Opinion ID: 3134112
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The prerequisites of a valid Miranda waiver

Text: The Supreme Court summarizes Miranda's central holdings at the beginning of the Miranda opinion itself. In pertinent part, the summary states: [T]he prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination .... [U]nless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning .... Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45 (emphasis added). As the above-emphasized text indicates, the Supreme Court stressed that the rights set forth in what became known as the Miranda warnings must be explained fully prior to questioning. See id. This explanation of rights must convey to the suspect that his right to silence-and his opportunity to exercise that right-applies continuously throughout the interrogation process. See id. In creating these protections, the Court stated that '[w]e cannot penalize a defendant who, not understanding his constitutional rights, does not make the formal request and by such failure demonstrates his helplessness.' /d. at 471 (quoting People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 351, 398 P.2d 361, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169 8 State v. Mayer (Nicholas), No. 90846-0 (1965), overruled on other grounds by People v. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th 478, 509-10, 853 P.2d 1037, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 582 (1993)). The Miranda Court recognized one important qualification to the rights conveyed in the Miranda warnings-specifically, that there need not be a 'station house lawyer' immediately available to talk to a suspect prior to any police interrogation. /d. at 474. But the Court stressed that the unavailability of such counsel only increases the responsibility of police to avoid impinging on the suspect's other Fifth Amendment rights: [l]f police propose to interrogate a person they must make known to him that he is entitled to a lawyer and that if he cannot afford one, a lawyer will be provided for him prior to any interrogation. If authorities conclude that they will not provide counsel during a reasonable period of time in which investigation in the field is carried out, they may refrain from doing so without violating the person's Fifth Amendment privilege so long as they do not question him during that time. /d. As this text suggests, the unavailability of appointed counsel does not negate the suspect's right to an appointed attorney and his right to speak to such an attorney prior to questioning. Rather, a suspect retains those rights and may give them effect by invoking his right to silence, thus precluding the police from questioning him unless and until an attorney can be present. See id. If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel. /d. at 475. To be knowing and intelligent, a waiver must be made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Moran, 475 9 State v: Mayer (Nicholas), No. 90846-0 U.S. at 421. To satisfy its burden of showing a valid waiver, the government need not demonstrate that the Miranda warnings given were a word-for-word copy of the language that the Supreme Court provided in Miranda itself. See Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 202, 109 S. Ct. 2875, 106 L. Ed. 2d 166 (1989); California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 359, 101 S. Ct. 2806, 69 L. Ed. 2d 696 (1981 ). But [t]he warnings required and the waiver necessary in accordance with [the Miranda opinion] are, in the absence of a fully effective equivalent, prerequisites to the admissibility of any statement made by a defendant. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476 (emphasis added). As the Supreme Court has stated, courts have held that an effective Miranda equivalent cannot link the right to appointed counsel to future events that would occur, if ever, only after the interrogation: Other courts considering the precise question presented by this case-whether a criminal defendant was adequately informed of his right to the presence of appointed counsel prior to and during interrogationhave not required a verbatim recital of the words of the Miranda opinion but rather have examined the warnings given to determine if the reference to the right to appointed counsel was linked with some future point in time after the police interrogation. Prysock, 453 U.S. at 360. In one of the cited cases, the Ninth Circuit held that federal agents had provided inadequate Miranda warnings because they advised the suspect [a]t one point ... that she had a right to the presence of counsel'when she answered any questions' but told her at another point that she could 'have an attorney appointed to represent you when you first appear before the U. S. Commissioner or the Court.' United States v. Garcia, 431 F.2d 134, 134 (9th Cir. 1970); compare id., with United States v. McCarty, 835 F. Supp. 2d 938, 959 (D. Haw. 2011) (distinguishing 10 State v. Mayer (Nicholas), No. 90846-0 Garcia because the detective who provided arguably contradictory warnings went on to clarify that if Defendant wanted counsel, [the detective] would not question him). Ultimately, the adequacy of the warnings and the validity of a purported waiver turn on the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case. State v. Earls, 116 Wn.2d 364, 378-79, 805 P.2d 211 (1991) (citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378 (1981 )). The dispositive inquiry is whether the warnings reasonably 'conve[y] to [a suspect] his rights as required by Miranda.' Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 203 (alterations in original) (quoting Prysock, 453 U.S. at 361 ). B. Mayer was given conflicting and confusing explanations of his Miranda rights While Dennison initially provided proper Miranda warnings, his responses to Mayer's questions regarding the appointment of counsel were contradictory and confusing. In his initial recitation of the Miranda warnings, Dennison told Mayer, If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent you before questioning if you wish. At this point, Dennison's questioning of Mayer was obviously about to commence. According to the initial Miranda warnings, Mayer thus should have had immediate access to appointed counsel. But moments later, after Mayer asked how he could obtain an appointed attorney, Dennison told Mayer that counsel would be appointed only if you were charged with a crime and arrested[ and] if you wanted an attorney and couldn't afford one. (Emphasis added.) When Mayer then asked for further clarification on how the appointment process would work, Dennison responded by telling Mayer, You're not under arrest at this point .... So, if you were, then you would be taken to jail and then 11 State v. Mayer (Nicholas), No. 90846-0 you'd go before a judge and ... you would [be] afforded an attorney ... if you weren't able to afford one. (Emphasis added.) These statements by Dennison conditioned Mayer's right to appointed counsel on the occurrence of several future events: being arrested, which Dennison stressed had not yet occurred; being charged with a crime; being taken to jail; and being taken before a judge. Plainly, all of these events would occur, if at all, after the impending interrogation rather than before. Thus, Dennison's responses to Mayer's questions about the appointment process contradicted his earlier statement, as part of the initial Miranda recitation, that counsel would be appointed for him before questioning. Had the explanation of Mayer's rights ended after Dennison's initial recitation, we could reject Mayer's Miranda challenge with no need for extended comment. Similarly, Dennison's later statements regarding the timing of appointment of counsel would not necessarily run afoul of Miranda if we were to read them in isolation. As a practical matter, Dennison may well have been accurately describing the appointment process in Clark County when he told Mayer that he would not be able to have counsel appointed for him unless and until he was arrested, jailed, charged, and arraigned. Taken together, however, Dennison's description of the process for appointment of counsel appeared to contradict his initial Miranda warnings. The State points out that in his initial Miranda warnings, Dennison also told Mayer that he could 'decide at any time to exercise these rights and not answer any questions or make any statements,' suggesting that this adequately conveyed to Mayer that his ability to exercise his rights was not time limited. But this argument ignores the fact that seconds after Dennison said that Mayer could exercise these 12 State v. Mayer (Nicholas), No. 90846-0 rights at any time, he stressed that Mayer was not yet under arrest and told Mayer that he could not exercise at least one of his rights-his right to appointed counselunless several contingent future events occurred. These later statements contradicted the at any time warning and suggested that at least some of Mayer's Miranda rights had not yet attached-and that they would not attach until he was, at the very least, arrested. The at any time statement thus did not immunize Dennison's warnings against the defects created by his later responses to Mayer's questions. C. The contradictory statements rendered the Miranda warnings unclear [D]ifferent and conflicting sets of warnings render a Miranda waiver invalid if, as a result of the conflicting instructions, the meaning of the warnings becomes unclear. United States v. San Juan-Cruz, 314 F.3d 384, 387-88 (9th Cir. 2002). For the reasons explained above, Dennison's instructions regarding the timing of the right to counsel conflicted with his initial recitation of Mayer's Miranda rights. Dennison did not offer curative clarifications comparable to those provided in Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 203. Because of this, the apparent contradiction in Dennison's instructions rendered the explanation of Mayer's Miranda rights unclear. Courts have recognized a number of circumstances under which the police can impermissibly undermine the meaning or significance of the Miranda warnings and fail to reasonably convey their meaning, thus negating the validity of a suspect's waiver of his Miranda rights. Courts have held confessions inadmissible, for instance, in cases where the police downplay[] the relevance of the warnings[] and their application to the current questioning. Doody v. Schriro, 548 F.3d 847, 862-63 (9th Cir. 2008) (Doody 1). Giving different and conflicting sets of warnings also renders a 13 State v. Mayer (Nicholas), No. 90846-0 suspect's Miranda waiver invalid if, as a result of the conflicting instructions, the meaning of the warnings becomes unclear. See San Juan-Cruz, 314 F.3d at 387-88; see also United States v. Connell, 869 F.2d 1349, 1352 (9th Cir. 1989) (We reject as fatally flawed ... a version of the Miranda litany if the combination or wording of its . warnings is in some way affirmatively misleading .... ). On the other hand, the police may expand on the Miranda warnings or clarify the rights they convey, including the right to appointed counsel and the time at which an indigent suspect can expect to have counsel appointed for him, so long as the explanation as a whole clearly informs the suspect of his rights. For example, in Duckworth, the primary case on which the State relies, the Supreme Court upheld the adequacy of the following written advice of rights form: Before we ask you any questions, you must understand your rights. You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can be used against you in court. You have a right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions, and to have him with you during questioning. You have this right to the advice and presence of a lawyer even if you cannot afford to hire one. We have no way of giving you a lawyer, but one will be appointed for you, if you wish, if and when you go to court. If you wish to answer questions now without a lawyer present, you have the right to stop answering questions at any time. You also have the right to stop answering at any time until you've talked to a lawyer. Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 198 (emphasis added) (emphasis omitted). The Supreme Court held that this warning touched all the bases required by Miranda, specifically citing the above-emphasized portions of the advice-of-rights form. /d. at 203. The Court explicitly distinguished Duckworth from cases in which 'the reference to the right to appointed counsel was linked [to a] future point in time after the police interrogation.' /d. at 204 (alteration in original) (quoting Prysock, 453 U.S. at 360). 14 State v. Mayer (Nicholas), No. 90846-0 Unlike the advice-of-rights form in Duckworth, Dennison's warnings conditioned the attachment of Mayer's right to appointed counsel on several future events and did not clarify how Mayer might protect his Fifth Amendment rights despite the unavailability of appointed counsel. The advice-of-rights form at issue in Duckworth explicitly told suspects how they can protect their Miranda rights despite the unavailability of appointed counsel: 'If you wish to answer questions now without a lawyer present, you have the right to stop answering questions at any time. You also have the right to stop answering at any time until you've talked to a lawyer.' /d. at 198. The Supreme Court specifically quoted this portion of the Duckworth advice-of-rights form in holding that the form adequately conveyed suspects' rights under Miranda. See id. at 203. Dennison could have cured any injury done to Mayer's Miranda rights if he had offered a comparable clarification after telling Mayer that appointed counsel was not yet available. But instead, Dennison simply told Mayer that he had no way of getting . an appointed attorney at that time and left it at that. Dennison's failure to clarify how Mayer might protect his Fifth Amendment rights despite his inability to obtain appointed counsel is fatal to the State's argument that Mayer knowingly and intelligently waived his Fifth Amendment rights under Miranda and its progeny. The right to speak to counsel prior to questioning and have counsel present during questioning is absolute. If, as a practical matter, no attorney is available to speak to an indigent suspect prior to questioning, the suspect may protect his right to have counsel present during questioning by remaining silent until such time that counsel can be provided for him. The advice-of-rights form in Duckworth explicitly informed 15 State v. Mayer (Nicholas), No. 90846-0 suspects of this method for protecting the right to counsel. Dennison's response to Mayer's question included no such clarification. Duckworth reasoned that the advice-of-rights form given to Duckworth had touched on all the basic principles required by Miranda. Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 203. Here, by contrast, there is no evidence that Mayer accurately understood his Fifth Amendment rights. In Doody II, the Ninth Circuit distinguished Duckworth because, among other things: The officers [in Duckworth] did not deviate from the printed form with inaccurate and garbled elaborations. There was no downplaying of the significance of the warnings. Most importantly, there was no implication that the right to counsel was available only if the individual being questioned had committed a crime. Doody v. Ryan, 649 F.3d 986, 1004 (9th Cir. 2011) (Doody II). Similarly here, Dennison's explanations introduced a number of key elements that were not present in Duckworth. Dennison emphasized that Mayer was not under arrest, thus downplaying the significance of the warnings and the adversarial nature of the encounter. See Doody I, 548 F.3d at 862-63 (suspect's Miranda waiver invalid because officers undermined the suspect's awareness that he was faced with a phase of the adversary system and downplayed the relevance of the warnings[] and their application to the current questioning). Dennison further suggested that appointed counsel was available only to suspects who had been arrested, charged, jailed, and arraigned. Because he provided no clarification explaining how Mayer, who was 16 State v. Mayer (Nicholas), No. 90846-0 indigent, 6 could protect his Fifth Amendment rights without appointed counsel, Dennison increased the already palpable sense of isolation that a suspect experiences during police interrogation. Duckworth sets forth the minimum standards that must be met for an effective Miranda warning. In this case, the explanation of Mayer's rights did not meet those standards. Of course, police officers may inform a suspect facing interrogation that appointed counsel is not immediately available. But if they tell a suspect that appointed counsel is not available until a future point in time, they must also clarify that this does not affect the suspect's right to have counsel present during interrogation and his right to remain silent unless and until a lawyer can be present. Without such a clarification, the suspect may perceive the officer's statement that appointed counsel is not yet available as contradicting the earlier Miranda warnings and as suggesting that his Miranda rights had not yet attached. Such a clarification was provided in Duckworth; it was not provided in Mayer's case. Instead, Dennison's explanation of Mayer's right to counsel places this case squarely in the category that Duckworth explicitly distinguished: cases where the police link the right to appointed counsel to a future point in time after the police interrogation. Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 204 (quoting Prysock, 453 U.S. at 360). By creating such a linkage, Dennison's explanation of Mayer's Fifth Amendment rights under Miranda became unclear at best and misleading at worst. 6 In addition to Mayer's suggestion during the custodial interview that he could not afford an attorney, Mayer's judgment and sentence includes assessments for court-appointed attorney and defense expert fees, indicating that he ultimately was represented by court-appointed counsel at trial. 17 State v. Mayer (Nicholas), No. 90846-0 D. Conclusion on Miranda challenge Dennison's linkage of Mayer's right to appointed counsel to conditional future events (arrest, jail, charge, and arraignment) contradicted his earlier statements that Mayer could have access to appointed counsel before questioning and that he could exercise his rights at any time. Critically, and unlike in Duckworth, Dennison did not tell Mayer that despite the fact that no appointed attorney was immediately available, Mayer's other Miranda rights remained in full effect and he could protect his right to the presence of counsel by remaining silent until he could speak to an attorney. Under these circumstances, Dennison's explanation of Mayer's rights was deficient, and the State has failed to meet its burden of establishing that Mayer knowingly and intelligently waived his rights. Mayer's subsequent confession therefore should have been suppressed.