Opinion ID: 2518586
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Denial of Defendant's Requests for Self-representation

Text: After the first trial ended and before the penalty retrial began, defendant made four unsuccessful motions for self-representation under Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562. On appeal, he contends the denial of the motions constituted reversible error. The Attorney General argues the motions were untimely and therefore were properly denied. Some procedural detail will place the Faretta issue in context. On August 25, 1987, after the jury returned a verdict of life without the possibility of parole for the murder of Calvin Ferguson, the trial court declared a mistrial when the jury was unable to reach a penalty verdict for the murder of Vicente Perez. Defendant's case was continued to September 14, 1987. On September 14, defense counsel requested a continuance, and, after some unresolved discussion of whether defendant was willing to wait until the conclusion of the penalty retrial to be sentenced on the noncapital counts, the matter was put over. On October 6, 1987, the trial court (Judge Fagan) heard and denied defendant's motion to bar proceedings on the ground of collateral estoppel, after which defense counsel stated that defendant wished to address the court. Defendant asked for a new trial, a complete new trial. That would require a pro per status. And I would like to ask for Mr. Torelli's assistance as counsel. Defendant asserted, among other things: I will prepare my case to where I have some defense. Not one word was said in my defense of the reason why I have become a murderer. Judge Fagan denied defendant's request for a new trial, indicated he would give defendant a written petition to proceed in propria persona to fill out, and stated he would appoint Dr. Blake Skrdla under Evidence Code section 730 to interview defendant and report on whether he had the mental capacity to represent himself. The judge then continued the matter. On November 2, 1987, Judge Fagan resumed proceedings on defendant's request for self-representation, noting he had received a letter from Dr. Skrdla that expressed the opinion that, although defendant understood the nature and purpose of the criminal proceedings and could cooperate with counsel if he chose to do so, his mental problems would prevent him from preparing and conducting his defense in a rational manner. Judge Fagan again continued the matter pending research on the legal standard applicable to Faretta motions. [14] On November 24, 1987, after considering the authority cited by the prosecutor, Judge Fagan denied the motion, concluding defendant lacked the mental capacity to represent himself and was self-destructive. Defendant made a second motion to represent himself in a hearing before Judge Fagan on January 5, 1988. When the judge asked if he had any new circumstances on which to base the motion, defendant cited equal protection principles, called his attorney a court-appointed puppet who fails the legal requirements of counsel, but who is really a wash-out, living on welfare payments from the court disguised as legal fees, and complained about a snitch, who he contended had been monitoring his movements in jail for the last two years. Defense counsel commented that the prosecutor had acknowledged a jailhouse informant had been previously involved in the case but would not be used at trial. Judge Fagan denied the motion for the reasons he had cited in denying the first motion. Defendant made a third motion for self-representation in a hearing before Judge Sheldon on May 2, 1988. Noting Judge Fagan had previously denied a Faretta motion by defendant, Judge Sheldon denied the motion without prejudice to a renewed motion showing a change of circumstances. Finally, defendant made a fourth motion for self-representation in a hearing on May 24, 1988, before Judge Nott, who ultimately presided over defendant's penalty retrial. Judge. Nott asked defendant if he would be ready to start the trial that day; defendant answered affirmatively. Asked if he had anything to add, defendant discoursed on morality and the meaning of priestcraft and carpe diem. Judge Nott denied defendant's motion for self-representation, noting that two other judges had already heard and denied the motion, and independently finding defendant incompetent to represent himself based on Dr. Skrdla's report and defendant's pro. per. petition. As noted, defendant contends the denial of his motions for self-representation violated his rights under Faretta. ... Faretta holds that the Sixth Amendment grants an accused personally the right to present a defense and thus to represent himself upon a timely and unequivocal request. (People v. Marshall [(1997)] 15 Cal.4th [1,] 20-21[, 61 Cal. Rptr.2d 84, 931 P.2d 262].) The right to self-representation obtains in capital cases as in other criminal cases (People v. Clark (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583, 617 [268 Cal.Rptr. 399, 789 P.2d 127], and may be asserted by any defendant competent to stand trial one's technical legal knowledge, as such, being irrelevant to the question whether he knowingly and voluntarily exercises the right (Godinez v. Moran[, supra,] 509 U.S. [at pp.] 399-400[, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321] ...; People v. Joseph (1983) 34 Cal.3d 936, 943-944 [196 Cal.Rptr. 339, 671 P.2d 843])). (People v. Dunkle (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861, 908, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 23, 116 P.3d 494.) The stated basis for the trial court's denial of defendant's motion for self-representationhis supposed mental incapacity not amounting to incompetency to stand trialtherefore was invalid. This conclusion does not end the matter, however, because the timeliness of one's assertion of Faretta rights is critical. [15] In People v. Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 121 [137 Cal.Rptr. 8, 560 P.2d 1187], this court held that, `in order to invoke the constitutionally mandated unconditional right of self-representation a defendant in a criminal trial should make an unequivocal assertion of that right within a reasonable time prior to the commencement of trial' (Id. at pp. 127-128[, 137 Cal.Rptr. 8, 560 P.2d 1187].) `However, once a defendant has chosen to proceed to trial represented by counsel, demands by such defendant that he be permitted to discharge his attorney and assume the defense himself shall be addressed to the sound discretion of the court.' (Id. at p. 128[, 137 Cal.Rptr. 8, 560 P.2d 1187]; People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1220[, 259 Cal.Rptr. 669, 774 P.2d 698].) (People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 193-194, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 825 P.2d 781.) Because the phases of a capital trial are stages of a unitary trial, not distinct trials, we have held a motion made after the guilt phase verdicts have been returned is untimely. (People v. Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 194-195, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 825 P.2d 781; see also People v. Kirkpatrick (1994) 7 Cal.4th 988, 1006-1007, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 818, 874 P.2d 248.) None of the cases in which we have considered a motion for self-representation made between the guilt and penalty phases of a unitary capital trial, however, involved a motion made after the guilt phase had ended in a mistrial, when the retrial would take place before a different jury. The rationale behind the rule giving the trial court the discretion to deny an untimely Faretta motion to avoid disruption of an ongoing trial thus is not implicated in this case. Jury selection in the penalty retrial did not actually commence until seven months after defendant's first motion for self-representation. Under these circumstances, defendant's motion was timely, and the trial court had no discretion to deny it. We therefore must reverse the penalty judgment. This conclusion renders it unnecessary to address defendant's further argument that the trial court had no discretion to deny his second, third and fourth motions for self-representation. In light of this conclusion, we need not address defendant's remaining claims pertaining to his penalty retrial.