Opinion ID: 182445
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hearsay Evidence of Larry Dahl's Firearms Convictions

Text: Hayes's next claim challenges the manner in which the prosecution sought to prove that Larry Dahl, the man who allegedly delivered the murder weapon to Hayes, was convicted of firearms offenses. According to Weller, Hayes requested a gun and silencer to use in the murders from an associate in Minnesota, Jim Johnson. Johnson arranged for Larry Dahl to deliver the weapon from Minnesota to California. After this plot unraveled, Dahl was convicted on federal charges in Minnesota for his role in transporting the weapon across state lines. Hayes argues that the prosecution improperly introduced hearsay evidence of Dahl's firearms convictions to bolster prosecution witness Diane Weller's credibility and to insinuate Hayes's guilt. He contends that this deprived him of his federal rights of due process and his right of confrontation, as purportedly established by the Supreme Court in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), and Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 118 S.Ct. 1151, 140 L.Ed.2d 294 (1998). [1] According to Hayes, the prosecution attempted to paint Weller as credible in front of the jury by connecting the fact that she testified against Dahl in a separate proceeding with the fact that he was ultimately convicted in that case. The prosecution elicited the following exchange with Weller on direct examination: Q: And you testified against Mr. Dahl in Minnesota while he was on charges of numerous things concerning guns; is that correct? A: Yes. Q: And in that testimony in Minnesota, did you tell the true story there? A: Yes I did. ... Q: Are you telling a true story here? A: Yes I am. On redirect examination, the prosecution linked Weller's supposed truth telling in Dahl's trial to his eventual conviction: Q: You testified against Mr. Dahl in Federal Court? A: Yes I did. Q: Mr. Dahl is charged with transporting the very firearms that we are talking about [in this case] across state lines? A: That's right. Q: As well as being an ex-felon in possession of firearms? A: Yes. Q: And you testified at that hearing against Mr. Dahl? A: Yes I did. Q: Mr. Dahl was convicted? A: Yes. Mr. Minsloff: Objection. Hearsay. The Court: Sustained. Hayes does not clearly explain how these exchanges violate the Confrontation Clause as interpreted in Bruton and Gray. Like the California Supreme Court, we infer that the confrontation claim is based on the hearsay nature of the evidence that Dahl had been convicted. Hayes, 21 Cal.4th at 1269, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 211, 989 P.2d 645. Bruton and Gray do not, however, stand for the proposition that any hearsay violation violates the Confrontation Clause. Bruton and Gray bear almost no resemblance to this case beyond the incidental detail that hearsay is in some way involved in both instances. In Bruton, two codefendants jointly stood trial for armed robbery. 391 U.S. at 124, 88 S.Ct. 1620. The trial court admitted the confession of one codefendant, Evans, that implicated both Evans and Bruton. Id. The court instructed the jury not to consider the confession, which was hearsay inadmissible against Bruton, in determining Bruton's guilt. Id. at 124-25, 88 S.Ct. 1620. The Supreme Court held that, because Evans did not take the stand and was not subject to cross-examination by Bruton, the jury's knowledge of Evans' confession violated Bruton's right of confrontation, despite the limiting instruction. The Court held that Bruton presented a context[] in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored. Id. at 135, 88 S.Ct. 1620. Gray extended Bruton to a codefendant's confession, under similar joint-trial circumstances, that was redacted ... by substituting for the defendant's name in the confession a blank space or the word `deleted.' Gray, 523 U.S. at 188, 118 S.Ct. 1151. The Court held that these redactions made no constitutional difference. Id. at 192, 118 S.Ct. 1151. The hearsay involved in this claim arises in a very different context. The hearsay statement at issue here is the evidence of Dahl's convictions, not a statement by any witness that Hayes was unable to cross-examine. Bruton's inability to cross-examine his codefendant was a necessary premise of the Court's holding in that case. See Bruton, 391 U.S. at 128, 88 S.Ct. 1620 (Evans' confession added substantial, perhaps even critical, weight to the Government's case in a form not subject to cross-examination, since Evans did not take the stand. Petitioner thus was denied his constitutional right of confrontation. (emphasis added)). Hayes does not identify any witness he was denied the opportunity to cross-examine, nor explain what additional cross-examination related to the existence of Dahl's firearm convictions might have accomplished. Bruton and Gray are further distinguishable because the trial court here excluded the challenged hearsay, while the confessions in Bruton and Gray were admitted with instructions that they be considered only as to one codefendant. See Gray, 523 U.S. at 189, 118 S.Ct. 1151; Bruton, 391 U.S. at 124, 88 S.Ct. 1620. A central problem in those cases was the practical difficulty of considering evidence for one purpose but ignoring it for another. Bruton addressed the great risk that a jury could not or would not limit its consideration as instructed under the circumstances of that case, where the consequences of its failure to do so would be vital for the nonconfessing codefendant. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 135, 88 S.Ct. 1620. Hayes does not identify any similar risk here. The complete exclusion of the inadmissible hearsay eased the jurors' task of ignoring it by allowing them to disregard it entirely. Outside of exceptional circumstances such as Bruton presented, juries are presumed to follow their instructions, Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987), including the routine instruction to disregard inadmissible evidence. Hayes gives us no reason to stray from the ordinary presumption here. In sum, the confrontation right at stake in Bruton and Gray is not implicated in this case. Hayes fails to identify a witness he was unable to cross-examine, let alone say how he was prejudiced by his inability to cross-examine such a hypothetical witness. The trial court did not admit the challenged hearsay for any purpose, but rather immediately sustained an objection to it. The district court properly denied this claim.