Opinion ID: 420985
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Applicability of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23

Text: 7 Because the order entered by the Board vindicates a wrong committed against a group of individuals, the Union argues that the suit brought by the Board is a class-action suit and that the Union, as defendant, should have been afforded the procedural protections of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23. The Supreme Court's holding in General Telephone Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980), gives us clear guidance in deciding this issue. In that case, the Supreme Court affirmed this court's holding (599 F.2d 322, 328-35 (9th Cir.1979)) that Rule 23 is not applicable to an enforcement action brought by the EEOC in its name and pursuant to statutory authority to prevent unlawful employment practices and, therefore, the EEOC may seek class-wide relief under Sec. 706(f)(1) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 without being certified as the class representative. 446 U.S. at 323, 334, 100 S.Ct. at 1702, 1708. While the holding of General Telephone is narrow, a footnote to the opinion indicates that its intended sweep is quite broad: 8 Petitioners characterize this action as a class action; the EEOC characterizes it as an action affecting a class of individuals. We need not choose between these characterizations. The issue is whether an action, however it is styled, brought by a Government agency to enforce the federal law with whose enforcement the agency is charged is subject to the requirements of Rule 23. 9 Id. at 323 n. 5, 100 S.Ct. at 1703 n. 5. 10 The Board brought the present action under section 10 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 160, which expressly authorizes the Board to bring an administrative action to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice. The Supreme Court found in General Telephone that, because of a similar authorization for the EEOC to bring suits under Title VII, the authority of the EEOC to bring enforcement actions is in no way dependent upon Rule 23, and the rule has no application to a Sec. 706 suit. 446 U.S. at 324, 100 S.Ct. at 1703. The same rationale applies to an action brought by the NLRB under section 10 of the NLRA, for the action is one to vindicate [t]he public interest in effectuating the policies of federal labor laws; it is not a civil proceeding brought by a group of individual claimants to vindicate the wrongs they have suffered. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 n. 8, 87 S.Ct. 903, 912 n. 8, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967). The Fifth Circuit has already applied the rationale of General Telephone to enforcement actions brought by the Board under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 201 et seq. Donovan v. University of Texas at El Paso, 643 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir.1981). We hold that the General Telephone rationale is equally applicable to enforcement actions brought by the Board under the NLRA. Therefore, the Board was not required to proceed in accordance with Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 11