Opinion ID: 1808510
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the circuit court had jurisdiction to decide the question of the liability of jones. county to sioux valley hospital for emergency air transportation costs.

Text: Every county has a duty to relieve and support poor and indigent persons who reside within its boundaries. SDCL 28-13-1. This obligation emanates from the statutes and not from common law. State of North Dakota ex rel. Strutz v. Perkins County, 69 S.D. 270, 273, 9 N.W.2d 500, 501 (1943). There exists a specific duty on the counties to provide hospitalization, medical care, and treatment for poor persons. SDCL 28-13-27. See Jerauld County v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 76 S.D. 1, 6, 71 N.W.2d 571, 574 (1955). Hospitals admitting indigents may be reimbursed for expenses by the indigent's county of residence, if the hospital complies with two procedural requirements set out in SDCL ch. 28-13. First, a hospital must file a Statement of Reimbursement Costs (Statement) at least once a year with the Secretary of Health. This statement must be filed 30 days prior to the admission for which reimbursement is sought. SDCL 28-13-28. The Secretary has the right to approve or modify any items therein for which the hospital intends to seek reimbursement. SDCL 28-13-32. Any county  may at any time file objections... to any ... items therein, which objections shall be passed upon by the secretary of health. SDCL 28-13-32 (emphasis added). Second, a hospital admitting an indigent under emergency circumstances must file notice with the indigent's county of residence within 15 days of the admittance. SDCL 28-13-34. Here, Hospital made both of the required filings. Hospital claims that SDCL 28-13-32 sets out an administrative procedure that County failed to use. Specifically, Hospital contends that once its Statement was filed and approved by the Secretary of Health, County was bound to pay any reimbursement costs which appeared in the Statement. Hospital points out that County never made objection to any of the Statement's items as they are directed to in SDCL 28-13-32. Hospital also asserts that all administrative remedies must be exhausted before a judicial review may be granted. SDCL 1-26-30. Using these arguments, Hospital concludes that County's method of disputing reimbursement costs is through the statute and that the circuit court was without jurisdiction when it decided the case. We disagree. A close examination of SDCL 28-13-32 and SDCL 1-26-30 appears to refute Hospital's claim that County must dispute reimbursement charges via objection to the Secretary of Health. SDCL 28-13-32 provides in pertinent part that [a]ny board of county commissioners may at any time file objections in writing to any such statement or any items therein, which objections shall be passed upon by the secretary of health. (Emphasis added.) The crucial word is may and it does not demand action. It appears the counties have an opportunity to file objections if they choose to make them. They are not required to file objections. If a county does object to the Secretary, then the Secretary shall entertain those objections. It is at this juncture when administrative procedure is triggered. Hospital also notes that all administrative remedies must be exhausted before judicial review may be granted. SDCL 1-26-30. [1] Yet, Hospital fails to fully apply the language of that statute which states that [t]his section does not limit utilization of or the scope of judicial review available under other means of review, redress, or relief, when provided by law. SDCL 1-26-30.