Opinion ID: 195625
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Guarico Residence

Text: 25 HAVED next contends that the district court committed reversible error in not treating the Guarico Residence as a SFH under Provisos 1 and 3 of FHA Sec. 3603(b)(1). HAVED argues that nothing in FHA Sec. 3603(b)(1) excludes owner-occupied houses from the term single-family house. Furthermore, HAVED notes, Proviso 2 explicitly qualifies the term SFH (any such single-family house by a private individual owner not residing in such house at the time of such sale), a qualification that would be entirely unnecessary if the term SFH itself excluded owner-occupied houses. 26 On the other hand, Suarez says that the Guarico Residence is excluded from consideration under Provisos 1 and 3 because the prefatory clause in FHA Sec. 3603(b)(1) (exempting any single-family house sold or rented by the [defendant] in a discriminatory manner) suggests that Congress did not intend that any property of the defendant count toward the four-SFH threshold unless that property itself was up for sale or rent at the time of the allegedly discriminatory transaction. 6 Suarez argues that this must be so because the references to such [SFHs] in Provisos 1 and 3 can only relate back to the prefatory clause, and incorporate the requirement that only sold or rented SFHs are to be included in calculating the four-SFH threshold. Thus, Suarez says, a defendant's residence normally would not be included as a SFH unless it were on the market at the time of the alleged discriminatory sale or rental. Suarez discounts the value of Proviso 2 as a tool for interpreting the prefatory clause in FHA Sec. 3603(b)(1), since Proviso 2 creates a considerably narrower and altogether independent exemption that allows one discriminatory sale (but not a rental) of an owner-occupied SFH to be excluded within any two-year period. Proviso 1, on the other hand, creates a broader exemption for owners who own no more than three SFHs that are either for sale or rent by the owner. 7 27 The present dispute prompts two inquiries. The first is whether a defendant's current residence is excluded from the threshold four-SFH calculus under Provisos 1 and 3 simply because it is his primary or current residence, even though all other SFHs owned but not occupied by the defendant are included without regard to whether they were concurrently on the market. The second inquiry is whether Congress meant to exclude from the threshold four-SFH calculus all SFHs owned by the defendant (including the primary residence) not on the market at the time the defendant--for discriminatory reasons--refused to sell or rent a different SFH to the plaintiff. We turn to these questions.
28 As its prefatory clause makes clear, the FHA Sec. 3603(b)(1) exemption--assuming its four provisos are satisfied--applies to any single-family house sold or rented by the owner in a discriminatory manner. For section 3603(b)(1) purposes, therefore, the relevant SFHs in this case are Houses A and B, located on the Los Llanos Property Suarez refused to rent or sell to HAVED. Section 3603(b)(1) neither defines the term SFH, nor does its prefatory clause expressly limit the term SFH to structures in which the defendant does not reside. Conversely, as Suarez acknowledges, if the Suarezes had refused to rent or sell their Guarico Residence to HAVED, the prefatory clause would not have debarred the Suarezes from a section 3603(b)(1) exemption merely because the property being rented or sold was their residence. 29 The statutory context in which the prefatory clause appears undermines the Suarez contention as well. See Skidgel v. Maine Dep't of Human Servs., 994 F.2d 930, 937 (1st Cir.1993) (meaning of particular statutory language assessed in light of entire statute). The four FHA Sec. 3603(b)(1) provisos do not give rise to four independent exemptions, as Suarez suggests, but represent four cumulative preconditions to the single exemption set out in the prefatory clause. If any of the four provisos is not satisfied, no section 3603(b)(1) exemption is appropriate. 30 Proviso 2 refers specifically to a discrete subset of the discriminatory SFH sales focused upon in the section 3603(b)(1) prefatory clause, namely, sales of SFHs in which the defendant is not residing. If the unqualified term SFH in the prefatory clause were intended to embrace only SFHs in which the defendant is not residing, no such further qualification would be needed in Proviso 2. See Mosquera-Perez v. INS, 3 F.3d 553, 556 (1st Cir.1993) (court should avoid interpretations which render any part of statute meaningless). Thus, if the term SFH, as used in the prefatory clause, applies to residences and nonresidences, the pendent references to such [SFHs] in Provisos 1 and 3 also necessarily encompass the Suarezes's Guarico Residence qua residence. 31 Finally, the legislative history discloses no basis for second-guessing the plain language of section 3603(b)(1). See Laracuente v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 891 F.2d 17, 23 (1st Cir.1989) (Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, the plain language of the statute is conclusive.). As initially introduced in Congress, the FHA contained few significant exemptions from liability, see, e.g., supra note 7 (describing Mrs. Murphy exemption), and the breadth of the FHA's coverage caused vigorous Senate opposition. See generally Jean E. Dubofsky, Fair Housing: A Legislative History and a Perspective, 8 Washburn L.J. 149 (1969). Senator Everett M. Dirksen proposed to assuage opposition by exempting sales and rentals of any single-family house sold or rented by an owner residing in such house at the time of such sale or rental, or who was the most recent resident of such house prior to such sale or rental. See 114 Cong.Rec. 4571 (1968). Yet even the Dirksen substitute, later modified and enacted as Proviso 2, failed to gain enough Senate support. To break the deadlock, Senator Robert C. Byrd proposed the expanded four-part exemption, later codified as present section 3603(b)(1). During floor debate, Senator Byrd offered two illuminating hypotheticals to demonstrate the coverage which would be provided under his proposal, but not under the Dirksen substitute: 32 A widow owns and lives in a single-family dwelling. She also owns a single-family dwelling across the street, the tenant therein being her daughter. The daughter moves to another State. The widow cannot qualify for exemption under the Dirksen substitute because she neither resides in the house across the street--of which she is the owner--nor is the most recent resident of such dwelling prior to a subsequent sale or rental. 33 An individual lives in his own single-family dwelling located on a three-quarter-acre lot. He decides to build a second house on the lot. Ten years later misfortune forces him to parcel the lot and sell the house thereon. He does not qualify under the Dirksen substitute exemption because he is neither residing in the adjacent dwelling nor was he the most recent resident thereof. 34 114 Cong.Rec. 5640 (1968) (emphasis added). 35 Asked why it was necessary to raise the number of houses owned by one party to three, Senator Byrd referred to these two hypotheticals, and noted that he had already discussed situations in which there would be at least two [single-family] houses involved. Id. (emphasis added). Significantly, both hypotheticals assumed that the houses in which the seller currently resided would be counted toward the four-SFH threshold in Provisos 1 and 3. See Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 728, 103 S.Ct. 3291, 3300, 77 L.Ed.2d 961 (1983) (noting that interpretation of statute by sponsor is  'authoritative guide to the statute's construction' ) (citation omitted); see also Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U.S. 253, 263, 106 S.Ct. 1834, 1840, 90 L.Ed.2d 248 (1986) (sponsor's statements credited if consistent with statutory language). Other senators likewise recognized that the more than three threshold would include houses in which the seller resided. See 114 Cong.Rec. 5641 (1968) (I know we have people who have a summer home or a winter home.... One could easily have three homes.) (statement of Senator Jordan). Since this legislative history, at the very least, precludes our finding a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, Laracuente, 891 F.2d at 23, we must conclude that a defendant's residence, qua residence, is not to be excluded under Provisos 1 and 3 of section 3603(b)(1). 8
36 Suarez proposes to exclude the Guarico Residence under Provisos 1 and 3 because it was neither for rent nor sale at the time he refused to sell the Los Llanos Property to HAVED. See Lamb v. Sallee, 417 F.Supp. 282, 285 (E.D.Ky.1976). The theory is that the term such [SFHs] in Provisos 1 and 3 unambiguously relates back to the complete phrase--single-family house sold or rented by an owner--in the section 3603(b)(1) prefatory clause. The language of the statute is not dispositive on this issue, and the interpretation proposed by Suarez is at least plausible. 37 Although it is conceivable that Congress's choice of the indeterminate modifier such was intended only to require the counting of residences qua residences under Provisos 1 and 3--in direct contrast to the more constricted scope of the term SFH under Proviso 2--Provisos 1 and 3 reasonably might be read to impose the additional, distinct requirement that any SFH, regardless whether it is the defendant's residence, be counted under Provisos 1 and 3 only if it is a single-family house sold or rented by an owner. Indeed, Congress's choice of words--sold or rented--in the section 3603(b)(1) prefatory clause is a most curious usage. In order for liability to attach under FHA Sec. 3604, a defendant need never have consummated the discriminatory rental or sale of the SFH to which the section 3603(b)(1) prefatory clause adverts. Rather, FHA liability attaches as soon as the defendant refuses to sell or rent after [the plaintiff makes] a bona fide offer, see supra note 1, without regard to whether the SFH is ever sold or rented to anyone. With these linguistic difficulties in mind, it seems arguable at least, in keeping with the structure and language of the statute, that the term such, as used in Provisos 1 and 3, imports the same on the market qualification necessarily implicit in the section 3603(b)(1) prefatory clause. 38 As noted earlier, however, normally latent ambiguity in a statutory modifier like such should be construed in furtherance of the statute's remedial goals. See Cia. Petrolera, 754 F.2d at 428. (When Congress uses broad generalized language in a remedial statute, and that language is not contravened by authoritative legislative history, a court should interpret the provision generously so as to effectuate the important congressional goals.) Not only does the authoritative legislative history not contravene the HAVED interpretation, see supra Section II.B.1, it contradicts the Suarez contention. Most importantly, neither hypothetical advanced by Senator Byrd assumed or intimated that the seller's residence was on the market at the time the discriminatory sale of the second house took place, yet Senator Byrd included both these SFHs under Provisos 1 and 3. Notwithstanding a conceivable vestige of literal ambiguity, therefore, we are persuaded to the view that the Guarico Residence must be included in the four-SFH calculus under section 3603(b)(1) consistent with the FHA's legislative history and its broad remedial design. 9 III