Opinion ID: 2365726
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: the nature of affirmative judicial relief

Text: In Mt. Laurel, I called for the trial court to be flexible and imaginative in molding remedies to fit the circumstances of each case. I now go a step further and propose guidelines which I hope will fuel the judicial imagination. Because all communities have differing characteristics, a remedial order which is suitable for one town may be wholly inappropriate for another. For this reason, it would be ludicrous for this Court to define a standard remedial order applicable to all municipalities which have failed to use their land use regulations to make possible an appropriate variety and choice of housing. Nevertheless, contrary to the majority, I firmly believe that this Court can and should specify the goals which must be furthered by such judicial relief and then outline the procedures and devices which, depending on local circumstances, can be employed to attain those goals.
Five basic goals or objectives are readily identifiable. Most important, the trial court must prohibit continued use of the zoning power for illegal, exclusionary purposes. Ordinarily, this may be accomplished by enjoining operation of exclusionary devices and ordering the municipality to amend its zoning ordinance to correct these deficiencies. Thus the court can alter an exclusionary scheme and foreclose prospective denial of plaintiffs' rights. Mt. Laurel, supra, 67 N.J. at 191. Insofar as the majority opinion sets aside the unlawfully exclusionary provisions of the Madison Township zoning ordinance and orders the township to correct the deficiencies therein, I join in that opinion. Ante at 552-553. Second: Not only must the trial court enjoin all prospective abuse of the zoning power, but through its remedial order it must provide effective relief to remedy past discrimination as well. Thus, in Mt. Laurel, we held that where a municipality chooses to exercise its power pursuant to the zoning enabling act, it automatically assumes a presumptive obligation with respect to regional housing needs: We conclude that every such municipality must, by its land use regulations, presumptively make realistically possible an appropriate variety and choice of housing. More specifically, presumptively it cannot foreclose the opportunity of the classes of people mentioned for low and moderate income housing and in its regulations must affirmatively afford that opportunity, at least to the extent of the municipality's fair share of the present and prospective regional need therefor. [67 N.J. at 174; emphasis supplied.] When a court has determined that a municipality has failed to meet this obligation, it must order that community to fulfill its duty. [13] This means that the town must make housing opportunities reasonably available to persons who desire to live there, but have been precluded from doing so by the town's land use regulations. Obviously, if the rights afforded by Mt. Laurel are to have any real meaning or value, fulfillment of the obligation must be measured in terms of actual production of sufficiently dispersed low and moderate income housing. [14] Judicial relief therefore must be geared toward achieving that goal. One well-reasoned article states: Where a municipality has engaged in exclusionary practices, particularly where it has done so in the face of precedents like Mount Laurel, the overriding judicial consideration should be to get housing built without delay.[ [15] ] [Mytelka & Mytelka, supra, 7 Seton Hall L. Rev. at 26.] Third: While principally designed to eliminate exclusionary zoning and encourage construction of low and moderate cost housing, remedial decrees must not be insensitive to other legitimate local concerns. Therefore, judicial decrees must also strive to preserve the amenities which have made the defendant-municipality an attractive place in which to live. This goal reflects the fact that providing an appropriate variety and choice of housing, though fundamental, is not the only objective of land use planning. Other objectives include preservation of the environment, regulation of the pace of community growth and development and protection of the public health, safety and welfare. N.J.S.A. 40:55-32, superseded by Municipal Land Use Act, L. 1975, c. 291, § 2. In Mt. Laurel, we stressed the importance of these additional functions of zoning. Mt. Laurel, supra, 67 N.J. at 190-191; id. at 212-213 (Pashman, J., concurring). Cf. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 94 S.Ct. 1536, 39 L.Ed. 2d 797 (1974); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926). A failure to advance this third objective could invariably lead to a condition which has been described as follows: Exclusionary zoning can be successfully attacked in the courts, but the excluded can win too well. If land use regulations are torn down without regard to the efficacy of substitute ordinances, the desirable residential community which originally attracted the plaintiffs can rapidly deteriorate into a place of soaring taxes, disappearing amenities, and inadequate schools, utilities, and public services  in short, a scene of chaotic, ugly growth. [Mytelka & Mytelka, supra, 7 Seton Hall L. Rev. at 1-2.] To avoid such a result the trial court must carefully balance the objective of building lower cost residences with the goal of preserving local amenities. As we noted in Mt. Laurel, both of these objectives can be achieved through careful planning and local cooperation: There is no reason why developing municipalities like Mount Laurel, required by this opinion to afford the opportunity for all types of housing to meet the needs of various categories of people, may not become and remain attractive, viable communities providing good living and adequate services for all their residents in the kind of atmosphere which a democracy and free institutions demand. They can have industrial sections, commercial sections and sections for every kind of housing from low cost and multifamily to lots of more than an acre with very expensive homes. Proper planning and governmental cooperation can prevent over-intensive and too sudden development, insure against future suburban sprawl and slums and assure the preservation of open space and local beauty. We do not intend that developing municipalities shall be overwhelmed by voracious land speculators and developers if they use the powers which they have intelligently and in the broad public interest. Under our holdings today, they can be better communities for all than they previously have been. [67 N.J. at 190-191] See generally Sedler, Conditional, Experimental and Substitutional Relief, 16 Rutgers L. Rev. 639 (1962). Fourth: So far as practical, the relief granted should respect the principle of local prerogative in land use planning. As was recognized in Mt. Laurel, zoning is still largely a function of local government. [16] Mt. Laurel, supra, 67 N.J. at 189. Therefore, at least in the first instance, it is the function and responsibility of local government to revise and amend its zoning ordinance and to formulate plans to meet its affirmative obligation under Mt. Laurel. Id. at 191. For this reason courts usually require the initial stages of remedial action to be undertaken by the municipality. Of course, respect for local judgment and control of land use decisions does not justify judicial acquiescence to indifference, evasion or subterfuge on the part of the municipality. Therefore, respect for local control should never override the other objectives of remedial action. As I stated in Mt. Laurel, [t]he mere fact that local land use control issues are involved does not preclude the court ... from exercising full panoply of equitable powers to remedy the situation. 67 N.J. at 215 (Pashman, J., concurring). Fifth: The relief ordered by the trial court must be judicially manageable. This, of course, does not mean that it may not be innovative, flexible, or require long-range or novel forms of judicial involvement. In short, the appropriateness and sufficiency of each remedial device must be measured in terms of its relation to the advancement of these five goals and objectives. [17]
In cases challenging the validity of municipal legislation, the traditional equitable remedy has been to enjoin operation and enforcement of the offending provisions. As noted in Part II, supra, this remedy is wholly inadequate in the context of exclusionary zoning. It makes no provision for vindicating and redressing past wrongs; skillful draftspeople will be able to circumvent it by devising new exclusionary devices, requiring prolonged litigation to achieve desired results; and, finally, an unqualified injunction against operation of the ordinance may subvert the legitimate, nonexclusionary function of land use planning, to the detriment of the entire community. Therefore, I conceive that the remedial stage of most exclusionary zoning cases will require both affirmative relief and close judicial supervision, almost as a matter of course. The need for a deliberate approach implementing this relief is apparent. As I noted in Mt. Laurel, effective relief can be achieved only if the trial court proceeds steadfastly in following these four steps: (1) identify[ing] the relevant region; (2) determin[ing] the present and future housing needs of the region; (3) allocat[ing] these needs among the various municipalities in the region; and (4) shap[ing] a suitable remedial order. [67 N.J. at 215-216] In order to effectuate each of these steps, the procedural guidelines which follow might be utilized by the trial court. Upon entering a judgment against the municipality, the trial court should, at the earliest practical point, join all municipalities located in the region surrounding the defendant community. Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. at 216 (Pashman, J., concurring). If necessary, this may be on the court's own motion. R. 4:28-1, 4:30. Not only is this necessary in order to equitably allocate housing needs among municipalities in a region, but it is essential if conflicting decisions are to be avoided in cases involving communities in the same region. 67 N.J. at 216 (Pashman, J., concurring). The trial court should then order the affected towns (if it has not already done so) to undertake a study identifying local and regional housing needs. This study would analyze, inter alia, the number of substandard and overcrowded units within the town and surrounding region, the number of people employed but unable to reside there, and the number of people likely to migrate there absent exclusionary zoning. The court would then ask the municipality to submit a recommendation as to what number of new low and moderate income residential units (over what period of time) would constitute its fair share of the regional housing need. See Part III (C) infra. Upon receipt of this recommendation, the court would fix and specify the municipality's fair share of that need. However, if prior to assessing each municipality's fair share the trial court finds that statistical data or independent testimony would be of assistance, the trial court may appoint its own zoning and planning experts to aid in its judgment. See Matter of Walter Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312, 40 S.Ct. 543, 64 L.Ed. 919, 925 (1920) (finding that a court possesses the inherent power to appoint persons unconnected with the court to aid in the performance of specific duties arising in a case); Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. at 216 (Pashman, J., concurring); Handleman v. Marwen Stores Corp., 53 N.J. 404 (1969); Pascack Ass'n v. Washington Tp., supra; Polulich v. J.G. Schmidt Tool Die & Stamping Co., 46 N.J. Super. 135 (Cty. Ct. 1957); Scott v. Spanjer Bros., Inc., 298 F. 2d 928 (2 Cir.1962). See generally, Wigmore, Evidence § 2484 at 270 (3 ed. 1940); Botter, The Court Appointed Impartial Expert in M. Kraft, Using Experts in Civil Cases (PLI 1977) at 73. Or, the court might appoint an independent expert if it finds that municipal recommendations are inadequate. Such consultants are to be appointed at the expense of the defendant; they should be allowed to consult with defendant, other parties, and the trial court; and ultimately, they should file a report and testify in any proceedings. This would provide the best way of ensuring a dialogue designed to meet Mt. Laurel obligations. Additionally, discussions with all parties should have the valuable effect of making certain that the expert's recommendations are sensitive to legitimate local concerns. After quantifying the municipality's fair share of the region's lower income housing needs, the court would order the town to formulate and submit a remedial plan designed to enable, encourage and affirmatively attain satisfaction of its portion of the regional need. The plan should include, among other things, proposed amendments to the municipal zoning ordinance and affirmative programs deemed necessary to satisfy the municipality's obligation under Mt. Laurel. Such additional programs might involve establishment of a local housing authority, creation of a mobile home park district, imposition of inclusionary conditions upon subdivision, PUD and cluster zone developments, or provision of density bonuses and other inclusionary devices. See Part III (D) infra. The plan would then be submitted to the trial court for approval within a specified number of days. After a hearing at which all parties could comment upon the proposed plan, the trial court would either approve the plan and order immediate implementation or, upon finding it deficient, modify the plan or order the municipality to do so. Such revisions would be submitted to the court for approval at a subsequent hearing. After the remedial plan has been formulated, approved and incorporated by the court into a judicial decree the court would retain jurisdiction in order to supervise implementation of the plan. During this process, the court could require submission of progress reports from those charged with implementing the plan and could, when necessary, issue supplemental orders enforcing or modifying the remedial decree. If it has not yet done so, independent planning consultants could be appointed to assist with implementation, and additionally, suggestions and participation by all parties to the suit should be encouraged. Finally, if there is evidence of bad faith, inadvertence or neglect on the part of the municipality, the court could assume direct control over certain aspects of the plan and impose stronger remedial measures than those provided for in the initial decree. See Part III (D) infra. Ample precedent exists for this approach. It has already been utilized by several of our trial courts in cases challenging the exclusionary character of local zoning ordinances. Mt. Laurel, supra, 119 N.J. Super. at 178-180; Pascack Ass'n Ltd. v. Mayor & Council of Washington Tp., supra. 131 N.J. Super. 195; Urban League of Greater New Brunswick v. Borough of Carteret, supra, 142 N.J. Super. at 35-39. It also mirrors the relief commonly provided by federal courts in school and housing desegregation cases. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., supra, 402 U.S. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 28 L.Ed. 2d 554. (Defendant's failure to meet a school desegregation deadline fixed by the District Court, triggered the appointment of an independent consultant whose recommendations were ultimately incorporated into a desegregation plan adopted by the court); Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization ( SASSO ) v. Union City, 424 F. 2d 291 (9 Cir.1970), on remand, 357 F. Supp. 1188, 1199 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (District Court gave the city nine months within which to take steps necessary and reasonably feasible under the law to accommodate ... the [housing] needs of [its] low income residents, and also ordered the city to submit periodic reports concerning the steps it had taken to accomplish this objective); Crow v. Brown, supra , 332 F. Supp. at 395-396 (county officials and a local housing authority were ordered to appoint a joint committee to prepare a county wide plan for the development and placement of low rent public housing projects and to implement the recommendations of the joint committee after first reporting to the court); Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, supra, 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969), supplemented 304 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (the District Court ordered the parties to submit plans designed to prohibit the future use and to remedy the past effects of [the housing authority's] unconstitutional site selection and tenant assignment procedures; following review of these plans, the Court issued a detailed order providing for the immediate deconcentration of public housing facilities in the Chicago Metropolitan area and further compelling the housing authority to revise its tenant assignment policy, submit such revisions to the Court for approval and undertake certain studies); Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, supra, 437 F. 2d at 1286 (5 Cir.), aff'd en banc 461 F. 2d 1171 at 1174 (5 Cir.1972) (town required to submit a plan for the court's approval detailing proposed cures for the long history of discrimination which the record reveals.). Cf. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299-300, 75 S.Ct. 753, 99 L.Ed. 1083, 1105-1106 (1955); Wright v. City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 454-458, 92 S.Ct. 2196, 33 L.Ed. 2d 51, 57-59 (1972); Mahaley v. Cuyahago Metropolitan Housing Authority, 355 F. Supp. 1257, 1269 (N.D. Ohio 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 500 F. 2d 1087 (6 Cir.1974), cert. den. 419 U.S. 1108, 95 S.Ct. 781, 42 L.Ed. 2d 805 (1975). [18] This approach is attractive in several respects. First, placing the initial responsibility for formulating a remedial plan into the hands of municipal officials furthers the objective of assuring maximum respect for local prerogatives. Cf. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 1394, 12 L.Ed. 2d 506, 541 (1964); Jackman v. Bodine, supra, 43 N.J. at 473-474. Good faith compliance with the letter and spirit of the initial court decree will obviate the need for additional judicial interference and thus guarantee the retention of municipal control and responsibility over zoning matters. Second, this approach recognizes the need to preserve local amenities. As noted above, if the municipality must accommodate low and moderate income families, it is best that this be done in a planned and orderly fashion. Intelligent use of PUD restrictions, density bonuses, landscape requirements and dispersal of different types of housing throughout the community can achieve compliance with the municipality's obligation under Mt. Laurel and still adequately protect the amenities which make the town an attractive place to live. Phased zoning, a technique which permits control over the pace and location of new development affords another means of achieving these ends. [19] Nevertheless, this technique must be used with caution. See Golden v. Ramapo Planning Bd., 30 N.Y. 2d 359, 334 N.Y.S. 2d 138, 285 N.E. 2d 291 (Ct. App. 1972), appeal dismissed 409 U.S. 1003, 93 S.Ct. 436, 34 L.Ed. 2d 294 (1972); Constr. Industry Ass'n of Sonoma Cty. v. Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1974), rev'd 522 F. 2d 897 (9 Cir.1975), cert. den. 424 U.S. 934, 96 S.Ct. 1148, 47 L.Ed. 2d 342 (1976); Kleven, supra, 21 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. at 1453 n. 66. All such efforts, if otherwise proper and valid, should be encouraged by the court. Third and most important, by requiring judicial review and approval of all remedial programs, this approach assures that plaintiffs' rights will be adequately protected and that the municipality's proposed plans will comply with both the trial court order and the dictates of Mt. Laurel. Moreover, by retaining jurisdiction to supervise implementation of the remedial order, the trial court will forestall the possibility of dilatory tactics or bad faith compliance on the part of the municipality. See Part II supra. As one commentator correctly notes: The mere adoption of [a remedial] plan is not sufficient to satisfy the court's duty. It must take the necessary steps to see to it that the plan becomes a reality. [Rubinowitz, supra note 8, 6 Mich. J.L. Reform at 669.] The remedial approach which I have suggested, seeks to do this by permitting courts to retain jurisdiction, require periodic reports, set time limits and, if necessary, issue supplemental orders to address problems which arise during implementation of the order. In this area, more than in most, continual supervision can be crucial. Mytelka & Mytelka, supra, 7 Seton Hall L. Rev. at 32. Cf. Green v. Cty. School Bd., supra, 391 U.S. at 439, 88 S.Ct. at 1694, 20 L.Ed. 2d at 724; Louisiana v. United States, supra, 380 U.S. at 156, 85 S.Ct. at 823, 13 L.Ed. 2d at 716; Kelley v. Altheimer, 378 F. 2d 483, 489 (8 Cir.1967); Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. Lackawanna, supra, 318 F. Supp. at 698; City of Miami Beach v. Weiss, 217 So. 2d 836, 838 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1969); Casey v. Warwick Tp. Zoning Hearing Bd., supra, 328 A. 2d at 470.
As noted, the task of formulating a remedial order ordinarily begins with a quantification of the municipality's fair share of regional housing needs. In Mt. Laurel, we observed that the recent proliferation and widespread acceptance of fair share allocation plans has engendered numerous formulae and techniques for making this determination. Mt. Laurel, supra, 67 N.J. at 189-190; id. at 215-216 (Pashman, J., concurring). Obviously, no one approach or formulaic device is judicially mandated and courts should carefully weigh all reasonable proposals submitted to them by expert witnesses and local planning authorities. However, some quantifiable approximation of the municipality's fair share is necessary as an aid in formulating remedial plans or evaluating their adequacy. See id. at 190. For this reason, I am baffled by the majority's pronouncement that, while Madison Township is obligated to create the opportunity for a fair and reasonable share of the housing needs of its region, no formulaic determination or numerical specification of such a fair and reasonable share is required. Ante at 553. Because this approach gives the trial court no reliable way of measuring local compliance with the Court's remedial order, I fail to see how it will encourage implementation of an effective remedial plan. The need for at least some degree of specificity in this regard was aptly stated in a recent article on the subject of exclusionary zoning: ... The absence of explicit tests for determining whether an ordinance is unlawfully exclusionary exacerbates the problem. On remand, the Madison court discussed the concept of fair share allocation of low and moderate income housing within a given region. This concept requires an evaluation of both the income distribution of the municipality's population and that of the larger metropolitan area of which the township is a part. The precise manipulation of the statistics to be gathered and the formulation of land use provisions, however, was not addressed by the court and thus the township was left with no clear idea of how best to implement the fair share concept. To require a township to revise its ordinance to meet reasonable yet imprecise standards imputes a measure of good faith that may not exist. It is difficult to believe that a township that systematically has excluded all but the affluent would frame, much less administer, an ordinance that actively will encourage the entry of others. [Mallach, supra, 6 Rutgers-Camden L.J. at 664; footnotes omitted, emphasis supplied] While absolute precision or adoption of a foolproof formula is neither necessary nor possible, some reasonable approximation of the municipality's fair share obligation is essential for a proper evaluation of remedial efforts. Ordinarily a challenge that a local zoning ordinance is exclusionary requires an initial determination of the municipality's fair share of regional housing needs during the course of the trial. However, in some cases, such as in the instant case, the exclusionary impact of the challenged ordinance is so patent that there is no need to quantify the municipal obligation under Mt. Laurel prior to entering judgment in the case. Oakwood at Madison v. Madison Tp., supra, 128 N.J. Super. at 447. Thus, where no such determination has been made, the trial court will have to fix and specify the municipal obligation during the remedial stage of the case. As noted in Mt. Laurel, proximate quantification of the municipal obligation generally requires (1) identification of the relevant region; (2) a determination of the present and prospective housing needs of the region and (3) allocation of these needs among the various municipalities in the region. Mt. Laurel, supra, 67 N.J. at 215 (Pashman, J., concurring). While the trial court should solicit recommendations from the parties and particularly from the municipality's planning authority, delineation of the appropriate region is ultimately a question for the court. As we recognized in Mt. Laurel, the composition of the relevant region will necessarily vary from case to case and no hard and fast rule can provide the appropriate answer in every instance. [20] Mt. Laurel, supra, 67 N.J. at 189. Among the geographic units which experts have suggested are: the county, a multicounty unit, the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area utilized by the Federal Office of Management and Budget in calculating the United States Census, an urbanized or nonrural subregion of the relevant Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (such as that utilized in Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, supra, 304 F. Supp. at 737-738); an area coextensive with the jurisdiction of a regional planning authority, if one exists; the area within which most residents of the community journey to work; and the housing market area employed by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development and discussed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Hills v. Gautreaux, supra, 425 U.S. at 298-301, 96 S.Ct. at 1546-47, 47 L.Ed. 2d at 804-05. In determining which of these alternate definitions of a region is appropriate in a particular case, the court should consider and weigh the following factors: (1) where low and moderate cost housing is currently being sought, (2) where development is likely to take place in the foreseeable future, (3) where the municipality's current and prospective residents work or are likely to work, (4) whether there exists a regional planning agency, (5) whether the location of transportation facilities and prospective employment makes commutation likely, and (6) whether the suggested region is sufficiently large and diverse to permit a feasible solution to the housing problem. See generally ante at 540; Mt. Laurel, supra, 67 N.J. at 215 n. 16 (Pashman, J., concurring); Rubinowitz, supra note 8, 6 Mich. L.J. Reform at 652-655; Rubinowitz, supra at 219-220; Rose, supra note 17, 6 Rutgers-Camden L.J. at 717-720; Davidoff & Davidoff, Opening the Suburbs: Toward Inclusionary Land Use Controls, 22 Syracuse L. Rev. 509 (1971); Bisgaier, supra note 2, 99 N.J.L.J. at 738, Cols. 2-3; Lindbloom, Defining `Fair Share' of `Regional Need': A Planner's Application of Mount Laurel, 98 N.J.L.J. 633 (1975). I would order the trial court to actually identify the region which includes the defendant municipality. The majority, on the other hand, concludes that, generally, no specific geographical area will be necessarily the authoritative region, and that in this case the trial court should look to the housing market area of which Madison Township is a part and from which the future population of the township would be drawn in the absence of exclusionary zoning. See ante at 537, 538, 543-544. Unless the trial court determines the appropriate region with some degree of specificity, it will be unable to arrive at any meaningful estimate of the region's housing needs or the defendant's fair share. Although the majority's formulation of the approximate region in this case is relevant to the factors which I have listed, it fails to provide a definitive standard necessary to identify the appropriate region. Once the relevant region has been identified, the court must then determine the housing need for that region. Again, this information should be solicited from the local planning board, its consultants, the other parties in the case and, if necessary, impartial experts appointed by the court. In the present context, the regional housing need may be defined as the number of new housing units that would be necessary to provide each low and moderate income family in the region with a decent, standard housing unit within the financial means of the family. Rubinowitz, supra note 8, 6 Mich. J.L. Reform at 656. See also M. Brooks, Lower Income Housing; The Planner's Response 14 (Am. Soc'y of Planning Officials 1972); Bisgaier, supra note 2, 99 N.J.L.J. at 738. Finally, the trial court must fix and specify the number of low and moderate cost dwelling units which shall constitute the municipality's fair share of the regional housing need. As noted above, this approximation need not be mathematically precise nor rely exclusively upon any one particular formula or technique. However, it must be specific enough to provide a workable benchmark to guide the formulation and measurement of remedial efforts. Ample discussion of the pertinent factors exists both in the literature [21] and in currently operative fair share allocation programs. [22] These factors include, but are not necessarily limited to: the percentage of the region's vacant, developable land lying within the municipality; whether this land is suitable for low cost housing in terms of its proximity to utilities, transportation facilities and other services; whether it is accessible to available or prospective employment opportunities; the town's population density relative to that in the region at large; whether or not the town's proportion of lower income families exceeds that in the region as a whole and the extent to which the municipality has heretofore violated the precepts of Mt. Laurel by excluding low and moderate income persons. Naturally, the relevance and weight accorded each of these factors will vary from case to case. For example, in a small region where jobs are still relatively concentrated, location of employment opportunities may not be as critical as in a large region with substantial suburbanization of employment. See Rubinowitz, supra note 8, 6 Mich. J.L. Reform at 666 n. 133. Similarly, in cases where exclusionary zoning has already become well entrenched, an allocation plan which overemphasizes satisfaction of local housing needs or immediate availability of job opportunities will reward those towns which have been most exclusionary and hence would subvert the fundamental objective of redressing past indiscretions. See note 21 supra. In the final analysis, it will be the task of the trial court to decide which of the above factors should be weighed most heavily in evaluating the figures submitted by the municipality and the other parties in the case, and in finally fixing a fair share figure.
Obviously, if the municipality fails to submit an adequate remedial plan in a timely manner, or if having done so it fails to faithfully execute that plan, a court will be required to issue stronger remedial measures, either upon application by one of the parties or upon its own motion. In addressing the problem of municipal neglect or recalcitrance, a court may utilize the services and assistance of an independent planning consultant. See Mt. Laurel, supra, 67 N.J. at 217 (Pashman, J., concurring); Pascack Ass'n Ltd. v. Mayor & Council of Washington Tp., supra, 131 N.J. Super. at 201. Cf. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., supra, 402 U.S. at 8, 91 S.Ct. at 1272, 28 L.Ed. 2d at 562; Hartman, supra note 8, 9 Urban L. Ann. at 173; Moskowitz, How to Use Experts Effectively in Land Regulation Proceedings, 3 Real Estate L.J. 359 (1975). In addition, a court should continue to solicit suggestions and comments from the parties in the case. Ultimately, though, it is the responsibility of the court to adopt measures which (so far as reasonably practical) will provide effective relief for plaintiffs and satisfy the objectives listed in Part III (A) supra. Following is a list of affirmative remedies which can be imposed, either by the defendant voluntarily or, if the town defaults in its responsibility, by the court. The list is not intended to be exhaustive. Nor should every measure be adopted in every case. Rather, the list is simply suggestive of what devices might be available to the municipality and to the court in framing a remedial order.