Opinion ID: 4680217
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: McDonnell Douglas Burden-Shifting Analysis

Text: Since Plaintiff seeks to prove retaliation through circumstantial evidence, his claim is analyzed under the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–04 (1973). Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing his prima facie case of retaliation. Id. at 802; accord Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252–53 (1981). If this threshold is met, then a defendant is required to “articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions.” Laster v. City of Kalamazoo, 746 F.3d 714, 730 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Dixon v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 324, 333 (6th Cir. 2007)). If the defendant meets this burden of production, then a plaintiff may still succeed on a claim if he can demonstrate the proffered reason was not the actual reason for the adverse employment decision. Id. Because the City challenges Plaintiff’s retaliation claim at the first step of the McDonnell Douglas framework—the prima facie case—our analysis begins there.
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, Plaintiff must show that “(1) he engaged in activity protected by Title VII; (2) his exercise of such protected activity was known by the defendant; (3) thereafter, the defendant took an action that was ‘materially adverse’ to the plaintiff; and (4) a causal connection existed between the protected activity and the materially adverse action.” Id. (quoting Jones v. Johanns, 264 F. App’x 463, 466 (6th Cir. 2007)). In this case, the City acknowledges that the Department’s disciplining of Plaintiff constituted an adverse action. It also does not challenge the district court’s conclusion that the officials responsible for that adverse employment action knew of Plaintiff’s allegedly protected activity. Strickland, 2019 WL 5737577, at . No. 19-2373 Strickland v. City of Detroit, Mich., et al. Page 18 Plaintiff’s retaliation claim arises from Title VII’s so-called “opposition clause,” which prohibits employers from discriminating against an employee “because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice” under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); see Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 555 U.S. 271, 274 (2009). Specifically, Plaintiff claims that he opposed unlawful racial discrimination when he complained to the Department’s Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) office about the January 22, 2017 incident. In that complaint, Plaintiff indicated that he believed his mistreatment constituted discrimination based on race by checking the corresponding box. On appeal, the City argues that Plaintiff did not engage in activity protected by Title VII. It contends that checking a box for racial discrimination is insufficient to render Plaintiff’s EEO complaint protected activity under Title VII when the body of the complaint does not mention race. The City’s reliance on this Court’s unpublished decision in Bray v. Palm Beach Co., 907 F.2d 150 (6th Cir. 1990) (table) (per curiam), in support of this proposition is inapposite. In Bray, the plaintiff filed a charge with the EEOC that she had been denied a promotion as retaliation for having filed discrimination charges against the defendant. However, her federal suit alleged that she had been discriminated against on the basis of sex. This Court agreed with the plaintiff “that the facts alleged in the body of the EEOC charge, rather than merely the boxes that are marked on the charge, are the major determinants of the scope of the charge.” 907 F.2d 150, at  (citation omitted). Bray is distinguishable because neither the box nor the body of the EEOC charge indicated that the plaintiff believed her mistreatment had been due to sex, rather than in retaliation for her previous discrimination complaints. In this case, the district court properly concluded that by marking the box for discrimination based on race, there was evidence that Plaintiff had engaged in activity protected under Title VII by opposing racial discrimination in employment. Strickland, 2019 WL 5737577, at . The City also contends in a conclusory fashion that Plaintiff has failed to establish causation, the final element of the prima facie retaliation case. No analysis or evidence is offered on appeal in support of reversing the district court’s conclusion that Plaintiff demonstrated the requisite connection between his protected activity and the adverse employment action. See id. at –. Accordingly, this argument is waived. See United States v. Layne, 192 F.3d 556, No. 19-2373 Strickland v. City of Detroit, Mich., et al. Page 19 566–67 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that “issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived” (quoting McPherson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 995–96 (6th Cir. 1997))). However, even if this argument had not been waived, there is ample evidence in the record of causation for Plaintiff to establish the final element of his prima facie case. The requirement to demonstrate “but-for” causation “is not onerous” and may be satisfied through “evidence that defendant treated the plaintiff differently from similarly situated employees or that the adverse action was taken shortly after the plaintiff’s exercise of protected rights.” Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 229 F.3d 559, 563 (6th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). Both these factors are present here. Plaintiff testified that Officer Murdock was required to complete an activity log, but was not disciplined for neglect of duty as Plaintiff was. Additionally, Plaintiff was charged with his disciplinary infractions on April 3, 2017, which was less than three months after Plaintiff complained about the January 22, 2017 incident. The investigation was assigned to Sergeant Wilson on January 27, 2017, three days after Plaintiff “reported to the Human Resources Bureau and prepared a Charge of Discrimination/Harassment Report with Ms. Alethea Johnson, Equal Employment Opportunity Coordinator.” (Internal Affairs Report, R. 36-7, Page ID #858.) The fact that Plaintiff became the subject of investigation shortly after filing his internal complaint is further evidence that Plaintiff’s protected activity caused his discipline. See Randolph, 453 F.3d at 737 (reversing grant of summary judgment on retaliation claim in part because the plaintiff was investigated for misconduct after reporting workplace harassment).
The City met its burden to articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory basis for Plaintiff’s discipline. It claims that Plaintiff was suspended for violating various Department regulations. Violation of work rules constitutes a legitimate, non-retaliatory basis for the City’s actions. See Romans v. Michigan Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 668 F.3d 826, 839 (6th Cir. 2012). Because the City has discharged its burden, Plaintiff must show that the proffered justification “is not the real reason” he was disciplined. George, 966 F.3d at 462. “This burden is not heavy, though, as summary judgment is warranted only if no reasonable juror could No. 19-2373 Strickland v. City of Detroit, Mich., et al. Page 20 conclude that the employer’s offered reason was pretextual.” Id. (citations omitted). “[A] plaintiff can show pretext in three interrelated ways: (1) that the proffered reasons had no basis in fact, (2) that the proffered reasons did not actually motivate the employer’s action, or (3) that they were insufficient to motivate the employer’s action.” Chen v. Dow Chem. Co., 580 F.3d 394, 400 (6th Cir. 2009) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). Most of the evidence offered by Plaintiff fails to meet these standards. First, he seeks to justify his failure to follow Sergeant Ballinger’s orders on January 22, 2017 by pointing out that none of the officers identified themselves and their uniforms were obscured by a thick fog. However, Plaintiff was not charged by internal affairs for his conduct at that time. Moreover, Plaintiff’s explanation does not demonstrate that Sergeant Wilson’s conclusion that his conduct was improper had no basis in fact. So too for Plaintiff’s explanation of the abuse of authority and withholding of information charges. Plaintiff contends he did not abuse his authority in obtaining video of the incident from the gas station because he initially asked the gas station attendant for the video while he was in plain clothes. This may very well be true, but Plaintiff was not disciplined for this request. Rather he was charged for two return trips to the gas station, including once while in uniform and a marked police vehicle. Plaintiff defends himself against the charge that he withheld the video evidence from the Department by observing that he was a union steward. Again, this fact does nothing to show that the Department’s charge that Plaintiff withheld information relating to an ongoing criminal investigation had no basis in fact. “[A] case alleging unlawful retaliation is not a vehicle for litigating the accuracy of the employer’s grounds” for the adverse employment action. Tingle v. Arbors at Hilliard, 692 F.3d 523, 530 (6th Cir. 2012). But that is precisely what Plaintiff attempts to do here. The district court erred, however, in rejecting Plaintiff’s third argument—that the legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for his discipline was pretextual because another officer, Murdock, had committed the same infraction as he did, but was not investigated or disciplined. Demonstrating pretext often consists of “raising the question of why [the plaintiff] was singled out” for an adverse employment action. George, 966 F.3d at 462. Strickland testified that he and Officer Murdock engaged in the same misconduct, failing to complete an activity log, and while Plaintiff was suspended in part for that conduct, Officer Murdock was not investigated or No. 19-2373 Strickland v. City of Detroit, Mich., et al. Page 21 charged. The district court rejected this comparison, observing that “Murdock was in a different precinct, and position, than Plaintiff, and the underlying events on which Plaintiff bases his argument, were different.” Strickland, 2019 WL 5737577, at . Plaintiff testified that such differences were immaterial, stating: “Any time you [are] working as a police officer you have to complete an activity log when you conduct activity.” (Strickland Dep., R. 36-3, Page ID #782.) The district court appears to have disregarded this testimony as Plaintiff’s “own opinion . . . .” Strickland, 2019 WL 5737577, at . Such an adverse credibility determination and weighing of Plaintiff’s testimony is inappropriate on summary judgment when a court must view “the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Kirilenko-Ison, 974 F.3d at 660. The dissent would affirm the district court and concludes that Plaintiff and Officer Murdock were not similarly situated due to their different positions, reporting regulations, and conduct. However, there is no evidence or claim by the City that these distinctions were in fact relevant to the Department’s disciplinary decisions. See Jackson v. FedEx Corp. Servs., 518 F.3d 388, 394 (6th Cir. 2008) (recognizing “that the appropriate test is to look at those factors relevant to the factual context, as opposed to a requirement that a plaintiff demonstrate similarity in all respects”). The dissent’s determination relies on weighing of facts, drawing inferences in favor of the City, and resolving questions of credibility. “Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge” on summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. For example, rather than crediting Plaintiff’s testimony that all police officers were required to complete activity logs, the dissent relies on Officer Murdock’s statement that he did not maintain an activity log because “[n]ormally when we get recalled we did not do activity logs. That has since changed and we do now.” (Murdock Dep., R. 36-8, Page ID #899.) As an initial matter, it is unclear to whom Officer Murdock was referring when he said that “we” did not complete activity logs; it could be the K-9 bomb squad, the bomb squad more generally, or even the entire Detroit Police Department, all working groups that Officer Murdock testified he was a member of during his deposition and in the context of discussing his activity log practices. No. 19-2373 Strickland v. City of Detroit, Mich., et al. Page 22 Regardless of the resolution of that issue, on the reading of Officer Murdock’s testimony most generous to Plaintiff, as is appropriate on a motion for summary judgment, there is no apparent conflict between Plaintiff’s declaration that all police officers are required to complete activity logs and Officer Murdock’s statements. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587–88 (1986) (recognizing that all permissible inferences from the evidence are to be drawn in favor of party opposing summary judgment). Officer Murdock’s testimony that he normally did not complete an activity log does not necessarily contradict Plaintiff’s testimony that all police officers were formally required to do so. Drawing all inferences in Plaintiff’s favor requires us to conclude that Officer Murdock was required to complete an activity log, just as Plaintiff was, in January 2017. Moreover, even if Officer Murdock’s testimony did contradict Plaintiff’s declaration that all police officers were required to complete activity logs, summary judgment would still not be appropriate. “The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed . . . .” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. For example, in George, the defendants offered testimony that the plaintiff was fired for administrative rather than retaliatory reasons, but we found that “on summary judgment, we cannot weigh which of these stories is more credible—so long as a reasonable juror could credit George’s evidence and not Defendants’, the case must proceed to a trial.” George, 966 F.3d at 462. We are similarly required to credit Plaintiff’s account in this case as well. Accordingly, there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the differences in position and applicable regulations justify the differential treatment that Plaintiff and Officer Murdock received for not completing an activity log. “[I]nasmuch as the explanations do not rationally explain the difference, . . . a jury could reasonably reject the stated reasons and find that the difference in treatment was instead motivated by” a desire to retaliate against Plaintiff for complaining about racial discrimination. Redlin v. Gross Pointe Pub. Sch. Sys., 921 F.3d 599, 613 (6th Cir. 2019). This Court has long held that evidence of such unjustified differential treatment is sufficient “to withstand summary judgment on the issue of pretext” and is itself evidence that the “proffered explanation . . . may not have actually motivated [the employer’s] conduct.” Dews v. A.B. Dick Co., 231 F.3d 1016, 1023 (6th Cir. 2000). Specifically, this Court has recognized that “showing that a similarly situated employee outside the protected class committed the same misconduct but was not subject to the same consequences—and insinuating No. 19-2373 Strickland v. City of Detroit, Mich., et al. Page 23 that the reason for that disparate treatment is” retaliation may support a finding of pretext. Miles v. S. Cen. Hum. Res. Agency, Inc., 946 F.3d 883, 892 (6th Cir. 2020). The dissent also argues that not only were Plaintiff and Officer Murdock differently positioned, but that they did not commit the same misconduct. It emphasizes that while Plaintiff improperly completed his activity log, Officer Murdock did not complete one at all. But this analysis requires making an inference in the City’s favor since the City did not appear to make this argument either before the district court or on appeal, and there is no indication in the record that the Department viewed or treated incomplete and entirely omitted activity logs any differently. This distinguishes the facts here from the cases cited by the dissent. For example, in Miles, the plaintiff “was responsible for the mismanagement of two programs, rather than just one,” like her proposed comparators. Miles, 946 F.3d at 894. Thus, by any metric, her misconduct was more severe than those with whom she sought to associate, justifying differential treatment on that basis alone. On the other hand, it is not immediately apparent whether omitting certain information from an activity log is more severe misconduct than entirely failing to file one. See Jackson-VHS, 814 F.3d at 781 (finding that “speculating on the likelihood and relative severity of” the harm that might have resulted from misconduct by a plaintiff and a proposed comparator “is a task better suited to a jury”). Contrary to the dissent, our decision in Seay v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 339 F.3d 454 (6th Cir. 2003), also does not support a determination that Plaintiff’s conduct was relevantly different than Officer Murdock’s. As relevant here, in Seay, the plaintiff, an African American man, claimed he was treated differently than similarly situated white employees who also violated the defendant’s vehicle use policy. For the most part, we disagreed. The defendant’s investigation determined that two of the proposed comparators who had misused vehicles had received permission to do so from their supervisors, which was a relevant fact because it meant their violations of the policy were not willful like the plaintiff’s. Id. at 479. Another white employee who received a suspension half the length of the plaintiff’s was determined not to be similarly situated because he only violated the vehicle policy once, whereas the plaintiff had violated it twice. Id. Accordingly, there was evidence in the record in Seay as to why the distinctions in conduct were relevant to differential discipline. That is not the case here. No. 19-2373 Strickland v. City of Detroit, Mich., et al. Page 24 Moreover, even if the distinction between omission and misrepresentation with respect to an officer’s activity log was relevant to Department disciplinary procedures, it is not at all clear it would apply in this case. Plaintiff was formally charged with “fail[ing] to properly document all activity thoroughly and completely on his activity log including his reviewing of video footage at the BP Gas Station . . . .” (Internal Affairs Report, R. 36-7, Page ID #892.) This suggests that Plaintiff was disciplined for an omission from his activity log, not “lying,” as the dissent concludes. The failure to document all his activity completely is the same infraction Plaintiff has offered evidence that Officer Murdock committed. Plaintiff has provided evidence “that [he] is similar to [his] proposed comparator in ‘all relevant respects.’” Miles, 946 F.3d. at 893 (quoting Bobo v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 665 F.3d 741, 751 (6th Cir. 2012), abrogated on other grounds by Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013)). “Where Plaintiff has presented no other evidence, . . . Plaintiff’s testimony [may be] sufficient to defeat Defendant’s motion to dismiss,” contrary to the dissent’s suggestion to the contrary. Moran v. Al Basit LLC, 788 F.3d 201, 205 (6th Cir. 2015). But even if that were not the law of our Circuit, the dissent’s characterization of a “thin presentation” by Plaintiff is not supported by the cases it cites. Unlike the unpublished decision in Clark v. Walgreen Co., 424 F. App’x 467 (6th Cir. 2011) (per curiam), it is not the case that Plaintiff’s “only evidence that other[s] . . . engaged in similar misconduct is [Plaintiff’s] own testimony.” Clark, 424 F. App’x at 474. Here, there is no dispute, and Officer Murdock testified that he did not keep an activity log for the January 22, 2017 incident. We also point out that Officer Murdock’s deposition testimony that he did not normally keep an activity log took up a total of nineteen words. That is the exact same quantum of evidence that the dissent finds insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact based on Plaintiff’s testimony. Plaintiff was disciplined because he was a police officer and required to document his activity in an activity log, and there is evidence in the record that Officer Murdock was exactly the same, except that he was not even investigated. Cf. Robinson v. MGM Grand Detroit, LLC, 821 F. App’x 522, 531 (6th Cir. 2020) (affirming grant of summary judgment on retaliation claim when the plaintiff failed to specifically identify any other similarly situated employees, the defendant offered evidence that no other employee engaged in similar conduct during the time No. 19-2373 Strickland v. City of Detroit, Mich., et al. Page 25 period in question, and demonstrated that other employees who engaged in similar misconduct as the plaintiff were terminated). Plaintiff has demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the proffered reason for his discipline actually motivated the City’s conduct. Therefore, the City is not entitled to summary judgment on his Title VII retaliation claim.