Opinion ID: 1377577
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: United States Supreme Court Due Process Analysis

Text: The court of appeals additionally determined that appellate review of the parents' unpreserved jury-charge errors comports with the requirements in Lassiter .  57 S.W.3d at 72. However, if all the pertinent factors are properly considered and weighed, the Lassiter due process test does not support the court of appeals' conclusion. In Lassiter , the U.S. Supreme Court held that due process does not require states to provide indigent parents counsel in all termination cases. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 33-34, 101 S.Ct. 2153. Before answering the due process question, the U.S. Supreme Court explained the nebulous nature of this concept: [D]ue process has never been, and perhaps can never be, precisely defined.... Rather, the phrase [due process] expresses the requirement of fundamental fairness, a requirement whose meaning can be as opaque as its importance is lofty. Applying the Due Process Clause is therefore an uncertain enterprise which must discover what fundamental fairness consists of in a particular situation by first considering any relevant precedents and then by assessing the several interests that are at stake. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 24-25, 101 S.Ct. 2153. The U.S. Supreme Court then held that the nature of the process due in parental-termination proceedings depends upon a balancing of three factors: (1) the private interests at stake; (2) the government's interests; and (3) the risk that the procedures used will lead to an erroneous deprivation. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27, 101 S.Ct. 2153 (relying on Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976)); see also see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982). Once these Eldridge factors are weighed against each other, the court must next set their net weight in the scales against the presumption that the procedure applied did not violate due process. Id. Here, the analysis begins with the presumption that our rules governing preservation of jury-charge error comport with due process. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27, 101 S.Ct. 2153. But this must be balanced against the net weight of the three Eldridge factors to determine if the presumption is overcome. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 754, 102 S.Ct. 1388; Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27, 101 S.Ct. 2153; Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893. With respect to the first Eldridge factorthe private interests at stakethis Court has long recognized that the natural right existing between parents and their children is of constitutional dimensions. Holick, 685 S.W.2d at 20; see also In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 846 (Tex.1980). A parent's right to the parent-child relationship is `essential,' `a basic civil right of man,' and `far more precious than property rights.' Holick, 685 S.W.2d at 20 (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972)). Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court has noted, A parent's interest in the accuracy and justice of the decision to terminate his or her parental status is ... a commanding one. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27, 101 S.Ct. 2153. However, the child's interests are also necessarily involved and must be considered in this analysis. The Family Code's entire statutory scheme for protecting children's welfare focuses on the child's best interest. See, e.g., Tex. Fam.Code §§ 51.11(b); 153.001; 153.002; 161.001(2); 161.101. And, like their parents, children have an interest in an accurate resolution and just decision in termination cases. But children also have a strong interest in a final decision on termination so that adoption to a stable home or return to the parents is not unduly prolonged. In fact, it is this State's express policy to provide a safe, stable, and nonviolent environment for the child. Tex. Fam.Code § 153.001(a)(2). And, if error is properly preserved, the Legislature has upheld this interest by requiring prompt appellate decisions: An appeal in a suit in which termination of the parent-child relationship is in issue shall be given precedence over other civil cases and shall be accelerated by the appellate courts. Tex. Fam.Code § 109.002(a). Similarly, Texas's preservation of error rules promote the child's interest in a final decision and thus placement in a safe and stable home, because they preclude appellate courts from unduly prolonging a decision by appellate review of issues not properly raised in the trial court. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that prolonged termination proceedings can have psychological effects on a child of such a magnitude that time is of the essence: It is undisputed that children require secure, stable, long-term, continuous relationships with their parents or foster parents. There is little that can be as detrimental to a child's sound development as uncertainty over whether he is to remain in his current home, under the care of his parents or foster parents, especially when such uncertainty is prolonged. Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Services Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 513-14, 102 S.Ct. 3231, 73 L.Ed.2d 928 (1982); see also Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 32, 101 S.Ct. 2153 ([C]hild-custody litigation must be concluded as rapidly as is consistent with fairness....). Accordingly, under the first Eldridge factor, the private interests reflect a desire for an accurate and just decision, but one that does not unduly prolong a final decision about the child's permanent home. The second factor under Eldridge is the State's interests. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 754, 102 S.Ct. 1388; Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27, 101 S.Ct. 2153; Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893. Undoubtedly, the State shares the parents' and child's interests in an accurate and just decision. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27, 101 S.Ct. 2153. However, the child's best interest is always the State's primary concern in termination proceedings. See Tex. Fam.Code §§ 161.001(2); 161.101. Thus, the State additionally shares the child's interest in not unduly prolonging a final decision about the child's future. See Lehman, 458 U.S. at 513, 102 S.Ct. 3231 (The State's interest in finality is unusually strong in child-custody disputes.); see also Tex. Fam. Code §§ 109.002(a) (giving appeals in parental-termination cases precedence over other civil cases); 161.202 (court shall grant motion for a preferential setting for a final termination hearing on the merits if termination would make the child eligible for adoption). Additionally, the State has an interest in courts consistently and uniformly applying our preservation of error rules. This interest does not merely reflect a fiscal policy. Without uniform application of our error preservation rules, termination proceedings would be conducted and reviewed in an arbitrary manner. At some point the benefit of an additional safeguard to the individual affected by the administrative action and to society in terms of increased assurance that the action is just, may be outweighed by the cost. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 348, 96 S.Ct. 893. Here, the cost of disregarding our error preservation rules risks not only unduly prolonging termination proceedings but also losing any predictability for the State, counsel for parents, and guardians for children about how courts will conduct and review these proceedings. Consequently, under the second factor, the State's interests encompass all the private interests, but weigh in favor of conducting termination proceedings under our error preservation rules so that the proceedings are not unduly prolonged or unpredictable. Finally, the third Eldridge factor to consider is the risk that our rules for preserving error about the jury charge will lead to an erroneous deprivation. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 754, 102 S.Ct. 1388; Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27, 101 S.Ct. 2153; Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893. Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 272-274 establish the procedures for parties to participate in the formulation of the jury charge. Tex.R. Civ. P. 272-274. Rule 272 requires a party to object to the charge, either orally or in writing, before the court reads the charge to the jury. Tex.R. Civ. P. 272. A party objecting to the charge must point out distinctly the objectionable matter and the grounds for the objection. Tex.R. Civ. P. 274. In addition to objecting to the charge, either party may request the trial court to submit certain questions, definitions, and instructions in the charge. Tex.R. Civ. P. 273. If a party fails to timely abide by the rules concerning the jury charge, the party waives any complaint on appeal. Tex.R. Civ. P. 273-74; Tex.R.App. P. 33.1(a). This Court has relaxed the jury-charge preservation rules in an effort to determine cases on the merits rather than on slight technical defects. See State Dep't. of Highways & Pub. Transp. v. Payne, 838 S.W.2d 235, 241 (Tex.1992). In Payne, the Court held that, although the State requested an improperly worded jury-charge instruction, it was sufficient to preserve error. Id. at 241. The Court explained that [t]here should be but one test for determining if a party has preserved error in the jury charge, and that is whether the party made the trial court aware of the complaint, timely and plainly, and obtained a ruling. The more specific requirements of the rules should be applied, while they remain, to serve rather than defeat this principle. Id. Accordingly, parties have various opportunities to formulate the jury charge and preserve error about the charge before the trial court reads it to the jury. Tex.R. Civ. P. 273-74. And, after Payne, a party need only timely and plainly make the trial court aware of a complaint to preserve such error. Payne, 838 S.W.2d at 241. Consequently, Texas's rules for preserving jury-charge error raise little risk of erroneous deprivations. To summarize the Eldridge factors, then: (1) the parents' interest is extremely important, but must be balanced with the child's important interests for not only an accurate and just decision but also finality and placement in a stable home; (2) the State shares both the parents' and child's interests in an accurate and just decision, but the State's interest in not unduly prolonging finality and in uniformity and predictability in applying our preservation of error rules is stronger; and (3) the risk of an erroneous deprivation under our rules about preserving error in the jury charge is low, because parties have notice and an opportunity to be heard about issues submitted and omitted from the charge, and error is preserved so long as the party timely and plainly made the trial court aware of the party's complaint. Weighing these factors' net weight against the presumption that our error preservation rules comport with due process, it cannot be said that the parents' were not afforded due process here so that appellate review of their unpreserved jury-charge errors is warranted. In fact, the record supports the conclusion that the parents' due process rights were not violated. The parents had an opportunity to be heard and object to the charge. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 333, 96 S.Ct. 893 (The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard `at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.') (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965)). As previously discussed, the parents' counsel objected to a portion of the charge not challenged on appeal. And, in making this objection, their counsel expressly acknowledged the risk involved in failing to object in a timely manner. For these reasons, under Lassiter analysis, the court of appeals erroneously relied upon due process considerations to review the parents' unpreserved jury-charge errors. An additional factor further supports the conclusion that due process does not require appellate review of the unpreserved jury-charge errors. Texas's Legislature has established the procedures for terminating parental rights. See Tex. Fam.Code §§ 161.001-161.211. In doing so, the Legislature has been heedful of the important interestsparents' and children'sat stake. For example, the Family Code expressly requires that a court terminate the parent-child relationship only if the grounds for termination, including whether termination is in the best interest of the child, are proven with clear and convincing evidence. Tex. Fam.Code § 161.001. This, of course, is a higher evidentiary standard than in ordinary civil case. See In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d at 847. Moreover, though the U.S. Supreme Court has held that states need not do so in every case, the Family Code requires courts to provide counsel for indigent parents in termination proceedings. Tex. Fam.Code § 107.013(a)(1); see Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 33-34, 101 S.Ct. 2153. Neither the Family Code passed by our Legislature nor the procedural and appellate rules promulgated and applied by our courts deny parents fair notice and the right to be heard in parental-termination cases. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that, [i]n assessing what process is due ... substantial weight must be given to the good-faith judgments of our law makers that the procedures they have provided assure fair consideration of entitlement claims of individuals. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 349, 96 S.Ct. 893. Here, our Legislature has carefully constructed a statutory scheme governing how courts shall conduct termination proceedings. In that scheme, though the Legislature has expressly provided certain procedures that differ from other civil cases, see Tex. Fam. Code §§ 107.013(a)(1), 161.001, it has chosen not to preclude application of our procedural and appellate rules in parental-termination cases. Therefore, substantial weight should be given to the Legislature's good-faith judgment when deciding these cases. See Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 349, 96 S.Ct. 893.