Opinion ID: 171258
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Allegedly irrelevant and prejudicial evidence

Text: Lastly, Schene challenges the district court's decision to admit Exhibits 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 14. He argues that, given his willingness to stipulate that the images were child pornography, any images were irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial under Rules 402 and 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Schene also contends that Exhibits 8, 9, and 14i.e., the exhibits containing images not linked to a specific count in the indictmentwere admitted in violation of Rule 404(b), as was the Real Player history in Exhibit 6. [7] Our review of the district court's decision to admit evidence is for an abuse of discretion. Chisum, 502 F.3d at 1241. Under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, otherwise relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Fed.R.Evid. 403. In addition, Rule 404(b) provides: Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts ... [may be] admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial. Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). Evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b) if the following factors are satisfied: (1) the evidence must be offered for a proper purpose; (2) it must be relevant; (3) its probative value must not be substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice under Rule 403; and (4) the court must give a proper limiting instruction, if it is requested by the defendant. United States v. Moran, 503 F.3d at 1135, 1143-44 (10th Cir.2007) (citing Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691-92, 108 S.Ct. 1496, 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988)). The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the exhibits that Schene challenges on appeal. In United States v. Campos, 221 F.3d 1143, 1148 (10th Cir.2000), we rejected a defendant's argument that, under Rule 403, and in light of his offer to stipulate that those images constituted child pornography, there was no reason to show them to the jury and to do so was unduly prejudicial. We explained that, in contrast to the evidence at issue in Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997), the offer to stipulate in Campos involved the gist of the government's current case against [the defendant]the two pornographic images that he allegedly transported via computer. Campos, 221 F.3d at 1149. Likewise, in the instant case, the images charged in the indictmentand admitted as evidence in Exhibits 5, 7, 10, 11, and 13were the gist of the government's current case against Schene. The government was entitled to prove its case, and given the charges against Schene, those images were not unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403. See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 186-87, 117 S.Ct. 644 (explaining that it is unquestionably true as a general matter, that the prosecution is entitled to prove its case by evidence of its own choice, or, more exactly, that a criminal defendant may not stipulate or admit his way out of the full evidentiary force of the case as the Government chooses to present it). [8] The uncharged images in Exhibits 8, 9, and 14 are a closer call, but the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting them into evidence. Exhibits 8 and 9 were emails containing images of child pornography, sent from outdoorguy to butwhoishe within minutes of other emails from butwhoishe to outdoorguy. Exhibit 14 was an email containing seventy-six images of child pornography that outdoorguy sent to himself. The government introduced these emails to show intent and knowledge under Rule 404(b), and the district court gave a limiting instruction on the matter. See Tr. at 88 (Ladies and gentlemen, to the extent that this evidence relates to anything other than the specific files that are charged in the indictment, I would instruct you that it's to be considered only as it bears on the defendant's knowledge or intent, and you should consider it only for that limited purpose.). Under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B), the government had to prove that Schene knowingly possess[ed] the images of child pornography, and the district court did not abuse its discretion under Rules 403 and 404(b) in admitting these uncharged images for this limited purpose. See United States v. Simpson, 152 F.3d 1241, 1249 (10th Cir.1998) (affirming the district court's decision to admit similar evidence to prove that (1) [the defendant's] possession of child pornography on his computer was not a mistake or accident, and (2) he had knowledge of the nature of the material he was receiving). Likewise, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Exhibit 6 into evidence. Exhibit 6the Real Player history pertaining to the video charged in Count 1was introduced to show knowledge and intent, and the district court gave a limiting instruction on the matter. See Tr. at 84 (explaining that the evidence comes in only as it bears or as it suggests intent or knowledge on behalf of the defendant, and you should consider it only for that limited purpose). Exhibit 6 was not unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403. It was a limited segment of the much broader Real Player history, and it pertained directly to Schene's knowing and intentional playing of the video charged in Count 1. The district court did not abuse its discretion. [9] AFFIRMED.