Opinion ID: 1993626
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Heading: Common Law Retaliatory Discharge: Controlling Principles

Text: In Illinois, a noncontracted employee is one who serves at the employer's will, and the employer may discharge such an employee for any reason or no reason. Zimmerman v. Buchheit of Sparta, Inc., 164 Ill.2d 29, 32, 206 Ill.Dec. 625, 645 N.E.2d 877 (1994); accord Fellhauer v. City of Geneva, 142 Ill.2d 495, 505, 154 Ill.Dec. 649, 568 N.E.2d 870 (1991) (stating this court's adherence to rule that employer may discharge at-will employee for any or no reason); Price v. Carmack Datsun, Inc., 109 Ill.2d 65, 67, 92 Ill.Dec. 548, 485 N.E.2d 359 (1985) (stating accepted general rule that in an employment at will there is no limitation on the right of an employer to discharge an employee). However, an exception to this general rule of at-will employment arises where there has been a retaliatory discharge of the employee. Price, 109 Ill.2d at 67, 92 Ill.Dec. 548, 485 N.E.2d 359. This court has recognized a limited and narrow cause of action for the tort of retaliatory discharge. Fellhauer, 142 Ill.2d at 505, 154 Ill.Dec. 649, 568 N.E.2d 870, citing Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill.2d 124, 52 Ill.Dec. 13, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill.2d 172, 23 Ill.Dec. 559, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978). To state a valid retaliatory discharge cause of action, an employee must allege that (1) the employer discharged the employee, (2) in retaliation for the employee's activities, and (3) that the discharge violates a clear mandate of public policy. Fellhauer, 142 Ill.2d at 505, 154 Ill.Dec. 649, 568 N.E.2d 870; Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Co., 106 Ill.2d 520, 529, 88 Ill.Dec. 628, 478 N.E.2d 1354 (1985); Palmateer, 85 Ill.2d at 134, 52 Ill.Dec. 13, 421 N.E.2d 876. Surveying many cases from across the country, this court in Palmateer discussed the meaning of clearly mandated public policy: There is no precise definition of the term. In general, it can be said that public policy concerns what is right and just and what affects the citizens of the State collectively. It is to be found in the State's constitution and statutes and, when they are silent, in its judicial decisions. [Citation.] Although there is no precise line of demarcation dividing matters that are the subject of public policies from matters purely personal, a survey of cases in other States involving retaliatory discharges shows that a matter must strike at the heart of a citizen's social rights, duties, and responsibilities before the tort will be allowed. Palmateer, 85 Ill.2d at 130, 52 Ill.Dec. 13, 421 N.E.2d 876. Further, numerous decisions of this court have maintained the narrow scope of the retaliatory discharge action. Buckner v. Atlantic Plant Maintenance, Inc., 182 Ill.2d 12, 19-20, 230 Ill.Dec. 596, 694 N.E.2d 565 (1998) (collecting cases). The common law doctrine that an employer may discharge an employee-at-will for any reason or for no reason is still the law in Illinois, except for when the discharge violates a clearly mandated public policy. Barr, 106 Ill.2d at 525, 88 Ill.Dec. 628, 478 N.E.2d 1354. At the outset, we reject plaintiff's contention that whether the failure to perform immediate charting jeopardizes the public policy of patient safety is a question of fact that precludes dismissal of his complaint. Generally, the ascertainment of public policy is a question for the courts. American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. Department of Central Management Services, 173 Ill.2d 299, 318, 219 Ill.Dec. 501, 671 N.E.2d 668 (1996). Plaintiff misapprehends a basic procedural aspect of a common law retaliatory discharge action. It is widely recognized that the existence of a public policy, as well as the issue whether that policy is undermined by the employee's discharge, presents questions of law for the court to resolve. [1] See Newby v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 659 F.Supp. 879, 880-81 (C.D.Ill.1987) (interpreting Illinois law); Fitzgerald v. Salsbury Chemical, Inc., 613 N.W.2d 275, 282 (Iowa 2000) (collecting authorities); Kanagy v. Fiesta Salons, Inc., 208 W.Va. 526, 529, 541 S.E.2d 616, 619 (2000) (stating that determination of existence of public policy in wrongful-discharge action is question of law); Watson v. Peoples Security Life Insurance Co., 322 Md. 467, 478, 588 A.2d 760, 765 (1991) (same); Mello v. Stop & Shop Cos., 402 Mass. 555, 561 n. 7, 524 N.E.2d 105, 108 n. 7 (1988) (same); 82 Am.Jur.2d Wrongful Discharge § 58, at 649 (2003) (same). We agree with this widely accepted proposition and so hold. Accordingly, the questions of whether patient safety is a clearly mandated public policy and, if so, whether plaintiff's discharge violated that policy are questions of law for the court. Turning to the merits, plaintiff contends that Memorial, by discharging him in retaliation for reporting the alleged patient charting discrepancy, violated the clearly mandated public policy of patient safety. Indeed, plaintiff asks us to definitively declare that patient safety is a matter of public policy in the state of Illinois and that terminating an employee who speaks out in favor of patient safety violates that public policy. Plaintiff overlooks a basic substantive requirement of a common law retaliatory discharge action. The tort of retaliatory discharge seeks to achieve `a proper balance    among the employer's interest in operating a business efficiently and profitably, the employee's interest in earning a livelihood, and society's interest in seeing its public policies carried out.' Fellhauer, 142 Ill.2d at 507, 154 Ill.Dec. 649, 568 N.E.2d 870, quoting Palmateer, 85 Ill.2d at 129, 52 Ill.Dec. 13, 421 N.E.2d 876. In the absence of a clearly mandated public policy, the employer retains the right to fire workers at will. Palmateer, 85 Ill.2d at 130, 52 Ill.Dec. 13, 421 N.E.2d 876; accord Fitzgerald, 613 N.W.2d at 283. A broad, general statement of policy is inadequate to justify finding an exception to the general rule of at-will employment. Corbin v. Sinclair Marketing, Inc., 684 P.2d 265, 267 (Colo.App.1984) (collecting cases). Indeed: Any effort to evaluate the public policy exception with generalized concepts of fairness and justice will result in an elimination of the at-will doctrine itself. Fitzgerald, 613 N.W.2d at 283. Further, generalized expressions of public policy fail to provide essential notice to employers. The phrase clearly mandated public policy implies that the policy will be recognizable simply because it is clear. An employer should not be exposed to liability where a public policy standard is too general to provide any specific guidance or is so vague that it is subject to different interpretations. Birthisel v. Tri-Cities Health Services Corp., 188 W.Va. 371, 377, 424 S.E.2d 606, 612 (1992); accord Fitzgerald, 613 N.W.2d at 282 (stating that requirement of well-recognized and clear public policy helps ensure that employers have notice that their dismissal decisions will give rise to liability). Accordingly, an employee has a cause of action for wrongful discharge when the discharge is contrary to a clear mandate of public policy. However, unless an employee at will identifies a specific expression of public policy, the employee may be discharged with or without cause. Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 72, 417 A.2d 505, 512 (1980). For example, insufficient allegations of public policy include right to marry a coworker ( McCluskey v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp., 147 Ill.App.3d 822, 825-26, 101 Ill.Dec. 235, 498 N.E.2d 559 (1986)); product safety ( Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 183, 319 A.2d 174, 180 (1974)); promoting quality health care ( Hrehorovich v. Harbor Hospital Center, Inc., 93 Md.App. 772, 796, 614 A.2d 1021, 1033 (1992)); and the Hippocratic Oath ( Pierce, 84 N.J. at 76, 417 A.2d at 514). Unless the employee identifies a clear mandate of public policy that is violated by the employee's discharge, the complaint will not state a cause of action for retaliatory discharge. Fellhauer, 142 Ill.2d at 510, 154 Ill.Dec. 649, 568 N.E.2d 870. Further, as the circuit court's decision was limited to the well-pled allegations in the complaint, so our review of the circuit court's decision is likewise limited to those same allegations. See Eisenbach v. Esformes, 221 Ill.App.3d 440, 443, 163 Ill.Dec. 930, 582 N.E.2d 196 (1991).