Opinion ID: 4468130
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Laches Is a Defense to a Habeas Petition

Text: ¶13 Wren begins with a request that we reexamine our adoption of the laches defense to habeas petitions. His principal argument is that we incorporated laches into our habeas corpus jurisprudence somewhat thoughtlessly in two court of appeals opinions.8 Whatever merit those criticisms may have, 7 Wren also argues the merits of his habeas petition and asks us to reinstate his direct appeal rights. However, because we affirm the court of appeals' application of laches, we need not address this argument. 8 Laches was first explicitly mentioned as a defense against a habeas petition in Wisconsin in 1986. State ex rel. McMillian v. Dickey, 132 Wis. 2d 266, 281, 392 N.W.2d 453 (Ct. App. 1986) (While we recognize that a habeas proceeding may be dismissed under the equitable doctrine of laches, the delay on the part of the petitioner must be unreasonable.), abrogated on other grounds by State ex rel. Coleman v. McCaughtry, 2006 WI 49, 290 Wis. 2d 352, 714 N.W.2d 900. A later court of appeals decision cited McMillian for the proposition that [a]s an equitable 7 No. 2017AP880-W however, we had occasion to directly answer this question last term. In Lopez-Quintero, we made clear that the State may raise laches as an affirmative defense to a habeas petition. 387 Wis. 2d 50, ¶16. Moreover, Wren did not raise and brief this issue below, nor was it presented in Wren's petition for review. Having just considered the matter, we decline Wren's invitation to reconsider it. B. Laches Was Properly Applied to Wren's Habeas Petition ¶14 Laches is founded on the notion that equity aids the vigilant, and not those who sleep on their rights to the detriment of the opposing party . . . . 27A Am. Jur. 2d Equity § 108.9 It is, at root, an equitable defense to an equitable claim.10 Though different jurisdictions structure the analytical doctrine, habeas corpus is subject to the doctrine of laches. State ex rel. Smalley v. Morgan, 211 Wis. 2d 795, 800, 565 N.W.2d 805 (Ct. App. 1997), overruled on other grounds by State ex rel. Lopez-Quintero v. Dittmann, 2019 WI 58, 387 Wis. 2d 50, 928 N.W.2d 480. Outside the context of habeas corpus, laches is a wellestablished equitable principle in Wisconsin jurisprudence. As early as 1859, this court stated that [u]nreasonable delay, and mere lapse of time, independently of any statute of limitations, constitute a defense in a court of equity. Sheldon v. Rockwell, 9 Wis. 158 (), 162 () (1859). 9 See also Kenosha County v. Town of Paris, 148 Wis. 2d 175, 188, 434 N.W.2d 801 (Ct. App. 1988) (equity aids the vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights). 10A habeas petition is an equitable claim, so application of an equitable defense like laches makes sense, especially where habeas petitions can be filed years after the conviction. See State ex rel. Dowe v. Circuit Court for Waukesha Cty., 184 Wis. 2d 724, 728-29, 516 N.W.2d 714 (1994) (As an equitable 8 No. 2017AP880-W framework somewhat differently, the doctrine is consistent in concept: did a party delay without good reason in asserting its rights, and did the delay prejudice the party seeking to defend that claim. ¶15 In Wisconsin, application of laches to habeas petitions proceeds in two steps. First, the party asserting the defense——the State in this instance——must prove the following three elements: (1) unreasonable delay in filing the habeas petition, (2) lack of knowledge on the part of the State that the petitioner would be asserting the habeas claim, and (3) prejudice to the State. Lopez-Quintero, 387 Wis. 2d 50, ¶16. Second, even if the State proves all three elements, the court may——in its discretion——choose not to apply laches if it determines that application of the defense is not appropriate and equitable. See State ex rel. Washington v. State, 2012 WI App 74, ¶26, 343 Wis. 2d 434, 819 N.W.2d 305. ¶16 Whether the State proved all three elements under step one is a legal question we review de novo. State ex rel. Coleman v. McCaughtry, 2006 WI 49, ¶17, 290 Wis. 2d 352, 714 N.W.2d 900. Assuming step one is satisfied, we review the decision to apply laches under step two for an erroneous exercise of discretion. Id. doctrine . . . habeas corpus is confined to situations in which there is a pressing need for relief or where the process or judgment upon which a prisoner is held is void.). 9 No. 2017AP880-W ¶17 Wren asserts that the State failed to prove two of the three elements——unreasonable delay and prejudice.11 And even if the State did meet its burden, Wren maintains the court of appeals erroneously chose to apply laches in his case.
¶18 Whether a delay is reasonable is case specific; we look at the totality of circumstances. State ex rel. McMillian v. Dickey, 132 Wis. 2d 266, 281, 392 N.W.2d 453 (Ct. App. 1986) (What is reasonable varies from case to case and involves the totality of the circumstances.), abrogated on other grounds by Coleman, 290 Wis. 2d 352; see also 27A Am. Jur. 2d Equity § 131 (Whether a party's delay is unreasonable depends on the circumstances of the particular case.). ¶19 In rendering its conclusion, the court of appeals zeroed in on two factual findings. First, Wren was aware no appeal had been filed by 2010 or 2011. And during the intervening time period, he filed four separate pro se motions, none of which raised the issue presented in this habeas petition. The court of appeals held that the six-year delay from the time he knew no appeal had been filed——a full ten years after the deadline to seek postconviction relief——was unreasonably long. Wren concedes the second element, i.e., the State lacked 11 knowledge that he would be asserting the habeas claim. 10 No. 2017AP880-W ¶20 As an initial matter, unreasonable delay in laches is based not on what litigants know, but what they might have known with the exercise of reasonable diligence. This underlying constructive knowledge requirement arises from the general rule that ignorance of one's legal rights is not a reasonable excuse in a laches case. 27A Am. Jur. 2d Equity § 138.12 Where the question of laches is in issue, the plaintiff is chargeable with such knowledge as he might have obtained upon inquiry, provided the facts already known by him were such as to put a man of ordinary prudence upon inquiry. Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co., 93 Wis. 153, 174, 66 N.W. 518 (1896) (citations omitted). To be sure, what we expect will vary from case to case and litigant to litigant. But the expectation of reasonable diligence is firm nonetheless.13 ¶21 Thus, the question is when Wren either knew or should have known he had a potential claim. We agree with the court of appeals that the delay clock started running no later than 2010 or 2011 when Wren, by his own admission, learned no appeal had been filed and had long since heard nothing from his attorney. See also Jones v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 531, 533 12 (1984) (Where laches is raised, knowledge of the law is imputed to all plaintiffs. Consequently, professed ignorance of one's legal rights does not justify delay in filing suit.). See also 27A Am. Jur. 2d Equity § 139 (The correct 13 inquiry in determining whether a claimant's conduct resulted in a want of due diligence requires focus not upon what the plaintiff knows, but what he or she might have known, by the use of the means of information within his or her reach, as the law requires a party to discover those facts that were discoverable through the exercise of reasonable diligence.). 11 No. 2017AP880-W After obtaining this knowledge, Wren researched and leveraged his available resources to craft four separate pro se motions relating to his conviction and sentence——none even hinting at the claims raised before us.14 After four attempts to seek various kinds of other postconviction relief, we agree with the court of appeals that a habeas petition coming ten years after his conviction and six years after he knew his attorney didn't file the appeal he was allegedly promised is a delay without good reason. ¶22 Wren raises two principal objections in response. First, he didn't know he could make such a claim and didn't know how to do so; and when he did discover this possible claim, he timely brought it within three to four months. Second, Wren proffers that any delay is actually the State's fault, and that's why he was supposed to have counsel in the first place. ¶23 Wren's first objection, echoed by the dissent, is really an effort to except Wren from the constructive knowledge requirement we apply to all other litigants. The not-so-silent argument being made is that Wren is less capable than others and should be held to a lower standard. However, we regularly 14 His first two motions dealt with the DNA surcharge and restitution award. It was not until his third motion in 2015 that he turned his attention to his sentence, the issue he states he would like to challenge if his direct appeal rights are reinstated. But even his 2016 motion for sentence modification was based on the circuit court's purported reliance on an improper fact——again, nothing suggesting a broader challenge to his conviction or sentence, or to his trial counsel's effectiveness. 12 No. 2017AP880-W require legally untrained litigants to assert their rights in a timely manner.15 Nothing prevented Wren from contacting another attorney. Nothing prevented Wren from researching available options to ensure he took advantage of every possible legal argument he could make. It surely cannot be that 20-year-olds (Wren's approximate age when he found out no appeal was forthcoming) are deemed incompetent. And while the PSI noted Wren had a second grade reading level at the time of sentencing, that detail alone does not mean he cannot research, consult others, and find out what needs to be done. In fact, Wren did just this when he filed four pro se motions regarding other matters prior to filing his habeas petition. This reflects someone who is more than capable of being resourceful.16 ¶24 Wren's paramount objection seems to be that as a pro se litigant whose postconviction attorney abandoned him, any delay is the State's fault, not his. Incorrect. As we explain See infra, ¶25. 15 Courts have long recognized that a violation of constitutional rights——and ineffective assistance of counsel is a violation of the Sixth Amendment——must be timely asserted even in criminal cases. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 444 (1944) (No procedural principle is more familiar to this Court than that a constitutional right may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it.). For example, Wren noted in his habeas petition that his 16 family discovered Kostich's disciplinary history. Moreover, the circuit court made no findings suggesting that Wren had the kind of severe mental limitations that might call for even broader latitude than we normally give pro se litigants. 13 No. 2017AP880-W below, we have long required pro se litigants, just like those with an attorney, to act reasonably in defense of their rights. ¶25 Pro se litigants are generally granted a degree of leeway in recognition of the fact that they are ordinarily unfamiliar with the procedural rules and substantive law that might govern their appeal. Rutherford v. LIRC, 2008 WI App 66, ¶27, 309 Wis. 2d 498, 752 N.W.2d 897. But by definition, a degree of leeway means the additional leniency will run out at some point. Thus, for example, while we construe pro se petitions, motions, and briefs to make the most intelligible argument we can discern, we do not impute to pro se litigants the best argument they could have, but did not, make.17 And while pro se litigants are given leeway in the style of a motion, we ordinarily hold them to strict deadlines, whether they know about them or not.18 In other words, we generally do not hold pro se litigants only to deadlines or arguments that See State v. Romero-Georgana, 2014 WI 83, ¶69, 360 17 Wis. 2d 522, 849 N.W.2d 668 (Although we liberally construe filings by pro se litigants, . . . there is a limit to our lenience. A reviewing court might avert its eyes from the flaws on the peripheries, but it will not ignore obvious insufficiencies at the center of a motion. (internal citation omitted)). See Waushara County v. Graf, 166 Wis. 2d 442, 452, 480 18 N.W.2d 16 (1992) (Pro se appellants must satisfy all procedural requirements, unless those requirements are waived by the court. They are bound by the same rules that apply to attorneys on appeal. The right to self-representation is '[not] a license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.' (quoting Farretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975))). 14 No. 2017AP880-W they know; we hold them to deadlines and arguments we expect them to discover with reasonable diligence. This means that once Wren no longer had a lawyer representing him, he was not free to do nothing to address the claims he raised in his habeas petition. Rather, he had an independent obligation to act——the same standard we apply to all pro se litigants. ¶26 The postconviction relief process is instructive on this point. Following a direct appeal, defendants seeking to attack their criminal convictions may do so through a motion under Wis. Stat. § 974.06 (2017-18).19 But this form of relief comes with a significant restriction. Under subsection (4), unless a sufficient reason is given, any legal issues that could have been raised in a prior motion may not be brought in a subsequent § 974.06 motion. § 974.06(4). And in 1994, this court made clear that if the issue could have been raised on direct appeal, the litigant has lost the opportunity to bring it under § 974.06. State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 173, 517 N.W.2d 157 (1994).20 19All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2017-18 version. 20This is no outlier; State v. Escalona-Naranjo has been cited thousands of times in Wisconsin courts. 185 Wis. 2d 168, 517 N.W.2d 157 (1994). 15 No. 2017AP880-W ¶27 The vast majority of motions under Wis. Stat. § 974.06 are filed by pro se litigants.21 The statute's strictures are not ignored or relaxed for pro se litigants; we apply the same rules to everyone. This means that even a potentially meritorious constitutional claim on a petitioner's third § 974.06 motion——a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, for example——is a nonstarter if it could have been brought on direct appeal or in the prior § 974.06 motions.22 These pro se litigants, no less than Wren here, are almost uniformly untrained in the law. Yet we expect them to exercise reasonable diligence to learn all potentially meritorious claims and to raise them in their first § 974.06 motion. If they don't, the claim is procedurally barred, whatever its merits may be.23 21This is in large part because there is no constitutional right to counsel on a collateral attack. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) (We have never held that prisoners have a constitutional right to counsel when mounting collateral attacks upon their convictions, . . . and we decline to so hold today. Our cases establish that the right to appointed counsel extends to the first appeal of right, and no further. (internal citation omitted)). 22See, e.g., Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d at 186 ([Escalona-Naranjo] has not alleged a sufficient reason as to why his allegation of ineffective assistance of trial counsel could not have been raised when he filed his [Wis. Stat. §] 974.02 motion for a new trial.); Romero-Georgana, 360 Wis. 2d 522, ¶5 ([T]he defendant has not offered a sufficient reason in his third postconviction motion for failing to raise his [Wis. Stat.] § 974.06 claim [for ineffective assistance of counsel] in his second postconviction motion. . . . Consequently, the defendant's claim is barred.). 23Unless, of course, an exception in Wis. Stat. § 974.06 is triggered. 16 No. 2017AP880-W ¶28 Wren appears to believe——as does the dissent——that ineffective assistance of counsel is an exception to these principles. Yet no authority to this effect is cited, nor are we aware of any. Without question, if Wren told Kostich to file an appeal and Kostich failed to do so, that failure would establish constitutionally deficient performance, and prejudice is presumed. See Garza v. Idaho, 139 S. Ct. 738, 744 (2019) ([P]rejudice is presumed 'when counsel's constitutionally deficient performance deprives a defendant of an appeal that he otherwise would have taken.' (quoting Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 484 (2000))). The law is clear that Wren is not liable for the faults of his constitutionally deficient counsel. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 754 (1991). ¶29 But Wren and the dissent take this proposition far afield from its more modest foundations. They argue that when a defendant alleges he has been denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, any subsequent delay must be attributed to the State due to its failure to provide adequate counsel in the first instance. Or said another way, if his counsel failed, Wren is relieved of any further obligation to assert his own rights. Or maybe more charitably, because he didn't know what actions to take, Wren was absolved from taking any action at all.24 There are two problems with this line of argument. Wren also argues he did not know he should file a habeas 24 petition in the court of appeals until our 2014 decision in Kyles, 354 Wis. 2d 626. But this decision only clarified where such a claim should be filed. Nothing in Kyles announced 17 No. 2017AP880-W ¶30 First, it assumes Wren's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was denied. But that is the very claim Wren wishes to maintain if this habeas petition is successful. One cannot assume his ultimate claim will be successful in order to assess whether he delayed in bringing that very claim. ¶31 Second, and more to the point, Wren's argument that laches cannot apply when counsel fails to appeal as promised is without any legal support in Wisconsin. The issue before us is not, did Wren, with counsel, miss the deadline. The question is, knowing counsel did not file an appeal, did Wren himself unreasonably delay in seeking relief. If the dissent is correct that any delay of the sort alleged here is attributable to the State, then Wren could wait ten, twenty, or even thirty years to raise his claim, regardless of any impact on the State's ability to address the merits of an alleged ineffective assistance claim. This cannot be correct. Pro se litigants, including those who claim their trial counsel did not serve them by filing an appeal, still have an independent obligation to timely raise these issues with the court on their own. A pro se litigant has no license to lay in the weeds and wait to raise an issue of anything new related to the substance or timing of a petition to reinstate direct appeal rights because of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The issue here is not that Wren timely raised the claim in the wrong court. It is that he untimely raised the claim. This argument is also unpersuasive in light of the fact that, notwithstanding his filing of several postconviction motions in the interim, Wren did not file his habeas petition until three years after Kyles was decided. 18 No. 2017AP880-W potential merit. Washington, 343 Wis. 2d 434, ¶23. After knowing no appeal had been filed, and after knowing his counsel had not responded to him, Wren had an obligation to exercise reasonable diligence and raise the issues in a timely manner. Wren's delay of six to seven years from the time he knew this is not attributable to the State; it is on Wren. Put simply, Wren had some time to figure this out, but not unlimited time. Here, his delay was unreasonable.
¶32 Wren's unreasonable delay alone is not sufficient to support the application of laches. The State also must prove that the unreasonable delay prejudiced its defense against the habeas petition.25 Coleman, 290 Wis. 2d 352, ¶19. What amounts 25Many jurisdictions include in their prejudice analysis whether the delay prejudices the state's ability to address the underlying merits should the petition be granted. The State has made no such argument in this case, but it is a common position around the country. See, e.g., United States v. Darnell, 716 F.2d 479, 480 (7th Cir. 1983) (The government's ability to meet successfully the allegations of the motion or to present a case against the defendant if he is granted a new trial may be greatly diminished by the passage of time. (footnote omitted)); Telink, Inc. v. United States, 24 F.3d 42, 48 (9th Cir. 1994) (In making a determination of prejudice, the effect of the delay on both the government's ability to respond to the petition and the government's ability to mount a retrial are relevant. (citing Darnell, 716 F.2d at 480)); In re Douglas, 200 Cal. App. 4th 236, 246 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) ([T]he People have been prejudiced both with regard to retrying Defendant and to responding to issues raised in Defendant's petition.); Armstrong v. State, 747 N.E.2d 1119, 1120 (Ind. 2001) (For post-conviction laches purposes, prejudice exists when the unreasonable delay operates to materially diminish a reasonable likelihood of successful re-prosecution. (citation omitted)); 19 No. 2017AP880-W to prejudice, such as will bar the right to assert a claim after the passage of time pursuant to laches, depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case, but it is generally held to be anything that places the party in a less favorable position. 27A Am. Jur. 2d Equity § 143. ¶33 Courts commonly describe two types of prejudice: evidentiary and economic.26 The State here claims evidentiary Woodberry v. State, 101 P.3d 727, 731 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004) (The length of th[e] delay is unreasonable, and the State would undoubtedly be prejudiced if forced to retry [the petitioner].); Jones v. State, 126 A.3d 1162, 1182 (Md. 2015) ([W]e conclude that, for purposes of determining whether laches bars an individual's ability to seek coram nobis relief, prejudice involves not only the State's ability to defend against the coram nobis petition, but also the State's ability to reprosecute.); Johnson v. State, 714 N.W.2d 832, 838 (N.D. 2006) ([P]rejudice exists when the unreasonable delay operates to materially diminish a reasonable likelihood of successful reprosecution. (quoting Kirby v. State, 822 N.E.2d 1097, 1100 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005))); Ex Parte Perez, 398 S.W.3d 206, 215 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) ([We] expand the definition of prejudice under the existing laches doctrine to permit consideration of anything that places the State in a less favorable position, including prejudice to the State's ability to retry a defendant . . . .). 26 See ABB Robotics, Inc. v. GMFanuc Robotics Corp., 828 F. Supp. 1386, 1393 (E.D. Wis. 1993) (Material Prejudice 'may be either economic or evidentiary.' (quoted source omitted)). American Jurisprudence, using slightly different terms, describes it this way: Generally, there are two main types of prejudice arising from delay by plaintiffs in bringing their claims that support the laches defense: (1) defense prejudice, whereby the defendant is impaired from successfully defending itself from suit given the passage of time; and (2) economic prejudice, whereby the costs to the defendant have significantly increased due to the delay. 20 No. 2017AP880-W prejudice. Evidentiary prejudice . . . may arise where a plaintiff's delay in bringing an action has curtailed the defendant's ability to present a full and fair defense on the merits due to the loss of evidence, the death of a witness, or the unreliability of memories. 30A C.J.S. Equity § 158. ¶34 The loss of key records and the unavailability of essential witnesses are classic elements of prejudice in a laches defense. Id. The death of key witnesses is precisely the kind of thing laches is aimed at, particularly where the the decedent's knowledge is crucial to a party's defense . . . . 27A Am. Jur. 2d Equity § 152. American Jurisprudence explains: The doctrine of laches is peculiarly applicable where the difficulty of doing justice arises through the death of the principal participants in transactions complained of, or of witnesses to transactions . . . . For example, documents may have been misplaced or destroyed, or it may be difficult or impossible for the party to defend a claim if essential witnesses are deceased . . . . Id. § 149.27 27A Am. Jur. 2d Equity § 144. The Wisconsin Practice Series offers draft forms for 27 practitioners. One of its sample laches forms addresses precisely this type of scenario as an archetypal issue. The form reads: The plaintiff had knowledge of all of the facts set forth in the complaint at least _______ years before commencement of this action. During that interval, all persons who would be material witnesses have died, the defendant's position has substantially changed as a result, and the defendant is materially prejudiced. The plaintiff should be barred by laches from obtaining relief in this action. 21 No. 2017AP880-W ¶35 Wren asserts that the State has not proven prejudice. He rests his argument largely on the fact that the State's claim of prejudice relies on the unavailability of Attorney Kostich. And in that vein, Wren points specifically to the circuit court's factual findings that he believed Kostich would file an appeal on his behalf and subsequently failed to respond to Wren or his family, despite their attempts to contact him. If these findings are accepted, Wren maintains, that establishes ineffective assistance of counsel, and no contradictory hypothetical evidence could matter. ¶36 Wren's argument on this point is superficially strong, but it rests on a faulty foundation. To be sure, the State does not contest the circuit court's factual findings. But fairly understood, the State advanced something even more fundamental: it had no tools and no evidence to defend the habeas claim at all because its necessary evidence——the files and testimony of Kostich——were unavailable due to Wren's unreasonable delay in raising the issue. The State made this point most poignantly at oral argument when it said it did not challenge the factual findings because——due to Wren's delay——it had nothing with which to challenge them. Even the evidentiary hearing at which the circuit court made its factual findings was a one-sided story. This is the very definition of prejudice. 5 Wisconsin Practice Series: Civil Procedure Forms § 40:433 (3d ed. 2019). 22 No. 2017AP880-W ¶37 It is no excuse to say that we do not know what testimony Kostich would have offered, or what evidence his case files may have contained. Zizzo v. Lakeside Steel & Manufacturing Co. is instructive on this point. 2008 WI App 69, 312 Wis. 2d 463, 752 N.W.2d 889. There, a son who inherited property sought to discharge the mortgage obligations on the property in part on the grounds of laches. Id., ¶1. His deceased parents received a loan in 1989 and were supposed to pay off the property in 1993, but no payments were ever made, nor were efforts made to collect or foreclose on the mortgage. Id. The mortgage holder responded that no prejudice was shown, essentially arguing the claim was speculative because he does not know exactly what information his [deceased] parents possessed . . . . Id., ¶20. The court's response there is true here as well: Of course he does not know that information——and that is exactly how he is prejudiced. Id. ¶38 It is important to stress that prejudice to a party for purposes of laches does not mean a party is so disadvantaged that it cannot prosecute its case. The prerequisite under our law is prejudice due to the delay, i.e., disadvantage to a party. Thus, the legal element is met by showing the State's defense of the habeas petition was meaningfully disadvantaged. The death of the essential witness to the events at issue, along with the loss of his documentary files, unquestionably satisfies this standard. 23 No. 2017AP880-W
Its Discretion in Applying Laches ¶39 Though we agree that the State proved all three elements of laches as a matter of law, the court of appeals still had the duty and authority to decide whether to apply laches in this case. As noted above, we review this decision for an erroneous exercise of discretion. Coleman, 290 Wis. 2d 352, ¶17. Therefore, as long as the court applied a proper standard of law and employed a demonstrated, rational process to reach a conclusion that a reasonable court could reach, the decision should be affirmed. State v. Cooper, 2019 WI 73, ¶13, 387 Wis. 2d 439, 929 N.W.2d 192. When we review a discretionary decision, we look for reasons to affirm the lower court's decision, even if its reasoning could have been explained more fully. See State v. Hurley, 2015 WI 35, ¶29, 361 Wis. 2d 529, 861 N.W.2d 174. ¶40 The court of appeals properly acknowledged it needed to exercise its discretion whether to apply laches to Wren's case. In deciding to do so, the court reasoned that application was appropriate because Wren waited over ten years to raise concerns about the lack of appointment of postconviction counsel and a direct appeal, despite the fact that he sought relief numerous times from the trial court. State ex rel. Wren v. Richardson, No. 2017AP880-W, unpublished slip op. at 9 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 2018). The court relied significantly on the reasoning of Washington, 343 Wis. 2d 434, where the petitioner waited five years to seek reinstatement of his appellate rights. 24 No. 2017AP880-W ¶41 Wren's objections to the court's decision to apply laches are predominantly echoes of his previous arguments: he shouldn't be faulted for the State's failure to ensure he had constitutionally adequate counsel; he didn't know he could do this; and he wasn't familiar with the court system. ¶42 All of these assertions, however, are aimed at a rebalancing of the equities in this court. That is not how we review discretionary decisions. The court of appeals' decision is sufficient to satisfy our standard of review. It was reasonable for the court to conclude that even if the State failed to provide him with constitutionally adequate counsel, any subsequent delays by Wren should not be attributed to the State.28 It was reasonable to conclude that the State's Furthermore, while failure to file an appeal is deficient 28 performance for which prejudice is presumed, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel generally fail absent some form of corroboration of the attorney's actions. A defendant on a post-conviction motion may bring a claim of ineffective counsel. If the counsel in question cannot appear to explain or rebut the defendant's contentions because of death . . . then the defendant should not, by uncorroborated allegations, be allowed to make a case for ineffectiveness. The defendant must support his allegations with corroborating evidence. Such evidence could be letters from the attorney to the client, transcripts of statements made by the attorney or any other tangible evidence which would show the attorney's ineffective representation. . . . In other words, we will presume that counsel had a reasonable basis for his actions, and the defendant cannot by his own words rebut this presumption. Such a burden will assure that post-conviction proceedings will not be brought solely on the basis of ineffective counsel 25 No. 2017AP880-W inability to mount a defense due to Wren's delay should outweigh Wren's interest in further challenging his conviction.29 The question before us is not whether we would have made the same decision, but whether the court of appeals applied a proper standard of law and employed a demonstrated, rational process to reach a conclusion that a reasonable court could reach.30 The answer is yes it did.