Opinion ID: 2542673
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: standard of review

Text: The standard to be applied by the trial court in ruling upon a motion for a judgment of acquittal is whether, upon the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution and in full recognition of the province of the trier of fact, a reasonable mind might fairly conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. An appellate court employs the same standard of review. State v. Maldonado, 108 Hawai`i 436, 442, 121 P.3d 901, 907 (2005) (citation omitted) (format altered).
[T]he granting or denial of a motion for new trial is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Yamada, 108 Hawai`i 474, 478, 122 P.3d 254, 258 (2005) (citation omitted). It is well-established that an abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court has clearly exceed[ed] the bounds of reason or disregards rules or principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment of a party litigant. Id. (citation omitted). Furthermore, at a hearing on a motion for new trial, the trial court acts as the trier of fact. State v. St. Clair, 101 Hawai`i 280, 287, 67 P.3d 779, 786 (2003) (citation omitted). In this jurisdiction, a trial court's FOFs are subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review. An FOF is clearly erroneous when, despite evidence to support the finding, the appellate court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. And where there is substantial evidence, which is credible evidence of sufficient quantity and probative value to justify a reasonable person in reaching conclusions that support the FOFs, the FOFs cannot be set aside. Moreover, an appellate court will not pass upon issues dependent upon credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence; this is the province of the trial judge. Id. (citations, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted). A trial court's conclusions of law, however, are reviewed de novo, under the right/wrong standard of review. State v. Kido, 109 Hawai`i 458, 461, 128 P.3d 340, 343 (2006).
The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law, which is reviewed de novo, under the right/wrong standard. State v. Friedman, 93 Hawai`i 63, 67, 996 P.2d 268, 272 (2000). We answer questions of constitutional law by exercising our own independent constitutional judgment based on the facts of the case. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law reviewable de novo.  State v. Kalani, 108 Hawai`i 279, 283, 118 P.3d 1222, 1226 (2005) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). It is well settled that our foremost obligation when construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, which is to be obtained primarily from the language contained in the statute itself. And we must read statutory language in the context of the entire statute and construe it in a manner consistent with its purpose. Id. (citation omitted).