Opinion ID: 814548
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Warden Ochoa

Text: The district court also properly granted summary judgment in favor of Warden Ochoa. Ochoa was neither personally involved with the alleged constitutional violation nor was his policy sufficiently casually connected to the violation. See Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1454-55 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding for a supervisor to be individually liable he must be personally involved in the constitutional deprivation, or his policy must be sufficiently casually connected to the constitutional violation). II. Pride’s Motion for Continuance to Conduct Discovery We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s denial of a motion to continue a summary judgment hearing pending further discovery. Michelman v. Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co., 685 F.3d 887, 892 (9th Cir. 2012). The district court abused its discretion by requiring the discovery sought by Pride under Rule 56(d) to be obtained from Defendants, rather than from a third-party. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996) (“A district court by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.”). Moreover, Pride demonstrated that the additional discovery would have precluded summary judgment, thus, the district court’s denial of Pride’s motion -5- was an abuse of discretion. See VISA Int’l Serv. Ass’n v. Bankcard Holders of Am., 784 F.2d 1472, 1475 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating denial is disfavored when plaintiff specifically identifies relevant information and points to “some basis” for its existence). Specifically, Pride’s requested information from Nurse Garcia on his appointments with doctors would have disproved Defendants-Appellees’ claim that Pride did not go back to his doctors as instructed. Pride’s requested information regarding attempts by Defendants-Appellees to fabricate documentation during Pride’s appeal would have demonstrated personal animosity, which bears on the issue of deliberate indifference. See Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding “personal animosity” may establish deliberate indifference). In his motion, Pride substantiated that Garcia would have the requested discovery because she interviewed Pride on issues raised in his inmate appeal, was involved in the grievance process, and filled out one of the appeal forms. Thus, on remand, Pride must be allowed additional discovery.2 2 Pride did not seek discovery relating to Dr. Santiago. Although Pride sought information from Garcia on Ochoa’s prison mattress policy, that discovery would not have precluded summary judgment. Thus, summary judgment for Dr. Santiago and Warden Ochoa is not subject to reversal because of the district court’s erroneous ruling on Pride’s motion for a continuance. -6- III. Defendants-Appellees’ Motion to Dismiss The district court’s dismissal of Pride’s injunctive relief claim is properly before us. See, e.g., Meehan v. County of Los Angeles, 856 F.2d 102, 105-06 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that when an issue is not designated in the notice of appeal, the issue is properly before the court when both parties fully brief the issue). The district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) is reviewed de novo. Vestron, Inc. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 839 F.2d 1380, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988). The district court dismissed Pride’s injunctive relief claim on the ground that the relief Pride sought was already provided for in the pending class action Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No. 01-1351, 2005 WL 2932253 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2005). The Plata stipulation states that California prison officials may “assert issue preclusion and res judicata in other litigation seeking class or systemic relief.” The dismissal of an individual complaint is proper when the plaintiff “is a member in a class action seeking the same relief.” Crawford v. Bell, 599 F.2d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 1979). Here, however, Pride seeks an injunction preventing Defendants from denying him his medical treatment and accommodations. Unlike Plata, he does not seek systemic relief. Thus, the district court erred by dismissing Pride’s claim for injunctive relief. See id. at 893 (holding the district court -7- correctly dismissed only those portions of plaintiff’s complaint “which duplicate the . . . allegations and prayer for relief” in a pending class action in which plaintiff is a member); Tillis v. Lamarque, No. C 04-3763 SI, 2006 WL 644876 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2006) (holding Plata does not bar plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief because plaintiff “seek[s] relief solely on his own behalf”); Burnett v. Dugan, 618 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1235-37 (S.D. Cal. 2009). Pride’s claim for injunctive relief is moot as to Dr. Santiago and Warden Ochoa because summary judgment was properly granted in their favor. On remand, the district court should address whether Dr. Levin’s transfer mooted Pride’s claim for injunctive relief against Dr. Levin. IV. Conclusion The district court’s order granting summary judgment for DefendantsAppellees is REVERSED in part and AFFIRMED in part. The district court’s order denying Pride’s motion for discovery is REVERSED; on remand, Pride must be allowed additional discovery. The district court’s grant of DefendantsAppellees’ motion to dismiss Pride’s claim for injunctive relief is REVERSED. Pride shall recover his costs on appeal. -8-