Opinion ID: 1651278
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Mental Health Experts

Text: In Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 84, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985), the United States Supreme Court concluded that in a sentencing proceeding, due process requires access to a psychiatric examination on relevant issues, to the testimony of the psychiatrist, and to assistance in preparation at the sentencing phase. While ordinarily a postconviction claim based on Ake is procedurally barred because it could have been raised on direct appeal, a defendant is entitled to litigate during postconviction a claim that a prior mental health expert's examination was so grossly insufficient that the expert ignore[d] clear indications of either mental retardation or organic brain damage. Raleigh v. State, 932 So.2d 1054, 1060 (Fla. 2006) (quoting Sireci, 502 So.2d at 1224). We affirm the denial of Stewart's postconviction claim. Stewart did not demonstrate that his mental health experts ignored clear indications of organic brain damage. At trial, Dr. Maher testified that he met with Stewart briefly and reviewed extensive records from other doctors and documentation such as police reports. Dr. Sultan explained that prior to the 2001 penalty phase, she met with Stewart for about twenty hours. She reviewed school and jail records, reviewed records about Stewart's suicide attempts, talked to Stewart's family members and friends, and administered psychological tests specifically an IQ test and the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI). Dr. Weiner's report indicated that he met with Stewart in preparation for the penalty phase and administered the following intellectual and cognitive tests: Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test; Boston Naming Test; Stroop Neuropsychological Screening Test; Verbal Fluency Test; Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-III (WAIS-III); Wechsler Memory Scale-III; and Wide Range Achievement Test-3. Stewart asserts that these evaluations were inadequate because Dr. Maher and Dr. Sultan were not qualified to conduct neuropsychological testing and because Dr. Weiner did not conduct a full battery of such tests. Stewart's claim is not persuasive. Without being familiar with what testing Dr. Maher and Dr. Sultan may have administered or reviewed, Dr. Eisenstein initially opined that unless those doctors had the benefit of a full neuropsychological battery and expertise in interpreting those tests, they could not fully assess whether Stewart had brain damage. Yet, elsewhere in his testimony, Dr. Eisenstein seemed to equivocate about whether Dr. Maher and Dr. Sultan could have been qualified to screen Stewart for brain damage. When asked if a psychiatric examination is inadequate for determining whether more testing for brain damage is necessary, he testified: No, that's not true. A good psychiatrist understands the issues, hopefully through a mental status examination and through a behavioral observation and understanding the pathology of brain impairment and the behavior manifestation. Of course, if there's history [a good psychiatrist] would understand... the need to do continuing evaluation and certainly would request that and would want that. Dr. Eisenstein further explained that he did not credit Dr. Weiner's conclusions because he felt that Dr. Weiner should have done more testing. He testified that Dr. Weiner administered tests designed to measure academic performance but did not administer a full memory examination or tests designed specifically to detect brain impairment. In contrast, Dr. Maher testified that a psychologist or a psychiatrist is qualified to determine if neuropsychological testing is warranted and opined that Dr. Weiner's testing was adequate to diagnose Stewart. Furthermore, while Dr. Eisenstein testified that the results of his testing indicated that Stewart likely had brain damagefor example, he considered the thirteen-point score discrepancy in Stewart's verbal and performance IQ scores to be significant he did not point to any test results available at the time of resentencing that should have alerted the prior experts to the need to perform additional neuropsychological testing. Stewart argues that Dr. Weiner should have known to investigate the thirteen-point discrepancy, but when Dr. Weiner administered the WAIS-III in 2001, Stewart had a verbal score of 98 and a performance score of 102. Finally, the record supports the postconviction court's characterization of Stewart's brain damage as possible brain damage rather than clearly established brain damage. Dr. Eisenstein and Dr. Wood opined that Stewart's left hemisphere was damaged, but Dr. Maher opined that Stewart's performance on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test undermined the diagnosis of brain damage. And although the postconviction court did not find his testimony persuasive because he was unfamiliar with assessing brain scans for neurocognitive issues, Dr. Wilf opined that Stewart's brain scans indicated a normal brain. In summary, Stewart has not identified clear signs of brain damage that his penalty-phase mental health experts overlooked. See generally Raleigh, 932 So.2d at 1060 (Dr. Bordini's testimony did not establish that Dr. Upson missed any clear indications of mental retardation or organic brain damage, thereby rendering Dr. Upson's evaluation `grossly insufficient' under Sireci. ). An expert's evaluation is not rendered less than competent ... simply because [the] appellant has been able to provide testimony to conflict with that presented by the expert. Jones v. State, 732 So.2d 313, 320 (Fla.1999). Accordingly, Stewart is not entitled to postconviction relief based on Ake.