Opinion ID: 615928
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Wisconsin's Right of Privacy Statute

Text: The plaintiffs argue that the defendants invaded Hutchins' right of privacy in violation of Wisconsin's Right of Privacy statute, Wis. Stat. § 995.50, and the district court found in favor of the plaintiffs. The relevant section of the act defines invasion of privacy as, [p]ublicity given to a matter concerning the private life of another, of a kind highly offensive to a reasonable person, if the defendant has acted either unreasonably or recklessly as to whether there was a legitimate public interest in the matter involved, or with actual knowledge that none existed. It is not an invasion of privacy to communicate any information available to the public as a matter of public record. Wis. Stat. § 995.50(2)(c). There is most certainly a question of material fact as to the first four factors that create the invasion of privacy claim (which, we note, appear to weigh heavily in favor of the plaintiffs). However, we do not reach this analysis because the information communicated is available to the public as a matter of public record. The appellants' argument with regard to the right of privacy claim is that Hutchins' disciplinary record is considered a public record because the record is the product of a closed investigation, and records of employee misconduct may be released under Wisconsin's Open Records Law once the investigation has concluded. [2] The district court addressed this argument and disagreed, stating that Hutchins' disciplinary file was not a public record, basing this conclusion on its finding that Sheriff Clarke violated Wisconsin's Open Records Law by failing to provide notice and conduct a balancing test. The district court entangled its analysis of Wisconsin's Open Records Law with its analysis under Wisconsin's Right of Privacy statute and incorrectly relied on its procedural finding under the Open Records Law when determining whether the disciplinary record should remain closed under the Right of Privacy statute. While the two statutes are related laws, they are only related in that a finding under the Open Records Law that a record should be made public would necessarily mean that the information was available to the public as a matter of public record. This is true because both statutes apply the same common-law balancing test when determining whether a record is public. In this case, however, the district court never made a finding as to whether the record could be made public under the Open Records Law (and thus under the Right of Privacy statute). Instead, it found only that the procedures delineated in the Open Records Law were not followed. These procedures, however, have no impact on the question of whether a record is public or not; they are merely procedural, not substantive. Although the district court's opinion and the parties' briefs identified the balancing test as being pertinent to a public records finding under the Right of Privacy statute, all failed to adequately apply the balancing test to the facts in this case. Because the application of the balancing test is a question of law, we apply our analysis independently. Milwaukee Journal Sentinel v. Wisconsin Dep't of Admin., 319 Wis.2d 439, 768 N.W.2d 700, 708 (2009) (citing Wisconsin Newspress, 546 N.W.2d at 149). [3] In order to determine whether Hutchins' disciplinary history is information available to the public as a matter of public record, we weigh the public interest in protecting its citizens' reputations and privacy against the strong public interest in maintaining open records, considering the relevant factors to determine whether the surrounding factual circumstances create an exceptional case not governed by the strong presumption of openness. Hempel v. City of Baraboo, 284 Wis.2d 162, 699 N.W.2d 551, 567 (2005). When applying the common-law balancing test, our consideration is not of personal embarrassment and damage to reputation, but whether disclosure would affect any public interest. Zellner v. Cedarburg Sch. Dist., 300 Wis.2d 290, 731 N.W.2d 240, 252 (2007); Linzmeyer v. Forcey, 254 Wis.2d 306, 646 N.W.2d 811, 820 (2002) ([T]he public interest in protecting individuals' privacy and reputation arises from the public effects of the failure to honor the individual's privacy interests, and not the individual's concern about embarrassment.). After balancing the two interests in this case, we find that the public interest in disclosure of this information is not outweighed by the public interest in maintaining it as a closed record. Many of the factors that favor nondisclosure of police officers' personnel files are not present in Hutchins' case. See Hempel, 699 N.W.2d at 568-70 (records pertaining to internal investigations may be withheld from the public when they are the result of a confidential investigation and disclosure would discourage other police officers and employees within the police department from providing potentially damaging information about a colleague); State ex rel. Journal/Sentinel, Inc., Anne Bothwell v. Arreola, 207 Wis.2d 496, 558 N.W.2d 670, 676-77 (Wis.Ct.App. 1996) (the release of disciplinary files might hamper the police department's ability to conduct an effective investigation against an accused officer); Law Offices of William A. Pangman & Associates, S.C. v. Zellmer, 163 Wis.2d 1070, 473 N.W.2d 538, 545 (Wis.Ct.App.1991) (disclosure of personnel records would have a chilling effect on law enforcement because officers might make fewer arrests if they knew their personnel files might be made public as a result of the arrest); Law Offices of William A. Pangman & Associates v. Stigler, 161 Wis.2d 828, 468 N.W.2d 784, 789 (Wis.Ct.App.1991) (release of records would endanger officer engaged in undercover work); Village of Butler v. Cohen, 163 Wis.2d 819, 472 N.W.2d 579, 584 (Wis.App.1991) ((1) the possibility of cross-examination of matters in personnel records might impair police officer's ability or willingness to testify in court, and (2) fewer qualified candidates would accept employment in a position where they could expect their personnel files are regularly open for public review). Nevertheless, some factors favoring non-disclosure do apply. For example, the release of Hutchins' disciplinary file could jeopardize the personal privacy of the employee who made the complaint about his offensive conduct. See State ex rel. Ledford v. Turcotte, 195 Wis.2d 244, 536 N.W.2d 130, 132 (Wis.Ct.App.1995). [4] And there is a valid concern about the impact of disclosing personnel files on intra-department morale. Zellmer, 473 N.W.2d at 543. [5] The public policies favoring disclosure include (1) the intent of Wisconsin's Open Records Law states that [t]he denial of public access generally is contrary to the public interest, and only in an exceptional case may access be denied, Wis. Stat. § 19.31; (2) the public has a particularly strong interest in being informed about its public officials, especially in the case of law enforcement officers, Local 2489, 689 N.W.2d at 654; and (3) the public has entrusted its police officers to protect the community from any wrongdoings, and the misconduct for which Hutchins' was disciplined occurred in the location where the public has entrusted [the employees] to work and during the performance of [their] public duties, and therefore should be more subject to public scrutiny, Linzmeyer, 646 N.W.2d at 819. [6] In addition to these factors, which have been identified in Wisconsin cases, there are additional relevant facts favoring disclosure in this case. Whether the county sheriff is performing his job in a satisfactory manner is particularly relevant to the public interest. Criticism of the sheriff's performance, especially from an individual who freely identified himself on-air as a deputy within the sheriff's department, gives the public a heightened interest in the origin and motives behind that criticism. We note that it is problematic when a government employer openly discusses his employees' disciplinary files, and Wisconsin's Right of Privacy statute remains a viable form of relief. However, in this case, after applying the common-law balancing test to Hutchins' disciplinary file, we conclude that there is no genuine public interest in keeping the record closed to the public. Hutchins' claim under Wisconsin's Right of Privacy statute fails.