Opinion ID: 2229976
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: admissibility of prior abuse

Text: The defendant contends that the district court erred in refusing to admit evidence of the physical abuse she allegedly had suffered in 1983 at the hands of a former boyfriend, Ron Thompson. Although the defendant was never married to Ron Thompson, she apparently lived with him from 1980 to 1983 and had her and her son's last names legally changed to Thompson during that time period. Thompson sought to testify on the witness stand about the alleged abusive and threatening relationship she had with Ron Thompson, but was prevented from doing so upon a relevance objection by the State. The court sustained the objection on the basis that what had happened 8 years previously with another man was not relevant to Thompson's response to threats made by Frank. Without making an immediate offer of proof following the trial court's ruling, the defendant continued to answer questions on her direct examination. Later that day, the defense submitted as an offer of proof an 11-page report Thompson herself had written and filed with the Washington County sheriff's office on March 20, 1983. That report detailed a bizarre 2-day episode on March 16 and 17, 1983, in which Ron Thompson allegedly raped the defendant, held her captive, and repeatedly threatened her with surgical mutilation and death. Based on the offer of proof, the trial court again found the proffered testimony to be irrelevant because it involved a third party rather than the victim and because the abuse had occurred over 8 years prior to the time the defendant killed Frank. The court also found that the evidence should be excluded under Neb.Evid.R. 403, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 27-403 (Reissue 1989), because of the danger that the acts of Ron Thompson might be imputed by the jury to Frank, thus creating unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury. The court stated that the issue in the case was Thompson's state of mind toward the victim, not her state of mind toward Ron Thompson. The defendant argues that the evidence should have been admitted to show that she acted in a reasonable fashion in defending herself against Frank. She further maintains that such evidence was necessary to explain her reference to Ron Thompson in the letter to her son dated July 24, which was introduced by the State as part of its case in chief. [I]n all proceedings where the Nebraska Evidence Rules apply, admissibility of evidence is controlled by the Nebraska Evidence Rules, not judicial discretion, except in those instances under the Nebraska Evidence Rules when judicial discretion is a factor involved in admissibility of evidence.... State v. Messersmith, 238 Neb. 924, 936, 473 N.W.2d 83, 92 (1991). Accord, State v. Toney, 243 Neb. 237, 498 N.W.2d 544 (1993); State v. Peterson, 242 Neb. 286, 494 N.W.2d 551 (1993). Initially, we address Thompson's claim that the evidence of her abuse by a person, Ron Thompson, was admissible under Neb.Evid.R. 404(2), Neb.Rev.Stat. § 27-404(2) (Reissue 1989), to show that Frank's actions made Thompson angry, frustrated, and frightened, because the actions of the two men were directly related in Thompson's mind. This is a misapplication of rule 404(2), which states: Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he or she acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. (Emphasis supplied.) Although the statute does not expressly state that the other crimes, wrongs, or acts must be those of the accused and not of a third party, it is obviously implied, and we have previously held that to be the case. In State v. Timmerman, 240 Neb. 74, 87, 480 N.W.2d 411, 419 (1992), we stated that [u]nder rule 404(2), evidence of other crimes is not admissible unless there is sufficient evidence that the crimes were actually committed and that the defendant committed them.... (Emphasis supplied.) We based our holding on Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 689, 108 S.Ct. 1496, 1501, 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988), in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that [e]vidence is admissible under Rule 404(b) only if it is relevant .... In the Rule 404(b) context, similar act evidence is relevant only if the jury can reasonably conclude that the act occurred and that the defendant was the actor. (Emphasis supplied.) Because Thompson was attempting to introduce evidence of the acts of a third party to show that she acted reasonably in defending herself against Frank, that evidence is irrelevant and therefore inadmissible in the context of rule 404(2). Even though evidence of Ron Thompson's abuse of the defendant is not admissible as an other act, that does not mean it is inadmissible for any purpose. All relevant evidence normally is admissible. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. See Neb.Evid.R. 402, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 27-402 (Reissue 1989). Relevant evidence means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Neb. Evid.R. 401, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 27-401 (Reissue 1989). Our research has found no cases, nor have we been cited to any, in which a defendant has been permitted to introduce evidence of one episode of abuse by one individual to support the defendant's claim of self-defense in killing a second individual many years later. Moreover, we have found no cases in which a defendant has been permitted to introduce evidence of prior abuse to support the killing in self-defense of a victim who has always behaved as a perfect gentleman and who has concededly never laid a hand on the defendant. Finally, we have found no cases in which evidence of prior abuse has been used to support the self-defense killing of a victim whose alleged abuse of a defendant consisted of three or four threats, all but one of which was by telephone from many miles away. We therefore conclude that the evidence of Ron Thompson's alleged abuse of the defendant is irrelevant, because it fails to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the defendant's claim of self-defense more or less probable than it would otherwise be, without such evidence. The trial court did not commit error in excluding the evidence for lack of relevance. Because we have determined that the evidence was not relevant, we need not consider whether it was properly excluded under rule 403. The defendant also appears to argue that evidence of the defendant's prior abuse is admissible under Neb.Evid.R. 106, Neb. Rev.Stat. § 27-106 (Reissue 1989), although she does not cite that statute. The State had introduced into evidence in its case in chief a letter to the defendant's son in which she referred to Ron Thompson. However, admission of evidence under rule 106, the rule of completeness, is not automatic. Even under rule 106, the evidence sought to be admitted must be relevant to the issues in the case. See State v. Schrein, 244 Neb. 136, 504 N.W.2d 827 (1993). Having determined that evidence of Ron Thompson's prior abuse of the defendant is not relevant for any purpose, we find that this assignment of error is without merit.