Opinion ID: 4556499
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: How do we define “same offense”?

Text: The protective scope of the Double Jeopardy Clause turns on the meaning of “same offense,” a “phrase deceptively simple in appearance but virtually kaleidoscopic in application.” Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 700 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Indeed, “there has been, and remains, widespread confusion in the decisional law and in the commentary as to what constitutes the ‘same offense,’ and under what circumstances the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked.” Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 60 (Boehm, J., concurring). Historically, the prohibition against double jeopardy—rooted in the English common law pleas of autrefois acquit (former acquittal) and autrefois convict (former conviction)—applied as a procedural bar to successive prosecutions for the same offense. Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 Yale L.J. 262, 262, 265–66 nn. 1, 11–12 (1965). Because early American penal codes defined only a handful of criminal offenses, a person seldom Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-CR-340 | August 18, 2020 Page 7 of 37 committed more than one violation in the same act or transaction. Strict rules of pleading and procedure likewise prevented multiple convictions in a single trial. See Abraham S. Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 Yale L.J. 1149, 1173–75 (1960) (summarizing common-law rules). By the mid-nineteenth century, however, this paradigm had shifted, the consequence of an expanding body of statutory law defining new—and often overlapping—criminal offenses.3 Relaxed rules of pleading and procedure opened the door to further change, allowing prosecutors to join multiple related charges against a defendant—and even fragment those charges—for a single criminal act. While minimizing the likelihood of unwarranted acquittal, these multi-count indictments “greatly enhance[d] the potential penalty for any given criminal transaction.”4 Note, Double Jeopardy and the MultipleCount Indictment, 57 Yale L.J. 132, 133 (1947). To protect the interests of the accused, then, the prohibition against double jeopardy evolved beyond the procedural context to embody a substantive bar to multiple convictions or punishments for the “same offense” in a single trial.5 Jay A. Sigler, A History of Double Jeopardy, 7 Am. J. Legal Hist. 283, 289 (1963). While the issues raised by these two strands of double jeopardy vary, the “crucial inquiry” remains constant: whether one charged offense is the “same” as another charged offense to trigger the constitutional protection. Elmore v. State, 269 Ind. 532, 534, 382 N.E.2d 3The Indiana Revised Code of 1852 identified 120 crimes, more than double the number of offenses defined at the time of statehood in 1816. David J. Bodenhamer, Criminal Punishment in Antebellum Indiana: The Limits of Reform, 82 Ind. Mag. Hist. 358, 372 (1986). Felonies alone rose from twenty in 1824 to forty-three in 1852. Id. at 372 n.62. 4 Legislative initiatives to codify and recodify the criminal code have attempted to mitigate this problem in recent decades, albeit with limited success. See Note, Res Judicata and Double Jeopardy in Indiana Criminal Procedure, 33 Ind. L.J. 409, 428 (1958) (proposing codification as one potential way to “reduce the number of overlapping” offenses that apply to the “same activity” or “fact situation”); I.C. Ann. § 35-41-4-3 cmt. at 368 (West 1978) (noting the limited effect of such efforts). 5We use “conviction” and “punishment” interchangeably. Both terms implicate disabilities beyond just excessive sentences (including collateral consequences or increased vulnerability to habitual-offender status). Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-CR-340 | August 18, 2020 Page 8 of 37 893, 895 (1978). The methods or standards on which courts have relied to resolve this question warrant a closer look for the proper context to our decision.
analytical framework applied. In resolving claims of double jeopardy, courts have generally relied on one of two tests: (1) the “statutory elements” (or “required evidence”) test and (2) the “actual evidence” test.6 See Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 42. The “statutory elements” test, as the name suggests, applies a comparative analysis of the statutory elements to determine whether two or more offenses are the “same.” Id. at 42 n.21. This test is the standard currently used by the federal judiciary. As articulated by the United States Supreme Court, “where the same act or transaction” violates two distinct statutes, the question is whether each statute “requires proof of a fact which the other does not.” Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) (emphasis added). If the answer to this question is “yes,” the two offenses are different; otherwise, the two offenses are the same. Id. The “actual evidence” test, on the other hand, looks to whether two or more offenses are the same based on the evidence actually presented at trial, rather than engaging in a strict comparative analysis of the statutory elements.7 Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 42 n.23. This test, in other words, calls for an analysis of the evidence as applied to, rather than as required by, 6Courts and commentators often group these two tests under the nominal umbrella of a “same evidence” test. See Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 42 & nn. 21, 23. Separate from this analytical framework is the “same transaction” test, which focuses on the defendant’s alleged conduct or behavior to determine whether a prior conviction or acquittal bars a second prosecution. See id. at 41–42. For an historical overview of other “same offense” tests applied by Indiana courts, see generally Note, Res Judicata and Double Jeopardy in Indiana Criminal Procedure, 33 Ind. L.J. 409 (1958). 7A variation of the “actual evidence” test is the “alleged evidence” test, which finds two or more offenses the same “if there is sufficient similarity between the allegations of the two indictments.” See Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 42 & n.22 (citation omitted). Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-CR-340 | August 18, 2020 Page 9 of 37 each element of the statutory offense.8 Whereas the “statutory elements” test takes a more deferential approach to the legislative definition of an offense, the “actual evidence” test looks beyond the elements of a crime to determine whether two offenses are the “same.” Beyond these judicially-created tests, many states have enacted legislation prohibiting the conviction of a defendant—whether in a single trial or in successive proceedings—for both an offense and a “lesser included” offense. Jay A. Sigler, Double Jeopardy: The Development of a Legal and Social Policy 109 (1969). Indiana is no exception. See I.C. § 35-38-1-6 (2019) (single trial); I.C. § 35-41-4-3 (subsequent prosecution). This statutory bar rests on the longstanding common-law recognition that a “lesser included” offense is the “same” as its greater (encompassing) offense. See, e.g., Kokenes v. State, 213 Ind. 476, 479, 13 N.E.2d 524, 525–26 (1938) (“A prosecution for any part of a single crime, bars any further prosecution based upon the whole or a part of the same crime.”); Wininger v. State, 13 Ind. 540, 541 (1859) (relying on the same rule). See also 1 Joel Prentiss Bishop, Commentaries on the Criminal Law § 682, at 705 (2d ed., 1858) (illustrating this principle with concentric circles). Depending on the scope of protection, these statutes may expand or restrict the meaning of “same offense” in relation to the judicial tests described above. See generally Christen R. Blair, Constitutional Limitations on the Lesser Included Offense Doctrine, 21 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 445, 455–62 (1984). 8For example, unlike the crime of burglary, the offense of attempted armed robbery does not require evidence of breaking and entering. Compare I.C. § 35-43-2-1 (2019) (burglary), with I.C. § 35-42-5-1 (robbery) and I.C. § 35-41-5-1 (attempt). Because the offenses aren’t the “same” under the “statutory elements” test, there’s no double-jeopardy violation. But when the analysis centers on the evidence as applied, that evidence, under the “actual evidence” test, may prove otherwise distinct elements under the respective statutory offenses. In Lee v. State, for example, the defendant argued that evidence of him barging into the victim’s house could have satisfied both (1) the breaking-and-entering element of burglary and (2) the substantialstep element required for attempted armed robbery. This Court ultimately rejected that argument, citing evidence presented to the jury “beyond Lee’s barging through the front door.” 892 N.E.2d 1231, 1236 (Ind. 2008). But the case illustrates the possibility of finding double jeopardy based on the actual evidence used to convict, rather than relying solely on the evidence required by each element of the offense. Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-CR-340 | August 18, 2020 Page 10 of 37 2. The “same offense” test in Richardson v. State created more confusion than clarity. In Richardson v. State, this Court adopted analytical variations of both the “statutory elements” test and the “actual evidence” test. 717 N.E.2d at 49. As formulated by a majority of the Court, “two or more offenses are the ‘same offense’ in violation” of the Indiana Double Jeopardy Clause “if, with respect to either [1] the statutory elements of the challenged crimes or [2] the actual evidence used to convict, the essential elements of one challenged offense also establish the essential elements of another challenged offense.”9 Id. The “statutory elements” test generally tracks the federal Blockburger analysis. Id. at 50 n.41. The “actual evidence” test, on the other hand, examines whether—based on the charging information, jury instructions, and arguments of counsel at trial—there’s a “reasonable possibility” that the jury used the same evidence to support two or more convictions. Id. at 53; Garrett v. State, 992 N.E.2d 710, 720 (Ind. 2013). By articulating these tests, the Court in Richardson set out to create a “single comprehensive rule” for resolving all substantive double-jeopardy claims under the Indiana Constitution. Spivey v. State, 761 N.E.2d 831, 832 (Ind. 2002). But despite this lofty goal, subsequent application of the rule quickly proved untenable, ultimately forcing the Court to retreat from its all-inclusive analytical framework. To begin with, the adoption of two tests, rather than one, did little to reconcile decades of conflicting precedent. See Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 49 (drawing upon several early Indiana cases, none of which “presented a comprehensive analysis, a generally articulated test, or a standard of review for double jeopardy claims”). This generated more confusion than