Opinion ID: 172312
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Applicable underlying criminal offense

Text: Because we affirm the district court's application of the accessory-after-the-fact cross reference guideline at sentencing, we address Leifson's alternative argument that the underlying offense should be kidnaping, and not second degree murder. If kidnaping were the underlying criminal offense, then Leifson's total offense level would be 23, [3] and his corresponding guideline range would be 46 to 57 months' imprisonment. Leifson raises three arguments in support of this issue: (1) he was not informed prior to testifying that the grand jury was investigating a murder; (2) the FBI had jurisdiction to investigate only kidnaping, not murder; and (3) Olsen's grand jury testimony, while clearly related to a murder investigation, is unlike Leifson's testimony, which was not related to a murder investigation. `Whether the underlying offense involved in perjury was `in respect to a criminal offense' is a finding of fact to be resolved by the district court during sentencing.' United States v. Dickerson, 114 F.3d 464, 467 (4th Cir.1997) (quoting United States v. Colbert, 977 F.2d 203, 207 (6th Cir.1992)); see also United States v. Arias, 253 F.3d 453, 455 (9th Cir.2001) (in an obstruction case, concluding that the determination of the cross reference offense with respect to which the obstruction occurred is a factual one that the sentencing judge will resolve by a preponderance of the evidence). For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err in determining that second degree murder was the criminal offense to which the accessory-after-the-fact cross reference guideline should be applied.
Leifson argues that the underlying offense to his perjury cannot be second degree murder because he was never put on notice prior to or after his swearing in during his grand jury testimony that the nature and subject of the investigation related to matters concerning a second-degree murder. Aplt. Br. at 26. Leifson cites Suleiman, 208 F.3d at 32, and Blanton, 281 F.3d at 771, to support this argument. In Suleiman, it was explained to the defendant prior to his grand jury testimony that the grand jury was investigating violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 844, and that these statutes covered conspiracy and the bombing of buildings used in interstate commerce. 208 F.3d at 35. The defendant in Suleiman argued that his perjury was not in respect to any bombing because he was never directly questioned about his involvement in the bombing. Id. at 36. The Second Circuit concluded that the district court had erred in presuming that perjury can be `in respect to' a criminal offense only where the questions asked and the false statements given in response specifically refer to a criminal offense. Id. at 39. The Second Circuit explained that [a] witness, punishable for any false answer, deserves enhanced punishment for a false answer that obstructs an inquiry concerning a criminal offense, and a witness, informed of the subject of such an inquiry, may not avoid the enhancement just because the question to which he gave a false answer did not alert him to the precise link between the question and the offense under inquiry. Id. at 40. In Blanton, it was explained prior to and during the defendant's grand jury testimony that the grand jury was investigating a series of bank robberies, and was interested specifically in a white Monte Carlo getaway car. 281 F.3d at 774. The jury found the defendant guilty of perjury for making false statements about a white car stored in her garage. The Eighth Circuit held that a witness is put on notice when an A[ssistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA)] informs that witness of the nature of the grand jury's inquiry either prior to or during her grand jury testimony. Id. at 776. Leifson contends that, unlike the defendants in Suleiman and Blanton, he was not put on notice as to the nature or subject of the grand jury's investigation into Davis's disappearance and presumed death. Aplt. Br. at 22, 25. Davis's disappearance and death were not mentioned during Leifson's grand jury testimony until after over an hour of questioning. Additionally, Leifson complains that the AUSA never formally told him that Davis's disappearance and death were the subject of the grand jury investigation. Id. at 24. However, as discussed above, Leifson was questioned repeatedly about Davis's disappearance, murder, and death prior to his uttering perjurious statements. He was, therefore, on notice that the grand jury was conducting a murder investigation. Leifson also argues that he had no reason to know that the grand jury was investigating a second-degree murder because he never heard a confession from Olsen regarding Davis's murder, id. at 25, and no one had been indicted on any charges for the second degree murder of Davis at the time of Leifson's grand jury testimony. Id. at 26. Although Leifson cites to United States v. Flemmi, 402 F.3d 79 (1st Cir.2005), for support, the holding in Flemmi does not require the defendant to hear a confession, have knowledge of an indictment, or to have experienced any other specific circumstances in order for his perjurious statement to be in respect to a specific criminal offense, such as murder. The First Circuit merely applied the law to the facts before it. See 402 F.3d at 96-97 & n. 28 (citing Ninth and Second Circuit cases for the proposition that the defendant must know, have reason to know, or be aware that the grand jury is investigating the underlying criminal offense for the accessory-after-the-fact cross reference guideline to apply). The First Circuit determined that the defendant in Flemmi knew or had reason to know that his perjurious testimony concerned murder because the defendant had recently heard a confession to the murder and several people had been indicted for the murder at the time of his grand jury testimony. Therefore, Flemmi does not support Leifson's argument that a defendant must hear a confession to murder or have knowledge of an indictment for murder in order for murder to be the appropriate underlying offense. The First Circuit's unremarkable holding in Flemmi is merely that the witness must have some knowledge that the grand jury is investigating the underlying offense, and not, as Leifson argues, that the witness must have experienced the specific circumstance of hearing a confession or having knowledge of a criminal indictment. Leifson had notice that the grand jury was investigating the possibility that Davis was murdered, and the district court did not clearly err in determining that second degree murder was the underlying offense.
Leifson also argues that the underlying offense should be limited to kidnaping because the FBI's jurisdiction was limited to kidnaping. Leifson cites no authority to support his argument that the underlying offense is limited by the FBI's jurisdiction. To the extent Leifson suggests that he had no notice that the grand jury was investigating murder because he knew that the FBI lacked jurisdiction to investigate murder, we have addressed this argument above. The federal kidnaping statute includes the possibility that the kidnaping might result in death. See 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (Whoever unlawfully ... kidnaps... and, if the death of any person results, shall be punished by death or life imprisonment). Further, an individual convicted of federal kidnaping that results in death can receive the same punishment under the sentencing guidelines as would be imposed for murder. U.S.S.G. § 2A4.1(c) (If the victim was killed under circumstances that would constitute murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1111 had such killing taken place within the territorial or maritime jurisdiction of the United States, apply § 2A1.1 (First Degree Murder).). Even if the FBI's jurisdiction somehow only put Leifson on notice that the grand jury investigation concerned Davis's kidnaping, Leifson was necessarily on notice of the possibility of a higher sentence if that kidnaping resulted in death.
Finally, Leifson acknowledges that the perjurious statements made by Olsen to the same grand jury were related to murder, but he argues that his case is distinguishable. See Aplt. Br. at 29-30 (While Olsen's perjurious statements about killing Davis and having information about her disappearance and burial are concededly related to murder, Leifson's perjurious statement about not being able to recall angrily confronting or threatening Olsen for spreading rumors is not.). Leifson appears to argue that because his statements were less material to Davis's murder investigation they were unrelated to Davis's murder investigation. However, Leifson cites no authority to support his contention that less material somehow means unrelated. Leifson pleaded guilty to perjury and thereby acknowledged that his statements were material to the investigation. Olsen's testimony may well be more related to Davis's disappearance and presumed death, but it does not follow that Leifson's testimony was unrelated to the murder investigation. See, e.g., Blanton, 281 F.3d at 774, 776 (where the perjury about storing a white Monte Carlo in the defendant's garage was related to bank robbery, even though the statement was not about robbing the bank); Suleiman, 208 F.3d at 40 (where the perjury about why the defendant traveled from Texas to Pakistan with another person was related to the bombing of a building, even though the statements were not about the defendant's direct involvement in the World Trade Center bombing). The district court did not clearly err when it determined that second degree murder, and not kidnaping, was the underlying criminal offense for the accessory-after-the-fact cross reference guideline. The district court is affirmed.