Opinion ID: 1468407
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Feemster's Young Age

Text: In Feemster II, we vacated Feemster's sentence based in part on our conclusion the district court gave too much weight to Feemster's young age at the time of his prior offenses. 483 F.3d at 589. We acknowledged in Feemster II that Feemster's prior adult convictions for conduct occurring while Feemster was a juvenile [are] relevant under § 3553(a)(1), because [they are] part of Feemster's history and characteristics. Id. at 587. However, we concluded Feemster's prior adult convictions for conduct occurring while Feemster was a juvenile do not justify the extent of the district court's variance[.] Id. at 588. As we read Gall, the district court has wide latitude to weigh the § 3553(a) factors in each case and assign some factors greater weight than others in deciding whether the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance. Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 597. Following Gall, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in giving significant weight to Feemster's status as a juvenile at the time of some of his prior adult convictions.
The district court did abuse its discretion in substantially basing the variance on Feemster's age at the time of the instant offense (26) and the sentencing (27). The Guidelines provide, [a]ge (including youth) is not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a departure is warranted. U.S.S.G. § 5H1.1, p.s. As we noted in Feemster II, [a]lthough the Guidelines are no longer mandatory, the Guidelines policy statements still must be taken into account in fashioning a reasonable sentence. Feemster II, 483 F.3d at 590 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(5)). A variance resulting in an unusually lenient sentence should not be based largely on the twenty-something age of the defendant, because relative youth is a factor that applies to many defendants and it is unlikely district courts will uniformly adopt the view that defendants in their mid-twenties deserve more lenient sentences than middle-aged or older defendants. See id. (citing United States v. Plaza, 471 F.3d 876, 879 (8th Cir.2006) (quoting United States v. Maloney, 466 F.3d 663, 669 (8th Cir.2006))). In Feemster's case, the fact that he was 26 when he committed the instant offense and 27 at sentencing does not distinguish him in any meaningful way from other defendants. A dramatic downward variance for Feemster based on his relative youth (26 or 27) is inappropriate because it manifestly would result in unwarranted sentencing disparities among similarly situated defendants. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). Taking into account the totality of the circumstances, Feemster's age, alone or together with the district court's other justifications, has little, if any, relevance and is not a sufficient justification for the extent of this unusually lenient sentence.