Opinion ID: 1698519
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Whether the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the video of Carawan at Six Flags on July 31, 2003. [19]

Text: ¶ 22. This Court applies an abuse-of-discretion standard when reviewing a trial court's admission or exclusion of evidence. Payne v. Whitten, 948 So.2d 427, 429 (Miss.2007) (citing Floyd v. City of Crystal Springs, 749 So.2d 110, 113 (Miss.1999)). Where an error involves an evidentiary matter, this Court will not reverse unless the error adversely affects a substantial right of a party. Whitten v. Cox, 799 So.2d 1, 13 (Miss.2000) (citing Floyd, 749 So.2d at 113). ¶ 23. James argues that the trial court abused its discretion by not allowing the Six Flags video into evidence. [20] The trial judge excluded the video on the basis that, since no damages were being sought after July 29, 2003, its prejudicial value outweighed its probative value. James argues that this ruling adversely affected his right to present relevant evidence challenging the extent of Carawan's injuries. He submits that he was unable to question [Carawan's] credibility, and to make true inquiry as to what she was and was not able to do physically at that given time. Furthermore, he contends that Carawan's decision to limit her damages occurred only after the production of the Six Flags video and was specifically crafted to exclude its admission. ¶ 24. Carawan, on the other hand, maintains that the Six Flags video is both irrelevant and highly prejudicial because it features events that occurred subsequent to the time for which she sought damages. [21] According to Carawan, James's argument requires him to assert that she was injured longer than she alleged, that she lost more wages than she claimed, and that she incurred more medical expenses than she requested. ¶ 25. Our first concern is whether the Six Flags video was relevant pursuant to Rule 401 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence. Relevant evidence is defined as evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Miss. R. Evid. 401. Admission is favored if the evidence has any probative value at all. Miss. R. Evid. 401, cmt. ¶ 26. As previously noted, the July 2003 video contained images of Carawan riding several rides at Six Flags on July 31, 2003. This footage had a tendency to make the existence of a factthe severity of Carawan's injuries and her truthfulness in communicating these injuries to her doctor more probable or less probable than it would be without such evidence. Miss. R. Evid. 401. The severity of her injuries, in turn, relates to the necessity of at least some of her medical expenses, the basis of her claim for lost wages, and the extent of her pain and suffering. ¶ 27. A reasonable juror could conclude that the Six Flags video casts doubt on the severity of Carawan's injuries prior to July 29, 2003. According to the facts presented at trial, Carawan had been unable to work since May 2003, but experienced significant improvement following the first steroid injection on July 15, 2003. Approximately one week later, Bazzone sent Carawan back to work on a part-time basis of two days a week, for three weeks, so that she could gradually build up her strength and endurance, and to ensure that her relief was permanent. A second steroid injection was administered on July 29, 2003, which became Carawan's cut-off date for seeking damages. In sum, the picture conveyed is that Carawan had been debilitated for months prior to receiving the steroid injections and was gradually able to return to work full-time. ¶ 28. Yet, just six days after the effective date of her limited return to work, Carawan was seen riding various rides, including several roller coasters. A reasonable juror might find subjecting oneself to the twists and forces associated with such rides difficult to reconcile with a recent history of physical problems that consisted primarily of pain in the back which was increased by walking, by bending, by twisting, and often times just by sitting in one position for any long period of time. Even assuming that Carawan had made a full recovery following her second steroid injection, a reasonable juror could view this conduct as inconsistent with (1) Carawan's claims of severe back pain on and off for the past three years, (2) her work history, (3) her claim that she considered back surgery, and (4) her claim of a gradual recovery. ¶ 29. Furthermore, a reasonable juror might conclude that the Six Flags video has a tendency to show that Carawan may not have been as weakened or vulnerable as she indicated to her doctors or as her medical treatments suggest. This video, capturing acts so close in time to the period for which she sought damages, could have been used to call into question at least some of her medical expenses. The video also could have been relevant to whether or not she truly had been unable to work. Furthermore, even though the jury did not award Carawan any damages for pain and suffering, the trial court awarded such damages in granting the additur. Had the video been admitted into evidence, it would have been relevant in this determination as well. Perhaps most significantly, from the jury's perspective, this video might shed doubt upon the merits of Carawan's case as a whole. ¶ 30. In Sweet v. Pace Membership Warehouse, Inc., 795 A.2d 524 (R.I.2002), the Supreme Court of Rhode Island faced a similar set of facts. A plaintiff sought damages after being injured on the job. Id. at 526. After the defense proffered video evidence of the plaintiff performing various activities, the plaintiff limited his damages to a time predating the video. Id. at 527. The trial court excluded the video because it concerned a period of time for which the plaintiff was not claiming damages. Id. In reversing the trial court, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that the video's relevance was not lessened by the fact that the plaintiff had limited his damages to before a particular date. Id. at 528-29. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island stated that, [e]vidence tending to show that [the plaintiff] had fully recovered from his injuries at some point after November 25, 1997, undisputedly would render it `less probable'within the meaning of Rule 401that [the plaintiff] suffered from `severe and permanent injury' during the period for which he claimed damages. Id. at 528. While not binding precedent for this Court, Sweet bears some factual similarity to the case before us. ¶ 31. Unlike the plaintiff in Sweet, who indicated during pretrial and trial proceedings that his injuries were permanent, Carawan maintained throughout trial that she had fully recovered after the second steroid injection. In her brief, Carawan asserts that she  is and never was claiming any injury, lost wages and/or medical expenses on July 31, 2003, or any period beyond July 29, 2003, the date of [the] second and final epidural treatment. (Emphasis added). While Carawan's assertion is accurate with regard to the trial itself, it is inaccurate as to the litigation at large. The record calls into question whether her second epidural or the Six Flags video led to her remarkable recovery. ¶ 32. Until the day before trial, Carawan had sought damages through at least November 3, 2003. In her motion in limine filed April 5, 2004, Carawan stated that she is not claiming any injury as a result of this wreck beyond November 3, 2003.  (Emphasis added). Medical records, which post-date July 29, 2003, and were not admitted at trial, confirm that Carawan claimed to continue having problems into August 2003. [22] Carawan did not disclose her intent to forgo any claim for damages past July 29, 2003, until a hearing conducted one day before trial. It is clear that Carawan made a calculated decision not to seek damages past July 29, 2003, in an effort to exclude the Six Flags video. While Carawan was certainly free to make such stipulation, it does not follow that all evidence subsequent to this date automatically becomes irrelevant. ¶ 33. For all the aforementioned reasons, we find that the Six Flags video was relevant evidence. ¶ 34. Our second inquiry is whether the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the video on the basis that its prejudicial value outweighed its probative value. Fitch v. Valentine, 959 So.2d 1012, 1022 (Miss.2007). Rule 403 provides that even relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, [23] confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Miss. R. Evid. 403. ¶ 35. Carawan basically argues that the prejudicial nature of the Six Flags video stems from its lack of relevance in that no damages were being sought on or after that date. [24] We already have determined that the video was relevant. Aside from its damaging effect to Carawan's case, we are unable to determine how its admission would unfairly prejudice Carawan. A reasonable juror could understand that the video calls into question the severity of Carawan's injuries prior to July 29, 2003, and therefore challenges the necessity of at least some of her medical expenses, the validity of her lost wages, the extent of her pain and suffering, and the legitimacy of her entire claim. ¶ 36. We find that the probative value of the Six Flags video was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to Carawan. Therefore, we find that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding such evidence.