Opinion ID: 755554
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Submission of the Labor Law Employee Question to the Jury

Text: 92 Under Article 6 of the New York Labor Law, an employer is required to pay a commission salesman in accordance with the agreed terms of employment. See N.Y. Labor Law § 191(1)(c). The statute defines a commission salesman as an employee whose earnings are based in whole or in part on commissions, id. § 190(6), and a person who is not an employee but an independent contractor is not within the scope of this section, see, e.g., Rivers v. Butterhill Realty, 145 A.D.2d 709, 710-11, 534 N.Y.S.2d 834, 836 (3d Dep't 1988); Guepet v. International Tao Systems, Inc., 110 Misc.2d 940, 443 N.Y.S.2d 321 (1981). 93 Kirsch contends that irrespective of the outcome of the challenges relating to his ADEA claim, he is entitled to a new trial on his labor law claim because the question of whether he was an employee was improperly submitted to the jury. He argues (1) that the district court unduly narrowly defined the factors that the jury was to consider in considering whether plaintiff was an employee or an[ ] independent contractor (Kirsch brief on appeal at 43), and (2) that [t]he question of whether an individual is an 'employee' under the New York Labor Law is a question of statutory interpretation that must be a legal question that only a Court of law can determine after the jury makes findings regarding the relevant operative facts (id.). We find no basis for reversal in either contention because the instructions given were not erroneous and because the manner of submitting the question to the jury arguably was not error, and if error, was surely harmless. 94 Preliminarily, we note that contrary to Kirsch's present contention that the court's instructions to the jury were unduly narrow, his attorney at the charging conference sought instructions that were narrower than those eventually given: 95 MR. WISEHART (Kirsch's attorney):.... 96 I think ... the jury should only be requested to determine the factual issues of direction or control, and that that is what is required based upon the totality of the circumstances in this particular case, not upon some general preconception.... 97 .... 98 THE COURT: ... I will add: Therefore it is up to you to judge, based upon the totality of the circumstances in this case, whether Mr. Kirsch, when he was performing duties as a salesman, was an independent contractor or an employee under the totality of all the circumstances. 99 .... 100 MR. WISEHART: I think the totality of circumstances goes to the issue of control. 101 .... 102 MR. WISEHART: I think it should deal only with the issue of control. The jury should find based on that issue. 103 THE COURT: Overruled. 104 (First Tr. 1123-27.) The instruction eventually given by the court, quoted in Part I.B. above, was broader than that sought by Kirsch, and we are not persuaded that the court's instructions in any way misled or inadequately informed the jury of the law. 105 As to the matter of whether Kirsch was an employee is an issue of law or of fact, the question is perhaps closer. In reviewing rulings after the bench trial of a claim under a federal statute in Brock v. Superior Care, Inc., 840 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir.1988), we discussed factors to be considered in determining whether a person was an employee or an independent contractor in light of the totality of the circumstances, and we noted that the existence and degree of each factor is a question of fact while the legal conclusion to be drawn from those facts--whether workers are employees or independent contractors--is a question of law. Id. at 1059. On the other hand, in the context of a claim for commissions under the very statute at issue here, a state court has stated that the question of whether [a] plaintiff was an employee or an independent contractor within the meaning of the New York Labor Law is a question of fact for trial. Rivers v. Butterhill Realty, 145 A.D.2d at 711, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 836. See also In Matter of Rivera, 69 N.Y.2d 679, 512 N.Y.S.2d 14, 504 N.E.2d 381 (1986) (upholding, as a factual determination entitled to a substantial-evidence standard of review, an administrative board's finding as to the existence of an employment relationship). 106 Whether the bottom-line question of whether a plaintiff was an employee or an independent contractor is characterized as a question of law or a question of fact, however, we cannot see that the submission of that question to the jury warrants a new trial. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (reversal not warranted for errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties). Such questions are regularly presented to juries that are instructed to return general verdicts, informed by the court's instructions on the law and given the direction that if they find that the plaintiffs in question were employees (and find all of the other elements of the plaintiffs' claims proven), they should simply state that they find in favor of the plaintiffs. Given the established principle that a trial judge has discretion to call for a general verdict rather than a special verdict, see, e.g., Skidmore v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 167 F.2d 54, 66-67 (2d Cir.) (Fed.R.Civ.P. 49(a)'s provision for special verdict is permissive, not mandatory), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 816, 69 S.Ct. 34, 93 L.Ed. 371 (1948); 9A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2505 (1995), we cannot conclude that the refusal of the trial court in this case to give the jury only specific fact questions and to reserve to the court the determination of whether Kirsch was an employee or an independent contractor, affected Kirsch's substantial rights. 107 We note parenthetically that the trial record was ample to permit any decisionmaker to conclude, in light of the totality of the circumstances, that Kirsch was not an employee but an independent contractor. The record included evidence that prior to being placed on salary in 1990, Kirsch was not required to spend time in the company's offices; was free to set his own schedule and take vacations when he wished; did not have the company withhold income or Social Security taxes; did not receive employee benefits such as health insurance; was not reimbursed for his expenses; was allowed to sell merchandise on behalf of other companies; and described himself as independently employed. We see no basis for a new trial. 108 Finally, Kirsch has also asked, if we deny him a new trial on the labor law claim, that we allow him to amend his complaint to assert a claim for breach of contract. We reject this request. When a plaintiff has not moved for leave to amend in the district court, we are ordinarily disinclined to exercise our discretion to grant his belated request on appeal. See, e.g., Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 101 (2d Cir.1993). We see no indication that Kirsch asked the district court for leave to amend to assert a contract claim, even after the first jury had rejected his labor law claim and after it became clear that there would, for other reasons, be a partial second trial. We decline to allow a tardy amendment that would necessitate a third trial.