Opinion ID: 3017046
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Challenges to Jacobs’ Conviction for the

Text: Murder of Holly Jacobs Based on Pennsylvania’s Corpus Delicti Rule Jacobs’ next claim is based on Pennsylvania’s corpus delicti rule and its application to his mother’s pretrial statements that he admitted in telephone conversations that he killed his baby Holly. Jacobs alleges that the trial court violated his federal right to due process by failing to instruct the jury in accordance with state law on the Commonwealth’s burden of proof to establish the corpus delicti of Holly’s murder before considering his out-of-court admissions. He also alleges that counsel rendered ineffective assistance in violation of the Sixth Amendment by failing to object to the corpus delicti jury instruction. He further asserts that the evidence apart from his out-of-court admissions is insufficient to establish the corpus delicti. According to Pennsylvania’s corpus delicti rule,12 before introducing a criminal defendant’s out-of-court admission, “the Commonwealth must establish by independent evidence that a crime has in fact been committed.” Commonwealth v. Reyes, 12 Translated literally, corpus delicti means “the body of a crime.” Black’s Law Dictionary 344 (6th ed. 1990). 30 681 A.2d 724, 727 (Pa. 1996). A defendant’s confession “is not evidence in the absence of proof of the corpus delicti.” Commonwealth v. Taylor, 831 A.2d 587, 590 (Pa. 2002) (internal quotations omitted). In a murder prosecution, the corpus delicti consists of evidence that an individual is dead and that the death resulted from criminal means. Commonwealth v. Tallon, 387 A.2d 77, 80 (Pa. 1978). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has described the application of the rule as a “two-tiered approach” having a “dual level of proof.” Reyes, 681 A.2d at 728. The first tier pertains solely to the admissibility of the defendant’s out-of-court confession. Id. at 727. At this stage, the trial court must determine whether the Commonwealth has established by a preponderance of the evidence (apart from the confession) that a crime has in fact been committed.13 Id. at 727-28. Once the trial court admits the confession, the jury may not consider the confession unless the Commonwealth proves the corpus delicti beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 728; Tallon, 387 A.2d at 81. Because Jacobs’ claim actually consists of three related but separate claims, he must show that he exhausted each of 13 Jacobs makes clear that he does not challenge the admissibility of his out-of-court statements to his mother. (Reply Br. at 10-11). 31 them.14 In his PCRA petitions,15 Jacobs does not mention the corpus delicti rule at all. In his brief on PCRA appeal, however, Jacobs argues that the trial court misapplied the corpus delicti rule and wrongly admitted his out-of-court statements, that the trial court failed to instruct the jury properly on the corpus delicti rule, and that all previous counsel were ineffective for failing to object to the trial court’s actions and failing to pursue the matter on direct appeal or in PCRA proceedings. Apparently, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court overlooked Jacobs’ challenge based on the trial court’s corpus delicti instruction. Plainly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed the merits of Jacobs’ assertion that “trial counsel and PCRA counsel were ineffective in not raising the trial court’s failure to 14 Unfortunately, the Commonwealth does not address fully whether these claims are properly exhausted. The Commonwealth reads these claims in part as challenging the trial court’s admission of Jacobs’ statements to his mother, and asserts that it is not cognizable as an issue of state law. (Appellees’ Br. at 28-29). The Commonwealth also reads these claims as challenging counsel’s failure to object to the admission of the evidence, and argues that it is exhausted but without merit because Jacobs’ statements were properly admitted. It appears that the Commonwealth concedes that Jacobs exhausted his challenge to the jury instruction on the corpus delicti rule. 15 Jacobs filed a pro se PCRA petition, which counsel subsequently supplemented. 32 apply the corpus delicti rule regarding the death of Holly Jacobs.” Jacobs II, 727 A.2d at 552. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court also addressed whether “the trial court erred in permitting into evidence the statements of [Jacobs’] mother relating to [his] confessed killing of Holly Jacobs where there was no independent evidence to establish that Holly Jacobs died as a result of anything other than an accident.” Id. Nowhere in its opinion does the Pennsylvania Supreme Court specifically mention the trial court’s instruction to the jury regarding corpus delicti or counsel’s failure to object to it. Significantly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court specifically found certain claims waived for failure to present them to the PCRA court – Jacobs’ challenge to the jury instructions on corpus delicti is not mentioned in the list of waived claims. Id. at 550 & n.9. In other words, although Jacobs presented his jury instruction challenge, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court neither addressed it nor found it waived. We can only conclude that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court overlooked this aspect of Jacobs’ corpus delicti claim. We must also conclude that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would not have deemed this claim waived – that court considered on the merits several other claims in precisely the same posture.16 Because no state court has issued a decision on 16 Alternatively, for reasons discussed infra in section III.D, Pennsylvania’s application of its waiver rule in capital cases on PCRA appeal is not an adequate state procedural rule for purposes of determining whether this claim is procedurally 33 Jacobs’ due process challenge to the jury instructions, the deferential standards of review of § 2254(d)(1) do not apply. See Everett, 290 F.3d at 508. Rather, we review this claim de novo. See Appel, 250 F.3d at 210. Even so, for the following reasons, the District Court correctly concluded that these claims do not warrant granting federal habeas relief.
Under Pennsylvania law, the jury cannot consider a defendant’s out-of-court admission unless the jury first finds that the Commonwealth established the corpus delicti beyond a reasonable doubt. See Reyes, 681 A.2d at 728. The federal Due Process Clause in turn protects a criminal defendant against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). The Due Process Clause also requires that the jury be instructed on the necessity of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 100, 104 (1972). On federal habeas review, the relevant question is “whether the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violated due process . . . , not merely whether the instruction is undesirable, erroneous, or even universally condemned.” Martin v. Warden, Huntingdon State Correctional Inst., 653 F.2d 799, 809 (3d Cir. 1981) (alteration in original) (quoting Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977) and Cupp v. Naughton, 414 U.S. 141, 14647 (1973)). “‘[A] single instruction to the jury may not be barred under federal habeas law. 34 judged in artificial isolation but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge.’” Martin, 653 F.2d at 809-10 (quoting Cupp, 414 U.S. at 146-47). Here, Jacobs contends that the trial court violated his right to federal due process by failing to instruct the jury that it must find the corpus delicti beyond a reasonable doubt before considering his out-of-court confessions, as required by state law. A review of the instruction as it pertains specifically to Jacobs’ confessions reflects that the charge was not perfect. The trial court spent four transcript pages of the 44-page charge discussing “special rules” that apply when considering a defendant’s confession: In this case, the Commonwealth is presenting the testimony of the Defendant’s mother in the belief that it is a confession, an admission, by him that he committed these crimes, and there are special rules that apply to confessions. The Commonwealth has introduced evidence of a statement which it claims was made by the Defendant. Before you consider the statement as evidence against the Defendant you must find, first, that a crime in fact was committed; second, that the Defendant in fact made the statement; and third, that the statement was voluntary. Otherwise, you must disregard the statement. 35 Each juror should ultimately decide these questions for himself and thereby individually accept or reject the Defendant’s statement as evidence. You must not allow the fact that I admitted the statement into evidence to influence you in any way during your deliberations. . . . Now to get back to confessions. There does not appear to be a great deal of dispute that a crime was in fact committed, at least in regard to the death of Tammy Mock. Now that doesn’t – my saying that doesn’t make it a fact. Nothing is a fact in the case until you as jurors determine it to be a fact, but in the arguments of counsel, that was what I understood defense counsel to indicate. That’s the only reason I’m saying that. But that’s something for you to determine when you get out to the jury room. . . . So it appeared to the Court that the specific issue that you would have to focus on in this particular area is that the Defendant in fact made the statement. And in that regard, what you want to focus on in particular is was [sic] his actual words as he spoke them repeated to you. In other words, did he say that exact thing? And, of course, there’s been some varied testimony in regard to that. You’ve heard the statement from the witness on the stand, the mother. You’ve heard statements that she made on earlier occasions and her reasons as to why there is a distinction between the two, and you’ve also heard the Defendant say what his version of his statement or conversation was to his mother. 36 So you’re going to have to work out if it’s been proven to you beyond a reasonable doubt what his exact words were, and if you’re satisfied as to what the exact words were, then you may consider that along with finding that a crime has been committed and that the statement was voluntary. (Trial Tr., Vol. V, 9/18/92 at 786:20-789:20). Jacobs argues that the trial court’s charge is constitutionally infirm because it omitted any reference to the Commonwealth’s burden of proving the corpus delicti beyond a reasonable doubt, failed to distinguish between the deaths of Tammy and Holly, and “all but directed a verdict on the corpus delicti issue.” (Appellant’s Opening Br. at 40-41). While Jacobs’ criticisms of this portion of the charge are not entirely unfounded, it is apparent that he has neglected to examine the charge as a whole – rather, he has isolated the portion of the charge as it relates specifically to confessions and essentially excluded consideration of the remaining forty pages of the charge. In the charge, the trial judge referred numerous times to the Commonwealth’s burden to prove each and every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Never did the trial court suggest any other burden of proof or that Jacobs bore any burden whatsoever. Based on the charge as a whole, we find it extremely unlikely that the jury perceived that the Commonwealth’s burden was ever less than beyond a reasonable doubt. Additionally, the trial judge specifically instructed the jury that the murder of Tammy and the murder of 37 Holly required individual findings: And as always, there’s [sic] going to be two separate findings, first that Tammy Mock is dead and second that Holly Jacobs is dead, and I won’t repeat that each time. Please assume that applies to everything I’m going to say. You’ll have two separate findings for each one. (Id. at 804:7-804:12). To the extent that Jacobs argues that the trial court “all but directed a verdict,” this contention also lacks support based on an examination of the charge as a whole. In its general instructions, the trial court charged the jury: Now, how do you make that decision? Well, in effect you, collectively, are the judge of the facts. In effect, there’s [sic] two judges in the case. I’m the judge for the law and you must follow the law as I am now going to give it to you, but you are the judges of the facts and it’s totally up to you to determine exactly what happened and what’s been proved by the Commonwealth and whether it meets their burden and the verdict that flows from that after you apply the law to the facts as you find them. (Id. at 779:11-779:21). Moreover, the trial court specifically reminded the jury of its duty to determine the facts regarding Jacobs’ confession: “Each juror should ultimately decide these questions for himself and thereby individually accept or reject the Defendant’s 38 statement as evidence. You must not allow the fact that I admitted the statement into evidence to influence you in any way during deliberations.” (Id. at 787:9-787:14). The judge further noted that there did “not appear to be a great deal of dispute that a crime was in fact committed, at least in regard to the death of Tammy Mock . . . [but] my saying that doesn’t make it a fact. Nothing is a fact in the case until you as jurors determine it to be a fact.” (Id. at 788:7-788:12) (emphasis added). Contrary to Jacobs’ assertions, the trial court did distinguish the death of Tammy from that of Holly, and did not express an opinion whether a crime had been committed as to Holly. Notwithstanding the adequacy of the instructions as a whole, Jacobs relies on Commonwealth v. Ahlborn, 657 A.2d 518 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995), for the proposition that Pennsylvania law requires the trial court to specifically charge the jury to find the corpus delicti beyond a reasonable doubt. In Ahlborn, the trial court charged the jury that prior to considering the confession, it must find that a crime had, in fact, occurred. Id. at 521-22. According to the Superior Court, such an instruction failed to convey the reasonable doubt standard and essentially diluted the Commonwealth’s burden of proof. Id. at 522. According to Jacobs, the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury in compliance with Ahlborn violated his federal right to due process. Ahlborn supports the conclusion that the trial court must, as a matter of state law, specifically charge the jury to find the corpus delicti beyond a reasonable doubt, even if the trial court has correctly instructed the jury as to the Commonwealth’s overall burden. Nothing in Ahlborn suggests, however, that the 39 trial court’s instruction violated the federal Due Process Clause. Ahlborn examines only a single paragraph in the instruction regarding the defendant’s confession without considering the overall instructions. Id. at 520-22. Such an analysis does not comport with the well-established principle of federal law that a single instruction must be viewed in light of the overall charge. See Cupp, 414 U.S. at 146-47. Therefore, Ahlborn does not and should not govern whether the trial court’s corpus delicti instruction violated Jacobs’ constitutional right to due process.17 The District Court properly rejected this claim on the merits.
Failure to Object to Jury Instructions Jacobs’ related claim is that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object specifically to the corpus delicti instruction. To the extent that this claim is based on counsel’s failure to object as a matter of federal law, this claim is without merit. For the reasons set forth previously, Jacobs cannot show a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different if counsel had 17 We note also that Ahlborn was a direct appeal of a criminal conviction. The burden of demonstrating that an erroneous instruction was so prejudicial as to support a federal collateral attack on a state court judgment is greater than that required to establish error on direct appeal. See Martin, 653 F.2d at 809. 40 objected based on the federal Due Process Clause. Whether counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the corpus delicti charge under state law is a separate question. As described previously, Ahlborn suggests that the trial court must specifically charge that the Commonwealth must prove the corpus delicti beyond a reasonable doubt before the jury can consider an out-of-court admission. Significantly, the corpus delicti instruction at issue in Ahlborn is similar to the one given at Jacobs’ trial; the trial court in each case instructed the jury that it had to find “that a crime in fact” was committed. Ahlborn holds that such an instruction essentially dilutes the Commonwealth’s burden of proof. We cannot end our inquiry here, however, because both the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and the District Court ruled that the Commonwealth was not required to prove the corpus delicti of Holly’s murder under the closely related exception to the corpus delicti rule. As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained: This exception comes into play where an accused is charged with more than one crime, and the accused makes a statement related to all the crimes charged, but the prosecution is only able to establish the corpus delicti of one of the crimes charged. Under those circumstances where the relationship between the crimes is sufficiently close so that the introduction of the statement will not violate the purpose underlying the corpus delicti rule, the statement of the accused will be admissible as to all the 41 crimes charged. Commonwealth v. Bardo, 709 A.2d 871, 874 (Pa. 1998). We agree that the closely related exception applies here. There is no question that the Commonwealth established the corpus delicti of Tammy Mock’s murder. Jacobs himself testified in court that he killed Tammy Mock when he lost control upon discovering that she had drowned Holly. The police found the bodies of both Tammy and Holly in the bathtub several days later. Because the closely related exception applies, the trial court was not required to instruct the jury that it must find the corpus delicti of Holly’s murder beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. Jacobs counters that the closely related exception applies only to the admissibility tier of the corpus delicti rule. (Appellant’s Opening Br. at 44 n.24). According to Jacobs, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has never applied the closely related exception to the second tier of the rule. (Id.). This is incorrect. In Bardo, for example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court expressly considered whether “the trial court erred in its instruction to the jury on the corpus delicti rule.” 709 A.2d at 875. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court relied squarely on the closely related exception to conclude that the claim was “meritless.” Id. It follows that Jacobs’ claim of ineffective assistance based on counsel’s failure to raise a state law objection to the corpus delicti instruction must fail. If counsel had raised such an objection, there is no reasonable likelihood that the outcome 42 of the proceedings would have been any different. Likewise, if appellate counsel had raised this argument on direct appeal, it is unlikely that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would have vacated Jacobs’ conviction for Holly’s murder.
Delicti Jacobs’ final claim based on the corpus delicti rule is that the evidence of Holly’s murder (apart from his out-of-court admission) is insufficient to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the baby was killed by unlawful means. Jacobs asserts that Holly died from drowning under circumstances equally consistent with an accident as with a crime. (Appellant’s Opening Br. at 48). From this, Jacobs concludes that the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a crime had been committed. The short answer to this argument is that the Commonwealth was not required to prove the corpus delicti of Holly’s murder because the closely related exception applies. Even if it did not apply, this argument lacks merit. The circumstances of Holly’s death are not equally consistent with an accident as with a crime. Indeed, Jacobs testified that Tammy killed Holly to get back at him, and that he killed Tammy when he lost control at finding his baby dead. No persuasive evidence was presented at trial to establish that 43 Holly’s death was anything but a homicide.18 For these reasons, we agree with the District Court that Jacobs’ claims based on the corpus delicti rule do not warrant federal habeas relief. C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel for Failing to Investigate and Present Evidence of Delois Jacobs’ Alcoholism At a preliminary hearing, Delois Jacobs testified that her son had admitted to her in telephone conversations that he killed both Tammy and Holly. At trial, however, Delois testified that she had been going through some problems and was very upset when Jacobs called her, and that she could not remember whether he admitted killing Holly. (Trial Tr., Vol. III, 9/16/92 at 543:20-545:3, 549:2-551:12). Jacobs now claims that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to investigate and present evidence that Delois had a long history of alcoholism and may have been intoxicated when Jacobs made out-of-court admissions to her.19 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected this claim on the merits because: (1) there was no evidence that Delois was 18 Common sense suggests that an infant of Holly’s age did not climb into the bathtub on her own and drown accidentally. 19 Jacobs exhausted this claim by presenting it in his PCRA petition and on PCRA appeal. 44 intoxicated at the time Jacobs confessed to her; and (2) trial counsel testified at the PCRA hearing that he did not want to undermine the credibility of Delois’ trial testimony by crossexamining her regarding her alcoholism. Jacobs II, 727 A.2d at 549. According to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, counsel had a reasonable basis for proceeding as he did and thus was not ineffective. Id. The District Court likewise rejected this claim on the merits after concluding that counsel’s actions constituted sound trial strategy. Jacobs III, 129 F. Supp. 2d at 414. We agree that this claim lacks merit. Jacobs’ assertion is, at best, that his mother may have been under the influence of alcohol at the time he confessed to her. We find no evidence establishing that Delois was intoxicated or that intoxication caused her to misrepresent the content of her conversations with Jacobs. Counsel testified at the PCRA hearing that he had spoken to Delois a couple of times before trial, and that she had never mentioned the possibility of intoxication. (PCRA Hearing Tr. 5/29/97 at 39:21-39:25). At the PCRA hearing, Delois testified that she did not remember whether she had been drinking alcohol the day Jacobs confessed to her. (PCRA Hearing Tr. 6/13/97 at 16:14-16:24). In other words, Jacobs has little factual support for his assertion of ineffective assistance in this regard. Additionally, Jacobs has failed to address how he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to discover Delois’ alcoholism and potential intoxication. He does not explain how he can demonstrate a reasonable probability that he would have been acquitted of murdering Holly if counsel had attacked Delois’ credibility. Delois’ testimony at trial plainly favored Jacobs – if 45 counsel had attacked Delois’ credibility with evidence of alcoholism, the jury could well have discounted her entire testimony, including that portion of her testimony which was favorable to Jacobs. In short, Jacobs has fallen short of demonstrating that he is entitled to federal habeas relief as to this claim. The District Court properly rejected this claim on the merits. D. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel for Failing to Request Voir Dire Concerning Racial Bias Jacobs is African-American; Tammy Mock was white. Each member of the venire panel was white. During voir dire, trial counsel did not question any prospective juror concerning racial bias. Jacobs claims that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance during voir dire for failing to inquire about racial bias, especially where a young African-American man was on trial for murdering his white girlfriend. The District Court declined to consider this claim. According to the District Court, this claim challenged counsel’s representation at the penalty phase, not at the guilt phase. The District Court believed that it need not address the merits of this issue because the death sentence had been vacated on other grounds. Jacobs III, 129 F. Supp. 2d at 409-10. After reviewing Jacobs’ habeas petition and his reply memorandum in support filed in the District Court, we disagree 46 that this claim challenges only counsel’s representation at the penalty phase. This claim challenges counsel’s failure “to inquire concerning racial bias among the members of the jury, where the entire venire was white and the case involved the murder of a white female teenager and child by her AfricanAmerican boyfriend.” (Pet. at 26). In his reply memorandum, Jacobs alleges that “counsel ineffectively failed to inquire concerning racial bias among members of the jury.” (Reply Mem. at 47). The discussion of this claim is included within the discussion of several other of counsel’s alleged errors regarding voir dire. (Id. at 46-58). Jacobs concludes this discussion in the following manner: Counsel’s numerous failures to protect Mr. Jacobs’ right to be tried by an impartial jury that would decide his guilt or innocence and sentence based on the law and the facts rather than preconceived bias, prejudice, or statements made about the case outside the court created an “unacceptable risk of . . . prejudice infecting the capital sentencing proceeding,” Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. at 37, in violation of Petitioner’s Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Id. at 58). To conclude that this claim challenges the death sentence, but not the underlying convictions, is unduly restrictive. We consider next whether this claim is exhausted and thus subject to federal habeas review. According to the Commonwealth, this claim is procedurally barred because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found it waived for failure to 47 present it to the PCRA court. (Appellees’ Br. at 36-37). The Commonwealth is correct that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to consider this claim on the merits after finding it waived for failure to present it to the PCRA court. Jacobs II, 727 A.2d at 548 n.5. The fact that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to consider this claim for procedural reasons does not necessarily render the issue procedurally barred on federal habeas review. A federal “habeas court ‘will not review a question of federal law decided by a state court if the decision of [the state] court rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.’” Szuchon v. Lehman, 273 F.3d 299, 325 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991)). We have previously explained that a rule is adequate 20 only under the following conditions: “(1) the state procedural rule speaks in unmistakable terms; (2) all state appellate courts refused to review the petitioner’s claims on the merits; and (3) the state courts’ refusal in this instance is consistent with other decisions.” Doctor v. Walters, 96 F.3d 675, 683-84 (3d Cir.1996). In other words, a procedural rule is adequate only if it is “firmly established, readily ascertainable, and regularly followed at the time of the purported default.” Szuchon, 273 F.3d at 327. Generally, Pennsylvania’s PCRA requires a petitioner to 20 There is no question that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s application of its waiver rule is independent from any federal question presented. 48 prove that his allegation of error has not been w aived. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9543(a)(3). An issue is deemed waived if the petitioner could have raised it but failed to do so before trial, at trial, during unitary review, on appeal or in a prior state postconviction proceeding. Id. § 9544(b). Currently, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court enforces the waiver rule in capital cases on PCRA appeal, and generally deems an issue waived where the petitioner failed to present it to the PCRA court. See Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 720 A.2d 693, 700 (Pa. 1998). Prior to Albrecht, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court applied the relaxed waiver doctrine in capital cases on PCRA appeal. Id. Under the relaxed waiver doctrine, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declined to apply ordinary waiver principles in capital cases in an effort to prevent the court “from being instrumental in an unconstitutional execution.” Id. On November 23, 1998, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Albrecht expressly abandoned the relaxed waiver doctrine in capital cases on PCRA appeal. Id. The relevant question, then, is whether Pennsylvania’s strict enforcement of the waiver rule in capital cases on PCRA appeal was “firmly established, readily ascertainable, and regularly followed at the time of the purported default.” Szuchon, 273 F.3d at 327. According to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Jacobs waived his claim challenging counsel’s failure to request voir dire regarding racial prejudice when he failed to present it to the PCRA court. See Jacobs II, 727 A.2d at 548 n.5. Jacobs initiated PCRA proceedings by filing a pro se petition on January 13, 1997, which appointed counsel supplemented on May 23, 1997. The PCRA court denied many of Jacobs’ claims 49 in an oral decision rendered May 29, 1997. The PCRA court then denied all relief in a second oral decision on June 13, 1997. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not firmly establish its strict enforcement of the waiver rule in such cases until November 23, 1998, when it decided Albrecht, more than a year after Jacobs’ PCRA petition was denied. It follows that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s strict enforcement of its waiver rule in capital cases on PCRA appeal is not adequate to support the judgment for the purpose of finding a procedural default under federal habeas law. See Szuchon, 273 F.3d at 327. Accordingly, we are free to examine the merits of Jacobs’ claim.21 “[A] capital defendant accused of an interracial crime is entitled to have prospective jurors informed of the race of the victim and questioned on the issue of racial bias.” Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36-37 (1991). The defendant must specifically request such an inquiry. Id. at 37. “[T]he trial judge retains discretion as to the form and number of questions on” racial prejudice. Id. Here, the potential jurors were never questioned concerning racial bias because trial counsel did not request it. The specific issue, then, is whether counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to request such voir dire. Under Strickland, a federal habeas court “must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland, 21 Because no state court has rendered a decision on the merits of this claim, we review it de novo. See Everett, 290 F.3d at 508. 50 466 U.S. at 689. The defendant bears the burden of overcoming the presumption that “the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). “When counsel focuses on some issues [and excludes] others, there is a strong presumption that he did so for tactical reasons rather than through sheer neglect.” Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 8 (2003). This presumption “has particular force where a petitioner bases his ineffective-assistance claim solely on the trial record, creating a situation in which a court may have no way of knowing whether a seemingly unusual or misguided action by counsel had a sound strategic motive.” Id. at 5 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, if Jacobs’ counsel had requested voir dire respecting racial prejudice, the trial court would have been constitutionally bound to grant his request. See Turner, 476 U.S. at 36-37. Our review of the entire voir dire confirms that counsel did not ask any questions of any potential jurors regarding racial prejudice. Certainly nothing in the record suggests that Tammy Mock’s killing was racially motivated. Counsel reasonably could have believed that probing the jurors’ potential racial prejudices might unduly emphasize the racial differences, somehow inject racial issues into a trial where none existed, or taint the jurors’ view of Jacobs and his attorney. In other words, counsel reasonably could have concluded that asking prospective jurors questions about racial prejudice would do more harm than good. Under these circumstances, and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, we presume that counsel’s decision was sound trial strategy. Jacobs has failed to overcome this strong presumption. 51 He notes “continuing racial tensions in York” since the 2001 indictment of a former mayor for his alleged participation in the slaying of an African-American woman in 1969. (Appellant’s Opening Br. at 63 n.37). He does not describe the racial climate in York at the time of his trial in 1992, nor does he explain how the racial tensions in 2001 could have impacted his trial. Jacobs also asserts that his trial was racially sensitive because it involved an interracial sexual relationship between an African-American man and his white girlfriend. He suggests that counsel always has a duty to inquire into possible racial bias in a racially sensitive case. (Appellant’s Opening Br. at 64, 66). Whether Jacobs properly characterizes his trial as racially sensitive is subject to debate.22 Even if his trial were racially sensitive, Jacobs cites no federal authority for the proposition that the Constitution requires defense counsel to inquire into possible racial bias in each racially sensitive case.23 Moreover, 22 To the extent that Jacobs relies on Reynolds v. Commonwealth, 367 S.E.2d 176 (Va. Ct. App. 1988), for the proposition that his case was racially sensitive, we are not persuaded. Reynolds’ case was “replete with racial epithets” and “racially inflammatory evidence.” Id. at 182. Our scrutiny of the record here reveals no such evidence. 23 Jacobs cites Butler v. State, No. C.C.A. 1163, 1988 WL 63526 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 23, 1988), holding that counsel was ineffective for failing to request voir dire regarding racial prejudice. We find nothing in Butler suggesting that the Constitution requires counsel to inquire about racial prejudice in 52 we decline to adopt a rule which would require counsel to inquire as to racial prejudice, even where he reasonably deemed such questioning a poor strategic choice. For these reasons, we conclude that Jacobs has failed to demonstrate that trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to inquire into possible racial bias on voir dire. Accordingly, his claim of ineffective assistance in this regard fails.