Opinion ID: 3009545
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: facts, procedural history, and scope

Text: OF THE INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL On July 6, 1989, while vacationing with her parents at Palmas Del Mar Resort, Humacao, Puerto Rico, Natalie Calhoun rented a Yamaha Wavejammer. While she was riding the Wavejammer, Natalie slammed into a vessel anchored in the waters off the hotel frontage and was killed. At the time of her death, Natalie was twelve years old. Her parents, Lucien and Robin Calhoun, individually and in their capacities as administrators for the estate of their daughter, sued Yamaha in the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania seeking recovery under the Pennsylvania wrongful death statute, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8301 (1982 & Supp. 1994), and the Pennsylvania survival statute, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8302 (1982). Their complaint invoked federal jurisdiction both on the basis of diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (1993),2 and admiralty, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1333 (1993). The theories of recovery alleged in the complaint included negligence, strict liability, and breach of the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for purpose. The complaint sought damages for lost future earnings, loss of society, loss of support and services, and funeral expenses. It also requested punitive damages. On November 27, 1991, Yamaha moved for partial summary judgment asserting that the damages recoverable in the action, if 2 The Calhouns are citizens of Pennsylvania; Yamaha Motor Corporation, U.S.A. is a California corporation, and Yamaha Motor Company, Ltd. is a Japanese corporation. any, were governed by the federal admiralty law, and that under that law the plaintiffs were not entitled to lost future wages, loss of society, loss of support and services, or punitive damages.3 In its decision on the motion, the district court: (1) agreed with Yamaha that the federal common law of admiralty governed the Calhouns' wrongful death and survival actions; (2) held that the general maritime wrongful death cause of action recognized in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 90 S. Ct. 1772 (1970), displaced the Pennsylvania wrongful death and survival statutes and hence that any available remedy was a function of federal common law; and (3) held that under this federal common law remedy, lost future wages and punitive damages could not be awarded but loss of society and loss of support and services could be. The court therefore granted Yamaha's motion for summary judgment on the loss of future earnings and punitive damages, and denied its motion respecting the claims for loss of society and loss of support and services. Yamaha moved the district court to certify for immediate interlocutory appeal, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(b) (1993), the question whether the plaintiffs should be able to recover damages for the loss of Natalie's society. Believing that the question was extremely close, the district court granted the motion and certified the issue to this court.4 Plaintiffs then requested 3 Yamaha has conceded that funeral expenses are compensable. 4 Section 1292(b) allows for immediate appeal of interlocutory orders (1) which involve a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and where an immediate appeal will materially advance the ultimate that the district court amend its certification order to add the question whether future earnings and punitive damages were recoverable. The district court agreed, and certified the following question to this Court: The questions of law certified to the Court of Appeals are whether, pursuant to [a federal] maritime cause of action, plaintiffs may seek to recover (1) damages for the loss of the society of their deceased minor child, (2) damages for the loss of their child's future earnings, and (3) punitive damages. Both parties petitioned for permission to appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 5(a). We granted both petitions and consolidated the appeals. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(b) (1993). The district court's statement in the certification order is limited to the question of what damages are available under a federal maritime cause of action. On appeal, however, the parties have also (properly) briefed the question whether federal maritime law displaced state wrongful death and survival statutes. As will appear, the answer to the certified question depends in large part on the resolution of the displacement question. We presume that the district court intended this important question of displacement to be considered. But even if such were not the case, it would not affect our jurisdiction. As provided in Section 1292(b), we have before us an appeal from the challenged order, not just the certified termination of the litigation and (2) which the Court of Appeals permits pursuant to Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(b); FED. R. APP. P. 5(a). question. Section 1292(b) requires not that we answer the certified question, but that we decide an appeal from an interlocutory order. We therefore are not bound by the district court's formulation of the question, and may address any issue that is necessary to decide the appeal before us. See In re School Asbestos Litigation, 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1986). There the district court certified for appeal an order certifying a compulsory class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(B), but after taking jurisdiction we also reviewed the court's denial of certification under Rule 23(b)(3). Id. at 1002. See also Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820, 822-23 (3d Cir. 1973) (stating that appeals court is not bound by district court's statement of the issue on Section 1292(b) appeal), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 882, 95 S. Ct. 148 (1974); 9 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 110.25[1], at 300 (2d ed. 1994) ([I]t is the order that is appealable, and not the controlling question identified by the district court. Thus, the court of appeals may address any issue necessary to decide the case before it.) (footnote omitted). The displacement question, which, in our view, is the critical question raised by this appeal, is therefore appropriately before us, and we turn immediately to it. The questions are ones of law and our review is plenary.