Opinion ID: 1254151
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: District Court's Response to Jury Question Regarding Conspiracy Duration[8]

Text: During deliberations, the jury sent out the following question for the court: On count one is it necessary for conspiracy to run from 1992 -2006 to [f]ind guilty? J.A. at 335 (Jury Communication). Over objections by Roller's and Young's counsel, the district court gave the following answer: To find a defendant guilty on Count One, you must find that there was a conspiracy that began `in or about' 1992 and lasted to `in or about' May 2006. However, to find a defendant guilty on Count One you are not required to find that a defendant was a member of the conspiracy from the beginning of the conspiracy. J.A. at 336 (Judge Communication). Roller argues that the second sentence of the judge's answer was unfairly prejudicial because it reemphasized a portion of the jury charge that the jurors had not asked about. Roller does not suggest that the answer misstated the law. Instead, Roller asserts that the jury asked only about the span of the conspiracy and that the court's inclusion of a statement that conviction did not require a finding that each individual had been a member of the conspiracy from the beginning was not responsive. Accordingly, Roller argues, this non-responsive portion of the district court's answer would have suggested to the jury that the part of the charge reflected in the second sentence of the court's response was what was important and that the jury should focus on that. Roller Br. at 36. `The district court's actions in responding to questions from the jury are reviewed for abuse of discretion.' United States v. Khalil, 279 F.3d 358, 367 (6th Cir.2002) (quoting United States v. August, 984 F.2d 705, 712 (6th Cir.1992)). There is a `high standard for reversal of a conviction on the grounds of improper instructions.' Id. (quoting United States v. Sheffey, 57 F.3d 1419, 1429 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1065, 116 S.Ct. 749, 133 L.Ed.2d 697 (1996)). Under this high standard, an appellate court `may reverse a judgment only if the instructions, viewed as a whole, were confusing, misleading and prejudicial.' Id. (quoting United States v. Clark, 988 F.2d 1459, 1468 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 832, 114 S.Ct. 105, 126 L.Ed.2d 71 (1993)). We cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion. In its initial jury charge, the district court stated that a conspiracy conviction does not require proof that the defendant knew everything about the conspiracy, or everyone else involved, or that he was a member of it from the very beginning.  J.A. at 126 (Jury Charge at 25) (emphasis added). This language follows Sixth Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction § 3.03(2). The district court's response to the jury's question reiterated the correct legal standard that had already been presented to the jury. Although the district court's response may have gone beyond the scope of the jury's question, Roller has not shown that the district court abused its discretion in doing so. Because we cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion, we deny Roller relief on this ground.