Opinion ID: 1199813
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: When Does Section 21092.1 Require Recirculation?

Text: The key to whether the Regents were required to recirculate the final EIR in this case is the meaning of the statutory phrase significant new information. Neither statutes nor the Guidelines define this phrase. [10] The Regents argue that the Legislature did not intend to require recirculation of a final EIR prior to certification except on the grounds found in the previously enacted standards for preparation of subsequent and supplemental EIR's after certification which were set forth in section 21166 and the guidelines implementing that statute. According to the Regents, significant new information therefore must mean new information that shows that the project will have new or more severe adverse effects on the environment not previously disclosed in the EIR. On the other hand, the Association argues that the phrase significant new information is derived directly from Sutter Sensible Planning, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors (1981) 122 Cal. App.3d 813 [176 Cal. Rptr. 342] (hereafter Sutter ). The Association further contends that the statutory language imposes a duty to recirculate whenever any new, arguably significant information or data, is added to the final EIR, regardless of whether the information reveals environmental bad news. Various amici curiae have advanced other interpretations of the phrase. For reasons explained below, our interpretation of the statutory language is generally in accord with the Regents' position. As we have often noted, our role in interpreting or construing a statute is to ascertain and effectuate the legislative intent. (E.g., City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 47, 54 [19 Cal. Rptr.2d 73, 850 P.2d 621].) When appropriate, we look to legislative history as an extrinsic aid in order to assist us in our task. ( Ibid. ) [11] The statutory language in question was enacted in 1984 as part of a larger measure amending CEQA. (Assem. Bill No. 2583 (1983-1984 Reg. Sess.) § 7, enacted as Stats. 1984, ch. 1514, § 7, p. 5340.) The bill was the result of a study for improving CEQA that was conducted by the Committee on the Environment of the State Bar of California at the request of the Assembly Committee on Natural Resources. The State Bar committee's December 1983 report suggested, among other measures, that the Legislature specify the circumstances under which a public agency is required to recirculate an environmental impact report. (The Cal. Environmental Quality Act: Recommendations for Legis. and Admin. Change, A Rep. to the Assem. on Natural Resources by the Com. on the Environment of the State Bar of Cal. (Dec. 1983) at p. 26 [hereafter State Bar Report].) To clarify this issue, the State Bar committee recommended that the Legislature codify Sutter, supra, 122 Cal. App.3d 813. (State Bar Rep., supra, at p. 28.) The committee stated that Sutter correctly summarized the law and enunciated standards that are usable in determining whether an EIR should be recirculated. ( Ibid. ) In Sutter, a county board of supervisors prepared an EIR for a tomato paste processing plant. At a public hearing the final EIR was criticized for several deficiencies and two board members expressed the opinion that the final EIR was `inadequate' and could not survive judicial review. ( Sutter, supra, 122 Cal. App.3d at p. 821.) As a result, the board directed its staff to rewrite the final EIR. The revised final EIR fundamentally reorganized the previous information and provided a substantial amount of new information, including additional details about the potential effects of the plant on the environment and substituting some new data for information which had been repudiated by its purported author. [12] The Sutter court observed that neither the statute nor the Guidelines addressed the question of what procedures should be followed when new information is added to an EIR between the close of the public comment period and certification. The Sutter court looked for guidance to the state law governing the requirements for subsequent and supplemental EIR's as found in section 21166 and its implementing regulations, and to federal cases applying the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA), which provides that supplements to environmental impact statements (the federal equivalent of EIR's) must be circulated. [13] ( Sutter, supra, 122 Cal. App.3d at pp. 821-823.) Reasoning by analogy, the Sutter court determined that recirculation for public comment would be an appropriate procedure to follow in the situation where significant new information is added to an EIR after the close of the public comment period, but prior to certification. ( Sutter, supra, 122 Cal. App.3d at pp. 818, 822-823.) The Sutter court further explained that recirculation should not be required where the new information added to the EIR merely clarifies or amplifies [citations] or makes insignificant modifications in [citation] an adequate EIR.... ( Id. at pp. 822-823.) On the other hand, where `substantial changes' in the EIR are made, recirculation is required. [Citation.] ( Id. at p. 823.) By adopting this standard, the Sutter court explicitly rejected the proposition that the addition of any new information triggers recirculation. A contrary conclusion indeed would have been at odds with the statutory scheme, which did not (and does not) generally require that a final EIR be recirculated even though that document by definition contains information not found in the draft EIR in the form of public comments and responses thereto. [14] In determining when recirculation prior to certification should be required, the Sutter court used CEQA terms with specific meanings. As previously mentioned, the Sutter court looked for guidance to section 21166 and its implementing guidelines. Section 21166 governs the analogous situation of preparation of a subsequent or supplemental EIR after a final EIR is certified. The terms significant, new information, and substantial change are all found in section 21166 or its implementing guidelines. For these reasons, we believe it is appropriate to look to these sources for guidance in interpreting section 21092.1. The reasons that public comment in the CEQA review process is initially solicited also help guide us in our interpretation of section 21092.1. The primary reason for soliciting comments from interested parties is to allow the lead agency to identify, at the earliest possible time, the potential significant adverse effects of the project and alternatives and mitigation measures that would substantially reduce these effects. (§ 21003.1, subds. (a) & (b).) (2) With these sources of guidance in mind, we conclude that the addition of new information to an EIR after the close of the public comment period is not significant unless the EIR is changed in a way that deprives the public of a meaningful opportunity to comment upon a substantial adverse environmental effect of the project or a feasible way to mitigate or avoid such an effect (including a feasible project alternative) that the project's proponents have declined to implement. (Cf. Cal. Pub. Resources Agency, Dig. of Assem. Bill No. 2583 (1983-1984 Reg. Sess.) at p. 7 [stating that Sutter and the bill recognize the importance of notifying the public of changes to an environmental document which deals with significant new information on significant effects which has not been previously reviewed by the public].) (3a) As recognized by the Sutter court, recirculation is not required where the new information added to the EIR merely clarifies or amplifies [citations] or makes insignificant modifications in [citation] an adequate EIR. ( Sutter, supra, 122 Cal. App.3d at pp. 822-823.) On the other hand, recirculation is required, for example, when the new information added to an EIR discloses: (1) a new substantial environmental impact resulting from the project or from a new mitigation measure proposed to be implemented (cf. Guidelines, § 15162, subd. (a)(1), (3)(B)(1)); (2) a substantial increase in the severity of an environmental impact unless mitigation measures are adopted that reduce the impact to a level of insignificance (cf. Guidelines, § 15162, subd. (a)(3)(B)(2)); (3) a feasible project alternative or mitigation measure that clearly would lessen the environmental impacts of the project, but which the project's proponents decline to adopt (cf. Guidelines, § 15162, subd. (a)(3)(B)(3), (4)); or (4) that the draft EIR was so fundamentally and basically inadequate and conclusory in nature that public comment on the draft was in effect meaningless ( Mountain Lion Coalition v. Fish & Game Com. (1989) 214 Cal. App.3d 1043 [263 Cal. Rptr. 104]). [15] With the addition of the fourth category of triggering information to the list, we recognize that significance for purposes of section 21092.1 cannot be defined exclusively in terms of the grounds for recirculation found in section 21166, from which the first three categories are drawn. The different circumstances governed by these statutes mandate this conclusion. (4) In the case of a certified EIR, which is a prerequisite for application of section 21166, section 21167.2 mandates that the EIR be conclusively presumed valid unless a lawsuit has been timely brought to contest the validity of the EIR. This presumption acts to preclude reopening of the CEQA process even if the initial EIR is discovered to have been fundamentally inaccurate and misleading in the description of a significant effect or the severity of its consequences. After certification, the interests of finality are favored over the policy of encouraging public comment. (3b) By way of contrast, section 21092.1 was intended to encourage meaningful public comment. (See State Bar Rep., supra, at p. 28.) Therefore, new information that demonstrates that an EIR commented upon by the public was so fundamentally and basically inadequate or conclusory in nature that public comment was in effect meaningless triggers recirculation under section 21092.1. (See, e.g., Mountain Lion Coalition v. Fish & Game Com., supra, 214 Cal. App.3d 1043.) Contrary to the arguments of the Association, the holding of Sutter is consistent with the views we express here. Although the Sutter opinion does not clearly explain the extent of the changes made between the draft EIR and the final EIR at issue in that case, it is apparent that the court and the agency viewed the draft EIR as fundamentally and basically inadequate in many respects. ( Sutter, supra, 122 Cal. App.3d at pp. 821, 823.) Furthermore, our understanding of the term significant new information is reflected explicitly or implicitly in other holdings of our lower courts. For example, in Marin Mun. Water Dist. v. KG Land California Corp. (1991) 235 Cal. App.3d 1652, 1667 [1 Cal. Rptr.2d 767], recirculation was not required when the final EIR contained a revised estimate that the subject water moratorium could last 10 years or more. The draft EIR disclosed that the duration of the proposed moratorium was indefinite and had considered the impacts of a moratorium of at least five to six years in duration. The new information merely served to clarify an environmental effect that was adequately discussed in the draft EIR. In Sierra Club v. Gilroy City Council (1990) 222 Cal. App.3d 30 [271 Cal. Rptr. 393], the presence on the project site of the potentially endangered California tiger salamander was discovered after the close of the public comment period for the draft EIR. In response to public comment, however, the lead agency delayed approval of the project and commissioned a study. A preliminary final EIR was prepared relying upon the study and was made available for public and agency comment before the project was certified. The new information, the presence of the tiger salamander, demonstrated that the draft EIR had not addressed a potentially substantial adverse environmental effect. Therefore, revision and recirculation were required and were voluntarily undertaken by the agency. Similarly, a woefully inadequate draft EIR was found to have deprived the public of its opportunity to comment upon the resumption of sport hunting of mountain lions. ( Mountain Lion Coalition v. Fish & Game Com., supra, 214 Cal. App.3d at pp. 1050-1051.) In defiance of a previously issued writ, the agency failed to address in other than conclusory fashion many areas relating to the cumulative impacts of the proposed hunting. Discovery that a project encroached upon wetlands, when the text of the draft EIR indicated that the wetlands area would remain undeveloped, was a substantial change in circumstances requiring revision and recirculation of the EIR. The failure to do so deprived the public, who relied upon the EIR's representations, of meaningful participation regarding the issue of wetlands degradation, a significant adverse effect. ( Mira Monte Homeowners Assn. v. County of Ventura (1985) 165 Cal. App.3d 357, 365 [212 Cal. Rptr. 127].) Finally, the opportunity for additional public comment was also required where an uncirculated EIR disclosed for the first time that, for mitigation purposes, a street would be extended through a ridge line resulting in a previously unidentified adverse visual impact. ( Stevens v. City of Glendale (1981) 125 Cal. App.3d 986, 998-999 [178 Cal. Rptr. 367].) (5) By codifying the significant new information language of Sutter, supra, 122 Cal. App.3d 813, the Legislature apparently intended to reaffirm the goal of meaningful public participation in the CEQA review process. (State Bar Rep., supra, at p. 28.) It is also clear, however, that by doing so the Legislature did not intend to promote endless rounds of revision and recirculation of EIR's. Recirculation was intended to be an exception, rather than the general rule. Significantly, at the time section 21092.1 was enacted, the Legislature had been and was continuing to streamline the CEQA review process. [16] Recognizing the legislative trend, we previously have cautioned: [R]ules regulating the protection of the environment must not be subverted into an instrument for the oppression and delay of social, economic, or recreational development and advancement. ( Goleta Valley II, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 576.) In our interpretation of section 21092.1, we have given consideration to both the legislative goals of furthering public participation in the CEQA process and of not unduly prolonging the process so that the process deters development and advancement.