Opinion ID: 765997
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Earl Lamont Brown

Text: 60 The critical issue in Brown's appeal is whether he was an enforcer for the conspiracy, for that is the sole basis on which he can be said to have participated in the Gibbs/Coleman operation. At trial, Brown argued that the government had presented no evidence that he was an enforcer for the conspiracy. Nevertheless, the jury convicted Brown of the conspiracy charge. At the sentencing hearing, the defense objected to the PSI's Conclusion that Brown was responsible for twenty-six kilograms of powder cocaine and 49.5 ounces of crack. The District Court rejected these arguments, attributed to Brown all of the drugs handled by the conspiracy during the time in which Brown was involved in the conspiracy (for a total of twenty-seven kilograms of powder cocaine and nine ounces of crack), and calculated an offense level of 38. 9 The Court thus sentenced Brown to 324 months in prison and ordered him to forfeit $5,200 to the government. Brown timely appealed his conviction and sentence. 61 On appeal, Brown presents a number of arguments why his conviction should be overturned and why, in the alternative, he is entitled to resentencing. With regard to his conviction, Brown argues that the government at trial failed to offer any evidence that he joined the larger conspiracy or that he took action to further the conspiracy's ends. He also contends that the District Court erred in allowing Agent Coleman to testify about ultimate issues of law, including Brown's knowledge and intent, in violation of Fed. R. Evid. 704(b), and he implicitly argues that Coleman's testimony violated Fed. R. Evid. 702 to the extent that his explication of the meaning of certain conversations was not helpful to the jury. As to sentencing, Brown submits that the District Court erred in: (i) failing to appoint new counsel for him because of his irreconcilable differences with his attorney; (ii) calculating the amount of drugs attributable to him; (iii) increasing his criminal history category based on a juvenile conviction; (iv) adding two points to his offense level based on an earlier conviction for possession of a weapon; and (v) failing to address his request that he receive a downward adjustment to his offense level based on his status as a minor participant in the conspiracy. We address the validity of Brown's conviction, as well as sentencing issues (ii) and (iv), below, after setting forth the relevant facts. We dispose of the remaining issues in the margin. 10
62 The government's contention that Brown was associated with the conspiracy was two-pronged: first, it claimed that he was an enforcer, and second, it alleged that he purchased drugs from Gibbs. Because the drug purchases, if any, were so minor, we focus on Brown's role as enforcer. On February 14, 1995, Gibbs was shot during an apparent robbery attempt; he came to suspect that the shooter had been either Antjuan Sydnor 11 or Belvin Brickel. The government alleged, based on the recorded conversations and the testimony of Vincent Collier, that Gibbs asked Frank Fluellen and Earl Brown to hurt or kill the person Gibbs suspected had shot him. The heart of Brown's defense was essentially one of mistaken identity: there was another person in the conspiracy named Earl (Earl Packer Hunte), and Hunte was the true enforcer for the conspiracy. 12 Since the conversations provide the bulk of the evidence against Brown, we discuss each relevant exchange. 63 The first recorded conversation arguably relating to Brown took place on March 1, 1995, between Gibbs and Fluellen. Fluellen asked Gibbs whether he paged Earl (without specifying which Earl) earlier that day, and Gibbs said no. Gibbs then stated that he was going to call Earl to see if he can make any progress. Gibbs also told Fluellen that Gibbs had not planned on calling Earl till [Gibbs] got the jawn. Fluellen ended the conversation by telling Gibbs that he would be on post. Agent Coleman interpreted this conversation as Fluellen asking Gibbs about a car and telling Gibbs that he was ready and waiting. 64 The first conversation in which Brown is recorded occurred the next day. Gibbs called Brown and told him that he was waiting for Collier to call him back, since Collier had been out the night before. Collier later testified that Gibbs had asked him to steal a car for a person or persons to use in their attempt to kill Sydnor or Brickel (an attempt referred to as a mission). Gibbs told Brown that he hoped Collier did that. Brown told Gibbs, Know what I mean, got to do it tonight . . . . Before Friday. Gibbs responded, Yeah, I hope so. That shit getting on my nerves. . . . That [guy] be around and I'll be thinking about that shit, more and more. Gibbs told Brown, I'm almost sure he got it. It should be somewhere sitting. So I'll just let you know where it's at so y'all can pop it right there. Agent Coleman testified that Brown and Gibbs were discussing whether Collier had stolen a car for Brown to use on his attempt to hurt Sydnor, and that got to do it tonight referred to that attempt. 13 65 A few minutes after Brown's conversation with Gibbs, Gibbs called Collier. Gibbs asked Collier, You get that? to which Collier replied that he had not, because his hand hurt. Collier told Gibbs that as soon as it got dark that night he would go out and grab anything [he] can. Gibbs responded, I need it kind of early, man, cause they be trying to get on a mission. Agent Coleman testified that Collier was telling Gibbs he was going to steal a car. Collier himself testified that going on a mission meant going to hurt or kill someone, though the people Gibbs was sending on the mission were not identified in this conversation. 66 The next afternoon, March 3, at 2:02 p.m., the government intercepted another conversation between Gibbs and Collier. Collier told Gibbs, I got this jawn sitting and shit. Gibbs announced, I'm trying to get this boy tonight, man. Collier recounted to Gibbs the story of how he stole the car and told him where he had left it. Gibbs then said, I gotta tell E . . . so they can move [it]. 67 Minutes later, at 2:15 p.m., Gibbs called Brown, telling him, Vince got that jawn. Brown informed Gibbs that he and someone else had gone out the previous night but that the person (presumably the person they were looking for) didn't come back out. Gibbs said, [T]onight will be the night though, to which Brown responded, I know. Gibbs confirmed that he had a stolen car waiting for Brown when Brown wanted it. Agent Coleman testified that tonight will be the night meant that it would be the night that [they] would be able to go through with the mission that they . . . talked about earlier. Agent Coleman further testified that when Brown said that he had gone out the previous night but that the person had not come back out, he believed that Brown was referring to going out and attempting to kill Sydnor or Brickel but that Sydnor or Brickel did not come back outside. 68 On March 17, the government recorded Gibbs speaking to Fluellen. The Discussion went as follows: 69 Gibbs: I was um, telling T, you know, when he getting ready to go inside that, that, club his pants be down, you know what I mean. 70 Fluellen: That's, that's what we trying to find out now. . . . 71 Gibbs: They pull his pants down to go in there cause they don't play that in there, you know. 72 Fluellen: That's what I, I tryin' to find out which jawn he go to. 73 Gibbs: Yeah. 74 . . . 75 Gibbs: Right here, before when you get out of there he gotta take it and leave it in there with him in there, you know what I mean. 76 Fluellen: A huh. 77 Gibbs: It'll be in the wheel. 78 Fluellen: Ah huh. 79 Gibbs: I might you know that's like the perfect place and shit.Fluellen: Yeah I know. Okay, that's what E was talkin' bout then. 14 80 Agent Coleman testified that Gibbs was telling Fluellen that the club at 47th Street and Woodland Avenue had a metal detector so that guests could not enter the club with a gun. (In this instance, jawn referred to a nightclub.) Agent Coleman said that when people have their pants down, it means they are unarmed and that in the wheel meant in the car. Coleman further testified that he understood Gibbs and Fluellen to be discussing a plan to allow their target to enter the club and shoot him when he came out because he would not have a gun. 81 On March 24, in a call between Brown and Gibbs, Brown told Gibbs, in no particular context, I was on that last night plus we're gonna be on that tonight. Gibbs responded that he wanted to talk to Brown about that and that they could discuss it once they got together. Agent Coleman testified that on that last night and on that tonight referred to the mission Brown was on for Gibbs. 82 Three days later, on March 27, Gibbs spoke to Collier. Collier told Gibbs that he had seen Earl the other day. Gibbs recounted, Earl was like he was on a mission the other night . . . . Ain't never turned nothing out. Collier later testified that when he spoke about Earl he meant Earl Brown. Gibbs and Collier then proceeded to discuss the advantages of getting people in the daytime, since they would not be expecting it. Gibbs ended by saying that he knew right where to catch that motherfucker .. . with his pants down.
83 Because Brown challenges his conviction, we first must decide whether the government introduced enough evidence against Brown such that a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The heart of the government's case against Brown lay in the inference that Brown contributed to the conspiracy as an enforcer; the pieces of evidence supporting this inference were the tape recorded conversations and Agent Coleman's interpretations thereof, in addition to Collier's testimony. 84 On appeal, Brown challenges the sufficiency of the government's evidence by arguing that the District Court abused its discretion in permitting Agent Coleman to testify to Brown's knowledge and intent in violation of Fed. R. Evid. 704(b). Under Rule 704(b), no expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether the defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an element of the crime charged . . . . Fed. R. Evid. 704(b). Specifically, Brown alleges that Agent Coleman was expressing his own opinion that Brown intended to hurt Sydnor or Brickel. He also implicitly argues that the testimony of Agent Coleman, who was qualified as an expert, violated the dictates of Rule 702 when he defined words that did not require specialized knowledge to understand, since that testimony would not assist the jury. 85 In support of his Rule 704(b) argument, Brown points to two statements by Agent Coleman. First, Coleman testified that (in his opinion) when Gibbs told Brown, Tonight will be the night, Gibbs meant that Brown and Fluellen could complete the mission against Sydnor or Brickel that night. Agent Coleman also testified that when Brown stated, I was on that last night, plus we're going to be on that tonight, he believed that Brown was referring to the mission they had talked about earlier to locate or find some individual and hurt them. 86 The government responds that Agent Coleman did not testify to Brown's state of mind or intent. Rather, the government contends that, in the passages cited by Brown, Coleman limited his testimony to interpreting the cryptic language, never opined on Brown's intent, and never stated that Brown was an enforcer. Indeed, the government points to two exchanges in the record where Agent Coleman explicitly disclaimed knowledge of what Brown's intentions were with regard to the mission. The government also notes that the District Court instructed the jury that they were not bound to believe or follow Agent Coleman's expert opinion. This was a proper instruction. 15 87 As a first step in deciding whether the evidence against Brown was sufficient, we must decide whether Agent Coleman improperly opined on Brown's intent or knowledge in violation of Rule 704(b), or whether his testimony violated Rule 702, and thus whether part of Coleman's testimony should have been excluded. The admission of expert testimony should be reversed only for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Bennett, 161 F.3d 171, 182 (3d Cir. 1998). The trial Judge has broad discretion to admit or exclude expert testimony, based upon whether it is helpful to the trier of fact. See id. (citing Fed. R. Evid. 702); 4 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 702.02[2] (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 1997). 88 As a preliminary matter, we note that it is well established that experienced government agents may testify to the meaning of coded drug language under Fed. R. Evid. 702. See, e.g., Theodoropoulos, 866 F.2d at 590-91; see also United States v. Plunk, 153 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that the jargon of the narcotics trade and drug dealers' code language are proper subjects of expert opinion), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1376 (1999); United States v. Delpit, 94 F.3d 1134, 1145 (8th Cir. 1996) (same); United States v. Boissoneault, 926 F.2d 230, 232 (2d Cir. 1991) (same). Because the primary purpose of coded drug language is to conceal the meaning of the conversation from outsiders through deliberate obscurity, drug traffickers' jargon is a specialized body of knowledge and thus an appropriate subject for expert testimony. See United States v. Griffith, 118 F.3d 318, 321 (5th Cir. 1997); Theodoropoulos, 866 F.2d at 591. 89 Such testimony is relatively uncontroversial when it permits a government agent to explain the actual meanings of coded words--that is, when the agent acts as a translator of sorts. See, e.g., Griffith, 118 F.3d at 322 (agent testified that days of work meant pounds of marijuana); Delpit, 94 F.3d at 1144 (agent testified that straps meant guns); United States v. Simmons, 923 F.2d 934, 946 (2d Cir. 1991) (boyfriend or boy meant heroin). This precept applies here to much of what Agent Coleman testified about. It was within the scope of Agent Coleman's expertise to explain, for example, in specific contexts, that jawn meant cocaine, that to hit someone meant to page them on a beeper, that on post meant ready and waiting, and that a quarter meant $2,500. 90 It is a different matter when an agent testifies that, in light of the meanings he has attributed to certain conversations, a defendant has played a certain role in, or has certain knowledge about, a conspiracy or other offense. See, e.g., Boissoneault, 926 F.2d at 233 (expressing discomfort with expert testimony that draws Conclusions as to the significance of conduct or evidence). But see United States v. Foster, 939 F.2d 445, 452 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that although certain behavior may have an innocent explanation, it is a fair use of expert testimony to offer another explanation for that behavior); United States v. DeSoto, 885 F.2d 354, 360-61 (7th Cir. 1989) (everyday appearance of an activity is not an automatic bar to admission of expert testimony that may attribute a more sinister motive to the actions, though admission does require special vigilance to avoid unfair prejudice). Brown contends that Agent Coleman testified about Brown's intent to harm the target of the mission in violation of Rule 704(b). 91 However, Agent Coleman never testified to what Brown's intent was with regard to the mission. Indeed, he specifically refused to do so. Where an expert in a criminal case has not explicitly testified about a defendant's intent, courts have been reluctant to exclude the expert's testimony under Rule 704(b). See United States v. Lipscomb, 14 F.3d 1236, 1242-43 (7th Cir. 1994) (using two-part test that examines whether the actual word intent was used and looking to the source of the expert's opinion to determine admissibility under 704(b)); United States v. Smart, 98 F.3d 1379, 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (adopting Seventh Circuit test). Similarly, in Plunk, the court noted that the defendant, who alleged that the expert's testimony violated Rule 704(b), pointed to nothing in [the expert's] testimony that comprises an explicit opinion that Plunk intended or knew anything in conjunction with the crimes charged. Likewise, nothing in the testimony necessarily compels such an inference or Conclusion. 153 F.3d at 1018; see also Simmons, 923 F.2d at 947 ([The agent's] testimony, which related only to the meaning of unfamiliar narcotics jargon, left to the jury the task of determining whether the decoded terms demonstrated the necessary criminal intent.). 92 The two sentences of Agent Coleman's testimony that allegedly offer an opinion on Brown's intent to further the conspiracy by protecting Gibbs--as the ringleader of the conspiracy--against a threat of harm do not in fact offer such an opinion. At no point did he articulate either that Brown intended to kill Sydnor or Brickel, or that Brown intended to further the conspiracy by acting as its enforcer. Coleman specifically stated, I don't know what his intentions were, and he agreed that he had no idea whether [Brown was] going on this mission or not. The District Court therefore did not abuse its discretion in permitting Agent Coleman to testify in this regard. 93 We read Brown's objection to Agent Coleman's testimony to include an objection that the District Court permitted Coleman to interpret several segments of conversation that did not require expertise to interpret, that his interpretation would thus not assist the jury, and that this evidence was prejudicial. Coleman testified that tonight is the night was a reference to the fact that Brown and Fluellen were going to go on their mission that night. He also testified that got to do it tonight meant got to go on the mission tonight. Unlike a word like jawn, which would not be familiar to most jurors and which is the proper subject of expert testimony, a phrase like tonight is the night contains no intrinsic code that a jury would be unable to understand. Testimony about such a phrase's meaning is therefore not helpful to the jury. 94 We have upheld the exclusion of expert testimony when that testimony ventures into areas in which the jury needs no aid or illumination. See, e.g., United States v. Dicker, 853 F.2d 1103, 1108-09 (3d Cir. 1988) (Although courts have construed the helpfulness requirement of Fed. R. Evid. 701 and 702 to allow the interpretation by a witness of coded or `code-like' conversations, they have held that the interpretation of clear conversations is not helpful to the jury, and thus is not admissible under either rule.); see also Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee notes (stating that whether the situation is a proper one for expert testimony is to be determined on the basis of assisting the trier); United States v. Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380, 1384 (3d Cir. 1991) ([W]e agree with the district court's exclusion of Stevens's expert testimony on two of the three disputed points in that such testimony would not have been `helpful' --the touchstone of Fed. R. Evid. 702--to the jury.); Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 789 F.2d 1052, 1055 (4th Cir. 1986) (noting that Rule 702 makes inadmissible expert testimony as to a matter that obviously is within the common knowledge of jurors because such testimony, almost by definition, can be of no assistance; but noting that the admission of such testimony, though technical error, will almost invariably be harmless); 2 Stephen A. Saltzburg et al., Federal Rules of Evidence Manual 1218-19 (7th ed. 1998). 95 We conclude that the District Court abused its discretion in failing to exclude Agent Coleman's testimony explaining what tonight's the night, we're going to be on that tonight, and got to do it tonight meant. It was the function of the jury, which heard all of the relevant tape recordings, to determine what these phrases meant in the context of the surrounding sentences. Agent Coleman's testimony was not helpful to the jury; in fact, the only purpose of that testimony was to bolster the government's allegations that Brown was an enforcer. 96 We cannot say, however, that the three sentences of Coleman's testimony that infringed on the jury's role constituted prejudicial error under Fed. R. Evid. 103(a), in light of the other properly admitted evidence against Brown. 16 97 We reach this Conclusion based on the strength of the remaining evidence against Brown. First, Collier testified that a mission meant an attempt to harm or kill someone, and that Gibbs had asked Collier to steal a car to be used in effectuating the mission. See supra Part III.A. Agent Coleman opined that mission meant [a]n attempt to locate, find and hurt whoever Gibbs wants them to locate, find and hurt. This type of interpretation is admissible since it is an interpretation of a code word whose definition a jury would most likely need to have explained. Taken in conjunction with those definitions of mission, Gibbs's statement that Earl was . . . on a mission the other night substantially furthers our Conclusion. Finally, taking the content and timing of conversations between Gibbs and Brown as a whole, a jury reasonably could have concluded that the exchanges (including Brown's statements like got to do it tonight and his assent to Gibbs's statement that [t]onight will be the night) traced a plan to harm someone who was getting on [Gibbs's] nerves, a plan that involved waiting outside a particular nightclub for the person to emerge unarmed and then injure him. 98 In light of our Conclusion that the vast bulk of Agent Coleman's testimony is admissible, and in view of the strength of the remaining evidence, we believe that the government offered sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude not only that Brown had acted as an enforcer for the conspiracy, but that Brown knew that by his acts he was furthering the aims of the conspiracy by protecting the individual whom he knew to be the ringleader. We therefore will affirm Brown's conviction.
99 Brown raises a number of reasons why his sentence should be overturned. We disposed of most of these supra, in the margin. We deal more fully with two of them: 100 whether the District Court erred in attributing to him all of the drugs that were distributed by the conspiracy in the one-month period during which Brown acted as an enforcer; and whether the District Court properly increased Brown's offense level on the basis of Brown's possession of a firearm.
101 At sentencing, the District Court attributed twenty-seven kilograms of powder cocaine and nine ounces of crack to Brown. Relying on Collado, 975 F.2d at 995, Brown contends that his involvement with the conspiracy, if any, was limited to interactions with Gibbs, and that the District Court therefore should not have attributed to him amounts of drugs that were part of other transactions of the conspiracy. We review for clear error the District Court's findings of fact regarding the relevant quantities of cocaine and crack attributable to Brown, as well as the types of drugs at issue. See Miele, 989 F.2d at 663; Roman, 121 F.3d at 140. 102 Brown is correct that, under the Guidelines, a court may not sentence a defendant for the entire amount of drugs in a conspiracy merely because the defendant has been found guilty of the crime of conspiracy. The sentencing court can consider relevant conduct, including the conduct of others that was both in furtherance of, and reasonably foreseeable in connection with, the criminal activity jointly undertaken by the defendant. Price, 13 F.3d at 732. However, courts often have held enforcers for drug conspiracies responsible for the amount of drugs that pass through the conspiracy during the time the person acts as an enforcer. For the most part, courts have based their holdings on the ground that the role of enforcer implies a strong familiarity with the goings-on of the entire conspiracy. See, e.g., United States v. Cortinas, 142 F.3d 242, 250 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding enforcer responsible for all of the drugs handled by the conspiracy during the twenty months he was part of the conspiracy); United States v. Phillips, 37 F.3d 1210, 1214 (7th Cir. 1994) (affirming district court's finding that the defendant, who carried guns and enforced for the conspiracy, had an intimate relationship with the operation and could be held responsible for all the drugs handled by the conspiracy). 103 We think these decisions are correct. In our view, the role of enforcer is often central to the viability of the drug conspiracy, which perforce exists in a dangerous environment, and thus an enforcer who has engaged in more than peripheral enforcement activities ought to be chargeable for any drugs passing through the conspiracy during his enforcership--at least for those deals made within the geographic region in which he operated. We recognize that, just as there are different paradigms of conspiracies, there may be different types of enforcers in a conspiracy. Some enforcers may be close to the center of the conspiracy, while others may work on the periphery. One enforcer may enforce during the entire life of the conspiracy; another may perform one task for the conspiracy and then go his own way. One must therefore be careful to consider the scope of the putative enforcer's role. In this conspiracy, however, during the limited time in question, there was only one leader: Gibbs. As we discuss below, the government proved that Brown served directly as an enforcer for Gibbs, who was widely known to be a major drug dealer, and that Brown's job was to protect Gibbs by hurting or killing someone who Gibbs perceived as a threat, thus facilitating Gibbs's ability to deal drugs. We are therefore comfortable in denominating Brown an enforcer for the conspiracy throughout the time in which Brown worked for Gibbs. 104 We also acknowledge the danger of attributing to an enforcer the entire quantity of drugs that pass through a conspiracy when that enforcer has acted for only a short period time relative to the conspiracy's total length. Here, Brown was involved in the conspiracy for about a month as the enforcer for the head of the conspiracy, and the amount attributed to him at sentencing reflected only the amount of drugs that passed through the conspiracy during that month. We have thus avoided the referenced danger. 105 In sum, in light of the number of conversations between Brown and Gibbs and the District Court's specific finding that Brown was an enforcer for a major drug dealer, we do not think it was clearly erroneous for the District Court to conclude that Brown was sufficiently involved with the conspiracy, as a protector of the leader of a large trafficking organization, so as to be charged with the twenty-seven kilograms of powder cocaine and nine ounces of crack that passed through the conspiracy during the time he served as an enforcer. 17
106 In July 1996, while the investigation of the conspiracy was ongoing, an informant told the government that Brown had participated in an armed robbery during which a security guard was shot. The government searched Brown's apartment, discovered a shotgun, and prosecuted Brown under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), which criminalizes possession of a weapon by a convicted felon. The jury convicted him of this offense. At sentencing in the instant case, the government introduced as evidence the sawed-off shotgun, which was at the heart of his earlier conviction, on the ground that Brown had possessed this shotgun during the relevant time periods for which he was an enforcer for the instant conspiracy. 107 The District Court took Brown's possession of the shotgun into account in adding two points to his offense level, in accordance with U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1), which directs a district court to increase a defendant's base offense level by two points when a defendant possesses a firearm during a drug offense. Brown alleges that this two-level increase constituted double-counting and violated double jeopardy, since he had already been punished for possessing the shotgun. We review this argument, which he did not raise below, for plain error. See United States v. Coates, 178 F.3d 681, 683 (3d Cir. 1999). 108 The Supreme Court has made clear that the use of relevant conduct to increase the punishment of a charged offense does not punish the offender for that relevant conduct. See Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 395 (1995). That is, a court does not violate a defendant's protections against double jeopardy when it convicts a defendant for crime X, enhances his sentence for crime X because of conduct Y, and convicts him for conduct Y as well. In Witte, the defendant pleaded guilty to possessing marijuana with intent to distribute. In calculating Witte's offense level under the guidelines, the district court considered not only the amount of marijuana involved in the charged offense, but also an additional 1000 pounds of marijuana and 1091 kilograms of cocaine involved in uncharged criminal conduct. See id. at 393-94. Witte was later indicted for conspiring and attempting to import the 1091 kilograms of cocaine considered in the earlier sentencing. The Supreme Court rejected Witte's contention that his subsequent prosecution on the cocaine offense would subject him to double jeopardybecause the district court had considered that conduct in sentencing him on the marijuana charge. 109 The Court explained, [W]e specifically have rejected the claim that double jeopardy principles bar a later prosecution or punishment for criminal activity where that activity has been considered at sentencing for a separate crime. Id. at 398 (citing Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576 (1959)). 18 The Court also explained that it makes no difference in this context whether the enhancement occurred in the first or second sentencing proceeding. Id. at 399. In Brown's case, the two-point sentence enhancement occurred in the second proceeding--his conspiracy conviction--based on his possession of a firearm during a drug offense, the possession for which he earlier had been convicted. Under Supreme Court precedent, this does not create a double jeopardy problem. See also United States v. Street, 66 F.3d 969, 980 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that use of defendant's earlier state conviction to enhance federal sentence for assaulting park rangers did not violate double jeopardy clause). Because Brown's possession of a weapon was the basis for an earlier conviction but a mandatory ground for enhancement in a separate offense with different requirements, the District Court did not violate Brown's double jeopardy rights and did not double count in reaching Brown's final offense level. We therefore will affirm Brown's sentence in its entirety.