Opinion ID: 2321964
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The narrowness of the exception

Text: As these cases demonstrate, there exists only a narrow exception to the general rule that substantial delay in carrying out an announced intent to take property, coupled with substantial adverse economic impact, do not constitute a taking. Appellants themselves acknowledge that a delay-based taking claim requires extraordinary circumstances, and they undertake to meet this standard by claiming unreasonable delay and grossly improper conduct, deliberate and unjustifiable government misconduct, deliberate fraud on the rights of plaintiffs, and a gross injustice. The narrowness of the exception reflects two considerations. First, a broader exception would be contrary to public and private interests in advance announcement of capital projects that substantially affect the community. Before an agency breaks ground on any significant project, whether or not it would require any taking, the agency should be able to get input from the community, which requires advance notice. Early public announcement may also benefit targeted property owners by enabling them to avoid wasteful investment; as appellants acknowledge, property owners may not want to make substantial investments if an impending taking would prevent them from realizing a reasonable return. A lax standard for delay-based taking claims would discourage timely announcement and encourage hasty decision-making. See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, 535 U.S. at 335, 122 S.Ct. 1465. As the Second Circuit stated, We do not believe that the Takings Clause requires a state to choose among planning in secret, not planning at all, and exposing itself to takings claims from every property owner whose land might be affected by its plans. Santini v. Connecticut Hazardous Waste Management Service, 342 F.3d 118, 133 (2d Cir. 2003). The second reason for limiting delay-based taking claims to truly extraordinary circumstances is that intensive review of the management of municipal projects by the courts would raise serious separation of powers issues. [2] Courts avoid legal standards in takings cases that would empowerand might often requirecourts to substitute their ... judgments for those of elected legislatures and expert agencies. Lingle, 544 U.S at 544, 125 S.Ct. 2074. Courts eschew intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures broad latitude in determining what public needs justify the use of the takings power. Franco v. National Capital Revitalization Corp., 930 A.2d 160, 168 (D.C.2007). Although Franco involved deference to legislative branch judgments about whether a taking is for a public purpose, the same principles apply to executive branch judgments about how to manage a project that includes takings for indisputably public purposes. [3] The executive branch is entrusted with principal responsibility to decide what is a reasonable amount of time to obtain public comment and complete planning, and what are the relative costs and benefits of extending an initial schedule to seek further public comment, refine plans, or achieve other valid goals. Courts should not adopt a standard for delay-based taking claims that would permit judges or juries to second-guess these judgments. See Bass Enterprises Production Co., 381 F.3d at 1367 (Governmental agencies that implement complex permitting schemes should be afforded significant deference in determining what additional information is required to satisfy statutorily imposed obligations.) (quotation and citation omitted).