Opinion ID: 218850
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Computing Unit

Text: Inventio also challenges the district court's conclusion that the claim term computing unit is a means-plus-function limitation. Inventio argues that a computing unit connotes structure to those of skill in the art, specifically a computer or other data processing device. Inventio also argues that the written descriptions explicitly define the computing unit as a commercially available personal computer or a workstation, which includes at least one processor and at least one data memory. ThyssenKrupp argues that the claimed computing unit lacks sufficiently definite structure to avoid the application of § 112, ¶ 6 because the claims fail to provide any physical structure, the term computing unit lacks a well understood meaning in the art, and the term unit is the legal equivalent of means. ThyssenKrupp also argues, quoting Brown v. Baylor Healthcare System, that even if a computing unit is read to mean a computer, simply disclosing a general processor without more is not enough to perform the claimed function and avoid the application of § 112, ¶ 6. 381 Fed.Appx. 981, 983-84 (Fed.Cir.2010) (nonprecedential decision). We agree with Inventio that the computing unit here connotes sufficiently definite structure. Similar to the term modernizing device, the claimed computing unit presumptively connotes sufficiently definite structure to those of skill in the art. Personalized Media, 161 F.3d at 703-04. The claims indicate that the presumption is not overcome in this case. The claims recite that the computing unit is connected to the modernizing device and generates a destination signal for transmission to the modernizing device. '861 patent, col.11 ll.6-21. The claims elaborate that the computing unit is connected to the floor terminals of the elevator system, and evaluates incoming call reports, destination floors, and identification codes to generate the destination signal for processing by the modernizing device. Id. col.12 ll.9-52; '465 patent, col.12 ll.7-59. The written descriptions also indicate that the computing unit connotes structure to skilled artisans. As the claim term implies, the written descriptions refer to the computing unit as a computer, where one of its functions is to store and execute a computer program product. '861 patent, col.6 ll.21-24 (stating that the computing unit is a commercially available personal computer or workstation and that the computing unit includes at least one processor and at least one data memory); id. col.9 ll.61-64 (stating that it is entirely possible to perform the computer program product on any computer, for example on the computing unit of the system or on a remote server) (internal reference number omitted). The written descriptions also explain the steps that the computer program product performs, see id. col.6 l.3-col.7 l.25, as well as the interaction between the computing unit and modernizing device, id. col.7 ll.26-48, and the computing unit and the floor terminals, id. col.8 ll.6-22. In total, this disclosure shows that ThyssenKrupp has not rebutted the presumption that the claimed computing unit connotes sufficiently definite structure to those of skill in the art. In response to this evidence, ThyssenKrupp relies on dictum from our nonprecedential decision in Brown to argue that a computer, when claimed, is not sufficient structure to perform the claimed functions as a matter of law. ThyssenKrupp's reading of that case, however, is overly broad. In Brown, the patentee had the burden to show that the portable processing means claim limitation recited sufficiently definite structure to perform the recited processing function, and we concluded on the record in that case that the patentee had failed to meet that burden. 381 Fed. Appx. at 983-84. We rejected the patentee's argument that one would equate the portable processing means with a general purpose processor because the argument ignored that the patentee chose to claim the element at issue in functional terms. Id. We also noted that even if the patentee's argument were correct, a general purpose processor without more would not be enough to perform the claimed function. Id. at 984. Contrary to ThyssenKrupp's arguments, Brown did not hold, as a matter of law, that a claimed computer is not sufficiently definite structure to avoid the application of § 112, ¶ 6. Indeed, we have held that a claimed control unit that comprised a CPU and a portioned memory system recited sufficiently definite structure to perform the recited controlling the communication unit function. LG Elecs., Inc. v. Bizcom Elecs., Inc., 453 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed.Cir.2006), rev'd on other grounds, Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 128 S.Ct. 2109, 170 L.Ed.2d 996 (2008). Ultimately, whether claim language invokes § 112, ¶ 6 depends on how those skilled in the art would understand the structural significance of that claim language, assessed against the presumptions that flow from a drafter's choice to employ or not employ the term means. See Personalized Media, 161 F.3d at 704. In this case, the inventor did not draft the claims in means for format, and his decision to avoid the term means raises a strong presumption that the claimed computing unit connotes sufficiently definite structure to those skilled in the art. Lighting World, 382 F.3d at 1358. ThyssenKrupp had the burden to show that the computing unit terms are so structurally devoid that we should rewrite them in means-plus-function format. The claims and the written descriptions, however, indicate that those of skill in the art would understand a computing unit to connote sufficiently definite structure. Thus, on this record, ThyssenKrupp has failed to meet its burden.