Opinion ID: 1849981
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: LAW I. The trial court erred in its oral comments/instructions to the jury after submission of the case to the jury.

Text: On appeal, Brantley charges error in the trial judge's comments/instructions to the jury after submission of the case to the jury and urges reversal. This matter is controlled by our holdings in Edlin v. State, 523 So.2d 42 (Miss. 1988) and Sharplin v. State, 330 So.2d 591 (Miss. 1976). In Edlin, the defendant was being tried for murder. During deliberations, a bailiff knocked on the door of the jury room and was told the jury was unable to reach a verdict because two members would not change their minds. The bailiff reported this to the judge. The judge told the bailiff to tell the jurors, and the bailiff so told the jurors, that we have put too much work and time on this case and for them to try again. Edlin, 523 So.2d at 43. In reversing the subsequent conviction, we held: The error complained of by Edlin need never have occurred. In Sharplin v. State, 330 So.2d 591 (Miss. 1976), this Court stated: If the trial judge feels that there is a likelihood that the jury might reach a verdict, he may return the jury for further deliberations by simply stating to the jurors: Please continue your deliberations, or he may give the following instruction set forth in the tentative draft of Mississippi Model Jury Instructions: Criminal, Volume 1, page 50: I know that it is possible for honest men and women to have honest different opinions about the facts of a case, but, if it is possible to reconcile your differences of opinion and decide this case, then you should do so. Accordingly, I remind you that the court originally instructed you that the verdict of the jury must represent the considered judgment of each juror. It is your duty as jurors to consult with one another and to deliberate in view of reaching agreement if you can do so without violence to your individual judgment. Each of you must decide the case for yourself, but only after an impartial consideration of the evidence with your fellow jurors. In the course of your deliberations, do not hesitate to reexamine your own views and change your opinion if you are convinced it is erroneous, but do not surrender your honest convictions as to the weight or effect of the evidence because of the opinion of your fellow jurors or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict. Please continue your deliberations. We approve the foregoing instruction. It may be given in either criminal or civil cases when the trial judge is confronted with a hung jury. Following publication of this opinion the  Allen Charge in any of its various forms should not be given. See Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 17 S.Ct. 154, 41 L.Ed. 528 (1896). (Footnotes omitted). Sharplin, 330 So.2d at 596. There are two instructions which properly may be given to a deadlocked jury. Neither of these instructions inform the jury that too much work and time has gone into this case. The procedure set out in Sharplin v. State, 330 So.2d 591, 596 (Miss. 1976) has been approved by this Court on numerous instances. See Wright v. State, 512 So.2d 679, 682 (Miss. 1987); Gearlson v. State, 482 So.2d 1141, 1143 (Miss. 1986); Isom v. State, 481 So.2d 820, 822 (Miss. 1985); Blanks v. State, 451 So.2d 775, 778 (Miss. 1984); Murphy v. State, 426 So.2d 786, 791 (Miss. 1983). The trial judge in this case departed from the unambiguous procedure outlined in Sharplin and this departure constitutes reversible error. Edlin, 523 So.2d at 44. The procedure we set forth in Edlin and Sharplin for instructing a deadlocked jury is clear and unambiguous. The trial judge's departure from the guidelines of Edlin and Sharplin is clear error. The State all but concedes that the trial judge's charge to the jury was improper. However, the State argues that under the peculiar facts of this case an error such as this is not presumptively prejudicial or incurably reversible. In other words, the State argues for affirmance based on harmless error. This we cannot do. In addressing the issue of a tainted jury, we held in Collins v. State, 99 Miss. 47, 54 So. 665 (1910), cited in Edlin: All the authorities hold that, if they (the jurors) were exposed to improper influences, which might have produced the verdict, the presumption of law is against its purity; and testimony will not be heard to rebut this presumption. It is a conclusive presumption. Collins, 99 Miss. at 51, 54 So. at 666, cited in Edlin, 523 So.2d at 45. We know that early in the deliberations in the instant case the jurors became deadlocked at a vote of seven in favor of acquittal, five in favor of conviction. We cannot conclude with confidence that the judge's spontaneous charge did not taint the jury and indeed, under the facts of this case, such arguments seem unlikely. Brantley is currently incarcerated under a separate 35-year sentence for the Greenville armed robbery conviction, so the State will have ample time to re-try him, should it decide to do so. However, the trial judge's failure to follow the clear and unambiguous procedure for instructing a deadlocked jury as set forth in Edlin and Sharplin is clear error and commands reversal.