Opinion ID: 1378661
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Official CapacityCounty Liability

Text: We review the district court's findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard and its conclusions of law de novo. Walker v. Maschner, 270 F.3d 573, 576 (8th Cir.2001). As we have noted, [a] suit against a public official in his official capacity is actually a suit against the entity for which the official is an agent. Elder-Keep v. Aksamit, 460 F.3d 979, 986 (8th Cir.2006) (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985)). Thus, to sustain the action against Sheriff Ball in his official capacity, Parrish must prove that the county  itself caused the constitutional violation at issue. Id. (quotation omitted). The question we are presented with then is whether Hot Spring County itself caused the sexual assault by its alleged failure to train Fite. In general, a local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents on a respondeat superior theory of liability. Monnell v. New York Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). But, a local government may be subject to § 1983 liability for inadequate training of its employees, City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989), where (1) the [county's] ... training practices [were] inadequate; (2) the [county] was deliberately indifferent to the rights of others in adopting them, such that the `failure to train reflects a deliberate or conscious choice by [the county]'; and (3) an alleged deficiency in the ... training procedures actually caused the plaintiff's injury. Andrews v. Fowler, 98 F.3d 1069, 1076 (8th Cir.1996) (quoting City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 389, 109 S.Ct. 1197). Even though the training Fite received was minimal at best, that finding alone will not satisfy a § 1983 claim for failure to train. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390-91, 109 S.Ct. 1197 (That a particular officer may be unsatisfactorily trained will not alone suffice to fasten liability on the [local government]....) Instead, to satisfy the standard, Parrish must demonstrate that in light of the duties assigned to specific officers ... the need for more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the [county] can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need. Id. at 390, 109 S.Ct. 1197; see also Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 411, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997) (noting that to succeed on a claim for municipal liability the plaintiff must demonstrate that a municipal decision reflects deliberate indifference to the risk that a violation of a particular constitutional or statutory right will follow the decision (emphasis added)). In other words, [Parrish] must demonstrate that the [county] `had notice that its procedures were inadequate and likely to result in a violation of constitutional rights.' Andrews, 98 F.3d at 1076 (quoting Thelma D. v. Bd. of Educ., 934 F.2d 929, 934 (8th Cir.1991)). Applying this standard, the district court found that Fite was not aware at the time of the incident that what he did to Parrish was a felony. Parrish v. Fite, No. 06-6024, 2008 WL 4495704, at  (W.D.Ark. Oct.7, 2008). The district court then found that [h]ad Fite been more familiar with the law ... he would not have sexually assaulted the Plaintiff. Id. Thus, the court concluded that since it was Sheriff Ball's decision to permit Fite to operate as a law enforcement officer without first training him on the contents of the law, it was the Sheriff's deliberate and conscious decision not to train him that caused the incident with Parrish. Id. at , 5. As we read the district court's order, the court found that had Fite been trained that sexual assault was a felony, he would not have sexually assaulted Parrish. See id. Thus, the court found that it was the failure to train Fite that if he sexually assaulted a woman, he would be committing a felony, that caused the deprivation of Parrish's rights. We disagree. We squarely addressed whether a failure to train officers not to engage in sexually deviant behavior was actionable under § 1983 in Andrews. In Andrews, officers were called to respond to reports of underage drinking taking place at the plaintiff's residence. Andrews, 98 F.3d at 1073. During that response, an officer took a particular interest in the plaintiff. Id. The chief of police noticed the officer's unusual interest in the plaintiff and warned him not to fraternize with minor females while on duty. Id. In addition, the chief of police had previously received a number of complaints regarding an unnamed officer who was impermissibly fraternizing with females while on duty. Id. Later that same evening, the officer returned to the plaintiff's house to respond to another reported disturbance. Id. During this second response, he invited the plaintiff into his police car, took her to his personal car, drove her to an isolated area, and raped her. Id. The plaintiff brought a § 1983 action against the chief of police in his official capacity for his failure to train the officer. Id. at 1074. Notably, the officer in Andrews had received substantially more training than Fite did. Specifically, the officer had engaged in two weeks of on-the-job training and had attended the police academy. Id. at 1076-77. But, the plaintiff alleged that the officer was inadequately trained in that he was never instructed not to rape young women. We held that [i]n light of the regular law enforcement duties of a police officer, we cannot conclude that there was a patently obvious need for the city to specifically train officers not to rape young women. Id. at 1077. We also noted, though, that even if the training procedures were in some manner deficient, the plaintiff could not demonstrate the close relationship necessary to conclude that the city's failure to properly train [the officer] caused him to rape [the plaintiff] or even raises a question of fact as to causation. Id. (second alteration in original). Although Fite received substantially less training than did the officer in Andrews, this case, nonetheless, presents a less egregious case of failure to train than was at issue in Andrews. In Andrews, the municipality had constructive notice of a general need to train its officers not to fraternize with women while on duty. Id. at 1073. Moreover, the chief of police had actual notice that the offending officer was taking an interest in the plaintiff. Id. Here, no deputies under Sheriff Ball had ever engaged in sexually impermissible or suggestive conduct. And nothing in Fite's record suggested that he had a proclivity to engage in sexually prurient behavior. As in Andrews, where we found no patently obvious need to train an officer not to rape young women even in the face of actual knowledge of deviant behavior, we do not believe that there is a patently obvious need to train an officer not to sexually assault women, especially where there is no notice at all that such behavior is likely. An objectively reasonable officer would know that it is impermissible to touch a detainee's sexual organs by forcible compulsion. See Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1308 (10th Cir.1998) (holding that the court was not persuaded that a plainly obvious consequence of a deficient training program would be the sexual assault of inmates and that [s]pecific or extensive training hardly seems necessary for a jailer to know that sexually assaulting inmates is inappropriate behavior). Moreover, Fite himself acknowledged in his testimony that he knew such behavior was wrong. Thus, while it may have been wise to tell officers not to sexually assault detainees, it is not so obvious that not doing so would result in an officer actually sexually assaulting a female detainee. Parrish, nonetheless, asserts that even if, as we find today, there is no obvious need to train officers not to sexually assault women, that Sheriff Ball's duty to train arises specifically from Arkansas statute. Pursuant to the Arkansas Code, all law enforcement officers [must] complete a minimum of twenty (20) hours of training concerning sexual assaults. Ark. Code Ann. § 12-9-114(a)(1). Moreover, Arkansas Code provides that such training shall cover ... the laws concerning sexual assault. Id. § 12-9-114(b)(2). The record reflects that Fite did not receive any such training. Thus, avers Parrish, Sheriff Ball had a duty to train Fite on the laws concerning sexual assault. Parrish's reliance on this section of the Arkansas Code is misplaced for two reasons. First, the statute does not create a duty for the county to train its officers on the laws concerning sexual assault. Instead, the statute mandates that the Arkansas Commission on Law Enforcement Standards and Training train officers on the laws concerning sexual assault as a part of the Basic Police Training Course curriculum. Id. § 12-9-114(a)(1). As the record reflects, Fite had one year within which to complete the Basic Police Training Course. Since Fite was only employed as a Road Deputy for three months, he was not yet required to have completed that course. Second, and more fundamentally, even if the statute does imply that the county has a duty to ensure its officers are trained on the laws concerning sexual assault, this obligation does not require that the county train its officers not to violate those laws, nor does it require that officers be trained on which violations constitute felonies. Thus, despite Parrish's contentions, the Arkansas Code did not impose a duty on Hot Spring County to train its officers not to sexually assault detainees. Moreover, even if Sheriff Ball's decision not to train Fite on the contents of the law was made with a deliberate disregard for other's rights, Parrish still must show that this deliberate conduct [of] the [county] was the `moving force' behind the injury alleged. Brown, 520 U.S. at 404, 117 S.Ct. 1382 (emphasis omitted). Here, while the district court did make a factual finding regarding the causal link between the county's deliberate misconduct and Parrish's ultimate injury, we find that causal connection too remote as a matter of law to demonstrate the close relationship necessary to conclude that the [county's] failure to properly train [Fite] caused him to sexually assault Parrish. Andrews, 98 F.3d at 1077 (third alteration in original). We recognize that causation is generally a question of fact. Ricketts v. City of Columbia, 36 F.3d 775, 779 (8th Cir.1994). However, where the causal link is too tenuous such that the question is so free from doubt as to justify taking it from the [fact finder] we may decide the issue as a matter of law. Id. 779-80; see also Andrews, 98 F.3d at 1077 (finding that summary judgment was appropriate on the causation issue because the plaintiff could not even raise[ ] a question of fact as to causation). The district court found a causal connection by holding that since Fite would not have sexually assaulted Parrish if he knew he was committing a felony, that training on the contents of the law would have prevented the constitutional violation. Parrish, 2008 WL 4495704, at . While this finding may establish but for causation, it ignores the additional requirement that `the identified deficiency in [the county's] training program ... be closely related to the ultimate injury.' Andrews, 98 F.3d at 1076 (quoting City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 391, 109 S.Ct. 1197); see also Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 285, 100 S.Ct. 553, 62 L.Ed.2d 481 (1980) (holding that a constitutional violation was too remote a consequence of the defendants' action to hold them responsible under the federal civil rights law). As we have noted, in cases such as this where the `plaintiff claims that the [local government] has not directly inflicted an injury, but nonetheless has caused an employee to do so,' the causation standard we apply is a rigorous one. Szabla v. City of Brooklyn Park, 486 F.3d 385, 390 (8th Cir.2007) (en banc) (quoting Brown, 520 U.S. at 405, 117 S.Ct. 1382). Here, even though Fite should have been more properly trained on the contents of the law, Fite's intentional sexual assault of Parrish is too remote a consequence of such a failure to meet the rigorous causation standard necessary to hold the county liable. Indeed, under the district court's findings, even if Fite had been trained that to sexually assault a detainee was wrong, the municipality would still be liable for its failure to specifically state that sexual assault constitutes a felony. We see no immediate significant distinction for the purposes of municipal liability between knowing that an act is wrong and knowing that something is so wrong that it is punishable by a year or more of jail time. Since a reasonable officer would know that intentionally sexually assaulting a detainee was inappropriate, and indeed, since Fite himself knew that such conduct was impermissible, Parrish has not demonstrated the close relationship necessary to conclude that the county's failure to train Fite that sexual assault constitutes a felony caused Fite to sexually assault Parrish. We, therefore, hold that Hot Spring County is not liable for its alleged failure to train Fite. Accordingly, we reverse the district court on its finding of official capacity liability for failure to train.