Opinion ID: 815024
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jury Selection Challenges

Text: Defendants assign three errors to the district court in connection with the jury selection process. First, Defendants argue that the court improperly 4 Case: 10-40525 Document: 00512104800 Page: 5 Date Filed: 01/08/2013 No. 10-40525 excluded for cause five prospective jurors who expressed reservations about imposing the death penalty. Second, Defendants contend that the court erred in dismissing a venire person who indicated that he had a physical infirmity that would impair his ability to render effective jury service.2 Finally, Defendants submit that the court improperly denied their for cause challenges to three prospective jurors. (1) Prospective Jurors Dismissed for Death Penalty Objections (a) Standard of Review A district court’s dismissal of a prospective juror for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Bernard, 299 F.3d 467, 474 (5th Cir. 2002). “Deference to the trial court is appropriate because it is in a position to assess the demeanor of the venire, and of the individuals who compose it, a factor of critical importance in assessing the attitude and qualifications of potential jurors.” Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1, 9 (2007). We thus give “considerable deference” to a district court’s decision to dismiss a juror based on his or her opposition to the death penalty. United States v. Fields, 483 F.3d 313, 357 (5th Cir. 2007). (b) Applicable Law In Witherspoon v. Illinois, the Supreme Court held that a capital defendant’s right to trial by an impartial jury is violated when a court universally excuses for cause all members of the venire who express conscientious objections to the death penalty. 391 U.S. 510, 521–22 (1968). Nevertheless, “[a] court may excuse a prospective juror for cause because of his views on capital punishment if those views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with the 2 Defendants actually maintain that two prospective jurors were dismissed based on their physical infirmities. As explained in further detail below, however, the court clearly dismissed one of these jurors for his views in connection with the death penalty. 5 Case: 10-40525 Document: 00512104800 Page: 6 Date Filed: 01/08/2013 No. 10-40525 instructions and oath.” United States v. Webster, 162 F.3d 308, 340 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985)). A prospective juror, therefore, properly is dismissed if, regardless of the facts and circumstances of a case, he indicates that he personally could not impose the death penalty. See Fields, 483 F.3d at 357. Additionally, because “many veniremen simply cannot be asked enough questions to reach the point where their bias has been made ‘unmistakably clear,’” dismissal for cause is also appropriate if the court “is left with the definite impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law.” Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 425–26. Accordingly, this court repeatedly has deemed proper a lower court’s dismissal for cause of a prospective juror who has wavered or given conflicting or ambiguous signals as to whether he or she could sentence a defendant to death. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 549 F.3d 963, 973 (5th Cir. 2008); Ortiz v. Quarterman, 504 F.3d 492, 502–03 (5th Cir. 2007); Bernard, 299 F.3d at 474–75; Webster, 162 F.3d at 340–41. (c) Discussion Here, each member of the venire submitted answers to a written questionnaire, after which he or she was questioned by both government and defense counsel. Defendants argue that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing for cause five prospective jurors who expressed reservations during this process about their ability to impose capital punishment. As discussed below, we disagree. The first venire person whose dismissal Defendants contest is prospective juror number three (“Lacy”). Although Defendants acknowledge that Lacy expressed conscientious scruples against the death penalty, they argue that when questioned by defense counsel, Lacy indicated that she would follow the law and would answer questions truthfully, even if that resulted in a death 6 Case: 10-40525 Document: 00512104800 Page: 7 Date Filed: 01/08/2013 No. 10-40525 sentence. Defendants also emphasize that Lacy indicated that she would “follow the evidence” and was “not going to disregard it.” Even so, Lacy answered in the affirmative when asked whether her “personal feelings against the death penalty would always prevent [her] from voting for the death penalty.” Further, when asked if she thought her “feelings against the death penalty would substantially impair [her] or prevent [her] from ever voting for it regardless of what the evidence and the law instructed,” she replied that they would. The court observed Lacy’s demeanor and heard her testimony. That testimony revealed Lacy’s consistent opposition to the death penalty and her view that, because of that opposition, she was unable to affirm that she could faithfully follow her oath as a juror. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in excusing her. See Jackson, 549 F.3d at 973. Next, Defendants submit that the court erred in dismissing prospective juror number sixty-six (“Stephenson”). In particular, Defendants contend that the sum of Stephenson’s testimony was that “she did not know how she felt” about the death penalty and that she “never said she could not impose it.” Defendants argue that Stephenson even stated that she could vote in favor of capital punishment “if the Holy Spirit was guiding her” to do so. In excusing her, however, the court emphasized that throughout her questionnaire, Stephenson had indicated that she was opposed to the death penalty, that she could not impose it, and that she “thought it was God’s job to put persons to death.” The court correctly explained that Stephenson never affirmed that she would be able to return a verdict of death if the facts and circumstances warranted it under the law. In light of Stephenson’s ambiguous responses during voir dire, and her “strange” demeanor, the district court was unable to ascertain whether—notwithstanding her opposition to the death penalty—she would be able “to faithfully and impartially apply the law.” 7 Case: 10-40525 Document: 00512104800 Page: 8 Date Filed: 01/08/2013 No. 10-40525 Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 426. As such, the court did not abuse its discretion in excusing her. Defendants also allege that potential juror number 130 (“Kimball”) should not have been dismissed.3 Kimball previously had served on a jury that imposed the death penalty, which Defendants suggest supports their conclusion that Kimball could have fulfilled his duties impartially as a juror in this case. Defendants also note that Kimball indicated that he generally favored the death penalty, and he affirmed that he “would base a decision to impose it on the facts and the law in the case.” Nevertheless, on his questionnaire, Kimball expressed in response to three separate questions that he did not think he could impose the death penalty a second time. During individual voir dire, Kimball testified that he might not be able to vote for the death penalty even if it was called for “under the law and the facts.” He stated that imposing capital punishment in the first case for which he had served as a juror had bothered him “an awful lot,” and had caused him to experience nightmares wherein he would “see the defendant’s face.” When asked if he thought his “personal feelings would substantially impair [his] ability to go ahead and vote for the death penalty,” Kimball replied, “I’m not really sure.” Even under questioning by defense counsel, Kimball consistently indicated that he did not know whether he could impose the death penalty in a second case. Because Kimball was consistent as to the fact that his personal feelings about imposing the death penalty in this case prevented him from attesting that he would faithfully and impartially apply the law, the district 3 Defendants suggest that Kimball was dismissed both because of his reservations about imposing the death penalty, and because he had a medical condition that prevented him from hearing the events that were transpiring in court. To be sure, the lower court did explore Kimball’s hearing impairment and, at one point, stated that his disability would “substantially impair[] his ability to serve as a juror.” Nevertheless, the district court was clear that it ultimately dismissed Kimball “because of what he said about the death penalty.” 8 Case: 10-40525 Document: 00512104800 Page: 9 Date Filed: 01/08/2013 No. 10-40525 court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Kimball for cause.4 See Bernard, 299 F.3d at 474–75. Defendants next maintain that the district court erred in excusing prospective juror number 140 (“Furby”). Although Defendants acknowledge that Furby expressed doubts about her ability to impose the death penalty, they stress that she also indicated that she “would follow [her] oath and follow the law.” Additionally, they note that Furby stated that she would not submit a “false answer” on verdict forms simply to avoid voting for the death penalty. Finally, Defendants emphasize that when asked whether she could follow her oath and vote for the death penalty if she “heard enough bad evidence from the government” to satisfy her that the death penalty was warranted, Furby stated that “I guess if I was put in that situation, yes.” Notwithstanding this statement, however, Furby repeatedly indicated that she did not know whether she could vote for the death penalty. Indeed, she stated that the “scariness” of capital punishment would impair her ability to vote “for the death penalty even if [she] felt like the facts justified that verdict.” When eventually asked directly whether she was “going to follow [her] oath or not” and impose the death penalty if it was warranted, she stated “I’m not going to.” In light of Furby’s vacillations as to whether she personally could impose capital punishment, and her explicit statement that her personal feelings would prevent her from following her oath, the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the government’s motion to strike her for cause. See Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 425–26. 4 In addition to his inability to affirm that he could adhere to his oath, Kimball also had conducted outside research about the case. The court noted that, in light of this outside investigation, it would be “inappropriate” to have Kimball serve. We agree. See Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959). 9 Case: 10-40525 Document: 00512104800 Page: 10 Date Filed: 01/08/2013 No. 10-40525 Finally, Defendants assert that the district court erred in dismissing for cause prospective juror number two-hundred (“Blackmon”). During voir dire, Blackmon stated to defense counsel that she had a “religious problem” with imposing capital punishment unless the case involved a child or an act of domestic violence. This generally was consistent with her questionnaire, wherein Blackmon had noted that she was against capital punishment except in cases involving “killing a child, abusing a child, child molestation, [or] killing an elderly person.” Nevertheless, Defendants argue that Blackmon should not have been dismissed because she testified that she was willing to keep an open mind that there might be other cases that could warrant a death sentence. Further, Defendants also emphasize that, when questioned by defense counsel, Blackmon stated that she could vote for the death penalty if the government established the appropriateness of such a sentence. Despite this testimony, however, Blackmon stated that although she had “waffled” when answering defense counsel’s questions, she did not think she “could live with [herself] if” she voted for the death penalty in this case. When government counsel asked if he would “ever have a chance of getting a death penalty verdict from” Blackmon in cases not involving victims she had listed on her questionnaire, she replied “[p]robably not.” Finally, Blackmon stated that she would not be able to follow her oath or the court’s instruction if it meant imposing capital punishment in this case. Given Blackmon’s position that she would not follow the oath to faithfully and impartially apply the law in this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing her. See Jackson, 549 F.3d at 973–74. (2) Prospective Juror Dismissed for a Physical Infirmity Defendants also raise a host of challenges to the district court’s dismissal of a prospective juror who indicated during voir dire that he had a physical infirmity that might have impeded his ability to render jury service. First, 10 Case: 10-40525 Document: 00512104800 Page: 11 Date Filed: 01/08/2013 No. 10-40525 Defendants claim that the court’s action in excusing this venire person was contrary to the Jury Selection and Service Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1861, et seq. Second, Defendants submit that the court violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) by dismissing this juror. 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. Finally, Defendants contend that excusing this juror violated their constitutional rights to equal protection and to have a venire drawn from a fair cross section of the community. (a) Standard of Review “Determinations as to the general qualifications of jurors are reviewed for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Whitfield, 590 F.3d 325, 360 (5th Cir. 2009). As a question of law, the applicability of the ADA is reviewed de novo. See Jackson, 549 F.3d at 969. Defendants’ constitutional claims were not raised below and, as such, are reviewed only for plain error. See United States v. Goldfaden, 959 F.2d 1324, 1327–28 (5th Cir. 1992). Plain error review “requires considerable deference to the district court.” United States v. Peltier, 505 F.3d 389, 391 (5th Cir. 2007). (b) Prospective Juror Number 232 On his questionnaire, prospective juror number 232 (“Horton”) indicated that he took medications that caused him to use the restroom frequently. He testified that although he wished to serve as a juror, his health kept him from so doing. Horton first estimated that he needed to use the facilities roughly every sixty to ninety minutes, though he later indicated that he had done so five times during the two-and-a-half hour period he was at the courthouse. He further stated that his inability to use the restroom when needed “would be a distraction” and would impede his ability to concentrate on the proceedings. After the court informed Horton that, during trial, “it could be as much as two hours at a time without a break,” Horton was unable to assure the court that he could wait that long without using the facilities. He later stated that while he knew he might be required to sit for an hour or two and be “undisturbed about 11 Case: 10-40525 Document: 00512104800 Page: 12 Date Filed: 01/08/2013 No. 10-40525 that . . . that’s just not going to work for me.” The court finally asked Horton directly if he was asking to be excused, to which Horton replied in the affirmative. The court therefore dismissed him. (c) The Jury Selection and Service Act Defendants first imply that Horton’s dismissal violated the Jury Selection and Service Act, which sets forth the qualifications for jury service in federal courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1865. As relevant, a person is disqualified from service under the Act’s provisions if he is unable “by reason of mental or physical infirmity, to render satisfactory jury service.” Id. at § 1865(b)(4). “A court has broad discretion to determine whether to excuse a juror for cause” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(4). United States v. Solomon, 273 F.3d 1108, 2001 WL 1131955, at  (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (unpublished). In Solomon, for example, we affirmed the dismissal for cause of a prospective juror who suffered from an obsessive compulsive disorder. Id. When asked whether his condition would interfere with his ability to focus on the proceedings, the venire person in Solomon had responded that there was “no way to know,” although he believed that he would be able to focus “[m]ost of the time.” Id. In affirming the district court’s dismissal of the prospective juror, we stated that “[t]he court properly exercised its discretion in concluding that the prospective juror’s mental condition prevented him from rendering satisfactory service.” Id. Other courts agree as to the propriety of dismissing prospective jurors whose infirmities would interfere with their jury service. In United States v. Flores, for instance, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal for cause of a potential juror who suffered from attention deficit disorder (“ADD”). 572 F.3d 1254, 1261 (11th Cir. 2009). The defendants there had argued “that the district court was required to inquire further into [the prospective juror’s] medical condition to determine the severity of her ADD.” Id. The court disagreed, explaining that because the trial was so lengthy, concerned multiple defendants, 12 Case: 10-40525 Document: 00512104800 Page: 13 Date Filed: 01/08/2013 No. 10-40525 and involved numerous witnesses and exhibits, and because “ADD could interfere with a juror’s ability to pay attention,” “the district court acted within its sound discretion when it dismissed [the potential juror] for cause.” Id.; see also United States v. Powell, 444 F. App’x 517, 519–20 (3d Cir. 2011) (unpublished) (affirming a district court’s decision to grant a prospective juror’s request to be excused based on the individual’s hearing impairment). Defendants do not address this authority or attempt to distinguish it from their case. Instead, they appear to focus on 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(2), which states that an individual is disqualified from jury service if he “is unable to read, write, and understand the English language with a degree of proficiency sufficient to fill out satisfactorily the juror qualification form.” Defendants argue that “[i]t is apparent from [his] educational and work experience, as well as [his] interview[], that [Horton] could read, write and understand the English language with proficiency.” While this is true, Defendants’ argument neglects that in dismissing Horton for cause, the district court acted not under subsection two of 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b), but rather under subsection four. Pursuant to subsection four, it is proper for a court to dismiss prospective jurors based on their infirmities if those infirmities render them unable to perform satisfactory service. Id. at § 1865(b)(4). Here, as detailed, Horton indicated that his physical infirmity could interfere with his ability to concentrate on the proceedings. This testimony was especially troubling given that, as in Flores, the trial here was lengthy, concerned multiple defendants, and involved numerous witnesses and exhibits. Accordingly, the district court did not violate the Jury Selection and Service Act or otherwise abuse its discretion in excusing Horton. (d) The ADA Defendants also maintain that the district court violated the ADA in excusing Horton based on his physical infirmity. Under the ADA, “no qualified 13 Case: 10-40525 Document: 00512104800 Page: 14 Date Filed: 01/08/2013 No. 10-40525 individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. The ADA, however, applies only to “public entities,” which the Act defines as “(A) any State or local government”; “(B) any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government”; and “(C) the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, and any commuter authority.” Id. at § 12131(1). As other courts have observed, “[n]oticeably absent from this definition is any mention of any agency or department of the federal government, other than the National Railroad Passenger Corporation.” Isle Royale Boaters Ass’n v. Norton, 154 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1135 (W.D. Mich. 2001) (holding that plaintiffs could not sue the National Park Service, “a unit of the federal government, for discrimination under the ADA”); see also Calero–Cerezo v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir. 2004) (“[T]he ADA applies to private employers with over 15 employees and state and local governments.”); Melton v. Freeland, Nos. 1:96CV516, 1:96CV517, 1997 WL 382054, at  (M.D.N.C. Feb. 6, 1997) (unpublished) (explaining that the ADA does not apply to federal courts because they are not public entities under the Act). Defendants point to no federal case in which the dismissal of a juror has been successfully challenged under the ADA, nor have we discovered such a case. We therefore reject Defendants’ claim that the district court violated the ADA in dismissing Horton due to his physical infirmity. (e) Defendants’ Constitutional Challenges Defendants next claim that by dismissing Horton, the district court abridged Defendants’ right to have a venire drawn from a fair cross section of the community—as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment—and violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As noted earlier, because 14 Case: 10-40525 Document: 00512104800 Page: 15 Date Filed: 01/08/2013 No. 10-40525 Defendants did not raise this claim below, they are entitled only to plain-error review. Under plain-error review, a defendant “must establish: (1) an error; (2) that is clear and obvious; and (3) that affected his substantial rights.” United States v. Hernandez–Martinez, 485 F.3d 270, 273 (5th Cir. 2007). “If these conditions are met, this court can exercise its discretion to notice the forfeited error only if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (citation omitted). (i) Applicable Law “The Sixth Amendment secures to criminal defendants the right to be tried by an impartial jury drawn from sources reflecting a fair cross section of the community.” Berghuis v. Smith, 130 S. Ct. 1382, 1388 (2010). To establish a prima facie violation of this right, a defendant must demonstrate: (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a “distinctive” group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979). Similarly, in Castaneda v. Partida, the Supreme Court delineated the general contours of an equal protection challenge to jury selection. 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977). There, the Court explained: The first step is to establish that the group is one that is a recognizable, distinct class . . . . Next, the degree of underrepresentation must be proved, by comparing the proportion of the group in the total population to the proportion called to serve as . . . jurors, over a significant period of time. . . . Finally, . . . a selection procedure that is susceptible of abuse . . . supports the presumption of discrimination raised by the statistical showing. Id. (internal citations omitted); see also McGinnis v. Johnson, 181 F.3d 686, 691 (5th Cir. 1999). Thus, to prevail under either theory, a defendant must 15 Case: 10-40525 Document: 00512104800 Page: 16 Date Filed: 01/08/2013 No. 10-40525 demonstrate not only that the excluded persons are members of a distinctive class, but also that the class is disproportionally underrepresented due to procedures in the jury selection process that work to exclude class members. Duren provides a roadmap as to how a petitioner might make such a showing.5 There, the petitioner alleged a Sixth Amendment violation based on the lack of females in his jury pool. Duren, 439 U.S. at 360. In explaining that the petitioner had successfully demonstrated a prima facie violation, the Court first stated that prior precedent “without doubt established that women ‘are sufficiently numerous and distinct from men’ so that ‘if they are systematically eliminated from jury panels, the Sixth Amendment’s fair-cross-section requirement cannot be satisfied.’” Id. at 364 (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 531 (1975)). Next, the petitioner’s “statistical presentation” evidenced “a gross discrepancy between the percentage of women in jury venires and the percentage of women in the community.” Id. at 364, 366. Finally, to establish the systematic nature of that underrepresentation, the petitioner had pointed, inter alia, to provisions of Missouri’s law that granted women automatic exemptions from jury service. Id. at 366–67. Given the “statistics and other evidence” presented by the petitioner, the Court held that he had demonstrated a prima facie fair-cross-section violation. Id. at 366, 367. (ii) Analysis In contrast to the showing made in Duren, Defendants here have done nothing more than advance conclusory statements to the effect that “the exclusion from the venire panel of [Horton] established a prima facie violation 5 Although Duren involved a claim based on the Sixth Amendment and not the Equal Protection Clause,“the equal protection analysis employs a prima facie case test virtually identical to the one used in the fair cross-section analysis.” Bowen v. Kemp, 769 F.2d 672, 683 (11th Cir. 1985). Indeed, the Supreme Court’s analysis in Duren largely mirrors that undertaken by the Castaneda Court. Compare Duren, 439 U.S. at 360–67, with Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 495–99. 16 Case: 10-40525 Document: 00512104800 Page: 17 Date Filed: 01/08/2013 No. 10-40525 of both the fair cross-section requirement of the Sixth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Defendants provide no supporting authority for their assertion that individuals who need to urinate frequently are a “distinct” class. By extension, Defendants provide no statistical data as to the representation of this supposed class on venires, or in the community at large. They therefore fail to demonstrate any degree of underrepresentation of this group and, relatedly, advance no argument supporting their implicit assumption that the individuals in this group have been underrepresented due to their purposeful or systemic exclusion during the jury selection process. In sum, Defendants simply have not established error, plain or otherwise, in connection with the exclusion of Horton. (3) Denial of Defendants’ For Cause Challenges Defendants next assert that the district court erred in refusing to grant their challenges for cause to three prospective jurors, which they contend violated their right to an impartial jury. (a) Standard of Review “The appellate court reviews the district court’s ruling on jury impartiality for ‘manifest abuse of discretion.’” United States v. Wharton, 320 F.3d 526, 535 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Munoz, 15 F.3d 395, 397 (5th Cir.1994)); see also Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2923 (2010) (“A trial court’s findings of juror impartiality may be overturned only for manifest error.”) (citation omitted). “In reviewing claims of this type, the deference due to district courts is at its pinnacle . . . .” Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2923. (b) Applicable Law As noted above, the general “standard for determining when a venire member may be excluded for cause is whether the prospective ‘juror’s views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.’” Soria v. Johnson, 207 F.3d 17 Case: 10-40525 Document: 00512104800 Page: 18 Date Filed: 01/08/2013 No. 10-40525 232, 242 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 424). In addressing a claim that an empaneled jury was not impartial, however, the inquiry turns not on the district court’s alleged failure to remove for cause certain prospective jurors, but rather on whether the jurors who ultimately sat were impartial. Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 86 (1988). In other words, “[a] district court’s erroneous refusal to grant a defendant’s challenge for cause is only grounds for reversal if the defendant establishes that the jury which actually sat to decide his guilt or innocence was not impartial.” Wharton, 320 F.3d at 535. The reasoning behind this approach is that peremptory challenges—which simply “are a means to achieve the end of an impartial jury”—often cure errors purportedly committed when trial courts refuse to grant challenges for cause. Ross, 487 U.S. at 88. Because “peremptory challenges are not of constitutional dimension . . . . the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve [an impartial jury] does not mean the Sixth Amendment was violated.” Id. Indeed, the Supreme Court expressly has held that “a defendant’s exercise of peremptory challenges . . . is not denied or impaired when the defendant chooses to use a peremptory challenge to remove a juror who should have been excused for cause.” United States v. Martinez–Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 317 (2000). (c) Discussion Here, Defendants were entitled to twenty peremptory challenges. Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(b)(1). Because Defendants were scheduled to be tried jointly, the district court inquired of defense counsel prior to trial as to whether Defendants would require additional challenges. Ultimately, the court granted Defendants ten additional peremptory challenges for Defendants to divide as they wished.6 6 This is expressly permitted by Rule 24(b), which states that “[t]he court may allow additional peremptory challenges to multiple defendants, and may allow the defendants to exercise those challenges separately or jointly.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(b). 18 Case: 10-40525 Document: 00512104800 Page: 19 Date Filed: 01/08/2013 No. 10-40525 Following voir dire, Defendants moved for “one or more” additional peremptory challenges and urged the district court to reconsider its allegedly erroneous denial of Defendants’ challenge for cause to seven prospective jurors. Included in the group of venire members Defendants had unsuccessfully challenged for cause were prospective jurors 17, 132, and 184. Defendants argued that if they were not granted additional challenges, they would be forced to lodge peremptory challenges against these individuals, and therefore would be “unable to remove other objectionable jurors who were not necessarily disqualified as a matter of law but who were nonetheless unable to be fair and impartial jurors in the judgment of defendants.” Listed amongst the latter venire members was prospective juror number 129, who ultimately was empaneled. On appeal, Defendants essentially maintain that they were denied the right to an impartial jury because they could not exercise a peremptory challenge against prospective juror number 129, since they had partially exhausted their challenges on venire persons 17, 132, and 184, whom they argue should have been dismissed for cause. (d) Defendants’ Argument Fails Under Wharton Although the parties vigorously disagree about whether prospective jurors 17, 132, and 184 should have been excused for cause, because Defendants ultimately exercised peremptory challenges to remove these venire persons, this disagreement is irrelevant under Wharton. There, a defendant appealed the lower court’s denial of his challenge for cause to a venire person the defendant claimed was biased. Wharton, 320 F.3d at 535. Although the defendant eventually had used a peremptory challenge to exclude the allegedly biased prospective juror, he argued on appeal that this precluded him from using the challenge to exclude from the jury another individual he otherwise would have challenged. Id. Relying on Martinez–Salazar, the Wharton court held that “[a] district court’s erroneous refusal to grant a defendant’s challenge for cause is 19 Case: 10-40525 Document: 00512104800 Page: 20 Date Filed: 01/08/2013 No. 10-40525 only grounds for reversal if the defendant establishes that the jury which actually sat to decide his guilt or innocence was not impartial.” Id.; see also Martinez–Salazar, 528 U.S. at 307 (holding that if a defendant elects to cure the erroneous refusal to dismiss a potential juror for cause “by exercising a peremptory challenge, and is subsequently convicted by a jury on which no biased juror sat, he has not been deprived of any rule-based or constitutional right”). Because the defendant had not shown that the empaneled jury was biased, the Wharton court rejected the defendant’s argument. 320 F.3d at 536. Thus, even assuming that prospective jurors 17, 132, and 184 should have been dismissed for cause, Defendants still must establish that the seated jury was not impartial. On this score, Defendants point only to prospective juror 129 (“Godkin”), who eventually was selected for the jury. On her questionnaire, Godkin placed her feelings as to the propriety of the death penalty at seven on a ten-point scale (where one indicated that the prospective juror felt capital punishment was always improper). When probed about this, Godkin explained that she arrived at seven given her belief that “life is very precious” and that a “person who takes that life is responsible and should be punished.” She stated, however, that she could comply with the law and the judge’s instruction about imposing capital punishment, and she affirmed that she did not “have any problem with the fact that it is the government’s burden to prove the death penalty is justified.” Godkin also acknowledged that, depending on the circumstances of a case—including evidence as to any mitigating and aggravating factors—either the death penalty or a life sentence may be appropriate for “[p]lanned and deliberate murder.” Nevertheless, Defendants argue that had they not been required to exhaust their peremptory strikes on prospective jurors who purportedly should have been dismissed for cause, they would have used one on Godkin. Aside from her “leanings in favor of the death penalty,” Defendants’ also emphasize that 20 Case: 10-40525 Document: 00512104800 Page: 21 Date Filed: 01/08/2013 No. 10-40525 Godkin had relatives in law enforcement and was acquainted with a crime victim and perpetrator.7 Defendants neglect, however, the incidental nature of these connections, and ignore that Godkin expressly testified that these experiences would not impact her ability to be fair and impartial.8 Indeed, Defendants admit that Godkin “was not subject to a challenge for cause.” Simply put, despite Defendants’ contention to the contrary, there is nothing in the record to suggest that Godkin was not impartial. Because Defendants point to no other evidence that the jury was not impartial, Wharton compels us to conclude that Defendants have not established that the district court erred in refusing to excuse for cause prospective jurors 17, 132, and 184.9 See 320 F.3d at 535–36.