Opinion ID: 782840
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Were Petitioner's Post-Miranda Statements Coerced?

Text: 28 Although we assume that petitioner made his initial inculpatory statements while in custody, and in the absence of Miranda warnings, petitioner's subsequent inculpatory statements, which occurred after the detectives advised him of his Miranda rights, are not necessarily inadmissible as fruit of the original Miranda violation. In Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985), the Supreme Court held that absent deliberately coercive or improper tactics in obtaining the initial statement, the mere fact that a suspect has made an unwarned admission does not warrant a presumption of compulsion with respect to subsequent statements that the suspect makes after receiving Miranda warnings. Id. at 314, 105 S.Ct. 1285. Rather, the admissibility of any subsequent statement should turn in these circumstances solely on whether it [was] knowingly and voluntarily made. Id. at 309, 105 S.Ct. 1285. Therefore, we must consider whether the circumstances surrounding petitioner's unwarned confession were so coercive as to prevent him from making a subsequent knowing and voluntary waiver of his rights, thereby requiring the suppression of his post- Miranda confession. See id. at 309-14, 105 S.Ct. 1285; see also Tankleff, 135 F.3d at 244. While all custodial interrogations inherently involve serious pressures, id., in determining the voluntariness of petitioner's post- Miranda confessions, we must examine the totality of the circumstances. See Tankleff, 135 F.3d at 245. Specifically, these circumstances include 1) the accused's characteristics, 2) the conditions of the interrogation, and 3) the conduct of the police. United States v. Anderson, 929 F.2d 96, 99 (2d Cir.1991). 29 Petitioner argues that his pre- Miranda statements were involuntary because he was an alcoholic and had been drinking prior to his interrogation. However, the trial court made detailed findings of fact on this issue. The court found that petitioner seemed to understand what was going on, as he was able to answer the officers' questions coherently. The trial court also found that although [petitioner] may have had beers and drank rum that day, when he was questioned he was not in such a state of intoxication that he could not understand what he was doing. The Appellate Division concluded that [a]lthough [petitioner] had been drinking alcohol when the officers initially approached him, the evidence establishes that [he] clearly understood the reason for and purpose behind the police investigation and was able to walk and articulate appropriate responses to the detectives' questions. Parsad, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 837. 30 Petitioner challenges the state courts' findings, arguing that Detective Geiger testified that petitioner was intoxicated. However, the detective refused to characterize petitioner as being drunk: 31 Q: And when you come upon them, would it be fair to say that both of them were intoxicated? 32 A: I would say they were drinking, yes, sir. 33 Q: All right. Well, again — were they drunk? A: I don't know, sir. I don't know the gentlemen's' level how alcohol they could take. [sic] 34 Accordingly, petitioner cannot demonstrate that the state courts' findings on this issue are clearly erroneous, the standard we apply in our de novo review of an issue that the state courts left unresolved. The mere fact that petitioner is an alcoholic is insufficient to render his pre- Miranda statements involuntary. 35 The conditions of petitioner's interrogation were not so coercive as to render his post- Miranda statements involuntary. Upon arriving at the police station at approximately 5:50 p.m., the detectives escorted petitioner to the squad room, where he sat in a sofa-chair, and not to an interrogation room. The room was unlocked throughout the interrogation, and the detectives did not handcuff petitioner prior to his actual arrest. Moreover, the detectives did not subject petitioner to extended periods of questioning without interruption. Upon arriving at the police station, the detectives talked with petitioner for approximately ten minutes. Afterwards, the detectives left him alone in the squad room until 6:30 p.m. to 6:45 p.m., when they brought him some coffee and food. The detectives resumed the questioning, and before 8:00 p.m., petitioner admitted to fighting with Minicz on the day in question. Shortly after 8:00 p.m., petitioner informed the detectives that he had gone to his sister's house after the fight to shower and change his clothes, and he gave them permission to retrieve his clothes. Approximately one hour later, at 9:15 p.m., petitioner admitted to wearing the bloody shirt that Detective Hopkins recovered from his sister's house. Thus, prior to receiving Miranda warnings, petitioner was at the police station from 5:50 p.m. to 9:15 p.m., and the detectives questioned him only intermittently. Based upon the atmosphere of the interrogation, we cannot conclude that petitioner's pre- Miranda statements were coerced. 36 Finally, petitioner does not establish that the detectives employed coercive or improper tactics during their interrogation. Petitioner argues that the detectives ignored his initial statement that he did not wish to say anything concerning Minicz's death. The mere fact that police officers improperly question a suspect after he invokes his right to remain silent during a custodial interrogation does not render his subsequent statements the product of coercion. Rather, the Supreme Court recognizes that such statements may, in fact, be voluntary. For example, statements taken in violation of Miranda, though inadmissible as part of the prosecution's case-in-chief, are nevertheless admissible for impeachment purposes where they are also voluntary and uncoerced. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722-24, 95 S.Ct. 1215, 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224-26, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971). Whether statements taken in violation of Miranda are the product of coercion entails an analysis that goes beyond the mere fact that the statement violates Miranda. Compare Hass, 420 U.S. at 722, 95 S.Ct. 1215 (holding that statements taken in violation of Miranda are admissible for impeachment purposes where the trustworthiness of the evidence satisfies legal standards (internal quotation marks omitted)), with Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 399-402, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978) (holding that statements taken in violation of Miranda are not admissible for any purpose where they were involuntary or the product of coercion). Thus, the mere fact that a police officer takes a statement after a suspect invokes his right to remain silent does not, standing alone, render that statement the product of coercion. 4 37 Petitioner argues that the detectives were increasingly hostile towards him, as they accused him of lying and confronted him with evidence linking him to the crime. However, petitioner's initial representations were contradicted by the evidence. For example, although petitioner initially denied making the 911 call, he identified himself by name during that call. Petitioner also told the detectives that he wore a blue shirt on the day he fought with Minicz, but his sister gave Detective Hopkins a flowered shirt. Therefore, the detectives were reasonable in exposing these inconsistencies and asking petitioner to explain them. Regardless, all custodial interrogations inherently involve pressure, and officers routinely confront suspects with incriminating evidence. Although such conduct, if excessive, could render a suspect's confession involuntary, we find that petitioner's statements were not the product of coercion. 38 Petitioner also contends that the police officers mistreated him. In his videotaped statement, petitioner alleged that a detective had punched him in the right eye and tried to force him to talk. Petitioner also argues that the detectives mistreated him by seizing his clothes. There is no evidence, however, that the detectives assaulted petitioner. During the videotaped statement, the detectives zoomed in on petitioner's face, and his eyes showed no indication of abuse. Even assuming that the officers seized petitioner's pants without his consent, the record is clear that they provided him another pair of pants. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the detectives mistreated petitioner in an effort to coerce a confession. 39 In sum, the totality of the circumstances surrounding petitioner's interrogation do not suggest that his statements to the police were involuntary. Therefore, we presume that the state courts' findings that petitioner was competent to be interrogated, and that neither the conditions of the pre- Miranda portion of the interrogation nor the detectives' corresponding actions were unlawfully coercive, are correct. 40