Opinion ID: 486380
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 61 Lexington claims that the district court erred in refusing to direct a verdict for Lexington at the close of HUP's case in chief because HUP had failed to meet its burden of proving that the Soppe settlement was reasonable. The district court instructed the jury that HUP had the burden of proving that the settlement was reasonable and in good faith. 9 Lexington claims that HUP failed to meet its burden as a matter of law because it failed to introduce sufficient facts about the actual Soppe case to demonstrate the reasonableness of the settlement. 62 We believe that the jury had sufficient evidence to find the settlement reasonable simply on the basis of the statement of Lexington's claims examiner, Paul Cote. Cote characterized Mrs. Soppe's injuries as catastrophic and admitted that HUP and Dr. Trotman were in a defenseless position. Cote also commented that the potential jury verdict could have amounted to $7 million to 10, 12 million, stating that in essence the sky was the limit. 63 In addition, HUP's defense counsel engaged a consultant, David Kurkowski, who organized a mock jury simulation. The mock jury panel returned a verdict of $10 million in favor of Mrs. Soppe, with some jurors indicating a willingness to award a substantially higher amount, and evidence of this result was introduced. Lexington deprecates the value of this evidence because the simulation involved a reading of facts by counsel rather than simulated testimony and because Dr. Kurkowski did not know, when asked, what constituted a typical demographic background of a Philadelphia Common Pleas jury. However, the mock trial evidence was probative, and if credited by a jury, it provided ample evidence from which the jury could conclude that the settlement figure of $7 million was reasonable. 64 Lexington contends that neither Cote's nor Kurkowski's testimony may support the district court's denial of the motion for a directed verdict because the jury only received this testimony during the course of Lexington's defense. Lexington made its original Rule 50 motion at the close of HUP's case in chief, and Lexington claims that HUP cannot buttress the district court's denial of the motion at that time by evidence available only afterwards. 65 Lexington's claim is without merit. By proceeding to offer evidence in its own defense, a defendant waives the right to a directed verdict. If the motion for directed verdict is renewed at the close of all the evidence, the court will decide it according to the record as it then stands. Peterson v. Hager, 724 F.2d 851 (10th Cir.1984); 9 J. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 2534 (1971) (initial error by district court is cured if subsequent testimony on behalf of the moving party repairs the defects of his opponent's case); 5A J. Moore & J. Lucas, Moore's Federal Practice p 50.05 (2d ed. 1986) (same). Accordingly, any defects in HUP's case in chief were cured by evidence adduced during Lexington's defense. 66