Opinion ID: 3010666
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jones Act Seaman Status

Text: The Jones Act provides that [a]ny seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right of trial by jury. 46 U.S.C. app. S 688(a). However, the Jones Act does not define the critical termseaman and thus leaves to the courts the determination of exactly which maritime workers are entitled to admiralty's special protection. Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 355, 115 S.Ct. 2172, 2183 (1995). In a recent series of opinions, the Supreme Court has clarified this definition and has provided guidance as to how courts are to interpret this key term. See Harbor Tug & Barge Co. v. Papai, 520 U.S. 548, 117 S.Ct. 1535 (1997); Chandris, 515 U.S. 347, 115 S.Ct. 2172; Southwest Marine, Inc. v. Gizoni, 502 U.S. 81, 112 S.Ct. 486 (1991); McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 111 S.Ct. 807 (1991). In developing a test for seaman status, the Court noted that prior cases recognized a fundamental distinction between land-based and sea-based maritime employees. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 359, 115 S.Ct. at 2185. In enunciating this difference, the Court has focusedon the 6 nature of the seaman's service, his status as a member of the vessel, and his relationship as such to the vessel and its operation in navigable waters, id. at 359-60, 115 S.Ct. at 2185, and not on the situs of injury, becauselandbased maritime workers do not become seamen because they happen to be working on board a vessel when they are injured, and seamen do not lose Jones Act protection when the course of their service to a vessel takes them ashore. Id. at 361, 115 S.Ct. at 2186; see also Wilander, 498 U.S. at 355, 111 S.Ct. at 817 (The key to seaman status . . . is employment-related connection to a vessel in navigation.). The rule as developed by the Supreme Court furthers the important goal of ensuring that a worker does not oscillate back and forth between Jones Act coverage and other remedies depending on the activity in which the worker was engaged while injured. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 363, 115 S.Ct. at 2187. From these basic principles, the Court in Chandris set forth a two-part test to determine if an individual is entitled to Jones Act protection as a seaman: First, as we emphasized in Wilander, `an employee's duties must contribut[e] to the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission.'  The Jones Act's protections, like the other admiralty protections for seamen, only extend to those maritime employees who do the ship's work. . . . Second, . . . a seaman must have a connection to a vessel in navigation (or to an identifiable group of such vessels) that is substantial in terms of both its duration and nature. Id. at 368, 115 S.Ct. at 2190 (citations omitted). The Court also noted that although seaman status is not merely a temporal concept, . . . it necessarily includes a temporal element. Id. at 371, 115 S.Ct. at 2191. In fact, both portions of the Chandris test contain such an element, because a court must determine how broad a time period to consider when evaluating both an employee's duties and his or her connection to a vessel in navigation. 1 _________________________________________________________________ 1. In addition, the second portion of the test contains a direct measurement of time through its durational element. 7 In its appeal, Great Lakes focuses on this temporal concept. Specifically, Great Lakes argues that in evaluating an employee's duties under the initial prong of the seaman status test, the fact-finder must consider only the activities of an employee at the time of his or her injury. Great Lakes maintains that under this interpretation it is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, because it contends that Shade was not acting as a seaman at the time of his injury. Alternatively, with respect to the latter portion of the seaman status test, Great Lakes asserts that only evidence regarding the employee's present assignment with his or her current employer is relevant and admissible to establish a substantial connection to a vessel in navigation. Thus, Great Lakes argues that if it does not receive a judgment as a matter of law, it is entitled to a new trial because the district court permitted Shade to introduce evidence regarding his prior employment history. After considering these arguments, we hold that Great Lakes is not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law with respect to Shade's seaman status, because Shade presented sufficient evidence to create an issue of fact for the jury to consider. However, we will reverse the judgment entered against Great Lakes, and remand this case to the district court for a new trial, because the district court abused its discretion to admit evidence regarding Shade's prior employment history.2