Opinion ID: 2419412
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The First Contempt Order

Text: Mary Ann argues that the first contempt order is void and unenforceable because the trial court did not admonish her of her right to counsel when she appeared at the original contempt hearing on May 5, 1993. The Family Code guarantees an alleged contemner's right to counsel: If the court determines that incarceration is a possible result of the proceedings, the court shall inform a respondent not represented by an attorney of the right to be represented by an attorney and, if the respondent is indigent, of the right to the appointment of an attorney. TEX. FAM.CODE § 157.163(b). This provision clearly required the court to admonish Mary Ann of her right to counsel, which the court did not do. Sherman argues that incarceration was not a possible result of the May 1993 hearing because the parties had agreed to suspend commitment based on Mary Ann's payment of the arrearage. However, incarceration was an ultimate possibility if Mary Ann did not comply with the terms of the suspension, which is precisely what happened. Her commitment in June 1996 was based, in part, on the sentence imposed under the May 1993 agreed judgment. Sherman further argues that Mary Ann was not indigent at the time of the 1993 hearing. However, section 157.163 requires courts to admonish pro se litigants of their right to counsel, regardless of whether they are indigent or not. Sherman misplaces his reliance on Ex parte Sustrik, 721 S.W.2d 592 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 1986, orig. proceeding). In Sustrik , the court simply held that a non-indigent party is not entitled to appointed counsel. The case did not deal with the failure to give the Family Code statutory admonishment. We hold that the court's failure to admonish Mary Ann of her right to counsel renders the commitment arising from the May 1993 contempt order void. See Ex parte Keene, 909 S.W.2d 507, 508 (Tex.1995); Ex parte Gunther, 758 S.W.2d 226, 227 (Tex.1988).