Opinion ID: 1298156
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admissibility of Psychologist's Opinion of Tuggle's Future Dangerousness.

Text: In the penalty trial, Dr. Arthur Centor, a clinical psychologist who evaluated Tuggle at Central State Hospital, was allowed to opine that Tuggle shows a high probability of future dangerousness. The defendant unsuccessfully objected to this testimony on the ground that he was examined without the benefit of counsel. Tuggle asserts that because an attorney had been appointed to represent him at the time of his examination, his Sixth Amendment right was violated when he was examined without the benefit of counsel. In support of his argument, Tuggle relies upon Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981). In Estelle v. Smith , the trial court informally ordered the State's attorney to arrange a psychiatric examination of Smith to determine Smith's competency to stand trial. Id. at 456-57, 101 S.Ct. at 1869-70. The evaluation was ordered even though Smith's attorney had not requested it, and the record suggests that Smith's counsel was unaware that the examination had been ordered. Id. at 458, note 5, 101 S.Ct. at 1871, note 5. Without obtaining a waiver of rights by Smith or permission from Smith's counsel, the psychiatrist examined Smith and concluded that he would be a danger to society in the future. Id. at 458-59, 101 S.Ct. at 1870-71. Over Smith's objection, the psychiatrist testified in the penalty phase of the trial as to Smith's future dangerousness. Id. at 459-60, 101 S.Ct. at 1871-72. The Supreme Court held that Smith's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated when the psychiatrist was allowed to testify regarding future dangerousness. The Court expressly noted that its holding does not preclude an accused from waiving this constitutional right. Id. at 471, note 16, 101 S.Ct. at 1877, note 16. Smith, however, did not waive this right. The right to counsel may be waived provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1883, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 146, 157-58, 255 S.E.2d 525, 531 (1979); Lamb v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 307, 310-11, 227 S.E.2d 737, 740 (1976). Whether a waiver is effective depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. at 482, 101 S.Ct. at 1883; Superintendent v. Barnes, 221 Va. 780, 784, 273 S.E.2d 558, 561 (1981). In stark contrast to the facts of Estelle v. Smith , Tuggle and his counsel requested the psychiatric examination. More importantly, before Tuggle was interviewed, Dr. Centor fully advised Tuggle of his constitutional rights, and Tuggle signed a legal rights advice form [11] indicating that his rights were explained to him, he understood that he had the right to have his lawyer present during questioning, and he voluntarily waived these rights. Furthermore, Tuggle's experience with the criminal justice system was graphically demonstrated when the defendant terminated further questioning by his remark to the police officer:  From past experience, I would like to talk to an attorney. (Emphasis added.) It is apparent from all the facts and circumstances of the case that Tuggle waived his right to counsel and did so voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Thus, the trial court properly admitted Dr. Centor's testimony regarding Tuggle's future dangerousness.