Opinion ID: 844222
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether California courts may deny self-representation when Indiana v. Edwards (2008) 554 U.S. 164 [171 L.Ed.2d 345, 128 S.Ct. 2379] permits such denial

Text: (2) In Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. 806, the United States Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution gives criminal defendants the right to represent themselves. When Faretta was decided, the law in California had been that a criminal defendant had no constitutional or statutory right to self-representation, although in noncapital cases the trial court had discretion to grant a defendant's request for self-representation. ( People v. Sharp (1972) 7 Cal.3d 448, 459, 461, 463-464 [103 Cal.Rptr. 233, 499 P.2d 489] [no right to self-representation]; People v. Floyd (1970) 1 Cal.3d 694, 702-703 [83 Cal.Rptr. 608, 464 P.2d 64] [discretion to grant self-representation]; see People v. Taylor (2009) 47 Cal.4th 850, 871-872 [102 Cal.Rptr.3d 852, 220 P.3d 872] ( Taylor ).) The California Constitution gives criminal defendants only the right to the assistance of counsel and to be personally present with counsel. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.) Still today, Penal Code section 686.1 provides that the defendant in a capital case shall be represented in court by counsel at all stages of the preliminary and trial proceedings. (See Taylor, supra, at p. 872, fn. 8.) When the Legislature enacted Penal Code section 686.1, it made this finding: The Legislature finds that persons representing themselves cause unnecessary delays in the trials of charges against them; that trials are extended by such persons representing themselves; and that orderly trial procedures are disrupted. Self-representation places a heavy burden upon the administration of criminal justice without any advantages accruing to those persons who desire to represent themselves. (Stats. 1971, ch. 1800, § 6, p. 3898; see People v. Sharp, supra, 7 Cal.3d at p. 463 [quoting this policy statement].) Obviously, California law is subject to the United States Constitution, including the Sixth Amendment right to self-representation as established in Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. 806, and its progeny. Penal Code section 686.1, for example, cannot be given effect. But People v. Sharp, supra, 7 Cal.3d 448, remains good law as to the California Constitution and Penal Code. ( Taylor, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 872, fn. 8.) California courts should give effect to this California law when it can. In the wake of Faretta 's strong constitutional statement, California courts tended to view the federal self-representation right as absolute, assuming a valid waiver of counsel. ( Taylor, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 872.) This view was strengthened by the later decision in Godinez v. Moran (1993) 509 U.S. 389 [125 L.Ed.2d 321, 113 S.Ct. 2680] ( Godinez ). In Godinez, the defendant, found competent to stand trial, sought and was allowed to waive counsel and plead guilty. The high court held that he was properly permitted to do so. It rejected the argument that federal law required a higher standard of competence for waiving counsel or pleading guilty than is required to stand trial. (See Taylor, supra, at p. 874.) California courts, including this one, as well as courts in other jurisdictions, generally interpreted Faretta and Godinez as prohibiting states from imposing a higher standard of competency for self-representation than the standard of competency to stand trial. ( Taylor, supra, at pp. 874-876.) (3) In 2008, however, the high court decided Edwards, supra, 554 U.S. 164. Edwards held that the Constitution permits judges to take realistic account of the particular defendant's mental capacities by asking whether a defendant who seeks to conduct his own defense at trial is mentally competent to do so. That is to say, the Constitution permits States to insist upon representation by counsel for those competent enough to stand trial under Dusky [ v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 402 [4 L.Ed.2d 824, 80 S.Ct. 788]] but who still suffer from severe mental illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves. ( Edwards, supra, at pp. 177-178.) The court called those defendants competent to stand trial but not to represent themselves gray-area defendants. ( Id. at p. 174.) The Edwards court quoted an amicus curiae brief from the American Psychiatric Association stating that  `[d]isorganized thinking, deficits in sustaining attention and concentration, impaired expressive abilities, anxiety, and other common symptoms of severe mental illnesses can impair the defendant's ability to play the significantly expanded role required for self-representation even if he can play the lesser role of represented defendant.'  ( Edwards, supra, 554 U.S. at p. 176.) It noted that some of the documents the defendant had prepared suggest to a layperson the common sense of this general conclusion. ( Ibid. ) The court in Edwards did not hold ... that due process mandates a higher standard of mental competence for self-representation than for trial with counsel. The Edwards court held only that states may, without running afoul of Faretta, impose a higher standard .... ( Taylor, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 877-878.) In Taylor, the trial court had permitted a defendant who was competent to stand trial and waive counsel to represent himself. Because the Edwards rule is permissive, not mandatory, we held that Edwards does not support a claim of federal constitutional error in a case like the present one, in which defendant's request to represent himself was granted. ( Taylor, supra, at p. 878.) This case presents the reverse situation: the trial court denied self-representation under Edwards. We must decide whether California courts may accept Edwards 's invitation and deny self-representation to gray-area defendants. Defendant argues that we should not accept the Edwards invitation. Preliminarily, he argues that the courts below violated the rule that all tribunals exercising inferior jurisdiction are required to follow decisions of courts exercising superior jurisdiction, and, specifically, decisions of this court are binding upon and must be followed by all the state courts of California. ( Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [20 Cal.Rptr. 321, 369 P.2d 937] ( Auto Equity ).) Citing a pre- Edwards decision from this court that had assumed that federal law did not permit a higher standard of competency for self-representation than for standing trial ( People v. Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 431-434 [64 Cal.Rptr.3d 721, 165 P.3d 512]), and a post- Edwards decision that explained that previous cases had so assumed ( Taylor, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 874-876), defendant argues that only this court could decide whether to accept the Edwards invitation and adopt a higher standard for self-representation. (4) Defendant is incorrect. The trial court and Court of Appeal are, indeed, bound by decisions of this court. If this court had held that trial courts should not accept the Edwards invitation, the lower courts would have been bound to follow that holding. But this court has never so held. The cases defendant relies on did not consider the question. (5)  `[C]ases are not authority for propositions not considered.'  ( In re Marriage of Cornejo (1996) 13 Cal.4th 381, 388 [53 Cal.Rptr.2d 81, 916 P.2d 476].) (6) Lower courts may decide questions of first impression, including the effect that subsequent events, such as a United States Supreme Court decision, have on decisions from a higher court, including this one. In this case, that authority includes deciding whether to accept the Edwards invitation. If a higher court believes the lower court decided a question erroneously, it can take appropriate action. But a lower court does not violate Auto Equity, supra, 57 Cal.2d 450, merely by deciding questions of first impression. (7) Turning to the merits, the Attorney General and amici curiae San Francisco Public Defender, California Attorneys for Criminal Justice, and the Office of the State Public Defender all argue that California courts should have discretion to deny self-representation to gray-area defendants. We agree. Indeed, to refuse to recognize such discretion would be inconsistent with California's own law. In People v. Floyd, supra, 1 Cal.3d 694, we upheld the denial of a capital defendant's request for self-representation citing, among other factors, his youth, his low level of education, and his ignorance of the law. ( Id. at pp. 703-704.) Certainly, a defendant who could be denied self-representation under Edwards, supra, 554 U.S. 164, could also have been denied self-representation under People v. Sharp, supra, 7 Cal.3d 448, and People v. Floyd . Denying self-representation when Edwards permits does not violate the Sixth Amendment right of self-representation. Because California law provides no statutory or constitutional right of self-representation, such denial also does not violate a state right. Consistent with long-established California law, we hold that trial courts may deny self-representation in those cases where Edwards permits such denial. It remains to consider the standard for trial courts to employ when deciding whether to deny self-representation under Edwards, supra, 554 U.S. 164. The Attorney General suggests the standard could be as simple as determining whether the defendant can conceive of a defense and coherently communicate it to the judge and jury. Amici curiae San Francisco Public Defender and California Attorneys for Criminal Justice urge this court to return to what they view as the pre- Faretta standard in California requiring that a defendant who wishes to represent himself demonstrate an understanding of the charges, defenses and punishments, and an ability to rationally communicate. Amicus curiae Office of the State Public Defender urges this court to adopt the standard stated in People v. Burnett (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1314 [234 Cal.Rptr. 67]. As we explained in Taylor, Burnett stated a test for the `cognitive and communicative skills' involved in competently representing oneself: `Such skills are present where the accused: (1) possesses a reasonably accurate awareness of his situation, including not simply an appreciation of the charges against him and the range and nature of possible penalties, but also his own physical or mental infirmities, if any; (2) is able to understand and use relevant information rationally in order to fashion a response to the charges; and (3) can coherently communicate that response to the trier of fact.' ( Burnett, supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at p. 1327, fn. omitted.) ( Taylor, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 873.) Two thoughtful law review articles have suggested more specific standards. One suggested this standard: A criminal defendant is mentally incompetent to represent himself or herself at trial if and only if a mental disorder or disability would prevent the defendant from achieving a basic understanding of the charges, law, and evidence, from formulating simple defense strategies and tactics, or from communicating with the witnesses, the court, the prosecutor, and the jury in a manner calculated to implement those strategies and tactics in at least a rudimentary manner. (Marks, State Competence Standards for Self-Representation in a Criminal Trial: Opportunity and Danger for State Courts after Indiana v. Edwards (2010) 44 U.S.F. L.Rev. 825, 847, italics deleted (Marks).) Drawing on social problem-solving theory, another article suggests a more technical standard: [P]roblem-solving theory suggests that, to represent oneself at a criminal trial, one should possess foundational abilities to perceive problematic situations, generate alternative courses of action, maintain mental organization, and communicate decisions to a functionary of the court. Within the context of a prosecution, a defendant should also possess the ability to identify a plausible source of the prosecution, an ability to gather information to evaluate the state's case, a willingness to attend to the prosecution, and an ability to withstand the stress of trial. Finally, for certain key decisions, such as selecting the defense to pursue at trial, a defendant should be capable of justifying a decision with a plausible reason. (Johnston, Representational Competence: Defining the Limits of the Right to Self-Representation at Trial (2011) 86 Notre Dame L.Rev. 523, 595.) All of these suggested standards are plausible. But we are constrained by the circumstance that what is permissible is only what Edwards permits, not what pre- Faretta California law permitted. In other words, because of federal constitutional constraints, in considering the defendant's mental state as a reason to deny self-representation, a California court may not exercise the discretion permitted under California law but solely that permitted in Edwards. Edwards described competence to represent oneself at trial as the ability to carry out the basic tasks needed to present [one's] own defense without the help of counsel. ( Edwards, supra, 554 U.S. at pp. 175-176.) It also said the states may deny self-representation to those competent to stand trial but who suffer from severe mental illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves. ( Id. at p. 178.) Although asked to adopt a more specific standard, the high court declined to do so. ( Ibid. ) (8) At this point, at least, we also think it best not to adopt a more specific standard. The discussion in People v. Burnett, supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at page 1327, and the standards suggested in the two law review articles quoted above are helpful to the extent they suggest relevant factors to consider. Experts asked to examine defendants for this purpose, and trial courts called on to make these rulings, may consider these factors in their examinations and rulings. But, pending further guidance from the high court, we believe the standard that trial courts considering exercising their discretion to deny self-representation should apply is simply whether the defendant suffers from a severe mental illness to the point where he or she cannot carry out the basic tasks needed to present the defense without the help of counsel. A trial court need not routinely inquire into the mental competence of a defendant seeking self-representation. It needs to do so only if it is considering denying self-representation due to doubts about the defendant's mental competence. When a court doubts a defendant's competence to stand trial, it shall appoint a psychiatrist or licensed psychologist, and any other expert the court may deem appropriate, to examine the defendant. (Pen. Code, § 1369, subd. (a).) Similarly, when it doubts the defendant's mental competence for self-representation, it may order a psychological or psychiatric examination to inquire into that question. To minimize the risk of improperly denying self-representation to a competent defendant, trial courts should be cautious about making an incompetence finding without benefit of an expert evaluation, though the judge's own observations of the defendant's in-court behavior will also provide key support for an incompetence finding and should be expressly placed on the record. (Marks, supra, 44 U.S.F. L.Rev. at p. 849.) [1] Trial courts must apply this standard cautiously. The Edwards court specifically declined to overrule Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. 806. ( Edwards, supra, 554 U.S. at p. 178.) Criminal defendants still generally have a Sixth Amendment right to represent themselves. Self-representation by defendants who wish it and validly waive counsel remains the norm and may not be denied lightly. A court may not deny self-representation merely because it believes the matter could be tried more efficiently, or even more fairly, with attorneys on both sides. Rather, it may deny self-representation only in those situations where Edwards permits it.