Opinion ID: 1219630
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence of Abuse

Text: Broderick has presented at least two pieces of admissible evidence which create a triable issue on the first of these two questions. First, there were her own observations of the blood spotting on J.S.J.'s panties following the church visits of March 25 and April 8, 1984. Second, Broderick submitted the affidavit of Dr. Maxwell. Based upon his own interview and the indicia of post-traumatic stress articulated in the Kaufman report  i.e., hyperalert states, excessive clingyness and severe phobic reactions  Dr. Maxwell concluded that J.S.J. had been sexually molested. Gilman opposed the affidavit, in part, because it did not include evidence which would qualify Dr. Maxwell as an expert witness. In response, Broderick submitted a supplemental affidavit by Dr. Maxwell which contained his qualifications as an expert in child sex abuse cases. The superior court disallowed the Maxwell affidavits because it felt that the ... affidavits when taken together create ... a serious credibility problem. We disapprove of the trial court weighing the credibility of a witness when ruling on a motion for summary judgment. It may be true, as the trial court noted, that issues of credibility arise when a doctor signs an affidavit, possibly prepared by an attorney, and later signs another affidavit to meet objections to the first. Credibility is a factual issue, however, properly determined by the factfinder at trial, not a matter of law determined by the court in summary judgment. See Grasle Electric v. Clark, 525 P.2d 1081, 1083 (Alaska 1974); Anthony v. State, 521 P.2d 486, 492 (Alaska 1974). Gilman argues that Maxwell's affidavit is deficient under Civil Rule 56(e) because the underlying data is unverified, and that assertions of fact in unverified pleadings and memoranda cannot be relied upon in denying a motion for summary judgment. This argument is flawed. Evidence Rule 703 allows an expert to base an opinion on hearsay evidence, which is by definition unverified testimony. See Alaska R.Evid. 703. The facts Dr. Maxwell relied upon and his opinion are set forth in a verified affidavit; therefore, the requirements of Civil Rule 56(e) have been met. Next, Gilman argues that Dr. Maxwell's opinion incorporates a novel validation theory which has not gained general acceptance in the field of child sexual abuse. Gilman makes this argument in terms of Evidence Rule 703. However, the appropriate challenge of an expert's opinion as novel falls under Evidence Rule 702. [8] J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence ¶ 702[03], at 702-34 (1990). If the opinion proffered by Dr. Maxwell has been judicially recognized as a proper subject for expert testimony, the court need only consider whether the evidence will aid the jury in deciding the particular issues in the case. Id. We find that Dr. Maxwell's opinion meets the requirements of Evidence Rule 702. In support of her validation argument, Gilman cites Colgan v. State, 711 P.2d 533 (Alaska App. 1985). In Colgan, a family therapist was permitted to testify, in part, I think all three girls have been abused, and I think they were accurate in their ability to be able to verbalize the differences in degree. Id. at 534. The testimony was allowed because Colgan did not properly preserve his objection for appeal and the testimony did not amount to plain error. Id. However, the court of appeals entertain[ed] serious doubts as to the wisdom of routinely admitting expert testimony which appears to validate the victim's veracity. Id. Admittedly, [t]estimony by an expert witness that purports to establish by scientific principles that another is telling the truth treads on dangerous legal ground. Rodriquez v. State, 741 P.2d 1200, 1204 (Alaska App. 1987). Such was not the case here, however. Dr. Maxwell did not conclude that J.S.J. was telling the truth about her abuse. Rather, he stated his opinion that J.S.J. was abused and that her behavior, as indicated in the Kaufman report, was clinically consistent with the finding that she [had been] sexually molested and was suffering from [p]ost-[t]raumatic [s]tress. Expert testimony that a child has been sexually molested and is suffering from post-traumatic stress has routinely been admitted in court in other jurisdictions. See State v. Robinson, 153 Ariz. 191, 735 P.2d 801, 805 (1987) (psychologist testified that child was suffering from acute post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of sexual abuse); State v. Hester, 114 Idaho 688, 760 P.2d 27, 31-32 (1988) (expert can render opinion that child has been sexually abused); Townsend v. State, 103 Nev. 113, 734 P.2d 705, 707-08 (1987) (proper for expert to express opinion whether child had, in fact, been sexually abused; expert testimony regarding patterns of post-traumatic stress disorder aids jury). [9] The Townsend court concluded that it is apparent that expert testimony concerning post-traumatic stress disorder patterns in sexually abused children satisfied the requirement of the evidence code in providing jury enlightenment on a critical and relevant subject of an esoteric nature. Similarly, it was proper for the State's expert to express an opinion on the issue of whether the child had, in fact, been sexually assaulted or abused. Such an opinion, although embracing an ultimate issue, represents both the peculiar expertise and consummate purpose of an expert's analysis. Townsend, 734 P.2d at 708. We agree and find that Dr. Maxwell's testimony would satisfy the requirements of Rule 702. [10] Finally, Gilman argues that Dr. Maxwell could not properly testify as to J.S.J.'s alleged sexual abuse, because he improperly based his opinion on the inadmissible Kaufman report. [11] See Alaska R.Evid. 703. [12] Even assuming that the Kaufman report is inadmissible, this argument also fails. Rule 703 explicitly allows an expert to rely on otherwise inadmissible evidence, so long as the material is of a type reasonably relied on by experts in the field. Id. We have previously held that [h]earsay can be a permissible basis for opinion testimony provided the reasonable reliance test is satisfied. Norris v. Gatts, 738 P.2d 344, 349 (Alaska 1987). Moreover, experts may rely on information from other case workers in forming their opinions. See In re J.R.B., 715 P.2d 1170, 1174 (Alaska 1986) (social workers and counselors could rely on information from other case workers as a basis for expert opinion). [13] Evidence Rule 705 provides the parties a safeguard by allowing them to request a determination of whether the requirements of Rule 703 are satisfied before an expert offers an opinion or discloses facts or data. Alaska R.Evid. 705(b). [14] Broderick correctly notes that Gilman did not make an Evidence Rule 705(b) request below.