Opinion ID: 71212
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Does the Injunction Authorize Arrest Without Probable Cause?

Text: 38 McKusick argues that the injunction authorizes arrests without probable cause because it states that [l]aw enforcement authorities, pursuant to the protective provisions of the court's order, are authorized to arrest those persons who appear to be in willful and intentional disobedience of the injunction. McKusick reasons that this language authorizes arrest on less than a reasonable ground to believe that a person is a named party or acting in concert with a named party. The City argues that McKusick has again misinterpreted the injunction because the enforcement provision, like every other part of the injunction, is subject to the injunction's limiting language that applies its proscriptions only to named parties and those acting in concert with named parties. 39 As we have already held, the injunction applies only to named parties and those acting in concert with them. By its plain words, the injunction only authorizes arrest for those who appear to be in willful disobedience of it. It follows that the injunction only authorizes the arrest of named parties, or those acting in concert with them, who appear to be acting in willful disobedience of the injunction. McKusick seizes upon the word appear in the injunction's enforcement provision, and contends that appear is less than probable cause to believe. We do not know why it should be interpreted in such a fashion, even in the abstract. Moreover, the word appear is but one word in the phrase appear to be in willful and intentional disobedience of the injunction. In context, the enforcement provision authorizes arrest of persons who, because of their own objective manifestations and because of other factors that may be relevant to a particular factual scenario, reasonably appear to be--i.e., give the police probable cause to believe that they are--named parties to the injunction or acting in concert with named parties, and engaged in actions in violation of the injunction. True enough, the injunction does not use the words probable cause or attempt to describe what factors will suffice for a showing of probable cause. However, no principle of law requires that injunctions use magic words or provide hornbook expositions on probable cause. Nor does any principle of law mandate that we interpret an injunction in a way that would undermine its validity. McKusick's facial challenge to the injunction is without merit. We turn now to her as-applied challenge, and to her claim that she is entitled to federal injunctive relief on that basis. 40