Opinion ID: 2582377
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Hawai`i Constitution's Confrontation Clause

Text: Fields contends that the ICA gravely erred by affirming a conviction that was based primarily on hearsay evidence rendered inadmissible by the confrontation clause of the Hawai`i Constitution. For the reasons that follow, we disagree.
The confrontation clause of article I, section 14 of the Hawai`i Constitution states: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against the accused[.] [7] The right of confrontation affords the accused both the opportunity to challenge the credibility and veracity of the prosecution's witnesses and an occasion for the jury to weigh the demeanor of those witnesses. State v. Ortiz, 74 Haw. 343, 360, 845 P.2d 547, 555 (1993) (citing State v. Rodrigues, 7 Haw.App. 80, 84, 742 P.2d 986, 989 (1987)). For this reason, the admission of a hearsay statement as substantive evidence of its truth raises special problems whenever the hearsay declarant is unavailable for meaningful cross-examination on the witness stand. See State v. Sua, 92 Hawai`i 61, 70, 987 P.2d 959, 968 (1999) (citing State v. Hoffman, 73 Haw. 41, 47, 828 P.2d 805, 809 (1992) (quoting Blue v. State, 558 P.2d 636, 644 (Alaska 1977))). Nonetheless, we have stopped short of holding that the right of confrontation poses an absolute bar to the admission of all out-of-court statements. See Haili, 103 Hawai`i at 103, 79 P.3d at 1277 (citing State v. McGriff, 76 Hawai`i 148, 156, 871 P.2d 782, 790 (1994) (quoting Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 182, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987))). Instead, we have long held that a trial court may, consistent with a criminal defendant's constitutional right of confrontation, permit a hearsay statement uttered by an unavailable declarant as substantive evidence if the statement satisfies the two-part test announced by the United States Supreme Court in Roberts. See Haili, 103 Hawai`i at 104, 79 P.3d at 1278 (citing Sua, 92 Hawai`i at 71, 987 P.2d at 969 (quoting Ortiz, 74 Haw. at 361, 845 P.2d at 555-56)). As regards the first part of the Roberts test, we have remained resolute that[,] under the confrontation clause of the Hawai`i Constitution, a showing of the declarant's unavailability is necessary to promote the integrity of the fact finding process and to ensure fairness to defendants. . . . Upon demonstrating that a witness is unavailable, under the second half of the Roberts test, only statements that bear adequate indicia of reliability may be admitted into evidence. Reliability may be shown in two ways. First, reliability may be inferred without more if it falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception[.] Ortiz, 74 Haw. at 361, 845 P.2d at 556 (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531). . . . Alternatively, reliability may be demonstrated upon a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. Ortiz, 74 Haw. at 361, 845 P.2d at 556 (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531). The United States Supreme Court has declined to endorse a mechanical test for determining `particularized guarantees of trustworthiness' under the [Confrontation] Clause. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 822, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990). Instead, the Court has determined that `particularized guarantees of trustworthiness' must be shown from the totality of the circumstances and that the relevant circumstances include only those that surround the making of the statement and that render the declarant particularly worthy of belief. Id. at 819, 110 S.Ct. 3139. Sua, 92 Hawai`i at 71-72, 987 P.2d at 969-70 (brackets in original) (some citations and quotation marks omitted). Our endorsement of Roberts as the appropriate litmus for identifying constitutionally inadmissible hearsay was therefore settled at the time of Fields' trial. See id. at 71, 987 P.2d at 969 (citing State v. Moore, 82 Hawai`i 202, 223, 921 P.2d 122, 143 (1996)).
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Crawford, decided during the pendency of Fields' appeal before the ICA, makes untenable our continued reliance on Roberts to define all forms of hearsay inadmissible under the confrontation clause. At issue in Crawford was an unavailable declarant's tape-recorded statement that was played to the jury to refute the defendant's theory of self defense. Id. at 39-40, 124 S.Ct. 1354. In considering the admissibility of the hearsay evidence, the Court declined to reassess the statement's reliability using the Roberts test. Rather, the Court overruled Roberts and, in its place, set forth a new interpretation of the federal confrontation clause that purports to hew more closely to the Framers' original intent. Crawford concludes that the history behind the sixth amendment supports important inferences about the constitutional right of confrontation. First, the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused. Id. at 50, 124 S.Ct. 1354. That inference in turn led the Court to a second, more fundamental proposition: that the Framers would not have allowed admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. Id. at 53-54, 124 S.Ct. 1354. As interpreted by Crawford, then, the primary object of the right of confrontation lies in securing for the criminal defendant a basic procedural guarantee: that he be entitled to confront and cross-examine witnesses who bear testimony against him. Id. at 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354. To the extent that an out-of-court statement is testimonial in nature, such hearsay is admissible only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine him about the statement. Id. at 59, 124 S.Ct. 1354. However, the procedural precondition of cross-examination does not apply when nontestimonial statements are involved, as the Framers did not rank the prosecutorial use of this latter type of hearsay among their core concerns. Id. at 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Thus, in contrast to the absolute rule governing testimonial hearsay, id. at 61, 124 S.Ct. 1354, Crawford subjects nontestimonial statements to a more relaxed standard of admissibility  one that afford[s] the States flexibility in their development of hearsay law. Id. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354. In sum, instead of asking whether an unavailable declarant's statement bears sufficient indicia of reliability (as Roberts required), Crawford commands that we query, Is the hearsay testimonial? To that end, Crawford confirms that some types of hearsay  prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial[,] . . . police interrogations[,] and plea allocutions  are undeniably testimonial under the sixth amendment. Id. at 64, 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Other classes of hearsay  business records, statements in furtherance of a conspiracy, and casual remark[s]  are likewise clearly nontestimonial. See id. at 51, 56, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Crawford ultimately declines, however, to unify these examples within a comprehensive definition of testimonial hearsay, id. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354, and simply observes, without further clarification, that some suggested formulations of the term trace the basic contours of the procedural right: Various formulations of this core class of testimonial statements exist: ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent  that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially, Brief for Petitioner 23; extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions, White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365, 112 S.Ct. 736, 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992) (THOMAS, J., joined by SCALIA, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial, Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae 3. These formulations all share a common nucleus and then define the Clause's coverage at various levels of abstraction around it. Id. at 51-52, 124 S.Ct. 1354.
Having left several foundational questions unresolved in Crawford, the United States Supreme Court revisited the analysis in its consolidated opinion in Davis. [8] Therein, the Court clarified that the federal confrontation clause applies only to testimonial hearsay: It is the testimonial character of the statement that separates it from other hearsay that, while subject to traditional limitations upon hearsay evidence, is not subject to the Confrontation Clause. Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2273 (emphasis added). Thereafter, the Court continued where Crawford left off: Without attempting to produce an exhaustive classification of all conceivable statements  or even all conceivable statements in response to police interrogation  as either testimonial or nontestimonial, it suffices to decide the present cases as follows: Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution. Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2273-74 (footnote omitted). The Court subsequently applied its new-fashioned distinction between testimonial and nontestimonial hearsay to the specific facts presented by Davis and Hammon.
Davis involved out-of-court statements made by Michelle McCottry (McCottry) while speaking with a 911 emergency operator on the telephone. Id. at 2270-71. McCottry reported an ongoing domestic disturbance with her former boyfriend, Adrian Davis (Davis). McCottry informed the operator that Davis was jumpin' on [her] again[,] and that he was usin' his fists. Id. at 2271. During the conversation, Davis struck McCottry and ran out the door. Id. The operator informed McCottry that the police were on their way, and that, They're gonna check the area for him first[.] Id. The police arrived four minutes later and observed that McCottry appeared distressed, that she recently sustained injuries to her face and forearm, and that she had frantically collected her children and her belongings in her preparation to leave the residence. Id. Davis was charged with violating a domestic no-contact order. Id. McCottry did not testify, and, over Davis' objection, the trial court permitted a recording of McCottry's conversation with the emergency operator. Id. The jury thereafter returned a verdict of guilt, and Davis' conviction was affirmed by both the Washington Court of Appeals and the Washington Supreme Court. Id. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Id. at 2272. The Court ultimately concluded that McCottry's statements made to the 911 emergency operator were nontestimonial. Id. at 2277. The Court reasoned that (1) McCottry was speaking about events as they were actually happening, rather than `describ[ing] past events,' id. at 2276 (emphasis in original) (brackets in original) (citation omitted), (2) any reasonable listener would recognize that McCottry . . . was facing an ongoing emergency[,] id., and (3) the nature of what was asked and answered . . ., again viewed objectively, was such that the elicited statements were necessary to be able to resolve the present emergency, rather than simply to learn . . . what had happened in the past. Id. The Court pointed out that even the emergency operator's attempt to establish the identity of McCottry's attacker produced nontestimonial hearsay insofar as the information was elicited so that the dispatched officers might know whether they would be encountering a violent felon. Id. Accordingly, the Court held that McCottry's statements were properly admitted and affirmed the Washington Supreme Court's judgment. Id. at 2280.
In Hammon, the police responded to a reported domestic disturbance at the residence of Hershel and Amy Hammon (hereinafter individually referred to as Hershel and Amy). Id. at 2272. Upon arrival, the police discovered Amy sitting alone on the front porch. Id. Amy gave the police permission to enter the dwelling, and the police further observed broken glass in front of a gas heating unit from which flames were being emitted. Id. Hershel was also on the premises, and he informed the police that he and Amy were arguing, but that the dispute had been resolved without becoming physical. Id. Amy's account differed. Id. After reporting the incident to the police, she filled out a battery affidavit as follows: Broke our Furnace & shoved me down on the floor into the broken glass. Hit me in the chest and threw me down. Broke our lamps & phone. Tore up my van where I couldn't leave the house. Attacked my daughter. Id. Hershel was charged with domestic battery and violating his probation. Id. At trial, Amy did not testify. Id. The trial court nevertheless admitted Amy's affidavit under the present sense impression exception to the hearsay exclusionary rule. Id. The trial court also permitted the introduction of Amy's oral account, via the testimony of one of the responding police officers, under the excited utterances exception. Id. The trial judge found Hershel guilty as charged, and Hershel's convictions were affirmed by both the Indiana Court of Appeals and the Indiana Supreme Court. Id. at 2273. The United States Supreme Court granted Hershel's application for certiorari. Id. The Court thereafter perceived a clear factual distinction between Hammon and Davis, and concluded that Amy's statements were testimonial: It is entirely clear from the circumstances that the interrogation was part of an investigation into possibly criminal past conduct  as, indeed, the testifying officer expressly acknowledged. . . . There was no emergency in progress; the interrogating officer testified that he had heard no arguments or crashing and saw no one throw or break anything. . . . When the officers first arrived, Amy told them that things were fine . . . and there was no immediate threat to her person. When the officer questioned Amy for the second time, and elicited the challenged statements, he was not seeking to determine (as in Davis ) `what is happening,' but rather `what happened.' Objectively viewed, the primary, if not indeed the sole, purpose of the interrogation was to investigate a possible crime  which is, of course, precisely what the officer should have done. Id. at 2278 (emphasis in original). The Court continued: The statements in Davis were taken when McCottry was alone, not only unprotected by police (as Amy Hammon was protected), but apparently in immediate danger from Davis. She was seeking aid, not telling a story about the past. McCottry's present-tense statements showed immediacy; Amy's narrative of past events was delivered at some remove in time from the danger she described. And after Amy answered the officer's questions, he had her execute an affidavit, in order, he testified, [t]o establish events that have occurred previously. Id. at 2279 (brackets in original). The Court reversed the judgment of the Indiana Supreme Court and remanded the matter for further consistent proceedings. Id. at 2280.
Crawford fundamentally alters our own analysis of article I, section 14 of the Hawai`i Constitution. To the extent that our cases have predicated the admissibility of testimonial hearsay on conformance with the now-abandoned reliability test set forth in Roberts, Crawford invalidates them. Cf. State v. Grace, 107 Hawai`i 133, 141, 111 P.3d 28, 36 (App.2005), cert. denied, 107 Hawai`i 348, 113 P.3d 799 (2005) ([F]ederal constitutional guarantees are the absolute minimum constitutional protections we must afford criminal defendants[.]). We read Crawford to unequivocally require that the admissibility of testimonial hearsay be governed by the following standard: where a hearsay declarant's unavailability has been shown, the testimonial statement is admissible for the truth of the matter asserted only if the defendant was afforded a prior opportunity to cross-examine the absent declarant about the statement. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354. However, to the extent that the hearsay statements in question are nontestimonial, Davis places them beyond the reach of the federal confrontation clause. See Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2273 (It is the testimonial character of the statement that separates it from other hearsay that, while subject to traditional limitations upon hearsay evidence, is not subject to the Confrontation Clause. ) (Emphasis added.); see also Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the Framers' design to afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay law[.]). Thus, we are disinclined to alter our application of Roberts to nontestimonial hearsay. Roberts embodies the commonsense principle that, when face-to-face cross-examination cannot be secured, extrajudicial statements are admissible as evidence of their truth only when demonstrably more reliable than the straightforward application of our rules of evidence would normally require. See, e.g., Sua, 92 Hawai`i at 70, 987 P.2d at 968; McGriff, 76 Hawai`i at 155, 871 P.2d at 789; Ortiz, 74 Haw. at 360, 845 P.2d at 555. In our estimation, the fairness of criminal proceedings would be significantly diminished were we to renounce Roberts in favor of conditioning the admission of nontestimonial hearsay on the vagaries of evolving rules of evidence. We therefore reaffirm Roberts' continued viability with respect to nontestimonial hearsay. Our position accords with that of other jurisdictions that continue to rely on Roberts to test the admissibility of nontestimonial statements. See, e.g., United States v. Holmes, 406 F.3d 337, 348 (5th Cir.2005) (With respect to nontestimonial statements . . . Crawford leaves in place the Roberts approach to determining admissibility.) (Footnote omitted.); State v. Rivera, 268 Conn. 351, 844 A.2d 191, 202 (2004) ([B]ecause th[e] statement was nontestimonial in nature, application of the Roberts test remains appropriate.); United States v. Hendricks, 395 F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir.2005) ([U]nless a particular hearsay statement qualifies as `testimonial,' Crawford is inapplicable and Roberts still controls.); State v. Staten, 364 S.C. 7, 610 S.E.2d 823, 836 (S.C.Ct.App.2005) (Because nontestimonial hearsay is at issue here, we apply the reliability test of Roberts [.]); United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 227 (2d Cir.2004) ( Crawford leaves the Roberts approach untouched with respect to nontestimonial statements.). These principles thus settled, we turn to whether Fields' right of confrontation was violated in the circumstances of this case.
When disposing of Fields' state constitutional claim, the ICA apparently believed that Haili, and not Crawford, was the relevant precedent. The ICA concluded as follows: When applying the Hawaii Constitution, Haili, 103 Hawai`i 89, 79 P.3d 1263 (2003), not Crawford, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, (March 8, 2004), is the applicable precedent. Haili applies the rule of Roberts. If counsel for Fields had objected to the introduction of [Staggs'] prior testimonial statement into evidence on the ground that it violated the right guaranteed to Fields by the confrontation clause in the Hawai`i Constitution, the objection would have lacked merit and could validly have been denied. The ICA's opinion, slip op. at 23-24, at ___ - ___, ___ P.3d at ___ - ___. However, it is fundamental that, when interpreting our own constitution, our divergence from federal interpretations of the United States Constitution may not convey less protection than the federal standard. See State v. Richie, 88 Hawai`i 19, 42, 960 P.2d 1227, 1250 (1998) (However, when departing from the federal standard, this court must at least provide the minimum level of protection required by the federal interpretation of the United States Constitution.); State v. Quino, 74 Haw. 161, 170, 840 P.2d 358, 362 (1992) ([W]e acknowledged that `[a]s long as we afford defendants the minimum protection required by federal interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, we are unrestricted in interpreting the constitution of this state to afford greater protection.') (Some brackets added and some in original.) (Quoting State v. Texeira, 50 Haw. 138, 142 n. 2, 433 P.2d 593, 597 n. 2 (1967).). Nevertheless, we agree with the ICA's ultimate conclusion that Fields' constitutional right of confrontation was not violated by the circuit court's admission of Staggs' statement to Officer Ke on the grounds that Hawai`i's confrontation clause, like its federal counterpart, is not implicated where, as here, the hearsay declarant attends trial and is cross-examined about his or her prior out-of-court statement. In so concluding, we note that the confrontation clause contained within article I, section 14 of the Hawai`i Constitution is virtually identical to the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution. [9] See discussion supra at n. 7. We thus find the following language in Crawford, delineating the scope of the federal confrontation clause, compelling: [W]e reiterate that, when the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 162, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970).[ [10] ]. . . . The Clause does not bar admission of a statement so long as the declarant is present at trial to defend or explain it. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60 n. 9, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Crawford, despite its absolute rules restricting admission of an absent declarant's hearsay statement, leaves no room for doubt that the federal confrontation clause is not concerned with the admission of an out-of-court statement where the declarant appears at trial and is cross-examined about that statement. Other jurisdictions interpreting the foregoing excerpt have reached similar conclusions. See Robinson v. State, 271 Ga. App. 584, 610 S.E.2d 194, 197 (2005) (Here, because the witnesses were present at trial and testified, Crawford does not apply.); State v. Tester, 179 Vt. 627, 895 A.2d 215, 221 n. 2 (2006) ( Crawford is inapposite because [the declarant] testified at trial.) (Citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60 n. 9, 124 S.Ct. 1354.); People v. Johnson, 363 Ill.App.3d 1060, 300 Ill.Dec. 756, 845 N.E.2d 645, 655 (2005) (Here, the victim testified at trial and was subject to cross-examination. As such, none of the statements admitted . . . were improper under Crawford. ); State v. Corbett, 281 Kan. 294, 130 P.3d 1179, 1189 (2006) (concluding that Crawford did not preclude the admission of pretrial depositions of Jenny Williams and Bryan Miller, that contradicted their trial testimony, because both Williams and Miller were available for cross-examination and testified at trial); Commonwealth v. Ruiz, 442 Mass. 826, 817 N.E.2d 771, 778 n. 5 (2004) (The defendant does not argue that admission of [the declarant's] spontaneous utterances constituted a violation of the principles stated in [ Crawford ]. Here [the declarant] testified at trial and was subjected to cross-examination. We, therefore, do not need to address what impact the Crawford case might have on the admission of spontaneous utterances made by persons who do not testify.); Gomez v. State, 183 S.W.3d 86, 90 (Tex.Ct.App.2005) (The fact that [the declarant] testified and was available for Appellant to cross examine her makes Crawford inapplicable here.); Mumphrey v. State, 155 S.W.3d 651, 657 n. 1 (Tex.Ct.App.2005) ([The declarant] testified at trial. Therefore, the concerns raised by the recent decision by the United States Supreme Court in [ Crawford ] are not relevant in this case.). Inasmuch as the dissent takes issue with the afore-referenced cases, we now discuss them at length. In so doing, we find Robinson and Tester particularly persuasive inasmuch as the hearsay declarants in those cases claimed losses of memory at trial. In Robinson, Rodney Shaw (Shaw) and Thomas Milo (Milo) were at a café when Aunterio Robinson (Robinson) entered. Robinson, 610 S.E.2d at 195. Robinson became aggravated when Shaw demanded payment on a debt owed by Robinson. Id. Not wanting trouble, Shaw and Milo left the café and proceeded to a gas station. Id. Robinson followed them and a fist fight ensued. Id. During the fight, Robinson pulled out a gun and shot Shaw twice. Id. Milo wrestled the gun away from Robinson and threw it over a nearby fence and into a neighboring apartment complex. Id. Robinson retrieved the gun and fled. Id. Milo then drove Shaw to the hospital. Id. Both Shaw and Milo provided statements identifying Robinson as the shooter, and each man picked Robinson's picture out of a photographic lineup. Id. However, at trial, Shaw and Milo exhibited losses of memory on the witness stand: Both witnesses testified that they were intoxicated when the incident occurred. Milo admitted being shown the lineup, remembered he picked someone out, and testified that he signed the lineup form. He could not recall any other relevant facts concerning the incident except that Shaw was shot and that he transported Shaw to the hospital. He first testified that he remembered talking to Detective Foster, but shortly afterward he stated, I don't even remember him. He was certain, though, that he did not tell him anything. Shaw testified that he did not know who shot him, that he did not know or speak to Detective Foster, and that he did not talk to Detective Johnson. He did not remember being shown a lineup or signing the lineup form. Id. at 196. The Georgia Court of Appeals held that the admission of Shaw's and Milo's prior statements made to the police did not violate Robinson's right of confrontation under the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution: Robinson asserts the authority of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), in support of his contention. But in Crawford, the prior statement improperly admitted was that of a wife who did not testify at trial because of a Washington state marital privilege barring her from testifying without her husband's consent. The United States Supreme Court held that admission of her prior statement violated the Confrontation Clause. The Court explicitly held, however, that when the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his prior statements. . . . The Clause does not bar admission of a statement so long as the declarant is present at trial to defend or explain it. The Clause also does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted. (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 38, n. 9, 124 S.Ct. 1354. On the other hand, [t]estimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial have been admitted only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine. (Citations and footnote omitted.) Id. Here, because the witnesses were present at trial and testified, Crawford does not apply. Robinson's confrontation right was not violated. Id. at 197 (ellipses in original). In the case at bar, as in Robinson, the reluctant witness testified to an extent, despite claiming memory loss as to material elements of the alleged crime. Furthermore, neither Staggs nor the hearsay declarants in Robinson testified as to the subject matter of their prior out-of-court statements. Insofar as the Robinson court thus concluded that Crawford was inapplicable, we are similarly persuaded that the same result should be reached here. In Tester, Dwight Tester, Sr. (Tester) was convicted of the offense of aggravated sexual assault. Tester, 895 A.2d at 220. Tester's daughter (D.T.) had reported to her therapeutic foster mother that she had been sleeping on a blow-up bed, and she heard [Tester] enter the room. [Tester] knelt by the bed, and touched her vagina. Id. at 218. She repeated her allegations to a Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services official and a police detective. Id. At trial, however, she claimed some degree of memory loss: She stated that [Tester] had hurt her. When asked how, she testified that she did not remember. D.T. acknowledged that she had told [her therapeutic foster mother] that [Tester] had touched her vagina. She reiterated that [Tester] had touched her, but testified that she did not know how he had touched her. Id. at 220. In a pro se brief, Tester argued that D.T.'s out-of-court statements should have been excluded because they violated his right of confrontation guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by Crawford. Id. at 221 n. 2. The Supreme Court of Vermont rejected that argument, stating that  Crawford is inapposite because D.T. testified at trial. Id. Here, as in Tester, the hearsay declarant  despite some degree of memory loss  testified at trial and was cross-examined. Accordingly, Tester supports the proposition that the Crawford analysis is not applicable to Staggs' out-of-court statements to Officer Ke. Although the factual backgrounds of the remaining cases do not parallel the facts presented in the case at bar, the principles espoused in those cases are nevertheless persuasive. In Johnson, Glenn Johnson (Johnson) was found guilty of two counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse. Johnson, 300 Ill.Dec. 756, 845 N.E.2d at 648. The victim was twelve years old at the time and suffered from mental, vision, speech, and language impairments. Id. Johnson was one of the care providers assigned to the victim, and had contact with the victim on eight separate occasions. Id. at 648-49. Johnson then resigned from his position. Id. at 649. Thereafter, the victim told another care provider that he wished that Johnson was still his care provider. Id. When asked why, the victim responded that they did fun things together. Id. After further questioning, the victim related that Johnson licked his asshole and that Johnson had bubbles in his ass. Id. The victim's mother was informed, and the following conversation ensued: The victim told his mother, while pointing at his genital area, that [Johnson] licked him. [The care provider] explained that the victim had told him that [Johnson] licked his asshole. The victim's mother asked the victim to show her what his asshole is, and the victim pointed to his penis. The victim's mother asked the victim if he meant his penis, and the victim said yes. The victim also said that the defendant was pulling on the defendant's penis and that stuff came out. Id. The victim also related the foregoing to a police investigator. Id. at 650. At trial, the victim testified, in relevant part, as follows: The victim testified that on the way to his uncle's house, the defendant would stop the car, unbutton or unzip his pants, pull down his underwear, and stick out his penis. The defendant would move his hand up and down on his penis and bubbles would come out. The defendant would then wipe the bubbles off with a napkin. The defendant would then do the same to the victim: unbutton his pants, pull down the victim's underwear, and squeeze the victim's penis. The victim saw bubbles come out of his penis. After that they went to the victim's uncle's house. However, the victim did not tell his uncle about the incident. The victim further testified that a similar incident occurred when he and the defendant were in a parking lot. In the parking lot they would stop, and the defendant would unbutton the victim's pants and pull down his underwear. The defendant held the victim's penis. The defendant then took the victim home. The victim testified that he did not tell anybody because the defendant told him not to and because he (the victim) would have been in trouble. Id. at 652. The victim's out-of-court statements were admitted pursuant to 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/115-10 (West 2002), which reads, in pertinent part, as follows: § 115-10. Certain hearsay exceptions. (a) In a prosecution for a physical or sexual act perpetrated upon or against a child under the age of 13, or a person who was a moderately, severely, or profoundly mentally retarded person as defined in this Code and in Section 2-10.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 at the time the act was committed, . . . the following evidence shall be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule: (1) testimony by the victim of an out of court statement made by the victim that he or she complained of such act to another; and (2) testimony of an out of court statement made by the victim describing any complaint of such act or matter or detail pertaining to any act which is an element of an offense which is the subject of a prosecution for a sexual or physical act against that victim. On appeal, Johnson argued that In re E.H., 355 Ill.App.3d 564, 291 Ill.Dec. 443, 823 N.E.2d 1029 (2005) held that 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/115-10 was unconstitutional, based upon the United States Supreme Court's decision in Crawford. Johnson, 300 Ill.Dec. 756, 845 N.E.2d at 655. The Illinois Court of Appeals, however, held that Crawford was inapplicable: In Crawford, the Supreme Court held that testimonial forms of hearsay evidence are inadmissible absent a finding of unavailability and an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-54, 124 S.Ct. at 1365-66, 158 L.Ed.2d at 194. However, when the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the [c]onfrontation [c]lause places no constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n. 9, 124 S.Ct. at 1369 n. 9, 158 L.Ed.2d at 197 n. 9. In other words, when a child sex abuse victim appears at trial and is subject to cross-examination, any prior statement of the victim being offered pursuant to section 115-10 of the Code is a nonevent. People v. Sharp, 355 Ill.App.3d 786, 796, 292 Ill.Dec. 118, 825 N.E.2d 706 (2005). Here, the victim testified at trial and was subject to cross-examination. As such, none of the statements admitted pursuant to section 115-10 were improper under Crawford. Id. (brackets in original). In Corbett, Trever Corbett (Corbett) was convicted of the offense of first degree premeditated murder of his ex-wife Crystal Casey (Crystal). Corbett, 130 P.3d at 1185. Crystal married Corbett in August 1995. Id. They divorced in December 1996. Id. Crystal married her second husband, Shane Casey (Shane), in September 1997. Id. On the morning of June 26, 2000, Crystal's part-time roommate returned to find Crystal's body lying in her apartment. Id. Crystal's neighbor, Jenny Williams (Williams) was walking around the apartment complex with her boyfriend, Bryan Miller (Miller), at approximately 1:30 A.M. on the morning that Crystal was murdered. Id. at 1186. Williams observed a partially clothed man emerging from the doorway to Crystal's apartment carrying a pile of laundry. Id. Williams thought she recognized the man as Corbett and greeted him. Id. The man did not respond. Id. Upon learning of Crystal's death, Williams and Miller contacted the police. Id. Erin Bailey, one of Williams' friends convinced Williams that she had actually seen Shane, because Corbett was the nice ex-husband, and Crystal's marriage with Shane was tumultuous. Id. The police presented Williams with a photographic lineup that included Shane's picture, but not Corbett's picture. Id. Williams did not know Shane, but she selected his picture from the lineup. Id. The police approached Miller with the same lineup. Id. Miller did not initially select a photograph, and the police accused Miller of smoking marijuana and ordered him to return at a later time. Id. Miller then spoke with Williams, who informed Miller of which photograph she had selected. Id. Miller subsequently met with the police and selected Shane's picture from the lineup. Id. at 1186-87. Williams and Miller later appeared for depositions at which Williams reaffirmed her identification. Id. at 1187. Miller, however, recanted. Id. Williams thereafter expressed concerns about her own photographic identification. Id. In January 2001, the police approached Williams and Miller with a second photographic lineup containing pictures of both Corbett and Shane. Id. Both Williams and Miller selected Corbett's picture from the lineup. Id. At trial, Williams and Miller testified about seeing Corbett outside of Crystal's apartment the morning she was murdered. Id. at 1188. On appeal, Corbett argued that the trial court erred by admitting the transcripts from Williams' and Miller's depositions. Id. The Supreme Court of Kansas, however, held that the admission of prior testimony of witnesses who testify at trial was not precluded by either Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-460(a) or the United States Supreme Court's decision in Crawford. Id. at 1189. The Supreme Court of Kansas stated that Crawford does not apply . . . because both Williams and Miller were available for cross-examination and testified at trial. The language in K.S.A. 60-460(a), which limits the application of the statute to a person who is present at the hearing and available for cross-examination, specifically protects the defendant's right to confrontation by requiring the person to be available for cross-examination at trial. Thus, the application of K.S.A. 60-460(a) negates the application of Crawford. Id. at 1189-90. In Ruiz, Juan Ruiz (Juan) was convicted of the offense of first degree murder for killing his wife, Carmen Ruiz (Carmen). Ruiz, 817 N.E.2d at 774. Juan and Carmen had been married for fourteen years and had four children. Id. Often, Carmen's friends and co-workers Angel Negron (Negron) and Anthony Matos (Matos) would drink and socialize at the Ruiz home. Id. During the summer of 1998, Carmen had an affair with Negron. Id. Eventually, Juan told Carmen that he did not want Negron and Matos at his home. Id. In August, Juan moved out of the house. Id. On September 1, 1998, Negron and Matos were at the Ruiz home when Juan entered the premises. Id. at 775. Carmen and Juan argued in the kitchen while Negron was in the bathroom. Id. Juan proceeded to the bathroom and pounded on the door demanding that Negron come out so they could talk. Id. Matos approached Juan and stated that they were not looking for trouble. Id. Juan responded by stabbing Matos six times in the chest and abdomen. Id. Juan then attacked Carmen and stabbed her multiple times in the torso. Id. During his attack on Carmen, Juan's twelve-year-old daughter opened her bedroom door and saw Juan stabbing Carmen. Id. She went back into her room and called the police. Id. Juan saw his daughter on the phone and ran out of the house, got into his vehicle, and drove away. Id. Officer Maria Lavita (Officer Lavita) arrived at the Ruiz home and found Carmen lying on the porch, bleeding but conscious. Id. at 777. Officer Lavita also found Juan's daughter, visibly upset, and asked her what happened. Id. Juan's daughter stated, My father did this to my mother. Id. She then described the stabbing. Id. At trial, the court admitted Juan's daughter's out-of-court statements under the spontaneous utterances exception to the exclusionary hearsay rule. Id. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the trial court's ruling, agreeing that Juan's daughter's statements were properly admitted as spontaneous utterances. Id. The court also noted that the principles set forth in Crawford were not implicated because Juan's daughter testified at trial: The defendant does not argue that admission of [Juan's daughter's] spontaneous utterances constituted a violation of the principles stated in [ Crawford ]. Here, [Juan's daughter] testified at trial and was subjected to cross-examination. We, therefore, do not need to address what impact the Crawford case might have on the admission of spontaneous utterances made by persons who do not testify. Id. at 778 n. 5. In Gomez, police officers were dispatched to a local convenience store where they encountered a crying and hysterical Carmen Perez (Perez). Gomez, 183 S.W.3d at 88. Perez told the officers that she had been assaulted by her ex-boyfriend, Mario A. Gomez (Gomez). Id. Perez was a reluctant witness, but she ultimately testified about the early morning events of October 19, 2003. Id. She testified that Gomez wanted to talk to her and that she received scrapes when he tried to force her into his vehicle. Id. at 89. She stated, however, that Gomez only wanted to talk and that he did not intend to hurt her. Id. The responding police officers also testified at trial, as to what Perez related to them about the incident in question. Id. at 88. The Texas Court of Appeals rejected Gomez's claim that his right of confrontation was violated, as follows: In the case before us, [the responding officers] testified about the statements made to them by the victim, Perez. However, Perez also testified, and [Gomez] had the opportunity to cross examine her three separate times. The fact that Perez testified and was available for [Gomez] to cross examine her makes Crawford inapplicable here. Id. at 90. In Mumphrey, Johnifer Ray Mumphrey (Johnifer) was convicted of perpetrating an assault on Theresa Reedy (Reedy), a member of his family or household. Mumphrey, 155 S.W.3d at 655. According to the trial testimony of the responding police officer, Sheriff's Deputy Craig Strickhausen (Deputy Strickhausen), Reedy informed him that Johnifer came over to her residence and asked her for some money. Id. at 657. When she refused he followed her into the house. Id. She retreated to her bedroom and leaned against the door, but he forced his way in and assaulted her by striking her in the face and in the back and neck areas. Id. Reedy also testified, stating that Johnifer struck her several times and chased her through the house because she had refused to give him money. Id. at 658. On appeal, the Texas Court of Appeals held that the trial court properly admitted Deputy Strickhausen's testimony regarding Reedy's out-of-court statements under the excited utterances exception to the exclusionary hearsay rule. Id. at 659. In a footnote, the court also stated that Reedy testified at trial. Therefore, the concerns raised by the recent decision by the United States Supreme Court in [ Crawford ] are not relevant[.] Id. at 657 n. 1. These cases, while somewhat factually dissimilar, share one unifying theme: Crawford does not preclude the admission of a prior out-of-court statement where the hearsay declarant is cross-examined at trial about the out-of-court statement. [11] That concept is not a novel one. For even under this jurisdiction's version of the Roberts analysis, sufficient cross-examination of the hearsay declarant at trial terminated the inquiry. See Sua, 92 Hawai`i at 77, 987 P.2d at 975 (Both Kaowili and Puahi were cross-examined with respect to their prior inconsistent statements. . . . It therefore follows that the substantive use of these statements did not infringe upon Sua's right of confrontation.); State v. Clark, 83 Hawai`i 289, 294, 926 P.2d 194, 199 (1996) (Because the witness is subject to cross-examination, the substantive use of his [or her] prior inconsistent statement does not infringe the sixth amendment confrontation rights of accused in criminal cases, see California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 [90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489] (1970).) (Quoting State v. Eastman, 81 Hawai`i 131, 136, 913 P.2d 57, 62 (1996) (citing commentary to HRE Rule 802.1 (1993)).) (Brackets in original.); Owens, 484 U.S. at 561, 108 S.Ct. 838 (The dangers associated with hearsay inspired the Court of Appeals in the present case to believe that the Constitution required the testimony to be examined for `indicia of reliability,' . . . or `particularized guarantees of trustworthiness,'. . . . We do not think such an inquiry is called for when a hearsay declarant is present at trial and subject to unrestricted cross-examination. ) (Emphasis added.). Here, Staggs claimed memory loss as to her prior statement on direct examination by the prosecution. Tr. 7/29/02 at 8-9. Indeed, she claimed that she could not even remember the incident in question. Tr. 7/29/02 at 8. On cross-examination, however, she willingly and informatively responded to virtually all of the questions posed by Fields' counsel. Tr. 7/29/02 at 10-11. Her earlier claim that she could not recall the incident was belied by her subsequent testimony on cross-examination. Staggs was able to recall that (1) Richards was present during the incident, Tr. 7/29/02 at 10, and (2) during the incident she was laying on [Fields'] [surf]board while it was positioned between the table and the chair and that she threatened to sit on it and break it if Fields left the premises. Tr. 7/29/02 at 11. She further testified, on cross-examination, that her memory loss as to other portions of the incident could have been caused by the fact that she drank a lot of beer on the evening of the incident in question. Tr. 7/29/02 at 10. Fields' counsel then terminated the cross-examination, having asked only a handful of questions occupying less than two pages of transcript. Tr. 7/29/02 at 10-11. Given the foregoing, we do not think that Fields' opportunity for cross-examination was insufficient. The trier of fact was provided with adequate information to test the credibility and veracity of Staggs' prior statement insofar as it could have reasonably inferred that (1) Staggs' drunken state rendered her prior statement inaccurate or unreliable, and/or (2) Staggs was not an innocent victim but an aggressive participant in the incident who, while angry at Fields, gave a false statement to the police. Fields certainly had the opportunity to develop those theories and cast doubt on Staggs' earlier out-of-court statement, but voluntarily declined to do so by terminating the cross-examination. Moreover, the fact of Staggs' memory loss further permitted the trier of fact to test the truth of her prior out-of-court statement. See Owens, 484 U.S. at 559, 108 S.Ct. 838 (It is sufficient that the defendant has the opportunity to bring out such matters as the witness' bias, his [or her] lack of care and attentiveness, his [or her] poor eyesight, and even (what is often a prime objective of cross-examination, see 3A J. Wigmore, Evidence § 995, pp. 931-932 (J. Chadbourn rev.1970)) the very fact that he [or she] has a bad memory. ) (Emphases added.). Therefore, we hold that the admission of Staggs' out-of-court statement did not violate Hawai`i's confrontation clause inasmuch as Fields was afforded a sufficient opportunity to cross-examine Staggs about her prior statement at trial. Insofar as Fields had a meaningful opportunity for cross-examination, the dissent's focus on the unavailability paradigm is misplaced. See dissenting opinion, at ___, 168 P.3d at 999. ([D]isagreement with the majority rests on the unavailability requirement[.]). The unavailability paradigm has alternatively been referred to as the rule of necessity. See State v. Lee, 83 Hawai`i 267, 275, 925 P.2d 1091, 1100 (1996) (First, in conformance with the Framers' preference for face to face confrontation, the [confrontation clause] establishes a rule of necessity. In the usual case (including cases where prior cross-examination has occurred), the prosecution must either produce, or demonstrate the unavailability of, the declarant whose statement it wishes to use against the defendant.) (Citing Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65, 100 S.Ct. 2531.) (Brackets in original.) The rule of necessity is so named because it imposes a burden on the prosecution to demonstrate the necessity of introducing a prior out-of-court statement by demonstrating the unavailability of the declarant at trial. Id. Thus, the constitutionally infused term, unavailable, means that the declarant is unavailable as a witness for the prosecution at trial. But that is not a relevant inquiry here, insofar as Staggs'unavailability has been conclusively established by her claimed loss of memory. As is intuitively obvious, the present matter turns on whether, given the circumstances, Fields was afforded a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine Staggs about her prior out-of-court statement. [12] The point here is that the protections guaranteed by Hawai`i's confrontation clause have been fully afforded to an accused where the hearsay declarant attends trial and is cross-examined about the prior hearsay statement. The explicit right conferred by both the state and federal confrontation clauses is the right to confront adverse witnesses. Id. at 70, 987 P.2d at 968. The right of confrontation affords the accused both the opportunity to challenge the credibility and veracity of the prosecution's witnesses and an occasion for the jury to weigh the demeanor of those witnesses. Id. (citing State v. Ortiz, 74 Haw. 343, 360, 845 P.2d 547, 555 (1993) (citing State v. Rodrigues, 7 Haw.App. 80, 84, 742 P.2d 986, 989 (1987))). These foundational interests are preserved where an accused is afforded the opportunity to cross-examine, and thereby challenge the credibility and veracity of, a hearsay declarant regarding his or her prior out-of-court statement. See 5 J. Wigmore on Evidence § 1396, at 154 (Chadbourn rev. 1974) (The satisfaction of the right of cross-examination . . . disposes of any objection based on the so-called right of confrontation.); Owens, 484 U.S. at 557-59, 108 S.Ct. 838 (stating that a defendant seeking to discredit a forgetful expert witness is not without ammunition, since the jury may be persuaded that his opinion is as unreliable as his memory[,] and that [i]t is sufficient that the defendant has the opportunity to bring out such matters as the witness' bias, his lack of care and attentiveness, his poor eyesight, and even (what is often a prime objective of cross-examination, see 3A J. Wigmore, Evidence § 995, pp. 931-932 (J. Chadbourn rev.1970)) the very fact that he has a bad memory.) (Quotation marks omitted.) (Citations omitted.). Consistent with the foregoing, we acknowledge that the dissent is correct to the extent that it accuses us of concluding that Staggs' was available for cross-examination. See dissenting opinion, at ___, 168 P.3d at 1000. Our holding that Fields had a sufficient opportunity to cross-examine Staggs about the subject matter of her prior out-of-court statement necessarily implies our acceptance of the proposition that Staggs was physically present at trial and thereby available for cross-examination. We emphasize, however, that we do not conclude that Staggs was constitutionally available as a witness for the prosecution because that finding is precluded by her claimed loss of memory, in accordance with Sua. Given the foregoing, the dissent's discomfort with our application of Sua is unwarranted. In Sua, Jonah Gooman (Gooman) was driving an automobile in which Alomalietoa Sua (Sua), Cory Kaowili (Kaowili), and Trent Puahi (Puahi) were passengers. Sua, 92 Hawai`i at 64, 987 P.2d at 962. Sua believed that Gooman owed a sum of money to his brother, and demanded that Gooman relinquish the money. Id. Gooman noticed Sua fiddling with a gun. Id. Sua continued to demand the money and struck Gooman in the head with the butt of the gun. Id. Kaowili produced $120.00 hoping that Sua would back off. Id. Sua thereafter exited the car. Id. On July 23, 1997, Sua was indicted for committing the offense of first degree robbery. Id. At trial, Puahi and Kaowili testified, but they denied making statements to the police. Id. at 64-65, 987 P.2d at 962-63. Gooman also testified at trial. Id. at 65, 987 P.2d at 963. When asked about his previous testimony before the grand jury, he claimed that he could not remember. Id. Over objection, the circuit court allowed Gooman's grand jury testimony to be read to the jury. Id. at 65-66, 987 P.2d at 963-64. On December 30, 1997, the jury found Sua guilty as charged. Id. at 67, 987 P.2d at 965. On August 30, 1999, the Intermediate Court of Appeals vacated the circuit court's judgment of conviction. Id. at 67-68, 987 P.2d at 965-66. On September 23, 1999, the prosecution filed an application for writ of certiorari, which this court accepted. Id. at 68, 987 P.2d at 966. On appeal, we applied this jurisdiction's version of the Roberts test to Sua's claim that the admission of Gooman's grand jury testimony as a past recollection recorded violated his constitutional right of confrontation. Id. at 70, 987 P.2d at 968. We first concluded that Gooman was `unavailable' by virtue of his loss of memory. Id. at 73, 987 P.2d at 971. Turning to the second prong of the Roberts analysis, this court concluded that Gooman's prior grand jury testimony constituted a past recollection recorded, and thus fell within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. Id. To ensure the highest standard of protection of Sua's constitution right of confrontation, we proceeded to analyze whether Gooman's grand jury testimony bore `particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.' Id. We found such guarantees of trustworthiness, as follows: First, we note that Gooman's grand jury testimony was given under oath. Second, as the victim, Gooman had direct personal knowledge of the relevant facts. Third, Gooman exhibited no reluctance in the grand jury proceeding to implicate Sua. Fourth, Gooman bore no relationship to the government that would have benefitted him to testify against Sua. Finally, Gooman never recanted his inculpatory testimony or expressed belated views regarding its accuracy; in fact, at Sua's trial, Gooman testified that he was able to testify at the grand jury fully and accurately. Given these indicia of trustworthiness, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Gooman's grand jury testimony into evidence. Id. at 74, 987 P.2d at 972. We subsequently cited the following excerpt from Carey v. United States, 647 A.2d 56 (D.C.1994): [The witness] was available for cross-examination by [the defendant's] trial counsel. Indeed, he did cross-examine her at trial about her failure to remember the events on the night of the murder.  The weapons available to impugn the witness' statement when memory loss is asserted will of course not always achieve success, but successful cross-examination is not the constitutional guarantee.  [ Owens, 484 U.S.] at 560[ 108 S.Ct. 838.] Though [the defendant's] trial counsel may not have been able to cross-examine [the witness] as he would have liked, our review of the record reveals nothing giving rise the [sic] a deprivation of appellant's constitutional right of confrontation. Sua, 92 Hawai`i at 75, 987 P.2d at 973 (emphasis added) (brackets in original) (citing Carey, 647 A.2d at 59). We thus concluded that Gooman's grand jury testimony met both requirements of the Roberts test and that Sua had a sufficient opportunity for cross-examination: Similarly, in the present matter, Gooman made assertions before the grand jury and later claimed a loss of memory at trial. Sua was provided with the opportunity to cross-examine Gooman regarding his loss of memory. Inasmuch as Gooman's grand jury testimony met both requirements of the Roberts test, and Sua was able to cross-examine Gooman regarding his failure to remember the alleged incident, we cannot say that the admission of Gooman's grand jury testimony violated Sua's right to confrontation. Id. at 75, 987 P.2d at 973 (emphases added). A fair reading of Sua indicates that this court rejected Sua's confrontation clause argument on two independent and dispositive, but coequal grounds: (1) both prongs of the Roberts test were met; and (2) Sua had a sufficient opportunity for cross-examination. See Sua, 92 Hawai`i at 75, 987 P.2d at 973 (Inasmuch as Gooman's grand jury testimony met both requirements of the Roberts test, and Sua was able to cross-examine Gooman regarding his failure to remember the alleged incident, we cannot say that the admission of Gooman's grand jury testimony violated Sua's right to confrontation.) (Emphasis added.). To interpret the conclusion that Sua was able to cross-examine Gooman regarding his failure to remember the alleged incident as a mere circumstantial fact, as the dissent suggests, see dissenting opinion, at ___, 168 P.3d at 1006, ignores Sua's citation of Carey, discussed supra. The dissent believes that Sua cannot be interpreted as adopting Carey's conclusion that a forgetful declarant was nevertheless available for cross-examination, Carey, 647 A.2d at 59, inasmuch as that conclusion would be inconsistent with Sua's holding that a witness who claims a loss of memory at trial as to a prior out-of-court statement is constitutionally unavailable. See dissenting opinion at ___, 168 P.3d at 1006 (If considered other than a circumstantial fact as the majority proposes, Carey would be contradictory of Sua II's formulation of Roberts, because Gooman's memory loss made him unavailable for confrontation purposes on the same facts that Carey would deem him available. Therefore, the purported `two independent . . . grounds,' . . . asserted by the majority cannot coexist.) (Some ellipses in original and some added.). The dissent's position is unpersuasive because it confuses the semantic statement available for cross-examination with the constitutionally infused statement available as a witness for the prosecution. The unavailability paradigm was not at issue in Carey. The Carey court made the foregoing statement in the context of analyzing whether the accused had a sufficient opportunity for cross-examination, the declarant's loss of memory notwithstanding. Thus, the Carey court's statement that the forgetful declarant was available for cross-examination implies nothing as to whether it would or would not have determined whether the forgetful witness was constitutionally unavailable ( i.e., unavailable as a witness for the prosecution ). It is not contradictory to suggest that a witness may be constitutionally unavailable as a witness for the prosecution by virtue of that witness' claimed loss of memory at trial as to a prior out-of-court statement, yet simultaneously semantically available for cross-examination as a result of the witness' physical presence on the witness stand. [13] Sua is consistent with that distinction, holding, inter alia, that (1) Gooman was constitutionally unavailable as a witness for the prosecution by virtue of his loss of memory, and (2) Gooman was nevertheless semantically available for cross-examination by virtue of his physical presence at trial, thereby providing Sua with an opportunity to cross-examine Gooman. Thus, Sua concluded that [i]nasmuch as Gooman's grand jury testimony met both requirements of the Roberts test, and Sua was able to cross-examine Gooman regarding his failure to remember the alleged incident, we cannot say that the admission of Gooman's grand jury testimony violated Sua's right to confrontation. Sua, 92 Hawai`i at 75, 987 P.2d at 973 (emphasis added). Additionally, the dissent's analysis is wrong because it misconstrues the Crawford opinion in an attempt to conjure disparity with this jurisdiction's confrontation clause jurisprudence. To wit, the dissent claims that, under Crawford, a declarant is unavailable for confrontation clause purposes only if he or she never takes the stand, and thus our endorsement of Crawford's view on unavailability directly contradicts this jurisdiction's view of unavailability as set forth in Sua. See dissenting opinion, at ___, 168 P.3d at 1016 (Pursuant to Crawford, a declarant is `unavailable' for confrontation clause purposes only if he or she never takes the stand.). However, Crawford does not state that a declarant is constitutionally unavailable only if the declarant is not present at trial. Indeed, the dissent provides no citation for that proposition. What Crawford does say, is that [t]he Clause[,] i.e., the confrontation clause analysis, does not bar admission of a statement so long as the declarant is present at trial to defend or explain it. Crawford at 60 n. 9, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Thus, the appropriate principle gleaned is that the confrontation clause analysis does not apply to exclude a prior out-of-court statement where a declarant is physically present at trial to defend or explain it[,] not that a hearsay declarant's presence at trial mandates the conclusion that the declarant is constitutionally available ( i.e., not unavailable). The dissent's misapprehension of Crawford again demonstrates its improper equation of the constitutional unavailability paradigm with the inquiry whether the hearsay declarant is physically present and available for cross-examination. Because the dissent believes that the federal unavailability paradigm asks whether the declarant is available for cross-examination at trial, it consequently concludes that the hearsay declarant's physical presence at trial establishes the declarant's availability ( i.e., lack of unavailability). Thus, the dissent translates Crawford's statement in footnote 9  that the confrontation clause analysis does not bar the admission of a prior out-of-court statement so long as the declarant is present at trial to defend or explain it, Crawford at 60 n. 9, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (emphasis added)  as stating that the confrontation clause analysis does not apply so long as the declarant is available for cross-examination at trial. This explains the dissent's opposition to our application of that principle to the present case. As previously mentioned, the dissent takes the federal courts' use of the phrase available for cross-examination to mean constitutionally available ( i.e., not unavailable). Thus, the dissent believes that an application of Crawford here mandates the conclusion that Staggs was constitutionally available despite the fact that her memory loss would render her constitutionally unavailable under Sua. See dissenting opinion, at ___-___, 168 P.3d at 1016. To the contrary, we read the federal courts' use of the phrase available for cross-examination as taking an intermediate step towards the conclusion that the accused had a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine a hearsay declarant who was physically present at trial; not as establishing the declarant's constitutional availability ( i.e., lack of unavailability) as a witness for the prosecution. See discussion supra. It is the dissent's erroneous substitution of the phrase, available for cross-examination, with the phrase, available as witness for the prosecution, that creates the foregoing appearance of incompatibility. Finally, the dissent claims that we have retained the unavailability paradigm with respect to nontestimonial situations and that by excluding the present out-of-court statement from the purview of Hawai`i's confrontation clause we have failed to preserve the unavailability paradigm with respect to testimonial situations, thus creating an anomalous result. Dissenting opinion, at ___ - ___, 168 P.3d at 1007-1008. However, contrary to the dissent's assertions, we have not extinguished the unavailability requirement with respect to testimonial situations. Under Hawai`i's confrontation clause, if an out-of-court statement is testimonial, it is subject to the Crawford analysis, which mandates that (1) the witness be unavailable, [14] and (2) the accused had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. If an out-of-court statement is nontestimonial, it is subject to the Roberts analysis, requiring a showing that (1) the declarant is unavailable, and (2) the statement bears some indicia of reliability. Thus, the unavailability paradigm is retained in both testimonial and nontestimonial situations, and the result achieved is not anomalous. Indeed, we reiterate that a showing of the declarant's unavailability is necessary to promote the integrity of the fact finding process and to ensure fairness to defendants. Sua, 92 Hawai`i at 71, 987 P.2d at 969 (citations omitted). To reiterate, and in sum, our present holding is no more, and no less, than that a trial court's admission of a prior out-of-court statement does not violate the Hawai`i Constitution's confrontation clause where the declarant appears at trial and the accused is afforded a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine the declarant about the subject matter of that statement. In such situations, the cross-examination satisfies the accused's right of confrontation and neither the Crawford analysis nor the Roberts analysis need be employed.
The ICA declined to address Fields' claim that Richards' out-of-court statement, [15] as related by Lhamo, violated Fields' right of confrontation under the Hawai`i Constitution. [16] Inasmuch as Fields failed to raise the argument in his opening brief, the ICA was within its discretion to deem the error waived. See HRAP Rule 28(b)(4) (2003) (stating that the appellant shall file an opening brief, containing . . . [a] concise statement of the points of error. . . . Points not presented in accordance with this section will be disregarded, except that the appellate court, at its option, may notice a plain error not presented.). We therefore perceive no grave error.