Opinion ID: 2070572
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Trial Court's Jury Selection Procedure

Text: Defendant also contends that the trial court improperly conducted jury selection. He maintains that the trial court erred when it instructed the venire panels on the standards for juror qualification. In his view, the instruction enabled potential jurors to manipulate the outcomes of their voir dires, thus tainting the selection process. In addition, defendant argues that the trial court erred by conducting group voir dire. During preliminary instructions to the venire panels, the court explained the life/death qualification process. It stressed to the panels that it was looking for jurors who would be open to both available sentencing options after a guilty verdict of murder in the first degree. At first defendant made no specific objection to the instructions. However, defendant ultimately did complain that the court was highlighting the requirements for jury selection to the panels. To the extent the trial court may have forecast the type of individual who could avoid jury service when it described the life/death qualification process, we do not see the prejudice defendant claims to have suffered in this case. We presume that jurors follow their oaths, answer the questions put to them truthfully and abide by the court's instructions ( see People v Acevedo, 69 NY2d 478, 488). However, courts should exercise caution in this regard. The way in which a court conducts death/life qualification should encourage honesty and frankness in a juror's responses without seeming to place a value or reward on a correct or appropriate answer. We also reject defendant's contention that CPL 270.16 (1) requires only individual voir dire in capital cases. CPL 270.16 (1) directs that the court permit the parties on motion to examine the prospective jurors individually and outside the presence of the other prospective jurors regarding their qualifications to serve as jurors. CPL 270.15 (1) (c) states that the court shall permit both parties to examine the prospective jurors individually or collectively regarding their qualifications to serve as jurors. There is nothing to suggest that in adding CPL 270.16, the Legislature intended to supersede CPL 270.15 ( see People v Santiago, 184 Misc 2d 403, 405). Defendant claims he was prejudiced when the court conducted group voir dire after individually questioning prospective jurors. The panels were asked if they had changed their minds after having a chance to consider their answers in the individual sessions. Defendant contends that because the jurors were educated in the individual interviews they could then alter prior answers and escape unwelcome jury service. Defendant never made any specific objection to the group voir dire procedure; defense counsel only expressed a concern regarding the scope of the questions presented to a group panel on the issue of whether prospective jurors had a change of heart about sitting on a death penalty case. In addition, the record does not indicate that during group voir dire, prospective jurors were pressed further on their views regarding the death penalty. When an individual juror expressed doubt about her ability to convict defendant of first-degree murder, given the uncertainty of the penalty phase, she was asked no further questions about capital punishment. [9]