Opinion ID: 197188
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Calculating the GSR

Text: 13 The district court found that the appellant's offense involved more than minimal planning and therefore raised the base offense level (BOL) by two levels. See U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(2). 1 The district court further found that the appellant had organized an extensive criminal activity and enhanced the BOL by four more levels on that account. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). The appellant challenges both findings. We review for clear error. See United States v. St. Cyr, 977 F.2d 698, 701 (1st Cir.1992); Dietz, 950 F.2d at 52. Under that test, where there is more than one plausible view of the circumstances, the sentencing court's choice among supportable alternatives cannot be clearly erroneous. United States v. Ruiz, 905 F.2d 499, 508 (1st Cir.1990). A. More than Minimal Planning 14 At sentencing, the district court found that the appellant aided in the preparation of all eight ersatz tax returns and that these repeated acts, carried out over an extended period of time (approximately six months), involved appreciable planning and forethought. The appellant questions the reliability of the evidence underpinning this finding and further asserts that, even if the evidence can be deemed reliable, it does not prove more than minimal planning. 15 Under the sentencing guidelines, an enhancement for more than minimal planning is appropriate when a defendant's course of relevant criminal conduct includes repeated acts over a period of time, unless it is clear that each instance was purely opportune. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, comment. (n.1(f)). The government has the burden of proving the applicability of U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(2) in any given case. See United States v. Sklar, 920 F.2d 107, 112 (1st Cir.1990) (explaining that the government must prove facts central to increasing a defendant's offense level). 16 We will not tarry. As the foregoing review of the record indicates, the lower court had before it ample evidence of adequate trustworthiness, including the PSI Report, Agent Sibilia's testimony, the striking similarities among the eight false claims, and the details of the earlier scheme at the Hampshire County Jail, to justify a finding that Fontaine engaged in a studied course of conduct that required (and received) more than minimal planning. Given this evidence and given the serial preparation and filing of multiple tax returns and refund claims, there was no error in the imposition of the upward adjustment. See Tardiff, 969 F.2d at 1288-89 (finding that a defendant's carefully orchestrated series of mailings designed to create a false impression satisfied the criteria for the planning adjustment); United States v. Gregorio, 956 F.2d 341, 343-44 (1st Cir.1992) (holding repeated preparation and submission of false statements sufficient to warrant the enhancement); see generally United States v. Fox, 889 F.2d 357, 361 (1st Cir.1989) (We cannot conceive of how obtaining even one fraudulent loan would not require more than minimal planning.). B. Role in the Offense 17 At sentencing, the district court found that Fontaine organized the [criminal] scheme, that he had decision making authority over his accomplices, and that the scheme involved five or more participants. The appellant challenges these imbricated findings and the four-level upward adjustment that they produced. Under the sentencing guidelines, a four-level enhancement for a defendant's role in the offense obtains if the government shows that the defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a); see also United States v. Rostoff, 53 F.3d 398, 412-14 (1st Cir.1995); Dietz, 950 F.2d at 52-54. As with other upward adjustments to the GSR, the government has the burden of proving the applicability of U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a) in a particular case. See United States v. Morillo, 8 F.3d 864, 872 (1st Cir.1993). 18 The government carried its burden here. A fair-minded factfinder, drawing reasonable inferences, could conclude--as, indeed, Judge Freedman did--that the eight false claims were part of an integrated course of conduct, and that Fontaine (who had orchestrated a similar plot at an earlier time) was the mastermind of it. We have observed before that battles over a defendant's role in the offense will most frequently be won or lost in the district court, see United States v. Graciani, 61 F.3d 70, 75 (1st Cir.1995), and that observation holds true in this case. 19 We need go no further. Since the court's determination that Fontaine organized and led a tax fraud scheme involving five or more participants is solidly rooted in the record, we reject the appellant's claim of error. See United States v. Tejada-Beltran, 50 F.3d 105, 110-13 (1st Cir.1995); Dietz, 950 F.2d at 52-54. 20 Affirmed.