Opinion ID: 2552701
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Exclusive, Continuing Jurisdiction or Initial Jurisdiction

Text: Section 15-14.1-14(a)(2) provides that Rhode Island courts have exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over child-custody determinations until [a] court of this state or a court of another state determines that the child, the child's parents, and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in this state. It is undisputed that neither Moss, Jacalyn, nor the minor child currently resides in Rhode Island, as was noted by the trial justice when she dismissed the action. In applying the plain and ordinary meaning of this language, as we are required to do, it is clear that the Family Court no longer has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction to make child-custody determinations concerning the minor child. See Waterman, 983 A.2d at 844 (It is well settled that when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, this Court must interpret the statute literally and must give the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meanings.) (quoting Iselin, 943 A.2d at 1049). We recognize that in certain, limited circumstances, § 15-14.1-14(b) permits a court to exercise continuing jurisdiction to modify a child-custody determination if it has or retains discretionary jurisdiction in the case. We note that Moss does not appear to have asked the Family Court to modify the custody order. Nonetheless, out of an abundance of caution we briefly discuss this issue. Specifically, § 15-14.1-14(b) provides that when [a] court of this state    has made a child custody determination and does not have exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under this section [it] may modify that determination only if it has jurisdiction to make an initial determination pursuant to this chapter. (Emphases added.) A court has jurisdiction to make an initial determination only if, under § 15-14.1-13(a): (1) This state is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of the proceeding, or was the home state of the child within six (6) months before the commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this state but a parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in this state; (2) A court of another state does not have jurisdiction under subdivision (1) of this subsection, or a court of the home state of the child has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this state is the more appropriate forum and: (i) The child and the child's parents, or the child and at least one parent or a person acting as a parent, have a significant connection with this state other than mere physical presence; and (ii) Substantial evidence is available in this state concerning the child's care, protection, training, and personal relationships; (3) All courts having jurisdiction under subdivision (1) or (2) of this subsection have declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that a court of this state is the more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child; or (4) No court of any other state would have jurisdiction under the criteria specified in subdivision (1), (2), or (3) of this subsection. We note that the date of the commencement of the proceedings has been interpreted by some courts to be the date of the original divorce proceeding rather than that of the current proceeding; however, we agree with those states that have held that the recent proceedingin this case Moss's filing of post-divorce motionsis the relevant proceeding to determine both the home state of the child and the date of the commencement of the proceedings. See Baumgartner v. Baumgartner, 788 P.2d 38, 40 (Alaska 1990); Barden v. Blau, 712 P.2d 481, 485 (Colo. 1986); Kioukis v. Kioukis, 185 Conn. 249, 440 A.2d 894, 898 (1981); Rypma v. Stehr, 68 Md.App. 242, 511 A.2d 527, 530 (1986); Pozzi v. Pozzi, 210 N.J.Super. 522, 510 A.2d 123, 124 (Ch.Div.1986); Trask v. Trask, 104 N.M. 780, 727 P.2d 88, 90 (App. 1986). To hold that `the proceeding' refers to the original dissolution action would confer perpetual jurisdiction over matters of custody to the courts of the state which granted the dissolution, regardless of whether the parties or child had any further connection with that state[;] Kioukis, 440 A.2d at 898 (citing Pierce v. Pierce, 287 N.W.2d 879 (Iowa 1980)), a result that is contrary to the underlying purpose of the UCCJEA. Nadeau, 716 A.2d at 721 (citing Paolino, 420 A.2d at 835). Because our goal is to give effect to the purpose of the act as intended by the General Assembly, ( Webster, 774 A.2d at 75; Matter of Falstaff Brewing Corp. Re: Narragansett Brewery Fire, 637 A.2d at 1050), we must interpret commencement of the proceeding to mean the recent, post-divorce proceeding concerning the custody of the child. Because Connecticut has been the child's home state since 2007, that state has jurisdiction under § 15-14.1-13(a)(2) and Conn. Gen.Stat. Ann. § 46b-115k(a)(1) (West 2009). [5] Rhode Island therefore lacks both exclusive, continuing jurisdiction and discretionary jurisdiction under §§ 15-14.1-13, 15-14.1-14. Based on the foregoing, Rhode Island no longer retains jurisdiction to make custody or visitation determinations in this case. Connecticut was the child's home state when Moss filed these motions and had been the home state since 2007. Section 15-14.1-13(a)(1). B