Opinion ID: 2101627
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: mistrial: visibility/identification experiment

Text: Appellant first contends that the trial court erred when it denied his request for a mistrial after the court overruled his objection to the Commonwealth's proposed testimony concerning a visibility/identification experiment conducted by Sergeant Michael Ryan and Lieutenant Thomas Grady. Appellant argues that Sergeant Ryan's testimony regarding the visibility/identification experiment was irrelevant and prejudicial, and thus the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a mistrial. We do not agree. On the first day of trial, Friday, November 2, 1984, the principal Commonwealth witness, Fay Shaw, testified during direct and redirect examination that between 9:30 p.m. and 9:45 p.m. on March 19, 1978, she witnessed appellant and Truesdale stab Melvin Fields in front of 1904 Napa Street from her porch at 3102 Berks Street. She testified that she had known appellant for six or seven years before the incident. She stated that as she was standing at 31st and Berks, she looked across the street and watched appellant and Truesdale punching another man for about five minutes, and that after the man fell down, appellant and Truesdale ran to the end of Napa Street. They stopped at the corner of Napa and Berks Streets and then turned back to where Fields was lying. When they returned to Fields, they bent over him holding a `shiny object' which looked like a knife and struck him in the chest area about two or three times in an up and down motion. Ms. Shaw was unable to see which of the two, appellant or Truesdale, held the knife. Ms. Shaw stated that after the stabbing, the two men ran away together. Throughout the entire incident, Ms. Shaw was standing on her front porch at 31st and Berks. (N.T. 11/2/84 at 73-80, 120). Ms. Shaw was questioned extensively by counsel for appellant and counsel for co-defendant Truesdale during cross and re-cross examination about her ability to see the incident, as well as the alleged impairment of her ability to see and to recollect the incident due to her acknowledged consumption of beer and marijuana prior to the incident. Ms. Shaw was questioned specifically about: the weather conditions on the night of the incident; the lighting of the area in which the incident occurred; how many other people were present in the area during and after the incident occurred; whether appellant or Truesdale had a beard, a mustache or sideburns; whether appellant or Truesdale were wearing glasses, hats, sneakers or shoes; whether appellant or Truesdale were wearing coats and, if so, what color were the coats; whether Fields was lying on the street, the pavement or the steps; whether she could see him lying on the pavement; whether it was possible to see the incident from where she stood; whether appellant or Truesdale held the knife; how recently she had seen appellant prior to the incident; how could she tell the assailant was appellant and not another black man; and whether she was positive about what she saw. [2] See generally N.T. 11/2/84 at 95-119. On Monday, November 5, 1984, the second day of trial, the Commonwealth called Police Sergeant Michael Ryan to testify. The defense promptly requested an offer of proof to which the prosecutor responded: Your Honor, Sergeant Ryan has no real connection with this case other than he was available Saturday night to go out to the scene and to look from 3102 Berks to 1904 Napa, and he will testify that he did that, and he was able to see and distinguish faces from that distance. (N.T. 11/5/84 at 11). The defense objected stating that the proposed testimony was irrelevant and prejudicial. The trial court overruled the objection and the defense made a motion for a mistrial which was denied. (N.T. 11/5/84 at 11-13). Police Sergeant Michael Ryan testified that on November 4, 1984, at approximately 1:30 a.m., he accompanied Police Lieutenant Thomas Grady to the crime scene; that he stood on the porch of the house at 3102 Berks while Lieutenant Grady went to an address on Napa Street; that from that distance he was able to see and to distinguish Lieutenant Grady's face; that Lieutenant Grady also stood at the corner of 31st and Napa Streets and that he was able to see and to distinguish Lieutenant Grady's face from that distance. In addition, Sergeant Ryan stated that from 3102 Berks Street, he could see the sidewalk in front of 1904 Napa Street. (N.T. 11/5/84 at 14-16). Sergeant Ryan was cross-examined by counsel for appellant and counsel for co-defendant Truesdale. The testimony elicited during cross-examination highlighted the differences between Sergeant Ryan and Ms. Shaw. Sergeant Ryan was questioned about whether he had been at the scene of the murder on the night of March 19, 1978; whether he had consumed any alcoholic beverages or marijuana on the night the visibility/identification experiment was conducted; whether he knew about the murder and the trial prior to visiting the scene of the murder; and what his height was. (N.T. 11/5/84 at 17-19). Initially, we note that a motion for a mistrial is addressed to the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Duffey, 519 Pa. 348, 548 A.2d 1178 (1988). We find no abuse of discretion. We recognize, however, the true essence of appellant's contention is that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting, over objection, the testimony of Sergeant Ryan concerning the visibility/identification experiment. The admissibility of evidence is, likewise, a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial court and may only be reversed on appeal upon a showing that the trial court abused its discretion. Commonwealth v. Osborn, 364 Pa.Super. 505, 516, 528 A.2d 623, 629 (1987). `[A]n abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the law is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will as shown on the record, discretion is abused.' Commonwealth v. Grove, 363 Pa.Super. 328, 346, 526 A.2d 369, 378 (1987), quoting Commonwealth v. Moyer, 497 Pa. 643, 647, 444 A.2d 101, 102 (1982). The basic requisite for the admissibility of any evidence in a criminal case is that it be competent and relevant. Commonwealth v. Potts, 314 Pa.Super. 256, 275, 460 A.2d 1127, 1137 (1983). Though relevance has not been precisely or universally defined, the courts of this Commonwealth have repeatedly stated that evidence is admissible if, and only if, the evidence logically or reasonably tends to prove or disprove a material fact in issue, tends to make such a fact more or less probable, or affords the basis for or supports a reasonable inference or presumption regarding the existence of a material fact. Commonwealth v. Potts, supra, 314 Pa.Superior Ct. at 276, 460 A.2d at 1137; see also Commonwealth v. Doe, 316 Pa.Super. 1, 7, 462 A.2d 762, 765 (1983). The decision whether or not to admit evidence which, though relevant, is merely corroborative of other substantive evidence requires a balancing test. Corroborative evidence may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by its potential prejudicial effect, i.e., confusion of issues, undue delay, needless repetition of cumulative evidence, or tendency to inflame or incite prejudice or bias. When the testimony of a key eyewitness has been impeached, the probative value of corroborative evidence may outweigh potential prejudicial effects; however, corroborative evidence in such cases must be related to the impeachment which it is to deny, rebut or explain. Commonwealth v. Fisher, 447 Pa. 405, 290 A.2d 262 (1972). Moreover, while corroborative evidence may be admitted for rehabilitative purposes, the use of such evidence may not violate any of the other exclusionary rules of evidence. Commonwealth v. Fisher, supra . The corroborative evidence offered to rehabilitate the key eyewitness in the instant case involved the results of an experiment. The decision to admit the results of experiments, like the decision to admit other forms of evidence, is ordinarily one for the trial court's discretion, reviewable only for an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Sero, 478 Pa. 440, 449, 387 A.2d 63, 68 (1978). Authority is unanimous that test results of experiments are admissible if the conditions under which the experiment was conducted are `substantially similar' to the conditions involved in the commission of the crime; to attain identical conditions is often impossible. Commonwealth v. Sero, supra, 478 Pa. at 449-450, 387 A.2d at 68 (results of a neutron activation tests on scarf worn by victim introduced to discredit defendant's version of the shooting held admissible). The requirement of similarity of conditions is a relative one: [p]erfect identity between experimental and actual conditions is neither attainable nor required. . . . [d]issimilarities affect the weight of the evidence, not admissibility. Ramseyer v. GM Corp., 417 F.2d 859, 864 (8th Cir. 1969). Thus, the general rule regarding corroboration by results of experiments is that unless some other exclusionary rule is violated, the results of experiments may be admitted into evidence when the circumstances under which the experiment was performed were sufficiently similar to the event in question to throw light on a material point in controversy and to assist the jury in arriving at the truth rather than to confuse the jury, inflame passions or prejudices, or unnecessarily delay proceedings. In the instant case, the Commonwealth witness testified that she witnessed the murder of Melvin Fields at 1904 Napa Street as she stood on her porch at 3102 Berks Street. The defense attempted during cross-examination to impeach her by extensively questioning her ability to make a positive identification of the assailants from the distance indicated under the circumstances present. Thus, whether a person could see and distinguish faces from where the witness stood was a fact specifically placed in issue by the appellant. Sergeant Ryan's testimony as to visibility was therefore relevant because it made a fact in issue, i.e. the credibility of the eyewitness' identification of the assailants from the distance indicated, more probable. The conditions between the actual occurrence and the experiment were sufficiently similar to warrant admissibility. Sergeant Ryan stood in the eyewitness' position as Lieutenant Grady stood in the appellant's position. Appellant was permitted unbridled cross-examination of Sergeant Ryan wherein counsel carefully brought out the differences between Sergeant Ryan and the Commonwealth witness. The extent to which the experiment may have deviated from the actual conditions was a consideration for the jury in determining the weight to be accorded the experiment results and not a bar to its admissibility so long as the differences did not render the results of the experiment more confusing or misleading than probative. The trial court found the similarities sufficient to warrant admission despite the differences, and we find no abuse of discretion in this respect. We note similarity between this case and Howser v. Commonwealth, 51 Pa. 332 (1865). In Howser, a witness testified that he had overheard a conversation between the appellant and his co-defendant who were in an adjoining cell while all three were in prison. The witness testified that the appellant and his co-defendant discussed their plan to murder and to rob the victim after they were discharged from prison. He testified further that he had subsequently demonstrated to visitors how a conversation in one cell could be heard and understood by a prisoner in an adjoining cell. This testimony concerning the audibility experiment conducted by the witness was deemed admissible corroborative evidence by our Supreme Court. [3] Later, in Commonwealth v. Wilson, 394 Pa. 588, 148 A.2d 234 (1959), our Supreme Court commented on the audibility experiment testimony in Howser, as follows: It was very proper, therefore, to corroborate him, and surely if he could demonstrate to his visitors that communication between cells was possible, he had a right to prove the fact in corroboration of his statement that such communications had actually taken place. 148 A.2d at 242-243. A like result obtains in the instant case. We find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in refusing to declare a mistrial, as it was entirely proper under the circumstances of this case for the trial court to permit Sergeant Ryan to testify to the results of the visibility/identification experiment conducted. Appellant's first contention, therefore, is found to be without merit.