Opinion ID: 874428
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: On remand, the district court must address Herrera's second theory of negligence.

Text: Herrera also asserted that Rock Creek employees were responsible for removing the scaffold support. His affidavit asserted: On the day that I was seriously injured, December 16, 2002, the supporting wooden beam was removed by workers that were laying felt on the roof on top of the residence. The defendant Rock Creek Development was responsible for laying the felt on the rooftop. I saw workers from Rock Creek Development placing the felt on Pedro Estay's rooftop. It is my belief that the defendant Rock Creek Development and its employees were responsible or [sic] the removal of the supporting wooden structure, which caused the scaffolding to break and my fall. Herrera's deposition testimony reiterated this claim. Francisco Herrera's affidavit also asserted his belief that the scaffold support was removed by Rock Creek's workers and/or employees. An employer is liable in tort for the tortious conduct of an employee committed within the scope of employment. See Finholt v. Cresto, 143 Idaho 894, 897, 155 P.3d 695, 698 (2007) (citing Clement v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 115 Idaho 298, 302, 766 P.2d 768, 772 (1988)). The district court simply did not address Herrera's second theory of negligence when granting summary judgment in favor of Rock Creek. Although in this appeal, Rock Creek asserts that the Herreras' testimony is inadmissible, this is a matter to be addressed in the first instance by the trial court. Accordingly, on remand, the district court is directed to consider the admissibility of the evidence offered in opposition to Rock Creek's motion for summary judgment and to address Herrera's second theory of negligence.