Opinion ID: 1619783
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Florida Property.

Text: ¶ 34. Of the multiple properties contemplated by the contract, only the Florida property was not sold. The chancellor originally ordered its sale, mandating distribution of the net proceeds to the three parties. Later, the judgment was modified to provide two alternate solutions: first, that Bailey could first purchase the one-third shares of Moses and Kemp after an appraisal of the property to ascertain their value; alternatively, Bailey could judicially partition the property. [11] ¶ 35. The contract and MOU repeatedly use the term contingent to describe the interest Moses and Kemp have in the proceeds from the sale of the property. Indeed, in their briefs the attorney and real estate expert defended themselves against allegations of overcharging for services by noting their payment was bargained-for and contingent. The contract states that each of the said parties has agreed to accept his compensation for such services on a partially deferred basis, as set forth in said memorandum contingent upon the financial result of these services heretofore and hereafter to be performed by each of them. The contract also states that when all properties have been in fact liquidated and all proceeds of sale received, adjustments would be made as between the parties . . . to assure that all parties receive their appropriate distributions. (Emphasis added). ¶ 36. The use of the term contingent, and the express and plain language of the contract requiring the sale of all the properties, indicate that two events are conditions precedent to Kemp and Moses receiving further fees. First, the Florida property must be sold. Second, the sale must be effected by Moses and Kemp for them to receive their portion of the fees. From the findings of the trial court it is clear that neither of these conditions have been satisfied. ¶ 37. We cannot guess at the intent of the parties, but the facts tell a compelling story. The Baileys were in a dire financial situation. Kemp and Moses helped them out of the situation by selling the beleaguered Indiana properties, for which they received a healthy fee. Once the Baileys were out of financial danger, the pressing need to exert great time and effort (without hourly fees) to sell the remaining property in Florida simply disappeared, and the parties apparently retreated to their respective spheres. The contract was born of need and was useful only when the Baileys were in financial danger. Once the danger had passed, none of the parties pressed to fulfill the remainder of the contract to sell the Florida property. ¶ 38. The trial court committed an abuse of discretion in ordering the sale or partition of the Florida property. Even ignoring the sticky jurisdictional issues involved with a Mississippi court demanding the sale of a Florida homestead, such a result was never contemplated by the contract. If and when two conditions precedent are satisfied, Kemp and Moses may receive their one-third fee. [12]