Opinion ID: 1203248
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Issues Affecting Both Guilt and Penalty Trials

Text: (12a) The trial court refused to order that every bench conference between the court and counsel be reported. Thus, 133 sidebar conferences were not reported. Defendant argues that the court's action violated his right to due process, to effective assistance of counsel, and to a fair and reliable review of the guilt and penalty determinations as guaranteed by article I, sections 7, 15, 16 and 17 of the California Constitution and by the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. He also claims the court's ruling violated Code of Civil Procedure section 269 and Penal Code section 190.9. Respondent counters that the law applicable to defendant's 1984 trial did not require the reporting of sidebar conferences, and maintains that in any case, there was no material omission in the record. The record reflects that during the first day of testimony at the guilt phase of trial, counsel for codefendant Brown moved that all sidebar conferences be reported, complaining that he would forget any objection not recorded at sidebar. After several discussions of the point, the court ruled: [I]t is the court's ruling that I will accept legal objections from counsel. I urge counsel not to make speaking objections, make the objections in legal terms. And when the court believes that any side bar conferences are appropriate, we will have side bar conferences. [ถ] In lieu of that, we will not have side bar conferences. I have said that before. I allow them at the convenience and to aid the attorneys, but we are not going to take the reporter around every five minutes to set up a side bar conference during this trial. It is interesting to note that immediately thereafter, having reviewed the daily transcript from the day before, Brown's attorney was permitted to clarify an objection he felt was not fully reflected in the transcript. The matter was raised for the last time in the motions for new trial. Defendant's claim that the court abused its discretion rests on Code of Civil Procedure section 269 and on Penal Code section 190.9. Code of Civil Procedure section 269 provided at the time of defendant's trial: The official reporter ... must ... take down in shorthand all the testimony, the objections made, the rulings of the court, the exceptions taken, all arraignments, pleas, and sentences of defendants in criminal cases, the arguments of the prosecuting attorney to the jury, and all statements made and oral instructions given by the judge.... [5] Effective in 1985, the year after defendant's trial, section 190.9 was added to the Penal Code, requiring that in a case in which a death sentence may be imposed  all proceedings conducted after the effective date of this section in the justice, municipal, and superior courts, including proceedings in chambers, shall be conducted on the record with a court reporter present. (Italics added.) [6] Defendant's claim that the section merely restated existing law is meritless; the express language making the statute prospective only belies the suggestion. In reaching this conclusion we rely also on the explanation of the Legislative Counsel accompanying the bill (Stats. 1984, ch. 1422, ง 2, p. 4994) that while existing law required the reporting of testimony and other specified statements, this section would require that all proceedings be conducted on the record, thereby imposing new costs on local government. (13)(See fn. 7.), (12b) Although sidebar and chambers discussions have long been a permissible part of the record on appeal (see Lipka v. Lipka (1963) 60 Cal.2d 472, 480-481 [35 Cal. Rptr. 71, 386 P.2d 671] [equivalent of settled statement of chambers discussion proper part of record on appeal]; see also People v. Holloway (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1098, 1115-1116 [269 Cal. Rptr. 530, 790 P.2d 1327]), we have found no case, nor has defendant cited any, requiring that in every instance they must be reported. Code of Civil Procedure section 269, whether in its current form or that applicable at the time of defendant's trial, is not explicit on the point. [7] However, we need not determine whether the trial court erred under Code of Civil Procedure section 269, since it is so patently clear that any abuse of discretion in refusing to order the sidebar conferences reported has not prejudiced defendant, and has not impeded his ability to seek meaningful appellate review. (14) As we said in a recent capital case in which defendant complained that five hours of chambers argument over a suppression motion was not reported: Section 1181, subdivision 9 [of the Penal Code] authorizes a reviewing court to order a new trial `because of the loss or destruction, in whole or in substantial part' of the reporter's notes. `The test is whether in light of all the circumstances it appears that the lost portion is substantial in that it affects the ability of the reviewing court to conduct a meaningful review and the ability of the defendant to properly perfect his appeal.' ( People v. Holloway, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 1116, quoting People v. Morales (1979) 88 Cal. App.3d 259, 267 [151 Cal. Rptr. 610].) We concluded that a settled statement provided an adequate substitute for the missing transcript. ( People v. Holloway, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 1116.) (12c) This is obviously not a case like those defendant cites in which the record of the trial as a whole is missing or unavailable. (See, e.g., People v. Jones (1981) 125 Cal. App.3d 298 [178 Cal. Rptr. 44] [notes of whole trial destroyed]; In re Ray O. (1979) 97 Cal. App.3d 136, 138-139 [158 Cal. Rptr. 550] revd. on other grounds 213 Cal. App.3d 701, 708 [no reporter's transcript of juvenile disposition hearing].) This is not a case in which a large or crucial portion of the record is missing (see, e.g., In re Steven B. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 1 [157 Cal. Rptr. 510, 598 P.2d 480] [stenographic notes for half of juvenile jurisdictional hearing destroyed]; People v. Apalatequi (1978) 82 Cal. App.3d 970, 973 [147 Cal. Rptr. 473] [reporter's notes of arguments of counsel lost; settled statement inadequate to raise prosecutorial misconduct argument]), or in which a crucial item of evidence is not available on appeal (compare In re Roderick S. (1981) 125 Cal. App.3d 48 [177 Cal. Rptr. 800] [loss of knife in possession of weapon case necessitates reversal] with People v. Curry (1985) 165 Cal. App.3d 349, 353-354 [211 Cal. Rptr. 590] [affirmance in face of loss of part of officer's probable cause statement to magistrate]). Rather, it is one in which only an inconsequential portion of the proceedings was not transcribed and has not been reconstructed. (Compare, e.g., People v. Moore (1988) 201 Cal. App.3d 51, 56 [248 Cal. Rptr. 31] [omission of defense counsel's closing arguments inconsequential].) We are convinced that no `substantial' portion of the record is missing in this case. The record in this appeal consists of 56 volumes of reporter's transcripts, covering 7,557 pages, 4 volumes of clerk's transcripts, covering 1,208 pages, as well as augmented clerk's and reporter's transcripts of several volumes. We have before us the reporter's transcript of the preliminary hearing, of hearings on all the pretrial motions, of voir dire, of the opening and closing arguments of the prosecutor and both defense counsel, of the testimony of every witness, and of the trial court's every word to the jury, including, of course, jury instructions. We have all the parties' pleadings and written motions, as well as the reporter's transcript of the hearing on defendant's motion for new trial, the application for modification of sentence, and the formal sentencing. For the purpose of appeal, a settled statement was prepared, supplying the recollection of the parties and the court of the content of the unreported sidebar discussions. The parties were able to fully settle the record as to 66 sidebar discussions; as to 40 more, they recalled at least part of the discussion, and as to 27 discussions, no settled statement is provided. Of the 133 unreported sidebar discussions, 58 took place during jury selection and before the taking of testimony. To put the matter in perspective, we note that the trial extended over 53 court days. Most importantly, the trial court told counsel it was appropriate to put their objections on the record; it was only their sidebar arguments the court refused to order reported in every instance. Many sidebar conferences were in fact reported. Counsel followed the court's advice; the record bristles with hundreds of evidentiary and other objections, and the court's rulings thereon. With respect to every issue raised on appeal, we have found the record sufficient to permit review. It is in this context that we must find that any abuse of discretion, assuming it existed, was not prejudicial, because the record is clearly adequate for meaningful appellate review. Defendant admits that he did settle the record regarding most of the 133 unreported bench conferences, but he claims that there remain disputes over several conferences involving his motion to sever his trial from that of the codefendants, voir dire, juror misconduct, admission of testimony and statements of codefendant Corona, certain hearsay objections, guilt phase instructions, prosecutorial misconduct, notice of evidence in aggravation at the penalty trial, and admission of improper evidence in aggravation. He claims that in some instances, an objection vital to preservation of an issue on appeal is not recorded because of the trial court's decision not to order the transcription of bench conferences. As it appears in our discussion of each of these issues, however, we have found the record adequate to permit our review of each claim. Defendant asserts a constitutional basis for his claim, arguing that substantial defects or omissions in a trial record impair a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal. He also argues that an effective appeal is impossible without an adequate record, and that an inadequate record is fundamentally incompatible with the Eighth Amendment and its requirement that there be a reliable determination whether death is the appropriate penalty. (15) Defendant argues that the burden is on the People to demonstrate that the unreported proceedings are immaterial, citing March v. Municipal Court (1972) 7 Cal.3d 422, 428 [102 Cal. Rptr. 597, 498 P.2d 437, 66 A.L.R.3d 945], and Draper v. Washington (1963) 372 U.S. 487, 499 [9 L.Ed.2d 899, 907, 83 S.Ct. 774]. However, those cases involved invidious discrimination in the preparation of transcripts on appeal. These cases were designed to vindicate the principle that indigents must be afforded as adequate and effective appellate review as that given appellants with funds.... ( Draper v. Washington, supra, at p. 496 [9 L.Ed.2d at p. 906].) The high court as well as this court have said that when the grounds for appeal suggest a colorable need for a transcript of the proceedings, the burden is on the state to show that a partial transcript or some alternative method will provide as effective an appeal as is available to the wealthier defendant who can pay for the transcript. (See Mayer v. Chicago (1971) 404 U.S. 189, 195 [30 L.Ed.2d 372, 378-379, 92 S.Ct. 410]; March v. Municipal Court, supra, 7 Cal.3d at pp. 427-428.) Here there is no invidious discrimination, and the principles of these cases are inapplicable. To the extent they are instructive because they describe the importance of an adequate record on appeal, defendant misstates the burden on the prosecutor, which is not to show that any omission is immaterial, as defendant claims, but to show that the transcript is sufficient to assure adequate appellate review. [8] (12d) Defendant's constitutional claims founder on our rejection of his premise that the omissions in the record are substantial. [9] They are not, even if we place the burden of proof on the People on this point as he would have us do. Rather, as we have explained, as to every issue raised on appeal, we have found the record perfectly adequate for the purpose of review; in an excess of caution, we have in one instance assumed that an objection was preserved in an unreported sidebar conference, but in every other instance we have been able to decide the issues raised without resorting to any such presumption. Finally, our review of the record convinces us that defendant's claim that there might be issues he could have raised if he had seen all the sidebar conferences transcribed is pure speculation. Therefore we must reject his claim as a matter both of federal constitutional law and state law.
(16a) Defendant argues that prejudicial jury misconduct occurred when two prospective jurors who did not serve on his jury read a newspaper article about another capital trial. He claims the information they gleaned from this article may have infected the rest of the venire, in violation of his rights to due process, an unbiased jury, and a reliable determination of penalty. The record shows that during voir dire, it came to the court's attention that prospective jurors may have read a newspaper article relating the ambivalence of capital defendant Robert Bloom toward his death sentence. The headline read: Judge ponders sentencing of killer who says he's had a change of heart. The article reported that though Bloom had requested his jury to impose the death penalty, he actually hoped for a sentence of life imprisonment. The article noted Bloom's antagonism to the jury and to his trial counsel, and noted that Judge Albracht, who also presided in defendant's case, was considering appointing new counsel for Bloom. The article quoted Bloom: `Look,' he said, `they're not going to execute me. I'll get an automatic appeal. When my case is reversed, I'll do the whole thing differently.' Defendant argues that the Bloom article prejudiced him by lessening the jury's sense of responsibility, undermining the gravity of the proceedings, and planting the fear that defendant might some day emerge from prison. (See People v. Milner (1988) 45 Cal.3d 227, 257 [246 Cal. Rptr. 713, 753 P.2d 669]; People v. Ramos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 136, 157-159 [207 Cal. Rptr. 800, 689 P.2d 430].) The claim is that any juror who read the article would have learned that a death sentence could be reduced to a life sentence by the trial judge, and that there was a likelihood that any death sentence would be reversed on appeal. Defendant also argues that the court failed to perform an adequate inquiry to determine whether other prospective jurors had read the article, and failed to allow counsel to question jurors in private regarding the article, making it impossible to know whether other jurors were affected by it. (See People v. Adcox, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 253.) (17a) As we said recently, [i]t is well settled that it is misconduct for a juror to read newspaper accounts of a case on which he is sitting.... ( People v. Holloway, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 1108; see also People v. Hernandez (1988) 47 Cal.3d 315, 338 [253 Cal. Rptr. 199, 763 P.2d 1289].) In fact, we have warned against the reading of `any matter in connection with the subject-matter of the trial which would be at all likely to influence jurors in the performance of duty....' ( People v. Holloway, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 1108, quoting People v. McCoy (1886) 71 Cal. 395, 397 [12 P. 272].) (16b) As the trial court found, on its face the Bloom article had absolutely nothing to do with defendant's case. However, to the extent that the article implied that a trial court could reduce a sentence of death to a life term, or that a conviction might be reversed on appeal, it could be considered extraneous legal information that would be misconduct for a juror to consider. (See People v. Marshall (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907, 950 [269 Cal. Rptr. 269, 790 P.2d 676]; In re Stankewitz (1985) 40 Cal.3d 391, 397 [220 Cal. Rptr. 382, 708 P.2d 1260]; see also People v. Anderson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 453, 468 [276 Cal. Rptr. 356, 801 P.2d 1107] [jury should generally not be advised regarding availability of appeal in capital cases].) Though a presumption of prejudice attaches to jury misconduct, we think that the presumption arising from any misconduct relating to the Bloom article is readily dispelled. (See People v. Holloway, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 1108.) The prospective juror who clipped the article showed it to only one other venireman. Neither man actually served on defendant's jury. Defendant's argument that the court erred in failing to inquire of the rest of the panel whether they had read the article is tenuous; since the article was found just where the prospective juror had left it in the courthouse it is speculative to argue that other jurors may have seen it. (Compare People v. Ramirez (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1158, 1175 [270 Cal. Rptr. 286, 791 P.2d 965] [insufficient evidence that one juror's misconduct tainted others to trigger duty of inquiry].) Even if we take into account the possibility that other jurors may have read the article, we think that any such misconduct, speculative as it is, is not prejudicial. (18) The presumption of prejudice may be dispelled by an admonition to disregard the improper information. ( People v. Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 838; see also People v. Holloway, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pp. 1111-1112.) We generally presume that jurors observe such instructions. ( People v. Adcox, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 253.) (16c) Here, the court admonished the entire panel to disregard the article, that the article contained errors, and that only the evidence presented at trial was to be considered. Further, the problem arose at an early stage of the proceedings, when attention was not focused on the sentence to be imposed. The problem is comparable to that presented by offhand remarks of a juror or even the prosecutor regarding the possibility of commutation that we have held nonprejudicial when they occur at the voir dire stage. (See, e.g., People v. Kaurish (1990) 52 Cal.3d 648, 709 [276 Cal. Rptr. 788, 802 P.2d 278] [juror told of early release of relative convicted of murder]; People v. Walker, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 627 [prosecutor asked jurors on voir dire what they thought life without parole really meant]; People v. Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d 739, 769-770 [prosecutor referred to commutation power in voir dire].) The misconduct alleged does not support a finding that there is a substantial likelihood that at least one juror was impermissibly influenced to the defendant's detriment.... ( People v. Marshall, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 951.) Accordingly we hold that the presumption of prejudice arising from any misconduct has been rebutted. [10] (19a) Defendant claims there was a further incident of jury misconduct when, before closing arguments of counsel at the guilt phase began, two jurors read an article in the Los Angeles Times lionizing the prosecutor in defendant's case. Among many anecdotes, it recounted how, in defendant's case, the prosecutor refused to stipulate that a photograph displayed one of the victims, and instead flew in the victim's mother, who broke down on the stand when called upon to identify the photograph. Defendant objects that the article made the prosecutor seem glamorous and successful, that it suggested that she only prosecuted guilty recidivists, and that it enhanced the poignancy of her claim that defendant was a Nazi by disclosing her own family's fate in the Nazi death camps. Counsel for both defendants made a motion for mistrial, but the court denied the motion, explaining that it found the article at least as damaging to the prosecution as it was helpful. The court pointed out that the article characterized the prosecutor as the master of overkill and an actress, as someone whose aggressiveness had won her loathing, as callous, heartless, cold, and able to win only easy cases, and as one who attempts to manipulate the jury with witnesses called only for dramatic purposes. The court assumed that all the jurors had read the article, but finding no prejudice, determined to address the problem with an admonition to the jury. The court informed counsel they could question the jurors as necessary, but without sequestration. When the court questioned the jury about the article, it appeared that two regular jurors and one alternate had read the article. Another regular juror explained that she had only read the headline, and then asked her husband to save the article. When asked whether the article had any effect on their ability to be fair, one of the jurors who had read the article responded that her interest had been in the description of the prosecutor's wardrobe and things of that nature. The other juror who had read the article did not respond. The court commented that it found the article did not reflect on the guilt or innocence of the accused. It instructed those jurors who had not read the article not to do so, and instructed those who had read it to recognize that news articles contain many errors, and to decide the case solely on the basis of properly introduced evidence. Counsel for defendant had no further questions, while counsel for codefendant Brown unsuccessfully renewed his request for individual voir dire of the jurors who had read the article. Respondent concedes, citing our decision in People v. Hernandez, supra, 47 Cal.3d at page 338, that to the extent the article contained any information about defendant's case, it was misconduct for any juror to read it. (17b) Indeed, as we have seen, it is misconduct for a juror to consult any material outside the record that is connected to the trial and that may influence a juror in the performance of his or her duty. ( People v. Holloway, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 1108.) (19b) Nonetheless, we are persuaded that the presumption of prejudice is rebutted. The court admonished the jury to disregard the article. (See id. at pp. 1111-1112.) Further, the content of the article was innocuous. The suggestion that the prosecutor handled only recidivists would have had no effect on jurors, since defendant had already testified that he was a professional robber who had a prior conviction. Because she was prosecuting, the suggestion that the prosecutor could never defend a guilty person did not convey, as defendant claims, the implication that she personally believed defendant to be guilty. The description of her technique of calling the victim's mother only served to discredit her as engaging in patent manipulation of the jury. The article quoted her as saying of the incident, the image of the tearful mother was clearly implanted in the minds of the jurors.... I take no chances; you never know what the jury is going to do. Finally, the information that the prosecutor had suffered personally from the Nazis and from anti-Semitism could only have raised an inference that she had a personal bias against defendant, an inference that would not enhance her prestige with the jury. This is not a case in which the jury received inadmissible evidence relating to guilt or innocence, or received improper legal information from outside sources. Rather, the article on the prosecutor was essentially a gossipy human interest story emphasizing her glamour and aggressiveness. Far from introducing the jury to new facts or law, it explored an area the jury was peculiarly well suited to evaluate for itself; the personality and human qualities of the deputy district attorney they had been watching in action for so long. (Compare People v. Marshall, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 950.) Finally, as the trial court perceived, the overall impression the article created was far from favorable to the prosecutor. Considering the contents of the article, and the court's admonition to the jury to disregard it and be bound by the evidence presented at trial, we find that the presumption of prejudice is rebutted. (See People v. Marshall, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pp. 951-952.) (20) We reject defendant's argument that the court's failure to question each juror privately regarding the impact of the article violated defendant's rights to a fair trial and a reliable determination of penalty by an unbiased adjudicator under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7, 8, 16 and 17 of the California Constitution. Certainly, when there is a claim of juror misconduct, the court must conduct an inquiry sufficient to determine the facts ... whenever the court is put on notice that good cause to discharge a juror may exist. ( People v. Burgener (1986) 41 Cal.3d 505, 519 [224 Cal. Rptr. 112, 714 P.2d 1251].) But failure to conduct a sufficient inquiry is ordinarily viewed as an abuse of discretion, rather than as constitutional error. ( Id., at p. 520, see also People v. Adcox, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 253, but see People v. McNeal (1979) 90 Cal. App.3d 830, 840 [153 Cal. Rptr. 706] [applying harmless-beyond-reasonable-doubt standard].) This is not a case in which the trial court conducted no inquiry. The court determined which jurors had read the article, asked them if their impartiality were impaired, and admonished them to disregard the article. The court also admonished the rest of the jury not to read the article and to disregard any mention of it. While individual questioning may have been preferable, we have never held that it is constitutionally required. Further, although we do not agree with respondent that trial counsel waived the issue of jury misconduct, we do note that counsel declined the opportunity to question the jury as a group on the article. (Compare People v. Burgener, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 521 [defense counsel in part responsible for inadequate record regarding misconduct].) Under the circumstances, even if we were of the view that the trial court should have inquired more fully into the question of misconduct, no prejudice appears.
(21a) For a brief period that ended six months before the commencement of trial, defendant represented himself. Advisory counsel was appointed to assist him. Defendant claims the trial court erroneously granted his motion to represent himself. He claims that because there is no reporter's transcript of the hearing at which the motion was granted, and thus no record that the court advised defendant of the dangers of self-representation, reversal of the entire judgment is required. (22) A defendant seeking self-representation `should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.' ( People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1224-1225 [259 Cal. Rptr. 669, 774 P.2d 698].) As long as the record as a whole shows that the defendant understood the dangers of self-representation, no particular form of warning is required. The test of a valid waiver of counsel is not whether specific warnings or advisements were given but whether the record as a whole demonstrates that the defendant understood the disadvantages of self-representation, including the risks and complexities of the particular case. ( Id. at p. 1225; see also People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1142 [282 Cal. Rptr. 465, 811 P.2d 757].) (21b) Defendant's reliance on the deficiency of the record is misplaced. Although there is no reporter's transcript of the hearing at which the motion was granted, there is a full record of an earlier hearing that discloses the defendant was made aware of the disadvantages of self-representation. The reporter's transcript shows that on March 3, 1983, defendant moved to represent himself. The court asked if defendant thought he could save his life, and whether defendant realized the prosecutor was trying to kill [him]. Defendant responded that he had known the stakes for over a year, and that he thought he could properly represent himself. The court informed defendant it would be difficult to represent himself while confined in jail, especially with defendant's history of difficulties following jailhouse rules. The court urged on him the advantages of keeping his counsel, explaining that counsel was trained and experienced, while defendant was not. He reminded him of his constitutional right to counsel. Defendant acknowledged that he understood he had a right to counsel but could knowingly waive that right. The court put the matter over to permit defendant to think about his request. The clerk's transcript indicates that on March 16, 1983, the court advised defendant of his constitutional right to be represented by counsel and defendant waived the right and was permitted to proceed in propria persona. In later appearances, the court urged advisory counsel on defendant, and advisory counsel was appointed on May 24, 1983. We are satisfied that the record of the March 3, 1983, hearing demonstrates defendant was adequately advised regarding the dangers of self-representation. Because we so conclude, we need not consider defendant's argument that the error in granting him in propria persona status was reversible per se, or that the error was prejudicial under any other standard. (23) Defendant argues that during his brief period of self-representation, the court violated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution and parallel rights under the state Constitution by permitting him and his former counsel to testify at a hearing on his motion to dismiss. He claims that his testimony and that of counsel provided windfall discovery to the prosecution regarding defendant's intention to present an alibi defense, and that the court should have excluded the district attorney before permitting such testimony. Defendant's motion was obviously not a Marsden ( People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118, 124 [84 Cal. Rptr. 156, 465 P.2d 44]) motion, as defendant now claims, since at the time of the motion he had already removed his appointed counsel and was representing himself. Instead, he attempted to persuade the court to dismiss the case against him because of inadequate time waivers and prosecutorial misconduct, and because his previous counsel had failed adequately to investigate his defense. This was clearly an adversarial hearing that could not proceed without the presence of the district attorney to represent the interests of the state. It is true that defendant testified and called counsel to the stand, disclosing defendant's intent to produce alibi witnesses. We observe, however, that the court cautioned him about his privilege against self-incrimination and his attorney-client privilege. Any harm to defendant was self-inflicted; [d]efendants who have elected self-representation may not thereafter seek reversal of their convictions on the ground that their own efforts were inadequate.... ( People v. Bloom, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 1226.)