Opinion ID: 716733
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Austin v. United States: Objective Purpose through History

Text: 85 Four years after Halper, in Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 113 S.Ct. 2801, 125 L.Ed.2d 488 (1993), the Court added yet another dimension to the punishment question: a focus on history. The Court held that civil forfeiture is punishment subject to the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. The government had argued that forfeiture of a mobile home and body shop after the owner was convicted of a drug offense served the remedial purpose of compensating the government for its costs in investigating and prosecuting these offenses. In setting out the appropriate analysis, the Austin Court rescribed the key passage in Halper. 86 We said in Halper that a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have come to understand the term. 87 Id. at 610, 113 S.Ct. at 2806 (quoting Halper, 490 U.S. at 448, 109 S.Ct. at 1901-02). 88 The Austin Court then took a different tack than the Halper Court: it applied the Halper test primarily by examining history, rather than proportionality. We turn, then, to consider whether, at the time the Eighth Amendment was ratified, forfeiture was understood at least in part as punishment and whether forfeiture under [the statute in question] should be so understood today. Id. Examining history, it concluded that forfeiture has traditionally been regarded as punishment. Looking to the language and legislative history of the statute as a whole, the Court determined that these factors confirmed that the forfeiture statute served a punitive purpose, regardless of the proportionality of the particular forfeiture to the government's costs. 20 Id. at 617-23, 113 S.Ct. at 2810-12. It therefore remanded for a determination whether the forfeiture, by being excessive, violated the Eighth Amendment. Id. 89 According to Austin, a measure that has historically served punitive purposes is punishment unless the text or legislative history shows a contrary purpose. Id. at 619, 113 S.Ct. at 2810 (We find nothing in these provisions or their legislative history to contradict the historical understanding of forfeiture as punishment.). Thus, even if a remedial purpose could fully explain a measure, thereby satisfying Halper, it will not pass Austin muster if it has historically been considered punishment and neither the text nor the legislative history contradicts this purpose. To draw again on our soupmeat hypothetical, sending someone out into the snow would be punishment if doing so was traditionally regarded as punitive and the sender did not make his plausible remedial purposes clear. This would be the case even though a remedial purpose----fetching soupmeat----could fully explain the action. Without a convincing counter-rationale, something understood as punishment for so long simply cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving retributive or deterrent purposes. Id. at 610, 113 S.Ct. at 2806. 90 The Austin objective purpose analysis also represents a move toward analyzing the effect of a provision in ascertaining whether it inflicts punishment. 21 Though it speaks of legislative purpose, the more likely and appropriate concern in a historical inquiry is the nature of the measure itself. Even the text and legislative history inquiry of Austin can be understood as going more to the nature of the provision itself rather than the subjective intent of the legislators. 91 In concluding our discussion of Austin, we must question whether, as some courts have assumed, that case establishes that punishment for purposes of one constitutional protection is necessarily punishment for another. See United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1219 (9th Cir.1994) (We believe that the only fair reading of Austin is that it resolves the 'punishment' issue with respect to forfeiture cases for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause as well as the Excessive Fines Clause.), amended on denial of rehearing, 56 F.3d 41 (1995), cert. granted, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 763, 133 L.Ed.2d 709 (1996). This Court, noting the tension between Halper and Austin, has rejected the Ninth Circuit's reading of Austin as resolving all forfeitures under § 881 as presumptively punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. See United States v. $184,505.01 in U.S. Currency, 72 F.3d 1160 (3d Cir.1995) (rejecting holding and reasoning of United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir.1994)). 22 92 Nevertheless, we believe that the historical methodology of Austin, as opposed to its broad language and holding, must be applicable to other punishment determinations: historical analysis is a staple of constitutional interpretation, including those guarantees dealing with punishment. Cf. Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 475, 97 S.Ct. 2777, 2806, 53 L.Ed.2d 867 (1977) (examining history to determine whether access restrictions on presidential papers constituted punishment for Bill of Attainder Clause); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 590 n. 23, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1901 n. 23, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (The Supreme Court has probably relied upon historical analysis more often than on any of the other objective factors ... [to] determin[e] whether some government sanction is punitive.) (citing cases). 93