Opinion ID: 202980
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Circumstantial Evidence of Motivation

Text: In seeking to justify plaintiffs' removals as part of a natural transition from one administration to the next  the changeover defense  defendants attempt to downplay the significance of the plaintiffs' political affiliation and that of their successors. This effort falters on the record before us. Plaintiffs were reassigned to their lower level career positions, without explanation, about a week after Rey assumed the Secretary's role. Although Rey stated in his deposition that the positions in the organization were evaluated based on need, the record contains no evidence  other than Rey's bald assertion that we re-arranged the whole administration  of a considered plan to restructure the Department of Education. Both Rey and Pillich acknowledged that, at the time the changes were made, they knew neither what plaintiffs' duties were nor how well they had performed their jobs. [14] See Agosto-de-Feliciano, 889 F.2d at 1221-22 (In evaluating the changeover defense, the factfinder should take into account, inter alia, whether the actions occurred precipitately or after some opportunity for appraisal, whether they seem connected with previously announced goals, and whether they flowed from an organizational or procedural study. (footnote omitted)). The quick terminations, with no attention to either job functions or performances, are strongly suggestive of pure political motivation. See id. at 1222 n. 12 ([C]hanges made within days of a new administration's ascent to power ordinarily would be more likely to reflect an improper political housecleaning than would changes made months later, after the new officials have had a chance to evaluate how to reorganize their departments to best meet their policy goals.). Indeed, the record permits an inference that the defendants mistakenly believed they could demote all NPP trust employees without regard to their policymaking functions. Moreover, the evidence was equivocal as to whether the nature of plaintiffs' positions changed after they were removed, permitting a jury to conclude on this record that the personnel actions were made for political reasons rather than to improve efficiency. There was some evidence of task realignment: Montfort's former secretary testified in her deposition that the office functioned differently [b]ecause now it's the director who makes the decisions . . . not like it was done before. In addition, Flores stated that the Institute that she led doesn't operate as before. However, Flores also observed that her old work team is carrying out the same functions that she performed. Her secretary agreed, testifying that Flores's successor does not do things the same way as Flores, but that [s]he has the same functions. [15] The absence of evidence of a comprehensive or carefully studied effort at reform distinguishes this case from a number of others in which we have rejected claims of political discrimination following a change in administration. For example, in Aguiar-Carrasquillo, the defendant had directed an investigator to conduct an audit of all recent employment actions to evaluate their compliance with department regulations. We concluded there that it did not matter that NPP members were heavily affected: [I]f uniformly applied personnel practices, predicated on legitimate reasons, result in terminations, those terminations are not unconstitutional because those affiliated with one political party are disproportionately impacted. It is in the nature of a change in administration that job actions by the new party will have a disparate impact on members of the outgoing party. 445 F.3d at 26 (quoting Sánchez-López v. Fuentes-Pujols, 375 F.3d 121, 140 (1st Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Similarly, in Vázquez-Valentín, the challenged reassignments occurred following defendants' review of the personnel files of all 1,300 or so municipal employees. 385 F.3d at 26; see also Vélez-Rivera v. Agosto-Alicea, 437 F.3d 145, 149 (1st Cir.2006) (affirming summary judgment for defendants where an independent contractor conducted an audit to assess the legality of all personnel transactions during a particular period); González-de-Blasini, 377 F.3d at 84 (affirming summary judgment for defendants where their office conducted an audit of its Human Resources Department following the change in administration).