Opinion ID: 2425032
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the trial court's sanction order

Text: As the Court acknowledges, the trial court's sanction order was for discovery abuse under Rule 215(3). The order imposed three monetary sanctions against Ford. The first was a $25,000 award of attorney's fees for prosecuting the motion for sanctions payable ten days from the date of the trial court's order. The second was a $25,000 award of attorney's fees if Ford appealed or applied for mandamus from the court's sanction order. The order did not specify a date for payment of this award. The third assessed a $10,000,000 fine, payable to the plaintiffs to punish Ford for its wrongful and abusive discovery conduct and to deter others from the same conduct. The court of appeals granted Ford mandamus relief in part, vacating the $10,000,000 fine. However, the court of appeals left undisturbed the other two monetary sanctions as well as the trial court's order excluding the Kent report from evidence. Here, the Court holds the trial court abused its discretion in sanctioning Ford for discovery abuse, but concludes that Ford has an adequate remedy by appeal for the excluded evidence and the attorney's fees awarded for the sanctions proceeding. I have no quarrel with the Court on these conclusions. However, the Court further holds that Ford need not wait until appeal from final judgment to obtain relief from the unconditional attorney's fees award because the penalty directly impacts the party's exercise of its rights, and therefore is an abuse of discretion, warranting mandamus relief. I agree with the Court that the trial court abused its discretion in unconditionally awarding $25,000 to the Archers' attorneys regardless of Ford's success in obtaining mandamus relief. But, I disagree with the Court's conclusion that Ford need not wait until appeal from the final judgment to obtain relief from the trial court's order. The Court recognizes that even with an abuse of discretion, for mandamus to issue, the party seeking that relief must establish the lack of an adequate appellate remedy. Indeed, the Court declines to award Ford mandamus relief on the evidentiary issue and the attorney's fees related to the sanction proceedings for the very reason that Ford has an adequate appellate remedy. But, the Court reaches the opposite conclusion about Ford's right to mandamus review of the attorney's fee awarded for prosecuting the mandamus action to obtain relief from this award. Further, the Court reaches this conclusion in the face of our rules that require appellate rather than mandamus review of awards of attorney's fees for discovery abuse. See TEX.R. CIV. P. 215(2)(b)(8),(3); Street, 715 S.W.2d at 639-40. In doing so, the Court pays lip service to Braden and other case law that interprets Rule 215 and provides the guiding principles for the limited circumstances when a party may seek mandamus relief from a trial court's award of attorney's fees for discovery abuse. The Court then misapplies Braden because it cannot reconcile the principles the case establishes. The record discloses that Ford has the financial ability to pay the attorney's fees and still continue with the litigation. Indeed, in support of Ford's motion to stay the sanctions order, Ford's representative testified that Ford's assets were sufficient to pay the $10,000,000 sanction and still continue its defense. Here, the sanction award can be remedied by appeal and the party's right to seek relief from an appellate court without penalty is not lost forever. Accordingly, Ford has an adequate remedy on appeal. See Braden, 811 S.W.2d at 929.