Opinion ID: 2973887
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Retroactivity of Booker

Text: As she did below, defense counsel contends that Booker should not be applied retroactively to her client. She failed, however, to make this argument in her opening brief to this court, raising it for the first time in her reply brief. Because the government had no opportunity to respond to this argument, we decline to reach it. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co. v. Leahey Const. Co., 219 F.3d 519, 545 (6th Cir. 2000) (issue raised for the first time in reply brief should not be considered because appellee had no chance to respond); accord Priddy v. Edelman, 883 F.2d 438, 446 (6th Cir. 1989) (“We normally decline to consider issues not raised in the appellant’s opening brief.”). As this case illustrates, unless both parties have an ample opportunity to present arguments, this court may receive an incomplete picture of the legal landscape. Defense counsel failed to call this court’s attention to contrary authority from this and other circuits in either her reply brief or in a letter filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(j). Had she done so, the list of circuits rejecting one form or another of her retroactivity argument would have included the following: United States v. Richardson, 437 F.3d 550, 555 (6th Cir. 2006) (no retroactivity problem because “[c]onclusions about [defendant’s] prior convictions would be treated the same before or after Booker”); United States v. Vaughn, 430 F.3d 518, 525 (2d Cir. 2005) (application of Booker to cases on direct review does not violate the ex post facto principle of the Due Process Clause), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Mar. 1, 2006) (No. 05-9499); United States v. Rines, 419 F.3d 1104, 1106 (10th Cir. 2005) (noting that Booker stated that it applied to all cases on direct review), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 1089 (2006); United States v. Dupas, 419 F.3d 916, 920-21 (9th Cir. 2005) (defendant had fair warning of sentence, which “is the touchstone of the retroactivity analysis under the Due Process Clause”), cert. -6- No. 05-5327 United States v. Johnson denied, 74 U.S.L.W. 3504 (U.S. Mar. 6, 2006) (No. 05-9082); United States v. Jamison, 416 F.3d 538, 539 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Scroggins, 411 F.3d 572, 576 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Duncan, 400 F.3d 1297, 1306-08 (11th Cir. 2005). As these cases make clear, to prevail on his retroactivity claim, defendant must demonstrate that he did not receive fair warning of his potential sentence, Dupas, 419 F.3d at 920-21, and that he was disadvantaged by application of Booker. Richardson, 437 F.3d at 555. With respect to the former, the district court explicitly told defendant at his plea hearing that the guidelines might well be advisory by the time of sentencing. With respect to the latter, defendant received a sentence at the low end of an advisory instead of a mandatory guidelines range and Booker did not adversely affect his actual, rather than hypothetical, sentence. Thus, even if we were to reach this retroactivity issue, defendant would not be entitled to re-sentencing.