Opinion ID: 2968018
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ms. Massey

Text: In response to Kandies’s Batson challenge, the prosecutor stated that Ms. Massey was peremptorily challenged because she: KANDIES v. POLK 23 had trouble understanding me, and I think she has a hearing problem because she continuously answered with difficulty, and I had difficulty getting her to understand my questions, and so I excused Ms. Massey because of her hearing problems, and I had some difficulty understanding her answer to the questions I asked her. J.A. 131. After the State set forth these race neutral reasons, Kandies had the burden of establishing that they were pretextual. However, as with Ms. Randleman and Ms. Jinwright, Kandies failed to even respond to the State’s proffered reasons when given the opportunity. Consequently, I review this Batson challenge for plain error. Davis, 160 F.3d at 1027. In doing so, I find that the trial court did not err by overruling Kandies’s Batson challenge because the State’s proffered race neutral reasons were clear, sufficiently specific and related to the case. 476 U.S. at 97-98. Accordingly, I need not proceed with plain error review. 4 & 5. Ms. Rawlinson and Mr. McClure In response to Kandies’s Batson challenge, the prosecutor stated that Ms. Rawlinson and Mr. McClure were peremptorily struck because: Ms. Rawlinson had not even thought about the death penalty, certainly was not [sic] a strong opinion for or against the death penalty. And Mr. McClure was in a similar situation except that he also — my officer noticed that he nodded off at least twice. Not that I’m saying this was the most interesting part of the trial, but I certainly do not believe he was paying sufficient attention in this case, though. Also, I discussed the jury panel with the High Point Police Department, and they indicated Mr. McClure and Ms. Rawlinson would not be good jurors for this type of case. J.A. 167. When asked by the court to elaborate on his proffered reasons for striking Ms. Rawlinson and Mr. McClure, the prosecutor asserted: I asked most everybody and basically indicated [sic] anyone that they had any contact with prior to the trial. Primarily, the reason was they were weak on the death penalty. Id. at 168. 24 KANDIES v. POLK In assessing the State’s proffered reasons, I begin by noting that it is completely proper for prosecutors to contact police to determine whether a prospective juror has a criminal record or has had any prior contact with police. I also note that prosecutors are free to solicit from police advice on a prospective jurors stance on the death penalty, as apparently was done here. In doing so, however, I observe that in most instances police will not have a basis upon which to render such advice. Of course, there may be some rare instances where police can advise prosecutors about a prospective jurors stance on the death penalty due to some prior contact where the prospective juror and police discussed at-length the death penalty or an officer heard the prospective juror discussing his or her views on the death penalty. Here, when given the opportunity, the State failed to set forth the basis upon which the High Point Police Department concluded that Ms. Rawlinson and Mr. McClure would not be good jurors for this type of case because they were weak on the death penalty question. Id. at 16768. Moreover, the State’s assertion that the High Point Police Department indicated that Ms. Rawlinson and Mr. McClure were weak on the death penalty contradicts its observation, after questioning and observing Ms. Rawlinson and Mr. McClure, that they were not a [sic] strong opinion for or against the death penalty. Id. at 167. Accordingly, the State’s assertion that it struck Ms. Rawlinson and Mr. McClure because the High Point Police Department indicated [they] would not be good jurors for this type of case, id. at 167, raises suspicion.15 Nonetheless, I conclude that this proffered reason was race neutral because a discriminatory intent is not inherent in this explanation. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768. Because the State proffered this race neutral reason that was clear, sufficiently specific and at least arguably related to the case, Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98, Kandies had the burden of establishing that it was pretextual, which Kandies failed to do. Kandies could have met his burden, for example, by establishing that the prosecution only discussed prospective African American jurors with the High Point Police Department or that the High Point Police Department’s assertions were solely based on race. 15 Unlike with four of the other seven prospective African American jurors that it struck, the State did not cite criminal history or possibility of criminal history when explaining its reasons for striking Ms. Rawlinson and Mr. McClure. KANDIES v. POLK 25 I am equally suspicious of the State’s assertion that it removed Ms. Rawlinson and Mr. McClure because they did not hold a strong position on the death penalty. Such prospective jurors are exactly the ones that should be empaneled for a capital trial. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 735-36 (1992)(holding that defendant has right to remove for cause prospective jurors who would always impose a death sentence after finding a defendant guilty of a capital crime); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 n.5 (1985)(holding that the State may exclude from capital sentencing juries that ‘class’ of veniremen whose views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of their duties in accordance with their instructions or their oaths). Nonetheless, because a discriminatory intent is not inherent in this proffered reason, I must deem it race neutral. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768. Accordingly, Kandies had the burden of showing that this race neutral reason, which was clear, sufficiently specific and related to the case, Batson, 476 U.S. 97-98, was pretextual. This, however, Kandies failed to do. The State’s last reason for striking Mr. McClure—his lack of attentiveness—clearly satisfies Batson. It is a race neutral reason that is clear, sufficiently specific and related to the case. A juror’s attentiveness is clearly pertinent and vitally important to a capital case because jurors are being asked to make a decision between life and death. 6. Mr. Campbell In response to Kandies’s Batson challenge, the prosecutor stated that he used a peremptory challenge to strike Mr. Campbell because: [Mr. Campbell] did not believe in the death penalty, and considering that [it] is a possible punishment in this case I just didn’t feel that he would be a qualified juror in the case. It would not matter what his answer would be to the question about following the law. Furthermore, a record check indicates that a person named Fred Campbell has a prior common law robbery conviction, but without a file here I didn’t feel I [had] . . . enough evidence to challenge him [on] this point. 26 KANDIES v. POLK J.A. 583. Given that, as discussed above, the Supreme Court has held that the State may exclude from capital sentencing juries that ‘class’ of veniremen whose views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of their duties in accordance with their instructions or their oaths, Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 424 n.5, I find that the State’s proffered race neutral reason satisfied Batson because it was clear, sufficiently specific and related to the case. 496 U.S. at 97-98. Thus, Kandies had the burden of establishing that this reason was pretextual, which he attempted to do by noting that Mr. Campbell stated that he would be able to follow the law despite his opposition to the death penalty. This argument, however, fails to establish that the State’s proffered reason for peremptorily striking Mr. Campbell was pretextual because a juror could, in good conscience, swear to uphold the law and yet be unaware that maintaining . . . dogmatic beliefs about the death penalty would prevent him or her from doing so. Morgan, 504 U.S. at 735. 7. Mr. Hines In response to Kandies’s Batson challenge, the State asserted that it exercised a peremptory strike to remove Mr. Hines because Mr. Hines was worried about his employment and his loss of income. . . . [H]e ha[d] never thought about the death penalty. . . . [and] records indicate that he had prior convictions for driving while impaired and driving while [sic] license revoked under his birth date. J.A. 605. In response to the State’s proffered reason, Kandies’s trial counsel renewed a motion requesting access to the records relied upon by the State or, in the alternative, that the records pertaining to Mr. Hines be made part of the proceeding’s record. The trial court denied this request and overruled Kandies’s Batson challenge, noting that at the time that it peremptorily struck Mr. Hines, the State had (1) accepted another African American juror, who was then struck peremptorily by Kandies; (2) accepted a second African American juror, who was not peremptorily challenged by Kandies; and (3) accepted a third African American juror during the same proceeding that Mr. Hines was struck. Accordingly, the trial court found that Kandies failed to show that the State’s proffered reason was pretextual. Because I accord great deference to the trial court’s determinations regarding purposeful discrimination, Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365, I KANDIES v. POLK 27 cannot, on the record before me, conclude that Kandies’s Batson challenge was improperly overruled by the trial court. 8. Mr. Wilson In response to Kandies’s Batson challenge, the State asserted that it struck Mr. Wilson because he has a record of reckless driving, driving while impaired, four worthless checks, two [sic] injury to personal property, a simple assault, and assault by pointing a gun. J.A. 751. In response to the State’s proffered race neutral reasons, Kandies’s trial counsel renewed the motion made in response to the State’s peremptory challenge to Mr. Hines, i.e., requested access to the records relied upon by the State or that the records pertaining to Mr. Wilson be made part of the proceeding’s record. The trial court denied this request on the same bases that it had previously done so and concluded, on the same grounds that it overruled Kandies’s Batson challenge to the removal of Mr. Hines, that the State’s proffered reasons were not pretextual. Accordingly, because the trial court’s determination regarding purposeful discrimination is given great deference, Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365, I conclude that the trial court did not err by overruling Kandies’s Batson challenge to the peremptory removal of Mr. Wilson. 9. Ms. Oliver During the selection of alternate jurors, the State exercised a peremptory challenge to remove Ms. Oliver. In response, Kandies’s trial counsel raised a Batson challenge. After the court found that Kandies had made a showing of a prima facie discrimination case, the State asserted that it struck Ms. Oliver because she was having trouble hearing . . . and because she certainly didn’t listen to [the court’s] instructions about watching t.v. or listening to any radio broadcasts about [the] case. J.A. 969. To rebut the State’s assertion, Kandies’s trial counsel noted that the State had accepted Caucasian American jurors who had also contravened the court’s instructions about watching television or listening to radio broadcasts about the case. While the disparate treatment of similarly situated prospective jurors of different races can be used to establish pretext, Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 343-44 (2003), Kandies’s trial counsel, in 28 KANDIES v. POLK challenging the removal of Ms. Oliver, did not point to jurors similarly situated to Ms. Oliver that the State accepted. Kandies’s trial counsel only pointed to jurors accepted by the State that had contravened the court’s instructions about watching television and listening to radio reports about the case whereas the State struck Ms. Oliver because she was (1) having trouble hearing and (2) failed to adhere to the court’s instructions. Accordingly, I find that Kandies’s disparate treatment argument fails and thus conclude that the trial court, whose determinations regarding purposeful discrimination merit great deference, Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365, did not err by overruling Kandies’s Batson challenge to the peremptory removal of Ms. Oliver.