Opinion ID: 2382893
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Order to Pay Arrearages Based on 1983 Judgment

Text: We have not had occasion to state specifically what effect remarriage between the parties to a prior divorce has on a child support order that is part of the initial divorce judgment. The great majority of jurisdictions that have addressed the issue have held that on remarriage, a prior order of child support becomes unenforceable. E.g., Ringstrom v. Ringstrom, 101 Ill.App.3d 677, 57 Ill.Dec. 193, 193-94, 428 N.E.2d 743, 744-45 (1981) (collecting cases). Reasons of public policy and common sense compel us to do likewise. When previously divorced parties remarry, the parties are restored to their rights as if they had never been divorced. After remarriage, the parties' relationship to the children and the duty to furnish support become exactly as they were before the divorce and upon the showing of remarriage, judgment for custody or for an amount for support of the children cannot be maintained based on the prior decree. Id., 57 Ill.Dec. at 194-95, 428 N.E.2d at 744-45; see also Davis v. Davis, 68 Cal.2d 290, 66 Cal.Rptr. 14, 15, 437 P.2d 502, 503 (1968) (collecting cases); Dunlap v. Dunlap, 88 Okl. 200, 212 P. 608, 609 (1923); 27B C.J.S. Divorce § 323(k) (1959) (remarriage between parties terminates authority of court with respect to maintenance of children). The decisions of those jurisdictions, which we now join, are consistent with the objective of reestablishment of the family for the benefit of both the children and the parties. Carol contends that even if her remarriage to Joseph made the 1983 support order unenforceable, Joseph failed to properly preserve that issue in the Superior Court, and his post-trial motion was untimely and amounts to an impermissible collateral attack. We disagree. The court denied Joseph's April 12, 1991 motion concerning the order of support arrearages as untimely (not within the 10-day requirement of M.R.Civ.P. 59(e)) and lacking in substantive merit. Although the motion was styled as a motion for reconsideration or to set aside the order, it is clear from the memorandum of law accompanying the motion that Joseph sought relief under the provisions of M.R.Civ.P. 60(b), which states in pertinent part: On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or the party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: . . . . (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time. . . . [1] M.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6). Relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) is altogether appropriate in the circumstances of this case. The state has a strong interest in preserving the family unit. See Mattson v. Mattson, 376 A.2d 473, 476 (Me.1977); Deblois v. Deblois, 158 Me. 24, 177 A.2d 199, 202 (1962). Unity of the family would be weakened if remarried spouses could seek to enforce provisions of prior divorce judgments dealing with child support or child custody. If the parties are seeking to dissolve their subsequent marriage, then the divorce proceeding on the second marriage is the proper forum for resolving issues of child support and child custody. Joseph had filed a complaint for divorce in August of 1989, and several months later Carol sought enforcement of the 1983 judgment. Any issue of reimbursement for her expenditures on behalf of the children prior to the remarriage also should be addressed in the second divorce proceeding. The existence of the pending divorce proceeding provides ample justification for the trial court, pursuant to its equitable powers under Rule 60(b)(6), to set aside its arrearage order based on the prior divorce judgment. Moreover, Joseph's motion, brought while the second divorce action was still pending, was filed within a reasonable time of the court's order on arrearages.