Opinion ID: 150593
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Davidson

Text: The facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Davidson, establish the 18 following. Rubin offered Davidson a Deputy Chief position in April 2004, but subsequently offered the position to Meadows, an African American. Meadows was an inexperienced chief officer who had moved up three ranks in 18 months, and Rubin specifically informed Davidson that he could not appoint a white male to the position. These facts, if true, would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that Rubin declined to promote Davidson because of his race. As noted above, a reasonable public official could not have believed that refusing to promote Davidson because of his race was lawful, because we have held that “it was clearly established [as early as] 1999 that it was unlawful for a public official to make a [race-based] decision concerning . . . promotion.” Williams, 341 F.3d at 1272. Thus, the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Davidson, establishes that Rubin’s conduct violated clearly established law. See Townsend, 601 F.3d at 1157. Rubin is nevertheless entitled to qualified immunity if the record indisputably shows that his failure to promote Davidson to the Deputy Chief position was based, at least in part, on a factor other than race. See Foy, 94 F.3d at 1535. In his appellate brief, Rubin fails to offer any legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for failing to appoint Davidson to the Deputy Chief position, other than to say that the appointment was entirely within his own discretion, and that he generally appointed individuals with the best qualifications. As noted above, these 19 general statements do not constitute indisputable evidence that Rubin’s decision not to promote Davidson was based on a factor other than race, as Rubin cites no record evidence showing that Davidson was less qualified than Meadows, who was ultimately appointed to the Deputy Chief position. Although Rubin, during his deposition, expressed dissatisfaction with Davidson’s behavior, he does not cite this in his appellate brief as a reason for failing to promote Davidson. Thus, Rubin has abandoned any such argument. See Smith v. Sec., Dept. Of Corrs., 572 F.3d 1327, 1342 n.8 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Failure to offer any argument on an issue in a brief abandons that issue”). Even if Rubin had not abandoned this argument, he would not be entitled to qualified immunity, because any evidence that Rubin did not promote Davidson to the Deputy Chief position because of Davidson’s behavior is disputed by Davidson’s deposition testimony that Rubin informed him that he could not promote him because he was a white male. See Stanley, 219 F.3d 1280 (holding that to be entitled to qualified immunity under Foy, the record must indisputably establish that the defendant was motivated, at least in part, by lawful considerations). Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying Rubin qualified immunity on Davidson’s claims.