Opinion ID: 406483
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Trial Court's Comments to the Jury.

Text: 32 In the trial court's opening remarks to the pool of prospective jurors, the court explained the charge as follows: 33 The Court has ordered Mr. Ray to give to the Government handwriting samples, handwriting exemplars, and he has refused to do it. That's what we're here today for you to determine. 34 Shortly afterwards, the court remarked to the jurors: 35 This case is a contempt of court is the charge. Mr. Ray is-has been indicted for a criminal offense in this Court, and in that case was ordered by me, by the Judge of this court, to give certain handwriting samples to the Government. I believe the evidence will show that Mr. Ray has refused to do that, and if you find those things beyond a reasonable doubt, that constitutes the charge. 36 The appellant then moved for a mistrial. The court denied the motion, and then gave the following cautionary instruction: 37 Ladies and gentlemen, let me modify what I said. I don't want you to think what I am saying is evidence. 38 Whether or not I ordered Mr. Ray to do what I told you and whether or not he refused, that's a question you're going to have to find from the evidence. I'm telling you-and by the way, that gets me to another general cautionary thing. 39 Jurors are the sole judges of the facts in all cases. That's our jury system. You listen to the evidence, and you decide what the facts are. Nothing I say or do in this case will be intended by me to be any indication to you what the facts are, and you should not take anything I say or do to be any indication of what I think the facts are. You are the sole judges of the facts. You're going to decide them, and in most cases there is a dispute about the facts. You listen to the evidence. You listen to the witnesses, and that's the way you decide it. 40 The judge then went on to explain that he was the sole judge of the law, but that only the jury could decide the facts. At the conclusion of the trial, the court again instructed the jurors that they were the sole triers of the facts, and that the court did not mean by any instruction, ruling or remark to indicate any opinion as to the facts or as to what the verdict should be. Despite these cautionary instructions, the appellant contends that the judge's opening remarks were so prejudicial that the appellant was denied an impartial jury. 41 As to the court's comment that it believed the evidence would show that the appellant refused to provide the samples, we find no reversible error. The judge may comment on the evidence if he clearly instructs the jury that they are the sole trier of facts and are not bound by his comments. See, e.g., United States v. Carlos, 478 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1973); 2 Wright, Federal Practice And Procedure § 488, at 305 (1969). The court's remark in explaining the charge was not tantamount to an expression that the appellant was guilty of contempt, compare United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 54 S.Ct. 223, 78 L.Ed. 381 (1933), or the giving of an instruction against the appellant on a material fact, compare United States v. Lee, 483 F.2d 959 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam). Any prejudicial effect from this remark was cured by the court's repeated cautionary instructions. See, e.g., United States v. Bukowski, 435 F.2d 1094 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 911, 91 S.Ct. 874, 27 L.Ed.2d 809 (1971). 42 The court's initial remark that the appellant had refused to provide the samples is concededly more troublesome. In context, however, the statement was made in explanation of the charge to the pool of potential jurors. Contempt proceedings such as these pose a somewhat different situation for evaluating the prejudicial effects of a court's remarks as compared to other criminal proceedings which are initiated by a grand jury indictment. In these contempt proceedings, initiation of the proceedings was based in part on the information and belief of the court which instructed the Government attorney to file the necessary papers to bring the appellant to trial on contempt charges. The court signed the order for a hearing to show cause why the appellant should not be held in contempt. It is evident from the very nature of these proceedings that the court believed that the appellant had refused to provide the samples mandated by its order. Under these circumstances, the court's remark as to the appellant's refusal, with the cautionary instruction, is analogous to a court's reading of the indictment to a jury while cautioning that the information contained in the indictment is not evidence. Given the nature of these contempt proceedings, and the repeated cautionary instructions, therefore, we find no reversible error in any of the trial court's comments. Cf. id. at 1109. 43