Opinion ID: 1240014
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: separate proceedings and custis v. u.s.

Text: LeGrand argues that the Nebraska Court of Appeals erred in interpreting the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Custis v. U.S., ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 1732, 128 L.Ed.2d 517 (1994), and Nichols v. U.S., ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 1921, 128 L.Ed.2d 745 (1994), as authority to invalidate separate proceedings in Nebraska. A defendant cannot collaterally attack a prior conviction in an enhancement proceeding. State v. Oliver, 230 Neb. 864, 434 N.W.2d 293 (1989). Therefore, objections to the validity of a prior conviction offered for the purpose of sentence enhancement, beyond the issue of whether the defendant had counsel or waived the right to counsel, constitute a collateral attack on the judgment, and must be raised either by a direct appeal from the prior conviction or in separate proceedings commenced expressly for the purpose of setting aside the prior conviction. Id. See, also, State v. Wiltshire, 241 Neb. 817, 491 N.W.2d 324 (1992). The Nebraska Court of Appeals was correct when it stated that we followed U.S. Supreme Court precedent in recognizing the right to collaterally attack prior convictions through a separate proceeding. See State v. Wiltshire, supra (following Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 88 S.Ct. 258, 19 L.Ed.2d 319 (1967), and Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 100 S.Ct. 1585, 64 L.Ed.2d 169 (1980)). State courts are bound by the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court when they establish a citizen's due process rights under the federal constitution. U.S. Const. art. VI. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). However, states are free to afford their citizens greater due process protection under their state constitutions than is granted by the federal constitution. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983). Accordingly, the Nebraska Court of Appeals erred in presuming that this court would automatically apply to Nebraska a U.S. Supreme Court holding that restricts where federal defendants subject to federal recidivist statutes may challenge earlier convictions used for federal sentence enhancement. Moreover, Custis v. U.S., supra , and Nichols v. U.S., supra , do not suggest that Nebraska's separate proceedings are no longer valid. In Custis v. U.S ., the Court addressed whether a defendant in a federal sentencing proceeding may collaterally attack the validity of previous state convictions that are used to enhance the defendant's sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (1994). The Court held that, based upon the language of the statute, Congress did not intend to permit collateral attacks on prior convictions under § 924(e). In Nichols v. U.S., the Court overruled its holding in Baldasar v. Illinois, supra , and held that an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction, where no prison term was imposed, is valid when used to enhance punishment at a subsequent conviction. Thus, there exists no federal mandate to overrule separate state proceedings to collaterally attack prior state convictions on grounds other than right to counsel or waiver of counsel. A constitutionally invalid conviction used for sentence enhancement works a second constitutional violation on the defendant by allowing an invalid conviction to serve as a predicate for a recidivist conviction. Without separate proceedings, a defendant in a state case, who is not in custody, has no other forum to challenge a constitutionally infirm judgment sought to be used for sentence enhancement. With this in mind, we reaffirm our holdings in State v. Oliver, supra , and State v. Wiltshire, supra , that separate proceedings are a valid means to collaterally attack allegedly constitutionally invalid prior convictions used for sentence enhancement.