Opinion ID: 2758220
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Officer Doyle

Text: The unwaived claims against Officer Doyle are: (1) Count Two (Unlawful and Unreasonable Searches and Seizures); Count Five (Excessive Force); and Count Six (False Arrest). We address each in turn. a. Count Two – Unlawful and Unreasonable Searches and Seizures In count two, Plaintiffs claim that Officer Doyle violated their rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures when he stopped and detained them for trespassing. In order to prevail on this claim, Plaintiffs must show that Officer Doyle lacked probable cause to search and detain them. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 550–51 (1980). The district court correctly concluded that Plaintiffs are collaterally estopped from challenging the existence of probable cause. Plaintiffs are estopped from challenging probable cause because Martin admitted to criminal trespass, and because the state juvenile court found that Bolden committed a criminal trespass. Federal courts apply state law to determine whether collateral estoppel applies. Daubenmire v. City of Columbus, 507 F.3d 383, 389 (6th Cir. 2007). Under Ohio law, collateral estoppel applies “‘when the fact or issue (1) was actually and directly litigated in the prior action, (2) was passed upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, and (3) when the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party in privity with a party to the prior action.’ ” Id. (quoting 6 No. 13-4397, Bolden et al. v. City of Euclid et al. Thompson v. Wing, 70 Ohio St. 3d 176, 637 N.E.2d 917, 923 (1994)). Where a plaintiff has been convicted criminally, collateral estoppel bars a subsequent challenge to probable cause related to his arrest in a civil case, Contreras v. Simone, 112 Ohio App. 3d 246, 678 N.E.2d 593, 595 (1996), and the same bar applies if the plaintiff pleaded guilty or no-contest to a criminal charge in state court, Daubenmire, 507 F.3d at 390. As to Bolden, the judgment entered by the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, precludes him from challenging the existence of probable cause in this case. After Bolden elected to proceed to a bench trial on the charge of misdemeanor Criminal Trespass, Ohio Rev. Code § 2911.21(A)(1), he was found by the magistrate judge to have committed the trespass. The magistrate judge’s order was adopted by the court, and the court in its judgment explicitly stated that there was probable cause for filing the complaint against Bolden. While the complaint was ultimately dismissed, it was dismissed under Ohio Juvenile Rule 29(F)(2)(d) which requires “the allegations of the complaint, indictment, or information” to be “admitted or proven.” Bolden’s argument that he was not “convicted,” therefore, is without merit. Bolden argues that collateral estoppel should not apply because his case was ultimately dismissed, and he cannot be required to appeal a favorable decision. At oral argument, Bolden’s counsel argued that an appeal would have required paying more for an attorney, transcript fees, etc., when the outcome was ultimately positive for Bolden. Although it may not have been wise for Bolden to appeal a judgment when the ultimate disposition was dismissal and a finding that he was not delinquent, Bolden was represented by counsel who should have known and advised Bolden that an appeal would preserve a future federal civil rights lawsuit. Bolden had the opportunity to appeal 7 No. 13-4397, Bolden et al. v. City of Euclid et al. the unfavorable finding of criminal trespass. The final judgment informed Bolden of this right: “[p]ursuant to Rule 34(J) of the Rules of Juvenile Procedure and Rules 3 and 4 of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure, an appeal of the order herein may be taken in the Eighth District Court of Appeals . . . .” We reject Bolden’s contrary arguments. As to Martin, his admission in juvenile court that he trespassed on Officer Doyle’s property establishes probable cause. As explained, both Martin and his mother testified that they understood the diversion program to be an admission of guilt. In addition, they both testified that Martin was required to admit to trespassing before the juvenile court judge allowed him to participate in the diversion program. Martin’s admission to trespassing is dispositive of his claim. Even if collateral estoppel does not bar Martin’s claim, judicial estoppel does. Teledyne Indus., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 911 F.2d 1214, 1217–18 (6th Cir. 1990) (explaining that judicial estoppel bars a party from taking a contradictory position accepted by a prior court). The juvenile court accepted Martin’s position that he was trespassing on Officer Doyle’s property in order to allow him to participate in the diversion program. He cannot now take a contradictory position to benefit in a civil case. Ultimately, there is no dispute that Martin admitted to the charge in a prior legal proceeding, thereby precluding him from challenging probable cause in this case. 8 No. 13-4397, Bolden et al. v. City of Euclid et al. b. Count Five – Excessive Force Count five alleges excessive force under federal law.1 Plaintiffs argue that Officer Doyle’s use of force in arresting them was unreasonable and excessive. We have explained that “[a]n officer making an investigative stop or arrest has ‘the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.’ ” Miller v. Sanilac Cnty., 606 F.3d 240, 251 (6th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). “Courts must determine whether a particular use of force is reasonable based on ‘the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.’ ” Smoak v. Hall, 460 F.3d 768, 783 (6th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). The central inquiry is whether, “under the totality of the circumstances, the officer’s actions were objectively reasonable.” Fox v DeSoto, 489 F.3d 227, 236–37 (6th Cir. 2007). “Among the most important factors to consider in determining the objective reasonableness of the force used are: 1) the severity of the crime at issue; 2) whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of the police officer or others; and 3) whether the suspect actively resisted arrest or attempted to evade arrest by flight.” Grawey v. Drury, 567 F.3d 302, 310 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). Applying the above standards to Bolden’s claim, he fails to establish a genuine issue of material fact that Officer Doyle used excessive force against him. Bolden testified at his deposition that he complied with all of Officer Doyle’s commands. The only use of force Bolden claims is that 1 The judgment in juvenile court establishing criminal trespass against Bolden does not bar his excessive force claim because the excessive force claim does not challenge any of the elements in a criminal trespass charge under Ohio law. Daubenmire, 507 F.3d at 389; but see Cummings v. City of Akron, 418 F.3d 676, 683 (6th Cir. 2005) (reasoning that Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), barred excessive force claim where plaintiff was convicted of assault arising out of same altercation). 9 No. 13-4397, Bolden et al. v. City of Euclid et al. Officer Doyle pushed Martin into him causing him to stumble onto the fence. If true, this establishes that Officer Doyle used force against Martin, not Bolden. The evidence does not support Bolden’s excessive force claim. To the extent that Bolden’s excessive force claim is premised on a theory that his handcuffs were on too tight, his claim likewise has no merit because Bolden conceded that the handcuffs were loosened after he complained. Morrison v. Bd. of Trs. of Green Twp., 583 F.3d 394, 401 (6th Cir. 2009) (requiring evidence that officer ignored complaints to loosen handcuffs) (citation omitted). Applying the Grawey factors to Martin, we reach the same conclusion. First, as to the severity of the crime Officer Doyle believed Martin to be committing, it cannot be disputed that criminal trespassing is a relatively minor offense. Second, we must consider whether Martin posed an immediate threat to Officer Doyle or others. Grawey, 567 F.3d at 310. Although under Plaintiffs’ version of events, Martin did not pose an obvious threat of danger, Martin admitted that he disregarded Officer Doyle’s commands, reached into his pocket and pulled out his phone to call his mother. Officer Doyle was justified in using some force (slapping Martin’s phone out of his hand and taking him to the ground) to secure a non-compliant Martin. At this point, Officer Doyle did not know if Martin had anything in his pockets. The final Grawey factor requires consideration of whether Martin actively resisted arrest or attempted to flee. Id. Martin admitted that he refused to sit down when he was told to do so by Officer Doyle, and that he disregarded Officer Doyle’s commands because he wanted to call his mother. Martin’s refusal to comply with Officer Doyle’s lawful commands justified the use of some force to control the situation. In sum, weighing the Grawey factors, the force used by Officer Doyle to control the situation was objectively reasonable. 10 No. 13-4397, Bolden et al. v. City of Euclid et al. The district court also concluded that Martin’s alleged injuries were de minimus. We have explained that the “ ‘extent of the injury inflicted’ is not ‘crucial to an analysis of a claim for excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.’ ” Morrison, 583 F.3d at 407 (citation omitted). But, the absence of injury to Martin supports the conclusion that the force used against him was reasonable. The district court appropriately granted summary judgment to Officer Doyle on Martin’s excessive force claim. c. Count Six – False Arrest Plaintiffs allege false arrest under Ohio law in Count Six. The district court determined that Plaintiffs are precluded from challenging the existence of probable cause to arrest them, and, therefore, could not maintain a false arrest claim. Alternatively, the district court held that Officer Doyle is entitled to immunity under state law. Plaintiffs only challenge Officer Doyle’s entitlement to immunity. However, we do not reach the immunity question because the false arrest claim fails on the merits. See Jordan v. City of Detroit, 557 F. App’x 450, 454 n.3 (6th Cir. 2014) (explaining that the “merits first” approach is preferred where a determination on the merits is straightforward). Under Ohio law, a false arrest claim requires proof of “ ‘(1) a detention of the person, and (2) an unlawful detention.’ ” Thacker v. City of Columbus, 328 F.3d 244, 261 (6th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). Although the district court incorrectly stated that Plaintiffs’ false arrest claim required proof of the lack of probable cause to arrest them, reversal is not warranted because the district court reached the correct result in dismissing the claim. Id. The essence of a false arrest claim is that the arrest was without lawful justification. Id. Plaintiffs’ false arrest claim fails because Martin admitted on the record in juvenile court to 11 No. 13-4397, Bolden et al. v. City of Euclid et al. trespassing, and Bolden was found to have trespassed after a bench trial. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the arrest was justified. Id.; Walker v. Schaeffer, 854 F.2d 138, 142 (6th Cir. 1988).