Opinion ID: 2364367
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Transfer of paternity case

Text: Barnes's second point relates to the transfer of his paternity case among several Chancery and Juvenile Court Judges in the Sixth Judicial District. Barnes argues the intra-district exchange violated our holding in Lee v. McNeil, 308 Ark. 114, 823 S.W.2d 837 (1992). The case was originally filed in the Juvenile Division of Pulaski County Chancery Court with Chancellor Joyce Williams Warren presiding and set for trial on Friday, September 27, 1991. Because the Juvenile Judges had a backlog of pending paternity cases, the other Sixth District Chancellors were assisting them in deciding these cases. Although the cases were technically not reassigned, the Chancellors assisted the Juvenile Judges by hearing their cases on Fridays on a rotation basis. The Barnes case was originally scheduled to be heard by one of the six rotating Chancellors, but due to scheduling conflicts, the case was sent back to Chancellor Warren's Court where it had been filed originally. In the Lee case, three judges in the Twentieth District entered into an exchange agreement which created within the District three divisions each of chancery, circuit, and juvenile courts. The practical effect of the agreement was that a criminal case could be heard by a duly elected chancery judge. In granting a writ of mandamus to prohibit this action, we held Ark. Code Ann. § 16-13-403 (1987), which addresses the exchange of districts among judges, did not authorize the exchange of divisions among circuit and chancery judges within a district. The exchange contemplated by the statute was inter-district, as opposed to intra-district. We recognize that the exchange of paternity cases among the Sixth District Juvenile and Chancery Courts was intra-district in nature. The exchange was, however, expressly authorized by statute. Arkansas Code Ann. § 16-13-1403(b)(2) (Supp.1991) provides: The circuit judges and chancery judges subject to this subsection [Sixth District] may by agreement, hold either of the circuit or chancery courts and may hear and try matters pending in any of those courts or may hear or try matters in the same court at the same time. The judges subject to this subsection may adopt such rules as they deem appropriate for the assignment of cases in the circuit and chancery courts of their district. We therefore find the Lee case distinguishable. There is a substantial difference between an agreement which allows a chancellor to preside over a criminal case and an agreement which allows a chancellor to preside over a paternity case which is clearly within the jurisdiction of a chancery court.