Opinion ID: 1880763
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admitting Orders Containing Fact Findings

Text: On June 24, 1999, the trial court issued a Temporary Order Following Adversary Hearing. [9] That order included these findings: 3.1 The Court finds there is sufficient evidence to satisfy a person of ordinary prudence and caution that: (1) there was a danger to the physical health or safety of the child(ren) which was caused by an act or failure to act of the person entitled to possession and for the child(ren) to remain in the home is contrary to the welfare of the child(ren); (2) the urgent need for protection required the immediate removal of the child(ren) and makes efforts to eliminate or prevent the child(ren)'s removal impossible or unreasonable; and (3) notwithstanding reasonable efforts to eliminate the need for the child(ren)'s removal and enable the child(ren) to return home, there is a substantial risk of a continuing danger if the child(ren) [is/are] returned home. 3.2 The Court finds sufficient evidence to satisfy a person of ordinary prudence and caution that there is a continuing danger to the physical health or safety of the child(ren) and for the child(ren) to remain in the home is contrary to the welfare of the child(ren). 3.3 The Court finds that all reasonable efforts consistent with time and circumstances and pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sections 671(a)(15) and 672(a)(1) have been made by the [Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services] to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child(ren) from the home and to make it possible for the child(ren) to return home, but it is not in the child(ren)'s best interest to remain at home. 3.4 The Court finds that the placement of the child(ren) with the child(ren)'s noncustodial parent or with a relative of the child(ren) is inappropriate and not in the best interest of the child(ren). 3.6 [sic] The Court finds that the following orders for the safety and welfare of the child(ren) are in the best interest of the child(ren). On April 6, 2000, the trial court issued an order based on a permanency hearing. [10] In that order, the trial court concluded: 2.6 The Court finds that neither the child(ren)'s parent(s) nor any other person or entity entitled to service under Chapter 102, Tex. Fam.Code, is willing and able to provide the child(ren) with a safe environment and; therefore, return of the child(ren) to a parent or other person or entity is not in the child(ren)'s best interest.... During the subsequent termination proceeding, the Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services (the Department) offered both orders into evidence over Strickland's objection. The trial judge overruled the objection and admitted the orders, along with the service plans submitted by the Department at those earlier hearings. The Department relied on the orders and service plans to show what Strickland had been ordered to do to retain custody of her children, and that she had not complied. The judge presiding at the termination proceeding was the same judge that presided over the earlier hearings and signed the orders admitted into evidence in the termination hearing. Strickland complains that admitting the orders violated Texas Rule of Evidence 605, which states that [t]he judge presiding at the trial may not testify in that trial as a witness. [11] Though Strickland's counsel objected to the admission of the orders, apparently on best evidence grounds, he did not specifically object under Rule 605. But Rule 605 states: No objection need be made in order to preserve the point. [12] A judge's findings of fact are not technically the same as testimony. A finding of fact is [a] determination by a judge ... of a fact supported by the evidence in the record. [13] In this case, the orders submitted into evidence, containing findings based on pretrial evidence by the very judge presiding over the termination proceeding, could be, like a judicial comment on the weight of the evidence, a form of judicial influence no less proscribed than judicial testimony. [O]ur statutes, court-made rules, and judicial decisions emphatically and repeatedly prohibit Texas judges from commenting on the weight of the evidence. [14] A comment on the weight of the evidence may take many forms, [15] but this Court specifically prohibits judicial comments that indicate the opinion of the trial judge as to the verity or accuracy of the facts in inquiry. [16] Here, the jury was permitted to see findings of fact made by the very judge presiding over the trial, and those facts were the very ones that the jury itself was being asked to find. The fact-finding present in the orders admitted as evidence comes far too close to indicat[ing] the opinion of the trial judge as to the verity or accuracy of the facts in inquiry [17] for any comfort here. To be clear, admitting the orders as evidence in support of the Department's position that Strickland failed to comply with the orders of a court was not in itself inappropriate. However, the trial judge's factual findings that his order had, in fact, been violated, should have been redacted, so that the jury could draw its own conclusions as to whether Strickland had complied. Strickland did not object to the admission of the orders into evidence on this basis, but only on best evidence grounds. But even had Strickland properly objected and preserved the error, the error was not harmful and thus would not be reversible error. [18] In cases where the error complained of involves an evidentiary ruling, the reviewing court examines the whole record to determine if the complaining party was harmed by the erroneous admission or exclusion. [19] It was Strickland's burden to show that she was prejudiced by the admitted orders. [20] First, Strickland fails to point out how she was harmed by the admission of the judge's findings. Second, there is nothing in the record showing that the Department specifically based any of its arguments on the trial court's fact-findings, or that the Department even pointed out the findings to the jury for its particular consideration. Finally, there was ample other evidence that Strickland did not comply with the trial court's orders. For example, there were a total of six family service plans. The first was established in September 1998. At that time, Strickland's goals were to find an appropriate home for herself and her children, provide consistent and appropriate supervision for her children, obtain employment, and attend counseling. In April 1999, the Department established a Child Safety and Evaluation Plan, which required Strickland to cooperate with Child Protective Services (CPS), and to provide appropriate supervision for her children. Another service plan was proposed in May 1999; the record does not contain a copy of the plan itself, only the plan coversheet. After the children were removed from Strickland, another plan, established in July 1999, set out the following tasks Strickland had to accomplish in order to be reunified with her children: (1) find employment and pay child support; (2) participate in paternity testing; (3) form healthy and supportive relationships with adults that are beneficial to the family; (4) abstain from drug use, and show her compliance with this task by submitting to drug tests; (5) take parenting classes; (6) submit herself to psychological evaluation, cooperate in the evaluation sessions, and follow all recommendations made by the psychologist; and (7) attend individual counseling at least twice a month. The plan in effect when the trial judge held the Permanency Hearing had been established in November 1999. That plan required Strickland to cooperate with random drug screening, attend parenting classes, participate in counseling, provide a Health, Social, Educational and Genetic History for each child, find stable employment, find stable housing, and pay child support. In the caseworker's progress report, the caseworker indicated that Strickland failed several drug tests, and had thus far refused treatment for drug dependency. The caseworker noted that Strickland had been referred to the Texas Rehabilitation Commission for employment training, but that she did not follow up with the Commission after her initial appointment. The caseworker concluded that Strickland had not yet made enough progress toward alleviating or mitigating the causes for her children's removal from her care. Yet another plan, established in March 2000, required Strickland to submit to drug testing, and to attend parenting classes, psychological evaluation, and counseling. It also required that Strickland find stable employment. The progress notes pertaining to that plan indicated that Strickland had still not satisfactorily resolved any of the problems that had caused the removal of her children. The report stated: She has been unable to retain stable employment so that she could secure her own housing and pay her court-ordered child support. She has made no child support payments thus far. She was arrested on January 26, 2000 for seven warrants. She made payment arrangements and her warrants were taken out of her records. Ms. Strickland was released on January 28, 2000. In July 2000, a final plan called for Strickland to find stable employment and stable housing, pay child support, receive counseling, and continue to submit herself for drug testing. The caseworker's notes reported that Strickland's progress was still unsatisfactory. The report indicated that Strickland had not established stable housing, and that she was driving with an expired driver's license. The report stated that even though Strickland's children had been removed, she had continued to receive child support payments from the father of one of the boys, an amount totaling three thousand dollars, but that she still had not made any child support payments to the Department. Copies of the plans and the three progress reports were published to the jury. Additionally, the jury heard testimony from several people who had been involved in the case at different stages. Jill Badeaux had provided daycare for Strickland's five children before the children were removed from Strickland. Badeaux testified that the children's attendance at daycare was inconsistent, and that Strickland paid for the daycare services sporadically. She testified that two of the boys had particular behavioral problems, one with anger, the other with separation anxiety. She testified about burns on three of the boys. She testified as to the severity of the youngest boy's diaper rash, and stated that while Strickland did provide medication for the rash one time, Badeaux herself purchased medication to treat the rash. Badeaux also said that she had to purchase formula for the baby because Strickland sent him to daycare with only a bottle of Kool-Aid. Badeaux often purchased clothes and shoes for the boys. Badeaux testified that she would often take the boys home around six-thirty p.m., because if she did not, then Strickland would leave the boys at daycare until eight o'clock at night, even if Strickland was not at work. Badeaux also testified that on the occasions she had to bring the boys home, she would see teenagers hanging around Strickland's home. Badeaux said that she thought that the presence of the teenagers prevented Strickland from giving her own children enough time and attention, and that she had spoken to Strickland about it on several occasions. She also testified that many times when she was at Strickland's house, the children were outside alone and unsupervised. The CPS caseworker who first assisted Strickland, Debbie Dugas, also testified that Strickland often left her children in daycare until very late, sometimes eight o'clock at night. Dugas testified as to various injuries sustained by the children. Three of the children had suffered first-and second-degree burns, one had sustained a dislocated shoulder, another a cracked kneecap; the youngest boy suffered from severe diaper rash and, at one time, had a black eye. Dugas testified that she had referred Strickland for a psychological evaluation, but that Strickland never went. When asked whether Strickland had complied with the requirement that she participate in counseling, Dugas responded that Strickland attended counseling at first, but then ended up not making appointments. Dugas testified that Strickland held at least three different jobs while Dugas was handling the case, but that none of those jobs lasted very long. The jury also heard testimony from Sherry Tucker, a CPS investigator. Tucker testified about the burn injuries on the children, and as to the severity of the infant's diaper rash, which by that time had actually become genital fungus. She also testified as to the condition of Strickland's mobile home, which had a broken window, and two broken door latches (one of which was the front door). She testified that the children were using a fork to open the front door, and that it took as long as one minute to get the door open using the fork, which constituted a significant safety hazard. She also observed that much of the trailer's siding was either rotted or missing. She told the jury that at the time of her visit, there were four or five teenagers present in the home who were not related to Strickland. The jury also heard testimony from Yoshi Bennett, a CPS foster care worker. At the time of the trial, Bennett had worked with Strickland and the children for 18 months, attempting to help Strickland set and meet goals in order to reunify the family. Bennett testified that Strickland had not maintained steady employment throughout the pendency of the case, and had never paid any child support for the children since the time they were removed from her. Bennett also testified that Strickland had not been able to obtain reliable transportation, and that Strickland never complied with the paternity test requirement. Bennett testified that though Strickland was supposed to form healthy relationships with other adults, she continued to associate mostly with teenagers. Bennett stated that Strickland was supposed to find a suitable home for herself, but up until at least five or six weeks before the trial, Strickland still lived in an apartment with an eighteen-year-old. Bennett attested that Strickland only sporadically complied with drug-testing requirements, with some test results registering positive for drugs. Bennett testified, however, that Strickland did eventually successfully complete rehabilitation, and did not thereafter test positive for drugs. Bennett testified that Strickland attended required counseling sessions at first, but then her attendance dropped off, so that the program finally had to be cancelled. Bennett also testified that although Strickland was permitted weekly supervised visitation with her children, so long as she complied with the drug testing schedule, her visits were as infrequent as once a month or less. Strickland also attempted to see the children at other times without properly setting up a visitation appointment. The jury heard testimony from Karen Martinez, a CPS investigator who had also worked on Strickland's case. Martinez testified that she had investigated allegations of neglectful supervision, because someone had called to report that two of the boys were riding Big Wheel toys in the street unsupervised. Martinez also related that one day while she was out driving, she saw one of Strickland's children, unsupervised and unattended, crossing back and forth over the intersection of a busy street. Martinez testified that she returned the child to his home and spoke with Strickland about the incident. There was also testimony from Nathan Cormie, a therapist who worked with the children. Cormie testified that when he first started seeing the children, after their removal from Strickland, he treated them for neglect issues, separation issues, anger management, peer relationships, depression, and self-esteem. Cormie testified that since the children had been away from their mother, they appeared happy and were doing very well in school. Pat Coyt, one of the foster parents, was also called as a witness. She testified that she first started taking care of one of the boys when he was about eight years old. She told the jury that the boy would hide when he was scared or depressed, that he could neither read nor write, that he was incontinent, and that he was unfamiliar with personal hygiene. Coyt testified that after a year and a half in her care, the boy was happier, better adjusted, was better able to take personal care of himself, and was doing well in schoolso well, in fact, that he was making the A-B honor roll. The jury also had the opportunity to listen to Strickland's testimony. Strickland testified that she understood her children were removed because she had neglected them. She testified that she had not seen her children very much after they were removed from her, and that she had been going through rehab, going through parenting classes, trying to get my life together. She acknowledged that she was not employed at the time, and that she had been through several jobs and had been terminated for various reasons. She admitted that she had not paid any child support, as ordered by the court, and that she had used some of the money she was supposed to pay for child support to purchase illegal drugs. She also testified that she had not found child care for her children. When asked whether she had yet found suitable housing for herself, Strickland stated that she was living with a roommate, a nineteen-year-old girl, in an apartment, and that she had attempted to find suitable housing. She testified that she had finally found a three-bedroom house to rent, and that it needed some work and to be inspected, and then she could move in. Strickland reported that she had taken a test for a job, had scored a one hundred on the test, but had not yet found out whether she got the job. She indicated that she loved her children, and wanted her family to be reunited. Given this record, Strickland failed to show that but for the admission of the orders into evidence, the jury would have reached a different conclusion. [21] We therefore conclude Strickland was not harmed. Her first issue is overruled.