Opinion ID: 2638546
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Principles of Beneficial Use Support Thayn's Use of His 600 cfs Power Generation Right

Text: ¶ 34 Water is a resource of inestimable value to our state and we have likened a drop of water [to] a drop of gold. Longley v. Leucadia Fin. Corp., 2000 UT 69, ¶ 15, 9 P.3d 762 (quoting Carbon Canal Co. v. Sanpete Water Users Ass'n, 19 Utah 2d 6, 425 P.2d 405, 407 (1967)). Thus, the guiding principle behind our water law statutes and the work of the State Engineer is that water must always be put to the most beneficial use. Because of the vital importance of water in this arid region both our statutory and decisional law have been fashioned in recognition of the desirability and of the necessity of insuring the highest possible development and of the most continuous beneficial use of all available water with as little waste as possible. Wayman v. Murray City Corp., 23 Utah 2d 97, 458 P.2d 861, 863 (1969). A water user's appropriations are limited to the amount that can be put to beneficial use. No one can acquire the right to use more water than is necessary, with reasonable efficiency, to satisfy his beneficial requirements. McNaughton v. Eaton, 121 Utah 394, 242 P.2d 570, 572 (1952). This is true regardless of the quantity [of water] that has been used for [past] purposes and the length of time it may have been used. Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co., 164 P. at 859 (Utah 1916). ¶ 35 The principle of beneficial use supports the decision we reach today. Thayn enjoys a state-approved right to divert 600 cfs to generate hydroelectric power. We have concluded that the contract does not restrict Thayn to the use of only 435 cfs to pump irrigation water, and allowing him to use his water rights to generate hydroelectric power ensures that our water is put to the highest and best use. Indeed, our water statutes specifically list power development as a beneficial use for water resources. Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-8(1) (1989 & Supp. 2002). GRCC argues that the 1952 Amendment does not prevent Thayn from using his 600 cfs, only that he must find a means to divert his water other than by using GRCC's diversion works for any amounts above 435 cfs. However, the 1952 Agreement explicitly requires that Thayn's water must be diverted through GRCC's diversion facilities. [9] Thus, if Thayn did not use GRCC's facilities to divert his water, he would be in explicit breach of the 1952 Agreement. Similarly, Thayn could never put the whole of his 600 cfs toward power generation because GRCC's interpretation of the 1952 Amendment precludes any use other than pumping irrigation water, the use mentioned therein. We find that the 1952 Amendment does not impose such unreasonable restraints in outright conflict with the beneficial use doctrine. ¶ 36 GRCC's construction of the 1952 Amendment runs contrary to beneficial use principles and would result in tremendous waste: GRCC would be permitted to take much more water than it needs and is entitled to while preventing Thayn from using all of the water that he has a right to put to a beneficial use. In Cleary v. Daniels, 50 Utah 494, 167 P. 820, 823 (1917) we rejected such a result, ruling that the holder of a prior water right cannot prevent another from using the water during the period of time that he cannot use it, or make it available for use. While ... he retains his right to the water, ... he may not insist that the water be wasted merely because he has a prior right to use it. The existence of the 1952 Agreement and Amendment do not alter this conclusion. Those documents establish priorities of use and resolve issues of facility ownership and canal maintenance. They do not give GRCC the unilateral right to control the amount or use of Thayn's water. ¶ 37 So long as GRCC gets its water (either 20 cfs during the non-irrigation season, or 60 cfs during the irrigation season), we see no reason to prevent Thayn from putting to beneficial use the water that will nevertheless continue to flow down the raceway, without causing any harm to GRCC. Regardless of the parties' past contentions about the capacity of the raceway, the record reveals that the dam was diverting the same amount of water when Thayn began operating his hydroelectric facility as when Wilson signed the 1952 Agreement and there has always been enough water for both parties. The flow measurements taken by the parties reveal that, when properly maintained, the raceway has ample capacity to satisfy the needs of both water users. [10] Because we find that Thayn did not breach the contract, we need not address the other contractual issues Thayn also raises on appeal.