Opinion ID: 813175
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the asserted claims of the fuss ’377,

Text: FUSS ’904, AND PERKINS ’837 PATENTS ARE INVALID FOR OBVIOUSNESS An obviousness analysis is based on underlying factual inquiries including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art, (2) the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art, (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art, and (4) objective indicia of nonobviousness. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18; Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 619 F.3d 1329, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010). “The ultimate judgment of obviousness is a legal determination.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427 (2007). When a jury has found a claim to be obvious, this court presumes the jury resolved all factual disputes in favor of the verdict. Agrizap, Inc. v. Woodstream Corp., 520 F.3d 1337, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Free-Flow does not dispute that the prior art cited at trial, with some modifications, teaches every element of the asserted claims of the Fuss ’377, Fuss ’904, and Perkins ’837 patents. Rather, Free-Flow asserts there was no evidence of a reason to combine the prior art references in the manner required to arrive at Free-Flow’s asserted claims. Free-Flow also argues that the prior art taught 9 PREGIS CORP v. KAPPOS away from such combination. This court finds there is substantial evidence to support the factual underpinnings of the jury verdict finding claims 1, 3 and 4 of Fuss ’377, claims 4, 6, 7, and 10 of Fuss ’904, and claims 1–3 and 5– 14 of Perkins ’837 invalid for obviousness. We affirm the district court’s denial of Free-Flow’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on validity of these claims. The primary invalidating reference presented by Pregis is expired U.S. Patent No. 3,868,285 to Troy (“Troy ’285”), which issued in 1975. Troy ’285 discloses a machine for making bubble-wrap type cushion material from prefabricated flat film stock. Troy ’285 col. 1, ll. 43–47. The Troy ’285 machine includes multiple “sealing bands” so that, rather than making a single seal along one edge of the air-filled film, multiple seals are made parallel to the longitudinal edges of the film. This forms smaller sealed chambers to create a “bubble wrap” effect. Troy ’285 teaches that its apparatus can be used to “produce a variety of cushionings, each having cells of different shape and volume than the others.” Troy ’285 col. 12, l. 63 – col. 13, l. 1. Pregis’ technical expert, Dr. Maslen, presented detailed claim charts and testimony explaining how the Troy ’285 patent discloses every element of the asserted claims of Fuss ’377. Dr. Maslen testified that a person of ordinary skill in the art would need only remove or disable the multiple sealing bands in order to adapt the machine to make larger air pillows rather than bubble wrap. Dr. Maslen testified that expired U.S. Patent No. 3,660,189 to Troy (“Troy ’189”), issued in 1972, and U.S. Patent No. 4,017,351 to Larson (“Larson”) each disclose preconfigured plastic films like those required by the system claims of the Fuss ’904 and Perkins ’837 patents. PREGIS CORP v. KAPPOS 10 Although bubble-wrap packaging is the preferred embodiment disclosed in Troy ’189, the patent also teaches that its preconfigured films “can be fabricated directly into inflatables of various types with many uses,” including “[d]isposable cushions or pads for tightly packaging merchandise.” Troy ’189 col. 19, ll. 63–70. Dr. Maslen explained that the Troy ’189 film or the Larson film could be fed through the Troy ’285 machine by one of ordinary skill in the art, making only technically trivial modifications to the machine. Dr. Maslen testified that the combination of the Troy ’189 film or Larson film and the Troy ’285 machine, with such modifications, meets all the limitations of the asserted claims of Perkins ’837 and Fuss ’904. Free-Flow contends Dr. Maslen’s testimony was inadequate because he declined to testify as to the legal conclusion that the combination of the prior art teachings he presented rendered the asserted claims “obvious.” The ultimate legal conclusion of obviousness, however, was appropriately left to the district court and to this court on review of the verdict. See Avia Grp. Int’l, Inc. v. L.A. Gear Cal., Inc., 853 F.2d 1557, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (expert testimony on the ultimate “legal conclusion of obviousness is neither necessary nor controlling”). Free-Flow’s next argument is that the prior art taught away from using the Troy ’285 machine in the manner suggested by Dr. Maslen. Larson states that the machines taught by Troy ’189 and Troy ’285 were “complex and expensive.” Larson col. 1, ll. 41–47. Larson also states that the Troy system’s method of “sealing across the full width of the inflated chambers causes wrinkles which tend to leak air through the sealed areas.” Id. Dr. Maslen testified that “if you left [the multiple sealers of Troy ’285] in, you would perhaps suffer from some wrinkling.” Nonetheless, he opined that by adapting the machine to make air pillow packaging with only a single 11 PREGIS CORP v. KAPPOS seal, the problems of wrinkling and leaky seals would be alleviated. The record contains substantial evidence to support the jury’s implicit finding that the prior art did not teach away. Given the modest modifications required to use the Troy ’285 machine to make air pillow packaging, the jury reasonably could find that those skilled in the art would have been motivated to simplify the Troy ’285 machine in precisely the way suggested by Dr. Maslen. We are also not persuaded by Free-Flow’s argument that removing the mechanism used to create the bubble wrap contravenes the basic teaching of Troy. The mere fact that Troy ’285 teaches creation of bubble-wrap as a preferred embodiment does not constitute “teaching away” from other reasonable uses of the Troy ’285 machine. See In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004). At trial, Free-Flow presented evidence of copying and commercial success as objective indicia of nonobviousness. As to copying, Pregis representatives conceded that the company’s predecessor, Pactiv, analyzed Free-Flow’s EZ I machine and “replicated certain unpatented components of it.” J.A. 418. Free-Flow’s technical expert, Dr. Kazerooni, testified to a litany of features on the accused Pregis AirSpeed 5000 that are “substantially identical” to features of the EZ I machine, but did not show that those features were claimed in the patents in suit. The jury also heard evidence from which it could conclude that the EZ I machine did not embody the Free-Flow Patents at all. Similarly, the jury heard conflicting evidence regarding the nexus between the commercial success of FreeFlow’s EZ I and EZ II machines and the claimed features of the Free-Flow Patents. Pregis’ expert testified, for example, that factors such as ease of use of the system electronics, cost of supplied film, customer service, and speed of maintenance—none of which were shown to be PREGIS CORP v. KAPPOS 12 related to the claimed elements of the Free-Flow Patents—determine commercial success in the air-pillow packaging industry. The lack of nexus between the claimed subject matter and the commercial success or purportedly copied features of the EZ I machine renders Free-Flow’s proffered objective evidence uninformative to the obviousness determination. Ormco Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc., 463 F.3d 1299, 1311–12 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Evidence of commercial success, or other secondary considerations, is only significant if there is a nexus between the claimed invention and the commercial success.”) Having considered the conflicting evidence, the jury concluded that the asserted claims of Fuss ’377, Fuss ’904, and Perkins ’837 are invalid for obviousness. This court holds that the jury’s underlying factual findings related to obviousness were supported by substantial evidence, and we affirm the legal conclusion that the asserted claims are invalid as obvious. Because we hold that the asserted claims of the Fuss ’377, Fuss ’904 and Perkins ’837 patents are invalid, this court need not reach, and declines to address, Pregis’ remaining defenses and Free-Flow’s appeal of the denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law of infringement.