Opinion ID: 718778
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prosecutorial Influence on Sentencing

Text: 53 Griffith also argues that the executive branch, through its prosecutors, holds inappropriate sway over the Sentencing Commission, and, hence, over the judicial branch. Griffith did not raise this argument in the district court and the government argues that it is forfeited on appeal. A successful allegation of prosecutorial intrusion into the sentencing process might survive plain error review, however. In any event, though he raises an interesting and important issue, which has been the subject of much scholarly comment, Griffith's particular arguments in this regard cannot prevail. 54 Griffith first complains that the Guidelines have, on the whole, increased the severity of criminal sentences and alleges that the Commission has come to be widely perceived as closely identified with the Department of Justice, and as little more than an arm of that department. Def. Br. at 41. While it may be the case that prosecutors on the whole favor increased sentences, Griffith presents us with no rationale nor anything beyond a supposed public perception that links the higher sentences resulting from the Guidelines to that prosecutorial preference. 55 Next, Griffith points to USSG § 5K1.1, which requires a motion from the government before a downward departure for substantial assistance to authorities may be granted. He argues that the result of this guidelines provision is that [w]ithout the 'permission' of the U.S. Attorney, the courts are required to apply the rigid criteria set out in the guideline manual and impose the often draconian sentences provided therein. Def. Br. at 42. However, the departure for substantial assistance is only one of a number of provisions which allow judges to depart from the rigid application of the guidelines and it is the only type of departure which the government must approve. We might agree that the Guidelines, taken as a whole, constrain the discretion to depart in an undesirable manner. However, the decision to condition a departure for substantial assistance to the government on a prosecutorial motion does not necessarily indicate undue prosecutorial influence on the framing of the Sentencing Guidelines. How else would a court determine whether a defendant had substantially assisted the government if not to ask the government's representative? Thus, the existence of this departure provision does not support Griffith's argument that the Sentencing Commission is dominated by the executive branch.