Opinion ID: 1724054
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: timberland

Text: Put simply, the central issue in the case sub judice is whether land containing valuable timber which has never been exploited or the subject of forestry management constitutes timberland for the purposes of the application of Article 562. Restated, does La.Civ.Code art. 562 require prior timber operations on the property for the land to be construed as timberland? As noted by Justice Kimball in her dissent in our original opinion, this exact issue was considered by the drafters of the 1976 revision of the law of usufruct. The original draft of Article 562, prepared by the Louisiana State Law Institute, stated: If the usufruct includes lands that were regularly exploited for timber at the time of the creation of the usufruct, and if there is no provision concerning the use and enjoyment of the landowner's rights in timber, the usufructuary is entitled to continue the operations of the owner; but he has no right to commence timber operations without the consent of the naked owner. (Emphasis added). This original version of the article was intended to adapt the open mines policy for the usufruct of minerals to the usufruct of timberlands. Nevertheless, upon a motion by Prof. Joseph Dainow, this draft of the article was rejected in favor of the more flexible prudent management standard found in Article 562 today. The language requiring regular exploitation or continuing timber operations was removed. La.Civ.Code art. 11 provides that the words of a law must be given their generally prevailing meaning, and that words of art and technical terms must be given their technical meaning when a law involves a technical matter. Timber is defined by La.Civ.Code art. 562, Comment (c) as trees which, if cut, would produce lumber for building or manufacturing purposes. The term timberland is defined in Webster's Third New International Dictionary as land covered with forest and especially with marketable timber. The expert witnesses also supplied definitions of timberland as applicable to forestry operations. Mr. Lewis Peters, Mrs. Kennedy's forestry expert, defined timberland as land that's capable of producing commercial forest products, while Mrs. Kennedy's other expert, Mr. Richard Freshwater defined timberland as land with or without timber capable of growing timber in commercial quantities. Mr. Gary Wade agreed that timberland is any land that has some type of timber growth on it, be it merchantable or not merchantable. Timberland is distinguishable from land which has been regularly managed and exploited for timber, which is best defined by the term tree farm. The defining characteristic of a tree farm as stated by this court is the land's ability, through proper management techniques such as selective thinnings and plantings, to provide sustained yields. Succession of Doll v. Doll, 593 So.2d 1239, 1249 (La.1992). Mr. Peters noted that the term tree farm was sort of like a trademark and that it's a designation that's given to landowners that apply and meet the requirements of the American Forestry Association whose ... under whose umbrella the tree farm system was created. The 143 acre tract is not a tree farm, as it has never been managed, and is unable to produce a sustained yield of timber in its present state. Under both the general definition and under the technical definition supplied by the foresters, the 143 acre tract is timberland. For this tract not to be classified as timberland, this court would have to create an alternative legal definition or term of art, requiring that the tract be regularly managed or exploited for timber prior to the initiation of the usufruct, making timberland synonymous with tree farm. We decline to do so, especially since this would substantively reenact the original version of La.Civ.Code art. 562, which had been rejected by the Louisiana State Law Institute.