Opinion ID: 1913200
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Trial court erred in defining health care.

Text: All property in this state is subject to taxation unless expressly exempted by statute. South Dakota Education Association v. Dromey, 85 S.D. 630, 188 N.W.2d 833 (1971). SDCL 10-4-9.3 states that non-profit corporations may be exempt if used primarily for human health care and health care related purposes. However, the statute fails to define these terms. Consistent with precedent, the trial court sought to give the terms their plain, ordinary, and popular meaning by using Black's Law Dictionary and Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary as guides. See Northwestern Bell v. Public Util. Comm'n, 467 N.W.2d 468 (S.D.1991); Lien v. Rowe, 77 S.D. 422, 92 N.W.2d 922 (1958). Health care, per the trial court, became the attention to maintaining a state of soundness of the mind and body, and promoting freedom from pain or sickness. Comparing this definition to wellness as defined by the State Health Plan, the trial court concluded that a wellness program implementing lifestyle changes, diet, nutrition and exercise is tax exempt under SDCL 10-4-9.3. Again we note that statutes allowing a tax exemption are strictly and narrowly construed in favor of the taxing power and are given a reasonable, natural and practical meaning to effectuate the purpose for which the exemption was granted. Lutherans Outdoors, 475 N.W.2d at 145; State & City Sales Tax Liability, 437 N.W.2d at 211. Such reasonable, natural and practical meaning, as intended by the Legislature, is best determined through statutory language. Norgeot v. State, 334 N.W.2d 501, 503 (S.D.1983). Therefore, we first look to the definition of health care as provided by SDCL 34-12C-1(1): any care, treatment, service or procedure to maintain, diagnose or treat a person's physical or mental condition. The term also includes admission to, and personal and custodial care provided by, a licensed health care facility as defined in § 34-12-1.1[.] This statute, adopted in 1990, was in effect when the trial court rendered its definition. There was no need for the trial court to construct its own version. Furthermore, SDCL 10-4-9.3 provides guidance in its last sentence: such health care facility must admit all persons for treatment consistent with the facility's ability to provide medical services required by the patient. Said statute refers to treatment and medical services, a clear reference to assistance of the sick and injured, not a general promotion of health. Additionally, the Legislature has since defined health care provider under SDCL 34-12D-1(3): any person who is licensed, certified or otherwise authorized by law to administer health care in the ordinary course of business or practice of a profession, including any person employed by or acting for any such authorized person[.] Health care facility in 1991 was defined per SDCL 34-12-1.1(3) as: any institution, sanitarium, maternity home, ambulatory surgery center, chemical dependency treatment facility, hospital, nursing home, supervised personal care facility, place, building or agency in which any accommodation is maintained, furnished or offered for the hospitalization, nursing care or supervised care of the sick or injured[.] As these definitions consistently show, the care and treatment of the sick and injured is the very purpose of a health care facility. Though these definitions are from other chapters in the Code, they are proffered for determining legislative intent. In re Kindle, 509 N.W.2d 278 (S.D.1993). Not only does the trial court's definition conflict with the statutes, it is overly broad. Any fitness activity would be tax exempt under the trial court's definition. Such exemption would include these Center activities: Dive-in Movies, Santa Soccer, Beachball Volleyball, Splashbash Parties, Birthday Parties, basketball and racquetball. When the Legislature provided a tax exemption for human health care and human health care related purposes, it did not intend to give a tax exemption for Splashbash Parties. Despite the Center's mandate on health over physique, we find it contrary to SDCL 34-12D-1 to associate these fitness activities with human health care per SDCL 10-4-9.3. Albeit preventive medicine may be the current trend, rather than the traditional method, of disease prevention, we would be guilty of enlarging SDCL 10-4-9.3 beyond its face if we permitted tax exemptions for these activities simply because they provide some health benefits. Matter of Estate of Pejsa, 459 N.W.2d 243, 246 (S.D.1990); Simpson v. Tobin, 367 N.W.2d 757, 763 (S.D.1985). Rather, we view that statutory duty to rest with the Legislature. Following the logic of the trial court's definition, we note a conflict with the Center's own stipulation that the cafeteria and pro shop are not tax exempt. Presumably under the trial court's definition, if the cafeteria provided health foods related to maintaining a state of soundness of the mind and body, the cafeteria would be tax exempt. Again, if the pro shop sold items used for general fitness, which related to maintaining a state of soundness of the mind and body, the pro shop would be tax exempt. As exemplified, the trial court's definition encompasses a broad spectrum of health care. We find that the Center inter-mixes too many activities that go beyond the natural and practical meaning to effectuate the purpose for which [an] exemption [is] granted. Lutherans Outdoors, 475 N.W.2d at 145.