Opinion ID: 789247
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Statutory Structure Belies Inadvertence

Text: 60 Congress's intent to withhold CSRA review rights from judicial branch employees is discernable in the first instance from the structure of the CSRA. Title 5 does not ignore judicial branch personnel in establishing laws relevant to the civil service. To the contrary, it specifically includes such personnel within the civil service and defines them as employees for various purposes. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 2101, 2105; see also Blankenship v. McDonald, 176 F.3d at 1195 (noting that in Title 5 Congress has given judicial employees certain employment benefits and remedies, such as back pay, severance pay, family and medical leave, and health and retirement benefits). 5 At the same time that Congress thus brought judicial branch employees within the CSRA scheme, however, it expressly excluded them, as members of the excepted service, from specific procedural rights and remedies. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 2302, 4301, 7511. Construing this exclusion of excepted service employees (including judicial branch employees) from the then-operative CSRA provisions granting review rights, the Supreme Court in Fausto concluded that Congress's action was not inadvertent but deliberate: 61 The comprehensive nature of the CSRA, the attention that it gives throughout to the rights of nonpreference excepted service employees, and the fact that it does not include them in provisions for administrative and judicial review contained in Chapter 75, combine to establish a congressional judgment that those employees should not be able to demand judicial review for the type of personnel action covered by that chapter. 62 United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. at 448, 108 S.Ct. 668; see also Blankenship v. McDonald, 176 F.3d at 1195; Lee v. Hughes, 145 F.3d at 1276. 63 (2) The Amendment History of the CSRA Evidences Congress's Deliberate Decision to Exclude Judicial Branch Employees from the Statute's Review Procedures 64 The applicability of Fausto 's conclusion to judicial branch employees is reinforced by the second factor evidencing congressional intent: the fact that on two occasions when Congress amended CSRA review provisions pertaining to excepted service employees, it did not extend these procedural protections to judicial branch personnel. 65 The first amendment was in response to Fausto 's holding that non-preference eligible excepted service employees who lacked review rights under the CSRA were nevertheless precluded from bringing damages actions. Congress modified the Act to extend review rights to certain non-preference eligible excepted service employees. See Civil Service Due Process Amendments of 1990, Pub.L. No. 101-376, 104 Stat. 461 (Aug. 17, 1990) (codified in relevant part at 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(C)); H.R.Rep. No. 101-328 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 695, 698 (citing Fausto as impetus for the amendment). Significantly, as our earlier discussion of § 7511(a)(1)(C) indicates, see supra at 164-65, judiciary employees were not among those to whom the extension applied. See Hartman v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 77 F.3d at 1379-81. 66 Even more telling was Congress's amendment of the CSRA the following year in the Administrative Office of the United States Courts Personnel Act of 1990 (AOUSC Act), Pub.L. No. 101-474, § 5, 104 Stat. 1097, 1099-1100 (Oct. 30, 1990). The AOUSC Act, inter alia, eliminated a loophole in the statutory scheme that had granted CSRA review rights to certain judicial employees in the AOUSC that were unavailable to all other judicial employees. 6 The AOUSC Act sought to bring AOUSC employees in line with the remainder of judicial branch personnel. This was accomplished, however, not by extending CSRA review rights to judiciary employees generally, but by phasing out such rights for AOUSC employees. See generally H.R.Rep. No. 101-770(I), reprinted in 1990 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 1709, 1710 (the purpose of the AOUSC Act is to authorize a personnel system within AOUSC that is free from executive branch controls and more similar to that of the rest of the judicial branch because keeping AOUSC employees subject to the executive branch is contrary to the doctrine of separation of powers). 7 Congress's decision to eliminate CSRA procedural protections for the small class of judicial branch employees to whom they had long applied indisputably reveals its conscious decision to withhold such statutory review rights from judicial employees generally. 67 (3) The Judiciary's Own Administrative Review Procedures for Employment Disputes Provide a Rational Basis for Congress's Decision to Withhold Statutory Remedies 68 Dotson and amicus submit that Congress could not have intended to grant extensive administrative and judicial review rights to most civil service employees while withholding such procedural protections from judicial branch employees. Indeed, amicus argues that such a distinction would be irrational and a violation of equal protection. A third factor, however, explains the rationality of Congress's choice: the judiciary's own comprehensive procedures for review of adverse employment actions. Like the CSRA, the judiciary's review procedures have been modified and refined over the years better to balance the dual concerns for fair treatment of employees and efficient judicial administration. But one factor particularly relevant to this case has informed the process for almost forty years: the commitment to equal employment opportunity. 69 Since 1966, it has been the avowed policy of the federal judiciary, speaking through the Judicial Conference of the United States, to follow the equal employment opportunity principles applicable to private sector and government employers. Rep. of the Jud. Conf. of the United States, Study of Judicial Branch Coverage Pursuant to the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995, at 6 (December 1996), (detailing history of judiciary commitment to equal employment opportunity) (hereinafter CAA Study). 8 Thus, soon after Congress's enactment of the CSRA, the Judicial Conference developed a Model Equal Employment Opportunity Plan and, by resolution, required federal courts to adopt EEO plans in conformance with the national policy of providing equal employment opportunity to all persons regardless of their race, sex, color, national origin, religion, age ... or handicap. Rep. of the Jud. Conf. of the United States, Judiciary Equal Employment Opportunity Program — Model Equal Employment Opportunity Plan § I (1980, rev.1986) (Model Plan), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/forms/AO342.pdf. The Model Plan requires each federal court to promote equal employment opportunity through a program encompassing all facets of personnel management including recruitment, hiring, promotion and advancement. Id. 70 The scope of the Model Plan endorsed by the Judicial Conference and subsequently adopted by each federal court is expansive, affording all court personnel including judges' staffs and court officers and their staffs, id. § II, and [a]ll applicants for court positions the right to seek timely redress of discrimination complaints, id. App. 1, § I. Further, all persons filing discrimination complaints have the right to be free from retaliation, coercion, or interference because of filing a timely complaint. Id. App. 1, § III.A. They have the right in pursuing their complaint to be represented by a person of their choice, see id. App. 1, § III.B., the right to have reasonable notice of any hearing conducted on a complaint, id. App. 1, § III.C., and the right to use a reasonable amount of official time to prepare their case, id. App. 1, § III.D. 71 A complainant initiates the administrative review process outlined in the Model Plan by filing a written complaint with a court's designated EEO Coordinator within fifteen days of the alleged incident. See id. App. 1, § IV. A., D. 1. 9 The EEO Coordinator is charged with the responsibility to investigate the matter, consult with the involved parties and seek an informal resolution, and prepare a report to the parties identifying the issues, describing his or her findings and recommendations, explaining what resolution, if any, was achieved, and defining what corrective actions, if any, will be undertaken. Id. App. 1, § IV.B. 72 If either party is dissatisfied with the findings and recommendations of the EEO Coordinator, the Model Plan affords further review upon filing of a written request with the Chief Judge or a designee to have the matter reviewed. Id. App. 1, § IV. C. 1. Upon receipt of such a request, the Chief Judge or a designee will conduct any necessary investigation, determine whether to interview the parties or other witnesses, determine whether to hold a hearing on the matter, and issue a final decision on the complaint. See id. App. 1, § IV. C. 2. If the Chief Judge deems a hearing necessary, all parties are timely notified and have the right to be represented at the hearing, to present evidence, and to cross-examine witnesses. Id. App. 1, § IV. C. 3. 73 Congress's awareness of the courts' EEO plans is beyond question. Indeed, it has carefully monitored the operation of these plans to satisfy itself that they adequately protect judicial employees from discrimination without the need for legislative action. This oversight role was most evident in conjunction with the enactment of the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 (CAA), whereby Congress extended to its own employees the protections of eleven labor laws generally applicable to other public and private employees, including the protections against discrimination provided in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq. See 2 U.S.C. § 1302, et seq. (West 1995). 10 74 In enacting the CAA, Congress initially considered extending the statute's coverage to employees of the judicial branch but, mindful of the importance of judicial autonomy, ultimately decided against such action. 11 Instead, Congress required the Judicial Conference to prepare a report on the application to the judicial branch of the labor laws in question, including any recommendations the Judicial Conference may have for legislation to provide to employees of the judicial branch the rights, protections, and procedures under the [labor] laws, including administrative and judicial relief, that are comparable to those available to employees of the legislative branch under [the CAA]. 2 U.S.C. § 1434; see also 141 Cong. Rec. S439, S442 (Jan. 5, 1995) (comments of Sen. Charles Grassley) (noting that the provision directing the Judicial Conference to undertake a study to determine how employees of the judiciary will obtain the rights and remedies conferred by these [labor] laws was included in the CAA to ensure compliance with these laws by the judicial branch). 75 In December of 1996, the Judicial Conference submitted to Congress a Study of Judicial Branch Coverage Pursuant to the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995. See Rep. of the Jud. Conf. of the United States (Mar. 11, 1997), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judconf/jccrpt397.html. After an exhaustive survey of then-operative judicial procedures, the Judicial Conference reported that [t]he judiciary currently provides its employees with protections similar to those enumerated in the laws referenced in the CAA. See CAA Study at 2. 12 Nevertheless, mindful of the new remedial scheme established in the CAA for congressional employees, the Conference proposed to review and revise its Model EEO Plan to afford judicial employees review procedures similar to those adopted by Congress in establishing its internal Office of Compliance. See id. at 7. The Conference concluded that in light of both this proposal and the judiciary's history of administrative review, no legislative action was necessary to ensure the rights of judicial branch employees: 76 Overall, in light of current judicial branch policies and enhancements undertaken in the course of the judiciary's CAA study process, the Judicial Conference concludes that legislation is neither necessary nor advisable in order to provide judicial branch employees with protections comparable to those provided to legislative branch employees under the CAA. 77 Id. at 2. 78 In support of this conclusion, the Conference highlighted the importance of internal governance to the principle of judicial independence. From the beginning of the federal court system, the hallmarks of judicial branch governance have been local court management and individual judge autonomy, coupled with mechanisms for ensuring accountability and effective use of resources. Id. at 4. For this reason, the judiciary's internal governance system is a necessary corollary to judicial independence. Id. 79 Significantly, after receipt of the CAA Study, Congress took no action to legislate administrative or judicial review requirements for the judicial branch. Instead, over the course of the next year, the Judicial Conference devised a new Model Employment Dispute Resolution Plan (Model EDR Plan) to provide employees with an enhanced administrative dispute resolution process similar to the structure Congress has created in the Office of Compliance. Jud. Conf. of the United States, Model EDR Plan (Mar.1997), available at http://www.ce9.uscourts.gov/Web/OCELibra.nsf/0/ f75b8f4776df874e8825650e0065ef2c?OpenDocument. The Model EDR Plan is, in fact, an adjunct to the Conference's earlier Model EEO Plan, which it leaves intact except for the complaint procedures outlined in Appendix A to the Model EEO Plan. 13 80 Drawing on the CAA, the Model EDR Plan establishes mandatory counseling and mediation as initial first steps in the dispute resolution process. Id. Ch. VIII, §§ 1, 5C.2, 6B.3. Within fifteen days after notice of the end of the mediation period, an employee who still thinks himself aggrieved may file a formal written complaint. See id. Ch. VIII, § 7A. Upon determination that the complaint states a claim for relief and raises a material dispute of fact, the court's chief judge, or another designated judicial officer, must hold a hearing on the merits within sixty days of the filing of the complaint. See id. Ch. VIII, §§ 7B.2, 7C.1, 7C.2.a. The judicial officer enjoys broad discretion to provide such discovery and investigation as is necessary. Id. Ch. VIII, § 7C.2. The employee, however, has the right to be notified of the date of the hearing, to be represented, to present evidence, and to cross-examine witnesses. See id. Ch. VIII, § 7C.2.b., c. The hearing must be recorded, see id. Ch. VIII, § 7C.2.d, and any final decision made available to the public, see id. at Ch. VIII, § 10. Should the judicial officer conclude that a right protected by the plan has been violated, he may award broad equitable relief and, where the statutory criteria of the Back Pay Act are satisfied, a monetary award. See id. Ch. VIII, §§ 9A-C. 81 The Model EDR Plan also provides for an additional level of appellate review not available under the original EEO Model Plan. Specifically, an employee dissatisfied with the final hearing decision may petition for review of that decision under procedures established by the judicial council of the circuit. Id. Ch. VIII, § 8. The Second Circuit's EDR Plan, based on the Judicial Conference's model, provides for such petition to be made in writing to the Circuit Executive. Review is conducted by one or more members of the Circuit Judicial Council as designated by the Chief Circuit Judge. See Equal Opportunity and Employment Dispute Resolution Plan of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals (effective Sept. 1, 2003) Ch. IV., § 3(e) 5. 82 We so painstakingly detail the history of administrative review of adverse employment actions within the judiciary to make several points supporting the conclusion that Congress's decision to withhold CSRA review procedures from judicial employees was deliberate and rational: (1) administrative review within the judiciary plainly has a long history, which has been well known to Congress; (2) at all times pertinent to this action, a judicial employee who thought himself the victim of unlawful discrimination had specific procedures available to him (separate and apart from the disciplinary review pursued by Dotson) to raise such a claim; (3) such internal procedures have always involved some opportunity for review by a judicial officer; 14 and (4) within the last decade, Congress has engaged in an extensive dialogue with the federal courts about the need to legislate remedies for judicial employment disputes, with Congress ultimately choosing not to enact any such legislation and with the courts establishing even more detailed and multi-layered levels of administrative review. 83 Under these circumstances, we conclude that Congress's decision to exclude judicial branch employees from the administrative and judicial review procedures of the CSRA, and from subsequent legislation such as the CAA, was not inadvertent, but a conscious and rational choice made and maintained over the years in light of both a proper regard for judicial independence and recognition of the judiciary's own comprehensive review procedures for adverse employment actions, including review by judicial officers. 84 For all these reasons, we conclude that judicial branch employees such as Dotson, no less than other federal employees covered by the CSRA, are precluded from pursuing Bivens damages actions for adverse employment decisions. The district court's dismissal of Dotson's Bivens claim is affirmed. 85