Opinion ID: 2271216
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: the sentencing phase instruction.

Text: Moreover, as to the sentencing-phase instructional error, the majority is reversing the trial court for doing what the Court directed it to do by virtue of our pronouncements in St Clair II (Ky.). St. Clair had four murder convictions in Oklahoma. Two of these convictions were entered prior to the Bullitt County murder of Frank Brady on October 6, 1991. The two other murders occurred prior to Brady's death, yet these convictions were not obtained until 1994 due to St. Clair's escape. All four of the convictions, however, were admissible as pertinent to the jury's sentencing functions. KRS 532.025(1)(b); [5] see also St. Clair II, 140 S.W.3d at 571 ( [W]e observe that all of them were admissible at the capital sentencing phase pursuant to KRS 532.025(1)(a).); Fields v. Commonwealth, 274 S.W.3d 375, 418 (Ky. 2008). As to the aggravating circumstance, KRS 532.025(2)(a)(1) defines it as where the offense of murder . . . was committed by a person with a prior record of conviction for a capital offense. . . . Thus, during the original trial, the trial court crafted an aggravating circumstance instruction that read, the Defendant has a prior record of conviction for murder, a capital offense. Thereafter, on appeal, we concluded that for purposes of KRS 532.025(2)(a)(1), [a] `prior record of conviction for a capital offense' includes a plea of guilty accepted by trial court or a jury's or a judge's verdict of guilty. St. Clair II, 140 S.W.3d at 570. We then concluded that the trial court's articulation of [the] aggravating circumstance changed its meaning. [Thus, upon] remand, the trial court should instruct the jury in accordance with the statutory language, i.e., `the murder was committed by a person with a prior record of conviction of a capital offense.' Id. at 571. St. Clair II (Ky.) was rendered in 2004. The next year, in 2005, in St. Clair III (Ky.), we again considered this aggravating circumstances instruction, this time arising out of St. Clair's Hardin County kidnapping of Francis Brady. The second aggravating circumstances instruction there read, [t]he Defendant has a prior record of conviction for murder, a capital offense. 174 S.W.3d at 481. This is the same language for the same instruction criticized in St. Clair II (Ky.). See 140 S.W.3d at 562, 571. Yet, in St. Clair III (Ky.), we concluded that this instruction was correct. The trial court properly concluded that St. Clair had a prior record of conviction for murder. 174 S.W.3d at 483. We also noted, [a]s a matter of law, St. Clair had two prior capital convictions for the 1991 murders before he committed the kidnapping. Id. at 484. Upon retrial in this case, in August of 2005, the trial courtattempting to comply with this Court's directionsreformulated this aggravating circumstance instruction to read, [t]he murder was committed by the Defendant and the Defendant has a prior record of conviction of murder, capital offense. However, the majority now holds that the trial court's instructions not only failed to follow this Court's explicit directive following the first appeal, but the instruction, as given, deprived St. Clair of his right to a unanimous verdict. And, `the denial of a unanimous verdictwhere the error is properly preservedis not subject to a harmless error analysis.' Op. at 306. The majority goes on to state: The better course would be to identify specifically the one or more convictions that could qualify as a `prior record of conviction for a capital offense' to avoid any possibility that the jury's verdict is not unanimous. For example, a proper instruction could read: In fixing a sentence for the Defendant for the offense of Murder, you shall consider the following aggravating circumstance which you may believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to be true: (1) the offense of murder was committed by a person with a prior record of conviction for a capital offense: the September 1991 Murray County, Oklahoma, conviction for the first-degree murder of William Henry Kelsey, Jr. Op. at 308. The majority also notes that Ronnie St. Clair's murder would also qualify, and notes further that [b]y specifically identifying qualifying convictions that can be used as aggravators, the trial court ensures that the jury cannot rely on convictions that cannot qualify. Id. While I agree with the simplicity (and accuracy) of the majority's new configuration of the instruction, I disagree with its underlying conclusions for two reasons. First, in St. Clair II (Ky.), we directed the trial court to formulate the instruction in the manner it did. And, secondly, any resulting error is simply harmless. Indeed, how could the error be harmful when we recognized in St. Clair III (Ky.) that  [a]s a matter of law, St. Clair had two prior capital convictions for the 1991 murders before he committed the kidnapping? 174 S.W.3d at 484 (emphasis added). In St. Clair II (Ky.) and III (Ky.), we considered the same instructions. In St. Clair II (Ky.), we directed that [u]pon remand, the trial court should instruct the jury in accordance with the statutory language, i.e., `the murder was committed by a person with a prior record of conviction of a capital offense. ' 140 S.W.3d at 571 (emphasis added). And, in St. Clair III (Ky.), we noted the prior instruction . . . was correct. The trial court properly concluded that St. Clair had a prior record of conviction for murder. [6] 174 S.W.3d at 483. Clearly, what we said and how we said it was, at best, murky. Thus, in support of the trial court's attempt to understand the directions given by the court in St. Clair II (Ky.), it reformulated the aggravating circumstance instruction to read, [t]he murder was committed by the defendant and the defendant has a prior record of conviction of murder, capital offense. In so doing, in my opinion, the trial court did what it was directed to do by this Court. I simply cannot read the trial court's response in any other way. If we had said there what the majority posits today, I could agreebut we did not. In addition, in the guilt phase of the first trial, St. Clair testified that he had been convicted by a jury of two counts of murder in Oklahoma prior to the murder of Francis Brady. This testimony, along with the other guilt-phase testimony, was introduced verbatim in the re-trial. Moreover, the prosecution introduced records of the convictions. These convictions were not seriously contested. Thus, in my opinion, it is illogical to argue that the jury may have found that St. Clair only had one conviction and that it was an impermissible one, when the logical conclusion would bethat if they were going to errthey would have found all four convictions of which they were permissibly aware. St. Clair II, 140 S.W.3d at 571 ([W]e observe that all of them were admissible at the capital sentencing phase pursuant to KRS 532.025(1)(a).). And, therefore, given that the jury undoubtedly found (at least) both permissible convictions (of the four)ones we took judicial notice of as a matter of law, St. Clair III, 174 S.W.3d at 484it can be said with fair assurance that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error. Winstead, 283 S.W.3d at 679 (citing Kotteakos v. U.S., 328 U.S. 750, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946)). To suggest that lumping the two impermissible convictions together with the two permissible ones might have swayed the jury wrongfully assumes a doubling impact of the convictions on the jury. This is a point I cannot accept for the reason that an item of evidence attains its maximum impact upon a jury at the moment of introduction (within the context of the other evidence), not upon its subsequent review in the jury room. For the foregoing reasons, I must respectfully dissent and would affirm the judgment and sentence of the Bullitt Circuit Court. Cunningham, J., joins. CUNNINGHAM, J., concurring, in part, and dissenting, in part.