Opinion ID: 76013
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The For Sale Sign, Counts V and VI

Text: 23 Appellants complain that HBSPOA's denying permission to post a For Sale sign in their front yard to expedite sale of their house with potential judicial enforcement of the deed restriction barring display of signs on the subdivision lots constituted state action and thereby denied appellants' rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. To succeed on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that the violative conduct was committed by a person acting under the color of state law and that the conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1913, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981); Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 561 (11th Cir. 1984). State action requires that the defendant acted under color of state law at the relevant time. Almand v. DeKalb County, Ga., 103 F.3d 1510, 1513 (11th Cir.1997). Actions by private organizations may be considered state action only if[ ] there is such a `close nexus between the State and the challenged action' that seemingly private behavior `may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.' Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295, 121 S.Ct. 924, 930, 148 L.Ed.2d 807 (2001) (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351, 95 S.Ct. 449, 453, 42 L.Ed.2d 477 (1974)). 24 Appellant's argument, that the threat of judicial enforcement of the deed restriction constitutes state action, is unavailing. Although the Supreme Court has held that the enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant constitutes state action, Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19-20, 68 S.Ct. 836, 845, 92 L.Ed. 1161 (1948), Shelley has not been extended beyond race discrimination, Davis v. Prudential Secs., Inc., 59 F.3d 1186, 1191(11th Cir.1995). The record in this case clarifies that Sasser, Hernando Beach Inc., and HBSPOA were not acting under state law. See Sofarelli v. Pinellas County, 931 F.2d 718, 723 (11th Cir.1991) (recognizing that the conduct of private individuals does not rise to the level of state action). Therefore, summary judgment correctly was granted to appellees on Counts V and VI relating to the For Sale sign because appellants failed to establish state action required for a cause of action under § 1983. 25 B. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support the Jury Verdict on Counts III and IV 26 Appellants allege various evidentiary errors committed by the district judge in conducting the trial of this case on Counts III and IV relating to their application for construction of a deck and wheelchair ramp on the front of their house. We review a challenge to sufficiency of the evidence de novo; we view the facts and inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and determine whether the evidence is so overwhelmingly in favor of the [defendant] that reasonable jurors could not arrive at a contrary verdict. Adams v. Sewell, 946 F.2d 757, 764 (11th Cir.1991), overruled on other grounds, McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1558 (11th Cir.1994) (en banc). Appellants, however, failed to provide a copy of the trial transcript in the appellate record in compliance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(b)(1) & (2). See 11th Cir. R. 10-1. 27 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(b)(2) provides that [i]f the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by the evidence or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant must include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to that finding or conclusion. Fed. R.App. P. 10(b)(2). The record shows that appellants attempted to order the trial transcript on the same day that they filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. R7-161, 162. The district judge denied their in forma pauperis motion because appellants' indigence had not been established, and it appeared to the judge that they were attempting to obtain a free trial transcript for which they were not eligible. Appellants have neither moved to proceed in forma pauperis in this court nor provided the trial transcript in the appellate record. Accordingly, we cannot review whether any evidentiary errors were committed by the district judge during the trial of this case, and we must affirm the district court when an appellant fails to provide all the evidence that the trial court had before it when making various contested evidentiary rulings. Borden, Inc. v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 772 F.2d 750, 758 (11th Cir.1985). 28 The appellant in Borden was not a pro se litigant, and our court has not used Rule 10(b)(2) for pro se litigants who have failed to provide trial transcripts for review on appeal. The Fifth and Ninth Circuits, however, have applied Rule 10(b)(2) to preclude review when pro se litigants have not supplied trial transcripts in the appellate record. See Richardson v. Henry, 902 F.2d 414, 415-16 (5th Cir.1990) (holding that the failure of an appellant to provide a trial transcript is grounds for dismissal of the appeal notwithstanding inability to pay for it); Syncom Capital Corp. v. Wade, 924 F.2d 167, 169 (9th Cir.1991) (per curiam) (`Because [appellant] did not provide a transcript of the trial, this court cannot properly review this case on appeal.' (alteration in original) (citation omitted)). Despite construction leniency afforded pro se litigants, we nevertheless have required them to conform to procedural rules. Brooks v. Britton, 669 F.2d 665, 666-67 (11th Cir.1982) (holding that pro se litigants are required to move timely for extension of time in order to file a late notice of appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5)). We agree with the reasoning of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits regarding pro se litigants' failing to provide trial transcripts for appellate review, which we adopt. Therefore, we also hold in this circuit that pro se appellants, like appellants represented by counsel, must provide trial transcripts in the appellate record to enable this court to review challenges to sufficiency of the evidence. Accordingly, we affirm the district judge's trial rulings regarding Counts III and IV relating to appellants' application for construction of a deck and wheelchair ramp on the front of their home.