Opinion ID: 1274735
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: An Agreed Restitution Order Waives the 60-Day Time Limit

Text: The majority essentially ignores Moen's trial conduct and asserts the restitution order at issue was not an agreed order because [t]he record does not reflect any actual agreement between the State and the defense. Op. at 72. Instead, the majority finds the order was neither agreed nor stipulated, and asserts the most that should be said about the order is that entry of the order was not contested. Op. at 73. This is not correct. Civil Rule 2A provides an agreement between parties or attorneys will be enforced by the court if made and assented to in open court on the record. (Civil rules may apply in criminal proceedings. Op. at 72 n. 1.) Here Moen agreed in open court, on the record, to pay restitution, to work out the amount with the State, and to set a hearing on the issue if agreement could not be reached. It is unfair to the victim Nakamoto to allow Moen to profess his willingness to pay restitution, to gain jury sympathy, and to allow him to work out the amount out of court, but then to relieve him of liability for restitution because he failed to have the restitution order entered in a timely fashion. Further, the majority's characterization of the restitution order as not being agreed despite Moen's counsel's signature is deeply troubling. Op. at 72-73. The majority's characterization of the order ignores the context in which the order arose and normal practice in the courts of our state. The trial court here directed the lawyers to come to an agreement on the amount of restitution. In fact, the lawyers did come to an agreement, which is reflected in the order entered by the trial court. In practice, when a lawyer signs an order prepared by his or her opponent with a notation such as copy received, notice of presentation waived, that lawyer may ordinarily be agreeing only to the entry of the order in the format prepared by the opposing counsel. In effect, counsel acknowledges the other side won the day before the court and the order embodies the trial court's ruling. However, that was not the case here. Initially, there was no decision by the trial court on the amount of restitution. The trial court requested the parties to come to an agreement as to the amount of restitution. They agreed. They then agreed to an amount of restitution which is reflected in the order signed by Moen's counsel. In these circumstances, where Moen's counsel signed the order copy received, notice of presentation waived, an agreed order was present. Moen's counsel not only agreed to the format of the order, but agreed to the content of it, reflecting the agreement he reached with the deputy prosecutor on the amount of restitution. Moen may not now challenge it on appeal. Even if Moen's counsel had not signed the proposed order, a mere failure to object to entry of the order also would have sufficed to indicate consent and make the restitution order enforceable. The majority cites with approval State v. Ryan, 78 Wash.App. 758, 899 P.2d 825, review denied, 128 Wash.2d 1006, 907 P.2d 296 (1995), where the Court of Appeals stated even an ex parte restitution order is final and enforceable if the defendant does not object to it. Ryan, 78 Wash. App. at 762, 899 P.2d 825; Op. at 72-73. It is undisputed Moen did not object to the restitution order here. Op. at 71. Accordingly, Moen's right to object under Krall was lost by his failure to exercise it. [2]