Opinion ID: 78010
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Retroactivity of SORNA

Text: It is now clear, following the Attorney General's pronouncement of the interim rule, that SORNA is to be retroactively applied to sex offenders convicted prior to SORNA's enactment. See Applicability of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 72 Fed.Reg. 8894, 8896 (explaining that [t]he current rulemaking serves the . . . immediately necessary purpose of foreclosing any dispute as to whether SORNA is applicable where the conviction for the predicate sex offense occurred prior to the enactment of SORNA.). The question that remains, however, is whether SORNA may be retroactively applied to Madera who was convicted prior to SORNA's enactment and prosecuted prior to the promulgation of the Attorney General's rule. Though this is the first time that a court of appeals has considered this issue, it has been raised in district courts across the country, and their decisions on the question have gone in both directions. See, e.g., United States v. Kapp, 487 F.Supp.2d 536 (M.D.Pa.2007) (finding that defendants indicted prior to Attorney General's promulgated rule could not be prosecuted under SORNA); United States v. Hinen, 487 F.Supp.2d 747 (W.D.Va.2007) (finding that defendants had duty to register under SORNA even prior to the Attorney General's rule promulgation). This case is unique, however, because the district court decision was rendered before the Attorney General even issued the interim rule. Because the scope of the rule had not yet been clarified, the district court undertook a statutory construction analysis and declared as a matter of law that SORNA was retroactive as of the day of its enactment. By doing so, the district court erred as a matter of law. Congress expressly reserved the retroactivity determination to be made by the Attorney General, and not by the district court. The plain language of the statute makes clear that Congress gave only the Attorney General the authority to determine SORNA's retroactivity. The statute clearly says, The Attorney General shall have the authority to specify the applicability of the requirements of this subchapter to sex offenders convicted before July 27, 2006 or its implementation in a particular jurisdiction. . . . 42 U.S.C. § 16913(d). Congress's use of the word shall indicates that Congress was issuing a directive to the Attorney General specifically to make the determination. See United States v. Quirante, 486 F.3d 1273, 1275 (11th Cir.2007) (concluding that Congress's use of the word shall means that [t]he one commanded must follow the command). The district court clearly erred by usurping the role of the Attorney General in preemptively determining SORNA's retroactive application. In so finding, we reject the Government's argument that the Attorney General was not given full discretion to determine whether SORNA would be retroactively applied to sex offenders convicted before its enactment. We cannot agree that 42 U.S.C. § 16913(d) addresses only those offenders unable to comply with the timing requirements for initial registration under § 16913(b). We recognize, as have some district courts, that [t]here is a tension between the title of subsection (d) and its text. United States v. Gould, 526 F.Supp.2d 538, 543 (D.Md.2007). Subsection (d)'s title indicates that it applies to the Initial registration of sex offenders unable to comply with subsection (b) of this section. The text of subsection (d), however, provides as follows: The Attorney General shall have the authority to specify the applicability of the requirements of this subchapter to sex offenders convicted before July 27, 2006 or its implementation in a particular jurisdiction, and to prescribe rules for the registration of any such sex offenders and for other categories of sex offenders who are unable to comply with subsection (b) of this section. 42 U.S.C. § 16913(d). We read the text, as did the Kapp court, among others, as being comprised of two clauses. The first gives the Attorney General authority to determine whether SORNA applies retroactively to all sex offenders, and the second gives the Attorney General authority to promulgate rules regarding initial registration. Thus, we find that Congress vested the Attorney General with sole discretion to determine SORNA's retroactivity. Our reading of the statute is supported by the fact that the Attorney General in fact exercised his full discretion to determine its retroactivity when he issued the interim rule stating, The requirements of [SORNA] apply to all sex offenders, including sex offenders convicted of the offense for which registration is required prior to the enactment of that Act. 28 C.F.R § 72.3. It is clear that this pronouncement is more than a mere regulation regarding the mechanical aspects of how previously convicted sex offenders should initially register under the statute. Our reading is also consistent with the change in language between 42 U.S.C. § 16913(d) and SORNA's predecessor statute. [6] SORNA was preceded by the Children's Safety Act of 2005, H.R. 3132, 109th Cong. § 113(d) (2005). It contained a comparable clause which read, The Attorney General shall prescribe a method for the registration of sex offenders convicted before the enactment of this Act or its effective date in a particular jurisdiction. § 113(d). Given that language, the Attorney General's role was clearly limited to specifying the manner by which past offenders could register. Kapp, 487 F.Supp.2d at 542 n. 9. Subsection (d), on the other hand, granted the Attorney General unfettered discretion to determine both how and whether SORNA was to be retroactively applied. Thus, Congress expanded the Attorney General's existing authority when it enacted SORNA. Given our finding that the Attorney General had sole discretion to determine whether or not SORNA was to be retroactively applied to sex offenders convicted before its enactment date, it only stands to reason that SORNA's scope was undefined prior to that determination. [7] Because Madera's indictment concerns his failure to register during the gap period between SORNA's enactment and the Attorney General's retroactivity determination, he cannot be prosecuted for violating SORNA during that time. Thus, his indictment is due to be dismissed, and the judgment of the district court is reversed. [8] Having decided the case on this basis, we need not reach the important constitutional questions raised in Madera's appeal. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 485, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000) (recognizing [c]ourts will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented in the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of) (citing Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)). The judgment of the district court is REVERSED.