Opinion ID: 4117371
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: 2d at 220. Indeed, the plurality stated:

Text: In the circumstances of Section 15—the creation of the power in the Governor with no mention of the Legislature[—]acts under the maxim, “expressio unius est exclusio alterius,” to exclude the Legislature from sharing the removal power of the Governor at least as to those officers appointed by the Governor for a term of years. Id. at 595, 907 A.2d at 220 (italics in original) (footnote omitted). Thus, the plurality concluded that the power to remove civil officers was exclusive to the Governor. See id. at 595, 907 A.2d at 220. - 29 - The plurality explained, however, that the General Assembly is authorized, under proper circumstances, to “effectively terminate the tenure of civil officers not having a fixed Constitutionally-set term[,]” stating: “If the General Assembly chooses to abolish or reconstitute the Public Service Commission or any other statutory board or commission, it is competent to do so, even if the effect of that abolition or reconstitution would be the shortening or ending of existing terms of incumbent members.” Id. at 598, 907 A.2d at 222. The plurality determined that the General Assembly did not abolish or reconstitute the Public Service Commission because it “left the [Public Service] Commission essentially intact and [] instead ended the terms of the five incumbents and effectively precluded the incumbent Governor from reappointing them by requiring that his appointees be from a list submitted by the [General Assembly].” Id. at 598-99, 907 A.2d at 222. Ultimately, the plurality concluded that the sections of the bill that were unconstitutional were severable, and that the remainder of the bill that could “operate within the parameters of th[e] opinion remain[ed] in effect.” Id. at 603, 907 A.2d at 225. In a concurring opinion, Judge Alan M. Wilner joined the judgment on the ground that sections of the bill violated the separation of powers. See id. at 606, 907 A.2d at 226 (Wilner, J., concurring). Judge Wilner explained that he differed from the plurality “only in that [he] would rest the decision solely on the basis of Article 8 of the Declaration of Rights [(Separation of Powers)] and Article II, §§ 1 and 9 of the Constitution” because he did “not believe that the first part of [a section] of [the b]ill []—ending prematurely the terms of the incumbent members of the Public Service Commission—of itself violates Article II, § 15 of the Constitution.” Schisler, 394 Md. at 605, 907 A.2d at 226 (Wilner, - 30 - J., concurring). Judge Wilner stated that, if the General Assembly had simply ended the Public Service Commission members’ terms and directed the Governor to appoint replacement members, there “may well” have been no violation of the separation of powers doctrine. Id. at 605, 907 A.2d at 226 (Wilner, J., concurring). Judge Wilner also explained that he agreed with the plurality that the General Assembly, “if it chose, could abolish or reconstitute the Public Service Commission (or any other statutory board or commission), even if the effect of doing so would be the premature ending of existing terms of incumbent members, and, as part of any reconstitution of the [Public Service] Commission, it could alter the method of appointment.” Id. at 605, 907 A.2d at 226 (Wilner, J., concurring). According to Judge Wilner, the problem in Schisler however, was that the General Assembly not only ended the Public Service Commission members’ terms without abolishing or reconstituting the Public Service Commission, but also “left the [Public Service] Commission essentially intact [and] simply ended the terms of the incumbent Commissioners and sharply curtailed the power of the Governor to appoint their successors.” Id. at 605-06, 907 A.2d at 226 (Wilner, J., concurring). As to whether the Public Service Commission members are civil officers, Judge Wilner commented that he thought that the dissent was “probably wrong . . . in assuming or suggesting that members of the Public Service Commission are not civil officers, although, because [he did] not believe that Article II, § 15 [was] implicated in any telling matter, [he did] not regard that error as significant[.]” Id. at 604-05, 907 A.2d at 226 (Wilner, J., concurring). In a concurring and dissenting opinion that Judge Irma S. Raker joined, Judge Glenn - 31 - T. Harrell, Jr. opined that the General Assembly violated the separation of powers doctrine by setting up an appointment process that applied only to the immediate successors of the terminated Public Service Commission members, and thus establishing “what essentially is a mock gubernatorial appointment process.” Id. at 606-07, 907 A.2d at 227 (Harrell, J., concurring and dissenting). Unlike the plurality and Judge Wilner, Judge Harrell took no issue with the General Assembly ending the terms of the Public Service Commission members early, concluding that the General Assembly “possesses the power to modify the terms of the service of the incumbent members . . . so as to terminate their service as of” a certain date. Id. at 606, 907 A.2d at 227 (Harrell, J., concurring and dissenting). 5 Judge Harrell concluded that the Public Service Commission members are civil officers within the meaning of Article II, § 15, and echoed the reasoning of the plurality, stating: “There is no longer any reason or need to give the term ‘civil officer’ [] an artificially narrow definition. The term ‘civil officer’ should be given its normal meaning as any officer other than a military officer.” Schisler, 394 Md. at 613, 907 A.2d at 231 (Harrell, J., concurring and dissenting). In a dissenting opinion, Judge Lynne A. Battaglia opined, in pertinent part, that the statute’s amendment did not violate the separation of powers doctrine because the appointment and removal of statutory officers is not exclusive to the Governor and “is 5 As to this point, in his concurring opinion, Judge Wilner stated that he differed from Judge Harrell because he did not think that the Court “can so neatly parse [the section of the bill at issue], finding the firing of the incumbent [Public Service] Commissioners to be valid but not the method of their replacement. It is the entirety of the legislative assault that runs afoul of Article 8.” Schisler, 394 Md. at 605, 907 A.2d at 226 (Wilner, J., concurring). - 32 - entirely subject to the authority of the General Assembly.” Id. at 615, 907 A.2d at 232 (Battaglia, J., dissenting). Judge Battaglia explained: [T]he gubernatorial powers enumerated in Sections 1, 9, and 15, Article II do not divest the [General Assembly] of its power to create, control, modify, and abolish any office which it has created. To the contrary, this Court has consistently said that the power to appoint and remove civil officers is not inherently executive, not even with respect to the Governor’s own appointees, but also may be exercised by the [General Assembly] if the office itself is a legislative creation. The [Public Service Commission] is an example of such an office, and therefore, the [General Assembly] has the power to regulate fully [the Public Service] Commissioners, a power which includes the ability to fire them. Id. at 631-32, 907 A.2d at 242 (Battaglia, J., dissenting). Judge Battaglia also disagreed that the Public Service Commission members were “civil officers” for purposes of Article II, § 15, stating that, under this Court’s jurisprudence, “it is highly doubtful that the [Public Service Commission] Commissioners are civil officers for purposes of” Article II, § 15 where “they are not vested with a portion of the [S]tate’s sovereignty to individually act for the public good[.]” Id. at 615, 631, 907 A.2d at 232, 242 (Battaglia, J., dissenting). Mode of Appointment Article II, § 10 of the Maryland Constitution provides: [The Governor] shall nominate, and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoint all civil and military officers of the State, whose appointment, or election, is not otherwise herein provided for, unless a different mode of appointment be prescribed by the Law creating the office. We have observed that, under Article II, § 10, when the General Assembly “has created an office by Act of Assembly, the [General Assembly] can designate by whom and in what manner the person who is to fill the office shall be appointed.” Comm’n on Med. Discipline v. Stillman, 291 Md. 390, 409, 435 A.2d 747, 757 (1981) (citation and internal - 33 - quotation marks omitted). Thus, “[w]here the office is of legislative creation, the [General Assembly] can modify, control or abolish it, and within these powers is embraced the right to change the mode of appointment.” Id. at 410, 435 A.2d at 758 (citation omitted). In Calvert Cnty. Comm’rs v. Monnett, 164 Md. 101, 104-05, 164 A. 155, 156 (1933), we stated: It is true that a distinction is drawn for some purposes between offices of legislative creation and offices specified in the Constitution and created by it, but it is drawn for some purposes only, not for all. Generally, the distinction is one of the location of the power of creation; the power to create has been found to include the power to alter or abolish. Where the office is of legislative creation, the [General Assembly] can modify, control or abolish it, and within these powers is embraced the right to change the mode of appointment. But that rule cannot apply to an office created by the Constitution, which directs how it shall be filled, fixes the term, and provides for the removal of the incumbent. And when offices of legislative creation are filled, the incumbents may come within comprehensive provisions of the Constitution. (Citations and internal quotation marks omitted).