Opinion ID: 1119652
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Jurisdiction and Authority to Order Back Support

Text: When the district court entered the divorce decree in 1992, constructive service by publication was insufficient for purposes of a child support order. Personal service within the state was necessary to provide proper notice and bestow in personam jurisdiction on the district court. See Duncan v. Duncan, 776 P.2d 758, 759-60 (Wyo.1989); Rodgers v. Rodgers, 627 P.2d 1381, 1383-84 (Wyo.1981); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-4-101, et seq. (repealed 1995). We often have held that a judgment or order issued by a court lacking personal jurisdiction over the defendant is void and is of no force or effect. MN v. CS, 908 P.2d 414, 416 (Wyo.1995); KT v. State, 902 P.2d 1288, 1291 (Wyo. 1995); Goss v. Goss, 780 P.2d 306, 312 (Wyo.1989); Matter of Contempt Order Issued Against Anderson, 765 P.2d 933, 936 (Wyo.1988). See also 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 18 (1997); 46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 27 (1994). A void judgment is not entitled to the respect accorded to, and is attended by none of the consequences of, a valid adjudication. Indeed, a void judgment need not be recognized by anyone, but may be entirely disregarded or declared inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to it. It has no legal or binding force or efficacy for any purpose.... 46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 31 (1994). We cited a similar rule in JHL v. BMG, 665 P.2d 491, 498-99 (Wyo.1983). The practical effect of the district court's lack of personal jurisdiction over Father in 1992 was the issuance of a divorce decree which made no determination of the child support obligation. Father argues the district court's 1997 Order for Child Support and Visitation was actually a retroactive modification of the void 1992 child support obligation. Under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-113(a) (Lexis 1999), a child support order cannot be modified retroactively beyond the date of the filing of the petition to modify unless the parties agree to the modification. However, the district court in this case was not considering a petition to modify an existing child support order. The portions of the 1992 divorce decree pertaining to child support were as nullity. Accordingly, when faced with a divorce decree which does not include child support, we have said: When the original divorce decree and subsequent modifications do not contain any references to child support, the petition to establish is not a motion to modify[;] ... [i]t is merely ancillary or supplemental to the main cause.... Additionally, the standard for establishing rather than modifying child support should apply. Warren v. Hart, 747 P.2d 511, 513 (Wyo.1987). Although the party's own labeling of a document is in no way binding on a court, Father implicitly recognized this concept when, instead of filing a motion to modify, he filed a Motion to Establish Visitation and Child Support. Having determined that the 1997 proceedings were for the purpose of establishment, and not modification, of the child support payments, Father's argument that the court lacked jurisdiction and authority to impose child support retroactively is easily dismissed. The district court clearly had the statutory authority to enter a child support order retroactively to the child's birth: Any person legally responsible for the support of a child who abandons, deserts, neglects or unjustifiably fails to support the child is liable for support of the child. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-204(a) (Lexis 1999). The measure of recovery from the defendant is the reasonable value of the care or support which has been furnished to the child by the petitioner. In addition, the court may make other suitable order for future care or support of the child. These remedies are cumulative and in addition to other remedies provided by law. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-204(d) (Lexis 1999). The statute allows recovery for support which has been furnished in the past and that which will cover future care or support. Id. The language of the statute leads to a clear inference that the legislature intended and recognized that child support would be collected retroactively in cases where a parent has abandoned a child and refused to participate in the support of the child. The analysis we have used in paternity determination/support cases, while not directly on point, is instructive. In Ellison v. Walter, ex rel. Walter, 834 P.2d 680, 684-85 (Wyo.1992), we stated that a district court possesses the authority to issue support orders retroactive to the date of a child's birth in paternity/support actions initiated by a state for the reimbursement of public assistance. The guiding principles in each instance are to promote the welfare of the child and to serve the ends of justice. We are persuaded that neither principle is generally served by failing to acknowledge a father's duty to support his child from the date of birth. The importance of these guiding principles applies equally to the situation presented in this case: a determination of the child support obligation of a parent who has abandoned his child and contributed nothing to the support of that child since birth. The duty of a natural father to support his child begins at birth[;] ... retroactive child support orders should be the rule, rather than the exception. The burden is accordingly placed upon the father to demonstrate to the district court why a retroactive child support order should not issue in a particular case. Id. at 684-85 (footnote omitted). Father also raises issues of res judicata and estoppel, arguing that dismissing the State's claim for back support due to lack of jurisdiction in the original decree barred the district court from allowing retroactive support in its establishment hearing. For the reasons stated above, we find these arguments to be without merit. The only issue the district court reached in its dismissal of the State's petition for back support was the lack of personal jurisdiction over Father in 1992. Accordingly, res judicata and collateral estoppel are not applicable as to the unrelated issue of whether retroactive support can be awarded in the child support establishment hearing.