Opinion ID: 1233878
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: Though the government misstated the law regarding buyer-seller transactions, the error was harmless

Text: Deitz also claims that he was improperly prejudiced by the prosecutor's misstatement of law at closing regarding the ordinary buyer-seller defense to a drug conspiracy charge. During its closing argument, the prosecution told the jury that: Government: [The instructions] suggest[ ] that where there's totally a simple buyer/seller relationship between parties, that's not enough to establish a conspiracy. Of course, all of the law the Judge gives you, you have to apply and have to accept. But this particular concept only applies if the sale of the drugs was a one-time isolated event, and it only applies if these particular sales are completely unrelated to the conspiracy. We would submit to you that it does not apply in this case. Taking, for example, Mr. Heckman selling to Mr. Watkins. Clearly that was one course of this conspiracy. He sold methamphetamine on several occasions. (JA 1150-51.) Defense counsel objected, arguing that the prosecution's statement made it appear that a buyer-seller relationship can be based on a single transaction, but the district court did not expressly rule on defense counsel's objection, choosing instead to admonish the jury that they'll take the law from the instructions and not from the lawyers. (JA 1151.) Deitz now asserts that government's statement misled the jurors into believing that the existence of multiple transactions automatically precluded them from finding an ordinary buyer-seller relationship between Deitz and both Bloor and Garland, and he argues that the district court should have given the jury an unambiguous correction of the instruction. Although we have previously held that evidence of repeat purchases provides evidence of more than a mere buyer-seller relationship, it is not true that a buyer-seller relationship can only exist if parties engage in a single isolated transaction. See Brown, 332 F.3d at 373 (stating that evidence of repeated drug purchases suggests more than a mere buyer-seller relationship and that evidence of transactions involving a large quantity of narcotics creates an inference of conspiracy). As noted above, an analysis of whether parties have more than a mere buyer-seller relationship involves the balancing of a number of factors, and is not simply determined by whether a sale was an isolated incident. See Cole, 59 Fed.Appx. at 700 (citing Rivera, 273 F.3d at 755). Thus, we agree with Deitz's claim that the government's statement that the buyer-seller concept only applies where the sales in question are one-time isolated events and are completely unrelated to the conspiracy was incorrect. Even if the government's statement misled the jury, however, any resulting error was harmless because it did not prejudice Deitz. The court instructed the jury that it should consider only the court-provided jury instructions in evaluating the case, and the parties do not challenge the accuracy of those instructions. Moreover, there was substantial evidence presented at trial that weighed against Deitz. Monus, 128 F.3d at 394. The bulk of the evidence established that, under the factors set forth in Cole (and Rivera ), Deitz's relationship with the various witnesses was not merely a buyer-seller relationship. Thus, the government's misstatement of the law also does not warrant reversal.