Opinion ID: 2590571
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Inman's statements to police

Text: We have not previously decided if defamatory statements made to police before the initiation of criminal proceedings are absolutely privileged or enjoy only a qualified privilege. On several occasions, we have recognized an absolute privilege for communications published in the course of judicial proceedings, even when the statements are false or malicious and are republished with the intent to harm another. [27] We have also extended an absolute privilege to quasi-judicial proceedings, such as when a citizen filed a complaint with an internal affairs bureau against a police officer. [28] Nevertheless, we have never directly decided what type of privilege applies to communications with a police officer before criminal proceedings are commenced. We previously addressed the issue in K-Mart Corporation v. Washington, [29] but failed to clearly determine whether a qualified or absolute privilege applies. In that case, the plaintiff claimed that K-Mart defamed him by falsely telling the police that he had stolen hair products. We concluded that K-Mart's statements were subject to a qualified privilege granted to merchants under former NRS 598.030, which applied when a person was reasonably believed to have stolen the store's merchandise. Alternatively, we opined that [t]he statements could be deemed communications preliminary to a judicial proceeding under Restatement (Second) of Torts [section] 587 and therefore would be absolutely privileged if made in good faith. [30] Accordingly, by employing a statutory qualified privilege but suggesting that an absolute privilege might apply, K-Mart failed to answer whether a qualified or absolute privilege operates in such instances. Most jurisdictions that have considered this issue have concluded that communications made to police before the initiation of criminal proceedings enjoy only a qualified privilege. [31] In so concluding, these courts have balanced an individual's right to enjoy a reputation unimpaired by defamatory attacks against the public interest of free and full disclosure of facts to the judicial, legislative, and executive departments of government. [32] Additionally, courts adopting a qualified privilege have noted the distinction between statements made in court and statements made to the police. As recognized by the Oregon Supreme Court in DeLong v. Yu Enterprises, Inc., [33] in court, individuals must be free to risk impugning the reputations of others, in order to discharge public duties and protect individual rights, but citizens making informal complaints to police should not enjoy blanket immunity from an action; instead, such statements should receive protection only if they were made in good faith, to discourage an abuse of the privilege. Although a few jurisdictions have considered communications with police in aid of law enforcement as an initial step in judicial proceedings and have therefore applied an absolute privilege, [34] we agree with those courts that have adopted a qualified privilege. The competing policies of safeguarding reputations and full disclosure are best served by a qualified privilege. To the extent that we suggested in K-Mart that statements made to police before the initiation of criminal proceedings could be deemed communications preliminary to a judicial proceeding under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 587, we recede from that premise. Additionally, as other courts have recognized, a qualified privilege provides adequate protection against frivolous lawsuits. Under a qualified privilege, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant abused the privilege by publishing the defamatory communication with actual malice. [35] Actual malice is a stringent standard that is proven by demonstrating that a statement is published with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard for its veracity. [36] Having concluded that a qualified privilege applies in this instance, we examine whether Juanita produced any evidence that Inman's statements to the police were made with actual malice. Juanita, in her opposition to Motel 6's summary judgment motion, supplied an affidavit, which implies that Inman's statements to the police were untrue but does not state that the statements were made with the knowledge that they were false. In addition, the only evidence in the record of the alleged defamatory statement is a letter from the police acknowledging that Inman lodged a complaint with them. The letter, however, simply indicates that Inman informed the police that she suspected that Juanita and Robert, and a third unrelated party, might be responsible for the problems at Motel 6. At most, the letter and affidavit demonstrate that Inman indicated to the police her suspicion that Juanita and Robert may have been responsible for the Motel 6 theft and the threatening letters. Suspicions of criminal wrongdoing are commonly expressed to police, and often the suspicion is misplaced. Without more, the mere fact that an individual informs police of possible criminal wrongdoing does not establish malice. To overcome the qualified privilege, Juanita was required to establish that Inman acted with reckless disregard for veracity or with knowledge of falsity. [37] She failed to do so. As a qualified privilege applies to Inman's statements to the police and Juanita failed to advance any evidence of malice, we conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment to Motel 6 on this issue.