Opinion ID: 1729118
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: was the statement given induced by threats or promises?

Text: ¶ 29. Taylor contends that her confession should have been suppressed because it was the product of threats and promises made by police personnel Jenkins and Ezell, as well as FBI Agent Lorraine. Taylor cites Abram v. State, 606 So.2d 1015 (Miss.1992), where this Court commented on coerced or improperly induced statements. This Court held, [w]e have repeatedly condemned the practice whereby law enforcement interrogators, or related third parties, convey to suspects the impression, however slight, that co-operation by the suspect might be of some benefit. Id. at 1031. ¶ 30. Regarding statements made by Detective Jenkins prior to Taylor's confession, the record shows that Jenkins's statements served to urge Taylor to tell the truth so she would feel better about herself. Jenkins clearly stated during the interview that she did not have the authority to get any charges dropped or reduced for Taylor or her boyfriend. ¶ 31. Captain Ezell's statements were not captured on the videotape of Taylor's interrogation but testimony at the hearing provided insight as to what was said by Ezell when he entered the room. It is apparent that Ezell used a tougher tone and may have even cursed when talking with Taylor. Taylor asserts that Ezell yelled at her and said that if she did not tell the truth that she and her boyfriend were going down. According to Jenkins, Ezell told Taylor, You've lied and there is no guy ... We're just wasting our time. Stop wasting this detective's time. Jenkins also testified that Ezell made no promises or threats to Taylor. Watching from the observation room and unable to hear the dialogue between the participants in the interview, Chief Whitmore stated that he did not see anything to cause him to believe that Taylor was threatened or intimidated while Ezell was in the room. ¶ 32. Taylor also contends that the groundwork for an induced confession was laid at Taylor's first interview with Officer Bosarge and FBI Agent Lorraine. Taylor points to statements Lorraine admitted making during his interview with Taylor. These statements consist of Lorraine explaining to Taylor that she will be better off if she tells the truth and asking her to explain what occurred so she can have peace of mind. Taylor contends that the combined words and actions of Jenkins, Ezell and Lorraine remove the voluntariness from Taylor's confession. ¶ 33. The Mississippi Court of Appeals recently addressed the issue of overruling a motion to suppress in Mullins v. State, 757 So.2d 1027 (Miss.Ct.App.2000). The Court of Appeals stated: Regarding the overruling of a motion to suppress by the circuit court, our scope of review is limited. Once the trial judge has determined at a preliminary hearing, that a confession is admissible, the defendant/appellant has a heavy burden in attempting to reverse that decision on appeal. Sills v. State, 634 So.2d 124, 126 (Miss.1994) (quoting Frost v. State, 483 So.2d 1345, 1350 (Miss.1986)). Such findings are treated as findings of fact made by a trial judge sitting without a jury as in any other context. As long as the trial judge applied the correct legal standards, his decision will not be reversed on appeal unless it is manifestly in error, or is contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Foster v. State, 639 So.2d 1263, 1281 (Miss.1994) (citations omitted). Where, on conflicting evidence, the court makes such findings, this Court generally must affirm. Lesley v. State, 606 So.2d 1084, 1091 (Miss. 1992) (citations omitted). Mullins, 757 So.2d at 1030. ¶ 34. The question before this Court is whether there were promises or inducements offered by the officers to Taylor if she confessed. The trial court used the correct legal standard enunciated by this Court. The test in such cases is whether the inducement is of a nature calculated under the circumstances to induce a confession irrespective of its truth or falsity. Robinson v. State, 247 Miss. 609, 612-13, 157 So.2d 49, 51 (1963). The trial court also properly considered Layne v. State, 542 So.2d 237, 240 (Miss.1989), where this Court found that a defendant, who claimed that he had confessed as a result of promises made by the officers that he would receive leniency, had freely and voluntarily given his statement after he had been appropriately advised of his rights, and done without any force, threats or promises having been made. ¶ 35. In the first motion to suppress, the trial court carefully reviewed the evidence and law and determined that the actions of Jenkins and Ezell did not constitute promises, inducements or threats and that Taylor confessed because she knew that the truth would clear her boyfriend. Although the trial court did not provide a memorandum order for the second motion for suppression, it can be safely assumed that the trial court used the same standards in reviewing Lorraine's statements. Lorraine's comments during Taylor's initial interview did not rise to the level of promises, inducements or threats that would render Taylor's confession that occurred on the following day involuntary. ¶ 36. The trial court applied the correct legal standard and did not make a decision that was manifestly in error or contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. This assignment of error is denied.