Opinion ID: 2086392
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application to the evidence of record.

Text: The government apparently argues that this is an unusually strong case of probable cause and that the circumstances, taken as a whole, warrant detention. We do not agree. It is true that the trial judge found the attempt to kill Keith Jones to be an especially vicious offense. She commented that this is like shooting into a fishbowl. I mean, the man was under a car. No reasonable person could disagree with the judge's characterization. Without doubt, this record, as developed so far, reflects a merciless, chilling attempted assassination. But there are few, if any, merciful or non-chilling first degree murders or AWIKWA's. The facts and circumstances of this case present no dramatic departure from the norm of these intrinsically dangerous crimes. As the Public Defender Service (PDS) points out in its brief as amicus curiae, [t]he question before the court in a detention hearing is whether the defendant would be a danger to the community if released pending trial. [20] This predictive judgment depends, as this [c]ourt explained in Tyler, on an individualized assessment of information concerning specified items that pertain to the crime charged, the history and characteristics of the person, and the danger that may be posed to others if the person is released. 705 A.2d at 277 (emphasis added).. . . [T]he inference that a defendant would be a danger if released ( i.e., that he would do it again) cannot be stronger than the factual premise ( i.e., that he did it before). (Emphasis in original.) This reasoning quite properly focuses on the dangerousness of the defendant as well as on the nature of the crime, and reinforces our view that a detention order could seldom, if ever, be sustained on the basis of a finding of probable cause plus the facts and circumstances of the charged offense, standing alone. To assess the record as a whole, we consider, in turn, the criteria for dangerousness set forth in D.C.Code § 23-1322(e): 1. The circumstances of the offense charged, see D.C.Code § 23-1322(e)(1), reflect extremely violent and dangerous conduct. We recognize, at the same time, that few, if any, assaults with the specific intent to kill while armed can be substantially less reprehensible; AWIKWA is intrinsically an extremely serious crime. 2. The weight of the evidence against Pope, see D.C.Code § 23-1322(e)(2), is marginal; indeed, the judge found the identifications sufficient only because she viewed the requirement of probable cause as having a very low evidentiary threshold. [21] 3. With the exception of a single expunged conviction, Pope has no criminal record. There is no evidence of recent drug or alcohol involvement, and Pope apparently has unusually strong community support and ties. See D.C.Code § 23-1322(e)(3)(A). 4. Pope was not on probation, parole, or other supervised release at the time of the charged offense. See D.C.Code § 23-1322(e)(3)(B). The nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by [Pope's] release, see D.C.Code § 23-1322(e)(4), therefore turns largely on the strength of the evidence against him. In any event, the enumeration of the foregoing factors demonstrates that although the nature of the crime tends in some measure to support the government's position, the available individualized information about Pope does not demonstrate that he personally is dangerous.