Opinion ID: 1405650
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Potential Juror Watkins

Text: The prosecutor gave a litany of reasons for striking Watkins, [6] a 37-year-old married African-American woman, who was a college graduate working as an accounting clerk at a law firm. Although some of the proffered explanations may appear plausible at first blush, when read in context and in comparison with seated jurors, they appear pretextual. See Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 241, 125 S.Ct. 2317 (side-by-side comparisons serve as evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination). Without evaluating each of these justifications individually or performing comparative juror analysis, the California Court of Appeal upheld the trial court's determination as long as one legitimate race-neutral explanation existed for the strike. The Court of Appeal stopped at the second step of the Batson analysis, where the facial validity of the prosecutor's reasons were determined, and failed to consider whether any of the proffered reasons were pretextual. As in another recent Ninth Circuit Batson case, the record pertaining to venireperson Watkins convinces me that each of the prosecutor's justifications is logically implausible, undermined by a comparative juror analysis, and otherwise unsupported by the record. Ali, 584 F.3d at 1182. Because an evaluation of the voir dire transcript and juror questionnaires clearly and convincingly refutes each of the prosecutor's nonracial grounds, I conclude that his actual and only reason for striking [the venireperson] was her race. Kesser, 465 F.3d at 360. First, the prosecutor claimed that Watkins believes her brother was unjustly prosecuted and was wrongly convicted, which could affect her perception of the criminal justice system. See supra note 6. On her questionnaire, Watkins reported that twenty years earlier her brother was convicted of a shooting that her parents had told her was in self defense. In response to questions during voir dire, Watkins stated that her brother's conviction, which occurred when she was only seventeen years old and lived in Alabama, would not affect her at trial and did not engender any ill feeling toward the police or prosecutors in Sacramento County. Despite Watkins's statements that her brother's conviction would not affect her judgment in this case, the prosecutor provided the first reason for striking Watkins: She may . . . perceive that . . . the government is treating an African-American person differently. She may see, there may be an inward bias. I'm not saying there is, that might be the driving force. That's a concern, just not that fact, but the whole scenario excludes her, from our point of view. The district court found, the prosecutor's inferential presumption that because Watkins thought her brother wrongly convicted, it might mean that she would be race conscious in her deliberations if chosen to be a juror. Such a presumption is highly problematic and suggests that the prosecutor exercised challenges in part with a discriminatory mindset. Indeed, because the prosecutor never asked her, it is not even certain that Watkins thought her brother was wrongly convicted. [7] In response to the court's questions, she testified that her brother's trial occurred when she was a minor, that all of her information about it came from her parents, and that her brother was convicted and served seven years in prison for the shooting. Watkins told the court, as she had stated on the questionnaire, that the incident would not affect her judgment in the case or her feelings toward police. Additionally, Watkins never stated, or even implied, that she believed the government treats African-Americans differently. The prosecutor's attribution was based solely on Watkins's lack of reply to the question whether she had experienced prejudice. On the questionnaire, Watkins did not mark either Yes or No in response to the question, Would you say you were raised in an atmosphere free of prejudice? Instead, she commented, There are many forms of prejudice, so I can't accurately answer that. With respect to both of these alleged statements by Watkins, as in Miller-El II, [p]erhaps [the prosecutor] misunderstood, but unless he had an ulterior reason for keeping [the struck venireperson] off the jury we think he would have proceeded differently. 545 U.S. at 244, 125 S.Ct. 2317. Similarly, we expect the prosecutor would have cleared up any misunderstanding by asking further questions before getting to the point of exercising a strike. Id. The failure to ask undermines the persuasiveness of the claimed concern. Id. at 250 n. 8, 125 S.Ct. 2317. As the voir dire transcript shows, Watkins testified that she had no reservations about her brother's conviction influencing her in the trial, and the prosecutor never challenged her on that assertion. Moreover, the prosecutor's explanation is undermined by his treatment of three non-African-American jurors, two of whom also had relatives who had been charged with homicides, and one of whom was unsure of a family member's past problems with the law. Juror 1's cousin shot and killed his brother-in-law and Juror 14's father was arrested for murder, but the prosecutor allowed both to be seated. Additionally, the prosecutor also did not strike Juror 5, who only vaguely related information about his brother's arrest or charge regarding [s]omething about cocaine around 1977, about which he [n]ever did find out the details. Although no seated juror was precisely identical to Watkins in every respect, the law does not require such a finding. Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 247 n. 6, 125 S.Ct. 2317 (A per se rule that a defendant cannot win a Batson claim unless there is an exactly identical white juror would leave Batson inoperable.); see also Kesser, 465 F.3d at 366. The prosecutor's unquestioning acceptance of similar non-African-American jurors, and rejection of Watkins based on his concern about the conviction of her brother creating bias against the criminal system, smacks of pretext. The Supreme Court has found that a prosecutor's reliance on crime in an African-American juror's family to justify a strike where the relative's criminal history was comparable to those of relatives of other panel members not struck by prosecutors suggests pretext. Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 250 n. 8, 125 S.Ct. 2317. Second, the prosecutor's assertion that he excused Watkins because she might not believe our officers here, or that they start off not with equal standing as some of the other witnesses, including defendants' witnesses, we suspect, in this case, is unpersuasive in light of comparative juror analysis. Although the prosecutor claims he struck Watkins because she stated she did not think police officers are always truthful, but [did not] think the civilian would be either, he failed to strike several non-African-American seated jurors who expressed equal or greater skepticism about police officers' credibility. [8] The distrust of law enforcement rationale for the strike is severely undercut by the prosecution's failure to object to other panel members who expressed views much like [the dismissed venireperson]. Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 248, 125 S.Ct. 2317. Furthermore, contrary to the prosecutor's contention that Watkins might be more likely to credit testimony by defense witnesses, her statement clearly indicates equal skepticism of civilian witnesses: I don't [think] police officers are always truthful, but I don't think the civilian would be either. There is simply no evidence in the record to support the prosecutor's suspicions of bias. As the magistrate correctly noted, because Watkins thought both law enforcement and non-law enforcement could be untruthful, the [prosecutor's assertion that] she therefore disfavored law enforcement is a non-sequitur and strained. Third, the prosecutor's alleged concern that Watkins might have had a hidden agenda to act against the prosecution through a nullification vote is equally implausible. On her questionnaire, Watkins indicated that she saw problems with the criminal justice system, but did not identify any specifics, stating I'm not sure. A comparison of Watkins to two empaneled non-African-American jurors, who the prosecutor failed to strike, is instructive. Juror 6 stated she was Not sure about what the problems were with the criminal justice system. Juror 5 indicated there were problems with the criminal justice system, generally stating that Nothing is perfect, but did not elaborate. The prosecutor's failure to strike either non-African-American juror also suggests that the hidden agenda rationale was pretextual. The prosecutor also failed to ask Watkins any clarifying questions on voir dire that might confirm or refute his inference. See Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 244, 125 S.Ct. 2317. During the Batson hearing, he stated that Watkins's answer that she was not sure about problems with the criminal justice system [left] a void somewhere. Not sure in what sense? Not sure because of the O.J. Simpson case? What sense? However, Watkins's questionnaire bears no indication that she closely followed the Simpson trial; she stated she watched [j]ust enough to see how it was going and that it did not affect[her] view [of the courts and the criminal justice system] at all. Contrary to the requirements of Batson, the prosecutor's justification provided no clear and reasonably specific explanation of [the] legitimate reasons for exercising the challenges. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n. 20, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, the prosecutor allowed several jurors to be seated who expressed an interest in the O.J. Simpson case to a far greater degree than Watkins. Juror 1 stated he watched whenever [he] could on CourtT.V. Juror 3 stated he followed the Simpson case fairly closely and found the trial disappointing. Indeed, most of the seated jurors followed news of the Simpson case to some degree, [9] and none stated in their questionnaire that they did not follow it at all. The prosecutor's claimed concern with Watkins's interest in the Simpson trial is simply not credible. Fourth, the prosecutor's proffered justification that he struck Watkins because she would not like to sit as a juror and indicate[d] she would not be able to give her full attention to the trial because of work pressures is again undermined by comparative juror analysis. In response to the questionnaire's inquiry of whether there would be any adverse effects from your service on this jury, such as loss of money, work pressures, or health that might prevent you from giving your full attention to this trial, Watkins marked Yes and wrote Work pressures. Although the prosecutor claimed that this statement contributed to his decision to strike Watkins, he failed to strike seated Jurors 3, 6, 10, and 12, who responded to the question in stronger or more concrete terms. Juror 3 stated that he would prefer not to be a juror; Juror 6 expressed her desire not to serve, stating loss of wage and the length of time as potential problems; Juror 10 noted [t]ime w/o pay as an adverse effect of serving on the jury; and Juror 12 indicated that it was not convenient because of the long drive and. . . traffic. The prosecutor's differential treatment of these non-African-American jurors again suggests pretext. See Snyder, 128 S.Ct. at 1211 (finding it particularly problematic that the prosecutor attempted to elicit assurances that [the non-African-American juror] would be able to serve despite his work and family obligations, while choosing not to question the African-American juror more deeply about the matter). Fifth, the prosecutor stated that, although not controlling, he was also concerned with Watkins's employment as an account clerk at a law firm: We find people that work in the legal field somewhat have a difficult time with issues. I'm not sure what comments she may have expressed about lawyers in that firm. This rationale falls short of Batson 's mandate for a clear and reasonably specific explanation of [the] legitimate reasons for exercising the challenges. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n. 20, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (internal quotation marks omitted). The prosecutor also failed to explore Watkins's opinion of attorneys. Sixth, one of the issues with which the prosecutor specifically noted a concern was Watkins's initial uncertainty in her questionnaire responses about the deliberative process. The prosecutor stated, I can't take a chance with a juror . . . who will not change her vote, is inflexible even if the others, even if she is persuaded [by the other jurors]. This is not someone that either party would want as a juror. Contrary to this characterization, Watkins initially appeared to suggest a great degree of flexibility, prompting the court to clarify whether she would too easily relinquish her views in the interests of unanimity. A comparative analysis of Watkins with Jurors 6 and 7 again reveals that the prosecutor allowed several jurors to sit with questionnaire responses more troubling than Watkins's. When asked if she would change her vote after discussion if she still thought she was right, Juror 6 handwrote Unsure on her questionnaire. Juror 7 stated that he would not change his initial view, even if he was persuaded that he was wrong. [10] The prosecutor struck neither, undermining his alleged concern with Watkins's inflexibility as a juror. Finally, on her questionnaire, Watkins stated that neither she nor anyone close to her used illegal drugs, but commented that she has friends that use [them]. The prosecutor claimed that this answer supported his strike: One can draw an inference from that, that she condones the use of marijuana, thus, that would be violating the law. She may find certain laws of such a nature that she personally feels she can disregard them, or is morally disinclined to follow them. She may reach such a conclusion during the consideration of this trial. She may not like a particular law, may not feel she has a requirement to follow it. I'm not saying that's what her position is. One could draw that inference from this response. It's another issue that leaves me uncomfortable that would support a challenge for cause. Although the prosecutor cited Watkins's condoning of drugs as a basis for his strike, he offered no explanation for why Watkins's personal views on marijuana would bear on the case. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n. 20, 106 S.Ct. 1712. He also declined to strike six non-African-American jurors who had close friends or relatives who used drugs in the past, four of whom described the relatives' drug use as problematic. Additionally, the prosecutor allowed two jurors to sit who admitted to using drugs themselves when they were younger, [11] behavior that is certainly more indicative of a disregard for the law than Watkins's association with individuals who use drugs. The majority explains the prosecutor's justification, which it concedes is weak, as a distinction between present and past attitudes regarding drug use. In the prosecutor's words, however, the issue of drug use was relevant due to his concern that a juror might reach a conclusion because  she personally feels she can disregard particular laws or be morally disinclined to follow them. This concern applies more, or certainly just as much, to individuals who have themselves used drugs, even if in the past, than with those potential jurors who have made the decision to personally abstain from drug use but happen to know other people who have not. Comparative juror analysis thus leads to only one reasonable conclusion: the prosecutor's asserted concern about condoning drug use was not his actual reason for striking Watkins. The analysis of the totality of relevant facts, including comparative juror analysis, refutes the prosecutor's proffered reasons for striking Watkins. The fact that[a given] reason also applied to these other panel members, most of them white, none of them struck, is evidence of pretext. Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 248, 125 S.Ct. 2317. The evidence on the record is open to judgment calls, but when this evidence on the issues raised is viewed cumulatively its direction is too powerful to conclude anything but discrimination. Id. at 265, 125 S.Ct. 2317. It leads me to conclude that the prosecutor's actual and only reason for striking Watkins was her race. See Kesser, 465 F.3d at 360. Moreover, the California courts, by failing to consider comparative evidence in the record before it that undeniably contradicted the prosecutor's purported motivations, unreasonably accepted his nonracial motives as genuine. Id. at 358. In so doing, the California appellate court reached a conclusion regarding the prosecutor's intent that was not only incorrect, but unreasonable. See Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 266, 125 S.Ct. 2317.