Opinion ID: 2734194
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: analysis

Text: I. Under Birklid, an Employer Must Know That Injury Is Certain To Occur but Need Not Foretell Every Specific Harm or Victim Title 51 RCW (Washington's IIA) generally limits a worker's right to recover for workplace injuries to benefits under the statute but permits an employee to sue the employer [i]f injury results to a worker from the deliberate intention of his or her employer to produce such injury ....  RCW 51.24.020. We considered the meaning of deliberate intention in Birklid v. Boeing Co., 127 Wn.2d 853, 904 P.2d 278 (1995). In Birklid, Boeing tested new fiberglass parts impregnated with a resin used to make interior parts for its airplanes. When workers became ill upon exposure to the resin, a supervisor requested improved ventilation, but Boeing refused, apparently for economic reasons. /d. at 856. As Boeing's supervisor predicted, when full production began, workers experienced dermatitis, rashes, nausea, headaches, and dizziness. /d. We noted in Birklid that the central feature distinguishing that case from all prior cases involving the intentional injury exception was that Boeing knew in advance that its workers would suffer injury from working with the new material. /d. at 863. We concluded that the injuries were not an accident and that the case involved willful disregard of actual knowledge by the employer of continuing injuries to employees. /d. We held that the phrase 'deliberate intention' in RCW 51.24.020 means the employer had actual knowledge that an injury was certain to occur and willfully disregarded that knowledge. /d. at 865. 2 Walston (Gary) et ux. eta/. v. The Boeing Co. eta/., No. 88511-7 Wiggins, J., dissenting Here, the injury at issue is a disease. The legislature provided that for the purpose of injury intentionally inflicted by the employer, 'injury' shall include any physical or mental condition, disease, ailment or loss, including death, for which compensation and benefits are paid or payable under this title. RCW 51.24.030(3). The IIA generally defines injury as a sudden and tangible happening, of a traumatic nature, producing an immediate or prompt result, and occurring from without, and such physical conditions as result therefrom. RCW 51.08.1 00. An occupational disease means a disease or infection that arises out of employment. RCW 51.08.140. By defining injury to include disease for purposes of the deliberate intent exception, the legislature envisioned certain circumstances where an employer knowingly exposes workers to conditions certain to produce a disease. Diseases differ from traditional workplace injuries. 1 For example, physical injuries are often immediately visible, while diseases have latency periods with symptoms materializing sometime after exposure. Relatedly, there is no way to know with absolute certainty that an exposed individual will ever contract a disease. Moreover, most diseases are caused by multiple factors, which can make it difficult to prove causation. 1 A search of Washington cases involving intentionally produced disease yielded no results. For this reason, I find our case law instructive but not controlling. See, e.g., Birklid, 127 Wn.2d at 856 (physical condition case involving dizziness, dryness in nose and throat, burning eyes, and upset stomach); Vallandigham v. Clover Park Sch. Dist. No. 400, 154 Wn.2d 16, 19, 109 P.3d 805 (2005) (scratches and slaps). 3 Walston (Gary) et ux. eta/. v. The Boeing Co. eta/., No. 88511-7 Wiggins, J., dissenting This case involves a disease arising from exposure to a toxic substance. Most toxic exposure injuries are dose-related, meaning the greater the exposure, the more severe the consequences. In addition, whether an exposed individual will suffer a compensable injury depends in part on vulnerabilities unique to that person. These qualities makes it near impossible to predict with absolute certainty how each exposure will affect a particular individual. Asbestos is one of the most notorious of hazardous substances injuring workers in cases brought into our courts. In addition to a long latency period, asbestos-related injuries are continuous, progressive, and cumulative. Each exposure builds on the last and can lead to any number of injuries at any given point in time including shortness of breath, asbestosis, mesothelioma, lung cancer, or a number of other late-appearing cancers. It is true that exposure to asbestos gives rise to uncertainties inherent in predicting specific toxic-produced injuries. And yet, we know that inhaling asbestos causes injuries. See Lockwood v. AC&S, Inc., 109 Wn.2d 235, 260, 744 P.2d 605 ( 1987) (holding that defendant had continuing duty to warn of hazards of asbestos after exposure); Macias v. Saberhagen Holdings, Inc., 175 Wn.2d 402, 406, 282 P.3d 1069 (2012) (holding that respirator manufacturers were not entitled to summary judgment where victim died from mesothelioma, a deadly type of cancer associated with asbestos exposure, after using product). Indeed, these qualities, along with the certainty that inhaling asbestos initiates a specific injurious process, have led federal courts to define the 4 Walston (Gary) et ux. eta/. v. The Boeing Co. eta/., No. 88511-7 Wiggins, J., dissenting occurrence of injury in asbestos cases as a continuing process, beginning with the inhalation of asbestos fibers and ending years later with the manifestation of an asbestos-related disease. See ACandS, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 764 F.2d 968, 972 (3d Cir. 1985) (bodily injury means any part of the single injurious process that asbestos-related diseases entail); Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 215 U.S. App. D.C. 156, 667 F.2d 1034, 1046 (1981) (inhalation exposure is part of injurious process and constitutes injury under policy); Porter v. Am. Optical Corp.,641 F.2d 1128, 1144(5thCir.1981)(same). 2 Experts agree. Forexample, asbestosis has been described as a progressive disease characterized by pulmonary fibrotic changes which develop slowly over the years. The process begins near the time of initial exposure. The fibers insidiously injure the lungs throughout the period of exposure, and the process continues even after physical 2 The legal definition of injury in other contexts supports a finding that inhaling asbestos causes certain and immediate injury. For example, in Department of Labor & Industries v. Fankhauser, 121 Wn.2d 304,311,849 P.2d 1209 (1993}, this court held that the last injurious exposure rule did not bar workers from compensation even though their last exposure to asbestos occurred during noncovered self-employment. Notably, the relevant injury was each exposure to asbestos throughout employment. Likewise, a tort claim arises when a plaintiff is exposed to asbestos and not when he or she discovers the injury. See Koker v. Armstrong Cork, Inc., 60 Wn. App. 466, 472, 804 P.2d 659 (1991) (injury producing event was exposure to asbestos, so tort claim arose before 1981 tort reform act); Krivanek v. Fibreboard Corp., 72 Wn. App. 632, 635, 865 P.2d 527 (1993) (same); Mavroudis v. Pittsburgh-Corning Corp., 86 Wn. App. 22, 34, 935 P.2d 684 (1997) (Washington Product Liability Act did not apply because both the exposure and the tissue changes leading to the disease occurred well before the effective date of the act); see also Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1219 (6th Cir. 1980) (noting universal medical agreement that asbestosis occurs at exposure and not when disease is discovered}, decision clarified on reh'g, 657 F.2d 814 (6th Cir. 1981). 5 Walston (Gary) et ux. et at. v. The Boeing Co. eta/., No. 88511-7 Wiggins, J., dissenting symptoms become evident. Pamela J. Layton, Comment, Manifestation: The Least Defensible Insurance Coverage Theory for Asbestos-Related Disease Suits, 7 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 167, 175 (1983) (footnotes omitted). Thus, I would hold that certainty does not mean absolute certainty that a particular plaintiff will develop a particular disease. Under Birklid, an employer must know that injury is certain to occur but need not foretell every specific harm or victim. In fact, in Birklid, Boeing did not know which workers would get sick, whether the injuries would be compensable, or the severity of illnesses workers would experience. Nevertheless, this court held that employees' claims fell under the deliberate injury exception because employers knew workers were being continuously injured. Thus, to show deliberate intention under RCW 51.24.020, a plaintiff must show that an employer knew with a high degree of confidence that injury would result and yet willfully disregarded that knowledge. This interpretation gives effect to legislature's intent to hold an employer accountable when the employer deliberately intends to produce a disease. Davis v. Dep't of Licensing, 137 Wn.2d 957, 963, 977 P.2d 554 (1999) (we interpret statutes so that all the language used is given effect, with no portion rendered meaningless or superfluous). Requiring 100 percent certainty would once again read the statutory exception out of existence in the context of disease-which, given its inclusion of disease in the definition of injury for purposes of the exception, would violate the 6 Walston (Gary) et ux. eta/. v. The Boeing Co. eta/., No. 88511-7 Wiggins, J., dissenting legislature's clear intent. See RCW 51.24.030(3). 3 Here, exposure to asbestos caused immediate and certain scarring in Walston's lungs-under the statute, this satisfies the injury requirement once and if the scars develop into a compensable disease. II. This Interpretation of Birklid Satisfies the IIA's Purpose of Balancing Competing Interests While Also Deterring Intentional Wrongdoing Birklid is consistent with general tort concepts outside the workers' compensation context. The gradations of tortious conduct can best be understood as a continuum. Woodson v. Rowland, 329 N.C. 330, 341-42, 407 S.E.2d 222 ( 1991) (discussing the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A & cmt. b ( 1965) 3 In Travis v. Dreis & Krump Manufacturing Co., 453 Mich. 149, 190, 551 N.W.2d 132, 150 (1996), the Michigan Supreme Court interpreted a similar intentional tort exception in their state's Worker's Disability Compensation Act. In his concurrence in part,