Opinion ID: 1270103
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Are the machines contraband per se?

Text: The State asserts the machines are contraband per se, such that their possession, without more, constitutes a violation. Appellant asserts that coin-operated video games are not inherently illegal, so the machines are therefore only derivative contraband. We conclude the machines are contraband per se. We have never explicitly used the terms contraband per se or derivative contraband. However, we recognized the theoretical distinction in Medlock v. 1985 Ford F-150 Pick Up VIN 1FTDF15YGFNA22049, 308 S.C. 68, 417 S.E.2d 85 (1992), where we differentiated between controlled substances or other items which are the subject matter of the crime itself and property normally used for lawful purposes. Other states have found gambling machines to be contraband per se under their statutes and have allowed their forfeiture regardless of their use or operability. See, e.g., People ex rel. Waller v. Seeburg Slot Machines, 267 Ill.App.3d 119, 204 Ill.Dec. 567, 641 N.E.2d 997 (1994) (contraband per se ), State v. One Hundred Fifty-Eight Gaming Devices, 304 Md. 404, 499 A.2d 940 (1985) (contraband per se); see also State v. Madere, 352 So.2d 666 (La.1977) (contraband, same result), Bell v. State, 212 Ark. 337, 205 S.W.2d 714 (1947) (contraband, same result), State v. Four Bell Fruit Gum Slot Machines, 196 Okla. 44, 162 P.2d 539 (1945) (contraband, same result). These illegal gambling machines cannot be considered derivative contraband because they are themselves the subject of the statute's prohibition. In light of the statute's clear proscription of mere possession of the machines, see supra part I.B.1, the machines are clearly contraband per se.