Opinion ID: 2337056
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Delegation of the Duty to Operate and Manage Airport Facilities and Regulate Aeronautical Matters within the State to RIAC

Text: The next issue we address is whether the director of the DOT possesses the statutory authority to subdelegate the duty to operate and manage the airport facilities and to regulate aeronautical matters within the state to RIAC. When we use the term subdelegation, we mean transfers by an executive-branch agency or official of powers or duties to subordinates or to an outside agency. 1 Kenneth C. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, 3:16  3:18 (2d ed. 1978). The test for determining whether a subdelegation is valid is primarily a question of statutory interpretation. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Raymond Metal Products Co., 385 F. Supp. 907, 921 (D.Md. 1974). Our obligation is to determine whether the General Assembly fairly intended to grant the director of the DOT the power to subdelegate to outside agencies the duty to operate airports and regulate aeronautical matters. The controlling statute bearing upon this inquiry is G.L. 1956 (1988 Reenactment) § 42-13-2(B), as amended by P.L. 1990, ch. 309, § 3, which states: The director [of the DOT] may assign such other responsibilities to the divisions and agencies as he or she shall find appropriate and may reassign functions to divisions and agencies other than as set out in this section if he or she shall find such reassignment necessary to the proper and efficient functioning of the department or of the state's transportation system. The parties in this matter offer two different interpretations of the language may reassign functions to divisions and agencies other than as set out in this section. According to Representative Zainyeh, this language only authorizes the director of the DOT to subdelegate to divisions within the DOT, not to outside agencies. This interpretation contradicts the position of RIPA and RIAC, which read such other divisions and agencies as plainly authorizing the director of the DOT to subdelegate to outside agencies. We believe that the more sensible reading of this language is that the director has the authority to subdelegate to agencies outside the DOT. The DOT is a department of the state organized pursuant to § 42-13-2(A) into several divisions. When the General Assembly authorizes the director to reassign functions to divisions and agencies other than as set out in this section, the General Assembly necessarily refers to divisions and agencies outside § 42-13-2 and hence outside the DOT. This conclusion is supported by a comparison of § 42-13-2(B) with G.L. 1956 (1988 Reenactment) § 42-17.1-2(h), as amended by P.L. 1990, ch. 320, § 4, which involves the Department of Environmental Management (DEM). Section 42-17.1-2(h) authorizes the director of the DEM to assign or reassign, with the approval of the governor, any functions, duties, or powers established by this chapter to any agency within the department, except as hereinafter limited. (Emphasis added.) Section 42-13-2(B) contains no such limitation on the reassignment powers of the director of the DOT. Although we are hesitant to glean a legislative intent solely from the omission of the phrase within the department, we believe the absence of this restriction on the powers of the director combined with the use of the open-ended language such other divisions and agencies reflects a legislative intent to authorize the director to subdelegate functions to agencies outside the DOT. General Laws 1956 (1988 Reenactment) § 42-6-5 does not alter our interpretation. Section 42-6-5 states: 1251/> Whenever the governor shall deem it to be desirable, he or she may designate and define within the limits of any department the agency or the official thereof which shall perform any specific or special function designated by law to be performed within a particular department, and any administrative function of government established by law that may not be specifically enumerated in this title shall be performed by such appropriate department as the governor may designate. Nothing herein shall authorize the governor to transfer any duties or administrative function of government designated by law to be performed within a particular department to any other department. (Emphasis added.) As a rule of statutory construction, when a general provision and a special provision cover the same subject matter, this court shall attempt to give effect to both, and if we cannot give effect to both, the special provision prevails. General Laws 1956 (1988 Reenactment) § 43-3-26. See also St. Germain v. City of Pawtucket, 119 R.I. 638, 641, 382 A.2d 180, 181 (1978) (applying § 43-3-26). In this matter § 42-6-5 regards the same subject matter as § 42-13-2(B). Section 42-6-5 is a general provision that limits the power of the governor to reassign functions delegated to a particular agency to another agency. In contrast, § 42-13-2(B) is a specific provision that authorizes the director of the DOT to reassign functions to outside agencies. Since it is impossible for us to give effect to both provisions, § 42-13-2(B) controls. It is important to note that § 42-6-5, which contains the general prohibition against reassignment to outside agencies, was originally enacted in 1939 and reflects early views on the development of the allocation of administrative and executive powers within the state. Public Laws 1939, ch. 660, § 5. Section 42-13-2(B) is a more specific, more recent statute that grants the director of the DOT expanded powers that correspond to the growth of the administrative structure in Rhode Island. See Whyte v. Sullivan, 119 R.I. 649, 654, 382 A.2d 186, 188-89 (1978) (stating that when the provisions of an earlier statute are inconsistent with a more recent statute, we should give effect to the more recent enactment). Moreover, nothing in § 42-6-5 prohibits the General Assembly from enacting a specific statute granting the director of the DOT broad reassignment powers. Section 42-6-5 states [n]othing herein shall authorize transfers to outside agencies. This language leaves the door open for the General Assembly to enact specific legislation granting the Governor and/or an agency director the power to subdelegate to outside agencies. We believe that given the well-accepted views of statutory interpretation and the timing of the enactment of the two pieces of legislation, § 42-13-2(B) is an exception to the general prohibition found in § 42-6-5. Having concluded that the director of the DOT has the authority to subdelegate functions to agencies outside the DOT, we now decide whether RIAC is an agency within the meaning of § 42-13-2(B) qualified to receive this subdelegation. As noted earlier in this opinion, RIAC is a wholly owned subsidiary of RIPA and holds the same powers and limitations as RIPA. Since RIPA is defined as a governmental agency, RIAC also is a governmental agency. Hence RIAC is a state agency empowered to receive the subdelegation from the DOT. Section 42-64-4(a). In order for this subdelegation to be valid, however, the enabling legislation that created RIPA and RIAC must grant RIPA and RIAC the power to operate airports and to regulate aeronautical matters within the state. Regarding the duty to operate and manage airports, we find express statutory authorization that enables RIAC to perform this function. Among the powers RIAC derives from RIPA is the power [t]o undertake the planning, development, construction, financing, management, operation of any project, and all activities in relation thereto. Section 42-64-7(a). In addition, RIAC derives from RIPA the power [t]o manage any project, whether owned or leased by the corporation. Section 42-64-7(d). Pursuant to § 42-64-3(r), 1252/> the term project includes airport facilities. Accordingly there is express statutory authority enabling RIAC, as a subsidiary of RIPA, to operate and manage Rhode Island airport facilities. Although the enabling legislation that created RIPA and RIAC does not expressly grant these agencies the power to regulate aeronautical matters in Rhode Island, we believe that a fair reading of the enabling legislation grants RIPA this power. Section 42-64-4(b) states in pertinent part: It is the intent of the general assembly by the passage of this chapter to vest in the corporation all powers, authority, rights, privileges, and titles which may be necessary to enable it to accomplish the purposes herein set forth, and this chapter and the powers granted hereby shall be liberally construed in conformity with those purposes. Toward this end, the General Assembly has granted RIPA and its subsidiaries regulatory power by authorizing the agencies to promulgate rules and regulations, § 42-64-7(p), as well as enforcement power by authorizing the agencies to establish penalties. Section 42-64-7(q). We believe the power to regulate aeronautical matters fits within these broad enumerated powers granted to RIPA and its subsidiaries. We agree with RIPA and RIAC that as a practical matter the exercise of aeronautical duties is a necessary and convenient corollary to RIAC's express authority to operate and manage airports. To require the DOT to retain the regulatory power over aeronautics while delegating the duty to manage airports to RIAC would thwart a primary purpose of RIPA's enabling legislation, which is to promote the efficient operation of the state's airport facilities. We conclude that RIAC, as a subsidiary of RIPA, possesses the statutory authority to regulate aeronautical matters in Rhode Island. In sum, statutory authority exists to support the transfers contemplated by Your Excellency's request. The DOT has the authority to act as lessor and transferor of the real and personal property that makes up the airport system, and RIAC, as a subsidiary of RIPA, possesses the authority to act as lessee and transferee of this property. The director of the DOT possesses the authority to subdelegate duties to RIAC, and RIAC has the statutory authority to operate airports and to regulate aeronautical matters within the state.