Opinion ID: 1349877
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Georgia Law.

Text: (a) Under Art. IV, Sec. II, Par. I of the Georgia Constitution of 1976, the board was vested with the power to grant reprieves, pardons and paroles, to commute penalties, remove disabilities imposed by law, and . . . remit any part of a sentence for any offense against the State, after conviction except in cases of treason or impeachment, and except in cases in which the Governor refuses to suspend a sentence of death . . . This provision of the 1976 Constitution further required the board to communicate to each Session of the General Assembly in full detail each case of pardon, parole, commutation, removal of disabilities or remission of sentence granted . . . Finally, this paragraph of the 1976 Constitution provided, The General Assembly may enact laws in and of, but not inconsistent with, this Paragraph. (b) Subparagraph (a) of Art. IV, Sec. II, Par. II of the Georgia Constitution of 1983 provides, Except as otherwise provided in this Paragraph, the State Board of Pardons and Paroles shall be vested with the power of executive clemency, including the powers to grant reprieves, pardons, and paroles; to commute penalties; to remove disabilities imposed by law; and to remit any part of a sentence for any offense against the state after conviction. Subparagraph (b) deals with two situations: when a sentence of death is commuted to life imprisonment, and when a person is convicted of armed robbery. When a sentence of death is commuted to life imprisonment, subparagraph (b) provides that the board shall not have the authority to grant a pardon to the convicted person until such person has served at least 25 years in the penitentiary. And, when a person is convicted of armed robbery, subparagraph (b) further provides that the board shall not have the authority to consider such person for pardon or parole until such person has served at least five years in the penitentiary. Subparagraph (c) provides, Notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraph (b) of this Paragraph, the General Assembly, by law, may prohibit the Board from granting and may prescribe the terms and conditions for the Board's granting a pardon or parole to: (1) Any person incarcerated for a second or subsequent time for any offense for which such person could have been sentenced to life imprisonment; and (2) Any person who has received consecutive life sentences as the result of offenses occurring during the same series of acts. (c) Art. IV, Sec. VII, Par. II of the 1983 Constitution provides, The powers and duties of members of constitutional boards and commissions provided for in this Article, except the Board of Pardons and Paroles, shall be as provided by law. (Emphasis supplied.) (d) And, the separation-of-powers doctrine is enshrined in both the 1976 and 1983 Georgia Constitutions. The legislative, judicial, and executive powers shall forever remain separate and distinct ... Art. I, Sec. II, Par. III, Georgia Constitution of 1983; Art. I, Sec. II, Par. IV, Georgia Constitution of 1976. (e) OCGA § 42-9-45 (b) sets forth the length of sentence which must be served before initial consideration for parole takes place. In this regard, § 42-9-45 (b) provides, An inmate serving a misdemeanor sentence or misdemeanor sentences shall only be eligible for consideration for parole after the expiration of six months of his sentence or sentences or one-third of the time of his sentence or sentences, whichever is greater. An inmate serving a felony sentence or felony sentences shall only be eligible for consideration for parole after the expiration of nine months of his sentence or one-third of the time of the sentences, whichever is greater. Inmates serving sentences aggregating 21 years or more shall become eligible for consideration for parole upon completion of the service of seven years. (f) However, OCGA § 42-9-46 provides that, Notwithstanding any other provisions of law to the contrary, if the board is to consider any case in which an inmate has failed to serve the time required by law for automatic initial consideration, the board shall notify in writing, at least ten days prior to consideration, the sentencing judge and the district attorney of the county in which the person was sentenced. The sentencing judge or district attorney or both may appear at a hearing held by the board or make a written statement to the board expressing their views and making their recommendation as to whether the person should be paroled.