Opinion ID: 159789
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Willing to Act Language

Text: 42 Having found that the use of the substantial doubt language was cured, we turn to the willing to act language. We must determine whether the use of this language, consistently criticized by the Courts, results in a reasonable likelihood that the jury convicted Mr. Tillman on a standard of proof below that required by the Due Process Clause. 43 The trial court instructed the jury, if . . . you can truthfully say that you have an abiding conviction of the defendant's guilt such as you would be willing to act upon in the more weighty and important matters relating to your own affairs, you have no reasonable doubt. For decades, the Supreme Court has strongly disfavored such an instruction. See Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954) (explaining, this section of the charge should have been in terms of the kind of doubt that would make a person hesitate to act, rather than the kind on which he would be willing to act (citation omitted)). In Victor, the Court reaffirmed this position, stressing that the hesitate to act standard gives a common sense benchmark for just how substantial such a doubt must be. 3 Since the Court announced its preference in Holland, courts have consistently criticized willing to act language and expressed a preference for hesitate to act. See Monk, 901 F.2d at 890; Hatheway v. Secretary of the Army, 641 F.2d 1376, 1384 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Gordon, 634 F.2d 639, 644 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Babtiste, 608 F.2d 666, 668 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Magnano, 543 F.2d 431, 436-37 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Emalfarb, 484 F.2d 787, 790-91 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Cole, 453 F.2d 902, 906 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v. Restaino, 369 F.2d 544, 546 (3d Cir. 1966); Scurry v. United States, 347 F.2d 468, 470 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 44 Prior to Monk, we repeatedly criticized willing to act instructions. See, e.g., United States v. Pepe, 501 F.2d 1142, 1144 (10th Cir. 1974) (The Supreme Court in Holland expressed its preference for the `hesitate to act' formulation, and that preference should be heeded.); United States v. Smalldone, 485 F.2d 1333, 1347-48 (10th Cir. 1973) (holding curative language mitigated error). We now repeat our admonition from United States v. Leaphart, 513 F.2d 747, 750 (10th Cir. 1975): The time has unquestionably arrived after Holland, Smalldone, and Pepe for the trial courts to change this instruction and to couch it in the terms prescribed by the Supreme Court of the United States. 45 Despite our criticism of the language, the cases have not held willing to act language to be reversible error in itself. See, e.g., Smalldone, 485 F.2d at 1348; Monk, 901 F.2d at 890. Viewing the instructions on the whole, the cases have held the instructions to have properly conveyed the meaning of reasonable doubt to the jury. See, e.g., Holland, 348 U.S. at 140 ([T]he instruction as given was not of the type that could mislead the jury into finding no reasonable doubt when in fact there was some.); United States v. Drake, 673 F.2d 15, 20 (1st Cir. 1982) (collecting cases). 46 Because the substantial doubt language in Mr. Tillman's reasonable doubt instruction was permissible, the willingness to act language stands alone. In an otherwise unobjectionable instruction, willingness to act language has not been held to constitute grounds for habeas corpus relief. 4 Accordingly, we hold that, taken as a whole, the instruction correctly conveyed the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury. We see no reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instructions to allow conviction based on proof insufficient to meet the Winship standard. See Victor, 511 U.S. at 6. Again, however, we note the possibility that this imprecise language could, as it did in Monk, create future problems, and, thus, should be eliminated. 47