Opinion ID: 1852379
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Failure to Move for Trial Judge's Recusal on the Basis of Prejudice Against Appellant

Text: In this claim, Waterhouse asserts that Judge Beach, who has presided over this case since the initial trial in 1980, was prejudiced against him. More specifically, he argues that defense counsel was ineffective in failing to seek Judge Beach's recusal. As the sole basis for this assertion, Waterhouse relies on a statement made by Judge Beach to the Florida Parole and Probation Commission on May 28, 1981. The statement is referenced in the Post-Sentence Investigation Report prepared by the Commission and reads as follows: Sentencing Judge, Robert E. Beach, commented that the subject is a dangerous and sick man and that many other women have probably suffered because of him. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, Post Sentence Investigation Report on Robert B. Waterhouse, May 28, 1981, at 3. At the outset, it is necessary to understand the procedural requirements for filing a motion for recusal. See Rogers v. State, 630 So.2d 513, 515 (Fla.1993) (Although the right to seek disqualification of a presiding judge is substantive in nature, the process governing disqualification is procedural....). Pursuant to Rule of Judicial Administration 2.160(e), a motion for recusal must be filed within a reasonable time not to exceed 10 days after discovery of the facts constituting the grounds for the motion. [14] Similarly, section 38.02, Florida Statutes (1999), dictates that a motion to disqualify must be filed within thirty days after the party learns of the grounds for disqualification. [15] Recently, in Asay v. State, 769 So.2d 974, 980 (Fla. 2000), we wrote, Of course, if the conduct or statements occur after the trial, then the postconviction proceeding may be the first time the defendant can raise them in a motion to recuse. See also Rivera v. State, 717 So.2d 477, 481 (Fla.1998) (addressing merits of motion to disqualify based on the judge's letter to the clemency board); Jones v. State, 446 So.2d 1059, 1061 (Fla.1984) (addressing motion to disqualify judge from presiding over a postconviction proceeding on the merits where defendant's claim was based on statements made by the trial judge following the sentencing proceeding). Waterhouse does not specify exactly which counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to seek the judge's recusal, thus we must analyze the claim as it relates to all stages of this particular case. First, defense counsel at the original trial in 1980 could not be deemed to be deficient for failing to seek Judge Beach's recusal because the statement which forms the basis for this claim was not made until after the first trial. The next time that Waterhouse appeared before Judge Beach was during the postconviction proceedings which began with the filing of a 3.850 motion in 1985 and culminated with our opinion released in 1988 (i.e., the decision which remanded for a new sentencing phase). Waterhouse was at that time being represented by Stephen B. Bright and Clive A. Stafford Smith. During this first postconviction proceeding, defense counsel should have been aware of the statement made to the Commission; therefore, if recusal was indeed warranted, that was the time to have requested such relief. See Asay, 769 So.2d at 979. Defense counsel, however, failed to seek Judge Beach's recusal at that time. Even assuming that defense counsel was ineffective in failing to move for recusal, this Court has repeatedly held that ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel is not a cognizable claim. See, e.g., State ex rel. Butterworth v. Kenny, 714 So.2d 404, 408 (Fla.1998) (citing Hill v. Jones, 81 F.3d 1015, 1025 (11th Cir.1996) (noting that there is no constitutional right to postconviction relief counsel and therefore ineffective assistance of postconviction relief counsel is not a cognizable claim)); Lambrix v. State, 698 So.2d 247, 248 (Fla.1996) (finding that claims of ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel do not present a valid basis for relief). Waterhouse then appeared before Judge Beach at his new penalty phase in 1990. At that time he was represented by a new and different counsel. This attorney, like Mr. Bright and Mr. Stafford-Smith before him, did not seek the judge's recusal. This new counsel, however, unlike Mr. Bright and Mr. Stafford-Smith, may properly be the subject of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Thus, this claim must necessarily be in reference to the attorney providing representation during this 1990 proceeding. As the claim relates to counsel in the 1990 proceedings, the attorney could not be deemed ineffective for failing to seek Judge Beach's recusal because any motion filed during the proceedings in 1990 would have been denied as untimely, or, in the alternative, the issue would have been deemed waived, given the fact that the motion should have been filed during the postconviction proceedings which began in 1985. See Asay, 769 So.2d at 980 (noting that when comment which forms basis for recusal occurs after the trial, postconviction proceedings provide the first opportunity in which recusal may be asserted). Further, even if the merits of the motion could or would have been addressed, Waterhouse's asserted basis for maintaining that Judge Beach was prejudiced against him would not have warranted the judge's recusal. To warrant recusal, a motion for disqualification must concretely allege a well-founded, reasonable fear on the part of the defendant that he or she will not receive a fair trial before a particular judge. See Asay, 769 So.2d at 980; Rivera, 717 So.2d at 480-81; Jackson v. State, 599 So.2d 103, 107 (Fla.1992). We have further noted that a defendant's subjective fears ... are not `reasonably sufficient' to justify a `well-founded fear' of prejudice. Arbelaez v. State, 775 So.2d 909, 916 (Fla.2000) (quoting Fischer v. Knuck, 497 So.2d 240, 242 (Fla.1986)). The fact that the judge has made adverse rulings in the past against the defendant, or that the judge has previously heard the evidence, or `allegations that the trial judge had formed a fixed opinion of the defendant's guilt, even where it is alleged that the judge discussed his opinion with others,' are generally considered legally insufficient reasons to warrant the judge's disqualification. Rivera, 717 So.2d at 481 (quoting Jackson, 599 So.2d at 107). Here, in accordance with well-settled procedures, the Commission sought comments from the sentencing judge. See Rivera, 717 So.2d at 481 (As part of the official clemency process for at least the last few decades, the Parole Commission seeks comments from sentencing judges when considering clemency for any inmate, not only those with capital sentences. (footnote omitted)). While in Rivera we declined to adopt a bright-line rule as to the propriety of comments to the Commission, we reached our conclusion in that particular case on the basis that the comment did not constitute a prejudgment of any pending or future motions that the defendant might file, and that the comment was not made outside the official clemency process in a manner indicating a predisposed bias against the defendant. See 717 So.2d at 480-81 (finding following comment by judge to Commission did not warrant recusal: I am inalterably opposed to any consideration for Executive Clemency and I believe the sentence of the court should be carried out as soon as possible.). Cf. Porter v. State, 723 So.2d 191, 194 (Fla.1998) (finding that recusal was warranted where judge twice overrode jury's life recommendation and stated to the Clerk of the Court that he had changed venue from Charlotte County to Glades County because there had been a lot of publicity and because Glades County had good, fair minded people ... who would listen and consider the evidence and then convict the son-of-a-bitch and judge later added that he would send Porter to the chair); Suarez v. Dugger, 527 So.2d 190, 192 (Fla.1988) (finding judge's extra-judicial comment to newspaper that it's fine with me if this one is the first they actually do impose (immediately) compelled judge's disqualification because statements were sufficient to warrant fear on defendant's part that he would not receive a fair hearing); Rucks v. State, 692 So.2d 976, 977-78 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (finding that defendant had well-founded fear where trial judge characterized case as sickest situation he had encountered in twenty-seven years as an attorney and judge); Fogelman v. State, 648 So.2d 214 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (concluding that judge should have recused himself after commenting that if the female victim of the sexual assault allegedly perpetrated by defendant had been his daughter, he would have killed the defendant himself). In the instant case, as in Rivera, the comment to the Commission did not constitute a prejudgment of any pending or future motions that the defendant might file, and was not made outside the official post-sentence investigative process in a manner indicating a predisposed bias against the defendant. Given the facts in this case, the statement to the Commission indicates nothing more than the judge's opinion after having heard evidence relating to two exceedingly cruel and brutal murders of women who were sexually assaulted. [16] The circumstances of these murders, coupled with Waterhouse's own admission that he had a problem with sex and violence, would lead any reasonable person to conclude that Waterhouse is a dangerous and sick man. Moreover, nothing in this record indicates that Judge Beach was biased or prejudiced against Waterhouse. On the contrary, as we articulated in our opinion on direct appeal following the imposition of the death penalty for a second time, Clearly, the trial court, the prosecutor, and his own attorney bent over backwards in trying to give Waterhouse the benefit of every legal right to which he was entitled. Waterhouse, 596 So.2d at 1014. In light of the above circumstances, we do not conclude that any of the attorneys who have throughout the years represented Waterhouse, including counsel during the 1990 proceedings, were ineffective in failing to seek Judge Beach's recusal. Thus, the trial court's denial of an evidentiary hearing on this claim is affirmed.