Opinion ID: 715778
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jury Charge on Substantive RICO Offense

Text: 24 Jamison and Rodgers argue that the jury was misinstructed as to the elements of the substantive RICO violation, and that this mistake constitutes reversible error. To show that the defendants were guilty of racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), the government was required to prove that they conduct[ed] or participate[d], directly or indirectly, in the conduct of [the] enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). In Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 113 S.Ct. 1163, 122 L.Ed.2d 525 (1993), the Supreme Court explained that the defendant must be shown to have had some part in directing the enterprise's affairs. Id. at 179, 113 S.Ct. at 1170 (emphasis in original). In making this determination, the Court noted that the proper question is whether the defendant had participated in the operation or management of the enterprise. Id. at 183, 113 S.Ct. at 1172. While the Court recognized that [a]n enterprise is 'operated' not just by upper management but also by lower-rung participants ... who are under the direction of upper management, id. at 184, 113 S.Ct. at 1173, Reves expressly declined to reach the question of how far § 1962(c) extends down the ladder of operation, id. at 184 n. 9, 113 S.Ct. at 1173 n. 9. 25 In this case, the jury was instructed, inter alia, that: 26 The government must prove ... the defendant conducted or participated directly or indirectly in the operation and management of the enterprise. The terms conduct and participate in the enterprise include the performance of acts or duties that are helpful to the operation of the enterprise. An enterprise is operated not just by upper management, but also by lower rung participants in the enterprise who are under the direction of others or persons associated with the enterprise. 27 (emphasis added). Appellants argue that this instruction misstated the proper test under Reves, by suggesting that a minor role in the enterprise--one merely helpful to its operation--is sufficient to generate § 1962(c) liability.
28 Absent a timely objection in the district court, we review a jury charge for plain error only. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 730-32, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1776, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993); United States v. Bonito, 57 F.3d 167, 171 (2d Cir.1995), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 713, 133 L.Ed.2d 667 (1996); Fed.R.Crim.P. 30, 52(b). 29 Appellants assert that they did raise a timely objection, but they are incorrect. At a pre-charge conference, defense counsel objected to a different charge proposed by the government. The court did not give the government's proposed charge. It prepared a new text in the light of the discussion at the pre-charge conference. Defense counsel, although provided an opportunity, never objected to the charge as given. See United States v. Civelli, 883 F.2d 191, 194 (2d Cir.) (Fed.R.Crim.P. 30 requires a distinct and well-grounded objection in order to direct the trial court's attention to the contention that is to be raised on appeal), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 966, 110 S.Ct. 409, 107 L.Ed.2d 374 (1989). Our inquiry is therefore confined to determining whether the charge constituted plain error.
30 The defendants are correct in pointing out that the charge did not conform to the requirement of Reves that the defendant must have had some part in directing the enterprise's affairs. Reves, 507 U.S. at 179, 113 S.Ct. at 1170 (emphasis in original). In stating that--for purposes of § 1962(c)--participation might include the performance of acts or duties that are helpful to the operation of the enterprise, (emphasis added) the charge may have suggested to the jury that a finding of guilt was appropriate even where the defendant played a quite minimal role. A defendant might well have performed helpful acts without playing any part in directing the enterprise's affairs, Reves, 507 U.S. at 179, 113 S.Ct. at 1170. See United States v. Viola, 35 F.3d 37, 43 (2d Cir.1994) (section 1962(c) does not apply where defendant was not on the ladder [of operation] at all, but rather, as ... janitor and handyman, was sweeping up the floor underneath it), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1270, 131 L.Ed.2d 148 (1995). 31 Furthermore, this suggestion may have been reinforced by the additional instruction that [a]n enterprise is 'operated' not just by upper management, but also by lower rung participants. Although this language was drawn from the Supreme Court's opinion, it did not conform to the Court's conclusion. See Reves, 507 U.S. at 184 n. 9, 113 S.Ct. at 1173 n. 9 ([w]e need not decide in this case how far § 1962(c) extends down the ladder of operation). 32 However, as explained above, because the defendants failed to raise an objection to the charge at a time--prior to the jury's deliberation--when the mistake might have been corrected, an error will not be noticed on appeal unless it was plain error. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). In United States v. Olano, the Supreme Court set forth a major restatement of the plain error rule. We have summarized this inquiry as follows: 33 Rule 52(b) places three limits on appellate authority to review errors not preserved at trial. First, there must be error, or deviation from a legal rule which has not been waived. Second, the error must be plain, which at a minimum means clear under current law. Third, the plain error must, as the text of Rule 52(b) indicates, affect[ ] substantial rights, which normally requires a showing of prejudice. 34 Viola, 35 F.3d at 41 (citations omitted); see United States v. Yu-Leung, 51 F.3d 1116, 1121 (2d Cir.1995). Furthermore, in United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982), the Supreme Court explained that to meet the plainness requirement of Rule 52(b), an error not preserved by timely objection must have been so 'plain' [that] the trial judge and prosecutor were derelict in countenancing it. Id. at 163, 102 S.Ct. at 1592. Even if all of these requirements are met, we are not obliged to notice on appeal an unpreserved claim of error. Review under Rule 52(b) is permissive, not mandatory. Olano, 507 U.S. at 735, 113 S.Ct. at 1778. And the Supreme Court has specified that reversals for plain error are appropriate only where failure to do so would seriously affect[ ] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. 507 U.S. at 736, 113 S.Ct. at 1779 (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160, 56 S.Ct. 391, 392, 80 L.Ed. 555 (1936)). 35 Despite the trial court's departure from Reves, we do not find plain error. At the pre-charge conference, the parties called Reves to the district court's attention, and the judge drafted the charge with that case in mind. Neither the government nor defendants' counsel saw any problem with the charge at the time it was delivered, though they were certainly on notice as to the applicability of Reves and had the opportunity to object. These are not the hallmarks of an error  'so plain [that] the trial judge and prosecutor were derelict in countenancing it, even absent the defendant's timely assistance in detecting it.'  United States v. Shaoul, 41 F.3d 811, 817 (2d Cir.1994) (quoting Frady, 456 U.S. at 163, 102 S.Ct. at 1592). 36 Even if we were to find this error meets the plainness requirement, the defendants must also demonstrate under the third prong of the Olano analysis that the error was prejudicial. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. at 1778. In other words, the defendants must show that the error affected the outcome of the District Court proceedings. Id. (describing inquiry as parallel to harmless error analysis save that [i]t is the defendant rather than the Government who bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice). As we noted in Napoli v. United States, 32 F.3d 31 (2d Cir.1994), modified on reh'g, 45 F.3d 680 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1796, 131 L.Ed.2d 724 (1995), [u]nder the plain error rule applicable to the review on direct appeal of challenges not raised at trial, ... a jury instruction which omits an element of the offense does not warrant reversal if the element was proven by overwhelming evidence. Id. at 36 (citing United States v. Tillem, 906 F.2d 814, 824-25 (2d Cir.1990)). 37 The evidence as to Jamison's participation in the operation or management of the L.A. Boys was overwhelming. The government presented compelling proof that Jamison was an important figure in the enterprise's drug dealing network. Several witnesses testified that Jamison served as an intermediary for lower-level drug dealers, delivering substantial quantities of cocaine for sale on consignment, and picking up the proceeds from the sales. Witnesses also testified that Jamison made trips to Los Angeles for the purpose of picking up drugs for later resale. 38 The government also presented testimony, and the jury found (in its verdict on racketeering acts), that Jamison had participated in the attempted murder of James Wright, a potential witness against one of the L.A. Boys' leaders, and in the murder of James Bolden. 39 In the face of such powerful evidence of Jamison's role in the operation or management of the enterprise, the erroneous jury instruction was not prejudicial and did not constitute plain error as to him. This conclusion is similar to our reasoning in United States v. Wong, 40 F.3d 1347, 1374 (2d Cir.1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1968, 131 L.Ed.2d 858 (1995), where we found, inter alia, no plain error as to a similarly deficient Reves charge for three defendants who had planned and carried out several murders in an intensive and continuing conspiracy under the direction of the enterprise's leadership. 40 As for Rodgers, the demonstration of his participation in the operation or management of the enterprise was also sufficiently powerful to meet the test of Napoli and prevent him from demonstrating prejudice. The jury, in its findings on racketeering acts, found Rodgers guilty of participating in a conspiracy to murder Reese Johnson, a rival of the L.A. Boys. Three witnesses--all co-defendants--testified that Rodgers was present at a meeting, held at Rodgers' house, at which the murder of Reese was planned. One of the witnesses, Nesbit Lee, testified that the meeting was only to be attended by captains in the L.A. Boys organization. 5 Two other witnesses, Norman Workman and Robert Felder, testified that Rodgers volunteered to commit the murder at this meeting. In addition, the government offered a recording of a telephone conversation between Green (then in prison) and Rodgers, in which Rodgers offered to kill Johnson. 6 Two witnesses testified, furthermore, that Rodgers had provided them each with guns, one for the murder of Wright, and another weapon that the jury might have inferred from the evidence was to have been used to kill Johnson. The government also presented compelling evidence that Rodgers was a major street-level dealer, who sold substantial quantities of drugs for the enterprise. Rodgers worked on consignment. Members of the L.A. Boys delivered cocaine to him, and he later paid for the drugs out of the profits earned from his retail sales. The jury explicitly found him guilty of participation in the narcotics conspiracy. 41 Once again, as in Wong, where a defendant had been convicted of a conspiracy to commit murder in furtherance of the [enterprise's] operations, 40 F.3d at 1374, Rodgers' participation in the L.A. Boys' murder plot and its narcotics activities placed him at a sufficiently high level in the enterprise to constitute involvement in the organization's operation or management under § 1962(c). Reversal is not required despite the erroneous charge. See Napoli, 32 F.3d at 36; Tillem, 906 F.2d at 824-25.