Opinion ID: 1874089
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Issues in These Cases Are Ripe for Determination

Text: [10-14] With regard to ripeness, we have recognized that if an action is not ready, or ripe for judicial determination, then the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider the case. See Bonge v. County of Madison, 253 Neb. 903, 573 N.W.2d 448 (1998). In the context of declaratory judgment actions, we have stated generally that [a] court should refuse a declaratory judgment action unless the pleadings present a justiciable controversy which is ripe for judicial determination.... An action for declaratory judgment cannot be used to decide the legal effect of a state of facts which are future, contingent, or uncertain. Central Neb. Pub. Power v. Jeffrey Lake Dev., 267 Neb. 997, 1003, 679 N.W.2d 235, 241 (2004). Accord Ryder Truck Rental v. Rollins, 246 Neb. 250, 518 N.W.2d 124 (1994). In a similar vein, we have noted that although not a constitutional prerequisite for jurisdiction, an actual case or controversy is necessary for the exercise of judicial power. Orchard Hill Neighborhood v. Orchard Hill Mercantile, 274 Neb. 154, 738 N.W.2d 820 (2007). [15] A determination with regard to ripeness depends upon the circumstances in a given case. This is because `[t]he difference between an abstract question and a [case ripe for determination] is one of degree....' See Nebraska Public Power Dist. v. MidAmerican Energy, 234 F.3d 1032, 1038 (8th Cir.2000) (quoting Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 99 S.Ct. 2301, 60 L.Ed.2d 895 (1979)). [16] It has been recognized that a determination of judicial ripeness often involves a two-part analysis. The Texas Supreme Court described this two-part approach by stating that [r]ipeness ... involves both jurisdictional and prudential concerns. See Perry v. Del Rio, 66 S.W.3d 239, 250 (Tex.2001). The court explained that when making a ripeness determination, a court must consider, as a jurisdictional matter, whether it can act at a certain time and also, as a prudential matter, whether it should act at that time. A similar approach was adopted by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. In Nebraska Public Power Dist. v. MidAmerican Energy, supra , a federal declaratory judgment action case, the Eighth Circuit stated that the ripeness inquiry required an examination of both the jurisdictional question of the `fitness of the issues for judicial decision' and of the prudential question concerning the `hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.' 234 F.3d at 1038 (quoting Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967)). The Eighth Circuit explained that [t]he fitness for judicial decision inquiry goes to a court's ability to visit an issue.... [I]t safeguards against judicial review of hypothetical or speculative disagreements.... In addition to being fit for judicial resolution, an issue must be such that delayed review will result in significant harm. Harm includes both the traditional concept of actual damagespecuniary or otherwiseand also the heightened uncertainty and resulting behavior modification that may result from delayed resolution. Nebraska Public Power Dist. v. MidAmerican Energy, 234 F.3d at 1038. We consider this two-part analytical approach to be appropriate when evaluating a ripeness challenge and employ it in the present cases. With regard to the jurisdictional aspect of ripeness, we disagree with appellants' argument that posits that these cases were not ripe at the time Omaha filed its declaratory judgment actions due to the existence of the appeal in the annexation case and that as a result, these cases remained immutably unripe through their pendency. Appellants' contention ignores this court's prior decisions involving Omaha's annexation of the former city of Millard, wherein we filed opinions on the same day that, first, affirmed the district court's determination that the annexation was valid and, second, notwithstanding the pendency of the annexation appeal, considered and resolved issues involving whether contracts entered into by the annexed airport authority were affected by the annexation. See City of Millard v. City of Omaha, 185 Neb. 617, 177 N.W.2d 576 (1970) (affirming district court's decision that Omaha's annexation of Millard was valid), and Airport Authority of City of Millard v. City of Omaha, 185 Neb. 623, 177 N.W.2d 603 (1970) (determining airport authority's contracts were not impaired by Omaha's annexation of Millard). [17] Appellants' argument presumes that ripeness is an unchanging characteristic of a lawsuit. However, just as a court can consider the issue of mootness during the pendency of litigation, see Keef v. State, 271 Neb. 738, 716 N.W.2d 58 (2006) (determining issue on appeal challenging statute became moot when Legislature repealed statute after filing of litigation), a court can take into account all information available to it at the time a ripeness challenge is considered and decide whether an issue is ripe for determination, see 13A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3532.1 at 136-37 (2d ed.1984) (stating that [r]ipeness should be decided on the basis of all the information available to the court. Intervening events that occur after decision in lower courts should be included, just as must be done with questions of mootness). The U.S. Supreme Court has said since ripeness is peculiarly a question of timing, it is the situation now rather than the situation at the time of the District Court's decision that must govern. Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 140, 95 S.Ct. 335, 42 L.Ed.2d 320 (1974). These cases were filed in district court on March 31, 2006. This court's decision in the annexation case was filed on January 12, 2007, and stated that Omaha's annexation of Elkhorn was effective March 24, 2005. Thus, although the appeal in the annexation case was resolved during the pendency of the present litigation, as a matter of law, Omaha annexed Elkhorn and succeeded to its contracts on March 24, 2005, which is prior to the filing of these cases in the district court. Taking into consideration all information available to us, as we must, we reject appellants' jurisdictional argument regarding ripeness. With respect to the prudential aspect of ripeness, we believe there can be no reasonable dispute as to the harm that would result from a delayed review in the instant cases. As noted above, the annexation is complete and final. Dismissing these appeals at the present time would result in delay and the unnecessary expense of judicial resources. Compare CenTra, Inc. v. Chandler Ins. Co., 248 Neb. 844, 854, 540 N.W.2d 318, 327 (1995) (discussing appellate court's attempt to avoid relitigating issues at the costs of greater delay ... and needless waste of judicial resources). The issue in these cases is essentially legal in nature and may be resolved without further factual development. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967), abrogated on other grounds, Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 97 S.Ct. 980, 51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977). Omaha's challenge to and our consideration of the severance provisions are limited to a constitutional analysis. Continued uncertainty regarding the enforceability of the severance provisions is undesirable and unnecessary. After consideration of both the jurisdictional and prudential aspects of ripeness, we conclude the instant cases are ripe for judicial consideration. Accordingly, appellants' assignment of error challenging jurisdiction is without merit.