Opinion ID: 3062827
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Affirmative Defense of Whistleblowing

Text: Brown next argues that his dismissal was in retaliation for certain protected whistleblowing disclosures. Under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A)(i), the agency cannot take a personnel action against an employee because of “any disclosure of information by an employee . . . which the employee . . . reasonably believes evidences -- (i) a violation of any law, rule, or regulation.” In order to prevail on a whistleblower claim, the claimant must establish that he made a disclosure protected by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) and that disclosure was a contributing factor in the personnel action being appealed. 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1); 5 C.F.R. § 1209.7(a). Even if the claimant meets that burden, however, corrective action is not necessary if the agency can show by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same personnel action in the absence of the disclosure. 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(2); 5 C.F.R. § 1209.7(b); see also Horton v. Dep’t of Navy, 66 F.3d 279, 283-84 (Fed. 6 Cir. 1995). The same action inquiry focuses on: “(1) the strength of the evidence supporting the personnel action; (2) the existence and strength of any motive to retaliate on the part of the agency officials who were involved in the decision; and (3) any evidence that the agency takes similar actions against employees who are not whistleblowers, but otherwise similarly situated.” Larson v. Dep’t of Army, 91 M.S.P.R. 511, 515 (2002); see Carr v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 185 F.3d 1318, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (approving of three-factor inquiry). We affirm the district court’s judgment upholding the agency’s rejection of Brown’s affirmative defense of whistleblowing. Brown was terminated on the basis of his “see memo” notes on the worksheets or cover sheets related to his lab reports. Although the forums below have assumed that plaintiff’s notations were protected under the whistleblower provisions, we conclude that the notations are not protected at all. It is clear that the “see memo” notations cannot constitute the required “disclosure.” It is not likely that anyone other than the management which the notations were intended to criticize would have access to the notations and the memo referenced. However, in any event, the notations cannot constitute the required “disclosure,” because they disclose nothing except to the supervisors to whom Brown was being insubordinate. 3. Affirmative Defense Under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(D) 7 Brown next argues that his dismissal was improper because Clements’ order required him to violate the law. Under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(D), an agency cannot take a personnel action against an employee “for refusing to obey an order that would require the individual to violate a law.” Brown’s argument that Clements’ order required him to violate the law is wholly unpersuasive. Because Brown has failed to show that following Clements’ order required him to violate any law, he is due no protection under this section. 4. Harmful Procedural Error Brown also argues that the agency failed to perform an independent fact finding investigation as required by its policies and that such failure was harmful procedural error. An agency’s decision may not be sustained if the employee “shows harmful error in the application of the agency’s procedures in arriving at such decision.” 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(2)(A). Harmful error is defined as: “Error by the agency in the application of its procedures that is likely to have caused the agency to reach a conclusion different from the one it would have reached in the absence or cure of the error. The burden is upon the appellant to show that the error was harmful, i.e., that it caused substantial harm or prejudice to his or her rights.” 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(c)(3). After reviewing the record, we conclude that the agency did not err in its application of the relevant procedure contained in “A Guide to 8 Good Conduct and Discipline Process.” Moreover, even assuming any error in the application of the procedure, Brown has failed to convince us that such error was harmful in that it led to a different conclusion than would have been reached otherwise. The evidence underlying the charges against him was plainly captured in documentary form, and Brown has failed to establish that further fact finding would have uncovered evidence defeating either of the charges. Thus, the determination that the agency did not commit harmful procedural error is supported by substantial evidence and is not arbitrary and capricious. 5. Exclusion of Witnesses Brown next argues that the AJ abused its discretion by excluding three witnesses. We disagree. The facts these witnesses proposed to testify to were either (1) already presumed in Brown’s favor by the AJ or (2) irrelevant to the determinations at hand. Thus, the AJ did not abuse its discretion in excluding the witnesses. 6. Improper Weighing of Douglas2 Factors Brown finally argues that the AJ improperly weighed the Douglas factors when reviewing the agency’s decision to terminate him. This argument is without merit. The record establishes that the AJ considered the relevant Douglas factors in 2 Douglas v. Veterans Admin., 5 MSPR 280 (1981). 9 its review of the agency’s decision.