Opinion ID: 591630
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Delton Scott Stevens

Text: 26 Harold Robinson testified that he had seen Delton Stevens distributing crack cocaine. Robinson was describing the roles of the various members of Timmy Rice's drug organization. In addition, Stevens appeared on the videotape narrated by John Gist. The Government elicited the following testimony from Gist regarding Delton Stevens' actions on the videotape: 27 Q.... And who else is in that picture there? 28 A.Delton Stevens. 29 ... 30 Q.Okay. Now, all those fellows out there, do you know what they're doing? 31 A.Selling drugs. 32 Q.They're selling crack? 33 A.Yes, sir. 34 When the police conducted the raid on May 3, 1990, Delton Stevens was among the men found standing in the driveway of 453 Beacon Street. The police found a bag of crack on the passenger-side front wheel of a truck parked in the driveway. This crack was five to six feet from where Delton Stevens and the other men were standing. II 35 The defendants first argue that the district court abused its discretion in denying them a bill of particulars. According to the defendants, the indictment failed to allege specific acts in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy, failed to attribute specific acts to specific defendants, and failed to specify the time periods during which specific defendants allegedly were involved in the conspiracy. The defendants argue that this lack of specificity prejudiced them by denying them the opportunity to present alibis and generally by making it harder to respond to prepare their defense. The Government responds that its open-file policy gave the defendants access to every statement and every piece of evidence that the Government had against the defendants. In addition, the Government notes without refutation that the Assistant U.S. Attorney handling the case went beyond the open-file policy and actually met with the attorney for three of the defendants and told him what witnesses were expected to be called, etc. No claim is made that the Government held back information. 36 The Government's maintenance of an open-file policy can cure an indictment that otherwise may not be sufficiently detailed so as adequately to inform the defendant of the charges against him in order that he may prepare a defense. See, e.g., United States v. Duncan, 598 F.2d 839, 849 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 871 (1979). We review a district court's decision to deny a bill of particulars on an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. MacDougall, 790 F.2d 1135, 1153 (4th Cir. 1986). In light of the Government's open-file policy, the defendants suggest nothing that would lead us to conclude that the district court abused its discretion in denying their motion for a bill of particulars, and we hold that it did not. III 37 Three of the defendants, Henry Rice, Peggy Rice, and Delton Scott Stevens, argue that the evidence was not sufficient to support their convictions for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute crack cocaine. 21 U.S.C. § 846, 841. 38 As an appellate court reviewing a conviction on appeal, we must uphold the conviction if, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, a reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942); United States v. Jones, 945 F.2d 747, 748 (4th Cir. 1991). 39 There clearly was sufficient evidence for the jury to find the existence of a conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine, involving, at least, Ronnie and Timmy Rice. The critical question, then, is whether, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, a reasonable jury could have found that Henry and Peggy Rice knew of the conspiracy's purpose and took some action indicating their participation, and that their actions amounted to more than mere acquiescence or approval of the conspiracy or presence at the scene of drug distribution. We are of opinion that the evidence is sufficient. 40 A reasonable jury could find that Peggy Rice was a member of the conspiracy from the testimony of Harold Robinson to the effect that he sold drugs for Timmy and Peggy Rice. Although Robinson admitted that he had never met Peggy Rice, he still may have known of her involvement with the conspiracy. To the extent that this admission reduces the credibility of Robinson's testimony, that determination is a question for the jury, which we will not disturb on appeal. Also, her house was proven beyond any doubt to be a crack house. Sales were made on the property, money was delivered to the property, and drugs were distributed from the property. While none of this may be conclusive standing alone, it is evidence which tends to prove the participation of Peggy Rice in the conspiracy. 41 We are also of opinion the evidence is sufficient to sustain the verdict against Henry Rice. From the evidence introduced, a reasonable jury could conclude that Henry Rice owned the property and lived at 453 Beacon Street and, therefore, was present during the course of the conspiracy. From the testimony of the undercover agent, Officer Bartee, and of Harold Robinson, and from the discovery of crack cocaine under a piece of tin near the driveway at 453, the jury could infer that drugs were kept on the property at 453 in furtherance of the conspiracy. From the testimony of Officer Parker, who warned Henry and Peggy Rice that the police had seen drug sales taking place in and around their property, the jury could infer that Henry Rice knew about the drug conspiracy taking place in and around his home. From the evidence that Henry Rice was the owner of 453 Beacon Street, the jury could infer that Henry Rice had dominion and control over the house and property. Finally, the testimony of Officer Parker that, even after his warning to them, neither Henry nor Peggy Rice contacted him for help in controlling the drug activity around their property, the jury could infer that Henry Rice knowingly allowed his house and property to be used to facilitate the conspiracy. We are of opinion, therefore, that the evidence, though circumstantial, is sufficient to sustain Henry Rice's conviction on the conspiracy charge. Cf. United States v. Williams-Hendricks, 805 F.2d 496, 503 (5th Cir. 1986)(Because [the defendant] owned the truck and exercised dominion and control over the truck, and because of the evidence of his knowledge of the marijuana, it follows that his allowing the truck to be used for the illicit activity resulted from at least a tacit agreement with his son to that effect.). IV 42 Delton Scott Stevens argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction on both the conspiracy count and on the possession with intent to distribute count. We disagree. The jury could infer from Harold Robinson's testimony not only that Stevens sold crack cocaine, which would establish the possession with intent to distribute count, but also that Stevens worked for Timmy Rice, which would establish the conspiracy count. V 43 Henry and Peggy Rice challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain their convictions on the possession with intent to distribute count. 21 U.S.C. § 841. They argue that no evidence was introduced to show that either of them ever actually possessed any crack cocaine. Because we have found the evidence sufficient to sustain their convictions on the conspiracy count, their argument fails. This is the rule of Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946), which holds all conspirators liable for unlawful substantive offenses committed in furtherance of the conspiracy, although some of them may not have participated in the discrete substantive offense. 328 U.S. at 645. See United States v. Cummings, 937 F.2d 941, 944 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 60 U.S.L.W. 3343 (U.S. 1991). Because the evidence clearly is sufficient to support the conviction of several of the defendants for possessing crack cocaine with intent to distribute it, and in fact they actually did distribute the cocaine, and because this possession with intent to distribute was done in furtherance of the conspiracy, but also was the central object of the conspiracy, we find the evidence sufficient to sustain the Rices' convictions on the § 841 count. VI 44 Henry and Peggy Rice challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain their convictions under 21 U.S.C. § 856, which provides: 45 (a) Except as authorized by this title, it shall be unlawful to- 46 (1) knowingly open or maintain any place for the purpose of manufacturing, distributing, or using any controlled substance; 47 (2) manage or control any building, room, or enclosure, ... and knowingly and intentionally ... make available for use, with or without compensation, the building, room, or enclosure for the purpose of unlawfully manufacturing, storing, distributing, or using a controlled substance. 48 We reject their challenge. 49 A jury could infer that crack was stored inside of 453 Beacon Street from the testimony of Officer Bartee, who testified that after arranging for a crack purchase with Marshall Jefferson, Jefferson went into the first house on the right on Beacon Street and returned with the crack cocaine to make the sale. In addition, crack cocaine was found in the yard at 453 near the driveway, and Harold Robinson testified that Timmy Rice got saleable amounts of crack from the backyard at 453. The evidence also tended to show that Henry Rice owned the house and lot at 453 Beacon Street and that he and Peggy Rice lived there during the course of the conspiracy. From this, the jury could infer that Henry and Peggy Rice controlled the premises at 453 Beacon Street. From the warning by Spartanburg Police Officer Parker, the jury would be permitted to infer that Henry and Peggy Rice knew that drug distributions were taking place on their property, and, in combination with the evidence that drugs were being kept in the house and on the property at 453, therefore, that they knowingly and intentionally made the premises available at least for storing or distributing drugs. Moreover, there was evidence that drugs were delivered from 453 Beacon Street and that drug payment was delivered to the same address, which tends to show that the premises were used for the purpose of unlawfully distributing drugs in violation of the statute. 3 VII 50 Henry Rice argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the forfeiture of his interest in 453 Beacon Street under 21 U.S.C. § 853. Section 853 provides that upon conviction for a qualifying offense, which includes the § 856 charge, any person shall forfeit any of the person's property used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of such violation. 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(2). In light of our holding that the evidence was sufficient for a jury to find that Henry and Peggy Rice violated § 856 by knowingly and intentionally making their premises available for the purpose of storing and distributing of crack cocaine, we also conclude that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the forfeiture. VIII 51 The defendants argue that the district court erred in refusing to charge the jury on the offense of simple possession of cocaine, a lesser included offense of the offense of possession with intent to distribute cocaine. It is well settled that a defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense when the evidence would permit a jury rationally to find [the defendant] guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater. Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 208 (1973). We need not decide whether the defendants were entitled to an instruction on the lesser included offense of simple possession, however, because if it was error to refuse the charge, the error was harmless. 52 Because all of the defendants were convicted on the conspiracy count, and because the jury necessarily credited the testimony suggesting that members of the conspiracy possessed cocaine with intent to distribute it, all of the defendants are held liable for possession with intent to distribute under the Pinkerton rule discussed above. This result would apply even if the jury reasonably could have found that one or more of the defendants did not actually possess a certain quantity of crack with the intent to distribute it. The verdict against each of the individual defendants, therefore, would not have been different had the district court instructed the jury on the lesser included offense of simple possession. We are of opinion, therefore, that, even if the district court erred in refusing to give the requested instruction on simple possession, the failure to give the instruction did not prejudice the defendants. IX 53 The defendants argue next that the district court erred in admitting into evidence a video tape that was recorded approximately six weeks after the date of the indictment. The defendants argue that this video tape was inadmissible under sections 404 and 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, because its only possible relevance to the crimes charged against the defendants was to show bad character or the propensity to commit crimes, which is not permitted under 404, and because any legitimate probative value that the tape may have was outweighed by the danger of prejudicial effect on the jury. 54 The Government argues that the tape is relevant to show that a drug conspiracy existed as of the date of the indictment and that two of the defendants pictured in the tape, Delton Stevens and John Stevens, were members of the conspiracy. The Government argues that the tape and accompanying testimony tend to prove that the conspiracy not only existed as of the date that the tape was recorded, but also that it was a continuation of a conspiracy that existed as of the date of the indictment. 55 The district court admitted the video tape over the defendants' objection. However, there was no request for a limiting instruction regarding the jury's consideration of the videotape and none was given. The tape was narrated by John Gist, who is shown on the video tape selling drugs but who was not a defendant at the trial. Gist testified that he had worked for Ronnie Rice selling drugs a number of years before the tape was made and that he had started working for Rice again shortly before the tape was made. According to Gist's narration, the tape shows a young man, Eric Johnson, who was not one of the defendants and who was out in the Fair Forest Creek area selling drugs on the day that the tape was made, go up to one of the Rice's house. The tape shows Gist selling a rock of crack cocaine that, according to Gist, he had gotten from Timmy Rice. The tape also shows a group of men, including Delton Stevens, selling drugs. It also shows John Stevens driving a white Nissan, and Gist giving Stevens some money as payment for crack cocaine with the understanding that Stevens would deliver the money and a message to Timmy Rice. Evidence of other bad acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). It is admissible, however, to prove other facts such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Id. That the other bad acts occurred after, rather than before, the indictment does not alter this rule. See, e.g., United States v. Hines, 717 F.2d 1481, 1488-89 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1214 (1984). United States v. Hadaway, 681 F.2d 214 (4th Cir. 1982). In determining whether evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b) and Rule 403, the district court must balance its probative value against the prejudice to the defendants. Hadaway, 681 F.2d at 217; Fed.R.Evid. 403. This decision is committed to the district court's discretion and will be reversed only if the discretion is abused. Hadaway, 681 F.2d at 217. United States v. Echeverri-Jaramillo, 777 F.2d 933, 936 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1031 (1986). 56 We are of opinion that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the video tape accompanied by the narration of the witness John Gist. The tape and narration are relevant to prove that a conspiracy existed at the time that the tape was recorded, that this conspiracy had continued for some time prior to the indictment, that the defendants John Stevens and Delton Stevens were members of this conspiracy, and to show a common scheme or plan. An instruction to the jury so limiting their consideration of the evidence would have reduced any prejudice caused by the likelihood that the jury would infer that the defendants shown on the tape had sold drugs before the indictment because they were seen selling them after the indictment. However, such an instruction was not requested, and we are of opinion that if error at all, it was not so plain error as to constitute an abuse of discretion for the district court to have admitted the evidence absent such an instruction. X 57 Some of the defendants next challenge their sentences. 4 They first argue that the Government did not offer sufficient evidence to support the quantity of cocaine attributed to the conspiracy. The presentence report estimated that the conspiracy had handled a total of 126 kilograms of crack cocaine during the entire course of its existence, April, 1987 to September, 1990, a period of 42 months. According to the report, based on testimony in court this conspiracy sold at least 100 grams of crack cocaine per day, 10 packages each containing 10 grams of cocaine. Multiplying by 30 days per month and 42 months results in the estimated total of 126 kilograms. 58 Delton Stevens, Timmy Rice, Ronnie Rice and Peggy Rice, filed objections to the presentence report challenging the probation officer's estimate. They declined, however, the district court's invitation to offer new evidence on the issue, instead choosing to stand on the trial record. Peggy Rice dropped her objection at her sentencing hearing. 59 The district court found at Timmy Rice's sentencing hearing that the record contains sufficient and adequate evidence to show that the calculations of the probation officer on 127 kilograms of crack/cocaine and the same objection in paragraph eight with reference to 126 kilograms of crack/cocaine are adequately supported by the evidence in the record. It made a similar finding at Ronnie Rice's sentencing hearing, and attributed 18 kilograms to Delton Stevens for his six-month participation. The district court made no other finding of fact as to the quantity of drugs involved in the conspiracy. It did factually conclude, however, that the defendants were operating a drug supermarket. We think this is supported by the record. 60 A court may approximate the quantity of drugs involved in a conspiracy when there has been no seizure or when the amount seized does not reflect the scale of the offense. U.S.S.G.s 2D1.4 application note 2. In view of the objection made, which was simply to the effect that the evidence in the case did not support the probation officer's finding as to the amount of drugs involved, and the district court's finding that the record in the case did support that conclusion, we have examined the record and are of opinion that the district court's finding of fact is supported by the record. There is no doubt that the jury's conclusion that a conspiracy to distribute cocaine involving all of the defendants existed. The record plainly shows that it was centered around the Rices, Timmy and Ronnie, and their parents, Henry and Peggy, and their two homes which were next door to each other. Sale after sale after sale of cocaine was proven, many perfectly open and in daylight, so that until curbed, it might well be said that the defendants in this case simply flaunted their illicit drug operation. XI 61 Delton Stevens makes the same argument as to the evidence to support the district court's findings of fact as to the quantity of drugs involved, and we apply to his objection the same rule and find that this contention is without merit. 62 Stevens' real complaint, however, seems to be that the record does not support a finding that he was involved in the conspiracy for a sixmonths' period as made in the presentence report. While it may be true that there is no explicit testimony in open court to support this finding, the fact is that the six-months' period was actually argued to the court at sentencing by Stevens' own attorney as follows: 63 In addition to that, the testimony, I am not sure if it is testimony at court, but I know during the discovery there was admission made on the part of the law enforcement officers that Mr. Delton Stevens was only involved for about six months in this operation; that was during the last six months prior to the arrest. 64 In view of this argument and the findings of the district court with respect to the quantity, which we have affirmed, we are also of opinion this last contention of Delton Stevens is without merit. 65 The judgment of the district court with respect to convictions, forfeiture and sentences is accordingly 66 AFFIRMED.