Opinion ID: 1642750
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Culpability of the offending parties. [5]

Text: The defendants do not argue that Vesta and Wausau acted with malicious intent in deciding what evidence to preserve, and the record, when viewed most favorably to Vesta and Wausau under the standard of review applicable to a summary judgment, reflects at most honest error in judgment and/or simple negligence. There is no showing that they allowed evidence that they knew, or should have known, would be favorable to the opposing parties in foreseeable litigation to be discarded. Classic spoliation involves the idea that the offending party purposefully and wrongfully destroyed evidence he knew was supportive of the interest of his opponent. May, 424 So.2d at 603; Alabama Power Co. v. Murray, 751 So.2d 494, 497 (Ala. 1999). In the context of choice of sanctions to impose when a party refuses to provide discovery owing under Rules 26 through 36, Ala. R. Civ. P., Rule 37 does not require a showing of willfulness. Alabama adopted this federal rule[, Rule 37,] subsequent to its 1970 amendment which eliminated the requirement that the failure to respond be `willful.' Weatherly v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 392 So.2d 832, 835 (Ala. 1981). Nonetheless, `willfulness' ... is a key criterion to the imposition of the drastic sanction of dismissal under Rule 37. Id. See also Iverson, supra; Blair v. Cooper, 437 So.2d 1249, 1251-52 (Ala.1983). In the context of whether a summary judgment should be entered against a plaintiff alleged to have caused or allowed material evidence to be destroyed, the culpability analysis is somewhat different. Technically, a summary judgment should be entered against a plaintiff only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant-defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Ala. R. Civ. P. Nonetheless, our cases, and those of the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals, have approved of the sanction of the entry of a summary judgment against a plaintiff, either partial or entirely, in certain instances of spoliation: Thompson, Copenhagen, Verchot, Vesta Fire Ins. Corp., supra; Alfa Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ray's Refrigeration, 682 So.2d 452 (Ala.1996), no-opinion affirmance (Houston, J., dissenting); and Smedley, supra (judgment entered on jury verdict for plaintiff reversed and case remanded with instruction that case be dismissed). In each of those cases either all relevant evidence was destroyed with full appreciation of its significance to anticipated litigation ( Thompson, Verchot, Smedley ) or the dismissal was upheld only as to those claims based on the destroyed evidence and reversed as to those claims based on retained evidence ( Copenhagen and Vesta Fire Ins. Corp.; see also Cincinnati Ins. Co., supra). A summary judgment for the defendant based on spoliation has been reversed where the defendant had adequate access to the article in question before it was destroyed, Ex parte General Motors Corp., 769 So.2d 903 (Ala.1999), and where the plaintiff did not act willfully, Joyner (judgment as a matter of law entered at conclusion of trial reversed); Buzbee v. Alabama Waste Servs., Inc., 709 So.2d 61 (Ala.Civ.App.1998). We approved the denial of the defendant's motion for a new trial premised on spoliation in Wal-Mart Stores, supra, because of the lack of proof that the plaintiff had acted with knowledge of the significance of the evidence and with the intent to inhibit the defendant's case.