Opinion ID: 1265347
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: disciplinary procedures

Text: Violations of institutional and/or departmental rules will be disposed of in one of the following manners, depending upon the seriousness of the violation: 1. Minor Violations of Nonconformance: Corrected by the observing employee. 2. Minor Violations of Rules: Referred and disposed of by the Chief Correctional Supervisor. 3. Major Violations of Rules: Referred to the Adjustment Committee by the Chief Correctional Supervisor. 4. Major Violations of Laws: Referred to County Court by Warden. The charge against respondent for assault on an officer is classified along with such other offenses as sexual assault upon another inmate, robbery by force, and rioting as a category three major violation of rules. Respondent's contention is that the serious offense with which he was charged is also a category four major violation of laws which, pursuant to the Inmate Guide , may be referred to ... solicitor for prosecution in General Sessions Court. Inmate Guide (Revised 1972), at page 12. Respondent would have us interpret the above provisions of the Guide, as did the lower court, to mandate the referral of such charges to the solicitor rather than allowing prison officials in their discretion to treat the offense as a category three violation and discipline the offender internally. Under respondent's approach, appellants' failure to refer the matter would be an arbitrary violation of the prison's own procedures in contravention of respondent's due process rights. We refuse to accept this line of reasoning. Misconduct constituting a direct danger to persons or property, or to the security of the institution, is specifically classified as a category three major violation of rules. While the language  may be referred (emphasis added) employed in the Inmate Guide is not conclusive of this issue, see Moore v. Waters , 148 S.C. 326, 146 S.E. 92 (1928), it is generally regarded as imparting some discretionary application to the terms of a statute or regulation. State v. Wilson , Opinion No. 21165, Smith's Advance Sheet No. 10 (1980); 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 380; 1 Am. Jur. (2d), Administrative Law , § 46. In our view, neither concern for the public interest nor any individual or constitutional privileges of respondent requires a construction of the Inmate Guide that mandates referring major rules violations such as an assault on a correctional officer for criminal prosecution. We read the intent of the provisions of the Inmate Guide as reflective of a policy of discretion in choosing between criminal prosecution and administrative procedure, which is harmonious with both statute and policy. The initiation of criminal process against respondent is certainly not foreclosed by a prior administrative disposition. U.S. v. Hedges , 458 F. (2d) 188 (10th Cir.1972); State v. Kjeldahl, Minn. , 278 N.W. (2d) 58 (1979); 21 Am. Jur. (2d) Criminal Law , § 169, at note 4. The assaulted officer, who fortunately was unharmed by the attack, is certainly free to vindicate his rights if he so chooses. However, there is nothing shown here which requires prison officials to defer inmate disciplinary action to the courts. Appellants also challenge the finding of the lower court that the officials' use of the polygraph in the investigation of the charges against respondent was arbitrary, and under the circumstances of this case amounts to a denial of due process. We agree this finding is unjustified. There is no question that the use of the polygraph as an investigative aid is purely discretionary with prison officials. Pruitt v. Leeke, supra at note 3. The Inmate Guide as amended September 18, 1974, provides that: [t]he Warden may, at his discretion, coordinate with the officials at SLED concerning the use of a polygraph (lie detector) as an investigative aid. Respondent does not contend that this provision in itself required prison officials to offer him the polygraph as he requested, [5] or that respondent had a right to demand a polygraph test purely as an exercise of his constitutional guarantees. He simply argues that the test was used on other inmates during the course of the investigation, and was administered to respondent's chief accuser, another inmate; thus the refusal to allow respondent to take the test was an arbitrary and discriminatory exercise of discretion by prison authorities inconsistent with the concept of due process. We disagree. The record shows the investigation was conducted in good faith concerning a matter of routine disciplinary action in prison administration which normally is not subject to judicial review. Sellers v. State, supra ; Crowe v. Leeke , S.C. 259 S.E. (2d) 614 (1979). We find no abuse of discretion here, nor actions by prison authorities which rise to a denial of constitutional rights, state or federal. Accordingly, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the administrative conviction and sentence of respondent reinstated. Reversed.