Opinion ID: 729693
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Street Furniture Guideline Under Intermediate Scrutiny

Text: 52 Strict scrutiny aside, restrictions on the time, place and manner of protected expression in a public forum--and the Street Furniture Guideline's effective ban on newsracks upon the District's public and private ways certainly qualifies as such a restriction--should be upheld so long as they are content-neutral, ... narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and allow for reasonable alternative channels of communication. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45, 103 S.Ct. at 955; see Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 428-431, 113 S.Ct. at 1516-18 (applying time, place, and manner test to regulation of newsracks in public forum); Plain Dealer, 486 U.S. at 763, 108 S.Ct. at 2147 (noting that the Court would apply time, place, and manner test to a hypothetical ordinance completely prohibiting a particular manner of expression); see also National Amusements, 43 F.3d at 741 (citing other cases). Cf. Capitol Sq. Review Bd. v. Pinette, --- U.S. ----, ----, 115 S.Ct. 2440, 2446, 132 L.Ed.2d 650 (1995) (noting that a ban on all unattended displays ... might be a reasonable, content-neutral time, place and manner restriction). As we have already discussed, the Street Furniture Guideline is content-neutral. We turn, thus, to the remainder of the analysis. 53 Aesthetics: A Significant Government Interest? 54 Pointing to the fact that preservation of the District as a landmark is mandated by state law, see Acts of 1955, ch. 616, § 12, the Commission contends that its interest in preserving the District's historic and architectural character is a substantial government interest that justifies a narrowly tailored restriction. The Newspapers roundly disagree, arguing that the Commission's invocation of its statutory purpose cannot justify a ban of newsracks in a public forum. The district court did not decide either way. Instead, it took for granted that the Commission satisfied the significant government interest prong when it assume[d] arguendo that the Commission's [a]esthetic interest is greater than that of the average community, because [the District] has been designated a special historic district. Globe Newspaper, 847 F.Supp. at 194. 55 The Commission has certainly met the significant governmental interest prong. On more than one occasion, the Court has recognized aesthetics ... as [a] significant government interest[ ] legitimately furthered through ordinances regulating First Amendment expression in various contexts. Gold Coast, 42 F.3d at 1345 (citing cases). Although there is no need to accord the Commission a greater than average interest in aesthetics, it would not be unreasonable to do so given its statutory mandate as well as the District's significance to both Massachusetts and the nation as a whole, as evidenced by its designation as a National Historic Landmark. See 36 C.F.R. § 65.2 (stating that such designations are reserved for properties of exceptional value to the nation as a whole rather than to a particular State or locality). 56 We are not swayed by the Newspapers' claim that the Commission's aesthetic interests cannot constitute a significant government interest where a ban in a public forum is involved. Although it did not explicitly address, or otherwise test, the legitimacy of aesthetics through a public forum lens, the Court in Discovery Network acknowledged that the city's asserted interest in aesthetics was an admittedly legitimate interest justifying its regulation of sidewalk newsracks. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 424-25, 113 S.Ct. at 1514 (holding that newsrack regulation's distinction between commercial and non-commercial speech bore no relationship whatsoever to its asserted aesthetic interest). Indeed, the Newspapers' contentions to the contrary, there is abundant authority for the proposition that aesthetic interests constitute a significant government interest justifying content neutral, narrowly tailored regulations of a public forum that leave open ample alternative channels. See, e.g., Gold Coast, 42 F.3d at 1345 (recognizing aesthetics as significant government interest[ ] when upholding ordinance regulating newsracks in traditional public forum); Chicago Observer, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 929 F.2d 325, 328 (7th Cir.1991) (upholding regulation of newsracks' advertising and size as justified by [c]ities' [interest in] curtail[ing] visual clutter, for aesthetic and safety reasons); Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. City of Lakewood, 794 F.2d 1139, 1147 (6th Cir.1986) (recognizing aesthetics as a substantial government interest justifying total ban of newsracks in residential areas). 57 Our conclusion that the Commission's specified interests are significant does not end the inquiry. As [i]n most cases, the outcome [of this prong] turns not on whether the specified interests are significant, but rather on whether the regulation is narrowly tailored to serve those interests. Gold Coast, 42 F.3d at 1345. 58 Is the Street Furniture Guideline Narrowly Tailored? 59 As the district court correctly set forth, the Court in Ward explained that the narrow tailoring requirement does not mandate a least restrictive means analysis: '[r]ather, the requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied so long as the ... regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.'  National Amusements, 43 F.3d at 744 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 799, 109 S.Ct. at 2758). The regulation will be valid if it does not burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government interest. Ward, 491 U.S. at 799, 109 S.Ct. at 2758; see Gold Coast, 42 F.3d at 1345. Where aesthetic interests are at play, the challenged regulation must be judged by overall context: the government must show that the regulation of the feature at issue would have more than a negligible impact on aesthetics, which generally requires that the government be making a bona fide or comprehensive coordinated effort to address aesthetic concerns in the affected community. See Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 531, 101 S.Ct. 2882, 2905, 69 L.Ed.2d 800 (1981). 60 In a nutshell, the district court held that the challenged regulation did not pass muster under the First Amendment because the Commission has shown no reason why its interest in preserving the architectural and historic character of the [D]istrict cannot be met by, for example, subjecting newsracks and other street furniture to the same review process as store-front merchandise racks. Globe Newspaper, 847 F.Supp. at 194. In reaching this conclusion, the district court took its cue from the Court's statement in Discovery Network: while a regulation need not satisfy the least-restrictive-means test, 12 if there are numerous and obvious less-burdensome alternatives to the restriction on ... speech, that is certainly a relevant consideration. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 417 n. 13, 113 S.Ct. at 1510 n. 13. 13 With this in mind, the district court observed that 61 [t]he SFG assumes that street lights, traffic lights, mail boxes, fire hydrants, street trees, and trash receptacles, can be designed in such a fashion that they will be in keeping with the architectural and historic character of the District. The same is true for store-front merchandise stands.... There is no showing that newsracks are any more inherently out of keeping with the architectural character of the [District] than other modern innovations that have been approved by the Commission on the basis of their external design features. 62 Globe Newspaper, 847 F.Supp. at 194-95. In the district court's view, the preference given to 'public' street furniture and store-front stands ... [i]s evidence that the [Street Furniture Guideline] ... is ... not narrowly tailored, id., and burdens substantially more speech than is necessary to serve the Commission's interest in preserving the character of the District, id. The Newspapers contend that this is correct. 63 We disagree, and conclude that the regulation is narrowly tailored. First, and without a doubt, it promotes the Commission's significant or substantial 14 government interest in preserving the District's aesthetics: as the SJC observed, the [C]ommission has determined that [newsracks] are inappropriate, in part because they did not exist at the time with which the [C]ommission's preservation efforts are concerned. Globe Newspaper, 421 Mass. at 590, 659 N.E.2d 710. Second, as the Report's review of the five available alternatives 15 indicate, the Commission's aesthetic interest in preserving the District's historic and architectural character would not be achieved as effectively, absent the regulation: banning the newsracks would effectively, as the Commission's Report observed, most completely reverse their inappropriateness and be most consistent with the purposes of the [D]istrict. 16 Exhibit H at 7. Finally, it does so without burdening substantially more speech than is necessary: it does not burden, or otherwise adversely affect, any other means of distribution, including the use of street vendors in the public forum. See ante at 179 n. 1. Significantly, we note that the district court acknowledged, albeit implicitly, that the challenged regulation meets this test: nowhere in its opinion did the district court conclude that the Street Furniture Guideline would fail to advance the Commission's interest or that its interest would be achieved as effectively absent the regulation. 64 In reaching our conclusion, we are mindful of the district court's findings that the Commission's interest could be met by, say, subjecting newsracks and other street furniture to the same review process as store-front merchandise racks, and that it treats some street furniture with preference. Unlike the district court, however, we do not conclude that such findings compel a determination--at least in this case--that the Street Furniture Guideline burdens substantially more speech than is necessary to accomplish its purpose and, thus, is not narrowly tailored. While the district court correctly considered the fact that less-burdensome alternatives exist, it gives too much weight to that fact alone. In so doing, it essentially discounts from the equation Ward 's inquiry into whether the Street Furniture Guideline promotes [the Commission's interests such] that [they] would be achieved less effectively absent the [Street Furniture Guideline]. Ward, 491 U.S. at 799, 109 S.Ct. at 2758 (emphasis added). 17 65 We explain: As an initial matter, the Court in Discovery Network explained that the existence of numerous and obvious less-burdensome alternatives ... is certainly a relevant consideration. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 418 n. 13, 113 S.Ct. at 1510 n. 13 (emphasis added). Standing alone, this plainly means that, while certainly a relevant consideration, id., it is not necessarily a controlling one: i.e., that numerous and obvious less-burdensome alternatives exist does not automatically compel the conclusion that a regulation burdens substantially more speech than is necessary. When read in light of Ward, it becomes clear that less-burdensome alternatives must be considered in connection with the inquiry into whether, absent the challenged regulation, the government's interests are achieved less effectively. Giving too much weight to the existence of alternatives, without calibrating the scales to account for differences between them and the challenged regulation in terms of overall effectiveness and impact on aesthetics, may result--as here--in error: that the record, here, reveals that the Commission's interests are achieved less effectively absent the Street Furniture Guideline was apparently lost in the shuffle. 66 In other words, the Court's qualifier in Discovery Network must, in turn, be qualified--or, rather, re-qualified--by its language in Ward, lest Ward 's explicit rejection of the least restrictive means test be reduced to a meaningless phrase. As the Court made clear in Ward: 67 So long as the means chosen are not substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government's interest, however, the regulation will not be invalid simply because a court concludes that the government's interest could be adequately served by some less-speech-restrictive alternative. The validity of [time, place, and manner] regulations does not turn on a judge's agreement with the responsible decisionmaker concerning the most appropriate method for promoting significant government interests or the degree to which those interests should be promoted. 68 Ward, 491 U.S. at 800, 109 S.Ct. at 2758 (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689, 105 S.Ct. 2897, 2907, 86 L.Ed.2d 536 (1985)). As the Sixth Circuit observed, the Court has repeatedly deferred to the aesthetic judgments of municipalities and other government bodies when evaluating restrictions on protected expression. Gold Coast, 42 F.3d at 1346 (citing, among others, Vincent, 466 U.S. at 807, 104 S.Ct. at 2130, and Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 512, 101 S.Ct. at 2895). Of course, as Discovery Network 's language implicitly reaffirms, courts are not merely to defer to the government's subjective judgment; instead, aesthetic considerations must be judged by overall context and the government must make its requisite showing. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 530, 101 S.Ct. at 2904. 69 Under this rubric, while we do not dispute that the Commission could have adopted a less drastic solution, the fact that it chose not to does not mean that it did not carefully calculate[ ] the costs and benefits associated with the burden on speech imposed by [the Street Furniture Guideline]. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 417, 113 S.Ct. at 1510. In Discovery Network the Court found that the city there did not make a careful calculation based on the fact that it did not address its recently developed concern about newsracks by regulating their size, shape, appearance, or number. Id. In this regard, it also noted that the benefit to be derived from the removal of 62 newsracks while about 1,500-2,000 remain in place was considered 'minute' by the [d]istrict [c]ourt and 'paltry' by the [c]ourt of [a]ppeals. Id. 70 Unlike the city in Discovery Network, however, the Commission's actions since newsracks became a subject of concern in the early 1980s--including survey, report and public hearings--demonstrate that it carefully calculated the costs and benefits. The path it chose to follow--eliminating the newsracks altogether--is the most effective solution aimed at reducing visual clutter and preserving the District's historic character. Designing the newsracks to better blend in and conform with the District's architectural and historic character by having, say, an old-fashioned or colonial look, would promote the Commission's interest by reducing their unsightliness. It would not achieve, however, as effective a reduction in the visual clutter created by their presence on the sidewalks [which] clearly detracts from the historic and architectural character of the [D]istrict, 18 or, for that matter, the long-standing concerns regarding congestion and inconvenience. 71 Our conclusion is not swayed by the Newspapers' protestations that the Street Furniture Guideline, as applied to Charles Street (the most commercial in the District), is a lost cause and that the regulation does not remove all evidence of modern life. It is also not influenced by the district court's finding that there has been no showing that newsracks are any more inherently out of keeping with the architectural character of the [D]istrict than other modern innovations. 19 847 F.Supp. at 194-95. These contentions miss the point. As the SJC correctly observed, the [C]ommission's charge is to preserve what it can of the ... District as a tangible reminder of old Boston. That particular nonconforming uses predated that charge ..., or that certain non-conforming uses have since been allowed to continue, has no effect on ongoing attempts the [C]ommission makes in preserving the [D]istrict. Id. More importantly, as the Court in Vincent made clear when it rejected a similar argument, [e]ven if some visual blight remains, a partial, content-neutral ban may nevertheless enhance the City's appearance. Vincent, 466 U.S. at 811, 104 S.Ct. at 2132 (rejecting argument that the validity of the [a]esthetic interest in the elimination of signs on public property is not compromised by failing to extend the ban to private property). Indeed, in contrast to both Vincent and Metromedia where the regulations were arguably partial-solutions, the Street Furniture Guideline completely tackles the newsracks' visual clutter and inappropriateness by eliminating them altogether. See Vincent, 466 U.S. at 811, 104 S.Ct. at 2132 (banning signs on public property but not private property); Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 512, 101 S.Ct. at 2895 (banning off-site advertising but not on-site advertising). 72 What is more, the Newspapers' argument, which is implicitly based on the notion that newsracks within the District may only be regulated as part of a comprehensive beautification or, better yet, visual clutter reduction plan, was rejected foursquare by the Court in Vincent, 466 U.S. at 807 n. 5, 104 S.Ct. at 2123 n. 5, and Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 511-12, 101 S.Ct. at 2894-95; see Chicago Observer, 929 F.2d at 328 (making this observation). In any event, we dismiss as disingenuous the Newspapers' suggestion that the challenged regulation is not part of a comprehensive plan because it does not ban all street furniture or all evidence of modern life: not only is the Street Furniture Guideline consistent with its long-standing prohibition against freestanding signs, the Commission's guidelines, review process, decisions regarding cable television control boxes and traffic control boxes, not to mention its thorough approach regarding newsracks, all speak for themselves. See Gold Coast, 42 F.3d at 1346 (finding city took several steps to enhance its aesthetic interest by convening a task force, conducting research, and revising ordinance). 73 Last, but not least, contrary to the Newspapers' suggestion, that the Street Furniture Guideline operates as a complete ban does not, by itself, mean that it is not narrowly tailored. While the Court has clearly voiced particular concern with laws that foreclose an entire medium of expression, City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, ----, 114 S.Ct. 2038, 2045, 129 L.Ed.2d 36 (1994) (invalidating ordinance banning all residential signs), bans on the use of privately owned structures or displays on public property have been upheld. See Vincent, 466 U.S. at 804-05, 104 S.Ct. at 2128-29 (upholding ban on signs posted on public utility poles). 74 In Vincent, the Supreme Court addressed a challenge to an ordinance banning all posted signs in the city brought by supporters of a political candidate. Vincent, 466 U.S. at 792-93, 104 S.Ct. at 2122. The supporters argued that the ban unconstitutionally abridged their freedom of speech. Id. at 802-03, 104 S.Ct. at 2127. The Court recognized that the complete ban, like the ban here, did no more than eliminate the exact source of the evil it sought to remedy. Id. at 808, 104 S.Ct. at 2130. The Vincent Court compared the sign ban to the ordinance banning handbilling to address littering problems that the Court struck down in Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 60 S.Ct. 146, 84 L.Ed. 155 (1939). In making its determination that the total ban in Vincent was narrowly tailored to serve the government's interest in aesthetics, the Court distinguished between the state's unconstitutional exercise of police power to regulate litter by prohibiting the distribution of handbills and the constitutional exercise of that power to completely eliminate the substantive evil addressed. Unlike the situation of littering, the evil in Vincent, as here, is not merely a possible byproduct of the [protected expressive] activity, but is created by the medium of expression itself. Id. at 810, 104 S.Ct. at 2131. The Court held that, because the Vincent regulation directly resolved the evil the city sought to address, the medium of expression, the regulation was narrowly tailored to the city's interest in aesthetics and limiting visual blight. Id. Similarly, the Commission's ban on the use of private newsracks, which are both the exact evil presented and the medium of expression, is narrowly tailored to the government interest in eliminating the visual blight and congestion on public property caused by that evil. 75 Moreover, unlike cases where the medium of expression involves the exercise of speech by an individual or where the medium is a uniquely valuable mode of expression, see, e.g., Ladue, 512 U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2045 (citing cases), the medium of expression here is the use of a privately owned structure placed on public property for which, as we discuss below, there are ample alternative channels available for the distribution of the Newspapers' publications. 76 In sum, we conclude--contrary to the district court--that the Street Furniture Guideline is narrowly tailored. 77 The Final Hurdle: Ample Alternative Channels? 78 The district court did not reach this final prong, 20 but we must before the full First Amendment analysis is completed. 79 Below, and on appeal, the Commission claims that ample alternative channels exist. The challenged regulation, it points out, leaves unaffected the Newspapers' primary means of distribution within the District: home delivery, sales by stores, street vendors, and mail. See ante at 179 n. 1. Even without newsracks, the Commission highlights, the Newspapers' publications are available within the District 24-hours a day, seven days a week, through private stores. Further still, it is undisputed that no point within the District is more than 1,000 feet (approximately 1/5 of a mile) from a source of publications and that adjacent to the District numerous additional sources exist, including newsracks: 21 this, it emphasizes, is well within the 1/4 mile distance that the Sixth Circuit found sufficient in Plain Dealer when it upheld a ban on newsracks in a residential neighborhood. See Plain Dealer, 794 F.2d at 1147. 80 Relying on Chicago Newspaper Publishers v. City of Wheaton, 697 F.Supp. 1464, 1470 (N.D.Ill.1988) ([t]he availability of private sellers is irrelevant); and Providence Journal Co. v. City of Newport, 665 F.Supp. 107, 118-19 (D.R.I.1987) (same), the Newspapers counter with the argument that the availability of private sources is irrelevant to the inquiry. Accordingly, they claim that the only relevant available means of distribution is the use of street vendors in the public forum. While street vendors are unaffected by the Street Furniture Guideline, the Newspapers nonetheless contend that, because the cost of 24-hour street vending is substantially more burdensome than placing stationary newsracks, the regulation fails to leave available any practical or economical alternative to newsracks. 81 We are unpersuaded by the Newspapers' arguments regarding street vendors. Without having to address the merits of whether the availability of private sources is relevant to the inquiry, 22 or resolve whether it is appropriate to rely on the proximity of newsracks on the District's boundaries, 23 we conclude that there are ample alternative channels available for the distribution of the Newspapers' publications. See ante at 179 n. 1. Throughout our analysis, we are mindful that the lens of inquiry must focus not on whether a degree of curtailment exists, but on whether the remaining communicative avenues are adequate. National Amusements, 43 F.3d at 745. 82 Here, it is undisputed that the Street Furniture Guideline does not affect the Newspapers' freedom to exercise their right to distribute publications through street vendors in the very public forum--the District's sidewalks--from which the newsracks are banned. See Vincent, 466 U.S. at 812, 104 S.Ct. at 2132-33 (finding ample alternative channels available where ordinance did not affect any individual's right to exercise the right to speak and distribute literature in the same place where the posting of signs ... is prohibited). Thus, without relying on the other current means of distribution within the District, the numerous private sources both within and without the District, or the proximity of newsracks outside the District, we conclude that the Street Furniture Guideline satisfies this last prong. We note further that street vendors--or newsboys per the Agreed Statement of Facts--began hawking newspapers on the streets of Boston in approximately 1844; thus, street vending is an alternative within the public forum that is consistent with the District's purpose. 83 In reaching this conclusion we reject as essentially irrelevant the contention that the cost of street vendors, let alone 24-hour street vending, is substantially more costly than placing a stationary newsrack. The First Amendment does not guarantee a right to the most cost-effective means of distribution or the rent-free use of public property. Cf. Capitol Sq. Review Bd. v. Pinette, --- U.S. ----, ----, 115 S.Ct. 2440, 2446, 132 L.Ed.2d 650 (1995) (It is undeniable, of course, that speech which is constitutionally protected against state suppression is not thereby accorded a guaranteed forum on all property owned by the State.); Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 546, 103 S.Ct. 1997, 2001, 76 L.Ed.2d 129 (1983) (rejecting the notion that First Amendment rights are not somehow fully realized unless they are subsidized by the State). Moreover, the Newspapers' claim that street vendors are not a practical alternative is belied by the record, particularly with respect to the daily papers serving the Boston area: sales by street vendors for both the Boston Herald and the Boston Globe exceed those by newsracks. See ante at 179 n. 1. What is more, the record shows that newsracks come in either last or second-to-last place in terms of percentage of distribution. Id. 84 While we do not dispute the Newspapers' claims that newsracks provide a relatively inexpensive means of distribution, which in some cases meet distribution needs where others are either prohibitively expensive or altogether unavailable, nothing in the record indicates how these concerns are implicated in the instant case. Indeed, there is nothing in the record to suggest, let alone show, that the newsracks within the District fulfill a unique distribution need which is not currently satisfied by other means of distribution and which could not be satisfied by a street vendor. As we see it, their claim boils down to the accidental reader who passes through the District and the District resident who prefers single-copy sales. Although the regulation may frustrate the preferences of these readers, thwarting ... an idiosyncratic [or not so idiosyncratic] preference cannot be equated with a denial of adequate avenues of communication. National Amusements, 43 F.3d at 745. While the Street Furniture Guideline diminishes the total quantity of the Newspapers' publications within the District, that is a necessary side effect of almost any restriction on speech: As long as restrictions are content-neutral, some diminution in the overall quantity of speech will be tolerated. Id. (citing Vincent, 466 U.S. at 803, 812, 104 S.Ct. at 2127-28, 2132-33). 24 85 In addition, our conclusion is not swayed by the assertion that street vending may not be a viable alternative for all publications, particularly those that are free, such as the TAB. 25 While we are aware that the Court, with good reason, has shown special solicitude for forms of expression that are much less expensive than feasible alternatives and hence may be important to a large segment of the citizenry, ... this solicitude has practical boundaries. Vincent, 466 U.S. at 812 n. 30, 104 S.Ct. at 2133 n. 30 (citations omitted). Given that the regulation neither affects the TAB's primary means of distribution, the mail, which accounts for 79% of its distribution, nor prohibits the use of street vendors, such practical boundaries exist here. In any event, absent any record evidence regarding the feasibility or infeasibility of street vending for free publications, such as the TAB, we are particularly reluctant to treat free publications differently than those for charge, or to otherwise alter our conclusion. 86 In short, [a]s the Court phrased it: 'That the city's limitations on volume may reduce to some degree the potential audience for respondent's speech is of no consequence, for there has been no showing that the remaining avenues of communication are inadequate.'  National Amusements, 43 F.3d at 745 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 802, 109 S.Ct. at 2760). Here, because the SFG leaves intact an alternative means of distribution within the public forum, and in the absence of any record evidence call[ing] into legitimate question the adequacy of the alternate routes for [distribution], National Amusements, 43 F.3d at 745, we conclude that the Street Furniture Guideline's effective ban on newsracks in no way runs afoul of the Newspapers' First Amendment right to distribute their publications. Accordingly, with this last prong satisfied, we find that the challenged guideline passes muster under the First Amendment: it is a reasonable, content-neutral time, place and manner restriction on the Newspapers' right to distribute their publications in the District.Some Additional Thoughts 87 We have considered the Newspapers' other arguments and find them to be without merit. We pause briefly, however, to respond to a few of them. 88 First: Contrary to their contention, and as the foregoing discussion makes clear, the Street Furniture Guideline in no way denies the Newspapers the ability to make their publications available to those willing to receive them. Indeed, there is simply nothing in the record to support this bald assertion. 89 Second: We also reject as utterly without merit the notion that, by upholding a ruling that bans a common and useful means of newspaper distribution, our decision today opens the door to the piecemeal destruction of the public forum. We are simply at a loss to see how the public forum is destroyed by such a valid content neutral, time, place and manner restriction on the distribution of protected speech--particularly where, as here, the Newspapers are free to distribute their publications from the very same spot within the public forum where their newsracks have been located. 90 Last, but not least: We also dismiss as irrelevant their claim that the SJC's decision signals a danger for newsracks in all historic districts: even if this were true, as long as the regulations are valid content neutral, time, place and manner restrictions, what of it? As noted above, while the First Amendment guarantees the right to circulate publications, it does not guarantee the right to do so through private structures erected on public property. No one disputes that regulations governing newsracks, because they facilitate the distribution of protected speech, are subject to First Amendment scrutiny. What the Newspapers fail to appreciate is that newsracks are nothing more than structures occupying, if not monopolizing, public space on the sidewalks, which--with or without publications within--simply are not immunized from regulations passing muster under the First Amendment. 91 In sum, our opinion today stands unaffected by the clatter of these alarmist claims. Without more ado, we reverse the district court's decision.