Opinion ID: 2519626
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Marathon's Procurement

Text: We note we are not called on to decide, and do not decide, what precisely constitutes procurement under the Act. The Act contains no definition, and the Labor Commissioner has struggled over time to better delineate which actions involve mere general assistance to an artist's career and which stray across the line to illicit procurement. Here, however, the Labor Commissioner concluded Marathon had engaged in various instances of procurement, the trial court concluded there was no material dispute that Marathon had done so, and Marathon has not further challenged that conclusion. We thus take it as a given that Marathon has engaged in one or more acts of procurement and that (as the parties also agree) Marathon has no talent agency license to do so. We also take as a given, at least at this stage, that Marathon's unlicensed procurement did not include the procurement specifically of Blasi's Strong Medicine role. Blasi takes issue with this point, correctly pointing out that the Labor Commissioner found to the contrary, but (1) under the Act's statutorily guaranteed trial de novo procedure, the Labor Commissioner's findings carry no weight ( Buchwald v. Katz, supra, 8 Cal.3d at, p. 501, 105 Cal.Rptr. 368, 503 P.2d 1376), and (2) neither Blasi's separate statement of undisputed material facts nor the evidence supporting it establish that Marathon procured the Strong Medicine role. Thus, for present purposes we presume Marathon did not procure that role for Blasi. Finally, although Marathon argued below that it fell within section 1700.44, subdivision (d)'s safe harbor for procurement done in conjunction with a licensed talent agency, it has not preserved that argument here. Accordingly, we assume for present purposes that the safe harbor provision does not apply.