Opinion ID: 1175474
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: Cross-examination Involving HF's Charge

Text: Appellant's three remaining claims of improper limit on cross-examination involve the victim HF. The first of these alleged errors occurred when the court prevented defense counsel from questioning HF about the length of appellant's penis at the time of the rape. The following exchange appears in the record: Q. [By defense counsel]: Now in respect to this penis, can you tell me how long it was? A. [By HF]: No. Q. Can you show me by use of your hands about  [The prosecutor]: I object to this. She states she doesn't know how long it was. THE COURT: Sustained. A bench conference was then held at which defense counsel argued that he should not be forced to accept HF's no answer as conclusive but should instead be able to test her memory by propounding the question in a different manner. The court responded: It seems to me, Counsel, that we have established the fact for purposes of going to the jury that she testified that she did observe a penis. Does it really make any difference as to what size it is, whether it is six inches or eight inches or whatever? I will allow you to ask whether or not she saw anything else in relation to the penis such as whether or not she observed his shorts, whether it was sticking out of his trousers or some such thing like this. Defense counsel proceeded to test HF's memory in the manner suggested by the court. Appellant alleges that a second error occurred when defense counsel attempted to ask HF about her brother's employment with the Lovell Police Department. On direct examination, HF had testified that she did not report her rape to anyone other than her mother. She said she did not report the incident to the police because she feared that they would not believe her. Defense counsel attempted to impeach this statement on cross-examination and the following exchange occurred: [Defense Counsel]: Do you have any relatives on the police force in Lovell? [HF] No. Q. You don't have a brother that works for the Lovell Police? A. Yes, I have a brother that is a radio operator. Q. For who? A. Fire Department and the Lovell Police. Q. How long has he been working there? The prosecutor then objected that this testimony was going beyond the scope of direct examination, and the court agreed. Defense counsel then made the following offer of proof: We would make an offer of proof that this witness would testify that [HF's brother] has been employed at the Police Department for a number of years. And contrary to her statements that the reason she didn't report it are because of fear that that is inconsistent with having, or because nobody would believe her, that that is inconsistent with having a brother that is on the force that she could have readily confided in him. And we think that that may have probative value and goes to the impeachment as to whether or not her testimony that she did not report because she didn't think anybody would believe her is not true. The court stood by its original ruling sustaining the prosecutor's objection. The court stated that it was not proper cross-examination because it went beyond the scope of direct. Appellant's third allegation of error involving HF occurred during the testimony of HF's mother, MF. On direct examination MF testified that her daughter told her of the rape on the day it occurred. Defense counsel then attempted to attack MF's testimony on cross-examination by showing that MF continued to employ appellant as her doctor after she learned of her daughter's rape. He asked her, Now, Doctor Story is also your physician; isn't he? As MF began to answer, the prosecutor objected that the question was beyond the scope of direct, and the court sustained the objection. Defense counsel then made the following offer of proof: We would make an offer of proof then to show that this witness continued to treat with Doctor Story herself including pelvic examinations up to and through the year of 1983 which is certainly inconsistent with somebody who had been informed that they had raped her daughter. We think that is probative and it is prejudicial to disallow it. The court responded: I am going to have to go along with [the prosecutor's] argument that this is outside of the scope of direct. If you wish to call this witness for your case in chief you may certainly do so. As we pointed out earlier, Rule 611(b), W.R.E., explicitly permits defense counsel to exceed the scope of direct when attacking credibility. All three of the questions to HF and MF which the district court excluded went to credibility. They should not have been excluded solely on grounds that they exceeded the scope of direct. Appellant's conviction for assault and battery with intent to rape HF should not be reversed, however, simply because the court's evidentiary rulings were unsupported by Rule 611(b). The court's basis for excluding evidence is of no importance if the evidence is inadmissible for some other reason appearing in the record. In re Estate of Carey, Wyo., 504 P.2d 793, 799 (1972). The district court excluded the inquiry into the length of appellant's penis because it was redundant and of limited probative value, not simply because it exceeded the scope of direct. While we recognize that a cross-examiner should be permitted to dislodge the witness from his initial response in some instances, we also recognize that repetitious questioning on insignificant points makes little sense. See 3 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence § 334 at 415 (1979). In this case, a guessing game between defense counsel and HF would not have impeached HF's memory any more than it was already impeached by the fact that she could not remember the length of the penis. The court acted within its discretion when it suggested that defense counsel impeach HF's memory by inquiring into other details of the rape. It is not so easy to find alternative reasons for the court's exclusion of the other two questions involving HF. HF admitted that her brother worked at the Lovell police department, but the court prevented defense counsel from asking her how long he worked there. In order to impeach HF's claim that she did not report the rape to the police because she feared they would not believe her, it was necessary for defense counsel to show when HF's brother worked at the police department. HF alleged that the rape occurred 17 years before trial and defense counsel had to show that HF's brother worked at the police department at that time. Appellant should have been permitted to establish HF's relationship with her brother, that she trusted him, confided in him, and that he helped and counselled her if that were true. This excluded cross-examination was an important part of the attack on HF's credibility. It was not repetitious or irrelevant. The court erred in excluding it. Defense counsel's attempted cross-examination of HF's mother, MF, was also relevant and important. When defense counsel began cross-examining MF, there was already some doubt as to whether HF had really reported the rape to her. HF told the prosecutor prior to trial that she had never reported the rape to anyone else. But at trial, she said that she told MF about it right after it occurred. If defense counsel could have shown that MF continued to visit Dr. Story after she allegedly learned of her daughter's rape, MF's credibility would have been sorely tested. The court obviously realized that this line of cross-examination was relevant because the court suggested that defense counsel raise the issue in its case in chief. But this procedure does not cure the court's error. Defense counsel should not be forced to call a witness back to the stand later in the case in order to attack his credibility. If a witness's misstatements are not demonstrated immediately, they can color the jury's view of the other evidence which follows. Defense counsel's eventual attack on the witness's credibility may come too late. And where the witness is recalled by defense counsel, it is not for cross-examination but in his case in chief. He may be denied cross-examination and, if allowed, may have to review again all the unfavorable testimony of the witness in order to set the stage for examination upon credibility. The examination then would surely lose effect. Finally, the witness will have had considerable time to prepare for cross-examination which defeats its purpose. It was error for the court to deny to defense counsel the opportunity to timely cross-examine MF about her continued visits to Dr. Story. Evidentiary errors can be harmless, and the burden is on the appellant to demonstrate that those errors are prejudicial. Bishop v. State, supra, 687 P.2d at 246. But before analyzing the harmfulness of the error, we must decide whether appellant's constitutional right of confrontation was also violated. If it was, the harmfulness of the error must be analyzed under much stricter standards. Although a trial court has some discretion to control cross-examination `this discretionary authority    comes into play only after there has been permitted as a matter of right sufficient cross-examination to satisfy the Sixth Amendment.' United States v. Lindstrom, 698 F.2d 1154, 1160 (11th Cir.1983), quoting Greene v. Wainwright, 634 F.2d 272 (5th Cir.1981). It is easy to find a Sixth Amendment violation when a trial court has barred all cross-examination of a witness, but in cases like this one, where extensive cross-examination was permitted, it is necessary to find the Sixth Amendment threshold. Our search for the Sixth Amendment threshold must begin with the most significant case in this area, Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1110, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974), in which the Supreme Court reversed a burglary conviction because of excessive interference with the defendant's right of cross-examination. The Court stated: Subject always to the broad discretion of a trial judge to preclude repetitive and unduly harassing interrogation, the cross-examiner is not only permitted to delve into the witness' story to test the witness' perceptions and memory, but the cross-examiner has traditionally been allowed to impeach, i.e., discredit, the witness.    A more particular attack on the witness' credibility is effected by means of cross-examination directed toward revealing possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives of the witness as they may relate directly to issues or personalities in the case at hand. The partiality of a witness is subject to exploration at trial, and is `always relevant as discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his testimony.' We have recognized that the exposure of a witness' motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination. (Citation omitted). This court's interpretation of the scope of the Davis case has not always been consistent. In Connor v. State, Wyo., 537 P.2d 715, 717 (1975), we stated in dictum that Davis only established the defendant's constitutional right to cross-examine on issues of bias and prejudice, not general credibility. [4] We reiterated this view in Salaz v. State, supra, 561 P.2d at 241. But recently, in Amin v. State, supra, 695 P.2d 1021, we seemed to recognize that the cross-examination right extends beyond bias and prejudice. We quoted the following statement with approval: `The right of cross-examination cannot be substantially restricted. It is not satisfied by `token interrogation' and includes the right to fully cross-examine the witness on any material matter which would bear on the creditability of the witness.' (Emphasis added.) Id. at 1027, quoting Valentine v. State, Miss., 396 So.2d 15 (1981). This quotation accurately reflects the Supreme Court's decision in Davis v. Alaska, supra. As interpreted in Davis, the confrontation clause guarantees a wide range of discrediting cross-examination and is not limited to attacks on bias. This is not to say that there can be no limits on cross-examination. Confrontation questions must be resolved on a case-by-case basis based on examination of all circumstances and evidence. Chipman v. Mercer, 628 F.2d 528, 530 (9th Cir.1980). The trial court can prevent harassing or repetitive questions, Davis v. Alaska, supra, 94 S.Ct. at 1110, and `some topics may be of such minimal relevance that the trial court would be justified either in totally prohibiting cross-examination about them or in allowing only limited questioning.' Chipman v. Mercer, supra, 628 F.2d at 531, quoting Skinner v. Cardwell, 564 F.2d 1381, 1389 (9th Cir.1977), cert. denied 435 U.S. 1009, 98 S.Ct. 1883, 56 L.Ed.2d 392 (1978). In this case these qualifications apply only to the restrictions on questions about the length of appellant's penis. The trial court committed constitutional error when it prevented the questions about the employment history of HF's brother, her relationship with him, and the continuing office visits by HF's mother. If cross-examination is to be the crucible which produces the truth and protects the innocent, this kind of inquiry must be guaranteed under the confrontation clause as well as the rules of evidence. Appellant's conviction for assault and battery with intent to rape HF must be reversed unless we can say that the court's erroneous evidentiary and constitutional rulings were harmless. Many state and federal courts have held that constitutional error of this type can never be harmless. Skinner v. Cardwell, 564 F.2d 1381, 1388-1389 (9th Cir.1977); 1 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence § 23 at 144 n. 55 (1977). They have based this conclusion on the following statement made by the Supreme Court in Davis v. Alaska, supra, 94 S.Ct. at 1111: Petitioner was thus denied the right of effective cross-examination which `would be constitutional error of the first magnitude and no amount of showing of want of prejudice would cure it. Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 3, 86 S.Ct. 1245, 1246, 16 L.Ed.2d 314 [1966].' Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 131, 88 S.Ct. 748, 750, 19 L.Ed.2d 956 (1968). However, other courts have employed a harmless-error analysis. E.g., Reed v. United States, D.C.App., 452 A.2d 1173, 1176-1177 (1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 839, 104 S.Ct. 132, 78 L.Ed.2d 127 (1983). The United States Supreme Court has recently held that the constitutionally improper denial of a defendant's opportunity to impeach a witness for bias, like other Confrontation Clause errors, is subject to Chapman harmless-error analysis. [ Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967).] The correct inquiry is whether, assuming that the damaging potential of the cross-examination were fully realized, a reviewing court might nonetheless say that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Whether such an error is harmless in a particular case depends upon a host of factors, all readily accessible to reviewing courts. These factors include the importance of the witness' testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution's case. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1438, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986). Appellant has raised his confrontation-clause arguments under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, so we will limit our harmless-error analysis to the rule enunciated by the Supreme Court. [5] It would be impossible for us to conclude that the trial court's restrictions on defense counsel's cross-examination of HF and MF were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. HF's accusation was not corroborated by any physical evidence or by the testimony of any witness other than MF. The jury's decision that appellant assaulted and battered HF with intent to rape her was based entirely on the testimony of HF and MF. Their credibility was crucial to the prosecution's case. Even without the excluded cross-examination, the prosecution's case against appellant for the rape of HF was not very strong. It is clear from the jury's decision that it disbelieved some of HF's testimony. HF testified that appellant penetrated her vagina with his penis, but the jury did not convict him of raping her. Instead, the jury found him guilty of the lesser-included offense of assault and battery with intent to rape. If HF and MF had been subjected to the cross-examination which was improperly excluded, there is a reasonable doubt as to whether appellant would have been convicted of even the lesser-included offense. The error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We reverse appellant's conviction, under count I of the amended information, for assault and battery with intent to rape HF.