Opinion ID: 1676688
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Act 836 and Amendment 59

Text: Next, Appellants contend that it was error for the trial court to interpret section 26-26-306(e) as exempting 1996 taxes from the rollback provision of Amendment 59, and thus not entitling them to a refund. The trial court stated that because the taxes from 1996 were due and owing at the time the law took effect, the provisions of section 26-26-306 were inapplicable to those taxes. Appellants argue that the correct interpretation of this section is not that subsection (e) creates an exemption from millage rollbacks, but rather that those taxes due and owing at the time of the effective date need not be recalculated based on pre-assessment values as required by subsection (d). Section 26-26-306 specifically states that any reappraisal begun in accordance with section 26-26-305, such as the 1996-97 Benton County reappraisal, shall be deemed to be a countywide reappraisal. Furthermore, if a county has begun such a reappraisal, it must use valuations that were applicable prior to the valuation adjustments pending completion of the countywide reappraisal. Section 26-26-306(e) states that: Ad valorem taxes which are due and owing on March 26, 1997, shall continue to be due and owing and shall not be affected by the terms of this section. This court has said that in determining the meaning of a statute, the first rule is to construe it just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Ellison, 334 Ark. 357, 974 S.W.2d 464 (1998). If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to rules of statutory interpretation. Id. The language in section 26-26-306(e) is unambiguous. The trial court, however, goes beyond the clear language of the section in ruling that the 1996 taxes were not affected by the rollback provision. In his ruling, the trial court stated: Section 2(e) of that Act provided that any ad valorem taxes due and owing on the effective date of the Act were not affected by the Act and would continue to be due and owing. The effective date of Act 836 was March 26, 1997. As taxes levied for 1996 were due and owing on that date (See Ark.Code Ann. Sec. 26-35-501(a)(1)), the provisions of Act 836 do not apply to those taxes. Additionally, as stated above, the portion of the second cycle of reappraisal began in 1996 did not constitute a countywide reappraisal under Amendment 59 and/or Ark.Code Ann. Sec. 26-26-401 et seq., and accordingly, a rollback of millage rates was not required for that year and Plaintiffs are not entitled to a refund of taxes paid for that year. The trial court based its finding that a rollback was not required on an erroneous interpretation of section 26-26-306. Logic does not dictate reading this section in a manner that excludes the 1996 taxes from the rollback provision of Amendment 59. The trial court's interpretation of subsection (e) that any taxes due and owing are not subject to a rollback essentially carves out an exception to the requirements of Amendment 59. As this court held in Hoyle v. Faucher, 334 Ark. 529, 975 S.W.2d 843 (1998), the attempt of Act 758 to circumvent the rollback provisions of Amendment 59 was unconstitutional. Likewise, any attempt to now interpret the provisions of Act 836 in a manner inconsistent with the dictates of Amendment 59 is also invalid.