Opinion ID: 1130197
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the lower court erred in denying appellant's motion for a change of venue.

Text: Prior to trial, on September 4, 1984, appellant filed a motion for change of venue, which was heard on September 5, 1984. The prosecution called to the stand four (4) supervisors of DeSoto County. The appellant called five (5) witnesses. The supervisors and three (3) of the five (5) witnesses called by the appellant testified that the appellant could receive a fair trial in DeSoto County. Attached to the motion for change of venue as exhibits were nineteen (19) newspaper articles, which referred to the crime. Seven (7) of the accounts were from local publications, three (3) were from the Clarion-Ledger, three (3) were from the Commercial Appeal, and six (6) were from an unknown source. A certificate executed by the News Director of WREG-TV, Channel 3, Memphis, Tennessee, indicating that full coverage was provided by the television station of the arrest and preliminary hearings concerning appellant and that the coverage was aired on evening and nightly news broadcasts July 13 and 26, 1984; and a certificate executed by Dave Black, Jr., manager of WVIM radio, FM 95, Hernando, Mississippi, that the station provided full coverage by way of radio news broadcasts relating to the arrest and preliminary hearing of Willie James Harris and Barry Patterson, five (5) times, beginning subsequent to July 12, 1984, were entered into evidence. An open letter from Representative Morris Lee Scott, DeSoto County, addressed to Governor William A. Allain, was among the publications. Although referring to the alleged rape, the emphasis of the letter was critical of the parole system in the State of Mississippi. Reference was made in one of the articles to a letter written by the Board of Supervisors, DeSoto County, to Governor William A. Allain criticizing the release of Harris on parole. The letter was not published. Appellant was arrested July 11, 1984, indicted August 15, 1984, and trial began October 30, 1984. Fifteen (15) of the newspaper articles were published in July, 1984, and four (4) were published in August, 1984. The last article was published August 22, and a period of two (2) months elapsed before the October 30 trial. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial judge made a finding from the evidence, including live witnesses and exhibits, that, in his opinion, he could not in good conscious arbitrarily sustain the motion for change of venue, but, likewise, did not feel that he should overrule the motion for change of venue at that time, and reserved ruling until he reconsidered the motion at the conclusion of the voir dire and after having the benefit of observing those persons summoned for jury duty. The court convened on October 30, 1984, for selection of the jury and for trial. Eighty-two (82) venire persons were present. The trial judge thoroughly interrogated and qualified them. The prosecutor and the defense attorneys extensively questioned them to determine whether or not they would be fair and unbiased jurors. Fifty-two (52) members of the venire had some knowledge of the case. The appellant challenged for cause eleven (11) jurors. The trial judge excused nine (9) of those eleven (11) challenged. Appellant exercised twelve (12) peremptory challenges, the State seven (7) challenges. Eleven (11) jurors had been selected at that point. The appellant did not request any additional peremptory challenges and the jury was accepted by the State and the appellant. Forty-five (45) jurors were left for consideration after the twelve (12) members of the jury were accepted. Again, the motion for change of venue was considered by the trial judge, and he stated the court had the opportunity to observe the jury panel, to listen to the response of the jurors under oath and to questions propounded by the court, the State and the defendant, and he overruled the motion for change of venue. The case sub judice is not comparable to the facts on the venue question in Fisher v. State, 481 So.2d 203 (Miss. 1985) and Johnson v. State, 476 So.2d 1195 (Miss. 1985). In those cases, the county was saturated by media coverage, television, radio and newspaper. In Fisher, saturation included, in addition to a single sex-related murder, the rape murder of another young woman in the county, the rape of a third woman, Fisher had a previous rape conviction in Georgia and was on parole at the time. The evidence against Fisher, including evidence that he was guilty of the second rape/murder, was repeatedly included in media reports. In Johnson, the venue was the same as in Fisher. The same news media bombarded the county with stories and articles about Johnson. On the issue of venue change, this Court will not disturb the ruling of the lower court where the sound discretion of the trial judge in denying change of venue was not abused. Wiley v. State, 484 So.2d 339, 342-43 (Miss. 1986); Cabello v. State, 490 So.2d 852, 854-855 (Miss. 1986); Weeks v. State, 493 So.2d 1280, 1285-87 (Miss. 1986); White v. State, 495 So.2d 1346, 1349 (Miss. 1986). In United States v. Harrelson, 754 F.2d 1153 (5th Cir.1985), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the matter of obtaining an impartial jury and in rebutting a presumption of prejudice. There, the Court referred to the fact that the trial judge saw and heard the jurors and that it could be shown from the voir dire an impartial jury was selected. The Court said: An appellant can demonstrate that prejudicial inflammatory publicity about his case so saturated the community from which his jury was drawn as to render it virtually impossible to obtain an impartial jury. Proof of such poisonous publicity raises a presumption that appellant's jury was prejudiced, relieving him of the obligation to establish actual prejudice by a juror in his case. This presumption is rebuttable, however, and the government may demonstrate from the voir dire that an impartial jury was actually impaneled in appellant's case. If the government succeeds in doing so, the conviction will stand despite appellant's showing of adverse pretrial publicity. [Citations omitted]. 754 F.2d at 1159. We are of the opinion that the trial judge did not abuse his sound discretion in denying the motion to change venue and the assigned Error I is rejected.