Opinion ID: 1179507
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Offer Mitigating Evidence Denial of Effective Counsel.

Text: Defendant contends that the failure to present mitigating evidence at the penalty phase, in conjunction with his own request to the jury for a death verdict, deprived him of his right to effective assistance of counsel and offended the state's interest in ensuring the reliability of capital penalty determinations. The issues raised by this contention are essentially the following: (1) whether the trial court erred in granting defendant's motion for self-representation; (2) whether defendant may be permitted to assert a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to present mitigating evidence at the penalty phase; and (3) whether the constitutional standards for the reliability of capital verdicts have been satisfied. Motion for self-representation. (11a) Defendant argues that because he sought only cocounsel status rather than full self-representation, and because the motion was made only after the guilt verdicts were returned, his motion for leave to participate actively in the trial proceedings had no constitutional basis but was merely `addressed to the sound discretion of the court.' The granting of the motion was an abuse of discretion, he further argues, because his announced purpose in making the motion was to seek a death verdict, a purpose which violates a public policy against misusing the judicial system to commit state-aided suicide. Before addressing these arguments directly, it is necessary to clarify the nature of defendant's motion. (12) While the Sixth Amendment guarantees both the right to self-representation and the right to representation by counsel, a defendant who elects representation by counsel does not have a constitutionally protected right to appear as cocounsel ( People v. Hamilton, ante, p. 1162, 259 Cal. Rptr. 701; People v. Moore (1988) 47 Cal.3d 63, 77 [252 Cal. Rptr. 494, 762 P.2d 1218]; People v. Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d 57, 75), and a defendant who elects self-representation does not have a constitutional right to choreograph special appearances by counsel ( McKaskle v. Wiggins (1984) 465 U.S. 168, 183 [79 L.Ed.2d 122, 136, 104 S.Ct. 944]). Thus none of the hybrid forms of representation, whether labeled cocounsel, advisory counsel, or standby counsel, is in any sense constitutionally guaranteed. As the courts of other jurisdictions have expressly recognized (see Ortberg v. State (Alaska App. 1988) 751 P.2d 1368, 1375; Parren v. State (1987) 309 Md. 260 [523 A.2d 597, 599]), the powers and responsibilities which attend the representation of a criminally accused person should never be conferred jointly and equally on the accused and the attorney. Rather, in all cases of shared or divided representation, either the accused or the attorney must be in charge. Stated otherwise, at all times the record should be clear that the accused is either self-represented or represented by counsel; the accused cannot be both at once. A defendant represented by counsel who wishes to participate in the presentation of the case, but without surrendering the benefits of professional representation, may do so only with counsel's concurrence and under counsel's supervision, and only by leave of the court upon a proper showing. ( People v. Hamilton, supra , ante, pp. 1162-1163.) Similarly, a self-represented defendant who wishes to obtain the assistance of an attorney in an advisory or other limited capacity, but without surrendering effective control over presentation of the defense case, may do so only with the court's permission and upon a proper showing. (11b) Viewed in light of these principles, defendant's motion was plainly one for self-representation, with an added request that his attorney remain in a limited and chiefly advisory capacity. As noted, defendant stated he wanted to go pro. per. Although defendant used the word cocounsel on several occasions, his intended purpose was to assume control of the case, rather than merely to assist his attorney in its presentation. (See People v. Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 121, 125, fn. 2 [137 Cal. Rptr. 8, 560 P.2d 1187].) Defendant's stated purpose of obtaining a death verdict was contrary to the advice of his attorney, who urged defendant to permit counsel to seek the lesser penalty of imprisonment for life without possibility of parole. To achieve his preferred verdict, defendant proposed to address the jury personally and to examine witnesses in a manner designed to aid the prosecution in obtaining the death penalty. To prevent frustration of his goal, defendant told the attorney that calling penalty phase witnesses would not be part of the attorney's role or function. The trial court described the proposed duties of the attorney as advising and assisting defendant, appearing with defendant, and aiding defendant in his presentation of the case. For his part, the attorney stated he would advise defendant on proper procedures and on how to address any requests to the court but would not examine or cross-examine witnesses or address the jury. As defendant sought complete control over the content and presentation of his own case at the penalty phase, the motion is properly treated as one for self-representation. We return to the question whether the trial court erred or abused its discretion in granting this motion for self-representation. (13a) If a request for self-representation is unequivocally asserted within a reasonable time before the commencement of the trial, and if the assertion is voluntarily made with an appreciation of the risks involved, the trial court has no discretion to deny it. ( Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [45 L.Ed.2d 562, 95 S.Ct. 2525]; People v. Windham, supra, 19 Cal.3d 121, 128.) A request for self-representation asserted for the first time after trial has commenced, on the other hand, is based on nonconstitutional grounds ( Windham, supra, at p. 129, fn. 6) and is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court ( id. at p. 128). (11c) So defendant is correct in asserting that his motion for self-representation, made for the first time after the guilt phase of his capital trial, did not have a constitutional basis and was addressed to the trial court's discretion. (See People v. Hamilton (1988) 45 Cal.3d 351, 369 [247 Cal. Rptr. 31, 753 P.2d 1109].) (14) The rule against invited error generally precludes a defendant from obtaining reversal of a judgment by asserting error in the granting of the defendant's own motion. (13b) (See fn. 5.), (11d) In this instance we do not understand defendant to be asserting that the granting of his motion for self-representation was error because the motion was untimely or because the showing made in support of the motion was insufficient under the criteria established in Windham, supra, 19 Cal.3d 121, 128. [5] Rather, defendant maintains that the ruling on his motion was an abuse of discretion because the motion's announced purpose, obtaining a verdict of death, is contrary to fundamental public policy. The issue presented, then, is whether a trial court in a capital case abuses its discretion by granting a competent defendant's midtrial motion for self-representation, when the motion is made for the announced purpose of seeking a verdict of death. We conclude that in such a case the defendant's stated intention to incur the death penalty does not in and of itself establish an abuse of discretion in the granting of the self-representation motion. Although defendant's midtrial motion for self-representation did not have a constitutional basis ( Windham, supra, 19 Cal.3d 121, 129, fn. 6), the United States Supreme Court's decision in Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. 806, recognizing a Sixth Amendment right of self-representation, is nonetheless instructive on the point raised by defendant. (13c) The basic teaching of Faretta is that the state may not constitutionally prevent a defendant charged with commission of a criminal offense from controlling his own fate by forcing on him counsel who may present a case which is not consistent with the actual wishes of the defendant. ( Windham, supra, 19 Cal.3d 121, 130.) As the high court stated: The language and spirit of the Sixth Amendment contemplate that counsel, like the other defense tools guaranteed by the Amendment, shall be an aid to a willing defendant  not an organ of the State interposed between an unwilling defendant and his right to defend himself personally. To thrust counsel upon the accused, against his considered wish, thus violates the logic of the Amendment. ( Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 820 [45 L.Ed.2d at p. 573].) The United States Supreme Court found firm support for this conclusion in a review of the Sixth Amendment's historical origins. The common law rule in England, as the court noted, has evidently always been that `no person charged with a criminal offense can have counsel forced upon him against his will.' ( Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 826 [45 L.Ed.2d at p. 576].) The one exception serves only to reinforce the rule: the only English tribunal ever to adopt a practice of forcing counsel upon an unwilling defendant was the Star Chamber, whose name has for centuries symbolized disregard of basic individual rights. ( Id. at p. 821 [45 L.Ed.2d at p. 574], fn. omitted.) In prerevolutionary America, the basic right of self-representation was never questioned ( id. at pp. 827-828 [45 L.Ed.2d at p. 577]), and in federal courts the right of self-representation has been protected by statute since the beginnings of our Nation ( id. at p. 812 [45 L.Ed.2d at p. 569]). When the Sixth Amendment was drafted, [n]o State or Colony had ever forced counsel upon an accused; no spokesman had ever suggested that such a practice would be tolerable, much less advisable. ( Id. at p. 832 [45 L.Ed.2d at p. 579].) In short, it is clear that [t]he Founders believed that self-representation was a basic right of a free people ( id. at p. 830, fn. 39 [45 L.Ed.2d at p. 578]) and that the notion of compulsory counsel was utterly foreign to them ( id. at p. 833 [45 L.Ed.2d at p. 580]). The core rationale of Faretta is that an unwanted counsel `represents' the defendant only through a tenuous and unacceptable legal fiction ( Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 821 [45 L.Ed.2d at p. 573]), and that although [the defendant] may conduct his own defense ultimately to his own detriment, his choice must be honored out of `that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law' ( id. at p. 834 [45 L.Ed.2d at p. 581], quoting Illinois v. Allen (1970) 397 U.S. 337, 350-351 [25 L.Ed.2d 353, 363, 90 S.Ct. 1057] (Brennan, J., conc.)). This court's opinions have been sensitive to the basic Sixth Amendment values found controlling in Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. 806. On numerous occasions we have recognized the need to respect the defendant's personal choice on the most `fundamental' decisions in a criminal case. [6] ( People v. Frierson (1985) 39 Cal.3d 803, 814 [218 Cal. Rptr. 73, 705 P.2d 396].) (15) Thus even in a capital case defense counsel has no power to prevent the defendant from testifying at trial ( People v. Lucky (1988) 45 Cal.3d 259, 282 [247 Cal. Rptr. 1, 753 P.2d 1052]) and the defendant may testify at the penalty phase to a preference for the death penalty ( People v. Guzman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 915, 961-963 [248 Cal. Rptr. 467, 755 P.2d 917]; People v. Grant (1988) 45 Cal.3d 829, 849-850 [248 Cal. Rptr. 444, 755 P.2d 894]). (16) By exercise of the right of self-representation, a capital defendant may dispense with the advice and assistance of counsel entirely ( People v. Joseph (1983) 34 Cal.3d 936, 945 [196 Cal. Rptr. 339, 671 P.2d 843]), waive jury trial, and elect not to oppose the prosecution's case at the guilt phase ( People v. Teron (1979) 23 Cal.3d 103, 108-115 [151 Cal. Rptr. 633, 588 P.2d 773]; see also, People v. McKenzie (1983) 34 Cal.3d 616, 628 [194 Cal. Rptr. 462, 668 P.2d 769] [The choice of self-representation preserves for the defendant the option of conducting his defense by nonparticipation.]). As this court has remarked, a capital defendant representing himself under Faretta has no duty to `present a defense' but may simply `put the state to its proof' ... [and] can presumably also take the stand and confess guilt. ( People v. Chadd, supra, 28 Cal.3d 739, 750, fn. 7 (per Mosk, J.).) (17) Similarly, neither the trial court nor defense counsel can compel a competent defendant to present an insanity defense, no matter how strong the available evidence of the defendant's insanity at the time of the charged acts. ( People v. Gauze (1975) 15 Cal.3d 709, 717-718 [125 Cal. Rptr. 773, 542 P.2d 1365] (per Mosk, J.).) The defense attorney in Gauze, expressing a view also taken by defendant's trial attorney in this case, stated to the trial court: I determine it to be a mandate of the Court by appointing me on this case that I am to proceed according to [the defendant's] wishes. ( Id. at p. 717.) This court endorsed the view that both court and counsel are obligated to respect a competent defendant's considered and voluntary decisions on matters of fundamental importance affecting trial of the action: ... defendant Gauze made a free and voluntary choice with knowledge of its consequences. Neither counsel nor the court had power to contravene that choice. ( Id. at p. 718.) (11e) Given the importance which the decisions of both this court and the United States Supreme Court have attached to an accused's ability to control his or her own destiny and to make fundamental decisions affecting trial of the action, and given this court's recognition that it is not irrational to prefer the death penalty to life imprisonment without parole ( People v. Guzman, supra, 45 Cal.3d 915, 963-965), [7] it would be incongruous to hold that a trial court lacked power to grant a midtrial motion for self-representation in a capital case merely because the accused stated an intention to seek a death verdict. While we do not suggest that trial courts must or even should grant such midtrial motions, we do not find the trial court's ruling on the motion in this case to be violative of defendant's rights or contrary to any fundamental public policy. Granting defendant's midtrial motion for self-representation did not contravene the policy against state-aided suicide (see People v. Deere (1985) 41 Cal.3d 353, 362-363 [222 Cal. Rptr. 13, 710 P.2d 925]). First, defendant's proposed strategy by no means ensured the return of a death verdict. Faced with a defendant arguing a preference for the death penalty after conviction of death-eligible offenses, a jury might well conclude that death was too good for the defendant and that life imprisonment with no hope of parole would be the more severe and more appropriate punishment. Second, if the trier of penalty has determined death to be the appropriate punishment, and the death judgment meets constitutional standards of reliability, the judgment cannot reasonably be regarded as the defendant's doing (other than by his commission of the capital crimes) or its execution as suicide. Finally, as discussed more fully below, defendant's argument would effectively preclude death penalty prosecution of self-represented capital defendants who decline to present mitigating evidence, as there is no effective means to compel a pro se defendant to make an affirmative penalty defense. We are not the first court to conclude that a capital defendant's announced intention to seek the death penalty does not compel denial of a motion for self-representation. In Hamblen v. State (Fla. 1988) 527 So.2d 800, the trial court granted a capital defendant's motion for self-representation after the defendant announced his intention to plead guilty and seek the death penalty. On appeal, as in the present case, defendant contended it was error to grant the motion because it resulted in a penalty trial at which no defense to the death penalty was presented. The Florida Supreme Court rejected this contention, stating that in the final analysis, all competent defendants have a right to control their own destinies, and that there was no error in not appointing counsel against [the defendant's] wishes to seek out and to present mitigating evidence and to argue against the death sentence. ( Id. at p. 804.) The Illinois Supreme Court had earlier reached the same conclusion, stating: We do not agree that the defendant's waiver of counsel should not have been accepted because the waiver frustrated the statutory intention to provide the sentencing body with all relevant mitigating evidence and this could best be done through counsel. ( People v. Silagy (1984) 101 Ill.2d 147 [77 Ill.Dec. 792, 461 N.E.2d 415, 431], cert. den. 469 U.S. 873 [83 L.Ed.2d 156, 105 S.Ct. 227].) In that case, as here, the trial court had granted the defendant's request, made immediately after being found guilty of capital offenses and for the purpose of obtaining a death verdict, to proceed without counsel for the penalty phase. As here, the attorney remained in an advisory role and no mitigating evidence was presented at the penalty phase. On appeal defendant argued that Society's interest in maintaining the integrity of the sentencing process ... must take precedence over his personal right to represent himself in a criminal proceeding. ( Id. at p. 175 [461 N.E.2d at p. 429].) After noting that the right of self-representation is protected by the Sixth Amendment, that the defendant's decision to discharge counsel was knowingly and intelligently made, and that his announced preference for the death penalty was not irrational, the court stated: Nor do we consider, as the defendant says, that his decision to discharge his attorneys interfered with society's interest in the fair administration of justice.... [¶] Society's interest in the proper administration of justice is preserved by giving a defendant the right freely to present evidence in mitigation, by requiring the sentencing body to find aggravating factors before imposing the death penalty, and by requiring that a sentence of death be reviewed by this court. ( Id. at p. 181 [461 N.E.2d at pp. 431-432].) (18a) A defendant may challenge the grant of a motion for self-representation on the basis that the record fails to show that the defendant was made aware of the risks of self-representation. Defendant has not challenged the granting of his self-representation motion on this basis, but we have nonetheless examined the record to determine whether it sufficiently reflects a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel. As we explain, it does. A defendant seeking self-representation should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that `he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.' ( Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 835 [45 L.Ed.2d at p. 582].) The test of a valid waiver of counsel is not whether specific warnings or advisements were given but whether the record as a whole demonstrates that the defendant understood the disadvantages of self-representation, including the risks and complexities of the particular case. ( U.S. v. McDowell (6th Cir.1987) 814 F.2d 245, 249; Fitzpatrick v. Wainwright (11th Cir.1986) 800 F.2d 1057, 1065; United States v. Kimmel (9th Cir.1982) 672 F.2d 720, 722; People v. Longwith (1981) 125 Cal. App.3d 400, 408 [178 Cal. Rptr. 136]; Zimmerman v. Municipal Court (1980) 111 Cal. App.3d 174, 179 [168 Cal. Rptr. 434].) (11f) The trial court in this case gave few specific warnings or advisements regarding the risks of self-representation, but in the unusual situation facing the court an elaborate catalog of dangers and pitfalls was unnecessary. As the trial court observed, defendant would be assisting rather than opposing the prosecutor and not only appreciated the risk of a death verdict but actively sought it. The record reveals, and the trial court found, that defendant possessed sufficient intellect to understand the proceedings and to address the court and the jury. Defendant was aware of the possible penalty verdicts on each count, and was advised by the trial court that his decision was an enormous mistake. Defendant acknowledged that the prosecutor had practiced law longer than defendant had been alive and thus would be a skilled opponent. The record therefore establishes that defendant was sufficiently aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation and made his decision with open eyes. (18b) Although some cases have suggested that a defendant seeking self-representation ought to be advised that a self-represented defendant is precluded on appeal from asserting ineffective assistance of counsel (e.g., People v. Doane (1988) 200 Cal. App.3d 852, 860, fn. 1 [246 Cal. Rptr. 366]; People v. Spencer (1984) 153 Cal. App.3d 931, 945 [200 Cal. Rptr. 693]), we agree with the holding in Longwith, supra, 125 Cal. App.3d at p. 409, that such a warning is not constitutionally required. [8] (11g) The defendant's waiver of counsel in this case is not rendered invalid by the absence of an advisement regarding the appellate consequences of the waiver. Having expressly rejected full representation by a skilled professional, and having elected self-representation for the purpose of facilitating a death verdict, defendant could not reasonably have expected to obtain reversal of a judgment of death by asserting the ineffectiveness of his own unskilled efforts. Effective assistance of counsel. (19) Defendants who have elected self-representation may not thereafter seek reversal of their convictions on the ground that their own efforts were inadequate and amounted to a denial of effective assistance of counsel. ( Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. 806, 834-835, fn. 46 [45 L.Ed.2d 562, 581].) This rule applies whether or not the self-represented defendant has been assisted by an attorney acting as advisory counsel or in some other limited capacity. (See Mullins v. Lavoie (1982) 249 Ga. 411 [290 S.E.2d 472, 474]; Carter v. State (Ind. 1987) 512 N.E.2d 158, 163-164; State v. Hutchison (Iowa 1983) 341 N.W.2d 33, 42; Parren v. State, supra, 309 Md. 260 [523 A.2d 597, 599]; State v. Harper (Mo. App. 1982) 637 S.W.2d 170, 173-174.) This must be especially true when, as here, the course charted by the self-represented defendant is contrary to the advice of counsel. In the present case, defendant made a considered decision to pursue a strategy likely to result, and intended to result, in a death verdict. Having made that decision, having persuaded the trial court to grant him self-representation, and having conducted the penalty phase according to his own plan, defendant may not predicate error on his own actions. (20) Defendant argues that his trial attorney had an independent obligation to present an effective penalty defense on defendant's behalf. As noted, defendant's attorney acted in a limited and largely advisory capacity at the penalty phase. Once defendant requested and was granted self-representation, and assumed control of the defense case, his attorney was under no obligation to act in a manner directly contrary to defendant's express instructions. To prevail on a claim that counsel acting in an advisory or other limited capacity has rendered ineffective assistance, a self-represented defendant must show that counsel failed to perform competently within the limited scope of the duties assigned to or assumed by counsel (see People v. Hamilton, supra , ante, pp. 1164-1165, fn. 14; People v. Doane, supra, 200 Cal. App.3d at pp. 864-866), and that a more favorable verdict was reasonably probable in the absence of counsel's failings (see Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 694 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 698, 104 S.Ct. 2052]; People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 584 [189 Cal. Rptr. 855, 659 P.2d 1144]). A self-represented defendant may not claim ineffective assistance on account of counsel's omission to perform an act within the scope of duties the defendant voluntarily undertook to perform personally at trial. As noted, defendant assumed complete control of the formulation and presentation of the defense case at the penalty phase with the objective of obtaining a death verdict. Presentation of mitigating evidence was not a duty that was assigned to or assumed by the attorney. Having assigned counsel a subordinate role which expressly precluded the selection or examination of penalty phase witnesses, defendant may not now predicate error on counsel's conduct in conformity with defendant's own wishes. (See Frierson, supra, 39 Cal.3d 803, 817 [... when a defendant insists on a course of action despite his counsel's contrary warning and advice, he may not later complain that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by complying with his wishes]; see also, Autry v. McKaskle (5th Cir.1984) 727 F.2d 358, 361 [By no measure can [the capital defendant] block his lawyer's efforts and later claim the resulting performance was constitutionally deficient]; State v. Felde (La. 1982) 422 So.2d 370, 395, cert. den. 461 U.S. 918 [77 L.Ed.2d 290, 103 S.Ct. 1903] [defense attorney permitted cocounsel defendant to testify to death verdict preference, offered no other penalty phase evidence, and argued for death verdict  ineffective assistance claim rejected].) Reliable verdict. (21) Relying on People v. Deere, supra, 41 Cal.3d 353, defendant argues that permitting a defendant to withhold substantial mitigating evidence undermines the state's interest in reliable penalty determinations in capital cases. As we explain, the argument contains both practical and theoretical flaws. In brief, a rule requiring a self-represented defendant to present mitigating evidence would be unenforceable and self-defeating. For this and other reasons, a judgment of death may not be regarded as unreliable in a constitutional sense merely because a self-represented defendant chose not to present mitigating evidence at the penalty phase. A rule requiring a pro se defendant to present mitigating evidence would be unenforceable, as the court has no means to compel a defendant to put on an affirmative defense. (See Hamblen v. State, supra, 527 So.2d at p. 804 [there is no power that could have compelled [the defendant] to cooperate and divulge such information].) The threat of appellate reversal would be not merely ineffective but counterproductive. A knowledgeable defendant desiring to avoid the death penalty could make a timely request for self-representation under Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. 806, and then decline to present any mitigating evidence at the penalty phase, secure in the knowledge that any death judgment would be reversed by this court, while a defendant genuinely desiring death could circumvent the rule by presenting a bare minimum of mitigating evidence. A rule so easily evaded or misused is clearly unsound. The sanction of appellate reversal is not the answer, nor has any alternative method been suggested to compel an unwilling defendant to present an effective penalty defense. While the United States Supreme Court has frequently stated that the Eighth Amendment and evolving standards of societal decency impose a high requirement of reliability on the determination that death is the appropriate penalty in a particular case (see, e.g., Johnson v. Mississippi (1988) 486 U.S. 578, 584 [100 L.Ed.2d 575, 584, 108 S.Ct. 1981, 1986]; Mills v. Maryland (1988) 486 U.S. 367, 377 [100 L.Ed.2d 384, 395, 108 S.Ct. 1860, 1870]), the high court has never suggested that this heightened concern for reliability requires or justifies forcing an unwilling defendant to accept representation or to present an affirmative penalty defense in a capital case. Indeed, the lack of any legal or practical means to force a pro se defendant to present mitigating evidence, or indeed any defense at all, compels the conclusion that the death-verdict-reliability requirement cannot mean that a death verdict is unsound merely because the defendant did not present potentially mitigating evidence. Rather, the required reliability is attained when the prosecution has discharged its burden of proof at the guilt and penalty phases pursuant to the rules of evidence and within the guidelines of a constitutional death penalty statute, the death verdict has been returned under proper instructions and procedures, and the trier of penalty has duly considered the relevant mitigating evidence, if any, which the defendant has chosen to present. A judgment of death entered in conformity with these rigorous standards does not violate the Eighth Amendment reliability requirements. [9] (See Hamblen v. State, supra, 527 So.2d 800, 804; People v. Silagy, supra, 101 Ill.2d at p. 181 [461 N.E.2d at p. 432]; see also, State v. Harding (1983) 137 Ariz. 278 [670 P.2d 383, 400] [self-represented defendant presented no mitigating evidence  judgment of death affirmed]; Bishop v. State (1979) 95 Nev. 511 [597 P.2d 273, 276] [same]; Bonnie, The Dignity of the Condemned (1988) 74 Va.L.Rev. 1363, 1382-1389.) Habeas corpus petition. Defendant has filed a habeas corpus petition to supplement the trial record with a declaration by his trial counsel summarizing the available mitigating evidence, which primarily concerned parental abuse by Bloom, Sr., and defendant's resulting psychological trauma or borderline schizophrenia. The contention advanced in the petition is that failure to present mitigating evidence at the penalty phase, in conjunction with defendant's argument to the jury requesting a death verdict, deprived him of his right to effective assistance of counsel and offended the state's interest in ensuring the reliability of death penalty verdicts. The reasons which caused us to reject this contention when raised on appeal compel its rejection in this context as well.