Opinion ID: 159592
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Wichita Defendants and Tompkins

Text: Next, we review the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the Wichita defendants and Tompkins. Generally, summary judgment is appropriately granted if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In reviewing a challenge under the IDEA, the district court engages in a modified de novo review, in which it must independently review the evidence contained in the administrative record, accept and review additional evidence, if necessary, and make a decision based on the preponderance of the evidence, while giving ‘due weight’ to the administrative proceedings below. Erickson , 199 F.3d at 1120 (quotation omitted ). We review the district court’s decision granting summary judgment de novo, applying the same standards as that court. See id. The district court found that: Based upon the facts presented to the court, it would appear that Joshua was not entitled to educational services from the [Wichita USD] since he was neither living in or physically present in the district in November 1995, and was not living with a parent or person acting as a parent in the [Wichita USD]. Both Joshua’s parents had moved out of the [Wichita USD]. Although plaintiffs assert that at some time Joshua continued to live in Wichita with his slightly older sister, the sister does not constitute a “person acting as parent” within the meaning of state law given the state of this record. Anita O. has directly acknowledged that she continued throughout this period to act to support Joshua and to make decisions regarding his control and education. -11- Appellant’s App., Vol. IV at 873. The court concluded that “the uncontroverted facts establish that, by the time of the attempt, or, more accurately, the pretended attempt to enroll Joshua W. in November 1995, he cannot be considered a resident of the Wichita school district.” Id. at 873-74 (footnote omitted). Next, the court specifically found the evidentiary record before it supported the conclusion that “Anita O.’s actions were not prompted by a sincere effort to obtain a final decision from the [Wichita USD] regarding placement, but were simply seeking to manipulate the District into funding a placement upon which she had already resolved.” Id. at 875 (footnote omitted). Because plaintiffs’ Rehabilitation Act and § 1983 claims were based on the purported IDEA violation, the district court concluded that the individual Wichita defendants were qualifiedly immune. See id. at 876. Last, the district court found Tompkins also qualifiedly immune. See id. at 878. A review of the record confirms the district court’s residency determination as well as its conclusions that Anita O.’s action in unilaterally placing Joshua W. in Three Springs was manipulative, was not undertaken for education purposes, and essentially obstructed the IDEA process. See Wise v. Ohio Dep’t of Educ. , 80 F.3d 177, 184-85 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding parents bear financial risk that unilateral private placement--without consent of school officials and effort to change placement through IDEA process--will not be reimbursed). Plaintiffs’ -12- arguments contra do not persuade us otherwise. 4 We agree with the district court, that, given these conclusions, there is no violation of constitutional and/or federal law, and plaintiffs’ additional, undeveloped claims under the Rehabilitation Act and § 1983 fail, as do their claims against Tompkins.