Opinion ID: 885785
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Did the District Court err in limiting Hardy's use of the easement to ingress and egress, and therefore improperly enjoin him from performing maintenance, repair and improvements?

Text: ¶ 55 The Appellants contend that the February 14, 1996 permanent injunction prohibiting Hardy from performing repairs, maintenance, or improvements to the easement in question is contrary to all existing law. ¶ 56 The Guthries and Krages contend that due to Hardy's conduct in seeking to dramatically improve and expand the existing road, and therefore burden their interests, the District Court properly curtailed his use of the easement under principles of equity. ¶ 57 Our standard of review of this issue is whether the district court abused its discretion. We will not interfere with the district court's ruling unless a manifest abuse of discretion has been shown. See Knudson v. McDunn (1995), 271 Mont. 61, 64, 894 P.2d 295, 297 (citation omitted). ¶ 58 In determining whether the court abused its discretion, we are initially guided by statutory rules to which a court must adhere. For example, under § 27-19-105, MCA, an order granting an injunction must (1) set forth the reasons for its issuance; (2) be specific in its terms; (3) describe in reasonable detail, and not by reference to the complaint or any other document, the act or acts sought to be restrained; and (4) be binding only upon the parties to the action; their officers, agents, employees, and attorneys; and those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the order by personal service or otherwise. ¶ 59 As for the specific issue of repair and maintenance, the general rule is that the owner of the easement has not only the right but the duty to keep it in repair, and the owner of the servient tenement is under no duty to maintain or repair it in the absence of an agreement. See Laden v. Atkeson (1941), 112 Mont. 302, 306, 116 P.2d 881, 883; 25 Am.Jur.2d, Easements and Licences § 94 at 666-67 (1996). ¶ 60 Here, in sum, the District Court concluded that Hardy was incapable of responsibly exercising his non-possessory rights associated with repairing and maintaining the easement burdening the Guthries' and Krages' property, and therefore enjoined him from any activity other than using the easement for temporary secondary access in the event his primary access becomes impaired. As this Court stated in Laden v. Atkeson , the owner of a dominant estate having an easement, has the right to enter upon the servient estate and make repairs necessary for the reasonable and convenient use of the easement, doing no unnecessary injury to the servient estate. Laden, 112 Mont. at 306, 116 P.2d at 883. ¶ 61 Nevertheless, the court's 1996 injunction, and 1999 order and judgment which reaffirmed the injunction, do not spell out which of the named parties to this action now carries the obligation to maintain the road, in particular the portion that crosses the Nine Mile Creek and enters the north-end of Section 12, which is not used by either the Guthries or the Krages as an access route. For example, it is not clear from the 1999 order and judgment whether Appellants Arno and Miller may maintainbut not improve or expandthe easement. Alternatively, it is not clear whether the Krages and Guthries must nowin the absence of any agreement between the partiesmaintain the entire easement for the benefit of the Appellants' use, however limited their use may be under the court's order. Further, it is not clear which of the foregoing parties has the burden of fronting the costs for repair and maintenance. ¶ 62 In light of these lingering uncertainties, we conclude that the court's injunction was not specific in its terms nor did it describe in reasonable detail ... the act or acts sought to be restrained or specifically which parties would be bound as required under § 27-19-105, MCA. Obviously, the ultimate goal of the court was to equitably resolve this dispute once and for all. The parties here, however, have identified a potential issue for future dispute. Accordingly, we remand for the limited purpose of clarifying the issue of maintenance and repair on the entire easement road.