Opinion ID: 2762751
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Independent source

Text: The exclusionary rule prohibits the introduction of (1) tangible materials obtained as the result of an illegal search or seizure, and (2) testimony concerning knowledge acquired during an unlawful search. 7 Evidence that is otherwise suppressible under the exclusionary rule may be admitted if the connection between the alleged illegality and the acquisition of the evidence is so attenuated as to dissipate the “taint” of the unlawful police activity. 8 To give effect to this principle, we apply different exceptions to the exclusionary rule, one of which the government contends fits the facts of this case, viz., the “independent source” doctrine. Under this exception to the exclusionary rule, evidence obtained “independently” of the alleged illegal search is admissible. In Segura v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the police officers’ illegal entry into a private apartment did not require the district court to suppress evidence subsequently discovered at that same apartment 6See United States v. Register, 931 F.2d 308, 311 (5th Cir. 1991) (refusing to consider whether exigent circumstances justified the officers’ warrantless entry because the evidence was admissible under the independent-source exception). 7 See United States v. Hernandez, 670 F.3d 616, 620 (5th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). 8 Runyan, 290 F.3d at 466 (citation omitted). 6 Case: 14-30172 Document: 00512875517 Page: 7 Date Filed: 12/18/2014 No. 14-30172 pursuant to a valid search warrant. 9 The Court specifically reserved ruling whether evidence observed in plain view following the warrantless entry is admissible under the independent source exception. The Court subsequently addressed that question in Murray v. United States and held that evidence obtained pursuant to an independently obtained search warrant was admissible despite the fact that the police officers first observed the evidence in plain view after their unlawful entry. 10 The Court further indicated that, to admit evidence under the independent-source exception, the district court is required to make two factual findings: (1) The judge would have issued the warrant even if the supporting affidavit had not contained information acquired during the illegal search, and (2) the police were not motivated to seek a warrant by items observed during their illegal search. 11 We review the first prong de novo, and the second prong for clear error. 12 We conclude from the record that the affidavit for the search warrant issued for Suite 206 did not contain any information derived from the initial warrantless entry, so the first prong is satisfied. We therefore turn to the second prong, viz., whether the district court correctly ruled that the government presented evidence sufficient to conclude that the officers would have sought a warrant to search Suite 206 irrespective of their initial warrantless entry. 9 468 U.S. 796, 814-15 (1984). 10 487 U.S. 533, 541 (1988). 11 Id. at 542-43 (“The ultimate question, therefore, is whether the search pursuant to warrant was in fact a genuinely independent source of the information and tangible evidence at issue.”); United States v. Bryan, No. 00-31491, 2001 WL 1468508, at  (5th Cir. Oct. 29, 2001) (“This circuit has developed a two-pronged test to determine whether the first and second searches were independent enough to allow evidence from the second search to be admitted.”). 12 United States v. Hassan, 83 F.3d 693, 697 (5th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). 7 Case: 14-30172 Document: 00512875517 Page: 8 Date Filed: 12/18/2014 No. 14-30172 Our inquiry is complicated by the district court’s failure to make a specific finding whether the officers were motivated to obtain a warrant by the evidence they observed in Room 206. We generally require the district court, as factfinder, to determine whether the initial illegal search “prompted or motivated the officers’ decision to seek the warrant,” and we will remand the case to the district court to make a finding. 13 On the other hand, we have declined to remand cases in which the district court neglected to make written findings on the officers’ motivation when (1) the record is sufficient to convince us that “the theory of independent source supports admission of the evidence,” and, (2) “[t]here is enough indication in the record for us to conclude that the court accepted the version of the events relayed by detectives.” 14 Here, the government argues that remand is not necessary because the record supports admitting the evidence under the independent-source exception. Washington counters that remand is necessary because: (1) the government may not raise its independent-source argument for the first time on appeal, and (2) the government failed to elicit any testimony at the suppression hearing or during trial that would support the trial court’s “passing reference” to the independent-source doctrine. We reject Washington’s contentions. First, the government asserted in the district court that the officers had developed probable cause to enter Suite 206 “entirely independent” from items subsequently found inside of it. 15 In its brief in 13 United States v. Restrepo, 966 F.2d 964, 972 (5th Cir. 1992); see Murray, 487 U.S. at 543 (remanding to the district court to make a finding that the agents “would have sought a warrant” even if they had not earlier entered the warehouse). 14 Bryan, 2001 WL 1468508, at ; see also United States v. Blount, 123 F.3d 831, 839 n.6 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (declining to remand for consideration of the officers’ motivations because no reasonable factfinder could conclude that the officers’ decision to seek the warrant was prompted by evidence observed during their unlawful entry). 15 The government did not waive its argument because it presented the independentsource issue while the district court possessed the ability to rule on it. See Hassan, 83 F.3d at 696. 8 Case: 14-30172 Document: 00512875517 Page: 9 Date Filed: 12/18/2014 No. 14-30172 opposition to the motions to suppress, the government contended that evidence observed in plain view during an initial warrantless entry need not be suppressed if it is later recovered during a search pursuant to a valid warrant. Second, although it is true that the government did not advance specific “independent source” arguments during the suppression hearing, it did present testimony consistent with its position that the evidence viewed in Suite 206 did not prompt the officers to seek a warrant. Based on our review of the record, we hold that the district court correctly denied the motions to suppress, but we do so on the alternative ground that the evidence is admissible under the independent-source exception to the exclusionary rule. The district court heard testimony at the suppression hearing that: (1) The affidavit accompanying the application for the search warrant contained only information known to the officers before they entered Suite 206, (2) the officers did not search Suite 206 prior to securing a warrant, and (3) the officers’ only actions after entering Suite 206 were to verify that there were no weapons present and no individuals hiding in the suite. Moreover, the court concluded in its written order that, even assuming the initial warrantless entry was unlawful, any evidence discovered during the subsequent search was admissible because the government had demonstrated that the police would have obtained the evidence even if no misconduct had taken place. 16 The district court did not specify whether its conclusion was based on the inevitable-discovery exception or independent-source exception. As the record supports admissibility based on independent source, we may 16 The district court cited Nix v. Williams as legal support for this conclusion. Nix concerns the inevitable-discovery doctrine, which Appellants contend does not fit the facts of this case. Because we may affirm on any basis supported by the record, we conclude it is immaterial that the district court cited Nix for its conclusion. See United States v. BochePerez, 755 F.3d 327, 333 (5th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). 9 Case: 14-30172 Document: 00512875517 Page: 10 Date Filed: 12/18/2014 No. 14-30172 affirm the district court without remanding for further findings. 17 Based on the record evidence and the district court’s written order, we hold that it did not err by denying the motions to suppress because the evidence was admissible under the independent-source exception. B. Convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 514(a)(2) – “Fictitious Obligations” The parties agree that Appellants’ convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 514(a)(2) must be vacated because they did not pass “fictitious obligations” as that term is interpreted by this court. 18 We held in United States v. Morganfield that although “[the defendants’] actions may well have created ‘forged’ or ‘counterfeit’ obligations . . . . [when] the underlying instruments are facially genuine checks, § 514(a) is not applicable.” 19 Appellants passed facially genuine checks so we vacate their convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 514(a)(2). We do not remand the cases for resentencing, however, because vacating their convictions does not affect Appellants’ advisory sentencing guidelines ranges. 20 C. United States Sentencing Guidelines § 3B1.1(c) Kittelberger appeals the district court’s application of U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c) to his sentence. He contends that the record is devoid of evidence that would 17 See United States v. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467, 540 (5th Cir. 2011) (affirming district court’s order denying a motion to suppress for reasons different than those cited by the district court). 18 The government contends that Washington waived his right to challenge his Section 514(a)(2) conviction because he failed to raise it in his opening brief. While that is generally true, we conclude that the rule should not be applied under the particular circumstances of this case. Washington raised the issue in his reply brief, no one disputes the merits of the argument, and it would waste judicial resources to revisit the issue on a collateral challenge to his sentence rather than ruling on it now. 19 501 F.3d 453, 461-62 (5th Cir. 2007) (emphasis supplied). 20 See United States v. Thomas, 690 F.3d 358, 372 (5th Cir. 2012). All counts of conviction in this case were grouped, meaning that vacating the § 514(a)(2) convictions would not affect the Appellants’ advisory guideline calculations. Although Kittelberger is serving two years on his conviction for aggravated identity theft consecutively to the sentence imposed on the other counts, vacating Kittelberger’s conviction on the Section 514(a)(2) count does not affect his sentence for his aggravated identity theft conviction. 10 Case: 14-30172 Document: 00512875517 Page: 11 Date Filed: 12/18/2014 No. 14-30172 support a finding that he was “an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor” of the criminal activity. The government counters that not only did Kittelberger fail to rebut the evidence contained in the presentence report, but the evidence at trial confirms that Kittelberger had supervisory authority and directed the activities of his co-conspirators. We review the district court’s application and interpretation of the Advisory Sentencing Guidelines de novo, and we review its factual findings for clear error. 21 A sentencing court’s decision to apply Section 3B1.1(c) on the grounds that the defendant is an “organizer” is a factual finding which we review for clear error. 22 We will conclude that a finding of fact is clearly erroneous “only if a review of all the evidence leaves us with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” 23 Section 3B1.1(c) provides for a two-level increase in the offense level if the defendant was an organizer or leader of at least one other participant in the crime and he asserted control or influence over at least that one participant. 24 When making factual findings for sentencing purposes, a district court may consider “any information which bears sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.” 25 Generally, a presentence report bears “sufficient indicia of reliability to be considered as evidence by the sentencing judge in making factual determinations.” 26 If the factual recitation in the presentence report bears sufficient indicia of reliability, then the “defendant [has] the burden of demonstrating that the [presentence report] is 21United States v. Rodriguez, 630 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). 22United States v. Giraldo, 111 F.3d 21, 23 (5th Cir. 1997). 23 Rodriguez, 630 F.3d at 380 (citation and quotation marks omitted). 24 See United States v. Jobe, 101 F.3d 1046, 1065 (5th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). 25 United States v. Zuniga, 720 F.3d 587, 590-91 (5th Cir. 2013) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 26 Id. at 591 (citation and quotation marks omitted). 11 Case: 14-30172 Document: 00512875517 Page: 12 Date Filed: 12/18/2014 No. 14-30172 inaccurate; in the absence of rebuttal evidence, the sentencing court may properly rely on the [presentence report] and adopt it.” 27 Rebuttal evidence must consist of “more than a defendant’s objection; it requires a demonstration that the information is materially untrue, inaccurate, or unreliable.” 28 Although Kittelberger asserts that “no evidence” in the record supports the enhancement and that the district court erred by relying on the presentence report, he did not introduce any rebuttal evidence that would show that the information contained in the presentence report was materially untrue, inaccurate, or unreliable. 29 The district court thus correctly relied on it. 30 Moreover, the record demonstrates that Kittelberger drove one of the participants to the bank to cash a fraudulent check, thereby controlling another participant in the conspiracy. As Kittelberger has not demonstrated that the enhancement is not plausible in light of the entire record, he fails to show that the district court clearly erred in applying Section 3B1.1(c) to his sentence.