Opinion ID: 1649522
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: whether the circuit court erred in allowing recovery of hedonic damages.

Text: ¶ 20. The loss of one's enjoyment of life continues to be an area of confusion in the state of Mississippi. The issue to be decided here is whether our state will or will not recognize this type of recovery in a personal injury action, and if so to what extent? Jurisdictions around the country have chosen either; 1) not to recognize the loss of enjoyment of life, 2) recognize the loss of enjoyment of life as a completely separate element considered in addition to pain and suffering, or 3) recognize the loss of enjoyment of life but only as integrated into pain and suffering. See e.g., Elliott v. United States, 877 F.Supp. 1569 (M.D.Ga. 1992); Loth v. Truck-A-Way Corp., 60 Cal.App.4th 757, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 571 (1998); Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Von Stetina, 474 So.2d 783, 792 (Fla.1985)(recognizing as separate from pain and suffering); Brookshire Bros., Inc. v. Wagnon, 979 S.W.2d 343, 353 (Tex.Ct. App.1998) (recognizing as an element of pain and suffering); Kirk v. Washington State Univ., 109 Wash.2d 448, 746 P.2d 285 (1987). Today we decide to follow the jurisdictions which recognize the loss of enjoyment of life. ¶ 21. The Court of Appeals has pointed out that there are no Mississippi cases directly on point on the question of whether loss of enjoyment of life is an element of damages in a survival personal injury action. KM Leasing, Inc. v. Butler, 749 So.2d 310 (Miss.Ct.App.1999). While we have not declared how to classify the loss of enjoyment of life, we have made clear that the damages to a particular plaintiff in a personal injury action should be decided on a case-by-case basis. Kinnard v. Martin, 223 So.2d 300, 302 (Miss.1969); Mobile & Ohio R.R. v. Carpenter, 104 Miss. 706, 61 So. 693 (1913); Southern R.R. v. Kendrick, 40 Miss. 374 (1866). We allowed recovery for all damages including those for partial loss of enjoyment of life in W.J. Runyon & Son, Inc. v. Davis, 605 So.2d 38, 50 (Miss.1992). This Court has also recognized damages for the loss of enjoyment of life in a number of other personal injury cases. See Flight Line, Inc. v. Tanksley, 608 So.2d 1149, 1163 (Miss.1992) (recognized loss of enjoyment of life as a factor in determining jury award); General Motors Corp. v. Jackson, 636 So.2d 310, 315 (Miss.1994) (holding award that included damages for loss of enjoyment of life not excessive); Atwood v. Lever, 274 So.2d 146, 149 (Miss.1973) (jury instruction on damages for loss of enjoyment of life recognized but found no facts in record to support award of damages based on loss of enjoyment of life.), Haywood v. Collier, 724 So.2d 1105, 1107 (Miss.Ct.App.1998). ¶ 22. Furthermore, we said that an injured plaintiff enjoys the right to damages such as will compensate him for all of his losses, past and future and is entitled to the present worth of all that has been forced upon him. Davis, 605 So.2d at 50. It was not, however, specified as to whether damages for loss of enjoyment of life were to be considered as part of or separate from those for pain and suffering. ¶ 23. The loss of enjoyment of life should be fully compensated and should be considered on its own merits as a separate element of damages, not as a part of one's pain and suffering. We decide to follow other jurisdictions which have held that damages for loss of enjoyment of life compensate the injured person for the limitations placed on his or her ability to enjoy the pleasures and amenities of life. Overstreet v. Shoney's, Inc., 4 S.W.3d 694, 715-16 (Tenn.Ct.App.1999) (citing Thompson v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 621 F.2d 814, 824 (6th Cir. 1980)). This type of damage relates to daily life activities that are common to most people. There are numerous activities that courts have held constitute daily life activities: going on a first date, reading, debating politics, the sense of taste, recreational activities, and family activities. See generally Nemmers v. United States, 681 F.Supp. 567, 575 (C.D.Ill.1988); Dyer v. United States, 551 F.Supp. 1266, 1281 (W.D.Mich.1982); Sweeney v. Car/Puter Int'l Corp., 521 F.Supp. 276, 288 (D.S.C. 1981); Overstreet, 4 S.W.3d at 716. Pain and suffering encompasses the physical and mental discomfort caused by an injury, such as anguish, distress, fear, humiliation, grief, shame, and worry. Overstreet, 4 S.W.3d at 715. A permanent injury differs from pain and suffering in that it is an injury from which the plaintiff cannot completely recover. Id. (citing Jordan v. Bero, 158 W.Va. 28, 210 S.E.2d 618, 630 (1974)). ¶ 24. Evidence was presented at trial that prior to the accident Mr. Johnson enjoyed hunting, fishing, and yard work. As a result of the accident, Johnson suffered brain injury, a cracked pelvis, bruised lungs, pneumonia, and was forced to move to an inpatient rehabilitation center for close to a year. Johnson also testified as to his inability to enjoy those activities in which he participated prior to the accident. His wrist has been damaged and one of his fingers remains crooked. Furthermore, there is evidence that Johnson has a diminished ability to speak. We find that the testimony of Mr. Johnson, Ms. Johnson, the physical therapist, the rehab specialist, the speech therapist, are ample to support damages for Johnson's lost ability to enjoy his prior life style. Johnson has demonstrated that he is conscious of his lost enjoyment of life's pleasures, and our tort system should compensate him for these losses. Perhaps most telling about the effects of the accident on Johnson's life is this testimony from Johnson's daughter, Angela: I watched an active man sit in a wheelchair all day. I watched an articulate man who took pride in his vocabulary struggle to get one word out. And I have watched a person that was always happy look sullen and sad, stare out into space. ¶ 25. It is apparent that Johnson is no longer the person he was prior to the accident. We hold today that these restrictions are significant enough to warrant compensation as a separate and distinct element of damages. ¶ 26. We believe jury instruction P-11A was correctly given. The instruction at issue reads as follows: The Court instructs the jury that damages is the word which expresses in dollars and cents the injuries sustained by a plaintiff. The damages to be assessed by a jury in a personal injury case cannot be assessed by any fixed rule, but you are the sole judges as to the measure of damages in any case. Should your verdict be for the plaintiffs, you may consider the following factors in determining the amount of damages to be awarded as may be shown by a preponderance of the evidence: ... 5.) Loss of enjoyment of Life, and 6.) The value of past, present and future physical pain and suffering and resulting mental anguish, if any. This instruction adequately separates loss of enjoyment of life damages from pain and suffering. The instruction was a simple, appropriate way to place before the jury the issue of loss of the enjoyment of life as a distinct and separate element of damages which cannot be considered as pain and suffering. The trial court did not err in granting this instruction.