Opinion ID: 2561940
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: did respondent practice law?

Text: In his brief to this court, Rost asserts that the hearing panel based its determination that he was practicing law on five factors: Rost's correspondence with the district court; Rost's use of his Supreme Court registration number on documents filed with the district court; Rost's meeting with clients; Rost's specific meetings with Lloyd; and Rost's resolution of Lloyd's legal problems. He then makes a cursory attempt at refuting those factors. With respect to the letter to Judge Yeoman on law firm letterhead, Rost asserts that the judge had testified that the Disciplinary Administrator had specifically advised the judge of Rost's retirement and that the letter was prepared by a temporary employee on stationery which was supposed to have been destroyed. Regardless of what the judge might have known, Rost signed a letter to the court, with a copy to another attorney, on stationery identifying Rost as an attorney at a time when he was not permitted to act as an attorney. He must bear responsibility for that act and cannot shift the blame to members of his staff. See Supreme Court Rule 5.3(c) (2008 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 561) (lawyer is responsible for employed nonlawyer conduct that would be KRPC violation if done by lawyer). With respect to using his Supreme Court registration number on documents filed with the district court, Rost first contends that he continued to possess his registration number, notwithstanding his retirement. He then argues that [u]nder Supreme Court Rule 211 [ sic ] attorneys are required to use their `Supreme court registration numbers for attorneys' on pleadings. Presumably, Rost intended to refer to Supreme Court Rule 111 (2008 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 196), which deals with the form of pleadings in the district court. That rule actually cuts against Rost. It provides that [a]ll pleadings, briefs, and other papers prepared by attorneys or litigants for filing in the courts ... shall include the name, Supreme Court registration numbers for attorneys, address, and telephone number of the person filing them. 2008 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 196. Clearly, what distinguishes a pleading prepared and filed by an attorney from one that is prepared and filed by a litigant is the inclusion of a Supreme Court registration number. Accordingly, by including his registration number on the documents filed with the district court, Rost was identifying the pleadings as having been prepared and filed by an attorney. At the time, Rost was not authorized to prepare and file pleadings as an attorney. With respect to meeting with clients, Rost simply refers us back to his argument that the hearing panel improperly restricted his business opportunities. We have rejected the argument that enforcing the prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law violates the Commerce Clause. To the extent that Rost suggests that he was permitted to meet with clients of a consulting firm which provided only law-related services, we find that potential argument is belied by Rost's own description of his activities, which will be discussed below. With respect to the last two factors involving Lloyd, Rost simply argues that Lloyd did not testify that he received legal advice and that the only testimony that exists is Rost's statement that he advised Lloyd to obtain elsewhere the legal advice which Rost could not provide. This summary argument fails to address the fact that Rost investigated the ownership of the real property and the manner in which its purchase was financed; that Rost then determined and advised Lloyd that the discovered facts revealed a legal problem for Lloyd; that Rost recommended that Lloyd solve his legal problem by executing a quitclaim deed in favor of Mr. Fish; and that a quitclaim deed was prepared by Ms. McConnell, who was identified by Rost as his paralegal. Such a consulting endeavor required the application of legal knowledge and constituted the practice of law. Perhaps the best evidence against Rost came from his own characterization of what he was doing after his retirement. He told Hesse that he was a paralegal. Some years ago, this court opined that a disbarred or suspended attorney could act as a paralegal. However, the activities of such a paralegal are limited. The consensus is that an attorney suspended from the practice of law may obtain employment as a law clerk, providing there are certain limitations upon the suspended attorney's activities. Regarding limitations, we are persuaded the better rule is that an attorney who has been disbarred or suspended from the practice of law is permitted to work as a law clerk, investigator, paralegal, or in any capacity as a lay person for a licensed attorney-employer if the suspended lawyer's functions are limited exclusively to work of a preparatory nature under the supervision of a licensed attorney-employer and does not involve client contact. Any contact with a client is prohibited. Although not an inclusive list, the following restrictions apply: a suspended or disbarred lawyer may not be present during conferences with clients, talk to clients either directly or on the telephone, sign correspondence to them, or contact them either directly or indirectly. In re Wilkinson, 251 Kan. at 553, 834 P.2d 1356. Rost's first problem is that he was not actually employed by a licensed attorney. Granted, he had an agreement with Kjorlie to sell his client base in which he agreed to provide administrative assistance to the buyer. However, the only compensation provision of that agreement involved splitting the future legal fees from Rost's client base. In fact, Lloyd made his fee payments directly to Rost, rather than to Kjorlie. Moreover, Kjorlie's testimony clearly refuted that he was acting as Rost's supervising attorney-employer in the matter. For instance, he appeared to be completely unaware of the particulars of the quitclaim deed preparation and was quite confused as to the nature of Lloyd's $3,500 payment to Rost. Rost's activities went far beyond work of a preparatory nature. Rather, Rost was operating as an independent paralegal who even employed his own paralegal, McConnell. Further, as Rost told Hesse, the client base of the post-retirement consulting firm was the same as the law firm's client base. Clearly, Rost made the majority, if not all, of the contacts with the clients. He even acknowledged that he would go to court with a former client and the new attorney to assist with the case. In short, the only change in Rost's activities following retirement is that he would only second chair in court and that he would tell his clients he was a retired attorney. Rost was practicing law. Rost attempts to avoid the rules set forth in Wilkinson by asserting that a retired attorney is different from a suspended or disbarred attorney. He intimates that a retired attorney has more leeway to engage in some sort of limited practice of law than an attorney who has been suspended. We disagree. The reasons for applying the Wilkinson rule  e.g. to avoid the appearance of impropriety, to avoid confusion among laypersons, or to avoid the temptation for law-trained clerks (or paralegals) to go beyond mere preparatory work-apply as equally to retired attorneys as to suspended or disbarred attorneys. See In re Wilkinson, 251 Kan. at 549-51, 834 P.2d 1356. Rost's situation is particularly akin to that of a suspended attorney because he avoided the potential of being placed on that status by agreeing to retire and cease practicing law. He was just as obligated to refrain from the practice of law as if he had been formally suspended.