Opinion ID: 2612814
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Duty To Warn Invitees

Text: Plaintiff contends the jury found the Zoo at fault based on violations of duties to Tincani as a invitee. A landowner must follow a separate set of duties for invitees. Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 (1965), [a] possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees by a condition on the land if, but only if, [the possessor] (a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and (b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and (c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger. In contrast to what a licensee may expect, an invitee is ... entitled to expect that the possessor will exercise reasonable care to make the land safe for his [or her] entry. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 cmt. b. Reasonable care requires the landowner to inspect for dangerous conditions, followed by such repair, safeguards, or warning as may be reasonably necessary for [the invitee's] protection under the circumstances. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 cmt. b. The trial court correctly instructed the jury on these duties. [11] The trial court did not instruct the jury correctly, however, on the Zoo's duty regarding known or obvious dangers. Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A, (1) A possessor of land is not liable to ... invitees for physical harm caused to them by any activity or condition on the land whose danger is known or obvious to them, unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness. We conclude, as did the Court of Appeals, that this section of the Restatement is the appropriate standard for duties to invitees for known or obvious dangers. See, e.g., Ford v. Red Lion Inns, 67 Wn. App. 766, 840 P.2d 198 (1992), review denied, 120 Wn.2d 1029 (1993); Jarr v. Seeco Constr. Co., 35 Wn. App. 324, 666 P.2d 392 (1983); Swanson v. McKain, 59 Wn. App. 303, 796 P.2d 1291 (1990), review denied, 116 Wn.2d 1007 (1991). The trial court's instruction 20 erroneously stated a landowner never has a duty to warn an invitee about open and apparent dangers from a natural condition. In limited circumstances, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A creates a duty to protect invitees even from known or obvious dangers. This occurs when a possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A(1). [R]eason to expect harm to the visitor from known or obvious dangers may arise, for example, where the possessor has reason to expect that the invitee's attention may be distracted, so that he [or she] will not discover what is obvious, or will forget what he [or she] has discovered, or fail to protect .. . against it. Such reason may also arise where the possessor has reason to expect that the invitee will proceed to encounter the known or obvious danger because to a reasonable [person] in [that] position the advantages of doing so would outweigh the apparent risk. (Italics ours.) Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A cmt. f (1965). Distraction, forgetfulness, or foreseeable, reasonable advantages from encountering the danger are factors which trigger the landowner's responsibility to warn of, or make safe, a known or obvious danger. [6] [12] Regardless of the error in instruction 20, the jury could not, as a matter of law, base its verdict on Tincani's earlier status of invitee. Plaintiff's argument rests on a misconception: a breach of duties to Tincani as an invitee remains an actionable claim even though Tincani suffered injuries while a licensee. [7] That is incorrect. The negligent failure to prevent an invitee from straying into prohibited areas extends the area of invitation; it does not, as Plaintiff's argument presumes, create a separate claim for negligence. Egede-Nissen v. Crystal Mt., Inc., 93 Wn.2d 127, 133, 606 P.2d 1214 (1980) (jury could not base negligence verdict on landowner's failure to make reasonable effort to mark area of invitation). If the Zoo were negligent in creating boundaries, the area of invitation would have extended to all places a zoo patron reasonably believed were held open to him or her. Once the patron strayed beyond that extended area, though, the patron would become a licensee with a corresponding change in the Zoo's duties. Egede-Nissen, 93 Wn.2d at 132-33. Because the jury found Tincani strayed from the area of invitation and was a licensee when he fell, Plaintiff's argument is insufficient to uphold the jury's finding of fault. Duties to invitees exist only when an individual is on the physical plot of land within the area of invitation. [T]he visitor has the status of an invitee only while he [or she] is on the part of the land to which his [or her] invitation extends. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 332 cmt. 1. Tincani suffered injury as a licensee, outside the area of invitation, and therefore he may not recover for prior claims as an invitee. Given the complexity of this area of the law, the instructions and the special verdict form may have confused the jury. The trial court did not instruct the jury on the negation of duties caused by a change in status. If the jury did in fact premise its finding of fault on a breach of duties to invitees, this result would contradict the jury's finding that Tincani was a licensee, requiring a new trial. Furthermore, the court's instructions on negligence (instruction 9) and proximate cause (instruction 8) may have led the jury to believe it could find the Zoo negligent under a general duty of ordinary care. Question 2 on the special verdict form asks only whether the Zoo was negligent, not whether it was negligent given its specific duties based on Tincani's status. If the jury had received proper instructions, could it reasonably conclude on this record that the Zoo violated duties to Tincani as an invitee? We believe it could. First, sufficient evidence exists to find the Zoo negligently marked the main trail, extending the area of invitation to include the cliff. Second, the jury could reasonably conclude the Zoo should have anticipated harm from the cliff despite its obvious dangers. Given the droves of young visitors to the Zoo, combined with an invitation to walk in the wild, sufficient evidence exists to determine the Zoo should have foreseen harm as dictated in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A. We express no opinion on the merits of these claims. We review them only to determine whether a new trial would result in a meaningful verdict or would be a useless exercise. We conclude a new trial is appropriate on these issues.