Opinion ID: 1897663
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Kyles Standard

Text: In order for Powers to succeed on his claims concerning newly discovered evidence and/or perjured testimony, he must demonstrate that the recently discovered evidence was not merely cumulative or impeaching, but that it was material. Mastracchio, 698 A.2d at 714, 719. In Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L. Ed.2d 490 (1995), the United States Supreme Court discussed the materiality of evidence in a post-conviction relief proceeding. The Supreme Court stated that the touchstone of materiality is a `reasonable probability' of a different result   . The question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence. A `reasonable probability' of a different result is accordingly shown when the government's evidentiary suppression `undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.'    A defendant need not demonstrate that after discounting the inculpatory evidence in light of the undisclosed evidence, there would not have been enough left to convict. The possibility of an acquittal on a criminal charge does not imply an insufficient evidentiary basis to convict. One    [must show] that the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict. Id. at 434-35, 115 S.Ct. at 1566, 131 L.Ed.2d at 506 (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3381, 87 L.Ed.2d 481, 491 (1985)). Accordingly, in order for Powers to be successful on this appeal, he must demonstrate that either the newly discovered evidence or the recently uncovered perjury places this case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict. Mastracchio, 698 A.2d at 715.