Opinion ID: 888582
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Rosling's Evidentiary Claim

Text: ¶68 In sentencing Rosling to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, the District Court explained in open court that this is a brutal and horrific offense. I think everybody here agrees with that. And I also feel this is necessary to protect society, because there has been no evidence presented to me, and I know of none, that there is any treatment program known to man that would cure whatever it is that caused this horrific crime. Likewise, as noted above, the court stated in its written judgment: The Court finds that the defendant should be ineligible for parole, in that this was one of the most brutal and horrific crimes ever seen by this Court. Because of the nature of the offenses, the Court does not believe that the defendant can ever be rehabilitated, and he poses a serious risk to society. ¶69 Based on the foregoing, Rosling argues that the lack of prospects for his rehabilitation was the primary basis for imposing the parole-eligibility restriction on his sentence. But, he contends, the evidence before the District Court did not support the court's determination that he cannot be rehabilitated. Thus, Rosling asserts that there is no basis for the parole-eligibility restriction on his sentence. We disagree. ¶70 Sentencing judges have broad discretion to impose parole-eligibility restrictions on sentences that exceed a one-year term of imprisonment. See Garrymore, ¶ 27. However, if a parole-eligibility restriction is imposed, the sentencing judge is required to state the reasons for it in writing. See § 46-18-202(2), MCA (If the restriction is to be imposed, the sentencing judge shall state the reasons for it in writing. (emphasis added)). Furthermore, a convicted criminal defendant has a due process right to be sentenced based on correct information. State v. Harper, 2006 MT 259, ¶ 18, 334 Mont. 138, ¶ 18, 144 P.3d 826, ¶ 18; State v. Mason, 2003 MT 371, ¶ 21, 319 Mont. 117, ¶ 21, 82 P.3d 903, ¶ 21. Thus, a parole-eligibility restriction that is not accompanied by written reasons or that is based on materially false information is illegal. ¶71 Here, however, Rosling provides nothing more than a conclusory assertion that the District Court's cannot-be-rehabilitated determination is incorrect or not supported by the evidence. There was testimony at the sentencing hearing, from the probation officer who prepared the presentence investigation report and from the mitigation specialist, to the effect that the counseling and treatment Rosling received for emotional and chemical-dependency issues at various points in his childhood and adolescent years were ineffective. Furthermore, at the outset of pronouncing sentence, the judge noted that while Rosling maintained his innocence, the jury had found him guilty of one of the most brutal and horrific offenses I have seen, and we agree that the nature and surrounding circumstances of the offense inform the question of the defendant's prospects for rehabilitation. ¶72 Moreover, even if the primary basis for imposing the parole-eligibility restriction was, as Rosling claims, the lack of prospects for rehabilitation, it was not the only basis. It is appropriate for a sentencing court to consider any evidence relevant to a defendant's sentence, including evidence relating to the crime, the defendant's character, background history, mental and physical condition, and any other evidence the court considers to have probative force. State v. Shreves, 2002 MT 333, ¶ 13, 313 Mont. 252, ¶ 13, 60 P.3d 991, ¶ 13. Here, the sentencing judge heard all of the evidence presented at trial concerning Rosling's actions. Further information about Rosling's character, social history, mental health history, family history, and employment history was presented at the sentencing hearing through the reports and testimony of the probation officer and the mitigation specialist, as well as the testimony of Hazlitt (Rosling's girlfriend) and Rosling's mother. It was only after consideration of all of this information that the judge imposed the parole-eligibility restriction. Again, the judge stated that this was one of the most brutal and horrific crimes he had ever seen. In this regard, Rosling acknowledges that the heinous nature of the crime is sufficient reason for imposing a parole-eligibility restriction. See State v. Christianson, 1999 MT 156, ¶¶ 36-39, 295 Mont. 100, ¶¶ 36-39, 983 P.2d 909, ¶¶ 36-39. ¶73 This Court has never set forth a litmus test that must be met before a parole-eligibility restriction may be imposed; rather, we have left that decision to the sentencing court's discretion based on all of the relevant facts. See Christianson, ¶ 38. We hold that the written reasons provided by the District Court were sufficient, on the record before us, to impose the parole-eligibility restriction and that the restriction, therefore, is not illegal based on Rosling's evidentiary claim. ¶74 Issue 3. Is Rosling's sentence illegal because the prosecutor referred to a swastika tattoo on Rosling's back during the sentencing hearing? ¶75 Rosling claims that the State violated his rights to freedom of speech and freedom of association under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Sections 4 and 7 of the Montana Constitution when the prosecutor made the following argument during the sentencing hearing: Keep in mind that this defendant at some point made a deliberate choice to put a swastika on his back with the SS lightening [sic] strikes on it. What does that tell you about the nature of the individual before us? ¶76 Rosling, however, did not object to these remarks. It is well-established that on direct appeal, the appellant is limited to those issues that were properly preserved in the district court and to allegations that his or her sentence is illegal. State v. McLeod, 2002 MT 348, ¶ 12, 313 Mont. 358, ¶ 12, 61 P.3d 126, ¶ 12; State v. Southwick, 2007 MT 257, ¶¶ 21-23, 339 Mont. 281, ¶¶ 21-23, 169 P.3d 698, ¶¶ 21-23. Thus, because Rosling failed to preserve this issue by timely objecting to the prosecutor's remarks, and because he has not raised a plausible allegation that his sentence is illegal due to the remarks, the issue is not properly before us. ¶77 Apparently recognizing this fact, Rosling asserts that we should address the issue under our common-law doctrine of plain error review. This Court may discretionarily review a claimed error that implicates a criminal defendant's fundamental constitutional rightseven if a timely objection was not made in the trial court, and notwithstanding the inapplicability of the criteria set forth in § 46-20-701(2), MCAwhere failing to review the claimed error may result in a manifest miscarriage of justice, may leave unsettled the question of the fundamental fairness of the trial or proceedings, or may compromise the integrity of the judicial process. State v. Finley, 276 Mont. 126, 137, 915 P.2d 208, 215 (1996), overruled in part on other grounds, State v. Gallagher, 2001 MT 39, ¶ 21, 304 Mont. 215, ¶ 21, 19 P.3d 817, ¶ 21. We use our inherent power of common law plain error review sparingly, on a case-by-case basis, and only in the aforementioned circumstances. Finley, 276 Mont. at 138, 915 P.2d at 215; State v. Daniels, 2003 MT 247, ¶ 20, 317 Mont. 331, ¶ 20, 77 P.3d 224, ¶ 20. ¶78 We conclude that Rosling's claim with respect to the prosecutor's remarks is not appropriate for plain error review. Not every inadvisable comment made by a prosecutor during a sentencing hearing results in a manifest miscarriage of justice, leaves unsettled the question of the fundamental fairness of the proceeding, or compromises the integrity of the judicial process. This is particularly true here, given that there is no indication in the record that the District Court took the prosecutor's remarks into consideration in fashioning Rosling's sentence. Because the record does not support invoking plain error review, we will not consider this issue further.