Opinion ID: 1856868
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the arbitration agreement is binding on Mann's wrongful death beneficiaries.

Text: ¶ 34. Plaintiffs assert the agreement is not binding on their claim, as it was not signed by them or by anyone with authority to sign on their behalf. However, the agreement expressly states it applies to any dispute . . . between Patient (whether a minor or an adult) or the heirs-at-law or personal representative of Patient, as the case may be, and the Clinic, PLLC and each Physician individually. . . . ¶ 35. In Terminix International, Inc. v. Rice, 904 So.2d 1051, 1058 (Miss. 2004), this Court adopted the Fifth Circuit's holding in Washington Mutual Finance Group, LLC v. Bailey, 364 F.3d 260, 266 (5th Cir.2004), that the plaintiff was bound by an arbitration agreement signed by her husband, although not by her. `It does not follow . . . that under the [Federal Arbitration] Act an obligation to arbitrate attaches only to one who has personally signed the written arbitration provision. [We have made] clear that a nonsignatory party may be bound to an arbitration agreement if so dictated by the ordinary principles of contract and agency.' Terminix, 904 So.2d at 1058 (quoting Washington Mutual, 364 F.3d at 266). ¶ 36. Further, this Court held in Smith Barney, Inc. v. Henry, 775 So.2d 722, 726 (Miss.2001), [t]he death of a party to an agreement to arbitrate future disputes does not invalidate the agreement. The agreement in Smith Barney plainly stated it was binding on heirs, successors, and administrators, as does the agreement at issue. Id. at 727. This Court upheld the agreement in Smith Barney, concluding, [a]ccording to the terms of the agreement, [plaintiff] is not required to be a signatory in order to be bound by the arbitration clause. As a successor of [the deceased], [plaintiff] is covered by the arbitration clause of the client agreements. Id. at 727. ¶ 37. The dissent takes a contrary view, which it rests upon several false premises. First, the dissent says a wrongful death action belongs solely to the heirs of the deceased. This premise, of course, is completely contrary to the express language of our wrongful death statute, which provides that, in a wrongful death suit, the plaintiff must pursue all the damages of every kind to the decedent and all damages to every kind to any and all parties interested in the suit. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-7-13 (Rev.2004). The parties interested in the suit are not limited to the wrongful death beneficiaries, but could include the estate of the decedent, an insurance company exercising its right of subrogation, and any other parties claiming a right of recovery. ¶ 38. The dissent is also incorrect in stating that wrongful death is different from other torts because it cannot arise until after death. Wrongful death is not a tort, but rather a cause of action based upon an underlying tort that must have been committed against the decedent, resulting in the decedent's death. Id. ¶ 39. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the dissent misunderstands what is required under Section 11-7-13 to justify a wrongful death claim. Under the statute, a wrongful death claim is one the decedent must have been able to bring had death not ensued. The statute opens with the following mandate: Whenever the death of any person . . . shall be caused by any real, wrongful or negligent act or omission, . . . as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured or damaged thereby to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, . . . the person . . . that would have been liable if death had not ensued, . . . shall be liable for damages. . . . Miss.Code Ann. § 11-7-13. ¶ 40. Based on the clear language of the statute, a wrongful death beneficiary is only allowed to bring claims that the decedent could have brought if the decedent had survived. Since the beneficiaries may only bring claims the decedent could have brought had the decedent survived, logic requires us to conclude that the converse is true, that is, the decedents may NOT bring claims the decedent could not have brought, had the decedent survived. Thus, plaintiffs in this case may not bring claims Mann could not have brought himself. This same reasoning was applied unanimously by this Court in Jenkins v. Pensacola Health Trust, 933 So.2d 923, 926 (Miss.2006), where we held that the beneficiaries could not bring a claim for wrongful death where the statute of limitations had expired and would have prevented the decedent from bringing the claim herself. Id. ¶ 41. Because Mann agreed to arbitrate, he could not have brought this claim for medical malpractice even if death had not ensued. He would have been required to submit his claim to arbitration. Therefore, since Mann could not have brought this claim, neither can plaintiffs. ¶ 42. Although the dissent skillfully attempts to support its view by citing cases from other jurisdictions, we are not troubled by the authorities cited. While it is true that a few jurisdictions take a contrary view, our holding today fully comports with Mississippi law and the law of many other jurisdictions. See Briarcliff Nursing Home, Inc. v. Turcotte, 894 So.2d 661, 664 (Ala.2004) (Alabama Supreme Court held that a wrongful death action was covered by the decedent's agreement to arbitrate); Herbert v. Superior Court, 169 Cal.App.3d 718, 727, 215 Cal.Rptr. 477 (1985) (wrongful death suit by non-signatories of the arbitration agreement was covered by the agreement); Allen v. Pacheco, 71 P.3d 375, 379 (Colo.2003) (Colorado Supreme Court held that an arbitration agreement applied to wrongful death claims). We are presented with no compelling reason to discard our own precedent and adopt the reasoning advanced by a handful of foreign courts of appeals. ¶ 43. In its opinion and order, the trial court held that in light of this Court's decision in Smith Barney, plaintiffs were bound by the agreement. We agree with this holding of the trial court.