Opinion ID: 1360039
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Defendant Johnston's Sentence Was Properly Increased by Three Years Because of His Prior Prison Term for Robbery With Use of a Firearm.

Text: Penal Code section 667.5 provides for the enhancement of prison terms because of prior terms. It reads in relevant part: Enhancement of prison terms for new offenses because of prior prison terms shall be imposed as follows: (a) Where one of the new offenses is one of the violent felonies specified in subdivision (c), ... the court shall impose a three-year term for each prior separate prison term served by the defendant where the prior was one of the violent felonies specified in subdivision (c); ... (b) Except where subdivision (a) applies, ... the court shall impose a one-year term.... (c) For the purpose of this section `violent felony' shall mean any of the following: (1) Murder or voluntary manslaughter. (2) Mayhem. (3) Rape as defined in ... subdivision (2) ... of section 261. (4) Sodomy by force, violence, duress, menace, or threat of great bodily harm. (5) Oral copulation by force, violence, duress, menace, or threat of great bodily harm. (6) Lewd acts on a child under 14 as defined in Section 288. (7) Any felony punishable by death or imprisonment in the state prison for life. (8) Any other felony in which the defendant inflicts great bodily injury on any person other than accomplice ... or any felony in which the defendant uses a firearm which use has been charged and proved as provided in Section 12022.5. (Italics added.) (7a) In 1971, Johnston was convicted of robbery with the use of a firearm and served a prison sentence for that offense. Robbery is not among the crimes specifically named in subdivision (c) of section 667.5, but the firearm use brings Johnston's conviction within the language of subpart (8)  any felony in which the defendant uses a firearm which use has been charged and proved as provided in Section 12022.5. The trial court accordingly enhanced Johnston's sentence by three years. Johnston argues that under People v. Harvey, supra, 25 Cal.3d 754 and People v. Davis (1980) 103 Cal. App.3d 270 [163 Cal. Rptr. 22], robbery or other felonies not specifically named in subparts (1) through (7) of subdivision (c) cannot be used to support a three-year enhancement. In People v. Harvey, supra, 25 Cal.3d 754, we considered the enhancement of a subordinate term for firearm use, a matter governed by section 1170.1. That section provided that the subordinate term for a consecutive offense shall exclude any enhancement for firearm use when the consecutive offense is not listed in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5, but shall include one-third of any enhancement ... when the consecutive offense is listed in subdivision (c).... Reading this language in conjunction with section 667.5, section 1170.1 appeared to permit enhancement of subordinate terms for firearm use only for felonies listed in subdivision (c), and not otherwise, yet subdivision (c) includes all felonies in which a firearm is used. Thus a literal reading of the two sections would have rendered meaningless section 1170.1's distinction between cases in which enhancement of a subordinate term for firearm use is proper and those in which it is not. Such a reading would also render redundant section 1170.1's language referring to the felonies described in section 667.5. We therefore concluded in Harvey that section 1170.1 permits enhancement of a subordinate term only if the enhancing conduct (use of a gun, or infliction of great bodily injury) occurred during the commission of a felony specifically listed in subdivision (c). [4] Harvey did not discuss enhancements based on a prior prison term. The Court of Appeal in People v. Davis, supra, 103 Cal. App.3d 270, however, reasoned that [t]he determination in Harvey that a robbery with use of a firearm is not a violent felony under section 1170.1, subdivision (a) governs our analysis of the section before us  667.5, subdivision (a). Following Harvey, it would be equally anomalous to hold an armed robbery is a violent felony only where it is alleged as a prior, but not where it is used to increase the subordinate term under section 1170.1, subdivision (a). Implicitly, the Harvey court held that the legislative intent of the provision (§ 1170.1, subd. (a)) prohibited the dual use of a section 12022.5 finding. ( Id., at pp. 278-279.) Subsequent to Davis, however, we took another look at the question of enhancements under sections 667.5 and 1170.1. People v. Hernandez (1981) 30 Cal.3d 462 [179 Cal. Rptr. 239, 637 P.2d 706] involved a portion of section 1170.1 not considered in Harvey which placed a five-year maximum on the total of subordinate terms for offenses not listed in section 667.5, subdivision (c). The question before us was whether the trial court could impose a total of subordinate terms exceeding five years for various counts of robbery and assault with firearm use. Our decision noted that the rationale of Harvey, the avoidance of the linguistic anomaly, does not apply to the limitation on the total of subordinate terms. There is no inconsistency or redundancy in interpreting section 1170.1 to permit unlimited subordinate terms for the enumerated crimes in subdivision (c) of section 667.5 as well as for `any other felony' where great bodily injury was inflicted or in which a firearm was used.... [T]he use of the statutory definition in section 667.5 to permit unlimited total subordinate terms for consecutive offenses is entirely harmonious with the related provisions. We see no reason not to abide by the clear letter of the statute and the legislative intent manifested by the incorporation of the statutory definition of `violent felony.' (Pp. 466-467.) In short, Hernandez refused to extend Harvey beyond that limited area in which a literal reading of sections 667.5 and 1170.1 results in inconsistency and redundancy; when a straightforward construction of the statutory language yields a clear and harmonious result, the court should follow that construction. We believe that the reasoning of Hernandez, not that of Harvey, controls the present case. (Two recent Court of Appeal opinions, People v. Flowers (1982) 132 Cal. App.3d 584 [183 Cal. Rptr. 276] and In re Hall (1982) 132 Cal. App.3d 525 [183 Cal. Rptr. 560], reach the same conclusion.) This case does not involve section 1170.1; we are concerned solely with the interpretation of section 667.5. Taking that section on its face, no inconsistency or anomaly arises from permitting the imposition of a three-year enhancement for prior prison terms for all violent felonies as defined in that section, that is, the specified felonies plus any others involving infliction of great bodily injury or use of a firearm. ( In re Hall, supra, 132 Cal. App.3d 525, 531.) A contrary interpretation, on the other hand, would essentially nullify subpart (8), giving no effect to the legislative intent to punish more severely when the prior term involved a felony with great bodily injury or firearm use. (See People v. Flowers, supra, 132 Cal. App.3d 584, 592-593.) Defendant argues of course that it is inconsistent to treat robbery with a firearm use as a violent felony for purpose of enhancement for a prior prison term but not for purpose of enhancement of subordinate terms. (8) (See fn. 5.) In Hernandez, however, we decided that it is better to interpret the term violent felony differently in different contexts than to let the Harvey interpretation of that phrase  an interpretation devised to correct a particular linguistic anomaly in the interplay of sections 667.5 and 1170.1  control in cases where it would defeat the clear meaning and purpose of the statute. [5] (7b) Adopting the Hernandez analysis in the present case, we conclude that the trial court correctly found that robbery with a firearm use was a violent felony under section 667.5, and imposed a three-year enhancement. [6]