Opinion ID: 1250784
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: method of analysis under article iv, section 20

Text: Article IV, section 20, of the Oregon Constitution, provides in part: Every Act shall embrace but one subject, and matters properly connected therewith, which subject shall be expressed in the title. But if any subject shall be embraced in an Act which shall not be expressed in the title, such Act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be expressed in the title. [7] 852/> Petitioners assert that SB 1156 is void, because SB 1156 contains more than one subject and because its title does not express a subject. Respondents counter that the scope of the legislature's authority in those regards essentially is unrestricted and thus not subject to judicial review. Respondents also contend that the legislature expressed a subject in the title for SB 1156 and that all provisions of the Act fall within the title. Intervenor agrees with respondents' positions and takes them one step further. Intervenor contends that Article IV, section 20, does not authorize the courts to review legislative acts for compliance therewith. We turn first to intervenor's assertion. A. This Court's Authority to Enforce Article IV, Section 20. In analyzing a provision of the Oregon Constitution, we consider [i]ts specific wording, the case law surrounding it, and the historical circumstances that led to its creation. Priest v. Pearce, 314 Or. 411, 415-16, 840 P.2d 65 (1992). Turning first to the text, we note that the second sentence of Article IV, section 20, speaks to the consequences of having any subject in an act that is not expressed in the title; such Act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be expressed in the title. Although that sentence perhaps does not answer unambiguously intervenor's position that the courts have no role to play in adjudicating a challenge under Article IV, section 20, it goes a long way in that direction. Whatever may be left open by the text, precedent has resolved. Case law firmly establishes that this court has authority to enforce Article IV, section 20. Indiana's one-subject constitutional provision was the verbatim antecedent of the Oregon constitutional provision. Charles Henry Carey, The Oregon Constitution and Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of 1857, 471 (1926); W.C. Palmer, The Sources of the Oregon Constitution, 5 Or.L.Rev. 200, 204 (1926). When the Oregon Constitution was adopted by the people of Oregon in 1857, it already was an established principle in Indiana that the one-subject requirement was mandatory, not directory, and was capable of enforcement by an action in court. See The Indiana Central Railway Co. v. Potts, 7 Ind. 681, 683-84 (1856) (rejecting the contention that the provision is directory only and holding that the constitution imposes upon the Court the obligation of adjudicating the one-subject challenge under Article IV, section 19, of the Indiana Constitution); Greencastle Township v. Black, 5 Ind. 557, 573 (1854) (holding that part of an act was clearly in conflict with [the onesubject requirement] and void.). [8] Consistent with that established Indiana case law, the Oregon case law through the generations agrees, not merely by implication but by express statement, that this court has authority to adjudicate a one-subject challenge under Article IV, section 20, and to remedy a violation if one is found. E.g., Nielson v. Bryson, 257 Or. 179, 186-87, 477 P.2d 714 (1970); Adm. of Vets. Affairs v. U.S. Nat. Bank, 191 Or. 203, 212, 229 P.2d 276 (1951); Lovejoy v. Portland, 95 Or. 459, 466, 188 P. 207 (1920); Gantenbein v. West, 74 Or. 334, 339-40, 144 P. 1171 (1914); State of Oregon v. Shaw, 22 Or. 287, 289, 29 P. 1028 (1892); David v. Portland Water Committee, 14 Or. 98, 109, 12 P. 174 (1886). Indeed, on several occasions, this court has exercised that authority and declared all or part of an act to be void for violation of Article IV, section 20. See, e.g., Spaulding L. Co. v. Independence I. Co., 42 Or. 394, 396-98, 71 P. 132 (1903) (declaring entire act void); Korth v. City of Portland et al., 123 Or. 180, 189-90, 261 P. 895 (1927) (declaring one provision of an act invalid). The historical circumstances and purposes leading to Article IV, section 20, 853/> will be discussed below. Those circumstances and purposes do nothing to bring into question the conclusion derived from the text of the constitutional provision and from the case law, viz.: This court has authority to remedy a violation of Article IV, section 20. B. Method of Analyzing Petitioners' One-Subject Challenge. Having concluded that this court has authority to remedy a violation if one is found, we next describe the framework for deciding whether such a violation has occurred here. At the outset, we will be mindful of this court's caution: The constitutional provision prohibiting a statute from containing more than one subject or object should not be technically, strictly, or narrowly, but reasonably, fairly, broadly, and liberally construed, with due regard to its purpose. It should not be so construed so as to hamper or cripple legislation, or render it oppressive or impracticable, by a strictness unnecessary to the accomplishment of the beneficial purpose for which it was adopted, or to make laws unnecessarily restrictive in their scope and operation, or to multiply the number of laws unnecessarily, or to promote controversy in regard to the validity of legislative enactments. Garbade and Boynton v. City of Portland, 188 Or. 158, 166, 214 P.2d 1000 (1950) (quoting 50 Am. Jur., Statutes, § 194, p. 175). As noted above, when analyzing a constitutional provision, we consider its wording, the case law surrounding it, and the historical circumstances and purposes that led to its creation. Moving first to the text, the first sentence of Article IV, section 20, expressly mandates that [e]very Act shall embrace but one subject, and matters properly connected therewith; it requires that every act shall have a title; and it expressly requires that the one subject of the Act shall be expressed in the title. The first sentence thus states separate requirements for the body of an act and the title of an act, and it also connects the two requirements by establishing a relationship between the body and the title. [9] The second sentence, as noted previously, prescribes a consequence when all or part of the body of an act is not expressed in the title. An act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be expressed in the title. The second sentence thus expressly ties the title of an act to the one-subject requirement. The content of Article IV, section 20, and the order in which it is written provide a framework for this court to follow: The provision sets distinct requirements for the body of an act, the title of the act, and the relationship between the body and the title. That framework is explicated by reference to the purposes of and history behind Article IV, section 20, and to this court's previous decisions, which we consider in turn. The principal purpose for the title requirement of Article IV, section 20, is to provide fair notice to legislators (and to others) of the contents of a bill: The constitutional restriction on titles of legislative acts was designed to prevent the use of the title as a means of deceiving members of the legislature and other interested persons as the bill moved through the legislative process. The restriction was intended to assure those who could not examine the body of the act itself that the act did not deal with more than its title disclosed. Warren v. Marion County et al., 222 Or. 307, 321, 353 P.2d 257 (1960). See also Clayton v. Enterprise Electric Co., 82 Or. 149, 156-57, 161 P. 411 (1916) (same); Shaw, 22 Or. at 288, 29 P. 1028 (same); Simpson v. Bailey, 3 Or. 515, 517 (1869) (same); Walter Probert, The Constitutional Restriction on Titles of Acts in Oregon, 31 Or.L.Rev. 111, 112 (1952) (same). Those persons who may wish to follow legislation as it moves through the legislative process may 854/> include members of the public, the Governor, local government officials, and others. The principal purpose for the one-subject requirement of Article IV, section 20, for the body of an act is to guard against logrolling. Nielson reiterates that one of the principal objects was to `prevent the combining of incongruous matters and objects totally distinct and having no connection nor relation with each other in one and the same bill.'  257 Or. at 187, 477 P.2d 714 (quoting Miles et al. v. Veatch et al., 189 Or. 506, 528, 220 P.2d 511, 221 P.2d 905 (1950) (emphasis in Nielson deleted)). Nielson also defines logrolling as combining subjects representing diverse interests, in order to unite the members of the legislature who favored either, in support of all. Nielson, 257 Or. at 186, 477 P.2d 714, quoting with approval from Shaw, 22 Or. at 288, 29 P. 1028. See also Probert, 31 Or.L.Rev. at 113 (same; stating that the concern is more pronounced in earlier cases). [10] The historical circumstances that led to the adoption of Article IV, section 20, and to provisions like it in most other states, confirm those two basic purposes: to provide notice and to inhibit logrolling. Carl H. Manson, The Title-Body Clause Provisions of Our State Constitutions, 12 Mich.St.BJ 236, 239-40 (1933); Beebe v. The State, 6 Ind. 501, 553 (1855) (identifying those dual purposes as the historical origins for the Indiana constitutional provision). [11] We turn next to the case law. The Oregon appellate courts have adjudicated at least 90 cases under Article IV, section 20, although none since 1970. [12] The cases are not always clear or consistent in analytical approach. However, several cases examine the body of an act, the title of the act, and the relationship between the body and the title. This court's most recent decision, Nielson, held that ORS 441.510, providing for examination and copying of hospital records relating to the injured person in a personal injury claim, was valid as against a challenge under Article IV, section 20. 257 Or. at 185-90, 477 P.2d 714. The legislature had enacted that statute as part of an act whose title was providing that hospitals shall be entitled to liens for hospitalization. Id. at 188, 477 P.2d 714. Nielson illustrates the inquiry that the court undertakes when examining the body and the title of an act. As to the body of an act, Nielson, 257 Or. at 186-87, 477 P.2d 714, quotes from Shaw, 22 Or. at 289, 29 P. 1028: If all the provisions of the law relate directly or indirectly to the same subject, are naturally connected, and are not foreign to the subject expressed in the title, they will not be held unconstitutional as in violation of this clause of the constitution. 855/> This clause is not violated by any legislative act having various details properly pertinent and germane to one general object. (Citations omitted; emphasis in Nielson deleted; internal quotation marks omitted.) That quotation says that a court looks first at the body of the act itself and seeks to determine whether all provisions in the act relate to the same topic and whether they are naturally connected. See also Calder et al. v. Orr et al., 105 Or. 223, 230, 209 P. 479 (1922) (same); Northern Counties Trust v. Sears, 30 Or. 388, 400, 41 P. 931 (1895) (same). Such an inquiry corresponds to the opening phrase of Article IV, section 20 (Every Act shall embrace but one subject). Nielson then moves to an examination of the title of the act and of the relationship between the body and the title. The Nielson court quotes with approval from Clayton, 82 Or. at 156-57, 161 P. 411, as follows: In order to render a portion of a statute invalid for the reason that its provisions are not embraced within the title of the act in conformity with Article IV, section 20, of the Constitution, such provisions must be entirely disconnected with the subject as embraced in the title, wholly incongruous, and consist of matter of which the title gives no notice, so that the adoption of such measure by means of the title would be fraudulent.     If the matter is reasonably connected with and germane to the title under our Constitution requiring an act to embrace but one subject and matters connected therewith, which subject must be embraced in the title, the law will be upheld[.] 257 Or. at 187, 477 P.2d 714 (emphasis in Nielson deleted here; internal quotation marks omitted). Some of this court's earlier cases also examined both the body and the title of an act in adjudicating a one-subject challenge under Article IV, section 20. See, e.g., State v. Allen, 152 Or. 422, 430, 53 P.2d 1054 (1936) (illustrating process); Lovejoy, 95 Or. at 465-68, 188 P. 207 (same). See also Warren, 222 Or. at 323, 353 P.2d 257 (in a case in which both body- and title-based arguments were made, the court noted the corollary connection between the two; as to the body-based claim, the court considered the provisions of the act in question, but did so by utilizing the subject of the act expressed in the title as a referent). In addition to explicating the overall framework for deciding a one-subject challenge, the case law is instructive on a central question that the text of Article IV, section 20, and its purposes and history do not answer fully: how to define the one subject that an act may embrace. Article IV, section 20, does not define what a subject is. The only guidance given by the text of the provision is that an act may embrace but one of them, and matters properly connected therewith. By necessary implication, a subject must be narrower than the universe of those things with respect to which the legislature is empowered to act, or the provision would be meaningless. Also, the one subject must be something that can be expressed in a title. Most recently, the court in Nielson, 257 Or. at 186-87, 477 P.2d 714, quoted with approval its chronicle of the cases that had defined and applied the definition of a subject for purposes of Article IV, section 20. The history began with Eastman v. Jennings-McRae Logging Co., 69 Or. 1, 10-11, 138 P. 216 (1914), one of the leading cases: All that is necessary is that the act should embrace some one general subject; and by this is meant merely that all matters treated should fall under some one general idea, be so connected with or related to each other, either logically or in popular understanding, as to be parts of, or germane to, one general subject. (Emphasis in original; citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) See also Feero et al. v. Housley et al., 205 Or. 404, 418, 288 P.2d 1052 (1955) (same). The Nielson court also cited Shaw, 22 Or. at 288-89, 29 P. 1028, as being [t]o the same effect. 257 Or. at 186, 477 P.2d 714. The decision in Shaw states in part: A reasonable construction permits the single subject to be comprehensive enough for practical purposes, and great latitude is 856/> allowed the legislature in stating the subject in the title.    If all the provisions of the law relate directly or indirectly to the same subject, are naturally connected, and are not foreign to the subject expressed in the title, they will not be held unconstitutional   . 22 Or. at 288-89, 29 P. 1028. See also Calder, 105 Or. at 231, 209 P. 479 (everything must be part of, or incident or auxiliary to, the object in view (internal quotation marks omitted)); Northern Counties Trust, 30 Or. at 401, 41 P. 931 (concluding that the provisions of the act under consideration tend to but one general object, in rejecting a challenge based on Article IV, section 20). One other significant attempt to define one subject should be noted. In Lovejoy, the court stated: The subject of the law is the matter to which the measure relates and with which it deals. The term `subject' is to be given a broad and extensive meaning so as to allow the legislature full scope to include in one act all matters having a logical or natural connection. The subject may be as comprehensive as the legislature chooses to make it, provided it constituted, in the constitutional sense, a single subject and not several, for the Constitution does not contain any limitation on the comprehensiveness of the subject: State v. Shaw, 22 Or. 287[, 29 P. 1028]. 95 Or. at 466, 188 P. 207 (citation omitted). One can extract from this court's cases interpreting Article IV, section 20, over the last century certain shared ingredients in the definition of what constitutes one subject. The legislature may choose a comprehensive subject for legislation. [13] But, for the contents of a bill to embrace one subject, there must be a unifying principle, referred to variously as one general subject, one general object, one general idea, or the object in view. Relatedly, for a bill to embrace one subject, there must exist among its parts some logical connection relating each to the others. After considering the foregoing sources, we conclude that the appropriate analysis of a one-subject challenge to the body of an act, made under Article IV, section 20, should proceed in these steps: (1) Examine the body of the act to determine whether (without regard to an examination of the title) the court can identify a unifying principle logically connecting all provisions in the act, such that it can be said that the act embrace[s] but one subject. (2) If the court has not identified a unifying principle logically connecting all provisions in the act, examine the title of the act with reference to the body of the act. In a one-subject challenge to the body of an act, the purpose of that examination is to determine whether the legislature nonetheless has identified, and expressed in the title, such a unifying principle logically connecting all provisions in the act, thereby demonstrating that the act, in fact, embrace[s] but one subject. [14]