Opinion ID: 1611682
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Does the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision conflict with Cochran v. Ward, 935 So.2d 1169 (Ala.2006), and Ex parte Johnson, 777 So.2d 1351 (Ala. 1986)?

Text: Before trial, Belisle moved the trial court to exclude any mention of alleged prior bad acts, specifically, any allegations of spousal abuse. The trial court decided, and the State agreed, that the State would not present evidence relating to any prior criminal history or bad acts or any instances of spousal abuse, absent notice to and a decision from the trial court. However, one of the State's exhibits included a fingerprint card that bore Belisle's name and fingerprints and that stated that the charge for which he was being fingerprinted was `Harassment (DV)' and that the `date of offense [was] 01-02-99.' Belisle, 11 So.3d at 289. Belisle did not object to the admission of the exhibit; thus, the Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed the admission of the fingerprint card for plain error. That court held that [b]ased on the unique facts presented in this case, we cannot say that the admittance of Belisle's fingerprint card was plain error. Belisle, 11 So.3d at 294. The Court of Criminal Appeals noted that [t]here is no indication that the jury was made aware of the contents of the fingerprint card, Belisle, 11 So.3d at 315, because the card was 1 of 115 exhibits and no reference was made to the card when it was admitted into evidence. Belisle argues that the Court of Criminal Appeals' conclusion conflicts with Ex parte Johnson, 507 So.2d 1351 (Ala.1986), in which this Court held that it was plain error to admit into evidence a fingerprint card containing a list of dates and prior arrests that had no relevance to the charged offense except to show the bad character of the accused. Belisle also argues that the Court of Criminal Appeals' conclusion that [t]here is no indication that the jury was made aware of the contents of the fingerprint card, Belisle, 11 So.3d at 315, conflicts with Cochran v. Ward, 935 So.2d 1169, 1176 (Ala.2006), which states that an appellate court presume[s] that the jury follows the trial court's instructions unless there is evidence to the contrary.
First, it does not appear that the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals conflicts with Cochran. Although the Court of Criminal Appeals in Belisle concluded that [t]here is no indication that the jury was made aware of the contents of the fingerprint card, 11 So.3d at 291, it does not appear that the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the jury did not examine or consider the fingerprint card. Instead, it appears that the Court of Criminal Appeals was merely distinguishing this case from Ex parte Johnson and Brown v. State, 369 So.2d 881 (Ala.Crim. App.1979), in which police officers testified regarding fingerprint cards being admitted into evidence and, thus, focused the jury's attention on those fingerprint cards. See Belisle, 11 So.3d 291 (`The circumstances of this case are clearly not as compelling as those of Johnson and Brown. ' (quoting Thomas v. State, 824 So.2d 1, 18 (Ala. Crim.App.1999))); Ex parte Johnson, 507 So.2d at 1354 (On direct examination, Officer Brand was asked whether the name of the person whose print was taken was on both sides of the [fingerprint] card and whether the person was asked to sign the card.); and Brown, 369 So.2d at 883 (Officer McDonald stated that the appellant had been admitted to jail and fingerprinted `about a year or two ago' ....). Therefore, it does not appear that the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals conflicts with Cochran, and Belisle is not entitled to a reversal of his conviction or sentence on this issue.
Belisle argues that the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals conflicts with Ex parte Johnson, 507 So.2d 1351 (Ala. 1986). This Court has held that the exclusionary rule prevents the State from using evidence of a defendant's prior bad acts to prove the defendant's bad character and, thereby, protects the defendant's right to a fair trial. Ex parte Drinkard, 777 So.2d 295, 302 (Ala.2000). Thus, under Alabama law, the admission of the fingerprint card, which contained information about a prior arrest, was error. However, because Belisle did not object to the admission of the card, the error will constitute reversible error only if `such error has or probably has adversely affected the substantial right of the [defendant].' Ex parte Johnson, 507 So.2d at 1356. Before trial, Belisle moved the trial court to exclude any mention of alleged prior bad acts, specifically, any allegations of spousal abuse. The trial court decided, and the State agreed, that the State would not present evidence relating to any prior criminal history or bad acts or any instances of spousal abuse, absent notice to and a decision from the trial court. However, State's exhibit 82 included several ... documentsa time card, a two-page letter to the Alabama Public Safety Department, a fingerprint-examination request form, and a copy of a fingerprint card for Annette, and a copy of a fingerprint card that bears the name `Rick Allen Belisle.' Belisle, 11 So.3d at 289. The exhibit was admitted with some testimony regarding its contents, [12] without objection from Belisle, and, apparently, without specific approval from the trial court. Belisle, 11 So.3d at 289. Because there was no objection to the admission of this exhibit, we are limited to reviewing this issue for plain error. See Rule 45A, Ala.R.App.P. The front of Belisle's fingerprint card includes the date the fingerprints were taken, Belisle's fingerprints, his signature, his vital statistics, and other personal information. It also contains the Signature of Official Taking Fingerprints, a box titled CHARGE in which Harassment (DV) is written, a box titled DATE ARRESTED OR RECEIVED in which 01-02-99 is written, and a box titled YOUR NO. OCA in which 0199003 is written. It also contains boxes titled FINAL DISPOSITION, ALIASES, FBI NO., and SID NO., but these were left blank. The reverse of the fingerprint card included Belisle's address, as well as 01-02-99 written in a box entitled DATE OF OFFENSE. The Court of Criminal Appeals, addressing the admission of the fingerprint card under the plain-error standard of review, concluded: Based on the unique facts presented in this case, we cannot say that the admittance of Belisle's fingerprint card was plain error. Even if the jurors examined the exhibit, `[i]t is inconceivable that a jury could have been influenced, under the circumstances here, to convict [the appellant] of crimes of the magnitude charged here because of an oblique reference to a prior criminal record.' Belisle, 11 So.3d at 294. Belisle argues that this holding by the Court of Criminal Appeals conflicts with Ex parte Johnson. In Ex parte Johnson this Court addressed whether the admission of Johnson's fingerprint card was plain error and required a reversal of Johnson's conviction. 507 So.2d at 1352. In that case, the front of Johnson's fingerprint card contained Johnson's name, an alias, a series of police numbers and an FBI number, the fingerprints themselves, and the signature of the taker of the impressions and the date of the card. 507 So.2d at 1352. The reverse of the fingerprint card included Johnson's signature, the offense charged at the time the fingerprints were taken, and a list of dates of arrest, which show[ed] an arrest for burglary in 1977 followed by a release, an arrest for burglary and grand larceny in 1977 followed by a release, an arrest in 1978 for grand larceny from a person followed by a release, and the present charge of murder in 1978 followed by a delivery to the sheriff's office. The card also show[ed] the original arrest in 1973 for robbery followed by a delivery to the sheriff's office. 507 So.2d at 1352-53. At trial, the State admitted Johnson's fingerprint card into evidence without objection, and a police officer testified regarding the exhibit. See Ex parte Johnson, 507 So.2d at 1354. It appears that the front of Johnson's fingerprint card was admitted into evidence, but it is unclear whether the reverse of the fingerprint card was admitted as well. 507 So.2d at 1354 (`It is not clear whether a photocopy of only the front of [State's exhibit] `EE' was received into evidence or whether a copy of both front and back were received into evidence.' (quoting Johnson v. State, 507 So.2d 1337, 1342 (Ala.Crim.App.1985))). Johnson was subsequently convicted of capital murder and was sentenced to death. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Johnson's conviction and sentence. Johnson v. State, 507 So.2d 1337 (Ala.Crim.App.1985). The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that Johnson had waived his right to appeal the admission of the fingerprint card because he was aware of the contents of the card but did not object when it was admitted into evidence. The Court of Criminal Appeals also concluded that this is a case where evidence of guilt is so overwhelming that evidence of previous arrests was not significant, and its admission was harmless error in light of the strong evidence identifying Johnson as the perpetrator. Johnson, 507 So.2d at 1344. This Court granted certiorari review in Johnson. We first noted that [i]t is apparent that the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that a substantial right of the defendant had not been, or probably had not been, adversely affected by the admission of state's exhibit `EE.' As we read the opinion, this conclusion is based upon its determination that evidence of the defendant's guilt was `so overwhelming that evidence of previous arrests was not significant, and its admission was harmless error in light of the strong evidence identifying [the defendant] as the perpetrator.' However, the proper inquiry here is not whether evidence of the defendant's guilt is overwhelming but, instead, whether a substantial right of the defendant has or probably has been adversely affected. 507 So.2d at 1356. We then concluded: In the present case, the copy showing the front of exhibit `EE' contained information which clearly revealed the defendant's past contacts with law enforcement agencies. From this the jury could have readily inferred, at a minimum, that he had been arrested in the past. In our view, such an inference would have had an almost irreversible impact upon the minds of the jurors. 507 So.2d at 1357. Belisle contends that Ex parte Johnson is controlling, and he argues that the fingerprint card leaves no room for question that [Belisle] had recently been charged with [an] offense. The reference to this prior charge was more than likely to have [a] tremendous impact on the jury. Belisle's brief at 25. The State counters, arguing that a reversal is not required in this case because the admission of [the] fingerprint card in this case is distinguishable from the admission of the prejudi[cial] information [found on the fingerprint card] in Ex parte Johnson.  State's brief at 35. The State, like the Court of Criminal Appeals below, argues that this case is distinguishable from Ex parte Johnson, and analogous to Thomas v. State, 824 So.2d 1 (1999), rev'd on other grounds, Ex parte Carter, 889 So.2d 528 (Ala.2004). [13] In Thomas, the defendant's fingerprint card was admitted without objection and contained, [i]n addition to Thomas's fingerprints,... his name and signature, an alias (`Tank'), his date and place of birth, his physical description, and his Social Security number. Below the signature blank appeared the sentence: `THIS DATA MAY BE COMPUTERIZED IN LOCAL, STATE AND NATIONAL FILES.' The card also contained the name of the `OFFICIAL' who took the fingerprints and the following information blocks with the information supplied as indicated: `DATE ARRESTED OR RECEIVED DOA '-'09-17-92'; `YOUR NO. OCA '-'COO62417'; `FBI NO.'-[blank]; `SID NO.'-[blank]; `CAUTION'-[blank]; `STATE USAGE'-[blank]; `NCIC CLASS-FPC'-[blank]; `CONTRIBUTOR'-'AL0020000 SO MOBILE, AL.'; `CLASS.'-[blank]; `REF.'-[blank]; and `FBI'-[blank]. (R. 531.) There was no reference to the charge of any offense. 824 So.2d at 15-16 (capitalization in original). The Court of Criminal Appeals in Thomas concluded that there was no plain error, stating that we believe the possibility of prejudice that resulted from the admission of the fingerprint card was remote. 824 So.2d at 20. In so concluding, the Thomas court noted that the only reference to contact with law enforcement was a date in the box entitled DATE ARRESTED OR RECEIVED and thus determined that the nature of Thomas's presumed contact with law enforcement authorities was `oblique.' Thomas, 824 So.2d at 19. Additionally, the Court of Criminal Appeals in Thomas noted that its conclusion that the admission of the fingerprint card was not plain error is buttressed by the fact that defense counsel apparently did not notice any allegedly potentially prejudicial information on the card when he viewed it, as disclosed by the record and the fact that testimony at trial contained references, properly admitted into evidence, to Thomas's illegal drug activity. Id. We find Thomas distinguishable from this case. The fingerprint card in Thomas contained no reference to the charge of any offense and merely showed a date in the DATE ARRESTED OR RECEIVED. 824 So.2d at 19. In this case, however, a charge is listed on the fingerprint card, and, in addition to the date entered in the box entitled DATE ARRESTED OR RECEIVED, the box entitled DATE OF OFFENSE is completed. Further, there is no argument by the State that, in this case, there was testimony regarding any previous illegal activities in which Belisle may have been involved. We conclude that this case is distinguishable from Thomas and Maples v. State, 758 So.2d 1 (Ala.Crim.App.1999) ( see note 13), we also conclude that it is distinguishable from Ex parte Johnson. As the State notes, the fingerprint card in this case was admitted as an exhibit along with several other documentsa time card, a two-page letter to the Alabama Public Safety Department, a fingerprint-examination request form, and a copy of a fingerprint card for Annette ...., with little testimony regarding the exhibit and apparently no specific mention of Belisle's fingerprint card. Belisle, 11 So.3d at 289. The fingerprint card in Ex parte Johnson was admitted as a separate exhibit and was accompanied by extensive testimony. 507 So.2d at 1341, rev'd, Ex parte Johnson, supra (discussing the testimony of at least two witnesses who testified regarding the defendant's fingerprints and the fingerprint card). The information found on Belisle's fingerprint card further distinguishes this case from Ex parte Johnson. Unlike Johnson's fingerprint card, Belisle's fingerprint card does not contain an alias. Even though it is unclear whether the reverse of Johnson's fingerprint card (which contained the list of prior arrests) was admitted at his trial, the front of the card contained a series of police numbers and an FBI number that clearly revealed the defendant's past contacts with law enforcement agencies. 507 So.2d at 1357. Here, Belisle's fingerprint card contains only one charge, and a date of offense that coincides with the DATE ARRESTED OR RECEIVED. Ex parte Johnson is therefore distinguishable from this case. Moreover, the other caselaw cited by Belisle does not support a reversal of his conviction and sentence. Thus, the Court of Criminal Appeals did not err by determining that the admission of the fingerprint card was harmless error.