Opinion ID: 1919820
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Louisiana Due Process Clause and Right of Access to Courts

Text: Petitioners and amici also argue Art. 930.8 violates state constitutional guarantees of due process as set out in La. Const. art. I, § 2 and of access to courts as set out in La. Const. art. I, § 22. These claims touch principally on the statute's retroactive application to those inmates convicted before Art. 930.8's effective date. Petitioners and amici argue that because inmates lack knowledge of the law and often face difficulty obtaining documents necessary to prosecute their claims, the time limit, especially the one-year period for those whose applications would have otherwise been barred on October 1, 1990, did not afford a reasonable time for these inmates to file as required by Louisiana law. Article I, § 2 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, except by due process of law. One of the goals of Louisiana's system of justice is to provide both the accused and the state fair and prompt trials, appeals, and further proceedings to correct error. A legitimate concern, however, is that this process should also end within a reasonable period of time. As such, we believe the question, insofar as due process is concerned, is whether Art. 930.8 provides a petitioner with a reasonable opportunity to have his claims heard and determined, in light of the state's interest in preventing the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims. Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 92-95, 76 S.Ct. 158, 160, 100 L.Ed. 83, 89 (1955); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 636, 94 S.Ct. 2496, 2501, 41 L.Ed.2d 363, 370 (1974); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 437, 102 S.Ct. 1148, 1158, 71 L.Ed.2d 265, 279 (1982). Cf. Reichenphader v. Allstate Ins., 418 So.2d 648, 649 (La.1982). In determining whether the three year limitations period in Art. 930.8 provides inmates with a reasonable period in which to bring an action for post conviction relief, we note that post conviction relief, which is procedural in nature, and speaks to matters of remedy, is not criminal litigation per se; rather, post conviction relief proceedings, which are designed to allow petitioners to challenge the legality of their confinement, are hybrid, unique, and have both criminal and civil legal characteristics. State ex rel. Tassin v. Whitley, 602 So.2d 721 (La.1992); Lemmon v. Connick, 590 So.2d 574 (La. 1992); Harrison v. Norris, 569 So.2d 585 (La.App.2d Cir.1990); cf. Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 293-94, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1087-88, 22 L.Ed.2d 281 (1969). As previously discussed, the post conviction reform measures undertaken pursuant to 1976 La.Acts, No. 448 and 1980 La.Acts, No. 429, as indicated supra, were aimed at streamlining Louisiana's former habeas procedure by easing the burden of repetitive applications, unnecessary hearings and administrative difficulties. The adoption of 1990 La.Acts, No. 1023, § 1 continued that policy. By not completely foreclosing the opportunity for post conviction relief in those cases involving new facts, new law, or where a death sentence has been imposed, and by providing a full three years (or one year for those who would have already been barred) for the filing of all other applications, Art. 930.8 strikes a balance between the competing interests of the state and the petitioners and provides a reasonable amount of time within which to file an application for post conviction relief. [8] We also conclude the one-year period provided in Art. 930.8 does not violate the due process rights of petitioners Glover and Wright. Glover, whose conviction and sentence became final in 1985, had approximately six years, twice as long as persons affected by Art. 930.8 prospectively, to file a meaningful application for post conviction relief. Wright, convicted in 1987, had over four years to file an application. In our view, the one-year grace period afforded these petitioners a reasonable opportunity to file applications for post conviction relief and did not deprive them of their right to due process. Cf. Reichenphader, supra . In a related vein, petitioners argue Art. 930.8 violates their right to access to courts under La. Const. art. I, § 22. Article I, § 22 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, which has no counterpart in the United States Constitution, provides: All courts shall be open, and every person shall have an adequate remedy by due process of law and justice, administered without denial, partiality, or unreasonable delay, for some injury to him in his person, property, reputation, or other rights. We recognized in Crier v. Whitecloud, 496 So.2d 305, 310 (La.1986), that statutes of limitation are exclusively a legislative prerogative whereby the legislature makes a legislative determination that after a certain period of time an action can no longer be maintained. The legislature's prerogative, however, only extends to matters which do not violate constitutional rights. In this case, there is no violation of petitioners' right of access to courts because Art. I, § 22, a mandate to the judiciary to insure that all courts are open so that every person shall have an adequate remedy by due process of law, is not violated so long as a legislative measure, like Art. 930.8, does not deprive petitioners of their right to due process. In addition, while Art. 930.8 restricts the time limit during which some petitioners may apply for post conviction relief, this article demonstrates the degree to which persons convicted in Louisiana courts are afforded post conviction access to courts. The post-conviction relief process in Louisiana provides for an additional level of review for persons who have already been tried (or who have pleaded guilty) [9] , who were convicted, and who had the right to seek judicial review of that conviction. [10] Because Art. 930.8 only deprives certain applicants (those without new facts, new law, and who have not been sentenced to death) of an unlimited time period within which to file an application for post conviction relief, it cannot be said that Art. 930.8 therefore denies those whom it affects of their right of access to courts under Art. I, § 22 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, in light of the additional level of review the same statute provides for.