Opinion ID: 891650
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether New Mexico Courts Should Apply the Linkletter or the Teague Standard of Retroactivity

Text: {22} In Linkletter, the United States Supreme Court considered whether its opinion in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), which held that the exclusion of evidence seized in violation of the search and seizure provisions of the Fourth Amendment was required of the States by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, applied retroactively to habeas corpus proceedings. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 619, 85 S.Ct. 1731. The Court held that retroactive application must be determined on a case by case basis by looking at three issues: the purpose of the new rule, the reliance placed upon the old rule, and the effect upon the administration of justice that retroactive application would have. Santillanes, 115 N.M. at 224, 849 P.2d at 367 (citing Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 636, 85 S.Ct. 1731). In Linkletter, the Court noted that the purpose of the exclusionary rule was to deter lawless police action and that this purpose would [not] be advanced by making the rule retrospective. 381 U.S. at 637, 85 S.Ct. 1731. Additionally, the Court determined that the States reasonably had relied upon the prior rule and that retroactive application of the new rule in Mapp would tax the administration of justice to the utmost. Id. Thus, the Court held that its opinion in Mapp was not subject to retroactive application. Id. {23} Twenty-four years later, in Teague, the Court decided that its approach to retroactivity for cases on collateral review require[d] modification, because the  Linkletter retroactivity standard has not led to consistent results. 489 U.S. at 301, 302, 109 S.Ct. 1060. After examining the nature of habeas corpus, the Court held that new rules generally should not be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review. Id. at 305-06, 308, 109 S.Ct. 1060. The Court reasoned that Habeas corpus always has been a collateral remedy, providing an avenue for upsetting judgments that have become otherwise final. It is not designed as a substitute for direct review. The interest in leaving concluded litigation in a state of repose, that is, reducing the controversy to a final judgment not subject to further revision, may quite legitimately be found by those responsible for defining the scope of the writ to outweigh in some, many, or most instances the competing interest in readjudicating convictions according to all legal standards in effect when a habeas petition is filed. Id. at 306, 109 S.Ct. 1060 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 682-83, 91 S.Ct. 1160, 28 L.Ed.2d 404 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). Given the broad scope of constitutional issues cognizable on habeas, the Court concluded that it is `sounder, in adjudicating habeas petitions, generally to apply the law prevailing at the time a conviction became final than it is to seek to dispose of [habeas] cases on the basis of intervening changes in constitutional interpretation.' Id. (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 689, 91 S.Ct. 1160 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). {24} The Court recognized only two exceptions to the general rule of nonretroactivity for cases on collateral review. The first exception permits the retroactive application of a new rule if [the rule] places certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe, id. at 311, 109 S.Ct. 1060 (internal quotations marks and citation omitted), or addresses a substantive categorical guarante[e] accorded by the Constitution, such as a rule prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense, Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 477, 113 S.Ct. 892, 122 L.Ed.2d 260 (1993) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Such substantive rules apply retroactively because they necessarily carry a significant risk that a defendant stands convicted of an act that the law does not make criminal or faces a punishment that the law cannot impose upon him. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352, 124 S.Ct. 2519, 159 L.Ed.2d 442 (2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The second exception permits the retroactive application of a new rule if the rule announces a watershed rule[ ] of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding. Graham, 506 U.S. at 478, 113 S.Ct. 892 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). That a new procedural rule is `fundamental' in some abstract sense is not enough; the rule must be one without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished. Schriro, 542 U.S. at 352, 124 S.Ct. 2519 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). {25} We agree with the United States Supreme Court that the Linkletter standard fails to yield consistent results, and that the Teague standard, which focuses on the function and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus, is the proper standard by which to determine whether new rules should apply retroactively to habeas corpus proceedings. Accordingly, pursuant to Teague and its progeny, we conclude that new rules generally should not be afforded retroactive effect unless (1) the rule is substantive in nature, in that it alters the range of conduct or the class of persons that the law punishes, Frawley, 2007-NMSC-057, ¶ 39, 143 N.M. 7, 172 P.3d 144 (quoting Schriro, 542 U.S. at 353, 124 S.Ct. 2519), or (2) although procedural in nature, the rule announces a watershed rule of criminal procedure, id. ¶ 42 (The watershed exception is extremely narrow; since Teague, the Supreme Court has rejected every claim that a new rule satisfied the requirements for watershed status. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). {26} Petitioner urges this Court to adopt a more liberal standard of retroactivity under the due process clause of the New Mexico Constitution, arguing that this is a state habeas proceeding, rather than federal, and the overriding concern of state courts is error correction rather than the more vague concepts of `federalism.' We disagree. The purpose of the writ of habeas corpus in the state and federal system essentially is the same, namely, to protect a person from being erroneously deprived of his or her rights. Campos v. Bravo, 2007-NMSC-021, ¶ 5, 141 N.M. 801, 161 P.3d 846; see also Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290-91, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 22 L.Ed.2d 281 (1969) (The writ of habeas corpus is the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action.). However, this purpose must be balanced against the government's `interest in the finality of a conviction once it has accorded an accused all of the constitutional rights required by law.' Montoya v. Ulibarri, 2007-NMSC-035, ¶ 29, 142 N.M. 89, 163 P.3d 476 (quoting People v. Cole, 1 Misc.3d 531, 765 N.Y.S.2d 477, 486 (N.Y.Sup.2003)). We conclude that the Teague standard appropriately balances both the purpose of the writ and the government's interest in finality by applying the law prevailing at the time a conviction became final and refusing, except in limited circumstances, to dispose of [habeas] cases on the basis of intervening changes in constitutional interpretation. Teague, 489 U.S. at 306, 109 S.Ct. 1060 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, we reject Petitioner's claim.