Opinion ID: 2546413
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Refusal to Ask Follow-up Questions

Text: Defendant cites several instances in which he sought unsuccessfully to have the trial court conduct additional questioning of certain prospective jurors in order to have them elaborate on the answers given in their questionnaires and during in-court examination. By denying these requests, he claims, the trial court compromised his ability to acquire sufficient information to exercise his challenges, both for cause and peremptorily, in an intelligent manner and thereby violated his constitutional rights. Although defendant identifies 14 prospective jurors of whom he sought to have the trial court ask additional questions on voir dire, only two actually served on his jury. Accordingly, even assuming error as to the other 12, no prejudice could have resulted from the trial court's refusal to engage in supplementary voir dire questioning as to them. ( People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 866, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 747, 62 P.3d 1; People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1157, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 892, 938 P.2d 950.) The two who served on defendant's jury were Juror B.R. and Juror H.R. In his questionnaire, Juror B.R. made clear he was in favor of the death penalty, [15] but would not automatically vote for death without considering the evidence, both aggravating and mitigating, including defendant's background and character. When questioned in open court, he affirmed he would not automatically vote for death as the appropriate penalty and that he would follow the law as described by the trial court even if he did not agree with it. Defense counsel requested supplemental voir dire of Juror B.R. and also challenged him for cause. The trial court denied both the request and the challenge, noting the juror pass[ed] Wainwright v. Witt scrutiny, both on the questionnaire and in open court, and [expressed] the general feelings that he has, the evident frustration in the criminal justice system, as well as his views of punishment in general. Like Juror B.R., Juror H.R. also expressed favorable views about the death penalty in her jury questionnaire, [16] but indicated she could set aside her personal feelings and follow the law as explained by the trial court. In open court, she affirmed she would not automatically vote for the death penalty. As with Juror B.R., defense counsel challenged Juror H.R. for cause and, in the alternative, requested that the trial court ask additional questions of her. The trial court denied the challenge for cause, explaining that [h]er views generally are that the death penalty is a deterrent. She answered twice both in the [questionnaire] and orally the Wainwright v. Witt questions and does not fall within the standard. The court also denied the request for additional voir dire questioning. In neither case did defense counsel explain to the trial court what additional questions he sought to have asked, what subjects needed additional exploration, or why the existing information he had about Jurors B.R. and H.R. (from their detailed questionnaires and from their answers to the in-court questioning by the trial court) was insufficient to exercise his challenges intelligently. Nor does he now explain what additional information he had hoped to discover by having the court ask additional questions. Although defendant relies on People v. Cash (2002) 28 Cal.4th 703, 718-723, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 545, 50 P.3d 332, that case is distinguishable. In Cash, the defendant sought to ask prospective jurors additional questions on a particularly relevant topic that, on the facts of that case, could have undermined their assertions of impartiality. Concluding the trial court committed reversible error by refusing to permit additional questions, we explained that the trial court's ruling prohibited defendant's trial attorney from inquiring during voir dire whether prospective jurors would automatically vote for the death penalty if the defendant had previously committed another murder. Because in this case defendant's guilt of a prior murder (specifically, the prior murders of his grandparents) was a general fact or circumstance that was present in the case and that could cause some jurors invariably to vote for the death penalty, regardless of the strength of the mitigating circumstances, the defense should have been permitted to probe the prospective jurors' attitudes as to that fact or circumstance. In prohibiting voir dire on prior murder, a fact likely to be of great significance to prospective jurors, the trial court erred. ( Id. at p. 721, 122 Cal. Rptr.2d 545, 50 P.3d 332, italics added.) Here, in contrast, defendant identifies no fact about his case that is comparable in relevance to the prior murders in People v. Cash, supra, 28 Cal.4th 703, 122 Cal. Rptr.2d 545, 50 P.3d 332, facts that could potentially have prejudiced even a reasonable juror. There were in this case no prior murders, no sensational sex crimes, no child victims, no torture. (See, e.g., id. at p. 721, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 545, 50 P.3d 332.) That defendant personally committed the murder was not seriously in question. Because defendant does not explain what additional information he sought to have elicited or how the existing information about Jurors B.R. and H.R. was inadequate, and because it appears defendant had sufficient information to intelligently exercise his challenges, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the requests for additional voir dire questioning of Jurors B.R. and H.R. ( People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 713-714, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46 [applying the abuse of discretion standard of review].) [17]