Opinion ID: 199695
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Walton Appeal

Text: 12
13 Walton first contends that there was enough evidence to establish that Nalco intended to inflict emotional distress by discharging him. Judgments entered as a matter of law are reviewed de novo, and will be affirmed only if, after scrutinizing the proof and inferences derivable therefrom in the light most hospitable to [Walton], we determine that a reasonable fact finder could have reached but one conclusion: that [Nalco] w[as] entitled to judgment. Fleet Nat'l Bank v. Anchor Media Television, Inc., 45 F.3d 546, 552 (1st Cir. 1995). 5 Walton had the burden to prove that 14 (1) [Nalco] intentionally or recklessly inflicted severe emotional distress or was certain that such distress would result from [its] conduct; (2) the conduct was so extreme and outrageous as to exceed all possible bounds of decency and must be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community; (3) [Nalco's] actions . . . caused [his] emotional distress; and (4) the emotional distress . . . was so severe that no reasonable [person] could be expected to endure it. 15 Vogt v. Churchill, 679 A.2d 522, 524 (Me. 1996) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Moreover, it was necessary for the district court, in its gatekeeper role, to determine, in the first instance, 'whether [Nalco's] conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous [as] to permit recovery.' Champagne v. Mid-Maine Med. Ctr., 711 A.2d 842, 847 (Me. 1998) (citation omitted). 16 Walton insists that the evidence demonstrated the requisite extreme and outrageous conduct, in that Nalco (i) abused its position of authority, qua employer; (ii) threatened his livelihood and professional reputation by attempting to pressure him to accept a buy-out package; and (iii) subjected him to undue humiliation by, inter alia, transferring his sales accounts to a less experienced employee, promulgating a false and demeaning job-performance review, and repossessing company property from him in the presence of his family and neighbors. 17 The district court correctly ruled that Walton's claim 6 should be dismissed because the evidence failed, as a matter of Maine law, 7 to demonstrate an intentional infliction of emotional distress.
18 Walton next contends that the district court erred in denying, as untimely, his motions to amend his complaint -- made immediately before and after trial -- to include a defamation claim under Maine law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), (b). We review only for abuse of discretion. See Kemper Ins. Cos. v. Fed. Express Corp., 252 F.3d 509, 512 (1st Cir. 2001); Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp. v. Garrity Oil Co., Inc., 884 F.2d 1510, 1517 (1st Cir. 1989) (trial court considering proposed amendment must examine the totality of the circumstances and exercise sound discretion in light of the pertinent balance of equitable considerations). Although leave [to amend] shall be freely given when justice so requires[,] Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), parties seeking the benefit of . . . [Rule 15(a)'s] liberality [must] exercise due diligence; unseemly delay, in combination with other factors, may warrant denial of a suggested amendment. Quaker State, 884 F.2d at 1517 (amendments may be foreclosed where movant's delay is extreme or unexplained). 19 The first motion to amend the Walton complaint was submitted eight months after the due date prescribed in the scheduling order, six months after discovery closed, and one week prior to the trial date initially established by the district court. 8 Yet Walton offered neither an explanation nor a justification for the inordinate delays, relying instead on the naked assertion that Nalco could not have been prejudiced. 20 Walton nonetheless insists that his post-trial motion to conform the complaint to the evidence is distinguishable, in that Nalco implicitly consented to the trial of his defamation claim. By way of example, Walton points to evidence that Nalco personnel falsely represented that he was incompetent, and contends that falsity is an element of his defamation claim. His characterization misses the mark. 21 'Consent to the trial of an issue may be implied if, during the trial, a party acquiesces in the introduction of evidence which is relevant only to that issue.' United States v. Davis, 261 F.3d 1, 59-60 (1st Cir. 2001) (emphasis in original; citation omitted). In the present case, however, where evidence of the alleged falsifications by Nalco representatives was independently material to establish pretext on the Walton age-discrimination claims under the ADEA and MHRA, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Walton's amendatory motions.