Opinion ID: 490911
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Corresponding Federal and State Crimes.

Text: 15 Defendants further argue that the intercepted conversations should not have been admitted into evidence because the government failed to comply with the terms of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2517(5), which requires judicial approval before wiretap evidence can be used in a criminal or grand jury proceeding relating to offenses other than those specified in the initial wiretap order. Section 2517(5) provides: 16 When an investigative or law enforcement officer, while engaged in intercepting wire, oral, or electronic communications in the manner authorized herein, intercepts wire, oral, or electronic communications relating to offenses other than those specified in the order of authorization or approval, the contents thereof, and evidence derived therefrom, may    be used under subsection (3) of this section when authorized or approved by a judge of competent jurisdiction where such judge finds on subsequent application that the contents were otherwise intercepted in accordance with the provisions of this chapter. 17 Defendants contend that the federal charges on which they were tried were other offenses from the state law offenses described in the original wiretap order, and that judicial approval was therefore necessary before the evidence could be used against them in the instant federal prosecution. We reject defendants' contention, because the federal offenses charged were not other offenses within the meaning of the statute. It is therefore unnecessary to consider whether, as the government alternatively contends, it was sufficient to obtain the judicial approval prior to defendants' trial, but after they had been indicted by the grand jury. 18 The state-law crimes for which the wiretap authorization was sought were identical to the federal crimes for which defendants were indicted and convicted. The district attorney's applications for wiretaps on George's business and home telephones alleged probable cause to believe that JUAN J. GEORGE and others yet unknown    are committing and are about to commit offenses involving sale of and possession with intent to sell controlled substances, attempt to and/or conspiracy to commit those offenses and use of a telephone to facilitate the commission of those offenses, in violation of Articles 220, 110 and 105 of the Penal Law of the State of New York, and it was for a violation of those sections that County Judge Joseph Harris found sufficient probable cause to justify issuance of the wiretap orders. The state Penal Law sections, of course, correspond exactly to the federal offenses of which defendants were convicted. 19 Where the only difference between the offenses described in the wiretap authorization and those for which defendants are indicted is that the former are state offenses and the latter are federal offenses, we hold that they are not other offenses within the meaning of Sec. 2517(5). Thus, as to substantially identical offenses--ones described in the same language and containing the same essential elements--subsequent judicial authorization is unnecessary. 20 We agree with the view of the first circuit in United States v. Smith, 726 F.2d 852, 864-66 (1st Cir.1984) (in banc), that this holding raises no possibility of subterfuge searches and will neither frustrate the purpose nor undermine the effects of the statute. Indeed, we perceive our holding as less an exception to, than a definition of, the phrase other offenses. The purpose of Sec. 2517(5) is to prevent subterfuge searches, which involve the government [using] a warrant authorizing seizure of one type of evidence as a license to collect evidence of an offense not covered by the authorization. Smith, 726 F.2d at 865. See S.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1968 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2112, 2188-89. This goal is in no way compromised by allowing the use of conversations intercepted via a wiretap authorized upon the showing of probable cause to believe that there exists a violation of state law, the elements of which do not in any meaningful way differ from the corresponding federal crimes. 21