Opinion ID: 705170
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Upward Departure and Consecutive Sentencing

Text: 44 The district court sentenced Bobby to 40 years imprisonment, and Jarmal to 30 years imprisonment. In imposing the sentences, the district court departed upward to the statutory maximum for each of the crimes to which the defendants pled guilty in federal court, 2 and then imposed the sentences to run consecutively to the state sentences which had already been imposed. We review the district court's upward departure under a multi-part test of 'reasonableness.'  United States v. Hummer, 916 F.2d 186, 192 (4th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 970, 111 S.Ct. 1608, 113 L.Ed.2d 670 (1991). We examine first, de novo, whether the district court's reasons for departing identify factors not adequately taken into consideration in the Guidelines. We then analyze the factual basis for those factors under a clearly erroneous standard. Id. Finally, we determine whether the identified factors warrant a departure from the defendants' guideline range, and whether the departure imposed is reasonable, reviewing the district court under an abuse of discretion standard. Id. The issue of consecutive sentencing is a legal issue which we review de novo. See United States v. Hill, 59 F.3d 500, 502 (4th Cir.1995). We begin our discussion by examining the legal and factual basis for the district court's decision to depart upwardly in imposing Jarmal's and Bobby's sentences. We then turn to the reasonableness of the district court's departure and discuss, along with that, the related issue of the district court's decision to impose consecutive sentences on Bobby and Jarmal. 45 The bases of the judge's upward departure were: physical injury under U.S.S.G. Sec. 5K2.2; 3 extreme psychological injury under U.S.S.G. Sec. 5K2.3; and extreme conduct under U.S.S.G. Sec. 5K2.8. While the defendants do not challenge on appeal the district court's decision to depart upwardly for extreme psychological injury, they challenge the departure for extreme conduct and for physical injury, on the grounds that these two factors were already taken into account in determining the defendants' state and federal sentences, and that considering them for purposes of departure thus constituted double punishment. 46 A departure may be warranted for extreme conduct [i]f the defendant's conduct was unusually heinous, cruel, brutal, or degrading to the victim.... Examples of extreme conduct include torture of a victim, gratuitous infliction of injury, or prolonging of pain or humiliation. U.S.S.G. Sec. 5K2.8. The defendants argue that to the extent that a finding by the district court of extreme conduct was made based on the sexual nature of the crime, the court's departure would constitute double counting because the sexual crime, rape, had already been punished in state court. However, the district court explicitly based its finding of extreme conduct on gratuitous infliction of injury, pointing out the way in which the defendants pistol whip[ped], choked, and tried to kill the victim after they had kidnapped, carjacked, and raped. There is no indication from the record that the district court's finding of extreme conduct was based on the sexual nature of the crime, and the court's departure on that basis therefore did not constitute double punishment. 47 The defendants are correct, however, in asserting that the district court erred in departing upwardly for physical injury. The Sentencing Guidelines state that physical injury is an appropriate factor to consider in departing from the Guidelines sentence. See U.S.S.G. Sec. 5K2.2. However, physical injury was already taken into account in determining the defendants' guideline range under Sec. 2B3.1(b)(3)(C), which mandates an increase in the offense level for permanent or life-threatening bodily injury sustained by the victim. The Guidelines allow an upward departure based on a factor already taken into account in the guideline calculation if the court determines that, in light of unusual circumstances, the guideline level attached to that factor is inadequate. U.S.S.G. Sec. 5K2.0, p.s. The district court made no finding that the adjustment for physical injury under Sec. 2B3.1 was inadequate, and in fact, did not acknowledge a possible double-counting issue. Thus it was error for the district court to depart upwardly based on physical injury. 48 The Supreme Court has stated that it is an incorrect application of the Guidelines for a district court to depart from the applicable sentencing range based on a factor that the Commission has already fully considered in establishing the guideline range...., Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 200, 112 S.Ct. 1112, 1119, 117 L.Ed.2d 341 (1992), and the defendants argue that they should be resentenced due to the district court's reliance on an impermissible basis for departure. However, we must remand for resentencing only if the sentence was 'imposed as a result of an incorrect application' of the Guidelines.... Id. at 202-03, 112 S.Ct. at 1120 (quoting 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3742(f)(1)). If we are convinced that, on the whole, the district court's reliance on an impermissible ground did not affect its determination of the sentence (i.e., the sentence was not a result of the district court's error), the case need not be remanded for resentencing. Id. at 203, 112 S.Ct. at 1120 (When a district court has intended to depart from the guideline range, a sentence is imposed 'as a result of' a misapplication of the Guidelines if the sentence would have been different but for the district court's error.). The party challenging the sentence must show that the district court used an improper factor for departure at sentencing, but does not have the burden of proving that the improper factor was determinative in the sentence imposed. Rather, once the court of appeals has decided that the district court misapplied the Guidelines, a remand is appropriate unless the reviewing court concludes, on the record as a whole, that the error ... did not affect the district court's selection of the sentence imposed. Id. 49 In the instant case, the district court departed on three grounds, one of which has not been challenged on appeal and is thus presumptively proper, and one of which we have determined was a proper factor on which to rely. The court also relied on one improper factor, physical injury. However, it is clear from the record that had the court not taken into consideration the physical harm suffered by the victim, it still would have concluded that the same upward departure was warranted. The court based its departure decision on the egregious behavior of the defendants in wantonly inflicting pain on the victim, and on the extensive psychological effect of the crime on the victim, thereby taking into account both the conduct of the defendants and the effect on the victim. The court's erroneous reliance on physical harm as a factor in the upward departure decision was harmless, see Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a), and we conclude that the district court was justified in imposing an upward departure in the instant case. 50 Further, there is a clear factual basis for the departure factors identified by the district court. The court outlined the evidence of unusually cruel and brutal acts performed by the defendants, including continuing to beat and choke the victim after she was rendered helpless on the ground. There was an obvious basis for a finding of extreme conduct. Similarly, the victim testified to the effect that the crime had on her. She stated that she has trouble spending time alone and no longer trusts people. She is often afraid when she must walk to her car, and has altered her daily routines to ensure that she is usually with someone else. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the factors identified were sufficiently important to justify a departure. 51 We next examine the length of the sentences ultimately imposed on Bobby and Jarmal, in light of the district court's decision to depart upward and its decision to impose sentences consecutive to those received by the defendants for their state convictions. In state court, both men pled guilty to first degree kidnapping, two counts of first degree rape, robbery with a dangerous weapon, and assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill. Bobby received two life sentences plus 40 years, all to be served consecutively; he must serve a minimum of 47 years before he is eligible for parole. Jarmal received two consecutive life sentences and must serve 40 years before he is eligible for parole. Both defendants claim that their federal sentences should have been imposed to run concurrently with their state sentences. 4 52 Section 5G1.3 of the Sentencing Guidelines governs the imposition of a sentence on a defendant who is subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment: 53 (a) If the instant offense was committed while the defendant was serving a term of imprisonment (including work release, furlough, or escape status) or after sentencing for, but before commencing service of, such term of imprisonment, the sentence for the instant offense shall be imposed to run consecutively to the undischarged term of imprisonment. 54 (b) If subsection (a) does not apply, and the undischarged term of imprisonment resulted from offense(s) that have been fully taken into account in the determination of the offense level for the instant offense, the sentence for the instant offense shall be imposed to run concurrently to the undischarged term of imprisonment. 55 (c) (Policy Statement) In any other case, the sentence for the instant offense shall be imposed to run consecutively to the prior undischarged term of imprisonment to the extent necessary to achieve a reasonable incremental punishment for the instant offense. 56 U.S.S.G. Sec. 5G1.3. The defendants first argue that subsection (b) applies, because the calculation of their sentence in the instant case, which included adjustments for the use of a firearm, assault, kidnapping, robbery, and injuries sustained by the victim, see U.S.S.G. Sec. 2B3.1, took into account all of the conduct for which the defendants were punished in state court. However, we find that subsection (b) does not apply to the instant case. The undischarged sentences in state court resulted in part from convictions for rape, conduct that was not taken into account in the federal guideline calculation. Although the defendants argue that the conduct of rape was accounted for in the federal sentencing calculation by adjustments for assault and physical injury to the victim, there are obvious components of rape that are not entirely encompassed by findings of assault and physical injury. In addition, as we noted earlier, the district judge's upward departure for extreme conduct was not based on the sexual nature of the offense, and thus did not take the counts of rape fully into account. Since rape was not fully accounted for in the sentencing calculation under the Guidelines, subsection (b) does not apply in the instant case. 57 Subsection (c) applies to the sentence calculation here. Although subsection (c) is designated as a policy statement, we enforce it as if it were a guideline, allowing for discretion as is illustrated by the commentary and examples in the Guidelines. See United States v. Wiley-Dunaway, 40 F.3d 67, 70-71 (4th Cir.1994). Under Sec. 5G1.3(c), the district court is instructed to impose a consecutive sentence for the instant offense to the extent necessary to fashion a sentence resulting in a reasonable incremental punishment for the multiple offenses. U.S.S.G. Sec. 5G1.3(c), comment. (n.3). The commentary explains, 58 To the extent practicable, the court should consider a reasonable incremental penalty to be a sentence for the instant offense that results in a combined sentence of imprisonment that approximates the total punishment that would have been imposed under Sec. 5G1.2 (Sentencing on Multiple Counts of Conviction) had all of the offenses been federal offenses for which sentences were being imposed at the same time. 59 Id. Thus, the district court computes the defendants' guideline range for the instant offense (instant offense guideline range), as well as the hypothetical guideline range that would apply if the defendants were sentenced at one time in federal court for both the instant offense and the offenses for which the state court sentences were imposed (combined guideline range), and then imposes a sentence within the instant offense guideline range that, together with the state sentence already imposed, results in a total sentence within the combined guideline range. See Hill, 59 F.3d at 503. In order to approximate a sentence within the combined guideline range, the district court may impose the sentence for the instant offense to run consecutively or concurrently, in whole or in part, to the state sentence. See id. A sentencing judge should not deviate from the procedures of Sec. 5G1.3(c) absent a reason, sufficiently articulated in the record, for doing so. United States v. Stewart, 59 F.3d 496, 498 (4th Cir.1995). 60 The determination of the hypothetical combined guideline level is the same for Bobby and Jarmal; however, Jarmal has a criminal history category of I, and Bobby has a criminal history category of V. 5 If the defendants' crimes had all been prosecuted federally, the controlling statute would have been one for aggravated sexual abuse, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2241, and all parties agree that the relevant provision under the Guidelines for purposes of determining the hypothetical sentence would have been Sec. 2A3.1. Under this provision, the defendants would have had a base offense level of 27, with 4 levels each added for force or threat, infliction of permanent or life-threatening injury, and abduction of the victim. The combined offense level therefore would have been 39. This would mean a range of 262 to 327 months for Jarmal (criminal history category I), and a range of 360 months to life for Bobby (criminal history category V). The mandatory statutory sentence under the criminal sexual abuse statute is life imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2241(a). Thus, the district court's task was to impose sentences on Bobby and Jarmal with the combined guideline range, by imposing the instant offense guideline range to run either concurrently or consecutively to the state sentences. 61 We turn first to Bobby's sentence. The district court determined that Bobby's instant offense guideline range was 202 to 267 months, 6 and he was sentenced to serve a minimum of 47 years, or 564 months, in state prison. His combined guideline range was between 360 months and life, and an appropriate total sentence would have fallen within that range. The district court both imposed a consecutive federal sentence, and departed upward to 35 years, or 420 months. 7 Bobby's combined actual sentence was thus 984 months, which is within the combined offense Guideline range. We find the upward departure imposed by the district court to be reasonable, and affirm the departure as well as the district court's decision to impose consecutive sentences on Bobby. 62 Jarmal's sentence, however, is quite different. Jarmal's guideline range for the instant offense was 108 to 150 months, 8 and he was to serve 40 years, or 480 months, in state prison. His combined guideline range, into which his final sentence in the instant case should have fallen, was between 262 and 327 months. As in Bobby's case, the district court imposed a consecutive sentence and departed upwardly to the statutory maximum of 25 years, or 300 months, making Jarmal's total sentence 780 months. The final sentence thus exceeded the upper end of Jarmal's hypothetical combined guideline range by 453 months (i.e., almost 38 years). 63 We find Jarmal's final sentence to be unreasonable by any standards. The high end of Jarmal's combined guideline range was 327 months, which was already 153 months lower than Jarmal's state court sentence alone. In other words, if the district court imposed any part of Jarmal's instant offense federal sentence consecutive to his state sentence, the court would be exceeding the hypothetical combined guideline range by at least 153 months. The district court here did not even attempt to come within Jarmal's combined guideline range as prescribed in U.S.S.G. Sec. 5G1.3, but rather exceeded it by 453 months. This the Guidelines do not allow. 64 We therefore vacate Jarmal's sentence and remand to the district court for resentencing. We limit the issue on remand to the recalculation of Jarmal's sentence, taking into account the proper application of U.S.S.G. Sec. 5G1.3 and the amount of any departure which the district court might impose. If the district court on remand should decide to use a method other than that outlined in Sec. 5G1.3 for calculating Jarmal's sentence, it must articulate on the record its reasons for doing so. See Stewart, 59 F.3d at 498.