Opinion ID: 220541
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: On appeal, Bacon renews his objection to the application of the five-level pattern of activity enhancement on the ground that the molestation of his daughters, occurring more than thirty years earlier, is too remote in time to be considered. We review a district court's application of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo. See United States v. Torres, 601 F.3d 303, 305 (5th Cir.2010). The commentary to U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(5) defines pattern of activity involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor as: any combination of two or more separate instances of the sexual abuse or sexual exploitation of a minor by the defendant, whether or not the abuse or exploitation (A) occurred during the course of the offense; (B) involved the same minor; or (C) resulted in a conviction for such conduct. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2 cmt. n. 1 (2008). Although it is an issue of first impression in this circuit, six other circuits have held that a sentencing court can consider remote-in-time occurrences to establish a pattern of activity under § 2G2.2. See United States v. Turner, 626 F.3d 566, 572-73 (11th Cir.2010) (applying the enhancement where the abusive incidents occurred 20 years prior to sentencing); United States v. Olfano, 503 F.3d 240, 243 (3d Cir.2007) (considering convictions from 16 and 13 years earlier); United States v. Garner, 490 F.3d 739, 742-43 (9th Cir.2007) (involving activity occurring at least 35 years earlier); United States v. Gawthrop, 310 F.3d 405, 414 (6th Cir.2002) (considering an 11-year-old conviction); United States v. Woodward, 277 F.3d 87, 90-92 (1st Cir.2002) (relying on convictions from 22 and 27 years earlier); United States v. Lovaas, 241 F.3d 900, 903-04 (7th Cir.2001) (involving abuse from 26 years earlier). A district court may consider all relevant conduct when fashioning a sentence. See United States v. Fowler, 216 F.3d 459, 461 (5th Cir.2000). Bacon argues that remote-in-time conduct that is not part of the offense of conviction cannot be relevant conduct. However, the term relevant conduct is defined in several ways by the Guidelines. As other circuits have noted, the plain language of § 2G2.2(b)(5) and its commentary do not require that the pattern of activity must be close in time or related to the offense of conviction. See, e.g., Turner, 626 F.3d at 573 (Nothing in § 2G2.2(b)(5) or its commentary suggests that the `pattern of activity' must be temporally close to the offense of conviction.); Garner, 490 F.3d at 743 (The plain language of the Commentary to § 2G2.2 eliminates the need for any temporal or factual nexus between the offense of conviction and any prior act of sexual abuse or exploitation.). Rather, the Guidelines commentary specifies that a sentencing court may consider conduct not occurring during the course of the offense of conviction. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2 cmt. n. 1. Thus, relevant conduct under § 2G2.2 is intended to be more broadly construed than the general relevancy provisions found in § 1B1.3. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app C. at 473 (2008) (Amendment 537) ([T]he conduct considered for purposes of the `pattern of activity' enhancement is broader than the scope of relevant conduct typically considered under § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct).); see also Lovaas, 241 F.3d at 904 & n. 5. [1] All that is necessary under the plain language of § 2G2.2(b)(5) and its commentary are two or more separate instances of sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor. See Turner, 626 F.3d at 573; Garner, 490 F.3d at 743. Bacon's admitted molestation of two of his daughters is therefore sufficient for the application of the pattern of activity enhancement, regardless of when it occurred or whether it is related to his possession of child pornography. Bacon argues that due process and the rule of lenity counsel against an interpretation of the Guidelines that considers conduct occurring thirty years earlier. Because we find that the plain language of the relevant guideline is not ambiguous, the rule of lenity does not apply. See United States v. Hubbard, 480 F.3d 341, 350 (5th Cir.2007) (As considered above, the statute is not ambiguous in this regard, and the rule of lenity is not implicated.). Similarly, consideration of remote-in-time conduct does not violate due process. A guideline violates due process only if it has no rational basis or is subject to arbitrary application. See United States v. Molina, 469 F.3d 408, 413-14 (5th Cir. 2006); see also Garner, 490 F.3d at 743 ([The defendant] does not explain how the use of older but admittedly relevant conduct is `arbitrary' or `irrational.'). This court has frequently noted the increased risk of recidivism associated with the sexual abuse and exploitation of children. See, e.g., United States v. Brigham, 569 F.3d 220, 234 (5th Cir.2009) (upholding the district court's special conditions of supervised release because of the reprehensibility of child pornography, the harm to society's children that results therefrom, and the undisputed likelihood of recidivism); United States v. Allison, 447 F.3d 402, 407 (5th Cir.2006) (upholding upward departure of lifetime supervised release because of the general notion that pedophiles are typically recidivists). Therefore, the consideration of even remote-in-time conduct is not irrational in applying the pattern of activity enhancement. [2] We join our six sister circuits who have held that remote-in-time conduct is relevant to § 2G2.2's pattern of activity enhancement. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.