Opinion ID: 2268089
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Cross-Examine Mr. Judge

Text: The bulk of appellant's ineffective assistance claim is based on the notion that his trial counsel failed to conduct any meaningful cross-examination of Edward Judge even though he had numerous grounds on which to impeach Mr. Judge's testimony. Mr. Judge was arguably the government's key witness: only he was able to peer from underneath his blanket to see what was happening, and only he was able to identify appellant as the murderer. Appellant characterizes Mr. Judge as someone who came across as very sure of himself and argues that his counsel had significant impeachment evidence available which would have undermined Judge's credibility. We are not persuaded. Appellant first contends that counsel should have cross-examined Mr. Judge about his identification. At trial Mr. Judge stated that he was able to identify appellant as the intruder because I recognized his voice. In his statement to the police, however, Mr. Judge said that the taller intruder was wearing a device to alter his voice [19] and that he was not able to match a face with the voice until several weeks later. Appellant also notes that Mr. Judge told the police that Mr. Robinson pressured him about the identity of the intruders before he talked to any police officer. Although these facts may undermine Mr. Judge's identification of appellant in some measure, they are not sufficient to cast doubt on the outcome of the trial. The government had a strong case against appellant even without Mr. Judge's identification testimony. Appellant owned the blue jump suits; he was seen wearing one of them on the night before the murders; he was of the same height and build as the taller of the intruders; and he admitted that he made the 911 call, using a false name. Additionally, Mr. Judge was not equivocal in his identification of appellant. He identified photographs of him to the police; he identified him in open court before the jury; and he stated, There is no doubt in my mind about [appellant's] being the person that was there. Although the facts offered by appellant in his § 23-110 motion may weaken Mr. Judge's identification to a certain extent, we are not convinced that they undermine it to such a degree that there was a significant chance of a different outcome in the trial. Appellant also criticizes his trial counsel for failing to cross-examine Mr. Judge about his motive for testifying. At trial Mr. Judge stated that he returned to the District of Columbia after leaving town because he had nightmares which caused him to come back and turn myself in to the police department. But, according to the police investigation report, Mr. Judge was arrested for violating his probation and agreed to discuss the murders only after that arrest. [20] Mr. Judge also told the police that the reason he did not come to them immediately after the murders was that he was concerned about his parole violation, not that he was afraid of appellant as he testified at trial. Although some of these facts might have been useful for impeachment, appellant has not shown that the outcome of the trial would have been different had the jury learned this additional information. As we have pointed out, the government had a strong case, and Mr. Judge never wavered in his identification of appellant. Appellant next claims that his trial counsel should have questioned Mr. Judge about the details of his account of the murders. At trial Mr. Judge testified that the intruders were wearing gloves and that the handle of the intruder's knife was brown. Mr. Judge initially told the police, however, that the intruders were not wearing gloves and had stubby fingers. He also said that the knife handle was white. These discrepancies, in our view, involved only minor details and would not have affected the outcome of the trial. Moreover, these details do not relate to the voice and behavior of the intrudersincluding, in particular, the fact that the intruder who committed the murders was hard of hearing, as was appellant. Those were the characteristics that enabled Mr. Judge to identify appellant, whom he had seen every day for months, listening to him talk and have conversations with various people. Counsel's failure to cross-examine Mr. Judge on these minor points did not cause any significant prejudice to appellant's case. Finally, appellant argues that his trial counsel should have confronted Mr. Judge about a statement he made alleging that appellant raped Kimberly Smith before he killed her. Appellant correctly points out that there was no information to support such an allegation in the medical examiner's report. Mr. Judge's statement about the rape, however, came as a non-responsive answer to a question by the prosecutor, and the prosecutor (wisely) never followed up on it. Additionally, appellant was not charged with rape, and any suggestion of rape was immaterial to the crimes with which he was charged. For these reasons we conclude that counsel's failure to cross-examine Mr. Judge on this point had no effect on the outcome of the trial.