Opinion ID: 2265552
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of Hearsay Testimony at the Hearing on Parole Revocation

Text: We find no merit in parolee's argument that the Parole Board erred in admitting the testimony of South Portland Police Detective Guimond that contained hearsay statements made by the victim soon after the alleged rape. The Maine Rules of Evidence do not govern parole revocation hearings. Ingerson I, 448 A.2d at 880; M.R. Evid. 1101(b)(3). In State v. Caron, 334 A.2d 495, 498 (Me.1975), we specifically stated: [T]he use of hearsay evidence is, per se, consistent with constitutional fundamental fairness due process guarantees as applicable to ... a proceeding for revocation of parole. In terms of policy, a minor use of hearsay testimony can be consistent with the informality and expedition desirable for the kind of revocation ... hearing now under scrutiny; therefore, we see no reason to prohibit hearsay evidence in such proceeding to the same extent it is prohibited in a criminal prosecution. We add the caveat, however, that if, in a given context, the hearsay evidence is unreasonably abundant and its substantive reliability highly suspect, a decision founded on it may be subject to vitiation for violation of due process of law fairness standards. (Citations omitted) In the hearing before the Parole Board, the hearsay evidence was neither unreasonably abundant nor highly suspect. In addition, the hearsay declarant testified at the parole revocation hearing and the parolee thus had a full opportunity to confront her and to cross-examine her on her statements that had come into the hearing through hearsay testimony. The admission of that minor amount of hearsay testimony at the parole hearing was not reversible error.