Opinion ID: 2650094
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to refute State’s forensic proof

Text: Reed asserts that his “trial counsel was deficient for not using competent experts to rebut the State’s plainly false inference that Stites’s death and intercourse with Reed coincided,” and contradict the State’s anal rape theory. He draws attention to the fact that his trial jury clearly was concerned about the sperm found in Stites’s body, as evidenced by the fact that during its deliberations the jury asked questions about the sperm’s presence, condition, and durability. Reed relies on affidavits by Dr. Bayardo, Dr. Riddick, and criminal laboratory director Ronald Singer. The State argues that Reed can show neither deficiency nor prejudice as relating to trial counsel’s failure to submit evidence of the kind included in the affidavits. This is because his trial counsel actually retained a court-qualified expert in criminalistics and DNA analysis—Dr. Johnson. Moreover, the State contends that any evidence in the affidavits of Dr. Bayardo, Dr. Riddick, and Singer is cumulative, and does not alter the fact that Reed’s sperm was found in Stites’s body. The CCA did not consider this claim because it was not raised in Reed’s initial state habeas petition. The district court concluded that the claim was procedurally barred and that our Ibarra decision foreclosed the possibility of his speedy-trial claim, . . . the district court’s error in dismissing that claim as procedurally barred was harmless, and remand is unnecessary.”); cf. Wright v. Quarterman, 470 F.3d 581, 591 (5th Cir. 2006) (declining to determine whether petitioner established actual innocence where merits of underlying claim were not debatable); Nelson v. Cockrell, 77 F. App’x 209, 216 (5th Cir. 2003) (granting COA with respect to ineffective assistance claim, but not remanding case because district court did not err in denying habeas relief because state courts’ application of clearly established federal law was not objectively unreasonable), vacated on other grounds by Nelson v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 934 (2004). Under these circumstances, we cannot grant a COA. See Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 118 n.3 (2009) (COA should issue on district court’s denial of habeas relief on procedural grounds only where jurists of reason would debate both the procedural ruling and that petition stated valid claim of denial of a constitutional right). As a practical matter, we also observe that although the district court did not review Reed’s ineffective assistance claims under Martinez, the district court did review Reed’s assertions of actual innocence, which included much of the evidence Reed relies on to show that his counsel acted deficiently. 27 Case: 13-70009 Document: 00512496780 Page: 28 Date Filed: 01/10/2014 No. 13-70009 review under Martinez. Although, as discussed, the district court’s procedural decision is debatable following Trevino, we conclude that Reed’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective for not adequately refuting the state’s forensic proof is not debatable, and thus does not require issuance of a COA. Considering the first Strickland prong, Reed admits that his DNA expert Dr. Johnson testified at trial that sperm could survive longer than twenty-four hours, and only protests trial counsel’s reliance on Dr. Johnson because of her purported lack of credentials and first-hand criminal experience. Contrary to Reed’s apparent belief, his trial counsel’s representation does not fall below an “objective standard of reasonableness” merely because the retained expert is not the best or most knowledgeable in her field. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. This is not a case of counsel failing to retain an expert or retaining an expert who could not address the issues disputed at trial. See Cox v. Cockrell, 62 F. App’x 557, 2003 WL 1202920, at  (5th Cir. 2003) (unpublished table decision) (counsel not deficient for calling expert who performed poorly, but because expert could not testify as to disputed issue). Comparing the affidavits Reed presents and the testimony of Dr. Johnson demonstrates that the crux of Reed’s argument—that sperm could remain intact for longer than twenty-four hours and that therefore the presence of Reed’s sperm could have been the product of a consensual sexual encounter between Reed and Stites—was presented at trial. Reed’s contention that his case is similar to State v. Fitzpatrick, 118 So. 3d 737 (Fla. 2013), is unpersuasive. Fitzpatrick was a case in which sperm evidence linked the defendant to the murder victim, and the key question was how long the sperm had been present in the victim. Id. at 748–49. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision to grant defendant a new trial based on counsel’s deficient performance. Id. at 741. The court found that “[t]he record repeatedly demonstrates that counsel did not adequately prepare 28 Case: 13-70009 Document: 00512496780 Page: 29 Date Filed: 01/10/2014 No. 13-70009 himself to present an intelligent or knowledgeable defense with respect to the most important issue of [defendant’s] trial: the timing of the alleged sexual encounter between [him] and [the victim].” Id. at 754. Most glaringly, “counsel failed to retain any forensic or medical experts,” and failed to challenge the State’s experts or the physical evidence. Id. at 754–55. Unlike trial counsel in Fitzpatrick, Reed’s defense team scrutinized the DNA evidence and the State’s experts. Reed’s assertion that a COA should issue because his “trial counsel failed to prepare for, or rebut through crossexamination or contradict by affirmative expert testimony, the State’s misleading forensics” ignores that Dr. Johnson testified as a DNA expert for the defense and provided testimony on the very issue Reed now challenges. It also is not debatable that Reed fails to state a valid constitutional claim based on Strickland’s second prong—prejudice. Just as the affidavits do not establish Reed’s actual innocence they also do not make it “reasonably likely” that the result of Reed’s trial would have been different. 12 Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 792 (2011) (“[T]he difference between Strickland’s prejudice standard and a more-probable-than-not standard is slight and matters ‘only in the rarest case.’” (citation omitted)). The addition of Singer’s affidavit to that of Dr. Bayardo’s and Dr. Riddick’s does nothing to change this outcome. In his affidavit, Singer challenges the nature of the substance (which appeared to be saliva) found on Stites’s brassiere and breasts, and the DNA evidence recovered from that substance. Specifically, Singer states that amylase testing of the type performed on the substance “cannot be relied upon 12 Likewise, we are unmoved by Reed’s reliance on an email by Clement agreeing that sperm can remain intact longer than 24 hours, and Blakely’s refusal to comment further on this case. This evidence is untimely and does not lend Reed any support beyond that already provided by the affidavits of Dr. Bayardo and Dr. Riddick. 29 Case: 13-70009 Document: 00512496780 Page: 30 Date Filed: 01/10/2014 No. 13-70009 to identify a specific body fluid such as saliva with accuracy.” Singer further states that “there is no evidence [that the crime scene examiner] changed gloves between the taking of evidentiary samples,” and thus “it is probable that [she] contaminated Ms. Stites’ brassiere and breasts with trace evidence. . . . after having probed Ms. Stites’ genital area with her fingers and taking swabs and tape lists from Ms. Stites’ pubic area.” We note that Singer’s affidavit merely recounts deficiencies in how the crime scene was secured and then infers, without further support, that the examiner did not change gloves while inspecting Stites’s body. But Singer himself states that “[t]he videotape of the crime scene . . . was poorly done,” and “does not completely record the activities at the crime scene.” A review of the video also reveals no unbroken sequence in which the examiner collected evidence from Stites’s genital area and then touched Stites’s chest. Reed also nowhere suggests that the presence of his sperm inside Stites was the result of improper crime scene investigation. Given this, there is nothing to support the contention that the alleged incompetence by police personnel at the crime scene prejudiced Reed. 13 We conclude that Reed has failed to present a debatable ineffectiveassistance-of-trial claim as to his trial counsels’ handling of the State’s forensic evidence. 13Reed also argues that effective trial counsel would have used the video recording of the crime scene to show that evidence was contaminated, destroyed, and overlooked. This argument fails for the same reasons detailed above. Further, we reject Reed’s suggestion that, but for the police’s incompetence, other evidence might have been uncovered. “Such speculation does not show prejudice.” Paz v. Scott, 68 F.3d 471, 1995 WL 581882, at  (5th Cir. 1995) (unpublished table decision). 30 Case: 13-70009 Document: 00512496780 Page: 31 Date Filed: 01/10/2014 No. 13-70009 2. Trial counsel’s failure to present witnesses substantiating Stites’s and Reed’s alleged relationship Reed next argues that trial counsel should have presented additional witnesses who could testify as to his relationship with Stites. In support, he lists the affidavits of multiple witnesses who purportedly knew about the alleged relationship. In response, the State argues that the decision not to call the various witnesses Reed identifies was “a quintessential strategic decision that cannot be undone through the benefit of hindsight.” It further argues that any prejudice resulting from trial counsel’s failure to present these witnesses was speculative. The CCA did not address the witnesses Reed points to in the context of his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim because Reed did not include that claim in his initial habeas petition. However, as we have noted supra, in considering whether Reed’s ineffective assistance claim should be considered because he met Article 11.071 § 5(a)(2)’s actual-innocence standard, the CCA concluded that the evidence as to all the “witnesses who affirmed a relationship between Reed and [Stites]” was “unreliable.” Reed, 271 S.W.3d at 747. The district court refused to consider the merits of this claim, finding it procedurally barred. Although, as discussed, the district court’s procedural ruling is debatable, Reed’s failure to actually discuss any of the affidavits he identifies, much less show how he was prejudiced by their omission at trial, means that he has failed to state a reasonably debatable claim under Strickland. We further note that, to the extent the CCA also made a credibility determination as to the witnesses Reed identifies, we defer to that factual finding unless Reed presents clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Having not done so, Reed’s request for a COA on this claim is denied. See Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 792. 31 Case: 13-70009 Document: 00512496780 Page: 32 Date Filed: 01/10/2014 No. 13-70009 3. Trial counsel’s failure to present evidence of Fennell’s abuses against women and minorities In the last of his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims, Reed contends that trial counsel was deficient for not conducting a proper pretrial investigation. Such an investigation, Reed asserts, would have revealed that Fennell was a jealous, abusive, and racist individual, 14 against whom civil lawsuits alleging violence and racism had been filed. The State asks that we find this argument waived for inadequate briefing. The CCA found this claim barred under its abuse-of-the-writ doctrine. The district court denied relief, holding that the claim was procedurally barred. As before, although the procedural part of the district court’s ruling is debatable, Reed’s failure to adequately brief his claim means that he has failed to state a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. We agree with the State that Reed has waived his request for a COA. Instead of fully briefing this issue, Reed instead relies on his federal habeas petition to fill in the gaps of his argument. We previously have declined to grant a COA in similar circumstances. See McGowen v. Thaler, 675 F.3d 482, 497 (5th Cir. 2012) (“We have held that a COA applicant waives claims by directing the appellate court to briefing before the district court to support his request for a COA. [Petitioner’s] reference to his habeas petition therefore does not preserve his claims.” (footnote omitted)). As the State correctly argues, waiver is especially appropriate where, as here, the admissibility of much of the evidence Reed refers to is questionable, and Reed provides no defense of its admissibility. See Clark v. Thaler, 673 F.3d 410, 429 (5th Cir. 2012) (failure to assert meritless objection is not grounds for deficient performance); Thompson 14 Reed is African-American. Fennell is Caucasian, as was Stites. 32 Case: 13-70009 Document: 00512496780 Page: 33 Date Filed: 01/10/2014 No. 13-70009 v. Thaler, 432 F. App’x 376, 379 (5th Cir. 2011). His request for a COA on this claim is denied.