Opinion ID: 2803338
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Biased Juror Claim

Text: Defendants argue that the district court's denial of their request to remove Juror No. 7 deprived them of their constitutional guarantee to an impartial jury. On the fifth day of trial, the government presented evidence that several of HOPE's victims had received yellow postcards from HOPE. Juror No. 7 subsequently approached the court clerk and revealed that she had received a similar-looking mailer two or three years ago. When asked at voir dire whether this prior experience caused her any feelings or biases or views about this case, Juror No. 7 replied, I don't know. What do you think? After her response elicited laughter in the courtroom, the district court followed up: Court: No. The question is--I think the question he's asking is do you--will it affect your ability to decide this case fairly based on what you hear in the courthouse? -16- Juror No. 7: I don't think so. I mean, I didn't do anything with it. It didn't cause me any grief. I feel that I was probably a target. Court: Do you have any--did your remembering this in any way change your view of this case, such a view as you may have at this point? Juror No. 7: I don't think so. Defendants claim that Juror No. 7 bore bias as a matter of law and in fact. They note that, prior to trial, the court had excused other prospective jurors who had more attenuated connections with the facts of the case. Defendants also make much of the government's theory that defendants specifically targeted people who were at [a] very vulnerable time[] in their lives. We review the district court's ruling on a claim of juror bias for clear abuse of discretion. United States v. Lowe, 145 F.3d 45, 48 (1st Cir. 1998). In assessing juror bias claims, the deference due to district courts is at its pinnacle: 'A trial court's findings of juror impartiality may be overturned only for manifest error.' Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 396 (2010) (quoting Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 428 (1991)). That being said, the presence of even a single biased juror requires reversal. See Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 366 (1966) (defendant was entitled to be tried by 12, not 9 or even 10, impartial and unprejudiced jurors). -17- Juror No. 7 did not bear what we call bias as a matter of law. Bias as a matter of law is reserved for only exceptional or extreme circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Burgos-Montes, No. 13–2305, 2015 WL 2223304, at  (1st Cir. 2015); see also Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 222 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (suggesting as exceptional situations when the juror is an employee of the prosecuting agency, or was a witness). Mere receipt by a juror prior to trial of a similar mailer, likely from another company, is simply not an extreme situation warranting a finding of implied bias. Cf. Lowe, 145 F.3d at 48–49 (no implied bias where juror in rape case was a survivor of attempted rape). Nor did the district court abuse its discretion in finding that the juror bore no bias in fact. The juror's [w]hat do you think? response was apparently flip, as noted by defense counsel, and could certainly be read as expressing skepticism that the receipt of a similar form or card could render her unable to decide the case fairly. Juror No. 7 subsequently said that the yellow card did not cause her much grief. She was asked point blank a second time whether her prior experience affected her views of the case, and she said, I don't think so. Compare Lowe, 145 F.3d at 49 (no abuse of discretion where juror said, I don't think so in response to judge's question whether her prior experience as survivor of attempted rape would affect her ability to serve on -18- jury in rape case). The record does not cause us to think the district court's credibility finding here constituted a manifest abuse of discretion. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 428 (1985) (juror credibility determinations are peculiarly within a trial