Opinion ID: 1129349
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: Exclusion from Participating in Jury Selection

Text: Lamarca also claims that his appellate counsel was ineffective for not challenging the dismissal of jurors for cause at a sidebar conference where Lamarca's counsel was present. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in a habeas petition, Lamarca must show (1) specific errors or omissions by appellate counsel that constitute a serious error or substantial deficiency falling measurably outside the range of professionally acceptable performance, and (2) that the deficiency in performance compromised the appellate process to such a degree as to undermine confidence in the correctness of the result. Dufour v. State, 905 So.2d 42, 70 (Fla.2005) (quoting Pope v. Wainwright, 496 So.2d 798, 800 (Fla.1986)). Appellate counsel cannot be declared ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim. State v. Knight, 866 So.2d 1195, 1204 (Fla.2003). Lamarca's claim is without merit because he has not established that his constitutional right to meaningfully participate in jury selection was violated. Jury selection in his case occurred on November 3, 1997, after the 1996 amendments to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.180(a)(4) took effect. See Amendments to Fla. Rules of Criminal Procedure, 685 So.2d 1253, 1254-55 (Fla.1996). These amendments recognize that when a defendant is physically present at a courtroom proceeding, his right to participate in a sidebar conference is satisfied if he is given a meaningful opportunity to participate through counsel. See id. at 1254 n. 2; see also Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.180(a)(4), (b). The requirements of this rule were satisfied in Lamarca's case. The record reveals that Lamarca was physically present in the courtroom when the sidebar took place and that he was given the opportunity to meaningfully participate through his attorneys. The court began the sidebar by asking Lamarca's attorneys if Lamarca waived his right to be present at the sidebar. When counsel affirmed, the court gave both the State and the defense an opportunity to object to each juror the court suggested excusing, and after the sidebar ended, the court excused six jurors in open court. Neither Lamarca nor his trial counsel objected. We recognize that before rule 3.180 was amended in 1996, this Court held that rule 3.180 granted criminal defendants the right to be physically present at the immediate site where pretrial juror challenges are exercised. Coney v. State, 653 So.2d 1009, 1013 (Fla.1995). This holding, however, was superseded by the 1996 amendments that took effect January 1, 1997. See Amendments to the Fla. Rules of Criminal Procedure, 685 So.2d 1253, 1254 n. 2, 1255 (Fla.1996). Rule 3.180(b) now recognizes that when a defendant is physically present at a courtroom proceeding, his opportunity to meaningfully participate in this proceeding can be satisfied through counsel. Because jury selection in Lamarca's case occurred after the amendments took effect, this language applies to his case. See Carmichael v. State, 715 So.2d 247, 248 n. 1 (Fla.1998) (recognizing Coney applies only to those cases where the jury selection occurred after Coney was issued and before the 1996 amendments took effect); see also Rincon v. Crosby, No. 803CV1138T17MAP, 2005 WL 1705472 ,  (M.D.Fla. July 19, 2005) (denying habeas petition, in part, because Coney does not apply to a trial that occurred in 1998). Furthermore, even if Coney applied to Lamarca's case, Lamarca would still not be entitled to relief. Neither Lamarca nor his trial counsel timely objected to his absence at the sidebar; therefore, he has not established that his right to be present was violated. Neal v. State, 713 So.2d 1002, 1003 (Fla.1998) (denying defendant's claim that Coney entitled him to a new trial because neither he [n]or his lawyer expressed any interest in [the defendant] being present at the bench during jury challenges). In summary, Lamarca's claim that his right to participate in jury selection was compromised by the sidebar is without merit; therefore, appellate counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing to raise this on appeal. See Valle v. Moore, 837 So.2d 905, 907-08 (Fla.2002) (recognizing that appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim).