Opinion ID: 390848
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Alcoholism

Text: 14 Carter's claim of disability due to alcoholism presents more of a problem. Alcoholism, which is classified as a functional nonpsychotic disorder under the Secretary's regulations, is not a disabling condition unless accompanied by additional physical or mental impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1517(d) (1980). The Secretary's regulations concerning nonpsychotic functional disorders specify that an individual generally will be found disabled if he or she manifests one or more clinical signs and experiences functional limitations as listed in the following regulation: 15 12.04 Functional nonpsychotic disorders (psychophysiologic, neurotic, and personality disorders: addictive dependence on alcohol or drugs). With both A and B: 16 A. Manifested persistence of one or more of the following clinical signs: 17 1. Demonstrable and persistent structural changes mediated through psychophysiological channels (e. g., duodenal ulcer); or 18 2. Recurrent and persistent periods of anxiety, with tension, apprehension, and interference with concentration and memory; or 19 3. Persistent depressive affect with insomnia, loss of weight, and suicidal preoccupations; or 20 4. Persistent phobic or obsessive ruminations with inappropriate, bizarre, or disruptive behavior; or 21 5. Persistent compulsive, ritualistic behavior; or 22 6. Persistent functional disturbance of vision, speech, hearing, or use of a limb with demonstrable structural or trophic changes; or 23 7. Persistent, deeply ingrained, maladaptive patterns of behavior manifested by either: 24
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26 B. Resulting persistence of marked restriction of daily activities and constrictions of interests and deterioration in personal habits and seriously impaired ability to relate to other people. 27 20 C.F.R. Subpart P, App. 1, § 12.04 (1980). 28 Carter is not now, and was not at the time of her application for benefits, addicted to alcohol, and thus is not entitled to future benefits based on a disability due to alcoholism. Nevertheless, she was an alcoholic until October 1978, and since she may have been disabled by alcoholism prior to that time she may be entitled to retroactive benefits for that condition. Section 223(b) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 423(b), provides in pertinent part: 29 An individual who would have been entitled to a disability insurance benefit for any month had he filed application therefor before the end of such month shall be entitled to such benefit for such month if such application is filed before the end of the twelfth month immediately succeeding such month. 30 Carter filed her application for benefits in January 1979, and thus would have been entitled to benefits for any of the twelve months preceding January 1979 in which she was disabled and met the other statutory requirements. Because Carter's insured status expired on March 31, 1978, she cannot receive benefits if her alcoholism had not become disabling on or before that date. If Carter had shown that during the first three months of 1978 she suffered functional and clinical disturbances as described in the regulations, and had shown, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), that her disability had lasted, or could be expected to last, for a continuous period of not less than 12 months, the ALJ presumably would have concluded that she was entitled to a retroactive award of benefits for all or part of the period from January to October 1978. 6 31 At the hearing, Carter presented little evidence concerning the effect of her alcoholism upon her ability to engage in substantial gainful activity. She stated the quantity of alcohol she ordinarily consumed and mentioned that she had occasionally experienced alcoholic black outs, i. e., periods of continuous heavy drinking that the drinker is later unable to recall. The bulk of her evidence, however, concerned her seizures. Similarly, the ALJ gave very thorough consideration to Carter's seizures as a possible disability, but did not question her regarding the effects of her alcoholism on her ability to work and did not consider whether her alcoholism might have been disabling in the past, entitling her to retroactive benefits. 7 Hence the record concerning the effects of Carter's alcoholism may be incomplete. 32 Prior to the 1980 amendment of the Social Security Act, § 205(g) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), allowed a court reviewing a determination of the Secretary to enter a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Secretary, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing, and further empowered the court at any time, on good cause shown, (to) order additional evidence to be taken before the Secretary. The 1980 amendment, while preserving the first quoted provision, allowing entry of judgment with or without a remand, see Dousewicz v. Harris, 646 F.2d 771, 773 (2d Cir. 1981), substantially modified the court's power to remand for the taking of additional evidence. As amended, section 205(g) now provides that the reviewing court may at any time order additional evidence to be taken before the Secretary, but only upon a showing that there is new evidence which is material and that there is good cause for the failure to incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior proceeding. Pub.L.No. 96-265, § 307, 94 Stat. 458 (1980); see 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g) (1981 Supp.) (emphasis added). 33 As we have recently noted, the amendment was at least in part designed to limit federal court remands to the Secretary. Aubeuf v. Schweiker, supra, 649 F.2d at 115. See also S.Rep.No. 96-408, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1979), reprinted in (1980) U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 1277, 1336. Although the amendment does not limit remands in cases where, for example, the Secretary has misapplied the law or has not provided a full and fair hearing, see Aubeuf, supra, 649 F.2d at 116; Dousewicz, supra, 646 F.2d at 773; H.R.Rep.No. 96-100, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1979), it does affect our power to order a remand to the Secretary in cases such as this, where the sole purpose of the remand would be to afford the claimant an opportunity to present additional evidence of disability. 34 As amended, § 205(g) permits an evidentiary remand only when the claimant shows (1) the existence of evidence which is (a) new and (b) material; and (2) the existence of good cause for the failure to produce the evidence in earlier proceedings. We are unable to determine, on the record before us, whether these statutory standards are met in the present case. The record does not indicate the nature of the evidence, if any, that Carter could produce concerning the effects of her alcoholism upon her ability to engage in substantial gainful activity during the relevant time period. 8 Similarly, we are unable to determine from the present record whether there was good cause for Carter's failure to introduce additional evidence concerning her alcoholism at the administrative level. 9 These related and primarily factual issues must be determined by the district court in the first instance. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment below and remand the matter to the district court so that it may determine whether a remand to the Secretary for further evidentiary hearings is justified under § 205(g) as amended. 35 Vacated and remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. No costs.