Opinion ID: 1693603
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: marchisio's testimony under daubert/kumho tire

Text: The parties do not contest that Marchisio was qualified to testify as an expert in vocational rehabilitation. Evidence presented at trial established that Marchisio has a master's degree in guidance and counseling and a bachelor's degree in sociology, and was, at the time of trial, president of Midlands Rehabilitations Consultants, Inc. Marchisio has extensive experience in the field of vocational rehabilitation, was licensed by the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services as a certified professional counselor and as a mental health practitioner, and was certified by the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court as a vocational rehabilitation counselor and job placement specialist. As the majority notes, the issues presented on appeal relate to the foundation presented for certain opinions to which Marchisio testified. Specifically, the majority addresses two aspects of Marchisio's opinion: (1) his description of Phillips as disabled and (2) his determination that Phillips' worklife expectancy had been reduced from 54.2 years to 38.9 years. I do not agree with the majority's conclusion that Marchisio's opinion lacked foundation because Marchisio was not qualified to determine that Phillips was disabled. The majority assumes that the word disability is uniquely associated with a medical diagnosis, such that only a qualified medical expert may use the term. This, in fact, is not the case. The Supreme Court of South Dakota addressed a similar situation in Marnette v. Morgan, 485 N.W.2d 595, 598 (S.D. 1992). The court stated: We continue to hold that a disability may be established through testimony other than a doctor. There is a distinction between a disability rating and an impairment rating.  (Emphasis in original.) The court articulated that distinction as follows: Although the medical impairment rating given by a doctor is an important factor, the extent of loss of use does not necessarily equal the extent of medical impairment.... .... Permanent medical impairment is related directly to the health status of the individual, whereas disability can be determined only within the context of the personal, social, or occupational demands, or statutory or regulatory requirements that the individual is unable to meet as a result of the impairment.  (Citation omitted.) (Emphasis in original.) Id. In Marnette, the court determined that the vocational rehabilitation expert's testimony lacked foundation because there was no medical testimony establishing that the plaintiff suffered any medical impairment. This result was entirely proper, as medical impairment can be established only through properly qualified medical testimony. In the present case, however, Ripa testified that Phillips suffered from restriction in the extremes of her mobility of the neck such that she did not have full range of motion in her neck. Ripa further testified that it was his opinion, within a reasonable degree of medical probability, that Phillips' injury was permanent. In addition, Phillips herself testified regarding the discomfort and limitations she suffered as a result of the injury. Finally, Marchisio testified that in preparing his opinion, he also relied on his interview of Phillips and an examination of Phillips' medical records. Based on this evidence, Marchisio could appropriately determine that Phillips was disabled. The testimony of Ripa, Phillips herself, and Phillips' self-report and medical records, provided an adequate assessment of Phillips' medical impairment. Given that assessment, Marchisio could conclude that Phillips was disabled, as that term is used in the field of vocational rehabilitation, by determining the effect of Phillips' physical impairment in the context of her personal, social, and occupational demands. See Marnette, supra . I agree, however, with the majority's conclusion regarding Marchisio's opinion that Phillips' worklife had been reduced by the specific figure of 15.3 years. This testimony, when subjected to a Daubert/Kumho Tire analysis, lacks the validity required under the Nebraska rules of evidence, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the erroneous admission of this evidence was prejudicial error requiring a new trial. Based on the testimony of Phillips and Ripa and Ripa's examination of Phillips and her medical records, as summarized above and in the majority opinion, Marchisio could appropriately offer his opinion regarding Phillips' reduced functional capacity and reduced earning capacity. As a vocational expert, Marchisio would be qualified by education, training, and experience to address how Phillips' physical limitations might affect her employability status. The specific figure regarding Phillips' reduced worklife expectancy, however, was derived entirely from the New Work Life Expectancy Tables published by Vocational Econometrics. Marchisio's reliance on this questionable data is the methodological flaw in his analysis. The usual foundation for expert reliance on external data, and the guarantee that such data is trustworthy, is generally that it is of the kind that is normally relied upon by experts in the particular field at issue. See § 27-703. Nonetheless, the gatekeeping responsibility of the trial court still requires it to determine whether the basis of an expert's opinion meets minimum standards of reliability before that expert's opinion is admissible. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). If the underlying data are so lacking in reliability that no reasonable expert would rely on them, then an opinion that is derived entirely from them must be excluded from evidence. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation, 35 F.3d 717 (3d Cir.1994), cert. denied, General Electric Co. et al. v. Ingram et al., 513 U.S. 1190, 115 S.Ct. 1253, 131 L.Ed.2d 134 (1995). [I]t is the judge who makes the determination of reasonable reliance, and ... for the judge to make the factual determination under [Fed.R.Evid.] 104(a) that an expert is basing his or her opinion on a type of data reasonably relied upon by experts, the judge must conduct an independent evaluation into reasonableness. The judge can of course take into account the particular expert's opinion that experts reasonably rely on that type of data, as well as the opinions of other experts as to its reliability, but the judge can also take into account other factors he or she deems relevant. (Emphasis in original.) In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation, 35 F.3d at 748. Marchisio testified that the New Work Life Expectancy Tables were reasonably relied upon by experts in his field. However, Marchisio's opinion about reasonable reliance is not determinative. A court must conduct an independent assessment of the data to determine if reliance upon them is indeed reasonable. Many courts have addressed the reliance of expert witnesses on worklife expectancy tables that are published by the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, and have stated that such tables are generally considered to be reliable. See, e.g., Boucher v. U.S. Suzuki Motor Corp., 73 F.3d 18 (2d Cir.1996); Mealey v. Slaton Machinery Sales, Inc., 508 F.2d 87 (5th Cir.1975); Sales v. Republic of Uganda, 828 F.Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y.1993); Earl v. Bouchard Transp. Co., Inc., 735 F.Supp. 1167 (E.D.N.Y.1990), aff'd. in part and in part rev'd, and remanded on other grounds, 917 F.2d 1320 (2d Cir.). But see In re Air Crash Disaster at Charlotte, N.C., 982 F.Supp. 1101 (D.S.C.1997) (U.S. Department of Labor worklife expectancy tables not persuasive because they ignore demographic changes made since 1986). Even if those courts approving of the U.S. Department of Labor tables were correct, however, their determinations are not persuasive in the present case. The New Work Life Expectancy Tables, used in this case, were not published by the U.S. Department of Labor and contain such broadly defined classifications that reliance on them is not reasonable. The New Work Life Expectancy Tables represent a statistical model that attempts to compare the worklife expectancy of the healthy segment of the work force with the disabled segment. The tables attempt to quantify how long a disabled person usually remains in the work force as opposed to a healthy person. For purposes of the tables, however, the term disabled refers to a broad continuum of disabilities, from mild or transitory conditions to conditions that result in total dependence on others for care. In other words, the tables measure and average together the experiences of individuals within a tremendously diverse range of occupations and injuries such that, for statistical purposes, a police officer with a broken arm is equivalent to an attorney who develops a hearing impairment, who is in turn equivalent to a surgeon who becomes a paraplegic. The flaw in this methodology is apparent. The degree of an individual's unique disability obviously has an effect on how long that individual will remain in the work force. The nature of a person's disability, relative to his or her particular occupation, will also have a commensurate effect on that person's employability status and worklife expectancy. A statistical average of such a broad range of disabilities, applied to an equally broad range of occupations, renders the result almost meaningless when attempting to determine what effect a disability will have on an individual person under particular circumstances. The use of actuarial tables in determining worklife expectancy should be rejected where the tables do not sufficiently relate to the unique circumstances of the person under evaluation. In the present case, evidence was presented of facts specific to Phillips, and for Marchisio to render an opinion supported by these facts was not error. Marchisio's opinion specifically quantifying Phillips' reduced worklife expectancy, however, was not based on any facts particular to her but was based solely on data that were too generic to support a reliable opinion. The use of statistical data by an expert in reaching an opinion is, of course, permissible, but can result in admissible evidence only where the basis for the opinion includes evidence particular to the case, demonstrating the pertinent applicability of the statistical data to the circumstances. That foundation was not present in this case. Marchisio's reasoning and methodology were not valid, as the New Work Life Expectancy Tables could not properly... be applied to the facts in issue. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). Consequently, it was error to admit Marchisio's opinion that Phillips' worklife expectancy had been reduced by 15.3 years. The Daubert/Kumho Tire requirement that an expert's conclusions be supported by good grounds for each step in the analysis means that any step that renders the analysis unreliable under the Daubert/Kumho Tire factors renders the expert's testimony inadmissible. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation, 35 F.3d 717 (3d Cir.1994). Given our standard of review, I cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in determining that the admission of Marchisio's testimony was error, or in determining that the error was prejudicial and required a new trial. It is for these reasons that I concur in the judgment. HENDRY, C.J., and MILLER-LERMAN, J., join in this concurrence.