Opinion ID: 149229
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: mr. hasan's claims of insufficient evidence

Text: Mr. Hasan also raises several challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his three perjury convictions, [5] arguing that no reasonable jury could have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because the government failed to establish certain statutory elements. First, he contends that the government did not present sufficient evidence that he made irreconcilably contradictory statements at the grand jury hearings. Second, he argues that there was not sufficient evidence to prove the materiality of his allegedly inconsistent statements. We reject all of these arguments.
Whether the government presented sufficient evidence to support a conviction is a legal question that we review de novo. United States v. Parker, 551 F.3d 1167, 1172 (10th Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). With that said, the restrictive standard of review for a sufficiency of the evidence question provides us with very little leeway. United States v. Evans, 970 F.2d 663, 671 (10th Cir.1992). [W]e view the facts in evidence in the light most favorable to the government. We will not weigh conflicting evidence or second-guess the fact-finding decisions of the jury. Rather, our role is limited to determining whether a reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, based on the direct and circumstantial evidence, together with the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. United States v. Sells, 477 F.3d 1226, 1235 (10th Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). For all of his sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims on appeal save one, Mr. Hasan failed to object before the district court. When a defendant challenges in district court the sufficiency of the evidence on specific grounds, `all grounds not specified in the motion are waived' and may only be reviewed for plain error. United States v. Goode, 483 F.3d 676, 681 (10th Cir.2007) (quoting United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1141 (10th Cir. 2003)). To establish plain error, Mr. Hasan `must show: (1) an error, (2) that is plain, which means clear or obvious under current law, and (3) that affects substantial rights. If he satisfies these criteria, this Court may exercise discretion to correct the error if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.' Id. (quoting Kimler, 335 F.3d at 1141). The plain error standard presents a heavy burden for an appellant, one which is not often satisfied. United States v. Romero, 491 F.3d 1173, 1178 (10th Cir.2007).
Mr. Hasan was convicted of perjury under 18 U.S.C. § 1623 on the basis of irreconcilably contradictory statements that he allegedly made before the grand juries. The statute provides, in relevant part: (a) Whoever under oath . . . in any proceeding before or ancillary to any court or grand jury of the United States knowingly makes any false material declaration. . . shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. . . . . (c) An indictment or information for violation of this section alleging that, in any proceedings before or ancillary to any court or grand jury of the United States, the defendant under oath has knowingly made two or more declarations, which are inconsistent to the degree that one of them is necessarily false, need not specify which declaration is false if (1) each declaration was material to the point in question, and (2) each declaration was made within the period of the statute of limitations for the offense charged under this section. In any prosecution under this section, the falsity of a declaration set forth in the indictment or information shall be established sufficient for conviction by proof that the defendant while under oath made irreconcilably contradictory declarations material to the point in question in any proceeding before or ancillary to any court or grand jury. It shall be a defense to an indictment or information made pursuant to the first sentence of this subsection that the defendant at the time he made each declaration believed the declaration was true. 18 U.S.C. § 1623. To establish guilt under the statute, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) the defendant made a declaration under oath before a grand jury; (2) such declaration was false; (3) the defendant knew the declaration was false; and (4) the false declaration was material to the grand jury's inquiry. United States v. Clifton, 406 F.3d 1173, 1177 (10th Cir.2005).
Mr. Hasan first argues that his convictions on Counts One and Two are not supported by sufficient evidence because the statements forming the basis for these counts are not irreconcilably contradictory. Because Mr. Hasan did not raise these challenges before the district court, we review his claims only for plain error. For the reasons stated below, we conclude that Mr. Hasan cannot establish clear or obvious error, and we reject his claims. Although we have not opined extensively on what is required to meet the irreconcilably contradictory (or necessarily false) requirement of § 1623(c), one of our sister circuits has sensibly stated that a conviction may only be sustained where the variance between the defendant's two statements extends beyond mere vagueness, uncertainty, or equivocality. Even though two declarations may differ from one another, the § 1623(c) standard is not met unless, taking them in context, they are so different that if one is true there is no way that the other can also be true. United States v. Flowers, 813 F.2d 1320, 1324 (4th Cir.1987). We adopt this standard here. See United States v. McAfee, 8 F.3d 1010, 1014-15 (5th Cir.1993) (adopting Flowers standard); United States v. Porter, 994 F.2d 470, 473 (8th Cir.1993) (same).
Count One involves inconsistent statements made by Mr. Hasan concerning when and how his brothers were killed in Somalia. At the April 2005 hearing, as the indictment charges, the following exchange occurred: Q. Okay. What were the other reasons that you left your country? A. The war that was going around and nobody can stay there and they took our house. They'reI mean, they took it and leave there. And my brother got killed there and all my family ran away. Q. What's the name of your brother that had been killed? A. Sadad. Sadad. Q. How do you spell his name? A. S-A-D, I think, A-D. Q. S-A-D A. A-D or A-T. Sadad. Q. And how long before 1997 when you filled out this form had your brother been killed? A. It was aroundas I remember, it was '92, '93. Q. Okay. And who killed him? A. One of those who shot him, the Somalian people, the one that was making war in the country. Aplt. Addendum of Exs., Ex. 6, at 10 (Grand Jury Tr., dated Apr. 5, 2005). At the November 2005 grand jury appearance, as the indictment avers, the following exchange occurred: Q. What's the name of your brother that had been killed? A. Sadad. Q. What's the name of your brother that was killed in the car wreck? A. That'sthat's Sadad. That's my brother Sadad and the other is Mohammed. Q. The one that got shot. And what year did he get shot? A. 1996. Id., Ex. 7, at 26 (Grand Jury Tr., dated Nov. 7, 2005). The government's theory at trial was that these statements were irreconcilably contradictory because Mr. Hasan's brother Sadad could not have been shot to death and killed in a car wreck. Mr. Hasan now contends that rather than being inconsistent these statements only indicate that he was confused. He points in particular to his response, That'sthat's Sadad. That's my brother Sadad and the other is Mohammed. According to Mr. Hasan, there is ambiguity in the words that and the other, and the prosecutor should have clarified who Mr. Hasan was referring to. Aplt. Br. at 18-20. Instead of undertaking the easy fix and asking who was shot and who was killed in a car wreck, id. at 19, Mr. Hasan contends that the prosecutor preyed on his confusion, producing nothing but doubt about who was shot and who was killed in a wreck, id. at 20. As a result, [n]o reasonable juror could have found the accounts irreconcilably incompatible. Id. at 20. Although we agree with Mr. Hasan that there is some confusion in his responses, he has not established clear or obvious error. In particular, we do not believe that the district court would have committed such error in finding that, in the full context of Mr. Hasan's testimony, a reasonable jury could conclude: (1) in his April appearance, Mr. Hasan meant it when he said that his brother Sadad was shot to death; and (2) in his November appearance, Mr. Hasan meant it when he said that his brother Sadad was killed in a car wreck. These two factual statements cannot simultaneously be true. And although the prosecutor could have done more to clarify, the district court would not have clearly or obviously erred in concluding that a reasonable jury could find that the questions were not the cause of Mr. Hasan's inconsistent answers here. Cf. United States v. Farmer, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir.1998) ([W]here a prosecutor's question is only `arguably ambiguous,' a defendant's understanding of the question is for the jury to resolve in the first instance.). Thus, we do not detect plain error, and we must reject Mr. Hasan's sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge to Count One.
Count Two involves inconsistent statements made by Mr. Hasan concerning harms inflicted upon his sister. As the indictment alleges, the following exchange occurred at the April 2005 grand jury appearance: Q. Did anyone in Somalia do things to you that hurt you physically? A. Yeah. Q. What did they do to you? A. Killing my brother, shot my father, try raping my sister. Aplt. Addendum of Exs., Ex. 6, at 20-21. At the November 2005 grand jury appearance, as the indictment avers, the following exchange took place: Q. Did anything happen to your sister in Somalia? A. No, sheshe wasshe moved from Somalia a long time ago. She wasshe was in Canada. Q. Okay. Butbut when she was in Somalia, did anybody try to do hurt her? A. I don't remember because I was staying home always. They always keep me at home. Id., Ex. 7, at 32. The government's theory at trial was that these statements were irreconcilably inconsistent because it cannot be true that his sister was the victim of an attempted rape and that she was not the victim of an attempted rape. Mr. Hasan now argues to the contrary that no reasonable jury could have found an irreconcilable contradiction in these statements. First, he contends, the transcript indicates that he was confused by the November question, Did anything happen to your sister in Somalia? Aplt. Br. at 21. He argues that his complete answer confirms that he thought he was being asked if his sister was still in Somalianot whether she had suffered any violence while there. Id. When the prosecutor did clarify that he was asking about harm to his sister, Mr. Hasan responded: I don't remember. Thus, Mr. Hasan insists that the statements cannot be irreconcilably contradictory because [i]t is at once logically possible that the attempted rape occurred, and that the Defendant did not recall it in his November testimony. Id. at 22. We understand the logic of Mr. Hasan's argument, but he cannot establish clear or obvious error on this issue. Mr. Hasan is correct that his November 2005 statement, I don't remember, is not in itself irreconcilably contradictory with his earlier statement that someone tried to rape his sister. However, the jury had before it Mr. Hasan's complete November grand jury testimony, and it could permissibly reach conclusions concerning the import of his charged statements by viewing them in the context of his other testimony. In particular, immediately following the statements noted above, the following exchange took place between the prosecutor and Mr. Hasan: Q. You don't remember? A. No. Q. That's your answer? A. Yeah. Q. Do you remember having been interviewed here in the Grand Jury on April 5th of 2005, and having said in answer to the question, What did they do to you, you said, Killing my brother, shot my father, try raping my sister. Is that something that you would forget? A. It wasn't my sister, it was my cousin. Q. All right. But you said sister, didn't you? A. I didn't. Q. Do you want to see the transcript? A. I don't remember. I said sister, I said cousin that they raped her because my sister was in Canada a long time. Q. Killing my brother, shot my father, try raping my sister. That's what it says; right? A. Yeah, that was what it says, but Q. Now, do you think our transcriptionist here didn't understand the difference between sister and cousin? A. I don't know, but it was my cousin who trying to get raped because my sister was in Canada a long time ago. Aplt. Addendum of Exs., Ex. 7, at 32-33 (emphasis added). This additional testimony could have led a reasonable jury to view Mr. Hasan's statement, I don't remember, as charged in the indictment, in a different light. In particular, in this testimony, Mr. Hasan pairs the exact same statement, I don't rememberand later a somewhat similar statement, I don't knowwith information concerning an alleged attempted rape involving his cousin and not his sister, which arguably could have led a reasonable jury to conclude that Mr. Hasan actually did remember whether his sister was subjected to an attempted rape, and that Mr. Hasan's testimony at that time was that it did not happen. More to the point, the district court would not have clearly or obviously erred in finding that, given this statement concerning Mr. Hasan's cousin, a reasonable jury could have determined that Mr. Hasan remembered a single incident of an attempted rape of a female family member, and that this incident involved his cousin and not his sister. Put another way, the district court would not have clearly or obviously erred in concluding that a reasonable jury could have found that the true import of Mr. Hasan's November 2005 testimony, as alleged in the indictment, was that there was no attempted rape of his sister. Therefore, the district court would not have clearly or obviously erred in concluding that a reasonable jury could find that: (1) in his April appearance, Mr. Hasan meant it when he said that his sister was the victim of an attempted rape; and (2) in his November grand jury appearance, Mr. Hasan meant it when he said that his sister was not the victim of an attempted rape. These two factual statements cannot at once be true. Thus, we do not detect plain error, and we must reject Mr. Hasan's sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge to Count Two.
We next consider Mr. Hasan's contentions that the evidence was insufficient to meet § 1623(c)(1)'s materiality requirement. He makes two specific arguments on this score. First, as to all three counts on which he was convicted, Mr. Hasan contends that no evidence enabled the jury to determine what decision the two grand juries were trying to make. Aplt. Br. at 22. Second, as to Count Three, even if the petit jury was aware of the decision the grand jury was trying to make, Mr. Hasan alleges that the government failed to establish a materiality nexus with the April grand jury testimony. Id. We reject both claims. Under the statute, to prove that a defendant made false statements before the grand jury, the government must show that each declaration was material to the point in question. 18 U.S.C. § 1623(c)(1). To be material to a charge of perjury, a statement must have a natural tendency to influence, or [be] capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed. Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 770, 108 S.Ct. 1537, 99 L.Ed.2d 839 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord United States v. Finn, 375 F.3d 1033, 1038 (10th Cir.2004); see also United States v. Vap, 852 F.2d 1249, 1253 (10th Cir.1988) (Testimony is material if it had a tendency to influence, mislead or hamper the grand jury in a matter which it had the authority to investigate. The testimony need not have an actual effect; it merely must be capable of influencing the grand jury. (citations, ellipsis, and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Black's Law Dictionary 1066 (9th ed.2009) (defining material as [h]aving some logical connection with the consequential facts, or [o]f such a nature that knowledge of the item would affect a person's decision-making; significant; essential). Materiality is an element of the crime of perjury, which must be submitted to the jury and proven by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Durham, 139 F.3d 1325, 1329 (10th Cir.1998). In United States v. Gaudin, the Supreme Court provided a framework for evaluating the factual aspects of a jury's materiality finding: Deciding whether a statement is material requires the determination of at least two subsidiary questions of purely historical fact: (a) what statement was made? and (b) what decision was the agency trying to make? The ultimate question: (c) whether the statement was material to the decision, requires applying the legal standard of materiality (quoted above) to these historical facts. 515 U.S. 506, 512, 115 S.Ct. 2310, 132 L.Ed.2d 444 (1995); accord Finn, 375 F.3d at 1038; see also United States v. Najera Jimenez, 593 F.3d 391, 399-400 (5th Cir. 2010). In this case, the relevant decisionmakers are the two grand juries before which Mr. Hasan appeared in 2005. The government was required to prove that Mr. Hasan's statements were material to the determination being made by each grand jury. See United States v. Allen, 892 F.2d 66, 68 (10th Cir.1989) (The materiality test is determined at the time and for the purpose for which the allegedly false statement was made.).
Mr. Hasan first argues, pointing to Gaudin, that there was not sufficient evidence to establish materiality because the petit jury was not adequately informed of the nature of the grand juries' investigations. The premise underlying this argument is simple: without information about the purpose of the grand juries' inquiries, no reasonable jury could decide if statements were material to those inquiries. See Finn, 375 F.3d at 1040. Because Mr. Hasan did not raise this objection before the district court, we review it only for plain error. To evaluate Mr. Hasan's claim, it is necessary to review the evidence before the petit jury going to the purpose of the grand juries' inquiries. First, the jury heard and received copies of Mr. Hasan's testimony from each grand jury appearance. The transcripts indicated that before the April grand jury the prosecutor stated: Mr. Hasan, this is a Federal Grand Jury that is investigating possible violations of the Federal Criminal Law involving violations of Title 18, U.S.Code, Section 1001. Aplt. Addendum of Exs., Ex. 6, at 2-3. And before the November grand jury the transcripts show that the prosecutor told Mr. Hasan [t]his is a Federal Grand Jury that's investigating possible violations of the Criminal Law. Id., Ex. 7, at 2. The petit jury also received a copy of the indictment against Mr. Hasan, which stated: It was material to each of the [grand jury] proceedings . . . to determine whether the Defendant, HASAN ALI HASAN, had given truthful answers to federal agents during an interview conducted on October 20, 2004, concerning answers he had previously given in 1997 to federal immigration agents in order to remain in the United States under asylum. It was material to the November 7, 2005, Grand Jury inquiry whether the Defendant had committed perjury in his April 5, 2005, Grand Jury answers. R., Vol. I, Doc. 2, at 1-2 (Indictment, filed Dec. 6, 2005). The federal law enforcement agent who interviewed Mr. Hasan in October 2004 testified at length about the subjects they covered. See R., Vol. 4, Pt. 1, at 32-100 (Trial Tr., dated May 16, 2006). And a copy of the agent's notes from his interview with Mr. Hasan were admitted as an exhibit at trial. See Aplt. Addendum of Exs., Ex. 5. Mr. Hasan argues that this was not enough to establish the purpose of the grand jury proceedings beyond a reasonable doubt. He points to a Ninth Circuit case that states that the government may prove materiality by introducing the complete transcript of the prior proceeding, by presenting testimony from persons who witnessed the proceedings, or by presenting testimony from a member of the grand jury. Aplt. Br. at 23 (quoting United States v. Leon-Reyes, 177 F.3d 816, 819-20 (9th Cir.1999)) (citations omitted). Reasoning inductively, Mr. Hasan argues that, because the government did not do any of these things in his case, it must have failed to introduce sufficient evidence of materiality. Mr. Hasan has not established that any deficiencies in the government's evidence would have rendered clear or obvious error the district court's decision to uphold the jury's verdict. There was direct and indirect evidence of the grand jury's purpose, and by the plain terms of the perjury statute, there is no need for the government to rely on the specific means or proof that Mr. Hasan suggests. See 18 U.S.C. § 1623(e) (Proof beyond a reasonable doubt under this section is sufficient for conviction. It shall not be necessary that such proof be made by any particular number of witnesses or by documentary or other type of evidence.). The case relied on by Mr. Hasan, Leon-Reyes, is inapposite (even if it were binding on us, which obviously it is not), for it discusses in general terms the kinds of evidence that may be used to establish materiality, but does not mention the issue herethe quantum of evidence required for the petit jury to determine the purpose of the grand juries' inquiries. [6] Our own independent review of the law also turns up no cases suggesting that it would have been clear or obvious error under current law for the district court in this case to conclude that a reasonable jury could have discerned the purpose of the grand juries. See Finn, 375 F.3d at 1038-40; cf. United States v. Ostertag, 671 F.2d 262, 264-65 (8th Cir. 1982) (discerning the scope of the grand jury's inquiry from the appellant's testimony before the grand jury). Therefore, we discern no plain error and must reject Mr. Hasan's claim that there was insufficient evidence to establish the investigatory purposes of the grand juries.
Finally, Mr. Hasan argues that the inconsistent statements supporting his conviction on Count Three were not material to any issue examined by the April 2005 grand jury. Because he raised this claim before the district court, to prevail on appeal, Mr. Hasan needs to show that, viewing the evidence de novo and in the light most favorable to the government, no reasonable jury could have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., United States v. Parada, 577 F.3d 1275, 1283 (10th Cir.2009), cert. denied, 78 U.S.L.W. 3687 (U.S. May 24, 2010) (No. 09-8388). Count Three concerns testimony given by Mr. Hasan about injuries to his mouth and teeth that he suffered while in Somalia. At his appearance before the April grand jury, Mr. Hasan stated that he had suffered broken teeth in an attack; before the November grand jury he denied having received such an injury. Mr. Hasan now argues that any statement about his teeth could not have been material to the April grand jury's investigation. He reasons as follows: The April grand jury was investigating the truthfulness of the statements that Hasan made to federal agents in 2004, regarding his personal and family history. Aplee. Br. at 34. But when the federal agent who interviewed Mr. Hasan in 2004 testified at trial, he did not disclose any statements made by the Defendant about harm he suffered in Somalia or the condition of his teeth. Aplt. Br. at 26. Thus any statement about broken teeth could not have been material to the April grand jury's inquiry because Mr. Hasan had not said anything about teeth to the federal agent and there was no potential falsehood for the grand jury to uncover on the topic. Mr. Hasan frames the materiality inquiry too narrowly. As noted above, for testimony to be material, it need not have an actual effect; it merely must be `capable of influencing' the grand jury. Vap, 852 F.2d at 1253 (quoting United States v. Girdner, 773 F.2d 257, 259 (10th Cir. 1985)). Our sister circuits take the same view. The Ninth Circuit has said: The only requirement is that the question be material to a subject of grand jury inquiry. The evidence need not be material to the main issue and it need not be directed to the primary subject of the investigation. It is material if it is relevant to any subsidiary issue then under consideration. United States v. Percell, 526 F.2d 189, 190 (9th Cir.1975); see also United States v. Farnham, 791 F.2d 331, 334 (4th Cir.1986) (Given the wide-ranging investigative function of the grand jury, the materiality of any line of inquiry pursued by a grand jury must be broadly construed. (citation omitted)). The April grand jury was investigating allegedly false statements made by Mr. Hasan to the federal agent regarding his family and personal history. The agent's testimony indicates that portions of the 2004 interview focused on physical harms suffered by Mr. Hasan and his family. Mr. Hasan's statements to the April grand jury that he suffered broken teeth involve harms he suffered in Somalia and thus would be material to that grand jury's investigation into whether Mr. Hasan made false statements about his personal circumstances in his home country. This is so even if he made no mention of broken teeth during the 2004 agent interview. In this light we are confident that a reasonable jury could conclude that Mr. Hasan's statements at the April grand jury were material, and we reject Mr. Hasan's claim that the government failed to present sufficient evidence on this count.