Opinion ID: 184247
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Effect of Steward’s Contractual Waiver

Text: As an initial matter, before we reach the substance of any of Steward’s claims, we address the effect of the aforementioned provision in Steward’s employment application on the timeliness of her claims. To restate, this clause provided that “any claim or lawsuit relating to [Steward’s employment] . . . must be filed no more than six (6) months after the date of the employment action that is the subject of the claim or lawsuit.” By signing the agreement, Steward agreed to “waive any statute of limitations to the contrary.” In Thurman v. DaimlerChrysler, a lawsuit filed against Chrysler by another Chrysler employee, we addressed the legal effect of this same provision. 397 F.3d 352 (6th Cir. 2004). We observed that under Michigan law, (1) “terms in an employment application constitute part of an - 11 - No. 08-1282 Steward v. New Chrysler employee’s contract of employment”; (2) “contracting parties may agree to an abbreviated statute of limitations so long as it is reasonable”; and (3) a “six-month statute of limitations clause in an employment application [is] not inherently unreasonable.” Id. at 356–57 (citations omitted). Accordingly, we held that the waiver was enforceable and served to bar the plaintiff’s claims insofar as they accrued more than six months before she filed suit. Id. at 358. In this case, Steward filed suit on August 5, 2005. Her claims are therefore barred to the extent they accrued before February 5, 2005. This time bar does not affect her disabilitydiscrimination claims or her retaliation claim, which are premised on her being placed on paid layoff on March 17, 2005. However, her race-discrimination claim and her IIED claim are premised not on her termination, but rather, on workplace conduct that occurred throughout her time under McKerley. Almost all of the specific racial incidents of which Steward complains occurred before February 2005 — that is, where Steward provides any dates at all. However, Steward did testify that the segregated assembly line persisted “up until basically the time that [she] left” in March 2005. Accordingly, her race-based claims are not altogether time-barred; however, Steward may not recover for any incidents that occurred before February 2005. See Leffman v. Sprint Corp., 481 F.3d 428, 431 (6th Cir. 2007) (“A discriminatory act which is not made the basis for a timely charge is . . . merely an unfortunate event in history which has no present legal consequences.” (quoting United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558 (1977)).4 Conduct that occurred prior to that date 4 Steward’s attempt to evade the contractual limitations period by arguing that Chrysler’s conduct throughout her employment amounts to a “continuing violation” must fail, as the Michigan Supreme Court has rejected the “continuing violation” doctrine under its civil rights laws. See Garg v. Macomb County Cmty. Mental Health Servs., 696 N.W.2d 646, 658-660 (Mich. 2005) (overruling - 12 - No. 08-1282 Steward v. New Chrysler “may be considered as ‘background evidence’” to establish racial animus with respect to actionable conduct within the limitations period, but is not in itself actionable. Barrett v. Whirlpool Corp., 556 F.3d 502, 519 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 120 (2002)).