Opinion ID: 809524
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: GARA’s Legislative History

Text: Our examination of the legislative history confirms our interpretation that the term “the aircraft” in section 2(a)(1)(A) refers to the accident aircraft including any component parts. As we explained above, Congress enacted GARA to alleviate “the problem of excessive liability costs for general aviation aircraft manufacturers.” H.R. Rep. No. 103-525, pt. I (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1638, 1994 WL 235994. In so doing, Congress made plain that the statute of repose was designed to protect manufacturers of aircraft and of component parts alike. Indeed, every Congressional report in the legislative record expresses this intent. UNITED STATES AVIATION UNDERWRITERS v. NABTESCO 11975 For instance, in recommending passage of S. 1458, the bill that would become GARA, the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee issued a report in which it described the problem of high liability costs facing manufacturers. It then explained that “[t]he reported bill responds to this problem by enacting a statute of repose for aircraft and component manufacturers.” S. Rep. No. 103-202 (1993), 1993 WL 484770 at -4 (emphasis added). Similarly, when the House Public Works and Transportation Committee next recommended passage of S. 1458, it explained the Act as follows: Under this provision, no civil action can be brought against a manufacturer for damages for death or injury arising out of an accident involving at [sic] general aviation aircraft more than 18 years after the aircraft is first delivered to a purchaser. The statute also applies to manufacturers of parts or compo- nents used in general aviation aircraft. H.R. Rep. No. 103-525, pt. I (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1638, 1994 WL 235994 (emphasis added). On the heels of the report above, the House Judiciary Committee also voiced its support of the bill, albeit with an amendment that principally provided for tiered limitation periods depending on the type of engine installed in the accident aircraft. H.R. Rep. 103-525(II) (June 24, 1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1644, 1994 WL 422719. At bottom, the Judiciary Committee shared the understanding that GARA would protect manufacturers of the aircraft’s component parts: In essence, the bill acknowledges that, for those general aviation aircraft and component parts in service beyond the statute of repose, any design or manufacturing defect not prevented or identified by the Fed- 11976 UNITED STATES AVIATION UNDERWRITERS v. NABTESCO eral regulatory process by then should, in most instances, have manifested itself. The bill thus makes clear that, once a general aviation aircraft or component part crosses the specified age threshold, and unless one of the specified exceptions applies, the possibility of any act or omission on the part of its manufacturer in its capacity as a manufacturer — including any defect in the aircraft or component part — ceases to be material or admissible in any civil action . . . . H.R. Rep. 103-525, pt. II (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1644, 1994 WL 422719 (emphasis added). Furthermore, contemporaneous statements by members of Congress bolster the conclusion that Congress intended the statute of repose to apply to manufacturers of used component parts.3 For example, Representative Glickman, the chief sponsor of the legislation, expressly noted that component parts “are covered under the bill.” 140 Cong. Rec. H4998, H5001 (daily ed. June 27, 1994). The Congressman elaborated that component parts are bound by the same limitation period as the aircraft on which they were first installed, such that “a used propeller which has 3 years left on its applicable limitation period would still have only 3 years if installed in its used condition[.]” Id. Moreover, upon signing GARA into law, President Clinton stated that GARA “is intended to give manufacturers of general aviation aircraft and related component parts some protection from lawsuits alleging defective design or manufacture after an aircraft has established a lengthy record 3 While comments by legislators are generally less authoritative than official committee reports, see In re Kelly, 841 F.2d 908, 912 n.3 (9th Cir. 1988), they nonetheless may be persuasive authority, see Fed. Election Comm’n v. Sailors’ Union of Pac. Political Fund, 828 F.2d 502, 506-507 (9th Cir. 1987). UNITED STATES AVIATION UNDERWRITERS v. NABTESCO 11977 of operational safety . . . The Act establishes an 18-year statute of repose for general aviation aircraft and component parts beyond which the manufacturer will not be liable in lawsuits alleging defective manufacture or design.” Statement by President Clinton, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1654, 1994 WL 542760 at  (Aug. 17, 1994) (emphasis added). Like the legislative history before it, the President’s statement cuts against the notion that Congress intended to protect manufacturers of aircraft and new component parts, but not manufacturers of used component parts. Undeterred, USAU contends that the legislative history supports the opposite inference. Appellant seizes on a oneword alteration between the original Senate bill, which extended the statute of repose to “the manufacturer of any component . . . part of the aircraft,” see S. Rep. No. 103-202 (1993), 1993 WL 484770 at -7, and the final legislation, which reads, “the manufacturer of any new component . . . part of the aircraft.” GARA §§ 2(a), 2(a)(2). In USAU’s view, this emendation reflects Congress’s intent that the statute of repose should not cover the manufacturers of used component parts. This argument unravels, however, when examined in the context of the legislative record accompanying the amendment in question. The House Judiciary Committee issued its official report on June 24, 1994, to introduce and explain this amendment, and conspicuously absent from the document is any suggestion that the committee’s purpose was to exclude a particular subset of manufacturers. H.R. Rep. 103-525, pt. II (June 24, 1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1644, 1994 WL 422719. Rather, the report explains the “any new component” provision in this way: Section 2(a)(2) specifies that the applicable statute of repose with regard to component parts runs from the date of the completion of the replacement or addition of the component. The statute of repose for compo- 11978 UNITED STATES AVIATION UNDERWRITERS v. NABTESCO nent parts applies on a “rolling” basis. For example, if the original piston engine is replaced, the new piston engine would have a 15-year statute of repose commencing with its replacement. Id. Three days after the report was issued, Representative Glickman clarified that “a used propeller which has 3 years left on its applicable limitation period would still have only 3 years if installed in its used condition.” 140 Cong. Rec. H4998, H5001 (daily ed. June 27, 1994). Viewed in context, Congress’s reasons for adding the word “new” are plain: it wished to ensure that the “rolling” period of repose could only be triggered by the replacement or addition of a new component part, as opposed to a used component part. Without this amendment, the replacement or addition of any used component part would have reset the rolling limitation period under § 2(a)(2), thus exposing the part manufacturer to a whole new period of liability. In short, USAU’s argument proves exactly the opposite of what it claims: by adding the word “new,” Congress reified the principle that the applicable limitation period for a used component part is permanently linked to the delivery date of that component part to its first purchaser. [7] In sum, the legislative history reassures us that Congress intended for the statute of repose in GARA to extend to manufacturers of used component parts in the accident aircraft. Consistent with this purpose, we interpret “the aircraft” to mean the accident aircraft or its component parts. Accordingly, where, as here, the damage arises from an allegedly defective used component part, the applicable limitation period commences with the delivery date of the used part to its first purchaser. GARA § 2(a)(1)(A). [8] Applying this construction, Nabtesco was a manufacturer of the accident aircraft or its component parts because it manufactured the nose landing gear actuator in the Cessna 560. GARA § 2(a). Thus, GARA applies to Nabtesco. It also follows that the applicable limitation period began on the date UNITED STATES AVIATION UNDERWRITERS v. NABTESCO 11979 of delivery of Actuator 339 to its first purchaser in October 1990, more than eighteen years before the accident. GARA § 2(a)(1)(A). Because the accident occurred after the statute of repose had run, USAU’s claim is barred and the district court properly granted summary judgment to Nabtesco.