Opinion ID: 2325769
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Hearing; Disposition

Text: (1) No more than 20 days after the Commonwealth files an answer pursuant to Rule 906(E)(1) or (E)(2), or if no answer is filed as permitted in Rule 906(E)(2), within 20 days after the expiration of the time for answering, the judge shall review the petition, the Commonwealth's answer, if any, and other matters of record relating to the defendant's claim(s), and shall determine whether an evidentiary hearing is required. (2) If the judge is satisfied from this review that there are no genuine issues concerning any material fact, the defendant is not entitled to post-conviction collateral relief, and no legitimate purpose would be served by any further proceedings, (a) the judge shall give notice to the parties of the intention to dismiss the petition and shall state in the notice the reasons for the dismissal. (b) The defendant may respond to the proposed dismissal within 20 days of the date of the notice. Pa.R.Crim.P. 909(B). We have previously made clear that the intent behind these rules is to ensure that an evidentiary hearing is held when a PCRA petition raises factual issues that must be resolved. Commonwealth v. Banks, 540 Pa. 143, 656 A.2d 467, 473 (1995). [N]otice of a court's intention to dismiss is required only where the trial court, after review of the petition, any answer by the Commonwealth thereto, and any other matters of record, determines that a hearing is not necessary, that the petitioner is not entitled to post-conviction relief, and that no further proceedings are necessary.  Id. (emphasis in original). In Commonwealth v. Lark, 548 Pa. 441, 698 A.2d 43, 52 (1997), we concluded that no pre-dismissal notice was required pursuant to Rule 907(a) because the court had heard oral argument on the matter of whether an evidentiary hearing was required prior to determining that there were no factual matters to be resolved. [24] Based on our holdings in Banks and Lark, we conclude that the PCRA court did not violate Rules 907 or 909 by failing to provide Appellant with formal written notice of intent to dismiss his guilt-phase claims. A brief procedural history of Appellant's case will suffice to explain this conclusion. Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition on January 13, 2004. The PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed an amended PCRA petition on January 28, 2005. The Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss on June 2, 2005, to which Appellant filed a reply on December 20, 2005. On February 21, 2006, the PCRA court held a hearing, at which time defense counsel correctly asserted that, under prevailing law, an evidentiary PCRA hearing is required when there is an outstanding issue of material fact. N.T., 2/21/06, PCRA Hearing, at 3. Defense counsel then argued that a hearing was required for many of Appellant's guilt phase as well as penalty phase claims. After hearing the arguments of defense counsel and then the Commonwealth, the court made clear its conclusion that there was no need for an evidentiary hearing as to the guilt phase claims. Id. at 46-47. However, the court did grant an evidentiary hearing as to Appellant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase. Id. at 46-47. Appellant had ample notice and ample opportunity to set forth the material facts that, in his view, remained at issue and accordingly justified an evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, we hold that there was no violation of Rules 907(1) or 909(B), and Appellant is entitled to no relief on his tenth and final issue. In sum, after review of each of Appellant's guilt phase issues, we conclude that none has any merit, and therefore we affirm the order of the PCRA court denying Appellant guilt phase relief. Chief Justice CASTILLE, Justices EAKIN, BAER, ORIE MELVIN, join the opinion. Justice TODD concurs in the result.