Opinion ID: 1302154
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Jeross: Obstructionist conduct and acceptance of responsibility

Text: Jeross challenges the district court's failure to apply a three-level reduction to his base offense for acceptance of responsibility under USSG § 3E1.1. Although Jeross acknowledges that the court rejected his request because he was found to have obstructed justice, he argues that the facts of his case warrant an exception to the general rule that a defendant who has obstructed justice is ineligible for an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction. Jeross relies on Note 4 to USSG § 3E 1. 1, which provides that conduct resulting in an obstruction-of-justice enhancement ordinarily indicates that the defendant has not accepted responsibility for his criminal conduct. There may, however, be extraordinary cases in which adjustments under both § 3C1.1 and [§] 3E1.1 may apply. The threatening behavior at issue included Jeross telling a probation officer during a presentence interview that he hoped to be placed in the same incarceration facility as Leto so that Jeross could make Leto his bitch. In addition, the court found that Jeross directly threatened Leo on two occasions, once by making a cut-throat gesture towards Leto and later by approaching Leto in a threatening way when the two men encountered each other in downtown Detroit. Leto, who provided extensive testimony regarding Jeross's role in the offense and the drug quantities involved in the conspiracy, said that he feared for his life as a result of Jeross's threats. Jeross concedes that he engaged in the above-described threatening conduct toward Leto, and that Leto felt apprehensive based on Jeross's actions. He contends, however, that he pled guilty after the threats occurred. But Jeross does not cite to any evidence in the record that supports his version of the timeline of events. A district court's determination that a defendant's case is extraordinary under Note 4 to USSG § 3E1. 1 is a question of law that we review de novo. United States v. Gregory, 315 F.3d 637, 640-41 (6th Cir.2003) (finding that extraordinary circumstances existed because all of the defendant's obstructive conduct predated his indictment, he never denied his own responsibility and guilt, and he cooperated with officials long before he was ever charged with an offense). Sixth Circuit law interpreting this provision has consistently granted district courts great leeway when making this determination. Id. at 640 (citation omitted). Appropriate considerations for determining whether a reduction is warranted for acceptance of responsibility include the defendant's truthful admission of the charged offense, the defendant's voluntary assistance to authorities in resolving the offense, and the timeliness of the defendant's conduct in affirmatively accepting responsibility for his actions. Id. The defendant has the burden of proving the extraordinary nature of his or her case where obstruction of justice has occurred. United States, v. Angel, 355 F.3d 462, 477 (6th Cir.2004) (finding that a sentence reduction under USSG § 3E1.1 was inappropriate where the defendant obstructed justice after he was indicted by refusing to admit to the district court that he had offered someone $50,000 to kill the government witness). Jeross asserts that the facts of his case satisfy the Gregory standard because his obstructive conduct occurred at his arraignment, before he pled guilty, and because he cooperated with the government by attending debriefings. A number of significant distinctions, however, are apparent from a comparison of Jeross's case to the facts of Gregory. Unlike the defendant in Gregory, all of Jeross's obstructive conduct occurred at or after his indictment and, according to the bond-revocation transcript, two of the incidents occurred after his guilty plea. Jeross fails to cite any evidence in the record that supports his assertion that his obstructive conduct occurred only before he pled guilty. He also denied his guilt for over four months after his indictment and challenged both his role in the offense and the amount of drugs involved until the date of his original sentencing hearing in July of 2004. Moreover, Jeross did not begin cooperating with the government until May of 2004, shortly after the total offense level recommended in his PSR was revised upward as a result of his threatening conduct. In exchange for his assistance, Jeross received a sentence of only 30 months for the offense of structuring transactions to evade cash-reporting requirements, a term that is well below the statutory maximum of 60 months. Jeross on these facts has failed to meet the exacting standard under Gregory of showing that he is entitled to an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction after having obstructed justice. The district court therefore did not err in determining that he was ineligible for such a reduction.