Opinion ID: 2040390
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admissibility of Testimony of Habit.

Text: The admissibility of foundation evidence is a matter ordinarily entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court. See State v. Gibb, 303 N.W.2d 673, 681 (Iowa 1981); Iowa R.Evid. 104. We review for abuse of discretion. State v. Hershey, 348 N.W.2d 1, 2 (1984). Foundation evidence is required for the admission of a blood test to insure the reliability and accuracy of the test. See State v. Steadman, 350 N.W.2d 172, 174 (Iowa 1984) (finding compliance with foundation requirements of Iowa Code ch. 321B); Henkel v. Heri, 274 N.W.2d 317, 319-22 (Iowa 1979) (discussing extra-321B foundational criteria for admission of blood test in civil damage action). Iowa Rule of Evidence 406, applicable to this case, states: Evidence of the habit of a person or of the routine practice of an organization, whether corroborated or not and regardless of the presence of eyewitnesses, is relevant to prove that the conduct of the person or organization on a particular occasion was in conformity with the habit or routine practice. Iowa law preceding adoption of the Iowa Rules of Evidence in 1983 was consistent with rule 406. Iowa R.Evid. 406 committee comment (1983); see State v. Don, 318 N.W.2d 801, 806 (Iowa 1982) (Evidence of habit is admissible to show that a person is likely to have acted on a particular occasion in conformity with that habit.); State v. Shelton, 176 N.W.2d 159, 161-62 (Iowa 1970) (permitting nurse who could not remember withdrawing blood from specific defendant to testify as to her habit in obtaining blood samples); Barrick v. Smith, 248 Iowa 195, 199-200, 80 N.W.2d 326, 328 (1957) (permitting testimony by bus driver concerning routine practice in turning on flashing stop lights and extending stop arm of school bus). Commentators too have endorsed the use of habit evidence to establish conduct on a particular occasion, so long as the specific instances from which the habit has been inferred were sufficiently numerous and occurred under substantially similar circumstances to qualify as a habit. See 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 376 (C. Chadbourn Rev.1979); C. McCormick, Evidence § 162, at 341 (1954); see generally Fed.R.Evid. 406 advisory committee note. Defendant contends that we should uphold the trial court's ruling because ten to twelve instances of specific conduct do not sufficiently establish the pattern of conduct necessary to prove routine practice and habit. We will uphold the discretionary ruling of a trial court on admissibility of evidence if the ruling can be sustained on any ground appearing in the record. State v. Jespersen, 360 N.W.2d 804, 806 (Iowa 1985); State v. McCowen, 297 N.W.2d 226, 227 (Iowa 1980). For example, if the trial court in the exercise of sound discretion had determined that the State had not satisfied the sufficient-instances requirement of Rule 406, we might well find no abuse of that discretion. We cannot do so on this record, however, because the trial court clearly exercised no discretion on the matter. Instead, the trial court found the testimony entitled to no weight solely because nurse Kilborn could not be cross-examined. The right to cross-examine the person whose habit is in question is not a predicate to admissibility of habit evidence. Indeed, the use of evidence of habit is often mandated by the unavailability or lack of recollection of the person whose conduct is in question, circumstances making cross-examination impossible or of very limited value. We must remand the case for a new hearing on the suppression motion in order that the trial court may exercise discretion in deciding (1) whether the requirements for habit testimony have been satisfied, and (2) if so, what weight the testimony should receive in satisfying the foundation requirements for admissibility of the blood test result.