Opinion ID: 221000
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defining Reason to Believe

Text: Citing Matter of Rocha, 20 I. & N. Dec. 944, petitioner argues that, as the IJ held in this case, the relevant reason to believe is the immigration officer's belief at the time the alien is encountered at the port of entry. Here, officers who encountered petitioner at the border on December 13, 2002, did testify before the IJ about what they observed at that time. Officer Abanico inspected petitioner's truck and testified that he found the marijuana and that petitioner made phone calls in violation of policy and oral instructions. Special Agent Encinas questioned petitioner shortly after the marijuana was discovered and testified that petitioner had a demeanor consistent with a drug trafficker, that petitioner's log book omitted a stop at Bajas Produce, and that petitioner made inconsistent statements about his history of transporting money across the border. However, both the IJ and BIA also relied on other information that was not available to anyone at the border on December 13, 2002. Agent Lehman, who did not take part in events at the border, testified as an expert that, based on his years of experience, it would be highly unusual for a drug smuggler to entrust such a large quantity of drugs to an unknowing courier. Inspector Rodriguez described his interview with petitioner on January 9, 2003, about a month after petitioner's attempt to cross the border. Although the BIA and IJ did not rely on information provided by Inspector Rodriguez, both the IJ and BIA relied on Agent Lehman's expert testimony. Additionally, although not noted by the petitioner, the BIA relied on other pieces of information that were not available to anyone at the border on December 13, 2002, such as a statement made by petitioner at the hearing and the fact that the owner of the trucking company retained an attorney for petitioner during criminal proceedings arising out of the seizure of marijuana at the border. Petitioner argues that this later-acquired information cannot properly be considered in deciding whether there was the requisite reason to believe that he knowingly transported the seized marijuana. In its brief, submitted in 2006, the government, citing Lopez-Molina, 368 F.3d at 1209-11, argues that we should look to whether substantial evidence supports the IJ having the necessary reason to believe. See Resp.'s Brief at 31. At oral argument, however, the government argued that the court should follow the BIA's 2010 precedential decision in Matter of Casillas-Topete, which recognizes that Matter of Rocha was superseded by statute and requires instead that the information [creating `reason to believe'] was demonstrably known to an appropriate immigration official when the admission occurred, but not necessarily to the inspecting immigration officer. Matter of Casillas-Topete, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 321. We are, therefore, required to decide who must have the necessary reason to believe and at what time. Although the Ninth Circuit and BIA precedent might initially appear inconsistent, we conclude that, in fact, the BIA's approach in Matter of Casillas-Topete and our court's approach in Alarcon-Serrano and later cases are reconcilable. This conclusion requires some discussion of the relevant cases, particularly because it appears that we are the first court of appeals to address the implications of Matter of Rocha and Matter of Casillas-Topete. Indeed, it appears we are the first court of appeals ever to cite these precedential decisions of the BIA.
In 1995, in Matter of Rocha, the BIA applied an earlier version of § 1182(a)(2)(C), which at that time excluded any alien who the consular or immigration officer knows or has reason to believe is a drug trafficker. See 20 I. & N. Dec. at 945 (quoting § 1182(a)(2)(C)) (emphasis added). In that case, an alien was admitted into the United States without incident. See id. at 944. Indeed, it was uncontested that the alien made an `entry' into the United States before encountering any problems. See id. at 946. Subsequently, however, the alien was stopped at a traffic checkpoint, found to be in possession of marijuana, and charged with being deportable under 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)(A) (now 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A)) on the basis of being excludable at the time of entry under § 1182(a)(2)(C). See id. at 944-45. The BIA held that the particular examining officer who inspected the [alien] must in fact have known or suspected that the [alien] was a trafficker at the time of his application for admission. Id. at 946. Because the marijuana was not found until after the alien made entry, the examining officer could not have had the necessary reason to believe, and the alien's deportation proceedings were terminated. See id. at 946-48.
In 2010, in Matter of Casillas-Topete, the BIA held that Matter of Rocha was superseded by statute. See 25 I. & N. Dec. at 321. In Matter of Casillas-Topete, officials within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) knew petitioner had been convicted of unlawful transportation of marijuana for sale while residing in the United States and placed him in deportation proceedings on that basis. See id. at 318. However, the alien then left the United States and, upon his return, was admitted. See id. DHS then withdrew the original deportation charges and lodged a new deportation charge that the alien (like the alien in Matter of Rocha ) was deportable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A) on the basis of being inadmissible at time of admission under § 1182(a)(2)(C) because there was reason to believe he was a drug trafficker based on his earlier conviction. See id. The IJ, citing Matter of Rocha, concluded the alien was not inadmissible because the particular officer examining him at the border did not know or suspect he was a drug trafficker. See id. The BIA vacated the IJ's decision based on the 1999 amendment to § 1182(a)(2)(C), which broadened the text to render inadmissible, and therefore removable, `[a]ny alien who the consular officer or the Attorney General knows or has reason to believe' is a drug trafficker. See id. at 319 (quoting Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Pub.L. No. 106-120, § 809, 113 Stat. 1606, 1632 (effective Dec. 3, 1999)) (emphasis added). The BIA also noted that, given the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the reference to the Attorney General should be read to include the Secretary of Homeland Security. See id. at 320 (citing Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub.L. No. 107-296, § 1517, 116 Stat. 2135, 2311 (enacted Nov. 25, 2002) (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 557)). In light of these statutory amendments, the BIA held that it is not relevant under the terms of the statute that the inspecting immigration officer does not have access to information regarding the alien's trafficking if that information is known to other immigration officials. See 25 I. & N. Dec. at 321. Thus, as long as the information was demonstrably known to an appropriate immigration official when the admission occurred, it can be relied on to sustain the charge. See id. (emphasis added); cf. Hing Sum v. Holder, 602 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir.2010) (defining admission); Matter of Rosas-Ramirez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 616, 618-20 (BIA 1999) (same). The BIA vacated the IJ's decision because DHS officials knew of the alien's conviction at the time he was admitted, even if the particular examining officer at the border did not. See id.
In 2000, in Alarcon-Serrano, petitioner was detained at the border after officers found concealed marijuana in his vehicle, and he was then placed in exclusion proceedings under the narrower pre-1999 version of § 1182(a)(2)(C). See 220 F.3d at 1117-18. [4] Applying the pre-1999 version of § 1182(a)(2)(C), we held that the only requirement is that an immigration officer `knows or has reason to believe' that [petitioner] is an illicit trafficker in controlled substances or that [petitioner] has knowingly assisted, abetted, conspired with, or colluded with others in such illicit trafficking. Id. at 1119 (emphasis added). In the next sentence, the court held that [t]he appropriate way of measuring whether the IJ and BIA had `reason to believe' that [petitioner] knew he was participating in drug trafficking is to determine whether substantial evidence supports such a conclusion. Id. (emphasis added). Thus, we held that, under the pre-1999 version of § 1182(a)(2)(C), the focus is upon the information available to the IJ and BIA, at least where the alien seeks adjudication of admissibility before admission. See id. at 1119-20. The court in Alarcon-Serrano employed this approach, focusing on the veracity of petitioner's testimony before the IJ, and information derived from it, which could not have been available to officers at the border or on the day petitioner was apprehended at the border. See id. at 1118, 1119-20. In 2004, in Lopez-Molina, petitioner was admitted to the United States as a visitor in 1995, and a year later was charged with misprision of felony arising out of a drug-related arrest in 1990, to which he ultimately pled guilty. See 368 F.3d at 1207. Petitioner later applied to adjust his status to permanent resident. See id. His application was denied, and he was charged with being deportable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A) because he was inadmissible under § 1182(a)(2)(C) at the time of adjustment of status. See id. Applying the broader post-1999 version of § 1182(a)(2)(C), we held that [t]he only requirement under § 1182(a)(2)(C) is that an immigration official has `reason to believe' that the alien is or has been involved in illicit drug trafficking. Id. at 1209 & n. 5. Citing Alarcon-Serrano, the court held that we must ... determine whether `reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence' supports the IJ's `reason to believe' that [petitioner] knew he was participating in illicit drug trafficking. Id. at 1211 (quoting Alarcon-Serrano, 220 F.3d at 1119) (emphasis added). Thus, in Lopez-Molina, the court imported the holding of Alarcon-Serrano into the application of the post-1999 version of § 1182(a)(2)(C). See id. This importation is consistent with the BIA's reasoning in Casillas-Topete that the amendments to the statute substituted the broad term Attorney General [or Secretary of Homeland Security] in place of the narrower term immigration officer. See 25 I. & N. Dec. at 319-20. In Alarcon-Serrano, we construed the IJ to be the immigration officer before the 1999 amendment, see 220 F.3d at 1119-20, and the IJ, an employee of the Department of Justice, fits even more comfortably with the term Attorney General. See Casillas-Topete, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 320. [5] Ultimately, the court in Lopez-Molina found the necessary reason to believe based on records of petitioner's 1990 arrest and his later guilty plea resulting in a criminal conviction, which existed at the time of his 1997 application to adjust his status. See 368 F.3d at 1208, 1211. Evidently the immigration authorities were aware of these documents at the time of the application for adjustment, as they denied the application and soon thereafter initiated removal proceedings based on the arrest and conviction. See id. at 1207. In 2005, in Lopez-Umanzor v. Gonzales, the petitioner entered the United States illegally, was placed in removal proceedings, and then applied for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2). See 405 F.3d 1049, 1050 (9th Cir.2005). To qualify for cancellation of removal, petitioner had to show at that time, among other things, that she was not inadmissible under § 1182(a)(2)(C). See id. at 1053. The government contended there was reason to believe the petitioner was a drug trafficker because she had been charged in Alaska with Misconduct Involving a Controlled Substance based on evidence of involvement with cocaine distribution. See id. at 1052. That charge, however, had been dismissed, and petitioner testified before the IJ that she was never involved in drug trafficking and that there was an innocent explanation for the circumstantial evidence of such involvement. See id. Adopting the holding of Alarcon-Serrano, our court stated that `[t]he appropriate way of measuring whether the IJ and BIA had reason to believe' that a petitioner is involved in drug trafficking is to assess `whether substantial evidence supports such a conclusion.' Id. at 1059 n. 10 (quoting Alarcon-Serrano, 220 F.3d at 1119). In Lopez-Umanzor, we held that the IJ and BIA are among those included in the collective term Attorney General [or Secretary of Homeland Security], at least where the question is whether the alien is inadmissible at the time of IJ's evidentiary hearing. See id. at 1053, 1059 n. 10. The analysis in Lopez-Umanzor reflects that approach, as it focuses on one question: who was telling the truth [at the evidentiary hearing] about Petitioner's alleged involvement in drug trafficking, Petitioner or [a detective]? See id. at 1053. This question would only be relevant if information received by the IJ at the evidentiary hearing could be considered in the reason to believe analysis. The court concluded it should be considered. See id. at 1058-59. Ultimately, it held that the IJ improperly made an adverse credibility determination regarding petitioner's testimony and remanded for a new hearing, preferably before a different IJ. See id. at 1059.
The BIA's decision in Casillas-Topete and this circuit's approach in Alarcon-Serrano and later cases lead to the following, consistent conclusions. 1. The IJ and BIA may, depending on the circumstances, be among the appropriate immigration officials included in the term Attorney General [or Secretary of Homeland Security] in § 1182(a)(2)(C). See Lopez-Molina, 368 F.3d at 1211-12; Alarcon-Serrano, 220 F.3d at 1119; Casillas-Topete, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 321. 2. The appropriate immigration officials may make a finding of reason to believe based only on information available when the admission occurred. See Casillas-Topete, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 321. Therefore, the appropriate immigration officials must collectively know the information before the alien makes lawful entry into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A); Hing Sum, 602 F.3d at 1096 (defining admission); Matter of Rosas-Ramirez, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 618-20 (same). 3. Accordingly, where the alien is apprehended at the border and, rather than being admitted, is charged with being inadmissible, information learned by the IJ during the subsequent proceedings to determine inadmissibility may be considered in deciding whether there is reason to believe the alien is involved in drug trafficking. See Alarcon-Serrano, 220 F.3d at 1119-20. [6] However, if the alien is admitted, information not known to an appropriate immigration official when the admission occurred may not later be relied upon to sustain a charge that the alien was inadmissible at the time of admission. [7] See Casillas-Topete, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 321. Applying these principles, the proper question in this case is whether substantial evidence supports the IJ and BIA having reason to believe petitioner knowingly engaged in drug trafficking based on all the evidence known to the IJ at the time of the IJ's decision. See Alarcon-Serrano, 220 F.3d at 1119-20. As in Alarcon-Serrano, and unlike in Casillas-Topete, petitioner arrived at the border and was apprehended and alleged to be inadmissible. Compare Alarcon-Serrano, 220 F.3d at 1118-19, with Casillas-Topete, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 318. In the Notice to Appear, petitioner was charged as an arriving alien. Therefore, consistent with the conclusions articulated above, the IJ, as a representative of the Attorney General, was free to receive new information at the evidentiary hearing, and to decide its credibility and weight. See Alarcon-Serrano, 220 F.3d at 1119-20. It was permissible and appropriate for the IJ and BIA to rely on such information in determining whether there was reason to believe petitioner was knowingly transporting marijuana when he attempted to cross the border into the United States. See id. Accordingly, we conclude that it was proper for the IJ to receive and consider petitioner's testimony, Agent Lehman's opinion, and other information not necessarily known, actually or constructively, to officers at the border on December 13, 2002.