Opinion ID: 1916837
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Zone of Privacy

Text: The majority's analysis of the zone of privacy factor is also flawed. It is well established that departures from the presumptive sentence are appropriate where a defendant invades the zone of privacy that surrounds the victim's home. See State v. Blanche, 696 N.W.2d 351, 379 (Minn.2005); Winchell, 363 N.W.2d at 750. But every time a defendant commits a crime within a victim's zone of privacy, the State can arguably charge the defendant with burglary. Minn.Stat. § 609.582 (2006). While the majority contends that it is not treading onto the prosecutor's discretion in charging, it seems to me that is precisely where the majority is going. And, as the court of appeals wisely noted, it is not for courts to supplant the prosecutor's charging function, in the absence of evidence of deliberate discrimination. State v. Jackson, 2007 WL 2245594, at  (Minn.App. Aug.7, 2007) (citing Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364, 98 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978); State v. Herme, 298 N.W.2d 454, 455 (Minn.1980)). [8] The majority also seems to conclude that a departure is not appropriate based on the invasion of the zone of privacy because punishment is allowed for both the burglary and the crime committed in the dwelling, and because the aggravated sentence imposed in this case is greater than the sentence that could have been imposed had Jackson been sentenced on both burglary and aggravated robbery. The majority argues that the guidelines do not contemplate enhanced sentences based on uncharged criminal conduct that would be far greater than what would otherwise be permitted based on charged criminal conduct. Had Jackson been given consecutive sentences, assuming he was charged and convicted with aggravated robbery and burglary, the presumptive sentence would have been 162 months. Because 210 months is apparently far greater than 162 months, the majority seemingly concludes that the district court erred. But the 162-month sentence is not an aggravated sentence; it is the presumptive sentence. The majority's analysis does not take into account that even in the hypothetical it poses the State could seek a departure based on the way in which the crimes were committed. Thus, in my view, it is not proper to conclude that an aggravated sentence is unlawful because it exceeds the presumptive sentence. If that were the law, there would no such thing as an aggravated sentence, and again this would write provisions out of the Guidelines, something that it is not within the province of this court to do.