Opinion ID: 1518320
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Amended Pleading

Text: Goswami argues that the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court's summary judgment against his claim for quantum meruit because his summary judgment proof raised a fact issue to defeat the motion. Metropolitan, however, asserts that Goswami's summary judgment evidence cannot be considered because there are no underlying pleadings to support it. The court of appeals held that since the trial court granted summary judgment denying recovery on the wrongful foreclosure claim, the filing of the amended petition was immaterial. 713 S.W.2d at 129. We disagree. Goswami filed an amended petition alleging unjust enrichment four days before the date of the summary judgement hearing. Metropolitan also asserts that since the record does not show that leave of court was granted to file the amended pleading within seven days of the hearing it should be disregarded. Rule 63 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provides: Parties may amend their pleadings ... provided, that any amendment offered for filing within seven days of the trial... shall be filed only after leave of the judge is obtained, which leave shall be granted by the judge unless there is a showing that such amendments will operate as a surprise of the opposite party. Accordingly, pleading amendments sought within seven days of the time of trial are to be granted unless there has been a showing of surprise to the opposite party. Rogers v. Gonzales, 654 S.W.2d 509, 515 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.). A liberal interpretation has been given to Rule 63. Texas courts have held that in the absence of a sufficient showing of surprise by the opposing party, the failure to obtain leave of court when filing a late pleading may be cured by the trial court's action in considering the amended pleading. Lloyds of London v. Walker, 716 S.W.2d 99, 103 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); West v. Touchstone, 620 S.W.2d 687, 689 n. 2 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Swinney v. Winters, 532 S.W.2d 396, 400 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Lucas v. Hayter, 376 S.W.2d 790 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio, 1964, writ dism'd). A summary judgment proceeding is a trial within the meaning of Rule 63. See Leche v. Stautz, 386 S.W.2d 872 (Tex.Civ. App.-Austin 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Jones v. Houston Materials Co., 477 S.W.2d 694, 695 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1972, no writ). The record does not reflect whether leave of court was requested or granted. In addition, the record gives no indication that the trial court refused leave to file nor does it contain a motion to strike the amended petition. The amended petition is a part of the record that was before the trial court and the trial court's judgment states that all pleadings on file were considered by the court. Since the record is silent of any basis to conclude that the amended petition was not considered by the trial court, and inasmuch as Metropolitan has not shown surprise or prejudice, leave of court is presumed. Lloyd's of London v. Walker, 716 S.W.2d at 103; Swinney v. Winters, 532 S.W.2d at 400. [1] We therefore conclude that Goswami's claim for quantum meruit was properly before the trial court. The standards for reviewing summary judgment are well settled. They are as follows: 1. The movant for summary judgment has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 2. In deciding whether there is a disputed material fact issue precluding summary judgment, evidence favorable to the non-movant will be taken as true. 3. Every reasonable inference must be indulged in favor of the non-movant and any doubts resolved in its favor. Nixon v. Mr. Property Management, 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex.1985). Goswami testified by deposition that he made eleven payments of $2,091 each to Metropolitan or to its attorney, five of these payments were to bring the mortgage current and six were monthly mortgage payments made as they became due. The last payment was cashed after the foreclosure. In addition, he paid $70,000 for repairing and rehabilitating the property and paid over $4,000 for property taxes. Because fact issues exist as to Goswami's claim for wrongful foreclosure and quantum meruit, the court of appeals erred in affirming the summary judgment. City of Houston v. Clear Lake Basin Authority, 589 S.W.2d 671 (Tex.1979). The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed and this cause is remanded to the trial court for a trial on its merits.