Opinion ID: 2634308
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of Hearsay Evidence to Prove Corpus Delicti

Text: The prosecution presented evidence that on December 20, 1978, defendant and three others kicked in an apartment door, robbed three men of their wallets, and hit one of the victims in the head with a gun. The victims were not available to testify. Instead, the prosecution presented the testimony of two police officers who responded to the scene and evidence of defendant's confession to the crime. Armando Marrujo and D.C. Ogan, who were police officers in 1978, testified that they responded to the apartment in question on December 20, 1978. They observed that the door frame at the point where the lock engages was shattered, had been forced open. Officer Marrujo observed that one of the occupants was holding a cloth to his forehead and it was saturated with blood. He appeared to have received a recent injury that was still bleeding. Defendant admitted his involvement in the crime. He said that one of his cohorts kicked in the door. Then, when one of his cohorts said to pass the money, the persons inside handed me their wallets. I got the money and ... I ran outside. He said that when he was running, one of his group hit one of the victims with his gun. Later, the group met to divide the money. They had gotten $109 dollars, which was split up three ways. Defendant received thirty some odd dollars, as did the other two. Over objection, the court also permitted Officer Marrujo to testify that the victim who was bleeding told him that one of the suspects told him, Give me the money. The court admitted the statement to satisfy the corpus delicti rule, finding that it qualified as an exception to the hearsay rule as a spontaneous statement. Defendant argues the court erred in admitting the victim's hearsay statement that one of the suspects said, [g]ive me the money, and that the error violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses. He also argues that without this statement, there was no evidence to establish the corpus delicti of the crime and, accordingly, his confession should not have been admitted. We conclude that, even without this hearsay statement, the prosecution adequately proved the necessary corpus delicti, and defendant's confession was properly admitted. We also conclude that any error in admitting the hearsay statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The corpus delicti rule generally requires the prosecution to prove `the body of the crime itself independent of a defendant's extrajudicial statements. ( People v. Sapp (2003) 31 Cal.4th 240, 303, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 554, 73 P.3d 433.) We have never decided whether the rule applies to unadjudicated crimes admitted in aggravation at the penalty phase of a capital trial under the current death penalty law. ( Ibid, [assuming without deciding that the rule does apply].) In People v. McClellan (1969) 71 Cal.2d 793, 805-806, 80 Cal.Rptr. 31, 457 P.2d 871, and People v. Hamilton (1963) 60 Cal.2d 105, 129-130, 32 Cal.Rptr. 4, 383 P.2d 412, concerning an earlier death penalty law, we held that the corpus delicti rule does apply to evidence of other crimes at the penalty phase. We relied on McClellan when we held that, under the current law, the prosecution must prove other crimes at the penalty phase beyond a reasonable doubt before the jury may consider them. ( People v. Robertson (1982) 33 Cal.3d 21, 54, 188 Cal.Rptr. 77, 655 P.2d 279.) We have also cited McClellan and other older cases in concluding that the rule requiring corroboration of accomplice testimony applies at the penalty phase of a capital trial. ( People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 100, 241 Cal.Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127.) The corpus delicti rule is intended to ensure that one will not be falsely convicted, by his or her untested words alone, of a crime that never happened. ( People v. Alvarez (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1161, 1169, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 903, 46 P.3d 372.) Although a jury does not convict the defendant of other crimes at a penalty phase ( People v. Visciotti (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 71, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 495, 825 P.2d 388), given the overriding importance of `other crimes' evidence to the jury's life-or-death determination ( People v. Robertson, supra, at p. 54, 188 Cal.Rptr. 77, 655 P.2d 279), this general purpose applies here. Accordingly, we conclude that the corpus delicti rule does apply to unadjudicated crimes offered in aggravation at the penalty phase of a capital trial under current law. But we must decide exactly what crime must be shown. The crime for which there must be a corpus delicti is the same as the crime that must be proven. Section 190.3, factor (b), permits the jury to consider in aggravation any criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence. (See People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 776-777, 215 Cal.Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782.) This statute refers to `criminal activity,' not specific crimes. ( People v. Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 840, 281 Cal.Rptr. 90, 809 P.2d 865.) No specific `elements' are at issue except that some violent criminal offense must exist. ( People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 754, 244 Cal.Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741.) Accordingly, at the penalty phase of a capital trial, as to each unadjudicated crime, the prosecution need only establish, independently of the defendant's statements, the corpus delicti of a crime admissible in aggravation under section 190.3, factor (b)that is, a crime involving the use or attempted use, or threat to use, force or violence. Once that corpus delicti is established, the defendant's extrajudicial statements may then be considered for their full value to strengthen the case on all issues. ( People v. Alvarez, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1171, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 903, 46 P.3d 372.) In this case, the prosecution established the corpus delicti of a crime of violencerobbery or assault. The corpus delicti consists of (1) the fact of injury, loss or harm, and (2) the existence of a criminal agency as its cause. ( People v. Alvarez, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1168, 119 Cal. Rptr.2d 903, 46 P.3d 372.) The identity of the defendant as the perpetrator is not part of the corpus delicti; identity may be established by the defendant's words alone. ( People v. Wright (1990) 52 Cal.3d 367, 404, 276 Cal.Rptr. 731, 802 P.2d 221.) Moreover, the modicum of necessary independent evidence of the corpus delicti, and thus the jury's duty to find such independent proof, is not great. The independent evidence may be circumstantial, and need only be `a slight or prima facie showing' permitting an inference of injury, loss, or harm from a criminal agency, after which the defendant's statements may be considered to strengthen the case on all issues. ( People v. Alvarez, supra, at p. 1181, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 903, 46 P.3d 372.) Here, the prosecution established, through the testimony of the responding officers, that the apartment door had been broken open, and one of the persons inside was bleeding from a recent head injury. This evidence permits an inference of a crime of violence. Doors do not normally get forced open without a criminal agency, and that circumstance combined with the head injury strongly suggests the crime involved violence. The evidence also permits an inference of robbery. A broken open apartment door and a man inside with a bleeding head wound suggests robbery, a very common purpose for a home invasion. Indeed, few other possible explanations for these events come to mind, and none so likely as robbery. These might not be the only possible inferences, but they are certainly reasonable inferences, which is sufficient. ( People v. Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 301-302, 70 Cal. Rptr.2d 793, 949 P.2d 890.) Even disregarding the victim's hearsay statement, little chance exists that defendant confessed to a violent crime that never occurred. Moreover, in People v. Alvarez, supra, 27 Cal.4th 1161, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 903, 46 P.3d 372, we considered the corpus delicti rule in light of the adoption by passage of Proposition 8 in 1982 of article I, section 28, subdivision (d) of the California Constitution (section 28(d)). We held that insofar as the corpus delicti rule restricts the admissibility of incriminatory extrajudicial statements by the accused, section 28(d) abrogates it. ( People v. Alvarez, supra, at p. 1174, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 903, 46 P.3d 372; see People v. Sapp, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 303, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 554, 73 P.3d 433.) Accordingly, the corpus delicti rule no longer prevents admission of the confession. Defendant argues that the prior crime at issue occurred in 1978, and therefore Proposition 8, allowing defendant's out-of-court statements, does not apply. We disagree. In People v. Smith (1983) 34 Cal.3d 251, 258, 193 Cal.Rptr. 692, 667 P.2d 149, we held that Proposition 8 applies only to prosecutions for crimes committed on or after its effective date. The only crime for which defendant was prosecuted in this trial was the 1993 murder of Roberto Cruz, which occurred long after Proposition 8's effective date. A capital defendant is not on trial for the past offense, [and] is not subject to conviction or punishment for the past offense .... ( People v. Visciotti, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 71, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 495, 825 P.2d 388; see also People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 754-755, 244 Cal. Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741.) Rather, the evidence of criminality ... is simply one factor the penalty jury is to consider in deciding the appropriate punishment for the capital offense. ( People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 205, 222 Cal.Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480, fn. omitted.) Accordingly, because the crime for which defendant is being prosecuted occurred in 1993, Proposition 8 and our holding in People v. Alvarez, supra, 27 Cal.4th 1161, 119 Cal. Rptr.2d 903, 46 P.3d 372, apply here. (See also People v. Mickle (1991) 54 Cal.3d 140, 171 & fn. 14, 284 Cal.Rptr. 511, 814 P.2d 290 [Proposition 8 applies to impeachment with a prior conviction if the charged crime postdated its enactment even if the prior conviction predated its enactment]; People v. Jackson (1985) 37 Cal.3d 826, 833, 210 Cal.Rptr. 623, 694 P.2d 736 [an enhancement for a serious felony conviction under Proposition 8 may be imposed if the charged crime postdated its enactment even if the prior crime predated its enactment].) [8] Defendant's confession was therefore admissible both because the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to establish the corpus delicti of a crime of violence under section 190.3, factor (b), and under our holding in People v. Alvarez, supra, 27 Cal.4th 1161, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 903, 46 P.3d 372. Alvarez additionally held that, notwithstanding Proposition 8, the court must instruct the jury that [the defendant's extrajudicial] statements cannot be the sole proof the crime occurred. ( People v. Alvarez, supra, at p. 1181, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 903, 46 P.3d 372; see People v. Sapp, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 304, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 554, 73 P.3d 433.) The trial court so instructed the jury. For these reasons, the trial court properly admitted defendant's confession and correctly instructed the jury regarding the corpus delicti rule. Admitting the hearsay statement of one of the victims, which added nothing to defendant's own confession, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we need not decide whether admitting the statement was error.