Opinion ID: 1177070
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: the dupont shorelines master program

Text: The majority cavalierly labels as slight language differences the dissimilarity between DuPont's conditional use provisions and the conditional use guidelines proposed by the Department of Ecology (DOE). In fact, there is a substantial difference in the language establishing the criteria for conditional use permits. In WAC 173-16-070(1), DOE's criteria that [t]he use will cause no unreasonably adverse effects on the environment or other uses was changed by the deletion of the word unreasonably in DuPont's shorelines master program. Clerk's Papers, at 103. This change results in a wholly different meaning obvious to either a layman or a lawyer. In subsection (2), DuPont made two changes from the DOE criteria regarding interference with shoreline use. First, DuPont added a colloquial modifier will in no way interfere to replace the declarative negative will not interfere in the DOE guidelines. Clerk's Papers, at 103. By adding in no way, DuPont demonstrated a plain intent to strengthen this protection. The term in no way conveys the same determination to preserve shoreline values that the removal of unreasonably had in the modification to the first of the conditional use criteria. Secondly, the City deleted the word public as a modifier of shoreline. By deleting the term public, the City extends prohibitions against interference with public use to private, as well as public, shorelines. In subsection (3), DuPont struck the words and the master program from the compatibility requirement. Clerk's Papers, at 103. By removing the words master program, the City eliminates the DOE suggestion that consistency with the master program be retained in design of the site. In subsection (4), the City adopted the DOE's suggested language in its entirety. Clerk's Papers, at 103. DOE adopted these modifications without question or comment when it approved the shorelines master program in June 1975. This is significant in view of the fact that DOE had full authority to modify, change or adopt new provisions of conditional uses on these shorelines of statewide significance if the master program does not provide the optimum implementation of the policy of this chapter to satisfy the state-wide interest. RCW 90.58.090(2). Three other aspects are also significant. First, Weyerhaeuser did not announce its purchase of the DuPont property and intention to construct the facility until a year after adoption of the DuPont shorelines master program. Secondly, no testimony was offered that suggested DuPont made a mistake in adopting its conditional use language. Thirdly, neither the City, Weyerhaeuser nor the Department of Ecology has proposed that the conditional use language be modified. This is significant because both DOE and the City are mandated to account for changing conditions in master programs in RCW 90.58.190: The department [Department of Ecology] and each local government shall periodically review any master programs under its jurisdiction and make such adjustments thereto as are necessary. The process for changing the master program is straightforward, uncomplicated and capable of expeditious completion. See WAC 173-19-060, -070. From the foregoing, it is evident that the City (with DOE approval) changed the conditional use criteria suggested by the DOE. It is further inescapable that the City made its criteria more restrictive and, therefore, more protective of the environment than the DOE's suggestions. The master program thus remains both the law of the city and of the state. With the adoption of strict conditional use criteria, DuPont adopted one of the strongest shorelines master programs in the state. It may be inferred that such strict conditional use criteria were adopted due to the statewide significance of the Nisqually Delta and the nature of adjoining shorelines. At the outset, it is important to note that, without the application of the Board's reasonableness standard, the Board would find the development inconsistent with the conditional use criteria. Consider the Board's decision relating to the four conditional use criteria. First, regarding the question of adverse impacts on the environment, the Board admits that there are adverse effects on the Sequalitchew Creek and on the Nisqually Delta which arise from this proposal. There is no serious argument on this score: the FEIS concludes that there will be a variety of impacts on the environment resulting from the Weyerhaeuser proposal. Some of these are concluded to be moderate to severe, including such matters as aesthetics, light and glare, erosion and noise. Secondly, the Board does find interference with public use of the shorelines, including public use of the shorelines in the vicinity of the proposed dock, the dock access causeway and the access road. Clerk's Papers, at 22. Such interference is obvious: the proposed dock, particularly when large, oceangoing ships are present, will prevent the public from using the water and land areas in and around the dock. Similarly, the construction of a road along Sequalitchew Creek to the dock will obviously interfere with shoreline use. Thirdly, the Board admits that the design of the site is aesthetically incompatible with the surroundings. The Board said: Aesthetics presently associated with the Nisqually Delta would be compromised by the activity at the proposed dock. Aesthetic losses and disturbing activity in the waters of Nisqually Reach would tend to move the delta away from its relatively natural condition. Clerk's Papers, at 35. Again, the Board's conclusion is correct: the dock would be 120 feet wide and 1,555 feet in length (more than a quarter mile) in an area where the only commercial shoreline use is a small, largely unused dock. The Shorelines Hearings Board conceded that the conditional use criteria language is unambiguous and the majority does not disagree. There is no basis for judicial or administrative interpretation of unambiguous language. The general rule as set forth in 2A C. Sands, Statutory Construction § 45.02 (4th ed. 1973) is as follows: A rule of statutory interpretation which is frequently encountered asserts that a statute which is clear and unambiguous on its face need not and cannot be interpreted by a court and that only those statutes which are of doubtful meaning are subject to the process of statutory interpretation. As declared in a leading case: Where the language is plain and admits of no more than one meaning the duty of interpretation does not arise and the rules which are to aid doubtful meanings need no discussion. (Footnote omitted.) A similar statement is made at section 46.01 as follows: There is no safer nor better settled canon of interpretation than that when language is clear and unambiguous it must be held to mean what it plainly expresses. The same rule is true in the state of Washington: when the language of a statute or ordinance is clear and unambiguous, there can be only one meaning and there is no room for statutory interpretation. See Tacoma Telco Fed. Credit Union v. Edwards, 94 Wn.2d 666, 619 P.2d 363 (1980); In re Lehman, 93 Wn.2d 25, 604 P.2d 948 (1980); McCarver v. Manson Park & Rec. Dist., 92 Wn.2d 370, 597 P.2d 1362 (1979); Thompson v. Lewis Cy., 92 Wn.2d 204, 595 P.2d 541 (1979); Hatfield v. Greco, 87 Wn.2d 780, 557 P.2d 340 (1976). Despite the clear language of the conditional use criteria, the majority holds that the Shorelines Hearings Board acted properly in applying a reasonableness standard as that applicable to Department of Ecology guidelines. The majority's acquiescence in this interpretation placed words back into the statute which had been deliberately and specifically taken out. The majority finds that a literal interpretation of the no-adverse-effects language would end any development of the DuPont shoreline, and defeat the overall purpose of the shorelines master program. The majority reasons that strict application of the criteria would mean that nothing would be permitted to be located on the DuPont shoreline, even the most minor uses. This proposition is, of course, hypothetical and contrary to the present facts. The Weyerhaeuser project is a massive undertaking: the dock is as long as 3 1/2 football fields and has the potential for nearly continuous loading activity from a ship or ships aggregating 1,300 feet or more in length. Indeed, the environmental impact statement for the project identifies serious and substantial environmental effects which will result from the Weyerhaeuser project. Aside from the hypothetical nature of the majority's argument, there is no support in the record for the proposition that nothing can be built on this shoreline if the conditional use criteria are applied. For the majority to rule that these provisions somehow result in absurd results is to say that citizen committees and local governments cannot adopt stringent programs to protect the environment. That certainly cannot be the case under the terms of the Shoreline Management Act of 1971. Here, a previous city council chose, on recommendations of a citizens advisory committee, to adopt strong protections for its shorelines. To those concerned with the protection of the Nisqually Delta, this was a considerable victory. However, now the same City (but a different city council) simply ignores what it has written into law and adopts a new standard, all because a certain project has arisen. Merely because Weyerhaeuser now has ownership of 3,200 acres of the approximately 3,300 acres comprising the city of DuPont does not permit the City to ignore the plain language of its own ordinances in order to accommodate the desires of Weyerhaeuser. This is ad hoc decisionmaking, ignoring and contradicting the terms of an adopted local ordinance and approved state regulations. The majority adopts a rule which allows local government to emasculate its own laws by circumvention. Contrary to the position of the majority, the goals and policies of the DuPont master program support the restrictive conditions of the conditional use criteria. All the policy statements refer specifically to the preservation and enhancement of natural environment and elimination of shoreline pollution. This, combined with the general goal to develop only consistent with the natural resource values and the city's unique aesthetic qualities offered by water, topography, views, and maritime character, indicates that the conditional use criteria are an extension of, not a deviation from, the general goals and policies. It is true that the Shoreline Management Act of 1971, RCW 90.58, does not purport to prohibit all development on the state's shorelines. But the act, as may be seen from its policies section (RCW 90.58.020), does evidence a strong bias toward a preservation and protection of natural shoreline qualities. Thus, it may be that the act, shorelines master programs or administrative determinations may prohibit certain uses. It is indeed inherent in any program of control of land uses that from time to time certain uses may be prohibited. Hayes v. Yount, 87 Wn.2d 280, 552 P.2d 1038 (1976) (affirmation of Shorelines Hearings Board's denial of a permit for a shoreline sanitary landfill). That this particular proposal may be prohibited does not warrant an interpretation of DuPont's shorelines master program which clearly is in contravention of its intent and meaning.