Opinion ID: 2545741
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Particularity of the Fraud Claims

Text: Sverdrup also argues that Robinson failed to plead his fraud claims with particularity and, therefore, that the trial court erred in submitting the intentional-misrepresentation claim to the jury and in entering a judgment on the jury's verdict in favor of Robinson on that claim. Sverdrup does not allege any particular defect in pleading, merely that Robinson did not plead fraud with the particularity expected from Tennessee's substantive law. Moreover, Sverdrup does not cite any Tennessee authority to support its argument. Additionally, without explaining how they apply except to state that Robinson omitted the sine qua non  of his claim, Sverdrup also cites two cases from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit regarding Rule 9(b), Fed. R. Civ. P., as it relates to claims under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq. See United States ex rel. Atkins v. McInteer, 470 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir.2006), and United States ex rel. Clausen v. Laboratory Corp. of America, Inc., 290 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir.2002). Rule 9(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides: In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be averred generally. The Committee Comments on 1973 Adoption of Rule 9 explain: [T]his special requirement [in Rule 9(b)] as to fraud and mistake does not require every element in such actions to be stated with particularity. It simply commands the pleader to use more than generalized or conclusory statements to set out the fraud complained of. The pleading must show time, place and the contents or substance of the false representations, the fact misrepresented, and an identification of what has been obtained.. . . But knowledge by the defendant of the falsity of the representation and reliance on the representation by the plaintiff can still be generally alleged.. . . [I]t should be expected that the courts will strive to find the details necessary for the sufficiency of such a complaint, if the pleading gives fair notice to the opposing party. . . . See also Bethel v. Thorn, 757 So.2d 1154, 1158 (Ala.1999). The purpose of this rule is to give fair notice to the opposing party. Winn-Dixie Montgomery, Inc. v. Henderson, 371 So.2d 899, 901 (Ala.1979); see also Kabel v. Brady, 519 So.2d 912, 916 (Ala.1987). In his fifth amended complaint, [8] Robinson alleged 1) that he and Sverdrup engaged in discussions regarding Sverdrup's use of Robinson as a subcontractor in its proposal; 2) that those discussions culminated in a teaming agreement in February 2003; 3) that Sverdrup worked on the proposal long before the execution of the February 2003 teaming agreement and had decided to internalize inventory services; 4) that Sverdrup and the other joint venturers included a new system of inventory, Initiative 13, in its proposal to the Air Force; 5) that Sverdrup never told Robinson about these changes in inventory management; 6) that, per Sverdrup's instruction, Robinson submitted a cost proposal with a description of his existing work, although Sverdrup knew that such a proposed subcontract would be insufficient; 7) that Robinson lost the opportunity to apply for employment with the joint venture when Sverdrup instructed him not to apply because he was already part of the team; 8) that Sverdrup made misrepresentations to Robinson in February and June 2003; 9) that Robinson relied on the misrepresentations by submitting a nonconforming subcontract and by not applying for employment with the joint venture; and 10) that Robinson suffered damage in lost profits and lost employment. Based on the foregoing, it is apparent that Robinson alleged the time of the misrepresentations (February 2003 and June 2003), the content of the misrepresentations (that in preparing the proposal in response to the RFP Sverdrup had not changed its inventory procedures and had named Robinson as a subcontractor), the facts misrepresented (that Sverdrup had changed its inventory procedures and had not proposed to use Robinson as a subcontractor), the defendant's knowledge of the falsity of the representations (Sverdrup's knowledge while it was developing the proposal that it was changing its inventory procedures and that it would not use Robinson as a subcontractor), and the result of the misrepresentations (Robinson's exclusion from the development of the proposal). Although it appears that Robinson did not allege the place where the misrepresentations occurred, his fifth amended complaint included sufficient allegations to place Sverdrup on notice of the acts complained of; Robinson, therefore, satisfied Rule 9(b). See VanLoock v. Curran, 489 So.2d 525, 534 (Ala.1986) (While the pleading is perhaps not a model of clarity and specificity, it sufficiently comports with the purpose of Rule 9(b) in that it gives the defendants fair notice of the acts complained of.). The record supports this conclusion in that the trial court's pretrial order describes Sverdrup's defenses to Robinson's allegation of intentional misrepresentation. The trial court also summarized Sverdrup's defenses to the intentional-misrepresentation claim in open court before trial. Accordingly, it is apparent that Robinson's allegations of fraud sufficiently apprised Sverdrup of the matters at issue so that Sverdrup was able to formulate a defense. Thus, the fifth amended complaint satisfied Rule 9(b). Sverdrup's conclusory claim of lack of particularity in pleading the fraud claims without any elaboration as to what was missing does not warrant a reversal of the trial court's judgment.