Opinion ID: 1685556
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Extent to which Jennings, as distinguished from his counsel, was personally responsible for the delay.

Text: ¶ 28. Jennings contends that he was not personally responsible for the delay. Jennings testified that Peggy's counsel had prolonged his efforts to move the case forward by continually refusing to show or produce what was requested . . . and canceling hearings and other meetings. Jennings stated that he called each of his attorneys [n]o less than every week and asked them to move the case forward. Additionally, in his order overruling Peggy's initial motion to dismiss, the chancellor found that most of the delay occasioned in bringing this case to trial was not [Jennings], but others. . . . ¶ 29. Where a litigant has not been an active participant in the fault, the sanction of dismissal with prejudice should be a last resort. See Flaksa v. Little River Marine Constr. Co., 389 F.2d 885, 889 n. 11 (5th Cir.1968). While a client may be held accountable for his attorney's conduct, many courts have imposed lesser sanctions than dismissal where fault lies with the attorney rather than the client. Rogers, 669 F.2d at 322 (citing Link v. Wabash Railroad, 370 U.S. 626, 633-34, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 1390, 8 L.Ed.2d 734, 740 (1962); 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2370, at 201 n. 86 (1971)). ¶ 30. While the chancellor found that most of the delay was not attributable to Jennings individually, he also stated that Jennings bore the obligation to prosecute the case to a conclusion and that he who seeks equity must be vigilant. See Last Will and Testament of Winding v. Estate of Winding, 783 So.2d 707, 711 (Miss.2001) (citing In re Estate of Davis, 510 So.2d 798, 800 (Miss.1987)). ¶ 31. We agree that Jennings must bear some responsibility for an almost nine-year period in which no substantive action was taken.