Opinion ID: 2788745
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sepero’s Additional Pro Se Arguments

Text: Although Sepero raises four additional arguments, none of them has merit and therefore did not need to be presented by counsel in the Anders brief. Sepero first argues that his conviction and sentence should be vacated because the government breached the plea agreement. Because he did not raise this issue below, we review for plain error. See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 133-34 (2009) (stating that the plain-error test applies to an unpreserved claim that the government “failed to meet its obligations under a plea agreement”). In the plea agreement, the parties stipulated to a total loss amount between $1 million and $2.5 million. Sepero contends that the government breached the agreement in three ways: by confirming the probation officer’s calculated loss amount of over $4 million in the PSR; by confirming the Court’s understanding that the facts relating to the calculated loss amount in the PSR were accurate; and by failing to disclose financial records to the probation officer showing that a portion of the supposed loss amounts were actually legitimately invested. Those arguments are meritless. The government’s statements to the probation officer and the Court relating to the accuracy of the facts contained in the PSR do not amount to a breach of its agreement. In fact, despite the difference in loss amount, in all 5 communications with the probation office, the government expressly stated that it would abide by the stipulations in the plea agreement. Further, in its communications with the Court, the government stressed repeatedly its recommendation that the Court impose a sentence within the stipulated guidelines range, reflecting the lower loss amount, as opposed to the higher range recommended in the PSR. Furthermore, Sepero himself eventually agreed at the sentencing hearing that the facts relating to the loss amount calculations were correct. Thus, the government did not breach the plea agreement by also confirming the Court’s understanding of the pertinent facts, nor by failing to provide records that supposedly showed a reduction in the loss amount due to legitimate investments. Sepero’s remaining arguments are similarly frivolous. He argues that the Court erred in imposing a four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(18)(B). That argument fails because, in the plea agreement, Sepero stipulated that section 2B1.1(b)(18)(B) applied and that it resulted in a four-level increase to his offense level. United States v. Cianci, 154 F.3d 106, 110 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that a defendant cannot challenge an enhancement on appeal to which he stipulated in the plea agreement). He also contends that the District Court erred in imposing a term of supervised release consecutive to his term of imprisonment. He claims that 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a) requires that any supervised release be part of the total sentence and cannot be imposed in addition to a term of imprisonment. That is simply incorrect. Courts may impose a term of supervised release in addition to a maximum term of imprisonment. See, e.g., United 6 States v. Jenkins, 42 F.3d 1370, 1371 (11th Cir. 1995) (upholding a sentence ordering supervised release in addition to the maximum term of imprisonment); United States v. Jamison, 934 F.2d 371, 373 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (interpreting the supervised release statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a), as authorizing imposition of supervised release “in addition to any authorized term of imprisonment, not by conversion of a portion thereof”). Sepero’s final argument is that his constitutional rights were violated when he was arraigned before a magistrate judge without his express consent. The common practice of having a magistrate judge preside over an arraignment is, however, authorized by both statute and local rule. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Local Crim. R. 5.1(g). There is no requirement that the defendant expressly consent, where, as here, the defendant simply enters a plea of not guilty.4 See Local Crim. R. 51(g) (authorizing a magistrate judge to conduct arraignments “to the extent of taking a not guilty plea …”). A magistrate judge may hear “any pretrial matter” other than eight exceptions listed in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), and Congress considered post-indictment arraignments to be a “pretrial matter” within this definition. See Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 869 n.16 (1989) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 94-1609, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6162); see also Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 931 (1991) (distinguishing “subsidiary matters” not requiring consent); In re Artis, 955 F.2d 40 (4th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (noting that “magistrate judges may act on preliminary, nondispositive matters without the consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)” and that such “delegation of preliminary 4 Sepero later changed his plea to guilty before the District Court, which the Court accepted after conducting a detailed plea hearing pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. 7 matters to the magistrate judge does not violate Article III”). Thus, Sepero’s argument fails.