Opinion ID: 1450094
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: aggravated kidnapping of rusch

Text: The trial court instructed the jury that in order to convict Grissom of the aggravated kidnapping of Rusch, the State had to prove the following: 1. That the defendant took or confined Christine A. Rusch by force, threat or deception; 2. That it was done with intent to hold such person to facilitate the commission of a crime; 3. That bodily harm was inflicted upon Christine A. Rusch; and 4. That this act occurred on or about the 26th day of June, 1989, in Johnson County, Kansas. The amended complaint specifies that Grissom took Rusch to facilitate the crime of robbery. The standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence set forth previously applies. Grissom claims the evidence does not support that he took or confined Rusch because the State failed to link him with Rusch's disappearance. In support of this claim, the defendant incorporates the arguments he set forth in Issue I. For the reasons set forth in Issue I, we find his arguments unpersuasive. Grissom contends the State failed to prove the alleged kidnapping was done to facilitate the commission of a robbery. The defendant incorporates his arguments set forth in Issue IV. For the reasons set forth in Issue IV, Grissom's argument fails. In the alternative, Grissom maintains that even if this court finds sufficient evidence to support a kidnapping conviction, the evidence only supports a finding of kidnapping, not aggravated kidnapping. Aggravated kidnapping differs from kidnapping in that it requires the additional element of bodily harm inflicted upon the victim. Compare K.S.A. 21-3421 with K.S.A. 21-3420. Citing State v. Lassley, 218 Kan. 758, 761-62, 545 P.2d 383 (1976), and State v. Racey, 225 Kan. 404, 408-09, 590 P.2d 1064 (1979), the defendant argues that the aggravated kidnapping conviction is multiplicitous with the first-degree murder conviction because the State relied upon the same act of force for both convictions. Multiplicity exists if the State uses a single wrongful act as the basis for multiple charges. Charges are not multiplicitous if each charge requires proof of a fact not required in proving the other. Charges are also not multiplicitous if the offenses occur at different times and in different places. State v. Scott, 250 Kan. 350, Syl. ¶ 1, 827 P.2d 733 (1992). See State v. Woods, 250 Kan. 109, 825 P.2d 514 (1992). Aggravated kidnapping and first-degree murder each require proof of facts not required in proving the other. For example, unlike first-degree murder, aggravated kidnapping requires that the defendant took or confined Rusch by force, threat, or deception. The charges are not multiplicitous. See, e.g., State v. Chears, 231 Kan. 161, 163, 643 P.2d 154 (1982). Based upon the evidence presented at trial, a rational factfinder could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Grissom had committed the aggravated kidnapping of Rusch.