Opinion ID: 1959672
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Real Property Taxes

Text: The landlord argues that the trial court erred when it ruled that Mr. Chang owed nineteen percent of the property taxes, rather than the fifty percent claimed by the landlord. The lease stated, Tenant shall pay to Landlord as additional rent fifty (50%) percent of the real estate taxes and assessments levied on the building and land on which the building is situated. At trial the parties disagreed about the meaning of the phrase the building and land on which the building is situated. Mr. Chang maintained that this language meant that he owed half of the taxes for the portion of 1801 Adams Mill Road that he leased, i.e., Mr. Eggroll. The landlord argued that this term meant Mr. Chang was obligated to pay half of the taxes for the entire property, including the bank and the building at 1789 Columbia Road. The trial court ruled that because the entire property had not been leased to Mr. Chang, the language at issue referred to the portion of the property occupied by Mr. Eggroll, which was thirty-eight percent of the entire property. The court accordingly calculated his share of the taxes as half of thirty-eight percent, in accordance with the lease. We find no error in this ruling. There were three buildings on the property, only one of which was occupied by Mr. Eggroll. Since the tax clause of the lease refers to building in the singular, not buildings in the plural, we think a reasonable person in the position of the parties [8] would almost certainly read it as applying only to the Mr. Eggroll building, not the entire lot. But we need not decide that point conclusively because the result would be the same even if the language in the lease were ambiguous. Assuming for the sake of argument that the tax clause in the lease could be read as referring either to the entire property or just the portion leased by Mr. Chang, it was for the trial court, as trier of fact, to resolve that ambiguity because the meaning of ambiguous contracts is a question of fact. See 1901 Wyoming Avenue Cooperative Ass'n v. Lee, 345 A.2d 456, 461 n. 8 (D.C. 1975). Thus our role on appeal is limited; we will reverse only if the trial court's determination is `plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.' Waverly Taylor, Inc. v. Polinger, 583 A.2d 179, 182 (D.C.1990) (quoting D.C.Code § 17-305(a)). Here the trial court determined that Mr. Chang was liable for his half of the taxes only on the portion of the property that he occupied. This conclusion is amply supported by the evidence of record, and we will not disturb it. [9]