Opinion ID: 931039
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Analytical Framework of Franks v. Delaware

Text: The District Court then decided whether to hold a hearing for the purpose of considering Rajaratnam’s suppression motion. In doing so, it noted that “[w]here a defendant makes a preliminary showing that the government’s affidavit misstated or omitted material information, Franks instructs a district court to hold a hearing to determine” whether the alleged misstatements or omissions in the warrant or wiretap application were made intentionally or with “reckless disregard for the truth” and, if so, whether any such misstatements or omissions were “material.” United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 Cr. 1184 (RJH), 2010 WL 4867402, at -8 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2010); see United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110, 125 (2d Cir. 2008). In other words, “[t]o suppress evidence obtained pursuant to an affidavit containing erroneous information, the defendant must show that: (1) the claimed inaccuracies or omissions are the result of the affiant’s deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth; and (2) the alleged falsehoods or omissions were necessary to the [issuing] judge’s probable cause [or necessity] finding.” United States v. Canfield, 212 F.3d 713, 717-18 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42, 64 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that “[i]n order to invoke the Franks doctrine, [a defendant] must show that there were intentional and material misrepresentations or omissions in [the] warrant affidavit.” (emphases supplied)). To determine whether misstatements are “material,” a court must “set[ ] aside the falsehoods” in the application, United States v. Coreas, 419 F.3d 151, 155 (2d Cir. 2005), and determine “[w]hether the untainted portions [of the application] suffice to support a probable cause [or necessity] finding,” United States v. Nanni, 59 F.3d 1425, 1433 (2d Cir. 1995). If the untainted portions of the application are sufficient to support the probable cause or necessity findings, then the misstatements are not “material” and suppression is not required. 8 Although omissions “are governed by the same rules” as misstatements, United States v. Ferguson, 758 F.2d 843, 848 (2d Cir. 1985), “the literal Franks approach [does not] seem[ ] adequate because, by their nature, omissions cannot be deleted”; therefore “[a] better approach . . . would be to . . . insert the omitted truths revealed at the suppression hearing,” United States v. Ippolito, 774 F.2d 1482, 1487 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985). Accordingly, we have held that “[t]he ultimate inquiry is whether, after putting aside erroneous information and [correcting] material omissions, there remains a residue of independent and lawful information sufficient to support [a finding of] probable cause [or necessity].” Canfield, 212 F.3d at 718 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Martin, 615 F.2d 318, 328 (5th Cir. 1980) (“[W]e [are] required to determine whether, if the omitted material had been included in the affidavit, the affidavit would still establish probable cause [or necessity] . . . . If it would not, we would be required to void the warrant and suppress the evidence seized pursuant to it.”).