Opinion ID: 1900201
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Arbitrary and Capricious Conduct of the Department

Text: The plaintiffs allege several procedural defects that, they conclude, made the Department's conduct arbitrary, capricious and contrary to law.
After Sandy River's application was determined complete, 22 M.R.S.A. § 306(4), and following the hearing before the MHSA, Sandy River submitted several changes to its application. The plaintiffs contend that these modifications and the related ex parte contacts between Sandy River and the Department denied it due process and violated the Department's procedures. Wyman points to three changes in Sandy River's application. First, at the Department's request, Sandy River submitted additional mortgage cost comparisons of the two facilities. Second, Sandy River sent a letter to the Department explaining their sewage treatment system. Third, in response to the Department's concerns about Bresloff's administrative skills, Sandy River notified the Department that he would work only as a nurse, not as a supervisor, at the facility. We cannot perceive how these actions deprived the plaintiffs of due process. Wyman made several changes in its application that were more substantial than the changes in Sandy River's application. Furthermore, the Department acted properly in accepting additional information and contacting the applicants to clarify points in the applications. The Certificate of Need Law provides for a hearing in the course of a review, 22 M.R.S.A. § 307(2), and thereby suggest that the Department may continue to accept new material before making its decision. In addition, the Department's regulations specify that the applicants may submit revised applications at any time before the Department makes its initial decision.
As notification of his decision to deny Wyman's application, the Commissioner sent Wyman a one-page letter summarizing his reasons for not choosing that proposal, accompanied by the report of the Department's staff, which provided a detailed comparison of the two projects. The plaintiffs assert that the Commissioner's explanation did not meet the statutory requirement that the notice to the applicant explain the basis for the decision. 22 M.R. S.A. § 307(5). This contention is frivolous. The staff report was thorough and well organized. The Commissioner's letter adequately summarized its main points. Together, the letter and the report sufficiently apprise the applicant and the public of the basis for the decision and allow for effective judicial review. See Gashgai v. Board of Registration in Medicine, Me., 390 A.2d 1080 (1978). The plaintiffs also urge that the notice of decision was inadequate because it failed to give a detailed statement of the reasons for the inconsistency between the MHSA recommendation and the Department's decision. See 22 M.R.S.A. § 307(5). It is true that the Commissioner did not directly compare his reasoning with that of the MHSA. The Agency, however, failed to provide any explanation for its decision. The statement of the reasons for the inconsistencies is intended to protect against arbitrary departmental action. The detailed staff report sufficiently indicates that the Commissioner did not act arbitrarily.
The plaintiffs contend that the Commissioner relied on criteria not permitted by state or federal law in evaluating the applications. Specifically, the plaintiffs state that the impermissible factors include the quality of developers, the experience of the parties, the availability of respite and hospice care, and the effect on competition for health services. The plaintiffs assert that the use of these factors is impermissible because they are not expressly listed in state or federal statutes. Title 22 M.R.S.A. § 309(2) does list several criteria, but instructs that the department shall consider them among other criteria. The Commissioner is authorized, therefore, to consider factors not expressly listed as long as these factors rationally relate to the purposes of the Certification Act. Federal law, similarly, allows for exercise of the Commissioner's discretion. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300n-1(c) (1974-1980 Supp.Pamphlet). Therefore, the Commissioner acted properly.