Opinion ID: 2167471
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Work-Product Privilege

Text: The viability of the work-product privilege under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was recognized by the United States Supreme Court in its landmark decision, Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511, 67 S.Ct. 385, 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947). [1] In Hickman, the plaintiff requested that opposing counsel produce witness statements and recount oral interviews with witnesses during discovery. Id. at 498-99, 67 S.Ct. 385. The Supreme Court denied the request, holding that most written materials obtained or prepared    with an eye toward litigation are protected from discovery. Id. at 511, 67 S.Ct. 385. In so holding, the Supreme Court noted that [p]roper preparation of a client's case demands that [the attorney] assemble information, sift what he considers to be the relevant from the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories and plan his strategy without undue and needless interference. Id. The Supreme Court stated that this policy against invading the privacy of an attorney's course of preparation was both well recognized and essential to an orderly working of the adversarial system. Id. However, not all materials prepared by an attorney constitute protected work product. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511, 67 S.Ct. 385. Unprotected materials might include documents that may be admissible as evidence or information that may be useful for corroboration or impeachment. Id. Precluding such information from discovery in certain circumstances would tend to strip the federal discovery rules of their liberal ideals. Id. at 511-12, 67 S.Ct. 385. Still, the Supreme Court indicated that it would be a rare situation that would justify disclosure of attorney work product, id. at 513, 67 S.Ct. 385, and that [n]ot even the most liberal of discovery theories can justify unwarranted inquiries into the files and mental impressions of an attorney. Id. at 510, 67 S.Ct. 385. [2] This Court has applied the Hickman work-product doctrine. See, e.g., Cabral v. Arruda, 556 A.2d 47, 49 (R.I.1989). We also have noted that Rhode Island's Rule 26(b)(3) embodies this doctrine. See Rhode Island Depositors Economic Protection Corp. v. Mapleroot Development Corp., 715 A.2d 1260, 1265 (R.I.1998). Rule 26 has two subparts whose interpretation and interrelation are crucial to the present controversy. The first subpart relevant to our inquiry is subdivision (b)(3) of Rule 26, which provides, in part: (3) Trial Preparation: Materials. Subject to the provisions of subdivision (b)(4) of this rule, a party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable under subdivisions (b)(1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's representative    only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the party's case and that the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. Rule 26(b)(3) then goes on to codify the work-product doctrine: In ordering discovery of such materials when the required showing has been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation. Id. Rule 26(b)(3) recognizes that there are two types of work product that warrant different levels of protection during the discovery process. The second sentence of Rule 26(b)(3) requires courts to protect against the disclosure of the [attorney's] mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories. Federal courts have deemed this type of work product opinion or core work product. See, e.g., Bogosian, 738 F.2d at 593; Haworth, Inc., 162 F.R.D. at 293. The other type of work product, which encompasses the remainder, is factual or ordinary work product. See, e.g., Data General Corp. v. Grumman Systems Support Corp., 139 F.R.D. 556, 560 (D.Mass. 1991). Many federal courts have afforded factual work product less protection than opinion work product, opining that the first sentence of Rule 26(b)(3) does allow some factual materials prepared in anticipation of litigation to be discovered, so long as the party seeking discovery demonstrates a substantial need for the materials and that it cannot obtain the substantial equivalent without undue hardship. See, e.g., Bogosian, 738 F.2d at 592; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(3) (1970 version).