Opinion ID: 3166757
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence of the Prior Assault

Text: [¶19] The jury heard evidence from which it could find that Pratt assaulted the victim approximately fifteen hours before she was killed. Pratt moved in limine, pursuant to M.R. Evid. 404(b)3 and 403, to exclude statements that the victim made about the assault, and to limit, but not exclude altogether, other evidence concerning the assault, saying, In this case, although evidence of the prior domestic violence is admissible insofar as it is relevant to motive or intent, the Court should carefully circumscribe the admission of such evidence. . . . [T]he Court should limit such evidence as much as possible. [¶20] Pratt reiterated that position at the motion hearing, and elaborated on it. As to the victim’s statements, he “concede[d] . . . that a few of these statements may be admissible as statements of existing . . . physical condition,” specifically her statements “complaining of having a hard time hearing out of her right ear and of leg pain. She also complained about her left ear . . . [and] that her right hand had been scratched already but that the discoloration was new.” As to evidence concerning the prior assault generally, Pratt told the court that 3 The rule in effect at the time of trial provided: “Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith.” M.R. Evid. 404(b) (Tower 2014). 11 [w]e do concede that some of that evidence is relevant to motive and intent but it needs to be carefully limited . . . . We would ask that there be a 404 limiting instruction before opening statements . . . . [and] also ask for a reiteration of that limiting instruction before any witness is going to talk about it. And then, lastly, it should be included in the jury instructions. [¶21] Although the court expressed concern that an instruction prior to openings would be confusing because the jury would not know at that point what it was to disregard, Pratt twice agreed with the outline of the instruction that the court proposed to give at appropriate points. He also agreed that “two neighbors and one cop” should be allowed to testify concerning the assault so long as the court did not allow them to “elaborate ad nauseam on this point.” [¶22] Before the Westbrook police officer testified about her contact with the victim and her observations of the victim’s injuries following the prior assault, Pratt accepted the court’s offer of a limiting instruction. The court told the jury: Mr. Pratt is not charged in this case with assaulting Margarita Scott on November 10 and you may not assume or conclude, based on any evidence as to any conduct or physical altercation involving the defendant that may have occurred on the morning of November 10, as evidence that Mr. Pratt had any disposition or propensity to commit any acts or any violent acts or any conduct that would tend to show he committed the crime here or that necessarily means he committed the offense that is charged here and that you need to determine at the conclusion of all the evidence. Evidence as to a physical altercation between Mr. Pratt and Margarita Scott on the morning of November 10 or of any conduct engaged in at that time may be considered by you only to the extent that that evidence may shed light on whether Mr. Pratt had any motive or intent to commit the crime that is charged in this case or to the extent that such evidence may 12 shed light on the state of Mr. Pratt’s relationship with Margarita Scott at the time in question. In its charge to the jury, the court gave a substantially similar instruction; Pratt did not object to it. [¶23] On appeal, Pratt contends that the court erred in admitting evidence concerning the prior assault—including the evidence that he agreed at trial was admissible—because admitting the evidence violated M.R. Evid. 403, and because the court’s limiting instruction was not sufficient to satisfy Rule 404(b). Although we generally “review the trial court’s decision to admit [] evidence pursuant to Rule 404(b) for clear error and its determination pursuant to Rule 403 for an abuse of discretion,” Steadman, 2015 ME 122, ¶ 18, --- A.3d --- (quotation marks omitted), here our review is for obvious error because Pratt did not object to evidence of the prior assault being admitted for a proper purpose, and did not object to the limiting instruction that the trial court gave to prevent potential prejudice. See State v. Millay, 2001 ME 177, ¶ 12, 787 A.2d 129.
[¶24] The rule in effect at the time of the trial provided: “Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith.” M.R. Evid. 404(b) (Tower 2014). As we have said, evidence of prior bad acts is admissible for 13 limited purposes other than to prove propensity, in that “Rule 404(b) does not render inadmissible evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts if the evidence is offered to demonstrate motive, intent, identity, absence of mistake, or the relationship of the parties.” State v. Barnes, 2004 ME 38, ¶ 5, 845 A.2d 575. [¶25] Here, the parties agreed that the only real issue for the jury was the identity of Margarita Scott’s killer. Evidence that an angry Pratt committed a serious assault against a woman whom he described as his fiancée hours before she was killed was relevant, and therefore admissible, concerning each of the proper purposes identified in Barnes: motive, intent, identity, absence of mistake, and the relationship of the parties.4 See id.
[¶26] Contrary to Pratt’s contention that “[t]he probative value of the alleged assault was low to nil,” the State’s theory of the case was that Pratt killed Margarita because he thought she was “cheating on him” with her husband. The probative value of evidence from which the jury could conclude that Pratt was angry enough with Margarita to purposefully and violently assault her hours before her death is obvious. As with the recording of Pratt’s police interview, evidence of 4 Contrary to Pratt’s assertion that the state of the relationship evidence was “simply floating freely without any nexus to anything at all,” evidence concerning the tumultuous state of Pratt and Margarita’s relationship on the day before her murder had a clear nexus to the ultimate issue—whether Pratt had the motive and intent to kill her, and did so. See Field & Murray, Maine Evidence § 404.7 at 150 (6th ed. 2007) (stating that “the court should carefully consider . . . the extent to which proof of the [parties’] relationship supports inferences relevant to the basic issues in the case”). 14 the close-in-time assault was doubtlessly prejudicial to Pratt’s cause, but it was not unfairly prejudicial and it was also highly probative concerning the central issue at trial—whether it was Pratt or someone else who murdered Margarita Scott.
[¶27] The danger of unfair prejudice that must be weighed against the probative value of relevant evidence was, in this case, mitigated by the court’s careful, twice-repeated limiting instruction. We presume that the jury followed the trial court’s instruction, which limited its consideration of the prior assault evidence to a proper purpose under Rule 404(b): “whether Mr. Pratt had any motive or intent to commit the crime that is charged in this case or [] the extent [to which] such evidence may shed light on the state of Mr. Pratt’s relationship with Margarita Scott at the time in question.” See Wyman, 2015 ME 1, ¶ 24, 107 A.3d 641. The record thus reveals no error.