Opinion ID: 1373789
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Family Car Doctrine.

Text: 4. This court, in common with about half of the American courts (Prosser on Torts, 2d ed 369), is committed to the family car doctrine, which is based upon the theory that, when an automobile is maintained by the owner for the pleasure or convenience of his family, a member of the family, who is using it for his own pleasure or convenience, is the agent of the owner, and the latter is responsible for his negligence. Gossett v. Van Egmond, supra, 142-143; Steele v. Hemmers, supra; Cockerham v. Potts, 143 Or 80, 20 P2d 423; McDowell v. Hurner, 142 Or 611, 13 P2d 600, 20 P2d 395, 88 ALR 578; Foster v. Farra, 117 Or 286, 243 P 778. Mrs. Piasecki testified that the Packard car, as well as the Cadillac, was used for the pleasure and convenience of the family, consisting of herself and Mr. Piasecki, and that she knew that he was going duck hunting in the Packard on the morning of the accident and had no objection to his doing so. Her counsel contend that the family car doctrine is applicable only to a father-minor-child relationship, and not as between husband and wife, particularly where the wife is the owner of the car. They argue that the doctrine carries the rules of agency to extreme limits and should not be further extended by applying it to a case like this. Both the prevailing and dissenting opinions in McDowell v. Hurner, supra, call attention to criticisms by courts and commentators of the agency theory which was evolved in order to give legal substance to the family car doctrine. The validity of these strictures may be conceded. There is obviously an element of fiction in this supposed agency; says Dean Prosser, and it is quite often recognized that the doctrine is an instrument of policy, intended to place the liability upon the party most easily held responsible. Prosser on Torts (2d ed) 369. Another recognized authority, who criticizes the agency explanation of the family car principle as not very convincing, says, It seems better, in the absence of legislation, to frankly recognize a new rule of vicarious liability, and to predicate the departure from `established principles' upon the real reason therefor, the demands of the welfare and safe organization of modern society. By recognizing such a basis for the doctrine, the difficulties of the agency theory are avoided. Harper on Torts, 621. In The Nature of the Judicial Process, p 65, Judge Cardozo wrote, Finally, when the social needs demand one settlement rather than another, there are times when we must bend symmetry, ignore history and sacrifice custom in the pursuit of other and larger ends. Consciously or unconsciously, this may have been what the courts were doing when they decided to fasten upon the owner of a family car responsibility for the negligence of a member of the family while operating the car, even though there is no real agency within the legal meaning of that word. However that may be, the family car doctrine has long since become part of the law of Oregon. It has not been limited to the relationship of a parent to a minor child, but in two cases was applied where the drivers of the cars were adult children of the owner. Steele v. Hemmers, Cockerham v. Potts, both supra. In the latter case, the driver of the car was a school teacher 21 years of age who was living with her parents as a member of the household. The argument that because she was over 21 years of age her father, the owner of the car, was not liable for her negligence was rejected. In four American Law Reports annotations, the cases are collected in which the question whether the family car doctrine applies as between spouses was considered. 64 ALR 873, 876; 88 ALR 613, 614; 100 ALR 1027; 132 ALR 990, 991. From these annotations it would appear that the courts are about evenly divided on the question. See 5 Am Jur 707, Automobiles § 369. But in most instances the courts which have held that the doctrine does not apply in such cases are courts which reject the doctrine altogether. Among the decisions sustaining liability are several in which the wife was the owner of the automobile and was held liable for the husband's negligent driving. Venghis v. Nathanson, 101 NJL 110, 127 A 175; Wyant v. Phillips, 116 WVa 207, 179 SE 303; Goldstein v. Johnson, 64 GaApp 31, 12 SE2d 92; Chapman v. Salazar, 40 Ariz 215, 11 P2d 613; Ransford v. Ainsworth, 196 Cal 279, 237 P 747. It should be noted, however, that the last two cases cited involved application of the community property laws of Arizona and California, respectively. 5. If we are to continue to adhere to the rationalization of the family car doctrine, then we see no reason why one spouse, the owner of the car, should not be made to answer for the negligence of the other when operating it in pursuance of the purpose for which it is furnished and maintained. In McDowell v. Hurner, supra, 142 Or at 621, we approved the reasoning that when a father furnishes an automobile for the comfort, convenience, pleasure and entertainment or outdoor recreation of his family he is engaging in what is in effect his business, and that when a member of the family drives the car with the father's permission he is furthering that business and thus is an agent acting within the scope of his agency. A court which refused to accept the family car doctrine said of this reasoning, A syllogism which deduced its conclusion from a major premise containing the word `business' in one of its meanings and a minor premise containing the same word in another of its meanings, would present the fallacy known to the logicians as that of the ambiguous middle. Smith v. Callahan, 34 Del 129, 138, 144 A 46, 64 ALR 830. But where, as in Oregon, the doctrine, with its basis, is accepted, it should apply just as fully to a spouse who chooses to make it his business to furnish a car for the family purposes of himself and the other spouse as to a parent. If, on the other hand, the fiction of agency were to be abandoned and the rule approved as a matter of policy, that is to say, to put the financial responsibility of the owner behind the automobile which is being used by a member of the family, Jones v. Cook, 90 WVa 710, 111 SE 828, quoted in Wyant v. Phillips, supra, then it seems to us that there is just as much reason for applying that policy where the relationship is that of man and wife as when it is that of parent and child. We turn to cases cited by the defendant, Kathryn A. Piasecki. In Cewe v. Schuminski, 182 Minn 126, 233 NW 805, the car was registered in the wife's name and she signed a chattel mortgage securing the unpaid portion of the purchase price. The husband alone procured, furnished, and maintained the car for whatever use anybody made of it; there was no evidence that the wife possessed or claimed any right of use or control independently of her husband. Why the husband put the title in her name and caused the car to be so registered did not appear. The court said, Her passive holding of title was not enough to charge her with liability for her husband's lethal negligence. In Sundock v. Pittman, 165 Tenn 17, 52 SW2d 155, the husband bought an automobile and gave it to his wife. He supported his wife and presumably furnished fuel and oil for the automobile, from the proceeds of a business to which he was driving at the time of the accident. A judgment against the wife was reversed. The court said, Liability does not result from mere ownership, as in the case before us. In Smith v. Doyle, 98 F2d 341, a car was bought in the father's name. A daughter who was driving the car at the time of the accident testified that she and her sister furnished the money to buy the car for them; it was bought for the use of the two daughters in going to American University, about two miles from their home; the family could use it if they wanted to; the father very seldom drove the car because he had a car of his own; the car was used for family purposes. At the time of the accident involved, the sisters were on their way to a party, and one of them was driving the car. The court said, According to this testimony, the father was merely the purchaser and legal owner of a car which the daughters caused to be bought with their own money for their own purposes. There was no contrary testimony. There was no evidence that the father put a dollar into the purchase of the car, or took any part in the decision to buy it, or decided who should drive it or to what uses it should be put. There was no evidence that he ever `maintained' it in any sense, to any extent, for any purpose.    The family-car doctrine rests upon the ideas that the owner of the car puts it into circulation, and that he is more likely than the driver to be financially responsible. Both ideas lose most of their force when, as in the present case, the driver provides the money with which the nominal owner makes the purchase. Smith v. Doyle, supra 343-344. An attempt to fasten liability on the father failed. In two of these cases, it will be noted, the evidence showed that the spouse sought to be vicariously charged was not the owner of the automobile, but merely held the legal title thereto. In the third case, Sundock v. Pittman , where the husband bought the car and made a gift of it to his wife, the facts that he supported his wife and furnished fuel and oil for the automobile  matters concerning which there is no evidence in this case  were apparently thought to be significant in determining that the wife did not maintain the car for family purposes. In none of these cases was the effect of a statute such as ours, making the title to an automobile prima facie evidence of ownership, considered. 6. The evidence here was such that the jury could find that Mrs. Piasecki was not merely the holder of the legal title to the Packard, but its actual owner. If she was the actual owner, she had the right to control its use unless she had surrendered that right to her husband. There is strong evidence to support an inference that this was the state of the case, but we can not say that this evidence was conclusive. We have no authority to disturb the verdict of a jury based on competent substantial evidence, even though we may think it wrong. We hold, therefore, that the circuit court did not err in denying the motion of the defendant, Kathryn A. Piasecki, for a directed verdict.