Opinion ID: 178112
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Consideration of Arguments in Mitigation

Text: Dantzler also argues that the District Court erred in failing to address his argument for mitigation during sentencing. Specifically, Dantzler contends that the Court should have rewarded his efforts to find employment upon being released from prison, namely, that he worked at a car wash for two months after being released from custody and assisted his wife in starting a cleaning business. A lengthy explanation is generally not required when a court sentences a defendant in accordance with the Sentencing Guidelines, such as here. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356-57 (2007). Indeed, “[t]he appropriateness of brevity or length, conciseness or detail, when to write, what to say, depends upon circumstances.” Id. at 356. Moreover, a court is not required “to discuss every argument made by a litigant if an argument is clearly without merit.” United States v. Jackson, 467 F.3d 834, 841 (3d Cir. 6 Because we conclude that the District Court sanctioned Dantzler for breaching the court’s trust by violating the terms of his supervised release, as opposed to punishing him for the violation conduct itself, we need not address Dantzler’s argument concerning the proper construction of § 3583(e). Regardless of that statutory construction question, we are confident district courts understand that, when considering a sentence for a violation of supervised release, they may not seek to punish any criminal conduct that constitutes the violation. See Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 700 (2000) (“Although [] violations of [supervised release] often lead to reimprisonment, the violative conduct need not be criminal and need only be found by a judge under a preponderance of the evidence standard, not by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Where the acts of violation are criminal in their own right, they may be the basis for separate prosecution, which would raise an issue of double jeopardy if the revocation of supervised release were also punishment for the same offense.” (citations omitted)). 8 2006) (quoting United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 329 (3d Cir. 2006)). A court must only recognize and respond to those arguments that are not frivolous. Id. The record reflects that Dantzler has exaggerated his efforts to find employment following his release from prison. At the revocation hearing, Carla testified that Dantzler was employed at a car wash for only two months following his release from prison before he quit because he was “sick of this [expletive].” (App. at 36.) He remained unemployed until the date of the evidentiary hearing six months later, despite his probation officer’s efforts to help him find a job. Furthermore, the only progress made toward starting a cleaning business was registering and obtaining a license and dispersing flyers advertising the business, all of which Carla handled. Dantzler’s precise role in this endeavor is unknown. Since there is an insufficient factual basis for Dantzler’s assertion that he made a “good effort” (App. at 199) to find employment while on supervised release, the Court did not err by not expressly discussing that mitigation argument.