Opinion ID: 1133414
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Trial Court's Refusal to Impanel New Jury

Text: At the start of the penalty phase, defendant moved to impanel a new jury, claiming that comments and questions by the prosecutor during the guilt phase trial had undermined the credibility of defense counsel, defense investigators, and potential penalty phase witnesses, including the victim's grandmother Diane Ellison. The trial court denied the motion because of defendant's failure to establish good cause for deviating from the clear legislative mandate of Penal Code section 190.4, subdivision (c), that both the guilt and penalty phases of the capital trial be tried by the same jury. Defendant contends that the trial court erred. We disagree. As the trial court pointed out, subdivision (c) of section 190.4 requires that, absent good cause, the same jury decide guilt and penalty at a capital trial. This statute ` reflects the long-standing legislative preference for a single jury to determine both guilt and penalty.' ( People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1353, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259; People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 483, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525, 907 P.2d 373.) Defendant insists there was good cause for impaneling a new jury because, at the guilt phase of the trial, the prosecutor implied that defendant's claim that Dennis Morgan was the killer was a recent fabrication, questioned the credibility of Amanda's grandmother Diane Ellison, and insinuated possible bribery and subornation of perjury by members of the defense team, including Attorney Bernstein. We reject defendant's contention that the prosecutor's conduct so poisoned the guilt phase jury that it could not fairly decide the issue of penalty. Good cause to discharge the guilt phase jury and to impanel a new one must be based on facts that appear `in the record as a demonstrable reality' showing the jury's `inability to perform' its function. ( People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1354, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259; People v. Gates (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1168, 1199, 240 Cal.Rptr. 666, 743 P.2d 301 [adopting for purposes of section 190.4, subdivision (c) the good cause standard from former sections 1123 and 1089].) Defendant points to no such facts here. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to impanel a new jury to try the penalty phase. (See People v. Bradford, supra, at p. 1353, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259; People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 268, 14 Cal. Rptr.2d 377, 841 P.2d 897.) We also reject defendant's contention that the trial court's refusal to impanel a new jury denied him his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal Constitution. Defendant claims that the prosecutor's intimation at the guilt phase that defense attorney Bernstein tried to bribe Dennis Morgan to give testimony favorable to defendant diminished counsel's ability to competently represent defendant at the penalty phase, and that the victim's grandmother, Diane Ellison, was so discredited during the guilt phase case that defendant could not call her as his character witness at the penalty phase. The record does not support defendant's assertion that defense attorney Bernstein's ability to function as a diligent advocate in the penalty phase was diminished by the prosecutor's eliciting, on cross-examination of Dennis Morgan, testimony that Bernstein had left a $20 bill on the table in the jail's visitor room in the presence of jail personnel. As we have already explained in part III D.2., ante, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d at page 887, 978 P.2d at page 45, Morgan's testimony about the purported bribe was inherently unbelievable. Moreover, Attorney Bernstein did not actively participate at the penalty phase. As the trial court mentioned after the penalty phase, cocounsel Dell did the entire penalty phase of the defense case herself. As to defendant's claim that Diane Ellison, the victim's grandmother, would have been a helpful witness on the issue of penalty, he made no offer of proof in the trial court regarding the substance of Ellison's proposed testimony. Accordingly, the record fails to show that the jury's penalty phase verdict would have been different had Ellison testified. (See People v. Whitt (1990) 51 Cal.3d 620, 648, 274 Cal.Rptr. 252, 798 P.2d 849 [an appellate court must know the substance or content of intended testimony in order to assess prejudice].)