Opinion ID: 2544453
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: WRC's Easements

Text: WDC's petition for designation of easements, which was approved by the land court on July 8, 1977, expressly and specifically reserves easements 62 and 63which are at the intake of the drainage systemand easement 61which is at the outfall of the drainage systemfor drainage purposes. Moreover, WDC not only reserved the right to designate and grant easements over, under, and across [Wailea Elua] for ... storm sewers in its Declaration of Horizontal Property Regime Under Chapter 514, Hawai`i Revised Statutes, but also expressly designated such easements for drainage purposes in its apartment deeds with the individual apartment owners. Although the trial court concluded that WRC owns implied easements in the drainage systems, the easements in this case are more properly characterized as construction of express easements, rather than creation by implied easements. An express easement is distinguished from an implied easement inasmuch as the latter is [o]ne which the law imposes by inferring the parties to a transaction intended that result, although they did not express it.... One not expressed by parties in writing but arises out of existence of certain facts implied from the transaction. [1] Black's Law Dictionary 510 (6th ed.1990). Generally, an express easement is created by the language in a written instrument; whereas an implied easement stems from other factors, such as original unity of ownership and whether the easement is apparent, permanent, and important for the enjoyment of the dominant estate. See Neary v. Martin, 57 Haw. 577, 580, 561 P.2d 1281, 1283-84 (1977); Tanaka v. Mitsunaga, 43 Haw. 119 (1959); Thompson on Real Property § 60.03(a) at 405-06, § 60.03(b)(4) at 426-30 (Thomas ed., 1994 & Supp.2000); Powell on Real Property § 34.08 at 79-99 (Wolf ed., 2000). To the extent that intent is a factor in creation of an easement, [2] intent determined primarily by examining express language of a written instrument creates an express easement, while intent generally inferred from other sources establishes an implied easement. Thompson on Real Property § 60.03(a)(1) describes express easements similarly: Persons in possession of property may create express easements by grant, for a consideration or by gift, transferring away the right or rights represented by the easement to another . . . . The person creating the easement must intend to create such an interest and observe the proper formalities in the local jurisdiction for transferring property by grant or by devise. Id. at 405. Here, WDC demonstrated in writing its intent to create easements through express language of a grant, which specifically asked for recognition of Easement 61, affecting Lot 78 [Wailea Elua], for drainage, landscaping, pedestrian access, recreational and building setback purposes[; and] Easement[s] 62 and 63, affecting Lot 78, for drainage purposes. In addition, such grant was registered with the land court in accordance with HRS § 501-82 (1993 & Supp.1998). See Amfac, Inc. v. Waikiki Beachcomber Inv. Co., 74 Haw. 85, 114 n. 8, 839 P.2d 10, 27 n. 8 (1992) (citations omitted). In 1944, the Supreme Court of the Territory of Hawai`i noted that an easement may be created by either an express grant or implication by prescription. The court then distinguished the two by explaining that the former is by special permission of the owner of the fee. The grant itself is the best evidence of title and it derives no strength from time or occupation. Lalakea v. Hawaiian Irrigation Co., 36 Haw. 692, 706 (1944) (quotation and internal quotation marks omitted). In contrast, the latter is by use and occupation for the [statutorily established] period . . . . Such use and occupation are substituted for the grant. In other words, they give rise to the presumption that a grant existed, since lost or destroyed by time or accident. Id. (citations omitted). Even earlier and more instructive are the observations of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Hawai`i in 1893. In the context of ways of necessity, the court distinguished creation by grant, prescription, and implication: Ways are commonly said to be created by grant, by prescription or by necessity. But these distinctions related to the mode of their proof rather than to the mode of their creation. It would be more correct to say that ways are created by express grant, by presumed grant and by implied grantor reservation, as the case may be. In every instance the way is created by grant, or reservation, the difference being merely in the mode of proof. The question as to what is granted or reserved is a question of intention to be shown by competent evidence. In the case of an express grant the intention is proved generally by the terms of the instrument alone. In the case of a presumed grant it is proved by an adverse user for twenty years. In the case of an implied grant it is proved by all the circumstances of the case, and especially by the condition of the property at the time of the conveyance. Kalaukoa v. Keawe, 9 Haw. 191, 192-93 (1893). Here, WRC and the County assert that there is no express language specifying a grant of drainage easement for the pipes themselves. The Kalaukoa court, however, explained the proper interpretation of an express grant with respect to location and width: The same rules which apply to the existence of a way apply equally to its location, direction, width and the purposes for which it may be used. The question is merely one of intention, to be proved by competent evidence. If the way is created by an express grant, which defines its location, direction, width and uses, the only evidence is to be found in the grant itself; but if the grant merely provides for the existence of the way, with no provision as to its location, width and uses, these must be ascertained by other evidence, such as the condition or character of the lands and the uses made of them, or the acts or acquiescence of the parties. Id. Likewise, Thompson on Real Property § 60.03(a)(7) points out that in interpreting an express grant, intent of the parties is paramount: [A]ny words which clearly show the intention to give an easement, which is by law grantable, are sufficient to effect that purpose, providing the language is sufficiently definite and certain in its terms. Neither words of limitation, nor words of inheritance, nor technical terminology are necessary to create an easement. If the language of the grant is free from ambiguity, it is not the subject of interpretation, and no resort to extrinsic facts and circumstances may be made to modify the clear terms of the grant. To determine whether an easement is the intention of the parties, courts will examine the language of the grant, the circumstances surrounding its creation and the property involved, with construction in favor of the grantee. Id. at 415 (quotations, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted). See also Los Angeles v. Howard, 244 Cal.App.2d 538, 543, 53 Cal.Rptr. 274, 277 (1966) (The extent of a servitude is determined by the terms of the grant, ... and the extent of an easement is a question of interpretation. Where an easement is founded upon a grant, ... only those interests expressed in the grant and those necessarily incident thereto pass from the owner of the fee.); Powell on Real Property § 34.12[2] at 185-89 (describing the flexibility given to the courts in construing grants of express easements). In Isenberg v. Woitchek, 144 Colo. 394, 356 P.2d 904 (1960), an express grant of easement for right of way described only the place of entry and exit, without detailing the width or exact course across the servient estate. The Colorado Supreme Court explained, The rule is that vagueness of description does not go to the existence or validity of an easement. While an extreme case of vagueness could result in a holding that no easement was granted, the present factual situation does not produce such result. Id. at 907. Rather, the court clarified that the lack of express location does not invalidate an express grant of easement: It is a settled rule that where there is no express easement agreement with respect to the location of a way granted but not located, the practical location and user of a reasonable way by the grantor or owner of the servient estate, sufficiently locates the way, which will be deemed to be that which was intended by the grant. Id. (quotation and internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, the language granting the easements here is not that of a careful conveyancer [who avoids the] risks of borderline language. Powell on Real Property § 34.04 at 32. Although an express grant of easement should specify carefully the acts on the servient land which are thereby privileged, id. at 32-33, this does not mean that an express easement requires the most extensive and exhaustive description. In interpreting express easements, Thompson on Real Property § 60.03(a)(7) observes that [s]o long as the words make clear the intention to create an easement, the law does not require perfection in its description. Id. at 415. See also Murdock v. Ward, 267 Ga. 303, 477 S.E.2d 835, 836 (1996) ([T]he law does not require perfection in the legal description of an easement.). Although WDC's easements include the inflow and outflow of the drainage systems, without specifying that such easements include the drainage pipes themselves, it is clear from the express language that they are included. To hold easements only at the ends of the drainage systems would be a hypertechnical and nonsensical reading of the express grant of drainage easements. In fact, easements 61, 62, and 63, which are expressly for drainage, would be useless if they did not include the drainage pipes. Thus, WRC, as WDC's successor in interest with respect to the golf course, holds express easements in the entire drainage systems from inflow to outflow. In addition, the grant of drainage easements, which include the drainpipes, fulfills the fundamental intent of the land court registration statute: to preserve the integrity of titles. Waikiki Malia Hotel, Inc. v. Kinkai Properties Ltd. Partnership, 75 Haw. 370, 391, 862 P.2d 1048, 1060 (1993). This court explained that [t]he integrity of titles can only be preserved if anyone dealing with registered property is assured that the only rights or claims of which he need take notice are those which are registered in the prescribed manner. Id., 862 P.2d at 1061 (quoting Honolulu Mem'l Park, Inc. v. City and County of Honolulu, 50 Haw. 189, 193-94, 436 P.2d 207, 210 (1967)). Here, the express grant of easements for the inflow and outflow of the drainage system would provide reasonable notice to the public that such easements include the drainpipes connecting the intake and outflow of the system. After all, granting easements for drainage that do not include a practical method of draining water would be absurd. Although the trial court's analysis concerning an implied easement is different from mine, the conclusion is the same: WRC owns easements in the drainage systems and is, therefore, responsible for the maintenance and repair of the systems. [I]t is . . . well established . . . that an owner of an easement has the right and the duty to keep it in repair. Levy v. Kimball, 50 Haw. 497, 498, 443 P.2d 142, 144 (1968) (citations omitted). Moreover, the original apartment deeds contain an express covenant to repair in favor of the condominium, which was assumed by WRC in the Purchase and Exchange Agreement. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by granting the Association's motion for partial summary judgment.