Opinion ID: 1619299
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Procedural Process Afforded Bailey

Text: In order to examine the adequacy of the pre- and post-dismissal procedures provided specifically to Bailey, we must first determine his date of dismissal. Defendants contend in their reply brief to this Court that Bailey's termination was not complete . . . until [Bailey] voluntarily dismissed his appeal of the hearing officer's decision before the Blount County Board of Education. That is, they assert that Bailey was not actually dismissed until after the Full Hearing. We reject this contention. Hord's November 30 letter to Bailey states unambiguously, [y]ou [Bailey] are dismissed from employment with Blount County Schools as of this date, for improper conduct. Also, after the Full Hearing, the Personnel Hearing Authority found that, [o]n November 30, 2006, Director of Schools Alvin Hord terminated Mr. Bailey's employment for improper conduct. The record reflects no actions by Defendants to contradict, correct, or otherwise dispute this finding. Indeed, during the Full Hearing, Defendants' lawyer told the Personnel Hearing Authority that Bailey was terminated on November 30th. And, in their motion for summary judgment, Defendants assert that the hearing officer's decision  sustained the termination of Mr. Bailey's employment by Alvin Hord. (Emphasis added). Defendants will not now be heard to argue otherwise. Accordingly, we will analyze the issues before us on the basis that Bailey was dismissed on November 30, 2006, prior to the Full Hearing.
BCBOE Policy 5.202 provides that, when dismissing an employee for cause, the director of schools may either provide the employee with a hearing before the director or give the employee an opportunity for a hearing before the Personnel Hearing Authority. In this case, Director Hord initially suspended Bailey with pay and, by letter dated November 1, 2006, notified Bailey with the reasons for the suspension and gave him an opportunity to respond to the charges in writing. The letter also notified Bailey that further investigation would continue, putting Bailey on notice that his suspension might escalate to dismissal. Bailey was subsequently provided with the complaint and evidence uncovered during the investigation. Director Hord did not afford Bailey the opportunity for a hearing before a Personnel Hearing Authority prior to dismissing Bailey on November 30. Thus, Bailey's pre-termination hearing was limited to an opportunity to respond in writing to the charges that had been lodged and were under investigation. While we acknowledge that an opportunity to respond in writing is a limited hearing, it is a constitutionally cognizable hearing nonetheless. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546, 105 S.Ct. 1487. Whether it passes constitutional muster depends on the extensiveness of the post-dismissal procedures that were made available to Bailey. Although Bailey was not specifically entitled by section 49-2-301 to a post-dismissal hearing before an impartial hearing officer, he was nevertheless provided with one pursuant to Policy 5.202. Bailey chose not to attend the hearing, but his lawyer did and actively participated in defending his client's cause, including the cross-examination of the BCBOE's witnesses. The Personnel Hearing Authority upheld Bailey's dismissal. Subsequently, although Bailey was also not entitled by section 49-2-301 to appeal the hearing officer's decision to the BCBOE, he was nevertheless provided with this opportunity pursuant to Policy 5.202. Again, he took advantage of this post-dismissal administrative proceeding. Prior to its conclusion, however, Bailey chose to dismiss this administrative appeal. Had Bailey persisted with this administrative remedy, he would have been entitled to seek judicial review pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 49-2-301(b)(1)(GG)(vii) (Any party dissatisfied with the decision rendered by the board shall have the right to appeal to the chancery court in the county where the school system is located within twenty (20) working days after receipt of notice of the decision of the board.). Our review of the procedures made available to Bailey and actually undertaken by the parties makes clear that Bailey was provided with adequate pre- and post-dismissal opportunities to respond to the charges against him. We hold that Bailey was afforded sufficient process to satisfy constitutional due process requirements. Bailey's contention that he was denied due process is without merit.