Opinion ID: 203020
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Evidentiary Hearings

Text: We also review the decision whether to grant an evidentiary hearing for abuse of discretion. Pike, 492 F.3d at 70; see also Schriro v. Landrigan, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1933, 1940, 167 L.Ed.2d 836 (2007). Before AEDPA, judge-made law governed the decision whether to grant an evidentiary hearing. Under Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963), district courts generally had discretion to grant such hearings when they deemed it appropriate. Id. at 318, 83 S.Ct. 745 (In every case [the district judge] has the power, constrained only by his sound discretion, to receive evidence bearing upon the applicant's constitutional claim.). In some situations, an evidentiary hearing before the district court was mandatory: Where the facts are in dispute, the federal court in habeas corpus must hold an evidentiary hearing if the habeas applicant did not receive a full and fair evidentiary hearing in state court, either at the time of the trial or in a collateral proceeding. Id. at 312. Townsend specified six situations which would necessitate a hearing under this standard, including a catch-all category for any reason the petitioner might not have received a full and fair hearing on the issue before a state court. Id. at 313, 83 S.Ct. 745. But Townsend was significantly qualified by later case law and congressional action[,] leaving the circuit courts in some uncertainty about when new federal factfinding for state prisoners is appropriate. [4] Bader, 488 F.3d at 487. There is debate post-AEDPA over whether evidentiary hearings are still mandatory in some circumstances, or whether they are simply within the district court judge's discretion when not prohibited. Some courts have concluded that Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 118 L.Ed.2d 318 (1992), and AEDPA only modified Townsend 's six categories of mandatory hearings, leaving the rest of Townsend intact. E.g., Conaway v. Polk, 453 F.3d 567, 582, 590 (4th Cir.2006); Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 670 (9th Cir.2005); Smith v. Bowersox, 311 F.3d 915, 921 (8th Cir.2002); Matheney v. Anderson, 253 F.3d 1025, 1039 (7th Cir.2001); Miller v. Champion, 161 F.3d 1249, 1253 (10th Cir. 1998). And some commentators agree. See 1 Hertz & Liebman § 20.1b (Even after AEDPA . . . Townsend 's mandatory-hearing standards . . . continue[] to govern all situations save those in which the petitioner's procedural default accounts for the state courts' failure to develop the material facts.); W. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 28.7(c) (2d ed.2004). Indeed, the Advisory Committee Notes for Rule 8 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, regarding evidentiary hearings, suggest that Townsend still applies except to the extent it is specifically superceded by § 2254(e)(2). The Third Circuit, on the other hand, has read AEDPA as rendering all evidentiary hearings purely discretionary. E.g., Campbell v. Vaughn, 209 F.3d 280, 287 (3d Cir.2000) (AEDPA, unlike Townsend and Keeney, does not require that such a hearing be held. Instead, federal courts have discretion to grant [an evidentiary] hearing or not.). At the least, where not explicitly prohibited by § 2254, federal habeas judges retain discretion to grant evidentiary hearings. See Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, Rule 8(a); Schriro, 127 S.Ct. at 1939 (AEDPA did not change the basic rule that the decision to grant an evidentiary hearing [is] generally left to the sound discretion of district courts); Guidry v. Dretke, 397 F.3d 306, 323 (5th Cir.2005). But that discretion should be exercised in a restrained manner. As the Supreme Court noted in Schriro, Congress through AEDPA meant to curb delays and prevent retrials before habeas courts. 127 S.Ct. at 1940; see also Pike, 492 F.3d at 70. As a result, federal evidentiary hearings seeking to rehear issues addressed by the state courts ought to be the exception, not the rule. Pike, 492 F.3d at 70. We need not resolve today the question of whether federal habeas evidentiary hearings are ever mandated. First, AEDPA is clear on one point: an evidentiary hearing is prohibited if the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings unless certain stringent exceptions apply. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). It may seem odd to prohibit an evidentiary hearing where the defendant did not present the facts to a state court but not to prohibit one where he did. But the prohibition is analogous to a procedural default rule, furthering the principles of comity, finality, and federalism by requiring the prisoner to present his claims fully before the state courts. Michael Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436-37, 120 S.Ct. 1479, 146 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). Section 2254(e)(2)'s bar applies where there has been a lack of diligence on the part of the petitioner or his counsel before the state courts. Id. at 432, 120 S.Ct. 1479. Teti demonstrated such a lack of diligence. Diligence will require in the usual case that the prisoner, at a minimum, seek an evidentiary hearing in state court in the manner prescribed by state law. Id. at 437, 120 S.Ct. 1479. Teti's broad claims in his state court motion for a new trial did not raise any specific question sufficient to require the state trial judge to hold an evidentiary hearing. Cf. Bowersox, 311 F.3d at 921-22 (petitioner's request for an evidentiary hearing barred under § 2254(e)(2) where petitioner had submitted only broad allegations to the state court, in conflict with state's requirement of factual allegations sufficient to warrant relief if true). Further, Teti did not develop his argument for an evidentiary hearing in his appeal to the MAC. Teti, 801 N.E.2d at 289. Section 2254(e)(2) does include narrow exceptions that would excuse a petitioner's lack of diligence, but they clearly do not apply to Teti's situation: there is no new rule of constitutional law, nor any new evidence, much less any evidence that could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(A). Second, even if Teti's request for an evidentiary hearing were not barred by § 2254(e)(2) for lack of diligence, he fails on another threshold matter, just as he did before the state trial court. Akin to Rule 6's good cause requirement, a habeas judge, before granting an evidentiary hearing, must [first] consider whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition's factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief. Schriro, 127 S.Ct. at 1940; see also Townsend, 372 U.S. at 312, 83 S.Ct. 745. The requirement is not so stringent that Teti must point to specific facts he will establish that will entitle him to relief, but rather that his allegations would entitle him to relief and the hearing is likely to elicit the factual support for those allegations. See, e.g., Insyxiengmay, 403 F.3d at 670. As the Fourth Circuit noted in the context of a state collateral review petition, it would create a `classic catch-22' if [a habeas] defendant were obliged to submit admissible evidence to the [habeas] court in order to be accorded an evidentiary hearing, when the defendant is seeking the hearing because he cannot, without subpoena power or mechanisms of discovery, otherwise secure such evidence. Conaway, 453 F.3d at 584. But see Campbell, 209 F.3d at 290 (petitioner needs clear evidence before a habeas court can justify a new evidentiary hearing, at least where the state court also held an evidentiary hearing and there is a sufficient basis in the record for the state court's conclusions). On the other hand, Teti must allege more than that he received inadequate assistance; he must allege facts sufficient to overcome AEDPA deference to the state court's factfindings and legal conclusion to the contrary. See Schriro, 127 S.Ct. at 1940; Bader, 488 F.3d at 488. The district court correctly considered this threshold question, concluding that Teti had not given any indication that an evidentiary hearing would give rise to `clear and convincing evidence' that petitioner's trial counsel suffered from a conflict of interest. We turn, however, directly to the question of prejudice. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ([A] court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant. . . . If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, . . . that course should be followed.). Teti argues that he suffered prejudice because he was unable to obtain a plea agreement. He does not, however, make the argument that his attorneys failed to obtain a plea agreement because of their conflicted loyalties. Nor would such an argument be plausible, given that Keene ceased representing Lobello shortly after, if not before, he began representing Teti. Teti instead argues that McBride was unable to secure a plea agreement for him because the Commonwealth was worried, once the conflict of interest concern was aired, that such an agreement might be vulnerable on appeal. The argument is hard to credit, as one would think a conviction would have been more vulnerable on appeal. Regardless, it is insufficient. Teti might be arguing that he was harmed because of procedural irregularities in the hearing before the state trial judge. The relevant harm, however, is the one emanating from Keene's alleged conflict of interest. If a federal evidentiary hearing could cure any procedural irregularities, Teti still has not explained what harm he would hope to demonstrate beyond the alleged plea agreement harm already discussed. Teti has not argued sufficient harm to satisfy Mickens, much less the prejudice needed to meet the more stringent standard for establishing ineffective assistance where counsel has a potential, rather than actual, conflict of interest. In short, Teti continues to assert he needs [an] evidentiary hearing to factually develop his constitutional claims, but he has failed at every level to make a factual showing (as opposed to conclusory statements) as to why those claims merit development through the crucible of an official hearing. Reynolds v. Bagley, 498 F.3d 549, 555 (6th Cir.2007). Because Teti provides no clear and convincing evidence that the MAC's factual determinations were erroneous, and because he has not adequately specified what facts he seeks to establish through discovery or an evidentiary hearing, the MAC's factual determinations stand, as does its ultimate conclusion under § 2254(d)(1) that Keene did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel due to any conflict of interest. See Allison, 388 F.3d at 370-71.