Opinion ID: 2614001
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alleged lack of procedural safeguards, and other defects

Text: Defendant contends the 1978 statute providing for the death penalty lacks procedural safeguards and contains numerous substantive defects. We previously have rejected the majority of such claims and decline defendant's invitation to reconsider our rulings; however, we specify below the nature of the claims in denying them. We previously have concluded that there is no requirement that the statute (§ 190.3) define which factors are aggravating and which are mitigating, and the factors need not be labeled exclusively as aggravating or mitigating. ( People v. Montiel (1993) 5 Cal.4th 877, 943 [21 Cal. Rptr.2d 705, 855 P.2d 1277]; People v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1191 [9 Cal. Rptr.2d 834, 832 P.2d 146].) There is no requirement that the court instruct the jury that, before it may fix the penalty at death, it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, and that death is beyond a reasonable doubt the appropriate penalty. ( People v. Diaz, supra, 3 Cal.4th 495, 569-570; People v. Clark, supra, 3 Cal.4th 41, 170; People v. Livaditis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 759, 786 [9 Cal. Rptr.2d 72, 831 P.2d 297]; see People v. McPeters, supra, 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1195.) The trial court is not required to instruct the jury that it must find any aggravating factor true beyond a reasonable doubt ( People v. Livaditis, supra, 2 Cal.4th 759, 785; People v. Mickey, supra, 54 Cal.3d 612, 701-702; People v. Benson, supra, 52 Cal.3d 754, 807-808), nor is there is any requirement that the jury unanimously find true the circumstance or circumstances in aggravation that support its verdict. ( People v. Bacigalupo (1991) 1 Cal.4th 103, 147 [2 Cal. Rptr.2d 335, 820 P.2d 559], cert. granted and vacated Bacigalupo v. California (1992) 503 U.S. ___ [121 L.Ed.2d 5, 113 S.Ct. 32], subsequent opn. on remand People v. Bacigalupo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 457 [24 Cal. Rptr.2d 808, 862 P.2d 808]; People v. Cox, supra, 53 Cal.3d 618, 692; People v. Andrews, supra, 49 Cal.3d 200, 233.) The court need not require that the jury submit written findings as to which aggravating circumstances it relied upon in imposing the death penalty. ( People v. Livaditis, supra, 2 Cal.4th 759, 786; People v. Kelly (1990) 51 Cal.3d 931, 970 [275 Cal. Rptr. 160, 800 P.2d 516]; People v. Medina (1990) 51 Cal.3d 870, 909-910 [274 Cal. Rptr. 849, 799 P.2d 1282].) No constitutional infirmity arises from permitting the prosecutor to peremptorily challenge prospective jurors who indicate opposition to, or concern over, the death penalty, because both sides may employ challenges on the basis of juror attitudes toward capital punishment. (See People v. Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th 195, 227-228; People v. Livaditis, supra, 2 Cal.4th 759, 771-772; People v. Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d 787, 831.) Defendant also claims, without argument or citation of authority, that the death penalty law is unconstitutional because it does not contain a presumption that life without possibility of parole is the appropriate sentence. Generally, we do not consider contentions unsupported by argument or authority. ( People v. Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th 629, 653, fn. 2; People v. Roberts, supra, 2 Cal.4th 271, 340-341.) Apart from this infirmity, we reject the substance of defendant's claim. ( People v. Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1256; People v. Visciotti, supra, 2 Cal.4th 1, 79.) Lastly, the combination of the foregoing deficiencies asserted by defendant does not establish collectively a basis for rejecting the death penalty law. (See People v. Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th 629, 691, fn. 17.)