Opinion ID: 199312
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Judgment as a Matter of Law on Fraudulent Concealment Count

Text: 41 Invest Almaz's second amended complaint alleged that Temple-Inland fraudulently failed to disclose a substantial number of material facts regarding the plant. The alleged omissions fell into three broad categories: omissions regarding the monetary value of the plant (dubbed by the magistrate judge the value claims); omissions regarding alleged obsolescence of the plant's equipment (the obsolescence claims); and omissions regarding environmental problems at the plant (the environmental claims). Consistent with the elements of fraudulent concealment, Invest Almaz alleged, with respect to each omission: that the information was material; that Temple-Inland intentionally concealed the information despite having a duty to disclose it; that Invest Almaz reasonably relied upon the omissions; and that Invest Almaz was damaged as a result. SeeMAC Fin. Plan of Nashua, Inc. v. Stone, 214 A.2d 878, 880 (N.H. 1965) (summarizing the elements of fraudulent concealment); seealso Batchelder v. Northern Fire Lites, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1115, 1118 (D.N.H. 1986) (discussing, in a case applying New Hampshire law, the requirement that there be a duty to disclose and citing cases). 42 At the close of Invest Almaz's case, Temple-Inland moved for judgment as a matter of law with respect to all of Invest Almaz's fraud claims. Following a hearing, the magistrate judge granted the motion, concluding, for each category of allegations, that Invest Almaz had failed to introduce evidence sufficient to establish that Temple-Inland had intentionally concealed the information in question: 43 [W]ith regard to the environmental claims there were -- the evidence is that there were substantial negotiations as to who is to be responsible for what. That in fact Pathex was given and ultimately Invest Almaz was given unfettered access to the plant and to the property with the full ability to observe, to test. The fact that Aries [the environmental consultant hired by Pathex] was late with regard to its test was because they didn't get in and do the test before the snow fell and they themselves asked for an extension; in other words, there was no intentional concealment. 44 With regard to obsolescence, no reasonable jury could determine that there was an intentional concealment of the obsolescence where in fact there was a full right by Pathex, which was in the equipment business, to thoroughly inspect, nor even with respect to Invest Almaz, where Invest Almaz sent two engineers to inspect the equipment. 45 With regard to the value issue, there is no evidence from which a reasonable jury could determine that there was an intentional concealment of value, particularly with respect to all of the allegations of value, vis-a-vis the Town of Claremont, the court takes judicial notice of the fact that all of those documents were public documents on record in the Town of Claremont Tax Assessor's office open to everyone in the public. They were specifically referenced in Exhibit Y [the appraisal prepared for Pathex in December 1993]. And in fact there was no evidence that the defendant ever represented any value to Pathex or to Invest Almaz. They simply negotiated a sales price. 46 On appeal, Invest Almaz argues, unsurprisingly, that it introduced sufficient evidence with respect to each element of fraudulent concealment, and each category of omission, that a reasonable jury could have found in its favor; therefore, the magistrate judge erred in granting judgment as a matter of law for Temple-Inland. In addition, Invest Almaz argues that the magistrate judge's analysis must be rejected because it proceeds from a legal error: the magistrate judge assumed, for purposes of his analysis, that any knowledge obtained from Temple-Inland by Pathex was chargeable to Invest Almaz. Invest Almaz contends that it is not chargeable with such knowledge under New Hampshire agency law because Pathex was a faithless agent. Temple-Inland, in turn, argues that Invest Almaz's faithless-agent defense does not apply to this case and that the magistrate judge was correct in concluding that no reasonable jury could find in Invest Almaz's favor on the fraud claims. Because the applicability of the faithless-agent defense is critical to our review of the evidence, we address it first. 47
48 Invest Almaz's argument that a principal is not chargeable with knowledge obtained by a faithless agent relies on Boucouvalas v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 5 A.2d 721 (N.H. 1939). In Boucouvalas, the defendant insurer sought to be relieved of its obligations under a life insurance policy procured through the fraud of its agent. The agent, in completing paperwork for an illiterate applicant, had deliberately omitted information the applicant provided concerning a serious illness. When the applicant died shortly thereafter from the same illness, the insurer argued that it was not chargeable with knowledge of the plaintiff's illness and therefore not bound by the policy. 49 The New Hampshire Supreme Court ruled for the defendant, reversing an earlier decision, Domocaris v. Ins. Co., 123 A. 220 (N.H. 1923), which had held that an insurer was chargeable with knowledge of a deceitful agent. In its decision, the Boucouvalas court cited back to pre-Domocaris precedent holding that the principal is not charged with the knowledge of his agent when the latter is engaged in committing an independent, fraudulent act on his own account, and the facts to be imputed relate to this fraudulent act. Brookhouse v. Union Publ'g Co., 62 A. 219, 222 (N.H. 1905); see also Warren v. Hayes, 68 A. 193, 194 (N.H. 1907) (The test, therefore, to determine whether an agent's knowledge is to be imputed to his principal is to inquire whether or not the agent was acting for the principal when he did that in respect to which is sought to charge the principal with his knowledge.). The court acknowledged that there was no evidence of wrongdoing by the applicant, but nonetheless concluded that he (or, in this case, his beneficiary) was entitled to no more than a refund of premiums paid. SeeBoucouvalas, 5 A.2d at 724. 50 Although Boucouvalas has never been overruled, and has been followed on at least one occasion, see LeClerc v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 39 A.2d 763 (N.H. 1944), we harbor some doubt concerning its vitality and applicability to this case. In the majority of jurisdictions, the law has evolved towards a recognition that information given to even a fraudulent agent should normally be imputed to the principal, unless the third party providing the information has notice that the agent is acting adversely or otherwise colludes with the faithless agent. See B. H. Glenn, Insured's Responsibility for False Answers Inserted by Insurer's Agent in Application Following Correct Answers by Insured, or Incorrect Answers Suggested by Agent, 26 A.L.R.3d 6, 33-45 (1969 & Supp. 2000) (showing state courts to be virtually unanimous in holding that knowledge of an insurance agent will be imputed to insurer, despite fraud of agent, unless the applicant has notice of the fraud); see also Restatement (Second) of Agency § 282, cmt. d (adopting the same position as a general principle of agency law). While the New Hampshire Supreme Court has not yet formally adopted this view, it has expressed clear misgivings about Boucouvalas. See Mut. Benefit Life Ins. v. Gruette, 529 A.2d 870, 872-73 (N.H. 1987) (conceding that the Boucouvalas rule acts harshly as to [those] who fall prey to devious agents and noting public policy reasons supporting its reversal, but concluding that factual circumstances of the case -- including evidence of collusion between the applicant and agent -- [did] not furnish an appropriate basis for returning to the rule of Domocaris); seealso Perkins v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 128 A.2d 207, 208 (N.H. 1956) (questioning whether, in light of Boucouvalas, New Hampshire insurance law permits the issuance of a policy to bind the insurer to the extent that reasonable person in the position of the insured would understand that it did but concluding that the problem was more properly resolved by the legislature); Taylor v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 214 A.2d 109, 113 (N.H. 1965) (same). It also appears that Boucouvalas has been limited to its facts by the New Hampshire Supreme Court: although the pre-Domocaris cases to which Boucouvalas refers involved a range of factual circumstances, we find no subsequent case applying the rule except in the context of duplicitous insurance agents. 51 Nonetheless, given our obligation in diversity cases to determine the rule that the state Supreme Court would probably follow, Moores v. Greenberg, 834 F.2d 1105, 1107 n.3 (1st Cir. 1987) (internal punctuation marks omitted), we find these doubts to be insufficient grounds for ruling that Boucouvalas is either invalid or inapplicable. The New Hampshire Supreme Court has not seen fit to overrule Boucouvalas, and we cannot reasonably assume that it would do so now, if it faced the issue directly. In addition, we find support for Boucouvalas' holding and its applicability to the present facts in New Hampshire's Uniform Partnership Act (UPA), which states, in pertinent part: 52 Notice to any partner of any matter relating to partnership affairs, and the knowledge of the partner acting in the particular matter, acquired while a partner . . . operates as notice to or knowledge of the partnership, except in the case of a fraud on the partnership committed by or with the consent of that partner. 53 N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 304-A:12 (emphasis added). 21 The New Hampshire Supreme Court looks to state partnership law in deciding cases involving joint ventures. Miami Subs Corp. v. Murray Family Trust, 703 A.2d 1366, 1370 (N.H. 1997). Although this provision of the UPA has not been given an authoritative reading by the New Hampshire Supreme Court, we find its plain language sufficiently persuasive to outweigh our doubts concerning the applicability of the rule of Boucouvalas. 54 Having accepted that Invest Almaz's faithless agent defense is available as a matter of New Hampshire law, we still must determine whether there is sufficient evidence that Pathex was engaged in a fraud against Invest Almaz to justify its application here. Unlike Invest Almaz, we do not consider the issue free from dispute. While the Pathex former president, Charles Kosa, admitted that information regarding the plant was not conveyed to Invest Almaz, Kosa suggested that this occurred because Pathex believed the joint venture agreement assigned it primary responsibility for selecting, purchasing and preparing a suitable plant. Nonetheless, we think enough evidence was introduced to permit a reasonable jury to find that Pathex intentionally withheld the information as part of an effort to conceal from Invest Almaz the condition and value of the facility. Therefore, for purposes of Temple-Inland's motion for judgment as a matter of law, Invest Almaz should not have been charged with knowledge of information that was never revealed to it by Pathex. 55
56 Although we find that Invest Almaz was entitled to the benefit of its faithless-agent defense for purposes of the Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a) motion, this result is not conclusive on the question of whether Temple-Inland was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. As we read it, the magistrate judge's ruling rested on two distinct grounds: first, that Temple-Inland's grants of access to Pathex and/or Invest Almaz to inspect and conduct tests negate any reasonable inference of fraudulent intent; and, second, that the availability of certain information to Pathex or Invest Almaz negates the inference that there was ultimately any concealment. 22 Invest Almaz's faithless-agent defense plainly weakens the second rationale, but it does not affect the first. Nor are we limited to upholding the magistrate judge's conclusion only for the reasons actually invoked in his ruling. E.g., Hodgens v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151, 172 (1st Cir. 1998) (noting, in the summary judgment context, that this court [w]ill affirm a correct result reached by the court below on any independently sufficient ground made manifest by the record); Acushnet Co. v. Mohasco Corp., 191 F.3d 69, 80 (1st Cir. 1999) (applying the same rule in reviewing a grant of judgment as a matter of law). We therefore proceed to the merits of Temple-Inland's Rule 50(a) motion. 57 We review a grant of judgment as a matter of law denovo, under the same standards as the district court. Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26, 28 (1st Cir. 1996). In so doing, we examine the evidence and all fair inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and may not consider the credibility of witnesses, resolve conflicts in testimony, or evaluate the weight of the evidence. Id. (quoting Richmond Steel, Inc. v. P.R. Am. Ins. Co., 954 F.2d 19, 22 (1st Cir. 1992)) (internal punctuation marks omitted). At the same time, it remains the responsibility of the party with the burden of proof to present more than a mere scintilla of evidence in its favor; and to do more than rely on conjecture or speculation in support of its position. Katz, 87 F.3d at 28. To the contrary, [t]he evidence offered must make the existence of the fact to be inferred more probable than its nonexistence. Id. (quoting Resare v. Raytheon Co., 981 F.2d 32, 34 (1st Cir. 1992)). We also bear in mind the plaintiff's burden of proof at trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986) ([T]he inquiry involved in a ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict necessarily implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the trial on the merits.). New Hampshire common law provides that fraud must be proved by clear and convincing proof and will not be implied from doubtful circumstances. Sheris v. Thompson, 295 A.2d 268, 271 (N.H. 1971); accord Snow v. Am. Morgan Horse Ass'n, Inc., 686 A.2d 1168, 1170 (N.H. 1997). Ultimately, we will affirm the magistrate judge's ruling if we find that as a matter of law, the record would permit a reasonable jury to reach only one conclusion as to that issue. Katz, 87 F.3d at 28. 58 Because our analysis differs with respect to each category of allegedly concealed information, we treat them separately, employing, for simplicity, the magistrate judge's labels. 59
60 Invest Almaz's complaint alleges that Temple-Inland fraudulently concealed three specific facts regarding the plant's value: the book value of the Claremont OSB plant (carried in Temple-Inland's internal records as $2.4 million); the fair market value of the plant (calculated by Temple-Inland for tax assessment purposes as $1.6 million); and the fact that Temple-Inland could not have realized $5 million on a sale of the equipment at auction. We think that the trial record provided an adequate basis from which a reasonable jury could have concluded that the alleged facts were true and known to Temple-Inland, were not disclosed by Temple-Inland to either Pathex 23 or Invest Almaz, and were material to Invest Almaz. However, we find that Invest Almaz has presented no legally sufficient grounds for concluding that Temple-Inland was under any duty to reveal the information in question. 61 In New Hampshire, as elsewhere, liability for fraudulent concealment does not arise in the absence of a duty of disclosure. Batchelder, 630 F. Supp. at 1118 ([F]or a failure to disclose to be actionable fraud, there must be a duty arising from the relation of the parties to so disclose.); Benoit v. Perkins, 104 A. 254, 256 (N.H. 1918) ([T]he fraudulent concealment of known facts with intent to mislead, and which in fact does mislead, . . . does not constitute actionable fraud, unless there be some obligation which the law recognizes to disclose the facts concealed.); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551(1). Invest Almaz does not dispute this, but instead argues that, under the circumstances of this case, Temple-Inland acquired such a duty. Invest Almaz's first rationale is that Temple-Inland's invitation to representatives of the Russian company to tour the plant, accompanied by the offer to answer any questions, by itself gave rise to an obligation fully to disclose information regarding the condition and value of the plant. However, Invest Almaz provides no support for this curious contention. Nor are we aware of any cases suggesting that, simply by inviting a prospective purchaser to tour a property, a seller assumes an obligation to volunteer its own views as to the property's value. 62 Invest Almaz's second contention is that Temple-Inland made partial disclosures concerning value which gave rise to a duty of full disclosure. Of the examples of such statements offered, only one merits discussion. 24 At trial, Invest Almaz played a videotaped deposition of Invest Almaz's president, Yurij Zepavalov. Zepavalov testified that Viktor Tikhov - one of the Invest Almaz engineers who toured the plant -- told Zepavalov that he had asked tour guide Earl Taylor about the price of the plant, but Taylor provided no response and, instead, evaded the question. Although plainly hearsay, this statement apparently entered the record because Temple-Inland's counsel failed to object at the appropriate time. 63 Assuming, without deciding, that this statement is appropriately part of the record for purposes of our review, we think it insufficient to support a finding that Temple-Inland acquired a duty of disclosure with respect to value. Invest Almaz points to no case, and we are aware of none, suggesting that merely not answering a question, without more, creates a duty of disclosure. 25 While there is precedent in New Hampshire case law for the proposition that a vendor offering a deceptive opinion as to value may be liable in fraud, nothing in the deposition testimony indicates that Taylor gave an opinion of value, 26 or, indeed, even knew the sale price of the plant. Compare Shafmaster v. Shafmaster, 642 A.2d 1361, 1364 (N.H. 1994) (holding that a defendant's inclusion of incorrect opinions of value in a financial statement submitted as part of divorce proceeding was fraudulent). We therefore conclude that Temple-Inland had no duty to disclose the information respecting value it is charged with concealing and that judgment as a matter of law was appropriate with respect to these allegations. 64
65 Seven of Invest Almaz's allegations of concealment relate to the obsolescence issue. According to Invest Almaz, Temple-Inland improperly failed to reveal that the plant was not capable of manufacturing OSB above cost in the current or foreseeable market; the plant was economically and functionally obsolete; the plant was closed because it lost money; the plant was one of the oldest OSB lines in America; the plant was characterized by Temple-Inland's CEO as economically not viable; the prior owner of the plant had gone bankrupt; and Temple-Inland knew as early as 1990 that the plant would never make money. 66 We have some doubt as to whether all seven of these allegations were seriously advanced below or are meaningfully pressed on appeal. Nor do we think that Invest Almaz's evidence supports the full breadth of these allegations. However, we find evidence in the record from which a reasonable jury could infer the truth of what we take to be the core of these allegations: that Temple-Inland's Claremont plant was old and, at least in its current location and configuration, unable to make a profit; 27 that its unprofitability was due in part to long-term changes in the regulatory regime and market in which it operated, including competition from newer, larger OSB plants able to operate with lower costs; and that Temple-Inland closed the plant because it was losing money. 67 Invest Almaz also introduced evidence generally tending to show that information of this kind was not revealed to Pathex or Invest Almaz by Temple-Inland. 28 However, on this point Invest Almaz's position was contradicted in part by an admission by Vladimir Semkin. In his videotaped deposition, Semkin testified that he was told by Earl Taylor that the plant was closed because it was loss-making and could not make a profit, a fact that Taylor allegedly attributed to increases in the price of obtaining timber. In addition, the record indicates that Taylor in fact told the Russian engineers that the plant began operation in 1981. 29 68 To establish the materiality of the concealed information, Invest Almaz introduced videotaped testimony of president Zapevalov. Zapevalov's testimony with respect to the materiality of the plant's alleged obsolescence, however, was not particularly helpful to Invest Almaz, as the following colloquy indicates: 69 Q: Were you ever told that production costs at the plant had exceeded the market price for the product? 70 A. No, I was never been told [sic] that. 71 Q: And when your representatives visited the plant in October 1993 were they told that? 72 A: No, they were not told that, but you have to bear in mind that the production cost in the United States can differ from that in Russia, but nevertheless nobody told us about the production price and the fair market value of the product. 73 Q: If you had been informed of those facts, would it have made a difference to you? 74 A: For us the most important is the production cost in Russian conditions, not in the United States, because we paid [sic] differently for electricity, for everything which comprises the production cost. 75 Zapevalov Dep. p. 50-51(emphasis added). No other testimony was introduced directly bearing on the materiality of the plant's obsolescence to Invest Almaz, although there was witness testimony and documentary evidence concerning the performance expectations Invest Almaz had for the rebuilt, relocated plant. 76 For the reasons discussed with respect to Invest Almaz's value claims, we do not think that Temple-Inland was under any general duty to disclose the information regarding obsolescence that Invest Almaz claims was concealed. It is apparent from Invest Almaz's allegations, and, indeed, conceded in Invest Almaz's brief, that the term obsolescence is meant to refer only to the alleged inability of the equipment to produce OSB profitably, not to any defects affecting its operation. See Pl's. Br. at 48 (The equipment was not obsolete in the sense that it did not work; it was obsolete in the sense that it was economically inefficient and could not make OSB at a competitive price.). Furthermore, as Invest Almaz's evidence regarding obsolescence indicates, the unprofitability of the plant was the result of circumstances -- such as increased energy and pollution control costs and the development of larger, more cost-effective plants -- external to the equipment itself. Invest Almaz has identified no precedent, and we are aware of none, obligating a seller as a general matter to reveal this kind of information, which appears relevant primarily to the suitability of the equipment for purposes and under conditions about which Invest Almaz plainly had superior knowledge. Such a duty seems particularly inappropriate here, where it was understood that the equipment would be put into operation only after extensive modification. 77 Invest Almaz has a stronger case that a limited duty of disclosure arose as a result of Taylor's alleged comments to the effect that high timber costs made the plant unprofitable. As noted above, the evidence at trial pointed to several other reasons why the plant could not make money. Given this, Taylor's statements could be construed as a partial disclosure requiring further clarification concerning the reasons why the plant closed. See, e.g., Dawe v. Am. Univ. Ins. Co., 417 A.2d 2, 4 (N.H. 1980) ([P]artial disclosure may give rise to a duty to fully disclose when the partial disclosure, standing alone, is deceptive.). 78 Ultimately, however, we do not think that this line of argument could have succeeded. First, it is not clear that Invest Almaz actually contends on appeal that Temple-Inland's duty to disclose obsolescence arose in this way. 30 Instead, Invest Almaz appears to rely on the same general grounds already considered and rejected as creating any duty of disclosure with respect to the value allegations. We consider it telling that Invest Almaz introduced no evidence in its affirmative case indicating that the information Taylor gave was actually false, that Taylor intended to mislead the Russian representatives by his statement, or that anyone else at Temple-Inland knew what Taylor told Invest Almaz. 31 79 In addition, we do not believe that a reasonable jury could find on this record clear and convincing evidence that the information Temple-Inland arguably came under a duty to disclose was material to Invest Almaz. As Zepavalov's deposition testimony plainly states, Invest Almaz's concern was with the ability of the equipment to operate profitably in its new location. Yet none of the reasons for the plant's unprofitability introduced as part of Invest Almaz's case are ultimately germane to that question. Zepavalov specifically acknowledges that the costs of production, which were the primary reasons for the plant's unprofitability in the United States, would be completely different in Russia. It is also far from self-evident that, in Russia, the plant would be directly competing with the same kinds of higher-volume facilities apparently dominating the North American market. 32 Invest Almaz introduced no evidence suggesting that parallels could be drawn between Russian and North American conditions, nor did it introduce any other evidence from which it could be inferred that the equipment could not be operated at a profit in Russia, or that it could not be rebuilt to meet the standards called for in the joint- venture agreement. Absent such evidence, we think any argument that the improperly concealed information was material to Invest Almaz would rest on sheer speculation. 80 For the foregoing reasons, we think judgment as a matter of law was appropriately granted with respect to the obsolescence allegations. 81
82 Invest Almaz's final allegation of fraud asserts that Temple-Inland concealed significant environmental problems at the plant, including the presence of hazardous and non-hazardous waste, chemical pollution, and radioactive material. Like the magistrate judge, who characterized the environmental issue as a red herring, we view this allegation with particular skepticism. While there were clearly environmental problems at the plant -- including both historical noncompliance with environmental regulations and present contamination of site soils and sediments -- we find it hard to discern how those problems were relevant to the equipment purchase Invest Almaz hoped to accomplish. 33 Invest Almaz does not appear to argue that the equipment itself was contaminated. Nor does Invest Almaz point to evidence suggesting that the plant was incapable of being operated in a non-polluting manner. Indeed, as we read the record, the environmental issues were only evaluated so that Pathex could decide whether or not to purchase the property on which the plant was built, an aspect of the transaction unrelated to the joint venture's purposes. 83 Furthermore, we think that the magistrate judge was plainly correct in concluding that, in view of the extensive interactions between Pathex and Temple-Inland regarding the environmental issues, no reasonable jury could find that Temple-Inland intentionally concealed environmental information in order to defraud either Pathex or Invest Almaz. See Hall v. Merrimack Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 13 A.2d 157, 160 (N.H. 1940) (fraud requires a deliberate falsehood . . . made for the purpose or with the intention of causing the other party to act upon it). Uncontradicted evidence in the record shows that the existence of environmental problems at the facility and the parties' respective obligations for analyzing and resolving those problems were discussed throughout the negotiations between Pathex and Temple-Inland, beginning, at latest, by mid-July 1993 -- before Pathex entered into the option agreement with Temple-Inland and well before Invest Almaz signed the joint-venture agreement. It is also beyond dispute that Pathex fully understood the importance of undertaking its own environmental assessment to determine the full scope of the environmental problems at the plant, 34 and there is no evidence that Temple-Inland sought to impede the assessments performed for Pathex by Aries. 35 Furthermore, the record indicates that Pathex and Temple-Inland continued to discuss the results of these environmental surveys, the progress of Temple-Inland's cleanup efforts, and the impact of environmental issues on the final shape of the Asset Purchase Agreement, throughout the option period. In our view, this uncontradicted evidence of extensive, ongoing discussions regarding environmental matters, begun before any agreement was signed and culminating in an unfettered opportunity to discover the true state of affairs prior to purchasing the property, precludes any reasonable jury from finding that Temple-Inland intentionally concealed any environmental problems the plant may have had. 36 84 Invest Almaz's arguments against this result are unpersuasive. Invest Almaz first suggests that giving Pathex notice of the environmental problems and the opportunity to learn more was not sufficient to avert a finding of fraudulent concealment. Instead, Invest Almaz argues, Temple-Inland was obliged to disclose the full environmental history of the plant and to do so from the outset. Invest Almaz offers no precedential support for this proposition, which strikes us as wholly at odds with established business practice. While we can certainly imagine circumstances in which notice and an opportunity to inspect would be inadequate -- as when the party providing notice intentionally misdirects the other party or prevents it from completing an investigation, see Bergeron v. Dupont, 359 A.2d 627, 629 (N.H. 1976) (plaintiff's own investigation not a defense to misrepresentation when the investigation was restricted by bad weather and by defendant's request that it be curtailed) -- we think it more generally the case that accepting such an opportunity prevents a party from later claiming that it acted in reliance on an adverse party's representations. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 547(1) ([T]he maker of a fraudulent misrepresentation is not liable to another whose decision to engage in the transaction that the representation was intended to induce . . . is the result of an independent investigation by him.); see also Sipola, 66 A. at 966 (noting that, although there is generally no duty of purchaser to investigate the truthfulness of representations made by a seller, such a duty arises when the purchaser has knowledge of his own, or of any facts which would excite suspicion). 37 85 Invest Almaz's second argument is that, notwithstanding Temple-Inland's above-board dealings with respect to Pathex, Temple-Inland remains liable vis a vis Invest Almaz, because it failed to disclose the environmental problems at the plant during the tour and Invest Almaz relied on that omission to its detriment by signing the joint-venture agreement. Under this theory, Temple-Inland's disclosures to Pathex are not evidence of Temple-Inland's lack of fraudulent intent, because Temple-Inland was engaged in a separate fraud against Invest Almaz specifically. The problem with this contention is that it presumes a degree of coordination between Pathex and Temple-Inland for which there is simply no evidence. To conclude that Temple-Inland intentionally defrauded Invest Almaz alone, a jury would seemingly have to find that Temple-Inland withheld the environmental information knowing that Pathex also had not and would not reveal it; knowing that Invest Almaz was about to sign a deal committing itself to this plant (although the option clock still had time to run); and expecting and intending that Invest Almaz would rely on these omissions. Although Invest Almaz's briefs assert that such collusion occurred, the evidence presented at trial does not begin to support this elaborate chain of inferences. 86 Indeed, we think it questionable whether a reasonable jury could conclude that Temple-Inland even withheld the existence of environmental concerns from Invest Almaz during the tour. The packet of written information given to Invest Almaz's representatives by Earl Taylor specifically mentions that the plant equipment includes gauges containing radioactive materials; that the plant used phenol formaldehyde as a binder; and that Temple-Inland contracted with an entity named Jet Line for environmental services relating to hazardous waste, oil in the ponds and drums of waste at the facility. This information would appear sufficient to put Invest Almaz on notice and therefore to defeat any claim of reliance. See Sipola, 66 A. at 966. At the very least, we consider the fact that Taylor handed out this information fatal to any argument that Temple-Inland intended to conceal the plant's environmental problems during the tour. 87 Given the foregoing, we conclude that judgment as a matter of law was properly granted with respect to this final group of allegations of fraudulent concealment.