Opinion ID: 2253827
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Capable of Repetition Yet Avoiding Review Exception

Text: Respondent's second argument for an established exception to the mootness doctrine is that his case falls within the capable of repetition yet avoiding review exception. This exception has two elements. First, the challenged action must be of a duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation. Second, there must be a reasonable expectation that the the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again. Barbara H., 183 Ill.2d at 491, 234 Ill.Dec. 215, 702 N.E.2d 555. In the present case, there is no question that the first criteria has been met. As noted, the order was limited to 90 days. Both the parties and the appellate court agree that this challenged order was of such short duration, it could not have been fully litigated prior to its cessation. 379 Ill.App.3d at 1029, 320 Ill.Dec. 260, 887 N.E.2d 40. Therefore, the only question with regard to this exception is whether there is a reasonable expectation that respondent will personally be subject to the same action again. Respondent reads the phrase same action as broadly meaning an `equal' or `equivalent,' but not necessarily `identical' action. Under this reading, respondent maintains that he is likely, based on his diagnosis and history, to face the same action againi.e. a petition for involuntary admission. The State, however, counters this argument by asserting that this reading ignores the justification for the exception. The State argues that the basis for this exception to an otherwise moot case is that resolution will likely be relevant to a future controversy affecting the same party. Because respondent's claim is one of insufficient evidence, the State asserts that even a similar case would present a completely different issue and, therefore, no meaningful purpose would be served in deciding the [present] moot appeal. Though respondent is correct that the actions need not be identical, he nevertheless overlooks that the actions must have a substantial enough relation that the resolution of the issue in the present case would be likely to affect a future case involving respondent. In In re A Minor, this court considered whether the capable of repetition yet avoiding review exception could be applied to hear the otherwise moot appeal of a newspaper that had been prohibited from publishing the name of a juvenile charged in a closed criminal proceeding. In the course of holding that the newspaper's appeal fell within this exception to mootness, this court reasoned that an appellant need not demonstrate that the statute will in the future be applied in precisely the same circumstances or for precisely the same reasons. Such a requirement would mean that no case would ever be `capable of repetition,' for the simple reason that the facts of a future case might be slightly different. In re A Minor, 127 Ill.2d 247, 259, 130 Ill.Dec. 225, 537 N.E.2d 292 (1989). Instead, the court noted that it was sufficient that the same statutory provision will most likely be applied in future cases involving the same party. A Minor, 127 Ill.2d at 259, 130 Ill.Dec. 225, 537 N.E.2d 292. The statute at issue that would likely be applied in future cases involving the same [newspaper] was a provision in the Juvenile Court Act that supposedly allowed a court to prohibit the paper from disclosing the name of the minor who had been charged. A Minor, 127 Ill.2d at 263-64, 130 Ill.Dec. 225, 537 N.E.2d 292. Thus, when this court stated that the likelihood of the same statutory provision being applied in future cases involving the same party was sufficient to overcome mootness, the court implicitly reasoned that resolution of the paper's constitutional challenge to the application of the statute would have some impact on future cases, as the paper was likely to seek the right to publish the name of a juvenile charged in a future case. Simply stated, there must be a substantial likelihood that the issue presented in the instant case, and any resolution thereof, would have some bearing on a similar issue presented in a subsequent case. Respondent does not meet this burden. His claim on appeal is that the trial court lacked sufficient evidence to order his involuntary commitment. Respondent does not raise a constitutional argument or challenge the interpretation of the statute. Instead, he disputes whether the specific facts that were established during the hearing in this specific adjudication were sufficient to find respondent was a danger to himself or to others. There is no clear indication of how a resolution of this issue could be of use to respondent in future litigation. The court acknowledges that though it is possible that the resolution of such questions could be helpful to future litigants, we do not, as stated earlier, review cases merely to set precedent or guide future litigation. Berlin, 179 Ill.2d at 8, 227 Ill.Dec. 769, 688 N.E.2d 106.