Opinion ID: 1678545
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: prejudice from improper impeachment

Text: Olsan next contends that he was unfairly prejudiced when the court improperly allowed the State to impeach Olsan on cross-examination by the question concerning the number of times that Olsan had been convicted of felonious escape. Admission or exclusion of evidence is a matter for the discretion of the trial court, whose ruling on an evidential question will be upheld unless such ruling constitutes an abuse of discretion. State v. Copple, 224 Neb. 672, 401 N.W.2d 141 (1987). Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-912(1) (Reissue 1985) defines the felony of escape: A person commits escape if he unlawfully removes himself from official detention or fails to return to official detention following temporary leave granted for a specific purpose or limited period. Official detention shall mean arrest, detention in or transportation to any facility for custody of persons under charge or conviction of crime or contempt or for persons alleged or found to be delinquent, detention for extradition or deportation, or any other detention for law enforcement purposes; but official detention does not include supervision of probation or parole or constraint incidental to release on bail. Pertinent to Olsan's case, Neb.Evid.R. 609 (Neb.Rev.Stat. § 27-609 (Reissue 1985)) provides in part: (1) For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from him or established by public record during cross-examination, but only if the crime (a) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted or (b) involved dishonesty or false statement regardless of the punishment. (2) Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of such conviction or of the release of the witness from confinement, whichever is the later date. Almost 3 decades ago, this court commented in Pierce v. State, 173 Neb. 319, 330, 113 N.W.2d 333, 341 (1962): [P]ublic prosecutors are charged with the duty of conducting criminal trials in such a manner that the accused may have a fair and impartial trial. Lest prosecutors overlook or ignore their duties for an accused's fair and impartial trial, in State v. Friend, 230 Neb. 765, 771, 433 N.W.2d 512, 516-17 (1988), we stated: [I]nstructions to prosecutors on the proper use of prior felony convictions apparently bear repeating. As noted in State v. Daugherty, 215 Neb. 45, 47, 337 N.W.2d 128, 129 (1983): The purpose of Rule 609 is to allow the prosecution to attack the credibility of a testifying defendant, not to retry him for a separate crime or prejudice the jury by allowing unlimited access to the facts of an unrelated crime, as the court in Vanderpool stated [citation omitted]: The right to inquire as to a previous conviction rests on the statute and is for the purpose only of affecting the credibility of the witness. A fair interpretation of the statute seems to permit the question whether the witness has ever been convicted of felony. If the witness answers in the affirmative the inquiry should end there, and thereafter it is improper to inquire into the nature of the crime or the details of the offense. [Quoting Vanderpool v. State, 115 Neb. 94, 211 N.W. 605 (1926).] See, also, State v. Johnson, 226 Neb. 618, 621, 413 N.W.2d 897, 898 (1987): Once having established the conviction, the inquiry must end there, and it is improper to inquire into the nature of the crime, the details of the offense, or the time spent in prison as a result thereof. See, further, State v. Friend, supra, 230 Neb. at 772, 433 N.W.2d at 517: There is no question but that a prosecutor's further inquiry as to the nature of the offense after a defendant has admitted his or her conviction of a felony is improper. Once the defendant answers in the affirmative a question as to a prior conviction, further inquiry is not permitted. Concerning an inquiry into the number of a defendant's felony convictions, this court has stated: When a defendant testifies on his own behalf, the prosecuting attorney may question him as to his previous convictions for felony and the number thereof, but no details as to the nature of the charges or other details may be elicited or received. State v. Boss, 195 Neb. 467, 473, 238 N.W.2d 639, 644 (1976), decided after December 31, 1975, the effective date of the Nebraska Evidence Rules; see Neb. Evid.R. 1102 (Neb.Rev.Stat. § 27-1102 (Reissue 1985)). See, also, State v. Craig, 192 Neb. 347, 220 N.W.2d 241 (1974) (if a defendant admits the correct number of convictions, the State shall not inquire into the nature of the charge in any conviction). Further, in Latham v. State, 152 Neb. 113, 40 N.W.2d 522 (1949), this court discussed the scope of inquiry initiated by the State on cross-examination of a defendant as a witness in the defendant's case. After observing that proper cross-examination directed toward impeachment of a defendant forbids inquiry into the nature of the charge of which the defendant was previously convicted, the details of the conviction, and the sentence imposed, the Latham court stated: The purpose of the restricted inquiry permitted [on proper cross-examination of a defendant] is for whatever effect the fact of a previous conviction may have on the credibility of the defendant as a witness, and not for the purpose of tending to show that he is prone to engage in criminal actions. 152 Neb. at 116, 40 N.W.2d at 524. While current construction of Neb. Evid.R. 609 prohibits mention of the name or identity of the crime in the conviction used for impeachment of a witness, by far the greater number of jurisdictions allow reference to the particular criminal offense underlying the conviction offered for a witness' impeachment in accordance with rules of evidence substantially similar to Neb.Evid.R. 609. See, United States v. Moore, 735 F.2d 289 (8th Cir.1984); United States v. Beckett, 706 F.2d 519 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Gaertner, 705 F.2d 210 (7th Cir.1983); Acevedo v. State, 467 So.2d 220 (Miss.1985); King v. State, 468 N.E.2d 226 (Ind.1984); State v. Murray, 310 N.C. 541, 313 S.E.2d 523 (1984); Stevens v. State, 671 S.W.2d 517 (Tex.Crim. App.1984); State v. Coe, 101 Wash.2d 772, 684 P.2d 668 (1984); People v. Bennette, 56 N.Y.2d 142, 436 N.E.2d 1249, 451 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1982); State v. Williams, 656 P.2d 450 (Utah 1982); State v. Connor, 403 So.2d 678 (La.1981); Bradley v. State, 635 P.2d 1161 (Wyo.1981); People v. McClellan, 71 Cal.2d 793, 457 P.2d 871, 80 Cal.Rptr. 31 (1969). A significantly smaller number of jurisdictions follow a rule similar to this court's construction of Neb.Evid.R. 609. See, State v. Geyer, 194 Conn. 1, 480 A.2d 489 (1984); Com. v. Richardson, 674 S.W. 2d 515 (Ky.1984); State v. Rutchik, 116 Wis.2d 61, 341 N.W.2d 639 (1984); McAmis v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 419, 304 S.E.2d 2 (1983). Applying long-established Nebraska precedent to the cross-examination of Olsan, we conclude that the prosecutor transgressed the mandatory boundaries of Neb. Evid.R. 609 for impeachment. The State, conceding the prosecutory transgression, contends that Olsan failed to make a timely objection to that part of the cross-examination in issue and, therefore, waived any objection to admissibility of Olsan's answer relative to his convictions for escape. See State v. Archbold, 217 Neb. 345, 352, 350 N.W.2d 500, 505 (1984): If a party does not make a timely objection to evidence, the party waives the right on appeal to assert prejudicial error. See, also, State v. Roggenkamp, 224 Neb. 914, 402 N.W.2d 682 (1987). We reject the State's contention regarding an evidential waiver. While there was no objection to the prosecutor's initial question, [H]ave you ever been convicted of the felony crime called escape? defense counsel timely objected to the next question, How many times? The prosecutor's second question concerning the number of convictions was undeniably directed to the content of the first question and, consequently, interconnected with Olsan's answer that he had been convicted of escape. While defense counsel could have properly objected to the first question, which specified the felony in Olsan's previous convictions, counsel's failure to object to the initial question did not waive a subsequent objection to the prosecutor's blatantly improper evidential inquiry into the number of escape convictions. Given the state of the record, defense counsel's objection to the prosecutor's inquiry, that is, the number of Olsan's prior escape convictions and the lack of qualification of the convictions regarding the 10-year limitation specified in Neb.Evid.R. 609(2), was valid and should have been sustained. The State suggests that the trial court's overruling Olsan's valid objection is harmless error. In a jury trial of a criminal case, whether an error in admitting or excluding evidence reaches a constitutional dimension or not, an erroneous evidential ruling results in prejudice to a defendant unless the State demonstrates that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Watkins, 227 Neb. 677, 419 N.W.2d 660 (1988); State v. Lenz, 227 Neb. 692, 419 N.W.2d 670 (1988). If there is some incorrect conduct in a jury trial which, on a review of the entire record, did not materially influence the jury in its verdict adverse to a substantial right of the appellant, the error is harmless. State v. Watkins, supra . Recalling our previous admonitions regarding proper use of Neb.Evid.R. 609 and also keeping in mind our reluctance to apply the doctrine of harmless error to a prosecutor's improper impeachment use of a defendant's prior conviction, see State v. Friend, 230 Neb. 765, 433 N.W.2d 512 (1988), we turn our attention to the evidential question whether the trial court's ruling was harmless error or resulted in unfair prejudice to a substantial right of Olsan. See Neb.Evid.R. 103(1) (Neb.Rev. Stat. § 27-103(1) (Reissue 1985)). While Olsan's credibility was essential to his alibi defense, the prosecutor's improper cross-examination went beyond an attack on Olsan's credibility and introduced the injurious implication of Olsan's extensive criminal background. In a jury trial, adduction of evidence concerning a defendant's prior conviction for escape inherently contains information that the witness was officially detained on account of criminal activity, with or without subsequent conviction or as the result of incarceration after conviction. Because the criminal activity underlying Olsan's detention necessary for an escape is undisclosed, Olsan's escape from official detention may prompt a jury to surmise that he has been implicated in at least six instances of criminal activitythe three escapes and three occasions of detention related to some criminal activity, whether such criminal activity included felonious conduct or criminal misconduct involving dishonesty or falsehood. In this manner the prosecutor injected the innuendo that Olsan is indelibly branded with an extensive background of criminal misbehavior indicative of a propensity to commit the crimes charged. In such a setting, the jury may have attached some evidential weight to Olsan's escape convictions as proof that he likely committed the crimes presently charged. Courts and counsel are aware of the peril to a defendant's fair trial through inadmissible evidence concerning other crimes, wrongs, or acts which establish a person's character or traits and action in conformity with such character or traits. See Neb.Evid.R. 404(1) (Neb.Rev.Stat. § 27-404(1) (Reissue 1985)). Under the circumstances, prosecutory exploration into the nature of Olsan's prior convictions ravished the rationale of Neb. Evid.R. 404, which is equally applicable to Neb.Evid.R. 609 in view of this court's statements concerning a defendant's impeachment by evidence of a prior conviction. See Latham v. State, 152 Neb. 113, 116, 40 N.W.2d 522, 524 (1949): Impeachment by prior conviction is not for the purpose of tending to show that [the defendant] is prone to engage in criminal actions. At the risk of delving into dicta, were evidence of Olsan's escape convictions relevant, such evidence would be excludable by Neb.Evid.R. 403 (Neb.Rev.Stat. § 27-403 (Reissue 1985)): Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. In State v. Atwater, 193 Neb. 563, 565-66, 228 N.W.2d 274, 275 (1975): The prosecution knew that the commission of other crimes by the defendant was irrelevant, improper, and inadmissible in its case. While the evidence of defendant's guilt herein is conclusive, this is a transgression which cannot be condoned. The evidence against the defendant was more than adequate. Possibly in the past we have been too lenient in excusing these transgressions under the guise of harmless error, and the prosecution has concluded that anything goes. Defendants must be given fair trials, and it is the responsibility of the prosecution to see that each defendant receives one. Harmless error is intended to cover those inadvertent slips, which occasionally creep into a hotly contested trial, which do not severely prejudice the rights of the defendant. Harmless error should never be applied in those instances where the prosecution deliberately, or because of very careless procedures, injects prejudicial error into the proceedings. Recently, in State v. Johnson, 226 Neb. 618, 413 N.W.2d 897 (1987), we reversed a defendant's conviction because the prosecutor had exceeded the proper scope for cross-examination of the defendant regarding a previous conviction used for impeachment. In Johnson, we noted that the credibility of the defendant as a witness was the critical issue in this case. The so-called poison having been injected into the case by the prosecutor, either deliberately or because of a lack of knowledge of the rules of evidence, it is problematical whether the defendant could have received a fair trial. It must be impressed upon the State that this court will not continually search for ways to extricate the prosecution from the results of its own misconduct by labeling such action harmless error. 226 Neb. at 621-22, 413 N.W.2d at 899. Even more recently, in State v. Friend, supra , issued on December 30, 1988, we again deplored prosecutory misuse of a defendant's prior conviction as a means to impeach the defendant. Whether attributable to ignorance or indifference of the Nebraska Evidence Rules, the conduct in Olsan's case participates in the persistent parade of prosecutory prejudice to a defendant's right to a fair trial, namely, improper impeachment inquiry into a defendant's convictions. For that reason, regretfully, we must repeat the rule for proper impeachment based on Neb.Evid.R. 609: Although the State may elicit information concerning the number of a defendant's convictions within the last 10 years, the State is prohibited from naming or identifying the crime underlying the witness' conviction and from inquiring into or referring to details surrounding the crime or conviction. Accordingly, we cannot condone or disregard the prosecutor's conduct in cross-examining Olsan. The criteria for a proper impeachment pursuant to Neb.Evid.R. 609 have been clearly stated and repeated by this court and must be respected by prosecutors seeking to impeach a defendant through evidence of the defendant's convictions. We hope that our emphatic and renewed disapproval expressed in this case will stem the steady stream of appeals to this court as the result of prosecutory misunderstanding or misapplication of Neb.Evid.R. 609. The district court committed reversible error in permitting cross-examination of Olsan which exceeded the scope allowed under Neb.Evid.R. 609 for impeachment.