Opinion ID: 6934755
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: facts

Text: This case arises from the stranding of the Exxon Houston on March 2, 1989, near the Island of Oahu, several hours after it broke away from an SPM owned and operated by defendants HIRI. The Houston, a steam propulsion oil tanker weighing over 72,000 dead weight tons, was engaged in delivering oil via two floating hoses into HIRI’s submerged pipeline, pursuant to a contract between Exxon and defendant Pacific Resources International, Inc. (“PRII”), when a heavy southern storm (locally termed a Kona storm) caused a break in the chafe chain linking the vessel to the SPM. As the vessel drifted, the two oil hoses broke away from the SPM. Because the hoses were bolted to the ship rather than secured by more readily detachable safety locks, a long (800 feet) length of one hose remained attached to the ship, and interfered with her ability to maneuver. While the parting of the first hose did not cause a significant threat to the Houston, the parting and partial sinking of the second, longer hose, weighed down by a heavy piece of spool torn from the SPM, threatened to foul the ship’s propeller. The parting of the second hose at approximately 1728, 2 designated as the “breakout” or “breakaway,” is the initiating point in time for events covered in the Phase One trial. Immediately after the breakout, the Coast Guard contacted the Houston to see whether it needed assistance, but because he was advised assistance vessels would not arrive within two hours, Houston’s Captain Kevin Coyne refused the offer, thinking the problem would be resolved within that time. Captain Coyne did not thereafter request assistance from the Coast Guard. During the two hours and forty-one minutes following the breakout, Captain Coyne took the ship through a series of phases described in some detail in the district court’s findings of fact. These phases are summarized in the following paragraphs. At about 1740, Captain Coyne attempted to anchor, dropping a single anchor which paid out one shot (90 feet) of chain. On the basis of expert testimony, the district court found that Captain Coyne failed to follow standard maritime practice, which would have involved releasing five to six shots of chain to hold the ship under the circumstances. The Houston had twelve shots of chain available for each of its two anchors. After this attempt to anchor failed, Captain Coyne made no further efforts to anchor the Houston before it stranded, although the district court found there were numerous places en route he could safely have done so. By 1803, the small assist vessel Nene was able, with the assistance of the Houston, to get control of the end of the second hose so that it was no longer a threat to the larger ship. Captain Coyne controlled the Nene’s movements as necessary to coordinate with the Houston’s movements. Between 1803 and 1830, Captain Coyne maneuvered the Houston out to sea and away from shallow water. Between 1830 and 2009, the time of stranding, the district court found that Captain Coyne made a series of ill-advised moves. Perhaps most significant was his failure to plot the ship’s position on the chart between 1830 and 2004. Rather than plotting fixes of the vessel’s position at regular intervals, Captain Coyne relied after 1830 entirely on parallel indexing, a supplemental technique which, according to Exxon’s Navigation and Bridge Organization Manual (“Navigation Manual”), “does not relieve the ship’s officer of the duty to frequently plot the position of the ship on the chart by means of navigational fixes.” Without a fix, Captain Coyne was unable to make effective use of the chart to check for hazards. Between 1830 and 1947, the crews of the Houston and the Nene worked to disconnect the second hose from the Houston. This was accomplished by 1947. The Houston’s port crane collapsed in the process, taking the crane operator’s seat with it onto the deck. The second mate went below to attend to the crane operator, who was in shock, leaving Captain Coyne alone on the bridge at 1948. Although the Navigation Manual requires that at least two officers be present on the bridge at all times, Captain Coyne-did not call upon any of the other available officers to join him until 2000. The district court found that if the bridge had been properly manned, the stranding danger would have been avoided. Finally, at 1956, Captain Coyne made a disastrous final turn to the right (toward the shore) which resulted in the ship’s stranding. Given that the Kona storm was threatening to push the vessel into shore, it is not dear why the Captain chose to turn right instead of continuing to back out safely to sea, or turning to port, away from the coast. Both options were viable. The district court found Captain Coyne’s explanations for his decision unconvincing. Because he had not taken fixes, Captain Coyne apparently was unaware of the ship’s position until he ordered Third Mate Spiller to do so at 2004. Third Mate Spiller testified that on seeing the 2004 fix on the chart, Captain Coyne uttered an expletive and immediately ordered an increased speed. Moments later the ship ran aground on a reef near the shore.