Opinion ID: 171442
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Conditional Cross-Appeal: Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Text: Before reaching the merits of relators' appeal, we must address the propriety of declining to first resolve the jurisdiction-related Eleventh Amendment questions raised in defendants' conditional cross-appeal. Both the government as amicus curiae and the defendants contend that we only need address whether the Eleventh Amendment bars relators' claims if and when we reach defendants' conditional cross-appeal. While [q]uestions of jurisdiction, of course, should be given priority, Stevens, 529 U.S. at 778, 120 S.Ct. 1858, the Supreme Court, addressing the FCA, recently declared appropriate the prior resolution of a statutory questionthat is, whether the statute itself permits the cause of action it creates to be asserted against States. Id. at 779, 120 S.Ct. 1858. In such a circumstance, there is no realistic possibility that addressing the statutory question will expand the Court's power beyond the limits that the jurisdictional restriction has imposed, id., and the statutory question is `logically antecedent to the existence of' the Eleventh Amendment question. Id. (quoting Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 612, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997) (choosing to first address the propriety of class-certification, because it was logically antecedent to the existence of any Article III issues)). However, the Supreme Court has not determined whether a federal court may reach a broader class of merits-based questions, beyond whether the statute's text precludes invocation against a state, before resolving an assertion of Eleventh-Amendment immunity raised through a conditional cross-appeal. Nor have we previously opined on the subject. We believe that, in such a unique procedural context, a federal court may address the merits-related question before reaching the Eleventh Amendment question. We tackle this interesting procedural issue by first describing the relevant characteristics of the Eleventh Amendment and the immunity it offers. [7] Eleventh Amendment immunity doctrine is not easy to characterize. It shares features with affirmative defenses, while also containing traits more akin to subject-matter jurisdiction. See Fent v. Okla. Water Res. Bd., 235 F.3d 553, 558 (10th Cir.2000). It is best understood according to its own unique identity, rather than through its similarities with other legal doctrines. In other words, the Eleventh Amendment occupies its own unique territory. Floyd v. Thompson, 227 F.3d 1029, 1035 (7th Cir.2000). For purposes of our sequence-of-issues analysis, Eleventh Amendment immunity possesses three main features. First, it may be raised at any time, even on appeal for the first time. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677-78, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974); Archuleta v. Lacuesta, 131 F.3d 1359, 1362 (10th Cir.1997). Second, like an affirmative defense, it may be waived by the affected party. See, e.g., Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 267, 117 S.Ct. 2028, 138 L.Ed.2d 438 (1997) (A State can waive its Eleventh Amendment protection and allow a federal court to hear and decide a case commenced or prosecuted against it.); Archuleta, 131 F.3d at 1362 ([I]t can be waived by the affected party.). Third, a court may raise the issue of Eleventh-Amendment immunity sua sponte but, unlike subject-matter jurisdiction, it is not obligated to do so. See, e.g., Wisc. Dep't of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 389, 118 S.Ct. 2047, 141 L.Ed.2d 364 (1998) (Nor need a court raise the defect on its own.); Nelson v. Geringer, 295 F.3d 1082, 1098 n. 16 (10th Cir.2002) ([T]he [Supreme] Court has stated that judicial consideration of Eleventh Amendment issues sua sponte is discretionary, not mandatory.). The net effect of these characteristics is that a state defendant retains broad discretion over whether a court must hear an Eleventh Amendment argument that may end the litigation. As more succinctly stated by the Supreme Court, [u]nless the State raises the matter, a court can ignore it. Schacht, 524 U.S. at 389, 118 S.Ct. 2047. This is not a case in which the State defendant (or those purportedly covered by the State's immunity) has directly asserted Eleventh Amendment immunity. If a State defendant had asserted it, addressing the threshold jurisdictional matter would be obligatory. [8] Without such an assertion, we are not obligated to resolve the Eleventh Amendment issue. See Fent, 235 F.3d at 559 ( [O]nce effectively asserted such immunity constitutes a bar to the exercise of federal subject matter jurisdiction.). In filing their conditional cross-appeal, defendants have asked us expressly, as a first task, to resolve relators' appeal. Put differently, defendants have chosen not to assert Eleventh Amendment immunity unless we reverse the district court's merits-related decision. See Hartman v. Duffey, 19 F.3d 1459, 1465 (D.C.Cir.1994) (Wald, J., concurring) (noting that a conditional cross-appeal protects contingent interests of a party victorious before the district court under theory that as soon as the appellate court decides to modify the trial court's judgment, that judgment may become `adverse' to the cross-appellant's interests and thus qualify as fair game for an appeal). Because we affirm the grant of summary judgment, defendants have not asserted Eleventh Amendment immunity on appeal. [9] This approach seems to be consistent with that taken by several other circuits. See, e.g., Nair v. Oakland County Cmty. Mental Health Auth., 443 F.3d 469, 477 (6th Cir.2006) (bypassing alternative assertion of Eleventh Amendment and affirming summary judgment based upon merits of claims under First Amendment and Michigan's Whistleblower's Protection Act; reasoning that under any circumstances in which the State (or the United States) declines to raise sovereign immunity as a threshold defense, we conclude that the federal courts have discretion to address the sovereign-immunity defense and the merits in whichever order they prefer); Strawser v. Atkins, 290 F.3d 720, 729-30 (4th Cir.2002) (concluding that a State's restricted use of Eleventh Amendment immunity permits a federal court to bypass the Eleventh Amendment question and affirm on the merits of the claim, independent of whether the statutory question related to the merits of the claim is logically antecedent to the Eleventh Amendment analysis). [10] Most similar to the procedural context of this case is McClendon v. Georgia Department of Community Health, 261 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir.2001). There, defendants presented two arguments to affirm the district court's dismissalthat plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and that plaintiffs' claims were barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 1257-58. The Eleventh Circuit interpreted defendants' position as a conditional assertion of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunitythey insist upon that defense only if it is necessary to prevent judgment against them on the merits. Id. at 1258 (emphasis added). After describing the elective nature of the Eleventh Amendment's jurisdictional bar, id. at 1257, and after surveying the relevant caselaw, id. at 1258-59, the McClendon Court held that the conditional assertion of the Eleventh Amendment gives a federal court the discretion to dispose of the merits favorably to the state or its officials if it chooses to do so. Id. at 1259 (emphasis added). It then chose to exercise this discretion, reasoning that the Eleventh Amendment issues were much more difficult than the merits of plaintiffs' claim. Id. Furthermore, this approach does not conflict with the Supreme Court's prohibition of hypothetical jurisdiction. In Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998), the Supreme Court rejected the practice of assuming Article III jurisdiction for the purpose of deciding a merits-based question. See id. at 94, 118 S.Ct. 1003. The Court reasoned that this approach offends fundamental principles of separation of powers, since it permits the judicial branch to act ultra vires by circumventing the requirement, grounded in Article III of the Constitution, that jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter. Id. at 94-95, 118 S.Ct. 1003. Although the Supreme Court recognized that certain cases have diluted the absolute purity of the rule that Article III jurisdiction is always an antecedent question, id. at 101, 118 S.Ct. 1003, it reaffirmed the general precept that a merits question cannot be given priority over an Article III question. Id. at 97 n. 2, 118 S.Ct. 1003. We have extended Steel Co. 's prohibition against hypothetical jurisdiction to preclude requests to bypass an assertion of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Specifically, we have concluded that  [o]nce effectively raised, the Eleventh Amendment becomes a limitation on our subject-matter jurisdiction, and we may not then assume `hypothetical jurisdiction' to reject a plaintiff's claim on the merits. Harris v. Owens, 264 F.3d 1282, 1288 (10th Cir.2001) (emphasis added). Whether immunity has been effectively raised is significant because the Eleventh Amendment, unlike Article III's Cases or Controversies mandate, imposes no special obligation on a federal appellate court to ensure its own jurisdiction or that of the district court, even though the parties are prepared to concede it. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 95, 118 S.Ct. 1003 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740, 745 n. 2, 118 S.Ct. 1694, 140 L.Ed.2d 970 (1998) (recognizing that Eleventh Amendment is not coextensive with the limitations on judicial power in Article III). Since Eleventh Amendment immunity necessarily becomes an antecedent question of jurisdictional proportions only when effectively raised, Harris, 264 F.3d at 1288, the logic of Steel Co. and Harris dictates that here, faced with a conditional cross-appeal, we may first resolve the merits of relators' claims. See McClendon, 261 F.3d at 1258-59; Betts v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 198 F.Supp.2d 787, 796 (W.D.Va.2002) (When the defendant expresses a willingness for the court to decide a case in its favor on the merits without deciding whether the defendant is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, the court makes no assumptions of law declaring power that violates the principles underlying Steel Co. ).