Opinion ID: 658590
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alleged Misrepresentations by Counsel

Text: 9 The petitioner claims that prior to the entry of his guilty pleas, his attorney approached him with a piece of paper that had the number 75 written on it. He further claims that the attorney explained that the judge had written that number on the piece of paper and that if the petitioner pled guilty the judge would sentence him to only 75 years in prison. 3 The record, however, reveals that the judge told the petitioner, prior to pleading, that he would be subject to a maximum sentence of 230 years. The record also establishes that the prosecutor was recommending a sentence of 100 years. Nevertheless, based solely on this promise of 75 years, the petitioner claims that he decided to waive his constitutional right to a trial and plead guilty. He entered his pleas, and the court made a finding of guilt on all counts. Following this, the judge sentenced the petitioner to a prison term of 100 years. 4 10 The petitioner argues that his attorney's alleged misrepresentations about the sentence the court would impose amounted to objectively unreasonable assistance of counsel and that they induced him to plead guilty and waive his right to trial. In other words, he asserts that had he known he was going to receive a sentence of 100 years (rather than 75) he would have fought the charges and never pled guilty. He raised similar arguments in his motion to withdraw the pleas before Judge Hanley in Wisconsin state court. Judge Hanley held a hearing on the merits of petitioner's claims and made certain findings of fact. As we consider this current petition for habeas corpus relief, the factual findings of the state court shall be presumed to be correct. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(d) (1988). We will not disregard these findings unless the petitioner shows a procedural defect in the state court proceedings, or demonstrates that the findings are not fairly supported by the record. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(d)(1-8). 11 Among other things, Judge Hanley found that Mrs. Harvey hired Mr. Eisenberg to represent the petitioner after he turned himself into the Milwaukee Police Department and confessed to what he was arrested for.... Furthermore, according to Judge Hanley's findings of fact, Eisenberg was hired to represent the petitioner only at sentencing, not to try the case. The record more than adequately supports these findings. First, Mrs. Harvey testified that she hired Eisenberg to see if he could get her son the least possible time in prison, and that she was aware that a guilty plea would probably be the best means for reducing the sentence. The petitioner himself stated that he wanted Eisenberg to get him the less time as possible. The only reasonable inference from this is that Eisenberg's role was limited to the guilty plea proceedings and sentencing. The petitioner had no attorney to prepare the case for trial and there is no evidence that he had any intent of hiring an attorney to go to trial. 12 The record is replete with other indications that Harvey never intended to go to trial. In addition to his own confession, Harvey was aware that there was an abundance of other evidence against him in the case. He was aware that his juvenile companion would testify against him. He was also aware that ample scientific evidence connected him with the attacks. Furthermore he expressed a desire to protect the victim from having to testify at a trial. His attorney, Mr. Eisenberg, stated that Harvey told him, in no uncertain terms, that he did not want to go to trial. Based upon the above information, as found in the record, we hold that there was no reasonable probability that the petitioner would have proceeded to trial; therefore, he has failed his burden under the second prong of the Strickland- Hill test. His claim of ineffective assistance in this regard must fail.