Opinion ID: 2108798
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Appropriation Bill.

Text: Pursuant to our constitutional language, every analysis of the item veto power must begin with a determination of the nature of the bill that the governor is attempting to item veto. The fundamental prerequisite for the proper exercise of the item veto power is that the bill to be item vetoed is an appropriation bill. See Iowa Const. art. III, § 16. This requirement springs from the language of the section and is the primary qualification on the exercise of the item veto power. See id. Its importance is underscored by the very nature of the three veto powers and the deviation from the traditional scheme of separation of powers implicit in the item veto power. See id.; Redmond, 268 N.W.2d at 851; see also Iowa Const. art. III, § 1; Welden, 229 N.W.2d at 709-10. Ultimately, this vital determination of whether the bill in question is an appropriation bill in the constitutional sense is for the courts. Junkins I, 421 N.W.2d at 135. Nearly every one of our prior cases in the item veto context has contributed to our definition of an appropriation bill, which is otherwise undefined in the constitution. See Junkins II, 448 N.W.2d at 483-85; Junkins I, 421 N.W.2d at 134; Welden, 229 N.W.2d at 710-11; Turner, 186 N.W.2d at 149-50; see also Iowa Code § 3.4 (2003) (defining an appropriation bill as a bill which has as its primary purpose the making of appropriations of money from the public treasury). However, Junkins II, decided in 1989, has been our most thorough consideration of the definition of appropriation bill to date. In Junkins II, we observed, We believe the proper test [of whether a bill is an appropriation bill] is to review each bill on an ad hoc basis and determine whether the bill contains an appropriation which could significantly affect the governor's budgeting responsibility. 448 N.W.2d at 484-85. As a corollary to this definition, we also stated, [w]e believe that the allocation of funds, whether from the general fund or from a revenue-producing bill, into a separate and distinct fund that the State can no longer utilize for other purposes absent subsequent legislation, is an appropriation as intended by article III, section 16. Id. at 483. In crafting these definitions, we rejected both the single appropriation and primary purpose tests of whether a bill is an appropriation bill in favor of the test excerpted above. See id. at 484; see also Iowa Code § 3.4. The parties in this case differ significantly in their interpretations of the definition of an appropriation bill. The different constructions offered by both parties are no doubt the result of attempting to apply our definition in light of the appropriation bill at issue in Junkins II, which was quite different from the appropriation bills we have dealt with in our other item veto cases. See, e.g., Welsh, 470 N.W.2d at 645-47; Colton, 372 N.W.2d at 185-86; Welden, 229 N.W.2d at 707-09; Turner, 186 N.W.2d at 149-50. Indeed, it appears that the appropriation bill subject to item veto in Junkins II marks the outer reaches of the definition of an appropriation bill as this court and other legal authorities have construed that term. Compare Junkins II, 448 N.W.2d at 484, with Harbor, 742 P.2d at 1290-91; Welsh, 470 N.W.2d at 645-47; Colton, 372 N.W.2d at 185-86; Welden, 229 N.W.2d at 707-09; Turner, 186 N.W.2d at 149-50; State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 86 N.M. 359, 524 P.2d 975, 980-82 (1974). See generally Appel, 41 Drake L.Rev. at 12-14 (discussing the definition of an appropriation bill); Briffault, State Courts , 66 Temp. L.Rev. at 1198-1203 (same). In each of our pre- Junkins II item veto cases, the determination of whether the vetoed items were a portion of an appropriation bill was significantly easier. This is because each of these bills contained at least one allocation of a monetary amount on the face of the bill, clearly signifying an appropriation of some sort as that term has traditionally been understood. See, e.g., Welsh, 470 N.W.2d at 645-47 (considering item vetoes of provisions of 1989 Iowa Acts chapters 307, 308, and 319); Colton, 372 N.W.2d at 185-86 (considering item vetoes of provisions of 1983 Iowa Acts chapter 206); Rush v. Ray, 362 N.W.2d 479, 481 (Iowa 1985) (considering item vetoes of provisions of 1979 Iowa Acts chapters 4, 5, and 14 and 1980 Iowa Acts chapters 1001 and 1007); Welden, 229 N.W.2d at 707-09 (considering item vetoes of provisions of 1978 Iowa Acts chapters 111, 113, 114, 115, and 117); Turner, 186 N.W.2d at 149-50 (considering item vetoes of provisions of 1969 Iowa Acts chapter 30). In contrast, the bill in Junkins II did not contain at least one allocation of a monetary amount on the face of the bill. See Junkins II, 448 N.W.2d at 481 (considering item vetoes of provisions of 1985 Iowa Acts chapter 197). Instead, the sections of the bill identified as appropriations allocated funds by either directly ordering an expenditure or commanding alterations to standing allocations within sections of the Iowa Code resulting in the expenditure of funds absent subsequent legislation to stop the expenditure or somehow redirect it. See id. at 484. The alterations, made on the face of the bill, simply changed the amounts of standing allocations based on preexisting legislation and appropriations. No further legislative action was needed to permit the expenditure of funds as directed, with alterations, by the bill. Thus, we have identified two types of appropriation bills in our item veto cases, both of which allocate funds whether from the general fund or from a revenue-producing bill, into a separate and distinct fund that the State can no longer utilize for other purposes absent subsequent legislation. Id. at 483. The first type, which may be considered a traditional appropriation bill, is marked by the inclusion of at least one allocation of a monetary amount on the face of the bill. The second type, first considered in Junkins II, is marked by the allocation of funds by either the direct ordering of an expenditure or the commanded alteration to standing allocations within sections of the Iowa Code resulting in the expenditure of funds absent subsequent legislation to stop the expenditure or somehow redirect it.