Opinion ID: 3171260
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Local Government Tort Claims Act (LGTCA)

Text: Ms. Holloway-Johnson contends that the Court of Special Appeals erred in approving the trial court’s application of the LGTCA’s compensatory damages “cap” to the jury verdict regarding the negligence count because Officer Beall failed to raise 9 Compare Heinze v. Murphy, 180 Md. 423, 432-33, 24 A.2d 917, 922 (1942) (holding that there was no evidence of malice because the police officer did not know the plaintiff, “there ever was any reason for ill will,” and the officer conducted himself becomingly as an officer of the law endeavoring to do his duty as he understood it to be”) with French v. Hines, 182 Md. App. 201, 221, 957 A.2d 1000, 1011 (2008) (discussing the inconsistency of a jury award of punitive damages without a finding of actual malice, when presented with evidence that the plaintiff bent over to get her purse at a traffic stop (only to be faced with the officer’s drawn gun), testimony that her head was slammed into the side of the truck, and that the “handcuffs were deliberately too tight”). 24 timely application of the LGTCA. She contends that the LGTCA is an affirmative defense and therefore must be pled before a verdict is rendered. Officer Beall responds that the Court of Special Appeals held correctly that he could not waive his employer’s protection under the LGTCA, because the LGTCA is not an affirmative defense, and that Ms. Holloway-Johnson’s arguments have no support in Maryland law.
Ms. Holloway-Johnson’s question is one of legislative interpretation, a question of law. Consequentially, we accord no deference to the lower courts’ decisions here. White v. Pines Cmty. Improvement Ass’n, Inc., 403 Md. 13, 31, 939 A.2d 165, 175 (2008); see Gebhardt & Smith LLP v. Maryland Port Admin., 188 Md. App. 532, 564, 982 A.2d 876, 894 (2009).
The Court of Special Appeals provided an exhaustive analysis of the LGTCA. See Holloway-Johnson, 220 Md. App. at 207-18, 103 A.3d at 727-34. We agree with that analysis. As noted aptly by the intermediate appellate court, “the LGTCA was designed to provide a remedy for persons injured by local government employees, who often have limited resources from which an injured person might collect on a judgment.” HollowayJohnson, 220 Md. App. at 212, 103 A.3d at 730-31. “Baltimore City police officers enjoy an indirect statutory qualified immunity under LGTCA [but] do not possess a direct immunity from liability for their tortious conduct under LGTCA. They may be 25 sued, and judgments may be entered against them.” Smith v. Danielczyk, 400 Md. 98, 129-30, 928 A.2d 795, 814 (2007). Because the LGTCA does not allow a plaintiff to bring suit directly against the local government, the suit is brought against the employee. Even so, “a person may not execute against an employee on a judgment rendered for tortious acts or omissions committed by the employee within the scope of employment with a local government [unless] it is found that the employee acted with actual malice.” 10 CJP § 5-302(a)-(b). If the employee is found to have acted with actual malice, the employee is liable fully for any damages awarded in the suit. CJP § 5-302 (b).11 10 Actual malice, for purposes of the LGTCA, is defined as “ill will or improper motivation.” Maryland Code (1974, 2013 Repl. Vol.), Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, § 5-301(b) (“CJP”). 11 The LGTCA acts to protect local government employees in multiple ways: If the action alleges that the conduct was within the scope of the defendant’s employment, the local government must provide a legal defense for the employee. CJP § 5–302(a). In addition, unless the employee is found to have acted with actual malice, the plaintiff may not execute on a judgment recovered against the employee, CJP § 5–302(b), but, rather, subject to certain limits, the local government is liable on the judgment. That protection may be broader than the common law immunity in that it does not appear to exclude liability for intentional torts, so long as they were committed within the scope of employment and without actual malice. Because of the construct of LGTCA, however, the complaint . . . is not subject to dismissal by reason of this indirect statutory immunity. That immunity will have relevance only if a judgment is entered against [the party protected by the LGTCA]. Smith v. Danielczyk, 400 Md. 98, 130, 928 A.2d 795, 814 (2007) (footnote omitted). 26 Of specific concern here, CJP § 5-301(d)(21) makes clear that, under the LGTCA, the Baltimore City Police Department (BCPD) is considered a local government entity and that “[f]or purposes of tort law, however, it has been since 1997 a ‘local government’ and, as such, the tort liability of its employees is governed by the LGTCA.” HollowayJohnson, 220 Md. App. at 212, 103 A.3d at 730. Therefore, because the BCPD is covered by the LGTCA, the question of whether a waiver of the statute’s protections occurred in this case must be answered. We agree with the Court of Special Appeals that LGTCA protection could not be waived by Officer Beall because it was not his to waive. Because the evidence was not sufficient to prove that Officer Beall had acted with actual malice (and he was operating within the scope of his employment), the LGTCA cap applied. As discussed by the Court of Special Appeals, in a case such as we have here, whether the judgment be for $10,000 or $10 million, an injured party may not collect so much as one penny from the employee directly, so long as the employee is acting without malice and within the scope of his employment. Although the judgment is nominally against the employee, it is as a practical matter frequently meaningless as applied against the employee. No action is required by the employee to protect himself, except to cooperate in the defense of the action. Even then, such action need consist only of explaining to the court that the judgment is subject to the LGTCA and that the plaintiff may not execute against him. Holloway-Johnson, 220 Md. App. at 213-14, 103 A.3d at 731. Because this case implicates clearly the LGTCA, Respondent is entitled only to collect up to the damages 27 cap of $200,00012 from the local government, the amount she received after the Circuit Court reduced the verdict awarded by the jury.13 Even though we conclude that Ms. Holloway-Johnson’s additional substantive claims perhaps should not have been withheld from the jury ordinarily, because the single injury-single recovery of compensatory damages were “capped” by the LGTCA as to the award on her negligence claim and no additional damages would be available to her had the other counts been submitted to the jury, it serves no purpose to remand for a new trial. Therefore, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, and remand with directions to reinstate the judgment of the Circuit Court. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART; CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO AFFIRM THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY. COSTS IN THIS COURT AND THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE SPLIT EQUALLY BY PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT. 12 As of 1 October 2015, CJP § 5-303(a) provides that “the liability of a local government may not exceed $400,000 per an individual claim, and $800,000 per total claims that arise from the same occurrence for damages resulting from tortious acts or omissions, or liability arising under subsection (b) of this section and indemnification under subsection (c) of this section.” At the time the verdict in this case was returned and the verdict reduced, the relevant amounts were $200,000 per individual claim and $500,000 per total claims, but the statute was no less clear. The most Respondent could receive was $200,000 under CJP § 5-303(a), which, regardless of our assessment of the error in not submitting to the jury the additional claims, would not have allowed her to recover duplicative compensatory damages, as feared by Petitioner. The local government is not liable for punitive damages under the LGTCA. See 13 CJP § 5–303(c)(1). 28