Opinion ID: 1986916
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Statutory Provisions Governing Child Support

Text: The provisions of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act) do not extend the parental obligation for support beyond minority except in limited statutory situations    [or] unless otherwise agreed in writing or by court order. Finley v. Finley, 81 Ill.2d 317, 326, 43 Ill.Dec. 12, 410 N.E.2d 12 (1980). In the present case, the dissolution judgment provided that Susan and Craig would be responsible for Max's postsecondary education expenses as provided by the applicable section of the [Act] in force when Max is ready to incur these expenses. Section 513(a) of the Act currently provides in pertinent part: The court may award sums of money out of the property and income of either or both parties or the estate of a deceased parent, as equity may require, for the support of the child or children of the parties who have attained majority in the following instances:    (2) The court may also make provision for the educational expenses of the child or children of the parties, whether of minor or majority age, and an application for educational expenses may be made before or after the child has attained majority, or after the death of either parent. The authority under this Section to make provision for educational expenses extends not only to periods of college education or professional or other training after graduation from high school, but also to any period during which the child of the parties is still attending high school, even though he or she attained the age of 19. The educational expenses    may be ordered payable to the child, to either parent, or to the educational institution, directly or through a special account or trust created for that purpose, as the court sees fit. 750 ILCS 5/513(a)(2) (West 2008). When making awards pursuant to section 513(a)(2), or when modifying or terminating the award, the court shall consider all relevant factors that appear reasonable and necessary. 750 ILCS 5/513(b) (West 2008). Among other factors to consider is whether the nonminor child actually will incur education expenses. If the child has no need or a lesser need for educational expenses when the child decides to go to college, a modification of the court's payment order can be sought by either parent. In re Marriage of Alltop, 203 Ill. App.3d 606, 617, 149 Ill.Dec. 116, 561 N.E.2d 394 (1990). In the present case, Craig alleged that Max probably would not pursue any form of postsecondary education in the near future, based on Max's alleged poor academic record in high school and three-year incarceration. For that reason, Craig sought termination of his and Susan's education expense obligation. However, the circuit court terminated Craig's obligation to contribute to Max's postsecondary education expenses based not on Craig's allegations of changed circumstances, but rather on the court's sua sponte conclusion that Max's incarceration constituted his emancipation. Section 510(d) of the Act provides in pertinent part: Unless otherwise provided in this Act, or as agreed in writing or expressly provided in the judgment, provisions for the support of a child are terminated by emancipation of the child   . 750 ILCS 5/510(d) (West 2008). Since section 513(a)(2) specifically provides for awards for education expenses even if the child reaches majority, but does not specifically allow awards in other emancipating circumstances, then a circuit court may award education expenses for a child who is emancipated by reaching majority age, but not by other means. See In re Marriage of Walters, 238 Ill.App.3d 1086, 1092, 178 Ill.Dec. 176, 604 N.E.2d 432 (1992). Thus, while recognizing that Max was 20 years old at the time of the circuit court's order, we must consider whether Max was emancipated by any means other than reaching majority age.