Opinion ID: 201670
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Summary Judgment in Favor of Defendant Fagundo

Text: 26 The remaining individual defendant in this case is PRHA Executive Director Fernando Fagundo, who ordered the investigation leading to Cepero-Rivera's dismissal. We now consider appellants' challenge to the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant Fagundo. 27 We review the district court's entry of summary judgment de novo, viewing all facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and granting all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. See, e.g., Torres v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 219 F.3d 13, 18 (1st Cir.2000). Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). We will also uphold summary judgment where the nonmoving party rests merely upon conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation, Rivera-Cotto v. Rivera, 38 F.3d 611, 613 (1st Cir.1994) (internal quotation omitted). 28 Claims of political discrimination are subject to the burden-shifting analysis developed after Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977). Under that analysis, a plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing that political discrimination was the substantial or motivating factor in a defendant's employment decision. The defendant must then show that the decision would have been the same even in the absence of the protected conduct. Avilés-Martínez, 963 F.2d at 5 (internal citations omitted). Because Fagundo acted under color of state law, belongs to an opposing political party, is the one directly responsible for Cepero-Rivera's dismissal, and it is alleged that Cepero-Rivera's political affiliation was the basis for his actions, the district court found that appellants' claims against Fagundo established a prima facie case. Rivera, 301 F.Supp.2d at 111. 29 Once plaintiffs establish a prima facie case, [t]he burden then shifts to the defendant official to articulate a nondiscriminatory basis for the adverse employment action, and prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the adverse action would have been taken regardless of any discriminatory political motivation. 1 LaRou v. Ridlon, 98 F.3d 659, 661 (1st Cir.1996); see also Rodríguez-Ríos v. Cordero, 138 F.3d 22, 24 (1st Cir.1998). In this case, defendants had little difficulty laying out the nondiscriminatory reasons for Cepero-Rivera's dismissal. Defendants contend, and appellants do not deny, that Cepero-Rivera's letter of September 24 stated that he possessed a list of female employees' salaries and fringe benefits. Even viewed in the light most favorable to appellants, we cannot but conclude that this letter gave Fagundo every reason to believe that Cepero-Rivera had improperly obtained this information from personnel files in violation of PHRA regulations. Defendants also allege, and Cepero-Rivera does not deny, that he had previously attached forty-eight pages of Phillips' personnel file to a letter in which he argued that Phillips was mentally unstable — an impermissible use of confidential personnel information under PRHA regulations. In addition, defendants allege, and Cepero-Rivera does not deny, that he refused to recognize the appointment of Santiago as his direct supervisor, which defendants characterize as insubordination. Like the district court, we find that, given the seriousness of Cepero-Rivera's violations of PRHA regulations, defendants easily meet their burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Cepero-Rivera would have been dismissed regardless of his political affiliation. See LaRou, 98 F.3d at 661. Once Cepero-Rivera made the misstep of claiming physical possession of confidential personnel records, it is difficult to see how a supervisor in Fagundo's position could have done anything less than order an investigation, potentially resulting in the employee's dismissal. 30 Nevertheless, at this point, the plaintiff[s] may discredit the proffered nondiscriminatory reason, either circumstantially or directly, by adducing evidence that discrimination was more likely than not a motivating factor. Padilla-García v. Guillermo Rodríguez, 212 F.3d 69, 77 (1st Cir.2000). Appellants' efforts in this regard fail to convince us that discrimination was more likely than not a motivating factor in Cepero-Rivera's dismissal. Appellants offer nothing to directly undermine the credibility of the proffered nondiscriminatory reasons for Cepero-Rivera's dismissal. Their only attack on the substance of these allegations is the contention that when Cepero-Rivera said he had in [his] power a list of the[se] employees . . . with their salaries and fringe benefits, he meant only that he had a copy of the office telephone book, from which he could deduce his female employees' salaries. Even accepting Cepero-Rivera's explanation, we find that the explanation is so implausible that it should not have caused any doubt in the minds of the PRHA officials considering his termination. Having been told by Cepero-Rivera himself, when he thought it suited his interest, that he possessed a list of salaries and fringe benefits of the organization's female employees, we do not see why his employers should believe Cepero-Rivera's later explanation that he had meant only that he had made such a list himself by guessing at salary and benefits from the office phonebook, especially in light of his earlier use of portions of Phillip's confidential information. Thus, although on summary judgment we assume Cepero-Rivera's explanation to be genuine, it does not undermine defendants proffered nondiscriminatory basis. 31 In their brief, appellants contend that defendants' proffered reasons for Cepero-Rivera's dismissal were nothing but an excuse to justify the real reason, which was politically motivated. However, they offer only meager evidence to support that contention. Appellants allege that Fagundo once asked Cepero-Rivera when he was leaving his position, since a new administration had taken office. However, they do not offer any evidence that this incident was anything more than a mistake as to Cepero-Rivera's status as a career employee. Nor do they assert that there was any follow-up conversation or point to other indicia of animus toward Cepero-Rivera on the part of Fagundo. Appellants also state that Phillip suggested that Cepero-Rivera should resign and leave his post to a PDP employee, and that Díaz suggested that Cepero-Rivera change his party affiliation to the PDP. This type of evidence can serve to show that the proffered nondiscriminatory basis for an employee's dismissal was only pretext. However, given the gravity of the charges against Cepero-Rivera, and the fact that they are based on his own admissions that he possessed confidential personnel information, this evidence fails to demonstrate that political discrimination was more likely than not a motivating factor in his dismissal. 32 Appellants' arguments that the charges against Cepero-Rivera were time-barred also fail to convince us that defendants' reasons for Cepero-Rivera's dismissal were mere pretext, particularly as they do not reach the primary charge of personnel file misuse. Appellants' only remaining arguments address irregular procedures followed in the course of his dismissal. However, these arguments do not relate to the grounds for Cepero-Rivera's dismissal. We consider these arguments in our discussion of his due process claims.