Opinion ID: 2549040
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the inherent dangerousness of traffic stops as part of the totality of the circumstances

Text: ¶ 22 The State argues that the court of appeals' analysis was flawed because it failed to consider the fact that all traffic stops are inherently dangerous. Though the court of appeals did not affirmatively disclaim the inherent dangerousness of traffic stops, we hereby clarify the principle that the inherent dangerousness of all traffic stops is a factor to be considered in the totality of the circumstances analysis. However, this danger can be fully or partially mitigated by ordering the occupants out of the vehicle. Thus, both the inherent dangerousness of the traffic stop and any reduction in that danger resulting from ordering the occupants out of the vehicle should be factored into the totality of the circumstances analysis.
¶ 23 In State v. James, we noted that there are inherent safety concerns in all traffic stops. 2000 UT 80, ¶ 10, 13 P.3d 576. We explained that officer safety is an inherent aspect of the governing caselaw, which we are not at liberty to disregard. Id. at ¶ 10 n. 3, 13 P.3d 576. The United States Supreme Court has also considered the dangerousness inherent in traffic stops, noting that officers face an inordinate risk when approaching a person seated in an automobile. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1048, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983). In addition, the Tenth Circuit recently explained, [t]he terrifying truth is that officers face a very real risk of being assaulted with a dangerous weapon each time they stop a vehicle.... [C]ourts have been willing to give the officers `wide latitude' to discern the threat the motorist may pose to officer safety. United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1223 (10th Cir.2001) (citation omitted). ¶ 24 Due to this inherent dangerousness, courts allow officers to take certain precautions to protect themselves without having to justify their actions based on reasonable suspicion. The United States Supreme Court in Pennsylvania v. Mimms held that once a motor vehicle has been lawfully detained for a traffic violation, police officers may order the driver out of the vehicle to promote safety, even in the absence of reasonable suspicion, without violating the Fourth Amendment's proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures. 434 U.S. 106, 108-111, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977). The Court later clarified that this same rationale also allows officers to order passengers out of the vehicle. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 410, 117 S.Ct. 882, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997). Officers can also run background checks pursuant to a traffic stop in order to increase officer safety. Holt, 264 F.3d at 1221. Officer safety is so important that all federal and most state courts allow these actions even in the absence of any specific safety concern. [4] ¶ 25 Although society's interest in promoting officer safety is great, that interest must be weighed against society's interest in protecting individual liberty. The reasonableness of a Terry frisk depends on a balance between the public interest and the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975) (citation omitted). Balancing these interests, courts have held that slight intrusions such as ordering a person out of a car or conducting background checks pursuant to a traffic stop are justifiable intrusions in order to allow officers to operate in safety. See Mimms, 434 U.S. at 111, 98 S.Ct. 330; Wilson, 519 U.S. at 410, 117 S.Ct. 882; Holt, 264 F.3d at 1221. A Terry frisk is an intrusion of a greater magnitude. As the Court noted in Terry, a Terry frisk may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be undertaken lightly. Terry, 392 U.S. at 17, 88 S.Ct. 1868. Hence, we expressly note that the State has not argued, and we do not hold, that the inherent dangerousness of traffic stops alone justifies a Terry frisk. However, we agree with the State that the inherent dangerousness of all traffic stops is a factor that should be considered under the totality of the circumstances analysis.
¶ 26 Traffic stops are analogous to Terry stops, which are justified on the basis of reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984). A significant difference, however, between a pedestrian stop and a traffic stop is the unknowns presented by the vehicle itself. A vehicle has hidden compartments and the potential to hide the suspect's actions from the officer's view. Thus, the inherent dangerousness of traffic stops discussed above is directly tied to a person's occupancy of, and potential access to, the vehicle. See Long, 463 U.S. at 1049, 103 S.Ct. 3469. ¶ 27 It stands to reason, therefore, that if a person is ordered out of a vehicle, some or all of the inherent dangerousness of a traffic stop may be mitigated. To perform a Terry frisk, an officer must order the occupants from the vehicle. As the United States Supreme Court explained, [e]stablishing a face-to-face confrontation diminishes the possibility, otherwise substantial, that the driver can make unobserved movements; this, in turn, reduces the likelihood that the officer will be the victim of an assault. Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110, 98 S.Ct. 330. In extending Mimms to passengers, the Court later explained, [o]utside the car, the passengers will be denied access to any possible weapon that might be concealed in the interior of the passenger compartment. Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414, 117 S.Ct. 882. In simple traffic stops where other indicia of dangerousness are absent, ordering the occupants of the vehicle out of the car clearly mitigates the inherent dangerousness of the stop. ¶ 28 This is not to say that officers must always order occupants out of a vehicle to minimize danger to themselves or others or that officers must adopt alternative means to increase their safety in order to avoid the intrusions involved in a Terry encounter. Long, 463 U.S. at 1052, 103 S.Ct. 3469. Nor do we believe that ordering occupants out of a vehicle during a traffic stop will necessarily eliminate all danger. As the Supreme Court has also noted, a suspect may still gain access to a vehicle even after the officer orders the suspect out of the vehicle. Id. at 1051-52, 103 S.Ct. 3469. Thus, while we recognize that the inherent dangerousness of traffic stops may be mitigated by ordering the occupants out of the vehicle, we also note that some danger related to potential access to the vehicle may remain. ¶ 29 Because ordering the occupants out of the vehicle may remove or substantially reduce the inherent dangerousness of a traffic stop, both the inherent dangerousness of a traffic stop and any decrease in danger from ordering a suspect from a vehicle are factors that should be considered under the totality of the circumstances. We reiterate that even when not mitigated, the inherent dangerousness of a traffic stop alone is not determinative. The officer must still meet the requirements of Terry by pointing to `specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts,' would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the suspect may be armed and presently dangerous. Long, 463 U.S. at 1049, 103 S.Ct. 3469 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868).