Opinion ID: 2068127
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: did the trial court err in granting summary judgment for the city of mitchell, kirkus and kaemingk?

Text: The standards for reviewing a summary judgment are well established: Summary judgment proceedings are not a substitute for trial and the remedy is authorized only when the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because there are no issues of material fact. The moving party has the burden to clearly show that no genuine issues of material fact exist. The evidence must be viewed most favorably to the non-moving party and reasonable doubts should be resolved against the moving party. The non-moving party opposing a motion for summary judgment must present specific facts which demonstrate the existence of genuine, material issues for trial; mere allegations are not sufficient to preclude summary judgment. Finally, on appeal, affirmance of a summary judgment is proper if there exits any basis which would support the trial court's ruling. Mackintosh v. Carter, 451 N.W.2d 285, 286 (S.D.1990) (citations omitted). The circuit court determined that the press release issued by Kaemingk was subject to a qualified privilege necessitating a showing that the release was issued with malice in order to sustain a defamation action. The circuit court further determined that Peterson had failed in any showing of malice sufficient to overcome the qualified privilege. Accordingly, the circuit court granted the defense motion for summary judgment. Peterson contends that the circuit court erred in ruling that malice must be shown by a private individual in a defamation action in order to overcome any qualified privilege enjoyed by law enforcement officials in issuing press releases. He asserts that the negligent and reckless act of Kaemingk in failing to do minimal research and verify issuance of the indictment subjects all three defendants to liability for defamation. We disagree. The facts of this matter are relatively undisputed. The initial argument centers on the existence of any privilege protecting the defendants from liability for defamation flowing from issuance of the press release. Questions on the existence of any such privilege are for the court and, therefore, are freely reviewable. Bego v. Gordon, 407 N.W.2d 801 (S.D.1987). Defamation is either libel or slander. SDCL 20-11-2. Both libel and slander are statutorily defined as unprivileged publications. SDCL 20-11-3, 20-11-4. Thus, if a communication is privileged, it cannot constitute defamation of an individual. SDCL 20-11-5 defines those communications which are considered privileged and therefore outside the scope of the definitions of libel or slander. The statute provides: A privileged communication is one made: (1) In the proper discharge of an official duty; (2) In any legislative or judicial proceeding, or in any other official proceeding authorized by law; (3) In a communication, without malice, to a person interested therein, by one who is also interested, or by one who stands in such relation to the person interested as to afford a reasonable ground for supposing the motive for the communication innocent, or who is requested by the person interested to give the information; (4) By a fair and true report, without malice, of a judicial, legislative, or other public official proceeding or of anything said in the course thereof. In the cases provided for in subdivisions (3) and (4) of this section, malice is not inferred from the communication or publication. SDCL 20-11-5 (emphasis added). Privileged communications created by subdivisions (1) and (2) of SDCL 20-11-5 are absolute and remain privileged whether made with or without malice. The privileged communications created by subdivisions (3) and (4) of SDCL 20-11-5 are qualified because the communication is only privileged if it is made, without malice. See, McLean v. Merriman, 42 S.D. 394, 175 N.W. 878 (1920) (difference between qualified and absolute privilege is that malice destroys the first but does not affect the latter). The circuit court concluded the press release at issue in the present case was subject to the qualified privilege created by subdivision (3) of SDCL 20-11-5. We agree. In McLean, supra, this Court was required to determine whether the publisher of an article concerning the director of the campaign against the women's suffrage amendment was subject to a qualified privilege under the statutory precursor to SDCL 20-11-5(3). This Court followed the following test: An infallible test in determining whether a communication published under the particular circumstances is or is not privileged is to ask whether, if true, it is a matter of proper public interest in relation to that with which it is sought to associate it. McLean, 42 S.D. at 399, 175 N.W. at 880 (emphasis added). Concluding that it was certainly a matter of proper public interest to know who was backing the campaign against the suffrage amendment, this Court held that the communication was, indeed, subject to a qualified privilege. More recently, this Court was required to determine whether notes from a parents' meeting concerning the performance of a school superintendent were privileged under SDCL 20-11-5(3) when the notes were later turned over to the school board. We reasoned: [A] qualified privilege exists for a communication between interested individuals, if made without malice. Our first line of inquiry, then, should be to determine if the communication involved was between interested individuals.... It does not take an exercise in deep logic to conclude that parents of children attending school in a district under the supervision of [the superintendent] are interested individuals as regards [the superintendent's] effect on that school district.... The parties at the January 9, 1978, meeting all are within the realm of interested individuals. We find all [the parents] interested in the communication herein involved. Uken v. Sloat, 296 N.W.2d 540, 542-43 (S.D.1980). In view of these precedents, we conclude that the citizens of Mitchell had no less common, public interest in the apprehension of those responsible for the recent wave of thefts and vandalisms than the electorate had in the motives of the campaign director in McLean or the parents had in the superintendent's performance in Uken. To paraphrase Uken, it would be preposterous to foreclose law enforcement officials from discussing community affairs that vitally affect the welfare of the citizens. For that reason, we hold that the City, Kirkus and Kaemingk were entitled to a qualified privilege in issuing the press release based upon the common interest provision in SDCL 20-11-5(3). Having established that the communication at issue was subject to the common interest privilege in SDCL 20-11-5(3), we must next determine whether the communication was made with malice that would negate the privilege. Tibke v. McDougall, 479 N.W.2d 898 (S.D.1992); Mackintosh, supra . A qualified or conditional privilege may be lost when the speaker, on an otherwise privileged occasion, publishes false and defamatory matter concerning another which either (a) he in fact does not believe to be true or (b) has no reasonable grounds for believing it to be true.... However, a specific showing of malice is required for purposes of raising a genuine issue of a material fact.... Because malice cannot be presumed, the party bearing the burden of proof must establish that there was a reckless disregard for the truth on the part of the accused. The real test of whether a defendant's conduct is reckless so as to constitute actual malice is whether he `in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publications.' Tibke, 479 N.W.2d at 905-906 (citations omitted). In this instance, Peterson's sole contention concerning the existence of malice is that Kaemingk negligently failed to verify his indictment before issuing the press release. However, it is settled that proof of a reckless disregard for the truth establishing malice requires more than proof of a defendant's failure to investigate. Janklow v. Viking Press, 459 N.W.2d 415 (S.D. 1990). Although Peterson cites Egan v. Dotson, 36 S.D. 459, 155 N.W. 783 (1915) for the proposition that failure to investigate does constitute malice, that part of the holding of Egan was overruled in Hackworth v. Larson, 83 S.D. 674, 685, 165 N.W.2d 705, 711 (1969): In Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 85 S.Ct. 209, 13 L.Ed.2d 125, it was held that statements made with personal malice and without reasonable grounds to believe them true were not sufficient to show reckless disregard because even where personal malice is present defeasance of the protection cannot be based on unreasonableness or mere negligence.... Plaintiffs take the position that AP's failure to make a further investigation into the matter before disseminating its dispatch constitutes malice. This was their only contention in this area in argument and for which they submitted proof in resistance of the motion for summary judgment. This view has been rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court. In New York Times it held that the failure of defendant to investigate the validity of statements was constitutionally insufficient to show reckless disregard. Based upon the foregoing, we hold that the press release issued by Kaemingk was subject to a qualified privilege under SDCL 20-11-5(3). Peterson failed to offer any evidence of malice sufficient to overcome that privilege and sustain his defamation action. In fact, the record evidence regarding the immediate retraction of the press release and Kaemingk's apology to Peterson goes far in establishing that the press release was issued without malice. Given the absence of any specific showing of malice, Peterson has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact for trial. The summary judgment for the City, Kirkus and Kaemingk is affirmed. Uken, supra; Ruple v. Weinaug, 328 N.W.2d 857 (S.D.1983). MILLER, C.J., and HENDERSON, SABERS and AMUNDSON, JJ., participating. WUEST, J., disqualified.