Opinion ID: 216562
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Bailment

Text: QT contends that even if Defendants are not liable under COGSA, the district court nonetheless erred in dismissing its bailment claim against Saga. It claims that QT had an implied contract of bailment with Saga because Saga knowingly took exclusive possession of QT's cargo and had exclusive possession at the time of its loss. QT argues that Daewoo acted as an agent for Saga during shipping, and that in so doing, Saga retained exclusive possession of the cargo. Because Saga had exclusive possession, QT urges, Saga's negligence is presumed because the cargo was returned to QT in damaged condition. We have previously described bailment as the delivery of goods or personal property to the bailee in trust, under express or implied contract, which requires the bailee to perform the trust and either to redeliver the goods or to otherwise dispose of the goods in conformity with the purpose of the trust. Thyssen, 50 F.3d at 1354-55 (citing T.N.T. Marine Serv., Inc. v. Weaver Shipyards & Dry Docks, Inc., 702 F.2d 585, 588 (5th Cir.1983)). A claim of bailment does not arise under admiralty law unless (1) delivery to the bailee is complete and (2) he has exclusive possession of the bailed property, even as against the property owner. Id. (citing T.N.T. Marine Serv., 702 F.2d at 588). For the same reasons we denied the cargo owner's bailment claim in Thyssen, we affirm the district court's denial of QT's bailment claim here. In Thyssen, we held that the cargo owner's bailment claim against the shipowner failed because the bills of lading and Clause 8 of the charter party indicated that the charterer also had possession of the cargo, thereby destroying exclusivity. Id. There, Clause 8 contained similar language to Clause 8 of the Charter Party here, both noting that the Charterers had responsibility for loading, stowing, securing, and discharging the cargo at their expense under the supervision of the Captain. Id. at 1355; see also Man Ferrostaal, Inc., 2011 WL 207968, at  ([W]hen a charterer has taken responsibility for stowage of cargo onboard a ship, the ship owner does not have exclusive possession of the property and so cannot be held liable as a bailee.) (citations omitted). Thus, the Charter Party provision destroys QT's exclusive-possession argument because it is nearly identical to the provision we used in Thyssen to find a lack of exclusive possession. Additionally, Daewoo's agent signed the Bills of Lading on behalf of Daewoo, further undermining the claim that Saga had exclusive possession of the cargo. Because QT has failed to show that Saga had exclusive possession of the cargo, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment on QT's bailment claim.