Opinion ID: 1920351
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Prosecutor's Closing Argument in Sentencing Phase

Text: ś 66. During closing argument of the sentencing phase, defense counsel implored the jury, as one of the mitigating factors, not to punish Spicer because of his previous infractions and prison sentences. According to defense counsel, Spicer had already paid his penalty for the previous crimes and should not be punished for them again. Furthermore, Spicer's attorney emphasized to the jury that they had the option to sentence Spicer to life without parole instead of death. Defense counsel charged the jury that they are under no obligation to impose the death penalty calling it merely an option and he left them with the thought that [i]fs a hard thing to put someone to death, and you hold his life in your hands. ś 67. The State responded during rebuttal by emphasizing the concept of retribution in the English and American legal systems. Spicer objected that the State was misstating the law and improperly making an eye for an eye argument, but the trial judge overruled the objection. In response to Spicer's attorney's plea for life without parole, the prosecutor stated: when I hear someone say, mercy, all I have to do is look at the pictures, when I hear someone say, think real hard before you give him death-you're not giving him death. He's giving himself death. The prosecutor then went on to argue that Hebert's family could not represent themselves in court and thus the prosecutor had to seek justice for Hebert's death. The prosecutor stated: I become a surrogate father to Edmond Hebert, and that's why I can say this with all candor and with all honesty. I look at cases, and not every case do I seek the death penalty. I try to find reasons that maybe we ought to work something else out. This is not one of them. ś 68. On rebuttal, the prosecutor challenged Spicer's mitigating circumstances by stating: You see, ladies and gentlemen, I asked you, would you do your duty, during voir dire. And I submit to you that the weak mitigating circumstances will never amount to the aggravating circumstances unless you were predisposed and, in fact, never wanted to give the death penalty, because if there ever was a case in George County that deserved it, this is the one. And if you back away from it, then you're backing away from it because you weren't honest and candid in voir dire. ś 69. Spicer objected to this and other statements regarding the honesty of the jurors, and not following their oath, arguing that the prosecutor was trying to explain to the jury that they have to give [Spicer] the death penalty. The trial court first overruled Spicer's objection without explanation, but after the prosecutor continued briefly along similar lines, and another objection was made, the trial court sustain[ed] the objection to that portion of [the prosecutors] argument. Spicer now argues that the prosecutor repeatedly misstated the law and argued his personal opinion on the appropriateness of the death penalty in this case and minimized the jury's role in sentencing. According to Spicer, the State improperly argued that the jury had promised during voir dire to impose the death penalty if they found Spicer guilty and that the jurors would not be the ones putting the defendant to death. Thus, Spicer concludes, the above prosecutorial misconduct deprived him of a fundamentally fair trial and violated his rights under state and federal law. ś 70. There is no distinction between the latitude given by this Court with regard to closing arguments during the sentencing phase as compared to the guilt phase. Wells v. State, 903 So.2d 739, 742-43 (Miss.2005). Attorneys are afforded a wide latitude in arguing their case to the jury, but they are not allowed to employ tactics which are inflammatory, highly prejudicial, or reasonably calculated to unduly influence the jury. Sheppard v. State, 777 So.2d at 661. This Court will reverse a conviction because of lawyer misconduct if it concludes that the natural and probable effect of the improper argument was to create unjust prejudice against the accused and was likely to result in, a decision influenced by the prejudice so created. Id. Furthermore, alleged improper prosecutorial comment must be considered in context with the circumstances of the case. Ahmad v. State, 603 So.2d 843, 846 (Miss.1992). In this case, the Court must review the prosecutor's comments in conjunction with the opening salvo from defense counsel. Edwards v. State, 737 So.2d 275, 299 (Miss.1999). ś 71. We find that the prosecutor's comments did not create unjust prejudice that influenced the verdict. The prosecutor was not making statements of law when discussing the concept of retribution, but was instead laying the historical foundation of an argument to rebut defense counsel's plea for mercy. We have held that counsel may draw upon literature, history, science, religion, and philosophy for material for his argument. Carr v. State, 655 So.2d 824, 853 (Miss.1995) (quoting Nelms & Blum Co. v. Fink, 159 Miss. 372, 383, 131 So. 817, 820 (1930)). The other comments to which Spicer objects were also in response to Spicer's argument for mercy and life without parole. The prosecutor did not argue that the jurors promised on voir dire to impose the death penalty nor did he minimize the juror's role by asserting they were not giving [Spicer] death. Instead, the prosecutor was responding to Spicer's attorney's argument for life without parole by urging the jury to conclude Spicer deserved the death penalty. In that regard the prosecutor was acting as an advocate for the State in an effort to encourage the jurors to draw conclusions from the evidence and to make suggestions as to a proper conclusion. See Evans v. State, 725 So.2d at 671 (quoting Blue v. State, 674 So.2d 1184, 1208 (Miss.1996)). There was nothing inappropriate with the prosecutor's comments. Accordingly, we find that Spicer's eleventh assertion of error is without merit.