Opinion ID: 3036105
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Balancing Rights And Interests

Text: Having recognized Napier’s interest in meeting the substantial showing requirements of Franks and the government’s interest in keeping the identity of the informant confidential, we must determine under the “the particular circumstances of [this] case,” Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 62, whether the district court abused its discretion by balancing these interests and ultimately deciding to deny Napier’s motion to unseal. A court abuses its discretion if its decision “lies beyond the pale of reasonable justification under the circumstances.” Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1175 (9th Cir. 2000). For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the district court properly exercised its discretion. The sole basis offered by Napier for his potential Franks motion was his naked claim that he never sold drugs to anyone in September and October of 2001. Napier further asserts that because he never sold drugs during these months, he could not have sold any drugs to the confidential informant as alleged in the search warrant. Napier makes this assertion in the face of the facts that (1) when the search warrant was executed a short time after the two sales to the informant, law enforcement officers found large quantities of drugs, a scale, packaging materials, and other items typically used to make rock cocaine, and (2) as developed in an evidentiary hearing, he was personally identified by surveillance officers as the person who met with the informant on the occasions in question. [6] A review of the district court’s rulings and hearing transcripts shows that the district court correctly followed procedures and methods established by the Ninth Circuit to balance the interests at issue. These procedural steps are, by themselves, evidence that the district court properly considered UNITED STATES v. NAPIER 1411 Napier’s interests and made efforts to reconcile those interests with the government’s interests in protecting the confidentiality of the informant. For instance, the district court recognized, and Napier acknowledged at oral argument, that courts have “sanctioned procedures where you don’t give the name of an informant, and you redact certain, very closely identifying pieces of information that would . . . identify an informant.” See, e.g., United States v. Dixon, 123 F. Supp. 2d 275, 278 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (“Information specifically identifying the confidential informant may be redacted.”). [7] Consistent with this acknowledgment and in an attempt to provide Napier with as much information as possible, the district court ordered the government to provide Napier with a redacted version of Attachment A. The government complied with this order. Napier asserted to the district court that the redacted version failed to provide him with enough information to meet the initial burden required for a Franks hearing. [8] However, after Napier moved for reconsideration, the district court granted Napier an evidentiary hearing, at which the search warrant affiant, Detective Meredith, testified and was subject to questioning by Napier. Even though the district court prevented Napier from asking certain questions which would tend to reveal the identity of the confidential informant, the hearing gave Napier an additional opportunity to gather information and to test the validity of the affidavit as well as the credibility of the detective. The hearing served also the important purpose of confirming to the district court that the reasons given to the court for sealing the affidavit continued to exist. In addition to the redacted attachment and evidentiary hearing, the district court took the extra precaution—to which the government consented—of asking Napier if he wanted an in 1412 UNITED STATES v. NAPIER camera hearing where the judge would question the confiden- tial informant to determine whether the sealed information involving the informant was truthful, and whether Napier had made a threshold showing of falsehood. Napier stated that he did not want the hearing and that it would be unhelpful and that he was entitled to Attachment A, period. The Court: I’m trying to figure out if there’s any reason for the court to contemplate any kind of in cam- era proceeding. Counsel for Napier: I can see no value in an in cam- era proceeding in settling any of the questions that are currently pending before the court. And that’s been my position from day one of this. [9] In Kiser, we identified ex parte, in camera hearings as a means by which defendants could pursue their claims of affiant misconduct in cases involving information from confidential informants. 716 F.2d at 1273. We held that where a defendant makes a “substantial preliminary showing” of false statements in an affidavit involving a confidential informant, the defendant is then entitled to an ex parte, in camera hearing to evaluate the defendant’s claims and to determine whether the defendant “is entitled to an open evidentiary hearing on his Franks claim.” Id. To quote the Kiser majority, The in camera procedure provides an equally- acceptable accommodation of the competing interests of the Government and the accused in the situation presented here, wherein the question is whether a law enforcement officer has lied. Through disclosure of the informer’s identity to the trial judge, and such subsequent inquiries by the judge as may be necessary, the Government can be protected from any significant, unnecessary impairment of necessary secrecy, yet the defendant can be saved from what could be serious police misconduct. UNITED STATES v. NAPIER 1413 Kiser, 716 F.2d at 1273 (quoting United States v. Moore, 522 F.2d 1068, 1072-73 (9th Cir. 1975)). [10] Each of these procedures, the revelation of additional information from the affidavit, the evidentiary hearing, and the rejected opportunity for in camera review, establishes that the district court was aware of the defendant’s interests and took careful steps to protect those interests by providing Napier with as much information as possible, and thus, an opportunity to meet the substantial showing requirement for a Franks hearing. On the basis of all the information then before the district court, the court then concluded that Napier “has not shown why that information is insufficient for him to know whether he could raise a Franks issue.” In so doing, the district court correctly ruled that the government’s interests remained paramount and that the sealed portions of the affidavit—which we have reviewed- should remain sealed. In these circumstances, the district court did not err in any respect. C. The District Court Correctly Denied Napier’s Motion To Suppress In light of our determination that Attachment A properly remained sealed, Napier’s assertion that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress fails. Napier requested the unsealing of the search warrant for one primary reason—to make a motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Franks. As set forth above, a defendant is entitled to a Franks hearing if he makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement was deliberately or recklessly included in the search warrant affidavit and that the statement was necessary to the magistrate’s finding of probable cause. 438 U.S. at 155-56. In Franks, the Supreme Court stated that a search warrant affiant is afforded a presumption of validity. Id. at 171. This presumption is bolstered, where as here, the incriminating results 1414 UNITED STATES v. NAPIER of the search and the in court testimony of the affiant substantially undermined Napier’s offer of proof. Moreover, he weakened his claim that he sold no drugs during the time of the sales by declining the court’s offer to examine the informant on that score; and he offered no other evidence to support what the full record before the court demonstrates to have been nothing more than a self-serving and doubtful denial. Consequently, Napier made no substantial preliminary showing of a entitlement to a Franks hearing. [11] In sum, Napier has failed to articulate any substantial reason why the additional sealed information he might have received would have helped him meet the initial burden required for a Franks hearing. Thus, Napier had no basis for a Franks hearing and, therefore, had no support for his motion to suppress. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court properly refused Napier a Franks hearing and correctly denied his motion to suppress. IV