Opinion ID: 2561867
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Plaintiffs' argument

Text: Plaintiffs do not claim to have made or attempted any purchase from Rawlings, nor do they claim that Rawlings solicited any. Rather, Plaintiffs argue that in the context of debt collection, the proper focus should be on whether the underlying obligation or debt is a consumer debt, as opposed to a commercial or business one. In other words, if the alleged debt arises in a consumer context, then the debt holder is a consumer who may bring suit under HRS § 480-13(b). Under Plaintiffs' theory, they would qualify as consumers because Rawlings was collecting on the loan agreement from HMSA purporting to advance Plaintiffs the expenses for their medical treatment, which is akin to a service for personal purposes. See HRS § 480-1. Plaintiffs contend that the opposite result would lead to an absurd result and controvert the clear intent of HRS chapter 443B to protect debtors from abusive collection agencies. Sen. Comm. Rep. No. 541, in 1987 House Journal, at 1355. In support of their argument, Plaintiffs cite the definition of debt in HRS § 4431, which they contend shows that in the context of debt collection, the focus is on the nature of the alleged debt. HRS § 443B-1 defines debt to mean any obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money or other forms of payment arising out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services, which are the subject of the transaction, are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, whether or not such obligation has been reduced to judgment. HRS § 443B-1 (emphases added). Based on this definition, Plaintiffs assert that the loan agreement from HMSA to pay for their personal medical treatments amounts to, a transaction within the meaning of debt. In the context of collection agency abuses actionable under HRS § 480-13, it is unlikely that the legislature intended to limit the ability to sue to those who had made, attempted to make, or were solicited to make a purchase by a collection agency. This would be an inconsistent, if not absurd, result that the legislature would not have intended. See Beneficial Hawai`i, Inc. v. Kida, 96 Hawai`i 289, 309, 30 P.3d 895, 914-15 (2001) ([T]he legislature is presumed not to intend an absurd result, and legislation will be construed to avoid, if possible, inconsistency, contradiction, and illogicality. (Citations and internal quotation marks omitted.)). HRS § 443B-20 states that any violation of chapter 443B shall constitute . . . unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce for the purpose of section 480-2. HRS § 443B-20. HRS § 480-2 in turn specifies that a consumer may bring an action based upon unfair or deceptive acts or practices, HRS § 480-2(d), and the prerequisites for bringing suit are laid out in HRS § 480-13. See HRS § 480-13(b) (Any consumer who is injured by any unfair or deceptive act or practice forbidden or declared unlawful by section 480-2 . . . (1) May sue for damages. . . .; and (2) May bring proceedings to enjoin the unlawful practices. . . . ). By deeming violations of HRS chapter 443B an unfair or deceptive act or practice for the purposes of HRS § 480-2, it is evident that the legislature wished to have chapter 443B be enforceable in the same manner as other unfair trade practices under chapter 480. If enforcement were limited to individuals who had purchased, attempted to purchase, or were solicited for purchase of a service or good from a collection agency, enforcement of HRS chapter 443B would be left entirely in the hands of the state. In view of the expressed purpose of HRS chapter 480 to encourage those who have been victimized by persons engaging in unfair or deceptive acts or practices to prosecute their claim, Hse. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 541, in 1987 House Journal, at 1355, and the intent of HRS chapter 443B to protect creditors from unscrupulous or dishonest collection agencies, and to protect debtors from abusive collection agencies, this result would not be in keeping with the statutory structure and would appear to be the type of inconsistent, or absurd, result that this court must presume the legislature would not have intended. [18] Rather, in the context of consumer debt, the determination of whether the individual seeking suit is a consumer should rest on whether the underlying transaction which gave rise to the obligation was for a good or service that is primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, HRS § 480-1. This reading is supported by the definition of debt in HRS § 443B-1, as well as the fact that the statutory structure of HRS chapter 480 does not require that one be a consumer of the defendant's goods or services, but merely a consumer. Cf Flenniken v. Longview Bank and Trust Co., 661 S.W.2d 705, 707 (Tex.1983) (Privity between the plaintiff and defendant is not a consideration in deciding the plaintiff's status as a consumer under the [Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act]. A plaintiff establishes his standing as a consumer in terms of his relationship to a transaction, not by a contractual relationship with the defendant. The only requirement is that the goods or services sought or acquired by the consumer form the basis of his complaint. (Citations omitted.)). [19]