Opinion ID: 3048734
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicability of the CCTA

Text: [1] Federal laws of general applicability are presumed to apply with equal force to Indian tribes. See United States v. Baker, 63 F.3d 1478, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890, 893 (9th Cir. 1980). We held in Baker that the CCTA is a law of general applicability. See 63 F.3d at 1484. There are three established exceptions, however, that preclude the application of an otherwise generally applicable federal law to Indian tribes. See id. at 1485; Farris, 624 F.2d at 893-94. The Smiskins argue that this case falls within the Indian treaty exception. As we explained in Baker, a “federal statute of general applicability that is silent on the issue of applicability to Indian tribes will not apply to them if . . . the application of the law to the tribe would abrogate rights guaranteed by Indian treaties.”6 63 F.3d at 1485 (internal quotation marks omitted). Congress must therefore expressly apply a statute to Indians in order to abrogate their treaty rights. See 5 We presume the allegations of an indictment to be true for purposes of reviewing a district court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss. See United States v. Blinder, 10 F.3d 1468, 1471 (9th Cir. 1993). 6 The other two exceptions, which do not apply here, arise if the statute is silent regarding applicability to Indian tribes and either: (1) the law touches “exclusive rights of self-governance in purely intramural matters” or (2) there is proof “by legislative history or some other means that Congress intended [the law] not to apply to Indians.” Baker, 63 F.3d at 1485 (alteration in original). UNITED STATES v. SMISKIN 5845 Farris, 624 F.2d at 893 (“[I]t is presumed that Congress does not intend to abrogate rights guaranteed by Indian treaties when it passes general laws, unless it makes specific reference to Indians.”). [2] There is no evidence that Congress intended to abrogate Indian treaty rights through adoption of the CCTA. Congress did not expressly make the CCTA applicable to Indian tribes, see Baker, 63 F.3d at 1485-86, and, if anything, the relevant legislative history suggests the opposite. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1778, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 9 n.1, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code & Cong. Admin. News 5535, 5538 (“[The CCTA is] not intended to affect transportation or sale by Indians or Indian tribes acting in accordance with legally established rights.”). But see Baker, 63 F.3d at 1486 (interpreting this language as referring only to rights granted to Indian tribes by the states). [3] The critical question, then, is whether applying the State of Washington’s pre-notification requirement to Yakama tribal members who possess and transport unstamped cigarettes violates the Yakama Treaty of 1855. If it does, the Smiskins cannot be prosecuted under the CCTA on the basis of this state requirement. In light of our interpretation of the Right to Travel provision of the Yakama Treaty in Cree II, as well as the canons of construction for interpreting Indian treaties, we conclude that applying the State’s pre-notification requirement to the Smiskins violates the right to travel guaranteed in Article III of the Treaty.