Opinion ID: 2166754
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Preclusion of Expert Witness

Text: The trial court barred Stradley's expert from testifying because the witness was not identified in response to Panaccion's interrogatories or in a pretrial conference statement. Stradley's counsel explained to the court that it had arranged for a person to serve as an expert witness but, shortly before trial, that person became unavailable to testify. Stradley immediately began to search for another expert witness and, ten days prior to trial, secured the services of such a witness. The next day, Stradley notified Panaccion by telephone that it would offer the testimony of this expert witness. Panaccion's counsel acknowledged on the record that the next day Stradley informed him by telephone of these events (N.T. 627-629). Both parties acknowledged that Stradley's expert was not identified in the answers to Panaccion's interrogatories and that Panaccion's counsel was first given a signed copy of the expert's report on the day of trial at which Stradley called its expert to testify. Panaccion's counsel also acknowledged, however, that he had received an unsigned copy of the expert's report eight days prior to trial (N.T. 628). Although the parties do not dispute this sequence of events, their arguments are decidedly antagonistic. Stradley asserts that Panaccion was not prejudiced by an inability to prepare for cross-examination because the latter knew in advance of trial the identity of the expert and the substance of the testimony. Panaccion maintains that the preclusion of the expert's testimony is mandatorily prescribed pursuant to the discovery rules. Pursuant to the relevant discovery rule, the proponent of an expert witness is required to identify its expert witness in response to interrogatories and state the substance of the expert's facts and opinions in a signed report or answer. Pa.R.Civ.P. 4003.5(a)(1). The failure to comply with Rule 4003.5(a)(1) is addressed in subsection (b), which provides as follows: (b) If the identity of an expert witness is not disclosed in compliance with subdivision (a)(1) of this rule, he shall not be permitted to testify on behalf of the defaulting party at the trial of the action. However, if the failure to disclose the identity of the witness is the result of extenuating circumstances beyond the control of the defaulting party, the court may grant a continuance or other appropriate relief. Pa.R.Civ.P. 4003.5(b). In the past, the effect of Rule 4003.5 has been less than clear. Prior to 1985, our Court had determined whether a witness should be precluded from testifying by examining four factors: 1. the prejudice or surprise in fact of the party against whom the excluded witnesses would have testified; 2. the ability of that party to cure the prejudice; 3. the extent to which waiver of the rule against calling unlisted witnesses would disrupt the orderly and efficient trial of the case or of other cases in the court; (and) 4. bad faith of (sic) willfulness in failing to comply with the court's order. Sindler v. Goldman, 309 Pa.Super. 7, 15 n. 8, 454 A.2d 1054, 1058 n. 8 (1982), citing Gill v. McGraw Electric Co., 264 Pa.Super. 368, 382, 399 A.2d 1095, 1102 (1979) ( en banc ). See Kemp v. Qualls, 326 Pa.Super. 319, 473 A.2d 1369 (1984) (no sanction imposed absent evidence of prejudice); Emerick v. Carson, 325 Pa.Super. 308, 472 A.2d 1133 (1984) (where expert was not identified in interrogatories but other party had an opportunity to take witness' deposition and had a copy of expert's report, no prejudice was shown and witness was permitted to testify; Royster v. McGowen Ford, Inc., 294 Pa.Super. 160, 439 A.2d 799 (1982) (remanding case for consideration in light of four factors). In 1985, however, a panel of this Court held that pursuant to the governing discovery rules, Pa.R.Civ.P. 4003.5 and Pa.R.Civ.P. 4019(i), [8] the testimony of an undisclosed witness must be precluded absent extenuating circumstances. Kaminski v. Employees Mutual Casualty Co., 338 Pa.Super. 400, 407, 487 A.2d 1340, 1344 (1985). Although the Kaminski Court made clear that the preclusion of a witness's testimony was mandatorily prescribed under the discovery rules, the Court also noted that the testimony of the undisclosed witness was precluded under the four-factor test of Sindler. [9] Kaminski, 338 Pa.Super. at 407 n. 3, 487 A.2d at 1344 n. 3. We acknowledge that the Kaminski decision failed to clarify the law. The effect of a Rule 4003.5 violation could vary depending upon which test  the four-factor approach of Gill and Sindler or the mandatory preclusion rule of Kaminski  was used. See Kaminski, 338 Pa.Super. at 420-21, 487 A.2d at 1352 (Del Sole, J., dissenting). Not surprisingly, the parties here each advocate an approach which would have us find in either's favor. Our resolution of this matter is made easier, however, given a recent pronouncement by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. In Feingold v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 512 Pa. 567, 517 A.2d 1270 (Pa. 1986), the Supreme Court followed the multi-factor or prejudice approach in reversing the trial court's exclusion of a witness which was known to the opposing party. Specifically, the Court stated that where an expert witness has not been identified pursuant to a local or state discovery rule, the presiding court must balance the facts and circumstances of each case to determine the prejudice to each party. Feingold, 512 Pa. at 573, 517 A.2d at 1273. The Court quoted the Superior Court opinion at length, focusing upon the following factors: (B)ad faith on the part of the party seeking to call witnesses not listed in his pretrial memorandum; see Clark v. Pa.R.R.Co., 328 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1006, 84 S.Ct. 1943, 12 L.Ed.2d 1054 (1964); ability of the party to have discovered the witnesses earlier, see Hunt v. Pa.R.R.Co., 41 F.R.D. 349 (E.D.Pa. 1967); validity of the excuse offered by the party, Thompson v. Calmar Steamship Corp., 331 F.2d 657, 662 (3d Cir. 1964); willfulness of the party's failure to comply with the court's order, Taggart v. Vermont Transportation Co., 32 F.R.D. 587 (E.D.Pa. 1963), aff'd. 325 F.2d 1022 (3d Cir. 1964); the parties' (sic) intent to mislead or confuse his adversary, Pakech v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 69 F.R.D. 534 (E.D.Pa. 1976); and finally, the importance of the excluded testimony, Clark, supra . Underlying the cases to which we have adverted are these basic considerations: (1) the prejudice or surprise in fact of the party against whom the excluded witnesses would have testified, (2) the ability of that party to cure the prejudice, (3) the extent to which waiver of the rule against calling unlisted witnesses would disrupt the orderly and efficient trial of the case or of other cases in the court, and (4) bad faith of (sic) willfulness in failing to comply with the court's order. Feingold, 512 Pa. at 573-574, 517 A.2d at 1273, quoting, Feingold v. SEPTA, 339 Pa.Super. 15, 21, 488 A.2d 284, 287 (1985). [10] We believe that Feingold is controlling in the present case. Further, after reviewing the record and the arguments of the parties, we conclude that the Feingold factors weigh heavily in Stradley's favor. The only claim of prejudice by Panaccion was his inability to prepare for the cross-examination of the expert witness's background and qualifications. [11] Although such prejudice is legitimate, we believe that Panaccion was in a position to cure that prejudice by requesting either a continuance or the opportunity to depose the witness. Panaccion was notified of the witness's identity almost two weeks in advance of trial and could have used that time to investigate the qualifications of Stradley's expert. During that time, Panaccion did nothing. This, we believe, mitigates any real prejudice caused by Stradley's untimely disclosure. See Kemp v. Qualls, 326 Pa.Super. 319, 473 A.2d 1369 (1984) (where party had thirteen days in which to investigate expert's background, no real prejudice flowed from an untimely disclosure of expert witness's identity and qualifications). As for the other factors listed in Feingold, we note that Stradley's excuse for failing to comply with the discovery rule was justified given the sudden unavailability of its original witness one week prior to trial. Further, we are unable to characterize Stradley's conduct as willful or to say that Stradley acted in bad faith; there is simply no evidence in the record to support such claims. Nor does the record indicate that a waiver of the rule precluding the testimony would have disrupted the orderly and efficient administration of the court. Indeed, as Stradley notes, it offered the expert's testimony in the midafternoon and there would have been little, if any, disruption of the trial to conclude the day with the expert's direct testimony and permit Panaccion's counsel to prepare for cross-examination of the witness the next day. [12] Panaccion maintains, however, that Stradley can show no prejudice flowing from the preclusion of its expert given that the law firm presented other testimony in its defense. We disagree. As a result of the court's ruling, Stradley lost the testimony of its sole expert witness. Contrary to Panaccion's assertions, the proposed testimony was, no doubt, necessary to the development of Stradley's defense. In balancing the Feingold factors as they relate to each party, we conclude that the prejudice to Stradley substantially outweighs the potential prejudice to Panaccion. [13] See Feingold, 339 Pa.Super. 15, 488 A.2d 284 (1985) (despite noncompliance with discovery rule, witness should be permitted to testify where opponent had knowledge of the substance of the testimony and could show no prejudice); Kemp v. Qualls, 326 Pa.Super. 319, 473 A.2d 1369 (1984) (where opponent was not properly informed of proponent's expert witness until three days prior to trial and did not receive the expert's qualifications until the day the expert was called to testify, the witness could testify absent a showing of real prejudice flowing from the untimely disclosure). Accordingly, Stradley has demonstrated that a basis exists for the grant of a new trial. A finding of substantial prejudice does not, however, automatically render the judgment a nullity. A new trial will not be granted unless it can be shown that the excluded evidence would have affected the verdict. Kremer v. Janet Fleisher Gallery, Inc., 320 Pa.Super. 384, 388, 467 A.2d 377, 379 (1983) ( en banc ). In the present case, the testimony of Stradley's proposed expert witness could have affected the jury's verdict. Stradley's entire case was based upon the testimony of two witnesses  an attorney with the firm whose alleged negligence gave rise to this case, and its proposed expert witness who was precluded from testifying. Contrary to Panaccion's assertions, the defendant-attorney did not testify as an expert. His testimony was directed toward explaining and defending the actions of his firm (N.T. 562-564). [14] The testimony of the expert witness would have been the only opinion evidence proffered by Stradley. In a case as complex as this, the expert's testimony was not only relevant to the issues of liability and damages, but also was crucial to Stradley's defense. It is not unlikely that the expert witness's testimony might have resulted in a different verdict. Thus, the preclusion of the expert testimony was error which, in our opinion, justifies the remedy of a new trial.