Opinion ID: 2972456
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prompt judicial decision

Text: Deja Vu further maintains that the resolution’s provision for the issuance of a temporary license pending appeal of an adverse licensing determination does not provide for the “prompt judicial decision” that is required when the government imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression. See Deja Vu of Nashville, Inc. v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson County, 274 F.3d 377, 403 n.8 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Merely preserving the status quo, however, is not sufficient . . . . The decision whether or not to grant a license must still be made within a specified, brief period, and the licensing scheme ‘must assure a prompt judicial decision.’”) (quoting Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59 (1965)) (emphasis in original). Nos. 00-4420/4529 Deja Vu of Cincinnati v. Union Township et al. Page 7 The Supreme Court in Freedman held that three procedural safeguards are required in order to ensure that a prior restraint on the freedom of expression is constitutional. First, “[a]ny restraint imposed in advance of a final judicial determination on the merits must . . . be limited to preservation of the status quo for the shortest fixed period compatible with sound judicial resolution.” 380 U.S. at 59. Second, “the procedure must also assure a prompt final judicial decision.” Id. And third, the burden of proving that the expression in question is unprotected must rest on the government. Id. at 58. The Sixth Circuit has held that “[l]icensing schemes in a city ordinance regulating sexually oriented businesses constitute a prior restraint that must incorporate at least the first two Freedman procedural safeguards.” Deja Vu of Nashville, Inc., 274 F.3d at 400-01 (holding that a Nashville ordinance regulating the licensing of sexually oriented businesses did not provide for a prompt judicial determination because it required “aggrieved applicants [to] proceed to court via a discretionary route” instead of allowing for an appeal as of right); see also FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 228 (1990) (plurality opinion of O’Connor, J.) (stating that “the first two [Freedman] safeguards are essential: the licensor must make the decision whether to issue the license within a specified and reasonable time period during which the status quo is maintained, and there must be the possibility of prompt judicial review in the event that the license is erroneously denied”). In analyzing the constitutionality of an adult-business-licensing scheme, this court has recognized that “any system of prior restraint carries a heavy presumption against its validity.” Deja Vu of Nashville, Inc., 274 F.3d at 391. Deja Vu maintains that the resolution in question fails to provide for prompt judicial review because it does not mandate specific time limits within which the Ohio courts must complete their review of an adverse licensing determination. This issue of what procedures are necessary in the context of an adult-business-licensing scheme to “assure prompt judicial review of an administrative decision denying a license” was recently explored by the Supreme Court in City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C., 124 S.Ct. 2219, 2221 (2004). The city ordinance at issue in Littleton required “an applicant to provide certain basic information about the business,” directed that a license be denied if an applicant had “been convicted of certain crimes within the prior five years,” required the city to issue a decision within “about 40 days,” and permitted the city’s decision to be “appealed to the [state] district court.” Id. at 2222, 2225 (alteration in original). After concluding that the “First Amendment does not require special ‘adult business’ judicial review rules,” the Court accepted the city’s invitation to modify FW/PBS by withdrawing its implication that Freedman’s special judicial review rules apply to adult-business-licensing schemes. Id. at 2224 (finding that “Colorado’s ordinary ‘judicial review’ rules offer adequate assurance, not only that access to the courts can be promptly obtained, but also that a judicial decision will be promptly forthcoming”) (emphases in original). The Supreme Court was faced with a statute in Freedman that prohibited the exhibition of any film until it was approved by a state censorship board, and the board’s denial of a license would, “without any judicial participation, effectively bar[] exhibition of any disapproved film, unless and until the exhibitor undert[ook] a time-consuming appeal to the Maryland courts and succeed[ed] in having the Board’s decision reversed.” Freedman, 380 U.S. at 54-55. As the Supreme Court explained in Littleton, the special characteristics of the statute before the court in Freedman necessitated that strict time limits be placed on judicial review in order to prevent “undue delay resulting in the unconstitutional suppression of protected speech.” Littleton, 124 S.Ct. at 2225 (observing that the statute in Freedman created “a scheme with rather subjective standards and where a denial likely meant complete censorship”) (quoting FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 228); see also Freedman, 380 U.S. at 61 (finding “that films differ from other forms of expression,” and warning “that the nature of the motion picture industry may suggest different time limits for a judicial determination”). Nos. 00-4420/4529 Deja Vu of Cincinnati v. Union Township et al. Page 8 In contrast, the adult-business-licensing ordinance before the court in Littleton did “not seek to censor material” and applied “reasonably objective, nondiscretionary criteria.” 124 S.Ct. at 2225 (emphasis in original). Finding that an “adult business licensing scheme does not present the grave dangers of a censorship system,” the court concluded that “ordinary court procedural rules and practices, in Colorado as elsewhere, provide reviewing courts with judicial tools sufficient to avoid delay-related First Amendment harm.” Id. at 2224-26 (quotation marks omitted). Like the ordinance in Littleton, the adult-cabaret-licensing resolution challenged by Deja Vu “applies reasonably objective, nondiscretionary criteria.” Id. at 2225. The resolution states that the Board “shall approve the application” for an adult cabaret license unless the application is false or incomplete, the applicant is under the age of 18, the operation of the cabaret would violate existing zoning laws, the applicant has committed certain civil offenses within the last three years, or the applicant is a business entity that is not registered to do business in Ohio. Resolution No. 00-22 § (F)(2)(a)-(g). Given that “[t]hese objective criteria are simple enough to apply and their application simple enough to review,” and that Deja Vu has given us “no reason to doubt the willingness of [Ohio]’s judges to exercise the[ir] powers wisely so as to avoid serious threats of delay-induced First Amendment harm,” we conclude that the resolution fulfills Littleton’s requirements for prompt judicial review. Littleton, 124 S.Ct. at 2225. The resolution in the present case also provides for an additional First Amendment safeguard not contained in the ordinance that was upheld by the court in Littleton— the issuance of a temporary permit. Upon request, the Union Township Board must issue the applicant a temporary permit that will allow the operation of the adult cabaret “until such time as the appeal process . . . has been completed.” Resolution No. 00-22 § (J)(1). The inclusion of this provision may well have been prompted by this court’s decisions suggesting that cities could avoid constitutional infirmities in their adult-business-licensing schemes by issuing “provisional licenses” that “actually permit the communication of protected expression until a judicial decision is rendered.” Nightclubs, Inc. v. City of Paducah, 202 F.3d 884, 894 (6th Cir. 2000) (invalidating an adult-cabaret-licensing scheme because it did not include such a provision); see also Currence v. City of Cincinnati, Nos. 003985/4041, 2002 WL 104778, at  (6th Cir. Jan. 24, 2002) (per curiam) (unpublished) (noting that our decisions have “suggested that a city enact an ordinance that: 1) requires a license to issue if the court does not decide the issue within a certain period of time; or 2) issues a provisional license to businesses or employees who seek judicial review”). Temporary permits are one way to comply with Freedman’s requirement that “[a]ny restraint imposed in advance of a final judicial determination on the merits must . . . be limited to the preservation of the status quo.” Freedman, 380 U.S. at 59; see also Deja Vu of Nashville, Inc., 274 F.3d at 403 n.8 (finding that Freedman’s requirement of “preserving the status quo” could be met by the issuance of temporary licenses that would allow “existing businesses to continue to operate until an adjudication on the merits” of their appeals). Although the resolution under consideration in this case provides for temporary licenses to be issued while an appeal is pending, Deja Vu nevertheless maintains that the resolution fails to preserve the status quo. In support of its argument, Deja Vu points to the provision that requires an applicant operating under a temporary permit “to follow all other guidelines set forth in [the] resolution.” Resolution No. 00-22 § (J)(1). We read this section as requiring Deja Vu to adhere to the regulations governing duly licensed cabarets, such as complying with the hours-of-operation provision or maintaining a list of employees with the Union Township Clerk. Deja Vu is therefore correct that possession of a temporary license does not permit an adult cabaret to operate without any governmental regulation. Compliance with the resolution’s minimal requirements, however, falls far short of the kind of “complete censorship” that prompted the Supreme Court in Freedman to fashion the status quo requirement. Littleton, 124 S.Ct. at 2225. Nos. 00-4420/4529 Deja Vu of Cincinnati v. Union Township et al. Page 9 An adverse decision by the censorship board in that case would have barred the film from being shown during the pendency of the lengthy appeal. Here, Deja Vu may still operate as an adult cabaret even though it must close earlier than it would like. Such a regulation “is unlikely in practice to suppress totally” Deja Vu’s protected expression. Id. (upholding the adult-businesslicensing ordinance even though it did not provide for temporary licences because “[s]ome license applicants will satisfy the criteria even if others do not; hence the community will likely contain outlets that sell protected adult material”). We therefore conclude that, in providing for temporary permits, the resolution effectively preserves the status quo while appeals from the Board’s adverse licensing decisions are pending.