Opinion ID: 1119516
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Was the statement the fruit of an illegal arrest?

Text: Although Miller made a statement after an illegal arrest, it does not automatically follow that the statement should have been excluded. A statement is inadmissible only if it is the fruit of an illegal arrest. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); State v. Reffitt, 145 Ariz. 452, 702 P.2d 681 (1985). Brown and Reffitt set forth four factors to help determine whether the taint from an illegal arrest has been purged: 1) the voluntariness of the confession, as a threshold requirement; 2) the temporal proximity between the illegal arrest and the confession; 3) the presence of intervening circumstances; and, particularly, 4) the purpose and flagrancy of official misconduct. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. at 603-04, 95 S.Ct. at 2261-62; State v. Reffitt, 145 Ariz. at 458, 702 P.2d at 687. First, Miller voluntarily made these statements. See supra, at 319, 921 P.2d at 1156. Second, Miller made his statements approximately one and one-half hours after he was initially detained. Although we found that the same period of time weighed in favor of exclusion in State v. Reffitt , we also said that this factor is scarcely outcome determinative and is often the least helpful of the three criteria. 145 Ariz. at 459, 702 P.2d at 688. This is not a case like State v. Monge, 173 Ariz. 279, 842 P.2d 1292 (1992), where the consent to search was given immediately after an illegal arrest. Third, we consider the presence of intervening circumstances. The police read Miller his Miranda rights. The police also told him that he was free to end the interview at any time, and that he could go home if he wanted. Miller clearly understood this, but decided to talk to the police anyway. [4] Some of Miller's inculpatory admissions were made after he was confronted with his roommates' statements. The police had probable cause to search Miller's residence and automobile, and had obtained a valid search warrant to do so. See supra, at 318-319, 921 P.2d at 1155-56. Excluding confessions resulting from illegal arrests serves interests and policies of the Fourth Amendment, not the Fifth Amendment. See e.g., Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. at 601, 95 S.Ct. at 2260; Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 217, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 2259, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979). The chief evil against which the Fourth Amendment is directed is the physical entry of the home. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1379-80, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). Thus, to the extent the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment is concerned with protecting the privacy of one's home, Miller's privacy interests had already been diminished by the issuance of the search warrant. See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340. Fourth, we consider the purpose and flagrancy of the police misconduct. Because the police had obtained a valid search warrant for Miller's home, they were authorized to detain him while they conducted the search. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. at 704-05, 101 S.Ct. at 2595. If the evidence that a citizen's residence is harboring contraband is sufficient to persuade a judicial officer that an invasion of the citizen's privacy is justified, the detention is constitutionally reasonable. Id. However, while the detention was proper, at some point during execution of the warrant the police went beyond detention and an illegal arrest occurred. In view of all of the circumstances, we conclude that Miller's statements were not the fruit of an illegal arrest. The confession was voluntary. The temporal proximity between the arrest and the statement was not immediate. The police made sure Miller understood he could end the interview and be returned home if he so desired. This case is unlike State v. Winegar, 147 Ariz. at 448, 711 P.2d at 587, in which the police failed to let the defendant know she was free to leave. Miller decided to talk, not because the police illegally transported him to the police station, but because he thought he might be able to escape criminal liability. Finally, while there was no probable cause to arrest, in this case the police had the right to detain him pending execution of the search warrant. 3. Death qualification of the jury During voir dire, the court asked whether there was anyone on the panel who has such negative feelings about the death penalty that you could not sit fairly and impartially knowing that [it] might be a potential punishment in the event of a conviction. Tr. Jul. 6, 1993, at 59. Miller argues that it was error to death qualify the jury because the trial court imposes the sentence. We have rejected this argument. E.g., State v. Scott, 177 Ariz. 131, 137-38, 865 P.2d 792, 798-99 (1993). Miller also argues that: the trial court's inquiry was improper because it suggested that jurors with death scruples should not be on the jury; it was error for the trial court not to ask whether anyone's feelings favoring the death penalty could affect his or her ability to sit fairly and impartially; and it was error not to use a questionnaire or individual voir dire. Because Miller did not object to the court's death qualification procedure, these arguments are waived. State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 572, 858 P.2d 1152, 1175 (1993), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 1578, 128 L.Ed.2d 221 (1994). There was no fundamental error. 4. Opening statement before voir dire The court denied Miller's motion to permit opening statements before voir dire. There was no error. Under Rule 18.5(c), Ariz.R.Crim.P., in effect at the time of Miller's trial, the court conducts voir dire, and in its discretion, may allow parties to question jurors. The rule did not permit such an opening statement. Even as amended, the rule conditions such an opening statement on the court's consent. Rule 18.5(c), Ariz. R.Crim.P. (1995). 5. Floyd Hamilton's statements Floyd Hamilton rented a room from Miller, and was home when the SWAT team executed the search warrant. The police took Hamilton to the station and questioned him and Miller at the same time. During Miller's interrogation, a detective told Miller that other people said he shot the victim. Miller first denied this. The detective told Miller he knew he shot her and that the reason I know this is because ... you told one of your friends and I talked to him. Ex. 77 at 61. Miller then admitted that Luna fired the first shot and he fired the remaining shots. Id. at 62. Miller argues that the friend was Hamilton and the statement was hearsay. The detective's statement, admitted over Miller's hearsay objection, was part of Miller's interrogation. The statement, admitted to show its effect on Miller during his interrogation, was not offered for its substantive content and therefore was not hearsay. See State v. Ceja, 113 Ariz. 39, 41-42, 546 P.2d 6, 8-9 (1976). Miller initially denied his participation. He confessed only after being told that others, including his roommates, had implicated him. There was no error. 6. Admission of Luna's hearsay statement that Miller agreed to be an alibi David Arias, Luna's friend, testified that Luna asked him to help murder the victim a couple days before the murder, that the murder occurred on the night Luna had said it would, and that Luna said he would have an alibi through Mark. Tr. Jul. 8, 1993, at 164. Miller objected to the alibi testimony. The court ruled that it was admissible as a statement against penal interest. Rule 804(b)(3), Ariz.R.Evid. Luna, the declarant, refused to testify and was thus unavailable. A statement against interest is a statement which at the time of its making ... so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability ... that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true. Rule 804(b)(3), Ariz.R.Evid. The statement need only have probative value and need not be a direct confession of guilt. State v. LaGrand, 153 Ariz. 21, 27, 734 P.2d 563, 569 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 872, 108 S.Ct. 207, 98 L.Ed.2d 158 (1987). Luna's statement that Miller would provide him an alibi subjected Luna to liability for murder and conspiracy to commit murder. The evidence in turn was properly admitted against Miller because it proved that the murder was planned and that Luna anticipated that Miller would assist him in some way. There was no error. 7. Soil disturbance evidence Miller argues that the court erred by admitting the opinions of three experts that the victim was alive when he shot her in the desert. The testimony to which Miller objects is that of a detective and a medical examiner, and the statement of another detective at Miller's interrogation. Miller argued that because he thought the victim was dead when he shot her, he could not be guilty of premeditated murder. The State introduced evidence showing that the victim was alive. Photographs of the murder scene show a struggle. Miller does not challenge the admission of these photographs. Miller's argument is not clear. He appears to argue that expert testimony was not necessary and the witnesses were not properly qualified as experts. But the detective did not testify as an expert. She testified that the victim's shorts and belt buckle made grooves in the sand. She also testified that vegetation found in the victim's hand appeared to have come from a plant approximately 12 to 13 inches away. This is proper lay testimony. The detective's opinion was based on her perception of the murder scene and assisted the jury in understanding the photographs. Rule 701, Ariz.R.Evid. There was no error. The medical examiner testified that rigor mortis hardened the victim's grasp of vegetation found in her hand, suggesting that she grabbed it while alive. In addition, he testified that the victim could have been able to move her legs after she was shot, and thus make the grooves in the sand. Miller did not object to the medical examiner's qualifications or testimony. His motion in limine addressed the police only. Thus, the argument over the medical examiner's testimony is waived. Even had there been no waiver, the admission of the medical examiner's testimony was not error. Rule 702, Ariz.R.Evid. Finally, Miller argues that a detective's statement about a struggle should have been redacted from the tape of his interrogation. He did not request exclusion, so his claim is waived. Nor is there fundamental error. 8. Jury Instructions Miller argues that 12 jury instructions were erroneous. But he objected to only three of them. He has thus waived the nine other claims of error, none of which rise to the level of fundamental. Miller argues that the trial court erred by failing to give his theory of defense instruction. [5] The trial court ruled that Miller's proposed instruction impermissibly commented on the evidence. We agree. See State v. Salazar, 173 Ariz. 399, 409, 844 P.2d 566, 576 (1992), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 912, 113 S.Ct. 3017, 125 L.Ed.2d 707 (1993). Miller next argues that the trial court's accomplice instruction was erroneous because it did not define culpable mental state. This argument is in a footnote in the opening brief. It is waived because Rule 31.13(c), Ariz.R.Crim.P., requires that argument appear in the body of a brief. See State v. Walden, 183 Ariz. 595, 605, 905 P.2d 974, 984 (1995), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 1444, 134 L.Ed.2d 564 (1996). In all events, this contention is without merit. The jury was adequately instructed on the requirements of intentional, knowing, and reckless conduct. Finally, Miller argues that the trial court's instruction to disregard Luna's absence was erroneous. The instruction provided that: [i]t is no defense to the crime charged ... that another person or persons not now on trial might have participated or cooperated in the crime. You're not to guess the reason for the absence from the courtroom of such other person or persons, if any, as the only matter before you for your decision is the guilt[] or innocence of Don Miller. Tr. Jul. 12, 1993, at 28. But this instruction is a correct statement of the law. See State v. Salazar, 173 Ariz. at 410, 844 P.2d at 577. There was no error. 9. Photographs Miller objected to the introduction of three autopsy photographs. Inflammatory photographs are admissible if they are relevant and not unfairly prejudicial. State v. Walden, 183 Ariz. at 610, 905 P.2d at 989. The trial court ruled that the photographs were not particularly inflammatory or prejudicial, and that they were important evidence on whether the victim was alive when Miller shot her. We agree. There was no error. Miller also claims it was error to admit another autopsy photograph. He failed to object and thus waived this claim. There was no fundamental error. 10. Use of Leg Irons and Shackles Miller objected to the use of shackles during trial. The court denied his request. Miller does not claim that the jury ever saw him shackled, and thus he fails to show prejudice. State v. McMurtrey, 136 Ariz. 93, 98, 664 P.2d 637, 642 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 858, 104 S.Ct. 180, 78 L.Ed.2d 161 (1983). This claim is without merit.