Opinion ID: 352420
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Applications of Terry

Text: 62 The distinction, then, is between reasonable grounds for a suspicion objective facts in light of which the stop appears reasonable that will support a stop, and intuition, hunch, or mere subjective suspicion that will not. 52 This is well illustrated by one of two incidents before the Supreme Court in Sibron v. New York. 53 A policeman kept Sibron under continuous surveillance for eight hours as he conversed successively with a number of known addicts. The officer did not overhear any of their conversations nor did he see anything pass between them. The Court refused to accept those circumstances as a basis for an investigative stop. So far as (the officer) knew, they might . . . 'have been talking about the World Series.' 54 The inference that persons who talk to narcotics addicts are engaged in the criminal traffic in narcotics is simply not the sort of reasonable inference required to support an intrusion by the police upon an individual's personal security. 55 63 The constitutional necessity for objectively- and reasonably-founded suspicion for a stop is further illustrated by Brignoni-Ponce, 56 wherein the Court delineated the power of the Border Patrol to halt automobiles in areas near the Mexican border and inquire into the citizenship and immigration status of the occupants. As posed by the Court, (t)he only issue presented for decision (was) whether a roving patrol may stop a vehicle in an area near the border and question its occupants when the only ground for suspicion is that the occupants appear to be of Mexican ancestry, 57 and that issue the Court resolved in the negative. Properly justified, such a procedure would be unobjectionable; because of the importance of the governmental interest at stake, the minimal intrusion of a brief stop, and the absence of practical alternatives for policing the border, the Court held that when an officer's observations lead him reasonably to suspect that a particular vehicle may contain aliens who are illegally in the country, he may stop the car briefly and investigate the circumstances that provoke suspicion. 58 Since, however, (r)oads near the border carry not only aliens seeking to enter the country illegally, but a large volume of legitimate traffic as well, the Court recognized that (t)o approve roving-patrol stops of all vehicles in the border area, without any suspicion that a particular vehicle is carrying illegal immigrants, would subject the residents of these and other areas to potentially unlimited interference with their use of the highways, solely at the discretion of Boarder Patrol officers. 59 Consequently, the Court was 64 not convinced that the legitimate needs of law enforcement require this degree of interference with lawful traffic. . . . (A) requirement of reasonable suspicion for stops allows the Government adequate means of guarding the public interest and also protects residents of the border area from indiscriminate official interference. Under the circumstances, and even though the intrusion incident to a stop is modest, we conclude that it is not reasonable under the Fourth Amendment to make such stops on a random basis. 60 65 Moreover, the Brignoni-Ponce Court continued, (f)or the same reasons that the Fourth Amendment forbids stopping vehicles at random to inquire if they are carrying aliens who are illegally in the country, it also forbids stopping or detaining persons for questioning about their citizenship on less than a reasonable suspicion that they may be aliens. 61 So, tracking Terry, the Court proclaimed that (e)xcept at the border and its functional equivalents, officers on roving patrol may stop vehicles only if they are aware of specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion that the vehicles contain aliens who may be illegally in the country; 62 and that standard had not been met: 66 In this case the officers relied on a single factor to justify stopping respondent's car: the apparent Mexican ancestry of the occupants. We cannot conclude that this furnished reasonable grounds to believe that the three occupants were aliens. At best the officers had only a fleeting glimpse of the persons in the moving car, illuminated by headlights. Even if they saw enough to think that the occupants were of Mexican descent, this factor alone would justify neither a reasonable belief that they were aliens, nor a reasonable belief that the car concealed other aliens who were illegally in the country. Large numbers of native-born and naturalized citizens have the physical characteristics identified with Mexican ancestry, and even in the border area a relatively small proportion of them are aliens. The likelihood that any given person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough to make Mexican appearance a relevant factor, but standing alone it does not justify stopping all Mexican-Americans to ask if they are aliens. 63 67 Very similar to these decisions is our own in Montgomery. 64 Police officers saw Montgomery drive through a residential area twice, whereupon they followed him around the block and stopped him. Montgomery had observed all relevant traffic and speed laws, and the officers knew of nothing reflecting adversely upon him. Their suspicions were nonetheless aroused by the manner in which he was encircling the area; 65 it seemed unusual that he would be encircling like that. There was really no business places around. 66 One of the officers became more skeptical when he observed (Montgomery) appeared (sic ) to be watching us in the rear view mirror and looking around. 67 We concluded that these events did not giv(e) rise to a founded suspicion of wrongdoing. 68 We said: 68 (G)ood faith, accompanied only by inarticulate hunch, is not enough for even the temporary seizure of a stop. And that is all that appears on this record. The officers saw (Montgomery) some four or five minutes after they originally noticed him, concluded that he had driven around the block, pulled their marked police car behind him and noted that (Montgomery) watched them in his rear view mirror and looked around. This may have been reason for an officer to become suspicious enough to keep an eye on (Montgomery). But it can hardly be deemed to be an objective indicator of reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct. There are perfectly legitimate reasons for circling a block, perhaps looking for an address in an unfamiliar neighborhood, or for a parking space close to the address sought, or waiting to meet a friend when parking at or near the location is unavailable. 69 69 The inarticulate hunch, the awareness of something unusual, is reason enough for officers to look sharp. Their knowledge and experience identify many incidents in the course of a day that an untrained eye might pass without any suspicion whatever. But awareness of the unusual, and a proper resolve to keep a sharp eye is not the same as an articulated suspicion of criminal conduct. (Montgomery's) acts, as reported, were too innocuous to warrant the intrusion of a temporary seizure for questioning. 70 70 Reverting to the case at bar, the question immediately becomes whether, in the totality of the circumstances of his encounter with Officer Franck, appellant's right to personal integrity was violated by what constitutionally amounted to an unreasonable seizure when he was required to go back to the bank for what eventuated as an extended interrogation. The reasonableness of this course of action turns on the facts, viewed objectively, 71 and the central inquiry is whether the officer was able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant(ed) that intrusion. 72 Applying Terry criteria to the facts here, I cannot accept the inferences purportedly underpinning the detention to which appellant was subjected. 73