Opinion ID: 888507
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Montana Courts have treated retribution as a component of punishment

Text: ¶ 25 This Court has repeatedly said retribution is a component of punishment. For example, [a] sentence of imprisonment following a criminal conviction is imposed because a particular crime was committed, and its purpose is both retributional and rehabilitational. Matter of C.S., 210 Mont. 144, 146, 687 P.2d 57, 59 (1984). We restated this declaration of purpose in 1993. Matter of B.L.T., 258 Mont. 468, 473, 853 P.2d 1226, 1229 (1993). ¶ 26 Matter of B.L.T. and Matter of C.S. are not the only cases in Montana that establish retribution as a part of punishment. A civil sanction will be deemed . . . punishment in the constitutional sense only if the sanction may not be fairly characterized as remedial but only as a deterrent or retribution. Frazier v. Montana State Dept. of Corrects., 277 Mont. 82, 86, 920 P.2d 93, 96 (1996) (quoting Bae v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 489, 493 (7th Cir.1995) (internal quotation marks omitted)). [A] civil penalty is `punishment' . . . if it `cannot fairly be said to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes.' State v. Nelson, 275 Mont. 86, 91, 910 P.2d 247, 250 (1996) ( quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 1901-02, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989)). See also State v. Mount, 2003 MT 275, ¶¶ 70, 73, 317 Mont. 481, ¶¶ 70, 73, 78 P.3d 829, ¶¶ 70, 73. ¶ 27 Lastly, the judgment and commitment of the sentencing judge shows retribution was only the third basis for the sentence. Other factors were the defendant's potential for rehabilitation appears to be minimal and the defendant poses a significant threat to the public. The District Court's use of the word retribution aligns with the sentencing policies and procedures in Montana. ¶ 28 Issue 3. Did the District Court err by imposing a restriction on Rickman's parole eligibility for fifty-five (55) years? ¶ 29 Rickman contends the District Court erred by imposing a restriction on his parole eligibility. According to Rickman, § 46-18-202(2), MCA, does not give a sentencing court the authority to restrict a defendant's parole eligibility. In essence, Rickman argues he is either parole eligible or he is not. ¶ 30 Recently, the Court described the task of statutory interpretation as simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or substance contained in the statute, not to insert what is omitted or to omit what has been inserted. State v. Ashmore, 2008 MT 14, ¶ 12, 341 Mont. 131, ¶ 12, 176 P.3d 1022, ¶ 12 ( quoting § 1-2-101, MCA) (internal brackets omitted). Section 46-18-202(2), MCA, states in pertinent part, the sentencing judge may also impose the restriction that the offender is ineligible for parole. Rickman argues the phrase is ineligible for parole only allows the sentencing judge to restrict parole for all of a sentence or none of it. The Court disagrees. ¶ 31 The Court has, on prior occasion, examined other parts of Title 46, Chapter 18 in order to determine the meaning of § 46-18-202(2), MCA. Gratzer v. Mahoney, 2006 MT 282, ¶¶ 4-7, 334 Mont. 297, ¶¶ 4-7, 150 P.3d 343, ¶¶ 4-7 ( examining § 46-23-103(4), MCA (1981), and § 46-23-1001(3), MCA (1981), in order to determine the meaning of term contained in § 46-18-202(2), MCA). Section 46-18-202(2), MCA, is not the only provision of Title 46, Chapter 18 dealing with the restrictions sentencing judges may put on sentences. For example, directly preceding § 46-18-202(2), MCA, is § 46-18-202(1)(f), MCA, which empowers trial court judges to attach to sentences, any other limitation reasonably related to the objectives of rehabilitation and protection of the victim and society. It is implausible to interpret § 46-18-202(2), MCA, as imposing an all or nothing limitation on parole restrictions based on the phrase is ineligible for parole when the prior section gives the judge great discretion that is limited only by reasonableness. ¶ 32 In addition, this Court has affirmed sentences which contained a parole restriction as early as 1988. State v. Wirtala, 231 Mont. 264, 752 P.2d 177 (1988), overruled on other grounds, State v. Lane, 1998 MT 76, ¶ 41, 288 Mont. 286, ¶ 41, 957 P.2d 9, ¶ 41. Rickman correctly argues Wirtala did not address the lawfulness of partial parole restrictions. However, the sentence in Wirtala was upheld and, importantly, the sentence contained a partial parole restriction. Wirtala, 231 Mont. at 269, 752 P.2d at 180. The Court has addressed parole restrictions in other cases. In State v. Thomas , the Court concluded the guilty plea was reasonable, deeming the partial parole restriction imposed under § 46-18-202(2), MCA, a discretionary parole restriction. State v. Thomas, 285 Mont. 112, 121-23, 946 P.2d 140, 145-47 (1997). It is implausible to interpret a discretionary parole restriction as allowing only enough discretion to hand down an all or nothing parole restriction. ¶ 33 Moreover, giving the trial court judge discretion is one of Montana's sentencing policies. See § 46-18-101(3)(d), MCA ([s]entencing practices must permit judicial discretion to consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances). This Court is unwilling to allow the phrase ineligible for parole to limit sentencing judges to all or nothing parole restrictions. If a sentencing court can impose a restriction of no parole eligibility, then a sentencing court can certainly impose a restriction of limited parole eligibility. ¶ 34 The passage of time and the actions, or more appropriately inactions, of Montana's legislature provide a final reason to hold partial parole restrictions lawful. Montana sentences containing partial parole restrictions have been upheld against other challenges at least since 1988. See Wirtala, 231 Mont. at 269, 752 P.2d at 180. Montana's legislature has convened every two years since. The legislature is presumed to know how this Court has interpreted its statutes. Sampson v. Nat'l Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co., 2006 MT 241, ¶ 20, 333 Mont. 541, ¶ 20, 144 P.3d 797, ¶ 20. Therefore, if the Montana legislature disapproved of partial parole restrictions, it would have changed the text of § 46-18-202(2), MCA, in order to ban such partial restrictions. Since the text of § 46-18-202(2), MCA, is unchanged, this Court presumes the legislature approves of partial parole restrictions. Therefore, this Court holds partial parole restrictions do not offend § 46-18-202(2), MCA. Rickman's sentence, including the parole restriction, is lawful.