Opinion ID: 2611102
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Malice in Wonderland

Text: The plurality is constrained to observe that if this court had recognized malice in law (implied malice) as a basis for proving malice under NRS 42.010 it would be compelled to affirm the punitive award because there is ample evidence in the record proving disregard by management level personnel at Circus-Circus of safety measures reasonably necessary to remedy hazardous conditions in its parking garage. I, of course, agree with the plurality opinion that there is ample evidence that management failed properly to regard reasonably necessary safety measures to remedy hazardous conditions in the garage. This failure to use reasonable care, this failure to remedy hazardous conditions, is called negligence. The trial court awarded $45,000.00 as compensation for the injuries suffered by reason of this negligence. I have no quarrel at all with Craigo's being compensated for his injuries. What I quarrel with is punishing Circus-Circus for malicious misconduct in what is essentially a negligence, maybe even a gross negligence, case. Although there is evidence in this case that the general manager was made aware of reports of criminal activity in the parking garage (mostly vandalism and petty theft), and although, as charged by Craigo, management took no steps to remedy the situation, I see this kind of a failure to attend properly to duty as negligence, not malice. No officer, director or managing agent can be seen as having engaged in the kind of conscious wrongdoing which constitutes malice, express or implied. There is some focus in this case on the general manager as the source of punitive damage liability. The general manager did have notice of an array of petty crime in the parking garage area and probably had a duty to do something about security in that area. This is a far cry, however, from saying that the manager consciously disregarded a known danger  that he knew a physical assault in the garage was imminent and nevertheless acted (or failed to act) in a manner that he knew would probably result in physical injury by criminal assault. Craigo's counsel argued that malice was present because management recklessly disregarded known safety measures. Those safety measures included increasing the number of security officers and installing electronic surveillance devices. If we were to accept the assumption that safety measures of this kind are generally known to increase the level of security, this is not to say that failing to increase safety measures amounts to anything more than failing to exercise due care. If the general manager knew that security could be improved by increasing the number of security personnel or by installing electronic devices, this does not mean that he knew that in the absence of increased security a criminal assault such as occurred in this case was probably going to happen. Absent the second-mentioned kind of knowledge, knowledge that certain decisions would probably result in injury, there can be no implied malice as I have described it. As I have indicated, the manager may be seen to have been reckless or to have exhibited unconscionable irresponsibility, Filice, 90 Nev. at 315, 526 P.2d at 89, in failing to attend to known safety measures, but his is not malice. No agent of Circus-Circus can be said to have been aware or conscious of the probability that a criminal assault was going to be the probable or necessary consequence of any management decision or decisions in this regard. I would absolve Circus-Circus from punitive damage liability for this reason. In today's society one never knows when or where a murder, a robbery, or a mugging is going to occur. It is hard to conceive of a specific decision that the corporation itself or individuals in management positions could have made that would have prevented crimes from occurring in its parking garage, or any place else. There is no evidence that Circus-Circus, directly or vicariously, made a deliberately wrongful decision, the necessary or probable result of which would have been the robbery and battery of Craigo or other patrons. The type of punishment-deserving conduct contemplated by the term malice is not present under the facts of this case; and no malice has been brought home to the Circus-Circus Corporation. 2 S. Speiser, supra.