Opinion ID: 1961489
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Modification of Spousal Agreements

Text: The equitable power of the courts to modify alimony and support orders at any time is specifically recognized by N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23: Pending any matrimonial action brought in this State or elsewhere, or after judgment of divorce or maintenance, whether obtained in this State or elsewhere, the court may make such order as to the alimony or maintenance of the parties, and also as to the care, custody, education and maintenance of the children, or any of them, as the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case shall render fit, reasonable and just, and require reasonable security for the due observance of such orders.    Orders so made may be revised and altered by the court from time to time as circumstances may require. As a result of this judicial authority, alimony and support orders define only the present obligations of the former spouses. Those duties are always subject to review and modification on a showing of changed circumstances. Chalmers v. Chalmers, 65 N.J. 186, 192 (1974); Martindell v. Martindell, 21 N.J. 341, 352-353 (1956); Boorstein v. Boorstein, 142 N.J. Eq. 135 (E & A 1948); Parmly v. Parmly, 125 N.J. Eq. 545, 548-549 (E & A 1939). Divorcing spouses have often attempted to temper the flexibility of the court's power to modify with greater predictability by entering into separation agreements. In the past, such agreements have had significant and varying impact on the availability of post-judgment modification. Specific performance of spousal support agreements was once thought to be barred by the flexible approach to modification embodied in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. Apfelbaum v. Apfelbaum, 111 N.J. Eq. 529 (E & A 1932). Although not specifically enforceable, such agreements could be regarded by the court as relevant to the issue of support, and could be incorporated in a divorce decree. The fact that [a] court took over the terms of the contract did not impair the power of the court to alter such provisions to accord with the equity of unfolding circumstance. Corbin v. Mathews, 129 N.J. Eq. 549, 554 (E & A 1941). The agreement was said to merge into the divorce decree, thereby losing its contractual nature. Id. at 553; Schluter v. Schluter, 23 N.J. Super. 409, 416 (App.Div. 1952), certif. den., 11 N.J. 583 (1953). The rule against specific enforcement was later rejected by this Court in Schlemm v. Schlemm, 31 N.J. 557 (1960). That decision recognized that apart from its statutory authority, the Superior Court may exercise its highly flexible remedial powers to enforce the terms of interspousal support agreements to the extent that they are just and equitable. Id. at 581-582. Later decisions continued to recognize the courts' power to modify such agreements upon a showing of changed circumstances. Berkowitz v. Berkowitz, 55 N.J. 564, 569 (1970); see Gulick v. Gulick, 113 N.J. Super. 366, 370 (Ch.Div. 1971). The rule which developed, however, required that [a] far greater showing of changed circumstances must be made before the court can modify a separation agreement than need be shown to warrant the court amending an order for alimony or support. Schiff v. Schiff, 116 N.J. Super. 546, 561 (App.Div. 1971), certif. den. 60 N.J. 139 (1972). Applying the same standard that is applied by courts of equity to the specific enforcement of contracts in other fields[,] the Appellate Division in Schiff held that modification of a spousal agreement required a showing of changed circumstances such as to convince the court that to enforce the agreement would be unconscionable.  116 N.J. Super. at 561 (emphasis supplied). Subsequent events which should have been in contemplation of the parties as possible contingencies when they entered into the contract [would] not excuse performance. Id. Although this standard was never expressly adopted by the Supreme Court, it has been followed by lower courts. [1] See, e.g., Skillman v. Skillman, 136 N.J. Super. 348 (App.Div. 1975); Edelman v. Edelman, 124 N.J. Super. 198 (Ch.Div. 1973). In Smith v. Smith, 72 N.J. 350 (1977), this Court considered whether the Schiff standard applied when the trial court was effecting equitable distribution of marital property pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. Noting that support payments are intimately related to equitable distribution and that trial judges should have the utmost leeway and flexibility in determining what is just and equitable in making allocations of marital assets, we disapproved of the Schiff rule: Henceforth the extent of the change in circumstances, whether urged by plaintiff or defendant, shall be the same, regardless of whether the support payments being questioned were determined consensually or by judicial decree. In each case the court must determine what, in the light of all the facts presented to it, is equitable and fair, giving due weight to the strong public policy favoring stability of arrangements. [72 N.J. at 360] The rule announced in Smith is fully applicable when considering post-judgment modification. Consensual agreements and judicial decrees should be subject to the same standard of changed circumstances. Initially it might appear that this rule would diminish the advantages of separation and property settlement agreements, since they would provide no greater certainty or stability than a judicial determination. However, granting a greater degree of permanence to negotiated agreements would tend to make them a riskier arrangement for spouses who are likely to be harmed by changed circumstances. Typically, they have been spouses who are economically dependent; they generally have been wives with custody of children. Often consensual agreements would not be in their best interests if only unconscionable circumstances would warrant modification. [2] As we recognized in rejecting Schiff, contract principles have little place in the law of domestic relations. See Smith, 72 N.J. at 360. When we first upheld the specific enforceability of spousal agreements in Schlemm, we relied on the flexible power of equity to enforce such agreements only to the extent that they were fair and equitable. Similarly, the terms of such agreements should receive continued enforcement without modification only so long as they remain fair and equitable. The equitable authority of a court to modify support obligations in response to changed circumstances, regardless of their source, cannot be restricted. Smith, 72 N.J. at 360; Berkowitz, 55 N.J. at 569; Schlemm, 31 N.J. at 581; Parmly, 125 N.J. Eq. at 548. We therefore find no reason to distinguish between judicial decrees and consensual agreements when changed circumstances call for the modification of either.