Opinion ID: 796039
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Flawed Indictment, Erroneous Jury Instructions, and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Text: 69 In addition to the Jackson claim already discussed above, Joseph argues that his due process rights were violated in two other ways: by being tried pursuant to an indictment and jury instructions that incorrectly stated the only capital specification with which he was charged. Joseph did not, however, object at trial to either the indictment or the jury instructions. Accordingly, the Ohio Supreme Court deemed these claims waived and reviewed only for plain error. Joseph II, 653 N.E.2d at 291, 294. We recently held in similar circumstances that a prisoner had procedurally defaulted his claims. See Biros, 422 F.3d at 386-87. Thus, Joseph has procedurally defaulted his indictment and jury-instruction claims, and federal habeas review of the claims is barred unless [Joseph] can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). 70
71 We note at the outset that [s]o confident is the government of the correctness of its [cause-and-prejudice] argument that it has not deigned to respond to the merits of the appeal. This was a tactical error. The government's confidence is unwarranted. Pasha v. Gonzales, 433 F.3d 530, 532 (7th Cir.2005). For the following reasons, Joseph has established cause and prejudice to excuse his procedural default. 72 Constitutionally [i]neffective assistance of counsel . . . is cause for a procedural default. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986); see also Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451, 120 S.Ct. 1587, 146 L.Ed.2d 518 (2000) (Not just any deficiency in counsel's performance will do . . .; the assistance must have been so ineffective as to violate the Federal Constitution. In other words, ineffective assistance adequate to establish cause for the procedural default of some other constitutional claim is itself an independent constitutional claim. (citation omitted)). Joseph argues that his procedural default should be excused because his trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to object to the flawed indictment and erroneous jury instructions. Joseph also claims the ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) as an independent claim for habeas relief. 13 Although Joseph must satisfy the AEDPA standard with respect to his independent IAC claim, he need not do so to claim ineffective assistance for the purpose of establishing cause. See Fischetti v. Johnson, 384 F.3d 140, 154-55 (3d Cir.2004). For the reasons discussed below, Joseph has established his IAC claim under the AEDPA standard, which necessarily means that he has also established ineffective assistance for the purpose of establishing cause. 73 IAC claims are governed by the test enunciated in the clearly established Supreme Court precedent of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the `counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Performance is measured against an objective standard of reasonableness, under prevailing professional norms. Id. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The second component of a Strickland claim is a show[ing] that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. A reasonable probability is less than a preponderance of the evidence, as a defendant need not show that counsel's deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in the case. Id. at 693, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Instead, [a] reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 74 The Ohio Court of Appeals, which was the last state court to issue a reasoned opinion on the issue, gave the following reasons for rejecting the argument that Joseph's counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the flawed indictment and erroneous jury instructions: 75 The flaw in the specification is very technical in nature, albeit the effect of this flaw has been an issue of significant importance to the case. This flaw in the precise wording of the specification was so subtle that neither the attorneys for the State nor the trial judge noticed it. Defense counsel's failing to notice this flaw does not rise to the level of deficient performance. 76 . . . 77 . . . Simply failing to object to an alleged error is insufficient to sustain a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, unless it is also shown that counsel violated an essential duty owed the client. The [failure to object to the jury instructions] do[es] not amount to deficient conduct resulting in prejudice affecting the fairness of [Joseph's] trial. Joseph I, 1993 WL 531858, at . 14 78 A number of recent cases have emphasized that defense attorneys have a constitutional duty to conduct adequate factual investigations. See, e.g., Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 162 L.Ed.2d 360 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003). Yet it can hardly be doubted that defense lawyers have a constitutional obligation to investigate and understand the law as well. See, e.g., Williams, 529 U.S. at 395, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (noting that counsel failed to conduct an investigation . . . not because of any strategic calculation but because they incorrectly thought that state law barred access to such records.); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ([S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable . . . . (emphasis added)); Smith v. Dretke, 417 F.3d 438, 442-43 (5th Cir.2005) ([Defense counsel] failed to achieve a rudimentary understanding of the well-settled law of self-defense in Texas. By doing so, he neglected the central issue in his client's case. . . . This misunderstanding could have been corrected with minimal legal research. (footnote omitted)). 79 Here, the principal-offender specification was the only capital specification with which Joseph was charged and therefore was the only reason Joseph faced the death penalty. Thus, it was obviously the critical issue in the case. Simply reading the statute would have revealed that the specification requires the defendant to be the principal offender in the commission of the aggravated murder, not of the kidnapping. And minimal case research would have revealed that being the principal offender in the commission of the aggravated murder means that the defendant must have actually killed the victim. Yet Joseph's trial counsel failed to grasp either of these two basic points, as evidenced by his failure to object to the flawed indictment and erroneous jury instructions. The complete lack of understanding was further confirmed by counsel's own repeated mis-statements of the specification. And it was topped off by his failure to notice that the state conceded that it could not prove that Joseph actually killed the victim. 80 Understanding the elements of the specification that makes a defendant eligible for the death penalty is perhaps the most basic aspect of representing a capital defendant. We think this proposition obvious, but in any event it finds support in the standards for capital defense work articulated by the American Bar Association (ABA)—standards to which [the Supreme Court] long ha[s] referred as `guides to determining what is reasonable.' Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524, 123 S.Ct. 2527 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052). The ABA Guidelines provide that [c]ounsel should conduct independent investigations relating to the guilt/innocence phase and to the penalty phase of a capital trial. ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES § 11.4.1(A) (1989). Counsel must procure [s]ources of investigative information, the first of which are the charging documents, which should be obtained and examined in the context of the applicable statutes and precedents, to identify . . . the elements of the charged offense(s), including the element(s) alleged to make the death penalty applicable . . . . Id. § 11.4.1(D)(1)(A). 15 In failing to understand even the basic elements of the principal-offender specification, the performance of Joseph's trial counsel was constitutionally deficient. 81 The state court attempted to diminish the failures of Joseph's counsel by calling the error in the specification technical and subtle. We think it inconceivable that a reasonable criminal defense attorney would find the difference between kidnapping and aggravated murder too technical and subtle, especially when this distinction provides the sole basis for receiving the death penalty rather than a life sentence. Under the state court's unreasonably low performance standard, criminal defense lawyers might also be permitted to confuse misdemeanor and felony, the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, or even guilty and not guilty. Fortunately for Joseph and other criminal defendants, the prevailing professional norms under which Strickland performance is judged are not as low as the state court would have them. 82 The state court also attempted to minimize the deficiency of Joseph's counsel by noting that he was not the only one to misunderstand the specification—the prosecution and the trial judge similarly erred. We fail to see how the pervasiveness of the error excuses Joseph's counsel's performance. After all, Joseph was represented— and consequently was owed a constitutionally sufficient level of performance—by his counsel, not by the prosecution or the trial judge. Furthermore, when the prosecution and the trial judge are operating under a mistaken view of the law, the performance of defense counsel becomes more important, because he is then the only one left to correct the misunderstanding. Accordingly, we conclude that the state court unreasonably applied Strickland in concluding that the performance of Joseph's trial counsel was constitutionally adequate. 83 The prejudice inquiry is similarly straightforward. If Joseph's trial counsel had objected to the flawed indictment and erroneous jury instruction, then the players at trial would not have labored under an incorrect understanding of the capital specification, and there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different (i.e., that Joseph would not have received a death sentence), in at least three identifiable ways. First, there is a reasonable probability that the prosecution, which conceded that it could not prove that Joseph actually killed the victim, would have declined to charge Joseph with the specification. Second, there is a reasonable probability that, given the prosecution's concession that it could not prove that Joseph actually killed the victim, a properly instructed jury would have found Joseph not guilty of the specification. Third, even if the jury still found Joseph guilty of the specification, there is a reasonable probability that a trial judge with a proper understanding of the specification would have intervened, either by setting aside the verdict after the guilt phase or by rejecting the jury's recommendation of a death sentence after the penalty phase. Thus, we have little trouble concluding that Joseph's defense was prejudiced by his trial counsel's deficient performance, and that the state court unreasonably applied Strickland in concluding otherwise. 84 Having determined that habeas relief is warranted on Joseph's independent IAC claim, it necessarily follows that Joseph has established cause to excuse the procedural default of his indictment and jury-instruction claims. Of course, Joseph must also establish the prejudice component of cause and prejudice. The Supreme Court has declined to provide a general definition of prejudice for purposes of cause and prejudice. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 168, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982). Nevertheless, the Court has given some instructive content to the term by explaining that one way to establish the prejudice component of cause and prejudice is to establish Brady materiality. Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 691, 698, 124 S.Ct. 1256, 157 L.Ed.2d 1166 (2004); Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 282, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999). Given that Strickland prejudice is governed by a standard worded similarly to the Brady materiality standard, compare Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) ([F]avorable evidence is material, and constitutional error results from its suppression by the government, if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. (internal quotation marks omitted)), with Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.), 16 it follows that establishing Strickland prejudice likewise establishes prejudice for purposes of cause and prejudice. Mincey v. Head, 206 F.3d 1106, 1147 n. 86 (11th Cir.2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 926, 121 S.Ct. 1369, 149 L.Ed.2d 297 (2001); Prou v. United States, 199 F.3d 37, 49 (1st Cir.1999). Thus, Joseph has established cause and prejudice to excuse his procedural default. 85 We may now turn to the merits of Joseph's indictment and jury-instruction claims. As we noted above, the state declined to argue the merits of these claims. Therefore, it is not clear that the state is even appealing the district court's resolution of the merits in Joseph's favor. Accordingly, we discuss the merits (which we affirm) only briefly.
86 No principle of procedural due process is more clearly established than that notice of the specific charge, and a chance to be heard in a trial of the issues raised by that charge, if desired, are among the constitutional rights of every accused in a criminal proceeding in all courts, state or federal. Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 201, 68 S.Ct. 514, 92 L.Ed. 644 (1948); see also Valentine v. Konteh, 395 F.3d 626, 631 (6th Cir.2005) ([A]n indictment is only [constitutionally] sufficient if it (1) contains the elements of the charged offense, (2) gives the defendant adequate notice of the charges, and (3) protects the defendant against double jeopardy.). 17 These fundamental principles of procedural fairness apply with no less force at the penalty phase of a trial in a capital case than they do in the guilt-determining phase of any criminal trial. Presnell v. Georgia, 439 U.S. 14, 16, 99 S.Ct. 235, 58 L.Ed.2d 207 (1978). Joseph claims that he was denied due process because the flawed indictment failed to give him adequate notice of the capital specification. The Ohio Supreme Court acknowledged the error in the indictment, but it concluded that Joseph had received sufficient notice of the correct capital specification and that the error had not prejudiced his defense. Joseph II, 653 N.E.2d at 291-92. 87 Joseph principally relies on Lucas v. O'Dea, 179 F.3d 412 (6th Cir.1999). There, a person was shot and killed in the course of a robbery committed by Lucas and two other men. Lucas was indicted for intentional murder, which required proof that he shot the victim. The only witness testified that he did not know which of the robbers fired the fatal shot, and Lucas's entire defense was that he did not shoot the victim. Despite the intentional-murder charge in the indictment, the jury was given instructions for wanton murder, for which it was immaterial who fired the shot. The state supreme court upheld the conviction, characterizing it as a conviction for wanton murder. We concluded that in these circumstances, Lucas had been deprived . . . of his Fourteenth Amendment right to notice of the charges against him. Id. at 417. We conclude likewise here: much as Lucas was indicted for one crime (intentional murder) but convicted of another (wanton murder), Joseph, too, was indicted for one asserted capital specification (being the principal offender in commission of the kidnapping) but convicted of another (being the principal offender in the commission of the aggravated murder). Indeed, the lack of notice is arguably even worse here, as Joseph was initially indicted under a specification that did not even exist. 88 In granting relief on this claim, the district court, relying on United States v. Ford, 872 F.2d 1231, 1235-36 (6th Cir. 1989) (explaining that an amendment to an indictment is prejudicial per se), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 843, 111 S.Ct. 124, 112 L.Ed.2d 93 (1990), held that the error in Joseph's indictment was not subject to harmless-error review. The district court held in the alternative that the error was not harmless in this case. Given the Supreme Court's decision in Esparza II (discussed above), we think it prudent to engage in the harmless-error analysis. 18 For the reasons similar to those that have already been discussed above, we conclude that the due-process violation had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict, Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted), and therefore was not harmless. Moreover, it was objectively unreasonable for the state court to conclude otherwise.
89 Supreme Court precedent clearly establishes that [i]n a criminal trial, the State must prove every element of the offense, and a jury instruction violates due process if it fails to give effect to that requirement. Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 437, 124 S.Ct. 1830, 158 L.Ed.2d 701 (2004) (citing Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 520-21, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979)). The only question . . . is `whether the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.' It is well established that the instruction `may not be judged in artificial isolation,' but must be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991) (citations omitted) (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147, 94 S.Ct. 396, 38 L.Ed.2d 368 (1973)). Joseph's jury-instruction claim is based, of course, on the erroneous principal-offender instruction. 90 The Ohio Supreme Court's rejection of Joseph's claim was premised on the idea that because the trial court read the correct specification once, it cured any error in the instructions. Joseph II, 653 N.E.2d at 294-95. We conclude that this decision is both contrary to and an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The decision is contrary to Supreme Court precedent in that it ignored the approach that the Court has explicitly articulated for this type of claim. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 405, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (A state-court decision will certainly be contrary to our clearly established precedent if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in our cases.). By excusing the error solely on the basis of the single instance in which the trial court read the correct specification, the state court judged in artificial isolation that one correct reading, virtually ignoring the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record, i.e., the countless times that the incorrect specification was stated or referenced. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 72, 112 S.Ct. 475 (internal quotation marks omitted). 91 The state court also unreasonably applied clearly established federal law. The jury instructions repeatedly and incorrectly stated (either explicitly or by reference to earlier misstatements) that the capital specification required proof that Joseph was the principal offender in the commission of the kidnapping. Thus, the instructions omitted the element of being the principal offender in the commission of the aggravated murder, i.e., that Joseph actually killed the victim, which means that they fail[ed] to give effect to th[e] [due-process] requirement that the State must prove every element of the offense. McNeil, 541 U.S. at 437, 124 S.Ct. 1830. The rest of the trial record, McGuire, 502 U.S. at 72, 112 S.Ct. 475, compounded the error in the jury instructions, as both the prosecution and Joseph's counsel repeatedly misstated the specification in their opening statements and closing and rebuttal arguments. The single instance in which the trial court correctly read the specification to the jury was insufficient to cure the pervasive errors elsewhere in the instructions and the rest of the proceedings. See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 322, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985) (Language that merely contradicts and does not explain a constitutionally infirm instruction will not suffice to absolve the infirmity. A reviewing court has no way of knowing which of the two irreconcilable instructions the jurors applied in reaching their verdict.); Laird v. Horn, 414 F.3d 419, 427-28 (3d Cir.2005) ([W]e can not conclude that such a brief reference to the required mens rea for first-degree murder remedies the incorrect and misleading portion of the instruction.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 1143, 163 L.Ed.2d 1014 (2006); Everett v. Beard, 290 F.3d 500, 512 (3d Cir.2002) (The mere fact that the law was correctly stated in one part of the charge will not automatically insulate the charge from a determination of error.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1107, 123 S.Ct. 877, 154 L.Ed.2d 777 (2003). Once again, for reasons that have been discussed at length, the due-process violation was not harmless. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623, 113 S.Ct. 1710. 92