Opinion ID: 3030609
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Abbott Is Consistent with the LHWCA’s Text and

Text: Purpose The interpretation of the LHWCA found in Abbott and Newport News and adopted by the OWCP Director in this case is supported by the language of the LHWCA and its purpose. The LHWCA does not specifically provide that total disability benefits are to be awarded where a claimant shows that GENERAL CONSTRUCTION CO. v. CASTRO 2411 participation in a rehabilitation program precludes acceptance of alternative employment. But the statute’s silence is not determinative. In fact, the statute is generally silent on the scope and definition of “total disability.” See 33 U.S.C. § 908(a) (providing that where claimant has not lost two major body parts, the existence of “total disability shall be determined in accordance with the facts”). As the Fifth Circuit noted in Abbott, the statute leaves it to the courts to “enunciate standards for distinguishing between the various categories” of disability—total and partial as well as permanent and temporary. 40 F.3d at 125-26. [2] The Abbott rule is consistent with the language and a principal policy of the LHWCA: the encouragement of vocational rehabilitation. The LHWCA specifically provides that “[t]he Secretary shall direct the vocational rehabilitation of permanently disabled employees and shall arrange . . . for such rehabilitation.” 33 U.S.C. § 939(c)(2). Moreover, the LHWCA defines “disability” as the “incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or other employment.” 33 U.S.C. § 902(10). Thus, the LHWCA speaks of disability in terms of economic harm, not just physical harm. Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121, 126-27 (1997). The Abbott rule, consistently with this definition, simply clarifies that it is possible for a claimant to be entitled to benefits for “total disability” when the claimant is physically capable of performing certain work but unable to secure that work for some other reason. See Abbott, 40 F.3d at 127; see also Newport News, 315 F.3d at 295. Amicus LCA argues that Abbott was wrongly decided because in 1984 Congress considered and failed to pass amendments to the LHWCA creating a statutory entitlement to total disability for all claimants during vocational rehabilitation training. We note at the outset that congressional inaction is not a reliable guide to legislative intent. See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 2412 GENERAL CONSTRUCTION CO. v. CASTRO U.S. 164, 187 (1994) (“Congressional inaction lacks persuasive significance because several equally tenable inferences may be drawn from such inaction, including the inference that the existing legislation already incorporated the offered change.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted); United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 411 (1962). Moreover, the failed amendments in this case would have been more sweeping than Abbott’s rule, since they would have created an entitlement to disability benefits during rehabilitation. H.R. 7610, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. at 19-20 (1980) (providing that “[a]n employee who as a result of injury is undergoing vocational rehabilitation . . . shall be entitled to receive continued temporary total or partial compensation during . . . such rehabilitation”).6 In contrast, the Abbott rule requires a fact-finder to consider on a case-by-case basis an injured worker’s participation in a rehabilitation program as one factor in determining whether suitable alternative employment is available to that worker. Cf. Kee v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 33 Ben. Rev. Bd. Serv. (MB) 221 (2000) (applying Abbott and denying temporary total disability benefits when claimant failed to show that enrollment in rehabilitation program precluded acceptance of alternate employment); Gregory, 32 Ben. Rev. Bd. Serv. (MB) 264 (same). Congress’s failure to enact an amendment more sweeping than the Abbott rule cannot be taken to invalidate that rule. The text, purposes, and legislative history of the LHWCA thus provide no basis for rejecting the Abbott approach.7 6 See also H.R. Rep. No. 98-570, pt. I, at 83 (1983) (including comments from sponsor of H.R. 7610 (1980) noting that compromises on LHWCA amendments included the elimination of “amendments concerning vocational rehabilitation which assured continued payment of benefits during rehabilitation”). 7 General Construction and LCA also invoke the language of § 8(g) of the LHWCA in support of the contention that the only money Congress intended to be provided to claimants during vocational rehabilitation is a $25 maintenance stipend. 33 U.S.C. §§ 908(g), 944. This argument ignores the plain language of the statute. Section 8(g) states that an injured GENERAL CONSTRUCTION CO. v. CASTRO 2413