Opinion ID: 2606242
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was Colman's canal taken or damaged for purposes of article I, section 22?

Text: Article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution provides, Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation. This Court has previously outlined what constitutes a taking and what constitutes damage under this constitutional provision. In State ex rel. State Road Commission v. District Court, Fourth Judicial District, 94 Utah 384, 78 P.2d 502 (1937), the Court stated that a taking is any substantial interference with private property which destroys or materially lessens its value, or by which the owner's right to its use and enjoyment is in any substantial degree abridged or destroyed. 94 Utah at 394, 78 P.2d at 506 (quoting Stockdale v. Rio Grande Western Ry. Co., 28 Utah 201, 211, 77 P. 849, 852 (1904)); see Hampton v. State Road Comm'n, 21 Utah 2d 342, 347, 445 P.2d 708, 711-12 (1968). This Court has also defined the term damage for the purpose of article I, section 22 and for the purpose of the eminent domain statute in Board of Education of Logan City School District v. Croft, 13 Utah 2d 310, 373 P.2d 697 (1962). In that case, the Court cited article I, section 22 and stated: Damages to land, by the construction of a public or industrial improvement, though no part thereof is taken as provided for under 78-34-10(3), contrary to the rule for severance damages, is limited to injuries that would be actionable at common law, or where there has been some physical disturbance of a right, either public or private, which the owner enjoys in connection with his property and which gives it additional value, and which causes him to sustain a special damage with respect to his property in excess of that sustained by the public generally. 13 Utah 2d at 313-14, 373 P.2d at 699; see State ex rel. Road Comm'n v. Williams, 22 Utah 2d 331, 334, 452 P.2d 881, 883-84 (1969); Twenty-Second Corporation of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Oregon Short Line R.R., 36 Utah 238, 247, 103 P. 243, 246 (1909) ([T]o bring the case within the damage clause of the Constitution, there must be some physical interference with the property itself or with some easement which constitutes an appurtenant thereto.). The Court went on to explain that such damage requires a definite physical injury cognizable to the senses with a perceptible effect on the present market value. Croft, 13 Utah 2d at 314, 373 P.2d at 699. The Court listed various types of injuries that would be compensable as damage under the constitutional provision. These included drying up wells and springs, destroying lateral supports, preventing surface waters from running off adjacent lands or running surface waters onto adjacent lands, or depositing of cinders and other foreign materials on neighboring lands by the permanent operation of the business or improvement established on the adjoining lands. Croft, 13 Utah 2d at 314, 373 P.2d at 699-700. In our recent case of Rocky Mountain Thrift Stores, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 784 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989), we stated: Plaintiffs alleged that damages [from the flooding] resulted from a temporary, one-time occurrence and not a permanent, continuous, or inevitably recurring interference with property rights usually associated with and requisite in a compensable taking. 784 P.2d at 465 (citing Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146, 149, 44 S.Ct. 264, 265, 68 L.Ed. 608 (1924); Accardi v. United States, 220 Ct.Cl. 347, 356-57, 599 F.2d 423, 429 (1979); Miotke v. City of Spokane, 101 Wash.2d 307, 334, 678 P.2d 803, 818 (1984)). See also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 428, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 3172, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982). Colman alleged in his complaint that the breach would result in the total destruction of at least a 300-foot segment of the canal. He also alleged that the breach would create such turbidity in the area of the canal that the remaining portions of the canal would be filled with sediment over much of its course. Colman alleged that the breach would require that he move the canal and pumps to another location free from the current caused by the breach. We conclude that Colman has alleged a permanent or recurring interference with property rights. Thus, Colman has alleged sufficient facts to constitute a taking or damage under article I, section 22.