Opinion ID: 71998
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the penry issue

Text: The district court vacated Pierce's death sentence and ordered resentencing after concluding that the statutory special issues presented to the jury at sentencing and the prosecutor's closing arguments regarding those special issues precluded the jury from giving meaningful consideration and effect to all of Pierce's mitigating evidence, as Penry requires. Pierce, 2008 WL 4445064, at . The State appeals, arguing that the special issues in fact permitted the jury to give meaningful consideration and effect to the mitigating evidence. The special issues, as prescribed by a now-superseded version of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, were: 1) Whether Pierce's conduct that caused Johnson's death was deliberate and undertaken with the reasonable expectation that the death of the victim or another would result; and 2) Whether there was a probability that Pierce would commit future criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society. See TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN., art. 37.071(b) (Vernon 1981); [1] see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN., art. 37.0711 § 1 (Vernon 2006) (noting that superseded statute applies to offenses committed before September 1, 1991).
The district court summarized the mitigating evidence that Pierce presented at sentencing as including that: Pierce was young at the time of the crime (he had turned eighteen just 15 days before); his behavior in prison while incarcerated at various points both before and after the crime was generally good; he was not a discipline problem as a child and was honest and respectful toward his mother and admitted past wrongs to her; he had matured emotionally and spiritually while in prison; and he had developed intellectually and creatively while in prison, improving his verbal abilities and making crafts, such as picture frames and jewelry boxes. Pierce, 2008 WL 4445064, at . The district court rejected as unreasonable the TCCA's conclusion that the special issues permitted the jury to give meaningful consideration and effect to this mitigating evidence. Noting that  Penry makes clear that jurors must have an opportunity to fully consider the mitigating evidence as it bears on the broader question of the defendant's moral culpability, id. at  (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted), the district court observed: On the face of the special issues, the jury could consider some of Pierce's evidence under the future dangerousness special issue. For example, Pierce's youth at the time of the offense and his behavior in prison are relevant to that issue. Other evidence, however, is irrelevant, or is only partially relevant, to the future dangerousness issue, yet raises questions about Pierce's general moral culpability and character. For example, his honesty and respect toward his mother, his willingness to admit past wrongs, his efforts to improve himself through education, and his work making craft items have little relevance to future dangerousness, but are relevant as to his character. Id. (citations omitted). The district court also held that the  Penry violation was exacerbated by prosecution comments during closing argument, which the district court found suggest[ed] to the jury that it could not consider Pierce's mitigating evidence at all. . . but could consider only whether the State presented sufficient evidence to merit a `yes' answer to the special issues. Id. The district court concluded that the special issues in this case, especially when considered in light of the State's closing argument, violated Pierce's rights under Penry.  Id. at . Accordingly, the district court vacated Pierce's death sentence with instructions that the state court grant a new sentencing hearing or resentence Pierce to a sentence less than death in accordance with Texas law in effect at the time of Pierce's crime.
Pierce contends that additional mitigating evidence that he presented at sentencing and raised in his state habeas application and federal habeas petition, but that the district court did not discuss in its Penry analysis, provides further support for the district court's conclusion. [2] Pierce cites the testimony of his mother, Erline Pierce, that he was a good child with few behavioral problems until he was 13 or 14 years old, when he fell in with a crowd of older boys who exerted a bad influence. Erline Pierce further testified that, as a result of this corrupting influence, Pierce was sent to the Texas Youth Council (TYC) [3] twice for extended juvenile detention stays as a young teenager. She commented that Pierce had been locked up most of his young life, so he couldn't have a chance. Erline Pierce testified that her son had regularly attended church growing up and still ha[d] those same beliefs after his arrest. Finally, Erline Pierce testified that her son had emotionally matured and improved himself in prison by furthering his education, developing his reading skills, and developing his talent for art and woodworking by making jewelry boxes and picture frames for her. Pierce also cites the testimony of Sister Isabella Estrada, a principal for Holy Cross School in Bay City, Texas. Sister Estrada testified that she got to know Pierce during his years on death row, and she visited him regularly in the four years leading up to Pierce's third trial. She testified that Pierce grew from being depressed and angry about his situation to being more understanding. As he developed his ability to speak and articulate his thoughts, Pierce became more open and able to communicate his feelings. Pierce also cites comments by the prosecutor during voir dire that he asserts conditioned the prospective jurors to disregard his mitigating evidence. In one such instance, the prosecutor stated: Q. Would you also agree that under our law that the age of an individual, whether that be old or young age, in and of itself does not give anyone any special rights? Under our law when a person becomes the age of 17 they are an adult and are treated as such. Would you agree? A. Yes, sir. Q. Okay. So in that instance whether a person is 17 or they're 85, the law doesn't ask how old you are, what color you are, what your job is, what your sex is, what your education is, it asks that you follow certain norms and those norms determine the interaction between human beings and violation of those be tried by a jury if it be a criminal. Can you follow that concept in the purposes of our law? A. Yes, sir, I believe so. The prosecutor also sought and obtained the juror's oral confirmation that if the juror concluded that the answer to the two special issues was yes, he would not change one of those answers to no just to prevent the defendant from receiving the death sentence. Similarly, to another prospective juror, the prosecutor asked: Q. Now, would you agree with me . . . that our law doesn't distinguish as far as finding someone guilty in the law as it relates to an individual on the basis of their age or sex, their race or ethnic background? . . . I'm saying that our law, as far as making a person guilty or being charged with capital murderlike that doesn't distinguish whether or not that person happens to be 17 or 18 or black or white or a doctor or what I'm saying is race, sex, occupation, ethnic background, as far as whether or not they violate the law. A. I agree. Q. And would you feel that if the State presented evidence to you on Special Issue No. 2 that was beyond a reasonable doubt that the answer to Special Issue No. 2 should be yes and you found that perhaps that individual was a particular age, a young person or so, would you necessarily answer that question no because of the age or despite what the State showed you? A. No. The State contends that the Texas special issues in fact permitted the jury to give meaningful consideration and effect to all of the mitigating evidence presented and rejects the proposition that any of the prosecutor's comments during voir dire or closing argument could have interfered with the jury's ability to do so.

The Supreme Court most recently addressed the Texas special issues in Abdul-Kabir, 550 U.S. 233, 127 S.Ct. 1654, 167 L.Ed.2d 585, and Brewer v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 286, 127 S.Ct. 1706, 167 L.Ed.2d 622 (2007). [4] These cases describe the clearly established law as it existed in 1999 and 2001, respectively, and Abdul-Kabir indicates that the same clearly established law existed as early as 1990. Abdul-Kabir, 550 U.S. at 238, 127 S.Ct. 1654; Brewer, 550 U.S. at 294-95, 127 S.Ct. 1706. Abdul-Kabir instructs that the relevant state-court judgment for purposes of review under AEDPA is the judgment adjudicating the merits of the petitioner's state habeas application. 550 U.S. at 238, 127 S.Ct. 1654. The TCCA rejected Pierce's petition for habeas relief in 2001. Therefore, the clearly established law described in Abdul-Kabir and Brewer controls this case. This circuit has construed Abdul-Kabir and Brewer as imposing a two-part test to determine whether resentencing is required: First, the reviewing court must determine whether the mitigating evidence presented by the petitioner satisfies the `low threshold for relevance' articulated by the Supreme Court. Coble v. Quarterman, 496 F.3d 430, 444 (5th Cir.2007). [5] If the relevance threshold is met, the court must determine whether there was a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the special issues in a manner that precluded it from giving meaningful consideration and effect to all of [the petitioner's] mitigating evidence. Id. Both Abdul-Kabir and Brewer emphasize the importance of allowing juries to give meaningful effect to any mitigating evidence providing a basis for a sentence of life rather than death. Abdul-Kabir, 550 U.S. at 260, 127 S.Ct. 1654 (emphasis added); accord Brewer, 550 U.S. at 296, 127 S.Ct. 1706 ([T]he jury must be allowed not only to consider such evidence, or to have such evidence before it, but to respond to it in a reasoned, moral manner and to weigh such evidence in its calculus of deciding whether a defendant is truly deserving of death.). [6] In particular, the Texas special issues will be constitutionally insufficient as applied when the mitigating evidence presented supports an entirely different reason for not imposing a death sentence than permitted by the special issues. Abdul-Kabir, 550 U.S. at 259, 127 S.Ct. 1654. Abdul-Kabir and Brewer also indicate that courts should consider whether the prosecutor's comments to the jury may have undermined the jury's ability to give meaningful consideration and effect to all of the petitioner's mitigating evidence by suggesting that the jurors may not consider mitigating evidence for relevance outside the special issues. Abdul-Kabir, 550 U.S. at 261, 127 S.Ct. 1654; Brewer, 550 U.S. at 291, 127 S.Ct. 1706.
The standard embraced by the Court in Abdul-Kabir and Brewer was first articulated by Justice O'Connor in her concurrence to Franklin, 487 U.S. 164, 108 S.Ct. 2320, 101 L.Ed.2d 155. In Franklin, the petitioner presented evidence at sentencing that he had behaved well in prison. Id. at 177, 108 S.Ct. 2320. The plurality opinion concluded that the future dangerousness special issue provided a sufficient vehicle for the jury to consider the mitigating evidence. Id. at 179-80, 108 S.Ct. 2320. The plurality rejected the petitioner's contention that an additional instruction was required because the mitigating evidence of good behavior in prison had relevance beyond the scope of the special issues. Id. at 181, 108 S.Ct. 2320. The plurality reasoned that we have never concluded that States cannot channel jury discretion in capital sentencing and rejected the argument that the jury must be able to consider mitigating evidence for every issue to which it may be relevant. Id. Justice O'Connor concurred with the plurality that the special issues were constitutionally sufficient as applied because the petitioner did not suggest that his lack of disciplinary violations [in prison] revealed anything more positive about his character than lack of future dangerousness. Id. at 186, 108 S.Ct. 2320 (O'Connor, J., concurring). But Justice O'Connor disagreed that the special issues would be constitutionally sufficient if the mitigating evidence presented in fact had relevance beyond their scopefor example, to personal culpability or character. Id. at 184-86, 108 S.Ct. 2320. She commented: If . . . petitioner had introduced mitigating evidence about his background or character or the circumstances of the crime that was not relevant to the special verdict questions, or that had relevance to the defendant's moral culpability beyond the scope of the special verdict questions, the jury instructions would have provided the jury with no vehicle for expressing its reasoned moral response to that evidence. . . . In my view, however, this is not such a case. The only mitigating evidence introduced by petitioner was the stipulation that he had no record of disciplinary violations while in prison. . . . While it is true that the jury was prevented from giving mitigating effect to the stipulation to the extent that it demonstrated positive character traits other than the ability to exist in prison without endangering jailers or fellow inmates, that limitation has no practical or constitutional significance in my view because the stipulation has no relevance to any other aspect of petitioner's character.. . . The limited probative value of the stipulation regarding petitioner's lack of prison disciplinary violations is best illustrated by the contrasting examples of probative character evidence suggested by the dissent. . . . Evidence of voluntary service, kindness to others, or of religious devotion might demonstrate positive character traits that might mitigate against the death penalty. Although petitioner argued to the sentencing jury that his prison record demonstrated his lack of future dangerousness, petitioner did not suggest that his lack of disciplinary violations revealed anything more positive about his character than that. Id. at 185-86, 108 S.Ct. 2320. The Court adopted Justice O'Connor's Franklin concurrence in Penry, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256, in an opinion which Justice O'Connor also wrote. There, the majority concluded that although the deliberateness and future dangerousness special issues allowed the jury to give partial consideration to the petitioner's mitigating evidence of mental retardation and childhood abuse, the Eighth Amendment was not satisfied because the mitigating evidence had relevance to his moral culpability beyond the scope of the special issues, and . . . the jury was unable to express its `reasoned moral response' to that evidence in determining whether death was the appropriate punishment. Id. at 322, 109 S.Ct. 2934.
The parties do not dispute that the mitigating evidence that Pierce presented at his sentencing satisfies the low threshold for relevance articulated by the Supreme Court. Coble, 496 F.3d at 444 (internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, the parties dispute whether the Texas special issues provided the jury with a basis to give meaningful consideration and effect to the mitigating evidence that Pierce presented. The State contends that the Supreme Court has already ruled, over a series of cases, that the special issues provide jurors with a meaningful basis to consider all of the types of mitigating evidence that Pierce presented at sentencing. The State urges that under the Penry line, the special issues are only inadequate where the defendant offers evidence of mental retardation or mental defect or childhood abuse or, perhaps, [childhood] hardship types of evidence that the State contends Pierce did not present in this case. Pierce counters that the Supreme Court has never taken a categorical approach to determining whether the special issues provide a basis for giving meaningful consideration and effect to various types of mitigating evidence, and he argues that the special issues did not provide such a basis in this case. Pierce also urges that the prosecutor's comments to the jury during voir dire and at closingwhich downplayed the mitigating effects of Pierce's youth and suggested that the jury lacked discretion to consider mitigating evidence outside the confines of the special issuesfurther deprived the jury of a basis for meaningful consideration of Pierce's mitigating evidence. The first issue is whether the special issues provided a basis for the jury to give meaningful consideration and effect to each type of mitigating evidence that Pierce introduced. The second issue is whether there is a reasonable probability that the prosecution's voir dire questioning or closing arguments operated to undermine the jury's ability to give such consideration. Pierce's mitigating evidence falls into the following general categories: youth at the time the crime was committed, good behavior in prison, troubled childhood, and good character. We address these categories of mitigating evidence, and the possible effects of the prosecutor's comments to the jury, in turn.
As the district court recognized, under clearly established federal law, the future dangerousness special issue provided a meaningful basis for the jury to consider and give effect to Pierce's youthhe had just turned 18 at the time of the killingand his good behavior in prison. In Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. at 369, 113 S.Ct. 2658, the Court held that the future dangerousness special issue gave the jury a meaningful basis to consider the relevant mitigating qualities of petitioner's youth, reasoning that the signature qualities of youth are transient; as individuals mature, the impetuousness and recklessness that may dominate in younger years can subside.. . . [T]here is ample room in the assessment of future dangerousness for a juror to take account of the difficulties of youth as a mitigating force in the sentencing determination. Id. at 368, 113 S.Ct. 2658. The Abdul-Kabir majority reiterated that youth has special relevance to the question of future dangerousness because it is a universally applicable mitigating circumstance that every juror has experienced and which necessarily is transient. 550 U.S. at 261, 127 S.Ct. 1654. The Franklin plurality and concurrence (a total of five Justices) agreed that the future dangerousness special issue also allows the jury to give meaningful consideration and effect to a petitioner's good behavior in prison. 487 U.S. at 177-78, 185-86, 108 S.Ct. 2320. The Court has not overruled this precedent. See Garcia v. Quarterman, 257 Fed.Appx. 717, 722 (5th Cir.2007) (per curiam) (applying Franklin to reject the petitioner's Penry claim premised on mitigating evidence of good behavior in prison). The special issues provided a basis for the jury to give meaningful consideration and effect to the mitigating evidence of Pierce's youth and good behavior in prison.
Pierce also urges as mitigating evidence his mother's testimony that he was a good boy until falling in with the wrong crowd when he was thirteen or fourteen years old, and that he spent much of his young life locked up during two extended stays in juvenile detention at the TYC. Pierce argues that this is evidence of a troubled childhoodevidence of a type that the Court held in Abdul-Kabir and Brewer has mitigating relevance beyond the special issues because it bears on a defendant's moral culpability. See Abdul-Kabir, 550 U.S. at 256-57, 127 S.Ct. 1654 (noting that evidence of a rough childhood has mitigating force beyond the scope of the special issues); Brewer, 550 U.S. at 293-94, 127 S.Ct. 1706 (finding a Penry violation because focus on special issues would necessarily disregard[ ] any independent concern that, given Brewer's troubled background, he may not be deserving of a death sentence). The State counters that Pierce's evidence is different in kind than the troubled childhood evidence at issue in those cases because those cases involved circumstances outside the petitioner's controlsuch as poverty and childhood abusewhile Pierce's evidence is limited to his self-inflicted problems with the law. The case law does not support the distinction that the State urges. In Brewer, for example, the Court concluded that an additional instruction was necessary in order to allow the jury to consider and give effect to evidence that the petitioner's co-defendant, a woman with whom he was apparently obsessed, dominated and manipulated him, and that the petitioner had a history of substance abuse. 550 U.S. at 289-90, 127 S.Ct. 1706 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Brewer majority concluded that there was a reasonable likelihood that the special issues led the jury to disregard[ ] any independent concern that, given Brewer's troubled background, he may not be deserving of a death sentence, and therefore deprived the jury of the opportunity to respond to the petitioner's mitigating evidence in a reasoned moral manner. Id. at 294, 296, 127 S.Ct. 1706. Similarly, this circuit has held that evidence of a petitioner's substance abuse might have meaningful mitigating relevance beyond its tendency to disprove that [the petitioner] acted deliberately and therefore requires an additional instruction. Garcia, 257 Fed.Appx. at 722 (internal quotation marks omitted). Both of these cases involved mitigating evidence that was arguably self-inflicted (to use the State's term), but recognized that this evidence might nevertheless have mitigating relevance to the petitioner's moral culpabilityand therefore relevance outside the special issues. These holdings are consistent with the requirement that juries be allowed to give meaningful effect to any mitigating evidence providing a basis for a sentence of life rather than death. Abdul-Kabir, 550 U.S. at 260, 127 S.Ct. 1654 (emphases added). Consistent with these precedents, Pierce's evidence of being led astray by older boys and being locked up for a significant period of time at the TYC had mitigating relevance beyond the special issues and therefore required an additional instruction.
Pierce introduced evidence of his good character before the crime, including that he was kind to his mother, was honest and admitted past wrongs to her, and regularly attended church. Pierce also presented evidence of his good character as it developed after he committed the crime. This evidence included that he had matured emotionally and spiritually while in prison, developing his ability to speak and articulate his thoughts and becoming more open and able to communicate his feelings. Pierce also matured in prison by furthering his education, improving his reading skills, and developing his talent for art and woodworking. In Franklin, five Justices (two concurring, three dissenting) indicated, in dicta, that the special issues would not allow a jury to give meaningful consideration and effect to this type of good character evidence. Justice O'Connor's concurrence stated that although the petitioner's evidence of good behavior in prison lacked relevance to any issue other than future dangerousness, had the petitioner presented [e]vidence of voluntary service, kindness to others, or of religious devotion, an additional instruction would have been required: [i]f [the] petitioner had introduced mitigating evidence about his background or character or the circumstances of the crime that was not relevant to the special verdict questions, or that had relevance to the defendant's moral culpability beyond the scope of the special verdict questions, the jury instructions would have provided the jury with no vehicle for expressing its reasoned moral response to that evidence. 487 U.S. at 185-86, 108 S.Ct. 2320 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Stevens's dissent likewise emphasized that character evidence of this type may suggest that the conduct of which the defendant stands convicted was not in keeping with his or her usual qualities or traits, a fact that has as much relevance to culpability as to future dangerousness. Id. at 190, 108 S.Ct. 2320 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Since Franklin, the Court's jurisprudence on California's death penalty statute [7] has repeatedly held that character evidence has relevance to a petitioner's moral culpability. See, e.g., Ayers v. Belmontes, 549 U.S. 7, 15, 127 S.Ct. 469, 166 L.Ed.2d 334 (2006) (noting that good character evidence may extenuate[ ] the gravity of the crime); Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 142-43, 125 S.Ct. 1432, 161 L.Ed.2d 334 (2005) (commenting on the relevance of good character evidence as a means of lessen[ing] or excus[ing] a defendant's culpability); Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 382 n. 5, 110 S.Ct. 1190, 108 L.Ed.2d 316 (1990) (commenting on relevance of good character evidence as a means of showing character strengths in the face of . . . difficulties and showing that criminal conduct was an aberration from otherwise good character). [8] Evidence of postcrime character transformations is also relevant: [T]o accept the view that such evidence could not [be relevant to moral culpability] because it occurred after the crime, one would have to reach the surprising conclusion that remorse could never serve to lessen or excuse a crime. But remorse, which by definition can only be experienced after a crime's commission, is something commonly thought to lessen or excuse a defendant's culpability. Brown, 544 U.S. at 142-43, 125 S.Ct. 1432; see also Ayers, 549 U.S. at 15-16, 127 S.Ct. 469 (noting that it would be counterintuitive if a defendant's capacity to redeem himself through good works [after the crime] could not extenuate his offense and render him less deserving of a death sentence). Ayers and Brown set out the clearly established law as it existed in 1994. 549 U.S. at 10, 127 S.Ct. 469; 544 U.S. at 139, 125 S.Ct. 1432. Boyde was a direct appeal decided in 1990, well before the denial of Pierce's state habeas application became final in 2001. All of these authorities set out the clearly established law for purposes of this case. The Court has addressed good character evidence in the context of the Texas special issues only once since Franklin, in Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 113 S.Ct. 892. The State urges that Graham stands for the proposition that the special issues allow juries to give meaningful consideration and effect to good character evidence. In Graham, the Court considered the petitioner's mitigating evidence that he had a transient upbringing, was a generous person, and loved the Lord. Id. at 464, 113 S.Ct. 892 (alterations omitted). The Court stated, in dicta, that the special issues allowed the jury to give at least some effect to this character evidence, and indicated that some effect was all that was constitutionally required. Id. at 476-77, 113 S.Ct. 892. Graham 's actual holding, however, was that under the law as it existed in 1984 (the year the petitioner's conviction became final) the relief that the petitioner sought would have constituted a new rule, in violation of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989). Id. at 477, 113 S.Ct. 892. The Abdul-Kabir majority took pains to distinguish Graham 's some effect language as dicta, 550 U.S. at 258-59, 127 S.Ct. 1654, as did this court in Nelson, in which we rejected the State's contention that Graham altered the requirement that the jury be able to give full consideration and full effect to the capital defendant's mitigating evidence, 472 F.3d at 298 (Because the [ Graham ] Court disposed of the case on Teague grounds, it did not address the substantive merits of the petitioner's Penry claim.). [9] Both Abdul-Kabir and Brewer emphasize the importance of allowing juries to give meaningful effect to any mitigating evidence providing a basis for a sentence of life rather than death. Abdul-Kabir, 550 U.S. at 260, 127 S.Ct. 1654 (emphases added). The California cases establish that good character evidence has meaningful relevance to moral culpability, which a majority of the Justices in Franklin indicated is not encompassed by the special issues. These authorities establish that an additional instruction was required in order for the jury to consider and give effect to this mitigating evidence.
In Abdul-Kabir and Brewer, the Court indicated that a prosecutor's comments to the jury at voir dire and at closing may further impede the ability of the jury to give meaningful consideration and effect to mitigating evidence. Pierce complains that the prosecutor, at his sentencing, impressed upon the jurors in closing argument that they could not consider evidence with relevance beyond the special issues: You each promised me individually that if the State brought you evidence that convinced you beyond a reasonable doubt that the answers to these special issues would be yes and you knew that a yes answer to each one of these issues would mean the death penalty that you would answer those questions yes and that you would never change your answer despite the evidence in this case just so that the death penalty would not be imposed. As the district court observed, these comments are very similar (indeed, nearly identical) to those that the Court criticized in Abdul-Kabir, in which the prosecutor reminded jurors that they had `promise[d' to] look only at the questions posed by the special issues, which, according to the prosecutor, required the jurors to put the petitioner's mitigating evidence `out of [their] mind[s]' and `just go by the facts.' 550 U.S. at 261, 127 S.Ct. 1654. The Abdul-Kabir Court concluded that these comments had the effect of impermissibly convinc[ing] jurors that the law compels them to disregard the force of the evidence offered in mitigation that had relevance outside the special issues. Id. The prosecutor's closing comments in this case are also similar to those that the Court criticized in Brewer, where the prosecutor urged the jury that `you don't have the power to say whether [the petitioner] lives or dies. You answer the questions according to the evidence, much like you did at the guilt or innocence [phase]. That's all.' Brewer, 550 U.S. at 291, 127 S.Ct. 1706 (alterations omitted). Finding a Penry violation, the Brewer Court concluded that [t]here [wa]s surely a reasonable likelihood that the jurors accepted the prosecutor's argument at the close of the sentencing hearing that all they needed to decide was whether Brewer had acted deliberately and would likely be dangerous in the future, necessarily disregarding any independent concern that, given Brewer's troubled background, he may not be deserving of a death sentence. Id. at 293-94, 127 S.Ct. 1706 (footnote omitted). To the extent that Pierce presented evidence that could not be given meaningful consideration and effect under the special issues, the prosecution's closing argument may have exacerbated the problem by instructing the jury to consider only the special issues. Certain of the prosecutor's comments at voir dire were also problematic. The prosecutor elicited agreement from one venire member (who was later selected to serve on the jury) that under our law . . . the age of an individual . . . in and of itself does not give anyone special rights, and that whether a person is 17 or they're 85, the law doesn't ask how old you are . . . it asks that you follow certain norms and those norms determine the interaction between human beings and violation of those be tried by a jury . . . . The prosecutor elicited agreement from another venire member (also selected to the jury) that our law, as far as making a person guilty or being charged with capital murderlike that doesn't distinguish whether or not that person happens to be 17 or 18 . . . as far as whether or not they violate the law and the statement that she would not necessarily answer the second special issue no because of the defendant's age. The Abdul-Kabir majority observed that comments like these, which tak[e] pains to convince jurors that the law compels them to disregard the force of evidence offered in mitigation, might undermine[ ] a jury's ability to give meaningful consideration and effect even to evidence encompassed by the special issues. 550 U.S. at 261, 127 S.Ct. 1654. By essentially instructing the venire members that youth isn't relevant, the comments may have undermined the jury's ability to give mitigating effect to evidence of Pierce's youth through the special issues.
Under the clearly established law, the special issues provided a basis for the jury to give meaningful consideration and effect to Pierce's mitigating evidence of youth and good behavior in prison but did not provide such a basis for the remainder of Pierce's mitigating evidence. The prosecutor's closing comments may have exacerbated this problem by impressing upon the jury that its deliberations should be guided by the special issues alone. The prosecutor's comments at voir dire may have also undermined the jury's ability to give meaningful consideration and effect under the special issues to the evidence of Pierce's youth. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order of resentencing. Because we affirm on this basis, we do not consider whether Pierce's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing provides an alternative basis for resentencing. Accord Beckham v. Wainwright, 639 F.2d 262, 265 n. 4 (5th Cir. Unit B Mar. 1981) (declining to consider whether the alleged denials of the right to confrontation and right to jury trial provided bases for habeas relief and a new trial because the petitioner's ineffective assistance claim provided such a basis).