Opinion ID: 7265
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defendant Thomas Massey

Text: 39 Massey argues on appeal that the district court erred when it ruled that the government could cross-examine the character witnesses that Massey intended to call with have you heard questions regarding Massey's indictment on state charges similar to the federal charges that are the basis of his conviction. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 405(a), cross-examination of a witness offering character evidence can include questions regarding relevant, specific instances of conduct by the defendant. Thus, [o]nce a witness has testified concerning a defendant's good character, it is permissible during cross-examination to attempt to undermine his credibility by asking him whether he has heard of prior misconduct of the defendant which is inconsistent with the witness' direct testimony. 37 40 There are two limits on this type of cross-examination. First, the government must have a good faith factual basis for the alleged prior misconduct. 38 Second, the incidents must be relevant to the trial. 39 Massey concedes that the government had more than a good faith factual basis but argues that the state charges are not relevant to his veracity, the character trait about which his character witnesses were to testify. This argument is without merit. An indictment alleging intentional evasion of state gasoline taxes is relevant to an inquiry into Massey's capacity for honesty. The district court was not in error when it stated that the government would be allowed to cross-examine character witnesses regarding the pending state charges as is specifically allowed by Rule 405(a). In addition, the district court's refusal to hold a separate hearing on this issue was not an abuse of its discretion in matters of the admission of evidence. We affirm. 41
42 Massey also argues that the admission of the testimony of the government's witness, Hillhouse, recounting statements made by West regarding Massey's involvement in the conspiracy without the benefit of a hearing to determine the existence of the conspiracy, was an abuse of discretion. Massey concedes that West's out-of-court statements to Hillhouse are not hearsay under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E), 40 but argues that he was entitled to a hearing to determine the existence of the conspiracy under Bourjaily v. United States. 41 43 In United States v. Fragoso, 42 this Court rejected a similar argument and, in response to the defendant's argument that Bourjaily required a hearing, stated [w]e think this argument erroneously transforms a descriptive portion of the Court's opinion in Bourjaily into a mandatory procedure. Bourjaily did not purport to address the procedure for proving the admissibility of a co[-]conspirator statements. 43 Thus, contrary to Massey's argument, no hearing is required and the district court was free to allow admission of the testimony before making its determination of whether the testimony fit within Rule 801(d)(2)(E). 44 And, although the district court did not make specific findings regarding the existence of the conspiracy, [i]n denying the defendant's motion for directed verdict of acquittal at the close of the trial, the court implicitly found the evidence sufficient to establish a conspiracy. 45 Thus, we affirm.
44 Finally, Massey argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for conspiracy to evade federal excise taxes. We must determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, a rational jury could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 46 In reviewing the evidence supporting the conviction: 45 It is not necessary that the evidence exclude every rational hypothesis of innocence or be wholly inconsistent with every conclusion except guilt, provided a reasonable trier of fact could find the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We accept all credibility choices that tend to support the jury's verdict. 47 46 In this case, the government presented evidence that Massey sold a high volume of fuel to Dispetco at a very low cost. In addition, when West purchased Dispetco and began his scheme to evade federal excise tax, sales from MBO to Dispetco increased dramatically. As Massey points out, however, all the sales transactions between MBO and Dispetco or General Distributors were legal because both Dispetco and General Distributors held a form 637. 48 The government also presented the testimony of Hillhouse who recounted statements by West that Massey was in on the conspiracy and was receiving a portion of the illegal profits. Massey, in turn, testified at the trial that he had no knowledge of the conspiracy and did not knowingly receive any illegal proceeds from the scheme. 47 The evidence presented by the government is minimal. There was, however, direct testimony of Massey's involvement by Hillhouse, a close associate of West. Massey attempted to rebut this evidence with his own testimony that he was innocent of any wrong-doing. The jury had the power to weigh the credibility of these witnesses. Based on the evidence presented, a reasonable jury could have found Massey guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We, therefore, affirm Massey's conviction.