Opinion ID: 1057954
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: HCC's claim of absolute immunity.

Text: In its assignment of cross-error, HCC asserts that the circuit court erred in holding that it was not entitled to absolute immunity from quantum meruit claims. HCC contends that it should enjoy the same level of immunity that is afforded to the entity that created it — Chesterfield County. Because counties, as opposed to municipalities, are entitled to absolute immunity as local subdivisions of the State, see 15 Mann v. County Board of Arlington County, 199 Va. 169, 174, 98 S.E.2d 515, 518-19 (1957), HCC maintains that it, too, is entitled to absolute immunity. HCC accordingly claims that it is immune from Jean Moreau's quantum meruit claim, regardless of whether the development and operation of Springdale serves a proprietary or governmental function. In support of its argument, HCC relies on Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. Hampton Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 217 Va. 30, 225 S.E.2d 364 (1976). There we considered, among other things, whether the Housing Authority was a municipal corporation. Id. at 33, 225 S.E.2d at 367. In concluding that it was, we said that, for purposes of uniformity in determining tort liability, a municipal housing authority should be held to occupy the same status as the municipality which brings it into existence and oversees its activities. Id. at 34, 225 S.E.2d at 368. While a number of years ago the Attorney General's office read this language from Hampton Redevelopment to mean that entities created by counties enjoy absolute immunity, see 1997 Op. Atty. Gen. 123, 124; 1995 Op. Atty. Gen. 72, 73, the circuit courts have not routinely agreed, and today we reject such an interpretation. A close reading of Hampton Redevelopment makes plain that we did not intend to formulate a new test for determining the appropriate level of immunity 16 due a municipal corporation. The language that HCC points to must be viewed in context. It was taken from our analysis of whether the Housing Authority was a municipal corporation. In the sentence preceding it, we said, in reference to an earlier decision, City of Richmond v. Richmond Metropolitan Authority, 210 Va. 645, 172 S.E.2d 831 (1970), that there was no valid reason for declaring that an entity occupies the status of a municipal corporation for tax refund purposes and not declaring that a similar entity occupies the same status for purposes of determining its immunity from tort liability. Hampton Redevelopment, 217 Va. at 34, 225 S.E.2d at 368. It was against this backdrop that we held that the Housing Authority was entitled to the status of a municipal corporation for purposes of determining its tort immunity. Id. We did not intend that a municipal corporation created by a county have a different status for immunity purposes than a municipal corporation created by a municipality. Indeed, in the 30-plus years since Hampton Redevelopment was decided, we have not once interpreted the language that HCC relies on in the manner that it urges. Rather, we have consistently reaffirmed that whether an entity is an arm or agency of the State, and therefore entitled to absolute immunity, depends on the nature of the entity. See, e.g., Prendergast v. Northern Virginia Regional Park Authority, 227 17 Va. 190, 194, 313 S.E.2d 399, 401 (1984) (The correct approach is the one we have long employed in the Commonwealth: the attributes of the particular entity which seeks immunity must be examined to determine whether it is an 'arm' of the Commonwealth.). In Prendergast, the circuit court held that the Northern Virginia Regional Park Authority was generally immune from liability in tort because it was created under the Park Authorities Act, former Code §§ 15.1-1228 through -1238.1,  which was enacted pursuant to Article XI, Section 1 of the Constitution. Id. at 192-93, 313 S.E.2d at 400-01. We reversed, concluding that, because the Park Authority was a creature of one or more localities and [was] essentially subject to their control, it was not an arm or agency of the State, and accordingly was not entitled to absolute immunity. Id. at 194, 313 S.E.2d at 401. In our analysis, we said that we were applying the same approach that was applied in Hampton Redevelopment – in which, after concluding that the Housing Authority was a municipal corporation, we addressed whether its operation and maintenance of a housing complex served a governmental or proprietary function. 217 Va. at 34, 225 S.E.2d at 368.