Opinion ID: 6333191
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Impeaching LeRoux

Text: As a general matter, the withheld information was nonprejudicial not only because other evidence existed to establish the jurisdictional elements of Hunter and Stillwell’s crimes, but also because significant impeachment evidence against LeRoux already existed at trial, where he was extensively impeached. In other words, impeachment based on the withheld information would have been cumulative. 47 As we have previously explained specifically with regard to withheld impeachment evidence, “a new trial is generally not required when the testimony of the witness is corroborated by other testimony, or when the suppressed impeachment evidence merely furnishes an additional basis on which to impeach a witness whose credibility has already been shown to be questionable.” 48 In LeRoux’s case, the evidence at trial left little doubt that he was untrustworthy. For example, the “2015 Statement”—and LeRoux’s recantation of it—was the subject of close cross-examination by attorneys for several of the Defendants. 49 Attorneys for the Government and several Defendants also cross-examined LeRoux about his vast international criminal 47 See United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 257 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[U]ndisclosed evidence may be cumulative, and hence not material.”). 48 Payne, 63 F.3d at 1210 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 49 Joint App’x 611–12 (Trial Tr. 594:21–597:7), 620-21(628:22–629:21) 24 organization. During the course of that testimony, LeRoux admitted to a host of deceitful and manipulative acts, including murdering a witness; framing individuals for crimes they did not commit; bribing multiple foreign authorities, including a judge; and attempting to secure diplomatic privileges for himself by supporting a coup in the Seychelles. And all of this is to say nothing of the litany of generally violent and nefarious acts to which he also admitted, including arranging for numerous other murders; personally committing murder; extensive trafficking in weapons and narcotics; and dealing in weapons with Iran and North Korea. Hunter and Stillwell would have us believe that additional evidence merely demonstrating that LeRoux was a liar, manipulative, or a perjurer would somehow have been the straw that broke the camel’s back with the jury—finally causing them to distrust Paul LeRoux. We are unpersuaded. 50 50 Our conclusion is unaltered by Stillwell’s argument that the withheld information would have shown that LeRoux perjured himself at trial. Stillwell refers to an instance where an unidentified person tells LeRoux that he will “throw the candles to the river.” Gov’t Br. Ex. B, PC #2012-79691, at 2. LeRoux agrees, and urges his interlocutor to throw “the other steel shit” in the river. Id. Stillwell claims that LeRoux and his interlocutor are discussing the disposal of the Lee murder weapon, that LeRoux therefore perjured himself when he testified at trial that the weapon was returned to a warehouse, and that the nondisclosure prejudiced Stillwell by preventing him from making this argument to the jury. We disagree. Stillwell’s argument under Brady requires multiple assumptions, including that the word “candles” as used in the communication meant guns and that the guns at issue included the Lee murder weapon. This, despite the fact there was no concrete connection between LeRoux’s interlocutor and the Lee murder, and three months had elapsed between the Lee murder and the communication. LeRoux’s criminal network and dealings were extensive. The 25 In sum, we recall that, “strictly speaking, there is never a real ‘Brady violation’ unless the nondisclosure was so serious that there is a reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence would have produced a different verdict.” 51 The withheld information would not have produced a different verdict here, it was not “material” under Brady, and the District Court on remand was right to deny Defendants’ Rule 33 motions.