Opinion ID: 2709466
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of Withholding of Removal Supported by

Text: Substantial Evidence Yasinskyy’s brief on appeal suffers from a profound disconnect from reality. Most of his arguments fail to track the decisions of the IJ or the BIA, and he attributes quotes to the IJ that appear nowhere in the record. As the government notes, the arguments appear to have been lifted from some unrelated brief to the BIA. Concerning withholding of removal, Yasinskyy insists that the IJ required him to prove that he was “seriously harmed” in order to show past persecution and thus relied on an incorrect legal standard. He adds that he “experienced considerable harm by local police, thugs, and other[s] controlled by the government militants” and “was kicked, beaten, collapsed and lost consciousness.” Yasinskyy’s assertions mischaracterize the administrative record and, as the government contends, violate Rule 28(a)(9)(A) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. First, 10 No. 12-3561 the IJ did not require Yasinskyy to show that he was “seriously harmed.” Instead, the IJ noted the fact-specific nature of the past persecution determination, compared Yasinskyy’s alleged harms—which the IJ credited—to other asylum cases, and concluded that the evidence did not demonstrate harm rising to the level of persecution. Although we would have reached a different conclusion were we in the IJ’s shoes (more on that later), the record does not support Yasinskyy’s assertion that the IJ required a showing of serious harm. Second, Yasinskyy never testified that he was injured by “local police, thugs, and other[s] controlled by the government militants.” Nor did he insist that those responsible for his injuries were acting on behalf of or with the approval of the government. Instead, he consistently testified that he did not know who had attacked him or made the threatening phone calls. In the haystack of Yasinskyy’s brief, however, there is a needle of truth. Yasinskyy says he collapsed after being kicked and beaten during the first attack. But Yasinskyy has not developed a legal argument about how that one incident—carried out by unknown assailants with no demonstrable connection to the government—equates to past persecution on account of political opinion. We will not entertain baseless and unsupported factual contentions or undeveloped legal arguments, see Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(9)(A) (requiring that appellant’s brief include his “contentions and the reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant relies”); Stevens v. Housing Auth. of South Bend, Ind., 663 F.3d 300, 310–11 (7th Cir. 2011); Smeigh v. Johns Manville, Inc., 643 F.3d 554, 564 n.3 (7th Cir. 2011), and once the inaccurate facts are removed, there is no No. 12-3561 11 basis for Yasinskyy’s contention that he suffered past persecution. His brief does not address the IJ’s or the BIA’s conclusion about future persecution, and so any related argument is waived. See Firishchak v. Holder, 636 F.3d 305, 309 n.2 (7th Cir. 2011). That said, we are bewildered by the IJ’s assertion that a beating resulting in a concussion and kidney injury—requiring a week’s stay in the hospital—followed by a second beating and countless telephone threats could not constitute persecution. The IJ assessed the harms to Yasinskyy by comparing his experiences to those of petitioners in previous cases before this court. That approach, however, “turn[s] the system upside down” by confusing our deferential review—asking whether the administrative record compels a finding of past persecution—with the role of immigration judges to draw on their expertise to decide whether the applicant actually has shown past persecution. See Sirbu v. Holder, 718 F.3d 655, 659-60 (7th Cir. 2013). Immigration judges must ask whether there was “the use of significant physical force against a person’s body, or the infliction of comparable physical harm without direct application of force … or nonphysical harm of equal gravity” which crossed the line between harassment and persecution, i.e., “the line between the nasty and the barbaric[.]” Stanojkova v. Holder, 645 F.3d 943, 948 (7th Cir. 2011). We conclude that it did. But that does not help Yasinskyy because he did not demonstrate that the beatings and threats were carried out by the Ukrainian government or by a group that the government was unable or unwilling to control—a necessary element for showing past persecution, see Almutairi v. Holder, No. 12-2734, 2013 WL 12 No. 12-3561 3481356, at  (7th Cir. July 12, 2013); Vahora v. Holder, 707 F.3d 904, 908 (7th Cir. 2013). So his request for withholding of removal is doomed. B. Denial of CAT Protection Supported by Substantial Evidence What remains is Yasinskyy’s challenge to the denial of CAT relief, which is similarly deficient. He argues that the IJ did not recognize that withholding of removal and relief under CAT are analytically distinct. That contention is not true: The IJ recited the standard that the petitioner had to meet—that it is more likely than not that he would be tortured if returned to Ukraine, see Bitsin v. Holder, No. 12-2717, 2013 WL 2402855, at  (7th Cir. May 31, 2013)—but concluded that Yasinskyy had failed to meet his burden. Yasinskyy presses that the “country report on human rights practices” shows that he will be tortured if he returns because, he contends, “the police is always influenced by the ruling party to arrest and torture the opposing party members.” Yasinskyy does not say, however, which of the two country reports he submitted supports that contention or provide any record citations, again violating Rule 28(a)(9)(A). But any citation would have been futile because the country reports contradict his argument. In fact, the 2008 and 2009 State Department reports, while acknowledging torture of prisoners and pretrial detainees, clarify that there were no reports of political prisoners or detainees.