Opinion ID: 2629458
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Superior Court Must Decide Whether Morris Conveyed His One-Half Interest in the Marital Residence to Horn in Exchange for Her Promise To Assume the Property Obligations.

Text: Morris argues that the court abused its discretion by requiring him to pay property taxes on the Willow home and loan payments on the construction loan per the parties' dissolution decree. He claims that when the parties realized they could no longer live together, he transferred his interest in the marital home to Horn and they agreed she would assume the property tax and loan payment obligations. Horn replies that because Morris never filed a Civil Rule 60(b) motion to modify the property agreement, he cannot seek relief now. [22] The court ordered Morris to pay the obligations associated with the Willow residence without addressing his allegation that a subsequent conveyance occurred. Instead, the court found that Morris agreed to pay the taxes and the loan amounts at the dissolution hearing, and that this verbal property agreement merged into the dissolution decree and was enforceable. Because the superior court failed to address the question whether the parties entered into a subsequent contract that superseded their earlier agreement, we remand for a determination of whether Morris conveyed his interest in the home to Horn after the decree was entered. Generally, if a party to a property settlement seeks relief from a dissolution decree into which the settlement is incorporated, the party must request relief under Civil Rule 60(b). [23] Although the court may adjudicate property rights, [24] it does not have statutory authority to modify the terms of a property settlement. [25] Here, it is undisputed that Morris neither filed a Civil Rule 60(b) motion nor requested modification of the property agreement. But he repeatedly alleged a subsequent transaction occurred in which he transferred his interest in the marital residence to Horn in return for her promise to assume the tax and loan obligations. When he made this allegation in the child support and visitation hearing, the court refused to address it because property issues were not within the scope of the hearing. On appeal, Morris again claims he conveyed his interest in the marital residence to Horn and that she agreed to undertake the tax and loan obligations. At no point has a court addressed Morris's allegation that a subsequent transaction occurred. Notably, Horn does not directly refute the assertion: she claims Morris makes false statements regarding the transfer of the property, but she also argued in the trial court that the marital home had been awarded to her, contrary to the dissolution decree granting the parties joint ownership. Indeed, before the trial court Horn repeatedly referred to the marital residence as solely hers. Whether this subsequent transaction occurred matters. We have explained: A subsequent contract completely covering the same subject-matter, and made by the same parties, as an earlier agreement, but containing terms inconsistent with the former contract, so that the two cannot stand together, rescinds, substitutes, and is substituted for the earlier contract and becomes the only agreement of the parties on the subject.[ [26] ] If Morris conveyed his one-half interest in the marital residence to Horn, and if the parties agreed Horn would accept the property in exchange for her promise to assume the tax and loan obligations, then this subsequent contract supersedes the earlier, conflicting property settlement agreement. Under such a scenario, Civil Rule 60(b) would not apply because Morris would be seeking to enforce the subsequent contract, not to modify or obtain relief from the dissolution decree. We therefore remand for the superior court to make a finding about whether the second transaction occurred. [27]