Opinion ID: 1355792
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: did the superior court err by granting the buoys' motion for a second trial?

Text: In its cross-appeal, ERA contends that the superior court erred by granting the Buoys' motion for a new trial at the conclusion of the first trial. There the jury found ERA liable for Glen Buoy's leg injury and awarded him damages for past medical expenses and past wage loss. However, the jury declined to compensate Glen Buoy for future medical costs, impairment of future earning capacity, pain and suffering, or loss of enjoyment of life, and also denied Corrine Buoy any award for loss of consortium. The Buoys subsequently moved for a new trial on the ground that, based on the evidence presented at trial, the jury's award of damages is so inadequate as to demonstrate that the jury did not follow the law or that the award was the result of passion and prejudice or compromise. The superior court granted their motion. ERA contends that the superior court granted the Buoys a new trial due to the jury's failure to award Glen Buoy damages for pain and suffering. ERA contends the lack of an award for pain and suffering is inconsistent with the jury's determination of liability, but maintains the Buoys waived any objections to this inconsistent verdict by not voicing opposition to the jury's findings prior to the jury's discharge. [1] ERA reasons that since the Buoys waived their objections to the verdict, the superior court erred by granting their motion for a new trial. We conclude that ERA's argument is without merit. The grant or refusal of a motion for a new trial rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, and we will not disturb a trial court's decision on such a motion except in exceptional circumstances to prevent a miscarriage of justice. Montgomery Ward v. Thomas, 394 P.2d 774, 774-75 (Alaska 1964). Contrary to ERA's arguments, the superior court did not base its order granting the Buoys a new trial solely on the jury's failure to award damages for pain and suffering or because the jury's damage findings were inconsistent. The superior court explicitly found that the jury's verdict on Corrine Buoy's loss of consortium claim was inadequate, and noted that  all damage verdicts including the loss of consortium verdict are the result of an irrational and unjust determinative process. (Emphasis added.) The superior court went on to conclude that the interest of justice required a new trial. [2] Our review of the record persuades us that exceptional circumstances have not been demonstrated which would require us to overrule the superior court's discretionary grant of a new trial. The superior court acted within its discretion in concluding that the inadequacy of the damages warranted the grant of a new trial.