Opinion ID: 2556812
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Attorney Sollitto

Text: In his original postconviction-relief application and on appeal, Laurence alleges that Sollitto denied him effective assistance of counsel at the suppression hearing by not raising the O'Connor allegation, not introducing pictures of Laurence's bruised shin, and not introducing psychiatric records that Laurence contends contained evidence relevant to the voluntariness of his confession of May 13-14, 1997. Dwyer's Shatney memorandum did not expound on Laurence's allegations with respect to Sollitto. However, because Dwyer determined that the O'Connor claim lacked merit, his Shatney memorandum necessarily determined that Sollitto's failure to raise this same claim also was a meritless argument with respect to ineffective assistance of counsel. As for the other two ineffective-assistance claims pertaining to Sollitto not expressly mentioned by Dwyer, [13] our caselaw indicates that an applicant bears some responsibility before the trial justice to dispute the content of the Shatney memorandum or raise any issues overlooked by the Shatney attorney. In Thornton, we recounted the Shatney v. State, 755 A.2d 130, 135 (R.I.2000), procedure whereby an appointed counsel [may] seek to withdraw from a postconviction relief proceeding after reaching the conclusion that the postconviction relief application is meritless. Thornton, 948 A.2d at 316. Essentially, the Shatney attorney files with the court and serves upon the applicant a motion to withdraw and a `no-merit' memorandum that details the nature and extent of his or her review of the case, lists each issue the applicant wished to raise, and explains why in counsel's professional opinion those issues and any others that he or she may have investigated lacked merit. Id. (quoting Shatney, 755 A.2d at 135). The court reviews the Shatney memorandum and then holds a hearing with the state, applicant, and appointed attorney. Id. At this hearing, the court explores the appointed attorney's assessment of the potential grounds for seeking post-conviction relief and any other issues that the applicant wishes to raise  and then makes a determination whether those grounds appear to lack any arguable merit. Thornton, 948 A.2d at 316 (quoting Shatney, 755 A.2d at 135) (emphasis added). Ensuring that the applicant is allowed to speak to the professional opinion of his Shatney attorney at the hearing is a vital part of the process as it elucidates what grounds [the defendant] still might have or may have wished to pursue in that application. Shatney, 755 A.2d at 133. As Shatney explains, [t]he appointed counsel's determination of frivolousness    would not necessarily warrant a court determination of frivolousness, especially if [the defendant] himself were able to articulate an arguable basis for post-conviction relief that his appointed attorney, for whatever reason, may have overlooked or wrongly deemed frivolous. Id. (emphasis added). If after reviewing the memorandum and hearing the parties' arguments the court still deems the application meritless, it shall permit counsel to withdraw and advise the applicant that he or she shall be required to proceed pro se, if he or she chooses to pursue the application. Thornton, 948 A.2d at 316 (quoting Shatney, 755 A.2d at 135). The posture of the instant case was slightly different from that of the traditional Shatney process because the parties were before the trial justice on the state's motion for the summary disposition of Laurence's postconviction-relief application rather than on Laurence's application in its own right or on Dwyer's motion to withdraw. Nonetheless, the trial justice, in our view, aptly followed the Shatney procedure during the hearing on January 26, 2007. He reviewed the Shatney memorandum beforehand, heard the state's argument for summary disposition that incorporated a recitation of Dwyer's Shatney memorandum, and then afforded [Laurence] an opportunity to speak on his own behalf and to dispute the points made in his counsel's no-merit [ Shatney ] memorandum. Thornton, 948 A.2d at 316 (quoting Brown v. State, 841 A.2d 1116, 1123 (R.I.2004)). Here, it is without question that, when Laurence addressed the merits of Dwyer's memorandum at this hearing, he did not raise or pursue either of the remaining Sollitto claims with the trial court. Laurence therefore did not articulate an arguable basis for post-conviction relief that his appointed attorney, for whatever reason, may have overlooked or wrongly deemed frivolous. Shatney, 755 A.2d at 133. Instead, Laurence focused his oral-argument efforts on O'Connor and most predominantly on his spying allegation. His abandonment of the Sollitto claims was made further apparent by Laurence's request that the trial justice ensure that his petition for postconviction relief that [he] filed with the [c]ourt    is in evidence [for the Supreme Court], not because he wanted all of his claims of ineffective assistance preserved, but rather because [i]t state[d] everything that [was] said about the camera. Effectively, by January 26, 2007, Laurence's postconviction-relief concerns were limited to O'Connor and the camera, not Sollitto. Thus, we deem that Laurence waived the Sollitto ineffective-assistance claims at the hearing for summary disposition, and we need not consider them further. See State v. McManus, 990 A.2d 1229, 1237 (R.I.2010) (According to our well settled `raise or waive' rule, if an issue was not preserved by specific objection at trial, then it may not be considered on appeal.). Furthermore, because the trial justice, having reviewed the memoranda of applicant and his court-appointed counsel and having heard oral argument with respect to same, determined that [Laurence's] application for postconviction relief was unavailing, it is our view that to permit the applicant to proceed any further on his application would have been an exercise in futility and an inefficient use of judicial resources. Thornton, 948 A.2d at 317.