Opinion ID: 1781175
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: adoption of state's proposed findings

Text: Phillips complains that the motion court clearly erred by adopting in whole the State's findings of fact and conclusions of law. Phillips concedes that this Court has held that it is proper for the motion court to adopt in whole or in part the findings of fact and conclusions of law drafted by one of the parties so long as the court thoughtfully and carefully considers the party's proposed findings and agrees with the content. State v. White, 873 S.W.2d 590, 600 (Mo. banc 1994). She insists, however, that the court in this case did not thoughtfully and carefully consider the State's proposed findings, because several factual claims made by the State and then adopted by the court were refuted and contradicted by the record. Phillips has identified only one allegedly refuted factual finding, and a review of the record shows that the testimony at the hearing did, in fact, support the finding, although the court did identify the wrong attorney as having provided the testimony. One minor error in the court's findings, though, does not establish that the court did not carefully consider the State's proposed findings. We cannot say that the motion court did not exercise independent judgment in its adoption of the State's findings of fact and conclusions of law. This point is denied. A. HANDWRITING EXEMPLARS Phillips raised several claims in her Rule 29.15 motion regarding the trial court's order that she submit handwriting samples and the trial court's admission of her refusal to do so on May 17, 1990. Specifically, she alleged that the trial court misled counsel as to what it intended to do concerning the handwriting samples and that the State committed misconduct by not taking the samples when it had the opportunity to do so. She now contends that the motion court clearly erred in denying her relief on these claims. Phillips' claim that the trial court misled her arises from events that took place on January 23, 1992, and January 31, 1992. On January 23, the State filed a motion to allow evidence of Phillips' refusal to submit handwriting samples on the ground that Phillips had not yet complied with the court's order to provide handwriting samples. Phillips' refusal, according to the State, was evidence of her consciousness of guilt. The court overruled the motion without prejudice to renew. On January 31, the State renewed its motion to allow evidence of Phillips' refusal to provide a handwriting sample and supplemented the motion with an offer of proof. The court then lifted its earlier order in limine that had precluded evidence of Phillips' refusal and stated that it fully advised counsel on January 23 of what [it] intended to do unless there was a compliance with the court's earlier order. In ruling that the refusal evidence would be allowed, the court explained that Phillips was always ordered to give the samples and that she had neither complied nor shown that the State had refused to accept her compliance. Phillips claims her attorneys were misled because, contrary to the trial court's statement on January 31, they were not fully advised on January 23 of the consequences of not supplying a handwriting sample. The record shows that the trial court did not specifically advise Phillips' attorneys on January 23 of what it intended to do if Phillips did not comply with the earlier order to provide a handwriting sample. This is not evidence, however, that the court misled the attorneys. The attorneys were fully aware that the court was overruling the State's motion to present the refusal evidence without prejudice to renew and that the motion alleged that Phillips had not complied with the court's order. Under these circumstances, the attorneys should have known that the State might renew its motion and that Phillips' compliance with the court's order would be at issue, and they should also have known that in light of Phillips' failure to comply, the court could decide to allow the evidence of her refusal on May 17. The court's failure to advise the attorneys of what a future ruling might be is not a misleading on the part of the court. The motion court did not clearly err in denying Phillips' claim that her attorneys were misled. Phillips' claim of prosecutorial misconduct is also without merit. She argues that the State engaged in that misconduct by failing to appear at the Greene County Jail on November 27 to obtain handwriting samples and then attempting to use her failure to submit a sample on May 17 as evidence of her guilt. On January 31, however, during arguments to support the renewed motion to admit the refusal evidence, the prosecutor informed the court that in several conversations he had with Phillips' attorneys, just before November 27, the attorneys indicated that Phillips' position to refuse to provide a handwriting sample had not changed. The State was not required to disbelieve Phillips' attorneys on this matter. The motion court did not clearly err in denying this claim. C. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL To establish that counsel's assistance was so ineffective as to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence, the movant must show that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the movant must satisfy both the performance prong and the prejudice prong; if the movant fails to satisfy either prong, the reviewing court need not consider the other. Sidebottom v. State, 781 S.W.2d 791, 796 (Mo. banc 1989). Counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and to have made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2065-66. The movant must also overcome the presumption that the challenged action was sound trial strategy. Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. To prove prejudice, the movant must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. See also State v. Richardson, 923 S.W.2d 301, 326-27 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 403, 136 L.Ed.2d 317 (1996).
Phillips claims that her counsel were ineffective in their handling of the court's order to produce handwriting samples. She alleges that she received conflicting advice from her attorneys on whether she should give a handwriting sample to the State. This conflicting advice, however, came after the events of May 17, 1990, when she first refused to submit a sample. At that time she was advised by counsel to submit a sample, but she disregarded the advice. Only the refusal of May 17-a decision that was not influenced by her attorneys-was admitted into evidence at trial. Further, Phillips does not attempt to allege that if all her attorneys had urged her to submit a sample that she would have done so, and in fact, the events of May 17 suggest otherwise. Phillips cannot show she was prejudiced by the actions of her counsel, because it was fully her initial decision to refuse to submit a handwriting sample. The motion court did not clearly err in denying this ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Phillips argues that her counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present evidence during guilt phase that her son, Buddy Minster, killed and dismembered Plaster. Part of this evidence includes opinions as to Buddy's bad temper; Buddy's employment both as a butcher and in the euthanasia room of the Humane Society; Buddy's possession of scissors that he claimed could be used to dismember a body and butcher tools; Buddy's passing of a bad check; his prior alcohol and drug abuse; and his prior criminal record. These matters are not relevant to any issue in the case, and they pertain, instead, to Buddy's character, or rather bad character. Other evidence, however, consists of statements made by Buddy implicating him in the crime. He allegedly said that his mother had been missing from their apartment for several days the week of the murder, that his mother was taking the fall, and that he passed a lie detector test even though he was lying. These statements, even taken at face value, do not exonerate Phillips, as they do not even suggest that she was not involved in the murder. The point is denied.
For her next point, Phillips argues that her trial counsel were ineffective for failing to investigate and present evidence of her mental health. At counsel's request, Phillips was examined by at least four psychologists and one sociologist before trial, and counsel also obtained medical records and other information from her treating physician. Phillips characterizes all of this information as a wealth of mental health evidence, yet she still complains that counsel's investigation in this regard was deficient. We disagree. As the record shows, counsel did obtain several evaluations of Phillips' mental status, and she fails to make any allegations as to what investigative avenues were left untouched. In a related argument, Phillips contends that counsel was ineffective for failing to litigate her competency to proceed to trial, and in support, she relies on one psychologist's testimony that she could not assist her attorneys due to her mental condition. She ignores, however, the testimony of three of the other psychologists who examined her before trial, all of whom found that she was competent to stand trial. Given these opinions by the mental health experts who examined Phillips, it was not unreasonable for counsel to decline to litigate the issue of competency. Finally, Phillips complains that the evidence regarding her mental health should have been presented during the guilt phase of trial even if she was competent to proceed. Evidence of a defendant's mental disease or defect is admissible during the guilt phase only if offered to show lack of responsibility for one or more elements of the crime charged, including absence of the appropriate culpable mental state. See State v. Copeland, 928 S.W.2d 828, 837 (Mo. banc 1996) cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 981, 136 L.Ed.2d 864 (1997); § 552.015, RSMo 1986. At least two of the psychologists who examined her before trial found that Phillips' mental problems did not exclude legal responsibility and that she knew right from wrong. In fact, Phillips does not now point to any evidence that she suffered from a mental disease or defect that would establish a lack of responsibility for the murder. Under these facts, counsel was not ineffective for rejecting a guilt-phase defense based upon mental disease or defect. The motion court did not clearly err in finding that counsel was not ineffective in the investigation and presentation of Phillips' mental health evidence.
Phillips raises ineffective assistance of counsel as an alternative to her claims of plain error during the guilt phase closing arguments. The substance of these arguments was discussed and rejected in Part III. Although the objection to the footprint argument was improperly preserved, Phillips was not prejudiced because the prosecutor did not misstate the evidence. Furthermore, counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to the other arguments that Phillips now claims were improper, because, as we have already determined, the arguments were permissible. The motion court did not clearly err in denying these claims.
Phillips alleges that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve the issue of the impeachment of Buddy's testimony with evidence of his prior criminal convictions. We have already determined that the trial court committed no error in refusing to allow Phillips to use Buddy's prior convictions for impeachment purposes. Trial counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing to preserve a claim that had no merit. The motion court did not clearly err in denying this claim.
Phillips raises a series of claims regarding counsel's alleged ineffectiveness during the guilt phase proceeding in the examination and presentation of witnesses.
Phillips complains of trial counsel's failure to impeach two witnesses. The mere failure to impeach a witness, however, does not entitle a movant to postconviction relief. State v. Dunn, 889 S.W.2d 65, 76 (Mo.App.1994). Rather, movant has the burden of showing that the impeachment would have provided her with a defense or would have changed the outcome of the trial, and she must also overcome the presumption that counsel's decision not to impeach was a matter of trial strategy. Id. The first claim is that counsel should have impeached Jean Walker's testimony that she saw a car similar to Phillips' car in the area where Plaster's body was found shortly before the body was discovered. This testimony, Phillips explains, should have been countered with Walker's prior statement that she saw two people in the car. This prior statement, we observe, is not necessarily inconsistent, but even if it was, counsel was not unreasonable to decline to use it. Co-counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that he did not want to present the jury with the possibility that two people were acting together in Plaster's murder, because the jury might conclude that Phillips was one of those people. In this instance, Phillips has not overcome the presumption that counsel's decision not to impeach with this statement was reasonable trial strategy. Next Phillips claims that counsel should have impeached Ethel Griep's trial testimony that she met Phillips in Branson on October 6, 1990, at close to 5:00 p.m. with Griep's prior inconsistent statement to the police that she met Phillips between 4:00 and 4:30 p.m. The prior inconsistent statement was important to Phillips' case because it placed her in Branson closer to 4:00 p.m., which was the time, according to other evidence, that the body was discarded miles away. Despite Phillips' allegations, counsel did in fact question Griep about her prior statement, and she responded that she did not remember its contents, but that her memory would have been clearer when she made the prior statement. The point is denied.
Phillips contends that counsel was ineffective in failing to conduct independent scientific testing and in cross-examining the State's handwriting and fingerprint experts. Specifically, she claims that counsel should have obtained an independent handwriting expert to examine the $4,050 check made out to her and to examine the handwriting samples she gave to the State. To support her position, Phillips presented the testimony of August Nilges, a handwriting expert, at the Rule 29.15 hearing. Nilges testified that Plaster's signature on the $4,050 check was genuine and did not appear to have been made under stress or duress. He also testified that he examined the handwriting sample given by Phillips to the police and he detected no signs that Phillips attempted to disguise her penmanship. We do not agree, however, that Phillips was prejudiced by the failure of counsel to obtain and present this testimony at trial. Although the evidence may have rebutted the State's argument that the forged check and Phillips' disguised penmanship were evidence of guilt, in view of the other substantial evidence of Phillips' guilt, there is no reasonable probability that the outcome of the guilt phase would have been different. Phillips also submits that her counsel were ineffective in cross-examining the State's forensic expert Gene Geitzen and the State's fingerprint expert Donald Hampton. She states that her counsel failed to elicit testimony from Geitzen that he had concluded that none of Phillips' shoes were consistent with the footprints he saw at Plaster's house and failed to elicit testimony from Hampton that Phillips' fingerprints were not found on Plaster's car. In view of the trial as a whole, this testimony would not have exonerated Phillips and was certainly not outcome determinative. The point is denied.
Phillips claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence that would have cast doubt on whether she was with Plaster on the night of the murder, Tuesday, October 3, 1989. At trial, Jimmie Shelton and Linda Dorsey, both employees of the Top Rail Lounge, testified for the State that they saw Phillips and Plaster together at the Top Rail on the night of October 3. Shelton, however, had made a prior statement to the police that he saw Phillips and Plaster together on Monday, October 2. Impeaching Shelton with this statement, Phillips contends, would have changed the outcome of the trial. We disagree. Even if the jury were to believe that Shelton saw Phillips and Plaster together on October 2 rather than October 3, this fact alone would not have provided Phillips with a defense. It does not preclude the possibility that they were together on both the 2nd and the 3rd. Phillips also argues that counsel should have elicited testimony from Dorsey during cross-examination that Phillips stayed at the Top Rail Lounge long after Plaster left and that she stayed until the band stopped playing. The record shows that counsel did elicit testimony from Dorsey during cross-examination that Plaster left at least a half hour before Phillips, so Phillips' trial counsel did essentially what she is claiming he failed to do. Counsel's cross-examination of Shelton and Dorsey was not ineffective. Finally, Phillips argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to call several witnesses during guilt phase who allegedly would have testified that they saw Plaster and Phillips together on Monday, October 2, 1989. In order to show that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present a witness, a defendant must prove that the witness could have been located through reasonable efforts, that the witness would have testified if called, and that the testimony would have provided a viable defense. See State v. Twenter, 818 S.W.2d 628, 639-40 (Mo. banc 1991). Testimony that Phillips and Plaster were together on Monday, October 2, totally fails to provide Phillips with a viable defense, because, as stated above, they might have been together on the 3rd as well. Counsel was not ineffective in failing to call these witnesses. The motion court did not clearly err in denying these claims.