Opinion ID: 220788
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Equitable Tolling Analysis

Text: Our Court has not yet addressed whether a language deficiency may constitute an extraordinary circumstance for the purposes of equitable tolling. We find it persuasive that the Second and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals have both determined that equitable tolling might be warranted when a non-English speaking petitioner could not comply with AEDPA's statute of limitations because the prison did not provide access to AEDPA-related materials, translation, or legal assistance in his or her language. In Mendoza, the petitioner asserted that he did not speak English and that the prison law library possessed no Spanish books, no Spanish-English legal dictionaries, and no postings about the AEDPA time limitations in any language. 449 F.3d at 1067. The Ninth Circuit held that the combination of (1) a prison law library's lack of Spanish-language legal materials, and (2) a petitioner's inability to obtain translation assistance before the one-year deadline, could constitute extraordinary circumstances. Id. at 1069. Mendoza's case was remanded for an evidentiary hearing on his equitable tolling claim in light of that holding. Id. at 1071. Pabon has alleged almost identical extraordinary circumstances as the petitioner in Mendoza (indeed, Pabon's are perhaps more extraordinary given his confinement in the RHU). In Mendoza, the petitioner eventually found a newly-arrived, bilingual inmate willing to offer assistance for a fee, and was able to file a habeas petition (though only after the AEDPA deadline had passed). Id. at 1069. Again similar to Mendoza, Pabon eventually received help from an English-speaking inmate in filing his habeas petition, but after the AEDPA deadline. Second, in Diaz, the Second Circuit adopted a similar approach to that used in Mendoza. 515 F.3d at 154 (holding that English language deficiency can warrant tolling of the AEDPA limitations period). The petitioners in Diaz  Angel Diaz and Yoke Yew Tan  had asserted, respectively, being `primarily a Spanish speaker' and having a lack of `a working knowledge' of English and `difficult[y]' in finding interpreters in the Department of Correctional Services. Id. at 151-52 (alterations in original). The Diaz Court noted that the proper inquiry is not how unusual the circumstance alleged to warrant tolling is among the universe of prisoners, as the State had argued (and the Commonwealth urges in Pabon's appeal),  but rather how severe an obstacle it is for the prisoner endeavoring to comply with AEDPA's limitations period. Id. at 154 (emphases added). For the prisoner who cannot read English, the obstacle is undoubtedly serious... and can, in some circumstances, justify equitable tolling. Id. In that case, however, the petitioners failed on the reasonable diligence prong. Neither had made efforts to learn of [AEDPA's] requirements within their places of confinement. Id. As these Circuit Courts did in Mendoza and Diaz, we now hold that inability to read or understand English, combined with denial of access to translation or legal assistance, can constitute extraordinary circumstances that trigger equitable tolling. [22] In addition, as the Diaz Court did, we note that the relevant inquiry is not whether the circumstance alleged to be extraordinary is unique to the petitioner, but how severe an obstacle it creates with respect to meeting AEDPA's one-year deadline. In light of this holding, we conclude that the District Court erred in rejecting Pabon's claim without an evidentiary hearing. First, it erred in concluding that Pabon had not explained why his inability to read, speak, or write English caused his inability to timely file his habeas petition. Pabon explained that there were no Spanish-language legal materials, and there was no notice of AEDPA in Spanish, in the RHU where he was housed for five years. These facts, he argued, coupled with repeated denials of legal or translation assistance from prison officials despite efforts on his part, were extraordinary circumstances that prevented him from timely filing his habeas petition. See Pabon Br. 18-19. He asserted quite clearly that language inability, coupled with denials of assistance, created a barrier to timely filing. The District Court also assumed that Pabon's potential language barrier was negated by his communication with a Spanish-speaking attorney. Op. at 389 n. 1. We disagree, as the evidence currently before us supports the contrary conclusion  that Pabon continued to face a language barrier until his habeas petition was filed, as he had been unable to obtain legal or translation assistance despite continuing efforts. The record also reflects that Pabon required a Spanish-language translator in trial and pre-trial proceedings. A129-130. A Spanish-speaking detective (Detective Perez) testified at trial that he read Pabon his Miranda rights in Spanish, questioned him in Spanish, and asked him (in Spanish) whether he reads, writes, or understands English, to which Pabon answered no. (N.T. 7/30/99: 52-62). [23] In sum, there is substantial evidence in the record that Pabon may have faced an extraordinary circumstance: he has consistently claimed to be a non-English speaker, required a translator in his interactions with police and the court system, lacked access to legal materials or notice of AEDPA in Spanish in the RHU where he was housed for five years, and was repeatedly denied legal materials in Spanish or translation assistance. [24] As the District Court did not hold an evidentiary hearing on this issue, we reverse and remand for it to do so.
Even if a petitioner has faced extraordinary circumstances, he must also exercise[] reasonable diligence in ... bringing [the] claims. Miller, 145 F.3d at 618-619 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court addressed reasonable diligence in Holland, explaining that [t]he diligence required for equitable tolling purposes is `reasonable diligence,'... not `maximum feasible diligence.' 130 S.Ct. at 2565 (internal citations omitted). Our Court has established a similar standard. Due diligence does not require `the maximum feasible diligence;' it does require reasonable diligence in the circumstances. Schlueter v. Varner, 384 F.3d 69, 74 (3d Cir.2004) (internal citations omitted); see also LaCava, 398 F.3d at 277. Here, based on the documents Pabon submitted with his objections to the R & R, we count ten or more efforts where he sought assistance, both before and after the AEDPA deadline. After ascertaining that there were no Spanish-language legal materials in the RHU, Pabon wrote to his PCRA attorney, in Spanish, before October 28, 2004. He wrote a second letter seeking help from that attorney before November 30, 2004. At various times before September 7, 2006, he submitted numerous written requests seeking legal materials or assistance within the prison system. [25] While in the RHU, he submitted a letter to the general population law library, with help from an English-speaking inmate, requesting assistance from the staff paralegal, but was denied assistance on September 19, 2006. On November 6, 2006, Pabon filed an Official Inmate Grievance, with the assistance of inmate José Ortiz, again requesting access to legal services and stating that he does not speak, read, or write in English. [26] That grievance was denied without explanation. [27] All of these efforts occurred before the AEDPA filing deadline of November 6, 2006. Pabon's efforts did not stop there. Before December 22, 2006, he again sought help from an attorney. He submitted a second appeal for access to paralegal services before January 23, 2007. On February 4, 2007, he requested the appointment of an Inmate Legal Reference Aide, but never received a response to his request. Thereafter, he found a bilingual inmate who agreed to help him with his pro se habeas petition. That petition was signed (and, as noted, delivered to prison officials) on September 20, 2007. The District Court's conclusion that Pabon did not demonstrate diligence is based, at least in part, on the assumption that he had a Spanish-speaking attorney. In its Order dismissing Pabon's habeas petition, the Court stated that he has made no attempt to explain why, in light of the fact that he contacted a Spanish speaking attorney, his petition was close to one year late. Op. at 388 n. 1. The record belies that statement. The attorney the Court references seems to be Pabon's post-conviction (PCRA) attorney, who did not speak Spanish. She wrote the following letter to Pabon on October 28, 2004: Dear Mr. Pabon: You have sent a letter to me in Spanish. I do not understand it. If you are asking about your appeal, there will not be a decision on it until some time next year (or longer). You must correspond with me in English in the future if you expect me to comprehend what you are saying. Thank you. Sincerely, Sondra R. Rodrigues, Esq. A-51 (emphases added). [28] Thus, unlike the Diaz petitioners who had made no efforts to communicate with anyone outside of prison or learn of next steps to pursue their legal claims within their places of confinement, 515 F.3d at 154, Pabon attempted to pursue his claims repeatedly. Moreover, within prison he sought access to legal materials in Spanish or translation assistance, but was denied or left without a response each time he did so. Under these circumstances, we hold that Pabon was reasonably diligent. Because we hold that language inability, when coupled with lack of translation assistance, may constitute an extraordinary circumstance, and because Pabon was reasonably diligent in pursuing his claims, we conclude that the District Court erred in dismissing Pabon's equitable tolling claim without considering the evidence he offered. The Commonwealth should also have an opportunity to submit evidence in response. Thus, we remand for an evidentiary hearing on the extraordinary circumstances prong of Pabon's equitable tolling claim.