Opinion ID: 1946348
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: comment on gray's right to remain silent

Text: The incident in question occurred while the state was questioning Officer Joe Kennedy, of the St. Tammany Parish sheriff's department, concerning his arrest of Gray: After you had advised them both of their rights, did you have occasion to ask either one of them or, in particular, David Gray, any questions? A. The only thing I asked Gray was, uh, about the ownership of the vehicle. Q. And did he respond to that question? A. He indicated that the van belonged to his girl friend. Q. Okay. Did he say anything further to you? A. He went on to state to me that, uh, that he knew his rights and he wasn't going to say anything. I told him... . BY MR. STEGALL: (Interposing) If it please the Court, I'm going to object to that and ask to approach the Bench. BY THE COURT: I sustain your objection. Gray moved for a mistrial on the ground that the witness's testimony constituted a comment upon his exercise of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. The court overruled the motion. Gray did not request nor was he given a curative instruction at that time. In arguing that his death sentence should be vacated for improper comment on his failure to offer sworn testimony, Gray argues that we should follow our holding in Williams v. State, 445 So.2d 798 (Miss. 1984). This contention is based on a misunderstanding of our holding in Williams. The defendant in Williams was allowed to make an unsworn opening statement and the prosecutor commented to the jury in closing on the defendant's failure to give his version of the facts while under oath. We held in that case that it was not necessary to hold that this error standing alone constituted reversible error. Instead, we considered the combined influence of this error with two other improper comments by the prosecutor concerning appellate review and the possibility of parole. Taken together, we then held that their aggregate effect was to deny Williams a fair sentencing hearing. Id. at 801. Evidence of post-arrest silence violates due process because it is fundamentally unfair to afford a suspect the right to remain silent and yet allow implications of his silence to be used against him. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976). However, we recognized in Austin v. State, 384 So.2d 600, 601 (Miss. 1980), that a prosecutor's comment about a defendant's silence, though improper, was harmless error in view of the overwhelming evidence of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). In this case, the single reference by the witness to Gray's intention to remain silent was neither repeated nor linked with Gray's exculpatory statement. Moreover, the trial judge charged the jury at the conclusion of trial that no adverse inference may be drawn by the invocation of the right to remain silent by a witness or an accused. These factors, together with the overwhelming evidence of guilt beyond reasonable doubt, lead us to conclude that the improper comment in this case was harmless error. Austin v. State, supra , Chapman v. California, supra . Gray's invocation of Williams v. State, supra , is unpersuasive in that it was not solely the improper prosecutor's comment, but the aggregate effect of several distinct improper arguments that required reversal of Williams' sentencing phase. This assignment of error is without merit.