Opinion ID: 1450901
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Introduction: Concepts of Jurisdiction

Text: MICHAEL A. WOLFF, Judge. In deciding this case, the task at hand is to bring down to earth and clarify the meaning of the magical word jurisdiction. The word has magic because it can make judgments disappear, as in: The judgment is a nullity because the court lacked jurisdiction. The word has magic because it makes judges fearful of entering the Land of No Jurisdiction. A lawyer, accordingly, employs the magic word in hopes of curbing the judicial beast from entering the Land of No Jurisdiction, where the defense of the case might be devoured on its merits. In other cases, perhaps, judges likewise may use the magical word to display the admirable trait of judicial self-restraint in order to avoid deciding the merits. (This admirable trait can be exercised, one hastens to add, without getting all jurisdictional about it.) A word with such magic would seem, of course, to be irresistible to those who would seek legislation to block the courthouse door to litigants of unpopular character and claims of disfavored origin. To call a concept jurisdictional is to elevate its importance. The problem with a word with such magic is, sadly, that it will be over used, as it is in cases such as the present case. The statute at the center of this case, section 452.455.4 [1] , is reasonably straightforward. It says that a parent who is more than $10,000 in arrears in payment of child support may not petition to modify a judgment of custody or visitation without posting a bond in the amount of the arrearage, or the legal fees of the custodial parent, whichever is greater, before filing the petition. [2] Id. An earlier decision of the court of appeals characterizes the statute's prohibition as a matter of personal jurisdiction. Miller v. Miller, 210 S.W.3d 439, 444 (Mo.App.2007). [3] In contrast, in this case, a different division of the court of appeals characterized the issue as a matter of subject matter jurisdiction or jurisdictional competence. J.C.W. ex rel. Webb v. Wyciskalla, 2008 WL 1957647,  (Mo.App.2008). As a brief review of jurisdiction will show, the correct characterization is: none of the above. As discussed in In re Marriage of Hendrix, 183 S.W.3d 582 (Mo. banc 2006), Missouri courts recognize two kinds of jurisdiction: subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction. These two kinds of jurisdictionand there are only two for the circuit courtsare based upon constitutional principles. Personal jurisdiction is, for the most part, a matter of federal constitutional law. [4] Subject matter jurisdiction is governed by article V of the Missouri Constitution. Personal jurisdiction often is referred to by its Latin name in personam jurisdiction, a handy way of implying that the concept has ancient roots and, thus, longstanding legitimacy. In modern terms, personal jurisdiction refers quite simply to the power of a court to require a person to respond to a legal proceeding that may affect the person's rights or interests. State v. Fassero, 256 S.W.3d 109, 117 (Mo. banc 2008). Since Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 24 L.Ed. 565 (1877), the power of a state's courts over persons within and without the territory of the state has been a matter of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. at 734. Even before Pennoyer, the power of the state courts to exercise jurisdiction over persons within the state and the interests of persons in property within the state was unquestioned. Id. at 723. The Due Process Clause limits the power of the state over persons outside the state; the needs of interstate and international commerce have expanded the notions of what extraterritorial power a state court may exercise. See International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945), and its progeny. To facilitate the economic advantages of having those with business in a state be answerable in the state's courts, Missouri and its sister states have enacted statutes and rules that explicitly, or by judicial interpretation, expand the state courts' jurisdictional reach to the maximum extent permitted by the federal constitution. [5] In modern times, when a court says that it lacks personal jurisdiction, it means simply that the constitutional principle of due process bars it from affecting the rights and interests of a particular person, whether such a person be an individual or an entity such as a corporation. Subject matter jurisdiction, in contrast to personal jurisdiction, is not a matter of a state court's power over a person, but the court's authority to render a judgment in a particular category of case. In the federal courts, unlike Missouri, subject matter jurisdiction is set forth in statutes passed within the authority granted to Congress by article III of the United States Constitution. Thus, pursuant to this constitutional authority, Congress has the power to increase or decrease the kinds and categories of cases heard in the federal courts. [6] In contrast to the federal system, the subject matter jurisdiction of Missouri's courts is governed directly by the state's constitution. Article V, section 14 sets forth the subject matter jurisdiction of Missouri's circuit courts in plenary terms, providing that [t]he circuit courts shall have original jurisdiction over all cases and matters, civil and criminal. Such courts may issue and determine original remedial writs and shall sit at times and places within the circuit as determined by the circuit court. (emphasis added.) [7] In evaluating the jurisdiction of circuit courts, there are cases that, in dicta, purport to recognize a third concept, jurisdictional competence, which often is confused with subject matter jurisdiction. As Hendrix noted, these cases generally concern situations in which there is no question as to the court's authority to decide the general issue before it, but there is a question whether the issue or parties affected by the court's judgment are properly before it for resolution at that time, 183 S.W.3d at 588, or where the court has proceeded `beyond the allegations of the pleadings and the prayer for relief.' Id. (citation omitted). Hendrix noted that these cases do not question the court's subject matter or personal jurisdiction and really go to the court's authority to render a particular judgment in a particular case, Id. at 588 (citing Mo. Soybean Ass'n v. Mo. Clean Water Comm'n, 102 S.W.3d 10, 21 (Mo. banc 2003)). The Court, however, did not take the further step of expressly holding that this third category does not deal with jurisdiction in the true sense. This has resulted in some continued confusion in the courts as to whether a court's errors in following a statute or in going beyond the pleadings are jurisdictional in nature. Today the Court takes that further step. Because the authority of a court to render judgment in a particular case is, in actuality, the definition of subject matter jurisdiction, there is no constitutional basis for this third jurisdictional concept for statutes that would bar litigants from relief. Elevating statutory restrictions to matters of jurisdictional competence erodes the constitutional boundary established by article V of the Missouri Constitution, as well as the separation of powers doctrine, and robs the concept of subject matter jurisdiction of the clarity that the constitution provides. If jurisdictional competence is recognized as a distinct concept under which a statute can restrict subject matter jurisdiction, the term creates a temptation for litigants to label every statutory restriction on claims for relief as a matter of jurisdictional competence. Accordingly, having fully considered the potential ill effects of recognizing a separate jurisdictional basis called jurisdictional competence, the courts of this state should confine their discussions of circuit court jurisdiction to constitutionally recognized doctrines of personal and subject matter jurisdiction; there is no third category of jurisdiction called jurisdictional competence.