Opinion ID: 2959641
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Impact of Howe I: Law of the Case

Text: The Plaintiffs contend that we should not review Akron’s challenges to the liability judgment either because we have already decided the issues in Howe I, or because Akron could have raised the arguments in its appeal of the promotion order, but did not. See Pls.’ Br. at 31–41. We agree. In Howe I, we noted that the district court had not yet entered a final judgment and “may yet revisit its decision regarding promotions,” and so “we review[ed] only the question of whether the district court abused its discretion in issuing the injunction and reach[ed] the merits of the case only as necessary to do so.” Howe I, 723 F.3d at 657–58. We therefore analyzed Akron’s challenges to the liability judgments to determine whether Akron was “‘likely to prevail on the merits.’” Id. at 658 (quoting Samuel v. Herrick Mem’l Hosp., 201 F.3d 830, 833 (6th Cir. 2000) (listing the four factors we consider when reviewing the propriety of a preliminary injunction)). Using this framework in Howe I, we examined Akron’s three challenges to the validity of the liability judgments. First, Akron argued that the Plaintiffs had not identified a specific employment practice that caused a disparate impact. Howe I, 723 F.3d at 658–59 (citing Grant v. Metro Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 446 F. App’x 737 (6th Cir. 2011)). We held that the “Plaintiffs sufficiently identified a specific employment practice.” Id. at 659. Second, Akron contended “that the district court erred as a matter of law in permitting Plaintiffs to demonstrate adverse effect by applying the ‘four-fifths rule’ to promotion rates instead of exam pass rates.” Id. at 659. Akron did not contest the validity of the four-fifths rule. See id. at 659–60. We held that the Plaintiffs could use the four-fifths rule with respect to promotion rates, and therefore the Plaintiffs had demonstrated that the promotion process had an adverse effect on African- Nos. 13-4172/13-4268/14-3352 Howe, et al. v. City of Akron Page 25 American and over-forty candidates for the rank of Lieutenant. Id. at 660. Third, Akron challenged the liability judgment in favor of the Caucasian candidates for Captain because the “Plaintiffs failed to show that [Akron] is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We held that Akron had waived that argument, but we also concluded that “[e]ven if the argument had not been waived, it is far from clear that the unusual-employer requirement” is applicable in the case of a disparate-impact— rather than disparate-treatment—claim. Id. at 661. Akron argues that our holding that Akron had waived its argument that the Plaintiffs were required to prove that Akron is the “unusual employer who discriminates against the majority” was “clear error and should not be followed.” Akron Br. at 38. Akron also urges us to consider all of their challenges to the liability judgments because Howe I was a review of a preliminary injunction, and therefore was not a full review of the liability judgment. Akron Reply Br. at 8. We will not address either issue, however, because the doctrine of law of the case counsels against reconsideration of issues that have already been decided. The doctrine of law of the case provides that the courts should not “reconsider a matter once resolved in a continuing proceeding.” 18B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, AND EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATTERS § 4478 (4th ed. 2015). “The purpose of the law-of-the-case doctrine is to ensure that ‘the same issue presented a second time in the same case in the same court should lead to the same result.’” Sherley v. Sebelius, 689 F.3d 776, 780 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting LaShawn A. v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389, 1393 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). For a prior decision to control, the prior tribunal must have actually decided the issue. WRIGHT ET AL., supra, § 4478. “A position that has been assumed without decision for purposes of resolving another issue is not the law of the case.” Id. “An alternate holding, however, does establish the law of the case.” Id. Unlike claim preclusion, the law of the case does not apply to issues that a party could have raised, but did not. Id. The law-of-the-case doctrine is a prudential practice; a court may revisit earlier issues, but should decline to do so to encourage efficient litigation and deter “indefatigable diehards.” Id. Whether a panel should treat a prior panel’s ruling on a preliminary injunction as the law of the case is tricky, however. Rulings on preliminary injunctions are generally “‘tentative Nos. 13-4172/13-4268/14-3352 Howe, et al. v. City of Akron Page 26 decision[s] on the merits,’” which “change[] the ‘incentives’ of the parties that inform their litigation strategies.” Gooch v. Life Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 672 F.3d 402, 433 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bieneman v. City of Chi., 838 F.2d 962, 964 (7th Cir. 1988)). But when the appellate panel considering the preliminary injunction has issued “[a] fully considered appellate ruling on an issue of law,” then that opinion becomes the law of the case. WRIGHT ET AL., supra, § 4478.5. This case presents an unusual circumstance because we considered the issues presented in Howe I with a completely developed record; we had transcripts from a completed jury trial available for review. “[W]here the earlier ruling, though on preliminary-injunction review, was established in a definitive, fully considered legal decision based on a fully developed factual record and a decisionmaking process that included full briefing and argument without unusual time constraints,” then the law-of-the-case doctrine applies. Sherley, 689 F.3d at 782. In Sherley, the D.C. Circuit vacated a preliminary injunction in favor of the plaintiffs and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings, after which the district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Id. at 779. The plaintiffs appealed the entry of summary judgment and offered “precisely the same argument” that the prior panel had rejected, arguing that the preliminary nature of a review of a denial of a preliminary injunction made the law-of-the-case doctrine inapplicable. Id. at 781. The D.C. Circuit held that the doctrine of law of the case prevented reconsideration of that prior holding because “[t]he time constraints and limited record” that usually make the law-of-the-case doctrine inappropriate in most cases involving preliminary injunctions were “not present.” Id. at 783. The D.C. Circuit’s conclusion is not novel; other circuits facing similar procedural issues have reached the same conclusion. See id. at 782–83 (citing Naser Jewelers, Inc. v. City of Concord, 538 F.3d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 2008) (“[T]he [law-of-the-case] doctrine applies when [the] court has previously ruled on a motion for preliminary injunction and the record before the prior panel was sufficiently developed and the facts necessary to shape the prior legal matrix were sufficiently clear.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); This That & The Other Gift & Tobacco, Inc. v. Cobb Cnty., 439 F.3d 1275, 1284–85 (11th Cir. 2006) (same); Entergy, Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 241 F.3d 979, 987 (8th Cir. 2001) (same); Royal Ins. Co. of Am. v. Quinn-L Capital Corp., 3 F.3d 877, 880–81 (5th Cir. 1993) (same)). We therefore join the other circuits and hold Nos. 13-4172/13-4268/14-3352 Howe, et al. v. City of Akron Page 27 that, when a court reviewing the propriety of a preliminary injunction issues a fully considered ruling on an issue of law with the benefit of a fully developed record, then the conclusions with respect to the likelihood of success on the merits are the law of the case in any subsequent appeal. In Howe I, Akron appealed the promotion of all of the Plaintiffs with the benefit of a complete record that “was sufficiently developed and the facts necessary to shape the proper legal matrix were sufficiently clear.” Naser Jewelers, 538 F.3d at 20 (internal quotation marks and bracket omitted). We “carefully considered” each argument that Akron raised as to why the Plaintiffs’ liability judgment would not be upheld on appeal and issued a reasoned judgment. Entergy, 241 F.3d at 987. We therefore conclude that the holdings of Howe I are the law of the case. That means that unless Akron provides compelling reasons to revisit those holdings, we will not address Akron’s contention that the Plaintiffs’ evidence that Akron’s promotional process adversely impacted Caucasian Captain candidates was insufficient because they did not prove that Akron is an “unusual employer.” See Howe I, 723 F.3d at 660–61. Akron has not demonstrated that “extraordinary circumstances” militate in favor of abandoning our prior holdings. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817 (1988). “We generally will not disturb these [holdings] unless there is ‘(1) an intervening change of controlling law; (2) new evidence available; or (3) a need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.’” Entm’t Prods., Inc. v. Shelby Cnty., 721 F.3d 729, 742 (6th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 906 (2014) (quoting Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov’t v. Hotels.com, L.P., 590 F.3d 381, 389 (6th Cir. 2009)). But there have been no intervening changes in the law since Howe I. Nor has the record changed in any way; it is exactly the same. We therefore hold that any legal error the Howe I panel made—if any at all—was neither clear nor manifestly unjust, and that the holdings of Howe I are binding on this panel.