Opinion ID: 2217957
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Negligence of Agent

Text: Trammell claims that summary judgment was not proper on the issue of agent's negligence. Summary judgment is proper only where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Breen v. Dakota Gear & Joint Co., Inc., 433 N.W.2d 221, 223 (S.D.1988); Koeniguer v. Eckrich, 422 N.W.2d 600, 601 (S.D.1988); SDCL 15-6-56(c). The burden of proof is on the party moving for summary judgment, and the benefit of any doubt about whether there is a material issue of fact goes to the nonmoving party. Koeniguer, supra ; Groseth Int'l, Inc. v. Tenneco, Inc., 410 N.W.2d 159, 164 (S.D.1987) ( Groseth I ). If there are no genuine issues of material fact, we will affirm a summary judgment if there is a basis to support the trial court's ruling. Breen, supra; Blote v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 422 N.W.2d 834, 836 (S.D.1988). Summary judgment is generally not feasible in negligence cases because the standard of the reasonable man must be applied to conflicting testimony.... It is only when the evidence is such that reasonable men can draw but one conclusion from facts and inferences that they become a matter of law and this occurs rarely. Wilson v. Great N. Ry. Co., 83 S.D. 207, 157 N.W.2d 19, 22 (1968) (citations omitted). Even though it is generally for the finder of fact to determine whether a duty has been negligently breached, the existence of the duty in the first place is a question of law. Gabrielson v. Warnemunde, 443 N.W.2d 540, 543 n. 1 (Minn. 1989) (citing Prosser & Keeton, The Law of Torts, § 37 (5th ed. 1984); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328B (1965)). As a matter of law, the duty of an insurance agent is simply to procure insurance of the kind and with the provisions specified by the insured. Fleming v. Torrey, 273 N.W.2d 169, 170 (S.D.1978) (citations omitted). See also Gabrielson v. Warnemunde, supra at 543, 545 (The legal duty imposed on insurance agents is to exercise the skill and care which a `reasonably prudent person engaged in the insurance business [would] use under similar circumstances.'... This is an objective rather than a subjective standard. (Citations omitted)). In other words, agent had a duty to obey Trammell's instructions in good faith and with reasonable professional skill. He had no duty to go beyond this standard and ask Trammell further questions if Trammell appeared clear about what he wanted. Fleming v. Torrey, supra, at 171; Gabrielson v. Warnemunde, supra, at 543. Had Trammell claimed that he asked agent to make certain that Jennifer would be covered by the accidental death policy, or to explain and recommend available coverages when adding her name to the car policy, whether agent breached his duty as defined by law would have been a material issue of fact for which summary judgment would not have been proper. However, that is not the claim nor the testimony of Kenneth Trammell in his deposition of July 6, 1989: Q: [By Attorney Rasmussen] Just so I'm clear. It's your understanding or your recollection that you were definite... that you wanted her added and you weren't approaching this as a question, should she be added? A: [By Mr. Trammell] Right.       Q: Okay. So, you talked with Mr. Lippert about adding Jennifer, and it was your definite plan to do that. You weren't asking his advice as to whether that should be done. A: No.       Q: Okay. Now, during these conversations you had with Mr. Lippert ..., was there any discussion whatsoever concerning the death benefit? A: No. Q: You never specifically asked Mr. Lippert to procure that kind of coverage for your daughter. A: No, I assumed that she would have the same coverage that we had. Q: Did you yourself know that you had death benefit coverage? A: No. Q: You didn't discover that until after this accident, right? A: Right. In short, agent did what Trammell asked him to do. He put Jennifer's name on the policy as an additional driver in the same way that Michelle's name appeared on the policy before he became Trammell's insurance agent. He received no indication from Trammell that there was anything unsatisfactory about the way Michelle's name appeared on the policy or that Trammell wanted more information from agent about the scope of the coverage he was requesting for Jennifer. Without more, the obligation to offer the supplemental coverages required by SDCL 58-23-7 exists only at the time of application for the policy. Since Trammell cannot claim a version of the facts more favorable to himself than his own testimony, Miller v. Stevens, 63 S.D. 10, 256 N.W. 152, 155 (1934), there are no genuine issues of material fact. Since Trammell does not claim that agent failed to do anything Trammell requested, and since the law imposes on agent no affirmative duty to go beyond what Trammell requested, there is a sufficient basis to support the trial court's ruling that agent is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Breen v. Dakota Gear & Joint Co., Inc., 433 N.W.2d at 223; Koeniguer v. Eckrich, 422 N.W.2d at 601.