Opinion ID: 663165
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Guy Davis' Testimony

Text: 42 MoPac next asserts that the district court improperly permitted into evidence Guy Davis' testimony concerning a near-miss collision at the McKennon Street crossing six days before the Turnbull crash. MoPac objected to Davis' testimony at trial in a somewhat nonspecific objection of different accident. (Tr. of Trial (5/14/91) at 112.) 43 [E]vidence of similar accidents involving the same product is admissible under ... federal law to establish 'notice, the existence of a defect, or to refute testimony given by a defense witness that a given product was designed without safety hazards.'  Johnson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 797 F.2d 1530, 1534 (10th Cir.1986) (quoting Rexrode v. American Laundry Press Co., 674 F.2d 826, 829 n. 9 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 862, 103 S.Ct. 137, 74 L.Ed.2d 117 (1982)). Although Johnson and Rexrode concerned similar accidents arising in the products liability context, introduction of evidence of a prior near-accident under similar circumstances should be considered under the same legal rubric. 44 Here the Turnbulls elicited Davis' testimony to show that MoPac knew or should have known of a signal defect at the crossing, and to create an inference that the same defect in the signal system caused both the Davis incident and the Turnbull accident. Despite MoPac's assertions to the contrary, the circumstances surrounding the incidents were substantially similar, considering the Turnbulls' theory of the crash. See Ponder v. Warren Tool Corp., 834 F.2d 1553, 1560 (10th Cir.1987) (In determining whether accidents are 'substantially similar,' the factors to be considered are those that relate to the particular theory underlying the case.). The Turnbulls allege that the gates failed to come down at the proper time, thereby allowing Julia Ann Turnbull to enter the intersection without notice of the approaching train. Davis testified that the failure of the gates to lower sooner caused his near-miss. The incidents have sufficient similarity to withstand the challenge to the evidence. The record does not establish that the probative value of Davis' testimony was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading the jury under Fed.R.Evid. 403. Because the Rule 403 requirements for rejecting the evidence have not been met, we cannot say the trial judge abused his discretion by allowing Davis' testimony.