Opinion ID: 1600215
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Why is Blue Cross Entitled to an Adjudication of Its Subrogation Rights before the Funds are Disbursed?

Text: Even assuming that Blue Cross is a fiduciary under federal law, and, therefore, is authorized to sue in federal court, does the exclusive jurisdiction of ERISA pre-empt the state court of jurisdiction to consider Blue Cross's subrogation claim? I do not think so. I believe that Blue Cross is entitled to an adjudication on its contract claim, by some court, especially in this case, where its claim has been impermissibly dismissed from the pending interpleader action on a ground that this Court has now determined was not supported by legal authority. In view of the fact that Blue Cross has been unable to get that adjudication in the interpleader action in state court, I would not think that the federal district court, applying equitable principles, would be powerless to effect a remedy to guarantee Blue Cross its rights under its contract, whatever those rights are, and to determine whether Blue Cross's subrogation rights are to be determined by state or by federal law. In short, while I do not believe that Congress intended to give federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction to establish a federal common law of pension plans governing subrogation rights contained in such plans, I am aware, as the Lewises argue in their brief, that the Supreme Court of the United States, in Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523, 101 S.Ct. 1895, 1906, 68 L.Ed.2d 402 (1981), said that Congress ... meant to establish pension plan regulation as exclusively a federal concern, I also know, of course, that the Supreme Court also said in Franchise Tax Board of Calif. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern California, 463 U.S. 1, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983), the following: The express grant of federal jurisdiction in ERISA is limited to suits brought by certain parties, ... as to whom Congress presumably determined that a right to enter federal court was necessary to further the statute's purposes. It did not go so far as to provide that any suit against such parties must also be brought in federal court when they themselves did not choose to sue. 463 U.S. at 21, 103 S.Ct. at 2852. The phrasing of § 502(a) is instructive. Section 502(a) specifies which personsparticipants, beneficiaries, fiduciaries, or the Secretary of Labormay bring actions for particular kinds of relief. It neither creates nor expressly denies any cause of action in favor of state governments, to enforce tax levies or for any other purpose. It does not purport to reach every question relating to plans covered by ERISA. Furthermore, § 514(b)(2)(A) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A), makes clear that Congress did not intend to pre-empt entirely every state cause of action relating to such plans. With important, but express limitations, it states that `nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities.' 463 U.S. at 25, 103 S.Ct. at 28. Based on the foregoing, I am of the opinion that the Lewises' petition for the writ mandamus should be denied. [15] Consequently, I must dissent. STEAGALL, J., concurs.