Opinion ID: 2638434
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Miranda/involuntariness

Text: Defendant first contends the prosecution failed to make even a threshold showing [of voluntariness] because they failed to demonstrate that appellant was informed of his Miranda rights. We recently explained the applicable law: When reviewing a trial court's decision on a motion that a statement was collected in violation of the defendant's rights under Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436 [86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694], we defer to the trial court's resolution of disputed facts, including the credibility of witnesses, if that resolution is supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] Considering those facts, as found, together with the undisputed facts, we independently determine whether the challenged statement was obtained in violation of Miranda's rules [citation], that is, whether (assuming the defendant was in custody) the statement was preceded by the now-famous admonition of Miranda rights: the defendant has the right to remain silent, any statement he might make can be used against him, he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and an attorney will be provided at state expense if he cannot afford one. ( Dickerson v. United States (2000) 530 U.S. 428, 435 [120 S.Ct. 2326, 147 L.Ed.2d 405]....) [¶] If a custodial defendant requests counsel, all questioning must cease. ( Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 482 [101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378]....) Statements made by a custodial defendant in the absence of Miranda warnings are inadmissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief. ( People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 918, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103.) Neither side disputes that Quinn and McCarthy were interrogating defendant or that defendant was in custody. The only issues, then, are whether substantial evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that defendant was given Miranda warnings before giving his June 17th statement, whether he invoked his right to counsel, and whether he was tricked into waiving his rights by improper police deception. Both officers testified that Quinn informed defendant of his rights, and their testimony was supported by the actual card defendant had signed. The trial court specifically accepted the officers' testimony as truthful; consequently, substantial evidence supports the court's resolution of the issue. Normally this would suffice to conclude no violation of the familiar Miranda rules occurred. Defendant contends, however, that Quinn's failure to record the Miranda admonition and defendant's waiver is suspicious. Indeed, defendant argues Quinn took quite a bit of trouble not to record the Miranda admonition and waiver. As indicated, however, Quinn explained the circumstances that led to the partial recording: he secretly turned on his hidden tape recorder after defendant had waived his rights and, when the tape ran out, decided against putting in a new tape for fear of distracting defendant. We assume the trial court considered the plausibility of this explanation together with Sergeant Quinn's credibility before it ruled in the People's favor. We also assume the court considered the fact that the officers had engaged in small talk before interrogating defendant. Unlike defendant, we cannot assume such pre-interview banter necessarily suggests the Miranda warning was jokingly delivered or was otherwise conveyed in a manner lacking the solemnity defendant argues such warnings require. The officers explained they wished to place defendant at ease before starting the interrogation. The trial court observed the officers testify, and we assume it evaluated their credibility on this issue. To the extent defendant suggests that by engaging in small talk Quinn and McCarthy improperly soften[ed] him up before extracting a Miranda waiver, we disagree. First, we find defendant did not raise this objection in his moving papers below. As a result, the parties had no incentive to fully litigate this theory below, and the trial court had no opportunity to resolve material factual disputes and make necessary factual findings ( People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 339, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 296, 914 P.2d 846), such as the nature and effect of the type of small talk in which the officers engaged. We conclude the objection was not preserved for appeal. ( Ibid. ) Second, even assuming for argument the issue was preserved, we find it lacks merit. We have explained that [w]hen the waiver results from a clever softening-up of a defendant through disparagement of the victim and ingratiating conversation, the subsequent decision to waive without a Miranda warning must be deemed to be involuntary for the same reason that an incriminating statement made under police interrogation without a Miranda warning is deemed to be involuntary. ( People v. Honeycutt (1977) 20 Cal.3d 150, 160-161, 141 Cal.Rptr. 698, 570 P.2d 1050.) But unlike in Honeycutt, neither Quinn nor McCarthy discussed the victim. Nor is there any other evidence suggesting that the manner in which Quinn and McCarthy engaged in small talk overbore defendant's free will. Honeycutt is thus distinguishable. Defendant argues due process requires application of a blanket rule requiring that all interrogations, including the Miranda warnings and waivers, be tape-recorded to facilitate later determinations of voluntariness. He cites Stephan v. State (Alaska 1985) 711 P.2d 1156 in support. While we have no wish to discourage law enforcement officials from recording such interrogations, we have already found that such a blanket rule is not required to protect the due process rights of those being interrogated ( People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 663-665, 63 Cal. Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213), and defendant fails to raise any argument convincing us that Holt was incorrectly decided. Defendant next contends his Miranda waiver was vitiated by Quinn and McCarthy's promise that anything defendant told them, we're going to keep between us. He claims such a promise was diametrically opposed to the statement that whatever [defendant] told the police officers could and would be used against him in a court of law. If the police had actually promised defendant his statements would not be used against him, contrary to the earlier Miranda warning, an error of constitutional dimension would have occurred. (See, e.g., People v. Quartermain (1997) 16 Cal.4th 600, 66 Cal. Rptr.2d 609, 941 P.2d 788.) As with the previous claim that the officers softened him up, defendant did not raise in his moving papers below the claim that he spoke in reliance on the officers' promise not to divulge his statements to anyone. Accordingly, the officers were not asked to explain the meaning of their assertion that they would keep between us defendant's revelations. [10] Consequently, the objection was not preserved for appeal. ( People v. Ray, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 339, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 296, 914 P.2d 846.) Even were we to assume the issue is properly before us, we find defendant's claim cannot be sustained, for the record does not support a conclusion that the officers made a promise to hold defendant's statements in confidence, or that defendant understood their comments as constituting such a promise. To begin with, the record is somewhat ambiguous and should be placed in context. In the course of the long interrogation, Detective McCarthy explained to defendant that Garrison had placed the blame for the crime primarily on defendant. McCarthy explained that [w]e're interested in this guy, Mark [Garrison]. OK, obviously we can't tell you everything. But he knows certain things about this case ... too. McCarthy told defendant the district attorney had not yet charged Garrison because of Garrison's allegations suggesting defendant was the actual killer. When defendant retorted, That ain't true, McCarthy responded: Well, we know [it] isn't. Only because of, No. 1, what he said, and No. 2 what some other people have told us. OK, again, I can't go into what the other people have told us because, what you tell us we're going to keep between us. Just like if somebody else tells us something, you know, that's why like I told you, we're going to know. (Italics added.) Despite this fleeting comment, defendant continued to deny his involvement. Placed in context, McCarthy's statement that what you tell us we're going to keep between us is but a fleeting comment during a long interrogation that was meant to communicate to defendant why the officers could not reveal everything Garrison had told them. Reading the whole transcript, we conclude McCarthy did not promise defendant that his statements would remain confidential, nor did defendant understand McCarthy's comment to mean that all that was said would remain confidential. Finally, defendant makes no showing he understood McCarthy's brief comment to vitiate the Miranda warning given just minutes earlier. We conclude that, assuming the issue was preserved for appeal, the officers did not promise defendant his comments would remain confidential. Accordingly, we find no Miranda violation. To the extent defendant separately contends his statements were involuntary due to the officers' promises, we also find the trial court's rejection of this claim was proper.