Opinion ID: 853048
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Gunn's Experience as a Victim of Rape

Text: In her questionnaire, Gunn twice answered no to the question of whether she or any member of her family had ever been a victim of a crime. Petitioner's Exhibit 11(A) (Gunn Questionnaire). However, in the post-conviction hearing, she testified that she had been raped by her uncle when she was two or three years old, but that her uncle had not been prosecuted. P.C.R. Tr. at 20. She also testified that she still thinks about the rape, and, although she did not reveal the crime on her juror questionnaire because she has tried to forget it, she thought about her experience during the trial. Id. at 20-22. A different juror in this case was struck for cause when she indicated that she could not be a fair juror because of a childhood experience. She did not reveal what that experience was, but the trial court removed that juror from the panel. Trial Record at 967, 1007. Judge Gifford, who presided over both the original trial and the post-conviction proceeding, noted that the other juror's removal indicated that, had Gunn revealed that she had been raped, either the State or the defense might have determined that her experiences would impact her verdict or recommendation. Appellant's App. at 9. The defendant's trial counsel testified at the post-conviction hearing that, had a juror provided information that she had been raped by a relative, he would have: Questioned her on it and asked her if she could sit on this case where there were allegations of a sexual assault, at least circumstantially, against [the victim] and asked her if she really felt she could be fair in this case because of her prior victimization in a sexual assault case and almost certainly stricken her peremptorily if not for cause. P.C.R. Tr. at 647. The State raises Williams v. State, 275 Ind. 434, 417 N.E.2d 328 (1981) in support of its argument that Gunn's rape was too remote and attenuated from the crimes charged and evidence presented at trial to establish that Gunn might be biased. In Williams, we affirmed the decision of the trial court to reject the defense's motion to strike a juror for cause where the juror had been a victim of a burglary or a robbery, and the defendant was on trial for burglary and robbery. In the present case, while the defendant's convictions did not include rape, evidence was presented at his trial that one of the victims was found laying partially undressed in a position highly suggestive of sexual assault, and a semen-stained washcloth was found near her body. Noting that the State did not charge that the victim was murdered in the course of a sexual assault, the post-conviction court nevertheless found that a reasonable inference of sexual activity could be drawn from the evidence. Appellant's App. at 811. The court also found that Gunn's failure to disclose that she had been a victim of a crime deprived the state and the Defendant of the opportunity to determine upon voir dire whether these experiences would have impacted upon her verdict or recommendation. Id. The post-conviction court's findings on this issue are not clearly erroneous.