Opinion ID: 626425
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: The Jury May Award Damages for Lost Opportunities to Bid.

Text: The union argues that damages for lost business opportunities are unavailable under section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 187(b), but the text of that statute suggests otherwise. Section 303 provides that any person injured by certain unfair labor practices may sue in state or federal court to recover the damages by him sustained and the cost of the suit. 29 U.S.C. § 187(b). In assessing [the meaning] of the word `damages' in § 303(b) we begin with the fundamental canon of statutory construction that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning. Summit Valley Indus. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 456 U.S. 717, 722, 102 S.Ct. 2112, 2115, 72 L.Ed.2d 511 (1982) (internal quotations omitted). The ordinary meaning of the term damages includes actual, compensatory damages. See Local 20, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, & Helpers Union v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 260, 84 S.Ct. 1253, 1259, 12 L.Ed.2d 280 (1964). Unlike punitive damages, compensatory damages indemnify the injured person for the loss suffered. Black's Law Dictionary 445 (9th ed. 2009). Because Fidelity suffered an actual loss the neutral employers ceased asking Fidelity to bid on projects that otherwise would have been awarded to FidelityFidelity is entitled to recover damages for lost opportunities to bid under section 303. The union ignores the text of section 303 and misreads Matson Plastering Co. v. Plasterers & Shophands Local No. 66, 852 F.2d 1200 (9th Cir.1988), to support its argument that Fidelity is not entitled to damages under section 303. Matson Plastering appealed from a judgment in favor of a union where the district court had assumed, for the sake of argument, that the union had engaged in illegal picketing activities, but concluded that section 303 afforded Matson Plastering no remedy. Id. at 1202. The Ninth Circuit affirmed and stated, Because Matson did not bid on ... subsequent contracts, we hold that any damages resulting from its lost opportunities are not available under section 303. Id. at 1203. Matson differs from this appeal because Fidelity presented evidence that it was not even invited to bid on contracts because of the illegal pickets of the union. We reject the argument of the union that damages based on lost opportunities are too speculative as a matter of law. The general rule is, that all damages resulting necessarily and immediately and directly from the breach are recoverable, and not those that are contingent and uncertain. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563, 51 S.Ct. 248, 250, 75 L.Ed. 544 (1931). The phrase contingent and uncertain embraces ... such only as are not the certain result of the breach, and does not embrace such as are the certain result, but uncertain in amount. Id. In other words, so long as a plaintiff can prove that it has suffered some injury to its business, mathematical precision in proving the amount of damages is unnecessary. See, e.g., George E. Hoffman & Sons, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am., 617 F.2d 1234, 1247 (7th Cir.1980). Fidelity proved the fact of its damages. The fact of damage is made out upon proof that the plaintiff's level of profits ... is ... less than it otherwise would have been absent some intervening cause. Alan's of Atlanta, Inc. v. Minolta Co., 903 F.2d 1414, 1426 (11th Cir.1990). At trial, contractors testified that they would have continued to award Fidelity work absent the fear of future pickets. Because Fidelity proved that it would have earned more profits but for the picketing, the jury was entitled to award it damages based on lost opportunities to bid. A categorical rule against recovery for damages based on lost opportunities to bid would eviscerate the secondary boycott law. If primary employers cannot recover damages for lost opportunities to bid, unions will have every incentive to engage in secondary boycotts because the unions ordinarily will suffer, at most, minimal financial liability, no matter how strong the proof of greater injury. As Fidelity persuasively argues, This ... go[es] beyond the Union's alleged desire to ... `level the playing field'; this is the blatant elimination of competition.