Opinion ID: 1709662
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: forfeitures and retroactivity

Text: ถ 60. The State's attempt to impose penalties and forfeitures in this case warrants a distinct analysis. Upon review of the language of the Spills Law and supporting material to ascertain the legislature's intent, we conclude that the State does not seek a retroactive, ex post facto application of the Spills Law. ถ 61. Although Chrysler concedes that a hazardous substance discharge occurred after 1978, Chrysler argues that it did not cause the hazardous discharge in this case. According to Chrysler, Keller Transit caused the discharge when it dumped the waste drums at the Bark River site in 1970. Even if Chrysler did cause the discharge, it did so prior to the effective date of the Spills Lawโagain, when the drums were buried at the Bark River site in 1970. Therefore, using the Spills Law to impose liability on Chrysler in this situation would be to retroactively apply the law in violation of the ex post facto provisions of the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions. ถ 62. We might be compelled to agree with Chrysler's argument if we agreed with its definition of the term cause, as it is used in Wis. Stat. ง 144.76(3) (1977). Under Chrysler's theory, the only cause of the hazardous substance discharge in this case was the dumping of waste drums at the Bark River site in 1970. We do not agree with this interpretation. ถ 63. Cause is not defined in Chapter 144 of the Wisconsin Statutes, nor has any court in this state defined the term as it is used in this context. Therefore, we must apply the standard principles of statutory construction to determine its meaning. The goal of our examination, as usual, is to discern the intent of the legislature. See State v. Rosenburg, 208 Wis. 2d 191, 194, 560 N.W.2d 266 (1997). [5,6] ถ 64. To determine the intent of the legislature, a court must first look to the language of the statute. If that language clearly and unambiguously sets forth the legislative intent, it is the court's duty to apply that intent to the case at hand and not look beyond the statute's language to determine its meaning. See N.E.M. v. Strigel, 208 Wis. 2d 1, 7, 559 N.W.2d 256 (1997). However, if a statute is ambiguous, a court should examine the scope, history, context, subject matter, and purpose of the statute in order to determine the legislature's intent. See State ex rel. Jacobus v. State, 208 Wis. 2d 39, 48, 559 N.W.2d 900 (1997). A statute is ambiguous if it is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in more than one way. See id. [7] ถ 65. In this case, we may determine the common and ordinary meaning of a word by examining the definition given by a recognized dictionary. See Mauthe, 123 Wis. 2d at 300. Cause is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as follows: Cause, v. To be the cause or occasion of; to effect as an agent; to bring about; to bring into existence; to make to induce; to compel. Cause, n .. . .Each separate antecedent of an event. Something that precedes and brings about an effect or a result. A reason for an action or condition. . . . An agent that brings something about. That which in some manner is accountable for condition that brings about an effect or that produces a cause for the resultant action or state. Black's Law Dictionary at 221 (6th ed. 1990). ถ 66. Using these accepted definitions as a guide, we address Chrysler's arguments that Keller Transit, not Chrysler, caused the discharge at the Bark River site and that if Chrysler indeed caused the discharge, it did so prior to the effective date of the Spills Law. We conclude that cause is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in more than one way. A person or entity can bring about an event not only by acting affirmatively to produce that event, but also by failing to act. Stated differently, the failure to act can be a reason for an action or condition and can be a necessary antecedent of an event in the same way that affirmative action can precede and bring about an effect. ถ 67. Using the term cause in this manner, a reasonably well-informed person may conclude that Chrysler caused hazardous substance discharges after the Spills Law took effect by failing to remediate any and all discharge which occurred after 1978. That is, by failing each day after May 21, 1978, to clean up the hazardous waste at the Bark River site, Chrysler would thereby cause a hazardous discharge independent of its, or Keller Transit's, actions in 1970. As we have already held in Mauthe, conscious human conduct is not needed to comport with the definition of discharge in Wis. Stat. ง 144.76(1)(a) (1977) because [w]ords such as `leaking' or `emitting' have no apparent tie to human activity and often refer to phenomena which occur absent human conduct. Mauthe, 123 Wis. 2d at 298. Because the leaking or emitting of hazardous waste is an ongoing process that occurs absent human conduct, one may reasonably conclude that a person can cause that leaking by failing to clean up the hazardous waste it has generated. ถ 68. Therefore, we examine factors such as the scope, history, context, subject matter and purpose of Wis. Stat. ง 144.76(3) (1977) to determine whether the legislature intended the term cause to include both the commission and omission of an act which leads to a hazardous waste spill. In this case, the purpose of the Spills Law alone leads us to the conclusion that the legislature did intend such a result. [8] ถ 69. The purpose of Wis. Stat. ง 144.76 (1977) is, as we have stated: to prevent, minimize, and, if necessary, abate and remedy contamination of this state's environment and the resultant risks to human health caused by discharges of hazardous substances. The same risks to this state's environment and to human health are present whether or not the seepage of a hazardous substance occurred in relation to some human activity at the time the seepage occurred. Mauthe, 123 Wis. 2d at 299. Thus, it would be inconsistent with legislative purpose to place a limitation upon the term cause that would restrict it to the action taken by Chrysler in 1970โaction which already forms the basis for liability under the Solid Waste Law. Failing to remediate hazardous waste spills can have the same, or perhaps greater, effect as any affirmative spilling or dumping of that waste: the environment is contaminated and damaged, posing serious risks to human health. It is the legislature's purpose to abate and remedy that contamination regardless of the cause. ถ 70. Evidence of the legislature's purpose may also be gleaned from the penalties provision of Chapter 144 as reproduced above, Wis. Stat. ง 144.57 (1969). That provision, the substantial equivalent of which was in effect in 1978, indicates that each day of continued violation is a separate offense. This provides clear evidence that the legislature recognized the ongoing nature of hazardous waste spills, and that the failure to remediate, each day, could itself be a cause of a hazardous discharge within the meaning of the Spills Law. [9] ถ 71. The logical counter-argument to our interpretation of the Spills Lawโone that is implicit in Chrysler's argument to this courtโis that Chrysler could not know of the hazardous substance spill which occurred after 1978, eight years after the waste had been removed from Chrysler's manufacturing plant. Nevertheless, Wis. Stat. ง 144.76(3) (1977) imposes liability upon persons causing hazardous discharges regardless of whether they knew about the discharge. If the legislature had desired to impose liability only upon those who knowingly cause a hazardous discharge, it certainly could have done so. ถ 72. Evidence of the legislature's intent not to require intentional causation is made apparent by looking to the Hazardous Waste Management Act, Wis. Stat. งง 144.60-144.74 (1977), enacted by the same legislation as the Spills Law. See 1977 Laws ch. 377, งง 21, 23. Specifically, ง 144.74(3) indicates as follows: Any person who transports any hazardous waste subject to ss. 144.60 to 144.74 to a facility which the transporter knows does not have a license, intentionally disposes of any hazardous waste subject to ss. 144.60 to 144.74 without having obtained a license for disposal of hazardous wastes or intentionally makes any false statement or representation. . . . (Emphasis added.) This provisionโagain, having been enacted by the same legislation as the Spills Lawโmakes clear that the legislature could have established intent as an element of a Spills Law violation if it had so desired. [10] ถ 73. Therefore, we conclude that Chrysler caused a hazardous discharge in this case after 1978 by failing to clean up the hazardous waste left at the Bark River site. Because the State does not seek penalties for Chrysler's pre-1978 conduct, but rather for Chrysler's post-1978 failure to remediate the spill alone, we are not presented with a retroactive, ex post facto application of the law. ถ 74. Indeed, [a] statute does not operate `retrospectively' merely because it is applied in a case arising from conduct antedating the statute's enactment, or upsets expectations based on prior law. Rather, the court must ask whether the new provision attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment. Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 269-70 (1994). Stated differently, [a] retroactive law `takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions or considerations already past. . . .' In re Estate of Bilsie, 100 Wis. 2d 342, 357, 302 N.W.2d 508 (Ct. App. 1981) (quoting Sturges v. Carter, 114 U.S. 511, 519 (1885)). ถ 75. In this case, the ongoing nature of a hazardous substance spill eliminates any concern that the State seeks to impose a new duty or attach new legal consequences to events completed before the effective date of the Spills Law. The hazardous discharge at the Bark River site was not a consideration or transaction already past. Rather, as we have stated, it was an ongoing process which Chrysler continued to cause after the effective date of the Spills Law by failing to remediate the spill. [24] ถ 76. In sum, we conclude that the remedial portion of Wis. Stat. ง 144.76(3) (1977) was intended to have both retroactive and prospective application. Therefore, Chrysler is liable for complete remediation of the hazardous substance spill in this case, even if the leaking had in part occurred before the Spills Law took effect. [11] ถ 77. We further conclude that Chrysler caused the discharge at issue after the Spills Law took effect in 1978, irrespective of Chrysler's activities prior to that date. Therefore, because Chrysler generated the hazardous substances, [25] and caused their discharge after 1978 by failing to remediate, it is liable for penalties for each day of violation by failure to remediate. ถ 78. There being no genuine issue of fact that remains for trial, we conclude that summary judgment was properly granted in favor of Chrysler on the Solid Waste Law claim. Accordingly, we affirm the order of the circuit court on this issue. Because we affirm the circuit court's order, we need not address Chrysler's argument that the Solid Waste Law was not intended to apply to Chrysler and that the law exceeded the DNR's rule-making authority. However, we reverse the order of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of Chrysler on the Spills Law claim and conclude that summary judgment should be granted in favor of the State on this issue. [26] ถ 79. Accordingly, Chrysler is compelled to complete remediation of the Bark River site, conduct an investigation to determine the location of any and all other unlicensed sites in Wisconsin at which its solid and hazardous wastes from its Hartford, Wisconsin, plant were disposed and to submit both the results of that investigation, and if necessary, a remediation plan, to the DNR. ถ 80. The cause is remanded to the circuit court in order to assess the penalties authorized by Wis. Stat. ง 144.57 (1969) and subsequent versions of that same statute from February 16, 1985, until the date that remediation was commenced by Chrysler in December 1993. As mentioned, ง 144.57 (1969) provides a forfeiture range of $10 to $5,000 for each day of violation. This reflects the legislature's intention to give the trial court a wide range of discretion in fixing the amounts of forfeitures for ch. 144 violations. State v. Schmitt, 145 Wis. 2d 724, 734, 429 N.W.2d 518 (Ct. App. 1988) (emphasis added). [12] ถ 81. There are no statutorily mandated factors which the circuit court must consider. See id. at 730 (discussing Chapter 778 of the Wisconsin statutes, which sets forth the appropriate procedures for the collection of forfeitures). Instead, the trial court is permitted to use the limits provided by sec. [144.57] to fashion an appropriate forfeiture based on the facts of the individual case. Id. at 735. The following are some of the factors which the circuit court should consider in this case: (1) Chrysler's cooperation with the DNR in remediating the Bark River site thus far, including removal of the buried waste drums and remediation of the contaminated soil; (2) Chrysler's initiation of remedial activities without being compelled to do so by the DNR via judicial or administrative enforcement procedures; (3) the environmental harm caused; and (4) the degree of Chrysler's culpability in this matterโnot for its violations of the Solid Waste Law in 1970, but for its violations of the 1978 Spills Law alone. By the Court. โThe order of the circuit court is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The cause is remanded to the circuit court for further fact-finding, if necessary, and for the assessment of penalties against Chrysler Corporation in a manner consistent with this opinion. ถ 82. WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J. ( concurring in part and dissenting in part ). Because I conclude that this court should extend the discovery rule to actions brought to enforce Wisconsin's Solid Waste Law, I respectfully dissent. ถ 83. In 1970, Chrysler Corporation knowingly violated the State's law with respect to disposal of solid wastes. Chrysler received the State of Wisconsin Solid Waste Disposal Standards (effective May 1, 1969) on December 15, 1969 but did not hire a licensed hauler until some time in the early 1970s. The regulations, Wis. Admin. Code ch. 51, clearly and unambiguously required that generators of solid waste such as Chrysler dispose of their waste: a) at a licensed facility, or b) by a licensed hauler. ถ 84. Chrysler did neither. ถ 85. Instead, Chrysler hired an unlicensed hauler to transport over 400 drums of waste, including hazardous substances, for disposal. Evidence in the record indicates that Chrysler knew that the waste disposal hauler was not licensed, and further knew that the regulations forbade their activities. ถ 86. The buried drums were not unearthed and discovered until 1992 when the site was excavated. I agree with the State that [i]t would be an injustice to apply the statute of limitations to bar the State from prosecuting the defendants when the State had absolutely no ability to identify the violations, to identify the defendants, or to assess the damage to the environment prior to discover of the barrels. State's Brief at 21-22. ถ 87. I dissent because I believe that the discovery rule should apply to enforcement actions of the Solid Waste Law provided for in Wis. Stat. ง 144.43 (1969) and Wis. Admin. Code ง RD 51.05-51.06. Extending the discovery rule is the proper result in this case because: 1) a violation of the Solid Waste Law and resultant liability bears a far closer resemblance to an analysis of a tort of negligence, to which the discovery rule applies, than it does to a contract analysis, to which the discovery rule does not apply; 2) applying the discovery rule to violations of the Solid Waste Law fits squarely with this court's rationale extending the discovery rule to torts in Hansen v. A.H. Robins, Inc., 113 Wis. 2d 550, 335 N.W.2d 578 (1983), Spitler v. Dean, 148 Wis. 2d 630, 436 N.W.2d 308 (1989), and Borello v. U.S. Oil Co., 130 Wis. 2d 397, 388 N.W.2d 140 (1986); 3) Chrysler's violation of the Solid Waste Law includes aspects similar to fraudโa cause of action to which the discovery rule statutorily applies; and 4) other states have extended the discovery rule to enforcement of similar environmental statutes.