Opinion ID: 2330422
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Did the Error Affect the Fairness, Integrity or Reputation of the Trial?

Text: Having found the three elements of plain error  an error, which is obvious and affects substantial rights  we must now decide whether to exercise our discretion to correct that error by reversing appellant's conviction. [A] plain error affecting substantial rights does not, without more, satisfy the Atkinson standard. Olano, 507 U.S. at 737, 113 S.Ct. 1770. Under that standard, a plain error entitles the appellant to a new trial only where it seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. at 736, 113 S.Ct. 1770 (quoting Atkinson, 297 U.S. at 160, 56 S.Ct. 391). Mindful that such discretion should be exercised only in particularly egregious situations, see Dixon, 565 A.2d at 75 (quoting Young, 470 U.S. at 15, 105 S.Ct. 1038), we conclude that the error in this case affected the fundamental fairness and integrity of the jury trial, and as such, requires reversal. The Constitution's guarantee of a jury trial is widely perceived as a hallmark of the fairness, integrity and public acceptance of judicial proceedings. Beyond serving an essential function in our system of criminal justice  ensuring that twelve independent minds, each with unique backgrounds, experiences and world views, are unanimous in their assessment of criminal guilt  the jury serves a fundamental purpose in our tripartite democracy. Just as suffrage ensures the people's ultimate control in the legislative and executive branches, jury trial is meant to ensure their control in the judiciary. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). [11] Inherent in the right to trial by jury is the assumption that the jury will be allowed to weigh the evidence and determine criminal guilt without undue judicial intervention: The accused has a right to a trial by the jury. That means that his guilt or innocence must be decided by twelve lay[persons] and not by the one judge. A judge cannot impinge upon that right any more than he can destroy it. He cannot press upon the jury the weight of his influence any more than he can eliminate the jury altogether. Billeci, 87 U.S.App.D.C. at 283, 184 F.2d at 403. See also Minor, 475 A.2d at 416 (Jurors may be perverse; the ends of justice may be defeated by unrighteous verdicts but so long as the functions of the judge and jury are distinct, the one responding to the law and the other to the facts, neither can invade the province of the other without destroying the significance of trial by court and jury.) (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 274, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952)). Judges have no power to weigh the evidence or to pass upon the credibility of witnesses. That is the function of the jury. V.E.M. Hotel Service, Inc. v. Uline, Inc., 190 A.2d 812, 813 (D.C.1963) (citing Cope Ford, Inc. v. Lastfogel, 184 A.2d 206 (D.C.1962)). When the trial court crosses the line of separation between its functions and those uniquely within the province of the jury, it diminishes the exercise of this fundamental right under our constitutional system. Given that this right is one of the cornerstones upon which our criminal justice system is balanced, when it is violated, or even diminished, the fairness, integrity or public reputation of that trial is called into question. This is not to say that every judicial encroachment into the role of the jury will be an error of such magnitude as to require reversal. Sometimes a judge may step into the jury's province, but that error will not rise to this high level, because the evidence against the defendant remains overwhelming, and he or she is not prejudiced by the encroachment. See ( Joyce) Johnson, 520 U.S. at 470, 117 S.Ct. 1544. As we have discussed, however, this is not such a case. In cases such as this, where the evidence requires careful weighing, the need for unfettered jury adjudication is at its zenith, and requires that each juror have considered all relevant evidence and be firmly convinced that there is no reasonable doubt as to the accused's guilt. When the court identifies one piece of evidence that favors the accused, and informs the jurors that it is only to be afforded minimal weight, the integrity of that jury trial is manifestly compromised. We conclude that appellant has shown a plain error which justifies reversal on appeal. We therefore reverse the judgment of conviction with respect to the weapons charges  and remand the case to the trial court. [12] So ordered.