Opinion ID: 415603
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The motivation for the discharge

Text: 31 Morris attempted to prove that the Authority's action was taken in retaliation for his speech by showing (1) that the Authority had a practice of retaliating against employees who complained about allegedly unlawful employment practices 17 and (2) that the Authority's allegations of unsatisfactory job performance on appellant's part were in fact merely pretextual because those citations were themselves acts of retaliation. In short, Morris attempted to make out a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge and then to discredit the Authority's asserted nonretaliatory justification for the firing. 32 The trial court excluded evidence proffered by Morris on both questions. For the reasons set forth below, we find that these rulings were erroneous. 33
34 Given a satisfactory demonstration--or, as here, a concession--that his speech was protected by the First Amendment, a prima facie case of unlawful discharge is made out if a plaintiff shows that the exercise of his right to speak and petition was a substantial or motivating factor in the decision to fire him. Mt. Healthy Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287, 97 S.Ct. 568, 576, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977). In other words, the plaintiff must show that but for his speech he would not have been fired. Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District, 439 U.S. 410, 417, 99 S.Ct. 693, 697, 58 L.Ed.2d 619 (1979); Egger v. Phillips, 669 F.2d 497 (7th Cir.1982). In order to impose liability on a political subdivision, as distinct from its employees or officials, a section 1983 plaintiff must also show that the unlawful decision was part of a custom or policy of unlawful firings on such grounds. Monell v. Department of Social Services, supra, 436 U.S. at 690-91, 98 S.Ct. at 2035-36 (1978). Once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to show by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same decision to discharge the plaintiff even in the absence of the protected conduct. Mt. Healthy Board of Education v. Doyle, supra, 429 U.S. at 287, 97 S.Ct. at 576. Plaintiff is then entitled to rebut this justification by proving it is merely pretextual. 35 In the present case the court instructed the jury that, in order to find for the plaintiff, they would have to determine that the Authority had discharged Morris solely because of his protected complaints. Jury Instruction No. 1. 18 Even if the sole factor test were correct, we would be forced to agree with appellant that the testimony of other employees as to the Authority's treatment of other complaints about employment conditions was improperly excluded. 36 The question of the legitimacy of the employer's motivation in firing the employee--i.e., the question whether an improper motive was a but for cause of the discharge--is one upon which the past acts of the employer have some bearing. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Porter, 659 F.2d 306, 320 (3d Cir.1981); Scaramuzzo v. Glenmore Distilleries, Inc., 501 F.Supp. 727, 733 n. 7 (N.D.Ill.1980), and cases cited. They also tend to show the existence of a custom or policy of unconstitutional acts, necessary to a finding of liability against the Authority. With regard to the latter, it bears noting that were evidence of other instances of retaliation inadmissible, it would be difficult to imagine many cases in which the custom or policy element could be proved save those in which the plaintiff could elicit testimony from the defendant's own agents that such a custom exists. 37 This conclusion as to the relevance of past acts of retaliation is the same whether the legal standard on which the jury was charged was the sole factor or the substantial or motivating factor test. 19 The legal standard for proof of causation is independent of the issue of whether evidence is relevant to causation. Here the plaintiff must show both that his dismissal was substantially caused by his speech and that this causation was not unique to his case but rather was customary in cases of complaint. The evidence plaintiff sought to adduce of past retaliation by the Authority for complaints from members of the Force was relevant to both requirements. 38 Morris attempted to introduce the testimony of three WMATA police officers, Bruce, Famoudou, and Nicola, in support of his allegation that the Authority engaged in the practice of retaliation against employees who complained about its employment practices. The district court excluded testimony by two of the three. 39 Officer Nicola, who is white, was employed by the Authority beginning in January 1977, and served as the officers' union shop steward. He was prepared to testify both as to management's disparate treatment of him in retaliation for his union organizing activities 20 and as to the disciplining of other officers in retaliation for complaints about employment conditions, with which he was familiar from his role as shop steward. The trial court took the view that Nicola's testimony that he personally had been disciplined for complaining was relevant to Morris' claim only insofar as it would relate other instances of retaliation for complaints about racial discrimination. Tr. 212-13B. Nicola would have testified only to events concerning complaints about sex discrimination and safety matters. Consequently, only one of plaintiff's witnesses, Officer Famoudou, was permitted to testify as to the Authority's response to his complaints, which concerned racial discrimination specifically. See Tr. 201, 203-04, 206. 40 We think this limitation on testimony was erroneous. Morris' claim that his First Amendment rights were violated rested upon an allegation that the Authority had retaliated against him for complaints that were protected speech and which were made in a reasonable time, place, and manner. Although Morris' complaints were directed at the Authority's treatment of its black employees, whereas the proffered testimony of Nicola concerned other sorts of employee complaints (made by Nicola himself and by other officers), we think that evidence showing that the employer followed a broad practice of retaliation and responded to any protected criticism with disciplinary action has some probative value on the issue of the employer's likely motivation here. Fed.R.Evid. 401. Evidence of other acts may be admitted to show motive, intent, preparation or plan. Id. 404(b). See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Porter, 659 F.2d 306, 310 (3d Cir.1981). Under the circumstances of this case, the court should have admitted the evidence as relevant, and permitted the jury to consider whether the Authority's response to criticism on other subjects, if proved, was persuasive of its motivation in firing Morris for the reasons he claims. 21 41 Morris also proffered the testimony of Officer Bruce, who was an employee at the time Morris was discharged, and who acted as a union shop steward during and after Morris' tenure on the Force. 22 Unlike Nicola, Bruce was permitted to testify to instances in which he personally had been charged with violations of Force regulations. 23 However, Bruce was not allowed to testify regarding complaints made by other officers or the Authority's response to such complaints. 42 As with the proffered testimony of Officer Nicola, appellant's contention on appeal with respect to Officer Bruce is that he should have been permitted to testify as to the discipline meted out to officers besides himself and appellant, and to the First Amendment activities of those so disciplined. Appellant argues that Bruce, as one who acted in the capacity of a shop steward handling employee-employer grievances regularly, was qualified to testify as to the correlation, if any, between complaints and discipline, and that the trial court's confinement of Bruce's testimony to his own discipline was therefore error. 43 From the outset, counsel for plaintiff cast as one of reasonableness the inquiry into the motivation in firing Morris. See, e.g., Tr. 46, 148. It appears that this emphasis on the reasonableness of the firing, instead of upon the probable motivation for the firing, ultimately led the court to confine the evidence to the facts surrounding the disciplining of Morris himself. Tr. 167. Although the court at one point appears to have recognized that the discipline accorded other officers could have been relevant to the motivation element, Tr. 168, it is evident from the record that the court gave plaintiff's counsel the clear impression that Bruce would not be permitted to testify to instances of discipline other than those directed against the witness personally or those with respect to which he represented Morris before the Authority. 44 Again, although testimony generally must be based upon personal knowledge, the requisite knowledge can be knowledge of the treatment accorded others. If a proper foundation was laid that Bruce had knowledge of other instances in which protected complaints were followed by official discipline--whether such knowledge came from first-hand observation, from records kept in the ordinary course of business, or from some other acceptable source--then he was competent to adduce that evidence. We conclude, therefore, that to the extent the testimony of Nicola and Bruce met these requirements, it should have been admitted. 24 45
46 The defense offered by the Authority to Morris' claim was in essence that its decision to discharge Morris was grounded on numerous violations of legitimate Force regulations. The Authority adverted to seventeen breaches of regulations during Morris' twenty-three month tenure, 25 culminating in a failure to report for duty when directly ordered to do so. Assistant Deputy Chief Stewart testified on behalf of the Authority that these recurrent violations constituted the true basis for Morris' dismissal. Tr. 363-69. 47 Morris sought to meet the Authority's defense by showing that the series of infractions allegedly leading to his firing was actually a series of unlawful retaliatory actions for various complaints he had voiced, in which the Authority had imposed disproportionate punishment for breaches of rules that normally went unpunished. In short, Morris sought to convince the jury that the Authority's justification was purely pretextual and fabricated only to disguise its real retaliatory motive. See, e.g., Tr. 232. 48 Morris attempted to substantiate his pretext theory with evidence that the instances of discipline leading up to his discharge typically followed close on the heels of one of his complaints to the Authority. By showing that discipline for breaches of duty that would normally be overlooked was regularly enforced only against those who voiced complaints about conditions of employment, Morris sought to convince the jury that the Authority was in fact unlawfully punishing not the breaches but the speech. This is a typical response, and the jury was fully justified in not believing it. Many violators attempt to excuse their conduct by pointing to someone else who went unpunished for identical conduct. The jury simply decided it was not identical, and we agree. 49 The trial court permitted Morris to testify to seven instances in which he complained to Authority officials (in one instance, to a D.C. Council member who sat on the Authority board of directors) about disparate treatment accorded black and white officers on the Force. However, when counsel on direct examination attempted to elicit Morris' account of how each complaint was followed in short order by a finding that he had violated Force regulations--in each case a violation that Morris alleged would usually have gone unpunished--the trial court sustained defense counsel's objections that the evidence was irrelevant. Because plaintiff had specified only the complaints in its trial brief, and not the consequent unjustified discipline, the court took the view that evidence of the discipline was beyond the scope of plaintiff's case and barred by the court's pretrial order. 26 50 As it happened, the instances of discipline to which Morris sought to testify were precisely those upon which the Authority relied in contending that its discharge was justified. Both parties sought to put the identical instances of discipline into evidence: Morris, for the purpose of showing that punishment followed his complaints; and the Authority, for the purpose of showing it had legitimate grounds for its action. Morris' contention on appeal is that he should have been permitted, on direct examination, to testify to the discipline in a way that made evident the retaliatory motivation for the discipline. 51 We agree, for several reasons. First, it was evident from the plaintiff's pretrial statement taken as a whole that Morris would seek in testifying to elucidate the link between his complaints and the disciplinary measures. The pretrial statement includes the contention that as a result of his lawful and justified complaints his superiors singled him out for harsh discipline not given others, and finally terminated him on the pretext of deficient performance and insubordination. Plaintiff's Pretrial Statement at II.A(4). It is apparent from this statement of the plaintiff's basic theory of the case that he sought to prove a connection between his speech and the Authority's asserted justification. 52 Second, it is evident from the case put on by the Authority that it could not have been surprised or otherwise prejudiced by the introduction of this testimony. Each instance of discipline about which Morris sought to testify was enumerated in the defendant's own trial brief. In fact, exposition of these instances constituted the bulk of the defense case. 53 Third, it is by now a recognized fact of employment discrimination litigation that showing of pretext can be part of the plaintiff's case in chief. The logical structure of a retaliation case, whether based upon Title VII or the First Amendment, consists in (1) the plaintiff proving his prima facie case, (2) the defendant providing a legitimate reason for its action, and (3) the plaintiff then having the opportunity to show that reason to be pretextual. However, the structure of the inquiry does not bar a plaintiff from adducing evidence of pretext at the same time his evidence of unlawful motive is presented. In instances where enforcing a rigid separation between the motivation and pretext cases would prevent the plaintiff from presenting a fair portrayal of the events as they unfolded, there is no reason to exclude evidence of pretext from plaintiff's case in chief, provided that the court and the defendant have notice, as they did here, of the plaintiff's ultimate intention to raise the pretext question. 54 We find under these circumstances that the exclusion of Morris' testimony regarding the discipline that followed (at least chronologically) his complaints to his employer was an abuse of discretion. Although we endorse the trial court's issuance of a detailed pretrial order governing the conduct of the litigation, in this instance the enforcement of the terms of part of that order by means of excluding testimony central to the plaintiff's case was an unduly strict approach. See, e.g., Schneider v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 658 F.2d 835, 848 n. 8 (D.C.Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 994, 102 S.Ct. 1622, 71 L.Ed.2d 855 (1982).