Opinion ID: 2783488
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Forfeiture by Conduct

Text: ¶53 Prior to reviewing the circuit court's decision to deny Anthony's request to testify, we must address a threshold issue in this case: whether a criminal defendant may forfeit his or her right to testify through conduct incompatible with the 19 No. 2013AP467-CR assertion of the right. Neither the United States Supreme Court nor this court has addressed the issue. ¶54 We have recognized two distinct ways in which a defendant may give up his rights: waiver and forfeiture. State v. Pinno, 2014 WI 74, ¶56, 356 Wis. 2d 106, 850 N.W.2d 207. Waiver 'is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.' Ndina, 315 Wis. 2d 653, ¶29 (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993)). [W]aiver typically applies to those rights so important to the administration of a fair trial that mere inaction on the part of a litigant is not sufficient to demonstrate that the party intended to forgo the right. State v. Soto, 2012 WI 93, ¶37, 343 Wis. 2d 43, 817 N.W.2d 848. ¶55 Forfeiture, on the other hand, often involves 'the failure to make the timely assertion of a right.' Ndina, 315 Wis. 2d 653, ¶29 (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 733). Rights that are subject to forfeiture are typically those whose relinquishment will not necessarily deprive a party of a fair trial, and whose protection is best left to the immediacy of the trial, such as when a party fails to raise an evidentiary objection. Soto, 343 Wis. 2d 43, ¶36. However, there is a second aspect to forfeiture: doing something incompatible with the assertion of a right. . . . State v. Vaughn, 2012 WI App 129, ¶21, 344 Wis. 2d 764, 823 N.W.2d 543 (citing Allen, 397 U.S. at 343). ¶56 As previously noted, we have held that the right to testify is subject to waiver, not forfeiture, in so far as a 20 No. 2013AP467-CR defendant's inaction in asserting the right is concerned. Weed, 263 Wis. 2d 434, ¶¶39-40. We now conclude that the right to testify may, in appropriate cases, be subject to forfeiture where conduct incompatible with the assertion of the right is at issue. ¶57 Case law supports our position. In Allen, the issue was whether Allen forfeited his constitutional right to be present at trial by engaging in speech and conduct which [was] so noisy, disorderly, and disruptive that it [was] exceedingly difficult or wholly impossible to carry on the trial. Allen, 397 U.S. at 338. At trial, Allen had requested to conduct his own defense. Id. at 339. During voir dire, Allen argued with the judge in a most abusive and disrespectful manner. Id. He later threatened the judge, tore up his appointed counsel's legal files, and threw papers on the floor. Id. at 340. Despite warning, Allen did not reform his conduct, leading the circuit court to remove him from the courtroom on two separate occasions. Id. at 340-41. ¶58 The United States Supreme Court rejected the notion that Allen's right to be present was so 'absolute' that, no matter how unruly or disruptive [Allen's] conduct might be, he could never be held to have lost that right so long as he continued to insist upon it, as Allen clearly did. Id. at 342. The Court held: [W]e explicitly hold today that a defendant can lose his right to be present at trial if, after he has been warned by the judge that he will be removed if he continues his disruptive behavior, he nevertheless 21 No. 2013AP467-CR insists on conducting himself in a manner so disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of the court that his trial cannot be carried on with him in the courtroom. Once lost, the right to be present can, of course, be reclaimed as soon as the defendant is willing to conduct himself consistently with the decorum and respect inherent in the concept of courts and judicial proceedings. It is essential to the proper administration of criminal justice that dignity, order, and decorum be the hallmarks of all court proceedings in our country. The flagrant disregard in the courtroom of elementary standards of proper conduct should not and cannot be tolerated. We believe trial judges confronted with disruptive, contumacious, stubbornly defiant defendants must be given sufficient discretion to meet the circumstances of each case. No one formula for maintaining appropriate courtroom atmosphere will be best in all situations. Id. at 343. Thus, Allen stands for the proposition that a defendant may forfeit a fundamental constitutional right through conduct incompatible with the assertion of the right. ¶59 In our view, the rationale of Allen logically extends to the context of the right to testify, given that a corollary to removal may be denial of that right. We are not alone in this opinion. See, e.g., United States v. Ives, 504 F.2d 935, 941 (9th Cir. 1974), vacated on other grounds, 421 U.S. 944 (1975), opinion reinstated in relevant part, 547 F.2d 1100 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that a defendant may forfeit the privilege to testify through conduct); Douglas v. State, 214 P.3d 312, 322 (Alaska 2009) (applying the Allen standards to determine whether the defendant forfeited his right to testify in person through misconduct); State v. Chapple, 36 P.3d 1025, 1033-34 (Wash. 2001) (relying on Allen and Ives to determine whether the 22 No. 2013AP467-CR defendant lost his right to testify by way of his conduct). We agree with the reasoning of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit: It is evident that the conduct of a defendant in the courtroom can become so inconsistent with the necessary decorum for effective administration of justice that reasonable restraints are necessary. It is even more evident that such conduct cannot be allowed when the defendant takes center stage on the witness stand. He has no more liberty and freedom to testify in a way degrading to the judicial system than he has to rob a bank. . . . Ives, 504 F.2d at 941. ¶60 Although the United States Supreme Court has not expressly stated that a defendant may forfeit the right to testify through conduct, it seems probable that it would reach such a conclusion in light of Allen and its indication in Rock that the right to testify is subject to legitimate interests in the criminal trial process. Surely, the preservation of dignity, order, and decorum in the courtroom constitutes a legitimate interest in the criminal trial process that may outweigh a defendant's right to testify in certain circumstances. ¶61 While we have not addressed the forfeiture by conduct issue in the context of the right to testify, we have held that a criminal defendant may forfeit his or her constitutional right to counsel through manipulative or disruptive conduct. Cummings, 199 Wis. 2d at 752-56; accord United States v. Leggett, 162 F.3d 237, 250 (3d Cir. 1998); United States v. McLeod, 53 F.3d 322, 324-25 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v. 23 No. 2013AP467-CR Bauer, 956 F.2d 693, 695 (7th Cir. 1992). In Cummings, the defendant repeatedly refused to cooperate with various courtappointed attorneys, constantly complained about the attorneys' performance, and made it impossible for an attorney to effectively represent him. Cummings, 199 Wis. 2d at 753-54. We held that there may be situations, such as the one before us, where a circuit court must have the ability to find that a defendant has forfeited his right to counsel. Id. at 756. ¶62 In a footnote to Cummings, we recommended that trial courts in the future, when faced with a recalcitrant defendant, follow the first four steps outlined in the dissent before determining that a defendant has forfeited his or her right to counsel. Id. at 756 n.18. Those four steps, designed to ensure that a defendant understands the consequences of his or her actions, are: (1) explicit warnings that, if the defendant persists in “X” [specific conduct], the court will find that the right to counsel has been forfeited and will require the defendant to proceed to trial pro se; (2) a colloquy indicating that the defendant has been made aware of the difficulties and dangers inherent in self-representation; (3) a clear ruling when the court deems the right to counsel to have been forfeited; [and] (4) factual findings to support the court's ruling. . . . Id. at 764 (Geske, J., dissenting). Thus, Cummings not only demonstrates that a defendant may forfeit a fundamental constitutional right through conduct incompatible with the assertion of the right, it provides guidance to circuit courts faced with making such a determination. 24 No. 2013AP467-CR ¶63 Since Cummings, the court of appeals has held that criminal defendants may, through their conduct, forfeit their right to an on-the-record colloquy designed to ensure that their decision not to testify is a knowing and voluntary one. Vaughn, 344 Wis. 2d 764, ¶26. Citing Allen, 397 U.S. at 343, the court of appeals explained: As we have seen, however, a defendant in a criminal case may lose fundamental rights (such as the right to appear at the trial and confront the accusers) when the defendant forfeits those rights by interfering with the ability of the trial court to protect those rights. . . . By refusing to come to court so the trial court could personally explain what Weed requires must be explained, Vaughn made it, as a practical matter consistent with safety, impossible for the trial court to explain his right to testify, and determine whether his decision to not testify was, in Weed's phrase, knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Id. (internal citations omitted). ¶64 The foregoing case law demonstrates that forfeiture by conduct is not a novel concept, even where fundamental constitutional rights are concerned. In light of that case law, and in light of the United States Supreme Court's declaration that the right to testify may 'bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process,' Rock, 483 U.S. at 55 (quoting Chambers, 410 U.S. at 295), we conclude that a criminal defendant may forfeit his or her right to testify through conduct incompatible with the assertion of the right in appropriate cases. However, we stress that a circuit court's determination on forfeiture must be guided by Rock's balancing test. Thus, a forfeiture determination may not be arbitrary or 25 No. 2013AP467-CR disproportionate to the purposes it is designed to serve. Rock, 483 U.S. at 56. Stated differently, a complete denial of the right to testify must be reasonable under the circumstances of the case.