Opinion ID: 1551257
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Violation of RSA 91-A:2, II

Text: Both parties rely upon RSA chapter 91-A, which governs access to public records and meetings. The relevant language from RSA 91-A:2 states: All public proceedings shall be open to the public, and all persons shall be permitted to attend any meetings of those bodies or agencies. . . . Any person shall be permitted to use recording devices, including, but not limited to, tape recorders, cameras and videotape equipment, at such meetings. The department does not dispute the trial court's conclusion that Hardwick's hearing before the department was a public proceeding under RSA 91-A:2, II. Further, the department concedes that the statute gives any person, including the media, a right to use video recording equipment in a public proceeding. Despite the applicability of RSA 91-A:2, II, the department argues that Perry's decision to exclude cameras from the hearing was correct for two reasons. First, Perry correctly balanced WMUR's right to videotape the hearing against Hardwick's constitutional due process right to have a fair hearing and an opportunity to be heard. Perry's balancing was proper, the department argues, because of his concern that Hardwick would not have been able to present fairly his position with a camera present. Second, the department argues that its administrative rules granted Perry independent authority to exclude the cameras. Though the department argues that Perry properly balanced WMUR's right to videotape the hearing against Hardwick's right to due process, the department has not developed a constitutional due process argument. The department simply states that Hardwick had a due process right to be heard and to have a fair hearing. The department did not identify whether the rights implicated by Perry's balancing arise under the Federal or the New Hampshire Constitution. If the department meant to argue under the State Constitution, we decline to address the argument. We will not address a party's State constitutional argument on appeal if the party does not specifically invoke in its brief a provision of the State Constitution. State v. Dellorfano, 128 N.H. 628, 632 (1986). Because the department failed to invoke a specific due process provision of the New Hampshire Constitution, we limit our due process analysis to the Federal Constitution. See Town of Nottingham v. Newman, 147 N.H. 131, 135 (2001) (addressing solely the defendants' federal due process argument because they failed to invoke Part I, Article 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution). It is well settled that the right to due process under the Federal Constitution arises only when there is a constitutionally protected life, liberty, or property interest at stake. Wilkinson v. Austin, 125 S. Ct. 2384, 2393 (2005). The department, however, has not identified a constitutionally protected interest that was at stake in Hardwick's hearing. Had the department done so, it presumably would have pointed to Hardwick's interest in obtaining a hunting license. We have never held, however, that a hunting license is a constitutionally protected right, and such a proposition is questionable, since other jurisdictions have specifically held that a hunting or fishing license is not a property interest for purposes of due process. E.g., Conti v. United States, 291 F.3d 1334, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Pennsylvania Game Com'n v. Marich, 666 A.2d 253, 257 (Pa. 1995). We decline to consider such a proposition when neither party has argued it. Because the department has failed to demonstrate that Hardwick had a due process right in the hearing, we reject the department's first argument. The department's second argument, that its administrative rules gave Perry the authority to override RSA 91-A:2, II, is also unavailing. The department's rules provide: A presiding [hearing] officer shall as necessary: (1) Regulate and control the course of a hearing; . . . [and] (8) Take any other action consistent with applicable statutes, rules and case law necessary to conduct the hearing and complete the record in a fair and timely manner. N.H. Admin Rules, Fis 203.01(b). The department asserts that this rule permitted Perry to issue an order that excluded cameras from the hearing. An agency, however, must comply with the governing statute, in both letter and spirit, and agency regulations which contradict the terms of a governing statute exceed the agency's authority. Appeal of Town of Nottingham, 153 N.H. ___, ___ (decided May 19, 2006) (quotations and citations omitted). There is no dispute that RSA 91-A:2, II applied to the department's hearing, and was, thus, a governing statute. Further, the express language of RSA 91-A:2, II states that [a]ny person shall be permitted to use recording devices, including . . . videotape equipment, at such meetings. Assuming without deciding that the department's interpretation of Rule 203.01(b) is accurate and that the rule purports to authorize the department to exclude cameras from the hearing, the rule conflicts with RSA 91-A:2, II. Accordingly, Rule 203.01(b) did not authorize Perry to exclude cameras from Hardwick's hearing in violation of RSA 91-A:2, II. Because the department has failed to provide an adequate reason for Perry's exclusion of cameras at Hardwick's hearing, we affirm the trial court's ruling that the department violated RSA 91-A:2.