Opinion ID: 626865
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Implications for Indictment and Conviction

Text: The only charge in the indictment to which Defendants pled guilty was one continuous conspiracy to violate the CCTA stretching from 1999 through 2007. Based on our interpretation of the CCTA and the relevant Washington laws, there is a gap in the middle of that period during which Defendants' actions did not violate the CCTA. Two issues arise concerning the implications of this gap. First, we must determine whether, based on the gap, Defendants actually committed two separate conspiracies rather than one continuous conspiracy and, if so, whether prosecution for the first conspiracy is barred by the statute of limitations. Second, we must determine whether the gap creates a variance or constructive amendment of the indictment such that the conspiracy charge should be dismissed in its entirety.
Defendants argue that, based on the gap in the conspiracy, they actually committed two separate conspiracies rather than one continuous conspiracy. Defendants therefore argue that prosecution for the first conspiracy is barred by the statute of limitations. We agree. Actions that cannot be prosecuted because of the statute of limitations can be considered as part of an ongoing conspiracy so long as one overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy occurred during the limitations period. See United States v. Fuchs, 218 F.3d 957, 961 (9th Cir.2000). The question here is whether the Wilburs' conspiracy ran continuously from 1999 through 2007, or whether the Wilburs engaged in two separate conspiracies, one before the Swinomish CTC went into effect from 1999 through 2003, and the other after their Swinomish tobacco license expired in 2005. The general rule is that a conspiracy continues until there is affirmative evidence of abandonment, withdrawal, disavowal or defeat of the object of the conspiracy. United States v. Recio, 371 F.3d 1093, 1096 (9th Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). There are relatively few cases in which defendants have argued that gaps in their activity demonstrated abandonment or withdrawal from the conspiracy such that the government was required to charge two separate conspiracies. See, e.g., United States v. Krasn, 614 F.2d 1229 (9th Cir.1980); United States v. Payne, 635 F.2d 643 (7th Cir.1980); Continental Baking Co. v. United States, 281 F.2d 137 (6th Cir.1960). The most similar case to the one before us is Continental Baking, decided by the Sixth Circuit. The government indicted the Continental Baking Company for a continuous conspiracy based on the fixing and stabilization of uniform and non-competitive prices of bakery products in the Memphis, Tennessee area. 281 F.2d at 141. For a period of slightly over two years in the middle of the alleged conspiracy, however, the Director of the Office of Price Stabilization set a price ceiling on bakery products. Id. at 154. Defendants argued that this terminated any conspiracy entered into prior thereto, and therefore any continuing conspiracy necessarily began as of the termination of the governmental control. Id. The Sixth Circuit rejected this argument, concluding that [e]ven if the price freeze were to be considered as interrupting an existing conspiracy, if the conspiracy were resumed upon the termination of the price freeze, the intervening period is more properly characterized as a period of suspension of activities rather than a termination resulting in two separate conspiracies. Id. We adopted the Sixth Circuit's reasoning in a case with very similar facts. Krasn, 614 F.2d at 1236. We conclude that Continental Baking and Krasn are distinguishable. In this case, there was affirmative evidence that there was a termination rather than a suspension of the conspiracy during the 2003-2005 period. In Continental Baking, the legal change that interrupted the conspiracy did not affect the legality of what the defendants were conspiring to do. Rather, by establishing a fixed price ceiling, the legal change made it impossible for them to achieve their object. In this case, however, the signing of the Swinomish CTC and subsequent state retrocession of its cigarette taxes did not prevent the Wilburs from achieving their object. Rather, it made the pursuit of that object legal under federal law. During the two years in which the Swinomish CTC was in effect and the Trading Post had its Swinomish tobacco license, the Wilburs could not have conspired to violate the CCTA because the purpose of their alleged conspiracy, to sell tax-free cigarettes, did not violate the CCTA. The Wilburs may have been engaged in a conspiracy to violate tribal law, but a violation of tribal cigarette tax law is not criminalized by the CCTA. We therefore conclude that the fact that the Wilburs could achieve their desired end without violating the CCTA during the second period is affirmative evidence that the Wilburs terminated their conspiracy during the period in which the Swinomish CTC was in effect and they possessed a Swinomish tobacco license. No overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy ending in 2003 occurred within the five-year statute of limitations for CCTA offenses. The government argues that the Wilburs waived a statute of limitations defense by not raising it in the district court. The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense and, generally, is waived if not raised in the trial court. See United States v. LeMaux, 994 F.2d 684, 689 (9th Cir.1993). However, a defendant's failure to raise a statute of limitations defense in the trial court does not result in waiver if raising the defense would have been futile. United States v. Manning, 56 F.3d 1188, 1195 (9th Cir. 1995). Defendants were charged in the indictment with a single continuing conspiracy, the last overt act of which occurred in 2007, well within the five-year statute of limitations period. Because there was no available statute of limitations defense to the conspiracy charged, to which they conditionally pled guilty, the Wilburs have not waived the defense. Prosecution for the first conspiracy, between 1999 and 2003, is barred by the statute of limitations. The conviction in the second conspiracy, between 2005 and 2007, the period after the Trading Post's tobacco license was revoked, is valid.
Constructive amendment and variance are based on the rule that after an indictment has been returned its charges may not be broadened through amendment except by the grand jury itself. Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215-16, 80 S.Ct. 270, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960). A constructive amendment of an indictment occurs when the charging terms of the indictment are altered, either literally or in effect, by the prosecutor or a court after the grand jury has last passed upon them. United States v. Hartz, 458 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). A variance occurs when the charging terms of the indictment are left unaltered, but the evidence offered at trial proves facts materially different from those alleged in the indictment. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The distinction is important because a constructive amendment always requires reversal, whereas a variance only requires reversal if it prejudices the defendant's substantial rights. Id. We conclude that neither of these doctrines applies. Courts find a constructive amendment where there is a complex of facts distinctly different from those set forth in the charging instrument. United States v. Von Stoll, 726 F.2d 584, 586 (9th Cir.1984) (internal quotation marks omitted). Constructive amendment does not apply in this case because no facts are in dispute, and the government has not offered proof of facts different from those set forth in the indictment. The only issue is the legal consequence of the undisputed facts. Further, constructive amendment only applies to the broadening, rather than the narrowing, of indictments. In United States v. Miller, the Supreme Court rejected a claim of constructive amendment where the complaint was not that the indictment failed to charge the offense for which he was convicted, but that the indictment charged more than was necessary. 471 U.S. 130, 140, 105 S.Ct. 1811, 85 L.Ed.2d 99 (1985). In that case, Miller was indicted for various fraudulent acts in connection with a burglary at his place of business. Id. at 131, 105 S.Ct. 1811. Proof at trial concerned only one of the many alleged fraudulent acts. Id. at 132, 105 S.Ct. 1811. The Court specifically rejected the argument that it constitutes an unconstitutional amendment to drop from an indictment those allegations that are unnecessary to an offense that is clearly contained within it. Id. at 144, 105 S.Ct. 1811. In Miller, the Court relied on its earlier decision in Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 47 S.Ct. 531, 71 L.Ed. 793 (1927). In that case, the defendant was charged with conspiring to import liquor to the United States in violation of both federal law and a treaty. 273 U.S. at 601, 47 S.Ct. 531. The treaty, however, created no offense against the United States, and thus the conspiracy charge based on the treaty could not be sustained. Id. at 602, 47 S.Ct. 531. The Court held that ignoring the treaty charge did not constitute an improper amendment of the indictment. It held that the constructive striking out of the part of the indictment involving the treaty is merely a judicial holding that a useless averment is innocuous and may be ignored. Id. These cases indicate that our conclusion that there was no conspiracy during the period of 2003 to 2005 does not require us to hold that there was an impermissible constructive amendment of the indictment, because the conviction is narrower, rather than broader, than the indictment. Variance contemplates a difference between the evidence offered at trial and the facts alleged in the indictment. Hartz, 458 F.3d at 1020. Like constructive amendment, variance does not apply in this case because the facts are not disputed. There is a possible argument that variance applies because the legal consequence of the facts alleged is different from the legal consequence alleged in the indictment. Based on the facts alleged, the indictment charged a single continuous conspiracy. As discussed above, we conclude that the facts show two separate conspiracies with a gap between them. If variance did apply, Defendants' substantial rights arguably would be prejudiced if we were to find that Defendants waived a statute of limitations defense as to the first conspiracy spanning the years 1999 to 2003. However, because we find the defense has not been waived, we need not reach that question.