Opinion ID: 352419
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Absolute Immunity for Witnesses Supreme Court Precedent, Logic, Policy, and History

Text: 152 In considering whether a witness should be accorded absolute immunity in a Bivens -type suit or any other, it must be emphasized that historically all of the essential participants in the judicial process enjoyed an absolute immunity from civil suit for their words and actions relevant to the judicial proceedings. This included the judge, petit jurors, grand jurors, counsel, and witnesses. Absolute immunity was regarded as essential to each, if justice was to have the full and uninhibited cooperation of those participants whose role was and is absolutely vital to the working of the entire judicial process. As Justice White declared in Imbler, 72 It is essential to the ends of justice that all persons participating in judicial proceedings . . . should enjoy freedom of speech in the discharge of their public duties or in pursuing their rights, without fear of consequences. 153 This is not to say that improper conduct in the courtroom or elsewhere by any participant could not then and cannot today be punished. The judge has always been subject to impeachment, prosecution, and disbarment as a lawyer. The prosecutor and defense counsel have always been subject to punishment for contempt, prosecution for any crime such as obstruction of justice, and disbarment. 73 Witnesses have always been subject to punishment for contempt, perjury, or possibly obstruction of justice. Criminal penalties likewise have been applied to petit jurors and grand jurors. No immunity protects these persons from criminal prosecution or professional discipline, if anyone should act contrary to law in the performance of his office. 154 But none of these participants, essential to the functioning of the judicial process, has ever been held to be subject to a civil suit by an allegedly aggrieved party because of anything said or done while functioning in the role of judge, juror, witness, or counsel. 155 The reasons for the historic common law absolute immunity of these essential participants is obvious on analysis, which will be developed in the following pages. What the majority of this court does in this decision is not just throw open one possibly errant prosecutor to civil liability, but to tear the whole seamless fabric of absolute immunity granted essential participants in the judicial process from time immemorial. 156 If we were to accept the majority's rationale here, the impact of the Bivens case and § 1983 on historic common law immunities would be devastating. Fortunately, that is not the way the Supreme Court has gone about its analysis. I can only deduce from it that the witness, particularly a public official as witness, should be accorded the same absolute immunity as the other participants. 157 It is well established that  § 1983 is to be read in harmony with general principles of tort immunities rather than in derogation of them. 74 Thus, in deciding which official functions should be absolutely protected from suit under § 1983, the Court has generally sought first to determine the status of the common law immunity with regard to that function, then the Court has considered whether the public policy behind the common law rule justifies the same immunity for constitutional torts. In a number of instances, the Court has adopted the absolute immunity that had developed at common law: Tenney v. Brandhove 75 (legislators); Pierson v. Ray 76 (judges); Imbler v. Pachtman, supra (prosecutors). Even though these immunities had initially arisen only with regard to common law torts, the Court preserved them with regard to deprivations of constitutional rights as well. Where the common law had established a qualified immunity for the official, the Court has maintained that standard in the § 1983 actions as well: Pierson v. Ray, supra (policemen); Wood v. Strickland 77 (school board members). As in the cases of absolute immunity, the court entered into a fresh appraisal of the competing factors, including, as just mentioned, the nature of the new constitutional tort. The fact that the results reached by the Court have generally 78 paralleled the judgments of the common law does not mean, of course, that the status of the common law immunity is dispositive, but surely does suggest that the common law, as a starting point of analysis, should not be overruled lightly. 158 The absolute immunity of the witness at common law is as firmly rooted in history and as widely accepted by the courts as is the absolute common law immunity that was accepted for legislators in Tenney, for judges in Pierson, and for prosecutors in Imbler. Immunities for various participants in the judicial process were already established by courts as early as the sixteenth century, 79 and in 1772 Lord Mansfield announced the comprehensive rule: Neither party, witness, counsel, jury nor judge can be put to answer, civilly or criminally for words spoken in office. 80 Accepted as practically (the) universal rule in this country, 81 this rule of absolute immunity means that a witness in judicial proceedings cannot be held liable in civil damages for injury that ensues from any relevant testimony. Of particular significance is that this rule is also applied as a matter of federal common law, 82 which, the majority tells us, 83 is an important focus for the formulation of a federal immunity standard. Absolute witness immunity has been carried into the Restatement of Torts 84 and has been set out approvingly by the commentators as well. 85 It is notable that in Imbler itself Justice White wrote that the need to protect the judicial process at common law meant that absolute immunity applied to suits against witnesses themselves for delivering false and defamatory testimony. 86 159 Do the policies that underlie the common law immunity for a witness warrant the continued availability of absolute immunity in § 1983 or Bivens -type suits? The policy behind the common law reflects a balancing process. In the context of a defamation suit, 87 Judge Hastie expressed the rationale for absolute witness immunity as follows: 88 160 This rule reflects the prevailing common law view that the public interest in freedom of expression by participants in judicial proceedings, uninhibited by any risk of resultant suits for defamation, outweighs the interest of the individual in the protection of his reputation from defamatory impairment in the judicial forum. 161 The reason for the public interest in the freedom of expression of a witness is that the judgment of the judicial process itself, the centerpiece of all judicial immunities, may well be based on the testimony of the witness and the witness, thus, should be fully encouraged to disclose pertinent information. For a witness, Justice White states, this means he must be permitted to testify without fear of being sued if his testimony is disbelieved. 89 Full disclosure may be impaired, in other words, if there can be intimidation deriving from the possibility of civil liability. 90 162 Set against the value of full freedom for the witness is, as Judge Hastie noted, the possible damage, e. g., to the reputation of others, that may ensue. This danger has its limits, however, because witnesses are, of course, subject to the control of the trial judge and are subject to contempt citations for misbehavior in the exercise of the privilege and to prosecution for perjury if convicted of knowingly giving false testimony. 91 Thus, with a deterrent already available against perjury by a witness in the form of criminal sanctions, the common law regarded the additional deterrent of having to defend a civil damage suit as rendering the risk of self-censorship . . . too great. 92 163 In striking the balance in favor of absolute immunity, the common law meant in no way to derogate the duty of the witness to state the facts objectively. Of course, the witness has no discretion to commit perjury, but, to borrow from Learned Hand, it might be impossible to know whether the claim (of perjury) is well founded until the case has been tried. 93 Such a possibility, Judge Hand concluded (in the context of prosecutorial immunity), could dampen the ardor 94 of even the person intending to perform truthfully and properly. The witness immunity at common law is apparently so thorough that it makes no exception for an action where the perjury seems, on the face of the complaint, to admit of no ambiguity, such as when a husband of twenty five years testifies, for example, that he has never been married. Even though it might be monstrous to deny recovery 95 in that case, the common law is so unwilling to expose the honest witness to any civil risk that it would not allow even that case to go to trial. 164 The policies underlying common law immunity for a witness justify the availability of absolute immunity for a witness sued in a § 1983 or Bivens -type action. As noted, the common law regarded absolute immunity for the witness as essential to the protection of the integrity of the judicial process. Similarly, each time the Supreme Court in a § 1983 suit has considered the immunities related to the judicial process, the Court has continued the absolute immunity of the common law for judges in Pierson and for prosecutors in Imbler. Indeed, the Imbler Court strongly suggested, both in the majority and separate opinions, that it would readily extend the full immunity to grand jurors 96 and defense counsel. 97 The Court's continued extension of absolute immunity to all the participants in the judicial process, which undeniably includes witnesses, represents a thorough acceptance of the common law policy that the provision of only qualified immunity might inhibit the full disclosure of relevant evidence and impair the judgment of the court. In each instance the common law policy has been assessed as a compelling enough justification for the absolute immunity also to be available for constitutional torts. 165 The majority gives no reason at all, and none appears to me, why a witness should be singled out for less than the full protection afforded all the other participants. 98 As for other participants, the possibility of civil liability for the witness undoubtedly can be said to provide some chill to the full expression of his testimony. Where the triers of fact in criminal cases often would be denied relevant evidence, 99 as a consequence of the provision of only qualified immunity, the judgment of the court can plainly be said to be impaired. The possibility of this adverse effect upon the functioning of the criminal justice system 100 has warranted absolute immunity for other participants in the judicial process and warrants absolute immunity for the witness too. 166 The witness should not be singled out for less protection than the other participants in the judicial process because, like those participants, he is also subject to other checks on the abuse of his power. Testimony may be excluded from court or tested under cross-examination and through jury scrutiny. The witness himself is subject to the supervision and discipline of the court and may even be indicted and convicted of perjury. Following the reasoning of the Imbler Court about prosecutorial immunity, 101 it is fair to say that the existence of those other checks undermines the argument that the imposition of civil liability is the only way to prevent a witness from inflicting constitutional injury through false testimony. 167 It is noteworthy that the only other court to consider the liability of a witness in a Bivens -type suit had no hesitation in awarding absolute immunity Brawer v. Horowitz. 102 Noting the need for fearless witnesses and the means, other than damage suits, for deterring perjury, Judge Aldisert, writing for a unanimous panel of the Third Circuit, concluded: 103 168 The policy arguments supporting common-law witness immunity obtain equally to immunize a single witness from a Bivens -type action. 169 This is the holding, and it is good precedent here, despite the majority's unwillingness to accept it. 104 The majority's notation that the merits of Brawer were reached only by assuming arguendo that the witness was acting under color of law is beside the point, as Brawer's assumption of state action does not invalidate its documentation and reasoning. 105 170 In addition to the common law policies discussed above and followed in Brawer, there are reasons why the absolute immunity should especially be preserved for the official as witness. Officials who are called as witnesses have duties in addition to the duty to tell the truth in their testimony. To the extent these additional duties are impaired by qualified immunity, that is all the more reason to assure them the full immunities afforded private citizens who have only their duties as witnesses. 171 Let us take the office of the prosecutor, for example. Suppose as a witness a prosecutor responds to the judge with very definitive but honest answers, but later uncovers evidence that puts into serious doubt the accuracy of his testimony. If he were only afforded qualified immunity, then this warning from Imbler becomes very appropriate: The possibility of personal liability . . . could dampen the prosecutor's exercise of his duty to bring to the attention of the court or of proper officials all significant evidence suggestive of innocence or mitigation. 106 172 Other officials are subject to similar duties. An FBI agent, for example, is supposed to reveal to the prosecutor mitigating evidence he unearths. Will the FBI agent be chilled in the exercise of this duty because he testified, albeit honestly, to the contrary, and fears a lawsuit for perjury as a witness, defensible only with a qualified immunity? Considerations such as these, left unaddressed by the majority, further tipped the balance towards absolute immunity in Imbler and, as shown, counsel us to provide absolute immunity to officials in their capacity as witnesses. 173 In sum, the rejection in toto by the majority of an absolute immunity for a witness in a Bivens -type suit amounts to a tearing of the whole seamless fabric of absolute immunity granted the other participants in the judicial process judges, prosecutors, defense counsel and jurors. In doing so, the majority clearly fails to engage in a full and reasoned analysis of the common law immunity, as Imbler requires and exemplifies. The majority's result not only clashes with the one other Circuit holding on witness immunity but, most significantly, undercuts a compelling interest that is at the heart of the judicial process, that is, that the integrity of its fact-finding function is best served by providing absolute freedom from civil suit to its participants so as to encourage unintimidated disclosure and expression. 174 The majority also argues the point that whatever the value of the common law immunity of the witness these policies are tangential, and essentially irrelevant to this case because the prosecutor here was not an ordinary witness. In attempting to carve out an exception to the absolute immunity of the witness the majority relies, as we shall see, upon a particular reading of immunity doctrine that was clearly rejected in Imbler. Noting that Goodwin did not testify in the usual sense at a trial or even before grand jurors, the majority also recites that it was the judge who asked the question and that the opportunity for cross-examination was denied. 107 These circumstances demonstrate for the majority, as it said earlier, 108 how the statement was thus insulat(ed) from examination and appraisal and how, therefore, it warrants only qualified immunity. As I understand this rationale, it goes more fully as follows: one justification for absolute witness immunity is that possible perjury by a witness will be subjected to the rough-and-tumble of the trial process cross-examination, jury scrutiny, and the presentation of conflicting evidence, so that when these corrective elements are lacking, as when cross-examination is foreclosed, the witness is not really an ordinary witness for purposes of absolute immunity and may justifiably be accorded only qualified immunity. 175 In Imbler, however, the majority expressly rejected the argument that absolute immunity for a prosecutor should turn on whether his possible constitutional violation in particular could be corrected through the trial process. 109 As explained in more detail earlier, 110 Imbler meant for the prosecutor to have absolute immunity even if his constitutional violation had involved the complete suppression of exculpatory evidence, a decision insulated from scrutiny at trial. Similarly with a witness, the provision of absolute immunity should not turn on whether the testimony could be tested for accuracy through cross-examination or whether the substance of the testimony itself amounted to a total suppression of the information sought. Absolute immunity for a witness is meant to ensure an unintimidated opportunity to contribute to the fact-finding of the judicial process; its availability should not depend on how, in a particular case, that opportunity was utilized. 111 176 Such an ad hoc rule, to be applied retroactively, as the majority enunciates here, would be totally devastating to any realistic protection by absolute (?) immunity. 177 The majority's other argument for finding absolute witness immunity inapplicable is that (t)he statement assailed here was prompted by, and directly incidental to, appellant's status as a prosecutor managing and administering an investigation. 112 Since the statement was related to his status as an investigator, as the majority sees it, he then is entitled to only a qualified immunity. 113 Even accepting the majority's characterization of Goodwin's underlying status as an investigator, it appears that the majority's analysis simply begs the question of witness immunity. If a witness is only entitled to the immunity of his underlying status, then the majority is really rejecting absolute witness immunity entirely as a special immunity that attaches to a certain class of participants in the judicial process. A police officer testifying about a search and seizure, for example, may only have a qualified immunity, as a police officer, but that does not mean he is not entitled to absolute immunity, as a witness. If the underlying status is dispositive of the degree of witness immunity, qualified or absolute, then the majority is really saying that there should be no special witness immunity at all. 178 Thus, its view that Goodwin in this particular case should not have absolute witness immunity is based upon its general position that no witness, qua witness, should be afforded absolute immunity where a constitutional tort is involved. And THAT is an idea whose time has not hitherto come in any court. I am not ready for it here.