Opinion ID: 1586247
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether the sentence violated Long's constitutional rights.

Text: ¶ 24. Long asserts that two consecutive life sentences for possession and sale of cocaine as a habitual offender are disproportionate to the offenses and constitute cruel and unusual punishment. ¶ 25. Long was sentenced as a habitual offender to two life terms pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 99-19-83, which states: Every person convicted in this state of a felony who shall have been convicted twice previously of any felony or federal crime upon charges separately brought and arising out of separate incidents at different times and who shall have been sentenced to and served separate terms of one (1) year or more in any state and/or federal penal institution, whether in this state or elsewhere, and where any one (1) of such felonies shall have been a crime of violence shall be sentenced to life imprisonment, and such sentence shall not be reduced or suspended nor shall such person be eligible for parole or probation. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-83 (Rev.2007). Long previously had two drug convictions and a conviction for attempted aggravated assault. ¶ 26. In White v. State, 742 So.2d 1126 (Miss.1999), this Court said: As a general rule, a sentence that does not exceed the maximum period allowed by statute will not be disturbed on appeal. Wallace v. State, 607 So.2d 1184, 1188 (Miss.1992). However, a sentence that is grossly disproportionate to the crime committed is subject to attack on Eighth Amendment grounds. Id. The elements for evaluating proportionality are: (1) The gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (2) Comparison of the sentence with sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (3) Comparison of sentences imposed in other jurisdictions for commission of the same crime with the sentence imposed in this case. Id. at 1135 (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983) (a criminal sentence must not be disproportionate to the crime for which the defendant is being sentenced)). White further states: When a threshold comparison of the crime committed to the sentence imposed leads to an inference of `gross disproportionality' the proportionality analysis of Solem is used. Hoops v. State, 681 So.2d 521, 538 (Miss.1996) (quoting Smallwood v. Johnson, 73 F.3d 1343, 1347 (5th Cir.1996)). One seeking to prove a sentence violative of the Eighth Amendment carries a heavy burden. See Stromas [ v. State, 618 So.2d 116, 123 (Miss.1993)]. Although White's sentence is severe, the Solem proportionality analysis is not implicated in this case. See id. White, 742 So.2d at 1136. See also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991) (... Solem was simply wrong; the Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality guarantee.) ¶ 27. Long relies heavily on White for the proposition that the trial court failed to exercise the discretion allowed by the Legislature. Specifically, Long asserts that the trial court exercised no discretion because there is no indication in the record that it seriously considered the alternative of concurrent sentences rather than consecutive sentences. However, Long does not offer any authority to support this proposition. Also, White involved a sentence enhancement for sale of cocaine within 1,500 feet of a church pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 41-29-142, which is not the enhancement in the instant case. See Miss.Code Ann. § 41-29-142 (Rev. 2009). Further, White specifically distinguished habitual-offender status under Sections 99-19-83 and 99-19-81 [1] from a case such as White's, where the trial court properly could exercise discretion. Only when a defendant has been convicted of a felony or federal crime twice previously and sentenced to two separate terms of one year or more has the Legislature removed any element of judicial discretion and mandated the defendant be sentenced to the maximum term of imprisonment allowed. Miss. Code Ann. §§ 99-19-81 to -83 (1994). White, 742 So.2d at 1137. However, this Court also has said: The fact that the trial judge lacks sentencing discretion does not necessarily mean the prescribed sentence meets federal constitutional proportionality requirements. Notwithstanding § 99-19-81, the trial court has authority to review a particular sentence in light of constitutional principles of proportionality as expressed in Solem v. Helm . That authority is a function of the Supremacy Clause. U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2; Bolton v. City of Greenville, 253 Miss. 656, 666, 178 So.2d 667, 672 (1965).... Our approval of the sentence in this case should not be taken to intimate that reduced sentences for habitual offenders might become the rule. Solem v. Helm does not represent a de facto grant of sentencing discretion, but, rather, ties proportionality to the three-step analysis outlined therein. Clowers v. State, 522 So.2d 762, 765 (Miss. 1988) (this Court affirmed the trial court's reduction of maximum sentence for forgery on the basis that it was disproportionate and cruel and unusual punishment). ¶ 28. In the instant case, Long argues that there is no indication that the trial court evaluated the proportionality of the sentence to sentences imposed for similar offenses in the trial court's jurisdiction and in other jurisdictions. However, Long fails to establish that a threshold comparison of the crime committed to the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality. White, 742 So.2d at 1136. Notwithstanding Long's failure to make this initial showing to warrant a Solem analysis, Long fails to address all three of the required factors set out above. Long alludes to the first Solem factor, but completely fails to address factors two and three. Therefore, Long's claim is procedurally barred. See Willis v. State, 911 So.2d 947, 951 (Miss.2005). Even if Long's claim was not procedurally barred, this Court previously has found that a defendant convicted of possession of a controlled substance may be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole as a habitual offender. See Wall v. State, 718 So.2d 1107, 1114-15 (Miss.1998); see also Oby v. State, 827 So.2d 731, 734-35 (Miss.Ct.App.2002). ¶ 29. Long also cites Ashley v. State, 538 So.2d 1181 (Miss.1989), for the proposition that the trial court was required to engage in a proportionality analysis under the Eighth Amendment. However, for the reasons stated previously herein, Long is mistaken. ¶ 30. In Ashley, Clyde Ashley was convicted of burglary as the result of the shoplifting and in-store consumption of two cans of sardines and breaking into a house to steal the money to pay for the sardines. Ashley, who had prior convictions for burglary and attempted robbery, was sentenced to life imprisonment as a habitual offender. In analyzing Ashley's sentence, this Court noted that even the district attorney acknowledged the undue harshness of a life sentence for Ashley's great sardine caper. Id. at 1185. This Court vacated Ashley's life sentence and remanded for an additional sentencing hearing consistent with Solem, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S.Ct. 3001. Ashley, 538 So.2d at 1185. ¶ 31. In the instant case, Long fails to make a clear argument. In addition to the previously mentioned arguments, Long appears to be making a proportionality argument based on his receiving consecutive rather than concurrent life sentences. However, Long fails to explain how a consecutive sentence is disproportionate, considering that Section 99-19-83 mandates life without parole. Long then asserts that the trial court had a duty under Ashley to determine whether Long's prior conviction for attempted aggravated assault involved actual violence prior to sentencing him under Section 99-19-83. However, in Ashley, this Court found that attempted armed robbery is a crime of violence. Id. at 1185. ¶ 32. Long also cites McQueen v. State, 473 So.2d 971, 973 (Miss.1985), for the proposition that there may be cases where it is not clear whether a conviction was for a crime of violence. In McQueen, this Court relied on authority from other jurisdictions, which found that violence and force are synonymous. Id. at 972-73. This Court held that the phrase crime of violence was not unconstitutionally vague, but acknowledged that there may be cases in which the application of the statute would not be clear. McQueen, 473 So.2d at 973. However, this Court further affirmed the trial court, finding that attempted rape was a crime of violence. ¶ 33. Clearly, attempted aggravated assault is a crime of violence. Assault is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as: Any willful attempt or threat to inflict injury upon the person of another, when coupled with an apparent present ability so to do [sic], and any intentional display of force such as would give the victim reason to fear or expect immediate bodily harm, constitutes an assault. Black's Law Dictionary 114 (6th ed.1990). ¶ 34. Long's sentence was in the statutory range, it was mandatory, and he has failed to establish that his sentence is grossly disproportionate to his crime. Therefore, the trial court did not err in sentencing Long to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment.