Opinion ID: 2091872
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whittington's Conviction

Text: Whittington has established that the state restricted his expressive activity. He was convicted of making unreasonable noise based solely on his loud speaking during Finnell's investigation of the reported domestic dispute. Whittington has failed to demonstrate, however, that his expressive activity did not constitute an abuse of the right to speak. We have little difficulty concluding that his expression was not political. Whittington testified that his remarks were not directed toward Officer Finnell. (R. at 82.) Whittington was irritated that the police were investigating the domestic complaint (R. at 84, 66), but he appears to have directed his frustration toward his sister's boyfriend, who may have been the one who summoned the police. He also protested that he had not done anything and that the other witnesses were lying. (R. at 66.) These statements involve the conduct of private individuals, not state action. In the final analysis, the evidence does not support an assertion that Whittington's expression was political. Thus, we must apply rationality review in determining whether the state could reasonably have concluded that Whittington's expressive activity, because of its volume, was an abuse of the right to speak or was, in other words, a threat to peace, safety, and well-being. We easily conclude that Whittington has not negated every conceivable basis for the state action in his case. Collins, 644 N.E.2d at 80. In Price we abstractly observed that abating excessive noise is an objective our legislature may legitimately pursue. 622 N.E.2d at 960. On the facts of this case, it is reasonably conceivable that the loud outbursts in the concrete circumstances of this case could have agitated other persons in the apartment, sparked additional disruptions of Finnell's investigation, or interfered with his ability to manage the medical crew and the alleged crime scene. The noisy tirade could have threatened the safety of Whittington's sister by aggravating her trauma or by distracting the medical personnel tending her injury. Finally, the volume of the speech undoubtedly made it highly annoying to all present. The state could therefore have believed Whittington's outbursts constituted an abuse of the right to speak and, as such, fell within the purview of the police power. We hold that Whittington's conviction for disorderly conduct did not contravene the right to speak, as guaranteed by Section 9 of the Indiana Bill of Rights.