Opinion ID: 3012414
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Does the FHAA or New Jersey Law Require a

Text: Local Land Use Board to Engage in an Informal Interactive Process with a Developer? Lapid argues that the FHAA itself, or alternatively New Jersey's MLUL, imposes an affirmative obligation on local land use boards to engage in an informal interactive process with variance applicants. Lapid argues that the Board in this case failed to engage in that process (citing in particular the inability of Lapid's representatives to meet with Fire Chief Ellis when they wanted to do so), and that therefore it is appropriate for a reviewing federal court to look at materials from outside the administrative record. For the following reasons, we do not think that any such informal interactive process requirement exists. Lapid argues that because the language of the FHAA's reasonable accommodations requirement was borrowed from the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. S 701 et seq., and that because this court has held that under the Rehabilitation Act, a defendant employer has a duty to make reasonable efforts to assist [an employee,] to communicate with him in good faith, Mengine v. Runyon, 114 F.3d 415, 420 (3d Cir. 1997), a local land use board has a similar duty under the FHAA to engage in an informal interactive process with a developer seeking a variance on behalf of the handicapped. Mengine involved a Rehabilitation Act challenge brought by a Postal Service employee, alleging that the Service had 17 failed to provide reasonable accommodations by failing to move him to a position other than letter carrier after he became disabled and incapable of fulfilling the duties of that position. Relying on Beck v. University of Wisconsin, 75 F.3d 1130 (7th Cir. 1996), an analogous case from the Seventh Circuit that involved a claim brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Mengine held that both parties [i.e., the employer and the employee] have a duty to assist in the search for [an] appropriate reasonable accommodation. 114 F.3d at 420. Beck involved a similar claim brought by a disabled employee under the ADA against her employer for failing to provide reasonable accommodations for her disability. In Beck, the court specifically relied on 29 C.F.R.S 1630 (1995), a regulation promulgated pursuant to the ADA, to reach its conclusion that [t]he appropriate accommodation for an employer to provide is best determined through a flexible, interactive process that involves both the employer and the [employee] with a disability. Beck, 75 F.3d at 1135 (quoting 29 C.F.R. S 1630, app. (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although we recognized in Mengine that 29 C.F.R. S 1630 technically applies only to the ADA, we found that Beck was relevant to our analysis of the Rehabilitation Act because in 1992 the Rehabilitation Act was amended to incorporate the standards of several sections of the ADA, including the section defining `reasonable accommodation.'  Mengine, 114 F.3d at 420. We have elaborated on the interactive process in later cases. See Donahue v. Consol. Rail Corp., 224 F.3d 226, 234 (3d Cir. 2000). The FHAA borrows language from the Rehabilitation Act. See Hovsons, Inc. v. Township of Brick, 89 F.3d 1096, 1101 (3d Cir. 1996). However, the FHAA and the Rehabilitation Act do not bear the significant similarities that justified importing the requirements of 29 C.F.R. S 1630 from the ADA to the Rehabilitation Act. The informal interactive process that S 1630 describes applies specifically to an employer-employee relationship. The regulation was promulgated to apply in the employment context, and it is highly doubtful that it was ever contemplated that it would apply in the very different context of housing and land use 18 regulations. Moreover, we believe that it would be particularly inappropriate to impose it on local land use boards because they already face detailed state and municipal requirements mandating formal procedures, which, at least in some cases, prohibit them from engaging in informal, off-the-record negotiations with variance applicants. See N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10 (requiring that local zoning boards hold hearings for variance applications at which testimony is given under oath and produce written resolutions that contain findings of fact and legal conclusions based on these hearings); see also Commons v. Westwood Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 410 A.2d 1138, 1145 (N.J. 1980) (noting that the New Jersey Supreme Court ha[s] frequently advised boards of adjustment to make findings predicated upon factual support in the record).7 Therefore, we hold that notwithstanding the interactive process requirement that exists in the law of this court in the employment context under the Rehabilitation Act, see Mengine, 114 F.3d at 420, the FHAA imposes no such requirement on local land use authorities. Lapid also argues that New Jersey law requires local zoning boards to engage in an informal interactive process with developers who apply for site plan approvals. To support this proposition, Lapid cites the following language from Pizzo Mantin Group v. Township of Randolph , 645 A.2d 89 (N.J. 1994): Although a planning board is not required affirmatively to propose suggested revisions and modifications of a subdivision plan or site plan, the MLUL [Municipal Land Use Law] contemplates active involvement by planning boards in their review of subdivisions. The generalized design standards for subdivision ordinances prescribed by the MLUL necessarily invoke the planning board's expertise and familiarity with local conditions and implicate the exercise of discretion by planning boards. . . . That discretion is best _________________________________________________________________ 7. By imposing an informal interactive process on land use boards, we would also be compromising the important policies underlying state law limitations on off-the-record contacts between developers and board members, such as limiting the potential for corruption of local officials. 19 exercised by a process in which planning boards affirmatively interact with developers when reviewing proposed subdivisions. Id. at 98 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). We do not agree that Pizzo Mantin imposes a requirement that local land use boards engage in an informal interactive process with developers. First, the language in the case says that how a board interacts with a developer is a matter of discretion that is best exercised when planning boards affirmatively interact with developers. Id. at 233. This language is far from mandatory. Second, it is unclear how, if the Scotch Plains zoning board violated New Jersey's MLUL in this case, that should bear on the scope of review of a federal FHAA claim (unless in violating the MLUL, the Board prevented Lapid from presenting necessary evidence). To the extent that Lapid is attempting to argue its pendent state law claims, it is barred from doing so because it failed to raise these state law claims in this appeal. It is generally beneficial for land use boards to be cooperative with developers, and we do not think that the Board engaged in model behavior toward Lapid in this case. Nevertheless, we cannot impose an interactive process requirement on the Board as a matter of law.