Opinion ID: 1342405
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Exclusion of Expert Mitigation Evidence

Text: Mercer retained numerous well-credentialed experts for the penalty phase, including a neurologist, a forensic psychiatrist, a pharmacologist, a sociologist licensed as a clinical social worker, and a corrections expert. During the penalty phase, the defense presented a comprehensive review of Mercer's troubled life. The mitigation evidence revealed much about Mercer. A sampling of the evidence reveals that Mercer has a damaging disability in terms of ... making judgment[s] and inferences and that he suffers from untreated depression. The experts opined that Mercer's abusive upbringing resulted in post-traumatic stress disorder and anxiety disorder, which are connected with previous trauma, nightmares[,] ... distressive recollections and substance abuse. Beyond Mercer's life experiences, he suffered from a myriad of cognitive deficiencies, including neurological dysfunction and learning disabilities. Because Mercer struggled from an early age to function in life and hold regular employment, he was found to be disabled by the Social Security Administration. Against this backdrop of a thorough mitigation presentation, we are presented with two challenges to the trial court's exclusion of expert testimony in the penalty phase. A ruling on the admissibility of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's ruling is based on an error of law. State v. Washington, 379 S.C. 120, 123-24, 665 S.E.2d 602, 604 (2008) (internal citations omitted). We first address the claim that the trial court abused its discretion in preventing Dr. John Steedman from opining that a SPECT Scan of Mercer's brain revealed an abnormality. While we agree that it was clear error to exclude this testimony, we do not find that Mercer was prejudiced by the error. Next is the assignment of error in connection with the trial court precluding Dr. Steedman from offering psychiatric opinion testimony. Again, we find no reversible error.
Dr. Steedman is a medical doctor who is board certified in neurology and psychiatry. Dr. Steedman analyzed a SPECT Scan conducted on Mercer's brain. [6] The SPECT Scan was initially reviewed by a radiologist who noted a questionable abnormality. Dr. Steedman was prepared to render a stronger finding of an abnormality. The State objected strenuously against such testimony, claiming surprise and prejudice. After an offer of proof and lengthy discussion, the trial court sustained the objection on the basis of Rule 403, SCRE, and a so-called discovery order violation. This ruling rises to the level of an abuse of discretion. Application of Rule 403 should be cautiously invoked against a capital defendant in the penalty phase, especially in light of the due process implications at stake when a capital defendant seeks to introduce mitigation evidence. [7] The probative value of Dr. Steedman's excluded testimony was, as a matter of law, not substantially outweighed by its potential for prejudice, as a result of the purported late disclosure or otherwise. Reliance on the so-called discovery order cannot withstand even minimal scrutiny, for there was no formal discovery order. [8] In any event, Dr. Steedman was disclosed to the State, as was the general substance of his testimony. We nevertheless find no reversible error. When the entirety of the record is considered, the exclusion of Dr. Steedman's proffered testimony of an abnormality juxtaposed to the radiologist's notation of a questionable abnormality resulted in no prejudice to Mercer. Despite the erroneous ruling, a review of the record demonstrates that Dr. Steedman testified at length concerning Mercer's cognitive deficiencies. Dr. Steedman's unchallenged testimony included reference to the SPECT Scan results as confirmatory of Mercer's learning disorder. More to the point, the same evidence the State successfully and erroneously challengedthe SPECT Scan abnormalitywas already in evidence without objection. Another defense expert previously testified that the SPECT Scan revealed an abnormality. Dr. Donna Schwartz-Watts, a defense psychiatrist, testified that she ordered what's called a SPECT Scan. And what a SPECT Scan is, this is one of the newer tests in medicine and it shows brain function.... But what it does, it's a ... picture of how your brain functions, and that test came back abnormal. There's a ... small area that's not normal on there.... Later, as Dr. Schwartz-Watts began to sum up her testimony, she again talked about the SPECT Scan. Referring to Mercer, she said that it's already a bad brain in the sense that he's got a learning disability and ... we even know that on a SPECT Scan there's an abnormality. Thus, the very SPECT Scan abnormality testimony Mercer sought to admit through Dr. Steedman was presented to the jury without objection through Dr. Schwartz-Watts. We therefore find the trial court's error in excluding Dr. Steedman's opinion testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Mitchell, 286 S.C. 572, 573, 336 S.E.2d 150, 151 (1985) (quoting State v. Key, 256 S.C. 90, 93, 180 S.E.2d 888, 890 (1971)) (noting that an error is harmless when it `could not reasonably have affected the result of the trial').
As noted, Dr. Steedman is board certified in both neurology and psychiatry. When Mercer sought to elicit brief testimony from Dr. Steedman as a psychiatrist, the State objected, claiming Dr. Steedman was only disclosed as an expert in neurology. The basis of the State's objection arose from the nonexistent discovery order, discussed above. The trial court entertained the objection, and Mercer proceeded to make an offer of proof. The offer of proof of Dr. Steedman's psychiatric opinion comprises a mere half page in this voluminous record. The thrust of Dr. Steedman's psychiatric opinion was that the types of [Mercer's] abnormalities ... are a cumulative effect on poor judgment, depression, anxiety, thought disorders, [and] paranoia. The State's objection was sustained, and Dr. Steedman was prevented from rendering a psychiatric opinion. Although the basis of the State's objection was specious, no reversible error is present. The excluded evidence was presented to the jury through other witnesses, especially Dr. Schwartz-Watts, without objection. Even defense counsel acknowledged that the proffered psychiatric opinion testimony of Dr. Steedman certainly ... mirrors [and] dove-tail[s] with Dr. Schwartz-Watts. As a result, Mercer sustained no prejudice from the exclusion of this cumulative evidence. State v. Graham, 314 S.C. 383, 386, 444 S.E.2d 525, 527 (1994) (noting that a harmless error analysis depends upon a host of factors, one of which is whether the excluded evidence was cumulative).