Opinion ID: 2010717
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Quantitative Standards

Text: [¶ 24] The Ulianos specifically contend that the scenic and aesthetic uses standard is unduly vague because it is completely lacking in quantitative standards, citing, in particular, our decision in Kosalka v. Town of Georgetown, 2000 ME 106, 752 A.2d 183. In Kosalka, we held that a municipal zoning ordinance that required an applicant to demonstrate that a proposed project would conserve natural beauty was an unconstitutional delegation because the standard was an unmeasurable quality, totally lacking in cognizable, quantitative standards. 2000 ME 106, ¶ 17, 752 A.2d at 187. Kosalka is in accord with a line of decisions that have held, in the conditional use context[,] that `in order to withstand attack as an impermissible legislative delegation of authority, ordinances that establish criteria for acceptance of a conditional use must specify sufficient reasons why such a use may be denied.' Id. ¶ 12, 752 A.2d at 186 (quoting Gorham v. Town of Cape Elizabeth, 625 A.2d 898, 900 (Me.1993)). See also Wakelin v. Town of Yarmouth, 523 A.2d 575, 577 (Me.1987) (holding the terms intensity of use and density of development not sufficiently quantifiable); Cope v. Inhabitants of the Town of Brunswick, 464 A.2d 223, 227 (Me.1983) (whether a use would comply with the health, safety and welfare of the public and the essential character of the area was a legislative question); Stucki v. Plavin, 291 A.2d 508, 511 (Me.1972) (ordinance authorizing zoning board to approve a use provided the use shall meet the approval of the board failed to prescribe sufficient standards); Waterville Hotel Corp. v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 241 A.2d 50, 52 (Me.1968) (subject to the approval of the Board of Zoning Appeals was not limited by legislative standards). [¶ 25] Section 480-D(1)'s scenic and aesthetic uses standard is distinguishable from the municipal ordinances whose terms we have found unconstitutionally vague due to their failure to provide cognizable, quantitative standards. First and foremost, unlike the terms in section 480-D(1), which are susceptible to a logical construction as discussed above, the standards at issue in the Kosalka line of cases were wholly subjective and permitted municipal employees or board members to make legislative-type decisions based on any factor they independently deem[ed] appropriate. Kosalka, 2000 ME 106, ¶ 16, 752 A.2d at 187. Identifying an existing scenic or aesthetic use for purposes of section 480-D(1) and determining whether a proposed activity will unreasonably interfere with those uses is a far more concrete exercise than the amorphous command we considered in Kosalka requiring an applicant to prove that a project will conserve natural beauty. [¶ 26] Second, the Kosalka line of cases involved delegations of relatively boundless discretion by municipal ordinances. We have long distinguished such delegations of authority from those established by acts of the Legislature. See Lewis, 433 A.2d at 748. Unlike a municipal delegation of authority to a town zoning board, the State's delegation of authority to an executive agency, the Board of Environmental Protection, to administer section 480-D(1) and other provisions of NRPA is subject to the Maine Administrative Procedure Act and its procedural protections. See 5 M.R.S. §§ 8001-11008 (2008); 38 M.R.S. § 341-D (2008). We have previously recognized that in such cases in which the statutory enactment of detailed specific standards is impossible, the presence of adequate procedural safeguards to protect against an abuse of discretion by the administrators of the law[] compensates substantially for the want of precise legislative guidelines and may be taken into consideration in resolving the constitutionality of the delegation of power. Finks v. Me. State Highway Comm'n, 328 A.2d 791, 796 (Me. 1974). [¶ 27] Unlike the municipal ordinances considered in the Kosalka line of cases, NRPA not only involves a delegation of authority by the legislative branch to the executive branch to regulate uses that do not lend themselves to precise guidelines, but also subjects the delegated authority to the procedural protections of the Maine Administrative Procedure Act. The procedural history of the Ulianos' application demonstrates the high degree of scrutiny that can result from this approach. [¶ 28] Third, pursuant to 38 M.R.S. § 341-D(1-B), the Board is required to promulgate rules, subject to the Maine Administrative Procedure Act, that are necessary for the interpretation, implementation and enforcement of any provision of law that the department is charged with administering. As the rules promulgated by the Board are themselves subject to the Maine Administrative Procedure Act, they are subject to public notice, modification, and judicial review. See Ne. Occupational Exch., Inc. v. State, 540 A.2d 1115, 1117 (Me.1988). Consequently, by providing significant protection against abuses of discretion by the Board in exercising its rule-making authority, the requirement that the Board promulgate rules subject to the Maine Administrative Procedure Act compensates substantially for the want of precise [legislative] guidelines. Id. (quotation marks omitted). [4] This requirement stands in contrast to the municipal delegations considered in the Kosalka line of decisions, in which municipal board members were not authorized or presumed to have the expertise necessary to formulate an interpretation of the delegated authority through a rulemaking process, but were instead left to decide ... legislative question[s] anew. Cope, 464 A.2d at 227. [5]