Opinion ID: 1245272
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Death Row Evidence

Text: During the penalty phase, the state called as a witness Bart Lousignont, a former inmate who had been incarcerated with defendant for a time in the Klamath County Jail. On cross-examination, the following exchange occurred: Q. I think you said something in one of your statements that people looked up to [defendant] when he was brought in but later when they found out what he was charged with uh the rape part, he wasn't a big man anymore. Is that what you said? A. Uh, basically everybody kind of flicked him a little bit of crap for it, yeah. Q. Okay. Because they, because of the allegation of rape? A. Because of thethe allegation of rape, yes. Q. And isn't that, isn't that accurate of what you said, he wasn't a big man anymore? A. Uh, I don't know how to say it. It is like he is and he ain't, you know? Q. Pardon? A. I don't know how to explain it. It's like hehe's still a threat because everybody knows that he's been on death row and he didn't have a whole lot to lose but. I don't know. See I use to kind of kiss Pratt's ass too until I found out about it, about thethe rape charge on him. And see IIII can't even be locked up with him now. You know they won't even put the two of us together. Q. Okay, but my question is, in this statement you wrote out a part of a statement didn't you? You said later everyone learned that he raped that girl. At that point [defendant] was nothing more than a rape-o that killed someone. He wasn't a big man anymore. Isn't that what you wrote out? A. Yeah, they don't look up to him like he's a big murderer anymore. (Emphasis supplied.) Defendant's cross-examination of Lousignont then continued for what amounts to five pages of transcript. After re-direct and re-cross examination amounting to seven more pages of transcript, Lousignont was allowed to step down. Following a ten-minute recess, Lousignont underwent further brief examination outside the presence of the jury. After that further examination, defendant moved for a mistrial based on the witness's testimony that defendant had been on death row. The court took the motion under advisement, then ruled as follows: Well I've read the authorities that were cited by both parties. [The] Court found that the prosecution didn't participate in causing the remark to be made and the State did not capitalize on the disclosure in any way. There's no reason to believe that the defense provoked the disclosure in order to cause a mistrial.      The State caused their witnesses to be instructed not to divulge anything about the prior trial and the conviction, including the witness Bart Lousignont who made the disclosure. The State satisfied its duty to try to prevent the disclosure by doing so. The disclosure came as a result of cross examination. After considering the direct testimony of the witness Lousignont and the cross examination, [the] court's finding is that the defense depended on a witness with three felony convictions to not only understand but to follow the rules. And then questioned him about the very reason the defendant had been looked up to by the other inmates. This resulted in the unfortunate disclosure. The court finds that it was inadvertently invited similar to the occurrence in State v[.] Hamilton, [4 Or.App. 214, 476 P.2d 207 (1970)]. Several times during the trial the jury has learned that this is a retrial for aggravated murder. It's inevitable that a jury on a retrial would not [sic] learn of this. There's a comment about that in State v[.] Coe, [109 Wash.2d 832, 750 P.2d 208 (1983) ]. The remark was isolated and made in passing and I don't believe the disclosure that the defendant had been on death row was so damaging as to warrant a mistrial of the penalty phase. Therefore the motion for mistrial is denied and the alternative motion for a directed sentence of life imprisonment is denied. Defendant assigns that ruling as error. As we have noted already, this court reviews the trial court's ruling on a motion for mistrial for abuse of discretion, because the trial court is in the best position to assess and rectify any potential prejudice to defendant. In State v. Farrar, supra, 309 Or. at 164, 786 P.2d 161, this court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a mistrial where a state's witness had mentioned a polygraph examination, because [the reference] was isolated and made only in passing, the results of the test were not disclosed, and the state never argued that the test had any significance to the witness's credibility or to any other issue in the case. Although the inadvertent testimony in this case was of a different, possibly more prejudicial, nature than the testimony in Farrar, the considerations that guided the decision in Farrar are also present here. The trial court found specifically that the mention of defendant being on death row was isolated and made in passing and that the state did not capitalize on the disclosure in any way. The trial judge, who was present throughout the entire trial and who heard the inadvertent testimony in its full context, concluded that the evidence was not so damaging as to warrant a mistrial. We find no abuse of discretion in that ruling.