Opinion ID: 2680600
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Deliberative process privilege in litigation

Text: [¶16] The threshold question this Court must answer is whether we recognize the deliberative process privilege at common law. If this privilege exists under the common law of Wyoming, it is incorporated in the WPRA. This approach is consistent with other authorities. See, e.g., Dep’t of Interior & Bureau of Indian Affairs v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1, 8, 121 S.Ct. 1060, 1065, 149 L.Ed.2d 87 (2001) 6 (discussing requirements for application of FOIA Exemption 5, “it must fall within the ambit of a privilege against discovery under judicial standards that would govern litigation against the agency that holds it”), 2 Federal Evidence § 5:57, at 893 (Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, 4th ed. 2013) (discussing FOIA Exemption 5 and stating “in effect this language incorporates the common law definition of the deliberative process privilege”); 1 McCormick on Evidence § 108, at 653 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 7th ed. 2013) (“FOIA itself does not address the question of evidentiary admissibility, and thus it cannot be said to be a statutory enactment of the privilege in question.”). [¶17] We now follow the analysis mapped out for us in Freudenthal, and turn to the rules and law governing litigation to determine whether there is a deliberative process privilege available under Wyoming law. No Wyoming rule or statute provides for an applicable evidentiary privilege and this Court has not, to date, recognized a common law deliberative process privilege.2 See Freudenthal, 2010 WY 80, ¶¶ 25, 28, 233 P.3d at 940, 941. 2 Wyoming has recognized certain privileges by statute, but makes no reference to the deliberative process privilege. Privileged communications and acts. (a) The following persons shall not testify in certain respects: (i) An attorney or a physician concerning a communication made to him by his client or patient in that relation, or his advice to his client or patient. The attorney or physician may testify by express consent of the client or patient, and if the client or patient voluntarily testifies the attorney or physician may be compelled to testify on the same subject; (ii) A clergyman or priest concerning a confession made to him in his professional character if enjoined by the church to which he belongs; (iii) Husband or wife, except as provided in W.S. 1-12-104; (iv) A person who assigns his claim or interest concerning any matter in respect to which he would not be permitted to testify if a party; (v) A person who, if a party, would be restricted in his evidence under W.S. 1-12-102 shall, where the property is sold or transferred by an executor, administrator, guardian, trustee, heir, devisee or legatee, be restricted in the same manner in any action or proceeding concerning the property; (vi) A confidential intermediary, as defined in W.S. 1-22201(a)(viii), concerning communications made to him or information obtained by him during the course of an investigation pursuant to W.S. 1- 7 [¶18] Rule 501 of the Wyoming Rules of Evidence reads: Except as otherwise required by the constitution or statute or by these or other rules promulgated by the Supreme Court of Wyoming, the privilege of a witness, person, government, state, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the State of Wyoming in the light of reason and experience. W.R.E. 501. (Emphasis added.) [¶19] Although the deliberative process “privilege is most commonly encountered in [FOIA] litigation, it originated as a common law privilege.” In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 737 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). As we stated in Freudenthal, we “recognize the common law as modified by judicial decisions, accepting the interpretation that best fits the time and this jurisdiction.” 2010 WY 80, ¶ 27, 233 P.3d at 941 (citing Nulle v. Gillette-Campbell Cnty. Joint Powers Fire Bd., 797 P.2d 1171, 1172 (Wyo. 1990)). This Court will not, however, routinely accept common law that has been adopted in other jurisdictions in a vacuum. Rather, we evaluate any particular common law rule independently to determine whether it is consistent with our policies and precedent before adopting it. Id. With this guidance in mind, we turn to whether the common law privilege exists in Wyoming. [¶20] The deliberative process privilege exempts from disclosure communications between executive officials that are both pre-decisional and deliberative. Freudenthal, 2010 WY 80, ¶ 33, 233 P.3d at 942. The policy objective proffered for the privilege is protection of the governmental decision-making process: Among the reasons given for recognizing the privilege in the context of FOIA’s Exemption 5 are that the privilege protects the flow of ideas within government agencies, allows candid discussion and free exploration of ideas and improves governmental decision-making by taking official deliberations out of a fishbowl. Id.; Sun-Sentinel Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 431 F.Supp.2d 1258, 1277 (S.D. Fla. 2006). The United States Supreme Court reiterated the rationale for the privilege within the context of FOIA’s 22-203, when the public interests, in the judgment of the court, would suffer by the disclosure. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-12-101 (LexisNexis 2013). 8 Exemption 5 most recently in Dep’t of the Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1, 8-9, 121 S.Ct. 1060, 1066, 149 L.Ed.2d 87 (2001): The deliberative process privilege rests on the obvious realization that officials will not communicate candidly among themselves if each remark is a potential item of discovery and front page news, and its object is to enhance “the quality of agency decisions” by protecting open and frank discussion among those who make them within the Government. Id. at ¶ 16, at 937-38. [¶21] Another court has framed the policy underlying the deliberative process privilege as follows: The privilege has a number of purposes: it serves to assure that subordinates within an agency will feel free to provide the decisionmaker with their uninhibited opinions and recommendations without fear of later being subject to public ridicule or criticism; to protect against premature disclosure of proposed policies before they have been finally formulated or adopted; and to protect against confusing the issues and misleading the public by dissemination of documents suggesting reasons and rationales for a course of action which were not in fact the ultimate reasons for the agency’s action. See Jordan [v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 591 F2d 753, 772-74, 192 U.S.App.D.C. [144], 163-165 [(1978)]. Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1980). [¶22] We are not persuaded by Mr. Aland’s argument that we should reject the privilege because the policy reasons behind it are not supported by empirical evidence. No empirical data is necessary where, as here, the conclusion that decisionmakers will be less inhibited in expressing their opinions if they have some assurance they will not later be subject to public ridicule and criticism, is based on a strong body of case law and “simple common sense.” Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 555, 121 S.Ct. 2404, 2421, 150 L.Ed.2d 532 (2001). We find the policy purposes behind the common law deliberative process privilege to be persuasive, and consistent with Wyoming policies and precedent; we therefore hold that a common law deliberative process privilege exists in Wyoming. 9 [¶23] Although we recognize a deliberative process privilege at common law, our decision does not address application of the privilege in the context of litigation with a government agency; rather, we confine our analysis to the context of applying the privilege to public records cases. We qualify our decision because we are mindful that the deliberative process privilege may be analyzed differently depending on the circumstances presented in litigation. As the U.S. Supreme Court has explained: Moreover, at best, the discovery rules can only be applied under Exemption 5 by way of rough analogies. For example, we do not know whether the Government is to be treated as though it were a prosecutor, a civil plaintiff, or a defendant. Nor does the Act, by its terms, permit inquiry into particularized needs of the individual seeking the information, although such an inquiry would ordinarily be made of a private litigant. Still, the legislative history of Exemption 5 demonstrates that Congress intended to incorporate generally the recognized rule that ‘confidential intra-agency advisory opinions . . . are privileged from inspection.’ Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. United States, 157 F.Supp. 939, 946, 141 Ct.Cl. 38, 49 (1958). EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 86-87, 93 S.Ct. 827, 835-36, 35 L.Ed.2d 119 (1973) (footnote omitted). [¶24] The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals elaborated further on this distinction between application of the deliberative process privilege in the public records context and in litigation with a government agency. The language of Exemption 5 is cast in terms of discovery law; the agencies need turn over no documents “which would not be available by law to a private party in litigation with the agency.” This discovery standard can only serve as a “rough guide” to the courts, EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 86, 93 S.Ct. 827, 835, 35 L.Ed.2d 119 (1973), since decisions as to discovery are usually based on a balancing of the relative need of the parties, and standards vary according to the kind of litigation involved. Furthermore, the most fundamental discovery and evidentiary principle, relevance to the issues being litigated, plays no part in FOIA cases. It is clear, however, that Congress intended that agencies should not lose the protection traditionally afforded through the evidentiary privileges simply because of the passage of the FOIA. The courts have recognized that Exemption 5 protects, 10 as a general rule, materials which would be protected under the attorney-client privilege, Mead Data Central [v. United States Dep’t of the Air Force, 184 U.S.App.D.C. [350], 360363, 566 F.2d [242], 252-255 [(1977)]; the attorney workproduct privilege, NLRB v. Sears, 421 U.S. [132], 154, 95 S.Ct. [1504], 1518 [(1975)], Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 194 U.S.App.D.C. 99, 598 F.2d 18 (1978); or the executive “deliberative process” privilege, EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. at 8590, 93 S.Ct. at 835-837, Vaughn v. Rosen, 173 U.S.App.D.C. 187, 523 F.2d 1136 (1975) (Vaughn II). Coastal States, 617 F.2d at 862; see also Dinger, 567 P.2d at 733 (“A showing of need is unnecessary to obtain access to public records . . . .”). [¶25] This Court has long recognized “the primary interest of the bar and bench is the disclosure of true facts in a given litigation.” Barber v. State Highway Comm’n, 80 Wyo. 340, 354-55, 342 P.2d 723, 727 (Wyo. 1959). A challenge to the assertion of the deliberative process privilege in litigation would be viewed under our liberal discovery rules. As the Indiana Supreme Court has cautioned, evidentiary privileges, even when supported by sound public policy, “are not lightly created nor expansively construed [because] they are in derogation of the search for truth.” In re C.P., 563 N.E.2d 1275, 1277 (Ind. 1990) (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 3108, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974)). As can be seen by the text of the discovery rules, in the early stages of litigation the parties are permitted broad access to information held by the other side. This broad access exists even though compliance with discovery requests often creates considerable burdens on the responding party. The policy for this liberal attitude is the belief that both parties must be permitted to scrutinize all relevant evidence so that each will have a fair opportunity to present its case at trial, and the flexible provisions contained in the rules serve this end. In re Estate of Novakovich, 2004 WY 158, ¶ 25, 101 P.3d 931, 937 (Wyo. 2004). (Application of the privilege in litigation could further be adjusted in light of the availability of protective orders under W.R.C.P. 26(c), which are not available in the context of WPRA record requests.) [¶26] A decision on the precise application of the deliberative process privilege to litigation must await the proper case. We observed in Freudenthal that it would not be appropriate in that case to attempt to define the parameters of an evidentiary privilege, explaining that “it is axiomatic that in applying any evidentiary privilege, a court must 11 consider the nature of the particular documents in the context of the litigation and assure the protection provided is as limited as it can be.” 2010 WY 80, ¶ 31, 233 P.3d at 942. The same is true in the present case. We are not presented with the question of the privilege in the context of a discovery request during litigation with a government entity, and we therefore do not address the parameters of an evidentiary privilege or define how the privilege should apply in the litigation context. [¶27] We do, however, conclude that a common law deliberative process privilege does exist in Wyoming, and we now turn to its function in section 203(b)(v) of the WPRA.