Opinion ID: 852268
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Indiana Constitution Claim

Text: Although the search and seizure provision found in Article I, § 11 of the Indiana Constitution tracks the Fourth Amendment verbatim, our jurisprudence has focused on whether the actions of the government were reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 359 (Ind.2005). The Indiana provision in some cases confers greater protections to individual rights than the Fourth Amendment affords. Holder v. State, 847 N.E.2d 930, 940 (Ind.2006); Litchfield, 824 N.E.2d at 358-59; Mitchell v. State, 745 N.E.2d 775, 786 (Ind.2001); Randall T. Shepard, Second Wind for the Indiana Bill of Rights, 22 Ind. L.Rev. 575, 577 (1989). But Article 1, § 11 of the Indiana Constitution does not demand a different result here. In Litchfield we summarized the relevant factors in assessing reasonableness of a seizure as turning on a balance of: 1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation had occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen's ordinary activities, and 3) the extent of law enforcement needs. Litchfield, 824 N.E.2d at 361. Here, based on the information from the Alabama officer and the NCIC entry, the Indiana officers reasonably believed that there was probable cause that Shotts committed a crime and that he was armed and at large in Indiana. The degree of intrusionan arrest and incarcerationwas equally strong. But the arrest was a necessary and reasonable intrusion considering the needs of law enforcement and governmental interests at stake. The Indiana officers had every reason to believe there was probable cause that Shotts had broken Alabama law. We have already noted the problem for law enforcement that any further requirements would impose on officers asked to enforce a warrant from another state. Under the totality of the circumstances, the Indiana officers' actions were reasonable considering the governmental interests and the steps they took in investigating and arresting Shotts. Accordingly, the Indiana officers acted reasonably and Shotts cannot prevail under the Indiana Constitution. Much of the debate in Herring between the five Justices in the majority and the four dissenters focused on the extent to which the exclusionary rule was grounded in a more majestic conception than simple deterrence of improper law enforcement. Herring, 129 S.Ct. at 707 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 18, 115 S.Ct. 1185, 131 L.Ed.2d 34 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). But we think the Herring dissenters would not find cause for concern here. As Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, noted in dissent in Herring, applying the exclusionary rule to negligent as well as intentional police errors may have the salutary effect of encouraging monitoring of systems and procedures to avoid mistakes. Id. at 708 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). And as Justice Breyer noted, errors by some agency other than the police may provide less reason to exclude erroneously seized evidence. Id. at 710-11 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Under the Indiana Constitution we need not resolve these issues today. If any flaw existed in the Alabama warrants, it was the product of an agencywhether Alabama law enforcement or Alabama judiciaryover which Indiana police have no control.