Opinion ID: 6500711
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Community Expectations

Text: [¶17] Ms. Jewkes also argues that the district court violated her right to equal protection when it improperly weighed the expectations of the citizens of the county in which the crime was committed as a factor in sentencing. The district court explained that it relies “quite a bit” on a “separate factor” that “many other judges don’t have.” The court described that factor as “involving kind of community values . . . the attitudes about what . . . the community expects to happen when somebody commits a crime [there].” Supra ¶ 4. [¶18] The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits states from denying “any person within [their] jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Wyoming’s equal protection guarantee can be found in Article 1, Section 34 of the Wyoming Constitution, which provides, “[a]ll laws of a general nature shall have a uniform application.” Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 34; see Washakie Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 332 (Wyo. 1980) (Article 1, Section 34 is “the equivalent of the ‘equal protection’ words of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.”). Equal protection requires that “all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” Bird v. Wyoming Bd. of Parole, 2016 WY 100, ¶ 6, 382 P.3d 56, 61 (Wyo. 2016) (quoting City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985)). [¶19] While equal protection may apply, we need not engage in an equal protection analysis here. We find that the issue is more appropriately decided on due process grounds. Due process requires fundamental fairness at sentencing. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 2015 WY 4, ¶ 49, 340 P.3d 1020, 1032 (Wyo. 2015); Despain v. State, 774 P.2d 77, 83 (Wyo. 1989); see also Lawson v. State, 2010 WY 145, ¶ 20, 242 P.3d 993, 1000 (Wyo. 2010) (“The right to a fair trial, guaranteed to state criminal defendants by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, imposes on States certain duties consistent with their sovereign obligation to ensure ‘that justice shall be done’ in all criminal prosecutions.” (quoting Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 451, 129 S.Ct. 1769, 1772, 173 L.Ed.2d 701 (2009))); Beaugureau v. State, 2002 WY 160, ¶ 16, 56 P.3d 626, 634 (Wyo. 2002) (“Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly.” (citations omitted)); Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 585 U.S. ---, ---, 138 S.Ct. 1897, 1901, 201 L.Ed.2d 376 (2018) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1779, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993)). [¶20] To ascertain whether the district court’s application of “community expectations” plainly violated Ms. Jewkes’ due process rights, we turn to our precedent which “requires 8 . . . that a court consider only accurate information in imposing [a] sentence.” Magnus v. State, 2013 WY 13, ¶ 26, 293 P.3d 459, 468 (Wyo. 2013) (citing Sandoval, ¶ 8, 217 P.3d at 395). “[A] sentencing decision cannot be based upon unreliable information, undocumented information, or inaccurate information.” Deeds, ¶ 23, 335 P.3d at 480 (emphasis added) (quoting Magnus, ¶ 26, 293 P.3d at 468). “[D]ue process provides a right to be sentenced only on accurate information.” Manes v. State, 2004 WY 70, ¶ 9, 92 P.3d 289, 292 (Wyo. 2004) (citing Mehring v. State, 860 P.2d 1101, 1117 (Wyo. 1993); Clouse v. State, 776 P.2d 1011, 1014 (Wyo. 1989)). [¶21] In Jackson v. State, 772 A.2d 273, 277–78 (Md. 2001), the sentencing court based its sentence, at least in part, on the fact that the defendant was from Baltimore City. The Jackson Court said, “The constitutional guarantee of due process of law forbids a court from imposing a sentence based in any part on inappropriate considerations,” and it held that “it is not permissible to base the severity of sentencing on where people live, have lived, or where they were raised.” Id. at 278–79. The Jackson Court relied on United States v. Diamond, 561 F.2d 557, 559 (4th Cir. 1977). In Diamond, the district judge, in sentencing the defendants, relied on residence saying, “Now, I suppose that that is grounds for appeal, but I will state it right for the record. If they want to live and have their being in the State of New York, then let them have their source of a [criminal] livelihood in the State of New York.” Id. The Fourth Circuit vacated the sentence concluding: The inference that the district judge considered as a factor in sentencing the fact that defendants who committed a crime within the district in which he presided were nonresidents is inescapable. We cannot permit a district judge who is an officer of a national judicial system and who is enforcing a national criminal code to be moved by such considerations of parochialism in imposing sentences. Id. [¶22] The State contends that the rationale set forth in Jackson and Diamond is inapplicable here because Ms. Jewkes’ residence was not a factor in her sentence. We do not perceive a substantive distinction between using the defendant’s residence as opposed to the expectations of the community where the crime occurred, but that is not the focus of our concern. [¶23] The State also responds that the district court’s comments refer to community protection not community expectations. We disagree. While safety of the community is a proper consideration for district courts in imposing sentences, Croy v. State, 2014 WY 111, ¶ 8, 334 P.3d 564, 567–68 (Wyo. 2014), the district court did not address community safety. It made clear that it considered as its own “separate factor” what “the community expects to happen when somebody commits a crime [there].” 9 [¶24] Our precedent is clear, a sentence cannot be based on unreliable information, undocumented information, or inaccurate information. Deeds, ¶ 23, 335 P.3d at 480 (quoting Magnus, ¶ 26, 293 P.3d at 468). Sentencing factors “‘must be supported by competent, credible evidence in the record’ to ensure that ‘[s]peculation and suspicion [do] not infect the sentencing process.’” State v. Rivera, 265 A.3d 134, 142 (N.J. 2021) (quoting State v. Case, 103 A.3d 237, 245 (N.J. 2014)). “[W]hen the sentencing court ‘fails to provide a qualitative analysis of the relevant sentencing factors on the record’ or ‘considers an aggravating factor that is inappropriate to a particular defendant or to the offense at issue’ the reviewing court ‘may remand for resentencing.’” Id. (quoting State v. Fuentes, 85 A.3d 923, 930 (N.J. 2014)). [¶25] The district court relied on its unsupported view of what the community expects in sentencing Ms. Jewkes. We find that the district court’s sentence, based at least in part on its subjective view of community expectations, violated Ms. Jewkes’ right to due process.