Opinion ID: 2081712
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The First Aggressor/Provocation Jury Instruction Issue

Text: Mr. Rorie argues that the trial court's first aggressor/provocation jury instruction constituted error because [n]o evidence showed that Mr. Rorie either verbally or physically provoked [Mr. Solice] in the moments before the final incident. Thus, [w]ithout facts to support that Mr. Rorie was the aggressor or provocateur toward Mr. Solice in the moments before the stabbing, the jury necessarily had to take into account prior, unrelated, and prejudicial acts of Mr. Rorie toward Ms. Price simply to make sense of the language in the instruction [emphasis in original]. The government generally supports the trial court's conclusion that the first aggressor/provocation instruction was appropriate in light of this entire case from the time the curtain opens until the curtain closes on decedent's life. Furthermore, the government asserts that any challenge to the wording of the instruction, raised for the first time [on appeal] [should be] reviewed for plain error only. [5] The trial court first broached the issue of a self-defense jury instruction at the end of the day on September 13, 1995, after the government had completed its main case and the defense had finished its direct examination of Mr. Rorie. The court informed counsel that it planned to give criminal jury instruction 5.12, Self-defense  General Considerations and 5.13, Self-defense  Amount of Force Permissible. The trial court also stated: I suppose that [we] will have to consider where defendant might have been the aggressor which is 5.16 and that calls into play A and B. [6] During the trial court's discussion of September 14, 1995 with defense and government counsel, the defense objected to the giving of instruction 5.16(A) and (B). In explanation of her objection, defense counsel stated: [W]e believe that there is no testimony ... that my client was the aggressor in this case at the time of the stabbing. Now, I know that the court ... heard [Ms.] Price say that the footsteps came from the direction where my client was. The trial court interrupted to say, in part: But there's so much more than that. That's just one isolated bit. You have to look at the whole context.... If you look at this entire case from the time the curtain opens until the curtain closes on the decedent's life, you have a picture of  a rather chaotic situation and through the night, through the night there were disputes off and on between the defendant and his girlfriend with interventions at the behest of his girlfriend from the decedent. There is considerable testimony .... Testimony from the girlfriend and the defendant and to an extent from the first witness in this case ... that in the final moments  moments leading up to the final confrontation and then until the confrontation was over, the defendant had the murder weapon in his hand. Reasonable people could conclude that he was behaving in an aggressive manner. Then you have a moment before the fatal fight. You have testimony undisputed that the decedent uttered words... which could only be considered as highly provocative, particularly if the hearer is someone whose senses have already been heightened ... to something that could probably be described from this evidence as a scathing rage. Someone who is torn between leaving and staying and whose determination is if I leave she goes with me, and who is being told, get out, get out, get the police, get him out. And then the words that we have heard using the curse words, the epithets and then the ultimate challenge to manhood .... Defense counsel responded: Okay. [7] We would ask for 5.14(b) ... amount of force permissible where appearances are false. Ultimately the trial court agreed to give criminal jury instruction 5.14(B) [deadly force], 5.17(A)(1) [defendant's awareness of specific acts of violence by the decedent], and 5.17(C) [threats by the decedent against the defendant]. The trial court decided sua sponte to give instruction 5.16(A) and (B). During the court's discussion of Instruction 5.16, the government remained silent, but the defense objected. Given this background, the critical issue presented for our consideration in this case is whether, in its instruction regarding the right of self-defense, the trial court appropriately included a charge relating to the defendant as the aggressor or the defendant as the person who provoked the conflict upon himself, despite the explicit objection of defense counsel and the absence of any request by the government. We begin our discussion by setting forth the general and specific legal principles which guide our analysis. In reviewing claims of instructional errors, we consider the instructions as a whole. Williams v. United States, 858 A.2d 984, 995 (D.C.2004) (citing Hunt v. United States, 729 A.2d 322, 325 (D.C. 1999)). `[I]t is axiomatic that a single instruction to a jury may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge.' Id. (quoting Dickerson v. United States, 620 A.2d 270, 273 (D.C.1993)). A defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on a `theory of the case that negates his guilt of the crime charged' if the instruction is supported by `any evidence, however weak.' Graves v. United States, 554 A.2d 1145, 1147 (D.C.1989) (citations omitted). Furthermore, an instruction to the jury must `properly inform [it] of the applicable principles involved.' Hernandez v. United States, 853 A.2d 202, 207 (D.C.2004) (quoting Stewart v. United States, 687 A.2d 576, 579 (D.C.1996)). `[T]he law of self-defense is a law of necessity'; the right of self-defense arises only when the necessity begins, and equally ends with the necessity. United States v. Peterson, 157 U.S.App.D.C. 219, 226, 483 F.2d 1222, 1229 (1973) (quoting Holmes v. United States, 56 App. D.C. 183, 188, 11 F.2d 569, 574 (1926) (footnotes omitted)). Thus, to be entitled to the defense of self-defense, the record must reflect that: (1) there was an actual or apparent threat [to the defendant]; (2) the threat was unlawful and immediate; (3) the defendant honestly and reasonably believed that he was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm; and (4) the defendant's response was necessary to save himself from danger. Hernandez, supra, 853 A.2d at 205 (citations omitted). Where the defendant asserts a defense of self-defense, if there is sufficient evidence to justify a self-defense instruction, the burden is on the government to disprove self-defense, by meeting its burden of proof negating the defendant's subjective actual belief or objective reasonableness. Swann v. United States, 648 A.2d 928, 930 n. 6 (D.C.1994) (citations omitted). In that regard, [w]hat the factfinder must determine to return a verdict of guilty is prescribed by the Due Process Clause. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993). The prosecution bears the burden of proving all elements of the offense charged, and must persuade the factfinder `beyond a reasonable doubt' of the facts necessary to establish each of those elements. Id. at 277-78, 113 S.Ct. 2078 (citations omitted). But, a defendant cannot claim self-defense if `the defendant was the aggressor, or if s/he provoked the conflict upon himself/herself.' Swann, supra, 648 A.2d at 930 n. 7 (citation omitted). In other words: The fact that the deceased struck the first blow, fired the first shot or made the first menacing gesture does not legalize the self-defense claim if in fact the claimant was the actual provoker. In sum, one who is the aggressor in a conflict culminating in death cannot invoke the necessities of self-preservation. Only in the event that he communicates to his adversary his intent to withdraw and in good faith attempts to do so is he restored to his right of self-defense. Peterson, supra, 157 U.S.App. D.C. at 228, 483 F.2d at 1231 (footnotes omitted). Thus, the fact that a defendant may have been an aggressor or a provocateur at an earlier point in time, does not by itself rule out a defense of self-defense. Indeed, it would ... be[] error to deny an otherwise established claim of self-defense solely because [the defendant] had previously taken aggressive action toward [the decedent]. United States v. Grover, 158 U.S.App. D.C. 260, 264, 485 F.2d 1039, 1043 (1973). This is so where there is evidence of a disengagement due to the passage of time, and [t]he effect of the disengagement of the parties and the passage of ... time ... restore[s] them to the status quo ante.  Id. Thus, any disability on [the defendant] because of his prior aggression [is] lifted, and he [is] able to defend himself against any subsequent attack. Id. We have not previously encountered a case like this one where the trial court decides, sua sponte and over the express objection of the defendant, to give criminal jury instruction 5.16(B), relating to the defendant as the aggressor or as the person who provoked the conflict upon himself. In rejecting the objection of defense counsel, the trial court focused on the whole context, that is, the entire case from the time the curtain open[ed] until the curtain clos[ed] on the decedent's life . . . . According to the trial court, the whole context included (1) disputes off and on between the defendant and his girlfriend with interventions at the behest of his girlfriend from the decedent; (2) the fact that in the ... moments leading up to the final confrontation and then until the confrontation was over, the defendant had the murder weapon inn his hand; (3) testimony undisputed that the decedent uttered words ... which could only be considered as highly provocative . . . .; (4) the defendant's determination ... [that] if I leave she [Ms. Price] goes with me; (5) instructions to Mr. Rorie from Mr. Solice to get out, get out and to Ms. Lewis to get the police; (6) the words that we have heard using the curse words, the epithets and then the ultimate challenge to manhood. The trial court's view of the whole context is inconsistent with fundamental legal principles in the law of self-defense pertaining to the first aggressor or provocation. Although criminal jury instruction 5.16(B) specifically states that [m]ere words without more by the defendant... do not constitute aggression or provocation, the trial court used as a partial justification for giving the instruction words that constituted epithets and Mr. Rorie's determination ... [that] if I leave she [Ms. Price] goes with me. Significantly also, the trial court overlooked the principle that: [I]t would ... be[] error to deny an otherwise established claim of self-defense solely because [the defendant] had previously taken aggressive action toward [the decedent]. Grover, supra, 158 U.S.App.D.C. at 264, 485 F.2d at 1043. Hence, even though Mr. Rorie may at times have had a knife in his hands during the early morning of October 2, 1994, that alone does not suggest that the aggressor/provocation jury instruction was appropriate on the facts of this case. [8] Where the record contains evidence of disengagement and the passage of time, [t]he effect of the disengagement of the parties and [the] passage of ... time ... restore[s] them to the status quo ante.  Grover, supra, 158 U.S.App.D.C. at 264, 485 F.2d at 1043. The record before us shows that there was disengagement after the first two episodes. The government's key witnesses, Ms. Lewis and Ms. Price, and the defense's primary witness, Mr. Rorie, gave similar material testimony showing discrete episodes within three different time frames in the early morning hours of October 2, 1994, and that after each of the first two episodes, Mr. Rorie and Mr. Solice disengaged and a block of time passed. The first episode took place around 3:00 a.m. It began with an argument between Ms. Price and Mr. Rorie over her desire to leave the apartment to purchase more drugs despite her pregnancy. When Mr. Rorie sought to restrain Ms. Price physically by grabbing her throat and choking her (Ms. Lewis' testimony), or grabbing her by the collar (Ms. Price's account), or throwing her on the couch (Mr. Rorie's testimony), Mr. Solice confronted Mr. Rorie with a baseball bat and began swinging it at Mr. Rorie. He missed when Mr. Rorie jumped out of the way each time. Mr. Rorie took out his pocket knife when Mr. Solice began to swing the bat the third time, but did not attempt to use it. Mr. Solice ended up smashing the glass table in the living room. There is evidence in the record that disengagement from this episode took place when Mr. Solice and Ms. Price left the apartment to purchase cocaine. The second episode occurred around 5:30 a.m. According to Ms. Lewis, Mr. Solice and Ms. Price returned from purchasing cocaine about an hour to one and one-half hours after leaving, and smoked it. While Ms. Price was in the living room bedroom with Mr. Rorie, she called Mr. Solice, complaining that Mr. Rorie was messing with her again. Mr. Solice and Mr. Rorie exchanged words, went outside, and had more words, during which Mr. Rorie said to Mr. Solice, come on, man, what you going to do. I'm outside now. There was no testimony that Mr. Rorie displayed his knife at that time, or took any other provocative action against Mr. Solice. In fact, Mr. Rorie returned to the apartment at Ms. Lewis' urging to leave it alone and to go inside, manifesting disengagement from his verbal exchange with Mr. Solice. Furthermore, Ms. Price, who was not certain of time lines, recalled that after she and Mr. Solice returned to the apartment from purchasing cocaine, Mr. Rorie was getting loud and Mr. Solice went and slept in the van. Mr. Rorie stated that sometime between 5:30 and six o'clock Mr. Solice emerged from his bedroom and went outside. When Mr. Solice was on his way outside, Mr. Rorie asked whether he was going to work that morning and Mr. Solice did not answer the question. There was evidence, then, that further disengagement from the second episode occurred when Mr. Solice left the apartment to sleep in his van. Based upon the legal principle concerning disengagement and the passage of time, then, the relevant context for the trial court's evaluation of the self-defense evidence with respect to the appropriateness of charging instruction number 5.16(B) was the final episode which occurred sometime between 6:30 and 7:30, or after sunrise. Instead, the court focused its justification for giving instruction 5.16 sua sponte on much earlier events, including the 3 a.m. and 5:30 a.m. episodes. Even when one examines the testimony relating to the final episode, the government's own evidence did not support the giving of instruction 5.16. It showed no basis for inferring that Mr. Rorie provoked a fight with Mr. Solice during the final episode, which unfolded sometime between 6:30 and 7:30 a.m., or after sunrise. The government presented no witness who saw the actual stabbing. Mr. Rorie provided his own version of the final episode. Mr. Rorie stated that he had full control of the conversation he was having with Ms. Price about her pregnancy and drug use, and her tendency to call Mr. Solice to intervene. He acknowledged that he had a knife in his hand but only because he had taken it out of his back pocket to avoid damaging anything that was on the bed. After telling Mr. Rorie to gather his things and leave, and instructing Ms. Lewis to call the police, Mr. Solice cursed Mr. Rorie, accused him of beating on women, and then returned to his bedroom. Mr. Rorie proceeded to assemble his belongings. When Mr. Rorie leaned down to put a shirt on the floor, Mr. Solice approached and began to choke him. As he was losing consciousness, Mr. Rorie reached for his knife. He felt like [he] was beginning to die, and that his eyes were beginning to pop out of his head and his veins were bulging. When Mr. Solice continued to choke him, Mr. Rorie struck him once, but Mr. Solice continued with the choking and Mr. Solice struck him again. When he determined that Mr. Solice might be dead, he informed Ms. Price. She discovered that Mr. Solice was still alive and Mr. Rorie instructed her to call the police and tell them what happened. Ms. Lewis was not in the apartment when the final episode occurred. Prior to the stabbing, Ms. Price heard Mr. Solice's footsteps as he left his bedroom, and then bumping which she interpreted as Mr. Rorie and Mr. Solice [getting] into it. She did not immediately investigate. When she finally got up and went to the hallway, she saw shoving. As she put it, They look[ed] like both of them was shoving each other. That is, they was pushing back off each other. Mr. Solice eased back into [his] bedroom. When she looked into the bedroom, Ms. Price saw that Mr. Rorie had slid down in the corner and that there was blood on his shirt and in the corner. She called the police. Instead of focusing on Mr. Rorie's actions with respect to Mr. Solice, and analyzing whether there was evidence that he was the aggressor toward Mr. Solice, or whether he provoked the final confrontation between the two men, the trial court emphasized his behavior toward Ms. Price. Mr. Rorie's aggression toward a third party did not turn Mr. Rorie into an aggressor against or provocateur toward Mr. Solice. See People v. Townes, 391 Mich. 578, 218 N.W.2d 136 (1974); State v. Wasson, 54 Wash.App. 156, 772 P.2d 1039 (1989). [9] Furthermore, even if the trial court properly considered the episodes beginning at 3 a.m. on October 2, 1994, the testimony of the witnesses suggested that Mr. Solice was the aggressor toward Mr. Rorie. It was he who swung the bat three times at Mr. Rorie, ending by smashing the glass table in the living room. During that episode the evidence shows that while Mr. Rorie took out a pocket knife, he did not use it. Before the final episode, it was Mr. Solice who hurled provocative words at Mr. Rorie cursing him, accusing him of not being a man because he beat a woman, and telling him, I should kill your m-f-ing a. In contrast, although Mr. Rorie had his knife the entire time on the early morning of October 2, 1994, he never used it against Mr. Solice. In sum, on this record we conclude that the giving of that instruction constituted error. While there was evidence supporting an inference that Mr. Rorie provoked some hostility during the interaction of the parties (including Mr. Solice and Ms. Price) that morning, that evidence alone did not justify giving the first aggressor or provocation instruction. Rather, instruction no. 5.16(B) is appropriately given when there is both evidence of self-defense and evidence that the defendant provoked the aggression from which he was defending himself. Furthermore, where the giving of the instruction is technically incorrect, the error generally is harmless. However, under the rather unique circumstances of this case, where there are earlier discrete episodes of an aggressive, even violent nature, some of which do not involve both the victim and the defendant, the jury might well be confused by the earlier provocative behavior of the defendant that did not operate as a legal trigger of the final fatal confrontation between the victim and the defendant. That potential jury confusion, generated by the technically erroneous first aggressor instruction prejudices the defendant. Therefore, it is not harmless. Our analysis is not yet complete, however, because we must now determine whether the trial error in giving the first aggressor instruction was harmless in the case before us. The standard that guides us is found in the Supreme court's decision in Sullivan, supra : The inquiry ... is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error. Id. at 279, 113 S.Ct. 2078. Moreover, [w]hat the factfinder must determine to return a verdict of guilty is prescribed by the Due Process Clause. The prosecution bears the burden of proving all elements of the offense charged, and must persuade the factfinder `beyond a reasonable doubt' of the facts necessary to establish those elements. Id. at 277, 113 S.Ct. 2078. (citations omitted). In cases where self-defense is a defense, and there is sufficient evidence to justify a self-defense instruction, the burden is on the government to disprove self-defense, by meeting its burden of proof negating the defendant's subjective actual belief or objective reasonableness. Swann, supra, 648 A.2d at 930 (citation omitted). As the trial court properly instructed the jury in this case, [w]here evidence of self-defense is present the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense. Mr. Rorie asserts that the proper standard of harmless error analysis in this case is that found in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); see also Mabry v. Demery, 707 A.2d 49, 51 (D.C.1998) (Under the test in Chapman, constitutional error can be held harmless only if the reviewing court can `declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.'). By citing Brooks v. United States, 599 A.2d 1094 (D.C.1991), the government implicitly argues that the harmless error standard applicable here is not that articulated in Chapman, supra . Rather, it is that set forth in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946). That is, [t]o conclude that the error in this case was harmless . . ., we must be satisfied ` with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.' Brooks, supra, 599 A.2d at 1102 (quoting Kotteakos, supra, 328 U.S. at 765, 66 S.Ct. 1239) (other citation and footnote omitted). We conclude that under both of these harmless error standards, the error in giving criminal jury instruction no. 5.16(B) was not harmless because there was [a] risk that jurors would conclude that they must reject [Mr. Rorie's] self-defense claim, Stewart, supra, 687 A.2d at 581, or decide that his fear of imminent harm was unreasonable, because he was the first aggressor, based on (1) his possession of a knife, even though he never used it to threaten Mr. Solice during the episodes leading up to the final one, (2) his confrontations with Ms. Price and his effort to restrain her from going out to purchase more cocaine, and (3) an inference that Mr. Rorie was enraged because, as the trial court implied in deciding to give the aggressor or provocation instruction, and as the government states in its brief: [J]ust before the fatal conflict [Mr. Solice] made inflammatory remarks attacking [Mr. Rorie's] manhood. and his simmering rage against [Mr. Solice] exploded, causing him to stab Mr. Solice to death. To reach the conclusion on the record before us that Mr. Rorie was the aggressor toward Mr. Solice and provoked him, the jury would have to ignore evidence that Mr. Solice was the aggressor, or would have to determine how Mr. Rorie's actions toward Ms. Price and Mr. Solice's verbal barbs and curse words directed toward Mr. Rorie made Mr. Rorie the aggressor or provocateur against Mr. Solice. Furthermore, there is no evidence to support the government's rebuttal argument that Mr. Solice was in a peacemaker mode and that [f]rom the incident with the hammer on August 23 of 1994 [when Mr. Rorie testified that Mr. Solice attacked him with a hammer] to the three o'clock incident on October 2nd [when Mr. Solice swung a baseball bat at Mr. Rorie three times and smashed the glass table in the living room] right down to the fatal confrontation, Mr. Solice was there to stop [Mr. Rorie] from having his way with [Ms.] Price and there was not a single shred of evidence that Mr. Solice was assaulting [Mr.] Rorie or doing any damage to [Mr.] Rorie. As we have indicated, on this record there was no basis on which the trial court reasonably could infer that Mr. Rorie was the aggressor toward or provoked Mr. Solice during the final episode, or that he was the aggressor toward or provoked Mr. Solice because of his behavior toward Ms. Price. Indeed, it was error for the trial court to have given criminal jury instruction No. 5.16(B) because there was no factual predicate for that charge. Even when we consider the [self-defense] instructions as a whole, Williams, supra, 858 A.2d at 995, we are compelled to conclude that the trial court erred. By giving the defendant as aggressor or the defendant as the person who provoked the conflict upon himself instruction and telling the jurors that if they found that the defendant was the aggressor or if he provoked the conflict upon himself, he cannot rely upon the right of self-defense to justify his use of force, the trial court not only effectively and improperly took away the government's burden to disprove self-defense, but also effectively deprived [Mr. Rorie] of his ability to claim self-defense, State v. Birnel, 89 Wash.App. 459, 949 P.2d 433, 440 (1998) (citation omitted). In short, the trial court also erroneously put forth concepts that, from the accused's point of view, . . . [affected the] proper evaluation of the evidence, Hernandez, supra, 853 A.2d at 207. In sweeping the whole context of October 2, 1994, into consideration of the appropriateness of criminal jury instruction 5.16(B), and ignoring the disengagement principle, the trial court lost sight of the proper focus on two considerations  one relating to Mr. Rorie's constitutional right to a defense, that is, a theory of the case that negates [a defendant's] guilt of the crime charged; and the other concerning the government's burden of proofits duty to disprove self-defense, by meeting its burden of proof negating the defendant's subjective actual belief or objective reasonableness that he was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm. Swann, supra, 648 A.2d at 930 n. 6; Hernandez, supra, 853 A.2d at 205. We conclude that under either the Chapman or the Kotteakos standard the trial court's error was not harmless. In short, we cannot say that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. 824; Birnel, supra, 949 P.2d at 440 (citations omitted). Nor can we declare, with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not swayed by the error. Kotteakos, supra, 328 U.S. at 765, 66 S.Ct. 1239; Brooks, supra, 599 A.2d at 1102. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this case for a new trial. [10] So ordered.