Opinion ID: 199256
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Structure of the Information

Text: 41 The district court concluded that the information to which Sawyer pled guilty was structured to require proof of a state law violation. See Sawyer, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 98 (the government was required to prove that Sawyer violated at least one state law.). We review this finding of fact for clear error, 12 see Blanton, 94 F.3d at 230, and conclude that it was clearly erroneous because the information was not predicated upon Sawyer's violation of section three of the Massachusetts gratuity statute. The information itself does not refer to any state law. Rather, it charges Sawyer with knowingly and willfully devis[ing] and execut[ing] a scheme and artifice to defraud the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and its citizens of their right to the honest services of members of the Massachusetts Legislature for the purpose of promoting Hancock's legislative interests. There is no language in the information itself indicating that Massachusetts state law was a part of the prosecution's case against Sawyer. Thus, there is no basis for concluding that Sun-Diamond undermined the criminality of a state law that was the basis for Sawyer's guilty plea. 42 The government's decision to eschew reliance on Massachusetts law in the information is hardly surprising. In Sawyer, we noted that the incorporation of a state law violation in [a prosecution for mail fraud] may cause complications. Sawyer, 85 F.3d at 726. We cautioned further: 43 First, concerning the theft of honest services jury instruction, an overemphasis on what state law forbids may lead the jury to believe that state rather than federal law defines the crime, or more specifically, that any violation of a state law or regulation concerning lobbying or related matters amounts to honest services fraud. Wire and mail fraud are federal offenses; and while state violations may play a role, the jury should not be allowed to slip into the misunderstanding that any violation of proliferating state laws and regulations controlling this area automatically amounts to a federal crime. 44 Id. at 731. 13 Obviously, the state violation must be correctly charged and adequately proven, or the proof on the federal charge fails as well. See id. at 725. Indeed, we reversed Sawyer's conviction on direct appeal because the jury instructions permitted the jury to convict him based solely on a violation of the Massachusetts gift statute, without a finding that he possessed the necessary intent to influence a public official. Thus, the government might well have concluded, in deciding to retry Sawyer, that an information charging honest services mail fraud without mentioning state law would avoid some of the issues that Sawyer successfully appealed following his conviction. In its brief here, the government acknowledges our ruling in Sawyer, noting, this Court went on to criticize any attempt by the government to define honest services in terms of state law requirements, and offering Sawyer as a justification for its strategy in structuring the information. 45 Although we noted in Sawyer that the parties agree that the indictment, as structured, required it to prove that Sawyer violated at least one state law, Sawyer, 85 F.3d at 726, Sawyer's plea agreement provided that his guilty plea would result in the dismissal of the indictment. Thus, when Sawyer entered his plea of guilty, the information became the controlling document for determining what the government sought to prove. 46