Opinion ID: 2060773
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Manufactured Issue

Text: Maryland Rule 4-243 sets out the procedures to be followed and the conditions to be observed regarding plea bargains. Allgood v. State, 309 Md. 58, 66, 522 A.2d 917, 922 (1987). It allows the State and the defendant, without involvement by the court, to enter into an agreement for a plea of guilty on any proper condition, including an amendment to the charging document, an agreement not to charge the defendant with certain offenses, and an agreement that the State will recommend, not oppose, or make no comment with respect to a particular sentence. An agreement reached under those circumstances does not bind the court to any particular sentence or sentence range; it is strictly between the parties. The rule also permits the parties to submit a plea agreement proposing a particular sentence, disposition, or other judicial action to a judge for consideration pursuant to section (c) of this Rule. Section (c)(1) provides: If a plea agreement has been reached pursuant to subsection (a)(6) of this Rule for a plea of guilty or nolo contendere which contemplates a particular sentence, disposition, or other judicial action, the defense counsel and the State's Attorney shall advise the judge of the terms of the agreement when the defendant pleads. The judge may then accept or reject the plea and, if accepted, may approve the agreement or defer decision as to its approval or rejection until after such pre-sentence proceedings and investigation as the judge directs. (Emphasis added.) Section (c)(2) of the Rule makes clear that [t]he agreement of the State's Attorney relating to a particular sentence, disposition, or other judicial action is not binding on the court unless the judge to whom the agreement is presented approves it. It appears to me that the Court, in arriving at its extraordinary decision that a prosecutor can force a judge to disregard a clear mandate of the General Assembly, has overlooked an important fact: there is utterly no evidence in this record that any plea agreement was ever reached between appellant and the State, much less an agreement presented to Judge Hubbard for approval. Indeed, there is no basis in this record for even inferring that a plea agreement had been reached. The codefendant Lebby obviously reached a plea agreement, but, from the beginning and throughout, Beverly maintained his plea of not guilty and never once indicated any desire to enter a plea of guilty to anything. There was nothing more here than an academic discussion of whether, in a hypothetical situation, a prosecutor could tie the judge's hands. Neither the Court nor I have been able to discern just what crime appellant agreed to plead guilty towhich of the 12 offenses he was ready to admit in return for a particular sentence. Neither the Court nor I have been able to fathom what charges the State was willing to drop, or to reduce, in return for a guilty plea. At no point in any of the discussion that occurred was there any mention of any terms of a plea agreement. The closest the discussion came to that was the prosecutor's initial statement that, due to her uncertainty about the guideline ranges, she would be willing to recommend a cap of 10 years, with appellant having the right to request a presentence investigation and argue for less, which the court indicated would be acceptable only if a 10-year sentence was within the guidelines. There was never even an actual attempt by the prosecutor to withdraw the notices previously served on Beverly. The Court's concluding statement that the State should abide by any agreement to withdraw the notice of mandatory penalties is wholly unsupported in the record. There is utterly no basis for even an inference that such an agreement existed. I find it distressing that, on this record, the Court would remand the case to determine whether there was a plea agreement and, if so what its terms were, and if there was a plea agreement, to require the court to act in accordance with its terms. [4] That approach not only ignores the plain mandate of § 286(c) but also Rule 4-243(c), which is supposed to be one of those precise rubrics the Court insists everyone else follow religiously. If, indeed, the parties had reached a plea agreement calling for a sentence of less than 10 years or a sentence subject to parole prior to the expiration of 10 years and had presented that agreement to the court in conformance with Rule 4-243, and if the court rejected the agreement on the ground that the proposed sentence was not a lawful one, at least the substantive issue would be presented. On this record, however, it is, at best, a manufactured issuenothing more than dust given life only by the Court's own breath. It is the wrong case in which to announce such a policy. The lack of any definitive, articulated plea agreement adds considerable force to the State's argument that, by maintaining his plea of not guilty and proceeding to trial, appellant waived his right to complain about the judge's perception of her duties under § 286(c). The Court's response to that argument might have merit if, indeed, a real plea agreement had been reached, presented to the judge, and rejected. On this record, however, its finding of no waiver is hardly compelling.