Opinion ID: 2982058
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Abandonment of Claims

Text: First we address the issue of whether Brown abandoned the claims that she failed to defend in her response to DMC’s motion for summary judgment, which addressed all claims, asserting both attacks on the merits and statute of limitations arguments. Brown asserted eight counts in her complaint, but her response to the motion for summary judgment expressly declined to address counts 4, 7 and 8 (age discrimination, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and defamation) and also simply failed to discuss counts 1, 2, 5, and 6 (race and gender discrimination and Equal Pay Act claims). R. 24, Brown’s Response at 5, Page ID # 314. The district court held that Brown abandoned the claims that she expressly declined to address and 6 No. 13-1054 Brown v. VHS of Michigan, Inc. the claims she never discussed in her response. As the district court explained, “even if two claims provide the same remedy, a plaintiff asserting both needs to establish the legal elements of each.” R. 33, District Court Op. at 3, Page ID # 546. DMC argues, as it did in the district court, that Brown has abandoned the claims that she failed to support in her response to DMC’s motion for summary judgment. Brown does not address the abandonment issue, explicitly, and only sets forth arguments for her claims of racial discrimination under Title VII, a new claim of racial discrimination under the Michigan ElliotLarsen Civil Rights Act (“ELCRA”), retaliation under Title VII, a new claim of retaliation under ELCRA, and her claim of discharge in violation of public policy. There is no dispute that Brown only addressed her retaliation claims under Title VII (Count 3) and the Equal Pay Act (Count 6) in her response to DMC’s motion for summary judgment. Yet Brown’s only contention regarding abandonment on appeal is that she did not abandon her “public policy” claim. This Court’s jurisprudence on abandonment of claims is clear: a plaintiff is deemed to have abandoned a claim when a plaintiff fails to address it in response to a motion for summary judgment. See Hicks v. Concorde Career Coll., 449 F. App’x 484, 487 (6th Cir. 2011) (holding that a district court properly declines to consider the merits of a claim when a plaintiff fails to address it in a response to a motion for summary judgment); Clark v. City of Dublin, 178 F. App’x 522, 524–25 (6th Cir. 2006) (recognizing that the failure to respond properly to motion for summary judgment arguments constitutes abandonment of a claim); Conner v. Hardee’s Food Sys., 65 F. App’x 19, 24–25 (6th Cir. 2003); see also Colston v. Cleveland Pub. Library, No. 1:12-CV-204, 2012 WL 3309663, at  n.2 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 13, 2013) (deeming a claim 7 No. 13-1054 Brown v. VHS of Michigan, Inc. abandoned and granting summary judgment when a plaintiff “did not respond or even mention [the] claim in her opposition to Defendants’ motions for summary judgment”). Accordingly, this Court agrees with the district court. Brown abandoned her claims for (1) Title VII race discrimination; (2) Title VII gender/sex discrimination; (4) ADEA age discrimination; (5) harassment and a hostile work environment; (6) Equal Pay Act discrimination; (7) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (8) defamation. Thus, it is only left for this Court to address Count 3 (Title VII retaliation claim) and the discharge in violation of public policy claim. The issue of whether Brown abandoned her claim based on “public policy” is complex. First, none of Brown’s eight counts specifically set forth a claim based on public policy.2 However, Brown is correct in arguing that her complaint includes factual allegations for violations of public policy. See Pet. Rep. Br. at 4; R. 1, Complaint at 11, PageID # 11. Furthermore, this Court finds that DMC acknowledged that Brown had stated a claim based on public policy but argued that her claim was barred because of the statute of limitations. R. 17, Mot. Summ. J. at 20, PageID # 117. Brown makes a strong case that this claim was never 2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(b) provides that if such practice would promote clarity, “each claim founded on a separate transaction or occurrence . . . must be stated in a separate count or defense.” While this Court has not explicitly addressed whether failure to separately state counts provides grounds for a court to either dismiss the claim or consider it “abandoned,” this Court simply notes that while Brown may make allegations that her discharge violated public policy, it is difficult to recognize her public policy claim because she failed to separately state this claim as a count. See also Northwest Airlines v. Glenn L. Martin Co., 9 F.R.D. 551, 552 (N.D. Ohio 1949) (holding that separation of claims into separate counts is mandatory only if more than one claim has been joined in a complaint and separation will facilitate clear presentation) (citation omitted). 8 No. 13-1054 Brown v. VHS of Michigan, Inc. abandoned because DMC moved for summary judgment solely based on statute of limitations grounds, and the district court failed to address the statute of limitations issue. As the district court never addressed the merits of the public policy claim, this Court will review the arguments as to her public policy claim as well as to her Title VII retaliation claim.3 R. 33, District Court Op. at 6, FN 1, PageID # 549.