Opinion ID: 867411
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Burden of Proof and Standard for Proving Mental Retardation

Text: ¶ 21 Grell's major argument on this appeal is that the trial court used a flawed process in finding that he does not have mental retardation. He raises three challenges to the process: First, the State should bear the burden of proving lack of retardation to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Second, if the defendant must bear the burden of proof, the standard should be no higher than a preponderance of the evidence; the statutory requirement of clear and convincing evidence is unconstitutionally high. Third, the process should be bifurcated, with both a pretrial hearing before a judge to determine, under Atkins, whether mental retardation should bar the defendant's execution and, should the judge not find mental retardation, a jury component in which the jury must find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant does not have mental retardation. [6] ¶ 22 Grell's challenges raise issues of constitutional law and statutory construction, which we review de novo. State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, 445, ¶ 62, 94 P.3d 1119, 1140 (2004). In analyzing statutes, however, we begin by assuming the statute is constitutional. State v. Casey, 205 Ariz. 359, 362, ¶ 11, 71 P.3d 351, 354 (2003).
¶ 23 For the hearing to determine whether Grell has mental retardation, this court instructed the trial court to apply the procedures in A.R.S. § 13-703.02 insofar as is practical in the post-trial posture of this case. Grell I, 205 Ariz. at 64, ¶ 42, 66 P.3d at 1241. The statute places on the defendant. . . the burden of proving mental retardation by clear and convincing evidence in the pretrial hearing. A.R.S. § 13-703.02(G). If the defendant's IQ is 65 or lower, a rebuttable presumption of mental retardation arises. Id. Because the parties here stipulated that Grell's IQ falls between 65 and 70, the trial court accordingly placed the burden on him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that mental retardation renders him ineligible for execution. Grell argues that if the defendant must bear the burden at all, the standard should be to prove retardation by no more than a preponderance of the evidence. ¶ 24 This issue reaches our court because in Atkins, the Supreme Court declined to specify the procedures that states should use to identify mentally retarded individuals, deferring to the states to develop appropriate procedures. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317, 122 S.Ct. 2242. The Court did so in part in acknowledgement of the lack of consensus regarding which defendants have mental retardation: To the extent there is serious disagreement about the execution of mentally retarded offenders, it is in determining which offenders are in fact retarded. . . . Not all people who claim to be mentally retarded will be so impaired as to fall within the range of mentally retarded offenders about whom there is a national consensus. As was our approach in Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986), with regard to insanity, we leave to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences. Id. at 405, 416-417, 477 U.S. 399, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 91 L.Ed.2d 335. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317, 122 S.Ct. 2242. Although left to the states, the procedures developed must comport with the Constitution. ¶ 25 The Supreme Court has confirmed that states may `regulate the procedures under which [their] laws are carried out, including the burden of producing evidence and the burden of persuasion,' and [their] decision[s] in this regard [are] not subject to proscription under the Due Process Clause unless `[they] offend[ ] some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked fundamental.' Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-02, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 523, 78 S.Ct. 1332, 2 L.Ed.2d 1460 (1958)); see also Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 445, 112 S.Ct. 2572, 120 L.Ed.2d 353 (1992) (calling Patterson the proper analytical approach in evaluating burdens of proof). Grell claims that imposing the burden on a defendant to prove mental retardation by clear and convincing evidence does offend deeply rooted principles. ¶ 26 Grell initially argues that the burden on the issue of mental retardation should not fall on the defendant at all, but rather should be borne by the State. We disagree that the Constitution requires the prosecution to bear this burden. The Supreme Court has held that a state may require that the defendant prove affirmative defenses. E.g., Patterson, 432 U.S. at 206, 97 S.Ct. 2319 (requiring the defendant to prove extreme emotional disturbance); Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 236, 107 S.Ct. 1098, 94 L.Ed.2d 267 (1987) (requiring the defendant to prove self defense). Proof of mental retardation is like proof of an affirmative defense in that it serves to relieve or mitigate a defendant's criminal responsibility, and as with affirmative defenses, the evidence of retardation will lie largely within the possession and control of the defendant. ¶ 27 Because the defendant has superior access to the evidence to prove his mental condition, it is not inappropriate to place the burden on him to do so. See Medina, 505 U.S. at 455, 112 S.Ct. 2572 (O'Connor, J., concurring); cf. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 206, 97 S.Ct. 2319 (to same effect). A critical component of proof of mental retardation is onset before age eighteen. The defendant has better information regarding his condition and superior access to friends and family who knew him before he turned eighteen. Moreover, a defendant has significant motivation to attempt to score poorly on an IQ test, a low score on which triggers a claim of mental retardation. See A.R.S. § 13-703.02(B). Such evidence lies within the defendant's control and may prove difficult for the state to rebut. ¶ 28 New Jersey is the only state, as of this writing, to place the burden of disproving mental retardation on the state. State v. Jimenez, 380 N.J.Super. 1, 880 A.2d 468, 484 (2005). It did so because state law developed under the Ring/Apprendi line of cases treats certain statutory capital triggers like aggravating factors that the state must prove to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 482-84 (discussing the implications of Ring II, 536 U.S. at 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000)). The court in Jimenez held that mental retardation was essentially such a capital trigger, which under New Jersey law the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. 880 A.2d at 484. Because, however, the absence of mental retardation is neither an aggravating factor nor an element of the capital offense under Arizona law, the rationale supporting the result in Jimenez does not apply here. ¶ 29 We find no constitutional bar to imposing the burden of proving mental retardation on the defendant.
¶ 30 Citing Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 116 S.Ct. 1373, 134 L.Ed.2d 498 (1996), Grell asserts the unconstitutionality of requiring him to prove mental retardation by clear and convincing evidence. In Cooper, the Court, having already declared that the defendant must bear the burden of proving competency to stand trial, id. at 355, 116 S.Ct. 1373, held that the defendant may not be forced to prove his competency by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 369, 116 S.Ct. 1373. The Court evaluated the right not to be tried while incompetent and weighed the impact of its loss on the defendant to determine the appropriate standard of proof. Id. at 354, 364, 116 S.Ct. 1373. The Court observed that the right not to be tried if incompetent is a fundamental principle of justice [so] rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people that its violation threatens . . . the basic fairness of the trial itself. Id. at 364, 116 S.Ct. 1373. ¶ 31 Furthermore, the Court reasoned, the heightened standard of proof affected only those defendants who could prove they were incompetent, but could not do so by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 366-67, 116 S.Ct. 1373. The higher standard affected those defendants' only opportunity to contest competency, creating a grave risk of violating their right not to be tried while incompetent. Id. The Court concluded that the defendants' interest outweighed the government's lesser interest in trying a probably incompetent defendant. Id. The Court also noted that forty-six other state jurisdictions used a lower standard of proof, showing consensus that Oklahoma's higher standard was unnecessary to serve the state's needs and inappropriate in light of the importance of the right. Id. at 361-62, 116 S.Ct. 1373. The Court therefore held that due process limits the burden on the defendant to prove competency to stand trial by a standard no higher than preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 368-69, 116 S.Ct. 1373. ¶ 32 As was the Court in Cooper, we have been asked to assess the statutory imposition of a clear and convincing evidence standard in a situation in which a preponderance standard would be permissible. Although the right not to be executed if mentally retarded is of recent vintage, itlike the right not to stand trial if incompetentis a constitutional right based on modern consensus and historical views regarding the propriety of executing those who may be less morally culpable because of their reduced mental capacity. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320-21, 122 S.Ct. 2242. We also note that, following Atkins, all but one jurisdiction that has chosen a burden has chosen preponderance of the evidence. [7] We might have done so as well, were there no Arizona statute already in place. The question before us, however, is whether the standard chosen by the legislature to protect admittedly important state interests can withstand constitutional scrutiny. ¶ 33 The statutory scheme enacted by the Arizona legislature does not merely prohibit execution of the mentally retarded. It provides a detailed, bifurcated process that requires a pretrial hearing at which a defendant may attempt to show, by clear and convincing evidence, that he has mental retardation; if he fails to make that showing, the defendant may still present mental retardation evidence to the jury in mitigation of his sentence. A.R.S. § 13-703.02. The statutory process gives the defendant with an IQ of 75 or below the opportunity to be examined by at least two psychological experts to determine his IQ. A.R.S. § 13-703.02(B), (D). Those with at least one full-scale IQ test result of 70 or below proceed for further evaluation and an evidentiary hearing. A.R.S. § 13-703.02(F), (G). Although the defendant bears the ultimate burden to prove mental retardation, the statute creates a rebuttable presumption of mental retardation if the defendant's IQ is 65 or below. A.R.S. § 13-703.02(G). [8] ¶ 34 The Arizona statute sets up a process similar to that used in Colorado and Indiana, and courts in both those states have evaluated the constitutionality of requiring a defendant to prove mental retardation by clear and convincing evidence. [9] Compare People v. Vasquez, 84 P.3d 1019 (Colo.2004) (approving use of clear and convincing standard in a pretrial hearing), with Pruitt v. State, 834 N.E.2d 90 (Ind.2005) (finding a clear and convincing standard unconstitutional). Grell and our dissenting colleague rely heavily on analysis from Cooper that also formed the basis of the Pruitt opinion. They argue that the definitive inquiry is the assessment of the relative risks faced by the parties: the defendant's risk of death compared to the state's minimal interest in executing a defendant who will otherwise go to prison for life. ¶ 35 With respect to statutes like those in Arizona, Indiana, and Colorado, however, Grell overstates his case. As the Colorado Supreme Court stressed in Vasquez, the defendant's risk at a pretrial hearing is not death, but a capital trial. [10] 84 P.3d at 1023. By creating a pretrial process, the legislature provided a way for mentally retarded defendants to avoid the burden of a capital trial and the risk of imposition of the capital penalty. All defendants who do not prove mental retardation at the pretrial hearing retain the ability to present mental retardation evidence to the jury under a preponderance standard in the penalty phase of the trial. That opportunity reduces the ultimate risk they face from an adverse determination in the pretrial mental retardation hearing. ¶ 36 The court in Pruitt acknowledged but rejected the argument that the defendant's ability to argue mental retardation evidence in mitigation to the jury under a preponderance of the evidence standard adequately safeguards the defendant's rights. It reasoned that [m]entally retarded defendants in the aggregate face a special risk of wrongful execution. 834 N.E.2d at 103 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321, 122 S.Ct. 2242). Although the acknowledged risk that the Pruitt court identifies may justify barring the execution of the mentally retarded, it does not suggest the need for any particular procedure to ascertain mental retardation. Under Arizona's statutory procedure, these defendants about whom there is consensus against execution will be screened out at the pretrial stage. Given that fact, we cannot say that those unable to establish retardation by clear and convincing evidence face such a severe risk at sentencing that they may not constitutionally be put through the capital trial process. ¶ 37 Although the Court in Atkins clearly announced that states may not execute the mentally retarded, it recognized that people may disagree over which individuals in fact have mental retardation. 536 U.S. at 317, 122 S.Ct. 2242. Before Atkins, states had already begun to develop their own procedures, and had drawn in different places the line for establishing the mental retardation that would bar execution. Knowing this, the Court explicitly left the procedure for determining mental retardation to the states. Id. State procedures must ensure that those about whom there is national consensus are protected from execution, but left states otherwise free to craft their laws for determining which defendants meet the consensus standard. By providing differing procedures based on the defendant's IQ, Arizona law reflects this concept. Those with IQ scores of 65 or below face a comparatively lower bar, while those whose IQ scores suggest greater intelligence must go to greater lengths to prove their mental retardation. The legislature placed a heavier burden on those who do not fall within the group about whom there is national consensus regarding their right not to be executed. The procedure occurs early in the capital process and removes defendants found to have mental retardation from exposure to a capital trial and hence to a sentence of death. See A.R.S. § 13-703.02(C), (F), (G). The application of Arizona's tiered procedure does not deprive Grell of a right rooted in fundamental justice. ¶ 38 Finally, in response to the reliance of the defendant and our dissenting colleague on the analysis in Cooper, 517 U.S. at 348, 116 S.Ct. 1373, we note the significant differences between the right not to be tried while incompetent and the right not to be executed if mentally retarded. First, a defendant found incompetent to stand trial is protected from having to submit to trial on any charges unless he is restored to competency. See id. A defendant deemed to have mental retardation, however, is not shielded from trial. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318, 122 S.Ct. 2242. Despite the risks that a mentally retarded defendant might not present well to a jury, such a defendant can be tried, found guilty, and sentenced to any statutory criminal penalty other than death. This legal distinction suggests that mental retardation differs constitutionally from incompetence to stand trial. ¶ 39 The second distinction relates to the risk of malingering. A defendant who successfully feigns incompetence to stand trial will not have to submit to trial at that time. Generally, however, such a defendant is sent to a mental health facility for treatment and further examination of his competency. See Ariz. R.Crim. P. 11.5(b)(2)(i). Most often, the defendant is either restored to competency or discovered to be malingering. In the event of either occurrence, the defendant is subject to trial and punishment, including the death penalty, if appropriate. On the other hand, once a court determines that a defendant has mental retardation, that defendant may never suffer the punishment of execution, even if he is later discovered to have been malingering. These concerns support the heightened standard that the legislature has imposed to protect the interests of Arizona citizens. ¶ 40 A better comparison lies between claims of mental retardation as a bar to execution and claims of mental incompetence as a bar to execution. The defendant asserting the latter claim is also subject to a clear and convincing evidence burden of proof. See A.R.S. § 13-4022(F) (clear and convincing burden of proof); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986) (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits states from inflicting the penalty of death upon a prisoner who is insane). We are aware of no case finding it violative of the Constitution to require a defendant to prove incompetence to be executed by clear and convincing evidence. ¶ 41 In sum, we conclude that requiring the defendant to prove mental retardation by clear and convincing evidence in the initial retardation hearing does not violate constitutional standards.
¶ 42 Grell argues that, under Ring, the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant does not have mental retardation before it may impose a sentence of death. Furthermore, he argues, the process should be bifurcated: a judge should make a preliminary finding on mental retardation, and if the judge finds the defendant death-eligible, the state still must prove a defendant's lack of mental retardation beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury. ¶ 43 Ring and Apprendi require that a jury find all functional elements of a crime and all non-admitted facts except prior convictions that increase the sentence above the presumptive sentence. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 489, 120 S.Ct. 2348. Although mental retardation does indeed involve fact-finding, it is not the functional equivalent of an element of the crime. It has nothing to do with the acts that make up the crime itself or the defendant's mental state while committing the crime, facts the state traditionally must prove. As a result, Ring does not require that a jury find the absence of mental retardation. See Arbelaez v. State, 898 So.2d 25, 43 (Fla.2005); Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Tex.Crim.App.2004); Winston v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 564, 604 S.E.2d 21, 50 (2004). ¶ 44 Nor is the absence of retardation a fact that increases the available penalty. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 n. 16, 120 S.Ct. 2348; see also United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). The finding that a defendant does not have mental retardation neither expos[es] the defendant to a deprivation of liberty greater than that authorized by the verdict according to statute, nor . . . impos[es] upon the defendant a greater stigma than that accompanying the jury verdict alone. Bowling v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 361, 379 (Ky.2005); see also Head v. Hill, 277 Ga. 255, 587 S.E.2d 613, 619-20 (2003); Russell v. State, 849 So.2d 95, 147-48 (Miss.2003); State v. Flores, 135 N.M. 759, 93 P.3d 1264, 1267 (2004); State v. Laney, 367 S.C. 639, 627 S.E.2d 726, 731 (2006); Howell v. State, 151 S.W.3d 450, 467 (Tenn.2004). Thus nothing in the Apprendi line of cases requires that a jury find the absence of mental retardation beyond a reasonable doubt. ¶ 45 The Supreme Court itself has signaled that a jury need not decide the issue of mental retardation. When the Ninth Circuit suspended federal habeas proceedings in Schriro v. Smith and ordered a state jury trial on the issue of mental retardation, the Supreme Court summarily reversed the decision, implicitly rejecting the conclusion that Atkins requires a jury trial. ___ U.S. ___, ___, 126 S.Ct. 7, 9, 163 L.Ed.2d 6 (2005) (per curiam). The defendant in Schriro had argued that he suffered from mental retardation and could not be executed. Id. at 8. Observing that Arizona and many states had adopted procedures for adjudicating the mental retardation question, the Court said, While those measures might, in their application, be subject to constitutional challenge, Arizona had not even had a chance to apply its chosen procedures when the Ninth Circuit preemptively imposed its jury trial condition. Id. at 9. Although we hesitate to read too much into the summary reversal, we draw from it a suggestion that a jury trial is not required. ¶ 46 Grell also compares the mental retardation finding to Enmund/Tison findings, arguing that both are findings of fact that should be made by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 107 S.Ct. 1676, 95 L.Ed.2d 127 (1987); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982). The analysis fails for two reasons. First, the Supreme Court has held that Enmund/Tison findings, that a defendant actually killed or intended to kill, need not be made by a jury. See Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 385-86, 106 S.Ct. 689, 88 L.Ed.2d 704 (1986), abrogated on other grounds by Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 503 n. 7, 107 S.Ct. 1918, 95 L.Ed.2d 439 (1987). The Court's reasoningthat Enmund/Tison findings serve to disqualify an otherwise seemingly death-eligible defendant from deathsuggests that that part of the opinion will survive Apprendi, because the findings mitigate rather than aggravate a potential sentence. Id.; see also Ring III, 204 Ariz. at 564, ¶ 100, 65 P.3d at 945 (concluding that Cabana survives Apprendi because it involves an Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis, traditionally done by a trial judge). Similarly, mental retardation serves to exclude a defendant from eligibility for the death penalty; its absence does not render an otherwise ineligible defendant eligible for the death penalty. ¶ 47 Second, Enmund/Tison findings lend themselves more logically to proof beyond a reasonable doubt than does proof of mental retardation. Enmund/Tison findings are based on evidence of participation in the crime and intent. Mental retardation, on the other hand, requires evaluation of the defendant's past and present mental functioning, using documentation and evidence largely within the control of the defendant. Placing the burden on the prosecution to prove lack of retardation beyond a reasonable doubt would require it to prove a negative against a party with a motive to misrepresent his mental health and his past. The burden on the prosecution would be almost impossibly high. ¶ 48 Grell argues not only that the jury should hear the mental retardation evidence in mitigation, but also that it should decide whether mental retardation should serve as a bar to execution following an initial determination by the trial judge on that issue. Because Atkins left the procedure for determining mental retardation to the states, such a procedure would not be prohibited; but neither is it required. Indeed, the statute already requires that both the judge and jury evaluate mental retardation before a sentence of death may be imposed. The judge hears mental retardation evidence as a legal bar to execution and the jury hears it for mitigation purposes. ¶ 49 Grell acknowledges that having the jury serve as the only arbiter of mental retardation is not wise. The difficulties a mentally retarded person may have in testifying, communicating, and expressing remorse may negatively influence the jury. That factor formed an explicit basis of the Supreme Court's prohibition on execution of the mentally retarded. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320-21, 122 S.Ct. 2242. But because the statute requires an initial judicial determination, Grell's concern is ameliorated. The trial court did not err in determining that a jury need not determine mental retardation as a bar to execution.