Opinion ID: 1204963
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence relating to other capital cases

Text: (27) Defendant challenges the trial court's denial of his personal request, not joined in by counsel, to present evidence that innocent persons in other cases have been convicted of capital offenses. Defendant's argument fails to recognize that an attorney representing a criminal defendant has the authority to control the presentation of the defense, except that such authority may not be exercised to deprive a defendant of certain fundamental rights, such as the right to testify in one's own behalf. ( People v. Robles (1970) 2 Cal.3d 205, 214-215 [85 Cal. Rptr. 166, 466 P.2d 710].) Defendant's argument is without merit for an additional reason  and would have to be rejected even if the request to present such evidence had come from his attorney  because a capital defendant has no right to demand jury consideration of such evidence at the penalty phase. The jury's focus at that proceeding must be directed to the defendant's character and prior record, and the circumstances of the charged offense. ( Franklin v. Lynaugh (1988) 487 U.S. 164, 172-175 [101 L.Ed.2d 155, 164-167, 108 S.Ct. 2320]; see also Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 586, 605, fn. 12 [57 L.Ed.2d 973, 990, 98 S.Ct. 2954] [upholding the trial court's traditional authority to exclude, as irrelevant, evidence not bearing on the defendant's character or prior record, or the circumstances of the offense].) Evidence of third persons' having been wrongfully convicted of capital offenses is irrelevant to the jury's function in the case before them and is therefore inadmissible. (See Evid. Code, § 350; People v. Malone (1988) 47 Cal.3d 1, 56-57, fn. 31 [252 Cal. Rptr. 525, 762 P.2d 1249] [individualized nature of jury's sentencing determination renders inappropriate the consideration of sentences imposed in similar cases]; People v. Dyer (1988) 45 Cal.3d 26, 69-71 [246 Cal. Rptr. 209, 753 P.2d 1] [upholding the trial court's rejection of the defendant's attempt to introduce evidence of lesser sentences imposed on codefendants].) The trial court's exclusion of such improper evidence did not prevent defendant from introducing relevant evidence regarding the circumstances of Robin's death, in an attempt to create a lingering doubt. Indeed, defendant's own testimony at the penalty phase, denying the commission of any offense against Robin, attempted to create such a doubt. Defendant also presented testimony which sought to undermine the prosection's theory regarding the gold ball earrings found in the Seattle storage locker. Moreover, the jury in the present case was instructed at the penalty phase to consider all of the evidence which has been received during any part of the trial of this case. The jury was further instructed pursuant to a catchall mitigation instruction derived from section 190.3, factor (k), allowing the jury to consider the following: any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime, even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime, and any other aspect of the defendant's character, record, background or emotional makeup, which is offered as a basis for a sentence less than death, whether or not related to the offense for which he is on trial. You are not limited as to the matters which you may consider as the basis for a sentence less than death and you may consider pity or sympathy for the defendant as one of those factors. You may, in addition, take into consideration the possibility or probability, if you should so determine, that the defendant has in the past and will in the future successfully adjust to life in prison in such manner as to make a worthwhile contribution thereto. These instructions were sufficient to advise the jury of the full range of mitigating evidence. ( People v. Sully (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1195, 1244-1245 [283 Cal. Rptr. 144, 812 P.2d 163]; People v. Howard, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 434.)