Opinion ID: 2982938
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Unreasonable Application of Law

Text: We turn now to the main thrust of Sutton’s argument: that the TCCA unreasonably applied Strickland, Williams, and Wiggins. Sutton challenges lead defense counsel’s diligence on a number of fronts, stressing his lack of experience in capital sentencing proceedings; the minimal time billed specifically for sentencing preparation (five hours), half of which occurred after the verdict; and his reliance on Dr. Engum, whose records lack details of the investigation into Sutton’s family background. In short, Sutton argues that, with a more thorough investigation, counsel would have presented more evidence of Sutton’s abusive upbringing that may have persuaded the jury to spare his life. Still, as noted above, the TCCA found that the defense team had access to evidence of Sutton’s abusive childhood, as demonstrated by Dr. Engum’s sentencing testimony about Sutton’s broken home, alcoholism, distrust of others, and manipulability. See Sutton, 2006 WL 1472542, at –23. And the TCCA rejected Sutton’s prejudice argument, finding that the aggravating circumstance of Branam’s murder still would have outweighed any additional mitigating evidence. Thus, the real question is whether the defense should have discovered more specific instances of abuse and devoted more attention to that subject and to Dellinger’s influence in its presentation to the sentencing jury. In the absence of clearly established Supreme Court precedent requiring additional investigation under similar circumstances, a fairminded jurist could conclude that the defense team satisfied the constitutional requirement. See - 18 - Case No. 11-6180, Sutton v. Carpenter Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103 (explaining, under § 2254(d)(1), that the habeas petitioner “must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement”); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75–76 (2003) (stressing that AEDPA’s “unreasonable application” prong reaches only “objectively unreasonable” state court decisions, not incorrect ones). Williams and Wiggins do not compel a contrary conclusion. The TCCA distinguished these cases as addressing the situation where “counsel wholly failed to investigate [the defendant’s] background and were thereby prevented by lack of awareness from presenting any mitigating proof of . . . social and family history.” See Sutton, 2006 WL 1472542, at . Sutton argues that this narrow reading distorts Williams and Wiggins, both of which found deficient performance and prejudice. But the TCCA reasonably concluded that counsel’s performance surpassed the constitutionally deficient assistance in those cases. In Williams, counsel failed to investigate several key mitigating circumstances, including Williams’s “nightmarish childhood,” borderline mental capacity, and prison records documenting his good behavior. Williams, 529 U.S. at 395–96. These oversights occurred: not because of any strategic calculation but because [counsel] incorrectly thought that state law barred access to such records. Had they [investigated], the jury would have learned that Williams’ parents had been imprisoned for the criminal neglect of Williams and his siblings, that Williams had been severely and repeatedly beaten by his father, that he had been committed to the custody of the social services bureau for two years during his parents’ incarceration (including one stint in an abusive foster home), and then, after his parents were released from prison, had been returned to his parents’ custody. - 19 - Case No. 11-6180, Sutton v. Carpenter Id. at 395. In view of the “comparatively voluminous amount of evidence” missed, the Court held that “trial counsel did not fulfill their obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant’s background.” Id. at 396. In Wiggins, counsel presented no family-history evidence at sentencing. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 516. Viewing skeptically counsel’s strategy to forgo mitigation, the Court noted that counsel limited its investigation of the defendant’s life history to the presentence investigation report and a handful of social services records documenting Wiggins’s foster care placements. Counsel also declined funds offered by the public defender’s office to obtain a forensic social worker. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 523–24. The Court found that counsel’s conduct fell below Maryland and ABA standards for capital defense work, explaining that: The scope of their investigation was . . . unreasonable in light of what counsel actually discovered in the [social services] records. The records revealed several facts: Petitioner’s mother was a chronic alcoholic; Wiggins was shuttled from foster home to foster home and displayed some emotional difficulties while there; he had frequent, lengthy absences from school; and, on at least one occasion, his mother left him and his siblings alone for days without food. As the Federal District Court emphasized, any reasonably competent attorney would have realized that pursuing these leads was necessary to making an informed choice among possible defenses, particularly given the apparent absence of any aggravating factors in petitioner’s background. Id. at 525. Here, as stated above, counsel testified that he relied on information provided by Dr. Engum and a college student to get a better understanding of Sutton’s family situation. He also had group meetings with family members during his investigation of the case. Admittedly, the short amount of time devoted to sentencing preparation gives pause, but as the district court explained, counsel’s earlier efforts overlapped somewhat with the penalty-phase preparation. As noted above, the defense team presented mitigating evidence on a variety of subjects, including - 20 - Case No. 11-6180, Sutton v. Carpenter Sutton’s employment history, previous conduct as a prisoner, his fine reputation as a family man (including heroic acts), and his family background. The jury heard about his parents’ divorce, his childhood abuse and “least favored” child status, his limited education and IQ, his alcoholism from an early age, and his tendency to follow others. Dr. Engum’s notes demonstrated that the defense team knew of Dellinger’s corrupting influence during Sutton’s childhood and of abuse by Sutton’s father. And, to the extent Sutton argues that counsel should have argued that Dellinger played a dominant role in the commission of the crime, he offers no evidence that Dellinger actually did take such a leadership role and thus fails to explain why counsel should have explored this mitigation theory.2 Strickland teaches that: strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation. In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. In any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments. 466 U.S. at 690–91. Counsel could have focused more on Sutton’s family background, but the TCCA reasonably distinguished Williams and Wiggins and determined that counsel investigated enough to make the strategic decision not to devote more attention to that subject. Cf. Bobby v. Van Hook, 558 U.S. 4, 9–11 (2009) (per curiam) (rejecting Strickland claim where counsel 2 Sutton points to three actions in arguing that Dellinger controlled their encounters with Griffin: Dellinger ordered the beer at the bar, he hid the gun in his trailer, and he posted Griffin’s bond. None supports Sutton’s claim that he followed Dellinger’s lead in a crime that both denied committing. - 21 - Case No. 11-6180, Sutton v. Carpenter presented considerable mitigating evidence from the petitioner’s traumatic childhood, including beatings, alcoholism, and violent tendencies). And even if counsel’s performance fell below the constitutional standard, Sutton fails to show prejudice under AEDPA. No doubt, the additional social-history evidence adduced during post-conviction proceedings paints a more vivid and harrowing picture of Sutton’s childhood abuse. But the state court reasonably concluded that the new evidence complemented Dr. Engum’s less-detailed testimony on the subject and, thus, was largely cumulative. The evidence Sutton now presents illustrates the abuse that Dr. Engum alluded to in describing Sutton’s “deplorable” childhood, but breaks no new ground. Further undermining Sutton’s prejudice argument, Dr. Auble informed the state court that “evidence of a negative childhood ha[s] some, but ‘not a great deal’ of impact on jurors.” Sutton, 2006 WL 1472542, at . Finally, the TCCA reasonably relied on state-court precedent that emphasizes the persuasive force of additional violent felony convictions. Id. at  (citing State v. McKinney, 74 S.W.3d 291, 313 (Tenn. 2002); State v. Howell, 868 S.W.2d 238, 261 (Tenn. 1993)). The U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged the strength of such a counterweight in its prejudice analysis in Wong v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15, 25–26 (2009) (referring to the additional murder conviction as the “elephant in the courtroom”). In light of Sutton’s additional conviction for murdering Connie Branam, the TCCA could reasonably conclude that the absence of evidence detailing specific instances of abuse and corruption by Dellinger did not cast doubt on Sutton’s death-sentence under Strickland’s reasonable-probability standard. - 22 - Case No. 11-6180, Sutton v. Carpenter D. Uncertified Ineffective-Assistance Claim: Trial Counsel’s Time-of-Death Strategy Sutton touches on another ineffective-assistance claim not certified for appeal: trial counsel’s performance litigating the time-of-death issue during the guilt phase of trial. Our order of June 11, 2013, denied Sutton’s request to certify this claim for appeal. Sutton argues that, under recent Supreme Court precedent, he may assert ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel as a reason to supplement the record for his underlying ineffective-assistance claim. See Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013); Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012). Yet, as we stated in Moore v. Mitchell, Martinez provides a limited remedy for procedurally defaulted ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims, not an opportunity to expand the record when the state court denies such claims on the merits. 708 F.3d 760, 784–85 (6th Cir. 2013); see also Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1319–20 (characterizing its holding as a “limited” remedy for a procedural default); Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1921(extending Martinez’s procedural-default remedy to jurisdictions that, while technically allowing ineffective-assistance claims on direct appeal, provide no “meaningful opportunity” for those claims to be heard). To read Martinez and Trevino more expansively would undermine Pinholster’s conclusion that AEDPA limits federalcourt review of habeas claims to the record established in state court. Moore, 708 F.3d at 785; see also Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1398. Sutton acknowledges that the TCCA rejected this uncertified time-of-death ineffectiveassistance claim on the merits. Sutton, 2006 WL 1472542, at . In the absence of procedural default, Martinez and Trevino have no application. We therefore have no occasion to reconsider excluding this ineffective-assistance claim from the certificate of appealability. - 23 - Case No. 11-6180, Sutton v. Carpenter