Opinion ID: 49922
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Next, Frazier argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient for a reasonable jury to infer that he was aware that the cocaine was in the vehicle, and, therefore the district court erred by denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal. In particular, he argues that there was no direct evidence, such as an admission or his fingerprints on the bag containing the drugs, linking him to the cocaine in the car and the government’s case rested on a statement pulled from a nearly inaudible tape referencing what possibly could have been a slang reference to the way in which cocaine is packaged. Frazier further argues that his “mere presence” in the area of the cocaine or his awareness was insufficient to prove he had possession of it and the government’s evidence, at most, established that he was in the presence 17 of the cocaine. We review a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence de novo. United States v. Silvestri, 409 F.3d 1311, 1327 (11th Cir.), cert. denied 126 S.Ct. 772 (2005). A guilty verdict will not be disturbed unless, “given the evidence in the record, no trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quotation omitted). When evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we examine “the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, drawing all reasonable inferences and making all credibility choices in the government's favor.” Id. “Where, as here, the Government’s case is based on circumstantial evidence, ‘reasonable inferences, not mere speculation, must support the jury's verdict.’” United States v. McDowell, 250 F.3d 1354, 1364 (11th Cir. 2001). “To convict a defendant of possession with intent to distribute controlled substances, the Government must prove that he or she possessed drugs with the intent to distribute them. . . . The government may prove each of these elements with direct or circumstantial evidence.” United States v. Miranda, 425 F.3d 953, 959 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotations and citation omitted). “The government may satisfy the ‘possession’ prong by showing either actual or constructive possession. To prove actual possession the evidence must show that the defendant either had physical possession of or personal dominion over the thing allegedly possessed.” 18 United States v. Leonard, 138 F.3d 906, 909 (11th Cir. 1998). “Constructive possession exists when a defendant has ownership, dominion, or control over an object itself or dominion or control over the premises or the vehicle in which the object is concealed.” Id. To establish possession, we have held that the government must show that the defendant was more than merely present in the car containing contraband. Id. We require that some nexus exist between the defendant and the contraband, and a defendant must have knowledge of the substance’s existence to exercise control or dominion over it. Holmes v. Kucynda, 321 F.3d 1069, 1080 (11th Cir. 2003). Evidence of a “consciousness of guilt,” such as nervousness, inconsistent statements or stories, and anxiousness regarding the search, is sufficient for a jury to infer a defendant’s knowledge of the controlled substances found in a car. See United States v. Stanley, 24 F.3d 1314, 1320, n.50 (11th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). In the instant case, the jury reasonably could have inferred Frazier’s knowledge and possession of the cocaine in the car because there was adequate circumstantial evidence showing a consciousness of guilt. Hedrick testified that Frazier was excessively nervous to the point his hand was shaking when he handed over his license during the traffic stop. He further testified that Frazier’s 19 movements were indicative of someone who was ready to fight or flee. Hedrick also observed Frazier’s knees buckle when Ahlquist ran his dog, Orson, around the vehicle, and Ahlquist observed Frazier in a praying motion when the car was actually searched. Moreover, Frazier and his passenger gave inconsistent stories. Finally, the government presented evidence of a conversation between Frazier and Jones in which references were made to throwing things out the window and the term “chunked up” was used—a term that Hedrick testified was slang for the way cocaine is packaged. In light of the foregoing, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to infer a “consciousness of guilt,” demonstrating knowledge of the drugs in the vehicle. Stanley, 24 F.3d at 1320-21, n.50; Leonard, 138 F.3d at 909. Therefore, the district court properly denied Frazier’s motion for a judgment of acquittal.