Opinion ID: 46216
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Pope’s “Falsity” Argument Was Waived

Text: Put simply, the district court decided the motion to suppress based on the issues presented to it. We may review the propriety of that decision, then, only within that framework. We may not test it on grounds or theories never presented to that court in the first place. If Pope believed that Baird’s “real purpose” for 14 Emphasis added. 11 pursuing the prescription-drug search was to look for evidence of a meth lab, and the statement of purpose in his affidavit was, therefore, “deliberately or recklessly false,” she should have made that point in her motion to suppress or at the suppression hearing. Only the district court had a real opportunity to assess the weight of the evidence —— particularly Baird’s credibility —— on this point. We have held that a “a defendant who fails to make a timely suppression motion cannot raise that claim for the first time on appeal.”15 We have also held that failure to raise specific issues or arguments in pre-trial suppression proceedings operates as a waiver of those issues or arguments for appeal.16 The reasons for such a rule are obvious, beginning, of course, with Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(C), which requires that a motion to suppress evidence be raised before trial. In Chavez-Valencia, we observed that “[i]f, at trial, the government assumes that a defendant will not 15 United States v. Chavez-Valencia, 116 F.3d 127, 130 (5th Cir. 1997)(finding its conclusion “supported by the language, history, and structure of [Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] 12(b)(3) and 12(f), by Fifth Circuit precedent, by the case law of our sister circuits, and by sound policy considerations”). 16 See United States v. Harrelson, 705 F.2d 733, 738 (5th Cir. 1983) (“[f]ailure to move pre-trial for suppression, or to assert a particular ground in the suppression motion, operates as a waiver”) (emphasis added and citations omitted); see also United States v. Carreon-Palacio, 267 F.3d 381, 389 (5th Cir. 2001)(suppression argument not preserved for appeal when not raised during suppression hearing below); United States v. Medina, 887 F.2d 528, 533 (5th Cir. 1989) (“in order to preserve an issue for appeal, the grounds for an objection must be stated specifically”). 12 seek to suppress certain evidence, the government may justifiably conclude that it need not introduce the quality or quantity of evidence needed otherwise to prevail.”17 Furthermore, “if a suppression motion is made before trial, the government may appeal an adverse ruling . . . . [But] if the court considers suppression motions after jeopardy attaches, the government loses this right.”18 Also, “little deterrence of unacceptable police conduct is lost by refusing to review suppression claims not raised in the district court.”19 Even though Chavez-Valencia involved a defendant’s failure to move to suppress evidence, these rationales apply with equal force when a defendant who has filed a motion to suppress makes a new or different suppression argument for the first time on appeal. In this case, the government was never put on notice that Pope would argue that Baird’s undisclosed suspicions of meth production rendered his affidavit “recklessly false.” It had no reason, therefore, to reinforce Baird’s unchallenged statement that his purpose was to find evidence related to the previous prescriptiondrug transaction. The brief cross-examination of Baird on this point, although perhaps raising the specter of some strategic subterfuge on his part, fell far short of providing the government 17 Chavez-Valencia, 116 F.3d at 132. 18 Id. 19 Id. 13 notice that Pope was challenging the truthfulness of Baird’s affidavit. It would be patently prejudicial to the government for us to make an effectively unreviewable factual finding on this point now, especially without the benefit of witnessing Baird’s live testimony. Even more importantly, the district court was never notified that it was to decide whether, by omission or commission, Baird lied to the state district judge about the “real purpose” for seeking authority to search Pope’s residence. For us to consider this argument now would run counter to axiomatic principles of appellate review, and we decline to do so.20 The government did note, in its response to Pope’s motion to suppress, that “[t]here was no evidence of deliberate recklessness... in the affidavit.” This assertion was not a direct response to any argument by Pope, however, but only a matter-of-fact assessment made while briefly acknowledging the inapplicability of each of the four exceptions to the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule —— even those 20 Even were we to regard Pope’s argument as merely forfeited and subject the district court’s decision to plain error review, we would find no such error. Under the plain error standard, the “appellant must show clear or obvious error that affects his substantial rights; if he does, this court has discretion to correct a forfeited error. . . .” United States v. Gordon, 346 F.3d 135, 137 (5th Cir. 2003). Here, the district court’s failure to find that Baird’s affidavit in support of the first search warrant was “recklessly false” was not clearly or obviously erroneous. Baird’s testimony at the suppression hearing provided ample basis for the court to credit the truthfulness of his stated purpose for seeking the initial search warrant. 14 that Pope did not assert should apply. Similarly, the district court concluded that “the information the state district judge relied on was not false in that the Officer admitted that the sale took place in June.” This conclusion, however, only addresses the potential falsity of the allegation in the context of Pope’s successful staleness claim; i.e, whether Baird lied in his affidavit about the date of the prescription-drug buy. This conclusion has no bearing on the claim, which Pope now urges for the first time, that Baird lied (by reckless omission) about the “real purpose” for his search of Pope’s residence. As noted, Pope’s failure to raise this issue in the district court bars our consideration whether Baird’s decision not to reveal his suspicions about Pope’s meth production to the state district judge rendered the affidavit “recklessly false.”