Opinion ID: 1454252
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: execution before final judgment

Text: Former ORS 18.125 was adopted in recognition that interlocutory appeals could avoid the possible injustice of delay to some litigants. Before the passage of that statute, a party in a multiple-party case could have judgment entered against him or her and the prevailing party could execute on that judgment and the party against whom the judgment was entered could not even stay the proceedings pending appeal because a supersedeas bond could only be filed after an appeal and an appeal could only be taken after entry of final judgment resolving all issues in the case. May v. Josephine Memorial Hospital, 297 Or. 525, 531 n. 8, 686 P.2d 1015 (1984) (citing Minutes, House Committee on Judiciary 1-3 (Feb. 4, 1977)). Former ORS 18.125(1) provided that, when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment or decree as to one or more but fewer than all of the    parties    upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment or decree. For purposes of appeal, ORS 19.040 provides for an automatic stay by supersedeas bond. With respect to stays for other purposes, former ORS 18.125(2) provided that, if the court entered a judgment in accordance with former ORS 18.125(1), the court may stay enforcement of that judgment    until the entering of a subsequent judgment    and may prescribe such conditions as are necessary to secure the benefit thereof to the party in whose favor the judgment    is entered. In order for the remedial purposes of former ORS 18.125 to be fulfilled, it is necessary to conclude that execution may issue only upon a judgment that would give the non-prevailing party an opportunity either to file a supersedeas bond and stay the proceeding under ORS 19.040 or to make a motion to stay the execution under former ORS 18.125(2). In the absence of a determination that there is no just reason for delay and an express direction for the entry of judgment, the judgment of January 14, 1981, was an intermediate order subject to revision [by the trial court] at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims between all the parties. Former ORS 18.010, 18.125(1). See also Jefferson State Bank v. Welch, 299 Or. 335, 339, 702 P.2d 414 (1985) (construing ORCP 67, the successor to former ORS 18.125). At the time of execution, there was no judgment upon which the execution could be based under ORS 23.030. [3] However, the posture of the prior case did not remain the same.