Opinion ID: 2157405
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Polin Case.

Text: As Deputy Attorney General for Kent County, Ridgely's official duties included the representation of the State Board of Health in matters in that County. Prior to 1954 he had been consulted officially by the State Board of Health on more than one occasion. From June 1951, Ridgely was the attorney for Isadore Polin, founder and president of the Polin Poultry Co., Inc. Polin had acquired a site for a proposed plant in Clayton, Delaware, and Ridgely had advised him on certain legal matters with respect thereto. In 1951 the Town of Clayton refused Polin's request to be allowed to operate a poultry processing plant in the town. In January 1952 the business was incorporated, Ridgely handling the matter. On February 8, 1952, the corporation applied to the State Board of Health for a license to operate a poultry processing plant. The application was denied by the Board on February 15th, for the reason that the town had refused to accept the effluent from the poultry plant into its sewage system. In March 1952 an ordinance was passed by the Town of Clayton prohibiting the erection of poultry processing plants within the town. The corporation made a subsequent application to the Board of Health on July 18, 1952. Sometime during the summer or fall of 1952 Ridgely telephoned the executive secretary of the Board and requested that a decision be given on the second application. This application was likewise denied. During this time Ridgely shared offices with David Buckson, another attorney. They were not partners but were close associates. Ridgely associated Buckson with him as counsel for the Polin Poultry Co. in connection with its application for a license. In November 1952 the poultry company filed an appeal to the Superior Court from the decision of the State Board of Health denying its application. The appeal was filed and signed by Buckson, but Buckson throughout acted under Ridgely's instructions, since the poultry company was Ridgely's client. In November of 1952 Ridgely called Chief Deputy Attorney General Theisen, stationed in Wilmington, and explained his association with Polin and the Polin Poultry Co., and told Theisen that he could not appear for the Attorney General's office to represent the State Board of Health upon the appeal. He did not tell Theisen that he intended to appear for the poultry company. The ground for the appeal was that the action of the Board in denying the poultry company's application was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable. The appeal was heard before Judge Terry and at the trial both Buckson and Ridgely appeared on behalf of the Polin Poultry Co., and actively participated in the trial. Mr. Theisen represented the State. The court held that the action of the State Board of Health was not arbitrary and dismissed the appeal with prejudice. Upon these facts the Censor Committee made a finding of unprofessional conduct, in that Ridgely violated Canon 6 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, relating to the representation of conflicting interests, and Canon 31 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, above referred to. We are in accord with the Committee's finding with respect to Canon 6. It is unnecessary to consider Canon 31. As we have heretofore indicated, public duty commands precedence. It was therefore improper for Ridgely, officially counsel for the State Board of Health, to take a case against it. He nevertheless did so, and the result was the unseemly appearance in the court of two State's attorneys, one endeavoring to uphold the State's case and the other to overthrow it. We should add that even if Ridgely had not appeared in court the error would not have been cured. The client was Ridgely's and he could not escape the burden of official duty by delegating the case to a lawyer associated with him. At that stage of the case he should have sent his client to other counsel. [4] Moreover, unless he was willing to resign from his office, he should have taken that action as soon as the probable conflict of interests appeared, that is, as soon as action before the Board of Health became necessary. For a law officer of the State to accept private employment in State matters and engage in litigation or the prosecution of claims against a fellow member of the Attorney General's staff is manifestly improper. It is suggested that this has happened frequently in connection with claims for tax refunds before the State Tax Board. If so, that practice is wrong. Before the Censor Committee, and again before us, Ridgely's counsel has earnestly pressed the argument that no conflict of interest existed in the Polin case, because the Board of Health was a nominal defendant only, the Town of Clayton being the real party in interest. This argument is founded upon the assertion that Polin had complied with the regulations of the Board, and that the only obstacle to the issuance of the license was the existence of the town ordinance. This is an incorrect view of the matter. The appeal papers charged the Board with arbitrary and capricious action, and the Board was required to defend its action. The executive secretary of the Board and many of the technicians testified in the case. According to Mr. Theisen the Board was the defendant in fact as well as in name. Probably, as Theisen also said, the Board would have been satisfied if the Town of Clayton had been satisfied, but this fact does not change the situation. The State Board of Health  Ridgely's client as well as Theisen's  had determined official policy and had taken official action. This action Ridgely sought to have annulled on the ground that it was arbitrary. There was a direct conflict of interest. Ridgely's counsel makes another argument designed to show the inconsistency of the Censor Committee's findings in the Polin case. It is founded on the following circumstances: The charges against Ridgely originally included charges of unprofessional conduct in representing private clients in matters before the State Highway Department and the Delaware Liquor Commission. Both these state agencies employ special counsel and are not represented by the Attorney General's office. It has been the practice in this State for many years for members of the Attorney General's staff to represent private interests before these agencies. The Committee accordingly determined during the hearing that no unprofessional conduct could be founded upon instances of this kind, because the agency had independent counsel, and because Ridgely merely followed a settled practice never before called in question. Upon these matters, therefore, it took no testimony. Ridgely's counsel insists that if the Committee was right in its determination in these cases (as he says it was), it must be wrong in its conclusion in the Polin matter, since in both cases the State is opposed by its own law officer and a conflict of interest exists to some extent. There is some logical force in the argument, but if it were pressed to conclusion the result would not help Ridgely's case; it would merely suggest the impropriety of the State's law officer in appearing for private clients before any State agency. But we think the Committee was right in deciding to go no further into these matters. Ridgely is not to be blamed for doing what has been done for years without suggestion of criticism. All that the argument shows is that the practices that have grown up in these matters may be inconsistent. This is not surprising; they depend largely upon custom. Indeed such inconsistencies exist in the legislative policy. Thus, the judges of certain of our inferior courts are permitted to engage in private practice, and the judges of other inferior courts are expressly forbidden by law to do so. This matter of representation by the State's law officers of private clients before agencies having independent counsel is of importance here only in furnishing an illustration of the difficulties that inevitably flow from the practice of permitting the members of the Attorney General's staff to engage in private practice. We shall have more to say hereafter upon this subject. As to the Polin matter, it is proper to say that, unlike the Villa case, it does not appear that the public interest suffered by reason of Ridgely's conduct. The State was adequately represented. But Ridgely's conduct was nevertheless a violation of the rule not to represent conflicting interests, and the Committee's finding to that effect is approved. Unprofessional conduct having been found we must determine what disciplinary action should be taken. One mitigating circumstance at once presents itself. We have already alluded to it. In Delaware, all the members of the Attorney General's staff are permitted by long-established usage to engage in the private practice of law. This, notwithstanding the fact that all of the State's legal business, civil and criminal (with the exception of that appertaining to agencies with independent counsel), is concentrated in the office of the Attorney General. This situation is the outgrowth of legislative policy, which, as we have recently pointed out, permits the State to obtain the services of well-qualified attorneys at salaries that would not be attractive if the official were required to devote his entire time to his duties. [5] This policy has unfortunate consequences. Its result is to cast upon the occupant of the office the burden of determining for himself the limits which must circumscribe his private practice. It is easy to say that in a doubtful case he should decide against himself. That is true. But lawyers, of course, are subject to human weakness, and the inevitable result is that in some cases  relatively few, we like to think  considerations of self-interest will entice the holder of the office away from the performance of his duty. Moreover, as the Censor Committee observed in its report, the established custom of permitting the State's law officers to engage in private practice has led to confusion and misunderstanding in the minds of the lawyers, because in many cases the line between propriety and impropriety is hard to draw. The modern tendency is to remedy this evil by striking at its root  by prohibiting lawyers representing the State from engaging in private practice. As of January 1, 1953, lawyers employed by the Department of Justice are prohibited (except by special permission of the Attorney General) from engaging in private practice. [6] The situation in Delaware suggests strongly the need for the General Assembly to review and reconsider its policy in these matters. It is for the General Assembly and not for the courts to determine legislative policy; but the subject is one that touches closely the administration of justice. As such, we think it a proper one for judicial criticism. The pertinency of these observations to the case before us lies in the fact that when Ridgely assumed his office he, like all others who have held it, became a part of an unfortunate system. For the inherent weaknesses and difficulties of that system he is not to be blamed. Its existence tends to mitigate his offense. We take into consideration also the fact of the publicity and adverse criticism that have attended this matter. We cannot doubt that he has suffered from it in many ways. These considerations have led us to the conclusion that the disciplinary action to be taken should be limited to a severe reprimand, provided certain conditions are met. These conditions concern the fees collected or billed in the two cases. Since the fee of $624 in the Villa case was improperly collected, it should be returned to the Biter Company; in fact, Ridgely has expressed his willingness to return it. As for the fee in the Polin matter, it appears that at the time of the hearing, a bill for $2,000, representing all of Ridgely's services to the Polin Company, had been sent but not paid. So much of this fee as is allocable to proceedings before the Board of Health, as well as to the appeal proceedings, should not be collected or retained by Ridgely, since it represents payment for work done in opposing the interests of the State. If Ridgely elects to comply with these conditions, his assent may be evidenced by an appropriate certificate of his counsel, filed with the Clerk. In that event, disciplinary action will be limited as above indicated, and the reprimand administered at the next session of this Court. Otherwise, the matter will be further considered.