Opinion ID: 789341
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: 13 The State defendants initially contend that we lack jurisdiction to review the district court's order dismissing Andrews' action without prejudice because this is a matter in abatement under 28 U.S.C. § 2105. 4 The State defendants argue that the revocation of Andrews' IFP status does not address the merits of his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and therefore, it fits within the definition of a `matter in abatement.' 5 14 We disagree. Although the defendants styled their complaint as one for summary judgment under Rule 56(d), they are in fact seeking to vacate the district court's order permitting Andrews to proceed IFP. The denial of a motion to proceed IFP is appealable as a final judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Roberts v. United States Dist. Ct. for the N. Dist., 339 U.S. 844, 845, 70 S.Ct. 954, 94 L.Ed. 1326 (1950) (The denial by a district judge of a motion to proceed in forma pauperis is an appealable order.); Lipscomb v. U.S., 301 F.2d 905, 905 (9th Cir.1962) (An order denying leave to proceed in the district court in forma pauperis is appealable.). 15 Moreover, even if we considered the defendants' motion as one for summary judgment, this is not a matter in abatement because our review of the dismissal of a prisoner's claim on the ground that he should not proceed IFP involves a decision on the merits. That is, Andrews would not otherwise have the opportunity to address whether any of the prior cases constitute a strike under § 1915(g) or to correct the district court's allegedly erroneous denial of IFP status. 16 Accordingly, we reject the State's challenge to our jurisdiction and hold that we have jurisdiction to review the district court order dismissing Andrews' case.