Opinion ID: 204341
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Textual Commitment to the Political Branches

Text: The dominant consideration in any political question inquiry is whether there is a `textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department.' Saldano v. O'Connell, 322 F.3d 365, 369 (5th Cir.2003) (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217, 82 S.Ct. 691). Appellants contend that this litigation does not involve a textual commitment to another branch, as the complaints merely require the court to interpret domestic antitrust law and apply it to conduct within the United States having only tangential effects on foreign affairs. In contrast, Appellees characterize the pleadings as seeking to condemn the actions of foreign sovereigns and interfere with the longstanding foreign policy of the political branches. Appellees point to several constitutional clauses as evidence that foreign policy is exclusively reserved to the political branches. In particular, they cite Article I, section 8, clause 3 (The Congress shall have the Power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations . . . .); Article II, section 2, clause 1 (The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States . . . .); Article II, section 2, clause 2 ([The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors [and] other public Ministers and Consuls . . . .); and Article II, section 3 ([The President] shall . . . receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers . . . .). In general, matters relating `to the conduct of foreign relations . . . are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference.' Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292, 101 S.Ct. 2766, 69 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981) (quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589, 72 S.Ct. 512, 96 L.Ed. 586 (1952)). [T]he conduct of foreign relations is committed by the Constitution to the political departments of the Federal Government; . . . the propriety of the exercise of that power is not open to judicial inquiry. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 222-23, 62 S.Ct. 552, 86 L.Ed. 796 (1942). This court has consistently followed the command that matters implicating foreign relations and military affairs are generally beyond the authority or competency of a court's adjudicative powers. Lane, 529 F.3d at 559 (citing Farmer v. Mabus, 940 F.2d 921, 923 (5th Cir.1991); Occidental of Umm al Qaywayn, Inc. v. A Certain Cargo of Petroleum, 577 F.2d 1196, 1203 (5th Cir.1978)). However, it cannot of course be thought that `every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance.' Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423, 84 S.Ct. 923, 11 L.Ed.2d 804 (1964) (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 211, 82 S.Ct. 691). A general invocation of foreign policy, without more, will not suffice. For example, in Japan Whaling, the Supreme Court held that a political question was not raised by a claim that asked the Court to command the Secretary of Commerce . . . to dishonor and repudiate an international agreement regarding limits on commercial whaling. 478 U.S. at 229, 106 S.Ct. 2860. The Japan Whaling Court proceeded to examine the merits of the claim in spite of the case's significant political overtones, noting that the interpretation of treaties and executive agreements is a recurring and accepted task for the federal courts. Id. at 230, 106 S.Ct. 2860. Unlike Japan Whaling, the case at bar does not present a purely legal question of statutory interpretation. Id. Adjudication of the claims before us would require that we review the considered foreign policy of the political branches, whichin contrast to those branches' chosen policy regarding the whaling quotas at issue in Japan Whaling is not codified in a treaty that we are merely asked to interpret. Moreover, in Japan Whaling, the Court was asked to compel U.S. officials to act according to the law, whereas in the instant matter, we are asked essentially to reprimand foreign nations and command them to dismantle their international agreements. Nor are we presented with a case in which a political question holding would require our predicate acceptance of an Executive Branch legal interpretation, such as (for example) the premise that de jure sovereignty is the touchstone of habeas corpus jurisdiction. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 755, 128 S.Ct. 2229, 171 L.Ed.2d 41 (2008). Appellants have alleged a price-fixing conspiracy involving OPEC member nations. We must analyze [this] claim as it would be tried, Occidental of Umm, 577 F.2d at 1202, and as we have already observed, a trial on Appellants' conspiracy claims requires an inquiry into whether Appellees entered into an agreement with OPEC member nations to fix prices. A pronouncement either way on the legality of other sovereigns' actions falls within the realm of delicate foreign policy questions committed to the political branches. By adjudicating this case, the panel would be reexamining critical foreign policy decisions, including the Executive Branch's longstanding approach of managing relations with foreign oil-producing states through diplomacy rather than private litigation, as discussed in the government's amicus brief and in several official statements of administration policy. [13] In accordance with this policy, the Department of Justice has, upon thorough consideration, declined to bring a Sherman Act case on behalf of the United States. Any merits ruling in this case, whether it vindicates or condemns the acts of OPEC member nations, would reflect a value judgment on their decisions and actionsa diplomatic determination textually committed to the political branches. As the Departments of State, Treasury, Energy, and Justice emphasize in their brief supporting affirmance, [14] adjudication of this case would result in the frustration of various objectives of vital interest to the United States' national security. The government's brief underscores that the damaging consequences of this litigation are likely to include immediate disruption of oil imports into the United States, the undermining of relationships with OPEC nations on issues such as counterterrorism and nuclear non-proliferation, the undermining of relationships with non-OPEC nations that have a stake in the questions presented here, and the frustration of other national priorities, including foreign investment in the United States by nations such as Saudi Arabia. Cf. Haig, 453 U.S. at 307, 101 S.Ct. 2766 ([F]oreign policy and national security considerations cannot neatly be compartmentalized.). As the briefing before us makes clear, access to petroleum products is essential to, among other concerns, our military and national defense infrastructure. A merits ruling in this case has the potential to interfere with our military's ability to access the requisite amounts of petroleum for ongoing military engagements and our national defense generally. Control over such vital military supplies is textually committed to the political branches. See Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10, 93 S.Ct. 2440, 37 L.Ed.2d 407 (1973) (The ultimate responsibility for decisions as to, inter alia, equipping[] and control of a military force is appropriately vested in branches of the government which are periodically subject to electoral accountability.); U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. For the foregoing reasons, we are persuaded that the foreign policy issues at stake in this case are textually committed to the political branches.