Opinion ID: 72884
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Procedures under the IDEA

Text: The procedural prong of the FAPE analysis assesses whether the state has complied with the procedures set forth in the IDEA, including the creation of an IEP that conforms to the requirements of the Act. Doe, 915 F.2d at 658. In evaluating whether a procedural defect has deprived a student of a FAPE, the Court must consider the impact of the procedural defect, and not merely the defect per se. See Doe, 915 F.2d at 661-662. The Weisses list twenty-seven acts of the School Board which the Weisses claim denied Samuel a FAPE.5 The majority of the acts listed by Plaintiffs stem 5 Plaintiffs assert that the School Board violated the IDEA by: (1) Failing to conduct evaluations prior to the formation of a six-month IEP. (2) Formulating an IEP based on information that was not legally sufficient. (3) Failing, upon the decision to reject the Georgia IEP, to treat Samuel Weiss as a new student, which would have required the School District to formulate a valid IEP within 30 days of the eligibility meeting on October 6, 1993, or to otherwise formulate the IEP with all due haste to limit the amount of time Sam was without an IEP formulated according to Congressional intent requirements and intent. (4) Failing to ensure that the Weisses understood the actions the School District was taking at the October 6, 1993 meeting, including the School District's determination that the documentation provided by the Weisses was inadequate for the School District to adopt the Georgia IEP (and to thereafter comply with the law regarding review and revision of IEPs). (5) Failing to provide appropriate notice to the Weisses of procedural safeguards available to them. (6) Formulating an IEP that was inadequate and erroneous in its statement of Samuel's current levels of performance. (7) Formulating an IEP that was too vague to use for purposes of educational planning. (8) Reducing on the face of the Interim IEP the commitment of resources to which Sam was entitled by specifying a range of time, rather than a fixed amount of time, for therapy services that were required in his Georgia IEP without having conducted educational evaluations that would justify such reductions. (9) Failing to provide Samuel Weiss with the speech and occupational therapy services that were required in his Georgia IEP without having conducted educational evaluations that would justify such reductions. (10) Failing to provide the Weisses with all of Samuel's student records upon their request for same. (11) Failing to adopt, on the interim IEP, goals and objectives that had been properly formulated and which were appropriate to Samuel Weiss. (12) Failing to use deliberate speed to ensure that Samuel was under the interim IEP only for as long as essential while appropriate educational evaluations were conducted. either from the School Board's failure to implement the Georgia IEP, or the alleged inadequacy of (13) Failing to provide notice to the Weisses when evaluations were scheduled and failing to have any policy requiring such notice to parents. (14) Implementing classroom strategies that were inappropriate to Samuel Weiss. (15) Precluding Samuel from eating in the school cafeteria based solely on his disability, and without regard to his individual needs, abilities or (Georgia) IEP goals and objectives. (16) Creating and implementing an interim IEP even though the ADAPT placement was not for evaluative purposes. (17) Failing to implement the Georgia IEP behavioral management plan. (18) Failing to implement any behavioral management plan that was individualized to Samuel's needs, abilities, unique emotional make-up, and degree of development of self-control. (19) Failing to create a behavioral management plan in conjunction with Samuel's parents. (20) Failing to appropriately chart Samuel's behavior, even after determining his behavior was an issue that needed attention. (21) Failing to appropriately respond to Samuel's behavioral communication regarding Positive Action, hand-over-hand writing, etc. (22) Failing to obtain evaluations timely to permit a considered IEP meeting and to prevent a 12th-hour attempt to complete an IEP in order to meet the District's six-month deadline. (23) Failing to formulate a speech evaluation that adequately evaluated the non-speaking child's various modes of communication, which evaluation would permit the IEP committee to appropriately formulate goals and objectives for the child. (24) Determining that, upon the conclusion of its six-month grace period, the School District's permanent IEP would be a review of the interim IEP rather than having the imprimatur of a new IEP. (25) Using the ADAPT Curriculum Plan to supplant the purposes and role of the IEP. (26) Unilaterally formulating the objectives on the ADAPT Curriculum Plan without the equal participation of Samuel's parents. (27) Failing to provide Samuel a placement that accommodated his sensitivity to extraneous sounds. the interim IEP.
The Weisses challenge the validity of Fla. Admin. Code R. 6A-6.0334, contending that a receiving school which chooses not to accept a current out-of-state IEP cannot wait as long as six months to formulate a permanent IEP. The Weisses claim that the School Board should have implemented a revised Georgia IEP if it deemed the Georgia IEP insufficient, or created its own permanent IEP. Although Fla. Admin. Code R. 6A-6.0334, promulgated by the State Board of Education, allows up to six months for the development of a permanent IEP for transfer students, the Weisses claim that Florida's regulation is valid only to the extent that [it] do[es] not limit the rights of children with disabilities to a free appropriate public education ... (Plaintiff's Mot. at 35 n. 11). Thus the Court must evaluate whether Fla. Admin. Code R. 6A-6.0334 limits Samuel Weiss' ability to receive a FAPE. The IDEA defines free appropriate public education as special education and services that: (A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge, (B) meet the standards of the state education agency, (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school education in the state involved, and (D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education program required under section 1415(a)(5) of th[e Act]. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(18) (emphasis added). As discussed infra, the interim IEP used by the School Board during the six month period provided by Fla. Admin. Code R. 6A-6.0334 conformed to textual definition of FAPE. Further, Fla. Admin. Code R. 6A-6.0334 does not appear to be inconsistent with the goals or purposes of the IDEA. The central purpose of the IDEA is to provide exceptional children with access to public education. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 194 n. 18, 102 S.Ct. at 3045 n. 18. The Weisses transferred Samuel to Maniscalco in October, and a permanent IEP could not have been implemented without proper evaluation, which the School Board began in December and continued through March of the following year. The six month window created under Fla. Admin. Code R. 6A-6.0334 is not inconsistent with the IDEA's goal to provide Samuel with a FAPE. Absent clear direction from Congress, the Court will not invalidate a state rule because it differs from a particular party's interpretation of the IDEA.
The Weisses claim that the interim IEP provided for Samuel during the six month period was deficient and denied him a FAPE. The IDEA sets out specific standards for an IEP which the Court must consider. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(20); J.S.K. v. Hendry County School Bd., 941 F.2d 1563 (11th Cir.1991). The Hearing Officer found that the interim IEP was legally sufficient under Florida law and the IDEA, although it lacked specificity and failed to explain the effect of the Georgia IEP. The Court upholds the Hearing Officer's findings regarding the legal sufficiency of the interim IEP. The IEP contained a statement of Samuel's current educational performance, a statement of annual goals, a statement of the specific education and related services to be provided, a statement of how much Samuel would participate in regular education programs, and the dates for and initiation of services. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(20). The interim IEP was neither as long nor as detailed as the Georgia IEP, but the Court finds it was satisfactory under the IDEA.6
Among the twenty-seven alleged violations by the School Board, the Weisses list several 6 Even assuming that the IEP was deficient, the Weisses have not shown that any procedural defect in the formulation or content of the interim IEP denied Samuel a FAPB. Samuel was placed in ADAPT, a program which the Weisses specifically requested for Samuel before transferring him to Maniscalco. The Hearing Officer found that Samuel made academic and behavioral progress while in the ADAPT program. procedural defects in the notice provided to the Weisses. The Weisses claim that the School Board failed to ensure that the Weisses understood the ramifications of the October 6, 1993 meeting, failed to provide appropriate notice to the Weisses of procedural safeguards available, failed to provide the Weisses with all of Samuel's school records, failed to notify the Weisses when evaluations were scheduled, and unilaterally formulated the objectives of the ADAPT Curriculum Plan without the equal participation of the Weisses. For the Weisses to prove that Samuel was denied a FAPE, they must show harm to Samuel as a result of the alleged procedural violations. Violation of any of the procedures of the IDEA is no a per se violation of the Act. The Weisses cite language from Rowley, 458 U.S. at 205-06, 102 S.Ct. at 3050-51. However, in Doe, the Eleventh Circuit qualified the Supreme Court's language, noting that the Court was concerned with the purpose behind procedural notice requirements—full an effective participation in the IEP process. Doe, 915 F.2d at 662. Because the purpose of the procedural requirements was not thwarted, the Court found no violation of the IDEA based on the procedural defects. Here, Plaintiffs seek to advance a per se violation argument, claiming that the School Board's failure to provide specific notice to the Weisses of various aspects of Samuel's education are per se denials of a FAPE to Samuel. However, the facts do not show that any of these procedural defects resulted in harm to Samuel, or restricted the Weiss' ability to participate fully in Samuel's education. The Weisses' first contention is belied by the undisputed facts. The Florida IEP which Col. Weiss signed stated clearly Interim IEP, and several changes requested by the Weisses reflected items already a part of the Georgia IEP, such as the use of a one-to-one aid and increased time in occupational therapy. As to the other alleged violations, the facts do not show that the Weisses were precluded from participating or making informed decisions regarding the education Samuel received. Although the IDEA envisions full parental participation in the development of the IEP, the Act does not mandate such participation in every aspect of the educational process. Cf. Doe, 915 F.2d at 662. Nevertheless, the facts show that the Weisses participated extensively in Samuel's education, initiating the use of a Canon Communicator for Samuel, increasing his weekly time in occupational therapy from 30 minutes to 60 minutes, and obtaining a one-to-one aid. At various points during the school year the Weisses requested that Samuel be removed from the Positive Action activity, that he no longer be made to write, and that he receive a fourth-grade curriculum. In sum, the Weisses have not shown a denial of participation resulting from the procedural violations.
The Weisses also claim that the Hearing Officer refused to admit the result of the independent evaluation but proceeded to use the evaluation in ordering his decision. The Weisses claim that the Hearing Officer's actions denied them the benefit of the independent evaluation provided under the IDEA. The Hearing Officer denied the evaluation based on the School Board's hearsay objection. The preparer of the report was not available to testify. and thus the Hearing Officer sustained the objection. Neither party had access to the report for the purposes of the administrative hearing, and there is no showing that the Weisses were barred based on the fact that the report was excluded. Further, the Weisses have not provided any specific proof that the Hearing Officer referred to the report in his findings. The Court finds that the exclusion of the report did not constitute a violation of the IDEA. 7 Plaintiffs claim that the Hearing Officer's failure to admit the report supports its argument that the Final Order should be accorded no deference by this Court. (Plaintiff's Mot. at 30). The Court interprets this argument to allege a violation of the procedures required under the IDEA.