Opinion ID: 564919
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Panel Majority's View

Text: 36 Johnson argues, and the panel majority agreed, that if these more recent psychological evaluations are true, they demonstrate that Yarbrough's preliminary conclusions as testified to in the advisory jury sentencing hearing were inaccurate. The panel majority concluded that 37 [t]his evidence, if true, suggests the existence of three statutory mitigating circumstances under Florida law. See Fla.Stat. Sec. 921.141(6)(b) (The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.); Sec. 921.141(6)(e) (The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person.); Sec. 921.141(6)(f) (The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired.). 38 Johnson v. Dugger, 911 F.2d at 462. The panel majority was of the opinion that were this case before us unencumbered with concerns of procedural default, we think it is clear that the proffered evidence would support a conclusion that Johnson was prejudiced by his sentencing counsel's failure to develop and present this evidence during sentencing before the trial judge. Id. The majority concluded that there is a high degree of certainty that the sentencing court would not have overridden the jury verdict, id., and that under the Tedder standard, there is a high degree of certainty that the Florida Supreme Court would not have permitted such an override had the evidence now before us been timely presented. Id. at 463. 39 The panel majority considered the meaning of the actually innocent exception. It proposed the following test: 40 [I]n order to establish a fundamental miscarriage of justice, [a petitioner] must prove that as a result of the alleged constitutional error the sentencing body's deliberative process was affected to such a degree that its ultimate conclusions are probably factually in error. In most cases, we envision that this will necessitate proof that as a result of the alleged constitutional error (1) the sentencing body was under a misperception as to the factual background of either the offender or the offense, and (2) but for those factual misperceptions held by the sentencing body, the petitioner probably would not have received a sentence of death. 41 Id. at 468-69 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). 38 42 The panel majority noted that one method of meeting the actually innocent exception is to establish that absent an alleged constitutional violation, the sentencing body would not have found any aggravating factors. The majority declined to hold, however, that a petitioner must establish that the constitutional error implicates all of the existing aggravating factors before a federal court should entertain a procedurally defaulted constitutional claim. Id. at 469 (emphasis in original). 43 Applying its newly-developed test to Johnson's case, the panel majority held that an evidentiary hearing is necessary to prevent a potential fundamental miscarriage of justice. Johnson, the majority decided, has proffered evidence which if true would establish that he was probably actually innocent of the death sentence. Id. at 477. The dissenting judge offered quite a different view of what it means to be actually innocent of the death penalty, a view with which we agree. 39 44