Opinion ID: 1043968
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Application of the Blockburger Test

Text: Applying the foregoing principles in this case, we first consider whether the defendant's dual convictions arose from the same act or transaction. Here, there was only one victim, and Defendant was charged with committing both offenses on August 30, 2004, without reference to any specific or discrete acts. [48] Thus, the threshold is surpassed, meaning the potential for a double jeopardy violation exists in this case. The General Assembly has not expressed its intent either to permit or to preclude dual convictions of reckless homicide and aggravated child abuse. See Godsey, 60 S.W.3d at 778 (explaining that the Legislature has designated child abuse and child neglect, but not aggravated child abuse, as lesser included offenses of homicide). Thus, we must next examine the statutes defining the crimes of which the defendant was convicted in order to discern legislative intent. Reckless homicide is statutorily defined as the [r]eckless killing of another. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-215(a) (2003). Aggravated child abuse as charged in this case is statutorily defined as follows: A person commits the offense of aggravated child abuse . . . who commits the offense of child abuse . . . as defined in § 39-15-401. . . and . . . [t]he act of abuse . . . results in serious bodily injury to the child. . . . Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-15-402(a)(1) (2003). Child abuse as defined in section 401 occurs when [a]ny person . . . knowingly, other than by accidental means, treats a child . . . in such a manner as to inflict injury. . . . Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-15-401(a) (2003). At the time of this offense, serious bodily injury was defined as including a substantial risk of death, [p]rotracted unconsciousness, [e]xtreme physical pain, [p]rotracted or obvious disfigurement, or [p]rotracted loss or substantial impairment of a function of a bodily member, organ or mental faculty. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-11-106(a)(34) (2003). Obviously, the definitions of reckless homicide and aggravated child abuse differ markedly. Reckless homicide requires proof of a killing; aggravated child abuse does not. Aggravated child abuse requires proof that the victim was a child, that is, a person less than eighteen years of age; reckless homicide has no age-based element. Having applied the Blockburger test, we conclude that the defendant's convictions of reckless homicide and aggravated child abuse are not the same offenses for purposes of double jeopardy. Each offense includes an element different from the other offense. Neither offense is a lesser included of the other. Accordingly, we conclude that the General Assembly intended to permit multiple convictions in this context. Thus, we hold that Defendant's dual convictions do not offend either the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment or article I, section 10 of the Tennessee Constitution.