Opinion ID: 786766
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: California's Death Sentencing System

Text: 26 We have indicated that California's post-1978 death penalty law created a weighing system. See Allen v. Woodford, 366 F.3d 823, 857 (9th Cir.2004). We have not, however, explained precisely how the weighing of sentencing factors operates under California law. Because specific features of California law are important to our ruling here, we shall do so now. 27 We consider a state death penalty regime to be a weighing system when the sentencer [is] restricted to a `weighing' of aggravation against mitigation and the sentencer [is] prevented from considering evidence in aggravation other than discrete, statutorily-defined factors. Williams v. Calderon, 52 F.3d 1465, 1477 (9th Cir.1995). 3 Both of these elements are present under California's post-1978 system. California Penal Code § 190.3 specifies that the sentencing jury in a capital case shall take into account ... if relevant any of 11 factors. The trier of fact shall impose a sentence of death if [it] concludes that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. If the trier of fact determines that the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances the trier of fact shall impose a sentence of confinement in state prison for a term of life without the possibility of parole. Cal.Penal Code § 190.3. The California Supreme Court has expressly interpreted § 109.3 as precluding the jury from considering aggravating factors other than those statutorily defined. People v. Boyd, 38 Cal.3d 762, 773, 215 Cal.Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782 (1985) (By ... requiring the jury to decide the appropriateness of the death penalty by a process of weighing the specific factors listed in the statute, the [post-1978 death penalty law] necessarily implie[s] that matters not within the statutory list are not entitled to any weight in the penalty determination.). Thus, as we have previously indicated, it is clear that California's post-1978 death penalty system is a weighing system. See Allen, 366 F.3d at 857. 28 We note, however, that California's system has features that are not present in all weighing states, and that are important for understanding the effect of the invalidation of the special circumstances in Sanders' case. A death penalty trial in California proceeds in two stages. At the initial phase of the trial, when the trier of fact decides the issue of the defendant's guilt or innocence, a determination must be made as to the existence of any `special circumstances.' People v. Bacigalupo, 6 Cal.4th 457, 467, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 808, 862 P.2d 808 (1993). Special circumstances found at the guilt phase serve to make a defendant eligible for the death penalty, and are thus the criteria in the California capital scheme that define the class of murders for which death is a potential penalty. Id. at 467-68, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 808, 862 P.2d 808. 29 The weighing of factors under § 190.3 becomes relevant only at a subsequent penalty or sentencing phase that occurs once the defendant has been found death-eligible during the guilt phase. 30 At this stage in the proceedings, additional evidence may be offered and the jury is given a list of relevant factors... to guide it in deciding whether to impose a sentence of life without the possibility of parole or a sentence of death.... 31 With the exception of section 190.3's factor (k), which invites consideration of any circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime, the statute does not explicitly designate any of the factors as exclusively aggravating or exclusively mitigating. It simply directs the trier of fact to aspects of the offense and the defendant's background that are relevant to the penalty determination. 32 Id. at 814 (internal citation, quotation marks and alterations omitted). Although the statute plainly instructs that the fact-finder shall at this stage impose death if it finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating ones, [t]his weighing is a process that by nature is incapable of precise description. Id. at 470, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 808, 862 P.2d 808 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also People v. Brown, 40 Cal.3d 512, 541-45, 230 Cal.Rptr. 834, 726 P.2d 516 (1983), reversed on other grounds by California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 107 S.Ct. 837, 93 L.Ed.2d 934 (1987). 33 The weighing of aggravating against mitigating circumstances is a mental balancing process, but not one that involves a mechanical counting of factors on either side of some imaginary scale, or the arbitrary assignment of weights to any factor. Rather ... a juror faced with making the requisite individualized determination whether a defendant should be sentenced to life without parole or to death is entirely free to assign whatever moral or sympathetic value that juror deems appropriate to each and all of the relevant factors. 34 Bacigalupo, 6 Cal.4th at 470, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 808, 862 P.2d 808 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Allen, 366 F.3d at 855. 35 Thus, under California law, when a jury decides whether to impose the death penalty, it does more than merely count aggravating and mitigating factors, and individual jurors may ascribe varying weight to any single aggravating factor. This makes it difficult for an appellate court that later reviews the jury's sentencing decision to surmise what weight the jury gave to a particular factor. 36 Nonetheless, California still qualifies as a weighing state, because the jury's sentencing discretion is not boundless — it must consider the defined list of aggravating factors, and may not consider other aggravating factors, in making its penalty determination. Therefore, an appellate court's invalidation of one or more of the sentencing factors may have a serious effect on individualized sentencing, because there is a real risk that the jury's decision to impose the death penalty rather than life imprisonment may have turned on the weight it gave to an invalid aggravating factor. With this sentencing structure in mind, we turn to the California Supreme Court's affirmance of Sanders' death sentence in light of its invalidation of two of the aggravating factors the jury considered. 37