Opinion ID: 615195
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Parens Patriae Standing

Text: Mr. Thiebaut first contends that he qualifies for parens patriae standing. We disagree. “Parens patriae is a standing doctrine that allows states to vindicate their interests in federal court.”5 Sierra Club v. Two Elk Generation Partners, 646 F.3d 1258, 1273 3 The only arguments concerning the independent standing or capacity of the Office of the District Attorney for the Tenth Judicial District of Colorado or the People of the State of Colorado were raised in Mr. Thiebaut’s reply brief. We have consistently stated that “arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are generally deemed waived.” United States v. Harrell, 642 F.3d 907, 918 (10th Cir. 2011). We perceive no grounds for deviating from that practice in this case. 4 At oral argument, counsel for the City conceded that Mr. Thiebaut would have standing if he had sued as an individual citizen, but he chose not to do so. Oral Argument at 11:55-12:20, Thiebaut v. Colorado Springs Utilities, ____ Fed. Appx. ____ (No. 101471). 5 The phrase “parens patriae” “may also refer to the common-law concept that the state has a duty to act as a guardian of children and the mentally disabled.” Sierra Club, 646 F.3d at 1273 n.3 (10th Cir. 2011) (Lucero, J., dissenting). -7- (Lucero, J., dissenting); see also Kathleen C. Engel, Do Cities Have Standing? Redressing the Externalities of Predatory Lending, 38 Conn. L. Rev. 355, 362 (2006) (“The great bulk of cases recognizing [parens patriae] standing involve states invoking their right to protect their citizens from harm.”). In Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592 (1982), the Supreme Court identified three requirements that a state must satisfy to qualify for parens patriae standing.6 See id. at 607. First, the state must “articulate an interest apart from the interests of particular private parties, i.e., the [plaintiff] must be more than a nominal party.” Id. Second, the state must “express a quasi-sovereign interest” that it seeks to protect. Id. Finally, the state must “allege injury to a sufficiently substantial segment of its population.” Id. at 607; see also Satsky v. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc., 7 F.3d 1464, 1469 (10th Cir. 1993) (discussing parens patriae standing). Mr. Thiebaut argues that the district court erred in concluding he lacks authority to sue as parens patriae. He contends the district court could consider only federal law in conducting its standing analysis and that it therefore erred in considering Colorado state law to determine whether he qualifies for parens patriae standing. He argues, in the alternative, that he qualifies for parens patriae standing because the Colorado Legislature 6 Because we conclude that Mr. Thiebaut does not qualify for parens patriae standing, we do not address whether or in what circumstances a plaintiff that is not a state or state attorney general may qualify for parens patriae standing. -8- has authorized district attorneys in their official capacities to file CWA citizen suits in federal courts. 1. The District Court Did Not Err in Considering State Law The district court concluded that Mr. Thiebaut did not qualify for parens patriae standing because he failed to identify legal authority to invoke the sovereign capacity of the state. Mr. Thiebaut argues the district court erred in considering Colorado state law because “federal law dictates the question of standing.” Aplt. Opening Br., at 11. We disagree. To qualify for parens patriae standing, a plaintiff must “express a quasi-sovereign interest” that it seeks to protect. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc., 458 U.S. at 607. The Supreme Court has defined quasi-sovereign interests as “a set of interests that [a] State has in the well-being of its populace,” including the health, safety, welfare, and economical and physical well-being of its citizens. Id. at 602. We have previously indicated that in deciding whether a plaintiff qualifies for parens patriae standing, it is appropriate to look to state law to determine whether the plaintiff has been authorized to represent a state’s sovereign interests. In Housing Authority of the Kaw Tribe of Indians v. Ponca City, 952 F.2d 1183 (10th Cir. 1991), we analyzed whether an Oklahoma housing authority had standing to sue as parens patriae. See id. at 1192-93. After reviewing the housing authority’s arguments, we noted it had presented “no authorization by the State of Oklahoma to represent the state’s sovereign interests.” Id. at 1193. As a result of this lack of authority, we held that the housing -9- authority could not sue as parens patriae. See id. Although it is often unnecessary to consider state law to determine whether a plaintiff has standing to assert a federal claim, Kaw Tribe demonstrates that it is appropriate for a federal court to do so in deciding whether a plaintiff qualifies for parens patriae standing. Based on this precedent, we reject Mr. Thiebaut’s argument that the district court erred in considering Colorado state law in its parens patriae standing analysis. 2. Colorado Has Not Authorized Mr. Thiebaut to Bring His Claims As with other theories of standing, plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing that they qualify for parens patriae standing. See, e.g., D.L. v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 497, 596 F.3d 768, 775 (10th Cir. 2010) (“Plaintiffs bear the burden of proof on jurisdictional issues such as standing.”). To satisfy this burden, plaintiffs must demonstrate that they have authority to represent a state’s sovereign or quasi-sovereign interests. See Kaw Tribe, 952 F.2d at 1193. Mr. Thiebaut has not satisfied this burden. He notes that the Colorado Legislature specifically allows district attorneys to bring a public nuisance suit in state court to abate “[a]ny unlawful pollution or contamination of any surface or subsurface waters in the state.” Aplt. Opening Br., at 22 (quoting Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-13-305(e)). But this limited grant of authority does not provide Mr. Thiebaut with authority to represent Colorado’s sovereign or quasi-sovereign interests in a CWA citizen suit in federal court. Moreover, our review of the relevant statutory scheme has not revealed any general grant -10- of authority to Colorado district attorneys to protect the state’s sovereign or quasisovereign interests. Because the State of Colorado has not authorized Mr. Thiebaut to represent its sovereign interests in this matter, we hold that he does not qualify for parens patriae standing.