Opinion ID: 2630937
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Constitutional challenge to lifetime postrelease supervision is unpreserved

Text: Plotner argues for the first time on appeal that sentencing a defendant to lifetime postrelease supervision as provided for in K.S.A. 22-3717(d)(1)(G) constitutes cruel or unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and § 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. Generally, parties may not raise constitutional issues for the first time on appeal. But this general rule has three exceptions that enable appellate review, including: (1) The newly asserted claim involves only a question of law arising on proved or admitted facts and is determinative of the case; (2) consideration of the claim is necessary to serve the ends of justice or to prevent the denial of fundamental rights; and (3) the district court is right for the wrong reason. Ortega-Cadelan, 287 Kan. at 159, 194 P.3d 1195 (citing Pierce v. Board of County Commissioners, 200 Kan. 74, 80-81, 434 P.2d 858 [1967]). In Ortega-Cadelan , this court reviewed fully the applicability those exceptions have in the context of a defendant's challenge under § 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights to a life sentence imposed under K.S.A. 21-4643(a)(1) when that challenge was raised for the first time on appeal. The court noted that whether a life sentence under that statute was cruel or unusual punishment must be analyzed using the three-prong test set out in State v. Freeman, 223 Kan. 362, 367, 574 P.2d 950 (1978). Ortega-Cadelan, 287 Kan. at 160-61, 194 P.3d 1195. Those considerations are: (1) The nature of the offense and the character of the offender should be examined with particular regard to the degree of danger present to society; relevant to this inquiry are the facts of the crime, the violent or nonviolent nature of the offense, the extent of culpability for the injury resulting, and the penological purposes of the prescribed punishment; (2) A comparison of the punishment with punishments imposed in this jurisdiction for more serious offenses, and if among them are found more serious crimes punished less severely than the offense in question the challenged penalty is to that extent suspect; and (3) A comparison of the penalty with punishments in other jurisdictions for the same offense. Freeman, 223 Kan. at 367, 574 P.2d 950. In reviewing those factors, the Ortega-Cadelan court determined that a Freeman analysis necessarily intertwines both factual and legal questions, and further noted that no single legal consideration under Freeman controls the outcome. 287 Kan. at 161, 194 P.3d 1195. Accordingly, the Ortega-Cadelan court determined it needed a record developed at the district court level to address the factual aspects embedded within the Freeman analysis in order for the defendant to properly challenge his or her life sentence under K.S.A. 21-4643(a)(1). Plotner acknowledges this court has consistently held none of the Pierce exceptions apply to his issue and that the issue presents mixed questions of law and fact. See, e.g., State v. Oehlert, 290 Kan. 189, 224 P.3d 561, 563-64 (2010); State v. Easterling, 289 Kan. 470, 485-87, 213 P.3d 418 (2009); State v. Mondragon, 289 Kan. 1158, 1162-65, 220 P.3d 369 (2009); State v. Spotts, 288 Kan. 650, 652-54, 206 P.3d 510 (2009); Ortega-Cadelan, 287 Kan. at 159-61, 194 P.3d 1195. Plotner urges this court to reverse its precedent and consider the issue here, claiming his trial record is factually sufficient to address the issue. We find otherwise. Because this issue was not raised below, the record is devoid of the facts this court needs to evaluate it, i.e., the facts required to apply Freeman . For the reasons explained in Oehlert , Easterling , Mondragon , Spotts , and Ortega-Cadelan , Plotner cannot raise this issue for the first time on appeal. Affirmed in part and reversed in part. DAVIS, C.J., not participating. STEVE LEBEN, Judge, assigned. [1]