Opinion ID: 2832140
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Voluntary Reform

Text: ¶87 Citing trademark caselaw, the majority also argues that Ms. Mercer‘s ―voluntary reformation and cessation of unlawful activity‖ by deleting InnoSys‘s files does not necessarily defeat InnoSys‘s claim for injunctive relief. Supra ¶¶ 42–46. As the Supreme Court has noted, ―the court‘s power to grant injunctive relief survives discontinuance of the illegal conduct.‖ W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. at 633. The principle that voluntary reformation does not necessarily defeat an injunctive relief claim makes sense in situations where a trademark infringer voluntarily stops the illegal activity after a lawsuit is filed. Where the only impediment to future harmful conduct is the defendant‘s self-imposed restraint, the likelihood of prospective infringement of an intellectual property right is a question of fact for the court. See id. (if the defendant discontinues the illegal conduct, the moving party must still show ―that there exists some cognizable danger of recurrent violation‖). ¶88 This case, however, is fundamentally different from the voluntary reformation caselaw cited by the majority. Unlike the typical trademark infringer who ceases illegal activity but retains the capability to reinitiate the harmful conduct in the future, Ms. Mercer undisputedly deleted InnoSys‘s emails and files. Thus, the future use or dissemination of the files is not just a matter of selfrestraint. InnoSys has not produced evidence that Ms. Mercer retains the capacity to use its documents in the future. Absent evidence that she retained the ability to use or distribute the files, summary judgment was appropriate.2 2 In support of its argument that the district court improperly granted summary judgment, the majority also quotes Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Dick Bruhn, Inc., 793 F.2d 1132, 1135–36 (9th Cir. 1986), which states: ―If the defendants sincerely intend not to infringe, the injunction harms them little; if they do, it gives [the plaintiff] substantial protection of its trademark.‖ Supra ¶ 44. Although the (continued…) 40 Cite as: 2015 UT 80 J. DURHAM, dissenting ¶89 The majority cites Supreme Court precedent for the proposition that ―‗a defendant claiming that its voluntary compliance moots a case bears the formidable burden of showing that it is absolutely clear the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.‘‖ Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721, 727 (2013) (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 190 (2000)). The majority concludes that under this precedent, ―the burden shifts to Mercer to carry the ‗formidable burden of showing that it is absolutely clear [that] the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur‖ in order to avoid an injunction against her. Supra ¶ 43 (alteration in original); see also supra ¶ 43 n.24 (―[T]he burden of proving reform has shifted to Mercer.‖). The majority also suggests that Ms. Mercer must satisfy this ―‘formidable burden‘‖ in order to prevail on remand. Supra ¶ 46 n.25. ¶90 Already, LLC and Friends of the Earth, however, do not shift the burden to a defendant to prove that an injunction should not issue. In both of these cases, the defendant claimed that a federal court had no Article III authority to adjudicate an injunctive relief claim because the defendant‘s actions had rendered the case or controversy moot. Already, LLC, 133 S. Ct. at 726–27; Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 173–74. Thus, the Supreme Court‘s pronouncement that a defendant bears a ―formidable burden‖ was made in the specific context of the defendant‘s argument that a federal court lacked the authority to even adjudicate the injunctive relief claim. Because Ms. Mercer never claimed that InnoSys‘s injunctive relief claims were moot or challenged the district court‘s authority to decide these claims, Already, LLC and Friends of the Earth do not apply here. relative burden borne by the defendant is certainly relevant when a court weighs the equities of granting an injunction, a plaintiff may not be relieved of the burden of providing evidence of a threatened irreparable harm. ―[I]njunctions will not be issued merely to allay the fears and apprehensions or to soothe the anxieties of the parties. Nor will an injunction be issued to restrain one from doing what he is not attempting and does not intend to do.‖ Campbell Soup Co. v. ConAgra, Inc., 977 F.2d 86, 92 (3d Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). 41 INNOSYS, INC. v. MERCER J. DURHAM, dissenting ¶91 Indeed, the Supreme Court has long recognized that although the court‘s power to grant injunctive relief survives discontinuance of the illegal conduct[,] . . . . the moving party must satisfy the court that relief is needed. The necessary determination is that there exists some cognizable danger of recurrent violation, something more than the mere possibility which serves to keep the case alive. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. at 633. Even though voluntary reformation does not divest the court of power to issue an injunction, it also does not relieve the moving party of the burden of meeting the requirements of proving an injunction is required. As noted above, InnoSys has failed to meet this burden by creating a dispute of material fact regarding a threat of future harm. But even if the majority disagrees with my conclusion regarding the propriety of summary judgment on the injunctive relief claims, on remand, InnoSys still bears the burden of showing that the elements of a permanent injunctive relief claim have been satisfied in this case. Johnson, 2005 UT 82, ¶ 13 (listing the requirements for a permanent injunction); Water & Energy Sys., 1999 UT 16, ¶¶ 8, 14. (party seeking an injunction bears the burden of proof).