Opinion ID: 2508462
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Absence of Basis for Law Precludes Calling It Law

Text: Despite RCW 46.98.020 and the statutory construction canon to construe similar language the same throughout a statute, the majority defines reckless differently from RCW 46.61.500(1)'s express definition. The majority claims prior cases from this court compel adherence to the rash or heedless manner, indifferent to the consequences definition. However a careful review of the history behind the rash or heedless manner, indifferent to the consequences standard demonstrates the basis for its distinction from reckless driving, while correct at the time, no longer exists.
The legislature first criminalized vehicular homicide in 1937. [5] One alternative for committing vehicular homicide was the operation of any vehicle in a reckless manner. LAWS OF 1937, ch. 189, § 120. Reckless driving, on the other hand, was criminalized by a different section, which provided: It shall be unlawful for any person to operate a motor vehicle in a reckless manner over and along the public highways of this state. For the purpose of this section to operate in a reckless manner shall be construed to mean the operation of a vehicle upon the public highways of this state in such a manner as to indicate either a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property. Id. § 118 (emphasis added). The phrase [f]or the purpose of this section prompted this court to distinguish negligent homicide by means of a motor vehicle and reckless driving in State v. Dickert, 194 Wash. 629, 79 P.2d 328 (1938). There we held the definition of reckless driving in section 118 (i.e., willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property) did not apply to vehicular homicide as defined in section 120. We declined to extend section 118's definition because it expressly provided that, for the purpose of this section,  to operate in a reckless manner means in such a manner as to indicate either a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property. The willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property is not one of the elements of negligent homicide, as that crime is defined in § 120. Id. at 632, 79 P.2d 328 (emphasis added). The rash or heedless standard first found its way into Washington jurisprudence in State v. Stevick, 23 Wash.2d 420, 161 P.2d 181 (1945), overruled on other grounds by State v. Partridge, 47 Wash.2d 640, 646, 289 P.2d 702 (1955), where we held a jury instruction defining `to operate in a reckless manner' as `in a heedless, careless or rash manner or in a manner indifferent to consequences' was not improper. Stevick, 23 Wash.2d at 426, 427, 161 P.2d 181. Partridge, though overruling Stevick on other grounds, [6] adopted the definition, but pronounced it [did] not wish to limit the trial courts in their definition of the term. Partridge, 47 Wash.2d at 645, 289 P.2d 702. Despite Partridge's proclamation, State v. Bowman, 57 Wash.2d 266, 356 P.2d 999 (1960), addressed a jury instruction which defined `reckless manner' as `heedless, careless or rash manner or in a manner indifferent to consequences.' Bowman, 57 Wash.2d at 270, 356 P.2d 999. We approved the instruction, holding it was `specifically approved' in Partridge. Id. However we cautioned against referencing carelessness in the definition as it could possibly be confused with ordinary negligence. Id. at 271, 356 P.2d 999. We concluded a more precise definition of the terms `to operate a motor vehicle in a reckless manner' would simply be driving in a rash or heedless manner, indifferent to the consequences.  Id. The majority relies on this statement to reject application of the reckless driving definition of RCW 46.61.500(1). See majority at 200-201. While the definition of reckless manner wavered slightly over the years from Stevick to Bowman, the underlying distinction of the reckless manner definition from the statutory reckless driving definition remains grounded in Dickert's reliance on the reckless driving statute's plain language restricting the willful or wanton standard to that statute alone. Dickert, 194 Wash. at 632, 79 P.2d 328. [7]
Shortly after Bowman was decided, the legislature in 1961 repealed and reenacted all motor vehicle laws with House Bill 2, codifying them in Title 46 RCW. LAWS OF 1961, ch. 12. Though the legislature did not alter the language criminalizing reckless driving and vehicular homicide, it did add what is now RCW 46.98.020, which directs the courts to construe the act's provisions in pari materia and as if they were enacted at the same time. LAWS OF 1961, ch. 12, at 435, codified at RCW 46.98.020. The section has remained unchanged ever since. Three years later the legislature enacted House Bill 234 to remove the phrase [f]or the purpose of this section that had existed at the time Dickert and its progeny were decided. LAWS OF 1965, Ex.Sess., ch. 155, § 59 [8] ; cf. LAWS OF 1937, ch. 189, § 118. That the legislature chose to repeal the fundamental basis for Dickert and its progeny (including Bowman ) cannot be ignored. Every action by the legislature must be given effect, for [t]he [l]egislature `does not engage in unnecessary or meaningless acts, and we presume some significant purpose or objective in every legislative enactment.' In re Recall of Pearsall-Stipek, 141 Wash.2d 756, 769, 10 P.3d 1034 (2000) (quoting John H. Sellen Constr. Co. v. Dep't of Revenue, 87 Wash.2d 878, 883, 558 P.2d 1342 (1976)). Nor are we permitted to presume the omission of that language was unintentional and therefore inconsequential. In re Custody of Smith, 137 Wash.2d 1, 12, 969 P.2d 21 (1998) (A `court cannot read into a statute that which it may believe the legislature has omitted, be it an intentional or inadvertent omission.' (quoting Auto. Drivers & Demonstrators Union Local 882 v. Dep't of Ret. Sys., 92 Wash.2d 415, 421, 598 P.2d 379 (1979))), aff'd sub nom. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000); see also Jepson v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 89 Wash.2d 394, 403, 573 P.2d 10 (1977) (We are not authorized to read into it those things which we conceive the legislature may have left out unintentionally. We must assume the legislature meant what it said. (citations omitted)). To the contrary we must presume the legislature consciously intended to eliminate the language which served as the underpinning of Dickert, namely the phrase [f]or the purpose of this section which prohibited the court from applying the reckless driving definition to the vehicular homicide statute. See Dickert, 194 Wash. at 632, 79 P.2d 328. As a result there is no longer any statutory basis to distinguish the reckless driving definition from the operating a motor vehicle in a reckless manner prong of the vehicular homicide and assault statutes. The majority however avers Bowman's interpretation of the vehicular homicide and assault statutes operates as though the legislature had originally written it into the statute. Were we confronted with the same statute at issue in Bowman, I would be inclined to agree. But the legislative amendments subsequent to Bowman unequivocally demonstrate we face a different legislative scheme. [9] Rather than follow a line of cases based on grounds that no longer exist, I instead abide by the legal maxim cessante ratione legis cessat et ipsa lex: When the reason of the law ceases, the law itself also ceases. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1622 (7th ed.1999); see also State ex rel. King County v. Superior Court, 104 Wash. 268, 275, 176 P. 352 (1918) (following doctrine). Reckless as used in the vehicular homicide and vehicular assault statutes, RCW 46.61.520(1)(b), RCW 46.61.522(1)(a), has the same meaning as reckless driving as defined by RCW 46.61.500(1). Plain language requires as much. RCW 46.98.020. [10]