Opinion ID: 2135804
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: delivery of deed

Text: It seems apparent from the record that the deed from Joe to Joe and Martha was never delivered during Joe's lifetime. It is essential to the validity of a deed that there be a delivery, and the burden of proof rests upon the party asserting delivery to establish it by a preponderance of the evidence. To constitute a valid delivery of a deed, there must be an intent on the part of the grantor that the deed shall operate as a muniment of title to take effect presently. Moseley v. Zieg, 180 Neb. 810, 146 N.W.2d 72 (1966); Lewis v. Marker, 145 Neb. 763, 18 N.W.2d 210 (1945). One of the problems in this litigation is that the only intent supported by evidence in the record is that of Agnes, not of the grantor. However, the essential fact to render delivery effective always is that the deed itself has left the control of the grantor, who has reserved no right to recall it, and it has passed to the grantee. Robinson v. Thompson, 192 Neb. 428, 222 N.W.2d 123 (1974); Kellner v. Whaley, 148 Neb. 259, 27 N.W.2d 183 (1947). No particular acts or words are necessary to constitute delivery of a deed; anything done by the grantor from which it is apparent that a delivery was intended, either by words or acts, or both combined, is sufficient. In re Estate of Saathoff. Saathoff v. Saathoff, 206 Neb. 793, 295 N.W.2d 290 (1980); Milligan v. Milligan, 161 Neb. 499, 74 N.W.2d 74 (1955). Whether a deed or other instrument conveying an interest in property has been delivered is largely a question of intent to be determined by facts and circumstances of the particular case. In re Estate of Saathoff. Saathoff v. Saathoff, supra ; Milligan v. Milligan, supra . In Perry v. Markle, 127 Neb. 29, 254 N.W. 692 (1934), in an action for foreclosure of a mortgage, the plaintiff claimed that there was not sufficient evidence of delivery of the deed by Samuel Perry to his children in 1915. This court found that the deed had been executed and acknowledged and that some one of the grantees had possession of the deed ever since that time. The deed had been recorded a few months after its execution. Later, the grantor inherited an undivided one-fifth interest in the property, and a mortgage was executed upon the land, in which he and his four surviving children had joined. We concluded that [t]here can be little question that Samuel H. Perry recognized that the deed had been delivered and that his children had title to the land. Id. at 32, 254 N.W. at 694. Although the syllabus of the court in Perry states that [d]elivery of a deed by the grantor to one of several named grantees is sufficient delivery as to all, it is clear from a reading of the opinion that this was only one of several factors which were considered in reaching the conclusion that a valid delivery had been made. Perhaps of great importance were the facts relating to adverse possession and statute of limitations and the fact that the deed was recorded prior to the death of the one grantee. Recordation of a deed generally presumes delivery. Kresser v. Peterson, 675 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1984). In Kresser, the testatrix's two stepsons asserted a one-half interest in a home under the terms of a will. The testatrix, Della, had executed a will which devised the home to her two sons and two stepsons. Seven years later, she executed a warranty deed in which she named herself and her two sons as grantees, with right of survivorship. The deed was recorded and placed in a bank safe deposit box under a lease agreement which provided exclusive access to the box to the joint tenants. Although the agreement permitted the sons access to the box, they did not know the deed was in the box and did not have a key to the box. The Utah court stated the general rules: An effective deed requires delivery, actual or constructive, without exclusive control or recall. Recording generally presumes delivery. Delivery to one cotenant or reservation of an estate connotes delivery to all cotenants, where the grantor is also the grantee. Id. at 1194. The court did not rely upon this last rule, however, noting instead that [w]ithal the recognized indicia of an effective delivery in this case, perhaps the most significant is the statement of Della at the time she signed the deed. Before a notary public, Della's sister and a daughter-in-law, she made it a point to state that she intended her sons to have the property. She emphasized such intention by adding that she did not intend the stepsons to have any interest in the property. Delivery was reflected by recordation of the deed and deposit by Della in the safety deposit box with written authority that any of the grantees, who also were tenants under the box rental agreement, had exclusive right of access to the box. (Emphasis supplied.) Id. The primary issue in Meadows v. Brich, 606 S.W.2d 258 (Mo.App.1980), was whether the trial court was correct in finding that a deed had been delivered. In making that determination, the court stated the following governing principles, with which we agree: Whether or not a deed has been delivered is a mixed question of law and fact. The element which controls the resolution of that question is the intention of the parties, especially the intention of the grantor. The vital inquiry is whether the grantor intended a complete transfer whether the grantor parted with dominion over the instrument with the intention of relinquishing all dominion over it and of making it presently operative as a conveyance of the title to the land. It is not necessary, to effectuate delivery, that the deed actually be handed over to the grantee or to another person for the grantee. There may be a delivery notwithstanding the deed remains in the custody of the grantor. If a valid delivery takes place, it is not rendered ineffectual by the act of the grantee in giving the deed into the custody of the grantor for safekeeping. It is all a question of the intention of the parties, which may be manifested by words or acts or both. If the deed, although acknowledged, is not recorded and is in the grantor's possession at the time of his death, those circumstances, unless explained, are deemed conclusive that the parties did not intend a complete transfer. If there is an unequivocal showing that the grantee was given possession of the deed, a presumption of delivery arises. Such a presumption, however, does not arise where the evidence shows that the grantor handed the deed to one of two grantees momentarily, for the purpose of reading it, and at the grantor's direction it is immediately taken back into grantor's possession, to be kept by him until his death. There is a presumption of non-delivery if the evidence shows that the deed was in grantor's possession at the time of his death and was not then recorded. Such a showing places upon grantees the burden of going forward with the evidence, more accurately, the burden of persuasion, to rebut the presumption of non-delivery. Id. at 260. The parties seem to agree that it was Agnes who decided that the Urbanek farm would be put in Joe's name originally, and it was Agnes who decided that Joe should add Martha's name to the deed. Thus, it is difficult to ascertain the grantor's intent. However, as noted in Moseley v. Zieg, 180 Neb. 810, 146 N.W.2d 72 (1966), the burden of proof rests upon the party asserting delivery to establish it by a preponderance of the evidence, and to constitute a valid delivery of a deed there must be an intent on the part of the grantor that the deed shall operate as evidence of title to take effect presently. Therefore, Martha had the burden of proof to show that Joe had the intention to relinquish dominion over the deed and to make it presently operative as a conveyance of the title to the land. In deposition testimony, Martha stated: Q. After Joe died, did you get a deed to the Urbanek place? A. Yes. Q. How? A. It was written in Joe's name. When he passed away, it was deeded to me. Q. Well, but how did you get the deed? A. It was made at the Schuyler Bank with Mr. Joe Beck whenwell, the farm was Joe's, and after something happened to him, then it would be mine. .... Q. Did you record the deed? A. No. Q. Do you know what it means to record a deed? A. Yes. .... Q. But you didn't record it? A. No. Q. Who did? A. Nobody. Joe had it at home. He had it. Q. In what? A. In the dresser drawer, and it was there until Q. Until he died? A. Until he died. Martha further testified: A. Well, then that Urbanek's, it was an estate. So we decided to buy it because it was just a mile and a half from the home place where I come from. Q. Did anybody make any decisions about how it was going to be paid for? A. We all pitched in. Q. Joe and Jerry and Mom and you, right? A. Yes. Q. And the title was put in Joe's name? A. Yes. Q. How did you get your name on that title? A. I don't know which year now, but then Mother decidedWell, it was with Dad's estate. The farm was put in just Dad's name and not in Mother's, and so we had it made that Urbanek's place, which Joe had in his name, so it would be willed to me, something should happen to him. Q. Why was that? A. Mother decided it that way. .... Q. After your mother died, did Jerry rent this farm from you for awhile? A. I did not have no right to the farm until after Joe passed away. (Emphasis supplied.) This testimony clearly evidences the testamentary intent of the deed as to Martha. Although factually distinct in that the grantor was not a cograntee, in Moseley v. Zieg, supra , we found that where an unrecorded deed was found after the grantor's death, in a safe deposit box to which the grantee had a right of access as a joint lessee with the grantor, this of itself would not sustain a finding that the deed was delivered when the grantor retained control, collected rents, and made repairs on the property, as he did before the purported delivery. On rehearing, in Moseley v. Zieg, 181 Neb. 691, 692, 150 N.W.2d 736 (1967), we reexamined the evidence and again concluded that there had been no delivery, noting that the facts show an attempted testamentary disposition of the property, which can only be done by compliance with the will statute. It is essential to the validity of a deed that there must be delivery, and the burden of proof rests upon the party asserting delivery to establish it by a preponderance of the evidence. Moseley v. Zieg, 180 Neb. 810, 146 N.W.2d 72 (1966). It is true that Moseley states that when the deed is found in the grantee's possession during the lifetime of the grantor, this is prima facie evidence of delivery, and the burden of proof is upon the one who disputes this presumption. However, here, the deed was never in Martha's possession during Joe's lifetime. We find that there is insufficient evidence to support a conclusion that the deed from Joe to Joe and Martha was delivered to Martha during Joe's lifetime. Accordingly, there is no valid title in the Cihals upon which a trust may be impressed. To that extent, the judgment of the district court finding that the Brteks have failed to prove the establishment of a trust as to the Urbanek place is affirmed. By the same token, we reverse the judgment of the trial court which confirmed title to the Urbanek place in the Cihals. Rather, we find that at Joe's death without a will, title vested immediately in his heirs or heir. Where an ancestor dies intestate his lands descend instantly to his heirs. It does not require settlement of his estate or a probate order declaring heirship to vest his title. Noell v. Noell, 214 Neb. 632, 635, 335 N.W.2d 303, 306 (1983). There is no question that Joe died in 1974, leaving no spouse or issue surviving him, so title descended to his mother, Agnes. Effective at that time was Neb.Rev.Stat. § 30-102 (Reissue 1964), which provided in substance that upon the death of one leaving no spouse or heir surviving, his or her property descended to parents if living. Accordingly, title descended to Agnes. Upon Agnes' death in 1982, in effect at that time was Neb.Rev.Stat. § 30-2303(1) (Reissue 1979), which provided that upon the death of a person leaving no spouse surviving, the estate passes to the issue of the decedent.... This, of course, would mean Jerry and Martha. Although this is not the lawsuit that was tried, nevertheless, the evidence supports such a conclusion. [W]here a court of equity has obtained jurisdiction of a cause for any purpose, it will retain it for all, and will proceed to a final determination of the case, adjudicating all matters in issue, thus avoiding unnecessary litigation. Whitehead Oil Co. v. City of Lincoln, 245 Neb. 680, 682, 515 N.W.2d 401, 405 (1994). Therefore, title is confirmed in Jerry and Martha as tenants in common, and the deeds to the Urbanek place purporting to vest title in Martha and then Martha and Lad are ordered canceled of record. There is no problem with the statutes of limitations, because the deed to Martha was not valid and she had no title to convey to herself and Lad. The judgment of the district court confirming title to the Urbanek place in Martha and Lad Cihal is reversed.