Opinion ID: 779813
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mr. Bovey

Text: 17 Before trial, Mr. Bovey moved to sever his trial from that of Mr. Hughes. Mr. Bovey submitted that he and his co-defendant intended to proceed with antagonistic defenses. After considering the parties' positions, the district court declined to grant the motion to sever. The court noted that Mr. Bovey simply had not demonstrated the specific harm, prejudice or risk involved in failing to sever the proceedings. R.113 at 9. Moreover, the district court emphasized that Mr. Bovey had failed to proffer evidence of the type that generally warranted severance. 6 18 Mr. Bovey now submits that the district court erred in denying his motion to sever his case from that of Mr. Hughes. He submits that the attempts of Mr. Hughes' counsel to shift blame to him through argument and cross-examination, combined with the references to Mr. Bovey's previous odometer tampering, severely prejudiced his right to receive a fair trial. We review a district court's denial of a motion to sever for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Wilson, 237 F.3d 827, 835 (7th Cir.2001). 19 To promote efficiency and to prevent the scandal and inequity of inconsistent verdicts, the federal judicial system has adopted a preference for joint trials of defendants who are indicted together. Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 537, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993) (internal quotations omitted). [A] district court should grant a severance ... only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence. Id. at 539, 113 S.Ct. 933; see also Wilson, 237 F.3d at 835. For instance, in certain circumstances, the complexity of the charges, the spillover effect of testimony the Government offers against a co-defendant or the prospect of issues implicating the holding of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), 7 may warrant a severance. See Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 539, 113 S.Ct. 933. 20 However, to establish on appeal that severance ought to have been granted, a defendant must demonstrate that the joint trial resulted in actual prejudice. United States v. Mohammad, 53 F.3d 1426, 1431 (7th Cir.1995). Actual prejudice means that the defendant could not have a fair trial without severance, not merely that a separate trial would offer him a better chance of acquittal. Id. (internal quotations omitted). The fact that defenses are mutually antagonistic 8 does not require severance in all instances. Mutually antagonistic defenses are not prejudicial per se.  Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 538, 113 S.Ct. 933. 21 The district court's denial of the motion to sever was not an abuse of discretion. Mr. Bovey has failed to demonstrate that the district court's ruling compromised one of his trial rights and actually prevented him from obtaining a fair trial. In his pretrial motion for severance, Mr. Bovey noted that earlier motions filed on behalf of his co-defendant, Mr. Hughes, indicated that Mr. Hughes' defense would be that he received the counterfeit material from Mr. Bovey and did not realize that the currency was counterfeit. Moreover, during opening statement, Mr. Hughes' counsel undoubtedly attempted to shift culpability from his client to Mr. Bovey. 9 However, these actions cannot be said fairly to have compromised one of Mr. Bovey's trial rights. Mere finger-pointing at another defendant, such as occurred here, is not sufficient to require severance. See United States v. Mietus, 237 F.3d 866, 874 (7th Cir.2001); United States v. Goines, 988 F.2d 750, 781 (7th Cir.1993). Moreover, Mr. Bovey's counsel had an opportunity to examine the witnesses who proffered the accusatory testimony. Other than his conclusory allegations, Mr. Bovey has proffered no evidence that the conduct of Mr. Hughes' counsel actually prejudiced his ability to obtain a fair trial. 10 Mr. Bovey has not pointed to any particular trial right that was compromised by the refusal to sever. Nor can we discern any serious risk that the jury was prevented from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence. Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 539, 113 S.Ct. 933.
22 Mr. Bovey further submits that the district court abused its discretion in permitting the Government to present evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) concerning his involvement in an odometer tampering scheme with Mr. Hughes. 23 Prior to trial, the Government served a timely notice of its intent to offer evidence under Rule 404(b). The Government noted that it intended to introduce testimony concerning the joint participation of Mr. Bovey and Mr. Hughes in an odometer tampering scheme. Over Mr. Bovey's motion to exclude the testimony, the district court allowed the Government to introduce this evidence to demonstrate that Mr. Hughes and Mr. Bovey had a working relationship with one another. 24 Before us, he submits that the prejudicial impact of this evidence far outweighed its probative value. In response, the Government emphasizes that this evidence demonstrated that Mr. Hughes and Mr. Bovey, the alleged co-conspirators, enjoyed a working relationship. 25 In a criminal prosecution, the Government may not tender evidence of prior misconduct merely to demonstrate that a defendant has a propensity to commit crime and that he acted in conformity with that propensity on the occasion in question. United States v. Best, 250 F.3d 1084, 1090 (7th Cir.2001). However, it may present such evidence for other purposes such as to demonstrate `motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake.' United States v. Conley, 291 F.3d 464, 472 (7th Cir.2002) (quoting Fed. R.Evid. 404(b)). Consequently, the central inquiry in cases involving admission of evidence under Rule 404(b) becomes whether the material is `probative of a material issue other than character.' United States v. Heath, 188 F.3d 916, 920 (7th Cir.1999) (quoting Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 686, 108 S.Ct. 1496, 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988)). 26 Although this court has adopted a four-prong test to determine if evidence may be admitted properly under Rule 404(b), 11 the parties' dispute concerns only the fourth element of this inquiry: whether the probative value of the material was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Heath, 188 F.3d at 919; United States v. Asher, 178 F.3d 486, 492 (7th Cir.1999). Under this inquiry, `the general rule is that the balance should be struck in favor of admission.' United States v. Denberg, 212 F.3d 987, 993 (7th Cir.2000) (quoting United States v. Dennis, 625 F.2d 782, 797 (8th Cir.1980)). Moreover, this court has stated that evidence is unfairly prejudicial only if it will `induce the jury to decide the case on an improper basis, commonly an emotional one, rather than on the evidence presented.' Conley, 291 F.3d at 473 (quoting United States v. Pulido, 69 F.3d 192, 201 (7th Cir.1995)). 27 Although the issue is a relatively close one, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence. The disputed information was relevant to the issue of whether Mr. Hughes and Mr. Bovey had a working relationship prior to the commission of this crime, a matter that might have been of some interest to the jury in light of the finger-pointing that took place between the defendants. Cf. United States v. Macias, 930 F.2d 567, 572 (7th Cir.1991) (holding that Rule 404(b) evidence is highly probative to show the working relationship between drug dealers). The introduction of this evidence no doubt cast Mr. Bovey in an unflattering light. However, odometer tampering does not carry with it such a stigma that this material would provoke a jury to convict based on emotion rather than on the evidence. Moreover, when material concerning the odometer tampering was introduced at trial, the district court admonished the jury that it only could consider this evidence for the limited purpose of determining whether there was a working relationship between Mr. Hughes and Mr. Bovey. Consequently, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence under Rule 404(b).