Opinion ID: 1790946
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: whether the circuit court erred in allowing waiver of sentencing by jury.

Text: ¶ 37. Bishop argues that the circuit court erred in allowing him to waive sentencing by a jury, because Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-101 does not make allowance for waiver. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-101(1) provides detailed instructions for trial courts to follow during the sentencing phase of the trial: (1) Upon conviction or adjudication of guilt of a defendant of capital murder or other capital offense, the court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death, life imprisonment without eligibility for parole, or life imprisonment. The proceeding shall be conducted by the trial judge before the trial jury as soon as practicable. If, through impossibility or inability, the trial jury is unable to reconvene for a hearing on the issue of penalty, having determined the guilt of the accused, the trial judge may summon a jury to determine the issue of the imposition of the penalty. If the trial jury has been waived, or if the defendant pleaded guilty, the sentencing proceeding shall be conducted before a jury impaneled for that purpose or may be conducted before the trial judge sitting without a jury if both the State of Mississippi and the defendant agree thereto in writing. In the proceeding, evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to sentence, and shall include matters relating to any of the aggravating or mitigating circumstances. However, this subsection shall not be construed to authorize the introduction of any evidence secured in violation of the Constitutions of the United States or of the State of Mississippi. The state and the defendant and/or his counsel shall be permitted to present arguments for or against the sentence of death (Emphasis added.) ¶ 38. In Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 465, 104 S.Ct. 3154, 82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984), the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant's constitutional rights were not violated when a trial judge was allowed to impose the death penalty. Upon agreement between the defendant and the prosecution, a criminal defendant may waive his right to jury trial as to guilt. Robinson v. State, 345 So.2d 1044, 1045 (Miss.1977). Criminal defendants frequently waive the right to jury trial and enter pleas of guilty. ¶ 39. By pleading guilty a defendant waives his constitutional rights against self-incrimination, to confront witnesses, and the requirement to have each element of the offense proved beyond a reasonable doubt. See Chunn v. State, 669 So.2d 29, 32 (Miss.1996); Jefferson v. State, 556 So.2d 1016, 1019 (Miss.1989). A defendant is allowed to waive many important rights. See Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 106 S.Ct. 1404, 89 L.Ed.2d 631 (1986) (waiver of Sixth Amendment right to counsel); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 374-75, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979) (waiver of Fifth Amendment or Miranda rights); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (waiver of Fourth Amendment rights by persons not in custody); Illinois v. Maxwell, 173 Ill.2d 102, 219 Ill.Dec. 1, 670 N.E.2d 679, 686-87 (1996) (waiver of sentencing jury in death penalty did not violate due process where trial court conducted extensive inquiry and determined that defendant's waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary). ¶ 40. The statute in question does not contain a provision for the waiver of a jury during the sentencing phase of a trial. However, case law and common practice show that the right to a jury during the sentencing phase may be waived. Bishop requested that his right to jury be waived. The sentencing judge did not force Bishop to do so. The judge discussed the matter in detail with Bishop. He made sure that Bishop's choice to waive his right to jury was voluntary and that he was not under the influence of any drugs. He explained to Bishop his right to offer mitigating evidence and what rights would be given up if the motion for waiver was granted. Bishop explicitly waived his right to a jury during the sentencing phase and cannot now complain his decision was error. ¶ 41. The record reflects that the following transpired after the jury rendered the guilty verdict and was returned to the jury room: BY THE COURT: I have been advised by counsel that in the event Mr. Bishop is convicted of capital murder that Mr. Bishop desires to waive jury in the sentencing phase. This can only be done provided that the State also waives jury in the sentencing phase. I'm going to take a recess and I want Mr. Daniels and Mr. Weddle to confer with counselconfer with their client and make certain that is the true knowing voluntary free decision of Mr. Bishop and to report back to the Court along those lines. We'll be in recess until you report back to the Court. You may be excused. [Recess.] BY THE COURT: All right. The Court has been presented with two written documents that purport to have been executed by Mr. Dale Leo Bishop, one of them, and the other by John R. Young, district attorney. These documents indicate that Mr. Bishop waives trial by jury with respect to the sentencing phase and also the other one indicates that the State of Mississippi waives a jury trial on the issue of sentencing in this case. Before we proceed further, Mr. Bishop, I want to ask you a few questions concerning that. Would you mind standing and be[ing] sworn again? Do you solemnly swear or affirm the statements you're about to make are the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? BY MR. BISHOP: Yes, sir. BY THE COURT: Mr. Bishop, do youlet me ask you this first. Are you presently under the influence of any intoxicating liquor, drug or other substance? BY MR. BISHOP: No, sir. BY THE COURT: How old are you? BY MR. BISHOP: 25-26. 26. BY THE COURT: Do you suffer from any known mental illness, sickness, disease or disorder? BY MR. BISHOP: Nothing substantial. BY THE COURT: Well, tell me about anything minor. BY MR. BISHOP: I don't knowno. The answer is no. BY THE COURT: All right. How far did you get in school? BY MR. BISHOP: 7th, 8th grade. BY THE COURT: Can you read and write? BY MR. BISHOP: Yes, sir. BY THE COURT: Do you understand that you do have the right, at this phase of the proceeding, the second phase commonly referred to as the sentencing phase, to have mitigating circumstances presented on your behalf, unlimited with respect to the number or really what they relate to, just about anything can be offered in way of mitigation by you and you can make that, present that proof or that testimony in the presence of the jury? Do you understand that? BY MR. BISHOP: Yes, sir. BY THE COURT: And that jury has the right to deliberate, after hearing those mitigating circumstances and the aggravating circumstances, if any, presented by the State, and that jury would have the final say-so in determining whether or not to sentence you to death or sentencing you to life without the possibility of parole. Do you understand that? BY MR. BISHOP: Yes, sir. BY THE COURT: And further, do you understand that if the jury could not agree, then the Court would only have one option and that would be to sentence you to life without parole? Do you understand that? BY MR. BISHOP: Yes, sir. BY THE COURT: Do you also understand that the jury could sentence you to life without parole, even though the aggravating circumstances, even though they found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances? Do you understand that? BY MR. BISHOP: Yeah. BY THE COURT: Are you, as you've indicated in this written document, are you knowingly, freely, voluntarily, and understandingly waiving your right to a jury trial at the sentencing phase of the proceeding? BY MR. BISHOP: Yes, sir. BY THE COURT: Very well. Mr. Daniels, I want you, if you desire, to ask Mr. Bishop any questions that you may think necessary. BY MR. DANIELS: All right, your Honor. BY THE COURT: From right there will be fine. BY MR. DANIELS: Mr. Bishop, have you been advised against doing this by Mr. Weddle and I? BY MR. BISHOP: Yes, sir. BY MR. DANIELS: Is this something that you have thought about thoroughly before today? BY MR. BISHOP: Yes, sir. BY MR. DANIELS: And did you advise me of this earlier on in my representation of you? BY MR. BISHOP: Yes, sir. BY MR. DANIELS: Do you understand that you might be giving up some issues that may come up on the appeal of this case before the Mississippi Supreme Court by waiving this sentencing hearing before a jury? BY MR. BISHOP: Yes, sir. BY MR. DANIELS: Is this your firm desire to do this? BY MR. BISHOP: Yes. BY MR. DANIELS: I have nothing further, your Honor. Mr. Weddle may have something. BY THE COURT: Mr. Weddle, do you have anything you want to add? BY MR. WEDDLE: Mr. Bishop, if I asked you the same questions that Mr. Daniels asked you, would your answers still be the same with respect to my questions? BY MR. BISHOP: Yes, sir. BY MR. WEDDLE: Are you satisfied that we have advised you of all rights that the Court has just advised you of? BY MR. BISHOP: Yes, sir. BY MR. WEDDLE: And, again, you waive those rights freely and voluntarily? BY MR. BISHOP: Yes, sir. BY MR. WEDDLE: Nothing further, your Honor. BY THE COURT: Mr. Bishop, are you satisfied with the legal services and advice of your attorneys? BY MR. BISHOP: Yes, sir. BY THE COURT: Do you feel that your attorneys have properly advised you before making this decision? BY MR. BISHOP: Yes, sir. BY THE COURT: And is it your own personal desire to waive jury for the sentencing phase? BY MR. BISHOP: Yes, sir. BY THE COURT: Very well. You may be seated. ¶ 42. This issue is without merit.