Opinion ID: 2317344
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Opinion of the Attorney General

Text: The State looks to 61 Op. Att'y Gen. 694 (1976) as support for its position. It suggests that [w]here the meaning of the legislative language is not entirely clear, the legal interpretation by the Attorney General's official opinions should be given great consideration in determining legislative intention. The State cites to Drug & Chem. Co. v. Claypoole, 165 Md. 250, 257, 166 A. 742 (1933) (consideration to be given Opinion of Attorney General); Crest Investment v. Cohen, 245 Md. 639, 648, 227 A.2d 8 (1967) (notice by legislature of Opinion of Attorney General); Bd. of Examiners in Optometry v. Spitz, 300 Md. 466, 479 A.2d 363 (1984) (legislative acquiescence theory). We are not bound by an Attorney General's opinion, and although we have given the Opinion called to our attention here due consideration, we are not persuaded by it. See Schmidt v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 285 Md. 148, 158, 400 A.2d 1124 (1979); Claypoole, 165 Md. at 257, 166 A. 742. The Attorney General bottoms his opinion on the wide discretion given a sentencing judge. It appeared clear to him that if the intent of the General Assembly is to limit or remove the discretion generally extended to the sentencing judge, that body will so specify. 61 Op. Att'y Gen. at 696. Even were this so, we depart from the reasoning of the Attorney General when he reads what is now subsection (b) of § 641A as authorizing the judge to impose a five year probationary period as to each indictment by specifically and expressly so imposing it. Id. (emphasis in original). The Attorney General believed that the intent of the Legislature was to provide the sentencing judge with discretionary power to impose consecutive or concurrent probationary periods. Id. at 696-697. We see nothing in subsection (b) which overrides the flat legislative prohibition against probationary periods in excess of five years, except, now, for restitutional purposes. [11] The Attorney General opines that the intent of § 641A is not violated where a trial judge tries two or more indictments, and imposes a consecutive five year probationary period as to each. Id. at 697. We are not convinced by his reasoning and do not accept his conclusion.