Opinion ID: 2582506
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: sentencing issuedual use of prior conviction

Text: As noted, defendant's registration obligation arose because he had suffered two earlier felony convictions under section 288, one of which the trial court struck before imposing sentence. The prescribed maximum punishment for failing to register as a convicted sex felon is three years. (§ 290, subd. (g)(2).) The trial court, however, relied on defendant's remaining prior conviction and the Three Strikes law, section 1170.12, subdivision (c)(1), to double defendant's punishment under section 290, imposing a term of six years. Defendant argues that section 290 has already factored in the commission of a prior felony in setting the three-year maximum punishment, and that the trial court improperly relied on that prior felony in doubling his punishment under the Three Strikes law. He claims this dual use of his prior conviction violated the rule that when a prior conviction constitutes an element of criminal conduct which otherwise would be noncriminal, the minimum sentence may not be increased because of the indispensable prior conviction. [Citations.] ( People v. Edwards (1976) 18 Cal.3d 796, 800, 135 Cal.Rptr. 411, 557 P.2d 995; see also In re Shull (1944) 23 Cal.2d 745, 749-753, 146 P.2d 417.) Here, according to defendant, Edwards should bar using his prior felony conviction to increase his sentence because that prior conviction constituted an element of the section 290 registration offense: Failure to register with authorities is noncriminal conduct in the absence of a qualifying prior conviction. Our first task, of course, is to ascertain the lawmakers' intent. As we recently stated, As with any other statute, our task in construing a provision of the Three Strikes law `is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent.' ( People v. Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605, 621, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 356, 927 P.2d 713....) We consider first the statute's words because they are generally the most reliable indicator of legislative intent. ( Ibid.; see also Holloway v. United States (1999) 526 U.S. [1, 6], 119 S.Ct. 966, 143 L.Ed.2d 1.) `When looking to the words of the statute, a court gives the language its usual, ordinary meaning.' ( People v. Snook (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1210, 1215, 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 615, 947 P.2d 808 ...; accord, Lennane v. Franchise Tax Bd. (1994) 9 Cal.4th 263, 268, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 563, 885 P.2d 976....) ( People v. Nguyen (1999) 21 Cal.4th 197, 203, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 198, 980 P.2d 905 ( Nguyen ).) On its face, the plain and unambiguous language of the Three Strikes law discloses an intent to impose the enhanced, doubled sentence despite a possible dual use of defendant's prior conviction. Section 1170.12, subdivision (c)(1), states that If a defendant has one prior [serious or violent] felony conviction that has been pled and proved, the determinate term or minimum term for an indeterminate term shall be twice the term otherwise provided as punishment for the current felony conviction. The section further provides that the doubled punishment shall apply in addition to any other enhancements or punishment provisions which may apply. Finally, section 1170.12, subdivision (d)(1), provides: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, this section shall be applied in every case in which a defendant has a prior felony conviction as defined in this section. (Italics added; see also § 667, subd. (f)(1).) These provisions convinced the Court of Appeal in the present case that the framers of the Three Strikes law intended to impose the doubled punishment without regard to such preexisting decisions as Edwards and its dual use rule. The Court of Appeal itself relied in large part on People v. Tillman (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 771, 774-786, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 715. As Tillman observed, the foregoing provisions demonstrate a broad intent to have the Three Strikes law apply to all recidivists coming within its terms. This intent would be frustrated by allowing the Edwards rule to limit the prior convictions that could be used to trigger application of the Three Strikes law. ( Id. at p. 782, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 715; see also People v. Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136, 156-157, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 387, 19 P.3d 1129.) Despite the apparent clarity of the language on which Tillman, supra, 73 Cal. App.4th 771, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 715, relied, defendant argues that Tillman was incorrect in holding that section 1170.12, subdivision (c)(1), properly may be used to double the punishment for a failure to register merely because the defendant had suffered an earlier qualifying (violent or serious) felony that also led to his duty to register. Defendant states that when he violated the provision in 1995, virtually all sex offense felonies listed in section 290, subdivision (a)(2)(A), as requiring registration were also violent or serious felonies under the Three Strikes law. (See §§ 1170.12, subd. (b)(1), 667.5, subd. (e) [violent felonies, including (6) lewd acts on a child under the age of 14 years as defined in Section 288], 1192.7, subd. (c) [serious felonies, including (6) lewd or lascivious act on a child under the age of 14 years].) He further argues that in light of this overlap, application of the Three Strikes law to violations of section 290 would result in an automatic doubling of the sentences prescribed by that section, a result unintended by the framers of the Three Strike law. In other words, defendant asserts that the problem with Tillman 's holding as applied to failures to register is that most, if not all, such failures would result in an automatic doubling of the prescribed punishment, because they would involve an underlying serious or violent sex offense felony. Defendant observes that automatically doubling the three-year term for violating what we have recently characterized as a regulatory enactment ( People v. Castellanos (1999) 21 Cal.4th 785, 798, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 346, 982 P.2d 211) is unduly harsh and exceeds the expressed intent of the Three Strikes law to punish recidivist felony offenders. (See People v. Jones (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1142, 1150, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 753, 857 P.2d 1163; cf. People v. Baird (1995) 12 Cal.4th 126, 134, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 65, 906 P.2d 1220.) Contrary to defendant's assumption, in testing his automatic doubling argument we must look at the list of registrable offenses in effect in 1994 when the Three Strikes law was passed in order to determine whether the framers intended persons convicted of felony violations of section 290 to be subject to the doubled punishment provision. Examined in that light, defendant's characterization is clearly overbroad, as many sex offenses registrable in 1994 would not also constitute Three Strikes offenses (which generally must involve force, violence, duress, menace, or threats, or lewd or lascivious acts on a child under 14). Without attempting to compile a complete list, examples of such registrable offenses would include various pimping and pandering offenses (see §§ 266, 266h-266j, 267), contributing to a minor's delinquency (§ 272), incest (§ 285), nonforcible sodomy (§ 286, subds. (e)-(k)), sex offenses based solely on the age of the child victim (§§ 286, subd. (b), 288.2, 288a, subd. (b), 289, subds. (h), (i)), various obscenity offenses (§ 311 et seq.), indecent exposure (§ 314), loitering (§ 647, subd. (d)), and child annoyance (§ 647.6). In short, and contrary to defendant's assumption, application of section 1170.12, subdivision (c)(1), to section 290 would not result in the automatic doubling of all felony sentences under that provision. Defendant next argues that the language of the Three Strikes law is reasonably susceptible to a construction favorable to him. (See People v. Franklin, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 253, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 241, 975 P.2d 30.) Section 1170.12, subdivision (c)(1), states that a person with a prior qualifying felony, or strike, must receive a prison term that is twice the term otherwise provided as punishment for his new offense. (Italics added.) Defendant argues that the statutory language could be read as requiring a doubling of the term otherwise provided for the current felony offense as if defendant had no prior strike conviction on his record. But if defendant had no prior conviction, he would not have been required by section 290 to register in the first place, and would have no otherwise provided punishment to double. In other words, according to defendant, section 290 has already factored in the commission of a prior felony in setting the three-year maximum punishment for a failure to register. Once again, we disagree. We have recently construed the otherwise provided language of section 1170.12, subdivision (c)(1), as referring to the term that would be imposed in the absence of the Three Strikes law. ( Nguyen, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 205, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 198, 980 P.2d 905.) In light of the numerous registrable offenses not falling within the Three Strikes law, as previously discussed, the Nguyen definition readily fits the facts of this case: Defendant, having suffered a prior qualifying strike, must receive a term for violating section 290 that is twice the term that would have been imposed had he committed one of the many prior nonqualifying offenses. (See also People v. Murphy, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 158-159, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 387,19 P.3d 1129.) In short, we find nothing in the language of the Three Strikes law or the cases construing it indicating the framers intended to exempt from section 1170.12, subdivision (c)(1), a felony violation of the sex registration laws. The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed. GEORGE, C.J., BAXTER, WERDEGAR, and BROWN, JJ., concur. KENNARD, J., concurring and dissenting. I agree with the majority that a conviction of the crime of willful failure to register as a sex offender (Pen.Code, § 290) [1] requires proof that the defendant had actual knowledge of the registration requirement. I disagree, however, with the majority's conclusion that here the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the element of knowledge was harmless.