Opinion ID: 771716
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Lapp Test and the District Court's Opinion

Text: 22 A likelihood of confusion exists when consumers viewing the mark would probably assume that the product or service it represents is associated with the source of a different product or service identified by a similar mark. Dranoff-Perlstein Assocs. v. Sklar, 967 F.2d 852, 862 (3d Cir. 1992) (quotation marks omitted). In Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460 (3d Cir. 1983), we stated that when the goods involved in a trademark infringement action directly compete with each other, a court need rarely look beyond the mark itself  to determine the likelihood of confusion. Id. at 462. For noncompeting goods, we developed a nonexhaustive list of factors to consider in determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion between marks: 23 (1) the degree of similarity between the owner's mark and the alleged infringing mark; 24 (2) the strength of the owner's mark; 25 (3) the price of the goods and other factors indicative of the care and attention expected of consumers when making a purchase; (4) the length of time the defendant has used the mark without evidence of actual confusion arising; 26 (5) the intent of the defendant in adopting the mark; 27 (6) the evidence of actual confusion; 28 (7) whether the goods, though not competing, are marketed through the same channels of trade and advertised through the same media; 29 (8) the extent to which the targets of the parties' sales efforts are the same; 30 (9) the relationship of the goods in the minds of consumers because of the similarity of function; 31 (10) other facts suggesting that the consuming public might expect the prior owner to manufacture a product in the defendant's market, or that he is likely to expand into that market. 32 Id. at 463 (citing Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225, 1229 (3d Cir. 1978)). Throughout the opinion we will refer to these factors as the Lapp factors. 33 The District Court recognized that we have not explicitly elucidated what kind of factors should be considered in the case of directly competing goods. A&H IV, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 163. It chose not to use the Lapp test, but instead developed its own test, drawing on many of the same factors: 34 (1) strength of the plaintiff's mark; 35 (2) similarity between the marks; 36 (3) similarity of the products and the degree to which they directly compete with each other; 37 (4) marketing or advertising channels used; 38 (5) sophistication of consumers; 39 (6) defendant's intent in selecting the mark; and 40 (7) incidents of actual confusion. 41 Id. A&H contends that the District Court erred in three ways in applying these factors. First, it argues that when goods are directly competing, a district court need only examine the similarity of the marks. Second, it submits that inasmuch as the District Court fashioned its own test, the Lapp factors it omitted would have tipped the balance in favor of finding a likelihood of confusion. Third, it contends that on any test the similarity of the marks creates a likelihood of confusion.