Opinion ID: 2077936
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: judgment on default

Text: [¶ 9] A court may set aside a default judgment for good cause shown. M.R. Civ. P. 55(c). To establish good cause, a party must show a good excuse for his or her untimeliness and a meritorious defense. Boit v. Brookstone Company, Inc., 641 A.2d 864, 865 (Me.1994). We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to set aside a default for abuse of discretion and will vacate the judgment only if the denial works a plain and unmistakable injustice against the defendant. LaFosse v. Champagne, 2000 ME 81, ¶ 10, 750 A.2d 1254, 1256. [¶ 10] In the present case, Browne has presented an arguably meritorious defense. She alleges, in her answer, that the statements she published to third parties are true. Browne has not, however, established that the court exceeded the bounds of its discretion in determining that she had not stated a good excuse for her untimely answer. Browne argues that she mistakenly thought that she had twenty days from the denial of her motion to dismiss in which to file her answer. However, the trial court could reasonably consider her claim in the context that Browne had recently filed a motion to dismiss that served to delay her answer and then had failed to appear at the scheduled hearing on the motion to dismiss. These actions suggested significant carelessness in her defense of the matter which the trial court could view as confirmed by her untimely answer. [¶ 11] Although Browne is representing herself, we afford her no bending of the rules or other special consideration. See Dumont v. Fleet Bank of Maine, 2000 ME 197, ¶ 13, 760 A.2d 1049, 1054. Rule 12(a) of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if the court denies the motion [in this case, the motion to dismiss] ... the responsive pleading shall be served within 10 days after notice of the court's action. M.R. Civ. P. 12(a). Browne's misunderstanding of this rule, taken in the context of her prior actions in this case, does not constitute a good excuse for her late answer. The court, therefore, did not exceed the bounds of its discretion by refusing to set aside the entry of default. Because entry of the default was proper, we need not address whether the preliminary injunction unduly limited Browne's capacity to develop evidence on liability issues.