Opinion ID: 848612
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: creation of an exception by use of the term unless

Text: The Legislature has demonstrated that it knows how to create an exception, and it created one in subsection 4 of the very statute in question. MCL 750.224f(4) provides: This section does not apply to a conviction that has been expunged or set aside, or for which the person has been pardoned, unless the expunction, order, or pardon expressly provides that the person shall not possess a firearm. [Emphasis added.] By using the term unless, it demonstrated its intent to create an exception. [9] Unless is an exclusionary term. By contrast, in subsection 2 of the felon-in-possession statute, the Legislature chose not to use an exclusionary term. Instead, it used the phrase until all. Looking at the definition of until helps demonstrate that until all is an inclusive phrase. The definition is 1. up to the time that or when; till. 2. before . . . 3. onward to or till . . . Random House Webster's College Dictionary (2001). Applying this definition to the statute, the defendant is guilty of the offense of felon in possession only if he (1) was convicted of a specified offense and (2) possessed a firearm before (a) the passage of five years from the time he paid all pertinent fines, or he served his term, or he successfully completed all conditions of probation or parole, or (b) his right to possess a firearm was not restored. MCL 750.224f(2). Therefore, to prove the crime, the prosecution must demonstrate that the possession occurred before one of the specified events. If the prosecution fails to prove this, it has not met the burden created by the Legislature. The result would be quite different had the Legislature chosen to use an exclusionary term like unless. Unless is defined as 1. except under the circumstances that . . . 2. except; but; save[.] Random House Webster's College Dictionary (2001). Substituting this word into the statute would change the statute's meaning, so that the prosecution would need to prove only that the defendant (1) had been convicted of a specified offense and (2) possessed a firearm. The defendant would be left to produce evidence that, more than five years before, he had (1) paid all pertinent fines, (2) served his term, (3) successfully completed all conditions of probation and parole, and that (4) he currently had the right to possess the firearm. Hence, the difference in the burden of production on the prosecution and on the defense is enormous depending on whether until introduces an element or an exception. Accordingly, we should assume that the decision to use until rather than unless was carefully made. We presuppose that the words the Legislature uses have a purpose. And we should not speculate that it inadvertently used one word or phrase when it intended another. The chosen wording is presumed intentional. Detroit v. Redford Twp., 253 Mich. 453, 456, 235 N.W. 217 (1931). When writing this statute, the Legislature demonstrated a clear knowledge of how to create an exception, but it chose not to do so. Its use of the term until is a strong indication that it intended the restoration of rights to be a contingent element of the offense. Because the Legislature chose to use the term until, the prosecution bears the burden of production for MCL 750.224f(2). Here the prosecution failed to present any evidence that defendant's right to possess a firearm had not been restored. And it made no effort to show that any of the three other factual circumstances listed in MCL 750.224f(2) had not occurred. Hence, it did not satisfy its burden, and defendant's convictions were in error.