Opinion ID: 170235
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mr. Alexander’s Response Under the YCA

Text: Mr. Alexander struggled during the early years of his incarceration, but by 1987 he began responding positively to treatment. He completed his program plan, which included 100 hours of group counseling and 500 hours of individual counseling. After 1987, he committed no disciplinary infractions. See Alexander v. Crabtree, No. 93-1019, 2 F.3d 1160, 1993 WL 307649, at  (10th Cir. Aug. 9, 1993) (unpublished table decision) (“Alexander I”). In 1991, the Chief of Psychology at FCI Sheridan, where Mr. Alexander was imprisoned, stated that Mr. Alexander “ha[d] met both the letter and the intent of the Youth Corrections Act,” and that Mr. Alexander did “not suffer from a major psychological disorder.” Id. In1992, the Warden recommended that Mr. Alexander be paroled. Id. The Parole Commission declined to follow this recommendation, expressing concern over the problems Mr. Alexander exhibited prior to 1987 and his apparent lack of remorse. The Commission found release would pose “an unwarranted risk to the public and also, without good cause, depreciate the heinous nature of [Mr. Alexander’s] offense.” Id. Mr. Alexander filed a habeas petition with the district court, claiming that the Commission had not complied with the YCA because it failed to give sufficient weight to his rehabilitation. Id. at . The district court denied the petition, and we affirmed the district court but remanded the case to the Commission, requiring it to provide additional evidence -5- supporting its denial of parole. Id. at . The Commission ordered Mr. Alexander to be evaluated by a psychiatrist, who recommended that Mr. Alexander receive “insight-oriented psychotherapy.” Alexander v. Crabtree, No. 94-1375, 45 F.3d 439, 1994 WL 722961, at  (10th Cir. Dec. 20, 1994) (unpublished table decision) (“Alexander II”). The Commission again denied parole in a special reconsideration hearing. Mr. Alexander filed his second habeas petition, which the district court again denied. We affirmed on appeal. Id. at . Mr. Alexander received interim reconsideration hearings in 1995, 1996, and 1997. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.64(c). Each time, the Commission denied parole. In 1998, Mr. Alexander waived his right to an interim hearing and instead filed his third habeas petition challenging the denial of parole, which the district court denied. Alexander v. United States Parole Comm’n, No. 99-1262, 211 F.3d 1277, 2000 WL 517928, (10th Cir. May 1, 2000) (unpublished table decision) (“Alexander III”). This Court affirmed on appeal, finding that Mr. Alexander’s failure to consistently show remorse, combined with the serious nature of his offense, provided a rational basis for the Commission’s denial of parole. Id. at . In 2001, Mr. Alexander received a de novo parole hearing. It was during this hearing that Mr. Alexander first accepted full responsibility for his crime. However, the Commission again denied parole, continuing the case for another 15 -6- years. On appeal, the National Appeals Board remanded for a new hearing and requested a current psychological evaluation to assess the impact of psychological counseling and therapy on Mr. Alexander’s rehabilitation. The psychologist found that Mr. Alexander was not mentally ill and did not experience emotional distress. The Commission again denied parole, concerned that Mr. Alexander’s remorse was not sincere and stating in its Notice of Action that “there continues to be significant doubt that your response to treatment programs has reduced the risk of further risk to the community in that it is found you are not remorseful . . . .” R. at 126. The National Appeals Board affirmed. Mr. Alexander received his most recent interim hearing in 2003. He was represented by Drug Treatment Specialist Doug Tucker, who had represented him in prior hearings and had worked with him in his treatment since 1991. The examiner, summarizing Mr. Tucker’s representation, stated that “the subject accepts responsibility for his behavior, . . . expressed his remorse and has participated in all available programs to prepare himself for return to the community . . . Mr. Tucker believes that subject no longer represents a threat to the community if ordered for release.” Id. at 143. Nonetheless, the examiner held that There is no history of any mental health problems prior to the current offense. The only explanation is that subject was unable to handle the everyday stresses of life as a teenager. The question at this point is whether or not he has developed the mechanisms to handle stresses of every day life should he be returned to the community. Clearly -7- for having been in custody for well over 20 years the stresses associated with transition are extremely high. The examiner has some concerns as to whether or not the subject has the ability to make that transition without aggressive acting out as demonstrated in the current offense. Id. at 144. He also stated that Subject continues to be a more serious risk than his scores would indicate based on the severity of the offense. The subject at the age of 17 shot and killed two women, one man and a 4 year old child multiple times and took their weapons. This was subject’s first conviction of record and he had no history of aggressive aberrant behavior. Given the absence of provocation or pattern the subject’s risk continues to be more serious be [sic] there are no indices to suggest that the subject is inclined to act out in an aggressive manner. Id. at 143–44. The Commission agreed with the examiner and denied parole. Mr. Alexander appealed this decision to the National Parole Board, which affirmed the Commission’s denial. Mr. Alexander subsequently filed this habeas petition in the District Court of Colorado. After reviewing the Commission’s decisions, the district court held that the Commission’s denial of parole was arbitrary and capricious. The court found that while the Commission focused primarily on the serious risk that Mr. Alexander might pose to the public upon release, it failed to consider the wide range of conditions the Commission could impose on Mr. Alexander to mitigate that risk. The court found this unreasonable, emphasizing that Mr. Alexander would never receive unconditional release. It ordered the Commission to reexamine Mr. -8- Alexander’s parole considering potential release conditions and to develop a prerelease program for Mr. Alexander. The Commission appeals from this order.