Opinion ID: 758747
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidentiary Problems

Text: 10 Appellants Danny and Blake claim that the district court improperly admitted evidence of the Howard beating incident and of Danny's different treatment of white and black customers and employees. They specifically claim that the potential prejudice resulting from the admission of this evidence--particularly the admission of evidence of racist policies to a predominantly black jury--far outweighed the probative value of that evidence. 11 This court reviews admissibility issues for abuse of discretion. United States v. Sassanelli, 118 F.3d 495, 498 (6th Cir.1997). Under this standard of review, this court takes a maximal view of the probative effect of the evidence and a minimal view of its unfairly prejudicial effect, and will hold that the district court erred only if the latter outweighs the former. Id. 12 From this perspective, the Owenses' argument is unavailing. With respect to the Howard beating incident, the evidence of violence is relevant to the conspiracy charge in the indictment, which specifically alleged that [i]n late May or Early [sic] June, 1991, ... [Danny and Blake] participated in the beating of an individual accused of stealing from [Danny's] electronic gambling devices. The admission of the evidence thus easily satisfies FED.R.EVID. 402. As to the claim that the potential prejudice outweighs the probative value of the evidence, courts routinely admit evidence similar to that admitted here in conspiracy cases in order to prove the patterns and practices of the conspiracy. See United States v. Wilson, 11 F.3d 346, 353 (2d Cir.1993). Thus, there is little or no support for the Owenses' claim that the district court abused its discretion in failing to find the evidence about the Howard beating to be overly prejudicial. 13 As to Danny's objection to the admission of evidence of racist policies, this argument also fails. His contention hinges largely on the decision in Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997), which held that a court cannot admit evidence of prior crimes in order to satisfy an element of a felon in possession of a firearm charge where the defendant stipulates to the prior felony conviction. He argues that because he was willing to stipulate to the bias of a witness, Marsha Schaffer, the government could not seek to introduce evidence of that witness's bias against Danny that she developed as a result of a racial incident. However, as the Court noted in Old Chief, a mere offer of stipulation to an element of an offense or certain evidence does not render those matters irrelevant and, hence, inadmissible. Id. at 650. Rather, subject to the limited exception of felony-convict status, the Court reaffirmed the accepted rule that the prosecution is entitled to prove its case free from any defendant's option to stipulate the evidence away. Id. at 654. 14 Thus, Old Chief leaves Danny to challenge the admission of the racial evidence strictly on the basis of its probative value versus its potential for prejudice. The district court determined that the evidence was relevant to the bias issue and to the control Danny exercised over the illegal activities charged and that the potential for prejudice arising out of admission of such evidence was outweighed by the probative value of the evidence. Danny has failed to show how this determination is an abuse of discretion.