Opinion ID: 2612945
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Public's Right of Access

Text: We do not think, however, that Administrative Order 94-021 can withstand constitutional scrutiny from the public's perspective. The presiding judge's order purports to limit all public access to trials and court proceedings after 3:00 p.m. each day. Moreover, by its terms, the order was intended to remain in effect for longer than 3 months. Because the order purports to limit public access to all court proceedings over a substantial period of time, it may only be characterized as an attempt to partially close the court. Such an attempt to partially close the entire courthouse complex must be considered an unconstitutional denial of public access. Article 2, section 11 of the Arizona Constitution requires that [j]ustice in all cases shall be administered openly. The open administration clause forbids general orders such as Administrative Order 94-021, which significantly interfere with free and open access to the courthouse. Phoenix Newspapers, 107 Ariz. at 560, 490 P.2d at 566; see also Allied Daily Newspapers v. Eikenberry, 121 Wash.2d 205, 848 P.2d 1258, 1261 (1993). The open administration clause permits closing a courtroom only for case-specific reasons for which closure is traditionally permitted (i.e., overcrowded courtroom, witness protection, etc.). Id. The presiding judge here had no case-specific reason to limit public access. Indeed, the order covered all proceedings in all cases after 3:00 p.m. Nevertheless, even if we did, in limited circumstances, permit general court closing orders, the particular order under consideration here would be unconstitutional in any event. If less drastic alternatives were available to implement the court's duty to exercise good faith efforts during the county's financial crisis, the presiding judge was compelled to have opted for those less drastic alternatives. See Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606-07, 102 S.Ct. at 2620 (order closing the court must be narrowly tailored to serve compelling government interest). If less drastic alternatives were not available, the order still would be unconstitutional on separation of powers grounds: the legislative or executive branches cannot, through lack of proper planning, budgeting or funding, require the judicial branch to take cost-cutting measures so severe that the operation of the judicial system cannot be carried out in a constitutional manner. See, e.g., Dann, 157 Ariz. at 398, 758 P.2d at 1300 (courts, as an independent branch of government, have right to appoint necessary personnel to carry out constitutional and statutory obligations); United States v. Superior Court, 144 Ariz. 265, 278, 697 P.2d 658, 671 (1985) (legislature cannot take actions that unreasonably limit or hamper the judicial system in performing its duties). Particularly given the volume of work in our courts today, it is not permissible for another branch of government to convert the third and equal judicial branch into a part-time operation. DISPOSITION On the specific facts of the record presently before us, defendant was not denied his constitutional right to a public trial. Therefore, we deny his request for a mistrial. However, because paragraph 1 of Administrative Order 94-021 unconstitutionally limits public access to the judicial system, we grant his request to vacate it and to permanently stay its enforcement. FELDMAN, C.J., and CORCORAN, ZLAKET and MARTONE, JJ., concur.