Opinion ID: 2816733
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: José's Claims

Text: José does not challenge on appeal the sufficiency of the evidence against him on any of the counts. Rather, he points to what he claims are errors in the indictment, the review of alleged Brady material, and the jury instructions. We address these claimed errors in turn. A. The Sufficiency of the Indictment's Aggravated Identity Theft Counts José first argues that the aggravated identity theft counts (counts thirty-one through thirty-five) of the superseding indictment were defective for lack of a corresponding substantive health-care fraud count. The aggravated identity theft counts of the indictment alleged that José knowingly possessed, transferred, or used the identification of another person without lawful authority in relation to felony violations enumerated in subsection (c) [of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A] as: (1) Healthcare Fraud, a violation of [18 U.S.C. § 1347], not charged herein. Each count listed a specific individual whose identity was used to commit the offense. The indictment did not include separate section 1347 health-care fraud charges with respect to the individuals named in the aggravated identity theft counts. According to José, because the government did not separately charge and convict him of the - 17 - predicate health-care fraud crimes underlying the aggravated identity theft charges, the indictment was defective.17 The predicate felony violation in section 1028A is simply an element of the crime of aggravated identity theft. The statute requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of a felony violation, not a felony conviction. It therefore did not require the government to charge José separately with the predicate healthcare fraud offenses. See United States v. Stepanian, 570 F.3d 51, 59-60 & n.15 (1st Cir. 2009) (To the extent [the defendant] wishes to argue that the government must separately allege and charge the predicate crime in order to charge a § 1028A offense . . . the statutory language lends no support to that proposition.); see also United States v. Jenkins-Watts, 574 F.3d 950, 970 (8th Cir. 2009). Moreover, the indictment adequately informed José that the predicate offenses for the aggravated identity theft counts were health-care fraud crimes not charged herein. See United States v. Savarese, 686 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2012) ([A]n indictment is adequate if it specifies the elements of the offense charged, fairly apprises the defendant of the charge against which he must defend, and allows him to contest it without fear of double 17 Although the basis for this claim of error is not clear from José's brief, we interpret this argument to be a challenge to the sufficiency of the indictment. - 18 - jeopardy.). We therefore detect no error in the aggravated identity theft counts of the indictment. B. In Camera Review of Potential Brady Material José next faults the district court for rejecting his request to order the government to turn over documents José claims were potentially exculpatory. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (government has an obligation to disclose evidence in its possession favorable to a criminal defendant and material to guilt). In particular, José argues that he was entitled to materials related to a government search of the offices of one of the Medicare Advantage insurers he fraudulently billed, Medical Card System (MCS). Both defendants filed separate pre-trial motions requesting specific exculpatory and impeachment material. The requested information included the following materials: Any documents, reports, affidavits in support of search warrants, grand jury subpoenas, or other materials and information regarding any investigation of any wrongdoing by any health insurance company that processes any Medicare or other insurance claim that is the subject of the charges alleged in the indictment, including, but not limited to, MCS . . . . The district court referred the matter to a magistrate judge, who granted the defendants' request subject to a protective order that restricted the disclosure and use of patients' individually identifiable health information. The government did not disclose - 19 - prior to trial any documents related to a search warrant executed at MCS. On the fifth day of trial, however, before the defendants cross-examined a fraud investigator at MCS, Carlos's defense attorney renewed his request in light of press coverage of a government search of MCS offices. The government agreed to review the MCS search documents during a pre-scheduled eight-day break in the trial, and to disclose any exculpatory or impeachment material, while complying with the protective order. On cross-examination, the MCS fraud investigator confirmed that government agents had searched the MCS office, but she did not speak with the agents and did not know whether the investigation was ongoing. The government again produced no documents, and on the next day of trial, Carlos's attorney asked that the Court order them to produce those records or that they be submitted to the Court and that copies be left in the record under seal for future review, if necessary. The government agreed to provide the MCS search warrant affidavit for the court's in camera review, to determine if the search may have revealed information relevant to Carlos and José's case. The next day, the district court informed counsel that its review of the search warrant, the application, and affidavit has completed, and I don't think any of it has any relevance to this case. . . . [Y]our motion is denied. The district court then denied Carlos's motion to seal the search warrant, application, and affidavit and make those documents part - 20 - of the record in this case, because the court was worried about making it a part of this record even as a sealed document. The district court and government noted that the documents could be made available to this court if necessary for appellate review. Shortly thereafter, José's counsel joined Carlos's motions. On appeal, José asks us to review the search warrant, application, and affidavit to determine whether the district court erred in refusing to require disclosure by the government. We review a district court's Brady determinations after its in camera review for an abuse of discretion. United States v. RosarioPeralta, 175 F.3d 48, 57 (1st Cir. 1999); see also United States v. Caro-Muñiz, 406 F.3d 22, 28-29 (1st Cir. 2005). We decline the invitation to join José on his fishing expedition. His theory about the relevance of the MCS documents is that those documents could have very well contained instructions from MCS to physicians, including José, to submit false information on CMS 1500 Forms, thereby corroborating José's testimony that he used inaccurate billing codes based on instructions from health insurance companies. How such evidence would have exonerated José from billing for urological services performed on women whom he did not treat is a complete mystery concerning which José offers no insight. Additionally, José points to nothing that suggests that the government's search of MCS had anything to do with its telling doctors to use incorrect billing - 21 - codes. Hence his theory of relevance amounts to little more than mere speculation. United States v. Prochilo, 629 F.3d 264, 269 (1st Cir. 2011). The district court therefore would have acted well within its discretion even if it had refused to conduct the in camera review in the first place. See id. at 268-69 (To justify [in camera] review, the defendant must make some showing that the materials in question could contain favorable, material evidence. This showing cannot consist of mere speculation. (citations omitted)). Because José's request amounts to no more than a shot in the dark, United States v. Espinal-Almeida, 699 F.3d 588, 618 (1st Cir. 2012), we find it unnecessary to review the sealed documents that the district court viewed in camera. C. Challenges to the Jury Instructions 1. Prior Knowledge for Aiding and Abetting José claims that the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury that, in order to convict him of aiding and abetting aggravated identity theft, the jury had to find that José had prior knowledge of one purported element of aggravated identity theft: that the patients' identifying information was obtained without lawful authority.18 In support of this argument, 18José also argues that, for the counts of conviction involving deceased patients, he needed prior knowledge that the patients were in fact deceased when José claimed to have treated them. None of the aggravated identity theft counts involve deceased beneficiaries, however, so we need say nothing more about this argument. - 22 - José cites Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240 (2014), in which the Supreme Court held that, to convict a defendant for aiding and abetting the knowing use of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), the government must prove that the defendant had advance knowledge of each element of the offense (i.e., the drug part and the gun part). Id. at 1248-49. José did not request that the district court give the instructions he now claims it should have given. To the contrary, he asked the court to give an instruction materially the same as that which it gave. José therefore arguably waived this challenge to the jury instructions. See United States v. Alberico, 559 F.3d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 2009). Even if José did not waive the argument, his failure to object would justify only plain error review, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 30(d), 52(b), a standard José fails to satisfy. See United States v. Duarte, 246 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2001) (Review for plain error entails four showings: (1) that an error occurred (2) which was clear or obvious and which not only (3) affected the defendant's substantial rights, but also (4) seriously impaired the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.). The so-called element of which José says he needed prior knowledge-- that the identifying information was initially obtained without lawful authority--is not actually an element of the offense. - 23 - Section 1028A punishes the knowing transfer, possession, or use without lawful authority of protected information, 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1), regardless of how that information was first obtained. United States v. Ozuna-Cabrera, 663 F.3d 496, 499 (1st Cir. 2011) ([R]egardless of how the means of identification is actually obtained, if its subsequent use breaks the law . . . it is violative of § 1028A(a)(1).). Even if an instructional error had occurred, it could not have affected José's substantial rights. The evidence overwhelmingly showed that José knew that he did not have the patients' consent to use their information to bill for surgical and medical procedures he never performed. 2. Typographical Error in an Instruction José also challenges a typographical error in the aggravated identity theft jury charge. The district court instructed the jury that the first element of aggravated identity theft was that the defendants committed the crime of health care fraud as set forth in jury instruction number 11. This instruction should have cross-referenced jury instruction number 12, listing the elements of health-care fraud, and not jury instruction number 11, which addressed vicarious liability for the acts and declarations of co-conspirators. There was no objection to this slip-up, and José concedes that review is for plain error only. The mistake here falls far short of the exceedingly difficult to satisfy plain error standard for jury instructions. - 24 - United States v. Gonzalez-Velez, 466 F.3d 27, 35 (1st Cir. 2006). The district court's instruction correctly indicated that the predicate offense was health-care fraud, and it would have been obvious to the jury that the crime of health-care fraud was set forth in the instruction labeled as such, and not in the plainly inapplicable instruction titled Acts and Declarations of Coconspirators. Moreover, given the weight and nature of the evidence against José, we doubt any confusion engendered by the typographical error contributed to the jury's verdict. 3. Success of the Conspiracy José next challenges the district court's refusal to instruct the jury that the government needed to prove the success of the conspiracy. This refusal, José contends, resulted in both a constructive amendment and prejudicial variance. José acknowledges that the government ordinarily does not need to prove the success of a conspiracy. See United States v. Paret-Ruiz, 567 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2009). According to José, though, the government committed itself to proving success by charging in the indictment that the object of the conspiracy was for the defendants to enrich themselves.19 No constructive amendment occurred here. [A] constructive amendment occurs where the crime charged has been 19The Object of the Conspiracy section of the superseding indictment's conspiracy count read in relevant part: The object - 25 - altered, either literally or in effect, after the grand jury last passed upon it. United States v. Mubayyid, 658 F.3d 35, 49 (1st Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). There was no change to the statutory elements of the offense. See id. at 51 ([O]ur practice has been to look to statutory elements in response to claims by defendants that 'the crime charged' has been changed.).20 Nor was there any variance between the charged crime and evidence at trial, let alone a variance that was prejudicial. See id. at 48 (A variance occurs when the facts proved at trial differ materially from those alleged in the indictment without altering the crime charged.). While there was no evidence that Carlos made even a penny as a result of José's fraud, the government established that José himself billed Medicare for more than $3,500,000, and that Medicare paid him hundreds of thousands of dollars. José implausibly responds that those sums do not necessarily show enrichment without evidence of his costs or of the conspiracy was that defendants . . . would unlawfully enrich themselves by submitting false and fraudulent claims to Medicare . . . . 20 José's reliance on United States v. Narog, 372 F.3d 1243 (11th Cir. 2004), is beside the point. This case does not present a situation where the government's failure to prove the crime as it was charged in the indictment opens the possibility that the jury convicted on the basis of conduct that was never charged. Mubayyid, 658 F.3d at 53 n.24 (emphasis omitted) (distinguishing Narog). - 26 - overhead. We think a jury could infer that José's costs were low, and certainly less than the amounts he received, given that he did not actually perform the procedures for which he billed Medicare.21