Opinion ID: 171635
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Raising Federal Claims Before the HPA

Text: In the first place, we have no idea whether the HPA would have been receptive to Brown's arguments under federal Medicaid law. And the burden on this point rests on the federal plaintiff to show that state procedural law barred presentation of its claims. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 14, 107 S.Ct. 1519, 95 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted). Brown, however, never raised her federal arguments in the HPA proceedings. In such a situation, the Supreme Court instructs we must assume that Brown could have raised these claims before the HPAunless unambiguous contrary authority exists. See id. at 15, 107 S.Ct. 1519 ([W]hen a litigant has not attempted to present his federal claims in related state-court proceedings, a federal court should assume that state procedures will afford an adequate remedy, in the absence of unambiguous authority to the contrary.); accord O'Neill, 32 F.3d at 792-93. Thus, we must consult Kansas state law to see whether it unambiguously prevents the HPA from considering federal Medicaid law during benefit termination proceedings. In my view, Kansas law does not unambiguously prevent benefit recipients like Brown from asserting federal claims in proceedings before the HPA. The relevant jurisdictional statute instructs HPA hearing officers as follows: The department of social and rehabilitation services shall not have jurisdiction to determine the facial validity of a state or federal statute. An administrative law judge from the office of administrative hearings shall not have jurisdiction to determine the facial validity of an agency rule and regulation. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 75-3306(h). Brown argues the HPA was thus jurisdictionally prohibited from considering her federal law claims. But a facial challenge is by no means the only way of raising federal issues. Brown could have presented an as-applied challenge. Younger does not require an opportunity to levy a facial challenge. Furthermore, Kansas case law would not have unambiguously precluded Brown from raising her federal issues. State case law does exist indicating Kansas administrative agencies are not empowered to decide constitutional questions. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Unified Sch. Dist. No. 443 v. Kan. State Bd. of Educ., 266 Kan. 75, 966 P.2d 68, 76 (Kan.1998). But it would be erroneous to conclude Brown could not have raised her constitutional claim before the agency. Indeed, the most recent Kansas Supreme Court case to address this issue concluded [t]he rule that a constitutional issue cannot be decided by an administrative agency does not necessarily preclude [an individual] from raising such an issue in that forum. Martin v. Kan. Dep't of Revenue, 285 Kan. 625, 176 P.3d 938, 946 (Kan.2008). This ability to raise a constitutional issue in state administrative proceedings is relevant for a number of reasons. First, one's ability to raise the same issues at the administrative level as at the state court level gives weight to the view that both comprise one unitary proceeding for the purposes of Younger abstention. Second, it means that if the HPA can be made aware of the federal issues, it can construe the challenged Kansas statute to avoid the federal question altogether. Thus, even if not empowered to decide the constitutional issue, the agency may avoid the entire federal conflict. And third, it cuts against the argument that Brown was unambiguously precluded from asserting her federal claim. All that Younger abstention asks is whether Brown could have raised her federal claim before the HPA. Whether or not Brown would have succeeded in challenging the offending Kansas statute as applied to her case is immaterial. And again, under the jurisdictional prohibition against facial challenges, that still leaves as-applied challenges and narrowing constructions, either of which could have adequately resolved Brown's complaint and obviated the need for her federal lawsuit. Accordingly, there is no unambiguous authority suggesting the HPA was prohibited from considering Brown's federal Medicaid arguments. The administrative proceedings support this view. Brown had succeeded in her initial proceedings before the hearing officer but the agency head later overturned the result. The initial determination in Brown's favor rested on equitable considerations of avoiding retroactivity in applying new Kansas statutory law to Brown's preexisting benefits. It is not at all clear why proceedings that were equitable in nature could not have addressed federal Medicaid law among all other equitable considerations. It may be possible that Brown could have raised an as-applied challenge before the HPA, that the HPA could have construed the offending Kansas statute narrowly to avoid the federal Medicaid law claim, or that the equitable nature of HPA proceedings could have taken federal Medicaid law into account. But most importantly, the Supreme Court instructs the assumption that in the absence of unambiguous authority to the contrary, Brown could have raised her federal claim in one shape or another before the HPA. Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 15, 107 S.Ct. 1519; see also Dayton, 477 U.S. at 629, 106 S.Ct. 2718 (But even if Ohio law is such that the Commission may not consider the constitutionality of the statute under which it operates, it would seem an unusual doctrine... to say that the Commission could not construe its own statutory mandate in the light of federal constitutional principles.). The burden is on Brown to demonstrate the contrary, and she failed to do so. Her sole argument on this score relies on the HPA's inability to address facial challenges to state welfare statutes, but this argument says nothing of other means by which Brown could have raised her federal claims before the HPA.