Opinion ID: 1156578
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: disclosure to jury: possible problems

Text: While disclosure may be the most commonly accepted approach to Mary Carter and related agreements, it is not without difficulty. Such agreements often contain self-serving statements and include the amount of the settlement, both of which could prejudice the nonagreeing defendant should the agreements be disclosed. See Lahocki, 286 Md. at 727, 410 A.2d at 1046. Furthermore, there are at least two generally recognized problems that may arise because of the potential for improper jury inferences. First, the jury may draw improper conclusions regarding the liability of the parties who settle. The jury may infer that the settling defendant must be the main culprit or he or she would not have settled. See Slayton v. Ford Motor Co., 140 Vt. 27, 28, 435 A.2d 946, 947 (1981). Or, as is just as likely in this case, it may see the settling defendant as conciliatory and responsible and the nonsettling defendant as recalcitrant and irresponsible. We believe that such concerns can largely be ameliorated through an appropriate instruction to the jury. [9] Second, if told of a settlement the jury may be more likely to assume the availability of insurance coverage. See Lum, 87 Nev. at 411, 488 P.2d at 352 (counsel acknowledged agreement might prejudice jury because of references to insurance); cf. Cox, 594 P.2d at 359 (refusal to allow cross-examination of witness as to settlement with an insurer is error even though it incidentally discloses existence of insurance). This strikes us as being of only minimal concern. [T]here is considerable authority to the effect that jurors today assume the presence of insurance. 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2388, at 282 (1971). That jurors in Utah make such assumptions, at least in automobile accident cases, is especially likely in view of the virtual requirement that all vehicles registered in this state be insured. See, e.g., Barber v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 751 P.2d 248, 249 (Utah Ct.App. 1988). Ospital and Slusher additionally argue in this case that Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-29 and -30 (1977) (superseded) [10] precluded introduction of the settlement agreement. Section 78-27-30 provided, with our emphasis: No settlement, partial settlement or voluntary payment under section 78-27-29 shall be admissible in any action as evidence prior to judgment. The implication is that settlement and payment might nonetheless come in other than as evidence, such as for impeachment purposes. This conclusion is supported by the explicit reference in section 78-27-30 to the immediately preceding section. Section 78-27-29 provided as follows, with our emphasis: No settlement, partial settlement or voluntary payment of a claim against any party shall be construed as an admission of liability by that party or his insurer with respect to any claim arising from the same event or set of facts, whether that payment or settlement is made by the party, an insurer or any other person on behalf of the party or the insurer. Taken together, the two statutes resulted in a rule not unlike Utah Rule of Evidence 408, now in effect. [11] In other words, they precluded introduction of the settlement for the purpose of establishing liability but not for purposes relating to credibility. [12] Finally, Ospital and Slusher contend that Campbell should not be heard to complain about the settlement because he actually benefited from the settlement agreement. The jury found that Campbell was 100 percent at fault and assessed damages of $200,000 in Slusher's favor. Under the statutory scheme then in effect, see note 2, supra, the nonsettling joint tort-feasor was credited for any settlement made to the injured party by another joint tort-feasor. [13] Without the settlement, Campbell would be liable for 100 percent of $200,000; with the settlement, he was 100 percent responsible for $200,000 less $65,000. This contention misses the point. Campbell contends that had the jury been let in on the secret, it might have evaluated the testimony and arguments differently and apportioned responsibility differently. Taking the extreme case, if the enlightened jury had found Ospital instead of Campbell to be 100 percent responsible, Campbell would have no liability whatsoever to Slusher.