Opinion ID: 505504
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: AR 4-6.03A As Applied

Text: 23 Turning to the application of the regulation, Rode asserts that it was improperly applied to punish her exercise of her first amendment rights. It is a well established principle that government employment does not require an employee to completely forego the exercise of the right to freedom of speech. Wilson v. Taylor, 733 F.2d 1539, 1542 (11th Cir.1984); Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968). Employees who claim that adverse employment action was taken against them based upon the exercise of this right bear a dual burden. They must show that they were engaged in constitutionally protected conduct and that the conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the government employer's decision. Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287, 97 S.Ct. 568, 576, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977). 24 It is undisputed that Rode's telephone interview played a substantial or motivating factor in her suspension. The district court found, however, that Rode's speech was unprotected because it did not involve matters of public interest but rather represented an unprotected employee dispute over personnel policies. Rode, 646 F.Supp. at 881. The court relied in large part upon Rode's admission at her deposition that she had merely agreed to speak to a reporter concerning [her] own personal problem with an employment situation. Id. 25 Public employees retain their first amendment right to comment on matters of public concern. Pickering, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968). Thus, the protected or unprotected character of Rode's speech is a preliminary problem of importance. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 1688, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983). Even if Rode's speech is found to be protected, however, her first amendment right must still be balanced against the State's right as an employer to promote the efficient delivery of its police services. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568, 88 S.Ct. at 1734. 26 The Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of determining whether a public employee's speech touches on matters of public concern: 27 [W]hen a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public concern, but instead as an employee upon matters only of personal interest, absent the most unusual circumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the employee's behavior. 28 Connick, 461 U.S. at 147, 103 S.Ct. at 1690. Otherwise, the Court noted, judicial oversight of federal or state employment would become intrusive and unmanageable. Id. at 146, 103 S.Ct. at 1689. The character of the employee's speech is a question of law to be determined by examining the content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record. Id. at 147-48, 103 S.Ct. at 1690. (footnote omitted). 29 Complete reliance on Rode's motivation for speaking is inappropriate. In Connick, the employee was unhappy with her proposed transfer and it was this unhappiness which motivated her distribution of a questionnaire to fellow employees. However, this factor was not determinative in deciding whether the employee's speech concerned matters of public interest. The Court focused particularly upon the content of the employee's speech, finding that, for the most part, it concerned internal employment practices that had no public interest character. Id. at 148-49, 103 S.Ct. at 1690-91. Notwithstanding her motivation, the Court found that one question in the questionnaire, concerning pressure to participate in political campaigns, did touch upon a matter of public concern. Id. at 149, 103 S.Ct. at 1691. 30 Similarly, in Czurlanis v. Albanese, 721 F.2d 98, 104 (3d Cir.1983), this court determined that a public employee spoke on matters of public concern when he sought to bring to light actual or potential wrongdoing or breach of the public trust by certain public officials. We suggested that motivation was merely one factor to be considered, but not necessarily controlling, in assessing the character of the employee's speech. Id. But see Callaway v. Hafeman, et al., 832 F.2d 414 (7th Cir.1987), which we believe is distinguishable on its facts. 31 The content, form, and context of Rode's comments reveal that she was speaking on a matter of public concern. Rode's complaints, while expressed because of her personal employment problems with the PSP, were a matter of serious public import. Rode may have been the disgruntled employee so disfavored in Connick, 461 U.S. at 148, 103 S.Ct. at 1690, and Czurlanis, 721 F.2d at 104. But Rode did not merely claim that she was being mistreated--she claimed that she was a victim of retaliation arising out of racial animus within the PSP. This was a matter of grave public concern, especially in light of the prior protracted history of litigation against the PSP charging it with racial animus in its employment practices, 3 and as evidenced by the news reporter's initiative in contacting Rode. Moreover, the hearings conducted by the state legislature to determine the extent of racial discrimination in the PSP attest to the public's concern. 32 Dismissing Rode's speech as unprotected merely because she had a personal stake in the controversy fetters public debate on an important issue because it muzzles an affected public employee from speaking out. Thus, we hold that when a public employee participates in an interview sought by a news reporter on a matter of public concern, the employee is engaged in the exercise of a first amendment right to freedom of speech, even though the employee may have a personal stake in the substance of the interview. 33 The determination that Rode's comments constituted protected speech does not end the inquiry. Her exercise of this right must be balanced against the right of her employer to promote the efficiency of the public services it renders through its employees. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568, 88 S.Ct. at 1734. Under Connick, the defendant may show that the PSP's legitimate interest in promoting efficiency, integrity, and discipline in public service outweighed Rode's interest in public discourse. 461 U.S. at 150-51, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92. The district court did not reach this question of law. The relevant facts for the most part are undisputed. The parties have briefed the issue on appeal and, instead of remanding, we consider it in the interest of judicial economy. See, e.g., Czurlanis, 721 F.2d at 102, 105. 34 There is little evidence that Rode's speech reduced her ability to perform her duties, an important consideration in Connick, where the district attorney's office required close working relationships between the complaining assistant district attorney and her superiors. 461 U.S. at 151, 103 S.Ct. at 1692. The importance of this factor was also emphasized in Sprague v. Fitzpatrick, 546 F.2d 560, 564 (3d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 937, 97 S.Ct. 2649, 53 L.Ed.2d 255 (1977), where the District Attorney's alter ego, the First Assistant Attorney, was terminated for criticizing the District Attorney. Here, Rode worked at essentially clerical tasks, the performance of which did not require her to work closely with her supervisors. In addition, the article most directly criticized personnel director Harhigh, who was separated from Rode in the chain of command. 35 The disruption of the workplace caused by Rode's speech is also relevant. Connick, 461 U.S. at 153, 103 S.Ct. at 1693. The news reporter interviewed Rode during non-work hours while she was at home. The defendants point to the disruption of the workplace when the Paxton Herald published the article. With respect to Rode's participation in the interview, we note that she did not seek it but that the newspaper reporter sought her out because of the public's concern with PSP employment practices. Compare Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1693 (only slight public interest inherent in employee's questionnaires). We thus must balance the interest of the public against the possible disruption in the workplace caused by the initial publication of the article. However, the defendants apparently did not consider the disruption caused by the initial publication serious, because the defendants themselves reproduced and disseminated the article in the workplace. See Czurlanis, 721 F.2d at 107. Thus, we conclude that under the circumstances, Rode's exercise of free speech did not impermissibly affect the State's interest in the efficiency and performance of the PSP. Rode is thus entitled to a determination of her damages. 4 III. 36 Rode also contends that the defendants allegedly retaliated against her by (1) transferring her from the Personnel Bureau; (2) assigning her demeaning tasks; (3) failing to provide training and work assignments; (4) making derogatory statements about her to fellow employees; and (5) taking away her office and filing cabinet. Rode, 646 F.Supp. at 880 (footnote omitted). Rode claims that PSP predicated these actions on her relationship with her brother-in-law Hileman and his testimony in the Clanagan civil rights case against PSP. 37 As a matter of logic, Rode must meet both legal and evidentiary requirements in asserting a cognizable cause of action to challenge the defendants' employment decisions. First, she must marshal sufficient facts to show that her employee problems are in some way related to Hileman's testimony. Second, she must identify a cause of action capable of affording her relief. 38 Rode has presented evidence to show that her objective job performance ratings rapidly declined after Hileman testified in the Clanagan litigation in August 1982. Further, not long after his testimony, her superiors transferred her to a position with less responsibility and less favorable working assignments and conditions. Rode's relationship with Hileman provides the nexus for her contention that there is some causal connection between his testimony on behalf of a black police lieutenant in hotly contested legal proceedings and her harassment. Analogizing to the more typical employment discrimination case, Rode arguably has presented a prima facie case suggesting the treatment accorded her related to Hileman's testimony. Cf. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) (employment discrimination under Title VII); Chipollini v. Spencer, 814 F.2d 893 (3d Cir.1987) (in banc) (employment discrimination under ADEA), cert. dismissed, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 26, 97 L.Ed.2d 815 (1987). 39 Like the ordinary defendant in an employment discrimination case, the defendants here have contested this prima facie case by asserting legitimate business reasons for each challenged job action. Cf. Chipollini, 814 F.2d at 899. They contend that Rode's transfer was premised on her inability to adjust to a departmental reorganization and her personality conflicts with her supervisor. They argue that her new assignments and conditions were related to the length of time required to establish a new position for Rode. Finally, the defendants challenge the inference that the employment actions were related to Hileman's testimony, asserting that Rode's relationship with her superiors had declined even before Hileman had been subpoenaed in August 1982. The defendants thus have attempted to rebut Rode's prima facie case by pointing to evidence supporting a non-discriminatory motive. 40 Rode, in turn, counters by attempting to show that the defendants' proffered legitimate rationale for her treatment is in fact pretextual. Cf. Chipollini, 814 F.2d at 899. She notes that she contemporaneously challenged the accuracy of each of the negative evaluations given after Hileman's testimony. She supports the inference that her employment problems were related to Hileman's testimony by pointing to the excellent performance rating she received in April 1982. It seems clear that we thus have a question of fact and a credibility issue sufficient to resist a motion for summary judgment. Cf. Jackson v. University of Pittsburgh, 826 F.2d 230, 234-35 (3d Cir.1987) (issue of credibility created under Title VII where discharged employee challenges basis of employer criticism of performance), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 732, 98 L.Ed.2d 680 (1988); Chipollini, 814 F.2d at 900 (inconsistencies in employer's proffered reason for discharge might support inference of pretext). 41 Rode's difficulty is not with establishing the necessary factual basis to support an inference that the defendants' actions were related to Hileman's testimony. Rather, the problem with Rode's claim is her failure to find a legal vehicle to carry her factual argument. The personnel decisions of state employers are not ordinarily subject to challenge in federal court. A claimant must challenge state employment actions based either on an asserted violation of constitutional rights or upon a violation of a federal statute. 42 Rode has attempted to mold her basic factual argument into two different causes of action. She first argues that she may assert a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 because the defendants' actions violated her constitutional rights to freedom of association and equal protection. She then argues that she may bring a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1985 because she was injured in the course of a conspiracy by the defendants to intimidate Hileman, who was a witness in a separate pending federal court action. A. Freedom of Association 43 Rode argues that she has a valid cause of action under section 1983 because the defendants violated her right to freedom of association. She contends that the defendants engaged in the course of retaliatory harassment described above in violation of the first amendment to deter her from associating with Hileman. 5 The defendants argue that Rode failed to present evidence that her relationship with Hileman was a close one protected by the amendment. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants on this claim, holding that Rode's relationship with her brother-in-law is not entitled to first amendment protection. Rode, 646 F.Supp. at 881. 44 Government employment does not require an employee to forego the exercise of the right to freedom of association. Wilson v. Taylor, 733 F.2d 1539, 1542 (11th Cir.1984). Employees, however, who claim that adverse employment action was taken against them based upon the exercise of their associational rights must show that they were engaged in constitutionally protected conduct, which conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the government employer's decision. Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. at 287, 97 S.Ct. at 576. 45 Two sometimes overlapping types of protected association have been recognized: associations founded on intimate human relationships in which freedom of association is protected as a fundamental element of liberty, and associations formed for the purpose of engaging in activities protected by the first amendment, such as the exercise of speech, assembly, and religion. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 3249, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984). Rode asserts that her relationship with Hileman was protected as an intimate association; she does not claim that she and Hileman banded together for the purpose of engaging in other protected activities. 46 Although the precise boundaries of this protection are unclear, it seems that at least some family relationships fall within its ambit. For [f]amily relationships, by their nature, involve deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares not only a special community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctly personal aspects of one's life. Id. at 619-20, 104 S.Ct. at 3250. Yet, not all family relationships are likely to be of similar character. Thus, in determining whether a particular association is sufficiently personal or private to warrant constitutional protection, factors such as size, purpose, selectivity, and the exclusion of others from the critical aspects of the relationship are to be considered. Board of Directors of Rotary International, et al. v. Rotary Club of Duarte, --- U.S. ----, ----, 107 S.Ct. 1940, 1945, 95 L.Ed.2d 474 (1987). Only relationships distinguished by such attributes as relative smallness, a high degree of selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from others in critical aspects of the relationship are likely to implicate protection. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620, 104 S.Ct. at 3250. 47 An application of these principles to the present facts yields the conclusion that Rode's relationship with her brother-in-law was not of the sort afforded special constitutional protection. Her relationship with Hileman was neither selected, compare Wilson v. Taylor, 733 F.2d 1539, 1544 (11th Cir.1984) (dating relationship protected), nor bound by blood, see Trujillo v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs of City of Santa Fe, 768 F.2d 1186, 1188-89 (10th Cir.1985) (relationship with son or brother protected). Nor would her assertion that she and Hileman were good friends appear sufficient to invoke protection where their relationship was not based on the creation and sustenance of a family. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619, 104 S.Ct. at 3250. Thus, Rode's freedom of association claim fails as a matter of law. We believe that the district court correctly determined that Rode's association with her brother-in-law was not constitutionally protected. B. Equal Protection Claim 48 Rode next contends that the defendants retaliated against her because of her association with a supporter of racial minorities. The district court apparently rejected this claim because the defendants' retaliatory actions did not deprive Rode of a property interest. Rode, 646 F.Supp. at 880. Employment decisions such as those at issue here, which do not terminate or abridge Rode's employment contract, and which could be litigated in state tribunals, do not constitute deprivations of property interests under the fourteenth amendment. Cf. Brown v. Brienen, 722 F.2d 360, 364-65 (7th Cir.1983) (employment decisions which do violate employment contract may not form basis for suit under section 1983). [T]he Constitution must not be trivialized by being dragged into every dispute in state and local government. Id. at 365. 49 Nonetheless, a pattern of harassment not implicating an employee's property rights may constitute a fourteenth amendment violation where it is motivated by the employee's exercise of protected constitutional rights or by invidious discriminatory intent. See, e.g., Bennis v. Gable, 823 F.2d 723, 731 (3d Cir.1987) (demotion actionable where motivated by employee's exercise of first amendment rights). 50 Rode's equal protection clause argument ultimately fails because she has not asserted that she is a member of a protected class. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) (elements of employment discrimination under Title VII). Rode admits that she is not a member of a racial minority. She relies instead upon that line of cases which suggests that supporters of racial minorities may be protected from retaliatory treatment. Cf. Richardson v. Miller, 446 F.2d 1247, 1249 (3d Cir.1971) (42 U.S.C. Sec. 1985(3) racial animus requirement met where plaintiff is a supporter of blacks); Waller v. Butkovich, 584 F.Supp. 909, 937 (M.D.N.C.1984). 51 Rode, however, does not present any evidence to suggest that she was perceived as a supporter of minorities or that she in fact supported them. She relies only on evidence of harassment due to her association with someone perceived as such a supporter. We hold that this attenuated connection by a person not a member of and not perceived as a supporter of minorities is insufficient to accord a person protection from discriminatory treatment based on racial animus or prejudice. Rode's section 1983 action based upon a violation of the equal protection clause therefore fails. 6