Opinion ID: 1247774
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defendant's Future Conduct.

Text: (24a) Defendant contends the court failed to consider evidence of his lack of future dangerousness in prison in violation of Skipper v. South Carolina (1986) 476 U.S. 1 [90 L.Ed.2d 1, 106 S.Ct. 1669] and related cases. In Skipper the trial court excluded evidence the defendant had conducted himself well in prison since arrest. On appeal the United States Supreme Court reversed, stating evidence that the defendant would not pose a danger if spared (but incarcerated) must be considered potentially mitigating. [Fn. omitted.] Under Eddings [v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104], such evidence may not be excluded from the sentencer's consideration. ( Id. at p. 5 [90 L.Ed.2d at p. 7]; accord, People v. Lucero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1006, 1026-1027 [245 Cal. Rptr. 185, 750 P.2d 1342].) In the instant case the court, in citing the mitigating factors it had considered, stated it had considered evidence of defendant's general good conduct while in custody of the county, as well as the testimony of the two death row prison guards and the two death row prisoners concerning defendant's conduct while at San Quentin Prison, and, particularly, the changes in his attitude and his actions since his rebirth or newly found interest in the Bible and study of religion. Based on this testimony, the court stated, the Court is of the opinion that as long as [defendant] is confined to prison, he will not pose any significant danger to the public, including other prisoners or prison officials. Thereafter, in summarizing the factors in aggravation and mitigation, the court stated, The Court does not consider the fact that [defendant] does not appear to pose a threat to society as long as he's confined to prison to be a factor either in aggravation or mitigation [of] punishment for these offenses. Later, in reviewing its decision in connection with defendant's penalty-reduction motion, the court stated: The sixth sympathy factor the Court considered was [defendant's] coming to the aid of Deputy Sheriff Coyle at some danger to himself. The Court also indicated at that time and the Court did consider in weighing these factors that after consideration of all the evidence it does not appear to the Court that [defendant] presently poses a threat to society as long as he's confined to a prison. And considering that I didn't consider that to be either in aggravation or mitigation, punishment, at least, but the Court did make it clear that the Court did not consider that an aggravating factor, the fact that he might still be a danger. [12] In light of the court's recitation of defendant's lack of future dangerousness as a sympathy factor and its express statement that it did consider in weighing these factors that defendant would not pose a threat to society so long as he is confined to prison, we reject defendant's premise that the court failed to consider his future nondangerousness in determining penalty. It appears, rather, that the court recognized defendant's evidence was relevant mitigating evidence, but ultimately determined on balance the evidence was of inconsequential weight as against the factors in aggravation and insufficient to mitigate punishment. (25) As the United States Supreme Court stated in Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104 [71 L.Ed.2d 1, 102 S.Ct. 869]: Just as the State may not by statute preclude the sentencer from considering any mitigating factor, neither may the sentencer refuse to consider, as a matter of law, any relevant mitigating evidence.... The sentencer ... may determine the weight to be given relevant mitigating evidence. But [it] may not give it no weight by excluding such evidence from ... consideration.  ( Id. at pp. 113-115 [71 L.Ed.2d at pp. 10-11], first italics in original, second italics added.) Continuing, the high court in a footnote stated: We note that the Oklahoma death penalty statute permits the defendant to present evidence `as to any mitigating circumstances.' [Citation.] Lockett [v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 586] requires the sentencer to listen.  ( Id. at p. 115, fn. 10 [71 L.Ed.2d at p. 11], italics added.) Franklin v. Lynaugh (1988) 487 U.S. 164 [101 L.Ed.2d 155, 108 S.Ct. 2320], cited by defendant, is in accord. Under the procedure there at issue, the jury was instructed defendant would receive a sentence of death if it answered yes to two Special Issues  one being whether defendant would be dangerous in the future. Defendant asserted the procedure prevented the jury from giving independent mitigating weight to his good conduct in prison. The high court in a plurality opinion held otherwise. Because defendant's good conduct was relevant to the issue of future dangerousness, defendant, the lead opinion stated, was accorded a full opportunity to have his sentencing jury consider and give effect to any mitigating impulse that [his] prison record might have suggested.... ( Id. at pp. 177-178 [101 L.Ed.2d at p. 168].) Concurring, Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Blackmun, stated that a State may not constitutionally prevent the sentencing body from giving effect to evidence relevant to the defendant's background or character.... Indeed, the right to have the sentencer consider and weigh relevant mitigating evidence would be meaningless unless the sentencer was also permitted to give effect to its consideration. ( Id. at pp. 184-185 [101 L.Ed.2d at pp. 172-173].) The dissent agreed it was not enough that the jury be allowed to hear defendant's mitigating evidence; it must also be allowed to give independent mitigating weight to the evidence. ( Id. at p. 191 [101 L.Ed.2d at p. 177] (dis. opn. of Stevens, J.).) (24b) What the Supreme Court's death penalty jurisprudence condemns, as the dissent in Franklin observed, is the erection of barriers to the jury's full consideration of mitigating evidence.... (487 U.S. at p. 192 [101 L.Ed.2d at p. 177] (Stevens, J.); see also Mills v. Maryland (1988) 486 U.S. 367, 375 [100 L.Ed.2d 384, 394, 108 S.Ct. 1860].) In the case at bench there was no barrier to the trial court's full consideration of defendant's evidence of future nondangerousness. The record is clear the court admitted the evidence, listened to it and considered it; thereafter the court determined, as it was entitled to do, that in the circumstances of this case the evidence was of minimal or no weight as balanced against the circumstances of the crimes and defendant's pattern of violent conduct. In so doing the court did not err. Were we, however, nevertheless to assume the court refused to consider this mitigating evidence, the question would be whether the court's refusal was harmless under the Chapman ( Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 87 S.Ct. 824, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065]) standard of review. ( People v. Lucero, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1032; see Hitchcock v. Dugger (1987) 481 U.S. 393, 398-399 [95 L.Ed.2d 347, 353, 107 S.Ct. 1821]; Skipper v. South Carolina, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 8 [90 L.Ed.2d at p. 9]; People v. McLain (1988) 46 Cal.3d 97, 109 [249 Cal. Rptr. 630, 757 P.2d 569]; cf. Mills v. Maryland, supra, 486 U.S. at p. 384 [100 L.Ed.2d at p. 400].) Applying the Chapman test, we are of the view the court's failure, if any, to consider defendant's evidence of his lack of future dangerousness is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. As circumstances in aggravation the court found the defendant had been convicted of two separate counts of first degree murder personally committed by him, with jury findings of nine special circumstances (see fn. 2, ante, p. 28), as well as three prior acts of criminal violence involving threats of murder and mutilation and extraordinary physical abuse. The court found defendant planned the kidnappings for the purpose of sexual assault and gratification, as shown by his cruising around looking for potential victims, carrying the boning knife in violation of probation, and sharpening the knife between the first and second murders. His primary motivation in each of the murders was to accomplish a sexual assault with infliction of pain and, ultimately, the murders as part of the infliction of pain and, also, to avoid detection; he may have actually preferred to use force because that then gave him an excuse for inflicting pain. From the manner in which the murders were committed, including the extreme mutilation of the bodies before and after death, as well as the circumstances of the assaults on Ernest F., Kim P. and Catherine A., [13] the court determined defendant obtained gratification from inflicting pain and discomfort, both mental and physical on his victims. As against these aggravating factors the court weighed in mitigation that defendant is mildly mentally retarded, emotionally immature, suffers from personality disorders, has impaired judgment, and had a troubled childhood. The court also considered defendant's assistance to Deputy Sheriff Coyle and his record of good conduct in prison. In reviewing its sentence choice at the penalty-reduction hearing, the court stated the most aggravating factor of all in the Court's opinion was the factor of [defendant] attempting to remove the breasts, being unsuccessful, and then going out and sharpening the knife and taking it with him. I think this is the principal factor that finally caused the Court to weigh the matter in which it did, that the aggravating circumstances clearly outweighed the mitigating factors. Contrary to defendant's assertion, this was not, in our view, a close case. [14] On the record before us, particularly the court's repeated express concern with the circumstances of the offenses, including defendant's planning activity, and with defendant's pattern of violent sexual conduct, including his purpose and pleasure in inflicting extreme pain and mutilation on his victims, we find the court's failure, if any, to weigh in mitigation defendant's lack of future dangerousness could not have affected its penalty determination and is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.