Opinion ID: 808144
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statements 1 and 6

Text: Williams objected to Statements 1 and 6 at trial, so the proper standard of review is abuse of discretion. See Learmonth v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 631 F.3d 724, 731-32 (5th Cir. 2011). 4 Case: 11-30904 Document: 00511978790 Page: 5 Date Filed: 09/07/2012 No. 11-30904 “The trial judge is in a far better position than an appellate court to evaluate the prejudice flowing from counsel’s improper comments during trial and to determine the most effective response to ensure a fair trial.” Mills v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 886 F.2d 758, 765 (5th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted). When an argument is challenged for impropriety, as is the case here, “we review the entire argument . . . within the context of the court’s rulings on objections, the jury charge, and any corrective measures applied by the trial court.” Learmonth, 631 F.3d at 731 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Alleged improprieties may well be cured by an admonition or charge to the jury.” Id. (citation and internal quotation omitted). Whether the closing argument statements at issue were based on evidence in the record is important to our inquiry. See Alaniz, 591 F.3d at 778. “It is a particularly indefensible tactic to use closing arguments to bring before the jury damaging facts not in evidence and never established.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Although we do not applaud C&E counsel’s word choice in either statement, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Williams’s motion for a new trial on these grounds. There is at least some evidence in the record that supports C&E counsel’s characterization of Schwartz’s actions. For example, one of Williams’s witnesses testified that after meeting with Williams and someone who worked for Schwartz, the witness gave a deposition dramatically different from statements he had previously made. Moreover, the trial court’s instructions to the jury on several occasions clearly described how they were to view attorney statements. For example, immediately prior to closing arguments, the trial court stated: You can disregard what lawyers say particularly if a lawyer says something or interprets the evidence 5 Case: 11-30904 Document: 00511978790 Page: 6 Date Filed: 09/07/2012 No. 11-30904 differently from your interpretation of the evidence. . . . If [a lawyer] make[s] a misstatement [about the evidence or the law], then you have to go by your interpretation of the evidence and your decision or credibility of the witnesses and exhibits admitted into the record. The jury charge includes similar language, as did the trial court’s response in overruling Williams’s objection. We now turn to C&E counsel’s characterization of Williams in Statement 6. At trial, Williams objected to C&E counsel’s description of Williams’s actions during the pulmonary function test, stating, “Your honor, that’s absolutely contrary.” The trial court responded, “Again, it is argument, counsel. Move on.” The record shows that Dr. Swift, one of C&E’s witnesses, had examined Williams prior to trial. At trial, Swift deemed the pulmonary function test that Williams performed during the examination invalid because “[w]e couldn’t get a reproducible test. That could be due to lack of understanding, lack of cooperation, could be a number of factors. We didn’t get a good test.” C&E counsel’s characterization that Williams would “not participate [or] blow in the tube [or] give his effort” is not fully supported by the record. However, in light of the trial court’s instructions to the jury discussed above, all of the evidence presented at trial, and the deference we give to the trial court’s actions at trial, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in denying Williams’s motion for a new trial on the basis of these comments.