Opinion ID: 1572323
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Failure to Challenge the Admissibility of Lowe's Statement

Text: Lowe argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach Lowe's girlfriend, Patricia White, with her deposition testimony at the hearing on the motion to suppress Lowe's statement. This claim is procedurally barred. [6] Lowe contends that White's evidentiary hearing testimony is newly discovered evidence, and argues that in her evidentiary hearing testimony, White recanted her trial testimony by testifying that the detectives coerced her into speaking with Lowe and getting a confession from him. To obtain a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, a defendant must meet two requirements: (1) the evidence must not have been known by the trial court, the party, or counsel at the time of trial, and (2) the newly discovered evidence must be of such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial. See Jones v. State, 709 So.2d 512, 521 (Fla.1998) ( Jones III ). Furthermore, to determine whether a new trial is warranted due to recantation of a witness's testimony, a trial judge is to examine all the circumstances of the case, including the testimony of the witnesses submitted on the motion for a new trial. `Moreover, recanting testimony is exceedingly unreliable, and it the duty of the court to deny a new trial where it is not satisfied that such testimony is true. Especially is this true where the recantation involves a confession of perjury.' Consalvo v. State, 937 So.2d 555, 561 (Fla.2006) (quoting Armstrong v. State, 642 So.2d 730, 735 (Fla.1994)). Furthermore, [a]bsent an abuse of discretion, a trial court's decision on a motion based on newly discovered evidence [including a witness's newly recanted testimony] will not be overturned on appeal. Mills v. State, 786 So.2d 547, 549 (Fla.2001). At the evidentiary hearing, White testified that the detectives asked her to talk to Lowe to get a confession, and if she could, the charges against her would go away. She admitted that what she was saying at the evidentiary hearing was different from her other testimony, but said she lied during the other testimony because at the time of the trial, she was seventeen years old and pregnant, and did not want to go to jail. She testified that her life was different now and she wanted to make amends because what she did was wrong. Detective Green testified at the evidentiary hearing that he never threatened White to get her to speak with Lowe, and that he never told her to testify falsely in any court proceeding. In denying relief on this claim, the trial court found that White's evidentiary hearing testimony was unreliable. Although White's evidentiary hearing testimony meets the first prong of the Jones standard because her testimony about what happened at the police department did not change until postconviction proceedings, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a new trial. In assessing the reliability of White's evidentiary hearing testimony, the court examined the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing, the evidence presented at trial, and all other circumstances of the case. Therefore, the trial court properly found that White's recent statement at the evidentiary hearing was not credible and it would not have changed the outcome of Lowe's trial. See, e.g., Kormondy v. State, 983 So.2d 418 (Fla.2007) (finding that the trial court acted within its discretion in denying a new trial based on newly discovered evidence in the form of codefendant's recanted statement because codefendant was not credible). Postconviction relief was properly denied.