Opinion ID: 1226450
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Holiday Pay

Text: One question posed to the jury was whether or not the dealership's failure to pay holiday pay to its employees violated the Act. The dealership's employment policy listed various days that would be observed as holidays, when the employees could stay home, but would still be compensated as though they had been present. For commissioned employees, the policy provided that holiday pay would be determined based upon the draw amount that employee received per day. The Act contains no requirement that an employer provide so-called holiday pay to employees. However, W. Va.Code, 21-5-3, requires an employer to settle with all employees every two weeks and `pay them the wages due.' [6] The Act defines wages to mean all `accrued fringe benefits capable of calculation and payable directly to an employee[.]' W. Va.Code, 21-5-1(c). Lowe v. Imperial Colliery Co., 180 W.Va. 518, n. 2, 377 S.E.2d 652, n. 2 (1988). The Act clearly includes holiday pay in its definition of fringe benefits, stating that: The term fringe benefits means any benefit provided an employee or group of employees by an employer, or which is required by law, and includes regular vacation, graduated vacation, floating vacation, holidays, sick leave, personal leave, production incentive bonuses, sickness and accident benefits and benefits relating to medical and pension coverage. W. Va.Code ß 21-5-1(1) (1987). Although the Act does not require Opequon Motors to pay holiday pay to its employees, it does require the dealership to pay all accrued fringe benefits capable of calculation. Because the dealership has, in its own handbook, established holiday pay as a fringe benefit, the Act demands that the dealership honor its agreement and pay its employees the holiday pay they have earned. [7] The dealership maintained that it did indeed pay holiday pay to its employees, and the employees offered evidence to the contrary. The jury had this evidence before it, and found in favor of the employees. In Syl. pt. 1 of Mildred L.M. v. John O.F., 192 W.Va. 345, 452 S.E.2d 436 (1994), we stated that our task is to determine whether the evidence was such that a reasonable trier of fact might have reached the decision below. Viewing the jury's decision through this lens, as we must, we find the lower court's denial of the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was correct. B.