Opinion ID: 4585008
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Jail-Housing Claim

Text: Bilal argues that the district court also erred in dismissing his claim concerning his month-long stay in the Santa Rosa County Jail in connection with his one-day hearing. We agree. As we have noted, those who are civilly committed may not be punished at all merely because of their status as civil committees. See Romeo, 457 U.S. at 316. Bilal asserts that his housing at the jail amounted to punishment. As with the restraints Defendants employed when they transported Bilal, the State’s interests in determining housing for Bilal include security and the safety of the public. We have recognized these as valid interests. See Lynch v. Baxley, 744 F.2d 1452, 1458 (11th Cir. 1984). Moreover, the State’s interest in security and the 22 USCA11 Case: 16-11722 Date Filed: 11/09/2020 Page: 23 of 31 safety of the public is particularly strong in this case because among an already dangerous group—those determined to be sexually violent predators “likely to engage in acts of violence if not confined in a secure facility”—Bilal has been diagnosed as “one of the most dangerous.” Fla. Stat. § 394.912(10). The district court concluded that Bilal lacked a liberty interest in not being housed temporarily in a jail. To reach this conclusion, it relied on Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976). That was error because Meachum involved a criminal prisoner, not a civil committee. See id. at 216. And as we have explained, duly convicted criminal prisoners do not share the same liberty interests as those who have been civilly committed. In Meachum, the Supreme Court concluded that a criminal conviction “sufficiently extinguishe[s] [a prisoner’s] liberty interest [so as] to empower the State to confine him in any of its prisons.” Id. at 224. But in Lynch, we acknowledged that those awaiting involuntary civilcommitment proceedings have a liberty interest in not being housed unnecessarily in jails. Lynch, 744 F.2d at 1458. So while the State has a compelling and legitimate interest in public safety, it cannot satisfy that interest “by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved.” Id. at 1459 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In particular, we explained, even if the mentally ill represent a danger to themselves or others, they may not be housed in jails if less restrictive, 23 USCA11 Case: 16-11722 Date Filed: 11/09/2020 Page: 24 of 31 secure options, such as a mental hospital or other health facility, are available. Id. at 1461, 1463. In reaching this conclusion, we noted that temporary confinement in a jail is “particularly harmful to those who are mentally ill.” Id. at 1458. And we emphasized that jail is typically not the “least restrictive means” for protecting society from the mentally ill who are dangerous. Id. Lynch dealt with the mentally ill who were being held before they were civilly committed. But it applies with equal force to those who have already been civilly committed. We explained in Lynch that “emergency detainees cannot be subjected to conditions of confinement substantially worse than they would face upon commitment.” Id. at 1461. In other words, we acknowledged the baseline for conditions of confining the mentally ill—either pre- or post-commitment—as those conditions that are not “substantially worse than they would face upon commitment.” Id. And we have already noted that conditions of confinement for the mentally ill may not inflict punishment simply because a person has been civilly committed. See Romeo, 457 U.S. at 316. In contrast, jails may be designed to appropriately punish the convicted individuals they hold. So the mentally ill may not be housed there, even for security reasons, unless no less restrictive, secure option is available. 24 USCA11 Case: 16-11722 Date Filed: 11/09/2020 Page: 25 of 31 We reject Defendants’ suggestion that those who have been civilly committed under Florida’s Jimmy Ryce Act somehow do not enjoy the same protections from punishment as those who have otherwise been civilly committed. As we explained in Pesci, although the civilly committed under the Jimmy Ryce Act have previously been convicted of crimes, they have served their time; they are not prisoners, and the FCCC is not a prison. 730 F.3d at 1292, 1297. So the State may not justify a restraint on a civil committee’s constitutional rights “for reasons related to punitive conditions of confinement.” Id. at 1298. Here, Bilal alleged that when he was housed in the Santa Rosa County Jail, he was subjected to punishing conditions. He asserted that, among other things, he “was placed into the jail’s confinement unit” and “did not have access to[] TV, phone calls, law library, visitation, fresh air exercise, canteen privileges, or access to religious and/or group.” He also contended that he did not receive any mental-health treatment, and the jail guards were abusive and engaged in “show of force tactics that caused . . . Bilal to become suicidal and spend more than two weeks in a suicide cell at the jail.” Under Lynch, the State bore the burden of achieving public security in housing Bilal by the least restrictive means—meaning it could not house Bilal at the jail unless no mental-health facility was both secure and within a reasonable distance of the Escambia County courthouse. Because Bilal was housed in a jail instead, he has 25 USCA11 Case: 16-11722 Date Filed: 11/09/2020 Page: 26 of 31 sufficiently stated a Fourteenth Amendment claim for purposes of surviving a motion to dismiss. During further proceedings, if the State can demonstrate that housing Bilal for a month at the Santa Rosa County Jail represented the “least restrictive means” for ensuring the safety and security of the public, see Lynch, 744 F.2d at 1459, it would be entitled to a judgment in its favor on Bilal’s Fourteenth Amendment claim.10 But under Lynch, the onus remains on the State to so demonstrate. In sum, we conclude that Bilal has sufficiently alleged a Fourteenth Amendment claim concerning his confinement in the Santa Rosa County Jail for one month to attend a one-day hearing. For that reason, we reverse the dismissal of Count II of the Third Amended Complaint and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.