Opinion ID: 740982
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Substantial Factor Causation as it Relates to Foreseeability

Text: 21 In determining how the elements of foreseeability and causation may properly be demonstrated in the instant case, we are again guided by Pennsylvania law. When addressing causation, Pennsylvania has rejected the but for test and adopted the substantial factor test as embodied in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 431, which provides: 22 The actor's negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if: (a) his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and (b) there is no rule of law relieving the actor from liability because of the manner in which his negligence resulted in the harm. 23 See Trude v. Martin, 442 Pa.Super. 614, 660 A.2d 626, 632 (1995) (citing Whitner v. Von Hintz, 437 Pa. 448, 263 A.2d 889 (1970)). 24 The courts of other states following the Restatement have defined a substantial factor as one that is not merely negligible. ACandS v. Asner, 344 Md. 155, 686 A.2d 250, 260 (1996). Stated differently, '[l]iability attaches not only to the dominating cause but also to any cause which constitutes at any event a substantial factor in bringing about the injury.'  Dawson v. Bunker Hill Plaza Assocs., 289 N.J.Super. 309, 673 A.2d 847, 853 (App.Div.1996)(quoting Peer v. City of Newark, 71 N.J.Super. 12, 176 A.2d 249 (App.Div.1961)(emphasis added)). The substantial factor test has replaced the but for causation test in strict liability contexts precisely because in design defect cases it is typically a matter of speculation whether the presence of a safety device would, in a given instance, have actually prevented a harm. See Yukon Equip., Inc. v. Gordon, 660 P.2d 428, 433 (Alaska 1983)(stating that but for causation jury instruction was improper in manufacturer's design defect case), overruled on other grounds, Williford v. L.J. Carr Invs., Inc., 783 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1989). 25 Our review of Pennsylvania law dictates that a plaintiff's conduct may be introduced to undermine a plaintiff's claim that the defect caused his accident only insofar as the plaintiff's conduct was unforeseeable to the defendant, even where the plaintiff played some part in setting the accident in motion. Evidence concerning a decedent's possible role in bringing about his or her own death is admissible only to support defendant's claim that the conduct was so extraordinary or [un]foreseeable that it would be unjust to hold the defendant liable for the harm. See. e.g., Holloway v. J.B. Sys., Ltd., 609 F.2d 1069, 1074 (3d Cir.1979). When courts admit such testimony, they must elucidate the limited permissible uses of that evidence, as it is highly susceptible to misinterpretation by the jury. 26 In determining causation, therefore, the task of the jury is not simply to determine whether the plaintiff played a part in causing the accident. Rather, the threshold question is whether the plaintiff's actions were foreseeable. As noted above, the manufacturer is responsible for making the product safe for all foreseeable uses. Decorative Precast Stone Erectors, Inc. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 493 F.Supp. 555, 557 (W.D.Pa.1980), aff'd, 642 F.2d 441 (3d Cir.1981),informs us that under Pennsylvania products liability law, if both a manufacturer's defect and a plaintiff's conduct are found to be proximate causes, the plaintiff will recover unless the defendant meets the burden of proving that plaintiff's conduct was so unforeseeable as to constitute a superseding cause. See infra, Sec. III.A.3. If foreseeable, the jury must find for the plaintiff unless it finds that the defect did not play even a substantial, or more than negligible, role in causing the plaintiff's injury. In Schell, 567 F.2d at 1263 (citing Bartkewich v. Billinger, 432 Pa. 351, 247 A.2d 603, 605 (1968)), we explained that recovery is allowed where the absence of a safety device caused an injury of the type that could be expected from the foreseeable use of the product. 3 27 The element of causation, while required, is not the primary focus of section 402A cases. Causation may be shown by process of elimination or circumstantial evidence. In cases dealing with product malfunction, for instance, Pennsylvania appellate courts have consistently reversed trial courts for not sending to the jury cases in which causation had not been directly demonstrated. See, e.g., Ducko v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 433 Pa.Super. 47, 639 A.2d 1204 (1994); Agostino v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 236 Pa.Super. 434, 345 A.2d 735 (1975); Burchill v. Kearney-Nat'l Corp. v. Pennsylvania Elec. Co., 468 F.2d 384 (3d Cir.1972). Similarly, in MacDougall v. Ford Motor Co., 214 Pa.Super. 384, 257 A.2d 676, 680 (1969) overruled on other grounds, REM Coal Co. v. Clark Equip. Co., 386 Pa.Super. 401, 563 A.2d 128, 134 (1989), 4 the Pennsylvania Superior Court stated: 28 The evidentiary requirements of negligence law demand proof that injury is proximately caused by a specific defect in design or construction because liability hinges upon whether the accident could have been avoided by the exercise of reasonable care. In contrast, the concern of both section 402A and warranty law is with the fitness of the product. 29 The de-emphasis of causation is a natural corollary of the distinction between negligence and strict products liability. In strict products liability, the focus is on whether the product was sold in an unreasonably dangerous condition for reasonably foreseeable uses. See Carpenter v. Koehring Co., 391 F.Supp. 206, 210-11 (E.D.Pa.1975), aff'd, 527 F.2d 644 (3d Cir.1976). In negligence, by contrast, the focus is on whether a duty of care was breached. See Kuisis, 319 A.2d at 920. In either negligence or strict products liability, proximate cause defines such limits on recovery as are economically and socially desirable. Klages v. General Ordnance Equip. Corp., 240 Pa.Super. 356, 367 A.2d 304, 313 (1976). In the products liability area, Pennsylvania has determined that it is economically and socially desirable to hold manufacturers liable for accidents caused by their defective products, without introducing negligence concepts of comparative fault that would weigh the manufacturer's negligent conduct against that of the injured product user. See Walton, 610 A.2d at 462. See also infra, Sec. III.A.4.