Opinion ID: 4541105
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Waiver of Exhaustion Defense

Text: Gray’s second argument is that because the defendants failed to raise the nonexhaustion defense in their 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, they should have been precluded from raising it during their motion for summary judgment. See Aplt. Br. at 3. But the statutory exhaustion requirement of § 1997e(a) is mandatory, and the district court is not authorized to dispense with it. For that reason, we have previously declined to find that a district court erred when it permitted the defendants to raise this exhaustion defense after the 12(b)(6) stage. See Beaudry v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 331 F.3d 1164, 1167 n.5 (10th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (“Nor are we persuaded that the district court erred in not finding that defendants had waived their exhaustion defense by waiting so late to raise it.”). 8