Opinion ID: 779429
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Gorman's Entitlement to Qualified Immunity

Text: 40 Loria's complaint alleges that Gorman's actions on April 10, 1998 constituted an unlawful arrest that was at his home and that violated the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. We construe these claims as being for common-law false arrest and for an unconstitutional search and seizure. In response, Gorman asserted qualified immunity as a defense and sought summary judgment on that basis. 41 The district court denied Gorman's motion for summary judgment, holding that a genuine issue of fact existed as to whether music was playing when Gorman arrived to investigate the second noise complaint. In the court's view, the issue of fact was material because the presence of loud music provided the sole justification for Gorman's investigation. The court reasoned that if there was no music Gorman's investigation was unlawful and any attempt by Loria to impede it could not properly support an arrest for OGA under New York law. See Lennon, 66 F.3d at 424 (noting that, under New York law, the official function obstructed must be authorized by law for the defendant to be guilty of OGA). 42 We disagree with the district court's reasoning and hold that summary judgment should have been granted in Gorman's favor with regard to Loria's claims of false arrest and false imprisonment. However, we affirm the district court's denial of qualified immunity to Gorman from Loria's Fourth Amendment claims to the extent those claims arise out of Gorman's warrantless entry into Loria's home and warrantless seizure. Thus, we affirm the order of the district court in part and reverse in part. 43 a. Loria's Fourth and Sixth Causes of Action Alleging Fourth Amendment Violations, False Arrest and False Imprisonment 44 As an initial matter, we believe the district court erred in denying Gorman's motion for summary judgment with regard to these claims based on the factual dispute as to whether music was playing when the police arrived to investigate the second noise complaint. Although there was indeed a factual dispute on the issue, it was not material and therefore cannot preclude a grant of summary judgment. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c) (providing, inter alia, that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if ... there is no genuine issue as to any material fact); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (holding that a material fact is one that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law and that [f]actual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment). 45 It is undisputed that, during the early morning hours of April 10, the police had received two noise complaints within an hour concerning the 15 Weaver Street property. Even if the music was off when the officers arrived they could lawfully investigate the successive noise complaints. Cf. Lee v. Sandberg, 136 F.3d 94, 103 (2d Cir.1997) (If policemen arrest a person on the basis of a private citizen's complaint that if true would justify the arrest, and they reasonably believe it is true, they cannot be held liable ... merely because it later turns out that the complaint was unfounded. (quotation marks omitted)). Therefore, the presence or absence of music on their arrival is immaterial and the district court erred in denying summary judgment on that basis. Consequently, we hold that the police were engaged in an authorized official function when they arrived at 15 Weaver Street to investigate the second loud noise complaint. See Lennon, 66 F.3d at 424. 4 46 Our inquiry is far from over, however. We now address the more difficult question of whether Gorman's acts of invading Loria's house without a warrant and seizing Loria inside preclude him from obtaining qualified immunity from Loria's Fourth Amendment claims. 5 We believe they do. 47 The Supreme Court recently reiterated the firmly established rule that police officers need either a warrant or probable cause plus exigent circumstances in order to make a lawful entry into a home. Kirk v. Louisiana, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 2458, 2459, 153 L.Ed.2d 599 (2002) (per curiam) (referencing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)); see Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 100, 119 S.Ct. 469, 142 L.Ed.2d 373 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Hurlman v. Rice, 927 F.2d 74, 79 (2d Cir.1991) (There can be no doubt that it was established prior to November 1986 that the Fourth Amendment guarantees an individual the right to be secure against forcible entry of his home save in exceptional circumstances and that seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable. (citations and quotation marks omitted)). Therefore, Gorman's entry into Loria's home and seizure of him without a warrant violated a constitutional right unless justified by exigent circumstances. 48 As the Supreme Court held in Payton, the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Payton, 445 U.S. at 590, 100 S.Ct. 1371. Subsequent holdings have reiterated that principle and made clear that any physical invasion of the structure of the home, `by even a fraction of an inch,' [i]s too much to be tolerated. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961)). We believe it is clear that by stepping into the house, Gorman crossed Payton 's firm line and implicated its protections. No invasion of the sanctity of the home can be dismissed as de minimis. `A sane, decent, civilized society must provide some... oasis, some shelter from public scrutiny, some insulated enclosure, some enclave, some inviolate place which is a man's castle.' Silverman, 365 U.S. at 511 n. 4, 81 S.Ct. 679 (quoting United States v. On Lee, 193 F.2d 306, 315-16 (2d Cir.1951) (Frank, J., dissenting)); see Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37, 121 S.Ct. 2038 ([T]here is certainly no exception to the warrant requirement for the officer who barely cracks open the front door and sees nothing but the non-intimate rug on the vestibule floor.). 49 Our next step is to determine if exigent circumstances were present that justified Gorman's entry into Loria's home. Gorman testified that at the time of the arrest no one was in danger and no emergency situation existed. He claimed, however, that he believed that given the late hour and the complaints by the neighbors for the noise disturbances exigent circumstances existed which would allow [him] to take the one or two steps into the doorway to stop the door from slamming and to take custody of Mr. Loria. 50 We use the following factors as guides to determine whether exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless entry are present: 51 (1) the gravity or violent nature of the offense with which the suspect is to be charged; (2) whether the suspect is reasonably believed to be armed; (3) a clear showing of probable cause ... to believe that the suspect committed the crime; (4) strong reason to believe that the suspect is in the premises being entered; (5) a likelihood that the suspect will escape if not swiftly apprehended; and (6) the peaceful circumstances of the entry. 52 United States v. Fields, 113 F.3d 313, 323 (2d Cir.1997) (quoting United States v. MacDonald, 916 F.2d 766, 769-70 (2d Cir. 1990) (in banc)). These factors are intended not as an exhaustive canon, but as an illustrative sampling of the kinds of facts to be taken into account. MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 770. Thus, the presence or absence of any single factor is not dispositive. 53 Ultimately, [t]he essential question in determining whether exigent circumstances justified a warrantless entry is whether law enforcement agents were confronted by an `urgent need' to render aid or take action. Id. at 769 (quoting Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 391 (D.C.Cir.1970) (in banc)). In answering that question, we must be cognizant of the Supreme Court's admonition that exceptions to the warrant requirement are few in number and carefully delineated and that the police bear a heavy burden when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that might justify warrantless searches or arrests. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749-50, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 54 The first factor — the gravity or violent nature of the offense — weighs heavily in the determination of whether exigent circumstances exist. See id. at 752, 104 S.Ct. 2091 (describing the gravity of the offense as an important part of the inquiry). Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted that it is difficult to conceive of a warrantless home arrest that would not be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the underlying offense is extremely minor. Id. at 753, 104 S.Ct. 2091. The offense for which Loria was arrested, OGA, is a Class A misdemeanor punishable by up to one year in jail. See N.Y. Penal Law § 195.05 (classifying OGA as a Class A misdemeanor); see also N.Y. Penal Law § 70.15(1) (providing that a sentence of imprisonment for a Class A misdemeanor shall not exceed one year). Thus, it is arguably more severe than the offense at issue in Welsh, driving while intoxicated, for which no imprisonment was possible under Wisconsin law. See id. at 754, 104 S.Ct. 2091; see also Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (reiterating that the penalty attached to an offense provides the clearest indication of the gravity of the offense). 55 Under these circumstances, however, we do not believe the offense of OGA is sufficiently grave or violent to provide the police with reason to ignore the warrant requirement. The crime for which Gorman arrested Loria did not create a risk of serious injury. Gorman himself conceded that no one was in danger and that no emergency existed at the time of the arrest. In addition, the underlying offense that Gorman was investigating — the violation of the City of Rochester noise ordinance — was punishable by only a twenty-five dollar fine and therefore qualifies as extremely minor. See Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753, 104 S.Ct. 2091; see also Rochester City Code, §§ 75-12 (proscribing noise), 75-16 (referencing penalties), 13A-11 (providing for a $25.00 penalty for the first violation). It would be hard to justify a holding that attempting to close a door in order to impede an investigation into an offense punishable by only a small fine constitutes a grave or violent offense, even if the obstruction itself is theoretically jailable. Cf. Nigro v. Phillips, 1997 WL 86323 at  (N.D.N.Y.1997) (concluding that the grave or violent offense factor weighed against a finding of exigent circumstances where crime defendants claim they had probable cause to believe was occurring ... [wa]s only a class A misdemeanor.). Therefore, we conclude that the first factor weighs heavily against a finding of exigent circumstances. 56 Along similar lines, the second factor — whether the suspect is reasonably believed to be armed — counsels against a finding of exigent circumstances. There is no indication that weapons were present at the scene of the arrest. The sixth factor — the peaceful circumstances of the entry — also militates against such a finding. Loria alleges that Gorman pushed the door into his face with sufficient force to knock him backwards. That use of physical force was sufficient to render the entry non-peaceful for purposes of this analysis. See United States v. Harris, 435 F.2d 74, 82 n. 13 (D.C.Cir.1970) (noting that the entry here was `peaceful' in the sense that no physical force was used, and as such would tend to support police entry without warrant in exigent circumstances). 57 The remaining factors do not tilt strongly in favor of finding exigent circumstances. We hold as a matter of law that exigent circumstances were not present when Gorman entered the house to arrest Loria. Although the existence of probable cause and knowledge that the suspect is on the premises are important predicates to a finding that an entry was justified based on exigent circumstances, they are not sufficient to justify an entry where the crime involved is minor and there is no apparent potential for violence. See Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753, 104 S.Ct. 2091 (noting that exigent circumstances do not exist simply because there is probable cause to believe that a serious crime has been committed). As the Supreme Court has noted, application of the exigent circumstances exception in the context of a home entry should rarely be sanctioned when there is probable cause to believe that only a minor offense, such as the kind at issue in this case, has been committed. Id.; see Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31, 121 S.Ct. 2038 (With few exceptions, the question whether a warrantless search of a home is reasonable and hence constitutional must be answered no.). Furthermore, the state's interest in preventing any likelihood of escape is significantly lessened where the offense involved is minor and poses no danger to the community. Consequently, Gorman's entry into the house and seizure of Loria inside were not justified by exigent circumstances and therefore violated the Constitution. 58 Having found a violation of a constitutional right, we consider whether that right was clearly established, that is, whether `it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.' Poe, 282 F.3d at 132 (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151). The question is whether circumstances were present in this case that would have made it objectively reasonable for Gorman to believe that stepping into Loria's house and seizing him did not violate the law. 59 We conclude that no such circumstances were present. We note as an initial matter that Payton clearly established that both searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable. 445 U.S. at 586, 100 S.Ct. 1371 (emphasis added). Taking the facts as alleged by Loria before the district court, as we are required to do, Loria was not in the doorway. Rather, he was at least a door's width inside the house when he attempted to close the door. Cf. Payton, 445 U.S. at 589, 100 S.Ct. 1371 (noting that nowhere is the zone of privacy more clearly defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual's home); United States v. Gori, 230 F.3d 44, 60-61 (2d Cir.2000), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 62, 151 L.Ed.2d 29 (2001) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) ( Payton did not draw the line one or two feet into the home; it drew the line at the home's entrance.  (quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in Gori )). 60 At no point was Loria as exposed to public view, speech, hearing, and touch as if [he] had been standing completely outside [his] house. United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42, 96 S.Ct. 2406, 49 L.Ed.2d 300 (1976). Indeed, he was attempting to limit his exposure to public view when he was arrested. Cf. United States v. Crespo, 834 F.2d 267, 270 (2d Cir.1987) (holding Santana inapplicable where door was opened half way in response to coercion by DEA agents and arrestee was not exposed to public view as if outside). Therefore, we hold that under the circumstances no reasonable officer could have concluded that — simply because Loria was near the door — taking two steps into the house and seizing Loria inside did not constitute a Fourth Amendment entry. See United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412, 422-23 (2d Cir.1978) (holding Santana inapplicable because arrestee, who had just opened door, was behind the threshold and was not exposed to public view as if outside). But cf. Sparing v. Vill. of Olympia Fields, 266 F.3d 684, 691 (7th Cir.2001), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 2660, 153 L.Ed.2d 835 (2002) (concluding that the law surrounding Fourth Amendment `doorway arrest' questions ... was not sufficiently settled or defined at the time of the arrest to defeat qualified immunity); Joyce v. Town of Tewksbury, 112 F.3d 19, 22 (1st Cir.1997) (in banc) (per curiam) (same). 61 Our next step is to determine whether it was objectively reasonable for Gorman to believe that exigent circumstances justified his entry and arrest. We have already held as a matter of law that such circumstances were not present at the time of the arrest. Gorman is entitled to qualified immunity, however, if reasonable officers could disagree as to whether exigent circumstances were present. See Koch, 287 F.3d at 169 (holding that a grant of summary judgment based on qualified immunity was appropriate because the officers reasonably believed that exigent circumstances justified their entry). We conclude that no reasonable officer could have found that exigent circumstances were present at the time of the arrest. The noise violation underlying the offense was minor and there was no threat of violence. Consequently, we hold that Gorman is not entitled to qualified immunity from Loria's claims arising out of the entry into his home and the seizure of Loria inside. 62 We also conclude that Loria's arrest inside his home, in addition to constituting an unconstitutional seizure, was proximately caused by the unconstitutional search of his home that occurred when Gorman entered it without a warrant. In Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978), the Supreme Court explained that the purpose of § 1983 is to adopt to the constitutional context the common law of torts [which] has developed a set of rules to implement the principle that a person should be compensated fairly for injuries caused by the violation of his legal rights. Id. at 257, 98 S.Ct. 1042 (emphasis added). Since Carey, this Court has held that in all § 1983 cases, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant's action was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. Gierlinger v. Gleason, 160 F.3d 858, 872 (2d Cir.1998). Gorman's entry into Loria's home was a proximate cause of the arrest, particularly because it is clear on these facts that Loria did not intend to submit to arrest outside of the house. 63 Therefore, we hold that Gorman is not entitled to qualified immunity from Loria's fourth and sixth causes of action to the extent they raise claims arising out of the entry into Loria's home and arrest of Loria inside. 64 b. Loria's First and Second Causes of Action Alleging the Use of Excessive Force and Assault and Battery 65 The district court, without any independent analysis, denied Gorman qualified immunity from Loria's first and second causes of action alleging that Gorman subjected Loria to excessive force in violation of both state and federal law and committed assault and battery under state law. Gorman makes no argument on appeal challenging this denial. Because Gorman abandoned this claim, we will move on to the next issue. 66