Opinion ID: 2519953
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Other Decisions

Text: Several post- Travelers cases from other jurisdictions have reached conclusions different from ours. (See, e.g., EklecCo, supra, 170 F.3d at p. 357 [lien statute making property owner liable for employer's ERISA contributions preempted as alternative enforcement mechanism]; Plumbing Industry Bd. v. E.W. Howell Co., Inc. (2d Cir.1997) 126 F.3d 61, 68-69 ( Plumbing Industry Bd. ) [same]; IBEW v. TRIG Elect. Const. Co. (2000) 142 Wash.2d 431, 13 P.3d 622, 627 ( Trig ) [public works lien statute making third party contractor liable for ERISA contributions preempted as alternative funding mechanism for the ERISA plans]; but see Maui Prince Hotel, supra, 918 P.2d at pp. 1154-1155 [neutral and general mechanic's and materialman's lien statute not preempted].) As one court observed, Because the state law impermissibly adds to the exclusive list of parties ERISA holds responsible for an employer's benefit obligations, it cannot stand. ( Plumbing Industry Bd., supra, 126 F.3d at p. 69.) However, we find these cases to be inapposite. Although these cases recognized the starting presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant state law in areas of traditional state regulation ( Travelers, supra, 514 U.S. at p. 654, 115 S.Ct. 1671), we conclude that none of these cases gave due consideration to the presumption before finding preemption. ( Plumbing Industry Bd., supra, 126 F.3d at pp. 68-69; EklecCo, supra, 170 F.3d at p. 357; Trig, supra, 13 P.3d at pp. 626-627.) Indeed, in discussing the alternative enforcement mechanism doctrine, these cases did not expressly consider whether the state statute at issue was in an area of traditional state regulation. ( Plumbing Industry Bd., supra, 126 F.3d at pp. 68-69; EklecCo, supra, 170 F.3d at p. 357; Trig, supra, 13 P.3d at pp. 626-627; see also Trig, supra, 13 P.3d. at p. 629 (dis. opn. of Johnson, J.) [the majority avoids any meaningful application of the post- Travelers doctrine and reaches a conclusion inconsistent with current law].) This presumption against preemption is particularly salient in this case given that our state has long recognized the importance of the mechanic's lien remedy, which is within the proper exercise of our state's police power. ( Roystone Co. v. Darling, supra, 171 Cal. at p. 540, 154 P. 15; Connolly, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 826, 132 Cal.Rptr. 477, 553 P.2d 637; see ante, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 264, 266, 82 P.3d at p. 290.) Moreover, in Plumbing Industry Bd., supra, 126 F.3d 61, relied on by EklecCo, supra, 170 F.3d 353, the New York lien law at issue was specifically amended to better protect the rights of workers by `supplement[ing]' the scheme for enforcing employee benefit obligations arising in connection with public works contracts [citation]. ( Plumbing Industry Bd., supra, 126 F.3d at p. 65.) In concluding that ERISA preempted the lien law as an alternative enforcement mechanism, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals observed, Were states free to supplement the enforcement matrix at will, Congress' policy choices would be undermined. ( Plumbing Industry Bd., at p. 68, citing Pilot Life, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 54, 107 S.Ct. 1549.) In contrast, section 3110 here was not designed to supplement the enforcement scheme for employee benefit obligations. Instead, this mechanic's lien law implements our state's constitutional mandate to protect laborers of every class and allow them to recover their entire compensation, regardless of the form the compensation takes. (Cal. Const., art. XIV, § 3; Wm. R. Clarke, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 889, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 578, 938 P.2d 372; see also § 3089, subd. (b).)