Opinion ID: 1852288
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Household Contents

Text: ¶ 6. Lange argues that the Chancellor erred in finding that the stock certificates and bonds should be considered contents of Lawson's house within the meaning of her will. ¶ 7. This Court recognizes a presumption against intestacy, and this Court will construe wills to avoid intestacy where that may be reasonably done. Tinnin v. First United Bank, 502 So.2d 659, 663 (Miss.1987). However, the paramount and controlling consideration is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the testator ... Where the instrument is susceptible of more than one construction, it is the duty of the court to adopt that construction which is most consistent with the intention of the testator. Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 352 So.2d 1324, 1326-27 (Miss.1977). This Court has stated that [t]he surest guide to testamentary intent is the wording employed by the maker of the will. Tinnin, 502 So.2d at 663. ¶ 8. Whether a devise of a house and its contents includes items such as stock certificates and bonds is an issue of first impression for this Court. Thus, keeping in mind our above-stated tenets of testamentary construction, we must look outside our jurisdiction for guidance. Upon a review of the case law from other jurisdictions, it is clear that a devise of a house and its contents does not include stock certificates and bonds. One authority states: In the absence of contrary testorial intention as a general rule, a bequest of the contents of house will not include choses in action or money found therein at the testator's death. The same rule applies to a bequest of the contents of an apartment or room, or in a particular place or business such as a store or office or farm. On the other hand, in the absence of a contrary testorial intention, it is the general rule that a bequest of the contents of a receptacle, such as a trunk, desk, envelope, safe, or safe deposit, includes money and choses in action. 80 Am.Jur.2d Wills, § 1277, at 385 (1975) (footnotes omitted). It is a general rule that, unless a contrary intention is expressed in the will, a devise of a house and its contents does not include such things as stock certificates, bank accounts, checks, insurance policies, deeds, mortgages, and securities found in a home. In re Estate of Shoptaugh, 482 N.E.2d 1142, 1144 (Ind.Ct. App.1985) (citing McLane v. Chancey, 211 Ark. 280, 200 S.W.2d 782 (1947); Linson v. Crapps, 204 Ga. 264, 49 S.E.2d 523 (1948); Old Colony Trust Co. v. Hale, 302 Mass. 68, 18 N.E.2d 432 (1939); In re Falvey's Will, 15 A.D.2d 415, 224 N.Y.S.2d 899 (1962), aff'd 12 N.Y.2d 759, 234 N.Y.S.2d 713, 186 N.E.2d 563 (1962); In re Estate of Lamb, 445 Pa. 323, 285 A.2d 163 (1971); In re Estate of Rudy, 329 Pa.Super. 458, 478 A.2d 879 (1984)). The gift of the contents of a home is limited to those things ordinarily identified with a home. Shoptaugh, 482 N.E.2d at 1144 (collecting authorities). The term contents when referring to a household customarily and ordinarily encompasses articles of personal property typically used in and about the household and appropriate to the functioning and enjoyment of the household. Linson v. Crapps, 49 S.E.2d at 524; Lauter v. Kays, 753 S.W.2d 302, 305 (Ky.Ct.App. 1988). ¶ 9. In Rentz v. Lambuth College, 1991 WL 164403 (Tenn.Ct.App.1991), the testator left his residence and its contents to one beneficiary. As in the case at bar, he did not dispose of the stocks and bonds found in his home. Id. The recipient of the residence argued that he was entitled to receive the stocks and bonds as contents. Id. The Tennessee Court of Appeals determined that the contents of the house did not include the stocks and bonds found in it. Id. Similarly, in Lauter the court found that as a matter of law, securities found in a house were not household contents for the purpose of the will. 753 S.W.2d at 305. The court noted that the testator's intent was apparent from the face of the will, and nothing in the will suggested that the phrase household contents was meant to include anything other than customary and ordinary articles of personal property typically used in the household. Id. ¶ 10. In the case sub judice, the will does not express Lawson's intention at the time the will was executed that the Moore sisters were to receive Lawson's intangible personal property such as stock certificates and bonds. Lawson specifically bequeathed Beverly Moore Brantly $30,000 in cash. Further, Lawson left her residence and its contents to the Moore sisters equally. The will stated, [t]hey, at their discretion may distribute Lawson family items to Lawson heirs James B. and John W. Lange. ¶ 11. Lawson was so specific in other areas of her will that it simply cannot be said that it was her intent to include stocks and bonds within the contents of the home. Lawson's intent is expressed through the specific words and bequests that she made in her will. She instructed her executor to pay all her debts, as well as her expenses for her last illness and her burial. She left only two bequests of her personal property, the household effects of her residence to both Moore sisters, equally, and a single cash bequest to only one Moore sister. Lawson expressed her intent that her personal property, both tangible and intangible, and not otherwise specifically disposed of, fall intestate to pay her debts and expenses. There is nothing in Lawson's will to suggest that the term contents was intended to include anything other than articles such as furniture, furnishings, linens, silverware, glassware, utensils, and other household supplies, equipment, and appliances. As the prevailing case law suggests, securities do not belong in this category simply because they fortuitously happen to be on the premises at the time of the decedent's death. We conclude that the Chancellor erred in finding the contents of Lawson's home to include the stock certificates and bonds. Therefore, the chancery court's ruling on this issue is reversed, and judgment rendered in favor of Lange.