Opinion ID: 4682858
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Trust’s Motions to Seal

Text: The Trust’s opening brief, reply brief, and appendix contain information about Dr. Robertson’s 1980 appointment letter from BYU. The Trust moved to seal parts of these documents, saying that BYU had designated these parts as highly confidential. BYU supported the motions, explaining that it had designated the information as confidential because it had appeared in Dr. Robertson’s employment file. With this explanation, BYU cited an unpublished district court order, which protected the confidentiality of employment files. Hamilton v. Ogden Weber Tech. Coll., No. 1:16-CV-00048-JNP-DBP, 2017 WL 5633106, at  (D. Utah Nov. 21, 2017). We deny the Trust’s motions to seal. To obtain an order to seal, the Trust must “overcome[] a presumption in favor of access to judicial records by ‘articulat[ing] a real and substantial interest that justifies depriving the public of access to the records that inform our decisionmaking process.’” Sacchi v. IHC Health Servs., Inc., 918 F.3d 1155, 1160 (10th Cir. 2019) (second alteration in original) (quoting Eugene S. v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of N.J., 663 F.3d 1124, 1135–36 (10th Cir. 2011)). 21 The parties have not shown a “real and substantial” privacy interest in the existence or content of Dr. Robertson’s appointment letter. The cited order served to protect discovery, not seal a court’s docket, and the considerations differ. See Helm v. Kansas, 656 F.3d 1277, 1292 (10th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he parties cannot overcome the presumption against sealing judicial records simply by pointing out that the records are subject to a protective order in the district court.”). So the parties have not justified sealing, and we deny the Trust’s motions.