Opinion ID: 1144149
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the testimony of glen ford should have been admitted as it related to the intent of the parties

Text: ¶ 17. The chancellor heard testimony from real estate agent Glen Ford, a portion of which was heard strictly as an offer of proof (proffer) on testimony and documents not allowed into evidence by the chancellor. The Stockstills argue on appeal that the chancellor erred in not admitting the testimony of Ford at trial because Ford was a dual agent, acting in the interest of both parties. The Stockstills had planned on introducing testimony of Ford concerning documents they claim evidence the negotiations between the parties. The Gammills objected based on the fact that the documents were not signed by Stewart Gammill, were not contracts, and were not relevant. The Stockstills also argue on appeal that Ford had apparent authority, even though he lacked actual authority, to represent any statements of the Gammills to the Stockstills concerning the boundaries of the property. The Stockstills rely on several cases from other jurisdictions for the proposition that knowledge of a dual agent is imputed to both parties represented by the dual agent. ¶ 18. The Gammills argue that Ford was never acting as a dual agent on behalf of both parties. In fact the Gammills stated they paid Ford only because Ford told them that it was customary for the seller to pay the real estate broker, yet the Gammills denied engaging Ford as an agent. Both parties acknowledged that no written agreement authorized Ford to act as an agent on behalf of the Gammills. This Court held long ago that the agency of the broker extends only to bringing the parties together. He is not authorized to make sale of the customer's land, or to make a contract of sale binding on him. Everman v. Herndon, 71 Miss. 823, 829, 15 So. 135, 137 (1894) (citations omitted). Our well-established standard for reviewing the trial court's admission or suppression of evidence, including expert testimony, is abuse of discretion, and the discretion possessed by a trial judge in such matters is no doubt great. Miss. Transp. Comm'n v. McLemore, 863 So.2d 31, 34 (Miss.2003). Finally, findings of fact made by a chancellor which are supported by credible evidence, may not be set aside on appeal. Allgood v. Allgood, 473 So.2d 416, 421 (Miss.1985). Given the testimony from both parties that Ford was not expressly given actual authority, we cannot state here that the findings of the chancellor, vested with his broad discretion concerning the admission of evidence, were not supported by credible evidence or that they were manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous. This issue is without merit.