Opinion ID: 2345721
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: Prior Petition

Text: In interpreting CP Section 7-106(b)(1)(ii)(6) we look first to the plain language of the statute. At the time of his Motion to Reopen Postconviction Proceeding and for New Trial, Arrington had already filed a petition for postconviction relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel, a claim that was resolved against him in the first postconviction proceeding. Arrington argues that this was not a prior petition under Subtitle 7: The [postconviction court] erred because it misunderstood the difference between a second successive petition and a proceeding that is reopened. Once a postconviction petition is reopened, its status is that of the initial postconviction. In other words, it is as if the postconviction proceeding was never closed. Consequently, Arrington was entitled to raise any issue that could have been raised in the initial postconviction proceeding. If one were to focus only on the word reopen, this argument would have some initial appeal because the word suggests a return to the original proceeding, during which the petitioner was free to present his contentions without the restraint of Section 7-106(b)(1)(ii)(6). But, even with this limited focus, equally appealing is the argument that a return to the original postconviction proceeding simply means that the petitioner has the right to assert the arguments he made there, plus present the new DNA evidence. When we consider the issue in the context of the overall statutory scheme regarding postconviction proceedings as set forth in the UPPA, the scales tip against Arrington's position. We explain. The UPPA, originally enacted in 1958, protected a broad array of rights, placed limits on collateral litigation (especially through res judicata and `waiver' provisions), and took a step toward unifying the various collateral remedies by making the postconviction process the primary means of asserting collateral claims. Michael A. Millemann, Collateral Remedies in Criminal Cases in Maryland: An Assessment, 64 Md. L.Rev. 968, 991-92 (2005). Although in the original Act the number of postconviction claims a person could file was unlimited, under current law, only one is allowed  though amendments are permitted  with an opportunity to reopen in the interests of justice. See CP §§ 7-103 and 7-104; Md. Rule 4-402(c). The UPPA also, in CP Section 7-106, established limits on what could be raised in a postconviction proceeding by introducing the doctrine of waiver. The purpose of this provision was to achieve finality in the criminal adjudicative process, without unduly interfering with a defendant's right to fully present his case before a court. There is no indication that when the General Assembly enacted CP Section 8-201(i)(2) it intended to modify the important waiver provisions of Section 7-106. If it had intended such a drastic change in the statutory scheme, we think it would have expressly stated so. We are not persuaded that the mere use of the word reopen reveals a legislative intent to make such a change. As we see it, the legislature was focused only on expanding the opportunity to use DNA evidence, not other arguments or evidence that had been waived. Arrington relies on Smith v. State, 115 Md.App. 614, 694 A.2d 182 (1997) for the proposition that the reopening of a post-conviction proceeding permits a defendant to raise any issue that could have been raised in the initial postconviction proceeding. Smith does not support this contention. Smith addressed Article 27, Section 645A(a)(2)(i) of the Maryland Code  now codified as CP Section 7-103  which stated that a person may file only one petition, arising out of each trial, for relief under this subtitle. (Emphasis added.) Appellant Smith had been found in violation of his probation, resulting in its revocation. Smith filed a petition for post conviction relief arguing (1) that the trial court imposed the order of probation improperly, in that the court failed to comply with Maryland Rule 4-346 in not providing appellant with a written copy of the probation order and (2) there was no evidence to support a finding that appellant violated the conditions of probation by failing to report to his probation officer. Id. at 618, 694 A.2d at 184. The Circuit Court did not reach the merits on either of Smith's claims, but instead dismissed the petition on the ground that it was barred by Art. 27, § 645A(a)(2)(i). The CSA held that because the first issue arose from the original criminal proceeding, it was limited by the one petition rule. The CSA held that because the second issue arose from a probation revocation hearing, it was not part of the first trial and therefore Smith had not yet exhausted his one petition limit in requesting postconviction relief from that proceeding. In dictum regarding the first issue, the CSA said: Absent a basis for reopening appellant's initial petition under § 645A(2)(iii) [now CP Section 7-104], appellant may not raise that issue now. Id. at 625, 694 A.2d at 187. Arrington seeks to elevate this comment into precedent for holding that whenever a post-conviction petition is reopened, the petitioner may raise any issue, even those that were considered waived under CP Section 7-106(b). Smith simply does not stand for this proposition, and we see nothing in that opinion that suggests the CSA was contemplating the application of its dictum to this statute.