Opinion ID: 2768865
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Attorney’s Fees Award to Barnes

Text: Barnes contends that the district court erroneously discounted the attorney’s fees awarded to him as a prevailing plaintiff against Zaccari. In light of our holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment against Barnes and in favor of Zaccari on the retaliation claim, we are remanding the claim to the district court. Accordingly, the attorney’s fee award to Barnes will have to be recalculated once the retaliation claim is resolved. Nonetheless, in the interest of efficiency, we provide some guidance by addressing Barnes’s arguments to the extent they may be relevant on remand. See ACLU of Ga. v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 438 (11th Cir. 1999) (providing guidance for the recalculation of fees on remand). The applicable statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, allows a district court to award attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in civil rights cases brought under § 1983. The Supreme Court has explained that when a plaintiff succeeds in bringing a civil rights claim, “he serves as a private attorney general, vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority.” Fox v. Vice, 131 S. Ct. 2205, 2213 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, a successful civil 20 Case: 13-13800 Date Filed: 01/12/2015 Page: 21 of 36 rights plaintiff “‘should ordinarily recover an attorney’s fee’ from the defendant— the party whose misconduct created the need for legal action.” Id. (quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 416 (1978)). We review a district court’s decision to award attorneys’ fees for abuse of discretion. Smalbein ex rel. Estate of Smalbein v. City of Daytona Beach, 353 F.3d 901, 904 (11th Cir. 2003) (42 U.S.C. § 1988). The question of whether a district court used the proper standard to award fees is a question of law we review de novo, and factual findings related to that question are reviewed for clear error. Id. The district court found that Barnes was a “prevailing plaintiff based on his success with his procedural due process claim against Zaccari.” Order at 50 (July 24, 2013). The district court applied the lodestar approach in determining the award of attorney’s fees.8 Additionally, the district court rejected Barnes’s counsel’s contention that Washington, D.C. was the relevant community for purposes of calculating fees. Instead, the court ruled that Atlanta was the relevant market. The court then ordered Barnes’s counsel to supplement their original fee motion with evidence regarding appropriate billing rates in Atlanta. After counsel submitted evidence regarding the range of rates in Atlanta, the district court found 8 “In setting a reasonable attorney’s fee, a district court is required to utilize the ‘lodestar approach,’ which is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Gray v. Bostic, 625 F.3d 692, 714 (11th Cir. 2010). “A reasonable hourly rate is the prevailing market rate in the relevant legal community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skills, experience, and reputation.” Id. at 714–15 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 21 Case: 13-13800 Date Filed: 01/12/2015 Page: 22 of 36 that, based on its “own knowledge and experience,” the rates claimed by counsel were excessive and reduced the rates. Id. at 52.
Barnes contends that the district court erred in imposing a maximum hourly rate of $315 because the court ignored record evidence submitted in support of the higher rates. Barnes’s attorneys had requested between $300 and $630 per hour, depending upon each attorney’s level of experience. Barnes, as the prevailing plaintiff, had the burden of establishing the claimed market rate. Dillard v. City of Greensboro, 213 F.3d 1347, 1354 (11th Cir. 2000). The determination of a reasonable hourly rate is a factual finding, which we review for clear error. Id. Here, the court itself requested additional evidence from Barnes’s counsel regarding the hourly rate in Atlanta and specifically referred to that evidence in its ruling. Thus, we do not agree that the court ignored the record evidence. As set forth above, the court expressly relied upon its “own knowledge and experience.” Id. A district court is entitled to rely on its own experience and judgment in determining a reasonable hourly rate. Norman v. Hous. Auth. of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1303 (11th Cir. 1988). 2. Excessive Across-the-Board Reduction of Hours Barnes also contends that the district court erred by imposing an excessive across-the-board reduction of hours. The district court found that the number of 22 Case: 13-13800 Date Filed: 01/12/2015 Page: 23 of 36 hours claimed by Barnes’s counsel was “appropriate” and that counsel “exercised appropriate billing judgment in the hours submitted to the Court. [Counsel] cut down the hours for which they seek fees from a raw number of 5,818.30 hours to 3,707.30 hours.” Order at 53 (July 24, 2013) (citations omitted). Based on the submitted hours, the lodestar calculation was $1,012,587.25 in attorney’s fees. However, the district court found that the amount of attorney’s fees under the lodestar approach was excessive. One of the reasons that the district court found the amount of fees excessive was that Barnes only succeeded on the one claim of a procedural due process violation. As set forth previously, we are remanding to the district court to allow it to address the claim of retaliation. Because of these changed circumstances, the district court will have to recalculate the plaintiff’s attorney’s fee award after it addresses the retaliation claim on remand. Nonetheless, we note that Barnes’s counsel asserts that they reduced the number of hours submitted to the court in part because of the unsuccessful claims. The district court’s across-the-board reduction was also based in part on the unsuccessful claims. On remand, the district court must take care not to doubly discount the hours based on the same consideration. Cf. Bivins v. Wrap It Up, Inc., 548 F.3d 1348, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008) (explaining that if a factor is considered in 23 Case: 13-13800 Date Filed: 01/12/2015 Page: 24 of 36 determining the lodestar figure, it should not be reconsidered to further adjust the lodestar because “doing so amounts to double-counting”).