Opinion ID: 3000517
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Due Process Rights of Prisoners

Text: The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from depriving “any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. “There is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this country.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974). Prisoners do maintain due process rights. Id. But in order to serve correctional goals and maintain institutional safety, prison officials must necessarily restrict the liberty of the prisoners they house. See Id. at 556; Rowe v. DeBruyn, 17 F.3d 1047, 1049 (7th Cir. 1994). While Scruggs has framed his challenge in terms of procedural due process, there is an underlying substantive due process issue that must be addressed before we may proceed. Namely, whether Scruggs had the substantive right to a defense-of-others claim in his prison disciplinary proceedings. Our decision in Rowe v. DeBruyn is controlling on this issue. 17 F.3d 1047 (7th Cir. 1994). In Rowe, we considered whether inmates have the substantive right to raise self-defense as a complete No. 05-4238 5 defense in prison disciplinary proceedings. We answered that question in the negative. Id. Rowe argued, as does Scruggs, that the Indiana statute creating a justification defense for defending one’s self or another in the criminal context gives him a substantive constitutional right. Id. at 1051-53; see Ind. Code Ann. § 35-41-3-2. This argument is misguided; the violation of a state statute simply does not create a substantive federal right. Colon v. Schneider, 899 F.2d 660, 672 (7th Cir. 1990). If such a right exists, then it must be found in the Constitution. But, as we noted in Rowe, there is no precedent for a fundamental right to self-defense or defense of others in the criminal context, and certainly not in the context of prison disciplinary proceedings. 17 F.3d at 1052. Scruggs cannot establish a substantive due process right to use violence to defend another person. Even if such a substantive right existed, prison regulations could impinge upon that right if they were “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Id. at 1051 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987); O’Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 347 (1987); Hadi v. Horn, 830 F.2d 779, 784 (7th Cir. 1987)). “A right that threatens to undermine prison discipline by encouraging inmates to combat violence with more violence subverts a core prison function of ensuring order and safety within the institution.” Rowe, 17 F.3d at 1052-53. Such determinations are uniquely suited to the legislature and the executive. “[S]eparation of powers concerns counsel a policy of judicial restraint. Where a state penal system is involved, federal courts have . . . additional reason to accord deference to the appropriate prison authorities.” Id. at 1050 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 85-86). Thus, the prison officials would not be required to accept Scruggs’s defense even if there were a substantive right to use violence in defense of others. 6 No. 05-4238