Opinion ID: 1251317
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Waiver of the Right to Counsel on May 13

Text: Because we conclude that Miller did invoke his right to counsel on May 13, we must examine whether he voluntarily waived that right. Once a defendant invokes his right to counsel, he may subsequently waive that right by reinitiating conversation with the police. See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85, 101 S.Ct. at 1884-85; State v. Howard, 324 N.W.2d 216, 222 (Minn.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1172, 103 S.Ct. 818, 74 L.Ed.2d 1016 (1983). Waiver of Miranda rights must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. [2] State v. Linder, 268 N.W.2d 734, 735 (Minn.1978). A district court must evaluate the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a defendant's waiver was voluntary. Id. We have set forth an extensive list of factors relevant to the totality of the circumstances. The analysis must take into account the defendant's age, maturity, intelligence, education, experience, ability to comprehend, lack of or adequacy of warnings, length and legality of detention, nature of the interrogation, physical deprivations, and access to counsel and friends. Id. When reviewing the district court's conclusion about voluntariness of a waiver, an appellate court evaluates the district court's findings of fact for clear error. Johnson, 463 N.W.2d at 533. The appellate court must make an independent subjective determination, however, as to whether the waiver of right to counsel was voluntary. State v. Wilson, 535 N.W.2d 597, 603 (Minn. 1995). In assessing voluntariness, this court has focused heavily on both a defendant's education and his familiarity with the criminal justice system. We have found significant in previous cases that the defendant had been read his Miranda rights before the investigation at issue. See, e.g., State v. Camacho, 561 N.W.2d 160, 169 (Minn.1997) (indicating that defendant had had prior contacts with police in which he was informed of his rights); State v. Ouk, 516 N.W.2d 180, 185 (Minn.1994) (noting that 15-year-old suspect had been advised of his rights on at least three earlier occasions). In another case, the defendant's high school education and previous encounters with the criminal justice system were important to our conclusion that he had voluntarily waived his right to counsel. State v. Pilcher, 472 N.W.2d 327, 333 (Minn. 1991). The district court concluded that once Miller asked about an attorney, Sgt. Nelson and Sgt. Weston ceased all interrogation and began asking questions again only after Miller voluntarily reinitiated communication with them. In reaching its conclusion, the court found that Miller was 42 years old and had a high school education. In addition, the court found that Miller had been arrested several times, had his Miranda rights read to him before May 13, 1996, and had been convicted of third- and fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct. The court thus concluded that Miller made all statements to the police freely and voluntarily and    not in violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Because the police interrogation on May 13 was taped in its entirety, we have a clear understanding of what happened. Miller was given a Miranda warning immediately after being arrested on May 13, and he indicated that he understood those rights. Moreover, Sgt. Nelson explained to Miller that he could not talk to him unless Miller reinitiated conversation, and Miller stated explicitly, I'd like to exercise that option. Indeed, Miller acknowledged later in the interview that he had voluntarily waived his right to an attorney and that he understood he had the right to stop the conversation at any time. Contrary to Miller's claim on appeal, the police officers worked scrupulously to ensure that Miller reinitiated conversation voluntarily. In addition to the police officers' explicit questions and Miller's clear answers, other facts demonstrate the validity of the waiver. Miller was not subject to any physical deprivations during the interrogation. The police did not question him for an excessive length of time, and they allowed him to use the restroom whenever he needed. Not only was he allowed to talk to his wife, but she also sat in on portions of the interrogation. We conclude that after invoking the right to counsel on May 13, Miller made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to counsel. Thus, the admission of testimony about and tapes of the May 13 interrogation did not violate his right to counsel under the Fifth Amendment.