Opinion ID: 203028
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Inability to Complete Plea Negotiations

Text: Defendants cite the government's rejection of their October 22 plea offer based on the imminent start of trial as evidence that a postponement in the trial date would have enabled them to successfully complete plea negotiations. Even assuming, for argument's sake, that denying or curtailing the time to conduct plea negotiations can be a basis for a claim of abuse of discretion  a matter on which we do not opine  no such abuse occurred here. The defendants' and the government's expectations for a deal remained far apart, [24] and, as reflected in the colloquy described above, at least some defendants remained ambivalent about entering a plea. Consequently, the possibility that a plea bargain acceptable to all could have been reached within a reasonable period of time is too speculative to factor significantly into our assessment. Defendants had no right to negotiate a plea, see Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561, 97 S.Ct. 837, 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977) ([T]here is no constitutional right to plea bargain; the prosecutor need not do so if he prefers to go to trial.), and even if some of the group had been able to reach agreement with the government, the court had the prerogative  which it indicated it might exercise  to reject a deal that did not embrace all defendants. Cf. United States v. Ventura-Cruel, 356 F.3d 55, 59 (1st Cir.2003) (It is well settled that a defendant does not have an absolute right to plead guilty.) (citing Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971)). It is apparent that the negotiations were not on the brink of completion, and defendants' general claim that an unspecified amount of additional time would have made a difference falls far short of showing the substantial prejudice necessary to justify a new trial. [25]