Opinion ID: 2064615
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: herman's claim against grand forks

Text: Herman, in his appeal from the judgment on the pleadings entered by the district court in favor of Grand Forks, presents three issues: a. Was the 90 day notice requirement of North Dakota Century Code, Chapter 40-42 regarding actions against municipalities for defective streets and bridges impliedly repealed by the enactment of the Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act of 1975? [1] b. If said notice requirement was impliedly repealed, are the notice provisions in the Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act of 1975 conditions precedent to suit, or merely directory? [2] c. If the notice provisions of North Dakota Century Code, Chapter 40-42 were not thus repealed, is such notice requirement unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection, and are the notice provisions of the 1975 Act unconstitutional if found to be mandatory and not directory? In order to sustain his first issue, appellant must overcome this court's resistance to repeals of statutes by implication. See, e. g., Rodgers v. Freborg, 240 N.W.2d 63 (N.D.1976). However, the fundamental test in all cases pertaining to repeal by implication is the intent of the Legislature. See, e. g., State v. Hagge, 224 N.W.2d 560 (N.D.1974). Chapter 40-42, N.D.C.C., was a special Act concerned only with claims against cities for injuries on the streets. Chapter 295, S.L.1975, on the other hand, was a general Act concerned with tort liability of all political subdivisions, including cities. Section 1-02-07, N.D.C.C., provides: Whenever a general provision in a statute shall be in conflict with a special provision in the same or in another statute, the two shall be construed, if possible, so that effect may be given to both provisions, but if the conflict between the two provisions is irreconcilable the special provision shall prevail and shall be construed as an exception to the general provision, unless the general provision shall be enacted later and it shall be the manifest legislative intent that such general provision shall prevail. [3] A reading of Herman's complaint against Grand Forks convinces us that it comes within the purview of Chapter 40-42, N.D.C.C., because that chapter applied to any claim against a city . . . for damages or injuries alleged to have arisen from the defective, unsafe, dangerous, or obstructed condition of any street, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, or bridge of the municipality or from the negligence of the municipal authorities in respect to any such street, sidewalk, crosswalk, culvert, or bridge,. . . Sec. 40-42-01, N.D.C.C. Herman points out that the definition of the term claim in Chapter 295, Section 1, S.L.1975, would include the type of action commenced by him in this lawsuit. [4] He also argues that the definition of the term political subdivision as used in that section would include Grand Forks. [5] Finally, Herman submits that because Chapter 295, Section 3, S.L.1975, excludes claims for damage caused by the use or operation of motor vehicles or aircraft by a political subdivision from the terms of the Act, that exclusion is evidence of the Legislature's intent that all other claims should be covered thereunder, thus impliedly repealing the provisions of Chapter 40-42, N.D.C.C. [6] Herman does not ask us to construe Chapter 40-42, N.D.C.C., and Chapter 295, S.L.1975, together; rather, he asks us to conclude that the latter enactment impliedly repealed the former. Such an argument necessarily prompts a conclusion that the two enactments are irreconcilable. Yet, if they are irreconcilable, his argument would contravene the provisions of Section 1-02-07, N.D.C.C., unless we find that it is the manifest legislative intent that such general provision shall prevail. [7] Grand Forks argues that because the 1975 legislation did not expressly repeal Sections 40-42-01, 40-42-02, and 40-42-03, N.D.C.C., and because these provisions were, in fact, expressly repealed by the Legislature in 1977, [8] the Act must have been in existence until July 1, 1977, when the repeal became effective. We note, however, that Chapter 303, Section 16, S.L. 1977, provides: If a claim against a municipality was filed in the office of the city auditor in accordance with section 40-42-01 after April 8, 1975, and prior to July 1, 1977, and the cause of action against the municipality was dismissed on the basis of failure to file the claim with the county auditor in accordance with section 4 of chapter 295 of the 1975 Session Laws of North Dakota, such claim is preserved and may be filed in the office of the city auditor within ninety days after the effective date of this Act. Notwithstanding sections 40-42-02 and 40-42-03, the time limits for rejecting a claim and for bringing an action shall be determined on the basis of the date a claim was filed as authorized by this section. The action by the 1977 Legislature is not indicative of the intent of the 1975 Legislature. [9] See, e. g., St. Vincent's Nursing Home v. Department of Labor, 169 N.W.2d 456 (N.D.1969). We are impressed by the fact that Chapter 295, S.L.1975, was an obvious legislative response to the invitation issued by this court in Kitto v. Minot Park District, 224 N.W.2d 795 (N.D.1974), wherein this court held that the political subdivisions of this State were not immune from tort liability, but delayed the effect of its decision, except with respect to the parties involved therein, [10] until fifteen days after adjournment of the 1975 Legislative Assembly. Thus Chapter 295, Section 13, S.L.1975, sets forth the legislative intent of the enactment as follows: It is the intent of the legislature that this Act is to provide the political subdivisions of this state with temporary protection only until July 1, 1977. This Act is deemed to be in the best interest of the people of this state and is an exercise of the police powers. This Act is a temporary response to the recent judicial decision which held that the doctrine of governmental immunity from tort liability as it applies to political subdivisions should not be sustained in this state. It is the policy of the legislature to encourage political subdivisions to continue to maintain present liability insurance coverage pending a legislative council study of governmental immunity and to encourage political subdivisions to maintain insurance coverage for motor vehicles and aircraft. [11] [Emphasis added.] The legislative intent in enacting the 1975 law is clear. The Legislature was responding to this court's decision in Kitto; it was not attempting to repeal Chapter 40-42, N.D.C.C. The declaration of legislative intent contained in Chapter 295, Section 13, S.L.1975, does not sustain a conclusion that Chapter 295, S.L.1975, should prevail over Chapter 40-42, N.D.C.C. Rather, it indicates that Chapter 295, S.L.1975, should apply only to those claims addressed in Kitto. The claim advanced by Herman against Grand Forks was statutorily authorized by Chapter 40-42, N.D.C.C., before this court decided Kitto. [12] Thus it was not affected by Kitto or by legislation necessitated by Kitto. We conclude that Chapter 40-42, N.D. C.C., was not impliedly repealed by Chapter 295, S.L.1975. Hence, to bring his action against Grand Forks, Herman was required to give Grand Forks notice in accordance with Section 40-42-01, N.D.C.C. Because of this conclusion, we need not consider whether the notice provision in Chapter 295, S.L.1975, is a condition precedent to the suit against Grand Forks or whether it is merely directory. [13] Because we have held that Herman's claim against Grand Forks is governed by Chapter 40-42, N.D.C.C., we must consider the third issue, i. e., the constitutionality of Sections 40-42-01 and 40-42-02, N.D.C.C. [14] Herman concedes that Section 40-42-02, N.D.C.C., makes the filing of the notice a condition precedent to instituting an action against the City. Section 40-42-02 provided: No action shall be maintained against any municipality . . . unless it shall appear that the claim upon which the action is brought was filed in the office of the city auditor as required by Section 40-42-01, . . . Herman also concedes that he did not file a claim within the time required in Section 40-42-01, N.D.C.C., and did not file any such claim prior to the commencement of the action against the City of Grand Forks. However, Herman contends that the requirements of Sections 40-42-01 and 40-42-02, N.D.C.C., violate his constitutional right of equal protection as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. [15] This court has previously discussed three standards of review to be used in a constitutional challenge to a statute. In Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978), we stated: In Johnson v. Hassett [217 N.W.2d 771 (N.D.1974)], we referred to the three standards of scrutiny of equal-protection questions for a judicial adjudication of constitutionality which appeared to have evolved in the Federal courts. One is the traditional reasonable or rational-basis standard under which a statute will be upheld if its classifications are not patently arbitrary and bear a reasonable relationship to a legitimate government interest. However, if the case involves an `inherently suspect classification' or a `fundamental interest,' it is `subjected to strict judicial scrutiny.' A third, less clearly defined, category requires a `close correspondence between statutory classification and legislative goals.' In Johnson v. Hassett, supra , we said that this latter test closely approximates the substantive due-process test historically used by this and other State courts. 270 N.W.2d at 132-133. This court applied the reasonable or rational-basis test in Tharaldson v. Unsatisfied Judgment Fund, 225 N.W.2d 39 (N.D. 1974), which involved an equal-protection challenge to statutes limiting recovery from the Unsatisfied Judgment Fund to $5,000 in those cases in which the tortfeasor could not be ascertained, while permitting a recovery of $10,000 in other cases. This court rejected the challenge, concluding that the purpose of the Fund was to provide some compensation to victims of automobile accidents who otherwise would be left without a means of recovery and that the allocation among recipients, the amount available, the number of other State functions in need of money, and other considerations were matters within the competency of the Legislature. The most severe test of constitutionalitystrict scrutinywas applied in State ex rel. Olson v. Maxwell, 259 N.W.2d 621 (N.D. 1977), in which this court required a hearing before a female prisoner could be transferred to a facility outside North Dakota for incarceration. Tharaldson v. Unsatisfied Judgment Fund, supra , and State ex rel. Olson v. Maxwell, supra , represent the two extremes in constitutional analysis of a statute. The intermediate analysis, the third approach, requires the court to look closely at the correspondence between the statutory classification and legislative goals. In Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771 (N.D.1974), this court concluded that the guest statute, prohibiting a person who accepts a ride in any vehicle without giving compensation therefor from recovering for damages caused by the ordinary negligence of his host, violated Sections 11, 13, and 20 of the North Dakota Constitution. The court wrote: We find that the statutory classification is unreasonable for any proper purpose of legislation and is not based upon justifiable distinctions concerning any proper purpose of the law, and that it is arbitrary and overinclusive. 217 N.W.2d at 780. While this court in Johnson did not specify the standard of scrutiny it was applying in express words, a reading of the case establishes that the court used the intermediate approach. See Arneson v. Olson, supra, 270 N.W.2d at 133. Statutory justifications were propounded, scrutinized, and ultimately rejected by the court. The issue herein is more closely related to that in Johnson v. Hassett, supra , than to the issue in either Tharaldson or State ex rel. Olson v. Maxwell, supra . In Tharaldson, the plaintiff, who could not identify the tortfeasor, would have had no recourse except for the action of the Legislature. Because the Legislature created the plaintiff's right of action, it could constitutionally impose reasonable limits on the right to bring that action. Following the rationale of Kitto, however, Herman's right of action was not created by the Legislature but rather has been limited by the Legislature pursuant to Chapter 40-42, N.D.C.C. Moreover, unlike State ex rel. Olson v. Maxwell, supra , this appeal does not involve a suspect classification, nor does it involve a fundamental interest. Instead, as in Johnson, the issue we are here concerned with involves a limitation upon the authority of an injured party to bring an action against the tortfeasor. While the proscription in Johnson was more severe than in the instant case, we nevertheless believe that the standard of judicial review adopted therein is applicable in the present instance, and we conclude that this intermediate level of judicial scrutiny should be applied in examining the provisions of Sections 40-42-01 and 40-42-02, N.D.C.C. In support of his equal-protection contention, Herman cites as authority a line of cases based primarily on Reich v. State Highway Department, 386 Mich. 617, 194 N.W.2d 700 (1972). The Michigan Legislature waived sovereign immunity of the State of Michigan but provided that a claim against the State was barred if notice of the claim was not served on the State within sixty days after the injury occurred. In Reich, the Supreme Court of Michigan, with one justice dissenting, held that the notice provision violated equal protection, and stated: The object of the legislation under consideration is to waive the immunity of governmental units and agencies from liability for injuries caused by their negligent conduct, thus putting them on an equal footing with private tort-feasors. However, the notice provisions of the statute arbitrarily split the natural class, i. e., all tort-feasors, into two differently treated subclasses: private tort-feasors to whom no notice of claim is owed and governmental tort-feasors to whom notice is owed. This diverse treatment of members of a class along the lines of governmental or private tort-feasors bears no reasonable relationship under today's circumstances to the recognized purpose of the act. It constitutes an arbitrary and unreasonable variance in the treatment of both portions of one natural class and is, therefore, barred by the constitutional guarantees of equal protection. 386 Mich. at 623, 194 N.W.2d at 702. The Michigan Legislature amended the Act challenged in Reich to provide for a 120-day notice provision, but this was also declared violative of equal-protection guarantees in Hobbs v. Michigan State Highway Dept., 58 Mich.App. 189, 227 N.W.2d 286 (1975). [16] The Nevada Supreme Court, with two justices dissenting, relied upon Reich and reached a similar conclusion in Turner v. Staggs, 89 Nev. 230, 510 P.2d 879, 59 A.L. R.3d 81 (1973). Other courts citing the decision in Reich have reached the same conclusion. See, e. g. O'Neil v. City of Parkersburg, W.Va., 237 S.E.2d 504 (1977); Hunter v. North Mason High School, 85 Wash.2d 810, 539 P.2d 845 (1975). These decisions contain little or no discussion of the standard of constitutional review to be applied to statutes such as the ones here under consideration. But in Parton v. City of Huntsville, 362 So.2d 898 (Ala.1978), the court rejected Reich and its progeny and upheld a statute requiring the filing of tort claims for damages against municipalities within six months from the accrual of the claim. The court, discussing the cases cited above, stated: Admittedly, the courts in those states, construing statutes abolishing governmental immunity, found that the legislature of each state had intended to put all tortfeasors on an equal footing; therefore, each court found that the diverse treatment of private tortfeasors and government tortfeasors was arbitrary and unrelated to the purpose of the legislation. We fail to find that Alabama's legislative scheme to eliminate the defense of governmental immunity in certain areas gave to an injured claimant an unconditional right to sue. In fact, legislative intent is to the contrary; included in the overall scheme were conditions, limitations, and requirements on the part of the injured claimant. In short, the Alabama legislature created a conditional right to sue in limited circumstances. [Citation omitted.]