of why defense counsel at trial failed to catch the new theory sprung on the defendant by instruction 16, setting forth the felony-murder rule in addition to the charge that defendant purposely or knowingly killed the McLeans. Trial counsel did not represent defendant on the appeal of this case (the reason being that sometime after the conviction in this case, he went to work for the county prosecutor who tried this case). It appears, nonetheless, that his failure to object to the felony-murder portion of the instruction, was inadvertent. His objection to the instruction was that it was repetitious of other instructions already defining deliberate homicide and the elements to be proved. It was indeed repetitious; but it went one step beyond this and injected the felony-murder theory into this case for the first time. It is fundamentally unfair that the prosecutor can be rewarded for his deliberate injection of a new issue and theory into the trial upon the settlement of instructions, in total violation of the procedural rules governing the charging of an offense. Why should a defendant be punished because the prosecutor has violated the basic procedural statutes governing his conduct as a prosecutor? The majority's rationale for permitting the felony-murder instruction and possible conviction for felony-murder to stand, is more than tissue-paper thin. Waiver by failing to object to the instruction, and failure to move the court to require the prosecution to elect its theory to present to the jury, are the announced grounds. As to waiver, the majority's reliance on State v. Campbell (1965), 146 Mont. 251, 405 P.2d 978, and cited by the State in its brief on this point, is misplaced. In Campbell, the raising of an objection to an instruction on one ground at trial, and on an entirely different ground on appeal, was held to constitute a waiver. But the instruction involved in Campbell did not inject into the trial an entirely new theory of the case. Here the State is rewarded for proceeding in blatant violation of the underlying statutory guidelines for charging and amending criminal charges. A waiver theory must have as its underlying foundation, a belief that the error was not so fundamental as to require a reversal. Here the error is so fundamental, and so palpable, that a reversal is required. As its second procedural reason for turning down defendant's argument with relation to the felony-murder instruction, the Court states: Additionally, at trial, Sunday did not require the State to specify which theory of deliberate homicide the State was following. In the context of this case, this rationale has no application at all. Where only one theory has been charged it is rather difficult and meaningless to require a defendant to move to require the prosecutor to specify which theory he will rely on in asking the jury to reach a decision. The charges contained no basis upon which a defendant could make such a motion. Furthermore, assuming that defendant was charged alternatively with felony-murder, there was no basis in the law upon which a defendant could successfully move that the State elect its theory. Section 46-11-404(1), supra, specifically allows alternative charges and states, moreover, that ... The prosecution is not required to elect ... Here the error is plain and the prejudice manifest. This Court has a duty to recognize such manifest errors and take the necessary corrective measures. Indeed, under the plain error doctrine this Court can take the necessary corrective action where the error has affected the substantial rights of the parties. The only remedy here is to grant defendant a new trial. For reasons that I am unable to fathom, there is an ever present tendency of this Court to relieve the trial courts of their affirmative duties to properly instruct the jury on the applicable law of the case. As far as I am concerned such duty inheres in the office of a district judge and cannot be delegated to trial counsel for either party. Although the duty is equally clear in civil and criminal cases, life and liberty is at stake in criminal cases and thus there are more compelling reasons to require the District Court to properly instruct the jury. In this respect, the trial judge cannot be an idle participant, leaving it to counsel to provide the appropriate instructions for the jury. There is, of course, a strong duty of counsel to aid the trial court in preparing the appropriate instructions, but the ultimate duty cannot be delegated to counsel. Here it was the plain duty of the prosecutor to refrain from offering an instruction which injected a theory of criminal homicide which had not been specifically charged. It was further the duty not to offer an instruction on a theory which has no evidentiary basis. It was equally the duty of the trial court not to permit the prosecutor to receive the benefit of an additional theory of criminal responsibility where such theory has not been charged and where the trial has not been conducted on that basis. Furthermore, it is the duty of a trial court to reject an instruction which offers a theory upon which there is no evidentiary basis.