Opinion ID: 2595824
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Wishes of the residents

Text: We agree with Judge Ireland that the Board not only took into consideration the commercial wind farms' impact upon county aesthetics and their nonconformance with the Comprehensive Plan 2004, but also considered the wishes of the citizens of Wabaunsee County. The Board's Findings of Fact reveal, inter alia: 4. In December 2002, the Planning Commission conducted its first meeting to discuss the pros and cons of wind farms. The Planning Commission conducted numerous public meetings on this topic from December 2002 until June 2004. In all, between the Planning Commission and the Board, this topic was discussed, in one form or another, at approximately 54 meetings over this period. 5. The first extensive public hearing on this issue was conducted by the Planning Commission on July 24, 2003. This meeting was well attended by the public and a majority of the public attending expressed their opposition to allowing Wind Farms in Wabaunsee County .... .... 8. On December 11, 2003, the Planning Commission conducted a public hearing on the Comprehensive Plan, and approximately 200 people attended this hearing. 9. The final adopted Plan, Wabaunsee County Comprehensive Plan 2004, includes... goals and objectives, which were developed as a direct result of a county-wide survey and focus groups by the Plan Preparation Class.... .... 13. In public meetings where the issue of Wind Farms was discussed, the majority of those in attendance opposed allowing them. The vast majority of letters received by the Planning Commission and the Board expressed opposition to Wind Farms.  (Emphasis added.) The Board's Conclusions provided to the district court included the following: 2.... The size, and scope, of the proposed Wind Farms make them objectionable and unsightly, partly as evidenced by the overwhelming opposition by the public. .... 5. The location of Wind Farms in Wabaunsee County would not conform to the Wabaunsee County Comprehensive Plan 2004, including the goals and objectives that were identified by the citizens of the County and incorporated as a part of the Plan.  (Emphasis added.) In the words of Judge Ireland, [o]ne can review the meetings and correspondence which the County conducted in its attempt to determine the wishes of the citizens of Wabaunsee County, Kansas. A large portion of the community's wishes were against the wind farms as proposed by the plaintiffs. Based upon our own examination of the record, including those places cited in support of the Board's findings, we agree. We also agree that these Board findings, while alone insufficient, could reasonably have been found to help justify its decision. See McPherson Landfill, Inc., 274 Kan. at 331, 49 P.3d 522. Intervenors take particular exception, however, to either the amount of the evidence presented in support of the commercial wind farm ban based on aesthetics or to the arguably greater amount of evidence presented in opposition to the ban. For example, they state: Granted, some of the testimony and letters cited by the Board support finding CWECS may impact the aesthetic and scenic value of the Flint Hills. Nonetheless, the record also reveals an abundance of evidence CWECS would have minimal impact. They also acknowledge the Board's reliance upon a Memorandum Re: Industrial Scale Wind Turbine Development Presented by the Tallgrass Ranchers, which states that a landscape architect/attorney has analyzed the visual impact of wind turbine complexes and... determined that they would be harmful to the stability and identity of the Flint Hills. But Intervenors then argue that a power point exhibit referenced in the Tallgrass Memorandum was not included. As a result, the Intervenors conclude that [a] reasonable zoning regulation would have accounted for the conflicting views by acknowledging CWECS can be placed in areas in which the current aesthetics would not be negatively impacted. Intervenors misunderstand our limited review on this issue. Even if the Board's action were quasi-judicial, we would still be limited to determining whether the given facts could reasonably have been found by the Board to justify its decision. McPherson Landfill, Inc., 274 Kan. at 331, 49 P.3d 522. We could not substitute our judgment for that of the Board, and we should not declare the action unreasonable unless clearly compelled to do so by the evidence.  (Emphasis added.) Combined Investment Co. v. Board of Butler County Comm'rs, 227 Kan. 17, 28, 605 P.2d 533 (1980). The Intervenors also take exception to the Board's reliance upon the alleged nonconformance with the Comprehensive Plan 2004. They again, however, appear to make an argument that would require us to reweigh the evidence presented there. For example, they argue that the Board's Findings of Fact cites testimony from the July 24, 2003, Planning Commission hearing of Roger Badeker and Larry Patton as evidence that CWECS would not conform to the ... Comprehensive Plan 2004. They acknowledge these individuals concluded these systems were not consistent with the Comprehensive Plan but argue their statements are mere conclusions and not actual evidence of nonconformance. We must again disagree. Intervenors take no exception to the fact that these individuals provided testimony. Accordingly, their testimony is obviously evidence. Moreover, Badeker has written professionally on the subject of zoning. Consequently, the Board may have considered his mere conclusions as carrying additional weight, i.e., approaching that of an expert witness. See Badeker,  Tell it to the Judge: Appealing a Zoning Decision.  67 J.K.B.A. 33 (September 1998); K.S.A. 60-456 on expert witnesses. In any event, this testimony clearly supports the Board's finding of fact which could reasonably have been found by the Board to justify its decision: that the commercial wind farms were inconsistent with the Comprehensive Plan 2004 and therefore should be prohibited. The Intervenors also take particular exception to the third factor relied upon by the Board as characterized by Judge Ireland: the concerns of county residents. Intervenors point out that the evidence reveals that some residents were for the commercial wind farms, others were against. They acknowledge that the Board should consider the objections of county residents but, quoting Gump, 35 Kan.App.2d at 511, 131 P.3d 1268, argue that `[z]oning is not to be based upon a plebiscite of the neighbors.' Intervenors argue that `although their wishes are to be considered, the final ruling is to be governed by consideration of the benefit or harm involved to the community at large.' Gump, 35 Kan.App.2d at 511, 131 P.3d 1268. They argue the Board did not consider the community at large because it failed to consider the impact upon [the] parties seeking to take advantage of their property rights. Judge Ireland found that after reviewing the documents and the minutes of numerous meetings in the record, the pros and cons of wind farms were discussed. He concluded that the County has taken into account the benefit or harm involved to the community at large. We agree, and reject the position of the Intervenors. Overall, we must acknowledge that several key points of appellate review dictate our result. We recognize that the Boardâ and not the courtâ has the right to change the zoning; that there is a presumption that the Board acted reasonably; that the Plaintiffs and Intervenors have the burden of proving the unreasonableness by a preponderance of the evidence; that this court may not substitute its judgment for the Board and should not declare the zoning amendment unreasonable unless clearly compelled to do so by the evidence; and that an act is unreasonable when it is so arbitrary that it can be said it was taken without regard to the benefit or harm involved to the community at large, including all interested parties, and was so wide of the mark that its unreasonableness lies outside the realm of fair debate. Combined Investment Co. v. Board of Butler County Comm'rs, 227 Kan. 17, 28, 605 P.2d 533 (1980). With these precepts in mind, we cannot hold that the Plaintiffs and Intervenors have met their burden of showing the Board acted unreasonably. See Board of Johnson County Comm'rs v. City of Olathe, 263 Kan. 667, 683, 952 P.2d 1302 (1998) (reciting and applying many of these precepts to reverse trial court's holding of unreasonableness). Finally, Plaintiffs' and Intervenors' repeated arguments that a county-wide ban on all commercial wind farms was unreasonable implies that the overall scope of the ban was somehow unreasonable per se and therefore improper. We acknowledge that some, mainly older, authority appears to support this view. One commentator has stated: Generally, it is unwise to enact provisions that will exclude lawful occupation or use from an entire township or city. (Emphasis added.) 1 Yokley, Zoning Law and Practice § 3-14(e), p. 3-158 (4th ed.1978). The treatise cites several cases, including Gust v. Township of Canton, 342 Mich. 436, 70 N.W.2d 772 (1955) (disallowing the prohibition of trailer camps anywhere in the township); see also Mandelker, Land Use Law § 5.37 (5th ed.2003) (citing cases). The contrary view is also acknowledged in Mandelker, Land Use Law § 5.37, p. 5-38. That treatise recognizes that a total ban can be appropriate: Courts review the total exclusion of one type of commercial use from a community on a case-by-case basis to decide whether the exclusion advances legitimate zoning purposes. See, e.g., Beacon Falls v. Posick, 212 Conn. 570, 583, 563 A.2d 285 (1989) (Connecticut courts have upheld prohibitions of certain activities within municipalities through zoning after determining that the prohibitions were rationally related to the protection of the municipalities' public safety, health and general welfare.); see also Lambros, Inc. v. Town of Ocean Ridge, Fla., 392 So.2d 993, 994 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) (The appellate courts in Florida have acknowledged the authority of a municipality to exclude certain uses of property entirely from a city.). We observe that in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 94 S.Ct. 1536, 39 L.Ed.2d 797 (1974) the United States Supreme Court upheld a zoning ordinance that restricted land use to one-family dwellings for an entire village of 700 people. In our view, however, the situation in the instant case does not involve such an absolute: The Board is allowing some wind farms, i.e., small ones, and disallowing only the large, commercial wind farms. The Kansas Legislature indicates that such distinctions can be validly made. K.S.A. 12-753(a) states: The . . . board of county commissioners of any county, by adoption of a resolution, may provide for the adoption or amendment of zoning regulations in the manner provided by this act. . . . Such regulations may include, but not be limited to, provisions restricting and regulating the height, number of stories and size of buildings; the percentage of each lot that may be occupied; the size of yards, courts and other open spaces; . . . the location, use and appearance of buildings, structures and land for residential, commercial, industrial and other purposes; the conservation of natural resources, including agricultural land; and the use of land located in areas designated as flood plains and other areas, including the distance of any buildings and structures from a street or highway. Here, as authorized by K.S.A. 12-753(a), the Board has restricted sizes. More particularly, it allows a  Small Wind Energy Conversion System (SWECS) consisting of a wind turbine, a tower and controls, which has a rated capacity of not more than 100 kilowatt and which is less than 120 feet in height and intended solely to reduce on-site consumption of purchased utility power. See Zoning Regulations, Article 1-104(210); Article 31-109(i)(f). By contrast, the Board has disallowed systems that exceed 100 kilowatt, exceed 120 feet in height, or that consist of more than one system of any size proposed or constructed by the same person or group of persons on the same or adjoining parcels or as a unified or single generating system. Zoning Regulations, Article 1-104(208); Article 31-112(5). Consistent with this statutory authority, the Board further limits the small wind energy conversion systems by specifying parcel size, density, spacing, setback distance, blade height and advertising. As for any argument that the important distinction is based not upon size, but rather upon commercial versus noncommercial, i.e., so that any-sized commercial system is banned, we nevertheless believe that such a distinction, and therefore such restriction, is valid. See Beacon Falls, 212 Conn. at 584, 563 A.2d 285, and cases cited there from various jurisdictions. In sum, the Plaintiffs and Intervenors have not established that the Board acted unreasonably in amending its zoning regulations to prohibit commercial wind farms in its county.