Opinion ID: 1192700
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Assignments Relating to the Order Pendente Lite

Text: We first consider those assignments of error dealing with the order pendente lite issued by the trial court on April 13, 1970, which ordered that the plaintiffs deposit all rentals, including the rentals on the two leases for which the state was claiming no deletions, with the district court and which further ordered that the defendants not serve notice of forfeiture unless the plaintiffs failed to deposit the full rental with the court. We are of the opinion that the district court improperly issued this order. First, the making of deposits of funds in the court is governed by Rule 67 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. That rule provides in part: In an action in which any part of the relief sought is a judgment for a sum of money or the disposition of a sum of money ... a party, upon notice to every other party and by leave of court, may deposit with the court all or any part of such sum or thing. When it is admitted by the pleading, or shown upon examination of a party, that he has in his possession, or under his control, any money or other thing capable of delivery, which, being the subject of litigation, is held by him as trustee for another party, or which belongs or is due to another party, the court may order the same, upon motion, to be deposited in court... . There is nothing in the pleadings in this action to indicate that any part of the relief sought was a judgment for a sum of money or disposition of a sum of money, or that any money was the subject of the litigation. The record discloses that the issue regarding the rentals under the leases arose because of a dispute between plaintiffs and defendants over whether or not the 25¢ per acre rental should be computed on the full acreage under the leases, without regard to the acreage deletions, or should be computed upon the reduced acreage. Plaintiffs, who were claiming that the deletions were ineffective, contended that the full rental should be paid, whereas apparently the defendants refused to accept the full amount of the rentals, but insisted on a lesser amount computed upon the acreage in the leases after the deletions. However, nothing in those circumstances requires or permits a district court to take action under Rule 67 and take over the function of collecting rentals and holding them. This is particularly true in the case of leases numbers 4048 and 3992, neither of which was subject to any claim of deletions by the defendants. The district court's action was a misapplication of Rule 67. While the record is not entirely clear, it does indicate that the plaintiffs may have attempted to pay the rental based upon the full acreage without any deletion, but that the defendants refused to accept the full amount, contending that the only rental due was based upon the acreage in the leases minus the deletions for the Dworshak Pool area. If, in fact, the plaintiffs did make a timely tender of the full amount, then such a tender upon their part would have prevented any default on the leases for lack of payment of rentals. Kelley v. Clark, 23 Idaho 1, 129 P. 921 (1912); Boise Lumber Company v. Independent School District, 36 Idaho 778, 214 P. 143 (1923); Dohrman v. Tomlinson, 88 Idaho 313, 399 P.2d 255 (1965). The problem of the disputed amount could have been avoided by the tender of payment in two checks, one being for the number of acres in the leases minus the deletions for the Dworshak Pool area, and the other for the rental for the acreage sought to be deleted by the defendants for the Dworshak Pool area. In any event, the appropriate remedy was the tender of the amounts due on the leases, and not the action which the plaintiff sought, and which the trial court took in assuming the collection of the rentals and retaining them in the district court. That action was not a proper exercise of the powers granted to district courts under Rule 67. The order pendente lite was further defective in that it attempted to restrain a state officer from the performance of his statutory duty in violation of I.C. § 8-408, which provides in part: 8-408. RESTRAINT OF STATE OFFICERS.  Where a duty is imposed by statute upon a state officer or officers, an injunction to restrain him . . from the performance of that duty, or to prevent the execution of the statute, shall not be granted, except by the district court, sitting in the county in which the officer or officers are located, . . (Emphasis supplied). This statute raises the issue of whether or not the district court of the Second Judicial District, in and for the County of Clearwater, can, while sitting in Lewiston, restrain a state officer located in Ada County from performing his duty under § 47-707 Idaho Code of Collecting the rental on state leases. In Williams v. Koelsch, 67 Idaho 341, 180 P.2d 237 (1947), this Court reviewed the notice provision of I.C. § 8-408 (at that time I.C.A. 6-408) and held that compliance with the statute was mandatory in order for a district court to have jurisdiction over a state officer. The defendants' motion to dismiss and objections to order pendente lite raised that issue in the trial court. The record indicates that the Land Commissioner lives in Ada County, and we take judicial notice that the state officers which comprise the State Land Board reside in Ada County and have their offices in Boise City (Idaho Const. Art. 9, Sec. 7; I.C. § 59-103). Therefore any action to enjoin the defendants would only be cognizable in the Fourth Judicial District Court for Ada County. Williams v. Koelsch, supra ; State of New Mexico ex rel. Bureau v. MacPherson, 79 N.M. 272, 442 P.2d 584 (1968); Allen v. McClellan, 77 N.M. 801, 427 P.2d 677 (1967); State ex rel. Thielicke v. Superior Court for Thurston County, 9 Wash.2d 309, 114 P.2d 1001 (1941); Say v. Smith, 5 Wash. App. 677, 491 P.2d 687 (1971). The order pendente lite was improperly issued for another reason. Rule 65(c) provides that no restraining order or preliminary injunction shall issue except upon giving a bond by the applicant in such sum as the court deems proper. Under I.C. § 8-405, prior to adopting Rule 65, I.R.C.P., our decisions held that the giving of the bond was mandatory, and that any restraining order issued without a bond was void. MacWatters v. Stockslager, 29 Idaho 803, 162 P. 671 (1917); Wakefield v. Griffiths, 45 Idaho 51, 261 P. 665 (1927). While the language of Rule 65(c) would seem to be mandatory, some federal courts in interpreting their Rule 65(c) have held that since the size of the bond is discretionary with the trial court the requirement of a bond in the first instance should also be discretionary. 3 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice & Procedure, § 1435 and supplement. In view of our backgound and practice under I.C. § 8-405 which made the filing of a bond mandatory, we hold that before an injunction is issued under Rule 65 the giving of security by the applicant for the payment of costs, damages and attorneys fees as provided in Rule 65(c) is mandatory, unless the trial court makes a specific finding based upon competent evidence that no such costs, damages or attorneys fees will result to the restrained party as a result of a wrongful issuing of the injunction or restraining order. Since there is no such finding in this case, the trial court improperly issued the order pendente lite without requiring security as provided for in Rule 65(c). For all of the foregoing reasons the order pendente lite was erroneously entered by the district court.