Opinion ID: 3134275
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Participation of Standby Counsel

Text: In the aggravation phase of sentencing, Iola Warren testified for the prosecution that in 1979 defendant raped her and strangled and stabbed her mother. Iola's mother, Geraldine Warren, also testified. Before defendant cross-examined Geraldine Warren, he was granted a recess to consult with standby counsel. When the hearing resumed, defendant asked the court to allow standby counsel to examine the witness because defendant did not want to add to her anxiety, frustration of [sic] me. The prosecutor offered the opinion that he did not think defendant was entitled to have standby counsel examine the witness. The trial judge reminded defendant that he had made a choice to defend himself and therefore would defend himself all of the way through. The trial judge then denied the request on the basis that standby was not the attorney of record, but was only present in a standby capacity. Defendant proceeded to cross-examine the witness without disruption or outburst. Defendant contends that the trial judge abused his discretion when he denied defendant's request to allow standby counsel to cross examine Geraldine Warren. Defendant alleges that his constitutional right to counsel (U.S. Const., amend. VI) was denied when the court first appointed standby counsel and then denied defendant's request to allow standby a more active role. The right of self-representation does not carry with it a corresponding right to legal assistance; one choosing to represent himself must be prepared to do just that. People v. Gibson, 136 Ill. 2d 362, 383 (1990). However, the trial court has broad discretion to appoint counsel for advisory or other limited purposes (People v. Allen, 37 Ill. 2d 167, 172 (1967)) and to determine the nature and extent of standby counsel's involvement (see People v. Smith, 249 Ill. App. 3d 460, 470-71 (1993)). Even where a trial court appoints standby counsel, the constitutional right to self-representation does not require a court to permit a hybrid representation in which a defendant alternates between representing himself and having counsel represent him. Cain v. Peters, 972 F.2d 748, 750 (7th Cir. 1992), citing McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 183, 79 L. Ed. 2d 122, 136, 104 S. Ct. 944, 953 (1984); People v. Taggart, 233 Ill. App. 3d 530, 557 (1992). We cannot say here that the trial court's refusal to allow standby counsel to cross-examine a witness was an abuse of discretion. In the pretrial phase, defendant adamantly resisted the court's repeated offers of appointed counsel. Defendant strongly resisted the appointment of standby counsel and ultimately accepted standby counsel only after the trial judge explained that standby counsel's role would be strictly limited. Moreover, the trial judge repeatedly informed defendant that the scope of standby counsel's participation would be very narrow and that if defendant chose self-representation, he would be bound by that decision throughout the trial. Defendant represented himself throughout the guilt phase and the eligibility hearing without seeking the active participation of standby counsel. The trial judge reasonably exercised its discretion in limiting standby counsel's participation to an advisory role. People v. Lindsey, 17 Ill. App. 3d 137 (1974), on which defendant relies, is distinguishable. In Lindsey, the trial court allowed defendant to act as his own counsel with appointed counsel in a co-counsel role. The court stated that defendant would be proceeding pro se with counsel to assist him. Counsel participated and objected during the examination of the State's first two witnesses. Later, the trial court refused to allow counsel to question several witnesses or to make objections. The appellate court held that it was an abuse of discretion to initially allow counsel to actively participate and then later restrict the availability of counsel to assist the defendant. Lindsey, 17 Ill. App. 3d at 143-44. In this case, the trial judge and the other pretrial judges consistently warned defendant that standby counsel's role would be very limited. Defendant was never led to believe that standby would be allowed to actively participate at trial. Unlike the defendant in Lindsey, here defendant cannot say that he reasonably held an expectation that standby counsel would be available to make objections or examine witnesses. We do not agree with defendant that because his request was reasonable under the circumstances it should have been granted. Defendant fails to demonstrate any change in circumstances that necessitated a change in the level of standby counsel's participation. The record does not reflect that examination of Geraldine Warren posed any more difficulty than cross- examination of other witnesses, including Ruby Bea, the mother of the victims, Iola Warren, a victim of defendant's prior crime, or Reynard McRay, an inmate allegedly raped by defendant. Even if we accepted defendant's contention that the court's refusal to acquiesce in defendant's desire for a hybrid representation violated his right to counsel, we believe that it was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant's characterization of Geraldine Warren's testimony as a linchpin of the prosecution's case in aggravation is unfounded. In the event that Geraldine Warren's testimony had been impeached, substantial evidence of the rape of Iola and the stabbing of Geraldine would nonetheless be before the jury. Iola gave a detailed description of the crimes, and the State later offered a certified copy of defendant's conviction for the rape of Iola Warren and the attempted murder of Geraldine Warren. We note that after the court denied defendant's request to have counsel question the witness, defendant cross-examined Geraldine Warren. The record does not reflect any overt antagonism that infected defendant's ability to elicit answers to his questions. Defendant explored inconsistencies between Geraldine's testimony and a hospital report. Defendant's contention that the witness was upset and that a different result probably would have obtained is purely speculative. On these facts, we cannot say that had standby counsel cross-examined Geraldine Warren the sentencing jury would have reached a different result.