Opinion ID: 187139
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Juror Questions

Text: Rawlings first objects to the judge's practice of permitting jurors to submit questions in writing for the judge to ask the witnesses. At the beginning of the trial, the judge advised the jury as follows: I do permit jurors to ask questions.... ... We will get you some 3 by 5 cards so you can, if you deem it appropriate, ask questions. I can't let you ask questions the way the lawyers do verbally, but if you have a question, just take a 3 by 5 card and write down what your question is. I will review that with the lawyers. If I think it's an appropriate question, I will ask it. If I think it's not an appropriate question, I will not ask it. And that's why we do not let jurors verbally ask questions because most of you are not legally trained and may not know some of the nuances of the law and, therefore, not appreciate what are appropriate or inappropriate questions. And, therefore, I have to have you write them down, review them with the lawyers, and decide whether they're appropriate. If I decide not to ask a question, the juror who asked that question has to disregard the fact that they even asked it and cannot speculate or guess as to what the answer would have been. 12/20/05 Tr. 41-42. Because Rawlings did not object to the judge's instruction, we review his challenge for plain error. See United States v. Perry, 479 F.3d 885, 892 (D.C.Cir.2007) (plain error review of jury instruction not objected to). Under the plain error standard, we will remedy a trial court error only if there is (1) `error,' (2) that is `plain,' and (3) that `affect[s] substantial rights []' ... [and] (4) the error `seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.' Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997) (quoting [ United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993)]). An error affec[ts] substantial rights if it is prejudicial or affected the outcome of the district court proceedings. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770. Id. (full Olano citation added; other alterations in original). There was no plain error here. Rawlings urges that the court establish a bright-line rule forbidding jurors to pose questions for the witnesses, relying on cases from other circuits that warn of the risks involved in allowing jurors to pose questions to witnesses. Appellant's Br. 25. At the same time, however, Rawlings concedes that [e]very Court of Appeals to address this issue has determined that it is a matter within the discretion of the trial court, and that it is not prejudicial per se.  Id. 22. As of the time of trial, at least ten circuits had considered the issue and concluded that juror questions are within the trial judge's discretion. See United States v. Sutton, 970 F.2d 1001, 1005 (1st Cir.1992); United States v. Bush, 47 F.3d 511, 515 (2d Cir.1995); United States v. Hernandez, 176 F.3d 719, 723 (3d Cir.1999); DeBenedetto v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 754 F.2d 512, 516 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Callahan, 588 F.2d 1078, 1086 (5th Cir.1979); United States v. Collins, 226 F.3d 457, 461 (6th Cir.2000); United States v. Feinberg, 89 F.3d 333, 337 (7th Cir.1996); United States v. Groene, 998 F.2d 604, 606 (8th Cir.1993); United States v. Gonzales, 424 F.2d 1055, 1056 (9th Cir.1970); United States v. Richardson, 233 F.3d 1285, 1288-89 (11th Cir. 2000). Given the unanimous view of ten sister circuits and the absence of law in this Circuit, Rawlings cannot establish that the trial judge's practice constituted an error that was  `plain' or `obvious' under the law as it stood at the time of trial under the second prong of the plain error standard. See United States v. Spriggs, 102 F.3d 1245, 1260 (D.C.Cir.1996) (finding no plain error in jury instruction that was consistent with the approach taken by several other circuits at the time). Further, we conclude the judge's practice was not error at all under the plain error standard's first prong. We agree with our sister circuits that whether to allow jurors to question witnesses is a matter within the trial judge's discretion. As other courts have observed, the practice offers substantial benefits. For example, it can help focus the jurors, clear up confusion, alert counsel to evidentiary lacunae and generally ensure that the jurors have the information needed to reach a reasoned verdict. See United States v. Collins, 226 F.3d at 462; United States v. Bush, 47 F.3d at 514, 516; United States v. Sutton, 970 F.2d at 1005 n. 3; United States v. Callahan, 588 F.2d at 1086. We also agree with other circuits, however, that the practice carries significant risk: There are a number of dangers inherent in allowing juror questions: jurors can find themselves removed from their appropriate role as neutral fact-finders; jurors may prematurely evaluate the evidence and adopt a particular position as to the weight of that evidence before considering all the facts; the pace of trial may be delayed; there is a certain awkwardness for lawyers wishing to object to juror-inspired questions; and there is a risk of undermining litigation strategies. In light of jurors' lack of knowledge of the rules of evidence, a juror question may be improper or prejudicial. When a court declines to ask a question, the questioning juror may feel that her pursuit of truth has been thwarted by rules she does not understand. Concern has also been expressed over a risk that a sense of camaraderie among jurors may lead them to attach more significance to questions propounded by fellow jurors than those posed by counsel. United States v. Collins, 226 F.3d at 461-62 (citations omitted); see also United States v. Richardson, 233 F.3d at 1290; United States v. Feinberg, 89 F.3d at 336-37; United States v. Bush, 47 F.3d at 516; United States v. Groene, 998 F.2d at 606; United States v. Sutton, 970 F.2d at 1005; DeBenedetto v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 754 F.2d at 516. To minimize these risks, a district judge who decides to permit questioning by jurors in a given case should implement specific precautionary procedures. First, the court should inform counsel in advance that juror questions will be allowed, should require that all juror questions be submitted in writing, should review them with counsel out of the presence of the jury (evaluating objections, if any) and then, if it finds the question proper, should itself ask the question of the witness. See United States v. Richardson, 233 F.3d at 1290-91; United States v. Collins, 226 F.3d at 464; United States v. Feinberg, 89 F.3d at 337; United States v. Bush, 47 F.3d at 516; United States v. Groene, 998 F.2d at 606. In addition, before any questioning begins, the court should instruct the jurors about the function of the questioning procedure in clarifying factual (not legal) issues and should direct them to remain neutral and, if the judge fails to ask a particular question, not to take offense or to speculate as to the reasons therefor or what answer might have been given. See United States v. Collins, 226 F.3d at 464-65; United States v. Sutton, 970 F.2d at 1005. Then, after a particular witness has responded to the questions, the court should permit counsel to re-question the witness. See United States v. Collins, 226 F.3d at 465; United States v. Hernandez, 995 F.2d 307, 312 (1st Cir.1993); DeBenedetto v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 754 F.2d at 515 n. 1. We also think it prudent to repeat the instructions in the closing charge. Because the judge in this case scrupulously adhered to these prophylactic procedures, we conclude that his practice of asking juror questions was not an abuse of discretion even had Rawlings objected to it. See United States v. Collins, 226 F.3d at 465 (Nor do we find an abuse of discretion in the court's implementation of measures to minimize the potential risks of allowing such questions.); United States v. Hernandez, 176 F.3d at 723 (The procedure utilized here is consistent with our admonitions and consistent with the sound exercise of judicial discretion.); United States v. Callahan, 588 F.2d at 1086 n. 2 (There was no error committed in allowing the question to be asked, and the procedure employed of requiring jurors to put their questions in writing and clear their relevancy with the court was not an abuse of the court's discretion to conduct the trial fairly.). Nonetheless, this case illustrates just how perilous it can be for the court to routinely solicit and ask juror questions. Notwithstanding all of the judge's precautions, one of the juror questions he asked, although seemingly innocuous, invited possible prejudicial error. At one juror's request, the judge asked witness Copeland: And why did you follow the vehicle out of the lot? The following exchange ensued: WITNESS: Because the vehicle was part of the actual  COURT: But was there something about the movement of the vehicle that caused you to follow it? OFFICER: Yes. Well, the vehicle was a part of the scene that had just transpired. COURT: Well, was there something about the movement of the vehicle that caused you to follow it? OFFICER: Yes. It sped off at a high rate of speed. Tr. 12/20/05 at 185-86. Had the judge not quickly cut off Copeland's first response and rephrased the juror's question, Copeland might have testified on the very subject that counsel and the court agreed to avoid, namely, the planned drug transaction that Rawlings had facilitated. Because the court's corrective action prevented Copeland from testifying about the prohibited subject of the drug sale, the question, if error, was not plain error because it was not prejudicial so as to affec[t] substantial rights under the third prong of the plain error standard. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770. [2] Nonetheless, prejudice was only narrowly averted. The episode highlights the risk of allowing jury questions during trial and demonstrates why other circuits have advised that they be used only sparingly. To limit such risk in the future, we, as have our sister circuits, advise trial judges to consider on a case-by-case basis whether and to what extent jury questions are appropriate, balancing the potential benefit of such questions against the dangers they pose. See United States v. Collins, 226 F.3d at 463 (In general, ... we think that a court should attempt to balance the risks and benefits of juror questions before trial....); United States v. Richardson, 233 F.3d at 1290 ([I]n determining whether to permit juror questioning, the trial court should `weigh the potential benefit to the jurors against the potential harm to the parties, especially when one of those parties is a criminal defendant.' (quoting United States v. Feinberg, 89 F.3d at 337)); United States v. Callahan, 588 F.2d at 1086 n. 2 (District courts must in each case balance the positive value of allowing a troubled juror to ask a question against the possible abuses that might occur if juror questioning became extensive.). Permitting juror questions as a matter of course is ill-advised. See United States v. Collins, 226 F.3d at 461 (Allowing juror questions should not become a routine practice, but should occur only rarely after the district court has determined that such questions are warranted.); United States v. Feinberg, 89 F.3d at 337 (There may be cases [in which] jurors should be allowed to ask questions in order to perform their duties as fact-finders. Of course those cases are the exceptions, not the rule. In the vast majority of cases the risks outweigh the benefits.); United States v. Sutton, 970 F.2d at 1005 ([J]uror participation in the examination of witnesses should be the long-odds exception, not the rule.); cf. United States v. Ajmal, 67 F.3d 12, 14-15 (2d Cir.1995) ([T]he district court, as a matter of course, established at the outset of the trial that jurors would be allowed to question witnesses.... [T]he district court's solicitation of juror questioning absent a showing of extraordinary circumstances was an abuse of discretion.).