Opinion ID: 3134662
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Testimony of Attorney

Text: In his amended petition, defendant argues that the State should not have had attorney Katherine Zellner testify at the second stage of the death sentencing hearing regarding an incident she observed in 1991. Defendant contends that the information Zellner possessed regarding the incident was subject to the attorney-client privilege and should not have been disclosed absent a waiver of the attorney-client privilege. In a related argument, defendant maintains that Zellner should not have agreed to represent him in 1992 because she knew she might be a witness against him regarding the 1991 incident, and because prosecutor Telander was her partner. The basis for Zellner and Telander’s partnership was their joint representation, pursuant to court appointment, of a criminal defendant in Du Page County over a six-month period in 1992. Defendant asserts he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because Zellner’s representation of defendant was subject to a per se conflict of interest. At the death sentencing hearing, Zellner testified that in the fall of 1991, while interviewing a client in the visiting room at Pontiac Correctional Center, she observed defendant strike his wife, Christine Simms, in the face. Defendant then unzipped his pants, and his wife performed oral sex on him. Although there are television cameras in the visiting room, they do not record activities at some of the tables in the visiting room. Zellner did not report the incident to the guard seated at a desk by the door. She had reported a sex act she observed on another visit to this very guard, and he failed to take action. Zellner also testified that when she learned that Birkett was prosecuting defendant’s case, she told Birkett about the oral sex incident. At the conclusion of the death sentencing hearing, defendant motioned that the trial court appoint new counsel to review specific allegations of ineffectiveness of trial counsel. Defendant alleged, inter alia , that trial counsel was ineffective because he did not have defendant testify to rebut Zellner’s testimony. At a post-trial hearing on defendant’s motion, Zellner testified as follows. In the spring of 1992, while she and her associate, Daniel DeLay, were interviewing Larry Eiler, a prisoner at Pontiac she had been appointed to represent, defendant asked Eiler if defendant could talk to Zellner for a moment. Defendant and his wife, Christine Simms, then spoke with Zellner and DeLay. Defendant asked Zellner what she thought of Telander; whether it was ethically appropriate for Telander to become close to the LaCrosse family. She answered that she and Telander were both representing a criminal defendant in Du Page County and, in her opinion, Telander is an ethical attorney. Defendant then asked her if she would see Telander sometime soon. She replied she would see him within the next two weeks. Defendant requested that she ask Telander whether some kind of a deal could be worked out if defendant pled guilty. She said, “I don’t know anything about your case, but I will convey the message.” Subsequently, she spoke with Telander, with Birkett present. When she told Telander that defendant wanted to plead guilty, Telander and Birkett laughed, explaining that guilt was not at issue; defendant’s case had been remanded for a new sentencing hearing. Zellner also testified that she told Telander and Birkett about the 1991 oral sex incident. She could not recall whether she told them about the incident at the time she relayed defendant’s plea-bargaining request or during another conversation. However, she believes they only had one conversation about defendant. Zellner stated that she did not tell defendant and his wife that Telander was a close friend. The first time she met Telander was when they were appointed to jointly represent a criminal defendant in Du Page County. Telander withdrew from the case after six months. Zellner also stated that she has never accepted a defendant facing the death penalty as a private client. She has only represented such defendants when she has been appointed by the court. We consider first whether Zellner should have been allowed to testify at the death sentencing hearing regarding the 1991 incident. We note that trial counsel did not object to Zellner’s testimony at the death sentencing hearing. Furthermore, appellate counsel did not argue on direct appeal that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to Zellner’s testimony. Defendant maintains, however, that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to Zellner’s testimony and appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this issue on appeal. The purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to secure for the client the ability to confide freely and fully in his or her attorney, without fear that confidential information will be disseminated to others. People v. Knuckles , 165 Ill. 2d 125, 130 (1995). In People v. Adam , 51 Ill. 2d 46 (1972), this court restated the essential elements for the creation and application of the attorney-client privilege: “ ‘(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived.’ ” Adam , 51 Ill. 2d at 48, quoting 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence §2292 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). The privilege is based upon the confidential nature of such communications. People v. Williams , 97 Ill. 2d 252, 294 (1983). In the present case, defendant cannot argue that he made a privileged communication to Zellner while seeking her legal advice. See Chicago Trust Co. v. Cook County Hospital , 298 Ill. App. 3d 396, 408 (1998). Additionally, the 1991 incident occurred in the presence of others, i.e. , Zellner’s client and the desk guard, in a room under camera surveillance. At the very least, defendant’s behavior was subject to observation by anyone present in the room. A defendant’s voluntary disclosure of information, or other matters subject to being testified to, in the presence of opposing counsel or any other third person who is not the agent of the defendant or his attorney is not privileged. Williams , 97 Ill. 2d at 295. We conclude that Zellner did not disclose any communication subject to the attorney-client privilege. Trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to Zellner’s testimony and appellate counsel was not ineffective in failing to raise this issue on direct appeal or argue trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. Next, we consider whether an attorney-client relationship existed between defendant and Zellner in 1992. The attorney-client relationship is a voluntary, contractual relationship that requires the consent of both the attorney and client. In re Chicago Flood Litigation , 289 Ill. App. 3d 937, 941 (1997). As explained in Corti v. Fleisher , 93 Ill. App. 3d 517, 521 (1981), the relationship “is only created by a retainer or an offer to retain or a fee paid. ( De Wolf v. Strader (1861), 26 Ill. 225.) It cannot be created by the attorney alone or by an attorney and a third party who has no authority to act.” See also In re Chicago Flood Litigation , 289 Ill. App. 3d at 941; Holstein v. Grossman , 246 Ill. App. 3d 719, 743 (1993). Being a consensual relationship, “[t]he client must manifest [his] authorization that the attorney act on [his] behalf, and the attorney must indicate [her] acceptance of the power to act on the client’s behalf.” Simon v. Wilson , 291 Ill. App. 3d 495, 509 (1997). The record from defendant’s death sentencing hearing reveals that throughout the proceedings defendant was represented by three court-appointed attorneys, Baker, Brucar and Ost. Defendant did not seek to have the trial court appoint Zellner as new counsel or as additional counsel. Zellner testified that she did not discuss possible representation with defendant or defendant’s wife. Defendant wanted a moment of her time; posed some questions regarding Telander; and asked that she inquire of Telander whether a deal could be worked out. These facts do not show a consultation by a layperson with an attorney for the purpose of securing that attorney’s legal advice on a particular matter. These facts also do not show that Zellner ever agreed to represent defendant. Although defendant’s wife stated in an affidavit that she spoke with Zellner three times about representing defendant, she did not state that either she or defendant paid Zellner a retainer, or attempted to have the trial court appoint Zellner as counsel. To the contrary, in her affidavit defendant’s wife indicates that Zellner wanted $15,000 for the sentencing hearing, with a 30% retainer. Further, she states that when she told Zellner she could not raise the money for the fee, Zellner replied that she did not give free advice and there was nothing more to talk about. Thus, the affidavit does not contradict the record, but rather supports our conclusion that an attorney-client relationship did not exist between defendant and Zellner. Consequently, defendant did not have a right to conflict-free representation from Zellner. It follows that the circuit court properly dismissed this claim.