Opinion ID: 6328135
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Medical Records Claim

Text: First up is Karr’s claim that Taylor was ineﬀective for failing to investigate and potentially present evidence of A.P.’s medication history. Karr argues, as he did before the district court, that Taylor should have researched A.P.’s potential use of medications when the assaults took place. Karr asserts that, had Taylor done so, he could have presented the jury with evidence casting signiﬁcant doubt on A.P.’s memory on the night of the assaults. This argument has two parts. Karr contends the jury should have heard that (1) A.P. was prescribed hydrocodone at the time of the assaults; and (2) A.P. told Karr that at the hospital she had been given an intravenous line with medication. At the postconviction evidentiary hearing, A.P. testiﬁed she did not recall whether she had been taking hydrocodone at the time of the assaults as well as that any drug consumption did not aﬀect her ability to recall the assaults. A.P. explained she might have told Karr that she had taken medication intravenously to account for the additional time she spent at the hospital. This would conceal from Karr that, at that time, she was speaking with a police oﬃcer about Karr’s abuse. Considering how the trial proceeded—and given A.P.’s testimony—the Indiana Court of Appeals determined that Taylor had made a reasonable strategic decision not to attempt to obtain A.P.’s medical records. The Court of Appeals observed that it was not clear whether any No. 21-2463 11 such records would have been discoverable or admissible at trial. Thus, the court held that Taylor’s failure to pursue the investigation of A.P.’s medical records did not prejudice Karr. In this procedural posture, we must decide whether that holding was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Strickland. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Minnick, 15 F.4th at 468. The ruling of the Indiana Court of Appeals rested on the evidentiary decisions at trial and the potential defenses available to Taylor as Karr’s attorney. Most prominently, the appeals court agreed with the State that the evidence showed A.P.’s thoughts and speech were clear on the night of the assaults and during her later conversations with police oﬃcers. Obtaining, and even introducing, A.P.’s medical records therefore would not have plausibly enabled Taylor to cast doubt on A.P.’s memory on the night of the assaults. To show that the state court unreasonably applied Strickland in making its no-prejudice determination, Karr would have to demonstrate why the state appeals court’s logic was ﬂawed. But he has not done so. In these federal habeas proceedings, Karr has not challenged the state appeals court’s determination that A.P.’s thought and speech were clear when she reported the assaults, which was shortly after they occurred. So, there is no factual foundation for Karr’s assertion that the evidence he claims should have been investigated and introduced at trial would have aﬀected the jurors’ assessment of A.P.’s credibility. This is particularly true because, per A.P.’s testimony and the absence of any contradictory evidence, there is reason to doubt that she was taking medication at the time of the assaults. It follows that there is no “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s [alleged] unprofessional 12 No. 21-2463 errors [regarding A.P.’s medications], the result of the proceeding would have been diﬀerent.” Adeyanju, 12 F.4th at 673. We agree with the district court that the Indiana Court of Appeals’ no-prejudice determination with respect to A.P.’s medication records was a reasonable application of Strickland. The state appeals court also described Taylor’s decision not to pursue the discovery of A.P.’s medical records as a strategic decision. “[W]hen counsel’s pretrial investigation is less than complete, counsel’s strategic choices are ‘reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation.’” Olvera v. Gomez, 2 F.4th 659, 669 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691). Here, Ruemmele introduced evidence at one of the posttrial evidentiary hearings that Taylor was aware a detective had met with A.P. a few days after the assaults occurred. During that meeting, the detective averred, “the vast majority of the time [A.P.] was collected and matter-offact.” This testimony supports the state appeals court’s conclusion that Taylor’s decision not to investigate A.P.’s medication records was a reasonable exercise of his professional judgment. Given that Taylor knew A.P. could speak in a calm and detailed manner about what happened to her on the night of the assaults, he reasonably could have concluded that any records of her medications would not have aﬀected the jury’s evaluation of her credibility. Notably, Ruemmele did not elicit any testimony contradicting this rationale during her examination of Taylor at the evidentiary hearing. Moreover, as the State notes, any attempt Taylor could have made to impeach A.P. with evidence of her medication No. 21-2463 13 history would have been contrary to the theory of defense he presented to the jury—that A.P. had purposely fabricated the story of the assault for ﬁnancial gain. Again, there was no evidence presented at the postconviction hearings to refute this rationale for Taylor’s decision not to pursue the medication records. Without more, Karr has not shown that the Indiana Court of Appeals unreasonably applied Strickland in concluding that he suﬀered no prejudice from Taylor’s strategic decisions regarding A.P.’s medication records.