Opinion ID: 1584057
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: The Recorded Jail Conversations

Text: We now turn to Hayward's assertion that the recorded conversations he had with Smith from jail were improperly admitted into evidence because the conversations were more prejudicial than probative. [11] He contends that the profane language he used during these conversations unduly prejudiced the jury during the guilt and penalty phases. At trial, the State sought to play portions of two telephone calls Hayward made to Smith from the jail shortly after his arrest. Their asserted purpose was to show that Hayward had called Smith to tell her what he had told the officers, so that her statement would mirror his. The State also asserted that Hayward's instructions to Smith in one of the telephone calls to get rid of the reefer, which both knew did not exist, was code instructing Smith to get rid of the murder weapon. [12] Hayward clearly knew that the calls were taped or monitoredhe specifically told Smith, They record these phones. The State argued that redacting the extensive vulgarity in the tapes would leave such a void as to render them meaningless. Further, the State urged, it was significant that Hayward's language increasingly worsened as Smith failed to listen to what he was telling her to say and do. During one of the conversations between Hayward and Smith, the following colloquy took place: HAYWARD: Soon as you get [off] this phone, you hear me. Huh? Do you hear me, Dot? ... Soon as you get [off] this phone .... Go get up Charles. SMITH: Huh? HAYWARD: Go get up Charles, you know what I'm talking about. SMITH: Okay. No, I can't do that. HAYWARD: Why? SMITH: Not-uh. No, I ain't trusting nobody, no. No.... HAYWARD: I told you SMITH: But I, they ain't got the gun though. Although Hayward's language throughout his conversations with Smith contained extensive vulgarity, Hayward's obscenity became extreme after Smith's reference to the gun. The State argued that Hayward's explosion of anger over the use of the word gun constituted admissible evidence of consciousness of guilt. The trial court concluded that the relevance [of the tapes] is not outweighed by any prejudicial [e]ffect and allowed the tapes to be played for the jury, with a transcript provided for their review during the playing of the tapes. Before we begin our analysis of this issue, we review the test to be applied in such cases. Admission of probative but potentially prejudicial evidence is controlled by section 90.403, Florida Statutes. It states in pertinent part: 90.403 Exclusion on the grounds of prejudice or confusionRelevant evidence is inadmissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. § 90.403, Fla. Stat. (2007). In State v. McClain, 525 So.2d 420, 422 (Fla.1988), we explained the balancing test a trial court must perform under section 90.403 in determining whether relevant evidence is admissible against a defendant at trial. We stated: This statute compels the trial court to weigh the danger of unfair prejudice against the probative value. In applying the balancing test, the trial court necessarily exercises its discretion. Indeed, the same item of evidence may be admissible in one case and not in another, depending upon the relation of that item to the other evidence. At issue in this case was the identity of Destefano's killer. Central to this issue was the presence of Hayward's blood on a number of items found at or near the crime scene. As noted earlier, Hayward provided several explanations for the presence of his blood at the crime scene. The tapes, including the language used as well as the context in which the conversations took place, provided relevant information for the jury to consider when assessing the reliability of his explanations. Professor Ehrhardt explained the application of section 90.403 under these circumstances as follows: Evidence of conduct or speech of the accused which demonstrates a consciousness of guilt is relevant since it supplies the basis for an inference that the accused is guilty of the offense. Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 403.1, at 189 (2008 ed.). Here, Hayward's thinly disguised attempts to instruct Smith to dispose of the murder weapon, his futile attempts to convey to Smith the statements he had given to the police, and his explosive reaction to Smith's use of the word gun in response to one of his statements were highly relevant to his consciousness of guilt and rebutted his claim that he merely found the gun at the scene. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court correctly determined that any prejudice caused by Hayward's extensive use of profanity during his taped conversations with Smith was outweighed by the highly probative value that such evidence offered. Moreover, the jurors were well aware of Hayward's propensity to use profanity since they previously heard and saw his videotaped statement, which also contained similar profanity. Although we have concluded that admission of the tapes was not error, even if it had been, such error would have been harmless. Under DiGuilio, in conducting a harmless error analysis, the focus is on the effect on the trier of fact. 491 So.2d at 1139. The question to be considered is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the verdict, with the burden being on the State to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not. Id. Given the strength of the evidence connecting Hayward to the crime, we find that there is no reasonable possibility that the profanity used by Hayward during his taped conversations with Smith affected the verdict. Hayward confessed to the burglary of Destefano's car and confirmed all of the events of the robbery and murder while claiming he was watching someone else do the shooting. McDowell gave testimony of his own eyewitness account, and there was extensive forensic evidence connecting Hayward to the murder. We also conclude that any impact that the admission of the tapes may have had on the jury during the penalty phase was insignificant and did not affect the jury's death sentence recommendation. Even if the language used by Hayward portrayed him in a derogatory light, any possible prejudice would have been overshadowed by the significant aggravating circumstances: (1) that the defendant had prior violent felony convictions; and (2) that the murder was committed during the course of a robbery; merged with (3) that it was committed for pecuniary gain. The prior violent felony aggravator has been regarded as one of the weightiest aggravators. See Jones v. State, 998 So.2d 573, 586 (Fla.2008) (reiterating that the prior violent felony aggravator is one of the most weighty in Florida's sentencing calculus (quoting Sireci v. Moore, 825 So.2d 882, 887-88 (Fla.2002))). Moreover, in Hayward's case, the trial court found a complete absence of statutory mitigation and found only relatively weak nonstatutory mitigation. Given the evidence of weighty aggravators presented to the jury, there is no reasonable possibility that the manner in which Hayward spoke to his girlfriend and the profanity he used affected the jury's sentencing recommendation or the trial court's ultimate decision to sentence Hayward to death. As the trial court noted, each statutory aggravator, when considered alone, outweighs the totality of the mitigating circumstances and justifies a sentence of death. Thus, the error, if any, was harmless and relief is denied on the claim.