Opinion ID: 6329599
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Copeland’s Competency Claim

Text: In support of her argument that the Florida appellate court’s denial of her competency-based due process claim was contrary to—or an unreasonable application of—clearly established federal law, Copeland primarily relies on the Supreme Court decisions Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966) and Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975). In Pate and Drope the Supreme Court reiterated its long-standing rule that a defendant cannot, consistent with due process, be subjected to a criminal proceeding unless she is competent to stand trial. See Pate, 383 U.S. at 378 (“[T]he conviction of an accused person while he is legally incompetent violates due process”); Drope, 420 U.S. at 171 (“It has long been accepted that a person whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be subject to a trial.”). For purposes of this rule, a defendant is competent when she has a “present ability to consult with [a] lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding” and a “rational as well as factual USCA11 Case: 20-11742 Date Filed: 04/07/2022 Page: 15 of 21 20-11742 Opinion of the Court 15 understanding of the proceedings” against her. See Drope, 420 U.S. at 172 (quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (quotation marks omitted)). The state trial courts in both Pate and Drope conducted a criminal trial without inquiring into the defendant’s competency, and despite substantial evidence that the defendant in each of those cases did not have the requisite rational and factual understanding to satisfy the competency standard. See Pate, 383 U.S. at 378–85 (noting that the trial court had proceeded with the defendant’s trial for shooting his wife without conducting a competency hearing despite evidence that the defendant had a long history of disturbed behavior and delusions, that he had served time in prison for shooting his 18-month old son in a prior erratic episode during which he had also shot himself in the head, and where numerous witnesses testified that the defendant was presently insane at the time of the trial and the prosecutor admitted that a psychological evaluation performed two or three months prior to trial and summarily opining that the defendant knew the nature of the charges against him and was able to cooperate with counsel was not dispositive on the issue of the defendant’s competence); Drope, 420 U.S. at 164–81 (observing that the trial court had denied the defendant’s motion for a continuance so he could be examined and receive psychiatric treatment, that the court had proceeded with the defendant’s trial on a rape charge without a competency hearing despite evidence indicating that the defendant had a long history of mental illness and bizarre behavior, and that the court had thereafter proceeded with the trial in the defendant’s absence after being informed that the defendant could not appear in court USCA11 Case: 20-11742 Date Filed: 04/07/2022 Page: 16 of 21 16 Opinion of the Court 20-11742 because he had been hospitalized after shooting himself in the stomach on the second day of trial). The Supreme Court held that the due process rights of the defendants in Pate and Drope were violated under the circumstances—that is, where the trial court had required the defendant to stand trial without holding a competency hearing or otherwise inquiring into the defendant’s competency despite evidence that raised “a bona fide doubt as to [the] defendant’s competence[.]” Pate, 383 U.S. at 385 (quotation marks omitted); see also Drope, 420 U.S. at 180 (noting that the evidence “created a sufficient doubt of [the defendant’s] competence to stand trial to require further inquiry on the question”). But Copeland’s competency-based due process claim does not clearly fall within the rule of Pate and Drope for several reasons. First, and contrary to Pate and Drope, the state trial court in this case did not fail to inquire into Copeland’s competence when the court was alerted by the parties in May 2007 that her competence was an issue. Instead, the court here obtained a psychological evaluation of Copeland and ultimately entered an order committing her to the Florida State Hospital for residential mental health treatment. Thereafter, the court did not hold any proceedings in Copeland’s case until it was notified by the Florida State Hospital—and specifically by Dr. Dellenbarger, who evaluated Copeland on August 13, 2007 after she completed two months of residential mental health treatment—that Copeland had been restored to competency and that she no longer met the requirements USCA11 Case: 20-11742 Date Filed: 04/07/2022 Page: 17 of 21 20-11742 Opinion of the Court 17 for commitment. At that time, the court scheduled a competency hearing for Copeland, which hearing occurred on September 5, 2007. Second, and likewise dissimilar to Pate and Drope, there was no evidence that raised a “bona fide doubt” as to Copeland’s competence at the time of the September 5, 2007 hearing, at the conclusion of which the state trial court accepted Copeland’s plea and sentenced her. On the contrary, all the evidence before the state trial court—including Dr. Dellenbarger’s report from August 13, 2007, the prosecutor and defense counsel’s stipulations, and Copeland’s demeanor and verbal responses in court—indicated that Copeland had been restored to competency after two months of residential treatment intended to achieve that exact purpose, and that at the time of her plea and sentencing on September 5, Copeland had a “present ability to consult with [her] lawyer” and a “rational . . . [and] factual understanding” of the proceedings against her. See Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402. To that end, Dr. Dellenbarger’s report specifically stated that Copeland “demonstrated both a factual and rational understanding of all areas of competency assessed” and that she was “competent to proceed.” Copeland’s demeanor and presentation in court, including her rational and well-ordered explanation of certain facts surrounding her offense, confirmed her competency. Copeland emphasizes that she had been deemed incompetent by Dr. Celeste Shuler and committed for residential treatment in June 2007, three months prior to her plea and sentencing USCA11 Case: 20-11742 Date Filed: 04/07/2022 Page: 18 of 21 18 Opinion of the Court 20-11742 hearing. According to Copeland, federal due process requires that an individual who previously has been deemed incompetent must be “presumed to remain incompetent until being afforded a meaningful competency hearing, where the person is then adjudicated competent to proceed by a court.” Again, the state trial court scheduled the September 5, 2007 hearing upon its receipt of a report from Florida State Hospital indicating that Copeland had been restored to competency. The court then opened the hearing by inquiring into Copeland’s competency, and it ultimately determined based on the evidence presented at the hearing that Copeland had decided to enter a plea “freely, intelligently, and voluntarily.” Accordingly, the record indicates that the state trial court held a hearing during which it inquired into Copeland’s competency, and that it determined that she was competent although it did not enter a written order expressly adjudicating her so. Copeland suggests that the September 5, 2007 hearing was inadequate because the state trial court did not independently consider additional evidence of her competency and, as noted, she argues further that she was presumed to remain incompetent until the court made an express adjudication of her competency. But Copeland does not point to any evidence that the state trial court overlooked or that would have led the court to question her competency as of September 5, 2007. See Moore v. Campbell, 344 F.3d 1313, 1324 (11th Cir. 2003) (“A defendant who was at the pertinent time competent to stand trial is not entitled to a new trial on the procedural ground that the trial judge in his initial trial failed to USCA11 Case: 20-11742 Date Filed: 04/07/2022 Page: 19 of 21 20-11742 Opinion of the Court 19 hold a competency hearing.”). Moreover, Copeland does not cite, and we have not found, any Supreme Court authority that requires the additional procedures for which she argues or that imposes a presumption of continuing incompetency until the trial court expressly enters an express adjudication of competency. See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 446 (1992) (“The rule that a criminal defendant who is incompetent should not be required to stand trial has deep roots in our common-law heritage. . . . By contrast, there is no settled tradition on the proper allocation of the burden of proof in a proceeding to determine competence.” (quotation marks and citation omitted)). Those requirements are not mandated by Pate or Drope, the Supreme Court cases cited by Copeland in support of her § 2254 petition. In fact, the presumption of continuing incompetency and express adjudication requirement cited by Copeland arise not from Supreme Court precedent, but instead from Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.212. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.212(c)(7). Florida Rule 3.212 provides that “[i]f, at any time after [a defendant’s] commitment [for treatment to restore competency], the court decides, after hearing, that the defendant is competent to proceed, it shall enter its order so finding and shall proceed.” Id. As interpreted by the Florida Supreme Court, Florida Rule 3.212 requires that “[a]n individual who has been adjudicated incompetent is presumed to remain incompetent until adjudicated competent to proceed by a court.” See Dougherty v. State, 149 So.3d 672, 676 (Fla. 2014) (quotation marks omitted). Per Dougherty, Florida law arguably USCA11 Case: 20-11742 Date Filed: 04/07/2022 Page: 20 of 21 20 Opinion of the Court 20-11742 requires a more extensive competency hearing than occurred here, as well as a written order of competency to proceed, when a defendant previously has been adjudicated incompetent. See id. at 677–78 (“[B]ased on our precedent and the procedural rules for competency determinations, a defendant cannot stipulate that he is competent, particularly where he has been previously adjudicated incompetent during the same criminal proceedings. Further, if a trial court finds that a defendant is competent to proceed, it must enter a written order so finding.”). But even assuming, without deciding, that the state trial court failed to comply with Florida Rule 3.212 and Dougherty when it accepted Copeland’s plea and sentenced her without entering an order expressly adjudicating her competent, that failure does not warrant federal habeas relief under § 2254. See Reese, 675 F.3d at 1290. As discussed above, Copeland does not cite, and we have not found, any Supreme Court authority that clearly mandates the specific procedures advocated for by Copeland under the circumstances of this case. Further, all the evidence before the state trial court at the time of Copeland’s plea and sentencing on September 5, 2007—including Dr. Dellenbarger’s psychological evaluation on August 13, 2007 concluding that Copeland had been restored to competency after two months of residential treatment, the prosecutor and defense counsel’s stipulations, and Copeland’s demeanor and verbal responses in the courtroom—indicates that Copeland was in fact competent to proceed at that time. See Wright v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 278 F.3d 1245, 1257 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding, on USCA11 Case: 20-11742 Date Filed: 04/07/2022 Page: 21 of 21 20-11742 Opinion of the Court 21 facts similar to this case, that the state appellate court’s rejection of a defendant’s competency-based due process claim “implicitly reflects a conclusion that all of the facts considered together were not sufficient to raise a bona fide doubt” as to the defendant’s competence at the time of trial). Therefore, the Florida appellate court’s rejection of Copeland’s competency-based due process claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as required to support federal habeas relief under § 2254.