Opinion ID: 161307
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Discharge of Messrs. Leedall and Martin

Text: Section 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), prohibits an employer from interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees who exercise certain rights under the NLRA, including “the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” See 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(1). Section 8(a)(3) prohibits “discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to 9 encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.” See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3). In applying these statutes, we have adopted a burden-shifting approach. “Initially, the [NLRB’s] General Counsel must establish that the employee’s protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the discharge decision; thereafter the burden shifts to the employer to show that it would have reached the same decision absent the protected conduct.” Ready Mixed Concrete Co. v. NLRB, 81 F.3d 1546, 1550 (10th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). An employer’s antiunion motivation may be proven by circumstantial evidence. Intermountain Rural Elec. Ass’n v. NLRB, 732 F.2d 754, 759 (10th Cir. 1984). Thus, proof of an employer’s specific intent to discriminate is unnecessary, and the evidence may provide a presumption of intent. Presbyterian/St. Luke’s Med. Ctr. v. NLRB, 723 F.2d 1468, 1476 (10th Cir. 1983). The NLRB may consider factors such as the employer’s knowledge of the employee’s union activities, the employer’s commission of other unfair labor practices, the timing of the employer’s action, and the credibility of its explanation of the reasons for the discharge. See Ready Mixed Concrete Co., 81 F.3d at 1550–51. Here, MJ Metal contends that there is a lack of substantial evidence supporting the conclusion that anti-union animus was a motivating factor in the discharges of Messrs. Leedall and Martin. In particular, MJ Metal challenges the administrative law judge’s 10 finding that the two employees were not informed of the company’s one-week probationary period for new employees. It also challenges the judge’s reliance on the testimony of two supervisors that the discharged employees were doing adequate work. Additionally, MJ Metal argues that the judge and the NLRB erred in relying on the short period of time between the employees’ public support of the union and their discharges. Finally, MJ Metal points to evidence that another recently hired employee (William Lawrence) also supported the union but was not fired. According to MJ Metal, the reason for discharging Mr. Leedall and Mr. Martin but not Mr. Lawrence was the inferior quality of their work. Upon review of the record, we are not convinced by these arguments. With regard to the administrative law judge’s finding that the two employees were not told that they were on a period of probation, we note that there was conflicting evidence on this point and that the judge acted within his discretion in believing these two employees rather than MJ Metal’s witnesses. More importantly, the judge found that, even if the two employees had been told of the probationary period, their discharge was still not justified by the deficiencies in their work asserted by MJ Metal. On this point, the judge properly relied on the testimony of two other employees—team leaders Mr. Newcombe and Mr. Miller—that the work of Messrs. Leedall and Martin was satisfactory. Although MJ Metal correctly notes that Mr. Miller admitted that “[w]e really didn’t have time to see what kind of work [Mr. Leedall and Mr. 11 Martin] were doing,” Mr. Miller also stated that the two discharged employees were progressing in their work “okay.” Aplt’s App. vol. I, at 165-66. MJ Metal correctly observes that Mark Johnston (its president and owner) testified that the work of Messrs. Leedall and Martin was deficient and that it was because of that deficient work that they were discharged. However, the other team leader, Mr. Newcombe, testified that he never observed Mr. Johnston or production manager John Dykes inspecting that work. Aplt’s App. vol. II, at 311. According to Mr. Newcombe, “[f]or new people[,] they were doing at least average, if not better.” Id. at 309. In light of this testimony, the administrative law judge was entitled to reject Mr. Johnston’s explanation of the discharges. Similarly, we discern no error in the administrative judge’s reliance on the timing of the discharges. Under our cases, this is one of many factors that may be considered in assessing the employer’s motivation. See Ready Mixed Concrete Co., 81 F.3d at 1550–51. Aside from the timing of the discharges, there is considerable evidence supporting the finding of anti-union animus, including the testimony of Mr. Miller and Mr. Newcombe that the discharge employees were doing adequate work, evidence of anti-union statements made by MJ Metal’s president and owner, and other instances of retaliatory action found by the judge and not objected to by MJ Metal. Finally, the fact that MJ Metal did not discharge a third employee (William Lawrence), who was hired at the same time as Messrs. Leedall and Martin and who was also a union supporter, is not dispositive. As the NLRB notes, an employer’s failure to 12 take action against “all pro-union employees does not necessarily undermine the NLRB’s finding of unlawful motivation.” NLRB v. McCullough Envtl. Servs., Inc., 5 F.3d 923, 937 (5th Cir. 1993). Thus, the administrative judge’s finding that MJ Metal unlawfully discharged these two employees is supported by substantial evidence.