Opinion ID: 2599895
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Alaska's One-Year Statute of Limitations on Adoption Challenges Bars David's ICWA Claims.

Text: Per AS 25.23.140(b), a challenge to an adoption decree must be filed within one year after the decree is issued. [10] The superior court held that this one-year limitation barred David's petition to invalidate the adoption decree. David argues that state statutes of limitations should not apply to adoption challenges brought under ICWA, a federal statute. Section 1914 of ICWA allows any parent or Indian custodian from whose custody [an Indian] child was removed to petition any court of competent jurisdiction to invalidate such action upon a showing that such action violated any provision of sections 1911, 1912 and 1913 of this title. [11] ICWA does not contain a generally applicable statute of limitations and § 1914 contains no time limits. [12] David maintains that because ICWA contains no general statute of limitations, challenges may be brought under § 1914 at any time.
We have previously considered whether AS 25.23.140(b), Alaska's one-year limitation on adoption challenges, applies to claims brought under § 1914 of ICWA. In In re Adoption of T.N.F., two of the four participating justices agreed that Alaska's one-year statute of limitations applied, [13] one justice concurred in the result without discussing the merits of the statute of limitations question, [14] and one justice dissented, arguing that § 1914 allows at least some ICWA claims to be brought at any time. [15] The parties here dispute T.N.F.'s stare decisis effect. Stare decisis compels us to give precedential value to our prior holdings. [16] David argues that because T.N.F. lacks a majority opinion it should not be given any stare decisis effect. The Grants counter that the plurality's opinion should be given stare decisis effect because a majority of participating justices agreed with the result. We agree with David's conclusion that T.N.F. does not have stare decisis effect. A majority of the participating justices did not agree on a rationale for deciding T.N.F. Generally, [i]f a majority of the court agreed on a decision in the case, but less than a majority could agree on the reasoning for that decision, the decision has no stare decisis effect. [17] In some cases, a holding can be extracted from an opinion without a majority opinion. The United States Supreme Court has held that [w]hen a fragmented court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds. [18] But one federal court has noted that this principle is inapplicable if there is no obvious narrower opinion or common denominator of the Court's reasoning. [19] T.N.F. contains no narrower reasoning agreed upon by all three affirming justices. The concurring justice expressed no opinion on the statute of limitations issue, and in agreeing with the result, he reasoned that ICWA did not give the plaintiff standing to sue. [20] The two-justice plurality specifically disagreed with the concurring justice on the standing issue. [21] Because a majority of the participating justices in T.N.F. did not agree on any one ground for affirmance, we do not accord T.N.F. stare decisis effect. [22]
Even though T.N.F. is not binding precedent, we nevertheless agree with the reasoning of the plurality opinion on the limitations issues. Congress did not include a generally applicable statute of limitations in ICWA. It specified a two-year statute of limitations for one class of ICWA claims, those brought under § 1913(d). The absence of a general statute of limitations is a void which is commonplace in federal statutory law. [23] The United States Supreme Court has held that [w]hen Congress has not established a time limitation for a federal cause of action, the settled practice has been to adopt a local time limitation as federal law if it is not inconsistent with federal law or policy to do so. [24] Apart from T.N.F., no reported case has discussed the issue of what statute of limitations applies for claims brought under § 1914 of ICWA. [25] But courts have borrowed state statutes of limitations in considering the timeliness of claims under many federal statutes, including the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, [26] the False Claims Act, [27] the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, [28] the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, [29] 42 U.S.C. § 1983, [30] the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, [31] and the Labor Management Relations Act. [32] David asks us to hold that no limitations period whatsoever applies to his § 1914 challenge to the adoption decree. But he cites no case in which a court has held that no statute of limitations applies to a federal statutory claim. Although courts have occasionally suggested that certain federal causes of action have no applicable statutes of limitation, such causes of action appear to be rare. [33] Courts, reasoning that the proposed state statute of limitations would be an unsatisfactory vehicle[ ] for the enforcement of federal law, do sometimes hold that a particular state statute of limitations should not be applied to a given federal claim. [34] But in such casesnone of which involves ICWA  courts have either borrowed a different state statute of limitations, [35] or they have used timeliness rules drawn from federal law  either express limitations periods from related federal statutes, or such alternatives as laches. [36] Applying Alaska's one-year statute of limitations for challenging adoption decrees to ICWA adoption challenges not based on fraud or duress does not conflict with federal law or policy. As noted above, Congress regularly creates private rights of action without statutes of limitations. It is reasonable to assume that Congress's enactment of ICWA without a general statute of limitations was informed by the settled practice of borrowing statutes of limitations from state law. [37] If Congress had intended to exempt claims under § 1914 from state statutes of limitations, it could have easily done so with explicit statutory language. And indeed, if Congress had intended that § 1914 claims challenging placements, including adoptions, would be subject to no time limitations despite the disruptive consequences of delay, one would expect some indication of that intent in ICWA's legislative history. We are aware of no such indication of legislative intent. Moreover, § 1913(d) indicates that Congress must have intended to allow state limitations periods to govern ICWA claims. Congress there adopted a two-year federal statute of limitations for claims that a parent's relinquishment of rights was obtained through fraud or duress, unless state law provides for a longer limitations period. [38] Subsection 1913(d) demonstrates that Congress was aware of, and endorsed, the practice of borrowing state statutes of limitations. It suggests that the drafters understood that state limitations periods would govern ICWA challenges unless Congress specified otherwise. Congress did so only as to claims brought under § 1913(d). Obtaining a parent's consent to termination by fraud or duress is arguably one of the most egregious placement practices addressed by ICWA. Congress's decision to adopt a minimum limitations period only for fraud and duress claims suggests that it was comfortable with the possibility that shorter state limitations periods would govern claims brought under other ICWA provisions. Conversely, it is unlikely that Congress would have limited the time for bringing claims under § 1913(d) if it intended that other § 1914 claims would be subject to no time limits. Also, we agree with the reasoning of the T.N.F. plurality that § 1913(d) implicitly recognizes the important policy that at some point adoptions must become final. [39] Although a primary purpose of ICWA is to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families by preventing the unwarranted breakup of Indian families, ICWA is also intended to protect the best interests of Indian children. [40] As we noted in another case: [a]doptive custody results in the rapid development of lasting and powerful psychological ties between adoptive parents and children, especially young children. Once formed, these bonds can seldom be severed without irreparable damage to the child's well-being.[ [41] ] ICWA is remedial legislation and must be liberally construed in favor of Indians, [42] but we do not think that an interpretation of ICWA that would completely disregard Indian children's interests in finality and stability would be consistent with Congress's intent in enacting the statute. We therefore hold that Alaska's one-year statute of limitations provides an appropriate balance between the important federal rights of Indian tribes and families and the best interests of adopted children. David argues that § 1921 of ICWA prohibits us from applying any statute of limitations to ICWA claims. Section 1921 states: In any case where State or Federal law applicable to a child custody proceeding under State or Federal law provides a higher standard of protection to the rights of the parent or Indian custodian of an Indian child than the rights provided under this subchapter, the State or Federal court shall apply the State or Federal standard.[ [43] ] David contends that because ICWA provides no statute of limitations, ICWA is a Federal law . . . provid[ing] a higher standard of protection to the rights of the parent and should therefore trump Alaska's statute of limitations. Section 1921, on its face, does not support David's interpretation. That provision requires that State or Federal law prevail if it provides more protection than the rights provided under this subchapter. Because the statute requires a comparison between State or Federal law and the rights provided under this subchapter, State or Federal law can only mean a state or federal law other than ICWA. Furthermore, a special provision is not necessary to ensure that a federal statute of limitationsor, as alleged in this case, a purported federal policy that lawsuits be allowed at any timeprevails over a conflicting state statute of limitations. Basic federal preemption principles require the same result. [44] David's argument fails because he cannot show that Congress's silence on the limitations issue indicates an intention to allow ICWA challenges at any time. Section 1921 does not shed any additional light on this question. Alaska Statute 25.23.140(b) provides that, subject to the disposition of an appeal, an adoption cannot be questioned upon the expiration of one year after the decree is issued. The superior court issued the adoption decree on September 6, 2002. [45] Per AS 25.23.140(b), any challenge to the adoption filed after September 4, 2003 was untimely. David's October 21, 2004 petition to invalidate Erin's adoption was therefore time-barred.