Opinion ID: 1393905
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: A Summary of Habeas Corpus Procedure

Text: Our state Constitution guarantees that a person improperly deprived of his or her liberty has the right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 11; see In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 764 & fn. 2 [21 Cal. Rptr.2d 509, 855 P.2d 729] [hereafter Clark ].) (1) Because a petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeks to collaterally attack a presumptively final criminal judgment, the petitioner bears a heavy burden initially to plead sufficient grounds for relief, and then later to prove them. For purposes of collateral attack, all presumptions favor the truth, accuracy, and fairness of the conviction and sentence; defendant thus must undertake the burden of overturning them. Society's interest in the finality of criminal proceedings so demands, and due process is not thereby offended. ( People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1260 [275 Cal. Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159], italics in original [hereafter Gonzalez ].) (2) To satisfy the initial burden of pleading adequate grounds for relief, an application for habeas corpus must be made by petition, and [i]f the imprisonment is alleged to be illegal, the petition must also state in what the alleged illegality consists. (§ 1474, subd. 2.) The petition should both (i) state fully and with particularity the facts on which relief is sought ( People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 656 [250 Cal. Rptr. 659, 758 P.2d 1189] [hereafter Karis ]; In re Swain (1949) 34 Cal.2d 300, 304 [209 P.2d 793]), as well as (ii) include copies of reasonably available documentary evidence supporting the claim, including pertinent portions of trial transcripts and affidavits or declarations. ( Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 827, fn. 5; Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 791, fn. 16.) Conclusory allegations made without any explanation of the basis for the allegations do not warrant relief, let alone an evidentiary hearing. ( Karis, supra, at p. 656.) We presume the regularity of proceedings that resulted in a final judgment ( In re Bell (1942) 19 Cal.2d 488, 500 [122 P.2d 22]), and, as stated above, the burden is on the petitioner to establish grounds for his release. ( Gonzalez, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 1260; In re Williams (1920) 183 Cal. 11, 14 [190 P. 163]; In re McVickers (1946) 29 Cal.2d 264, 285 [176 P.2d 40] (conc. & dis. opn. of Spence, J.); In re Oxman (1950) 100 Cal. App.2d 148, 151 [223 P.2d 66].) (3) An appellate court receiving such a petition evaluates it by asking whether, assuming the petition's factual allegations are true, the petitioner would be entitled to relief. ( Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 769, fn. 9; In re Lawler (1979) 23 Cal.3d 190, 194 [151 Cal. Rptr. 833, 588 P.2d 1257] [hereafter Lawler ].) If no prima facie case for relief is stated, the court will summarily deny the petition. If, however, the court finds the factual allegations, taken as true, establish a prima facie case for relief, the court will issue an OSC. ( Clark, supra, at p. 781, fn. 16; In re Hochberg (1970) 2 Cal.3d 870, 875, fn. 4 [87 Cal. Rptr. 681, 471 P.2d 1].) When an order to show cause does issue, it is limited to the claims raised in the petition and the factual bases for those claims alleged in the petition. It directs the respondent to address only those issues. ( Clark, supra, at p. 781, fn. 16.) Issuance of an OSC, therefore, indicates the issuing court's preliminary assessment that the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his factual allegations are proved. We have consistently followed this procedure when evaluating habeas corpus petitions. (See, e.g., People v. Pensinger (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1272 [278 Cal. Rptr. 640, 805 P.2d 899]; People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 936, fn. 30 [245 Cal. Rptr. 336, 751 P.2d 395]; Lawler, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 194; see also People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 119, fn. 37 [241 Cal. Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127] [limiting issues in OSC was an implicit determination that in his petition for habeas corpus defendant failed to make a prima facie case as to the other issues presented]; Gonzalez, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 1240 [amending OSC to eliminate issues implies petition failed to state prima facie case with respect to those issues].) In doing so, we have explained that the OSC, although not expressly provided for in the statutes governing the writ, has developed as an appropriate means by which to initiate a hearing and disposition of a [habeas corpus] petition on behalf of a person in custody without the necessity of bringing the petitioner before the court. ( Lawler, supra, at p. 194; see In re Romero (1994) 8 Cal.4th 728, 738 [35 Cal. Rptr.2d 270, 883 P.2d 388] [hereafter Romero ]; In re Hochberg, supra, 2 Cal.3d at pp. 873-874, fn. 2.) Issuance of an OSC signifies the court's preliminary determination that the petitioner has pleaded sufficient facts that, if true, would entitle him to relief. (4) The Penal Code then contemplates the custodian of the confined person shall file a responsive pleading, called a return, justifying the confinement. (§ 1480.) Historically, the required contents of the return were not very extensive. [2] This probably is attributable to the fact that as originally conceived, relief on habeas corpus was limited to a claim that the petitioner was confined pursuant to the judgment of a court that lacked jurisdiction. ( Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 836; Ex parte Long (1896) 114 Cal. 159 [45 P. 1057].) [T]his strict jurisdictional view ... has changed over the years ( Harris, supra, at p. 836), and the function of habeas corpus has evolved to permit judicial inquiry into a variety of constitutional and jurisdictional issues. (See generally, 6 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (2d ed. 1989) Extraordinary Writs, § 3331(a), p. 4125 [hereafter Witkin & Epstein] [the functions of habeas corpus have been changed in recent years by decisions substituting the test of fundamental unfairness for the jurisdictional test].) As a result of this evolution, this court has required more of the return than mere compliance with the literal language of section 1480; we have required the return to allege facts tending to establish the legality of petitioner's detention. ( Sixto, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 1252, italics added; see Romero, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 738 [The return ... must allege facts establishing the legality of the petitioner's custody.]; Lawler, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 194 [return must allege facts]; In re Saunders (1970) 2 Cal.3d 1033, 1047 [88 Cal. Rptr. 633, 472 P.2d 921] [hereafter Saunders ] [In a habeas corpus proceeding the return ... alleges facts tending to establish the legality of the challenged detention.].) Those facts are not simply the existence of a judgment of conviction and sentence when the petitioner challenges his restraint in prison. The factual allegations of a return must also respond to the allegations of the petition that form the basis of the petitioner's claim that the confinement is unlawful. ( Romero, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 738; People v. Pacini (1981) 120 Cal. App.3d 877, 884 [174 Cal. Rptr. 820].) [3] In addition to stating facts, the return should also, where appropriate, ... provide such documentary evidence, affidavits, or other materials as will enable the court to determine which issues are truly disputed. ( Lewallen, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 278, fn. 2.) (5) Following the filing of the return, the habeas corpus petitioner responds to the facts pleaded therein in a pleading called a traverse. The requirement that the return allege facts responsive to the petition is critical, for the factual allegations in the return are either admitted or disputed in the traverse and this interplay frames the factual issues that the court must decide. Facts set forth in the return that are not disputed in the traverse are deemed true. ( Lawler, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 194.) Conversely, [w]hen the return effectively acknowledges or `admits' allegations in the petition and traverse which, if true, justify the relief sought, such relief may be granted without a hearing on the other factual issues joined by the pleadings. ( Saunders, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 1048.) To respond to the return, the habeas corpus petitioner may either file a traverse or the parties may stipulate that the original habeas corpus petition be treated as a traverse. ( Lawler, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 194; In re Masching (1953) 41 Cal.2d 530, 533 [261 P.2d 251]; 6 Witkin & Epstein, supra, § 3377(c), p. 4182 [Instead of making further allegations in support of his demand for relief, the petitioner, by stipulation or acquiescence, may rely on his original (habeas corpus) petition as a traverse.]; cf. In re Stafford (1958) 160 Cal. App.2d 110, 113 [324 P.2d 967] [habeas corpus petitioner did not stipulate that petition be treated as traverse].) (6) Three important rules govern the traverse. First, as stated above, [t]he factual allegations of the return will be deemed true unless the petitioner in his traverse denies the truth of the respondent's allegations and either realleges the facts set out in his petition, or by stipulation the petition is deemed a traverse. ( Lawler, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 194, italics added; see also Karis, supra, 46 Cal.3d 612, 656; In re Love (1974) 11 Cal.3d 179, 183 [113 Cal. Rptr. 89, 520 P.2d 713]; Saunders, supra, 2 Cal.3d at pp. 1047-1048.) Thus, if a habeas corpus petitioner fails to reassert factual allegations in the traverse, stipulate that the petition should serve as a traverse, or except to the sufficiency of the return, the allegations of the return are deemed admitted, and relief will be denied. (6 Witkin & Epstein, supra, § 3377(e), p. 4182; see In re Gutierrez (1934) 1 Cal. App.2d 281 [36 P.2d 712].) Second, if the factual allegations in the return are so inadequate that the petitioner cannot answer them, the petitioner may `except to the sufficiency' (Pen. Code, § 1484) of the return in his ... traverse, thus raising questions of law in a procedure analogous to demurrer. ( Saunders, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 1048, see also In re Collins (1907) 151 Cal. 340 [90 P. 827, 91 P. 397]; 6 Witkin & Epstein, supra, § 3377(d), p. 4182.) [4] Like the rule requiring the respondent to raise his arguments in the return in timely fashion, however, a petitioner must also timely raise his objections to the return or he will be deemed to have waived them. ( In re Egan (1944) 24 Cal.2d 323, 330 [149 P.2d 693] [objections to return, made for first time at evidentiary hearing, were untimely].) [5] Third, [although] the traverse may allege additional facts in support of the claim on which an order to show cause has issued, attempts to introduce additional claims or wholly different factual bases for those claims in a traverse do not expand the scope of the proceeding which is limited to the claims which the court initially determined stated a prima facie case for relief. [Citations.] ( Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 781, fn. 16.) In this relatively uncomplicated manner both factual and legal issues are joined for review. ( Lewallen, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 278.) This process of defining the issues is important because issues not raised in the pleadings need not be addressed. ( Sixto, supra, 48 Cal.2d at p. 1263, fn. 2.) (7) When, after considering the return and the traverse, the court finds material facts in dispute, it may appoint a referee and order an evidentiary hearing be held. (See, e.g., In re Hitchings (1993) 6 Cal.4th 97 [24 Cal. Rptr.2d 74, 860 P.2d 466] [referee appointed to hold evidentiary hearing on allegations of jury misconduct]; see also People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 426 [152 Cal. Rptr. 732, 590 P.2d 859, 2 A.L.R.4th 1] [In habeas corpus proceedings, there is an opportunity in an evidentiary hearing to have trial counsel fully describe his or her reasons for acting or failing to act in the manner complained of.].) Conversely, [w]here there are no disputed factual questions as to matters outside the trial record, the merits of a habeas corpus petition can be decided without an evidentiary hearing. ( Karis, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 656, citing Lewallen, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 278; see also, People v. Frierson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 142, 160 [158 Cal. Rptr. 281, 599 P.2d 587] [The pleadings ... furnish sufficient uncontested information to resolve the issue without resort to a reference for an evidentiary hearing.].) Thus, [w]hen the return effectively admits the material factual allegations of the petition and traverse by not disputing them, we may resolve the issue without ordering an evidentiary hearing. ( Sixto, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 1252.)