Opinion ID: 424892
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The District Court's Charge on Contributory Negligence

Text: 68 Defendants also take issue with the court's instruction to the jury that it could not find plaintiff, an off-duty policeman, contributorily negligent even if plaintiff was proceeding at high speed over roads known to be full of potholes, provided that his high speed was (as one witness had testified) the result of his chasing an escaped felon. 26 69 Defendants assert that the instruction was erroneous in two respects. First, they contend that the instruction confused the jury by failing adequately to distinguish between contributory negligence, which is relevant to defendants' liability on the negligence count, and comparative fault, which is relevant to defendants' liability under section 402A. 27 Thus, according to defendants, the jury probably understood the instruction to mean that findings of contributory negligence and comparative fault would be precluded if the jury were to find that plaintiff had been engaged in high-speed pursuit at the time of the accident. Since the jury in fact found no fault on the plaintiff's part, and defendants assert that the evidence can only support that plaintiff was operating the motorcycle at a high speed when he lost control ..., Brief at 37, the defendants conclude that the jury must have excused plaintiff's conduct, which would be wrong. 70 Defendants would have us draw a conclusion that simply is not inexorable. Although it is possible to infer that the jury found no comparative fault because it excused plaintiff's high speed, it is at least as likely that the jury concluded, based on the conflicting evidence, that Acosta had not been speeding at all. That interpretation of the evidence, which finds support in the record, would also lead to a finding that plaintiff was not at fault. Indeed that interpretation of the jury's verdict may be more likely, given the court's clear instruction that the question whether plaintiff was chasing a felon was totally irrelevant to the 402A count and the issue of comparative fault. See App. V. at 24. 71 Defendant's next objection is that the district court violated Fed.R.Civ.P. 51 by failing to inform counsel that it intended to given an instruction permitting the jury to find plaintiff's conduct excused. 28 Again, we must disagree. As defendants acknowledge in their brief, a failure to comply with Rule 51 warrants reversal only if it has resulted in prejudice to one of the parties. See Bradshaw v. Thompson, 454 F.2d 75, 81 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 878, 93 S.Ct. 130, 34 L.Ed.2d 131 (1972). 29 Although defendants assert that such prejudice occurred here, the only support they offer are the conclusory statements that counsel was misled into delivering a contradictory argument, Br. for Cross-Appellants at 37, and that the instruction severely undermined the credibility of counsel, Reply Br. at 14. Without more, we will not order a new trial.