Opinion ID: 154137
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Joy's status as an Operator

Text: 25 We next determine whether the term operator as defined in section 3(d) of the Mine Act includes all independent contractors performing services at a mine or whether it exempts from regulation certain independent contractors, like Joy, whose only connection with a mine is limited to providing services in connection with the sale of goods. Joy asserts that we should adopt the position set forth in Old Dominion Power Co. v. Donovan, 772 F.2d 92 (4th Cir.1985). In Old Dominion, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that in amending the Coal Mine Act to include independent contractors performing services ... at [a] mine, Congress intended to include within the definition of operator only those independent contractors who are engaged in ... the extraction process, and who have a 'continuing presence' at the mine. Id. at 97; see also National Indus. Sand Ass'n v. Marshall, 601 F.2d 689, 704-06 (3d Cir.1979) (upholding proposed MSHA regulations that would have treated only certain independent contractors performing services at a mine as operators). Old Dominion derived these two limitations from several pieces of legislative history that the court concluded showed Congress's intent to regulate only those contractors with a sufficient nexus to mining who are at the mine more than occasionally or infrequently. 772 F.2d at 96 (citing Senate Report at 14, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3414, and S.Rep. No. 95-461, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 37, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3485, 3485). Under Old Dominion, Joy asserts that it was neither sufficiently engaged in the extraction process nor continuously present at the mine, and thus does not meet the requirements for operator status. Alternatively, Joy asserts that under FMHSRC's two-part nexus test, which is a diluted version of the Old Dominion test, it is not an operator because it did not provide a service sufficiently related to the extraction process or maintain a presence in a mine that is not rare, infrequent, and attenuated. Otis II, 11 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 1922-23. 26 The Secretary, on the other hand, urges us to adopt the approach taken in Otis Elevator Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 921 F.2d 1285 (D.C.Cir.1990), in which the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit adopted a broad reading of section 3(d) based on the plain meaning of the statute. In construing the term operator, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the phrase 'any independent contractor performing services ... at [a] mine' means just that--any independent contractor performing services at a mine. Id. at 1290. The court refused to look beyond the plain meaning of section 3(d) and rejected the approach taken in Old Dominion, in which the Fourth Circuit derived its two limiting criteria based on the statute's legislative history. Even looking to the legislative history, the court concluded that Congress's only express intent was to include those contractors meeting the Old Dominion criteria and found nothing [that] expressly states an intent to cover only these independent contractors. 921 F.2d at 1290 (citing Senate Report at 14, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3414 ([T]he definition of mine 'operator' is expanded to include 'any independent contractor performing services or construction at such mine.' )). 27 Like the D.C. Circuit in Otis Elevator, we decline to adopt either the Old Dominion approach or the Commission's diluted version of that approach. Rather, we think the definition of operator in section 3(d) of the Mine Act is clear and means just what it says--an operator includes any independent contractor performing services ... at [a] mine. See Otis Elevator, 921 F.2d at 1290. Although Congress may have been specially concerned with contractors who are engaged in the extraction process and who have a continuing presence at a mine, see id., section 3(d) by its terms is not limited to these contractors. Nothing in the legislative history shows a  'clearly expressed legislative intention'  to the contrary that would allow us to question the strong presumption that Congress expresse[d] its intent through the language it cho[se]. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 n. 12, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 1213 n. 12, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987) (citation omitted). 28 Joy, nonetheless, argues that Congress could not have intended a definition of operator that is so broad as to include mere vendors, such as the Xerox service representative who comes onto mine property to repair a copy machine. In this regard, Joy argues that the legislative history is important for what it does not contain, asserting that there is no evidence in the legislative history that Congress intended to include equipment vendors like Joy, whose only contact with the mine is in providing services pursuant to a contract of sale. For present purposes, it is enough to conclude that we are constrained by the plain meaning of the words Congress chose. The phrase any independent contractor performing services ... at [a] mine may be broad, but its meaning is clear. In this case, Joy sent a service representative onto mine property, who, in carrying out his job, performed services at the mine. Accordingly, Joy is subject to regulation as an operator under the Mine Act. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.