Opinion ID: 150472
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Standard for Determining Whether a Statute is Closely Drawn

Text: On only one occasion has the Supreme Court held that a contribution limit was not closely drawn to the government's interests. In Randall v. Sorrell , the Supreme Court applied a multifactor test and struck down a Vermont law that limited the amount of money that any single individual could contribute to a campaign for state office. See 548 U.S. at 253-62, 126 S.Ct. 2479. A plurality of the Court found the law too restrictive because, among other things, its limits were so low that they prevent[ed] candidates from `amassing the resources necessary for effective [campaign] advocacy.' Id. at 248, 253, 126 S.Ct. 2479 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21, 96 S.Ct. 612) (second alteration in Randall ). The District Court relied extensively on Randall's multifactor test in determining whether the CFRA's contribution bans were closely drawn to the asserted government interests. See Green Party I, 590 F.Supp.2d at 309-16. We disagree with that approach. Randall addressed general contribution limits that applied to all citizens. The law in Randall, for instance, prohibited any Vermont resident from contributing more than $400 to a candidate for governor. See 548 U.S. at 238, 126 S.Ct. 2479. Thus Randall's multifactor test was concerned primarily with the effect the contribution limits would have on the electoral system as a whole. See, e.g., id. at 248-49, 126 S.Ct. 2479 ([C]ontribution limits that are too low can ... harm the electoral process by preventing challengers from mounting effective campaigns against incumbent officeholders, thereby reducing democratic accountability. (emphasis added)). Here, however, plaintiffs are not challenging the provisions of the CFRA that impose general contribution limits on all Connecticut citizens. See generally Conn. Gen.Stat. § 9-611 (imposing, for instance, a limit of $3500 on any individual's contributions to a gubernatorial campaign). Rather, plaintiffs are challenging the provisions of the CFRA that impose contribution bans on discrete groups of Connecticut citizens. And unlike the situation in Randall, there is no serious argument here that the challenged contribution bans will harm the electoral process by stifling candidates' ability to raise sufficient campaign funds. See 548 U.S. at 248-49, 126 S.Ct. 2479. Indeed, contributions by contractors and lobbyists have, in the past, made up only a small fraction of the total amount of money given as campaign contributions in Connecticut. See Green Party I, 590 F.Supp.2d at 316. Accordingly, the First Amendment inquiry in this case does not focus on the electoral process, for the issue is notas it was in Randall whether the law in question prevent[s] candidates from `amassing the resources necessary for effective [campaign] advocacy.' Randall, 548 U.S. at 248, 126 S.Ct. 2479 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21, 96 S.Ct. 612) (second alteration in Randall ). We will not, therefore, look to Randall's multifactor test as a means of evaluating whether the CFRA's ban on contributions is closely drawn to the state's interests. The issue, instead, is whether the CFRA's contribution bans impermissibly infringe the First Amendment rights of the discrete groups of citizens it regulatescontractors, lobbyists, and associated individuals. To address that issue, we are required to examine how the CFRA applies to the different groups of individuals it regulates and determine, in each case, whether the law is closely drawn to the state's interest in combating corruption and the appearance of corruption. The CFRA's ban on contractor contributions, in particular, applies not only to individuals who currently have contracts with the state, but also to prospective state contractors who seek (but do not currently have) state contracts. See Conn. Gen.Stat. § 9-612(g)(1)(E), (2)(A)-(B). It also applies to any principal of an entity that has (or is seeking) contracts with the state, see id. § 9-612(g)(1)(F), (2)(A)-(B), and it applies to any spouse or dependent child of a covered individual, see id. § 9-612(g)(1)(F)(v), (1)(G), (2)(A)-(B). To survive First Amendment scrutiny, the CFRA's contractor contribution bans must be closely drawn to the state's anticorruption interest with respect to each of those groups of individuals.