Opinion ID: 2324757
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: the whistleblower case

Text: Ms. Okyiri also brought a separate civil action against Dr. Franklin claiming in substance that she had been removed from her position in retaliation for blowing the whistle on her superiors in connection with suspected unlawful activities at the DCPL. In this suit, Ms. Okyiri alleged that she had generated, and cooperated with, an investigation by representatives of the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) of certain allegedly improper financial practices at the DCPL. This investigation first addressed allegations of irregularities at the DCPL's bookstore, but it was later expanded to embrace a number of other matters, including Dr. Franklin's personal travel records. Ms. Okyiri asserted that the adverse action that resulted in her discharge was instituted in reprisal for her legally protected conduct in providing information to the OIG auditors and in resisting the unlawful expenditure of taxpayers' money in relation to the Greenlee voucher. The whistleblower case came to trial before Judge Linda Turner Hamilton, sitting without a jury, on July 19, 1995, less than four weeks after the ALJ had ruled in Ms. Okyiri's favor in the proceeding before the OEA. The trial continued for twelve days in July and October of that year. In part, the proceedings were a reprise of the earlier hearing, with testimony from several of the same witnesses. A principal focus of the whistleblower trial, however, was the testimony regarding the OIG investigation. In her written decision signed on June 7, 1996, the trial judge described the relevant events: In late fall 1992, two auditors, John Panholzer and Roy Simmons, from the Inspector General's Office were assigned to the library. Mr. Simmons actually arrived at the library in January 1993 to begin the audit. Plaintiff was made the audit liaison by Dr. Franklin. It was decided that the bookstore and its problems would be first on the auditors' agenda. Soon the audit expanded beyond the bookstore moving to [X]erox monies and miscellaneous donations. Eventually, the audit moved to defendant's personal travel records. [29] Plaintiff also alerted the auditors to the lack of control over cash donated to the library specifically telling them that the Director took the money to his office to count. At some later point in the audit, the auditors instructed plaintiff to pull all contracts over a certain dollar amount. It was undisputed at trial that plaintiff was cooperating fully with the auditors. The auditors quickly discovered the embezzlement of funds within the library. Indeed, Mr. Panholzer testified that he believed there was systematic stealing of money over a two year period. Mr. Panholzer testified that no one other than plaintiff was the source of their information. Plaintiff also brought to the auditors' attention a seemingly personal relationship between the photographer used by the library and the Director. It was plaintiff's view that the photography services provided to the library should be put to a competitive bid. Finally according to Mr. Panholzer, defendant was leaning on plaintiff by the end of March 1993.     Mr. Simmon[s] corroborated that plaintiff began to feel the pressure for her cooperation with him. The DCPL contended that Ms. Okyiri was not a genuine whistleblower and that she was discharged for legitimate and compelling reasons. Both Dr. Franklin and Mr. Molumby denied any knowledge that Ms. Okyiri had provided unfavorable information about them to the OIG auditors. The DCPL also established that on the date that she was discharged, Ms. Okyiri had formally requested whistleblower protection from the OIG, and that the Inspector General had declined to provide such protection. [30] Mr. Molumby testified that on a number of occasions, predating the controversies over the Greenlee voucher and the Bert Smith & Company letter, Ms. Okyiri had acted in an uncooperative and adversarial fashion, but that no disciplinary action was taken against her at that time. Mr. Molumby also insisted that he had instituted the adverse action against Ms. Okyiri solely on account of her insubordination and neglect of duty.
The trial judge found that Ms. Okyiri was a compelling witnessshe impressed the court as a truthful individual who entered a new job excited, ambitious and stepped on some toes as a result. Although the judge was perhaps too polite to say so, she was apparently a good deal less persuaded of the veracity of some of the DCPL witnesses, and she resolved all of the credibility issues in favor of Ms. Okyiri. Believing Ms. Okyiri rather than the DCPL representatives (and, implicitly, the OIG auditors rather than the Inspector General's letter), the judge rejected the DCPL's claim that it was the defendant and Mr. Molumby on their own accord who alerted the Inspector General's office, and instead credit[ed] plaintiff's testimony that it was at her urging. Without explicitly making a finding on the point, the judge, like the ALJ, evidently disbelieved Dr. Franklin's version of the Form PL 456 incident. With respect to Mr. Molumby's claims of uncharged instances of misconduct, the judge found that plaintiff who was never admonished at the time gave wholly credible explanations for the situations. There were some she simply could not recall. Finally, rejecting the DCPL witnesses' contrary testimony, the judge found that Ms. Okyiri's disclosures to the OIG were a substantial factor in her removal. Judge Hamilton apparently did not attribute a great deal of significance to the lengthy sojourn in Ms. Okyiri's in-box of the unopened envelope from Bert Smith & Company. In fact, the judge consigned the issue to a footnote in which she briefly described the incident, but then dismissed it because [a]t trial, Mr. Molumby testified that although the information sat on plaintiff's desk for months, the issues were resolved in the library's favor with no sanctions or fines based on delay. The judge then turned to the legal issues. After quoting the relevant proscriptions of the whistleblower statute, [31] the judge wrote that in order to prevail, plaintiff must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence the disclosure was a protected whistleblowing activity, Clark v. Department of the Army, 997 F.2d 1466 (Fed. Cir.1993); Marano v. Department of Justice, 2 F.3d 1137 (Fed.Cir.1993), and that the disclosure was a substantial factor in bringing about the personnel action. Arthur Young & Company v. Sutherland, 631 A.2d 354 (D.C.1993). The burden then shifts to the defendant to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same personnel action against the whistleblower even in the absence of the protected disclosure. Marano v. Department of Justice, supra . (Footnote omitted.) Applying this standard to the record before her, the judge ruled in Ms. Okyiri's favor: Based on the plaintiff's testimony and the corroboration presented at trial, the court finds that plaintiff has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that she was engaged in a protected whistleblowing activity. Plaintiff reported to her supervisors a reasonably held belief that payment of the Greenlee voucher violated Mayor's Memorandum 83-68. The court further finds that plaintiff's disclosures to the auditors, a public body within the meaning of § 1-616.3, were protected disclosures in that she reasonably believed violations of the law were occurring. It is also apparent from an examination of the evidence, that the disclosures were a substantial factor in her termination. Looking at the timing of the termination, the court notes that the letter of warning and the termination came at a time when, according to the testimony, plaintiff was beginning to feel the heat for her cooperation. Plaintiff had never been confronted with any personnel action or substantive complaints from her supervisors until the auditors began to step up their investigation. Additionally, there is no credible evidence in this record to explain the disparity in treatment between plaintiff's conduct which [led] to her dismissal and the treatment of those engaging in suspected illegal conduct, [32] Lastly, the court finds that the defendant has simply failed to come forward with clear and convincing evidence to support a finding that the same personnel action would have occurred in any event. (Emphasis in original; footnote omitted.)
The DCPL claims that the trial judge's findings are not supported by the evidence. In particular, according to the DCPL, there is no evidence that Dr. Franklin or Mr. Molumby were aware of any disclosures critical of them by Ms. Okyiri to the auditors. The DCPL points to the denials by Franklin and Molumby of any such knowledge, and argues that Ms. Okyiri's alleged whistleblowingan activity of which the DCPL supposedly knew nothingtherefore could not have been a substantial factor in the decision to remove her from her position. We are not persuaded by this contention. As an appellate court, we must view the record in the light most favorable to Ms. Okyiri, the party that prevailed in the trial court, and we must take into account the judge's superior opportunity to assess credibility and to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence. See, e.g., In re S.G., 581 A.2d 771, 774-75 (D.C.1990). We may set aside the judge's factual findings only if they are clearly erroneous. See D.C.Code § 17-305(a) (1997); Super. Ct. Civ. R. 52(a). We are also mindful that circumstantial evidence may be more certain, satisfying and persuasive than direct evidence, Janifer v. Jandebeur, 551 A.2d 1351, 1352 (D.C.1989) (citations omitted), especially where, as here, the existence vel non of a legally impermissible intent is at issue. [33] One can often learn a great deal from the timing of events. In this case, the adverse action against Ms. Okyiri came close on the heels of her collaboration with the OIG auditors and the expansion of their inquiry into sensitive areas, such as Dr. Franklin's travel records. It is, of course, possible that, even though the auditors were dealing with numerous DCPL employees, Dr. Franklin had no idea what Ms. Okyiri might be telling the OIG. But the judge was not compelled to believe that Dr. Franklin was unaware of what was going on, or that the disclosures and Ms. Okyiri's removal were unrelated. Moreover, as one librarian testified, there was extensive discussion among the DCPL employees regarding the OIG audit, and it is common knowledge that such a grapevine can often travel directly to the boss. Ms. Okyiri spilled the beans to the OIG auditors, and shortly thereafter she was cashiered. Coincidences happen, but an alternative explanation not predicated on happenstance is often the one that has the ring of truth. Tursio v. United States, 634 A.2d 1205, 1213 (D.C.1993) (quoting Poulnot v. District of Columbia, 608 A.2d 134, 139 (D.C.1992)). The testimony of the auditors provides further circumstantial support for the common-sense inference that the head of an institution under investigation by the OIG was aware of the course of the investigation. Ms. Okyiri had been designated to deal with the auditors, and her superiors obviously knew that she was dealing with them about something. One auditor, Mr. Panholzer, testified that as the investigation proceeded, Dr. Franklin began to play hardball and to stonewall the auditors by placing annoying procedural obstacles in their path ( e.g., by requiring a written request from the auditors whenever they wished to inspect any document, and by denying them a request for a lock to secure their workroom). Ms. Okyiri also adduced testimony from the auditors and from DCPL employees showing that, after Ms. Okyiri was discharged, the level of cooperation with the auditors was drastically reduced. Resorting to the vernacular, Ms. Okyiri claimed that she was feeling the heat, and the record supports an inference that others were feeling it too. Finally, there was evidence that Dr. Franklin fabricated the charge relating to Form PL 456 and that DCPL witnesses gave testimony that the judge did not credit. Such conduct may give rise to an inference of consciousness of guilt, which operates, indefinitely though strongly, against the whole mass of alleged facts constituting [Dr. Franklin's] cause. Mills v. United States, 599 A.2d 775, 783-84 (D.C.1991) (italics omitted) (quoting 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 278 at 133 (Chadbourn ed.1979)). [34]