Opinion ID: 1201769
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of Gregory Cudjo's Preliminary Hearing Testimony

Text: The prosecution had intended to call Gregory Cudjo as a witness during the case-in-chief. Because Gregory was a potential suspect in the murder of Amelia P., the trial court appointed counsel to advise him. After conferring with counsel, Gregory decided to assert his privilege against self-incrimination (U.S. Const., 5th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, ง 15) and to refuse to answer any questions relating to the murder. The prosecution then announced its intention to offer in evidence, under the former testimony exception to the hearsay rule (see Evid. Code, งง 1200, 1291), the testimony Gregory had given at the preliminary hearing. After Gregory had asserted his privilege against self-incrimination during a nonjury hearing, the trial court found that Gregory was unavailable as a witness ( id., ง 240), and it overruled the defense objection to Gregory's former testimony. When proceedings with the jury resumed, the transcript of Gregory's preliminary hearing testimony was read aloud. Here is what the transcript revealed: Called as a prosecution witness at the preliminary hearing, Gregory had at first testified that on the morning of Amelia P.'s murder, and throughout that day, defendant had worn long pants and boots; that defendant had remained in the camper with Gregory from the time Gregory awoke, between 9:30 and 10 a.m., until their mother arrived and the three of them went together to the house of Julia Watson; and that Gregory had not seen defendant washing his tennis shoes at Watson's house. Under further questioning, including references to his previous interviews with sheriff's investigators, Gregory had testified that he could not be sure that defendant had remained in the camper during the late morning hours because he (Gregory) had fallen asleep again for most of this time, and that defendant had later told Gregory he had been jogging that morning. But Gregory denied that he had ever told sheriff's investigators that he had seen defendant leave the camper that morning, that defendant had been wearing cut-off jeans and tennis shoes, or that defendant had later washed his shoes at Watson's house. Without objection, the prosecutor at the preliminary hearing had then played part of a tape recording of two sheriff's investigators interviewing Gregory on the day following the murder. During the portion of the taped interview that was played, Gregory had said that defendant had been gone from the camper for two hours on the morning of the murder, that defendant had worn cut-off jeans and white tennis shoes that morning, that at Watson's house defendant had taken off his tennis shoes and washed them, and that defendant had later changed into long pants and boots. After the tape had been played, Gregory had testified that he remembered the conversation with the sheriff's investigators, that hearing the tape had refreshed his recollection, that he had not lied to the investigators and had told them what he knew, and that he did not disagree with any of the things he had told the officers. Defendant now contends: (1) his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object at the preliminary hearing to the playing of the tape recording of the interview; (2) his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction that Gregory's taped statements could not be considered for the truth of the matters asserted; (3) the trial court erred in finding Gregory unavailable as a witness; (4) admission of Gregory's preliminary hearing testimony denied defendant his right of confrontation; (5) the prosecutor's failure to grant immunity to Gregory violated various constitutional rights of defendant; and (6) the trial court should have told the jurors why Gregory was not appearing before them to testify.
(9) A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to the assistance of counsel (U.S. Const., 6th and 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, ง 15). This right to counsel extends to every critical stage of the proceeding, including the preliminary hearing. ( Coleman v. Alabama (1970) 399 U.S. 1, 9-10 [26 L.Ed.2d 387, 396-397, 90 S.Ct. 1999] (lead opn. of Brennan, J.); id. at p. 11 [26 L.Ed.2d at pp. 397-398] (conc. opn. of Black, J.).) The right comprehends more than just the formality of representation by a lawyer; it entitles the defendant to competent and effective legal assistance. ( United States v. Cronic (1984) 466 U.S. 648, 654-655 [80 L.Ed.2d 657, 664-666, 104 S.Ct. 2039]; People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 215 [233 Cal. Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839].) (10) A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is evaluated by well-established standards. A defendant seeking relief on the basis of ineffective assistance must show both that trial counsel failed to act in a manner to be expected of reasonably competent attorneys acting as diligent advocates, and that it is reasonably probable a more favorable determination would have resulted in the absence of counsel's failings. ( People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 584 [189 Cal. Rptr. 855, 659 P.2d 1144]; see also Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-696 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693-699, 104 S.Ct. 2052].) (11) Here, defendant has failed to show that a reasonably competent attorney, acting as a diligent advocate, would have objected at the preliminary hearing to introduction of evidence of the taped interview with Gregory. Although hearsay (Evid. Code, ง 1200), the evidence was admissible under the hearsay rule exceptions for inconsistent statements ( id., ง 1235) and past recollection recorded ( id., ง 1237). Because there was no sound legal basis for objection, counsel's failure to object to the admission of the evidence cannot establish ineffective assistance.
(12) Defendant faults his trial counsel for not asking the trial court to instruct the jury that Gregory's taped statements could not be considered for the truth of the matters asserted. He relies on the Law Revision Commission's comment to Evidence Code section 1202, stating that although Evidence Code section 1235 permits a finder of fact to consider a trial witness's inconsistent statement for the truth of the matter stated, no similar hearsay exception applies to the inconsistent statements of a hearsay declarant. (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 29B West's Ann. Evid. Code (1979 ed.) ง 1202, p. 62.) What defendant's argument overlooks is that after his taped statements were played at the preliminary hearing, Gregory testified that the tape had refreshed his recollection, that he had not lied to the investigators and had told them what he knew, and that he did not disagree with any of the things he had told the officers. Because Gregory in this way adopted and reaffirmed the substance of his statements to the officers, the jury was entitled to consider those statements for their truth under Evidence Code section 1291 as part of Gregory's former testimony. An instruction correctly explaining this situation to the jury would not have benefited the defense.
(13) A person is unavailable as a witness if the person is [e]xempted or precluded on the ground of privilege from testifying concerning the matter to which his or her statement is relevant. (Evid. Code, ง 240, subd. (a)(1).) One such privilege, the exercise of which makes a person unavailable as a witness, is the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. ( People v. Gordon (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1251 [270 Cal. Rptr. 451, 792 P.2d 251].) To be found unavailable on this ground, a witness must not only intend to assert the privilege, but also be entitled to assert it. ( People v. Ford (1988) 45 Cal.3d 431, 440-441 [247 Cal. Rptr. 121, 754 P.2d 168, 76 A.L.R.4th 785].) (14a) Here, Gregory demonstrated his intention to assert the privilege when he was called to testify during a foundational hearing out of the jury's presence. After Gregory was sworn, the prosecutor asked whether Gregory intended to answer any questions about the murder of Amelia P., and whether he had conversed with defendant about a crime defendant had committed near the Cudjo camper on the day of the murder. Gregory refused to answer each question, expressly grounding his refusal on the privilege against self-incrimination. Defense counsel then stipulated that Gregory would assert the privilege as to any testimony he may give in this matter. Defendant argues that even though Gregory intended to assert the privilege, Gregory did not sufficiently establish that he was entitled to do so. We disagree. (15) To invoke the privilege, a witness need not be guilty of any offense; rather, the privilege is properly invoked whenever the witness's answers would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the witness for a criminal offense. ( Hoffman v. United States (1951) 341 U.S. 479, 486 [95 L.Ed. 1118, 1123-1124, 71 S.Ct. 814]; see also People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 441 [6 Cal. Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388].) To satisfy this standard, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result. ( Hoffman v. United States, supra, at pp. 486-487 [95 L.Ed.2d at pp. 1123-1124].) Consistent with these principles, our Evidence Code provides that when a witness grounds a refusal to testify on the privilege against self-incrimination, a trial court may compel the witness to answer only if it clearly appears to the court that the proposed testimony cannot possibly have a tendency to incriminate the person claiming the privilege. (Evid. Code, ง 404.) (14b) Here, it did not clearly appear that Gregory's proposed testimony could not have tended to incriminate him for the murder of Amelia P. Gregory had been taken into custody as a suspect in that offense. Indeed, defendant has argued, both at trial and on this appeal, that the evidence is entirely consistent with the hypothesis that Gregory, rather than defendant, killed Amelia P. Answers to the prosecution's questions about Gregory's observations on the day of the murder, and Gregory's conversations with defendant relating to the murder, could have developed evidence tending to establish Gregory's own complicity in the victim's death. (See People v. Sipress (1975) 51 Cal. App.3d 98, 102 [123 Cal. Rptr. 884]; People v. Traylor (1972) 23 Cal. App.3d 323, 330 [100 Cal. Rptr. 116].) Moreover, because Gregory had testified at the preliminary hearing, he could properly invoke the privilege to avoid exposing himself to a charge of perjury in that proceeding. ( People v. Maxwell (1979) 94 Cal. App.3d 562, 570-571 [156 Cal. Rptr. 630].) The trial court did not err in finding Gregory unavailable as a witness on the ground of privilege.
(16) Both the state and federal Constitutions guarantee criminal defendants the right to confront the witnesses against them. (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, ง 15.) The right of confrontation is not absolute, however; in particular, it does not preclude the prosecution from proving its case through the prior testimony of a witness who is unavailable at trial, so long as the defendant had the right and the opportunity to cross-examine the witness during the earlier proceeding at which the witness gave this testimony. ( Barber v. Page (1968) 390 U.S. 719, 722 [20 L.Ed.2d 255, 258-259, 88 S.Ct. 1318]; People v. Alcala, supra, 4 Cal.4th 742, 784-785.) (14c) Here, defendant maintains that his right of confrontation was denied by the prosecution's use of Gregory's preliminary hearing testimony. Although his attorney did cross-examine Gregory at the preliminary hearing, defendant maintains that he did not have a fair opportunity to cross-examine because Gregory's ability to think and respond coherently had been impaired by the ingestion of some drug or drugs. The record before us does not support defendant's contention. During the preliminary hearing, Gregory's competence as a witness was not challenged. Gregory was not asked at the preliminary hearing whether he had taken drugs, and no evidence on that subject was introduced at the preliminary hearing. Although at trial defense counsel voiced his opinion that Gregory had been under the influence of drugs at the time of his preliminary hearing, he provided no evidence to support the claim. Even if we assume that Gregory had ingested some drug, moreover, it does not appear that Gregory's mental functioning was so impaired as to preclude meaningful cross-examination. Gregory's testimony at the preliminary hearing was lucid and responsive to the questions asked. Although his testimony was internally inconsistent, this does not appear to have been the result of inability on his part to comprehend the questions or to understand his duty as a witness to tell the truth. Rather, it appears that Gregory was reluctant to give evidence damaging to defendant and did so only under the pressure of the prosecutor's examination and after listening to the tape recording of his prior interview. The failure of defense counsel to cross-examine more vigorously may be explained as a tactical decision. Gregory had already impeached himself by giving contradictory testimony, and further probing could have resulted in testimony more damaging to defendant. The trial court did not err, therefore, in concluding that defendant had a fair opportunity to cross-examine Gregory at the preliminary hearing. Defendant has not established a violation of his right of confrontation.
(17) Defendant contends that by not granting immunity to Gregory, and thereby removing the self-incrimination barrier to Gregory's testimony at defendant's trial, the prosecution violated defendant's constitutional right of confrontation and denied him due process of law. (U.S. Const., 5th, 6th, & 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, งง 7, 15.) At no time during proceedings in the trial court did the defense request immunity for Gregory, nor did the defense make an offer of proof as to Gregory's testimony. Because the issue of immunity was not raised at trial, it is not preserved for review on appeal. ( People v. Sutter (1982) 134 Cal. App.3d 806, 813 [184 Cal. Rptr. 829]; People v. Sipress, supra, 51 Cal. App.3d 98, 102.) Moreover, there is no authority in this state for the proposition that a prosecutor must request or the trial court must grant immunity to a witness on the ground that the witness's testimony could be favorable to the defense. (See People v. Hunter (1989) 49 Cal.3d 957, 973 [264 Cal. Rptr. 367, 782 P.2d 608]; People v. Jackson (1986) 178 Cal. App.3d 694, 700 [224 Cal. Rptr. 37]; People v. DeFreitas (1983) 140 Cal. App.3d 835, 841 [189 Cal. Rptr. 814].) In Hunter, supra, we assumed without deciding that in appropriate circumstances judicially conferred use immunity might be necessary to vindicate a criminal defendant's rights to compulsory process and a fair trial[.] ( Hunter, supra, at p. 974.) But we also said that such immunity would be required only if the witness's testimony was both clearly exculpatory and essential to an effective defense, and if no strong governmental interest weighed against the grant of immunity. ( Ibid. ) Here, defendant has not demonstrated that Gregory's testimony would have been clearly exculpatory or that it would have differed from his preliminary hearing testimony. And, because the issue was never raised at trial, the record is inadequate to determine whether a strong governmental interest would have weighed against a grant of immunity. Thus, defendant has failed to demonstrate the existence of circumstances in which a trial court might be required to confer use immunity to ensure a fair trial.
(18) Defendant contends that the trial court should have either informed the jury of Gregory's refusal to testify or compelled Gregory to claim the privilege against self-incrimination in the jury's presence. We reject this contention. As we have explained in previous opinions, permitting the jury to learn that a witness has invoked the privilege against self-incrimination serves no legitimate purpose and may cause the jury to draw an improper inference of the witness's guilt or complicity in the charged offense. ( People v. Hill (1992) 3 Cal.4th 959, 992 [13 Cal. Rptr.2d 475, 839 P.2d 984]; People v. Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th 408, 441; People v. Frierson, supra, 53 Cal.3d 730, 743.)