Opinion ID: 2025227
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: instructions regarding actual malice

Text: Plaintiff next submits that errors were committed in instructing the jury regarding actual malice. The court instructed the jury in part as follows: The term `actual malice' is a legal term and does not lend itself to an exact definition. In defining `actual malice,' I instruct you that as a matter of law, Michael Reed is a public official, and public officials in actions based on libel must show that the defendant either knew that the statement was false or that the defendant had a reckless disregard for the accuracy of the statements. Reckless disregard is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent person would have published or would have investigated before publishing. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the publications. Publishing with such doubts shows reckless disregard for the truth or falsity. This instruction adequately conveys to the jury that actual malice denotes knowledge of a statement's falsity or serious doubts as to its truth. Plaintiff does not challenge this instruction directly. Rather, he submits that the circuit court erroneously refused additional instructions on the actual-malice issue, instructions which he believes clarify the meaning of actual malice and the means of proving it. We examine these instructions with due regard for the fact that, while a party is entitled to have the jury accurately instructed, he has no right to have any particular instruction submitted if the subject of the instruction is adequately covered in other instructions; needless repetition in jury instructions should be avoided. See, e.g., Kingston v. Turner (1987), 115 Ill.2d 445, 448. The first instruction regarding actual malice which plaintiff submits was erroneously refused states: If you determine serious inaccuracies were made by a defendant in the reporting of the grand jury report, you may consider this as a factor in determining whether there was underlying malice. This instruction does no more than inform the jury that they may rely on circumstantial evidence to determine a fact in issue; the import of the instruction is that the more serious the inaccuracy, the more likely its author may have acted with actual malice. The jury clearly understood that if it believed that such an inference were an accurate one, it was perfectly free to draw such an inference. The jury was instructed on circumstantial evidence as follows: A fact may be proved by circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of facts which give rise to a reasonable inference of the truth of the fact sought to be proved. Considering this standard instruction, we believe the jury was adequately instructed on the use of the circumstantial evidence upon which plaintiff now focuses. The next instruction which plaintiff submits was erroneously refused states: Actual malice does not necessarily connote personal spite or ill will so much as an intention to do an act from which injury may be expected. Reckless disregard implies a higher degree of culpability than negligence. Reckless means indifference to consequences. In indicating that reckless disregard for the truth of a matter means indifference to the consequences, this instruction is inaccurate. Reckless disregard, for first amendment purposes, does not mean indifference. Rather, it means entertaining serious doubt as to a statement's truth. The instruction is also inaccurate in indicating that actual malice means an intention to do an act from which injury may be expected. Clearly, in publishing material indicating that an individual is a burglar, an author recognizes that injury may be expected. The issue, however, is whether he knows that the statement is false or seriously doubts that the statement is true. Because this instruction was substantially inaccurate, it was properly refused. The next instruction which plaintiff submits was erroneously refused states: Actual malice is a state of mind. It is a lack of reasonable grounds for belief in the truth of the published statement and therefore a reckless disregard of the rights of the plaintiff. Malice may not be implied or inferred merely from the fact of the publication or merely from negligence in the publication. However, actual malice may be proved by either direct or circumstantial evidence. In indicating that actual malice is a lack of reasonable grounds for belief in the truth of a published statement, this instruction is clearly erroneous. This instruction contains language more indicative of a negligence standard, a standard which was inapplicable to this case. Moreover, the reference to circumstantial evidence is redundant of a separate instruction. For these reasons, the instruction was properly refused. Plaintiff next submits that the following instruction was erroneously refused: You, the jury, are instructed that actual malice may be inferred when the investigation for a story which is not `hot news' is grossly inadequate. To support this proposition plaintiff cites Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts (1967), 388 U.S. 130, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094, 87 S.Ct. 1975. In Curtis Publishing Co., Justice Harlan, in a plurality opinion, stated that with respect to public figures (as distinguished from public officials), actual malice should not be required and a showing of highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers should be sufficient. (388 U.S. at 155, 18 L.Ed.2d at 1111, 87 S.Ct. at 1991.) Justice Harlan then concluded that the jury must have decided that the investigation    was grossly inadequate in the circumstances (388 U.S. at 156, 18 L.Ed.2d at 1112, 87 S.Ct. at 1992), a finding which he found was supported by the evidence and which he believed justified a verdict for the plaintiff for false publication. Justice Harlan thus did not state that actual malice could be shown by failure to investigate, but merely that with respect to public figures actual malice should not be required. The majority, however, rejected this conclusion and the Court has subsequently applied the actual-malice standard to public figures. (See Herbert v. Lando (1979), 441 U.S. 153, 156, 60 L.Ed.2d 115, 121, 99 S.Ct. 1635, 1638-39.) Plaintiff has thus misconstrued Curtis Publishing Co., as did Newell v. Field Enterprises, Inc. (1980), 91 Ill. App.3d 735, upon which he also relies. Plaintiff thus has not cited any authority indicating that this instruction properly states the law. However, even assuming, arguendo, that the instruction does accurately state the law, it would nevertheless have been error for the circuit court to submit it, for numerous reasons. First, plaintiff did not tender an instruction containing, nor have we found, a definition of hot news, the colloquial term used by Justice Harlan. The definition of this term is certainly subject to disagreement. Second, and more important, the instruction improperly focuses the jury's attention on a single point that plaintiff wished to emphasize  the adequacy of the investigation  rather than on the critical subjective inquiry of whether defendant did actually entertain serious doubts as to the truth of a publication. This court has long held that instructions singling out particular facts or evidence and giving them undue prominence are erroneous. (See, e.g., Mount v. Dusing (1953), 414 Ill. 361; Garvey v. Chicago Rys. Co. (1930), 339 Ill. 276; Hoffman v. Ernest Tossetti Brewing Co. (1912), 257 Ill. 185.) We further find that this instruction is argumentative and was improper on this basis as well. Jury instructions should not be argumentative in form. ( City of Waukegan v. Stanczak (1955), 6 Ill.2d 594.) We further find that the instruction on circumstantial evidence, in conjunction with the instruction on actual malice, adequately informed the jury regarding the relevance of any inadequacy in the investigation. Plaintiff next complains of certain comments made by the circuit court in ruling on the use of evidence, comments which plaintiff claims psychologically induc[ed] in the jury a predilection to place upon the plaintiff an insurmountable burden of proof. We find none of these statements improper. In each instance the court was either stating its reason for excluding evidence or explaining the limited purpose for which such evidence could be presented. This court long ago held that a statute stating that jury instructions are to be written was not intended to preclude a circuit court, in admitting evidence, from orally telling the jury the limited purpose for which certain evidence is being presented. ( People v. Horn (1923), 309 Ill. 23.) We believe that the current provision regarding written instructions (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2-1107) also was not intended to preclude such contemporaneous explanations by the circuit court. It is also well-established that a circuit court, in ruling on the admissibility of evidence, may state its reasons for such rulings without violating the provision requiring written jury instructions. See South Park Commissioners v. Ayer (1910), 245 Ill. 402.