Opinion ID: 2512485
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did the superior court abuse its discretion by failing to order reimbursement

Text: Corrine also argues the superior court had power to order the county to pay for her automobile liability insurance under a variety of statutes defining the courts' powers in dependency cases, and that the court abused its discretion in not doing so. We find no basis for concluding the court abused its discretion. (6) Courts do have broad powers in dependency cases. Under Welfare and Institutions Code section 362, subdivision (a), [w]hen a child is adjudged a dependent child of the court on the ground that the child is a person described by Section 300, the court may make any and all reasonable orders for the care, supervision, custody, conduct, maintenance, and support of the child . . . . Other statutes guide the court's exercise of this power in specific circumstances. For example, [i]f the minor is removed from his or her own family, it is the purpose of this chapter [i.e., the Arnold-Kennick Juvenile Court Law; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 200 et seq.] to secure for the minor custody, care, and discipline as nearly as possible equivalent to that which should have been given by his or her parents. This chapter shall be liberally construed to carry out these purposes. ( Id., § 202, subd. (a).) Also, [e]very child adjudged a dependent child of the juvenile court shall be entitled to participate in age-appropriate extracurricular, enrichment, and social activities. No state or local regulation or policy may prevent, or create barriers to, participation in those activities. ( Id., § 362.05.) In such matters, [t]he juvenile court has broad discretion to determine what would best serve and protect the child's interest and to fashion a dispositional order in accordance with this discretion. [Citations.] The court's determination in this regard will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. ( In re Jose M. (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 1098, 1103-1104 [254 Cal.Rptr. 364].) We may accept as true, if only for the sake of argument, that the cited statutes would permit the court to order the county to pay for a foster child's automobile liability insurance in an appropriate case. [9] Here, however, Corrine made no showing of need sufficiently detailed or specific to distinguish her case from that of any other 17 year old in foster care. She did not assert or make any effort to demonstrate, for example, that she needed to drive to attend school or work. On this meager showing, we cannot say the superior court abused its discretion.