Opinion ID: 196089
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Public School Students' Freedom of Expression Under

Text: Massachusetts Law 6 In 1974 Massachusetts enacted a statute that reads, in pertinent part: 7 The right of students to freedom of expression in the public schools of the commonwealth shall not be abridged, provided that such right shall not cause any disruption or disorder within the school. Freedom of expression shall include without limitation, the rights and responsibilities of students, collectively and individually, (a) to express their views through speech and symbols, (b) to write, publish and disseminate their views, (c) to assemble peaceably on school property for the purpose of expressing their opinions.... 8 M.G.L. c. 71, Sec. 82. 3 The statute was originally applicable only to those cities and towns which chose to accept it, but became mandatory throughout the State in 1988. St.1988, c. 137, M.G.L. c. 71, Sec. 86, as amended. 9 There is no Massachusetts decisional law interpreting section 82. If, as the Pyles contend, it creates a broad student right to exhibit messages subject to restriction only for obscenity, defamation, fighting words, incitement and disruption, we need not reach the question whether the First Amendment does so. There is no contention that the tee-shirts fell into any of these concededly prohibitable categories, so we start with a routine question of statutory interpretation. We do not find the answer altogether clear. 10 On the sole basis of a press release issued by the legislator who sponsored the 1988 amendment, the district court read the statute to require[ ] that 'school-sponsored' speech, such as articles in student-run newspapers, ... be judged by the same standard as 'school-tolerated' speech, but to have no relevance ... to the analysis of a school administrator's efforts to curb vulgarity and sexual innuendo. 861 F.Supp. at 168. Its conclusion, 861 F.Supp. at 167, that the statute was aimed at the Supreme Court's decision in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 108 S.Ct. 562, 98 L.Ed.2d 592 (1988) (holding public school officials may regulate the content of school newspapers, plays and other school sponsored expressive activities), presumably meant aimed at the Hazelwood principle, as the statute preceded the actual decision by fourteen years. However, neither the statute nor the amendment rendering it mandatory mentions anything about school-sponsored or school-tolerated speech. We do not consider the press sheet of a former high school journalist, issued fourteen years after the original statute was written, to offer adequate interpretive guidance. Nor does any legislative history provide a basis for the court to build clauses into the statute. On its face, the statute guarantees students' freedom of expression shall not be abridged except insofar as it cause[s] any disruption or disorder within the school. M.G.L. c. 71, Sec. 82. Students may express their views through speech and symbols, presumably including a stance against drinking and driving, without limitation. Id. 11 It is difficult to think of at least the See Dick shirt, though reasonably thought vulgar, as not expressing a view. At the same time, our difficulty with proceeding along this straightforward route is that it puts a federal court in the awkward position of issuing this binding interpretation ahead of any state tribunal where, despite the apparent language, it is quite possible that the Massachusetts legislature never considered licensing students to use vulgarity at will in the public schools, and depriving school officials of all authority to regulate it if non-disruptive. Nor is it easy to read into the statute a blanket prohibition against a school's suppressing vulgarity. In the absence of any state court interpretation, we would be in the position of dictating state-wide policy to local school officials at the behest of two students.