Opinion ID: 2594199
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Proof of Timeliness of Prior Felony Conviction

Text: {10} Since the State has the burden of proof under habitual offender proceedings, Elliott, 2001-NMCA-108, ¶ 35, 131 N.M. 390, 37 P.3d 107, we examine the State's case for the timeliness of the prior felony conviction at issue against Defendant. The standard of proof for the State's evidence is a preponderance of the evidence. Smith, 2000-NMSC-005, ¶ 9, 128 N.M. 588, 995 P.2d 1030. The sufficiency of the evidence is reviewed with a substantial evidence standard. State v. Treadway, 2006-NMSC-008, ¶ 7, 139 N.M. 167, 130 P.3d 746. When we review for substantial evidence we give deference to the findings of the district court. State v. Sandoval, 2004-NMCA-046, ¶ 8, 135 N.M. 420, 89 P.3d 92. {11} In order to make a prima facie case under Section 31-18-17 (2003), the State must offer proof of all three elements: identity, conviction, and timing. In its memorandum opinion, the Court of Appeals held that the State met its prima facie burden of proof, apparently through Defendant's plea agreement, and therefore it was up to the trial court's discretion to decide whether to believe Defendant's assertion that the prior felony was outdated. {12} We address the plea agreement as a unique form of contract, binding upon both parties, relying on the rules of contract construction. State v. Montano, 2004-NMCA-094, ¶ 7, 136 N.M. 144, 95 P.3d 1059. `Under these circumstances, contract interpretation is a legal issue that this Court reviews de novo.' Id. (quoting State v. Fairbanks, 2004-NMCA-005, ¶ 15, 134 N.M. 783, 82 P.3d 954). Defendant signed two plea documents called Repeat Offender Plea and Disposition Agreement (Agreement), relating to the two separate cases that were later consolidated for sentencing. Each Agreement contains Admission of Identity and Supplemental Criminal Information sections through which Defendant agreed that he was the person convicted of enumerated crimes, and thus admitted to the first two elements of the definition of prior felony conviction contained in the habitual offender statute. The Admission of Identity section required Defendant to agree that the conviction for these crimes is valid as defined below in the section labeled `Habitual Offender Proceedings.' The Habitual Offender Proceedings section outlines various future possibilities for additional habitual offender proceedings against the defendant, and includes the following two sections pertinent to this case: 2. Proof. The State will use the defendant's admission of identity on the prior felony convictions in any additional habitual offender proceedings. The defendant understands and agrees that the admissions alone will be sufficient to prove the existence of the convictions and the defender's identity. 3. Validity of Conviction. The defendant also agrees that the convictions listed in the section labeled Admission of Identity, as well as those to which the defendant is pleading guilty in this agreement, are valid. Valid means the defendant is the person who was convicted of the crimes, that the crimes were felonies and that the defendant's constitutional rights, including the right to counsel, were explained to the defendant at the time the conviction was obtained. The defendant waives any collateral attack on the validity and effectiveness of the above convictions, including those to which the defendant is. . . pleading guilty under this agreement. The defendant agrees not to contest the validity of the convictions as defined above if additional habitual offender proceedings are brought under the terms of this agreement. If the defendant contests the validity of the convictions as defined above, the State may, at its option, reinstate any charges dismissed or not filed as a result of this agreement. The State argues that Defendant admitted not only his identity and the fact of the 1990 prior felony conviction, but by signing the plea agreement also admitted that the conviction was properly usable as a `prior felony conviction' for sentencing enhancement. The plain language of the agreement indicates otherwise. The only indication in the Agreement that Defendant admits the prior felony is valid plainly refers only to identity, conviction, and validity in terms of Defendant's constitutional rights at the time of the prior convictions. There is no mention whatsoever of the third element for a prior felony conviction, that less than ten years have passed since the defendant completed serving his sentence, probation or parole for the conviction. Contrary to the State's assertions that the issue of the timing of the conviction is a collateral attack on the validity or effectiveness of the prior felony conviction, the third element is not collateral, but is expressly required by the statute. {13} The State has argued in this appeal that it was not the State's burden to present evidence on the issue of whether Petitioner's 1990 prior felony conviction was less than ten years old and thus effective for sentencing enhancement purposes. Through Section 31-18-17, as amended in 2002, the legislature made this issue the State's burden. The State argues, however, that since Defendant has not produced evidence to support his claim of the invalidity of his prior conviction for sentencing purposes, this simply is not a matter to be decided, quoting State v. O'Neil, 91 N.M. 727, 730, 580 P.2d 495, 498 (Ct.App.1978). The State has misinterpreted O'Neil, which describes the shifting burden of proof required for determining the validity of a prior conviction for sentencing purposes. In O'Neil, the State made a prima facie showing of the required elements for proving the prior convictions: the identity of the defendant and the existence of the prior convictions. Id. at 728, 580 P.2d at 496. The defendant then challenged the validity of the convictions, and thus had the burden of presenting evidence in support of the asserted invalidity. Id. at 729, 580 P.2d at 497. O'Neil demonstrates that the State must make its prima facie showing, including all of the required elements for a prior felony conviction as defined by the habitual offender statute, and then the burden of proof shifts to the defendant. In this case, the State has not made a prima facie showing of all three required elements, and therefore the burden of proof has not yet shifted to the defendant. Once the State presents a prima facie case showing identity, prior conviction, and timing, the burden to present proof of invalidity will shift to the defendant, and he will be required to produce evidence in support of his defense. Id. As O'Neil demonstrates, once such evidence is offered, the State must then persuade the fact finder that the guilty pleas are valid . . . It is the State that is relying on the prior convictions in order to enhance defendant's sentence for his last felony conviction. Id. {14} The burden of making a prima facie case is not onerous on the State. The Supplemental Criminal Information filed by the State to support the habitual offender enhancement in this case already contained the dates of the previous conviction, the exact charge, and the jurisdiction of the conviction. In addition, NMSA 1978, Section 31-13-1(C) (2005) requires that [a] person who has served the entirety of a sentence imposed for a felony conviction, including a term of probation or parole shall be issued a certificate of completion by the corrections department. We also note that even when the prior felony conviction occurred in another state, as in this case, information should be available to assist the State in proving all three elements of a prior felony conviction. For example, the felony conviction at issue here occurred in Nevada. Nevada statutory law requires the Director of the Corrections Department to submit to the county clerk every month a list of offenders released from prison or discharged from parole. Nev.Rev.Stat. § 209.134 (2005). This list includes the name of each offender released from prison by expiration of his term of imprisonment during the previous month or who was discharged from parole during the previous month, as well as the case number of each offense for which the offender was released or discharged. Id. Thus, with modern technology and the public records of state corrections departments, it should not be difficult for the State to prove all three required elements of a prior felony conviction under the habitual offender statute. The Legislature has made it clear that as of July 1, 2002 only certain prior felony convictions may be used to enhance a defendant's basic sentence. {15} The State must prove that any and all prior felony convictions it relies on to enhance a sentence meet this definition. Although the State may make its prima facie showing by having defendant admit all of the necessary requirements of the definition in a written plea agreement, the agreement in this case did not satisfy the recent requirements of the Legislature, and the trial court should have determined that the State had not met its burden. See NMRA 5-607(E) (the court shall determine the sufficiency of the evidence, whether or not a motion for directed verdict is made). If Defendant's 1990 conviction meets the definition of prior felony conviction, the district court must increase his sentence under the habitual offender statute. § 31-18-17(B). Therefore, we remand to the district court for re-sentencing of Defendant consistent with this opinion.