Opinion ID: 429511
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Factual Basis

Text: 12 The OCCA is a criminal statute imposing punishment of up to a $10,000 fine or ten years' imprisonment for the sale of explosives without a license. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 844(a). The first interpretative principle and one to which the Supreme Court has repeatedly paid tribute provides that 'ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.'  United States v. Grissom, 645 F.2d 461, 466 (5th Cir.1981), quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347, 92 S.Ct. 515, 522, 30 L.Ed.2d 488, 496 (1971) (adopting the narrower reading of a statute where legislative history is ambiguous). See Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 406, 100 S.Ct. 1747, 1753, 64 L.Ed.2d 381, 389 (1980); United States v. Dudley, 581 F.2d 1193, 1197 (5th Cir.1978). This familiar rule of statutory construction applies even though we construe the OCCA in a declaratory judgment action, a civil context. See FCC v. American Broad. Co., 347 U.S. 284, 296, 74 S.Ct. 593, 600-01, 98 L.Ed. 699, 709 (1954) (strictly construing a criminal statute in a civil action); Schwartz v. Romnes, 495 F.2d 844, 849 (2d Cir.1974) (applying the rule of strict construction in a stockholder's derivative suit); Briggs v. American Air Filter Co., 455 F.Supp. 179, 182 (N.D.Ga.1978) (following basic due process principles of criminal statutory construction in a civil damage action), aff'd, 630 F.2d 414 (5th Cir.1980). Applying this rule, we do not consider Congress' intent so clear as to entitle the government to judgment as a matter of law upon the factual record as developed thus far. 13 First, one aspect of the congressional history discussed by the trial court, 545 F.Supp. at 990, seems to cut against the court's conclusion, rather than support it. A Model Explosives Act, drafted by the Institute of Makers of Explosives, was the subject of testimony during House hearings, and contained exemption language virtually identical to existing Sec. 845(a)(4). See Explosives Control: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House of Rep. Comm. on the Jud., 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 193 (1970). The definitional section of the Model Act, however, specifically excluded military-type ammunition containing explosive bursting charges from its definition of small arms ammunition. Id. at 195. Although Congress adopted language identical to the Model Act's small arms ammunition exception, the ATF has not adopted the Model Act's definition of ammunition; 27 C.F.R. Sec. 55.11 (1983) does not contain an express exclusion of military-type ammunition containing explosive bursting charges. 14 Secondly, a subsequent amendment to Sec. 845(a)(5) casts doubt upon the district court's conclusion that both Secs. 845(a)(4) and (5) were effectively limited to sports-related activities. As originally enacted in 1970, Sec. 845(a)(5) exempted black powder in quantities not to exceed five pounds. Pub.L. No. 91-452, Sec. 845(a)(5), 84 Stat. 952, 958 (1970), reprinted in [1970] U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 1073, 1117. Although this exemption clearly was designed to accommodate sporting enthusiasts, see H.R.Rep. No. 91-1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 70, reprinted in [1970] U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 4007, 4047, in operation the exemption allowed any person to obtain or possess up to five pounds of black powder, notwithstanding the possibility that it [might] be intended for criminal misuse. H.R.Rep. No. 93-1570, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 120, reprinted in [1974] U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 7805, 7808. To close this loophole, Congress amended the statute in 1975 to read: Black powder ... intended to be used solely for sporting, recreational, or cultural purposes in antique firearms. See United States v. Guess, 629 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir.1980). 15 This amendment indicates that without the additional limiting language, the original exemption was drafted broader than necessary in order to minimize interference with lawful activity. Therefore, if, as the district court concluded, Sec. 845(a)(4) was, like Sec. 845(a)(5), originally enacted to facilitate pursuit of legitimate sporting activities, Congress' failure to add similar limiting language to subsection (4) renders that provision susceptible to a broader interpretation. Although the legislative history discussed by the district court lends support to its conclusion, 3 these countervailing factors reveal that the legislative history and intent are ambiguous. 16 We do not decide that the district court's construction of the Act was incorrect. Rather, we consider this case analogous to the situation in United States v. Perry, supra, 431 F.2d 1020, in which the court confronted a difficult statutory construction problem in a summary judgment case involving The Anti-Kickback Act, 41 U.S.C. Sec. 51. The Ninth Circuit vacated summary judgment noting that 17 to decide the issue means to determine the meaning of an extraordinarily ambiguous statute in the face of an inconclusive legislative history, a nearly complete absence of relevant precedent and a totally inadequate factual record.... We prefer not to expound its meaning in the absence of the light that may be shed by [the development of] a factual record. 18 431 F.2d at 1023. As noted, the fact that the OCCA is a criminal statute heightens our concern with its ambiguity.