Opinion ID: 8312943
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Plaintiff's Claim of Discrimination and Retaliation Based on Transfer Denials

Text: The District also argues that the [p]laintiff cannot show that denying her request for a transfer ... was a prohibited personnel action, id. at 11 , because there is no evidence that the District's failure to transfer the plaintiff either constituted an adverse action for purposes of her discrimination claim, id. at 13 , or was an adverse personnel action to support her retaliation claim, id. The plaintiff claims that she can establish that the District took an adverse action against her based on her sex by continuing to refuse her requests for transfers, Pl.'s Opp'n at 25; see also id. at 25 (maintaining that she was subjected to several adverse employment actions by [the] District); id. at 22-23 (stating that the District took employment actions that were continuously adverse to [her] by refusing to transfer her to her requested unit in which [she] could properly perform her assignments); id. at 27, 29 (same, with the exception that the District allegedly continually fail[ed] and refus[ed] to transfer her to the Intake Unit). For the following reasons, the Court concludes that the District is entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff's claim that the District  allegedly discriminated and retaliated against her by denying her the opportunity to transfer. Under Title VII, it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to discriminate against any [employee] with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of [her] race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). To state a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must establish that (1) [s]he is a member of a protected class, (2) [s]he suffered an adverse employment action , and (3) the unfavorable action gives rise to an inference of discrimination (that is, an inference that [her] employer took the action because of his membership in the protected class). Forkkio v. Powell , 306 F.3d 1127 , 1130 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (emphasis added) (citing Brown v. Brody , 199 F.3d 446 , 452 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ); see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A. , 534 U.S. 506 , 510, 122 S.Ct. 992 , 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002). It is also unlawful under Title VII for an employer to retaliate against an employee who either has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII], or ... [having] made a charge ... under [Title VII]. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show (1) that [s]he engaged in [a] statutorily protected activity; (2) that [s]he suffered a materially adverse action by h[er] employer; and (3) that a causal link connects the two. Jones v. Bernanke , 557 F.3d 670 , 677 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (emphasis added); see also Hamilton v. Geithner , 666 F.3d 1344 , 1357 (D.C. Cir. 2012). In the absence of direct evidence of an alleged unlawful employment action, as is the situation here, claims of discrimination and retaliation arising under Title VII are analyzed under the three-part framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green . See Jackson v. Gonzales , 496 F.3d 703 , 706 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792 , 802-05, 93 S.Ct. 1817 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) ); Morgan v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. , 328 F.3d 647 , 651 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (applying the McDonnell Douglas framework to a Title VII retaliation claim). Under this framework, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing her prima facie case of discrimination and retaliation. See McDonnell Douglas , 411 U.S. at 802 , 93 S.Ct. 1817 ; Vickers v. Powell , 493 F.3d 186 , 194 (D.C. Cir. 2007). If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, [t]he burden then must shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory [or non-retaliatory] reason for its actions. McDonnell Douglas , 411 U.S. at 802 , 93 S.Ct. 1817 ; see Vickers , 493 F.3d at 194 . Once the employer offers a legitimate, nondiscriminatory justification for its action, the McDonnell Douglas framework-with its presumptions and burdens-disappears, and the sole remaining issue is discrimination [or retaliation] vel non . Jackson , 496 F.3d at 707 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see Vickers , 493 F.3d at 194 . After the employer makes such a showing, the plaintiff must prove that a reasonable jury could infer that the employer's given explanation was pretextual and that this pretext shielded discriminatory motives. Jackson , 496 F.3d at 707 (citations omitted). However, this Circuit has clarified that [i]n a Title VII disparate-treatment suit where an employee has suffered an adverse [ ] action and an employer has asserted a legitimate, non-discriminatory [or non-retaliatory] reason for the decision, the district court need not-and should not-decide whether the plaintiff actually made out a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas . Rather, ... the district court must resolve one central  question: Has the employee produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the employer's asserted non-discriminatory reason was not the actual reason and that the employer intentionally discriminated against the employee on the basis of ... sex[.] Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms , 520 F.3d 490 , 494 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ; see Talavera v. Shah , 638 F.3d 303 , 308 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (applying the Brady framework in the context of a gender discrimination and retaliation case). However, while an employee need not establish a prima facie of discrimination or retaliation at the summary judgment stage, she must still, at a minimum, demonstrate that she suffered an adverse employment action. See Brady , 520 F.3d at 493 ; see also Dorns v. Geithner , 692 F. Supp. 2d 119 , 131 (D.D.C. 2010) (Walton, J.) (Title VII ... requires that plaintiff suffered some adverse employment action.); Nurriddin v. Goldin , 382 F. Supp. 2d 79 , 102 (D.D.C. 2005) ([T]he necessary threshold element for any Title VII discrimination claim [is] an adverse employment action.). The standard for what constitutes an adverse action differs under Title VII's anti-discrimination and anti-retaliation provisions. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White , 548 U.S. 53 , 57, 126 S.Ct. 2405 , 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006). Title VII's anti-discrimination provision protects an individual only from employment-related discrimination, and a plaintiff claiming that she was discriminated against must prove that she suffered an adverse employment action . Forkkio , 306 F.3d at 1130 (emphasis added). [A]n adverse employment action [is] a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing significant change in benefits. Douglas v. Donovan , 559 F.3d 549 , 552 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). A plaintiff will be found to have suffered an adverse employment action if [s]he experiences materially adverse consequences affecting the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment or future employment opportunities such that a reasonable trier of fact could find objectively tangible harm. Forkkio , 306 F.3d at 1131 (emphasis added) (citing Brown , 199 F.3d at 457 ); see also Stewart v. Evans , 275 F.3d 1126 , 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (An employment decision does not rise to the level of an actionable adverse action ... unless there is a tangible change in the duties or working conditions constituting a material employment disadvantage.); Ames v. Nielsen , 286 F. Supp. 3d 70 , 83 (D.D.C. 2017) ([E]mployment actions that do not obviously cause a significant change in employment status-such as a decision causing a significant change in benefits-require the plaintiff to 'go the further step' of demonstrating how the decision caused objectively tangible harm. (quoting Douglas , 559 F.3d at 553 )). On the other hand,  '[a]dverse actions' in the retaliation context encompass a broader sweep of actions than those in a pure discrimination claim, Baloch v. Kempthorne , 550 F.3d 1191 , 1198 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2008), such that they need not be employment-related or even occur in the workplace, nor must they result in a materially adverse change in the terms or conditions of [one's] employment , Nurriddin v. Bolden , 40 F. Supp. 3d 104 , 116 (D.D.C. 2014) (emphasis added) (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Gardner v. District of Columbia , 448 F. Supp. 2d 70 , 76 (D.D.C. 2006) (explaining that, under Title VII's anti-retaliation provision, [a]dverse actions can include actions that do not adversely affect promotion opportunities or  that do not create tangible, economic loss). Nonetheless, the alleged retaliatory action must produce an injury or harm in order to be actionable, and that injury or harm must be material, meaning that it could dissuade[ ] a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. Nurriddin , 40 F. Supp. 3d at 116 (alteration in original) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Burlington N. , 548 U.S. at 67 , 126 S.Ct. 2405 (The antiretaliation provision [of Title VII] protects an individual not from all retaliation, but from retaliation that produces an injury or harm.). However, for example, [a]n employee's decision to report discriminatory behavior cannot immunize that employee from those petty slights or minor annoyances that often take place at work and that all employees experience. Burlington N. , 548 U.S. at 68 , 126 S.Ct. 2405 (citation omitted). The denial of a transfer involving no diminution in pay and benefits, i.e., a lateral transfer, does not rise to the level of an adverse action unless there are some other materially adverse consequences affecting the terms, conditions, or privileges of [an employee's] employment or her future employment opportunities such that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the plaintiff has suffered objectively tangible harm. Brown v. Brody , 199 F.3d 446 , 457 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ; see also Geleta v. Gray , 645 F.3d 408 , 411 (D.C. Cir. 2011). For example, a reassignment of duties may be materially adverse if it places the employee in a position with significantly different-and diminished-supervisory and programmatic responsibilities, Czekalski v. Peters , 475 F.3d 360 , 364 (D.C. Cir. 2007), or fewer opportunities for compensation and advancement, Caudle v. District of Columbia , 804 F. Supp. 2d 32 , 43 (D.D.C. 2011). Here, the Court finds that the plaintiff has failed to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether she suffered an adverse action under Title VII's anti-discrimination or anti-retaliation provisions as a result of the District's denial of her request to be transferred. The plaintiff disputes the District's contention that [t]here is also no evidence that [the] [p]laintiff suffered a loss in pay, Def.'s Mem. at 13; see Pl.'s Opp'n at 26, and argues that the evidence is clear that she has been harmed ... because she has been prevented from receiving a promotion as a Support Enforcement Specialist and will now be delayed in receiving a within grade increase, Pl.'s Opp'n at 22, 26. However, she has neither produced nor cited a single piece of evidence supporting her positions. In fact, the record is completely devoid of evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that she suffered any harm, let alone any material adverse consequences that affect[ed] the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment or future employment opportunities such that a reasonable trier of fact could find objectively tangible harm. Forkkio , 306 F.3d at 1131 (citations omitted). And, because the necessary threshold element for any Title VII discrimination [or retaliation] claim [is] an adverse [ ] action, Nurriddin , 382 F. Supp. 2d at 102 , the plaintiff's unsupported conclusory arguments are insufficient to satisfy her burden of showing that she suffered an adverse action, and her failure to establish the requisite material adversity is fatal to her discrimination and retaliation claims, see Brady , 520 F.3d at 493 . Accordingly, the Court concludes that the District's denial of the plaintiff's transfer request does not constitute an adverse action either under Title VII's anti-discrimination or anti-retaliation provisions and therefore finds that the District is entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff's claim that she was subjected to discrimination and retaliation  when the District denied her a transfer.