Opinion ID: 1873671
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sua sponte vacation of default judgment

Text: ¶ 20 The relief that may be accorded under Wis. Stat. § 806.07 need not be sought by one of the parties; a court may act on its own motion pursuant to § 806.07, as long as the court provides the parties notice of its action and an opportunity to be heard. Gittel v. Abram, 2002 WI App 113, ¶ 27, 255 Wis.2d 767, 649 N.W.2d 661. In Gittel, Nickolas Persha executed a will naming Ruth Abram, who was also Persha's personal representative in the probate proceedings, as his sole beneficiary. Id., ¶ 1. Persha's sister, Mary Gittel, challenged the will, arguing in part that the will was invalid because it was the product of Abram's undue influence. Id. Because the circuit court concluded that the will was tainted by undue influence and that the testator was incompetent, it refused to probate the will. Id., ¶¶ 7-8. ¶ 21 Abram objected to the court's award of costs and fees to Gittel, and the court held a hearing on Abram's motion. Id., ¶¶ 8, 10. At the hearing and without prior notice to the parties that it planned to do so, the court vacated the portion of its order that declared the will the product of undue influence. Id., ¶ 11. Gittel filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court denied, indicating that it had the authority to vacate its original order pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h). Id., ¶ 13. ¶ 22 The court of appeals held in Gittel that a circuit court is authorized to grant relief from its own orders sua sponte under the authority of Wis. Stat. § 806.07, but that the circuit court did not provide the parties with the requisite notice of its action. Id., ¶¶ 24, 29. The court of appeals explained, Gittel did not have notice and the opportunity to be heard on the specific issue of the court's authority under Wis. Stat. § 806.07, because the court did not refer to § 806.07 until the written order denying Gittel's motion for reconsideration without a hearing. [11] Id., ¶ 29. ¶ 23 We agree with Gittel that circuit courts are vested with the authority to grant relief from their judgments, on their own motion under Wis. Stat. § 806.07. We have recognized a wide swath of contexts in which Wisconsin courts are permitted to act on their own motion. See, e.g., Howell v. Denomie, 2005 WI 81, ¶ 19, 282 Wis.2d 130, 698 N.W.2d 621 (concluding that the court of appeals may inquire, on its own motion, whether a frivolous claim has been filed); City of Sun Prairie v. Davis, 226 Wis.2d 738, ¶ 19, 595 N.W.2d 635 (1999) (recognizing the inherent power of courts to vacate void judgments); State v. Peterson, 104 Wis.2d 616, 628, 312 N.W.2d 784 (1981) (holding that a circuit court may amend pleadings on its own motion); State v. Hanson, 85 Wis.2d 233, 237, 270 N.W.2d 212 (1978) (stating that a circuit court may on its own motion reopen [a case] for further testimony in order to make a more complete record in the interests of equity and justice); Behning v. Star Fireworks Mfg. Co., 57 Wis.2d 183, 188, 203 N.W.2d 655 (1973) (concluding that circuit courts may, on their own motion, grant a new trial in the interests of justice). [12] The wide recognition of courts' abilities to act sua sponte comports with the balance of the interests served by § 806.07, fairness and finality. Indeed, as we have stated, Every court has inherent power, exercisable in its sound discretion, consistent within the Constitution and statutes, to control disposition of causes on its docket with economy of time and effort. Neylan v. Vorwald, 124 Wis.2d 85, 94, 368 N.W.2d 648 (1985). That a court should raise issues sua sponte is the natural outgrowth of the court's function to do justice between the parties. State v. Holmes, 106 Wis.2d 31, 39, 315 N.W.2d 703 (1982). ¶ 24 In addition, the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1) does not foreclose the court from acting sua sponte under the statute's authority. When interpreting a statute, we look to its language, and if that language conveys a plain, clear statutory meaning, we construe the statute according to that meaning. State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶ 46, 271 Wis.2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (quoting Bruno v. Milwaukee County, 2003 WI 28, ¶ 20, 260 Wis.2d 633, 660 N.W.2d 656). Section 806.07(1) provides in part: On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court[ ] . . . may relieve a party . . . from a judgment. . . . Because the language of the statute provides that a court may relieve a party from judgment, without qualifying that the relief may be granted only upon a motion brought by one of the parties, the statute does not restrict the court from acting on its own motion. ¶ 25 In sum, we reaffirm Gittel 's conclusion that courts have the power to act sua sponte under the provisions of Wis. Stat. § 806.07. The interests underlying § 806.07 parallel the interests that we have held permit courts to act sua sponte. In addition, we construe the plain language of § 806.07 to permit a court to act sua sponte under its authority.