Opinion ID: 863607
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 32

Heading: whether the trial court committed reversible error by allowing the prosecution to obtain pledges from the prospective jurors to convict edwards and sentence him to death and by precluding the defense from asking permissible questions during voir dire?

Text: ś 102. Edwards asserts that it was error for the trial judge to allow the State to ask the jury questions regarding a conviction of guilty for capital murder and sentencing him to death based on the facts of this case. ś 103. Edwards made no objection at trial to the prosecution's voir dire, so this issue is barred on appeal. Carr, 655 So.2d at 853. Notwithstanding any procedural bar, this issue will be addressed on the merits. ś 104. First, it is noted that Rule 5.02 of the Mississippi Uniform Criminal Rules of Circuit Court Practice and the cases Edwards cites in his favor stand for the general rule that it is reversible error to ask a juror during voir dire to commit to returning a particular verdict. Stringer v. State, 500 So.2d 928, 938 (Miss.1986); Miss. U.Crim. R.Cir. C.P. 5.02. The standard of review for determining the impropriety of a question is abuse of discretion. Harris v. State, 532 So.2d 602, 606 (Miss. 1988). ś 105. Edwards makes no meaningful argument that the State's questions during voir dire reached the level of reversible error as was the case in Stringer v. State, 500 So.2d 928, 938-40 (Miss.1986). In that case, the prosecutor asked the jurors if they could or could not vote for the death penalty under certain circumstances. Stringer, 500 So.2d at 938. This Court held that since the prosecutor did not specifically secure commitments from the jury to vote for the death penalty during voir dire, no per se reversible error occurred, but the conduct combined with other factors amounted to reversible error. Id. ś 106. Furthermore, this Court finds that the complained of questions were not designed to extract a promise from these jurors, under oath, that they would certainly find Edwards guilty or they would vote for the death penalty given a specific set of circumstances. Lester v. State, 692 So.2d 755, 773-74 (Miss.1997). The questions which the State asked during voir dire in this case all properly informed the jury of the law. There is no indication of an unconstitutionally impaneled jury. This assignment is rejected as being without merit. Foster v. State, 639 So.2d 1263, 1283-84 (Miss.1994). ś 107. Edwards also asserts that it was error for the trial judge to sustain the State's objections to defense counsel's questioning of prospective jurors. After the State objected to defense counsel misstating the law, the trial judge, stated: [Y]ou can't argue the instructions, because there is a specific procedure that the jury will follow step by step. It's very clear, and I don't think it's proper for you to off the cuff try to tell them what the law is at this point. As stated previously, the standard of review for determining the impropriety of a question is abuse of discretion. We do not find that the trial judge abused his discretion in refusing to allow defense counsel to question potential jurors as to what is the law, and there is no merit to this assignment of error.