Opinion ID: 2816567
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Basis of the Indefinite Suspension

Text: Did Not Change After Acquittal Ms. Ryan also objects to the revocation of her security clearance after she was acquitted of the charges that originally gave rise to the suspension of her security clearance. See Pet’r’s Br. 54. However, neither this court nor the MSPB may review the merits of an agency’s decision to suspend or revoke a security clearance. See Egan, 484 U.S. at 530 (“A denial of a security clearance . . . is not subject to [MSPB] review.”). Moreover, even if the agency’s suspension of Ms. Ryan’s employment had been based on her indictment rather than on the suspension of her security clearance, acquittal of criminal charges under the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard does not require the agency to reinstate the employee. See Richardson v. U.S. Customs Serv., 47 F.3d 415, 421 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (rejecting the theory “that the grounds for suspension disappear[] as a result of . . . later acquittal”). Finally, Ms. Ryan asserts she “was not provided a new notice of the implicit change in the basis for the indefinite suspension.” Pet’r’s Br. 55. She explains: The transition from clearance suspension to clearance revocation was accompanied by a notice stat- ing the reasons for the revocation, which included the specifics of the indictment (as opposed to just Ryan’s access to classified information was suspended on March 28, 2012 and she was acquitted of criminal charges on February 19, 2013. Her security clearance was revoked approximately five months later, on July 26, 2013. This court has previously observed that security clearance investigations “often take up to a year.” Griffin, 864 F.2d at 1581; see also Gargiulo, 727 F.3d at 1182–83 (approximately sixteen-month period between suspension of clearance and revocation of clearance). RYAN v. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. 13 the existence of the indictment, referenced in the clearance suspension), and to which was added a basis not stated in the indictment: misleading statements to an ethics officer. Id. at 54. As already noted, “[a] denial of a security clearance . . . is not subject to [MSPB] review.” Egan, 484 U.S. at 530. The notice discussed in detail the bases for the clearance revocation. It did not alter the basis for suspending Ms. Ryan’s employment. The suspension, as stated in the letter informing Ms. Ryan of the indefinite suspension of her employment, was “based exclusively upon the suspension of your access to classified information.” J.A. 78. It was therefore Ms. Ryan’s inability to access classified information, rather than the underlying reasons for that inability, that formed the basis of the indefinite suspension. See Gargiulo, 727 F.3d at 1185 (An employee indefinitely suspended for failure to maintain a required security clearance “ha[s] due process rights with respect to [the] indefinite suspension, but they [do] not include the right to contest the merits of the decision to suspend [the] security clearance.”). The revocation of Ms. Ryan’s clearance made this inability permanent.