Opinion ID: 52314
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Fifth Amendment and Waiver

Text: As noted above, the Government, at trial, made several references to and elicited testimony regarding Pando's post-arrest, pre- and post- Miranda silence. Interestingly, the parties focus solely on the Government's references to Pando's post-arrest, pre- Miranda silence. This court has refrained from addressing the issue of whether references to a defendant's post-arrest, pre- Miranda silence as substantive evidence of guilt violates the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. See United States v. Salinas, 480 F.3d 750 (5th Cir.2007) (refusing to address issue because defendant did not preserve it and could not overcome harmless error review). [1] However, our review of the record reveals that the Government in this case referenced not only Pando's post-arrest, pre- Miranda silence but also his post-arrest, post- Miranda silence. Indeed, in the Government's case-in-chief, one of the officers testified: We pointed out to Mr. Pando that, throughout the duration of the interview with him, not once had he bothered asking why he was being interviewed. (emphasis added). After an objection, the officer continued: We pointed out to him that not once during the whole course of his detention  not once had he bothered to ask why he had been handcuffed, detained and was now being presently interviewed.  (emphasis added). During closing argument, the Government again pointed out that not once did [Pando] ask why he had been handcuffed and detained in the interview.  (emphasis added). Thus, the Government referenced and elicited testimony regarding Pando's silence both before and after he was Mirandized. See, e.g., United States v. Tenorio, 69 F.3d 1103, 1106 (11th Cir.1995) (holding that district court erred in concluding that evidence referred solely to pre- Miranda silence when government alluded to silence up to and including time spent with officers after being Mirandized ). Accordingly, we need not address the issue of whether the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applies to post-arrest, pre- Miranda silence because each of the aforementioned statements include references to Pando's post-arrest, post- Miranda silence, which is squarely governed by Miranda. The Supreme Court has adopted a strict prohibition against the use of post- Miranda silence at trial. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-73, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976); Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 291 n. 5, 106 S.Ct. 634, 88 L.Ed.2d 623 (1986) (the use of postarrest, post-Miranda warnings silence [is] impermissible in federal prosecutions) (citing United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 95 S.Ct. 2133, 45 L.Ed.2d 99 (1975)). The privilege against self-incrimination, however, is subject to waiver provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 572, 107 S.Ct. 851, 93 L.Ed.2d 954 (1987) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602); United States v. Abrego, 141 F.3d 142, 171 (5th Cir.1998). Here, Pando does not dispute that he voluntarily waived his Miranda rights with full knowledge that anything he said could be used as evidence against him. Nor does he dispute that during his interrogation he answered questions about his post-arrest, pre-and post- Miranda silence. In fact, the officers specifically asked Pando why he never questioned the fact that he was being detained and interviewed or if there was a problem with the table, to which Pando responded, the table must contain drugs. We conclude that by answering these questions after having knowingly received proper Miranda warnings, Pando waived his right to have the entire conversation, including the implicit references to his silence contained therein, used against him as substantive evidence of guilt. See, e.g., United States v. Burns, 276 F.3d 439, 442 (8th Cir.2002) (holding that evidence of defendant's silence and refusal to answer post-arrest questions is admissible because they were part of an otherwise admissible conversation pursuant to defendant's Miranda waiver); see also United States v. Goldman, 563 F.2d 501, 503 (1st Cir.1977) (A defendant cannot have it both ways. If he talks, what he says or omits is to be judged on its merits or demerits, and not on some artificial standard that only the part that helps him can be later referred to. This was not a case where the government commented upon . . . a prior exercise of rights. The government asked the jury to measure what the defendant said when he had no rights because he had voluntarily waived them.). In short, by knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waiving his Miranda rights and then answering questions about his silence, Pando cannot be said to have been exercising his privilege against self-incrimination at that time. [2] Accordingly, we conclude that the admission of such evidence of silence at trial did not violate Pando's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. [3]