Opinion ID: 305172
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Billy Sircovich.

Text: 24 Q. Franicevich was with him, you say? 25 A. Yes, sir, right there. They made it clear what would happen if anybody talked, if I said anything. 26 (App. 145, 146.) 27 When Pelas, Sr., reported to Franicevich that, 28    I had the engines in my boat up at Empire, and he said OK, and I said I would like to have my money, and he went in the house, and when he came back out, he gave me a check for $900, and he told me then that he was coming up to Empire to see the engines, and so him and 'Junior' Buras came up. 29 I got in my truck with Marshall Dixon and drove on back up to Empire, over to the Mosquito Control Unit, and had a cup of coffee, and then Motto [Franicevich] and 'Junior' Buras got there, and they boarded my boat and looked at the engines, and then Motto said he would like to have the boat brought down to Buras, so I asked Melvin if he would tow it down to Buras for me, and he agreed to do it for me. 30 So we went on down to Buras with it, and Motto met us in the river, and he got in the boat with us, and he told us to bring it into the slip, his slip, so we brought it into his slip, which is alongside the river, and we tied it up on the side of the slip. 31 After Motto tied it up, I took my tow off, and Melvin and I went back to Empire. 32 (App. 186, 187.) 33 The fact that Franicevich went on the boat owned by Pelas, Sr., to view the two motors was corroborated by the testimony of Calvin Pelas, Jr., and of Arthur Buras, Jr. Franicevich's $900.00 check to Pelas, Sr., was cashed by a merchant, Thomas Ray Langston, who testified that the bank reported insufficient funds for payment of the check and Mr. Franicevich's bookkeeper brought me $900.00 all in $20.00 bills. 34 The jury might well have taken the same view of the evidence as that expressed by Judge Christenberry when imposing sentence: 35 I think it is perfectly clear in this case that this defendant is the evil genius of this whole thing. These other people stole that $50,000 boat, stole the engines, threw the equipment overboard, and the boat was sunk. 36 The only thing they kept was the two motors that were taken out of the boat. In other words, this boat was stolen so that this defendant could get two new motors. I think that was established beyond any reasonable doubt, any possible doubt, and the jury found him guilty. 37 (App. 260.) 38 While the evidence was thus ample to prove that Franicevich and Pelas, Sr., conspired together from the very beginning of the plot, some questions of law remain as to whether their conspiracy was to violate 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2275 (quoted in n. 1) as charged in the indictment, that is by wilfully and feloniously removing the engines and navigational instruments of a vessel of the United States, with the intent to injure or endanger the safety of said vessel. Franicevich's counsel stipulated that the MANTARAY is a vessel of the United States: 39 MR. WHEELER: Your Honor, we will stipulate that it is a vessel of the United States. We are not making any dispute about that at all. 40 THE COURT: All right. Let it be admitted then. 41 (App. 76). 3 42 Franicevich's counsel vigorously urges, however, that there is not sufficient evidence to prove the intent charged in the indictment, i. e., with the intent to injure or endanger the safety of said vessel. Franicevich's position was made clear to the district court by his requested instruction No. VI: 43 As a necessary element of the defense for which the defendant is being prosecuted, it must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he, Motto Franicevich, willfully and knowingly entered into an agreement with Calvin J. Pelas, Sr., the object or purpose of which was to commit an offense against the United States in that they were to feloniously and unlawfully remove the engines of a vessel of the United States with the intent to injure or endanger the safety of that vessel. 44 I charge you that the prohibited intent must go further than a mere intent to remove the engines themselves, and that the intent required is one to injure or endanger the vessel as a whole through the removal of the engines.In other words, if you find that there was an agreement to merely remove the engines of a vessel of the United States with the intention only of rendering that vessel incapable of navigation under its own power, you must then acquit the defendant. 45 Franicevich's contention as to the intent required by the statute is supported by two district court decisions-United States v. Saglietto, E.D.Va.1941, 41 F. Supp. 21, 26, et seq., and United States v. Martini, S.D.Ala.1941, 42 F.Supp. 502, 510. However, the Fourth, Fifth, Third and First Circuits have decided differently. In Bersio v. United States, 4 Cir. 1941, 124 F.2d 310, cert. denied 316 U.S. 665, 666, 62 S.Ct. 1033, 86 L.Ed. 1742, Judge Parker said in part: 46 The question then comes down to this: Was the evidence sufficient to establish intent 'to injure or endanger the safety of the vessel'? We think that it was. In this connection, we think it clear that the language of the statute is properly interpreted as requiring intent to injure the vessel or endanger her safety; for no one speaks of injuring the safety of an object. Such interpretation is seen to be manifestly correct if the words, 'or endanger the safety of', be set off by commas; and the subsequent phrase of the section, 'whether the injury or danger is so intended to take place within the jurisdiction of the United States, or after the vessel shall have departed therefrom', shows clearly that what was contemplated as embraced within the prescribed intent was injury itself as well as danger or the impairment of safety.    47    We have carefully considered Judge Paul's opinion to the contrary in United States v. Saglietto, D.C., 41 F.Supp. 21, but we are not convinced by it. We think that it does not give sufficient scope to the phrase of the section 'whether the injury or danger is so intended to take place within the jurisdiction of the United States, or after the vessel shall have departed therefrom.' 48 124 F.2d 314, 315. 49 In Marchese v. United States, 5 Cir. 1942, 126 F.2d 671, 674, Judge Sibley wrote for this Circuit in part as follows: 50 All the acts named, whether done or attempted or conspired about, must be with 'intent to injure or endanger the safety of the vessel, or of her cargo, or of persons on board.' There is in this specification of intent plainly an ellipsis, words left out, to be supplied from the context. The word 'injure' is a transitive verb, requiring an object, but none immediately follows it. Is its object to be taken to be the noun 'safety' in the phrase 'endanger the safety', or are the nouns 'vessel', 'cargo' and 'persons' the objects meant? 'Endanger the safety' is a common expression to signify jeopardy without actual injury inflicted. 'Injure the safety' is a most unusual expression, injury being commonly affirmed as done to a person or a concrete thing. We think the natural meaning fully expressed is this: 'With intent to injure the vessel, her cargo, or persons on board, or to endanger the safety of the vessel, or of her cargo, or of persons on board.' If in interpreting a criminal statute we may regard its legislative evolution, we will find confirmation of this interpretation. 51 In United States v. Scaleggeri, 3 Cir. 1942, 126 F.2d 1023, that Circuit expressed itself as in entire agreement with the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit in Marchese and also as agreeing with the Fourth Circuit in Bersio. 52 In Giugni v. United States, 1 Cir. 1942, 127 F.2d 786, 790, Judge Woodbury wrote: 53 There remains to be considered the question of whether or not the defendants harbored the specific criminal intent required for conviction under the statute. The intent required is 'to injure or endanger the safety of the vessel or of her cargo, or of persons on board'. This language is not altogether clear as pointed out in the Bersio and Marchese cases cited above. However, without attempting to add to or improve upon what was said in those cases concerning the above quoted language, we think that it is clear enough that Congress intended to penalize acts of destruction done with intent either to injure the vessel, her cargo, or persons on board or to endanger the safety of either the vessel, her cargo, or of persons on board. This is the conclusion reached by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in the Marchese case on reasoning which we find satisfactory. 54 It may be added that in United States v. Polonio, D.Or.1941, 77 F.Supp. 768, Judge Alger Fee expressed like views and more specifically wrote: 55 A ship or vessel is not the hull alone, but consists of the engines and other integral portions thereof. Therefore, according to the interpretation of the Court, an intent to injure the vessel would be satisfied by finding of an intent to injure the integral parts thereof, such as the main engines. (Footnote omitted.) 56 77 F.Supp. 771. 57 We conclude that the evidence was clearly sufficient to sustain the conviction under the particular statute as charged. 58