Opinion ID: 4025596
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Anyone described …

Text: 10 No. 15‐1181 According to Robbins, the estate’s interpretation is reasonable because it avoids “duplication of numbers or renumbering of paragraphs.” (Appellant Br. 22.) Robbins contends that Great West’s interpretation requires the reader to “ignor[e] the con‐ flicting numbers” under subparagraph A.1.b., as that subpar‐ agraph already had exclusions numbered “(1)” and “(2).” (Id.) Further, according to Robbins, the estate’s interpretation is more reasonable than Great West’s because it adds to and does not subtract from the definition of who is “insured” un‐ der the policy, which is consistent with Minnesota law con‐ struing ambiguities against insurance policies in favor of the insured. But there is no ambiguity to construe against Great West. We agree with the district court that Great West’s interpreta‐ tion of this provision is the only reasonable reading. In inter‐ preting the Great West policy and endorsement under Min‐ nesota law, we must read them together “from the viewpoint of a layperson, not a lawyer.” Mut. Serv. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Wilson Twp., 603 N.W.2d 151, 153 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999). Robbins’s interpretation would force us to abandon that position and read the policy language and endorsement as only a lawyer construing a contract could—in the most hyper‐technical, over‐analyzed sense. We refuse to adopt such a reading. No reasonable interpretation would construe the endorse‐ ment as doing anything but adding two more enumerated ex‐ clusions under subparagraph A.1.b. The endorsement states “the following is added” to subparagraph A.1.b., (emphasis added), and it then provides two numbered provisions that are worded in a manner similar to the other enumerated exclu‐ sions. Nothing in the endorsement would lead a layperson to believe that Great West intended to modify the beginning of No. 15‐1181 11 subparagraph A.1.b. In fact, embracing Robbins’s interpreta‐ tion does the most violence to the policy language as it uses two “1”s and places two numbering conventions next to each other, which is not done anywhere else within the policy. Moreover, additional extensions of coverage are provided in sections A.1.c–A.1.e. If the endorsement intended to extend coverage, it could have added lettered subparagraphs to sec‐ tion A.1, rather than adding numbered subparagraphs to sec‐ tion A.1.b, a section that lists exclusions from coverage. Min‐ nesota courts tend to reject interpretations like the one ad‐ vanced by Robbins. See, e.g., Red & White Airway Cab Co. v. Transit Cas. Co., 234 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1975) (refusing to adopt an interpretation of an insurance policy that “does vio‐ lence to the plain meaning of the contract language”). Also making Robbins’s reading unreasonable is that it makes the endorsement’s additional language superfluous. Robbins’s reading purports to add two more categories of in‐ dividuals who are insured under the policy. The problem with Robbins’s interpretation though is that the policy prior to the endorsement would have already included the two cat‐ egories listed as insured, making the endorsement completely superfluous. Some redundancy in insurance contracts is nor‐ mal, see, e.g., Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 656, 355 N.W.2d 413, 418 (Minn. 1984), while construing an en‐ dorsement to be completely superfluous is not, see Jarvis & Sons, Inc. v. Intʹl Marine Underwriters, 768 N.W.2d 365, 371 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (rejecting an interpretation that would make an endorsement “wholly superfluous or require an ab‐ surd result”). Despite the obvious redundancies the estate’s interpreta‐ tion would create, Robbins nonetheless argues that Great 12 No. 15‐1181 West’s interpretation is unreasonable because the endorse‐ ment’s two exclusions could both independently exclude Hoker and Phillips from the policy’s coverage, making them redundant. Contrary to Robbins’s position, the exclusions are not wholly redundant. For example, an individual could be an independent contractor hired by Lakeville to transport goods for Lakeville in furtherance of Lakeville’s business. The first policy exclusion then would not apply. But if the inde‐ pendent contractor had a written trailer interchange agree‐ ment with Lakeville, then the exclusion would not extend the policy’s coverage to that individual. And even if there is some overlap, Great West’s interpretation does not make the entire endorsement itself superfluous. Indeed, it is consistent with the “belt and suspenders” approach often adopted by insur‐ ance companies in detailing exclusions in their policies. See Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloydʹs, London v. Stolberg, 680 F.3d 61, 68 (1st Cir. 2012) (“[I]nsurance policies are notorious for their simultaneous use of both belts and suspenders, and some overlap is to be expected.”). Great West’s interpretation is the only reasonable reading of the unambiguous policy and controls our analysis moving forward.