Opinion ID: 842331
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: michigan's mixed determinateindeterminate sentencing scheme

Text: The majority attempts to justify its conclusion in this case by claiming that Michigan has a traditional indeterminate sentencing scheme. See id. at 308-309, 124 S.Ct. 2531. The United States Supreme Court has noted that such schemes do not violate the Sixth Amendment. But because intermediate sanction cells set maximum sentences, Michigan's sentencing scheme is distinct from the traditional indeterminate scheme. For Sixth Amendment purposes, it is properly viewed as a mixed determinate/indeterminate sentencing scheme. This is because, as discussed in Blakely, a traditional indeterminate scheme can have only one maximum sentence. Id. at 308-309, 124 S.Ct. 2531. The fact that Michigan's scheme is different in this way mandates that it be treated differently. Again, this makes Michigan's system strikingly similar to California's system, which the Supreme Court found unconstitutional in Cunningham. As I discuss in McCuller, the majority also attempts to distinguish the Michigan system from a wholly determinate scheme by noting that one possible intermediate sanction is probation. MCL 769.31(b). To support its argument, the majority relies on the federal probation system. But Michigan's probation system differs greatly from the federal system. Whereas the federal system imposes a new sentence after a probation violation, the Michigan system merely directs resentencing using the original sentencing guidelines. See United States v. Goffi, 446 F.3d 319, 322 (C.A.2, 2006), and Hendrick, 472 Mich. at 560, 697 N.W.2d 511. Because the same guidelines apply before and after a probation violation in this state, Blakely continues to apply after a probation revocation. This completely undermines the majority's argument that intermediate sanction cells set only minimum sanctions. [12] The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit explained why Blakely does not apply to sentencing after a federal probation violation: The statutory scheme thus requires a sentencing court to consider a variety of factors, including the non-binding policy statements applicable to probation violations, in determining an appropriate sentence. Nowhere, however, does it require a court to sentence within the Guidelines range for the underlying conviction in determining punishment for separate and distinct malfeasance by the defendantviolation of probation. . . . United States v. Pena, 125 F.3d 285, 287 (5th Cir.1997). (Because there are no guidelines for sentencing on revocation of probation, and because the district court was not limited to the sentencing range available at the time of the initial sentence, we find no error in the trial court's failure to employ the analysis normally required in departure case[s].). . . . [ Goffi, 446 F.3d at 322-323 (emphasis added).] The exact opposite is true in Michigan. The guidelines continue to apply to a Michigan defendant. Hendrick, 472 Mich. at 560, 697 N.W.2d 511. The sentencing court is limited to the sentence range available at the time of the initial sentence. And the probation violation is not treated as a separate malfeasance in Michigan. People v. Kaczmarek, 464 Mich. 478, 483-484, 628 N.W.2d 484 (2001). These fundamental differences between the Michigan system and the federal system mandate different results when Blakely 's bright-line rule is applied. Because none of the factors relied on by the federal courts exists in Michigan, Blakely continues to apply after probation revocation in Michigan. This completely undermines the majority's argument that, because of the possibility of probation as an intermediate sanction, intermediate sanction cells produce a minimum sentence rather than a maximum sentence. [13] The majority further argues that intermediate sanctions must be minimum sentences because a defendant subject to them can be given a sentence of probation with jail. It argues that recognizing that intermediate sanction cell sentences are statutory maximum sentences will limit the effectiveness of imposing such sentences. Although it is true that MCL 769.31(b)( iv ) allows for intermediate sanction cell sentences that include both probation and jail, the majority's reliance on this point is irrelevant. The Legislature has determined that a sentence of 12 months in jail is an appropriate statutory maximum sentence for defendants who merit an intermediate sanction. [14] Our constitution vests the Legislature with the ultimate authority to set criminal penalties. Const. 1963, art. 4, § 45; People v. Hegwood, 465 Mich. 432, 436, 636 N.W.2d 127 (2001). The Legislature inserted the 12-month limit on jail sentences in MCL 769.34(4)(a). Only the Legislature, not this Court, may increase this limit. Someone who believes that the 12-month cap is insufficient can petition the Legislature to amend the statute. But the Court cannot ignore the statutory maximum sentence and a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights because it finds the statutory penalty insufficient. For example, those who believe that 12 months is insufficient incarceration to punish probation violators could petition the Legislature to change Michigan's probation system to mimic the federal system. The Legislature could follow the lead of Goffi and treat a probation violation as a separate malfeasance. It could make probation violation subject, not to the guidelines for the underlying offense, but to independent punishment. See Goffi, 446 F.3d at 322-323; Pena, 125 F.3d at 287. If the Legislature effected such a change, it could eliminate the Sixth Amendment violation now lurking in the Michigan system. But, again, this decision must be left to the Legislature. Ultimately, and most importantly, the majority cannot disregard the Sixth Amendment simply because it is convenient for purposes of the status quo or because it comports with legislative intent. Blakely specifically rejected any such approach: Ultimately, our decision cannot turn on whether or to what degree trial by jury impairs the efficiency or fairness of criminal justice. One can certainly argue that both these values would be better served by leaving justice entirely in the hands of professionals; many nations of the world, particularly those following civil-law traditions, take just that course. There is not one shred of doubt, however, about the Framers' paradigm for criminal justice: not the civil-law ideal of administrative perfection, but the common-law ideal of limited state power accomplished by strict division of authority between judge and jury. As Apprendi held, every defendant has the right to insist that the prosecutor prove to a jury all facts legally essential to the punishment. [ Blakely, 542 U.S. at 313, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (emphasis in original).] It might be easier to continue the current modus operandi: to punish probation violators by allowing judges to increase their statutory maximum sentence by using findings of fact not supported by the violators' prior record or admissions or the jury's verdict. But the Sixth Amendment does not allow courts to disregard defendants' rights just because to make a correction would require the judicial system to undergo change. Id. The majority is also incorrect in relying on its belief that the Legislature intended that probation violators be punished with more than 12 months in jail. Even if the Legislature intended that punishment, it is irrelevant. This fact is made obvious by the decision in Ring. The Arizona legislature intended that a sentence of death should be imposed in first-degree murder cases in which aggravating factors existed. Ring, 536 U.S. at 592-593, 122 S.Ct. 2428. But the Supreme Court found that this intent could not be effectuated in light of the Sixth Amendment. Notwithstanding the Arizona legislature's intent, the judicial fact-finding that increased Ring's maximum sentence to the death penalty violated Blakely 's bright-line rule: If a State makes an increase in a defendant's authorized punishment contingent on the finding of a fact, that factno matter how the State labels itmust be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 602, 122 S.Ct. 2428. Moreover, the proper application of the Sixth Amendment to Michigan's intermediate sanction cells need not weaken an intermediate sanction cell sentence of probation with jail. The system easily could be made to comply with Blakely. For example, this Court could amend our court rules to provide for a jury to be impaneled after a court found a probation violation. If the jury then found beyond a reasonable doubt the facts necessary to move the defendant from an intermediate sanction cell, there would be no Sixth Amendment violation. Therefore, Michigan could both retain its current probation system and protect a defendant's constitutional rights. [15] The majority contends that the imposition of an intermediate sanction cell sentence does not affect the absolute maximum statutory sentence. It reasons that a defendant is not entitled to an intermediate sanction cell sentence until after the court decides that substantial and compelling reasons to depart from it do not exist. Therefore, it reasons, there is only one statutory maximum sentence. But the Supreme Court heard and rejected a similar argument in Ring. There the pertinent statute directed the judge to conduct a separate sentencing hearing. The purpose of the hearing was to enable the judge to determine the existence of specified circumstances in order to decide which to impose, the death penalty or life imprisonment. Ring, 536 U.S. at 592-593, 122 S.Ct. 2428. But the Supreme Court concluded that the fact that the judge could impose a higher sentence under the sentencing scheme is not relevant. A defendant is entitled to a sentence based solely on the jury's verdict and the defendant's admissions and criminal history. The Supreme Court explained: In an effort to reconcile its capital sentencing system with the Sixth Amendment as interpreted by Apprendi, Arizona first restates the Apprendi majority's portrayal of Arizona's system: Ring was convicted of first-degree murder, for which Arizona law specifies death or life imprisonment as the only sentencing options, see Ariz.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 13-1105(C) (West 2001); Ring was therefore sentenced within the range of punishment authorized by the jury verdict. See Brief for Respondent 9-19. This argument overlooks Apprendi 's instruction that the relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect. 530 U.S. at 494, 120 S.Ct. 2348. In effect, the required finding [of an aggravated circumstance] expose[d] [Ring] to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury's guilty verdict. Ibid.; see 200 Ariz., at 279, 25 P.3d, at 1151. The Arizona first-degree murder statute authorizes a maximum penalty of death only in a formal sense, Apprendi, 530 U.S., at 541, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (O'Connor, J., dissenting), for it explicitly cross-references the statutory provision requiring the finding of an aggravating circumstance before imposition of the death penalty. See [Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.] 13-1105(C) (First degree murder is a class 1 felony and is punishable by death or life imprisonment as provided by [Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.] 13-703.  (emphasis added)). If Arizona prevailed on its opening argument, Apprendi would be reduced to a meaningless and formalistic rule of statutory drafting. [ Id. at 603-604, 120 S.Ct. 2348.] The Supreme Court made clear that the majority's argument in this case must fail. The Arizona court in Ring was imposing a statutory maximum sentence by sentencing the defendant to a life sentence rather than the death penalty. Similarly, a Michigan court imposes a statutory maximum sentence when sentencing a defendant to an intermediate sanction cell sentence rather than to the absolute maximum sentence. Both systems set statutory maximum sentences. And, in both situations, judicial fact-finding by the sentencing court increasing this sentence violates the Sixth Amendment, no matter what formalistic gloss is placed on the fact-finding. [16] In summary, Michigan's intermediate sanction cells set maximum sentences. They can be increased only through judicial fact-finding after the jury's verdict. Because of this fact, intermediate sanction cell sentences equate to the middle term of California's DSL system. Cunningham, 127 S.Ct. at 868. Both constitute a statutory maximum sentence for Apprendi purposes. In this case, but for the trial court's findings of fact made using a preponderance of the evidence standard, Harper would have received an intermediate sanction. The highest valid sentence he would have faced was 12 months in jail. MCL 769.34(4)(a). The sentence he received was four years in prison. This violated the Sixth Amendment, and the violation requires resentencing.