Opinion ID: 425171
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Weisz' February 2 Statement to FBI

Text: 109 As Weisz carried a briefcase containing $50,000 from his February 2, 1980 meeting with Amoroso and Weinberg at the Hilton Hotel, he was met by two FBI agents, Raleigh and Melore, who requested that Weisz accompany them to another room in the hotel. 89 In a statement allegedly given during subsequent questioning by the two agents, Weisz admitted 110 that he knew full well that he was instrumental in bringing people together to be corrupted. 90 111 Prior to trial, Weisz objected to the introduction of his statement, contending, inter alia, that it was obtained in violation of his right to assistance of counsel at a custodial interrogation. 91 Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1883-85, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45, 473-76, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1627-29, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Weisz renews this objection on appeal, asserting that the district court committed reversible error by permitting Raleigh to testify to Weisz' statement. 92 We conclude that the district court properly allowed the government to adduce evidence of Weisz' statement. 112 Faced with Weisz' challenge to the admissibility of his statement, the government was required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Weisz knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to the assistance of counsel during custodial questioning. 93 Edwards v. Arizona, supra, 451 U.S. at 482, 101 S.Ct. at 1883; North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 1757, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979); Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 487-89, 92 S.Ct. 619, 625-26, 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972); United States v. Hackley, 636 F.2d 493, 500 (D.C.Cir.1980); United States v. Glover, 596 F.2d 857, 865 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 857, 860, 100 S.Ct. 117, 124, 62 L.Ed.2d 76 (1979). In reviewing the district court's ruling that the government had met this burden, we are not bound by the district court's conclusions of law and must determine whether it applied the correct rule of law to the facts of the case. However, we must accept the district court's resolution of factual questions unless clearly erroneous. United States v. Saimiento-Rozo, 676 F.2d 146, 150 (5th Cir.1982); United States v. Hinckley, 672 F.2d 115, 119 (D.C.Cir.1982) (per curiam); United States v. Glover, supra, 596 F.2d at 865. 113 The admissibility of Weisz' statement turned on the district court's resolution of a factual dispute between Weisz and the FBI agents regarding the course of events which culminated in Weisz' statement. According to Weisz, when he reached the other hotel room the agents told him that he was in very deep trouble and asked him to read a detailed, heavy sort of a document which outlined his rights. After he had read the document, the agents demanded that he sign it; Weisz refused: 114 I said, no way. I won't sign it. I won't sign anything without my lawyer, and I want my lawyer. 94 115 Despite his clear request for his attorney, the agents persisted in questioning him regarding his role in Kelly's introduction to Amoroso and Weinberg. 95 On the other hand, according to the FBI agents, when Weisz arrived at the second room he was given an Advice of Rights form, which he read, and was asked to sign the waiver at the bottom of the form. Weisz responded that he understood his Miranda rights and that he was willing to answer the agents' questions, but that he preferred not to sign the waiver. 96 The agents then proceeded to question Weisz for approximately twenty minutes, during which time Weisz made the incriminating statement. Shortly thereafter, according to the agents, Weisz first asked to speak to his attorney and all questioning by the agents stopped. 97 116 In ruling that Weisz' statement was admissible, the district court accepted the FBI agents' version of their questioning of Weisz, and concluded that their testimony demonstrated that Weisz had waived his right to assistance of counsel prior to questioning. 98 The agents' version was corroborated by handwritten notes taken by both agents during the questioning of Weisz. 99 On this record we cannot say that it was clearly erroneous for the district court to credit the agents' version of the questioning over that offered by Weisz. 100 117 Having so resolved this crucial factual dispute, the district court was certainly correct in concluding that Weisz had effectively waived his right to have an attorney present during questioning. That Weisz declined to sign the proffered waiver form is not determinative of the waiver question; [a]n express written ... statement of waiver of ... the right to counsel ... is not inevitably either necessary or sufficient to establish waiver. North Carolina v. Butler, supra, 441 U.S. at 373, 99 S.Ct. at 1757. Accord United States v. Stewart, 585 F.2d 799, 800 (5th Cir.1978) (per curiam), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 933, 99 S.Ct. 2054, 60 L.Ed.2d 661 (1979); United States v. Cooper, 499 F.2d 1060, 1062-63 (D.C.Cir.1974). As we recognized several years ago, 118 [i]t is ... a common experience of life that in many circumstances persons are willing to convey information orally but are reluctant to put the same thing in writing. 119 United States v. Cooper, supra, 499 F.2d at 1062. 101 Here Weisz, a mature, well-educated accountant, 102 having read an Advice of Rights form, unequivocally stated that he understood his Miranda rights and expressly agreed to answer the FBI agents' questions. On these facts, we have no difficulty concluding that Weisz waived his right to counsel prior to the start of the agents' questioning. Accordingly, the incriminating statement elicited by the FBI agents during their questioning of Weisz was properly admitted by the district court. We reject Weisz' contention to the contrary.