Opinion ID: 1708582
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Taylor's Reasons for Quitting.

Text: The pertinent statute and department regulations provide guidelines for evaluating each of the three reasons Taylor gave for quitting his job. We must decide whether substantial evidence in the record as a whole supports the department's determination that Taylor did not quit for a reason that would permit him to receive benefits. A. Illness. Taylor said that he quit the job because of illness, but at no time did he consult a physician. When an employee's only reason for quitting a job is illness, injury or pregnancy, the statute and implementing regulations clearly require the employee to obtain a physician's recommendation to quit in order to avoid disqualification. Iowa Code section 96.5(1)(d) declares in pertinent part: An individual shall be disqualified for benefits: 1. Voluntary quitting. If he or she has left his or her work voluntarily without good cause attributable to his or her employer, if so found by the department. But he or she shall not be disqualified if the department finds that: . . . . . d. The individual left employment because of illness, injury or pregnancy upon the advice of a licensed and practicing physician, and upon knowledge of the necessity for absence immediately notified the employer, or the employer consented to the absence, and after recovering from the illness, injury or pregnancy, when recovery was certified by a licensed and practicing physician, the individual returned to the employer and offered to perform services and the individual's regular work or comparable suitable work was not available, if so found by the department, provided the individual is otherwise eligible. (Emphasis added). The regulations are equally explicit, providing that one reason presumed to be without good cause attributable to the employer is leaving due to illness but not on the advice of a licensed and practicing physician. 370 Iowa Admin.Code 4.25(39); see also 370 Iowa Admin.Code 4.26(6). As the department points out, this requirement reduces the possibility that persons would be allowed to draw unemployment benefits on the basis of a self-diagnosis of illness that is either inaccurate or fraudulent. Taylor never consulted a physician even though he said one reason he quit was the illness he contracted on the job. Before analyzing the other reasons Taylor gave for quitting, we note that the department correctly applied the applicable law governing illness as a sole reason for quitting. Had Taylor given no other reason for quitting, his failure to consult a physician would clearly have barred his claim because of the quoted statute and regulations. B. Unsafe and detrimental working conditions. Taylor contends he also quit because the working conditions were unsafe and detrimental to his welfare. He argues that the work was beyond his physical capability, and he complains that the noise and electrical shocks he received while working in the wet underground tunnel were intolerable. Neither the hearing officer's ruling nor the department's final decision addressed this second reason that Taylor gave for quitting. Apparently the department determined that Taylor's entitlement to benefits must stand or fall on the illness reason he had given. Twice in its decision the department emphasized Taylor's reliance on the illness reason: The claimant's fact-finding statement is replete with statements that he left his employment because of his illness. . . . . . At the claimant's own admission he left his employment because of illness. Regardless whether Taylor emphasized illness more than his other reasons for quitting, we are satisfied that he adequately informed the department that illness was not his only reason. He was therefore entitled to have the department consider each of the reasons he reported in making his claim for benefits. In his initial filed claim for benefits, Taylor wrote that he had found the work physically difficult to do. He said he was shocked several times. He concluded by writing: After I started getting sick at work I just could not handle it. I had worked in noisy places but not standing in a foot of water running a jackhammer. Department regulations do furnish rough guidelines which recognize that Taylor's second reason for quitting may constitute good cause attributable to the employer rather than a cause which would disqualify him. The regulations provide in pertinent part: The following are reasons for a claimant leaving employment with good cause attributable to the employer: . . . . The claimant left due to unsafe working conditions. .... The claimant left due to intolerable or detrimental working conditions. 370 Iowa Admin.Code 4.26(2), (4). On remand the agency shall make findings of fact and a reasoned decision on whether Taylor's second reason constituted good cause attributable to the employer, or whether Taylor must be disqualified regardless of those working conditions about which he has complained and given testimony. C. Change in employment agreement. The final reason Taylor gave for quitting the jackhammer job was that shortly after he was employed the employer Hurst switched from one shift to two shifts, reduced his weekly hours from 50 to 40, and thereby substantially changed the contract of hire. As with his complaint about working conditions, it is clear Taylor urged this reason from the time he first submitted his claim for benefits. The hearing examiner and department, however, found instead that Taylor's only reason for quitting was the illness he had contracted. In its decision, the department found Taylor's illness reason incompatible with his complaint about the change of compensation. As a consequence, the department did not independently determine whether there was substantial evidence in the record to support the latter reason for quitting. The decision explains: As stated by the claimant, he left his employment after becoming ill, and, therefore, it is inconsistent for him to complain about not working ten hours per day as originally told. While the claimant was not working ten hours per day as originally told, this would not be a legitimate complaint by the claimant because, due to his illness, he did not even want to work the eight hours per day that were available to him. .... Under the facts of this case, the claimant did not leave his employment because of the change in his contract of hire, but left because of illness. Taylor contends that the reasons he gave for quitting the job are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and we agree. An employee may choose to leave employment for several reasons, with each reason important in the decision to quit. Perhaps Taylor's illness would not have caused him to quit if working conditions had been tolerable or the hours of work and compensation equivalent to those he had been promised. Nothing in the department's regulations suggests that a claimant must rest his entire claim for unemployment compensation on one reason for leaving a job. The regulations do provide guidelines for determining when a change in a contract of hire constitutes good cause attributable to the employer: An employer's willful breach of contract of hire shall not be a disqualifiable issue. This would include any change that would jeopardize the worker's safety, health or morals. The change of contract of hire must be substantial in nature and could involve changes in working hours, shifts, remuneration, location of employment, drastic modification and type of work, etc. Minor changes in a worker's routine on a job would not constitute a change of contract of hire. 370 Iowa Admin.Code 4.26(1). As with the contention that Taylor quit because of intolerable working conditions, we cannot decide as a matter of law whether Taylor quit because of the change in his employment contract. There is sufficient evidence that Taylor was promised and thereafter denied overtime hours and pay. The agency on remand should make findings of fact and a reasoned decision on whether there was a substantial change in Taylor's contract of hire, whether that was a reason he quit, and whether that constituted good cause attributable to the employer within the meaning of the controlling statute and regulations. In considering again the reasons Taylor gave for quitting, the department may receive some guidance from Ellis v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 285 N.W.2d 153 (Iowa 1979), a case on which Taylor places considerable reliance. In Ellis, a housekeeper informed her employer at the outset of the employment that she was allergic to evergreen trees. On the first Christmas after she was hired, the employer did not set up a Christmas tree. On the second Christmas, however, the employer insisted on having a Christmas tree; the housekeeper asserted that she could not work because of her allergic condition and quit. Id. at 154. Although the department denied unemployment benefits to the housekeeper on the ground that she had left without good cause attributable to her employer, we affirmed the district court's decision which overturned that agency ruling. One teaching of the Ellis case is that even though an employee's allergy is not itself a condition attributable to the employer, it may in combination with other factors constitute good cause for quitting attributable to the employer. A combination of reasons allowed Ellis to receive benefits: she was allergic; the employer understood the presence of a tree would cause her difficulty; the employer nevertheless created a condition detrimental to her because of the allergy; and the resulting working conditions were not reasonably tolerable for her. Id. at 157. Similarly here the department must consider all reasons which may have combined to give Taylor good cause to quit, then consider whether any of those reasons was a cause attributable to the employer Hurst.