Opinion ID: 2517375
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the Keliiheleua case

Text: In State v. Keliiheleua, 105 Hawai`i 174, 95 P.3d 605 (2004), this court again applied the Carroll test to determine whether two criminal offenses, prosecuted separately, were barred pursuant to HRS §§ 701-111(1)(b) and 701-109(2). In Keliiheleua, the defendant's van drifted across three lanes of freeway and rear-ended a parked car. Id. at 176, 95 P.3d at 607. A passenger in the defendant's van and the driver of the parked car were both injured. Id. At the time of the accident, the defendant did not have insurance; however, he obtained an insurance policy later that same day. Id. After obtaining the policy, he falsely represented the date and time of the accident as occurring subsequent to the initiation of the policy. Id. During the police investigation of the accident, the Insurance Fraud Division of the State of Hawai`i Department of Commerce and Consumer Affairs (DCCA) began a separate investigation of the defendant's purported insurance fraud. Id. The DCCA investigator testified he had no knowledge regarding the pending criminal investigation for the negligent injury case. Id. As a result of the DCCA investigation, the defendant was charged with insurance fraud and attempted theft in the second degree. Id. at 177, 95 P.3d at 608. On December 6, 2001, the defendant pled no contest to the charges of insurance fraud and attempted theft in the second degree and moved for a deferred acceptance of his plea, which was granted. Id. Thereafter, on July 17, 2002, as a result of the HPD's investigation, the prosecutor's office formally initiated prosecution against the defendant as a result of the accident itself. Id. On September 19, 2002, a grand jury indicted the defendant on the charge of negligent injury in the first degree. Id. The defendant then moved to dismiss the negligent injury indictment, arguing that the case was barred pursuant to HRS §§ 701-111(1)(b) and 701-109(2). Id. at 178, 95 P.3d at 609. The circuit court denied the defendant's motion. Id. Thereafter, the defendant entered a conditional plea of no contest and subsequently appealed. Id. On appeal to this court, the defendant argued, inter alia, that the negligent injury case should have been dismissed pursuant to HRS §§ 701-111(1)(b) and 701-109(2). Id. This court reasoned that: (1) although the motor vehicle accident and fraudulent insurance claim occurred on the same day, they did not occur at the same time; (2) although the record does not so indicate, the places where [the d]efendant committed the offenses were presumably different; and (3) the circumstances were not similar because the facts and issues involved in the charges (namely, the statutory requirements of the alleged offenses) are dissimilar. Id. at 181-82, 95 P.3d at 612-13 (footnote omitted). Accordingly, this court held that, [because the criminal offenses in question are not closely re]lated in time, place and circumstances, they did not arise from the same `episode,' [and, c]onsequently[,] HRS § []701-109(2) does not apply to this case. Id. at 182, 95 P.3d at 613 (footnote omitted). In so holding, this court distinguished the facts in the case at bar from Servantes, which was relied upon by the defendant, stating that: Here, there was no reason to suspect that subsequent to causing the motor vehicle accident, [the defendant would obtain an insurance policy and then file a fraudulent insurance claim. Furthermore, unlike the offenses involved in Servantes, the negligent injury charge can be tried without mention of the fraud case. Id. (emphasis added). [11]