Opinion ID: 2637002
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion to dismiss and statutory construction

Text: Vallery's motion to dismiss raised several issues. Among them was a contention that the State failed to introduce sufficient evidence in its case-in-chief to support allegations in Count I that she abused or exploited Thomas within the meaning of NRS 200.5099. Although Vallery did not specifically address the differences between the 1993 and 1995 versions of the statute, her arguments on the motion involve construction of the 1993 statute. Vallery asserts that the district court erred in refusing to grant her motion or accept her construction of the statute. The State contends that the merits of the motion are irrelevant because a district court has no authority to dismiss a criminal action at the close of evidence. We agree. We have previously concluded that a district court may not dismiss a criminal allegation after the close of the evidence, but instead is limited to giving an acquittal instruction or, after the jury returns a verdict of guilt, entering a judgment of acquittal or granting a new trial. [6] While the district court did not err in refusing to grant the motion to dismiss, Vallery raised several issues in the motion and in her brief on appeal discussing the motion, regarding the construction of the elder abuse prevention statutes. Because statutory construction affected the jury instructions, we will address the substance of Vallery's statutory construction arguments. In addition, although Vallery was not convicted of abusing or exploiting an older person, only of neglecting an older person, we take this opportunity to address all three issues.
In the 1993 version of NRS 200.5099, the elements of the offense required that the State prove that an individual willfully caused or permitted an older person to suffer unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering as a result of abuse or that the individual willfully caused or permitted an older person to be placed in a situation where the person may suffer unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering as a result of abuse. In 1995, the Legislature eliminated the willfully caused or permitted language from the abuse provision of the statute and instead simply stated that any person who abuses an older person, causing the older person to suffer unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering, is guilty of violating the statute. [7] The definition of abuse, however, did not change. Abuse, as used in any version of NRS 200.5099, is defined in NRS 200.5092: 1. Abuse means willful and unjustified: (a) Infliction of pain, injury or mental anguish on an older person; or (b) Deprivation of food, shelter, clothing or services which are necessary to maintain the physical or mental health of an older person. The term willful is not defined. Vallery asserts that we should interpret that word and the phrase willfully causes or permits in the same way as we have interpreted the phrase willfully caused in the child abuse and neglect statutes. We agree. The language of the criminal child abuse and neglect statute [8] is very similar to the language used in the elderly abuse and neglect statute. In interpreting the child abuse and neglect statute, we have stated that a willful act is one that is done intentionally, not accidentally. [9] Moreover, we conclude that the deletion of the words willfully causes from NRS 200.5099 during the 1995 legislative session does not change the basic definition of abuse. Under NRS 200.5092, abuse involves willful and unjustified infliction or deprivation. The plain language of the statute reflects intentional acts. [10]
The 1993 version of NRS 200.5099 speaks of exploitation causing physical pain or mental suffering while exploitation was defined under NRS 200.5092(2) as wrongful use of an older person or his money or property to the advantage of another. [11] The 1995 version makes it clear that exploitation refers to actions involving the property or assets of an older person. Exploitation is now unlawful under separate provisions of NRS 200.5099 [12] and is defined as any act taken by a person who has the trust and confidence of an older person or any use of the power of attorney or guardianship of an older person to obtain control, through deception, intimidation or undue influence, over the older person's money, assets or property with the intention of permanently depriving the older person of the ownership, use, benefit or possession of his money, assets or property. As used in this subsection, undue influence does not include the normal influence that one member of a family has over another. [13] We conclude that the 1995 amendments merely clarify, the Legislature's intent that exploitation refers to the assets or property of an older person. Whereas the 1993 statute requires that the exploitation result in physical pain or mental suffering, the 1995 statute contains no such provision and makes it a crime to exploit the property of the older person even when no pain or suffering is involved.
As with abuse, the 1993 version of NRS 200.5099 made it a crime for an individual to willfully cause or permit an older person to suffer unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering as a result of neglect. NRS 200.5092 defined neglect: 3. Neglect means the failure of: (a) A person who has assumed legal responsibility or a contractual obligation for caring for an older person ... to provide food, shelter, clothing or services which are necessary to maintain the physical or mental health of the older person. [14] Permit was defined in the body of NRS 200.5099 itself: Permit means permission that a reasonable person would not grant and which amounts to a neglect of responsibility attending the care and custody of an older person. [15] Vallery again asserts that the phrase willfully causes or permits contemplates intentional conduct. Vallery contends the statute requires that an individual must have actual knowledge that an older person is in a situation where he or she is likely to suffer unjustifiable pain or mental suffering in order to be convicted of violating the statute. The State argues that, when combined with the definitions of neglect and permit, the statute does not require actual knowledge, but also contemplates constructive knowledge. Thus, an individual who should have known that his or her actions, or failure to act, placed an older person under his or her care in a position where the older person might be subjected to unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering can also be charged with neglect. We disagree. The statutes, read as a whole, require either that an individual willfully fails to provide for an older person or grant permission for some action that places an older person in a situation where the older person will suffer harm. We agree with the State that under a neglect charge, an individual does not have to intend to harm an older person. However, one cannot willfully cause or permit unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering by failing to provide appropriate care or services if one is unaware of the needs of the older person. The phrase willfully causes or permits contemplates actual knowledge of a situation which requires action (or a denial of permission) in order to prevent harm to an older person. We reach a different result however when we consider the language of the 1995 version of NRS 200.5099. As noted above, in 1995 the Legislature deleted the willfully causes or permits language. In addition, the Legislature restructured the statute. Subsequent to the amendments, NRS 200.5099(2) now provides criminal sanctions for any person who has assumed responsibility, legally, voluntarily or pursuant to contract, to care for an older person and who: (a) Neglects the older person, causing the older person to suffer physical pain or mental suffering; (b) Permits or allows the older person to suffer unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering; or (c) Permits or allows the older person to be placed in a situation where the older person may suffer physical pain or mental suffering as the result of abuse or neglect. The definitions of neglect and permit remain the same. The Legislature also added a new definition encompassing the term allow: Allow means to take no action to prevent or stop the abuse or neglect of an older person if the person knows or has reason to know that the older person is being abused or neglected. [16] The 1995 version of NRS 200.5099 again uses language identical or substantially similar to the child abuse and neglect prevention statutes. In interpreting those statutes, we have said that the permit and allow language must be read in conjunction and when so read both definitions establish the same requirement: a person acts unreasonably and is therefore criminally liable if she knows or has reason to know of abuse or neglect yet permits or allows the child to be subject to it. This requirement of knowledge and reasonableness adequately defines the state of mind required for a finding of guilt and effectively precludes punishment for inadvertent or ignorant acts. [17] We conclude that the same reasoning applies to the elder abuse prevention statute. With the deletion of the willfully causes language from the neglect provisions of the statute and the addition of the allow language, we conclude that a conviction under the neglect, permit or allow sections of NRS 200.5099 only requires proof that an accused knew or had reason to know that an older person could suffer harm as a result of the accused's actions or failure to act. Our conclusion is further supported by an additional amendment to the statutory scheme in 1999. The Legislature added NRS 200.50925, which states in pertinent part: For the purposes of NRS 200.5091 to 200.50995, inclusive, a person: 1. Has reasonable cause to believe if, in light of all the surrounding facts and circumstances which are known or which reasonably should be known to the person at the time, a reasonable person would believe, under those facts and circumstances, that an act, transaction, event, situation or condition exists, is occurring or has occurred. [18] While the term reasonable cause to believe does not appear in the neglect, permit or allow provisions of the statute, the language of NRS 200.50925 incorporates the overall theme of the statutes. In cases involving activities that do not rise to abuse, a reasonable person standard should apply. Thus, when an individual who is responsible for the care of an older person has knowledge of facts and circumstances that would cause a reasonable person to believe an older person was in a situation that might require additional care or services, the failure to take steps to check out the situation may result in criminal liability if the actions or failure to act causes the older person to suffer harm. Actual knowledge of danger to an older person is not required under the 1995 version of NRS 200.5099.