Opinion ID: 1182529
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: people's appeal

Text: (1)(See fn. 2.) The People contend the trial court erred in holding section 654 applicable to the oral copulation and sodomy convictions and therefore staying execution of sentence on them. [2] Section 654 provides in pertinent part that An act or omission which is made punishable in different ways by different provisions of this code may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case can it be punished under more than one.... At the time of sentencing defense counsel urged that section 654 precluded imposition of sentence on the oral copulation and sodomy convictions because those crimes were committed pursuant to the same intent and objective as the rape. (2, 3)(See fn. 3.) At that time the prosecution and the trial court acquiesced, and the trial court entered judgment accordingly. [3] The prosecutor thereafter changed his mind and moved the court to amend the judgment nunc pro tunc to vacate the stay of sentence on these convictions. After argument on February 16, 1977, the court refused to vacate the stay, stating that given all the circumstances it was satisfied with the original sentencing in that regard. (4a) The People contend that section 654 does not preclude punishing for each sex offense, citing People v. Hicks (1965) 63 Cal.2d 764 [48 Cal. Rptr. 139, 408 P.2d 747]; People v. Slobodion (1948) 31 Cal.2d 555 [191 P.2d 1], and numerous Court of Appeal cases. (E.g., People v. Robinson (1977) 66 Cal. App.3d 624 [136 Cal. Rptr. 127]; People v. Delgado, supra, 32 Cal. App.3d 242, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Rist (1976) 16 Cal.3d 211 [127 Cal. Rptr. 457, 545 P.2d 833]; People v. Smith (1971) 22 Cal. App.3d 197 [99 Cal. Rptr. 192]; People v. Hurd (1970) 5 Cal. App.3d 865 [85 Cal. Rptr. 718].) They assert that each sex offense was a separate and distinct act for which defendant may be separately punished. Defendant, on the other hand, argues that section 654 precludes punishment for more than one of the sex offenses on the ground that they were all committed with the single intent and objective of obtaining sexual gratification. (See Neal v. State of California (1960) 55 Cal.2d 11 [9 Cal. Rptr. 607, 357 P.2d 839].) He asserts that the cases relied on by the People are not based on a proper application of the single intent and objective test that was established in the Neal case. Section 654 was enacted in 1872 and, insofar as here relevant, has never been amended. (5) The purpose of this legislative protection against punishment for more than one violation arising out of an act or omission is to insure that a defendant's punishment will be commensurate with his culpability. (See Neal v. State of California, supra, 55 Cal.2d at p. 20.) Because of the many differing circumstances wherein criminal conduct involving multiple violations may be deemed to arise out of an `act or omission,' there can be no universal construction which directs the proper application of section 654 in every instance. ( People v. Beamon (1973) 8 Cal.3d 625, 636 [105 Cal. Rptr. 681, 504 P.2d 905]; see also In re Hayes (1969) 70 Cal.2d 604, 605-606 [75 Cal. Rptr. 790, 451 P.2d 430]; In re Adams (1975) 14 Cal.3d 629, 633 [122 Cal. Rptr. 73, 536 P.2d 473].) Although certain general principles may be distilled from prior decisions on section 654, we do not attempt in this case to determine their proper application to other than sex offenses. The general principles on the applicability of section 654 have been thoroughly reviewed in a number of decisions. (See e.g., Neal v. State of California, supra, 55 Cal.2d 11; In re Hayes, supra, 70 Cal.2d 604; People v. Bauer (1969) 1 Cal.3d 368 [82 Cal. Rptr. 357, 461 P.2d 637, 37 A.L.R.3d 1398]; People v. Beamon, supra, 8 Cal.3d 625.) (6) For our purposes, it is sufficient to observe that it is well settled that section 654 applies not only where there was but one act in the ordinary sense, but also where there was a course of conduct which violated more than one statute but nevertheless constituted an indivisible transaction. ( People v. Beamon, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 637.) Whether a course of conduct is indivisible depends upon the intent and objective of the actor. ( Neal v. State of California, supra, 55 Cal.2d at p. 19.) If all the offenses were incident to one objective, the defendant may be punished for any one of such offenses but not for more than one. ( Ibid. ) For example, the defendant in Neal, who attempted to murder a husband and wife by throwing gasoline into their bedroom and igniting it, could not be punished for both arson and attempted murder because his primary objective was to kill, and the arson was the means of accomplishing that objective and thus merely incidental to it. On the other hand, if the evidence discloses that a defendant entertained multiple criminal objectives which were independent of and not merely incidental to each other, he may be punished for the independent violations committed in pursuit of each objective even though the violations were parts of an otherwise indivisible course of conduct. [4] ( In re Adams, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 634; People v. Beamon, supra, 8 Cal.3d at pp. 638-639; In re Hayes, supra, 70 Cal.2d 604.) For example, in Hayes, we held that section 654 was inapplicable to a defendant who simultaneously drove while intoxicated (Veh. Code, § 23102) and with knowledge that his license was suspended (Veh. Code, § 14601). As we subsequently explained in Beamon, ... neither of the Hayes violations, though simultaneously committed, was a means toward the objective of the commission of the other. The objectives, insofar as the criminal conduct was concerned, were deemed by the [ Hayes ] majority to be to drive while intoxicated and to drive with a suspended license. (8 Cal.3d at p. 639.) In determining the applicability of section 654 to the sex offenses in this case we thus focus on the question whether defendant should be deemed to have entertained single or multiple criminal objectives. (4b) Defendant asserts that the trial court properly found that his sole intent and objective was to obtain sexual gratification, and that since the evidence supports this finding, the trial court's ruling must be upheld. [5] We disagree. Such an intent and objective is much too broad and amorphous to determine the applicability of section 654. Assertion of a sole intent and objective to achieve sexual gratification is akin to an assertion of a desire for wealth as the sole intent and objective in committing a series of separate thefts. To accept such a broad, overriding intent and objective to preclude punishment for otherwise clearly separate offenses would violate the statute's purpose to insure that a defendant's punishment will be commensurate with his culpability. (See Neal v. State of California, supra, 55 Cal.2d at p. 20.) It would reward the defendant who has the greater criminal ambition with a lesser punishment. (See Seiterle v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 397, 403-406 [20 Cal. Rptr. 1, 369 P.2d 697] [conc. & dis. opn. of Schauer, J.].) A defendant who attempts to achieve sexual gratification by committing a number of base criminal acts on his victim is substantially more culpable than a defendant who commits only one such act. We therefore decline to extend the single intent and objective test of section 654 beyond its purpose to preclude punishment for each such act. (See also People v. James (1977) 19 Cal.3d 99, 119 [137 Cal. Rptr. 447, 561 P.2d 1135] [separate burglaries of different offices in the same building may each be punished]; People v. Massie (1967) 66 Cal.2d 899, 908 [59 Cal. Rptr. 733, 428 P.2d 869] [defendant may not bootstrap himself into section 654 by claiming a series of robberies constituted a single course of conduct with one intent and objective].) Our rejection of the broad and amorphous intent and objective asserted by defendant is consistent with Neal and with our past decisions on the applicability of section 654 to sex offenses. In People v. Greer (1947) 30 Cal.2d 589 [184 P.2d 512], we held that section 654 precluded punishment for both lewd and lascivious conduct and rape because the act giving rise to the lewd conduct, the removal of the victim's underclothing, was essentially part of the rape. In People v. Slobodion, supra, 31 Cal.2d 555, however, we held that section 654 did not preclude punishment for both lewd and lascivious conduct and oral copulation, even though both acts were closely connected in time and a part of the same criminal venture, because the act giving rise to the lewd and lascivious conduct was separate and distinct and was not incidental to or the means by which the oral copulation was accomplished. In Neal we noted that both Greer and Slobodion were consistent with the intent and objective test we were establishing there. Subsequently, in People v. Hicks, supra, 63 Cal.2d 764, we held that section 654 did not preclude separate punishment for two counts of oral copulation and one count of sodomy arising from the same criminal venture because each offense was a separate and distinct act and was not incidental to or the means by which any other offense was accomplished. [6] We indicated a similar view in In re McGrew (1967) 66 Cal.2d 685 [58 Cal. Rptr. 561, 427 P.2d 161], with regard to two counts of rape and one count of oral copulation. In summary, we find no basis to depart from the cases relied on by the People and no basis under those cases for applying section 654 in this case. None of the sex offenses was committed as a means of committing any other, none facilitated commission of any other, and none was incidental to the commission of any other. We therefore conclude that section 654 does not preclude punishment for each of the sex offenses committed by defendant.