Opinion ID: 3152191
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: dunlap’s substantive claims

Text: “Whether a successive petition for post-conviction relief was properly dismissed pursuant to I.C. § 19-2719 is a question of law. This Court reviews questions of law de novo.” Fields v. State, 154 Idaho 347, 349, 298 P.3d 241, 243 (2013) (Fields V) (quoting Pizzuto v. State, 134 Idaho 793, 795, 10 P.3d 742, 744 (2000) (Pizzuto III)). When reviewing a dismissal based on Idaho Code section 19-2719, “the proper standard of review this Court should utilize is to directly address the motion, determine whether or not the requirements of section 19-2719 have been met, and rule accordingly.” Stuart v. State, 149 Idaho 35, 40, 232 P.3d 813, 818 (2010) (quoting Hairston v. State, 144 Idaho 51, 55, 156 P.3d 552, 556 (2007)). 2. Dunlap’s substantive claims are barred by Idaho Code section 19-2719. Dunlap asserted seventeen substantive claims in his Successive Petition. The district court granted the State’s Motion for Summary Dismissal for each substantive claim as untimely based on Idaho Code section 19-2719. The district court concluded that Dunlap’s failure to raise these substantive claims in his 2008 Petition was not excused because the issues were known or reasonably could have been known at that time and, even if the substantive issues were not known at the time of his 2008 Petition, they were not raised within a reasonable time after they became known. On appeal, Dunlap contends that four of his substantive claims were erroneously dismissed. He argues: (1) Jury Instruction (J.I.) 11 was vague and ambiguous and therefore, unconstitutional; (2) J.I. 14 improperly instructed the jury and violated the ex post facto and due process clauses of the Idaho and U.S. Constitutions; (3) Preliminary Instruction P-3 was unconstitutional; and (4) trial counsel’s inadequate voir dire amounted to ineffective assistance of trial counsel and resulted in a violation of Dunlap’s right to an impartial jury. Dunlap asserts 5 that he was unable to raise these claims because this Court limited SAPD’s opening briefing in Dunlap’s Consolidated Resentencing Appeal to 100 pages. “Post-conviction proceedings are generally controlled by the Uniform Post–Conviction Procedure Act (UPCPA),” at Idaho Code sections 19-4901 to 4911. Pizzuto v. State, 149 Idaho 155, 160, 233 P.3d 86, 91 (2010) (Pizzuto V). However, “Idaho Code Section 19-2719 provides a series of procedural requirements for post-conviction petitions in capital cases” and “[t]hese provisions supersede the UPCPA to the extent that any conflict exists.” Stuart, 149 Idaho at 41, 232 P.3d at 819. The purpose of Idaho Code section “19-2719 is to eliminate unnecessary delay in carrying out a valid death sentence,” Rhoades v. State, 135 Idaho 299, 301, 17 P.3d 243, 245 (2000), by giving the claimant for post-conviction relief “one opportunity to raise all challenges to the conviction and sentence.” Dunlap III, 141 Idaho 50, 57, 106 P.3d 376, 383 (2004). Under Idaho Code section 19-2719(3), “within forty-two days after the judgment imposing the punishment of death, ‘the defendant must file any legal or factual challenge to the sentence or conviction that is known or reasonably should be known.’ ” Fields v. State, 151 Idaho 18, 23, 253 P.3d 692, 697 (2011) (Fields IV) (quoting Idaho Code § 19-2719(5)). Idaho Code section 192719 provides that if a defendant fails to timely apply for post-conviction relief, the defendant has “waived such claims for relief as were known, or reasonably should have been known” and “[t]he courts of Idaho shall have no power to consider any such claims for relief as have been so waived . . . .” I.C. §§ 19-2719(3), (5); see Pizzuto III, 134 Idaho at 795, 10 P.3d at 744. There is one exception: “a successive post-conviction petition may be heard . . . for issues that were not known or could not reasonably have been known” within forty-two days of the judgment. I.C. § 19-2719(5)(a). However, even in such cases, this Court requires the claims to be asserted within a reasonable time after they are known or reasonably could have been known. Stuart, 149 Idaho at 41, 232 P.3d at 819. In Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720, 727, 202 P.3d 642, 649 (2008) (Pizzuto IV), this Court concluded: [A] reasonable time for filing a successive petition for post-conviction relief is forty-two days after the petitioner knew or reasonably should have known of the claim, unless the petitioner shows that there were extraordinary circumstances that prevented him or her from filing the claim within that time period. “Idaho Code § 19-2719 places a heightened burden on petitioners to make a prima facie showing that the issues raised after the forty-two day time period were not known or could not 6 reasonably have been known.” Pizzuto V, 149 Idaho at 160, 233 P.3d at 91. Idaho Code section 19-2719 dictates that a successive post-conviction petition: shall not be considered unless the applicant shows the existence of such issues by (i) a precise statement of the issue or issues asserted together with (ii) material facts stated under oath or affirmation by credible persons with first hand knowledge that would support the issue or issues asserted. A pleading that fails to make a showing of excepted issues supported by material facts, or which is not credible, must be summarily dismissed. I.C. § 19-2719(5)(a); see also I.C. § 19-2719(11) (any successive post-conviction petition that does not comply with Idaho Code section 19-2719(5) “shall be dismissed summarily”). Here, the judgment imposing the death sentence was filed on February 22, 2006. Dunlap’s initial version of the Successive Petition was filed on April 7, 2011. Thus, Dunlap was required to meet the heightened burden imposed by Idaho Code section 19-2719. Because Dunlap made no argument or showing that his claims of error regarding the jury instructions and voir dire were not known or could not have been known within forty-two days of the 2006 judgment, Dunlap is deemed to have waived each substantive claim for relief by operation of Idaho Code section 19-2719(5). Dunlap asserts that that he should be excused from failing to raise these claims within the time limits of Idaho Code section 19-2719 due to the page limit imposed by this Court in Dunlap’s Consolidated Resentencing Appeal. Dunlap argues the page limit violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment because it impeded his ability to present all of his claims to this Court and consequently limited his ability to seek federal habeas corpus relief on the omitted claims. This Court’s order imposing the page limit was entered on March 22, 2011. Dunlap did not raise the page limit issue in his Successive Petition. Instead, the issue was presented only as a response to the State’s motion for summary dismissal. As Dunlap did not properly raise this due process claim in a timely fashion, we will not consider this issue on appeal. “Any remedy available by post-conviction procedure, habeas corpus or any other provision of state law must be pursued according to the procedures set forth in” Idaho Code section 19-2719 and within the time limitations of Idaho Code section 19-2719(3). I.C. § 192719(4). Indeed, the courts of Idaho have no power to consider claims for relief “[i]f the defendant fails to apply for relief as provided” in Idaho Code section 19-2719. I.C. § 19-2719(5). Thus, all claims for relief must be made by way of a petition for post-conviction relief. As this 7 Court explained in McKinney, when the defendant fails to raise an issue in the petition or in an amended petition, that issue is not raised before the district court and this Court will not consider the issue on appeal. McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 708, 992 P.2d 144, 157 (1999); see also Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 686–87, 978 P.2d 241, 246–47 (Ct. App. 1999). This Court has consistently maintained that “the petitioner must raise the newly discovered issues ‘within a reasonable time.’ ” Fields v. State, 155 Idaho 532, 535, 314 P.3d 587, 590 (2013) (Fields VI) (quoting Fields V, 154 Idaho 347, 350, 233 P.3d 241, 244 (2013)); see Stuart, 149 Idaho at 41, 232 P.3d at 819. Again, a reasonable time is forty-two days “after the petitioner knew or reasonably should have known of the claim, unless the petitioner shows that there were extraordinary circumstances that prevent him or her from filing” within that time. Pizzuto V, 146 Idaho at 727, 202 P.3d at 649. In the Consolidated Resentencing Appeal, Dunlap sought permission to file an overlength brief of 221 pages. On March 22, 2011, this Court granted Dunlap leave to file a 100 page brief. Dunlap renewed his motion and this Court permitted him to file a brief 114 pages long. Dunlap filed the initial version of his Successive Petition on April 7, 2011, well after he had notice of his claim based upon the page limit. Dunlap did not raise this issue until November 30, 2012, when he filed his response to the State’s motion for summary dismissal. Even though the State contended that the claim was improper because it was not raised in his petition for postconviction relief, the Successive Petition filed on February 15, 2013, did not advance a claim based upon the page limit. Thus, at no point did Dunlap present a precise statement of the issue together with material facts in a petition for post-conviction relief as required by Idaho Code section 19-2719, and as such, it cannot be considered. See I.C. § 19-2719(5)(a). Further, Dunlap did not raise this issue within a reasonable time. Dunlap knew of the facts supporting this claim in March of 2011 and took no action until November of 2012. Dunlap has not identified any extraordinary circumstance which prevented him from filing this claim within a reasonable time. Because the requirements of Idaho Code section 19-2719 have not been met, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed all of Dunlap’s substantive claims. As a result, we will only address Dunlap’s claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.1 1 The district court concluded that the earliest possible time that Dunlap could have known of his claims for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel was upon the filing of his first brief on March 22, 2011. The district court 8