Opinion ID: 177263
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Catch-all Clause

Text: Alternatively, Sherman argues that even if Brown and Croft were correctly decided, this case is distinguishable because the statutes at issue in those cases included the catch-all phrase any other silent activity. Brown, 258 F.3d at 270 (quoting Va.Code Ann. § 22.1-203); Croft, 562 F.3d at 738 (quoting Tex. Educ.Code. § 25.082(d)). Sherman claims that in contrast, Section 1 limits pupils to only two activitiesprayer or reflection on the day's activities. Sherman and the ACLU, however, misread Section 1. Nothing in the text of Section 1 limits students' thoughts during the period of silence; the text mandates only one thingsilence. While Section 1 does state that [t]his period ... shall be an opportunity for silent prayer or for silent reflection on the anticipated activities of the day, providing an opportunity is not the same thing as mandating conduct. [8] There is nothing in the statute limiting the use of the period of silence, and the legislative history makes clear that the legislators intended the moment of silence to be available for any silent thought. See Statement of Senator Lightford, S. Proceedings, 95th Ill. Gen. Assem., March 21, 2007, at 86, 88 (the moment should not be conducted as a religious exercise, but rather was a neutral act which affords students the opportunity to reflect on whatever they wish, whether religious or not); Statements of Senators Cronin and Sieben, id. at 87-88 (supporting mandatory moment of silence to instill a little meditative exercise at the beginning of the day, however students may choose to use it). Moreover, it would be unreasonable to interpret the statute as limiting students' thoughts to prayer or reflection as there is no way a teacher could know what a student is pondering, and we will not interpret a law in an absurd way. Zbaraz v. Madigan, 572 F.3d 370, 386-87 (7th Cir. 2009). Thus, while the text of Section 1 differs from the statutes at issue in Virginia and Texas, Section 1, like those statutes, permits any silent activity. See also Bown, 112 F.3d at 1472-73 (noting that Georgia's moment of silence statute, which provided that it shall be considered as an opportunity for a moment of silent reflection on the anticipated activities of the day, allowed students to use the moment of quiet reflection as they wish, so long as they remain silent). Accordingly, we reject Sherman's argument that Section 1 is unconstitutional because it lacks a catch-all clause.
The second prong of Lemon considers whether the government's practice has the principal or primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613, 91 S.Ct. 2105. Under this prong, the question is: irrespective of government's actual purpose, whether the practice under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. City of Marshfield, Wis., 203 F.3d 487, 493 (7th Cir.2000) (internal quotation omitted). The ACLU argues that Section 1 has the principal or primary effect of advancing religion by limiting students' thoughts during the period of silence to one of two topics (prayer or reflection on the day's activity), making prayer an attractive alternative. However, as explained above, see supra at 516-17, Section 1 does not limit students' thoughts during the moment of silence and thus this argument fails. Of course, should a school (or an individual teacher) implement Section 1 in a way which encourages (or discourages) prayer, that would be another case. But in this case Sherman presents solely a facial challenge and facially the statute only mandates a period of silence and conveys neither a message of endorsement nor disapproval. Justice O'Connor in her concurrence in Wallace put it best when she said: It is difficult to discern a serious threat to religious liberty from a room of silent, thoughtful schoolchildren. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 73, 105 S.Ct. 2479 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In fact, the plain language of Section 1 shows that Illinois acted with neutralityavoiding both endorsement (by stating that the period of silence shall not be conducted as a religious exercise) and disapproval (by stating that the period of silence shall be an opportunity for prayer or silent reflection). The decisions from our sister circuits support this conclusion. [9] In Bown, the Eleventh Circuit held that Georgia's moment of silence law satisfied Lemon's second prong because the law merely required students to remain silent and explicitly says that the moment of quiet reflection is not to be conducted as a religious exercise. Bown, 112 F.3d at 1473. And there was no suggestion that students should or should not pray silently during the moment of quiet reflection. Id. Similarly, in Brown, the Fourth Circuit held that the second prong of Lemon was clearly satisfied because the statute was facially neutral between religious and nonreligious modes of introspection and other silent activity. Brown, 258 F.3d at 277. Further, Brown rejected the plaintiff's argument that despite the statute's facial neutrality between silent religious expression and silent nonreligious expression, the statute's inevitable effect ... will be to promote prayer by creating the perception, especially from the viewpoint of young, impressionable school children, that the Commonwealth endorses prayer. Brown, 258 F.3d at 277-78. The court reasoned that [i]n the context of a facial challenge, however, this fear is speculative at best.... Brown, 258 F.3d at 278. The Brown court concluded that speculative fears as to the potential effects of this statute [on school children] cannot be used to strike down a statute that on its face is neutral between religious and nonreligious activity. Id. Croft likewise held that the moment of silence law did not have the primary effect of advancing religion, and so survives the second Lemon prong. 562 F.3d at 749. Even May, which held New Jersey's moment of silence law unconstitutional, held that the statute did not have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. May, 780 F.2d at 247-50. Alternatively, Sherman argues that Section 1 violates the second prong of Lemon by favoring some religions (those which engage in silent prayer) over other religions (those which do not). Attorneys General amici urge us to reject this argument because this reasoning would render unconstitutional the moment of silence laws of more than thirty states because, by their nature, moment of silence laws will always preclude vocal prayer. We agree with Koch and the Attorneys General amici: A moment of silence law does not violate the Establishment Clause by favoring some religions. The government may not favor one religion over another without a legitimate secular reason. Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 881 (7th Cir.2009). In this case, to the extent it could be considering favoring some religions by providing a period of silence, there is a valid secular reason for not allowing vocal prayer during that time maintaining silence. Therefore, Section 1 neither advances nor inhibits any particular religion in violation of Lemon's second prong. Our sister circuits have reached the same conclusion on this issue as well. For instance, in Bown, the plaintiff argued that the Act, by mandating a moment of silence, both advances and inhibits religion by favoring silent prayer and discouraging other forms of prayer. Bown, 112 F.3d at 1472. The Eleventh Circuit rejected this argument stressing [t]he Act mandates a moment of quiet reflection, not a moment of silent prayer. Id. at 1472. The court then concluded that so long as the moment of quiet reflection exercise is conducted in the manner prescribed by the statute (i.e., that the moment of quiet reflection is silent and is not conducted as a religious exercise), the statute does not violate the second prong of Lemon. Bown, 112 F.3d at 1473. Similarly, the Fifth Circuit in Croft rejected the argument that the moment of silence law discriminates against religions that do not practice silent prayer, explaining the statute provides for a minute of silence and allows any non-disruptive silent activity. Croft, 562 F.3d at 750. Requiring that students be silent does not discriminate among religious sects. Id. Thus, Section 1 does not have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion in violation of Lemon's second prong.
Under the third prong of the Lemon test, a statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613, 91 S.Ct. 2105. This prong is not at issue here because Sherman did not argue, nor did the district court find, that Section 1 fostered an excessive entanglement with religion. See Books, 401 F.3d at 858 n. 1. (Books has not argued that the display excessively entangles government with religion, the third inquiry under Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971), so we do not address that issue.). Nor do we believe that such an argument would succeed because Section 1 mandates only a period of silence and thus there is no need for schools, teachers, or students to become entangled in questions of religion. Every circuit to have considered this issue has reached a similar conclusion. See Croft, 562 F.3d at 750 (stating that no court has ever acceptedespecially on a facial challengethat a moment of silence statute is excessive government entanglement with religion); Brown, 258 F.3d at 278 (And the third prongthat the State not become excessively entangled with religionis undoubtedly satisfied.); Bown, 112 F.3d at 1474 (We conclude that there is no excessive entanglement in this case. All that the Act requires is that the students and the teacher in charge remain silent during the moment of quiet reflection.); May, 780 F.2d at 247 (holding that moment of silence statute did not foster an excessive entanglement with religion, but affirming district court's conclusion that statute was unconstitutional because the district court's factual finding that the law lacked a secular purpose was not clearly erroneous). See also Wallace, 472 U.S. at 66, 105 S.Ct. 2479 (Powell, J., concurring) (stating the effect of a straight-forward moment-of-silence statute [would not] ... foster an excessive government entanglement with religion).
Finally, Sherman asserts that Section 1 is unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it does not specify how the period of silence will be implemented or penalties for violations of the statute. The void for vagueness doctrine rests on the basic principle of due process that a law is unconstitutional if its prohibitions are not clearly defined. Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446, 458 (7th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation omitted). The Due Process Clause, though, does not demand perfect clarity and precise guidance. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 794, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989). Rather, a statute is only unconstitutionally vague if it fails to define the offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and it fails to establish standards to permit enforcement in a nonarbitrary, nondiscriminatory manner. Fuller ex rel. Fuller v. Decatur Public School Bd. of Educ. Sch. Dist. 61, 251 F.3d 662, 666 (7th Cir.2001). However, the degree of vagueness that the Constitution toleratesas well as the relative importance of fair notice and fair enforcement depends in part on the nature of the enactment. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982). The Constitution tolerates a lesser degree of vagueness in enactments with criminal rather than civil penalties because the consequences of imprecision are more severe. Karlin, 188 F.3d at 458. And [g]iven the school's need to be able to impose disciplinary sanctions for a wide range of unanticipated conduct disruptive of the educational process, the school disciplinary rules need not be as detailed as a criminal code. Fuller, 251 F.3d at 667 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 686, 106 S.Ct. 3159, 92 L.Ed.2d 549 (1986)). Moreover, in a facial vagueness challenge the question is whether the statute is vague in all its operations. Id. While Section 1 does not define the length of the period of silence, it is not unconstitutionally vague in all its applications, as demonstrated by District 214's proposed implementation of the statute. At a hearing at the preliminary injunction stage, District 214 indicated that it intended to implement Section 1 by making a school-wide morning announcement: We will now have a brief period of silence. Then, after fifteen seconds had passed, the announcer would begin the Pledge. A student of ordinary intelligence would clearly understand that he is to remain silent for the fifteen seconds between the announcement and the beginning of the Pledge. And given the school setting, the Constitution does not mandate a cornucopia of additional details or a statement of the punishment students will face should they disregard their teacher's direction. Sherman, therefore, cannot complain of the vagueness of the law in every situation and her Due Process challenge fails.