Opinion ID: 1485096
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Lanning's Methodology

Text: Appellant argues, and the government concedes, that Lanning's testimony concerning the psychological reasons for children's reactions to sexual abuse was scientific in nature and hence was subject to Frye. [31] Under Frye, the methodology underpinning scientific testimony must enjoy general acceptance among practitioners in the relevant field of scientific inquiry, and our review of that question is de novo. Appellant cogently argues, and the government all but concedes, that the methodology Lanning used to reach his conclusions about victim psychology was not shown to pass muster under the general acceptance test. An expert's experience is not a substitute for the scientific method, which requires techniques more rigorous than just the accumulation of observations and intuitively plausible deductions. At a minimum, appellant asserts, the scientific study of behavior requires critical inquiry guided by theory and hypothesis, systematic and controlled observation and collection of data, careful documentation, and structured analysis. [32] There is no evidence Lanning employed scientific methods in deriving his opinions about victim psychology from the law enforcement case files that happened to come to his attention. Although Lanning unfortunately was not pressed to clarify exactly how he arrived at those opinions, he conceded that his methods were informal and undocumented. But as the government argues, appellant did not object to Lanning's testimony about victim psychology on this ground in the trial court. While appellant did raise a Frye objection, he limited it to Lanning's testimony about offenders. Specifically, he argued only that Lanning's offender typology was not generally accepted (an argument not pursued on appeal). [33] Although appellant disputed Lanning's qualifications to testify about victim psychology, he did not contend that the methodology underlying Lanning's testimony on that subject lacked general acceptance. [34] Consequently, whether Lanning's research into victim psychology met the requirements of scientific methodology was never explored in the trial court and no record on the issue adequate for appellate review was made. If, under these circumstances, we may consider the contention at all, our review must be for plain error. [35] Under the established four-part test for plain error, an appellant must demonstrate not merely that there was an error, but also that the error was `clear' or `obvious'`so egregious and obvious as to make the trial judge and prosecutor derelict in permitting it, despite the defendant's failure to object. [36] If there was error in the admission of any portion of Lanning's testimony, it was not clear or obvious error. As we have said, the trial judge was presented with no evidence that Lanning's methodology was scientifically unorthodox or controversial. We would not expect the judge to have recognized on her own that Lanning might not have employed the scientific method of inquiry: under Frye, judges seemingly do not need to have any facility with scientific methods to make the admissibility decision. [37] Accordingly, we conclude that appellant has not shown plain error in the failure to exclude Lanning's testimony under Frye. [38]