Opinion ID: 1453216
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prejudicial Effect of Erroneous Instruction

Text: (2b) Having determined it was error to refuse to give BAJI No. 3.76 and instead give BAJI No. 3.75, we must decide whether the error was so prejudicial as to require reversal. (5) Under article VI, section 13 of the California Constitution, if there is error in instructing the jury, the judgment shall be reversed only when the reviewing court, after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, concludes that the error has resulted in a miscarriage of justice. Under the Constitution, we must determine whether it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of error. ( People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243].) Although there is no precise formula for determining the prejudicial effect of instructional error, we are guided by the five factors enumerated in LeMons v. Regents of University of California (1978) 21 Cal.3d 869, 876 [148 Cal. Rptr. 355, 582 P.2d 946]. (2c) The first factor we consider is the degree of conflict in the evidence on the critical issue, here cause in fact. The evidence shows that Damechie drowned, not only because he could not swim, but also because he was placed in a position in which his inability to swim resulted in death. The jury's verdict, amply supported by the evidence, indicates that Mr. and Mrs. Gonzales and their son Luis were at least partially responsible for Damechie's predicament. Mr. and Mrs. Gonzales failed to supervise him adequately. Luis, after assuring Damechie he would be careful and knowing that Damechie could not swim, climbed onto the paddleboard, rocked it, causing it to flip over, and failed to call for help despite the presence of adults who might have been able to save Damechie. The conflict in the evidence is not great. If properly instructed, it is reasonably probable that the jury would have found defendants' behavior to have been a substantial factor, and thus a cause in fact, in Damechie's death. Second, we consider whether the jury asked for a rereading of the erroneous instruction or of related evidence. The jury did not make such a request, but we note that jury received a copy of the instructions, making such a request unnecessary. Third, we analyze the closeness of the jury's verdict. The jury found on a vote of nine to three that Jose Gonzales and Luis were negligent (i.e., they breached a duty of care to Damechie). Likewise, the jury concluded on a vote of 11 to 1 that Matilde Gonzales was negligent. Yet the jury unanimously concluded that neither the actions of Luis nor Jose Gonzales caused Damechie's death and, on a vote of 10 to 2, the jury found that the actions of Matilde Gonzales were not a cause of the death. The verdict as to causation was not particularly close. It seems that the jury did follow BAJI No. 3.75 but was misled by the instruction's flaws: Having found the defendants negligent, it is illogical and inconsistent on this record to conclude that they were not a cause in fact of Damechie's death. Accordingly, we conclude it is reasonably probable that the jury was confused by BAJI No. 3.75 and overemphasized the but for nature of the instruction, improperly focusing on the factor operative at the closest temporal proximity to the time of death, Damechie's inability to swim. Fourth, we consider whether defense counsel's closing argument contributed to the instruction's misleading effect. The closing argument was replete with references to Damechie's inability to swim, his own knowledge that he could not swim, and his decision nevertheless to venture out on the lake. Counsel also argued that Damechie's parents knew he could not swim, yet they permitted him to go with the Gonzaleses without determining whether the Gonzaleses intended to take the children swimming, and argued that but for these facts, Damechie would not have drowned. The argument thus highlighted the condition temporally closest to the death, Damechie's inability to swim, and factors related to it. As discussed above, BAJI No. 3.75 improperly emphasizes temporal and spatial proximity. The argument thus contributed to the instruction's misleading effect. It is reasonably probable that if the jury had received the substantial factor instruction, counsel's argument would not have misled the jury. Finally we consider the effect of other instructions in remedying the error. BAJI No. 3.77 was requested by both parties and given by the court. [11] This instruction did not remedy the confusion caused by instructing the jury under BAJI No. 3.75. By frequently repeating the term proximate cause and by emphasizing that a cause must be operating at the moment of injury, the instruction buttressed rather counteracted the restrictions on time and place inherent in the word proximate. Thus, giving BAJI No. 3.77 did not cure the deficiencies of BAJI No. 3.75. ( Hart v. Browne, supra, 103 Cal. App.3d 947, 961.) Based on the foregoing analysis, we conclude that it is reasonably probable a result more favorable to the plaintiffs would have resulted if BAJI No. 3.75 had not been given.