Opinion ID: 167728
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mr. Argo's Reverse Sex Discrimination Claim

Text: 21 Mr. Argo's principal claim is that his termination was the product of reverse sex discrimination, in violation of Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (making it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discharge any individual ... because of such individual's... sex). Under the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of sex discrimination, whereupon the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge, and then back to the plaintiff to show that the stated reason is pretextual. To establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff ordinarily must show that (1) the plaintiff belongs to some protected class, (2) the plaintiff was qualified for the position or benefit at issue, (3) the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) the plaintiff was treated less favorably than others (e.g., the position at issue remained open after the adverse employment action). Exum v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 389 F.3d 1130, 1134 (10th Cir. 2004). The Supreme Court has held that such a prima facie case raises an inference of discrimination only because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on consideration of impermissible factors. Furnco Const. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978). For most plaintiffs, establishing a prima facie case is perfunctory, and liability turns on whether the defendant's stated explanation for the adverse employment action is pretextual. 22 In a reverse discrimination case, however, a prima facie case of discrimination requires a stronger showing. We have held that a plaintiff alleging reverse discrimination must, in lieu of showing that he belongs to a protected group, establish background circumstances that support an inference that the defendant is one of those unusual employers who discriminates against the majority. Notari v. Denver Water Dep't, 971 F.2d 585, 589 (10th Cir.1992). Alternatively, a plaintiff may produce facts sufficient to support a reasonable inference that but for plaintiff's status the challenged decision would not have occurred. Id. at 590. We recently reaffirmed Notari, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's decisions in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 118 S.Ct. 998, 140 L.Ed.2d 201 (1998), and Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). See Mattioda v. White, 323 F.3d 1288, 1293 (10th Cir.2003). 23 Mr. Argo has failed to establish any circumstances that might justify a presumption of reverse sex discrimination. By all accounts, Blue Cross Blue Shield hired plenty of men as IESs, and Mr. Argo has introduced not a whit of statistical or even anecdotal evidence that men suffered adverse treatment as a class in the workplace. Also, although he appears to have been well-qualified for the job, at least before his performance began to decline in April 2002, Mr. Argo has produced no evidence suggesting that the position remained open or that he was replaced by a woman. These circumstances do not support an inference that Blue Cross Blue Shield has taken the unusual step of discriminating against men. Nor has Mr. Argo made a sufficient showing that, but for his sex, he would not have been terminated. Ms. Oliva's actions — two flirtatious comments, a mock-bawdy birthday card, and an incident of toe-touching — were incredibly mild. Even viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. Argo, they represent precisely the kind of ordinary socializing in the workplace and intersexual flirtation about which Title VII is unconcerned. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81, 118 S.Ct. 998. Moreover, nothing in the record suggests a temporal or causal connection between Ms. Oliva's alleged flirtation and the termination decision. Even if we assume Ms. Oliva's conduct manifested an inappropriately sex discriminatory attitude toward Mr. Argo, those incidents began long before Mr. Argo's troubles, at a time when Ms. Oliva's job evaluations of Mr. Argo were effusive, and did not change or intensify as his work performance deteriorated and evaluations soured. In this case, there was no post hoc to which we could attach a propter hoc. 24 Because Mr. Argo has failed to establish a prima facie case of reverse sex discrimination, we affirm the district court's decision granting summary judgment to Blue Cross Blue Shield.