Opinion ID: 527007
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Preemption Under Section 301.12

Text: 29 When resolution of a state law claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between parties to a labor contract, the claim must be treated as a section 301 claim. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 1915, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985). 13 But section 301 is not implicated unless resolution of the state claim requires interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 1883, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988). The Court declared in Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 396, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 2431, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987), that a plaintiff covered by a collective-bargaining agreement is permitted to assert legal rights independent of that agreement, including state-law contract rights, so long as the contract relied upon is not a collective-bargaining agreement (emphasis in original). 14 Here, the district court concluded that no interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement or of the VTEP would be required in order to resolve the plaintiffs' claims. 30 GM presents a forceful argument that resolution of plaintiffs' fraudulent misrepresentation claims requires interpreting the terms of the collectively-bargained VTEP. Its claim is that in order to determine whether GM falsely represented the consequences of accepting the VTEP, there must be an examination and interpretation of the VTEP to determine what a truthful representation would have been. In such a case, it argues, preemption occurs. See Lingle. 31 However, GM's position is flawed in two important respects: First, it is not the case that section 301 preemption occurs whenever a collectively-bargained agreement becomes relevant to a dispute of this nature; rather, the resolution of the particular dispute must be substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. Lueck, 471 U.S. at 220, 105 S.Ct. at 1915. Second, the argument rests upon an unsound premise: namely, that the plaintiffs' claim is that GM's representatives fraudulently misrepresented what was in the contract. Instead, as plaintiffs observe, their claim was that GM fraudulently induced individual employees to opt for the VTEP by making an extraneous promise concerning their future employment eligibility. They do not claim that the promise had anything to do with the contents of the VTEP. 32 Thus, plaintiffs urge that they are not relying upon any contract at all, but only upon an inducement that was separate and apart from the VTEP, was not covered by it, and was never a subject of negotiation. It is GM that claims, as a defense, that the contract contemplates, albeit not expressly, the circumstances that eventually occurred and therefore must be interpreted in order to resolve these claims. 33 But that is not a defense to a fraudulent-inducement claim in this context. The dispute is a highly fact-bound one concerning what was said, or promised, at the meeting. The defense to such a claim is not that the VTEP might be construed to say otherwise; rather, it is that we made no such representation or that no such representation could have been made given the VTEP's provisions. 15 34 We recognize, as have other circuits, that the existence of an agreement nevertheless may invoke section 301 preemption where a court determines that the agreement contains provisions that might reasonably be construed as governing the disputed matter. 16 6] The agreement might, for example, contain provisions that are contrary to the representations made, or might reserve the particular issue for further collective bargaining or preclude such inducements on the part of employer representatives. Under such circumstances, interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement, in the sense of construction and application of these provisions, would be required, and federal law probably would govern. 17 But that is not the case here. After careful review of the VTEP, we find no provision that reasonably might be construed to govern the issue of future employment eligibility, nor are there vague and ambiguous references to eligibility that might be construed in GM's favor. 35 Therefore, we hold that where, as here, the employee/plaintiffs' state law claims are founded upon contractual rights or common-law rights independent of those which the collectively-bargained agreement creates, a defense that relies upon the provisions of a collectively-bargained agreement does not invoke federal preemption unless that agreement contains provisions that govern, or reasonably might be construed as governing, the circumstances at hand. 18 Contrary to GM's assertions here, a court's perusal of the agreement to determine whether such provisions are contained within it does not constitute interpretation of that agreement. 36 Because no governing provision can be found in the VTEP, 19 resolution of the plaintiffs' claims is not inextricably intertwined with the agreement in the sense described by the Lueck/Hechler/Lingle line of cases. 20 Under these narrow circumstances, the rationale supporting section 301 preemption, i.e., avoiding the danger of inconsistent interpretations of collectively-bargained labor agreements, is not at work. Mississippi has a deeply-rooted interest in protecting its citizens from fraudulent conduct, and unlike the federal scheme, provides remedies designed to compensate the victims of fraud for economic harm they may have suffered as a result of their reliance upon false promises. See Moore, 739 F.2d at 317 (Fagg, J., dissenting); Berkline, 453 So.2d at 702. Accordingly, we conclude that there is no federal preemption here.