Opinion ID: 1041858
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Merits of Summary Judgment in this Case

Text: However, the district court did not grant the motion for summary judgment solely based on Plaintiff’s failure to respond. Its order granting the motion also stated that the court had reviewed the motion and granted it on its merits. Although the district court did not elaborate on its reasoning regarding the merits, perhaps influenced by its apparent authority to grant summary judgment under the local rule based on the lack of opposition, we may affirm the district court’s ruling on the merits “on any ground supported by the record.” Van Asdale v. Int’l. Game Tech., 577 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). The record is clear that Satterberg was entitled to summary judgment. Any of the three arguments presented by Satterberg in his motion might provide an adequate ground. For our purposes, we will focus on prosecutorial immunity. As Heinemann alleges in his complaint, Satterberg is the King County Prosecuting Attorney whose office filed a charge against Heinemann in state court. The only misconduct identified in Heinemann’s complaint was that filing the criminal action was improper because the state court lacked jurisdiction and that only federal authorities could bring a charge against Heinemann. That is incorrect, but for current purposes it matters only that prosecutorial 10 HEINEMANN V. SATTERBERG immunity protects a prosecutor for “his decision to initiate a prosecution.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 421–24 (1976). At oral argument, Heinemann’s pro bono counsel argued that immunity did not extend to protect a prosecutor who took action outside a traditional prosecutor’s role. See, e.g., Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 129–31 (1997) (holding that prosecutors are not absolutely immune when testifying about probable cause to obtain an arrest warrant). That is true, but Heinemann did not allege misconduct of that nature in his complaint. He complained only about the filing of the criminal charges. If Heinemann sought to pursue this alternative theory, then he could have responded to the summary judgment motion by asking for leave to amend his complaint. If he needed more time to investigate or to obtain evidence he could have sought a continuance under Rule 56(d). After the order was granted, he could have asked the district court for reconsideration or relief from judgment. Heinemann did none of these things. He did not make any further filings in the district court. We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the merits. AFFIRMED.