Opinion ID: 586737
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 27 In reviewing a claim of the sufficiency of the evidence we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and will not re-weigh credibility of witnesses. See United States v. Hooks, 780 F.2d 1526, 1531 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1128 (1986). Evidence is considered sufficient if, under this standard, a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Ratchford, 942 F.2d 702, 703 (10th Cir.1991); cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1185 (1992).
28 SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE AS TO DEFENDANT ROBINSON 29 Robinson contends the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. He alleges the government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had not been entrapped into committing the offenses. The trial court instructed the jury as to the government's burden when the defense of entrapment was raised by the defendant. 30 The defense of entrapment has two elements: first, government agents must have induced the defendant to commit the offense; and second, the defendant must not have been otherwise predisposed to commit the offense, given the opportunity. United States v. Fadel, 844 F.2d 1425, 1429 (10th Cir.1988); see also Matthews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63 (1988). Inducement is government conduct which creates a substantial risk that an undisposed person or otherwise law-abiding citizen would commit the offense. United States v. Ortiz, 804 F.2d 1161, 1165 (10th Cir.1986). 31 The ultimate issue of entrapment is the defendant's predisposition to commit the crime. Here, Robinson's past drug trafficking evidenced his predisposition to engage in the illegal activity. The mere fact that he was contacted on several different occasions by telephone does not support his alleged entrapment by coercion defense. The government's use of undercover agents who buy drugs from defendants, without more, does not constitute entrapment. See, e.g., United States v. Pfeffer, 901 F.2d 654, 656 (8th Cir.1990). 32 Robinson alone determined where to meet and the price for the quantity of drug negotiated. Robinson wanted to consummate the drug transaction at his store, the Pic and Save 2. Agent Holliday and Rogers changed only the location to the Wal-Mart parking lot. 33 The multitude of phone calls can be explained by evidence that Robinson kept putting Rogers off, stating that his contact for the amphetamine supply was apparently a truck driver who was on the road. Robinson placed a telephone call to Rogers and indicated that the deal was on and set for December 20. When Rogers arrived in Durant, he contacted Robinson who agreed to come to the Wal-Mart. 34 Robinson's demeanor and conversance demonstrated that he was at ease and felt comfortable with the entire deal. At the first meeting with Agent Holliday, Robinson discussed the quantity of amphetamine that he had waiting at his store. He further indicated that if Holliday liked that, it would take him forty-five minutes or so to get the other pound of amphetamine. 35 The evidence shows there were no threats. Robinson told Holliday the money is going to be good for me, the money is going to be good for them, referring to his co-conspirators. Robinson also indicated that his compatriots would come with him and that they would not leave the dope behind. A defendant must show a lack of predisposition to commit a crime for the defense of entrapment to succeed. United States v. Heidecke, 900 F.2d 1155, 1162 (7th Cir.1990). 1 Based upon the court's instructions on entrapment and the evidence in the case, a reasonable jury could determine that: (1) Robinson was predisposed to commit the crime when given the opportunity as in the present case, and (2) his defense was unbelievable. 36 Not only does Robinson fail to show entrapment, he fails to establish coercion. A coercion or duress defense requires the establishment of three elements: (1) an immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury, (2) a well-grounded fear that the threat will be carried out, and (3) no reasonable opportunity to escape the threatened harm. United States v. Scott, 901 F.2d 871, 873 (10th Cir.1990). No such evidence was presented.
37 SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE AS TO DEFENDANTS COOPER AND WEAVER 38 Defendants Cooper and Weaver each allege the evidence did not support the convictions for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). Cooper alleges the evidence was insufficient to show that his gun facilitated or played any role in the drug transaction, nor did the availability of the gun increase the likelihood that the transaction would succeed. 39 We have stated that the uses element of § 924(c)(1) is met when the defendant has  'ready access'  to the firearm and the firearm  'was an integral part of his criminal undertaking and its availability increased the likelihood that the criminal undertaking would succeed.'  United States v. McKinnell, 888 F.2d 669 (10th Cir.1989) (citing United States v. Matra, 841 F.2d 837, 843 (8th Cir.1988)). 40 In the present case, the firearm was located within easy reach of all three defendants in the cab of Weaver's pickup truck. It provided a means of protecting the operation and intimidating those encountered in the course of the drug transaction that day. As guns in the hands of drug dealers are inherently dangerous, § 924(c) imposes severe sanctions for firearms which facilitated, or could have facilitated the commission of certain serious crimes. Section 924(c) merely requires some relation or connection between the underlying criminal act and the use or possession of the firearm. United States v. Stewart, 779 F.2d 538, 540 (9th Cir.1985). Thus, 41 [i]f the firearm is within possession or control of a person who commits an underlying crime as defined by the statute, and the circumstances of the case show that the firearm facilitated or had a role in the crime, such as emboldening an actor who had the opportunity or ability to display or discharge the weapon to protect himself or intimidate others, whether or not such display or discharge in fact occurred, then there is a violation of the statute. 42 Id. 43 In the present case, Weaver's pickup truck was used to transport the firearm as well as the first pound of amphetamine to the Wal-Mart parking lot. In United States v. Cardenas, 864 F.2d 1528, 1535 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 909 (1989), we held that when a motor vehicle is used,  'carrying a weapon' takes on a less restrictive meaning than carrying on the person. Cooper admitted to the agents that he always carried a firearm. A reasonable inference which may be drawn is that his associate, Weaver, was also aware of this fact. Further, as the case involved a conspiracy, Weaver was likewise providing his assistance in furtherance of the drug trafficking offense as driver for Cooper and Robinson. 44 In sum, evidence in the record is more than adequate to support Cooper and Weaver's convictions. The surveillance evidence confirmed Cooper and Weaver's association and involvement with Robinson. Telephone toll records reflected numerous calls between these defendants and Robinson. Federal agents noted that Cooper nervously paced in front of Robinson's Pic and Save 2. Further, Robinson's statements to Agent Holliday that he would have to check with his people, that he would be back in a short period of time, that they would not leave the drugs, that they would probably return to the Wal-Mart with him, and that the money was good for them, made it clear that other actors were involved. This, coupled with the very short time frame in which all the defendants met at the Pic and Save 2 and returned together to the Wal-Mart store and Robinson's statement to the undercover agent that if you like this one, I can get the other pound and be back in thirty or forty-five minutes, constituted sufficient evidence upon which a jury could find each defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 45 IV. THE DISTRICT COURT REFUSED TO EXERCISE ITS DISCRETION IN DEPARTING DOWNWARD FROM THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES RANGE. 46 Robinson further alleges that the district court sentenced him under the erroneous belief that it lacked discretion to depart downward from the sentencing guideline range. Robinson requested departure for an over-representation of his criminal history under Guideline § 4A1.3 and based on coercion. 47 The issue is whether the trial judge refused to depart downward because he erroneously believed that he had no power to do so. Robinson relies on several statements by the trial judge at sentencing which he argues indicate that the judge believed he had no discretion to make a downward departure. Other passages in the record, however, belie this conclusion. 48 For example, in response to Robinson's request for departure based on an overstated criminal history, the court reasoned, 49 I don't have any discretion just to go outside the guidelines without some legitimate reason--at least you haven't give[n] me any--except you and the other taxpayers don't want to pay [for Robinson's incarceration]. If you think legitimately unless this is something frivolous and you just want to make a good speech, give me some reason to depart; a legitimate reason is not because it's going to cost too much money. If you have some legitimate reason, that's fine; otherwise, it's frivolous. You're wasting our time. 50 (Tr. Vol. II at 11.) (emphasis added). The court's cognizance of its discretion to depart is obvious. The court was aware that reasons for imposing a particular sentence must be stated in the record under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). Its comments were an attempt to edify defense counsel that the sentence would be vacated if this section was not complied with. See United States v. Bishop, 921 F.2d 1068, 1070 (10th Cir.1990); cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 2034 (1991); United States v. Beaulieu, 900 F.2d 1531 1535 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 3252 (1990). 51 We presume that refusals to depart are knowing exercises of the District Court's discretion. The court's statement of 'the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence' required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) need not include the reasons for denying a request for departure. United States v. Lowden, 905 F.2d 1448, 1449 n. 1 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 206 (1990). 52 In this case, the trial judge refused to exercise his discretion to depart downward. Such a refusal to depart downward from the guidelines range, absent legal error or an incorrect application of the guidelines, is not appealable. United States v. Davis, 900 F.2d 1524, 1529-30 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 155 (1990).