Opinion ID: 2633286
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Asserted Trial Court Error in Failing to Find a Prima Facie Case of Discrimination

Text: Defendant argues first that the court erred in finding no prima facie case of discrimination when the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to excuse Prospective Jurors R.M., an Hispanic, and L.B., an African-American. We disagree. When a trial court denies a Wheeler motion without finding a prima facie case of group bias, the appellate court reviews the record of voir dire for evidence to support the trial court's ruling. [Citations.] We will affirm the ruling where the record suggests grounds upon which the prosecutor might reasonably have challenged the jurors in question. ( People v. Farnam, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 135, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 47 P.3d 988.) As a preliminary matter, in supplemental briefing defendant asserts that because the trial court did not state the standard it used to determine whether he established a prima facie case of discrimination, we must presume the trial court used the improper more likely than not standard under People v. Johnson. ( See Ross v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 899, 913, 141 Cal.Rptr. 133, 569 P.2d 727 [trial court is presumed to follow established law absent evidence to the contrary].) Therefore, he asks that we independently determine whether he established a prima facie case of discrimination using the reasonable inference test under Batson. As in People v. Cornwell, [r]egardless of the standard employed by the trial court, and even assuming without deciding that the trial court's decision is not entitled to deference, we have reviewed the record and, like the United States Supreme Court in Johnson ... [we] are able to apply the high court's standard and resolve the legal question whether the record supports an inference that the prosecutor excused a juror on the basis of race. ( People v. Cornwell, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 73, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 117 P.3d 622.) We conclude the record fails to support an inference that the prosecutor excused [any] juror on the basis of race. ( Ibid. ) As to Prospective Juror R.M., defense counsel sought to establish a prima facie case of discrimination based solely on the circumstance that R.M. was the only Hispanic sitting in the jury box, leaving only two other Hispanics on the entire panel. This circumstance, standing alone, is not dispositive on the issue of whether defendant established a prima facie case. ( People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 119, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887; but see Johnson, supra, 545 U.S. at pp. ___, ___, 125 S.Ct. at pp. 2414, 2419 [the removal of all three African-American prospective jurors established a prima facie case].) Moreover, the record discloses reasons other than racial bias for any prosecutor to challenge Prospective Juror R.M. He indicated on his questionnaire that a person's voluntary intoxication should automatically be considered a defense, or reduce his or her culpability, if that person commits a crime because your mind is not where it [is] suppose[d] to be. The prosecutor volunteered that this response was something he considered in excusing R.M. He may reasonably have believed that R.M. would have difficulty setting his belief aside and evaluating the evidence in this case because defendant claimed he was intoxicated at the time of Powell's murder. Defendant contends the trial court rejected this possibility because it stated that the juror's attitude towards intoxication was not disqualifying at all. But it may merely have meant the attitude would not support a challenge for cause, not that a prosecutor had to ignore it. The circumstance that the juror was not subject to exclusion for cause certainly did not support an inference that the exercise of a peremptory challenge against [the juror] was motivated by group bias. ( People v. Cornwell, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 70, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 117 P.3d 622.) In addition, the trial court also said that it would have excused the juror itself. It said that R.M. had an attitude that projects itself as clearly as a ringing bell and some kind of chip on his shoulder or some attitude here that's very disturbing. With respect to Prospective Juror L.B., defense counsel sought to establish a prima facie case of discrimination because the prosecutor challenged a second African-American prospective juror. [8] As stated, this showing is not dispositive of whether defendant established a prima facie case. ( People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 119, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887.) As with Prospective Juror R.M., the record reveals reasons other than racial discrimination for any prosecutor to challenge this prospective juror. L.B. had indicated that a cousin was treated unfairly by police when the cousin was arrested for carrying a gun in a Mercedes he was driving. The officer had asked L.B.'s cousin if he had stolen the vehicle. L.B., who was a passenger in the Mercedes, believed her cousin was treated unfairly by the police based on this question. She also believed her cousin was treated unfairly by the judicial system regarding this incident. In addition, L.B. responded on her questionnaire that she did not let people tell her what to do and that she had very strong opinions. She also questioned whether she could remain objective in judging a person's credibility. Even though L.B. gave assurances that she could evaluate the evidence objectively, based on these responses, the prosecutor reasonably might have been concerned with L.B.'s negative views of the police and the judicial system based on the incident with her cousin and her self-described strong personality, and challenged her on these bases. Relying on Hernandez v. New York (1991) 500 U.S. 352, 359, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395, defendant further argues the trial court impliedly found that he established a prima facie case of discrimination when it considered and purportedly rejected the prosecutor's explanation that he excused Prospective Juror R.M. because he believed voluntary intoxication should automatically be a defense to a crime. In Hernandez, a plurality of the United States Supreme Court held that, although no express finding of a prima facie case had been made, the issue of whether a prima facie case of discrimination had been made became moot once the prosecutor volunteered his reasons for exercising his peremptory challenges. ( Ibid. ) Defendant's reliance on Hernandez is misplaced. At the conclusion of the hearing, unlike Hernandez, the trial court expressly found that a prima facie case of discrimination was not established and impliedly found that the prosecutor's proffered reason was genuine. As we explained, the trial court's remark that R.M.'s belief was not necessarily disqualifying may have meant his attitude did not support a challenge for cause. In any event, the remark did not support an inference that the prosecutor was racially biased in challenging R.M. or that the trial court rejected the prosecutor's explanation as implausible. Even assuming the trial court did find a prima facie case of discrimination at this point, defendant is not entitled to relief. The trial court made a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate the prosecutor's race-neutral reason for challenging R.M., and substantial evidence supports the trial court's implied finding that the prosecutor's reason was genuine and non-discriminatory. ( People v. McDermott (2002) 28 Cal.4th 946, 970, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 654, 51 P.3d 874.) Defendant next argues that when the prosecutor's explanation is compared with the responses of certain other jurors, the prosecutor's discriminatory intent is apparent. He relies on Miller-El v. Dretke (2005) ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 2317 ( Miller-El ) (discussed post, 40 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 153-155, 129 P.3d at pp. 351-353) in asking us to perform a comparative juror analysis to review the trial court's finding on this issue. Assuming without deciding that a comparative juror analysis should be conducted under the circumstances presented to evaluate the plausibility of the prosecutor's volunteered explanation as to R.M., we conclude defendant's proffered analysis fails to establish purposeful discrimination. (See People v. Schmeck (2005) 37 Cal.4th 240, 270, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 397, 118 P.3d 451 [comparative juror analysis failed to demonstrate purposeful discrimination].) Defendant asserts that R.M.'s belief that voluntary intoxication should or could be a defense to a crime or make an offender less culpable was shared by non-Hispanic Jurors K.D., A.B., and K.Z., whom the prosecutor did not peremptorily challenge. His assertion is misleading because R.M. indicated yes on his questionnaire that voluntary intoxication should automatically be a defense to a crime or reduce an offender's culpability because your mind is not where it['s] suppose[d] to be. None of the jurors with whom defendant compares R.M. marked yes to this question or otherwise shared his view. Accordingly, a comparison of the responses to the voluntary intoxication question by these prospective jurors does not alter our conclusion that the record substantiates the trial court's implied finding that the prosecutor's reason for excusing R.M. was genuine and nondiscriminatory. Finally, defendant also compared Prospective Juror L.B., who regarded herself as a leader, with non-African-American jurors who also considered themselves leaders. He does not, however, expressly ask that we perform a comparative analysis, as he did with Prospective Juror R.M. Performing a comparative analysis is problematic when, as here, the prosecutor did not provide reasons for the challenge because the trial court found no prima facie case had been established. Indeed, in Miller-El, the high court used comparative analysis to review the trial court's findings as to the plausibility of the prosecutor's reasons. (See Miller-El, supra, ___ U.S. at pp. ___ _ ___, 125 S.Ct. at pp. 2325-2332.) In any event, the record does not convince us that the court should have found a prima facie case at this stage. In sum, challenging these two prospective jurors early in the process did not, itself, support an inference that discrimination had occurred. Accordingly, we conclude the defendant failed to make a prima facie case of discrimination at this stage.