Opinion ID: 6221174
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Step 2: Exercise of Discretion

Text: Once the eligibility hurdle is cleared, the district judge is next tasked with “undertak[ing] a complete review” of defendant’s First Step Act motion. Shaw, 957 F.3d at 743 (internal quotation marks omitted). Even if we read the district court’s ambiguous opinion to find eligibility at Step 1 and instead deny relief at Step 2, the district court did not undertake a complete review, having deemed “[n]o further analysis is warranted” after announcing its erroneous conclusion that McSwain was “not legally eligible for relief under the First Step Act” based on his heroin conviction. With respect to statutory minimums, “a district court ruling on a § 404(b) motion … must begin by recalculating the statutory minimum and maximum that would have applied had §§ 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act been in effect at the time the movant was originally convicted.” Fowowe, 1 F.4th at 529. Failure to consider lower statutory penalties presently applicable constitutes procedural error. Id. Additionally, while district courts must consider lowered statutory minimums, they are authorized—but not required—to apply intervening judicial decisions when exercising discretion to reduce a petitioner’s sentence under the First Step Act § 404(b). Id. at 534. Since a district court is not required to do so, there is no procedural error in declining to apply intervening judicial decisions. Id. Turning to the district court’s decision in this case, we note that the district court did mention McSwain’s § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) statutory penalty range. 1 The court, 1 Looking to McSwain’s supplemental filing, we do not read our recent opinion in United States v. Blake, 22 F.4th 637 (7th Cir. 2022) (per 10 No. 20-2732 however, was silent as to the impact of intervening caselaw— United States v. Ruth—that was published a month prior to its denial of McSwain’s motion. If the district court had considered this intervening decision, Ruth had the potential to disqualify McSwain’s 1999 Illinois state conviction as a predicate controlled substance offense. Thus, the statutory enhancement under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) would not have applied, and no statutory mandatory minimum would have been at play—a change separate and apart from any concerns that the First Step Act did not affect heroin convictions. Although the district court noted that “[t]he statutory penalty for an offense involving one kilogram or more of heroin (after being convicted of a prior drug offense) was 20 years to life imprisonment,” the disqualification of the prior drug offense in question would have radically changed the sentencing landscape. curiam), as particularly helpful. In Blake, we reversed the district court’s decision that resentencing was not warranted under Step 2 of the First Step Act analysis, because the court had bypassed recalculating the defendant’s statutory minimum and maximum. Id. at 640–41. Distinguishable from the facts before us, Blake involved an error in the presentence investigation report and a resultant drug quantity overestimation. The recalculation of the applicable sentencing range at issue was mandatory due to the operation of the Fair Sentencing Act and First Step Act—not based on intervening decisions from this Court. Id. By contrast, in this case, it appears that McSwain may only avoid his heroin-based mandatory minimum if the district court—in its discretion—applies intervening caselaw. Incorporating the reasoning found in Blake, “Fowowe does not require courts to apply intervening precedent when deciding First Step Act motions,” and “[t]herefore, the court’s failure to do so alone could not be reversible error under any standard of review.” Id. at 643. Any argument counseling reversal for failure to recalculate guidelines based solely on intervening caselaw runs afoul of our holding in Fowowe. No. 20-2732 11 As this Court recently noted in Fowowe, we authorize, but do not require, district courts to apply intervening judicial decisions when exercising their discretion to reduce a petitioner’s sentence under the First Step Act § 404(b). 1 F.4th at 534. Shortly after our decision in Fowowe, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in United States v. Concepcion, 991 F.3d 279 (1st Cir. 2021). The question under consideration by the Supreme Court overlaps almost entirely with Fowowe: Whether, when deciding if it should “impose a reduced sentence” on an individual under Section 404(b) of the First Step Act of 2018 a district court must or may consider intervening legal and factual developments. 142 S. Ct. 54 (2021). 2 Open question before the Supreme Court aside, the law as it currently stands in this Circuit dictates our conclusion that the district court’s decision not to apply intervening judicial decisions (such as Ruth) falls shy of procedural error, and thus in and of itself does not lead us to conclude that the district court abused its discretion. See Fowowe, 1 F.4th at 527–28. The district court’s decision not to exercise discretion—apparently because it thought it had no such discretion to exercise—does, however, amount to an abuse of discretion. Here, it is unclear whether the district court was aware it had the authority to consider intervening judicial decisions, should it wish to. Cursorily stating that a heroin-related mandatory minimum renders McSwain legally ineligible for relief amounts to “non-exercise of discretion” that is “itself an abuse of discretion.” Id. at 527 (quoting Corner, 967 F.3d at 666); see also Concepcion, 991 F.3d at 292 (Barron, J., dissenting) (“The majority finds no abuse of discretion in this case. But it is a classic abuse of 2 The Supreme Court heard oral arguments on January 19, 2022. 12 No. 20-2732 discretion for a district court to decline to exercise the discretion that it legally possesses because it mistakenly believes that it lacks that discretion as a matter of law.”). The district court’s exercise of discretion will necessarily include the considerations raised on appeal about pro se litigants, waiver, and the extraordinary circumstances surrounding the swift onset of COVID-19. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (noting pro se pleadings are entitled to liberal construction); Dixon v. Chrans, 986 F.2d 201, 203 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that while this Court does not “routinely spare[] pro se litigants from the same waiver rules attorneys face,” the Court does take into account “special procedural posture[s]”). We agree with McSwain’s position on appeal that it is unclear what the district court’s ultimate basis for its ruling was—Step 1 or Step 2. We conclude the district court’s finding that McSwain was “ineligible” under the First Step Act was an error justifying remand and therefore remand this case to the district court to exercise its discretion—especially in light of the district court’s own characterization that “[n]o further analysis was warranted” after it found McSwain ineligible for relief. Resentencing under the First Step Act for eligible defendants is “wholly discretionary,” a framework that rejects an abdication of such discretion. See Concepcion, 991 F.3d at 289–90.