Opinion ID: 1479756
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: fifth amendment protection against double jeopardy and the requirement of manifest necessity

Text: The principle that a defendant may not be tried twice for the same offense has been described as one of the oldest ideas found in western civilization. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 151, 79 S.Ct. 676, 695-96, 3 L.Ed.2d 684 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting). Its origins can be traced to Greek and Roman times, and it became established in the common law of England long before this Nation's independence. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 2063, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969) (footnote omitted). The American formulation of this principle  embodied in the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment [4]  has long been understood not merely to ensure the finality of criminal judgments and to protect against multiple punishments for the same offense, but also to safeguard a defendant's obvious interest in avoiding the burdens of a second prosecution when his first trial was aborted  unnecessarily  before judgment. Perez, 22 U.S. at 580; see Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 36, 98 S.Ct. 2156, 2161, 57 L.Ed.2d 24 (1978). For Fifth Amendment purposes, jeopardy attaches as soon as the jury is empaneled and sworn, or, in a nonjury trial, as soon as the judge begins to hear evidence. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569, 97 S.Ct. 1349, 1353, 51 L.Ed.2d 642 (1977). Once jeopardy attaches, the defendant gains a `valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal.' Braxton v. United States, 395 A.2d 759, 769 (D.C. 1978) (quoting Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689, 69 S.Ct. 834, 837, 93 L.Ed. 974 (1949)). Consequently, unless a defendant consents to a mistrial, any attempt to begin a second prosecution is vulnerable to dismissal under the double jeopardy clause.
There are several reasons why this valued right merits constitutional protection. First, a defendant has an interest in being able, once and for all, to conclude his confrontation with society through the verdict of a tribunal he might believe to be favorably disposed to his fate. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 486, 91 S.Ct. 547, 558, 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971) (plurality opinion); see Crist, 437 U.S. at 35-36, 98 S.Ct. at 2160-61. This interest in retaining a potentially favorable jury initially arises with the selection and swearing in of a panel of jurors. For any number of reasons, a defendant may perceive the jury to be sympathetic to his case at the outset. Indeed, the extensive time and effort frequently spent screening veniremen attest to the importance attached to empaneling a receptive jury. See 2 A. AMSTERDAM, B. SEGAL & M. MILLER, TRIAL MANUAL FOR DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES § 340 (1971). This interest in retaining a chosen jury may intensify as the trial proceeds, if the defendant senses the trial is going well and the factfinder is leaning toward acquittal. In the present case, for example, appellant apparently had every reason to believe the trial was progressing favorably; counsel had announced a frameup theory to the jury and had substantially undermined the first government witness' ability to identify appellant as his assailant. Second, when a defendant is forced to abandon a trial in progress and undergo a retrial, the prospects for an acquittal may be lessened and the risk that an innocent defendant may be convicted may be enhanced. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 504, 98 S.Ct. 824, 829, 54 L.Ed.2d 717 (1978). The opportunity to present the government's case a second time may permit the prosecutor to compensate for weaknesses exposed during the first trial, correct mistakes, and generally strengthen the government's presentation. This second crack at a jury is especially significant when there is an assailant-identification issue, as in this case. Courts have observed that government witnesses frequently become more definite in their testimony and more favorable to the prosecution with successive trips to the stand. See Carsey v. United States, 129 U.S.App.D.C. 205, 208-09, 392 F.2d 810, 813-14 (1967). The prosecutor also may benefit from having observed defense strategies at the first trial. [5] Finally, the defendant's right to receive a judgment at the first trial is supported by the realization that inherently  without regard to the merits of the prosecution  a second [trial] may be grossly unfair. It increases the financial and emotional burden on the accused, [and] prolongs the period in which he is stigmatized by an unresolved accusation of wrongdoing. Arizona, 434 U.S. at 503-04, 98 S.Ct. at 829. [6] Because these burdens of delay, expense, and personal anxiety will inevitably be associated with a reprosecution, regardless of whether the defendant is ultimately found guilty or innocent, a defendant need not demonstrate any other prejudice when seeking to bar a retrial on double jeopardy grounds. Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 471, 93 S.Ct. 1066, 1073, 35 L.Ed.2d 425 (1973).
Despite these significant considerations weighing against declaration of a mistrial over defense objection, a defendant does not have an absolute right to dismissal of an indictment simply because a judge aborts the first trial without defense consent. It is readily apparent that a mechanical rule prohibiting retrial whenever circumstances compel the discharge of a jury without the defendant's consent would be too high a price to pay for the added assurance of personal security and freedom from government harassment which such a mechanical rule would provide. Jorn, 400 U.S. at 480, 91 S.Ct. at 554. Rather, `a defendant's valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal must in some circumstances be subordinated to the public's interest in fair trials designed to end in just judgments.' Id. (quoting Wade, 336 U.S. at 689, 69 S.Ct. at 837). For this reason, when courtroom errors or other developments at trial make a just judgment impossible, the public's interest in maintaining the integrity of the criminal justice system will outweigh the defendant's right to obtain a judgment, and the court may terminate the trial without the defendant's consent and without foreclosing reprosecution. Justice Story first articulated in Perez the standard a trial court must apply in determining whether circumstances warrant a mistrial over defense objection: We think, that in all cases of this nature, the law has invested Courts of justice with the authority to discharge a jury from giving any verdict, whenever, in their opinion, taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 580 (emphasis added). Although Justice Story instructed that a trial court may exercise a sound discretion in applying this standard, he nonetheless advised that the power to terminate a trial without the defendant's consent ought to be used with the greatest caution, under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes. Id. Accordingly, the manifest necessity standard in Perez is a command to trial judges not to foreclose the defendant's option [to continue with a trial] until a scrupulous exercise of judicial discretion leads to the conclusion that the ends of public justice would not be served by a continuation of the proceedings. Jorn, 400 U.S. at 485, 91 S.Ct. at 557. To satisfy this command, a trial court must engage in a two-step inquiry. First, the court must determine whether a trial development gives rise to a `high degree' of necessity to terminate the trial. Braxton, 395 A.2d at 769 (quoting Arizona, 434 U.S. at 506, 98 S.Ct. at 831). Although this standard does not require demonstration of absolute necessity, Braxton, 395 A.2d at 769, the reasons for aborting a trial must be sufficient to override the defendant's double jeopardy interests. Id. A mistrial without defense consent is therefore justified `only in very extraordinary and striking circumstances,' Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 736, 83 S.Ct. 1033, 1034, 10 L.Ed.2d 100 (1963) (quoting United States v. Coolidge, 25 Fed.Cas. 622, 623 (C.C.D.Mass. 1815) (No. 14858) (Story, J.)), where it becomes impossible for the jury to reach an impartial verdict, or there is improper conduct of such a nature that a conviction would likely be reversed on appeal. Somerville, 410 U.S. at 464, 93 S.Ct. at 1070; United States v. Bristol, 325 A.2d 183, 186 (D.C.1974). [7] Second, even when there is a high degree of necessity that would ordinarily justify a mistrial, the trial judge must determine whether an alternative measure  less drastic than a mistrial  can alleviate the problem so that the trial can continue to an impartial verdict. See Jorn, 400 U.S. at 487, 91 S.Ct. at 558; Coleman v. United States, 449 A.2d 327, 329 (D.C.1982). While the trial judge need not adopt an alternative that runs directly counter to a legitimate state policy, Somerville, 410 U.S. at 469, [8] 93 S.Ct. at 1073, the judge should not resort to a mistrial when some other course of action can mitigate or cure the trial prejudice and thereby accommodate both the defendant's interest in retaining a particular jury and society's interest in just and defensible judgments.
We next turn to the standards which a reviewing court must apply when confronted by a claim of double jeopardy. [9] In attempting to bring a second prosecution after a mistrial granted over defense objection, the government bears a heavy burden to justify the mistrial decision. Arizona, 434 U.S. at 505, 98 S.Ct. at 830. The words `manifest necessity' appropriately characterize the magnitude of [this] burden. Id. Thus, in determining whether a retrial is barred, a reviewing court must resolve any doubt `in favor of the liberty of the citizen.' Downum, 372 U.S. at 738, 83 S.Ct. at 1035 (quoting United States v. Watson, 28 Fed.Cas. 499 (S.D. N.Y.1868) (No. 16651)). Reviewing courts are obligated to scrutiniz[e] mistrial decisions, Somerville, 410 U.S. at 462-63, 93 S.Ct. at 1069-70, and satisfy themselves that ... the trial judge exercised `sound discretion' in declaring a mistrial. Arizona, 434 U.S. at 514, 98 S.Ct. at 835 (quoting Perez, 22 U.S. at 580). This is not to say a reviewing court is to engage in de novo consideration of the manifest necessity issue. A reviewing court ordinarily will accept a trial judge's determination that there is a high degree of necessity for a mistrial, without a less drastic alternative, as long as that determination is reasonable. See Somerville, 410 U.S. at 459, 93 S.Ct. at 1068; United States v. Sedgwick, 345 A.2d 465, 472 (D.C.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 966, 96 S.Ct. 1751, 48 L.Ed.2d 210 (1976); Coleman, 449 A.2d at 329. This is true even when the reviewing court is aware that, if presented with the question in the first instance, other trial judges  or the reviewing court itself  might well be persuaded to continue with the trial. See Arizona, 434 U.S. at 509-10, 98 S.Ct. at 832-33; Sedgwick, 345 A.2d at 472. In evaluating the reasonableness of a mistrial decision, the level of deference accorded the trial court's determination will depend on the particular problem confronting the trial judge. Arizona, 434 U.S. at 506, 98 S.Ct. at 830 (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court has recognized that there is a spectrum of trial problems which may warrant a mistrial, and that these problems vary in their amenability to appellate scrutiny. Id. at 510, 98 S.Ct. at 833. For instance, when a mistrial is declared because the jury is deadlocked in deliberations and unable to reach a verdict, or because of a courtroom error that the trial judge believes may result in irreparable jury bias, a reviewing court generally should accord the highest degree of respect to the trial judge's determination of manifest necessity. Id. at 511, 98 S.Ct. at 833; see id. at 509-11, 98 S.Ct. at 832-33. [10] The reason for this heightened deference is that the trial court is in the best position to assess all the factors which must be considered in making a necessarily discretionary determination regarding the jury's ability to render an impartial verdict. Id. at 510 n. 28, 98 S.Ct. at 832-33 n. 28. When, however, a mistrial decision is based on factors that are not uniquely within the purview of the trial court, the reviewing court need not defer to the trial judge's reasoning and conclusions. [11] In order to satisfy itself that sound discretion was exercised in declaring a mistrial, a reviewing court should not focus exclusively on the trial judge's reasons or on a lack of expressed reasons. The double jeopardy clause does not mandate that a trial judge make findings of fact or set forth specific reasoning. Arizona, 434 U.S. at 516-17, 98 S.Ct. at 835-36. Thus, the absence of specific findings or reasoning in the record regarding manifest necessity, or the lack of less drastic alternatives, does not necessarily mean that the trial judge failed to exercise sound discretion. Id. [12] Alternatively, when a trial judge's reasons for declaring a mistrial are placed on the record, a reviewing court is not prohibited from looking behind these reasons to see if they accurately reflect the record and support a determination of manifest necessity. Braxton, 395 A.2d at 769. [13] Accordingly, the reviewing court should look at the record as a whole in determining whether the mistrial was justified by manifest necessity. Id. In sum, the reviewing court should require that `the basis for the trial judge's mistrial order [be] adequately disclosed by the record.' Id. (quoting Arizona, 434 U.S. at 517, 98 S.Ct. at 836). While the trial judge need not set forth reasoning, unless the reviewing court is able to discern from the record [p]recise and justified reasons for the mistrial, a second prosecution should not be permitted. Bristol, 325 A.2d at 187. This means that the record must support both (1) a reasonable conclusion that the events at trial were sufficiently serious to override the interests of the defendant in completing the trial, and (2) a determination that there were no measures short of mistrial that might have sufficed to mitigate or cure any perceived undue trial prejudice. Braxton, 395 A.2d at 773; See Brady v. Samaha, 667 F.2d 224, 229-31 (1st Cir. 1981); Dunkerley v. Hogan, 579 F.2d 141, 146-48 (2d Cir.1978); cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1090, 99 S.Ct. 872, 59 L.Ed.2d 56 (1979).