Opinion ID: 2103726
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Separate Awards

Text: Fleetguard and the Fund contend that the trial court should have applied the concurrent injury rule, [2] and made a single award, rather than three separate awards. In the circumstances of this case, this argument involves two distinct issues: (a) application of the doctrine of judicial estoppel, and (b) a factual determination as to whether Ms. Elmore's injury, or injuries, resulted in concurrent disabilities. (a) Judicial Estoppel. The trial court ruled that Fleetguard, but not the Fund, was barred by the doctrine of judicial estoppel from arguing that a single award should be made. The court stated: [Ms. Elmore] indicated that these were separate injuries, and [Fleetguard] agreed that these were separate injuries and stated thus in their pleadings or in their information that they provided in the case. The Court recognizes that Ms. Elmore relied upon the representation by [Fleetguard] that these were separate incidents. And when [Fleetguard] tried to change their position ... [Ms. Elmore] was prejudiced as a result. These statements concern the proceedings on Ms. Elmore's motion requesting that Dr. Williams be authorized to provide all of her care, described previously. On the basis of that ruling, the trial court made three separate awards, as described above. The trial court erred in its application of judicial estoppel in this case. The Supreme Court has recently stated that judicial estoppel is applicable only when a party has attempted to contradict by oath a sworn statement previously made. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. v. Epperson, 284 S.W.3d 303, 315 (Tenn. 2009). Statements made by counsel for the parties in connection with Ms. Elmore's motion, Fleetguard's response to that motion, or in other pleadings, were unsworn, and therefore do not provide a basis for application of judicial estoppel. The only sworn statements remotely related to the issue are contained in Fleetguard's responses to Ms. Elmore's interrogatories. Such statements likewise do not provide a basis for raising judicial estoppel. See Tenn. R. Evid. 803(1.2) advisory commission comments. In addition, it must be noted that Ms. Elmore explicitly alleged in her original complaint, and in her motion to have her medical care transferred to Dr. Williams, that she had sustained a single injury. [3] Her position at trial and on appeal is that she suffered three separate and distinct injuries. We can find no basis in the record, to permit her to change her position on the issue while forbidding the opposing party from doing so. We therefore hold that the Fleetguard was not barred from arguing that the concurrent injury rule applies in this case. (b) Concurrent Injury Rule. The injuries at issue in this case are all gradually occurring injuries, caused by Ms. Elmore's repetitive use of her hands and arms in the course of her employment. Fleetguard argues that the trial court should have applied the concurrent injury rule found in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(3)(C) (2008). That Code section provides in pertinent part: When an employee sustains concurrent injuries resulting in concurrent disabilities, such employee shall receive compensation only for the injury that produced the longest period of disability.... As Fleetguard points out, several recent decisions of Workers' Compensation Appeals Panels have consistently held that the concurrent injury rule applies when gradual injuries to different body parts are caused by work activity conducted over the same time period. In Lane v. Perdue Farms, Inc., No. M2008-00235-WC-R3-WC., 2009 WL 1099276 (Tenn.Workers Comp.Panel Apr.24, 2009), the employee suffered gradually occurring hand and shoulder injuries. The Workers' Compensation Panel found that the employee had sustained gradual injuries to different body parts caused by the same activity conducted over the same time period and that the concurrent injury rule applied. Id. at . In Ayers v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., No. E2007-00077-WC-R3-WC, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 775 (Tenn. Workers' Comp. Panel June 11, 2008), review denied, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 745 (Sept. 26, 2008), the employee filed separate suits for carpal tunnel injuries to her hands and tarsal tunnel injuries to her feet. The panel held the trial court correctly held these injuries to be concurrent because both [injuries] were caused gradually by the duties of her job, carried out over the same period of time. Id. at . The panel rejected the argument that her injuries were separate because they were caused by different activities, i.e. the injuries to her hands by repetitive use of her hands and the injuries to her feet by standing and moving about. Id. at . In Clardy v. TRW Commercial Steering Division, No. M2006-01261-WC-R3-WC, 2007 WL 4730083 (Tenn.Workers' Comp.Panel Nov.6, 2007), the employee sustained gradual injuries to his right shoulder, right arm and thumb, and left arm. The panel found the evidence was to the effect that these gradual injuries were caused by the same activity, conducted over the same period, and manifested themselves at more or less the same time. Id. at . Consequently, the panel held the concurrent injury rule applied and reversed the trial court's awards for separate injuries. Id. In Reagan v. Transcontinental Insurance Co., No. M2006-00009-WC-R3-CV, 2006 WL 3804402 (Tenn.Workers Comp.Panel Dec.27, 2006), a trial court made separate awards for a gradually occurring left hand injury that manifested itself in the Spring of 2003 and a gradually occurring left shoulder injury that first manifested itself in August 2003. An examining physician testified both injuries were the result of the increased use of the employee's left hand and arm due to a prior injury to her right shoulder. The Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel reversed the separate awards, holding that section 50-6-207(3)(C) required a single body as a whole award encompassing both gradual injuries. Id. at . Ms. Elmore argues that the injuries are separate and distinct because they arose at different times. She cites Scales v. City of Oak Ridge, 53 S.W.3d 649 (Tenn.2001) in support of her position. In that case, the employee had carpal tunnel syndrome. After she had surgery for that condition, she returned to work. She then tripped and fell, injuring her back. The employer argued that a single award should have been made. Both the trial court and the Supreme Court disagreed, finding the injuries to be separate. Id. at 652-53. Scales differs from this case in that Ms. Scales' second injury was the result of a specific, identifiable, traumatic event. In contrast, all of Ms. Elmore's injuries in this case occurred gradually as a result of the same repetitive activities. During his deposition, Dr. Williams discussed the interrelationship of the gradual injuries at issue here. He stated: My perspective on a problem, or problems such as Ms. Elmore has, is that I have an umbrella term which I call complex upper extremity pain and, as I mentioned, it can involve a number of entities, which can each, in its own right, become the preeminent pain that a patient experiences at a given time and there is a tenuous interrelationship certainly of all of these conditions because they all exist in the same upper extremity in the same person who is doing the same types of repetitive motion, but I don't think it's wrong at all to consider them as separate conditions, and I guess, if you will, separate injuries. There is a semantic issue here because I think it'swe think of an injury typically as something where someone trips and falls, and puts out their wrist and breaks the bone. That's an acute injury and very well-defined. It's very easy to understand. Something like carpal tunnel syndrome may be a progressive problem precipitated by tendinitis, and as it worsens, the patient may initially have some hints of discomfort, maybe a little tingling. Maybe it comes and goes, but they don't really think much of it until it reaches a certain critical point, and everybody has a different threshold, I guess, if you will, of concern.    It's difficult to pinpoint a calendar date with cases such as carpal tunnel, and even in shoulder impingement, or in tennis elbow.... The injuries for which Ms. Elmore seeks workers' compensation benefits were reported to Fleetguard at the same time. Her initial injury report to Fleetguard was dated January 29, 2003, and states that she noticed [a] lump center of right hand. That condition, however, was found to be not work-related. Her second injury report, in October 2003, referred to left hand pain, elbow pain (both), arms and shoulders. This report is the only report of the injuries for which she seeks benefits and is supported by her complaint for benefits which alleges that, on July 28, 2003, she sustained an injury by accident to her neck and both upper extremities due to repetitive work activities at Fleetguard. The first physician to evaluate Ms. Elmore for her work-related conditions was Dr. Hudson on July 31, 2003. His notes state that she gave him a history of painful pressure in her right hand beginning in January 2003 which she noted while picking up some [parts] ... She did not notice any further problems until about two to three weeks ago, when she again noticed some discomfort in her right hand. Dr. Hudson found that she had duPuytren's contracture, a condition which was not related to her work. He also ordered nerve conduction studies and x-rays which revealed mild carpal tunnel syndrome and mild degenerative arthritis of the cervical spine. Dr. Weikert began to treat Ms. Elmore in September 2003. In addition to Dr. Hudson's diagnoses, he found that she had tendinitis of both elbows. He treated her with physical therapy and injections. Dr. Williams first examined Ms. Elmore on January 13, 2004. His note states that Ms. Elmore told him: Her [bilateral shoulder] pain has been gradually worsening since July of this year. The note states that Dr. Williams explained to Ms. Elmore that [he frequently sees] an overlap between lateral epicondylitis and shoulder weakness and that [he thinks] shoulder weakness may precipitate lateral epicondylitis in many cases, as it forces the individual to rely more heavily on elbow manipulation when the shoulders are weak and painful. In his note of his next contact with Ms. Elmore, on February 10, 2004, he commented that [he believes] the neck is probably playing a role as well. Ms. Elmore was referred to Dr. Davis for evaluation of her neck in November 2004. At that time she gave a history of mechanical neck pain and right extremity pain which she relates to an on-the-job injury with repetitive lifting in July 2003. Our assessment of the medical evidence in this case is that the histories given by Ms. Elmore to the various physicians who treated her indicates she began experiencing significant symptoms with her various injuries in July 2003. It is clear from Dr. Williams' testimony that all of these symptoms were the result of anatomical conditions caused by the same set of repetitive work activities carried out by Ms. Elmore over the course of her employment. The medical treatment for those conditions included a variety of procedures. Beginning in April 2004, those procedures included multiple surgeries. After that time, she was unable to return to work, other than two brief attempts at light duty. We find Ms. Elmore sustained gradual injuries that were caused by the same activity, conducted over the same period, and manifested themselves at more or less the same time. As have the other recent Workers' Compensation Panels cited above, we conclude that the concurrent injury rule applies in this case. Accordingly, the trial court should have made a single award of permanent partial disability benefits apportioned to the body as a whole, covering all of Ms. Elmore's injuries. Having reached that conclusion, we find that it is not necessary to address Fleetguard's contention that the trial court erred by failing to find that Ms. Elmore was permanently and totally disabled. Fleetguard's position is based upon Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(4)(A)(i), which limits awards of permanent total disability to workers who sustain compensable injuries after the age of 60 to 260 weeks of benefits. In Vogel v. Wells Fargo Guard Services, 937 S.W.2d 856, 862 (Tenn.1996), the Supreme Court held that, in order to avoid an irrational result, the statute would be interpreted to limit awards of permanent partial disability in a similar fashion. In this case, Ms. Elmore has sustained injuries to both arms, both shoulders and her neck. The medical impairments alone from those injuries amount to 39% to the body as a whole. The trial court explicitly found that she is unable to work at any full-time job. She has limited education, and her work experience is all in unskilled jobs. Based upon these facts, we have no difficulty in finding that her work-related injuries have resulted in a permanent partial disability of at least 65% to the body as a whole, which is the maximum permissible award. A finding of permanent total disability would not affect the amount of the award. Further, if Ms. Elmore were found to be permanently and totally disabled, Fleetguard would remain liable for the entire award, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-208(a). See, Roper v. First Presbyterian Church, No. M2007-02287-WC-R3-WC, 2008 WL 5101006, -4 (Tenn.Workers Comp.Panel Dec.4, 2008).