Opinion ID: 2173542
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Timing of Request for Appellate Attorney's Fees

Text: We next consider the point at which a plaintiff pursuing a claim under the TCPA must request reasonable appellate attorney's fees. We agree with the intermediate appellate court's conclusion on this issue: when a party is seeking attorney fees incurred on an appeal, that request, absent any statute or rule directing otherwise, must be directed first to the appellate court in a timely fashion. Our rules of appellate procedure require an appellant to set forth in his or her brief [a] statement of the issues presented for review. Tenn. R.App. P. 27(a)(4) (2006). A claim for appellate attorney's fees is an issue that should be set before the appellate court because a remand to the trial court is not a foregone conclusion. [2] Also, as Ted Russell Ford points out in its brief to this Court, subsection (a)(8) of Rule 27 provides that an appellant's brief shall contain [a] short conclusion, stating the precise relief sought. Tenn. R.App. P. 27(a)(8). An award of attorney's fees generated in pursuing the appeal is a form of relief; the rule requires it to be stated. The Killingsworths contend that a defendant is on notice of a plaintiffs intent to seek appellate attorney's fees by reference to the TCPA in the original complaint. While notice of a plaintiff's intent to seek fees in the trial court may be provided by such a reference, we disagree that notice of intent to seek appellate fees is accomplished thereby. Unless and until a judgment is rendered from which an appeal is taken, a plaintiff has no claim to appellate attorney's fees. Also, a request for appellate attorney's fees in an original complaint is nonsensical because such fees will not have been incurred by the time a judgment is rendered. Further, we agree with the intermediate appellate court that a party's failure to request appellate attorney's fees on appeal would leave that party empty-handed in the event the matter was not remanded to the trial court. Finally, a party defending an action under the TCPA is entitled to clear and timely notice that the plaintiff will be seeking attorney's fees generated during the appeal in order to address the propriety of such an award. Relying on Chaille v. Warren, 689 S.W.2d 173 (Tenn.Ct.App.1985), the Killingsworths contend that the only proper time to request fees for legal services performed on appeal would be on the remand of the case. Id. at 178. We are not persuaded. In Chaille , the intermediate appellate court was not construing the TCPA. Rather, the court addressed the effect of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-27-121 permitting an award of attorney's fees from the common fund created by the sale of partitioned land. All issues related to the partition sale, including the payment of costs and fees, are statutorily addressed to the trial court. Further, the court was not considering the impact of Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(a). In short, Chaille is not apposite to the issue now before us. We hold that a plaintiff seeking to recover reasonable attorney's fees generated during an appeal of a case brought under the TCPA must set forth his or her intention to do so in his or her appellate pleadings. Accordingly, we hold that the Killingsworths are not entitled to their appellate attorney's fees because they failed to request them in their appellate pleadings.