Opinion ID: 790741
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Alteration of Lunch Policy

Text: 50 Finally, Brandeis claims that its alteration of the lunch policy was not a response to the Union's organizing activities that took place during the lunch hour. It was, instead, a legitimate response to the detrimental effect that an uniform lunch hour had on its ability to serve its customers' needs. The General Counsel urges that both the breadth of the policy, as well as the timing of its implementation, support the NLRB's conclusion that the change in policy was in response to legitimate, protected activity. 11 51 Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA prohibits an employer from discriminating in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to... discourage membership in any labor organization. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3). In order to establish a violation of § 8(a)(3), the General Counsel must establish that antiunion animus was a motivating factor in the decision. If the General Counsel succeeds, the employer — to escape a finding of an unfair labor practice—must establish its affirmative defense—that it would have taken the action regardless for nondiscriminatory reasons. NLRB v. Joy Recovery Tech. Corp., 134 F.3d 1307, 1314 (7th Cir.1998) (citing Schaeff Inc. v. NLRB, 113 F.3d 264, 267 n. 5 (D.C.Cir. 1997)). 52 In this case, the NLRB found that anti-union animus was a motivating factor behind the decision to change the lunch policy. The record establishes that the Union was using the lunch hour as a time to meet with potential members and convince them of the merits of unionization. Furthermore, the record shows that the Company became aware that active union recruitment was taking place during the lunch hour. The change in policy followed closely on the heels of Cook's and Benefield's lunch meetings with Karre and, according to the Board, made it difficult for employees to take their lunches at the same time, and thereby inhibit[ed] the Union's organizing efforts. A.R. Vol. I, NLRB Dec. at 9. Thus, the record supports the NLRB's conclusion that union activity was a motivating factor in the change of policy. 53 Brandeis does not argue that the General Counsel failed to meet its initial burden of establishing that the union campaign was a motivating factor in the decision to alter the lunch policy. See Reply Br. at 15. Brandeis maintains, however, that it established that its actions were non-pretextual. It contends that, even in the absence of the Union's organizing campaign, the change would have been implemented because the uniform lunch hour deprived Brandeis of the necessary personnel to service customers, as evidenced by the events of May 8, 2002. 54 The NLRB counters that, if customer service was the driving force behind the change in policy, the policy should have been restricted to mechanics. However, the changes restricted everyone from taking lunch with anyone else and therefore stymied any attempts to organize during lunch time, which is when Cook and Benefield previously had spoken to employees one-on-one about joining the Union. A.R. Vol. I, NLRB Dec. at 10. Furthermore, the General Counsel argues that [q]uickly attending to repairs was not an ongoing problem at the facility and similar situations were not likely to occur. Respondent's Br. at 38. 55 Brandeis need not wait, however, until it has experienced persistent lapses in customer service before it adopts a policy that allows it to serve its customers in a more efficient and timely manner. Furthermore, we have no doubt that, at some level, Brandeis' lunch policy forwards that goal. Brandeis' burden, however, was not simply to establish that there was another, legitimate reason that motivated its action; Brandeis had to show that it would have taken the same action in the absence of the illicit motive. See, e.g., NLRB v. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 400-03, 103 S.Ct. 2469, 76 L.Ed.2d 667 (1983) (upholding NLRB's construction of the Act that, after a showing that the employer's adverse action was motivated by anti-union animus, the burden was on the employer to show that it would have reached the same decision had the forbidden motive not been present), abrogated on other grounds, Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, Dep't of Labor v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 114 S.Ct. 2251, 129 L.Ed.2d 221 (1994); Multi-Ad Servs., Inc. v. NLRB, 255 F.3d 363, 371 (7th Cir.2001) (stating that, if protected activity has motivated an adverse action, a violation has been established unless the employer demonstrates that it would have taken the same action in the absence of the employee's protected activity). The breadth of Brandeis' new lunch policy suggests that factors other than customer service motivated its adoption. The policy applied to all employees, not just mechanics or service personnel. Furthermore, the policy not only staggered lunch periods, it also shortened lunch periods, thus making it more difficult for union organizers to meet with recruits during day-time hours. Consequently, we believe that the NLRB's conclusion—that Brandeis would not have adopted the same policy in the absence of union activity—is supported by substantial evidence.