Opinion ID: 1619299
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Entitlement

Text: The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state may deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1. Article I, section 8, of the Tennessee Constitution, known as the law of the land clause, provides similar protections. Lynch v. City of Jellico, 205 S.W.3d 384, 391 (Tenn.2006) (recognizing that article I, section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution is synonymous with the due process provisions of the federal constitution). The property interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment are not created by the Constitution itself but stem from an independent source, such as contracts or state statutes. Sharp v. Lindsey, 285 F.3d 479, 487 (6th Cir.2002). One form of property entitled to due process protection is a public employee's right to continued employment pursuant to a one-year contract, given which, he or she may be dismissed only for cause. See, e.g., Kendall v. Bd. of Educ., 627 F.2d 1, 4 (6th Cir.1980) impliedly overruled in part on grounds not relevant to this discussion, see Prichard v. Lafferty, 974 F.2d 1338 n. 6 (6th Cir.1992) (unpublished table decision). We must first determine, therefore, whether Bailey had a protected right to continued employment at the time he was dismissed. See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-78, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). As set forth above, Bailey was employed pursuant to a year-to-year contract. Tenn.Code Ann. § 49-2-301(b)(1)(FF). He was entitled to a minimum of fifteen days' notice that his contract would not be renewed. Id. Additionally, Bailey could be dismissed only for cause during the term of his contract. Id. at (b)(1)(GG). Read together, these statutory provisions provided Bailey with a reasonable expectation of continued employment through the end of his contract period. [12] Accordingly, he had a sufficient property interest in his continued employment during the contract year that he could not be terminated during his contract term without adequate due process. See Lindsey, 285 F.3d at 487; Kendall, 627 F.2d at 4.