Opinion ID: 797658
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Violation of Blankenhorn's Constitutional Rights.

Text: 52 The Fourth Amendment requires police officers making an arrest to use only an amount of force that is objectively reasonable in light of the circumstances facing them. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7-8, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985). Neither tackling nor punching a suspect to make an arrest necessarily constitutes excessive force. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (`Not every push or shove, even if it may seem unnecessary in the peace of the judge's chambers,' . . . violates the Fourth Amendment) (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.1973)). But even where some force is justified, the amount actually used may be excessive. Santos v. Gates, 287 F.3d 846, 853 (9th Cir.2002). The question in all cases is whether the use of force was objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting the arresting officers. Graham, 490 U.S. at 397, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (internal quotation marks omitted). 53 To determine whether a specific use of force was reasonable, we must balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing government interests at stake. Id. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (internal quotation marks omitted). Relevant factors to this inquiry include, but are not limited to, the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. Id. ; see also Forrester v. City of San Diego, 25 F.3d 804, 806 n. 2 (9th Cir.1994). When appropriate, our reasonableness determination must also make allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97, 109 S.Ct. 1865. 54 The parties dispute some facts necessary to decide the issue of qualified immunity on excessive force. For example, Defendants allege that Blankenhorn yelled out before his arrest that he was a member of the 18th Street Gang, but Blankenhorn denies this. Also, Nguyen claims that Blankenhorn resisted being handcuffed by pinning his arms beneath his body. Blankenhorn denies he did this or that he in any other way resisted being handcuffed. Where such disputes exist, summary judgment is appropriate only if Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on the facts as alleged by the nonmoving party. Barlow v. Ground, 943 F.2d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir.1991). We must therefore make our excessive force determination by viewing the disputed facts in favor of Blankenhorn. 55 Six months before the arrest, mall security issued Blankenhorn a Notice Forbidding Trespass. Three weeks before the arrest, Officer Ross stopped Blankenhorn after spotting him near the scene of an alleged gang fight at The Block. Throughout the stop, Blankenhorn remained calm, and, when asked, willingly provided Ross with information about the gang fight. The night of his arrest, Blankenhorn was suspected of having committed a misdemeanor trespass. When Nguyen and Gray stopped him, he was talking with an adult friend and was accompanied by two young boys. Nguyen asked Blankenhorn what he was doing at the mall, and Blankenhorn responded that he was talking with some friends. At some point, Nguyen grabbed his arm and, when Blankenhorn pulled free, threatened to spray him with mace. Blankenhorn threw his driver's license on the ground, but he did not take a combative stance, clench his fists, or otherwise make threatening gestures. When Nguyen asked him to kneel down so he could be handcuffed, Blankenhorn refused. Almost immediately, Nguyen, Ross, and South gang-tackled him. Nguyen did not try to handcuff Blankenhorn before the three officers tackled him. Blankenhorn struggled for several moments before the officers brought him to the ground. Once on the ground, however, Blankenhorn did not attempt to prevent the officers from handcuffing him. Even so, Nguyen punched him several times, and an officer or officers pushed his face into the pavement by shoving a knee into the back of his neck. Once Blankenhorn was subdued, the officers placed hobble restraints on his ankles, which made it difficult for Blankenhorn to move and breathe. 56 If Blankenhorn can prove the events as set forth above, some or all of the Defendants would probably be liable for excessive force, both in their gang tackling, use of hobble restraints, and in Nguyen's punching of Blankenhorn. That is, there are genuine issues of material fact. 57
58 A rational jury could find that the use of a gang tackle by Nguyen, Ross, and South under these circumstances was unreasonable. First, the severity of the alleged crime, misdemeanor trespass, was minimal, when the only bases for suspecting that Blankenhorn was interfering with mall business were his presence at the mall, his previous banishment, his known gang association, and the attention by security that his presence required. Second, a rational jury could conclude from Blankenhorn's cooperative behavior with Ross just three weeks before his arrest, the fact that Nguyen and Gray discovered him talking casually with a friend, and the video footage of Blankenhorn's behavior during the detention, that Blankenhorn did not pose a serious threat to the officers' or others' safety. The officers' conduct during Blankenhorn's detention as captured on the video — e.g., Nguyen's standing for long periods of time with his arms folded, South's permitting Garcia to speak with Blankenhorn, the officers' failure to prevent other mall patrons from walking within a few feet of the scene — could reasonably support this conclusion. Furthermore, the pace of events could reasonably lead to the conclusion that the latitude Graham requires for split-second police judgments in tense, uncertain, or rapidly evolving situations was not warranted here. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 397, 109 S.Ct. 1865. Finally, though Blankenhorn verbally refused to comply with Nguyen's request to kneel down, a reasonable jury could conclude from his testimony and the video that Nguyen never tried to handcuff Blankenhorn, and Blankenhorn did not actively resist being handcuffed, before Nguyen, Ross, and South gang-tackled him. 59 Because a rational jury — drawing all reasonable inferences from the facts alleged — could conclude the gang tackle was unreasonable under the circumstances, under Saucier, the officers' conduct violated Blankenhorn's Fourth Amendment rights. 60
61 The video of Blankenhorn's arrest shows that Blankenhorn did not initially submit to the officers' attempts to arrest him. Rather, he struggled with them for several seconds before being tackled to the ground, where the officers eventually gained control over him. Defendants argue that Blankenhorn's resistance could have led a prudent officer to conclude that he might pose an increased risk of danger to others and that the use of hobble restraints was therefore justified as a matter of law. We disagree. 62 In assessing the reasonableness of the defendant officers' use of hobble restraints after taking custody of Blankenhorn, we must balance competing concerns. On the one hand, the Fourth Amendment permits police officers to use some force to overcome resistance to being arrested. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865. We agree with our sister circuit that, in some situations, the need to maintain control of a person who physically struggled while being taken into custody might reasonably call for the use of hobble restraints. See, e.g., Mayard v. Hopwood, 105 F.3d 1226, 1227-28 (8th Cir.1997). On the other hand, a person has the limited right to offer reasonable resistance to an arrest that is the product of an officer's personal frolic. That right is not triggered by the absence of probable cause, but rather by the officer's bad faith or provocative conduct. United States v. Span, 970 F.2d 573, 580 (9th Cir.1992) (citation omitted); see also Arpin, 261 F.3d at 921. Thus, we must ask whether a reasonable jury could conclude, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Blankenhorn, that the Defendant officers acted in bad faith or engaged in provocative conduct when arresting him. If so, and Blankenhorn's resistance was reasonable, a constitutional violation occurred. 63 Span supports the conclusion that the officers acted in bad faith. Span held that it was not reversible error in a trial for assault on a federal officer under 18 U.S.C. § 111 to instruct the jury that a United States Marshal who is ... trying to arrest a person is engaged in his official duties. Span, 970 F.2d at 580-81. Span claimed this instruction foreclosed her defense that she had the right to resist the use of excessive force because it was essentially a directed verdict on the issue of good faith. Id. at 581. There was no error, and Span's defense was not foreclosed, because [a]n officer who uses excessive force is not acting in good faith. Id. Under Span, then, our earlier holding that a reasonable jury could find the defendant arresting officers used excessive force in gang-tackling Blankenhorn precludes a finding as a matter of law that those same officers acted in good faith. 64 We also conclude that the officers' precipitate actions in making the arrest could reasonably be considered provocative. According to Blankenhorn, the arresting officers gave no warning that they were going to arrest him before gang-tackling him and later applying hobble restraints. Indeed, as the video shows, Nguyen did not even attempt to handcuff Blankenhorn before he, Ross, and South — as if by predetermined signal — simultaneously took hold of and wrestled him to the ground. The lack of forewarning, the swiftness, and the violence with which the defendant officers threw themselves upon Blankenhorn could reasonably be considered provocative, triggering Blankenhorn's limited right to reasonable resistance and thus making their later use of the hobble restraints unreasonable. 65 As for whether Blankenhorn's resistance was itself reasonable under the circumstances, the video appears to show that he tried to stay on his feet while three officers wrestled with him and, in Nguyen's case, punched him several times. Defendants do not allege, and the video does not show, that Blankenhorn struck out at any of the officers or mall patrons. Considering the rapidity of the officers' actions and the restrained nature of Blankenhorn's own response, a jury could conclude Blankenhorn's resistance was reasonable under the circumstances. 66 Since a reasonable jury could conclude that Nguyen, Ross, and South acted in a provocative manner and in bad faith, and that Blankenhorn's resistance was reasonable under the circumstances, the arresting officers are not entitled to summary judgment on Blankenhorn's claim that the use of hobble restraints was excessive under the circumstances. 67
68 Although Blankenhorn initially resisted being arrested, Nguyen's punches were not necessarily a reasonable response. Underlying Graham 's objective-reasonableness test is the clear principle that the force used to make an arrest `must be balanced against the need for force: it is the need for force which is at the heart of the Graham factors.' Liston v. County of Riverside, 120 F.3d 965, 976 (9th Cir.1997) (quoting Alexander v. City & County of San Francisco, 29 F.3d 1355, 1367 (9th Cir.1994)); see also Headwaters Forest Def. v. County of Humboldt, 276 F.3d 1125, 1130 (9th Cir.2002) (Because the officers had control over the protesters[,] it would have been clear to any reasonable officer that it was unnecessary to use pepper spray to bring them under control[.]). 69 At the preliminary hearing, Nguyen said he punched Blankenhorn several times during the arrest because he was trying to get Mr. Blankenhorn's arms out from underneath him and secure the handcuffs. Nguyen further testified that such punches are utilized at times to distract an individual so that his muscles relax momentarily and then you are able to take control. But Blankenhorn claims he never pinned his arms underneath his body. (The video does not clearly show whether he did so or not.) Crediting Blankenhorn's version of the events, as we must at a summary-judgment stage, we conclude that a rational jury could find that if Blankenhorn did not maneuver his arms beneath his body it eliminated the need for any use of force to release them, and thus that Nguyen's punches were not reasonably justified by the circumstances as he claims. 11 70