Opinion ID: 187209
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Coast Guard Action

Text: Appellants' second claim is directed against the Coast Guard and its purported omissions while engaged in the process by which it promulgates, enforces, and alters vessel routing measures that coincide with right whale habitat. Appellees first contend that appellants lack standing to raise this argument, and second, that the Coast Guard has no more than a ministerial role in the vessel routing process, giving rise to no duties regarding right whales. We will address the standing argument first, but we begin by providing a brief overview of the relevant statutory provisions. The Ports and Waterways Safety Act requires the Coast Guard to designate necessary fairways and traffic separation schemes to provide safe routes for boats traveling in and out of U.S. ports and other places subject to U.S. jurisdiction. 33 U.S.C. § 1223(c)(1). Traffic separation schemes (TSSs) are similar to the markings on paved roadsthey are aimed at the separation of opposing streams of traffic... by the establishment of traffic lanes. 33 C.F.R. § 167.5(b). The Coast Guard's construction of measures for controlling or supervising vessel traffic is [s]ubject to the requirements of section 1224, 33 U.S.C. § 1223(a)(1); see also id. § 1223(c)(3), which, inter alia, requires the Coast Guard to take into account all relevant factors concerning ... protection of the marine environment, ... including but not limited to ... environmental factors, id. § 1224(a)(6). Prior to designating a traffic separation scheme, the Coast Guard must, inter alia, (1) undertake a study, which the Coast Guard calls a port access route study (PARS), and publish notice of it in the Federal Register, id. § 1223(c)(3)(A); (2) take into account all other uses of the area under consideration, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce and others, id. § 1223(c)(3)(B); and (3) to the extent practicable, reconcile the need for safe access routes with the needs of all other reasonable uses of the area involved, id. § 1223(c)(3)(C). After completing the above tasks, the Coast Guard must issue a notice of proposed rulemaking of the contemplated route, or lack thereof, in the Federal Register, and state its reasons for the decision. Id. § 1223(4). The Coast Guard may later adjust the location or limits of these vessel shipping routes, id. § 1223(5)(C), and may also make them mandatory, id. § 1223(5)(B). Since the enactment of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act, the Coast Guard has established numerous traffic separation schemes, some of which coincide with right whale habitat. In recent years, the Coast Guard has undertaken several port access route studies and modified traffic separation schemes in right whale-inhabited areas. See, e.g., Port Access Routes: Approaches to Portland, ME and Casco Bay, 70 Fed.Reg. 7067 (Feb. 10, 2005) (notice of PARS); Port Access Routes Study: In the Approaches to Chesapeake Bay, VA, 69 Fed.Reg. 3869 (Jan. 27, 2004) (notice of PARS results); Port Access Routes Study: In the Approaches to Narragansett Bay and Buzzards Bay, Cleveland Ledge to the Race, Narragansett Bay East Passage, and the Areas Offshore of Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts, 68 Fed.Reg. 74,199 (Dec. 23, 2003) (notice of PARS); TSS in the Approaches to Delaware Bay, 65 Fed.Reg. 12,944 (Mar. 10, 2000). There are at least six traffic separation schemes at issue in this case namely, (1) In the Approaches to the Chesapeake Bay, (2) Off Delaware Bay, (3) Off New York, (4) In the Approaches to Narragansett Bay, R.I. and Buzzards Bay, Mass., (5) In the Approach to Boston, Mass., and (6) In the Approaches to Portland, Maine. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Gutierrez, 484 F.Supp.2d 44, 55 n. 9 (D.D.C.2007) (listing the TSSs mentioned in the amended complaint). The Endangered Species Act and the Marine Mammal Protection Act give the Coast Guard duties regarding the right whale. ESA section 7(a)(1) requires all federal agencies, in consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary, [to] utilize their authorities in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter by carrying out programs for the conservation of endangered species and threatened species.... 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1). And ESA section 9 prohibits any federal agency from tak[ing], id. § 1538(a)(1)(B), meaning, inter alia, harassing, harming, wounding, or killing, id. § 1532(19), any endangered species of fish or wildlife within the United States or [its] territorial sea ... [,] id. § 1538(a)(1)(B); see id. § 1332(13) (including federal departments, instrumentalities, and agents in its definition of person for ESA purposes). The Marine Mammal Protection Act also prohibits the unauthorized take of all marine mammals, id. § 1372(a), and requires the Secretary of Commerce to prescribe such regulations as are necessary and appropriate to carry out the purposes of this subchapter, id. § 1382(a). The statutory provision most relevant to this dispute is ESA section 7(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). This provision requires [e]ach Federal agency ... in consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary, [to] insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency (hereinafter in this section referred to as an `agency action') is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or its habitat, unless the agency is granted an exemption. Id. No party disputes that the Coast Guard did not consult with NMFS about the potential effect of any of the above-listed traffic separation schemes on the right whale. They do argue, however, about the applicability of the ESA to the Coast Guard's role in the traffic separation scheme process. First, however, we address standing. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984) (noting that [c]onstitutional limits on the role of the federal courts preclude us from judging the merits of a case in which plaintiffs fail to show standing).
Appellees argue that appellants fail to meet two of the three elements required to establish the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing: causation and redressability. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). Appellees do not contest the first element of our standing inquiry, injury-in-fact, nor, in light of precedential authority, do we question appellants' showing of this element. See Declarations of Regina Asmutis-Silvia, Sharon Young, Linda Bremer, and John Phillips (declaring that these individuals engage in whale watching and the studying of whales, activities that ship strike mortalities threaten); Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 n. 4, 106 S.Ct. 2860, 92 L.Ed.2d 166 (1986) (holding that plaintiffs undoubtedly have alleged a sufficient `injury in fact' in that the whale watching and studying of their members will be adversely affected by continued whale harvesting). The second element of our standing analysis requires a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained ofthe injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant.... Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Appellees essentially argue that the chain of causation between the Coast Guard's actions and collisions between right whales and vessels is too speculative to provide standing. Appellees contend that this case is controlled by Florida Audubon Society v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658 (D.C.Cir.1996) (en banc) , in which we found that plaintiffs premise[d] their claims of particularized injury and causation on a lengthy chain of conjecture. Id. at 666. There, plaintiffs claimed that the challenged tax credit would cause an increase in the production of a fuel additive derived from ethanol, which is made from either corn or sugar items that would also be grown in greater quantities. Id. Plaintiffs claimed that an increase in production of corn and sugar would cause more agricultural pollution, which would likely increase pollution in wildlife areas bordering farms. Id. Plaintiffs regularly visited the wildlife areas in question and claimed they would be harmed by that pollution. Id. This particular chain of causation failed to meet the second element of the standing inquiry both because of the uncertainty of several individual links and because of the number of speculative links that must hold for the chain to connect the challenged acts to the asserted particularized injury. Id. at 670. Appellees argue that appellants' theory of causation depends upon this type of attenuated chain. They claim that the Coast Guard's only arguably discretionary role in promulgating the traffic separation schemes at issue was to conduct port access route studies on them, studies they argue do not alone constitute final agency action. They contend the Coast Guard then performed purely ministerial acts, first by forwarding those studies to the Shipping Coordinating Committee in the State Department, and finally after many intermediary actions(1) review by the Shipping Coordinating Committee in the State Department, (2) development of those proposals by that committee into traffic separation scheme proposals for the Secretary of State, (3) review of the proposals by the Secretary, (4) forwarding of the proposals by the Secretary to the International Maritime Organization, and (5) adoption of the traffic separation schemes by the International Maritime Organizationthe Coast Guard simply ensured that the vessel routing measures were codified in the Code of Federal Regulations. And even after adoption by the International Maritime Organization, appellees argue, no direct link exists between traffic separation schemes and right whale ship strikes because those schemes are voluntary. Appellees assert, in short, this sequence of events is too attenuated to fulfill the causation element of standing. Appellees' argument assumes that its view on the merits of the case will prevail. But in reviewing the standing question, the court must be careful not to decide the questions on the merits for or against the plaintiff, and must therefore assume that on the merits the plaintiffs would be successful in their claims. City of Waukesha v. EPA, 320 F.3d 228, 235 (D.C.Cir.2003) (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 502, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975)). In Southern California Edison Co. v. FERC, 502 F.3d 176 (D.C.Cir.2007), we noted that it was sharply contested whether [the petitioner] in fact forfeited its right to recover the costs [of a construction project] if it did not provide an invoice within the twelve-month period. Id. at 180. FERC's contention that the petitioner forfeited its rights by not providing an invoice during the twelve-month period in question was the exact reason it contended the petitioner lacked standing. Id. at 179. Just as in Southern California Edison Co., appellees' argument here `is nothing more than an effort to bootstrap standing analysis to issues that are controverted on the merits.' Id. at 180 (quoting Public Citizen v. FTC, 869 F.2d 1541, 1549 (D.C.Cir.1989)). Here, the Coast Guard's actual role in the traffic separation scheme process is sharply contested. Appellants argue that the Coast Guard plays a much more pronounced and discretionary role in the promulgation of traffic separation schemes than appellees suggest. We assume for the purposes of standing that appellants view on the merits will prevail. See id. Therefore, we reject this standing argument by appellees. Appellees also contest redressability. The redressability element of standing requires that it be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (internal quotation marks omitted). Appellees base their argument solely upon the premise that the Coast Guard does not have authority to recommend changes to traffic separation schemes to protect endangered and threatened species, such as the right whale, from ship strikes. Again, appellants disagree with this premise, and as a disputed proposition, we assume for the purposes of standing that appellants' view will prevail. Appellants stress that the Coast Guard's duty under 33 U.S.C. § 1223(c)(1) to designate traffic separation schemes is subject to its duties under id. § 1224(a) to take into account all relevant factors concerning... protection of the marine environment,... including but not limited to... environmental factors. See id. § 1223(a)(1) (applying the requirements of 33 U.S.C. § 1224 to the construct[ion], maintain[ance], improve[ment], or expan[sion of] vessel traffic services, which includes routing systems[ ] and fairways); id. § 1223(c)(3) (specifically applying 33 U.S.C. § 1224 to the designation of traffic separation schemes). They also note that Congress reinforced the agency's authority to take into account the effects of vessel routing measures on right whales in the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2004, Pub.L. No. 108-293, 118 Stat. 1028, when it directed the agency to cooperate with the Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration in analyzing potential vessel routing measures for reducing strikes of North Atlantic Right Whales.... 118 Stat. 1065-66. Assuming appellants' view on the merits will prevail, the Coast Guard has authority to take into account right whales when promulgating traffic separation schemes; thus, an order from the district court could redress appellants' injury, at least in part. See Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 476, 107 S.Ct. 1862, 95 L.Ed.2d 415 (1987) (requiring only partial redressability). Therefore, we may proceed to the merits of appellants' claim.
Appellants challenge the Coast Guard's actions regarding the traffic separation scheme process as violations of ESA sections 7(a)(1), 7(a)(2), and 9. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(a)(1), (a)(2), 1538. The district court dismissed this challenge, concluding that the International Maritime Organization, a multinational body, adopted the traffic separation schemes at issue, not the Coast Guard. Defenders of Wildlife, 484 F.Supp.2d at 55. Because the district court held that there was no final agency action, the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider appellants' claims against the Coast Guard. Id. at 55-56. The parties dispute whether agency action or  final agency action is required in order to bring suit under the citizen-suit provision of the ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g), based on a violation of ESA section 7(a)(2)'s consultation requirement. Appellants extract a simple agency action requirement from the text of ESA section 7(a)(2), which speaks only to agency action. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (Each Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary, insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency (hereinafter in this section referred to as an `agency action') is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of endangered species or their habitats.). Appellees argue that the final agency action requirement in the second clause of the Administrative Procedure Act should be read into ESA section 7(a)(2). See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review.). We find it unnecessary to resolve this issue because we hold that appellants are challenging final agency action by the Coast Guard. As they did in their standing arguments, appellees characterize the traffic separation scheme process as one controlled by an international organization with the State Department acting as an intermediary between the international body and the Coast Guard, leaving the Coast Guard with a minor and purely ministerial role. However, the record shows quite a different role for the Coast Guard in this process. Most significantly, the Coast Guard is the sole body charged with the duty of promulgating traffic separation schemes. 33 U.S.C. § 1223(c)(1); see 33 C.F.R. § 1.05-1. Appellees point to no congressional authorization permitting the State Department to promulgate traffic separation schemes. Nor can they point to any provision that gives the International Maritime Organization, which was created as a consultative and advisory body, Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, art. 2, Mar. 6, 1948, 9 U.S.T. 621, T.I.A.S. 4004, authority to promulgate regulations in U.S. waters. Treaties are not domestic law unless Congress has either enacted implementing statutes or the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be self-executing and is ratified on these terms. Medellin v. Texas, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 1346, 1356, 170 L.Ed.2d 190 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Appellees do not contend that Congress has enacted implementing statutes for the treaty at issue, International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), Nov. 1, 1974, 32 U.S.T. 47, T.I.A.S. 9700, or that the treaty is self-executing. In fact, the treaty relies on member nations to enforce its routing measures: Contracting Governments will use their influence to secure the appropriate use of adopted routes and will do everything in their power to ensure adherence to the measures adopted by the Organization in conne[ct]ion with rout[ ]ing of ships. SOLAS, ch. 5, reg. 8(d). By giving the Coast Guard authority to promulgate traffic separation schemes, Congress intended to make the Coast Guard accountable for them. See 33 U.S.C. § 1223(c)(1). Were we to hold that the Coast Guard had delegated its duties under the Ports and Waterways Safety Act to the International Maritime Organization, and that this delegation relieved the Coast Guard of any responsibility for the final action, we would countermine this intent. Such an outcome would also undermine several other statutes that Congress enacted to give parties the ability to challenge unlawful agency action. A party harmed by the Coast Guard's failure to take into account the safety and security of United States ports and waterways, 33 U.S.C. § 1224(a), or the economic impact and effects, id. § 1224(a)(7), of traffic separation schemes would normally have recourse under the citizen-suit provision of the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g), or the Administrative Procedure Act. But if the Coast Guard delegates its responsibility for traffic separation schemes to the International Maritime Organization, and if we accept this delegation as relieving the Coast Guard of any responsibility for them, no such recourse is available. The International Maritime Organization is not subject to the Administrative Procedure Act or the ESA. As we noted in U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554 (D.C.Cir.2004), when an agency delegates power to outside parties, lines of accountability may blur, undermining an important democratic check on government decision-making. Id. at 565. Appellees point to no evidence showing that Congress intended to undermine the ability of injured parties to challenge unlawful agency action in the promulgation of traffic separation schemes. Just as the President cannot unilaterally convert[ ] a non-self-executing treaty into a self-executing one, Medellin, 128 S.Ct. at 1368, the Coast Guard cannot convert the SOLAS treaty into domestic law by simply delegating its congressionally given authority under the Ports and Waterways Safety Act to the International Maritime Organization. Even if the Coast Guard had delegated some or all of its decisionmaking authority under the Ports and Waterways Safety Act to an outside body not subordinate to it, such as the International Maritime Organization, the delegation would be unlawful absent affirmative evidence that Congress intended the delegation. [W]hile federal agency officials may subdelegate their decision-making authority to subordinates absent evidence of contrary congressional intent, they may not subdelegate to outside entitiesprivate or sovereignabsent affirmative evidence of authority to do so. U.S. Telecom, 359 F.3d at 566. Appellees do not argue that affirmative evidence of congressional intent to subdelegate the Coast Guard's decisionmaking authority to an outside party exists. The simple fact that an agency possesses statutory authority is not a basis for finding final agency action if no evidence exists that the agency used it. However, appellants have presented evidence of final agency action in this case. The Coast Guard has conducted port access route studies, see, e.g., Port Access Routes: Approaches to Portland, ME and Casco Bay, 70 Fed.Reg. 7067 (Feb. 10, 2005), published notice of port access route study results, see Port Access Routes: Approaches to Delaware Bay, 60 Fed.Reg. 49,237 (Sept. 22, 1995), accepted comments on a proposed route, see TSS in the Approaches to Delaware Bay, 65 Fed.Reg. 12,944 (Mar. 10, 2000), and ensured that traffic separation schemes appear in the Code of Federal Regulations, see, e.g., 33 C.F.R. § 167.170 (traffic separation scheme for the approach to the waters off Delaware Bay). These tasks are not merely ministerial; they require a significant amount of discretion. In promulgating traffic separation schemes, the Coast Guard must (a) take into account all relevant factors concerning navigation and vessel safety, protection of the marine environment, and the safety and security of United States ports and waterways, including but not limited to(1) the scope and degree of the risk or hazard involved; (2) vessel traffic characteristics and trends ...; (3) port and waterway configurations and variations in local conditions of geography, climate, and other similar factors; (4) the need for granting exemptions for the installation and use of equipment or devices for use with vessel traffic services for certain classes of small vessels ...; (5) the proximity of fishing grounds, oil and gas drilling and production operations, or any other potential or actual conflicting activity; (6) environmental factors; (7) economic impact and effects; (8) existing vessel traffic services; and (9) local practices and customs, including voluntary arrangements and agreements within the maritime community; and (b) at the earliest possible time, consult with and receive and consider the views of representatives of the maritime community, ports and harbor authorities or associations, environmental groups, and other parties who may be affected by the proposed actions. 33 U.S.C. § 1224. The Coast Guard accepts and responds to public comment on all the above issues prior to codifying a traffic separation scheme in the Code of Federal Regulations. See, e.g., Traffic Separation Scheme in the Approaches to Delaware Bay, 62 Fed.Reg. 25,576, 25,577 (May 9, 1997) (stating, in the notice of proposed rulemaking, that changes may result from the notice-and-comment period). Accordingly, appellants have demonstrated final agency action, and the district court erred in granting summary judgment to appellees based on its conclusion that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Because we reverse the district court's holding on the agency action issue and remand the case to that court to reconsider the cross motions for summary judgment in light of our holding, it is unnecessary to decide whether the district court abused its discretion in denying appellants' motion to reconsider its judgment on that issue.