Opinion ID: 622676
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The District Court's Denial of Reconsideration

Text: We acknowledge that our review of the order denying reconsideration is subject to a more deferential and circumscribed standard of review than would apply if we also were to have jurisdiction to consider the underlying dismissal order, as we review only whether the District Court's denial of reconsideration constitutes an abuse of discretion. [20] See, e.g., Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir.2010) ([T]he appropriate standard of review [of an appeal from the district court's denial of a Rule 59 motion] is for an abuse of discretion.). Consequently, in the ordinary case, we would not assume that reviewing a denial of reconsideration would be functionally the same as reviewing the underlying order, even if the former covered all of the same issues as the latter. However, though we are bound by an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing the denial of reconsideration, it would indeed be an abuse of discretion in this case if the District Court were wrong in saying that Heck required dismissal of Long's complaint. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Att'y Gen. of the State of N.J., 297 F.3d 253, 265 (3d Cir. 2002) ([A] court abuses its discretion when its ruling is founded on an error of law or a misapplication of law to the facts. (internal citation omitted)). Thus, even though we cannot conclude on this record whether we have jurisdiction to exercise plenary review to consider whether the District Court erred in dismissing Long's complaint, the legal question presented is essentially the same under either plenary or abuse-of-discretion review: whether the District Court correctly found Long's complaint to be barred by Heck. In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a § 1983 suit should be dismissed when a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence ... unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. 512 U.S. at 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364. Here, Long's complaint seeks the sort of relief that is plainly barred by Heck because he seeks § 1983 relief on the ground that the defendants conspired to obtain a capital murder conviction against him, but he has not demonstrated that his conviction has already been invalidated. ( See Amicus App. at 133 (alleging that the Defendants violated [Long's] constitutional and civil rights ... by committing perjury and/or fabricating evidence and engaging in conspiratorial acts to hide evidence to prevent DNA testing, causing ... [Long] to be falsely convicted of capital murder).) Although the Supreme Court has clarified that Heck does not bar a litigant from seeking access to DNA evidence through § 1983, see Skinner v. Switzer, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1289, 1298, 179 L.Ed.2d 233 (2011), the conspiracy described in Long's complaint does not, even liberally construed, seek such relief. Therefore, we hold that the District Court committed no legal error in denying Long's motion for reconsideration, and so did not abuse its discretion in declining to change its order dismissing Long's complaint. And because the same result would obtain were we to ultimately determine that we have jurisdiction to review the District Court's dismissal order, we need not remand for Fiorelli fact-finding.