Opinion ID: 757566
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Elements of a Section 504 Rehabilitation Action Claim

Text: 44 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act states, in relevant part: 45 No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service. 46 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). We have held that in order to establish a violation under this section, the plaintiff must prove: 47 (1) that he is a handicapped individual under the Act, (2) that he is otherwise qualified for the position sought, (3) that he was excluded from the position sought solely by reason of his handicap, and (4) that the program or activity in question receives federal financial assistance. 48 Strathie v. Department of Transp., 716 F.2d 227, 230 (3d Cir.1983); see also Wagner v. Fair Acres Geriatric Ctr., 49 F.3d 1002, 1009 (3d Cir.1995). As the Supreme Court has previously stated, the Rehabilitation Act does not impose an affirmative action obligation on recipients of federal assistance. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 410-14, 99 S.Ct. 2361, 60 L.Ed.2d 980 (1979). Instead, the Act is cast in negative terms and prohibits discriminatory action when an otherwise qualified individual is excluded from a position sought solely by reason of his handicap. See Jeremy H. v. Mount Lebanon Sch. Dist., 95 F.3d 272, 278 (3d Cir.1996). The parties do not dispute at this stage of the litigation that appellant has sufficiently alleged he is a handicapped individual, he is otherwise qualified, and the hospital receives federal financial assistance. 3 The only remaining issue, therefore, is whether appellant has properly alleged he was excluded from the position sought solely by reason of ... his disability. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). 49 Many courts, including our own, have opined as to the meaning of the causation requirement embodied in the phrase solely by reason of an individual's disability. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, for example, held that the solely by reason of language was designed to weed out section 504 claims where an employer can point to conduct or circumstances that are causally unrelated to the plaintiff's handicap. Teahan v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 951 F.2d 511, 515 (2d Cir.1991). We have previously stated that a plaintiff stating a claim under section 504 need not allege an intent to discriminate on the part of the employer. See W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 492 (3d Cir.1995). Where the complaint alleges intentional discriminatory conduct, a plaintiff may make a prima facie case of causation if he was denied a benefit for which he was qualified and was rejected under circumstances indicating discrimination on the basis of an impermissible factor. Smith v. Barton, 914 F.2d 1330, 1340 (9th Cir.1990) (quoting Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 766 (2d Cir.1981)); see also Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 305 (5th Cir.1981).