Opinion ID: 712827
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Failing to Give Unanimity Instructions

Text: 78 Thierman contends that the complexity of the case required the district court to give unanimity instructions on the objects of the conspiracies, the theory to defraud or mislead the FDA or consumers, and the theory of intended drug use. We review for plain error the failure to give an unrequested unanimity instruction. U.S. v. Payseno, 782 F.2d 832, 834 (9th Cir.1986). 79 The district court instructed the jury that it must consider each count separately, that the members must be unanimous in their verdict, and that the members must find that there was a plan to commit at least one of the crimes alleged in the indictment as an object of the conspiracy. Thierman claims that these instructions left room for the jury unanimously to convict him of conspiracy, but not unanimously agree on which object of the conspiracy served as a basis for the finding of guilty. 80 In most cases, a general unanimity instruction is sufficient. Where it appears however, that there is a genuine possibility of jury confusion or that a conviction may occur as the result of different jurors concluding that the defendant committed different acts, the general unanimity instruction does not suffice. Payseno, 782 F.2d at 836. 81 We have upheld instructions similar to the ones given in this case in U.S. v. Friedman, 445 F.2d 1076 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 958 (1971). There, the district court gave a general unanimity instruction and then told the jury that it must find a conspiracy to commit at least one of the alleged crimes, and the commission of at least one of the overt acts. Given these instructions, the court stated: We cannot swallow appellants' argument that, under the instructions given, the jury could have unanimously found appellants guilty of conspiracy, yet not have unanimously agreed on what the conspiracy was. Id. at 1084. 82 While Thierman correctly contends that the defendant in Friedman had also been convicted of four substantive charges which had also been alleged as possible objects of the conspiracy, the court's ruling in Friedman did not rely on this fact. Thus, under Friedman, we find the district court's instructions to be free of reversible error. 83 Thierman also contends that the district court should have instructed the jury that it must unanimously agree on (1) who was defrauded or mislead--the FDA or consumers; (2) whether the party was either defrauded or mislead; and (3) a theory of intended drug use. Yet Thierman failed to support his contention that these issues presented a potential for jury confusion so that a special unanimity instruction beyond the general one was required. While we find no reversible error in the failure to give an unrequested unanimity instruction, it would be prudent to give it in the event the government elects to pursue a new trial.