Opinion ID: 1254168
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Unnecessary Security Procedures.

Text: After hearing from law enforcement officers responsible for maintaining custody of appellant while he was confined in the Santa Cruz County jail and for court security, [16] the trial court permitted, over defense objection, screening of all persons who entered the courtroom. Security provisions included use of a hand-held metal detecting wand, patdown of outer clothing, examination of bags and purses for weapons, locking the courtroom door, and positioning an extra deputy in the courtroom with two additional deputies outside the courtroom. Until a jury was selected, the screening included prospective jurors who often appeared en masse for a hardship voir dire in advance of the sequestered individual voir dire. At that time prospective jurors in Santa Cruz County were not given identification badges and therefore could not be distinguished from the general public. Appellant now contends that the trial court erred in failing to require the law enforcement officials responsible for courtroom security to justify the security measures at a hearing in which he could examine them regarding the facts on which they based their belief that these measures should be employed. He repeats his claim that these extraordinary security preeautions implied that he was dangerous and frightening, thereby denying him a fair trial. The record fails to support the latter claim. Instead, it suggests that those prospective jurors who were questioned about the subject during voir dire viewed it as a routine procedure like that at an airport, a good idea, indicative that there was something important or a big or severe case, and made some persons (not necessarily jurors) feel like criminals. No prospective juror responses during voir dire about either their own reactions or those of other persons whose comments they overheard expressed concern that appellant might be dangerous. Those who speculated at all thought that the security might be due to danger from persons entering the courtroom as spectators. No juror who actually sat on the case is identified as being a person who believed that the security precautions were instituted because the defendant was dangerous and, as appellant concedes, once the jury was selected the jurors were no longer subjected to search. Neither due process nor any other constitutional right of a criminal defendant mandates a hearing on the necessity for courtroom or courthouse security. Appellant's attempt to analogize the courtroom security measures of which he complains to shackling and other physical restraint of a defendant, and his reliance on authority related to that practice is unpersuasive. Both this court and the United States Supreme Court have recognized that the use of security personnel, even in the courtroom, is not so inherently prejudicial that it must be justified by a state interest specific to the trial. The chief feature that distinguishes the use of identifiable security officers from courtroom practices we might find inherently prejudicial is the wider range of inferences that a juror might reasonably draw from the officers' presence. While shackling and prison clothes are unmistakable indications of the need to separate a defendant from the community at large, the presence of guards at a defendant's trial need not be interpreted as a sign that he is particularly dangerous or culpable. Jurors may just as easily believe that the officers are there to guard against disruptions emanating from outside the courtroom or to ensure that tense courtroom exchanges do not erupt into violence. Indeed, it is entirely possible that jurors will not infer anything at all from the presence of the guards.... Our society has become inured to the presence of armed guards in most public places; they are doubtless taken for granted so long as their numbers or weaponry do not suggest particular official concern or alarm. ( Holbrook v. Flynn (1986) 475 U.S. 560, 569, 106 S.Ct. 1340, 89 L.Ed.2d 525; see also People v. Duran (1976) 16 Cal.3d 282, 291, 127 Cal.Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322, fn. 8 [Unless they are present in unreasonable numbers, such presence need not be justified by the court or the prosecutor.].) In Holbrook v. Flynn, supra, 475 U.S. 560, 106 S.Ct. 1340, 89 L.Ed.2d 525, the high court opted for a case-by-case consideration of whether challenged security measures are so inherently prejudicial as to deny the defendant the constitutional right to a fair trial. The court recognized that jurors' initial reaction at the outset of a trial is not dispositive as the jurors may not be aware of the impact the practice will have on their attitude toward the accused. Therefore, the court must determine only whether the security practice or practices presented an unacceptable risk that impermissible factors will come into play. ( Id. at p. 570, 106 S.Ct. 1340.) The court should look at the scene presented to jurors and determine whether what they saw was so inherently prejudicial as to pose an unacceptable threat to defendant's right to a fair trial; if the challenged practice is not found inherently prejudicial and if the defendant fails to show actual prejudice, the inquiry is over. ( Id. at p. 572, 106 S.Ct. 1340.) A trial court has broad power to maintain courtroom security and orderly proceedings. (Code Civ. Proa, § 128; People v. Woodward (1992) 4 Cal.4th 376, 385, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 434, 841 P.2d 954; People v. Merkouris (1956) 46 Cal.2d 540, 556, 297 P.2d 999.) That discretion was not abused here. Appellant has not demonstrated actual prejudice, and we find nothing in the description of the security measures utilized at his trial in the Santa Cruz County Superior Court that is so inherently prejudicial as to warrant a conclusion that in reaching a verdict the jurors might have been affected by their observation of those measures.