Opinion ID: 1996929
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The 1995 Show Cause Order

Text: To recapitulate, in 1995, in response to DHR's petition for a contempt of court show cause order, the Circuit Court issued an order directing Flanagan to appear at a show cause hearing scheduled for 11 September 1995, provided the order was served on him by 1 September 1995. On 24 August 1995, a copy of the show cause order [5] was left under the door at 1925 Pennsylvania Avenue, an address which, according to DHR, was the last known address for Flanagan at that time. The record indicates, however, that 1925 Pennsylvania Avenue was but one of a number of potential addresses that DHR possessed for where Flanagan might be found. A Wage History Report contained in the record lists seven additional addresses, apparently of businesses for which Flanagan worked in the years prior to service of the show cause order at 1925 Pennsylvania Avenue. Based on the discussion below, we conclude that the service of process effected in the present case, namely, leaving the show cause order under the door of 1925 Pennsylvania Avenue, was insufficient under the relevant Maryland Rules and case law to provide the Circuit Court with personal jurisdiction over Flanagan for purposes of conducting a contempt proceeding. Rule 2-121, entitled ProcessService In personam, governs service of original process in civil actions. The version of that section in effect in 1995 provided: (a) Generally.Service of process may be made within this State or outside this State when authorized by the law of this State, by delivering to the person to be served a copy of the summons, complaint, and all other papers filed with it, or by mailing to the person to be served a copy of the summons, complaint, and all other papers filed with it by certified mail requesting: Restricted Delivery show to whom, date, address of delivery. Service by certified mail under this Rule is complete upon delivery. Service outside the State may also be made in the manner prescribed by the court or prescribed by the foreign jurisdiction if reasonably calculated to give actual notice. (b) Evasion of Service.When proof is made by affidavit that a defendant has acted to evade service, the court may order that service be made by mailing a copy of the summons, complaint, and all other papers filed with it to the defendant at the defendant's last known residence and delivering a copy of each to a person of suitable age and discretion at the place of business, dwelling house, or usual place of abode of the defendant. (c) By Order of Court.When proof is made by affidavit that good faith efforts to serve the defendant pursuant to section (a) of this Rule have not succeeded and that service pursuant to section (b) of this Rule is inapplicable or impracticable, the court may order any other means of service that it deems appropriate in the circumstances and reasonably calculated to give actual notice. (d) Methods Not Exclusive.The methods of service provided in this Rule are in addition to and not exclusive of any other means of service that may be provided by statute or rule for obtaining jurisdiction over a defendant. Rule 2-121 (1995). Rule 1-321, entitled Service of pleadings and papers other than original pleadings, governs service of process for subsequent pleadings where an individual is already a party to the action. As it does today, the version of that section in effect in 1995 provided: (a) Generally.Except as otherwise provided in these rules or by order of court, every pleading and other paper filed after the original pleading shall be served upon each of the parties. If service is required or permitted to be made upon a party represented by an attorney, service shall be made upon the attorney unless service upon the party is ordered by the court. Service upon the attorney or upon a party shall be made by delivery of a copy or by mailing it to the address most recently stated in a pleading or paper filed by the attorney or party, or if not stated, to the last known address. Delivery of a copy within this Rule means: handing it to the attorney or to the party; or leaving it at the office of the person to be served with an individual in charge; or, if there is no one in charge, leaving it in a conspicuous place in the office; or, if the office is closed or the person to be served has no office, leaving it at the dwelling house or usual place of abode of that person with some individual of suitable age and discretion who is residing there. Service by mail is complete upon mailing. (b) Party in DefaultException.No pleading or other paper after the original pleading need be served on a party in default for failure to appear except a pleading asserting a new or additional claim for relief against the party which shall be served in accordance with the rules for service of original process. (c) Requests to ClerkException.A request directed to the clerk for the issuance of process or any writ need not be served on any party. Rule 1-321 (1995). Regardless of whether service of the show cause order and petition for contempt was required to comply with the rigors of Rule 2-121 as an original pleading or the more relaxed standards of 1-321 as a subsequent pleading, the service effected in the present case was deficient under either. It is readily apparent that service was not effected properly under any of the options listed in Rule 2-121. Even under the more lenient Rule 1-321, service of a subsequent filing upon an individual at his or her usual place of abode, where the person to be served is not present, must be effected upon an individual of suitable age and discretion who is residing there. In the present case, the show cause order merely was left under the door of 1925 Pennsylvania Avenue, where DHR believed Flanagan to be residing, rather than served on an individual residing at the address and capable of receiving service. In addition, there is no indication that service was attempted at any of the other potential addresses listed for Flanagan (whether residential or places of business), such that a court could conclude that DHR exercised good faith efforts to serve Flanagan or that Flanagan was evading service. The attempt at service effected here falls short of compliance with either of the Rules governing service of process. Such failure undermines fatally reliance on service of the 1995 show cause order as the basis for personal jurisdiction over Flanagan by the Circuit Court for the purpose of the 2007 contempt proceedings. DHR's fallback contention is that leaving the order under the door at Flanagan's alleged residence constituted sufficient notice under the doctrine of continuing jurisdiction. Under that doctrine, if a court obtains personal jurisdiction initially over parties to an action (in this case, the entry of the 1987 consent decree), its jurisdiction continues throughout all subsequent proceedings which arise out of the original cause of action. Glading v. Furman, 282 Md. 200, 204, 383 A.2d 398, 401 (1978); Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228 U.S. 346, 353, 33 S.Ct. 550, 552, 57 L.Ed. 867, 874 (1913) (noting that, if a judicial proceeding is begun with jurisdiction over the person of the party concerned it is within the power of a State to bind him by every subsequent order in the cause). In order for the court to maintain personal jurisdiction under the doctrine, however, the defendant must receive reasonable notice and be afforded an opportunity to be heard at each new step in the case if an in personam decree is to be rendered against him. Glading, 282 Md. at 204, 383 A.2d at 401. To satisfy the requirements of the doctrine, DHR contends that: the contempt proceeding arose out of the original paternity proceedings; the service afforded Flanagan in 1995 provided him with reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard; and, thus, the Circuit Court retained its personal jurisdiction over Flanagan despite DHR's failure to comply with either Rule 2-121 or Rule 1-321 as previously explained. Even under the doctrine's greatly reduced standard, however, we find that leaving the show cause order under the door at 1925 Pennsylvania Avenue did not constitute providing Flanagan with reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard. In Glading, reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard were provided by the fact that the non-resident defendant received actual notice of the proceedings through personal service, although improperly effected, in Virginia. Glading, 282 Md. at 209, 383 A.2d at 403. Here, there is no such evidence in the record to suggest that Flanagan received actual, if improperly served, notice of the contempt petition or the show cause order. Likewise, there is no evidence that would lead to the conclusion that leaving the order under the door at one of at least eight potential locations provided Flanagan with reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard. As such, attempted service of the 1995 show cause order cannot be used to provide the Circuit Court with personal jurisdiction over Flanagan to justify proceeding on the contempt petition.