Opinion ID: 1193813
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: other unpreserved issues

Text: {47} Defendant raises several additional issues for which he did not fairly invoke a ruling by the district court. Under Rule 12-216(A) NMRA 1998, [t]o preserve a question for review it must appear that a ruling or decision by the district court was fairly invoked. See also State v. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 14, 122 N.M. 777, 932 P.2d 1 (discussing origins of Rule 12-216). In this case, it is Defendant's burden to explain how the issues presented in his brief were preserved in the court below with citations to authorities and parts of the record proper, transcript of proceedings or exhibits relied on. Rule 12-213(A)(4) NMRA 1998; State v. Goss, 111 N.M. 530, 533, 807 P.2d 228, 231 (Ct.App.1991). When an issue is not preserved in this manner, our review generally is limited to consideration of jurisdictional questions, issues of general public interest, or matters involving fundamental error or fundamental rights of a party. See Rule 12-216(B); Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 15, 122 N.M. 777, 932 P.2d 1. Further, the doctrine of fundamental error applies only under exceptional circumstances, as when appellate review is necessary `to prevent a miscarriage of justice' [or] the question of guilt `is so doubtful that it would shock the conscience to permit the conviction to stand.' State v. Osborne, 111 N.M. 654, 662, 808 P.2d 624, 632 (1991) (citations omitted). We apply these principles to Defendant's remaining claims.
{48} On October 17, 1996, Defendant filed a motion to exclude the testimony of the State's fingerprint expert, Ron Smith, or grant a continuance to allow the defense more time to prepare for cross-examination of this witness. Defendant did not pursue this motion before trial, however, and his trial counsel stated at the beginning of his second trial that the defense was ready to proceed. When the State informed the district court that Smith would be called to testify the next day, Defendant's trial counsel indicated that the defense had received Smith's reports and only requested a short time to interview him. The district court granted this request, and no mention was made of the October 17 motion until after the close of the evidence. Under these circumstances, the issue of whether to exclude or postpone Smith's trial testimony was not preserved for appellate review. See Rule 12-216(A); cf. State v. Mora, 1997-NMSC-060, ¶¶ 45-46, 124 N.M. 346, 950 P.2d 789 (holding that a Defendant's inaction when presented with an opportunity to cure the State's delay in disclosing witness interviews resulted in a waiver of the Defendant's claim that the delay prevented effective cross-examination of the witness). {49} Further, the record does not indicate that the district court's decision to allow Smith to testify at trial on October 24, 1996, resulted in fundamental error. We note that Defendant was made aware of the State's effort to obtain further analysis of the palm print on the murder weapon when the State moved for release of the palm print evidence at a hearing on September 4, 1996. The State also provided the defense with Smith's name and phone number in its Supplemental Notice of Intent to Call Witnesses on October 8, 1996. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the timing of Smith's testimony resulted in `a miscarriage of justice' [or made] the question of guilt ... `so doubtful that it would shock the conscience to permit the conviction to stand.' Osborne, 111 N.M. at 662, 808 P.2d at 632 (citations omitted).
{50} Prior to his first trial, Defendant moved to have the State identify any of his prior bad acts that the prosecution intended to introduce at trial. The State responded that the only prior bad act at issue was Defendant's escape from prison while on furlough at the basketball game on the night of the murder. Defendant discussed the inadmissibility of several prior bad acts with the district court on the eve of the first trial, but did not pursue a ruling on the escape evidence after the district court stated that: I don't think I need to rule on things that may or may not occur. Defendant did not object at either his first or second trial when his escape was mentioned in the prosecutor's opening statements and in the testimony of several witnesses. Indeed, Defendant's trial counsel even discussed Defendant's escape with the jury during voir dire in the second trial. Under these circumstances, the issue of the admissibility of evidence concerning Defendant's escape was not preserved for appellate review. See Rules 12-213(A)(4), 12-216(A); cf. State v. Lopez, 105 N.M. 538, 544, 734 P.2d 778, 784 (Ct.App.1986) (To preserve a claim of error for appellate review involving the admissibility of evidence, a party must make a timely objection.). {51} Further, we cannot say that the State's use of the escape evidence affected Defendant's substantial rights or was so unjust as to create grave doubts about the validity of the verdict. See State v. Begay, 1998-NMSC-029, ¶¶ 21-23, 125 N.M. 541, 964 P.2d 102 (discussing limits on appellate review of unpreserved evidentiary issues); Contreras, 120 N.M. at 492, 903 P.2d at 234 (same). Although we acknowledge the injustice of admitting evidence of other bad acts merely to show the bad character of the accused[,] State v. Elinski, 1997-NMCA-117, ¶ 13, 124 N.M. 261, 948 P.2d 1209, it remains within a trial court's discretion to admit evidence of a Defendant's prior acts under Rule 11-404(B) when the State shows that such evidence is relevant to a material issue such as motive or opportunity. See generally State v. Williams, 117 N.M. 551, 557, 874 P.2d 12, 18 (1994). In this case, Defendant's escape was part of the sequence of events leading to the kidnapping and murder of the victim, the unlawful taking of her vehicle, and the crime of resisting, evading, or obstructing a police officer. As part of this sequence, the evidence of Defendant's escape is relevant to the State's theories that Defendant had the opportunity to commit these other crimes, and that his motive for committing the other crimes was to facilitate his escape. The record does not show that the escape evidence was used for an improper purpose, and we will not apply the doctrines of fundamental or plain error here.
{52} Defendant's next contention is that the Double Jeopardy Clause requires reversal of his felony murder conviction because the jury may have impliedly acquitted him of this offense in his first trial. Defendant's claim of implied acquittal is based on his assertion that the district court violated Rule 5-611 NMRA 1998 by not polling the jury on lesser included offenses before declaring a mistrial. Cf. State v. Castrillo, 90 N.M. 608, 612, 566 P.2d 1146, 1150 (1977) (recognizing that acquittal or conviction of a lesser included offense bars retrial on the greater offense), overruled on other grounds by State v. Wardlow, 95 N.M. 585, 624 P.2d 527 (1981). Defendant's claim to a jury poll under Rule 5-611 is based on his contention that the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury that second degree murder and unlawful taking of a vehicle are lesser included offenses of first degree felony murder. Cf. UJI 14-250 NMRA 1998 (jury procedure for various degrees of homicide); UJI 14-6002 NMRA 1998 (instruction for necessarily included offense); UJI 14-6012 NMRA 1998 (multiple verdict forms for lesser included offenses). {53} Under Rule 5-611(D), [i]f the jury has been instructed on one or more lesser included offenses, and the jury cannot unanimously agree upon any of the offenses submitted, the court shall poll the jury by inquiring as to each degree of the offense upon which the jury has been instructed beginning with the highest degree and, in descending order, inquiring as to each lesser degree until the court has determined at what level of the offense the jury has disagreed. This rule does not apply here, however, because the jury was not instructed on one or more lesser included offenses. See O'Kelly v. State, 94 N.M. 74, 75, 607 P.2d 612, 613 (1980); cf. State v. O'Kelley, 113 N.M. 25, 29, 822 P.2d 122, 126 (Ct.App.1991) (Only where the jury is given the full opportunity to return a verdict either on the greater or alternatively on the lesser offense does the doctrine of implied acquittal obtain.). {54} Further, Defendant's trial counsel failed to preserve the alleged instructional error for appellate review because he did not tender any jury instructions at the first trial to indicate that the charges of second degree murder and unlawful taking of a vehicle should be considered as lesser included offenses. To preserve error concerning a failure to instruct on an issue, a correct written instruction must be tendered before the jury is instructed. Rule 5-608(D) NMRA 1998. While we have recognized an exception to this rule when a court fails to instruct a jury on an essential element of an offense that is factually at issue, see Osborne, 111 N.M. at 662-63, 808 P.2d at 632-33, we have declined to apply the doctrine of fundamental error to a defendant's choice of whether to have the jury instructed on lesser included offenses, see State v. Boeglin, 105 N.M. 247, 250-52, 731 P.2d 943, 946-48 (1987). [T]he defendant in a first degree murder prosecution may take his [or her] chances with the jury by waiving instructions on lesser included offenses and cannot be heard to complain on appeal if he [or she] has gambled and lost. Id. at 251, 731 P.2d at 947. {55} When the jury is not instructed on lesser included offenses, [t]he protection ... against double jeopardy may reasonably and rationally be safeguarded by the trial judge exercising sound discretion in determining from the situation before him [or her] that the jury is hopelessly deadlocked. O'Kelly, 94 N.M. at 75, 607 P.2d at 613. Unlike the record in Castrillo, 90 N.M. at 613, 566 P.2d at 1151, the record of Defendant's first trial contains no ambiguity in the jurors' statements that they could not reach a verdict on any of the charges. During deliberations, the jury foreman wrote a note to the district court stating that the jury is deadlocked on all counts. Before declaring a mistrial, however, the district court advised the jury to consider each charge separately and made further inquiries as to whether the jurors were truly deadlocked. The jury's responses to these inquiries made clear that they had deadlocked on all counts and had not unanimously voted to acquit or convict Defendant on any of the charges at issue. Thus, the mistrial did not provide a basis for dismissal of the felony murder charge, and the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss this charge prior to his second trial.
{56} On October 17, 1996, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charges against him on the grounds that his second trial did not occur within six months after the district court filed its order declaring a mistrial on March 27, 1996. See Rule 5-604(B)(3), (D). Because the State filed a nolle prosequi and then re-indicted Defendant with additional charges, however, the six-month time limit for Defendant's second trial did not begin to run until after he was arraigned on the second indictment on April 26, 1996. See Rule 5-604(B)(1); cf. State v. Bolton, 1997-NMCA-007, ¶ 1, 122 N.M. 831, 932 P.2d 1075 (Ordinarily, prosecutors may file nolle prosequis and subsequently file new charges based on the same incident at will.). Defendant was retried within six months of his arraignment on the second indictment, as required by Rule 5-604(B)(1). Therefore, the six-month rule does not provide a basis for reversal of Defendant's convictions. {57} In his Rule 5-604 motion, Defendant made no showing that the State dismissed and refiled the charges in order to circumvent the six-month time limit or for any other bad reason. Cf. Bolton, 1997-NMCA-007, ¶ 2, 122 N.M. 831, 932 P.2d 1075 (noting that trial courts may and should interfere with prosecutorial discretion when prosecutors have bad reasons for their actions). While Defendant alleged prosecutorial vindictiveness in a separate motion to dismiss the aggravated kidnapping and armed robbery charges based on his constitutional rights to due process and a speedy trial, the issues raised in that motion are analytically distinct from the Rule 5-604 inquiry. See id. ¶ 11; cf. State v. Eskridge, 1997-NMCA-106, ¶ 2, 124 N.M. 227, 947 P.2d 502 (distinguishing analysis under six-month rule from analysis of constitutional speedy-trial issue). Therefore, the issue of whether the State dismissed and refiled the charges in order to circumvent the six-month rule was not preserved for appellate review. See generally Rule 12-216(A). {58} Further, the record does not show that any delay caused by the State's nolle prosequi resulted in fundamental error. Defendant requested and received at least three extensions of time from this Court under Rule 5-604(C) before he filed his motion accusing the State of unlawful delay under Rule 5-604(D), and Defendant's motion was filed only four days before his second trial began. In contrast, the State's nolle prosequi was filed only three weeks after the district court's order declaring a mistrial and well before the court had set a date for Defendant's second trial. Thus, unlike Bolton, 1997-NMCA-007, ¶ 14, 122 N.M. 831, 932 P.2d 1075, there is no showing that the State filed its nolle prosequi on the eve of Defendant's trial or under other circumstances suggesting a bad reason. We decline to apply the doctrine of fundamental error here.