Opinion ID: 3172548
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Underinclusivity

Text: Wolfson contends that Arizona’s Endorsement Clauses and Campaign Prohibition are underinclusive because they allow judicial candidates to receive endorsements, allow judicial candidates to endorse public officials and noncandidates, and allow other candidates to participate in judicial campaigns. “[U]nderinclusiveness can raise ‘doubts 9 Wolfson again does not contest that Arizona has a compelling interest in upholding the Endorsement Clauses and Campaign Prohibition. Arizona has a compelling interest in upholding the public confidence in the judiciary and furthers this interest through a ban on personal solicitation and curtailment of judicial candidates’ ability to engage with the political branches of government. WOLFSON V. CONCANNON 15 about whether the government is in fact pursuing the interest it invokes, rather than disfavoring a particular speaker or viewpoint,’” Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1668 (quoting Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2740 (2011)), and can “reveal that a law does not actually advance a compelling interest.” Id. However, “[a] State need not address all aspects of a problem in one fell swoop” and can “focus on . . . [the] most pressing concerns.” Id. Once again, Williams-Yulee controls our reasoning. In assessing whether Florida’s solicitation clause was underinclusive, the Court looked at whether Canon 7C(1) was “aim[ed] squarely at the conduct most likely to undermine public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary,” “applie[d] evenhandedly to all judges and judicial candidates, regardless of their viewpoint,” and was “not riddled with exceptions.” Id. at 1668–69. We do not believe that the analysis should be any different when assessing a prohibition of endorsements or participation in political campaigns. Williams-Yulee may have been about a prohibition on direct candidate solicitations of campaign contributions, but the Supreme Court’s reasoning was broad enough to encompass underinclusivity arguments aimed at other types of judicial candidate speech prohibitions such as Arizona’s Endorsement Clauses and its Campaign Prohibition. And both the Endorsement Clauses and Campaign Prohibition fit easily under the Williams-Yulee underinclusivity analysis. First, Arizona squarely aimed at preventing conduct that could erode the judiciary’s credibility. When a judicial candidate actively engages in political campaigns, a judge’s impartiality can be put into question, and the public can lose faith in the judiciary’s ability to abide by the law and not make decisions along 16 WOLFSON V. CONCANNON political lines. Arizona’s Endorsement Clauses and Campaign Prohibition are aimed at these valid concerns. See Arizona Judicial Code of Conduct Rule 4.1, Comment 1 (“Rather than making decisions based upon the expressed views or preferences of the electorate, a judge makes decisions based upon the law and the facts of every case. Therefore, in furtherance of this interest, judges and judicial candidates must, to the greatest extent possible, be free and appear to be free from political influence and political pressure.”). Further, the Endorsement Clauses and Campaign Prohibition apply to both judges and judicial candidates and have few exceptions.10 We need not question whether Arizona could have, as Wolfson argues, prohibited more types of endorsements or campaign participation. “[P]olicymakers may focus on their most pressing concerns” and the fact that the state could “conceivably could have restricted even greater amounts of speech in service of their stated interests” is not a death blow under strict scrutiny. Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1668. Arizona’s Endorsement Clauses and Campaign Prohibition are not underinclusive.