Opinion ID: 2356506
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Striking of Amendment

Text: Appellants' last point on appeal is that the trial court erred in striking the first amendment to its complaint, which added a claim that the vote to convert the Brushy Island Water Association into the Authority failed to pass by the statutorily required two-thirds majority. Appellees state that this court reviews a trial court's decision to strike an amendment for manifest abuse of discretion and argue that, because appellants concede that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we should affirm the trial court's decision. Rule 15 of the Arkansas Rules' of Civil Procedure, which governs amendments to pleadings, provides in pertinent part that, [w]ith the exception of pleading the defenses mentioned in Rule 12(h)(1), a party may amend his pleadings at any time without leave of the court. Where, however, upon motion of an opposing party, the court determines that prejudice would result or the disposition of the cause would be unduly delayed because of the filing of an amendment, the court may strike such amended pleading or grant a continuance of the proceeding. We will not reverse a trial court's decision allowing or denying amendments to pleadings absent a manifest abuse of discretion. Harvill Cmty. Methodist Hosp. Ass'n, 302 Ark. 39, 786 S.W.2d 577 (1990). In their initial complaint, appellants alleged that the vote to convert the Brushy Island Water Association from a nonprofit corporation into a water authority was void and invalid because it failed to carry by a majority of the members. In response to appellees' motion to dismiss the complaint, appellants filed an amended complaint, which repeated these allegations. In response to another motion to dismiss, they filed a second amended and substituted complaint, again repeating these allegations. Finally, after another motion to dismiss, appellants filed a third amended and substituted complaint, alleging that the conversion vote failed to pass by a two-thirds majority as required by Ark.Code Ann. § 4-28-225 (Supp.2005). Appellees filed a motion to strike the third amended and substituted complaint, which the trial court granted on September 28, 2004. The effect of this order was to eliminate the claim that the conversion vote failed to pass by a two-thirds majority vote. A year later, on August 16, 2005, three weeks before the trial was scheduled to take place, appellants filed a first amendment to complaint, again alleging that the conversion vote failed to pass by a two-thirds majority as required by Ark.Code Ann. § 4-28-225. The trial court struck the amendment as untimely, finding that it was an attempt to reassert a claim contained in the third amended complaint that the court had stricken a year earlier. The court held that allowing the amendment would prejudice the appellees by forcing them to defend against new allegations so close to trial, On appeal, appellants do not argue that the trial court abused its discretion in striking the amendment, but instead claim that, because a statute requires a two-thirds vote rather than a majority vote, the trial court erred in deciding the conversion-vote issue on a standard other than this. Appellants admit that they are unable to cite any authority to support their position. Appellees maintain that a trial court is vested with broad discretion in allowing or denying amendments of pleadings. See Harvill, supra. Further, they claim that appellants have cited no legal authority to support a different standard of review. Therefore, they argue that we should affirm the trial court's decision. While it is unfortunate for appellants that they did not discover this claim until long after they filed their initial complaint, this fact does not change the law. [T]he trial court is vested with broad discretion in allowing or denying amendments to pleadings. Stoltz v. Friday, 325 Ark. 399, 409, 926 S.W.2d 438, 444 (1996) (citing Cawood v. Smith, 310 Ark. 619, 839 S.W.2d 208 (1992)). In Stoltz , we upheld the trial court's order striking an amended complaint where the amendment attempted to change the theory of recovery while a motion for summary judgment was pending. In Kay v. Economy Fire and Casualty Co., 284 Ark. 11, 678 S.W.2d 365 (1984), the trial court said that it would consider no pleadings filed after a certain date. Sometime after that date, plaintiffs realized that they had failed to include an allegation for compensatory damages in their bad-faith claim. The court found that the plaintiffs' complaint supported a claim for punitive, damages, which are allowed only if supported by a claim for compensatory damages. Id. at 13, 678 S.W.2d at 366. However, the court refused to allow an amendment including a claim for compensatory damages, entered judgment on the pleadings, and dismissed the complaint. We affirmed on appeal, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Appellants have failed to argue that the trial court abused its discretion in this case and have cited no legal authority supporting another standard of review. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and affirm. Affirmed.