Opinion ID: 2219142
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: CERTIFIED ISSUEâ SUPPRESSION OF PHYSICAL EVIDENCE

Text: ś 30. As noted, the court of appeals certified the question: Should physical evidence obtained as the direct result of a Miranda violation be suppressed when the violation was an intentional attempt to prevent the suspect from exercising his Fifth Amendment rights? [8] ś 31. The State concedes that at the time Knapp identified the physical evidence, i.e. his sweatshirt, he was in custody and being interrogated by police. Further, the State does not dispute that Knapp's pointing to the sweatshirt was testimonial in nature. Consequently, the State does not challenge either the circuit court's conclusion that the police violated Knapp's Miranda rights or its subsequent decision to suppress in the State's case-in-chief all of the statements the police obtained in violation of Miranda. ś 32. However, Knapp asks this court to reverse the circuit court's ruling and hold that the physical evidence in this case, his sweatshirt, should be suppressed as well because the clothing was identified by Knapp in response to questions put to him without being advised of, and then waiving his rights, as required by Miranda. The clothing obtained, he argues, was the inadmissible fruit of the Miranda violation. ś 33. Moreover, Knapp argues that the circuit court wrongly relied on Yang to hold that physical evidence discovered as a direct result of a statement obtained in violation of Miranda is still admissible despite the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. Yang, 233 Wis. 2d 545, ś 14. Knapp points out that Yang relied upon the Elstad-Tucker [9] rule for its reasoning. The decisions in Elstad and Tucker rest on the premise that a Miranda violation is not a constitutional violation, and that Miranda was not a constitutional imperative, but a mere prophylactic standard. ś 34. Knapp argues that the premise underlying Elstad, Tucker, and Yang has arguably been disavowed by the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Dickerson, 530 U.S. 428, which upheld the viability of Miranda as a decision that announced a constitutional rule. ś 35. Accordingly, Knapp maintains that Yang is no longer good law, because Miranda is a constitutional rule, and physical evidence obtained in violation of that rule is inadmissible under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. ś 36. Knapp also maintains that appellate court decisions, in light of Dickerson, have been mixed. As a result, Knapp argues that this court must look at the mindset of the questioning officer in failing to Mirandize Knapp. ś 37. Knapp argues that the rationale of Yang depends upon the premise that a Miranda violation is a mere errorâ the type of mistake that is unavoidable in regular police work. Knapp maintains that this premise does not work in this case because: (1) Roets knew of the requirement to Mirandize suspects in custody (R. 102:79-80; Def. App. 362-63); and (2) Roets knew that Knapp was unlikely to respond to questions if he was advised of his rights (R. 102:120, 123-24; Def. App. 377, 379-80). Therefore, Knapp argues, this was no benign error, as Roets deliberately chose to disregard Miranda. ś 38. The State disagrees with Knapp and asks that this court uphold the circuit court's ruling that the physical evidence is admissible. ś 39. As noted, the State concedes that Roets violated the requirements of Miranda when, without advice and waiver of rights, he asked Knapp what clothing he had been wearing the evening of December 11 and early morning of December 12. As a result, the State agrees that Knapp's statements in response to that question should not be admissible in the State's case-in-chief. The State nevertheless argues that Knapp's clothing is not subject to suppression for the Miranda violation. ś 40. The State argues that Yang stands for the proposition that if the non- Mirandized statement was voluntary, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine does not apply because the statement was not unconstitutionally obtained. Yang, 233 Wis. 2d, ś 3. If the statements leading the police to the physical evidence were voluntary, that evidence is admissible. Id. In support of its argument the State contends that the Yang holding is supported by Elstad and Tucker. ś 41. The State argues that Dickerson does not abrogate the holding in Yang because it did not overrule Tucker or Elstad. ś 42. In support of its argument the State points out that other courts have applied the Elstad-Tucker rule after Dickerson. The State cites the Third Circuit case of United States v. DeSumma, 272 F.3d 176 (3d Cir. 2001), [10] and the Fourth Circuit's decision in United States v. Sterling, 283 F.3d 216 (4th Cir. 2002). [11]