Opinion ID: 1782565
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: abilities amendment

Text: Petitioner maintains that the district court also erred in concluding that a subsequent amendment to the Declaration known as the Abilities Amendment, when viewed together with the nine-month lease restriction, impermissibly created two classes of condominium unit ownership. [7] As reflected in the decision below, Abilities of Florida, Inc. (Abilities) is a non-profit corporation that obtains financing through the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to purchase condominium units that it then leases to handicapped persons. HUD refused to finance Abilities' purchase of units at Woodside Village because of the nine-month lease restriction. As a result, Abilities filed a federal lawsuit alleging that Woodside Village had violated fair housing laws by failing to provide a reasonable accommodation to tenants based on their disabilities. The federal court entered a temporary injunction against the Association barring the enforcement of the lease restriction against Abilities. Subsequently, the parties settled the lawsuit. One condition of the settlement was that the Association adopt the so-called Abilities Amendment, which would permit Abilities to purchase six units at the condominium that would be exempt from the nine-month lease restriction. The amendment was properly adopted by the Association's members in November of 1997. On appeal, the district court agreed with the trial court that the Abilities Amendment impermissibly created two classes of condominium ownership, although the court cited no authority to support its conclusion. See Woodside Village Condominium Ass'n, 754 So.2d at 836. In so doing, the court rejected petitioner's claims that the issue was not properly before the trial court and that the amendment should not be considered in an equal protection argument regarding an arbitrary creation and treatment of two classes of unit owners since the class created by the amendment resulted from the settlement of a contested claim involving alleged civil rights violations. See id. As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that some courts and commentators have expressed considerable doubt as to whether the actions of a community association, such as a condominium association, constitute state action necessary for constitutional claims. See, e.g., Laguna Royale Owners Ass'n v. Darger, 119 Cal.App.3d 670, 174 Cal.Rptr. 136, 144 (1981) ([T]here is considerable doubt of whether the actions of Association constitute state action so as to bring into play the constitutional guarantees.); Lewis A. Schiller, Limitations on the Enforceability of Condominium Rules, 22 Stetson L.Rev. 1133, 1167 (1993) (noting that state action appears to be lacking in condominium rules, although author expressed view that constitutional standards should apply to condominium rules). On the other hand, some courts have either assumed state action exists or have chosen not to address the issue. For example, in White Egret, this Court analyzed a due process and equal protection challenge to an age restriction contained in a declaration without specifically discussing the issue of state action. See White Egret Condominium, Inc. v. Franklin, 379 So.2d 346 (Fla.1979); see also Franklin v. Spadafora, 388 Mass. 764, 447 N.E.2d 1244, 1249-51 (1983) (assuming state action for purposes of analyzing claim that an amendment limiting to two the number of units which could be owned by any individual or entity deprived plaintiffs of their due process and equal protection rights). We resolve the issue here by concluding that no colorable claim of discrimination has been demonstrated. We recognize that amendments which grant different benefits or impose different restrictions on truly similarly situated unit owners may be subject to challenge. For instance, in Pearlman v. Lake Dora Villas Management, Inc., 479 So.2d 780 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985), the court invalidated a declaration provision prohibiting all children under sixteen from permanent residence, except children of transferees from an institutional first mortgage. In so doing, the court agreed with the appellants' argument that the provision violated equal protection by its arbitrary creation and treatment of two classes of grantees. See id. at 780. The court reasoned as follows: The Association does not argue that children under the age of sixteen whose parents own a unit as transferees from an institutional first mortgage are less intrusive that those children whose parents obtained title from another source. It speculates such a group may be smaller and the exception is required for financing purposes. However true that may be as a practical matter, the distinction between the two classes of children still remains arbitrary and discriminatory. Id. at 781. However, unlike the situation in Pearlman, the distinction between Abilities and other unit owners, such as the respondents, is not arbitrary and discriminatory. Rather, it is directly related to providing reasonable accommodations to enable handicapped persons an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a unit in the complex through the assistance of Abilities. As noted by petitioner, both federal law and section 760.23, Florida Statutes (2000), generally prohibit discrimination in the sale or rental of a dwelling based on, among other things, a person's handicap. For purposes of section 760.23(7) and (8), [8] pertaining to discrimination because of a handicap, discrimination includes [a] refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling. § 760.23(9)(b), Fla. Stat. (2000). Thus, contrary to the holdings below, we conclude the Abilities Amendment does not constitute an arbitrary and discriminatory creation of two classes of unit owners in its attempt to accommodate the disabled. Cf. Lakeside Manor Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Forehand, 513 So.2d 1104, 1106 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) (rejecting argument that right of first refusal in condominium declaration pertaining to sales and leases was invalid merely because the developer and first mortgage holders were exempt from its operation).