Opinion ID: 2796228
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Atkins/Chase standard

Text: ¶6. In Chase’s 2002 appeal, this Court addressed the Atkins decision. We recognized “that Atkins exempts all mentally retarded persons – even those who are minimally mentally retarded – from execution.” Chase, 873 So. 2d at 1026. Because Atkins left to the states the task of defining intellectual disability, and because our Legislature had not undertaken that task, we provided two complementary definitions of intellectual disability that were cited with approval in Atkins. Id. at 1027-28; see Foster v. State, 848 So. 2d 172, 175 (Miss. 4 2003) (adopting the definitions from Atkins). The definition from the American Association on Mental Retardation states: Mental retardation refers to substantial limitations in present functioning. It is characterized by significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, existing concurrently with related limitations in two or more of the following applicable adaptive skill areas: communication, self-care, community use, self-direction, health and safety, functional academics, leisure, and work, Mental retardation manifests before age 18. Id. at 1027 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3, 122 S. Ct. 2242 (citing Mental Retardation: Definition, Classification, and Systems of Support 5 (9th ed.1992))). The American Psychiatric Association’s definition states: The essential feature of Mental Retardation is significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning (Criterion A) that is accompanied by significant limitations in adaptive functioning in at least two of the following skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, social/interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-direction, functional academic skills, work, leisure, health, and safety (Criterion B). The onset must occur before age 18 years (Criterion C). Mental Retardation has many different etiologies and may be seen as a final common pathway of various pathological processes that affect the functioning of the central nervous system.” Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 39 (4th ed. 2000). Chase, 873 So. 2d at 1028 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n. 3, 122 S.Ct. 2242). This Court held that these definitions “provide a clear standard to be used in this State by our trial courts in determining whether, for Eighth Amendment purposes, a criminal defendant is mentally retarded.” Chase, 873 So. 3d at 1028. ¶7. We also recognized that, while mild intellectual disability describes persons with an IQ between 55 and 70, intellectual disability “may, under certain conditions, be present in an individual with an IQ of up to 75.” Chase, 873 So. 2d at 1028 n.18; see Hall v. Florida, 5 ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 188 L. Ed. 2d 1007 (2014). We observed that IQ, alone, does not determine mental retardation. According to the DSM-IV, “it is possible to diagnose Mental Retardation in individuals with IQ’s between 70 and 75 who exhibit significant deficits in adaptive behavior.” Conversely, Mental Retardation would not be diagnosed in an individual with an IQ lower than 70 if there are no significant deficits or impairments in adaptive functioning. Chase, 873 So. 2d at 1028 n.18. ¶8. Chase promulgated a procedure to be used to determine a defendant’s claim of intellectual disability. We held that, for entitlement to a hearing on the issue of intellectual disability, the defendant must produce an expert who testifies that: (1) the defendant is mentally retarded, as that term is defined by the American Association on Mental Retardation and/or the American Psychiatric Association; and (2) the defendant has completed the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory–II (MMPI–II) and/or other similar tests, and the defendant is not malingering. Chase, 873 So. 2d at 1029. Subsequently, this Court clarified that our trial courts are free to use the MMPI-II or similar tests, the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scales Test, the Structured Interview of Reported Symptoms (SIRS), the Validity Indicator Profile (VIP), and the Test of Memory Malingering (TOMM), and/or other tests suggested and approved by mental health professionals in determining intellectual disability and/or malingering. Lynch v. State, 951 So. 2d 549, 556 (Miss. 2007). At a hearing on intellectual disability, the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that “(1) he has significantly subaverage intellectual functioning; (2) he has deficits in two or more adaptive skills; (3) he was eighteen or younger when the retardation manifested itself; and (4) he is not malingering.” Thorson v. State, 76 So. 3d 667, 676-77 (Miss. 2011). We also 6 have held that, because Atkins is concerned with whether an individual was intellectually disabled at the time of the crime and whether the intellectual disability manifested prior to age eighteen, intellectual disability must be assessed retrospectively to those relevant times. Goodin v. State, 102 So. 3d 1102, 1115 (Miss. 2012). To this end, an individual’s present functioning is relevant if it is informative of the individual’s condition at the time of the crime and/or prior to age eighteen. B. Recent definitions of intellectual disability ¶9. Since our adoption of the definitions of mental retardation in Foster and Chase, our Legislature has not enacted legislation addressing the constitutional ban on the execution of the intellectually disabled. Thus, it remains this Court’s duty “to set the limits and define the procedure which will safeguard the Eighth Amendment protection of mentally retarded persons, as required by Atkins.” Chase, 873 So. 2d at 1027. But in Hall v. Florida, the United States Supreme Court held that states’ discretion to define intellectual disability for Eighth Amendment purposes is not unlimited. Hall, ___ U.S. ____, 134 S. Ct. at 1998. We are mindful of Hall’s directive that the states lack “unfettered discretion to define the full scope of the constitutional protection” and that “Atkins provide[s] substantial guidance on the definition of intellectual disability.” Hall, ___ U.S. ____, 134 S. Ct. at 1998-99. ¶10. This case presents the Court with the opportunity to recognize developments in the field of assessing intellectual disability that have manifested since Atkins and Chase. Since Atkins, the American Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR), recently renamed the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disability (AAIDD), promulgated 7 new definitions of intellectual disability that changed the terminology applicable to adaptive functioning. In 2002, the AAMR promulgated the following definition: “Mental Retardation is a disability characterized by significant limitations in both intellectual functioning and in adaptive behavior as expressed in conceptual, social, and practical adaptive skills.” Mental Retardation: Definition, Classification, and Systems of Support 1 (10th ed. 2002). In 2010, the AAIDD promulgated a definition that changed the term “mental retardation” to “intellectual disability.” The 2010 definition states: “Intellectual Disability is characterized by significant limitations in both intellectual functioning and in adaptive behavior as expressed in conceptual, social, and practical adaptive skills.” Intellectual Disability: Definition, Classification, and Systems of Support 1 (11th ed. 2010). Intellectual disability must have originated prior to age eighteen. Id. ¶11. The 2010 AAIDD manual defines each domain of adaptive functioning. The conceptual skills domain includes “language; reading and writing; and money, time, and number concepts.” Id. at 44. The social skills domain includes “interpersonal skills, social responsibility, self-esteem, gullibility, naïveté (i.e., wariness), follows rules/obeys laws, avoids being victimized, and social problem solving.” Id. The practical skills domain includes “activities of daily living (personal care), occupational skills, use of money, safety, health care, travel/transportation, schedules/routines, and use of the telephone.” Id. For a diagnosis of intellectual disability, an individual must have significant deficits in one of the three adaptive functioning domains. Id. at 43. ¶12. In 2013, after the hearing presently under review, the American Psychiatric 8 Association also promulgated a new definition of intellectual disability: “Intellectual disability (intellectual developmental disorder) is a disorder with onset during the developmental period that includes both intellectual and adaptive functioning deficits in conceptual, social, and practical domains.” Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 33 (5th ed. 2013). The APA’s description of the adaptive functioning domains is similar to the AAIDD’s description: The conceptual (academic) domain involves competence in memory, language, reading, writing, math reasoning, acquisition of practical knowledge, problems solving, and judgment in novel situations, among others. The social domain involves awareness of others’ thoughts, feelings, and experiences; empathy; interpersonal communication skills; friendship abilities; and social judgment, among others. The practical domain involves learning and selfmanagement across life settings, including personal care, job responsibilities, money management, recreation, self-management of behavior, and school and work task organization, among others. Id. at 37. The adaptive functioning prong is met when the individual has significant limitations in one of the three domains. Id. at 38. ¶13. The new AAIDD and APA definitions are similar and require the same three basic elements of intellectual disability as the earlier definitions: significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, significant deficits in adaptive behavior, and manifestation before age eighteen. Although the new definitions changed the terminology applicable to adaptive functioning, other courts have recognized that “the exact wording of the various standards makes little substantive difference in this Atkins context.” U.S. v. Williams, 1 F. Supp. 3d 1124, 1146 (D. Haw. 2014) (citing U.S. v. Hardy, 762 F. Supp. 2d 849, 879-80 (E.D. La. 2010)). This is because both the earlier and later standards promulgated by the AAIDD and 9 the APA “direct clinicians to the same standardized measures of adaptive behavior, such as the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales–II (VABS–II) and the [AAIDD’s] Adaptive Behavior Scale.” Williams, 1 F. Supp. 3d at 1147 (quoting Hardy, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 87980). And “[e]ven after release of the DSM–5, prong two still ‘generally requires a more expansive investigation of a defendant’s life history and skill levels than could be fully evaluated through use of a normed instrument,’” and still involves “significantly more subjective clinical judgment.” Id. (quoting U.S. v. Salad, 959 F. Supp. 2d 865, 878 (E.D. Va. 2013)). ¶14. The experts presented by both Chase and the State relied on the 2010 AAIDD definition in this case. Dr. Gerald O’Brien testified that, to a practicing psychologist, the differences in the 2010 AAIDD definition and the Atkins/Chase definitions are not professionally significant. Dr. Daniel Reschly, who relied on the 2010 AAIDD definition throughout his report, testified that the conclusions he reached under that definition were comparable to those reached under the Atkins/Chase definitions. He testified that, under either the Atkins/Chase definitions or the 2010 AAIDD definition, Chase had significant limitations in intellectual functioning and in adaptive behavior that manifested prior to age eighteen. ¶15. This Court is faced with the reality of evolving standards for determining intellectual disability in the medical community. While a legal determination of intellectual disability for the purposes of the Eighth Amendment is distinct from a medical diagnosis, Hall ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. at 2000, legal determinations of intellectual disability are informed by 10 established clinical standards. See Hall, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. at 1993. Hall held that “Atkins provide[s] substantial guidance on the definition of intellectual disability.” Hall, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. at 1999. And Hall recognized the significant role of the medical community in informing legal determinations of intellectual disability, stating: That this Court, state courts, and state legislatures consult and are informed by the work of medical experts in determining intellectual disability is unsurprising. Those professionals use their learning and skills to study and consider the consequences of the classification schemes they devise in the diagnosis of persons with mental or psychiatric disorders or disabilities. Society relies upon medical and professional expertise to define and explain how to diagnose the mental condition at issue. And the definition of intellectual disability by skilled professionals has implications far beyond the confines of the death penalty: for it is relevant to education, access to social programs, and medical treatment plans. In determining who qualifies as intellectually disabled, it is proper to consult the medical community’s opinions. Hall, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. at 1993. ¶16. In 2004, this Court adopted the AAMR and APA definitions of intellectual disability cited in Atkins. As part of the medical community’s evolving understanding of intellectual disability and its diagnosis, those institutions have promulgated new definitions of intellectual disability that are generally accepted in the medical community. The new definitions have not materially altered the diagnosis of intellectual disability but have provided new terminology. Williams, 1. F. Supp. 3d at 1146. We find that judicial recognition of the new terminology conforms with the directives of Atkins and Hall and will facilitate legal determinations of intellectual disability by allowing our courts to rely on the newer, generally-accepted definitions most frequently used by modern clinicians. We now adopt the 2010 AAIDD and 2013 APA definitions of intellectual disability as appropriate for 11 use to determine intellectual disability in the courts of this state in addition to the definitions promulgated in Atkins and Chase.