Opinion ID: 1740699
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: other states' case law involving retaliatory conduct short of discharge

Text: We have not previously addressed whether our cause of action for retaliatory discharge should be expanded to include any lesser retaliatory actions against employees who file workers' compensation claims. Other jurisdictions provide some guidance. In Zimmerman v. Buchheit of Sparta, Inc., [17] a plurality of the Illinois Supreme Court rejected a claim for retaliatory demotion. The court first addressed this claim as a possible extension of its retaliatory discharge tort. [18] In declining to expand the tort, the court cited several Illinois cases which had narrowly interpreted the cause of action. [19] The Zimmerman court stated that the element of discharge was essential to the tort it had created. It explained, In our view, adoption of plaintiff's argument [a cause of action for retaliatory demotion] would replace the welldeveloped element of discharge with a new, ill-defined, and potentially all-encompassing concept of retaliatory conduct or discrimination. The courts then would be called upon to become increasingly involved in the resolution of workplace disputes which center on employer conduct that heretofore has not been actionable at common law or by statute. [20] The plaintiff's recitations of the general principles of policy behind retaliatory discharge did not sway the court. [21] It held that the plaintiff had not established a compelling reason to expand the cause of action. The court also rejected the plaintiff's claim under an Illinois statutory provision which made it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee because he exercised his rights under that state's workers' compensation act. In its discussion, the court pointed out that the plaintiff failed] to explain the manner in which demotions, as distinct from terminations, relieve employers of their responsibility to compensate employees for their work-related injuries. [22] Only two justices joined the majority decision. Two concurring justices and two dissenting justices disagreed with the plurality's decision to treat retaliatory demotion and retaliatory discharge differently. The concurring justices stated that the courts should leave recognition of both retaliatory discharge and demotion to the legislature. The concurrence pointed out, however, that refusing to recognize a tort of retaliatory demotion while maintaining the retaliatory discharge tort created a glaring loophole because employers could simply retaliate by demoting rather than firing employees who file workers' compensation claims. [23] The dissent argued the cause of action should be extended to demotion because there is no principled way to distinguish the two situations. [24] The dissent relied on an Illinois statute which made it a crime to either discharge or discriminate against workers who filed workers' compensation claims. In response to the concurring and dissenting opinions, the plurality wrote: Neither the dissent nor the concurrence acknowledges that this court acts within its authority in reaffirming the well-settled and limited tort of retaliatory discharge, as an exception to the at-will employment doctrine, without being constrained to open broad new avenues of litigation for other, less defined types of retaliatory conduct in the workplace. [25] Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court rejected a cause of action for retaliatory harassment or discrimination against an employee who disagreed with how an employer treated employees who filed workers' compensation claims. In Touchard v. La-Z-Boy Inc., [26] the Utah court determined that the public policy exception behind retaliatory discharge did not apply to the same extent when the employee . . . does not have the fear of losing his or her employment. The court also expressed concern that to recognize such a claim would expand the public policy exception beyond its intended narrow scope by implicating a much broader range of behavior, including demotions, salary reductions, job transfers, or disciplinary actions. [27] In contrast, the Kansas Supreme Court has recognized a cause of action for retaliatory demotion. In Brigham v. Dillon Companies, Inc., [28] the Kansas court analyzed the Zimmerman decision, focusing on the concurring and dissenting opinions. The Kansas court pointed out that four of seven justices on the Zimmerman courtboth the concurring and dissenting justicesbelieved it was inconsistent to recognize a cause of action for retaliatory discharge, but not demotion. The Kansas court, in recognizing a cause of action for retaliatory demotion, reasoned: The employers' violation of public policy and the resulting coercive effect on the employee is the same in both [termination and demotion]. The loss or damage to the demoted employee differs in degree only. We do not share the employers' concern that a torrent of litigation of insubstantial employment matters would follow in the wake of our recognition of a cause of action for retaliatory demotion and, even if we did, it does not constitute a valid reason for denying recognition of an otherwise justified cause of action. We conclude that the recognition of a cause of action for retaliatory demotion is a necessary and logical extension of the cause of action for retaliatory discharge. To conclude otherwise would be to repudiate this court's recognition of a cause of action for retaliatory discharge. The obvious message would be for employers to demote rather than discharge employees in retaliation for filing a workers compensation claim or whistleblowing. Thus, employers could negate this court's decisions recognizing wrongful or retaliatory discharge by taking actions falling short of actual discharge. [29] Bag 'N Save cites several cases refusing to expand the public policy exception to other retaliatory actions short of discharge. [30] But we do not find that authority persuasive. Here, we address only demotion. Moreover, most of the cases cited did not involve retaliatory actions for filing a workers' compensation claim and thus, did not address the same policy concerns now before us. [31] Although one of the cases cited is a workers' compensation case, it is distinguishable because it involved the unique circumstance where the plaintiffs had filed for workers' compensation under a different state's statute. [32] Finally, one other jurisdiction has taken the opposite view and allowed claims for lesser retaliatory actions. [33]