Opinion ID: 469800
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appellant Cassidy3

Text: 15 Cassidy was convicted of (1) conspiracy to import marijuana in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 963 and 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2; and (2) conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2 and 21 U.S.C. Sec. 846. He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of two years. 16 Cassidy first argues that the district court unduly limited his cross-examination of Robert Frappier, a key government witness. Frappier testified pursuant to a plea agreement made contingent upon full cooperation with the government. Under the agreement, full cooperation meant that Frappier would, inter alia, (1) disclose all assets in which he had an interest and all assets in which he had had an interest in the last fifteen years; and (2) forfeit to the United States assets or interests obtained either in payment for illicit drug activity or with funds or other things of value ultimately traceable to such activity. Furthermore, the agreement stated that the government could, in its discretion, allow Frappier to retain one asset which might otherwise be subject to forfeiture ... 17 At trial, the district court refused to allow defense counsel to cross-examine Frappier as to the identity of his assets. The court also prohibited cross-examination as to (1) whether Frappier's assets were under aliases the witness had employed; (2) whether Frappier had empowered anyone to do transactions with his assets; (3) whether all of the assets were in the United States; and (4) what the value of his most valuable asset was. Cassidy complains that the district court's prohibitions violated his right to cross-examine Frappier. 18 Trial courts are granted broad discretion to control the scope of cross-examination. United States v. Barrett, 766 F.2d 609, 614 (1st Cir.1985). The two purposes served by cross-examination are (1) to allow the defendant to impeach a witness' credibility; and (2) to expose a witness' biases and possible motives for testifying. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1110, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). A trial court's restrictions on cross-examination must be sustained if jurors have had sufficient information to appraise witnesses' veracity, biases and motives for testifying. United States v. Tracey, 675 F.2d 433, 437-38 (1st Cir.1982). Cassidy contends that the district court deprived appellant of the opportunity to expose Frappier's lack of veracity by examining the witness as to his assets and lack of compliance with the assets portion of the agreement. We disagree. 19 Frappier testified that in his view forfeitable assets amounted to $6.7 million. Also, he stated that (1) he had made profits of over $20 million smuggling drugs; (2) a portion of his assets were held under the name of third parties; (3) none of the assets was of a liquid nature; (4) the assets were not generating income; (5) he had not told the government about any of his assets; and (6) no forfeitures had yet occurred. We are satisfied that sufficient evidence regarding Frappier's assets and compliance--or lack thereof--with the assets portion of the plea agreement was before the jury to satisfy whatever purpose defense counsel had in asking excluded questions. 20 Moreover, we note that Frappier testified that he had pleaded guilty to charges covering eleven separate marijuana importation and distribution ventures and that in the future he would plead guilty to an indictment charging him with having imported approximately 18,000 pounds of marijuana into Oregon. Counsel questioned Frappier about the witness' drug-smuggling activities of the past ten years. Also, Frappier testified that he stood to gain years of freedom from imprisonment if he cooperated fully with the government. Thus, jurors had before them all the evidence they needed to recognize the vulnerability of the witness' testimony. Defense counsel clearly focused through cross-examination Frappier's credibility and motives for testifying. Accordingly, we are persuaded that the district court did not commit reversible error in limiting the cross-examination of Frappier. 21 Finally, Cassidy complains that the district court erred in instructing the jury on the testimony of accomplice-witnesses. Specifically, appellant objects that the court below refused to instruct the jury as follows: 22 [Y]ou should bear in mind that a witness who has entered into such ... [a plea] agreement has an interest in this case different than any ordinary witness. A witness who realizes that he may be able to obtain his own freedom, or receive a lighter sentence by giving testimony favorable to the prosecution, has a motive to testify falsely ... 23 Appellant suggests that if, as here, a government accomplice-witness has not been sentenced, the government could pressure the witness by conditioning the sentence upon his testimony being favorable to the government. Thus, he claims that the proposed instruction would have been particularly effective in conveying the message that the testimony of an accomplice-witnesses had to be scrutinized with care. 24 Instructing the jury on accomplice-witnesses, the trial court stated: 25 [T]he testimony of an accomplice must always be scrutinized by a jury with great care and great caution. More care and more caution than that of an ordinary witness who is not an accomplice. They may have feelings about the defendant that affects their testimony. And you should not convict a defendant on the unsupported testimony of an accomplice unless you believe beyond a reasonable doubt that that accomplice is telling the truth. 26 Now, in this case, there was also evidence that some of the accomplices made plea agreements with the government under which they received additional considerable advantages. You may consider these agreements and the witnesses' hopes as to future advantages, in judging their credibility as well. 27 With respect to Frappier, Mining and Tindall, particularly keep in mind in judging their testimony and their credibility that the government has the power to confer or withhold future advantages, depending on the value of their cooperation. 28 The charge here was clear that the testimony of accomplice-witnesses was to be scrutinized with care. The trial judge was careful to emphasize that some of the witnesses hoped to receive future advantages. The agreements stated that among the possible advantages to the witnesses were lesser sentences for cooperating with the government. The judge read the witnesses' agreements to the jury and gave the jury a copy of the agreements. We are satisfied that the jury could not have failed to be aware of the need to scrutinize the accomplice-witnesses' testimony with care due to the possibility that reduced sentences could be provided for cooperating with the government. 29 In short, nothing in the record justifies reversing Cassidy's convictions.