Opinion ID: 659933
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Finding of Arbitrability

Text: 32 Indiana Construction claims that the trial court's conclusion that the grievance is arbitrable is erroneous in light of the Agreement and the evidence. Brief of Appellant at 25. Specifically, appellant asserts that this Court stated that the Operators Union's grievance would not be arbitrable, i.e. involving a 'dispute arising between the Union, or Unions, involving territorial or craft jurisdiction,' if the Operators Union claimed 'the work as its own.'  Brief of Appellant at 19. Consequently, Indiana Construction states that the district court's factual findings show that Operators claimed the work as its own, and insists that the district court specifically found the existence of a jurisdictional dispute. Brief of Appellant at 21. 33 First, there is no indication from the transcript that the judge specifically found that a non-arbitrable jurisdictional dispute existed under the terms of the Agreement. Also, we note once more, that this court never said that a jurisdictional dispute would exist if Operators claimed the work as its own. See Indiana Constr. II, 910 F.2d at 453 (AA 45). However, we did emphasize that [t]he facts of this case defy the label of either a stereotypical jurisdictional or subcontracting dispute. Id. Consequently, we remanded the case for further proceedings and directed the district court to apply the principles enunciated in AT & T. Id. at 455. We apply those same principles here. 34 In AT & T, the Court noted that when a collective bargaining agreement contains a broad arbitration clause like the one in the instant case, there is a presumption in favor of arbitration that can only be overcome by an express provision excluding a particular grievance or the most forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude the claim. 475 U.S. at 650, 106 S.Ct. at 1419. In the present case, Indiana Construction contends that its provision in Article 6 exempting any dispute involving territorial or craft jurisdiction is just such an exclusion. We disagree. 35 The term jurisdiction is not defined in the Agreement. Yet, we noted in Indiana Constr. II that a classic jurisdictional dispute involves a dispute between two or more unions over which is entitled to do certain work for an employer. 910 F.2d at 453 (citing NLRB v. Radio and Television Broadcast Eng'rs Union Local 1212, 364 U.S. 573, 579, 81 S.Ct. 330, 334, 5 L.Ed.2d 302 (1961)). In those cases, the employer has agreements with two or more unions, assigns a particular piece of work to one union, and another union threatens action unless the work is reassigned. Indiana Constr. II, 910 F.2d at 453. This case does not involve the classic situation because it was the subcontractor that assigned the work, rather than the employer, Indiana Construction. Admittedly, this situation resembles a traditional jurisdictional dispute, but it also resembles a subcontracting dispute--a dispute that arises when an employer subcontracts a part of the union's work to another employer that does not hire that union's employees. Id. Consequently, the trial court noted that in cases like the present one, the distinction between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional is often a matter of semantics. (SA 8-9). 36 Furthermore, the subcontracting language in the Agreement is far from clear. Although Article 15 provides that Indiana Construction can only subcontract to a firm that pays at least the minimum rates of pay and abides by all apprenticeship standards, it is unclear how appellant could possibly comply with this provision if it hires a nonsignatory subcontractor. 4 Rather than acknowledging the ambiguity in the contract language, Indiana Construction merely reiterated that it may have to pay one union for work performed by another, and that the Agreement sought to avoid this problem by exempting disputes that in any way involve territorial or craft jurisdiction--regardless of the level on which such dispute occurs. Conversely, Operators emphasized that any claims for work occurred at the subcontracting level, and that the Agreement's jurisdictional exemption is limited by the subcontracting provision. 5 However, at oral argument, Operators also admitted that having subcontractors uphold their wage provisions is important for preserving the work for those [they] represent. 37 Clearly, these provisions and the motivations behind each are closely intertwined. Since the jurisdictional provision is arguably limited by the subcontracting limitation in Article 15, this court concludes that the Article 6 exception for disputes involving territorial or craft jurisdiction cannot be characterized as an express provision excluding [the] particular grievance involved here. See AT & T, 475 U.S. at 650, 106 S.Ct. at 1419. That being so, we must determine whether this case presents forceful evidence that the parties intended to exclude this grievance from arbitration. 6 38 In the instant case, the relevant evidence includes several factual findings supporting appellant's contention that this is a jurisdictional dispute. In particular, after weighing the credibility of witnesses, 7 the trial court found that Operators asked Byerly to sign its collective bargaining agreement, tried to get the forklift work for Operators' members, and threatened to picket and shut the job down if the work was not reassigned. (SA 3-7). In addition, the parties stipulated that the forklift work was covered by both Operators' and Laborers' collective bargaining agreements with Indiana Construction, and that Laborers claimed the forklift work on the Toys R Us project as its own pursuant to its collective bargaining agreement. 8 (AA 51, 52, 59). However, the evidence also included the written grievance which charged that Indiana Construction violated the subcontractor clause in Article 15 by subcontracting to a company that did not pay rates of pay and fringe benefits outlined in the Agreement. (PX 2). Moreover, this court has already noted that the remedy sought (contribution to Operators' pension fund) is consistent with either a jurisdictional or a subcontracting claim. Indiana Constr. II, 910 F.2d at 455 (AA 47). 39 In sum, we are left with two contractual provisions which might cover Operators' grievance: the Article 6 jurisdictional dispute exclusion precluding arbitration, and the Article 15 subcontracting dispute requiring arbitration. In addition, there is significant evidence of a jurisdictional dispute because both unions claimed the forklift work. 9 Moreover, we find Operators' suggestion at oral argument that it was not claiming the work because it never made a demand on Byerly disingenuous and inconsistent with the lower court's factual findings regarding Operators' conduct. The court is also mindful of the fact that this dispute between unions over the Toys R Us forklift work presents just the kind of situation which Indiana Construction hoped to exempt from arbitration under its jurisdictional exclusion in Article 6. 40 However, the written grievance charges a violation of Article 15. Also, the requested remedy is consistent with a subcontracting dispute. In addition, it appears that Indiana Construction's decision to subcontract work to Byerly implicates the subcontracting provision because Byerly paid Laborers less than the wages provided for in the Agreement. (Tr. 64). Finally, at oral argument, neither party could describe a situation where Indiana Construction could subcontract to a nonsignatory firm without owing damages under the subcontracting provision. Taking these considerations as a whole, we cannot say with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. 10 Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 582-583, 80 S.Ct. at 1353. Therefore, we resolve our doubt in favor of arbitration. 11 See id.