Opinion ID: 901847
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Audio Recording

Text: [¶ 17.] Johnson contends that admitting the audio recording of the conversation that transpired within his residence into evidence violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation because Lewis was unavailable at trial and Johnson had no prior opportunity to cross-examine him. [¶ 18.] The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him[.] [6] US Const amend VI. In Crawford, the United States Supreme Court held that this provision bars admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. [7] 541 US at 53-54, 124 SCt at 1365, 158 LEd2d 177. [¶ 19.] Crawford did not precisely articulate what is considered testimonial, but it provided some guidance. At a minimum, the Court announced, testimonial includes statements made during police interrogations and prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial. Id. at 68, 124 SCt at 1374, 158 LE2d 177. In describing testimonial statements, the Court also noted that testimony is typically [a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact. Id. at 51, 124 SCt at 1364, 158 LE2d 177. Further, the Court offered a non-exclusive list of formulations of the term testimonial: (1) ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent  that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine . . .; (2) extrajudicial statements contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions; and (3) statements made under circumstances that would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial. Id. at 51-52, 124 SCt at 1364, 158 LE2d 177 (internal citations omitted). [¶ 20.] The substance of the conversation on the audio recording is between Johnson and his wife. Johnson's statements constitute admissions by a party-opponent and, as such, are by definition not hearsay under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(A). Because the prohibition annunciated in Crawford applies to hearsay statements, that prohibition does not cover Johnson's statements on the recording. Despite this, neither Johnson's nor his wife's statements are testimonial. An objective witness in those circumstances would not have reason to believe that the statements would be available for use at a later trial, as there was no realization that he or she was speaking to a government informant. See Crawford, 541 US at 51-52, 124 SCt at 1364, 158 LE2d 177. The Supreme Court specifically stated in Davis v. Washington, that statements made unwittingly to a government informant are clearly nontestimonial. [8] 547 US 813, 825, 126 SCt 2266, 2275, 165 LEd2d 224 (2006) (citing Bourjaily v. United States, 483 US 171, 181-84, 107 SCt 2775, 2782-83, 97 LEd2d 144 (1987)). It is the testimonial character of the statement that separates it from other hearsay that, while subject to traditional limitations upon hearsay evidence, is not subject to the Confrontation Clause. Davis, 547 US at 821, 126 SCt at 2273, 165 LEd2d 224. Therefore, admission of neither Johnson's nor his wife's statements violate Johnson's Sixth Amendment right to confront his witnesses. [¶ 21.] Lewis's statements on the recording are responses to questions posed by Johnson. The only statement made by Lewis pertinent to this case is Lewis's response that it is for a friend. However, the veracity of this statement, or any of Lewis's other recorded statements, was completely irrelevant to the case. Therefore, the statements were not hearsay, as they were not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted. Admission of Lewis's responses provided context for Johnson's admissible statements, making them intelligible for the jury. Statements providing context for other admissible statements are not hearsay because they are not offered for their truth. United States v. Tolliver, 454 F3d 660,666 (7thCir 2006) (citation omitted). Therefore, because Lewis's statements merely provided the framework or context within which Johnson's statements could be understood, Lewis's statements were properly admitted at trial. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's decision to admit this portion of the audio recording into evidence.