Opinion ID: 720557
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure of the United States to Meet its Burden of Proof.

Text: 22 The district court's alternate ground for granting summary judgment in favor of Berger was that the United States failed to establish genuine issues of fact regarding its assertions that Berger actually backdated the forms at issue, that he knew the documents were backdated, and that he knew that the backdating would result in the understatement of another person's tax liability. See Berger, slip op. at 12-15. 23 The district court correctly noted that [i]f after discovery, the nonmoving party 'has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of [its] case with respect to which [it] has the burden of proof,' then summary judgment is appropriate. Id. at 6 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)) (alterations in Berger ). However, the district court did not wait until after discovery to grant summary judgment. As noted above, the district court had granted a joint motion by the parties staying discovery until after the district court decided the legal issues presented by the cross-motions for summary judgment. 24 The nonmoving party must have 'had the opportunity to discover information that is essential to his opposition' to the motion for summary judgment. Trebor Sportswear Co. v. The Limited Stores, Inc., 865 F.2d 506, 511 (2d Cir.1989) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 n. 5, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511 n. 5, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). While the trial court may properly deny further discovery if the nonmoving party has had a fully adequate opportunity for discovery, id., the district court made no such finding here. On the contrary, the district court's order granted the parties' request to stay all discovery until there is a final determination on [Berger's] motion for partial summary judgment, and there has been no discovery as yet in this action. Thus, we cannot conclude that the parties had already had a fully adequate opportunity for discovery when the district court granted summary judgment. Id. In short, the grant of summary judgment here was premature. Meloff v. New York Life Ins. Co., 51 F.3d 372, 375 (2d Cir.1995); see also Sutera v. Schering Corp., 73 F.3d 13, 18 (2d Cir.1995) (reversing summary judgment entered before any discovery had taken place).