Opinion ID: 570987
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Weeden's Constitutional Claims

Text: 29 A cable television franchisee has a property right in its franchise that is entitled to due process protections. See, e.g., Teleprompter of Erie, Inc. v. City of Erie, 537 F.Supp. 6, 11 (W.D.Penn.1981). The Town does not dispute that Weeden's was entitled to due process in the termination of its franchise. Rather, the Town argues that Weeden's was in fact afforded due process. Weeden's asserts that the Town denied Weeden's a fair hearing, the right to confront witnesses, the right to see evidence that would be used against it, the right to notice of meetings, and the right to receive public comment after notice was provided to Town residents. 30 At the core of the due process clause is the right to notice and a hearing 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.'  Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass'n v. City of Simi Valley, 882 F.2d 1398, 1405 (9th Cir.1989) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 1317 (1990). Under Sinaloa Lake, the notice required by due process has at least two elements. First, the notice must include notice of the hearing at which the plaintiff's rights will be determined. Second, the notice must be sufficient to enable the plaintiffs to prepare for the hearing in a meaningful way. See id; see also Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 14 (1978) (The purpose of notice under the Due Process Clause is to apprise the affected individual of, and permit adequate preparation for, an impending hearing.). 31 On January 27, 1986, the Town Administrator notified Weeden's that the bond had lapsed. While this letter did not warn of a possible termination, or give notice of a hearing on Weeden's failure to maintain the bond, Weeden's had notice of their default and that the town was officially concerned. 32 On April 1, 1986, the Town Council voted to give Weeden's notice that unless it paid money due the Town, and filed evidence of a renewed bond by April 18, the franchise would be terminated. On April 7, the Town notified Weeden's that if it did not file the bond by April 18, as well as make all payments due the Town by that date, the Town would terminate the franchise. On April 21, 1986, the Town sent Weeden's a letter stating that the Town planned to proceed with termination of the franchise because Weeden's had failed to meet the April 18 deadline. The letter explained that Weeden's could request the Town Council to reconsider the matter at its May 6, 1986 meeting. 33 At the May 6 meeting, the Town Council heard from Art Weeden and from Weeden's insurance broker. The Council debated the question of termination and voted to approve a resolution terminating the franchise as of June 30, 1986. 34 We hold that Weeden's received adequate notice of the May 6 meeting, and that meeting met the requirement that Weeden's have an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner. 35 Weeden's now complains that in deliberating, the Council weighed evidence of customer complaints about Weeden's service, as well as considered a survey which the Town alleged showed that 48% of cable subscribers were dissatisfied with Weeden's. Weeden's also alleges that it was not permitted to see either the complaint file or the survey results before the Council voted on termination. These matters were redundant. The franchise agreement permitted the Town to terminate the franchise if Weeden's violated a franchise provision and maintaining the bond was a substantial requirement. On this record, the trial court correctly held that the Town could terminate the franchise solely because of the bond default. Therefore, the Town Council did not deny Weeden's due process, even if it failed to give Weeden's access to the complaint file and survey results prior to terminating the franchise. Weeden's had notice and an opportunity to be heard on its failure to maintain the bond, which failure provided the Town with sufficient grounds for terminating the franchise. Therefore, Weeden's received all the process that was due. 36
37 The trial court denied Weeden's motion to amend its complaint to allege violations of the first amendment and the contracts clause. We review a district court's denial of a motion to amend for an abuse of discretion. Under this standard, the district court's discretion cannot be reversed unless this court has a definite and firm conviction that the court below committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors. Parker v. Joe Lujan Enters., Inc., 848 F.2d 118, 121 (9th Cir.1988). The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Weeden's motion, which was filed three years after the proceedings began. 38 A number of additional points were briefed and argued but none overcomes the decisive fact that Weeden's had defaulted on the bonding requirement and that the Town terminated the franchise after notice and hearing. 39 AFFIRMED.