Opinion ID: 3065869
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Strength of the Eddings Claim

Text: Our conclusion is reinforced when we consider Towery’s Eddings-Tennard claim applying AEDPA’s governing standards. Towery’s federal habeas petition is governed by AEDPA. See Towery II, 641 F.3d at 306. Under AEDPA, an application for a writ of habeas corpus may not be granted unless the last reasoned state court decision adjudicating the claim on the merits was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or “was based on 2494 TOWERY v. RYAN an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Towery relies exclusively on the first of these prongs, arguing that the decisions of the Arizona courts were “contrary to” Supreme Court precedent in Lockett, Eddings and Penry. A state court decision is “contrary to” federal law if the court either “arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law,” or arrives at a different result on facts that are “materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405, 408 (2000). “We review the state court’s last reasoned decision.” Crittenden v. Ayers, 624 F.3d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 2010). Here, the last reasoned decision addressing Towery’s Eddings-Tennard claim is the decision of the Arizona Supreme Court affirming Towery’s conviction and sentence on direct review.3 The state supreme court’s decision is not contrary to Supreme Court precedent. The Arizona Supreme Court recognized that “a sentencer may not be precluded from considering, and may not refuse to consider, any relevant mitigating evidence offered by the defendant as a basis for a sentence less than death.” Towery I, 920 P.2d at 311 (quoting Penry, 492 U.S. at 318) (internal quotation marks omitted). It recog- 3 Towery suggests we review the decisions of the sentencing court and the state supreme court together. “When more than one state court has adjudicated a claim, we analyze the last reasoned decision.” Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2005). The AEDPA inquiry applies “to a single state court decision, not to some amalgamation of multiple state court decisions.” Id. at 1093. We have considered more than one decision when “the last reasoned decision adopted or substantially incorporated the reasoning from a previous decision and, as a result, it was reasonable for the reviewing court to look at both decisions to fully ascertain the reasoning of the last decision.” Id. Our focus here is on the independent review conducted by the state supreme court in the last reasoned state-court decision. TOWERY v. RYAN 2495 nized that, “[h]aving considered family background during the penalty phase, the sentencer must give the evidence such weight that the sentence reflects a ‘reasoned moral response’ to the evidence.” Id. (quoting Penry, 492 U.S. at 319). It also recognized that “[t]he sentencer therefore must consider the defendant’s upbringing if proffered but is not required to give it significant mitigating weight. How much weight should be given proffered mitigating factors is a matter within the sound discretion of the sentencing judge.” Id. These were all correct statements of the law. The supreme court also said that “a difficult family background is not always entitled to great weight as a mitigating circumstance”; that “family background may be a substantial mitigating circumstance when it is shown to have some connection with the defendant’s offense-related conduct”; and that where the defendant fails to connect his family background to his criminal conduct, a trial judge could give it little or no weight or value. Id. These statements too were not contrary to Supreme Court precedent. See Schad v. Ryan, ___ F.3d ____, No. 07-99005, 2011 WL 5433763, at  (9th Cir. Nov. 10, 2011) (per curiam) (“The United States Supreme Court has said that the use of the nexus test [to assess the quality and strength of the mitigation evidence] is not unconstitutional because state courts are free to assess the weight to be given to particular mitigating evidence.” (citing Eddings, 455 U.S. at 114-15)), petition for reh’g en banc filed (Nov. 23, 2011). [6] The supreme court also “independently weigh[ed] the mitigating evidence against the aggravating circumstances to determine whether leniency [wa]s called for.” Towery I, 290 P.2d at 310. As part of that review, the court considered whether evidence of Towery’s difficult childhood should be given substantial weight. See id. at 311. Agreeing with the sentencing court, it accorded this evidence “little or no mitigating value” because Towery “failed to connect his family background to his criminal conduct.” Id. The evidence was 2496 TOWERY v. RYAN entitled to little or no weight because it did “not prove a loss of impulse control or explain what caused him to kill.” Id. These statements too were not contrary to Supreme Court precedent.4 One could question the wisdom of the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision to accord Towery’s evidence little or no weight. See Lambright v. Schriro, 490 F.3d 1103, 1115 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (explaining that “evidence relating to life circumstances with no causal relationship to the crime,” such as “a defendant’s disadvantaged background, emotional and mental problems, and adverse history, . . . might cause a sentencer to determine that a life sentence, rather than death at the hands of the state, is the appropriate punishment for the particular defendant”); cf. Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37, 45 (2004) (per curiam) (holding that petitioner’s evidence of a troubled childhood “was relevant for mitigation purposes” notwithstanding the petitioner’s failure to establish a nexus between his background and his crime); Tennard, 542 U.S. at 287 (“[W]e cannot countenance the suggestion that low IQ evidence is not relevant mitigating evidence . . . unless the defendant also establishes a nexus to the crime.”). [7] However, the court’s reasoned and individualized decision to give Towery’s evidence little or no weight was not contrary to Supreme Court precedent. See Eddings, 455 U.S. at 114-15 (“The sentencer, and the Court of Criminal Appeals on review, may determine the weight to be given relevant mitigating evidence.”); Schad, 2011 WL 5433763, at  (“The United States Supreme Court has said that the use of the 4 Towery does not argue that the state supreme court’s finding that the sentencing court used a nexus test as a weighing mechanism rather than as a screening mechanism was an “unreasonable determination of the facts” under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). See Lopez v. Schriro, 491 F.3d 1029, 1037-38 & n.2 (9th Cir. 2007) (treating the state supreme court’s determination of the sentencing court’s actions as a question of historical fact subject to review for objective unreasonableness under § 2254(d)(2)). We therefore do not reach that issue. TOWERY v. RYAN 2497 nexus test [in assessing the quality and strength of the mitigation evidence] is not unconstitutional because state courts are free to assess the weight to be given to particular mitigating evidence”). The record supports the conclusion that the Arizona Supreme Court gave Towery’s difficult childhood little or no weight as a matter of fact, after giving individualized consideration to the evidence, rather than treating the evidence as irrelevant or nonmitigating as a matter of law.5 Towery points out that the Arizona Supreme Court in its Towery decision referred to State v. Wallace, 773 P.2d 983, 985-86 (Ariz. 1989), a decision we have deemed constitutionally suspect, see Schad, 2011 WL 5433763, at . Towery also points to the Arizona court’s subsequent interpretation of Towery, see State v Hoskins, 14 P.3d 997, 1021-22 (Ariz. 2000), that suggests the court may have cited Towery as supporting an analysis now constitutionally infirm. But this does not require us to hold the Arizona court committed constitutional error in Towery itself. The Arizona court’s opinion as a whole indicates the court understood Supreme Court precedent and applied it correctly. Our review must be of the record in Towery itself, rather than the state supreme court’s subsequent interpretations of Towery. See Lopez v. Ryan, 630 F.3d 1198, 1203 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining that we review “the record,” to determine whether “the state court applied the wrong standard,” and we “cannot assume the courts violated 5 Because we conclude that Towery’s Eddings-Tennard claim would not satisfy § 2254(d), we do not address the constitutional merits of the claim. See Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 736-37 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (discussing the relationship between the AEDPA analysis under § 2254(d)(1) and the analysis of the constitutional claim on the merits). We also do not address whether, if there was constitutional error by the sentencing court, the supreme court’s independent review cured it. See Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U.S. 40, 49 (1992) (holding that a state appellate court can cure a sentencing error in a capital case when “the state appellate court . . . actually perform[s] a new sentencing calculus”); Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 741, 750-51 (1990). The state does not invoke the cure doctrine or argue that the supreme court performed a new sentencing calculus here. 2498 TOWERY v. RYAN . . . constitutional mandates” otherwise (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Considering Towery itself, we conclude that it was not contrary to Supreme Court precedent — a conclusion we have noted before. See id. at 1203-04 & n.4 (citing Towery as a decision in which the Arizona Supreme Court “properly looked to causal nexus only as a factor in determining the weight or significance of mitigating evidence”). Even if subsequent Arizona Supreme Court interpretations of Towery were relevant to our analysis, Arizona’s case law in this regard is conflicting. See State v. Sansing, 26 P.3d 1118, 1129 (Ariz. 2001) (citing Towery for the proposition that the “sentencer therefore must consider the defendant’s upbringing if proffered but is not required to give it significant mitigating weight.” (emphasis added) (quoting Towery, 290 P.2d at 311) (internal quotation marks omitted)), judgment vacated on other grounds by Sansing v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 954 (2002). Indeed, Towery’s counsel conceded at oral argument that we should not base our analysis on this conflicting Arizona case law, but should instead confine our review to the record of Towery. [8] We conclude that the district court applied the correct legal rule for the relief requested on this claim, and the court did not make an “illogical[ or] implausible” determination when it concluded that Maynard’s actions did not amount to an extraordinary circumstance warranting relief under Rule 60(b)(6). Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1262-63; see also Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 535. At most, Towery alleges a claim of negligence, which falls far short of a claim of abandonment. Towery was neither subjected to “egregious” professional misconduct, Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2563-64, nor “left without any functioning attorney of record,” Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 927. IV. CONCLUSION [9] In sum, even assuming attorney abandonment could constitute an exception to the statutory bar on second or sucTOWERY v. RYAN 2499 cessive habeas petitions, Towery has not shown that he was abandoned in this case. Nor has he shown a serious breach of loyalty that might have severed his agency relationship with counsel. The district court therefore properly treated Towery’s Rule 60 motion as a second or successive petition and did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2), (b)(3)(A). AFFIRMED. Towery’s emergency motion for a stay of execution, filed February 24, 2012, is premised on the merits of his Rule 60(b)(6) motion. Given our affirmance of the denial of the Rule 60(b)(6) motion, Towery’s emergency motion is hereby DENIED.