Opinion ID: 2276112
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Threat to kill the social worker.

Text: Bridgett Kincaid testified that Appellant came to her residence after his meeting with the social worker only a few hours before the homicides occurred, and that he was very angry about the meeting and about the fact that Kincaid's husband had borrowed a pair of Appellant's blue jeans. During their conversation, Appellant stated that if the social worker took his kids, he would kill her. It has long been a rule in this jurisdiction that threats against the victim of a crime are probative of the defendant's motive and intent to commit the crime, Richie v. Commonwealth, Ky., 242 S.W.2d 1000, 1004 (1951), and general threats against no one in particular are probative to demonstrate general malice and a purpose to injure or kill someone, of which the deceased became the unfortunate victim. Brooks v. Commonwealth, 100 Ky. 194, 37 S.W. 1043, 1045 (1896). However, specific threats directed against third parties are inadmissible. While a threat to kill or injure someone which is couched in vague terms and directed at no one person in particular is admissible in a homicide prosecution to show a hostility towards mankind in general and hence towards the deceased, a threat to kill or injure someone which is specifically directed at some individual other than the deceased is inadmissible, as it shows only a special malice resulting from a transaction with which the deceased had no connection. Jones v. Commonwealth, Ky., 560 S.W.2d 810, 812 (1977). See also Burden v. Commonwealth, 296 Ky. 553, 178 S.W.2d 1, 3 (1944); Fugate v. Commonwealth, 202 Ky. 509, 260 S.W. 338, 340-41 (1924). An exception has been recognized when the threat against the third person is so close in time to the charged offense as to be considered a part of the same transaction. Chatt v. Commonwealth, 268 Ky. 141, 103 S.W.2d 952, 954-55 (1937) (threat against third party less than a minute before the killing); Smith v. Commonwealth, Ky., 92 S.W. 610, 610 (1906) (threat against third party five minutes before the killing). All of these cases were decided prior to the adoption of the Kentucky Rules of Evidence (KRE). However, they are premised upon the same exclusionary policy reflected by KRE 404(b), that evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is inadmissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. However, such evidence is admissible if offered for another purpose, see, e.g., Tamme v. Commonwealth, Ky., 973 S.W.2d 13, 29-30 (1998) (evidence of subornation of perjury admissible to prove consciousness of guilt), or inextricably intertwined with other evidence essential to the case. Under KRE 404(b)(1), [T]he admissibility issue for the judge is ... whether the other crimes evidence is admissible for some purpose other than proving propensity of the defendant to commit criminal acts. Robert G. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook § 2.25[5], at 151 (4th ed. LexisNexis 2003). If so, the issue becomes whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice, KRE 403, and the trial judge's ruling in that regard is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. English, Ky., 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (1999). The result of both inquiries supports the admission of Appellant's threat against the social worker. Other jurisdictions have admitted evidence of threats against third parties if relevant to prove the defendant's state of mind at the time of the crime. E.g., State v. DeSantiago, 429 N.W.2d 566, 567 (Iowa Ct.App.1988) (evidence of threat to kill third person earlier the same evening as the charged offense relevant to rebut defense of lack of intent); People v. Rushlow, 179 Mich.App. 172, 445 N.W.2d 222, 224 (1989) (evidence in trial for murder of topless dancer that defendant threatened to kill another topless dancer forty-five minutes before the murder relevant to prove willingness to kill if denied sexual favors and to disprove defenses of self-defense and accident). The facts of this case provide an even stronger justification for admitting evidence of Appellant's conduct within hours of the crime. Here, Appellant was charged with killing all three victims. He denied killing Reschke and claimed that he killed Mills and Davis while under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance triggered by witnessing Mills and Davis kill Reschke. Kincaid's testimony tended to prove that Appellant was so emotionally disturbed before Reschke's death that he threatened to kill yet another person. This evidence of Appellant's state of mind only a few hours before the homicides tended to disprove his claim that Reschke's murder triggered his emotional disturbance, thus bolstering the Commonwealth's theory that Appellant, not Mills and Davis, killed Reschke. Since the evidence was relevant for a purpose other than proving Appellant's criminal disposition, it was admissible unless excluded under KRE 403. In admitting the evidence, the trial court intimated that the evidence also tended to support Appellant's claim that he was, indeed, emotionally disturbed when the killings occurred, thus indicating that the evidence was not so prejudicial to Appellant as to substantially outweigh its probative value. We perceive no abuse of discretion in that conclusion.