Opinion ID: 1374541
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Constitutional Challenges to 1978 Death Penalty Initiative

Text: The charged murders occurred on December 22, 1978. Hence, this case is governed by the Briggs death penalty initiative, adopted by the voters in November 1978 to supplant the Legislature's 1977 death penalty statute. Under both the 1977 and 1978 versions of sections 190.1 and 190.2, a defendant becomes eligible for the death penalty only if the jury first convicts him of first degree murder and also finds one or more special circumstances to be true. If that occurs, the case proceeds to a separate penalty trial. There the sentencer must consider enumerated aggravating and mitigating circumstances in choosing between the penalties of death or life without parole. (Current and former § 190.3.) The 1978 law contains an additional provision that the sentencer shall impose the death penalty if it determines that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating and shall impose life without parole if it finds that mitigating circumstances outweigh aggravating. (Current § 190.3.) (21) Appellant argues that the 1978 law lacks certain procedural safeguards essential to a constitutional capital sentencing scheme. The statute is invalid, he claims, because it does not distinguish which factors are aggravating and which are mitigating and does not exclude nonstatutory, unspecified aggravating factors as a basis for the death penalty. Further, appellant urges, the law is unconstitutional because it fails to require (1) written findings as to the aggravating factors supporting a death judgment, (2) proof beyond a reasonable doubt of any such aggravating factors, (3) jury unanimity on the dispositive aggravating factors, (4) a finding that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating beyond a reasonable doubt, (5) a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that death is the appropriate penalty, and (6) appellate proportionality review. Most of these challenges were rejected as to the 1977 law in People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264, 315-317, 318-319 [168 Cal. Rptr. 603, 618 P.2d 149], cert. den. (1981) 450 U.S. 1035 [68 L.Ed.2d 232, 101 S.Ct. 1750]; and People v. Frierson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 142, 176-184, 195-196 [158 Cal. Rptr. 281, 599 P.2d 587]. The prevailing opinions noted that three features of the 1977 statute provided adequate safeguards against arbitrary death judgments and ensured the guided sentencing discretion required by the Eighth Amendment. First, the statute made a defendant eligible for the death penalty only if he was first found guilty of first degree murder and the jury also agreed beyond a reasonable doubt upon the truth of at least one statutory special circumstance. Second, the law specified the criteria the sentencer should then evaluate in selecting a penalty. Third, it established independent review of each death judgment both by the trial judge and on automatic appeal. The 1978 statute is similar in all relevant respects. Subsequent United States Supreme Court decisions confirm that a death penalty law avoids the Eighth Amendment's proscription of arbitrary sentencing procedures if it suitably narrows the class of death-eligible persons, then provides for an individualized penalty determination at the sentencing and appeal stages. ( Pulley v. Harris (1984) 465 U.S. 37, 53-54 [79 L.Ed.2d 29, 42-43, 104 S.Ct. 871]; California v. Ramos (1983) 463 U.S. 992, 1008 [77 L.Ed.2d 1171, 1185, 103 S.Ct. 3446]; Zant v. Stephens (1983) 462 U.S. 862, 876-880 [77 L.Ed.2d 235, 249-252, 103 S.Ct. 2733].) The court has upheld both the 1977 and 1978 California statutes on this basis. In Pulley, the court concluded, for reasons like those specified in Jackson and Frierson, that the 1977 law met constitutional standards of narrow death eligibility, individualized sentencing, and appellate oversight. Hence, the court held, the statute was not invalid because it lacked provision for review of sentence proportionality. (465 U.S. at pp. 51-53 [79 L.Ed.2d at pp. 40-42].) In Ramos, the majority rejected a claim that the 1978 law was unconstitutional because it required the sentencing jury to be told of the Governor's power to commute a life sentence (the so-called Briggs Instruction) but provided no guidance on how the sentencer was to evaluate this information. As we held in Zant ..., the majority said, the constitutional prohibition on arbitrary and capricious capital sentencing determinations is not violated by a capital sentencing `scheme that permits the jury to exercise unbridled discretion in determining whether the death penalty should be imposed after it has found that the defendant is a member of the class made eligible for that penalty by statute.' [Citation.] (463 U.S. at p. 1009, fn. 22 [77 L.Ed.2d at pp. 1185-1186], italics added.) In other words, the 1978 California law would not contravene the Eighth Amendment even if it set no standards for the sentencing of defendants already deemed death-eligible. [15] The 1978 initiative, unlike its 1977 counterpart, provides that the sentencer shall impose death if it finds that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating and shall impose life without parole if mitigating circumstances outweigh aggravating. This difference warrants no change in the rulings of Frierson and Jackson. As we explained in People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512 [220 Cal. Rptr. 637, 709 P.2d 440], the sentencing function is inherently moral and normative, not factual; the sentencer's power and discretion under both the 1978 and 1977 provisions is to decide the appropriate penalty for the particular offense and offender under all the relevant circumstances. (Pp. 540-545.) Because we recognized that the 1978 language might cause confusion, Brown includes a requirement that in all future penalty trials under the 1978 law, the jury must be fully advised of the nature and scope of its sentencing discretion. (P. 545, at fn. 17.) [16] We are confident that no jury so instructed will mistake the solemnity of its task. Moreover, instructions like those discussed in Brown are better suited to the normative task of sentencing than are admonitions, such as those urged by appellant, which speak in terms associated with traditional factfinding. We conclude that the 1978 statute is not invalid on the grounds appellant cites. [17]