Opinion ID: 1943086
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: anderson i

Text: In resolving the first appeal, we recognized the equitable principle that a prisoner can be granted credit against a sentence for time during which the prisoner is erroneously at liberty. We also recognized that no equitable relief is required where a prisoner causes his or her own premature release from prison, thwarts governmental attempts at recapture, or misbehaves while at liberty. We held that prisoners who are aware of an erroneous release from confinement but make no effort to correct it are not entitled to equitable relief. Specifically, we stated: To preserve the right to credit for time spent at liberty, a prisoner who knows his or her release is erroneous must make a reasonable attempt to notify authorities of the mistake. Although the prisoner need not continue to badger the authorities, a reasonable attempt may well include voicing an objection at the time of release or contacting authorities a short time later in order to clarify his or her status. [2] We further held that the prisoner carries the burden to show that the complexity in calculating his or her release date, or some cognitive deficiency, prevented him or her from realizing the release was premature. [3] We concluded that although the district court had specifically found that Anderson did not cause his premature release and there was no evidence before us that Anderson had committed any crimes while he was erroneously at liberty, there was an unresolved question as to whether Anderson knew that his release was premature, yet remained silent. Accordingly, we remanded to the district court for a determination of whether Anderson tried to inform officials of their mistake and, if not, whether Anderson reasonably did not know his sentence was set to expire. [4] We further directed the district court to determine whether Anderson had or should have had notice of the September 24, 2003, hearing on the Department's motion for capias and/or Douglas County's motion to declare a forfeiture of his bond. We also directed the parties to present evidence as to why the arrest warrant for Anderson was not issued immediately after it was authorized by the district judge on September 24, and we noted that the district court should determine whether the delay was part of an organized and diligent plan to notify, find, and reapprehend Anderson, or was instead the product of misconductnegligent or affirmativeby public officials. [5] Finally, we directed the district court to determine the impact of any delay due to misconduct on the equities of denying Anderson credit for any or all of the 14-month period between the authorization and issuance of the arrest warrant. We wrote that this equitable analysis should be conducted in a manner consistent with the rationale and policies expressed in this opinion. [6] Accordingly, our mandate reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded the cause for further proceedings.