Opinion ID: 1277158
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Nature of the Charges

Text: ¶ 45 Brown argues he made a prima facie showing that he did not understand the nature of the charges based on the fact that the plea hearing lacked any discussion of the elements of the offenses to which he pleaded guilty. The State responds that the circuit court established Brown's understanding of the charges at the plea hearing in other ways. Both parties rely upon Bangert. ¶ 46 In Bangert we said a circuit court may establish the defendant's understanding of the charges to which he is pleading by any one of, or combination of, the following non-exhaustive methods. First, the trial court may summarize the elements of the crime charged by reading from the appropriate jury instructions, see Wis. JICriminal SM-32, Part IV [1995], or from the applicable statute. Bangert, 131 Wis.2d at 268, 389 N.W.2d 12. ¶ 47 Second, the trial judge may ask defendant's counsel whether he explained the nature of the charge to the defendant and request him to summarize the extent of the explanation, including a reiteration of the elements, at the plea hearing. Id. (emphasis added). ¶ 48 Third, the trial judge may expressly refer to the record or other evidence of defendant's knowledge of the nature of the charge established prior to the plea hearing. Id. For example, when a criminal complaint has been read to the defendant at a preliminary hearing, the trial judge may inquire whether the defendant understands the nature of the charge based on that reading. Id. A trial judge may also specifically refer to and summarize any signed statement of the defendant which might demonstrate that the defendant has notice of the nature of the charge. Id. ¶ 49 The State emphasizes that the Bangert list is non-exhaustive, and we agree. There may be other ways to show a defendant's understanding of the charges. ¶ 50 In this case, the State notes: (1) Brown's defense attorney stated he had reviewed the elements with Brown; (2) Brown confirmed that his attorney reviewed with him the elements of the charges; and (3) Brown said he understood the charges. ¶ 51 These representations are not sufficient to establish that Brown's plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The State concedes that where an illiterate defendant is involved, the better practice is to use one of the three methods expressly stated in Bangert to establish that the defendant understood the nature of the charges. ¶ 52 Complying with the requisite standards is not optional. Bangert requires that the plea colloquy establish the defendant's understanding of the nature of the charges, the range of penalties, the constitutional rights being waived, and other essential information on the record. We observed in Bangert that the method a circuit court employs to ascertain a defendant's understanding should depend upon the circumstances of the particular case, including the level of education of the defendant and the complexity of the charge[s]. Bangert, 131 Wis.2d at 267-68, 389 N.W.2d 12. The less a defendant's intellectual capacity and education, the more a court should do to ensure the defendant knows and understands the essential elements of the charges. ¶ 53 In the present case, the circuit court did not follow any of the methods established in Bangert. The circuit court never enumerated, explained, or discussed the elements of first-degree sexual assault, armed robbery, or kidnapping, or the facts making up the elements. Although Brown's attorney stated that he had explained the nature of the charges to Brown, the circuit court never asked either Brown or his attorney to summarize the extent of the explanation or the elements of the crimes on the record. The circuit court never referred to the record from prior court proceedings to establish that Brown understood the nature of the charges. [25] The circuit court never referred to or summarized the charges as found in a plea questionnaire or other writing signed by Brown, because there were no such documents. ¶ 54 The fact that there was no plea questionnaire at hand should have warned the court that special steps were imperative to ensure, on the record, that the defendant was fully apprised and understood the charges, the potential penalties, and the panoply of valuable rights he was surrendering by entering his plea. The absence of the plea questionnaire and waiver of rights form prevented the court from using these documents to instruct the defendant, to assess the defendant's understanding, or to construct an invulnerable record. The absence of these documents will now hamper the State at the evidentiary hearing. ¶ 55 An examination of the record illustrates why the court's failure to enumerate or discuss elements of the crimes may have shortchanged the defendant. Brown pleaded guilty to all charges as a party to the crime without the circuit court ever explaining or ensuring that the defendant understood the concept of party to a crime. This could be significant for four reasons. First, at the plea hearing Brown's attorney said that Brown denied that he personally held or pointed a gun in Booth's hotel room. Second, at the sentencing hearing, Brown's attorney repeated Brown's denial that he had intercourse with Booth's girlfriend. Third, the court never referenced party to a crime when it mentioned the sexual assault charge. Fourth, Attorney Earle acknowledged, perhaps I didn't prepare him as well for his plea as I should have . . . perhaps we should have tendered a no contest plea with regard to the sexual assault. These statements and omissions raise questions of whether Brown understood the concept of party to a crime, an essential element of the charges to which he pleaded guilty. ¶ 56 The admission by Brown's original attorney that he may not have fully prepared Brown to plead guilty to the sexual assault charge also helps to explain why a court cannot rely very heavily upon mere statements from defense counsel that he or she has reviewed the nature of the charges with a defendant. Bangert requires verification, independent of defense counsel's assertion, that a defendant understands the nature of the charges. See Bangert, 131 Wis.2d at 267, 389 N.W.2d 12 (requiring the circuit court to ascertain that the defendant possesses accurate information about the nature of the charge). Hence, Bangert requires a circuit court to summarize the elements of the offenses on the record, or ask defense counsel to summarize the elements of the offenses, or refer to a prior court proceeding at which the elements were reviewed, or refer to a document signed by the defendant that includes the elements. [26] Id. at 268, 389 N.W.2d 12. Each method enables a court to ascertain the accuracy of the defendant's knowledge; each method gives substantive content to a defendant's understanding. Cf. id. at 269, 389 N.W.2d 12 (Understanding must have knowledge as its antecedent; knowledge, like understanding, cannot be inferred or assumed on a silent record.). Moreover, we encourage circuit court judges to translate legal generalities into factual specifics when necessary to ensure the defendant's understanding of the charges. ¶ 57 Unfortunately, the record in this case is bereft of what Brown knew and understood about the charges to which he pleaded guilty. Although Brown's attorney stated he reviewed the charges with Brown, we do not know whether he accurately described and discussed all the elements because that is not on the record. In view of Brown's illiteracy, his one-word responses, the complexity of the charges, and the absence of a plea questionnaire, Brown's one-word acknowledgment that he reviewed the elements with his attorney and understood them is conclusory, not persuasive. ¶ 58 We conclude Brown's postconviction motion alleges a prima facie violation of Wis. Stat. § 971.08. Although a circuit court must establish that a defendant understands every element of the charges to which he pleads, the circuit court is not expected to explain every element of every charge in every case. This opinion is intended to revitalize Bangert, which allows a court to tailor a plea colloquy to the individual defendant. [27] In customizing a plea colloquy, however, a circuit court must do more than merely record the defendant's affirmation of understanding. Bangert, 131 Wis.2d at 267, 389 N.W.2d 12. As we stated in Bangert: [I]t is no longer sufficient for a trial judge merely to perfunctorily question the defendant about his understanding of the charge. Likewise, a perfunctory affirmative response by the defendant that he understands the nature of the offense, without an affirmative showing that the nature of the crime has been communicated to him or that the defendant has at some point expressed his knowledge of the nature of the charge, will not satisfy the requirement of sec. 971.08, Stats. Bangert, 131 Wis.2d at 268-69, 389 N.W.2d 12 (emphasis added). A statement from defense counsel that he has reviewed the elements of the charge, without some summary of the elements or detailed description of the conversation, cannot constitute an affirmative showing that the nature of the crime has been communicated. Id. at 268, 389 N.W.2d 12. ¶ 59 To earn a Bangert evidentiary hearing, a defendant must satisfy a second obligation. In addition to making a prima facie case that the circuit court erred in the plea colloquy, a defendant must allege he did not enter a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea because he did not know or understand information that should have been provided at the plea hearing. Bangert, 131 Wis.2d at 274, 389 N.W.2d 12. Accordingly, we turn to the question whether Brown's postconviction motion sufficiently alleged that he did not understand the nature of the charges to which he pleaded guilty. ¶ 60 The State contends Brown failed to adequately allege that he did not understand the nature of the charges. The State argues Brown's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas was insufficient because it failed to specifically state what Brown did not understand. ¶ 61 Brown's motion reads in part as follows: The guilty plea record fails to demonstrate that Mr. Brown actually understood the elements of any of the crimes to which he pled guilty. The guilty plea record also fails to demonstrate that Mr. Brown actually understood the valuable constitutional rights he was waiving. .... Illustration of the second part of defendant's burden, that Mr. Brown did not know or understand the information which should have been provided at the plea hearing is (only a bit) more problematic. Undersigned counsel considered, but rejected, having Mr. Brown execute an affidavit to this effect. An affidavit would suffer from the same flaw as the (never executed) Plea Questionnaireto wit, what use is an affidavit executed by an illiterate defendant? Counsel also considered submitting his own affidavit. This suffers from a different flaw, placing counsel in the untenable dual role of advocate and witness. Suffice it to say that counsel has discussed the issues raised herein and represents that Mr. Brown appears to understand very little of what transpired in connection with the entry of his guilty pleas. His testimony will make this clear beyond dispute. (Emphasis added.) ¶ 62 We share the State's concern that this motion does not allege directly that the defendant did not know or understand certain information that should have been provided or addressed at the plea hearing. A defendant is not required to submit a sworn affidavit to the court, but he is required to plead in his motion that he did not know or understand some aspect of his plea that is related to a deficiency in the plea colloquy. ¶ 63 This requirement is necessary for at least three reasons. First, if the defendant is unwilling or unable to assert a lack of understanding about some aspect of the plea process, there is no point in holding a hearing. The ultimate issue to be decided at the hearing is whether the defendant's plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, not whether the circuit court erred. The court's error has already been exposed. In the absence of a claim by the defendant that he lacked understanding with regard to the plea, any shortcoming in the plea colloquy is harmless. ¶ 64 Second, if the defendant alleges that he did not understand some aspect of the plea colloquy (such as the nature of the charges) but the transcript shows that the court's treatment of the subject was unassailable, the defendant's motion for a hearing cannot be granted on the basis of a deficiency in the transcript. On that score, the defendant's motion will have failed to make a prima facie showing that the plea colloquy was deficient. Strictly speaking, a Bangert motion relies on information in the record. When a defendant moves to withdraw a plea based on information outside the record, the defendant has a higher burden and must meet the standards set out in Bentley, 201 Wis.2d at 318, 548 N.W.2d 50. ¶ 65 Third, when a Bangert -type motion is granted, the state should know from the pleading what it is required to prove at the evidentiary hearing. A Bangert evidentiary hearing is not a search for error; it is designed to evaluate the effect of known error on the defendant's plea so that the court can determine whether it must accept the withdrawal of the defendant's plea. The state must be given fair notice of what it must prove. ¶ 66 In this case, defense counsel persuasively documented deficiencies in the plea hearing transcript, but the motion did not allege directly that the defendant did not understand the nature of the charges against him. Counsel explained his decision not to submit an affidavit from the defendant or himself, but he did not explain why the defendant could not plead that he did not understand the nature of the charges. We are required to infer such an allegation from the totality of the motion. In this case, we accept counsel's representations that the defendant lacked understanding about the charges and that the defendant's testimony will make this clear beyond dispute. ¶ 67 In the ordinary case, defense counsel should plead with greater particularity a defendant's lack of understanding. A defendant must identify deficiencies in the plea colloquy, state what he did not understand, and connect his lack of understanding to the deficiencies. See Hampton, 274 Wis.2d 379, ¶ 57, 683 N.W.2d 14; State v. Giebel, 198 Wis.2d 207, 217, 541 N.W.2d 815 (Ct.App.1995). This procedure should prove fair to both parties. ¶ 68 Because this case is being remanded to the circuit court for a hearing, we will respond to the defendant's two other attacks on the plea colloquy.