Opinion ID: 771168
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: battered spouse defense

Text: 21 The petitioner was allowed to introduce expert testimony regarding battered spouse syndrome at the penalty phase of the proceedings. She contends, however, that the state's expert testimony should not have been admitted and that her counsel failed to investigate adequately. 22 On the ineffective assistance claim, the petitioner specifically cites a neighbor's report that Ray hit petitioner in the back with a board while the two were mending a fence. Counsel failed to introduce the report at the penalty phase. The district court found this omission harmless, given that other witnesses testified that Ray Copeland had treated petitioner like trash. Copeland v. Washington, No. 97-1123-CV-W-3, slip op. at 35. 23 The petitioner also argues that the testimony of Dr. Jacks, who had performed a court-ordered interview to determine the petitioner's competency, violated her right against self-incrimination and her right to counsel. At the penalty phase, Jacks testified that the petitioner did not have symptoms consistent with battered spouse syndrome. As the state could rebut expert testimony with its own expert witnesses, there was no error in Jacks' testimony. Cf. Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402 (1987). 24 What is far more troubling about these two claims is that Jacks later submitted an affidavit stating that had he been aware of the incident with the board, he could not have testified that the petitioner did not have symptoms stemming from battered spouse syndrome. Further, a portion of the prosecutor's closing argument used Dr. Jacks' testimony to rebut the testimony of the petitioner's expert witness. As we have already determined that the penalty phase was constitutionally flawed due to the prosecutor's improper closing argument and are already granting relief on the penalty phase, we need not reach this issue.
25 The petitioner was not allowed to present expert witness testimony on battered spouse syndrome during the guilt phase of the proceedings. As the petitioner was not prevented from presenting exculpatory evidence, a new trial is not required. The evidence was excluded because trial counsel failed to give notice of a diminished responsibility defense as required by Missouri statute. 3 However, numerous witnesses, including the petitioner's children and other family members, did have the opportunity to testify and recount their observations of the way in which the petitioner was treated by her husband.