Opinion ID: 3170825
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Any person who, under circumstances or

Text: conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death, [1] willfully causes or permits any child to suffer, or [2] inflicts thereon unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering, or [3] having the care or custody of any child, willfully causes or permits the person or health of that child to be injured, or [4] willfully causes or permits that child to be placed in a situation where his or her person or health is endangered, shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year, or in the state prison for two, four, or six years. (brackets and numbers added). It is undisputed here that section 273a(a) criminalizes conduct that would not necessarily entail any affirmative “use” of force, and encompasses passive, negligent conduct. For example, the statute criminalizes conduct that “permits any child to suffer,” “permits the person or health of that child to be injured,” and “permits that child to be placed in a situation where his or her person or health is endangered.” California case law confirms that section 273a(a) is an “omnibus statute,” meaning that a violation “can occur in a wide variety of situations: the definition broadly includes both active and passive conduct, i.e., child abuse by direct assault and child RAMIREZ V. LYNCH 11 endangering by extreme neglect.” People v. Sargent, 970 P.2d 409, 414–15 (Cal. 1999) (quoting People v. Smith, 678 P.2d 886, 890–91 (Cal. 1984)). Although section 273a(a) requires a mens rea of “willful[ness]” for the three prongs of the statute that criminalize indirect infliction of harm or passive conduct, the California Supreme Court has interpreted “willful[ness]” in this context to require proof only of criminal negligence. People v. Valdez, 42 P.3d 511, 519–20 (Cal. 2002) (holding that criminal negligence is the appropriate standard for the indirect infliction prongs of section 273a(a), and explaining that “[w]e do not think the Legislature’s use of the word ‘willful’ is inconsistent with a criminal negligence standard”); see also People v. Peabody, 119 Cal. Rptr. 780 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975), cited with approval by Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d 852, 866–67, 880 (Cal. 1988). Because willfulness under section 273a(a) does not require greater proof of culpability than criminal negligence, willfulness in this context does not meet the definition of “‘use’ of force” elucidated by the Court in Leocal. 543 U.S. at 9–10; see also Fernandez-Ruiz, 466 F.3d at 1132. A review of California case law confirms that courts have applied section 273a(a) to criminally negligent conduct. See, e.g., People v. Kinkead, 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 121 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (affirming the conviction of a defendant who fell asleep next to his three-year-old daughter, after ingesting methamphetamine, marijuana, and alcohol and being up for days, and asphyxiated her); People v. Toney, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 578 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (affirming the conviction of a defendant who left several containers of highly flammable and caustic chemicals on the floor of a residence inhabited by his wife’s six-year-old son). Thus, we agree with the government that section 273a(a) is not a categorical match to the federal 12 RAMIREZ V. LYNCH generic definition of a crime of violence because it criminalizes conduct that falls outside this definition. While section 273a(a) is not categorically a crime of violence, the indirect and direct infliction prongs of the statute are phrased in the disjunctive. Therefore, we next consider whether section 273a(a) is divisible. Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2284–85; see also Medina-Lara v. Holder, 771 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2014). We hold that it is not.