Opinion ID: 498711
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Procedures Followed at Contempt Hearing

Text: 11 The statutory authority for an adjudication of civil contempt is set forth in 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1826(a), which states 12 (a) Whenever a witness in any proceeding before or ancillary to any court or grand jury of the United States refuses without just cause shown to comply with an order of the court to testify or provide other information, including any book, paper, document, record, recording or other material, the court, upon such refusal, or when such refusal is duly brought to its attention, may summarily order his confinement at a suitable place until such time as the witness is willing to give such testimony or provide such information. No period of such confinement shall exceed the life of-- 13 (1) the court proceeding, or 14 (2) the term of the grand jury, including extensions, 15 before which such refusal to comply with the court order occurred, but in no event shall such confinement exceed eighteen months. 16 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1826(a) (1982). Fed.R.Crim.P. 17(g) also makes a failure to obey a subpoena without adequate excuse a contempt of court. Upon an adjudication of civil contempt, Sec. 1826(a) authorizes the contemnor's confinement. Fines are an additional or alternative sanction that may be imposed. See, e.g., Matter of Dickinson, 763 F.2d 84, 88 (2d Cir.1985); Matter of Grand Jury Impaneled January 21, 1975, 529 F.2d 543, 550-51 (3d Cir.) (reviewing legislative history), cert. denied sub nom. Freedman v. United States, 425 U.S. 992, 96 S.Ct. 2203, 48 L.Ed.2d 816 (1976). 17 An adjudication of civil contempt is coercive--to compel obedience to a lawful court order--criminal contempt is imposed to punish the contemnor for an offense against the public and to vindicate the authority of the court. United States v. Petito, 671 F.2d 68, 72 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 824, 103 S.Ct. 56, 74 L.Ed.2d 60 (1982). Refusal to obey a court order may subject a person to both civil and criminal contempt for the same acts. Yates v. United States, 355 U.S. 66, 74, 78 S.Ct. 128, 133, 2 L.Ed.2d 95 (1957). At issue in the instant matter is an adjudication for civil--not criminal--contempt, and the imposition of sanctions--not a summary order of confinement--for appellant's failure to obey a subpoena. 18 Judicial sanctions following an order of civil contempt may be employed both to compel compliance with the court's order, as here, and as a remedial measure to compensate a civil complainant. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 448-49, 31 S.Ct. 492, 500-01, 55 L.Ed. 797 (1911). Where the purpose of civil contempt is compliance, the district court must consider several factors, which will be discussed shortly. 19 Appellant first argues that the denial of an open hearing deprived him of due process. A witness charged with civil contempt, absent the imminent threat of confinement, is not entitled to every right available to a defendant in a criminal contempt proceeding. In re Kitchen, 706 F.2d 1266, 1271 (2d Cir.1983). While we have been guided by the Ninth Circuit's lead in United States v. Alter, 482 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir.1973), on the procedures to be followed before imprisoning a recalcitrant witness under Sec. 1826(a), Kitchen, 706 F.2d at 1271, we are not faced with that concern on this appeal. 20 Hence, all of the procedural safeguards we have previously recognized in the context of possible imprisonment, e.g., In re Sadin, 509 F.2d 1252, 1255 (2d Cir.1975) (witness entitled to uninhibited adversary hearing); In re Di Bella, 518 F.2d 955, 959 (2d Cir.1975) (right to counsel); In re Rosahn, 671 F.2d 690, 696-97 (2d Cir.1982) (open public hearing required where civil contemnor faces confinement), generally are not required here. The reason is simply that those constitutional due process protections afforded a contemnor facing prison are not perceived to be necessary to the same degree to a civil contemnor not facing that prospect. See In re Rosahn, 671 F.2d at 697. Further, Arambulo has chosen not to appear, and has absented himself from the United States without providing, through counsel or otherwise, an explanation. We decline to extend an even greater degree of protection to a contemnor who has voluntarily chosen not to appear. 21 The facts here reveal that Arambulo had at all times since the issuance of the subpoena for his appearance before the grand jury been represented by competent counsel. Moreover, there is a strong likelihood that were this civil contempt proceeding conducted at a public hearing sensitive and secret grand jury investigative information would be revealed to the prejudice of the public interest. Under these circumstances, the district court's decision to close the hearing did not deprive the absent Arambulo of his right to due process of law. 22 Appellant next asserts that during the contempt hearing the government presented the district court with a sealed ex parte affidavit, and adjourned to the robing room to discuss it outside the presence of Arambulo's counsel, without affording defense counsel an opportunity to examine the affidavit. Arambulo argues that this submission also denied him his right to a fair hearing. The government responds that the district court expressly found that the papers submitted had no direct bearing on the contempt proceeding. We have read the papers submitted regarding the on-the-record (though sealed) colloquy between Judge Walker and AUSA LaBella and are satisfied that the actions by the government did not deprive appellant of a fair hearing. 23 In sum, the procedures followed by the district court in adjudicating appellant in civil contempt did not deprive him either of due process of the law or of a fair hearing.