Opinion ID: 831214
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the causation element

Text: The first issue presented in this appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to admit evidence of the victim's BAC. We hold that, under the facts of this case, the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to admit the evidence because it was relevant to the element of proximate causation in MCL 257.617(3) and MCL 257.625(4) and (8). Moreover, because the error resulted in a miscarriage of justice, it requires reversal under MCL 769.26.
A trial court's decision to either admit or exclude evidence will not be disturbed absent an abuse of ... discretion. People v. McDaniel, 469 Mich. 409, 412, 670 N.W.2d 659 (2003). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision falls outside the range of principled outcomes. People v. Smith, 482 Mich. 292, 300, 754 N.W.2d 284 (2008). If a reviewing court concludes that a trial court erred by excluding evidence, under MCL 769.26 the verdict cannot be reversed unless in the opinion of the court, after an examination of the entire cause, it shall affirmatively appear that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice. In examining whether a miscarriage of justice occurred, the relevant inquiry is the `effect the error had or reasonably may be taken to have had upon the jury's decision.' People v. Straight, 430 Mich. 418, 427, 424 N.W.2d 257 (1988), quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946). If the evidentiary error is a nonconstitutional, preserved error, then it is presumed not to be a ground for reversal unless it affirmatively appears that, more probably than not, it was outcome determinative. People v. Krueger, 466 Mich. 50, 54, 643 N.W.2d 223 (2002). An error is outcome determinative if it undermined the reliability of the verdict; in making this determination, this Court should focus on the nature of the error in light of the weight and strength of the untainted evidence. Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted).
Three of the offenses with which defendant was charged contain an element of causation, so the prosecution was required to prove causation beyond a reasonable doubt for each offense. The Court of Appeals erred to the extent that it held otherwise. The plain language of the statutes that prohibit OWI causing death, MCL 257.625(1) and (4), and the statutes that prohibit operating a motor vehicle with the presence of a schedule 1 controlled substance in one's body, causing death, MCL 257.625(4) and (8), requires that the defendant's operation of a motor vehicle have caused the death of another person. [1] Likewise, the plain language of MCL 257.617(3) contains an element of causation. Specifically, the statute imposes criminal liability if an individual fails to stop following an accident caused by that individual and the accident results in the death of another.... MCL 257.617(3) (emphasis added). [2] Thus, because the statute specifically requires the prosecution to establish that the accident was caused by the accused, the Court of Appeals ignored the plain language of the MCL 257.617(3) and erred by holding that it does not contain a causation element. Having determined that each of the statutes contains a causation element, we now turn to the definition of the term cause. In People v. Schaefer , we stated that, in the criminal law context, the term `cause' has acquired a unique, technical meaning. People v. Schaefer, 473 Mich. 418, 435, 703 N.W.2d 774 (2005). Specifically, the term and concept have two parts: factual causation and proximate causation. Id. at 435-436, 703 N.W.2d 774. Factual causation exists if a finder of fact determines that but for defendant's conduct the result would not have occurred. Id. A finding of factual causation alone, however, is not sufficient to hold an individual criminally responsible. Id. at 436, 703 N.W.2d 774. The prosecution must also establish that the defendant's conduct was a proximate cause of, in this case, the accident or the victim's death. Id. [3] Proximate causation is a legal construct designed to prevent criminal liability from attaching when the result of the defendant's conduct is viewed as too remote or unnatural. Id. If the finder of fact determines that an intervening cause supersedes a defendant's conduct such that the causal link between the defendant's conduct and the victim's injury was broken, proximate cause is lacking and criminal liability cannot be imposed. Id. at 436-437. Whether an intervening cause supersedes a defendant's conduct is a question of reasonable foreseeability. Id. at 437. Ordinary negligence is considered reasonably foreseeable, and it is thus not a superseding cause that would sever proximate causation. Id. at 437-438. In contrast, gross negligence or intentional misconduct on the part of a victim is considered sufficient to break the causal chain between the defendant and the victim because it is not reasonably foreseeable. Id. Gross negligence, however, is more than an enhanced version of ordinary negligence. Id. at 438. It means wantonness and disregard of the consequences which may ensue.... People v. Barnes, 182 Mich. 179, 198, 148 N.W. 400 (1914). [4] Wantonness is defined as [c]onduct indicating that the actor is aware of the risks but indifferent to the results and usually suggests a greater degree of culpability than recklessness.... Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed.). Therefore, while a victim's negligence is not a defense, it is an important factor to be considered by the trier of fact in determining whether proximate cause has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., People v. Campbell, 237 Mich. 424, 430-431, 212 N.W. 97 (1927). [5]
We must examine whether, in this case, the victim's BAC was a relevant and admissible fact for the jury's consideration when determining whether the prima facie element of proximate causation was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. We hold that it was. However, we caution that trial courts must make a threshold determination that there is a jury-submissible question of fact regarding gross negligence before such evidence becomes relevant and admissible. Under the Michigan Rules of Evidence, evidence is admissible only if it is relevant as defined by MRE 401 and is not otherwise excluded under MRE 403. [6] In People v. Crawford, 458 Mich. 376, 388, 582 N.W.2d 785 (1998), we explained that [p]ursuant to MRE 401, evidence is relevant if two components are present, materiality and probative value. Materiality is the requirement that the proffered evidence be related to `any fact that is of consequence' to the action. Id., quoting MRE 401. This Court has stated that [b]ecause the prosecution must carry the burden of proving every element beyond a reasonable doubt, ... the elements of the offense are always `in issue' and, thus, material. Crawford, 458 Mich. at 389, 582 N.W.2d 785. When examining whether the proffered evidence is probative, a court considers whether the evidence tends `to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence,' and [t]he threshold is minimal: `any' tendency is sufficient probative force. Id. at 389-390, 582 N.W.2d 785 (citations omitted). Moreover, MRE 403 excludes evidence, even if relevant, only if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. Thus, MRE 403 does not prohibit prejudicial evidence; only evidence that is unfairly so. Crawford, 458 Mich. at 398, 582 N.W.2d 785. Further, [e]vidence is unfairly prejudicial when there exists a danger that marginally probative evidence will be given undue or preemptive weight by the jury. Id. (emphasis added). Under these rules of evidence, a court must make a threshold determination in cases such as this of whether evidence of the victim's intoxication is relevant to the element of proximate causation. If the evidence is relevant, a court must also determine whether the evidence is nevertheless inadmissible under MRE 403. We conclude that, under the facts of this case, the evidence of the victim's BAC was relevant because it was both material and probative. In addition, its probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury because the evidence was highly probative of the element of proximate causation. First, the materiality requirement of MRE 401 was met because, as explained earlier, the charges at issue required the prosecution to prove an element of causation beyond a reasonable doubt. See Crawford, 458 Mich. at 389, 582 N.W.2d 785. In addition, under the broad definition of probative, evidence of the victim's BAC must merely have any tendency to make gross negligence on the part of the victim more or less probable. See id. at 389-390, 582 N.W.2d 785. Depending on the facts of a particular case, there may be instances in which a victim's intoxication is not sufficiently probative, such as when the proofs are insufficient to create a question of fact for the jury about whether the victim was conducting himself or herself in a grossly negligent manner. Generally, the mere fact that a victim was intoxicated at the time a defendant committed a crime is not sufficient to render evidence of the victim's intoxication admissible. While intoxication may explain why a person acted in a particular manner, being intoxicated, by itself, is not conduct amounting to gross negligence. In this case, however, the victim's extreme intoxication was highly probative of the issue of gross negligence, and therefore causation, because the victim's intoxication would have affected his ability to perceive the risks posed by his conduct and diminished his capacity to react to the world around him. [7] Indeed, in this case, the proffered superseding cause was the victim's presence in the middle of the road with his back to traffic at night during a rain storm with a sidewalk nearby. Thus, the proofs were sufficient to create a jury-submissible question about whether the victim was grossly negligent, and the victim's high level of intoxication would have aided the jury in determining whether the victim acted with wantonness and a disregard of the consequences which may ensue.... Barnes, 182 Mich. at 198, 148 N.W. 400. Second, the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. The evidence was not unfairly prejudicial because, as explained earlier, the victim's high level of intoxication went to the heart of whether the victim was grossly negligent; thus, the evidence was not merely marginally probative, but instead was highly probative of the element of causation. In addition, the probative value of the evidence was not, as the prosecution argues, substantially outweighed by the danger of confusion of the issues or misleading the jury. The prosecution's argument that the admission of evidence of the victim's BAC would shift responsibility from defendant ignores that under the circumstances of this case, the victim's conduct directly related to the disputed element of proximate causation and, therefore, whether the victim's actions amounted to ordinary or gross negligence. See, e.g., May v. Goulding, 365 Mich. 143, 148, 111 N.W.2d 862 (1961) (describing the difference between wanton misconduct and ordinary negligence as `faults of different hues in the spectrum of human conduct') (citation omitted). As a result, the probative value of the victim's high level of intoxication was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury because, under the facts of this case, the victim's BAC was highly probative of the element of proximate causation, which necessarily required the trier of fact to determine whether the victim's own behavior amounted to a superseding cause. [8] For all these reasons, we disagree with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the evidence was irrelevant because the victim's intoxication, or lack thereof, does not impact the foreseeability of an intoxicated driver striking a pedestrian in the road. Feezel, unpub. op. at 11. While it is true that when a person drives intoxicated it is foreseeable that the person may cause an accident or possibly strike a pedestrian, this general premise ignores the fact that proximate causation must be decided on a case-by-case basis. See Stoll v. Laubengayer, 174 Mich. 701, 705, 140 N.W. 532 (1913) (stating that [w]hile this court has never apparently attempted to accurately define the term `proximate cause,' it has in many cases applied the principle as enunciated in the authorities to the particular facts under consideration ) (emphasis added). [9] Indeed, this principle is embedded within the concept of proximate causation, which requires the trier of fact to determine whether the victim's own conduct amounted to a superseding cause. See Schaefer, 473 Mich. at 438-439, 703 N.W.2d 774 (stating that gross negligence by the victim ... will generally be considered a superseding cause) (emphasis added). Thus, to hold defendant criminally responsible, the trier of fact must find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant's conduct was a proximate cause of this victim's death or of this accident given the particular facts of the case. Therefore, while the victim's intoxication is not a defense, under the facts of this case it should have been a factor for the jury to consider when determining whether the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant's conduct was a proximate cause of the accident, under MCL 257.617(3), or a proximate cause of the victim's death, under MCL 257.625(4) and (8). We emphasize, however, that evidence of a victim's intoxication may not be relevant or admissible in all cases. Indeed, the primary focus in a criminal trial remains on the defendant's conduct. Accordingly, any level of intoxication on the part of a victim is not automatically relevant, and the mere consumption of alcohol by a victim does not automatically amount to a superseding cause or de facto gross negligence. Instead, under MRE 401, a trial court must determine whether the evidence tends to make the existence of gross negligence more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence and, if relevant, whether the evidence is inadmissible under the balancing test of MRE 403. Thus, when determining whether evidence of a victim's intoxication is admissible, the trial court must make a threshold determination that evidence of the victim's conduct is sufficiently probative for a proper purposeto show gross negligence. In other words, the trial court must determine that the issue of gross negligence is in issue. See People v. McKinney, 410 Mich. 413, 418, 301 N.W.2d 824 (1981). The court may allow the admission of evidence of the victim's intoxication to aid the jury in determining whether the victim's actions were grossly negligent only when the proofs are sufficient to create a question of fact for the jury. If a trial court cannot come to the conclusion that a reasonable juror could view the victim's conduct as demonstrating a wanton disregard of the consequences that may ensue, however, then the evidence of intoxication is not admissible. Applying these standards to the facts of this case, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to admit the evidence of the victim's BAC. In excluding the evidence, the trial court deprived the jury of its ability to consider an important, relevant factor in determining whether the victim was grossly negligent. As a result, the error undermined the reliability of the verdict. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and vacate defendant's convictions of those offenses.
To aid the trial court on remand, we note that in this case, the jury instructions, when read as a whole, may have been confusing. In Schaefer, we stated that the term cause is a legal term of art normally not within the common understanding of jurors.... Schaefer, 473 Mich. at 441, 703 N.W.2d 774. As a result, a jury could not be expected to understand that the term required the prosecutor to prove both factual causation and proximate causation. Id. The trial court instructed the jury and gave the jury a written instruction on the term's unique meaning, but the instruction was buried within the elements of the charge of OWI causing death and not included in the instructions for MCL 257.617(3) and MCL 257.625(4) and (8). Moreover, the instructions for these other charges were separated from the causation instruction by instructions on lesser included offenses and a jury verdict form. Because the potential deprivation of personal rights in criminal cases is extreme and a defendant is entitled to have all the elements of the crime submitted to the jury in a charge which [is] neither erroneous nor misleading, People v. Pepper, 389 Mich. 317, 322, 206 N.W.2d 439 (1973), we caution the trial court on remand to avoid possible confusion by either reinstructing the jury on causation for each crime that contains a causation element or by referring the jurors back to its earlier causation instruction.