Opinion ID: 2361206
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Circumstances Manifesting Extreme Indifference to the Value of Human Life

Text: Branstetter alleges that he was not on notice that brutally beating a frail eight-year-old boy in the head so as to cause his death constituted circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life and that, therefore, his conviction should be overturned. Branstetter alleges this court has not consistently defined the term under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. He argues cases wherein this court has discussed that term under other statutes such as DWI. The capital murder statute provides the required intent, which is knowingly. That term is specifically defined in Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-202(2)(Repl.1997). Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-101(a)(9) (Repl.1997) requires he knowingly cause the death of a person fourteen (14) years of age or younger.... The questioned phrase adds that for the crime to fit the requirements of capital murder, the knowing act must be committed under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. In the context of capital murder cases this court has already stated, The words `manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life' indicate that the perpetrator of capital murder must act with deliberate conduct that culminates in the death of some person. Davis, supra . See also, Flowers v. State, 342 Ark. 45, 25 S.W.3d 422 (2000); Sanford v. State, 331 Ark. 334, 962 S.W.2d 335 (1998); McGehee v. State, 328 Ark. 404, 943 S.W.2d 585 (1997). Here, there was deliberate conduct that culminated in the death of eight-year-old J.N. Thus, there is no merit to Branstetter's argument.