Opinion ID: 1973657
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Admission of the Doctor's Report

Text: After the physical examination of the child Dr. Entwistle reported his findings in a form supplied by the Department For Children and Their Families pursuant to Rhode Island law. G.L. 1956 (1984 Reenactment) § 40-11-6, as amended by P.L. 1985, ch. 371, § 1. At trial the prosecution called Dr. Entwistle to the stand to testify about the examination he performed upon the child. Although the doctor was able to recall some general facts surrounding the event, he indicated that his memory was exhausted concerning his specific observations and findings. Then, in an attempt to refresh the doctor's recollection, the prosecutor showed him a copy of the report he had made after the examination. Apparently this did not refresh the doctor's present recollection of the specifics of the examination. A conference was then held in-chambers with the trial justice and both counsel present, and a discussion ensued regarding how this medical report would be used. The prosecutor then informed the trial justice that he intended to lay the appropriate foundation and introduce the medical report under Rule 803(5) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, the hearsay exception for past recollection recorded. This prompted an objection by defense counsel, who argued that the report contained highly prejudicial hearsay that was not admissible under any hearsay exception. Additionally defense counsel argued that this court's holding in State v. Pina, 455 A.2d 313 (R.I. 1983), addressed the same situation and found this type of evidence to be inadmissible. This objection was overruled by the trial justice, and the medical report was eventually admitted in full as past recollection recorded under Rule 803(5). We conclude, however, that this medical report should not have been admitted into evidence under any hearsay exception. The document clearly does not satisfy the requirements necessary to qualify it as a memorandum of past recollection recorded. That hearsay exception has a threshold requirement that the person who prepared the memorandum must have based the perceptions recorded in the memorandum upon his personal observations and not upon what others have told him. See Mercurio v. Fascitelli, 116 R.I. 237, 354 A.2d 736 (1976). In this case the report included numerous highly prejudicial statements made by the child to Dr. Entwistle concerning events of which he had absolutely no personal knowledge. Thus, in admitting this document under Rule 803(5), the trial justice, we believe, committed reversible error. Although the state did not attempt to admit this document under Rule 803(4), the hearsay exception for statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment, we shall address the rule's applicability to this case due to the fact that defense counsel raised the issue in objecting to the admissibility of the medical report. In Pina, supra, we held that a doctor's testimony concerning the account of specific events surrounding the rape related to him by a rape victim was not admissible under Rule 803(4). In Pina, the doctor testified not only about the factual events leading up to the rape but also concerning threats made by the perpetrator to the victim, all of which had been told to the examining physician by the victim. The doctor had no firsthand knowledge of any of this information. Clearly any statements made by a victim concerning what sexual acts had occurred would be admissible hearsay insofar as they would be related to the diagnosis and treatment of a sexual-assault victim. See State v. Ucero, 450 A.2d 809 (R.I. 1982). However, when the statements made are merely to assign fault or to narrate details that are not connected with diagnosis or treatment, they are inadmissible hearsay if they do not fall within any other hearsay exception. State v. Contreras, 105 R.I. 523, 534-35, 253 A.2d 612, 619 (1969). The test this court has used in determining the admissibility of such statements was enunciated in Contreras: [A]dmission or rejection will hinge on whether what has been related by the patient will assist or is helpful in the diagnosis or treatment of his ailment. Id. In the present case the report contained a statement made by the child that identified her alleged attacker and a further statement that the child had been asked to commit sexual acts that were never in fact perpetrated. Such statements, we must conclude, do not in any way assist a physician in the diagnosis and treatment of a sexual-assault victim and as such are not within the scope of the Rule 803(4) hearsay exception. Additionally we must recognize the significant prejudicial effect that the admission of this report may have had upon the jury. We have often recognized that a physician's testimony can carry with it an impression of great credibility. In this case the only witness to the alleged molestations was a child who was six years old when the incidents were alleged to have occurred. The documentation by a physician of the child's descriptions of the attacks could potentially have given these statements heightened credibility. As we stated in Pina, 455 A.2d at 315: [T]he doctor's repetition of the victim's version of events was sure to lend it credibility. A medical expert cannot serve the function of a thirteenth juror by evaluating the credibility of witnesses. (Citing State v. Castore, 435 A.2d 321, 326 (R.I. 1981).) Thus we must conclude that the trial court's admission of this medical report constituted reversible error, and in such circumstances, the defendant must be granted a new trial. For the reasons stated, the defendant's appeal is sustained, and his judgment of conviction on both counts is vacated. The papers in the case may be remanded to the Superior Court for a new trial.