Opinion ID: 582742
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sudden and Accidental

Text: 12 Liability for continuous polluting events is the subject of intense national debate, and there is a wide range of authority to which both parties have cited. The Utah Supreme Court has not yet considered the meaning of sudden and accidental in the context of the pollution exclusion. In such a case of first impression, our responsibility is to give the clause the interpretation we believe the Utah court would. We are informed by decisions of the Utah appellate courts and by precedent of federal courts in this and other circuits. 3 We review the district court's interpretation of Utah law de novo. Salve Regina, 111 S.Ct. at 1221. 13 Most courts agree accidental means unexpected or unintended. In American Motorists Ins. Co. v. General Host Corp., 946 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir.1991), construing Kansas law, we noted [t]here is a sharp division of authority on the issue of whether pollution that occurs over an extended period of time is 'sudden' within the meaning of the pollution exclusion.... However, we have found no similar division of authority concerning the meaning of the term 'accidental.' The courts have interpreted 'accidental' to refer to pollution which is not expected or intended by the insured. Id. at 1486. 4 Similarly, in EAD Metallurgical, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 905 F.2d 8 (2d Cir.1990), where EAD continuously deposited radioactive substances into sewer lines in a New York town, the court stated pollution damage resulting from purposeful conduct, cannot be considered 'accidental.'  Id. at 11 (citing Powers Chemco, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 74 N.Y.2d 910, 549 N.Y.S.2d 650, 548 N.E.2d 1301 (1989)). See also Great Lakes Container Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 30, 33-34 (1st Cir.1984) (coverage excluded where pollution and contamination of the soil, surface, and subsurface waters allegedly occurred as a concomitant of regular business activity). 14 El Paso argues most cases where coverage is excluded involve not only gradual or long-term pollution but also intentional polluting acts. While this is true in cases which have failed the accidental requirement, 5 the argument assumes we will read sudden synonymously with accidental or unintentional. El Paso no doubt believes [t]he central inquiry should not be whether the pollution occurred over a long period of time, but whether the insured knew about it or intended it. (Brief of Defendant-Appellant El Paso Natural Gas Company at 35). The contract, however, treats sudden and accidental as coextensive requirements, which we weigh equally. 15 The principal authority on which El Paso relies is New Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 933 F.2d 1162 (3d Cir.1991). The New Castle County court found authority for the interpretation of sudden and accidental split evenly between those courts barring coverage and holding sudden means abrupt or brief, and those holding in favor of the insured on the grounds sudden and accidental is ambiguous and means unexpected or unintended. New Castle County, 933 F.2d at 1195 n. 60, n. 61. The court stated because  'sudden' ... [is] capable of two reasonable interpretations, ('abrupt' and 'unexpected') ... the term is ambiguous under Delaware law, and must be construed in favor of the County of New Castle. Id. at 1198-99. The court reasoned: 16 Simply put, sudden means unexpected, and accidental means unintended.... Insurance policies routinely use words that, while not strictly redundant, are somewhat synonymous.... We think that the words sudden and accidental, when read together, serve the same purpose as discharge, dispersal, release or escape: they each connote the same general concept--namely fortuity--with a small variation. Neither do we think that annexing the word sudden to the word accidental with the conjunctive and necessarily injects a temporal element, such as brevity or abruptness, into the exception to the pollution exclusion clause. 17 Id. at 1194-95. 18 We disagree. We think the annexation of sudden to accidental is precisely the issue: reading sudden without a temporal component renders accidental redundant. While both conditions might include unexpected or unintended, sudden cannot mean gradual, routine or continuous. Since Utah law dictates each contract provision be given effect, Marriot, 467 P.2d at 983, the conjunctive association of sudden with accidental is exactly the point on which our interpretation turns. Dictionaries may indicate each word has several overlapping meanings. We cannot use only the redundant definitions, however. Giving effect to every provision obliges us to construe sudden and accidental as separate, conditional requirements for coverage. This interpretive rule thus removes any ambiguity created by common usage. 19 It is worth noting the New Castle County court did not claim either the split of judicial authority on this issue or the existence of numerous dictionary definitions required a finding of ambiguity. 6 The court stated [b]y their very nature, dictionaries define words in the abstract, whereas here, we must ascertain whether the word 'sudden' is ambiguous in the context of a specific insurance policy. 933 F.2d at 1194. The court also noted conflicting precedent, while relevant, did not automatically mandate a finding of ambiguity. Id. at 1196. 20 We are in accord with numerous other federal court decisions which have found sudden and accidental precludes coverage of damage from continuous or routine business practices. In United States Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. Star Fire Coals, Inc., 856 F.2d 31 (6th Cir.1988), the Sixth Circuit held where Star Fire had discharged excessive amounts of coal dust in the course of its routine operations, it was not possible to define 'sudden' without reference to a temporal element that joins together conceptually the immediate and the unexpected. Id. at 34. In Ogden Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 924 F.2d 39 (2d Cir.1991), the Second Circuit found a sudden release or discharge of hazardous heavy metals had to  'occur[ ] over a short period of time'  under New York law. Id. at 42 (citing Technicon Elecs. Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 141 A.D.2d 124, 137, 533 N.Y.S.2d 91, 99 (2d Dep't 1988), aff'd, 74 N.Y.2d 66, 544 N.Y.S.2d 531, 542 N.E.2d 1048 (1989)). Similarly, the First Circuit recently stated [w]e agree ... '[i]f the word 'sudden' is to have any meaning or value in the exception to the pollution exclusion clause, only an abrupt discharge or release of pollutants falls within the exception.'  A. Johnson & Co. v. Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co., 933 F.2d 66, 73 (1st Cir.1991). 21 Since its decision in this case, the Utah district court again has construed Utah law to require sudden be given its common temporal meaning. Anaconda Minerals Co. v. Stoller Chem. Co., 773 F.Supp. 1498 (D.Utah 1991). In Anaconda Minerals, a manufacturing operation continuously produced open waste piles of flue dust and mineral products containing hazardous materials. Holding routine discharges of pollutants or contaminants over a lengthy period are not sudden, the court stated: 22 [t]o strip sudden of its temporal element and define it as meaning unexpected as insureds suggests, would render accidental mere surplusage in the sudden and accidental exception. This would be contrary to Utah contract law, which requires the court to assume all language in a contract has a purpose and must be given effect. See Marriot v. Pacific Nat'l Assurance Co., 24 Utah 2d 182, 467 P.2d 981, 983 (1970). 23 Anaconda Minerals, 773 F.Supp. at 1505. 24 While the Utah Supreme Court has not yet addressed the pollution exclusion, we believe the Utah trial and appellate courts have indicated the Utah Supreme Court would accord sudden its temporal meaning in the context of these contracts. In Gridley Assocs., Ltd. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 828 P.2d 524 (Utah App.1992), the Utah Court of Appeals held the pollution exclusion applied to a gasoline spill which occurred because of a clean break in the gasoline line. Gridley, 828 P.2d at 527. Noting it was a case of first impression in Utah, id. 828 P.2d at 526, the court found sudden was unambiguous in the language of the pollution clause. While the word connotes a sense of unexpectedness, 'sudden' within the 'sudden and accidental' clause cannot be defined without reference to a temporal element, specifically immediacy, abruptness, and quickness. Id. 828 P.2d at 527. 7 We thus are persuaded the temporal element of sudden when joined with accidental is unambiguous.