Opinion ID: 2679904
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Evidence Found in the Trash Area

Text: [¶24] Diana asserts that evidence found in a trash area at his apartment building should have been excluded at trial because of a defective chain of custody. Alternatively, he contends that lay and expert testimony concerning the significance of a purple towel found in the trash area should have been excluded pursuant to M.R. Evid. 702.
[¶25] Asserting a defective chain of custody, Diana moved in limine to exclude evidence found by police in a white trash bag in a trash area outside his apartment building, which included a purple towel, a note with the word “Arnold” written on it, cigarette butts containing Diana’s DNA, and a jacket from which hair and blood were recovered that was DNA-matched to Windred. The motion was denied at a hearing. [¶26] Concerning any item of physical evidence, M.R. Evid. 901(a) provides that “[t]he requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” We have said that [t]he central point of the chain of custody requirement is to assure that the evidence is what it purports to be—that is, related to the crime— and that it has not been contaminated or tampered with such that testing of it will yield unreliable (and therefore irrelevant) results. 14 .... [T]he temporal scope of the chain of custody depends on the context of the particular crime and the events surrounding the discovery and retention of the evidence in question. Cookson v. State, 2011 ME 53, ¶ 17, 17 A.3d 1208. [¶27] We have also explained that “[a] break in the chain of custody of real evidence is relevant in assessing the weight of that evidence, but it does not inexorably affect admissibility.” State v. Poirier, 1997 ME 86, ¶ 4, 694 A.2d 448; see Field & Murray, Maine Evidence § 901.3 at 543 (6th ed. 2007) (stating that “the chain need [not] be ironclad in order to support admission of the evidence”; also stating that “a ‘minor break’ goes to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility”). The trial court’s ruling that the chain of custody was sufficient is reviewed for clear error. Poirier, 1997 ME 86, ¶ 4, 694 A.2d 448. [¶28] Here, the court found that the trash area was not locked, but it was enclosed by a privacy fence and marked with a “no trespassing” sign. Sergeant Christopher Young of the Rockland Police Department assigned an officer to secure the trash area on the evening of November 21, and a cursory search to look for a body was performed while State Police detectives were interviewing Diana inside his apartment. When the officers ended their search in the early morning hours of November 22, the privacy fence was left closed, but the area was unlocked and unguarded. 15 [¶29] State Police Detective Jeffrey Love began a search of the trash area at 1:41 p.m. on the afternoon of November 22. A Rockland police officer was watching the general area at the time. Love randomly selected a white garbage bag, opened it, and saw a stained purple towel and a brown coat. At that point he was called away to process other potential evidence. No one was posted at the trash area when he left, and it was “pouring rain.” When Love returned the next day at 10:33 a.m. there were other detectives already searching the trash area; Love saw the bag that he had opened where he had left it. State Police Detective Mark Holmquist was examining the coat, and Love saw the purple towel next to the bag. Holmquist testified that when he came upon the bag within a few feet of the trash area gate, it was open and a purple towel was lying on top as Love said he had left it. He described the search of the trash bag as “very methodical.” [¶30] Given this record, although the chain of custody was not airtight, our standard that “by the fair preponderance of the evidence . . . it is more probable than not that the [challenged] object is the one connected with the case” was satisfied. Id. ¶ 5 (quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, it was not clear error for the trial court to find that the evidence found in the trash bag was admissible. 2. Lay and Expert Testimony Concerning the Purple Towel [¶31] Maine State Police Sergeant William Ross testified at trial that on November 23, 2010, he was the evidence technician who collected and processed 16 the purple towel. Ross was later sent to where Windred’s body had been found and saw that it was wrapped in a quilt secured by two strips of purple towel. Ross testified that the strips were “similar to the purple towel that we saw in the trash area behind [Diana’s apartment] building.” [¶32] Diana did not object to Ross’s testimony. Accordingly, our review is limited to obvious error. See State v. Hassan, 2013 ME 98, ¶ 25, 82 A.3d 86. None is demonstrated on this record because Ross did not opine that the strips actually came from the towel, but rather testified that as a police evidence technician the strips securing Windred’s body had obvious significance to him because they were “similar to” the towel found at Diana’s apartment building. The mere similarity of the strips to the towel was a factual observation that a lay witness could make. It was for the jury to determine the weight to give Ross’s observation. [¶33] Robert Burns, a State Police forensic specialist with ten years’ experience, was prepared to testify as an expert that it was his opinion that the two strips wrapped around Windred’s body came from the towel found in the trash area. Diana moved in limine to exclude Burns’s opinion on the ground that no scientific or other reliable evidence linked the towel with the strips. The court held a hearing at which Burns described his training as a forensic specialist and his duties in the specific discipline of physical matching, which he described as 17 “looking at two or more . . . pieces of evidence to examine them for their characteristics to determine if at one time they were one item.” Burns said that all of his casework is peer reviewed, and that he had testified as an expert concerning physical matching in two previous homicide cases. He explained the process of physical matching and why particular expertise is required to perform it. Specifically concerning the towel and strips, Burns said that he had conducted a visual examination lasting several hours, but pursuant to lab protocol he did not conduct any microscopic or chemical analysis. [¶34] The court ruled that Burns’s opinion was admissible pursuant to M.R. Evid. 7023 because he possessed specialized knowledge, experience, and training that would assist the jury in assessing the towel evidence. Burns subsequently testified at trial that unique features in the torn edges of the towel and strips suggested that they were once one item, stating that “some jagged edges . . . could be matched back together. They fit into each other almost like a jigsaw puzzle.” [¶35] We review the court’s ruling that Burns’s opinion was admissible for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Ericson, 2011 ME 28, ¶ 12, 13 A.3d 777. In order for proffered evidence to qualify for admission pursuant to Rule 702, a court 3 Maine Rule of Evidence 702 provides: “If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.” 18 must find that it “meet[s] a threshold level of reliability,” and that it “(1) is relevant in accordance with M.R. Evid. 401, and (2) will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or determining a fact in issue.” Id. ¶ 11 (quotation marks omitted). Indicia for determining reliability include “whether the hypothesis of the testimony has been subject to peer review,” and “the nature of the expert’s qualifications.” Id. ¶ 12 (citation omitted). [¶36] Here, if the jury determined that the towel located in the trash bag outside Diana’s building belonged to him, then the question of whether the strips found tied around Windred’s body came from that towel was directly relevant to the ultimate fact in issue—whether Diana had killed Windred. Burns’s testimony at the hearing on the motion in limine supported the court’s finding that he possessed specialized training and experience that could assist the jury in resolving that question. The weight to give Burns’s opinion in light of his methodology was for the jury to decide; the court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the opinion met the threshold requirements for admission.