Opinion ID: 425935
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the application of the standard to this case

Text: 66 We have made such a judgment in this case, and, after examining the detailed in camera affidavits of the parties, we conclude that the CIA properly classified the information at issue. The CIA affidavits give us reason to believe that disclosure of the censored portions of McGehee's article could reasonably be expected to cause serious damage to the national security. The affidavit offers reasonably convincing and detailed evidence of a serious risk that intelligence sources and methods would be compromised by disclosures proposed by McGehee. We also believe, on the basis of plausible scenarios put forward in the CIA affidavit, that the United States could suffer significant strategic and diplomatic setbacks as a result of the disclosure of the deleted information. These risks identified in the CIA affidavits do not, of course, rise to the level of certainty, but we believe they are real and serious enough to justify the classification decision in this case. 67 Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is 68 Affirmed. Separate Statement of WALD, Circuit Judge: 69 The Supreme Court has ruled that secrecy contracts, such as the one involved here, are a legal condition of CIA employment; today this court finds that the secret classification censorship scheme employed by the CIA has been constitutionally applied in this case. 70 I write separately to stress, however, that neither the agency's nor our analysis takes account of any separate public right to know critical albeit classified facts about the activities of our intelligence agencies. 1 See Afshar v. CIA, 702 F.2d 1125 (D.C.Cir.1983); cf. N.Y. Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728-30, 91 S.Ct. 2140, 2148-49, 29 L.Ed.2d 822 (1970) (Stewart, J., concurring). It would of course be extremely difficult for judges to balance the public's right to know against an acknowledged national security risk, and I do not believe we are currently authorized to do so. However, it seems important in view of recent revelations about past indiscretions in the name of national security, for some governmental institution, if not the classification system itself, to conduct such a balance. As Emerson explained, history ... give[s] value to the present hour and its duty. By not weighing the value to the public of knowing about particularly relevant episodes in the intelligence agencies' history, we may undermine the public's ability to assess the government's performance of its duty. Economic and criminal sanctions against agents who violate the preclearance and agency classification scheme are justifiable. But with no mechanism in the system for balancing the public's right to know with possible risks to security, those sanctions can also result in the permanent loss of information critical to public debate. Our decision today, reflecting current restraints on our authority, cannot and does not fill the public's need for such a balance. 71