Opinion ID: 1870865
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Alleged Abuse of Discretion in Deciding the Motion

Text: Davis does, however, argue an abuse of discretion in deciding issues presented by the motion on attorney's fees. She argues that the circuit court abused its discretion in failing to recognize that this case presented difficult financial issues and was a complex case involving the Statute of Limitations, unconstitutionality of the administrative order, equitable defenses of laches, waiver, equitable estoppel, and a contested hearing on child custody. The circuit court concluded to the contrary, that aside from the financial matters, this case presented straight forward issues. Davis also notes that several extraordinary motions were filed in this case making costs and fees justifiably higher. Davis argues that the circuit court failed to properly consider disparity in income in denying attorney's fees. However, disparity in income is discussed in the order. The circuit court found that while disparity in income is a factor to be considered, it was not determinative in this case. Davis additionally argues that the circuit court erred in finding that counsel failed to provide total submission of bills. According to Davis, it is evident that certain activities are included in the billings, such as presumed follow-up activities based on the activity actually listed. The circuit court found that the billings were inadequate and that some billings were inflated. Examples of deficiencies were given in the order. Davis next argues that the hourly fees she and those she hired charged are reasonable. The circuit court denied the fees in total. Hourly fees are not discussed in the order. Davis also argues: The court erred in her attorney fee Order in the following respects: The issue of attorney's fees was reserved from the hearing held in 1997, not from 2001 forward. In as much as the court had been unable to schedule the continuation of this hearing until 2001, the parties agreed that Mr. Williamson would pay a partial temporary attorney fee of $5000 in the year 2000. The only other award was $3000 out of a $23,552.50 expert witness fee. No proof of any agreement on fees is offered. Davis also states, At the time this decision was rendered Ms. Davis was unemployed and a student; she had been employed and was earning $31,123, which is misstated in the Order. The order states that Davis' employment status is based on the most recent financial affidavit of Davis on earnings at the time of the issue of child support. Davis offers no proof of this not being so. Davis next argues that a great deal of time was spent in preparation for trial and that the circuit court could not know how long letters were or how long it took to review matters and do research. Davis argues that she need not provide actual billing of hours. She cites this court to Deaton v. Deaton, 11 Ark.App. 165, 668 S.W.2d 49 (1984) for this proposition. The relevant language from the case is: The second point raised by the appellant is that the chancellor erred in awarding additional attorney's fees. He bases this argument on the fact that the appellee did not provide any documentation as to the time spent on the case by her attorney. Attorney's fees are a matter for the discretion of the trial court, and, absent an abuse of discretion, we will not reverse his decision in that regard. In the case at bar, the chancellor had the opportunity to observe the parties and, as the chancellor noted, the appellant was extremely uncooperative in adhering to any of the court's orders. We find no abuse of discretion on the part of the chancellor. Further, this issue was not raised before the trial court nor was any documentation requested. Deaton, 11 Ark.App. at 166, 668 S.W.2d 49. Deaton states it is not an abuse of discretion to grant fees in the absence of documentation where the judge has observed the work and documentation was not requested. Davis provided documentation, but the circuit court found it was inadequate and exhibited problems in inflated billings and otherwise. The circuit court was of the opinion that counsel's billings were unreliable, that too much time was spent on a number of types of items, and that counsel exhibited a lack of expertise. The circuit court evaluated counsel's legal services in the order on attorney's fees, noting the following examples: 1. Poor record keeping on billings as noted by Davis's own expert; 2. Inflated billings, $750 for review of an order, $350 for review of a letter; 3. Failure to bring copies of exhibits to trial for opposing counsel; 4. Raising the issue in open court of the nature of Davis and Williamson's sexual relationship after paternity had already been established; 5. Failure to understand what a proffer was; 6. Further inflated times on billings; 7. Lack of proper documentation; 8. Request for reimbursement of improper items as part of fees; 9. Lack of dates when work was done; 10. Vague billings, such as for research; 11. Unreadable entries in billings; and 12. $450 for a single photo. The circuit court looked to Paulson v. Paulson, 8 Ark.App. 306, 652 S.W.2d 46 (1983) for the factors to be considered in determining the amount, if any, to be awarded in attorney's fees. We first note that the factors in Paulson are very similar to the factors set out in Chrisco v. Sun Industries, Inc., 304 Ark. 227, 800 S.W.2d 717 (1990), with one exception. In the context of domestic relations cases, the financial abilities of the parties are also considered. Disparity in incomes is a relevant factor for the circuit court to consider, but standing alone it will not justify an award of attorney's fees. Scroggins v. Scroggins, 302 Ark. 362, 790 S.W.2d 157 (1990). The relevant Chrisco factors are: 1. Experience and ability of the attorney; 2. The time and labor required to perform the legal service properly; 3. The amount involved in the case and the result obtained; 4. The novelty and the difficulty of the issues involved; 5. The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; 6. The time limitations imposed on the client or by the circumstances; and 7. That the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer. Chrisco, 304 Ark. at 229, 800 S.W.2d 717. While the decision to award attorney's fees and the amount awarded are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, factual findings of fact by a circuit court on the existence of the Chrisco factors is reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard of review. See, e.g., Phi Kappa Tau Housing Corp. v. Wengert, 350 Ark. 335, 86 S.W.3d 856 (2002). When reviewing findings of fact by a circuit court, this court uses a clearly erroneous standard. Butt v. The Evans Law Firm, 351 Ark. 566, 98 S.W.3d 1 (2003). The only factor that was not considered by the trial court was the preclusion of other employment by the lawyer. No argument about loss of other employment was made in this case. The finding of the circuit court on the factors was not clearly erroneous. This court has considered all assertions of abuse of discretion in denying the motion for attorney's fees. The circuit court considered the proper factors in deciding Davis's attorney's fee motion. Davis fails to show an abuse of discretion by the circuit court.