Opinion ID: 76968
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: A juvenile adjudication may be a prior conviction under the ACCA

Text: 13 Burge's juvenile adjudication required a finding of proof beyond a reasonable doubt (as well as all other constitutionally required safeguards), but did not afford him the right to a jury trial. Thus, Burge, relying on United States v. Tighe, 266 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir.2001), argues that the district court erred when it considered his prior juvenile adjudication for purposes of increasing his sentence under the ACCA. 14 [T]he sentencing factor at issue here—recidivism—is a traditional, if not the most traditional, basis for a sentencing court's increasing an offender's sentence. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 243, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 1230, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998). [T]he government need not allege in its indictment and need not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant had prior convictions for a district court to use those convictions for purposes of enhancing a sentence. United States v. Marseille, 377 F.3d 1249, 1257 (11th Cir.2004) (citing Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 228, 118 S.Ct. at 1223). This conclusion was left undisturbed by Apprendi, Blakely [ v. Washington, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004)], and Booker. United States v. Shelton, 400 F.3d 1325, 1329 (11th Cir.2005). 15 In Almendarez-Torres the Court considered whether an increased maximum sentence (from up to 2 years to up to 20 years) based on a prior conviction constituted a separate crime, which needed to be alleged in the indictment, or a sentence enhancement, which did not need to be alleged in the indictment, and the Court concluded that it was a sentence enhancement. 523 U.S. at 227-28, 118 S.Ct. at 1222. In Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999), decided the following Term, the Court explained that Almendarez-Torres stands for the proposition that not every fact expanding a penalty range must be stated in a felony indictment, the precise holding being that recidivism increasing the maximum penalty need not be so charged. 526 U.S. at 248, 119 S.Ct. at 1226-27. In Jones, the Court concluded that the federal carjacking statute, which provided three separate sentencing penalties based on facts other than the fact of a prior conviction, constituted three separate crimes. Jones, 526 U.S. at 229, 119 S.Ct. at 1217. Addressing Almendarez-Torres, the Court recognized that: 16 the holding last Term rested in substantial part on the tradition of regarding recidivism as a sentencing factor, not as an element to be set out in the indictment. The Court's repeated emphasis on the distinctive significance of recidivism leaves no question that the Court regarded that fact as potentially distinguishable for constitutional purposes from other facts that might extend the range of possible sentencing .... One basis for that possible constitutional distinctiveness is not hard to see: unlike virtually any other consideration used to enlarge the possible penalty for an offense, and certainly unlike the factor before us in this case, a prior conviction must itself have been established through procedures satisfying the fair notice, reasonable doubt, and jury trial guarantees. 17 Jones, 526 U.S. at 249, 119 S.Ct. at 1227 (citations omitted). 18 In Apprendi, the Court was not faced with recidivism as a sentence enhancement; rather, Apprendi argued that the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution requires that the [trial court's] finding of bias upon which his hate crime sentence was based must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 530 U.S. at 471, 120 S.Ct. at 2352. The Court agreed, but preserved a prior conviction exception: Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. at 2362-63. As to this exception, the Court explained that there is a vast difference between accepting the validity of a prior judgment of conviction entered in a proceeding in which the defendant had the right to a jury trial and the right to require the prosecutor to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and allowing the judge to find the required fact under a lesser standard of proof. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 496, 120 S.Ct. at 2366. Further, the Court stated that the due process and Sixth Amendment concerns in Almendarez-Torres were mitigated by [b]oth the certainty that procedural safeguards attached to any `fact' of prior conviction, and the reality that Almendarez-Torres did not challenge the accuracy of the `fact' in his case, Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488, 120 S.Ct. at 2362, and because recidivism does not relate to the commission of the offense itself. 530 U.S. at 496, 120 S.Ct. at 2366 (quotation omitted). The Court reaffirmed Apprendi's prior conviction exception in Booker: Any fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738, 756. 19 Based on its interpretations of Jones and Apprendi, the Ninth Circuit limited this exception to prior convictions that were themselves obtained through proceedings that included the right to a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1194. Specifically, the panel majority in Tighe concluded that the underlying rationale for the prior conviction exception is the following fundamental triumvirate of procedural protections: fair notice, reasonable doubt and the right to a jury trial. Id. at 1193. Thus, the court held that a juvenile adjudication that does not itself afford a defendant the right to a jury trial cannot fall within Apprendi's prior conviction exception and cannot be used as a prior conviction for purposes of the ACCA. Id. at 1194. The court was forced to distinguish its holding from a prior panel decision, United States v. Williams, 891 F.2d 212 (9th Cir.1989), which held that it does not violate a defendant's due process rights for the sentencing judge to use his prior, nonjury, juvenile adjudications to enhance his sentence under the [federal] sentencing guidelines. 891 F.2d at 215 (reasoning that [i]f it does not violate due process for a juvenile to be deprived of his or her liberty without a jury trial, we fail to find a violation of due process when a later deprivation of liberty is enhanced due to this juvenile adjudication). The court distinguished Williams from Tighe by stating that William's [sic] prior juvenile adjudications were not used to increase the statutorily mandated maximum punishment to which he was exposed. Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1192. The dissent in Tighe disagreed and stated that: 20 the language in Jones stands for the basic proposition that Congress has the constitutional power to treat prior convictions as sentencing factors subject to a lesser standard of proof because the defendant presumably received all the process that was due when he was convicted of the predicate crime. For adults, this would indeed include the right to a jury trial. For juveniles, it does not. Extending Jones ' logic to juvenile adjudications, when a juvenile receives all the process constitutionally due at the juvenile stage, there is no constitutional problem (on which Apprendi focused) in using that adjudication to support a later sentencing enhancement. Our decision in Williams recognizes just that. 21 Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1200 (Brunetti, J., dissenting). 22 Since Tighe, the majority of courts have followed the Tighe dissent: If juvenile adjudications are constitutionally sound according to the more limited set of rights afforded in juvenile proceedings, they may be used to increase a defendant's sentence for a later crime. State v. Hitt, 273 Kan. 224, 235, 42 P.3d 732, 739, (Kan.2002); accord United States v. Jones, 332 F.3d 688 (3d Cir.2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1150, 124 S.Ct. 1145, 157 L.Ed.2d 1044 (2004); United States v. Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030 (8th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1114, 123 S.Ct. 870, 154 L.Ed.2d 790 (2003); Ryle v. State, 819 N.E.2d 119, 123 (Ind.Ct.App.2004); People v. Bowden, 102 Cal.App.4th 387, 125 Cal.Rptr.2d 513 (Cal.Ct.App.2002). But see State v. Brown, 879 So.2d 1276, 1290 (La.2004), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 1310, 161 L.Ed.2d 161 (2005) (agreeing with Tighe that if a juvenile adjudication is not established through a procedure guaranteeing a jury trial, it cannot be excepted from Apprendi's general rule). This issue is one of first impression in our circuit. 23 In Smalley, the Eighth Circuit stated that the Ninth Circuit's interpretation was too strict because: We think that while the Court [in Apprendi ] established what constitutes sufficient procedural safeguards (a right to jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt), and what does not (judge-made findings under a lesser standard of proof), the Court did not take a position on possibilities that lie in between these two poles. Smalley, 294 F.3d at 1032. Juvenile adjudications, where juvenile defendants have the right to notice, the right to counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, the privilege against self-incrimination, and the right to a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, see McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 533, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 1980, 29 L.Ed.2d 647 (1971) (setting forth the constitutional requirements of a state juvenile proceeding), provide more than sufficient safeguards to ensure the reliability that Apprendi requires and, therefore, may be considered under the ACCA. Smalley, 294 F.3d at 1033. In Jones, the Third Circuit agreed with Smalley and stated that [l]ike the Smalley court, we find nothing in Apprendi or Jones, two cases relied upon by the Tighe court and [the defendant] on this appeal, that requires us to hold that prior nonjury juvenile adjudications that afforded all required due process safeguards cannot be used to enhance a sentence under the ACCA. Jones, 332 F.3d at 696; see Hitt, 273 Kan. at 235, 42 P.3d at 740 (stating that although Apprendi spoke of procedural safeguards attached to a prior conviction, [i]t did not specify all procedural safeguards nor did it require certain crucial procedural safeguards). Thus, the Third Circuit held that [a] prior nonjury juvenile adjudication that was afforded all constitutionally-required procedural safeguards can properly be characterized as a prior conviction for Apprendi purposes. Jones, 332 F.3d at 696. 24 In the present case, the district court found the Third Circuit's Jones decision more persuasive than Tighe and applied Burge's juvenile adjudication to the ACCA. After reviewing the record, we conclude that this application was correct. We base our holding on the reasoning of our sister circuits in Smalley and Jones. 25 [T]rial by jury in the juvenile court's adjudicative stage is not a constitutional requirement. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 545, 91 S.Ct. at 1986; McCullough v. Singletary, 967 F.2d 530, 532 (11th Cir.1992); cf. United States v. Bent, 702 F.2d 210, 212 (11th Cir.1983) ([T]here is no constitutional right to a jury trial in federal juvenile delinquency proceedings.). Further, although the Court's Jones and Apprendi decisions discuss the right to a jury trial as a procedural safeguard, neither case addresses juvenile adjudications and neither case explicitly states that a juvenile adjudication can only count as a prior conviction under the ACCA if the juvenile was afforded the right to a jury trial. At a minimum, however, Apprendi's prior conviction exception is based on the procedural safeguards that attach to a prior conviction or juvenile adjudication. See Hitt, 273 Kan. at 236, 42 P.3d at 740. 26 Prior to Almendarez-Torres, we recognized that the fact of a prior conviction under section 924(e) merely links the severity of the defendant's punishment for a violation of the predicate offense § 922(g) to the number of previous felony convictions and need not be submitted for jury consideration because the defendant has received the totality of constitutional protections due in the prior proceeding on the predicate offense. United States v. McGatha, 891 F.2d 1520, 1526 (11th Cir. 1990). We explained that [i]t was unnecessary for the jury to consider the defendant's prior convictions, for these convictions were not an element of the offense for which he was indicted and to which he entered his plea of guilty. Id. at 1525. And we concluded that [w]hile the Due Process Clause indeed requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime, in sentencing those already constitutionally convicted the courts have traditionally operated without constitutionally imposed burdens of proof. Id. at 1526-27. Although we did not consider the use of a prior juvenile adjudication in McGatha, its rationale is consistent with the Eighth Circuit's decision in Smalley and the Third Circuit's decision in Jones, and can be applied in this case. Accordingly, [a] prior nonjury juvenile adjudication that was afforded all constitutionally-required procedural safeguards can properly be characterized as a prior conviction for Apprendi purposes. Jones, 332 F.3d at 696. Here, we are persuaded that Burge received the totality of constitutional protections due in his prior juvenile proceeding.