Opinion ID: 797987
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Force Instruction

Text: 14 Holly first argues the district court erred in instructing the jury that force may be implied from a disparity in size or coercive power between the defendant and the victim. He contends that such an instruction essentially directs a guilty verdict against the defendant in circumstances such as these because, as a sheriff, Holly necessarily had power over the prisoners. By allowing an inference of force from this fact alone, Holly argues, the instruction impermissibly reduced the government's burden of proof. 15 The term force is not defined by statute and this court has not previously defined it for purposes of § 242 or § 2241. Nevertheless, this court has construed the term in the context of USSG § 2A3.1(b)(1), which allows for a sentencing enhancement when the defendant's conduct violates § 2241(a) or (b). See United States v. Reyes Pena, 216 F.3d 1204, 1211 (10th Cir.2000). In doing so, this court held a force enhancement is appropriate when the sexual contact resulted from a restraint upon the other person that was sufficient that the other person could not escape the sexual contact. Id. (quotation omitted). We further stated that force may be inferred by such facts as disparity in size between victim and assailant, or disparity in coercive power. Id. This court has therefore explained the element of force within the meaning of aggravated sexual abuse does not require the brute force [commonly] associated with rape. Id. 16 Contrary to Holly's assertions, there is no reason for this court to distinguish between the definition of force in the context of USSG § 2A3.1(b)(1) and the definition of force in the context of § 2241. The Guideline provision at issue in Reyes Pena provides for a four-level enhancement [i]f the offense involved conduct described in 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a) or (b). USSG § 2A3.1(b)(1). Because application of the sentencing enhancement requires a violation of the statute, the requisite degree of force is identical. Other circuits addressing the meaning of force for purposes of § 2241 have similarly relied on cases interpreting the statute as part of a review of a sentencing enhancement. See, e.g., United States v. Simmons, 470 F.3d 1115, 1121 (5th Cir.2006) (citing United States v. Lucas, 157 F.3d 998, 1002 (5th Cir.1998)); United States v. Allery, 139 F.3d 609, 611 (8th Cir.1998) (citing United States v. Fire Thunder, 908 F.2d 272, 274 (8th Cir.1990)). Thus, this circuit's case law on the meaning of force for purposes of the application of USSG § 2A3.1(b)(1) applies with equal force outside the sentencing context. 17 This court also rejects Holly's contention that force may be inferred from a disparity in size or power only where the defendant is an adult and the victim is a child. Although this circuit's cases expressing the propriety of such an inference have often involved an act committed upon a child by an adult, there is no reason to limit its application to such facts. Rather, an adult/child relationship is offered as but one example of a disparity in size or coercive power. See Reyes Pena, 216 F.3d at 1211 (explaining force may be inferred from a disparity in size or power, such as that between an adult and a child). Indeed, one of the cases on which Reyes Pena relied referenced the inference in a case involving abuse perpetrated by a jail warden against an inmate. See Lucas, 157 F.3d at 1002 (5th Cir.1998). There is no reason to limit the inference of force from disparity in size or power to cases involving child victims and this court declines to do so in this case. 18 The district court therefore properly instructed the jury on the element of force. After properly stating the element of force does not require proof of actual violence, it then indicated, consistent with Reyes Pena, that [t]he requirement of force may be satisfied by a showing of restraint sufficient to prevent the victim from escaping the sexual conduct. The district court went on to instruct that this required showing could be implied, rather than proved directly, from a disparity in coercive power or in size. Contrary to Holly's claim that the instruction directed a guilty verdict, the instruction simply permitted such an inference rather than requiring it. Because the instruction was consistent with the prevailing case law, the instruction as to force was not error.