Opinion ID: 6104581
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Probable cause to search the car

Text: ¶31 Thompson argues the search was conducted without probable cause. Warrantless searches are generally unconstitutional, subject to a few exceptions. See Cheatham, 240 Ariz. at 2 ¶ 7. “One such exception allows the warrantless search of an automobile, including containers within, provided an officer has probable cause to believe contraband or evidence will be found.” Id. Probable cause exists if the facts available to the officer would “‘warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief’ that contraband or evidence of a crime is present.” Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 243 (2013) (quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983)); see also id. at 244 (“All we have required is the kind of ‘fair 9 STATE V. THOMPSON Opinion of the Court probability’ on which ‘reasonable and prudent [people], not legal technicians, act.’” (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 235 (1983))). In evaluating whether probable cause exists, we consider the totality of the circumstances. See id. at 244. ¶32 The trial court found probable cause based on Leo alerting to the car. It found that Thompson had consented to the dog-sniff search and, alternatively, that Bratz had reasonable suspicion to walk Leo around the car. See State v. Driscoll, 238 Ariz. 432, 434 ¶ 8 (App. 2015) (acknowledging that officers “may not ‘extend an otherwise-completed traffic stop, absent reasonable suspicion, in order to conduct a dog sniff’” (quoting Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 353 (2015))). ¶33 Thompson argues the trial court erred by “sid[ing] with the pretextual fantasy of probable cause based on the alleged valid alert by the drug-detection dog.” Specifically, Thompson challenges the court’s finding that he consented to Bratz walking Leo around the car. He asserts Bratz was “an aggressive trooper looking for a reason to stop and search” and maintains it was “unlikely” Thompson consented to the dog-sniff search after initially refusing to get out of the car and later refusing the request to search the car’s interior. Thompson also casts suspicion on Bratz’s version of events by pointing out that the dash camera’s audio was not working that day, and that Bratz had already requested back up to help search the car before conducting the dog-sniff search. ¶34 We reject Thompson’s argument. Bratz’s version of events was uncontested at the suppression hearing, and the court found Bratz “very credible in his testimony.” Also, Thompson’s consent is not farfetched, as he contends. Thompson did not, in fact, possess illegal drugs, so he had no reason to believe Leo would alert to the car. He therefore may have consented to avoid suspicion. The court acted within its discretion by finding that Thompson consented to Leo’s search. See State v. Fritz, 157 Ariz. 139, 141 (App. 1988) (“The trial court is the sole arbitrator of the credibility of witnesses.”). ¶35 Thompson next argues the trial court erred by finding that Leo’s alert provided probable cause for the search. He claims that the fact no drugs were found in the car, together with doubt about the accuracy of Leo’s alert, suggests Bratz staged the alert as a pretext for searching the car. As support for this argument, Thompson points to testimony from his expert witness, professional dog trainer Steven Nicely. Nicely testified that based on his review of Leo’s training records, Leo was not adequately 10 STATE V. THOMPSON Opinion of the Court trained. Nicely also testified that Bratz’s increase in heartrate and breathing “cued” Leo to alert to Thompson’s car. Nicely admitted this “cue” was not detectable on the traffic-stop video. ¶36 The State presented two rebuttal witnesses, Edward Nicks, a certified trainer from a company that selects, trains, and provides drugdetector dogs to Arizona law enforcement agencies, and Brian Greene, the officer who originally completed basic narcotics detection school with Leo and helped Bratz learn to handle him. Nicks testified he had reviewed the training records and found the Bratz-Leo team to be appropriately trained. Based on his review of the traffic-stop video, Nicks also opined the stop was consistent with the team’s training and that Leo was not cued. Greene concurred, testifying that Bratz performed an appropriate inspection during the stop and did not cue Leo. He characterized Bratz and Leo as a highly reliable team. ¶37 The trial court did not err by discarding Nicely’s opinions and finding that Leo had properly alerted to the car. See Fritz, 157 Ariz. at 141. Nicely acknowledged he had not worked as a police officer since the 1990s, had not trained police dogs since 2006, had only ever testified on behalf of defendants, and had testified that the dogs involved had been cued “the high majority of the time.” Conversely, Bratz and Greene had worked directly with Leo and were familiar with his training, and Nicks was a certified trainer familiar with Arizona drug-detector dogs. The training records showed that Bratz and Leo had a 99.6% reliability rate based on criteria used by the state. And significantly, the traffic-stop video did not show that Leo had been cued. ¶38 Thompson relatedly argues the trial court violated his substantive due process rights by finding probable cause considering Bratz’s intent to search the car, Thompson’s unlikely consent to the dogsniff search, and Leo’s unreliable alert. But Thompson offers nothing in addition to his previously made arguments challenging the probable cause finding. The trial court acted within its discretion and not arbitrarily in crediting the State’s witnesses over the defense’s witnesses and finding probable cause. ¶39 Thompson finally argues the trial court violated Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 by sustaining the State’s foundation objections during defense counsel’s direct examination of Nicely. After Nicely testified that dogs pick up odor on the downwind side of a vehicle, defense counsel twice asked where Leo should have alerted based on the wind conditions on the 11 STATE V. THOMPSON Opinion of the Court day of the stop if drugs had been in Thompson’s car. The court sustained the State’s foundation objection, reasoning that because Nicely was not present at the stop and “[w]e do not have any conclusion about wind direction, wind speed, et cetera,” Nicely’s opinion would lack foundation. ¶40 The court did not abuse its discretion by sustaining the foundation objection. See Ritchie v. Krasner, 221 Ariz. 288, 302 ¶ 45 (App. 2009) (applying abuse of discretion standard for trial court’s exclusion of evidence based on lack of foundation). Experts may base opinions on facts in evidence. See Ariz. R. Evid. 703; Lynn v. Helitec Corp., 144 Ariz. 564, 568 (App. 1984). Earlier in the suppression hearing, Bratz testified the wind was blowing from the southwest at the time of the stop (moving from the right rear of the car toward the left front), as recorded in his report of the stop. But he also testified there were “sporadic gusts of wind” and that passing semi-trucks made odors go in “all sorts of different directions.” Nothing in the record addressed the wind conditions at the precise time Leo alerted to the car. Nicely therefore lacked foundation to opine on where Leo should have alerted had drugs been inside the car.