Opinion ID: 1179849
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: reviewability of summary judgment

Text: Pacesetter appeals the circuit court's denial of its motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs' implied warranty claim. Plaintiffs urge this court to dismiss Pacesetter's appeal, arguing that the vast majority of courts have held orders denying motions for summary judgment unreviewable when the appeal is taken after a trial on the merits. A summary judgment motion is viewed as going to the merits of the case and will be granted only when the pleadings, depositions, affidavits, and other materials submitted to the court show that there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Miller v. First Hawaiian Bank, 61 Haw. 346, 349, 604 P.2d 39, 41 (1979); 10 C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2712 at 584 (1983); Hawaii Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule 56. At an early stage in the development of the motion for summary judgment, the rule developed that an order denying the motion could not be appealed if denial was based on the presence of factual questions for the jury, but could be appealed if based on questions of law. J. Rothschild, Simplification of Civil Practice in New York: A Review of Judicial Experience Under the Civil Practice Act, 23 Col.L.Rev. 618, 648 (1923). This rule seems to explain the holding in Morgan v. American University, 534 A.2d 323 (D.C.App.1987), the case upon which plaintiff relies for its assertion that denials of summary judgments are unreviewable. In Morgan, the court reasoned that where summary judgment was denied because of the existence of issues of fact and the case was subsequently decided by the jury, reversal on appeal would allow a decision based on less evidence, to prevail over one reached on more. Id. at 326. Significantly, however, the court also ruled that any legal rulings made by the trial court at summary judgment could be reviewed on appeal. Id. at 327. We therefore conclude that the Morgan rule is inopposite to this case. It is clear from the record that the issue argued and decided on summary judgment  whether the defect asserted by plaintiff was actionable  was a question of law. In this jurisdiction, an appeal lies from a court order which resolves a motion for summary judgment as a question of law. See Vega v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 67 Haw. 148, 152, 682 P.2d 73, 76 (1984). We conclude that Pacesetter is entitled to a review of the trial court's denial of its motion for summary judgment.