Opinion ID: 2982191
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ross’s Brady Claim

Text: Finding that Ross fairly presented his federal claim, we examine whether Brady requires the disclosure of grand jury testimony in this case.2 With respect to the appropriate standard of review, in a case like this, where a state court does not address a federal claim, “a federal habeas court must 2 In lieu of seeking disclosure, Ross also asked the trial court to conduct an in camera review of the grand jury transcripts. However, that issue was not certified in the COA and is not addressed herein. - 22 - No. 11-3454 Ross v. Pineda presume that the federal claim was adjudicated on the merits” and “that the restrictive standard of review set out in § 2254(d)(2) consequently applies.” Williams, 133 S.Ct. at 1096, 1092 (emphasis added). Based on this, the Ohio Court of Appeal’s decision was not “unreasonable” or “contrary” to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal law.
In the seminal case of Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment . . . .” 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Under Brady, a defendant must show “(1) suppression by the prosecution after a request by the defense, (2) the evidence’s favorable character for the defense, and (3) the materiality of the evidence.” Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 794 (1972). Brady imposes a duty to disclose exculpatory evidence “even though there has been no request by the accused.” Stickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280 (1999) (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976)). Impeachment evidence is also encompassed within the Brady rule because a jury’s reliance on the credibility of a witness can be decisive in determining the guilt or innocence of the accused. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). A defendant’s right to exculpatory evidence must, however, be reconciled with the “longestablished policy that maintains the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings in federal courts.” Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 869 (1966). Grand jury proceedings, though traditionally cloaked in secrecy, can be used to impeach a witness’s testimony. Id. at 869. Trial courts can reveal - 23 - No. 11-3454 Ross v. Pineda grand jury testimony, or relevant portions thereof, if a defendant shows a “particularized need” to impeach a witness, to refresh his recollection, or to test his credibility. Id. at 870. Applying Brady and Dennis, we find no violation of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. Ross argues that he is entitled to the grand jury testimony to show inconsistencies in the victims’ trial testimony. Speculating that the grand jury testimony contained impeachment evidence, he claims that not divulging the transcripts prejudiced the outcome of his trial. His suspicions were aroused when the bill of particulars included accusations of anal penetration or attempted anal penetration. From here, Ross leaps to the conclusion that the bill of particulars is “only explicable” if the victims testified about anal sex before the grand jury. If such accusations were made before the grand jury, Ross argues that it was “manifestly unfair” to prevent him from using the testimony to cross-examine the victims. Ross’s conclusion is flawed. The bill of particulars states that Ross engaged in sexual behavior that “include[d], but was not limited to, oral sex being performed on the victim, the victim performing oral sex on the defendant and/or anal sex performed on the victim.” This wording, according to the state court, suggested that anal sex was “a possible form of sexual conduct.” But the evidence adduced at trial did not establish this offense, nor did the trial court instruct the jury on anal rape. As the court of appeals accurately observed, because the probability that anal rape had been mentioned in the grand jury was slim, Ross did not demonstrate a particularized need for disclosure and was not deprived of a fair trial. - 24 - No. 11-3454 Ross v. Pineda
Given the improbability that the grand jury testimony contained impeachment evidence, Ross fails to demonstrate materiality under Brady and thus cannot sustain his high burden of proving that the state court’s conclusion was “unreasonable” or “contrary” to, clearly established federal law. Evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that had the evidence been revealed, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678. But “[t]he mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish ‘materiality’ in the constitutional sense.” Agurs, 427 U.S. at 109–10. Furthermore, a constitutional violation under Brady occurs only where a prosecutor’s “omission is of sufficient significance to result in the denial of defendant’s right to a fair trial,” or “undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.” Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676, 679. In determining materiality, “[t]he question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.” Strickler, 527 U.S. at 289–90 (quoting Kyles v. Whitely, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995)) (internal quotation and citations omitted). When the omission is evaluated in the context of the entire record, we conclude that Ross fails to satisfy the materiality requirement under these standards. Neither Ross nor this Court can declare with certainty whether the grand jury testimony in this case contained favorable impeachment evidence, as the trial court did not conduct an in camera review, or give Ross an opportunity to inspect the transcripts. Perhaps the testimony would have - 25 - No. 11-3454 Ross v. Pineda revealed an inconsistency; however, the “mere possibility” that undisclosed evidence may have assisted the defense does not rise to the level of materiality as contemplated by Supreme Court. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 109–10. There are several reasons to believe the grand jury testimony did not contain impeachment evidence. We agree with the Ohio Court of Appeals that both the parties and the court expended a substantial amount of time and effort during the trial considering Ross’s inferences that B.B. and D.D. had made prior statements about anal contact with Ross. In the end, allegations of anal rape likely came from statements made by third parties and not from the victims. Indeed, neither B.B. nor D.D. testified at trial that Ross engaged in anal contact. The evidence shows that B.B.’s mother was concerned about the possibility that Ross had attempted anal penetration. However, she stated unambiguously that B.B. denied penile-anal contact with Ross. Therefore, even if Ross had access to the transcripts, it is likely that the testimony he sought contained little, if any, impeachment value. Furthermore, Ross was not prejudiced because even if the testimony had been revealed, the result of the proceeding would not have been different. Had the grand jury testimony contained allegations of anal penetration, B.B. and D.D.’s in-court testimony regarding oral rape would have been sufficient to support Ross’s conviction. Allegations of anal penetration, whether alleged or not, do not necessarily cast doubt on Ross’s guilt with respect to the oral rape charges. Contrary to Ross’s argument that the grand jury testimony would have “undercut the prosecution’s evidence against him,” there is nothing to suggest that Ross was prejudiced by the trial court’s refusal to provide access to the transcript. - 26 - No. 11-3454 Ross v. Pineda In short, given that Ross has failed to establish materiality under Brady, he was not entitled to disclosure of the grand jury transcripts. Accordingly, the state court’s decision was not “unreasonable” or “contrary” to Supreme Court precedent.