Opinion ID: 901725
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether the trial court erred when instructing the jury on self defense.

Text: [¶ 7.] We have clarified our standard of review for jury instructions as follows: A trial court has discretion in the wording and arrangement of its jury instructions, and therefore we generally review a trial court's decision to grant or deny a particular instruction under the abuse of discretion standard. However, no court has discretion to give incorrect, misleading, conflicting, or confusing instructions: to do so constitutes reversible error if it is shown not only that the instructions were erroneous, but also that they were prejudicial. State v. Packed, 2007 SD 75, ¶ 17, 736 N.W.2d 851, 856 (quoting Vetter v. Cam Wal Elec. Co-op., Inc., 2006 SD 21, ¶ 10, 711 N.W.2d 612, 615) (internal citations omitted). Erroneous instructions are prejudicial under SDCL 15-6-61 when in all probability they produced some effect upon the verdict and were harmful to the substantial rights of a party. Accordingly, when the question is whether a jury was properly instructed overall, that issue becomes a question of law reviewable de novo. Under this de novo standard, we construe jury instructions as a whole to learn if they provided a full and correct statement of the law. Papke v. Harbert, 2007 SD 87, ¶ 13, 738 N.W.2d 510, 515 (quoting Vetter, 2006 SD 21, ¶ 10, 711 N.W.2d at 615 (quoting State v. Frazier, 2001 SD 19, ¶ 35, 622 N.W.2d 246, 259 (citations omitted)). [¶ 8.] The trial court instructed the jury on the defense of justifiable homicide structured around SDCL 22-16-34 (2005) and SDCL 22-16-35 (2005). The statutes provided as follows: Homicide is justifiable when committed by any person when resisting any attempt to murder such person, or to commit any felony upon him or her, or upon or in any dwelling house in which such person is. SDCL 22-16-34 (2005). Homicide is justifiable when committed by any person in the lawful defense of such person, or of his or her husband, wife, parent, child, master, mistress, or servant when there is reasonable ground to apprehend a design to commit a felony, or to do some great personal injury, and imminent danger of such design being accomplished. SDCL 22-16-35 (2005). Cottier had no objection to the trial court's instructions based on the two statutes. He did, however, object to the court giving six additional instructions numbered 31 to 36. Cottier objected to Instructions 31 and 36 because they both instructed on the right of self defense against an assault not rising to the level of a felony aggravated assault and the lawful degree of force in defending against a non-felony assault. [¶ 9.] Instruction 32 explained that one being attacked can legally defend oneself and pursue the attacker if it is reasonable and necessary. Instruction 33 explained what constituted a lawful self defense against an assault with fists and hands. Instruction 34 explained a situation under which deadly force could not be used in self defense. Instruction 35 explained that a person defending against unlawful attack has to stop the use of force as soon as the danger of attack ended. When settling instructions, the defense argued that the six instructions were not relevant to the defense of justifiable homicide. Cottier claimed that the challenged instructions limited the language from justifiable homicide against any felony to self defense against aggravated assault or assault and were philosophically inconsistent and conflicting statements of the law. Cottier claimed that to infuse the additional irrelevant instructions concerning retreat and the necessity to stop when the danger ends only served to confuse the jury and blurred the true issue of justification. [¶ 10.] The trial court overruled Cottier's objections and explained on the record that it wanted the jury to understand the law of self defense fully, including the law of self defense against assault not rising to the level of a felony assault and that it anticipated a jury question about non-felony assaults if it did not give the additional instructions. [2] Cottier claims that the trial court's failure to properly instruct the jury denied him his right to a fair trial in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article VI, Section two of the South Dakota Constitution. US Const amend V and XIV; SD Const art VI, § 2. [¶ 11.] Had the trial court only instructed the jury on justifiable homicide without the additional six instructions, it would have been less confusing for the jury. Self defense against non-felony assault was not an issue in the case and superfluous to the jury's decision. Nevertheless, the defense originally proposed defense instructions 9 and 10, which clearly introduced the concept of self defense against a non-felony assault. [3] The record does not reflect that either proposed instruction was withdrawn. In fact, even after the court decided to give the six challenged instructions, the defense urged the trial court to substitute defense instructions 9 and 10 for two of the court's instructions. Consequently, since the court's instructions 31 and 36 mirror defense proposed instructions 9 and 10, Cottier has shown no prejudice in giving those two instructions. Additionally, Cottier admits that two of the instructions, Instructions 33 and 34, actually benefited the defense. Thus, even if Instructions 33 and 34 were irrelevant, no prejudice was shown. [¶ 12.] Of the two remaining, Instruction 32 instructed that Cottier had the right to defend himself against an attacker and did not have to retreat, but could, if it appeared reasonable and necessary, pursue the attacker until he was secure from danger, even if safety may have been more easily gained by withdrawing from the scene. When this instruction is read in conjunction with the trial court's instructions on justifiable homicide, it is an accurate statement of the law. Cottier's defense of justifiable homicide required a showing that he was defending against imminent danger of great personal injury or attempted murder or the attempt to commit a felony upon him. See SDCL 22-16-35; SDCL 22-16-34. Instruction 32, by contrast, simply explained that Cottier was not required to retreat from the attack and could pursue the attacker until free from danger. If anything, the extra instruction permitting the pursuit of the attacker helped, rather than hurt, Cottier's defense. Under the facts of the case, it was not error to give Instruction 32. [¶ 13.] The final challenged instruction, Instruction 35, provided as follows: A person who defends against unlawful attack must stop the use of force as soon as the danger of attack has ended. If it would appear to a reasonable person in the same position that there is no further danger, then there should be no further force. Cottier claims that the reasonable person standard used in the instruction is not required for a justifiable homicide defense. We disagree. When a defendant claims justifiable homicide because he was threatened with serious bodily injury, the responding force becomes limited to that which is reasonable in the circumstances, and, as the threat of harm dissipates, so does the reasonableness of the force used. State v. Jaques, 428 N.W.2d 260, 265-66 (S.D.1988); see also State v. Pellegrino, 1998 SD 39, ¶ 16, 577 N.W.2d 590, 596-97 (defining justifiable homicide statute as follows: when persons are placed in apparent imminent danger of great personal injury, [they] have the right to stand their ground and meet force with force, even to the extent of taking life if such persons actually believe, and the circumstances and surrounding conditions are such that a reasonably cautious and prudent person would believe, danger of death or great personal injury to be imminent at the hands of the assailant) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). [¶ 14.] Cottier also claims that a jury question concerning Instruction 35 supports his argument that Instructions 31 through 36 were confusing and prejudicial. The jury asked: Does Instruction 35, where it speaks of unlawful attack. Does this instruction include a felony assault or a lesser offense? The trial court's answer instructed the jury to read Instruction 35 together with the prior instructions defining justifiable homicide. The defense agreed to the court's answer without conceding the previous objection that the instruction was philosophically inconsistent with justifiable homicide and unsupported by the evidence. Ultimately, Cottier's main disagreement with Instruction 35 was that is was unnecessary because the justifiable homicide instruction was complete by itself, since the justifiable homicide instruction required imminent danger. Although this instruction may not have been necessary, as the defense argues, it is not an incorrect statement of the law. See Pellegrino, 1998 SD 39, ¶ 16, 577 N.W.2d at 596-97. [¶ 15.] Thus, because the defense can show no prejudice from instructions 31, 33, 34, or 36, or that instructions 32 and 35 are incorrect statements of the law, the court's instructions did not result in prejudicial error. See Papke, 2007 SD 87, ¶ 13, 738 N.W.2d at 515.