Opinion ID: 4200327
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Different-Occasions Inquiry

Text: Washington’s first two arguments relate to the district court’s use of Shepard-approved documents 2 to determine whether he committed the ACCApredicate crimes on different occasions. He argues that recent Supreme Court decisions make clear that courts may not rely on “non-elemental” facts, such as the date a crime was committed, in Shepard-approved documents. He also asserts that 1 Some of Washington’s challenges were raised for the first time on appeal and therefore are subject to review for plain error only. See Weeks, 711 F.3d at 1261. We need not delineate which arguments were preserved and which were forfeited, however, because Washington has not shown that he is entitled to relief on any of his claims even under de novo review. 2 In Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16, 26 (2005), the Supreme held that, in determining the character of a prior conviction under the ACCA, the sentencing court “is generally limited to examining the statutory definition [of the offense of the prior conviction], charging document, written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant assented.” The term “Shepard-approved documents,” as used in this opinion, refers to this limited category of evidence. 3 Case: 17-10059 Date Filed: 08/31/2017 Page: 4 of 11 his sentence violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments because the fact that his prior offenses were committed on different occasions was not charged in the indictment and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Here, the district court did not err in relying on Shepard-approved documents to determine whether Washington committed the prior crimes on different occasions. We have held that district courts may determine whether predicate offenses were committed on different occasions for purposes of the ACCA “so long as they limit themselves to Shepard-approved documents.” Weeks, 711 F.3d at 1259; see United States v. Overstreet, 713 F.3d 627, 635 (11th Cir. 2013). Washington does not assert that the district court went beyond these materials in making its sentencing determinations. And he has abandoned any argument that the offenses were not, as a factual matter, committed on different occasions by failing to raise the issue on appeal. See United States v. Ardley, 242 F.3d 989, 990 (11th Cir. 2001) (issues “not timely raised in the briefs are abandoned”). Our prior precedent is likewise clear that a sentencing court does not violate the Fifth and Sixth Amendment by judicially determining that a defendant’s prior convictions were committed on different occasions for ACCA purposes. Weeks, 711 F.3d at 1259–60. In Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 226– 67 (1998), the Supreme Court held that a defendant’s prior convictions need not be 4 Case: 17-10059 Date Filed: 08/31/2017 Page: 5 of 11 alleged in the indictment or proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order for a sentencing court to use those convictions for purposes of enhancing a sentence. See Weeks, 711 F.3d at 1259. We have consistently held that Almendarez-Torres remains good law, and we have explained that it permits district courts to determine not only the mere fact of a prior conviction but also “the factual nature of those convictions, including whether they were committed on different occasions.” Id.; see Overstreet, 713 F.3d at 635. Accordingly, the district court did not err in using Shepard-approved documents to determine that Washington’s prior crimes were committed on different occasions. Washington contends that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016), and Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013), prohibit a sentencing court’s reliance on dates and other non-elemental facts in Shepard-approved materials. He asserts that these decisions have abrogated our prior holdings on the different-occasions issue. We disagree. Under this Court’s prior precedent rule, “a prior panel’s holding binding on all subsequent panels unless and until it is overruled or undermined to the point of abrogation by the Supreme Court or this court sitting en banc.” United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008). To conclude that we are not bound by a prior holding in light of a Supreme Court case, we must find that the case is “clearly on point” and that it “actually abrogate[s] or directly conflict[s] with, as 5 Case: 17-10059 Date Filed: 08/31/2017 Page: 6 of 11 opposed to merely weaken[s], the holding of the prior panel.” United States v. Kaley, 579 F.3d 1246, 1255 (11th Cir. 2009). Neither Descamps nor Mathis is “clearly on point” and “actually abrogate[s] or directly conflict[s] with, as opposed to merely weaken[s],” our holdings in Weeks and Overstreet. See id. Descamps dealt with whether a sentencing court may use the modified categorical approach to ascertain whether a conviction is a qualifying offense under the ACCA when the statute under which the defendant was convicted has a single, indivisible set of elements. 133 S. Ct. at 2283–93. Mathis dealt with whether a sentencing court may apply the modified categorical approach if a statute of conviction lists alternatives that are “means” of committing the crime, rather than “elements.” 136 S. Ct. at 2256–58. Neither case addresses the different-occasions inquiry, which does not concern the elements of the state offenses at issue. Thus, Descamps and Mathis do not abrogate our prior precedent on the different-occasions issue for purposes of the ACCA. In sum, the district court did not err by considering Shepard-approved documents to determine that Washington’s predicate offenses occurred on different occasions for purposes of the ACCA.