Opinion ID: 2612478
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Limited Preemptive Effect

Text: Consistent with the underlying goals of the LMRDA, the history and text of the Act also disclose a very limited preemptive intent. The Act was designed to supplement, not to supplant, available state law remedies.
First, the Act itself explicitly saves both state criminal actions and state-imposed responsibilities of union officers from preemption by the Act. ( Bloom v. General Truck Drivers (9th Cir.1986) 783 F.2d 1356, 1361, fns. omitted; 29 U.S.C. งง 524, 523(a).) [7] In addition, section 413, immediately following the provision in section 412 for a civil action for a violation of subchapter II rights, states: Nothing contained in this subchapter [subchapter II] shall limit the rights and remedies of any member of a labor organization under any State or Federal law or before any court or other tribunal, or under the constitution and bylaws of any labor organization. Thus, in the context of union-member relations, the goal of the LMRDA is to preserve to the union members, not to preempt, existing federal and state remedies. As explained in Posner v. Utility Workers Union of America (1975) 47 Cal. App.3d 970 [121 Cal. Rptr. 423]: Congress has expressly withheld preemption of any rights or remedies which a union member may have under state law. [Citations.] The rights and remedies provided by the federal statute are additional to other rights of union members under state law. ( Id. at p. 973; see also Tomko v. Hilbert, supra, 288 F.2d 625, 629 [Rights and remedies [the union member] may have under state law have not been preempted or affected by passage of the bill-of-rights section of the LMRDA.].)
The scope of the LMRDA is further limited. It does not address the relationship between union officials and union employees in their status as employees, but only as members. Putting the matter more directly in terms of actual conflict preemption, it is difficult to conclude that Congress intended to preempt state regulation of conduct (employer-employee relations) which the federal act does not even purport to regulate. Moreover, [t]he continued vitality of the California statutes in light of [the LMRDA's] saving[s] clauses logically implies the continued vitality of the state's means of enforcing those statutes.... Thus, although the savings clauses addressing union members do not directly save [a union business agent's] state cause of action ... the clauses addressing criminal actions and union officers' duties imply that [the business agent] can maintain his action. ( Bloom v. General Truck Drivers, supra, 783 F.2d 1356, 1361.) In Tomko v. Hilbert, supra , for example, a union member attempted to invoke the federal jurisdiction provided in section 412 in a suit against two other union members, who had allegedly libeled and assaulted him. The court held that the LMRDA is narrowly focused on protecting the union-member relationship (288 F.2d at p. 627), and that the plaintiff's rights as a member were protected from interference by a union official. Because the plaintiff did not allege that the defendants were union officials, or that any union official had interfered with his rights, his cause of action was not governed by the LMRDA. However, although the LMRDA did not provide a federal action, neither did it preclude a state action for ordinary tort claims merely because the conduct occurs in a union hall during a union meeting.... ( Id. at p. 629.) The court held that [ t ] he state courts remain open to appellant. Rights and remedies that he may have under state law have not been preempted or affected by passage of the bill-of-rights section of the LMRDA. ( Ibid., italics added.) In Strauss v. International Brother. of Teamsters, etc. (E.D.Pa. 1959) 179 F. Supp. 297, a discharged union business agent attempted to bring suit under the LMRDA in federal court, arguing he was improperly discharged because the union had misconstrued a provision of the Act. The court held that, although section 412 authorizes civil suit in the federal district court for violation of subchapter II rights, it must appear that the right, title or interest which he alleges has been violated by the defendant is created by or finds protection under one of these sections.... [ถ] The right which plaintiff now seeks to protect as against the defendant is the right to be free from discharge as business agent of a labor union.... As between the parties to this suit, this is at best a contractual right or a right of `status.' (179 F.Supp at pp. 299-230, original italics.) Because the LMRDA deals with the union-member relationship, and does not involve jurisdiction over a contractual dispute as between employer and employee, [t]his [contractual] right is enforceable, if at all, in the common law courts of the state in which the contract arose. ... ( Id. at p. 301, italics added.) Finnegan v. Leu, supra, 456 U.S. 431, on which the majority relies, is not to the contrary. In Finnegan, an appointed union business agent attempted to sue in federal court for alleged violation of his rights under the LMRDA. The plaintiff had vigorously supported an opposing candidate in a contested election for the union presidency. The new president discharged plaintiff and other business agents who had opposed him. The United States Supreme Court held that the Bill of Rights under the LMRDA, including the right of free speech, applied to protect union members qua members, and was not intended to protect plaintiff in his capacity as a union employee. Finnegan does not, as the majority implies, sanction or guarantee the power of union officials to discharge union employees for opposing their election; [8] rather, the Supreme Court held only that the LMRDA did not provide a federal remedy. Finnegan does not suggest that the plaintiff was precluded from bringing a state claim on a matter admittedly outside the scope of the LMRDA.
At the heart of the majority opinion is its conclusion that the preservation of union democracy requires that union leadership have a free hand in discharging employees for reasons of policy. Even assuming that the LMRDA sanctions patronage firing as an adjunct of its purpose to promote union democracy (see Finnegan v. Leu, supra, 456 U.S. 431, 441 [72 L.Ed.2d at p. 247]; Tyra v. Kearney (1984) 153 Cal. App.3d 921, 926 [200 Cal. Rptr. 716]), that purpose does not provide union leadership with an unfettered license to dismiss union employees. In Sheet Metal Workers v. Lynn (1989) 488 U.S. 347 [102 L.Ed.2d 700, 109 S.Ct. 639], for example, a local union in financial crisis was placed under trusteeship by the president of the international union. The plaintiff, an elected business agent, was an outspoken member of a faction in the union which opposed a dues increase as a method of solving the local's financial problems. The trustee discharged the plaintiff from his position as a business agent because of his (successful) opposition to the dues increase. The plaintiff brought suit in federal court under section 412 alleging violation of his free speech rights under section 411(a)(2) of subchapter II. The union alleged that the dismissal was immune from attack under Finnegan v. Leu, supra, 456 U.S. 431, because it was policy based. The Supreme Court disagreed, observing that the discharge penalized plaintiff for the exercise of his free speech rights, and deprived the union membership of an elected business agent. His removal, therefore, hardly was `an integral part of ensuring a union administration's responsiveness to the mandate of the union election.' [Citations.] ( Sheet Metal Workers v. Lynn, supra, 488 U.S. at p. 355 [102 L.Ed.2d at p. 710].) In addition, in light of the plaintiff's removal, other members of the Local may well have concluded that one challenged the union's hierarchy, if at all, at one's peril. This is precisely what the Congress sought to prevent when it passed the LMRDA. ( Ibid. ) The court carefully examined the purposes of the LMRDA, and determined that this discharge did not promote the purpose of union democracy. Accordingly, the court found not only that the plaintiff's discharge was not sanctioned by the LMRDA, but also that the Act provided affirmative redress for the breach of the plaintiff's free speech rights. Justice White's concurring opinion in Sheet Metal Workers v. Lynn underscores the distinction between a union official's exercise of union patronage, and his or her power to hire and fire as an ordinary employer: In this case, unlike Finnegan, respondent was not discharged by an incoming elected president with power to appoint his own staff, but by a trustee whose power to dismiss and appoint officers, for all that is shown here, went no farther than the Local's president to discharge for cause, i.e., for incompetence or other behavior disqualifying them for the tasks they were expected to perform as officers. Respondent's speech opposing the dues increase was the speech of a member about a matter the members were to resolve, and there is no countervailing interest rooted in union democracy that suffices to override that protection. (488 U.S. at p. 360 [102 L.Ed.2d at p. 713] (conc. opn. of White, J.).) In Bloom v. General Truck Drivers, supra, 783 F.2d 1356, a union member alleged he was wrongfully discharged as coordinator of the business agents and business manager of the union because he refused to illegally alter the minutes of a union meeting. The Court of Appeals held the plaintiff could not properly state a federal claim under section 412 of the LMRDA because the discharge affected him as an employee and not as a union member (citing Finnegan v. Leu, supra, 456 U.S. 431, and Cehaich v. International Union, U.A.W. (6th Cir.1983) 710 F.2d 234, 238). The court further held, however, that the plaintiff's state claim was not preempted : The kind of discharge alleged, retaliation for refusal to commit a crime and breach a trust, is not the kind sanctioned by the Act, or by the courts in Finnegan and Tyra. Protecting such a discharge by preempting a state cause of action based on it does nothing to serve union democracy or the rights of union members; it serves only to encourage and conceal such criminal acts and coercion by union leaders. (783 F.2d at p. 1362.) The Bloom court properly analyzed the state claim in terms of its relation to the purposes of the LMRDA. Not only would the state action not inhibit union democracy, it concluded, but preemption would deprive the plaintiff of any viable remedy, and thus frustrate the very purposes of the Act. ( Bloom v. General Truck Drivers, supra, 783 F.2d 1356.) Brown v. Hotel Employees, supra, 468 U.S. 491, is also instructive. New Jersey casino laws regulated unions representing casino employees and disqualified from union office those persons who had ties to organized crime. The union argued that section 7 of the NLRA (codified at 29 U.S.C. ง 157) โ including the right of employees to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing โ preempted the jurisdiction of the state casino commission to disqualify any member from holding office. The Supreme Court held that section 7 of the NLRA (29 U.S.C. ง 157) did not confer an absolute right on employees to choose the officials of their bargaining representatives, notwithstanding the impact on union democracy. Ironically, it was the enactment of the LMRDA itself which led the court to this conclusion. [9] Title V [subchapter VI] of LMRDA imposes various restrictions on labor union officials and defines certain qualifications for them.... [ถ] By enacting ง 504(a) [setting forth disqualifications from office for conviction of crime], Congress has unmistakably indicated that the right of employees to select the officers of their bargaining representatives is not absolute and necessarily admits of some exception. ( Brown v. Hotel Employees, supra, 468 U.S. 491, 505 [82 L.Ed.2d at pp. 385-386].) In addition, the high court noted, another provision of LMRDA, [section 523(a)], is `an express disclaimer of pre-emption of state laws regulating the responsibilities of union officials....' De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 157 (1960).... In affirmatively preserving the operation of state laws, [section 523(a)] indicates that Congress necessarily intended to preserve some room for state action concerning the responsibilities and qualifications of union officials. ( Brown v. Hotel Employees, supra, 468 U.S. at pp. 505-506 [82 L.Ed.2d at p. 386], italics partially added, fns. omitted.) As the foregoing cases demonstrate, the concept of union democracy in the LMRDA was designed to make union leadership accountable to its members, not to put the members at the mercy of its leaders. The Act does not, as the majority suggests, demand a broad rule of state preemption in order to effectuate the federal mandate. Instead, each case must be examined to determine whether the conduct regulated by the state actually conflicts with the conduct intended to be protected by the Act. As explained below, plaintiff's state law claims for wrongful discharge do not impinge upon any federally protected preserve.