Opinion ID: 1439558
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: EFFECT OF RCW 49.60's EMPLOYER DEFINITION

Text: The final issue is whether RCW 49.60.040's employer definition should apply outside chapter 49.60 and operate to bar an implied cause of action under RCW 49.44.090 or the public policy wrongful discharge tort when these claims are advanced by employees of a firm employing fewer than eight persons. [10, 11] Several principles of statutory construction assist us in resolving this issue. First, legislative bodies ... are presumed to have full knowledge of existing statutes affecting the matter upon which they are legislating. Louthan v. King Cy., 94 Wn.2d 422, 429, 617 P.2d 977 (1980). Second, [a] court may not read into a statute those things which it conceives the Legislature may have left out unintentionally. Addleman v. Board of Prison Terms & Paroles, 107 Wn.2d 503, 509, 730 P.2d 1327 (1986). [12] RCW 49.60's definition section provides, [a]s used in this chapter: ... `Employer' includes any person ... who employs eight or more persons.... RCW 49.60.040. (Italics ours.) We hold that this employer definition does not operate to restrict employer as used in the separate chapter, RCW 49.44.090. We presume that the Legislature is aware of the fact that two statutes address age discrimination in employment. We further presume that if the Legislature had intended to restrict the application of RCW 49.44.090 by a limited definition of employer as it did in RCW 49.60, the Legislature would have expressly done so. [13] Another principle of statutory construction provides that statutes relating to the same subject matter are to be considered together to ascertain legislative policy and intent. In re Marriage of Little, 96 Wn.2d 183, 189, 634 P.2d 498 (1981). Because RCW 49.60 and RCW 49.44.090 both address age discrimination in employment, it is appropriate for this court to consider statements of policy enunciated in RCW 49.60 to determine whether it was the Legislature's intent to incorporate limitations set forth in RCW 49.60 into RCW 49.44.090. RCW 49.60, Washington's Law Against Discrimination, is a much broader statute than RCW 49.44.090. It recognizes a variety of areas, including, but not limited to, employment, in which citizens of Washington have a right to be free from various forms of discrimination. RCW 49.60.030. It specifically makes employment discrimination based upon age, sex, marital status, race, creed, color, national origin, or sensory, mental, or physical handicap an unfair practice. RCW 49.60.180. RCW 49.60.030(2) creates a civil cause of action for [a]ny person deeming himself injured by any act in violation of this chapter.... Significantly, RCW 49.60.020 expressly states that nothing in this chapter shall be construed to deny the right to any person to institute any action or pursue any civil or criminal remedy based upon an alleged violation of his civil rights. This language indicates legislative recognition that other means of redress than those in the state Statute should be available. Seattle Newspaper-Web Pressmen's Union Local 26 v. Seattle, 24 Wn. App. 462, 467, 604 P.2d 170 (1979). RCW 49.60 is a broad remedial statute evidencing the Legislature's desire to confront many forms of discrimination. See Bulaich v. AT&T Information Sys., 113 Wn.2d 254, 258, 778 P.2d 1031 (1989). The statute's purpose section declares discrimination to be a matter of state concern, that ... threatens not only the rights and proper privileges of its inhabitants but menaces the institutions and foundation of a free democratic state. RCW 49.60.010. There is nothing within this broad statement of purpose to suggest that the employer definition found in RCW 49.60.040 was intended by the Legislature to narrow the state's overall policy against age discrimination as defendant suggests. [14] Ultimately, in resolving a question of statutory construction, this court will adopt the interpretation which best advances the legislative purpose. In re R., 97 Wn.2d 182, 187, 641 P.2d 704 (1982). It would be inconsistent with the express statements of broad purpose quoted above to apply any limiting aspect of RCW 49.60 outside the chapter itself. [15] It is important to consider why the Legislature may have included a size limitation in its definition of employer. We find no explanation in the legislative history of the act but we are provided two possible reasons by the State Human Rights Commission. Considering the Commission's interpretation is appropriate because [i]n interpreting a statute, great weight must be accorded to the contemporaneous construction placed upon it by officials charged with its enforcement, particularly where that construction has been accompanied by silent acquiescence of the legislative body over a long period of time. Newschwander v. Board of Trustees, 94 Wn.2d 701, 711, 620 P.2d 88 (1980). The Commission identifies its purposes for exempting small businesses from its regulation: (a) To relieve small businesses of a regulatory burden; and (b) In the interest of cost effectiveness, to confine public agency enforcement of the law to employers whose practices affect a substantial number of persons. WAC 162-16-160(2). RCW 49.60 created the Human Rights Commission to eliminate and prevent discrimination. RCW 49.60.010. Given limited resources for the implementation of this goal the Legislature and the Commission were necessarily required to identify the scope of the agency's regulations, thus, at least according to the Commission, the employer size definition was created. The purposes announced by the Commission for exempting small businesses from regulation will in no way be interfered with by permitting private causes of action against employers whose size keeps them outside the scope of public agency regulation. Moreover, permitting private actions by individual plaintiffs can only assist the Commission in furthering the goal of preventing and eliminating employment discrimination. In conclusion we hold that the employer size definition of RCW 49.60.040 does not apply outside chapter 49.60 and so does not operate to bar either of the claims recognized above. Based on the foregoing analysis, we reverse the trial court's grant of defendants' motion for summary judgment and remand this case for trial. CALLOW, C.J., UTTER, DOLLIVER, ANDERSEN, DURHAM, and SMITH, JJ., and CUNNINGHAM and PEARSON, JJ. Pro Tem., concur.