Opinion ID: 2497751
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Atkins v. Virginia

Text: In Atkins v. Virginia , the United States Supreme Court overruled Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989), [8] and declared that the mentally retarded must be excluded from execution. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318, 122 S.Ct. 2242. In reaching its holding, the Supreme Court discussed the definitions of mental retardation promulgated by the American Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR) [9] and the American Psychiatric Association (APA). The Supreme Court found the two associations had similar definitions, defining the test for mental retardation as having three prongs: (1) significantly subaverage intellectual functioning; (2) limitations in adaptive functioning; and (3) mental retardation manifested before 18 years of age. Id. at 308 n. 3, 122 S.Ct. 2242. These same three prongs constitute the test for mental retardation under Florida law. The Supreme Court did note that an IQ between 70 and 75 or lower is typically considered the cut-off IQ score for the intellectual function prong of the mental retardation definition. Id. n. 5. However, the Supreme Court did not mandate an IQ range of between 70 and 75 for a finding of mental retardation. The Supreme Court in Atkins recognized that [n]ot all people who claim to be mentally retarded will be so impaired as to fall within the range of mentally retarded offenders about whom there is a national consensus. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317, 122 S.Ct. 2242. In addition, the Supreme Court noted that the statutory definitions for mental retardation that were already in existence were not identical, but generally conformed to the clinical definition provided by the AAMR and APA. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 n. 22, 122 S.Ct. 2242. [10] Consequently, the Supreme Court followed its approach in Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986), [11] and left to the states the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317, 122 S.Ct. 2242 (quoting Ford, 477 U.S. at 416-17, 106 S.Ct. 2595). When Atkins was issued, Florida had already enacted its statute prohibiting the execution of the mentally retarded. § 921.137, Fla. Stat. (2001). Section 921.137(1), Florida Statutes (2009), which is almost identical to the 2001 version of the statute, provides in pertinent part as follows: 921.137 Imposition of the death sentence upon a defendant with mental retardation prohibited. (1) As used in this section, the term mental retardation means significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during the period from conception to age 18. The term significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning, for the purpose of this section, means performance that is two or more standard deviations from the mean score on a standardized intelligence test specified by the Agency for Persons with Disabilities. The term adaptive behavior, for the purpose of this definition, means the effectiveness or degree with which an individual meets the standards of personal independence and social responsibility expected of his or her age, cultural group, and community.