Opinion ID: 2514211
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Testimony of Jailhouse Informant

Text: State's witness Eugene Hillius, a jailhouse informant, testified that during two separate conversations with Clark at the Snohomish County Jail, Clark claimed, with respect to Roxanne Doll, they took my DNA sample out of her butt, RP (Apr. 4, 1997) at 4639 (trial), and that Clark was upset his brother would not help him out by lying to the police about the presence of deer blood in Clark's van. Hillius testified that Clark, after revealing the DNA information, [j]ust looked at me, justit was like I was looking like I could look right through him, which is unreal, like he didn't care, like there is no feelings there at all. I get kind of blown away. RP (Apr. 4, 1997) at 4640 (trial).
Clark contends the trial court erred in denying him the opportunity to impeach Hillius under ER 608(b) with specific instances of conduct underlying his 1993 convictions for theft and forgery. Clark argued those instances of conduct were probative of Hillius' truthfulness and would have assisted the jury in assessing his credibility. Such evidence is admissible as follows: Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness' credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross examination of the witness (1) concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined has testified. ER 608(b). Thus allowing such testimony is within the discretion of the court and will be reviewed only for an abuse of discretion. Failing to allow cross-examination of a state's witness under ER 608(b) is an abuse of discretion if the witness is crucial and the alleged misconduct constitutes the only available impeachment. State v. York, 28 Wash. App. 33, 621 P.2d 784 (1980). The need for cross-examination on misconduct diminishes with the significance of the witness in the state's case. State v. Robinson, 44 Wash. App. 611, 622, 722 P.2d 1379 (1986). Once impeached, there is less need for further impeachment on cross. State v. Martinez, 38 Wash.App. 421, 424, 685 P.2d 650 (1984). The state argues Hillius was not a crucial witness because the statements from Clark to which he testified were susceptible to innocent explanation. The state further argues that it impeached Hillius on cross with 36 instances of prior convictions, including the ones Clark has put at issue. As Hillius was not a crucial witness, and was effectively impeached on cross, the state concludes that it was within the trial court's discretion to deny cross-examination by Clark on the misconduct underlying certain of those convictions. Here, the rule concerning use of prior convictions for witness impeachment is also relevant to the analysis. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness in a criminal or civil case, evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from the witness or established by public record during examination of the witness.... ER 609(a). Under this rule, cross-examination regarding prior convictions is limited to the fact of the conviction, the type of crime, and the punishment. State v. Copeland, 130 Wash.2d 244, 284, 922 P.2d 1304 (1996). Further, under ER 609, [t]he details of the acts leading to the prior convictions are not admissible. State v. Coles, 28 Wash.App. 563, 573, 625 P.2d 713 (1981). However these holdings are limited to an ER 609 analysis. Judge Thorpe could have let prior misconduct in under ER 608(b) but chose not to. Given the fact that Hillius was impeached under ER 609 on direct examination by an enumeration of each of his 36 prior convictions, Judge Thorpe concluded further examination on the misconduct underlying some of those convictions would not be any more probative. That was not an abuse of discretion.
Before Hillius testified, the court granted a defense motion excluding from Hillius' testimony evidence of personal habits of Mr. Clark, or [Hillius'] perception of Mr. Clark's mental state that he is losing it [due to stress stemming from the charges]. RP (Apr. 4, 1997) at 4624 (trial). Clark argues Hillius' statement that, after saying police removed DNA evidence of Clark from Roxanne Doll's body, Clark [j]ust looked at me, justit was like I was looking like I could look right through him, which is unreal, like he didn't care, like there is no feelings there at all, RP (Apr. 4, 1997) at 4640 (trial), violated the order in limine on mental state evidence described above. Clark's counsel did not object, however, when Hillius made that statement in court, and therefore the objection was raised for the first time on appeal contrary to RAP 2.5(a). Nevertheless it is clear this testimony did not violate the order in limine. Clark was aware that Hillius had made a statement that Clark appeared to be under a lot of stress as a result of the charges and appeared to be losing it. Clark's counsel specified the scope of the motion in limine: So I want it clear and when I said mental state, what I'm talking about is Mr. Hillius' view that Mr. Clark was under a great deal of stress because of the charges. I think his term was losing it. RP (Apr. 4, 1997) at 4623-24 (trial). The court granted this motionthat Hillius may not chat about the personal habits of Mr. Clark, or his perception of Mr. Clark's mental state that he is losing it[.] Id. at 4624. Hillius' testimony did not violate this order in limine because he did not testify about Clark's mental state, or say anything about the stress Clark was reportedly under. The most correct characterization of Hillius' testimony is that he spoke to Clark's demeanor as Clark told the witness they took my DNA sample out of her butt. Id. at 4639. This is similar to the demeanor testimony of the paramedic in Stenson, 132 Wash.2d at 720-22, 940 P.2d 1239 (paramedic testified defendant was calm and showed no grief when told his wife was dying). Such testimony is proper if based upon personal observation of the defendant's conduct. Id. at 724, 940 P.2d 1239. Here Hillius recounted his personal observation and laid a factual foundation for this observation. As noted, Clark's counsel did not object to the testimony at trial and did not move for a mistrial after the testimony. There was no error on this issue.