Opinion ID: 1163274
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: the prejudgment interest award

Text: Brashier argues he is entitled to prejudgment interest authorized by the terms of § 3629(B) or, in the alternative, by the general statute, 12 O.S.1991 § 727(A)(2). [26] The insurer counters that because Brashier's quest below was pressed solely in reliance on § 3629, and the Court of Appeals found that statute to be inapplicable to a bad-faith claim, he cannot now change theories on appeal. The applicable statute, 12 O.S.1991 § 727(A)(2), provides for prejudgment interest upon a verdict by reason of personal injuries. [27] UM coverage is a first-party indemnity paid by the insurer for bodily injury sustained by the insured, for which the latter is legally entitled to recover from the uninsured, underinsured or hit-and-run motorist. [28] In contemplation of law, the UM coverage proceeds stand as a substituted res for personal injury recovery the insured would have received from the uninsured or underinsured tortfeasor. Because the UM recovery represents recompense for one's personal injuries, [29] a judgment in a bad-faith claim for loss sustained by a UM insured would entitle the victor to the § 727(A)(2) prejudgment interest. Brashier's failure to press for prejudgment interest due under § 727(A)(2) is no bar to its recovery. A legally correct judgment will not be reversed because of the judge's faulty reasoning, erroneous fact finding or consideration of an immaterial issue. [30] Because the prejudgment interest award is erroneously rested upon the provisions of § 3629(B), we reverse that allowance and remand the cause for reassessment of that element of recovery under the provisions of § 727.