Opinion ID: 203120
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Conduct of the IJ

Text: To the extent that Yosd's due process claim is based on the IJ's conduct at the second hearing, it also fails. Yosd's bias allegations arise directly from the IJ's participation in Yosd's prior proceedings. To prevail under these circumstances, Yosd must meet the substantial burden of proving that the IJ displayed a `deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.' See Situ Ling Ni, 439 F.3d at 181 (quoting Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555, 114 S.Ct. 1147). Yosd has not met this burden. Yosd alleges that the IJ's conduct at the second hearing was improper because she chose to use that hearing to justify her prior ruling. In support of this claim, he cites her introduction into evidence at the second hearing of an evaluation of the quality of the translation during the first hearing. We fail to see how the IJ's request for an evaluation of the interpreter and her introduction of that evaluation into evidence provides proof of the IJ's bias. As she thoroughly explained during the hearing, the IJ believed that the errors noted by the BIA stemmed as much from inadequate transcription of the first hearing as from inadequate translation services by the interpreter. She expressed concern that this was a chronic problem because the BIA reviews transcripts rather than audio tapes of the hearings. She explained that she was introducing the evaluation of the translation services into the record to illustrate to the BIA that errors in transcription may be to blame for what the BIA perceives to be an inadequacy in translation services. She noted that the evaluation of the translation in the prior hearing was not something [she was] considering during the second hearing. Instead, she felt it was something for the Board to consider. Yosd characterizes the IJ's introduction of the translation evaluation as an expression of disdain or disagreement with the remand itself. Even if that were the case, such disdain alone does not amount to a due process violation. See Aguilar-Solis, 168 F.3d at 569 (noting that charges of judicial bias and partiality cannot be established solely by `expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger' quoting Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555, 114 S.Ct. 1147)). However, we disagree with Yosd's characterization and instead conclude, as the BIA did, that the IJ's request for an evaluation of the first interpreter and her submission of that evaluation to the BIA was in support of an institutional concern for the integrity of interpretations before EOIR [the Executive Office of the Immigration Review], not to justify her prior ruling. Yosd also contends that the. IJ's bias was revealed in her comment at the outset of the second hearing that she was going to send the case back to the Board unless [she saw] something different in the testimony here today to make [her] believe that [her] decision was incorrect. In context, this comment is merely a restatement of the IJ's understanding of the purpose of the remand. Earlier in the hearing, the IJ explained that the purpose of the second hearing was to use a new translator and to hear new testimony to clarify anything that [Yosd's counsel] felt was not properly translated [and] to clarify anything that maybe I misunderstood or was otherwise not properly translated. This statement of the purpose for the second hearing is consistent with the BIA's order that the IJ conduct further proceedings to allow the respondent to meaningfully participate in the removal proceedings. Thus, we find nothing improper, much less any evidence of the deep-seated antagonism necessary to establish a due process violation, in the IJ's explanation that she would need to see something different during the second hearing in order to find Yosd credible. Yosd next alleges that the IJ's use of some of the testimony from the prior hearings to support her lack of credibility determination while ignoring other testimony further illustrates her predisposition. [5] We do not agree. The IJ has broad discretion to consider unexplained inconsistencies as evidence of a lack of credibility. See Mewengkang v. Gonzales, 486 F.3d 737, 739-40 (1st Cir.2007) (holding that an alien may be found incredible based on unexplained discrepancies in testimony when the IJ provides specific and cogent reasons to conclude that the respondent's testimony was not credible). The second hearing with a new interpreter afforded Yosd the opportunity to explain any inconsistencies he wished to explain. Indeed, Yosd had the advantage of a prior decision pointing out the specific discrepancies with which the IJ was particularly concerned. The fact that he failed to clarify these points in the second hearing is a proper ground for an adverse credibility finding and does not suggest that the IJ prejudged Yosd's credibility on remand. Thus, we conclude that Yosd's due process claim fails.