Opinion ID: 6324159
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: , whether in making the false statement, or in

Text: concealing material facts, one or more of the Defendants intended that another rely on the omission or concealment. Intentional concealment exists where a party knows of defects in a product and intentionally conceals them, or, while under no duty to speak, nevertheless voluntarily does so, but does not speak honestly or makes misleading statements or suppresses facts. (Emphasis added.) Later, as to “fraud by concealment,” the Phase I jury answered yes to this question: “Did one or more of the Defendants conceal or omit material information, not otherwise known or available, knowing the material was false and misleading, or failed to disclose a material fact concerning or proving the health effects and/or addictive nature of smoking cigarettes?” (Emphasis added.) For the question to make sense, “the material” must be understood as - 15 - referring to material that the Engle defendants disseminated to the public. Reading these three things together—Engle class counsel’s argument at the Phase I charge conference, the Phase I jury instruction, and the Phase I jury finding—gives a clear picture of the Engle plaintiffs’ theory of the Engle defendants’ fraudulent conduct. Namely, the Engle plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had made statements that concealed material information about the health effects or addictiveness of smoking cigarettes, with the intention of misleading would-be purchasers of the defendants’ products. This conduct breached a duty that was well established in the common law of fraud: “Though a vendor may have no duty to speak, yet ‘if he does assume to speak, he must make a full and fair disclosure as to the matters about which he assumes to speak. He must then avoid a deliberate nondisclosure.’ ” Harper, et al., supra p.11, § 7.14, at 472 (quoting Franchey v. Hannes, 207 A.2d 268, 271 (Conn. 1965)).