Opinion ID: 218749
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Hill's Proposed Instruction about Good Faith Reliance on Advice of Counsel

Text: Hill argues that because he used attorneys for most of the fraudulent transactions and closings, he was entitled to rely on their implied advice that what he was doing was legal. [24] He requested that the jury be instructed that good faith reliance on his counsel's advice was a complete defense to the charges against him. The government opposed the instruction on the ground that it would be misleading because Hill's attorneys were also co-conspirators. The district court denied Hill's request, finding that there was insufficient evidence to support the instruction because there had been no testimony that any of the defendants actually did rely on advice of counsel. In denying Hill's post-trial motion for acquittal, the district court reiterated that there was no evidence to support the instruction. It added that the fraud was obvious from the face of the documents and that the attorneys who testified about the residential mortgage fraud scheme were admitted co-conspirators. In order to qualify for an instruction on good faith reliance on the advice of counsel, a defendant must show that (1) he fully disclosed to his attorney all material facts that are relevant to the advice for which he consulted the attorney; and (2) thereafter, he relied in good faith on advice given by his attorney. See United States v. Miles, 290 F.3d 1341, 1354 (11th Cir.2002); United States v. Condon, 132 F.3d 653, 656 (11th Cir.1998); United States v. Johnson, 730 F.2d 683, 686 (11th Cir.1984). Although the burden on a defendant to put forth sufficient evidence to support a proposed jury instruction is low, United States v. Ruiz, 59 F.3d 1151, 1154 (11th Cir.1995), Hill failed to meet it because there was no evidence to support the instruction. Hill points out that attorneys were used by many of his investors as well as by the lenders, and he was personally represented by at least five different attorneys over the course of the events. At no point, however, did any of the attorneys advise Hill that the overall scheme or all of its essential components were legal. Hill argues that he relied on the advice of attorneys Dewrell and Sacks with respect to Counts 1-14, which charged him with the line of credit fraud on Charter Bank. Both of those attorneys testified, but they did not say that they had represented Hill in his dealings with Charter, or that they had reviewed and advised Hill about the false statements on the credit applications, the false statements on Hill's and Graham's financial statements, or the false statements that Hill made to Hungerford, a vice president of Charter Bank who had requested assurances that Hill's lines of credit were sufficiently secured. Attorneys Dewrell and Sacks did testify that they advised Hill concerning the formation and business of Atlanta Condo and Atlanta Millenium (the Hill-controlled entities involved in the Charter Bank fraud), and that they advised him about his personal transactions with Vargas (his co-conspirator at Charter who helped him get the lines of credit). Those transactions were not, however, the basis of the fraud charges. Hill has not pointed to a single piece of evidence indicating that he fully disclosed to any attorney the material facts relevant to his obtaining the lines of credit from Charter Bank, or any evidence indicating that any attorney advised him that his fraudulent representations to Charter were legal. So, no advice of counsel instruction was warranted on Counts 1-14. Hill also argues that he relied upon the advice of his co-conspirator attorneys Halcomb and Wolf with respect to Counts 19-187, charging him with the multi-property mortgage fraud. Halcomb and Wolf both testified, however, that at no time did they believe that Hill had come to them for advice, and they specifically denied ever giving him an opinion as to the legality of those transactions. Given the lack of evidence to support an advice of counsel instruction, the district court's refusal to give one was not an abuse of discretion. [25]