Opinion ID: 539917
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: offet was wrongly decided

Text: 26
27 [T]he initial question whether exhaustion is required should be answered by congressional intent; and a court should not defer the exercise of jurisdiction under a federal statute unless it is consistent with that intent. Patsy, 457 U.S. at 501-02, 102 S.Ct. at 2560 (emphasis added); Coit Independence v. FSLIC, 489 U.S. ----, ----, 109 S.Ct. 1361, 1372, 103 L.Ed.2d 602, 619 (1989). 28 Section 1983 provides every citizen with a federal civil remedy in federal court for the violation of federal rights. Section 1983 allows immediate access to federal court and does not include any requirement that state remedies be exhausted. 6 29 The history of section 1983 reveals that Congress intended the federal courts to assume a primary role in the guarantee of federal rights. Section 1983 is an important part of the basic alteration in our federal system wrought in the Reconstruction era through federal legislation and constitutional amendment. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238-42, 92 S.Ct. 2151, 2160-62, 32 L.Ed.2d 705 (1972). Opponents of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 had objected that it unfairly invaded the province of the states. Id. at 241-42 & n. 32, 92 S.Ct. at 2161-62 & n. 32. 7 Congress brushed aside these criticisms and enacted what has become section 1983 pursuant to its powers under the fourteenth amendment to secure due process of law. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 464 n. 13, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 1218 n. 13, 39 L.Ed.2d 505 (1974). ... Congress clearly conceived that it was altering the relationship between the States and the Nation with respect to the protection of federally created rights.... The very purpose of Sec. 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between the States and the people.... Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. at 242, 92 S.Ct. at 2162 (emphasis added). 30 Section 1983 and the writ of habeas corpus reflect Congress's decision to provide all Americans, including prison inmates, with the right to have a federal court ultimately decide the scope of their federal rights. Congress has required prisoners to exhaust state remedies in only two circumstances: in habeas corpus claims under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(b) and in 1983 actions in states with grievance procedures which conform to federal standards. 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1997e(a) (1981). 8 Under section 1997e, a prisoner's 1983 claim must be stayed for ninety days by a federal district court pending state administrative review of the prisoner's grievance. In all other circumstances, Congress has intended that federal court jurisdiction for prisoners' section 1983 suits be immediately available. Patsy, 457 U.S. at 512, 102 S.Ct. at 2565. 31 Initially, congressional sentiment with respect to section 1983 exhaustion is clearly revealed in the legislative history of section 1997e. The President's Crime Commission and private studies had recommended the establishment of prison grievance mechanisms as a means of enabling prison authorities to anticipate internal problems and as an aid to good morale. 125 Cong.Rec. 12491 (1979) (remarks of Rep. Drinan). Adoption of prison grievance procedures is voluntary under section 1997e; the purpose of 1997e was to provide incentives to the states to stimulate the development and implementation of effective administrative mechanisms for the resolution of grievances in correctional and pretrial facilities.... H.R.Rep. No. 96-80, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1979) (House Report). The House Judiciary Committee anticipated that [t]he effect of H.R. 10 would be to improve the quality of life for institutionalized persons, and to assist in relieving the caseloads of Federal courts in prisoner petitions. Id. The exhaustion requirement of section 1997e was suggested by the minority members of the Judiciary Committee, was strongly endorsed by the States, and passed with bipartisan support. 124 Cong.Rec. 11976 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier); House Report at 3. 9 32 Offet is inconsistent with section 1997e in two ways. First, Offet overwhelms the incentive Congress offered the states to develop grievance mechanisms. Congress concluded that the development of state prison grievance procedures was desirable and offered essentially an administrative exhaustion rule as an incentive for the adoption of state grievance procedures. Offet, however, allows state prison authorities to subject prisoner claims to state judicial exhaustion without participation in the section 1997e program. While there are non-disciplinary grievances, states will have less incentive to certify their grievance procedures when the effect of Offet is understood. This purpose would be frustrated by judicial discretion to impose exhaustion generally: the States would have no incentive to adopt grievance procedures capable of certification.... Patsy, 457 U.S. at 511-12, 102 S.Ct. at 2565. 33 Second, Offet is inconsistent with Congress's understanding when it enacted section 1997e. The hearings and debates are replete with recognition that exhaustion is generally not required of prisoner complaints under section 1983. For many years, some of us have felt that the requirement of exhaustion of remedies would be desirable in the case of 1983 actions, but for various reasons it has been impossible to implement this requirement. The bill, however, makes a modest approach at an exhaustion of remedies requirement. 124 Cong.Rec. 23180 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Wiggins). 10 34 The Supreme Court recognized the intent of Congress in Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents, a decision not considered by Offet. In Patsy, the Court extensively reviewed the legislative history of section 1997e and declined to require exhaustion of administrative remedies in a section 1983 suit. 457 U.S. at 507-12, 102 S.Ct. at 2563-66. The Court concluded that with 1997e, Congress believed it was creating an exception to exhaustion rules, and that [i]mplicit in this decision is Congress's conclusion that the no-exhaustion rule should be left standing with respect to other Sec. 1983 suits. Id. at 509, 102 S.Ct. at 2564. 35 Section 1997e and its legislative history demonstrate that Congress understood that exhaustion is not generally required in Sec. 1983 actions, and that it decided to carve out only a narrow exception to this rule. A judicially imposed exhaustion requirement would be inconsistent with Congress' decision to adopt Sec. 1997e and would usurp policy judgments that Congress has reserved for itself. 36 Id. at 508, 102 S.Ct. at 2563. Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Rehnquist, concurred, expressing the hope that Congress would consider expanding exhaustion requirements. Id. at 516-17, 102 S.Ct. at 2568 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 37 Next, Offet is inconsistent with congressional intent because it effectively prevents some prisoners from ever having their legal claims adjudicated by a federal court. If a prisoner wants to challenge the legality of any aspect of a disciplinary proceeding in which one sanction imposed affects his release date, Offet forces him to go first to state court. If the prisoner loses in state court, he can appeal to a state appeals court. If he loses again, he can file a habeas action in federal court. At the same time, he can file a companion section 1983 action requesting damages, provided the 1983 action is stayed pending resolution of the habeas claims. This procedure can take years. Often the prisoner will no longer be incarcerated by the time state remedies are exhausted and federal court jurisdiction is invoked. Because habeas claims relating to disciplinary decisions can usually be pursued only by confined persons, under Offet, many short-term prisoners will be unable to obtain federal court review of the state's legal conclusions. If they pursued state relief first, they will be estopped from seeking damages under section 1983 for asserted violations of their federal rights because federal habeas relief will be unavailable, even though their damage claims are not moot. 11 This is inconsistent with the congressional policy of making available to every citizen federal adjudication of the scope of federal civil rights. It also effectively stymies the development of federal law by federal courts. 38 Finally, Offet surrenders control of federal court jurisdiction to state prison officials. It encourages prison officials always to include the loss of good-time credits as a sanction to defeat a prisoner's right to a federal hearing. As the Seventh Circuit concluded in deciding not to follow Offet, ... Offet, ultimately proves too much.... [T]he state could insulate every imposition of discipline from attack under section 1983 by simply revoking one hour, or one day, of good time as part of every punishment.... We cannot accept such off-hand treatment of the importance to a state prisoner of prompt access to federal court under section 1983.... Viens v. Daniels, 871 F.2d 1328, 1333 (7th Cir.1989) (Cudahy, Easterbrook, and Ripple). For example, today the majority concludes that Charles Reese must exhaust state remedies because he was sanctioned with a loss of good-time credits, ante at 1308, even though Reese is serving a life term without possibility of parole. By sanctioning Reese with a meaningless loss of good-time credits, his disciplinary committee delayed his access to federal court. In the name of enhancing federal-state comity, Offet places control of federal court jurisdiction in the hands of unelected state prison disciplinary committees. 39
40 Supreme Court. 41 Offet misconstrues the Supreme Court's decisions in Preiser and Wolff, and disregards other decisions. 12 In Wolff, the Supreme Court reviewed the disciplinary procedures of the Nebraska state prison and established new hearing standards to apply to future cases. 418 U.S. at 555-72, 94 S.Ct. at 2974-82. The Court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims for restoration of their good-time credits, but held that Preiser did not require exhaustion of the inmates' claims for damages and declaratory relief. Id. at 554-55, 94 S.Ct. at 2973-74. Judge Arnold correctly concludes in his dissent that Preiser and Wolff create a relief-based distinction and that Offet misconstrues these two decisions. See Offet, 823 F.2d at 1261-63 (Arnold, J., dissenting). 13 In response, Offet offers several arguments for distinguishing Wolff. 42 Initially, Offet reasons that Wolff granted prospective relief only and thus did not allow federal decisions which would constrain state courts. 823 F.2d at 1260. This distinction is unpersuasive. First, a federal court's grant of prospective relief from a current prison practice on constitutional grounds would necessarily influence a subsequent state proceeding. It would produce at the very least results indistinguishable from Judge O'Brien's waiver option found untenable by today's majority. Ante at 1309. Second, Wolff cannot be construed as limited to prospective relief because the inmates in Wolff sought damages for the past acts of the defendants, and the Court concluded that the legal issues underlying their damage claims did not have to be exhausted in state court. 418 U.S. at 555, 94 S.Ct. at 2974. While the Court limited the application of the newly announced standards, the Court did not foreclose damage claims based on violations of due process apparent at the time of the violation. Accordingly, it cannot be said that Wolff clearly was intended to be entirely prospective in nature ..., 823 F.2d at 1260, nor does limiting Wolff to prospective relief resolve federal-state comity problems. 43 Next, Offet argues that Wolff had not considered the res judicata effects of federal decisions on subsequent state proceedings. Wolff concluded, however, that Preiser expressly contemplated that claims properly brought under Sec. 1983 could go forward while actual restoration of good-time credits is sought in state proceedings. 418 U.S. at 554, 94 S.Ct. at 2974. The Court added in an accompanying footnote that [o]ne would expect that normal principles of res judicata would apply in such circumstances. Id. n. 12. Offet nevertheless justifies the extension of Preiser's exhaustion requirement based on the unacceptable res judicata effects of a federal ruling on subsequent state proceedings. 823 F.2d at 1258. Offet speculates that the Court was simply unaware of the implications of its footnote in Wolff, or had not considered ... fully the preclusive effect of a federal ruling ..., and may have been thinking only of the res judicata effects of state judgments on subsequent 1983 proceedings. 823 F.2d at 1260. The claim that the Court never considered the res judicata effects of a federal decision is absolutely essential to Offet's license to fashion new exhaustion rules consistent with federal-state comity. The claim is, however, unsupportable. 44 First, the majority in Wolff added a footnote discussing res judicata to show that it was aware of the potential implications of its decision and intended no special res judicata rule for 1983 plaintiffs. The Court had been invited to fashion a special res judicata rule by the dissent in Preiser, lest the traditional principles of res judicata lead to federal and state decisions terminating simultaneous suits in the other forum. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 509 n. 14, 511, 93 S.Ct. at 1846 n. 14, 1847 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Instead, in Wolff, the Court anticipated the application of normal res judicata principles. Under normal res judicata rules, a decision in federal or state court has a preclusive effect in a subsequent proceeding in either forum, except where an exception is created by statute. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. 2254(d) (limited res judicata effect of state post-conviction decisions). It thus seems clear that the Court understood that federal decisions would have res judicata effects on subsequent state proceedings and accepted that consequence. Accord Williams v. Ward, 556 F.2d 1143, 1151, 1153-54 (2d Cir.) (Friendly, J.), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 944, 98 S.Ct. 469, 54 L.Ed.2d 323 (1977). 45 Second, the Supreme Court was reviewing a decision of this Court. See McDonnell v. Wolff, 483 F.2d 1059 (8th Cir.1973). We construed Preiser to create a relief-based distinction between 1983 suits and habeas corpus. Id. at 1064. We recognized that a federal decision would have a res judicata effect on state proceedings and concluded that indeed the Court had authorized simultaneous federal and state proceedings. 46 We recognize that the above result may mean that the federal courts may often establish minimum due process standards for all types of disciplinary hearings for serious misconduct in state prisons and that there may be simultaneous litigation in state and federal courts, but the Supreme Court anticipated these results would probably occur. Preiser ... n. 14.... 47 Id. It is thus highly unlikely that the Wolff Court was unaware of the issue or may have only been thinking of the res judicata effects of state judgments on subsequent 1983 proceedings. Offet, 823 F.2d at 1260. 48 Third, the Supreme Court's decision earlier in the same term in Steffel v. Thompson also refutes Offet's gloss on Wolff. Steffel sought a declaratory judgment that a prospective state criminal prosecution would violate his constitutional rights. The Court distinguished between the enjoining of current state criminal proceedings and declaratory relief in advance of a threatened prosecution, allowing Steffel's suit to go forward. 415 U.S. at 469, 475, 94 S.Ct. at 1220, 1223. Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger, concurred, expressing the view that the decision did not reach whether the granting of a declaratory judgment by a federal court will have any res judicata effect.... Id. at 479, 94 S.Ct. at 1226 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). He concluded that a federal declaratory judgment would not be res judicata in state court and would not support the issuance of an injunction against state action. Id. at 479-85, 94 S.Ct. at 1225-28. Justice White wrote separately to express his disagreement with Justice Rehnquist. At this writing at least, I would anticipate that a final declaratory judgment entered by a federal court ... should be accorded res judicata effect in any later prosecution of that very conduct. Id. at 477, 94 S.Ct. at 1225. This supports the view that the Court understood that federal decisions would have res judicata effects on state proceedings when, three months later, Justice White authored the Wolff opinion discussing normal principles of res judicata. 418 U.S. at 554 n. 12, 94 S.Ct. at 2974 n. 12. 14 49 Wolff clearly limited the scope of Preiser and federal-state comity concerns. Although federal decisions have res judicata effects on state proceedings, exhaustion is still not required except in the limited class of Preiser cases where only injunctive relief is sought and habeas is a complete substitute. Offet simply reads too much into Preiser. The subsequent decisions of the Court in Wolff, Greenholtz, and Gerstein, allowing prisoner suits for damages where earlier release from confinement was sought, make it apparent that: 50 [A]t least one of the premises of Preiser is not absolute: either (1) comity does not bar Sec. 1983 claims that, if successful, would cast doubt on--but not ultimately determine--the constitutionality of state administrative decisions and state court convictions or (2) with regard to such claims, state administrative decisions are not always due the same level of deference as state court convictions and sentencing decisions. 51 Serio v. Louisiana Bd. of Pardons, 821 F.2d 1112, 1116 (5th Cir.1987) (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court's subsequent decisions make clear that Preiser represents the limits of the Court's willingness to supplement Congress's pronouncements on exhaustion, and that the relief-based distinction created by Supreme Court decisions is to be followed by this court. 15 C. Offet is Inconsistent with Past Decisions of this Circuit. 52 Offet asserts that a conflict exists between prior opinions of this circuit and announces, [a]ccordingly, we approach this case as one in which our decision will establish the rule for this Circuit. 823 F.2d at 1258. The relation between section 1983 suits and habeas corpus was explored at least nine times by panels of this circuit prior to the decision in Offet. There was no prior conflict and the Offet panel lacked the authority to announce the rule for the circuit. 16 53 We had repeatedly permitted state prisoners to bring in federal court section 1983 damage actions challenging disciplinary decisions which resulted in a loss of good-time credits. See Brown v. Frey, 807 F.2d 1407, 1408 (8th Cir.1986); Graham v. Baughman, 772 F.2d 441, 443 (8th Cir.1985); 17 Eugene v. Klecker, 636 F.2d 250, 251 (8th Cir.1980) (per curiam); Glouser v. Parratt, 605 F.2d 419 (8th Cir.1979) (per curiam); Kelsey v. Minnesota, 565 F.2d 503, 506 (8th Cir.1977); Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194, 206, 212 (8th Cir.1974) (loss of good time suffered but relief requested unclear); see also Smallwood v. Missouri Bd. of Probation & Parole, 587 F.2d 369, 371 (8th Cir.1978) (interpreting Preiser and Wolff to separate damage and injunctive claims); Inmates v. Greenholtz, 576 F.2d 1274, 1278 n. 2 (8th Cir.1978) (class action procedural challenge to state parole procedures), rev'd on other grounds, 442 U.S. 1, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 60 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979); McDonnell v. Wolff, 483 F.2d at 1064 (relief-based test). The two per curiam opinions cited by Offet as evidence of a conflict within this circuit both involved attacks on criminal convictions while state criminal proceedings were still pending and thus did not create a conflict with cases involving disciplinary proceedings. 18 54 Accordingly, prior to Offet, the clear rule in this circuit was that a 1983 complaint attacking a criminal conviction was subject to abstention or exhaustion. 19 If a prisoner was not attacking his original conviction, whether exhaustion was required was determined by the type of relief sought. 20 If there was a prior conflict in our decisions, the Offet panel should have referred the issue to the court sitting en banc. 55 Until en banc review, we must adhere to our first decided case, consistent with the rule that no panel can overturn a previous panel decision. United States v. Edelman, 873 F.2d 791, 794 (5th Cir.1989); Johnson v. Moral, 843 F.2d 846, 847-48 (5th Cir.1988). 21 Offet thus cannot announce the rule for the circuit nor can it be relied on, but it has created a present conflict requiring en banc review. 56