Opinion ID: 2216307
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: broad-form comprehensive general liability endorsement

Text: We now turn to the broad-form comprehensive general liability endorsement. The endorsement covers, inter alia, personal injury and advertising injury liability. Pacesetter and Fingerlin argue that the coverage extended through these provisions obligated Columbia to defend them in the Sarpy County actions. Among the errors assigned by Pacesetter and Fingerlin is one claiming that the trial court erred in refusing to allow Pacesetter and Fingerlin to withdraw their rest and introduce three sets of interrogatories which described more clearly the type of damages claimed by the Sarpy County plaintiffs, i.e., noise, dust, ground vibration, diminution in the value of their property, loss of trees, and increased traffic volume. The court committed no error because, as explained below, the evidence Pacesetter and Fingerlin attempted to introduce had no bearing on the question of coverage under the policy. Pacesetter and Fingerlin claim that the Sarpy County plaintiffs have alleged a personal injury. They point specifically to the personal injury definition regarding wrongful entry or eviction or other invasion of the right of private occupancy. Pacesetter and Fingerlin maintain that the plaintiffs' factual allegations which underlie this invasion are the noise, dust, lighting, and other construction activities from 126th Street. With regard to such injuries, we find that the precedents cited by Pacesetter simply do not address a factual setting such as the one now before us. It is critical to remember that the tangible property purchased by the Sarpy County plaintiffs remains unchanged. The underlying causes of action do not claim any physical invasion of the plaintiffs' own lots, nor are they based upon trespass or nuisance. In Decorative Center v. Employers Cas., 833 S.W.2d 257 (Tex.App.1992), the insurer brought an action seeking a declaration that it was not responsible for providing coverage to the owner and the general contractor of a construction project (the insureds) in connection with a nuisance and trespass suit brought against the owner and the contractor by an adjacent property owner (the Bakers). The insureds claimed that because the Bakers' ability to use their property was interfered with, the interference was an other invasion of the right of private occupancy. The contractor caused various forms of physical and mental harm to the Bakers and their property, including deliberately working late at night, directing water onto the Bakers' property, dropping heavy limbs onto the property, and cursing the Bakers when they complained to the workers on duty. The Bakers sued, and the insurer defended the suit, but denied coverage. The policy in question contained a provision dealing with personal injury liability coverage arising out of, inter alia, `wrongful entry or eviction, or other invasion of the right of private occupancy.' Id. at 259. The insureds argued that because the Bakers' ability to use their property was interfered with, the interference constituted an other invasion of the right of private occupancy and, therefore, triggered coverage. The court disagreed: `Occupancy' normally refers to the state of being inhabited. The right of `private occupancy' can only refer to those rights associated with an individual's act of inhabiting the premises, and not to rights associated with the individual's right to use and enjoy the inhabited premises. Id. at 261. In other words, the right of private occupancy is the legal right to occupy premises, not the right to enjoy occupying those premises. In relation to this, it should be noted that none of the Sarpy County plaintiffs pled wrongful or constructive eviction from their property. In Decorative Center, the court noted: `Ejusdem generis principles draw on the sensible notion that words such as or other invasion of the right of private occupancy are intended to encompass actions of the same general type as, though not specifically embraced within, wrongful entry or eviction. Those two terms have commonly understood meanings.' Id. at 262 (quoting Martin v. Brunzelle, 699 F.Supp. 167 (N.D.Ill.1988)). We believe the court's reasoning in Decorative Center is correct. It is therefore quite clear that with or without the information contained in the interrogatories, there was no coverage under the personal injury section of the policy. Furthermore, the claim of an advertising injury is transparently without merit. Pacesetter's own advertising activities were not shown to have caused any injury to the Sarpy County plaintiffs, nor do we find that Fingerlin's activities constitute an advertising injury under the specific definition contained in the endorsement. There is no coverage under the endorsement. The allegations of diminution in value and loss of enjoyment of the trees do not create an action under the endorsement for personal injury or advertising injury.