Opinion ID: 572159
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Use of Excessive Force and Battery

Text: 13 Miller contends the district court erred in dismissing his § 1983 claim for use of excessive force and his claim for battery. Because the court improperly reviewed matters outside of plaintiff's complaint when deciding to grant defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, we must determine whether that error was harmless. The error is harmless if the allegations of Miller's amended complaint on their face are insufficient to state a claim under § 1983. 14 The use of excessive force by jail officials violates a prisoner's rights under the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause when the prisoner is subjected to an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1084, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2925, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976). This standard should be applied with due regard for the differences in the kind of conduct against which an Eighth Amendment objection is lodged. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320, 106 S.Ct. at 1084. 15 Where (as in Whitley ) officials act in response to a prison disturbance, their actions are necessarily taken in haste, under pressure, and balanced against competing institutional concerns for the safety of prison staff or other inmates. In such an emergency situation, ... wantonness consist[s] of acting maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm. 16 Wilson v. Seiter, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 2326, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991) (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21, 106 S.Ct. at 1084-85). In contrast, in non-emergency situations or when the State's responsibility to the prisoner does ... not clash with other equally important governmental responsibilities, Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320, 106 S.Ct. at 1084, the Court has held that deliberate indifference is the appropriate Eighth Amendment standard. See Wilson, 111 S.Ct. at 2326; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105, 97 S.Ct. 285, 291, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). We must examine Miller's allegations in light of this need to adjust the Eighth Amendment standard to the context of the prison officials' conduct. 17 Miller first alleges that Officer Ramsey used excessive force in apprehending him and moving him to a holding cell. In his amended complaint, Miller concedes that he resisted Ramsey's instructions to place his hands behind his back; Miller also states that he wrestled with Ramsey. Given Miller's resistance, we conclude that this situation involved the type of emergency situation contemplated in Whitley, and we hold that Miller's allegations are insufficient to support a conclusion that Ramsey acted maliciously and sadistically with the very purpose of causing harm. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21, 106 S.Ct. at 1084-85. 18 Miller next alleges that he again was subjected to the use of excessive force after being placed in the holding cell, this time by three officers acting together. From Miller's amended complaint, we are unable to determine whether, at this point, Miller continued to pose a legitimate threat to the safety of the officers and other prisoners. Therefore, we cannot determine whether to apply the deliberate indifference standard or to apply the standard from Whitley. 19 However, we conclude that Miller's amended complaint, taken as true, sufficiently states a claim under either standard. In his amended complaint, Miller alleges that Deputy Sheriffs Lance Ramsey, Bob Bates, and Jerry Bagby kicked, choked, beat and stomped me, and almost choking [sic] me to the point of death. He also alleges that Ramsey jumped on top of me and commenced beating me and that the officers hit and kicked him in the sides, back of head, and stomach. Elsewhere in the complaint, Miller alleges that he was badly injured, could barely breathe, suffered numerous bruises, and excreted blood caused by internal injuries. These allegations are sufficient to state a claim even under the Whitley standard that the defendant officers acted maliciously and sadistically with the very purpose of causing harm. On remand, in order to decide which standard should apply to further proceedings, the district court must make a factual determination as to whether Miller posed an emergency-type threat when the defendant officers entered the holding cell to subdue him. 20 After reviewing the record of the state court criminal trial, the district court broadly applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel to dismiss Miller's claims for use of excessive force and battery. As mentioned above, the district court's review of that record on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion was premature. In any event, the transcript of the state court trial suggests that the altercation for which Miller was convicted of battery occurred before Miller was locked in the holding cell. It is necessary to view Miller's allegations as two separate excessive force claims--one before Officer Ramsey placed Miller in the holding cell and the other later, when the other officers arrived. When considering the state court record on remand, the district court should make a separate determination of the collateral estoppel effect of Miller's conviction on the second of these two alleged incidents of use of excessive force. See Ridley v. Leavitt, 631 F.2d 358, 359-60 (4th Cir.1980); Williams v. Liberty, 461 F.2d 325, 327-28 (7th Cir.1972); Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 81-82 (3d Cir.1965). 21 With regard to plaintiff's state law claim for battery, we note that a federal court may exercise jurisdiction over a state law claim when a related federal claim is of sufficient substance to support federal jurisdiction. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1138, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966); Plott v. Griffiths, 938 F.2d 164, 166-67 (10th Cir.1991). 4 The district court dismissed the possibility of pendent state law claims because it held that none of plaintiff's federal claims were substantial. Because we hold that plaintiff's amended complaint states a federal claim under § 1983, we remand for a determination whether to exercise jurisdiction over the pendent claim. 22 Miller also alleges that Sheriff Stanley Glanz, Captain Dan Cherry, Director Don C. Holyfield of Oklahoma's Council on Law Enforcement Education and Training (CLEET), and Commissioner Clent Dedek are responsible for his injuries because they implemented policies and procedures that caused the deputy sheriffs to act unlawfully and because they failed to properly train and certify those deputy sheriffs. In addition, it appears that Johnny F. Dirck has been added as a party defendant due to his current status as Director of CLEET. 5 The district court dismissed claims against these defendants after deciding to dismiss all underlying claims against the deputy sheriffs. Because we remand for the district court's consideration of plaintiff's excessive force claim, we also reinstate plaintiff's claims against defendants Glantz, Cherry, Holyfield and Dirck for consideration on remand. 23 The district court dismissed all claims against Commissioner Dedek because he was improperly named as a party to the suit and has no affiliation with the Tulsa County Sheriff's Office, its deputies, its employees, or its jail. Miller did not argue on appeal that this dismissal was incorrect and, therefore, the district court's order is final as to that point. 24