Opinion ID: 1722223
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether a re-indictment would allow the state to frustrate defendants' speedy trial rights and allow the state to take advantage of unlawful ex parte communications?

Text: ¶ 17. Shumpert further contends, a judgement of a trial judge which is correct is to be affirmed if the ruling is correct for reasons different than those given by the judge. See Larry v. Moody, 242 Miss. 267, 279, 134 So.2d 462, 467 (1961); Miller v. Miller, 173 So.2d 424 (Miss.1965); McIntosh v. Johnson, 649 So.2d 190, 193 (Miss.1995); overruled on other grounds by Norman v. Bucklew, 684 So.2d 1246 (Miss.1996); Gates v. Gates, 616 So.2d 888, 890 (Miss.1993). Shumpert argues that the circuit court was correct in sustaining the motion to dismiss because a failure to do so would frustrate his speedy trial rights. Appellee relies on Miss. Code Ann. § 99-17-1 where defendants are entitled to a speedy trial within 270 days of the date of the arraignment. He indicates that the process of the State taking an ex parte nolle prosequi indictment that had been pending for 270 days and then re-indicting is a way the State can avoid application of the 270 rule and gain advantage over the defendants. ¶ 18. It is recognized that the constitutional right of a defendant to a speedy trial attaches at the time such person becomes accused. Galloway v. State, 574 So.2d 1, 2 (Miss.1990) (citing Beavers v. State, 498 So.2d 788 (Miss.1986)). Appellee is correct in stating that under Miss.Code Ann. § 99-17-1, defendants are entitled to a speedy trial within 270 days of the date of arraignment. This court, however, has held that where a defendant is re-indicted for the same crime, the 270 day rule does not begin to run until the arraignment on the re-indictment. See Corley v. State, 584 So.2d 769, 771-72 (Miss.1991) (citing Moore v. State, 556 So.2d 1031, 1033 (Miss.1990)); Galloway, 574 So.2d at 2. Furthermore, the Court in Corley stated that even if the State, as the Shumperts assert here, attempts to circumvent the 270 day rule by dismissing an indictment and re-indicting a defendant on a separate charge arising out of the same facts and circumstances, we would reach that issue under the balancing test set out in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). Corley, 584 So.2d at 772. ¶ 19. From an analysis of the facts of the case, it seems clear that the appellee's reindictment was for the same offense. After the confusion over whether the officer could identify the defendants had been resolved, the State had reason to proceed with the re-indictment of the appellees for assault, and as the record indicates, it did just that. Thus, the controlling precedent can be found in this Court's decision in Corley v. State , where a defendant is reindicted for the same crime, the 270 day rule does not begin to run until the arraignment on the re-indictment. Consequently, the appellee's contention that a re-indictment would frustrate his right to a speedy trial lacks merit. ¶ 20. The appellee alleges, there will be no need for the State to ever attempt to comply with the statutory 270 day rule, since all it needs to do is to make an ex parte motion for nolle prosequi as the 270 days approaches, and then re-indict. From the facts, it seems clear that the reason for the re-indictment was not for the State to gain unfair advantage over the defendant, but that the State was ready to proceed once it had clarified its good faith mistake. ¶ 21. Alternatively, if one views the State as attempting to circumvent the 270 day rule, analysis under the balancing test set out in Barker v. Wingo , is required as recognized by this Court in Corley v. State . The balancing test is applied to determine whether or not a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated. See Galloway, 574 So.2d at 2. Under the Barker test, we must consider the following: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) whether the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial; and (4) whether the defendant has been prejudiced by the delay. We have considered all four Barker factors and find no speedy trial violations. ¶ 22. The main issue in the case at bar, is whether there was a valid reason for the delay. Although appellees allege that the State took the ex parte nolle prosequi for a less than valid reason  to await the return of the co-defendant such an allegation is incorrect under the record. [QUESTION:] Sir, is it your testimony that you were informed that somebody had indicated the suit was dropped because you couldn't identify Mr. Shumpert? [OFFICER GILBERT:] Yes, sir. The reason for the delay was valid  a good faith mistake by the District Attorney's office. Consequently, the defendants' right to a speedy trial was not violated under the Barker test.