Opinion ID: 2980104
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: County Policies

Text: Plaintiffs next argue that, even if the County bears no vicarious liability for its officers’ actions, a number of its own policies caused their injuries. They allege that the incident at the Siler residence arose from the County’s policies of failing to (a) reprimand officers’ use of excessive force against suspects, (b) train officers before placing them on duty, and (c) screen officers before employing them. Municipalities face policy-based liability under § 1983 only if a plaintiff demonstrates “that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the ‘moving force’ behind the injury alleged.” Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997). Where, as here, a plaintiff points to a municipal policy of inaction as the municipality’s “deliberate conduct,” the plaintiff must show that -6- No. 09-6115 Siler v. Campbell Cnty. the municipality’s failure to act constitutes “deliberate indifference” to the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, see id. at 407, and “directly caused” the plaintiff’s injury, see id. at 415. With limited exceptions, deliberate indifference must be established with evidence that the municipality ignored a pattern of similar constitutional violations. See id. at 409. Because Plaintiffs offer no evidence establishing a pattern of constitutional violations under any of their municipal-policy theories, and fail to argue that their case falls into an exception to the pattern rule, we hold that no reasonable jury could find the County deliberately indifferent to Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. See Napier, 238 F.3d at 742.
Plaintiffs first contend that the County had “a custom or policy of allowing its officers to abuse individuals,” and support their claim with an affidavit from Officer Jackie Miracle. Miracle attests that, “on or about 2004,” a number of unspecified officers abused a suspect they pulled over for a traffic stop. Miracle further attests that “Chief Deputy Charles Scott stood by and watched the passenger of the vehicle being abused” without “reprimand[ing] any of the [o]fficers involved.” In Thomas v. City of Chattanooga, a case involving similar allegations of officer abuse, we explained that to prove a municipality’s deliberate indifference in this context, a plaintiff must show, among other things, that the municipality ignored “the existence of a clear and persistent pattern of [illegal activity]” by officers. 398 F.3d 426, 429 (6th Cir. 2005) (alteration in original) (internal -7- No. 09-6115 Siler v. Campbell Cnty. quotation marks and citation omitted). Though those plaintiffs submitted affidavits establishing that forty-five excessive-force suits had been filed against the city in the eight years before the relevant incident, id. at 430, we found that these complaints did not constitute a “clear and persistent” pattern of illegal conduct in the absence of “data showing what a ‘normal’ number of excessive force complaints would be,” id. at 431. Like the Thomas plaintiffs, Plaintiffs here fail to support their claim regarding “the existence of a clear and persistent pattern” of illegal activity by County officers. See id. at 429. Indeed, Plaintiffs offer even less than their Thomas counterparts: they do not point to any complaint of excessive force, nor do they produce any lawsuit on the matter. Rather, they put forth a lone affidavit from an officer who claims that he witnessed a single instance of abuse. Even if we assume the truth of the affidavit, the isolated incident described therein falls short of Thomas’s pattern requirement. See id.
Plaintiffs next argue that the County should face liability for its “policy of not training and supervising the deputies it hired.” In support of their claim, they point to a number of exhibits demonstrating that, at the time of the incident, Monday, Green, and Carroll had not yet attended the academy for training or achieved academy certification. -8- No. 09-6115 Siler v. Campbell Cnty. Because “[a] municipality’s culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous where a claim turns on a failure to train,” “[a] pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is ordinarily necessary to demonstrate deliberate indifference.” Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359–60 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Fisher v. Harden, 398 F.3d 837, 849 (6th Cir. 2005). In arguing for failure-to-train liability, Plaintiffs misconstrue this pattern requirement. They hinge their claim on the premise that, “on many occasions,” the County inadequately trained its officers. But even if widespread training inadequacies exist, this is not the relevant pattern for deliberate indifference: a plaintiff must offer evidence of a pattern of constitutional violations attributable to training shortcomings. As already discussed, the Miracle affidavit is the only evidence suggesting prior officer misconduct. Plaintiffs thus present no evidence of “[a] pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees,” which “is ordinarily necessary” to demonstrate the County’s deliberate indifference. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1360 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). There is, however, a potential exception to this general rule. In City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), “the Court left open the possibility that, in a narrow range of circumstances, a pattern of similar violations might not be necessary to show deliberate indifference” in the failure-totrain context. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1361 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Such a -9- No. 09-6115 Siler v. Campbell Cnty. circumstance could occur if the injury alleged were a “patently obvious” consequence of the deficiency in the training program. Id.; see also Brown, 520 U.S. at 409–10. Plaintiffs do not, and cannot, argue that theirs is one of the “narrow range of circumstances” hypothesized by Canton, as the officers’ shocking conduct was not a “patently obvious” consequence of any training deficiency. Our precedent confirms that “[t]he intentional, violent act that a [police officer] performed far outside the scope of his duties cannot be something that was ‘obvious’ to occur.” Mize v. Tedford, 375 F. App’x 497, 501 (6th Cir. 2010) (second alteration in original) (quoting Doe v. Magoffin Cnty. Fiscal Court, 174 F. App’x 962, 970 (6th Cir. 2006)); see also Stemler v. City of Florence, 126 F.3d 856, 866 (6th Cir. 1997).
Plaintiffs go on to contend that the County “had a policy of not checking the criminal backgrounds of the individuals it hired.” They highlight the records of two officers: Daniel Pedrin, who had a citation for operating a motor vehicle without a valid driver’s license, and Green, who was charged with—but not convicted of—one count of domestic violence, and who had two civil orders of protection against him. “Cases involving constitutional injuries allegedly traceable to an ill-considered hiring decision pose the greatest risk that a municipality will be held liable for an injury that it did not cause.” - 10 - No. 09-6115 Siler v. Campbell Cnty. Brown, 520 U.S. at 415. Like failure-to-train claims, a “pattern of injuries” caused by failures to screen is thus “ordinarily necessary to establish” deliberate indifference. Id. at 409–10. Again, Plaintiffs offer no relevant pattern; but again, there exists a potential pattern exception. The Brown Court “assum[ed] without deciding” that it could import Canton into the failure-to-screen context, making a municipality liable if “a full review of [the offender’s] record reveals that . . . [the offender’s] use of excessive force would be a plainly obvious consequence of the hiring decision.” Id. at 412–13 (emphasis added). The Court noted that “a finding of culpability simply cannot depend on the mere probability that any officer inadequately screened will inflict any constitutional injury,” but “must depend on a finding that this officer was highly likely to inflict the particular injury suffered by the plaintiff.” Id. at 412. Though the officer in Brown had convictions for assault and resisting arrest, the Court held that his use of excessive force—pulling a suspect from a vehicle and injuring her knees—was not a “plainly obvious consequence of the hiring decision.” Id. at 414. Plaintiffs pose no argument that their screening claim falls within Brown’s pattern exception. Nor can they: here, the officers had milder backgrounds, and performed more brutal acts, than the officer in Brown. Though, like the Brown officer, Officer Green’s domestic violence charges and protection orders “may well have made him an extremely poor candidate for . . . deputy,” id., Plaintiffs cannot show that these shortcomings made it “highly likely” that he would “inflict the particular injury suffered by [them],” id. at 412. - 11 - No. 09-6115 Siler v. Campbell Cnty.