Opinion ID: 1798961
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Instructions on Comparative Negligence.

Text: Appellants contend that the trial court committed prejudicial error in instructing the jury on the difference in the rule of negligence that applies to the defendant and to the minor plaintiff both in determining negligence, if any, on the part of Stephen and in comparing Stephen's negligence with that of the defendant. The trial court's entire instruction on the question in the verdict concerning Stephen's negligence was as follows: Question No. 3 of the verdict inquires whether Stephen Metcalf was negligent with respect to his own safety. He had a duty to exercise care for his own safety. The care which he was required to use depended upon his age, his capacity, his discretion and knowledge and experience. Negligence on the part of a child is failure to exercise that degree of care which is ordinarily exercised by a child of the same age and capacity and discretion and knowledge and experience under the same or similar circumstances. In determining whether Stephen Metcalf was exercising that care that one of his age, capacity, discretion, knowledge and experience would exercise under the same or similar circumstances due consideration should be given to the child's instinct and impulses; for, while the child may have the knowledge of an adult respecting dangerou[s] acts, he may not have the prudence, or discretion or thoughtfulness to avoid hazards of risk to which he is exposed. It is for you to determine from all of the evidence, weighing it and considering it, what your answer to this question should be. On the comparison of negligence the trial court instructed: In determining your answer to the comparative negligence question you may bear in mind the difference in the rule of negligence that applies to the defendant and the plaintiff minor boy, and determine this question, No. 5, in the light of the difference in these rules which apply to these parties. (Emphasis added.) Appellants contend the latter instruction was erroneous because the court used the word may rather than should. Appellants did not properly preserve this alleged error for appeal. Appellants did not propose an instruction on comparative negligence, object to the instruction given, or allege that the instruction was erroneous in their motions after verdict. Consequently, appellants cannot now, as a matter of right, avail themselves of this alleged error as a basis for reversal. [4] Nevertheless, in our discretion, we proceed to a consideration of this contention on its merits. The trial court should have instructed the jury that, in making its comparison of negligence, it should rather than may bear in mind the difference between child and adult negligence. [5] Nevertheless, viewing the instructions as a whole, [6] their net effect was to advise the jurors that they were continually to take account of Stephen's age whenever they considered his actions, on the question of comparison in negligence as well as on the question of his causal negligence. Therefore, there was no reversible error committed by the trial court in this regard.