Opinion ID: 175076
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of Correia's motion for a new trial

Text: The district court should grant a motion for a new trial only if `the outcome is against the clear weight of the evidence such that upholding the verdict will result in a miscarriage of justice.' Goulet v. New Penn Motor Express, Inc., 512 F.3d 34, 44 (1st Cir.2008) (quoting Ramos v. Davis & Geck, Inc., 167 F.3d 727, 731 (1st Cir.1999)). On appeal, we owe much deference to the trial court's determination. See Jennings v. Jones, 587 F.3d 430, 437 (1st Cir.2009) (`Circuit judges, reading the dry pages of the record, do not experience the tenor of the testimony at trial.' (quoting United States v. Alston, 974 F.2d 1206, 1212 (9th Cir.1992))). Unlike our review of a motion for judgment as a matter of law, we do not engage in de novo review and we do not take the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner. Id. at 438. We reverse only if we find that the trial court has abused its discretion in making its assessment of the weight of the evidence. Id. at 436-37 & n. 7. In arguing that the jury's verdict for Feeney was so against the weight of the evidence that he was entitled to a new trial, Correia cites testimony at trial corroborating his version of events and purported contradictions in Feeney's testimony. In addition, he argues that the length of the jury deliberations supports the conclusion that the verdict was out of sync with the evidence presented. We disagree. The material dispute at the core of Correia's excessive force and unlawful arrest claims involves Feeney's interaction with Correia when he first spoke to and then confronted him in his car after he had parked. In order to prevail on his excessive force claim, Correia had to show that the defendant employed force that was unreasonable under all the circumstances. Morelli v. Webster, 552 F.3d 12, 23 (1st Cir.2009). His unlawful arrest claim required a showing that Feeney lacked probable cause to arrest him. See id. at 19. In essence, both claims required the jury to find that Feeney's behavior during the confrontation with Correia was unwarranted and unreasonable. Only Correia and Feeney were able to give accounts at trial of what they said and did during their confrontation. Correia testified that after he refused to give Feeney his car keys, Feeney, without warning and without asking Correia to produce his license, grabbed and twisted Correia's arm through the car window, opened the car door, and started punching him. Correia insisted that he did not punch or hit Feeney. At some point during the ensuing scuffle, however, when Feeney had Correia in a grip that impeded his breathing, he bit Feeney to get him to let go. Feeney testified that Correia refused to produce his license when asked. Feeney then tried to remove Correia from the car, prompting Correia to bite him. To get Correia to release his bite, Feeney hit him. No other witnesses at trial gave accounts of that part of the altercation. Thus, the jury had to decide whether to accept Correia's account of the altercation or Feeney's. That they exercised their judgment in favor of Feeney is not grounds for a new trial. It is axiomatic that, absent exceptional circumstances, issues of witness credibility are to be decided by the jury. United States v. Garcia, 978 F.2d 746, 748 (1st Cir.1992) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Correia argues that his witnesses corroborated his version of events, while Feeney's witnesses gave contradictory accounts of what transpired, harming Feeney's credibility. That argument overlooks inconsistencies in the evidence presented by Correia's witnesses. For example, Correia and one of his witnesses asserted that two other officers who had been working the detail with Feeney came to the scene to assist him, helped him remove Correia from the car, and then were stomping him with their feet once he was on the ground. Correia's other four witnesses testified that he was not beaten once he was removed from the car. Those inconsistencies were damaging to Correia's case. It was reasonable for the district court to conclude, in assessing Correia's motion for a new trial, that the verdict was not clearly against the weight of the evidence. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the motion for a new trial. [2]