Opinion ID: 155604
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Nature of Forum

Text: Turning to the second step, the Supreme Court has recognized three distinct categories of government property: (1) traditional public fora; (2) designated public fora; and (3) nonpublic fora. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983). Summum does not argue that the courthouse lawn is a traditional public forum. 11 Aplt. Reply Br. at 11. Summum instead contends that the courthouse lawn is a “limited public forum.” Id. at 11-12. As we discuss more fully below, there is some confusion over this term in the case law. It is not clear whether Summum uses “limited public forum” to refer to a designated public forum that is subject to heightened scrutiny, or to a nonpublic 11 A traditional public forum consists of places such as “streets and parks, which have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public, and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.” Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45 (internal quotations omitted). In a traditional public forum, content-based regulations are subject to heightened scrutiny, i.e., the government must show that the regulation is “necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.” Id. Content-neutral regulations must be “narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication.” Id. -14- forum that is subject to a reasonableness standard. Summum’s (and the district court’s) confusion is readily understandable in light of the inconsistent manner in which the Supreme Court itself has used this term. We must therefore clarify precisely how Summum defines “limited public forum” in order to assess the sufficiency of its amended complaint.
A designated public forum is property the government has opened for expressive activity, treating the property as if it were a traditional public forum. A designated public forum may be created for a “limited purpose” for use “by certain speakers, or for the discussion of certain subjects.” Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45-46 & n.7 (citations omitted); see also Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802. For example, “[u]niversity facilities opened for meetings of registered student organizations qualify as a designated public forum.” Church on the Rock v. City of Albuquerque, 84 F.3d 1273, 1278 (10th Cir.) (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-68 (1981)), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 360 (1996). Unlike a traditional public forum, the government “is not required to indefinitely retain the open character” of a designated public forum. Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46. However, as long as the property is designated as a public forum, the government is “bound by the same standards as apply in a traditional public forum.” Id. Thus, content-based regulations must be narrowly drawn to -15- effectuate a compelling state interest and reasonable time, place, and manner regulations are permissible. Id. Sometimes included within this category of designated public forum is property referred to as a “limited public forum.” In Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), for example, the Supreme Court held that a state university had created a “limited public forum,” id. at 272, by making its facilities generally available for the activities of registered student groups, and applied the strict scrutiny test to the university’s decision to exclude a religious student group from using its facilities, id. at 269-70. Thus, in Widmar, the term “limited public forum” was used specifically to denote a particular sub-category of the designated public forum--a designated public forum for a limited purpose for use by certain speakers, i.e., registered student groups. In more recent cases, however, the Court has used the term “limited public forum” to describe a type of nonpublic forum and has applied a reasonableness standard under which the state may restrict speech “so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral.” 12 Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806. For example, in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995), the Court, as in Widmar, held a state university had created a “limited public forum,” id. at 829, 12 See part B2, infra. -16- by allowing a wide spectrum of registered student groups access to a student activities fund. In contrast to Widmar, however, the Court applied a reasonableness test to the university’s decision to exclude a Christian student news publication from receiving money from the fund. Id. at 829-30. Similarly, in Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993), the Court accepted the lower courts’ holding that the school district had created a “limited public forum,” id. at 390, by allowing various private organizations access to school property, and went on to apply a reasonableness standard to the school district’s exclusion of a church from showing a film on school property, id. at 393-94. Our review of the record and briefs persuades us that Summum does not use “limited public forum” to mean property which falls within the category of a designated public forum. In determining whether the government has created a designated public forum, courts must examine several factors, including (1) the purpose of the forum; (2) the extent of use of the forum; and (3) the government’s intent in creating a designated public forum. See generally 1 R ODNEY A. S MOLLA , S MOLLA AND N IMMER ON F REEDOM OF S PEECH § 8:10-8:14 (3d ed. 1996). 13 Nowhere in the amended complaint does Summum allege facts 13 The purpose element requires “consideration of a forum’s special attributes [which] is relevant to the constitutionality of a regulation since the (continued...) -17- pertaining to the purpose or any special attributes of the courthouse lawn which make it compatible with extensive expressive activity; the extent to which the County uses the courthouse lawn as a place for expressive activity; or the County’s intent to open up the courthouse lawn to expressive activity by the general public, certain speakers, or certain topics. Indeed, as Summum points out, the only facts it alleges to support its assertions that the County’s actions have established a public forum are that the Ten Commandments monolith has stood on the courthouse lawn on property 13 (...continued) significance of the governmental interest must be assessed in light of the characteristic nature and function of the particular forum involved.” Heffron v. International Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 650-51 (1981). The extent-of-use requirement is not satisfied merely when some speakers are allowed access to government property. See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 730 (1990) (plurality opinion); Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 47; Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976); Brown v. Palmer, 944 F.2d 732, 734 (10th Cir. 1991) (en banc). Something more than “selective access” or “limited discourse” is required. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802, 805. The government must allow “general access” to, id. at 803, or “indiscriminate use” of, Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 47, the forum in question whether by the general public, certain speakers, or for certain subjects. Finally, the government intent element is satisfied only when the government “intentionally open[s] a nontraditional forum for public discourse.” Cornelius, 460 U.S. at 802. The Court identified two factors to help it discern intent: (1) the policy and practice of the government; and (2) the nature of the property and its compatibility with expressive activity. Id. Thus, the Court expressed its reluctance to find a designated public forum where “the principal function of the property would be disrupted by expressive activity” or where government policy or practice reveals criteria to selectively limit access. Id. at 803-05. -18- owned by the County since 1971. Aplt. Reply Br. at 10-11 & n. 1. Summum contends the placement of this monolith on government property is enough to create a limited public forum. Id. at 10. As the district court correctly observed, a designated public forum (even the limited purpose variety) cannot be created simply by allowing one private organization access to the forum. See Brown v. Palmer, 944 F.2d 732, 734 (10th Cir. 1991) (en banc); see also supra note 12. Clearly Summum cannot be arguing that the courthouse lawn is a designated public forum. The district court’s conclusion that a designated public forum has not been created, however, fails to address the more pertinent question whether a “limited public forum”--in the sense that Summum and the Court in Rosenberger and Lamb’s Chapel define that term under the category of a nonpublic forum--has been created. It is to this third category that we now turn. 14
14 We recognize that the boundary between a designated public forum for a limited purpose (e.g., Widmar) and a limited public forum (e.g., Rosenberger and Lamb’s Chapel) is far from clear. Because we conclude that Summum is not alleging that a designated public forum has been created, we do not have to clarify the precise distinctions between the two. We simply note that a designated public forum for a limited purpose and a limited public forum are not interchangeable terms. We use the term “limited public forum” here to denote a particular species of nonpublic forum, in accordance with the manner in which Summum, the Supreme Court in Rosenberger and Lamb’s Chapel, and some commentators define that term. See, e.g., 1 S MOLLA , supra, § 8:8, at 8-5; Andrew C. Spiropoulos, The Constitutionality of Holiday Displays on Public Property (Or How the Court Stole Christmas), 68 O KLA . B.J. 1897, 1901 n.29 (1997). -19- The final category--the nonpublic forum--consists of “[p]ublic property which is not by tradition or designation a forum for public communication.” Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46. The government may limit speech in a nonpublic forum to reserve the forum for the specific official uses to which it is lawfully dedicated. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829; Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 761. When the government allows selective access to some speakers or some types of speech in a nonpublic forum, but does not open the property sufficiently to become a designated public forum, it creates a “limited public forum.” See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829-30; Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 390-92. For example, in United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990), a plurality of the Court concluded that the sidewalk in front of a post office was a nonpublic forum and upheld postal regulations banning solicitation on the sidewalk. Id. at 732-33. The Court recognized, however, that the postal sidewalk was “not a purely nonpublic forum” because it had been dedicated to some expressive activity--namely, the post office had permitted some speakers to leaflet and picket on postal premises. Id. at 730. Even so, since the postal sidewalk did not rise to the level of a designated public forum, the Court proceeded to analyze the regulations banning solicitation “under the standards set forth for nonpublic fora.” Id. Regulations of speech in a nonpublic or limited public forum are subject to the more deferential reasonableness standard. This does not mean the government -20- has unbridled control over speech, however, for it is axiomatic that “‘the First Amendment forbids the government to regulate speech in ways that favor some viewpoints or ideas at the expense of others.’” Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 394 (quoting City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984)). Thus, “[c]ontrol over access to a nonpublic forum can be based on subject matter and speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral.” Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806. 15 In other words, although content-based discrimination is permissible in a limited or nonpublic forum if it preserves the purpose of the forum, when the government moves beyond restricting the subject matter of speech and targets “particular views taken by speakers on a subject,” such viewpoint discrimination 15 In Cornelius, the Court elaborated on both the reasonableness and viewpoint neutrality prong of this test. With respect to reasonableness, the Court clarified that not only must the government’s restriction be assessed in light of the purpose of the forum, but also “all the surrounding circumstances.” Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 809. With respect to viewpoint neutrality, the Court stated: Although a speaker may be excluded from a nonpublic forum if he wishes to address a topic not encompassed within the purpose of a forum, or if he is not a member of the class of speakers for whose especial benefit the forum was created, the government violates the First Amendment when it denies access to a speaker solely to suppress the point of view he espouses on an otherwise includible subject. Id. at 806 (citations omitted). -21- is “presumed impermissible.” Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829-30. Viewpoint discrimination is thus a subset of and an “egregious form of content discrimination.” Id. at 829. The Court in Rosenberger did not explain what specifically is needed to overcome this heavy presumption of impermissibility. However, we have interpreted Rosenberger to mean: [C]ourts must examine viewpoint-based restrictions with an especially critical review of the government’s asserted justifications for those restrictions. At a minimum, to survive strict scrutiny the [government’s] policy must be “narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling state interest.” Church on the Rock, 84 F.3d at 1279-80 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46). In Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. 384, the Supreme Court directly addressed the problem of viewpoint discrimination raised by excluding private religious speech in a limited or nonpublic forum. A school district, pursuant to state statute, allowed various private organizations to use school property for social, civic, recreational, or political purposes. Lamb’s Chapel, a church, petitioned the school district to show a film on child rearing and family issues from a religious perspective. The school district denied the church’s request on the grounds that the film appeared “church related” and school property could not be used for religious purposes. Id. at 387-89. The trial and appellate courts held that the school property was a “limited public forum,” and thus, exclusions needed only be -22- “reasonable and viewpoint neutral.” Id. at 389-90. Both lower courts held that the school district’s refusal to show the film met this standard. Id. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Lamb’s Chapel argued that the school property was a designated public forum, and therefore exclusions were subject to a heightened standard of review. The Supreme Court declined to reevaluate the public forum question, id. at 391-92, and instead took issue with the finding of viewpoint neutrality, id. at 392-93. The Court rejected the appellate court’s conclusion that the school district avoided viewpoint discrimination by treating all religions and all uses of school property for religious purposes alike--i.e., by banning such uses entirely. 16 This analysis, in the Court’s view, did not answer the “critical question” whether the school district engaged in viewpoint discrimination by allowing presentations about family issues and child rearing from nonreligious points of view while excluding a film dealing with the same subject from a religious perspective. Id. at 393. Because the church’s film “dealt with a subject otherwise permissible” and it was “denied solely because [it] dealt with a subject from a religious standpoint,” the Court held its exclusion amounted to viewpoint discrimination in violation of the church’s free speech rights. Id. at 394. The Court likewise rejected the school district’s argument that the denial 16 was a “permissible subject-matter exclusion rather than a denial based on viewpoint.” Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 396. -23- In Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819, the Court clarified the distinction between content-based and viewpoint discrimination and adopted a broad construction of the latter, providing greater protection to private religious speech on public property. See The Supreme Court--Leading Cases, 109 H ARV . L. R EV . 111, 214 (1995); see also Grossbaum v. Indianapolis-Marion Bldg. Auth., 63 F.3d 581, 590 (7th Cir. 1995). There, a state university permitted certain registered student groups to receive money from a student activities fund. The regulations governing access to the fund permitted student news groups to seek payment, but excluded religious activities from receiving any support. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 824-25. A Christian student newspaper requested money from the fund but was denied on the grounds that it was a religious activity. Id. at 826-27. The university argued the regulation excluding all religious activities from receiving financial support was a permissible content-based restriction, which banned the entire subject matter of religion. Id. at 830. Although the Court recognized that “[r]eligion may be a vast area of inquiry,” “it also provides . . . a specific premise, a perspective, a standpoint from which a variety of subjects may be discussed and considered.” Id. at 831. The university permitted various other student news publications access to the fund, but denied money to one student news publication which discussed topics from a uniquely religious editorial viewpoint. The Court concluded that the university impermissibly excluded the -24- Christian newspaper based on its “prohibited perspective” of religion, and “not the general subject matter” of religion itself. Id. In Church on the Rock, 84 F.3d 1273, we recognized the broad definition of viewpoint discrimination afforded by the Supreme Court to protect private religious speech on public property: Any prohibition of sectarian instruction where other instruction is permitted is inherently non-neutral with respect to viewpoint. Instruction becomes “sectarian” when it manifests a preference for a set of religious beliefs. Because there is no nonreligious sectarian instruction (and indeed the concept is a contradiction in terms), a restriction prohibiting sectarian instruction intrinsically favors secularism at the expense of religion. Id. at 1279. Church on the Rock involved city-owned senior centers, which permitted private individuals and organizations to use the centers to provide classes and other activities for seniors, id. at 1276-77, including classes on the Bible from a literary, philosophical, and historical perspective, id. at 1279. City policy prohibited using the centers for sectarian instruction or as a place for religious worship, and thus, the city denied a church’s request to show a film on Jesus, which advocated adopting Christianity. Id. at 1277. Relying on Lamb’s Chapel and Rosenberger, we held that the city’s prohibition against showing the church’s film on Jesus, “[e]ven if the City had not previously opened the Senior -25- Centers to presentations on religious subjects,” was viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment. Id. at 1279. 17 In Grossbaum, 63 F.3d 581, a rabbi requested permission to erect a menorah in the lobby of a city building. The government denied the request because of a policy prohibiting the display of seasonal religious symbols in city buildings. The government erected a Christmas tree in the lobby, however, because it believed the secular nature of the Christmas tree would not result in a violation of its policy. Id. at 582-83. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the parties did not dispute the lobby was a nonpublic forum. Id. at 586. After an extensive analysis of Lamb’s Chapel and Rosenberger, the court held that prohibiting a religious holiday display such as a menorah, while allowing a secular holiday display such as a Christmas tree to stand, constituted discrimination based on a religious viewpoint and violated the First Amendment. Id. at 591-92. In sum, while the government does have wide discretion to regulate a nonpublic forum consistent with the specific purpose for which it was intended-- 17 In Church on the Rock we characterized the city-owned senior centers as designated public fora, but did not apply the compelling interest test applicable to such fora. Instead, we stated “the City’s policy is properly analyzed as a viewpoint-based restriction on speech,” and went on to hold that the city had violated the church’s First Amendment rights on this basis. Church on the Rock, 84 F.3d at 1279. -26- including banning all speech displays--problems arise when the government allows some private speech on the property. If, for example, the government permits secular displays on a nonpublic forum, it cannot ban displays discussing otherwise permissible topics from a religious perspective. “The government is on the safest ground in denying a request to erect a display where it has consistently refused to allow any speech displays in the designated area.” Andrew C. Spiropoulos, The Constitutionality of Holiday Displays on Public Property (Or How the Court Stole Christmas), 68 O KLA . B.J. 1897, 1901 n.29 (1997). 18 In dismissing Summum’s free speech claims, the district court did not consider whether a limited or nonpublic forum had been created, nor did it apply or even discuss the reasonableness standard applicable to such a forum. The court apparently assumed that the only way Summum could prevail on its free speech claim was by establishing that a designated public forum had been created on the courthouse lawn. In light of recent cases discussed above, the district court erred in its assumption. We conclude that Summum’s amended complaint sufficiently alleges that a limited public forum has been created and that the County engaged in viewpoint 18 See also Spiropoulos, supra, at 1903 (“If the requested forum is a nonpublic forum and no other speakers have been allowed to use that forum, then the city most likely can safely deny the request. If other speakers have been allowed to use the forum in a way similar to that requested by the religious speaker . . . , the religious group must receive the same permission.”) -27- discrimination in violation of Summum’s free speech rights. Summum alleges, and it is undisputed, that the County has permitted the Order of Eagles, a private fraternal organization, to place on government property a display espousing the Eagles’ views. The installation of the monolith is enough to transform the property into a limited public forum as it has more recently been defined by the Supreme Court. The courthouse lawn cannot be characterized as a purely nonpublic forum reserved for specific official uses. By allowing access to the Eagles, the County has opened the forum to at least some private expression, clearly choosing not to restrict the forum to official government uses. 19 19 In finding that a public forum had not been created, the district court asserted that if Summum’s position were adopted, “the County could no more chisel the words ‘justice for all’ into the facade above the courthouse entrance without opening itself to contrary opinions similarly displayed on the courthouse walls.” Aplt. App. at 231. The district court’s analogy, however, is inapt. The courthouse is a forum in which cases are tried and official judicial business is conducted; it is reserved for a specific use that is clearly incompatible with opening it up to the public for expressive activity. The inscription, which the County itself has chiseled on the courthouse, serves to add an air of solemnity or dignity to the judicial function. However, the County certainly need not allow any expression that is not relevant to conducting judicial business in or on the courthouse itself. The Ten Commandments monolith here differs in many important respects from the district court’s “justice for all” hypothetical. First, the monolith is private speech expressing the views of the Eagles and not speech the County itself has uttered in furtherance of official government business. Second, by allowing private speech on the courthouse lawn, the County has chosen not to reserve the forum for official government uses. Third, the monolith is situated on the courthouse lawn and not in the courthouse itself. Unlike the courthouse where the actual business of the judiciary is conducted, the courthouse lawn, being outside (continued...) -28- Regardless of whether the courthouse lawn is described as a nonpublic or limited public forum, the distinction the County drew by excluding Summum’s display while allowing the Eagles’ display to stand must be reasonable in light of the purpose of the forum and be viewpoint neutral. Summum alleges that its requests to erect a similar monolith were summarily rejected, that County Commissioners have sole authority in deciding who may place a permanent monolith on county property as well as the content of such displays, and that the County seeks to censor Summum’s ideas. As we discuss below, such “unbridled discretion” in the hands of government officials “raises the specter of . . . viewpoint censorship.” City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750, 763 (1988). Construing the amended complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiff, we are persuaded Summum has sufficiently stated a claim for relief under the Free Speech Clause. We therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings. On remand, the district court should carefully consider the allegations made in Summum’s amended complaint that the County lacks rules or regulations 19 (...continued) and somewhat comparable to a public park or a square in front of a state building, is not clearly incompatible with private expressive activity. The district court therefore need not be concerned that the courthouse itself has become a limited public forum simply because the County may have created a limited public forum by allowing a private display on the courthouse lawn. -29- governing the placement of permanent displays on county property in determining whether the County has acted reasonably and not arbitrarily. Allowing government officials to make decisions as to who may speak on county property, without any criteria or guidelines to circumscribe their power, strongly suggests the potential for unconstitutional conduct, namely favoring one viewpoint over another. As the Supreme Court explains: [A] law or policy permitting communication in a certain manner for some but not for others raises the specter of content and viewpoint censorship. This danger is at its zenith when the determination of who may speak and who may not is left to the unbridled discretion of a government official . . . . [B]ecause without standards governing the exercise of discretion, a government official may decide who may speak and who may not based upon the content of the speech or viewpoint of the speaker. City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 763-64; cf. American Jewish Congress v. City of Beverly Hills, 90 F.3d 379, 385-86 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (holding City’s ad hoc, standardless policy for permitting private religious unattended displays in public park violates Establishment Clause because of its potential for impermissibly favoring one religion over another). In City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. 750, the Court recognized that an absence of express standards made it far too easy for officials to use “post hoc rationalizations” and “shifting or illegitimate criteria” to justify their behavior, and thus make it difficult for courts to determine whether an official has engaged -30- in viewpoint discrimination. Id. at 758. Here, the County appears to have shifted positions on its reasons for denying Summum’s application. In its letter to Summum, the County stated that the courthouse lawn was being reserved for other purposes, such as the construction of a county jail. Aplt. App. at 28. However, in its brief the County identified the purpose of the courthouse lawn as providing “an aesthetically pleasing entrance to the courthouse itself.” Aplee. Br. at 22. If this is in fact true, it seems the difference in access to the courtyard between Summum and the Order of Eagles should have been based on the aesthetic value of the monuments, which the County has never argued. Indeed, at oral argument, the County suggested that Summum was denied access because its religious tenets lacked the historical significance and antiquity of the Ten Commandments. On remand, the district court must carefully scrutinize the validity of the County’s stated reasons for refusing access to the courthouse lawn to ensure that the County’s justifications are not simply “post hoc rationalizations” or a pretext for viewpoint discrimination. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 797, 811-13 (after finding public forum not created, remanding on issue of viewpoint discrimination and requiring further investigation of government’s “facially neutral and valid justifications for exclusion” to determine whether stated reasons were “facade” for viewpoint discrimination). -31-