Opinion ID: 202810
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Supreme Court's Analysis

Text: The Court first held that § 2511(1)(c) was content neutral, explaining that the statute does not distinguish based on the content of the intercepted conversations, nor is it justified by reference to the content of those conversations. Rather, the communications at issue are singled out by virtue of the fact that they were illegally intercepted. . . . Id. at 526, 121 S.Ct. 1753. The Court also explained that the statute, as applied to the facts of the case, is fairly characterized as a regulation of pure speech. Id. It noted that the delivery of a tape recording is like the delivery of a handbill or pamphlet, and as such, it is the kind of `speech' that the First Amendment protects. Id. at 527, 121 S.Ct. 1753. Having established these principles, the Court then balanced the state interests served by the statute against the public interest in the disclosure of information. The Court identified two interests served by the statute: (1) removing an incentive for parties to intercept private conversations; and (2) minimizing the harm to persons whose conversations have been illegally intercepted. Id. at 529, 121 S.Ct. 1753. The Court accorded little weight to the first interest, id. at 532, 121 S.Ct. 1753, noting that it would be quite remarkable to hold that speech by a law-abiding possessor of information can be suppressed in order to deter conduct by a non-law-abiding third party, id. at 529-30, 121 S.Ct. 1753, and explaining that there is no empirical evidence to support the assumption that the prohibition against disclosures reduces the number of illegal interceptions, id. at 530-31, 121 S.Ct. 1753. It found the second interest in the situation before it more immediately relevant, noting that disclosure of the contents of a private conversation can be an even greater intrusion on privacy than the interception itself. Id. at 533, 121 S.Ct. 1753. Given this concern, it found a valid independent justification for prohibiting disclosures by persons who lawfully obtained access to the contents of an illegally intercepted message, even if such prohibition does not deter the initial interception. Id. In particular, the fear of public disclosure of private conversations might well have a chilling effect on private speech. Id. With respect to the public interest in disclosure, the Court emphasized that `if a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need . . . of the highest order.' Id. at 528, 121 S.Ct. 1753 (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103, 99 S.Ct. 2667, 61 L.Ed.2d 399 (1979)(omission in original)). Given the presumption in favor of protecting publication of truthful information, the issue presented in Bartnicki was narrow: `Where the punished publisher of information has obtained the information in question in a manner lawful in itself but from a source who has obtained it unlawfully, may the government punish the ensuing publication of that information based on the defect in a chain?' Id. (quoting Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d 463, 484-85 (D.C.Cir.1999)(Sentelle, J., dissenting)). Although the Court thus noted that there are important interests to be considered on both sides of the constitutional calculus, id. at 533, 121 S.Ct. 1753, it ultimately concluded that privacy concerns give way when balanced against the interest in publishing matters of public importance, id. at 534, 121 S.Ct. 1753. Surveying the many cases in which it had protected speech on matters of public concern, id. at 534-35, 121 S.Ct. 1753, the Court explained that [o]ne of the costs associated with participation in public affairs is an attendant loss of privacy, id. at 534, 121 S.Ct. 1753. Consequently, the Court concluded that a stranger's illegal conduct does not suffice to remove the First Amendment shield from speech about a matter of public concern. Id. at 535, 121 S.Ct. 1753. Because the collective bargaining negotiations in Bartnicki were unquestionably a matter of public concern, and respondents were clearly engaged in debate about that concern, the First Amendment prohibited recovery of damages against defendants. Id.