Opinion ID: 1483830
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Arrest and Search Valid Motion to Suppress Properly Denied

Text: The Superior Court denied Jackson's motion to suppress the evidence, ruling that the evidence the police recovered had been either abandoned by Jackson or seized incident to his lawful arrest. The court explained its reasoning in denying the motion to suppress as follows: [The search] is reasonable. It is within a relatively close period of time from the original confrontation in the direction that the search was pushingat least the police hopedpushing the individual involved in the contact with Officer Herring. The items in question were either found on the defendant or he was observed discarding the same. They were secured incident to a lawful arrest and inventoried as well. And promptly identified as being contraband from the Brandywine [Boulevard home].... I will conclude, find or rule that [the bag] is abandoned property in the first instance, but even if it isn't, it was taken incident to a lawful arrest. It would have to be. It was dropped, [the defendant] ran across the street, [the] defendant [was] arrested, [then the] bag [was] picked up. It was part of the contraband. Either way or alternatively, I think the motion to suppress goes out. It should be denied as well as to the items that were found on his person. We review the Superior Court's grant or denial of a motion to suppress for abuse of discretion. [25] We examine the trial court's legal conclusions de novo for errors in formulating or applying legal precepts. [26] We will uphold the trial court's factual findings unless they are not supported by sufficient evidence and are clearly erroneous. [27] Jackson claims that his arrest and search were illegal and that the evidence obtained during the illegal arrest and search is fruit of the poisonous tree that should have been excluded. He asserts that the police lacked a reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop him because he was not engaged in any criminal conduct at the time. He argues that he was merely riding a bicycle through a parking lot at 8:30 p.m. on a Saturday night and happened to be a thin, black man with facial hair. Although he recognizes that the police were searching for a suspect described as a black male, thin, six feet tall, dark complexion and with facial hair, Jackson contends that the suspect had been wearing a puffy jacket, golden brown in color and was identified as Corron Moon. Jackson argues that [h]is jacket did not match that worn by [the] original suspect, Moon. Therefore, he claims, his apprehension, detention and search violated the Delaware and United States Constitutions. However, he cites no authority for either contention. In Ortiz v. State , we held that conclusory assertions that the Delaware Constitution has been violated will be considered to be waived on appeal. [28] Accordingly, if an alleged violation of the Delaware Constitution is not fully and fairly presented to this Court, it will not be addressed on appeal. [29] Jackson's brief makes only a general reference to the law of search and seizure and his motion to suppress mentions only that he sought that all evidence ... be suppressed as a result of his illegal arrest in violation of his federal and state constitutional protections. He cites no relevant constitutional provisions in his motion to suppress and cites no case law in his brief. Accordingly, Jackson has waived any claim that the evidence was seized in violation of the Delaware Constitution. [30] We will consider only his claims under the United States Constitution. We conclude that Jackson also has failed to assert a violation of the United States Constitution. With regard to the bicycle and bag Jackson discarded prior to his detention by Officer Guzevich, the Fourth Amendment's protection had not yet attached. The Fourth Amendment's protection from unlawful searches and seizures does not attach until an officer applies physical force to the suspect or the suspect submits to an officer's show of authority. [31] In this case, Jackson was not seized until he was physically subdued by Officer Guzevich following the foot chase. [32] Property discarded by a suspect who refuses to submit to an officer's authority and flees is deemed abandoned. [33] There is no legal basis under the Fourth Amendment to suppress that abandoned property. [34] Therefore, the Superior Court properly denied the motion to suppress the bag Jackson threw away and the bicycle he left behind as he fled from the police. [35] Under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, Jackson was seized when he submitted to Officer Guzevich's show of authority, i.e., when he was physically subdued. He discarded the bag and bicycle before his seizure. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly denied the motion for suppression of the bag and bicycle because they were abandoned and not protected by the Fourth Amendment. [36] With regard to the items recovered from Jackson's person after his arrest, we conclude that the police had probable cause to arrest Jackson and lawfully seized those items incident to Jackson's arrest. The Superior Court ruled that those itemsthe iPod, palm pilot, class ring, photo, and twenty dollarswere lawfully seized incident to Jackson's arrest. The State did not address the seizure of those items. Whether suppression was properly denied depends on whether the arrest was lawful. Therefore, we must consider whether the police had probable cause to arrest Jackson. [37] Whether there was probable cause to arrest a defendant is determined under a totality of the circumstances test. [38] Jackson argues that the police had no reason to stop him and implies that the police stopped him solely on the basis of race. Although a stop based solely on race is impermissible under the Fourth Amendment, the use of race may be legitimate when it is one among several factors suggestive of criminality. [39] Jackson matched the description of the suspect given by Officer Herring. That description contained one racial element, but the other, racially neutral circumstances surrounding Jackson's arrest were amply sufficient to establish probable cause. Jackson was in a nearly deserted shopping center, in an area the police had cordoned off, shortly after a suspect of similar appearance had fled from Officer Herring. In addition, Jackson fled from Officer Guzevich immediately upon seeing the police car and discarded the bag he was carrying. Having considered the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the record reflects that the police had probable cause to lawfully arrest Jackson. [40] Accordingly, the Superior Court properly denied the motion for suppression of the items the police discovered on Jackson's person during their search incident to his lawful arrest. [41]