Opinion ID: 424892
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defendants' Objections to the Court's Instructions

Text: 63 Regarding Liability and Compensatory Damages 64 In addition to their attack on the award of punitive damages, defendants also attack the compensatory damages verdict. They base their attack on two grounds. 65
66 Defendants contend that the district court erred in failing to grant their request for an instruction that the prolonged safe use of the motorcycle by two previous owners over a six-year period was persuasive evidence that the motorcycle was not defective. 24 We do not agree that the court was obliged to grant the request. Defendants essentially were asking the court to comment on the evidence. The decision so to comment, however, lies within the discretion of the court, see Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 470, 53 S.Ct. 698, 699, 77 L.Ed. 1321 (1933); Saltzburg, The Unnecessarily Expanding Role of the American Trial Judge, 64 Va.L.Rev. 1, 40-41 (1978); see also United States v. Anton, 597 F.2d 371 (3d Cir.1979), and we cannot agree that the district court abused its discretion here. The fact of prolonged safe use was quite clear from the testimony; 25 the court gave defense counsel permission to argue the significance of prolonged safe use; and the court's instruction on circumstantial evidence was sufficiently broad to enable counsel to do so. We therefore cannot agree with defendants' assertion that the absence of the instruction prejudiced the defendants by diminishing the importance of this concept in the minds of the jurors. Reply Br. at 14. 67
68 Defendants also take issue with the court's instruction to the jury that it could not find plaintiff, an off-duty policeman, contributorily negligent even if plaintiff was proceeding at high speed over roads known to be full of potholes, provided that his high speed was (as one witness had testified) the result of his chasing an escaped felon. 26 69 Defendants assert that the instruction was erroneous in two respects. First, they contend that the instruction confused the jury by failing adequately to distinguish between contributory negligence, which is relevant to defendants' liability on the negligence count, and comparative fault, which is relevant to defendants' liability under section 402A. 27 Thus, according to defendants, the jury probably understood the instruction to mean that findings of contributory negligence and comparative fault would be precluded if the jury were to find that plaintiff had been engaged in high-speed pursuit at the time of the accident. Since the jury in fact found no fault on the plaintiff's part, and defendants assert that the evidence can only support that plaintiff was operating the motorcycle at a high speed when he lost control ..., Brief at 37, the defendants conclude that the jury must have excused plaintiff's conduct, which would be wrong. 70 Defendants would have us draw a conclusion that simply is not inexorable. Although it is possible to infer that the jury found no comparative fault because it excused plaintiff's high speed, it is at least as likely that the jury concluded, based on the conflicting evidence, that Acosta had not been speeding at all. That interpretation of the evidence, which finds support in the record, would also lead to a finding that plaintiff was not at fault. Indeed that interpretation of the jury's verdict may be more likely, given the court's clear instruction that the question whether plaintiff was chasing a felon was totally irrelevant to the 402A count and the issue of comparative fault. See App. V. at 24. 71 Defendant's next objection is that the district court violated Fed.R.Civ.P. 51 by failing to inform counsel that it intended to given an instruction permitting the jury to find plaintiff's conduct excused. 28 Again, we must disagree. As defendants acknowledge in their brief, a failure to comply with Rule 51 warrants reversal only if it has resulted in prejudice to one of the parties. See Bradshaw v. Thompson, 454 F.2d 75, 81 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 878, 93 S.Ct. 130, 34 L.Ed.2d 131 (1972). 29 Although defendants assert that such prejudice occurred here, the only support they offer are the conclusory statements that counsel was misled into delivering a contradictory argument, Br. for Cross-Appellants at 37, and that the instruction severely undermined the credibility of counsel, Reply Br. at 14. Without more, we will not order a new trial.