Opinion ID: 1699458
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Existence of Suspicious Circumstances

Text: [14] Even if we were to conclude that a confidential relationship existed between John and his mother, this fact is not conclusive to raise the presumption of undue influence as it must be remembered that: The basis for the undue influence presumption lies in the ease in which a confidant can dictate the contents and control or influence the drafting of such a will. . . The relationship must be such that the testator depends upon the advice of the confidant in relation to the subject matter of the will. Estate of Steffke, supra at 51. See also: Estate of Velk, supra at 507. Thus, our inquiry is directed to whether the record indicates the existence of suspicious circumstances establishing that John used his position in the familial relationship to his advantage and destroyed Julia's free agency in the disposition of her estate. The appellant-objector argues that there are suspicious circumstances established by the following events: (1) Julia unexpectedly, after her husband's death, revised an estate plan she had maintained for at least 15 years and for the first time undertook the gifting of personal assets to John and his family; (2) that her physical condition, coupled with the extensive medications she ingested, weakened her physical and mental conditions prior to the execution of the will of November 1, 1973. The objector urges this court to more closely scrutinize the facts he has alleged in his claims of suspicious circumstances because of Julia's failing health and alleged drugged condition. The will objector established that the 81 year-old testatrix had taken numerous medications for the past 4 years in treatment of various physical infirmities which included arteriosclerosis, heart problems, arthritis and tension headaches. Julia's daily medication schedule from 1970-74 is reflected in the following: On arising 2 Ascriptin, 1 calcium Gluconate, Thorazine, Thyroid, Lanoxin, Hytakerol. At Noon, 2 Ascriptin, Calcium Gluconate, Thorazine. At 4:00 p.m. 2 Ascriptin, Calcium Gluconate, Thorazine. At 6:00 to 8:00 p.m. 2 Ascriptin, Calcium Gluconate, Thorazine, Hytakerol. At bedtime, Tuinal, which is also a sleeping medication which would occasionally be used in place of Quaalude or other sleeping medications, but never together. Thorazine and Benadryl. In addition Fiornal with Codeine as needed every three or four hours or 2 Fiornal every three hours for severe headache. It is further established through the testimony of Dr. Paul Johnson, a psychiatrist, that Tuinal, Fiornal and Fiornal with Codeine [an opium derivative] are barbituates. Dr. Johnson testified that these drugs would have a depressing effect on Julia, possibly lessening both her mental strength and resistance to outside pressures. Dr. Johnson noted from Julia's medical history that she was taking Triavil, a tranquilizer normally prescribed for mental depression. The prescription required Julia to ingest this drug four times daily and the psychiatrist testified that this dosage of Triavil was misprescribed and excessive for Julia's age, weight and physical condition. In conclusion, Dr. Johnson opined that due to the amount and nature of Julia's medications, she was susceptible to undue influence. The appellant-objector's case of undue influence primarily relies on his testimony and that of Dr. Johnson in support of the contention that Julia's revision of her 15 year-old estate plan was not the product of her own free will. However, this medical testimony is not persuasive as Dr. Johnson had never examined nor personally treated the testatrix and based his conclusions solely on his examination of the medical records of the deceased. The testimony of Dr. Dedmond, Julia's personal physician since 1965, rebutted Dr. Johnson's medical conclusion. Dr. Dedmond unequivocally stated that following the Colonel's death, Julia's mental capabilities were considerable and the same as he had always observed in her. In fact, the witnesses, when called to testify about Julia's personality in the months of October and November, 1973, stated in various terms that Julia was intelligent, independent, strong-willed, domineering, decisive and opinionated. Agnes Mullen stated that Julia's deceased husband was the only person she knew of who could influence the testatrix or to whom she would defer. Without question, it is evident that the overwhelming testimony concerning Julia's strong and dominant personality supports the inference that if the November 1, 1973 will did not express her specific testamentary intentions, Julia would not have signed and approved the same as well as delivering the new will to Agnes Mullen and personally directing the destruction of her prior will and codicils. Mrs. Mullen's testimony also reveals that she had often heard Julia in the presence of the Colonel announce that she was going to leave everything in her estate to John. Thus, it can be inferred that the Colonel was aware of his wife's desire to leave the entire estate to their only natural issue, John, including assets subject to the marital trust powers of appointment. The objector contends that it is suspicious that a 15 year-old estate plan paralleling her husband's testamentary intentions would be hastily abandoned immediately following his death. However, the record indicates to the contrary; the will was not hastily abandoned but was carefully considered, drafted and reviewed in the weeks following the Colonel's death. The new will took into consideration Julia's personal assets, her tax position and the new assets she was receiving from her husband's estate. It is not unnatural that this strong-willed woman would, in the interests of marital harmony, acquiesce to her husband's estate plans during his lifetime, knowing that upon his death she could rewrite her will for the exclusive benefit of the only child born to her marriage with the Colonel. John, rather than the step-children, was the natural object of her bounty. The history of this family relationship gives logical reason and cause for the bequeathing of her bounty to John and is supported by ample evidence that she did not enjoy a close relationship with her step-children. This is in sharp contrast to the fine relationship she enjoyed with her son, John, and his family. This relationship included daily visits on John's part for many years as well as his comforting her during the Colonel's final illness. James, on the other hand, was not present to provide such comfort and aid to his step-mother and father during their final days. In Estate of McGonigal, 46 Wis.2d 256 (1970), the court noted: . . . There is nothing wrong with aiding and comforting a failing testator; indeed, such activity should be encouraged. The fact that the testator is wealthy should have no effect on this encouragement. Id., at 290. In Estate of Elvers, 48 Wis.2d 17, 179 N.W.2d 881 (1970), the court stated: . . . while a change of beneficiary is of some significance, it is not controlling that the change was caused by undue influence. Id. at p. 20. Nor is it controlling that John admitted that on occasion he discussed Julia's estate plan with her. In Estate of Perssion, 20 Wis.2d 537, 123 N.W.2d 465 (1963) the court noted that advice and counsel given to the testator in and of itself is not indicative of undue influence: All humanity is susceptible to influence  that is the nature of man. But all influence is not wrong or undue; it is often quite good. `Influence becomes undue when it commands or compels the exercise of volition on the part of the person subject to such influence so that the result in the accomplishment of the will or purpose of the one using influence rather than, in fact, the will or purpose of the donor. The nature of the influence is in the form of mental persuasion or compulsion but not necessarily fear, which is the element of duress. The degree of persuasion which is unfair depends on a variety of circumstances. Both permissible influence and undue influence may induce a transaction. The distinction is whether the result was produced by influencing a freely exercised and competent judgment or by dominating the mind or emotions of the person susceptible to the influence.' Kuehn v. Kuehn (1960), 11 Wis.(2d) 15, 24, 104 N.W.(2d) 138. supra at 543. [15, 16] In this case, even if John's relationship with his mother could have been classified as confidential in the eyes of the law and if he had procured the legal services used as alleged in preparing her last will as well as rendering advice on her revised estate plan, the evidence is overwhelming that his mother was possessed of a strong, vibrant and unwavering mind whose propensity to undue influence was a virtual impossibility. It was stated in the Will of Schaefer, 207 Wis. 404, 411, 241 N.W. 382 (1932) that aid and assistance to a testator must be distinguished from undue influence: Undue influence should not be confused with that highly proper influence which results naturally from kindnesses done, or love and affection bestowed, which rightly and naturally give rise to feelings of esteem and gratitude. [citation omitted]. As was said in Mackall v. Mackall, 135 U.S. 167, 172, 10 Sup. Ct. 705: `Influence gained by kindness and affection will not be regarded as `undue' if no imposition or fraud be practiced, even though it induced the testator to make an unequal and unjust disposition of his property in favor of those who have contributed to his comfort and ministered to his wants, if such disposition is voluntarily made. . . . It would be a great reproach to the law if, in its jealous watchfulness over the freedom of testamentary disposition, it should deprive age and infirmity of the kindly ministrations of affection, or of the power of rewarding those who bestow them.' Id. at 411. The record supports that Julia's decision in her last will to exercise the marital trust powers of appointment solely for John's benefit and thus disinheriting her step-children was unquestionably her own intention and not a product of undue influence. This conclusion is further supported by the uncontradicted testimony of Agnes Mullen and Mowry Smith, Julia's nephew, that John possessed a passive personality that was unlikely to influence his mother's domineering and independent spirit. The record supports that even though John may have discussed his mother's estate planning with her, this conduct certainly could not be characterized as destroying the free agency of the testatrix in the making of her November, 1973 will. [17] The evidence offered by the will's proponent supporting the natural circumstances surrounding Julia's last will and testament is overwhelming and rebuts the objector's allegations of undue influence. Another element of the objector's contention of undue influence is that John asked the attorney in March, 1974 to change the will and provide the inheritance be received in trust rather than an outright bequest to avoid certain estate taxes. The appellant also points out that shortly after Julia's return from Florida in April, 1974 John guided her hand in the signing of certain stock transfer papers as well as providing him with a general power of attorney. The court finds these contentions unpersuasive as the evidence of John's activities some 5 months after the execution of the will is irrelevant to the question of undue influence at the time of the making of her testamentary bequest. Estate of Elvers, supra at 21 and Estate of Brehner, 41 Wis.2d 349, 351, 164 N.W.2d 318 (1969) hold that a will objector must prove the overreaching was contemporaneous with the making of the will. [18] Also, the appellant on appeal attempts to undermine the credibility of the proponent's witnesses but the law is clear that the determination of credibility is the sole province of the trial court sitting as the trier of fact and will not be upset unless there is an abuse of discretion or an error of law. In re Estate of Christen, 72 Wis. 2d 8, 22, 239 N.W.2d 528 (1976); In re Russell's Will, 257 Wis. 510, 44 N.W.2d 231 (1950) In Posnanski v. City of West Allis, 61 Wis.2d 461, 465-66 the court stated in this regard: The trial judge, when acting as the factfinder, is the ultimate arbiter of the credibility of a witness. His determination in that respect will not be questioned unless his findings are based upon caprice, an abuse of discretion or an error of law. Id. at 465-66. The above-described factors are not present in this case and the trial court was entitled to find the proponent's witnesses worthy of belief and reach the conclusion that undue influence was not present prior to nor during the making of Julia's last will and testament. Inasmuch as the court has determined earlier in this opinion the question of undue influence as related to the revision of the 15 year estate plan and Julia's alleged drugged condition, the final problem presented deals with the question of undue influence relating to the beneficiary's presence in his mother's home prior to and at the time of the execution of the will. This court will not upset the trial court's finding of an absence of suspicious circumstances as the record establishes that John, a devoted son, had been making daily visits to his parents' home for sometime and had been invited into Julia's living room by her during the execution of the will. Nor will the court find it a suspicious circumstance that Julia would revise her will and undertake a gift program for the benefit of her grandchildren as they also were the natural objects of her bounty and the same assets they now received had previously been bequeathed to their father under the 1959 will. Additionally a gift program of this type is the preferred method of estate planning in bequeathing assets of this size in order to avoid the imposition of greater estate taxes. [19] We hold it is not unusual for a testatrix to exercise the power of appointment over marital trust assets bequeathing her entire estate to her own child, leaving nothing to the children of her spouse's earlier marriage. The record, reviewed as a whole, supports the trial court's findings that the appellant failed to prove suspicious circumstances during the preparation, review and execution of Julia's last will and testament in October and November of 1973. Thus, we hold the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the insufficiency of the quantum of proof required to support the appellant's theory of undue influence are not against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. By the Court.  Order affirmed.