Opinion ID: 834908
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: trustworthiness and witness credibility

Text: The critical issue on review revolves around what those rules mean by trustworthiness. The state asserts that courts can and should consider the credibility of the witnessesTorres, Rivera, Callahan, and Smithin determining whether the hearsay statements are trustworthy. The state notes that most of those witnesses have prior felony convictions, that they admitted to using methamphetamine during the period at issue (in some cases even being under the influence at the time of the statements), and that each witness had waited for years before disclosing the statements by Scherer to authorities. Furthermore, Scherer testified and denied making the statements. The state asserts that, as a factual matter, the trial court was entitled to conclude that the witnesses were not credible and that Scherer, the declarant, was. We believe, however, that the state's argument misunderstands the nature of the trustworthiness at issue in hearsay cases. The relevant trustworthiness is not that of the witnesses who testify that the statement was made; it refers to whether the statement by the declarant has sufficient indicia of reliability. In considering trustworthiness for purposes of determining whether a hearsay exception applies, the credibility of the relating witnesses the individuals who testify as to what the declarant saidis not the issue. That conclusion follows from the text of the rules themselves. OEC 804(3)(c) refers to the trustworthiness of the statement, while 803(28)(a) applies to a statement    having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. (Emphases added.) The statement is the statement by the declarant, not the testimony of the witness. See OEC 801(2) (defining declarant as a person who makes a statement); OEC 801(3) (defining hearsay as a statement    offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted). Furthermore, this court's case law confirms that a relating witness's credibility is not part of the court's determination of whether a hearsay statement is trustworthy. Both before and after the adoption of the Oregon Evidence Code in 1981, this court explained that the hearsay rule and its exceptions turn on the trustworthiness of the declarant's statement, not the credibility of the witness to the statement. Witness credibility, of course, is always critical. But just as credibility is for the jury to determine when the issue is what the witness saw, so too is credibility for the jury to determine when the issue is what the witness heard. As this court explained in Sheedy, a pre-OEC case: Hearsay evidence is excluded because of its untrustworthiness. The declarant's accuracy and veracity cannot be tested by cross-examination. It is not the untrustworthiness of the testimony of the witness on the stand who is asked to testify to what the declarant said that causes the exclusion of hearsay testimony. The credibility of the witness can be tested by cross-examination. The problem of the trustworthiness of the witness in the courtroom is the same whether the witness is testifying to another's conduct or to another's words. It is the untrustworthiness of the declarant's statement that causes hearsay testimony to be excluded. 255 Or. at 596-97, 468 P.2d 529 (citation omitted). See also State v. Mendez, 308 Or. 9, 18-19, 774 P.2d 1082 (1989) (post-OEC case quoting Sheedy to the same effect). The very nature of hearsay demonstrates that the threshold trustworthiness inquiry made by the court before ruling on admissibility does not depend on the credibility of the testifying witness. Hearsay does not exclude all testimony as to out-of-court statements, but only those statements offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Thus, as long as the declarant's statement is not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, a witness may testify to any out-of-court statement without running afoul of the prohibition against hearsayeven though that witness's credibility remains an issue. See Sheedy, 255 Or. at 597, 468 P.2d 529 (so noting). Perhaps the best illustration of the concept that trial courts should not consider the credibility of the witness in evaluating whether a hearsay statement is trustworthy came in Wright v. Swann, 261 Or. 440, 493 P.2d 148 (1972). The plaintiff, an eight-year-old girl, brought a civil action against the defendant for having struck her with his car while she was in a crosswalk. The defendant asserted that the plaintiff had run into the side of his car. The defendant was allowed to testify that an unidentified bystander had said, in an excited utterance, `Oh, God    it wasn't your fault. She darted out in front of me and ran into the side of your car.' Id. at 442, 493 P.2d 148. In upholding the trial court's decision to allow the testimony, the court recognized that allowing interested parties to offer hearsay statements from unidentified witnesses carries with it the risk of perjured testimony of statements by so-called `phantom witnesses.' Id. at 450, 493 P.2d 148. The court quoted Sheedy, however, for the proposition that the untrustworthiness of the witness has nothing to do with whether a statement is hearsay. 261 Or. at 451, 493 P.2d 148. The court confirmed that it is for the jury to decide whether the witness to the hearsay statement was credible: [U]nder the established rules of evidence, including the rules relating to `spontaneous statements,' the risk of perjured testimony by an interested party is not an independent ground for the exclusion of testimony that would be admissible if given by an uninterested third party. Instead, this is a matter which goes to the credibility, rather than the admissibility, of such testimony. As such, it is for the jury to consider the source of such testimony, among other circumstances, in deciding whether to believe the testimony and the fact that it was given by an interested party does not provide an independent ground upon which a trial court may properly exclude such testimony from consideration by the jury. Id. at 450-51, 493 P.2d 148. If witness credibility were part of the trustworthiness of the hearsay statement, then one could hardly find more compelling facts for considering it than existed in Wright, where the witness was an interested party offering self-serving hearsay testimony. Nevertheless, this court held that witness credibility was purely an issue for the jury. As the court explained in Sheedy, unlike the declarant's statement, the witness's testimony is made under oath and is subject to cross-examination. [5] In light of our conclusion that, under OEC 804(3)(c) and OEC 803(28)(a), trial courts are not to evaluate the credibility of the witness to the hearsay statement, we necessarily reject the state's primary arguments against the introduction of the testimony at issue here. Most of the state's contentions are irrelevant for purposes of determining whether the evidence is admissible (although they would be relevant to the jury's credibility determination). For admissibility purposes, a witness's delay in reporting the statements to the police is irrelevant, as is a witness's use of methamphetamine, or Smith's repeated assertions during the Cazares-Mendez trial that she was having memory problems. And the state's largely speculative assertions that the witnesses were biased (because they were part of a larger, inter-connected, local group of methamphetamine abusers and dealers with connections to defendants) are also irrelevant. Even the fact that Scherer took the stand and denied making the statements is irrelevant to the trial court's determination of trustworthiness for purposes of admissibility. The credibility of Scherer's testimony at trial, and that of the other witnesses, was a matter for the jury. To the extent that the trial court may have relied on any or all of those considerations, it erred. Having determined what may and may not be considered in evaluating trustworthiness under OEC 804(3)(c) or OEC 803(28)(a), we return to the facts of this case. We review preliminary findings of fact by the trial court for whether any evidence in the record supports them, but we review the ultimate legal conclusion[] as to whether the hearsay statement is admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule for errors of law. State v. Cook, 340 Or. 530, 537, 135 P.3d 260 (2006). In analyzing the issues, we ordinarily begin with statutory arguments before proceeding to constitutional questions. See State v. Barrett, 350 Or. 390, 397-98, ___ P.3d ___ (2011) (citing cases). In this context, as this court specifically held in Thoma, the due process analysis articulated in Chambers applies only if the evidence could not be admitted under any provision of state law. 313 Or. at 282-83, 834 P.2d 1020 ([T]o be admissible under the due process rule of Chambers, the evidence must be inadmissible under the Oregon Evidence Code.). In other words, state law does not violate due process if it offers any avenue by which the evidence may be introduced, regardless of whether defense counsel identified that avenue in a particular trial. Although the state agrees with defendant Cazares-Mendez that the evidence is not admissible under any other provision of the Oregon Evidence Code, defendant Reyes-Sanchez asserts that the evidence is admissible under the residual hearsay exception of OEC 803(28)(a). Accordingly, we begin by considering that statutory basis for admissibility of the proffered evidence.