Opinion ID: 852968
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Present Indiana System

Text: The statutory process by which trial judges fashion discrete sentences has been described above. Appellate review of such sentences proceeds on a basis somewhat different from the methods that apply to other issues that typically are the subject of a criminal appeal. The drafters of the present judicial article of the Indiana Constitution provided in Article 7, section 4: The Supreme Court shall have, in all appeals of criminal cases, the power to review all questions of law and to review and revise the sentence imposed. Likewise, the constitution authorizes the Court of Appeals to review sentences to the extent provided by Supreme Court rules. Ind. Const. art. VII, § 6. While Indiana legislative history is frequently sparse, the legislative history of these provisions is available and fairly informative. The framers of the constitutional reform of which section 4 was a part provided explicitly for reference to certain historical materials to assist in interpreting its meaning: The report of the Judicial Study Commission and the comments to the article contained therein may be consulted by the Court of Justice to determine the underlying reasons, purposes, and policies of this article and may be used as a guide in its construction and application. Ind. Const. art. VII, Schedule (Michie 1978 ed.). The Commission's report describes the origin and scope of the power to review and revise sentences contained in section 4: The proposal that the appellate power in criminal cases include the power to review sentences is based on the efficacious use to which that power has been put by the Court of Criminal Appeals in England. Report of the Judicial Study Commission 140 (1967). The English statute establishing the Court of Criminal Appeals set forth that court's power to review and revise sentences as follows: On appeal against sentence the Court of Criminal Appeal shall, if they think that a different sentence should have been passed, quash the sentence passed at the trial, and pass such other sentence warranted in law by the verdict (whether more or less severe) in substitution therefore as they think ought to have been passed, and in any other case shall dismiss the appeal. Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, 7 Edward 7, ch. 23 § 4(3). Cooper v. State, 540 N.E.2d 1216, 1218 (Ind.1989). For much of the period after the voters adopted this provision of the state constitution, this Court constrained review of sentences under a rule that provided that appellate courts could not revise sentences unless the sentence was manifestly unreasonable in light of the offense and the offender. See Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B) (2002). This barrier was so high that it ran the risk of impinging on another constitutional right contained in Article 7, that the Supreme Court's rules shall provide in all cases an absolute right to one appeal. Ind. Const. art. VII, § 6. Accordingly, we have taken modest steps to provide more realistic appeal of sentencing issues. The present rule says: The Court may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B). This formulation places central focus on the role of the trial judge, while reserving for the appellate court the chance to review the matter in a climate more distant from local clamor. The rule recited above became effective on January 1, 2003, well after Serino was sentenced, but the Court of Appeals usefully applied this standard to the present appeal, as it has recently done in other cases.