Opinion ID: 805657
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: KG's Requested Relief

Text: In this suit, KG requests only equitable relief: a declaration that § 91 of the Massachusetts Gaming Act violates the Equal Protection Clause, preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, and associated attorneys' fees. We view the appropriate resolution of this appeal through the lens of KG's request for equitable relief. We start with KG's request for a preliminary injunction. Four factors govern the issuance of preliminary injunctive relief:
the injunction will succeed on the merits of -50- its claim or claims; (2) the potential for irreparable harm to this party if the injunction is denied; (3) the balance of the relative hardships that will ensue following either a grant or denial; and (4) the effect (if any) that the grant or denial will have on the public interest. González-Fuentes v. Molina, 607 F.3d 864, 875 (1st Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1568 (2011). In this case, several circumstances weigh strongly against granting injunctive relief at this point in time. As to likelihood of success on the merits, the law is far from clear, and both sides have weaknesses in their positions, as we have just outlined. That factor is only one of four we consider. First, it is clear from the affidavit of the Chairman of the Gaming Commission that the Commission is not now soliciting applications for the other two regions, will not do so until October 2012 at the earliest, and may not do so until some point in 2013. As a result, the nature of KG's present injury is relatively limited. For reasons other than § 91, the category 1 licensing process may not move forward in Region C for months to come. Second, the shape of the issues raised in this suit, and the attendant claims of injury, could well change depending on future events. It has already changed since oral argument, with the approval of the compact. What is more difficult is the indefiniteness of when the Gaming Commission may, after August 1, 2012, determine that the -51- tribe will not have land taken into trust, which would then trigger the competitive license application process. The statute does not set a date for this determination, instead providing only that if, at any time on or after August 1, 2012, the commission determines that the tribe will not have land taken into trust by the United States Secretary of the Interior, the commission shall consider bids for a category 1 license in Region C under said chapter 23K. 2011 Mass. Acts ch. 194, § 91(e). At oral argument, the defendants provided two examples of when this determination would presumably take place: (1) if the Secretary of the Interior disapproves the tribal-state compact or (2) if the Secretary denies the Mashpee's pending land in trust application.28 The defendants stated that beyond those circumstances, the Commission would have to exercise its own authority in deciding whether to consider bids, but gave no suggestion as to when the Commission may do so. There are two provisions in the Mashpee Tribal-State Compact that raise the prospect of further delays and cast doubt on 28 Neither of these events appears to be associated with a fixed time limit under the IGRA and the land in trust statute. The approval or disapproval of a tribal-state compact must take place within 45 days after the date on which the compact is submitted to the Secretary for approval, 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(8)(C), but there is no explicit requirement as to when a compact must be submitted after it has been agreed on by the state and the tribe, see 25 C.F.R. § 293.7 (providing that [t]he Indian tribe or State should submit the compact or amendment after it has been legally entered into by both parties). As to the land in trust process, the relevant regulations provide only that [t]he Secretary shall review all requests and shall promptly notify the applicant in writing of his decision. Id. § 151.12(a). -52- the two examples provided at oral argument. First, the compact provides that if the United States Secretary of the Interior fails to accept such land in trust as to the current land in trust application, the Tribe may identify alternative land in Region C to be acquired in trust for Gaming under this Compact, and so presumably begin the land in trust process anew. Mashpee TribalState Compact § 5.2.2. This raises the prospect of multiple land in trust applications and further delay as to when the Commission might determine that the Mashpee will not have land taken into trust under § 91(e). Second, the compact provides that if it is not approved by the United States Secretary of the Interior as required by IGRA, the Governor agrees that, if requested by the Tribe, the Governor will immediately resume negotiations in good faith with the Tribe for an amended compact. Mashpee Tribal-State Compact § 18.8. This raises the prospect that even the Secretary's disapproval of the compact will not trigger a Commission decision to commence the competitive licensing process. There also remains the potential that the Commission might wait years until the Secretary makes a determination as to the compact or land in trust application before itself acting under § 91.29 And the Mashpee Tribal-State Compact provides that it shall 29 The Commissioner of the Massachusetts Gaming Commission has recently stated that [w]e'll give the tribe whatever the appropriate amount of time is to get that decision made, and would let the tribe have their fair shot to get the land in trust. -53- not prevent the Tribe from challenging in a court of competent jurisdiction any such determination by the Commission. Mashpee Tribal-State Compact § 21.10. This compact clause raises the prospect of a lengthy delay before a conclusive decision is made as to whether the commercial licensing process will go forward in Region C. The Supreme Court recently took notice of the length of time involved in reaching a decision on a land in trust application. Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians, 132 S. Ct. at 2203 (noting the lengthy administrative review of a request to have land taken into trust for purposes of operating a casino). Even if the lands were taken into trust by the Secretary, there could be further delays from litigation over the Secretary's decision. The Court held that sovereign immunity does not bar suits under the Administrative Procedure Act challenging the Secretary's taking of land into trust, and that a nearby property owner satisfied the requirements of prudential standing to bring such a challenge. Id. at 2209-12. Moreover, the Court's opinion appears to suggest that a nearby property owner had standing to raise a challenge based on Carcieri to a land in trust determination. Id. at 2203-04. Beyond any such more typical delays in the land in trust application and compact approval processes, there is also the issue Brenann, Patrick Expects Casino Deal Next Week, Cape Cod Times, June 13, 2012. -54- of whether the Secretary of the Interior has the authority take land into trust for the Mashpee in the wake of Carcieri. If the Secretary lacks such authority, that would require Congressional action before land could be taken into trust. This adds yet another layer of uncertainty and potential delay. If such lengthy delays occurred, this would undercut the argument that § 91 is meant as a temporary accommodation to the IGRA process to allow lands to be taken into trust and so is authorized in that minimal sense. Given this situation, the lack of clear answers on questions of both state and federal law, the shifting of the nature of the injury to KG, and the apparent attempt to allow some time for the IGRA process to work (including any Carcieri fix), we cannot say there was an abuse of discretion in the denial of preliminary injunctive relief. An injunction is an exercise of a court's equitable authority, to be ordered only after taking into account all of the circumstances that bear on the need for prospective relief. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1816 (2010). Equitable relief is not granted as a matter of course, and a court should be particularly cautious when contemplating relief that implicates public interests. Id. (citations omitted). These considerations also lead us to affirm the denial of KG's request for injunctive and declaratory relief at this point in time. The Supreme Court has made clear that the Declaratory Judgment Act has been understood to confer on federal courts unique -55- and substantial discretion in deciding whether to declare the rights of litigants. On its face, the statute provides that a court 'may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration.' Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 286 (1995) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a)). The Court has explained that the propriety of declaratory relief in a particular case will depend upon a circumspect sense of its fitness informed by the teachings and experience concerning the functions and extent of federal judicial power. Id. at 287 (quoting Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Utah v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 243 (1952)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court's dismissal of the complaint is another matter. We simply cannot say that KG's equal protection claim as to § 91 fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or that the issuance of equitable relief may not be appropriate at some future date. We also affirm the dismissal with prejudice of KG's claims as to the $5 million appropriation, the advisory committee seat, and the preemption challenge to § 91. We dismiss KG's statelaw claims without prejudice. We remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. No costs are awarded. -56-