Opinion ID: 1619721
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dependent adult abuse in Iowa Code section 235B.2(5) can occur in several alternative ways. For the purposes of this case it is:

Text: The deprivation of the minimum food, shelter, clothing, supervision, physical or mental health care, or other care necessary to maintain a dependent adult's life or health. Iowa Code § 235B.2(5)(a)(1)(d). Under section 235B.18(1) the department can petition for authorization of protective services if the department reasonably determines that a dependent adult is a victim of dependent adult abuse and lacks capacity to consent to the receipt of protective services. It is beyond dispute that the petition was appropriate here because E.Z.'s situation obviously qualified as dependent adult abuse and she clearly lacked the capacity to consent to receive the services. But of course resolution of such a petition is left to the court, not the department that filed it. Under section 235B.18 the court may order the protective services only upon a showing which establishes two elements by clear and convincing evidence: need for the services and lack of capacity to consent. We think the considerations for resolving the petition are those explained for establishing guardianships in In re Guardianship of Hedin, 528 N.W.2d 567, 578-80 (Iowa 1995). Our review from a court order in this special proceeding is on error. In re J.P., 574 N.W.2d 340, 342 (Iowa 1998). Need and incapacity to consent seem unassailable on this record. The district court recognized this, finding the department's actions appropriate, in that E.Z. does constitute a danger to herself if unsupervised, based on her condition as a `dependent adult.' Although the court stated it did not find E.Z. a victim of dependent adult abuse, it equivocated, ordering: the services previously provided for [E.Z.] continue, including such services to be determined by the department of human services and a registered nurse [from a named facility]. This may include unannounced visits to [the grandson's] home. Notwithstanding the district court's statement otherwise, we find this to be an order for protective services. Protective services is not defined in the chapter but we think the authority of the district court order in such a proceeding is broad. This is indicated by the wide authority granted in ordering emergency protective services in section 235B.19(3) which accords the district court various options upon a finding of dependent adult abuse. II. Ordinarily the court would not intrude into the details of the protective services, but would leave those matters within the discretion of the department. We find nothing in the chapter however, prohibiting a review of the nature of those services, especially in the challenged selection of a dwelling place. This is a matter so fundamental to personal liberty as to fall outside the day-to-day determinations incident to the protective services. We note in passing that the arrangement ordered by the court was only to preserve the one previously arranged by the department and the record strongly supports its fitness. In fact E.Z. encountered two incidents of inattention at the facility identical to those in Mark's home which had resulted in the two founded reports which precipitated the petition. We are satisfied, as was the trial court, that Mark now recognizes the importance of avoiding any lapses in the twenty-four-hour daily care required for E.Z. The trial court's order for unannounced visits will help ensure a satisfactory standard of care. Although we have not agreed with all the trial court's conclusions, the challenged order was appropriate. AFFIRMED.