Opinion ID: 3010150
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting scheme

Text: The Supreme Court of New Jersey has adopted the methodology governing federal employment discrimination law for state claims of a similar nature. See Clowes v. Terminix International, Inc., 538 A.2d 794, 805 (N.J. 1988); Andersen v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 446 A.2d 486, 490-91 (N.J. 1982). The United States Supreme Court, in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), articulated the analytical framework for federal claims of employment discrimination in which the plaintiff seeks to make his or her case through circumstantial evidence. McDonnell Douglas set forth the basic allocation of burdens among employer and employee and order of presentation of proof: First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. Second, if the plaintiff succeeds in proving the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection. Third, should the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981) (citations omitted). While the burden of production may shift, [t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff. Id. at 253. In McDonnell Douglas, the Court explained that the plaintiff could meet his or her prima facie burden by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. At the same time as it was articulating the elements of a prima facie case, the McDonnell Douglas Court explained in no uncertain terms that these elements might vary in differing factual situations. Id. at 802 n.13. Similarly, we have often remarked that 'the nature of the required showing' to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment by indirect evidence 'depends on the circumstances of the case.' Torre v. Casio, Inc., 42 F.3d 825, 830 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Massarsky v. General Motors Corp., 706 F.2d 111, 118 n.13 (3d Cir.), cert.denied, 464 U.S. 937 (1983)). In the context of a claim of discriminatory termination of employment, for instance, we have held that the plaintiff must prov[e] by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) he belongs to a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position; (3) he was dismissed despite being qualified; and (4) he ultimately was replaced by a person [outside the protected class]. Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 897 (3d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 438 U.S. 1052 (1987); see also Sempier v. Johnson & Higgins, 45 F.3d 724, 728 (3d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2611 (1995); Torre, 42 F.3d at 830 (same). In a further effort to fine-tune our jurisprudence on the subject, we have held that the fourth prong of the prima facie case should be relaxed when the employee's layoff occurred in the context of a reduction in force. Torre, 42 F.3d at 831. In such a situation, it obviously is unnecessary for the plaintiff to . . . show that he was actually replaced by someone outside the protected class. Massarsky, 706 F.2d at 118 n.13; see alsoDuffy v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 738 F.2d 1393, 1395 n.3 (3d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1087 (1984). Rather, it is sufficient to show that he was discharged, while the [employer] retained someone [outside the protected class]. Healy v. New York Life Insurance Co., 860 F.2d 1209, 1214 n.1 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1098 (1989); see also DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 723 n.2 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 306 (1995); Torre, 42 F.3d at 831; Armbruster, 32 F.3d at 777; Billet v. CIGNA Corp., 940 F.2d 812, 816 n.3 (3d Cir. 1991); Duffy, 738 F.2d at 1395 n.2; Massarsky, 706 F.2d at 118.