Opinion ID: 1233910
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: evidentiary rulings prosecution case

Text: A. VALIDITY OF STIPULATION TO PRIOR CONVICTIONS At the outset of the second penalty trial, defense counsel indicated that, as at the first penalty trial, defendant would be stipulating that he had suffered three prior felony convictions: a 1978 rape conviction, a 1978 conviction of possession of a concealed weapon, and a 1980 conviction of receiving stolen property. In voir dire conducted by the district attorney, defendant indicated that he understood that by admitting the priors he was giving up his right to have live witnesses presented whom he could confront and cross-examine, that the jury would be told that there is no doubt about it, you were convicted of those three prior felony convictions, and that the priors would be used, as they had been used in the first penalty trial, as aggravating factors in the sentencing determination. Defendant confirmed that he wanted to admit the priors. Pursuant to the stipulation, the jury was informed at the penalty trial that defendant had admitted that he had suffered the three prior convictions. (7) Defendant now contends, however, that his stipulation to the priors was improper under In re Yurko (1972) 10 Cal.3d 857 [112 Cal. Rptr. 513, 519 P.2d 561], because, during the voir dire at the second penalty trial, defendant did not expressly waive his privilege against self-incrimination or his right to a jury or court trial on the prior convictions. In response, the Attorney General argues that Yurko is not applicable in this context, because defendant's stipulation to the priors was not analogous to the admission of the truth of a sentence enhancement as in Yurko, but was instead comparable to a stipulation to the admission of a subsidiary evidentiary matter. The Attorney General's position is well taken. Unlike the defendant's stipulation in In re Yurko, supra, 10 Cal.3d 857, which automatically subjected the defendant to an increased sentence under the California habitual criminal law and thus was somewhat comparable to a guilty plea as to which a waiver of rights is constitutionally required (see Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238, 242 [23 L.Ed.2d 274, 279, 89 S.Ct. 1709]; In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122, 132-133 [81 Cal. Rptr. 577, 460 P.2d 449]), defendant's admission of the priors in this case did not inevitably subject defendant to an increased penalty. Here, the priors were simply evidence in aggravation that the jury was to consider along with all of the other aggravating and mitigating evidence presented at the penalty phase. Neither Yurko nor any other California decision requires an on-the-record waiver of rights by the defendant when the defendant or defense counsel stipulates to the admission of a subsidiary item of evidence of this nature. (See People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1038 [264 Cal. Rptr. 386, 782 P.2d 627]; People v. Robertson (1989) 48 Cal.3d 18, 38-42 [255 Cal. Rptr. 631, 767 P.2d 1109].) [13] B. ADMISSION OF FACTS UNDERLYING PRIOR CONVICTIONS (8) Defendant contends that even if his stipulation to the three prior felony convictions was properly obtained and admitted in evidence, the trial court erred in permitting the prosecution to go beyond the face of the prior convictions to present additional evidence of the specific circumstances of two of the prior offenses, the prior rape and the possession-of-a-concealed-weapon incident. Because the trial court found that the rape and concealed-weapon offenses constituted criminal activity involving the use ... or implied threat to use force of violence within the meaning of factor (b) of section 190.3 (factor (b)), [14] it concluded that the prosecution was authorized to introduce evidence of the underlying facts of the offenses and was not limited to relying on the record of conviction. Defendant takes issue with the trial court's conclusion, arguing that when the prosecution elects to introduce a felony conviction it cannot ... engage in overkill by also introducing evidence of the facts underlying the convictions. We have, however, specifically rejected an identical claim with respect to criminal activity relevant to factor (b) in numerous recent decisions (see, e.g., People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 638-641 [250 Cal. Rptr. 659, 758 P.2d 1189]; People v. Keenan (1988) 46 Cal.3d 478, 526 [250 Cal. Rptr. 550, 758 P.2d 1081]; People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 754 [244 Cal. Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741]), and defendant provides no basis for reexamining those holdings. C. ADMISSION OF HAIR SPRAY CAN INCIDENT (9) In addition to arguing that it was improper to admit any evidence beyond the record of the prior convictions, defendant takes particular issue with the admission of the testimony of the prior rape victim describing defendant's insertion of a hair spray can into her vagina. Defendant argues that because the current statute prohibiting the penetration of genital or anal openings by a foreign object  section 289  did not go into effect until 1979, after the date of the incident in question, the incident did not constitute violent criminal activity within the meaning of factor (b) (see ante, at p. 1184, fn. 14), and thus should not have been admitted. (See, e.g., People v. Phillips (1985) 41 Cal.3d 29, 72 [222 Cal. Rptr. 127, 711 P.2d 423].) For a number of reasons, defendant's claim lacks merit. First, even before the adoption of the current foreign object statute, the conduct in question was unquestionably criminal activity  at the least, a battery (§ 242)  involving force or violence. Thus, the incident could properly have been admitted as an aggravating circumstance under factor (b). (See, e.g., People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 201 [222 Cal. Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480].) Second, in any event, in this case the evidence was properly admitted as part of the circumstances of the prior rape offense. As noted, the hair spray can incident occurred during the course of the on-going sexual assault for which defendant was convicted of rape; the rape victim could properly relate this occurrence in describing the circumstances of the rape. (See, e.g., People v. Keenan, supra, 46 Cal.3d 478, 526; People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d 713, 756-757.) Indeed, at the conclusion of the penalty trial, the prosecution  in accordance with the procedure suggested in People v. Robertson (1982) 33 Cal.3d 21, 55, footnote 19 [188 Cal. Rptr. 77, 655 P.2d 279]  specified that the only other crimes on which it was relying as aggravating circumstances were the three prior offenses of which defendant had been convicted, and the trial court specifically instructed the jury that you may not consider any evidence of any other crime as an aggravating circumstance; the above three (3) crimes are the only ones you may consider. Thus, in this case, the jury was told not to consider the incident as separate criminal activity under factor (b). There was no error in admitting this evidence. D. ADMISSION OF FACTS UNDERLYING CONCEALED WEAPON CONVICTION (10) Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the facts underlying his conviction for possession of a concealed weapon. As we have seen, the trial court admitted the testimony of two nurses who worked at the infirmary of the California Youth Authority facility at which defendant was confined, who stated that they were present when defendant dropped a sharpened eight-and-one-half-inch table knife that had been concealed under his clothes. After the knife dropped, defendant handed it to one of the nurses without making any threatening statements or gestures. Defendant asserts that even if his section 12020 conviction for possessing the concealed knife was a prior felony conviction that was admissible under factor (c), [15] his conduct did not involve the use or attempted use of force or violence or ... [the] express or implied threat to use force or violence within the meaning of factor (b), and therefore evidence of the underlying facts of the incident should not have been admitted at the penalty phase. (See, e.g., People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 776 [215 Cal. Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782].) The Attorney General responds that possession of a concealed sharpened knife in a California Youth Authority facility is criminal activity that involves the implied threat to use force or violence under factor (b). People v. Harris (1981) 28 Cal.3d 935, 962-963 [171 Cal. Rptr. 679, 623 P.2d 240] directly supports the Attorney General's position. In Harris, the court, applying a virtually identical provision of the 1977 death penalty law (see former § 190.3, factor (b)), upheld the admission of evidence that the defendant had possessed a wire garotte and a prison-made knife while in jail, concluding that such possession clearly involved an implied threat to use force or violence. (28 Cal.3d at p. 963.) The fact that defendant in this case did not actually use the sharpened knife in a threatening or violent manner when his possession of the weapon was discovered in the school infirmary does not mean that he did not engage in criminal conduct involving the implied threat to use force or violence. The concealed possession of the type of dirk or dagger involved here (see In re Quintus W. (1981) 120 Cal. App.3d 640, 643-645 [175 Cal. Rptr. 30]) is prohibited precisely because such an implement is a classic instrument[] of violence ( People v. Grubb (1965) 63 Cal.2d 614, 620 [47 Cal. Rptr. 772, 408 P.2d 100]) that is normally used only for criminal purposes. (See People v. Wasley (1966) 245 Cal. App.2d 383, 386 [53 Cal. Rptr. 877].) Thus, we conclude that there was no error in admitting this evidence. Defendant, of course, was free to present any additional evidence of the circumstances of the incident that would be relevant to the jury's assessment of the incident's probative value with respect to defendant's propensity for violence. [16] E. ADMISSION OF CONCEALED WEAPON CONVICTION AS FELONY CONVICTION (11) In a somewhat related argument, defendant contends that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the prosecution's use of his conviction under section 12020 as a prior felony conviction for purposes of factor (c). In support of his argument, defendant points out that section 12020 is a wobbler  i.e., a crime that is punishable as either a felony or misdemeanor  and that section 17, subdivision (c) provides that when a defendant is committed to the California Youth Authority for such a crime and then is discharged from the Youth Authority, the offense shall ... be deemed a misdemeanor for all purposes. Defendant asks us to take judicial notice of court records indicating that he was committed to the Youth Authority for his section 12020 offense in March 1979 and was discharged from the Youth Authority in January 1981. Defendant contends that his trial counsel should have been aware of these facts and should have recognized that, under section 17, subdivision (c), his section 12020 conviction should be deemed a misdemeanor rather than a felony. Defendant contends that under the circumstances his trial counsel was ineffective in advising him to stipulate that his section 12020 conviction was a prior felony conviction for purposes of factor (c). The Attorney General does not object to our taking judicial notice of the court records to which defendant refers, and does not challenge defendant's assertion that, in light of section 17, subdivision (c), trial counsel could have succeeded in having defendant's section 12020 conviction designated a misdemeanor, rather than a felony. [17] The Attorney General argues, however, that defendant's trial counsel had a reasonable tactical basis for stipulating to the admission of the section 12020 conviction as a felony conviction. The Attorney General points out that, prior to both the first and second penalty trials, trial counsel argued vigorously that the prosecution should not be permitted to go behind the record of any admitted prior felony conviction to introduce evidence of the facts underlying such conviction. (Cf. People v. Hall, supra, 28 Cal.3d 143, 156.) The Attorney General asserts that counsel would not have been able to make or preserve this argument with respect to the evidence underlying the section 12020 conviction if that conviction had not been admitted as a felony conviction under section 17, subdivision (c). The record on appeal does not reveal whether or not defendant's trial counsel was aware that it could be argued that defendant's section 12020 conviction should be deemed a misdemeanor conviction rather than a felony conviction. [18] The record does, however, support the Attorney General's claim that trial counsel's decision to advise defendant to stipulate to the prior felony convictions was a strategic one, which formed the foundation for counsel's motion to exclude evidence of the facts underlying the admitted prior convictions. Although, as we have discussed above, recent decisions have made it clear that a defendant's stipulation to a prior felony conviction does not preclude the prosecution from presenting evidence of the facts underlying such conviction if the criminal activity in question falls within the aegis of factor (b) (see ante, at pp. 1184-1185), this issue had not been resolved at the time of defendant's trial and trial counsel's decision to have defendant admit the prior convictions appears to have been a reasonable tactical decision. Although it is certainly possible that trial counsel was unaware that the section 12020 conviction might be deemed a misdemeanor conviction in view of section 17, subdivision (c), and that counsel would have made a different tactical decision if he had that knowledge, on this record we cannot say that there is no possible reasonable tactical explanation for trial counsel's actions. Accordingly, defendant has not established that his counsel's performance was deficient. (See, e.g., People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 426 [152 Cal. Rptr. 732, 590 P.2d 859, 2 A.L.R.4th 1].) Furthermore, even if defendant could show that trial counsel's conduct was deficient in this regard, defendant has not established the requisite prejudice to sustain an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. As our analysis of the immediately preceding issue demonstrates, the facts underlying defendant's section 12020 conviction were properly admitted under factor (b) in any event. Thus, even if the section 12020 conviction had not been considered by the jury as a prior felony conviction under factor (c), the jury would still have been aware that defendant had suffered two prior felony convictions, and would also have known that defendant had possessed a concealed knife while confined at a California Youth Authority school. (See People v. Burton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 843, 862 [258 Cal. Rptr. 184, 771 P.2d 1270].) Under these circumstances, even if defense counsel erred in permitting the jury to consider the section 12020 conviction as a prior felony conviction under factor (c), we cannot find that the error was sufficiently serious to undermine confidence in the outcome of the jury's penalty determination. (See Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 693-694 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 697-698, 104 S.Ct. 2052].)