Opinion ID: 2611854
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Mitchell Instruction

Text: Given the preceding standards, if the proposed Mitchell instruction incorrectly stated the law, the court properly refused to give it. Alternatively, if the City did not properly object, under HRCP 51(e) and absent plain error, the City is precluded from assigning error. The record reflects that the City objected to the court's refusal to give the Mitchell instruction as follows: Your Honor, this goes to the same argument we made earlier with respect to the negligence on the part of Mr. Montalvo subsequent to ou[r] accident. And that on the basis of Doctor Lipp and Doctor Nakano, they both said that surgery was not required as late as October of 1991. And there were subsequent incidents.... which may have aggravated or caused his condition to become worse and possibly even caused his need for the back surgery. (Emphasis added.) The same argument we made earlier refers to a discussion regarding the proffered contributory negligence instructions; thus, it appears that the City was concerned about the lack of an instruction on contributory negligence  not about an inadequate explanation of legal causation. The proposed Mitchell instruction had little, if anything, to do with contributory negligence. Nothing in the record indicates that the City objected to the refusal to give the Mitchell instruction on the ground that the court was not explaining legal causation. The objection cited above was, at best, an oblique reference to a lack of explanation of causation and should have been more precise. Cf., 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2554 (1971) ([t]he grounds must be stated with sufficient clarity that the trial judge may see what they are and follow them if well taken.... [O]bjections to a charge must be sufficiently specific to bring into focus the precise nature of the alleged error.). Furthermore, even if the objection was sufficient, the proposed Mitchell instruction incorrectly defines proximate or legal cause. In the proposed instruction (and in its brief and at oral argument), the City quoted and stressed the language from Mitchell that [t]he injury must be the result of, or flow from, the negligent act[.] Mitchell, 45 Haw. at 131, 363 P.2d at 973 (emphasis added). This language, the City argues, would have helped the jury understand the concept of legal cause. However, three paragraphs following the quoted portion, the Mitchell court stated: The best definition and the most workable test of proximate or legal cause so far suggested seems to be this: The actor's negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if (a) his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and (b) there is no rule of law relieving the actor from liability because of the manner in which his negligence has resulted in the harm. Id. at 132, 363 P.2d at 973 (citing Restatement of Torts, § 431 and Prosser on Torts, § 47) (emphasis added); see Knodle, 69 Haw. at 390, 742 P.2d at 186 (reaffirming that Mitchell correctly adopted the substantial factor definition). Courts have long grappled with the concept of proximate or legal cause. There is perhaps nothing in the entire field of law which has called forth more disagreement, or upon which opinions are in such a welter of confusion. Knodle, 69 Haw. at 389 n. 9, 742 P.2d at 385 n. 9 (quoting Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, § 41 at 263 (1984)). The [substantial factor] formula is not without critics ... [b]ut we are convinced that `substantial factor' is a phrase sufficiently intelligible to furnish an adequate guide in instructions to the jury, and that it is neither possible nor desirable to reduce it to any lower terms.  Id. at 390, 742 P.2d at 386 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). Thus, although the City correctly cited to Mitchell for the definition of proximate or legal cause, it quoted the wrong language. Under Knodle, the language flow from would have insufficiently explained legal cause. Consequently, we conclude that the court properly refused the proffered Mitchell instruction.