Opinion ID: 2508486
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Analogizing to Conversion Was Proper to Enforce the Dissolution Decree in a Motion on the Family Law Calendar

Text: Velle argues that he was deprived of the usual protections afforded a tort defendant because this case arose as an enforcement of a dissolution decree. In a normal tort action, he would have time to answer, the opportunity for discovery, and a jury trial with the ability to cross-examine witnesses. But here he had to respond to Margo's motion to enter judgment that was placed on the family law motion calendar and decided after a brief hearing based on documentary evidence. Velle cites no authority to support his position. We find no merit in Velle's contentions since precedent establishes the trial court's authority to enter such a judgment. Having before it at the outset a cause cognizable in equity, the court retain[s] jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties to be affected by its decree for all purposes  to administer justice among the parties according to law or equity. Yount v. Indianola Beach Estates, Inc., 63 Wash.2d 519, 524-25, 387 P.2d 975 (1964). The superior court unquestionably has authority to enforce property settlements. RCW 26.12.010. It further has the authority to use any suitable process or mode of proceeding to settle disputes over which it has jurisdiction, provided no specific procedure is set forth by statute and the chosen procedure best conforms to the spirit of the law. RCW 2.28.150. Indeed, `[w]hen the equitable jurisdiction of the court is invoked ... whatever relief the facts warrant will be granted.' Ronken v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 89 Wash.2d 304, 313, 572 P.2d 1 (1977) (quoting Kreger v. Hall, 70 Wash.2d 1002, 1008, 425 P.2d 638 (1967)) (alteration in original). The trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties via the equitable action to enforce the decree, and it properly entered judgment against Velle when he admitted the facts relevant to the tort of conversion. Velle admitted he exercised the options. He claims to have done so in good faith, but that is irrelevant: `Therefore, neither good nor bad faith, neither care nor negligence, neither knowledge nor ignorance, are of the gist of the action [in conversion].' Judkins v. Sadler-MacNeil, 61 Wash.2d 1, 4, 376 P.2d 837 (1962) (quoting Poggi v. Scott, 167 Cal. 372, 375, 139 P. 815 (1914)). Since Velle admitted he exercised the options, which did not belong to him, he admitted to converting them. Additional safeguards would have done him little good.