Opinion ID: 697290
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Effect of the Outside Information

Text: 15 Ruggiero and Parker argue that their trial was prejudiced as a result of the extrinsic information gained by Neely. Specifically, the two men argue that the introduction of extrinsic evidence to the jury is presumptively prejudicial, and they contend that the government failed to rebut this presumption. Ruggiero and Parker also aver that the extrinsic information in this case was especially prejudicial because it revealed that Roberts (the government's star witness) was a 'good guy' and that ... Ruggiero's employment from another company (Global Marine) had been terminated because inventory had come up missing (i.e., he was a 'thief'). Additionally, Ruggiero and Parker maintain that the effect of this information was magnified in light of the importance of Roberts's testimony and the weight assigned to it by the jurors. Finally, the defendants contend that the fact that only one juror had this information did not mitigate its prejudicial effect because the defendants were entitled to a unanimous verdict. 16 We often have stated that [i]n any trial there is initially a presumption of jury impartiality. United States v. O'Keefe, 722 F.2d 1175, 1179 (5th Cir.1983); accord United States v. Winkle, 587 F.2d 705, 714 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 827, 100 S.Ct. 51, 62 L.Ed.2d 34 (1979). This presumption, however, may be attacked, and [p]rejudice may be shown by evidence that extrinsic factual matter tainted the jury's deliberations. O'Keefe, 722 F.2d at 1179; accord Winkle, 587 F.2d at 714; United States v. Howard, 506 F.2d 865 (5th Cir.1975). 17 When a colorable showing of extrinsic influence appears, a court must investigate the asserted impropriety. Winkle, 587 F.2d at 714; accord United States v. Sanchez-Sotelo, 8 F.3d 202, 212 (5th Cir.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1410, 128 L.Ed.2d 82 (1994). Further, it is well-settled that a defendant is entitled to a new trial when extrinsic evidence is introduced into the jury room 'unless there is no reasonable possibility that the jury's verdict was influenced by the material that improperly came before it.'  United States v. Luffred, 911 F.2d 1011, 1014 (5th Cir.1990) (quoting Llewellyn v. Stynchcombe, 609 F.2d 194, 195 (5th Cir.1980)); accord Sanchez-Sotelo, 8 F.3d at 212; United States v. Ortiz, 942 F.2d 903, 913 (5th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 985, 112 S.Ct. 2966, 119 L.Ed.2d 587 (1992); Winkle, 587 F.2d at 714. This rule creates a rebuttable presumption of prejudice to the defendant, and the government has the burden of proving the harmlessness of the breach. Luffred, 911 F.2d at 1014. 18 Generally, a court is limited in its ability to inquire about a jury's deliberations. Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) forbids a juror from testifying about the deliberative process, 3 and we have noted that: 19 the rule separately bars juror testimony regarding at least four topics: (1) the method or arguments of the jury's deliberations, (2) the effect of any particular thing upon an outcome in the deliberations, (3) the mindset or emotions of any juror during deliberation, and (4) the testifying juror's own mental process during the deliberations. 20 Ortiz, 942 F.2d at 913; see also Llewellyn, 609 F.2d at 196 (Inquiries that seek to probe the mental processes of jurors ... are impermissible.); Howard, 506 F.2d at 868 (Well-established case law forbids the eliciting of juror testimony regarding the jury's mental processes, or the influences that any particular evidence had upon the jury's conclusion.). We have also stated, however, that juror testimony concerning prejudicial extraneous information is a horse of another hue, Ortiz, 942 F.2d at 913, for the rule expressly provides that  'a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention.'  Id. (quoting Fed.R.Evid. 606(b)). Accordingly, we have stated that: 21 Post-verdict inquiries into the existence of impermissible extraneous influences on a jury's deliberations are allowed under appropriate circumstances so that a jury-man may testify to any facts bearing upon the question of the existence of any extraneous influence, although not as to how far that influence operated upon his mind. 22 Llewellyn, 609 F.2d at 196 (internal quotations and citations omitted); accord Sanchez-Sotelo, 8 F.3d at 212; Howard, 506 F.2d at 869. 23 Thus, in determining whether the government has successfully rebutted the presumption of prejudice and shown that there is no reasonable possibility that the jury was improperly influenced, the district court is to examine the content of the extrinsic material, the manner in which it came to the jury's attention, and the weight of the evidence against the defendant. Luffred, 911 F.2d at 1014; accord Llewellyn, 609 F.2d at 195. 24 If, after undertaking such an analysis, the district court refuses to grant a new trial, we have stated that we will upset the district court's decision only for an abuse of discretion. Ortiz, 942 F.2d at 913; Sanchez-Sotelo, 8 F.3d at 212. Additionally, we have noted that [a]n appellate court should accord great weight to the trial court's finding that the [extrinsic] evidence in no way interfered with any juror's decision. O'Keefe, 722 F.2d at 1179. 25 In the instant case, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the government rebutted the presumption that Neely's outside investigation prejudiced the jury. Neely's statements regarding the extrinsic evidence support the district court's decision, and the content of the statements heard by Neely does not undermine the district court's conclusion. While Neely heard that Roberts was a real nice man, she also heard Roberts testify that he had lied to the SEC, that he had lied under oath, and that he had engaged in illegal stock transactions. Similarly, although Neely heard that Ruggiero had been accused of stealing company property, she also had the opportunity to hear Ruggiero testify about the events surrounding his options transaction. Further, Neely heard the extrinsic evidence only after all of the evidence had been introduced, and she did not relay any of the information she had heard to other jurors until after the jury had determined the verdict. 26 Additionally, the weight of the other evidence adduced at trial supports the district court's decision. The government presented strong evidence against both Ruggiero and Parker, establishing that the two men began regularly trading in Vista options after Roberts began to give them information. Further, there was evidence that the trades coincided with times that the sale of Vista was most likely, and the options purchased by the men were only of value if the company was sold quickly. 27 We have affirmed a district court's determination that the government overcame the presumption of prejudice in cases involving far more egregious juror misconduct. For example, in Ortiz, we found no error in the district court's conclusion that the government rebutted the presumption of prejudice raised by: one juror's investigation of an airport involved in drug smuggling operations; a second juror's visit to an apartment complex described in the trial and that juror's description of that complex to other jurors during deliberations; and a third juror's statement that she knew one of the individuals mentioned during the trial ... and that she knew he was a drug dealer and that the people on trial were guilty. Ortiz, 942 F.2d at 913. Considering only the objective factors surrounding the extrinsic evidence, we find that the district court's refusal to grant a new trial or a mistrial was not an abuse of discretion. 4