Opinion ID: 2972608
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Clarke’s Claims

Text: Clarke challenges his conviction on a number of grounds, ranging from alleged evidentiary errors to ineffective assistance of counsel. We consider each claim in turn.
Clarke first contends that two of the district court’s evidentiary rulings warrant reversal. We review these rulings for abuse of discretion, e.g., United States v. Wright, 343 F.3d 849, 865 (6th Cir. 2003); United States v. Jackson-Randolph, 282 F.3d 369, 375 (6th Cir. 2002), and find no basis for reversal. Clarke’s first contention – that the district court should have excluded Walter Wright’s testimony on the ground that Wright claimed he was intoxicated at trial and before the grand jury – is clearly without merit. Rule 602 of the Federal Rules of Evidence requires that witnesses have personal knowledge of the matter about which they testify. FED. R. EVID. 602. The threshold for 5 At trial, FBI Agent Booth, who was present for Wright’s grand jury appearance, testified that he noticed no signs that Wright was intoxicated. Nos. 03-2439/2440 United States v. Franklin, et al. Page 9 admitting testimony under Rule 602 is “low.” United States v. Hickey, 917 F.2d 901, 904 (6th Cir. 1990). “Testimony should not be excluded for lack of personal knowledge unless no reasonable juror could believe that the witness had the ability and opportunity to perceive the event that he testifies about.” Id. (citation omitted). Under this standard, it was not an abuse of discretion to admit Wright’s testimony. First, no record evidence corroborates Wright’s claim that he was intoxicated during his grand jury and trial testimony. Moreover, he first made this claim after testifying before the grand jury, where he had steadfastly described his testimony as truthful under questioning from the foreman. The district court’s decision not to credit Wright’s post hoc representations was not clear error. In addition, Wright did not assert that conversations with Clarke regarding the robbery never occurred; rather, he primarily suggested that he could not remember precisely when those conversations occurred or precisely what Clarke said. In sum, the government met its low threshold of proof and Wright’s testimony was admissible. Clarke’s second evidentiary claim is that the district court abused its discretion in permitting Wallace Stinson to testify regarding out-of-court statements Marcus Franklin, Clarke’s nontestifying co-defendant, made to him the day after the truck robbery. Finding no abuse of discretion, we reject this claim as well. According to Stinson’s testimony, Franklin made statements to Stinson in which he inculpated both himself and Clarke. Franklin did not testify at trial, electing to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The government contends that the admission of Franklin’s out-of-court statements was proper either because they were statements between co-conspirators made in furtherance of the conspiracy, FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E), or because they were statements against Franklin’s penal interest, FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3). The district court did not specifically explain why it admitted the statements. In any event, we conclude that the statements were admissible as statements between co-conspirators made in furtherance of the conspiracy and therefore affirm the district court’s ruling. Because we hold that the statements were admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), we need not consider the government’s alternative theory that they were admissible under Rule 804(b)(3). At trial, Stinson testified that from 1998 to 2000, he worked at Guardian Armored Services, where he served as a driver, guard, and balancer. One of Stinson’s routes was the route that included the ATM at the NABI Center in Southgate, Michigan – route 910. When assigned to that route, Stinson used the same truck which Franklin and Clarke ultimately robbed. During his time as a balancer on route 910, Stinson came to possess an extra set of keys to the truck. Stinson did not return the extra set – which offered access to the truck’s cab and its currency storage area – when he left Guardian in July or August 2000. Stinson testified that he met Franklin and Christopher Martin when he was assigned to route 907. Sometime before February 2000, according to Stinson’s testimony, Franklin proposed that the two use Franklin’s F Key to rob ATMs in Detroit. Stinson offered his “hatch key,” which is necessary in addition to the F Key for opening the currency area of an ATM. Stinson explained that Franklin promised to “take care of [him]” in exchange for use of the hatch key. J.A. 570. Stinson’s understanding was that this meant Stinson would receive some proceeds from the ATM robberies. Shortly after the robberies, Franklin summoned Stinson to his home. Franklin instructed Stinson to open the trunk of his car; Stinson did so and discovered a bag of between $5000 and $7000, which Franklin instructed him to take for himself. Franklin explained to Stinson that he and Martin had stolen around $100,000 from the ATMs. Stinson then testified regarding the robbery of the armored truck. In April 2000, according to Stinson, Franklin proposed robbing a Guardian truck. Stinson suggested a few “secluded type stops” on various truck routes. J.A. 573-74. In particular, Stinson recommended the NABI building in Southgate, Michigan. Stinson described the advantages of robbing the truck at this location: “. . . It’s a very secluded place. You have to pull the truck into the back and the balancer and guard have to walk all the way around. And also at the time it’s a once-a-week stop and it’s a lot of [money] on the truck at that time.” J.A. 574. In the April 2000 conversation with Franklin, Stinson told Franklin that the truck stopped at the NABI stop on Mondays; further, Stinson volunteered that he Nos. 03-2439/2440 United States v. Franklin, et al. Page 10 had an extra set of keys to the truck and offered them to Franklin, who accepted. Stinson told Franklin that he did not want to participate in the robbery and did not want to know about it. However, Stinson testified that he was to receive a share of the proceeds. In a subsequent conversation with Franklin, Stinson explained which key to use for which door on the Guardian truck. Finally, Stinson testified that on the morning of September 12, 2000, he noticed upon awakening that he had received voicemail messages during the night. One of the messages was from Franklin and Stinson returned the call. Franklin told Stinson to stop by; Stinson did so and testified that when he arrived, “there was a bag of money there” for him. J.A. 579-80. Stinson asked Franklin what happened and, according to Stinson, Franklin replied as follows: ANSWER: Well, he told me that he did it himself, along with Jamaal, and he described what happened. I guess he told me Jamaal hit the driver and I guess they took a long time and the driver was really, Timothy was really scared about what happened. QUESTION: Now when you say that he told you Jamaal hit the driver, did he say where he hit the driver or with what? ANSWER: He said he hit him in the head with a weapon. QUESTION: And you said that Marcus Franklin said it took them a long time? ANSWER: Meaning the people who were actually inside the building servicing the building. QUESTION: And you said that he stated to you that the driver Timothy Leake was scared? ANSWER: Yes. ... QUESTION: Anything else? ANSWER: And he told me not to get caught. J.A. 580-81. Stinson further testified that Franklin explained he had thrown the truck keys into the river and buried his share of the proceeds. Regarding Stinson’s share, Franklin “told [Stinson] not to get caught with it and to stash it.” J.A. 582. Franklin told Stinson that it would be “a while” before the two talked again. Stinson then testified that he left Franklin’s residence with the bag of money, which contained $100,000, and immediately stored it in a storage unit. Clarke contests the admissibility of Stinson’s testimony to the extent Stinson recounted Franklin’s references to Clarke’s involvement in the robbery. Under Rule 801 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, “[a] statement is not hearsay if [t]he statement is offered against a party and is a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E). It is clear that the government offered Franklin’s statements against Nos. 03-2439/2440 United States v. Franklin, et al. Page 11 Clarke and that Franklin, Clarke, and Stinson were coconspirators.6 The question for the Court is whether Franklin’s statements to Stinson on September 12, after the robbery had occurred, were made “during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E). The government bears the burden of showing this by a preponderance of the evidence. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 176 (1987); see also United States v. Darwich, 337 F.3d 645, 657 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. Hamilton, 689 F.2d 1262, 1268 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1117 (1983)). We review the district court’s determination that Franklin’s statements to Stinson were made in furtherance of a conspiracy for clear error, United States v. Clark, 18 F.3d 1337, 1341 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. Gessa, 971 F.2d 1257, 1261 (6th Cir. 1992) (en banc)), and its decision to admit the statements under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) for abuse of discretion. United States v. Smith, 320 F.3d 647, 654 (6th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). There is a range of statements that are deemed to be in furtherance of a conspiracy for purposes of admission under Rule 801(d)(2)(E). This Court has “acknowledged that ‘statements in furtherance of a conspiracy can take many forms,’ such as keeping co-conspirators advised, or concealing aspects of the scheme. The statement may also be ‘susceptible of alternative interpretations.’” United States v. Tocco, 200 F.3d 401, 419 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Doerr, 886 F.2d 944, 951-52 (7th Cir. 1989)). Moreover, this Court has adopted the Fourth and Seventh Circuits’ view that “a statement may be admissible as in furtherance of a conspiracy even if not exclusively, or even primarily, made to further the conspiracy.” Tocco, 200 F.3d at 419 (quotation marks omitted) (citing United States v. Shores, 33 F.3d 438, 444 (4th Cir. 1994) and United States v. Shoffner, 826 F.2d 619, 628 (7th Cir. 1987)). Under these precedents, Franklin’s statements to Stinson were admissible. First, the mere fact that Franklin and Clarke had already completed the robbery when Franklin revealed Clarke’s participation to Stinson is not a bar to admission. Statements that are designed to facilitate the concealment of a conspiracy’s criminal accomplishments are admissible under 801(d)(2)(E). See United States v. Monus, 128 F.3d 376, 393 (6th Cir. 1997); Tocco, 200 F.3d at 419. Franklin’s statements to Stinson, which he made only hours after the robbery and in the context of dispersing the ill-gotten proceeds, were of this sort. He explained to Stinson what occurred during the robbery, provided Stinson his share of the proceeds, and cautioned Stinson not to get caught, adding a final proviso that the two were not likely to talk again soon. In addition, Franklin identified Clarke as a participant. “Statements that ‘identify participants and their roles in the conspiracy’ also qualify as statements made in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Monus, 128 F.3d at 393 (quoting Clark, 18 F.3d at 1342 (6th Cir. 1994)). Similarly, statements that “keep a conspirator abreast of a co-conspirator’s activities” are admissible. United States v. Rios, 842 F.2d 868, 874 (6th Cir. 1988). In sum, the district court did not clearly err in concluding that the statements Franklin made to Stinson were in furtherance of the conspiracy. See Clark, 18 F.3d at 1341 (noting that this Court reviews such determinations for clear error). Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Stinson’s testimony about the statements.7 6 The government introduced the statements to prove the truth of the matters the statements asserted; hence, the statements are hearsay. FED. R. EVID. 801(c). Further, the government need not charge a conspiracy for 801(d)(2)(E) to apply. See FED. R. EVID. 801, Advisory Committee Notes, 1974 Enactment, Note to Subdivision 801(d)(2)(E). Finally, Clarke does not contest the existence of the conspiracy, nor his, Franklin’s, and Stinson’s participation therein. His argument is that the particular statements at issue were not made in furtherance of the conspiracy. 7 Clarke does not challenge the admission of Franklin’s statements to Stinson on Sixth Amendment grounds. We note in any event that the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule is firmly rooted for purposes of the confrontation clause. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 181-83 (1987). Nos. 03-2439/2440 United States v. Franklin, et al. Page 12
Clarke next contends the district court erred when it declined to adopt his proposed jury instruction regarding witness credibility. We review “jury instructions as a whole to determine whether they fairly and adequately submitted the issues and applicable law to the jury.” United States v. Williams, 952 F.2d 1504, 1512 (6th Cir.1991). “A ... refusal to deliver the requested instruction is reversible only if that instruction is (1) a correct statement of the law, (2) not substantially covered by the charge actually delivered to the jury, and (3) concerns a point so important in the trial that the failure to give it substantially impairs the defendant's defense.” Id; see also United States v. Gibbs, 182 F.3d 408, 432 (6th Cir. 1999). A comparison of the jury instruction proposed by Clarke with the instruction actually given compels the conclusion that Clarke’s proposed instruction was “substantially covered by the charge actually delivered to the jury.” Williams, 952 F.2d at 1512. Clarke’s proposed instruction reads as follows: You have heard the testimony of Walter Wright, that he is an alcoholic and was drunk during his alleged conversations with Jamaal Clarke and during each interview with the federal agents, which he testified before the grand jury and all three time including this trial and two hearings before this court. You have heard testimony from Wallace Stinson that he admittedly used illegal drugs one time prior to testifying in open court. You may consider alcohol and drug use in deciding the credibility of the witnesses. You are the judges of the credibility of the witnesses and you must decide what if any weight to give to alcohol use by Walter Wright and the drug use by Wallace Stinson. J.A. 949-50. The court instructed the jury in accordance with the Sixth Circuit’s Pattern Criminal Jury Instruction regarding witness credibility, as follows: . . . Ask yourself how believable the witnesses’ testimony was in light of all the other witnesses. Was the witnesses’ testimony supported or contradicted by other evidence that you found to be believable? If you believe a witness’s testimony was contradicted by other evidence, remember that sometimes people forget things and that even two honest people who witness the same event may not describe it exactly the same way. Also you’ve heard testimony that a witness may have used or abused alcohol or drugs, and you may consider this in judging the credibility of the witnesses. J.A. 1051-52. To the extent the two instructions differ, the difference relates only to how closely each links a witness’s drug or alcohol use to his credibility. Clarke’s instruction seeks to remind the jury that Wright and Stinson may have been under the influence of drugs or alcohol during their testimony, while the court’s instruction, by declining to refer to Wright and Stinson by name, was appropriately more ambiguous as to whether particular witnesses should be viewed with extra scrutiny. The district court provided a more general instruction regarding the credibility of any witness whose testimony the jury heard. The jury was fully apprised during Wright and Stinson’s testimony of their prior and current alleged drug or alcohol abuse. The district court’s instruction properly laid out the considerations relevant to evaluating credibility and emphasized that the jury was within its power to discredit a witness’s testimony on the basis of his use or abuse of alcohol or drugs. Accordingly, the district court did not err in relying on its own instruction rather than the one Clarke proposed. Nos. 03-2439/2440 United States v. Franklin, et al. Page 13 3. Sufficiency of the Evidence for Brandishing a Firearm Although Clarke contends otherwise, we conclude that any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), beyond a reasonable doubt.8 When considering a defendant’s claim that his conviction rests on insufficient evidence, this Court is to review all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). We may not question credibility determinations made and inferences drawn by the jury unless they are wholly unreasonable. See id. Furthermore, where, as is the case here, the defendant failed to move for a judgment of acquittal during trial or no later than seven days after the verdict, see FED. R. CRIM. P. 29, “appellate review is limited to determining whether there was a manifest miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Price, 134 F.3d 340, 350 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 845 (1998) (citations omitted). “A miscarriage of justice exists only if the record is devoid of evidence pointing to guilt.” Id. Because this record is not devoid of evidence pointing to guilt, we hold that Clarke’s conviction is supported by sufficient evidence. The government charged that Clarke violated 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) under two alternative theories: first, that he did so as a principal and, second, that he did so as an aider and abettor. See 18 U.S.C. § 2. A defendant may be found to have brandished a firearm under an aiding and abetting theory of liability. United States v. Robinson, 389 F.3d 582, 590-91 (6th Cir. 2004). We conclude that Clarke’s conviction is supported by sufficient evidence under either an aiding and abetting or principal theory of liability. To sustain a conviction under § 924(c) for aiding and abetting: The government must prove that the defendant, as the accomplice, associated and participated in the use of the firearm in connection with the underlying . . . crime. The government must show that the defendant was a participant rather than merely a knowing spectator, that his presence at the scene of the crime was not surplusage, and that the crime would not have transpired without him. This can be satisfied if the accomplice knows that the principal is armed and acts with the intent to assist or influence the commission of the underlying predicate crime. Rattigan v.United States, 151 F.3d 551, 558 (6th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Lowery, 60 F.3d 1199, 1202 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v. Morrow, 977 F.2d 222, 231 (6th Cir. 1992). One may be held liable as a principal under § 924(c)(1) if the evidence shows that he actively used or brandished a firearm during a crime of violence. See Rattigan, 151 F.3d at 557; see also Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 143 (1995). Clarke concedes that armed robbery is a crime of violence but contends that the evidence does not sufficiently link him to the guns allegedly used in the armed robbery at issue here. Timothy Leake, the driver of the truck, testified that a masked individual ordered him at gunpoint to move to the passenger side of the truck. The masked individual assumed the driver’s seat and drove the truck to a secluded area, at which point he ordered Leake to exit. When Leake did so, another individual hit him over the head “with the butt of a gun.” J.A. 458-60. That individual then ordered Leake to open the cargo area of the truck. Wallace Stinson, a coconspirator 8 The government is not required to charge in the indictment that the defendant brandished a firearm because § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) is merely a sentencing factor, the applicability of which may be determined by the district judge. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 568 (2002). In this case, the government elected to charge Franklin and Clarke with brandishing firearms during the armed robbery. Accordingly, the district court instructed the jury on the basic elements of §924(c) and on the brandishing factor under a principal theory and an aiding and abetting theory; the jury returned a verdict of guilty. Nos. 03-2439/2440 United States v. Franklin, et al. Page 14 in the truck robbery, testified that on the morning after the robbery, Franklin told him that he and Clarke had committed the crime together. In addition, Walter Wright admitted in his trial testimony that before the grand jury he had testified that at some point after the robbery Clarke told him that he and “Mark” had “hit a truck.” Further, Wright testified that Franklin had asked Clarke for money because he was being watched and could not access his own share. On the basis of this testimony, the jury could have reasonably concluded that (1) the two individuals who robbed the truck were Clarke and Franklin; (2) one of the two pointed a gun at Leake and the other hit Leake over the head with the butt of a gun; and (3) Clarke knew that Franklin was armed. Under the applicable case law, e.g., Robinson, 389 F.3d at 590-91; United States v. Davis, 306 F.3d 398, 408-410 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v. McNeil, 2004 WL 1544486 (6th Cir. July 1, 2004) (unpublished); United States v. Clark, 2002 WL 1378235 (6th Cir. June 24, 2002) (unpublished), this constitutes sufficient evidence to support Clarke’s conviction for brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), either as a principal or as an aider and abettor. 4. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Clarke contends that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective in two respects. First, according to Clarke, counsel was ineffective by not moving to sever the trial such that Clarke, who was charged with fewer offenses than Franklin, would be tried separately. Second, Clarke maintains that counsel’s failure to seek a downward departure also amounts to ineffective assistance. The latter claim is moot because, as we explain infra, both defendants must be re-sentenced. Consistent with the Supreme Court’s preference, Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500 (2003), it is our general practice not to consider ineffective assistance claims on direct appeal because they are better left to a post-conviction motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See United States v. Bradley, 400 F.3d 459, 461-62 (6th Cir. 2005) (listing cases); United States v. Shabazz, 263 F.3d 603, 612 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Neuhausser, 241 F.3d 460, 474 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Pruitt, 156 F.3d 638, 646 (6th Cir. 1998). However, there is a narrow exception to the general rule that ineffective assistance claims may not be considered on direct appeal – namely, “when the existing record is adequate to assess properly the merits of the claim,” Pruitt, 156 F.3d at 646 – and Clarke contends it applies here. We agree. The existing record is adequate for purposes of determining whether counsel’s failure to move for a severance prejudiced Clarke. Clarke must show that his counsel’s performance (1) “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and (2) was prejudicial, i.e., “but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693-94 (1984). Here, Clarke maintains that it was objectively unreasonable and prejudicial to Clarke for his counsel not to seek severance. The severance of a trial of two defendants who were jointly indicted is an extraordinary remedy, employed only to alleviate “a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence.” Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539 (1993). Indeed, this Court has observed that “[a] defendant seeking severance at trial from co-defendants bears a strong burden and must demonstrate substantial, undue, or compelling prejudice.” United States v. Davis, 177 F.3d 552, 558 (6th Cir. 1999). Clarke does not specify how the joint trial prejudiced him; therefore, we construe the claim as a general one, i.e., as a claim that Clarke alleges prejudice stemming from the spill-over effect of evidence against Franklin. Clarke’s claim must fail. First, the evidence did not implicate Clarke in the ATM larcenies for which Franklin alone was tried. Second, these were discrete incidents and “[j]uries are presumed to be capable of following instructions . . . regarding the sorting of evidence and the separate Nos. 03-2439/2440 United States v. Franklin, et al. Page 15 consideration of multiple defendants.” United States v. Walls, 293 F.3d 959, 966 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 540-41). The limiting instructions provided at the commencement of the trial by the9 district court apprised the jurors of their responsibility to consider each defendant separately. The court reminded the jurors of this obligation at the close of the evidence: Each defendant has been charged with separate crimes. The number of charges is no evidence of guilt, and this should also not influence your decision in any way. It is your duty to separately consider the evidence that relates to each charge, and return a separate verdict for each one . . . . And in our system of justice, guilt or innocence is personal and individual. It is your duty to separately consider the evidence against each defendant on each charge, and to return a separate verdict for each one of them. For each one, you must decide whether the government has presented proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a particular defendant is guilty of a particular charge, okay. So it’s each defendant, each charge you have to separately consider. Your decision on any one defendant or charge, whether it is guilty or not guilty, should not influence your decision on the other defendant on any of the other charges. J.A. 1055-57. The district court continued in this manner and individually instructed the jury as to each defendant and the crimes with which each were charged. Clarke presents no evidence to rebut the presumption that these instructions adequately insured his right to a fair trial; indeed, Clarke appears to ignore the fact that the instructions were given in the first place. Consequently, we must conclude that Clarke was not prejudiced merely by virtue of being tried alongside Franklin. It follows that counsel’s failure to seek severance did not prejudice Clarke. Therefore, counsel was not constitutionally ineffective. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.