Opinion ID: 4271420
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Objection to Alleged Blocking

Text: PruittHealth first asserts that the Board erroneously declined to find that Union agents “engaged in repeated acts of intentional, objectionable blocking of ingress and egress” to the Facility that “interfered with employees’ Section 7 rights and was sufficiently objectionable to warrant setting aside the election.” Petitioner’s Br. 20–21. As support, PruittHealth points to Yolando Thornton’s, Erica Merriweather’s, and Andrew Johnson’s testimony that, in the week before the election, pro-Union demonstrators approached their cars as they were driving into the Facility to distribute flyers and encourage them to vote for the Union. See id. at 21–22. The Company also relies on Jan Marie Benn’s testimony that she was unable to catch her bus one day when demonstrators were “‘swarming’ around the bus stop,” id. at 22–23, as well as Suzanne Gerhardt’s testimony that demonstrators obstructed her view of traffic as she was exiting the Facility’s premises one afternoon, id. at 22. As an initial matter, we discount PruittHealth’s allegations that Benn and Gerhardt were unlawfully blocked because the Company failed to raise these arguments in its request for Board review of the Regional Director’s certification decision. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (“No objection that has not been urged before the Board . . . shall be considered by the court, unless the failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be excused because of extraordinary circumstances.”). We find no merit to the objection based on the remaining evidence. 11 Under Board precedent, unions are permitted to hold demonstrations outside employers’ premises and engage with employees on their way to work to peacefully encourage them to support the union and distribute union literature. For example, in Chrill Care, Inc., 340 NLRB 1016 (2003), the Board found there to have been no objectionable conduct when union supporters attempted to speak with employees entering the work area and momentarily hindered their access to the building, where there was no evidence of “any forceful or . . . threatening harassing contact,” id. at 1016; see also Comcast Cablevision of New Haven, Inc., 325 NLRB 833, 833 & n.3, 838 (1998). And in Firestone Textiles Co., 244 NLRB 168 (1979), the Board concluded that derogatory comments union supporters made at the entrance to the employer’s facility were “regret[t]able” but not coercive under the circumstances, where “the overall conduct” was “generally peaceful” and there was no evidence that employees were prevented from entering or exiting the facility, id. at 168, 170–71. There are limits, however. See, e.g., Local 3, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 312 NLRB 487, 489–90, 492–93 (1993) (finding objectionable conduct where demonstrators yelled, cursed, and threatened individual employees; banged on, and threw pamphlets into, vehicles; and stood in front of vehicles, refusing to step aside). The Board found that the Union did not exceed the limits of the law in its election campaign activities. It adopted the Hearing Officer’s determination that the challenged conduct in this case fell far short of the kind of egregious blocking behavior the Board has deemed objectionable. For example, the Hearing Officer found that “the credited evidence established that individual demonstrators approached cars from the side to hand them a flyer, and attempted to persuade them peacefully to support the [Union].” J.A. 241. He further found that “[t]here was no evidence [that] the demonstrators . . . maneuvered in front of cars to intentionally block employees from entering the 12 facility, nor was there evidence that any employees had trouble entering” the Facility. Id. The Regional Director agreed and concluded that the disputed conduct caused, at most, “momentary inconveniences” to employees. J.A. 271. Substantial evidence supports these determinations. The Hearing Officer found much of the testimony forming the basis of this objection not credible. He declined to credit Thornton’s testimony that a demonstrator stood in front of her car because her testimony was “conclusory and contradictory.” J.A. 239 n.8. He likewise refused to credit Merriweather’s testimony that she was blocked because her testimony was “conclusory, largely devoid of any specifics, contradictory, and confusing.” J.A. 240. PruittHealth does not contest these credibility determinations on appeal and we have no basis to doubt their validity. See Alden Leeds, Inc. v. NLRB, 812 F.3d 159, 165 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (court accepts credibility findings made by an ALJ and adopted by the Board unless they are shown to be “patently insupportable”). The remaining, credited testimony from Thornton, Johnson, and Merriweather indicates that demonstrators approached employees in a peaceful manner to try to persuade them to vote for the Union, but did not prevent access to the premises. These encounters lasted for at most a few minutes and there is no evidence in the record that the encounters disrupted the Company’s operations. In sum, the Board reasonably concluded that there was no merit to the Company’s claim that Union supporters interfered with employees’ Section 7 rights by blocking access to or from the Facility during the election campaign. 13