Opinion ID: 1439456
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alleged Jury Taint

Text: Next, Honken asserts the district court violated his Sixth Amendment rights by upholding the guilty verdict despite dismissing Juror 523 during the penalty phase. Honken contends the guilty verdict should not be allowed to stand because the allegedly inappropriate comments by Juror 523's boss occurred before guilt phase deliberations. We review for abuse of discretion the district court's ruling on Honken's motion for a mistrial based on alleged jury taint. See United States v. Lussier, 423 F.3d 838, 841-42 (8th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). A district court's determinations as to the credibility of witnesses are virtually unreviewable on appeal. United States v. Ralph, 480 F.3d 888, 890 (8th Cir.2007). Honken claims there is no support for the district court's conclusion Juror 523 was upset by the stress of her duties as a juror, rather than by the comments Juror 523 attributed to her boss. The district court conducted a searching inquiry into the allegations of jury taint: questioning Juror 523 on two separate days, individually questioning each juror and each alternate, and conducting a post-trial evidentiary hearing where the court again questioned Juror 523, the boss who allegedly made the comments, and a number of Juror 523's co-workers who might have had knowledge of the purported comments. The trial judge found Juror 523's boss did not make comments to the effect of guilty, guilty, guilty, fry him, or when are you gonna burn him? Instead, the district court determined Juror 523's testimony was inconsistent, and the only comment supported by credible testimony was Juror 523 should have said something `outrageous' to get out of jury duty. The court also found credible the boss's testimony he did not know what trial Juror 523 was hearing; did not follow the Honken trial; did not know what the trial was about, apart from `drugs'; did not know that the case was a death penalty case, until after the trial was in progress; and that he did not pay attention to the process. The district court then resolved Juror 523 was not troubled and upset by the comments that her boss was purportedly making, but by the stress of the duties of a juror in a capital case, coupled with the stress of changing `gears' to return to work when she was not in trial, and the fact that she had to go to work while other jurors did not, all of which manifested in a desire to finish deliberations as quickly as possible and to `get her life back.' Each of these determinations is supported by the record and was well within the district court's discretion. Honken also disputes the district court's decision Honken suffered no prejudice as a result of Juror 523's participation in guilt phase deliberations. Honken claims he was prejudiced because the one comment the district court foundthat Juror 523 should have said something outrageous to get out of jury serviceoccurred before guilt phase deliberations. Honken contends prejudice is presumed because Juror 523 was exposed to extraneous information from a third party. To support his argument, Honken relies on Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 74 S.Ct. 450, 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954), where the Supreme Court held [i]n a criminal case, any private communication, contact, or tampering directly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial about the matter pending before the jury is, for obvious reasons, deemed presumptively prejudicial ... [and] the burden rests heavily upon the Government to establish ... that such contact with the juror was harmless to the defendant. Id. at 229, 74 S.Ct. 450 (citations omitted). In Remmer, a juror was offered money in exchange for a favorable verdict. Id. at 228-29, 74 S.Ct. 450. We have consistently held the Remmer presumption of prejudice does not apply unless the alleged outside contact relates to factual evidence not developed at trial. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 367 F.3d 1019, 1029 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Hall, 85 F.3d 367, 371 (8th Cir.1996)); United States v. Wallingford, 82 F.3d 278, 281 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. Blumeyer, 62 F.3d 1013, 1016 (8th Cir.1995)). We also have concluded the Remmer presumption of prejudice applies in cases with facts like Remmer 'sthose involving outside communication or tampering. We explained, [c]ontamination of a different kind occurs when, rather than being exposed to a fact not in evidence, a juror is subjected to psychological pressure by an outsider trying to coopt that juror's vote. United States v. Tucker, 137 F.3d 1016, 1032 (8th Cir.1998). Juror 523's boss's remark that Juror 523 should have said something outrageous to get out of jury service does not involve improperly received facts or relate in any way to any issue in Honken's case. The comment could hardly be construed as an attempt to influence Juror 523's vote, particularly in light of the district court's conclusion Juror 523's boss did not know what trial Juror 523 was hearing. The comment took place before Juror 523 was even seated on the jury. We therefore determine, as the district court did, that the comment amounted to nothing more than an unsolicited, passing remark which was made, and taken, in jest. Thus, the Remmer presumption of prejudice does not apply. As we explained in Tucker, whether the presumption shifts the burden of proof to the government or not, the ultimate question is the same: `Did the intrusion affect the jury's deliberations and thereby its verdict?' Id. at 1030 (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 739, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993)). Even if we presume Honken was prejudiced by Juror 523's boss's suggestion to say something outrageous to get out of jury duty, our review of the record reveals any such presumption was soundly dispelled by the evidence adduced during the district court's various hearings on the issue. The evidence uniformly pointed to one conclusionJuror 523's boss's comment was completely insignificant and the comment had no affect on the jury's deliberations or its verdict. Honken was not prejudiced by Juror 523's exposure to her boss's relatively insignificant comment. Finally, Honken maintains, under Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) (Rule 606(b)), the district court was prohibited from asking Juror 523 whether her boss's purported comments affected her ability to be fair and impartial. Rule 606(b) provides a juror may testify about (1) whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention, [and] (2) whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror, but may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict ... or concerning the juror's mental processes in connection therewith. Fed.R.Evid. 606(b) (emphasis added). The circuits disagree whether Rule 606(b) prohibits a juror from testifying as to whether extraneous information or an outside influence affected the juror's ability to be impartial. A number of circuits addressing the issue have concluded such questioning is improper. See United States v. Greer, 285 F.3d 158, 173-74 (2d Cir.2002) (noting, where the district court asked jurors in a post-verdict evidentiary hearing whether the extra-record information impacted their ability to be fair and impartial ... that line of questioning was improper (citations omitted)); Haugh v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 949 F.2d 914, 917 (7th Cir.1991) (stating, [t]he proper procedure [to determine the existence of any unauthorized communication made to a juror] is for the judge to limit the questions asked the jurors to whether the communication was made and what it contained, and to make that determination emphatically without asking them what role the communication played in their thoughts or discussion [or] whether there is a reasonable possibility that the communication altered their verdict (citations omitted)); United States v. Simpson, 950 F.2d 1519, 1521 (10th Cir.1991) (explaining a juror may testify as to whether any extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to bear upon a juror... [but] may not testify as to the effect the outside information had upon the juror). By contrast, the Sixth Circuit found a district court abused its discretion by not asking jurors about whether their exposure to outside influences affected their ability to be impartial. See United States v. Herndon, 156 F.3d 629, 637 (6th Cir. 1998) (vacating a defendant's conviction and sentence, and remanding for a hearing so the defendant could have an opportunity to prove actual bias, where the district court not only failed to adequately investigate the allegation of juror partiality, but the juror never personally assured the court of his impartiality); United States v. Walker, 1 F.3d 423, 431 (6th Cir.1993) (remanding for a new trial where the judge den[ied] the reasonable request to inquire into the jurors' states of mind after jurors were exposed to unredacted deposition transcripts). The Ninth Circuit appears to agree with the Sixth. See United States v. Rutherford, 371 F.3d 634, 644 (9th Cir.2004) (stating, evidence regarding any influence that such improper conduct or contacts had on the jurors' abilities to fairly and impartially receive the evidence, listen to the testimony presented, and the judge's instructions is also admissible). We have found no Eighth Circuit case specifically addressing whether a district court may, at a post-verdict hearing, ask a juror whether an outside influence affected that juror's ability to be impartial. However, we generally have observed Rule 606(b) prevent[s] any examination into the effect ... extrinsic material had on the mental processes of the jurors. United States v. Bassler, 651 F.2d 600, 603 (8th Cir.1981). We now hold Rule 606(b) prohibits a juror from testifying at a post-verdict hearing as to whether extraneous information or an outside influence affected that juror's ability to be impartial. The plain language of Rule 606(b) permits a juror to testify as to  whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention [and] whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror but the rule expressly prohibits a juror from testifying as to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict ... or concerning the juror's mental processes in connection therewith. Fed.R.Evid. 606(b) (emphasis added). Asking a juror whether he or she believes extraneous information or an improper influence affected his or her ability to be impartial in reaching a verdict goes directly to the effect of anything upon that ... juror's mind or emotions, or mental processes. We conclude it was improper for the district court to ask Juror 523 what effect her boss's comment had on her and whether exposure to the boss's comment affected her ability to be impartial. This conclusion does not necessitate remanding Honken's case for a new trial. In Haugh, after finding the district court improperly questioned jurors, the Seventh Circuit reasoned: So there was error; what is to be done? One possibility would be to remand for a further hearing before the judge. But that would be futile because it would be unrealistic to expect him to erase the impression that the jurors' answers had made on him; nor is it irrelevant that the case is already a decade old. In the circumstances we think we should make our own judgment.... Haugh, 949 F.2d at 919. Similarly, the Second Circuit in Greer made an independent determination as to whether the outside contact ... presented [any] information that could have been improperly used in deliberations, determining a `hypothetical average juror' would not have been influenced by the extrinsic information in this case. Greer, 285 F.3d at 174. The circumstances of Honken's case also warrant an independent determination by this court. Because Rule 606(b) precludes questioning the jurors as to the subjective effects of an outside influence, the court must apply an objective test, assessing for itself the likelihood that the influence would affect a typical juror. Simpson, 950 F.2d at 1522 (citing Bassler, 651 F.2d at 603). The inquiry is whether there exists a reasonable possibility that the external influence or information affected the verdict. Id. (citation omitted). In Honken's case, no evidence suggests Juror 523's boss's remark, that Juror 523 should have said something outrageous to get out of jury service, presented even a remote possibility of influencing any typical or reasonable juror's verdict either in favor of or against Honken. The record does suggest the comment amounted to nothing more than an unsolicited, passing remark which was made, and taken, in jest. Honken is not entitled to a new trial. [19]