Opinion ID: 854102
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Haak's claim

Text: Haak relies on Abner v. State, 497 N.E.2d 550 (Ind.1986), a case construing the predecessor statute, for the proposition that allowing the deletion of the killing as an overt act was error. In Abner, an information alleging conspiracy to commit murder was amended six days before trial to change the overt act from a shooting to pushing the victim into a river. Id. at 553. The conviction was reversed on the ground that this was a substantial alteration of an essential fact amounting to an impermissible shift in the State's theory of the case. Id. at 554. [7] However, the change here did not surprise Haak with a new factual allegation that he was unprepared to counter as trial approached. Because the amendment only reduced the possible grounds on which the jury could find one element of conspiracy, there was no unfair surprise. Cf. Sides v. State, 693 N.E.2d 1310, 1312-13 (Ind.1998) (deletion of the word auto from auto theft in habitual offender allegation was non-substantive and did not prejudice defendant); Taylor v. State, 663 N.E.2d 213, 218 (Ind.Ct.App.1996) (deletion of mere surplusage from the information was not error), trans. denied. In the parlance of Sharp, the amendment did not cause Haak to lose any defenses or affect the application of his evidence to the crimes charged; nor was it essential to the making of a criminal charge. Sharp, 534 N.E.2d at 714. The change was not of substance, and the amendment therefore was permissible at any time if not prejudicial to Haak. IND. CODE § 35-34-1-5(c) (1993). Haak's real claim as to prejudice is not that he was caught off guard, but rather that the amendment was a prerequisite to the State's obtaining convictions on both counts. He asserts that because the information alleged the killing as an overt act before it was (impermissibly) amended, murder and conspiracy to commit murder under the facts of this case are the same offense for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. [8] Because it is presumed in the absence of a contrary intent that the legislature did not intend to attach cumulative penalties to the same offense, Grinstead v. State, 684 N.E.2d 482, 485 (Ind.1997), the argument goes, conviction on both counts is barred. Even if we accepted the premise of this contentionthat Haak was or should have been tried on an information alleging Pronger's murder as an overt actthere would be no error because the inquiry in determining whether two offenses are the same for federal double jeopardy purposes focuses on the statutes defining the crimes, not the charging instrument. If each offense contains at least one statutory element that the other does not, the offenses are distinct for federal Fifth Amendment purposes and there is no bar on conviction and sentence on both. Games v. State, 684 N.E.2d 466, 477 (Ind. 1997), modified on reh'g, 690 N.E.2d 211 (Ind.1997), petition for cert. filed, ___ U.S.L.W. ___ (U.S. May 13, 1998) (No. 97-9143). Murder and conspiracy to commit murder are separate offenses under this analysis. Compare IND.CODE § 35-42-1-1 (1988) with IND.CODE § 35-41-5-2 (1993). Because the federal double jeopardy claim fails, the amendment to the charging information deleting the killing as an overt act did not prejudice Haak's substantial rights. IND. CODE § 35-34-1-5(c) (1993).