Opinion ID: 3169263
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Krieger

Text: Krieger claims that Lilly retaliated against her in violation of Title VII and the NJLAD for filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC and making two complaints against Rowland to HR. (See id. 35a–37a, 48a). The District Court did not make a finding that Krieger established a prima facie case of retaliation, but found that even if she was able to do so, her claim would fail at the pretext stage because Lilly provided a facially neutral reason for disciplining and ultimately terminating Krieger. (Id. at 48a–49a). Krieger has not produced any evidence that suggests Lilly’s actions were pretextual and not merely based on her numerous well-documented and self-admitted performance deficiencies, which resulted in a probationary period and two warnings issued in a year. As the District Court correctly concluded, even if Krieger could establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Lilly’s neutral reasons for disciplining and ultimately terminating Krieger are facially valid. Krieger admitted to engaging in the conduct that gave rise to the performance deficiencies meriting adverse employment action. (Id. at 49a). Krieger’s assertion that her admitted misconduct and performance issues are pretext since other employees engaged in similar conduct and did not face discipline are bare assertions, and are insufficient under this Court’s precedent to prove pretext. See Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 762. Pointing to the non-discipline of other employees, Krieger fails to demonstrate pretext under either of this Court’s alternative theories. Krieger has not provided evidence that other employees, particularly those outside her protected class whom she references such as her male partner Puleo, have in fact committed substantially similar conduct and received no discipline. Her bare assertions about what has not happened in response to her coworkers’ alleged deficiencies is not sufficient evidence to cast doubt on Lilly’s proffered reasons. Id. Nor are these assertions evidence of “such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its actions that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence.” Atkinson, 460 F.3d at 454 (quoting Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1108–09 (3d Cir. 1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Consequently, we will affirm the grant of summary judgment against Krieger on her retaliation claim. (App. 49a). c. Reyes’s Challenges to Evidentiary Rulings at Trial Reyes’s retaliation claim was the only claim of Appellants to survive Lilly and Rowland’s renewed motions for summary judgment and reach a jury. Reyes challenges two of the District Court’s evidentiary rulings at trial. One, Reyes challenges the District Court’s denial of her motion in limine to include evidence of Rowlands’s conduct towards other employees. (Appellants’ Br. 61–62). 37 At trial, the District Court restricted introduction of evidence about Rowland’s conduct towards others to that which Reyes personally observed. (App. 1990a–1992a). Reyes asserts that at sidebars during the trial she attempted to make offers of proof as to why the court should admit evidence of similarly situated individuals and Lilly’s failure to properly investigate her claims. (Appellants’ Br. 62 & n.14). Two, Reyes challenges the District Court’s admission, to which she objected at trial, of Lilly’s direct examination of Brian Rafferty, Rowland’s supervisor, about the coaching provided to Rowland in response to the HR investigations. (Appellants’ Br. 64–65). At sidebar, Reyes’s counsel contended that the direct 37 Appellee Lilly asserts that the denial of this motion in limine is not appealable as a final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and rather is merged into the December 16, 2014 jury verdict. We disagree. This Court reviews final rulings by a district court on motions in limine made definitively on the record. See, e.g., Forrest v. Beloit Corp., 424 F.3d 344, 348–49 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Peppers, 302 F.3d 120, 137–39 (3d Cir. 2002). Here, the District Court made a final ruling on Reyes’s motion in limine, which was part of the January 29, 2014 order. (App. 4a–5a). Appellee Lilly also contends that Reyes’s attempt to incorporate the motion in limine by reference does not satisfy Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28. (Appellee Lilly’s Br. 53 n.11) (citing Appellants’ Br. 61 n.13). Appellants cite the specific pages of the record in the Appendix containing the motion in limine, as required by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(e) and are not in violation of this rule. (Appellants’ Br. 61 n.13). examination of Rafferty was an attempt to illicit testimony about complaints made by other employees, which was barred by the District Court’s prior evidentiary ruling. (App. 1464a, 1479a–1480a). In the same order denying Reyes’s motion in limine to include evidence, the District Court granted Lilly’s motion in limine to exclude evidence of alleged inappropriate incidents unrelated to Reyes’ claim experienced by former plaintiffs, namely are her co-Appellants. (Id. at 4a–5a). The standard of review for the admission or exclusion of evidence is generally abuse of discretion. Walden, 126 F.3d at 517. If a party fails to preserve an evidentiary ruling, this Court reviews for plain error. 38 Id. Evidentiary issues are properly preserved when the moving party makes offers of proof during trial to admit or object to evidence. Northeast Women’s Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1352–53 (3d Cir. 1989). Pursuant to Rule 61, we will not remand or reverse if the admission or exclusion of evidence constituted harmless error. Abrams v. Lightolier Inc., 50 F.3d 1204, 1213 (3d Cir. 1995). An error is harmless “only if it is highly probable that the error[] did not affect the outcome of the case.” Hirst v. Inverness Hotel Corp., 544 F.3d 221, 228 (3d Cir. 2008) (alteration in original) (quoting McQueeney v. Wilmington Trust Co., 779 F.2d 916, 917 (3d Cir. 1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, Rule 61 38 This Court has cited the three requirements that the United States Supreme Court requires for a plain error challenge: “First, there must be an actual error—a deviation from or violation of a legal rule. Second, the error must be plain; that is, the error must be clear and obvious under current law. Finally, the error must affect substantial rights.” Walden, 126 F.3d at 520 (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732–34 (1993)). For a plain error challenge to an evidentiary ruling to succeed, the appealing party must demonstrate that the error was both prejudicial and affected the outcome of the proceedings below. Id. provides that harmless error is any error that does not affect “any party’s substantial rights.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 61. Assuming that Reyes properly preserved her objections to the evidentiary ruling on her motion in limine, we review both challenges for abuse of discretion.39 Reviewing under this standard, we cannot say that the District Court abused its discretion by excluding Reyes’s evidence and admitting Lilly’s. See Abrams, 50 F.3d at 1213. In her brief, Reyes only describes the evidence precluded by the denial of her motion in limine in very general terms, stating that the District Court “prohibited all evidence described [in this brief] regarding the seven women that complained to Lilly about Rowland.” (Appellants’ Br. 62). Other than general statements that the evidence would bear on Rowland’s motive, Reyes does not describe how the exclusion of this evidence affected the outcome of her trial. (Id.). As Reyes noted, this Court has stated that a “plaintiff may rely upon a broad array of evidence to demonstrate a causal link, [including evidence of] ongoing antagonism, inconsistent reasons for termination, and certain conduct towards others.” (Appellants’ Br. 63) (alteration in original) (quoting App. 71a) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 284 39 Appellee Lilly argues that Reyes failed to preserve her objection to the evidence she wished to admit through her motion in limine by not making individual offers of proof on this evidence at trial, necessitating review for plain error. Citing the record, Reyes disputes Lilly’s assertion. (Appellants’ Br. 62 n.14). We assume, for the purposes of this appeal, that Reyes properly preserved this objection. Even under the less stringent abuse of discretion test, Reyes’s challenge fails since she has not demonstrated that this ruling affected her substantial rights in terms of the outcome of the case. Reyes objected to Lilly’s direct-examination of Rafferty at trial so we review this ruling for harmless error. Abrams, 50 F.3d at 1213; (App. 1464a–1484a). (3d Cir. 2000)). However, this does not require that a trial court admit such evidence when it is, in the discretion afforded the court, not in accordance with the rules of evidence, such as threshold requirements of relevance and first-hand knowledge. Reviewing under this highly deferential standard, Reyes’s challenge fails because she has not demonstrated how this ruling impacted her ability to establish her case. This renders any error harmless. See Abrams, 50 F.3d at 1213 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 61). Under the abuse of discretion standard, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of Reyes’s motion in limine. With respect to Reyes’s challenge to the contents of Rafferty’s direct examination about the coaching provided to Rowland, Reyes states that the denial of her motion in limine, coupled with the admission of this evidence by Lilly, was “doubly prejudicial.” (Appellants’ Br. 65). In support of this, Reyes only asserts that this evidence could allow the jury to assume that Rafferty only coached Rowland on Reyes’s complaints and not others, but does not state how this impacted her ability to establish her case. (Id. at 64– 65). Additionally, the District Court allowed Reyes to cross-examine Rafferty on the complaints, mitigating both her concerns about some of the evidence she wished to include in her motion in limine, as well as any negative impact of Rafferty’s testimony. (App. 1482a–1484a). Reviewing for harmless error, we cannot say that the District Court abused its discretion in admitting this evidence, which Reyes has not demonstrated affected her substantial rights. Accordingly, we will affirm the challenged admission. 6. Claims Against Rowland Tourtellotte and Krieger claim that Rowland violated the NJLAD by aiding and abetting Lilly’s violations of the relevant statutes.40 (Appellants’ Br. 4). These Appellants only name Rowland jointly with Lilly for their NJLAD claims and for Krieger’s § 1981 claim. (Appellee Rowland’s Br. 26). Since none of the Appellants have established a prima facie case for any of their claims against Lilly, Rowland cannot be individually liable. The NJLAD does not provide for individual liability for aiding and abetting if the employer is not found liable. Cicchetti v. Morris Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 947 A.2d 626, 645 (N.J. 2008) (citing N.J. Stat. Ann. §10:5–12(e)). Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Rowland on all claims and do not reach the merits of Appellants’ claims. (App. 6a). While we agree with the District Court that many of Rowland’s actions were “inexcusable and offensive,” none of the alleged conduct rises to the level of unlawful discrimination. (Id. at 30a).