Opinion ID: 2534320
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: The ruling on the amount of fees is vacated and remanded.

Text: Ed also takes issue with the amount of fees awarded, contending they are excessive and unreasonable. We agreeto an extent. Rule 54 provides the criteria courts must consider in awarding attorney's fees. In its order on fees the district court noted the long lifespan and difficult, undesirable nature of the case, the experience of Mike's counsel, and the fact that Mike obtained a favorable result. The court noted that the hourly rates of Mike's lawyers were consistent with attorneys similarly situated in the largest of Idaho firms. The court stated the balance of the 54(e)(3) criteria, are unknown to the court. We acknowledge that calculation of the amount of attorney fees is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Eastern Idaho Agricultural Credit Ass'n v. Neibaur, 133 Idaho 402, 987 P.2d 314 (1999). And we do not disagree with the findings the court made. However, we believe the court can improve on its examination of the Rule 54(e)(3) criteria. The rule, employing the term shall, is mandatoryit requires the court to consider all eleven factors plus any other factor the court deems appropriate. To examine some factors, simply declare the rest unknown, and yet award the full amount of fees requested, we believe, in this case, is not sufficiently thorough to withstand appeal. For one thing, the affidavit Mike's counsel submitted essentially addresses only criterion (D) (prevailing charges for like work) and asserted that the fees were reasonably and necessarily incurred. These statements, plus the billing sheets showing how much was billed, do not equip the court with enough information to arrive at a reasonable award. Criterion (D) requires the court to consider the prevailing charges for like work. Here, the district court found, instead, that the hourly fees of Mike's lawyers were consistent with those charged by the largest of Idaho firms. In determining the reasonableness of an hourly rate, the court should consider prevailing charges in a geographic context, rather than in a strata context. That is, the court should consider the fee rates generally prevailing in the pertinent geographic area, rather than what any particular segment of the legal community may be charging. Additionally, we believe, having examined the record before us, that the amount awarded exceeds that ever-elusive definition of reasonableness. For example, Mike's three attorneys billed about 379 hours, or around $70,000, for the final hearings and preparation therefor. Assuming a 10-hour day, that amounts to roughly 44 hours spent outside of court for every 10 in court. Under the time and labor required criterion, that seems somewhat excessive. So, too, does the $54,000 spent on post-trial briefing. Over the span of one and a half months, Mike's attorneys spent 267 hours drafting or discussing briefs. Much of this time involved two attorneys working on the same project, according to the billing statements. Further, two of Mike's three attorneys were partners in their firm and well seasoned litigators. Some consideration should have given as to the necessity of this legal firepower. While the time and labor expended is certainly a factor to consider, it is to be considered under a standard of reasonableness. Daisy Mfg. Co. v. Paintball Sports, 134 Idaho 259, 999 P.2d 914 (Ct.App.2000). For these reasons, we vacate the award of attorney's fees and remand to the district court for another look at the appropriate amount of the award.