Opinion ID: 1394991
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: The Jail Cell Tapes

Text: Following his arrest, defendant was advised of his Miranda ( Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436) rights and thereafter agreed to speak with Officer Kilgore of the Los Angeles Police Department Homicide Division. During the discussion, defendant denied involvement in the murder of Gary Black. Officer Kilgore had previously spoken with codefendant Gonzales for approximately two hours. Defendant was then transported to Parker Center jail where, as previously mentioned, Officer Kilgore arranged to have defendant and Gonzales placed in two separate jail cells which contained hidden microphones for the purpose of monitoring and recording conversations. Officer Kilgore testified the purpose of the tape recording was to obtain information helpful for the investigation of the case. During the tape-recorded conversation Gonzales repeatedly warned defendant that the rooms are taped. Defendant nevertheless discussed the circumstances of his arrest: They fuckin tackled me I ran after two of them they fuckin say are you Adam Miranda and I say no, I'm Robert Diaz ... Everybody was just tripping out on me and I tried to go for my cuete [gun] and shit the mother fucker was all over me hey and when he finally threw me down.... He had his knee over my fuckin over the cuete [gun] ... and I tried to put my hand in there ... Defendant stated that he was about to leave for Mexico but that he wouldn't have been safe there ... because ... they were waiting for me at the border. Defendant also spoke about the people who informed on him to the police. He stated that he believed Laurie called the police and then he warned, I know I ain't getting outa [jail], but if by any chance I do ..., I'm coming right back. Defendant additionally told Gonzales that the police had shown him the videotape of the shooting. Defendant stated: Shit it showed everything ... it showed mostly you ... And you remember that bitch that you say you put in front of you? ... She came back (laughter) she came back into the store and looked over the counter.... Yeah, you can hear, they even have our voices, or they had mine.... When I told them this is a hold up. I know and he said fuck you, shoot me. He said it like that you know he said, then you hear them on the fuckin telephone yeah robbery here robbery here, at so and so place, help we've been shot we've been shot (laughter) ... It sounds funny ... cause... he was talking like he couldn't ... (laughter) the camera didn't show them at all it was just, it was just you and I, and that lady. Defendant made no objection at the time the tape was played for the jury. However, at the conclusion of the evidentiary portion of the guilt phase, defendant objected to the admission of the tape based on First Amendment and Fifth Amendment rights. The trial court overruled the objection. Defendant now contends the trial court erred in permitting the jail cell tape to be introduced into evidence. Defendant claims the tape recording violated his right of privacy, the Fifth Amendment ban against self-incrimination and his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The People counter that defendant's objection was untimely and therefore cannot be raised on appeal. (See 3 Witkin, Evidence, supra, § 2012, pp. 1971-1972.) We determine that, even assuming defendant had made a timely objection, each of his contentions lacks merit. For his privacy argument defendant relies upon De Lancie v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 865 [183 Cal. Rptr. 866, 647 P.2d 142]. [9] In Donaldson v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.3d at page 39, we held De Lancie does not apply to police conduct which took place before the decision was filed. Here the taping occurred on October 4, 1980. Since De Lancie was filed on July 8, 1982, defendant's privacy contention must fail. [10] (10) Defendant next argues that prior to being placed in a jail cell near Gonzales's cell he should have been given additional Miranda warnings. However, Miranda was concerned only with custodial police interrogation and therefore does not apply to the instant situation. ( People v. Whitt (1984) 36 Cal.3d 724, 745 [205 Cal. Rptr. 810, 685 P.2d 1161].) Miranda warnings are not required when an accused makes statements to a private citizen, absent evidence of an agency relationship between the citizen and law enforcement officials. ( Ibid. ) Defendant admits that Gonzales was not in any way acting as an agent for the government. Defendant lastly contends the taping violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. ( United States v. Henry (1980) 447 U.S. 264 [65 L.Ed.2d 115, 100 S.Ct. 2183].) Defendant acknowledges that he failed to raise the Sixth Amendment claim below. He maintains, however, that his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights are inextricably intertwined and therefore he should not be precluded from raising the issue. Alternatively, defendant argues he was denied the effective assistance of counsel by counsel's failure to preserve the Sixth Amendment claim. We conclude that counsel's failure to articulate the Sixth Amendment basis of his objection did not result in any prejudice. (See People v. Whitt, supra, 36 Cal.3d 724, 740.) A defendant's right to counsel is not implicated where an accused voluntarily makes statements to a cellmate, who is not acting as a government agent or informant. ( Id. at pp. 741-744.)
(11a) Defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation to support a verdict of first degree murder. (12) In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must draw all inferences in support of the verdict that can reasonably be deduced and must uphold the judgment if, after viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576 [162 Cal. Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738, 16 A.L.R.4th 1255]; People v. Lunafelix (1985) 168 Cal. App.3d 97, 100 [214 Cal. Rptr. 33].) In People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15 [73 Cal. Rptr. 550, 447 P.2d 942], we set forth three categories of evidence which might sustain a finding of premeditated murder: (1) facts about a defendant's behavior before the killing that show prior planning of it; (2) facts about any prior relationship or conduct with the victim from which the jury could infer a motive; and (3) facts about the manner of the killing from which the jury could infer that the defendant intentionally killed the victim according to a preconceived plan. (11b) The record here shows evidence of premeditation pertaining to each of the three categories. As to the first category, the fact that defendant brought his loaded gun into the store and shortly thereafter used it to kill an unarmed victim reasonably suggests that defendant considered the possibility of murder in advance. Moreover, defendant's warning that Chandler and Black should give him the money or he would shoot implies that defendant contemplated the killing. (13) It has been recognized that premeditation can occur in a very brief period of time. ( People v. Velasquez (1980) 26 Cal.3d 425, 435 [162 Cal. Rptr. 306, 606 P.2d 341].) `The true test is not the duration of time as much as it is the extent of the reflection. Thoughts may follow each other with great rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly, ...' ( Ibid. ) (11c) As to motive, the evidence showed that immediately prior to the killing, Chandler and Black refused to sell beer to defendant. Defendant testified he became angry because he believed the men were being rude to him. Defendant requested to buy beer several more times but each time was refused. The conversation between defendant and his victims suggests that defendant acted with conscious motive and had time to reflect upon his plan to shoot the victims. (14) [T]he law does not require that a first degree murderer have a `rational' motive for killing. Anger at the way the victim talked to him ... may be sufficient. ( People v. Lunafelix, supra, 168 Cal. App.3d at p. 102; see People v. Jackson (1981) 121 Cal. App.3d 862, 873-874.) (11d) The manner of killing also suggests the shooting was conceived in advance. Defendant shot Black and Chandler, who were unarmed and standing behind the counter a few feet away. The lack of provocation by the victim leads to an inference that an attack was the result of a deliberate plan rather than a rash explosion of violence. ( People v. Lunafelix, supra, 168 Cal. App.3d at p. 102.) We conclude the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, supports a finding of premeditated and deliberate first degree murder.
(15a) Defendant claims the jury was not adequately instructed on diminished capacity. In asserting this argument, defendant acknowledges that the jury was given the general diminished capacity instruction (CALJIC No. 3.35) [11] and the voluntary intoxication instruction [12] (CALJIC No. 4.21). He complains, however, that the trial court did not additionally sua sponte instruct in the language of CALJIC No. 8.77, which specifically applies the general diminished capacity rule to murder and voluntary manslaughter crimes. [13] (See People v. Conley (1966) 64 Cal.2d 310 [49 Cal. Rptr. 815, 411 P.2d 911].) Contrary to defendant's assertions, we believe the given instructions (CALJIC Nos. 3.35, 4.21) adequately informed the jury that evidence of diminished capacity was relevant in determining whether defendant acted with the requisite intent at the time of the shooting. Moreover, even if the jury had not been so instructed, based on the evidence in this case, the trial judge was clearly not obligated to instruct the jury on its own motion. (16) It is settled that the trial court is under no duty to sua sponte instruct on the issue of diminished capacity unless substantial evidence is presented at trial raising such a defense. ( People v. Turner, supra, 37 Cal.3d at pp. 325-326; People v. St. Martin (1970) 1 Cal.3d 524, 531 [83 Cal. Rptr. 166, 463 P.2d 390]; People v. Conley, supra, 64 Cal.2d at p. 319; People v. Cram (1970) 12 Cal. App.3d 37, 41 [90 Cal. Rptr. 393].) A defendant's mere consumption of drugs or alcohol prior to the commission of a crime is generally insufficient to warrant an instruction on diminished capacity. ( People v. Turner, supra, at pp. 325-327; People v. Carr, supra, 8 Cal.3d 287 at pp. 294-295; People v. Cram, supra, at p. 44.) (15b) A review of the record reveals that the evidence of defendant's diminished capacity was practically nonexistent. The sole evidence on this issue was defendant's own testimony that he had been drinking and smoking some weed earlier that evening, but that he was not intoxicated when he entered the mini-market. In response to a question from his attorney, defendant declined to state that his intoxication was the reason for the shooting. He testified that codefendant Gonzales, unlike himself, appeared to be under the influence during the incident. On this record, we conclude the instructions given to the jury on the issue of diminished capacity were adequate.

(17) Citing Carlos v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 131 [197 Cal. Rptr. 79, 672 P.2d 862], defendant contends that the felony-murder special-circumstance finding must be vacated because the court failed to instruct the jury that it could find the allegation true only if it found that defendant acted with intent to kill. In People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104 [240 Cal. Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306] we reconsidered our Carlos decision. We concluded that the court need not instruct on intent to kill as an element of the felony-murder special circumstance unless there is evidence from which the jury could find that the defendant was an accomplice rather than the actual killer. ( Id. at pp. 1138-1139.) Here all the evidence showed that defendant actually killed Gary Black. Moreover, in finding defendant guilty of first degree murder, the jury made a special finding that the killing was wilful, deliberate, and premeditated, which finding necessarily includes a finding of the intent to kill. ( People v. Burgener (1986) 41 Cal.3d 505, 536-537 [224 Cal. Rptr. 112, 714 P.2d 1251]; People v. Phillips (1985) 41 Cal.3d 29, 59 [222 Cal. Rptr. 127, 711 P.2d 423].) Failure to instruct on intent was not error.
(18) Relying on People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1 [164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468], defendant contends the jury was not adequately informed that in order to find the special circumstance to be true, it had to find the murder was committed to advance the commission of the attempted robbery. Defendant's contention is not supported by the record. In People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at pages 59-62, we set aside a robbery-murder special circumstance because there was no showing that the murder was committed to advance an independent felonious purpose. (See People v. Weidert (1985) 39 Cal.3d 836, 842 [218 Cal. Rptr. 57, 705 P.2d 380]; People v. Thompson, supra, 27 Cal.3d at pp. 321-325.) The Attorney General in Green conceded that the robbery was merely incidental to the murder since the sole object of the robbery was to conceal the identity of the murder victim. The jury, however, had been told it could find the special circumstance to be true if the murder took place during the robbery regardless of the relationship between the two crimes. By contrast, in the instant case, the jury was expressly instructed that to find the special circumstance ... is true, it must be proved 1. That the murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of a robbery, and 2. That the murder was committed in order to carry out or advance the commission of the crime of robbery, or to facilitate the escape therefrom or to avoid detection.  (Italics added.) Defendant did not request any additional instruction on this point at trial. There is no doubt that the final sentence of the instruction effectively informed the jury that in order to find the special circumstance to be true it had to find the murder was committed in furtherance of the robbery. Moreover, in Green there was overwhelming evidence that the robbery was merely incidental to the murder. Here, unlike Green, the evidence of the robbery is compelling. Defendant points to several facts suggesting that the killing was not perpetrated pursuant to a robbery, such as the events which transpired at the 7-Eleven store, defendant's anger at Kelly Chandler, defendant's testimony that he did not intend to rob or kill, and the fact that nothing was actually taken at the robbery. However, upon a review of the record, especially the audio portion of the videotape where defendant stated this is a holdup, ... give me all your money in a bag, we are convinced the crime was nothing more than a cold blooded killing in the perpetration of a robbery. ( People v. Sanders (1983) 145 Cal. App.3d 218, 223 [193 Cal. Rptr. 331], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Mattson (1984) 37 Cal.3d 85, 94, fn. 4 [207 Cal. Rptr. 278, 688 P.2d 887].)
(19) Defendant further argues that the special circumstances should be set aside because (1) the information was inherently confusing concerning the special circumstance crime (see § 190.4) and (2) the trial court failed to adequately instruct the jury regarding proof of the special circumstances. Both contentions are without merit. Defendant was charged in count I with murder, count II with assault with intent to commit murder, count III with burglary with intent to commit larceny, and count IV with robbery. Counts I, II and III relate to the mini-market incident and count IV relates to the New York Cafe incident. Although defendant was never separately charged with attempted robbery (at the mini-market), this crime was the basis for the felony-murder charge and the special circumstance allegation that the murder was committed in the course of an attempted robbery. Section 190.4, subdivision (a) provides in pertinent part: Whenever a special circumstance requires proof of the commission or attempted commission of a crime, such crime shall be charged and proved pursuant to the general law applying to the trial and conviction of the crime. Defendant maintains the prosecution did not separately charge and prove the separate offense of attempted robbery as required by this code section. In People v. Robertson (1982) 33 Cal.3d 21, 47-48 [188 Cal. Rptr. 77, 655 P.2d 279] and People v. Velasquez, supra, 26 Cal.3d at page 434, footnote 6, we held that the failure to charge pursuant to section 190.4 does not require per se reversal. We asserted that no prejudice results from the failure to separately charge the underlying felony when the defendant is put on notice that he was required to defend against the underlying crime. [16] Defendant fully concedes he received adequate notice of the attempted robbery charge by the special circumstance allegation. He argues instead that the pleading ... violated another of the purposes of section 190.4  that is to ensure that the jury is properly focused upon the special circumstance crime. Defendant cites no authority for this proposition. We find it difficult to understand how the jury here was not focused on the underlying attempted robbery crime. The jury was specifically instructed that to find the special circumstance true it must find the murder was committed during the attempted commission of the crime of robbery. Defendant additionally contends that since the attempted robbery was not a separately charged offense, the jury was not properly told of the elements of the crime and therefore the special circumstance must be set aside. We agree that the trial court erred in failing to specifically instruct on the attempted robbery crime. However, there was no prejudice to defendant since the elements of attempted robbery were before the jury under other properly given instructions. (See People v. Sedeno, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 721.) The jury was in fact separately instructed as to the elements of attempt (CALJIC No. 6.00) and robbery (CALJIC No. 9.10). Contrary to defendant's assertions, the fact that the robbery instruction was given in connection with count IV (the New York Cafe incident) is wholly immaterial. [17] There is no doubt that the jury understood that the same elements of robbery were applicable to the special circumstance allegation. We therefore determine there was no reversible error.

At the penalty phase, the only evidence offered by the prosecution concerned defendant's killing of Robert Hosey approximately two weeks before the murder in the instant case. Joe Saucedo testified as follows: On September 12, 1980, he and Tomas Martinez bought two PCP cigarettes from Hosey. After the purchase, Saucedo and Martinez discovered the cigarettes did not contain PCP. The two men then took Hosey in Martinez's vehicle and drove around looking for the person from whom Hosey had obtained the cigarettes. They were unable to find this individual and drove to Saucedo's residence. When they arrived at Saucedo's house, a number of individuals, including defendant, began arguing with Hosey concerning the bunk he had sold to Martinez and Saucedo. Saucedo observed a knife in Hosey's back pocket and removed it. Defendant asked for the knife and Saucedo gave it to him. During the argument, someone pushed Hosey down to the ground. Hosey got up and began running down the street. Defendant ran after him. Martinez and Saucedo reentered Martinez's car and began chasing Hosey. Shortly thereafter Saucedo got out of the car, ran towards Hosey, and tripped him. At this point defendant jumped on top of [Hosey] and started stabbing him. Hosey tried to stand up and begged defendant not to kill him. Defendant grabbed Hosey by the hair and continued stabbing him. Saucedo tried to separate the two men, and in the process, Saucedo got stabbed in the hand. Saucedo returned to his car and found a shirt which he put around his hand to stop the bleeding. Hosey later died as a result of multiple stab wounds to the face and neck. Saucedo also testified that when they first arrived at his house, several girls, including Patricia Torres, were standing outside. At trial, Patricia Torres did not recall the events of that evening. [18] She had made a prior statement, under oath, at the district attorney's office, and portions were read into the record at trial. In the prior statement, Torres had corroborated Saucedo's version of the events. She stated that when Saucedo and Martinez brought the man (later identified as Hosey) to the apartment, she thought Hosey had ripped [Martinez] off. She noticed that defendant had a knife and was telling Hosey to give back the money. Defendant was holding the knife about two inches away from Hosey's neck. Torres saw someone push Hosey onto the ground. Hosey then ran down the street. Torres noticed defendant and two other guys following after Hosey. Martinez and Saucedo then got in the car and went down the street. Later in the evening Saucedo returned with his hand wrapped in a blood-soaked shirt. Saucedo was charged with murder with respect to the death of Hosey. In exchange for his agreement to testify, the charge was reduced to assault with a deadly weapon, and, upon a plea of guilty, he was given probation. Defendant did not testify nor did he present any mitigating evidence at the penalty phase. At the time, he had been charged but not tried for the Hosey murder.

(20) Defendant contends that the exclusion of two prospective jurors because of their views on the death penalty was contrary to the standards established in Witherspoon v. Illinois, supra, 391 U.S. 510. (See People v. Velasquez, supra, 26 Cal.3d at pp. 436-437.) He argues that the jurors failed to make it unmistakably clear that they would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial.... ( Witherspoon, supra , at p. 522, fn. 21 [20 L.Ed.2d at p. 785]; Hovey v. Superior Court, supra, 28 Cal.3d at pp. 10-11; Velasquez, supra, at p. 436.) The United States Supreme Court has recently broadened Witherspoon's requirement that a juror's bias be proved with unmistakable clarity. ( Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424 [83 L.Ed.2d 841, 852, 105 S.Ct. 844, 852].) The applicable standard enunciated in Witt is whether the juror's views would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' ( Ibid. [83 L.Ed.2d at pp. 851-852]) The court explained determinations of juror bias cannot be reduced to question-and-answer sessions which obtain results in the manner of a catechism. ( Ibid. ) Under Witt, therefore, our duty is to examine the context surrounding [the juror's] exclusion to determine whether the trial court's decision that [the juror's] beliefs would `substantially impair the performance of his duties...' was fairly supported by the record. ( Darden v. Wainwright (1986) 477 U.S. 168, 176 [91 L.Ed.2d 144, 154, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 2469].) In People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 767 [239 Cal. Rptr. 82, 739 P.2d 1250], we adopted the Witt standard. Here, however, we conclude that applying either the Witt or the stricter Witherspoon standards, the two jurors were properly excused for cause. Defendant first challenges the exclusion of prospective juror Pauline Bia. During the individual voir dire, Bia responded to a question by stating, I don't think I can vote for the death penalty. Later, the following colloquy occurred between the court and Bia: THE COURT: And my inquiry of you is whether you have such a conscientious opinion concerning the death penalty that it would not matter what the evidence was, that under no circumstances could you vote for the death penalty? Ms. BIA: No. THE COURT: No what? Ms. BIA: I don't think I can vote for the death penalty. THE COURT: The key word is automatically, and that is, would you automatically and absolutely refuse to vote for such a penalty? Ms. BIA: Yes. THE COURT: Regardless of the evidence? Ms. BIA: Yes, I will refuse. THE COURT: [Y]ou would automatically vote for life imprisonment without the possibility of parole and never vote for a verdict of death? Ms. BIA: Never vote for a verdict of death.  There was no ambiguity here. Even applying the stricter Witherspoon standard, Bia was properly excused for cause. While Bia did appear confused by some of the court's earlier inquiries, her answers to the later questions made her absolute opposition to voting for the death penalty unmistakably clear. Prospective juror Bia left no doubt that she would automatically vote against the imposition of the death penalty regardless of the evidence. Defendant next challenges the exclusion of prospective juror Robert Manley. At the beginning of his individual voir dire on the death penalty, Manley volunteered that: I have difficult problems with the capital punishment question, and at this point I don't think I could really be an unbiased or  I am opposed to it. I will put it that way. The trial court then reviewed the allegations and charges in the case and asked whether he would refuse to vote for murder in the first degree ... knowing that to do so would obligate the jury to get into a ... penalty phase of the trial? Manley replied, I would have a very difficult time of it, Your Honor, I would have a very difficult time. The trial court then asked Manley whether he would ... refuse to vote for the truthfulness of the special circumstances... knowing that to do so would obligate the jury to get into the penalty phase? Manley replied,  Yes, Ma'am.  The court questioned Manley as to whether he would automatically and absolutely refuse to vote for such a penalty in any case? Manley answered, I probably would. I probably would have to. When the court repeated the question, Manley replied, Yes Ma'am, I think I would. No further questions were asked of Manley prior to his excusal. Although he may have responded equivocally to some of the court's questions, Manley made it absolutely clear that his attitude toward the death penalty would prevent [him] from making an impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt. ( Witherspoon, supra , 391 U.S. at pp. 522-523, fn. 21 [20 L.Ed.2d at p. 785], italics omitted.) Under Witherspoon, therefore, excusal was proper. Moreover, the trial court was in the best position to observe and evaluate Manley's demeanor firsthand and could have reasonably understood the prospective juror's responses to indicate he would never vote for the death penalty. (See Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at pp. 426-429 [83 L.Ed.2d at pp. 852-856, 105 S.Ct. at pp. 852-853]; Darden, supra, 477 U.S. at p. 178 [91 L.Ed.2d at pp. 154-155, 106 S.Ct. at p. 2470].) We are convinced that Manley would have been unable to perform his duties as required by law and therefore was properly excused for cause. ( Witt, supra ; Witherspoon, supra . ) Defendant additionally contends that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to sua sponte inform potential jurors that it was their civic duty to sit as jurors if they could subordinate their views and obey the laws of this state. ( Witherspoon, supra , 391 U.S. 510; Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412.) We find nothing in Witherspoon which obligates a trial court to so instruct the jury. Moreover, the proposed instruction is unnecessary. A prospective juror who would refuse to vote for the death penalty under all circumstances is obviously unable or unwilling to set aside individual views concerning capital punishment.
(21) Defendant maintains the prosecution violated the section 190.3 notice requirement and therefore the trial court erred in permitting evidence in aggravation to be introduced at the penalty trial. We disagree. Section 190.3 provides, in pertinent part: Except for evidence in proof of the offense or special circumstances which subject a defendant to the death penalty, no evidence may be presented by the prosecution in aggravation unless notice of the evidence to be introduced has been given to the defendant within a reasonable period of time as determined by the court, prior to trial. The purpose of the statutory notice is to advise an accused of the evidence against him so that he may have a reasonable opportunity to prepare a defense at the penalty trial. (See Keenan v. Superior Court (1981) 126 Cal. App.3d 576, 587 [177 Cal. Rptr. 841].) In the instant case defendant moved prior to the penalty trial to preclude the evidence in aggravation on the sole ground that the district attorney failed to presen[t] in writing ... notice of the specific areas of aggravation which would be presented at the penalty phase. (Italics added.) At the hearing on the motion, defense counsel admitted that, prior to the guilt trial, the prosecutor had informed him Saucedo and Torres would be testifying at any penalty trial. He further acknowledged that he also represented defendant on the Hosey murder charge, implying that he was familiar with the incident which would serve as the basis for the aggravating evidence presented at the penalty trial. [19] In our view the district attorney adequately fulfilled the statutory notice requirements. Although written notice is preferable and should be the norm, nowhere does the statute mandate that the notice be in writing. Defendant had full knowledge, prior to the start of the guilt trial, of the aggravating evidence to be introduced at a potential penalty trial. The evidence therefore was properly admitted.