Opinion ID: 186062
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Convera's Motion to Compel

Text: 11 Under Section 4, [a] party aggrieved by the alleged failure ... of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district court ... for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement. 9 U.S.C. § 4. Nothing about Convera's motion to compel suggests that it was filed pursuant to Section 4. Convera did not cite Section 4 in the motion, and did not comply with the requirement in Section 4 that five days' notice be given of the motion to compel. Convera's contention that DSMC should be compelled to arbitrate its claims against Convera was not based on any alleged failure of DSMC to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration — the only such agreement was between DSMC and NGTL, and Convera acknowledged that [t]he DSMC[ ] claims against National Geographic are already in arbitration. Convera's Mem. Supp. Mot. to Compel, at 1. Nor did Convera seek an order directing that arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement, 9 U.S.C. § 4 — there was no such agreement between Convera and DSMC. Instead, Convera's motion to compel was expressly based on principles of equitable estoppel. Convera contended that the relation between DSMC's claims against it and DSMC's claims against NGTL was such that DSMC should be compelled to arbitrate the former along with the latter. 12 Section 4, however, applies only to an alleged failure ... to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration — not an alleged failure to arbitrate when principles of equitable estoppel indicate that you should. Convera argued that the DSMC/NGTL contract satisfies the written arbitration agreement requirement, Convera's Mem. Supp. Mot. to Compel, at 6, but Section 4 does not merely require that there be a written agreement somewhere in the picture. It requires that the motion to compel be based on an alleged failure to arbitrate under that written agreement. Convera's motion to compel is not based on any alleged failure by DSMC to arbitrate under the only written agreement at issue here — the one between DSMC and NGTL. The motion is instead based on an effort to expand DSMC's obligation beyond the terms of that written agreement pursuant to principles of equitable estoppel. As appellants acknowledge, [t]he doctrine of equitable estoppel ... by definition applies where there is no written contract between the parties.... Reply Br. at 6. 13 Convera recognizes that there is no precedent from this court compelling a party to an arbitration agreement to arbitrate with a non-signatory on the basis of equitable estoppel, see Appellants' Br. at 22, but cites cases from other circuits that have done so. Those cases typically did not address jurisdiction under Section 16 of the FAA, but instead simply proceeded directly to consider the propriety of compelling signatories to arbitrate with non-signatories. We need not and do not decide whether such an effort can ever succeed. What we do decide is that an effort to compel arbitration in such circumstances on the basis of equitable estoppel does not fall within Section 4 of the FAA. Accordingly, we hold that this court has no jurisdiction under Section 16(a)(1)(B) to hear an appeal of an order denying a motion to compel arbitration between parties not under a written agreement to arbitrate. 14 In doing so we are mindful that Section 16 is a limited grant of jurisdiction, that [i]n general, statutes authorizing appeals should be narrowly construed, and that this is particularly true with respect to statutes allowing interlocutory appeals. Bombardier, 333 F.3d at 253. We are also cognizant that jurisdictional rules should be, to the extent possible, clear, predictable, bright-line rules that can be applied to determine jurisdiction with a fair degree of certainty from the outset. See, e.g., Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock, 513 U.S. 527, 547, 115 S.Ct. 1043, 130 L.Ed.2d 1024 (1995) (rejecting multi-factor jurisdictional test in part because it would be hard to apply, jettisoning relative predictability for the open-ended rough-and-tumble of factors). Asking whether the parties are signatories to a written agreement to arbitrate satisfies these criteria. On the other hand, the application of equitable estoppel — if permitted in this context — requires a multifactor factual and legal inquiry to determine whether the issues to be litigated by the non-signatory and signatory are sufficiently intertwined with the issues subject to arbitration. That type of analysis, in turn, would require this court to delve deeply into the merits of a case before even deciding whether we had interlocutory appellate jurisdiction — an unattractive prospect.