Opinion ID: 2161601
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 29

Heading: Use of the Act Constituting the Offense as an Aggravating Factor

Text: Grandison argues, for the first time, that the finding that he entered into an agreement with Evans to have the Piechowiczs murdered for remuneration [23] could not, standing alone, properly be relied upon to impose the death penalty. He argues that the act of contracting was the crime itself, hence it could not also be an aggravating factor. While this issue was not raised in the trial court and we need not address it (see Md. Rule 885), we shall do so in recognition of the seriousness of the case. In Stebbing v. State, 299 Md. 331, 358-361, 473 A.2d 903, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 276, 83 L.Ed.2d 212 (1984), we had occasion to discuss a similar contention made in the context of using an underlying felony as an aggravating factor in a felony murder case in the capital sentencing phase. Judge Rodowsky stated for the Court: Maryland's capital punishment statute, Art. 27, §§ 412-414 makes plain the legislative intent that the commission of certain felonies, underlying a felony murder conviction, is to be considered an aggravating circumstance in the capital sentencing proceeding. At least 30 days prior to trial, the State must notify the accused of its intent to seek a sentence of death and must advise the accused `of each aggravating circumstance' upon which it intends to rely. § 412(b). Section 413(c)(1) provides that the `following type of evidence is admissible in [a sentencing] proceeding: .... (ii) Evidence relating to any aggravating circumstance listed in subsection (d) of which the State had notified the defendant pursuant to § 412(b).' Id. at 359-60, 473 A.2d at 917. Section 413(d) lists the aggravating circumstances, of which the seventh is that the defendant engaged or employed another person to commit the murder and the murder was committed pursuant to an agreement or contract for remuneration or the promise of remuneration. In our view the same rationale used in Stebbing is applicable; the intent of the legislature is as clear in the instant case as it was in Stebbing. We reject Grandison's argument.