Opinion ID: 1268291
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to Adequately Advocate Railey's Case

Text: Railey next argues that his defense attorneys were ineffective because they failed to advocate Railey's case adequately, consult with Railey, keep him informed as to all of his legal options, or properly advise him on any defenses, specifically voluntary intoxication, applicable to the charges against him. Railey asserts that his attorneys disagreed with each other as to whether he should go to trial or take a plea and that their conflicting advice confused him. Citing Strickland, the Kentucky court found no clear error in the trial court's determination that Railey's counsel were not ineffective. The court concluded that Railey's counsel educated [Railey] on the range of options available to all defendants, entering a plea or proceeding to trial. The court's determination that Railey's counsel were not deficient is neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of Strickland. Railey maintains that his attorneys did not fully explore the efficacy of any potential defenses, which is apparent from Railey's statements illustrating a misunderstanding of the law and a belief that proper defenses did exist in his case. As evidence, Railey points to a statement he read at his sentencing hearing, in which he stated that the shooting was unintentional, that his lawyers advised [him] . . . that whether it was an accident or not, [the shooting] still constitutes as a first degree assault, that he chose to take the plea not because [he thought he] deserve[d] it but because [his] attorneys ha[d] advised [him] to do so . . . to keep from hurting [the victim] any more, and that he had an alcohol problem. But Railey's statement does not suggest that his attorneys failed to counsel him about potential defenses. Consistent with the wording of the indictment, the government could have prosecuted Railey on the first-degree assault count under either a theory of specific intent or wanton conduct [9]  and Railey's intent is immaterial as it relates to wanton conduct. While Kentucky law provides that voluntary intoxication negate[s] specific intent, it does not negate culpability for a crime requiring a culpable mental state of wantonness or recklessness. McGuire v. Kentucky, 885 S.W.2d 931, 934 (Ky.1994) (emphasis added). Therefore, his attorneys' explanation  that the shooting, whether accidental or not, constituted first-degree assault  accurately reflects Kentucky law. [10] Moreover, defense counsel raised the accidental aspect of the shooting as a mitigating factor to reduce his sentence. The record simply does not support Railey's assertions of deficient performance or prejudice. The district court did not err by concluding that the state court's conclusion that Railey failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel was not an unreasonable application of or contrary to clearly established federal law.
Railey argues that his plea was not voluntary because he did not understand the law in relation to the facts, inasmuch as he was unaware that the circumstance of voluntary intoxication could be argued to negate specific intent. As evidence of his misunderstanding, Railey refers to his repeated  and consistent  assertions that all three alleged instances of assault were accidental because he did not commit them purposefully. Presumably, if he had known that voluntary intoxication could benefit his case, he would have argued that he was intoxicated. The longstanding test for determining the validity of a guilty plea is `whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.' Hill, 474 U.S. at 56, 106 S.Ct. 366 (quoting North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970)). Moreover, [t]he factual findings of a state court that the plea was proper generally are accorded a presumption of correctness. Garcia v. Johnson, 991 F.2d 324, 326 (6th Cir.1993). Here, the Kentucky Court of Appeals concluded: Railey asserts that the trial court erred in finding his guilty plea to have been educated and voluntary. The trial court noted that the court held a careful inquiry as required by Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), prior to accepting the guilty plea. The statements made by Railey on the record show that his plea was voluntary, and made knowingly and intelligently. Railey informed the court of his mental state prior to entering the plea. He stated that he was not under the influence of any stimulants. Railey affirmed that he had ample opportunity to discuss the evidence and options available to him with counsel, and that nothing further remained to be discussed with counsel. Railey also stated that he believed his attorneys were fully informed regarding the case. The court reviewed Railey's constitutional rights with him and informed him of the possible penalties he was facing, and the sentence he was agreeing to if he entered the plea. Where, as here, the record supports the finding that a plea was freely, knowingly and intelligently made, the conviction will not be reversed. Further, as the Commonwealth notes, Railey signed a `Waiver of Further Proceedings with Petition to Enter Plea of Guilty,' and counsel signed a `Certificate of Counsel' showing that Railey had been notified of his rights prior to entry of the plea. The Kentucky Supreme Court has held that the signing of such documents is sufficient to prove that a plea is freely and intelligently entered into. Railey, 2004 WL 2201368, at  (certain citations omitted). The transcript of the plea hearing supports the state court's conclusion that Railey's plea was knowing and voluntary. The trial court discussed with Railey the rights that he would waive by entering a plea of guilty. Railey's attorneys stated that they were satisfied that he entered the plea knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. Railey also signed a statement to enter his guilty plea, which contained the following: I have reviewed a copy of the indictment and told my attorney all the facts known to me concerning my charges. I believe he/she is fully informed about my case. We have fully discussed, and I understand, the charges and any possible defenses to them. Despite his protests to the contrary, Railey has simply not overcome the presumption of correctness we apply to the state court's determination that a plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily. Moreover, Railey fails to identify any basis for concluding that the state court's determination is an unreasonable application of or contrary to clearly established federal precedent.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.