Opinion ID: 6471493
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Enforceability of Debts Incurred During First Thirty Days.

Text: In New Mexico Beverage Co. v. Blything, 102 N.M. 533, 697 P.2d 952 (1985), we rejected the contention that a wholesaler had complied with Section 60-7A-9 by marking its deliveries “C.O.D.” when it in fact had not collected payment at the time of delivery. We held that the wholesaler had extended credit in violation of the statute “[b]y failing to bring an action promptly when an invoice went unpaid for more than 30 days, and continuing to deliver liquor without receiving immediate payment.” Id., 102 N.M. at 534, 697 P.2d at 953. In accordance with that holding, plaintiffs concede that they cannot maintain an action to collect debts for credit sales made after any invoice in their respective accounts had gone unpaid for more than thirty days. On appeal, however, they contend that the rule of New Mexico Beverage Co. v. Blything does not reach credit sales made during the initial thirty-day periods, and that such sales are lawful and enforceable in an action to collect debts. We believe that New Mexico Beverage Co. v. Blything correctly held that unlawful extensions of credit under Section 60-7A-9 occur when a wholesaler makes credit sales of alcoholic beverages to a retailer who has not paid for any prior deliv-, ery from the wholesaler within thirty days of its invoice. New Mexico Beverage Co. v. Blything did not hold that lawful credit sales made during the initial thirty-day period are rendered unlawful and unenforceable by the retailer’s subsequent failure to make timely payment on its account, for all the debts sued upon in that case arose from deliveries of alcoholic beverages made after the retailer had failed to pay prior invoices for more than thirty days. See id., 102 N.M. at 534, 697 P.2d at 953. Whether credit sales made during the initial thirty-day period constitute unlawful extensions of credit under Section 60-7A-9 therefore is a question of first impression for this Court. By expressly proscribing sales in which credit is extended for more than thirty days, Section 60-7A-9 implicitly authorizes sales in which credit is extended for thirty days or less. New Mexico Beverage Co. v. Blything prevents the wholesaler from continuing to make such authorized sales once the retailer, by failing to pay a prior invoice for more than thirty days, effectively transforms a permissible thirty-day credit arrangement into an impermissible longer one. See id., 102 N.M. at 534, 697 P.2d at 953. Neither the language of Section 60-7A-9 nor the holding of New Mexico Beverage Co. v. Blything compels the conclusion that an unlawful extension of credit occurs, and a debt unenforceable under Section 60-8A-5 arises, whenever any credit sale of alcoholic beverages is made during the initial thirty-day period. Section 60-7A-9 is penal in nature, see NMSA 1978, § 60-7A-25 (Repl.Pamp. 1981) (criminal penalties), and should be construed to define the proscribed act with sufficient certainty so that a person will know his act is criminal when he does it. Cf. State v. Collins, 80 N.M. 499, 502, 458 P.2d 225, 228 (1969) (prosecution under Endowed Care Cemetery Act). Under the district court’s interpretation of this statute, a wholesaler’s credit sale, lawful at the time it was made, might subsequently be rendered unlawful by the retailer’s nonpayment of a lawful obligation. We will not adopt a construction that makes the statute’s application absurd, unreasonable or unjust. See State v. Santillanes, 99 N.M. 89, 90, 654 P.2d 542, 543 (1982). We therefore hold that lawful extensions of credit under Section 60-7A-9 made during the initial period before any invoice goes unpaid for more than thirty days fall outside the Section 60-8A-5 bar to suit. Because the evidence in this case raises a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the sales that form the basis of this appeal involved such lawful extensions of credit, see Paperchase Partnership v. Bruckner, 102 N.M. 221, 222-23, 693 P.2d 587, 588-89 (1985), we reverse the district court’s summary judgment in favor of defendants on the claims for debts arising in the first thirty-day period of sales to each plaintiff.