Opinion ID: 1405837
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Sequestered voir dire.

Text: (35) Pursuant to Hovey, supra, 28 Cal.3d at pages 69-81, a sequestered voir dire was held on issues pertaining to the death qualification of jurors (see Wainwright, supra, 469 U.S. at pp. 424, 432-433 [83 L.Ed.2d at p. 857]; Witherspoon, supra, 391 U.S. at pp. 521-523 [20 L.Ed.2d at pp. 784-786]). The court, however, overruled defense counsel's repeated requests and efforts to include in the sequestered portion of the voir dire questions about panelists' attitudes on such subjects as drugs, psychiatry, homosexuality, and witchcraft, insofar as they might affect the juror's penalty choice in a particular case. The court expressed its willingness to allow questions on all these issues during general voir dire, and to consider individual cases in which a juror's answers might justify further private inquiry on the issue of death qualification. Defendant renews his contention that the court's restrictive ruling violated Hovey. There the majority cited studies suggesting that when prospective jurors are subjected to repeated questioning of their fellows in open court about willingness to assess the death penalty, they may become desensitized and uncertain about their own reluctance to vote for capital punishment. Hovey therefore imposed, as a prospective rule of judicial procedure, a requirement that each juror be privately questioned about his qualifications to serve on a capital jury. (28 Cal.3d at pp. 80-81.) Hovey expressly provided that the rule of sequestration does not extend to questions routinely pertinent in a noncapital case, including those which probe attitudes toward potentially controversial defenses (insanity, diminished capacity, self-defense, or alibi), facts (defendants' race, drug use, or sexual conduct), or rules of law (defendant's right not to testify, presumption of innocence, truth beyond a reasonable doubt, or jury unanimity). However, if any of these questions in a specific case are relevant to the death-qualification of the panel or may tend to identify those prospective jurors whose views on capital punishment render them ineligible, then those particular questions should be answered individually and in sequestration. It is the duty of trial counsel to alert the court in advance of voir dire as to which of those general topics are likely to call forth answers bearing on the death-qualification of the jury. (28 Cal.3d at p. 81, fn. 137, italics added.) Manifestly, this latter proviso must be reasonably construed. It does not permit defendant to obtain sequestered voir dire for his questions about juror attitudes on any and all controversial issues in the case simply by urging that he must determine whether their presence might affect the jurors' penalty choice. Any such expanded interpretation could easily require the bulk of voir dire in a capital case to be conducted individually. It would ignore Hovey's explicit limitation to specific case[s] and particular questions which arise with respect to individual jurors. Here, counsel at no time alert[ed] the trial court to any such individual situations. He simply sought to convert examination on all controversial issues into a sequestered voir dire on attitudes toward penalty. On the other hand, the court expressly left itself open to the possibility of expanded private questioning where it appeared appropriate in particular cases. There was no Hovey violation. [36]
Defendant requests that we review his sentence to determine whether it is constitutionally disproportionate in light of the facts of his crime, his personal characteristics, and the penalties imposed in other cases. (36) Of course, California's death penalty scheme satisfies the federal Constitution despite its failure to provide for proportionality review. ( McClesky, supra, 481 U.S. at pp. 307-308, and fn. 28 [95 L.Ed.2d at p. 288]; Pulley, supra, 465 U.S. at pp. 50-54 [79 L.Ed.2d at pp. 40-43].) Assuming such review is required under the state Constitution (Cal. Const., art. I, § 17; see, e.g., People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 477-489 [194 Cal. Rptr. 390, 668 P.2d 697]), the facts stated above indicate that defendant's sentence is fully proportionate to his individual culpability. Nor can he assert his punishment is more severe than that imposed for less serious crimes or disproportionate to the sentence imposed for similar crimes in other jurisdictions. ( In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 423-429 [105 Cal. Rptr. 217, 503 P.2d 921].) Finally, defendant contends that capital defendants are denied equal protection unless they receive the benefits of disparate sentence review accorded noncapital convicts under the Determinate Sentencing Act. (§ 1170, subd. (f).) We have rejected this contention. ( Allen, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 1286-1288.)
Whether viewed singly or in combination, we find no errors warranting reversal of the guilt or penalty verdicts. We therefore affirm the judgment in its entirety.