Opinion ID: 1618310
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Application of the ALSLA

Text: The central tenet of Line's argument in this appeal is that the ALSLA provides the only avenue by which Ventura and Hartford can seek relief and that, because he did not represent either Ventura or Hartford, this avenue is unavailable to them. He asserts that this is because the depletion of the funds in the conservatorship was related to his legal work for Dutton in creating the conservatorship and in furtherance of the legal services he provided to her. Thus, he argues, the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the procedural and substantive prerequisites for establishing a claim under the ALSLA and the trial court erred in denying his motion for a judgment as a matter of law. This Court's standard for reviewing the trial court's ruling on this point is well settled: When reviewing a ruling on a motion for a JML [judgment as a matter of law], this Court uses the same standard the trial court used initially in granting or denying a JML. Palm Harbor Homes, Inc. v. Crawford, 689 So.2d 3 (Ala. 1997). Regarding questions of fact, the ultimate question is whether the nonmovant has presented sufficient evidence to allow the case or the issue to be submitted to the jury for a factual resolution. Carter v. Henderson, 598 So.2d 1350 (Ala.1992). For actions filed after June 11, 1987, the nonmovant must present `substantial evidence' in order to withstand a motion for a JML. See § 12-21-12, Ala.Code 1975; West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989). A reviewing court must determine whether the party who bears the burden of proof has produced substantial evidence creating a factual dispute requiring resolution by the jury. Carter, 598 So.2d at 1353. In reviewing a ruling on a motion for a JML, this Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and entertains such reasonable inferences as the jury would have been free to draw. Motion Industries, Inc. v. Pate, 678 So.2d 724 (Ala.1996). Regarding a question of law, however, this Court indulges no presumption of correctness as to the trial court's ruling. Ricwil, Inc. v. S.L. Pappas & Co., 599 So.2d 1126 (Ala.1992). Furthermore, a jury verdict is presumed to be correct, and that presumption is strengthened by the trial court's denial of a motion for a new trial. Cobb v. MacMillan Bloedel, Inc., 604 So.2d 344 (Ala.1992). In reviewing a jury verdict, an appellate court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, and it will set aside the verdict only if it is plainly and palpably wrong. Id.  Delchamps, Inc. v. Bryant, 738 So.2d 824, 830-31 (Ala.1999). Line argues that, even though neither Ventura nor Hartford was his client, their claims are related to the fact that he provided legal services to Dutton in creating the conservatorship. Line relies on the statements in the ALSLA to the effect that the ALSLA is intended to be a complete approach to claims against legal-service providers. In light of these statutory provisions, Line says, the plaintiffs' claims, which are related to the depletion of the funds in the conservatorship he created as a legal-service provider, can be asserted only in the context of the complete and unified approach of the ALSLA. This Court has addressed the language of the intended scope of the ALSLA and the extent to which the ALSLA is applicable to third-party nonclients in two cases that are of particular importance here, Cunningham v. Langston, Frazer, Sweet & Freese, P.A., 727 So.2d 800 (Ala.1999), and Fogarty v. Parker, Poe, Adams & Bernstein, L.L.P., 961 So.2d 784 (Ala.2006). In Cunningham, the Court considered Cunningham's action against Langston, Frazer, Sweet & Freese, P.A., a law firm (Langston Frazer), asserting claims of breach of contract, negligence, and wantonness. Cunningham was a lawyer who alleged that Langston Frazer had breached its arrangement with him concerning a fee-sharing agreement with regard to the firm's representation of clients in a class-action lawsuit. The trial court dismissed Cunningham's action against Langston Frazer, and Cunningham appealed. On appeal, this Court considered Langston Frazer's argument that Cunningham's claims could be asserted only under the ALSLA and that the action had been properly dismissed as untimely under the limitations period in the ALSLA. Cunningham argued that his claims should be considered under general principles of contract and tort law. In its analysis, the Cunningham Court first noted the statement in the ALSLA that `[t]here shall be only one form and cause of action against legal service providers in courts in the State of Alabama....' Ala.Code 1975, § 6-5-573, 727 So.2d at 802, and then set out the definitions of legal service liability action and legal service provider as provided in Ala. Code 1975, § 6-5-572(1) and (2). [4] In considering those definitions and their application to Cunningham's claims, the Court stated: The language of the ALSLA makes it clear that that Act refers to actions against `legal service providers' alleging breaches of their duties in providing legal services. Conversely, from a plaintiff's perspective, the ALSLA applies to any claim originating from his receipt of legal services. 727 So.2d at 803. As illustrations of the emphasis on the requirement that an action brought under the ALSLA arise out of the provision of legal services, the Court discussed the standard of care required by the ALSLA and noted that the standard was directly associated with the legal matter that was the basis of the legal services provided. The Court also considered the effect of the statement of the legislature's intent in § 6-5-570 in the following discussion: It is apparent that the legislature was centrally concerned with the threat posed by `legal actions against Alabama legal service providers.' The question is whether the legislature meant by that phrase any lawsuit against any attorney for whatever cause of action, or meant lawsuits alleging legal malpractice against attorneys. For example, was the legislature responding to the threat of legal actions against attorneys in regard to such things as a law firm's contracting to have a drink machine placed in its office but then failing to pay in accordance with its contract; an attorney's involvement in a motor-vehicle accident; or an attorney's dispute with his neighbor over a landline? These situations commonly give rise to lawsuits, but the disputes presented in those lawsuits would exist regardless of the one party's status as a `legal service provider' and would have no special relation to that status. It is clear from the language of the legislature's statement of intent that by enacting the ALSLA the legislature was attempting to provide a unified approach to those `legal actions against legal service providers' that, if abused, could threaten `the delivery of legal service to the people of Alabama and ... the quality of legal services which should be made available to the citizens of this state' by forcing citizens to pay increased costs for legal services and decreasing the availability of those services. See Ala.Code 1975, § 6-5-570. Those `legal actions' the legislature was concerned about are, of course, actions against attorneys in their professional capacities; the legislature made this point evident in its statement of intent: `In addition, this legislature finds that legal service providers are experiencing great and increasing difficulties in obtaining professional liability insurance and that there is a great and rapid increase in the cost of professional liability insurance. This legislature finds that both the availability and the cost of professional liability insurance [are] in direct consequence to the threat of legal actions against Alabama legal service providers. ' Ala.Code 1975, § 6-5-570 (emphasis added). Therefore, we conclude, from the language of the statute, that the ALSLA does not apply to an action filed against a `legal service provider' by someone whose claim does not arise out of the receipt of legal services. 727 So.2d at 804. The Court in Cunningham noted further that its analysis was consistent with results in earlier cases and concluded: Because the ALSLA applies only to lawsuits based on the relationship between `legal service providers' and those who have received legal services, the provisions of that Act, including its statute of limitations, do not apply to Cunningham's claims against Langston Frazer. 727 So.2d at 805. Accordingly, the Court held that Cunningham's claims were not required to be presented under the ALSLA nor subject to the limitations period in the ALSLA, and it reversed the trial court's judgment of dismissal. In Fogarty, the Court considered claims by South Carolina investors, the Fogartys, against the North Carolina law firm of Parker, Poe, Adams, and Bernstein, L.L.P., and certain lawyers who were members of that firm (Parker Poe). The claims arose from the depletion of the Fogartys' investments in a real-estate venture involving property in Gulf Shores, Alabama. The Fogartys asserted that Parker Poe committed numerous fraudulent and tortious actions in preventing the Fogartys' access to investment records, and they sought compensatory damages on theories of breach of fiduciary duty, among other things. Parker Poe moved to dismiss the Fogartys' claims on the ground that the Fogartys were not Parker Poe's clients and therefore had no claim under the ALSLA and that, because the Fogartys' claims arose out of Parker Poe's rendition of legal services, the ALSLA was the only remedy available to the Fogartys. The trial court granted Parker Poe's motion to dismiss, and the Fogartys appealed. With respect to Parker Poe's argument that the ALSLA provided the Fogartys' only means for relief, the Court stated: First, Parker Poe alleges that the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim was properly granted because, it argues, all of the claims alleged in the complaint arise solely out of the rendition of legal services by Parker Poe, and the exclusive remedy for such claims is the ALSLA, and the Fogartys make no claim under the ALSLA in the complaint. We disagree with Parker Poe's assertion that the ALSLA is the exclusive remedy for the Fogartys' claims against it. The ALSLA applies only to allegations of legal malpractice, i.e., claims against legal-service providers that arise from the performance of legal services, and only to allegations against attorneys licensed to practice law in the State of Alabama. Thus, it does not apply to Parker Poe in the present case. 961 So.2d at 788-89. The Court based its conclusion on the holding in Cunningham, supra, that the ALSLA is inapplicable to a claim against a legal-service provider that `does not arise out of the receipt of legal services.' 961 So.2d at 789 (quoting Cunningham, 727 So.2d at 804 (emphasis added in Fogarty )). Accordingly, the Court held that the trial court erred in dismissing the Fogartys' claims on the rationale that the ALSLA governed their claims. Although Line argues that the holdings in Fogarty and Cunningham create confusion as to the concept of the ALSLA as the sole source of relief for claims against legal-service providers and claims brought by third party non-clients, we perceive no such confusion. We conclude that those cases hold that the ALSLA applies only to claims against legal-service providers arising out of the provision of legal services. See also Robinson v. Benton, 842 So.2d 631 (Ala.2002) (devisee of a will had no standing to bring an ALSLA claim against the lawyer who drafted the will because the parties were never in an attorney-client relationship), and Smith v. Math, 984 So.2d 1179 (Ala. Civ.App.2007) (plaintiff's claims against lawyer for filing multiple judgments against plaintiff were not governed by the ALSLA because the plaintiff was not the lawyer's client). Under the circumstances of this case, the evidence is effectively uncontroverted that neither Ventura nor Hartford was Line's client, and Line provided legal services to neither. Accordingly, the ALSLA has no application to Ventura's and Hartford's claims against Line. Moreover, the record strongly supports the inference that Line undertook an entirely separate fiduciary obligation to Ventura and Hartford by explicitly agreeing to participate in the conservatorship by cosigning checks and being actively involved with the conservatorship funds. The evidence also strongly supports the inference that Line consciously disregarded his duty in this regard. Thus, the trial court properly permitted Ventura's claims of negligence, wantonness, and breach of fiduciary duty and Hartford's claims of indemnity and breach of fiduciary duty to go to the jury, and the trial court did not err in denying Line's motion for a judgment as a matter of law based on the application of the ALSLA. Because we conclude that the trial court was correct in refusing to apply the ALSLA to Ventura's and Hartford's claims, Line's arguments concerning the limitations period of the ALSLA [5] or any other aspect of the ALSLA in his arguments asserting error in the trial court's instructions to the jury and in his motion for a new trial must also fail. In the context of his argument concerning the applicability of the ALSLA, Line also argues that the trial court's instruction [6] to the jury regarding Line's actions as an attorney were sufficiently confusing as to require a new trial. Our examination of the record gives no indication that Line objected to this instruction with sufficient clarity or specificity to preserve the error. McElmurry v. Uniroyal, Inc., 531 So.2d 859 (Ala.1988). See also Kyle v. Selma Med. Ctr., 534 So.2d 589 (Ala.1988). Because Line's argument on this point was not preserved for our review, we do not consider it further.