Opinion ID: 409582
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Disposition of plaintiffs' claims

Text: 21
22 Seven of the present appellees are individuals who are or were officials of the CIA or the Department of Defense. These individuals were sued for damages based on asserted violations of plaintiffs' rights under the Constitution, on the well-established theory that certain provisions of the Constitution provide direct actions for damages arising from their violation. 42 The claims against these defendants were disposed of in two phases. 23 Defendants Howard Osborn and James J. Angleton were, respectively, the CIA's Director of Security and Chief of Counterintelligence Staff at the time plaintiffs' claims arose. They moved in May 1978 to dismiss the complaint against them for lack of jurisdiction over their persons, on the theory that because they lived and worked in Virginia (where CIA headquarters is located), they lacked sufficient contacts with the District of Columbia to give the court power over them. After directing plaintiffs to adduce evidence showing both venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and personal jurisdiction under the District of Columbia long-arm statute, D.C.Code § 13-423, the court found the proffered evidence of contacts with the District insufficient and dismissed the complaint as to Osborn and Angleton in August 1978 for lack of jurisdiction. 24 Former CIA Directors William Colby and Richard Helms, former Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger (also a former CIA director), Richard Ober (head of the CHAOS program) and Cord Meyer, Jr. (Assistant Deputy Director for Plans of the CIA), remained parties. With the district court's ruling upholding the CIA's claim of the state secrets privilege, however, it became clear that plaintiffs would be unable to adduce evidence to prove any of the details of their claims based on (1) physical and electronic surveillance by the CIA; (2) surveillance conducted by foreign intelligence (liaison) services; or (3) infiltration of plaintiff organizations or other groups to which plaintiffs belonged. Without access to documents identifying either the subjects of CHAOS surveillance or the types of surveillance used against particular plaintiffs, the likelihood of establishing injury in fact, causation by the defendants, violations of substantive constitutional provisions, or the quantum of damages was clearly minimal. 25 Based on the plaintiffs' evident inability to prove their claims, the five individual defendants moved for summary judgment on the claims except those involving letter-opening. 43 The court, with plaintiffs' concession that they could not prove a set of facts entitling them to relief, 44 subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of the individual defendants. 26
27 The heads of the CIA, FBI, Department of Defense and Secret Service were sued in their official capacities for injunctive and declaratory relief. The plaintiffs sought thereby to prevent the government from any future surveillance of the sort alleged to have taken place in the course of Operation CHAOS. 28 In June 1979, the agency heads filed a motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(b) and 12(b)(6) for summary judgment, or in the alternative for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, on all of plaintiffs' claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. 45 The grounds for this motion were that: (1) Operation CHAOS had been terminated in 1974; (2) the United States' involvement in the Vietnam War, resistance to which had been the subject of CHAOS and related intelligence activities, had ended in 1973; (3) the CIA had not collected any information on plaintiffs since 1974; and (4) the promulgation in 1978 (in response to the Rockefeller Commission report) of Executive Order 12036, 3 C.F.R. 112 (1979), governing the gathering of intelligence about U. S. citizens, and the adoption of informal CIA directives implementing that Order, had eliminated any likelihood of future surveillance of the types that plaintiffs alleged had violated their rights. 29 Plaintiffs opposed the government's motion, claiming that the newly-signed Executive Order in fact continued to render them subject to surveillance by the various intelligence agencies, and that in any event, they were entitled to an injunction prohibiting future unconstitutional surveillance and a declaration that Operation CHAOS violated their rights. 30 The court granted the motion of the agency heads on June 5, 1980. With respect to the claims based on the submission by the CIA of watchlists to NSA, the court noted that our decision in Halkin I upholding the NSA's state secrets privilege had prevented discovery of information that would disclose whether NSA had in fact intercepted plaintiffs' communications, and had also rejected the claim that the inclusion of plaintiffs' names on a NSA watchlist required the presumptive inference that their communications had been intercepted. 46 The district court ruled that, as a result of being unable to demonstrate the actual interception of their communications, plaintiffs would be unable to prove any liability on the part of the CIA and its officials, and hence could not make out a case for injunctive or declaratory relief against the agency. The watchlisting claims were consequently dismissed. 31 With respect to the claims based on Operation CHAOS, the district court rejected plaintiffs' contention that there existed a likelihood of their being subjected to CIA surveillance in the future. The Court believes that this is hypothetical or speculative harm which is insufficient to support the grant of declaratory or injunctive relief. 47 It therefore entered summary judgment in favor of defendants on all claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. 32
33 All plaintiffs were served with some 240 interrogatories by the defendants in late 1976. 48 These interrogatories sought, inter alia, information about plaintiffs' political activities, the factual bases of the allegations contained in the complaint, the injuries sustained by plaintiffs, and the damages sought. After several stipulated time extensions, plaintiffs objected to the vast majority of the interrogatories. 49 Two of the organizational plaintiffs ultimately dismissed filed timely answers to those relatively few interrogatories to which they did not object. The defendants then filed a motion to compel. 34 In July 1977, the court entered an order ruling on plaintiffs' objections and incorporating certain agreements as to the interrogatories that the parties had reached at the urging of the court. The court rejected plaintiffs' objections based on the presence of information in public reports and many of the objections to relevance. It deferred plaintiffs' obligation to answer questions relating to damages, plaintiffs' legal theories, and areas covered by the attorney-client privilege until plaintiffs had made further discovery. Plaintiffs were given 14 days in which to answer the remaining interrogatories or the claims asserted by such plaintiffs shall be dismissed with prejudice. 50 35 Plaintiffs failed to comply with that deadline, and were granted an extension of time to August 18, 1977. The order extending the time for filing stated that upon failure to file timely answers, this court will entertain briefs on the issue of what sanctions, if any, should be imposed .... 51 Appellants Cora Weiss, American Friends Service Committee, Clergy and Laity Concerned, and Institute for Policy Studies failed to file their answers by August 18; a motion for further extension was denied. After a hearing, the court on May 24, 1978 granted CIA's motion to dismiss the noncomplying plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' motion in the interim for discovery sanctions against defendants based on similar lapses was denied.