Opinion ID: 836216
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: facts

Text: On appeal after a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the party who prevailed before the jury. Jacobs v. Tidewater Barge Lines, 277 Or. 809, 811, 562 P.2d 545 (1977). We therefore review the record in this case in the light most favorable to plaintiff. Plaintiff had been an insurance agent for Farmers in Roseburg, Oregon. In 1981, defendants asked plaintiff to become a district manager for Farmers in the Portland area, and plaintiff agreed. [5] Plaintiff signed a written District Manager's Appointment Agreement (agreement) with Farmers. Although FGI directed Farmers's operations and employed Farmers's management personnel, only Farmers contracted with plaintiff. The agreement described the district manager's duties and compensation, and provided: This Agreement    may be canceled without cause by either the District Manager or [Farmers] on 30 days [ sic ] written notice. The agreement also provided: Nothing contained [in the agreement] is intended or shall be construed to create the relationship of employer and employee.    No control is to be exercised by [Farmers] over the time when, the place where, or the manner in which the District Manager shall operate in carrying out the objectives of this Agreement provided only that they conform to normal good business practice   . Finally, the agreement stated that the parties could make no change, alteration or modification of the agreement, except as    evidenced by an agreement in writing signed by the District Manager and an authorized representative of [Farmers]. Defendants regularly evaluated district managers' performance. Some of the factors affecting those evaluations were the number of new agents that the district manager had recruited and the number and types of policies that agents within the district had sold. In 1985, Winter, plaintiff's regional sales manager, [6] and other FGI managers criticized plaintiff's performance as a district sales manager. That criticism centered around what Winter referred to as plaintiff's poor performance in agency development. According to Winter, plaintiff had failed to recruit and train a sufficient number of new agents. Winter informed plaintiff that he was expected to meet specific recruitment goals by the end of August 1985 and additional goals by the end of that year. In a letter describing those goals, Winter wrote: Failure to attain any one of these goals will    result in us requesting your resignation or terminating your appointment agreement. Winter also requested that plaintiff submit a detailed description of how he intended to meet his goals. Winter went on to list the additional expectations, including that plaintiff would provide a weekly recruiting report and that plaintiff would contact his prospective recruits every two weeks. The parties referred to that agreement as plaintiff's performance plan. Winter closed the letter about the performance plan by saying: At this point, you will either make the goals that we established together and develop the habits necessary to be a successful district manager over the long haul, or we will have to replace you as a district manager. If you approach this in a positive manner and take advantage of the assistance that we can and will provide, you can attain the established goals. If you are unwilling or unable to put forth the effort necessary to attain these goals, you probably should not be a district manager. Your future is in your hands. We can help, but we can't do the job for you. Your own abilities and efforts will be the determinant factor as to whether you remain as a district manager   . At Winter's request, plaintiff signed, dated, and returned the letter. According to plaintiff, after that performance plan was developed, defendants began to exercise increasing control over the manner in which he conducted his business. Plaintiff nearly reached the goals that had been set for him in the 1985 performance plan. Farmers acknowledged plaintiff's success by giving him various awards. However, in 1992, a new group of regional managers placed plaintiff on another performance plan with new goals. That performance plan also was accompanied by exhortatory letters from defendants' managers, including statements such as, you are responsible for your own destiny and as always, your ultimate destiny lies in your own hands. One year later, Farmers terminated its agreement with plaintiff, citing plaintiff's failure to meet stated goals and his management decisions on several specified occasions. In August 1993, plaintiff filed the present action against defendants. Plaintiff alleged that defendants had encouraged him to give up his insurance agency to become a district manager and that, after he had built a successful business, defendants had established unreasonable performance goals and used other deceitful strategies to force him out of business and to reap the profits of the business that he had created. Plaintiff introduced evidence at trial in support of those allegations. Colvard, the regional agency manager who worked under Winter and who attended the meetings to evaluate plaintiff, testified that plaintiff's 1985 performance plan was part of defendants' strategy to force plaintiff to resign. Colvard explained that his own success was evaluated based on the number of district managers that he could replace. According to Colvard, defendants benefitted from replacing district managers because the commission paid to new agents typically was lower than that paid to seasoned ones, and defendants would profit from the difference. Colvard further testified that he had been told that Farmers had to have good cause to terminate a district manager. Accordingly, to support plaintiff's termination, Colvard had had to document a severe performance deficiency. Colvard also admitted that he had set out to obtain plaintiff's resignation or to document his performance deficiency by setting unreachable performance quotas. Additional testimony from Meals, the manager under Colvard who worked directly with district managers, corroborated Colvard's testimony. Meals testified that he directly was responsible for executing defendants' plan to push plaintiff into resignation or to document plaintiff's performance failure. Meals testified that he had set out to demonstrate that plaintiff had failed to perform and that he had asked for plaintiff's resignation at least eight times in 1985. Meals also admitted that he had told plaintiff that, if plaintiff met the production goals, then plaintiff would remain a district manager. Additionally, Meals acknowledged that he had told plaintiff in writing that plaintiff's future as district manager was in plaintiff's own hands. Meals, like Colvard, understood that Farmers's agreement with plaintiff could not be terminated without good cause. In addition to the testimony of those who worked directly with plaintiff, plaintiff offered the testimony of Bigley, Farmers's zone vice president at the time that Farmers terminated its agreement with plaintiff. Bigley was responsible for reviewing any employee's termination and ensuring that it was fair. Bigley testified that he had reviewed the reasons for plaintiff's termination and then had approved it. Bigley also testified that he believed that it was impossible for Farmers to terminate a district manager without good cause. Plaintiff testified that, throughout the time that he had served as a district manager, various representatives of Farmers had made clear to him that Farmers would terminate the agreement only if he lied, cheated, or stole. As noted above, the jury returned a verdict in plaintiff's favor on each of plaintiff's claims. After entering judgment on that verdict, the trial court granted defendants' motion for JNOV and, alternatively, for a new trial. On plaintiff's appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's JNOV on the tort claims, but reversed the JNOV on the contract claim, holding that there was sufficient evidence that the parties had modified the agreement. Bennett, 150 Or.App. at 70, 945 P.2d 595. The Court of Appeals then affirmed the trial court's alternative order of a new trial because of error in the jury instructions. Id. at 73, 945 P.2d 595. A majority of the Court of Appeals also held that, in a new trial, plaintiff could not use estoppel as one of his legal theories in support of his contention that Farmers was not entitled to rely on the at-will provision of the agreement. Id. at 78, 945 P.2d 595. Four judges dissented in part. According to the dissenting judges, plaintiff was entitled to pursue his theory that Farmers was estopped from relying on the at-will provision. Id. at 86, 945 P.2d 595. Plaintiff seeks reinstatement of the judgment in his favor. Farmers seeks review of the Court of Appeals' reversal of the JNOV on the contract claim.