Opinion ID: 3151132
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dudley's Other Alleged Requests for Counsel

Text: As for Dudley's alleged requests for counsel before and during his interrogation in Agent Fife's SUV, Dudley argues that the district court committed clear error in finding that Dudley never invoked this right. At the suppression hearing, both Agents Fife and Conley testified that Dudley never mentioned an attorney. Agent Fife further testified that Dudley never asked to stop the interview. And while Dudley did testify that he requested a lawyer, he also testified that he understood his rights and was quite protective of them (indeed he testified that he knew to ask to see the search warrant and to use the phrase probable cause when challenging his arrest), but that he nevertheless continued answering the officer's questions after allegedly invoking his right to counsel on three separate occasions. The district court did not find this testimony credible,13 deem[ing] it unlikely that the defendant would have 13Highlighting minor inconsistencies in the agents' testimony (e.g., differences among the agents as to when, or if, Dudley's interview was interrupted by Agent Cote), Dudley argues that it was clear error for the district court to find Dudley's testimony unreliable because his testimony, as opposed to the agents, was comprehensive and unwavering. Dudley also argues that because the agents admittedly did not consider Dudley to be in custody, his asking for an attorney was not perceived as invoking his right to counsel under Miranda and therefore [was] more forgettable to the agents. These arguments go nowhere as the district court explicitly noted a number of these same inconsistencies when making its credibility determinations. For example, the district court noted the discrepancies surrounding Agent Cote's disruption of the interview, but unambiguously credited Agent Fife's testimony while - 16 - proceeded to answer the officers' questions had he invoked his right to an attorney. Rather, the district court found it likely that Dudley chose to continue answering questions because he perceived an advantage, or at least no harm, in doing so. This credibility determination was reasonable and was well within the trial court's purview. As such, we will not second-guess the district court's findings. See United States v. McGregor, 650 F.3d 813, 820 (1st Cir. 2011) (Clear-error review is highly deferential, requiring us to let the judge's fact-sensitive conclusions and credibility calls stand unless we are left with a definite and firm conviction that the judge made a mistake.). The district court's conclusion that Dudley never unambiguously invoked his right to counsel was not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the motion to suppress was properly denied. See Davis, 512 U.S. at 462 (Unless the suspect actually requests an attorney, questioning may continue.).