Opinion ID: 1876142
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: did the lower court err in setting aside the holographic will of mrs. louise trotter rooney dated may 26, 1980?

Text: The chancellor found as fact that in June of 1980 the testatrix sent the appellant her holographic will executed on May 26, 1980, and that she offered to agree not to revoke the will if the appellant promised to take care of her and her property for the rest of her life. The appellant was the sole beneficiary of this will. After deliberation with his wife, the appellant promised to do so. The chancellor found that at this time an oral contract not to revoke the will was entered. A contract to devise or bequeath property by will is valid. See Estate of McKellar v. Brown, 404 So.2d 550, 552 (Miss. 1981). The chancellor's holding that the 1980 will was void because of the breach of contract by the appellant was based on Johnston v. Tomme, 199 Miss. 337, 24 So.2d 730 (1946). The often-quoted relevant holding in Tomme was discussed in Voss v. Stewart, 420 So.2d 761, 764-65 (Miss. 1982): Although this court has acknowledged that an oral promise to devise property is enforceable where services were performed pursuant thereto, it has nevertheless circumscribed the essentials of such contract in addition to the requirement of clear, definite and certain evidence. In Johnson v. Tomme, 199 Miss. 337, 24 So.2d 730 (1946), we stated: The will, when written in conformity and compliance with the agreement, was a consideration which belonged to the appellee. The testator had no right to revoke it, and its attempted revocation, if deliberately made, constituted a fraud upon her. 199 Miss. at 347, 24 So.2d at 732. We do not lay down a general rule allowing the establishment of a trust by oral agreement, nor do we design a model for all cases. We do say that where a testator executed a will in compliance with an oral agreement with the devisee that the latter will render unique and necessary personal services to him involving a substantial change in the status and manner of living of the promisee, and such services have been performed so that a revocation of the will amounts to fraud upon the latter, rendering it impossible or impracticable to restore him to the situation in which he was prior to the contract, equity will hold such will to be irrevocable and the rights thereunder may be established. 199 Miss. at 351-52, 24 So.2d at 734. (emphasis added). Presumably the rare remedy afforded under Tomme, which is in essence a type of specific performance, is limited to devises. See, e.g., Old Ladies Home Ass'n v. Hall, 212 Miss. 67, 52 So.2d 650 (Miss. 1951); Frierson v. Moorehead, 211 Miss. 811, 51 So.2d 925 (Miss. 1951); Denson v. Denson, 203 Miss. 146, 33 So.2d 311 (Miss. 1948). At Mrs. Rooney's death, her estate consisted solely of personal property. In any event, a promisee of an oral contract to make a will, who provides the services contemplated by the contract, may at the very least be entitled to the reasonable value of the services actually rendered, known as the quantum meruit, as a claim against the estate if the promisor breaches the contract by making a different devise or bequest than that which was contracted for. Liddell v. Jones, 482 So.2d 1131 (Miss. 1986); Ellis v. Berry, 145 Miss. 652, 110 So. 211 (1926). If the promisee parted with any other valuable consideration for the contract, he may well have an action against the estate for that consideration. The above discussion is relevant to this appeal only as background because the issue in this case does not involve a promisee suing the promisor/testator's estate on the basis of a breach of contract to make a will by the promisor/testator. The issue here does not concern what remedies the appellant, as promisee, would have against Mrs. Rooney's estate if the 1982 will had been found to be valid and, therefore, to revoke the 1980 will. Conversely, it does not concern what defenses Mrs. Rooney's estate would have against such actions. The issue before us is whether the purported breach of the contract by Herman Trotter, the promisee, has the effect of revoking the otherwise valid 1980 will. As a threshold proposition, we point out that the principles which apply to a contract to make a will apply to contracts not to revoke a will which the promisor has made theretofore... . 1 Bowe-Parker: Page on Wills § 10.1 (1960). We also note that the 1980 will made no mention of the contract; therefore, it was not conditioned upon the performance of the contract. See Stovall v. Stovall, 360 So.2d 679, 681 (Miss. 1978). In Page on Wills, it was said, The contract [to make a will or not to revoke a will] cannot be used to prevent admission to probate of a will which had been made in violation of the provisions of the contract. Id. § 10.3. See, e.g., Allen v. Bromberg, 147 Ala. 317, 41 So. 771 (1906) But compare Walker v. Yardbrough, 200 Ala. 458, 76 So. 390 (1917). Therefore, it was inappropriate for Herman Trotter to allege, as a fourth defense to the probate of the 1982 will, the contract not to revoke. The contract not to revoke was not a defense to the probate of the 1982 will. If the 1982 will had been admitted and substituted for the 1980 will, Herman Trotter's appropriate remedy would have been on the contract, pursuant to the cases mentioned above. More than likely, Herman Trotter's remedy would have been limited to a claim for quantum meruit against the Rooney estate, which is in essence what the chancellor gave him. More important, concerning the effects of Herman Trotter's purported breach, in Page, it was stated: If the promisee has agreed to render services to the promisor ... his breach of such covenant discharges the contract if the promisor so elects. Id. § 10.19. See, e.g., Clarke v. Portland Trust Bank, 221 Ore. 339, 351 P.2d 51, 61 (1960). In Page, it was also stated: If the promisee fails to perform all of his covenants but the promisor does not elect to treat such non-performance as a breach, the heirs and next of kin, on the death of the promisor, cannot set up such breach. Id. § 10.19. See, e.g., Ledingham v. Bayless, 218 Md. 108, 145 A.2d 434, 440-41 (1958). Therefore, even if the promisee breaches the contract during the life of the promisor, the heirs of the promisor cannot set up the breach as a defense to the enforcement of the contract if the promisor knew of the breach during his life but elected not to rescind the contract or take any other appropriate remedy. For our purposes, the chancellor found as a matter of fact that a contract not to revoke the will existed beginning in June, 1980. The chancellor further found that the Herman Trotter breached that contract and, presumably, Mrs. Rooney rightfully rescinded the contract. However, a breach of a contract not to revoke a will is just that: a breach of a contract. It is not grounds for contesting the will pertaining to the contract. In Re Estate of Schmalz, 58 Wis.2d 220, 206 N.W.2d 141 (1973); In Re Derusseau's Will, 175 Wis. 140, 184 N.W. 705, 708 (1921); Page, § 10.19. The remedies, if any, of the promisor's heirs lie on the contract or perhaps upon a constructive trust theory. The question of whether a contract not to revoke a will can be enforced is a separate question from whether a will has been revoked. The better view is that a contract not to revoke a will may become irrevocable, as long as the promisee performs in accordance with the contract. Conversely, the contract may be rescinded by the promisor if the promisee breaches the contract. However, a will is valid until revoked and, by its inherent nature, is revocable until the death of the testatrix. The fact that a contract not to revoke a will may have been properly rescinded by the testatrix does not mean that the will itself was revoked. Miss. Code Ann. § 91-5-3 (1972) provides the only means by which a will may be expressly revoked. Livelar v. Arnold, 233 So.2d 760 (Miss. 1970). Generally, it can be accomplished only by physical destruction of the will or by subsequent will, codicil, or declaration, in writing, made and executed. Any express instrument of revocation must meet the requirements of the will statute, Miss. Code Ann. § 91-5-1 (Supp. 1985). See Kinnard v. Evans, 218 Miss. 176, 65 So.2d 285 (1953). Mississippi does recognize that a will may also be impliedly revoked. For example, a validly executed will with inconsistent provisions, but no express revocation clause, revokes an earlier will. In Re Will and Estate of Vavaris, 477 So.2d 273, 277 (Miss. 1985); Wheat v. Lacals, 139 Miss. 300, 104 So. 73 (1925). See also, Caine v. Barnwell, 120 Miss. 209, 82 So. 65 (1919). Cf. Estate of Crawford, 225 Miss. 208, 82 So.2d 823 (1955). Concerning the implied revocation of a will, this Court has said, The doctrine of implied revocation has been carefully limited in Mississippi to execution of conflicting deeds or other instruments. In re Stoball's Will, 211 Miss. 15, 50 So.2d 635, 638 (1951). But see McCormack v. Warren, 228 Miss. 617, 628, 89 So.2d 702, 706 (1956). Statements of the testator alone that she intends to revoke the will are not enough. See Ramsey v. Robinson, 346 So.2d 379 (Miss. 1977). Generally, the statements are inadmissible if offered to show an implied revocation. In re Stoball's Will, supra . Based on the above discussion, we find as follows: The execution of the 1982 will did not operate to revoke the 1980 will because the chancellor, based upon very substantial evidence, found that Mrs. Rooney lacked testamentary capacity on May 7, 1982, when she wrote the 1982 will. He correctly found that the 1982 will was invalid and of no effect. The breach of contract by Herman Trotter did not revoke the 1980 will. Mrs. Rooney could have revoked the will after the breach of contract by the execution of another will; however, she did not do so at a time when she had testamentary capacity. The same degree of mentality required to revoke a will is the same as that required to make one... . Watkins v. Watkins, 142 Miss. 210, 106 So. 753, 757 (1926). Therefore, the finding by the chancellor that the 1980 will was revoked, either because of the breach of contract by Herman Trotter or the statements or actions of Mrs. Rooney, especially at a time when she lacked capacity, was manifest error. We conclude that the 1980 will is valid and was entitled to probate.