Opinion ID: 1182062
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Defendant's Challenge for Cause of Prospective Juror Lorenz

Text: After the trial court rejected a defense challenge for cause to prospective juror Lorenz, he was seated as an alternate. Lorenz did not participate in guilt phase deliberations, but was called on to serve at the penalty phase when a regular juror was excused. (11a) Defendant argues he was prejudiced by the trial court's refusal to sustain the challenge and excuse Juror Lorenz; he also maintains he was denied the effective assistance of counsel when his trial attorney apparently lost track of the number of peremptory challenges he had used. Neither contention has merit. As defendant observes, there was some inconsistency in Lorenz's responses to voir dire questions by the court and counsel. Lorenz recalled hearing or reading about the case. Based on what he heard or read, he stated his belief the accused was more likely to be guilty than innocent. He also stated his belief that a person was more apt to be guilty because he had been arrested and charged. On further examination, however, Lorenz affirmed several times his ability to make a decision based on the evidence and not on what he heard or read before trial. After observing Lorenz's responses to counsel's questions and asking several of his own, the trial court scrutinized the inconsistency in Lorenz's answers and expressly found him to be impartial. (12) The qualifications of jurors challenged for cause are a matter within the broad discretion of the trial court, seldom disturbed on appeal. ( Odle v. Superior Court (1982) 32 Cal.3d 932, 944 [187 Cal. Rptr. 455, 654 P.2d 225].) `Where a prospective juror gives conflicting answers to questions relevant to his impartiality, the trial court's determination as to his state of mind is binding upon an appellate court....' ( People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1089 [259 Cal. Rptr. 630, 774 P.2d 659].) (11b) Although the trial court could have excused Juror Lorenz based on his answers, it was not compelled to do so. From the record, we cannot say that Lorenz's candor in admitting his reactions to pretrial information necessarily evinces bias when considered along with his assurances that he could set aside what he had read or heard and could decide the case based on the law and the evidence presented to him. There was no abuse of discretion in denying the challenge for cause. (13a) Defendant also argues his trial counsel was ineffective because he twice lost count of the number of defense peremptory challenges during the selection of alternate jurors. The record does show inquiries by counsel about the number of challenges left, including one after they were exhausted. (14) [T]o be entitled to reversal of a judgment on grounds that counsel did not provide constitutionally adequate assistance, the petitioner must carry his burden of proving prejudice as a `demonstrable reality,' not simply speculation as to the effect of the errors or omissions of counsel. ( People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 937 [245 Cal. Rptr. 336, 751 P.2d 395].) (13b) Assuming counsel's performance was deficient for losing track of the peremptory challenge count, defendant cannot demonstrate prejudice. Each of the four prospective alternate jurors challenged peremptorily by defendant expressed some strong pro-death-penalty or pro-guilt views or had direct personal or family connections with law enforcement. Defendant's suggestion that effective defense counsel aware of the count would have saved his final challenge for Juror Lorenz is pure speculation. Defendant was not prejudiced for another, independent reason. Juror Lorenz began the trial as an alternate juror; he did not participate in deliberations or the rendition of a verdict in the guilt phase. He joined the jury only in the penalty phase after another juror was excused. Lorenz's voir dire responses with respect to the death penalty were unequivocal and consistent with his obligations as a juror in a capital case. Although he professed to be in favor of the death penalty, he also believed the death penalty should not be imposed for all murders and acknowledged both the seriousness of a decision to impose the death penalty and a willingness to accept personal responsibility for that decision. Defendant has failed to demonstrate that any of Lorenz's statements regarding his beliefs as to guilt or innocence had any necessary impact on his penalty decision or the penalty verdict; thus, defendant has failed to show prejudice.