Opinion ID: 445219
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: reinstatement of the l & n rate

Text: 94 Having determined that the Indiana Commission's decision was inconsistent with federal standards, the ICC was further obligated by the statute to determine and authorize the carrier to establish the appropriate rate .... 49 U.S.C. Sec. 11501(c). The Commission's rate-determination responsibility is distinct from its review of state proceedings, but both responsibilities must be discharged within the statutory thirty-day period for final action. As the Commission itself has recognized in this very proceeding, it cannot remand the case to the state authority, but must establish an appropriate rate in the same decision .... ICC June Decision at 20. In Utah Power & Light Co., supra, at 738, we accepted that interpretation of the Commission's authority. 95 In this case, the ICC determined that the appropriate rate was the existing rate of $.94/ton that had been set by L & N. In arriving at that determination, the Commission calculated a revised figure for variable costs, found the resulting ratio of revenue to variable costs to lie within the reasonable range established by applicable ICC precedents, and noted its concern for the railroad's revenue inadequacy. ICC November Decision at 6 (accompanied by appendix on costs) (JA 74, 77-79); ICC June Decision at 20-21 (JA 25-26). In its second opinion, the ICC added that the existing rate was well below that of other intrastate and interstate unit-train coal rates in the area, the latter comparison being relevant due to the statutory policy of closing the gap between intrastate and interstate rates. ICC June Decision at 20 (JA 25). Finally, the ICC held that in the absence of a showing by complainants of unreasonableness, the carrier's rate would be allowed to stand; this was not a maximum reasonable rate, said the Commission, but only a reasonable rate that should not be lowered on the record in these proceedings. Id. at 21 (JA 26). 96 Petitioners challenge the ICC's rate determination, complaining that the Commission did not explain its decision to authorize the existing rate, and indeed allegedly ignored various statutory concerns in so doing. This argument appears to be a variant of petitioners' complaint, discussed supra, that the Commission has established no general standard of rate reasonableness. In addition, it should be emphasized that petitioners have launched a sweeping attack on the ICC's exercise of its authority, rather than pointing to any specific deficiencies in the cost findings or analysis of revenue-to-cost ratios. Before this court, petitioners have merely defended the finality of the Indiana Commission's fact finding concerning costs, without regard to the substance. 97 We must decide whether the Commission has adequately supported and justified its appropriate rate determination. In so doing, we are mindful that the ICC has been setting railroad rates for close to a century now, and that its accumulated expertise in such matters far exceeds that of any court. Our review in ratemaking cases is deferential. See supra. We are also aware that the Commission is presently working under a fairly fresh, and substantially reformed congressional mandate, in the form of the Staggers Act. Congress did not define what it meant by the term appropriate as employed in section 11501(c). Moreover, the Commission has not yet interpreted the relationship of section 11501(c) appropriateness to the reasonableness determinations elsewhere required by the Staggers Act. See Utah Power & Light Co. v. ICC, supra, at 735. Nor need we do so in order to decide this case. We note only that the section 11501(c) mandate to determine and authorize ... the appropriate rate does not call for the Commission to prescribe a rate within the meaning of Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway, 284 U.S. 370, 52 S.Ct. 183, 76 L.Ed. 348 (1932). 98 In the absence of any specific criticisms by petitioners of the ICC's cost findings, we cannot find inadequate the cost evidence supporting the Commission's rate determination. Nor were the figures and use of precedents for revenue to variable cost ratios inadequately reasoned or presented. From its opinion and cost appendix, it appears that the Commission articulated and took into consideration relevant statutory factors. In the absence of any specific statutory guidance as to how an appropriate rate must be derived, we cannot require more from the Commission than the provision of substantial evidence, consistency with the statute, and reasoned decisionmaking. We are thus constrained to find that from its decision and opinions, the ICC's path may reasonably be discerned. Bowman Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286, 95 S.Ct. 438, 442, 42 L.Ed.2d 447 (1974).