Opinion ID: 2149087
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Conduct Involving Moral Turpitude

Text: The hearing officer appointed by this Court, upon her review of the evidence, found that Oliver's conduct did not constitute illegal behavior involving moral turpitude. Since disciplinary matters are original actions, this Court sits as fact-finder. While the hearing officer is in a superior position to judge the evidence put before her, we examine and review all matters which have been submitted in a particular cause. The findings of fact rendered by the hearing officers are the initial starting point for that review. In re Murray (1977), 266 Ind. 221, 362 N.E.2d 128. As for the level of proof required, violations need be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Matter of Moore (1983), Ind., 453 N.E.2d 971. Although this standard is frequently described as being intermediary between preponderance of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt, this Court described it earlier this year as akin to that required in criminal trials, one reserved for those actions which are penal in nature. Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Traina (1986), Ind., 486 N.E.2d 1019, 1022. The general definition of moral turpitude, as employed in disciplinary proceedings, was set forth in Baker et al. v. Miller (1956), 236 Ind. 20, 24, 138 N.E.2d 145, 147: In proceedings of this character moral turpitude has always been a controlling factor in the disciplinary action to be taken by the court where there has been a charged of misconduct by a member of the bar. The problem of defining moral turpitude is not without difficulty. There is certain conduct involving fraud, perjury, theft, embezzlement, and bribery where there is no question but that moral turpitude is involved. On the other hand, because the law does not always coincide exactly with principles of morality there are cases that are crimes that would not necessarily involve moral turpitude. Acts which normally at common law were not considered wrong, do not by reason of statutory enactment making them a crime, add any element of moral turpitude. For example, willfully running a stop light or exceeding the speed limit does not necessarily involve moral turpitude. Webster's International Dictionary (2d Edition) defines turpitude as: Inherent baseness or vileness of principle, words, or actions; depravity. Black's Law Dictionary (4th Edition) defines moral turpitude as: An act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellow man, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man. Because this problem of definition makes it easy to lose track of what Rule 1-102(A)(3) seeks to accomplish, some courts have attempted to describe moral turpitude in terms of the objective of the rule. The Supreme Court of California has adopted a definition which seems cogent: The paramount purpose of the moral turpitude standard is not to punish practitioners but to protect the public, the courts and the profession against unsuitable practitioners. (See Hallinan v. Committee of Bar Examiners (1966) 65 Cal.2d 447, 417-472, 55 Cal. Rptr. 228, 421 P.2d 76; In re Rothrock (1940) 16 Cal.2d 449, 454, 106 P.2d 907.) To hold that an act of a practitioner constitutes moral turpitude is to characterize him as unsuitable to practice law. In re Higbie [(1972)], 6 Cal.3d 562, 570, 99 Cal. Rptr. 865, 869, 493 P.2d 97, 101. In re Fahey (1973), 8 Cal.3d 842, 849, 106 Cal. Rptr. 313, 317, 505 P.2d 1369, 1373. This formulation is consonant with the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which use the term a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness. Rule 8.4. The Indiana State Bar Association has recently recommended that this Court adopt a revised version of the same rule, which provides that it is professional misconduct to commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects. Rule 8.4(b). Commission of some crimes establishes moral turpitude on its face. These include crimes that necessarily involve an intent to defraud, intentional dishonesty for personal gain, or behavior particularly repugnant to accepted moral standards. Commission of other offenses may or may not involve moral turpitude, and thus conviction of other offenses is not grounds for discipline without additional proof of circumstances surrounding the offense. Hallinan, supra . Acts which this Court has declared to involve moral turpitude have included standing naked in a window masturbating and waving to attract attention ( In re Levinson (1983), Ind., 444 N.E.2d 1175), and misrepresenting the reasons why a bank failed to honor a check which was issued without sufficient funds and failing to appear in court after receiving a summons, necessitating issuance of a bench warrant ( In re Schaumann (1983), Ind., 446 N.E.2d 1304). Where the conduct involved driving while intoxicated and another offense, such as possession of marijuana and hashish, this Court has determined that the behavior constituted illegal conduct involving moral turpitude. Matter of Jones (1984), Ind., 464 N.E.2d 1281. Considering Jones in light of cited precedent, this Court noted that it was not simply possession of marijuana which made the respondent guilty of violating the Code: The fact that marijuana was involved in both disciplinary actions does not mean that all issues in such cases are forever decided. Our analysis involves the consideration of Respondent's conduct, in toto, not the rigid application of discipline because a particular allegation is raised. Id., at 1282. Thus, the respondent's violation in Jones was not the result of any one of the acts with which he had been charged, but the result of consideration of all three offenses. The only other jurisdiction which has considered whether driving while intoxicated is an illegal offense involving moral turpitude has concluded that it is not. Matter of Walker (1977), S.D., 254 N.W.2d 452. The only reported cases under which driving while intoxicated, standing alone, has served as a basis for discipline arose in states under whose statutes any conviction for any criminal offense would serve as a basis for discipline. In re Enright (1938), 160 Or. 313, 85 P.2d 359, rev. on other grounds 239 Or. 82, 396 P.2d 216 (1964) (any misdemeanor or felony conviction a basis for discipline); Matter of Costigan (1972), 39 App.Div.2d 961, 333 N.Y.S.2d 984 (suspension required upon any felony conviction). While cases involving driving while intoxicated as a basis for attorney discipline are sparse, many states have concluded that driving while intoxicated is not an offense involving moral turpitude in the context of statutes or rules authorizing impeachment of witnesses through introduction of evidence showing that the witness has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. State v. Fournier (1963), 123 Vt. 439, 193 A.2d 924; State v. Deer (1955), Ohio Comm.Pl., 57 O.O. 493, 129 N.E.2d 667; Fee v. State (Tenn.Cr.App. 1973), 497 S.W.2d 748; Diamond v. State (1972), 49 Ala.App. 68, 268 So.2d 850; Compton v. Jay (Tex. 1965), 389 S.W.2d 639. One state has held that driving while intoxicated is not an offense involving moral turpitude for purposes of alcoholic beverage regulation. Flowers v. Benton County Beer Board (1957), 202 Tenn. 56, 302 S.W.2d 335. In reaching its conclusion, the Vermont Supreme Court emphasized that to involve moral turpitude the conduct must not only be socially undesirable which the law has made criminal, but it must, by its nature, be base or depraved. 193 A.2d at 925. Similarly, the Alabama court held that driving while intoxicated is not the kind of offense which signifies an inherent quality of baseness, vileness, and depravity, denoting moral turpitude. 268 So.2d at 853. We assess Oliver's behavior against this precedent, and we consider the nature of his conduct in toto. First, the Respondent is not a multiple offender or someone with a chronic alcohol problem. The findings of fact, not challenged, are that this was an isolated incident. Second, the Respondent has not been convicted of a felony. Indeed, he has not been convicted of a misdemeanor. He was charged with a misdemeanor and readily admitted his guilt. Third, the Respondent has not caused any personal injury or property damage, except to himself. The judgment of the community upon Oliver's conduct is a part of the determination of moral turpitude, which depends upon the state of public morals and may vary according to time and place, as well as with the degree of public harm produced by the act in question. In re Fahey, supra ; In re Hibgbie, supra. The trial judge withheld acceptance of Oliver's plea on condition that he perform fifty hours of community service, attend alcohol education school, contribute $250.00 to an appropriate charity, and commit no further offense for one year. These penalties lie within the discretion and authority of the trial judge. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-2 (Burns 1985 Repl.). After Oliver successfully fulfilled these requirements, the trial judge dismissed the case. The prosecutor apparently concluded that the penal interests of the State had been met and concurred in this dismissal; otherwise the matter would have been set for trial. The trial judge was sufficiently confident that Oliver would not be a further danger to the community that he chose to permit him to drive on a restricted license, as authorized by the legislature. Ind. Code § 9-4-1-54 (Burns 1980 Repl.), now Ind. Code § 9-11-3-2. Standing alone, Oliver's act of driving while intoxicated, without a prior history of alcohol offenses and without any damage done to anyone other than himself, does not constitute a violation of Rule 1-102(A)(3).