Opinion ID: 2750426
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: scope of miller's holding

Text: Having concluded the rule in Miller applies retroactively, we now turn to whether it extends to the petitioners, who were sentenced to life without parole under a nonmandatory statutory scheme. In analyzing the precedent relevant to the constitutional question before it, the Court in Miller noted that Roper and Graham established that children were constitutionally different from adults for sentencing purposes, a conclusion that 2012); State v. Ragland, 836 N.W. 2d 107, 116 (Iowa 2013); Diatchenko v. Dist. Attorney for Suffolk Dist., 1 N.E.3d 270, 281 (Mass. 2013); Jones v. State, 122 So.3d 698, 702 (Miss. 2013); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Chemerinsky: Juvenile Life-Without-Parole Case Means Courts Must Look at Mandatory Sentences, A.B.A J. Law News Now (Aug. 8, 2012, 8:30 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/chemerinsky_juvenile_life-withoutparole_case_means_courts_must_look_at_sen/ ([Miller] says that it is beyond the authority of the criminal law to impose a mandatory sentence of life without parole. It would be terribly unfair to have individuals imprisoned for life without any chance of parole based on the accident of the timing of the trial.). 7 We fear that the dissent is conflating the retroactivity analysis and the applicability analysis. A particular jurisdiction's statutory framework has no bearing on the threshold determination of whether Miller applies retroactively. A new rule announced by the Supreme Court is not amorphous; it is either a substantive rule of law that applies retroactively, or it is not. was based on common sense as well as science and social science. 132 S. Ct at 2464. Roper and Graham emphasized that the distinctive attributes of youth diminish the penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders, even when they commit terrible crimes. Id. at 2465. Specifically, the Court noted juveniles differ from adults in their general lack of maturity and [] underdeveloped sense of responsibility, vulnerab[ility] . . . to negative influences and outside pressures, including family and peers, and still evolving character and personality traits. Id. at 2464 (ellipsis in original) (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70). Important to our determination of the breadth of the Miller decision is this statement by the majority: Graham's reasoning implicates any life-without-parole sentence imposed on a juvenile, even as its categorical bar relates only to nonhomicide offenses. Id. at 2465. Thus, the Miller Court unequivocally held that youth has a constitutional dimension when determining the appropriateness of a lifetime of incarceration with no possibility of parole, and that the mandatory penalty schemes at issue prevented the sentencing authority from considering the differences between adult and juvenile offenders before imposing a sentence of life without parole. Focusing on Graham's treatment of juvenile life sentences as analogous to capital punishment, the majority held that Woodson and its progeny required an individualized sentencing proceeding before imposing a sentence of life without parole on a juvenile offender. Id. at 2467. We recognize that in holding the Eighth Amendment proscribes a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders, the Court did not expressly extend its ruling to states such as South Carolina whose sentencing scheme permits a life without parole sentence to be imposed on a juvenile offender but does not mandate it. Indeed, the Court noted that because its holding was sufficient to decide the cases before it, consideration of the defendants' alternative argument that the Eighth Amendment requires a categorical bar on life without parole for juveniles was unnecessary. Id. at 2469. However, we must give effect to the proportionality rationale integral to Miller's holding—youth has constitutional significance. As such, it must be afforded adequate weight in sentencing. Thus, we profoundly disagree with the position advanced by the respondents and the dissent that the import of the Miller decision has no application in South Carolina. Miller is clear that it is the failure of a sentencing court to consider the hallmark features of youth prior to sentencing that offends the Constitution. Contrary to the dissent's interpretation, Miller does more than ban mandatory life sentencing schemes for juveniles; it establishes an affirmative requirement that courts fully explore the impact of the defendant's juvenility on the sentence rendered. As evidenced by the record, although some of the hearings touch on the issues of youth, none of them approach the sort of hearing envisioned by Miller where the factors of youth are carefully and thoughtfully considered.8 Many of the attorneys mention age as nothing more than a chronological fact in a vague plea for mercy. Miller holds the Constitution requires more. As the majority states succinctly, Although we do not foreclose a sentencer's ability to make that judgment in homicide cases, we require it to take into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison. Id. We believe this statement deserves universal application. The absence of this level of inquiry into the characteristics of youth produced a facially unconstitutional sentence for these petitioners. In our view, whether their sentence is mandatory or permissible, any juvenile offender who receives a sentence of life without the possibility of parole is entitled to the same constitutional protections afforded by the Eighth Amendment's guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment. The petitioners and those similarly situated are accordingly entitled to resentencing to allow the inmates to present evidence specific to their attributes of youth and allow the judge to consider such evidence in the light of its constitutional weight. 8 The dissent's discussion of the individual sentencing hearings—in particular its recitation of Angelo Ham's—does not dissuade us of the accuracy of this statement. Instead it highlights the distinction between its reading of Miller and ours—we recognize and give credence to the decision's command that courts afford youth and its attendant characteristics constitutional meaning. The dissent would simply continue to treat the characteristics of youth as any other fact. We are likewise unfazed by the dissent's criticism that we have failed to pinpoint an abuse of discretion; that admonition appears to arise from a fundamental misunderstanding of our holding. We have determined that the sentencing hearings in these cases suffer from a constitutional defect—the failure to examine the youth of the offender through the lens mandated by Miller. We decline to denominate the error an abuse of discretion because the sentencing courts in these instances did not have the benefit of Miller to shape their inquiries. Those courts will have the opportunity on resentencing to exercise their discretion within the proper framework as outlined by the United States Supreme Court.
We turn finally to the scope of the resentencing hearings that we order today. Miller requires the sentencing authority take into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison. 132 S. Ct. at 2469. Consequently, Miller establishes a specific framework, articulating that the factors a sentencing court consider at a hearing must include: (1) the chronological age of the offender and the hallmark features of youth, including immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate the risks and consequence; (2) the family and home environment that surrounded the offender; (3) the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of the offender's participation in the conduct and how familial and peer pressures may have affected him; (4) the incompetencies associated with youth—for example, [the offender's] inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) or [the offender's] incapacity to assist his own attorneys; and (5) the possibility of rehabilitation. 132 S. Ct. at 2468. While we do not go so far as some commentators who suggest that the sentencing of a juvenile offender subject to a life without parole sentence should mirror the penalty phase of a capital case,9 we are mindful that the Miller Court specifically linked the individualized sentencing requirements of capital sentencing to juvenile life without parole sentences. 132 S. Ct. at 2463, 2467–68. Thus, the type of mitigating evidence permitted in death penalty sentencing hearings unquestionably has relevance to juvenile life without parole sentencing hearings, in addition to the factors illustrated above. Without question, the judge may still determine that life without parole is the appropriate sentence in some of these cases in light of other aggravating circumstances. Our General Assembly has made the decision that juvenile offenders may be sentenced to life without parole, and we honor that decision. However, Miller requires that before a life without parole sentence is imposed upon a juvenile offender, he must receive an individualized hearing where the mitigating hallmark features of youth are fully explored.10 9 See Chemerinsky, supra note 6. 10 We decline the dissent's invitation to set out a specific process for trial court judges to follow when considering whether to sentence a juvenile to life without parole. The United States Supreme Court did not establish a definite resentencing procedure and we likewise see no reason to do so. We have the utmost confidence