Opinion ID: 1834324
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: failure to produce evidence

Text: The state has the duty to preserve all relevant evidence. If the state has failed to offer evidence under their control and the evidence was not equally available to the defendant, you may infer that the evidence would be unfavorable to the state. NDJI-CIVIL 1625 (modified) Steffes at 610. While drawn from a civil pattern jury instruction, the requested instruction did not include that part of the instruction which permitted the unfavorable inference if `no reasonable explanation for that failure is given.' Steffes at 610 n. 2. The trial court refused to give the requested instruction. This Court held that the trial court did not err in failing to give the requested instruction and upheld Steffes's conviction because there was no evidence the audio tape was erased in bad faith. In Steffes at 612, this Court recognized a prosecutor's duty to preserve evidence: The prosecutor has a duty to preserve evidence that is material and favorable to the defendant. Rule 16(a)(1), N.D.R.Crim.P. A prosecutor's failure to do so may be held to violate the defendant's constitutional right to due process and a fair trial. Rule 16(d)(2), N.D.R.Crim.P. We emphasized [i]t is the State's duty to zealously protect evidence in its possession. Steffes at 614 n. 5. Relying on Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58, 109 S.Ct. 333, 337, 102 L.Ed.2d 281, 289 (1988), this Court said that `unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law.' Steffes at 613. We also recognized: Bad faith, as used in cases involving destroyed evidence or statements, means that the state deliberately destroyed the evidence with the intent to deprive the defense of information; that is, that the evidence was destroyed by, or at the direction of, a state agent who intended to thwart the defense. Steffes. We further recognized, however, less stringent rules might be appropriate if the destruction of evidence is commonplace: The haphazard handling and destruction of evidence, which actions are potentially prejudicial to the accused, may warrant different rules if destruction of evidence is commonplace. Steffes at 614 n. 6. This case involves the Bismarck Police Department's loss, destruction or misplacing of a videotape of Holden performing field sobriety tests. Steffes involved the North Dakota Highway Patrol's destruction of an audio tape of Steffes's performance of an alphabet recitation exercise and a counting exercise. City of Bismarck v. Bauer, 409 N.W.2d 90 (N.D.1987), involved the Bismarck Police Department's destruction of a videotape of the defendant's performance of physical tests and a breath test. Defense counsel asserted in the trial court the loss or destruction of evidence was quite regular. The prosecuting attorney in this case said, I wish they weren't lost all the time, too, but errors are going to be made, acknowledging the loss of evidence is common. If there is a systemic disregard, Madison v. North Dakota Dept. of Transp., 503 N.W.2d 243, 246 (N.D.1993), of the State's duty to zealously protect evidence in its possession, Steffes at 614 n. 5, so that haphazard handling and destruction of evidence ... is commonplace, Steffes, the adoption of prophylactic measures, such as an adverse-inference instruction, may be justified in cases of a failure to preserve evidence in order to protect defendants from the loss or destruction of potentially helpful evidence and to induce the state to adopt better safeguards to protect evidence in its possession. Were we to adopt an adverse-inference instruction as a prophylactic measure in cases like this, however, the instruction requested by Holden would not be an appropriate instruction. The requested instruction would allow an adverse inference to be drawn from every failure of the state to offer evidence in its control. Such an instruction might compel prosecutors to offer unduly cumulative or marginally relevant evidence just to avoid that instruction. This could be avoided by an adverse-inference instruction specifically limited to lost or destroyed evidence, and providing an adverse inference could be drawn from a failure to offer evidence only if no reasonable explanation for that failure is given. Because the instruction requested by Holden was not an appropriate method of dealing with unintentionally lost or destroyed evidence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give it.
Holden's failure to comply with the trial court's discovery order may well have contributed to the unavailability of the videotape at trial. The prosecution did not have the time to search for the correct videotape, as it would have had, if the discovery order had been followed. The defendant's alternative motion to exclude the tape if found demonstrates his doubt as to its exculpatory nature. A defendant's delay in asking for sanctions against the government, for not producing evidence, United States v. $94,000.00 In United States Currency, 2 F.3d 778, 787 (7th Cir.1993), procrastination in seeking discovery of evidence until after a discovery deadline had expired, United States v. Pretel, 939 F.2d 233, 239-40 (5th Cir.1991), or failure in a timely fashion to request an independent analysis of the evidence while it was available, Hamele v. Manson, 577 F.Supp. 439, 444 (D.Conn.1983), are factors a court may consider in dealing with unintentional loss or destruction of evidence while in police control. See also United States v. Shelton, 588 F.2d 1242, 1250 (9th Cir.1978) (Government's failure to provide evidence did not require a new trial where the government made a good-faith effort to locate the material and the defense was guilty of a lack of diligence in attempting to obtain such evidence independently); State v. Eugene, 340 N.W.2d 18 (N.D.1983) (State's loss of physical evidence did not require acquittal or new trial where defense did not attempt to gain access to the evidence until trial and there was no indication in the record that the police knew or had reason to know the items might be material and exculpatory). In light of the defense counsel's untimeliness in seeking to view the videotape, and the speculative nature of its contents, which neither the prosecutor nor defense counsel had seen, we also conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the adverse-inference instruction, or the more drastic measures of mistrial or dismissal.