Opinion ID: 790216
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: EGC's Impeachment Evidence

Text: 43 Hammel next argues that the district court erred in its decision to admit evidence that EGC failed to disclose prior to trial: 1) evidence of a cash gift he received after leaving EGC; and 2) testimony of one of his former employers on the subject of his poor attitude and work ethic. At trial, EGC sought to enter both forms of evidence to impeach statements Hammel made on cross-examination. Hammel timely objected to admission of the evidence, arguing that EGC failed to disclose prior to trial that it intended to offer either evidence of the cash gift or the testimony by Hammel's former employer. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 26(a)(3). Finding that the evidence was intended for impeachment purposes only, the district court concluded that EGC was not required to disclose the evidence prior to trial and properly allowed EGC to present it. 44 In accordance with Fed. R.Civ.P. 26(a)(1)(A) & (3), evidence offered solely for impeachment purposes does not have to be disclosed prior to trial. See Musser, 356 F.3d at 756; DeBiasio v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 52 F.3d 678, 688 (7th Cir.1995). 11 EGC offered evidence of a cash gift Hammel received from his father when exploring the issue of whether Hammel had received payment from any collateral sources following his termination which could serve to offset his request for an award of back pay from EGC. 12 See Flowers v. Komatsu Mining Sys., Inc., 165 F.3d 554, 558 (7th Cir.1999). Hammel was asked on cross-examination if, after his termination, he was given any money even as a gift in exchange for staying with his father, and he answered that he had not. To impeach Hammel's answer, EGC offered evidence of the $5,000 cash gift that Hammel received after caring for his father: a $5,000 check and an accompanying transaction statement referencing the check and containing the notation [t]his money was given to Paul [Hammel] as [a] gift for taking care of Dad since last Nov. Evidence of the cash gift that Hammel received directly contradicted his statement that he had not received such a gift. 45 We also conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion when allowing EGC to present testimony from Hammel's former employer on the subject of his poor attitude and work ethic. On cross examination, EGC asked Hammel a series of questions concerning many aspects of his period of employment at Schlosser Lumber in Durand, Wisconsin, the job he held immediately prior to his employment at EGC. Specifically, Hammel was asked if, while at Schlosser, he: 1) was told that he was not doing [his] job correctly; 2) threatened the individuals at Schlosser Lumber with a disability lawsuit if they fired [him]; and 3) had walked off the job and told his supervisor to go to hell. Hammel answered no to all three questions. To impeach Hammel's answers to these questions, EGC introduced testimony from Michael Berger, Hammel's supervisor at Schlosser Lumber. EGC first queried Berger as to whether he ever [told] Mr. Hammel that he had done [his] job incorrectly? Berger's response was: Yes, I did. EGC next asked Berger if Hammel ever threaten[ed] to sue? Berger's answer to this question was: Yes, he did .... he said `I'll sue you if you fire me.' Subsequently, EGC inquired as to how Hammel's employment came to an end at Schlosser Lumber? Berger's reply was: One day he was .... more or less standing there, and I told him, Get working .... and he went and got all pissed off and called me a bunch of names and called me a lot of things, and he walked off. Berger's testimony as to these matters directly contradicted Hammel's representations and suggests a lack of honesty; for Hammel claimed that, while employed at Schlosser Lumber, he was never told he was doing his job incorrectly, he never threatened to file a lawsuit if terminated, and he never walked off the job in the wake of a profanity-laced tirade. Berger's testimony thus served to impeach Hammel's credibility as a witness. Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Berger's testimony for impeachment purposes, even though EGC failed to disclose Berger as a witness before the trial. 13 See DeBiasio, 52 F.3d at 688.