Opinion ID: 2274559
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Police immediately retrieved the evidence from Harris's mouth.

Text: Section 1269 does not apply to an attempted act of concealment, alteration or destruction. Rather, it applies when the defendant suppresses the evidence by actual completed concealment, alteration, or destruction. In Pennewell v. State , we held that the defendant did not tamper with evidence, because the drugs were visible and immediately retrievable. [4] Although Pennewell attempted to hide drugs from an approaching police officer, we held that he failed to commit the crime of Tampering with Evidence. [5] Here, Connick saw plastic in Harris's mouth. Connick obviously believed that the plastic may have been a baggie containing contraband. Harris did not immediately spit out the baggie when the police officers told him to do so, nor did he successfully partially conceal the item for more than a brief moment. Pennewell does not require the police to retrieve potential evidence immediately. Rather, it requires immediately retrievable evidence. This rule makes sense, because it focuses on whether the defendant actually completed the required act of suppressing evidence. [6] This rule in Pennewell also comports with our earlier decisions. The exception, as we explained in Pennewell, applied to abandonment, which results from failed concealment. Whether Harris attempted to destroy the evidence does not materially affect our application of Pennewell. Rather, we may consider whether the evidence was visible and immediately retrievable to determine whether Harris failed to destroy  and by actually doing so, suppress the evidence. If he failed to suppress the evidence, then he did not meet the § 1269 felony tampering requirements. In Pennewell, we discussed cases where the police could immediately retrieve evidence that the defendant attempted to suppress. We noted that police could immediately retrieve evidence from on top of a garage roof, [7] the ground, [8] and a bush. [9] In each of these cases, the police officers saw the defendant attempt to suppress evidence, and they could immediately retrieve that evidence, thus frustrating the defendant's attempt to prevent its use against him in an official proceeding. In Hardy v. State , when upholding a § 1269 conviction of a defendant who placed a bag of drugs in his mouth during a traffic stop, we misstated the applicable standard. [10] We held that the jury had properly considered whether Hardy had damaged or was attempting to destroy the drugs. [11] That, regrettably misstated the law. Section 1269 does not punish `attempted suppression of evidence,' nor does it punish `attempted concealment, alteration, or destruction of evidence.' The statute provides that the person suppresses [evidence] by any act of concealment, alteration or destruction. ... [12] The police officer noticed that Hardy clenched his jaw while speaking, and surmised that Hardy was concealing contraband in his mouth. [13] Hardy's conviction could have been affirmed under the proper standard. That said, we emphasize here that § 1269 punishes only materialized suppression  not its mere attempt. Delaware law punishes attempted crimes in a manner that corresponds to the underlying offense's severity. 11 Del. C. § 531 applies proportionate penalties to inchoate criminal actions. [14] Section 1269, on the other hand, punishes a substantive offense, and does not allow the underlying offense to determine the degree of punishment. Whereas prosecutors may charge § 531 attempt crimes with the proper level of statutory force, § 1269 always carries felony penalties. We must, therefore, apply § 1269 consistent with the statutory intent. Our concurring colleagues believe that we misconstrue the General Assembly's intent. We believe the General Assembly relied on the commentary when it adopted our Penal Code. The commentary makes it clear that § 1269 cannot be read to felonize misdemeanor infractions of the Code. The Delaware Criminal Code Commentary to § 1269 guides our understanding and the State's prosecution. The Commentary states that tampering deserves felony penalties, because [t]he crime is serious ... so the dangers of a miscarriage of justice are multiplied when such evidence is fabricated or concealed. [15] Anyone who breaks into an evidence room, takes something from a police officer, or frustrates a search warrant obtained through probable cause has committed a serious crime. But, someone who temporarily frustrates a police officer's happenstance investigation of a hand- or bag-full of drugs, has not committed a serious crime. Harris did not commit a serious crime or multiply dangers of a miscarriage of justice. As Pennewell explains, briefly hiding contraband until the police take the contraband and the defendant into custody, does not constitute suppress[ion] by any act of concealment. At best, that constitutes `delay by an act of concealment.' In these circumstances, that defendant has failed to suppress evidence from production or use against him. Whether the defendant briefly hides evidence on a rooftop or in his mouth, if the police perceive the act of concealment and could immediately retrieve the evidence, the defendant has failed to suppress evidence under § 1269. Because Connick saw the baggie and immediately retriev[ed] it from Harris's mouth, Harris did not suppress evidence within the meaning of to 11 Del. C. § 1269.