Opinion ID: 2517672
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Rickey Ginsburg[10]

Text: Petitioner alleges that a few days before the killings, Boyd and Marcus tried to recruit Ollie Epps, another one of Boyd's friends, to help with the killings. This allegation is supported by the testimony of Rickey Ginsburg, who at the time of the crimes resided with his mother at the Vose Street apartments. Ginsburg testified that Epps, his mother's boyfriend, told him that Boyd and Marcus had attempted to recruit him, but he had declined. Respondent denies the allegation, relying on Boyd's testimony denying he had asked anyone to commit the murders. Other than to conclude Boyd was generally not credible, the referee made no specific findings regarding Boyd's alleged attempt to recruit Epps. Accordingly, we assign this fact no weight. Petitioner also alleges that after the murders, Ginsburg overheard Boyd say to Ollie Epps that he (Boyd) had `tripped upon the kid and grabbed a pillow and put it over his face and stabbed him.' This allegation is supported by Ginsburg's testimony that, sometime after the murders, he was shooting pool with Boyd, Epps and others, and he heard Boyd tell Epps: Yes, man, I went in to do the lady in and Marcus and I were stumbling through the house, and I went through one room, I tripped upon the kid and grabbed a pillow and put it over his face and stabbed him. The referee found the allegation to be true, concluding that, [i]n testifying at the reference hearing, Boyd made a number of statements which were shown to be false[, including] ... that he did not tell ... Ollie Epps [or] Rick Ginsburg ... that he had participated in the planning and/or the carrying out of the murders in this case. (Italics added.) Respondent denies Ginsburg actually overheard Boyd make these incriminating comments; in support, respondent argues that Boyd testified and denied participation in the murders, Ginsburg's credibility is suspect because he has a felony conviction for selling cocaine, Ginsburg failed to give police this information when they interviewed him around the time of the crimes, and Ginsburg never told his mother about the incident although for him to conceal such important information from her would have been unusual. [11] Respondent also formally takes exception to the referee's findings, arguing Ginsburg's testimony was not credible. Although Boyd denied making the statements overheard by Ginsburg, the referee found that Boyd generally lacked credibility. (Italics added.) The referee also specifically credited Ginsburg's testimony on this point. This was a classic credibility determination to which we defer, inasmuch as the referee's conclusion on this point is supported by substantial evidence, namely, Ginsburg's own testimony. We thus overrule respondent's exceptions and adopt the referee's findings. Petitioner also alleges that after the murders, Boyd told Ginsburg in a threatening manner to tell the police he knew nothing about them. This allegation is supported by Ginsburg's testimony that sometime after he was interviewed by the police, Boyd confronted him and said: `And what did you tell them? And what do you know? And now you know nothing.'  Ginsburg took these comments to be a threat. The referee found [t]he evidence showed that, at some point after the killings, ... Boyd told Ginsburg [in a threatening manner that] he should tell the police that he knew nothing about the killings. As noted, the referee specifically credited Ginsburg's testimony and found Boyd generally lacked credibility. Respondent impliedly denies this allegation in his return, alleging: Boyd did not tell ... Rickey Ginsburg ... that he committed one or both of the murders. We may assume respondent's attack on Ginsburg's credibility applies here as well. Respondent also takes exception to the referee's finding that Boyd threatened Ginsburg. The referee, however, reasonably weighed Ginsburg's credibility against that of Boyd and, inasmuch as Ginsburg testified specifically that Boyd threatened him, substantial evidence supports the referee's finding. We thus overrule respondent's exception. Respondent's further exception to the referee's description of the exact nature of the threat is meritless: That Boyd said, `And now you know nothing,' in context, was reasonably construed as a threat. Respondent also takes exception to the referee's finding regarding Ginsburg because his testimony recounting Boyd's threat was inadmissible hearsay. It is unclear whether respondent properly objected on this ground. Although respondent made a continuing hearsay objection during Ginsburg's testimony, that objection could be construed as applying only to Ginsburg's testimony regarding the comments of Ollie Epps. As the matter is unclear from the record, however, we give respondent the benefit of the doubt and conclude the issue is preserved for our review. ( People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 908, fn. 6, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 547, 891 P.2d 93, overruled on another point in People v. Combs (2004) 34 Cal.4th 821, 860, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 61,101 P.3d 1007.) Turning to the merits of the hearsay question, we conclude Boyd's threat to Ginsburg falls under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule. (See discussion, ante, at pt. IV.B.1.a.) Although the threat was made after the crimes had occurred, there is no question Boyd's statement was made while he was engaged in the conspiracy. As we explained on appeal: The conspiracy did not ... end with the death of the insureds. Instead, for purposes of this case, it continued until the coconspirators received the insurance proceeds [citation], or [Clifford] Morgan was convicted of unjustifiable homicide of the victims, thus disabling him from legally collecting the insurance proceeds. [Citation.] Because the insurance companies had not yet paid out at the time of trial, the conspiracy was a continuing one, permitting the introduction of hearsay statements made during the time between the crime and the trial, pursuant to Evidence Code section 1223. ( People v. Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 144, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 825 P.2d 781, fn. omitted.) Respondent contends Boyd's threat to Ginsburg was not uttered in furtherance of the objective of the conspiracy. Although respondent's argument lacks detail, we conclude Boyd's threat not to reveal his name to the police was a clear attempt to avoid detection and thus protect the aims of the conspiracy. (See People v. Sully (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1195, 1231, 283 Cal.Rptr. 144, 812 P.2d 163 [statements fell within the coconspirator exception because they could reasonably be viewed as an attempt to commit a potential witness to silence, thereby concealing the murder].) We thus conclude that, assuming respondent preserved this issue, the referee properly admitted the evidence over the hearsay objection. As the referee's conclusions with regard to Ginsburg are supported by substantial evidence, they are entitled to deference and we adopt them.