Opinion ID: 2065664
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Basic Contract Principles

Text: At the outset, we reject Raymond's claim that neither he nor William had notice or knowledge of the binding arbitration provision or that they were forgoing their ability to bring a civil suit because the buyer's order constitutes a contract of adhesion. The pertinent portion of the provision on the buyer's order stated: WE AGREE THAT ANY CLAIM, DISPUTE OR CONTROVERSY DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY RELATING TO THIS AGREEMENT OR TO ANY VEHICLE INVOLVED HEREIN SHALL BE RESOLVED BY BINDING ARBITRATION. . . . THE PARTIES ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THEY HAVE KNOWINGLY WAIVED THEIR RIGHTS TO A JUDGE OR JURY TRIAL. The applicable language was clear and comprehensible and appeared in the buyer's order in capital letters and in bold print. Moreover, both Raymond and William signed their names below the arbitration provision, attesting to their understanding of what they had read. We hold that Raymond and William may not evade their obligations simply because they chose to not read what they had signed. This conclusion is consistent with the precedent of this Court. We explained recently in Holloman v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 391 Md. 580, 595, 894 A.2d 547, 556 (2006), that under Maryland law, a party who signs a contract is presumed to have read and understood its terms and as such will be bound by its execution. In addition, in Walther v. Sovereign Bank, 386 Md. 412, 444, 872 A.2d 735, 754 (2005), we stated that [i]f petitioners did not [read the agreement] before they signed the agreement, they have no person to blame but themselves. As expressed earlier in our discussion, we are loath to rescind a conspicuous agreement that was signed by a party whom now, for whatever reason, does not desire to fulfill that agreement. This principle is not a new principle; it has been long echoed in this Court. In Binder v. Benson, 225 Md. 456, 461, 171 A.2d 248, 250 (1961), we explained that [i]t is true that the usual rule is that if there is no fraud, duress or mutual mistake, one who has the capacity to understand a written document who reads and signs it, or, without reading it or having it read to him, signs it, is bound by his signature as to all of its terms. Raymond has not alleged fraud, duress, or mutual mistake in this case. Nor has he alleged that he or William lacked the capacity to understand the written buyer's order that both of them signed. He simply contends that he and William are not bound by their signatures. We disagree. Another provision of the buyer's order provides in relevant part, NOR SHALL ANYTHING HEREIN BE CONSTRUED TO LIMIT ANY REMEDIES UNDER . . . THE MAGNUSON MOSS ACT. We follow the objective law of contract interpretation. Taylor v. Nations-Bank, N.A., 365 Md. 166, 178, 776 A.2d 645, 653 (2001). In Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Daniels, 303 Md. 254, 261, 492 A.2d 1306, 1310 (1985), we said: A court construing an agreement under this [objective] test must first determine from the language of the agreement itself what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have meant at the time it was effectuated. In addition, when the language of the contract is plain and unambiguous there is no room for construction, and a court must presume that the parties meant what they expressed. In these circumstances, the true test of what is meant is not what the parties to the contract intended it to mean, but what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have thought it meant. Consequently, the clear and unambiguous language of an agreement will not give away to what the parties thought that the agreement meant or intended it to mean. We interpret the above referenced contract provision, by its terms, to mean that claims filed under the MMWA are exempt from the restrictive provisions of the buyer's order. Thus, as a reasonable interpretation of the contract between the parties, Raymond may not be precluded from pursuing his claims for breach of warranty in a court of law. Our analysis does not stop here. Even though we think the MMWA allows for non-binding, as opposed to binding arbitration, we must determine whether the FAA trumps the MMWA and whether the binding arbitration provision contained in the buyer's order is nonetheless enforceable.