Opinion ID: 707302
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: False Statements to Federal Agency

Text: 37 Dulinawka contends that his conviction for false statements to a federal agency should be reversed because the false statements at issue did not concern a matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency as required by 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1001, which provides, 38 Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States knowingly or willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. 39 At trial, Dulinawka conceded that the matter was within the jurisdiction of any department or agency. Subsequently, in Hubbard v. United States, 115 S.Ct. 1754 (1995), the United States Supreme Court held that a federal court is neither a 'department' nor an 'agency' within the meaning of Sec. 1001, expressly overruling United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503 (1955) (holding that the word department, as used in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1001, was meant to describe the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the government). Hubbard, 115 S.Ct. at 1758, 1765. Here, Dulinawka's false statements were made to a federal magistrate judge and because a federal court is not a department or agency under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1001, Dulinawka's conviction must be reversed. 40 The government argues that Hubbard is merely a plurality opinion and, therefore, this court's opinion in United States v. Powell, 708 F.2d 455 (1983), rev'd on other grounds, 469 U.S. 57 (1984), still controls. 2 We reject the government's argument because a majority of the Justices concurred in the relevant portion of the Hubbard opinion. 3 41 Notwithstanding Dulinawka's concession at trial that his false statements were within the jurisdiction of any department or agency, we apply the holding in Hubbard on review. In United States v. Mkhsian, 5 F.3d 1306 (9th Cir.1993), we held there are three exceptions to the general rule that an issue raised for the first time on direct appeal will not be considered: (1) when review of the issue is required 'to prevent a miscarriage of justice or to preserve the integrity of the judicial process'; (2) when the issue arises by virtue of a change in law while the appeal is pending; or (3) when the issue to be reviewed is purely legal. Mkhsian, 5 F.3d at 1310 (quoting United States v. Kimball, 896 F.2d 1218, 1219 (9th Cir.1990), vacated in part, 925 F.2d 356 (9th Cir.1991) (en banc)). 42 The second and third exceptions enumerated in Mkhsian apply here. Not only was Hubbard (which changed this circuit's law as stated in Powell 4 ) decided after Dulinawka's conviction, but the issue is one of statutory construction, which makes review particularly appropriate. See Mkhsian, 5 F.3d at 1311. 43 We also rely on Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987), in which the Supreme Court held that a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final. Id., at 328; see also United States v. Montoya, 945 F.2d 1068, 1071 (9th Cir.1991) (applying new substantive law to a case on direct review). 44 Because we reverse Dulinawka's conviction for making false statements under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1001, we do not reach his contention that there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction. We similarly decline to address the government's Rule 29(b) objection to Dulinawka's insufficiency of evidence claim. 45 Accordingly, Dulinawka's conviction for false statement to a federal agency is reversed.