Opinion ID: 1171991
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the Trial Court Err in Denying Defendant's Motion for a Change of Venue?

Text: Defendant claims that the coverage given his escape and recapture by the news media was so outrageous that a fair trial was impossible. He maintains both that the publicity entitled him to a change of venue without a showing of identifiable prejudice and also that he met the burden of proving that actual prejudice existed. See State v. Mulligan, 126 Ariz. 210, 613 P.2d 1266 (1980). Motions for a change of venue are made pursuant to Rule 10.3(b), Ariz.R.Crim.P., 17 A.R.S., which provides: Whenever the grounds for change of place of trial are based on pretrial publicity, the moving party shall be required to prove that the dissemination of the prejudicial material will probably result in the party being deprived of a fair trial. We have held that the standard established by Rule 10.3 is commensurate with the constitutional standard, State v. Smith, 123 Ariz. 231, 236, 599 P.2d 187, 192 (1979), namely whether the individual juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court, Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 1649, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961). In unusual circumstances, we have presumed that pretrial publicity renders a fair trial impossible. Either where the publicity is outrageous, Mulligan, 126 Ariz. at 214, 613 P.2d at 1270, or where it pervades the court proceedings to the extent they take on a carnival atmosphere, State v. Chaney, 141 Ariz. 295, 302, 686 P.2d 1265, 1272 (1984), prejudice is presumed. In all other cases, defendant has the burden of proving that the pretrial publicity will likely deprive him of a fair trial. Id. He can satisfy this burden by showing that the jurors have formed preconceived notions concerning his guilt and that they cannot lay those notions aside. Mulligan, 126 Ariz. at 214, 613 P.2d at 1270. Prior knowledge of a case, by itself, is therefore insufficient to disqualify a juror. Smith, 123 Ariz. at 236, 599 P.2d at 192. In the instant case, the trial court denied defendant's motion for a change of venue, finding that the media ... acted with competency and professionalism in their newscasts and written coverage. The reporting was non-hysterical in tone ... and was concerned primarily with providing the public with as much information as possible about an escaped felon. Minute Entry, Mar. 17, 1986. It concluded that the publicity could not be presumed to have rendered a fair trial impossible. We agree. The newspaper articles defendant submitted in support of his motion factually represented his escape, recapture, and the larger problem of courthouse security. See Smith, 123 Ariz. at 236, 599 P.2d at 192. The most recent article was dated January 22, 1986, seven months before the trial. Most had appeared within days of the escape on November 19, 1985. [1] We see nothing in the coverage to support defendant's characterization of it as outrageous. The events described may well have been outrageous, but this is attributable to the nature of defendant's acts, not to the manner of coverage. We therefore reject defendant's assertion that the publicity was per se prejudicial. In addition, we find that the court took adequate measures to ensure that prospective jurors' exposure to the publicity did not in fact deprive defendant of a fair trial. Contrary to defendant's assertion, [i]t is the effect of publicity on a juror's objectivity that is critical, not the extent of publicity. State v. LaGrand, 153 Ariz. 21, 34, 734 P.2d 563, 576 (emphasis in original), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 207, 98 L.Ed.2d 158 (1987). The trial court conducted individual voir dire to assess the extent of the prospective jurors' knowledge of the case and their ability to set aside any preconceived notions they had formed. See id. (approving this procedure). Of those prospective jurors who had been exposed to the pretrial publicity, many had only vague recollections of its substance. Most told the court they could set aside any opinions they had formed and decide the case solely on the evidence presented in court. Only five jurors said they could not fairly judge the case because of the publicity, and they were excused. Absent an abuse of discretion, the trial court's denial of a motion for a change of venue will not be disturbed. Chaney, 141 Ariz. at 302, 686 P.2d at 1272. We accordingly reject defendant's assignment of error on this issue.