Opinion ID: 2227398
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: State Police Powers

Text: In analyzing whether Indiana was justified in exercising its police powers when enacting IND. CODE § 16-13-21-14, the majority opinion looks to the United States Supreme Court decision in Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spanaus (1978), 438 U.S. 234, 98 S.Ct. 2716, 57 L.Ed.2d 727. The Court in Spanaus considered whether the disruption with contractual expectations was necessary to meet an important general societal problem and whether it was enacted to protect a broad societal interest rather than a narrow class. The majority opinion in our case examines the same factors and concludes their inquiry in the negative. I disagree with this conclusion. The majority opinion determines that the justification behind IND. CODE § 16-13-21-14 is insufficient in that it does not address a broad, generalized societal problem and it is not reasonably necessary for the protection of the health, safety, and welfare of the general public. I disagree with this determination. In analyzing the relationship between a state's right to exercise its police powers in a manner that impairs private contracts, the U.S. Supreme Court has said: [I]t is to be accepted as a [sic] commonplace that the Contract Clause does not operate to obliterate the police power of the States. `It is the settled law of this court that the interdiction of statutes impairing the obligation of contracts does not prevent the State from exercising such powers as are vested in it for the promotion of the common weal, or are necessary for the general good of the public, though contracts previously entered into between individuals may thereby be affected. This power, which in its various ramifications is known as the police power, is an exercise of the sovereign right of the Government to protect the lives, health, morals, comfort and general welfare of the people, and is paramount to any rights under contracts between individuals.' Keystone Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis (1987), 480 U.S. 470, 503, 107 S.Ct. 1232, 1251, 94 L.Ed.2d 472, 500, quoting Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell (1934), 290 U.S. 398, 54 S.Ct. 231, 78 L.Ed. 413. As the Court in Keystone explains, the first inquiry is whether the right to contract has been impaired. Certainly it has been in this case. The next inquiry must be into whether the public purpose asserted is significant and legitimate. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 505, 107 S.Ct. at 1252, 94 L.Ed.2d at 501. It is certainly true that statistically the mentally handicapped comprise less than a majority of the general public. In fact, in purely numeric terms, they may be considered insignificant. The care and treatment of this statistic minority, however, is of tremendous concern to society generally. The care and treatment of the mentally and physically handicapped in our State represents a significant financial obligation. Consequently, each individual taxpayer, regardless of his personal contact with or need for such services, has at least an economic interest in how they are managed. Each taxpayer has a direct interest in ensuring that every patient within the State system receives the most cost efficient, beneficial care possible, thus allowing them to function at their highest possible level of independence and productivity. Mainstreaming is regarded as an effective, efficient treatment option. Thus, mainstreaming creates economic benefits to society as a whole. The project of mainstreaming patients is designed not only to alleviate a substantial tax drain, but also to provide the social contact necessary to improve the patient's condition. By placing the patient in a situation closely replicating average day-to-day life, the patient will become a more productive citizen. It is certainly the goal of our State that each citizen should be encouraged to be as productive and independent as possible. Again, society as a whole is benefitted. Finally, mainstreaming provides a benefit to the neighborhood. As with any policy of integration, mainstreaming places the mentally and physically handicapped into an environment not generally acquainted with their nature and the daily challenges they face. Placing handicapped and nonhandicapped persons side by side helps to break stereotypes, overcome prejudices, and create a more understanding society. Again, society as a whole is benefitted. The argument that any legislative act aimed at benefiting society generally by first directly benefiting a minority of the population is improper sets a dangerous precedent. This rationale could be used to attack any social legislation aimed at protecting any racial, ethnic, physical, or religious minority. Our inquiry must be whether the legislative act was designed to protect the health, safety and welfare of the general public. The fact that it accomplishes this goal by first directly impacting a minority group and then secondarily impacting society in general is irrelevant so long as it can be shown that the action taken does, in fact, address a matter of general societal concern. Certainly, ensuring that the mentally and physically impaired receive effective treatment designed to aid them both in independent living and general productivity as citizens and that such treatment is conducted in a manner aimed at alleviating the financial burden on the State is a matter of general societal concern. Thus, the public purpose asserted is both legitimate and significant. Once satisfied of this point, the Court in Keystone directs us to our last test: A court must also satisfy itself that the legislature's adjustment of the rights and responsibilities of contracting parties is based upon reasonable conditions and is of a character appropriate to the public purpose justifying the legislation's adoption. Keystone at 505, 107 S.Ct. at 1252, 94 L.Ed.2d at 501. (Citations omitted.) The Court then goes on to recite what I believe to be the crucial consideration on this point. But, we have repeatedly held that unless the State is itself a contracting party, courts should properly defer to legislative judgment as to the necessity and reasonableness of a particular measure. Id. (Citations omitted.) I believe that Ind. Code § 16-13-21-14 was clearly a proper exercise of this State's police powers and thus not unconstitutional. The enactment represents a reasonable, rational approach to a significant problem impacting the general citizen population. Accordingly, the impairment of contractual obligations by the State was justified. The summary judgments entered against Christole and Hopewell should be reversed. DeBRULER, J., concurs.