Opinion ID: 697705
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Prior Consensual Intercourse Testimony

Text: 63 The defendant carelessly contends that the court committed plain error when it refused to admit evidence of prior acts of consensual intercourse between Boyles and Tomow into evidence. 17 After O'Kimosh's testimony, but before Tomow testified, defense counsel advised the court at a sidebar conference, that Boyles and Tomow engaged in consensual sexual intercourse on two prior occasions, once within the last year, and the other time eleven years earlier. Boyles's attorney stated that Boyles did not tell anyone about these two incidents before trial because he did not want his girlfriend to find out. Now that Boyles and his girlfriend had broken up, defense counsel wanted to have Boyles testify about these two occasions during his direct examination, 18 and asked permission of the court to question Tomow about the two incidents if she denied that she had sex with Boyles on those occasions while testifying. The government stated at a sidebar with the judge that it would object to the introduction of any testimony about the first occasion because it was too remote in time (eleven years) from the alleged rape, but agreed that the second occasion might be relevant to the issue of consent. When Tomow did take the stand, she failed to testify about any sexual acts between her and Boyles other than those charged in the indictment. 64 Boyles, now on appeal, argues that these prior acts of consensual intercourse were relevant to the issue of whether Tomow consented to engage in sex acts with him on the night in question and on the issue of a good faith reasonable mistake. 19 Although Boyles merely made a statement to the court concerning the prior incidents of consensual intercourse, the court stated that it was inclined to agree with the defendant that the evidence was relevant and indicated that it would hold an in camera hearing to determine its admissibility should any testimony come in concerning Tomow's prior sexual activity with Boyles. In spite of the fact that the defendant knew he had a judge inclined to agree with him that such evidence was relevant, he failed to make any attempt to have the previous sexual encounters brought to the jury's attention by requesting the judge to make a timely specific ruling on the issue. As such, we review for plain error only. United States v. Badger, 983 F.2d 1443, 1453 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2391, 124 L.Ed.2d 293 (1993) (when counsel fails to ask for a ruling on a motion in limine and fails to make a record and make a specific objection to the lack of such ruling, the issue is waived on appeal and we review for plain error only). 65 Although the evidence of prior consensual intercourse may, under limited circumstances, have been relevant to the issue of consent, Boyles did not file a written motion at least 14 days before trial specifically describing the evidence and stating the purpose for which it is offered as required by Federal Rule of Evidence 412(c)(1), 20 nor did he or Tomow testify about any prior sexual encounters with each other. In light of Boyles's failure to make a proper offer of proof much less a request for a timely and specific ruling on the admissibility of this evidence, see, id., and the failure of either Tomow or Boyles to testify about the prior incidents of consensual intercourse, we hold that the district judge did not err when he did not issue a ruling on Boyles's mere reference to a possible request to admit evidence of prior sexual encounters with Tomow.