Opinion ID: 1953866
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Comments on the Defendant's Presence at Trial

Text: Appellant also assails the prosecution's conduct during its closing argument. The first assignment of error concerns the government's comments on appellant's presence at trial. Near the end of the government's summation, the prosecutor argued as follows: Let's talk about Tony for a second. Ladies and gentlemen, isn't it convenient that the defendant, I think sua sponte on his own, sort of said, but I never ask for anybody's last name, it's not something that I do? Isn't it convenient that he doesn't know where Tony lives? Who is Tony? We don't know. Isn't it convenient that Tony is unemployed? There's no way to contact him at work. Isn't it convenient that only the defendant, but not Tony, used a condom, and that Tony ejaculated on himself leaving nothing behind? Convenient. Isn't it convenient that only [the complainant] apparently saw the condom, and the condom was tied so that the semen stays more viable? It's all too convenient. Ladies and gentlemen, the defendant is in a unique position here. He's the one person who gets to see all the evidence through the trial and hear all the testimony [At this point, the defense objected and the court overruled the objection.] What he's trying to do, he's trying to navigate the evidence and come up with a story. Defense counsel then renewed his objection, and the following colloquy occurred during a bench conference: [DEFENSE]: This is absolutely improper, and I move for a mistrial. THE COURT: You are not supposed to be arguing that, because the Court of Appeals says [PROSECUTION]: A United States Supreme Court decision says it is not improper. THE COURT: Go on to something else. [DEFENSE]: For the record, I am moving for a mistrial. THE COURT: I will deny your motion for mistrial. Appellant now argues that the prosecutor's statements to the effect that appellant's presence in court allowed him to fabricate a story in response to the government's evidence flout(s) . . . unambiguous holdings of this court which prohibit such tactics. In Jenkins v. United States, 374 A.2d 581, 584 (D.C.1977), we held that the government's suggest[ion] that appellant's presence during trial facilitated his ability to fabricate was improper, and . . . should not [have] be[en] countenanced by the trial court because it interfered with the appellant's exercise of his right to confront the witnesses against him. The government, however, argues that Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 120 S.Ct. 1119, 146 L.Ed.2d 47 (2000), supersedes the Jenkins line of cases by explicitly holding that comments by the prosecution that the defendant has the opportunity to tailor his testimony to the government's evidence do not violate a defendant's constitutional rights. This is the first occasion on which this court has been required to address the Portuondo decision, and therefore presents the question of whether this aspect of Jenkins remains good law in the District. We review this issue de novo. See United States v. Felder, 548 A.2d 57, 61 (D.C. 1988). Jenkins relied upon Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965), for its holding that the prosecutor's remarks were improper. Jenkins, supra, 374 A.2d at 584. Griffin, in turn, held that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution forbid the prosecution or the court from making comments inferring that a defendant's decision not to testify is evidence of guilt. Griffin, supra, 380 U.S. at 615, 85 S.Ct. 1229. Yet unlike this court in Jenkins, the Supreme Court in Portuondo specifically rejected the proposition that Griffin's reasoning also applied to a prosecutor's comments that a criminal defendant who testified could tailor his testimony to the government's evidence: Respondent's argument boils down to a request that we extend to comments of the type the prosecutor made here[ [13] ] the rationale of Griffin v. California . . . . We decline to extend Griffin to the present context. Portuondo, supra, 529 U.S. at 65, 120 S.Ct. 1119. In reaching that conclusion, the majority reasoned that Griffin's holding that a defendant's decision not to testify cannot be used against him by the jury was based upon something that the jury was not permitted to do, that is, punish a defendant for exercising his right not to testify. Moreover, the opinion concludes that [i]t is reasonable enough to expect a jury to comply with that instruction since . . . the inference of guilt from silence is not always `natural or irresistible.' Id. at 67, 120 S.Ct. 1119, citing Griffin, supra, 380 U.S. at 615, 85 S.Ct. 1229. For example, [a] defendant might refuse to testify simply out of fear that he will be made to look bad by clever counsel, or fear that his prior convictions will prejudice the jury. Portuondo, supra, 529 U.S. at 67, 120 S.Ct. 1119 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In contrast, reasoned the Court, it is natural and irresistible for a jury, in evaluating the relative credibility of a defendant who testified last, to have in mind and weigh in the balance the fact that he heard the testimony of all those who preceded him. Id. at 67-68, 120 S.Ct. 1119. Indeed, the majority concluded, it is quite impossible for the jury to evaluate the credibility of the defendant's testimony while blotting out from its mind the fact that before giving the testimony the defendant had been sitting there listening to the other witnesses. Id. at 68, 120 S.Ct. 1119. See also State v. Alexander, 254 Conn. 290, 755 A.2d 868, 874 (2000), where the Supreme Court of Connecticut, applying Portuondo for the first time, concluded that [i]t was proper for the prosecutor to request that the jury generally consider the defendant's unique opportunity when determining the credibility of his testimony, and referred to Portuondo's reliance on Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 282, 109 S.Ct. 594, 102 L.Ed.2d 624 (1989), where the Supreme Court wrote that when a defendant assumes the role of a witness, the rules that generally apply to other witnessesrules that serve the truth-seeking function of the trialare generally applicable to him as well. Id. at 873. As did Alexander, we find the reasoning of Portuondo to be persuasive. Nevertheless, appellant argues and the government concedes that a constitutional decision by the Supreme Court does not prevent state courts from using their supervisory authority to maintain more stringent local standards to deter prosecutorial misconduct. Appellant, however, has presented no authority that would indicate that this was, in fact, what this court was trying to do in Jenkins and the subsequent cases that rely on that decision. To the contrary, Jenkins relied specifically on Griffin, a constitutional decision of the Supreme Court. See Simpson v. United States, 877 A.2d 1045, 1050 n. 4 (D.C.2005) (In Griffin, the Supreme Court held that a comment to the jury about the defendant's refusal to testify at trial violated the defendant's constitutional rights.); see also Dyson v. United States, 418 A.2d 127, 131 (D.C.1980) (We have construed such an argument as an apparent attempt by the prosecutor to have the jury draw adverse inferences from appellant's exercise of his constitutional right to confront witnesses.); Fornah v. United States, 460 A.2d 556, 560-61 (D.C.1983) ([I]t is impermissible to attempt to cause the jury to draw adverse inferences from appellant's exercise of his constitutional right to confront witnesses against him.); Sherrod v. United States, 478 A.2d 644, 657 (D.C.1984) ([A] prosecutor's comment during closing argument on a defendant's decision to testify last has been construed by this court as an attempt to have the jury draw adverse inferences from the defendant's exercise of his constitutional right to confront witnesses and is thus impermissible.); Hart v. United States, 538 A.2d 1146, 1149 (D.C.1988) (Drawing an adverse inference from the defendant's exercise of his constitutional right to confront witnesses is impermissible. . . .); Mitchell v. United States, 569 A.2d 177, 183 (D.C.1990) (the prosecutor's statement in rebuttal closing argument impermissibly suggested . . . an adverse inference from appellant's exercise of his constitutional right to confront witnesses). All these cases assumed, based on the Jenkins court's reading of Griffin, that a defendant's Sixth Amendment confrontation rights included the right to listen to the testimony of all other witnesses before testifying and the right to testify without the prosecutor commenting on the effect these circumstances have on the defendant's credibility as a witness. The Supreme Court, however, has determined that no such constitutional right exists. Portuondo, supra, 529 U.S. at 69, 120 S.Ct. 1119. We have long held that a division of this court may not overrule the prior decision of another. M.A.P., supra, 285 A.2d 310 at 312. However, a panel cannot blindly follow [a] prior ruling in the face of clearly controlling doctrine later enunciated by the Supreme Court. Frendak v. United States, 408 A.2d 364, 379 n. 27 (D.C.1979) (citing Ralpho v. Bell, 186 U.S.App.D.C. 368, 390, 569 F.2d 607, 629 (1977)). Where, as in Jenkins, this court purports only to comply with the commands of the United States Constitution, the stability of its holdings is subject to the Supreme Court's ultimate authority to interpret that document. See Lenkin Co. Mgmt., Inc. v. District of Columbia Rental Hous. Comm'n, 677 A.2d 46, 49 (D.C.1996) (citing M.A.P., supra, for the proposition that only the en banc court can overrule a panel's prior decision but noting [a] panel decision interpreting the [Constitution] . . . would undoubtedly yield to a later Supreme Court decision on point). In summary, we find that Jenkins, in its reliance on Griffin, was a constitutional decision that has now been overruled by the United States Supreme Court in Portuondo and therefore is no longer binding on this court. We decline, moreover, to exercise our supervisory authority to prohibit the government from commenting on a defendant's ability to tailor his own testimony to the evidence. Our decisions have made plain that this court's supervisory authority is to be sparingly exercised, Watkins v. United States, 846 A.2d 293, 300 (D.C.2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), and we have been given no sound reason to exercise it in this context. We therefore hold that the prosecutor did not impermissibly comment upon the effect of the defendant's presence at trial on his credibility as a witness, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the jury to consider the remarks. [14] We note that while the Constitution would allow such comments even without specific indications of tailoring, Portuondo, supra, 529 U.S. at 70-71, 120 S.Ct. 1119, the government was particularly justified in using the tactic here, where it could pinpoint aspects of appellant's testimony that seemed unusually coincidental to the government's presentation.