Opinion ID: 803253
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Was the party against whom the plea is asserted

Text: given a fair opportunity to be heard on the issue? Colandrea v. Wilde Lake Cmty. Ass’n, 761 A.2d 899, 909 (Md. 2000) (citations omitted). Appellant cannot meet her burden because the issue in the underlying action is not identical to the one presented by this case. Under Maryland law, the doctrine of respondeat superior permits “an employer to be held vicariously liable for the tortious conduct of its employee when that employee was acting within the scope of the employment relationship.” Oaks v. Connors, 660 A.2d 423, 426 (Md. 1995). But because “a strict application of the doctrine . . . in the modern commercial world would result in great injustice,” Maryland law holds that a master will not be held responsible for negligent operation of a servant’s automobile, even though engaged at the time in furthering the master’s business, unless the master expressly or impliedly consented to the use of the automobile, and had the right to control the servant in its operation, or else the use of the automobile was of such vital importance in furthering the master’s business that his control over it might reasonably be inferred. Gallagher’s Estate v. Battle, 122 A.2d 93, 97 (Md. 1956) (emphasis omitted). As a result, there are four elements to 6 establish respondeat superior in Maryland: (1) the existence of an employer-employee relationship 2; (2) the tortious act must have occurred “within the scope of the employment relationship”; (3) the employer consented, explicitly or implicity, to the use of the automobile; and (4) the employer had the right to control the employee in the operation of the automobile or the use of the automobile was vitally important in furthering the master’s business. In contrast, the business use exception applies whenever “a covered ‘auto’ is used to carry people or property in any business or while a covered ‘auto’ is used in the business of anyone to whom the ‘auto’ is leased or rented.” Plainly, the respondeat superior doctrine and the business use exception are not identical issues. While respondeat superior requires the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the business use exception has no such element. Thus, an individual like Forkwar who was acting “in the business of” J&J but who is an independent contractor rather than employee would be subject to the Policy’s exclusion without falling under the doctrine of respondeat superior. 2 Maryland courts resolve this question by asking whether the employer had the right “to control and direct the employee in the performance of the work and in the manner in which the work is to be done.” B.P. Oil Corp. v. Mabe, 370 A.2d 554 (Md. 1977). 7 While the Appellant never makes this argument in her brief, she could have relied on some of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland’s language in Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co, 699 A.2d 482 (Md. Ct. Sp. App. 1997). There, in construing Empire Fire’s business use exception, the court said that it would “follow the course of other courts that have sought guidance from the analogous common law doctrine of respondeat superior.” Id. at 495. This suggests that the application of the business use exception and respondeat superior are identical issues. It is true that the requirement in the business use exception that bodily injury occur while an auto “is used in the business of anyone” is quite similar to the second element for respondeat superior, that the accident occur “within the scope of the employment.” However, that is not to say that all of the elements are identical. Respondeat superior requires that there be an employer-employee relationship, and Maryland -- like other states -- recognizes a distinction between an employee and an independent contractor. See, e.g., Greer Lines Co. v. Roberts, 139 A.2d 235 (Md. 1958) (“Whether the relation of the parties is that of master and servant, or employer and independent contractor, depends upon the facts . . . .”). In contrast, no language in the business use exception suggests there must be an employer-employee relationship; it requires only that the accident occur while the 8 auto is used in someone’s business. Thus at best Appellant has proven that one of the four elements of respondeat superior are met, but cannot establish the remaining three. We therefore reject Appellant’s collateral estoppel claim.