Opinion ID: 205003
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Sex Offender Treatment and Testing Condition

Text: Mike contends that this condition is infirm because it improperly delegates to the probation officer the discretion to decide whether he will be subject to inpatient treatment and/or penile plethysmographic testing, requirements he claims implicate significant liberty interests. The Government counters by arguing that because the district court clearly mandated that Mike participate in sex offender treatment and testing, it could permissibly delegate to the probation officer the decision of which types of treatment and testing that would be employed. Mike raised this argument to the district court, therefore, we will review for abuse of discretion. It is well established that [p]robation officers have broad authority to advise and supervise probationers. . . . Pruden, 398 F.3d at 250; accord United States v. Rodriguez, 558 F.3d 408, 414-15 (5th Cir.2009). There are limits to this authority, though. For instance, Article III prohibits a judge from delegating the duty of imposing the defendant's punishment to the probation officer. See, e.g., United States v. Kent, 209 F.3d 1073, 1078 (8th Cir.2000). In determining whether a particular delegation violates this restriction, courts distinguish between those delegations that merely task the probation officer with performing ministerial acts or support services related to the punishment imposed and those that allow the officer to decide the nature or extent of the defendant's punishment. See United States v. Stephens, 424 F.3d 876, 881 (9th Cir.2005); Pruden, 398 F.3d at 250. Delegations that do the former are permissible, while those that do the latter are not. Recently, in United States v. Esparza, 552 F.3d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir.2009) (per curiam), the Ninth Circuit addressed the question of whether a district court could permissibly delegate to a probation officer the decision of whether the defendant was to be subject to inpatient treatment. There, the defendant contended that the delegation was infirm because inpatient treatment is a condition so different in kind from other forms of treatment that to allow his probation officer to decide whether he would be required to participate in such treatment would mean that the officer would be deciding the nature or extent of his punishment. The government responded by claiming that the decision between whether treatment would be inpatient or out was merely a ministerial one, and, as a result, could be delegated. The Ninth Circuit sided with the defendant, stating that, in light of the liberty interest implicated by residential treatment, the probation officer could not be given the discretion to decide whether the defendant must participate in such treatment. We find the Ninth Circuit's approach of focusing on the liberty interest implicated when determining whether a particular delegation is infirm to be correct. Conditions that touch on significant liberty interests are qualitatively different from those that do not. See United States v. Stoterau, 524 F.3d 988, 1005-06 (9th Cir.2008) (implicitly recognizing this fact by requiring the district court to make special findings before imposing a condition that implicates a significant liberty interest). In light of this difference, we are of the belief that granting the probation officer the discretion to decide whether such conditions will be imposed is tantamount to allowing him to decide the nature or extent of the defendant's punishment. Accordingly, we hold that any condition that affects a significant liberty interest, such as one requiring the defendant to participate in residential treatment, see, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979) (This Court repeatedly has recognized that civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty. . . .), or undergo penile plethysmographic testing, see, e.g., United States v. Weber, 451 F.3d 552, 563 (9th Cir.2006), must be imposed by the district court and supported by particularized findings that it does not constitute a greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary to accomplish the goals of sentencing, see, e.g., id. at 561. With it established that a district court cannot delegate the decision of whether to subject a defendant to residential treatment or penile plethysmograph testing to the probation officer, we turn to the condition at issue. The condition in this case, unlike the one in Esparza, does not explicitly state that the probation officer has the discretion to force Mike to participate in residential treatment nor does it say that plethysmograph testing is an option. However, due to its open-ended language, the condition could be read to delegate such discretion. When reviewing challenges to non-specific, all-encompassing conditions like the one here, other courts have opted to construe them in a manner that does not make them infirm. See, e.g., United States v. Daniels, 541 F.3d 915, 926 (9th Cir.2008) (finding that a condition that ordered the defendant to take all prescribed medication must necessarily be understood not to include medications that implicated significant liberty interests because the district court did not make the necessary findings). We believe this approach is best, as we see no reason to require district courts to include language eliminating all potential forms of treatment [or testing] not contemplated at the time of sentencing. United States v. Villamil, 383 Fed.Appx. 632, 633 (9th Cir. 2010). Construing the challenged condition as not delegating to the probation officer the authority to decide whether to subject Mike to inpatient treatment or plethysmograph testing, we conclude that it does not delegate the duty of imposing Mike's punishment to the probation officer. As a result, we reject Mike's challenge to this condition.