Opinion ID: 2802982
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Extension of the INA to CNMI

Text: Mtoched presents two separate arguments challenging the application of the INA to remove him from the United States. One is that the application violates the terms of the Covenant and infringes upon CNMI’s right to self-government. The other is that it represents an unlawfully retroactive application of law years after his entry into CNMI in 1991 and his conviction for a crime in 1994. We are not persuaded by either argument.
Mtoched argues that he cannot be removed because the extension of the INA to CNMI violated the terms of the Covenant and thus cannot have the force of law. Essentially similar arguments were made by the CNMI government itself 8 MTOCHED V. LYNCH when it sought to enjoin application and enforcement of United States immigration laws to the Commonwealth after Congress adopted the legislation extending those laws to CNMI. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia rejected that effort in Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands v. United States, 670 F. Supp. 2d 65 (D.D.C. 2009), holding that the extension was lawful in a decision that substantially relied upon and quoted from our court’s decision in Richards. Id. at 80–91. We agree with that decision and adopt its reasoning. “Congress was authorized to enact the challenged provisions of the CNRA by the plain and unambiguous terms of Section 503 of the Covenant.” Id. at 91.
Mtoched argues that the extension of the INA to CNMI and the subsequent application of the INA to him, years after his crime and conviction, has an impermissible retroactive effect. There is a presumption in American law against retroactive legislation. Vartelas v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1479, 1486 (2012). In Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994), the Supreme Court established a two-step test to determine whether a statute has an impermissible retroactive effect. The first question is “whether Congress has expressly prescribed the statute's proper reach.” Id. at 280. If so, then the analysis ends and the statute should be applied as Congress determined. Id. If there is no express command in the statute, “the court must determine whether the new statute would have retroactive effect, i.e., whether it would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party’s liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect MTOCHED V. LYNCH 9 to transactions already completed.” Id. If so, the presumption against retroactive application should apply. Id. The BIA concluded that the statute, 48 U.S.C. § 1806, did not express a clear intent to make the legislation retroactive. The government acknowledges the same in its arguments to us. As a result, we must consider the second Landgraf question. After doing so, we conclude that application of the INA to Mtoched is proper. Mtoched was already subject to possible deportation under the prior CNMI law because he was convicted of a felony, a deportable offense under that law. See 3 N. Mar. I. Code § 4340(d) (repealed) and 6 N. Mar. I. Code § 102(i). Mtoched admits that to be true. On that level, therefore, the application of the INA does not constitute a change. Mtoched was deportable before, under the prior CNMI immigration laws, and he remains deportable under the INA. Mtoched argues, however, that deportation under prior CNMI law was subject to the discretion of the CNMI Attorney General. Under the CNMI law that previously applied, the CNMI Attorney General had “ultimate discretion as to when and whether to bring prosecutions and actions for deportations pursuant to [the former CNMI immigration laws].” 3 N. Mar. I. Code § 4312(d)(4) (repealed). The CNMI Attorney General did not bring such proceedings against Mtoched. Mtoched further argues that there is substantially less discretion available under the INA than was assigned to the CNMI Attorney General under the prior law, at least for someone in Mtoched’s situation, an alien who is removable or excludable on the grounds of having committed a crime. 10 MTOCHED V. LYNCH He points, for example, to an INA section limiting the exercise of discretion by the United States Attorney General to waive an alien’s criminal conduct. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). We are not persuaded by his argument. For one thing, Mtoched has not established that the CNMI Attorney General had actually exercised discretion in his favor at any time while CNMI law applied, or that discretion would have been exercised if the matter had been raised. All that he has established is that CNMI deportation proceedings had not been commenced against him. The failure to initiate deportation proceedings is not the same as an actual exercise of discretion. Mtoched has not demonstrated that he had a right to discretionary relief or even a substantial prospect of obtaining relief of any formal kind. The presumption against the retroactive application of law is triggered when such application would “tak[e] away or impai[r] vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creat[e] a new obligation, impos[e] a new duty, or attac[h] a new disability, in respect to transactions or considerations already past.” Vartelas, 132 S. Ct. at 1486–87 (quoting Justice Story in Soc’y for Propagation of Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F.Cas. 756, 767 (No. 13,156) (CCNH 1814)). Mtoched had no vested right to avoid deportation under CNMI law. Although the closure of a door to apply for discretionary relief can in some circumstances constitute “a new disability,” INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 321 (2001), Mtoched points to nothing other than the failure to initiate proceedings against him to support the notion that the prior CNMI law was more favorable to him. The fact that the federal government, as the new enforcement authority, has more resources or might be more aggressive in enforcement than the CNMI Attorney General does not represent the kind of MTOCHED V. LYNCH 11 “new disability” against which the presumption against retroactivity is intended to protect. Moreover, Mtoched’s argument fails to appreciate that the federal government still maintains significant discretion. In particular, there is at least some degree of discretion inherent in the decision whether to initiate removal proceedings against a given individual. As the Supreme Court has observed, a “principal feature of the removal system is the broad discretion exercised by immigration officials.” Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012). All that Mtoched demonstrated in connection with the prior CNMI law was that the CNMI Attorney General could decide “when and whether to bring prosecutions and actions for deportation.” 3 N. Mar. I. Code § 4312(d)(4) (repealed). That discretion is not unlike the discretion that federal authorities have. His arguments about the limitations on the discretion of the United States Attorney General all involve the exercise of discretion after removal proceedings have been commenced and after the alien has been found otherwise removable. Mtoched did not establish that the CNMI authorities could not have acted to deport him under prior law or that he had any legal basis under CNMI law to avoid deportation. That the federal government has commenced removal proceedings against him does not represent an impermissibly retroactive application of law.