Opinion ID: 412715
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Lindberg's Motion to Amend its Pretrial Narrative

Text: 19 Lindberg argues that the trial court abused its discretion by not allowing defendants to amend their pretrial statement during trial. The court held that defendants were precluded from raising the issue of whether all implied warranties had been disclaimed under the proposal sent by Lindberg to Joy. App. at 205a, 209a. 13 The trial court based its ruling on the statement made by Lindberg in its pretrial narrative that Lindberg had never made any express warranties to Joy and that all implied warranties had been fulfilled. 14 20 Defendants' pretrial narrative was filed with the court in accordance with W.D.Pa.R. 5-II(D)(2). Rule 5-II(D)(5)(d) states: 21 Failure to fully disclose in the pretrial narrative statement or at the pretrial conference, the substance of the evidence proposed to be offered at trial, will result in the exclusion of that evidence at trial unless the parties otherwise agree or the court otherwise orders. 22 The purpose of this rule is to simplify issues, to expedite the disposition of cases, and to avoid unnecessary delays once a trial had begun. See Ely v. Reading Company, 424 F.2d 758, 763-64 (3d Cir.1970). 23 We previously have held that it is within the trial court's discretionary power to allow for amendment of a pretrial narrative, E.C. Ernst, Inc. v. Koppers Co., 626 F.2d 324, 331 (3d Cir.1980), and absent clear abuse of discretion, our interference with the use of that discretion should be minimal. Ely v. Reading Company, 424 F.2d at 763-64. Our decisions identify four principal criteria for making and evaluating that discretionary judgment: (1) the prejudice or surprise in fact to the nonmoving party, (2) the ability of that party to cure the prejudice, (3) the extent to which the waiver of the rule would disrupt the orderly and efficient trial of the case, and (4) bad faith or willfulness on the part of the movant. Berroyer v. Hertz, 672 F.2d 334, 338 (3d Cir.1982); see Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Association, 559 F.2d 894, 904-05 (3d Cir.1977). 15 Applying these factors to the instant case, we are constrained to hold that the trial court abused its discretion in not allowing Lindberg to amend its pretrial narrative. 24 First, it is clear that any prejudice or surprise to Joy was minimal if it existed at all. In its original complaint Joy alleged breaches of both express and implied warranties by the defendants. Complaint p 21. In its allegation of what constituted the contract between the parties, Joy claimed [d]efendants received and accepted the aforesaid purchase orders and agreed to supply furnaces conforming to that described in the aforesaid purchase orders and as described in their quotations. Complaint p 10 (emphasis added). In its pretrial narrative Joy claimed that in June, 1974, Lindberg submitted to Joy a proposal containing numerous express warranties. App. at 18a. Joy indicated that at trial it would establish that Lindberg breached expressed warranties as to the quality and workmanship and capacity of the furnaces as set forth in written proposals made to Joy.... App. at 24a. Although Lindberg claimed in its pretrial narrative to have made no express warranties and to have fulfilled all implied warranties, app. at 189a, the parties jointly filed a later pretrial stipulation which stated that [t]his is an action for ... breach of express and implied warranties.... Pretrial Stipulation at 1. Joy specifically identified as Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 38 the proposal form that Lindberg later tried to use in questioning Baldwin. Pretrial Stipulation at 7. 16 These facts show that plaintiff was not only aware of the document which contained the alleged waiver, but had originally relied on it as a basis for its claims of liability. Despite defendants' statement in their pretrial narrative, plaintiff continued throughout the pretrial process to claim breach of both implied warranty and express warranty, specifically, the breach of the express warranty made in Lindberg's proposal form. 17 Plaintiff could hardly claim surprise over the existence of the proposal form or the disclaimer which Lindberg contended it contained. 25 Second, plaintiff could have minimized any prejudice caused by allowing Lindberg to amend its pretrial narrative. Defendants sought leave to amend prior to presentation of [their] case in chief. App. at 209a. This motion was made on August 12, 1981, the first full day of trial. It was not until August 20 that defendants began presentation of their case. Transcript of August 20 at 113. There is no indication that Joy could not have sought a continuance to prepare a response to Lindberg's claim of waiver. 18 If defendant's motion presented any possible prejudice, plaintiff would have been able to cure it. See Meyers v. Pennypack Woods, 559 F.2d at 905. 26 Third, allowing defendant to amend would not have disrupted the orderly and efficient trial of the case. Defendants' amendment really went to the terms of the contract between the parties, an issue both parties agreed was in dispute. Transcript of August 12 at 31-32. The determination of whether implied warranties existed at all is clearly relevant to the issue of breach of those warranties. It would not have disrupted the trial process to allow the defendants to argue that all implied warranties had been waived. 19 27 Fourth, there is no evidence of bad faith on the part of the defendants. Claims based on breach of the express warranty allegedly contained in Lindberg's proposal form had been made by plaintiff a year earlier. It was that same warranty which Lindberg relied on when raising the issue of disclaimer. There is nothing to indicate that the defendants purposefully or wilfully withheld their disclaimer argument until trial in order to prejudice the plaintiff. 28 Thus we hold it was an abuse of discretion for the trial judge not to allow Lindberg to amend its pretrial narrative to include the issue of disclaimer of implied warranties.