Opinion ID: 1058658
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Clause (iii)Improper Purpose

Text: We next consider whether the provisions of clause (iii) of the second paragraph of Code § 8.01-271.1 provided an independent basis for the circuit court's award of sanctions against the Feld Attorneys. The Feld Attorneys argue that Judge Stitt did not find that the motions were filed for an improper purpose. The Feld Attorneys note that while Judge Stitt referenced language in clause (ii) of the second paragraph of Code § 8.01-271.1 when imposing sanctions, he did not make a parallel reference to language in clause (iii). Alternatively, the Feld Attorneys assert that the motions were not filed for an improper purpose but were filed for the manifest and valid purpose of seeking the Trial Judge's recusal. We disagree with the Feld Attorneys' arguments. Judge Stitt stated that he was imposing sanctions under Code § 8.01-271.1 and, although he did not make specific reference to the language of clause (iii) when stating his decision, the record is replete with references in which he described the unacceptable and contemptuous character of the Feld Attorneys' motions. In addition, in rendering his decision, Judge Stitt stated that he was granting PETA's motion for sanctions, which was based on both clauses (ii) and (iii) of the second paragraph of Code § 8.01-271.1. We therefore consider whether the record supports a conclusion that the Feld Attorneys violated Code § 8.01-271.1 on the ground that the motions were filed for an improper purpose. The fact that the Feld Attorneys were seeking the recusal of the trial judge did not permit them to use language that was derisive in character. Yet they liberally employed such language. As stated above, the Feld Attorneys alleged in the motion to recuse that Judge Stitt ignor[ed] the basic tenets of contempt law, create[d] an appearance, at the very least, that [he] will ignore the law in order to give a strategic advantage to PETA, and ignored his ethical responsibilities [and] acted directly counter to them. The circuit court made several observations concerning the language used by the Feld Attorneys. The circuit court noted, [T]here is some very contemptuous language in those filings. It's unacceptable. The circuit court further observed, I've never seen anything like [the language in the Feld Attorneys' motions] outside of something filed by pro se [litigants]. . . . Additionally, the court found that the pleadings were not helpful to determining the issues in the case. The circuit court stated, [ N] ot only do I not find there's a legal basis for [the motion to recuse], but the things that are in this motion, some of them didn't even happen, and the rest of them were either twisted or distorted in a manner that I found to be highly inappropriate. The circuit court declined to hold the Feld Attorneys in criminal contempt under Code § 18.2-456(3) for their use of contemptuous language. Explaining its decision, the circuit court stated that contempt findings do have some very serious ramifications for attorneys' careers, and [the] contempt power absolutely is to be used sparingly, and I think I can accomplish what I need to in this situation without it. Thus, the record shows that the circuit court elected to use the sanctions provisions of Code § 8.01-271.1 in lieu of the stronger contempt power. We hold that the record before us demonstrates that the Feld Attorneys' motions were filed for an improper purpose and, thus, violated clause (iii) of the second paragraph of Code § 8.01-271.1. Contemptuous language and distorted representations in a pleading never serve a proper purpose and inherently render that pleading as one interposed for [an] improper purpose, within the meaning of clause (iii) of the second paragraph of Code § 8.01-271.1. Such language and representations are wholly gratuitous and serve only to deride the court in an apparent effort to provoke a desired response. As we held in Taboada v. Daly Seven, Inc., 272 Va. 211, 215-16, 636 S.E.2d 889, 891 (2006), clause (iii) of the second paragraph of Code § 8.01-271.1 is designed to ensure dignity and decorum in the judicial process. This provision deters abuse of the legal process and fosters and promotes public confidence and respect for the rule of law. Id. at 216, 636 S.E.2d at 891. We observe that clause (iii) in the second paragraph of the statute also is intended to prevent use of intemperate language that serves no objective purpose other than to ridicule or deride a court. Because the language found in the Feld Attorneys' motions clearly falls within this proscription, we hold that the Feld Attorneys' motions were filed with an improper purpose, within the meaning of clause (iii). The Feld Attorneys argue, nevertheless, that the circuit court erred in its award of sanctions because that award was based in part on the motion to vacate the rule to show cause against Petrosinelli and Porter (motion to vacate). The Feld Attorneys assert that the motion to vacate was objectively reasonable because Petrosinelli and Porter did not violate any order of the circuit court. In deciding this issue, we recognize that the circuit court dismissed the March rule to show cause against Porter. Also, we have held in Petrosinelli v. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, 273 Va. ___, ___, 643 S.E.2d 151, ___ (2007) (this day decided), that the circuit court abused its discretion in holding Petrosinelli in contempt of court. These holdings establish that the motion to vacate was warranted by existing law to the extent that it argued that Petrosinelli and Porter should not be held in contempt of court. However, the determinative consideration before us is that the motion to vacate additionally incorporated by reference the motion to recuse, which we have held was not warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and was filed for an improper purpose. Therefore, because the Feld Attorneys made the motion to recuse part of their motion to vacate, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in basing its award of sanctions in part on the motion to vacate. [7] The Feld Attorneys also contend that the circuit court erred in sanctioning the Feld Attorneys for filing Feld's [o]pposition to PETA's [a]mended and [s]upplemental [m]otion for [s]anctions. The record, however, fails to show that this pleading was a basis for the circuit court's award of sanctions. As stated above, the circuit court granted PETA's motion for sanctions and PETA's Amended and Supplemental motion for sanctions. Neither of those motions for sanctions contained any reference to the Feld Attorneys' opposition to sanctions. Therefore, we conclude that the Feld Attorneys' argument on this issue is without merit because it is not supported by the record. [8] In summary, we conclude that the record demonstrates the Feld Attorneys committed three separate violations of Code § 8.01-271.1, each of which independently supports the circuit court's impositions of sanctions. On these three separate bases, we hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions on the Feld Attorneys under Code § 8.01-271.1. [9]