Opinion ID: 77758
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The CCP Aggravating Factor

Text: 82 In the final challenge to his death sentence, Jennings contends that the CCP aggravator was retroactively applied to his offense in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. The aggravator became effective on July 5, 1979, two months after the murder. See 1979 Fla. Laws, ch. 79-353. In dismissing Jennings's petition for federal habeas relief, the district court agreed that there had been an ex post facto violation, but nonetheless concluded that the error was harmless. Jennings appeals from the court's harmless error determination, while the State has filed a cross appeal to contest the court's conclusion that the aggravator was ex post facto. We need not decide whether reliance on the CCP aggravator violated the Ex Post Facto Clause, however, because Jennings's claim fails in any event. For purposes of this decision, we will assume, without deciding, that an ex post facto violation has occurred. 17 Nevertheless, we agree with the district court that any error was harmless. 83 The district court conducted harmless error review without the Florida Supreme Court's having attempted its own such analysis. 18 We have yet to endorse federal harmless error review of death sentences based on invalid sentencing factors when the state appellate court has not performed its own harmless error analysis. By our count, five circuit courts of appeals have authorized such an approach. See Coe v. Bell, 161 F.3d 320, 334 (6th Cir. 1998); Billiot v. Puckett, 135 F.3d 311, 318 (5th Cir.1998); Davis v. Executive Dir. of Dep't of Corr., 100 F.3d 750, 768-69 n. 18 (10th Cir.1996); Williams v. Clarke, 40 F.3d 1529, 1539-40 (8th Cir.1994); Smith v. Dixon, 14 F.3d 956, 974-81 (4th Cir. 1994) (en banc). Of the five, the Fourth Circuit's decision in Smith v. Dixon provides the most comprehensive discussion. The Smith court recognized that the United States Supreme Court has never approved federal harmless error review in circumstances such as these. In fact, whenever the Court has invalidated a death sentence on direct review, it has remanded the case back to the state appellate court to give it an opportunity to review the sentence for harmless error (or, alternatively, to reweigh the sentence). See Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U.S. 40, 52, 113 S.Ct. 528, 537, 121 L.Ed.2d 411 (1992); Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 322-23, 111 S.Ct. 731, 740, 112 L.Ed.2d 812 (1991); Clemons, 494 U.S. at 754, 110 S.Ct. at 1451. In Richmond, the Court used language that could be construed as reserving the reweighing of death sentences to state courts: Where the death sentence has been infected by a vague or otherwise constitutionally invalid aggravating factor, the state appellate court or some other state sentencer must actually perform a new sentencing calculus, if the sentence is to stand. Richmond, 506 U.S. at 49, 113 S.Ct. at 535 (emphases added). 84 And yet, as the Fourth Circuit observed, none of these decisions squarely addresses the issue of federal district courts conducting harmless error review in place of state courts. See Smith, 14 F.3d at 977. Indeed, the Supreme Court's references to state-only reformation of capital sentencing errors read most naturally as a limit on the reweighing of sentences, not on the ability of federal courts to engage in harmless error analysis. See id. at 977-78 (discussing Richmond ). The distinction between harmless error review and reweighing is a meaningful one. Whereas the reweighing of aggravating and mitigating evidence calls for assessing the relative value of factual evidence normally left to the province of state courts, [h]armless error analysis must necessarily be conducted on a cold record, whether the court be federal or state. Id. at 978. Like the Fourth Circuit, we do not read the Supreme Court's decisions as foreclosing federal courts from performing harmless error review in these circumstances. 85 In fact, the general rule requires federal habeas courts to perform harmless error review of state court trial-type errors. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-38, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1721-1722, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (directing courts to determine whether constitutional errors at trial had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1253, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946)). And it is equally clear that the Supreme Court has endorsed harmless error review of death sentences supported in part by invalid aggravators. Clemons, 494 U.S. at 752-54, 110 S.Ct. at 1450-51. We have no trouble concluding that harmless error review by federal courts is also appropriate when state courts have not undertaken such a review themselves. 19 86 We therefore review the inclusion of the CCP aggravator to determine whether it had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on Jennings's death sentence. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637-38, 113 S.Ct. at 1721-22. 20 We conclude that it did not. As discussed in the preceding sections, the Florida Supreme Court properly determined that Jennings's death sentence was supported by two valid aggravating factors—committed while engaged in the commission of a felony and HAC—and by the absence of any statutory mitigating factors. Although an ex post facto error is not harmless merely because the aggravators outnumber the mitigators, see Hargrave v. State, 366 So.2d 1, 5 (Fla.1978) (abjuring the mere tabulation of aggravating versus mitigating circumstances to arrive at a net sum), after careful review, we find nothing about the facts of this case to suggest that application of the CCP aggravator contributed substantially to Jennings's ultimate sentence. 87 The primary effect of the aggravator was to grant the jury and the trial judge authority to give aggravating weight to the facts underpinning CCP. 21 We find that these facts played little or no role in the sentencing determination. In his penalty-phase argument, the prosecutor summarized the evidence supporting the CCP aggravator as follows: 88 The defendant went to the location, looked in the window, left, decided to come back. He decided to enter the window, decided to check out who was in that house to make sure he would not be detected when he abducted the child. Who stealthily, not only entered, but exited, so no one would detect him. He takes her to an isolated area so that he can do whatever he wants, and what does he do? Sexually assaults her. When she comes around where she might be able to yell or give warning, he bashes her head. And when he is finished, he drowns her. 89 The trial judge made the following findings of fact in support of the aggravator: 90 The Defendant had driven by her house earlier in the evening, gone to her window and saw her asleep. He left only to return a short time later. At that time, he made a conscious decision to enter her room and did so. Rebecca Kunash offered no threat to the Defendant. From the initial abduction to the final premeditated act of drowning her, the Defendant's acts represented a cold and calculated indifference to the feelings or life of Rebecca Kunash. 91 Between the prosecutor's argument and the trial judge's statement of facts, it is clear that only two distinct sets of facts and circumstances were given aggravating weight under the CCP aggravator: (1) the premeditation evinced by Jennings's decision to return to Rebecca Kunash's window and enter her bedroom, and (2) his actions in carrying out the kidnapping, sexual assault, and murder, specifically Jennings's decision to kill Rebecca once she regained consciousness and was able to cry out for help. 92 We find that the second of these was properly given aggravating weight under the felony and HAC aggravating factors, and thus no aggravation for this set of facts can be attributed to the CCP aggravator for ex post facto purposes. The Florida Supreme Court has consistently ruled that the HAC aggravator concerns whether the State proved that the defendant had the intent to inflict a high degree of pain or otherwise torture the victims. Hamilton v. State, 678 So.2d 1228, 1231 (Fla.1996). Key to this finding is the suffering experienced by a conscious victim. Thus, as already mentioned, strangulation of a conscious victim satisfies the requirements of a properly defined HAC aggravator. For the same reason, the court has refused to treat instantaneous or near-instantaneous deaths, when not accompanied by additional acts of mental or physical torture, as heinous, atrocious, or cruel. See, e.g., Rimmer v. State, 825 So.2d 304, 327-28 (Fla.2002). From this perspective, it is plain that Jennings's decision to murder Rebecca in the manner that he did once she became conscious falls under the factual rubric designated by the HAC aggravator. In fact, it is identical to the prosecutor's argument in support of HAC: And when she comes around, when she starts to become conscious again, what is done? She is lifted up above his head and smashed onto the concrete, not once, but twice, to keep her quiet. The trial judge described the same aspect of Rebecca's death in approving the finding of HAC. As to the manner of Rebecca's death and the suffering she experienced, the CCP aggravator had no effect on Jennings's sentence because these facts were already given aggravating weight under HAC. 93 That conclusion flows directly from our prior decision in Francis v. Dugger, discussed above. See supra note 17. It is also supported by the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Brown v. Sanders, 546 U.S. 212, 126 S.Ct. 884, 163 L.Ed.2d 723 (2006), in which the Court set out an analysis similar to the approach we took in Francis. Reviewing a California death sentence imposed where two of the four aggravating factors were subsequently invalidated, the Court in Brown announced a new rule for determining when constitutional error will result from the application of invalid aggravators: 94 An invalidated sentencing factor (whether an eligibility factor or not) will render the sentence unconstitutional by reason of its adding an improper element to the aggravation scale in the weighing process unless one of the other sentencing factors enables the sentencer to give aggravating weight to the same facts and circumstances. 95 Id. at 892 (footnote omitted). The Court explained that the skewing that could result from the jury's considering as aggravation properly admitted evidence that should not have weighed in favor of the death penalty would arise only where the jury could not have given aggravating weight to the same facts and circumstances under the rubric of some other, valid sentencing factor. Id. Thus, no constitutional error results where the facts underlying an invalid aggravator also support a valid aggravator. That is because, in cases where the Brown condition is met, the constitutionally impermissible aggravator does not lend any additional aggravating weight to the facts and circumstances common to the aggravators. The Court upheld the death sentence before it because the California death penalty scheme permitted the sentencer to consider an omnibus aggravating factor that included all the circumstances of the crime. Id. at 893. There was no question then that the facts supporting the invalid aggravators were properly considered by the sentencer under the omnibus factor. 22 Id. Brown holds that the subsequent invalidation of an aggravating factor will constitute constitutional error only where the jury could not have given aggravating weight to the same facts and circumstances under the rubric of some other, valid sentencing factor. Id. at 892. Jennings misreads the Court's Brown decision by arguing the converse of the rule, and then extending its application: according to Jennings, if the remaining, valid sentencing factors do not enable the sentencer to give aggravating weight to the same facts and circumstances, then constitutional error is unavoidable and may not be reviewed for harmless error. But the Brown decision does not bar courts from engaging in harmless error review; in fact, the Court recognized the continuing need for harmless error review in weighing states like Florida when it distinguished weighing from nonweighing states. Id. at 890-91 n. 3. Brown therefore deals only with the threshold matter of deciding when constitutional error has resulted from reliance on invalid aggravators, not with how appellate courts can remedy the error short of resentencing. 96 Jennings also argues that the Brown rule cannot apply here (or indeed in any Florida death penalty case) because under Florida law, aggravating factors may never overlap and may never refer to the same aspect of the crime. Jennings here refers to the state prohibition on double counting aggravators when they arise out of the same facts and circumstances. See Provence v. State, 337 So.2d 783, 786 (Fla. 1976) (merging aggravating factors of committed during commission of a robbery and committed for pecuniary gain where those factors subsumed the same aspect of the crime). Even Jennings recognizes, however, that in such situations, Florida law instructs juries and trial judges to merge the overlapping aggravating circumstances into a single factor for the purpose of giving aggravating weight to the underlying facts. See, e.g., Francis v. State, 808 So.2d 110, 137 (Fla.2001); see also Standard Jury Instructions, 690 So.2d at 1267 (The State may not rely upon a single aspect of the offense to establish more than one aggravating circumstance. Therefore, if you find that two or more of the aggravating circumstances are proven beyond a reasonable doubt by a single aspect of the offense, you are to consider that as supporting only one aggravating circumstance.). 97 Properly viewed, Florida law does not preclude application of the rule announced by the Supreme Court in Brown. Rather, the prohibition on double counting presupposes that aggravators may sometimes share common facts and circumstances. The state law merger rule can therefore be read as anticipating the Brown rule, as both recognize the principle that no improper aggravation occurs where the same facts can be considered under a valid, remaining aggravating factor. In this case, the death sentence was supported by both the HAC and CCP aggravators. And here, the most significant facts receiving aggravating weight under CCP—facts related to the manner of the killing and the victim's suffering—could and did receive the same emphasis under HAC. Thus, as to these facts, the CCP aggravator had no effect on Jennings's sentence. 98 The only factual circumstance that could possibly have received improper aggravating weight was Jennings's decision to return to the victim's window after looking in on her earlier in the evening. 23 This fact alone, when compared to the other aspects of Jennings's crime—his callous indifference to the suffering of his young victim, the brutal, unrelenting ferocity of his attack, and the violent manner in which he dashed her head against the curb— cannot be viewed as a substantial motive in the decision to impose the death sentence in this case. Even when viewed in isolation, the level of premeditation evinced by Jennings's actions does not stand out as particularly egregious, especially when compared to the execution-style contract killings that the Florida Supreme Court has offered as the paradigm of the CCP aggravator. See, e.g., Scott v. State, 494 So.2d 1134, 1138 (Fla.1986); McCray v. State, 416 So.2d 804, 807 (Fla. 1982). Given the absence of statutory mitigating evidence, the presence of two valid aggravating factors, and the heinous nature of the crime, we conclude that the CCP aggravator produced no substantial and injurious effect on Jennings's sentence. Thus, any ex post facto violation was harmless, and the district court properly denied Jennings relief on his habeas petition.