Opinion ID: 2633477
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Discovery Must Be Limited Because of John's Right to Privacy Under the State Constitution

Text: Article I, section 1 of the California Constitution recognizes a number of inalienable rights, including the right to privacy. As we have previously observed, the right of privacy extends to sexual relations ( Vinson v. Superior Court, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 841, 239 Cal.Rptr. 292, 740 P.2d 404) and medical records ( Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 41, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 865 P.2d 633). Accordingly, a litigant may invoke the constitutional right to privacy as justification for refusing to answer questions that unreasonably intrude on that right. ( Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 855, 143 Cal.Rptr. 695, 574 P.2d 766 [associational privacy]; Fults v. Superior Court (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 899, 903, 152 Cal. Rptr. 210 [sexual privacy].) The right to privacy, however, is not absolute. In appropriate circumstances, this right must be balanced against other important interests. ( Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 37, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 865 P.2d 633.) On occasion [a party's] privacy interests may have to give way to [the] opponent's right to a fair trial. Thus courts must balance the right of civil litigants to discover relevant facts against the privacy interests of persons subject to discovery. ( Vinson v. Superior Court, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 842, 239 Cal.Rptr. 292, 740 P.2d 404.) Here, defendant has invoked his constitutional right to privacy as justification for refusing to answer questions concerning his HIV status or his sexual history. Bridget, in turn, has identified not only the historically important state interest of facilitating the ascertainment of truth in connection with legal proceedings ( In re Lifschutz (1970) 2 Cal.3d 415, 432, 85 Cal.Rptr. 829, 467 P.2d 557), but also the state's compelling interest in preventing the spread of AIDS, a communicable and dangerous disease. Penal Code section 12022.85, which provides for a three-year enhancement if the perpetrator of specified felonies knows he or she is HIV positive, and Health and Safety Code section 120291, which makes it a felony to intentionally infect another with HIV, are strong statements by the Legislature that the spread of HIV is a serious public health threat and that its control is of paramount importance. (See generally Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health (1990) 497 U.S. 261, 282, 110 S.Ct. 2841, 111 L.Ed.2d 224 [recognizing the state's unqualified interest in the preservation of human life].) In balancing these competing concerns, we note at the outset that this is not a case in which a plaintiff seeks discovery to obtain information from a defendant whose HIV status is unknown. Both parties have admitted they are HIV positive, informally and in court filings. John thus has a diminished privacy interest in his HIV status. (Cf. In re Marriage of Bonneau (1998) 294 Ill.App.3d 720, 229 Ill.Dec. 187, 691 N.E.2d 123, 134 [declining to permit discovery of medical records where neither party's HIV status was alleged].) Moreover, not only does the complaint allege sufficient facts to permit the inference that John infected Bridget with HIV, but John has alleged that Bridget infected him. By thus putting his own medical condition at issue, John has substantially lowered his expectation of privacy even further. ( Heller v. Norcal Mutual Ins. Co. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 30, 43, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 200, 876 P.2d 999.) After balancing the competing interests in this case, we are persuaded that Bridget is entitled to discovery concerning John's sexual history and HIV status. We emphasize, though, that Bridget is not entitled to discovery without limit. As the Court of Appeal pointed out, even where the plaintiff can establish a compelling state interest in discovery, ``[p]recision of [compelled disclosure]'' is required so that the right of privacy is not ``curtailed except to the extent necessitated by the legitimate governmental objective.'' Thus, where a plaintiff seeks discovery from a defendant concerning sexual matters protected by the constitutional right of privacy, the intrusion upon sexual privacy may only be done on the basis of `practical necessity' ( Fults v. Superior Court, supra, at pp. 904-905, 152 Cal.Rptr. 210), and `the compelled disclosure [must] be narrowly drawn to assure maximum protection of the constitutional interests at stake.' ( Britt v. Superior Court, supra, [20 Cal.3d] at p. 859 [143 Cal.Rptr. 695, 574 P.2d 766].) ( Boler v. Superior Court (1987) 201 Cal.App.3d 467, 473-474, 247 Cal.Rptr. 185.) It is therefore essential to measure the closeness of the fit between the requested discovery and the allegations of the complaint. The theory of Bridget's complaint is that John became infected with HIV prior to or during their relationship by engaging in unprotected sex with other men, that he knew or had reason to know he was infected before he engaged in unprotected sex with her, that he did not share his knowledge with Bridget or otherwise take steps to prevent transmission of the virus, and that he infected her with HIV during unprotected sex. To prove these allegations, it is necessary for Bridget to inquire into John's medical records and his sexual activity, as the superior court and the Court of Appeal found. Not all of the discovery authorized by the superior court and the Court of Appeal satisfies this heightened standard, however. To the extent that special interrogatory Nos. 3 and 13 and request for admission No. 10 seek information concerning John's sexual conduct after the couple stopped having sex  which, according to the complaint, was sometime during the honeymoon in July 2000  they are overbroad. John's sexual conduct after the cessation of marital sexual relations could not have resulted in the transmission of HIV to Bridget through sexual relations as alleged in the complaint, nor would it shed light on whether John knew or had reason to know that he was HIV positive at the time he and Bridget engaged in unprotected sex. Bridget thus has failed to identify the practical necessity for discovery of John's sexual conduct subsequent to their honeymoon. The Court of Appeal also erred in upholding discovery into John's sexual behavior dating back years before he even met Bridget. Under the record as it currently stands, Bridget has failed to identify the practical necessity for discovery of John's sexual conduct any earlier than the six months that preceded his negative HIV test. John's declaration in support of his motion for summary judgment states that he was tested for HIV in connection with a life insurance application on August 17, 2000, and includes a copy of the lab report. The results were negative. Based on information from the Centers for Disease Control that the window period between exposure to HIV and the production of sufficient antibodies to detect the presence of the virus in the blood can last up to six months, [11] John reasons that he was necessarily HIV negative six months prior to August 17, i.e., mid-February 2000, and at every prior time in his life. He therefore contends that any discovery related to his sexual history must be limited to the six-month window period. Bridget responds that John's negative HIV test in August 2000 is a mere allegation which defendant has advanced as a part of his `she-infected-me' defense and which plaintiff intends to prove to be patently false. Obviously, discovery cannot serve to debunk a lie if discovery is thwarted by having to assume the truth of the lie. The defect in Bridget's response is that John's negative HIV test is not a mere allegation. John has supported his allegation with an applicant profile from Intellisys reflecting the results of his HIV test. If the test is accurate, and if the latency period for development of HIV antibodies is no longer than six months, John could not have been infected any earlier than February 2000. Under those circumstances, as Bridget's counsel conceded at oral argument, John's sexual behavior during that earlier period would not be relevant to the issue of when he became infected. In other words, Bridget has not demonstrated, under the heightened standard applicable to constitutional rights of privacy, a practical necessity for discovery of John's sexual conduct before he could have been infected with HIV. On the other hand, as Bridget's counsel explained at oral argument, it is possible that Bridget could offer evidence to cast doubt on the results of the August 2000 HIV test, such as by challenging the accuracy or reliability of an insurance application test or by offering expert testimony that the test was inconsistent with John's development of full-blown AIDS the following year. If Bridget were to offer some basis to question the August 2000 test, or to adduce evidence that the time period from exposure to the virus to the development of antibodies in the blood can be longer than six months, then she may be entitled to discovery covering a broader time period. That option remains open to Bridget on remand. Because Bridget has not yet done so, however, we must balance John's constitutional right to privacy against Bridget's need for discovery based on the record as it currently stands. We must therefore limit her discovery requests concerning John's sexual behavior to the period between February 17, 2000, the earliest date at which John could have been infected, through July 2000, when the couple last had sexual relations. Finally, we emphasize that we have not been asked and therefore express no views as to what measures the trial court should employ to maintain the confidentiality of the materials produced in discovery. The propriety of in camera review, orders to seal documents, protective orders, and other measures is an issue that remains for the trial court on remand. (See Schnabel v. Superior Court, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 714, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 200, 854 P.2d 1117.)