Opinion ID: 529707
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jurisprudential Considerations

Text: 46 We consider first the law of the case issue. Doe contends that this doctrine, which holds that a decision on an issue of law made at one stage of a case becomes a binding precedent to be followed in successive stages of the same litigation, IB J. Moore, J. Lucas, T. Currier, Moore's Federal Practice, p 0.404 (2d ed. 1988), prevents us from ruling on his constitutional claims. Doe appears to maintain that, by virtue of the law of the case, our previous decision vacating the district court's dismissal of his constitutional challenges requires that we remand these issues to the district court. Doe Reply Br. at 15. In his original brief, Doe also suggested that, in any event, the district court did not properly review the alleged infringements to his constitutional interests and that, as a result, our consideration would be premature. Doe Br. at 26; Appellant's Br. at 29-33. 47 These arguments are problematic for several reasons. First, because the Supreme Court heard this case on certiorari and reversed, the mandate in our original decision never took effect. See 1B Moore, Lucas, Currier, Moore's Federal Practice, p 0.404[5.-3]. Thus, the district court's determination concerning Doe's constitutional claims remains unvacated. 48 Furthermore, in its opinion in this case, the district court stated that 49 The Court also finds that plaintiff's due process claims are without merit because plaintiff, as an employee excepted from the protections of the Civil Service Reform Act had no property interest in his job, and because the withdrawal of plaintiff's access to SCI and the resulting termination of employment, did not infringe any liberty interest. 50 Doe v. Weinberger, No. 85-1996, slip op. at 3-4, J.A. at 34-35. Thus, the district court did consider the liberty and property interest claims, albeit in a summary manner, and dismissed them. 8 Doe's cross-motion for summary judgment to the trial court, J.A. at 30-31, indicates that he sought the district court's determination of the merits of those claims; he cannot now maintain that the court did not deal with his constitutional challenges properly. As a result, we should be allowed to review Doe's constitutional claims. 51 In general, constitutional claims are judicially reviewable unless Congress clearly expresses its intent to preclude review. Webster v. Doe, 108 S.Ct. at 2053. Appellant does not contend that Congress has rendered his liberty interest complaint unreviewable, and the relevant statutes and regulations contain no suggestion that Congress intended constitutional claims arising from NSA dismissals to be unreviewable. Although Webster indicated that constitutional claims arising out of an individual discharge are reviewable by a district court, id. at 2054, Webster does not flatly require that those claims always be remanded to the district court if the court of appeals can dispose of them more efficiently.