Opinion ID: 1478242
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Postindictment Delay

Text: Rippy argues that the State's failure to disclose discovery information in violation of M.R.Crim.P. 16(b) caused a 19-month pretrial delay and thus denied him the right to a speedy trial. Me. Const. art. I § 6. A 19-month delay does not establish a per se violation of Rippy's right to a speedy trial. See State v. Michaud, 590 A.2d 538, 540 (Me.1991) (32-month delay is not a per se violation of defendant's right to a speedy trial). It is, however, enough to raise the presumption that such delay is unnecessary. See State v. McLaughlin, 567 A.2d 82, 83 (Me.1989) (17 and one-half month delay also raises presumption). Once that presumption is raised, we apply the balance required by Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), to determine whether a due process violation existed. State v. Joubert, 603 A.2d 861, 863 (Me.1992). The Barker test is a `delicate balancing test that takes into account all of the circumstances of the case at hand.' Id. (quoting State v. Murphy, 496 A.2d 623, 627 (Me.1985)). The Barker Court identified four factors that should be considered: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his right to a speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice to the defendant caused by the delay. State v. Murphy, 496 A.2d at 627. First, the 19-month delay in the case at bar can be attributed to the fault of both parties. Rippy filed at least six continuances that were entirely unrelated to the alleged discovery violations on the part of the State. Second, although Rippy did assert his right to a speedy trial, he did so only after 13 months has passed since arraignment (and after five continuances were granted on his behalf). Rippy's second jury trial was held six months after he asserted his right to a speedy trial and could have been held earlier had Rippy not moved for additional continuances. Third, as we discussed above, Rippy failed to show any substantial prejudice from the delay. Considering all of the circumstances of this case, we find no violation of Rippy's constitutional right to a speedy trial. Rippy further contends that he was deprived of due process because of the 17-month delay in furnishing trial transcripts to be used by this court on appeal. Although the deadline for filing transcripts with this court was March 18, 1991, the court reporter did not submit the transcripts to the court until August 17, 1992. Although we have not previously addressed this issue, the First Circuit Court of Appeals has held: An excessive delay in furnishing a pretrial or trial transcript to be used on appeal or for post-conviction relief can amount to a deprivation of due process. United States v. Pratt, 645 F.2d 89, 91 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 881, 102 S.Ct. 369, 70 L.Ed.2d 195 (1981) (nine-month delay not enough to deprive defendant of due process); and Layne v. Gunter, 559 F.2d 850, 851 (1st Cir.1977) (delay of nearly three years was found to be a due process violation). Although a 17-month wait for a trial transcript is unfortunate, it does not constitute a denial of due process. Rippy raises a number of other contentions none of which merit discussion. The entry is: Judgment vacated. Remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion herein. All concurring.