Opinion ID: 2623326
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Adequacy of instruction on voluntary intoxication

Text: With defense counsel's assent, the trial court used a modified version of CALJIC No. 4.21 to instruct the jury on the relevance of evidence of defendant's intoxication to the question whether he formed the specific intents required to prove the charged crimes of robbery, burglary, and attempted murder, and the necessarily included offense of theft. [7] Defendant asserts the trial court erred in omitting from the standard instruction the first paragraph, which would have described for the jury the specific intent necessary for robbery or burglary. He argues the error was compounded by the trial court's failure to instruct on the lesser crime of manslaughter and on imperfect self-defense. In assessing defendant's claim of error, we consider the entire charge to the jury and not simply the asserted deficiencies in the challenged instruction. ( People v. Burgener (1986) 41 Cal.3d 505, 538, 224 Cal.Rptr. 112, 714 P.2d 1251, overruled on another point in People v. Reyes (1998) 19 Cal.4th 743, 80 Cal. Rptr.2d 734, 968 P.2d 445.) A trial court is not obliged to condense the required explanation of a legal rule or concept in a single instruction; a charge is not erroneous or prejudicial simply because a required explanation is given in two instructions rather than one. ( People v. Burgener, supra, at pp. 538-539, 224 Cal. Rptr. 112, 714 P.2d 1251.) The record shows that in instructing the jury how evidence of voluntary intoxication relates to the question of specific intent, the trial court did not expressly define the specific intents required to establish the various crimes at issue in the case but instead stated as follows: In the crime of robbery, burglary and attempted murder and the included or related crime of theft, a necessary element is the existence in the mind of the defendant of a certain specific intent, included in the definition of each crime. The definition of each crime was given in other instructions such as CALJIC Nos. 9.40 and 14.50, which set forth the elements of robbery and burglary, respectively, including the specific intents necessary to establish those crimes. The jury was also instructed under CALJIC No. 1.01 to consider the instructions as a whole and in light of all the others. In People v. Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th 353, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442, we found no reasonable likelihood a jury that had been similarly instructed would be confused or misled about the relationship between evidence of the defendant's voluntary intoxication and the formation of the specific intent required for proving the felony-murder charges at issue in that case. ( Id. at p. 421, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442; see also People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1143, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1; People v. Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 950, 1021, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 689, 857 P.2d 1099.) Defendant fails to point to anything in the record suggesting grounds for reaching a contrary conclusion here. (See People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 757, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203, 976 P.2d 754 [finding similar claim of error waived by counsel's failure to request additional or clarifying instruction].) Defendant also contends the trial court should have further defined voluntary intoxication for the jury by giving CALJIC No. 4.22 on its own initiative. He asserts the omission violated his federal constitutional rights to due process, fundamental fairness, confrontation of witnesses, and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment. That instruction states: Intoxication of a person is voluntary if it results from the willing use of any intoxicating liquor, drug or other substance, knowing that it is capable of an intoxicating effect or when [he] [she] willingly assumes the risk of that effect, [ถ] Voluntary intoxication includes the voluntary ingestion, injecting or taking by any means of any intoxicating liquor, drug or other substance. ( Ibid. ) There was no error. Because a trial court has no duty on its own initiative to give an instruction relating evidence of voluntary intoxication to the question of defendant's mental state generally ( People v. Ervin (2000) 22 Cal.4th 48, 90-91, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 623, 990 P.2d 506; People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1120, 2 Cal. Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588), the trial court here had no obligation to clarify or elaborate on the voluntary intoxication instructions it gave. ( People v. Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 1021-1022, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 689, 857 P.2d 1099.) Nor did the absence of an instruction further defining voluntary intoxication prejudice defendant. As previously noted, the modified version of CALJIC No. 4.21 told the jury: [I]f the evidence shows that the defendant was intoxicated at the time of the alleged crime from the use of alcohol and drugs, you should consider that fact in determining whether the defendant had such specific intent. In addition, defense counsel urged the jury to find defendant lacked the specific intent to steal when he entered the Rumseys' apartment and attacked them, stressing the evidence of defendant's intoxication on methamphetamine and alcohol. (See People v. Ervin, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 91, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 623, 990 P.2d 506.) Because the absence of an instruction further defining voluntary intoxication did not prejudice defendant, we also reject his contention that trial counsel's failure to request CALJIC No. 4.22 violated his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel.