Opinion ID: 2609783
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether the design proposals at issue were bids within the meaning of NRS 281.481(3).

Text: The district court found that NRS 281.481(3) can only be applied to public employees who make a bid on a government contract. The definition of bid urged upon this court, and apparently accepted by the district court below, is that the term bid only applies to offers to contract based on a specified price. JMAL relies primarily upon NRS Chapters 332, 333, and 338 to support this interpretation. The cited sections govern purchasing by state and local governments. JMAL points specifically to NRS 333.330(1) which states that [a]ll bids on more than one item on which bids are called for by the same notice shall be itemized and give a price for each item. (Emphasis added). JMAL argues from this that the term `bid' is a term of art and has a specific meaning when used by our Legislature. JMAL also relies upon the testimony of two SPWB employees who testified that the design competition was not a bidding process. In response, BMSH argues that the key element in a `bid' is not price, but a competitive offer to contract. To support its position, BMSH properly notes that this court should construe the term in light of the intention of the Legislature. In McKay v. Bd. of Supervisors, 102 Nev. 644, 650-51, 730 P.2d 438, 443 (1986), this court stated that: The leading rule of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the legislature in enacting the statute. This intent will prevail over the literal sense of the words. The meaning of the words used may be determined by examining the context and the spirit of the law or the causes which induced the legislature to enact it. The entire subject matter and policy may be involved as an interpretive aid. (Citations omitted.) The public policy rationale behind the Nevada Ethics in Government Law is set forth in NRS 281.421(1) which states: It is hereby declared to be the public policy of this state that: (a) A public office is a public trust and shall be held for the sole benefit of the people. (b) A public officer or employee must commit himself [or herself] to avoid conflicts between his [or her] private interests and those of the general public whom he [or she] serves. We are not persuaded by JMAL's arguments as the stated policy of the Legislature, to prevent conflicts of interest, militates towards a more expansive reading of the term bid than the one which JMAL urges upon this court. A logical reading of the statutes involved reflects a legislative intent to prevent public employees from entering into any contract which would present a conflict between the employee's private interests and those of the general public whom he [or she] serves, not just those contracts involving offers based on price. Further, the Legislature has modified the definition of a bid as it pertains to architects. See NRS 625.530(3); NAC 623.800. There is additional support in the case law and legal treatises for this position. One such treatise states, for example, that [a] bid is an offer submitted in response to an invitation for bids. 1B T. Toughey & B. McBride, Bender's Government Contracts § 101.10[5] (1984). This suggests that it is not the element of price which is crucial, but the element of competition amongst offers. Similarly, one court noted that [a] bid is no more than an offer to contract. A.A.B. Electric, Inc. v. Stevenson Public School Distr., 5 Wash.App. 887, 491 P.2d 684, 686 (1971). More importantly, this court has noted that [t]he purpose of bidding is to secure competition, save public funds, and to guard against favoritism, improvidence and corruption. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Clark County, 94 Nev. 116, 118, 575 P.2d 1332, 1333 (1978). In light of the stated policy of the Legislature, the district court erred in concluding that design proposals were not bids within the meaning of NRS 281.481(3).