Opinion ID: 777473
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Eighth Amendment and Deliberate Indifference to Treatment Needs

Text: 48 Relying on [ Victor ] Torres v. Fauver, see supra n. 3, the District Court concluded that Leamer's Eighth Amendment claims were without merit because the conditions of the segregated detention were not severe or unwarranted deprivation sufficient to constitute cruel and unusual punishment. But we think that conclusory assessment essentially disregards Leamer's allegations. He claims that the prison authorities were deliberately indifferent to his physical and mental well-being by his strict confinement and denial of treatment. As with the other constitutional claims, this claim is fact-intensive and will require further development of the record. In Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976), the Supreme Court stressed that pro se complaints are to be read liberally. The District Court should dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim only if it appears beyond doubt that Leamer can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle him to relief. See id. In Estelle, the Supreme Court established the deliberate indifference standard as appropriate in Eighth Amendment prisoner cases, focusing on the treatment provided, and concluding there that the alleged indifference was a matter of medical judgment that did not implicate principles of cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 107, 97 S.Ct. 285. In contrast, in Buckley v. Rogerson, 133 F.3d 1125 (8th Cir.1998), the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held the prisoner's allegations sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim where his segregation and treatment were dictated by correctional, non-medical staff, and a doctor opined that the actions taken would exacerbate a condition such as Buckley's. In Lair v. Fauver, 595 F.2d 911 (3d Cir.1979), we confronted similar claims by a prisoner sentenced under the same provisions as Leamer who was, in that instance, complaining of a deprivation of treatment arising from his transfer to another institution. There, we urged the district court to assess whether Lair can adduce facts that would establish that the prison authorities' conduct with respect to his alleged need for psychological treatment constituted' deliberate indifference' to a serious illness or injury and `wanton infliction of unnecessary pain,' `repugnant to the conscience of mankind,' so as to violate the eighth amendment under the standards laid down in Estelle v. Gamble.  10 (citations omitted). Id. at 914 n. 11. Because of the paucity of the record before us and the need for an assessment and understanding of the treatment required and prescribed, we cannot say that such a demonstration of deliberate indifference based on a failure to provide treatment is beyond doubt at this stage, and we likewise remand for further consideration.