Opinion ID: 1869049
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Judicial Review of Jury Verdicts in General

Text: Under our system of government, with its guarantee of separation of powers between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, it is peculiarly and exclusively the function of the judiciary to determine whether a jury award in a civil case exceeds the amount that the State and Federal Constitutions will allow without violating the due process rights guaranteed to all citizens of this State and this country. Armstrong v. Roger's Outdoor Sports, Inc., 581 So.2d 414, 419, 581 So.2d 414 (Ala.1991). The separation of powers provision, found in Article III, § 42, of the Alabama Constitution of 1901, provides: The powers of the government of the State of Alabama shall be divided into three distinct departments, each of which shall be confided to a separate body of magistracy, to wit: those which are legislative, to one; those which are executive to another, and those which are judicial to another. Section 43 reads: In the government of this state, except in the instances in this Constitution, hereinafter expressly directed or permitted, the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them; the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them; the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them; to the end that it may be a government of laws and not of men. In Armstrong v. Roger's Outdoor Sports , we held certain statutes, which attempted to remove all presumption of correctness from a jury verdict and from a trial court's judgment, to be unconstitutional as a violation of the separation of powers provisions of the Alabama Constitution, Article III, §§ 42 and 43. [10] Armstrong, 581 So.2d at 421. In Armstrong v. Roger's Outdoor Sports we quoted with approval Cobb v. Malone, 92 Ala. 630, 9 So. 738 (1891): `The power to set aside verdicts has been generally regarded in this country as inherent in courts organized upon the principles of common law, though in some States it is regulated by statute, enumerating the grounds upon which a motion for a new trial may be made. The power is essential to prevent irreparable injustice in cases where a verdict wholly wrong is the result of inadvertence, forgetfulness, or intentional or capricious disregard of the testimony, or of bias or prejudice, on the part of juries, which sometimes occurs....' 581 So.2d at 419. In two other cases, this Court had held that statutes enacted by the legislature violated the right-to-jury-trial provisions of the Alabama Constitution. In Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 592 So.2d 156 (Ala.1991), this Court held that § 6-5-544(b), Ala.Code 1975, which limited the amount of noneconomic damages recoverable in a medical malpractice action, violated the right to trial by jury as guaranteed by Article I, § 11, of the Alabama Constitution 1901. This section provides [t]hat the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. Then, in Henderson v. Alabama Power Co., 627 So.2d 878 (Ala. 1993), this Court held that a limitation on punitive damages, such as that imposed by § 6-11-21, clearly impairs the traditional function of the jury, thus violating the right to trial by jury guaranteed by Article I, § 11. In those cases, we said that, under an analysis of § 11, the pertinent question is not whether the right still exists under the statute, but whether it still remains inviolate. 627 So.2d at 885 (quoting Alford v. State, 170 Ala. 178, 197, 54 So. 213 (1910)). Because the majority was convinced that the statutes violated the right-to-jury-trial provision of the Alabama Constitution, it was not necessary in those cases to decide whether those statutes also violated the separation of powers provisions of the Alabama and United States Constitutions. However, it is arguable that these statutes did violate the separation of powers provisions. Because, under the separation of powers provisions, it is the inherent and exclusive power of the judiciary to determine whether a jury award in a civil case exceeds the amount that the State and Federal Constitutions will allow without violating due process rights, the trial judge in this case, in a post-verdict Hammond hearing, considered the question whether the jury had followed its instructions on the law, as well as whether the verdict was the result of passion or bias in favor of, or against, either side in the litigation. After so doing, he ordered a remittitur of the $15 million award of punitive damages to $12.5 million.