Opinion ID: 796898
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Parrott

Text: 85 Chesher alleges that Parrot, like the other employee defendants, both intentionally and negligently inflicted emotional distress on the class plaintiffs by facilitating Condon's access to the Morgue and by covering up the County's actions. In support of her claims, Chesher points out that Parrott attended the two introductory meetings with Condon prior to the preliminary work on the video project in August of 2000. Both Daly and Waits have stated that, during one of the meetings, Condon apprised Parrott of his intent to pursue an art project at the Morgue. Daly and Waits also testified in their depositions that Parrott made no objection to such a project at the time, noted that he had seen things like that before, and indicated that he would consider it. 86 Contrary to the advice he received from the Prosecutor's Office, Parrott allegedly placed no limits on Condon and permitted him to take photographs without obscuring identifiable characteristics and without a plan to secure the photographs. As chief policymaker, Parrott was also in charge of the trust-based security policy at the Coroner's Office that permitted Condon to enter the facility even after Parrott claims to have cancelled the video project. Parrott does not specifically recall giving his staff any notice that he had cancelled the project, and his staff does not recall receiving such a notice. 87 Chesher also identifies several instances of an ongoing relationship between Parrott and Condon during Condon's continued presence at the Coroner's Office from August of 2000 to January of 2001. During Parrott's reelection campaign, for example, Condon received and distributed yard signs supporting Parrott's candidacy. Condon also sent Parrott a Christmas card and sent the Coroner's Office a spiral-sliced ham for its holiday party. Chesher further alleges that following the discovery of the offending photographs in January of 2001, Parrott engaged in a conspiracy with the prosecutors and others to cover up the involvement of the County with Condon's activities. 88 Our first task is to decide whether the district court erred in determining that Parrott's conduct as summarized above fell manifestly outside the scope of his employment. We conclude that the record does not support the district court's ruling. To the contrary, Parrott sought out and directed Condon's work in an effort to create an instructional video that was a legitimate work-related goal. Like the defendant in Caruso, Parrott's actions in this regard were motivated, even if in a misguided manner, toward promoting a state purpose rather than strictly personal concerns. Caruso, 737 N.E.2d at 567. We thus conclude that Parrott's actions fell within the scope of his employment under § 2744.03(A)(6)(a). 89 This leaves the question of whether Parrott's actions were wanton or reckless under § 2744.03(A)(6)(b). The essence of Chesher's claim against Parrott is that he knew of Condon's desire to take artistic photographs and that Parrott's acts and omissions gave Condon free rein over a prolonged period of time to take such photographs, against the legal advice that Parrott had obtained from the Prosecutor's Office. Based on the existing record, a factfinder could reasonably determine that Condon's desire and ability to take artistic photographs amounted to a known risk. In the face of this danger, Parrott — the self-described top policymaker — permitted Condon to photograph Morgue subjects without restrictions or viable security measures in place, and failed to inform his staff that the video project had been cancelled. 90 We therefore affirm the district court's denial of Parrott's summary judgment motion regarding the intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim because, as the court in Thompson concluded, a jury could find that Parrott's actions amounted to the disregard of a known risk substantially greater than that necessary to make the conduct negligent. 2005 WL 940872, at  11. The Coroner's Office has a duty to hold bodies placed in its custody in a safe and respectful manner. Unlike the state agency in Jackson that was not on notice of the father's dangerous propensities when it gave him custody of his child, Parrott knew of the great risk that Condon's artistic photography posed in the most straightforward possible way: Condon allegedly told Parrott of his intent and showed him examples of similar photographs. See 602 N.E.2d at 366-367 91 We thus leave the determination of whether Parrott's actions amounted to wantonness or recklessness under § 2744.03(A)(6)(b) to a jury. See Fabrey, 639 N.E.2d at 35 (noting that the issue of wanton misconduct is normally a jury question). This conclusion is not at odds with the separate determination that Parrott's actions fell within the scope of his employment. See Floyd v. Thomas, No. CA99-07-016, 2000 WL 864990, at  (Ohio Ct.App. June 26, 2000) (Although [the defendant] is correct in her statement that media statements are within the scope of her employment, the exception to immunity found in [Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2744.03(A)(6)(b)] for acts committed with malicious purpose, in bad faith and in a wanton and reckless manner would still apply.).