Opinion ID: 789247
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prudential Factors Limiting Bivens Actions

Text: 40 In Bivens, the Supreme Court recognized as implicit in the rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment a cause of action for money damages against federal officials, sued in their individual capacities, who had allegedly violated those rights. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. at 396-97, 91 S.Ct. 1999. Bivens actions have subsequently been recognized to vindicate rights protected by the Eighth Amendment, see Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19-23, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980) (recognizing Bivens action against federal official who allegedly subjected plaintiff to cruel and unusual punishment), and the Due Process Clause, see Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 244-49, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979) (recognizing Bivens action against member of Congress for alleged gender discrimination). 41 Because a Bivens action is a judicially created remedy, however, courts proceed cautiously in extending such implied relief, particularly if either of two factors (absent from Bivens ) are present in a case, specifically: (a) an explicit congressional declaration that persons injured by a federal officer's violation of [a constitutional] Amendment may not recover money damages from the agents but must instead be remitted to another remedy equally effective in the view of Congress, or (b) special factors counseling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. at 396-97, 91 S.Ct. 1999; see Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 421-22, 108 S.Ct. 2460. 42 2. The CSRA Remedial Scheme as a Special Factor Precluding Bivens Claims to Challenge Federal Employment Actions 43 The enactment and amendment of the CSRA to construct an elaborate remedial scheme for dealing with federal employment issues has been identified by the Supreme Court as a special factor cautioning against recognition of an implied right of action for federal employment disputes. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 388, 103 S.Ct. 2404, 76 L.Ed.2d 648 (1983). In Bush, the Court refused to allow a federal aerospace engineer alleging retaliatory demotion to sue for money damages under Bivens, although recognizing that the ruling might leave plaintiff without complete relief for his alleged injury. Id. As the Court explained, the question of preclusion did not turn on the merits of the particular remedy sought but on who should decide what remedy, if any, should be provided. Id. at 380, 103 S.Ct. 2404. The Court concluded that the decision belonged to Congress, not the judiciary: Congress is in a far better position than a court to evaluate the impact of a new species of litigation between federal employees on the efficiency of the civil service. Id. at 389, 103 S.Ct. 2404. 44 Because the CSRA did afford the employee in Bush v. Lucas other relief for his injuries, some courts initially concluded that preclusion depended on the statute providing the particular employee with meaningful remedies for his employment claim. See, e.g., McIntosh v. Weinberger, 810 F.2d 1411, 1434-36 (8th Cir.1987), vacated sub nom. Turner v. McIntosh, 487 U.S. 1212, 108 S.Ct. 2861, 101 L.Ed.2d 898 (1988); Kotarski v. Cooper, 799 F.2d 1342, 1348-49 (9th Cir.1986), vacated 487 U.S. 1212, 108 S.Ct. 2861, 101 L.Ed.2d 897 (1988). This assumption was dispelled by the ruling in Schweiker v. Chilicky. In rejecting a Bivens claim by Social Security recipients seeking money damages for due process violations in connection with their continuing disability reviews, Chilicky made clear that it is the overall comprehensiveness of the statutory scheme at issue, not the adequacy of the particular remedies afforded, that counsels judicial caution in implying Bivens actions. The Court emphasized that [t]he absence of statutory relief for a constitutional violation is not sufficient, by itself, for courts to imply a cause of action for money damages against the official causing the violation. Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 421-22, 108 S.Ct. 2460. It explained that the concept of `special factors counseling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress' has proved to include an appropriate judicial deference to indications that congressional inaction [in providing a statutory remedy in a particular circumstance] has not been inadvertent. Id. at 423, 108 S.Ct. 2460 (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396-97, 91 S.Ct. 1999). 45 The unavailability of judicial review under the CSRA for certain employment grievances cannot be deemed inadvertent in light of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Fausto. Fausto, an employee of the Department of the Interior, had no right to administrative or judicial review of a disciplinary suspension under Subchapter II, governing major adverse employment actions, in the then-version of CSRA Chapter 75. When he attempted to challenge the employment action in the Court of Claims by suing under the Back Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. § 5596, and the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, the Supreme Court ruled the suit precluded by the CSRA, noting that the unavailability of judicial review in Fausto's case was not an uninformative consequence of the limited scope of the [CSRA], but rather manifestation of a considered congressional judgment that [in certain contexts, certain federal employees] should not have statutory entitlement to review for adverse action of the type governed by Chapter 75. United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. at 448-49, 108 S.Ct. 668. 46 At the time Fausto was decided, § 7511 of the CSRA defined the term employee in a way that did not differentiate between employees of the judiciary and other (non-preference-eligible) excepted service employees. See 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1988) (amended 1990) (defining employee for the purposes of Chapter 75, Subchapter II, as a non-probationary member of the competitive service or as certain preference eligible members of the civil service); Fausto, 484 U.S. at 447, 108 S.Ct. 668 (The definition of `employee[s]' covered by Subchapter II (major adverse action) specifically includes preference eligibles in the excepted service, § 7511(a)(1)(B), but does not include other members of the excepted service.). Therefore, as a non-preference-eligible excepted service employee of an executive agency, Fausto was then, as Dotson is now, ineligible for any of the administrative or judicial review protections afforded by Chapter 75 for adverse employment actions. 47 Both before and after Fausto, in cases invoking Bivens and in cases relying on particular remedial statutes, federal circuit courts have drawn similar conclusions about the preclusive effect of the comprehensive remedial scheme established by the CSRA. Most recently, in Orsay v. United States Dep't of Justice, 289 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir.2002), the Ninth Circuit ruled that deputy United States marshals could not sue under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(C), for alleged retaliatory discipline even though no relief was available to them under the CSRA. The Ninth Circuit had made the same point with respect to Social Security Administration employees almost a decade earlier in Saul v. United States, 928 F.2d 829 (9th Cir.1991). Noting that the CSRA is a special factor counseling against recognition of a Bivens remedy, Saul held that the CSRA precludes even those Bivens claims for which the act prescribes no alternative remedy, id. at 840. The Eleventh Circuit cited Saul in holding that the CSRA precludes a Bivens claim virtually identical to the one presented by Dotson: a federal probation officer suing his superiors for race discrimination in termination. See Lee v. Hughes, 145 F.3d at 1276. Indeed, no circuit court has ruled that a federal employee covered by the CSRA may pursue a Bivens damages action to challenge an adverse employment decision. See also Lombardi v. Small Bus. Admin., 889 F.2d 959, 961 (10th Cir.1989) (citing Fausto and Chilicky to support holding that no Bivens action is available in a federal employment dispute even if no remedy at all has been provided by the CSRA); Feit v. Ward, 886 F.2d 848, 854-56 (7th Cir.1989) (holding that comprehensiveness of CSRA's administrative system, together with Congress's authority regarding federal employment, constitute special factors precluding Bivens challenge to adverse employment action); Volk v. Hobson, 866 F.2d 1398, 1403 (Fed.Cir.1989) (observing that [w]hether or not an employee has access to all of the procedures and remedies of the CSRA, courts should not recognize Bivens actions to fill perceived gaps in the [statutory] program); Spagnola v. Mathis, 859 F.2d 223, 228-29 (D.C.Cir.1988) (per curiam)(en banc) (identifying the comprehensive review system established by the CSRA, Congress's advertent omission of damages relief for certain CSRA claims, and the absence of any clear expression of congressional intent to preserve Bivens remedies, as special factors precluding the creation of a Bivens damages action for constitutional challenges to federal personnel actions); Pinar v. Dole, 747 F.2d 899, 910-12 (4th Cir.1984) (noting that Congress intended CSRA remedies to be exclusive and rejecting federal employee's Bivens challenge to personnel actions taken against him); Braun v. United States, 707 F.2d 922, 926 (6th Cir.1983) (holding that federal employee could not pursue Bivens action for retaliation in employment); Broadway v. Block, 694 F.2d 979, 985 (5th Cir.1982) (holding that federal employee who challenged reassignment could not bring a Bivens action); cf. Zimbelman v. Savage, 228 F.3d 367, 370-71 (4th Cir.2000) (holding that civilian Air Force employees excluded from the CSRA by Congress in order to give the armed services maximum personnel flexibility could not use Bivens action to challenge dismissal). 48 While our own court has not specifically ruled on the preclusive effect of the CSRA on Bivens actions, we implicitly approved such preclusion in Dew v. United States, 192 F.3d 366 (2d Cir.1999). In that case, we ruled that the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), 38 U.S.C. § 4301 et seq., precluded a judicial challenge to an employment policy prohibiting Federal Bureau of Investigation agents from serving as Ready Reserves in military reserve units, even though USERRA provided no alternative mechanism for review. See Dew v. United States, 192 F.3d at 372-73. In reaching this conclusion, we analogized USERRA to the CSRA, and explained that the CSRA precludes Bivens challenges to employment actions, even where alternative remedies are unavailable to the employee. See id. (and cases cited therein). 49 We now expressly hold what we implied in dictum in Dew: the remedial scheme established by the CSRA precludes federal civil service employees from challenging adverse employment decisions through Bivens actions for money damages. 50 3. CSRA Preclusion of Bivens Actions Applies to Judicial Branch Employees 51
52 In applying CSRA preclusion to Dotson's case, we recognize that because he is a non-preference eligible exempt employee of the judicial branch, the CSRA not only affords him no damages remedy for the alleged constitutional violations in the termination of his employment; it provides him with no administrative or judicial review of the challenged employment action. We note, however, that when Fausto was decided no non-preference-eligible members of the excepted service were entitled to any administrative or judicial review for challenged employment actions under Chapter 75; thus, Dotson is no worse off now than the plaintiff in Fausto was at that time. 53 In Lee v. Hughes, 145 F.3d at 1275, the Eleventh Circuit confronted a case, like this one, in which a probation officer sought to challenge an adverse employment action. That court concluded, despite the unavailability of any other protections under the CSRA, that Bush, Chilicky, and Fausto warranted preclusion of the Bivens claim. The court explained: 54 [T]he exclusion of certain classes of employees from the remedies provided by the CSRA reflects not congressional silence from which courts may imply that an excluded employee is free to pursue whatever judicial remedies he would have had before enactment of the CSRA, ... but rather congressional intent to deny the excluded employee specific protections otherwise afforded by the Act.... In light of Congress's deliberate exclusion of certain employees from the protections of the CSRA and this country's long-respected separation of powers doctrine, courts should be hesitant to provide an aggrieved plaintiff with a remedy where Congress intentionally has withheld one. 55 Lee v. Hughes, 145 F.3d at 1276 (quoting Fausto, 484 U.S. at 447, 108 S.Ct. 668)(internal citations omitted). 56 The Ninth Circuit has similarly ruled that CSRA preclusion bars Bivens actions by employees of the judicial branch. See Blankenship v. McDonald, 176 F.3d 1192, 1195 (9th Cir.1999). In that case, a federal court reporter alleged that her termination violated due process because it was in retaliation for her testimony at a court EEO hearing. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the CSRA afforded the reporter no effective remedies, id. at 1194; nevertheless, because it concluded that Congress's decision in this regard had not been inadvertent, it declined to recognize a Bivens cause of action, see id. at 1195. 57 We agree with the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits that Congress's omission of review rights for judicial branch employees was not inadvertent and, therefore, precludes pursuit of a Bivens claim. 4 Indeed, Congress's intent on this point can be discerned in three ways. 58
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60 Congress's intent to withhold CSRA review rights from judicial branch employees is discernable in the first instance from the structure of the CSRA. Title 5 does not ignore judicial branch personnel in establishing laws relevant to the civil service. To the contrary, it specifically includes such personnel within the civil service and defines them as employees for various purposes. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 2101, 2105; see also Blankenship v. McDonald, 176 F.3d at 1195 (noting that in Title 5 Congress has given judicial employees certain employment benefits and remedies, such as back pay, severance pay, family and medical leave, and health and retirement benefits). 5 At the same time that Congress thus brought judicial branch employees within the CSRA scheme, however, it expressly excluded them, as members of the excepted service, from specific procedural rights and remedies. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 2302, 4301, 7511. Construing this exclusion of excepted service employees (including judicial branch employees) from the then-operative CSRA provisions granting review rights, the Supreme Court in Fausto concluded that Congress's action was not inadvertent but deliberate: 61 The comprehensive nature of the CSRA, the attention that it gives throughout to the rights of nonpreference excepted service employees, and the fact that it does not include them in provisions for administrative and judicial review contained in Chapter 75, combine to establish a congressional judgment that those employees should not be able to demand judicial review for the type of personnel action covered by that chapter. 62 United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. at 448, 108 S.Ct. 668; see also Blankenship v. McDonald, 176 F.3d at 1195; Lee v. Hughes, 145 F.3d at 1276. 63 (2) The Amendment History of the CSRA Evidences Congress's Deliberate Decision to Exclude Judicial Branch Employees from the Statute's Review Procedures 64 The applicability of Fausto 's conclusion to judicial branch employees is reinforced by the second factor evidencing congressional intent: the fact that on two occasions when Congress amended CSRA review provisions pertaining to excepted service employees, it did not extend these procedural protections to judicial branch personnel. 65 The first amendment was in response to Fausto 's holding that non-preference eligible excepted service employees who lacked review rights under the CSRA were nevertheless precluded from bringing damages actions. Congress modified the Act to extend review rights to certain non-preference eligible excepted service employees. See Civil Service Due Process Amendments of 1990, Pub.L. No. 101-376, 104 Stat. 461 (Aug. 17, 1990) (codified in relevant part at 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(C)); H.R.Rep. No. 101-328 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 695, 698 (citing Fausto as impetus for the amendment). Significantly, as our earlier discussion of § 7511(a)(1)(C) indicates, see supra at 164-65, judiciary employees were not among those to whom the extension applied. See Hartman v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 77 F.3d at 1379-81. 66 Even more telling was Congress's amendment of the CSRA the following year in the Administrative Office of the United States Courts Personnel Act of 1990 (AOUSC Act), Pub.L. No. 101-474, § 5, 104 Stat. 1097, 1099-1100 (Oct. 30, 1990). The AOUSC Act, inter alia, eliminated a loophole in the statutory scheme that had granted CSRA review rights to certain judicial employees in the AOUSC that were unavailable to all other judicial employees. 6 The AOUSC Act sought to bring AOUSC employees in line with the remainder of judicial branch personnel. This was accomplished, however, not by extending CSRA review rights to judiciary employees generally, but by phasing out such rights for AOUSC employees. See generally H.R.Rep. No. 101-770(I), reprinted in 1990 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 1709, 1710 (the purpose of the AOUSC Act is to authorize a personnel system within AOUSC that is free from executive branch controls and more similar to that of the rest of the judicial branch because keeping AOUSC employees subject to the executive branch is contrary to the doctrine of separation of powers). 7 Congress's decision to eliminate CSRA procedural protections for the small class of judicial branch employees to whom they had long applied indisputably reveals its conscious decision to withhold such statutory review rights from judicial employees generally. 67 (3) The Judiciary's Own Administrative Review Procedures for Employment Disputes Provide a Rational Basis for Congress's Decision to Withhold Statutory Remedies 68 Dotson and amicus submit that Congress could not have intended to grant extensive administrative and judicial review rights to most civil service employees while withholding such procedural protections from judicial branch employees. Indeed, amicus argues that such a distinction would be irrational and a violation of equal protection. A third factor, however, explains the rationality of Congress's choice: the judiciary's own comprehensive procedures for review of adverse employment actions. Like the CSRA, the judiciary's review procedures have been modified and refined over the years better to balance the dual concerns for fair treatment of employees and efficient judicial administration. But one factor particularly relevant to this case has informed the process for almost forty years: the commitment to equal employment opportunity. 69 Since 1966, it has been the avowed policy of the federal judiciary, speaking through the Judicial Conference of the United States, to follow the equal employment opportunity principles applicable to private sector and government employers. Rep. of the Jud. Conf. of the United States, Study of Judicial Branch Coverage Pursuant to the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995, at 6 (December 1996), (detailing history of judiciary commitment to equal employment opportunity) (hereinafter CAA Study). 8 Thus, soon after Congress's enactment of the CSRA, the Judicial Conference developed a Model Equal Employment Opportunity Plan and, by resolution, required federal courts to adopt EEO plans in conformance with the national policy of providing equal employment opportunity to all persons regardless of their race, sex, color, national origin, religion, age ... or handicap. Rep. of the Jud. Conf. of the United States, Judiciary Equal Employment Opportunity Program — Model Equal Employment Opportunity Plan § I (1980, rev.1986) (Model Plan), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/forms/AO342.pdf. The Model Plan requires each federal court to promote equal employment opportunity through a program encompassing all facets of personnel management including recruitment, hiring, promotion and advancement. Id. 70 The scope of the Model Plan endorsed by the Judicial Conference and subsequently adopted by each federal court is expansive, affording all court personnel including judges' staffs and court officers and their staffs, id. § II, and [a]ll applicants for court positions the right to seek timely redress of discrimination complaints, id. App. 1, § I. Further, all persons filing discrimination complaints have the right to be free from retaliation, coercion, or interference because of filing a timely complaint. Id. App. 1, § III.A. They have the right in pursuing their complaint to be represented by a person of their choice, see id. App. 1, § III.B., the right to have reasonable notice of any hearing conducted on a complaint, id. App. 1, § III.C., and the right to use a reasonable amount of official time to prepare their case, id. App. 1, § III.D. 71 A complainant initiates the administrative review process outlined in the Model Plan by filing a written complaint with a court's designated EEO Coordinator within fifteen days of the alleged incident. See id. App. 1, § IV. A., D. 1. 9 The EEO Coordinator is charged with the responsibility to investigate the matter, consult with the involved parties and seek an informal resolution, and prepare a report to the parties identifying the issues, describing his or her findings and recommendations, explaining what resolution, if any, was achieved, and defining what corrective actions, if any, will be undertaken. Id. App. 1, § IV.B. 72 If either party is dissatisfied with the findings and recommendations of the EEO Coordinator, the Model Plan affords further review upon filing of a written request with the Chief Judge or a designee to have the matter reviewed. Id. App. 1, § IV. C. 1. Upon receipt of such a request, the Chief Judge or a designee will conduct any necessary investigation, determine whether to interview the parties or other witnesses, determine whether to hold a hearing on the matter, and issue a final decision on the complaint. See id. App. 1, § IV. C. 2. If the Chief Judge deems a hearing necessary, all parties are timely notified and have the right to be represented at the hearing, to present evidence, and to cross-examine witnesses. Id. App. 1, § IV. C. 3. 73 Congress's awareness of the courts' EEO plans is beyond question. Indeed, it has carefully monitored the operation of these plans to satisfy itself that they adequately protect judicial employees from discrimination without the need for legislative action. This oversight role was most evident in conjunction with the enactment of the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 (CAA), whereby Congress extended to its own employees the protections of eleven labor laws generally applicable to other public and private employees, including the protections against discrimination provided in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq. See 2 U.S.C. § 1302, et seq. (West 1995). 10 74 In enacting the CAA, Congress initially considered extending the statute's coverage to employees of the judicial branch but, mindful of the importance of judicial autonomy, ultimately decided against such action. 11 Instead, Congress required the Judicial Conference to prepare a report on the application to the judicial branch of the labor laws in question, including any recommendations the Judicial Conference may have for legislation to provide to employees of the judicial branch the rights, protections, and procedures under the [labor] laws, including administrative and judicial relief, that are comparable to those available to employees of the legislative branch under [the CAA]. 2 U.S.C. § 1434; see also 141 Cong. Rec. S439, S442 (Jan. 5, 1995) (comments of Sen. Charles Grassley) (noting that the provision directing the Judicial Conference to undertake a study to determine how employees of the judiciary will obtain the rights and remedies conferred by these [labor] laws was included in the CAA to ensure compliance with these laws by the judicial branch). 75 In December of 1996, the Judicial Conference submitted to Congress a Study of Judicial Branch Coverage Pursuant to the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995. See Rep. of the Jud. Conf. of the United States (Mar. 11, 1997), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judconf/jccrpt397.html. After an exhaustive survey of then-operative judicial procedures, the Judicial Conference reported that [t]he judiciary currently provides its employees with protections similar to those enumerated in the laws referenced in the CAA. See CAA Study at 2. 12 Nevertheless, mindful of the new remedial scheme established in the CAA for congressional employees, the Conference proposed to review and revise its Model EEO Plan to afford judicial employees review procedures similar to those adopted by Congress in establishing its internal Office of Compliance. See id. at 7. The Conference concluded that in light of both this proposal and the judiciary's history of administrative review, no legislative action was necessary to ensure the rights of judicial branch employees: 76 Overall, in light of current judicial branch policies and enhancements undertaken in the course of the judiciary's CAA study process, the Judicial Conference concludes that legislation is neither necessary nor advisable in order to provide judicial branch employees with protections comparable to those provided to legislative branch employees under the CAA. 77 Id. at 2. 78 In support of this conclusion, the Conference highlighted the importance of internal governance to the principle of judicial independence. From the beginning of the federal court system, the hallmarks of judicial branch governance have been local court management and individual judge autonomy, coupled with mechanisms for ensuring accountability and effective use of resources. Id. at 4. For this reason, the judiciary's internal governance system is a necessary corollary to judicial independence. Id. 79 Significantly, after receipt of the CAA Study, Congress took no action to legislate administrative or judicial review requirements for the judicial branch. Instead, over the course of the next year, the Judicial Conference devised a new Model Employment Dispute Resolution Plan (Model EDR Plan) to provide employees with an enhanced administrative dispute resolution process similar to the structure Congress has created in the Office of Compliance. Jud. Conf. of the United States, Model EDR Plan (Mar.1997), available at http://www.ce9.uscourts.gov/Web/OCELibra.nsf/0/ f75b8f4776df874e8825650e0065ef2c?OpenDocument. The Model EDR Plan is, in fact, an adjunct to the Conference's earlier Model EEO Plan, which it leaves intact except for the complaint procedures outlined in Appendix A to the Model EEO Plan. 13 80 Drawing on the CAA, the Model EDR Plan establishes mandatory counseling and mediation as initial first steps in the dispute resolution process. Id. Ch. VIII, §§ 1, 5C.2, 6B.3. Within fifteen days after notice of the end of the mediation period, an employee who still thinks himself aggrieved may file a formal written complaint. See id. Ch. VIII, § 7A. Upon determination that the complaint states a claim for relief and raises a material dispute of fact, the court's chief judge, or another designated judicial officer, must hold a hearing on the merits within sixty days of the filing of the complaint. See id. Ch. VIII, §§ 7B.2, 7C.1, 7C.2.a. The judicial officer enjoys broad discretion to provide such discovery and investigation as is necessary. Id. Ch. VIII, § 7C.2. The employee, however, has the right to be notified of the date of the hearing, to be represented, to present evidence, and to cross-examine witnesses. See id. Ch. VIII, § 7C.2.b., c. The hearing must be recorded, see id. Ch. VIII, § 7C.2.d, and any final decision made available to the public, see id. at Ch. VIII, § 10. Should the judicial officer conclude that a right protected by the plan has been violated, he may award broad equitable relief and, where the statutory criteria of the Back Pay Act are satisfied, a monetary award. See id. Ch. VIII, §§ 9A-C. 81 The Model EDR Plan also provides for an additional level of appellate review not available under the original EEO Model Plan. Specifically, an employee dissatisfied with the final hearing decision may petition for review of that decision under procedures established by the judicial council of the circuit. Id. Ch. VIII, § 8. The Second Circuit's EDR Plan, based on the Judicial Conference's model, provides for such petition to be made in writing to the Circuit Executive. Review is conducted by one or more members of the Circuit Judicial Council as designated by the Chief Circuit Judge. See Equal Opportunity and Employment Dispute Resolution Plan of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals (effective Sept. 1, 2003) Ch. IV., § 3(e) 5. 82 We so painstakingly detail the history of administrative review of adverse employment actions within the judiciary to make several points supporting the conclusion that Congress's decision to withhold CSRA review procedures from judicial employees was deliberate and rational: (1) administrative review within the judiciary plainly has a long history, which has been well known to Congress; (2) at all times pertinent to this action, a judicial employee who thought himself the victim of unlawful discrimination had specific procedures available to him (separate and apart from the disciplinary review pursued by Dotson) to raise such a claim; (3) such internal procedures have always involved some opportunity for review by a judicial officer; 14 and (4) within the last decade, Congress has engaged in an extensive dialogue with the federal courts about the need to legislate remedies for judicial employment disputes, with Congress ultimately choosing not to enact any such legislation and with the courts establishing even more detailed and multi-layered levels of administrative review. 83 Under these circumstances, we conclude that Congress's decision to exclude judicial branch employees from the administrative and judicial review procedures of the CSRA, and from subsequent legislation such as the CAA, was not inadvertent, but a conscious and rational choice made and maintained over the years in light of both a proper regard for judicial independence and recognition of the judiciary's own comprehensive review procedures for adverse employment actions, including review by judicial officers. 84 For all these reasons, we conclude that judicial branch employees such as Dotson, no less than other federal employees covered by the CSRA, are precluded from pursuing Bivens damages actions for adverse employment decisions. The district court's dismissal of Dotson's Bivens claim is affirmed. 85