Opinion ID: 2978974
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sovereign-Immunity Defense

Text: Finally, the Defendants contend that sovereign immunity prevents McCoy from maintaining his suit against the State of Michigan, the MDOC, and the other named Defendants to the extent that they were sued in their official capacities. Whether immunity exists is a question of constitutional law that we review de novo. S.J. v. Hamilton County, 374 F.3d 416, 418 (6th Cir. 2004). issued in 2004. See Adair, 680 N.W.2d at 397. Moreover, a single-judge order does not invoke the law-of-the-case doctrine and preclude us from reaching the merits of McCoy’s appeal. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(c) provides, in relevant part, that “[a] circuit judge . . . may not dismiss or otherwise determine an appeal or other proceeding,” and “[t]he court may review the action of a single judge.” Fed. R. App. P. 27(c). If a merits panel were bound by a single-judge order denying a motion to proceed in forma pauperis on the grounds of frivolousness, then any subsequent appeal automatically would be meritless and the single judge would be vested with a power that Rule 27(c) expressly prohibits. See Thomson v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 772 F.2d 879, 882 (Fed. Cir. 1985); cf. Friends of Earth v. Reilly, 966 F.2d 690, 696 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (expressing doubt that a “single judge acting on a motion for stay can bind a full panel” and invoke the law-of-the-case doctrine); Locke v. Allstate Ins. Co., 696 F.2d 1340, 1343 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that a single-judge order that was not appealed to a three-judge panel under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(c) was nonbinding). 12 We agree with the district court that the State of Michigan is entitled to sovereign immunity with respect to McCoy’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. The Eleventh Amendment generally bars a suit for money damages brought in federal court against a state unless the state has waived its sovereign immunity or consented to be sued, and the State of Michigan has not done so here. See Kovacevich v. Kent State Univ., 224 F.3d 806, 817 (6th Cir. 2000). Because sovereign immunity extends to “state instrumentalities,” Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997), and the MDOC is “an arm of the State of Michigan,” the MDOC is entitled to sovereign immunity on the § 1983 claim as well, Turnboe v. Stegall, 234 F.3d 1270 (6th Cir. 2000) (unpublished order). Moreover, the named Defendants, in their official capacities, are similarly entitled to immunity with respect to McCoy’s § 1983 claim because “a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office,” which is “no different from a suit against the State.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). McCoy’s § 1983 claim against the Defendants in their individual capacities, however, is not barred by sovereign immunity. See Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 571 (6th Cir. 2000). Lastly, the individual Defendants are not entitled to sovereign immunity with respect to the Title VII claims brought against them in their official capacities, but a suit against them as individuals is precluded under Title VII because they are not alleged to have been McCoy’s employers.4 See id.