Opinion ID: 771401
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: To permit their children to remain in the Cleveland public schools as before;

Text: 98 (2)To accept a tuition voucher for them to attend a Cleveland area nonreligious private school; 99 (3)To accept a tuition voucher for them to attend a Cleveland area religious private school; 100 (4)To accept a voucher for them to obtain special tutorial help in the Cleveland schools; or 101 (5)To accept a voucher for them to attend a public school in a district adjacent to Cleveland, although for the present these districts have declined to participate in the program. See Ohio Rev. Code §§ 3313.976-3313.978. 102 It is difficult to imagine a statute that could afford its voucher recipients a broader spectrum of educational choice. It is true, of course, that the public school districts adjacent to Cleveland have declined to participate in the voucher program, but there is not the slightest hint in the record that when the Ohio statute was enacted either the legislators or the governor had any idea that the public school districts adjacent to Cleveland would not participate. What we measure today is not whether the children in Cleveland have the fullest conceivable range of options available to them that a panel of federal judges might think to be ideal, but rather, whether the statute, as enacted, has the primary effect of advancing religion by involving the state in governmental indoctrination under Agostini's first criterion. See Mitchell, 120 S. Ct. at 2541-44.To my knowledge, no federal court has ever held that a school-choice voucher program is unconstitutional because the range of choices does not include a public school option; certainly the majority does not cite such a case.