Opinion ID: 46557
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: standard of review

Text: In our only previous review of a district court’s award of attorneys’ fees under § 3730(d)(4) of the FCA, we applied an abuse of discretion standard of review. Martel v. Maxxam Inc., 211 F.3d 584, 2000 WL 329354, at  (5th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (unpublished table opinion). This standard of review is consistent with that employed by our sister circuits having occasion to consider an award of attorneys’ fees under § 3730(d)(4). United States ex rel. Grynberg v. Praxair, Inc., 389 F.3d 1038, 1058 (10th Cir. 2004); United States ex rel., Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 704 (2d Cir. 2001); see also United States ex rel. Chandler v. Cook Co., Ill., 277 F.3d 969, 5 976 (stating that the addition of § 3730(d)(4) to the FCA gives courts more discretion to regulate qui tam suits). The abuse of discretion standard is also consistent with our review of attorneys’ fees under analogous circumstances. See, e.g., Skidmore Energy, Inc. v. KPMG, 455 F.3d 564, 566 (5th Cir. 2006) (reviewing Rule 11 sanctions for legally or factually frivolous filings under an abuse of discretion standard); Travelers Ins. Co. v. St. Jude Hosp. of Kenner, Inc., 38 F.3d 1414, 1417 (5th Cir. 1994) (applying abuse of discretion standard to award of attorneys’ fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, which allows fees where an attorney’s conduct unreasonably and vexatiously multiplies the proceedings); Alizadeh v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 910 F.2d 234, 237-38 (5th Cir. 1990) (applying abuse of discretion standard when reviewing award of attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which allows fees when plaintiff’s suit is frivolous and unreasonable); EEOC v. First Ala. Bank, 595 F.2d 1050, 1056 (5th Cir. 1979) (applying abuse of discretion standard when reviewing award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to Title VII, which allows fees when plaintiff’s action is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation). Accordingly, we will review the district court’s award of attorneys’ fees to Georgia Gulf pursuant to § 3730(d)(4) of the FCA for abuse of discretion. We are mindful that the district court is in the best position to render an informed judgment on an award of attorneys’ fees as it is intimately involved with the case, the litigants, 6 and the attorneys. Skidmore Energy, 455 F.3d at 566. Accordingly, our review is deferential. Under the abuse of discretion standard, a district court’s decision to award attorneys’ fees will not be disturbed unless the award is based on (1) an erroneous view of the law or (2) a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence. Id. at 566.