Opinion ID: 2631032
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of United States Supreme Court Precedent

Text: {56} Applying the Supreme Court's precedent to the instant case, I believe an inquiry must first be made into whether Frazier's charge of kidnapping is the same offense as his charge of felony murder. This requires the answering of two questions: (1) whether kidnapping is a lesser-included offense of felony murder in this case; and if so, (2) whether the kidnapping charge and the felony-murder charge stem from the same act or transaction? If the answer to either of these questions is no, the charges of kidnapping and felony murder are not the same for purposes of double jeopardy and the presumption is that the Legislature intended multiple punishments. Conversely, if the answer to both questions is yes, then the two charges are the same offense and an additional inquiry into whether the Legislature intended multiple punishments is required. {57} Frazier's kidnapping charge is a lesser-included offense of his felony-murder charge. In Whalen, the government argued that rape was not a lesser-included offense of the defendant's felony-murder charge because the felony-murder statute proscribe[d] the killing of another person in the course of committing rape or robbery or kidnaping or arson, etc. 445 U.S. at 694, 100 S.Ct. 1432. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, stating: A conviction for killing in the course of a rape cannot be had without proving all the elements of the offense of rape. Id. at 693-94, 100 S.Ct. 1432. We recognized in State v. Contreras that, after Whalen, there is no doubt that the predicate felony of a felony-murder charge is a lesser-included offense of felony murder. 120 N.M. 486, 491, 903 P.2d 228, 233 (1995), overruling State v. Stephens, 93 N.M. 458, 463, 601 P.2d 428, 433 (1979). In the instant case, as pointed out by Justice Bosson, in order to be convicted of felony murder the jury had to find that Frazier caused the death of Kelly Knoll during the commission of kidnapping. Maj. Op. ¶ 22. Similar to Whalen, Frazier could not have been convicted of felony murder without all of the elements of kidnapping having first been proved. Since kidnapping is subsumed by the felony-murder charge in this case, Frazier's kidnapping charge is a lesser-included offense of his felony-murder charge. {58} The next inquiry is whether the kidnapping and the subsequent killing of Knoll were part of the same act or transaction. The answer to this inquiry depends on whether [t]he applicable . . . statutes, as written and as construed in this case, make [kidnapping and felony murder] a single offense. See Brown, 432 U.S. at 169, 97 S.Ct. 2221. My reading of United States Supreme Court precedent is that we must look only to the statutes; we must not use the simple expedient of dividing [the] crime into a series of temporal or spatial units. See id. I recognize that, when it comes to felony murder, the majority and I agree. See Maj. Op. ¶ 17 ([W]e ask whether our felony-murder statute expresses a clear legislative intent that a killing during the commission of a felony constitutes unitary conduct in every case, thereby precluding a unitary conduct inquiry by this Court into the specific facts of the case.). I applaud this departure from our previous cases, which have mostly conducted a spatial and temporal analysis of the defendant's underlying conduct. See, e.g., State v. Mora, 1997-NMSC-060, ¶¶ 68-71, 124 N.M. 346, 950 P.2d 789; State v. Livernois, 1997-NMSC-019, ¶¶ 20-22, 123 N.M. 128, 934 P.2d 1057. Where I differ with the majority, however, is its conclusion that a unitary-conduct analysis based on Swafford is to be used as a proxy when the statutes do not clearly provide that they are to be construed as part of the same transaction. See Maj. Op. ¶ 19. As I discuss further below, I believe that we must always consider the statutes at hand and the intent behind them when determining whether the Legislature intended two charged offenses to be part of the same act or transaction. Doing otherwise would be resorting to the simple expedient that the Supreme Court in Brown warned against. {59} Applying Brown, I conclude that Frazier's kidnapping charge stems from the same act or transaction as his felony-murder charge. Our Legislature has provided that to be guilty of felony murder, the murder must occur in the commission of or attempt to commit any felony. NMSA 1978, § 30-2-1(A)(2) (1994). In fashioning this crime, it is clear from the plain language that the Legislature did not intend to temporally or spatially divide the underlying felony from the killing. That is, the statute requires that the killing occur  in the commission of the felony. Since the Legislature fashioned the felony murder statute such that the murder must occur during the commission of the predicate felony, the predicate felony is part of the same act or transaction as the murder. {60} Similar to Brown, a different case would be presented had the Legislature provided that felony murder was a separate offense from its predicate when there was a temporal or spatial gap between the completion of the underlying felony and the subsequent murder. Because it did not, and because we are bound to follow Supreme Court precedent, I conclude that Knolls's kidnapping and murder occurred as part of the same act or transaction. Thus, because the answer to both prongs of the same offense question is yes, I conclude that Frazier's kidnapping and felony-murder charges are the same offense within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. {61} Having concluded that kidnapping and felony murder in this case are the same offense, I believe the next course of action is to determine whether multiple punishments are legislatively authorized. Since kidnapping is a lesser-included offense of felony murder predicated on kidnapping, there is a presumption that our Legislature did not intend multiple punishments. See Whalen, 445 U.S. at 691-92, 100 S.Ct. 1432. In looking at the statutory language, Frazier should not receive multiple punishments unless there is a clear indication of contrary legislative intent. Id. Any ambiguity should be construed in favor of Frazier. See id. at 695 n. 10, 100 S.Ct. 1432. {62} The legislation at issue is silent on whether the Legislature intended multiple punishments. Under New Mexico law, felony murder is murder in the first degreea capital felony. NMSA 1978, § 30-2-1(A). A defendant guilty of a capital felony shall be punished by life imprisonment or death. Id. § 31-18-14(A) (1993). Whoever commits kidnapping who does not voluntarily free the victim in a safe place is guilty of a first-degree felony. Id. § 30-4-1 (2003). The basic sentence for a first-degree felony is eighteen years of imprisonment. Id. § 31-18-15(A)(2) (2005). Nowhere in the statutory provisions defining these crimes or providing for their punishment does the Legislature specifically authorize multiple punishments. Had it wanted to, the Legislature could have spoken clearly on this point. See Hunter, 459 U.S. at 362, 103 S.Ct. 673 (discussing a statute that provided for the punishment of armed criminal action to be in addition to any punishment provided by law for the [lesser-included offense]); Jackson v. State, 1996-NMSC-054, ¶ 2 n. 1, 122 N.M. 433, 925 P.2d 1195 (discussing legislation providing for multiple punishments for felony murder and the underlying felony, but that never reached the senate floor). Given the Legislature's silence on this matter and applying the rule of lenity, I conclude that the Legislature has not clearly authorized multiple punishments for felony murder and its predicate felony. Because it has not, Frazier's dual conviction of both kidnapping and felony murder predicated on kidnapping runs afoul of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Accordingly, I agree that we must vacate Frazier's conviction of kidnapping.