Opinion ID: 414482
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: impossibility and variance

Text: 15 Petitioners also object to their convictions on the grounds that they were prosecuted for transporting stolen explosives through interstate commerce when, in actuality, the government transported the explosives. Norton and Girgenti view their convictions for illegal transportation of explosives as a legal impossibility given that the government carried the goods legally across the state lines. 16 Appellants fail to take into account 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2(b) in their impossibility argument. Section 2(b) reads as follows: 17 Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal. 18 The evidence introduced at trial sufficiently shows the involvement of the defendants in procuring the explosives and in causing the dynamite to be carried across state lines, albeit in the government agent's truck. Under Sec. 2(b) the appellants are to be treated as principals in the crimes of illegally transporting stolen explosives and transporting explosives for the purpose of destroying a building even though they themselves may not have physically carried the materials from Alabama to Tennessee. 19 In a similar argument, appellants maintain that there was a fatal variance between the indictment, which outlined a conspiracy to bomb the Temple, and the proof at trial showing an attempt to bomb the Synagogue. Testimony at trial by agent Vance indicates that the conspirators were ambivalent as to which Jewish place of worship would be the best target. The group initially planned to destroy the Temple but at the last minute Vance, who was driving the truck, turned toward the Synagogue to facilitate the arrests by the government. The conspirators did not object to the last minute minor change in plans. 20 Appellants seem to be arguing that where any mistake in factual detail occurs in the indictment, the court must overturn their convictions. In United States v. Beeler, 587 F.2d 340 (6th Cir.1978), the Sixth Circuit defined a variance as when the proof introduced at trial differs materially from the facts alleged in the indictment.... Variances may be subject to the harmless error rule. Id. at 342. In Beeler, the Court reversed the defendant's conviction for extortion under the Hobbs Act because the indictment failed to mention a crucial agreement to accept payments in exchange for a promise to vote a particular way on an issue before the Board of Commissioners of Knox County, Tennessee. The indictment also did not mention a $30,000 payment to the defendant. The government did, however, introduce evidence of these facts and events at trial. 21 Obviously, the variance between the indictment and the proof introduced at trial in Beeler is much more extensive than the variance in this case. The counts involving transportation of stolen explosives and conspiracy to so transport explosives are in no way affected by the variance in facts. Even those counts which describe the Temple as the target do not differ materially from the crime proven at trial: the appellants were shown to have conspired and to have attempted to destroy a Jewish place of worship in Nashville using stolen explosives transported across state lines. Even if the incorrect label attached to the particular target in this situation is deemed to be a material difference, appellants do not show any prejudice to their defense arising from this alleged variance. Thus, the difference between the facts stated in the indictment and those proven by the government at trial fails to pass the test for reversible error as laid out in Beeler, supra.