Opinion ID: 519994
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The EPA's Toxic Limitations

Text: 303
304 The effluent limitations subject each discharger to the BAT limits for all regulated toxic pollutants. 233 Pursuant to the EPA's existing NPDES regulations, the permit writers will establish monitoring requirements for toxics on a case-by-case basis, but each plant must be monitored for each pollutant at least once per year. 234 305 Courtaulds and Ethyl argue that requiring all dischargers to monitor for compliance with the BAT1 limitations for all toxic pollutants is arbitrary because this will require expensive monitoring and some toxics are not likely to be present in particular wastestreams. They urge that they should be required to monitor only for those toxics likely to appear in their wastestreams. 306 The EPA contends that this challenge to the monitoring requirement is not ripe for review because monitoring requirements will be, but have not yet been, established on a case-by-case basis. The EPA's response misses the point. The petitioners are not directly challenging the frequency of monitoring but the requirement that all dischargers must monitor their effluents for all toxics, not only for those that could be expected to be found. This issue is therefore ripe for review. 307 On the merits the EPA states that its requirement that all dischargers must comply with the effluent limitations for all priority pollutants is based on evidence and comments indicating that OCPSF plants engage in such diverse production processes that they cannot guarantee against the existence of priority pollutants in their wastestreams. 235 Therefore, the EPA argues, its regulations must be industry-wide. Furthermore, the EPA points out that the regulations provide that monitoring frequencies will be established on a case-by-case basis by the individual NPDES permit writer, taking into account the likelihood that certain pollutants will or will not be found in a particular discharger's wastestream. 236 308 The EPA has provided a rational reason for the need for an industry-wide rule and has provided a flexible mechanism for the mitigation of any harsh economic consequences of the rule. The rule is therefore not arbitrary.
309 Courtaulds claims that the EPA failed to give adequate notice that it intended to subject all dischargers to the limitations for all toxics. In a 1985 notice of proposed rulemaking the EPA announced: 310 EPA has decided to promulgate a single set of BAT limitations which would be applicable to all OCPSF facilities. (However, permits would tailor these requirements somewhat to account for the fact that most OCPSF plants routinely discharge only a subset of pollutants covered by the BAT limitations ...). 237 311 The notice listed three options the EPA was considering for establishing monitoring requirements. The first of these options, and the one ultimately adopted by the Agency, stated: 312 (1) Limiting all pollutants covered by the regulation in the permit and as a pretreatment standard, but requiring frequent monitoring only for pollutants of concern. Other pollutants would be monitored for compliance only occasionally (e.g., once or twice per year). 238 313 The notice made it clear that the EPA was considering subjecting all dischargers to the limits for all toxics. Courtaulds' challenge is without merit.
314 Courtaulds also claims that the EPA violated section 8(a)(iii) of the consent decree in NRDC v. Train, which provides that the EPA may exclude from regulation pollutants found only in trace amounts. 239 Although the decree provides that the EPA may exclude such pollutants from regulation, nothing in the consent decree requires the EPA to do so. Even if, therefore, this is the proper court in which to complain of noncompliance with the decree, a point we do not decide, no such violation has been shown. 315