Opinion ID: 324541
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the trial events

Text: 50 We next examine three events occurring at Anderson's trial, which assertedly require reversal of his conviction. One was a reference by a Government witness to an act of bribery attempted by Anderson some years prior to trial. Another was the trial judge's refusal to give to the jury two instructions requested by Anderson's counsel. The third was an unsuccessful challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support Anderson's conviction of bribery. We find none of these contentions a basis for upsetting the conviction.
51 John Sullivan testified that when Brewster's January, 1966, visitor said that she could get campaign funds from Anderson, Brewster suggested that Anderson contact Sullivan in that regard. Somewhat surprised by Brewster's reply, Sullivan continued, after the visitor's departure he inquired of Brewster about it. Sullivan then testified that Brewster responded, 'I know Cy Anderson and back when I was a Congressman he tried to bribe me and I threw him out of my office.' 52 On objection by Spiegel's counsel, the trial judge immediately instructed the jury to limit consideration of that statement to Brewster's fate alone. Anderson now contends that the statement was an impermissible hearsay reference to another crime--a reference which he could not explore by examination of Brewster, 114 and which the judge's limiting instruction could not completely meet. We do not find in these arguments a basis for reversal. 53 As we have had past occasion to admonish, 'evidence indicating the accused's commission of an offense not on trial, because of its potential for prejudice, is generally to be excluded.' 115 We have consistently recognized, however, that this rule is subject to exceptions 116 which may come into operation when the probative value of the evidence outweighs its potentially harmful effect. 117 A situation possibly justifying invocation of an exception arises when other-crimes evidence tends to prove an intent which is an essential element of the offense on trial. 118 54 Proof of the offense of bribery involves proof, among other things, of corrupt intent to influence or be influenced in official conduct. 119 The statement in question tended to show Brewster's prior knowledge of Anderson and Brewster's state of mind in accepting money from Anderson. So, upon a balance of that value against possible injury, the trial judge might properly have admitted the statement for the jury's consideration in connection with the bribery charges then pending against Brewster. 55 The greater concern, however, is not the admissibility of the statement against Brewster, but the effect of such admission upon Anderson, and in that regard Anderson lodges three complaints. One is that the statement, as to Anderson, was hearsay, and with that premise we readily agree. But the statement, as a purported admission by Brewster, was not hearsay as to him, and the trial judge instructed the jury to confine to Brewster alone any use it might mike of the statement. Another complaint registered by Anderson is that since, at the time of admission of the statement, Brewster could not have been examined by Anderson, 120 he was deprived of his constitutional right of confrontation. 121 That difficulty disappeared, however, when later in the trial Brewster took the witness stand himself and denied that he ever made the statement. 122 Anderson's remaining complaint is that the trial judge's limiting instruction did not give him adequate protection. We think the jury's willingness to heed instructions and its ability to keep separate the evidence against Brewster and Anderson, respectively, is amply shown by the discriminating verdicts it rendered. 123
56 At trial, Anderson's counsel requested, and the judge refused, two instructions which assertedly were essential to the jury's understanding of the theory of his defense. One would have told the jury that 57 (i)t is not corrupt in itself to influence or to attempt to influence a Senator or other legislator, nor is it corrupt in itself for a Senator to be influenced in respect to his actions, vote or decision on legislation. It is a part of the duty of every Senator to pay heed to and consider the views of all responsible parties on any matter of legislation before him. The other request would have said that 58 (a) lobbyist is a person who is paid for the purpose of attempting to influence the passage or defeat of legislation by the Congress of the United States. This is neither illegal nor improper. The only legal restriction on a lobbyist is that he or she must be properly registered with the Clerk of the House of Representatives or the Secretary of the Senate. In this case Mr. Anderson was so registered. 59 We think the judge properly rejected both. 60 We have no problem with the portion of the first request which spoke to the obligation of legislators to consider responsible views on pending legislation. But we cannot subscribe to an instruction indicating that influencing or attempting to influence a legislator in the performance of an official act cannot amount to bribery. A gift or promise of something of value with intent to exert such an influence is bribery; 124 the influencing is legally innocent only if unaccompanied by that factor. If Anderson's first request incorporated that qualification, it did so all too subtly, 125 and unless the qualification was clear the instruction asked for was misleading. 61 The second instruction Anderson sought suffers from a similar infirmity. While we do not quarrel with the accuracy as distinguished from the relevance of Anderson's general definition of a lobbyist, we encounter difficulty with the statement that '(t)he only legal restriction on a lobbyist is' proper registration. It may be that registration is the only precondition to lobbying, but a lobbyist is nonetheless under the same legal restrictions imposed by the bribery laws upon everybody else; in a word, that one who violates those laws is a lobbyist is no defense. Anderson's second request, like the first, could have misled the jury, and the trial judge rightly declined to give it. Certainly the profession of lobbying is honorable; just as surely influence devoid of unlawful means is innocuous, but Anderson's instructions implied much more. 62 We are advertent to the consideration that, as Anderson argues, an accused is entitled to instructions addressed to his theory of the case when properly requested and framed. 126 But here the function of the lobbyist was thoroughly ventilated before the jury by Anderson's testimony, and the instructions the trial judge gave the jury adequately explained the requirement of corrupt intent--the element toward which Anderson directed his main defense--even to the extent of exonerating campaign contributions inspired by the recipient's general position of support on particular legislation. In this fashion the jury was informed of Anderson's occupational and operational background, and the judge's instructions furnished the jury with sufficient guidance to enable the distinction of lawful contributions from bribes. These circumstances considered, Anderson is not in position to urge that the judge should have done more.
63 Anderson also questions the legal sufficiency of the Government's evidence to support his conviction on the three bribery charges. He contends, as he did on his motion for a new trial, that the Government failed to prove the specific intent prerequisite to a bribery conviction. He asserts that the evidence did no more than portray an active lobbyist who contributed funds for the reelection campaign of a financially hard-pressed legislator, both before and during an effort to assist him in the presentation of a position which he had long espoused publicly as well as in the legislature. Anderson also suggests that the Government showed at most the payment of unlawful gratuities and not bribery. We find these arguments unacceptable. 64 Certainly, to establish one of the elements of bribery, the Government had to prove that Anderson, directly or indirectly, corruptly gave, offered or promised something of value to Brewster, or promised Brewster that he would give something of value to some other person or entity, with intent to influence an offical act. 127 We need not restate the extensive evidence introduced by the Government for that purpose--evidence we have already elaborately summarized. 128 For present purposes it suffices to note Anderson's employment by Spiegel and his duty as its lobbyist to protect its vital business interest in low third-class postal rates; Anderson's contacts, financial and otherwise, with Brewster, after a rate-increase proposal became known; the $5,000 check from the Bartenders Union, sent at Anderson's request to DCCME in January, 1966, in the understanding that Brewster would keep an 'open mind' on the proposal; the $5,000 cash payment in January, 1967, during Anderson's presentation to Brewster of Spiegel's opposition to the proposal; the $4,500 cash payment in April, 1967, during a similar discussion; and the delivery in July, 1967, of Anderson's check for $5,000 with the payee blank, in lieu of the delayed Spiegel check in that amount, after Sullivan's call for another contribution. We also note that these payments were invariably associated with a communication, express or tacit, of interest in the rate-raise proposal, and in all but one instance were made from Spiegel funds. 65 It is not our function to retry the case, weigh the evidence, or pass on the credibility of the witnesses. 129 It is our duty to sustain the jury's verdict if there is substantial evidence, in the light most favorable to the Government, to support the jury's conclusion. 130 Here the evidence warranted the jury in finding, if so inclined, that Anderson, both directly and indirectly, gave Brewster monies originating from Spiegel with intent to influence Brewster's action on the postal-rate legislation. That intent could be derived from the nature of Anderson's communications with Brewster, from the professed interest of Anderson's client in Brewster's position, and from subterfuge--delivering two large cash payments--in negotiating two Spiegel checks, and in preparing Betsey Norton for the grand jury. 131 We hold that the evidence was legally sufficient to enable conviction. 132