Opinion ID: 783771
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: mailing labels

Text: 37 Jenkins argues that the district court erred in admitting into evidence during the trial the mailing labels from the other express mail packages which she received at her home. Jenkins asserts that the labels constitute excludable hearsay for which no exception applies. Contrary to the district court's finding, Jenkins contends that the Government did not lay a proper foundation for the admission of the labels and claims that it did not establish that the business records exception to the hearsay rule applied because Kramer was not an otherwise qualified witness under Rule 803(6). Although Kramer testified that he was familiar with the fact that the Union City Post Office gave him the records which he had requested, Jenkins claims that Kramer never indicated that he had an understanding about the record keeping system at the Union City Post Office. Without this knowledge, Jenkins claims that Kramer is neither a custodian nor an otherwise qualified witness as required by Rule 803(6). 38 The Government argues that Kramer qualifies under Rule 803(6) as an other qualified witness, and thus, the district court correctly admitted the labels pursuant to the business records exception to the hearsay rule. The Government asserts that it is clear from Kramer's testimony that he was aware of the record keeping procedures of the United States Postal Service. Moreover, Kramer testified that he was familiar with these business records based upon his training and experience. Finally, the Government notes that it was Kramer who instructed Cooley to maintain the very records in question and advised him on how to maintain the records. In any event, the Government argues that, if the district court erred in admitting this evidence, the admission constitutes harmless error which does not require reversal. 39 In reviewing a trial court's evidentiary determinations, this court reviews de novo the court's conclusions of law and reviews for clear error the court's factual determinations that underpin its legal conclusions. United States v. Salgado, 250 F.3d 438, 451 (6th Cir.2001) (citing United States v. Reed, 167 F.3d 984, 987 (6th Cir.1999)). As this Court has explained: 40 A business record must satisfy four requirements in order to be admissible under Rule 803(6): 41 (1) it must have been made in the course of a regularly conducted business activity; (2) it must have been kept in the regular course of that business; (3) the regular practice of that business must have been to have made the memorandum; and (4) the memorandum must have been made by a person with knowledge of the transaction or from information transmitted by a person with knowledge. 42 United States v. Weinstock, 153 F.3d 272, 276 (6th Cir.1998) (quoting Redken Laboratories, Inc. v. Levin, 843 F.2d 226, 229 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 852, 109 S.Ct. 137, 102 L.Ed.2d 110 (1988)). This information must be presented through the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness[.] Fed.R.Evid. 803(6). Business records meeting these criteria are admissible unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. Id. 43 Rule 803(6) does not require that the custodian personally gather, input, and compile the information memorialized in a business record. Weinstock, 153 F.3d at 276. The custodian of the records need not be in control of or have individual knowledge of the particular corporate records, but need only be familiar with the company's recordkeeping practices. Id. ( citing In re Custodian of Records of Variety Distrib., Inc., 927 F.2d 244, 248 (6th Cir.1991)). Likewise, [t]o be an `other qualified witness,' it is not necessary that the person laying the foundation for the introduction of the business record have personal knowledge of their preparation. Dyno Construction Co. v. McWane, Inc., 198 F.3d 567, 575-76 (6th Cir.1999). 44 Salgado, 250 F.3d at 451-52. 45 In the instant case, the district court correctly found that Kramer was an otherwise qualified witness under Rule 803(6). Kramer testified that he was familiar with these labels through his training and experience and that he commonly dealt with these records. Moreover, Kramer testified that he had instructed Cooley ( i.e., the individual from whom he had requested the production of these labels) on how to maintain these labels. Finally, Kramer testified that he was maintaining a file on the suspicious express mail packages which were being sent to Jenkins' address which was similar to the file which was being kept at the Union City Post Office. 46 In order to be considered to be an otherwise qualified witness under Rule 803(6), [a]ll that is required of the witness is that he or she is familiar with the record keeping procedures of the organization. Dyno Constr. Co. v. McWane, Inc., 198 F.3d 567, 576 (6th Cir.1999). Kramer testified that he was familiar with the Union City Post Office's record keeping procedures with regard to the express mail package labels, and therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the labels pursuant to Rule 803(6).