Opinion ID: 1036460
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Authority to Award Attorney Fees

Text: Under Rule 47.7, this court must itself be authorized by law to award attorney fees. Contrary to Gallo’s argument, merely because this court is authorized to review a tribunal that is statutorily authorized to award attorney 6 JANE GALLO v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION fees, does not mean that this court itself is authorized by that same statute to award attorney fees in the first instance. These principles are demonstrated by this court’s recognition of the need to examine the independent statutory bases of the authority of the Board and this court before determining the propriety of a fee award. For example, the Board in certain circumstances may award attorney fees for work before it when attorney fees are not available under the same statute for work done before this court. See Phillips v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 924 F.2d 1577, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“As we have previously observed, [5 U.S.C.] section 7701(g) is not a provision under which fees may be awarded for services in connection with a judicial proceeding.” (citing Olsen v. Dep’t of Commerce, 735 F.2d 558, 560-61 (Fed. Cir. 1984), superseded by statute not in relevant part, Act of Aug. 5, 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-80, 99 Stat. 183, as recognized in Chiu v. United States, 948 F.2d 711, 714-15 (Fed. Cir. 1991))); Olsen, 735 F.2d at 560-61 (“The Board’s authority under . . . [5 U.S.C. § 7701](g)(1) to award attorney’s fees necessarily relates to fees incurred in those administrative proceedings. Judicial review of Board decisions is governed by section 7703, which contains no provision authorizing the award of attorney’s fees incurred in the judicial proceedings. The Board has no authority to award attorney’s fees for services rendered in connection with judicial review of a Board decision.”). Conversely, this court has the statutory authority to award attorney fees incurred in appeals when the Board is not authorized to award attorney fees under the same statute. See Gavette v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 808 F.2d 1456, 1461-62 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (en banc) (noting that Olsen held that the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 5 U.S.C. § 504 and 28 U.S.C. § 2412, “does not apply to proceedings before the board in cases involving ‘tenure’” and treating the “request for attorney fees for proceedings before the board as a request under the Back Pay Act,” but “reaffirm[ing]” Olsen’s holding that “the EAJA applies to appeals from JANE GALLO v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 7 the board to the Federal Circuit, because such appeals are judicial proceedings or ‘civil actions’ under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A)”). We therefore hold that this court does not derive its authority to award attorney fees from the Board’s authority to do so and must have its own statutory authorization to award attorney fees. Gallo is correct that this court is the appropriate forum in which to request attorney fees incurred in proceedings before this court. See Phillips, 924 F.2d at 1581 (“We conclude that a request for attorney fees under the Back Pay Act for services rendered in judicial proceedings must, as in the case of an EAJA request, be directed to this court.”); see also Gavette, 808 F.2d at 1468 (“[W]hen attorney fees and expenses are authorized in connection with an appeal, the amount of the award for such fees and expenses shall be determined by this court.”). But that does not obviate the need for statutory authorization before this court can make such an award. When the Back Pay Act applies, it provides this court with the statutory authority to award attorney fees. See Ramos v. Dep’t of Justice, 552 F.3d 1356, 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (providing “a mechanism by which [a party] can now apply to this court for attorney fees that are authorized by the Back Pay Act” because “Congress wanted a party . . . to have an opportunity to apply for fees not only before the agency but also on judicial appeal,” and granting the party “20 days within which to submit an attorney fee request under the Back Pay Act”); see also Olsen, 735 F.2d at 563 (“[T]he language of the Back Pay Act ‘is sufficiently broad to include attorney’s fees for services rendered in administrative or judicial appeals . . . .’” (ellipsis in original) (quoting Hoska v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 694 F.2d 270, 273 (D.C. Cir. 1982))). We turn now to the question of whether the 2012 Amendment allows this court to provide attorney fees under the Back Pay Act to an FAA employee. 8 JANE GALLO v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION