Opinion ID: 550707
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Instructions 54-56--Ground G

Text: 70 In Ground G of his second petition, Byrd claims that Instructions 54-56 unconstitutionally required him to prove mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, or were at least so confusing that a reviewing court could not determine whether the jury reached its conclusion on the basis of an unconstitutional understanding. The district court rejected this claim as an abuse of the writ and on the merits. Byrd v. Delo, 733 F.Supp. at 1344-45. 71 On appeal, Byrd makes the same procedural argument which we rejected in our discussion of Ground A, i.e., that the actual innocence exception should apply because Byrd would not have been sentenced to death if the jury had been properly instructed. 72 As noted in our discussion of Ground A, the evidence of multiple aggravating circumstances was compelling and Byrd's evidence of mitigating circumstances is weak. We therefore hold that the actual innocence exception, as it applies in the penalty phase, does not apply because Byrd would have been sentenced to death even if the jury instructions had been less confusing. 5. Proportionality--Ground I 73 In Ground I of his second petition, Byrd claims that his death sentence is disproportionate when compared with those of similar offenders. Byrd states that he did not raise this claim in his first petition because he only recently discovered evidence that the Missouri Supreme Court had based its proportionality review of his sentence on inaccurate information. Under Missouri law, the Missouri Supreme Court's staff is required to prepare a synopsis of all cases in which a sentence of death or life without parole was imposed after May 26, 1977. Brief of Appellant at 19. Byrd claims that the Missouri Supreme Court's records are incomplete and inaccurate, and that the court therefore could not have engaged in the required proportionality review. Id. at 21. 74 Where, as here, the petitioner's claim is based on newly discovered evidence, the cause and prejudice test is inapplicable. Instead, the court must determine whether the newly discovered evidence would have resulted in an acquittal or a lesser sentence on retrial. See Mastrian, 554 F.2d at 823. As noted above, Byrd's crimes and the evidence at trial were quite similar to those in Gilmore and other cases where the death penalty has been imposed. Cf. State v. Gilmore, 661 S.W.2d 519, 525 (Mo.1983) (banc) (citing similar cases), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 945, 104 S.Ct. 1931, 80 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983). The court therefore finds that a more comprehensive database would not have changed the Missouri Supreme Court's holding that his death sentence was not disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant. State v. Byrd, 676 S.W.2d at 507. 11