Opinion ID: 414387
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Cat out of the bag.

Text: 17 Holleman's final contention is that the confessions of October 21 and 26 were the result of the inadmissible confession of October 18. Holleman argues that had he known that his first confession would be suppressed he would not have made the later incriminating statements, but having once let the cat out of the bag remaining silent during the later interrogation appeared to be an exercise in futility. 18 The proper measure of a claim that a confession is involuntary is whether the totality of the circumstances demonstrate that the accused did not make the decision to confess of his own free will. Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 77 S.Ct. 281, 1 L.Ed.2d 246 (1957); see also Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 80 S.Ct. 274, 4 L.Ed.2d 242 (1960); Montes v. Jenkins, 626 F.2d 584 (7th Cir.1980). That the accused has already made an involuntary confession is a strong indication that later statements were not the product of his free will, but it is not dispositive on the issue. The Supreme Court recognized this in United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540-41, 67 S.Ct. 1394, 1398, 91 L.Ed. 1654 (1947). 19 Of course, after an accused has once let the cat out of the bag by confessing, no matter what the inducement, he is never thereafter free of the psychological and practical disadvantages of having confessed.... The secret is out for good. In such a sense, a later confession always may be looked upon as fruit of the first. But this Court has never gone so far as to hold that making a confession under circumstances which preclude its use, perpetually disables the confessor from making a usable one after those conditions have been removed. 20 (emphasis added); see also Knott v. Howard, 511 F.2d 1060, 1061 (1st Cir.1975). 21 In considering whether the first confession tainted the later ones we must examine factors such as whether the conditions that rendered the first confession inadmissible persisted through later questioning, the break in time, if any, between the confessions, whether defendant was given renewed Miranda warnings, and any other relevant circumstances. When the timing and conditions of the confessions are so close that one must say the facts of one control the character of the other the subsequent confession will be suppressed. Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 561, 74 S.Ct. 716, 719, 98 L.Ed. 948 (1957); United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 467 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir.1972). That the defendant remained in custody and was denied access to counsel will also taint the subsequent confessions. Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 87 S.Ct. 1338, 18 L.Ed.2d 423 (1967); United States ex rel. Gockley v. Meyers, 450 F.2d 232 (3rd Cir.1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1063, 92 S.Ct. 738, 30 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972). And, of course, the persistence of the conditions that caused the initial confession to be involuntary during later questioning will result in a continued taint. Conversely, that there was a break in time between the confessions and that the coercive conditions were removed will counsel in favor of finding the later statements voluntary. United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 67 S.Ct. 1394, 91 L.Ed. 1654 (1947); United States v. Monti, 557 F.2d 899 (1st Cir.1977); United States v. Gorman, 355 F.2d 151 (2nd Cir.1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1024, 86 S.Ct. 1962, 16 L.Ed.2d 1027. That defendant initiated contact with the police prior to making the later confessions with the hope of making a deal also weighs in favor of finding the confessions admissible. 22 In this case there was a break of several days between the confessions, and Holleman was advised of his rights on each occasion. The trial court found that Holleman's withdrawal symptoms had eased to the point at which they were no longer the cause of the confessions. Although Holleman remained in custody he was advised of his right to speak with an attorney but declined to do so. Furthermore, we find no reason for thinking that incarceration caused Holleman to confess as he was also being held on other charges and could not expect to be released as a result of making a statement. Most importantly, the Indiana Supreme Court found that Holleman initiated the conversations with the police that led to the confessions on October 21 and 26 in the hope that he would be given leniency, although no promises had been made by the police on this score. Based on these facts, which make up the totality of the circumstances of this case, we cannot conclude that the three courts that have already considered this claim erred in finding the confessions voluntary. Accordingly, the decision of the district court is AFFIRMED.