Opinion ID: 796157
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prima Facie Case: Qualifications Prong in Light of Hugh

Text: 21 Our Court in Hugh addressed whether an employer that promotes an employee who fails to meet a job posting's objective criteria can then point to the employee's failure to meet those criteria as a valid justification for employment termination. 418 F.3d at 268. Specifically, Hugh was promoted despite lacking the associated job posting's objective qualifications. When she later was fired and filed a discrimination claim, did her failure to meet the job posting's objective qualifications mean that she also failed to meet the qualification prong for purposes of establishing a prima facie case of employment discrimination? We answered no because it is a fair inference that the decision to promote Hugh was based on her satisfactory performance in her two previous positions [at the organization]. Id. In other words, the promotion does establish [ ] plaintiff's qualification for [the] job. Id. (internal citations omitted). Cf. Jalil v. Avdel Corp., 873 F.2d 701, 707 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that where an employer promoted an eight-year employee to the `lead man' position in his department ..., satisfactory performance of duties ... leading to a promotion clearly established his qualifications for the job.). 22 We have not decided yet whether the qualifications prong may be met implicitly through the promotion of an unqualified third party, as in this case, but Hugh provides guidance. There the employer was precluded from using a lack of objective qualifications defense, as previously it had ignored those posted qualifications in promoting the employee-plaintiff. Applying those principles to this case, Hugh stands for the proposition that, by departing from a job posting's objective criteria in making an employment decision, an employer establishes different qualifications against which an employee or applicant should be measured for the position. 23 This reading of Hugh is consistent with our review of past District Court decisions. See, e.g., Pinckney v. County of Northampton, 512 F.Supp. 989, 998 (E.D.Pa. 1981), aff'd, 681 F.2d 808 (3d Cir.1982) (concluding that, in order to establish a prima facie discrimination case, courts should look to the hiring decision to determine if the plaintiff was at least as qualified—not necessarily better qualified—as the person selected for the position.). 7 Moreover, any narrow reading of Hugh runs contrary to the generously construed, remedial civil rights regime. If an employer could, with impunity, appeal to objective qualifications to defeat any female job applicant's challenge to its hire of an objectively unqualified male in her place, discrimination law would be reduced to bark with no bite. Title VII demands that employers apply the same standards for hiring women and other protected minorities that they apply to all other applicants. 24 Like Hugh, we look here to the hiree's qualifications to determine whether Slippery Rock created the inference that something other than the posted objective qualifications was sufficient. Rippey (the 2003 hiree), Winrader (the 2004 assignee), and Scheidemantle all lacked the objective qualifications listed in the job posting. If we compare the subsequent hiring decision to the objective criteria in this case, we can only conclude that something other than the job postings' two or three years of locksmithing experience was sufficient. The record shows that when Slippery Rock hired Rippey in 2003, it did so with the understanding that he had only three months of locksmithing experience on light duty while he was a carpenter and was recovering from surgery to both hands, App. 242-44, and Scheidemantle asserts that her training made her at least as qualified as Rippey. App. Br. at 13-14. 8 Similarly, when Slippery Rock assigned Winrader to the position in 2004, he had no locksmithing experience according to his resume. Nor had he completed a course in locksmithing as had Scheidemantle. 9 Applying Hugh, we conclude that, by departing from the objective requirements in its hiring decision, Slippery Rock thereby established different qualifications by which Scheidemantle—as a protected applicant who suffered an adverse employment decision—met the qualifications prong and completed her prima facie case of discrimination. The District Court thus erred by entering summary judgment in favor of Slippery Rock.