Opinion ID: 1760726
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The testimony of James Boyd.

Text: James Boyd suffered massive injuries in the collision, which left him severely disabled and speech-impaired. Burton filed a motion in limine to exclude Boyd's testimony on grounds that [i]t is defense counsel's understanding that Mr. Boyd neither remembers the accident nor has any first-hand knowledge as to how it happened. Therefore testimony regarding his injuries would be irrelevant pursuant to KRE 402. In its response, the Commonwealth argued that Boyd does have some memory of the incident but whether Boyd has any memory of the crash is, in any court, a question for the jury. The Commonwealth further argued that the fact and extent of Boyd's injuries was relevant to proving serious physical injury for purposes of first-degree assault. At the hearing on the motion, the Commonwealth acknowledged that six months before trial Boyd could not have been able to communicate, but that Boyd had since improved and recently indicated that he did remember the accident and could communicate, although he would be difficult to understand. The court then ruled that as long as Boyd could communicate, he could testify. The defense could then test his ability to recollect. Finally, the court ruled that Boyd's injuries were relevant to proving serious physical injury. At trial, Boyd's speech was very difficult to understand. But when asked if he remembered the wreck, he appears have said, yeah. When asked whether he was on his side of the road or on Burton's when the wreck occurred, Boyd appears to say ours. Because Boyd was difficult to understand, the trial court suggested that he demonstrate with his hands which side of the road he meant. The prosecutor then asked Boyd to imagine his (the prosecutor's) arms were two different sides of the road. The prosecutor then raised his right arm and explained this represented Boyd's side of the road. The prosecutor raised his left arm and explained this represented the other side of the road. The prosecutor then asked Boyd which side of the road he was on when the cars collided. The prosecutor then leaned toward Boyd with his right arm closest to Boyd. Boyd reached out and touched the prosecutor's right arm, ostensibly testifying that he and Bartolo were in their lane of travel when the collision occurred. KRE 601 provides, in part: (b) Minimal qualifications. A person is disqualified to testify as a witness if the trial court determines that he: (1) Lacked the capacity to perceive accurately the matters about which he proposes to testify; (2) Lacks the capacity to recollect facts; (3) Lacks the capacity to express himself so as to be understood, either directly or through an interpreter; or (4) Lacks the capacity to understand the obligation of a witness to tell the truth. KRE 601 establishes a presumption of competency and allows disqualification of a witness only upon proof of incompetency. Price v. Commonwealth, 31 S.W.3d 885, 891 (Ky.2000). First, the defense presented no evidence to indicate that Boyd, as the passenger in Bartolo's car, was incapable of perceiving the collision at the time it occurred. KRE 601(b)(1). Second, when asked if he remembered the accident, Boyd apparently said, yeah. KRE 601(b)(2). The burden was on the defense to prove that he could not recollect. The defense, however, chose not to cross-examine Boyd nor present any evidence to rebut his assertions. On the witness stand, Boyd was awake and attentive and he appeared to be listening to and understanding the questions being directed to him. Although his speech was very difficult to understand, his responses of yeah and ours were discernable. Further, in light of Boyd's speech disability, we see nothing amiss in the trial court's allowing Burton to gesture as an alternate means of communication. Although Burton attempts to argue that Boyd only pointed to the prosecutor's right arm because it was the closest to Boyd, (representing that he and Boyd were in their lane when the crash occurred), the defense was free to cross-examine Boyd on this issue and chose not to. Under these facts, we cannot say the trial court's finding of competency was an abuse of discretion. Whitehead v. Stith, 268 Ky. 703, 105 S.W.2d 834, 837 (1937) (stating that a trial court's competency determination is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard). As to the intimation that Boyd's pointing was influenced by the closeness of the prosecutor's right arm, this should certainly be avoided at retrial. Burton additionally argues that Boyd's testimony violated KRE 403, on grounds that Boyd was incompetent to testify and that his severe disabilities aroused undue sympathy for him from the jury. We disagree. We have addressed the competency issue above. As to the probative value of the testimony, other than Burton  who did not testify and had stated that he did not know what happened  Boyd was the only surviving eyewitness to the crash. Thus, his testimony was highly probative of how the crash occurred. In addition, Boyd's injuries were relevant to proving the serious physical injury element of the first-degree assault charge. Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 508.010. As to Burton's claim of undue prejudice resulting from Boyd's sympathetic appearance and his contention that the prosecution could have introduced medical evidence to establish Boyd's injuries, the prosecution is permitted to prove its case by competent evidence of its own choosing, and the defendant may not stipulate away the parts of the case that he does not want the jury to see Barnett v. Commonwealth, 979 S.W.2d 98, 103 (Ky. 1998). So, we find no error in the trial court's admission of Boyd's testimony.