Opinion ID: 1992848
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Interview of penalty phase jurors

Text: The day after defendant was sentenced to death the Trentonian featured an article in which one of the penalty-phase jurors was quoted as stating that the jury never lost sight of the fact that the victim also had a family. We had an obligation to them also. Pursuant to Rule 1:16-1, defense counsel moved for permission to interview the jurors to determine whether improper considerations had tainted the verdict. Rule 1:16-1, Interviewing Jurors Subsequent To Trial, states: Except by leave of court granted on good cause shown no attorney or party shall directly through any investigator or other person acting for the attorney interview, examine or question any grand or petit juror with respect to any matter relating to the case. The defense claims that the jury's focus on the victim's family was the result of the court room outburst by the daughter of the Atlantic County murder victim. The trial court denied the motion based on lack of jurisdiction because the defendant had already filed a Notice of Appeal. Defense's motion for a limited remand to consider the motion was likewise denied by this Court. Defendant argues that he was entitled to interview the jurors to discover whether they had improperly weighed victim impact considerations in rendering their decision to impose the death penalty. Because defendant believes that a remand at this juncture would be pointless as jurors will be unable to recall what was on their minds in December 1994, he argues that under the First, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments and the corresponding rights under the New Jersey Constitution, he is entitled to a new penalty trial. Additionally, defendant asserts that, to the extent that Rule 1:16-1 prevents him from interviewing the jurors, the rule is unconstitutional. Rule 1:16-1 reaffirms the privilege accorded jurors against disclosure of their communications during deliberations  a privilege required in the interest of fair trial since `Freedom of debate might be stifled and independence of thought checked if jurors were made to feel that their arguments and ballots were to be freely published to the world.' Pressler, Current N.J. Court Rules cmt. 1 on R. 1:16-1 (1996) (quoting State v. LaFera, 42 N.J. 97, 106, 199 A. 2d 630 (1964)). That rule recognizes that there may be extraordinary circumstances in which jury misconduct or the introduction of extraneous information into the jury deliberations brought about an unjust result. Ibid. `Good cause' intended by the rule ... is some event or occurrence that injected into the deliberation in which the capacity for prejudice inheres. Ibid. (citing State v. Kociolek, 20 N.J. 92, 100, 118 A. 2d 812 (1955)). This Court's decision in Koedatich I, supra, 112 N.J. 225, 548 A. 2d 939 is controlling. In Koedatich I, supra, defendant requested to interrogate jurors after his trial relying exclusively on a newspaper article printed after the trial, that quoted some jurors as having knowledge of his involvement in an unrelated murder. Id. at 286, 548 A. 2d 939. The Koedatich Court observed that [c]alling back jurors for interrogation after they have been discharged is an extraordinary procedure which should be invoked only upon a strong showing that a litigant may have been harmed by jury misconduct. Id. at 288, 548 A. 2d 939 (quoting State v. Athorn, 46 N.J. 247, 250, 216 A. 2d 369 (1966)). The Koedatich Court recognized two exceptions to the rule. First, post-verdict interviews may occur when any racial or religious bigotry manifested in jury deliberations may invalidate a verdict. Ibid. (citing State v. Levitt, 36 N.J. 266, 176 A. 2d 465 (1961)). The second exception arises when a juror informs or misinforms his or her colleagues in the jury room about the facts of the case based upon his personal knowledge of facts not in evidence. Ibid. Finding that the circumstances presented did not fall within one of those exceptions, the Koedatich Court concluded: [W]e strongly believe that the contents of a single newspaper article, indisputably hearsay, cannot be the sole basis for the extraordinary procedure of a post-trial interrogation. Id. at 289, 548 A. 2d 939. This case presents the same circumstances. As in Koedatich I, the trial court properly denied the motion for post-verdict juror interviews that was based on a single newspaper article. In addition, defendant's claim that Rule 1:16-1 is unconstitutional is without merit. See Loftin, supra, 287 N.J. Super. at 108-09, 670 A. 2d 557 (holding that Rule 1:16-1 is not unconstitutional).