Opinion ID: 2123840
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sexual abuse in the third degree.

Text: Constable was tried and convicted of sexual abuse in the second degree under Iowa Code section 709.3(2) (1991). The elements of sexual abuse in the second degree are: (1) a person commits sexual abuse as defined in section 709.1 and (2) the other participant is under the age of twelve. It was undisputed at trial that S.W. was eight years old and J.H. was seven years old when the alleged sex acts occurred. Two other circumstances exist under which the State may charge an individual with sexual abuse in the second degree. See Iowa Code § 709.3(1), (3) (1991). The State did not allege that either of these situations formed the basis of any of the counts of sexual abuse in the second degree and relied solely on the basis that each child was under the age of twelve. The elements of sexual abuse in the third degree under Iowa Code section 709.4(1) are (1) a sex act is performed and (2) the act is done by force or against the will of the other participant, whether or not the other participant is the person's spouse or is cohabiting with the person. Constable argues that this offense is necessarily included in sexual abuse in the second degree when the State alleges the participant is under the age of twelve. Constable bases this argument on the legal fiction that a child is not capable of giving consent, therefore any sex act with a child must necessarily be by force and against the child's will. Conversely, the State argues that under our legislative scheme, it is irrelevant whether the act is performed by force or against the will of a child; the youth of the child alone is sufficient to render the perpetrator of a sex act guilty of sexual abuse. We agree that the legal fiction that a child is incapable of consent should not lead to the conclusion that any act performed on that child was necessarily by force or against the will of the child. When a child is under twelve, a sex act performed on that child constitutes sexual abuse in the second degree, regardless of whether that child understood the nature of the act, was forced to perform a sex act or submit to a sex act, or whether that act was against the child's will. When the State charges an individual with sexual abuse in the second degree and bases that charge on the age of the child, sexual abuse in the third degree based upon whether the act is done by force or against the will of the victim is not a lesser included offense. In State v. Lampman, 345 N.W.2d 142 (Iowa 1984), we held that sexual abuse in the third degree is not a lesser included offense of sexual abuse in the second degree when the sex act occurs with a participant under twelve because sexual abuse in the third degree required that the participants in the sex act not be living together as spouses. Our analysis in Lampman does not bear on this issue now because the additional element that was central to the court's analysis in Lampman is no longer included under Iowa law.