Opinion ID: 160861
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Coverage under the policy provisions

Text: 28 Maryland Casualty contends that even if Marathon qualifies as an additional insured, the policy's use of you makes it clear that named insureds and additional insureds are provided different coverage. Maryland Casualty argues that you refers only to the named insured, whereas insured refers to all other insureds under the policy, including Marathon. To support this argument, Maryland Casualty relies on the preamble's language which states, [t]hroughout this policy the words 'you' and 'your' refer to the Named Insured shown in the Declarations, and any other person or organization qualifying as a Named Insured under this policy. App., Vol. 1 at 207. According to Maryland Casualty, all of the provisions, exclusions, and definitions within the policy which use the term you apply only to named insureds. For example, the SELI provision provides coverage for all sums which you shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury by accident . . . sustained . . . by any employee of yours. App., Vol. I at 202. 29 The district court rejected Maryland Casualty's argument on this point concluding that additional insureds qualify as named insureds under the policy, and therefore you refers to additional insureds like Marathon, providing the same coverage as a named insured. See Marathon, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 1255-56. We agree with the district court's determination for all the reasons stated in its opinion, and we add a few of our own. 30 At a minimum, the use of you in the policy is ambiguous as to whether it refers to additional insureds and, as such, must be interpreted in their favor. 6 Under the policy language and in the Marathon endorsement, it is not clear that you as used in the policy excludes additional insureds. The endorsement adding Marathon as an additional insured stated that WHO IS AN INSURED (Section II) is amended to include as an insured the person or organization shown in the Schedule. App., Vol. 1 at 195. This amendment, by its own language, adds Marathon as an insured, and does not relegate it to a lesser status than named insureds under the policy. Moreover, Section II does not define classes of insureds in terms of lesser or greater coverage. Instead, it describes which persons related to the insured are included under the policy. In paragraph 1 of Section II, for example, the policy reads: if you are designated in the Declarations as an organization . . . you are an insured. Your 'executive officers' and directors are insureds, but only with respect to their duties as your officers or directors. App., Vol. 1 at 212, 1c (emphasis added). Reading the policy as excluding additional insureds everywhere the word you is employed would make the policy's coverage amorphous, leaving additional insureds open to all sorts of unanticipated exclusions. The purpose of provisions to add insureds is 'to extend the policy coverage to others . . . not to change the nature of th[e] coverage.' Wyner, 78 F.3d at 756 (quoting Sonoco v. Travelers Indem. Co., 315 F.2d 126, 128 (10th Cir. 1963)). 31 The mere use of the word you in connection with the entire policy also does not place additional insureds on notice that they are excluded from its provisions. Surely Maryland Casualty could have included a plain statement in the endorsement that additional insureds were to be treated differently under the policy than named insureds through the use of the word you. Alternatively, Maryland Casualty could have included a plain statement in the preamble, in Section II, or in the endorsement specifying that additional insureds do not qualify as named insureds. Absent such a clear exclusion, the policy is at least ambiguous whether you includes endorsed additional insureds. 32 The preamble pointed to by Maryland Casualty does not convince us otherwise. That preamble states that 'you' and 'your' refer to the Named Insured shown in the Declarations, and any other person or organization qualifying as a Named Insured under this policy. App., Vol. 1 at 207. The entire policy, read as a whole, is ambiguous as to whether this language differentiates an additional insured such as Marathon from a named insured. We agree with Marathon that the endorsement can reasonably be interpreted as qualifying Marathon as a named insured, and therefore including Marathon within the scope of you as used in the policy. 7 See, e.g., Greene v. General Cas. Co., 576 N.W.2d 56, 60 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (common sense reading of similar preamble is that named insured has been expanded to include additional insured, and thus you as used throughout policy referred to additional insured). 33 We asked the parties to submit additional briefing on the Wyoming Supreme Court's recent determination in Page v. Mountain West Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 2 P.3d 506 (Wyo. 2000). In Page, the court interpreted a farm and ranch insurance policy and concluded that you as used in the policy referred only to the named insureds, Mr. and Mrs. Page, and did not include the Pages' employees who were covered as omnibus insureds under the policy. See id. at 509. In Page, however, the court's holding was premised on its conclusion that the policy language was unambiguous in its use of you as referring only to the Pages. See id. ([a] careful reading of the policy leads to the ineluctable conclusion that 'you' and 'your' refer only to the [Pages]. The policy in Page did not define you to include any other person or organization qualifying as a Named Insured. Compare Preamble, App., Vol. 1 at 207, with Page, 2 P.3d at 508. Because we hold that the language adding Marathon as an insured is ambiguous as to whether it expands the named insured category to include Marathon for purposes of the policy's use of you, the Wyoming Supreme Court's determination in Page is inapposite. 34 Given our conclusion that you includes Marathon, Maryland Casualty's contention that the supplemental employer's liability insurance provision does not cover Marathon is without merit. Maryland Casualty presents no other reason why the SELI coverage would not apply. 8 While it is hotly contested between the parties whether Mr. Berg was an employee of SSI, none of the parties contests the fact that Mr. Berg was an employee of Marathon. We therefore accept as undisputed that Mr. Berg was a Marathon employee for purposes of coverage. See Marathon, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 1257 (stating as a prior adjudicated fact that Marathon was Berg's employer). We hold that the SELI provision covers Marathon for Mr. Berg's injuries. 35