Opinion ID: 2645266
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: BIA’s Ruling

Text: The BIA denied Zheng’s motion to reopen as untimely because it was not filed within ninety days of the BIA’s final decision, as required by INA 7 Case: 13-11916 Date Filed: 12/09/2013 Page: 8 of 15 § 240(c)(7)(C)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i). As to Zheng’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the BIA noted that Zheng did not learn of her former counsel’s failure until she retained new counsel. The BIA concluded, however, that Zheng had not “explained or shown how she acted with due diligence during the 7-year period since her appeal was dismissed” or “why her motion to reopen was not filed until April 2012” when her own evidence showed that she was aware of her former counsel’s failure to file the brief by 2009, when she filed her disciplinary complaint. As to Zheng’s “new evidence” of a fear of religious persecution, the BIA concluded that Zheng had not shown changed conditions in China “such that her motion falls within an exception to the motion time limitations.” The BIA briefly noted that Zheng’s three letters from China all claimed that the Chinese government regulated religious activities more strictly and that individuals who participated in unregistered churches faced arrest or imprisonment. The BIA concluded, however, that Zheng’s motion to reopen had not argued that the conditions in China had changed materially since her original asylum claim. The BIA also determined that other evidence in the record indicated that the mistreatment of members of unregistered Christian churches was a “longstanding problem” in China that already existed at the time of Zheng’s November 2003 removal hearing. 8 Case: 13-11916 Date Filed: 12/09/2013 Page: 9 of 15 Alternatively, the BIA concluded that reopening was not warranted based on the new evidence Zheng had proffered. The BIA gave “reduced weight” to Zheng’s letters from China because: (1) they were not made under penalty of perjury or sworn to by an official authorized to administer oaths; and (2) they “appear[ed] to have been prepared for purposes of litigation, as the authors express[ed] a hope that the respondent will be allowed to stay in the United States.”1 The BIA gave no weight to the Warrant of Summon because it did not have “sufficient indicia of reliability.” The BIA emphasized that the warrant had “not been authenticated pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1287.6 or in any manner, and d[id] not bear the signature of the individual issuing the letter.” The BIA further stated that, even if it assumed the document was authentic, it did not “actually threaten any particular punishment” and did not convince the BIA that Zheng “would face any likelihood of being subjected to harm or treatment rising to the level of persecution, if she were to return to China.” Finally, the BIA rejected Zheng’s suggestion that it should reopen her proceedings sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). The BIA stated that Zheng’s 1 The BIA noted that the letters recounted events relating to Zheng’s 2000 arrest and detention in China, but that these statements were not new facts that could not have been previously discovered. Zheng does not challenge this finding in her petition for review, and we do not address it further. 9 Case: 13-11916 Date Filed: 12/09/2013 Page: 10 of 15 case did not present “‘exceptional circumstances’ that would warrant the Board’s exercise of its discretion to reopen sua sponte.”