Opinion ID: 864742
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: whether the court erred in restricting

Text: PLAINTIFF'S CROSS-EXAMINATION OF DEFENSE WITNESSES TOWNSEND AND SEIDEN ABOUT THE INDUSTRY'S ACTION TO INFLUENCE PUBLIC OPINION AND KNOWLEDGE AS TO THE RISKS OF SMOKING. ¶41. Plaintiff argues that there were at least four different occasions during crossexamination in which she was not allowed to pursue her line of questioning and, therefore, the trial court erred in not allowing her to pursue this questioning. ¶42. Plaintiff contends that these lines of questioning would have helped prove that smokers such as Joe Nunnally did not truly understand how serious the risk of smoking is. While this is what the plaintiff said that she wished to prove, none of the lines of questioning that are cited in the plaintiff’s brief support this argument. Each and every line of 17 questioning either pertained to evidence that was excluded in a motion in limine, claims that were dropped before the trial and therefore not at issue, or were cumulative because it was allowed elsewhere during the questioning. The plaintiff has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion. This issue is without merit. IX. WHETHER THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE OF FOUR JURORS. ¶43. Plaintiff asserts that four different jurors should have been excused for cause, which, according to the plaintiff, could not be removed by using her peremptory strike because it would have allowed the seating of another juror which she claimed may be the most strongly opinionated juror we've had in here from the standpoint of the ultimate issues in the case. ¶44. We have held: It should .... be borne in mind that jurors take their oaths and responsibilities seriously, and when a prospective juror assures the court that, despite the circumstance that raises some question as to his qualification, this will not affect his verdict, this promise is entitled to considerable deference ... These varied imponderables make selection of jurors a judgment call peculiarly within the province of the circuit judge, and one we will not on appeal second guess in the absence of a record showing a clear abuse of discretion. Scott v. Ball, 595 So.2d 848, 850 (Miss. 1992) (citing Harding v. Estate of Harding, 185 So.2d 452, 456 (Miss. 1966); Howell v. State, 107 Miss. 568, 65 So. 641, 642 (1914)). Accord, Hamilton v. Hammons, 792 So.2d 956, 963 (Miss. 2001). ¶45. This Court has a long-standing rule that when a party has challenges remaining and fails to use them, he cannot object to the court for failing to excuse a juror for cause. Davis 18 v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 724 So.2d 907, 911 (Miss. 1998); Capler v. City of Greenville, 207 So.2d 339, 341 (Miss. 1968) (citing Bone v. State, 207 Miss. 20, 41 So.2d 347 (1949)). ¶46. The threshold test for an objection to the court's failure to excuse a juror for cause is a showing on appeal that the objecting party had used all of his peremptory challenges and the party was forced to take the incompetent juror. Chisolm v. State, 529 So.2d 635, 639 (Miss. 1988). Any other rule would allow the objecting party to take advantage of error he helped commit. Capler, 207 So.2d at 341. ¶47. We find that plaintiff’s arguments are without merit. The trial judges decide whether jurors need to be excused for cause. The trial judge views the demeanor and hears the responses of each possible juror. Plaintiff reserved one of her peremptory challenges, deciding not to exhaust them. Mississippi law holds that before one can appeal based on whether a juror should be excused, they must exhaust all peremptory challenges. Plaintiff did not do this and, therefore, cannot raise this point on appeal. ¶48. We find that the trial court did not err in denying plaintiff’s challenges for cause. Thus, this issue is without merit.