Opinion ID: 1249594
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Heading: difference between nebraska and california law

Text: We first address the difference between Nebraska law and California law on the proof necessary to recover parasitic damages for fear of developing a future disease. [B]efore entangling itself in messy issues of conflict of laws a court ought to satisfy itself that there actually is a difference between the relevant laws of the different states. Barron v. Ford Motor Co. of Canada Ltd., 965 F.2d 195, 197 (7th Cir.1992). Parasitic damages are damages occasioned by anxiety specifically from a reasonable fear of a future harm attributable to a physical injury caused by the defendant's negligence. Hartwig v. Oregon Trail Eye Clinic, 254 Neb. 777, 580 N.W.2d 86 (1998). In Hartwig, we addressed whether a plaintiff who sustains an injury such as a needle stick can recover parasitic damages for anxiety and mental suffering caused by fear of contracting AIDS without showing actual exposure to infected body fluids. In addressing the issue, we cited and discussed cases from other jurisdictions, including California, that require proof of actual exposure to infected body fluids before parasitic damages can be recovered. In particular, we noted that under California law: [A]n ordinary needle stick does not give rise to parasitic damages for emotional distress and mental suffering unless a hazardous foreign substance is introduced into the body through the needle and causes detrimental changes to the body. Absent such detrimental change, in order to recover damages for a fear of contracting an illness, the plaintiff's fear must result from knowledge, corroborated by reliable medical or scientific opinion, that it is more likely than not that the plaintiff will develop such illness in the future due to the exposure. Id. at 786, 580 N.W.2d at 92, citing Macy's Cal., Inc. v. Superior Court, 41 Cal. App.4th 744, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 496 (1995). Noting that modern medicine treats a potential exposure the same as an actual exposure, we disagreed with the rule adopted by jurisdictions such as California. We adopted a different rule. Instead of requiring proof of actual exposure, we held: [A] plaintiff may adduce proof and potentially recover damages for the mental anguish of reasonably fearing AIDS resulting from a physical injury when the plaintiff may have been exposed, via a medically sufficient channel of transmission, to the tissue, blood, or body fluid of another in circumstances where the identity of the patient upon whom the contaminated needle or instrument was used is unknown, and when it is impossible or impracticable to ascertain whether any such tissue, blood, or body fluid may be HIV positive. Hartwig, 254 Neb. at 790-91, 580 N.W.2d at 94. We then held that when the elements are met, a plaintiff may adduce proof of, and potentially recover, parasitic damages for the `window of anxiety' during which the plaintiff's fear of HIV infection and contraction of AIDS was reasonable and genuine and resulted in mental suffering occasioned by a physical injury for which he or she could receive compensation. Id. at 791, 580 N.W.2d at 94. California has specifically rejected the test that we adopted in Hartwig. In Potter v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 6 Cal.4th 965, 863 P.2d 795, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 550 (1993), a case involving exposure to toxic substances and fear of developing cancer, the California Supreme Court discussed concerns about the speculative nature of damages for fear of developing an illness based merely on exposure or a significant increase of the risk that the illness would develop. The court was particularly concerned about the possibility of an increase in unreasonable claims and the effect on society of an increase in the number of lawsuits. As a result, the court limited the availability of a plaintiff to recover. The court held that where there is an absence of present physical injury or illness, parasitic damages for fear of developing cancer may be recovered only if the plaintiff pleads and proves that (1) as a result of the defendant's negligent breach of a duty owed to the plaintiff, the plaintiff is exposed to a toxic substance which threatens [illness]; and (2) the plaintiff's fear stems from a knowledge, corroborated by reliable medical or scientific opinion, that it is more likely than not that the plaintiff will develop the [illness] in the future due to the toxic exposure. Id. at 997, 863 P.2d at 816, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d at 571. The court stated that the rule required more than knowledge of exposure or a significant increase in risk. The more likely than not test set out in Potter was first applied to a case involving fear of AIDS in Kerins v. Hartley, 27 Cal.App.4th 1062, 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 172 (1994). The Court of Appeal in Kerins had initially adopted a window of anxiety test like the test followed in Nebraska, but on petition for review, the California Supreme Court transferred the matter back with directions to vacate and reconsider in light of Potter, supra . The Court of Appeal then applied the more likely than not rule from Potter. The Potter test was applied again in Herbert v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 26 Cal.App.4th 782, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 709 (1994). In Herbert, a child was stuck or scratched by a needle while waiting in an examination room at a medical center. The child's mother brought suit and sought damages for fear that her child would contract AIDS, and the trial court granted the medical center's motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the mother argued that the more likely than not test from Potter, supra, should not be applied to a fear of AIDS case. For purposes of its discussion, the court assumed that the mother could establish direct victim or bystander liability, applied the more likely than not test from Potter to the case, and affirmed. In Macy's Cal., Inc. v. Superior Court, 41 Cal.App.4th 744, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 496 (1995), another division of the California Court of Appeal agreed that in the absence of a physical injury, the plaintiff was required to plead and prove that it was more likely than not that he or she would develop an illness. The plaintiff in Macy's Cal., Inc. was stuck by a needle that was left in the pocket of a jacket she was trying on in a department store. The Macy's Cal., Inc. court discussed the definition of physical injury and whether the plaintiff was required to show that it was more likely than not that she would develop a disease. The court determined that the plaintiff was required to have actual harm, id. at 756, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d at 504, in order to escape the more likely than not test. The court stated: The question before us is whether a routine needle stick constitutes harm for purposes of parasitic damages. We conclude it does not. In a routine needle stick, harm, if it occurs, takes place when a hazardous foreign substance, introduced to the body through the needle, causes detrimental change to the body. Only if the plaintiff proves detrimental change to the body may he or she recover parasitic emotional distress damages. Without such proof, the plaintiff must satisfy Potter's more likely than not test. Id. at 756, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d at 504. The decision in Macy's Cal., Inc. illustrates that under California law, physical injury for purposes of parasitic damages does not occur when the needle punctures the skin or causes some form of injury not related to the feared disease. Instead, in order to escape from the more likely than not test, the plaintiff has to prove that a substance entered the body and caused a detrimental change to the body. Thus, as we recognized in Hartwig v. Oregon Trail Eye Clinic, 254 Neb. 777, 580 N.W.2d 86 (1998), the law of California is stricter than the rule in Nebraska. Nebraska does not require actual exposure to infected body fluids and allows recovery for a reasonable window of anxiety. California, however, requires an actual exposure under its definition of physical injury or harm in an incident where a needle punctures the skin. In the absence of actual exposure, California requires the plaintiff to prove that it is more likely than not that he or she will develop the feared illness. We recognized this distinction when we decided Hartwig. We determine that California law applies a different rule than the window of anxiety test we adopted in Hartwig. Accordingly, we next address which state law applies.