Opinion ID: 613956
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Nature of Plaintiffs' Claim Warrants Particular Attention in Assessing Standing

Text: The panel's novel conclusionthat self-incurred costs can establish standing whenever occasioned by a not-irrational fear of being affected by challenged government conductwould warrant en banc review in any case. This, however, is hardly any case. Three features merit mention before discussing the panel's general failure to follow Supreme Court standing precedent. First, plaintiffs sue to strike down an act of Congress. That circumstance, by itself, demands an especially rigorous standing inquiry. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819-20, 117 S.Ct. 2312, 138 L.Ed.2d 849 (1997). The rigorous inquiry requirement derives from the Constitution's separation of powers and serves to maintain the proper balance between the least and most democratic branches of the federal government. See Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1436, 1441-42, 179 L.Ed.2d 523 (2011) (observing that [f]or the federal courts to decide questions of law arising outside of cases and controversies would be inimical to the Constitution's democratic character); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United For Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982) (recognizing that federal courts do not wield an unconditioned authority to determine the constitutionality of legislative or executive acts); see also Livingston, J., Op. Dissenting from Denial of Reh'g En Banc (Livingston, J., Op.), post at [199-200]. Thus, while a court should not hesitate to recognize standing to challenge federal law where rigorous inquiry demonstrates it exists, a court cannot excuse a party from that rigorous inquiry simply by proclaiming it the glory of our system that even our elected leaders must defend the legality of their conduct when challenged. Lynch, J., Op. Concurring in Denial of Reh'g En Banc (Lynch, J., Op.), ante at [172]. [3] Second, plaintiffs cannot themselves be targets of the statute they seek to invalidate. That fact requires them to make a much more convincing showing of standing than would be demanded of a target. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (stating that it is ordinarily substantially more difficult to establish standing to challenge government action that targets someone else (internal quotation marks omitted)). The requirement is based on a prudential concern with ensuring that a party who wishes to use the courts rather than the public square to attack legislation asserts his own concrete claim of injury rather than those of third parties. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). This prudential rule frees the Court not only from unnecessary pronouncement on constitutional issues, but also from premature interpretations of statutes in areas where their constitutional application might be cloudy. United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22, 80 S.Ct. 519, 4 L.Ed.2d 524 (1960). This last point assumes greater significance in light of a third feature of the case: the nature and source of the personal right asserted by plaintiffs are unclear. Although standing in no way depends on the merits of the plaintiff's contention that particular conduct is illegal, it often turns on the nature and source of the claim asserted. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 500, 95 S.Ct. 2197 (internal citation omitted). In short, to determine whether a party satisfies the injury prong of standing, a court must understand what legally protected interest has been invaded. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130. The question requires particular attention when, as here, Fourth Amendment rights are asserted. See generally Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 138-41, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978) (recognizing that identification of standing and substantive Fourth Amendment rights are intertwined). [4] Plaintiffs submit that the FAA is unconstitutional on its face for authorizing surveillance that violates the Fourth Amendment. [5] The claim is curious because, on its face, the FAA makes plain that any surveillance under that statute must be conducted consistent with the Fourth Amendment. This is reflected in no less than three provisions: (1) § 1881a(b)(5), which mandates that FAA surveillance shall be conducted in a manner consistent with the fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United States; (2) § 1881a(g)(2)(A)(iv), which requires the executive to certify to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISA court) that the procedures and guidelines it has adopted to satisfy FAA targeting and minimization requirements are consistent with the requirements of the fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United States; and (3) § 1881a(i)(3)(A), which conditions the requisite court order on a judicial finding that the executive's targeting and minimization procedures are consistent ... with the fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United States. See 154 Cong. Rec. S6388 (daily ed. July 8, 2008) (statement of Sen. Bond, then-Vice Chairman, S. Select Comm. on Intelligence) (describing Fourth Amendment compliance as overarching mandate of FAA). In the absence of any evidence of actual surveillance practices under the FAA, a court cannot assume that the executive and the judiciary will flout these statutory requirements or misconstrue Fourth Amendment protections. Indeed, the presumption is to the contrary. See United States v. Chem. Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15, 47 S.Ct. 1, 71 L.Ed. 131 (1926) (The presumption of regularity supports the official acts of public officers, and, in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, courts presume that they have properly discharged their official duties.); see also Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 618, 127 S.Ct. 2553, 168 L.Ed.2d 424 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (Government officials must make a conscious decision to obey the Constitution whether or not their acts can be challenged in a court of law and then must conform their actions to these principled determinations.). Thus, how can these plaintiffs claimin a lawsuit filed the very day the FAA became lawthat a statute to which they are not even subject, on its face, puts them at risk of any Fourth Amendment injury? See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 569 n. 4, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (requiring standing to be determined on the facts as they existed when the complaint [was] filed (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted)). [6] In the context of such a curious claim, the concerns raised by the panel's decision to lower plaintiffs' constitutional standing burden are heightened by those prudential principles whereby the judiciary seeks (1) to avoid deciding questions of broad social import where no individual rights would be vindicated and (2) to limit access to the federal courts to those litigants best suited to assert a particular claim. Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100, 99 S.Ct. 1601, 60 L.Ed.2d 66 (1979); see Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 499, 95 S.Ct. 2197 (discussing how prudential concerns supplement constitutional elements of standing). What individual Fourth Amendment right do plaintiffs seek to vindicate by this facial challenge? The question admits no easy answer. Plaintiffs assert that the FAA authorizes defendants to acquire the constitutionally protected communications of U.S. citizens and residentspresumably themselveswithout requiring identification of the people to be surveilled and the facilities to be monitored in individualized warrants based on criminal or foreign intelligence probable cause. Compl. ¶ 104. But as United States persons, plaintiffs cannot be the people to be surveilled under the FAA; if intercepted at all, it could only be as coincidental communicants of FAA targets. Coincidental interceptees, however, cannot claim a personal Fourth Amendment right to be identified or to have probable cause established as to themselves as a precondition to reasonable surveillance. Cf. United States v. Figueroa, 757 F.2d 466, 472 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that Title III order which does not specify every person whose conversations may be intercepted does not per se amount to a `virtual general warrant' in violation of the fourth amendment) (quoting United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 154, 94 S.Ct. 977, 39 L.Ed.2d 225 (1974)); United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764, 775 (2d Cir.1973) (rejecting argument that government must establish probable cause as to all interceptees: If probable cause has been shown as to one such participant, the statements of the other participants may be intercepted if pertinent to the investigation.). Alternatively, plaintiffs might be understood to challenge the FAA for failing to require individualized warrants, particularity, or probable cause with respect to foreign targets. But a non-target's personal right to challenge the lawfulness of surveillance of a third party usually arises only upon the non-target's actual interception in the course of such surveillance, which plaintiffs do not allege here. See generally United States v. Fury, 554 F.2d 522, 526 (2d Cir.1977). In any event, because FAA targets must be non-United States persons outside this country, they lack the very Fourth Amendment rights with respect to foreign intelligence surveillance that plaintiffs claim on their behalf. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274, 110 S.Ct. 1056, 108 L.Ed.2d 222 (1990) (holding that foreign persons outside the United States cannot claim Fourth Amendment protections); accord In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Africa, 552 F.3d 157, 168-69 (2d Cir. 2008). [7] This gives rise to a question that plaintiffs do not address and for which no answer can be found either in the panel opinion or Judge Lynch's concurrence: Under what, if any, circumstances can a coincidental interceptee claim a personal Fourth Amendment right to challenge foreign intelligence surveillance that is lawful as to its target? In other contexts in which warrantless interceptions are lawful as to one party, coincidental interceptees have not been found to have a distinct Fourth Amendment right. See generally United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751-53, 91 S.Ct. 1122, 28 L.Ed.2d 453 (1971) (holding that conversation recorded on consent of one participant did not violate other participant's Fourth Amendment rights). [8] If, like the district court, the panel had concluded that plaintiffs lacked standing regardless of the nature of their claims because they failed to show actual or imminent injury from FAA interception, there would, of course, have been no need to pursue this matter. But I question how, consistent with the province of the court... to decide on the rights of individuals, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803), the panel could recognize plaintiffs' standing without a clearer comprehension of the personal Fourth Amendment right at stake, see Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 500, 95 S.Ct. 2197. Further, without such an understanding, it is impossible to conclude that these plaintiffs are the persons best suited to challenge the constitutionality of a statute that cannot target them. Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. at 100, 99 S.Ct. 1601. Indeed, a contrary inference might be drawn from the fact that, in the FAA, Congress expressly conferred standing on electronic communication service providers to challenge directives requiring them to provide technical assistance to effect authorized surveillance. See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(4). Service providers' willingness to avail themselves of such standing is evidenced by the Fourth Amendment challenge one such provider filed to surveillance under the FAA's predecessor statute, the Protect America Act of 2007 (PAA), Pub.L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552. See In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ( In re FISA Section 105B Directives), 551 F.3d 1004 (FISA Ct.Rev.2008) (discussed further infra at [27-28]). In addition, the law recognizes any person's standing to challenge the legality of FISA-acquired evidence that is offered against him in a criminal prosecution. See, e.g., United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d 102, 107-31 (2d Cir.2010), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 3062, 180 L.Ed.2d 892 (2011); see also 50 U.S.C. § 1806(c) (requiring government to notify interceptee of intent to disclose or use information derived from electronic surveillance); id. § 1806(e) (permitting interceptee to move to suppress information derived from electronic surveillance as unlawfully acquired); id. § 1881e(a) (subjecting information derived from FAA surveillance to provisions of § 1806). Thus, a relaxed inquiry into plaintiffs' standing cannot be justified on the ground that no one else will be able to challenge FAA surveillance. In any event, the Supreme Court has expressly rejected such an argument as a ground for recognizing standing. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227, 94 S.Ct. 2925, 41 L.Ed.2d 706 (1974) (citing United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179, 94 S.Ct. 2940, 41 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974)); accord ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d at 675-76 (Batchelder, J.). Mindful of the heightened scrutiny and prudential concerns triggered by these particular aspects of plaintiffs' claim, I turn to the even more serious matter of the panel's failure to follow Supreme Court standing precedent.