Opinion ID: 2718751
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Counts Six and Seven: Mail Fraud

Text: Forehand was also convicted of two counts of mail fraud (Counts Six and Seven). A third count of mail fraud, Count Eight, was dismissed after the jury verdict on motion from the government. As noted above, “[m]ail and wire fraud are analytically identical save for the method of execution.” Id. at 1238. As discussed with respect to wire fraud, the evidence at trial established that Forehand had the necessary intent to deceive the victim-investors because he lied to them about material facts in order to obtain their money. See id. The government demonstrated that Forehand had the necessary intent required to sustain his mail fraud convictions. See id. Additionally, Forehand takes issue with the dates listed for Count Six only. Forehand argues that there was a material difference between the charges as listed 8 Case: 13-14089 Date Filed: 08/19/2014 Page: 9 of 13 in the indictment from the evidence presented at trial; specifically the dates proved for those crimes were different from the dates alleged. “[T]ime is not an essential element of the offense, so long as the government establishes that the conduct occurred reasonably near the date that the indictment mentions.” United States v. Pope, 132 F.3d 684, 688–89 (11th Cir. 1998). “Ordinarily, we will not disturb a conviction due to a variance between the date the indictment alleges the offense occurred and the date the proof shows that it occurred if the date shown at trial falls within the statute of limitations and before the return of the indictment.” United States v. Roberts, 308 F.3d 1147, 1156 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam). “Two purposes are served by the requirement that the allegations of the indictment and the proof at trial correspond: (1) the defendant is properly notified of the charges so that he may present a defense; and (2) the defendant is protected against the possibility of another prosecution for the same offense.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In United States v. McIntosh, we concluded that because the date of the offense was not an essential element of the offense, the error was of form, not substance, and was not fatally defective. 580 F.3d 1222, 1228 (11th Cir. 2009). With respect to Count Six, there is only an eight-day difference between the date alleged in the indictment and the date testified to at trial. The indictment alleged that the mail fraud took place on October 20, 2008. The testifying witness 9 Case: 13-14089 Date Filed: 08/19/2014 Page: 10 of 13 said that he received the fraudulent document on October 28, 2008. The mail fraud occurred reasonably near when the indictment alleged, and it occurred within the statute of limitations and prior to the return of the indictment. See Pope, 132 F.3d at 688–89; Roberts, 308 F.3d at 1156. The indictment charged that on or about October 20, 2008, Forehand mailed an IRA to “KT” in Dothan, Alabama. The evidence at trial established that on October 28, 2008, Kevin Tillman received in the mail an IRA from Forehand. Forehand admitted at trial there was only one KT on the list of victims provided to him, and that victim was Kevin Tillman. He admitted at trial that he had adequate notice of this charge. Forehand’s argument as to this issue fails.