Opinion ID: 1314867
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the issue of multiple offenses

Text: The indictment alleged that the defendant committed a criminal act or acts in July, 1978. However, the State introduced evidence to the effect that the defendant committed criminal acts in June and July, 1978. These acts are related in that they involve both possession or delivery of marihuana. Nevertheless, this Court is of the opinion that the trial judge committed error in the unrestricted admission of evidence to the effect that the defendant committed various criminal acts in June and July, 1978. An indictment is sufficient when it clearly states the nature and cause of the accusation against a defendant, enabling him to prepare his defense and plead his conviction as a bar to later prosecution for the same offense. Syl. pt. 1, State v. Furner, 245 S.E.2d 618 (W.Va.1978); State v. Ash, 139 W.Va. 374, 379, 80 S.E.2d 339, 342 (1954). There is nothing in the record to indicate that evidence of various criminal acts of the defendant in June and July, 1978, was admitted for the limited purpose of showing that the defendant, having committed similar collateral crimes, was likely to be guilty of possession or delivery of marijuana in July, 1978, as charged in the indictment. In other words, the State did not attempt to establish a common scheme or plan within the meaning of State v. Thomas, 157 W.Va. 640, 203 S.E.2d 445 (1974). No instruction concerning such theory was offered by the State. Subject to certain exceptions discussed below, collateral or other crimes for which a defendant is not charged are inadmissible. As we held in Syl. pt. 1, State v. Moubray, 139 W.Va. 535, 81 S.E.2d 117 (1954): The general rule is that the State, in a criminal case, may not introduce evidence of a substantive offense committed by the defendant which is separate and distinct from the specific offense charged in the indictment. In Thomas, we held in Syl. pt. 12 as follows: The exceptions permitting evidence of collateral crimes and charges to be admissible against an accused are recognized as follows: the evidence is admissible if it tends to establish (1) motive; (2) intent; (3) the absence of mistake or accident; (4) a common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the others; and (5) the identity of the person charged with the commission of the crime on trial. The phrase common scheme or plan has been defined to some extent by this Court. As indicated above in Thomas, and in subsequent decisions of this Court, common scheme or plan has been generally defined as ... embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the others.... Thomas, supra, 157 W.Va. at 655, 203 S.E.2d 445. See also, Syl. pt. 9, State v. Craft, 272 S.E.2d 46 (W.Va.1980); State v. Harman, 270 S.E.2d 146, 155 (W.Va.1980); State v. Haverty, 267 S.E.2d 727, 733 (W.Va.1980); State v. Spicer, 245 S.E.2d 922, 925 (W.Va.1978). Common scheme or plan is the fourth enumerated exception in Thomas to the general rule that evidence of collateral crimes is inadmissible. Common scheme or plan was specifically defined in State v. Frasher, 265 S.E.2d 43, 50 (W.Va.1980) where we stated as follows: To a certain extent, the fourth exception in Thomas combines two separate concepts. First, it embraces a situation where the defendant embarks on a plan to commit a series of similar crimes which are interrelated. The second concept is where, in the proof of a particular crime, the evidence may also tend to establish a related crime with which the defendant has not been charged. [9] Whether the prosecution seeks to introduce collateral crimes to show common scheme or plan, motive, intent or otherwise, the admission of such evidence rests within the discretion of the trial court. As we held in Syl. pt. 14 in Thomas : As the control of the scope, latitude and method of introduction of evidence of collateral crimes and charges is vested in the trial court, motions to introduce and motions and objections for exclusion of such evidence are addressed to the sound discretion of the court. [10] No theory of common scheme or plan or other exception under Thomas or subsequent cases was advanced by the State against the defendant in the proceedings below. Specifically, the State did not argue that proof of the various marihuana transactions alleged tended to establish the guilt of the defendant under the indictment. The indictment in this case is a single count indictment charging that the defendant in July, 1978, did ... possess and possess with the intent to deliver and deliver to one Marvin Griffith a controlled substance, to-wit, marihuana. The evidence of the State admitted at trial, however, tended to establish the defendant's involvement in several marihuana transactions in June and July, 1978. The indictment does not contain separate counts for each offense alleged. In Syl. pt. 1, State ex rel. Watson v. Ferguson, 274 S.E.2d 440 (W.Va.1980), we held as follows: A defendant shall be charged in the same indictment, in a separate count for each offense, if the offenses charged, whether felonies or misdemeanors or both, are of the same or similar character, or are based on the same act or transaction, or are two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan. In State ex rel. Watson, the defendant was charged by a Wayne County grand jury with the murder of four persons on June 25, 1979. The defendant was convicted of first degree murder upon one of the charges. The defendant then sought upon double jeopardy grounds to prohibit further trials upon the remaining murder charges. However, this Court, holding that the defendant could be tried and punished separately upon the charges, declined to prohibit further prosecution. At this defendant's trial, the State introduced evidence to the effect that the defendant committed criminal acts in June and July, 1978. These acts allegedly involved the possession or delivery of marihuana and therefore were of the same or similar character within the meaning of Syl. pt. 1, State ex rel. Watson. As indicated above, State ex rel. Watson holds that a defendant shall be charged separately for each alleged crime of the same or similar character. Consequently, if the State intended at trial to seek convictions of the defendant upon various marijuana violations in June or July, 1978, the State should have charged the defendant separately for each alleged violation. Specific allegations as to when an offense was committed are not strictly required in indictments. W.Va.Code, 62-2-10. However, the State in this case confronted the defendant with a number of alleged offenses for June and July, 1978, even though the indictment contained only one count. Nor did the State attempt to establish a common scheme or plan or other exception within the meaning of Thomas, supra . The numerous offenses the State attempted to establish unreasonably denied to the defendant an opportunity to prepare a defense. The admission of evidence of various offenses allegedly committed by the defendant in June and July, 1978, was prejudicial to the defendant and reversible error.