Opinion ID: 1058331
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Board's Consideration of Green's Disciplinary Record

Text: In determining the appropriate sanction, the Board considered Green's disciplinary record, which reflects a six month suspension and a forty-five day suspension resulting from subcommittee certifications that took place in 2004 and 2005. Green's former attorney, Richardson, participated on the subcommittees that certified the charges of misconduct. Green argues that his disciplinary record was void due to the inclusion of those sanctions, because Richardson was ineligible to participate in subcommittee determinations involving Green. According to Green, Richardson's participation was a conflict of interest, in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, and his ineligibility to participate resulted in a lack of a quorum as required by what is now Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13-7(B)-(C). Green therefore argues that any certification by a subcommittee on which Richardson sat is void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, Green contends that the Bar should not have been permitted to use his disciplinary record, which reflected sanctions arising out of void certifications, to induce the Subcommittee's certification on May 18, 2006 and, later, to enhance his sanction. Green maintains that the use of his disciplinary record by the Subcommittee should have resulted in dismissal by the Board, and that the resultant Suspension Order is void ab initio. The Bar argues that Green is alleging an irregularity of procedure, not a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Bar cites Barrett v. Virginia State Bar, 272 Va. 260, 634 S.E.2d 341 (2006) for the proposition that an objection to the qualification of subcommittee members must be timely made or it is waived. The Bar also relies on what is now Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13-12(B), which provides that substantial compliance with the procedures of this Paragraph is sufficient, except where specific deadlines are provided, such deadlines shall be jurisdictional. Continuing, the Bar argues that the regulations on quorum and qualifications of subcommittee members do not contain specific time deadlines and thus are not jurisdictional. The Bar contends that any argument regarding Richardson's participation in the prior subcommittees and the inclusion of charges certified by those subcommittees on Green's disciplinary record is waivable, and has been waived by Green. The Bar asserts that Green did not object to Richardson's participation on any subcommittee and did not object to the admission of his disciplinary record in the present case. We agree with the Bar that this issue does not involve subject matter jurisdiction and has been waived by Green. We have stated: The term jurisdiction embraces several concepts including subject matter jurisdiction, which is the authority granted through constitution or statute to adjudicate a class of cases or controversies; territorial jurisdiction, that is, authority over persons, things, or occurrences located in a defined geographic area; notice jurisdiction, or effective notice to a party or if the proceeding is in rem seizure of a res; and `the other conditions of fact must exist which are demanded by the unwritten or statute law as the prerequisites of the authority of the court to proceed to judgment or decree.' Morrison v. Bestler, 239 Va. 166, 169, 387 S.E.2d 753, 755 (1990) (quoting Farant Investment Corp. v. Francis, 138 Va. 417, 427-28, 122 S.E. 141, 144 (1924)) (emphasis added); accord Porter v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 203, 228, 661 S.E.2d 415, 426 (2008). The Bar was created in 1938 by the General Assembly as an administrative agency of this Court. Code § 54.1-3910 establishes the Bar as an administrative agency for the purpose of investigating and reporting violations of rules and regulations adopted by the Court under [Title 54.1, Subtitle IV, Chapter 39, Article 2]. Issues regarding the composition of Board subcommittees do not divest the Bar of this jurisdiction. Objections to such composition are therefore waived if not timely made. In Barrett, the attorney claimed that the three-judge panel erred in denying his motion to dismiss all charges against him because a member of the subcommittee that certified the charges was not impartial and was biased. 272 Va. at 267, 634 S.E.2d at 344. The attorney raised this issue for the first time before the three-judge panel, and not before the subcommittee, although he was aware of the alleged conflict at that time. Id. We held that the circuit court properly determined that the attorney had waived this issue. Id. As in Barrett, Green did not object to Richardson's participation on the subcommittees, or to the use of his disciplinary record in this case, in a timely manner. The subcommittee meetings to which Green objects took place on April 15, 2004, June 16, 2005, June 21, 2005, and February 24, 2006. As an exhibit to his brief, Green appended notices of these meetings, several of which are certifications. Each notice clearly states that Richardson was a member of the subcommittee that considered the charges of misconduct against Green. In addition, in this Court's opinion rendered in Green's previous appeal from disciplinary proceedings, issued on November 2, 2007, we set forth that Richardson was the subcommittee chair at the June 16, 2005, June 21, 2005, and February 24, 2006 subcommittee meetings. Green, 274 Va. at 780-81, 652 S.E.2d at 120. Despite Green's knowledge of Richardson's participation in the subcommittee determination that resulted in sanctions included in his disciplinary record, Green did not lodge an objection to Richardson's participation until October 23, 2008, when he moved to set aside the summary order in the Henley and Beavers/Eavey matters. Prior to Green's October 10, 2008 meeting with counsel, he had not complained about [the 2004 and 2005 subcommittees] whatsoever. Green argued on October 23, 2008, for the first time, and before a different panel of the Board than the panels that held the June and August 2008 hearings, that the Board lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to Richardson's participation and the subcommittees' consequently void certifications. Moreover, Green did not object to the introduction of his disciplinary record at the August 2008 hearing when disposition of the charges was made. We hold that the Board correctly decided to overrule Green's motion to set aside the Suspension Order on this basis, as Green's objection was not timely made. We note that effective January 1, 2007, this Court amended Part 6, § IV in what is now Paragraph 13-14(E) to avoid the need for a separate hearing on whether a subcommittee member has a conflict of interest. Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13-14(E) now clearly provides that [a]ny member or former member of a District Committee or the Board shall be ineligible to serve in a Disciplinary Proceeding in which . . . [t]he District Committee or Board member previously represented the Respondent.