Opinion ID: 2761130
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Board’s Alleged Adoption of a New

Text: Legislative Rule During the Course of the Ongoing Adjudication is Not a Final Order Subject to Judicial Review CSX argues that judicial review is appropriate even if we were to hold (as indeed we do) that the market dominance decision is not an appealable final order. CSX reasons that the Board should not have implemented a new methodology for assessing market dominance without first going through notice and comment rulemaking. Thus, according to CSX, “failure to follow notice-and-comment procedures required by the APA constitutes a completed, final injury to the parties that is subject to immediate judicial review.” Pet’r’s Br. at 10. This argument is nothing more than a backhanded attempt to circumvent the final order rule. The principal premise of CSX’s argument is that the new methodology and rules adopted by the Board to evaluate the evidence of market dominance “have the force of law, establish binding norms, and determine rights and obligations.” Pet’r’s Br. at 27 (citing CropLife Am. v. EPA, 329 F.3d 876 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 290 F.3d 377 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974)). CSX thus characterizes the new methodology as a rule, rather than an unreviewable statement of agency policy. Some of what CSX says about the reviewability of “legislative rules,” as distinguished from 13 agency policy statements, is certainly true. See EDWARDS, ELLIOTT, & LEVY, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW 156–63 (2d ed. 2013) (discussing “Reviewability of Agency Policy Statements and Interpretative Rules”). But CSX’s argument is a non sequitur. Merely because the Board’s alleged adoption of a new legislative rule without notice and comment may be subject to judicial review does not mean that the court will allow CSX to pursue an interlocutory appeal. Indeed, CSX has not cited a single decision in which this or any other appellate court has permitted a party to seek interlocutory review on the ground that an agency has allegedly adopted a new legislative rule during the course of an adjudication. This comes as no surprise because the courts would wreak havoc with the final order rule were we to subscribe to CSX’s position. After an adjudication has ended, a party is free to argue that the agency exceeded its authority or abused its discretion in adopting new principles through adjudication instead of rulemaking. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974). If an agency interprets the law in an adjudication, a party can challenge that interpretation as being inconsistent with the agency’s organic statute, or with its regulations. See, e.g., NLRB v. Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571, 584 (1994) (overturning administrative decision inconsistent with governing statute); Am. Fed'n of Gov't Emps. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 777 F.2d 751, 758 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (overturning administrative decision inconsistent with agency regulations). And when an “agency applies [a general statement of] policy in a particular situation, it must be prepared to support the policy just as if the policy statement had never been issued.” Pac. Gas, 506 F.2d at 38. In all such cases, however, if the contested agency action takes place during the course of an adjudication, judicial review comes only at the conclusion of the proceedings. 14 CSX’s position is that the mere allegation that an agency has adopted a legislative rule during the course of an ongoing adjudication without notice and comment is sufficient to allow a party to sidestep the final order rule and require the court to rule on the merits of the party’s APA claim. This is not the law. We therefore reject CSX’s position.