Opinion ID: 2054541
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Multiplicity Doctrine and the Illegal Possession of Controlled Substances

Text: Williams' first argument on appeal is that charging him with possession with intent to distribute cocaine for the drugs found in the car and again for possession with intent to distribute cocaine for the drugs found in his apartment was plain error [5] and multiplicitous because he constructively possessed all the cocaine at the same time, in the same relative location and with one unifying intent to distribute the drugs. [6] We agree that these charges violated the multiplicity doctrine of the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and Delaware Constitutions. Williams first raised this issue on appeal. Issues that are not fairly raised to the trial court are reviewed for plain error. [7] Under Delaware law, plain error occurs when an error [is] so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process ... [and is a] material defec[t] which [is] apparent on the face of the record [and is] basic, serious and fundamental.... [8] We conclude that this was plain error. [9] Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Superior Court on this issue and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution states that no ... person [shall] be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.... [10] The Delaware Constitution similarly states that no person shall be for the same offense [be] twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.... [11] Double jeopardy, as a constitutional principle, provides the following protections: (1) against successive prosecutions; [12] (2) against multiple charges under separate statutes; [13] and (3) against being charged multiple times under the same statute. [14] In Williams' case the only applicable principle is whether charging someone multiple times under the same statute violates double jeopardy and the doctrine of multiplicity. Multiplicity is the charging of a single offense in more than one count of an indictment. [15] Dividing one offense into multiple counts of an indictment violates the double jeopardy provisions of the constitutions of the State of Delaware and of the United States. [16] Williams relies on, and we adopt, the rationale used by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Rashad v. Burt [17] in determining that the two counts of possession with intent to deliver cocaine are multiplicitous on these facts. In Rashad the defendant was charged with two counts of possession with intent to deliver cocaine, as was Williams here. [18] The question in Rashad, as in this case, was whether one violation of a single statute or two discrete violations of that same statute had occurred. [19] In Rashad, as in this case, the police found cocaine in the defendant's house and in a car of his that was on the premises. [20] In Rashad, however, the police did not discover the cocaine in the car until one week after the car had been impounded. [21] The defendant was tried in two separate proceedings and convicted twice. [22] The Court of Appeals held this to be a violation of the multiplicity doctrine of double jeopardy because Rashad possessed the full amount of cocaine with the same intent of distributing it at whatever future times, and in whatever amounts best suited him. [23] The court also went on to state that [a]bsent evidence of separate and distinct dedications of the two caches, his possession was a single and undivided transaction, regardless of the one week time gap. [24] Additionally, the court articulated the following test: [I]f the possessions are sufficiently differentiated by time, location or intended purpose,  then there is no double jeopardy violation for convicting someone for possession of the same substance. [25] This test consists of factors a court may use in determining, under the circumstances, whether two violations of same statute have occurred. First, all the drugs in the Williams case were found at the same time and during the same police confrontation. [26] In Rashad, by contrast, the police did not find the drugs in the vehicle until one week after the initial seizure. [27] Thus, this is an a fortiori case for a double jeopardy violation under this factor. Second, the drugs were in the same general location because the car was in close proximity to the apartment. All the cocaine was within Williams' reasonable control because he was in the vehicle at the time the cocaine was found. Regardless of whether the drugs were in the apartment or in the car 500 feet from the apartment, this possession represented a single instance of possession, with two hiding places for the drugs. Finally, Williams' possession of cocaine shows that he displayed a single intent and goal  distribution. [28] Williams had one intended purpose for all of the drugs confiscated during this police confrontation: to distribute them. There is no evidence that indicates more than one intent to distribute cocaine. Moreover, the separate packaging supports an inference of a unified intent to distribute all the cocaine in Williams' possession. The packaging tends to show that Williams formulated a single intent to distribute his entire stash of cocaine and separated the cocaine into a mobile cache and a non-mobile cache. Williams possessed all the cocaine for one purpose: delivery. Other federal cases have used a standard similar to Rashad, some finding no multiplicity violation [29] and some finding a violation. [30] In United States v. Rodriguez-Ramirez the defendant delivered a small cache of heroin to an undercover police officer at one location, and the State construed that as one crime  intent to distribute a controlled substance. [31] Two days later, the police found a much larger cache of heroin at a different location and charged the defendant with a separate crime  possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance. [32] The defendant argued that he should have been charged once because there was a continuous course of conduct. [33] The court, however, looked at the time and place of distribution and possession, and determined that two violations had occurred. [34] Although in this case a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause was not found, the analysis in Rodriguez-Ramirez is consistent with Rashad. [35] Adopting Rashad's test is consistent with Delaware case law regarding multiplicity. [36] For example, in Feddiman v. State , this Court held that a person could be punished for separate and distinct act[s] that violate the same statute as long as the defendant formulated a separate intent each time the statute was violated. [37] Feddiman dealt with separate and distinct acts of sexual assault where, accordingly, the defendant formulated the intent to commit each assault and separately violated the same statute numerous times during one continuous attack of the victim. [38] Williams, on the other hand, did not formulate two separate intents to distribute cocaine even though he separated the cocaine into different caches. Accordingly, the multiplicity doctrine applies.