Opinion ID: 782233
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: scope of damages

Text: 128 The district court determined that Alvarez could recover damages only for activities taking place prior to the point that United States law enforcement authorities took him into custody, not for the entire period in which he was imprisoned in the United States. We review this question of law de novo. See United States v. Stephens, 237 F.3d 1031, 1033 (9th Cir.2001). 129 There is no established body of case law applying federal common law to determine the proper scope of damages for arbitrary arrest and detention. Although several federal cases have awarded damages for this brand of international law violation, none of those cases dealt with the unique set of facts presented here. See, e.g., Xuncax, 886 F.Supp. at 197-98 (awarding damages for arbitrary detention authorized by Guatemala's Minister of Defense). Even so, we agree with the district court that existing principles governing false arrest provide adequate guidance. 130 In the context of law enforcement, the federal courts are largely in accord that, consistent with the principles of tort law, the chain of causation set in motion by the initial act of misconduct of one actor can be broken by the acts of a third party. For example, police officers have been held to be insulated from liability for deprivations of liberty where there are independent, intervening acts of other decisionmakers in the criminal justice system, such as prosecutors, grand juries, or judges. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) (`If there is a false arrest claim, damages for that claim cover the time of detention up until issuance of process or arraignment, but not more.' (quoting W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts 888 (5th ed. 1984))); Townes v. City of New York, 176 F.3d 138, 147 (2d Cir.1999) (holding that the trial judge's independent decision not to suppress evidence, though erroneous, broke the chain of causation for purposes of police officer's liability); Barts v. Joyner, 865 F.2d 1187, 1195 (11th Cir.1989) (holding that intervening acts of prosecutor, grand jury, and judge broke chain of causation); Hand v. Gary, 838 F.2d 1420, 1427-28 (5th Cir.1988) (holding that a sheriff's actions were not the proximate cause of damages given intervening acts of federal agents, federal prosecutors, and grand jury). In this connection, we have held that the [f]iling of a criminal complaint immunizes investigating officers ... from damages suffered thereafter because it is presumed that the prosecutor filing the complaint exercised independent judgment in determining that probable cause for an accused's arrest exists at that time. Smiddy v. Varney, 665 F.2d 261, 266 (9th Cir.1981). 41 131 These principles of proximate causation, taken in combination with the Supreme Court's holding in Alvarez-Machain II, guide us in assessing the scope of Sosa's liability. Sosa's participation in Alvarez's arrest and detention in this case took place almost solely within the confines of Mexico. Although he was guided by the unlawful directives of American DEA agents, once he delivered Alvarez to United States authorities in El Paso, the actions of domestic law enforcement set in motion a supervening prosecutorial mechanism which met all of the procedural requisites of federal due process and ultimately received the blessing of the United States Supreme Court. See Alvarez-Machain II, 504 U.S. at 669-70, 112 S.Ct. 2188. To be sure, a grand jury had already indicted Alvarez and an American arrest warrant had been issued by the time Sosa was hired, giving this case a unique factual twist when compared to traditional false arrest cases. But, as we have explained, these procedural formalities stand apart from the illegitimacy that characterized Alvarez's initial arrest and detention, and came into operation only at the moment Alvarez set foot on U.S. soil. At that point, the criminal justice system, with proper jurisdiction, began its march toward trial and the chain of causation linked to Sosa's actions was broken, thus limiting Sosa's liability for damages. 132 Because the district court cited California law for its damages analysis, the parties focus on the nuances of California law, despite framing the issue in terms of choosing either federal common law or Mexican law. Applying California law, however, yields the same result. The California Supreme Court recently rejected a plaintiff's claim of false imprisonment for the entire time he was held in custody. See Asgari v. City of Los Angeles, 15 Cal.4th 744, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 842, 937 P.2d 273, 281 (1997). Relying on state statutes, the court explicitly distinguished the rebuttable presumption rule of Smiddy, clarifying that a police officer's liability for false arrest could not, even with a showing of bad faith, include damages caused by incarceration following arraignment because that result would thwart the applicable statutes' directives. Id. at 279. 133 Alvarez seeks to distinguish Asgari by arguing that it is a narrow holding based only on immunity principles grounded in the California Tort Claims Act, specifically Cal. Gov.Code §§ 820.4 and 821.6. Instead, he urges us to rely on an earlier case, Gill v. Epstein, 62 Cal.2d 611, 44 Cal.Rptr. 45, 401 P.2d 397 (1965), which held, prior to the enactment of the above provisions, that a plaintiff could recover damages arising from his incarceration after his arraignment because the arraignment was not an independent act that could break the chain of causation. Id. at 401. But Gill does not help Alvarez. In Gill, the plaintiff was arrested without a warrant, and the case was dismissed at a preliminary hearing five days after the arraignment. Id. at 398-99. The court held that the plaintiff could recover for damages up until the time an independent judgment was made as to probable cause for his arrest. See id. at 401. Here, there is no question that at the time Alvarez was arrested, an independent judgment had already been made that he should be brought to trial. 42 As a result, Alvarez is entitled to damages only to the point at which he was handed over to U.S. authorities.