Opinion ID: 785474
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence Supporting Aiding and Abbetting Duffy's Use of the Gun

Text: 16 The standard under which we review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal trial is a familiar one: A defendant challenging a conviction based on a claim of insufficiency of the evidence bears a heavy burden. See United States v. Walsh, 194 F.3d 37, 51 (2d Cir.1999). The evidence presented at trial should be viewed in the light most favorable to the [G]overnment, crediting every inference that the jury might have drawn in favor of the [G]overnment. United States v. Walker, 191 F.3d 326, 333 (2d Cir.1999) (quotation marks omitted) .... We consider the evidence presented at trial in its totality, not in isolation, but may not substitute our own determinations of credibility or relative weight of the evidence for that of the jury. United States v. Autuori, 212 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir.2000). We defer to the jury's determination of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, and to the jury's choice of the competing inferences that can be drawn from the evidence. United States v. Morrison, 153 F.3d 34, 49 (2d Cir.1998). Accordingly, we will not disturb a conviction on grounds of legal insufficiency of the evidence at trial if  any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); see also United States v. Naiman, 211 F.3d 40, 46 (2d Cir.2000). 17 United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 648-49 (2d Cir.2001). With this deferential standard of review in mind, we turn to Wilkerson's argument that the evidence presented to the jury was legally insufficient to support the jury's finding that he aided and abetted Duffy's use of the gun. 18 A defendant's guilt as an aider and abettor must be established separately with respect to a firearms offense and not merely with respect to the underlying robbery. United States v. Medina, 32 F.3d 40, 45 (2d Cir.1994). Moreover, a defendant cannot be convicted as an aider and abettor under [18 U.S.C.] § 924(c) merely because he knew that a firearm would be used or carried and, with that knowledge, performed an act to facilitate or encourage the robbery itself. Id. For example, in Medina, we reversed the defendant's firearms conviction where the evidence established that he knew that one of the robbers would be carrying a gun but did not establish that he acted in any way to facilitate or encourage the use of a gun; mere knowledge that a gun would be used was legally insufficient to prove aiding and abetting its use. Id. In contrast, we held that the evidence in United States v. Persico, 164 F.3d 796, 802-03 (2d Cir.1999), was legally sufficient to establish aiding and abetting where one of the coconspirators testified that the defendant had instructed him to provide a silencer to the murderers. 19 Here, Wilkerson did not use a firearm and was not present when the firearm was used to kill Bilberto. In arguing that the evidence was legally insufficient, Wilkerson focuses our attention on the conversation Ligon testified she had overheard between Wilkerson and Duffy: Wait for them to go inside, and go inside and get what you gotta get and come back out. While the Government argues that this statement was a direction to Duffy to retrieve a gun from Wilkerson's apartment, Wilkerson counters that this statement — which did not mention a gun — was made to direct Duffy to go inside the Lopez brothers' basement to commit the robbery. These two competing views of this statement may therefore be contrasted as follows: 20 Government's View: Wait for them [the Lopez brothers] to go inside [their basement], and go inside [my apartment] and get what you gotta get [the gun] and come back out. 21 Wilkerson's View: Wait for them [the Lopez brothers] to go inside [their basement], and go inside [their basement] and get what you gotta get [their money] and come back out. 22 Without any additional evidence, either reading of this statement is plausible, and the statement would not be legally sufficient proof that Wilkerson aided and abetted Duffy's § 924(c) violation. See United States v. Glenn, 312 F.3d 58, 70 (2d Cir. 2002) (evidence that gives `nearly equal circumstantial support' to competing explanations for [the victim's] death ... fail[s] to establish [the defendant's] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt). But Ligon's trial testimony was not the sole piece of evidence against Wilkerson on the § 924(c) charge. 23 During its redirect examination of Ligon, the Government requested permission to introduce, as prior consistent statements, part of a taped interview of Ligon conducted by a police detective and three Kings County Assistant District Attorneys the day after the attempted robbery. At a sidebar, in response to Judge Block's inquiry about what was on the tape, counsel for the Government stated: The portion I'm playing is on September 9 of 1997. Ms. Ligon was passing 147 Hull Street and heard [Wilkerson] say to Duffy, [']Go get your thing and when you see those people, go back into the basement. Go do what you have to do.['] Just like she said just now. Judge Block permitted the Government to play that portion of the tape, and (subsequent to oral argument in this appeal) the parties submitted to us for review (i) that tape and (ii) an unofficial transcript of the tape, made by Wilkerson's trial counsel. According to the tape and transcript, 2 Ligon stated that, as she walked to the corner store to purchase a role of film, she passed Wilkerson, his wife, and Duffy; they were discussing something[,] ... [Ligon] was listening to what they said[,] and [Wilkerson] told [Duffy ...] [`]when you go inside[,'] he said[,][`]get what you have to get and come back out and wait for two guys to go in the basement and then[,'] he said[,] ... [`]go do what you have to do.['] 24 Taken together with Ligon's testimony about Duffy's subsequent conduct, this characterization by Ligon of Wilkerson's statement, recorded only a day after she overheard it, thus makes Wilkerson's interpretation of Ligon's trial testimony significantly less plausible than the Government's interpretation. 3 In addition to Ligon's testimony, Toney testified that Wilkerson admitted that he was concerned about Ligon's testimony because, as she was walking by [Wilkerson], his wife[,] and Duffy sitting down on the stoop, Ligon overheard Wilkerson tell Duffy to go inside, get what he had to get, to follow the guys inside the basement to rob them, some guys staying next door to him or something. Toney further testified that Wilkerson told Toney that Ligon had seen this guy Duffy go in his house and change clothes into ... a red and yellow jacket, a red and blue jacket, [or] something like that. Finally, as discussed above, Ligon testified that, shortly after overhearing the conversation between Wilkerson and Duffy, she observed Duffy enter Wilkerson's apartment and return wearing a jacket in which she believed him to be concealing an object. 25 Consequently, the jury's finding that Wilkerson aided and abetted Duffy's use of the gun was not entirely based on Ligon's trial testimony about the conversation between Duffy and Wilkerson, but also likely rested on her prior tape-recorded statement, Toney's testimony, and Ligon's testimony as to what she saw Duffy do after the Wilkerson/Duffy conversation that Ligon overheard. Admittedly, the above evidence is circumstantial because Ligon did not know what [Duffy] had to get or if he was hiding a gun in his jacket sleeve. But we have repeatedly emphasized that a jury may base its verdict entirely on circumstantial evidence and that it is the task of the jury, not the court, to choose among competing inferences. E.g., United States v. Martinez, 54 F.3d 1040, 1043 (2d Cir.1995). Accordingly, we find that the Government provided sufficient evidence for a rational juror to have found the essential elements of [the § 924(c) count] beyond a reasonable doubt. See Glenn, 312 F.3d at 63. 26