Opinion ID: 548943
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Rios Decision

Text: 17 By order dated June 25, 1990, the Supreme Court vacated our judgment and remanded the case to us for further consideration in light of United States v. Rios, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 1845, 109 L.Ed.2d 224 (1990), which was decided after our opinion in Vastola was filed. --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. at 3233, 111 L.Ed.2d 744. In Rios, the Supreme Court decided that the suppression of tapes derived from an authorized electronic surveillance is required where the government is unable to offer a satisfactory explanation for a delay in sealing the tapes in accordance with 25 U.S.C. Sec. 2518(8)(a). In so holding, the Court expressly overruled Falcone and its progeny in other appellate courts. 110 S.Ct. at 1850 n. 5. 18 The facts of Rios were similar to those here insofar as the sealing delay is concerned. Effective April 27, 1984, the government originally obtained authorization to intercept communications at the defendant's residence in Levittown, Puerto Rico. Two extensions of the original order were granted, the second expiring on July 23, 1984. However, on July 9, 1984, the government terminated the surveillance because the defendant moved to a new residence in El Cortijo, Puerto Rico. 110 S.Ct. at 1848. On July 27, 1984, the government obtained a new surveillance order covering the El Cortijo residence which, after extensions, expired on September 24, 1984. After an additional surveillance order covering the defendant's car finally expired on October 10, 1984, the government, on October 13, 1984, had all of the tapes from the Levittown and El Cortijo residences judicially sealed. Id. 19 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's determination that the Levittown tapes were inadmissible because they should have been sealed at the latest on July 23, 1984, when the final extension order expired. United States v. Ojeda Rios, 875 F.2d 17, 22 (2d Cir.1989). The court rejected the government's threshold argument that the El Cortijo surveillance order was an extension of the Levittown order, reasoning that, under the Wiretap Act, an extension order must cover the same location as the original surveillance order. Id. It similarly rejected the government's suggestion that its mistaken belief that the sealing obligation did not arise until there was a lapse in the investigation as a whole constituted a satisfactory explanation for the sealing delay. In this regard, the court stated that [t]he privacy and other interests affected by the electronic surveillance statutes are sufficiently important to preclude the government from relying on a misunderstanding of the law as its explanation for a sealing delay. Id. at 23. Therefore, following its precedent that wiretap evidence may be suppressed on the basis of an unexplained sealing delay standing alone, see United States v. Massino, 784 F.2d 153, 156 (2d Cir.1986), the court affirmed. 20 The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeal's reasoning insofar as it held that the government's satisfactory explanation for a substantial delay in sealing wiretap evidence is a precondition to its admissibility under section 2518(8)(a), regardless of whether the authenticity of the tapes has been challenged. In doing so, the Court explained that a satisfactory explanation for a sealing delay is required by the literal language of section 2518(8)(a), and that any other reading of the section would eviscerate the force of the sealing requirement as a safeguard against tampering. 110 S.Ct. at 1849-50. It rejected our interpretation of the sealing requirement in Falcone, namely that the evidence could be admitted upon proof of nontampering even where a sealing delay is not satisfactorily explained, as inconsistent with the unambiguous language of the statute stating:It is true that offering to prove that tapes are authentic would be consistent with Congress's concern about tampering, but even if we were confident that tampering could always be easily detected, we would not be at liberty to agree with the Government, for it is obvious that Congress had another view when it imposed the sealing safeguard. 21 Id. at 1850 (footnote omitted). 22 Ultimately, however, the Court remanded the case for further factual inquiry into whether the government's asserted belief that it had no obligation to seal the tapes until the conclusion of its entire investigation was its actual reason for the sealing delay. The Court did not decide when the obligation to seal in fact arose but, instead, stated that in view of existing Second Circuit precedent at the time of sealing delay, the government's explanation was objectively reasonable and hence would suffice as a satisfactory explanation if it was the actual reason for the delay. Id. at 1851.