Opinion ID: 613537
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Continued drug use and sale

Text: Defendants' final contention concerns whether Rhoades continued to use and sell drugs. They point to the following exchanges during the cross-examination of Rhoades: Q: Let me turn your attention to robbery charges. Am I correct in saying that you and John McNeil had participated in robbery charges together? A: In robbery charges together? I ain't never been in no robbery charges with him. Q: Never? A: Never. Q: And if anybody testified to that, they're being untruthful and you are being truthful in your denial? A: Yes, I am. .... Q: While you were an informant, did you deal drugs or sell drugs with Mr. McNeil? A: No. Q: Did you deal drugs or sell drugs with anybody during that period of time? A: No. Q: Okay. So you stopped dealing drugs when? When you were arrested on those charges in 2006? A: Yes. .... Q: So you became legitimate after you were arrested? A: Yes. Q: Okay. Now, you've testified that you brought a lot of cocaine back from New York, correct, Harlem, Queens, South Queens? Is that correct? A: Yes. Q: When did you bring all this cocaine and make it into crack and sell it in Harrisburg? A: Before the time I got caught and indicted for this. Q: Before you got into trouble? A: From 15 until then. Q: And now you're a different person? A: Yes. A fair reading of Rhoades's testimony is that he stated (i) he did not engage in any robberies with John McNeil, (ii) anyone who said he engaged in such robberies was lying, (iii) he never sold drugs with John McNeil, and (iv) he did not sell drugs after 2006. Defendants argue that Rhoades presented himself to the Court and jury as not having anything to do with drugs after his arrest in 2006, and as someone who was working as a government informant who had been totally rehabilitated and specifically testified that all those that said differently [by identifying him as a participant in robberies] were untruthful and not worthy of belief. Therefore, defendants argue, had the jury known of Rhoades's March 2007 possession of 0.18 grams of crack cocaine, they would not have believed that he was telling the truth about his rehabilitation, id., and thus, would not believe any of his testimony regarding Counts I, II, and III. The contradiction between Rhoades's testimony and that of other witnesses regarding Rhoades's participation in robberies was already highlighted to the jury through cross-examination and argument, and the March 2007 incident does not reflect on that contradiction. Moreover, although Rhoades denied selling drugs after 2006, nowhere in his testimony does he expressly deny possessing or using drugs after that date. The inference starting from a single instance of possession of 0.18 grams of crack cocaine and extrapolating to selling or dealing drugs is not so strong as to provide a reasonable probability that the jury would find Rhoades wholly unbelievable, as defendants argue. Thus, disclosure of Rhoades's March 2007 possession of 0.18 grams of crack cocaine was not likely to undermine[] confidence in the outcome of the trial. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678, 105 S.Ct. 3375. We clarify that, although the March 2007 incident is potentially a new avenue of impeachment, it is not material for Brady purposes. As noted above, we have recognized that undisclosed Brady material that would have provided a different avenue of impeachment is material, even where the witness is otherwise impeached. Lambert v. Beard, 633 F.3d at 134. In making this observation, we cited to two of our prior cases, Slutzker v. Johnson, 393 F.3d 373, 387 (3d Cir.2004), and United States v. Perdomo, 929 F.2d 967, 969, 972 (3d Cir.1991), in which different avenues of impeachment were indeed material. However, this is not to say that every unexplored avenue of impeachment is ipso facto material; because the touchstone of materiality is a `reasonable probability' of a different result, Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555 (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375), it is only those new avenues of impeachment that sufficiently undermine confidence in the verdict that will make out a successful Brady claim. Indeed, our primary concern in Lambert v. Beard was that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had concluded that a witness was so thoroughly impeached that, ipso facto, additional evidence could not have made a difference, and we held that it was patently unreasonable to presumewithout explanationthat whenever a witness is impeached in one manner, any other impeachment becomes immaterial. 633 F.3d at 133-34. Our statement in Lambert v. Beard is a recognition that there are some instances where specific impeachment evidence is so important (for issues such as the identity of the culprit) that it is material for Brady purposes even when a witness has already been effectively impeached on other issues. See id. at 135-36 (witness's prior reference to another co-defendant other than the accused was material even though witness had been thoroughly impeached on other grounds because witness had testified at trial that only the accused and one other person were present); Slutzker, 393 F.3d at 387-88 (impeachment evidence was material where the witness had previously identified another individual as the culprit even though the witness had been impeached by prior statements in which she failed to identify defendant as the culprit); Perdomo, 929 F.2d at 972 (noting that whether the jury has had an opportunity to consider other impeachment evidence is not the correct standard for determining materiality, but instead was whether the evidence, if disclosed and used effectively ... may make the difference between conviction and acquittal (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375)). We further observe that this was not a case in which there was a lone witness providing uncorroborated testimony. Cf. Lambert v. Beard, 633 F.3d at 134 n. 3 (`[C]onfidence in the outcome is particularly doubtful when the withheld evidence impeaches a witness whose testimony is uncorroborated and essential to the conviction.' (quoting Norton v. Spencer, 351 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir.2003))). Here, Rhoades's testimony was not the only testimony providing direct support to the prosecution on Counts I, II, and IIIJason McNeil independently testified at length to the defendants' conspiracy to sell drugs, actual sale of drugs, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of those drug sales, corroborating Rhoades's testimony. While it is regrettable that the government did not disclose the March 8, 2007, incident prior to trial, the government's mistake does not rise to the level of a Brady violation.