Opinion ID: 171881
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mr. Gonzales' battery/domestic violence conviction

Text: On its own motion, this court inquired of the parties whether Mr. Gonzales' battery/domestic violence conviction qualified as a violent felony under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). [5] The Government concedes that Mr. Gonzales has not waived this argument. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733-34, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (distinguishing between waiver and forfeiture). However, he has forfeited the issue by failing to raise it to the district court. Thus, this court will review the question for plain error. See id. at 732-33, 113 S.Ct. 1770. When reviewing an issue for plain error, we will reverse the judgment ... only if there is (1) error, (2) that is plain, which (3) affects substantial rights. If these three criteria are met, then we may exercise discretion to correct the error if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. United States v. Zubia-Torres, 550 F.3d 1202, 1208 (10th Cir.2008) (citation omitted); see also Olano, 507 U.S. at 734-37, 113 S.Ct. 1770. Mr. Gonzales bears the burden of establishing plain error that warrants relief. See Zubia-Torres, 550 F.3d at 1209. We conclude he has not established such plain error here. There are two means by which Mr. Gonzales could have committed battery in violation of Wyoming law: 1) by unlawfully touch[ing] another in a rude, insolent or angry manner, or 2) by intentionally, knowingly or recklessly caus[ing] bodily injury to another. Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-501(b). See also United States v. Hays, 526 F.3d 674, 675, 678 (10th Cir.2008) (recognizing these two prongs of the Wyoming battery statute). It is unclear from the record under which of these two prongs (or both) Mr. Gonzales was convicted. Because Mr. Gonzales did not raise this challenge below, the parties agree that, to be entitled to relief, Mr. Gonzales must now establish that the district court would have committed plain error in treating his battery conviction, under either prong of the Wyoming battery statute, as a violent felony under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). [6] There are three ways in which a conviction can be a violent felony under § 924(e): (1) it has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, 2) it is burglary, arson, or extortion, [or] involves the use of explosives, or 3) it otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). See also Chambers v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 687, 691, 172 L.Ed.2d 484 (2009) (recognizing these three definitions of violent felony under the ACCA). Because Mr. Gonzales did not, at sentencing, challenge the decision of the district court to treat his battery conviction as a violent felony, that court never addressed which of these definitions the Wyoming battery conviction met. We will, therefore, briefly consider each. Addressing § 924(e)'s second definition of a violent felony, Mr. Gonzales' battery conviction clearly was not burglary, arson, extortion, or an offense involving explosives. Therefore, regardless of whether Mr. Gonzales was convicted under the first or second prong of the Wyoming battery statute, it would have been plain error had the district court concluded that his conviction met the ACCA's second violent-felony definition. See United States v. Edgar, 348 F.3d 867, 871-72 (10th Cir.2003) (holding error was plain where it was contrary to clear congressional mandate embodied in rule of criminal procedure). Turning to § 924(e)'s first definition of a violent felony, United States v. Hays held that a battery conviction under the first prong of the Wyoming statute did not have, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force. 526 F.3d at 676-79 (applying 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii)). In light of that decision, if Mr. Gonzales' conviction fell under the first prong of the Wyoming battery statute, it would have been plain error for the district court to have treated that conviction as a violent felony under § 924(e)'s first definition one that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). [7] However, that leaves the possibility that Mr. Gonzales' conviction could still be a violent felony if it fell under any of the remaining scenarios: (1) if it fell under the second prong of Wyoming's battery statute and it met 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)'s first definitionhaving as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or (2) if it fell under either prong of the Wyoming battery statute and it otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). Mr. Gonzales has not pointed out, and we have not found, any Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit authority that directly addresses these possibilities. Nor has Mr. Gonzales pointed to any cases from other circuits addressing these issues. Therefore, even if it would have been error for the district court to have relied upon these bases for characterizing Mr. Gonzales' Wyoming battery/domestic violence conviction as a violent felony under the ACCAand we do not here address the merits of these issues and so do not conclude that it would have been errorany such error could not have been plain. Plain error means clear or obvious error. Kaufman, 546 F.3d at 1252 (quotation omitted). An error in a ruling is `plain' only if the ruling violates `well-settled law.' United States v. Baum, 555 F.3d 1129, 1135 (10th Cir.2009) (citation omitted; quoting United States v. Smith, 413 F.3d 1253, 1274 (10th Cir. 2005)). For these reasons, we conclude Mr. Gonzales has failed to establish that the district court plainly erred in determining that his Wyoming battery conviction qualified as a violent felony for purposes of the ACCA.