Opinion ID: 1102969
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: questioning of danny's character

Text: During the cross-examination of Danny, the defense posed the following questions: Q: Now, you took your grandmother's ring, is that correct? A: Yes, sir. Q: Did you ever take anything else from your grandmother's house? A: No, sir. Q: Has your mother ever had to whip you before that for taking things? A: Yes, sir. Q: What things? Q: For what? BY MR. SMITH: Your Honor, I would object at this time to this line of testimony as neither relevant or material to the issue before the jury. BY THE COURT: I'm going to sustain under Rule 608(b). BY MR. VARAS: Your Honor, I think I'm entitled to bring out matters that reflect on the child's behavior. BY THE COURT: Well, I have already ruled. Under 608 you can only go into matters that concern the character of truthfulness. (T. 66-67) We must begin with the observation that, having secured an answer to the question that the witness had been punished for taking things, defense counsel seems to have been clearly delving into irrelevant matter with the inquiry as to what things were taken. Moreover, even if there could be some relevancy in the nature of the things taken we have no way of making that determination because no proffer was made. For these reasons this assignment of error must fail. We discuss the matter further, however, because of the circuit judge's ruling on Rule 608(b) of M.R.E. Rule 608(b) provides: Specific Instances of Conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility, other than conviction of a crime as provided in rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of a witness (1) concerning his character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, ... M.R.E. 608(b). Thus, the rule provides discretionary authority for the trial judge to permit upon cross-examination inquiry into specific acts of misconduct of a witness if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, and concerning a witness's character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. The comment to the rule notes that this exception goes beyond pre-rules decisions, and allows impeachment by specific acts which are something other than criminal convictions when the character trait of truthfulness of the witness being examined is under attack. While the circuit judge may have been mistaken in his observation that taking things did not concern a character trait of truthfulness, he did not abuse his discretion in sustaining an objection to this line of questioning regarding the child's behavior. Mississippi Rule of Evidence 608(b) comes verbatim from the Federal Rules of Evidence, and we go to the federal courts' interpretation for guidance. Rule 608(b) has been called a complex rule. Leonard, Appellate Review of Evidentiary Findings, 70 N.C.L.Rev. 1155, 1167 (1992). Today we give guidance to trial courts in its application. It is elementary that evidence offered for one purpose might be inadmissible, yet admissible when offered for another. M.R.E. 105; See U.S. v. Martinez, 962 F.2d 1161, 1165 (5th Cir.1992); U.S. v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 56, 105 S.Ct. 465, 471, 83 L.Ed.2d 450 (1984); Lubbock Feed Lots v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 630 F.2d 250, 261 (5th Cir.); reh'g denied 634 F.2d 1355 (5th Cir.1980). [4] In construing evidentiary rules, it is necessary that we be precise, because it is quite easy to mix an evidentiary apple in with an evidentiary orange. In this case we are faced with this question: Under what circumstances may one cross-examine a witness under Rule 608(b) about specific instances of past conduct not resulting in a conviction when the sole purpose of such line of questioning is to destroy the witness's credibility for truthfulness? When will it be permitted, and what is its effect? These questions embrace our entire inquiry in this case. Prior to promulgating the M.R.E., cross-examination of a witness about specific instances of past conduct not connected with the case was considered irrelevant and impermissible when the purpose was to impeach his character. Baxter v. Rounsaville, 193 So.2d 735 (Miss. 1967); Tippit v. Hunter, 205 So.2d 267 (Miss. 1967); Bailey v. State, 67 Miss. 333, 7 So. 348 (1889); Stewart v. State, 263 So.2d 754 (Miss. 1972); Pierce v. State, 213 So.2d 769 (Miss. 1968); Gallion v. State, 469 So.2d 1247, appeal after remand 517 So.2d 1364 (Miss. 1985). [5] Rule 608(b) offers a window of opportunity, albeit small. The rule first tells us that specific instances of a witness's conduct for the purpose of either attacking or supporting his credibility which did not result in a conviction may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. M.R.E. 608(b). As noted, this has always been the rule in this state. Rule 608(b) continues, however, to inform us that specific instances of past conduct not resulting in a conviction may in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning his character for truthfulness or untruthfulness ... M.R.E. 608(b). What are the guides to a trial court in making this determination? The first guide, of course, is the rule itself. The proffered conduct must be such as to reflect upon the witness's character for truthfulness. If the past conduct did not involve lying, deceit, or dishonesty in some manner, it cannot be inquired into on cross-examination Sayles v. State, 552 So.2d 1383, 1385-86 (Miss. 1989); Pace v. State, 473 So.2d 167, 169 (Miss. 1985). The trial court has no discretionary authority to permit inquiry by cross-examination into conduct not involving truthfulness. Assuming the trial court finds the proposed inquiry probative of the witness's character for veracity, in exercising his discretion whether or not to permit it, the court must look to two other Rules of Evidence, 611 and 403. [6] Rule 611 tells us that the court must exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of trial testimony and presentation of evidence to promote attaining the truth, and to avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment. M.R.E. 611. The trial judge must also consider the proffered evidence under the strictures of Rule 403 which states that relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury ... M.R.E. 403. The comment to F.R.E. 608(b) states: Particular instances of conduct, though not the subject of criminal conviction, may be inquired into on cross-examination of the principal witness himself or of a witness who testifies concerning his character for truthfulness. Effective cross-examination demands that some allowance be made for going into matters of this kind, but the possibilities of abuse are substantial. Consequently safeguards are erected in the form of specific requirements that the instances inquired into be probative of truthfulness or its opposite and not remote in time. Also, the overriding protection of Rule 403 requires that probative value not be outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, and that of Rule 611 bars harassment and undue embarrassment. F.R.E. 608, comment (2) at page 552 (emphasis added). We commend to all trial judges that when a party seeks to cross-examine a witness about specific instances of past conduct probative of veracity under Rule 608(b) that the judge make his findings under Rule 403 of record. Our ability to accord deference to the trial court's discretion in either permitting or denying such Rule 608(b) cross-examination rests upon specific findings of the trial court of it's weighing process under Rule 403. [7] Admission of evidence of past conduct poses special hazards and danger, and should only be admitted when it is necessary to do so to ascertain the truth, and unfair prejudice is not imposed, especially upon the accused. Unlike pre-rules decisions, Rule 608(b) authorizes impeachment of the accused by such cross-examination once he takes the stand. State v. Walton, 673 S.W.2d 166 (Tenn. 1984). Procedurally, before counsel attempts an inquiry on cross-examination as to specific acts of past conduct not resulting in a conviction he should inform the trial judge that he intends to do so. The trial judge can then conduct a hearing outside the presence of the jury. It should be emphasized that Rule 608(b) does not authorize a fishing license, but counsel must have specific instances of past conduct about which he proposes to cross-examine the witness, and inform the trial judge of them. Following this, the trial judge can determine first if the conduct reflects upon the witness's honesty, and if so, weigh the probative value against the danger of unfair prejudice, as required under Rule 403 and also determine whether admission of the evidence will advance the ascertainment of the truth in the case. Finally, it should be noted that the party cross-examining a witness about past instances of conduct is bound by the witness's answer. He is not permitted to offer evidence in rebuttal to contradict it. U.S. v. Johnson, 968 F.2d 765, 766-67 (8th Cir.) cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 481, 121 L.Ed.2d 386 (1992); U.S. v. Leonardi, 623 F.2d 746, 757 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 447 U.S. 928, 100 S.Ct. 3027, 65 L.Ed.2d 1123 (1980); U.S. v. Rabinowitz, 578 F.2d 910, 912 (5th Cir.1978); Hayes v. U.S., 407 F.2d 189, 193-94 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed 395 U.S. 972, 89 S.Ct. 2133, 23 L.Ed.2d 777 (1969); Peel v. U.S., 410 F.2d 1141-42 (5th Cir.1969). We find no error in the circuit judge's exclusion of the line of questioning of Danny which defense counsel was attempting in this case. It offered no specific instances and was no more than a fishing expedition. Unless there has been some predicate laid for it, counsel is not permitted to ask a witness on cross-examination open-ended questions such as has he ever stolen or lied or committed wrongful acts of one kind or another. This runs afoul of both Rule 611 which requires a court to protect a witness from harassment or humiliation [8] as well as Rule 403 which requires the cross-examination to be about specific instances. Moreover, counsel made no proffer of what he expected to prove. M.R.E. 103(a)(2). Finding no reversible error, we affirm. CONVICTION OF FELONIOUS CHILD ABUSE AND SENTENCE OF TEN YEARS AFFIRMED. PRATHER, P.J., and PITTMAN, BANKS, JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr. and SMITH, JJ., concur. BANKS, J., concurs with separate written opinion joined by SULLIVAN and JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., JJ. DAN M. LEE, P.J., dissents with separate written opinion joined by McRAE, J. McRAE, J., dissents with separate written opinion joined by DAN M. LEE, P.J.