Opinion ID: 4686682
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: KCRA Discrimination Claim

Text: “The language of the KCRA mirrors that of the ADA; consequently, claims brought under the KCRA are interpreted consistently with the standards developed under the ADA.” Bryson, 498 F.3d at 574 (citation omitted); see Howard Baer, Inc. v. Schave, 127 S.W.3d 589, 592 (Ky. 2003) (“The Kentucky Civil Rights Act was modeled after federal law, and our courts have interpreted the Kentucky Act consistently therewith.”). Because Kentucky passed the KCRA before the ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA), this court continues to apply pre-ADAAA jurisprudence to KCRA analysis. See Krueger v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 674 F. App’x 490, 494 -7- No. 20-5367, Koch v. Thames Healthcare Group, LLC (6th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he Kentucky legislature adopted the language in the KCRA in 1992 and intended it to reflect the language of the ADA at that time, not the subsequent amendments.”); Breen v. Infiltrator Sys., 417 F. App’x 483, 486 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[T]h[e] amendment has yet to be incorporated into the Kentucky statute, see K.R.S. § 344.010(4) (1992), so the pre-2008 ADA standards apply to [Plaintiff]'s claim.”). “Under [Kentucky Revised Statutes] § 344.040(1), it is unlawful for an employer to discharge any individual . . . because the person is a qualified person with a disability.” Hallahan v. Courier-Journal, 138 S.W.3d 699, 706 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). When, like here, a plaintiff bases his or her disability-discrimination claim on circumstantial evidence, Kentucky courts require that the plaintiff show that: (1) he is disabled; (2) he is “otherwise qualified” for the position with or without reasonable accommodation; (3) he suffered an adverse employment decision; (4) the employer knew or had reason to know of the plaintiff’s disability; and (5) the position remained open while the employer sought other applicants or the disabled plaintiff was replaced. The employer must then offer a legitimate explanation for its action. If the employer satisfies this burden of production, the plaintiff must introduce evidence showing that the proffered explanation is pretextual. Id. at 706 n.5. Koch’s claim falters on the disability prong. Under the KCRA, the term “disability” is defined to include: (a) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of the individual; (b) a record of such impairment; or (c) being regarded as having such an impairment. See K.R.S. 344.010(4). Koch does not have a disability under any scenario.
Under pre-ADAAA law, Kentucky courts consider three factors in determining whether an individual is substantially limited: “[1] the nature and severity of the impairment; [2] the duration or expected duration of the impairment; and [3] the permanent or long-term impact, or the expected -8- No. 20-5367, Koch v. Thames Healthcare Group, LLC permanent or long-term impact of or resulting from the impairment.” Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 196 (2002), superseded by statute Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2009). “Merely having an impairment does not make one disabled for purposes of the ADA [and KCRA].” Id. at 195. “Under Kentucky law temporary impairments do not qualify as disabilities” either. Larison v. Home of the Innocents, 551 S.W.3d 36, 43 (Ky. Ct. App. 2018). Therefore, “a person whose . . . mental impairment is corrected by mitigating measures still has an impairment, but if the impairment is corrected it does not substantially limi[t] a major life activity.” Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 483 (1999), superseded by statute Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2009) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Koch has provided sufficient evidence that she suffers a mental impairment, but her impairment does not substantially limit her ability to work. Her period of incapacity lasts only as long as she lacks medication. Koch was fully capable of working when she was medicated. At worst, Koch’s substantial limitation was temporary, which, in this instance, lasted only four days— and only because she was without medicine. See Mahon v. Crowell, 295 F.3d 585, 590–91 (6th Cir. 2002) (An “impairment that only moderately or intermittently prevents an individual from performing major life activities is not a substantial limitation” under the ADA). Koch’s ADHD and MDD does not substantially limit her work activities.
“A record of an impairment means an individual has ‘a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.’” MX Grp., Inc. v. City of Covington, 293 F.3d 326, 339 (6th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). Koch’s record-of-disability challenge fails because she does not cite to any history or -9- No. 20-5367, Koch v. Thames Healthcare Group, LLC classification demonstrating that her impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities. Id.
Although the record reveals that Steffey and other Thames employees knew that Koch had ADHD—through Koch’s jokes or hearsay statements—it does not reflect that Koch or Thames’s staff classified or regarded Koch as disabled. The record refutes any claim that (1) Thames thought that Koch’s ADHD or MDD prevented her from performing a broad class of jobs and (2) Thames modified Koch’s duties to accommodate a perceived disability. See Schave, 127 S.W.3d at 594 (“To succeed upon a regarded as disabled claim, plaintiff must demonstrate that an employer thought he was disabled . . . [and] that the employer thought that his disability would prevent him from performing a broad class of jobs.” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). There is no genuine issue of fact as to whether Koch had a disability as defined by K.R.S. § 344.010(4).