Opinion ID: 1043793
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Injunction Directed at Town

Text: ¶ 11. At trial, plaintiff sought an injunction directed at the Town requiring it to grant his request for municipal approval and to communicate to the Board and the Agency that it lacked authority to withhold approval of his helipad in the absence of a zoning ordinance. The State and Town moved to dismiss, contending among other things that plaintiff was bound to appeal under Rule 75 within 30 days of the selectboard decision. The trial court granted defendants' motions on the grounds that the limitations period had run and that Rule 75 was [plaintiff's] exclusive remedy. We agree. ¶ 12. Rule 75 provides for review of government action and states: Any action or failure or refusal to act by an agency of the state or a political subdivision thereof, including any department, board, commission, or officer, that is not reviewable or appealable under Rule 74 . . . may be reviewed in accordance with this rule . . . . V.R.C.P. 75(a). Rule 74 delineates the procedure for appeals from decisions of governmental agencies where a party is entitled to seek review of the decision by statute. V.R.C.P. 74(a). Thus Rule 75 allows for appellate remedy when a party is dissatisfied with state or municipal action but does not have a statutory right of direct appeal. There is no statutorily created right of direct appeal from the selectboard's decision to withhold its approval. Therefore, appeal under Rule 75 was plaintiff's exclusive remedy with regard to the selectboard's decision. ¶ 13. A party seeking review of a judgment under Rule 75 must file[] within 30 days after notice of any action or refusal to act of which review is sought . . . and, in the event of a failure to act, within six months after expiration of the time in which action should reasonably have occurred. V.R.C.P. 75(c). Plaintiff made a formal request that the Town send a letter indicating that there [wa]s no ordinance for them to rule on and . . . request[ing] a hearing so that the state [could] take it over from there. The Town did not send such a letter. Instead, the Town's selectboard took a quick approval poll and sent a letter expressing its disapproval of the helipad. Plaintiff argues that this letter was not a final decision on his request and thus Rule 75's thirty-day limitations period has never started to run. But if plaintiff is correct in this assertion, then there can be no doubt that the Town has failed to act, which would trigger the rule's six-month limitations period. We agree with the trial court that [i]t is not possible that neither an action or a refusal to act triggering the 30 day period nor a failure to act triggering the 6 month period has ever occurred. We thus conclude that even taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff the Rule 75 limitations period has runeither under the thirty-day period or the six-month periodand therefore the Town's action is no longer appealable under Rule 75.