Opinion ID: 2302675
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prospective Application and Dispute Resolution

Text: The proposed Consent Order provides that it is intended to and will supersede and control over any different or conflicting provisions of the Westbrook Code of Ordinances now existing or hereafter enacted, and [i]n the event of a difference or conflict between the terms of this Order and any state or federal requirements, the stricter provision will control and this Order will otherwise remain in full force and effect. (Consent Order ¶ 56.) The agreement, and thus the order, would be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the parties' successors and assigns and contains a re-opener provision that allows the parties to discuss and negotiate in good faith the incorporation of improved mining technologies once every 10 years. (Consent Order ¶ 56.) If the parties do not come to an agreement, the then-current terms of the agreement will continue for another 10 years. (Consent Order ¶ 56.) If a dispute arises between the parties regarding the Consent Order, it shall first be subject to informal negotiations, and then Westbrook may enforce violations pursuant to 30-A M.R.S. § 4452 (2009). (Consent Order ¶ ¶ 57-58.) [¶ 10] Pike and the City moved the court to approve and enter the consent decree, and, over the objection of Artel and Smiling Hill, the court granted Pike's motion for a nonevidentiary hearing on the motions for entry. Following the hearing, the court approved the consent decree in a comprehensive decision dated November 22, 2010, that thoroughly addressed all of the arguments posed by Artel and Smiling Hill. [¶ 11] In its decision, the court noted the public policy favoring the resolution of disputes by settlement and determined that although the consent decree resembled contract zoning, it did not result in an illegal, de facto contract zone in violation of the statutory requirements for contract zoning. The court observed that the consent decree represents the settlement of legitimate equitable claims that the parties have disputed through litigation, and that [w]hether Westbrook is equitably estopped from enforcing its zoning ordinance against Pike's quarrying and mining operation or whether the doctrine of laches applies are determinations that the court must make. The court ultimately concluded that the consent decree would not result in a de facto contract zone because the City had not acted in its legislative capacity when it entered into the consent decree: When the City Council ... votes to enter into a waste removal contract, approves the hiring of a new code enforcement officer, or enters into a settlement agreement of legitimate claims in pending litigation, it acts in an executive capacity, pursuant to the broad powers of administration granted to municipalities by the Maine Constitution's home rule authority for matters which are local and municipal in character.... The City Council's decision and vote to enter into the [c]onsent decree is executive, not legislative in nature and, therefore, it does not constitute contract zoning, illegal or otherwise. [¶ 12] The court also voiced concern with the practical consequences that would result if it adopted Artel's position that Pike should dismiss the suit and apply for contract zoning approval: The logical conclusion of their preferred procedure would prevent a municipality from settling any land use litigation involving a statutorily mandated process, regardless of the risks or costs to the municipality.... In the context of the litigation of Pike's independent claims, the court believes that the procedure advanced by Artel is neither necessary, nor intended by the Legislature. [¶ 13] The court concluded that the City had the power to settle Pike's claims as part of its right to sue and be sued; that the opponents to the consent decree received ample notice and an opportunity to be heard; and that it would not second guess the [City's] judgment that it is in the City's best interest to settle the litigation with Pike rather than risk an adverse result after trial. The court adopted the executed consent decree by an order dated November 23, 2010, and entered it as a final judgment on December 7, 2010. This appeal followed.