Opinion ID: 2145408
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the Jury Selection Process Employed in Lee County Constitutes Reversible Error.

Text: Morgan argues that the jury selection procedures in Lee County violated his constitutional rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution and article I, section 9 of the Iowa Constitution. He also contends that the process violated Iowa Code section 607A.10 because it did not involve a random selection of jurors. Concerning alleged statutory violations, we review for correction of errors at law. Iowa R.App. P. 4. For constitutional violations, we review de novo. State v. Rhomberg, 516 N.W.2d 803, 805 (Iowa 1994). A. Lee County's jury selection procedures. For judicial purposes, Lee County is divided into North Lee County and South Lee County. Each division has its own courthouse. Jurors are to be separately selected for each subdivision from persons residing in that geographical area. Iowa Code § 607A.25 (1993). South Lee County Division consists of five townships. It appears that the master jury list at the time of Morgan's trial included persons who resided in the North Division of Lee County as well as a resident of another county. That circumstance was attributable to the use of post office addresses to sort names in the selection process rather than precise geographical location. No juror who lived outside the county was actually called for jury duty on the case. Three of 114 potential jurors who were called resided in the South Lee County Division rather than the division where the trial was held. One of those persons actually served on the jury. B. Constitutional violations. According to Morgan, Lee County's jury selection procedures, by including residents of South Lee County, violated the vicinage requirement of the Sixth Amendment dictating that districts shall have been previously determined by law. See United States v. Grisham, 63 F.3d 1074, 1078-81 (11th Cir.1995), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 798, 133 L.Ed.2d 746 (1996). He argues that a similar requirement is contained in the Iowa Constitution. The State contends that no vicinage requirement is contained in the Iowa Constitution and that the Federal Constitution requires only that the trial take place in the same federal judicial district. Grisham, 63 F.3d at 1079-80. There was no constitutional violation in this case. The State correctly notes that the vicinage clause of the Federal Constitution contemplates federal judicial districts. Grisham, 63 F.3d at 1079-80. After the Sixth Amendment was made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, there is no reason to think that any narrower requirement would be applicable to the states. Iowa's Constitution provides: The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.... Iowa Const. art. I, § 9. We have stated that this clause preserves the right to a jury trial as it existed at common law. Iowa Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 305 N.W.2d 724, 726-28 (Iowa 1981). At common law, jurors were summoned from the vicinage where the alleged crime occurred. 47 Am.Jur.2d Jury § 111, at 807 (1995). The vicinage was the county where the crime was committed, and the same meaning will ordinarily be given the term today. Id. Although a South Lee County resident served on Morgan's jury in an alleged violation of the statute subdividing Lee County, we do not find that to be of constitutional significance. To determine whether one's jury trial rights have been violated, the court turns to the common law, not to the statutes of the moment. Mitchell, 305 N.W.2d at 728. Morgan, having received a jury selected in accordance with the common law, has no grounds for a constitutional complaint. C. Adequacy of random selection procedures and residency of jury members under controlling statutes. Morgan asserts that the method by which the jury list was compiled failed to follow the random selection requirements of Iowa Code section 607A.10. He also asserts that a South Lee County resident was improperly included in the North Lee County jury panel. Our cases divide jury selection rules into two classes: mandatory rules and directory rules. State v. Lohr, 266 N.W.2d 1, 5-6 (Iowa 1978). The distinction is explained as follows: If the prescribed duty is essential to the main objective of the statute, the statute ordinarily is mandatory and a violation will invalidate subsequent proceedings under it. If the duty is not essential to accomplishing the principal purpose of the statute but is designed to assure order and promptness in the proceeding, the statute ordinarily is directory and a violation will not invalidate subsequent proceedings unless prejudice is shown. Id. at 5 (quoting Taylor v. Department of Transp., 260 N.W.2d 521, 522-23 (Iowa 1977)). After reviewing the record, we conclude that Morgan failed to show that a mandatory duty was violated or that a directory duty was violated to his prejudice. We note that the computer program used to draw juror names complied with our statute. Although not mathematically random, it selected jurors in a manner immune to any subjective bias so that no recognizable class of the population ... can be purposefully included or excluded. Iowa Code § 607A.3(9) (defining random selection). Potential jurors were selected based on the last number of their birth dates. That procedure, in our view, is not linked to impermissible discrimination on the basis of race, gender, or other recognizable classifications within the population. We also find that Iowa Code section 607A.25, the statute authorizing separate jury pools for separate divisions of a county, is directory, not mandatory. The only clear purpose we have been able to deduce for such a division is administrative ease. Each of the two courthouses serves a smaller number of people and is consequently more convenient to attorneys, court personnel, litigants, and potential jurors. There is no indication that Lee County was divided on the basis of insular and recognizable communities so that the fairness of the jury system may only be assured by maintaining separate judicial subdivisions. Consequently, in order to establish a basis for relief, Morgan must show he was prejudiced by the inclusion of a South Lee County resident on his jury. It is necessary to show in this regard some lack of qualifications or bias affecting the juror's impartiality and the fairness of the trial. Bennett v. Lockhart, 39 F.3d 848, 853 (8th Cir.1994); United States v. Humphreys, 982 F.2d 254, 261 (8th Cir.1992). Because no indication of bias or unfairness appears as a result of the South Lee County resident serving on the jury, that circumstance does not afford Morgan any basis for relief.