Opinion ID: 1115672
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: adverse possession/alley dispute

Text: At the outset, we note that the superior court made an error in nomenclature when it based its decision on the theory of adverse possession. The theory of adverse possession allows an individual to acquire title to property if he possesses the land adversely for the statutory period, which in Alaska is ten years. [4] AS 09.10.030. The theory of adverse possession is not applicable to the present case. Rather than seeking to possess the property, the City is seeking a right to use the road and alleys on Survey 2541. Since at most the public only used the property as a roadway, the City cannot establish the first element of an adverse possession claim: continuous and uninterrupted possession. Bentley Family Trust v. Lynx Enterprises, Inc., 658 P.2d 761, 765 (Alaska 1983). This does not end the inquiry, however, because there are alternate theories, similar to adverse possession, which may be used to uphold the superior court's award of the alleyways to the City. It is clear that the right of the public to use land as a public highway may be acquired through public use. II American Law of Property, § 9.50, at 483 (J. Casner ed. 1952). Two theories are most commonly used to establish such a right: prescription and implied dedication. Comment, The Acquisition of Easements by the Public Through Use, 16 S.D.L.Rev. 150, 150 (1971). In order to establish a public road by implied dedication, two basic elements must be shown. First, there must be an intent to dedicate the road to the public, and second, there must be an acceptance of this offer. 6A R. Powell, The Law of Real Property ¶ 926 (1984). One seeking to establish a road on the theory of implied dedication must meet a high threshold of proof. In Hamerly, we stated: There is dedication when the owner of an interest in land transfers to the public a privilege of use of such interest for a public purpose. It is a question of fact whether there has been a dedication. This fact will not be presumed against the owner of the land; the burden rests on the party relying on a dedication to establish it by proof that is clear and unequivocal. ... . Dedication is not an act or omission to assert a right; mere absence of objection is not sufficient. Passive permission by the landowner is not in itself evidence of an intent to dedicate. Intention must be clearly and unequivocally manifested by acts that are decisive in character. 359 P.2d at 125 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). Thus, evidence of public use without more is insufficient to prove dedication. In the present case, the City did not come forward with any evidence indicating that D.C. Co. or its predecessors in interest intended to dedicate parts of Survey 2541 for a public road or alley. As such, the City could not prevail on this theory. This leaves the doctrine of prescription. There is a split of authority as to whether a public highway may be created by prescription. A number of older cases hold that the public cannot acquire a road by prescription because the doctrine of prescription is based on the theory of a lost grant, [5] and such a grant cannot be made to a large and indefinite body such as the public. See II American Law of Property § 9.50 (J. Casner ed. 1952). The lost grant theory, however, has been discarded. W. Burby, Real Property § 31, at 77 (1965). In its place, courts have resorted to the justifications that underlie statutes of limitations: [The] functional utility in helping to cause prompt termination of controversies before the possible loss of evidence and in stabilizing long continued property uses. 3 R. Powell, supra note 5, ¶ 413, at XX-XXX-XX; W. Burby, supra, § 31, at 77; Restatement of Property ch. 38, Introductory Note, at 2923 (1944). These reasons apply equally to the acquisition of prescriptive easements by public use. The majority view now is that a public easement may be acquired by prescription. 2 J. Grimes, Thompson on Real Property § 342, at 209 (1980). We impliedly joined this majority in Hamerly and do so explicitly now. The requirements for establishing a public easement by prescription are nearly identical to the requirements of adverse possession, and the string of adjectives used to describe prescription have a familiar ring: the use must be open, notorious, adverse, hostile, and continuous. See W. Burby, supra, § 31, at 76-77. These general requirements have been reduced to a simple statement by this court in the adverse possession context: (1) the possession must have been continuous and uninterrupted; (2) the possessor must have acted as if he were the owner and not merely one acting with the permission of the owner; and (3) the possession must have been reasonably visible to the record owner. Alaska National Bank v. Linck, 559 P.2d 1049, 1052 (Alaska 1977). See also Restatement of Property § 457 (1944). In order to prove that use was adverse, the party seeking an easement by prescription must overcome the presumption that the use was permissive. In Hamerly, this court stated: Use alone for the statutory period  even with the knowledge of the owner  would not establish an easement. When one enters into possession or use of another's property, there is a presumption that he does so with the owner's permission and in subordination to his title. This presumption is overcome only by showing that such use of another's land was not only continuous and uninterrupted, but was openly adverse to the owner's interest, i.e., by proof of a distinct and positive assertion of a right hostile to the owner of the property. 359 P.2d at 126 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). We find that a triable issue of fact exists on the question of whether the public use of the portions of the alleyways abutting Survey 2541 was permissive or adverse. Since its occupation in the 1920's, Survey 2541 has always contained public businesses. A reasonable inference is that the public used the alleys on the north and east borders of Survey 2541 in conjunction with conducting business at either the general store or (later) at the Sea Inn Bar, or both. Indeed, a review of the aerial photographs taken of Dillingham in the mid to late 1950's shows that there was a circular driveway around the house on the northeast corner of Survey 2541, and that the entrance to the general store faced this driveway. If the public did use these alleys in conjunction with business at the store, then use of the portions of Survey 2541 adjoining the public alleys would have been with permission. This theory, together with the presumption of permissiveness, leads us to conclude that the issue of whether a prescriptive easement was created by public use should have been submitted to a factfinder. As such, summary judgment was inappropriate. [6]