Opinion ID: 2228003
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Second Search of Harris' Person

Text: Harris contends that he did not voluntarily consent to the second search of his person, a search conducted after he was seized, and that, therefore, the evidence obtained as the result of this second search should have been suppressed. Consent is not involuntary merely because the person giving the consent has been seized. See State v. Alayon, 459 N.W.2d 325, 330 (Minn. 1990) (holding that a defendant gave voluntary consent when, sometime after being ordered at gunpoint to lie on the floor, he was allowed to stand up, the police put away their guns, and the defendant then gave the police consent to search and assisted in the search). Rather, we look to the totality of the circumstances to determine whether consent was voluntarily given. See id. at 330. Here, the circumstances that led us to conclude that Harris was seized  Bratsch finding the plastic bindles in Harris' bag, then pointedly telling Harris that he knew what bindles were used for and that Harris should give Bratsch the drugs  also lead us to conclude that the consent Harris gave to the search of his jacket sleeve was not voluntary. Accordingly, we hold that Harris did not voluntarily consent to the second search of his person.
Generally, evidence gathered pursuant to consent that is determined to be involuntary must be suppressed. See, e.g., Dezso, 512 N.W.2d at 881. Because Harris did not voluntarily consent to the second search of his person, in order to justify Bratsch's second search of Harris' person, Bratsch must have had another basis to justify the search. Therefore, we turn our attention to whether at this point Bratsch had reasonable articulable suspicion that Harris was armed and dangerous. When an officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that a person he has seized is armed and dangerous, the officer may conduct a protective pat-down search of the person's outer clothing in order to ascertain whether the person is armed. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868; see also State v. Ludtke, 306 N.W.2d 111, 113 (Minn.1981). If, during the course of this protective patdown search, an officer locates what he immediately and without further manipulation has probable cause to believe is evidence of a crime, then the officer may legally seize that evidence. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375-76, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993); Ludtke, 306 N.W.2d at 113. After Bratsch found the plastic bindles in Harris' bag, he noted that Harris appeared extremely nervous and tried to hide his left arm. Bratsch testified that, at that point, he did not know whether Harris had a gun. When he ordered Harris to place his left arm on his lap, Bratsch noticed a large bulge in the sleeve of Harris' jacket. Then, when Bratsch questioned Harris as to what was in the jacket sleeve, Harris responded that he did not know. Under these circumstances, Bratsch's conclusion that Harris might be armed and dangerous was reasonable. Thus, at that point, Bratsch had reasonable articulable suspicion that Harris might be armed and dangerous, and a protective pat-down search of Harris' outer clothing was justified. But Bratsch did not pat down Harris' outer clothing. Instead, he asked Harris for permission to search Harris' jacket sleeve and, pursuant to Harris' apparent consent, reached his hand into the jacket sleeve through the arm and pulled out a large baggy of marijuana. By searching Harris' jacket sleeve from inside the jacket, Bratsch exceeded the scope of a proper protective pat-down search. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868. Normally, when police exceed the scope of a protective pat-down search, thereby performing an illegal warrantless search, any evidence gathered as a result of that search should be suppressed. See State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 843 (Minn. 1992); aff'd 508 U.S. at 378-79, 113 S.Ct. 2130. We recognize an exception to this general rule, however, when the police would have obtained the evidence if no misconduct had taken place. See In re J.W.K., 583 N.W.2d 752 (Minn.1998) (citing Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984)). This exception is commonly known as the inevitable discovery exception. See id. at 756. In the present case, the totality of the circumstances indicates that, had Bratsch performed a protective outer-clothing pat-down search of Harris' jacket, he would have felt, then seized, what he had probable cause to believe was marijuana, which would have been admissible against Harris. See Ludtke, 306 N.W.2d at 113. See also Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d at 846. Bratsch, an experienced drug interdiction officer, had already found plastic bindles, commonly used in the packaging and sale of controlled substances. Immediately after Bratsch found the bindles, Harris began to act nervously and tried to hide his arm from Bratsch's view. Then, when Bratsch next saw Harris' arm, there was a noticeable bulge in the sleeve of Harris' jacket. Had Bratsch then proceeded to search Harris' jacket via a permissible pat-down search, he would have felt a plastic bag containing a suspicious substance. Even if Bratsch may not have been able to positively identify the substance in the plastic bag as marijuana by his sense of touch alone, under the totality of the circumstances surrounding such a discovery, the presence of a plastic bag containing a substance consistent with marijuana hidden on Harris likely would have given Bratsch probable cause to believe that the bag contained a controlled substance. See Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d at 846; Ludtke, 306 N.W.2d at 113. With probable cause, Bratsch could have permissibly seized the plastic bag. See Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d at 843. The only reason that Bratsch patted down Harris' jacket sleeve from the inside of the jacket as opposed to the outside of the jacket was that he believed he had obtained Harris' voluntary consent to search the jacket sleeve from the inside. Therefore, we conclude that it was inevitable that Bratsch would have discovered and legally seized the marijuana during a protective pat-down search. Because legal discovery of the marijuana was inevitable, the intervening illegality of performing a search of Harris' jacket sleeve from the inside of his jacket sleeve pursuant to Harris' apparent, but involuntary, consent cannot operate to invalidate the search. Accordingly, we hold that the second search of Harris' person and the resulting seizure of the marijuana found in Harris' jacket was justified and that the marijuana should not have been suppressed. Affirmed. LANCASTER, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.