Opinion ID: 33223
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: was undertaken at the improper urging of the

Text: A. district court, which, she states, intended to Plaintiff complains that her non-ERISA undermine the neutrality of the report. More claims were severed from the other likely, the need to redraft was caused by the proceedings, including her claims asserted difficulty of the ERISA issues in the case. It under the Racketeer Influenced and was no abuse of discretion to appoint and rely Corruption Organization Act and her claims on special masters here. based on t heo ries of negligent misrepresentation, legal malpractice, and abuse C. of process. The court found that “these The district court made its inquiry claims, while each relying on the same general concerning retention of counsel after the facts, are separate and distinct from the masters’ report raised the possibility that remaining claims asserted under” ERISA. plaintiff might prevail on some issues. Plaintiff Indeed, they are. indicated a willingness to secure counsel at an appropriate time, and the court directed her to The non-ERISA claims are quite different do so. She asserted no opposition to the order in purpose and content from the ERISA at the time and did indeed retain counsel. She claims. In a case already complicated by di- eventually terminated counsel and resumed verse and difficult issues of ERISA law, it was representing herself pro se after complaining no abuse of discretion for the district court to that she was short of funds to support a deal with plaintiff’s non-ERISA claims separate attorney. separately. Plaintiff avers that when she failed to object B. to the order to retain legal counsel, she had As the district court noted, this case been led to believe by the district court that “involves a myriad of issues with each being she might succeed on some issues and that the briefed in exhaustive detail by the parties.” To court intended to order mediation. That these bring focus to the case, the court appointed hopes were disappointed apparently forms the two special masters with expertise in ERISA basis of her objection to the order to retain law, pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 53. counsel. The order, a reasonable response to reports from the special masters, was no abuse Plaintiff contends the appointment of spe- of discretion. cial masters was unnecessary, because the “facts and law on her ERISA claims were D. clear,” and the appointment would lead to ERISA provides that in “any action . . . by “unwarranted delay and expense.” But even a a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary, the short reading of the issues in the case reveals court in its discretion may allow a reasonable that it revolves around difficult and unfamiliar attorney’s fee and costs of action to either areas of law. party.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1). Plaintiff argues that the refusal to allow her to recover Plaintiff also avers that the special masters her attorneys’ fees was an abuse of discretion. 8 She notes that she did prevail on her initial motion. It looked unfavorably on her claim for clarification and enforcement of her arguments that the court was biased, noting right to a qualified domestic relations order that she had “quoted isolated words and and a distribution. Indeed, this issue was the phrases from various orders entered in this core of the disagreement between her and the action to date, arguing the forceful language defendants, though it was far less an issue in used by the Court shows bias or prejudice federal district court than at the state level and against the subject matter of her claims, throughout the mediation process. extreme favorable predisposition to the Fulbright Defendants, and undeserved and Defendants note that plaintiff’s few excessive bias against the Plaintiff.” Plaintiff successes in the course of the litigation again quotes isolated words of the court, occurred while she was working pro se, so where it characterized several of her factual they urge that, as in Matassarin v. Lynch, 174 and legal arguments as “unnecessarily abusive F.3d 549, 570 (5th Cir.1999), no attorneys and insulting,” “unsupported personal venom,” fees should be due a pro se litigant. There was “disrespectful and unprofessional,” and no abuse of discretion in denying fees. “outrageous, fri volous, and completely unsupported.” Plaintiff seems especially Plaintiff urges, however, that the district exercised that the court characterized her court improperly failed to consider the five divorce proceedings as “bitter and ac- “Bowen factors” to be applied in awarding fees rimonious” and urged her and James Hatteberg in ERISA disputes. See Iron Workers Local to “put to rest the parties’ divorce” and avoid No. 272 v. Bowen, 624 F.2d 1255, 1265-66 turning the proceedings into a “post-mortem” (5th Cir. 1980). Plaintiff claims that of the divorce. consideration of the Bowen factors is mandatory in the Fifth Circuit. In Riley v. There is, however, no good evidence that AMR Corp. Subsidiaries Supersaver 401(k) the court was biased against plaintiff or the Capital Accumulation Plan, 209 F.3d 780, subject matter of her claims. Although the 781-82 (5th Cir. 2000), we wrote that a court court apparently showed irritation with a num- “should consider and explicate the five Bowen ber of plaintiff’s arguments and accusations, factors, and should do so without giving the court’s characterizations of her conduct predominance or preclusive effect to any one had some foundation. The court lacked the of them . . . .” Nothing in Bowen requires, “deep-seated favoritism and unequivocal anhowever, that a court must, in every case, tagonism that would render fair judgment imelaborately and explicitly run its fact pattern possible” and make recusal appropriate. Litethrough the five factors in its written opinion, ky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994); especially where a litigant has achieved as little see also Matassarin, 174 F.3d at 571. success as has this plaintiff. Furthermore, plaintiff contributed substantially to the F. prolongation of the litigation process by After lengthy discovery, the district court aggressively pursuing appeals. concluded that there had been “more than adequate time for discovery.” It overruled E. plaintiff’s requests for unlimited discovery. The district court denied plaintiff’s recusal She, however, still wanted documents relating 9 to the Fulbright attorneys’ legal advice to James Hatteberg with respect to the divorce proceedings. Plaintiff also sought assorted other documents she insists were relevant to appropriate statutory penalties under § 1132 and to her allegations of self-dealing, breaches of fiduciary duty, and interferences with Hatte- berg’s rights under ERISA. In short, she argued that further discovery was necessary with regard to the bulk of her case. The district court was in a good position to decide whether further discovery was needed. The record is voluminous and detailed and is additionally enriched by the analysis of the spe- cial masters. The court was within its dis- cretion to bring an end to discovery. AFFIRMED. 10