Opinion ID: 2791904
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Restitution to ACS

Text: According to Herrera, including $22,193.54 lost by ACS is contrary to the MVRA because ACS was not a victim of her offense of conviction. 1 The MVRA 1 Herrera also claims that the award to ACS is impermissible because, even though it arises from relevant conduct, she did not agree to pay restitution for losses arising from relevant conduct. Because Herrera’s plea agreement explicitly encompasses “restitution arising from all relevant conduct,” this argument is meritless. 5 Case: 14-10513 Document: 00512995779 Page: 6 Date Filed: 04/07/2015 No. 14-10513 requires defendants “to make full restitution for offenses in which an identifiable victim has suffered a pecuniary loss.” United States v. Beydoun, 469 F.3d 102, 107 (5th Cir. 2006). “[T]he term ‘victim’ means a person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of an offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(2). However, “if agreed to by the parties in a plea agreement, [the court shall also order] restitution to persons other than the victim of the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(3). Regardless whether ACS was a “victim” of Herrera’s offense of conviction, a defendant may enter a plea agreement to pay restitution beyond that which is required by the MVRA, and such an award to a non-victim may be proper. Herrera’s plea agreement explicitly permits “restitution to victims or to the community, which may be mandatory under the law, and which Herrera agree[d] may include restitution arising from all relevant conduct, not limited to that arising from the offense of conviction alone.” Alternatively, Herrera contends that the restitution provision of her plea agreement is ambiguous and thus should be construed in her favor. This argument is clearly foreclosed by our precedent in United States v. Miller. 406 F.3d 323, 330 (5th Cir. 2005). Like Herrera, the defendant in Miller entered a plea agreement to pay restitution “arising from all relevant conduct, not limited to that arising from the offenses of conviction alone.” 406 F.3d at 329. Miller contended this language was ambiguous. This court dismissed Miller’s ambiguity argument, stating that “[d]espite Miller’s protestations to the contrary, he did give his consent to the restitution.” Id. at 330 (internal quotation omitted). To avoid any confusion on the subject, the court further noted that “[t]here is, however, no ambiguity. . . .[Miller] agreed that by pleading guilty he recognized that the maximum penalties that might be imposed on him included restitution for all relevant conduct.” Id. Miller controls factually and legally and refutes Herrera’s ambiguity argument. 6 Case: 14-10513 Document: 00512995779 Page: 7 Date Filed: 04/07/2015 No. 14-10513