Opinion ID: 170450
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Contours of a Constitutional Tort

Text: What differentiates a constitutional transgression from an ordinary common law tort is a level of executive abuse of power . . . that . . . shocks the conscience. Id. at 846, 118 S.Ct. 1708. In other words, the executive abuse represents arbitrary action of government and requires a showing of government officials abusing their power, or employing it as an instrument of oppression. Id. at 845-46, 118 S.Ct. 1708 (quotations and brackets omitted). While recognizing no calibrated yard stick, id. at 847, 118 S.Ct. 1708, the Supreme Court instructs that the constitutional concept of conscience shocking duplicates no traditional category of common-law fault, id. at 848, 118 S.Ct. 1708. The Supreme Court has also explained, [r]ules of due process are not . . . subject to mechanical application in unfamiliar territory. Id. at 850, 118 S.Ct. 1708. What shocks [the conscience] in one environment may not be so patently egregious in another, and our concern with preserving the constitutional proportions of substantive due process demands an exact analysis of circumstance before any abuse of power is condemned as conscience shocking. Id. Thus, the cases recognize that common-sense distinctions exist between force in one setting (say, a prison) and force in another (say, a kennel business). The case law also recognizes official conduct may be more egregious in circumstances allowing for deliberation (such as when a person is in custody or under governmental control or supervision) than in circumstances calling for quick decisions (such as police chases or prison disturbances). See id. These distinctions in the application of force are not always facilely drawn. Given the latitude we ordinarily afford government actors operating in their official capacities, we recognize constitutional torts only in the narrowest of circumstances, Becker, 494 F.3d at 922. The tortious conduct alleged must do more than show that the government actor intentionally or recklessly caused injury to the plaintiff by abusing or misusing government power. . . . [It] must demonstrate a degree of outrageousness and a magnitude of potential or actual harm that is truly conscience shocking. Livsey v. Salt Lake County, 275 F.3d 952, 957-58, (10th Cir.2001) (emphasis added) (quotation omitted). Not surprisingly, little governmental action is held unconstitutional under th[is] formulation[]. 1 Martin A. Schwartz, Section 1983 Litigation § 3.05[D], at 3-116 (4th ed.2006). [3] Even with these general principles in mind, Plaintiffs' case presents a narrow issue that has generated a surprising dearth of reported authority: whether a § 1983 plaintiff can successfully assert a substantive due process right to be free from intentional use of force by a state actor not authorized to use force.