Opinion ID: 3064643
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Standard of Law

Text: [1] There are several decisions in this Circuit which address defamation claims and the standards that should be applied. In Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990), the Supreme Court rejected the bright-line approach previously used by this Circuit and held that while “pure” opinions (those that do not imply facts capable of being proven true or false) are protected by the First Amendment, a statement that may imply a false assertion of fact is actionable even if it is 4834 GARDNER v. MARTINO couched as a statement of “opinion.” Id. at 19; see also Partington v. Bugliosi, 56 F.3d 1147, 1152-53 (9th Cir. 1994). [2] In Unelko Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 1990), we held that the threshold question after Milkovich in a defamation claim is “whether a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the contested statement implies an assertion of objective fact.” If the answer is no, the claim is foreclosed by the First Amendment. We use a three-part test to resolve this question: (1) whether the general tenor of the entire work negates the impression that the defendant was asserting an objective fact, (2) whether the defendant used figurative or hyperbolic language that negates the impression, and (3) whether the statement in question is susceptible of being proved true or false. Partington, 56 F.3d at 1152 (citing Unelko, 912 F.2d 1053); see also Knievel, 393 F.3d at 1075 (noting the three parts for the “totality of the circumstances” test as (1) the broad context; (2) the specific context and the content of the statement; and (3) whether the statement is sufficiently factual to be susceptible of being proved true or false). In Partington, we held that when a speaker outlines the factual basis for his conclusion, his statement is not defamatory and receives First Amendment protection. 56 F.3d at 1152-63. In that case, the defendant’s book, And The Sea Will Tell, implied that the plaintiff represented his clients poorly in a murder trial. Id. at 1150-51. We held that the defendant’s statements in the book were not defamatory because the book’s general tenor made clear that the defendant’s statements were from his personal viewpoint, and not assertions of an objective fact. Id. at 1153. In Underwager v. Channel 9 Australia, 69 F.3d 361, 367 (9th Cir. 1995), we noted that the word “lying” is not always defamatory because the word applies to a “spectrum of untruths including ‘white lies,’ ‘partial truths,’ ‘misinterpretation,’ and ‘deception’ ” which may be statements of nonacGARDNER v. MARTINO 4835 tionable opinion. The defendant in Underwager was sued for rebroadcasting a television show interview where the speaker said the plaintiff was “lying” about his credentials as an expert in the child psychology field. Id. However, the plaintiff failed to show that the challenged statement implied a verifiable assertion of perjury and therefore the statement was protected under the First Amendment. Id. In Flowers v. Carville, 310 F.3d 1118, 1129 (9th Cir. 2002), we refined the Partington rule to protect a speaker who reasonably relies on facts that may be false. In that case, Gennifer Flowers sued George Stephanopoulos and James Carville for defamation after they claimed she lied about her affair with President Bill Clinton and “doctored” recordings of intimate phone calls from Clinton that she secretly taped. Id. at 1122. Stephanopoulos and Carville argued that their statements were protected because they relied on news reports that the tapes were selectively edited. We explained that in the case of a public figure, “unless defendants knew the news reports were probably false or had some obvious reason to doubt their accuracy, their reliance is protected by the First Amendment. But if it turns out that defendants knew the news reports were wrong or acted with reckless indifference in the face of some clear warning sign then they weren’t entitled to repeat them publicly and later claim that they were merely expressing nondefamatory opinions.” Id. at 1129. Finally, and most recently, in Manufactured Home Communities, Inc. v. County of San Diego, 554 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 2008), we held that a defendant’s statements that accused the plaintiff of lying without expressly disclosing a factual basis for the statements could be defamatory. We remanded the case for further proceedings because in that case, unlike in Partington, the defendant’s statements were “not clearly attached to . . . an outline of fact, nor did she explicitly link her statements to an express factual basis.” Id. at 965. 4836 GARDNER v. MARTINO