Opinion ID: 2780783
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: m. on April 4.

Text: According to Lewis, Tyler remained sitting in his Escalade. In an apparent attempt to explain why his prints were found on the interior and exterior of the rear driver's side door and on the interior handle of the rear passenger side door, Lewis stated that he entered the Escalade through the rear driver's side door. Lewis explained that he did this because he could not tell whether someone was already sitting in the front passenger seat (the windows of the Escalade are tinted). After entering the Escalade, Lewis said that he realized that Tyler was by himself in the vehicle. Tyler told Lewis to get into the front passenger seat, so Lewis slid across the rear passenger seat, exited the vehicle through the rear passenger door, and got into the front passenger seat. Lewis said that once he was sitting in the front passenger seat, he pulled his money out, counted out $1,300, and handed it over to Tyler. The two men then spoke briefly before Tyler left the apartment complex. Lewis said that shortly after Tyler left in the Escalade, he called Lewis again asking for directions. After giving Tyler directions, Lewis said that he left his apartment and went to a nearby club. He then proceeded to travel towards his mother's house in Kansas City, Kansas, taking Highway 71 north to I- 435 West and eventually to I-435 North. In explaining why his cell phone pinged off of towers located at 15400 Midland Drive and 12902 Shawnee Mission Parkway in Shawnee when Shackelford called him at 1:59 a.m. on April 4, Lewis said that on his way to his mother's house, he stopped at a gas station and at a Walmart located off of Shawnee Mission Parkway. Notably, the Walmart 23 that Lewis claimed he stopped at was within the servicing area of the tower located at 15400 Midland Drive. Lewis said that he eventually arrived at his mother's house and picked up some clothes. He then traveled back to his apartment in Grandview and went to sleep. Lewis specifically denied ever seeing Shackelford that night. Later that morning, Lewis proceeded to receive numerous calls from Tyler's relatives asking him about Tyler's whereabouts. Lewis said that Tyler's relatives eventually told him that Tyler had been murdered. Lewis said that the relatives started threatening him because they thought he was responsible for Tyler's murder. (Other evidence presented at trial corroborated Lewis' claim that he received threats from Tyler's family.) Lewis said that he planned on traveling to Tyler's apartment that morning, but Tyler's brother, a pastor, called him and advised him against coming to the apartment complex due to the pastor's fear that more violence would occur. Because of the threats he was receiving from Tyler's family, Lewis became concerned for his safety. He decided then to leave the Kansas City area on April 10 and travel to California. Lewis said that he planned on returning to the area once the murderer was caught and the situation cooled off. Lewis said that he rented a car from a friend named B.J. for $300. Lewis said that his mom's friend, Darnell, and two other people (Lewis was unable to remember their names) traveled with him in the rented car to California. Lewis said that after paying the money to rent the car, he had about $300 remaining for the trip. On the way to California, Lewis said that they stopped in Las Vegas to visit with his sister. During their brief visit, Lewis said that his sister asked for $5 so he gave her $5. Lewis said that he eventually arrived in Long Beach, California, where he stayed at his half-brother's father's house for 2 days before being arrested by police. 24 On February 15, 2012, a few days after the bench trial concluded, the district court judge announced his verdict from the bench, finding Lewis guilty of felony murder and aggravated robbery. In explaining his verdict, the district court judge stated: Murder cases often are proved by circumstantial evidence. The victim can't testify. Unless there is a confession or an eyewitness, we have to rely on that other evidence. All of the forensic evidence here was vigorously challenged, but the fingerprints, the DNA, the cell phone evidence, and the plotted movements of those phones do not lie. I do not accept the defense's alternative explanations for that evidence. The substantial evidence of hiding and flight clearly support the State's theory of the case. Frankly I'm not convinced that robbery of a few thousand dollars was the only motive for this murder. I am not convinced that Curly Tyler was shot at the exact location where the Escalade was found. .... But the evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant here, Michael Lewis, committed the crimes of first degree felony murder and aggravated robbery, and I find him guilty of those charges. On February 29, 2012, Lewis filed a motion for a new trial, arguing, among other things, that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to convict him of the charged crimes and that he was denied the opportunity for a fair trial and was denied the opportunity to have a trial to a jury 'of his peers,' requiring [him] to waive jury trial to avoid facing an all white or virtually all white jury panel. At sentencing on April 3, 2012, the district court denied Lewis' motion for a new trial. The court then sentenced Lewis to a hard 20 life sentence for the felony-murder conviction and a consecutive 61-month sentence for the aggravated robbery conviction. In announcing Lewis' sentence from the bench, the district court did not impose parole or postrelease supervision in connection to the felony-murder and aggravated robbery 25 convictions, respectively. In the journal entry of judgment, however, the district court imposed lifetime parole for both the felony-murder and aggravated robbery convictions. Lewis filed his notice of appeal with the district court on April 9, 2012. The notice of appeal states in its entirety: COMES now Donald S. Smith, attorney for the defendant, and hereby files his Notice of Appeal as to the judgment and orders of this Court on the 3rd day of April, 2012. The notice of appeal shows that Lewis signed it on April 3 and that a copy of the notice was emailed that same day to the prosecutor. SUFFICIENCY OF LEWIS' NOTICE OF APPEAL Because the language of Lewis' notice of appeal seemed to suggest that Lewis was only appealing the district court's judgment and orders made on April 3, 2012 (the date of Lewis' sentencing), we issued an order to the parties asking them to be prepared to discuss at oral arguments whether the notice of appeal filed in this case was sufficient to confer jurisdiction on this court over all the issues Lewis raises on appeal. See State v. Richard, 300 Kan. 715, 728, 333 P.3d 179 (2014) (appellate court has duty to question jurisdiction on its own initiative). Determining whether an appellate court has jurisdiction raises a question of law over which the scope of appellate review is unlimited. State v. Brown, 299 Kan. 1021, 1027, 327 P.3d 1002 (2014). At oral arguments, Lewis contended that the language used by trial counsel in the notice of appeal was ambiguous and should not be interpreted as referencing only issues arising at sentencing. Lewis argued that the phrase judgment and orders was broad enough to encompass both sentencing and nonsentencing issues and noted that the district court did rule on his motion for a new trial at sentencing, which raised nonsentencing issues. Accordingly, Lewis argued that the notice of appeal was sufficient to confer 26 jurisdiction over all of the issues he raised on appeal. The State, commendably, agreed with Lewis' argument. We find that the entirety of the notice of appeal indicates that it was trial counsel's intent to appeal both sentencing and nonsentencing issues. The phrase judgment and orders is broad enough to convey this meaning. Cf. State v. Coman, 294 Kan. 84, 89-91, 273 P.3d 701 (2012) (notice of appeal stated that defendant was appealing from the sentence imposed and specifically described the subject matter of the appeal as the requirement that he register as a sex offender; because notice of appeal did not even suggest that [defendant] was challenging his conviction, court elected not to address nonsentencing issues, reasoning that [a]lthough our appellate courts have, at times, liberally construed a notice of appeal to retain jurisdiction, one simply cannot construe a notice that appellant is appealing his or her sentence to mean that he or she is appealing the conviction); State v. Wilkins, 269 Kan. 256, 270, 7 P.3d 252 (2000) (notice of appeal stated defendant was appealing from 'judgment of sentence'; court accepted defendant's argument that notice of appeal should have read 'judgment and sentence' and, thus, found that notice of appeal was sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals to determine nonsentencing issues raised in defendant's appeal). Furthermore, it appears that the phrase on the 3rd day of April, 2012 is a misplaced modifier and that the notice of appeal should read: COMES now Donald S. Smith, attorney for the defendant, and on the 3rd day of April, 2012, hereby files his Notice of Appeal as to the judgment and orders of this Court. Though this reading seems somewhat strained, it is supported by the fact that Lewis signed the notice of appeal on April 3 and trial counsel emailed a copy that same day to the prosecutor. Accordingly, we believe that trial counsel meant to reference April 3, 2012, as the date he prepared and intended to file the notice of appeal and not as the date of the occurrences he wished to appeal on behalf of Lewis. Accordingly, we conclude that the notice of appeal filed in 27 this case was sufficient to confer jurisdiction on this court over all the issues Lewis has raised on appeal. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE Lewis argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to show that he was the person who robbed and murdered Tyler. When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged in a criminal case, this court reviews the evidence in a light most favorable to the State to determine whether a rational factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Frye, 294 Kan. 364, 374-75, 277 P.3d 1091 (2012). This standard applies to convictions arising from bench trials as well as those arising from jury trials. 294 Kan. at 374. An appellate court does not reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts in the evidence, or pass on the credibility of witnesses. State v. McCaslin, 291 Kan. 697, Syl. ¶ 8, 245 P.3d 1030 (2011). Furthermore, this court has recognized that there is no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence in terms of probative value. State v. Evans, 275 Kan. 95, 105, 62 P.3d 220 (2003). A conviction of even the gravest offense can be based entirely on circumstantial evidence and the inferences fairly deducible therefrom. If an inference is a reasonable one, the jury has the right to make the inference. McCaslin, 291 Kan. 697, Syl. ¶ 9. The evidence presented at trial showed that Tyler left his apartment in Shawnee around 11 p.m. on April 3 and arrived at Lewis' apartment in Grandview shortly before midnight. Tyler's cell phone placed an outgoing call to Lewis' phone at 11:52 p.m. During this 3-minute phone call, Tyler's phone pinged off of towers in the south Kansas City area near Grandview and Lewis' phone pinged off of a tower in the north part of Grandview. Based on Lewis' testimony acknowledging that he met Tyler on the night of his murder 28 sometime between 11:30 p.m. and midnight, it can be inferred that the two men met shortly after the 11:52 p.m. phone call ended—sometime around midnight on April 4. Notably, the 11:52 p.m. call on Tyler's phone was the last activity recorded for his phone. Additionally, after meeting with Lewis, Tyler had planned to drop off clothes at his grandson's house and then go to his brother's house to cut his hair. Tyler failed to complete either errand. All of this evidence suggests that something happened to Tyler around the time he met with Lewis. Because Tyler's body was discovered inside his Escalade—parked in an unusual spot behind his apartment—we know that, somehow, Tyler and his vehicle traveled from Grandview back to Shawnee. Based on Kane's testimony (the resident of the apartment complex who saw the Escalade parked in the stall next to her parking spot) we also know that the Escalade was back at the apartment complex no later than 4 a.m. Whether Tyler had died during his return trip from Grandview is unknown. Regardless, Lewis' phone records and testimony established that after Lewis met with Tyler, Lewis also traveled from Grandview to Shawnee. Lewis' cell phone records showed that after his 11:52 p.m. phone call with Tyler, he remained in the North Grandview/South Kansas City area for about 1 1/2 hours. Then, during a 1:34 a.m. phone call from Shackelford, Lewis' phone initially pinged off of a tower located at 6111 East 129th Street in Grandview and then pinged off of tower further north at 9801 Bunker Ridge Road. The next time tower information was recorded for Lewis' phone was at 1:59 a.m. when Shackelford called his phone. During this phone call, Lewis' phone first pinged off of a tower located at 15400 Midland Drive in Shawnee and then pinged off of another Shawnee tower located at 12902 Shawnee Mission Parkway. As mentioned above, the tower at 12902 Shawnee Mission Parkway is just east of Tyler's apartment complex and can be seen from the complex. Furthermore, records showed that Eshawn's 29 cell phone pinged off of this tower when he tried calling Tyler's cell phone later that morning. From this evidence, it can be inferred that, at the very least, Lewis was within the vicinity of Tyler's apartment complex and, at the most, Lewis was at the apartment complex. The forensic evidence discovered on and inside the Escalade tied Lewis to the crimes. As mentioned above, Lewis' right palm print was found on the exterior of the rear driver's side door. His left palm print was found on two different locations on the interior of the Escalade's rear driver's side door frame. His left thumb print was also found on the rear driver's side door frame. Prints of Lewis' left palm and fingers were found on the interior handle of the rear passenger's side door. The placement of the prints on the handle was consistent with Lewis using his left hand to reach across his body to open the rear passenger's side door. Using his left hand to open the rear passenger's side door would indicate that Lewis was holding something in his right hand (i.e., a gun) which prevented him from using that hand—his dominant hand and the one closest to the rear passenger's side door—to open the door. Coincidentally, Tyler's bullet wound and the subsequent blood splatter analysis—showing that Tyler was sitting upright in the front driver's seat when he was shot—indicated that whoever shot Tyler did so while sitting behind him in the backseat and to his right. Additional blood splatter analysis showed that Tyler, after being shot, remained in an upright position for an indeterminate amount of time. His body was then moved into the position it was found in—lying face down on the front passenger seat with the midsection draped over the center console and the legs extended behind the driver's seat. The detective performing the blood splatter analysis indicated that based on blood transfer stains found on the driver's seat, it was possible that someone else sat in the driver's seat after Tyler's body was moved. Notably, Lewis' DNA was found on the interior manual lock mechanism of the front driver's side door. 30 Evidence also showed that Tyler was carrying a cell phone and a large amount of cash on the night he was murdered. But neither a cell phone nor cash were found on Tyler or inside the Escalade. In fact, the pockets of Tyler's pants were found turned out as if someone had gone through them, and Tyler's cell phone holder—clipped to the waist of his pants—was found empty. When this evidence is considered in conjunction with: (1) Lewis' finger and palm prints being found in the rear passenger compartment; (2) Lewis' DNA being found on the manual lock mechanism of the front driver's side door; (3) Lewis' late night trip to Shawnee; and (4) Lewis' subsequent trip to California after being contacted by police, it points to Lewis being the person who robbed and shot Tyler. See State v. Phillips, 295 Kan. 929, 947, 287 P.3d 245 (2012) (Evidence of a defendant's flight or attempted flight may be relevant to show both the commission of the acts charged and the intent and purpose for which those acts were committed.). Admittedly, Lewis denied killing Tyler and stated that after paying Tyler his money, Tyler left in his Escalade. Lewis also provided innocent explanations for (1) why his cell phone pinged off of towers located in the vicinity of Tyler's apartment complex; (2) why his DNA and prints were found inside the Escalade; and (3) why he traveled to California after being contacted by police. Lewis points to this evidence as supporting his argument for why the State did not present sufficient evidence to convict him of the crimes. Essentially, Lewis asks us to engage in a reweighing of the evidence and passing on the credibility of witnesses—things which this court cannot do on appeal. See McCaslin, 291 Kan. 697, Syl. ¶ 8. When the evidence presented at the bench trial is viewed in the light most favorable to the State, it shows that a rational factfinder could have found Lewis guilty of felony murder and aggravated robbery beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence to convict Lewis of both crimes. 31 JURY TRIAL WAIVER Next, Lewis argues that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to a jury trial. He raised this issue before the district court in his motion for a new trial. Whether a defendant waived the right to a jury trial is a factual question, subject to analysis under a substantial competent evidence standard of review. But when the facts of the district court's determination to accept a jury trial waiver are not disputed, the question whether the defendant voluntarily and knowingly waived the jury trial right is a legal inquiry subject to unlimited appellate review. State v. Beaman, 295 Kan. 853, 858, 286 P.3d 876 (2012). Applicable Facts The parties do not dispute the pertinent facts related to the jury trial waiver. The record on appeal contains a complete transcript of the pretrial motions hearing where Lewis' waiver was discussed. At the hearing, the following exchange took place: THE COURT: The case was set for motions today. I think there is a motion to suppress at least on file. [Defense counsel], I guess I will ask you to start there. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, I think just in terms of logistics, the first thing we probably ought to do would be to formally waive our right to jury trial in this case. I have talked with Mr. Lewis on many, many occasions regarding this issue. I know he has counseled with some of his friends and family regarding this as well. For a number of reasons, Judge, which we don't need to annunciate for record purposes, we believe that it is in our best interests and we would ask to be allowed to waive jury trial at this time and ask the trial be had to the Court. THE COURT: Mr. Lewis, obviously you are charged here with a very serious crime for which you could be sentenced to life in prison. You have a right to have your case heard by a jury of your peers. If you waive that right, your case will be heard by a judge. It would be my plan to be here to hear it, but once you waive a jury, you can't get it back later on. Is that what you want to do here? 32 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: Do you have any question about that? Have you had plenty of time to discuss this with Mr. Smith? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. I feel like if I take the jury trial, I won't get a fair trial because it says a jury of your peers, but I don't think it will really be my peers. But in Johnson County with a Johnson County jury, I feel like I won't be treated fairly. I wouldn't be—I wouldn't want to get convicted of a crime I didn't commit. THE COURT: Well, I think I understand your position here, but I want to be clear for the record that you want your case to be heard by a judge rather than a jury. You have a constitutional right to have your case heard and decided by a jury of your peers. Now, we talk about that all of the time, and the fact of the matter is you might not consider the impaneled jury exactly your peers and they might not consider you their peer. But if we try this case, we would call in 36 citizens from the county. Your attorney and the State's attorney would have a right to go through and see if any of them had any sort of reason to be against you or especially for you, if any of them felt any bias or prejudice against you. And then even after they went through all of that and we had 36 people, each of these attorneys have a right to release 12 people each. In other words, the State would get to eliminate 12 one by one and your attorney would get to eliminate 12 one by one, and what is left is the jury of 12 that would hear and decide your case. And so I just want to be clear that you have a right to have your case heard by a jury of your peers. That is the system we use to assemble that jury. And I just want to make sure that you understand what you're giving up by waiving your right to have your case heard by a jury. Are you comfortable with this? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I understand. It is pros and cons to the judge. Pros and cons to both sides. THE COURT: Have you had a chance to consider all of that and discuss all this with your attorney? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: That is still what you want to do here? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: All right. I will accept the waiver as knowing and voluntary. 33 In his motion for a new trial, Lewis claimed that he was denied the opportunity for a fair trial and was denied the opportunity to have a trial to a jury 'of his peers,' requiring the defendant to waive jury trial to avoid facing an all white or virtually all white jury panel. Nowhere in the record does it indicate that Lewis ever requested to change the venue of his trial.