Opinion ID: 500110
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Authority to Override a Valid Will.

Text: 29 Assuming arguendo that the jurisdictional issue were not dispositive in this case, the district court was without authority to override Douglas' valid will. 4 The Supreme Court has spoken clearly on this issue in two cases. 30 In Blanset v. Cardin, 256 U.S. 319, 41 S.Ct. 519, 65 L.Ed. 950 (1921), an Indian woman left a will disposing of allotted land which did not include her husband as a beneficiary. Her husband, a non-Indian, sought a one-third interest in the land under state law. The Supreme Court held that the husband had no interest in the land, stating conclusively: 31 In a word, the act of Congress [25 U.S.C. Sec. 373, governing the validity of Indian wills] is complete in its control and administration of the allotment and of all that is connected with or made necessary by it, and is antagonistic to any right or interest in the husband of an Indian woman in her allotment under the Oklahoma Code. 32 Blanset, 256 U.S. at 326, 41 S.Ct. at 522. The Court continued: 33 [I]t was the intention of Congress that this class of Indians should have the right to dispose of property by will under this act of Congress, free from restrictions on the part of the State as to the portions to be conveyed or as to the objects of the testator's bounty, provided such wills are in accordance with the regulations and meet the approval of the Secretary of the Interior. 34 Id. at 326-27, 41 S.Ct. at 522. 35 More recently, in Tooahnippah v. Hickel, 397 U.S. 598, 90 S.Ct. 1316, 25 L.Ed.2d 600 (1970), the Supreme Court overturned the Secretary of the Interior's invalidation of an Indian's will. In his will the Indian testator had left nothing to his daughter, and the Secretary concluded that it would be inappropriate to perpetuate this utter disregard for the daughter's welfare   . Tooahnippah, 397 U.S. at 602, 90 S.Ct. at 1319. The Supreme Court stated: 36 To sustain the administrative action performed on behalf of the Secretary would, on this record, be tantamount to holding that a public officer can substitute his preference for that of an Indian testator.    [W]e cannot assume that Congress, in giving testamentary power to Indians respecting their allotted property with the one hand, was taking that power away from the other by vesting in the Secretary the same degree of authority to disapprove such a disposition. 37