Opinion ID: 2633881
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant's Absence During His Mother's Testimony

Text: Defendant was voluntarily absent during the second part of the guilt phase testimony of his mother. He contends on appeal his absence violated his federal and state constitutional rights, as well as state statutory law. As a constitutional matter, a criminal defendant accused of a felony has the right to be present at every critical stage of the trial. ( Illinois v. Allen (1970) 397 U.S. 337, 338, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353.) The right derives from the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution and the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and article I, section 15 of the California Constitution. ( Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 1010, 77 Cal. Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183.) A critical stage of the trial is one in which a defendant's `absence might frustrate the fairness of the proceedings' ( Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806, 819, fn. 15, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562), or `whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge' ( Snyder v. Massachusetts (1934) 291 U.S. 97, 105-106, 54 S.Ct. 330, 78 L.Ed. 674). ( People v. Rodriguez (1998) 17 Cal.4th 253, 260, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 334, 949 P.2d 31 ( Rodriguez ).) A defendant may waive his or her constitutional right to be present during a critical stage, provided the waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. ( People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 20-21, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 894, 117 P.3d 591.) Under California statutory law, section 1043, subdivision (a) provides that [e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section, the defendant in a felony case shall be personally present at the trial. Although, pursuant to section 1043, subdivision (b)(2), a felony trial that has commenced generally may continue if the defendant subsequently is voluntarily absent, this exception does not apply in capital cases. (§ 1043, subd. (b)(2).) Similarly, section 977, subdivision (b)(1) requires, in part, that defendants charged with a felony must be present during those portions of the trial when evidence is taken before the trier of fact. Under that statute, a defendant is not permitted to waive his or her presence at that stage of the proceedings. (§ 977, subd. (b)(1); see also People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 967-968, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103 ( Weaver ).) Thus, under the statutes, a capital defendant generally must be present during the trial when evidence is taken. A defendant seeking reversal of a judgment based upon statutory error, however, must demonstrate prejudice under Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at page 836, 299 P.2d 243that it is reasonably probable a result more favorable to the defendant would have been reached in the absence of the error. ( Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 968, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103.) After defendant testified, defense counsel announced they would re-call defendant's mother as a witness in order to examine her concerning the supposed incestuous relationship she had with defendant and about her exhibitionism. Outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel notified the court that defendant was experiencing extreme stress at the prospect of hearing his mother testify concerning these subjects, and instead wished to voluntarily absent himself during her testimony. Counsel stated they had advised defendant of his right to be present and his right to waive that right, and of the possible advantages and disadvantages of his not being present. The court then directly questioned defendant whether he had sufficiently discussed the matter with his attorneys and still wished to waive his presence. Defendant said he had, and wanted to absent himself from that testimony. The trial court, finding defendant knowingly and voluntarily had waived his right to be present, granted his request to be absent. Before defendant's mother testified, the court explained to the jury that due to the nature of the expected testimony, the court had granted defendant's request to exercise his right to be absent during the testimony. Defendant returned to the courtroom after his mother completed her testimony. Defendant first contends that in a capital case the defendant's presence during the taking of testimony is so fundamental to the fairness of the proceeding that he or she should not be permitted to waive the constitutional right to be present, even if done so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. We have rejected this very claim ( People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 405, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 821 P.2d 610), and defendant's argument, which relies primarily upon three nearly 200-year-old United States Supreme Court cases, the relevant parts of which the high court itself has rejected as broad dicta ( Illinois v. Allen, supra, 397 U.S. at pp. 342-343, 90 S.Ct. 1057 ( Allen)), provides no compelling reason to revisit the issue. (See also People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 531, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 96, 115 P.3d 417; Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 966, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103; People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1209-1210, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254; Campbell v. Wood (9th Cir.1994) 18 F.3d 662, 672 (en banc) [There is no principled basis for limiting to noncapital offenses a defendant's ability knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently to waive the right of presence. Nor do we find logic in the proposition that a right that may be waived by disruptive behavior cannot be waived by an affirmative petition freely made and based on informed judgment.].) Defendant correctly contends that despite his valid waiver of his constitutional rights to be present during the testimony in question, his absence violated sections 977 and 1043. We must stress that a defendant's statutory ability to waive his presence in a capital case is more circumscribed than the associated ability to waive his constitutional rights. As we previously have observed, `[t]he Legislature evidently intended that a capital defendant's right to voluntarily waive his right to be present be severely restricted.' ( Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 968, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103.) Even assuming defendant has not forfeited his appellate claim of statutory error by failing to raise the claim in the trial court (cf. People v. Vera (1997) 15 Cal.4th 269, 276-281, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 754, 934 P.2d 1279 ( Vera ) [claim of deprivation of statutory right to jury trial on prior-prison-term sentence enhancement was not a claim of the deprivation of a fundamental constitutional right that may be raised for the first time on appeal]), defendant nonetheless has not demonstrated that such statutory error warrants reversal, because it is not reasonably probable that without the error, the result of the trial would have been more favorable to him. Defendant admitted killing the victims, and the jury rejected his version of the eventsthat he did so in uncontrolled fits of rage and did not form the intent to have sexual relations with his victims until after they were deadin less than one full day of deliberations. In short, the guilt phase evidence against him was overwhelming. Although, unlike the situation in Weaver, the proceedings as to which defendant was absent involved the testimony of a live witness, defendant already had testified on the subjects about which his mother was to be examined. Indeed, she was asked primarily whether defendant's and other witnesses' testimony was true, and she responded in the negative. Defendant's attorneys obviously were quite familiar with what defendant possibly might add to the examination, and there is no evidence in the record that defendant might have assisted counsel in some other manner had he been present. Defendant has not established that a different outcome at this phase of the trial would have been reasonably probable had he been forced to remain in the courtroom against his will. (See also Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 968, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103 [noting it was possible defendant's absence, which was based upon his fear of becoming overly emotional in the presence of the jury, helped his case rather than prejudiced it].) [26] Defendant, relying upon Hicks v. Oklahoma (1980) 447 U.S. 343, 346, 100 S.Ct. 2227, 65 L.Ed.2d 175, contends the statutory violation deprived him of his federal constitutional procedural due process rights because, he argues, he was denied his liberty interest in the proper application of state law. Sections 977 and 1043, however, do not create a liberty interest for the benefit of defendants of the type involved in Hicks. (Cf. People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 170-172, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094 ( Breverman ) [distinguishing Hicks based upon the different right created by the state-law provision at issue]; Vera, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 279-280, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 754, 934 P.2d 1279 [deprivation of statutory right to jury trial on sentencing enhancement does not constitute a claim of federal constitutional dimension under Hicks ]. ) Indeed, as a practical matter, the statutes here at issue deprive a capital defendant of his or her ability to voluntarily waive the constitutional right to be present, and require him or her to remain in the courtroom. We cannot accept the premise that the federal constitutional right of due process was implicated in this case by an error of state law that afforded defendant something he asked forand which was permissible under the state and federal Constitutionsbut should not have received under state statutory law, and, moreover, that did not directly implicate his interest in freedom from restraint, as did the error in Hicks. (See Cabana v. Bullock (1986) 474 U.S. 376, 387, fn. 4, 106 S.Ct. 689, 88 L.Ed.2d 704 [In Hicks, we held only that where state law creates for the defendant a liberty interest in having the jury make particular findings, the Due Process Clause implies that appellate findings do not suffice to protect that entitlement], overruled on other grounds in Pope v. Illinois (1987) 481 U.S. 497, 502, fn. 7, 107 S.Ct. 1918, 95 L.Ed.2d 439; Engle v. Isaac (1982) 456 U.S. 107,121, fn. 21, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 [We have long recognized that a `mere error of state law' is not a denial of due process. [Citation.] If the contrary were true, then `every erroneous decision by a state court on state law would come [to this Court] as a federal constitutional question.' [Citations.]].)