Opinion ID: 2072414
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: client l.k.counts vi and vii

Text: [5] ¶ 36. On this appeal, Reitz does not now challenge the referee's findings and conclusions with respect to Count VI of the complaint. However, he does challenge the referee's findings and conclusions with respect to Count VII. The facts presented to the referee relating to these two counts are these: On September 10, 1999, L.K. was involved in a five-car collision; shortly thereafter, L.K. retained Reitz & Mandelman, LLC to represent her in her personal injury claim arising from the accident. After the accident, L.K. received chiropractic treatment which ended in January 2000. Between February 2000 and May 2000, Reitz gathered L.K.'s medical records, bills, and wage loss information. Then, on May 16, 2000, he submitted those records to the insurer of one of the drivers involved in the accident and made a settlement demand on behalf of L.K. According to L.K.'s testimony at the disciplinary hearing, Reitz then took no further action on her case from May through October 20, 2000. Reitz, however, testified at the disciplinary hearing that L.K. was aware that settlement negotiations were taking place during that period involving his partner, Mandelman, and the adverse insurance carrier. ¶ 37. Between October 21, 2000 and January 4, 2001, Mandelman continued to pursue settlement negotiations and obtained from the insurer an offer to settle L.K.'s claim for $17,000. That offer was rejected, and Reitz told L.K. on January 4, 2001 that Reitz would immediately file a lawsuit on her behalf. ¶ 38. L.K. subsequently testified at Reitz's disciplinary hearing that between January 4, 2001 and March 7, 2001, she called Reitz numerous times and left messages seeking a status report on her case. Reitz, however, did not return her calls. L.K. further testified that she spoke with Reitz on March 7, 2001 and during that conversation, she was led to believe that he was filing a lawsuit on her behalf and that she would soon get a copy of the documents by mail. ¶ 39. On March 29, 2001, L.K. received a summons and complaint that had been signed by Reitz. His cover letter stated Please find enclosed a copy of the Summons and Complaint for your lawsuit. We will keep you advised of any changes as they develop. Nothing on those documents suggested that they were only drafts of a summons and complaint. L.K. testified that based on that correspondence, she believed that Reitz had commenced a lawsuit on her behalf. She further testified that after waiting for most of the 45-day period the defendants had to answer that summons and complaint, she called Reitz on May 2, 2001 to ask about the status of her case. Reitz told L.K. that her claim had been denied and that he would schedule a conference with the court to try to resolve the matter. L.K. thereafter made repeated inquiries about the court date. She was told by Reitz that he was trying to settle the case and later he told her that he was having a consultant review her file and was awaiting a call from the court. ¶ 40. On May 31, 2001, L.K. contacted Reitz for a status update. Reitz told her that there were often delays when the insurance company refuses to pay; he promised that he would continue settlement talks and set a date with the judge. Reitz instructed L.K. to call him the following Friday and when she did, Reitz told her that the court clerk would be calling him back in a few days with a court date. On June 22, 2001, L.K. again spoke with Reitz who informed her that a consultant was then reviewing her file for completeness and that they were still waiting for a call from the court which Reitz expected would come by June 25; Reitz also told L.K. that he thought a court date would then be set for two to six weeks thereafter. In a subsequent in-person meeting with Reitz on July 9, 2001, L.K. reiterated her desire to litigate her claim and repeated her position that the earlier $17,000 settlement offer from the insurance company was inadequate. ¶ 41. Between May and September, 2001, Reitz attempted mediation with the insurance company in lieu of filing a lawsuit. On September 23, 2001, after it became apparent that the insurer would not increase its earlier settlement offer or mediate the matter, Reitz prepared another summons and complaint, identical to the summons and complaint he had previously mailed to L.K. Reitz, however, filed neither the first summons and complaint nor the second summons and complaint; consequently, no lawsuit had been commenced on L.K.'s behalf. ¶ 42. This course of conduct led to the following two counts of misconduct as alleged in the OLR complaint:  Count VIBy failing to pursue [L.K.'s] personal injury claim in a timely manner, Reitz failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing [L.K.], in violation of SCR 20:1.3.  Count VIIBy misrepresenting to [L.K.] that he had filed the lawsuit on her behalf, Reitz engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c). [10] ¶ 43. The referee determined that the OLR had presented clear and satisfactory evidence that Reitz had committed both violations as alleged. Reitz does not now challenge the referee's findings and conclusions with respect to Count VI. ¶ 44. With respect to Count VII, the referee found that Reitz had engaged in deceit, misrepresentation or dishonesty by his behavior and the information he had given his client, L.K., concerning his preparation of a summons and complaint for her lawsuit. According to the referee, the wording on Reitz's March 29, 2001 cover letter, which included a summons and complaint that he had signed, indicated to L.K. that Reitz had, in fact, initiated a lawsuit on her behalf. The referee observed that there was nothing in that cover letter or on the summons and complaint to suggest that those documents were simply drafts. ¶ 45. Furthermore, the referee noted that Reitz had acknowledged that a lay person would think that a signed summons and complaint represented the initiation of a lawsuit. According to the referee, a prudent lawyer intending that such documents were to be merely drafts, would have explained that fact to his client or stamped draft on the documents. Reitz, however, did neither. Moreover, the referee pointed out that in subsequent conversations with L.K., Reitz did nothing to disabuse her of her belief that he had filed a lawsuit on her behalf. According to the referee, Reitz's actions led L.K. to believe that progress was being made on her case when in reality, he was engaging in dishonesty, deceit, and misrepresentation. ¶ 46. On this appeal, Reitz maintains that there is no clear and convincing evidence that he committed the ethical violation as alleged in Count VII. He believes that the evidence only established poor communication skills on his part, but not deceitful or dishonest conduct as proscribed by SCR 20:8.4. He characterizes this situation as being simply a miscommunication between she [L.K.] and I [sic] . . . . He insists that on the evidence presented, the referee could not find that he had been deceptive, deceitful or had misrepresented anything to L.K. Although he acknowledges miscommunication, Reitz insists that there was nothing more insidious and therefore his behavior did not violate the rule. ¶ 47. We reject Reitz's arguments. We conclude that the referee's findings of fact were not clearly erroneous and that Reitz's behavior with respect to his client, L.K., constitutes dishonesty, deceit, and misrepresentation as proscribed by SCR 20:8.4. We agree with OLR that Reitz's March 29 cover letter to L.K. could only be interpreted by a lay person like L.K. as meaning that a lawsuit had been filed on her behalf. Furthermore, Reitz continued with that deception in all of his subsequent conversations with L.K. between May and September 2001. We note that SCR 20:8.4 is stated in the disjunctive and prohibits a lawyer from engaging in four specific types of misconduct: dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. We conclude that Reitz's failure to inform his client that no lawsuit had in fact been commenced on her behalf amounted to a deceitful omission of relevant information. Such omission constitutes dishonest conduct within the meaning of this rule. See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Knickmeier, 2004 WI 115, ¶ 93, 275 Wis. 2d 69, 683 N.W.2d 445; see also In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Urban, 2002 WI 63, 253 Wis. 2d 194, 645 N.W.2d 612. Because the referee's findings on these two counts were not clearly erroneous, we adopt them and we agree with the referee's conclusions that these actions violated the specific rules as alleged.