Opinion ID: 1198268
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Award of Attorney's Fees Constituted an Abuse of Discretion.

Text: Agen argues that the superior court erred in awarding $713.80 in attorney's fees under Civil Rule 82, rather than under Appellate Rule 508. [10] He further argues that even under the appellate rules, an award of attorney's fees is improper because the Department of Law attorneys who argued this case for the State are the equivalent of in-house counsel. See Continental Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity and Guar. Co., 552 P.2d 1122, 1128 (Alaska 1976) (holding that attorney's fees do not include the cost of in-house counsel). The State concedes that its request for attorney's fees should have been made under Appellate Rule 508, rather than Civil Rule 82. However, the State argues that since there are no specific guidelines in Appellate Rule 508, an analogy to, and use of, Civil Rule 82 is appropriate. In response to Agen's in-house counsel argument the State cites numerous cases in support of its contention that fee awards to state agencies are proper. We reverse the award of attorney's fees. As a general matter, a superior court acting as an intermediate appellate court has broad discretion to award costs and attorney's fees pursuant to Appellate Rule 508. See Messerli v. Department of Natural Resources, 768 P.2d 1112, 1122 (Alaska 1989); Rosen v. State Bd. of Pub. Accountancy, 689 P.2d 478, 482 (Alaska 1984). Indeed, we have held that the superior court need not articulate its reasons for awarding attorney's fees. See Rosen, 689 P.2d at 480. Such broad discretion notwithstanding, in Royal Krest Construction, Inc. v. Municipality of Anchorage, 640 P.2d 133, 134 (Alaska 1981), we held that it is error for a superior court acting as an intermediate appellate court to award fees under Civil Rule 82, rather than under Appellate Rule 508. [11] See also Diedrich, 805 P.2d at 371; Kodiak West. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Bob Harris Flying Serv., Inc., 592 P.2d 1200, 1204-05 (Alaska 1979). In Royal Krest, we focused on the different directives in the fee award provisions: [A]ttorney's fees need not be awarded as a matter of course under [Appellate Rule 29(d), now Appellate Rule 508(e)]. This differs from Civil Rule 82, which requires that some portion of attorney's fees be awarded to the prevailing party.... Royal Krest, 640 P.2d at 134. In this case, the superior court based its award on Civil Rule 82. Since the superior court based its award on an incorrect rule, the case must be remanded to the superior court for recalculation in accordance with the correct rule. [12] Agen's argument that Continental Insurance bars even an Appellate Rule 508 fee award to the State lacks merit. We have repeatedly affirmed the award of attorney's fees to prevailing government entities. See, e.g., Patch v. Patch, 760 P.2d 526, 530-31 (Alaska 1988) (affirming award to CSED of attorney's fees). In Greater Anchorage Area Borough v. Sisters of Charity of House of Providence, 573 P.2d 862 (Alaska 1978), we explained our holding in Continental Insurance: In that case the prevailing party in the superior court, an insurance company, argued that its actual legal costs were greater than those incurred by retained counsel, as the cost of in-house attorney time spent on the case had not been included within the award of attorney's fees sought in the superior court.... We did not intend to express a prohibition against awarding attorney's fees when a party's active representation in litigation is by in-house counsel rather than retained counsel. Nothing in Continental was intended to alter our long-standing practice of awarding attorney's fees to public entities who litigate chiefly, and often entirely, through in-house counsel. 573 P.2d at 862-63. Agen offers no reason for us now to overrule that decision.