Opinion ID: 1405619
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appropriate level of scrutiny

Text: The second issue is what level of scrutiny we should apply to review this statute. Sonneman argues that we should review this statute using the strictest scrutiny, because it burdens the fundamental right to vote. Although voting is unquestionably a fundamental right, not every burden on the right to vote is subject to strict scrutiny. See O'Callaghan v. State, 914 P.2d 1250, 1253-54 (Alaska 1996) (citing Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433-34, 112 S.Ct. 2059, 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992)). States clearly have the power to enact substantial regulation of elections pursuant to Article I, section 4, clause 1 of the United States Constitution to prescribe [t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives[.] Id. at 1253 (quoting Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433, 112 S.Ct. 2059). The United States Supreme Court has recognized that because election laws will inevitably burden the right to vote, to subject every voting regulation to strict scrutiny and to require that the regulation be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest ... would tie the hands of States seeking to assure that elections are operated equitably and efficiently[.] Id. at 1254 (quoting Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433, 112 S.Ct. 2059). Instead of automatically applying strict scrutiny, courts apply the following standard in reviewing election code provisions that burden the right to vote: A court considering a challenge to a state election law must weigh the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate against the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule, taking into consideration the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights. Under this standard, the rigorousness of our inquiry into the propriety of a state election law depends upon the extent to which a challenged regulation burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Thus, as we have recognized when those rights are subjected to severe restrictions, the regulation must be narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance. But when a state election law provision imposes only reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions upon the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters, the State's important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify the restrictions. Id. (quoting Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434, 112 S.Ct. 2059) (internal citations and ellipses omitted). We must first determine, therefore, the extent to which this statute burdens the right to votewhether it is a severe restriction or a reasonable, nondiscriminatory restriction. Id. Although AS 15.15.030(6) does not deny candidates access to ballots, it limits access to the benefits of positional bias. In a single-district election, it will operate to give one candidate all of the votes received due to positional bias, thereby giving that candidate an advantage over all other candidates. Thus, this statute does burden the right to vote of supporters of disadvantaged candidates. See Vogler v. Miller, 660 P.2d 1192, 1193 (Alaska 1983) ([R]estrictions on ballot access implicate the fundamental rights of potential candidates and voters alike.... [T]he rights thus implicated are the right to vote and the right to associate freely in pursuit of political beliefs ....); see also Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 786-87, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983) (emphasizing that laws which affect candidates will always have a correlative effect on voters). We have stated that in ballot access cases, the state must show a compelling interest in order to justify infringements of these rights. Vogler v. Miller, 651 P.2d 1, 3 (Alaska 1982) (emphasis added). Strict scrutiny review is necessary in ballot access cases because the burden placed on the right to vote is severe when the right to vote is denied or limited to certain candidates or parties. See id. (reviewing ballot access restrictions using strict scrutiny); cf. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972) (reviewing one-year residency requirement for voting using strict scrutiny under equal protection analysis). The statute in question, however, does not restrict access to the ballot or deny any voters the right to vote for candidates of their choice. See AS 15.15.030(6). Instead, it merely allocates the benefit of positional bias, which places a lesser burden on the right to vote. See id. In addition, the statute is nondiscriminatory, because it gives each candidate an equal opportunity to receive the benefit of positional bias; the benefit is not allocated in favor of any definable group such as incumbents or a specific political party. Further, the burden imposed on voters by this statute is not greater than the burden imposed in several cases which applied a lower level of scrutiny. See, e.g., Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434-40, 112 S.Ct. 2059 (requiring only legitimate state interest to uphold state's prohibition on write-in voting because it imposed only reasonable burdens on right to vote); Libertarian Party of Colo. v. Buckley, 938 F.Supp. 687, 693 (D.Colo. 1996) (requiring only legitimate interests to uphold ballot positioning statute which divided major and minor parties into two groups and determined placement within the groups by random drawing because it imposed only minimal burden on right to vote); O'Callaghan, 914 P.2d at 1263 (requiring only showing of legitimate state interests to uphold blanket primary requirement against First Amendment challenge). Sonneman argues that the State is required to use the fairest method of allocating the benefit of positional bias, which he asserts is rotating candidate names. Sonneman is correct in asserting that ballot rotation would be fairer, because it would place each candidate on an equal number of ballots in each position, thus equalizing the effects of positional bias. The question, therefore, is whether the legislature is required to use the fairest method, or whether a reasonable, nondiscriminatory method is sufficient. The cases which have reviewed ballot positioning statutes conflict. Some require only that each candidate must have an equal opportunity to obtain the positional votes, holding that placement by drawing or other neutral means is constitutionally permissible. See, e.g., Clough v. Guzzi, 416 F.Supp. 1057, 1068 (D.Mass.1976) (holding that whether different statutory scheme is warranted to achieve absolute fairness is properly a legislative consideration); Mann v. Powell, 333 F.Supp. 1261, 1267 (N.D.Ill.1969) (holding that allocation of positional bias must be made by lot or other nondiscriminatory means); Gould v. Grubb, 14 Cal.3d 661, 122 Cal.Rptr. 377, 536 P.2d 1337, 1347 (Cal.1975) (noting that rotational method is [not] the only constitutionally permissible ballot procedure); Ulland v. Growe, 262 N.W.2d 412, 418 (Minn.1978) (The method selected by the legislature to assist partisan voters in locating their candidates on the ballot cannot be overturned by this court merely because we think a rotation system would be marginally more fair.); Holtzman v. Power, 62 Misc.2d 1020, 313 N.Y.S.2d 904, 909 (N.Y.Sup.1970) (ordering that ballot positions be determined by lot), aff'd 34 A.D.2d 917, 311 N.Y.S.2d 824 (N.Y.App.Div.1970), aff'd 27 N.Y.2d 628, 313 N.Y.S.2d 760, 261 N.E.2d 666 (N.Y.1970). According to these cases, random determination of ballot positions would be constitutional. On the other hand, some jurisdictions have held that the positional bias must be distributed as equally as possible. See, e.g., McLain v. Meier, 637 F.2d 1159, 1169 (8th Cir.1980) (emphasizing that positional advantage must be eliminated as much as is possible); Elliott v. Secretary of State, 295 Mich. 245, 294 N.W. 171, 173 (Mich.1940) (ordering legislature to implement rotational system). We find that the cases which require only equal opportunity to obtain the benefits of positional bias are more persuasive. We have emphasized that it is not our function to question which of two possible solutions is the wisest as long as the legislature's choice is both reasonable and nondiscriminatory. O'Callaghan, 914 P.2d at 1263. [7] Here, the legislature specifically considered the effects of positional bias and concluded that rotational ballots were not necessary. Since the statute only imposes a minimal, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory burden on the right to vote, we decline to impose strict scrutiny review, and will uphold the statute if the State has important regulatory interests. See id.