Opinion ID: 757025
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Abouhalima--Severance

Text: 64 Abouhalima argues that the district court deprived him of a constitutionally fair trial by denying his pretrial motion for a severance. Specifically, Abouhalima first claims that absent severance, he was harmed by the admission and the subsequent spillover effect of holy war literature and video tapes that were seized from Ajaj at Kennedy Airport in September 1992. These materials included (1) a videotape of the bombing of the American Embassy, which contained instructions regarding how to make explosives and timing devices and how to construct a bomb; (2) Ajaj's manuals, detailing how to prepare explosives, including urea nitrate, and improvised weapons; (3) a videotape containing a chemistry lesson on manufacturing explosives; (4) additional manuals on catalysts, detonators and other bomb ingredients; (5) a document entitled Facing the enemies of God--[T]errorism is a[R]eligious [D]uty and [F]orce is [N]ecessary, which urged acts of terrorism against the enemies of Islam; and (6) a book entitled Rapid Destruction and Demolition, which described the destruction of buildings and contained a formula for using explosives to accomplish this end. Copies of publications (5) and (6) above were recovered from Abouhalima's residence and admitted into evidence. Although identical, Abouhalima does not dispute the admissibility of these items, but only those items seized from Ajaj. 65 Next, Abouhalima argues that through the joinder, he was prejudiced by Salameh's closing argument, where Salameh purportedly asserted a defense antagonistic to his own. In this regard, as part of his defense, Abouhalima refused to concede either that a bomb had caused the World Trade Center explosion, or that he had any association with Yousef. Salameh, on the other hand, conceded not only the existence of a bomb, but argued that he was an unwitting dupe of Yousef, who had masterminded the bombing. Because the government had characterized Yousef as Abouhalima's close associate, Abouhalima avers that Salameh's summation undermined his defense of not knowingly participating in the conspiracy. 66 We find no basis for reversal. There is a preference in the federal system for joint trials of defendants who are indicted together. Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 537, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993); United States v. Hernandez, 85 F.3d 1023, 1029 (2d Cir.1996). This preference is particularly strong where, as here, the defendants are alleged to have participated in a common plan or scheme. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 8(b); United States v. Cardascia, 951 F.2d 474, 482 (2d Cir.1991); United States v. Turoff, 853 F.2d 1037, 1042 (2d Cir.1988). It would impair both the efficiency and the fairness of the criminal justice system to require ... that prosecutors bring separate proceedings, presenting the same evidence again and again, requiring victims and witnesses to repeat the inconvenience (and sometimes trauma) of testifying, and randomly favoring the last-tried defendants who have the advantage of knowing the prosecution's case beforehand. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 210, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987). 67 Whether to grant or deny a severance motion is committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge. United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1149 (2d Cir.1989); see United States v. Torres, 901 F.2d 205, 230 (2d Cir.1990). The district court's exercise of that discretion is virtually unreviewable. United States v. Lasanta, 978 F.2d 1300, 1306 (2d Cir.1992) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 68 Accordingly, a district court's denial of a severance motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14 will be reversed only if a defendant can 'show prejudice so severe that his conviction constituted a miscarriage of justice, and that the denial of his motion constituted an abuse of discretion.'  Hernandez, 85 F.3d at 1029 (quoting United States v. Rosa, 11 F.3d 315, 341 (2d Cir.1993)). To satisfy this extremely difficult burden, of showing an abuse of discretion, an appellant must demonstrate that the denial of the motion caused substantial prejudice, Casamento, 887 F.2d at 1149-50 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), that is, prejudice so great as to deny him a fair trial, Cardascia, 951 F.2d at 482. If the denial of the motion causes some prejudice, but less than substantial prejudice, we are not apt to reverse, since, by and large, joinder promotes judicial efficiency. Casamento, 887 F.2d at 1150.
69 The admission of Ajaj's holy war materials did not result in prejudicial spillover as to Abouhalima. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying severance. A defendant's claim that he was prejudiced by the admission of evidence at a joint conspiracy trial is insupportable when the evidence would have been admissible against him in a separate trial alone as a member of the conspiracy. See Rosa, 11 F.3d at 341 (such evidence is neither spillover nor prejudicial); United States v. Cunningham, 723 F.2d 217, 230 (2d Cir.1983). Prejudice occurs in joint trials when proof inadmissible against a defendant becomes a part of his trial solely due to the presence of co-defendants as to whom its admission is proper. See, e.g., United States v. Cervone, 907 F.2d 332, 341-42 (2d Cir.1990). This is an unlikely occurrence when all the defendants are charged under the same conspiracy count. See United States v. DiNome, 954 F.2d 839, 843-44 (2d Cir.1992). 70 In the present case, Ajaj and Abouhalima were alleged to have participated in a common plan or scheme and were tried under the same conspiracy count. As we have already discussed in connection with co-appellant Ayyad, the materials seized from Ajaj at Kennedy Airport were properly admitted as background evidence to establish the nature and scope of the conspiracy and to establish the motive and intent of the conspirators, namely, a desire to use violence to effect change in American foreign policy in the Middle East. See United States v. Daly, 842 F.2d 1380, 1387 (2d Cir.1988) (Background evidence may be admitted to show, for example, the circumstances surrounding the events or to furnish an explanation of the understanding or intent with which certain acts were performed.). Additionally, the materials were admissible to link Abouhalima to the conspiracy, as two of the terrorist publications seized from Ajaj were identical to the publications found in Abouhalima's apartment. Because each of the items would have been admitted against Abouhalima had he been tried alone, they were properly admitted against Abouhalima in the joint trial and there is no prejudicial spillover. Consequently, Abouhalima has not shown that the district court erred in denying his pretrial motion for a severance, let alone an abuse of discretion and a miscarriage of justice.
71 We find no prejudice to Abouhalima arising from Salameh's summation.  '[M]utually antagonistic' or 'irreconcilable' defenses may be so prejudicial in some circumstances as to mandate severance. Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 538, 113 S.Ct. 933. In order to make a showing of mutually antagonistic or irreconcilable defenses, the defendant must make a factual demonstration that acceptance of one party's defense would tend to preclude the acquittal of [the] other. United States v. Smith, 788 F.2d 663, 668 (10th Cir.1986) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); United States v. Keck, 773 F.2d 759, 765 (7th Cir.1985). However, [m]utually antagonistic defenses are not prejudicial per se. Moreover, Rule 14 does not require severance even if prejudice is shown; rather, it leaves the tailoring of the relief to be granted, if any, to the district court's sound discretion. Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 538-39, 113 S.Ct. 933; see, e.g., id. at 540-41, 113 S.Ct. 933 (where two co-defendants both claim they are innocent and each accuses the other of the crime, district court did not err in denying motion for severance). The risk of prejudice will vary with the facts in each case ... [and w]hen the risk of prejudice is high, a district court is more likely to determine that separate trials are necessary, but, as [the Supreme Court] indicated in Richardson v. Marsh, less drastic measures, such as limiting instructions, often will suffice to cure any risk of prejudice. Id. at 539, 113 S.Ct. 933.  '[J]uries are presumed to follow their instructions.'  Id. at 540, 113 S.Ct. 933 (citation omitted). 72 Throughout the trial in this case, all four defendants challenged the government's case without attempting to accuse one another. Unlike Abouhalima, during summation Salameh abandoned his trial strategy of disputing that a bomb had caused the explosion and argued that he was nothing more that an unwitting dupe of Yousef, who had masterminded the bombing. While the defense asserted by Salameh was, in the end, inconsistent with Abouhalima's defense, at no time did Salameh argue or suggest that Abouhalima was involved in the bombing, or directly contradict Abouhalima's defense strategy. Salameh and Abouhalima both claimed to be innocent of the charges and neither's claim of innocence required the jury to find the other guilty. 73 Consequently, because there was nothing directly antagonistic between the two defense theories so as to create mutually antagonistic or irreconcilable defenses, we perceive no ground for reversal based on the court's denial of severance. Furthermore, any possible prejudice was eliminated by the district court's repeated admonitions to the jury that each defendant's guilt had to be separately and individually considered. 3 See, e.g., Hernandez, 85 F.3d at 1029-30 (rejecting claim of prejudicial spillover where the district court instructed the jury that it was required to consider the evidence against each defendant individually for each count); United States v. Losada, 674 F.2d 167, 171 (2d Cir.1982) (same). 74 Moreover, to the extent that Salameh's summation may have undermined Abouhalima's defense by indirectly linking him to Yousef, any possible prejudice was cured by the district court's jury instruction that [m]ere association with other people that you found are members of the conspiracy is not enough for you to find a person to be a member ... [even] a person who has knowledge of a conspiracy and all of its ramifications and does nothing about it is not a co-conspirator.... [It's] got to be an intentional joining of the conspiracy. In light of this instruction, we find no error.