Opinion ID: 450588
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence on count four

Text: 23 Adi challenges his conviction on Count Four on grounds that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he was engaged in the business of dealing in firearms without a license. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(a)(1). 7 Specifically, Adi argues that the Government proved only that he had no license to deal in firearms but adduced no evidence showing that Adi actually sold any firearms, or that he offered any firearms for sale. On the other hand, the Government contends that while no direct evidence of firearms sales was presented, there was ample circumstantial evidence from which the jury could infer that Adi held guns available for sale. See United States v. Berry, 644 F.2d 1034, 1037 (5th Cir.1981); United States v. Wilmoth, 636 F.2d 123, 125 (5th Cir.1981); United States v. Shirling, 572 F.2d 532, 534 (5th Cir.1978). 24 Adi received a sentence on Count Four which is to run concurrently with those imposed on Counts Three and Six. Adi does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions on those counts. Thus, in the interest of judicial economy, we invoke the concurrent sentence doctrine to decline review of Adi's conviction of dealing in firearms without a license. United States v. Montemayor, 703 F.2d 109 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 89, 78 L.Ed.2d 97 (1983). Under this doctrine, the existence of one valid conviction may make unnecessary the review of other convictions when, as here, concurrent sentences have been given. United States v. Rubin, 591 F.2d 278, 280 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 864, 100 S.Ct. 133, 62 L.Ed.2d 87 (1979). To assure that Adi suffers no adverse consequences from our declining to review Count Four, we vacate the conviction on that count. Vacating the unreviewed conviction in no way alters the jury's verdict or the conviction itself. Instead, the effect of this judicial action is to suspend imposition of the sentence.... No need of the Government is impaired; at the same time, no possibility of adverse collateral consequences to [the defendant] exists. Montemayor, 703 F.2d at 116. See United States v. Cardona, 650 F.2d 54, 57-58 (5th Cir.1981). 25