Opinion ID: 1946688
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Statute's Prerequisites

Text: 1) Will the testimony concern a statement by, or a transaction with, a deceased person? Defendant Jesse Parker testified that he and his wife went with J.R. Richardson to the property described in the deed. There, Jesse said, J.R. handed Jesse the original deed. Jesse and his wife looked over the deed. He then handed the deed back to J.R., and asked him to keep it for me til I got back in off the boat `cause I had to leave right momentarily afterwards. Clearly, this testimony describing some act done by the deceased, or in the doing of which he personally participated, Wood v. Brewer & Brewer, 73 Ala. 259, 262 (1882), is a transaction as that term is used in the Dead Man's Statute. 2) Will the estate of this deceased person be affected by the outcome of the suit? The Parkers argue that if any estate was interested in the outcome of this litigation, it was the estate of Andrew R. Richardson ... not J.R. Richardson. Andrew's estate, of course, is interested in the outcome of this litigation, but this interest does not preclude his father's estate from also being interested. This Court has held that the protection of the Dead Man's Statute extends ... to the rights of heirs and others claiming in succession or privity. Jennings v. Provident Life and Accident Insurance Co., 246 Ala. 689, 694, 22 So.2d 319, 322 (1945). See, also, Jennings v. Jennings, 250 Ala. 130, 33 So.2d 251 (1947). Nor does the fact that Ms. Melvin claims title to the land by a conveyance from protected heirs ( i.e., Andrew and his children) operate to exclude her from the protection of the Dead Man's Statute. Walling v. Couch, 292 Ala. 33, 35, 288 So.2d 435, 436 (1973); McCulloch v. Roberts, 290 Ala. 303, 308, 276 So.2d 425, 429 (1973). The statute protects Ms. Melvin as it would her children if they had any remaining interest in the property. 3) Does the witness have a pecuniary interest in the result of the suit? The interest of the witness, Jesse Parker, in this litigation is his claim of title to the subject property. Quite obviously, this is a pecuniary interest. 4) Is the interest of the witness opposed to the interest of the party against whom he is called to testify? Although it would appear that this final requirement is easily answered in the affirmative, the Parkers strenuously argue that Ms. Melvin does not meet this requirement of adverseness. At trial, the Parkers offered evidence that Andrew Richardson was not J.R. and Daisy Richardson's son. Several witnesses testified that Daisy had been married prior to her marriage to J.R. During that previous marriage, the evidence indicated, a young woman left her infant son with Daisy and then disappeared. Daisy called the child Andrew and reared him as her own. Shortly after Daisy married J.R., Andrew began calling himself Andrew Richardson. J.R. treated Andrew as his son, but never formally adopted him. Thus, according to the Parkers' argument, because J.R. is not Andrew's father, Andrew received nothing from J.R. by intestate succession. Ms. Melvin, then, the Parkers say, is not opposed to the Parkers' interest because her husband Andrew never had title to the subject property; therefore, at his death, his children did not take the property through intestate succession and had no interest to convey to Ms. Melvin. J.R.'s estate, the Parkers say, passed by intestacy pursuant to Code 1975, § 43-8-42, presumably to J.R.'s brothers and sisters, if any. Furthermore, the Parkers contend, these unknown heirs are the real parties in interest in the present action and the only parties adverse to their claim. We note that if we accept the Parkers' argument that J.R. is not Andrew's father, it would not only preclude application of the Dead Man's Statute for failure to meet the fourth and final requirement of adverseness, but it would also operate as a complete defense in this action. That is, under this theory, Ms. Melvin would have no claim on the property; and, therefore, she would have no standing to bring this quiet title action against the Parkers. The trial judge made no explicit finding as to Andrew Richardson's paternity. In his final decree, however, the judge ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that MAMIE RICHARDSON MELVIN is the owner in fee simple of all lands described in the Bill of Complaint ... less those certain lands claimed by respondents, JESSE DELEON PARKER and SARAH PARKER. Thus, by vesting ownership in Ms. Melvin of all the property exclusive of that claimed by the Parkers, the judge implicitly found that Andrew was J.R.'s son and heir at law. Otherwise, as explained above, Ms. Melvin would have no legitimate claim to any of the property. The Parkers would have us hold that Andrew was not J.R.'s son and reverse the trial court's finding as to Andrew's paternity. This we cannot do. Because the trial judge sat without a jury and heard evidence presented ore tenus, a presumption of correctness attached to his factual finding of paternity. Skinner v. Florence, 439 So.2d 118, 119 (Ala.1983); Chaffin v. Hall, 439 So.2d 67, 69 (Ala.1983). Our careful review of the evidence of record fails to convince us that the judge's findings are either unsupported by some evidence or that such findings are plainly and palpably erroneous or manifestly unjust. We, therefore, affirm the trial judge's implicit ruling as to Andrew's paternity. Because Andrew was J.R.'s son, Ms. Melvin's interest is in opposition to the interest of Jesse Parker, the witness in our Dead Man's Statute analysis, in that she will get title to the property if the Parkers do not, and vice versa. We find, therefore, that in addition to having met the first three requirements for application of the Dead Man's Statute, Plaintiff also meets its fourth and final requirement. Unless, as the Parkers urge, the instant situation falls into one of the recognized exceptions to the statute's application, Ms. Melvin was entitled to its protection, and we must reverse the trial court for overruling her objections and allowing an incompetent witness, Jesse Parker, to testify.