Opinion ID: 1058965
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: Pretrial Publicity and the Right to a Fair Trial

Text: In assignments of error 5, 23, 24, and 28, Muhammad makes various arguments concerning alleged errors of the trial court concerning its handling of pretrial publicity. Muhammad argues that: 1. The trial court erred by denying his motion to issue a show cause order, quashing subpoenas related to seeking evidence of pretrial leaks of information concerning the investigation of Muhammad and Malvo, and denying a request for appointment of a special prosecutor to investigate pretrial leaks; 2. The trial court erred by denying Muhammad's motion to close a hearing on a motion in limine; 3. The trial court erred in failing to prevent information leaks and to take appropriate corrective action concerning the leaks; 4. The trial court erred in refusing to dismiss the charges against Muhammad based upon leaks of information; 5. The leaks hindered the defendant's ability to seat a fair jury despite the change of venue. This case attracted extensive media coverage. Counsel for Muhammad and the Fairfax Commonwealth's Attorney agreed to a consent order in the Fairfax County Circuit Court, where Malvo's prosecution was pending, generally prohibiting law enforcement officials of the Fairfax County Police Department and its civilian employees from disclosing information in violation of the Department's own rules, namely, General Order 401.1. Among other things, General Order 401.1 and the consent order in Fairfax County Circuit Court specifically prohibit disclosure of evidence of statements, criminal records, opinions of guilt or innocence, testing and test results, and statements about expected testimony. Additionally, counsel for Muhammad and the Commonwealth's Attorney for Prince William County agreed that all discovery from the Commonwealth would be sealed to limit dissemination of information that might have an effect upon jury selection. Due to continued concerns about allegations of leaks of information related to the investigation and prosecution of Muhammad and Malvo, Muhammad filed a motion for rule to show cause in the Prince William County Circuit Court requesting that the trial court determine the source of information appearing in the media concerning the Malvo and Muhammad cases which had been attributed to law enforcement sources, and take appropriate action. In the alternative, Muhammad requested that the trial court appoint a special prosecutor or investigator. The trial court denied the motion. A similar motion had been presented to the Circuit Court of Fairfax County and was denied. Thereafter, Muhammad and the Prince William County Commonwealth's Attorney agreed to the entry of an order on August 5, 2003, providing in pertinent part: Law enforcement employees, from all agencies working as members of the prosecution Task Force, or working with the Task Force, whether sworn officers/agents or civilian employees shall not disclose any information to the press or public related to the investigation leading to the arrests of John Allen Muhammad and Lee Boyd Malvo, and pending prosecution of John Allen Muhammad and Lee Boyd Malvo in Prince William and Fairfax County Circuit Courts. Approximately two weeks before the commencement of Muhammad's trial, a book entitled Sniper: Inside The Hunt For The Killers Who Terrorized The Nation, was released to the public. This 237-page publication contained detailed information concerning the investigation of Muhammad and Malvo. Muhammad filed a motion to dismiss the charges or for other appropriate relief asserting that there had been a flagrant violation of the August 5, 2003 order by numerous and unknown law enforcement agents. In the motion, Muhammad did not fault the prosecutors in the case and did not argue that there had been any discovery violations under Rule 3A:11. The trial court expressed its concern about the matter but disagreed regarding Muhammad's proposed remedies. In the absence of any violations of the discovery rules, the trial court declined to prohibit introduction of specified evidence of the Commonwealth. The trial court declined to order that the Commonwealth could not seek the death penalty. The trial court indicated that it would allow individual voir dire of potential jurors on the issue of pre-trial publicity. The trial court had already granted a motion for change of venue and the trial was scheduled to be held in Virginia Beach, Virginia. Muhammad asserts that the trial court should have dismissed the charges, precluded the death penalty, or limited the introduction of evidence pursuant to the authority of Code ง 19.2-265.4. However, this code section recites potential remedies for failure to provide discovery under Rule 3A:11. Muhammad expressly stated in his motion that no discovery violations under the rule had occurred. In his motion, Muhammad does not suggest that the Commonwealth's Attorney's office of Prince William County was the source of leaks. Additionally, there is no evidence that the information contained in the book published before trial came from leaks after the August 5, 2003 order. The trial court noted that it was likely that most of the information in the book came from communications prior to the time the trial court was asked to intervene and prohibit disclosure of any information regarding the Muhammad and Malvo investigations. In his brief on this matter, Muhammad cites one statute, which does not apply, and no cases, in support of his argument that Muhammad was not tried by a fair and impartial jury or that his trial was in any way tainted by pretrial publicity. Upon review of the record, we conclude that the trial court took appropriate action to limit the effect of pretrial publicity in this case. The trial court entered a consent order regarding sealing of discovery responses of the Commonwealth; when asked, the trial court entered the August 5, 2003 order prohibiting law enforcement and civilian employees of law enforcement agencies from disclosing to the media or the public any information concerning the investigation of Muhammad and Malvo; the trial court granted Muhammad's motion for a change of venue to a location away from the immediate zone of pretrial publicity; and, the trial court permitted individualized voir dire of potential jurors concerning pretrial publicity. Muhammad does not cite any actual tainting of the jury selection process or any way in which his trial was compromised by pretrial publicity. He does not cite any particular consequences of the trial court's denial of a motion to close a hearing on a motion in limine or the trial court's refusal to issue show cause orders or appoint a special prosecutor to investigate leaks. It is most telling that at trial, of the 125 potential jurors questioned, only 8 were challenged on grounds that exposure to pretrial publicity made them inappropriate jurors. We hold that the trial court did not err with regard to any of the issues raised in Muhammad's assignments of error 5, 23, 24 and 28.