Opinion ID: 1614413
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: is second-degree murder a general- or specific-intent crime?

Text: Defendant Langworthy petitions this Court to extend to second-degree murder cases the rule in People v Garcia, 398 Mich 250; 247 NW2d 547 (1976), that non-felony first-degree murder is a specific-intent crime. Defendant urges this Court to adopt the California rule of diminished capacity. In support of his position, defendant has cited for our consideration cases from other jurisdictions which allow murder to be reduced to manslaughter through the successful assertion of the voluntary intoxication defense. We have reviewed these cases and others, and we have concluded that they are not applicable to the situation existing in Michigan. [27] An examination of the jurisdictions which defendant relies upon demonstrates why the cases are clearly distinguishable. Unlike that of Michigan, the statutory schemes of some states do not divide murder into degrees. To further complicate comparison, these states may require, as an element of their single crime of murder, premeditation or some other specific mental element (such as intent to kill) not required for second-degree murder in Michigan. [28] These states do no more than Michigan already does with respect to first-degree murder, i.e., allow intoxication to negate the element of premeditation (or intent to kill) and reduce the degree of the offense. The difference is that in these states negation of premeditation, for example, means that murder has not been proven at all, whereas in Michigan it only means that first-degree murder has not been proven. This difference is due to the legislative classification of homicide, which we have no control over and, consequently, which makes these cases distinguishable. Other states allow charges of second-degree murder to be reduced to manslaughter, but this result is mandated by the particular statutory definition of the required mens rea. In Colorado, for instance, under a prior statute, second-degree murder was not a specific-intent crime, and voluntary intoxication was not a defense. Under the revised statute, the inclusion of the term intentionally caused the Colorado Supreme Court to redefine second-degree murder as a specific-intent crime. [29] Michigan has no statutory mens rea requirement for second-degree murder which would mandate similar treatment. Some of the other states which defendant refers us to have case-law definitions of malice which require premeditation or intent to kill as necessary requirements. [30] Michigan does not have either of these elements as a prerequisite to second-degree murder. [31] The remaining jurisdiction which defendant cites is California. We are referred to People v Conley, 64 Cal 2d 310; 49 Cal Rptr 815; 411 P2d 911 (1966), and we are asked to adopt the diminished-capacity rule of that case. Under the diminished-capacity doctrine, inter alia, voluntary intoxication may negate the malice requirement for second-degree murder and reduce a homicide to manslaughter. However, recent legislation has seriously undermined the controversial diminished-capacity doctrine in California. California Penal Code § 28(a) abolished the independent defense of diminished capacity established by cases such as Conley, and amendments to California Penal Code §§ 188 and 189 have overruled expansive definitions of malice used in Conley and other California cases. [32] Thus, we find that all of the jurisdictions which defendant relies upon as persuasive authority for his position are not applicable to our circumstances in Michigan. In any event, despite the existence of cases which allow a proper voluntary intoxication defense to reduce murder or second-degree murder to manslaughter, the majority rule remains as follows: `It is now generally held that intoxication may be considered where murder is divided into degrees, and in many states, may have the effect of reducing homicide from murder in the first degree to murder in the second degree. In fact, in most states the only consideration given to the fact of drunkenness or intoxication at the time of the commission of the homicide is to enable the court and jury to determine whether the prisoner may be guilty of murder in the second degree, rather than of murder in the first degree. The rule followed by most courts is that intoxication will not reduce a homicide from murder to manslaughter. 40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide, § 129, pp 420-421. See also 40 CJS, Homicide, § 5, p 831. (Voluntary intoxication does not of itself negative the malice required to constitute murder in the second degree and thereby reduce murder in the second degree to voluntary manslaughter.); Anno: 12 ALR 861, 888 (the great weight of authority is that intoxication will not reduce a homicide from murder to manslaughter), 79 ALR 897, 904'. [33] Defendant also contends that the distinction between first- and second-degree murder is not so great as to require the difference in treatment vis-a-vis the intoxication defense. He argues that because the line drawn is a fine one, the emphasis should not be placed on the difference between first- and second-degree murder; rather, the emphasis should be placed on the difference between murder and manslaughter, the former distinction only being necessary for punishment purposes. At oral argument, defense counsel stressed that willfulness is the common thread of first- and second-degree murder and that the Criminal Jury Instructions use the term willfulness in conjunction with both crimes. Thus, defense counsel argued, voluntary intoxication should be allowed to negate the willfulness element of both degrees of murder. Contrary to defense counsel's argument, our reading of the relevant jury instructions indicates no requirement of willfulness for second-degree murder. The requirement of a wilful killing is contained only in the language of the first-degree murder statute. Furthermore, while the distinction between first- and second-degree murder, on the facts of a particular case, may at times appear to be a fine line, it nevertheless represents a policy decision of our Legislature to punish more severely certain types of murder which it considered to be more serious. We do not question the wisdom of that policy decision. We find that there is more than a sufficient basis to distinguish between the degrees of murder to require that specific intent be demonstrated for first-degree murder only. In People v Garcia, supra , we held that wilful killing means the intent to accomplish the result of death. Moreover, specific intent to kill is a necessary constituent of the elements of premeditation and deliberation. [34] It would be difficult, if not impossible, to premeditate and deliberate a killing without at the same time possessing the specific intent to kill. This logic, however, does not apply to second-degree murder. The mens rea requirement for second-degree murder is supplied by the element of malice. While the intent to kill satisfies the malice requirement, it is not a necessary element of second-degree murder. An intent to inflict great bodily harm or a wanton and willful disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of a person's behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm may also satisfy the malice requirement. People v Aaron, 409 Mich 672; 299 NW2d 304 (1980). With respect to the element of malice encompassing wanton and willful disregard, we concur with the majority rule that voluntary intoxication is not a defense. We agree with the analysis of Professors LaFave and Scott: The person who unconsciously creates risk because he is voluntarily drunk is perhaps morally worse than one who does so because he is sober but mentally deficient. At all events, the cases generally hold that drunkenness does not negative a depraved heart by blotting out consciousness of risk, and the Model Penal Code, which generally requires awareness of the risk for depraved-heart murder (and for recklessness manslaughter), so provides. [35] Because second-degree murder does not require intent to kill, but rather, only wanton and willful disregard malice need be shown; and, because we have concluded that voluntary intoxication may not negate this latter category of malice, we believe that voluntary intoxication should not be a defense to a charge of second-degree murder. We are aware that there may be second-degree murder cases which involve only the intent to kill or the intent to do great bodily harm types of malice. We are further aware that these two categories of malice sound suspiciously akin to the traditional language of specific intent. However, we decline to extend the defense of voluntary intoxication to these cases on the grounds of public policy. In People v Bourne, 385 Mich 170, 172; 188 NW2d 573 (1971), this Court held that a killing may be only manslaughter even though there is an intent to kill. Quoting from Justice CAMPBELL in People v Scott, 6 Mich 287, 295 (1859), we noted that: Voluntary manslaughter often involves a direct intent to kill, but the law reduces the grade of the offense because, looking at the frailty of human nature, it considers great provocations sufficient to excite the passions beyond the control of reason. Hence, because of policy considerations, the law allows provocation to negate the element of malice and reduce the offense from murder to manslaughter. We are not aware of any statutory or common-law rule in Michigan which holds similarly when voluntary intoxication is a factor. Nor do we believe it wise to extend the policy exception to include voluntary intoxication as a factor which may reduce to manslaughter what would otherwise be a murder. In short, we agree with the majority of jurisdictions which hold: As between murder in the first degree and murder in the second degree, voluntary drunkenness may be a legitimate subject of inquiry, but as between murder in the second degree and manslaughter it is never material and cannot be considered. [36] We hold that second-degree murder is not a specific-intent crime for which the defense of voluntary intoxication may be asserted.