Opinion ID: 2636938
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Failure to instruct on elements of unadjudicated violent crime.

Text: The jury was told there was evidence that defendant had committed the robbery and murder of Jack Mackey, that no juror could consider these criminal acts as aggravating factors unless satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that defendant committed them, and that the jury could consider no other criminal acts in aggravation. However, defendant's counsel requested no instructions on the specific elements of robbery and murder. When the failure to request murder instructions was called to counsel's attention in open court, counsel admitted he had not requested such instructions. Counsel further agreed that the court had no obligation to give them in the absence of request. A minute order recited that [defendant specifically does not request instructions on [the] substantive law of other criminal acts evidence, and the jury did not receive such instructions. Nonetheless, defendant now argues the trial court's failure to instruct, sua sponte, on the elements of the crimes the jury could consider in connection with the Mackey killing violated his due process and equal protection rights to proof beyond reasonable doubt of all elements of a charged crime, as guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as his rights to a fair trial and a reliable penalty determination, as guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Defendant insists these rights could not be waived, but if waiver was possible, he alone, and not counsel, could waive them. If counsel's waiver was valid, he asserts, it constituted ineffective assistance. We have repeatedly rejected just such arguments (e.g., Hart, supra, 20 Cal.4th 546, 651, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 132, 976 P.2d 683; People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 704, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 26, 919 P.2d 640; People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 435, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 301, 916 P.2d 1000 ( Avena ); People v. Hawkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 920, 963-964, 42 Cal. Rptr.2d 636, 897 P.2d 574; Cain, supra, 10 Cal.4th 1, 72-74, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224; People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 48-49, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 593, 859 P.2d 673; Phillips, supra, 41 Cal.3d 29, 72-73, fn. 25, 222 Cal.Rptr. 127, 711 P.2d 423), and we do so again. As we have explained, the rule absolving the court of a sua sponte duty to instruct on the elements of crimes introduced under factor (b) `is based in part on a recognition that, as [a] tactical matter, the defendant may not want the penalty phase instructions overloaded with a series of lengthy instructions on the elements of alleged other crimes because he may fear that such instructions could lead the jury to place undue emphasis on the crimes rather than on the central question of whether he should live or die. [Citations.]' ( Hart, supra, at p. 651, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 132, 976 P.2d 683, quoting Cain, supra, at p. 72, 40 Cal. Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224.) This may be true even when other violent crimes are the only aggravating evidence other than the circumstances of the capital crimes themselves. ( Avena, supra, at p. 435, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 301, 916 P.2d 1000.) The court has no duty to override counsel's choice, though the court is not prohibited from giving elements instructions sua sponte where they are `vital to a proper consideration of the evidence. [Citation.]' ( Hart, supra, at p. 651, 85 Cal. Rptr.2d 132, 976 P.2d 683, quoting Cain, supra, at p. 72, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224.) Here, counsel's admission that he was not requesting elements instructions, and that they therefore need not be given, suggests he made the tactical choice to forgo them. We cannot say as a matter of law that his decision was unreasonable. Defendant had little to gain by such instructions, because the evidence raised no substantial doubt that defendant's conduct against Mackey, as described by Deborah, included the offenses of murder and robbery. Under these circumstances, counsel could reasonably wish to avoid focusing the sentencer's attention on the ample evidence that the elements of those offenses were satisfied. For similar reasons, such instructions were not vital to a proper consideration of the evidence on the issue of penalty. Defendant analogizes to the rule that failure to instruct sua sponte on all the elements of a charged offense, thus relieving the prosecution of its burden to prove each such element beyond a reasonable doubt, is serious constitutional error. (See People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 479-480, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869.) The analogy is inapt. The defendant's history of criminal violence is relevant to the ultimate issue in a capital sentencing trial, but that issue is the appropriate penalty for the defendant's already-proven capital crimes, not whether the defendant committed the specific elements of additional criminal offenses. The California capital sentencing scheme does require that violent conduct be criminal in fact in order to constitute valid penalty evidence. (See authorities cited, ante, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d p. 611, 22 P.3d pp. 376-377.) Moreover, because evidence that the defendant committed other violent crimes is often of `overriding importance ... to the jury's life-or-death determination,'  California law imposes a foundational requirement one not mandated by the Constitutionโthat other-crimes evidence offered for this purpose be subject to the reasonable doubt standard of proof. ( Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d 57, 98, 241 Cal.Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127; see also Avena, supra, 13 Cal.4th 394, 429, 53 Cal. Rptr.2d 301, 916 P.2d 1000.) In other words, before a sentencing juror weighs the culpable nature of such other violent criminal conduct on the issue of penalty, he or she must be highly certain that the defendant committed it. However, the ultimate question for the sentencer is simply whether the aggravating circumstances, as defined by California's death penalty law (ง 190.3), so substantially outweigh those in mitigation as to call for the penalty of death, rather than life without parole. ( People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512, 541-542, fn. 13, 230 Cal.Rptr. 834, 726 P.2d 516.) In making this essentially normative determination, penalty jurors need not agree on the dispositive factors, or on the existence of any specific aggravating factor or crime, as a prerequisite to imposing the death penalty. (See, e.g., Box, supra, 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1216, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130; People v. Millwee (1998) 18 Cal.4th 96, 166, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 418, 954 P.2d 990; People v. Tuilaepa (1992) 4 Cal.4th 569, 595, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 382, 842 P.2d 1142; Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d 57, 99, 241 Cal.Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127; People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 773-774, 239 Cal.Rptr. 82, 739 P.2d 1250 ( Ghent) ; People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 777-779, 230 Cal. Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113 ( Rodriguez ).) Conversely, the prosecution has no burden of proof that death is the appropriate penalty, or that one or more aggravating factors or crimes exist, in order to obtain a judgment of death. (See Box, supra ; People v. Hawthorne (1992) 4 Cal.4th 43, 79, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 133, 841 P.2d 118.) Indeed, we would immerse the jurors in lengthy and complicated discussions of matters wholly collateral to the penalty determination ( Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d 739, 773, 239 Cal.Rptr. 82, 739 P.2d 1250) were we to require sua sponte instructions focusing on the elements of particular offenses that might be included in the defendant's violent criminal history. We therefore adhere to our rule that such instructions are not required in the absence of a request. [14]