Opinion ID: 1890458
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Restriction of Defense Counsel's Cross-examination of the Complainant

Text: The appellant further asserts that the trial court committed constitutional error by limiting the defense's cross-examination of the complainant to three specific prior acts of violence. Specifically, the appellant complains that this ruling unfairly forced defense counsel to choose from among the ten prior acts of violence that had been presented, see supra, note 2, thereby inhibiting the defense from presenting a clear-cut case of self-defense by demonstrating [that] the known abusive behavior of the victim justified the reasonableness of appellant's fear of the complainant. The appellant further argues that the trial court's limitation on cross-examination undermined her efforts to show the complainant's bias against the appellant. [T]he Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish. Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20, 106 S.Ct. 292, 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1985). [T]rial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986). Even where extrinsic evidence of a victim's prior violence is relevant, the trial court may exclude such evidence if it is cumulative. See Harris, 618 A.2d at 145 ( citing Hurt v. United States, 337 A.2d 215, 217 (D.C.1975)). The test for whether a trial judge has placed too great a limit on cross-examination is whether that limit keeps from the jury relevant and important facts bearing on the trustworthiness of crucial testimony. Springer v. United States, 388 A.2d 846, 855 (D.C.1978) (rev'd on other grounds) (quoting United States v. Harris, 501 F.2d 1, 8 (9th Cir.1974)). In this case, defense counsel was permitted to introduce through the appellant and three other witnesses at least ten prior violent acts committed by the complainant. The trial court then permitted the defense counsel to recall the complainant for re-cross-examination in order to impeach the truthfulness of her prior testimony that her relationship with the appellant was okay and all right. As defense counsel started to cross-examine the complainant, the court called a bench conference: Court: Now, sir, you have a limited number of incidents you cannot go over. Is this the same incident you were talking about before and how many incidents are you going to go over because you can't just go over and over and over. Defense Counsel: What I intend to do your Honor, was go over the incidents that have already been testified to. Court: All right, what incidents are they? [Defense counsel listed three incidents] Court: All right. Defense Counsel: My client testified  Court: Okay, those are three. Defense Counsel: Yeah, that's it but there's one other if I may. Court: Three is sufficient. Defense: Then I would like to leave one and go back to the one that my client testified to which is that she cut another neighbor around September 2001 in the hand and had to go to court in Maryland for it. Patricia Hart testified to that as well, that she was afraid. Court: All right. Defense: So those would be three. [The court overrules an objection from the government, in favor of the appellant.] Defense: May I continue, Your Honor? Court: You may. Defense counsel did not object to the court's limiting cross-examination of the complainant to three of her prior violent acts, and proceeded to cross-examine the complainant about the three acts he selected. Thus, we review the trial court's limitation for plain error. See Foreman v. United States, 633 A.2d 792, 795 (D.C.1993) (where no objection is raised at trial to alleged constitutional error, the review is only for plain error, i.e., whether the error was obvious or readily apparent, and so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the very fairness and integrity of the trial). As noted above, the trial court had discretion to place reasonable limitations to prevent cumulative evidence consistent with the appellant's right to cross-examine the complainant. The trial court's ruling limited  but did not preclude  this particular line of cross-examination and, therefore, was not obviously wrong. Nor was there significant prejudice. Appellant was able to cross-examine the complainant about three separate prior incidents of violence chosen by defense counsel to impeach the complainant's trial testimony and show her bias against the appellant. Appellant did not argue to the trial court  nor does she on appeal  that further cross-examination of the complainant regarding more prior acts of violence would have provided additional facts necessary for the jury's evaluation of the trustworthiness of the complainant or her bias against appellant. As a result, there was no plain error. [6]