Opinion ID: 167660
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Is there a sufficient jurisdictional hook?

Text: 53 Finally, we consider whether the statute's reach was limited by an express jurisdictional element. Jeronimo-Bautista, 425 F.3d at 1269. As the Court explained in Morrison, a jurisdictional hook restricting the statute to activities that `have an explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce' .... may establish that the enactment is in pursuance of Congress' regulation of interstate commerce. 529 U.S. at 612, 120 S.Ct. 1740 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562, 115 S.Ct. 1624). A jurisdictional hook is not, however, a talisman that wards off constitutional challenges. See United States v. Rodia, 194 F.3d 465, 472-73 (3d Cir.1999) (rejecting a hard and fast rule that the presence of a jurisdictional element automatically ensures the constitutionality of a statute); United States v. Holston, 343 F.3d 83, 88 (2d Cir.2003) (finding the jurisdictional hook factor superficially met but not relying on the mere existence of jurisdictional language purporting to tie criminal conduct to interstate commerce). As the Eleventh Circuit has recently noted, where a jurisdictional element is required, a meaningful one, rather than a pretextual incantation evoking the phantasm of commerce, must be offered. Maxwell, 446 F.3d at 1217 (internal quotation marks, citations, and alteration omitted). The ultimate inquiry is whether the prohibited activity has a substantial effect on interstate commerce, and the presence of a jurisdictional hook, though certainly helpful, is neither necessary nor sufficient. 54 The principal practical consequence of a jurisdictional hook is to make a facial constitutional challenge unlikely or impossible, and to direct litigation toward the statutory question of whether, in the particular case, the regulated conduct possesses the requisite connection to interstate commerce. See Jones, 529 U.S. at 857, 120 S.Ct. 1904. In Jones, the Supreme Court unanimously held that an alleged violation of the federal arson statute fell outside the statute's jurisdictional hook, which limited application to `property used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce.' Id. at 850-51, 120 S.Ct. 1904 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 844(i)). The government argued that the jurisdictional hook was satisfied because the burned home was used in three activities affecting interstate commerce: securing a mortgage from an out-of-state lender, obtaining a casualty insurance policy from an out-of-state insurer, and receiving natural gas from out-of-state sources. Id. at 855, 120 S.Ct. 1904. The Court rejected this expansive interpretation in part because [p]ractically every building in our cities, towns, and rural areas is constructed with supplies that have moved in interstate commerce, served by utilities that have an interstate connection, financed or insured by enterprises that do business across state lines, or bears some other trace of interstate commerce. Id. at 857, 120 S.Ct. 1904. In Jones, therefore, the jurisdictional hook served the purpose of limiting the statute to arson cases where there really was a substantial and non-attenuated effect on interstate commerce. 55 The statute under which Mr. Patton was charged also has a jurisdictional hook, but it does not seriously limit the reach of the statute. The jurisdictional hook, § 921(a)(35), limits the definition of body armor to any product sold or offered for sale, in interstate or foreign commerce, as personal protective body covering intended to protect against gunfire. Nearly all body armor will meet that test. More important, there is no reason to think that possession of body armor that satisfies the jurisdictional hook has any greater effect on interstate commerce than possession of any other body armor. 56 If Congress intended to suppress the interstate market in body armor, then directing a prohibition on possession towards armor that had moved in interstate commerce would make sense. Cf. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128, 63 S.Ct. 82 (One of the primary purposes of the Act in question was to increase the market price of wheat and to that end to limit the volume thereof that could affect the market.). Where Congress has chosen to allow production, distribution, and sale of body armor in interstate commerce, however, it is hard to understand why possession of armor that meets that description is more objectionable than any other. See Holston, 343 F.3d at 89 (questioning the effectiveness of a jurisdictional hook when the interstate component underpinning the jurisdictional element, for example, the shipment of a video camera, is attenuated from the criminal conduct — the production of child pornography — which occurs entirely locally). 57 A jurisdictional hook that restricts a statute to items that bear a trace of interstate commerce is no restriction at all. Jones, 529 U.S. at 857, 120 S.Ct. 1904. To apply the body armor statute to every case where body armor was once sold across state lines would therefore replicate the government's error in Jones. If the jurisdictional hook had limited application of the statute to cases where the felon used body armor during commission of a crime that affected interstate commerce, we would know exactly what Congress's theory of its authority is. We would then be able to evaluate whether, on the facts of the case, the substantial and non-attenuated connection to interstate commerce that Congress expected was present. As it is, however, section 931's requirement that the body armor must once have traveled in interstate commerce is so sweeping as to be unhelpful in determining whether the activities regulated by the statute have a substantial and non-attenuated effect on interstate commerce. 58 Given that Mr. Patton's possession was not interstate, not commercial, and not an essential part of a comprehensive scheme of economic regulation, that his use of the bulletproof vest was in self-defense and not connected to crimes that might affect interstate commerce, and in light of the CBO's prediction that the statute would be applied fewer than ten times a year, we find no rational basis for concluding that the possession of body armor prohibited by section 931 substantially affects interstate commerce. We thus conclude that 18 U.S.C. § 931 cannot be justified as a regulation of the channels of commerce, as a protection of the instrumentalities of commerce, or as a regulation of intrastate activity that substantially affects interstate commerce.