Opinion ID: 2139457
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Letica first alleges there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction of attempted criminal deviate conduct. He acknowledges, but challenges, our standard of review. In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge credibility. We examine only the circumstantial and direct evidence most favorable to the judgment together with all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. If there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the conclusion that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the judgment will not be set aside on appeal. Thomas v. State (1988), Ind., 519 N.E.2d 143, 144-45. Letica argues that this standard of review is inconsistent with Ind.Trial Rules 50 and 59. We find nothing in these rules which is inconsistent with our appellate standard of review as set forth above. Letica next contends, without citation to authority, that our standard of review is one-sided and unconstitutional because it deprives him of his due process rights on appeal. In Jackson v. Virginia (1979), 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, the United States Supreme Court set forth the relevant appellate standard of review in federal habeas corpus proceedings as follows: [T]his inquiry does not require a court to ask whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 at 282, 17 L.Ed.2d 362, 87 S.Ct. 483 [486 (1966)] (emphasis added). Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 at 362, 32 L.Ed.2d 152, 92 S.Ct. 1620 [1624 (1972)]. This familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Once a defendant has been found guilty of the crime charged, the factfinder's role as weigher of the evidence is preserved through a legal conclusion that upon judicial review all of the evidence is to be considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution. The criterion thus impinges upon jury discretion only to the extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental protection of due process of law. 443 U.S. at 318-319, 99 S.Ct. at 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d at 573-74 (footnotes omitted, emphasis in original). We apply the same standard of review on questions of insufficiency of the evidence on direct appeal. This fundamental standard of review is not unconstitutional. We now turn to the merits of Letica's claim of insufficiency. Letica introduced alibi evidence and, although he acknowledges that the alibi testimony alone does not constitute sufficient grounds for reversal on appeal, he contends that such evidence, when combined with other factors present in this case, requires a reversal of his conviction. Those other alleged factors include conflicting evidence, a lack of positive identification, tainted identification procedures, and a lack of recollection by the victims at trial. Letica maintains that a number of conflicts in the evidence lead to the conclusion that there was a substantial likelihood of misidentification in this case. Letica first points out that neither victim detected, or remembered, any odor of alcohol on their attacker's breath, whereas one of the arresting officers, Dennis Meyers, testified that in speaking with Letica upon his arrest, he noticed an obvious odor of alcohol. In addition, M.M. noticed nothing distinctive about her attacker's bare arms and C.A. mentioned her attacker had tatoos, but could not remember which arm the tatoos were on. In court, Letica demonstrated that he had tatoos on both arms, his chest, back and groin area, and that he had the tatoos on his body on July 12, 1987, the date of the crime. Letica also notes that neither victim mentioned the fact that his hands were greasy, whereas Detective Kiser testified that the palms of his hands were noticeably greasy. What Letica fails to mention, however, is that arresting Officer Mesich testified that when he initially pulled over Letica, he got off of his bicycle and started doing something to the chain. In addition, when Letica was brought to the police station for fingerprinting, he wanted photographs taken of his hands due to the fact that they were greasy and dirty. Finally, neither one of the victims was able to positively identify his bicycle in court. All of this evidence was presented to the trial judge who had each witness before him. We decline Letica's invitation to reweigh this evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Thomas, supra . Letica presents no grounds for reversal on these issues. Letica further maintains that there was a lack of a positive identification by the victims and that the identification procedures upon his arrest were tainted. Letica first contends C.A. was unable to identify Letica in court as her attacker. Letica also argues, without citation to authority, that the identification procedures subsequent to his arrest were impermissibly suggestive. M.M. was able, over objection, to identify Letica in court and testified that she had no doubt in her mind that he was her attacker. It is undisputed that M.M. and C.A. were attacked by the same man. C.A. testified that Letica looked like the same person as her attacker in court, but was not positive of her identification. Nevertheless, C.A. did testify that if Letica was the same guy that they had caught that night, then it's him. Arresting Officer Mesich did identify Letica in court as the individual he arrested on the night of July 12, 1987. Nevertheless, Letica alleges the post-arrest identification procedures were impermissibly suggestive. Letica points to the fact that both victims remained in a squad car while he was standing, with his bicycle, next to a number of police officers. From this, he concludes, a strong impression was left in the victims' minds prior to the identification that the police had their man. It is well established that one-on-one confrontations, even though suggestive, are proper in circumstances where they occur immediately after the crime is committed. Savage v. State (1988), Ind., 523 N.E.2d 758, 761 (citing cases). Here, both victims identified Letica as their attacker within 30 minutes after the crime occurred. Both victims had ample opportunity to observe Letica when he rode past them on his bicycle outside of Willowcreek School, and when he followed them as they walked home. One of the victims, M.M., was able to positively identify him in court. Both victims unequivocally identified him soon after his arrest. We find no error on these issues. Finally, Letica maintains that the trial court judge expressed doubt in convicting him and that this Court should accordingly reverse his conviction and remand the case for a new trial by jury. The trial court judge's comments were, in pertinent part, as follows (emphasis added): I've been sitting here over 15 years. I'm no expert on anything. I've heard plenty of criminal cases, murder to rape or whatever, and it's a known fact, human nature, that in many criminal cases some witnesses testify accurately, some are mistaken at times and, unfortunately, some lie. That's just the way it is. It will be that way a long time after I'm gone. It's always been that way. That's the way the evidence comes in. Now, there is  If this is a misidentification case, which is possible, then I'm deeply sorry. I don't apologize because it's not my mistake in identification. I didn't identify anybody. It would be the mistake of the two victims, two girls. I apologize for them. I don't want to analyze all the facts in the case. The attorneys have done that for me. I don't have to do that. I'm convinced beyond a reasonable doubt there's no mistake. There is no mistake, no doubt in my mind about it. If there was a doubt in my mind, that would be my judgment. There's no mistake here. I find the Defendant guilty of Count I, Criminal Deviate Conduct, Class B felony; Count III, Battery, Class A misdemeaner [sic]; Count IV Battery, Class A misdemeanor. These comments, while recognizing Letica's defense of mistaken identity, do not lead us to the conclusion that a reasonable doubt existed in the mind of the trial judge. In fact, the trial judge explicitly stated that he was convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that there was no mistake. Letica presents no reversible error on these issues.