Opinion ID: 2325365
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Denial of Harodite's Motion to Amend Its Complaint

Text: In contending that the hearing justice abused her discretion in denying its motion to amend its complaint, Harodite sets forth two multi-faceted arguments: (1) that Harodite could not have amended its complaint earlier because the substance of its amendments was derived from Warren Electric's supplemental answers to interrogatories that were served on March 26, 2009 and (2) that Warren Electric has not shown the kind of prejudice that justifies denial of the motion. By contrast, with respect to its argument that the hearing justice did not abuse her discretion in denying the motion, Warren Electric contends: (1) that Warren Electric showed that it would suffer substantial prejudice if the amendment were allowed only days before trial [24] and (2) that Harodite had no valid reason for its delay in seeking to amend the complaint. Rule 15(a) provides in pertinent part as follows: (a) Amendments. A party may amend the party's pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served   . Otherwise a party may amend the party's pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. In interpreting Rule 15(a), this Court has observed that the true spirit of the rule is exemplified by the words and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. Medeiros, 911 A.2d at 253 (quoting Ricard v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 113 R.I. 528, 540, 324 A.2d 671, 677 (1974)); see also Inleasing Corp. v. Jessup, 475 A.2d 989, 992 (R.I.1984) (We have held that it is this final [clause] of the rule which embodies its true spirit.). In abiding by the true spirit of Rule 15, we have consistently held that trial justices should liberally allow amendments to the pleadings. [25] Medeiros, 911 A.2d at 253 (quoting Serra v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 463 A.2d 142, 150 (R.I.1983)); see also Manocchia, 658 A.2d at 909 (It is well settled in Rhode Island that amendments under [Rule 15] are allowed with liberality.). [26] Accordingly, although we are mindful that the decision as to whether or not to grant leave to amend is confided to the sound discretion of the hearing justice, we note that that discretion is inherently constrained by the plain language of Rule 15(a) and our cases interpreting same; the proverbial scales are tipped at the outset in favor of permitting the amendment. As we have previously stated, Rule 15(a)    liberally permits amendment absent a showing of extreme prejudice. Weybosset Hill Investments, LLC v. Rossi, 857 A.2d 231, 236 (R.I.2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). It follows that [t]he question of prejudice to the party opposing the amendment is central to the investigation into whether an amendment should be granted. Faerber v. Cavanagh, 568 A.2d 326, 329 (R.I.1990). And with respect to a party's delay in moving to amend, we have previously stated that, mere delay is an insufficient reason to deny an amendment. Wachsberger v. Pepper, 583 A.2d 77, 79 (R.I.1990); see Inleasing Corp., 475 A.2d at 992. Rather, it is incumbent upon the hearing justice to find that such delay creates substantial prejudice to the opposing party. Wachsberger, 583 A.2d at 79. At the same time, it should also be borne in mind that we have explicitly observed that the risk of substantial prejudice generally increases with the passage of time. RICO Corp. v. Town of Exeter, 836 A.2d 212, 218 (R.I. 2003). In other words, there comes a point when delay becomes undue and excessive, and causes prejudice to the opposing party. See Faerber, 568 A.2d at 329 (Although we have ruled that mere delay is not enough to deny the amendment, undue and excessive delay that causes prejudice to the opposing party is grounds for denial.) (internal citation omitted). In Faerber, 568 A.2d at 329, this Court undertook an examination of what constitutes undue delay. In carrying out that task, we quoted with approval the following burden-focused observation of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Carter v. Supermarkets General Corp., 684 F.2d 187 (1st Cir.1982): With respect to undue delay,    where . . . a considerable period of time has passed between the filing of the complaint and the motion to amend, courts have placed the burden upon the movant to show some valid reason for his neglect and delay. Carter, 684 F.2d at 192 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Faerber, 568 A.2d at 330, we then proceeded to examine the explanation proffered by the movant in that case, and we found that explanation to be simply not sufficient. We also held in Faerber that substantial prejudice inured to the opposing party because the amendment would have involved a considerable amount of new discovery. Id. In the present case, we perceive nothing in the record to suggest that Harodite has established a reasonable explanation for its delay in moving to amend the original complaint. As previously discussed, Harodite's proposed amended complaint sets forth three substantive additions to the original complaint: (1) it added an allegation that the gasket was not properly centered to its original allegation that the gasket was oversized; (2) it added to the defect in design count a new allegation about the lack of a fail-safe system; and (3) it added an entirely new count alleging failure to warn. Our review of the record makes it completely clear to us that plaintiff Harodite had ample opportunity to amend its complaint long before filing a motion to that effect on April 23, 2009. With respect to the proposed additional allegation regarding the improper centering of the gasket, the summary of facts in Harodite's own brief suggests that it could have amended its complaint at least as early as November of 2007. (It will be recalled that it was at that time that Harodite's supplemental answers to Acadia Elastomers' interrogatories indicated that Dr. Ali M. Sadegh was prepared to testify that the gasket may not have been properly centered. See section I B 2 of this opinion, supra. ) With respect to the other two proposed additions, a review of the record in its entirety indicates that Harodite's delay was the product of a protracted discovery process, in which both parties refrained at times from sharing information for as long as possible. However, the record also reflects that Harodite bears particular responsibility for its delay in providing adequate responses to Warren Electric's interrogatories and requests for production of documentswhich discovery (the RALCO invoice in particular) provided Warren Electric with the informational basis upon which it supplemented its interrogatories in March of 2009. It is further our opinion that the hearing justice did not abuse her discretion in determining that Warren Electric would be prejudiced by the granting of plaintiff's motion to amend its complaint. In reaching that conclusion, we have been struck by the similarity between the situation before the hearing justice in this case and the situation at issue in Weybosset Hill Investments, LLC. The following extract from this Court's opinion in that case is particularly pertinent to the case at bar: The plaintiff may well have been extremely prejudiced had the city been granted leave to amend, considering the lateness of defendant's motion, its proximity to trial, and the significant work plaintiff would have needed to undertake to prepare for the new legal issue. Weybosset Hill Investments, LLC, 857 A.2d at 237 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). In the instant case, the hearing justice predicated her denial of Harodite's motion to amend on essentially the same reasoning as we employed in Weybosset Hill Investments, LLC, in which we affirmed a hearing justice's denial of a motion to amend. The hearing justice in the instant case pointed to: (1) Harodite's delay in filing the motion to amend; (2) the proximity of the motion to trial; and (3) the extent to which Warren Electric would have to undertake additional discovery, retain new experts, and reconsider its previously developed trial strategy in order to defend against the new allegations. During the hearing of July 9, 2009, the hearing justice thoughtfully and candidly explained how close a call she considered to have been her ruling of two months earlier on the motion to amend. She stated in pertinent part as follows: I remain satisfied that it was no abuse of discretion for me to deny the motion to amend the complaint which was filed on the [eve] of trial, a motion that sought to supplant the existing complaint which undoubtedly would trigger the need for substantial discovery.    On the other hand, allowing the amended complaint would not necessarily have been an abuse of discretion either, in view of the determination I've just made on choice and conflicts of law and in spite of the fact that allowing the amended complaint would have invited a very messy record in discovery proceedings   . Having carefully considered the entire record, we are of the same mind; there are legitimate arguments in favor both of denying the motion to amend and in favor of granting same. However, in view of the abuse of discretion standard of review, we are unable to say that the hearing justice abused her discretion in ruling as she did. The issue, of course, is not what ruling a member of this Court might have made if he or she were confronted with the motion to amend at the trial court level. The only issue properly before us is whether the hearing justice abused her discretion in ruling as she did, and we hold that she did not. See State v. Gillespie, 960 A.2d 969, 980 (R.I.2008) ([W]e may uphold a trial justice's ruling even if we would have ruled differently had we been in the trial justice's position.); North Providence School Committee v. North Providence Federation of Teachers, Local 920, American Federation of Teachers, 945 A.2d 339, 345 n. 10 (R.I.2008); see also National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 642, 96 S.Ct. 2778, 49 L.Ed.2d 747 (1976) (The question, of course, is not whether this Court, or whether the Court of Appeals, would as an original matter have dismissed the action; it is whether the District Court abused its discretion in so doing.); State v. Gongoleski, 14 A.3d 218, 222 (R.I.2011). Finally, although many of our decided cases have emphasized the liberal spirit in which motions to amend should be considered, there exists a competing policy concern that strikes us as being particularly relevant to the instant case. In Faerber, we stated the following: [T]he trial justice's discretional authority to deny amendments to pleadings when delay is involved must always be placed within the scope of the spirit of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure: `They shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.' Faerber, 568 A.2d at 329 (emphasis added) (quoting Rule 1 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure). Taking into account all of the above-summarized factual and legal considerations, we hold that the hearing justice in the instant case did not abuse her discretion in denying Harodite's motion to amend its complaint. See id.