Opinion ID: 2159212
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Cross-examination of Defendant's Step-brother

Text: The defense called David Paul Baldwin, the defendant's step-brother, who attended high school and lived at home in November 1982. Baldwin testified that his brother's car had not been running well in November 1982; that his brother had a beard that fall; that on the night in question the defendant was upstairs playing Atari most of the evening, at least until 9 o'clock; and that the sneakers seized in the search of the house and associated with the defendant by Helen Cato were bought for the defendant as a Christmas gift in December 1982. During the course of his cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Baldwin if his brother had ever worked in Mendham. As he asked this question, the prosecutor pointed to Mendham on a map introduced into evidence to show the area near the retention tanks in Randolph Township, in an obvious attempt to show an association between defendant and the place where the victim's body was found. He did this in spite of the fact that he knew that Koedatich had not worked in Mendham until after the murder. The prosecutor went on to elicit testimony that Baldwin himself had been to the Morris County Mall on numerous occasions and that he played video games there. He developed the fact that defendant had a great interest in video games, and then proceeded to ask Baldwin whether the defendant was in the Morris County Mall on the afternoon of the crime, allegedly knowing that that was not the fact. The prosecutor's cross-examination of Mr. Baldwin caused a motion for a mistrial. The trial court ruled on that motion as follows: THE COURT: ... Nobody is going to have a perfect trial, but they're going to get a fair trial in here, I'm going to make sure of that. There are four items brought as the motion as the basis for the motion for mistrial. One of the detectives, when asked a question yesterday, said as soon as he got out  and stopped himself. Then immediately the subject moved on to something else which was totally unrelated to that kind of an answer. Second, Mr. Rubbinaccio asked today an open-ended question, do you know where he lived. That's a dangerous question because you never know what the witness is going to answer. Do you know where he lived before Thanksgiving. He asked David Baldwin, the brother of the Defendant. Dangerous question, it should not have been asked. But it was cured and then in the context of the way it was dealt with, certainly was cured. Item No. 3 is asking this young man when, if he knew had his brother worked in Mendham. Something well beyond the scope of the direct, I might add, but more importantly, having nothing to do with the facts of this case that he started working there in December, long after the events which give rise to this indictment. I'll have to give a curative instruction as to that. And fourth, the question is, quite frankly, I can say was absolutely outrageous to ask a witness, did he know that his brother was in Morris County Mall on the day of, the time that the victim disappeared in a case where his presence is so critical to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, with absolutely no factual basis for that question is totally improper. I'll have to cure it, but I can cure it. I am satisfied that given the appropriate curative instruction, forcefully, strongly and I hope in a clear and articulate manner, I'm satisfied that there would be no need to grant a mistrial in this case. The motion is accordingly denied. Having denied the motion, the court instructed the jury to disregard the questions relating to defendant's employment in Mendham and to defendant's possible presence in the Morris County Mall on November 23rd: THE COURT: Before the witness is brought back, I have a couple of things to discuss with you concerning some questions that were asked this morning because they should not have been asked this morning. I'll deal with two areas. One. Mr. Baldwin was asked a question about whether or not he knew if his brother, the Defendant in this case, had worked in Mendham. There was not as far as I can tell, will not be any factual basis in any evidence which has been presented or will be presented to support that question being asked. It is to be disregarded, nothing to do with the evidence in this case. The second question asked, was to the effect or the substance of the question was, Mr. Baldwin was asked if he knew that his brother, the Defendant, was in the Morris County Mall on that particular afternoon. That particular afternoon I presume being the afternoon of the 23rd of November. There is not nor will there be as far as any one knows to this date, any basis in facts of that question having been asked. You have not heard or it is expected that you will have any reason to hear or will hear any evidence of the presence that afternoon of Mr. Koedatich in the Morris County Mall playing video games or his presence that afternoon at all for that matter. The question defendant raises is whether the curative instructions were sufficient. Defendant argues that [t]o tell the jurors that there was no factual basis to support asking whether the defendant worked in Mendham and `it is to be disregarded ...' is tantalizing rather than curative and probably highlighted the testimony better than the prosecutor could have on his summation. State v. Farrell, 61 N.J. 99, 107 (1972); cf. State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 218 (1984) (prosecutorial misconduct is grounds for reversal only if it was so egregious as to deprive defendant of a fair trial); State v. Tirone, 64 N.J. 222, 229 (1974) (In the context of the summation as a whole, we cannot say that the prosecutor's comments were so inflammatory as to deny defendant a fair trial.); State v. Bucanis, 26 N.J. 45, 56, cert. denied, 357 U.S. 910, 78 S.Ct. 1157, 2 L.Ed. 2d 1160 (1958). In State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 320-24, this Court held that a prosecutor's cross-examination of a witness, during which he made several statements that can be construed as providing his personal opinion about defendant's guilt, was improper. The Court's reasoning was that [s]tatements such as those ... are improper because they divert the jurors' attention from the facts of the case before them. Id. at 322. Similarly, in this case the prosecutor's inquiries regarding facts that he knew had no basis, from which inferences could be drawn that would be wholly untrue, arguably diverted the jurors' attention from the relevant facts of the case in a manner that was necessarily prejudicial. As we pointed out in State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. 123, the determination that a prosecutor has been guilty of misconduct does not end our inquiry. Prosecutorial misconduct is not ground for reversal ... unless the conduct was so egregious that it deprived defendant of a fair trial. Ibid. The Court then set forth the standards for determining whether the misconduct denied defendant a fair trial: we consider whether defense counsel made a timely and proper objection, whether the remark was withdrawn promptly, and whether the court ordered the remarks stricken from the record and instructed the jury to disregard them. See State v. Bogen, 13 N.J. 137, 141-42 (1953). State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 322-23. The Court in State v. Ramseur found that the defendant was not deprived of a fair trial; it concluded, however, with the following admonition: A prosecutor willing to engage in proscribed conduct to obtain a conviction in a capital case betrays his oath.... Because death is a uniquely harsh sanction, the Court of necessity will more readily find prejudice resulting from prosecutorial misconduct in a capital case than in other criminal matters; prosecutors who fail to take seriously their particularly stringent ethical obligations in capital cases thus strongly risk postponing, and even jeopardizing, the enforcement of the law. [ Id. at 324.] The procedure the trial court followed in this case comported with the curative procedures outlined in Ramseur: the defense objected, the objections were sustained, and the court issued curative instructions. We therefore conclude that defendant's right to a fair trial was honored.