Opinion ID: 1187285
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Heading: scope and intent of the apa

Text: Where a particular administrative proceeding not specifically exempted from the operation of the APA nonetheless clearly lies outside the scope and intent of the act, the provisions of the act will not apply. See for example Olson v. University of Wash., 89 Wn.2d 558, 573 P.2d 1308 (1978). That is the case here. The rigid, formal and time-consuming procedures created by the APA are clearly not designed to deal with the unique problems of enforcing disciplinary rules within a prison. See Clardy v. Levi, 545 F.2d 1241 (9th Cir.1976). In light of the nature of the prison setting and the needs of prison administrators to determine discipline matters fairly and swiftly, while preserving calm and order within the institution, it is apparent that the procedures of the APA are wholly inappropriate to prison disciplinary matters. The reasons for which APA procedures are not appropriate stem from the unique needs and objectives of penal institutions and the limited scope of due process rights to which a prison resident is entitled. In Wolff v. McDonald, 418 U.S. 539, 560-67, 41 L.Ed.2d 935, 94 S.Ct. 2963 (1974), the United States Supreme Court discussed both the unique nature of prison disciplinary proceedings and the scope of due process rights which apply. As noted by the Court, a prison is a tightly controlled environment populated by persons who have chosen to violate the criminal law, many of whom have employed violence to achieve their ends. Tension between guards and residents is unremitting; [f]rustration, resentment, and despair are commonplace. Wolff v. McDonald, supra at 562. In this setting disciplinary hearings must be conducted in such a way as to minimize the danger of heated confrontation, while preserving the due process rights to which the resident is entitled. The reality is that disciplinary hearings and the imposition of disagreeable sanctions necessarily involve confrontations between inmates and authority and between inmates who are being disciplined and those who would charge or furnish evidence against them. Retaliation is much more than a theoretical possibility; and the basic and unavoidable task of providing reasonable personal safety for guards and inmates may be at stake, to say nothing of the impact of disciplinary confrontations and the resulting escalation of personal antagonisms on the important aims of the correctional process. Wolff v. McDonald, supra at 562. With regard to the due process rights which must be afforded prison residents in this setting, the court stated: Viewed in this light it is immediately apparent that one cannot automatically apply procedural rules designed for free citizens in an open society ... to the very different situation presented by a disciplinary proceeding in a state prison. Wolff v. McDonald, supra at 560. The court concluded that a limited number of procedural safeguards must be afforded when a prison resident is subject to discipline for serious misconduct which may deprive him of a liberty interest. See also Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 47 L.Ed.2d 810, 96 S.Ct. 1551 (1976). In such cases a resident is constitutionally entitled to notice of the alleged violation, a written statement from the factfinder as to the evidence relied upon and the reason for any disciplinary action taken, and, where not unduly hazardous, a right to call witnesses and present documentary evidence. Wolff v. McDonald, supra at 563-66. Due process in such proceedings does not include the right of confrontation and cross-examination or, in most circumstances, the right to be represented by an attorney. Wolff v. McDonald, supra at 563-68. Confrontation and cross-examination in the prison context may indeed create a very real and physical danger to guards and residents alike. We contrast to these aspects of hearings in the prison setting the formal and rigid procedures prescribed by the APA. While prison hearings must take place swiftly, in many cases no more than 5 days after an event giving rise to the charge, no hearing may take place under the APA without at least 20 days' notice. RCW 34.04.090. Such a delay could have a substantial adverse effect on the rehabilitative function of the sanction imposed. Second, while confrontation and cross-examination in the prison setting may create tensions which disrupt and endanger the functioning of the institution, under the APA all parties have the right of cross-examination. RCW 34.04.100. It is thus apparent that application of the APA to prison disciplinary hearings would tend to be counterproductive and disruptive of the institutions' goals. Other features of the act also suggest it was not intended to apply in the prison discipline setting. Pursuant to the present regulations, written records of disciplinary hearings documenting the essential aspects of the proceedings are filed and made available for review when a resident is found guilty. Under the APA, however, all oral proceedings must be transcribed. RCW 34.04.090(5). Although statistics more recent than 1977 were not available to this court at the time of oral argument, it may safely be estimated that more than 5,000 prison disciplinary hearings take place each year in Washington adult correction institutions. Transcribing the proceedings of each of these hearings would require an expenditure of time and funds which was neither intended nor provided for by the legislature when the APA was enacted. Moreover, while the prison resident now may seek review in state courts through the traditional writs of habeas corpus, certiorari, and mandamus, as well as personal restraint petitions under RAP 16.3, the APA specifies that its procedures for judicial review are exclusive, leaving no other avenue for review if the time for review of an administrative action has expired. RCW 34.04.130. We do not believe such a restriction on the traditional avenues of review open to all residents of state penal institutions was the intent of the APA. Indeed, the writ of habeas corpus is expressly protected by Const. art. 4, § 4 and could not be denied by legislative act. In light of all these considerations, we find it quite clear that prison disciplinary hearings are not within the scope or intent of the administrative procedures act.