Opinion ID: 660294
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Enhancement of Chaves' Sentence

Text: 15 The district court gave two enhancements to Chaves' sentence. First, the court found that Chaves' offenses involved more than minimal planning and thus increased his base offense level by two steps, pursuant to United States Sentencing Guideline (U.S.S.G.) Sec. 2B1.2(b)(3)(B) (Nov. 1, 1989). 15 Second, the court found that Chaves obstructed justice by attempting to induce Schlinder to hide relevant information from the FBI and thus increased his base offense level by two more levels, pursuant to U.S.S.G. Sec. 3C1.1 (Nov. 1, 1989). 16 16 A finding of more than minimal planning is reviewed for clear error. United States v. Scroggins, 880 F.2d 1204, 1215 (11th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1083, 110 S.Ct. 1816, 108 L.Ed.2d 946 (1990). Section 2B1.2(b)(3)(B) provides that the offense level for the crime of receipt of stolen property from interstate commerce increases by two levels if the offense involved more than minimal planning. The Guidelines define more than minimal planning as more planning than is typical for commission of the offense in a simple form, and stress that  'more than minimal planning' is deemed present in any case involving repeated acts over a period of time, except where each instance was clearly opportune. U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.1, comment, (n. 1(f)) (Nov. 1, 1989). More than minimal planning also exists if significant affirmative steps were taken to conceal the offense. Id. 17 The facts of this case confirm the district court's determination that Chaves' role was more than minor. His relevant conduct includes reasonably foreseeable actions in furtherance of the conspiracy by his coconspirators. U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.3(a) (Nov. 1, 1989). 17 See also id., comment, (n. 1) (defining conduct for which defendant would otherwise be accountable to include conduct of others in furtherance of the execution of the jointly-undertaken criminal activity that was reasonably foreseeable by the defendant); United States v. Fuentes, 991 F.2d 700, 701 (11th Cir.1993) (per curiam) (conspiracy defendant can be sentenced for reasonably foreseeable coconspirator acts committed in furtherance of conspiracy). Here, the conspirators engaged in repeated acts over a period of time as they frequently searched for tractor trailers loaded with seafood, stole several tractor trailers, hid them in a warehouse, and used Chaves' truck to redistribute the stolen seafood to Chaves, who then fenced the stolen merchandise. See United States v. Mullins, 996 F.2d 1170, 1171 (11th Cir.1993) (per curiam) (defendant's three separate purchases of vehicles with worthless checks authorizes enhancement). Further, the use of an abandoned warehouse to secrete the stolen trucks demonstrates that the thefts were deliberate. Hence, there is ample factual support in the record evidencing the extensive planning that this undertaking required, and the trial court was not clearly erroneous in finding Chaves' role in the conspiracy constituted more than minimal planning. 18 Chaves also attacks the two-step enhancement of his sentence based on the district court's finding that he obstructed justice by asking Schlinder not to speak with FBI agents. Whether the district court properly applied the obstruction of justice enhancement is a mixed question of law and fact. United States v. Burton, 933 F.2d 916, 917 (11th Cir.1991) (per curiam). The district court's findings of fact are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard, though the court's application of law to those facts is reviewed de novo. Id. 19 The Sentencing Guidelines mandate a two-level enhancement [i]f the defendant willfully impeded or obstructed, or attempted to impede or obstruct, the administration of justice during the investigation or prosecution of the instant offense. U.S.S.G. Sec. 3C1.1 (Nov. 1, 1989). Examples of obstructive conduct include (1) directing another person to conceal material evidence and (2) threatening or unlawfully influencing a witness. See id., comment, (n. 1(b)) (adjustment applicable for directing or procuring another person to ... conceal material evidence, or attempting to do so); id., comment, (n. 1(d)) (adjustment applicable for threatening, intimidating, or otherwise unlawfully attempting to influence a ... witness, directly or indirectly). Here, the district court enhanced Chaves' sentence after concluding that he obstructed justice by bringing Schlinder into a walk-in freezer and asking him not to speak with the FBI. 18 Provided the language used by Chaves and the circumstances surrounding its use, the court was not clearly erroneous in finding that Chaves' conduct constituted obstruction of justice. See United States v. Holland, 884 F.2d 354, 359 (8th Cir.) (defendant's requesting co-defendant not to mention involvement of certain individuals when speaking to law enforcement officers warranted sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 997, 110 S.Ct. 552, 107 L.Ed.2d 549 (1989). 19 20 This Court has recognized that [t]he sentence imposed is committed to the discretion of the trial court and, so long as the sentence falls within the range provided by statute, generally will not be reviewed on appeal. United States v. Funt, 896 F.2d 1288, 1298 (11th Cir.1990). On these facts, Chaves' sentence falls within the statutory guidelines for sentencing.