Opinion ID: 1747473
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prosecutor's Comments During the Guilt Phase and Penalty Phase

Text: Howard argues to this court that the prosecutor improperly commented on his right not to testify during both the guilt phase of his trial and, again, during the penalty phase. While being questioned by the defense during the guilt phase, defense witness Kim Jones testified that Howard had asked her to call Vicki Howard and tell Vicki to pick him up. The prosecutor objected to this testimony and without asking to approach the bench, the prosecutor argued in front of the jury: I would object to the Defendant saying... What the Defendant is saying ... He can say what he said, but she can't. That's self-serving hearsay. At that point the defense asked to approach the bench and moved for a mistrial. In response to defense counsel's motion, the trial court stated at the bench: ... I guess you are going to have to be careful about what you say in front of the jury ... and do not make any improper comment on the Defendant's failure to testify should he fail to testify. The trial court then denied the defense's motion for a mistrial. Howard argues the mistrial should have been granted because the comment made by the prosecutor violated Howard's right not to testify during trial. The State asserts that the prosecutor's objection did not constitute an improper comment because there was no direct reference to Howard's decision not to testify. The prosecutor did not suggest that the jury should draw any inferences in the event Howard chose not to testify. The prosecutor made his objection during the defense case, when, for all the jury knew, it was still possible that Howard would take the stand. Furthermore, the State contends that the objection was not a reference to Howard's failure to testify, but rather a hearsay objection. A mistrial is a drastic remedy, to be employed only when an error is so prejudicial that justice cannot be served by continuing the trial, and when it cannot be cured by an instruction to the jury. Jones v. State, 340 Ark. 390, 10 S.W.3d 449 (2000). The decision to grant a mistrial is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned absent a showing of abuse or manifest prejudice to the appellant. Jones, supra. Prejudice is presumed. Adams v. State, 263 Ark. 536, 566 S.W.2d 387 (1978). An abuse of discretion may be manifested by an erroneous interpretation of the law. Wilburn v. State, 346 Ark. 137, 56 S.W.3d 365 (2001); Seeco, Inc. v. Hales, 334 Ark. 134, 969 S.W.2d 193 (1998). In this case, the trial court's denial of Howard's motion for a mistrial during the guilt phase was not so prejudicial that justice could not be served by continuing the trial. The decision to deny the mistrial was within the sound discretion of the trial court, and an abuse of this discretion cannot be found. The trial court admonished the prosecutor not to improperly comment on Howard's failure to testify and did not rule that the prosecutor had made such a comment. Therefore, the trial court's ruling to deny the mistrial was correct, and no error can be found. During the penalty phase of Howard's trial, Howard contends the prosecutor commented on his right not to testify during the State's closing argument. The prosecutor stated: Ladies and Gentlemen, the only comment that I guess I would make on the Defendant's witnesses and its testimony, and I listened very carefully and even discussed it with Mr. Cooper. Did you ever once hear the word of remorse? Did you hear it just once? You've been here for four days ... The defense objected to this comment as being an improper comment on Howard's right not to testify. The trial court stated, Well, I don't know that it is a comment. It might could be reflected or could be reflected, so let's just avoid it. Howard asserts that his convictions were based on minimal circumstantial evidence and the prosecutor's comments as such cannot be deemed harmless. When an objection to a statement during closing argument is sustained, an appellant has been given all of the relief requested, and, consequently, there is no basis to raise the issue on appeal unless the appellant requests admonition to the jury or a mistrial. Leaks v. State, 339 Ark. 348, 5 S.W.3d 448 (1999). Furthermore, a comment is improper when it draws attention to the fact, or comments on, the defendant's failure to testify. Jones, supra. An allegedly improper comment on the defendant's failure to testify usually occurs during the prosecutor's closing argument, when the evidence is closed and the defendant's opportunity to testify has passed. Adams, supra . Under those circumstances, a comment that draws attention to the defendant's failure to testify is improper because it creates the risk that the jury will surmise that the defendant's failure was an admission of guilt. Adams, supra . Consequently, the comment has the effect of making the defendant testify against himself in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Jones, supra. Under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, a defendant has the privilege of deciding whether to testify. Here, Howard did not seek further relief by moving for a mistrial or requesting an admonition to the jury. However, even if Howard had moved for a mistrial or an admonition to the jury, the comment did not refer to Howard's failure to testify. Rather, Howard never expressed remorse to the witnesses that testified, not that he failed to express remorse to the jury. Therefore, we find no error and affirm the trial court.