Opinion ID: 2595540
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alleged Coercion of Deadlocked Jury

Text: The court asked the jury to return separate verdicts of either death or life imprisonment without parole on count two (the murder of Allen) and on count three (the murder of Allen's fetus). On three occasions, over three days of deliberations, the jurors informed the court they were deadlocked. The jurors reported there had been changes in the votes on count two and count three on each of the ballots taken. [8] Following each declaration of deadlock, defendant moved for a mistrial, arguing in essence that further deliberations would be futile and the court's insistence in continuing deliberations constituted coercion. He now argues the court should have declared a mistrial. We disagree. Section 1140 provides, Except as provided by law, the jury cannot be discharged after the cause is submitted to them until they have agreed upon their verdict and rendered it in open court, unless by consent of both parties, entered upon the minutes, or unless, at the expiration of such time as the court may deem proper, it satisfactorily appears that there is no reasonable probability that the jury can agree. The determination whether there is a reasonable probability of agreement rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. ( People v. Proctor, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 539, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 340, 842 P.2d 1100.) Although the court must take care to exercise its power without coercing the jury into abdicating its independent judgment in favor of considerations of compromise and expediency [citation], the court may direct further deliberations upon its reasonable conclusion that such direction would be perceived `as a means of enabling the jurors to enhance their understanding of the case rather than as mere pressure to reach a verdict on the basis of matters already discussed and considered.' ( People v. Proctor, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 539, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 340, 842 P.2d 1100.) On the first occasion, the court noted that the jury had only been deliberating for four hours and had taken only one ballot. The court polled each juror individually to determine if any readback of testimony or clarification of the law would be of benefit. The court answered questions submitted by several jurors, and sent the jury back to continue deliberations. On the second occasion, later that afternoon, the court indicated that because three additional ballots had been taken and each revealed there had been changes in the votes, it was not satisfied that a unanimous verdict could not be reached. Before sending the jurors home for the weekend, the court reminded them that each had said during the jury selection process that they were the type of folks who could choose between the penalties, that each individual juror had assured the court that he or she could vote for the punishment they thought appropriate, whether it be life without the possibility of parole or death, and that if at any time during the trial any juror felt unable to make such a decision, he or she would so inform the court. Each juror was polled and indicated he or she could make such a decision. The court instructed the jurors: Do not take any of my comments now or at any time in this trial as suggesting how any juror should vote as to penalty on either count. . . . [¶] . . . I am not going to attempt to coerce a verdict out of a jury at all, but what I will do is explore this until I am convinced that there is no reasonable possibility of a unanimous verdict. . . . [¶] . . . Please draw no inferences from anything that I have said or any question that I may have asked about how I believe or feel this case should be resolved or if it should be. On the third occasion, the following day, the court again noted changes in votes in the five ballots taken that day, and stated it was not satisfied a unanimous verdict could not be reached. Defendant argues the court's comments improperly constituted subtle insistence that a verdict should be reached and implicitly required the jurors to move toward unanimity. Further, he argues the court abandoned its responsibility to remind the jurors they should not surrender their individual beliefs in order to reach a verdict. We find no abuse of discretion. In spite of the jury's assessment that they were hopelessly deadlocked, the record reasonably supports the court's determination that the jurors had not reached an impasse. Each successive ballot taken revealed changes in the votes. Further, contrary to defendant's argument, the court's comments did not insist that a verdict be reached. The court's comments informed the jury that deliberations would continue until the court was satisfied they were deadlocked, but they were not to infer that the court believed a verdict should be reached. Finally, each juror was sufficiently reminded of his or her individual responsibilities in the deliberative process when the court polled each juror to determine if each could make a choice and reach a verdict. (Cf. People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 774-777, 230 Cal.Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113 [no error in denying mistrial motion when jury stated it was hopelessly deadlocked after 18 days of deliberations].)