Opinion ID: 2801007
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Scope of Deeded Easement

Text: ¶ 51. On cross-appeal, P&B contests the trial court’s conclusion that P&B’s express, deeded easement allowing for the use of Sunne Village Lane to access Parcel 2 does not encompass the use contemplated here, which would overburden the easement. [14] ¶ 52. The declaration of covenants establishing the express easement states: [T]he Subdivision Roadway . . . shall be held and conveyed in common ownership among the owners of the lots within the Subdivision with each lot owner owning in fee simple an undivided 1/28th interest in said Subdivision Roadway in common with all other owners of lots within the Subdivision, provided that the ownership interest of each lot owner in the Subdivision Road shall be subject to and benefitted by a perpetual right-of-way and easement over and upon said Subdivision Road in common with the owners of other lots within the Subdivision, their respective heirs, successors, administrators, assigns, guests, and invitees . . . . . . . . ALTERATION OF OR ACCESS TO THE SUBDIVISION ROAD. Except as hereinafter provided there shall be no improvements or alterations of the Subdivision Road except in accordance with the approved plans. Each lot owner shall, upon written application to the Association, construct a reasonable access driveway entering onto the subdivision road so long as such access driveway does not adversely affect, or impair the Subdivision Road, or result in any undue safety hazard. ¶ 53. The deed by which P&B acquired title to Parcel 2 repeats the grant of “an easement and right-of-way” to P&B and its heirs and assigns, and states that “[s]aid easement [is] to be for all normal and usual purpose of vehicular and pedestrian ingress and egress from the parcel . . . to and from . . . Route 100.” ¶ 54. Because the declaration of covenants contain no language limiting the use of Sunne Village Lane or No Name Road to residential purposes, P&B argued in the trial court that it grants unrestricted use to each lot owner. The court rejected this argument, concluding that the commercial use contemplated here was beyond the intended scope of the easement. The court explained that (1) the subdivision plan laid out building lots for residential purposes; (2) the declaration of covenants referred to constructing driveways off the roadway for access to residential lots; and (3) the easement over Sunne Village Lane was for the “normal and usual purposes of vehicular and pedestrian ingress and egress.” The court found that these facts indicated that the easement’s intended purpose was to allow access to residential lots, and that allowing a large number of vehicles to travel onto No Name Road and P&B’s parking lots “would materially increase the burden on the estate” in a way not contemplated by the easement. ¶ 55. On cross-appeal, P&B renews its contention that the express easement in favor of the lots on Parcel 2 allows for this commercial use. P&B emphasizes that the declaration does not contain any restriction against such use. While P&B disclaims any “present intent to utilize the No Name Road for access to the rear of the Parking Lot Property,” it suggests that any future commercial use of the road would not overburden the easement, and a bar on commercial use of the road “may impede future development of the Parking Lot Property.” [15] ¶ 56. The interpretation of an express easement is a “question of law, which we review de novo.” Creed v. Clogston , 2004 VT 34, ¶ 13, 176 Vt. 436, 852 A.2d 577. “In construing an express easement, as in construing a deed or declaration of covenants, “[o]ur master rule . . . is that the intent of the parties governs.” DeGraff v. Burnett , 2007 VT 95, ¶ 20, 182 Vt. 314, 939 A.2d 472 (quotation omitted); see also Rowe v. Lavanway , 2006 VT 47, ¶ 11, 180 Vt. 505, 904 A.2d 78 (mem.) (“Our goal in interpreting a deed is to implement the intent of the parties.”). If the terms of the express easement are unambiguous—that is, if reasonable people could not interpret it in different ways—then we “enforce the terms as written without resort to rules of construction or extrinsic evidence.” DeGraff , 2007 VT 95, ¶ 20 (quotation omitted). “If ambiguity exists, however, the interpretation of the parties’ intent becomes a question of fact to be determined based on all of the evidence—not only the language of the written instrument, but also evidence concerning its subject matter, its purpose at the time it was executed, and the situation of the parties.” Id . (quotation omitted). ¶ 57. Several principles guide our interpretation of express easements. First, “a dominant estate is entitled to use an easement ‘in a manner that is reasonably necessary for the convenient enjoyment of the servitude.’ ” Rowe , 2006 VT 47, ¶ 23 (quoting Restatement (Third) of Property, Servitudes § 4.10 (2000)). Second, the easement must be used “in a manner consistent with the use contemplated at the time of its creation” and may not be used “in a way that materially increases the burden on the servient estate.” Id . ¶ 22 (citing Greenberg v. Hadwen , 145 Vt. 112, 116, 484 A.2d 916, 918 (1984)). “Whether a particular use overburdens an easement . . . depends on the easement’s original purpose and the scope of its authorized use.” Farrell v. Vt. Elec. Power Co. , 2012 VT 96, ¶ 13, 193 Vt. 307, 68 A.3d 1111. The third principle follows naturally from the other two: the “manner, frequency, and intensity of the use [of the easement] may change over time to take advantage of developments in technology and to accommodate normal development[,] . . . permit[ting] servitudes to retain their utility over time,” if doing so would “reflect[] the expectations of the parties who create servitudes of indefinite duration.” Rowe , 2006 VT 47, ¶ 23 (quoting Restatement (Third) of Property, Servitudes § 4.10 & cmt. f); see also Farrell , 2012 VT 96, ¶ 13 (“If a new use of an easement is consistent with the original purpose of an easement, then no additional taking or easement is required.” (quotation omitted)). ¶ 58. In Rowe , we construed an easement (contained in an 1881 deed) granting the dominant estate “ ‘the right to pass through [the servient estate] in the lane as it now is . . . for all purposes whatever.’ ” Id . ¶ 3. We found that the use of automobiles was “consistent with the use contemplated at the time of [the easement’s] creation” and would not “materially increase[] the burden on the servient estate.” Id . ¶ 22 (“[B]ecause there was no limitation on the grantee’s use of the right-of-way in the 1881 deed that created it, none should be imported merely because, over time, horses had been replaced by automobiles and cows by ATVs.”). ¶ 59. Here, the deed in question does not contain such broad language encompassing all purposes whatsoever, but also does not expressly limit the character or volume of use. Our task is to infer the “intent of the parties, as drawn from the language of the deed, the circumstances existing at the time of execution, and the object and purpose to be accomplished by the easement.” Barrett v. Kunz , 158 Vt. 15, 18, 604 A.2d 1278, 1280 (1992). ¶ 60. Although nothing in the founding documents appears to limit lots in the subdivision to residential use, the subdivision plan and the history we can glean from the record suggest that the subdivision was intended to be residential. Further, the declaration of covenants provides that each lot owner shall bear an equal percentage of the common expenses to insure and maintain the subdivision road and the common sewer system. This provision suggests an expectation that the actual use and impact of the respective lot owners would be similar. Finally, the initial deed to P&B’s predecessor in title, and the subsequent deeds, state that the easement is “for all normal and usual purposes of vehicular and pedestrian ingress and egress . . . to and from . . . Route 100, as well as for the installation of all normal and usual utilities to serve the parcel.” The burden associated with the normal and usual vehicular and pedestrian ingress and egress to a residential dwelling is far more modest than the burden associated with the operation of two busy restaurants. [16] ¶ 61. P&B contends that their predecessors in title purchased the property from the developers of the subdivision for the purpose of adding to the parking for the restaurant, and that the use of the easement by P&B’s predecessors in title has from the beginning always been the commercial use in place today. It is true that a year after filing the declaration of covenants, the original developer sold the three lots that make up Parcel 2 to a person who already owned and operated a restaurant on Parcel 1, and that Parcel 2 has served as a parking lot for the restaurants since that time. ¶ 62. We nonetheless reject P&B’s argument that the easement contained in the declaration of covenants allows for a burden on the roadway easement commensurate with the operation of these restaurants. First, P&B’s argument requires us to draw an inference that the original developer understood that the initial purchaser planned to use Parcel 2 as a restaurant parking lot, and that the developer believed the burden on the roadway easement associated with such use to be consistent with the declaration of covenants. There is no direct evidence on this point. Second, the transfer in question occurred more than a year after the declaration of covenants was filed, and the obligations and benefits of the covenants had attached with respect to existing lot owners. Third, and most significantly, given the trial court’s findings that the disputed access to Parcel 1 was used as early as 1975, the developer could also have assumed that the initial purchaser of Parcel 2 would rely on that access for restaurant patrons parking on Parcel 2 so that the burden on subdivision roads would not be impacted by the acquisition. ¶ 63. For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the judgment for P&B on its nuisance claim; uphold the award of punitive damages and attorney’s fees; affirm the judgment that P&B’s deeded easement for access does not include access for patrons of two restaurants; and reverse the award of compensatory damages because of the lack of evidence to support the award. The judgment for P&B on its claim for nuisance is affirmed. The award of punitive damages and attorney’s fees is affirmed. The judgment for the POA concerning the scope of P&B’s deeded access to lots 2, 3, and 4 is affirmed. The award of compensatory damages is reversed for lack of evidence to support it . FOR THE COURT: