Opinion ID: 799337
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Federal Statutory Claims

Text: Section 1983 can also be used to enforce federal statutes. Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340, 117 S.Ct. 1353, 137 L.Ed.2d 569 (1997). For a statutory provision to be privately enforceable, however, it must create an individual right. See id. (In order to seek redress through § 1983, however, a plaintiff must assert the violation of a federal right, not merely a violation of federal law. ). Blessing established a three-prong test for determining whether a federal statute creates an individual right. The Blessing test requires: 1) that Congress intended the statutory provision to benefit the plaintiff; 2) that the asserted right is not so `vague and amorphous' that its enforcement would strain judicial competence; and 3) that the provision couch the asserted right in mandatory rather than precatory terms. Watson v. Weeks, 436 F.3d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir.2006) (citing Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340-41, 117 S.Ct. 1353). In Gonzaga University v. Doe, the Supreme Court clarified that the first prong of the Blessing test is meant to determine whether Congress unambiguously conferred a federal right. 536 U.S. 273, 283, 122 S.Ct. 2268, 153 L.Ed.2d 309 (2002). This requires rights-creating language, meaning that the text of the statute must be phrased in terms of the persons benefited. Id. at 284, 284 n. 3, 122 S.Ct. 2268 (quotation marks and citations omitted). If a statutory provision satisfies the Blessing test, it is presumptively enforceable through § 1983. Watson, 436 F.3d at 1158 (citing Blessing, 520 U.S. at 341, 117 S.Ct. 1353). This presumption is rebutted if Congress expressly or impliedly foreclosed enforcement under section 1983. Id. [A]n implied foreclosure occurs if Congress created `a comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual enforcement.' Id. at 1158-59 (quoting Blessing, 520 U.S. at 341, 117 S.Ct. 1353). Here, the plaintiffs seek to enforce four sets of federal statutory provisions through § 1983: the case plan provisions of the CWA, the records provisions of the CWA, the guardian ad litem provision of CAPTA, and the early intervention services provisions of CAPTA and the IDEA. All of these are spending statutes; the State of Nevada has agreed to administer its foster care system in accordance with these federal laws in return for financial assistance from the federal government. The district court dismissed these claims on the basis that none of the provisions are privately enforceable. [7]
Count Eight of the complaint seeks injunctive relief for a class of children who have not received a case plan as required by the CWA. The case plan provisions of the CWA are codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 671(a)(16) and 675(1). Section 671(a)(16) states that: In order for a State to be eligible for payments under this part, it shall have a plan approved by the Secretary which... provides for the development of a case plan (as defined in section 675(1) of this title) for each child receiving foster care maintenance payments under the State plan.... Section 675(1) provides a detailed definition of what a case plan must include, such as the child's health and educational records, a description of the child's permanency plan, and a plan for ensuring the child's educational stability. The district court concluded that these provisions do not contain sufficient rights-creating language to satisfy the first prong of the Blessing test. We disagree and join the majority of federal courts in holding that the case plan provisions are enforceable through § 1983. See, e.g., L.J. v. Massinga, 838 F.2d 118, 123 (4th Cir.1988); Lynch v. Dukakis, 719 F.2d 504, 512 (1st Cir.1983); Sam M. v. Chafee, 800 F.Supp.2d 363, 386-88 (D.R.I. 2011); Connor B. v. Patrick, 771 F.Supp.2d 142, 170-72 (D.Mass.2011); Kenny A. v. Perdue, 218 F.R.D. 277, 292-93 (N.D.Ga.2003); Brian A. v. Sundquist, 149 F.Supp.2d 941, 946-49 (M.D.Tenn. 2000); Jeanine B. v. Thompson, 877 F.Supp. 1268, 1283-84 (E.D.Wis.1995); B.H. v. Johnson, 715 F.Supp. 1387, 1402 (N.D.Ill.1989). But see Carson P. v. Heineman, 240 F.R.D. 456, 544 (D.Neb. 2007); Olivia Y. v. Barbour, 351 F.Supp.2d 543, 562 (S.D.Miss.2004); Charlie H. v. Whitman, 83 F.Supp.2d 476, 489-90 (D.N.J.2000). Section 671(a)(16) unambiguously requires the State to provide for the development of a case plan for each child. As the Massachusetts district court wrote recently in Connor B., rights-creating language is readily discernible in § 671(a)(16) because it expresses a clear mandate by using the term `shall' and discusses how the state must distribute benefits to each child.  771 F.Supp.2d at 171. Plainly, these directives are both couched in mandatory terms and are unmistakably focused on the benefitted class, i.e., foster children. Id. Our court's precedent also supports this conclusion. We have concluded in two different cases that other provisions of the CWA contain rights-creating language. [8] In ASW, we held that §§ 671(a)(1) and 673(a)(3) create a right to individualized adoption assistance payment determinations and that § 671(a)(12) creates a right to a hearing when adoption assistance payments are reduced. 424 F.3d at 975-79. In California State Foster Parent Association v. Wagner, we held that §§ 672(a) and 675(4)(A) create a right to foster care maintenance payments that cover certain enumerated costs. 624 F.3d 974, 978-82 (9th Cir.2010). Both of these decisions recognized the importance of language phrasing the benefit in terms of each child, see id. at 979-81, or each family, see ASW, 424 F.3d at 976 (citing Rabin v. Wilson-Coker, 362 F.3d 190, 201 (2d Cir. 2004)). As in those cases, the reference here to a case plan for each child focuses squarely on the protected individual, rather than an aggregate interest or a regulated entity. See Wagner, 624 F.3d at 980 (citing Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 288-89, 122 S.Ct. 2268). Defendants' argument to the contrary is not persuasive. Defendants maintain that Congress only required the State to have a plan to `develop' a case plan for each child. But as we recognized in ASW, Congress has directed that statutory provisions within the Social Security Act should not be deemed unenforceable because of its inclusion in a section ... requiring a State plan or specifying the required contents of a State plan. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-2; ASW, 424 F.3d at 977 n. 11. [9] We conclude that the first Blessing factor weighs in favor of an enforceable right. The second and third Blessing factors also show that the case plan provisions are presumptively enforceable. The requirement that each child have a case plan is not so vague and amorphous that its enforcement would strain judicial competence. Watson, 436 F.3d at 1158 (internal quotation marks omitted). The definition provided in § 675(1) describes exactly what a case plan must include; as in ASW, there is no ambiguity as to what [the state is] required to do[.] 424 F.3d at 976. In Wagner, we held that another detailed definition in § 675, which provided an itemized list of what expenses foster care maintenance payments must cover, satisfied the second Blessing prong. 624 F.3d at 981. We conclude that § 675(1) does so as well. Finally, we have already determined that the repeated use of the word shall in the CWA shows that the statute is written in mandatory rather than precatory terms. Id. at 982. We now turn to whether the presumption that the case plan provisions are enforceable is rebutted by Congressional action that has expressly or impliedly foreclosed enforcement under section 1983[.] Watson, 436 F.3d at 1158. In Wagner, we recognized that the CWA provides no administrative forum through which aggrieved foster children or parents can seek redress, which weighs in favor of enforcement through § 1983. 624 F.3d at 982. Here, however, Defendants argue that because Congress created an express cause of action to enforce § 671(a)(18), it could not have intended the other subsections of § 671(a) to be privately enforceable. See Charlie H., 83 F.Supp.2d at 489. The district court also relied on this reasoning. This argument, however, has been implicitly rejected by our holding in ASW that § 671(a)(12) creates an enforceable right. Furthermore, because the express cause of action created for § 671(a)(18) is actually broader than § 1983, it does not suggest an intent to limit § 1983 enforcement. See Joseph A. v. Ingram, 275 F.3d 1253, 1264 (10th Cir.2002); cf. ASW, 424 F.3d at 978 ([T]he dispositive issue is whether the private remedy provided by statute is more restrictive than those available through a § 1983 action, such that the § 1983 action would function as an end run around the enforcement mechanism Congress provided.). We conclude that the case plan provisions of the CWA, codified at §§ 671(a)(16) and 675(1), are enforceable through § 1983. We therefore reverse the district court's dismissal of Count Eight.
Count Three is a claim for injunctive relief and damages on behalf of the individual plaintiffs. It seeks to enforce the requirement that a State provide updated health and education records to foster parents as part of a case review system. These provisions are codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 671(a)(16), 675(1), and 675(5)(D). As it does with respect to a case plan, § 671(a)(16) requires a State to provide for a case review system for each child. Section 675(5)(D) defines case review system to include a procedure for assuring that ... a child's health and education record ... is reviewed and updated, and a copy of the record is supplied to the foster parent or foster care provider with whom the child is placed, at the time of each placement of the child in foster care. Section 675(1)(C) outlines the detailed information that must be included in a child's health and education record. The district court analyzed the records provisions of the CWA along with the case plan provisions and concluded that the records provisions were also not enforceable. The district court adopted the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit in 31 Foster Children v. Bush, which held that the language describing a case review system as a procedure for assuring that a foster child has accurate health and education records gives the provision an aggregate or system wide focus instead of one that indicates concern with whether the needs of any particular child are met. 329 F.3d 1255, 1272 (11th Cir.2003). We disagree with this analysis and instead join the federal courts that have found the records provisions of the CWA to be privately enforceable along with the case plan provisions. See, e.g., Lynch, 719 F.2d at 512; Kenny A., 218 F.R.D. at 291-92; Brian A., 149 F.Supp.2d at 946-49. We are persuaded by the statute's repeated focus on the individuals benefitted by §§ 671(a)(16) and 675(5)(D): A case review system must be provided with respect to each child; the child's health and education record must be provided to the foster parent; and this must happen at the time the child is placed in foster care. As in Wagner, the focus on individual foster children, and the language designating foster parents to receive a benefit on their foster child's behalf, together unambiguously reflect Congress's intent that the records provisions benefit individual foster children and parents. 624 F.3d at 981. Furthermore, like the case plan provisions, the records provisions are couched in mandatory terms and contain detailed, concrete requirements that are capable of judicial enforcement. [10] To conclude otherwise would be inconsistent with our decisions in ASW and Wagner, as well as our analysis of the case plan provisions above. Defendants argue that the district court's decision is supported by a footnote in ASW, which distinguished 31 Foster Children by noting that unlike § 673(3), the provision at issue in ASW, the statutory text of § 675(5) alone does not mention a right ... to have medical and education backgrounds provided to caregivers[.] 424 F.3d at 977 n. 12. We agree with Plaintiffs, however, that this footnote has little significance because ASW did not consider § 675(5) in the context of related provisions such as § 671(a)(16) and § 622(b)(8)(A)(ii). We conclude that, like the case plan provisions, the records provisions can be enforced through § 1983, and we reverse the district court's dismissal of Count Three.
Count Nine of the complaint seeks injunctive relief on behalf of a class of foster children who have not been appointed guardians ad litem. It seeks to enforce the guardian ad litem provision of CAPTA, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(xiii), which provides that: A State plan ... shall contain a description of the activities that the State will carry out using amounts received under the grant ... including ... an assurance in the form of a certification by the Governor of the State that the State has in effect and is enforcing a State law, or has in effect and is operating a statewide program ... that includes provisions and procedures requiring that in every case involving a victim of child abuse or neglect which results in a judicial proceeding, a guardian ad litem ... shall be appointed to represent the child in such proceedings....[ [11] ] As the district court observed, Nevada does have a law directing state courts to appoint a guardian ad litem for every eligible child. See Nev.Rev.Stat. § 432B.500(1) (After a petition is filed that a child is in need of protection ... the court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for the child.). But courts do not always order these appointments, because Clark County does not have enough guardian ad litem volunteers. See Nev.Rev.Stat. § 432B.500(2) (No compensation may be allowed a person serving as a guardian ad litem pursuant to this section.). Plaintiffs thus seek an injunction compelling the State and County defendants to make it possible for state courts to appoint a guardian ad litem in every case. The district court held that the guardian ad litem provision of CAPTA was not privately enforceable and that, in the alternative, abstention was warranted under the doctrine set forth in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971). As best we can tell, no court has specifically addressed whether the guardian ad litem provision of CAPTA is enforceable through § 1983, and no federal appellate court has considered whether any provision of the current version of CAPTA is privately enforceable. As a matter of first impression, we conclude that the guardian ad litem provision does not create an individual right enforceable through § 1983. The Sixth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit have held that an earlier version of CAPTA is not privately enforceable. Doe v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 861, 866-67 (D.C.Cir.1996); Tony L. v. Childers, 71 F.3d 1182, 1188-89 (6th Cir.1995). That version required that in order to qualify for a grant, a State shall provide that upon receipt of a report of known or suspected instances of child abuse or neglect, the State would initiate an investigation and take immediate steps to protect the abused or neglected child. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2) (1988) (emphasis added). Despite this mandatory language, both circuits held that CAPTA was not privately enforceable because it did not mandate a particular means of investigation or state what type of actions must be taken to protect a child. Tony L., 71 F.3d at 1189; see also Doe, 93 F.3d at 867. The Sixth Circuit also observed that Congress wanted to leave states a certain amount of discretion in this area. Id. In 1996, the language of CAPTA was changed substantially. The current version requires each State receiving a grant to submit a plan that specifies the areas of the child protective services system that the State will address with its grant money. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(1)(A). That plan must contain a description of the activities that the State will carry out, including, as detailed above, a certification that the State is enforcing a law or operating a program that includes provisions and procedures requiring the appointment of guardians ad litem. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(xiii). Every federal district court to consider the question has found that the more recent versions of CAPTA do not satisfy the Blessing test. [12] See, e.g., Charlie H., 83 F.Supp.2d at 496-97; A.S. v. Tellus, 22 F.Supp.2d 1217, 1224 (D.Kan.1998); Jeanine B., 967 F.Supp. at 1118. These courts have generally agreed that CAPTA's requirements have too broad a focus to create individual, enforceable rights. At least one district court has emphasized that the current version presents a weaker case for private enforcement than the prior version. Jeanine B., 967 F.Supp. at 1118. We agree with this reasoning and affirm the district court's decision below. Unlike the case plan and records provisions of the CWA, the guardian ad litem provision of CAPTA does not contain the unambiguous rights-creating language necessary to satisfy the first prong of the Blessing test. As discussed above, when Congress wrote the CWA, it incorporated detailed requirements for what a child's case plan or health and education record must include and how those records must be incorporated into a case review system. In contrast, CAPTA gives little specific guidance, requiring only that a State either enact a law or create a program that includes procedures designed to accomplish broad goals, such as representation for every child by a guardian ad litem. [13] This approach leads us to conclude that Congress intended to focus on the aggregate or systemwide policies and practices of a regulated entity[,] rather than individual rights to benefits. Watson, 436 F.3d at 1159 (citing Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 287-88, 122 S.Ct. 2268). Our conclusion is bolstered by CAPTA's legislative history, which explains that Congress intended to ensure that States are responsible for planning and implementing the essential elements of an effective and efficient child protective service system without placing undue administrative burdens on States. S.Rep. No. 104-117, at 13 (1995), 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3490, 3503. We thus affirm the district court's dismissal of Count Nine on the basis that the guardian ad litem provision is not enforceable through § 1983. We need not consider the district court's alternative holding that Younger abstention was appropriate.
Count Ten seeks injunctive relief on behalf of a class of foster children who were not referred to early intervention services for which they were eligible. It seeks to enforce provisions of both CAPTA and IDEA that require States to refer certain children to early intervention services. The CAPTA provision, 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(xxi), provides: A State plan ... shall contain a description of the activities that the State will carry out using amounts received under the grant ..., including ... an assurance in the form of a certification by the Governor of the State that the State has in effect and is enforcing a State law, or has in effect and is operating a statewide program ... that includes ... provisions and procedures for referral of a child under the age of 3 who is involved in a substantiated case of child abuse or neglect to early intervention services funded under Part C of the [IDEA].[ [14] ] The IDEA provision requires a State to have policies and procedures that require the referral for early intervention services... of a child under the age of 3 ... who is involved in a substantiated case of child abuse or neglect[.] 20 U.S.C. § 1437(a)(6)(A). The district court held that the CAPTA provision is not privately enforceable and that IDEA's comprehensive enforcement scheme precludes enforcement of that provision through § 1983. We affirm the decision of the district court. Our analysis of the CAPTA guardian ad litem provision applies with equal force to the early intervention provision. Because Congress did not unambiguously confer an individual federal right, the early intervention provision fails the first prong of the Blessing test. See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283, 122 S.Ct. 2268. With respect to the IDEA claim, we have previously held that the IDEA has a comprehensive enforcement scheme that forecloses enforcement through § 1983. Blanchard v. Morton Sch. Dist., 509 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir.2007). Plaintiffs do not dispute this point, but they arguefor the first time on appealthat they are seeking to enforce the IDEA claim not through § 1983, as their complaint alleges, but through the express cause of action contained in Part C of the IDEA (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1439(a)(1)). Plaintiffs concede that IDEA's express cause of action requires parties to exhaust their administrative remedies. They urge us, however, to reverse the district court's dismissal; reinstate their IDEA cause of action; and allow Defendants to argue exhaustion as an affirmative defense on remand. See Payne v. Peninsula Sch. Dist., 653 F.3d 863, 867 (9th Cir.2011) (en banc) (holding that IDEA's exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional and must be raised as an affirmative defense). This course of action would be inappropriate. The district court correctly applied the law to Plaintiffs' § 1983 claim and had no opportunity to decide whether Plaintiffs could proceed under IDEA's express cause of action. We thus affirm the district court's dismissal of Count Ten. If, on remand, Plaintiffs wish to pursue a claim under IDEA's express cause of action, they can seek leave to amend their complaint.