Opinion ID: 2022829
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: plaintiff's conduct as the accident's sole proximate cause

Text: Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to recover in the face of a record that shows no violation and reveals that he was entirely responsible for his own injuries. There is no basis for this argument. Even when a worker is not recalcitrant, [9] we have held that there can be no liability under section 240 (1) when there is no violation and the worker's actions (here, his negligence) are the sole proximate cause of the accident. Extending the statute to impose liability in such a case would be inconsistent with statutory goals since the accident was not caused by the absence of (or defect in) any safety device, or in the way the safety device was placed. In Weininger v Hagedorn & Co. (91 NY2d 958, 960 [1998]), we held that Supreme Court erred . . . in directing a verdict in favor of plaintiff, at the close of his own case, on the issue of proximate cause where a reasonable jury could have concluded that plaintiff's actions were the sole proximate cause of his injuries, and consequently that liability under [section] 240 (1) did not attach. Contrary to plaintiff's claim, the Appellate Division has held (both before and after Weininger ) that a defendant is not liable under Labor Law § 240 (1) where there is no evidence of violation and the proof reveals that the plaintiff's own negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident. Under Labor Law § 240 (1) it is conceptually impossible for a statutory violation (which serves as a proximate cause for a plaintiff's injury) to occupy the same ground as a plaintiff's sole proximate cause for the injury. Thus, if a statutory violation is a proximate cause of an injury, the plaintiff cannot be solely to blame for it. Conversely, if the plaintiff is solely to blame for the injury, it necessarily means that there has been no statutory violation. That is what we held in Weininger, a holding the Appellate Division has consistently understood and applied. [10] The Pattern Jury Instructions reflect a like-minded interpretation of Weininger ( see PJI3d 2:217 [2003]). [11] We reaffirm that holding today. As in Weininger, the record now before us fully supports the jury's findings that there was no statutory violation and that plaintiff alone, by negligently using the ladder with the extension clips unlocked, was fully responsible for his injury. Plaintiff relies heavily on Bland v Manocherian (66 NY2d at 457). There, the jury found that the ladder in question was not placed so as to give proper protection to the plaintiff and that improper placement of the ladder [was] a proximate cause of the accident ( id. ). We held that [t]he jury was clearly entitled to find that, under the circumstances, defendants failed to satisfy the responsibilities imposed by section 240 (1) in that they had not `erected' or `placed' the ladder from which plaintiff fell in such a manner, or with such safeguards, as necessary to provide plaintiff with `proper protection' while he was working on defendants' building ( id. at 460). In reaching this conclusion, we noted the nature of the work the plaintiff had to perform while on the ladder and the conditions at the work site. [P]ressure would have to be applied to the sashes and, at the same time, the windows forcibly twisted loose, all while plaintiff was standing on a ladder ( id. ). Further, and also in contrast to the case before us, there was testimony that the floor upon which the ladder was placed was bare, highly polished and shiny and that no safety equipment, safety belts, hard hats, scaffolding or anything else, was used to protect plaintiff from falling through the fourth floor window or to secure the ladder to insure that it remained steady and erect while plaintiff was applying pressure to that window ( id. ). Bland, then, does not support plaintiff's position or stand for the proposition that regardless of the facts every ladder injury leads ineluctably to liability under section 240 (1). In Bland, there were affirmed findings of fact, supported by the evidence, from which the jury could find that defendants had failed to satisfy their section 240 (1) responsibilities. Here, in contrast, the affirmed findings of fact were supported by the record, enabling the jury to conclude that there was no violation of the Labor Law. The record in Bland fairly suggested that better safety devices could have prevented the accident. In our case, the ladder was undisputedly in proper working order, and no further devices were necessary. To be sure, we have long held that this statute is one for the protection of work[ers] from injury and undoubtedly is to be construed as liberally as may be for the accomplishment of the purpose for which it was thus framed ( Quigley v Thatcher, 207 NY 66, 68 [1912]). But to impose liability for a ladder injury even though all the proper safety precautions were met would not further the Legislature's purpose. It would, instead, be a sweeping and dramatic turnabout that the statute neither permits nor contemplates. As we recognized in a related context, the language of Labor Law § 240 (1) must not be strained to accomplish what the Legislature did not intend ( Martinez v City of New York, 93 NY2d 322, 326 [1999]). If liability were to attach even though the proper safety devices were entirely sound and in place, the Legislature would have simply said so, or made owners and contractors into insurers. Instead, the Legislature has enacted no-fault workers' compensation to address workplace injuries where, as here, the worker is entirely at fault and there has been no Labor Law violation shown.