Opinion ID: 1127405
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Court's Reading of Guilt Phase Verdicts

Text: (31) Prior to penalty phase arguments, at defense counsel Frank's request, the trial court read the information and summarized the guilt verdict, including the special circumstances findings, for the jury. In summarizing the verdict, the court purported to read from the August 3, 1988, minute order which had omitted the verdict as to certain allegations charged in the information. For example, defendant had been charged in the information with the multiple-murder special circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)) with respect to the Tatman and Bocanegra murders. The August 3 order found true the multiple-murder special circumstance with respect to the Bocanegra murders only and did not include the Tatman murder in the special-circumstance disposition. Purporting to read from the August 3 minute order, the court inexplicably included Tatman as part of the section 190.2, subdivision (a)(3) finding when it summarized the verdict to the jury. That finding is not in the record copy of the minute order. Also during penalty phase argument, Frank explained to the jury the meaning of the felony-murder charges in the Tatman verdict, and discussed defendant's role as an accomplice in the Tatman robbery and murder in an apparent attempt to clarify the court's allegedly inconsistent verdicts finding defendant guilty of the first degree murder and robbery of Tatman, but finding not true the robbery-murder special circumstance. Frank's explanation of the felony-murder verdict was interrupted by Ryals's successful objection. Defendant now complains that the court's erroneous inclusion of the Tatman murder as part of the multiple-murder special-circumstance finding in the Bocanegra murders, and its failure to explain (or allow counsel to adequately explain) its allegedly inconsistent verdict and special-circumstance finding in the Tatman murder verdicts amounted to the use of false or misleading evidence in capital sentencing in violation of defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process, and the Eighth Amendment right to a fair trial. (See Simmons v. South Carolina (1994) 512 U.S. 154, ___, fn. 5 [129 L.Ed.2d 133, 143-144, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 2195] [due process requires sentencing jury be informed that defendant is ineligible for parole where defendant's future dangerousness is at issue and state law prohibits defendant's release on parole]; Townsend v. Burke (1948) 334 U.S. 736, 740-741 [92 L.Ed. 1690, 1693-1694, 68 S.Ct. 1252] [reliance on dismissed charges not proved in noncapital sentencing denied defendant due process]; Johnson v. Mississippi (1988) 486 U.S. 578, 584 [100 L.Ed.2d 575, 583-584, 108 S.Ct. 1981] [reversing death sentence on Eighth Amendment grounds for counsel's use of prior conviction that had been reversed]; see also People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 748, fn. 12 [244 Cal. Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741] [hereafter Melton ] [robbery-murder special-circumstance finding as to accomplice requires finding of intent to kill].) We find defendant's arguments unpersuasive. First, counsel did not object to the court's incorrect reading of the multiple-murder special-circumstances verdict. Hence, if any error occurred, it was waived. ( Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 171.) Moreover, even if counsel had objected, we would find any error the court made in reading incorrectly the multiple-murder special-circumstance findings, or any confusion caused by the court's verdict as to the Tatman charges, could have been rendered harmless by an admonition to the jury. In addition, Frank's penalty phase argument explained to the jury the meaning of the Tatman verdict: The significance of what [defendant] was and wasn't convicted of, I would submit to you, establishes a lot of facts, number one, that he himself did not kill Woodrow [Wilson] Tatman. You heard the evidence. I think you can infer from the evidence, from the verdicts that it was not Ted Sanchez who killed Mr. Tatman, it was Robert Reyes. [¶] I submit to you that you can logically infer from what you've heard that Ted Sanchez did not kill Mr. Tatman nor did he share in Robert Reyes' intent to kill Mr. Tatman. Ted's role in that tragic incident was limited to removing some of Mr. Tatman's property. [¶] You heard the evidence. Mr. Tatman was not supposed to even have known that his property had been taken.... Frank next repeated to the jury: Robert Reyes took it upon himself to kill, but Ted had no part in that. Frank then explained the multiple-murder special-circumstance findings and argued the circumstances of the Bocanegra murders as a mitigating factor under section 190.3, factor (a). Now let's turn to the charges involving the Bocanegras. Teddy was charged in count two of the Information with having killed Mr. Bocanegra and in count three of the Information with having killed Mrs. Bocanegra. Each count carried with it the special circumstance that the murder had been committed during the course of a robbery. Although he was found guilty of the murders of Mr. and Mrs. Bocanegra, the special circumstance that the murders occurred during the course of a robbery were not found true. In addition, he was found not guilty of robbing the Bocanegras as was alleged in count five. I submit to you that the importance of all this is that you can infer that when Ted  that when Ted went over to the Bocanegra house he did not do so with the intent to rob him. In fact, I would submit that you can infer that when he went over to that house he didn't intend to commit any criminal acts against the Bocanegras, and that it wasn't until after Joey and his father started fighting that Teddy thought about engaging in any criminal activity. Now, I bring all this to your attention because the law says that you can take into account the circumstances of the crimes when you deliberate on the issue of penalty, and that is provided for in ... [section 190.3, factor (a)]. Now this factor is general, looked upon as being an aggravating factor, one that doesn't usually contain any mitigating value, but I submit to you that, in this case, if you look closely at the facts and circumstances of what transpired at the Tatman and Bocanegra residence[s], you will find significant mitigating values there. Frank thereafter told the jury that it was Reyes, not defendant, who killed Tatman, and that defendant had no criminal intent when he went over to [the Bocanegras'] house. He also argued that these same facts could be interpreted as mitigating evidence under section 190.3, factor (k). Frank's argument likely clarified for the jury any misperceptions about the verdict that occurred in light of the court's statement of the verdict. We conclude any error the court made in the court's verdict statement was harmless. Defendant requested the court read the verdict and special circumstance findings, and failed to correct the court or offer clarifying instructions in order to remedy any misperceptions the jury may have had about the verdict. Moreover, counsel's explanation of the verdict to the jury during argument more than clarified any potential confusion the jury may have experienced following the court's explanation. The prosecutor did not mention the erroneous verdict, or capitalize on its inclusion. Defendant was convicted of three counts of first degree murder, including one supportable special-circumstance allegation, as well as two counts of use of a deadly weapon, and one count of robbery. Under these circumstances, there is no reasonable possibility that consideration of the court's potentially confusing reading of the guilt phase verdict could have improperly influenced the jury. (Cf. People v. Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 389-391 [279 Cal. Rptr. 780, 807 P.2d 1009] [any error in court's failure to tailor instruction that the jury consider all evidence, even those charges of which defendant was acquitted, rendered harmless by instructions and other valid charges].)