Opinion ID: 201247
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Tulloch

Text: 20 At sentencing, the district court imposed a term of supervised release on Tulloch and described various supervised release conditions. Among other things, it directed him to comply with the standard conditions as set forth in the guidelines, but it did not describe them in detail. The written judgment included conditions substantially similar to the first fourteen of the fifteen standard conditions set out in the Guidelines. 6 See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5D1.3(c)(1)-(14) (2001). Tulloch contends that the court's general reference to the standard conditions failed adequately to notify him which conditions actually would be imposed, thus depriving him of his opportunity to object to them. Moreover, he claims that allowing adoption by reference permits sentencing courts to indiscriminately impose standard conditions on defendants. 21 For a variety of reasons, we disagree. As with Castillo, Tulloch knew before he was sentenced that he faced a term of supervised release, that conditions would apply during that term, and that the Guidelines controlled his sentencing. The Guidelines flatly recommend the standard conditions, without qualification or prerequisite (other than that a term of supervised release be imposed). U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c) (The following `standard' conditions are recommended for supervised release.) At sentencing, moreover, the court made clear that the standard Guideline conditions would apply, 7 and the written judgment imposed all that were applicable. Thus, the court's oral and written sentences were entirely consistent: they imposed the very same burdens on Tulloch. Indeed, Tulloch does not complain that the written conditions are more onerous, and he does not object to any particular condition; his objection seems entirely theoretical. But we see no potential for abuse in allowing courts to streamline sentencing proceedings by incorporating by reference such well-known, commonly used conditions of supervised release. See Torres-Aguilar, 352 F.3d at 938; Truscello, 168 F.3d at 63. 8 And, in other contexts, we have allowed incorporation by reference at sentencing. See United States v. Tavano, 12 F.3d 301, 307 (1st Cir.1993) (As a general rule, a trial court lawfully may make implicit findings with regard to sentencing matters, incorporating by reference suitably detailed suggestions limned in the PSI Report or advanced by a party.) (concerning drug quantity determination). 22 We direct the district courts in these appeals to strike the improper delegation to the probation officer from their written judgments. The district court in Appeal No. 02-2410 is ordered to amend the drug testing condition to provide for the minimum number of drug tests mandated in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). In all other respects, the judgments of conviction and the sentences are affirmed.