Opinion ID: 2981427
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Arbitrator’s Powers

Text: Crescent next argues that the district court should have vacated the award because, in conducting the ex parte proceeding, the Arbitrator failed to “adhere to the terms” of the Order, and thus exceeded its powers. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (permitting a court to vacate an arbitration award “where the arbitrators exceeded their powers”). This court has instructed that arbitrators “do not exceed their authority unless ‘they display a manifest disregard of the law,’ which ‘means more than 2 Though Clinchfield was decided over forty years ago, we still rely upon it. See Armco Emples. Indep. Fedn., Inc. v. AK Steel Corp., 149 F. App’x 347, 352 (6th Cir. 2005); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 330 F.3d 843, 846 (6th Cir. 2003). 9 No. 11-1778 Barrick Enterprises, Inc. v. Crescent Petroleum, Inc., et al. mere error in interpretation or application of the law.’” Appalachian Reg’l Healthcare, Inc. v. Beyt, Rish, Robbins Grp., Architects, No. 91-6063, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 12100,  (6th Cir. May 19, 1992) (citing J.V.B. Indust., 894 F.2d at 866). Rather, “the decision must fly in the face of clearly established legal precedent.” Jaros, 70 F.3d at 421. (internal citation omitted). As long as the arbitrator is “even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority, that a court is convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision.” J.V.B. Indus., 894 F.2d at 866 (citing Misco, 484 U.S. at 38). Though the contract is perhaps ambiguous regarding the disclosure requirement, it would be all but impossible to say that the Arbitrator was not “arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority.” Id. And we know of no cases that would indicate that the Arbitrator’s ex parte meeting with Morton flies in the face of clearly established precedent. Finally, Crescent lodged no objection to the proceedings, and “defects in proceedings prior to or during arbitration may be waived by a party’s acquiescence in the arbitration with knowledge of the defect.” Clinchfield R.R. Co., 407 F.2d at 988. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Crescent’s arguments are without merit.