Opinion ID: 2745054
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the Information Was Favorable

Text: The government‘s sole argument on the question whether Officer Davis‘s testimony about the discovery of Mr. Biles‘s belongings was ―favorable‖ for Brady purposes is that Mr. Biles did not sufficiently preserve his Brady claim, and that under the plain-error standard of review of United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993), he cannot demonstrate that it is ―clear‖ and ―obvious‖ that Brady applies to suppression hearings.2 The government does not argue that the late disclosure of information material to the outcome of a pretrial suppression hearing cannot violate Brady, aside from saying the law is not clear. Instead, the government leaves for the second and third prongs of Brady its fallback arguments, contending that ―even if this Court concludes that appellant has preserved his Brady claim, the claim still fails because appellant cannot show that the government suppressed the material or a reasonable probability of a different outcome.‖ The record in this case makes sufficiently clear that the trial court was fairly 2 The heading for the government‘s argument on the favorability prong reads: ―The Material Was Not Plainly Exculpatory or Impeaching.‖ 9 apprised of the nature of Mr. Biles‘s claim. When Officer Davis first testified that an informant had phoned her and directed her to the DVDs, defense counsel asked the court to exclude the evidence stemming from this call, stating that there was ―no mention whatsoever‖ of this information in pretrial discovery materials, that she had ―never heard anything of it before this testimony,‖ and that she ―didn‘t have an opportunity to do motions‖ or ―an opportunity to do anything on this.‖ The trial judge then described the withheld information as ―fundamental because it‘s what led them to the box‖ and chided the prosecutor that he ―should have told counsel as soon as [he] found out‖ because Mr. Biles‘s counsel ―may have had a motion available to her.‖ While counsel did not invoke Brady by name, the claim she was making had the clear hallmarks of a Brady claim—that the government failed to disclose information favorable to the accused that would have made a difference to the outcome of the proceeding—and it is preserved for appellate review. See, e.g., Parsons v. United States, 15 A.3d 276, 279 (D.C. 2011) (holding that defense counsel‘s request to exclude seized drugs, combined with counsel‘s closing argument that evidence of the informant‘s reliability was ―insufficient and not correct,‖ was enough to preserve for appeal a Fourth Amendment claim); Tindle v. United States, 778 A.2d 1077, 1081 (D.C. 2001) (holding that Mr. Tindle preserved his claim under Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), even though neither the attorneys nor the trial judge mentioned Edwards). 10 Turning to the merits, the government, again, identifies no reason Brady should not apply to the failure to disclose information material to suppression hearings, and we likewise find no basis in our case law. We have repeatedly held that information tending to show the inadmissibility of government evidence is ―favorable‖ evidence that must be disclosed under Brady. In Gaither v. United States, 759 A.2d 655 (D.C. 2000), amended by 816 A.2d 791 (D.C. 2003), we remanded for findings on whether the government had withheld Brady information pertaining to suggestive identification procedures. In Smith v. United States, 666 A.2d 1216, 1224-25 (D.C. 1995), we held that the government violated Brady by failing to disclose a witness statement that undermined the admissibility of a government witness‘s purportedly spontaneous utterance. And in James v. United States, 580 A.2d 636 (D.C. 1990), we similarly evaluated under Brady a latedisclosed witness statement that ―cast[] serious doubt‖ upon the trial court‘s finding that another statement it admitted ―was truly spontaneous.‖ Id. at 638. And while we have never had occasion to explicitly address whether information is ―favorable‖ for Brady purposes if it relates to a defendant‘s claim at a Fourth Amendment suppression hearing rather than at trial, we have assumed as much in at least one case. In Porter v. United States, 7 A.3d 1021 (D.C. 2010), Eugene Porter contended that his due process rights under Brady were violated when the government failed to turn over information about an informant that, in 11 Mr. Porter‘s view, would have shown that police lacked probable cause to arrest and search him and that his motion to suppress evidence should have been granted. Id. at 1023. This court, never questioning that Brady applied in such circumstances, held that the information at issue ―was not material to the defense‖ given that the informant did not testify and that the police were not aware of the information when they decided to arrest and search Mr. Porter.3 Id. at 1026. 3 Many courts have similarly assumed without deciding that such information can be favorable for Brady purposes. See, e.g., United States v. Veras, 51 F.3d 1365, 1375 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding ―no fault‖ with the district court‘s conclusion that ―‗[b]ecause the suppressed evidence would not have affected the outcome of the suppression hearing or the trial, defendant‘s due process rights were not violated and his motion for a new trial pursuant to Brady and Giglio is denied‘‖); United States v. Williams, 10 F.3d 1070, 1077 (4th Cir. 1993) (―[W]e assume arguendo but decline to address definitively on the merits the issue of whether Brady should call for disclosure of material evidence at pre-trial suppression hearings‖ because ―[t]he evidence allegedly withheld by the government regarding conflicting eyewitness reports was not material to the determination of probable cause‖ to arrest the defendants.); United States v. Taylor, 471 F. App‘x 499, 520 (6th Cir. 2012) (―Assuming without deciding that Brady applies to suppression hearings, we nonetheless conclude that the evidence about Agent Lucas was not material to the suppression-hearing proceedings or to the trials held in this case.‖); United States v. McCoy, 348 F. App‘x 900, 902 (4th Cir. 2009) (―Assuming, without deciding‖ that evidence regarding the legality of a Terry stop was ―was both favorable and withheld under Brady, McCoy failed to prove that the new evidence was material.‖); United States v. Bullock, 130 F. App‘x. 706, 723 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting the ―questionable relevance‖ of Brady to ―whether the suppression hearing might have come out the other way,‖ but concluding that appellant could not show prejudice); United States v. Johnson, No. 96-2008, 1997 WL 381926 (10th Cir. July 7, 1997) (―[A]ssuming that the evidence identified by Mr. Johnson was in fact withheld by the prosecution and favorable to Mr. Johnson . . . we hold that the evidence was not material, and that its nondisclosure by the prosecution does not constitute a Brady violation,‖ where the 12 The only courts we know to have squarely addressed the issue on the merits have held that the failure to disclose information material to a ruling on a Fourth Amendment suppression motion can constitute a Brady violation.4 In Smith v. Black, 904 F.2d 950, 965-66 (5th Cir. 1990), vacated on other grounds, 503 U.S. 930 (1992), the government failed to disclose evidence that would have bolstered the impeachment of a detective who testified at a suppression hearing involving the warrantless seizure of evidence from the defendant‘s car and home. The Fifth Circuit concluded that ―objections may be made under Brady to the state‘s failure to disclose material evidence prior to a suppression hearing,‖ id. at 965, and that ―the appropriate assessment for Brady purposes‖ was whether the nondisclosure evidence would have undermined the officer‘s credibility during a pretrial suppression hearing where the officer and the defendant disputed whether the defendant had consented to a car search.). 4 A split of authority exists on the different but related question whether Brady applies to information that would impeach police officers‘ affidavits in support of search warrants. Compare United States v. Barton, 995 F.2d 931, 935 (9th Cir. 1993) (concluding ―that the due process principles announced in Brady and its progeny must be applied to a suppression hearing involving a challenge to the truthfulness of allegations in an affidavit for a search warrant‖ where the concealed information would have impeached the police officer‘s claim that he had probable cause to search the defendant‘s home), with United States v. Colkley, 899 F.2d 297, 303 (4th Cir. 1990) (declining to extend Brady to the warrant application process so as to avoid ―perniciously prolix affidavits that would distract police officers from more important duties and render the magistrate‘s determination of probable cause unnecessarily burdensome‖). The logistical concerns raised in Colkley are not present in Mr. Biles‘s case, which involves disclosure of information relevant to a trial court‘s pretrial suppression ruling, not a magistrate‘s probable cause determination at the warrant phase. 13 ―affected the outcome of the suppression hearing,‖ id. at 956-66. In United States v. Gamez-Orduno, 235 F.3d 453 (9th Cir. 2000), the government failed to timely disclose a codefendant‘s statement that contradicted the government‘s assertion that the defendants lacked standing to challenge on Fourth Amendment grounds the Border Patrol‘s warrantless search of the trailer where the defendants resided. The Ninth Circuit concluded that ―[t]he suppression of material evidence helpful to the accused, whether at trial or on a motion to suppress, violates due process if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different.‖ Id. at 461.5 In addition, at least one court has held that Brady applies to suppression hearings alleging Miranda violations. See Nuckols v. Gibson, 233 F.3d 1261, 1266-67 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding a Brady violation where ―the prosecution withheld evidence that would have allowed defense counsel the means to test [the police officer‘s] credibility‖ where the admissibility of Mr. Nuckols‘s confession ―hinged upon proof‖ that he initiated the interview).6 5 The courts in Smith and Gamez-Orduno ultimately rejected the Brady claims in those cases on grounds that the suppressed information was not ―material‖ to the outcome of the hearing. We discuss materiality infra in Part II.C. 6 Some courts have simply noted that, for plain error purposes, the applicability of Brady to Fourth Amendment suppression hearings was not ―obvious.‖ See, e.g., United States v. Nelson, 193 F. App‘x 47, 50 (2d Cir. 2006) (remanding on other grounds and declining to answer ―[w]hether Brady and its 14 We agree that the suppression of material information can violate due process under Brady if it affects the success of a defendant‘s pretrial suppression motion. We have described as ―eminently sensible‖ a broad formulation of the government‘s Brady obligation that would reach the kind of evidence ―that would suggest to any prosecutor that the defense would want to know about it,‖ Miller v. United States, 14 A.3d at 1110 (quoting Leka v. Portuondo, 257 F.3d 89, 99 (2d Cir. 2001)); see also Mackabee, 29 A.3d at 962 (D.C. 2011), and a rule prohibiting the government from suppressing favorable information material to a Fourth Amendment suppression hearing would impose little if any additional burden on prosecutors and police beyond the obligations that court rules and professional standards already impose. See, e.g., USAM § 9-5.001.C.2 (requiring disclosure of information that ―might have a significant bearing on the admissibility of prosecution evidence‖); D. MASS. L. R. 116.1 (c)(1)(B) (requiring that the progeny require disclosures in advance of pre-trial hearings‖—―an open question in this circuit‖); United States v. Stott, 245 F.3d 890, 902 (7th Cir. 2001) (stating that ―we cannot say that the law is clear on the question of whether Brady should apply to suppression hearings‖); United States v. Bowie, 198 F.3d 905, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (stating that ―it is hardly clear that the Brady line of Supreme Court cases applies to suppression hearings‖). The Bowie court, briefly reflecting on an argument the appellant ―faintly‖ and ―obliquely‖ made in a heading of his reply brief, reasoned in dicta that suppression hearings ―do not determine a defendant‘s guilt or punishment,‖ and thus presumably would be beyond the scope of Brady. Bowie, 198 F.3d at 912. But the court explicitly made clear that the issue was not briefed and that it was not purporting to formally consider or decide it. Id. For the reasons stated in this opinion, we find this dicta unpersuasive. 15 government disclose within 28 days of arraignment a written description of an incriminating warrantless search, including an inventory of items seized); D. MASS. L. R. 116.2 (a)(2) (requiring disclosure of information that ―tends to . . . cast doubt on the admissibility of evidence that the government anticipates offering in its case-in-chief‖).7 Having held that the failure to disclose information material to a pretrial suppression ruling can implicate Brady, we conclude that the withheld information here, which tended to show that the search could not be justified as a routine search of a suspect‘s wingspan incident to arrest, was favorable for purposes of the Brady doctrine.