Opinion ID: 2588468
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Proof of Serious Difficulty Controlling Behavior

Text: The first issue raised by the petitioners concerns whether the fact finder must determine that the person facing commitment as an SVP has serious difficulty controlling behavior under the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 122 S.Ct. 867, 871, 151 L.Ed.2d 856 (2002). If this determination is required, we must also decide whether the determination must be a separate finding based upon a jury instruction. To resolve this issue, we begin by examining the progression of the United States Supreme Court's treatment of SVP commitment. Freedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the liberty interest protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. Commitment for any reason constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty triggering due process protection. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80, 112 S.Ct. 1780, 118 L.Ed.2d 437 (1992). However, the civil commitment of an SVP satisfies due process if the SVP statute couples proof of dangerousness with proof of an additional element, such as mental illness, because the additional element limits confinement to those who suffer from an impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their control. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997) (holding civil commitment of SVPs' constitutional under the Kansas sexually violent predator act (Kansas SVPA)). The United States Supreme Court recently clarified Hendricks' mental illness element in SVP commitment proceedings as one requiring proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior. Crane, 534 U.S. at 413, 122 S.Ct. 867. The Court advised this proof must be considered in the context of the features of the case, such as the nature of the psychiatric diagnosis and the severity of the mental abnormality. Crane, 534 U.S. at 413, 122 S.Ct. 867. Although the United States Supreme Court agreed with the State of Kansas that the State need not prove a total lack of control, the Court rejected Kansas' position that it need not prove any lack of control. Put another way, the Court recognized that lack of control could not be demonstrated with precision, but required proof sufficient to distinguish the dangerous sexual offender whose serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder subjects him [or her] to civil commitment from the dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case. Crane, 534 U.S. at 413, 122 S.Ct. 867. Significantly, the United States Supreme Court specified neither the quantum of proof that it required nor the means of establishing the proof. Instead, the Court's constitutional guidance in this area was given in the context of respondent Crane's specific circumstances. Crane, 534 U.S. at 414, 122 S.Ct. 867. Although the Crane opinion did not discuss the facts of the underlying SVP commitment in detail, the specific circumstances of the case illuminate the Court's reasoning. Crane was convicted of lewd and lascivious behavior and pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual battery for two incidents. In re Crane, 269 Kan. 578, 586, 7 P.3d 285 (2000). Prior to his parole, Kansas entered a petition to have Crane declared an SVP under the Kansas SVPA. Crane, 269 Kan. at 579, 7 P.3d 285. The Kansas SVPA definition of mental illness is substantially the same as Washington's and permits the civil detention of a person convicted of any of several enumerated sexual offenses if it is proved beyond a reasonable doubt the individual suffers from a mental abnormalitya disorder affecting emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offensesor a personality disorder, either of which makes the person likely to engage in repeat acts of sexual violence. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-29-a02(a), (b) (Supp. 2002). [2] Several psychologists examined Crane to determine whether he had a mental abnormality or personality disorder under the Kansas SVPA. The psychologists determined Crane suffered from exhibitionism and antisocial personality disorder. Crane, 269 Kan. at 579, 7 P.3d 285. The opinion of one of the examining psychologists was that the two disorders in combination placed Crane's condition within the range of disorders covered by the Kansas SVPA. However, the State's experts concluded that Crane's mental disorders did not impair his volitional control to the degree he could not control his dangerous behavior. Crane, 269 Kan. at 581, 7 P.3d 285. Crane moved for summary judgment, arguing that Hendricks required the State to prove he was unable to control his violent behavior. Alternatively, Crane sought a jury instruction that would have required the jury to decide whether his diagnosed disorders had the effect of impairing his volitional control to such an extent that he was unable to control his behavior. Crane, 269 Kan. at 581, 7 P.3d 285. The trial court denied Crane's summary judgment motion and did not instruct the jury that it must find Crane lacked volitional control. [3] Crane, 269 Kan. at 581, 7 P.3d 285. The jury found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Crane was an SVP, and he was civilly committed. Crane, 269 Kan. at 586, 7 P.3d 285. The Kansas Supreme Court reversed Crane's civil commitment, holding the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury it must find Crane's mental disability so impaired his volitional control that he was unable to restrain his dangerous sexual behavior. Crane, 269 Kan. at 586, 7 P.3d 285. The court reasoned that because Crane had not been diagnosed with a mental abnormality, but a personality disorder, which by definition does not include a volitional impairment, his civil commitment violated due process. Crane, 269 Kan. at 586, 7 P.3d 285. The court held that, in the absence of a diagnosed volitional impairment, to satisfy its burden of proof the State must prove, not merely a likelihood that Crane would engage in repeat acts of sexual violence, but also an inability to control violent behavior. Crane, 269 Kan. at 585-86, 7 P.3d 285. Because the sufficiency of the State's proof was a question for the jury, and the jury had not been instructed to make a finding that Crane could not control his behavior, the court reversed Crane's civil commitment and remanded for a new trial. Crane, 269 Kan. at 593, 7 P.3d 285. The Kansas Supreme Court based its holding solely on its reading of Hendricks. [4] The court reasoned, the plain language of the majority opinion in Hendricks  mandated a finding of volitional impairment. Crane, 269 Kan. at 586, 7 P.3d 285. The court supported its plain language argument by seizing on several Hendricks passages explicitly referring to volitional impairment, by relying on Hendricks' pedophilia diagnosis, which arguably demonstrated Hendricks' volitional impairment, and by referring to Hendricks' concession that when stressed he could not control his urge to molest children. Crane, 269 Kan. at 581-82, 7 P.3d 285. The United States Supreme Court rejected the Kansas Supreme Court's bright-line analysis, but refused to abandon the requirement that states show the individuals they petition to commit in SVP proceedings have serious difficulty controlling sexually violent behavior. Crane, 534 U.S. at 414-15, 122 S.Ct. 867. The Court held that a person may not be committed as an SVP without any lack-of-control determination. Crane, 534 U.S. at 412, 122 S.Ct. 867. Thus, states must produce some proof that the individuals against whom petitions are brought have a serious lack of control over their behavior. Crane, 534 U.S. at 413, 122 S.Ct. 867. However, the Court refused to give the phrase lack of control a particularly narrow or technical meaning, rejecting the bright-line rules advocated by the parties in favor of a case specific analysis. Crane, 534 U.S. at 413, 122 S.Ct. 867. The United States Supreme Court advanced two considerations in support of its case specific approach. First, states retain considerable leeway in defining the mental abnormalities and disorders that make an individual eligible for SVP commitment. Second, the science of psychiatry is ever-advancing and its distinctions do not seek precisely to mirror those of the law. Crane, 534 U.S. at 413, 122 S.Ct. 867. Significantly, just as it rejected the Kansas Supreme Court's distinction between personality disorders and mental abnormalities, the United States Supreme Court explicitly declined to distinguish between volitional, emotional, or other cognitive factors that might impair an SVP's ability to control violent behavior. Crane, 534 U.S. at 414, 122 S.Ct. 867. We conclude that Crane requires a determination that a potential SVP has serious difficulty controlling dangerous, sexually predatory behavior, but does not require a separate finding to that effect. The United States Supreme Court did not impose a new element in SVP commitment proceedings when explaining its case specific approach. Although Crane held that there must be proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior, the Court made this holding in response to whether a fact finder must find a total lack of control, not whether the proof requires a specific finding. Crane, 534 U.S. at 413, 122 S.Ct. 867. We therefore read Crane as consistent with Hendricks, which held that a lack of control determination may be included in the finding of mental abnormality. Crane, 534 U.S. at 421, 122 S.Ct. 867 (Scalia, J., dissenting). What is critical to both Hendricks and Crane is the existence of some proof that the diagnosed mental abnormality has an impact on offenders' ability to control their behavior. Crane requires linking an SVP's serious difficulty in controlling behavior to a mental abnormality, which together with a history of sexually predatory behavior, gives rise to a finding of future dangerousness, justifies civil commitment, and sufficiently distinguishes the SVP from the dangerous but typical criminal recidivist. It is the finding of this link, rather than an independent determination, that establishes the serious lack of control and thus meets the constitutional requirements for SVP commitment under Hendricks and Crane. Then, if the existence of this link is challenged on appeal, this case specific approach requires the reviewing court to analyze the evidence and determine whether sufficient evidence exists to establish a serious lack of control, as we do below. We base our conclusion on the Supreme Court's lengthy discussion of the impracticability of giving lack of control a narrow or technical meaning, and the Court's recognition of the need to proceed contextually. Crane, 534 U.S. at 412, 122 S.Ct. 867. Moreover, the Supreme Court's vacation of the Kansas Supreme Court's holding that Crane was entitled to a jury instruction and the Crane majority's explicit preference for case specific analysis rather than bright-line rules militate against the conclusion that a separate jury instruction must be given. We find further support for our reading of Crane in a recent opinion of the Arizona Supreme Court, In re Leon G., 204 Ariz. 15, 59 P.3d 779 (2002). In an earlier decision, the Arizona Supreme Court had held that Hendricks did not impose `volitional impairment' as a separate requirement for civil commitment statutes. In re Leon G., 200 Ariz. 298, 301, 26 P.3d 481, 484 (2001). Then, after the United States Supreme Court issued Crane, it vacated the Arizona court's 2001 decision for reconsideration in light of Crane. Glick v. Arizona, 535 U.S. 982, 122 S.Ct. 1535, 152 L.Ed.2d 461 (2002). On remand, the Arizona court determined Hendricks and Crane merely required that an SVP statute narrow the class of persons subject to commitment to only those who have `serious difficulty controlling' their behavior. Leon G., 59 P.3d at 783. The court held that Hendricks and Crane do not require explicit references to control. Leon G., 59 P.3d at 785. The Arizona court concluded, as we have here, that Crane's statement that a state must prove serious difficulty in controlling behavior does not require express statutory language, but rather reiterates the requirement that an SVP statute substantially and adequately narrows the class of individuals subject to involuntary civil commitment. Crane does not alter the Court's analysis in Hendricks that focused on the link between proof of dangerousness and proof of mental abnormality in upholding the Kansas Act. Leon G., 59 P.3d at 786 (citation omitted). The Arizona court found that if the State establishes the required nexus between a person's mental disorder and the person's dangerousness, and proves that the disorder, rather than a voluntary decision, makes the person act in a certain manner, the State has shown that the person has serious difficulty in controlling his or her behavior. Leon G., 59 P.3d at 787. As did the Arizona court, we conclude that Hendricks and Crane do not mandate a specific jury instruction as long as the State demonstrates the cause and effect relationship between the alleged SVP's mental disorder and a high probability the individual will commit future acts of violence. See Leon G., 59 P.3d at 787-88. We find additional support for a case specific approach in related cases involving the Minnesota Supreme Court's analysis of Hendricks and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals' review of that analysis in light of Crane. Linehan v. Milczark, 315 F.3d 920, 925 (8th Cir.2003) ( Linehan V); In re Linehan, 594 N.W.2d 867 (Minn.1999) ( Linehan IV). Both cases confirm our interpretation that Hendricks and Crane focus on the link between the mental disorder and difficulty controlling behavior, not on a separate finding of lack of control. In Linehan IV, the Minnesota Supreme Court analyzed the lack of control aspect of Hendricks because it had previously ruled the State was required to prove SVPs had evidenced an utter lack of power to control [their] sexual impulses. Linehan IV, 594 N.W.2d at 869. The Minnesota Supreme Court considered whether Hendricks required a complete or a partial lack of volitional control. The court concluded Hendricks required some lack of volitional control to narrow the scope of civil commitment statutes. Linehan IV, 594 N.W.2d at 873. Utilizing a case specific approach, the court examined the underlying record for proof of lack of control and found Linehan's commitment did not violate due process or require a separate finding by the jury. Linehan IV, 594 N.W.2d at 877-78. Then, after a denial of certiorari, Linehan filed a petition for habeas corpus. The federal district court denied his petition and Linehan appealed to the Eighth Circuit. Linehan V, 315 F.3d at 921. He argued, inter alia, that his commitment was unconstitutional because the State did not provide separate proof of his volitional impairment at his commitment proceedings. Linehan V, 315 F.3d at 921. The Eighth Circuit closely examined the Minnesota Supreme Court's earlier decision in light of Crane and held that Crane was consistent with Hendricks because it merely clarified the level of volitional impairment constitutionally required for commitment. Linehan V, 315 F.3d at 926. Although the Eighth Circuit characterized the Minnesota Supreme Court in Linehan IV as requiring a finding of lack of control, the Eighth Circuit held the state court correctly applied Hendricks when it made that finding in relation to findings of past sexual violence and a mental disorder. Linehan, 315 F.3d at 927. The connection between past sexually violent behavior and a mental abnormality results in a likelihood of future sexually dangerous behavior, and thus a lack of control. Linehan V, 315 F.3d at 927. Thus, the Eighth Circuit also emphasized the link of these factors when upholding Linehan's commitment as constitutional. Accord In re Dutil, 437 Mass. 9, 11, 768 N.E.2d 1055 (2002) (construing Massachusetts statute requiring a general lack of power to control ... sexual impulses to satisfy Crane without requiring a separate finding). We agree with the Supreme Courts of Arizona, Minnesota, and Massachusetts that a separate finding that the individual facing SVP commitment has serious difficulty controlling behavior is not required under the United States Constitution. Dissenting in Crane, Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas ( Hendricks' author) complained Crane might necessitate a separate jury instruction for lack of control and illustrated the inherent constitutional difficulties should states attempt such an instruction. Crane, 534 U.S. at 423-24, 122 S.Ct. 867 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The petitioners, as well as the opinion of Chief Justice Alexander here, rely on Scalia's characterization of the Crane majority, using it to argue the majority in Crane requires proof of lack of control as a separate element of an SVP commitment. However, if this analysis were correct, the United States Supreme Court would have gone beyond vacating the Kansas Supreme Court's prior case and would have declared Kansas' sexually violent predator commitment statute unconstitutional because it did not include this separate element. Crane therefore cannot be read in the manner advanced by the dissent here. The petitioners ask us to consider that the United States Supreme Court recently vacated and remanded an unpublished decision of Minnesota's Court of Appeals, which relied upon Linehan IV for its holding. In re Martinelli, 2000 WL 1285430 (Minn.Ct.App. Sept.12, 2000), cert. granted & judgment vacated by Martinelli v. Minnesota, 534 U.S. 1160, 122 S.Ct. 1171, 152 L.Ed.2d 114 (2002). We conclude the petitioners' reliance on Martinelli is misplaced. In that case, the Minnesota Court of Appeals concluded that the State needed only to prove Martinelli was unable to adequately control his sexual impulses. In re Martinelli, 2000 WL 1285430, at . The United States Supreme Court vacated Martinelli for reconsideration in light of Crane. [5] We interpret the United States Supreme Court's vacation of Martinelli to turn upon the degree of difficulty a person facing SVP commitment must have controlling behavior, not as a mandate to impose a separate lack of control finding never mentioned in the Crane majority. If a separate finding of this kind were required, Linehan IV, which held lack of control was not a separate element and instead analyzed the record for sufficient evidence of Linehan's inability to control his behavior, would have been erroneous under Crane. The recent reconsideration of Martinelli, however, underscores the importance of establishing a connection between the mental disorder and difficulty controlling behavior. In re Martinelli, 649 N.W.2d 886 (Minn.Ct. App.2002). On remand, the court rejected any semantic distinctions between serious difficulty, difficult, if not impossible, and lack of adequate control, emphasizing that Crane declined to give any particular narrow or technical meaning to lack of control. Martinelli, 649 N.W.2d at 890-91. The court on remand focused on the factual context and held that what was essential was expert testimony tying a lack of control to a diagnosed mental abnormality or personality disorder before civil commitment may occur. Martinelli, 649 N.W.2d at 890-91. Although the court held that a finding of lack of control was essential, the court did not focus on whether such a finding must be made separately. Martinelli, 649 N.W.2d at 890-91. Nonetheless, this case reinforces that control must be considered within the factual context of the mental abnormality. Finally, we acknowledge that our conclusion that Crane does not mandate a separate jury finding is arguably inconsistent with those of other state supreme courts, such as the Missouri Supreme Court. The Missouri court recently mandated its jury instruction defining mental abnormality must be updated to mean[ ] a congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses in a degree that causes the individual serious difficulty in controlling his behavior. Thomas v. State, 74 S.W.3d 789, 792 (Mo.2002) (emphasis added); accord In re Commitment of W.Z, 173 N.J. 109, 801 A.2d 205 (2002) (remanding to trial court for finding that individual has serious difficulty controlling behavior). However, as Chief Justice Limbaugh's dissent in Thomas noted, the Missouri court's decision to change the definition of mental abnormality in the jury instruction means that the Missouri statute governing SVP commitment lacks a significant constitutional element because the lack of control language added to the jury instruction is not in the SVP statute. [6] Thomas, 74 S.W.3d at 793 (Limbaugh, C.J., dissenting). In our view, if Missouri's definitional change were necessary, the United States Supreme Court would not have upheld the Kansas SVPA in Hendricks because the statutes in those cases did not include lack of control as a separate element. Nor did they require separate jury findings as to the degree of control the SVPs required. Finally, Missouri's approach does not recognize the United States Supreme Court's refusal to give the phrase lack of control a particularly narrow or technical meaning in favor of a case specific analysis. Crane, 534 U.S. at 412, 122 S.Ct. 867. We conclude that the United States Supreme Court's holding in Crane clarifies Hendricks' mental illness element. Applying the United States Supreme Court's reasoning to the Washington SVPA, we hold that proof that a person facing commitment under chapter 71.09 RCW lacks behavioral control is not a new element of the SVP commitment and a jury need not make a separate finding regarding lack of control. However, the jury's finding that an SVP suffers from a mental illness, defined under our statute as a mental abnormality or personality disorder, coupled with the person's history of sexually predatory acts, must support the conclusion that the person has serious difficulty controlling behavior, although this evidence need not rise to the level of demonstrating the person is completely unable to control his or her behavior. We now turn to whether the jury instructions in the present cases meet the constitutional standard of sufficiently narrowing the class of persons subject to SVP civil commitment by requiring a link between the mental abnormality and a serious lack of ability to control sexually violent behavior, applying our above holding. In each of these six cases, the juries were given the standard to commit instruction, which reads in relevant part: To find that the respondent is a sexually violent predator, each of the following elements must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) That the respondent has been convicted of or charged with a crime of sexual violence; and (2) That the respondent suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder; and (3) That such mental abnormality or personality disorder makes the respondent likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility.[ [7] ] Because the standard to commit instruction requires the fact finder to find a link between a mental abnormality and the likelihood of future acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility, the instruction requires a fact finder to determine the person seriously lacks control of sexually violent behavior. Again, we look to the Arizona Supreme Court's recent opinion, Leon G., for guidance. Leon G., 59 P.3d at 786-87. Like Washington's SVPA, Arizona's SVP statute defines a sexually violent predator as someone who has committed a sexually violent offense and has `a mental disorder that makes the person likely to engage in acts of sexual violence.' Leon G., 59 P.3d at 786 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 36-3701.7). The Arizona court held the requirement that the person's mental disorder or abnormality makes the person likely to commit acts of sexual violence sufficiently required the fact finder to link the abnormality with a serious lack of volitional control, meeting the constitutional standard as articulated in Crane and Hendricks. Leon G., 59 P.3d at 787. Because the language of the instructions in the cases before us is substantially the same as that analyzed by the Arizona court, we find that court's analysis persuasive. We hold the jury instructions given in the petitioners' cases here were constitutionally adequate. We do not reach Ross's and Johnson's arguments under the Washington Constitution because these arguments are directed to the standard of review we should employ had we concluded lack of control was a separate element of SVP commitment. We now turn to the standard of review for SVP commitment proceedings. We first note that we have not previously addressed the appropriate standard of review to establish the quantum of evidence required for SVP commitment. The only other state supreme court to do so is the Wisconsin Supreme Court, which held the criminal standard of review should be used. In re Commitment of Curiel, 227 Wis.2d 389, 597 N.W.2d 697, 709 (1999). Most important to the Wisconsin court's decision was the fact that, while its SVP commitment statute is a civil proceeding, it shares many of the same procedural and constitutional features present in criminal prosecutions. Curiel, 597 N.W.2d at 709. Although we agree with the Wisconsin Supreme Court that the criminal standard is the correct standard to apply in SVP commitment proceedings, we do so on different grounds. While we have not previously established the standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence in SVP proceedings, we have assessed probable cause in SVP commitments under a criminal standard. In re Det. of Petersen, 145 Wash.2d 789, 42 P.3d 952 (2002). The Court of Appeals also concluded the criminal standard should be applied to SVP commitments, although it did so under a different approach. In re Det. of Ross, 102 Wash.App. 108, 119, 6 P.3d 625 (2000). The Court of Appeals reasoned that because the legislature has adopted the beyond a reasonable doubt standard for commitments under the SVPA, the sufficiency of the evidence should be tested against this standard. Ross, 102 Wash.App. at 119, 6 P.3d 625. We agree. We hold that the quantum of the evidence in SVP commitment hearings should be examined under a criminal standard. Although an SVP commitment is a civil proceeding and a finding of serious difficulty controlling behavior is not a separate element of the commitment proceeding, the legislature's adoption of the reasonable doubt standard for SVP commitment should be applied to the lack of control determination as well. Under this approach, the evidence is sufficient if, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Randhawa, 133 Wash.2d 67, 73, 941 P.2d 661 (1997). We hold, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, there must be sufficient evidence in the finding of mental illness to allow a rational trier of fact to conclude the person facing commitment has serious difficulty controlling behavior. We will examine each of the petitioners' cases for sufficient evidence to support their commitment once we have completed our analysis of current precedent. In conclusion, we hold the fact finder need not make a separate finding that a person committed under chapter 71.09 RCW, the SVPA, has serious difficulty controlling his or her behavior. [8] We hold that although Crane did not establish a new element in SVP commitments, Crane did require SVP commitments to be supported by proof beyond a reasonable doubt of serious difficulty controlling behavior.