Opinion ID: 791581
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Summary Judgment on the CEPA Retaliation Claim

Text: 31 This Court reviews lower court grants of summary judgment de novo, and we apply the same standard that the District Court should have applied. Union Pacific R.R. v. Greentree Transportation Trucking Co., 293 F.3d 120, 125 (3d Cir.2002). Under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(c), summary judgment should be granted only where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
32 Davis claims the City unlawfully retaliated against him because of his radio room complaints. The New Jersey CEPA makes it unlawful for an employer to take retaliatory action against an employee because he [o]bjects to, or refuses to participate in any activity, policy or practice which the employee reasonably believes is incompatible with a clear mandate of public policy concerning the public health, safety or welfare or protection of the environment. N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(c)(3). New Jersey courts have created a four-pronged test for evaluating CEPA claims, which mirrors the three-pronged test used to evaluate federal unlawful retaliation claims under Title VII: 33 A plaintiff . . . must demonstrate that: (1) he or she reasonably believed that his or her employer's conduct was violating either a law, rule, or regulation promulgated pursuant to law, or a clear mandate of public policy; (2) he or she performed a whistle-blowing activity described in N.J.S.A. 34:19-3c; (3) an adverse employment action was taken against him or her; and (4) a causal connection exists between the whistle-blowing activity and the adverse employment action. 34 Dzwonar v. McDevitt, 177 N.J. 451, 828 A.2d 893, 900 (2003); Kolb v. Burns, 320 N.J.Super. 467, 727 A.2d 525, 530 (1999). 35 The District Court held that Davis failed to make out a prima facie CEPA claim because (1) his complaints were unreasonable; (2) being required to undergo psychiatric evaluations does not constitute an adverse employment action; and (3) any subsequent adverse employment action was not taken because of Davis' whistle-blowing. With respect to the first prong, the District Court concluded that Davis' complaints were unreasonable as a matter of law because he refused to acknowledge that he was not being harassed by radio room personnel. In so holding, the court noted that the CEPA is not intended to spawn litigation concerning the most trivial or benign employee complaints, Estate of Roach v. TRW, Inc., 164 N.J. 598, 754 A.2d 544, 552 (2000). 36 Davis argues that the District Court inappropriately made findings of fact on this issue. We agree. The Supreme Court of New Jersey has clearly outlined the role of a trial judge in addressing the first prong of the CEPA standard: 37 [T]he trial court must make a threshold determination that there is a substantial nexus between the complained-of conduct and a law or public policy identified by the court or the plaintiff. If the trial court so finds, the jury then must determine whether the plaintiff actually held such a belief and, if so, whether it was reasonable. 38 Dzwonar, 828 A.2d at 901-902 (emphasis added); see also Abbamont v. Piscataway Township Bd. of Educ., 138 N.J. 405, 650 A.2d 958, 967-68 (1994). 39 In this case, the District Court properly determined that the complained of conduct (the radio room's poor record keeping and inappropriate assignments) implicates public policy concerns in that Davis' complaints identified potential official misconduct issues. (Pa76.) 7 However, the District Court overstepped its bounds by deciding for itself whether the complaints were trivial or reasonable. This is an issue of fact that has been specifically reserved for the jury under New Jersey case law. 8 Therefore, we could not affirm summary judgment based on the first element of a CEPA standard. 40 The District Court's alternative basis for summary judgment was that, even if Davis could satisfy the first two elements, he did not establish that he was subject to an adverse employment action under the CEPA because of whistle-blowing. The CEPA defines retaliatory action as the discharge, suspension or demotion of an employee, or other adverse employment action taken against an employee in the terms and conditions of employment. N.J.S.A. 34:19-2(e). New Jersey courts have interpreted N.J.S.A. 34:19-2(e) as requiring an employer's action to have either impacted on the employee's `compensation or rank' or be `virtually equivalent to discharge' in order to give rise to the level of a retaliatory action required for a CEPA claim. Klein v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of New Jersey, 377 N.J.Super. 28, 871 A.2d 681, 691 (2005) (quoting Hancock v. Borough of Oaklyn, 347 N.J.Super. 350, 790 A.2d 186, 193 (2002)). The Superior Court in Klein elaborated further: 41 Moreover, retaliatory action does not encompass action taken to effectuate the discharge, suspension or demotion but rather speaks in terms of completed action. . . . Nor does the imposition of a condition on continued performance of duties in and of itself constitute an adverse employment action as a matter of law, absent evidence of adverse consequences flowing from that condition. 42 Id. at 691-92 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 43 Similarly, in deciding a Title VII retaliation claim, this Circuit stated, retaliatory conduct must be serious and tangible enough to alter an employee's compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1300 (3d Cir.1997). 9 As such, in cases not involving actual discharge or refusal to hire, courts may find unlawful retaliatory conduct only if it alters the employee's compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, deprives him or her of employment opportunities, or adversely affects his or her status as an employee. Id. (internal citations omitted). [U]nsubstantiated oral reprimands and unnecessary derogatory comments are not serious and tangible enough to constitute adverse employment actions. Id. at 1301. 44 In this case, there are two possible retaliatory actions relevant to Count Seven. The first is the Department's requirement that Davis submit to psychiatric evaluations. The second is Davis' transfer from the K-9 unit to light administrative duty. 10 We agree with the District Court that ordering Davis to see a psychiatrist, without more, did not adversely affect his status as an employee. [A]n adverse employment action involves some harm to an employee's employment opportunities. Nelson v. Upsala College, 51 F.3d 383, 388 n. 6 (3d Cir.1995); see also Robinson, 120 F.3d at 1300. Where an officer is not guaranteed a negative evaluation upon entering the psychiatrist's office, merely being required to undergo an evaluation does not harm the officer's employment opportunities. 11 Davis' case actually illustrates this point because, after his first compelled psychiatric evaluation in 1998, he received a favorable determination from Dr. Logue, and the terms and conditions of his employment remained unchanged. Cf. Benningfield v. City of Houston, 157 F.3d 369, 376 (5th Cir., 1998) (referral of police officer for psychological testing to determine fitness for duty, in and of itself, was not an adverse employment action. Rather, the referral was designed to gather facts to form the basis for an employment decision.); Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 755 (4th Cir.1996) (referral for psychological examination insufficient under Title VII where no adverse employment action actually resulted). 45 On the other hand, Davis' transfer to administrative duty was an adverse employment action under the standards articulated in Robinson, 120 F.3d at 1300, in that it significantly altered his duties and status as an officer. The administrative position carried much less prestige than did his position as a K-9 officer, and he was forced to turn over his weapon, thereby preventing him from performing many of the normal duties of a police officer. Thus, the transfer to light duty was essentially a demotion. The issue, then, is whether Davis made out a prima facie case for retaliation by presenting evidence that there was a causal connection between this demotion and his protected whistle-blowing activities. 46 Davis has not alleged that the Department's decision-makers relied on anything other than the psychiatric reports when they decided to assign him to light duty. He does not dispute that Chief Williams and Deputy Chief Meyer transferred him because they saw reports from trained professionals indicating that he was not fit for duty, and not because they resented him for blowing the whistle on the radio room. The only individuals that Davis alleges were directly motivated by his whistle-blowing activities were Valdora and McKee. They were not, however, in a position to demote, transfer, or terminate Davis. 47 The extent of Valdora and McKee's alleged retaliatory conduct is the writing of memos suggesting that Davis be referred for psychiatric treatment. 12 This leaves a gap in causation between the actions of Davis' supervisors, who may have had inappropriate motives but did not directly take an adverse employment action, and the eventual adverse employment decision made by the City. When Davis' Count Sixteen retaliation claims went to trial in 2004, he attempted to fill this gap with the theory that the otherwise innocent decision-makers were tainted by the biased, untrue, and retaliatory memos of their subordinates, Valdora and McKee. 48 Some courts have held that an innocent employer who relied on a biased subordinate may be liable for retaliation under Title VII or the CEPA. See, e.g., Roach, 754 A.2d at 552 (the jury could have inferred from the evidence that in deciding to terminate plaintiff, [the employer] relied on a `tainted' evaluation prepared by [his subordinate].); see also Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 226 (5th Cir.2000) (If the employee can demonstrate that others had influence or leverage over the official decisionmaker,. . . it is proper to impute their discriminatory attitudes to the formal decisionmaker.); Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir.1990); Abbamont, 650 A.2d at 965-66 (holding that a school board may be held vicariously liable under the CEPA for the retaliatory actions of its officials). 49 However, Davis' theory in connection with Count Sixteen at the 2004 trial was different from the theory he advanced in the initial pleadings and in opposing summary judgment on the Count Seven CEPA claim in 2001. In reviewing the September 2001 summary judgment grant, we restrict our review to the submissions made to the District Court at that time. Knoll v. Springfield Township Sch. Dist., 699 F.2d 137, 145 (3d Cir.1983); see also MacGlashing v. Dunlop Equipment Co., Inc., 89 F.3d 932, 936 (1st Cir.1996). Prior to the entry of summary judgment, Davis' retaliation claim hinged solely on the allegation that Valdora and McKee sought to embarrass and harass him by forcing him to undergo unwanted psychiatric evaluations. We reemphasize, however, that neither generalized harassment nor being referred for psychiatric evaluation are adverse employment actions for the purposes of sustaining a retaliation claim. 50 On the other hand, Davis' later trial theory went further by asserting that Valdora and McKee wrote intentionally false memos in order to effectuate an adverse employment action, knowing that their recommendations would lead to a negative evaluation from the psychologists. 13 This slight difference in theories is a critical one. In 2001, Davis claimed the memos were only aimed at harassing him, rather than claiming they were intentionally fabricated and aimed at effectuating an adverse employment action. These 2001 allegations were insufficient to meet the CEPA's causation element. 51 The Valdora and McKee memos may have been factual but-for causes of Davis' demotion. However, unless they somehow improperly tainted the decision-making process (a crucial fact which Davis failed to allege in connection with Count Seven), it was Davis' actual receipt of a negative diagnosis that was the intervening and proximate cause of his adverse employment action. This is especially apparent given that Dr. Logue initially found Davis to be fit for duty, notwithstanding the Valdora and McKee memos. The pleadings alleged, at most, that Valdora and McKee had deplorable motivations for referring Davis for psychiatric evaluation. But retaliatory motive on the part of non-decision-makers is not enough to satisfy the causation element of a CEPA claim. Even viewing all reasonable inferences (that were available in September 2001) in favor of Davis, the proximate cause of his demotion was the mental health professionals' diagnosis that he was unfit for duty, not the supervisors' recommendations. Cf. Donofry, 795 A.2d at 269-70 (applying a proximate cause analysis to a CEPA retaliation claim). 52 We will therefore affirm the District Court's September 28, 2001, grant of summary judgment on Count Seven of the Second Amended Complaint. 53