Opinion ID: 1384955
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Illegal Trafficking.

Text: Appellant asserts that there was insufficient evidence that the syndicate was collaborating to promote or engage in illegal trafficking in controlled substances, as required to satisfy KRS 506.120(3)(e), because no marijuana was produced at trial and no witness was competent to testify that the alleged marijuana was, in fact, marijuana as opposed to, e.g., oregano. In support of this argument, Appellant cites Boyington v. State, 748 So.2d 897 (Ala.Crim.App.1999), an Alabama case that apparently requires the government to actually confiscate the illegal drug in order to charge the defendant with its possession. Id. at 902-03. He further cites a host of cases from other jurisdictions and argues that they require the government to prove that the witnesses identifying the controlled substance, whether experts or laypersons, have some training or experience allowing them to make a proper identification. See United States v. Spann, 515 F.2d 579, 580 (10th Cir.1975); State v. Scott, 187 Ariz. 474, 930 P.2d 551, 554 (App.1996); A.A. v. State, 461 So.2d 165, 167 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1984); Dean v. State, 406 So.2d 1162, 1164 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1981); State v. McKee, 91 Ohio St.3d 292, 744 N.E.2d 737, 741-42 (2001); State v. Frazier, 162 W.Va. 602, 252 S.E.2d 39, 50 (1979). Based on these cases, Appellant contends that no witness at his trial was shown to have such training or experience; ergo, a reasonable jury could not have concluded that the syndicate possessed marijuana, rather than, e.g., oregano. Therefore, Appellant claims, that the evidence was insufficient to support a crucial element of the organized crime statute. However, in Graves v. Commonwealth, Ky., 17 S.W.3d 858, 862 (2000), we held: It is unnecessary for a conviction of trafficking in a controlled substance that the controlled substance be seized by the police or that it be introduced at trial. Conviction can be premised on circumstantial evidence of such nature that, based on the whole case, it would not be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 862 (emphasis added). See also United States v. Schrock, 855 F.2d 327, 334 (6th Cir.1988) (To our knowledge, no court has held that scientific identification of a substance is an absolute prerequisite to conviction for a drug-related offense, and we too are unwilling to announce such a rule. In view of the limitations that such a burden would place on prosecutors, and in accordance with general evidentiary principles, courts have held that the government may establish the identity of a drug through cumulative circumstantial evidence.). Here, abundant evidence, both direct and circumstantial, indicated that Appellant participated in organizing a criminal syndicate that illegally trafficked in marijuana. Ray, Nicolais, and Maggard, testified that Appellant collaborated with them to smuggle marijuana into the prison. Connolly testified that he purchased marijuana from Appellant while in prison. Ray testified that he tested the marijuana by smoking some of it himself. Hightower testified that Ray bribed her to bring marijuana into the prison. Thus, even if Appellant had been indicted for trafficking in marijuana, the evidence was sufficient to have convicted him of that offense. Of course, he was not indicted for trafficking in marijuana. The Commonwealth was not required to prove that Appellant actually trafficked in marijuana to convict him of engaging in organized crime. Trafficking in a controlled substance is not an element of that offense. Collaborating to promote or engage in trafficking in a controlled substance is, inter alia, a part of the definition of a criminal syndicate. KRS 506.120(3)(e). Appellant was subject to conviction under KRS 506.120(1)(a) if he participated in organizing a criminal syndicate regardless of whether he subsequently collaborated with others by promoting or engaging in the syndicate's activities. Evidence of the latter is required simply to prove that the entity organized by Appellant was, in fact, a criminal syndicate. This case is more analogous to a criminal conspiracy case in which the absence of an actual sale or seizure of narcotics does not render insufficient the proof of a conspiracy to distribute it. United States v. Desimone, 119 F.3d 217, 223 (2d Cir.1997).