Opinion ID: 1729109
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: youngs' attorney and paralegal fees

Text: The $25,000 attorney fee award in this case does not include an itemization of the amounts attributable to the efforts of McBride and the Youngs. However, inasmuch as the award exceeds the total amount reflected on billing statements which McBride submitted to the Youngs, we conclude that a portion of the award must be attributable to the attorney and paralegal fees submitted by the Youngs for time spent working on their own case. [6, 7] As a general rule, attorney fees and expenses may be recovered in a civil action only where provided for by statute or when a recognized and accepted uniform course of procedure has been to allow recovery of attorney fees. [7] Section 44-359 is a fee-shifting statute which permits a successful litigant to recover attorney fees as a part of the judgment in certain actions against insurance companies. The statute provides in pertinent part: In all cases when the beneficiary or other person entitled thereto brings an action upon any type of insurance policy... the court, upon rendering judgment against such company, person, or association, shall allow the plaintiff a reasonable sum as an attorney's fee in addition to the amount of his or her recovery, to be taxed as part of the costs. [8] In Dale Electronics, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., [9] we held that under § 44-359, a successful litigant is entitled to receive a reasonable attorney's fee for in-house counsel actually engaged in the preparation and trial of the litigation to the same extent as outside counsel. However, we have not previously decided whether § 44-359 permits the recovery of an attorney fee by a pro se plaintiff who is a licensed attorney. The U.S. Supreme Court addressed a similar issue in Kay v. Ehrler, [10] decided in 1991. Richard Kay, an attorney, successfully represented himself in a civil rights action challenging Kentucky's election statutes. He sought attorney fees under a federal statute [11] which permitted an award of an attorney fee to the prevailing party in federal civil rights litigation. Noting that pro se litigants who were not lawyers were not entitled to recover fees, the Supreme Court framed the issue as whether a lawyer who represents himself should be treated like other pro se litigants or like a client who has had the benefit of the advice and advocacy of an independent attorney. [12] The Court resolved the issue in the negative based upon three principles. First, as a textual matter, the Court concluded that the term attorney assumed an agency relationship and that it seems likely that Congress contemplated an attorney-client relationship as the predicate for an award of attorney fees. [13] Second, the Court observed that the purpose of fee-shifting statutes was to enable potential plaintiffs to obtain the assistance of competent counsel in vindicating their rights. [14] Third, the Court noted that a rule which awards fees only to those litigants who have retained independent counsel ensures the effective prosecution of meritorious claims. [15] After the Kay decision, federal courts have denied attorney fees to pro se attorneys under a variety of fee-shifting statutes, including the Equal Access to Justice Act, the Freedom of Information Act, and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. [16] State courts have generally followed suit. [17] While post- Kay decisions have continued to emphasize the incentive of retaining independent counsel [18] and the agency relationship between an attorney and a client, [19] some have also noted that pro se attorneys do not actually incur fees for which they might be compensated. [20] We join the courts which have adopted the reasoning of Kay. Allowing a pro se attorney litigant to recover fees while barring nonlawyer litigants from collecting fees would create disparate treatment of pro se litigants on the basis of their occupations, [21] and we decline to adopt such rule. We hold that a successful pro se litigant in an action on an insurance policy is not entitled to recover an attorney fee under § 44-359, even if the pro se litigant is a licensed attorney. Accordingly, the fee award in this case was erroneous to the extent that it included the attorney fees claimed by Thomas and the paralegal fees claimed by Jennie.