Opinion ID: 1272629
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Immediate-Episode Evidence

Text: The abuse of discretion standard controls our review of the district court's decision to admit testimony regarding the R.S. robbery and shoes acquisition. See State v. Kennedy, 585 N.W.2d 385, 389 (Minn.1998) (Absent a clear abuse of discretion, evidentiary rulings generally rest within the trial court's discretion.). A defendant appealing the admission of evidence has the burden to show the admission was both erroneous and prejudicial. Id. (citing State v. Steinbuch, 514 N.W.2d 793, 799 (Minn.1994)). Minnesota has long adhered to the common-law rule excluding evidence of prior bad acts except where the evidence fits within a specific exception. See State v. Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 490, 139 N.W.2d 167, 169 (1965). Although other bad acts evidence is often probative, it also carries a great likelihood of inflaming passions and resulting in unfair prejudice to the defendant. See McCormick on Evidence § 190 at 797-98, 811 (John William Strong, ed., 4th ed. 1992). As we said in Spreigl, That such former misconduct is relevant, i.e. has probative value to persuade us of the general trait or disposition, cannot be doubted. The assumption of its probative value is made throughout the judicial opinions on this subject. . . . It may almost be said that it is because of this indubitable relevancy of such evidence that it is excluded. . . . The natural and inevitable tendency of the tribunalwhether judge or juryis to give excessive weight to the vicious record of crime thus exhibited, and either to allow it to bear too strongly on the present charge, or to take the proof of it as justifying a condemnation irrespective of guilt of the present charge. Moreover, use of alleged particular acts ranging over the entire period of the defendant's life makes it impossible for him to be prepared to refute the charge, any or all of which may be mere fabrications. 272 Minn. at 495-96, 139 N.W.2d at 172 (citing 1 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 193, 194 (3d ed. 1940)). Because of the danger that evidence of other bad acts will be used improperly to convict a defendant based on character, the safeguards now set forth in Rule 404(b) were developed to govern admission of other acts evidence. See State v. Billstrom, 276 Minn. 174, 178-79, 149 N.W.2d 281, 284-85 (1967); Spreigl, 272 Minn. at 496-97, 139 N.W.2d at 172-73. Immediate-episode evidence is a narrow exception to the general character evidence rule. In State v. Wofford, we explained that the rule excluding evidence of the commission of other offenses does not necessarily deprive the state of the right to make out its whole case against the accused on any evidence which is otherwise relevant upon the issue of the defendant's guilt of the crime with which he was charged. 262 Minn. 112, 118, 114 N.W.2d 267, 271 (1962). Rather, [t]he state may prove all relevant facts and circumstances which tend to establish any of the elements of the offense with which the accused is charged, even though such facts and circumstances may prove or tend to prove that the defendant committed other crimes. Id. We further explained that immediate episode evidence is admissible where two or more offenses are linked together in point of time or circumstances so that one cannot be fully shown without proving the other, or where evidence of other crimes constitutes part of the res gestae. Id. [2] Applying the analysis developed in Wofford, we have repeatedly affirmed the admission of immediate-episode evidence when there is a close causal and temporal connection between the prior bad act and the charged crime. [3] We concluded in State v. Martin, 293 Minn. 116, 128, 197 N.W.2d 219, 226-27 (1972), that the district court properly admitted testimony regarding earlier robberies committed by the defendant because the defendant's desire to conceal the earlier robberies motivated the charged murder. In State v. Leecy, we explained that testimony about earlier threats constituted immediate-episode evidence because the earlier threats escalated into the charged assault. 294 N.W.2d 280, 282 (Minn.1980). We held in State v. Darveaux that evidence of drugs found in the defendant's purse two days after drug store robbery was admissible as immediate-episode evidence where the drugs were the same type of drugs stolen from the drug store. 318 N.W.2d 44, 48 (Minn. 1982). More recently, we concluded in State v. Nunn that testimony regarding an earlier kidnapping was immediate-episode evidence because the defendant obtained information during the earlier kidnapping that motivated the charged murder. 561 N.W.2d 902, 907-08 (Minn.1997). Our decisions in these cases illustrate the type of close causal and temporal connection required to satisfy the narrow immediate-episode exception to the general character evidence rule. We have also discussed immediate-episode evidence when considering whether a district court's decision to join two offenses for trial prejudiced the defendant. In State v. Kendell, we held that joinder did not unfairly prejudice the defendant when the evidence of the joined offense would have been admissible in a separate trial as immediate-episode evidence because there was a temporal and causal connection between the two offenses. 723 N.W.2d 597, 608 (Minn.2006). In Kendell, testimony regarding a murder committed in unit 303 constituted immediate-episode evidence because the unit-303 murder was committed to avoid apprehension for the murders committed next door in unit 304. See id. Our most recent discussion of immediate-episode evidence, State v. Fardan, emphasizes the need for a close causal and temporal connection between the prior bad act and the charged crime. 773 N.W.2d 303, 316 (2009). In Fardan, the defendant was charged with first-degree murder. Id. at 311. The district court admitted evidence of several other offenses the defendant committed on the night of the murder as immediate-episode evidence because the crimes were all committed within a short time frame by the same group of men. See id. at 312, 316. We disagreed, explaining that the other crime evidence was not immediate-episode evidence because the murder was not committed to facilitate the other offenses, and the other offenses were not committed to facilitate [the] murder. Id. at 317. While the identity of the perpetrators of all of the offenses was the same, and the other offenses and the murder were all committed as part of the same broad plan to commit robbery, we said that this limited connection is not sufficient to make the other offenses part of the `immediate episode' of [the deceased's] robbery and murder. Id. In Riddley's case, there is a close connection in terms of the time and location between the charged offenses and the R.S. robbery and shoes acquisition. See Wofford, 262 Minn. at 118, 114 N.W.2d at 271 (stating that where two or more offenses are linked together in point of time or circumstances so that one cannot be fully shown without providing the other . . . [the evidence of the prior crime] is admissible.) The prior acts and the charged crimes took place within a short time of each otherno more than 15 minutes apart. The prior acts and the charged crimes also took place in and around the same locationin alleys within one block of each other. But, there is not a close causal connection between the charged offenses and the R.S. robbery and shoes acquisition. There is no evidence that the murders were motivated by the R.S. robbery or that the murders were committed to conceal the R.S. robbery. In addition, the police did not find evidence relating to the murders at the site of the R.S. robbery. Because the R.S. robbery and shoes acquisition did not have a close causal connection to the charged murders, we conclude the district court abused its discretion when it concluded that testimony regarding the R.S. robbery and shoes acquisition was immediate-episode evidence. Our conclusion that the district court abused its discretion when it admitted testimony regarding the R.S. robbery and shoes acquisition does not end our analysis. A defendant appealing the admission of other crimes evidence must also demonstrate that the erroneous admission of evidence created a reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict. State v. Ness, 707 N.W.2d 676, 691 (Minn.2006). We have said that, [t]he underlying purpose of the Spreigl notice is to avoid surprise to the defendant by giving him time to prepare a defense to the charges. State v. Grilli, 304 Minn. 80, 86, 230 N.W.2d 445, 450 (1975); see also State v. Bolte, 530 N.W.2d 191, 197 (Minn.1995) (The notice requirement is designed to give a defendant sufficient opportunity to prepare for trial and to avoid situations where a defendant must defend against unexpected testimony regarding prior offenses.). In Bolte, we held that the State's failure to provide the defendant formal Spreigl notice did not prejudice the defendant when the State did not discover the relevance of the evidence until after the trial began, the police reports alluded to the Spreigl evidence, and it appeared that the defendant intended to call the Spreigl victim as a witness at trial. 530 N.W.2d at 199. Here, the complaint included detailed allegations about the R.S. robbery. Riddley had actual knowledge of the R.S. robbery allegation, as evidenced by his pretrial motion to prohibit the State from introducing evidence of a prior robbery occurring on the date of the offense. In response to Riddley's pretrial motion, the State described both the R.S. robbery and shoes acquisition in detail and on the record and asserted the two incidents were part of the chronology of events on the evening of the murder. The State also included R.S. on its list of potential trial witnesses. Riddley did not argue to the district court, nor does he argue on appeal, that he was not aware of the facts of the R.S. robbery and shoes acquisition. Riddley asserted in the district court that the lack of notice affected his trial preparation. However, Riddley did not articulate to the district court, nor does he articulate on appeal, how the lack of formal Spreigl notice adversely affected his trial preparation or what he might have done differently had he received formal notice. [4] Based on the record in this case, we conclude that Riddley has failed to demonstrate that the lack of formal Spreigl notice prejudiced him. In determining whether the erroneous admission of other crimes evidence significantly affected the verdict, we have considered whether the State presented other evidence on the issue for which the other crime evidence was offered. State v. Courtney, 696 N.W.2d 73, 84 (Minn.2005). We have also considered whether the district court instructed the jury to limit the use of the other crime evidence and not to convict [the defendant] based on that evidence. Id. We presume a jury follows a court's cautionary instruction. Id. Other relevant considerations are whether the State dwelled on the evidence in closing argument and whether the evidence of guilt was overwhelming. Bolte, 530 N.W.2d at 198. Here, the State offered the testimony regarding the R.S. robbery and shoes acquisition to prove identity, motive, and possession of the gun. C.A., E.M., and Thurman provided additional direct testimony on these issues. The district court also gave the jury a cautionary instruction regarding the R.S. robbery. Although the 911 call reporting the R.S. robbery was played for the jury during the State's case-in-chief and again in closing argument, the evidence of Riddley's guilt is significant. In addition, the R.S. robbery and shoes acquisition evidence was not graphic or inflammatory. Nor was the evidence likely to lead to a conviction based on propensity because the jury was likely to see the evidence as parts of a whole and if [the jury was going to] believe or disbelieve [the defendant's] doing of one part, [it would] believe or disbelieve his doing of all. IA Wigmore on Evidence § 218 (Tillers rev. 1983). Thus, we conclude that Riddley failed to demonstrate that the erroneous admission of testimony regarding the R.S. robbery and the shoes acquisition significantly affected the verdict.