Opinion ID: 666579
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Elements under section 844--cocaine base

Text: Section 844(a) provides in part: 12  It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled substance unless such substance was obtained directly, or pursuant to a valid prescription or order.... Any person who violates this subsection may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not more than 1 year ... except that if he commits such offense after a prior conviction ... for any drug or narcotic offense ... he shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for not less than 15 days but not more than 2 years ... except, further, that if he commits such offense after two or more prior convictions ... for any drug or narcotic offense ... he shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for not less than 90 days but not more than 3 years.... Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, a person convicted under this subsection for the possession of a mixture or substance which contains cocaine base shall be imprisoned not less than 5 years and not more than 20 years, and fined a minimum of $1,000, if the conviction is a first conviction under this subsection and the amount of the mixture or substance exceeds 5 grams, if the conviction is after a prior conviction for the possession of such a mixture or substance under this subsection becomes final and the amount of the mixture or substance exceeds 3 grams, or if the conviction is after 2 or more prior convictions for the possession of such a mixture or substance under this subsection becomes final and the amount of the mixture or substance exceeds 1 gram. 21 U.S.C. Sec. 844(a) (West Supp.1993) (bracketed numbering added). 13 Pursuant to the first and second sentences of section 844(a), a person can be convicted and sentenced for simple possession of any quantity of a controlled substance; the maximum confinement varies from one to three years depending on whether the offense was committed after one or two prior drug convictions. 5 In accordance with the third sentence of section 844(a), a person can be convicted of simple possession of a mixture or substance which contains cocaine base if the amount thereof so possessed exceeds the statutory defined quantity; 6 the sentencing range in each instance is the same, namely, not less than five nor more than twenty years' imprisonment. 14 Deisch's five year sentence was necessarily under the third sentence of section 844(a), as she had no prior conviction. The question thus arises whether the identity of the knowingly possessed substance as being a mixture or substance which contains cocaine base is, on the one hand, an element of the section 844(a) offense, or, on the other hand, a mere sentencing factor. We conclude that it is an element of the offense. 15 In United States v. Michael, 10 F.3d 838, 839 (D.C.Cir.1993), the D.C.Circuit concluded that the third sentence of Sec. 844(a) ... creates an independent crime of possession of cocaine base. The Michael court further clearly, albeit inferentially, held that the identity of the substance possessed as being cocaine base was an element of this independent crime. 7 The opinion relies in part on the structure of section 844(a), noting that its third sentence is buried in one great paragraph, in contrast to the penalty section of Sec. 841, which is clearly set off in subsection '(b)' and labeled 'Penalties.'  Id. at 840. It also relies on the third sentence's person convicted ... for the possession of ... cocaine base language, which it characterizes as suggesting that the conviction itself must encompass cocaine base. Id. Michael also attaches significance to the fact that the third sentence was a completely new provision added in 1988, and that the remainder of section 844(a) did not, and does not, mention cocaine base. Id. 8 We are generally in agreement with the reasoning of Michael in these respects. 16 There is, however, an additional consideration that is particularly influential in our conclusion that the identity of the substance knowingly possessed as being cocaine base is an element of the offense denounced by the third sentence of section 844(a) instead of being merely a sentencing factor for a violation of the first sentence of section 844(a). 9 This consideration arises from the indictment clause of the Fifth Amendment, 10 which requires a grand jury indictment for any federal offense that is a felony or is punishable by confinement in a penitentiary or at hard labor. 11 It has become clear that any federal offense punishable by imprisonment for more than one year is an offense for which the Fifth Amendment requires a grand jury indictment. 12 17 For anyone, such as Deisch, not previously convicted, exposure to more than one year's confinement for a violation of section 844(a) would be possible if the substance possessed was a mixture or substance which contains cocaine base, but not otherwise. If the nature of the substance as cocaine base is an element of the offense, then Deisch will be afforded the protection of the indictment clause in this respect because the indictment must allege every element of the offense. United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. [15 Otto] 611, 26 L.Ed. 1135 (1882); Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 764-65, 82 S.Ct. 1038, 1047 (1962); Honea v. United States, 344 F.2d 798, 803-04 (1965). As the above authorities reflect, it is not enough that the grand jury concludes that the defendant should be prosecuted for violating a particular statute; rather, the indictment must also allege every element of the offense. 13 Only in this way is any assurance furnished that the grand jury found probable cause to believe that the defendant in fact committed acts constituting the offense in question. This clearly appears from the reason so often given for the rules that the failure of the indictment to allege all elements of the offense may not be cured by evidence or instructions at trial, 14 nor by a bill of particulars, 15 and that the indictment may not be actually or constructively amended by adding material allegations as to the offense charged or of another offense, 16 namely, that absent such rules there is lacking the necessary assurance the grand jury found probable cause to believe the defendant committed acts constituting all elements of the offense of conviction as proved at trial. 18 On the other hand, an indictment need not allege mere sentencing facts. United States v. Vasquez-Olvera, 999 F.2d 943, 944-45 (5th Cir.1993); United States v. Pico, 2 F.3d 472, 474-5 (2nd Cir.1993) (indictment charging conspiracy to import cocaine need not allege quantity, even though mandatory minimum sentence is based on quantity, because quantity is relevant only to the sentence and is not an element of the offense). See also United States v. Affleck, 861 F.2d 97, 99 (5th Cir.1988) (Traditional sentencing factors need not be pleaded....); Buckley v. Butler, 825 F.2d 895, 903 (... there is no Fifth Amendment right to grand jury indictment on the sentencing facts....). Accordingly, if the third sentence of section 844(a) does not create a separate offense and the only offense established by section 844(a) is the knowing possession of any controlled substance as denounced in the first sentence thereof, so that the identity of the substance possessed as cocaine base is not an element of any section 844(a) offense but is only a sentencing factor, then, even if an indictment were required, 17 nevertheless it would not have to allege that the controlled substance possessed was cocaine base. However, were that the rule, then any defendant without a prior conviction, such as Deisch, would be exposed to an infamous punishment without a grand jury ever having considered whether there was probable cause to believe that the defendant did that which the law requires she have done before she can be exposed to any infamous punishment. Such a rule--which is the necessary consequence of holding that under section 844(a) the identity of the substance as cocaine base is merely a sentencing factor--would emasculate the protection intended by the Fifth Amendment's indictment clause. If no indictment were required, then obviously such a section 844(a) defendant could be exposed to infamous punishment without the protection of a grand jury. But if an indictment is required because the punishment may be infamous if (and only if) cocaine base is what is possessed, then it is wholly illogical to authorize a punishment of that character even though the indictment does not allege cocaine base. That which requires the grand jury must likewise require allegation in the indictment, else the presence of the grand jury does nothing to subserve the purpose of requiring it. 19 Surely the indictment clause must be understood to mean that the defendant may not be exposed to an infamous punishment unless the grand jury finds probable cause to believe that he did that which the law requires him to have done before any character of infamous punishment whatever may be imposed on him. 18 20 Our conclusion in this regard is supported by several decisions holding that where an offense that is otherwise a misdemeanor becomes a felony if committed in a certain way or with certain consequences, the particular attribute that makes it a felony is an element of the offense, which must be alleged in the indictment and proved at trial. We have applied this rule to 18 U.S.C. Secs. 659 (theft of shipments in commerce) and 641 (theft of property of the United States) in each of which the offense is a misdemeanor if the value of what is taken does not exceed $100, and is otherwise a felony, holding that a value of $100 or more is an element of the felony that must be alleged and proved, Packnett v. United States, 503 F.2d 949, 950 (5th Cir.1974) (section 659); Theriault v. United States, 434 F.2d 212, 214 (5th Cir.1970) (section 641), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869, 92 S.Ct. 124, 30 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971); Cartwright v. United States, 146 F.2d 133, 135 (5th Cir.1944) (former section 82, predecessor to section 641). Other courts have reached similar results. See United States v. Scanzello, 832 F.2d 18, 23 (3d Cir.1987) (sections 649 and 641); United States v. Alberico, 604 F.2d 1315, 1321 (10th Cir.) (section 641), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 992, 100 S.Ct. 524, 62 L.Ed.2d 422 (1979). 21 For purposes of deciding if a particular factor is merely a sentencing consideration or is an offense element under section 844(a), two other circuits have also given significance to whether the presence or absence of the factor determines whether the defendant is guilty of a misdemeanor only or of a felony. In United States v. Puryear, 940 F.2d 602, 603-4 (10th Cir.1991), the Tenth Circuit, relying in part on Theriault, Alberico, and Scanzello, held that the amount of cocaine base possessed by a defendant was an essential element of simple possession under section 844(a) and that [a]bsent a jury finding as to the amount of cocaine, the trial court may not decide of its own accord to enter a felony conviction and sentence, instead of a misdemeanor conviction and sentence, by resolving the crucial element of the amount of cocaine against the defendant. Similarly, in United States v. Sharp, 12 F.3d 605 (6th Cir.1993), the Sixth Circuit held that for section 844(a) possession of cocaine base to be sentenced as a felony, the trial jury must have found the requisite quantity because the quantity does not merely affect the length of the defendant's sentence but determines whether he is guilty of a felony or a misdemeanor, and that for a sentencing judge to make factual findings that convert what would otherwise be a misdemeanor into a felony seems to us an impermissible usurpation of the historic rule of the jury. Id. at 608. Sharp distinguished cases holding that under section 841 quantity was merely a sentencing factor and not an element of the offense, because in those cases the offense would have been a felony regardless of the quantity and the felony/misdemeanor dichotomy was not implicated. Id. at 608 & n. 1. 22 Accordingly, we hold, consistent with Michael, that the third sentence of section 844(a) creates a separate offense, an element of which is that the substance possessed contains cocaine base. 19 23