Opinion ID: 1691148
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the lower court committed error in failing to give a sua sponte limiting instruction concerning henton's prior felony conviction.

Text: ¶ 6. To prove the charge that Henton was a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, the State introduced into evidence a certified copy of Henton's felony conviction for intimidating a witness. Later, the State cross-examined Henton on his prior conviction: BY MR. HORAN (for the State): Q. Are you the same Kenyatta Henton that was convicted in this courtroom for intimidating a witness? BY MR. HENTON: A. Yes, sir. Q. A witness in a criminal case; right? A. Yes, sir. Q. You intimidated a witness, tried to get them to change their testimony, didn't you? A. Yes, sir. BY MR. BRIDGES (for the defense): Your Honor we are going to object to him going into anything about the charges. BY THE COURT: You can't do that. ¶ 7. Citing McLemore v. State, 669 So.2d 19 (Miss.1996) and Smith v. State, 656 So.2d 95 (Miss.1995), Henton argues that the trial court should have instructed the jury sua sponte to limit its consideration of the evidence of his prior conviction for the particular purpose for which it was offered. However, those cases are different from the one here because there the prosecutor was purportedly using the prior conviction to attack the defendant's credibility under M.R.E. 609 and to show motive under M.R.E. 404(b), respectively. Here, the prosecutor was not proceeding under either evidentiary rule. Instead, he introduced the prior conviction to prove an element of the State's case. ¶ 8. Nettles v. State, 380 So.2d 246 (Miss. 1980) is analogous to the instant case. In Nettles, the State put on proof of Nettles' prior convictions to show that he was an habitual offender pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-83 (Supp.1979). As here, no limiting instruction was requested. On appeal, Nettles argued that the court's failure to instruct the jury sua sponte that it was not to consider Nettles' prior convictions as evidence of the charge of aggravated assault denied him due process. Id. at 247. We found no error in either the defense counsel's failure to request the instruction or the trial court's failure to sua sponte give the limiting instruction. We noted, [S]uch a failure must be evaluated in light of the totality of the circumstances-including all the instructions to the jury, the arguments of counsel, whether the weight of the evidence was overwhelming, and other related factors.... Id. (quoting Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 789, 99 S.Ct. 2088, 2090, 60 L.Ed.2d 640 (1979)). After carefully reviewing the record, we find the sufficiency and weight of the evidence requires us to find no reversible error in the trial court failing to issue a limiting instruction, sua sponte.