Opinion ID: 2397328
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Denial of Request to Recall Witness

Text: Finally, appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request to reopen his case and recall a defense witness, Ruthie Randall, to provide evidence supporting his theory that bias infected the testimony of the government's eyewitnesses. His bias theory, as related to this argument, was that the testimony of Michelle Anderson and Charles Anderson was colored by fear of reprisal from the decedent's associates, a group known as the Five Percenters. Defense counsel proffered that Ms. Randall's testimony would show that after the defense rested and the court had given its instructions, all of the windows in the store where she worked were broken out. Appellant contends that the defense could have used this evidence to show that, out of fear, the Andersons were either exaggerating or not being truthful about the circumstances surrounding the shooting. [28] Appellant also points to information relayed by Ms. Randall prior to her original testimony in which she informed the court that she had been warned by decedent's friends that if she testified, they would take care of her and that they strongly advised her that it would not be in her best health interest to come to court. [29] The trial court ruled that the evidence proffered after the jury had been instructed was of limited relevance and more prejudicial than probative. Whether to permit a defendant to reopen a case after the close of the evidence is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and this court will reverse only for an abuse of discretion. Davis v. United States, 735 A.2d 467, 472 (D.C.1999) (citation omitted). In exercising its discretion, the court must consider the timeliness of the motion, the character of the testimony [] and the effect of granting the motion. King v. United States, 550 A.2d 348, 354 (D.C.1988) (quoting United States v. Thetford, 676 F.2d 170, 182 (5th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1148, 103 S.Ct. 790, 74 L.Ed.2d 996 (1983)). It should consider also whether the proffered evidence is relevant, admissible and helpful to the jury in deciding the accused's guilt or innocence. Id. (citation omitted). Further, [t]he belated receipt of such testimony should not imbue the evidence with distorted importance, prejudice the opposing party's case, or preclude an adversary from having an adequate opportunity to meet additional evidence offered. Id. (citations omitted). Considering these factors, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's ruling. Bias of a witness may be established through cross-examination and by the introduction of extrinsic evidence. Gibson v. United States, 536 A.2d 78, 82 (D.C.1987). However, the opportunity to use extrinsic evidence to explore a witness' bias is circumscribed by the rule of relevance and the discretion of the trial court to exclude evidence for a lack thereof. Id. (citing McClain v. United States, 460 A.2d 562, 569 (D.C.1983)). As the trial court observed in making its ruling, there was no evidence concerning who actually broke the window or the circumstances involved. Absent a showing of some connection between the vandalism and decedent's associates, the jury could not infer reasonably that the decedent's associates were responsible for breaking the windows, and therefore a source of fear in the Andersons that colored their testimony at trial. Not only was the proffered incident not shown to be connected to the decedent, it occurred after the Andersons had testified. Therefore, the jury could not infer reasonably that the incident itself generated fear in the Andersons that caused them to be biased at the time they gave their testimony. That being the case, the evidence was irrelevant to the theory of bias advanced. See Jones v. United States 625 A.2d 281, 284 (D.C.1993) ([E]vidence is relevant if it makes the existence of a contested fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without that evidence.) (citation omitted). Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence for lack of relevance. [30] See Gibson, 536 A.2d at 82. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from hereby is Affirmed.