Opinion ID: 2625101
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jacobs's claim of trial court error

Text: ¶ 12 A mentally incompetent defendant can provide no defense, and proceedings against such a defendant do not comport with due process. State v. Young, 780 P.2d 1233, 1236 (Utah 1989) (citing Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960)). In determining whether a defendant is competent to plead guilty, the trial court must consider `whether the defendant has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and has a rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings against him.' State v. Holland, 921 P.2d 430, 433 (Utah 1996) (further quotations omitted) (quoting Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993)). [2] In this case, the trial court determined that Jacobs was competent to stand trial based on the three alienists' reports and not a competency hearing. Jacobs contends that this was error, and, therefore, that the post-conviction court erred in finding that the trial court did not violate his right to due process by failing to hold a competency hearing sua sponte. ¶ 13 A trial court must hold a competency hearing when there is a `substantial question of possible doubt' as to a defendant's competency at the time of the guilty plea. Id. at 435 (quoting Commonwealth v. Hill, 375 Mass. 50, 375 N.E.2d 1168, 1175 (1978)). The issue thus becomes whether there was a substantial question of possible doubt as to Jacobs's competency when he pleaded guilty. ¶ 14 Jacobs first contends that the reports of the three alienists, his history of mental illness, and his behavior while confined in the Weber County Jail raised a substantial question of possible doubt as to his competency to plead guilty. In so arguing, he relies on Holland. In that case, Holland pleaded guilty to first degree murder and was sentenced to death. Holland later moved to vacate his guilty plea on the basis of incompetency. The trial court denied his motion, although the findings of the four experts who evaluated Holland were in conflict as to his competency. Holland appealed. In light of the conflict between the experts, this court found there was a substantial question of possible doubt as to Holland's competency and reversed the trial court. Id. at 434-35. ¶ 15 The State contends Holland is inapposite, arguing this case is more like State v. Bailey, 712 P.2d 281 (Utah 1985). Bailey had a history of mental illness. After his arrest on burglary, theft, and habitual criminal charges, Bailey's behavior was irrational and disoriented, and Dr. Austin, a prison psychiatrist, concluded he was incompetent to stand trial. [3] Id. at 282. The trial court then ordered Dr. Moench and Dr. Austin, two alienists, to examine Bailey. The alienists' reports conflicted. This time, Dr. Austin found Bailey competent, and Dr. Moench found him incompetent. Therefore, the court ordered Dr. Moench and a third alienist to reexamine Bailey. Both found him competent to stand trial, and he was then tried. Following his conviction, Bailey appealed, alleging the trial court had erred in not holding a competency hearing. This court held that the evidence did not mandate a hearing on the issue of competency as the most recent examinations found him competent to stand trial. See id. at 285. ¶ 16 We hold that Bailey controls this case. Indeed, Bailey presented a closer question than this case. Unlike Bailey, here none of the alienists asserted that Jacobs was incompetent, although they had grave concerns as to his mental health. While Jacobs's behavior while in custody was bizarre at best, as his counsel describes it, this is not determinative: Fitness to stand trial is a much narrower concept than moral or social wellness, and thus the fact that a defendant is twisted and disturbed does not necessarily mean he is unfit for trial. The fact that a person is mentally ill, displays bizarre, volatile, and irrational behavior, or has a history of mental illness, does not mean that he or she is incompetent to stand trial. A defendant may be fit for trial even though his mind is otherwise unsound. 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law § 97 (1998) (footnotes omitted). In light of the fact that none of the alienists found Jacobs incompetent to stand trial, we cannot say that there was a substantial question of possible doubt as to his competency that would require the trial court to hold a competency hearing sua sponte. ¶ 17 Jacobs next contends that there was a substantial question of possible doubt as to his competency based on the filing of a notice of proposed defense of insanity. We disagree. As the court of appeals has correctly stated, the mere filing of notice to rely on the defense of insanity is not sufficient to require a competency hearing before accepting a guilty plea. York v. Shulsen, 875 P.2d 590, 597 (Utah Ct.App. 1994) (citing In re Hanson, 160 Vt. 111, 623 A.2d 466, 467-68 (1993)); see also State v. Williams, 154 Vt. 76, 574 A.2d 1264, 1265-66 (1990) (upholding trial court's decision to not hold a competency hearing after the defendant filed a notice to raise an insanity defense but then waived the competency hearing). ¶ 18 Finally, Jacobs argues that there was a substantial question of possible doubt as to his competency based on the report of Dr. Pray. In 1995, Dr. Pray submitted an affidavit to the post-conviction court in which he concluded as follows: Jacobs sufferd [sic] from [multiple personality disorder] for a period of time before the alleged crime was committed, throughout his incarceration at the Weber County Jail in 1984, throughout sentencing and while imprisioned [sic], through January in 1984. In my opinion, this disorder prevented Mr. Jacobs from understanding the nature and purpose of the legal process in which he was involved and prevented him from being able to assist, in any meaningful sense, his defense counsel in defending him. While such a statement might have raised a substantial question of possible doubt as to Jacobs's competency were it before the trial court, it is irrelevant to this case. [I]n determining whether a trial court denied due process in refusing a competency hearing,. . . the focus should be on what the trial court did in light of what it then knew of the defendant. Young, 780 P.2d at 1237 (emphasis added) (citing People v. Harris, 109 A.D.2d 351, 491 N.Y.S.2d 678, 684 (N.Y.App. Div.1985)). Put another way, we consider only those facts that were before the [trial] court when the plea was entered. York, 875 P.2d at 595. We are unwilling to substitute the judgment of one mental health professional ten years after the fact for the conclusion unanimously reached by three such professionals at the time the plea was entered. As Dr. Pray himself admits, the experts who examined Jacobs at the time he entered his plea were in the best position to determine whether he could assist his counsel in his defense and whether he was otherwise competent to stand trial. Therefore, because Dr. Pray's report was unavailable to the trial court in 1984, we do not consider it in our determination of whether the trial court erred in failing to hold a competency hearing. ¶ 19 In conclusion, Jacobs has not raised any issues that persuade us to believe that the trial court had a substantial question of possible doubt as to his competency to enter a guilty plea. Therefore, we hold that the post-conviction court was correct in ruling that the trial court did not err in failing to hold sua sponte a competency hearing.