Opinion ID: 6358387
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Impeachment of Anderson

Text: For his second issue, Brown raises four claims related to trial counsel's alleged failure to effectively impeach Anderson: (a) trial counsel failed to impeach Anderson with evidence of pending drug charges in New Jersey; (b) trial counsel failed to impeach Anderson with evidence of his juvenile criminal history; (c) the Commonwealth violated Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 , (1963), by failing to disclose information related to Anderson's juvenile criminal history; and (d) trial counsel failed to present Justin Akines-Harris as a witness to impeach Anderson.
Brown argues that trial counsel should have cross-examined Anderson more extensively with evidence of Anderson's pending drug charges in New Jersey to demonstrate that Anderson's trial testimony was motivated by his desire to curry favor from the prosecution. Brown claims that prior to trial, New Jersey prosecutors engaged in plea negotiations with Anderson. Brown's Brief at 29. On June 6, 2005, after Brown's trial concluded, Anderson pleaded guilty to failure to make a required disposition, a reduced charge, in exchange for a probationary sentence. See PCRA Petition, Appendix, Anderson Plea Form, 6/6/2005. Brown suggests that New Jersey prosecutors offered Anderson a more lenient sentence in exchange for his cooperation in Brown's murder trial. Brown's Brief at 29-30. According to Brown, trial counsel never uncovered these details because he failed to obtain Anderson's complete criminal file from New Jersey. Id. at 30.  The PCRA court concluded that Brown's claim fails because he did not suffer prejudice. Rule 907 Notice, 4/7/2016, at 19. In support, the PCRA court reasoned that further investigation by trial counsel would not have altered the outcome of Brown's trial, as evidence of Anderson's pending charges was thoroughly elicited. Id. Further, Anderson did not officially plead guilty until after Brown's jury trial, and there was no evidence to suggest that Anderson accepted any plea agreement prior to his trial testimony. Id. at 20. The PCRA court added that it provided clear instructions to the jury as to how they should consider Anderson's pending charges. The PCRA court's conclusions are supported by the record. The record reveals that evidence of Anderson's open criminal matter in New Jersey was provided to the jury. The Commonwealth first questioned Anderson on this topic as follows: [Commonwealth]: Now, Mr. Anderson, you currently have an open arrest; correct? [Anderson]: Yes. [Commonwealth] : In New Jersey, actually? [Anderson]: Yes. [Commonwealth] : And you are - have you gone to trial yet? [Anderson]: I'm still - it's still pending right now. [Commonwealth]: Okay. And you were charged with possession of narcotics with the intent to deliver; right? [Anderson]: Yes. [Commonwealth]: Either with having enough drugs or with drug dealing; correct? [Anderson]: Yes. [Commonwealth]: And there's a conspiracy charge, too; right? [Anderson]: Yes. [Commonwealth]: Have the police in New Jersey or the police here or me or anybody from a District Attorney's Office made you any promises on that case -- [Anderson]: No. [Commonwealth]: -- in order to -- let me finish -- in order to get you to testify here today? [Anderson]: No. [Commonwealth]: As you sit here, do you expect that my office or the Philadelphia Police Department will help you beat that case or help you get a light sentence of anything like that? [Anderson]: No. [Commonwealth]: Have any written or oral deals been made with you? [Anderson]: No. N.T., 5/26/2005, at 57-58. Trial counsel then cross-examined Anderson about the pending charges: [Trial Counsel]: You ... currently have an open case in New Jersey for possession with intent to deliver narcotics; correct: [Anderson]: Yes. [Trial Counsel]: And do you know what the maximum sentence you could receive in that case is?    [Anderson]: Three to five. [Trial Counsel]: Three to five-- [Anderson]: Yes. [Trial Counsel]: - years' incarceration; correct? [Anderson]: Yes. [Trial Counsel]: Did the ... Philadelphia D.A.'s Office, by any representative, tell you that if you testified, they would help you favorably resolve your New Jersey case? [Anderson]: No.  [Trial Counsel]: Did anyone from the police tell you that? [Anderson]: No. [Trial Counsel]: Did any detective tell you that they would appear at your sentencing if you were convicted in New Jersey and inform the [c]ourt that you had cooperated in a homicide investigation in Philadelphia? [Anderson]: No. [Trial Counsel]: Never discussed that with any members of the law enforcement community? [Anderson]: No. [Trial Counsel]: Do you have a lawyer that represents you in New Jersey? [Anderson]: I have a Public Defender. [Trial Counsel]: Did you ever discuss with your Public Defender that you expected favorable treatment from the authorities in Philadelphia if you helped them prosecute this homicide case?    [Anderson]: No. Id. , at 64-66. The trial court then advised the jury as follows: Regarding that case, I will tell the jury that in my initial instruction to you or part of what the instructions are to you is that charges are only charges. You may have heard me say that to you and that just because someone is arrested, it does not mean that they are guilty of anything. The only reason that it is permitted to be brought out at all that this witness had an open case is so that the jury can evaluate for itself whether the fact that this person has this open case, were they at all testifying here in such a manner as to try to curry favor with the prosecution. Whether the prosecution had offered them anything or not, is this something that perhaps might be in their head and that that would, therefore, make them or lead them to perhaps tailor their testimony in any way. And so that's why it's brought out, so that the jury can evaluate all of that as they decide who and what to believe. Id. , at 114-15. During the jury charge, the trial court also provided the following instruction: You have heard evidence that Rahsaan Anderson has an open case in New Jersey. Whenever a prosecution witness ... may be biased in favor of the prosecution because of outstanding criminal charges within the same jurisdiction, that possible bias must be made known to the jury, as was done in this case. Even if the prosecution has made no promises on the present case or on other pending criminal matters, the law recognizes that the witness may hope for favorable treatment from the prosecutor if the witness presently testified in a way that is helpful to the prosecution. It is for you, the jury, to consider whether such bias in favor of the prosecution exists in this case regarding Rahsaan Anderson's testimony and what weight, if any, you attach to it. N.T., 5/31/2005, at 195-96. Brown contends that trial counsel's cross-examination was incomplete, as Anderson had been charged with, inter alia, five counts of intent to distribute cocaine, four carrying maximum sentences of three to five years of incarceration and the fifth carrying a maximum sentence of eighteen months. Brown's Brief at 29. Several of these charges involved drug transactions in a school zone, which carried mandatory minimum sentences. Id. Moreover, Anderson did not disclose that he had been offered a plea deal (probation in exchange for pleading guilty to a single count in the indictment). Id. Anderson formally accepted the plea offer on June 6, 2005, eleven  days after Brown's trial concluded. Id. In exchange for his plea, Anderson received two years of probation. Id. at 30. According to Brown, reasonable investigation would have led trial counsel to this additional information, which would have resulted in a more effective cross-examination of Anderson. Id. Other than speculation, Brown presented no evidence that prosecutors (either in Pennsylvania or New Jersey), offered Anderson a plea agreement in exchange for his testimony against Brown. Anderson provided his statement to police inculpating Brown on the night of the shooting, well before he was arrested and charged with crimes in New Jersey in October 2004, and his testimony (that Brown shot Crawford) remained unchanged thereafter. The PCRA court found that Brown had not demonstrated any prejudice associated with this claim, as it was brought out on direct and cross-examination that Anderson was facing drug charges - possession of narcotics, possession of narcotics with intent to deliver, and conspiracy - in New Jersey. The jury was even instructed on how to consider Anderson's open case. Rule 907 Notice, 4/7/2016, at 20-21. Because Brown fails to establish that trial counsel's alleged derelictions impacted the verdict, this claim fails.
Next, Brown claims that trial counsel failed to impeach Anderson with evidence of his juvenile criminal history, which consisted of a 2000 adjudication for burglary and a 2001 adjudication for receiving stolen property, both in Montgomery County. Although the Commonwealth provided trial counsel with Anderson's FBI excerpt, the excerpt identified only Anderson's 2001 juvenile adjudication, and it mistakenly indicated that the adjudication was in Philadelphia rather than Montgomery County. According to Brown, if trial counsel had conducted a more thorough investigation, the discrepancies would have been discovered and accurate information regarding both adjudications could have been used to impeach Anderson, as they were crimen falsi crimes committed within the past ten years before trial and thus admissible under Pa.R.E. 609. Brown stresses that because of trial counsel's ineffectiveness, the jury did not have the benefit of the prior adjudications in assessing Anderson's overall credibility. This claim lacks any arguable merit. This Court has summarized the relevant law in this area as follows: Counsel has a duty to undertake reasonable investigations or to make reasonable decisions that render particular investigations unnecessary. Commonwealth v. Basemore , 560 Pa. 258 , 744 A.2d 717 , 735 (2000) (citing Strickland , 466 U.S. at 691 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 ) (emphasis added); accord Wiggins [ v. Smith ], 539 U.S. [510,] 521-23, 123 S.Ct. 2527 [ 156 L.Ed.2d 471 ] [2003] [ ] (analysis of ineffectiveness claim for failure to investigate must focus on whether the investigation supporting counsel's decision not to introduce mitigating evidence of Wiggins' background was itself reasonable ). Thus, counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to investigate and introduce information he could not possibly have known about, so long as counsel's decision not to investigate was reasonable. See Commonwealth v. Sneed , 587 Pa. 318 , 899 A.2d 1067 , 1083 (2006) ([C]ounsel cannot be deemed ineffective for not introducing information uniquely within the knowledge of the defendant and his family which is not supplied to counsel.); Commonwealth v. Malloy , 579 Pa. 425 , 856 A.2d 767 , 788 (2004) (counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to pursue particular mitigating evidence where counsel had no notice of  such evidence). However, strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation. Wiggins , 539 U.S. at 528, 123 S.Ct. 2527 (quoting Strickland , 466 U.S. at 690-91 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 ). Commonwealth v. Tedford , 598 Pa. 639 , 960 A.2d 1 , 39-40 (2008) (emphasis in original); see also Commonwealth v. Eichinger , 631 Pa. 138 , 108 A.3d 821 , 847 (2014) (Counsel's strategic choices made after less than a complete investigation are considered reasonable, on a claim of ineffective assistance, precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support limitations on the investigation. Failure to conduct a more intensive investigation, in the absence of any indication that such investigation would develop more than was already known, is simply not ineffectiveness.) (citation omitted). No evidence of record suggests that trial counsel had any knowledge of the errors and omissions in Anderson's FBI excerpt, and they thus had no reasonable basis or obligation to obtain Anderson's juvenile records to verify the information that had been provided to them. As such, trial counsels' failure to conduct a more thorough investigation in this regard did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Moreover, even if we were to conclude that trial counsel should have conducted further investigation and uncovered the details with respect to the two crimen falsi crimes, we cannot say that Brown established any prejudice as a result of their failure to do so. On several occasions, this Court has held that the failure to impeach a witness with crimen falsi crimes is not per se prejudicial, so long as the record, taken as a whole, reflects that the witness was otherwise thoroughly cross-examined. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Small , 602 Pa. 425 , 980 A.2d 549 , 565-66 (2009) (Tucker's credibility was already assaulted to the nth degree - he was depicted as a crook, a recidivist, a drug abuser, a drunkard, and an admitted liar.... Consequently, we agree with the PCRA court that '[c]rimen falsi impeachment would have been merely cumulative and was unnecessary.' Essentially, Small was not prejudiced by counsel not cross-examining Tucker about crimen falsi as that information would have just reiterated a significant credibility attack that already occurred.) (citation omitted); Commonwealth v. Solano , 634 Pa. 218 , 129 A.3d 1156 , 1175 (2015) (finding appellant was not denied a fair trial and counsel did not act unreasonably in declining to question witness about a prior crimen falsi conviction where counsel impeached one of several eyewitnesses through other means).
Brown next raises a brief and cursory Brady challenge, arguing that the Commonwealth failed to provide trial counsel with a complete report of Anderson's juvenile criminal history. Brown's Brief at 343. As discussed above, the FBI excerpt provided to trial counsel contained certain errors and omissions. The United States Supreme Court in Brady established that suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. Commonwealth v. Reid , 627 Pa. 151 , 99 A.3d 470 , 496-97 (2014) (citing Brady , 373 U.S. at 87 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 ). To succeed on a Brady claim, an individual must prove the following:  (1) the prosecutor has suppressed evidence; (2) the evidence, whether exculpatory or impeaching, is helpful to the defendant; and (3) the suppression of the evidence prejudiced the defendant. Commonwealth v. Busanet, 618 Pa. 1 , 54 A.3d 35 , 48 (2012). To obtain a new trial based on the Commonwealth's failure to disclose evidence affecting a witness's credibility, a defendant must demonstrate that the reliability of the witness may be determinative of the defendant's guilt or innocence. Commonwealth v. Weiss, 604 Pa. 573 , 986 A.2d 808 , 815 (2000 [2009] ). Id. This Court has established that the prosecutorial duty under Brady respecting exculpatory evidence is limited to information in the possession of prosecutors or in the files of police agencies[,] limited to those agencies of the same government bringing the prosecution. Commonwealth v. Watkins , 630 Pa. 652 , 108 A.3d 692 , 711-12 (2014). As a result, Commonwealth prosecutors are not responsible to secure and disclose information held by federal authorities. Id. Here, the Commonwealth provided to trial counsel the information in its possession (the FBI excerpt), and had no obligation to investigate the accuracy of that information (as the FBI was not involved in bringing charges against Brown). We further agree with the PCRA court's observation that Brown point[s] to no authority which states that the Commonwealth has to go above and beyond turning over a witness'[ ] FBI extract, or which states that the Commonwealth itself acted unreasonably in relying upon the information contained in that. Rule 907 Notice, 4/7/2016, at 24.
Next, Brown asserts that trial counsel should have presented another witness, Akines-Harris, to impeach Anderson's credibility. Of relevance to this argument, Anderson testified at trial that he was wearing a blue jacket when the shooting occurred and when police first stopped and frisked him. N.T., 5/26/2005, at 52. The morning of the shooting, Anderson claimed that he loaned a red jacket to a high school student named Justice or Justin who lived near him. Id. at 51-52. He did not know the boy's full name. Shortly after the shooting, Anderson claimed that he saw this boy again, the boy returned the red jacket to him, and Anderson put it on. Id. at 52-53. Anderson testified that as a result, when he went to a nearby restaurant, where the police approached him again, he was then wearing the red jacket. Id. at 53-54. While wearing the red jacket, the police put him in a patrol car and took him to the police station for questioning. Id. at 54. Brown now claims that Justin Akines-Harris is the boy to whom Anderson claimed to have loaned his jacket, and that Akines-Harris would have testified that he never borrowed any jacket from Anderson. Brown's Brief at 31-32; PCRA Petition, Appendix, Akines-Harris Affidavit, 2/4/2013. This testimony, Brown asserts, would have undermined Anderson's explanation for changing his jacket, highlighting Anderson's guilt. Brown's Brief at 35-36. According to Brown, impeaching Anderson about changing his jacket would have significantly strengthened his defense, especially because trial counsel's strategy was to suggest that Anderson either killed Crawford or was protecting the person who killed Crawford. Id. at 36. Brown waived this claim at trial. The trial court conducted the following colloquy with Brown: The Court : Now, sir, are there any witnesses that you wanted to call or anything  that you discussed with [trial counsel] that is not going to happen at this trial? And I know that there's a few witnesses that are going to be called, and why don't we just state for the record who those are. [Trial Counsel]: Judge, I intend to call Police Officer Kevin Fant, F-A-N-T, and Detective Gregory Rodden, R-O-D-D-E-N, who was the assigned detective in this case. And we may call the crime scene detective who did the crime scene, Detective David Baker and Detective George Fetters. Detective Fetters has not yet arrived. We've only interviewed Detective Baker. The Court: Okay. So those are all the police witnesses. Were there any other names that you gave to [trial counsel] for the trial portion of this case, not the penalty phase, that you expected to testify and whose names just did not hear mentioned? [Brown]: Negative. The Court : All right. And are you satisfied with the representation that you have received from your counsel. [Brown]: Yes. N.T., 5/31/2005, at 14. In Commonwealth v. Mallory , 596 Pa. 172 , 941 A.2d 686 (2008), this Court held: [A]n on-the-record colloquy is a useful procedural tool whenever the waiver of any significant right is at issue, constitutional or otherwise, e.g., waiver of a trial, waiver of the right to counsel, waiver of the right to call witnesses , waiver of the right to cross-examine witnesses, waiver of rules-based speedy trial time limits, etc.) Id. at 697 (emphasis added). Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Paddy , 569 Pa. 47 , 800 A.2d 294 (2002), we recognized that a defendant who makes a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent decision concerning trial strategy will not later be heard to complain that trial counsel was ineffective on the basis of that decision. Id. at 316 . To do otherwise, the Court held, would allow a defendant to build into his case a ready-made ineffectiveness claim to be raised in the event of an adverse verdict. Id. at 316 . In Paddy , the defendant complained of trial counsel's ineffectiveness for failing to call alibi witnesses, in response to which we held that this ineffectiveness claim fails for the fundamental reason that Paddy agreed at trial to counsel's decision not to call the witnesses in question. Id. at 315 ; see also Commonwealth v. Rios , 591 Pa. 583 , 920 A.2d 790 , 803 (2007), overruled on other grounds , Tharp , 101 A.3d 736 . As the record reflects, Brown participated in a colloquy at which he was advised of all of the witnesses his trial counsel intended to call in his defense, and he expressly acknowledged that after consulting with trial counsel, there were no other witnesses he wanted to testify on his behalf. As Brown voluntarily agreed that he did not want to call any other witnesses, he cannot now complain about trial counsel's failure to call Akines-Harris to testify.