Opinion ID: 2169679
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Motion to Dismiss Dr. DiCenso

Text: When she amended her complaint to add Dr. DiCenso as a defendant, Ms. Foley alleged that Dr. Sullivan consulted with Dr. DiCenso by telephone on October 28, 1997, and that Dr. DiCenso made the decision to discharge Ms. Foley from the hospital on that day. Promptly, Dr. DiCenso moved to dismiss Ms. Foley's complaint as to him pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that Ms. Foley's complaint was time-barred because it was brought more than three years after he treated her. [3] A motion justice of the Superior Court agreed with Dr. DiCenso and granted his motion. [4] We observe that in making his determination, the motion justice considered documents, such as Ms. Foley's medical records, which were outside of the pleadings. Therefore, for purposes of this appeal, we will consider the defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) motion as a motion for summary judgment. See Ouimette v. Moran, 541 A.2d 855, 856 (R.I.1988) (If a trial justice, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, considers matters outside the scope of the complaint, the motion is converted into a motion for summary judgment.). Accordingly, we will apply a de novo standard of review and affirm the entry of judgment if we are satisfied that no genuine issue of material fact exists and Dr. DiCenso is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. East Providence School Committee v. Smith, 896 A.2d 49, 51 (R.I.2006). An action for medical malpractice must be commenced within three years after the occurrence of the incident that gives rise to the action. G.L.1956 § 9-1-14.1. But, if the injury or damage could not in the exercise of reasonable diligence be discoverable at the time of the occurrence of the incident which gave rise to the action, suit shall be commenced within three (3) years of the time that the act or acts of malpractice should, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, have been discovered. Section 9-1-14.1(2). On appeal, Ms. Foley argues that she did not, and could not, have discovered Dr. DiCenso's negligence until April 18, 2003, [5] despite her exercise of reasonable diligence. In Dionne v. Baute, 589 A.2d 833 (R.I. 1991), we addressed a fact pattern that bears similarities to the case before us now. In that case, the plaintiff contended that although she knew of her husband's injury at the time that it occurred, she was not aware of the identity of one of the doctors involved in his treatment until after she filed suit against other defendants. In Dionne, medical records indicated that the defendant, who was covering for another doctor, had returned a phone call to the emergency room concerning the treatment of the plaintiff's husband. Id. at 834. Although the plaintiff had access to these records as early as 1984, she did not file an amended complaint to add the defendant until July 1988. Id. at 834-35. The defendant then moved for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff's claim was time-barred by the relevant statute of limitations, and a hearing justice granted the motion. Id. at 833. As an issue of first impression, we considered whether the reasonable-diligence standard of § 9-1-14.1 is applicable to the efforts of a plaintiff who seeks to determine potential defendants in a malpractice dispute. Dionne, 589 A.2d at 835. Concluding that the reasonable diligence standard did apply, we said that when asserting a malpractice claim it is necessary for a plaintiff to investigate diligently who may or may not have had any exposure to liability during treatment. Id. We also held that whether a party has exercised reasonable diligence is a question of law. See id. Based on the facts present in Dionne, we determined that the plaintiff did not exercise reasonable diligence because she failed to bring suit against the defendant until July 1988, even though she received the medical records in 1984. Id. We held that once she obtained her husband's medical records she was obligated to diligently examine them. Id. Ms. Foley attempts to distinguish her case from Dionne, maintaining that here, unlike in that case, there was nothing in the medical records or Dr. DiCenso's office records that would have suggested that Dr. DiCenso consulted with Dr. Sullivan when Ms. Foley was in the emergency room the day before her stroke. She also argues that although she eventually discovered from Dr. Sullivan's responses to interrogatories that Dr. Sullivan consulted with Dr. DiCenso, she did not receive those responses until April 18, 2003, because Dr. Sullivan suffered a stroke after the interrogatories were propounded, thus delaying his answers. Therefore, she contends, the three-year statute of limitations should not have begun to run until she received the responses to the interrogatories that she propounded to Dr. Sullivan. It was only then, she argues, that she discovered that Dr. DiCenso was involved in the decision to discharge her the day before she was stricken. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Ms. Foley had ample opportunity from the time of her injury to discover Dr. DiCenso's involvement in her treatment and his potential liability, but she did not exercise reasonable diligence. After all, Dr. DiCenso was Ms. Foley's primary-care physician, and it was he whom she called on October 28, 1997, after she had fallen multiple times. Doctor DiCenso referred her to the emergency room on October 28, 1997, and also treated her when she returned to the emergency room the next day. Ms. Foley was well aware that Dr. DiCenso had treated her before and after her stroke, and yet she never availed herself of an opportunity to depose him and question him about the circumstances surrounding her discharge from the emergency room on October 28, 1997. Because she did not exercise reasonable diligence, § 9-1-14.1(2) does not apply, and we affirm the motion justice's decision to dismiss Dr. DiCenso from this case. [6]