Opinion ID: 1179776
Heading Depth: 6
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Disparagement of Lingering Doubt.

Text: (42) An instruction was given that [i]t is appropriate for the jury to consider in mitigation any lingering doubt it may have concerning defendant's guilt. [ถ] Lingering or residual doubt is defined as that state of mind between beyond a reasonable doubt and beyond all possible doubt. (See People v. Terry (1964) 61 Cal.2d 137, 146-147 [37 Cal. Rptr. 605, 390 P.2d 381].) Defense counsel argued at length that the jury should consider any lingering doubt about whether defendant intended to kill John Waltrip when deciding the appropriate penalty. In his own opening argument, the prosecutor had anticipated this lingering doubt claim. He read the jury the lingering doubt instruction it would later hear, then commented: You may consider this in mitigation in the penalty phase. [ถ] Now, I don't understand that really. You're asked to determine whether or not the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, not beyond all imaginary doubt, but beyond a reasonable doubt. [ถ] You did not have to consider an area above that. Since you did not have to consider an area above that, it's beyond me how anyone could have any lingering doubt that's defined as existing above a reasonable doubt. At this point, defense counsel objected that the prosecutor was personalizing his argument. Directed by the court to proceed, the prosecutor concluded, So again, for what that is worth, you should consider it, evaluate it and compare it to all of the aggravation, the substantial aggravation in the case in making your decision. Defendant claims this argument improperly expressed the prosecutor's personal views about a legal theory applicable to the case. We agree in principle that an attorney's argument should not disparage instructions with which he disagrees. But the prosecutor did not cross that line here. Though his thoughts were inartfully phrased, the prosecutor sought only to persuade the jurors that little room remained for lingering doubt. Having already found no reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt, the prosecutor suggested, the jurors should have difficulty retaining a doubt that was more than merely imaginary. This was not improper. Moreover, the prosecutor quickly abandoned the point when interrupted and thereafter conceded to the jury that it was entitled to consider any remaining reservations it harbored. Under all the circumstances, we find no misconduct. Even if there had been misconduct, we would not find it prejudicial. Defense counsel argued at length why there remained lingering doubt about defendant's intent to kill even though the jury had already determined defendant's guilt. The instructions given confirmed these concepts. Hence, there arose no reasonable likelihood the jury was misled or improperly influenced by the prosecutor's remarks. (E.g., People v. Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th 629, 663.)