Opinion ID: 1376040
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Harvey argues the evidence at the bench trial was insufficient to meet two components of the SVP definition: mental abnormality and likelihood of sexual violence. In an appeal regarding sufficiency of the evidence in a SVP case, the appellate court may only reverse the trial court if there is no evidence to support the trial court's ruling. In re Matthews, 345 S.C. 638, 646, 550 S.E.2d 311, 315 (2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1062, 122 S.Ct. 1928, 152 L.Ed.2d 834 (2002). In other words, the court is concerned with the existence of evidence, not its weight. Id. Under the SVP Act, the State bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that a person is a sexually violent predator. See S.C.Code Ann. § 44-48-100 (2002). A sexually violent predator is defined as a person who: (a) has been convicted of a sexually violent offense; and (b) suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility for long-term control, care, and treatment. § 44-48-30(1)(a) & (b). The Act defines [l]ikely to engage in acts of sexual violence to mean the person's propensity to commit acts of sexual violence is of such a degree as to pose a menace to the health and safety of others. § 44-48-30(9). Harvey contends the State failed to prove he is a pedophile because Dr. Schwartz-Watts' diagnosis of pedophilia was inconsistent with the DSM-IV criteria. Specifically, Harvey maintains that his acts of sexual misconduct which occurred before he was 16 should not be the basis of a pedophilia diagnosis. Since the DSM-IV criteria clearly indicate that a pedophilia diagnosis is only appropriate if the person is over 16, we share Harvey's concern with the focus placed on his acts. See footnote 3, supra. Moreover, we note the Michigan incident does not satisfy the DSM-IV criteria since Harvey was not five years older than the twin boys. Nonetheless, there remain portions of Dr. Schwartz-Watts' testimony which justify her diagnosis. She testified that Harvey reported having urges after turning sixteen and her diagnosis was based on his present mental state. Technically, this meets the definition of pedophilia. Thus, there was sufficient evidence of a mental abnormality or disorder. See In re Matthews, supra (the court is concerned with the existence of evidence, not its weight). Harvey also argues the State failed to prove that the pedophilia made him likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility for long-term control, care, and treatment. Harvey's argument is based primarily on the United States Supreme Court's holding in Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 122 S.Ct. 867, 151 L.Ed.2d 856 (2002), that there must be proof of a lack of ability to control behavior. In In re Luckabaugh, 351 S.C. 122, 568 S.E.2d 338 (2002), this Court noted that the Crane decision does not mandate a court must separately and specially make a lack of control determination, only that a court must determine the individual lacks control while looking at the totality of the evidence. Id. at 143, 568 S.E.2d at 348. The Luckabaugh Court went on to state the following: Inherent within the mental abnormality prong of the Act is a lack of control determination, i.e. the individual can only be committed if he suffers from a mental illness which he cannot sufficiently control without the structure and care provided by a mental health facility, rendering him likely to commit a dangerous act. Id. at 144, 568 S.E.2d at 349. Thus, the Court concluded the requirements of the SVP Act are the functional equivalent of the requirement in Crane. Id. Accordingly, given Dr. Schwartz-Watts' diagnosis of pedophilia and her testimony that Harvey met the statutory SVP definition, we do not agree the State failed to present evidence of present dangerousness. See In re Matthews, supra . [7]