Opinion ID: 691359
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Polling the Jury

Text: 31 Sturman's next proffered basis for reversal requires some discussion of the events which transpired at the conclusion of the trial. After the jury delivered its verdict, the court, at Sturman's request, polled the jury. Assured that the jury was unanimous in its guilty verdicts, Sturman nevertheless asked that the court poll the jury on each of the three extortion schemes charged in the conspiracy count to ensure that the jury had been unanimous as to at least one of the three alleged conspiracies. The court refused this request. Sturman claims that the court's refusal constitutes reversible error. Because Sturman is contesting the manner in which the jury was polled, a matter left to the discretion of the trial judge, United States v. Shepherd, 576 F.2d 719, 722 n. 1 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 852, 99 S.Ct. 158, 58 L.Ed.2d 155 (1978), we review the record for an abuse of that discretion. 32 Though he readily concedes that no court has held that a defendant has a right to poll the jury in the manner he desires, Sturman maintains that the right follows logically from two separate lines of authority: the right to poll the jury and the right to have a specific unanimity instruction. A specific unanimity instruction advises the jury that where a charged offense can be predicated on one of several charged acts, the jury must be unanimous on the act before it can convict. United States v. Beros, 833 F.2d 455, 462 (3d Cir.1987); United States v. Mangieri, 694 F.2d 1270, 1280 (D.C.Cir.1982). It is not enough that the jury is unanimous as to guilt but divided in their assessment of which act supported the verdict. Beros, 833 F.2d at 462. Sturman contends that it logically follows from this proposition that the right to poll the jury should extend to polling on each individual scheme. 33 The right to poll a jury is indeed a substantial right, but it is not a constitutional right. United States v. Randle, 966 F.2d 1209, 1214 (7th Cir.1992). The purpose of the jury poll is to ensure unanimity by forcing the jurors to voice their accountability. Shepherd, 576 F.2d at 725. It is not intended to develop into a searching inquiry into the factual bases underlying the verdict. Sturman's proposal seeks to change this. 34 The court specifically instructed the jury that in order to convict Sturman on the conspiracy charge, they were to be unanimous not only in their conclusion of guilt but on their findings underlying that conclusion. There is nothing in the record to rebut our standard presumption that jurors follow their instructions. United States v. L'Allier, 838 F.2d 234, 242 (7th Cir.1988). Were we to accept Sturman's argument, we would be in effect holding that trial courts should use the jury poll as a reinforcement against potentially misleading instructions. And nothing Sturman proposes suggests any limits as to what purpose the jury poll could be used. Indeed, his position seems to be that whatever aspect of the case the defendant deems to be confusing to the jury would be ripe for polling. Such a requirement would be clearly excessive. 35 Moreover, not only is there no evidence to suggest the jury was confused about the unanimity instruction, but there is evidence indicating that the jury was in fact unanimous in its finding that the conspiracy against May was complete. Necessary to its conclusion that Sturman was guilty on Counts Seven and Eight of the indictment was a factual finding that Sturman hired Feinberg to organize an attack on May's stores in an effort to coerce May into resuming his payments to Sturman. In other words, for the jury to have found Sturman guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on Counts Seven and Eight, they had to have found that Sturman and Feinberg had an agreement because there was no evidence showing that Sturman ever interacted with Brisette and the others who travelled to Chicago. Only Feinberg had contact with those men. Hence, implicit in the jury's guilty verdict on the nonconspiracy charges was a unanimous finding as to his participation in an agreement to extort the Mays.