Opinion ID: 799901
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Herrera's Kentucky Civil Rights Act Claim

Text: Herrera contends that the district court erred in holding that Kentucky Revised Statute § 344.270 barred him from bringing his KCRA claim under § 344.450, arguing that the Order of Dismissal from the Fayette HRC was not a final order. In interpreting state law, we apply the law of the state's highest court, and when the state's highest court has not ruled on an issue, we must ascertain the state law from all relevant data, including the state's intermediate court decisions. Ellis ex rel. Pendergrass v. Cleveland Mun. Sch. Dist., 455 F.3d 690, 697-98 (6th Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Intermediate appellate decisions are accorded weight, although a federal court is not bound by lower court determinations if convinced by other data that the state's highest court would determine otherwise. Bailey v. V. & O Press Co., 770 F.2d 601, 604 (6th Cir.1985). Kentucky courts have consistently treated Orders of Dismissal based on lack of probable cause as final orders that trigger the election-of-remedies bar of § 344.270. See Vaezkoroni v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 914 S.W.2d 341, 341-42 (Ky. 1995); Burton v. Ky. State Police, 341 S.W.3d 589, 592-93 (Ky.Ct.App.2011); Grisby v. UPS Ground Freight, Inc., No. 2007-CA-002401-MR, 2009 WL 1636293, at , 4-5 (Ky.Ct.App. June 12, 2009); accord Young v. Sabbatine, No. 97-5169, 1998 WL 136559, at , 4 (6th Cir. Mar. 19, 1998) (unpublished opinion). In Vaezkoroni, Burton, and Grisby, the plaintiffs were barred from bringing KCRA claims in court after their complaints with the state or county human rights commission were dismissed based on a finding of no probable cause. In Vaezkoroni, the Supreme Court of Kentucky described as well settled the notion that the KCRA `provides alternative sources of relief, one administrative and one judicial.' 914 S.W.2d at 342 (quoting Meyers v. Chapman Printing Co., 840 S.W.2d 814, 820 (Ky.1992)). Moreover, the court stated that it would be absurd to assume that an individual could pursue a charge with the state or local commission and then, if that was unsuccessful, file a separate lawsuit in the courts. Id. In addition, the court held that a decision by a local commission, such as the Fayette HRC, should have the same preclusive effect as a decision by the Kentucky Commission on Human Rights. Id. A contrary holding, [t]aken to its logical extreme, ... would offer an individual the option of proceeding before a local commission, then before the circuit court and finally before the Ky. Commission. This is not the case. Id. Herrera has not provided any caselaw to the contrary. He correctly notes that subsequent cases have narrowed the holding in Vaezkoroni, but only by identifying as dicta the language in that opinion suggesting that the mere filing of a complaint with the human rights commission would bar a subsequent KCRA suit on election-of-remedies ground. See Brown v. Diversified Decorative Plastics, LLC, 103 S.W.3d 108, 110-13 (Ky.Ct.App.2003) (en banc). These cases clarify that § 344.270 does not bar an individual who files a complaint with a human rights commission, but later withdraws that complaint before the commission issues a final order, from filing suit under the KCRA in court. Id. ; Wilson v. Lowe's Home Ctr., 75 S.W.3d 229, 236 (Ky.Ct.App.2001). Because Herrera did not withdraw his HRC complaint prior to the issuance of the Order of Dismissal, Brown and Wilson have no bearing on this case. [2] Although neither party raised the issue, we note that the statutory language is now somewhat ambiguous as to whether a final order of a human rights commission will bar subsequent judicial proceedings or just further administrative proceedings. The election-of-remedies provision states that: A final determination by a state court or a final order of the commission of a claim alleging an unlawful practice under KRS 344.450 shall exclude any other administrative action or proceeding brought in accordance with KRS Chapter 13B by the same person based on the same grievance. KY.REV.STAT. ANN. § 344.270. [3] Prior to 1996, by contrast, the provision read: A final determination by a state court or the commission of a claim alleging an unlawful practice under KRS 344.450 shall exclude any other action or proceeding brought by the same person based on the same grievance. KY.REV.STAT. ANN. § 344.270 (1984), amended by KY.REV.STAT. ANN. § 344.270 (1996). The Supreme Court of Kentucky has not interpreted § 344.270 since the 1996 amendment; the last case that court decided involving § 344.270 was Vaezkoroni in 1995. As described above, it appears that post-1996 decisions of the Kentucky intermediate appellate courts have consistently applied the rule that a final order from a human rights commission bars subsequent judicial proceedings based on the same grievance. Burton, 341 S.W.3d at 592-93; Grisby, 2009 WL 1636293, at -5; see also McKissic v. Commonwealth of Ky. Transp. Cabinet, 334 S.W.3d 885, 890 (Ky. Ct.App.2010) (KCRA suit barred after plaintiff raised the same claims in proceedings before the state Personnel Board). [4] We therefore view these intermediate-appellate-court cases as relevant data in predicting how the Supreme Court of Kentucky would rule on the issue of whether this suit is barred. Ellis, 455 F.3d at 697-98. We believe that the Supreme Court of Kentucky would hold that, where an individual receives an Order of Dismissal from a civil rights commissionwhether state or localand the individual does not seek further relief in the manner prescribed by the commission, but rather files a KCRA lawsuit in court based on the same claim, the election-of-remedies doctrine bars the subsequent lawsuit. We therefore affirm the district court's grant of partial judgment on the pleadings with respect to Count Two, the KCRA claim. [5]