Opinion ID: 1163229
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Scope of Seller's Duty to Warn Purchaser of, or Make Safe, Products Dangerous for Their Intended Use

Text: The superior court concluded that River and Sea did not owe Maddox a duty with regard to the configuration of the boat-trailer combination. Specifically, the trial court found that River and Sea did not have a duty to configure the boat-trailer combination in such a way that it could be detached manually. With due respect to the trial court, we see the issue as being different: It is whether River and Sea owed Maddox a duty to configure the boat-trailer combination properly or to warn him that it was not so configured. The concept of duty in negligence encompasses a broad range of policy considerations underlying the determination when, and to what extent, an individual should bear the costs of a given activity. See Busby v. Municipality of Anchorage, 741 P.2d 230, 233 (Alaska 1987) (listing factors relevant to analysis). Courts have long recognized that a seller must shoulder some responsibility for the costs imposed by defective or dangerous products. Prince v. Parachutes, Inc., 685 P.2d 83, 87 (Alaska 1984); see also MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916) (duty of manufacturer). The outcome of this case turns upon the scope of a seller's duty to protect the customer from hazards potentially posed by the seller's product. According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts [o]ne who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for another to use is subject to liability to those whom the supplier should expect to use the chattel with the consent of the other or to be endangered by its probable use, for physical harm caused by the use of the chattel in the manner for which and by a person for whose use it is supplied, if the supplier (a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be dangerous for the use for which it is supplied, and (b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is supplied will realize its dangerous condition, and (c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous condition or of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388 (1965). [6] While we have not explicitly adopted Section 388, we have referred to it. Saddler v. Alaska Marine Lines, Inc., 856 P.2d 784, 788 (Alaska 1993). Prior cases have recognized a duty to warn, breach of which may result in strict liability. Prince, 685 P.2d at 87; Patricia R. v. Sullivan, 631 P.2d 91, 102 (Alaska 1981). River and Sea suggests that it had no duty to Maddox, under Section 388 or otherwise, to protect him from the weight of the boat-trailer combination because: (1) it was not foreseeable that he would attempt to detach the trailer by hand; and (2) the danger posed by the weight was obvious.