Opinion ID: 545581
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: appeal by pausa

Text: 6 Pausa argues that summary judgment on the plaintiffs' copyright infringement claim was improper because genuine issues of material fact exist as to: (1) whether the letter of December 26, 1984, was an effective termination or revocation of the licenses; (2) if so, whether the infringements were willful; and (3) the amount of statutory damages to be awarded.
7 The district court found that the letter of December 26, 1984, constituted a revocation of the licenses. Pausa argues there is a question of fact as to whether, in light of the previous dealings between the parties and their dealings after December 26, 1984, the letter was intended to be and should reasonably be construed as a revocation of the licenses. 8 Pausa first argues that a genuine issue of fact exists as to Fox's intent to revoke because beginning in 1980 and continuing until December 26, 1984, Fox made approximately twenty demands upon Pausa, four of which Pausa claims purported to revoke licenses issued to them. Despite these demands and revocations, Fox continued to accept payments and issue licenses to Pausa. 9 Contrary to Pausa's assertions, only one letter dated September 14, 1982, actually states that it constitutes formal notice of license termination pursuant to section 115(c). Newman Declaration, Exh. 4. The other three letters written between August 1, 1980, and July 30, 1982, merely threaten legal action if overdue royalties and accountings were not forthcoming. Newman Declaration, Exhs. 1-3. We are not told which licenses the September revocation applied to or whether Pausa complied with its statutory obligations in response to the notice of revocation. We find this single letter of revocation insufficient to create a triable issue of fact as to the plaintiffs' intention to revoke the licenses at issue a full two years later in December 1984. 10 Pausa also argues that a genuine issue of fact as to Fox's intent to revoke exists because Fox continued to issue licenses to Pausa after the revocation on December 26, 1984. Pausa admits, however, that none of the licenses issued after December 26, 1984, were also licenses subject to the December revocation. 1 Because the plaintiffs' copyrighted works are governed by the compulsory licensing provisions of section 115(c), the plaintiffs also could not prevent the defendants from obtaining licenses to use other copyrighted works not subject to the revocation. 2 Therefore, the fact that Fox issued other licenses after December 1984 does not raise a genuine issue of fact as to the plaintiffs' intent to revoke the licenses specified in the December letter. 11 Pausa next contends that the plaintiffs' acceptance of a $5,000 payment on account thirty days after December 26, 1984, raises a question of fact as to their intent to terminate. The evidence establishes that Fox deposited the $5,000 in an escrow account on or near July 10, 1985, pending an explanation from Pausa as the payment was unaccompanied by a royalty statement. Pausa argues Fox's failure to return the check raises an inference it intended to retain the money which of course, was inconsistent with its present claim that the licenses had been revoked. 12 The district court held, and we agree, that this evidence is insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact for trial. 13 [D]efendants do not dispute that, although they made sporadic payments, they never complied with the royalty and accounting requirements of the [Copyright Act]. Moreover, defendants do not dispute that plaintiffs placed such payments in escrow and at all time continued to demand compliance with the statutory provisions. Defendants submit no evidence that would even suggest plaintiffs intended to waive their rights to sue for infringement. 14 Pausa also fails to show the $5,000 represented payment on royalties due under the licenses terminated in December 1984, as opposed to payment on other nonrevoked licenses. Consequently, the payment, even if accepted, is insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to Fox's intent to revoke. 15 In another effort to show that the parties accorded no special significance to the December letter, Pausa claims that by letter dated March 27, 1985, Fox again threatened revocation of the licenses unless payment was received by April 12, 1985. Newman Declaration, Exh. 8. The March letter was not sent by Fox, however, but by Prager and Fenton, an accounting firm engaged by Fox to examine Pausa's records to determine the amount of royalties overdue for the period between July 1, 1983, and June 30, 1986. Having assessed a deficiency of $129,015.00, the letter advises that Fox would allow additional time no later than April 12, 1985, for Pausa to furnish a meaningful response and downpayment. The letter concludes that if this deadline was not met, Fox intend[ed] to discuss with the involved publishers revocation of licenses as well as infringement proceedings. 16 Once again, there is no evidence this threatened revocation covered the same licenses identified in the December letter. Under these circumstances, such evidence is insufficient to create a triable issue of fact with respect to the plaintiffs' intent to revoke the licenses. We find that the December letter effectively revoked the licenses at issue.
17 Section 504(c)(1) of the Copyright Act provides that the copyright owner may elect to recover, instead of actual damages and profits, an award of statutory damages in a sum of not less than $250 or more than $10,000 for each infringement. The provision governing willful infringement says: 18 In a case where the copyright owner sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that infringement was committed willfully, the court in its discretion may increase the award of statutory damages to a sum of not more than $50,000. In a case where the infringer sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that such infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright, the court [in] its discretion may reduce the award of statutory damages to a sum of not less than $100. 19 17 U.S.C. Sec. 504(c)(2) (1982) (footnote omitted). 20 The district court held that the plaintiffs met their burden of establishing willful infringement. The court defined willful as knowledge that the defendants' conduct constituted an act of infringement. 3 The court found the infringements were willful because of Mr. Newman's [deposition] testimony that defendants received the December 26, 1984 notice of termination, failed to account for and pay royalties, yet nevertheless continued to manufacture and distribute phonorecords. The court found that Mr. Newman's contradictory declaration that it was not Pausa's intention to infringe upon the plaintiffs' copyrights was insufficient to raise a material issue of fact as to willfulness. See Radobenko v. Automated Equip. Corp., 520 F.2d 540, 544 (9th Cir.1975) (party cannot raise a genuine issue of fact by an affidavit contradicting his prior deposition testimony). 21 Pausa claims it is entitled to a full evidentiary hearing to determine whether its conduct was willful in light of the fact the parties disagreed over the applicable royalty rates. This argument is not persuasive. The royalty dispute Pausa refers to did not surface until well after the plaintiffs had terminated the licenses. The defendants cannot claim that their failure to pay royalties resulted from a dispute over the applicable royalty rate where they failed, in the first instance, to submit statements of account identifying the royalties due. 22 The defendants also argue that summary judgment was improper in light of their belief Fox did not intend the December letter to be a revocation. To refute evidence of willful infringement, Pausa must not only establish its good faith belief in the innocence of its conduct, it must also show that it was reasonable in holding such a belief. See 3 M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright Sec. 14.04[B], at 14-40.3 (1989). The December letter was unambiguous in its statement of intent to terminate the licenses if payment was not received within thirty days. Pausa, a corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing and distributing copyrighted works, does not claim ignorance as to its legal obligations. Fox's conduct following Pausa's receipt of that letter cannot reasonably be construed as a withdrawal of its intent to terminate the licenses. We find that Pausa's conduct in ignoring the revocation was unreasonable, and that its further use of the plaintiffs' copyrighted works thereafter was willful as a matter of law within the meaning of section 504(c)(2).
23 Assuming the infringements were willful, Pausa argues there is a genuine issue of fact as to the proper amount of statutory damages to be awarded. Pausa claims the $4 million award, or eighty violations at $50,000 apiece, represents an abuse of discretion because it bears no relationship to the plaintiffs' actual damages. 24 Under the 1976 Copyright Act, the plaintiff may elect to recover either actual or statutory damages. See 17 U.S.C. Sec. 504(c)(1). If statutory damages are elected, [t]he court has wide discretion in determining the amount of statutory damages to be awarded, constrained only by the specified maxima and minima. Harris v. Emus Records Corp., 734 F.2d 1329, 1335 (9th Cir.1984). The maximum award for willful infringements is $50,000, 4 and the minimum $250, per infringement. See 17 U.S.C. Sec. 504(c)(2). In measuring the damages, the court is to be guided by 25 what is just in the particular case, considering the nature of the copyright, the circumstances of the infringement and the like, ... but with the express qualification that in every case the assessment must be within the prescribed [maximum or minimum]. Within these limitations the court's discretion and sense of justice are controlling.... 26 F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 232, 73 S.Ct. 222, 225, 97 L.Ed. 276 (1952) (quoting L.A. Westermann Co. v. Dispatch Printing Co., 249 U.S. 100, 106-07, 39 S.Ct. 194, 195-96, 63 L.Ed. 499 (1919)). The award will be overturned only for abuse of discretion. Harris, 734 F.2d at 1335. 27 The district court in this case awarded the maximum damages possible, or $50,000 per violation, for each of the eighty willful infringements. Pausa argues the statutory damage provisions should not be converted into a windfall where, as a practical matter, the plaintiff has suffered only nominal damages. Doehrer v. Caldwell, 207 U.S.P.Q. 391, 393, 1980 WL 1158 (N.D.Ill.1980) (nonwillful infringements). It is clear, however, that a plaintiff may recover statutory damages whether or not there is adequate evidence of the actual damages suffered by the plaintiff or of the profits reaped by defendant. Harris, 734 F.2d at 1335. The Supreme Court has stated that [e]ven for uninjurious and unprofitable invasions of copyright the court may, if it deems it just, impose a liability within [the] statutory limits to sanction and vindicate the statutory policy of discouraging infringement. Woolworth Co., 344 U.S. at 233, 73 S.Ct. at 225. 28 In affirming the district court's award of the maximum damages permissible in the absence of a specific finding of willfulness ($10,000 per infringement), we stated in Harris that [t]he trial court is in a better position than are we to determine appropriate damages. 734 F.2d at 1335. Given the number of willful infringements committed by Pausa, the compulsory nature of the licenses, and the fact Pausa is engaged in the business of selling copyrighted works, we find the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding $4 million in statutory damages.