Opinion ID: 2519810
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Brady Disclosure

Text: Under Brady, supra, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, the prosecution must disclose to the defense any evidence that is favorable to the accused and is material on the issue of either guilt or punishment. Failure to do so violates the accused's constitutional right to due process. ( Id. at pp. 86-87, 83 S.Ct. 1194.) Evidence is material under the Brady standard if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. ( United States v. Bagley (1985) 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481.) Although Brady disclosure issues may arise in advance of, during, or after trial ( United States v. Agurs (1976) 427 U.S. 97, 107-108, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342), the test is always the same. ( Id. at p. 108, 96 S.Ct. 2392.) Brady materiality is a constitutional standard required to ensure that nondisclosure will not result in the denial of defendant's [due process] right to a fair trial. ( Ibid.) Because the Brady rule encompasses evidence known only to police investigators and not to the prosecutor, it is incumbent upon the prosecutor to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf in [a] case, including the police. ( Kyles v. Whitley (1995) 514 U.S. 419, 437-438, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490; see In re Brown (1998) 17 Cal.4th 873, 879, fn. 3, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 698, 952 P.2d 715, and cases cited therein.) The prosecution's disclosure duty under Brady applies even without a request by the accused; it pertains not only to exculpatory evidence but also to impeachment evidence. ( Strickler v. Greene (1999) 527 U.S. 263, 280-281, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286; United States v. Bagley, supra, 473 U.S. at p. 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375; United States v. Agurs, supra, 427 U.S. at p. 107, 96 S.Ct. 2392.) Closely related to the Brady rule requiring the prosecution to disclose material evidence favorable to the defense is the prosecution's obligation to retain evidence. With respect to retention, however, the prosecution's obligation is narrower. Its failure to retain evidence violates due process only when that evidence might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect's defense, and has exculpatory value [that is] apparent before [it is] destroyed. ( California v. Trombetta (1984) 467 U.S. 479, 488-89, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d 413.) In that regard, the mere possibility that information in the prosecution's possession may ultimately prove exculpatory is not enough to satisfy the standard of constitutional materiality. ( Arizona v. Young blood (1988) 488 U.S. 51, 56, 109 S.Ct. 333, 102 L.Ed.2d 281, fn. .) And whereas under Brady, supra, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, the good or bad faith of the prosecution is irrelevant when it fails to disclose to the defendant material exculpatory evidence ( id. at p. 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194), a different standard applies when the prosecution fails to retain evidence that is potentially useful to the defense. In the latter situation, there is no due process violation unless the accused can show bad faith by the government. ( Arizona v. Youngblood, supra, 488 U.S. at p. 58, 109 S.Ct. 333.)