Opinion ID: 3011844
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Multiple Occurrences under Air Sunshine’s

Text: Insurance Policy This Court has adopted the cause theory to determine the number of occurrences under an insurance policy. Under the cause theory, [t]he general rule is that an occurrence is determined by the cause or causes of the resulting injury. . . . Using this analysis, the court asks if ‘(t)here was but one proximate, uninterrupted, and continuing cause which resulted in all of the injuries and 20 damage.’  Appalachian Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 676 F.2d 56, 61 (3d Cir. 1982) (citations and quotations omitted). Air Sunshine’s insurance policy also contains a specific policy definition of occurrence: an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which results in bodily injury or property damage during the policy period neither expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured . . . . App. at 359. The policy further narrows the scope of occurrence in discussing limitations on liability: For the purpose of determining the limit of the Company’s liability, all bodily injury and property damage arising out of continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general conditions shall be considered as arising out of one occurrence. Id. at 357 (emphasis added). The policy therefore explicitly defines occurrence to mean an accident. As we already noted, in her notice of occurrences, Sabine Flemming specified four separate alleged occurrences: 1) the plane crash itself; 2) the failure to provide a pre-flight safety briefing; 3) the failure to notify passengers of the impending crash and failure to provide emergency safety instructions; and 4) after the crash, the failure to provide any aid to James Flemming. Because the District Court failed to find facts with regard to these allegations, we assume each allegation of negligence to be true for purposes of this opinion. Even so, we find that all of these allegedly negligent acts constitute a single occurrence under the terms of the insurance policy. Sabine Flemming’s allegations of pre-crash negligence, including failure to provide a safety briefing and failure to provide warning of the crash, do not meet the policy definition of occurrence because they simply cannot be seen as accidents independent from the crash itself. Any pre-crash acts of negligence cannot be termed proximate causes of James Flemming’s death because the crash intervened and the pre-crash negligence would not have caused any injury absent the crash. 21 While it is true that James Flemming did not die upon impact of the plane on the water, this fact alone does not mean that the proximate cause of his death was the failure of the pilot to aid passengers after the crash. Under both the policy definition and our cause theory, the plane crash was one constant, uninterrupted cause that subjected James Flemming to continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general conditions and led to his death. The danger that resulted from the plane crashing into the ocean at night was not interrupted or suspended by any intervening event. Any post-crash incidents stemmed from the extreme risk and disorder resulting from the collision. The short time frame between the crash and any subsequent negligent acts, while not dispositive, is relevant when considered in the context of the confusion and disorientation caused by the accident. The cases on which Sabine Flemming relies either concern different definitions of occurrence or can be distinguished factually from this case. For example, in Wiltshire v. Government of Virgin Islands, 893 F.2d 629 (3d Cir. 1990), this Court found that a premature baby had suffered three distinct occurrences of medical malpractice during a single hospital stay. Id. at 634. Each of these negligent acts -- negligent placement of a catheter tube, negligent administration of CPR, and negligent placement of a second catheter tube into the infant’s scalp -- each caused distinct injuries and were separated in time from one another. The Virgin Islands Malpractice Act, which controlled in Wiltshire, provides that injury arising out of continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same conditions shall be considered as arising out of a single occurrence. Id. (quoting 27 V.I.C. S 166b(e)). We held that under this standard, the infant’s injuries did not come about as a result of extended exposure to the same basic condition. Id. This case is governed by the definition of occurrence found in Air Sunshine’s insurance policy, which differs from the controlling standard in Wiltshire because the insurance policy here explicitly defines an occurrence as an accident. Common sense dictates that only one accident occurred here: the plane crash. Not only does this narrower 22 definition undermine any application Wiltshire might have to this case, but in Wiltshire three separate acts of negligence occurred, each of which standing alone caused a separate injury. The three distinct acts could not be said to create continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same conditions but instead created separate, distinct conditions. Here, however, the plane crash exposed James Flemming to substantially the same conditions (namely a sinking plane and the severe risk of drowning) that caused his death, and any alleged pilot negligence after the crash failed to change, suspend, or alter these conditions. We agree with Air Sunshine that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals opinion in Welter v. Singer, 376 N.W.2d 84 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985), is more analogous. The court described the facts in Welter as follows: Bruce Welter was riding his bicycle into a Janesville intersection when he was struck and seriously injured by a car driven by defendant Garland Singer. Welter’s cycling companion, John Ihle, Jr., was also hit by the Singer car, but was not seriously injured. Singer stopped after the collision but then drove clear of the intersection, dragging Welter beneath the car, before stopping again. In an apparent attempt to find reverse gear, Singer again moved the car forward about a foot. He then got out of the car and Ihle got in. Ihle backed up about ten feet in an attempt to free Welter. Welter suffered permanent paraplegia from the trauma. Id. at 84. Welter brought suit, arguing that under the defendant’s auto insurance policy, plaintiff suffered four separate accidents or occurrences. The policy limited liability for each person for any one accident. Id. at 85 n.1. This policy definition is similar to Air Sunshine’s policy definition in this case, as both define occurrence in terms of an accident. The court in Welter quoted our opinion in Appalachian Ins. Co. and applied the cause theory to determine whether to affirm the trial court’s ruling that there was only one occurrence. The court reasoned: If cause and result are so simultaneous or so closely linked in time and space as to be considered by the 23 average person as one event, courts adopting the cause analysis uniformly find a single occurrence or accident . . . . [I]t was the initial collision which created the occasion and circumstances for any subsequent injuries. There is no assertion that the last three operations of Singer’s car would have inflicted any injury or would have occurred at all in the absence of the initial impact . . . . The entire incident lasted approximately one minute . . . . The proximity in both time and space of these events, and their direct interdependence, convince us that the average lay person would view the circumstances as a singular accident or occurrence. Id. at 87-88. Furthermore, the court rejected plaintiff ’s argument that each of the driver’s acts constituted separate accidents or occurrences because the driver regained control of the car between each act. The court held that [w]hile Singer may have regained full control of his car each time he stopped, Welter was still trapped beneath it. Hence, Singer never regained a full measure of control over either the car’s injury - inflicting potential or the situation in general. Id. at 88. In this case, the plane crash and the subsequent allegedly negligent acts are so closely linked in time and space as to be considered by the average person as one event. Id. at 87. The initial plane crash created the occasion and circumstances for James Flemming’s subsequent death, and as the District Court concluded, the post-crash acts of the pilot would not have been injurious absent the crash. The failure to assist James Flemming medically, to provide him with emergency life vests, or otherwise to help him exit the plane all fall under the substantially the same general conditions created by the single accident -- the plane crash. These alleged post-crash negligent acts by the pilot were interdependent with, not independent of, the plane crash. Viewed in the light most favorable to Sabine Flemming, these facts do not support the claim that the pilot regained control of the situation in the crazed minutes following the crash such that the pilot’s post-crash actions amounted to an intervening cause or exposed James Flemming to a different set of conditions. 24 Just as the court in Welter concluded, acommon sense view of the facts shows that James Flemming’s death resulted from causes acting concurrently with and directly attributable to to the plane crash, and, therefore, the crash was the predominant, active and continuing cause. Id. at 87. As a result, we conclude that the plane crash and the events stemming from the crash all constituted a single accident and subjected James Flemming and the other passengers to continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general conditions. James Flemming’s death is tragic, but it was caused by only one occurrence under the terms of the policy. Thus, Sabine Flemming does not prevail on multiple occurrences and may not recover any additional money under the partial settlement.10