Opinion ID: 2334655
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Entitlement to a hearing

Text: The plaintiff offers two arguments to support his claim that he was entitled to a pre-termination hearing. First, Monahan grounds his claim on a textual analysis of the February 25 agreement. According to plaintiff, the absence of any language in the agreement setting forth the manner in which PHA rule violations would be determined renders the agreement ambiguous in that respect. Such ambiguity, he argues, must be resolved against the PHA, the drafter of the agreement. He therefore construes the agreement as meaning that he retained a right to contest a determination that he had violated any PHA rules. In other words, plaintiff asserts that by signing the waiver agreement he waived only the right to dispute his termination once a decision was made that he had violated PHA rules. He maintains that he did not waive his right to a hearing to determine whether the violation had occurred. We disagree. It is well settled that when this Court is called upon to consider the clarity of any agreement, `the document must be viewed in its entirety and its language be given its plain, ordinary and usual meaning.' Rotelli v. Catanzaro, 686 A.2d 91, 94 (R.I.1996). When ambiguity is present, and the document's language is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, the language will be strictly construed with all ambiguities decided against the drafter. See Employers Mutual Casualty Co. v. Pires, 723 A.2d 295, 298 (R.I. 1999). When, however, no such ambiguity exists, judicial construction is at an end for the terms will be applied as written. Rivera v. Gagnon, 847 A.2d 280, 284 (R.I. 2004). We have analyzed the February 25 agreement and see no ambiguity. Paragraph 5 of the document says that during plaintiff's probationary period, any infraction of rules, regulations, insubordination, insolence, or unexcused absence from work shall be a basis for immediate termination. Paragraph 7 reads, [i]f it is determined by the employer that Patrick Monahan has violated any terms of this agreement, he shall waive all rights under the Collective Bargaining Agreement and/or any state, federal, or local ordinance or regulation pertaining to this employment. When read together, these two paragraphs can only mean that Monahan waived all rights    pertaining to [his] employment upon a determination by his employer that he had violated the terms of the February 25 agreement. Thus, under the plain meaning of the words of the agreement, Monahan's waiver became effective upon the determination by the PHA that he had violated the agreementi.e., that he had broken the PHA rules. In our opinion, PHA's decision that Monahan's conduct had contravened the agreement was neither arbitrary nor capricious. In McGee v. Stone, 522 A.2d 211 (R.I. 1987), this Court upheld the validity of a waiver agreement similar to the one involved here. There, a public employee (McGee), facing suspension on a charge of larceny, was allowed to continue his employment because he signed a waiver agreement that placed him on probationary status. Under the waiver, McGee agreed that if he were fired during the probationary period, he would waive any and all rights [he] may have    to contest the dismissal. Id. at 213. After he was fired while still on probation, McGee sought to challenge the validity of his waiver. We held that the waiver agreement was entered into voluntarily, and therefore was valid. We reasoned that because McGee unquestionably understood his right to a hearing under state law on the larceny charges, his voluntary waiver of that right, and his right to dispute his termination during the probationary period, constituted the punishment imposed for the [earlier] crimes. [9] Id. at 215. Similarly, plaintiff was well aware of, and indeed had taken steps to exercise, his contractual right to arbitrate the December 1999 termination. In an effort to avoid an unfavorable arbitration decision, plaintiff voluntarily, and with the assistance of his union representative, waived that right and his rights to a hearing concerning any future violations of PHA rules, in the February 25 agreement. The plaintiff cannot now sidestep the penalty to which he voluntarily agreed. Thus, [t]he settlement reached under the terms of the waiver is as conclusive of the parties' rights as is a judgment that terminates the litigation between them. Id. The plaintiff further argues that his absence on June 29, 2000 was excused, and he points us to factual disputes in the record regarding the circumstances surrounding that incident. We agree with plaintiff that, generally, such factual ambiguities are grist for the fact-finding mill and render summary judgment inappropriate. Here, however, because we conclude that Monahan waived his right to dispute whether his absence was justified, and because he raised no genuine issue of material fact concerning the validity of his waiver, summary judgment was appropriate. Second, plaintiff contends that he had a property interest in his job and was therefore entitled to a pre-termination hearing under the United States Supreme Court's holding in Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985). In Loudermill, two Ohio public employees were discharged and were denied pre-termination hearings. Under an Ohio statute, the employees were classified civil service employees who could be terminated only for cause. Id. at 535, 105 S.Ct. 1487. The Court concluded that, for those so classified, this statute conferred a constitutionally protected property interest in the continuation of employment, and further held that due process requires `some kind of hearing' prior to the discharge of an employee who has [such an]    interest in his employment. Id. at 542, 105 S.Ct. 1487. We need not reach this issue, however, because we conclude that Monahan validly waived his rights to any due process hearing to which he otherwise may have been entitled. It is well settled that we will refrain from passing on a constitutional question when it is clear that the case before us can be decided on another point and that a determination of such a question is not indispensably necessary for a disposition of the case. McGee, 522 A.2d at 215. In a nutshell, once PHA had determined that Monahan had violated its personnel rules, the waiver that he signed to avoid the previous termination effort stripped him of any right to dispute that decision. The rights Monahan waived were those under the Collective Bargaining Agreement and/or any state, federal, or local ordinance or regulation pertaining to [his] employment. (Letter of Agreement par. 7.) We are satisfied that this language is broad enough, and clear enough, to constitute a waiver of any rights Monahan may have had to a hearing either under the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, or under the collective bargaining agreement. We therefore hold that under the terms of the February 25 agreement, plaintiff was not entitled to either a pre- or post-termination hearing to dispute the decision by the PHA that the agreement had been violated.