Opinion ID: 4110578
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: On appeal, Brooks argues that the probation officers’ entry into his bedroom violated his rights under article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution and that any information acquired as a result of that entry must be suppressed. The State responds that the entry was lawful, and further argues that even if it was unlawful, the exclusionary rule does not apply in probation revocation proceedings. Article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution provides, 7 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable seizures and searches shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons and things to be seized. “We employ a two-step approach to determine whether there has been a violation of . . . article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution.” State v. Kern, 831 N.W.2d 149, 164 (Iowa 2013) (quoting State v. Lowe, 812 N.W.2d 554, 567 (Iowa 2012)). “First, the defendant must show he or she has ‘a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched.’ ” Id. (quoting Lowe, 812 N.W.2d at 567). “Second, if so, we must determine whether the defendant’s rights were violated.” Id. “We jealously guard our right to construe a provision of our state constitution differently than its federal counterpart, though the two provisions may contain nearly identical language and have the same general scope, import, and purpose.” State v. Jackson, 878 N.W.2d 422, 442 (Iowa 2016). A. Brooks’s Expectation of Privacy. At the time of the incident, Brooks was living with his sister and father. Brooks’s father—the owner of the residence—freely and voluntarily consented to the probation officers entering the home in order to check on Brooks. Nonetheless, Brooks argues he maintained a legitimate expectation of privacy in the room in which he was staying in his father’s home. To establish a legitimate expectation of privacy in his room, Brooks must show “(1) a subjective expectation of privacy and (2) this expectation of privacy was reasonable.” Tyler, 867 N.W.2d at 168 (quoting State v. Ortiz, 618 N.W.2d 556, 559 (Iowa 2000)). “The determination of whether a person has a legitimate expectation of privacy with respect to a certain area is made on a case-by-case basis, 8 considering the unique facts of each particular situation.” Id. (quoting State v. Fleming, 790 N.W.2d 560, 564 (Iowa 2010)). At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Brooks testified that he had exclusive possession of the room and had been paying his father monthly rent to solely occupy the room. Brooks also testified that he believed no one had the right to enter his room without his consent, including his father. We have held that a tenant, unrelated to a landlord, may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a rented bedroom under the Iowa Constitution. See Fleming, 790 N.W.2d at 567. In Fleming, we declined to adopt the “community-living exception” used by other jurisdictions, under which a person renting a room within a single-family home has no separate expectation of privacy. Id. at 566–67. Instead, we reasoned that tenants in a house do not reasonably believe they are “giving up the right to privacy in their personal space.” Id. at 567. While an individual may surrender his or her privacy in a communal space, such as a living room or a bathroom, we concluded it is reasonable that “the individual bedrooms remain private.” Id. The entry here was not into a communal space, but instead, into Brooks’s personal bedroom. Brooks testified that he rented the bedroom from his father, although there is no evidence the probation officers knew this. We will assume for purposes of our decision that Brooks had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his bedroom. B. Special-Needs Doctrine. We must now determine whether Brooks’s rights under article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution were violated when Officers Wignall and Smith entered his bedroom. Among other things, the State argues that the probation officers’ entry was justified by the special-needs doctrine. We believe it would be helpful to 9 begin by reviewing our recent article I, section 8 caselaw concerning searches and seizures of probationers and parolees. In State v. Baldon, we concluded that a parole agreement containing a prospective consent-to-search provision is insufficient, by itself, to establish the voluntary consent necessary to justify a suspicionless search under article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. See 829 N.W.2d 785, 802–03 (Iowa 2013). In that case, the defendant had signed a parole agreement that included a blanket consent to future searches with or without a warrant or reasonable cause. Id. at 787. An on-duty police officer discovered that Baldon was staying in a motel wellknown for being a high-crime location. Id. at 787–88. A police sergeant called Baldon’s parole officer and requested permission to search Baldon’s motel room and vehicle pursuant to the parole agreement. Id. at 788. Police officers on the scene and the parole officer conducted the search together, which was “completely based on [the] agreement and nothing more.” Id. (alteration in original). The officers discovered marijuana in Baldon’s vehicle, which resulted in a charge of possession of marijuana with intent to deliver. Id. On appeal, the only issue we addressed was “whether a parole agreement containing a consent-to-search clause renders suspicionless and warrantless searches of parolees reasonable under the search and seizure clause of the Iowa Constitution.” Id. at 789–90. We did not consider whether the State’s maintenance of a parole system presented “special needs[] beyond the normal need for law enforcement.” Id. at 789 (alteration in original) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351, 105 S. Ct. 733, 748, 83 L. Ed. 2d 720, 741 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring)). Further, we “largely set aside” cases dealing with probationers and instead focused primarily on parolee cases. See id. at 10 795. We held that “the search provision contained in Baldon’s parole agreement does not represent a voluntary grant of consent within our constitutional meaning” and therefore the suspicionless search of Baldon’s car violated article I, section 8. Id. at 803. Shortly after Baldon, we decided another parolee case in State v. Kern, 831 N.W.2d at 149. In that case, Kern was on parole and had signed a parole agreement with a similar blanket consent-to-search provision. Id. at 155–56. A caseworker with the Iowa Department of Human Services received a complaint that marijuana was being grown, processed, and sold in the house where Kern resided. Id. at 156. Kern’s sixteen-year-old daughter and infant grandchild occasionally stayed at the house. Id. The caseworker visited the home, accompanied by two police officers, and asked Kern for consent to search the house. Id. Kern refused, and the caseworker removed the children from the home. Id. Thereafter the police officers returned to the house, without Kern’s parole officer, and informed Kern that the officers were going to search the house “because Kern was a parolee and had consented to a search in her parole agreement.” Id. at 156–57. The officers found marijuana and guns in various rooms of the house and Kern was charged with four drug offenses. Id. at 157. Kern challenged the police officers’ search as a violation of her constitutional rights, whereas the State argued the search was justified under several exceptions to the warrant requirement. Id. at 157–58. We determined that no exception to the warrant requirement justified the warrantless search of Kern’s home under article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. Id. at 177. Although we ultimately concluded that it was unnecessary to decide whether the special-needs doctrine was “viable in the context of parole under the Iowa Constitution” based on the facts of 11 that case, we did outline the scope of the doctrine were we to recognize the existence of such an exception. See id. at 170. First, we noted the “obvious limitation” that the doctrine would apply only to searches conducted by parole officers consistent with the parole mission. Id.; cf. Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 294–95 (Cady, J., concurring specially) (recognizing the distinction between interests unrelated to general law enforcement and interests “involving enforcement of criminal laws”). This limitation ensures that the search furthers the goals of parole rather than the interests in law enforcement. Kern, 831 N.W.2d at 170. Second, we recognized that the special-needs doctrine “cannot be used by police to make an end-run around the constitutional protections otherwise available to parolees.” Id. Because the search conducted by the police officers was “instigated and dominated by the needs and interests of law enforcement,” we declined to consider applying the special-needs doctrine in Kern. Id. at 172. We subsequently addressed a warrantless search of a probationer’s home by police officers in State v. Short, 851 N.W.2d 474 (Iowa 2014). Following a reported burglary, police officers received information that implicated the defendant, Justin Short. See id. at 476. Police officers obtained a search warrant for the wrong address. Id. Yet without getting a valid new warrant, they conducted a search of Short’s apartment anyway. Id. at 476–77. Short was on probation for unrelated crimes. Id. at 477. However, Short’s probation officer did not participate in the search, and it was undisputed that the search was not connected with Short’s probation, but was instead “an investigatory search by law enforcement related to new crimes.” Id. at 477. On appeal, we considered whether law enforcement officers, “as distinguished from probation officers,” may conduct a warrantless search 12 for investigatory law enforcement purposes of a probationer’s home under article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. Id. at 481. We held that the warrant requirement has “full applicability” to home searches of probationers by law enforcement. Id. at 506. Given the absence of a warrant, we reversed the denial of Short’s motion to suppress, while making it clear that we were not addressing “the legality of home visits or other types of supervision by probation officers pursuant to their ordinary functions, [or] . . . the question of whether a probationer may validly consent to warrantless home searches.” Id. In our Short decision, we relied heavily upon State v. Cullison, 173 N.W.2d 533, 540–41 (Iowa 1970), which had invalidated a warrantless search of a parolee’s home by a parole officer. Id. at 492–96. Although Cullison involved a parolee, not a probationer, we said in Short that “the analytic structure of Cullison applies with equal force to both.” Short, 851 N.W.2d at 492. Importantly, the issue in Cullison was whether the parole officer could search the parolee’s house for evidence “relative to the prosecution of an offense separate and apart from that upon which he had been previously granted a parole.” Cullison, 173 N.W.2d at 540. 3 Lastly, we returned to the special-needs doctrine in the 2015 case of State v. King, 867 N.W.2d 106 (Iowa 2015). Like the defendants in Baldon and Kern, Donald King was a parolee. Id. at 109. He had been paroled following multiple convictions for possession and intent to deliver methamphetamine. Id. He had also signed a parole agreement with a 3We added in Short, There is substantial authority, for instance, for the proposition that while evidence obtained through home visits, or searches by probation officers, may not be used in new criminal prosecutions, it may be used for purposes of establishing a violation of probation or parole. 851 N.W.2d at 505. 13 standard consent-to-search provision. Id. During meetings with his parole officer, King had complained about his drug treatment and generally “seemed to be losing his motivation to succeed at parole.” Id. King’s parole officer was concerned that King was either “on the verge of another relapse” or would abscond from parole. Id. During a home visit, the parole officer decided to check King’s bedroom for signs of drug use. Id. at 110. He informed King of his intention to search, and King did not refuse. Id. The parole officer noticed a sunglasses case in King’s bedroom, opened the case, and discovered two bags of marijuana. Id. King was charged with possession of marijuana as a result of the search. Id. He moved to suppress the results of the search based on article I, section 8. Id. The State defended the parole officer’s search as justified by the special-needs doctrine. Id. We first acknowledged that we had not yet applied the special-needs doctrine to warrantless searches of parolees or probationers by parole or probation officers. See id. at 116. However, we ultimately concluded that the special-needs exception authorized the parole search at issue. Id. at 126–27. We balanced three factors in reaching that conclusion: (1) the nature of the privacy interest intruded upon by the search, (2) the character of the intrusion, and (3) the nature of the governmental concerns and the efficacy of the search policy. See id. at 117–26. In our King opinion, we noted, “A distinction exists between searches to pursue the purposes of law enforcement and those to pursue the purposes of carrying out the mission of parole.” Id. at 122. We also stated, “The concerns that prompt the parole search in general need to be broad enough to achieve the purpose of parole, but narrow enough that the search not be arbitrary or depart from the parole mission.” Id. 14 at 124. With respect to the facts at hand, we said, “The immediacy of the government concerns [was] derived from the general mission of parole supervision.” Id. at 126. We believe the King three-factor analysis supports the application of the special-needs doctrine to this probation case. Critically, as in King, this was not an entry for law enforcement purposes. Rather, two probation officers entered Brooks’s bedroom after being summoned by Brooks’s regular probation officer who was otherwise tied up but had received a family report of a drug relapse. The intrusion was limited. The probation officers entered the bedroom, saw Brooks’s obviously disoriented condition, conducted a “cursory search” (which is not even at issue here), questioned Brooks, and arrested him for a probation violation. As the district court put it, The officers had reasonable suspicion that Defendant was violating the terms of his probation based upon the statements made by the family members. They came to the home, were invited in, and attempted to make contact with Defendant. This is exactly what probation officers are supposed to do. Probationers are expected to abide by conditions of their probation, including in this case refraining from possessing or using illegal drugs. See Iowa Code § 907.6 (2015). Probation officers are required by statute to “supervise, assist, and counsel [a] person during the term of the person’s probation.” Id. § 907.8(1). They are to “investigate all persons referred to them for investigation by the director of the judicial district department of correctional services which employs them.” Id. § 907.2. They are to “keep informed of each person’s conduct and condition and shall use all suitable methods prescribed by the judicial district department of correctional services to aid and encourage the person to bring about improvements in the person’s conduct and condition.” Id. 15 Probation officers “shall make reports to the court when alleged violations occur.” Id. Probation officers are peace officers. Id. This means they have authority to make arrests that the general public does not have. See id. §§ 804.6–.7, .9. Close supervision of probationers furthers legitimate goals such as rehabilitating the probationer, protecting the community at large, and reducing recidivism. See id. § 907.6; see also Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 875, 107 S. Ct. 3164, 3169, 97 L. Ed. 2d 709, 718 (1987). Consequently, the probation officer and probationer share an “ongoing relationship” that is not entirely adversarial in nature. See King, 867 N.W.2d at 121, 126. Probation supervision—like parole supervision— “necessarily involves” intrusion by the government as probationers assimilate to social norms. Id. at 121. This is not a case like Short, where the probationary status of the defendant became an after-the-fact justification for a warrantless search of his residence for independent law-enforcement purposes. This was a probation mission from the beginning (when the defendant’s probation officer received a call from the defendant’s sister and father) until the end (when the defendant was charged with violating the terms of probation and not a separate crime). Brooks disputes that the entry into his bedroom was performed by actual probation officers. However, the district court found otherwise, and based on our de novo review of the record, we agree with the district court. Officer Evans was Brooks’s regular probation officer. He testified that he asked two of his “coworkers”—Wignall and Smith—to respond to the calls he received from Brooks’s family and from the manager of the treatment facility. Wignall, one of those coworkers, appeared at the 16 hearing and testified he is a probation officer employed by the Fifth Judicial District Department of Correctional Services. This was further confirmed by the district court’s questioning: THE COURT: One follow-up question, Mr. Evans. Were all of the officers that you asked to respond in your stead, since you were in court someplace else, were they all also probation/parole officers? THE WITNESS: Yes, ma’am, they were. For reasons not explored at the hearing, but which may have to do with reducing the risk of a misunderstanding with the public, Wignall regularly wore a police uniform with a “Polk County Sheriff” patch on the sleeve. He also carried a firearm. Yet Wignall explained that his position meant he only arrested probationers or parolees who had violated the terms of their probation or parole, even though he did have the general authority to make any arrest. His job description meant he did not write tickets or citations, did not respond to calls for service, and did not respond to calls from dispatch. As a member of the fugitive unit in the Fifth Judicial District Department of Correctional Services, Wignall’s duties differed from those of an average probation officer because he was responsible for “folks that abscond supervision” and dealt with “situations that include home visits and high-risk situations.” 4 Wignall acknowledged that he did not have a list of probationers he regularly supervised and did not normally conduct traditional home visits of probationers. And the trip to the Brooks family home was not a preplanned home visit. Still, it was a probation visit, as confirmed by the facts that Brooks’s regular probation officer initiated the visit and no independent criminal charges resulted from it. In sum, 4Evans belonged to the same fugitive unit, even while serving as Brooks’s regular probation officer. 17 we agree with the district court and reject Brooks’s claim that Wignall and Smith entered his room “as law enforcement officers” and for law enforcement purposes. The record indicates that the Fifth Judicial District Department of Correctional Services has set up a separate unit of probation officers that have special training and carry firearms so they can deal with high-risk situations. In our view, this does not alter the basic analysis under King. Some probationers present more risks than others, for example if they have been actively using methamphetamine. Some probation-related duties are more hazardous than others. It would not make sense to adopt a rule that a probation mission ceases to be a probation mission just because the probation officer is carrying a firearm for protection. The focus should remain, rather, on the activity itself: Was the probation officer engaged in supervision of a probationer (which can include an arrest for a probation violation) or was she or he conducting a separate law enforcement investigation? In this regard, the impromptu entry here can be contrasted with the investigative search that occurred in Cullison. In that case, a parole officer visited a parolee and became suspicious when the parolee refused to unlock an interior door in the parolee’s apartment. Cullison, 173 N.W.2d at 534–35. The parole officer left the apartment, came back with a set of master keys, and ultimately convinced the parolee that he should open the locked door for the officer. Id. at 535. The officer found stolen merchandise in the locked room and the parolee was charged with a new offense. Id. On appeal, we took no issue with the parole officer’s initial entry because the parole officer went inside to determine why the parolee had not reported to work. See id. at 539; see also King, 867 N.W.2d at 122 18 (“The initial intrusion by the parole officer in the apartment, however, was consistent with the mission of parole and was not part of the analysis that found the search of the home to be unconstitutional.” (discussing Cullison, 173 N.W.2d at 539)). Instead, we concluded the parole officer’s further search of the locked room in the apartment, for the purpose of discovering independent criminal activity, “became intertwined with the state’s interest in law enforcement” and therefore required a warrant. See King, 867 N.W.2d at 122 (discussing Cullison, 173 N.W.2d at 539–40). The entry into Brooks’s bedroom arguably stands on stronger legal ground than the King search in several ways. In King, the parole officer had at most “reasonable suspicion” of a parole violation. Here, by contrast, the probation officers had more than reasonable suspicion. Brooks does not deny, in fact, that probable cause existed to believe he had violated the terms of his probation. Furthermore, unlike in King, the warrantless entry here did not result in an independent prosecution on a new charge. It simply led to revocation of Brooks’s existing probation. It is true that Brooks, unlike the parolee in King, did not lead the officers into his bedroom. But he did not object to their coming in, either, and instead told the probation officers he was going to open the door. Shortly thereafter the door, in fact, opened. For the reasons stated, we find the special-needs doctrine applies, and the entry into Brooks’s room did not violate his rights under article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. In light of this conclusion, we need not reach the State’s argument that the entry into Brooks’s bedroom also should be sustained under the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement. See State v. Crawford, 659 N.W.2d 537, 543 (Iowa 19 2003) (setting forth the elements of this exception); State v. Carlson, 548 N.W.2d 138, 140–41 (Iowa 1996) (considering police officers’ entry into a home under the community caretaking exception). Likewise, we do not reach the State’s contention that the exclusionary rule does not apply in probation revocation proceedings. See Kain, 378 N.W.2d at 902–03 (holding that article I, section 8 does not require the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence in probation revocation proceedings).