Opinion ID: 2976339
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Victim’s Mental Capacity

Text: Under Michigan law, a person is “mentally incapable” where the person “suffers from a mental disease or defect that renders that person temporarily or permanently incapable of appraising the nature of his or her conduct.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520a(i). In People v. Breck, 584 N.W.2d 602 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988), the Michigan Court of Appeals noted that “the rationale behind the statutes prohibiting sexual relations with a mentally incapable person is that such a person is presumed to be incapable of truly consenting to the sexual act.” Id. at 605. Based on the rationale of the statute, the Breck court rejected a defendant’s assertion that the statute was intended to reach only those mental disabilities which impact a person’s ability to “understand the physical nature of the act.” Id. at 603. Instead, the court read the term “mentally incapable” to include “not only an understanding of the physical act but also an appreciation of the nonphysical factors, including the moral quality of the act, that accompany such an act.” Id. Applying this definition, the Breck court found that the victim was “mentally incapable” based on the fact that the victim was unable to understand the “long-term ramifications of safe sex” or “the nature of a romantic relationship.” Id. at 605. Moreover, the victim was deemed to be mentally incapable because of testimony from a psychologist indicating that the victim “was a trusting individual who would quickly make a person his friend and do anything that person asked him to do.” Id. The psychologist also testified that the victim was “unable to make personality or character judgments.” Id. Taken together, the court found that the evidence established that the victim was mentally incapable of “appraising the nature of his conduct.” Id. 10 No. 07-1202 Similarly, in People v. Cox, 709 N.W.2d 152 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005), the defendant appealed a conviction for third degree criminal sexual conduct, alleging that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that the victim was mentally incapable. There, the defendant engaged in oral sex with a seventeen year-old victim who was alleged to be mentally incapable. During the defendant’s trial, the victim testified regarding the sex acts between him and the defendant, stating “I just wanted to try something new and so he asked me if I wanted to, and I said yeah, so we went on.” Id. at 156. Various caseworkers and psychologists testified that the victim was unable to live on his own, was easily manipulated and functioned at a “‘borderline’ range of intelligence.” Id. In the opinion of these experts, the victim was “developmentally around the age of eleven, twelve or thirteen.” Id. One expert further testified that, although the victim was “aware of his conduct,” he could not appreciate the significance of a sexual relationship with the defendant. Id. at 157. Based on this evidence, the Michigan Court of Appeals found that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that the victim was “mentally incapable” within the meaning of the third degree criminal sexual conduct statute. Id. In the instant case, which is like Breck and Cox, the Michigan Court of Appeals was not unreasonable in determining that there was ample evidence from which a rational trier of fact could find that Steven was mentally incapable beyond a reasonable doubt. Like the victim in Cox, there was evidence produced at trial regarding Steven’s cognitive disabilities. For instance, Steven’s mother testified that Steven was in special education classes until age 26 because of his developmental disabilities. While in school, Steven was classified as “trainable mentally impaired,” 11 No. 07-1202 which corresponds to an IQ of 45 to 55. (J.A. at 50) Steven’s mother also testified that his ability to reason and make decisions is equivalent to that of a six- to eight-year-old child. Additionally, as in Breck, the jury heard testimony from Steven’s mother regarding his dependency on others to meet his basic needs, as she testified that “he would never be completely on his own in society.” (Id.) Indeed, although Steven maintained a job at Arby’s, it was obtained through a Michigan Rehabilitation Services program that matches a job coach with individuals with a mental disability to teach basic job skills and functions. Steven’s mother further testified regarding his need of supervision because he is “too trusting of others,” and “always trying to please people.” (Id.) Moreover, the jury heard testimony regarding Steven’s limited knowledge regarding reproductive matters. During the trial, the prosecution offered evidence in the form of testimony that Steven’s knowledge of sex prior to his encounter with Mueller was equivalent to what a young child would know, and that Steven had not asked his parents many sex-related questions. This assessment was further bolstered by the testimony of Jay McCrae of the Saginaw County Community Mental Health Authority, who evaluated Steven after the alleged sexual abuse. According to McCrae, Steven’s awareness of sex-related issues is likely “on the level of a five- to seven-year-old child. It’s very elementary – his awareness is very elementary of some of those concepts.” (J.A. at 59) Mueller, however, argues that the evidence adduced at trial demonstrates that Steven had an awareness of sex prior to the alleged abuse such that he could appreciate both the physical act and the non-physical factors. To support this assertion, Muller points to three pieces of evidence: (1) a diagnosis by a staff member at the Community Mental Health Authority that Steven had a “history 12 No. 07-1202 of sexual preoccupation;” (2) testimony that Steven told his mother that he watched “Oprah and the news” rather than pornographic materials while at Mueller’s home; and (3) testimony that Steven wanted to see the pornographic materials obtained by Mueller. Mueller’s arguments regarding Steven’s ability to appreciate the nature and consequences of his sexual activity, however, are unavailing when placed in the context of the totality of the evidence presented to the jury. First, the evidence suggesting that Steven had a “history of sexual preoccupation” was disputed at trial and was not corroborated by McCrae. Second, while Steven did testify that he lied to his mother regarding his viewing of pornographic materials, Mueller neglects to note that the jury heard evidence that Steven was instructed not to tell his parents about what occurred. Additionally, as Cox demonstrates, the mere fact that a victim may have wanted an act to occur, does not mean that the victim could consent to or understand the significance of a particular act. Importantly, while the jury could have inferred that Steven was aware of the moral quality of his act based on the evidence cited by Mueller, it was not compelled to do so. As noted above, the jury was presented with significant evidence regarding Steven’s limited cognitive abilities as well as some evidence regarding Steven’s ability to consent to the sexual activity that took place. After evaluating the evidence, it appears that the jury discounted evidence of Steven’s ability to consent based on its verdict. Indeed, under Jackson “a federal habeas corpus court faced with a record of historical facts that support conflicting inferences must presume—even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record—that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.” 443 U.S. at 326. Thus, the district court properly concluded that 13 No. 07-1202 the Michigan Courts did not unreasonably apply federal law in holding that there was adequate evidence to support a finding that Steven was “mentally incapable.”