Opinion ID: 1403238
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Heading: The Trial Court's Power to Dismiss Under Section 1385.

Text: Asserting that section 1118.1 is the exclusive statutory basis for court-ordered acquittals, the People claim section 1385 does not permit dismissals for legal insufficiency of the evidence. The People, however, misread the statutes and ignore the relevant case law. Originally codified in 1872, section 1385 states in relevant part: The judge or magistrate may, either of his or her own motion or upon the application of the prosecuting attorney, and in furtherance of justice, order an action to be dismissed. Dismissals under section 1385 may be proper before, during and after trial. ( People v. Orin (1975) 13 Cal.3d 937, 946, 120 Cal.Rptr. 65, 533 P.2d 193 ( Orin ).) Because the concept of furtherance of justice (§ 1385) is amorphous, we have enunciated some general principles to guide trial courts when deciding whether to dismiss under section 1385. Courts must consider the constitutional rights of the defendant, and the interests of society represented by the People, and [a]t the very least, the reason for dismissal must be `that which would motivate a reasonable judge.' ( Orin, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 945, 120 Cal.Rptr. 65, 533 P.2d 193, italics omitted, quoting People v. Curtiss (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 123, 126, 84 Cal.Rptr. 106.) Under these principles, trial courts historically have had the power to acquit for legal insufficiency of the evidence pursuant to section 1385. (See People v. Belton (1979) 23 Cal.3d 516, 520-521, 153 Cal.Rptr. 195, 591 P.2d 485 ( Belton ) [prior to the passage of §§ 1118 and 1118.1, § 1385 provided the only means for obtaining a dismissal on the ground that the prosecution had failed to prove a prima facie case]; see also People v. Superior Court (Howard ) (1968) 69 Cal.2d 491, 505, 72 Cal.Rptr. 330, 446 P.2d 138 ( Howard ) [a trial court may dismiss an action where the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law].) Nonetheless, the People contend that trial courts no longer have this power after the enactment of section 1118.1 in 1967. According to the People, section 1118.1which mandates an acquittal before submission of a case to the jury if the court determines there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction as a matter of laweliminates the court's power to make that determination under section 1385. We disagree. Because the trial court's power to dismiss in furtherance of justice is statutory, the Legislature may eliminate it. (See People v. Superior Court (Romero ) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 518, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 789, 917 P.2d 628.) To do so, the Legislature need not expressly refer to section 1385. ( Ibid. ) Nonetheless, we will not abrogate a court's power under section 1385 absent a clear legislative direction to do so. ( People v. Thomas (1992) 4 Cal.4th 206, 210, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 174, 841 P.2d 159; see also People v. Williams (1981) 30 Cal.3d 470, 482, 179 Cal.Rptr. 443, 637 P.2d 1029 ( Williams ) [Section 1385 permits dismissals in the interest of justice in any situation where the Legislature has not clearly evidenced a contrary intent].) No legislative intent to abrogate the trial court's power to dismiss for legal insufficiency of the evidence after a case has been submitted to the jury exists here. Section 1118.1 provides that: In a case tried before a jury, the court on motion of the defendant or on its own motion, at the close of the evidence on either side and before the case is submitted to the jury for decision, shall order the entry of a judgment of acquittal of one or more of the offenses charged in the accusatory pleading if the evidence then before the court is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses on appeal. By its terms, section 1118.1 only governs the court's power to acquit for legal insufficiency of the evidence before the case is submitted to the jury for decision. (§ 1118.1, italics added.) Nothing in section 1118.1 purports to eliminate the court's power under section 1385 to acquit for legal insufficiency after the case is submitted to the jury. Indeed, the mere use of mandatory language in section 1118.1 does not make section 1385 inapplicable. (See Williams, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 483, 179 Cal.Rptr. 443, 637 P.2d 1029.) The People also point to nothing in the legislative history of section 1118.1 suggesting an intent to abolish the trial court's power to dismiss for legal insufficiency of the evidence after submission of a case to the jury. [5] Absent evidence of such an intent, we will not eliminate this power. (See Williams, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 482, 179 Cal.Rptr. 443, 637 P.2d 1029; see also Agresti, supra, 5 Cal.App.4th at p. 606, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 353 [a dismissal may sometimes have the same effect as an acquittal to dispose of criminal charges]; cf. People v. Lagunas (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1030, 1038-1039, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 67, 884 P.2d 1015, fn. 6 ( Lagunas ) [implying that the court's grant of a new trial motion after a guilty verdict because the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law may bar retrial]; People v. Trevino (1985) 39 Cal.3d 667, 698-699, 217 Cal.Rptr. 652, 704 P.2d 719 ( Trevino ) [barring retrial because the court, in the context of a new trial motion after a guilty verdict, correctly found the evidence legally insufficient and had erroneously denied defendant's section 1118.1 motions], overruled on other grounds in People v. Johnson (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1219, 255 Cal.Rptr. 569, 767 P.2d 1047.) The People's reliance on section 1387 is also misplaced. [6] Section 1387 merely establishes that two dismissals pursuant to section 1385, 859b, 861, 871 or 995, bar retrial on felony charges except in limited circumstances. (See § 1387; People v. Superior Court (Martinez ) (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 738, 744, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 733 [section 1387 is sometimes loosely described as establishing a two-dismissal rule].) It does not preclude a single section 1385 dismissal from barring retrial. In fact, we have construed a single section 1385 dismissal as a bar to retrial under certain circumstances despite section 1387. (See, e.g., People v. Fields (1996) 13 Cal.4th 289, 311, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 282, 914 P.2d 832 ( Fields ) [the dismissal of greater charges in order to obtain a guilty verdict on lesser included or related charges bars retrial on the greater charges].) Finally, we are guided by common sense. Trial courts undoubtedly have the power to acquit for legal insufficiency of the evidence before submission to a jury. (See §§ 1118.1, 1118.2.) Neither the evidence at trial nor the defendant's interest in avoiding both the stress of repeated prosecutions and the enhanced risk of erroneous conviction changes after the case has been submitted to a jury. ( Fields, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 298, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 282, 914 P.2d 832.) As such, when a trial court rules that the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law should not determine whether that ruling operates as a bar to double jeopardy. (See United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co. (1977) 430 U.S. 564, 574, 97 S.Ct. 1349, 51 L.Ed.2d 642 ( Martin Linen Co. ) [a defendant's need for protection against deficient prosecutions is essentially identical both before the jury is allowed to come to a verdict and after the jury is unable to reach a verdict].) Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has long held that what constitutes an `acquittal' is not to be controlled by the form of the judge's action. ( Martin Linen Co., supra, 430 U.S. at p. 571, 97 S.Ct. 1349.) Rather, appellate courts must determine whether the ruling of the judge, whatever its label, actually represents a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged. ( Ibid. ) If a trial court rules the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law, then the ruling bars retrial even if it is patently erroneous or the court has no statutory authority to make it. (See Sanabria v. United States (1978) 437 U.S. 54, 64, 98 S.Ct. 2170, 57 L.Ed.2d 43 [a trial court finding of legal insufficiency based on an erroneous foundation is still an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes]; People v. Valenti (1957) 49 Cal.2d 199, 203, 209, 316 P.2d 633 [a trial court dismissal for legal insufficiency made without statutory authorization bars retrial under the California Constitution], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Sidener (1962) 58 Cal.2d 645, 647, 25 Cal.Rptr. 697, 375 P.2d 641; see also Fong Foo v. United States (1962) 369 U.S. 141, 143, 82 S.Ct. 671, 7 L.Ed.2d 629 [a ruling by a trial court acquitting a defendant bars retrial even if the ruling is egregiously erroneous and the court lacks the power to make the ruling].) Accordingly, it makes no sense to prohibit trial courts from acquitting for legal insufficiency after the case has been submitted to a jury, and we decline to do so.