Opinion ID: 1444899
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: issues

Text: In defendant's next assignment of error, he argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to declare him ineligible for the death penalty. [8] He asserts that the sentencing jury's verdict in the Smith murder trial precluded the state from relitigating the issue of his future dangerousness and, thus, from seeking the death penalty for the Molalla Forest murders. Pursuant to ORS 163.150(1)(b) (1987), [9] the sentencing jury in the Smith homicide trial returned the following verdict on the three penalty-phase questions submitted: One, was the conduct of the defendant, Dayton Leroy Rogers, that caused the death of Jennifer Lisa Smith committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of Jennifer Lisa Smith would result? Answer. No. Two. Is there a probability that the defendant, Dayton Leroy Rogers, would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society? Answer. No. Three. Was the conduct of defendant, Dayton Leroy Rogers, in killing the deceased, Jennifer Lisa Smith, unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased, Jennifer Lisa Smith? Answer. Yes. Because one or more questions were answered no, defendant was not subject to the death penalty for the aggravated murder of Smith. The sentencing jury in the present case was asked the same three statutory penalty-phase questions with regard to the deaths of the Molalla Forest victims and answered each question yes, and defendant therefore was sentenced to death. Defendant argues that the state was precluded from relitigating the second question, i.e., the issue of his future dangerousness, because the Smith homicide sentencing jury had answered that question in the negative. Defendant argues that all the elements necessary for the application of issue preclusion [10] are satisfied: the parties are the same, the state and defendant; the issue, defendant's future dangerousness, is the same; the state had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue; and the issue actually and necessarily was decided in the prior prosecution. Defendant contends that the preclusion doctrine on which he relies is embodied in Oregon statutory and constitutional provisions, as well as in the prohibition against double jeopardy guaranteed him by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. In State v. Dewey, 206 Or. 496, 504-08, 292 P.2d 799 (1956), this court held that ORS 43.160, which states a rule of issue preclusion that has its genesis in the common law, applies in criminal cases. ORS 43.160 provides: That only is determined by a former judgment, decree or order which appears upon its face to have been so determined or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. In discussing the application of issue preclusion in the criminal context, the Dewey court stated: Where the second prosecution is for another offense, `the previous judgment is conclusive only as to those matters which were in fact in issue and actually or necessarily adjudicated. Thus an acquittal of the charge of seduction does not adjudicate the question of sexual intercourse although that was one of the issues in the case, since the acquittal might have been due to the failure to establish other facts essential to a conviction.' State v. Dewey, supra, 206 Or. at 508, 292 P.2d 799 (quoting 2 Freeman on Judgments 1364-65, § 648 (5th ed. 1925). See also State v. George, 253 Or. 458, 462-63, 466, 455 P.2d 609 (1969) (following State v. Dewey, supra ; conviction of a defendant for murder of one of two victims reversed, because the defendant previously had been acquitted of the murder of the other victim and both had died from the same bullet). The federal prohibition against double jeopardy prevents the state from seeking the death penalty in a retrial of a capital case when the sentencing jury refused to impose the death penalty at the first trial. Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 444-46, 101 S.Ct. 1852, 1860-62, 68 L.Ed.2d 270 (1981) (because the penalty phase of a capital trial is like a trial on the issue of guilt or innocence, a verdict against the state demonstrates the jury's conclusion that the state failed to prove its case and is entitled to the same finality that characterizes an acquittal, even one on an erroneous ground). The federal Double Jeopardy Clause does not prevent the state from seeking the death penalty in a separate prosecution of the defendant for a different crime. See United States v. Felix, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 1377, 1382, 118 L.Ed.2d 25, 33 (1992) (At its root, the Double Jeopardy Clause forbids the duplicative prosecution for the `same offence.' U.S. Const., Amdt. 5). There is also an issue preclusion component of the federal Double Jeopardy Clause. [W]hen an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 1194, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970). In Ashe, the defendant was indicted in connection with the robbery of six players in a poker game. Id. at 437-38, 90 S.Ct. at 1190-91. Initially, he was tried for the robbery of one of the six players. Id. at 438, 90 S.Ct. at 1191. After he was acquitted, the state tried him for the robbery of another of the players. Id. at 439, 90 S.Ct. at 1191. The trial record from the first prosecution revealed that the sole issue litigated was whether the defendant was one of the robbers. Id. at 444-45 & n. 9, 90 S.Ct. at 1194-95 & n. 9. Because the first jury's verdict was premised on the state's failure to prove the defendant's identity as one of the robbers, the Court held that the state was precluded from relitigating that issue, and the second prosecution was barred. Id. at 445-46, 90 S.Ct. at 1195-96. As noted above, the rule of issue preclusion is essentially the same in Oregon. State v. George, supra, 253 Or. at 462-63, 455 P.2d 609; State v. Dewey, supra, 206 Or. at 508, 292 P.2d 799. The question here is whether the issue decided in the prior trial for the Smith homicide is the same issue that was presented to the jury in this case. The sentencing jury in the Smith case was instructed (as was the sentencing jury in the present case) as follows with regard to the second penalty-phase question: The second question asked by the law is: Is there a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society? In determining this issue, you must consider any mitigating circumstances received in evidence, including, but not limited to, defendant's age, the extent and severity of the defendant's prior criminal conduct, and the extent of the mental and emotional pressure under which the defendant was acting at the time the killing was committed. [11] The issue presented by the second question in the present case differs from the second-question issue in the Smith case, because the sentencing jury in each case had to determine whether, based on everything in defendant's life to that point in time (including the extent of the mental and emotional pressure under which the defendant was acting at the time the killing was committed), defendant likely would be dangerous in the future. See State v. Moen, 309 Or. 45, 73, 786 P.2d 111 (1990) (Evidence of all of a defendant's prior conduct, bad and good, is precisely the type of evidence that the jury needs to make this determination); Wagner II, supra, 309 Or. at 19, 786 P.2d 93 (all aspects of a defendant's character and background are `relevant to sentence'). The trial in the present case took place nearly one year after the Smith homicide trial. Because everything that has occurred in a defendant's life may be relevant to a determination of that defendant's future dangerousness, the second-question determination necessarily incorporates a temporal element. The jury must determine a defendant's future dangerousness from the day on which the jury makes its determination forward, based on the defendant's life from that day backward. The year of defendant's life between the two trials and defendant's subsequent conviction in the guilt phase of this case had not yet occurred at the time the Smith homicide jury rendered its verdict. [12] In the present case, the second-question issue was, based on defendant's conduct and character up to the time of trial and the convictions and the circumstances of the aggravated murders of the six Molalla Forest victims, [13] whether defendant would pose a continuing threat to society. That issue is not the same issue decided by the Smith homicide jury. Because the sentencing juries were making their determinations at different times and based on different evidencesome of which was not available at the time of the Smith homicide trialthe sentencing verdicts in the two cases are neither inconsistent nor irreconcilable. Because the second-question issue by its nature involves a temporal elementthe futureand is based on a broad inquiry into a defendant's life bounded only by the present, the point at which the jury decides the issue, the issue to be decided changes continuously with time. Issue preclusion therefore is not available to defendant. The trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to be declared ineligible for the death penalty.