Opinion ID: 687305
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Collateral Estoppel Effect of Finding on Probable Cause

Text: 54 The issue of probable cause--i.e., whether trooper Flanigan had probable cause to arrest Kraushaar on the DUI count--was a key element in several of the appellant's claims against the defendants. Because the state courts had quashed the arrest based upon a lack of probable cause, the appellant argued that the defendants were collaterally estopped from relitigating the probable cause issue in this case. 55 The Seventh Circuit has held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel may be used to preclude relitigation of issues in a subsequent proceeding when: (1) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted was a party to the earlier proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated and decided on the merits; (3) the resolution of the particular issue was necessary to the result; and (4) the issues are identical. Kunzelman v. Thompson, 799 F.2d 1172, 1176 (7th Cir.1986). There is no dispute that the latter three elements have been met in this case; the decision, therefore, turns upon the first element, identity of the party. 56 As a matter of due process, collateral estoppel can be used to bind only those persons who were parties or who are in privity with parties to the prior proceeding. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 n. 7, 99 S.Ct. 645, 649, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979). The Supreme Court has also held that the doctrine cannot be used offensively--i.e., when a plaintiff seeks to estop a defendant from relitigating an issue which the defendant previously litigated and lost in another action--where the application of the doctrine would be unfair to a defendant[.] Id. at 331, 99 S.Ct. at 652. When analyzed under either of these principles, use of collateral estoppel in this case would be inappropriate. 57 Although [s]trict identity of the parties is not necessary to achieve privity[,] ... the parties must be 'so closely aligned that they represent the same legal interest.'  Kunzelman, 799 F.2d at 1178 (citations omitted). The question ... is whether the defendants were sufficiently involved in the conduct of the state court litigation to actuate the principles of collateral estoppel. Id. In this case, as in Kunzelman, the state itself was the party to the original criminal action. The state's attorney prosecuted the DUI charge and did not even call Flanigan or Winterroth as witnesses in the case, choosing instead to rely solely upon Flanigan's arrest report. Therefore, we find that the defendants in this case, like those in Kunzelman, did not have the requisite privity to the prior proceeding. 58 Our decision in Williams v. Kobel, 789 F.2d 463 (7th Cir.1986), applies a similar analysis in a case virtually identical to the case at bar. The plaintiff in Williams had been arrested for arson but the charges were later dismissed at a preliminary hearing for lack of probable cause. The plaintiff brought a Sec. 1983 suit against the arresting officers, alleging that they violated his constitutional rights by arresting him without probable cause. The decision does not discuss whether the defendants were parties or privies to the original criminal proceeding but, instead, viewed the issue as one of fairness under the Parklane Hosiery standard--i.e., whether the defendants had a full and fair opportunity in the preliminary hearing to litigate the issue of whether they had probable cause to arrest Williams. Id. 59 The decision noted that the arresting officers had no tactical control over the presentation of the evidence, and, in fact, were not even called as witnesses in the proceeding. Under these circumstances, the court concluded, the defendant officers did not receive their full panoply of rights in that they were given no opportunity to challenge the testimony and/or [the plaintiff's] statements much less given the opportunity to present any evidence on their own behalf as to the issue of whether they had probable cause to arrest Williams. Id. at 470. 60 The same circumstances are present in the case at bar. In order to avoid the expense of bringing in witnesses, the state's attorney relied solely upon Flanigan's arrest report to establish the state's case in Kraushaar's statutory summary suspension hearing. Kraushaar testified in his own behalf and presented testimony from his family members and a friend to refute the arrest report's statements concerning his intoxication. The state judge ultimately ruled in his favor, finding that the arresting officer did not have reasonable grounds to believe that Kraushaar was driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence.... 61 Despite this ruling, the state's attorney agreed that rather than waste time, the judge could use the same evidence to rule on Kraushaar's subsequent motion to quash his arrest. Not surprisingly, the judge quashed the arrest, finding that [t]he arresting officer did not have probable cause to arrest Defendant and did not have probable cause to believe Defendant was driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. 62 The appellant argues that prosecution of DUI charges often proceeds on the basis of police reports alone and that Flanigan himself admitted that there was nothing that he would have added by way of personal testimony to the materials he placed in his report. However, the appellant fails to recognize the significance of Flanigan's ability to present live testimony as opposed to a cold report. Given the conflicting testimony, resolution of the probable cause issue necessarily turned upon the credibility of the various witnesses and, as discussed below, credibility determinations rest in large part upon the trier of fact's ability to observe the witnesses' demeanor and appearance. 63 Because Flanigan did not have an opportunity to testify on his own behalf in the state court proceeding and did not have the opportunity to present testimony from other witnesses to corroborate his own observations, he did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of probable cause. Therefore, we find that the district court properly refused to hold that the defendants were collaterally estopped from relitigating this issue in the federal lawsuit. 64