Opinion ID: 1757093
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: GILLIAM v. STEWART

Text: The impact rule has not been without its critics and has been abolished in most jurisdictions. [2] In 1972, the Fourth District, believing that the impact rule was at variance with modern-day needs and with concepts of justice and fair dealing, held that a plaintiff may recover for the demonstrable physical consequences of a mental or emotional disturbance caused by the negligent act of another, even in the absence of an actual physical impact to the claimant. Stewart v. Gilliam, 271 So.2d 466, 472 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972), quashed, 291 So.2d 593 (Fla. 1974). To support its decision, the court discussed and rejected the three basic arguments which have served as the underlying reasons for adhering to the impact doctrine: (1) the difficulty in proving causation between the claimed damages and the alleged fright or shock; (2) the fear of fraudulent or exaggerated claims; and (3) the possible flood of litigation. Id. [3] In Stewart, the plaintiffs sued two drivers for negligently operating their motor vehicles so as to collide with each other, and then to collide with the plaintiffs' house where Jane Stewart was in bed, but not asleep. The complaint alleged that Jane Stewart suffered shock to her nervous system which resulted in a coronary insufficiency and myocardial infarction and a left lateral cerebellar lesion. Id. at 467. The Fourth District held that these allegations were sufficient to state a claim despite the absence of any physical impact to Mrs. Stewart. On review, however, we quashed the Fourth District's decision and reaffirmed the validity of the impact rule, finding that there was no valid justification to recede from the long standing decisions of this Court in this area. Gilliam v. Stewart, 291 So.2d 593, 595 (Fla. 1974). We cited with approval the dissenting opinion authored by Judge Reed in the district court which opined that [t]he impact doctrine gives practical recognition to the thought that not every injury which one person may by his negligence inflict upon another should be compensated in money damages. Stewart, 271 So.2d at 477.