Opinion ID: 794672
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Availability of Compensatory and Punitive Damages

Text: 108 The parties dispute whether the district court erred in awarding the plaintiffs punitive damages, as well as in awarding the plaintiffs expenses incurred in the course of obtaining new employment. Before we address the merits of these issues, we pause to consider whether Riverboat waived the argument that § 2114 permits only equitable relief—limited to reinstatement with back pay—by failing to raise it in a timely fashion. Specifically, Riverboat neglected to make this argument in its post-trial brief; it instead responded for the first time to the plaintiffs' request for compensatory and punitive damages in its Rule 52 Motion for Judgment or, in the Alternative, for Amendment of Judgment Pursuant to Rule 59. 109 Ordinarily, a challenge to damages not raised until post-judgment motions is deemed waived. See NutraSweet Co. v. X-L Eng'g Co., 227 F.3d 776, 791 (7th Cir.2000); see also Ameritech Info. Sys., Inc. v. Bar Code Res., Inc., 331 F.3d 571, 574 (7th Cir.2003). 32 However, this general waiver principle does not resolve, by itself, the situation before us. Given the very unique procedural history of this case, we must examine and evaluate the record as a totality to determine whether the defendants waived this issue. The plaintiffs first contend that Riverboat should have objected to their request for punitive damages in their proposed jury instructions and that the failure to do so constitutes waiver. However, Riverboat did file objections to the plaintiffs' jury instructions, including to the plaintiffs' request for an instruction on punitive damages. See R.160 at 6 (objecting to the proposed instruction on damages as placing undue emphasis on an award of damages, and incorrectly allowing punitive damages and other compensatory damages for violations of general maritime law and statutory violations. Defendants suggest that no instruction be given). That Riverboat did not further develop this objection is, in all likelihood, attributable to the procedural development of the case. The trial was not sent to a jury but instead was heard by the magistrate judge. Notably, the district court was given a full opportunity to address the merits of Riverboat's position on the availability of compensatory and punitive damages during post-trial proceedings, and the district court, who obviously was far more knowledgeable about the course of proceedings than the cold record allows us to be, considered the possibility of waiver but nevertheless decided to proceed to the merits of the issue. The plaintiffs certainly were given a meaningful opportunity to respond to the defendants' challenges in their responses to the defendants' post-trial motions. Jones-El v. Berge, 374 F.3d 541, 545 (7th Cir.2004). Similarly, the district court was given ample opportunity to address the issue. In light of these circumstances, we cannot say that the district court erred in determining that the availability of damages had been preserved adequately. 110 Therefore, we turn to the merits of Riverboat's challenge to the availability of compensatory and punitive damages. The district court examined the text of 46 U.S.C. § 2114, as well as general maritime law and analogous retaliatory discharge case law, and concluded from these sources that compensatory and punitive damages were available in this case. See R.191 at 36-40 (also noting that punitive damages would further the purpose of § 2114 in light of the potential chilling effect that flows from workplace retaliation). As a question of law, we review this conclusion de novo. Kramer v. Banc of America Sec., LLC, 355 F.3d 961, 964 (7th Cir.2004) (reviewing the district court's conclusion that punitive damages were permissible under the governing statute de novo). 111 At the time of the events in this case, 46 U.S.C. § 2114 provided that, if a seaman is terminated in retaliation for protected correspondence with the Coast Guard, he is entitled to any appropriate relief, including—(1) restraining violations of this section; and (2) reinstatement to the seaman's former position with back pay. § 13(b), 98 Stat. at 2864. Riverboat contends that the statute does not make available either compensatory or punitive damages, but rather limits the plaintiff's [sic] relief to equitable remedies such as reinstatement and back pay. Appellants' Br. at 43. 112 The plain text of the statute, however, makes clear that the plaintiffs' relief is not so limited. The statute authorizes a federal court to award any and all relief that the court deems appropriate. Equitable remedies, including an injunction and reinstatement, are listed in a demonstrative fashion; such remedies may be awarded, but do not represent the exclusive options available to the court. 33 This conclusion is bolstered by § 2114's legislative history. First, the legislative history describes § 2114 as making available a legal remedy, see S.Rep. No. 98-454, at 12 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4831, 4842, a term of art that—as a historical matter—encompasses and is defined by monetary relief. See Int'l Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Chromas Techs. Canada, Inc., 356 F.3d 731, 736 (7th Cir.2004) (Legal remedies traditionally involve money damages.). Second, Congress noted in the legislative history that § 2114 is intended to create a private right of action similar . . . to that in OSH Act section 11(c). S.Rep. No. 98-454. Indeed, Congress employed precisely the same statutory language in § 2114 as it did in OSHA, in both cases making available all appropriate relief. Compare § 13(b), 98 Stat. at 2864, with 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(2). This provision in the OSHA statute has been held to authorize both compensatory and punitive damages. See Reich v. Cambridgeport Air Sys., Inc., 26 F.3d 1187, 1191-92 (1st Cir.1994). Specifically, the First Circuit in Reich deemed Congress' choice of words, in light of governing Supreme Court precedent, significant. It pointed out that, in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60, 112 S.Ct. 1028, 117 L.Ed.2d 208 (1992), the Supreme Court held that, as a general matter and absent clear direction to the contrary by Congress, the federal courts have the power to award any appropriate relief in a cognizable cause of action brought pursuant to a federal statute, including compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 70-71, 112 S.Ct. 1028 (emphasis added). In turn, when a statute explicitly makes available any appropriate relief, referencing the broad power of the federal courts to award both compensatory and punitive damages, we can infer that Congress intended prevailing plaintiffs to recover compensatory and punitive remedies. This is true of § 2114, as it is of OSHA § 11(c). 34 113 Riverboat, however, submits that by detailing available forms of relief that are equitable in nature—an injunction, reinstatement and back pay—Congress thereby limited the available remedies to those listed in the statute. We cannot accept this argument. Use of the term including, followed by a list of equitable remedies, indicates the availability of the named remedies, but does not purport to limit `all appropriate relief' to those remedies only. Reich, 26 F.3d at 1191; see also Black's Law Dictionary 687 (5th ed. 1979) (`Including' within a statute is interpreted as a word of . . . illustrative application). By choosing to begin with the phrase any appropriate relief'—rather than merely providing that a seaman is entitled to an award restraining violations of this section; [and] reinstatement to the seaman's former position with backpay, § 13(b), 98 Stat. at 2864—Congress made it clear that it was not presenting an exhaustive list of available remedies. 35 Thus, we read any appropriate relief as an umbrella label; in turn, the phrase including restraining violations . . . and reinstatement indicates that the umbrella of available remedies encompasses both legal and equitable relief.