Opinion ID: 1244797
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Sidewalks of a Large One-Stop Shopping Center

Text: In considering a case involving persons seeking to exercise their right to seek signatures on initiative petitions on privately-owned property to which the public has been invited and the reasonableness of time, place, and manner restrictions upon their rights to do so, the private property involved in such a case may range from a small mom and pop grocery store to areas near stores in a company town. Even for a small mom and pop grocery store, it would clearly be both unlawful and unreasonable for the owner to adopt and post a rule stating that any person entering the store wearing a shirt with a political slogan would be asked to leave, and if that person refused to leave he would be arrested for criminal trespass. On the other hand, it would not appear to be either unlawful or unreasonable for the owner of such a store to adopt a rule forbidding persons seeking signatures on initiative petitions to enter inside the store to do so. Such persons could do so, however, while standing on the public sidewalk outside and near the entrance to the store. At the other extreme, for the owner of a company town with privately-owned streets and sidewalks to adopt and enforce a rule prohibiting persons from exercising their right of free speech by seeking signatures on initiative petitions on such privately-owned sidewalks near the entrances of stores bordering such sidewalks or streets would be unlawful, as held in Marsh v. Alabama, supra . But, again, it would appear not to be either unlawful or unreasonable for the owner of a company town to adopt and enforce a rule prohibiting solicitation of signatures on initiative petitions inside stores bordered by such sidewalks and streets. In between these two extremes are at least two types or categories of private property with retail stores to which the public is invited: (1) large shopping centers such as the Lloyd Center, which have common areas and wide malls that are similar in function to public sidewalks; and (2) large downtown department stores and their modern counterpartlarge suburban one-stop shopping centers, which do not have malls or common areas, but which offer a variety of items for sale comparable to large downtown department stores, and which commonly have large privately-owned parking lots and privately-owned sidewalks for use by customers in going from their cars to the entrances of such stores. Although all Fred Meyer stores are not the same, according to a brief in this case, it is a matter of common knowledge that Fred Meyer advertises that its stores provide one-stop shopping centers. In any event, it appears from the record in this case that this Fred Meyer store is a large suburban one-stop shopping center with a large parking lot and a sidewalk that its potential customers are invited to use in going to and from entrances to the store. As previously noted, in Whiffen II, supra, this court held that, under Article IV, section 1, of the Oregon Constitution, persons have the right to seek signatures on initiative petitions inside large shopping centers (the first of these two categories) at designated areas on the malls (sidewalks) inside such shopping centers, but not inside the stores bordering such walkways. This case involves the second of the two categories, a large suburban one-stop shopping center, without inside malls, but with outside sidewalks. Defendant did not assert the right to go inside the Fred Meyer store to seek signatures on initiative petitions, but contends that he had the right to do so while standing on the sidewalk near its entrance, a far less intrusive invasion of private property. Defendant contends that his right to do so was violated when, at the request of the store, he was arrested for criminal trespass. His arrest was the enforcement, by use of the criminal trespass statute, ORS 164.295, of a rule adopted by the owner of the store that persons would not be permitted to solicit signatures on initiative petitions on any part of its privately-owned property. For these reasons, it is my opinion that the rule adopted by Fred Meyer forbidding the solicitation of signatures on initiative petitions on any part of its property was not only an unreasonable rule, but a rule that, when enforced by the arrest of defendant for criminal trespass, violated his rights under Article IV, section 1, of the Oregon Constitution. It would be a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction for Fred Meyer to designate areas near the entrances to its store for use by persons seeking signatures on initiative petitions, as in Whiffen II, supra, in which persons seeking signatures on initiative petitions were permitted to do so in designated areas in the malls of the Lloyd Center, but the rule adopted by Fred Meyer is not such a reasonable rule. For these same reasons, it is my opinion that the exterior sidewalk of a large one-stop shopping center is a public place of such a nature that defendant had a constitutional right under Article IV, section 1, to seek signatures on initiative petitions while standing on such a sidewalk. Indeed, this conclusion is implicit in the opinion by Justice Van Hoomissen. It follows that the order by the person in charge of this Fred Meyer property directing defendant to stop that activity and to leave those premises was not a lawful order. In this case, it is not necessary to attempt to adopt rules or tests by which this court can properly determine the outcome of all future cases in which persons claim the right to seek signatures on initiative petitions on private property to which to public has been invited by its owner. Just as courts make no attempt to adopt rules defining what is a reasonable search and seizure, but decide such cases on a case-by-case basis, so also, in my opinion, cases in which persons claim a right to seek signatures on initiative petitions on private property open to the public likewise must be decided on a case-by-case basis. In the event, however, that this court should desire to state and adopt rules or tests for application in such future cases, the same result as previously stated would follow in this case by adoption of the tests adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615 (1980).