Opinion ID: 2334960
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Heisey's Claims In This Appeal Arise Out Of An Alleged Assault Or Battery For Which The State Is Otherwise Immune.

Text: Alaska Statute 09.50.250(3) grants the State immunity for a claim that arises out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights. In his original complaint, Heisey advanced several alternate theories of intentional tort and negligence. The superior court grouped his claims into an intentional tort claim and a negligent failure to train claim. Both, the court concluded, were barred by AS 09.50.250(3). [41] Before the superior court, Heisey conceded that the complaint does in fact mention assault and battery. But he also argued that in addition to assault and battery he alleged an excessive force claim, a claim that he argued is distinct and is not barred by the State's immunity. He makes the same argument to us: [A] claim for excessive force ... is not a claim for assault and battery. The State disagrees, contending that excessive force is the functional equivalent of assault or battery and that Heisey is creatively re-naming his causes of action in order to avoid the State's statutory immunity. We have not yet addressed whether an excessive force claim is barred by the State's sovereign immunity for common law assault or battery. As the State points out, however, other jurisdictions have determined that excessive force claims against a state are barred by immunity statutes similar to Alaska's. [42] This is particularly true in the federal context, where a number of courts have interpreted the Federal Tort Claims Act as barring claims of excessive force. The leading case in this area is Stepp v. United States, [43] in which the Fourth Circuit held that the FTCA barred an excessive force claim against the government. The court noted that [i]t is well established that an intentional use of excessive force in making an arrest amounts to an assault and battery, and cited to cases from eight different states. [44] At a general level, we agree with Stepp that there is no distinction between excessive force and assault and battery for purposes of the immunity statute. Alaska Statute 09.50.250(3) bars claims that arise[ ] out of assault or battery. In Kinegak v. State, Department of Corrections, [45] discussing AS 09.50.250(3) in the false imprisonment context, we interpreted the statute as immunizing the government from claims arising out of the conduct constituting reasonably well-recognized forms of false imprisonment. [46] Here, the factual basis for Heisey's excessive force claims gives us reason to believe that excessive force includes an assault or battery. Heisey alleged in his complaint that without justification or provocation, two Correctional Officers ... took down Mr. Heisey and slammed him to the floor face first. To the degree that this description forms the basis for his excessive force claims, it fits easily into the common law definitions of assault and battery. [47] The wording of Heisey's remaining excessive force claims, [48] however, alleges negligence in conjunction with excessive force: (1) that the State of Alaska breached a duty to Heisey to ensure that their officers do not use excessive or unnecessary force in their treatment of inmates, and (2) that the officers negligently used excessive force and caused injury and damage to [Heisey]. This formulation does not avoid the immunity bar. We first note that regardless of the label that a claimant attaches to his or her tort, we will look first to the substance of the claim. If the substance of the claim shows that it falls within the intentional tort exceptions, the courts will ignore this label and treat the claim as one within the list of exceptions if the pleaded facts seem to warrant. [49] Turning to Heisey's negligent[ ] use of excessive force claim, we hold that in spite of its wording, this is an assault or battery claim. The negligent application of too much force still implies that the alleged tort offenders intended to apply some degree of force, making the underlying action one of assault or battery. In B.R. v. State, [50] we addressed claims that included both intentional and negligent torts. In B.R., a physician's assistant sexually assaulted a female inmate while treating her at a correctional facility. [51] The physician's assistant was an employee of the Department of Corrections. [52] The inmate, B.R., reported the incident. [53] The police launched an investigation. [54] After the first incident, B.R. again experienced pain and was sent back to the jail's medical center. [55] She requested an escort as protection against the physician's assistant. [56] In spite of the request, the same physician's assistant again examined her, and again sexually assaulted her. [57] B.R. sued the department on several tort theories, including a negligent hiring claim and the failure to adequately train employees. The department moved for summary judgment, which the superior court granted on the grounds that B.R.'s claims were barred by AS 09.50.250(3). B.R. appealed. [58] We held that AS 09.50.250(3) barred claims which merely assert breaches of the department's duty to exercise due care in hiring, training, and supervising the employee because such claims depended on the tort offender's employment status. [59] However, we also held that the State's immunity did not extend to theories of liability not grounded on the department's employment relation with the tortfeasor. [60] Thus, though B.R.'s complaint did focus on the department's duties as the physician's assistant's employer, it also implicated a separate protective duty.... to exercise `reasonable care for the protection of [the prisoner's] life and health.' [61] This protective duty was independent because it ha[d] no relation to [the employee's] employment statusin other words, regardless of whether [he] was acting as a department employee, an independent contractor, a privately retained physician's aid[e], or a volunteer health care provider when he examined B.R. at the jail, the department would have had a duty to protect her and could have breached this duty by negligently exposing her to an unreasonable risk of harm from [the tortfeasor].[ [62] ] Here, we conclude that Heisey's negligent training claim does not implicate the breach of an independent duty. The claim is entirely dependent on the State's status as the correctional officers' employer. Heisey's complaint neither implicates a separate protective duty as in B.R., nor gives reason to believe that the Department may have negligently supervised its employees in general. We thus hold that Heisey's excessive force claims are barred by AS 09.50.250(3). [63]
In his amended complaint, Heisey alleged violations of the Alaska Constitution using largely the same facts as in his original complaint, but he removed the negligence claims against the individual officers. The superior court permitted Heisey to amend his complaint, ruling that he may have a Bivens -type state constitutional claim. The State argues that it is immune from the claims in the amended complaint, regardless of whether they are characterized as constitutional torts or common law torts. In the State's view, AS 09.50.250(3) bars  all tort claims against the State that arise out of an assault or battery. If plaintiffs could circumvent immunity simply by claiming a constitutional tort rather than a common law tort, this would eviscerate the purpose and meaning of AS 09.50.250(3). Heisey contends that AS 09.50.250 does not provide immunity against state constitutional torts and that those claims against the State should be allowed to proceed. In addition, the amended complaint makes a constitutional tort claim for excessive force, which Heisey says should not be characterized as an assault or battery. After examining the plain meaning of the statute and related statutory provisions, we agree with the State.
Article II, section 21 of the Alaska Constitution provides that [t]he legislature shall establish procedures for suits against the State. In Glover v. State, Department of Transportation, Alaska Marine Highway System, [64] we held that article II waived the State's absolute immunity, and that the legislature may specify the circumstances under which the [S]tate's less-than-absolute sovereign immunity will apply. [65] Citing to article II and Glover, Heisey claims that the default rule in Alaska is that the State is liable for its wrongs, and exceptions to liability must be carved out by statute. A violation of constitutional rights is a form of tort, as noted by Adkins v. Stansel. [66] As AS 09.50.250 does not enumerate constitutional torts among the torts the State is immune from, Heisey argues that the State is not immune from state constitutional tort claims. Heisey correctly observes that in Alaska, the government generally is liable for its wrongs, while immunity is the exception. Numerous cases have made this point. [67] But in AS 09.50.250(3) the legislature has recognized an exception. [68] We are not convinced that Heisey can evade the State's statutorily defined immunity simply by characterizing his claims as constitutional violations; we must look to the statute to understand whether the grant of immunity encompasses the particular constitutional violations alleged. In construing AS 09.50.250, we look for a construction that avoids absurdity and is consistent with a reasonable interpretation of the terms of the statute. [69] In this case, the State provides a reasonable interpretation that is truer to the statute's language and purpose. The plain language of AS 09.50.250 states, in relevant part: A person or corporation having a contract, quasi-contract, or tort claim against the state may bring an action against the state in a state court that has jurisdiction over the claim.... However, an action may not be brought if the claim . . . (3) arises out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights. Although any person alleging a tort claim against the state is authorized to bring a lawsuit against the State, claims that arise out of assault [or] battery are barred. If anyone alleging a constitutional tort claim is also subject to the limitations of this statute, then if the individual's claim arises out of assault or battery, it too would be barred. As a preliminary matter, then, we must address whether the statute contemplates constitutional torts in addition to common law torts. A constitutional tort is any action for damages for violation of a constitutional right against a government or individual defendants. [70] Constitutional torts have been recognized in the United States since at least the late 1800s, when the Civil Rights Act of 1871 authorized civil damage actions against [e]very person who, under color of [law] ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws. [71] Because the word tort in AS 09.50.250 is unmodified, the plain language of AS 09.50.250 supports the State's contention that constitutional torts are included within the State's immunity. Additional evidence is provided by AS 09.50.253(a) and (f), which were enacted at the same time as AS 09.50.250. [72] These sections provide: (a) Except as provided in (f) of this section, the remedy against the state provided by AS 09.50.250 for injury or loss of property or personal injury or death arising or resulting from an act or omission of a state employee while acting within the scope of the employee's office or employment is exclusive of any other civil action or proceeding for money damages by reason of the same subject matter against the employee whose act or omission gave rise to the claim or against the estate of the employee. Any other civil action or proceeding for money damages arising out of or relating to the same subject matter against the employee or the employee's estate is precluded without regard to when the act or omission occurred. . . . . (f) This section does not extend or apply to a civil action or proceeding against an employee of the state that is brought for a violation of the Constitution of the United States or that is brought for a violation of a law of the state under which an action or proceeding against an employee is expressly authorized.[ [73] ] By the statute's terms, the Alaska legislature made AS 09.50.250 the exclusive remedy for tort claims against the State, except for alleged violations of the U.S. Constitution that is, federal constitutional torts. There is no exception, however, for state constitutional torts. Because AS 09.50.250 provides the exclusive remedy for actions against state employees alleging state constitutional violations, it bars state constitutional torts arising out of a claim for assault or battery as well. We conclude that AS 09.50.250 encompasses state constitutional torts. A claim for a state constitutional violation arising out of an assault or battery is therefore also barred by the State's immunity.
If AS 09.50.250 includes state constitutional violations within its scope, then a state constitutional violation that arises out of assault or battery would be barred by the State's immunity. In his amended complaint, Heisey alleged that the correctional officers performed a `take-down' without provocation and slammed plaintiff into a concrete floor, slamming his face and head into the floor and caus[ing] serious physical injury and disfigurement. Based on these facts, Heisey alleged two instances of constitutional violations. First, the correctional officers' action constitutes the use of excessive force in violation of [a]rticle I, [s]ection 12 of the Constitution. Second, the State of Alaska violated its duty to institute proper training programs that [e]nsure prison employees do not use excessive force and violate the constitutional rights of prisoners, which violated Heisey's due process rights and violated his right to be free from the use of excessive force under the Alaska Constitution. Heisey's constitutional claims clearly arise out of an alleged assault or battery. As the State is immune from assault and battery claims, we conclude that Heisey's state constitutional claims are barred by the State's immunity.