Opinion ID: 2452857
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: issues of alleged motion court error

Text: Hall claims the motion court erred by failing to find that his trial counsel was ineffective. Hall complains his counsel was ineffective because she: 1) failed to effectively impeach state's witnesses; 2) failed to produce an effective defense; and 3) failed to object to the prosecutor's closing argument. Hall also asserts that the motion court failed to make findings of fact and conclusions of law on all issues raised in his motion.
Hall claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for not impeaching Donna Hicks with some of her prior inconsistent statements and with other available evidence. Hall also asserts his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to establish that Hicks was incompetent to testify, and for failing to impeach scene witness Charles Ingram.
There is no doubt that Hicks was a key witness for the state. She testified that Hall returned to the car from White's jewelry store with bloody hands and stolen jewelry. She also testified that Hall said he shot White in the head and that he did it because the only good witness is a dead witness. At trial, Hall's counsel cross-examined Hicks. Hall's counsel obtained an admission from Hicks that, although she testified that Hall was away from the car for ten minutes, she had previously told police that Hall was away from the car for just a few seconds. Hall's counsel forced Hicks to admit that she was using a lot of cocaine for at least two weeks prior to the day of the crime and that she had previously falsely denied using drugs. Hall's counsel also elicited admissions from Hicks that she has been treated by health professionals, has undergone electroshock therapy, and has used Prozac. Hicks also admitted on cross-examination that she initially went to the press rather than the police with information about the murder, and that she did not give the police all the jewelry from White's shop at once. Hall's counsel also asked Hicks about statements she had allegedly made claiming she was testifying against Hall because of his relationship with Laura Loveless. Hall's counsel suggested during cross-examination that Hicks was testifying against Hall in exchange for immunity from prosecution for receiving stolen jewelry. When Hicks denied that she had been in contact with Hall since his arrest and claimed that she was afraid of him, Hall's counsel introduced the testimonies of witnesses claiming Hicks had in fact been in contact with Hall. Hall's counsel also questioned Hicks about statements she made during her videotaped statement to the police, suggesting that Hicks knew several details about the crime and, therefore, played a more direct part in it. Hall claims his counsel did not go far enough. He claims she was ineffective because she should have cross-examined Hicks with the pretrial videotaped statement in which Hicks stated that Hall planned only to break in and steal from White's store when White was not there; in short, to commit a burglary, not a robbery. Hall contends this would have shown that he had no predisposition to kill White and would have supported his version of the facts. The manner in which cross-examination is conducted, and the extent of cross-examination, are matters of trial strategy best left to the judgment of trial counsel. Kinder, 942 S.W.2d at 335. At the evidentiary hearing, Hall's counsel testified that she considered Hall's case to be a two-witness trial, with the essential witnesses being Hall and Hicks. Counsel further testified that Hicks' trial testimony was, for the most part, consistent with her videotaped testimony. In the videotape, Hicks explains the crime in detail. It was not unreasonable for Hall's counsel to conclude that more harm than benefit would come from its use at trial. The motion court did not err. Point denied.
Hall also claims his trial counsel was ineffective for choosing not to introduce a letter allegedly sent to Hall by Hicks. Hall claims the letter should have been used to impeach Hicks' testimony that she had not contacted Hall since his arrest. Hall's counsel called John Mahan, Agnes Carpenter, and LeRoy Carpenter to impeach Hicks' testimony that she had not contacted Hall while he was awaiting trial. Therefore the motion court found that the letter from Hicks to Hall would have been cumulative evidence, and trial counsel will not be found ineffective for failing to present cumulative evidence. Kinder, 942 S.W.2d at 336. The motion court did not err in finding that Hall's counsel was not ineffective for failing to introduce this letter. Point denied. Hall also complains that his counsel should have introduced the testimony of Laura Loveless. Hall claims that Hicks was angry because Loveless was having an affair with Hall. Hall claims Loveless would have testified that Hicks threatened her during the trial, making her afraid to testify on Hall's behalf. Loveless testified at the evidentiary hearing but did not testify in the manner in which Hall claims she would have testified had she been called at trial. Loveless testified that she and Hicks had verbal arguments but that she was not afraid of Hicks and that she did not remember Hicks threatening to harm her if she testified for Hall. The motion court did not err by finding that Hall's counsel was not ineffective for failing to call Loveless as a defense witness. Point denied. Hall also complains his counsel was ineffective for failing to call Curt Hough as a defense witness. Hough testified at the evidentiary hearing that Hicks did not tell Hough that she was lying to the police about the facts surrounding White's murder. Hall's trial counsel explained that she did not call Hough as a witness because he was not prepared to say that Hicks lied, and because he did not want to testify. The motion court did not err in finding that Hall's counsel was not ineffective for failing to call Hough as a defense witness. Point denied.
Hall also asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to competently litigate a pretrial motion to bar Hicks' testimony on the grounds that she was not competent to testify. Hall's counsel filed a motion to suppress Hicks' testimony, alleging that Hicks was incompetent to testify because of drug use and treatments for mental disorders. The trial court overruled that motion. At Hall's trial, his counsel called two doctors to the stand to testify about Hicks' drug use and about her exposure to electroconvulsive therapy and drug treatment for mental disorders. At the evidentiary hearing Hall produced testimony of doctors who evaluated Hicks, but Hall was unable to establish through their testimony that Hicks was not competent to testify. Dr. Rose Buckner, a clinical psychologist, conducted a clinical interview and administered psychological evaluations to Hicks in August 1993. Dr. Buckner testified that Hicks suffered from depression and anxiety, but that she was not psychotic or in any way out of touch with reality. Dr. Shirley Taylor reviewed Dr. Buckner's report. Both Dr. Buckner and Dr. Taylor testified that Hicks' evaluation could not predict whether Hicks had lied or was likely to lie during Hall's trial. The motion court did not err in finding that Hall's counsel was not ineffective for failing to call these expert witnesses. Point denied.
Hall claims that the motion court erred by failing to find that trial counsel was ineffective for not impeaching scene witness Charles Ingram with his pretrial inconsistent statement. Ingram testified at trial that he saw Hall in the vicinity of White's shop between 10:30 and 11 a.m. Ingram told police prior to trial that he believed he saw Hall in the vicinity of White's shop around 11:55 a.m. Failure to impeach a witness does not automatically entitle Hall to post-conviction relief. See Phillips, 940 S.W.2d at 522. Hall must establish that the impeachment of Charles Ingram would have provided him with a defense to the crime of first-degree murder, or that it would have changed the outcome of the trial. Phillips, 940 S.W.2d at 522. In establishing this, Hall must overcome the presumption that trial counsel's decision not to impeach was a matter of reasonable trial strategy. Phillips, 940 S.W.2d at 522; State v. Twenter, 818 S.W.2d 628, 640 (Mo. banc 1991) (if [a] prior inconsistent statement by a state's witness does not give rise to a reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt, such impeachment evidence is not the basis for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.). Hall's counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that she believed that Ingram's inconsistency was irrelevant because Hall testified that he was in White's store and that he shot White; therefore, Ingram's testimony placing Hall at the scene of the murder was not necessary to the state's case. Hall's argument that this inconsistency would have reinforced his version of the facts is too remote and speculative to establish either ineffective assistance of counsel or prejudice. The motion court found that Hall's counsel practiced sound trial strategy in choosing not to cross-examine Ingram on his prior inconsistent statement. The motion court did not err. Point denied.
Hall asserts his counsel was ineffective for 1) failing to call certain experts to testify about blood and gunpowder evidence; 2) failing to rebut a state's witness; and 3) failing to call Hall's relatives as penalty phase witnesses.
Hall claims his counsel was ineffective when she failed to present expert testimony that the blood evidence and gunpowder evidence were inconsistent with Hicks' account of the shooting. Hall asserts that the expert testimony of Dr. Jay Dix would have corroborated Hall's testimony and discredited Hicks' testimony. Hall claims that expert testimony and lab reports would have established that the amount of blood pooled on White's chair and the gunpowder residue on White's hand would support Hall's account of what happened after he shot White. Dr. Dix testified at the evidentiary hearing. Dr. Dix's analysis of the evidence was that White died in his chair and that he was in the chair long enough for blood to accumulate on the seat of the chair. Dr. Dix also concluded that the gunshot residue test indicated that White's right hand was near the gun when it was fired. Dr. Dix could not tell whether there was a struggle and he could not calculate the positions of Hall and White at the time the shot was fired. The motion court found that Dr. Dix was unable to support Hall's testimony that White was shot accidentally and during a struggle. The motion court therefore concluded that the outcome of Hall's trial would not have been different had Dr. Dix testified. The motion court did not err in its finding. Point denied.
Hall also asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call Hall as a witness to rebut Kimball Morton's testimony. The record directly refutes Hall's assertion. First, trial counsel did in fact call Hall as a witness to rebut Morton's testimony. Second, elsewhere in Hall's motion, Hall asserts that his trial counsel forced him to testify because she failed to call other defense witnesses, and that Hall did not understand that he had a right not to testify. The motion court directly addressed the issue of Morton's testimony and of Hall's voluntary decision to testify. The motion court did not err by finding that Hall's counsel did allow Hall to rebut Morton's testimony. Point denied.
Hall asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to call Hall's father and brothers to testify during the penalty phase of Hall's trial. Charlie Mooney, Hall's father, testified at the evidentiary hearing that he was not closely acquainted with Hall. He testified that he was aware Hall was to be on trial, but he did not know when or the nature of the charges against Hall. He testified that he was in Mexico at the time of Hall's trial and did not try to attend Hall's trial or sentencing. The attorney representing Hall during the penalty phase testified that Charlie Mooney and his wife told her that they would be of no help to Hall because Hall had been away from the family for a very long time. Hall's brother Jeff Mooney testified at the evidentiary hearing that he lived in Missouri at the time of Hall's trial, he knew Hall was on trial for murder, and that he made no attempt to contact Hall or Hall's trial counsel. Hall's brother Kelley Mooney testified that he was living in Missouri at the time of Hall's trial but he did not know there was a trial and did not know Hall was charged with first-degree murder. The motion court recognized that Hall's father and brothers appeared to be productive citizens with stable employment, but the court also noted that they were not close to Hall. The motion court further noted that at the penalty phase Hall's trial counsel called other witnesses to testify on behalf of Hall. LeRoy Carpenter testified that he and Hall had been in prison together and that he had been out of prison for eleven years and had not been rearrested. Carpenter stated that he and Hall maintained a close friendship and asked the jury to spare Hall's life. John Mahan, Hall's son, testified that he and Hall were close and asked the jury to spare Hall's life. Missouri law does not impose on trial counsel an absolute duty to present mitigating character evidence during the penalty phase of trial. Schneider v. State, 787 S.W.2d 718, 721 (Mo. banc 1990), cert. denied 498 U.S. 882, 111 S.Ct. 231, 112 L.Ed.2d 186 (1990); Jones v. State, 767 S.W.2d 41, 44 (Mo. banc 1989), cert. denied 493 U.S. 874, 110 S.Ct. 207, 107 L.Ed.2d 160 (1989). The motion court properly found that Hall's trial counsel met her obligation to investigate possible mitigating circumstances. Hall's counsel presented evidence she believed would be most beneficial to Hall. The motion court did not err in finding that counsel's decisions regarding evidence to present during the penalty phase constituted sound trial strategy. Schneider, 787 S.W.2d at 721. Point denied.
Hall also claims that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor's guilt-phase closing argument. During his closing argument, the prosecutor stated that: on December 15, 1992 the defendant, at 10:30 in the morning, goes down to that store to case it out. Charlie Slater tells you that. Why does he remember 10:30? He's had to drive his friend Ingram to work, and Slater had to be to his job. He was already late. That's why he looked at his watch. He was already running late. That's why 10:30 sticks in his mind. Hall argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because she failed to object to the prosecutor's mention of Slater looking at his watch, because Slater did not in fact testify that he had looked at his watch at 10:30 a.m. Objections during closing argument are considered a function of trial strategy. See State v. Wood, 719 S.W.2d 756, 759-60 (Mo. banc 1986). Even if the evidence did not strictly support this statement, it was not so inconsistent with the other evidence in the record to have constituted ineffective assistance or prejudice. The motion court did not err in finding that counsel's decision not to object to the prosecutor's closing argument was sound trial strategy that did not prejudice Hall's defense. Point denied.
Finally, Hall asserts that the motion court inappropriately overruled Hall's post-conviction motion without making findings of fact and conclusions of law on all claims raised as required by Rule 29.15(j). Hall claims the motion court failed to address the issue of whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call Laura Loveless as a defense witness to rebut the testimony of Morton. An appellate court will not order a useless remand to direct the motion court to enter a proper conclusion of law on an isolated issue overlooked by the motion court where it is clear that movant is entitled to no relief as a matter of law.... White v. State, 939 S.W.2d 887, 903 (Mo. banc 1997), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 365, 139 L.Ed.2d 284 (1997); see State v. Stallings, 812 S.W.2d 772, 779 (Mo.App.1991). Here, the motion court entered a thorough and detailed fifty-one page judgment rejecting Hall's 29.15 claims. The judgment ruled on all pertinent matters raised and specifically discussed the issue regarding Loveless' testimony. At the evidentiary hearing Loveless testified that she received a subpoena for Hall's trial and she came to the courthouse but that she became ill and left before the trial started. The motion court discussed Loveless' testimony in its ruling and found that her testimony would not have provided Hall with a defense. Contrary to Hall's assertion, the motion court complied with 29.15(j) on this issue. Motion Court Judgment, Legal File Vol. III, paragraph 9, pp. 6-7. Point denied.