Opinion ID: 4530983
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Borrás's Section 1983 Claims

Text: On the merits, we begin with whether the district court properly dismissed Borrás's Section 1983 claims. Despite the - 13 - litany of constitutional claims alleged in his complaint, Borrás advances a single argument on appeal: that the SIFC and the Individual Defendants violated his freedom of expression by retaliating against him for speaking out against his fellow employees. Borrás is correct that government officials may not retaliate against an individual for blowing the whistle and reporting misconduct by other employees. See Mercado-Berrios v. Cancel-Alegría, 611 F.3d 18, 25 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006)). However, where a state employee plaintiff (here, Borrás) asserts that a state-employer defendant (here, the SIFC) violated his right to free expression by taking an adverse employment action against him, we qualify the general prohibition against retaliation in recognition of the government's interest in running an effective workplace. See id. at 26. We therefore apply a three-part test in these circumstances, considering: (1) whether the speech involves a matter of public concern; (2) whether, when balanced against each other, the First Amendment interests of the plaintiff and the public outweigh the government's interest in functioning efficiently; and (3) whether the protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse action against the plaintiff. Rosado-Quiñones v. Toledo, 528 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Jordan v. Carter 428 F.3d 67, 72 (1st Cir. 2005)). - 14 - The district court held that Borrás failed to satisfy the first and third prongs of this test, because (1) his speech allegedly giving rise to retaliation was not on a matter of public concern, and because (2) he failed to plead sufficient facts establishing that his expression was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse decisions taken against him. We agree with the district court on both fronts. Borrás all but openly concedes that his speech is not on a matter of public concern; the entirety of his argument on appeal is that his speech need not be on a matter of public concern because Puerto Rico law does not require government employee speech to be on a matter of public concern to be protected. Therefore, according to Borrás, both Supreme Court and First Circuit law restricting the scope of First Amendment protections for government employee speech do not apply here. This proposition is patently untrue as a matter of law. It is established beyond peradventure that a state actor's failure to observe a duty imposed by state law, standing alone, is not a sufficient foundation on which to erect a section 1983 claim. Martinez v. Colon, 54 F.3d 980, 989 (1st Cir. 1995). To the contrary, in order to state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States[.] West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). The Supreme Court has consistently clarified that Section - 15 - 1983 'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.' Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). Whether or not Borrás has a legitimate claim under state law that the SIFC retaliated against his free expression, his Section 1983 claims cannot succeed to the extent that they rely on protections that are present in Puerto Rico law but not in the U.S. Constitution or any federal statutes, as they therefore do not vindicate federal rights, Atkins, 487 U.S. at 49, secured by the United States' Constitution and laws, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We follow controlling First Amendment precedent and find that Borrás's Section 1983 claims were properly dismissed. We have explicitly found that a complaint regarding personal animosity between coworkers, as here, represents a classic example of speech concerning internal working conditions affecting only the speaker and co-workers, not speech which concerns the public. Rosado-Quiñones, 528 F.3d at 5; see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145-46 (1983). The facts before us are strikingly similar to the facts in Rosado-Quiñones, in which the plaintiff was allegedly demoted because he filed a lawsuit against his employer claiming labor harassment. 528 F.3d at 5. There, we found that the plaintiff's claims, which were applicable to him alone, did not implicate the - 16 - ability of the public employer to carry out [its] responsibility to the public, and therefore did not merit First Amendment protection. Id. Applying this standard to the facts presented, we cannot discern any articulable relationship between Borrás's conflict with Escobar and the ability of the SIFC to fulfill its public duties. Even drawing all reasonable inferences in Borrás's favor, our most charitable reading of the complaint still reveals that what Borrás attempts to frame as whistleblowing is better characterized as a scattered collection of misgivings about his fellow employees who, more often than not, were acting in their personal capacities. None of Borrás's speech acts concern the SIFC in its operational capacity — and even if they did, the Supreme Court has denied First Amendment protection to mere extensions of personal disputes which, if released to the public, would convey no information at all other than the fact that a single employee is upset with the status quo. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 148. Because Borrás alleges nothing in the complaint to suggest that this incident could be related to the SIFC's official malfeasance, abuse of office, and neglect of duties — the quintessential subjects of public concern when it comes to public employee speech - 17 - — his claim cannot survive. Rosado-Quiñones, 528 F.3d at 5 (quoting Curran v. Cousins, 509 F.3d 36, 46 (1st Cir. 2007)).4 Furthermore, even if his speech were on a matter of public concern, Borrás still fails to allege a single nonconclusory fact linking his suspension to his whistleblowing acts. The complaint is rife with conclusory allegations that the defendants conspired to fabricate a disciplinary claim against Borrás concerning his physical conflict with Escobar, but remains conspicuously silent on several key questions, such as (a) whether the defendants even knew of the speech that allegedly engendered retaliation to begin with; (b) whether the defendants, if they did know of the speech that allegedly engendered retaliation, felt negatively (or had reason to feel negatively) about the speech; and (c) whether the defendants at any time considered Borrás's speech when suspending him from work. We do not suggest that Borrás must painstakingly allege facts that would address each of these issues to state a claim for relief. But, taken as a whole, these open questions reflect a conspicuous dearth of factual allegations in the complaint that 4 We do not consider whether Borrás's speech in relation to his 2010 demotion was on a matter of public concern because the demotion is the subject of a separate action. See Order, Bisbal-Bultron, CIVIL 10-01555CCC, ECF No. 80. To the extent included in this action, claims related to the demotion are barred by the statute of limitations. See Muñiz-Cabrero v. Ruiz, 23 F.3d 607, 610 (1st Cir. 1994) (explaining that the statute of limitations for a Section 1983 claim in Puerto Rico is one year). - 18 - might tend to show that Borrás's suspension had anything to do with the reporting of his coworkers. Even if the facts--construed in the light most favorable to Borrás--might lead us to conclude that he was treated unfairly by his public employer, a First Amendment retaliation claim must allege specific facts that connect an adverse employment action to the speech or whistleblowing activity. Stripped of its conclusory allegations, the complaint cannot survive under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).