Opinion ID: 1913722
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: b. v. state

Text: Subsequently, in B.B. v. State, 659 So.2d 256 (Fla.1995), upon review of a certified question, [6] we found section 794.05, Florida Statutes (1991), [7] unconstitutional as applied to the unique facts of that case, including the fact that both the charged defendant and the alleged consenting victim were aged sixteen. We cast the issue in B.B. as whether a minor who engages in `unlawful' carnal intercourse with an unmarried minor of previous chaste character can be adjudicated delinquent of a felony of the second degree in light of the minor's right to privacy guaranteed by the Florida Constitution. 659 So.2d at 258. After noting that other intimate acts fall within the zone of privacy recognized by the United States Constitution, and in light of our decision in T.W. finding abortion rights to be within a minor's privacy interest, we concluded that Florida's clear constitutional mandate in favor of privacy is implicated in B.B., a sixteen-year-old, engaging in carnal intercourse. Id. at 259. Thereafter, we applied the stringent test [8] to the statute, the standard whereby the State must prove that the statute furthers a compelling state interest through the least intrusive means. Id. at 259 (quoting T.W., 551 So.2d at 1193), and found that the State's interest fell short of that measure in its attempt to punish one sixteen-year-old for consenting to having sex with another sixteen-year-old. We distinguished B.B. from Jones by pointing out material distinctions between both the statutes, the issues under review, and especially the specific factual circumstances involved of two consenting sixteen-year-olds. We specifically distinguished the State's interest that we found compelling in Jones. We noted that Jones implicated an adult-minor situation where the crux of the State's interest ... [was] the prevention of exploitation of the minor by the adult. Id. In contrast, in this minor-minor situation, the crux of the State's interest is in protecting the minor from the sexual activity itself for reasons of health and quality of life. Id. We also explored the ancient roots of the statute in an attempt to determine why the statute protected only unmarried minors who were chaste. Id. Finally, after agreeing with a Fourth District opinion [9] that the statute's apparent purpose was to protect minors from sex acts imposed by adults, we held that section 794.05 was unconstitutional as applied to sixteen-year-old B.B., since in his case it was being used as a weapon to adjudicate a minor delinquent, rather than being utilized as a shield to protect a minor. Id. at 260. [10] Hence, we held, in essence, that the State could not single out, solely on the basis of chastity, one of two consenting sixteen-year-old minors for criminal prosecution. [11]