Opinion ID: 2960144
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: PPG’s Breach of Duty

Text: Under the element of duty, the plaintiff must show that the shipper had a duty to warn because the cargo presented dangers about which the carrier could not reasonably be expected to know. Because the existence of this duty is ultimately a question of law, see Burke v. Spartanics Ltd., 252 F.3d 131, 139 (2d Cir. 2001), our review is de novo, Ching Sheng Fishery Co. v. United States, 124 F.3d 152, 157 (2d Cir. 1997). We review the district court’s factual findings, however, for clear error. Contship, 442 F.3d at 77. Whether a cargo posed dangers “of which the [carrier] could not reasonably have been expected to be aware,” id. at 78, is principally a legal question that hinges on a legal judgment about what the carrier reasonably should have known. Unlike the threshold “binary” knowledge inquiry in the strict liability context, the reasonable awareness inquiry asks whether it would have been reasonable to expect the carrier to know of the specific type and degree of danger posed by the cargo at issue. Answering this question requires a fact-sensitive, “calibrated” analysis of the cargo’s dangerousness and the extent to which that risk was different from risks commonly 20 encountered by carriers. Cf. id. at 77 (holding that even if, as a result of its general awareness of a cargo’s danger, a party “cannot prevail on strict liability,” it may “ultimately prevail” on another theory). Two principles bear upon the determination of the dangers that are normally associated with a cargo. First, when receiving a cargo like calhypo, the dangerousness of which is not open and obvious, a carrier may rely on the shipper’s attestations as to the cargo’s characteristics. In the shipping industry, stevedores and ship’s masters often must make quick and complex stowage decisions about diverse containerized cargoes. Senator Linie, 291 F.3d at 169. “In contrast to a carrier, which typically is in the position of taking aboard its vessel a large quantity and variety of cargoes, a shipper can be expected to have greater access to and familiarity with goods and their manufacturers before those goods are placed in maritime commerce.” Id.; see also O’Connell Mach. Co. v. M.V. “Americana”, 797 F.2d 1130, 1134 (2d Cir. 1986) (“[T]he carrier . . . did not have a duty to inspect the contents of the cargo . . . before assigning a stowage location . . . . Rather, the shipper had an obligation to inform the carrier of special requirements regarding stowage location, and to make such special arrangements in advance of stowage . . . .”); William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims 489 (3d ed. 1988) (“Where the container is packed and sealed by the shipper, then the carrier has only its general knowledge of such type of goods in the light of the description on the bill of lading.”). For that reason, we generally will not charge stevedores and ship’s masters with encyclopedic knowledge beyond the shipper’s attestations. The district court, when determining the dangers normally associated with a cargo, should begin—and typically will end—with the shipper’s attestations. Second, when evaluating the legal significance of apparently contradictory information in the shipper’s 21 description or warning, the specific controls the general. J. Aron & Co. v. The Askvin, 267 F.2d 276, 277 (2d Cir. 1959). The district court correctly found that PPG’s calhypo presented dangers about which the carrier could not reasonably be expected to know and that PPG therefore had a duty to warn. Harmony, 394 F. Supp. 2d at 673. PPG’s attestations and the IMDG Code shaped the carrier’s reasonable expectations about the dangers of its calhypo. PPG’s Material Safety Data Sheet warned that the calhypo was unstable at temperatures above 117°C. The IMDG Code required calhypo to be kept away from sources of heat where temperatures greater than 55°C will be encountered for longer than twenty-four hours. The district court found, however, that because PPG’s calhypo was packaged, while still warm, in an unusual configuration, it had a CAT of below 41°C. Furthermore, although the IMDG Code warned only of temperatures above 55°C, the calhypo packaged by PPG “should [have] be[en] stowed at temperatures substantially lower.” Harmony, 394 F. Supp. 2d at 675. Although PPG challenges these factual findings , they are not clearly erroneous. Based on these findings, the district court—in keeping with our understanding that the duty element requires a “calibrated” inquiry into whether the carrier reasonably would have known of the precise risks presented by the cargo—held that PPG had a duty to warn of “all the risks involved in shipping cal-hypo in the manner in which it was shipped here.” Id. at 675 (emphasis added). After finding that the dangers posed by PPG’s calhypo gave rise to a duty to warn, the district court went on to find that PPG had breached that duty because its warnings were “inadequate and misleading.” Id. at 674. In other words, PPG’s breach of duty consisted of its failure to warn the carrier of the dangers posed by the calhypo it was shipping in this particular 22 configuration. The district court’s conclusion that PPG breached its duty to warn thus rests on its findings with respect to the dangerous nature of PPG’s calhypo, and as we have already held, those findings are not clearly erroneous. We therefore will not disturb the district court’s finding that PPG breached its duty to warn.