Opinion ID: 2166594
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Malicious, Willful, Intentional

Text: [7] ¶ 18. The parties disagree whether the exception regarding malicious, willful, and intentional conduct should be read in the conjunctive (malicious, willful, and intentional) or the disjunctive (malicious, willful, or intentional). The source of the confusion stems from the use of both and and or by courts in stating the exception. The exception was first announced in Lister as malicious, willful and intentional misconduct, but the court concluded in that case that [t]he complaint contains no allegation of malicious or intentional misconduct on the part of [the defendant] which could subject him to personal liability. Lister, 72 Wis. 2d at 302 (emphasis added). Since Lister, Wisconsin courts have stated the exception in both the conjunctive and disjunctive; however, in the majority of cases, the exception has been recited in the conjunctive. [3] ¶ 19. Bicknese argues that mere intentional conduct, as opposed to negligent conduct, is sufficient to abrogate public officer immunity. We disagree. As will be discussed, this proffered interpretation is unquestionably over-inclusive. We recognize that people often act intentionally; thus, common sense dictates that the exception should not cover every intentional act, but rather intentional acts of a harmful or pernicious character. Moreover, the exception also refers to malicious and willful conduct. These additional terms indicate that the exception should only apply to ill-intended acts, as opposed to all intentional actions. One court has articulated the exception as `where the alleged acts involve malice, wantonness or intent to injure, rather than negligence.' Colon v. City of New Haven, 758 A.2d 900, 902 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000) (emphasis added) (quoting Evon v. Andrews, 559 A.2d 1131, 1134 (Conn. 1989)). In addition, malice is defined as the intent, without justification or excuse, to commit a wrongful act. Black's Law Dictionary 968 (7th ed. 1999). [4] Furthermore, this court has characterized the exception pertaining to `malicious, willful and intentional conduct' as a potential remedy [for] gross municipal wrongdoing. Willow Creek, 235 Wis. 2d 409, ¶ 36 n.12 (quoting Kierstyn, 228 Wis. 2d at 90 n.8). Accordingly, the exception does not apply to mere intentional conduct of a public officer or employee without more. Therefore, the three terms should be read in conjunction as malicious, willful, and intentional. [8] ¶ 20. In this case, the jury found that Sutula made representations to Bicknese that she had a job at the UW Medical School even though this was not true. On the other hand, the jury found that Sutula did not make these representations with the intent to deceive Bicknese or to induce her to act upon such representations. It appears from Sutula's efforts that he genuinely wanted Bicknese to the join the faculty at the UW and was not trying to intentionally harm her. Thus, while Sutula presumably acted intentionally, he did not act maliciously with an intent to injure Bicknese. Admittedly, Sutula's tactics to persuade Bicknese to choose the UW and turn down the competing offer from Buffalo were arguably highly inappropriate; however, it does not appear that Sutula's actions were principally aimed at causing harm to Bicknese. Consequently, we hold that Sutula's actions must have risen to the level of malicious, willful, and intentional conduct in order to abrogate his public officer immunity. There is sufficient evidence from the record to support a finding that Sutula's actions were not malicious, willful, and intentional. Accordingly, we uphold the jury verdict that answered this question in the negative.