Opinion ID: 2428959
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: issues other than damages direct appeal

Text: Smith asserts the trial court abused its discretion in excluding evidence that fourteen other dump trucks also had their odometers altered. These fourteen trucks, like Smith's truck, were previously owned by Landis, repossessed by Ford Motor Credit and assigned to WBF. Smith contends this evidence was admissible for the limited purpose of showing WBF's general scheme of intent to defraud. He emphasizes that intent to defraud is an element of his cause of action under the Federal Odometer Fraud Act. WBF moved in limine to exclude any reference to the fourteen trucks. In a written order responding to WBF's motion in limine, the trial court ruled any evidence relating to the other fourteen trucks would be more prejudicial than probative. This court has ruled that similar acts are admissible for the limited purpose of showing intent to defraud, not for showing the alleged fraud was actually committed, if the acts are of the same nature and close in point of time to the act in issue. Fulwider v. Woods, 249 Ark. 776, 461 S.W.2d 581 (1971). The jury found WBF was liable to Smith. Obviously, since Smith successfully proved WBF had the requisite intent to defraud, we cannot say that Smith demonstrated any prejudice from the exclusion of this evidence.
Smith argues the trial court erred in hearing WBF's motion in limine on the afternoon before trial without giving Smith ten days to respond to the motion as required by ARCP Rule 78(b). Smith claims WBF had plenty of advance notice through discovery that Smith was going to offer the evidence WBF sought to exclude, and the motion was nothing more than a last minute attempt to deprive Smith of an opportunity to file a written response and to interrupt counsel's preparation for trial the next day. Here, Smith does not challenge the substance of the trial court's ruling on the motion. Rather, he challenges the timing of both the motion and the hearing thereon, and the fact he did not have ten days to file a written response pursuant to ARCP Rule 78(b). He claims WBF's conduct was an abuse of pretrial procedure. WBF responds that a motion in limine is just what its name implies, a motion made preliminarily or on the threshold of trial, and thus WBF committed no error in waiting until the day before trial to file the motion. In addition, WBF points out that Smith had more time to respond to WBF's contentions at the hearing than he would have had at trial. We agree with WBF's response. This court has stated that motions in limine are to enlighten the court and advise counsel of the specific nature of the anticipated evidence so that the court may intelligently act on such motions. Schichtl v. Slack, 293 Ark. 281, 737 S.W.2d 628 (1987). Motions in limine are not ordinarily used to extinguish an entire claim or defense. Rather, they are usually used to prohibit the mentioning of some specific matter, such as an inflammatory piece of evidence, until the admissibility of that matter has been determined out of the hearing of the jury. Id., (citing Lewis v. Buena Vista Mutual Ins. Ass'n, 183 N.W.2d 198 (Iowa 1971)). Although the subject of responses to motions is contemplated by the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, the subject is not clearly addressed therein. There is no specific requirement of a written response to a written motion; ARCP Rule 78(b) merely requires that if a written response is to be filed, it must be done so within ten days of service of the motion. However, a trial court should either allow a written response to the motion or hold a hearing at which a response is heard. David Newbern, Arkansas Civil Practice and Procedure § 10-3 (2d ed. 1993). As Smith appeared at the hearing and responded to the motion in limine, we cannot say any error occurred in deciding the motion the day before trial.