Opinion ID: 341531
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Loss of Singleton rights.

Text: 6 The district court found that plaintiff resigned from his position as assistant principal of the desegregated Clarksdale High School in order to pursue postgraduate studies at Auburn University, for which purpose he had received a substantial financial grant from an unspecified source. It found that he resigned voluntarily, without pressure, without any feeling that he was treated unfairly or that his pay was improper, for the sole purpose of taking advantage of the substantial grant available to him. In short, his resignation was unrelated to school desegregation. Substantial evidence supports the trial court's conclusions. His letter of resignation was cordial in tone, and neither in his letter nor in any of his other dealings with school officials did he express dissatisfaction with his position. His stated reason for resigning was to pursue further education through the financial grant. He had been paid more as assistant principal than as principal before integration. His course of study, launched by the grant, enhanced his professional career, and he became dean and director of financial aid in a junior college. He did not communicate to the Board any desire for reemployment, or assert any right to reemployment, until February 1972. 7 Under the teaching of Singleton, the rights of teachers affected by staff reductions and rearrangements caused by integration are twofold. First, dismissals and demotions must be accomplished pursuant to objective and reasonable nondiscriminatory standards, which must be developed by the school board and which shall be available for public inspection and shall be retained by the school district. 419 F.2d at 1218. Plaintiff claims that no such standards were followed in the case of his transfer. Second, even if dismissals or demotions are made pursuant to acceptable nondiscriminatory criteria, displaced staff, if qualified, must be given a right of first refusal in cases of subsequent staff vacancies. Plaintiff also contends that this was refused to him. 8 In reaching the conclusion that plaintiff lost all his Singleton rights by resigning, the district judge relied on Lee v. Macon County, supra, where it was said of a demoted school principal that if he voluntarily removed himself from the Muscle Shoals school system, he would not be entitled to claim any succor under Singleton. 453 F.2d at 1108. 2 9 The district judge in the present case had the view that one who voluntarily leaves the school system forfeits his protection under Singleton regardless of his reason for leaving. We need not, and do not, embrace such a sweeping rule. According to the district court's findings, Hardy left the system for reasons unrelated to the desegregation process and to the inequities which Singleton is intended to remedy. 10 Appellant contends that it is both unjust and unconstitutional to eliminate his Singleton entitlements simply because he voluntarily left the school system, and that those rights can be lost only in accordance with the exacting standards of constitutional waiver. His arguments rest on a misapprehension of the nature of the Singleton provisions relating to displacements caused by integration. Singleton entitlements are not constitutional rights. Both the requirement that displacements be affected only in accordance with written, objective criteria and the requirement that displaced personnel be given a right of first refusal of subsequent vacancies are standards of conduct imposed upon school boards under court order. They are aspects of equitable remedies, designed by this court under its general equitable power to fashion relief for constitutional violations (in this case, maintenance of a segregated, dual school system) in accordance with principles of fairness and with a minimum of hardship to persons affected by large scale, court-ordered social change. The question of their reach is for this court to decide on nonconstitutional grounds. 11 We hold that plaintiff lost his Singleton rights when he resigned from the school system for reasons which the district court found upon sufficient evidence to have been unrelated to his earlier displacement. 3 12