Opinion ID: 1715987
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Sec. 261.01 (1), Stats., requires certain suits to be brought in the county where the real property in question is located. [1] Subsections (b), (c), and (d) of sec. 261.01 (1) are definitely inapplicable in this action since they involve partition, foreclosure, and recovery of distrained personal property respectively. The question of whether the circuit court for Sauk county had jurisdiction in the present case turns on whether a specific-performance suit to enforce an option to purchase real estate constitutes an action [f]or the recovery of real property, or of an estate or interest therein, or for the determination in any form of such estate or interest, within the meaning of sec. 261.01 (1) (a). This precise question is one of first impression in this state, but appellants deem the holding in State ex rel. Hammer v. Williams [2] to be broad enough to cover the present facts. In Williams the court said that an action could not be brought in Rusk county to foreclose a mortgage on property situated in Price county. Williams is not controlling, however, since sec. 261.01 (1) (c) specifically commands that mortgage foreclosure actions be commenced in the county where the land is located. There is no such specific reference to specific-performance actions. Respondent contends that because the contract ( i.e., the option) and not the land is the subject matter of the action, sec. 261.01 (1) (a), Stats., is inapplicable and the suit can be brought in the county where appellants reside pursuant to sec. 261.01 (12). [3] This position is well taken for several reasons. First, to come within the purview of sec. 261.01 (1), this situation could only be covered by the or for the determination in any form of such estate or interest language of subsection (a). The such estate or interest wording, however, alludes to a previous reference to estate or interest, therein, which in turn relates to the recovery of real property language. Thus, subsection (a) as a whole keys off of recovery of real property. That is, actions for recovery of real property or an estate or interest therein or the determination in any form of such estate or interest must be started in the county where the land lies. The present action is not one for recovery of land, and does not fall within the meaning of sec. 261.01 (1) (a). Second, the action is to enforce the contract (option), and not to try title to the land. Appellants' defenses to the granting of the summary judgment are contract defenses. No previous decision of this court declares that an action to enforce an underlying contract must be commenced under sec. 261.01 (1) (a), Stats. The authorities are limited to suits involving the title [4] or possession [5] of land. In addition, the partition, mortgage foreclosure, and recovery of distrained personalty actions specified in the other subsections of sec. 261.01 (1) involve suits not based on contract. [6] Third, in this case, the judgment for specific performance does not operate on the land, but upon the person. [7] The appellants are commanded to perform according to their contract with the respondent. Therefore, it is not an action made local under sec. 261.01 (1), Stats. [8] We conclude therefore that the circuit court for Sauk county did have jurisdiction over the action for specific performance even though the land covered by the option agreement was all located in Columbia county.