Opinion ID: 171750
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Initial Stop of the Vehicle

Text: “When evaluating the reasonableness of the initial stop, ‘[o]ur sole inquiry is whether this particular officer had reasonable suspicion that this particular motorist violated any one of the multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations of the jurisdiction.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc)) (alteration in original; internal quotation marks omitted). Mr. Pulido-Vasquez challenges the initial stop in two respects. He raises (1) a legal claim that briefly going over the fog line is not a violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-1522(a), which states that on any road with two or more lanes of traffic, “[a] vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first -5- ascertained that such movement can be made with safety,” and (2) a factual claim that Trooper Epperly caused the vehicle to go over the fog line. With regard to the first claim, we have previously rejected the argument that a single instance of going over the fog line cannot be a violation of the Kansas statute. E.g., United States v. Cline, 349 F.3d 1276, 1287 (10th Cir. 2003). “Rather, the particular facts and circumstances of each case determine the result.” Id. Here, the district court credited Trooper Epperly’s testimony that there were no external factors to account for the Explorer’s sudden swerve over the fog line. The factual situation of the initial stop resembles instances in which we have found a violation of the Kansas statute or similar laws of other states. In Cline, we determined that a one-time swerve onto the shoulder of the road could give rise to an articulable suspicion of a section 8-1522(a) violation. Id. See also United States v. Alvarado, 430 F.3d 1305, 1309 (10th Cir. 2005) (“Under the particular facts and circumstances of this case, where there is an utter absence of any weather conditions, road features, or other circumstances that could have interfered with [the driver’s] ability to keep his vehicle in a single lane,” the trooper “had a reasonable articulable suspicion that [the driver], by crossing one foot over the fog line, had violated [a Utah statute similar to Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-1522].”); Zabalza, 346 F.3d at 1258 (finding a stop reasonable after a vehicle crossed the center line twice); United States v. Ozbirn, 189 F.3d 1194, 1198-99 -6- (10th Cir. 1999) (finding probable cause to stop a vehicle for crossing the fog line twice where weather, road conditions, and officer conduct would not have contributed to such an action). The district court did not err in determining that Trooper Epperly had a reasonable suspicion that the driver of the vehicle had violated Kansas law. Furthermore, we find no clear error in the district court’s determination that there was “not [] convincing evidence that Trooper Epperly caused the traffic infraction.” R., Vol. I, Doc. 31, at 7 (Mem. & Order Denying Def’s Mot. to Suppress, dated June 26, 2006). In the district court’s analysis, there was no evidence, aside from Mr. Pulido-Vasquez’s “conclusory assertion” at the evidentiary hearing, that Trooper Epperly was following the vehicle closely. Id. at 7-8. We will not disturb this factual determination. Accordingly, we conclude that the initial stop of the vehicle was justified at its inception.