Opinion ID: 1697927
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The PIP Statute

Text: Having determined that a PIP suit is a civil action for damages covered by the offer of judgment statute, we now consider whether the separate attorney's fees provision in the PIP statute precludes application of other attorney's fees provisions. In considering this issue, we note the long-recognized principle of statutory construction that where two statutory provisions are in conflict, the specific statute controls over the general statute. State v. J.M., 824 So.2d 105, 112 (Fla.2002) (citing State ex rel. Johnson v. Vizzini, 227 So.2d 205, 207 (Fla.1969)). Moreover, the chapter containing the offer of judgment statute expressly states that [i]f a provision of this part is in conflict with any other provision of the Florida Statutes, such other provision shall apply. § 768.71(3), Fla. Stat. (1999). Thus, if the offer of judgment statute conflicts with the attorney's fees provision in the PIP statute, the latter controls. We conclude, however, that they do not conflict. The attorney's fees provision in the PIP statute, entitled Applicability of provision regulating attorney's fees, states that [w]ith respect to any dispute under the provisions of [the PIP statute] between the insured and the insurer, the provisions of s. 627.428 shall apply. § 627.736(8), Fla. Stat. (1999). The cross-referenced statute, section 627.428, provides: Upon the rendition of a judgment or decree by any of the courts of this state against an insurer and in favor of any named or omnibus insured or the named beneficiary under a policy or contract executed by the insurer, the trial court or, in the event of an appeal in which the insured or beneficiary prevails, the appellate court shall adjudge or decree against the insurer and in favor of the insured or beneficiary a reasonable sum as fees or compensation for the insured's or beneficiary's attorney prosecuting the suit in which the recovery is had. § 627.428(1), Fla. Stat. (1999). In other words, a prevailing insured, but not a prevailing insurer, is entitled to attorney's fees. Nichols argues that because section 627.428 only authorizes attorney's fees for insureds, and because it is the only attorney's fees provision incorporated into the PIP statute, it implicitly precludes courts from awarding attorney's fees to PIP insurers under any other provision, including the offer of judgment statute. She emphasizes our decision in Danis Industries Corp. v. Ground Improvement Techniques, Inc., 645 So.2d 420 (Fla.1994), which explained that section 627.428 is a one-way street offering the potential for attorneys' fees only to the insured or beneficiary in order to discourage insurers from contesting valid claims and to reimburse successful policy holders forced to sue to enforce their policies. Id. at 421. Even Danis recognized, however, that the one-way street under section 627.428 cannot be used as a detour around settlement negotiations. The specific issue in that case was what it meant for an insured to prevail under section 627.428. We held that an insured prevails only when the insured obtain[s] a judgment greater than any offer of settlement previously tendered by the insurer. Id. In a later case, Scottsdale Insurance Co. v. DeSalvo, 748 So.2d 941 (Fla.1999), we clarified that the judgment includes the insured's damages plus any attorney's fees, taxable costs, and prejudgment interest incurred before the insurer's offer. Together, Danis and DeSalvo drew a clear line between the pre-offer and post-offer periods. Unless and until the insurer offers to pay the insured's damages plus attorney's fees, costs, and interest, the one-way street under section 627.428 entitles the insured to attorney's fees. But once such an offer is made and rejected, the one-way street ends. The insured, having turned down the full amount she is owed, cannot claim the protection of section 627.428. The question here is whether the insurer, having made an offer that eliminates the insured's entitlement to further attorney's fees under section 627.428, can recover its own fees if it meets the conditions of the offer of judgment statute. Neither Danis nor DeSalvo resolved that question. Recently, however, we did clear the way for application of the offer of judgment statute to insurance cases by extending a crucial part of the Danis/DeSalvo reasoning to the offer of judgment statute. In White v. Steak & Ale of Florida, Inc., 816 So.2d 546 (Fla.2002), we held that the term judgment under the offer of judgment statute must be definedas it is under section 627.428to include not only the plaintiff's damages award, but also any attorney's fees, taxable costs, and prejudgment interest to which the plaintiff would have been entitled when the offer was made. Id. at 551. It is this judgment to which the offer must be compared in determining whether to award fees and costs under both the offer of judgment statute and section 627.428. Id. (citing DeSalvo, 748 So.2d at 944 n. 3). We explained that [a]lthough Danis and [ DeSalvo ] involved an award of attorneys' fees under section 627.428, we see no reason why this rationale should not apply equally to offers or demands made under section 768.79(6). Id. at 551 n. 5. Because we have uniformly defined the term judgment under both section 627.428 and the offer of judgment statute, the two statutes can be applied simultaneously to PIP cases without creating conflict. The following chart illustrates how they interact: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- If the judgment is: The insured receives: The insurer receives: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- No liability No fees Post-offer fees under the offer of judgment statute -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 75 percent or less of insurer's Pre-offer fees under section 627.428 Post-offer fees under the offer of judgment offer statute -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- More than 75 percent of insurer's Pre-offer fees under section 627.428 No fees offer, but not more than 100 percent -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- More than insurer's offer All fees under section 627.428 No fees -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The most complex situation is where the insured recovers some damages, but the judgment is only 75 percent or less of the defendant's offer. (This is not such a case, because Nichols recovered nothing.) In that situation, both parties have a statutory entitlement to attorney's fees. Even then, however, the two statutes will not conflict: under section 627.428 the insured will be awarded attorney's fees incurred before the offer, and under the offer of judgment statute the insurer will be awarded fees incurred after the offer. Given the lack of conflict between the statutes, the question becomes whether the expression of one thing (i.e., attorney's fees for insureds under sections 627.428 and 627.736) implies the exclusion of another (i.e., attorney's fees under the offer of judgment statute). As one court noted in holding that the offer of judgment statute applied in PIP cases, [t]his rule that the inclusion of one thing means the exclusion of another, however, does not mean that the application of one precludes the additional application of another. Cahuasqui, 760 So.2d at 1105. In cases involving other types of insurance, we have not interpreted section 627.428 as precluding the application of other attorney's fees provisions. To the contrary, we have authorized the application of the offer of judgment statute in an underinsured motorist case, even though it also fell within the scope of section 627.428. See Sarkis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 863 So.2d 210, 223 (Fla.2003). The district courts, too, have applied the offer of judgment statute to insurance cases, including those involving property insurance, see Pa. Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sunrise Club, Inc., 711 So.2d 593, 594 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998), liability insurance, Rabatie v. U.S. Sec. Ins. Co., 581 So.2d 1327 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989), and uninsured motorist benefits. See Weesner v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 711 So.2d 1192, 1194 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Manasse, 715 So.2d 1079, 1082 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Silow, 714 So.2d 647, 651 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Marko, 695 So.2d 874, 876 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). One court has specifically rejected the argument that in an uninsured motorist case section 627.428 precludes an award of attorney's fees to the insurer under the offer of judgment statute. Weesner, 711 So.2d at 1194. Nichols attempts to distinguish PIP suits from these other insurance cases on the ground that section 627.428 applies to PIP suits through a separate provision in the PIP statute, which incorporates it by reference. See § 627.736(8), Fla. Stat. (1999). According to Nichols, the Legislature's reason for including this separate provision must have been to foreclose the application of any other attorney's fees provisions to PIP suits. Otherwise, she argues, the provision would be redundant with section 627.428. We find this argument unpersuasive. If the Legislature had enacted section 627.736(8) for the sole purpose of excluding all other attorney's fees provisions in PIP suits, then presumably it would have used exclusionary language, rather than the inclusive language it used. The words in the statute are the best guide to legislative intent. Here, section 627.736(8) gives no clue that the Legislature intended to prohibit application of the offer of judgment statute.