Opinion ID: 1163403
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: Due Process and Cruel Punishment.

Text: Brett argues that allowing the jury to consider the same indivisible course of conduct to constitute more than one aggravating factor violates due process and constitutes cruel punishment under Const. art. 1, §§ 3 and 14. Brett cites no Washington cases in support of this proposition, and it is not persuasive. See People v. Harris, 36 Cal.3d 36, 63, 679 P.2d 433, 449, 201 Cal. Rptr. 782, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 965 (1984); Provence v. State, 337 So.2d 783 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 969 (1977); White v. State, 403 So.2d 331 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1229 (1983); Herzog v. State, 439 So.2d 1372 (Fla. 1983); State v. Henderson, 109 N.M. 655, 661, 789 P.2d 603, 609 (1990); Engberg v. Meyer, 820 P.2d 70, 89 (Wyo. 1991) (Cardine, J., concurring). See also Cook v. State, 369 So.2d 1251, 1256 (Ala. 1978); State v. Goodman, 298 N.C. 1, 29, 257 S.E.2d 569, 587 (1979). [25] In Florida, New Mexico, North Carolina, and Alabama, the courts have invalidated the doubling up of aggravators when those aggravators are based on the same aspect of the defendant's conduct. For example, in Provence v. State, supra , the court held the aggravating circumstances of murder in the commission of a robbery and murder for pecuniary gain could not validly be considered as two separate aggravating circumstances. Similarly in Wyoming, the court held the underlying robbery of defendant's felony murder conviction could not be used as an aggravating circumstance. Engberg v. Meyer, supra . But see Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 108 L.Ed.2d 255, 110 S.Ct. 1078 (1990) (felony element of felony murder can be a valid aggravating factor). Here, the robbery, burglary, and kidnapping are not based on the same aspect of Defendant's conduct nor are the aggravators elements of premeditated first degree murder. Harris is also distinguishable. The Harris court rejected the doubling up of the robbery and burglary aggravators because the California death penalty statute in effect when the defendant was sentenced specified that `[i]n determining the penalty the trier of fact shall take into account ... [t]he circumstances of the crime ... and the existence of any special circumstances found to be true....' Harris, 36 Cal.3d at 65 (quoting former Cal. Penal Code § 190.3). The court felt that allowing the jury to take into account the crime and the aggravating circumstances artificially inflated the defendant's conduct. Harris, 36 Cal.3d at 62. Washington's death penalty statute and the jury instructions in this case, however, instruct the jury to [h]av[e] in mind the crime of which the defendant has been found guilty .... RCW 10.95.060(4). The jury is not instructed to consider the crime and separately consider the aggravating factors. Rather, the aggravators describe the circumstances of the crime for which Brett was found guilty.