Opinion ID: 171618
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mr. Ferrell's Conviction

Text: Mr. Ferrell also contends the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, asserting that the government failed to establish a nexus between him and the Uzi. According to Mr. Ferrell, the evidence in this case contra-indicates guilt and amounts to mere presence in a car where a firearm was located. Aplt. Br. at 11, 14. Having thoroughly reviewed the record, and mindful that there were two additional passengers in the back seat of the pickup, we agree that the record does not support Mr. Ferrell's conviction. The government's evidence consists of no more than Mr. Ferrell's presence inside the pickup occupied by four persons, his recorded statements to Mr. Hooks, and the location where the Uzi was found by the side of the road. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we hold that no reasonable jury could have found Mr. Ferrell guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Even if we assume that Mr. Ferrell's mere presence in the pickup establishes proximity, see Jameson, 478 F.3d at 1209-10, the government still has failed to show that Mr. Ferrell had knowledge of or dominion or control over the Uzi, as opposed to the two passengers in the back of the pickup. We emphasize dominion or control, as opposed to access to, because of our decision in United States v. Norman, 388 F.3d 1337 (10th Cir.2004). In Norman, we noted that a firearm does not need to be readily accessible, i.e., visible and retrievable, to a defendant at the time of his arrest for the defendant to constructively possess it. Id. at 1341-42. The firearm may be locked in a glove compartment or even stored in the trunk of a car, assuming the defendant had knowledge and control of it. See id. at 1342. In other words, a defendant's access to a firearm is not determined by his proximity to the firearm. Rather, the access to element necessarily subsumes a subelement of ownership, dominion, or control. Cf. United States v. Behanna, 814 F.2d 1318, 1320 (9th Cir.1987) (When the government charges an individual with possession of a weapon in a vehicle, we have squarely held that the government must do more than show that the defendant was present as a passenger in the vehicle and within reach of the weapon.); United States v. Whitfield, 629 F.2d 136, 143 (D.C.Cir.1980) (concluding that evidence of mere accessibility, without evidence of dominion and control, is insufficient to support a finding of constructive possession). Regarding Mr. Ferrell's recorded statements, we conclude his comments to Mr. Hooks do not evince knowledge of the Uzi's presence in the vehicle. Mr. Ferrell denied ownership of the Uzi upon inquiry by Officer Cash. He also asked Mr. Hooks whether Mr. Hooks' fingerprints were on all that, referring to the Uzi the officer was holding outside the patrol car. Gov't Ex. 3, Tr. of Video Clip 3. Mr. Hooks replied I think I touched that home [sic]. Id. Mr. Hooksnot Mr. Ferrellcommented that he thought the Uzi had no bullets in the chamber. See Gov't Ex. 4, Tr. of Video Clip 4. Mr. Ferrell's observation that the officer did not know how to rack the Uzi is not evidence of knowledge of the weapon while it was in the vehicle. While the remark may indicate general knowledge of how to operate a semiautomatic firearm, it does not establish that Mr. Ferrell knew that the Uzi was in the pickup. Similarly, the area in which the Uzi was found does not show Mr. Ferrell's dominion or control over the firearm. Officer Cash discovered the Uzi in a ditch on what was the passenger's side of the highway, three-quarters to half of a mile back from where the pickup had been stopped. The Uzi had no fingerprints on it, and the record contains no officer testimony, physics analysis, or other evidence identifying the window from which the firearm was thrown. The record merely reveals that at least the front windows could be opened from the inside, and that the passenger window in the rear where two other passengers were located had a large hole in it. The officers admit, moreover, that they did not observe the Uzi in the pickup or being thrown from the vehicle. At bottom, we can readily distinguish the dearth of circumstantial evidence in this case from the relative abundance of such evidence in our prior decisions upholding possession convictions. See, e.g., Jameson, 478 F.3d at 1210 (upholding possession conviction where government's evidence included defendant's furtive movements, his inferred physical contact with the pistol (his foot was on top of it), and the pistol's being in plain view and easily retrievable to a passenger in [the defendant]'s seat) (internal citation omitted); Michel, 446 F.3d at 1128-29 (upholding possession conviction where defendant, the front-seat passenger in the car in which the gun was found, made repeated movements toward the back seat area where the gun was located); Norman, 388 F.3d at 1341 (finding sufficient evidence of knowing possession where defendant, the owner and driver of the vehicle, exhibited anxious and bizarre behavior throughout his encounter with the police, had a key to the locked glove compartment in which the gun was found, may have had exclusive possession of the vehicle the evening before his arrest, and transported a passenger whose behavior and statements indicated no knowledge of the firearm); United States v. Gorman, 312 F.3d 1159, 1164 (10th Cir.2002) (holding the evidence established sufficient nexus between defendant and the firearm where defendant owned and worked on the vehicle in which the firearm was found, and the firearm was partially hidden on defendant's side of the vehicle and retrievable from defendant's driver-side seat); United States v. Springfield, 196 F.3d 1180, 1184 (10th Cir. 1999) (upholding possession conviction where defendant (i) engaged in furtive movements while being followed by the police, (ii) had been seated in the rear of the van where the gun was found, and (iii) carried on his person bullets linking him to the gun). Here, the government's only real link to Mr. Ferrell is his prese[nce] inside a car with three others where a [different] gun was [arguably thrown out]. Jameson, 478 F.3d at 1210. The evidence here, without more, does not support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We conclude that Mr. Ferrell's conviction is not supported by the evidence and must be reversed. In light of this conclusion, we need not address his other grounds for reversal of his conviction or sentence.