Opinion ID: 4534203
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Burden-Shifting Argument

Text: Bush’s third argument suggests that this Court may wish to reconsider whether the penalty phase jury instructions improperly shift the burden to the defense. This Court has previously addressed this issue, and we decline to reconsider it. See Rogers v. State, 957 So. 2d 538, 555 (Fla. 2007) (“[T]he standard penalty phase jury instructions do not ‘impermissibly shift the burden to - 64 - the defense to prove that death is not the appropriate sentence.’ ” (quoting Taylor v. State, 937 So. 2d 590, 599 (Fla. 2006)). Bush is not entitled to relief. 9. Fundamental Error in Penalty Phase Jury Instructions Bush also claims that his penalty phase instructions were fundamentally erroneous. However, this argument is without merit. His first argument regarding the definition of mitigation merely speculates that a juror’s views might be trampled upon by others if not deemed reasonable by the other jurors. This argument does not demonstrate any error—let alone fundamental error—sufficient to vitiate Bush’s death sentence. Bush’s second argument, that the interim instructions did not require individual findings on mitigating circumstances, is also without merit. In fact, even though the jury was not required to make individual findings as to mitigating circumstances, the verdict form in this case did require the jury to indicate the jury vote for each mitigating circumstance. The record demonstrates that the jury understood its responsibility in considering the mitigating circumstances that Bush sought to prove. Bush’s claim of fundamental error does not warrant relief. 10. Penalty Phase Closing Arguments Bush argues that the trial court erred in overruling defense counsel’s objections during the State’s closing argument, and he also raises a claim of fundamental error based on a prosecutorial comment that was not objected to. In - 65 - this case, neither the objected-to nor the unobjected-to comments entitle Bush to relief. A. Objected-to Comments We first turn to the closing argument claims that Bush preserved for appellate review by raising contemporaneous objections. Throughout the State’s closing argument, defense counsel made repeated objections to the prosecutor’s comments. Most commonly, the defense argued that the State improperly characterized various mitigating circumstances as aggravation. With one exception where a curative instruction was given, the trial court overruled the defense objections. On appeal, Bush argues that the trial court erred in overruling the objections. However, our careful review of the prosecutor’s closing argument reveals that when analyzing various mitigating circumstances, the prosecutor consistently framed his comments in terms of the amount of weight that the jury should assign. For example: Prosecutor: He had a strong work ethic, useful occupation, and a strong skill set. See, all of this, ladies and gentlemen, when you’re back there, you’re deciding, number one, is this a mitigating circumstance. And then the second part of that is, how much weight should I give it? So when you consider the evidence, how much weight you should give, you may—you may find that all of the stuff from his childhood, that's a mitigator. I agree. That’s a mitigator. But when you—how much weight do you give it when you know that the defendant pulled himself up out of—he had the ability to pull himself out of all of that stuff from his childhood and graduate - 66 - from high school, get an—a certificate in IT, and have a good job, consistently employed, strong work ethic? Those are the things that you can consider in deciding how much weight to give those mitigating circumstances. Leadership qualities, we heard testimony he can help mentor others to take different paths or improve themselves, that he was helpful to other inmates in the St. Johns County Jail, and that he was a positive influence on others. One of the things that you can consider in how much weight to give those mitigators is why wasn’t he doing that before? Defense Counsel: Objection, your Honor. Arguing an aggra— a mitigator is an aggravator again. The Court: Overruled. Prosecutor: Again, how much weight do you give this? Such arguments, made in the context of the jury’s weighing process, do not argue mitigating circumstances as aggravation but instead comment on the appropriate weight they should be assigned in light of the evidence presented. Additionally, Bush argues that the prosecutor made an improper argument when he said, “That’s not fair to you [the jury].” In context, the prosecutor was arguing against the mitigating circumstance that Bush has a family that loves and cares about him and supports him. The prosecutor cautioned the jury against being concerned about Bush’s family when considering this mitigation: Defense Counsel: It is up to you to decide whether or not that is a mitigating factor and, if it is, how much weight to give it. And here’s what’s going on with that argument because what happens—what invariably happens when you’re thinking about the family that’s damaged by his bad choices, what begins to happen in the jury room is you begin to think about your decision, about what that’s—how that’s going to impact other people. And, again, sympathy, as the judge says, cannot be a part of this process. - 67 - And what happens is it shifts the responsibility of the consequences of his decision from his shoulders to you. Defense Counsel: Objection, your Honor. He’s arguing a nonenumerated aggravator, and he’s trying to argue that the mitigation evidence is an aggravator in the case. The Court: Overruled. I just want to hear the legal objections, not speeches. The objection is overruled. Prosecutor: It shifts it to you, and that’s not fair to you. None of you asked to be here. You received a summons from this Court to come for jury selection. And you sat through two days of lawyers asking you questions about your life to decide if you’re appropriate for this jury. And then you didn’t get a choice whether or not you were on this jury. You were told you were the jury. And you didn’t ask to have to come listen to evidence of this crime and to sit here for days and weeks to listen to the evidence in this case. You didn’t have a choice. So it’s not fair to you to shift that burden to you. Bush claims that these comments improperly denigrated defense counsel as manipulative. However, these are not inflammatory comments such as, “the defense using a ‘diversionary tactic,’ putting on a ‘magnificent display,’ or ‘cloud[ing]’ and ‘muddl[ing]’ the issues” that this Court deemed improper in Cardona v. State, 185 So. 3d 514, 524-25 (Fla. 2016). Rather, the comments, cautioning the jury about feeling sorry for Bush’s family or being concerned with the impact of Bush’s sentence upon his family, fell within the scope of proper advocacy. B. Unobjected-to Comments Bush also challenges comments that were not objected to during closing argument. In the absence of a contemporaneous objection, relief is not appropriate - 68 - unless the complained-of comments constitute fundamental error. Fundamental error “reaches down into the validity of the trial itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty or jury recommendation of death could not have been obtained without the assistance of the alleged error.” Card v. State, 803 So. 2d 613, 622 (Fla. 2001). As explained below, fundamental error did not occur in this case. At the end of his closing argument, the prosecutor said: For Nicole Bush, life did not get to mean life. Life did not get to mean life. I don’t pretend that it’s easy, but the right decisions in life are not often easy. The right decisions in life are often hard, and they require courage to make them. I ask each of you, each and every one of you, the 12 individuals who are going to decide this case, each and every—all 12 of you, because that’s what is required. It requires 12 of you. If one of you decide[s] no, then Sean Bush does not get the death penalty. That’s what the judge will tell you. I’m asking each of you to do the hard thing, but the right thing, to have the courage to return a verdict that, yes, there are aggravating factors in this case that have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt; that, yes, those aggravating factors are sufficient to warrant imposition of the death penalty; that, yes, those aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors; and that, yes, the death penalty should be imposed in this case. Thank you. Bush cites this Court’s decision in Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411, 421 (Fla. 1998), in support of his claim that the prosecutor’s statement amounted to fundamental error. However, this case is distinguishable from Urbin, in which this Court observed that “so many of these instances of misconduct are literally - 69 - verbatim examples of conduct we have unambiguously prohibited.” Id. at 422. In Urbin, after suggesting that the jury should not recommend a life sentence because the law might change and Urbin might receive parole someday, the prosecutor told the jury he was concerned “that some of you may be tempted to take the easy way out, to not weigh the aggravating circumstances and the mitigating circumstances and not want to fully carry out your responsibility and just vote for life.” Id. at 421. The prosecutor further engaged in the “same mercy” argument, asking the jury to show Urbin the same mercy that he showed the victim. Id. These comments led this Court to engage in an extended discussion of the prosecutor’s improper closing argument, although it reversed Urbin’s death sentence on proportionality grounds. Id. at 418-19. In the present case, the prosecutor’s argument does not rise to the level of fundamental error. Given the extremely weighty aggravation in this case, the prosecutor’s comments do not constitute fundamental error such that Bush’s death sentence could not have been obtained without them. However, we are concerned with the prosecutor’s appeal to the jurors “to have the courage” to impose the death penalty. In the strongest terms, we urge prosecutors to avoid such argument, and we remind them of their solemn obligation “to seek only justice when life or death may be at stake.” Doorbal v. State, 837 So. 2d 940, 957 (Fla. 2003). - 70 - 11. Victim Impact Testimony Bush further argues that the trial court erred when it denied defense counsel’s motions to declare unconstitutional the statute that permits victim impact testimony, and to limit the amount of victim impact evidence admitted. As a threshold matter, we reject Bush’s claim that the statute permitting victim impact evidence is unconstitutional. “Evidence of a family member’s grief and suffering due to the loss of the victim is evidence of ‘the resultant loss to the community’s members by the victim’s death’ permitted by section 921.141(7), and the admission of such evidence is consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 115 L. Ed. 2d 720 (1991).” Victorino v. State, 127 So. 3d 478, 496 (Fla. 2013). 10 The United States Supreme Court held in Payne that “if the State chooses to permit the admission of victim impact evidence and prosecutorial argument on that subject, the Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar.” Payne, 501 U.S. at 827. Moreover, this Court concluded that “[s]uch evidence is also protected by article I, 10. The statute permitting victim impact evidence was renumbered in 2016 and is now codified in section 921.141(8), Florida Statutes (2019). See ch. 201613, § 3, Laws of Fla. - 71 - section 16 of the Florida Constitution,” which pertains to the rights of accused individuals and of crime victims. Baker v. State, 71 So. 3d 802, 817 (Fla. 2011). Having rejected Bush’s challenge to the constitutionality of victim impact evidence, we now turn to his argument regarding the victim impact evidence admitted during his trial. Before the admission of the victim impact testimony from Nicole’s mother, sister, and best friend, the trial court carefully reviewed the contents of the proposed statements in the presence of both parties. The trial court sustained multiple objections and overruled others, granting defense counsel’s requests for certain redactions. The trial court instructed the jury with the standard jury instruction on victim impact testimony, including the instruction that victim impact testimony was not to be used for finding aggravation and was not to be considered as an aggravating factor. The redacted versions of the victim impact testimony that were published to the jury described Nicole as a loving mother, daughter, sister, aunt, friend, and coworker, and described the impact of her loss. Bush’s challenge is without merit. The victim impact testimony stayed within its proper scope, describing Nicole’s uniqueness as an individual and the resultant loss to the community. Moreover, the penalty phase testimony was limited to three witnesses: her mother, sister, and best friend. In Deparvine v. State, 995 So. 2d 351, 378 (Fla. 2008), the testimony of five victim impact witnesses was found admissible. See also Farina v. State, 801 So. 2d 44, 52 (Fla. - 72 - 2001) (concluding no error in the admission of victim impact testimony of twelve witnesses). Bush is not entitled to relief. 12. Cumulative Error Bush claims that he was denied a fair penalty phase due to cumulative error. “However, where the individual claims of error alleged are either procedurally barred or without merit, the claim of cumulative error also necessarily fails.” Israel v. State, 985 So. 2d 510, 520 (Fla. 2008) (quoting Parker v. State, 904 So. 2d 370, 380 (Fla. 2005)). Bush’s individual claims of penalty phase error are without merit. Therefore, he is not entitled to relief. 13. Constitutionality of the Death Penalty Citing the number of aggravating factors provided in Florida’s death penalty scheme, Bush argues that Florida’s death penalty statute is unconstitutional because it does not sufficiently narrow the class of individuals who are eligible to receive the death penalty. In particular, he challenges the State’s ability to rely on a contemporaneous crime to satisfy the prior violent felony aggravator, and the ability to establish the CCP aggravator with proof of premeditation formed shortly before the murder. This Court has rejected similar arguments. Specifically, “[t]his Court has rejected the argument that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme is unconstitutional because it provides for an automatic aggravating circumstance and neither - 73 - ‘narrow[s] the class of persons eligible for the death penalty’ nor ‘reasonably justif[ies] the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder.’ ” Miller v. State, 926 So. 2d 1243, 1260 (Fla. 2006) (quoting Parker v. State, 873 So. 2d 270, 286 n.12 (Fla. 2004) (alterations in original)); see Blanco v. State, 706 So. 2d 7, 11 (Fla. 1997) (rejecting Blanco’s argument that the murder-in-the-course-of-a-felony aggravator does not sufficiently narrow the class of death penalty-eligible individuals). Bush is not entitled to relief. Moreover, the instances that Bush uses to support his argument are inapplicable in this case. Although felony murder is a statutory basis for a conviction of first-degree murder where a defendant is convicted of an underlying predicate felony, Bush was convicted under both the felony and premeditated murder theories. Also, while it is true that contemporaneous crimes may be used to satisfy the prior violent felony aggravator, the prior violent felony in this case was Bush’s conviction for aggravated assault after he threw an electrified rod into the water-filled bathtub containing his unsuspecting then-wife, Cherise ConteBush. Further, his argument that the CCP aggravator cannot be based on premeditation formed shortly before the murder is inapposite to this case, where Bush researched silencers and .22 caliber suppressors months before the murder, coordinated keeping his children and the family dog at his home so that they would - 74 - not be at the townhome during the attack, drove thirty minutes to Nicole’s neighborhood, parked his van in a location where he would avoid being seen, walked to Nicole’s townhome, and disarmed the alarm panel before attacking her. Bush’s argument is without merit. 14. Proportionality Although Bush does not argue proportionality, this Court is required to conduct “a comprehensive analysis in order to determine whether the crime falls within the category of both the most aggravated and the least mitigated of murders, thereby assuring uniformity in the application of the sentence.” Offord v. State, 959 So. 2d 187, 191 (Fla. 2007) (quoting Anderson v. State, 841 So. 2d 390, 40708 (Fla. 2003)). “This entails ‘a qualitative review . . . of the underlying basis for each aggravator and mitigator rather than a quantitative analysis.’ ” Id. (quoting Urbin, 714 So. 2d at 417. This five-aggravator death case (HAC, CCP, prior violent felony, murder during the commission of a burglary, and murder committed for pecuniary gain) is among the most aggravated and least mitigated and is proportionate to other cases where the death sentence has been imposed. Three of the aggravating circumstances found in this case, HAC, CCP, and prior violent felony, have repeatedly been identified by this Court as among the most serious aggravating factors. See Damas v. State, 260 So. 3d 200, 216 (Fla. 2018); Larkins v. State, 739 - 75 - So. 2d 90, 95 (Fla. 1999). In particular, “when [HAC and CCP] are present, the mitigating circumstances must be of considerable weight to overcome them.” Brown v. State, 143 So. 3d 392, 405-06 (Fla.) (citing Abdool v. State, 53 So. 3d 208, 224 (Fla. 2010)), cert. denied, 574 U.S. 1034 (2014). This Court upheld a defendant’s death sentence in Beasley v. State, 774 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 2000), where the victim also suffered a sustained brutal attack. In Beasley, the victim was viciously bludgeoned with a hammer, and she was conscious while she tried to defend herself. This Court upheld the defendant’s death sentence despite a lengthy list of mitigating factors and “conclude[d] that the death penalty imposed here for this particularly brutal murder is proportionate when compared with other cases in which a death sentence has been upheld.” Id. at 675. Like the victim in Beasley, Nicole Bush was the victim of a “particularly brutal murder.” Despite the six gunshots, followed by being beaten with an aluminum baseball bat and being stabbed multiple times, she somehow survived for almost three hours. Moreover, the medical examiner testified that Nicole would have been conscious through much of her attack. Although the trial court found and assigned varying weight to all thirty-four of Bush’s nonstatutory mitigating circumstances, they simply do not overcome the - 76 - five weighty aggravating circumstances, each of which was assigned great weight. Bush’s death sentence is proportionate.