Opinion ID: 453007
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: standard of review

Text: 30 In Brooks v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1383 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc), this court set forth the standard for reviewing prosecutorial argument at the sentencing phase of a capital trial. 11 Improper arguments will not command habeas corpus relief unless they render the sentencing proceeding fundamentally unfair. 762 F.2d at 1399 - 1400 (citing Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 645, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 1872, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974). 12 To make that determination, a reviewing court should ask whether there is a reasonable probability that, in the absence of the offending remarks, the sentencing outcome would have been different. 762 F.2d at 1401 - 1402 (citing Strickland v. Washington, --- U.S. -, ----, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2069, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 698 (1974)). A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Strickland v. Washington, --- U.S. at ----, 104 S.Ct. at 2069, 80 L.Ed.2d at 698. 31 Of course, our constitutional review will only gauge the impact of improper arguments. If an argument focuses on a subject appropriately within the jury's concern, it ordinarily will not be improper. As a general matter, the Georgia capital sentencing jury may consider the circumstances of the particular offense, the individual characteristics of the defendant (including the potential for future dangerousness or rehabilitation), and the valid penological justifications for the death penalty (retribution, incapacitation, and general deterrence). Brooks v. Kemp, 762 F.2d at 1405 - 1408. Arguments related to those topics will normally be acceptable. Id., at 1408. 32 In this case, we must examine the closing argument delivered by the prosecutor and isolate portions which are improper. We then can decide whether the improper argument rendered Tucker's sentencing fundamentally unfair.