Opinion ID: 2011334
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: Whether the District Has a Substantial or Compelling State Interest in Barring Same-Sex Marriage

Text: I assume, for the sake of argument, that homosexuals have an irreversible sexual orientation and thus (when all relevant factors are considered) comprise a quasi-suspect or suspect class. The state, nonetheless, may attempt to demonstrate a substantial, if not compelling, interest in withholding marriage from same-sex couples simply because of a concern that such marriages, if deemed legitimate, could influence the sexual orientation and behavior of children, to the extent choice plays a role. I repeat: the deterrence scenario mayor may notbe scientifically far-fetched; this issue of legislative fact is perhaps the most complex of any presented here. But, if there can be any truth to the deterrence rationale at all, the state's interest in preventing same-sex marriages arguably may be substantial enough to deprive same-sex couples of that right, even though not substantial enough to allow discrimination against homosexuals based, for example, on housing or employment. The state's interest in deterring homosexual lifestyles, of course, would be premised on the general public's adherence to traditional values favoring heterosexual orientationmajoritarian values which homosexuals question. If, however, at trial no scientifically credible evidence were presented tending to prove that a public policy, such as the present marriage statute, can help deter the advent of homosexual orientation and behaviorand I have seen no such evidence to datethen I do not believe the government would have demonstrated a substantial, let alone compelling, state interest in enforcing traditional heterosexual values, to the substantial prejudice of those who cannot share those values. That is to say, if the government cannot cite actual prejudice to the public majority from a change in the law to allow same-sex marriages, such as a predictable increase in antisocial homosexual behavior, then the public majority will not have a sound basis for claiming a compelling, or even a substantial, state interest in withholding the marriage statute from same-sex couples; a mere feeling of distaste or even revulsion at what someone else is or does, simply because it offends majority values without causing concrete harm, cannot justify inherently discriminatory legislation against members of a constitutionally protected classas the history of constitutional rulings against racially discriminatory legislation makes clear. [61] Suppose, on the other hand, that scientifically credible deterrence evidence were forthcoming at trial, so that either the heterosexual majority or the homosexual minority would be prejudiced in some concrete way, depending on whether the marriage statute was, or was not, available to homosexual couples. See supra note 61. In that case, the ultimate question of whose values should be enforced, framed in terms of what a substantial or compelling state interest really is, would pose the hardest possible question for the court as majority and minority interests resoundingly clash. [62]