Opinion ID: 2545349
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Trial Court's Comment

Text: Cole argues that the trial court improperly admonished defense counsel when defense counsel asked codefendant Nixon during cross-examination whether Nixon's plea agreement allowed the court to impose a sentence of less than fifty-two years. The challenged comment of the trial court occurred at the conclusion of the following exchange: Q [BY MR. TILL]: [Your lawyer] told you what that 52 years to life really means, didn't he? A: Sir? Q: He told you what that 52 years to life really meant, didn't he? A: Yes, sir. Q: And Judge Weatherby the better you testify he could go down below that 52 years to life, can't he? MR. MIZRAHI: Objection, Your Honor. THE COURT: That's absolutely not the case, Mr. Till. (Emphasis added.) Because defense counsel did not object to the trial court's comment, we will reverse only if the comment was fundamental error. Jones v. State, 612 So.2d 1370, 1373 (Fla.1992) (The contemporaneous objection rule applies to such comments,... and an appellate court will not reverse in the absence of an objection unless the comment is so prejudicial as to be fundamental error.). Fundamental error is error that `reaches down into the validity of the trial itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty could not have been obtained without the assistance of the alleged error.' Brooks v. State, 762 So.2d 879, 899 (Fla.2000) (quoting McDonald v. State, 743 So.2d 501, 505 (Fla.1999)). We conclude that even if the trial court's comment was error, [3] it was not fundamental error. In Jones, we held that the trial court's improper comment to the State's witness, That's correct, according to the previous witness, Mr. Stout, was not fundamental error. 612 So.2d at 1373. The Court emphasized that the trial court's comment pertained to only a minor detail of the codefendant's testimony. Thus, the error did not affect the validity of the trial. See id. at 1373-74, 1376; see also Harmon v. State, 527 So.2d 182, 186 (Fla.1988) (holding no fundamental error where trial court commented four times on a State witness's credibility during defense counsel's attempt to impeach the witness, including one comment that the statements seemed consistent to [the trial court] also, but that it was for the jury to decide). In this case, soon after the trial court made the comment at issue, defense counsel raised the issue of Nixon's plea agreement at a bench conference on an unrelated matter. The trial court and the State acknowledged that Nixon's plea agreement did allow the trial court to impose a sentence below fifty-two years. The trial court then allowed defense counsel to question Nixon again on the terms of Nixon's plea agreement, which enabled defense counsel to dispel any confusion or prejudice that the jury otherwise would have had toward the defense as a result of the trial court's comment.