Opinion ID: 187381
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Pre-Amendment Eligibility

Text: We now turn to Summers's argument that he is eligible to receive a fee award pursuant to the FOIA standard in effect prior to the passage of the 2007 Act. To grant a FOIA plaintiff an award of attorneys' fees under that standard, the district court must have determined the plaintiff was not only eligible for but also entitled to an award. Tax Analysts, 965 F.2d at 1093. In the present case the district court (unlike the magistrate judge) went no further than to hold Summers was not eligible to receive a fee award inasmuch as he had not substantially prevailed in his FOIA action. Summers, 2007 WL 2111049, at  n. 1. We review that determination de novo because it rests on an interpretation of the statutory terms that define eligibility for an award. Davy v. CIA, 456 F.3d 162, 164 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). To be eligible under the applicable standard, a plaintiff must have been awarded some relief by [a] court, either in a judgment on the merits or in a court-ordered consent decree. OCAW, 288 F.3d at 456-57 (internal quotation marks omitted). Summers points to three identical orders issued by the district court as evidence he received court-ordered relief. In each the district court ordered that the parties file another joint status report by [a specific date] indicating the additional disclosures defendant has made to plaintiff and whether plaintiff intends to compel the release of any withholdings. Summers argues these orders required the FBI to make disclosures but that is not correct. The orders required the FBI to do no more than to join with the plaintiff in filing status reports updating the court on any voluntary disclosures the agency may have made. The FBI would not have violated the orders if it had refused to disclose a single document or datum. Consequently, the status reports do not affect a court-ordered change in the legal relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant. OCAW, 288 F.3d at 458 (holding similar status reports did not constitute relief ordered by a court). Finally, Summers argues the settlement agreement he executed with the FBI makes him eligible for a fee award because his dismissal of the action was made contingent upon the FBI's disclosing certain information. This argument fails the requirement that the plaintiff ha[ve] been awarded some relief by the court. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603, 121 S.Ct. 1835. Neither the district court nor this court compelled the FBI to disclose anything. Again, we rejected a similar argument in OCAW. 288 F.3d. at 458-59. Like the district court, we conclude Summers is not eligible to receive an award of attorneys' fees under the preamendment FOIA. Because he is ineligible to receive a fee award, like the district court, we do not consider whether he would be entitled to an award if he were eligible.