Opinion ID: 347528
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Interruption in Count 8

Text: 195 Haldeman next asserts that the court erred in failing to grant his requested instruction with respect to the effect of an alleged interruption in his testimony. 196 As is indicated by the transcript of Haldeman's testimony before the Senate Committee, the following colloquy occurred with Senator Baker: 197 Senator Baker. What I want to point out to you is that one sentence in your addendum . . . the third from the last sentence on page 2, The President said there is no problem in raising a million dollars. We can do that but it would be wrong. Now, how sure are you, Mr. Haldeman, that those tapes, in fact say that? 198 Mr. Haldeman. I am absolutely positive that the tapes 199 Senator Baker. Did you heard it with your own voice? Mr. Haldeman. With my own ears, yes. 195 200 Haldeman points to what appears to be an interruption by Senator Baker of the reply to the Senator's first question. At trial, Haldeman testified that his answer was incomplete and that if he had been allowed to do so he would have enlarged upon his answer to avoid what on the face of the record (he now contends) appears to be a misinterpretation of his statement (Tr. 8676). Haldeman br. at 138. To assist in making this point to the jury, Haldeman proffered the following proposed instruction: 201 You may not convict a defendant of perjury merely because his testimony was factually incorrect, or if he gave incorrect testimony because of surprise, confusion, haste, inadvertence, an honest mistake as to the facts, carelessness, negligence, or if an incorrect impression was created because the defendant was interrupted while making his statement. 202 J.A. 712 (emphasis added). He now claims error because this instruction was denied. 203 The court, however, did give the following instruction: 204 A Defendant may not be found guilty of perjury simply because he gives testimony which is factually incorrect. He may have given incorrect testimony because of surprise, confusion, inadvertence, honest mistake of facts, carelessness or negligence. Also, if a Defendant believed a statement to be true when he made it, you must find that Defendant not guilty, even if it so happens that the statement was, in fact, false. 205 This instruction covers all the principal points of the requested instruction, except it omits the italicized words, i. e., a defendant may not be found guilty of perjury if an incorrect impression was created because the defendant was interrupted while making his statement. We do not find error in the refusal to so instruct the jury. 206 The italicized portion of the requested instruction was too strongly worded in the defendant's behalf and was not a correct statement of the law. 196 It would have in effect instructed the jury that they could acquit the defendant on Count 8 if an interruption in his testimony created an incorrect impression even though it clearly appeared that other testimony set forth in the count constituted clear perjury. The requested instruction was far too inclusive the creation of an incorrect impression, without further specification, is not a legal defense to the offense charged in Count 8 of the indictment. There was much more to the perjury charged in this count than the portion related to the alleged interruption. The same statement was repeated elsewhere, and particularly in Haldeman's prepared statement. If the apparent falsity of all the testimony that is charged as being false in a particular count of an indictment was due to an incorrect impression created by an interruption, that would be a defense to the count. The court is not required to adopt the exact words of a proposed instruction which is given in substance, 197 and it appears here that the court's charge adequately instructed to this end when it pointed out, He may have given incorrect testimony because of surprise, confusion, inadvertence.     That portion of the charge was sufficient for Haldeman's counsel to make his point in arguing that particular defense to the jury. He was therefore not denied an instruction on the theory of his defense, to the extent that his theory was valid. The charge was sufficient and it was not necessary to make it more detailed. 198 207 We likewise find no error in the denial of the following instruction suggested by Haldeman: 208 The essence of the crime of perjury is that the challenged sworn testimony must be false and that the witness believes it to be false. No one may be convicted of perjury where he gives an answer that is literally accurate or is reasonably susceptible of more than one interpretation, one of which is truthful. Nor is it a criminal act for a witness to willfully state any material matter that implies any material matter that he does not believe to be true. 209 J.A. 708. This instruction is said to be predicated upon Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 93 S.Ct. 595, 34 L.Ed.2d 568 (1973), where the Supreme Court held that the federal perjury statute does not reach a witness' answer that is literally true but unresponsive, even assuming the witness intends to mislead his questioner by the answer. 199 210 Bronston, however, dealt with an answer that was undisputably true, which is not the case here. The appellant's statement to the Committee under Count 8 in this case was untrue (though responsive) unless the jury accepted his explanation. Bronston cannot be read to shield from prosecution answers or statements which are arguably true under some defense theory, for such a holding would all but void the federal perjury statute. Therefore, we hold that the instruction which was given 200 fully satisfied Bronston, and we affirm the conviction.