Opinion ID: 664133
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Unarmed Bank Robbery

Text: 28 The government asserts that even if the evidence was insufficient to convict Dinkane for armed bank robbery, it was sufficient to support a conviction for unarmed bank robbery under Sec. 2113(a). We agree, and accordingly direct the trial court to enter a judgment of conviction for the lesser-included offense of unarmed bank robbery. 29 Dinkane was convicted of the aggravated offense of armed bank robbery. He was not separately charged with or convicted of unarmed bank robbery, and thus there is no judgment entered against him on this count for us to affirm. We may nonetheless direct the trial court to enter a judgment on a lesser offense if the evidence is insufficient to support a guilty verdict on the greater offense but sufficient on the lesser offense when (1) the lesser offense [is] a lesser-included offense--a 'subset' of the greater one; (2) the jury [was] explicitly instructed that it could find the defendant guilty of the lesser-included offense and [was] properly instructed on the elements of that offense; and (3) the government [requested] on appeal that judgment be entered against the defendant on the lesser offense. United States v. Vasquez-Chan, 978 F.2d 546, 554 (9th Cir.1992) (footnotes omitted). 30 Here, each of these elements is satisfied. Unarmed bank robbery is a lesser-included offense of armed bank robbery, and when the jury found Dinkane had committed the latter, it necessarily also found that he committed the former. Burnette, 698 F.2d at 1044 n. 9 (citing Faleafine, 492 F.2d at 23-25). The jury was instructed on the elements of unarmed bank robbery and told that it was a lesser-included offense of armed bank robbery, and it was instructed that it could find the defendant guilty of the lesser charge. The jury instructions were not erroneous with respect to this offense. Furthermore, the government on appeal requested that this court affirm Dinkane's conviction for unarmed bank robbery. This request satisfies the requirement that the government ask for judgment to be entered on the lesser offense on appeal, see Vasquez-Chan, 978 F.2d at 554, although the government appears mistakenly to assume that a judgment of conviction was actually entered on the lesser offense. 31 The evidence was sufficient to support a conviction on this charge. Eighteen U.S.C. Sec. 2113(a) defines unarmed bank robbery, making liable[w]hoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes, or attempts to take, from the person or presence of another, or obtains or attempts to obtain by extortion any property or money or any other thing of value belonging to, or in the care, custody, control, management, or possession of, any bank, credit union, or any savings and loan association.... 32 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2113(a) (emphasis added). 33 Many courts have found that the crime of unarmed bank robbery continues through the period of hot pursuit. Thus a getaway car driver who learns of the robbery only at the time he aids the escape is guilty as an aider and abettor of bank robbery, not an accessory after the fact. See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 749 F.2d 1514, 1518 (11th Cir.1985); United States v. Willis, 559 F.2d 443, 444 (5th Cir.1977) (per curiam); United States v. Jarboe, 513 F.2d 33, 36-37 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 849, 96 S.Ct. 90, 46 L.Ed.2d 71 (1975). 34 This circuit implicitly accepted this proposition in United States v. Lovato, 740 F.2d 764, 765-66 (9th Cir.1984). In Lovato we upheld jury instructions in a bank robbery trial which stated: if the evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt that ... Lovato knowingly, intentionally and willfully aided the robber in leaving the scene of the robbery ... with stolen money from the [victimized institution], then defendant Lovato is guilty of the offense of robbery ... even if you believe she did not know the robbery of the savings and loan was going to take place while she waited in her car. Id. (emphasis in original). We affirmed Lovato's conviction, suggesting only that the instruction be modified to reflect that the money must have been just stolen from the savings and loan. Id. at 766. 35 Holding that the crime of unarmed bank robbery continues through the escape comports with the plain language of the statute. Section 2113(a) punishes the taking of property belonging to certain financial institutions. The taking continues beyond the immediate scene of the robbery, encompassing the escape. 4 We therefore now make clear what was implicit in Lovato: the crime of unarmed bank robbery continues throughout the period of hot pursuit. 36 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, a reasonable jury could have found Dinkane guilty of aiding and abetting unarmed bank robbery. To begin, there was evidence that Dinkane knew of the planned robbery before it even began. The testimony of the security guard identified Dinkane as the individual who went into the bank shortly before the robbery and returned with pamphlets, an accomplice stated that the person who went into the bank had the duty of locating the security cameras as part of the robbery preparations, and Dinkane's fingerprints were on bank pamphlets found in the getaway car. Dinkane also conferred with two of the three men who robbed the bank just minutes before the robbery occurred. The jury, on the basis of this evidence, could have believed beyond a reasonable doubt that Dinkane helped plan the robbery, acting as the scout who went into the bank to locate the security cameras so that they could be blocked during the robbery. 37 Moreover, even if the evidence of his prior participation was insufficient, the evidence that he knowingly and intentionally aided the escape was sufficient. After the robbery, the three robbers ran out of the bank, guns drawn. One man carried a bag. When they got in the car the exploding bait money filled the car with smoke and red dye. Carmichael, Dinkane's cousin, directed Dinkane to drive to a designated parking lot and he followed the instructions, driving quickly. At this point, a reasonable jury could find that Dinkane knew he was aiding and abetting escaping bank robbers. Furthermore, when they got out of the car, Dinkane, along with the others, fled. The jury might have considered the evidence of Dinkane's flight as indicating his consciousness of guilt. See United States v. Harris, 792 F.2d 866, 869 (9th Cir.1986). 38 Although Dinkane argues that he had no knowledge of the robbery and that the jury could not have convicted him based on the testimony of certain witnesses whom it disbelieved with respect to other defendants, the jury was not required to accept Dinkane's potentially innocent explanations for his behavior. See United States v. Aichele, 941 F.2d 761, 764 (9th Cir.1991) (inquiry is whether any reasonable jury could find the elements of the crime, on these facts, beyond a reasonable doubt, not whether [the defendant] is plausibly not guilty). Viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, the jury could have believed that Dinkane knowingly and intentionally aided and abetted the robbery of the Security Pacific Bank.