Opinion ID: 2609858
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Do the statutes apply?

Text: Arizona's statutes regulate tort liability arising out of certain alcohol-related transactions. It is necessary first to determine if any statute governs this cause. The history and general outline of these statutes are described in Estate of Hernandez and need not be repeated. Suffice it to say that the three statutes passed in 1985 and 1986 outline certain immunities to licensees and non-licensees. In part, they also codify Ontiveros and Brannigan by imposing statutory liability on licensees in certain situations. We turn now to those statutes and consider their application, if any, to this case.
Non-licensee liability is encompassed in Article 1 of Chapter 3, entitled Liability Limitation. A.R.S. § 4-301 reads: Liability limitations; social hosts A person other than a licensee ... is not liable in damages to any person who is injured, or to the survivors of any person killed, or for damage to property, which is alleged to have been caused in whole or in part by reason of the furnishing or serving of spirituous liquor to a person of the legal drinking age. (Emphasis added.) This section protects from liability non-licensees who furnish alcohol to adults. As we held in Estate of Hernandez, however, the statute does not protect non-licensees who furnish alcohol to minors. 177 Ariz. at 249, 866 P.2d at 1335. Further, as far as the Association and Sinclair are concerned, the statute obviously does not apply to the transaction described in this case. Mattox was not a guest, and the liquor was stolen, not furnished or served under any rational definition of those terms. Therefore, we conclude that § 4-301 does not protect Defendants.
Two statutes regulate alcohol transactions under a liquor license. They are in Article 2 of Chapter 3, and are entitled Illegal Sale of Spirituous Liquor.
Section 4-311, which imposes liability on licensees under certain circumstances, states in pertinent part: A. A licensee is liable for property damage and personal injuries or is liable to a person who may bring an action for wrongful death pursuant to § 12-612 if a court or jury finds the following: 1. The licensee sold spirituous liquor either to a purchaser who was obviously intoxicated, or to a purchaser under the legal drinking age without requesting identification containing proof of age or with knowledge that the person was under the legal drinking age, .... (Emphasis added.) Defendants argue that the wording of § 4-311 is sufficiently narrow to exclude the present facts. We agree. For dram shop liability to exist under § 4-311, the licensee must sell alcohol to a purchaser who is either intoxicated or under the legal drinking age. Obviously, no such commercial sale occurred here. We do not now address how narrowly or broadly the term sold should be interpreted. Suffice it to say again that under any rational meaning of the term, the liquor here was not sold. Defendants were not acting as licensees in this transaction  even unlicensed persons may store alcohol. Moreover, Mattox certainly was no purchaser  he was alleged to be a thief. Thus, we conclude that A.R.S. § 4-311 does not apply.
The next arguably relevant statute, A.R.S. § 4-312(B), [2] provides, in relevant part: [E]xcept as provided in § 4-311, a person, firm, corporation or licensee is not liable in damages to any person who is injured, or to the survivors of any person killed, or for damage to property which is alleged to have been caused in whole or in part by reason of the sale, furnishing or serving of spirituous liquor. (Emphasis added.) Defendants contend that because they are not liable as provided in § 4-311, the terms of § 4-312(B) apply to grant licensees immunity from suit under any other set of circumstances. This, indeed, was the trial court's result. We disagree. Under § 4-312(B), there is no liability by reason of the sale, furnishing or serving of spirituous liquor. Although this language is admittedly broader than the sold to a purchaser language used in § 4-311, [3] it still does not contemplate the taking of alcohol. Although we do not attempt to determine the statute's ultimate reach by parsing the operative phrases, it is clear that whatever their semantic significance, Plaintiffs do not charge Defendants with selling, furnishing, or serving liquor to Mattox. In essence, they claim that, with notice of the danger, Defendants negligently gave Mattox the opportunity to steal the liquor or failed to prevent him from doing so. As we said in Estate of Hernandez, § 4-312(B) protects from liability only licensees and their associates while conducting a transaction permitted under a license for the sale, furnishing, or serving of alcohol. 177 Ariz. at 252, 866 P.2d at 1338. Thus, we conclude that Arizona's social host and dram shop legislation does not apply to the present facts. Rather, this cause of action must stand or fall on basic common-law negligence principles. Having concluded that the statutes neither impose liability nor grant immunity in this case, we now turn to the common-law issues briefed and decided in the court of appeals. Petolicchio, 172 Ariz. at 590, 838 P.2d at 1351.