Opinion ID: 150366
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Intent of the Defendant in Adopting the Mark ( Lapp Factor Five)

Text: Evidence of a defendant's intent is not a prerequisite for finding a Lanham Act violation; such evidence, however, weighs heavily in favor of finding a likelihood of confusion. See Id. at 286. In evaluating this factor, courts must look at whether the defendant chose the mark to intentionally confuse consumers, and thereby capitalize on the senior user's goodwill, and whether the defendant gave adequate care to investigating its proposed mark. See Kos., 369 F.3d at 721. [A] defendant's mere intent to copy, without more, is not sufficiently probative of the defendant's success in causing confusion to weigh such a finding in the plaintiff's favor; rather, defendant's intent will indicate a likelihood of confusion only if an intent to confuse consumers is demonstrated via purposeful manipulation of the junior mark to resemble the senior's. A & H Sportswear, 237 F.3d at 225-26. The District Court did not mention specific evidence regarding Creative Compounds's good or bad intent; rather, the court found that there is nothing in the record to suggest that Creative Compounds attempted to pass off its goods as Sabinsa's. In fact, the evidence is to the contrary: Creative Compounds has made efforts to distinguish itself and its Forsthin product from Sabinsa. The record belies these conclusions. In fact, far from there being nothing in the record to suggest bad intent, there was ample evidence that Creative Compounds attempted to pass off its product as Sabinsa's. Creative Compounds' personnel offered inconsistent testimony concerning their trademark searches prior to the company's adopting the Forsthin mark. There was also evidence that Creative Compounds's President and CEO falsely claimed to have conducted research that expanded on Sabinsa's discoveries regarding forskohlin. In addition, the timing of Creative Compounds's adoption of the Forsthin mark and its pamphlet touting the return of Coleusboth of which coincided with ForsLean renewing its supply of forskohlin following the drought in India and issuing a ForsLean promise to its customers regarding continued supplywould support an inference that Creative Compounds intended to trade on Sabinsa's goodwill and confuse customers as to the source of its product. Indeed, the fact that Creative Compounds chose fors, not coleus, or cole, or col, as the first syllable of its brand name, while also promoting the return of Coleus, would suggest that the adoption of the Forsthin brand name was aimed at ForsLean. The District Court was, of course, permitted to credit or discredit certain pieces of testimony and weigh them accordingly. But in stating that there was nothing in the record to suggest Creative Compounds's bad intent, the District Court failed even to acknowledge the existence of contradictory evidence. Accordingly, its conclusory finding that this factor favors Creative Compounds is clearly erroneous. Sabinsa argues that the District Court failed to apply the proper standards governing intent and that Creative Compounds's behavior in choosing a mark so similar to ForsLean should at least be considered reckless, rendering it sufficient to weigh this factor in Sabinsa's favor. In Kos, we held that the defendant's adoption of the ALTOCOR mark, after Kos had successfully used the ADVICOR mark for similar goods and with notice of its objections, was sufficient to weigh this factor in favor of Kos. See 369 F.3d at 721-22. Because the District Court in the instant case ignored whole swaths of evidence and failed to make any subordinate findings regarding intent, however, it is impossible to determine whether it appropriately comprehended the standard. Moreover, in contrast to the ADVICOR mark, both ForsLean and Forsthin bear some relationship to the underlying product; Creative Compounds's adoption of its mark, alone, therefore cannot be considered enough to weigh the intent factor for Sabinsa. Accordingly, unlike the other factors, the intent factor involves disputed factual issues, and we are unable to hold that it favors either party as a matter of law.