Opinion ID: 2396134
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Question 2 and Question 3

Text: In respect to questions two and three, we must respectfully decline to address Your Excellency's questions in the context of an advisory opinion. We held clearly in In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 113 R.I. 586, 597, 324 A.2d 641, 647 (1974), that this Court will not issue advisory opinions which require a direct or indirect exercise of our fact-finding power. The justices of this Court, when rendering advisory opinions, act as individuals and not as the judicial department of the state government. Opinion to the Governor, 96 R.I. 358, 364, 191 A.2d 611, 614 (1963). Because fact-finding power inheres in the Court as the judicial branch of the state government, judges acting in their individual capacities lack this power and therefore lack the power to issue advisory opinions which implicate fact-finding. See Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 113 R.I. at 597, 324 A.2d at 647-48; Opinion to the Governor, 96 R.I. at 364, 191 A.2d at 614-15. Consequently, we decline to issue advisory opinions requiring fact-finding. In order to answer questions two and three, we would be required to make factual determinations in deciding which public and quasi-public boards and commissions are executive in nature. It is undisputed that the composition and function of such entities vary widely. For example, the Commission on Judicial Tenure and Discipline deals with complaints against members of the judiciary, G.L.1956 § 8-16-1, whereas the Rhode Island Ethics Commission is an agency that may combine all three functions of executive, legislative, and judicial nature, even though the commission is not subject to supervision by the executive authority of the governor. There are also the Coastal Resources Management Council, G.L.1956 § 46-23-2, the Rhode Island Economic Development Corporation, G.L.1956 § 42-64-4, the Commission on Interstate Cooperation, G.L.1956 § 42-23-1, the American and Irish Cultural Exchange Commission, G.L.1956 § 42-65-1, the Pesticide Relief Advisory Board, G.L.1956 § 23-25.2-3, and the Legislative Commission on Historical Cemeteries, G.L.1956 § 23-18.3-1, all of which presumably have their own unique structure and purpose. We list only these few of the scores of public and quasi-public boards and commissions to illustrate that the classification of boards as executive or otherwise requires fact-intensive investigation of the nature, purpose, membership, and operation of each board and commission. Moreover, the various briefs filed by the amici curiae have reflected that the number of public boards and commissions to which legislative members have been appointed is large but not readily ascertained. For example, a brief filed on behalf of the Governor suggested that there are over 75 public boards on which the General Assembly has designated over 200 places for legislators. In contrast, the brief filed on behalf of the Majority Leader of the Senate asserted that there are currently no less than 166 permanent boards and commissions to which the Senate Majority Leader, the Senate Minority Leader and/or the Lieutenant Governor (in his capacity as President of the Senate) make appointments. Members of the Senate serve on more than 140 of those boards and commissions. Consequently, even determining the number of boards to which our advisory opinion would apply would require the exercise of fact-finding powers. Our colleague suggests that in the future the members of this Court may become better educated concerning what they themselves have said about the subject addressed in these opinions when controversies may arise in respect to these same legal issues. We do not share the same Olympian disdain for our advisory opinions, although we realize that they are of limited precedential effect. They may be persuasive although not binding upon future or even the present members of this Court. We assure Your Excellency that our minds are open in respect to issues that might be raised pursuant to questions two and three propounded by Your Excellency. We must refrain from discussing or even alluding to the merits of these issues when we have declined to attempt to answer them by reason of the limitations of our ability to deal with the myriad of factual questions that would underlie these issues. We, of course, stand ready to deal with such issues as may be raised in litigated cases from time to time, including constitutional issues similar to those presently propounded. Our potential personal preferences for the philosophic advantages of the doctrine of separation of powers included explicitly in the federal Constitution must not and cannot cause us to overlook the fact that it is the Rhode Island Constitution that we are expounding, not the Constitution of the United States or the constitutions of our sister states which may vary widely from our own. Because we cannot answer Your Excellency's inquiry without an examination of the identity, function, and composition of the numerous public bodies that are the subject of these questions, we decline to address Your Excellency's questions in this present context. Therefore, we defer our response until a litigated case is presented to us with a factual record upon which we more properly can address concrete questions rather than abstractions and hypotheses. Consequently, we must respectfully decline to answer questions two and three propounded by Your Excellency. /s/ Joseph R. Weisberger Joseph R. Weisberger Chief Justice /s/ Victoria Lederberg Victoria Lederberg Justice /s/ John P. Bourcier John P. Bourcier Justice /s/ Maureen McKenna Goldberg Maureen McKenna Goldberg Justice