Opinion ID: 710073
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Anecdotal Approach To Defining Crimes Involving

Text: 53 Moral Turpitude 54 In the face of the difficulty of determining what crimes involve moral turpitude and the lack of congressional guidance as to the meaning of the phrase, courts have approached the problem of defining the phrase crime involving moral turpitude in anecdotal fashion. Courts have found consistently that certain categories of crimes involve moral turpitude, but whether or not moral turpitude inheres in other categories of crimes has left courts if not lost, at least bewildered. I shall wander first through the safe ground in the moral turpitude landscape, before venturing, with no small trepidation, into the terra incognita which I believe is the place where this case can be found. 55 Some cases, as I said at the outset of this dissent, in which an alien is found deportable for commission of a crime assertedly involving moral turpitude, can be decided with relative ease and dispatched with brevity. Such easy cases are those in which the alien has been convicted of a crime with an element of fraud. Over four decades ago, the Supreme Court found that [w]ithout exception, federal and state courts have held that a crime in which fraud is an ingredient involves moral turpitude. Jordan, 341 U.S. at 227, 71 S.Ct. at 706. Furthermore, 56 [i]n every deportation case where fraud has been proved, federal courts have held that the crime in issue involved moral turpitude. This has been true in a variety of situations involving fraudulent conduct: obtaining goods under fraudulent pretenses; conspiracy to defraud by deceit and falsehood; forgery with intent to defraud; using the mails to defraud; execution of chattel mortgage with intent to defraud; concealing assets in bankruptcy; issuing checks with intent to defraud. In the state courts, crimes involving fraud have universally been held to involve moral turpitude. 57 Moreover, there have been two other decisions by courts of appeals prior to the decision now under review on the question of whether the particular offense before us in this case [conspiracy to violate the internal revenue laws by possessing and concealing distilled spirits with intent to defraud the United States of taxes] involves moral turpitude within the meaning of Sec. 19(a) of the Immigration Act.... 58 In view of these decisions, it can be concluded that fraud has consistently been regarded as such a contaminating component in any crime that American courts have, without exception, included such crimes within the scope of moral turpitude. It is therefore clear, under an unbroken course of judicial decisions, that the crime of conspiring to defraud the United States is a crime involving moral turpitude.Id. at 227-29, 71 S.Ct. at 706-07; see also Izedonmwen v. INS, 37 F.3d 416, 417 (8th Cir.1994) ( 'crimes in which fraud was an ingredient have always been regarded as involving moral turpitude,'  quoting Jordan, 341 U.S. at 232, 71 S.Ct. at 708); Mendoza v. INS, 16 F.3d 335, 336 (9th Cir.1994) (no issue on appeal of whether welfare fraud constituted crime involving moral turpitude; issue was whether alien's return after three-day departure constituted entry within meaning of 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1101(a)(13) and 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1251(a)(2)(A)(i)); Kabongo v. INS, 837 F.2d 753, 758 n. 8 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 982, 109 S.Ct. 533, 102 L.Ed.2d 564 (1988) (fraud crimes are always crimes involving moral turpitude); Winestock v. INS, 576 F.2d 234, 235 (9th Cir.1978) (same); Lozano-Giron v. INS, 506 F.2d 1073, 1077 (7th Cir.1974) (same); Burr v. INS, 350 F.2d 87, 91 (9th Cir.1965) (same). Indeed, for some courts, the absence of an element of fraudulent conduct from the definition of the crime has been sufficient to find that the crime was not one involving moral turpitude. See, e.g., Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350, 353, 81 S.Ct. 147, 149-50, 5 L.Ed.2d 120 (1960) (breach of peace not a crime involving moral turpitude, because no fraudulent conduct was involved). 59 Courts have consistently held that statutory rape is a crime involving moral turpitude, even though it has no intent element, because such a crime is usually classed as rape, which manifestly involves moral turpitude. See, e.g., Marciano, 450 F.2d at 1025 (citing cases so holding). So, too, courts have expressed similar certainty that theft crimes involve moral turpitude. See, e.g., Dashto v. INS, 59 F.3d 697, 699 (7th Cir.1995) (recognizing prior decision holding that  '[t]heft has always been held to involve moral turpitude, regardless of the sentence imposed or the amount stolen,'  quoting Soetarto v. INS, 516 F.2d 778, 780 (7th Cir.1975)); United States v. Villa-Fabela, 882 F.2d 434, 440 (9th Cir.1989) (theft[s] [are] crime[s] of moral turpitude.), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Proa-Tovar, 975 F.2d 592, 595 (9th Cir.1992) (en banc); Chiaramonte v. INS, 626 F.2d 1093, 1097 (2d Cir.1980) (thefts are presumed to be crimes involving moral turpitude however they may be technically translated into domestic penal provisions, and citing cases so holding); Christianson v. United States, 226 F.2d 646, 655 (8th Cir.1955) (for purposes of impeaching a witness, crimes of larceny and embezzlement have always been held to involve moral turpitude), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 994, 76 S.Ct. 543, 100 L.Ed. 859 (1956); United States ex rel. Berlandi v. Reimer, 113 F.2d 429, 431 (2d Cir.1940) (An intent to steal or defraud in the [case of one who defrauds a private citizen of property] has repeatedly been held to render an offense one which involves moral turpitude and for which an alien may be deported or excluded under the Immigration Laws, and finding an intent to defraud element in forgery). This certainty of the courts remains in spite of, or perhaps because of, Congress's refusal to define crime involving moral turpitude with greater specificity even after Rep. Sabath pointed out that state theft laws were not uniform. See supra, p. 586. As the Second Circuit Court of Appeals observed, whatever the vicissitudes of the state laws of larceny, it is clear that for immigration purposes, a crime of moral turpitude is involved when ... one carries away property knowing it to belong to another. Chiaramonte, 626 F.2d at 1099 (citing Gordon & Rosenfield, Immigration Law and Procedure Sec. 4.14(d) (1977)). 16 60 Of greater pertinence here are cases involving homicides. Courts have uniformly held voluntary murder to be a crime involving moral turpitude. Cabral, 15 F.3d at 195-96 (citing Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 162 F.2d 663, 664 (9th Cir.1947), rev'd on other grounds, 333 U.S. 6, 68 S.Ct. 374, 92 L.Ed. 433 (1948)); In re Johnson, 1 Cal.4th 689, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 170, 822 P.2d 1317 (1992); Burleigh v. State Bar of Nevada, 98 Nev. 140, 643 P.2d 1201, 1204 (1982); State v. Lee, 404 S.W.2d 740, 748 (Mo.1966); In re Noble, 77 N.M. 461, 423 P.2d 984, 984 (1967). Courts have also consistently held that voluntary manslaughter is a crime involving moral turpitude. See, e.g., Vincent v. State, 264 Ga. 234, 442 S.E.2d 748, 749 (1994) (impeachment with conviction of crime involving moral turpitude based on voluntary manslaughter conviction was proper, but exceeded proper scope when prosecutor explored facts of conviction); Harris v. Deafenbaugh, Slip. Op., No. CV91-0320379, 1993 WL 407983,  1 (Conn.Super.Ct. Sept. 30, 1993) (murder and voluntary manslaughter are crimes involving moral turpitude, citing Drazen v. New Haven Taxicab Co., 95 Conn. 500, 507, 111 A. 861 (1920)); People v. Gutierrez, 14 Cal.App.4th 1425, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 371, 376 (1993) (voluntary manslaughter is crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of impeaching witness); People v. Ballard, 13 Cal.App.4th 687, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 624, 628 (1993) (parties conceded conviction for voluntary manslaughter was conviction of crime involving moral turpitude); People v. Von Villas, 11 Cal.App.4th 175, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 112, 143 (1992) (same conclusion, but such conviction may not be useable for impeachment of witness for other reasons), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 118, 126 L.Ed.2d 83 (1993); People v. Foster, 201 Cal.App.3d 20, 246 Cal.Rptr. 855, 857 (1988) (voluntary manslaughter is crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of witness impeachment); In re Strick, 43 Cal.3d 644, 238 Cal.Rptr. 397, 404, 738 P.2d 743, 750 (1987) (circumstances surrounding attorney's conviction for voluntary manslaughter and assault with a deadly weapon exhibited moral turpitude as a matter of law in attorney discipline case); People v. Partner, 180 Cal.App.3d 178, 225 Cal.Rptr. 502, 506 (1986) (voluntary manslaughter is crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of impeachment of witness); People v. Parrish, 170 Cal.App.3d 336, 217 Cal.Rptr. 700, 709 (1985) (same, but stating that discussion applied only to voluntary manslaughter, despite defendant's arguments, which had principally involved involuntary manslaughter); but see Mitchell v. State, 298 S.C. 186, 379 S.E.2d 123, 125 (1989) (voluntary manslaughter under South Carolina law, and therefore like offense with same elements under New York law, are not crimes involving moral turpitude for purposes of impeaching a witness); In re Mostman, 47 Cal.3d 725, 254 Cal.Rptr. 286, 292-93, 765 P.2d 448, 454 (1989) (in attorney discipline case, court read its precedent as holding that voluntary manslaughter is not necessarily a crime involving moral turpitude, citing In re Strick, 43 Cal.3d 644, 238 Cal.Rptr. 397, 405, 738 P.2d 743, 750 (1987), and In re Nevill, 39 Cal.3d 729, 217 Cal.Rptr. 841, 704 P.2d 1332 (1985)); People v. Thomas, 206 Cal.App.3d 689, 254 Cal.Rptr. 15, 19 (1988) (in considering impeachment with conviction for assault with a deadly weapon, court discussed, but did not decide, question of whether imperfect self-defense should call into doubt whether voluntary manslaughter necessarily involves moral turpitude); State v. Morgan, 541 S.W.2d 385, 390 (Tenn.1976) (concluding that voluntary manslaughter was not infamous crime under Tennessee statute allowing use of infamous crimes, to be used to impeach credibility, but not deciding whether such a crime was one involving moral turpitude, finding issue of fact to be settled on remand as to whether conviction was too remote to be used in any event). 61 Yet, the question presented here is whether the crime of involuntary manslaughter is also a crime universally recognized as a crime involving moral turpitude. A merely anecdotal survey of court decisions, many of which involve impeachment of witnesses, would suggest that a conviction for involuntary manslaughter is not such a crime, because of the lack of any intent, let alone an evil intent. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Mongiovi v. Karnuth, 30 F.2d 825 (W.D.N.Y.1929) (involuntary manslaughter does not involve moral turpitude); Carreker v. State, 661 So.2d 784 (Ala.Crim.App.1994) (holding that involuntary manslaughter, defined either as reckless or negligent, was not a crime of moral turpitude, because it was based on unintentional conduct, in contrast to those crimes involving some form of evil intent. It is not an offense that is mala in se and, thus, does not fall within the definition of crimes involving moral turpitude.); Matter of Frascinella, 1 Cal.State Bar Ct.Rptr. 543, 1991 WL 94403,  5 (Cal.Bar Ct.1991) (recognizing involuntary manslaughter as an offense that does not in and of itself constitute a crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of attorney disbarment); In re Strick, 43 Cal.3d 644, 238 Cal.Rptr. 397, 404, 738 P.2d 743, 750 (1987) (involuntary manslaughter is not a crime necessarily involving moral turpitude for purposes of attorney disbarment); People v. Montilla, 134 Misc.2d 868, 513 N.Y.S.2d 338 (Sup.Ct.1987) (vehicular manslaughter is not a crime involving moral turpitude because it did not involve evil intent, but crime was defined in terms of criminal negligence, even though court considered precedents to establish rule that reckless manslaughter did not involve moral turpitude); People v. Coad, 181 Cal.App.3d 1094, 226 Cal.Rptr. 386 (1986) (voluntary manslaughter always involves intent to do evil, and hence involves moral turpitude, citing federal INS cases in which involuntary manslaughter was held not to involve moral turpitude); People v.Solis, 172 Cal.App.3d 877, 218 Cal.Rptr. 469 (1985) (involuntary manslaughter is not a crime involving moral turpitude); Abbey v. Lord, 168 Cal.App.2d 499, 336 P.2d 226, 231 (1959) (in deciding whether causing death of insured barred payment of insurance proceeds to beneficiary, court noted that involuntary manslaughter does not involve the same kind of moral turpitude present in a voluntary killing); see also People v. Ford, 157 Misc.2d 668, 597 N.Y.S.2d 882 (Sup.Ct.1993) (where person who pleaded guilty to reckless manslaughter sought to have trial judge reduce plea to negligent homicide so that person could avoid deportation for conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, the court held jury should decide if crime involved moral turpitude, and set aside plea for trial by jury); Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Jones, 759 S.W.2d 61 (Ky.1988) (it was not necessary for court to determine if reckless homicide was a crime of moral turpitude, because it was conduct inappropriate of an attorney allowing suspension of license); People v. Cazares, 190 Cal.App.3d 833, 235 Cal.Rptr. 604, 605-06 (1987) (trial court could properly deny probation on the ground that unusual circumstances were absent in conviction for involuntary manslaughter, because firing a loaded weapon into a crowded dance hall was acting with a depraved heart and with reckless abandon, even if crime did not involve moral turpitude, because of the lack of intent or malice); In re Morris, 74 N.M. 679, 397 P.2d 475, 478 (1965) (court need not decide whether conviction for involuntary manslaughter rendered attorney unfit to practice law on ground of conviction of crime involving moral turpitude, because involuntary manslaughter as the result of driving under the influence of alcohol otherwise supported suspension of attorney's license); State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Weiner, 68 N.J.Super. 468, 172 A.2d 661, 670 (App.Div.1961) (refusing to foreclose the possibility that manslaughter, even involuntary manslaughter, was crime that did not involve moral turpitude for purposes of suspending license to practice medicine); In re Welansky, 319 Mass. 205, 65 N.E.2d 202 (1946) (court need not consider whether involuntary manslaughter was crime involving moral turpitude or otherwise indicating unfitness to practice law where attorney offered no evidence that crime of which he was convicted was not one that disclosed his unfitness to remain at the bar). 17 62 Prior to the decision in this case, the BIA itself made a distinction between voluntary manslaughter, which it invariably held was a crime involving moral turpitude, and involuntary manslaughter, which the BIA held was not such a crime. See Matter of Sanchez-Linn, Interim Dec. 3156 (BIA 1991) (voluntary manslaughter is a crime involving moral turpitude); Matter of Rosario, 15 I. & N. Dec. 416, 417 (BIA 1975) (It is well settled that voluntary manslaughter--[defined as] an intentional killing of a human being--is a crime involving moral turpitude.); Matter of Ghunaim, 15 I. & N. Dec. 269, 270 (BIA 1975) (Murder and voluntary manslaughter are crimes involving moral turpitude; involuntary manslaughter is not; thus, immigration judge properly found conviction was for crime involving moral turpitude in the form of voluntary manslaughter where manslaughter statute included both voluntary and involuntary manslaughter, but record of conviction revealed indictment for a voluntary murder, and a necessary element of involuntary manslaughter, unintentional killing while in the commission of some unlawful act, was missing); Matter of Lopez, 13 I. & N. Dec. 725, 726-27 (BIA 1971) (finding no moral turpitude where statute did not distinguish between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter and indictment did not reveal intent); Matter of Ptasi, 12 I. & N. Dec. 790 (BIA 1968) (conviction of manslaughter by stabbing was conviction of crime involving moral turpitude); Matter of Sanchez-Marin, 11 I. & N. Dec. 264, 266 (BIA 1965) (Voluntary manslaughter has generally been held to involve moral turpitude while involuntary manslaughter has not, but where alien indicted for second degree murder pleaded guilty to lesser offense of manslaughter under statute that did not distinguish between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter, it was reasonable to conclude alien had pleaded guilty to voluntary homicide, which is a crime involving moral turpitude); Matter of Abi-Rached, 10 I. & N. Dec. 551 (BIA 1964) (voluntary manslaughter was crime involving moral turpitude); Matter of Szegedi, 10 I. & N. Dec. 28, 34 (BIA 1962) (finding that involuntary manslaughter, defined as homicide by reckless conduct, and defining mens rea as grossly negligent conduct, did not involve moral turpitude because the intent element was not present); Matter of S, 9 I. & N. Dec. 496 (BIA 1961) (conviction under Peruvian statute was analogous to conviction of voluntary manslaughter in the United States, and therefore was conviction for crime involving moral turpitude); Matter of P, 6 I. & N. Dec. 788 (BIA 1955) (citing prior cases holding that voluntary manslaughter is a crime involving moral turpitude and so holding); Matter of R, 5 I. & N. Dec. 463 (BIA 1953) (where indictment charged voluntary killing, guilty plea under statute that makes no distinction between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter was conviction for crime involving moral turpitude); Matter of H R, 4 I. & N. Dec. 742 (BIA 1952) (in absence of evidence in record of conviction indicating involuntary nature of crime, manslaughter under statute making no distinction was deemed to be voluntary, and therefore a crime involving moral turpitude); 18 Matter of K, 4 I. & N. Dec. 108 (BIA 1951) (where neither statute nor conviction record make clear whether conviction was for voluntary or involuntary manslaughter, board cannot conclude that conviction under statute making no distinction is for crime involving moral turpitude); Matter of D, 3 I. & N. Dec. 51 (BIA 1947) (where statute does not distinguish between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter, but indictment is for homicide committed by means of an assault with malice aforethought, conviction is for voluntary manslaughter, and hence involves moral turpitude); Matter of J, 2 I. & N. Dec. 477 (BIA 1947); Matter of N, 1 I. & N. Dec. 181 (BIA 1947) (involuntary manslaughter is not crime involving moral turpitude); Matter of S, 1 I. & N. Dec. 519 (BIA 1947) (voluntary manslaughter is crime involving moral turpitude). Thus, on a purely anecdotal basis, this should have been an easy case, and the result should have been contrary to the BIA's decision below. 63 The INS argues that a change from its prior interpretations of the meaning of crime involving moral turpitude does not necessarily make the new interpretation unreasonable, citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 186, 111 S.Ct. 1759, 1768-69, 114 L.Ed.2d 233 (1991) (An initial agency interpretation is not instantly carved in stone.... This Court has rejected the argument that an agency's interpretation 'is not entitled to deference because it represents a sharp break with prior interpretations' of the statute in question, quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 862, 104 S.Ct. at 2791); Yanez-Popp v. INS, 998 F.2d 231, 235 (4th Cir.1993) ([t]he Board has discretion to reinterpret the INA if it employs a 'reasoned analysis' ); Sussex Eng'g, Ltd. v. Montgomery, 825 F.2d 1084, 1088 (6th Cir.1987) (new agency interpretation still should be afforded deference even if it conflicts with agency's prior interpretation), cert. denied sub nom. E & S Design and Dev., Ltd. v. Montgomery, 485 U.S. 1008, 108 S.Ct. 1473, 99 L.Ed.2d 702 (1988). However, in Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 2381, 129 L.Ed.2d 405 (1994), the Supreme Court held that an inconsistent interpretation of a statutory provision by the agency is  ' entitled to considerably less deference than a consistently held agency view.'  Thomas Jefferson Univ., 512 U.S. at ---- - ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2392-94 (1994) (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 n. 30, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 1221 n. 30, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987), in turn quoting Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 273, 101 S.Ct. 1673, 1681, 68 L.Ed.2d 80 (1981)). That rule is only inapplicable when the party challenging the current interpretation has failed to present persuasive evidence that the agency has interpreted the statutory provision in an inconsistent manner. Id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2388. In this case, the inconsistency with prior BIA determinations that involuntary manslaughter is not a crime involving moral turpitude is more than adequately demonstrated. 64 Furthermore, the new interpretation here is not merely a change of interpretation of statutory language, but a reinterpretation of language with a long history of application and interpretation in the statutes and common law of this country. Here, the BIA's new interpretation of crimes involving moral turpitude as including involuntary manslaughter is against the entire weight of the common law and the interpretations of the phrase by the courts of this country, as well as contrary to the BIA's prior interpretations. On that basis alone, I do not find the BIA's change of interpretation reasonable. 65 Nor do I find the requisite reasoned analysis that might sustain a new interpretation of a statute even where it is contrary to prior agency interpretations. Yanez-Popp v. INS, 998 F.2d at 235. The BIA's analysis below consists of the following: 66 In Matter of Median, 15 I. & N. Dec. 611 (BIA 1976), aff'd sub nom. Medina-Luna v. INA, 547 F.2d 1171 (7th Cir.1977), the Board revisited the issue of whether criminally reckless conduct constituted a crime involving moral turpitude. In Medina, the alien had been convicted of aggravated assault in violation of Illinois law. Holding that the criminally reckless conduct defined by the Illinois recklessness statute provided the basis for a finding of moral turpitude, the Board construed the statute as follows: 67 The person acting recklessly must consciously disregard a substantial and unjustifiable risk, and such disregard must constitute a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation. This definition of recklessness requires an actual awareness of the risk created by the criminal violator's action. While the Illinois recklessness statute may not require a specific intent to cause a particular harm, the violator must show a willingness to commit the act in disregard of the perceived risk. The presence or absence of a corrupt or vicious mind is not controlling. 68 Id. at 613-14. 69 Later, in Matter of Wojtkow, [18 I. & N. Dec. 111 (BIA 1981) ], the Board relied upon the holding in Medina to conclude that an alien's conviction for second degree manslaughter under the New York Penal Law constituted a crime involving moral turpitude. Quoting the New York statute, the Board noted that a person is guilty of second degree manslaughter in New York if  'he recklessly causes the death of another person.'  Matter of Wojtkow, supra, at 112 n. 1. The Board further observed that the definition of recklessness under New York law was the same as the definition under Illinois law that had been analyzed in Medina. Id. at 112-13. 70 Matter of Franklin, Interim Dec. (BIA) 3228, Slip. op., pp. 3-4. Rejecting all prior precedent to the contrary, the BIA found these two decisions sufficient to find involuntary manslaughter based on reckless conduct to be a crime involving moral turpitude. 71 The authority upon which the BIA relied in this case, however, suffers from its own fatal deficiencies. As the BIA noted in its opinion below, the decision in Wojtkow relies upon that in Medina. Indeed, I find no analysis at all in the Wojtkow decision except a parroting of the conclusions of the Medina court. Wojtkow, 18 I. & N. Dec. at 112-13. The decision in Medina had been based upon an Illinois statute and the Wojtkow Board simply applied the Medina Board's conclusions to a New York statute framed in similar language. Id. In Medina, the BIA stated that we have reconsidered the general position taken in [prior] cases, and we have concluded that moral turpitude can lie in criminally reckless conduct. Medina, 15 I. & N. Dec. 611 (BIA 1976). The extent of the Medina Board's analysis is the following: 72 The person acting recklessly must consciously disregard a substantial and unjustifiable risk, and such disregard must constitute a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation. This definition of recklessness requires an actual awareness of the risk created by the criminal violator's action. While the Illinois recklessness statute may not require a specific intent to cause a particular harm, the violator must show a willingness to commit the act in disregard of the perceived risk. The presence or absence of a corrupt or vicious mind is not controlling. Guerrero de Nodahl v. INS, 407 F.2d 1405 ( [9th Cir.] 1969). We hold that the criminally reckless conduct defined by [the Illinois statute] be [sic] the basis for a finding of moral turpitude. 73 Medina, 15 I. & N. Dec. 611 (also rejecting assertions that an infamous crime is synonymous with crime involving moral turpitude). I find that the Medina decision gives no explanation or analysis to support its conclusion that willingness to commit an act in disregard of a perceived risk is moral turpitude, because that decision does not consider the relationship of willingness to commit the act to an evil intent or any other necessary element of moral turpitude. It asserts only that willingness to commit an act does not equate with a corrupt or vicious mind, but that the lack of a corrupt or vicious mind is not dispositive of the question of whether a crime involves moral turpitude. Nor does the BIA consider in Medina whether its reading of the statute bears any relationship to the reading given the statute by the state's highest court, the body properly charged with interpreting the laws of the state. 74 Furthermore, the BIA's decision in this case is against the far greater weight of precedent. As the state and federal court decisions cited in this section indicate, most courts require an evil intent element or, at the very least, a knowledge element, for a crime to be one that involves moral turpitude. Additional examples of decisions so holding are Wadman v. INS, 329 F.2d 812 (9th Cir.1964) (requirement of knowledge that items were stolen was sufficient to involve moral turpitude); People v. Coad, 181 Cal.App.3d 1094, 226 Cal.Rptr. 386 (1986) (intent to do evil is required to find moral turpitude, and intent to do evil is always involved in the intentional taking of a human life); In re Conduct of Chase, 299 Or. 391, 702 P.2d 1082 (1985) (finding that federal cases are in agreement that moral turpitude requires an intentional mental state). Only a few cases specifically consider whether recklessness suffices to show moral turpitude. Compare In re Wilkins, 649 A.2d 557 (D.C.App.1994) (recklessness may satisfy intent element of offense, but is insufficient to find moral turpitude within meaning of attorney disciplinary rule, because recklessness won't stand in for the specific intent required to find moral turpitude); Willis v. State, No. B14-89-00215-CR, 1989 WL 156268 (Tex.Ct.App. Dec. 21, 1989) (not reported) (reckless conduct is not a crime of moral turpitude); Patterson v. State, 783 S.W.2d 268 (Tex.Ct.App.1989) (companion to Willis) (reckless misdemeanor not involving violence towards women does not involve moral turpitude); Ricketts v. State, 291 Md. 701, 436 A.2d 906 (App.1981) (crime is too unspecific to be one of moral turpitude where it includes within the definition acts that are reckless or negligent, for purposes of impeachment of a witness); with Gutierrez-Chavez v. INS, 8 F.3d 26 (Table), 1993 WL 394916 (9th Cir.1993) (recklessly receiving a stolen gun, second degree theft, was crime involving moral turpitude under Alaska statute interpreted by Alaska courts to contain both an element of guilty knowledge and an implied element of intent to deprive the owner of property which has been stolen,); People v. Campbell, 23 Cal.App.4th 1488, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 716 (1994) (definition of maliciously as wanton and wilful (or 'reckless') disregard of the plain dangers of harm, without justification, excuse, or mitigation, exceeding mere intentional harm, can show the state of mind that betokens a general readiness to do evil, which constitutes moral turpitude). Courts have therefore only rarely parlayed recklessness into the evil intent required to find that a crime involves moral turpitude. In the cases where courts did so, the courts found that the governing statute had been interpreted by the state's highest courts to include at least an implied evil intent element. The BIA here undertook no such analysis of Missouri law. Thus, I find no reasoned basis either for the BIA's determination that recklessness can suffice to make a crime one involving moral turpitude, nor for finding that recklessness as defined under Missouri law can be parlayed into an element of guilty knowledge or implied intent that could be acknowledged to imbue a crime with moral turpitude. 75 In part because of the BIA's change of direction from these precedents in this case, I deem it essential, in deciding the reasonableness of the BIA's new position, to move beyond an anecdotal determination of what is a crime involving moral turpitude, and instead attempt to find a concrete meaning for the phrase. However, I find that such a quest has rarely been made, and even more rarely has reached its objective.