Opinion ID: 3000635
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Adjustment for Mitigating Role

Text: Olivas-Ramirez first argues that he was a minor participant in the offense and that the district court erred by denying him a two-level reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b). He contends that his limited participation in the conspiracy over the two-day period made him substantially less culpable than the average participant. 6 No. 06-2415 “The district court’s determination concerning the defendant’s [participation] in the offense is a finding of fact, subject to a clearly erroneous standard of review on appeal.” United States v. Mendoza, 457 F.3d 726, 728 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Hankton, 432 F.3d 779, 793 (7th Cir. 2005). A defendant’s offense level may be decreased by two levels if the sentencing court determines that the defendant was a minor participant in the offense. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b). To receive a deduction as a minor participant, a defendant must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he/she was “substantially less culpable” than the average participant. Mendoza, 457 F.3d at 728 (citing U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b), comment, application n.3(A)). Clear error exists when, after reviewing the evidence, we are “left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Id. (quoting United States v. Arocho, 305 F.3d 627, 641 (7th Cir. 2002). Olivas-Ramirez says that his role was minor because he only pretended to be the methamphetamine cook and he was only involved in the conspiracy for two days. He further argues that the district court failed to compare his role to the roles of the other participants in the conspiracy. The district court, however, found that “[Olivas-Ramirez’s] involvement . . . shows that he was a person that was central to the effectuation of the criminal conduct that the parties desired to participate in. Without the cook to cook the methamphetamine, there would be no methamphetamine created.” In rejecting Olivas-Ramirez’s arguments, the district court also found that even if Olivas-Ramirez was not the experienced methamphetamine cook, he was an assistant cook with knowledge of methamphetamine and its manufacturing process. We agree. Olivas-Ramirez and his co-defendants believed that if they supplied a cook and other necessary ingredients, the undercover agents would supply pseudoephedrine and a laboratory. Gomez-Albaranga and Lopez trusted OlivasNo. 06-2415 7 Ramirez to explain the methamphetamine cooking process to the undercover agents and evaluate the adequacy of the Bonfield warehouse. Olivas-Ramirez inspected the warehouse, stated which items he would need to produce the drugs, and assured the undercover agents that the warehouse was suitable for manufacturing and that he would help manufacture the methamphetamine. His statements at the warehouse suggest that he previously had manufactured or assisted in manufacturing methamphetamine. He also gave the agents iodine in return for a quantity of pseudoephedrine. His actions were essential to his and his co-defendants attempt to manufacture methamphetamine. The district court did not clearly err in determining that Olivas-Ramirez was not “substantially less culpable” than the others and in denying him a two-level reduction. B. Application of the Safety Valve Provision Under U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2 Olivas-Ramirez also challenges the district court’s denial of his motion requesting a downward departure from the statutory minimum sentence in accordance with U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2. We review a district court’s decision concerning a safety valve departure for clear error. United States v. Alvarado, 326 F.3d 857, 862 (7th Cir. 2003). The purpose of the safety valve statute is to “allow certain non-violent first-time drug offenders to avoid the application of statutory minimum mandatory sentences if they cooperated with the government.” Id. at 860. The defendant bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he is eligible for the safety valve. United States v. Ramirez, 94 F.3d 1095, 1101 (7th Cir. 1996). Section 5C1.2(a) of the Sentencing Guidelines permits the district court to make such a departure if five criteria are satisfied. United States v. Williams, 202 F.3d 959, 964 (7th Cir. 2000). The only criterion in dispute is whether Olivas- 8 No. 06-2415 Ramirez “has truthfully provided to the government all information and evidence [he] has concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the same course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan and complete informa- tion. . . .” See U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a)(5). Olivas-Ramirez argues that when he met with the government agents prior to sentencing, he fully admitted his involvement, disclosed his complete role, and explained everything that he knew concerning the attempted methamphetamine production. We agree with the district court that Olivas-Ramirez was “minimizing his conduct in connection with the offense.” Too many of the defendant’s propositions—that he did not know what he would be doing while in Chicago, that he never had cooked or assisted in cooking methamphetamine before, that Lopez had explained to him the process of cooking methamphetamine and told him what to tell the undercover agents, that he had burned his arms while cooking eggs, that he did not know what was inside the bottles that he handed over to Dominguez, and that he was only at Chela’s to play cards—are unbelievable. The district court did not clearly err in finding that Olivas-Ramirez had not provided completely truthful information, and thus, Olivas-Ramirez did not qualify for a decrease in his sentence pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2. C. Reasonableness of Sentence Olivas-Ramirez’s final argument is that the 135-month sentence imposed by the district court was unreasonable. After United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S. Ct. 738, 160 L. Ed. 2d 621 (2005), we review a defendant’s sentence for unreasonableness. We review the district court’s factfindings at sentencing for clear error and the application of those to the Sentencing Guidelines de novo. United States v. Robinson, 435 F.3d 699, 701 (7th Cir. 2006). No. 06-2415 9 While the district court is not required to discuss and make findings as to each factor listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the record on appeal must indicate that the court conducted “meaningful consideration of the types of factors that Section 3553(a) identifies.” United States v. Laufle, 433 F.3d 981, 987 (7th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Olivas-Ramirez argues that the district court incorrectly denied him an offense level reduction pursuant to § 3B1.2 and, therefore, erred in determining that his offense level was 33 and that his advisory guideline range totaled between 135 and 168 months. Because Olivas-Ramirez was not a minor participant, this argument fails. He also argues that the district court failed to discuss and consider meaningfully the statutory sentencing factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). We disagree. The district court considered each of the § 3553(a) factors and provided an adequate explanation before sentencing Olivas-Ramirez to the bottom of the applicable guideline range.