Opinion ID: 2444991
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Sister State Case Law

Text: The defendant relies specifically on state constitutional case law from ten states, Alaska, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Washington and Wyoming in support of his argument that we should interpret article first, § 7, to preclude, in the context of a routine traffic stop, requests for consent to search and other questioning unrelated to the purpose of the stop. [45] Only those cases from Alaska, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Wyoming warrant any significant discussion. [46] In our view, the most comprehensive and persuasive of these cited decisions is State v. Carty, 170 N.J. 632, 635, 790 A.2d 903, modified, 174 N.J. 351, 806 A.2d 798 (2002), wherein the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded, under that state's constitution, that in order for a consent to search a motor vehicle and its occupants to be valid, law enforcement personnel must have a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing prior to seeking consent to search a lawfully stopped motor vehicle. The court emphasized its long history of elevating state constitutional protections beyond those provided by the fourth amendment in the area of consent searches, including its separate requirement, in contravention of Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, supra, 412 U.S. at 248-49, 93 S.Ct. 2041, that individuals give knowing and voluntary consent to searches. State v. Carty, supra, at 639, 790 A.2d 903, discussing State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 354, 346 A.2d 66 (1975). Most significantly, the New Jersey court also relied upon an extensive record demonstrating that state police officers frequently had utilized coercive tactics that had violated both a federal consent decree and state police policy. [47] State v. Carty, supra, at 644-45, 790 A.2d 903; see also id., at 647, 790 A.2d 903 (reasonable suspicion rule serves the prophylactic purpose of preventing the police from turning a routine traffic stop into a fishing expedition for criminal activity unrelated to the stop). We decline to follow Carty because the record in the present case lacks the evidence of specific instances of law enforcement abuses by police officers in our jurisdiction similar to that which prompted the New Jersey court to interpret its state constitution to provide enhanced protections to motorists on that state's highways. See State v. Snell, 323 Mont. 157, 161, 99 P.3d 191 (2004) (declining to follow Carty because defendant does not arguemuch less establish that Montana law enforcement officers are abusing their authority). Like the New Jersey Supreme Court, the Minnesota Supreme Court has interpreted its state constitution to require that officers have reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity prior to asking for consent to search during a routine traffic stop. State v. Fort, 660 N.W.2d 415, 416 (Minn.2003). Fort, however, is legally inapposite, because in that case, the Minnesota court was constrained to follow its then recent precedent in a dog sniff case that had interpreted both the fourth amendment, pre- Illinois v. Caballes, supra, 543 U.S. at 408-409, 125 S.Ct. 834, and the state constitution, to limit the scope and duration of a traffic stop investigation... to the justification for the stop. [48] State v. Fort, supra, at 418; see id., at 418-19, discussing State v. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d 125, 135-37 (Minn.2002) (requiring reasonable and articulable suspicion of narcotics related activity to justify exterior dog sniff of car). Case law from the high courts of Massachusetts and Pennsylvania is similarly restrictive, as both states also do not permit police to inquire beyond the purpose of a traffic stop in the absence of a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The case law from these states, however, is not persuasive because of the cursory state constitutional analyses contained in those opinions. See Commonwealth v. Torres, 424 Mass. 153, 158, 674 N.E.2d 638 (1997) (police inquiry in a routine traffic stop must end on the production of a valid license and registration unless the police have grounds for inferring that either the operator or his passengers were involved in the commission of a crime ... or engaged in other suspicious conduct [internal quotation marks omitted]); [49] Commonwealth v. Strickler, 563 Pa. 47, 69, 757 A.2d 884 (2000) ([o]ur jurisprudence under [the Pennsylvania constitution], however, would not sustain a consent search conducted in the context of, but which is wholly unrelated in its scope to, an ongoing detention, since there can be no constitutionally-valid detention independently or following a traffic or similar stop absent reasonable suspicion ... and the scope of a detention is circumscribed by the reasons that justify it [citation omitted]); id., at 70 n. 20, 757 A.2d 884 ([a]s noted, [ Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868] and its progeny strongly suggest that a traffic stop [viewed as the equivalent of a Terry stop] is not an appropriate vehicle within which to make inquiries about potential unlawful conduct unrelated to the stop not supported by reasonable suspicion). [50] Indeed, we agree with a Pennsylvania appellate court's characterization of this point in Strickler as dicta. See Commonwealth v. Acosta, 815 A.2d 1078, 1087 n. 8 (Pa.Super.) (concluding on record that defendant's consent to search during traffic stop was product of coercion and citing Strickler in dicta for proposition that there is some question regarding the constitutionality of [the police officer's] attempt to secure [the defendant's] consent during the investigative detention), appeal denied, 576 Pa. 710, 839 A.2d 350 (2003). In O'Boyle v. State, 117 P.3d 401, 411 (Wyo.2005), the Wyoming Supreme Court did not adopt a specific rule such as that followed in State v. Carty, supra, 170 N.J. 632, 790 A.2d 903, but emphasized a reasonableness inquiry influenced by local factors, specifically, the fact that Wyoming's location along a nationally recognized drug trafficking corridor likely results in a disproportionately large percentage of Wyoming's disproportionately small population being subjected to what have become routine requests to relinquish their privacy rights by detention, invasive questioning and searchesall without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity other than the offense giving rise to the stop. [51] Given the fact that the defendant had not yet been placed under arrest and there was no reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, the court then concluded that the scope of the traffic stop had been improperly expanded because he had been detained in the cruiser during the stop and questioned extensively about his family, travel plans and profession. O'Boyle v. State, supra, at 410. Aside from O'Boyle's lack of a specific legal standard beyond reasonableness, [52] it is factually inapposite given the brief and limited questioning that took place in this case prior to the defendant volunteering permission for Morgan to search the Altima. [53] With respect to state constitutional decisions issued after the United States Supreme Court's decision in Muehler v. Mena, supra, 544 U.S. 93, 125 S.Ct. 1465, the Kansas decision relied upon by both Justice Katz in her dissent and the defendant, State v. Smith, 286 Kan. 402, 184 P.3d 890, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 628, 172 L.Ed.2d 639 (2008), is facially on-point but, upon closer review, ultimately lacking in persuasive value. In Smith, the court concluded that Muehler v. Mena, supra, at 100-101, 125 S.Ct. 1465, does not [allow] law enforcement officers to expand the scope of a traffic stop to include a search not related to the purpose of the stop, even if a detainee has given permission for the search. Rather, we continue to adhere to our longstanding rule that consensual searches during the period of a detention for a traffic stop are invalid under the [f]ourth [a]mendment... and [the state constitution]. [54] State v. Smith, supra, at 419, 184 P.3d 890. Smith is unpersuasive because it lacks an independent state constitutional analysis. Moreover, as noted previously, the Kansas Supreme Court's more recent decision in State v. Morlock, supra, 289 Kan. at 988, 218 P.3d 801, makes clear that, to the extent Smith is analyzing the federal constitution, it no longer is good law because Arizona v. Johnson, supra, 129 S.Ct. at 787-88, eliminated any doubt that the Muehler rationale applied to traffic stops. [55] See also footnote 28 of this opinion. Finally, we find the Alaska Court of Appeals decision in Brown v. State, 182 P.3d 624 (Alaska App.2008), to lack persuasive value because of a significant internal inconsistency in the opinion. The Alaska court relied on a comprehensive survey of academic literature and existing case law; id., at 630-32; in support of its determination that federal law does not afford sufficient protection to motorists who are asked to consent to a search of their person, their vehicle, or their belongings during a traffic stop. [56] Id., at 629. The court observed that, because most people need to travel by car, and because of the near-inevitability that people will commit traffic infractions, the `routine' traffic stop has become the doorway to widespread and probing searches of persons, vehicles, and luggage. Id., at 631-32. The Alaska court then stated that [t]he facts of this case present an example of an apparently ongoing and unjustified infringement of the privacy rights of Alaska citizens. And, as we have explained here, it is uncertain whether the [fourth amendment] offers any remedy. We therefore conclude that [the Alaska state constitution] must be interpreted to grant broader protections than its federal counterpart in situations like this. Id., at 633-34. Curiously, however, the Alaska court then backpedaled somewhat, and stated that, we need not decide whether [the state constitution] should be interpreted to completely preclude requests for searches during a routine traffic stop unless the search is related to the ground for the stop or is otherwise supported by a reasonable suspicion of criminality. We leave that question for another day. Id., at 634. The court then held simply that the record in Brown present[ed] a particularly egregious example of this police practice because of the trooper's failure to inform the defendant of the reason for the stop or its disposition prior to requesting consent to search. Id. Justice Katz' attempts to salvage Brown notwithstanding, this limitation necessarily diminishes the persuasive value of the case in support of the defendant's request for a specific state constitutional rule in Connecticut. See also Murphy v. Anchorage, Alaska Court of Appeals, Docket No. A-10345, No. 5576, 2010 WL 986688, , 2010 Alaska App. LEXIS 28,  (March 17, 2010) (memorandum opinion) (noting that defendant misinterprets Brown by asserting that we did adopt this general restriction on police authority during traffic stops [emphasis in original]); Bostwick v. State, Alaska Court of Appeals, Docket No. A-10224, No. 5569, 2010 WL 668947, , 2-3, 2010 Alaska App. LEXIS 21, , 7-8 (February 24, 2010) (memorandum opinion) (describing Brown as limited to its facts and stating that this case, which involved far from a routine traffic stop, also does not require us to resolve issue of whether consent searches during routine traffic stops require reasonable suspicion).