Opinion ID: 4545965
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Broad Approach

Text: Under the broad approach, a patient who places his or her mental condition at issue—for example, by “mak[ing] a claim for emotional distress”—waives privilege. Koch, 489 F.3d at 381 (quoting Schoffstall v. Henderson, 223 F.3d 818, 823 (8th Cir. 2000)). This is the approach taken by the Court of Appeals in Lodis v. Corbis Holdings, Inc., 172 Wn. App. 835, 854-55, 292 P.3d 779 (2013). I agree with the majority’s analysis and rejection of Lodis. In addition, as I noted above, 4 The majority seems to suggest that it is not worth this court’s time to examine cases from other state courts and from federal courts, pointing out that I “devote[] almost the entirety of [my] opinion to the discussion of out-of-state and federal authority.” Majority at 17 n.8. I, however, believe that it is this court’s duty to examine the law in full detail in order to reach the best decision possible. I am well aware that we are not bound by out-of-jurisdiction cases, but the fact that a case is not binding does not mean that it is not helpful. That is particularly true here, where our court has a dearth of case law (recent case law, at least) on the issue at hand, and where the out-of-jurisdiction cases neatly summarize the three different approaches we might take. 7 Magney et al. v. Pham, MD et al., No. 96669-9 (Gordon McCloud, J., concurring in part/dissenting in part) our court has already rejected the broad approach to waiver, albeit in a different context. See Bond, 69 Wn.2d at 880 (holding that the mere filing of a lawsuit for personal injuries does not waive the physician-patient privilege). Aside from the problems with Lodis identified by the majority, there’s another problem with adopting the reasoning from that case: our legislature has since rejected it. The privilege holder in Lodis filed his claim under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), ch. 49.60 RCW, and sought emotional damages. 172 Wn. App. at 842. The court adopted the broad approach and held that “when a plaintiff puts his mental health at issue by alleging emotional distress, he waives his psychologist-patient privilege for relevant mental health records.” Id. at 855. But the legislature has now passed a law that effectively overrules Lodis. See RCW 49.60.510. Under that new law,5 a privilege holder who brings a WLAD claim does not waive privilege simply by requesting noneconomic damages such as emotional distress. RCW 49.60.510(1). Instead, a privilege holder waives privilege when he or she “[a]lleges a specific diagnosable physical or psychiatric injury as a proximate result of the respondents’ conduct” or “[r]elies on the records or testimony of a health care provider or expert witness to seek general damages.” 5 The legislature recently amended this statute, but the changes have not yet gone into effect. S.B. 6236, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2020). 8 Magney et al. v. Pham, MD et al., No. 96669-9 (Gordon McCloud, J., concurring in part/dissenting in part) RCW 49.60.510(1)(a), (b). Thus, not only was Lodis incorrectly decided for the reasons stated in the majority opinion, but it also has since been abrogated by our legislature. Other courts have rejected the broad approach for the same reason I disagree with the majority’s opinion: it largely overrides the privilege. The Colorado Supreme Court rejected the broad approach in a case with facts that mirror those before us now. Johnson, 977 P.2d 152. There, Johnson brought a personal injury action in which she sought damages “for mental anguish, emotional distress, pain and suffering, and loss of enjoyment of life.” Id. at 153. One of the defendants sought “records from her marriage counseling sessions with her ex-husband.” Id. at 154. Like Washington, Colorado has a statutorily created marital counseling privilege. Id. at 155 (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107(1)(g) (1998)). The defendant claimed that the plaintiff had impliedly waived privilege by “inject[ing] her mental condition into the case.” Id. at 154. The defendant argued that “[i]t would be unfair . . . if she were precluded from discovering potential causes of Johnson’s mental and emotional suffering that are not related to the accident.” Id. at 156. The Colorado Supreme Court rejected that argument. Id. at 157. The court noted that the defendant’s “most compelling argument for why we should find an 9 Magney et al. v. Pham, MD et al., No. 96669-9 (Gordon McCloud, J., concurring in part/dissenting in part) implied waiver is that the information sought may be relevant to a determination of the extent to which Johnson’s mental suffering is properly attributable to the accident as opposed to some other cause.” Id. But the court held “that ‘relevance alone cannot be the test, because such a test would ignore the fundamental purpose of evidentiary privileges, which is to preclude discovery and admission of relevant evidence under prescribed circumstances.’” Id. (quoting R.K., 887 S.W.2d at 842). Indeed, if relevance were the test, then privilege may as well not even exist, because even unprivileged material must be relevant to be discoverable. CR 26(b)(1) (allowing parties to discovery only material that “is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action”). Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has rejected any approach that takes relevancy into consideration: “Making the promise of confidentiality contingent upon a trial judge’s later evaluation of the relative importance of the patient’s interest in privacy and the evidentiary need for disclosure would eviscerate the effectiveness of the privilege.” Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 17, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 135 L. Ed. 2d 337 (1996). I would reject the broad approach to waiver.