Opinion ID: 425934
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Equitable Powers of the Federal Courts

Text: 75 The most profoundly troubling of the arguments for the consent decree holds that the court may, as an exercise of its equity powers, take virtually any remedial action it chooses. 31 Only a rough equity balancing of all the facts of the case would tell whether the court's order was a permissible extension of its equity jurisdiction. Here, the argument goes, the court's action was justified as a practical way to resolve vexatious litigation. 76 This argument fails here for two reasons. First, appellees err in contending that the equity power of the federal courts knows no bounds but necessity. 32 Appellees correctly note that in many cases federal courts have exercised broad remedial powers in correcting Constitutional violations. Courts have used their equitable powers to assume administrative and legislative roles, supervising in a highly active and intrusive manner prisons, school systems, mental hospitals and electoral apportionment. 33 77 In those cases, however, the court invariably acts against state governments or individual citizens. Those decisions in which the court seizes the broadest powers are also those in which it declares that the doctrine of separation of powers does not apply vertically when courts act under the Supremacy Clause. 34 In the case at issue, the court acts against a coordinate and co-equal branch of government. The court cannot take refuge in the Supremacy Clause. The court must face head-on the separation of powers issue. 78 The court's infringement on the agency's discretion resolves that issue. The court here acts as an Administrator. It acts without any statutory or constitutional mandate; the contested provisions of the decree admittedly exceed what could be required by the statute. To permit the court's equity powers to extend so far would abolish the principle of separation of powers. 79 The argument also fails because even if the court's equity power might conceivably support the decree at issue, the court still should ask whether its exercise of power is prudent. In this case of first impression, that prudential inquiry must necessarily ask whether this new device for agency administration will prove wise over time. A look at this procedural innovation suffices to show that government by consent decree is not only unconstitutional but unwise. 80 First, any legitimate purpose served by the decree could have been accomplished by other means. The agency did not need a consent decree in order to take the actions mandated by the decree. Since those actions were within its discretion it could have pursued a course of action precisely identical to that called for by the court order. 81 Nor did the agency need a consent decree to lend some stability to its position. The agency could have, by undertaking proper notice and comment rulemaking, issued the substance of the consent decree as regulations. 35 Such a course of action would give all parties affected by the proposed programs a chance to be heard, as well as bind the agency not to change course arbitrarily and capriciously. 36 82 The flaws with government by consent decree run deeper than the superfluity of the device. The device invites abuse--intentional or unintentional. Today's action may seem desirable to some because it requires a sometimes recalcitrant agency operating under a relatively precise statute to provide more of what many see as an unmitigated social good--environmental regulation. The device can just as easily be used, however, to establish regulatory processes which guarantee the bare minimum of regulation 37 or which enable regulated industries to evade prosecution. Nor is the device limited to the EPA. Under the typical broad and imprecise administrative statute, almost any agency action would pass the majority's vague test that the decree somehow be consistent with the law. An inattentive or unprincipled court could thus bind successive administrations to a nonstatutory, limiting process of regulatory action. 83 The abuses to which this device can be put are limited only by the almost inexhaustible imaginations of litigants. The same sorts of procedural agreements that the majority finds so innocuous could be used to limit the manner in which an agency goes about seeking evidence or to constrain the investigative practices of federal agencies. EPA and OSHA, for example, could consent not to conduct on site inspections without first rendering 60 days notice. Such a procedural agreement would be fully acceptable under the majority's approach; in practice, it would limit the effectiveness of the agencies. 84 The greatest evil of government by consent decree, however, comes from its potential to freeze the regulatory processes of representative democracy. At best, even with the most principled and fair-minded courts, the device adds friction. 85 First, the device makes far more difficult the task of those citizens who wish to monitor agency actions and influence their development. This court has previously ruled that the consent decree at issue here does not rise to the level of a rulemaking. That may or may not be good law. In any case, however, the consent decree binds the agency, and binds it in some ways even more than a rule would. An agency can abandon a rule so long as the change in policy is not arbitrary and capricious; 38 an agency cannot escape a consent decree without the active participation and approval of the court. 86 The commitment that occurs through a consent decree takes place, however, without recourse to the public notice requirements of notice and comment rulemaking. Those third parties who wish to know of such consent decrees would be faced with the nearly impossible task of monitoring all of the nation's district courts. Even then, if the filing of the suit and the consent decree coincide closely in time, notice would amount only to learning that the binding decree is a fait accompli. 87 Second, government by consent decree inhibits Congressional influence on agency policy. No longer could an agency freely and voluntarily respond to Congressional concerns; action would be impossible without prior approval of the court. The informal give-and-take between Congress and the agencies that characterizes modern administrative practice would be squeezed out by the court's assumption of control. 88 Third, Executive Branch control over agency policy would be hindered. So long as a consent decree remained in force, no new policy spurred by a change in administrations (or prompted by a desire to avoid a change in administrations) could take effect without the prior blessing of the court. Conversely, the consent decree provides the executive with a vehicle for avoiding responsibility for its programs. 89 This weakening of democratic control over agency policy accompanies an increase in the power of two nondemocratic groups. Government by consent decree enshrines at its very center those special interest groups who are party to the decree. They stand in a strong tactical position to oppose changing the decree, and so likely will enjoy material influence on proposed changes in agency policy. 90 Standing guard over the whole process is the court, the one branch of our government which is by design least responsive to democratic pressures and least fit to accommodate the many and varied interests affected by the decree. The court can neither effectively negotiate with all the parties affected by the decree, nor ably balance the political and technological trade-offs involved. Even the best-intentioned and most vigilant court will prove institutionally incompetent to oversee an agency's discretionary actions. 91 As a policy device, then, government by consent decree serves no necessary end. It opens the door to unforeseeable mischief; it degrades the institutions of representative democracy and augments the power of special interest groups. It does all of this in a society that hardly needs new devices that emasculate representative democracy and strengthen the power of special interests. 92 I see no need and no warrant for countenancing this raid on the powers of the Executive Branch. I respectfully dissent.