Opinion ID: 3017046
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel During the

Text: Guilt Phase for Failing to Investigate and Discover Mental Health Evidence We begin with Jacobs’ claim that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance during the guilt phase by failing to investigate and present mental health evidence for the purpose of supporting his diminished capacity defense.5 Jacobs testified that on the day of the killings, he and Tammy argued, fought, and cut each other. According to Jacobs, after fighting with Tammy, he helped her into the bathtub, brought the baby into the bathroom, then left the bathroom. When he returned to the 5 Jacobs exhausted this claim by presenting it in his PCRA petition and on PCRA appeal. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected this claim on the merits. See Jacobs II, 727 A.2d at 548-49. Therefore we apply the AEDPA standard of review to this claim. 11 bathroom a short time later, he saw the baby dead in the bathtub, lost control, and stabbed Tammy repeatedly. Based on Jacobs’ testimony, defense counsel presented a heat of passion and diminished capacity defense, asserting that Jacobs lacked the specific intent to kill Tammy Mock.6 In preparation for Jacobs’ PCRA appeal, Dr. Julie Kessel, a licensed and certified psychiatrist familiar with forensic mental health issues, conducted a forensic psychiatric evaluation of Jacobs. (Kessel Affidavit ¶¶ 1-2). Dr. Kessel reported that Jacobs suffers from a number of mental health deficits, including mild mental retardation, organic brain damage, and schizoid personality disorder, and was a child witness and victim of abuse, neglect, and drug and alcohol abuse. (Id. ¶¶ 3-5). According to Dr. Kessel, the combination of these impairments substantially hindered Jacobs’ mental, emotional, and cognitive capacities. (Id. ¶ 5). In Dr. Kessel’s opinion, at the time of the crimes, Jacobs’ capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct and to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired. (Id. ¶ 12). His impairments also substantially diminished his capacity to formulate the specific intent to kill. (Id. ¶ 14). Dr. Kessel concluded that Jacobs “did not in fact have the specific intent to kill Ms. 6 In Pennsylvania, the diminished capacity defense requires a defendant to admit general culpability. See Commonwealth v. Legg, 711 A.2d 430, 433 (Pa. 1998). Because Jacobs denied killing Holly, the diminished capacity defense was unavailable as to the baby’s murder. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 815 A.2d 563, 578 (Pa. 2002). 12 Mock.” (Id. ¶ 14). Dr. Patricia Fleming, a licensed clinical psychologist and neuropsychologist, also evaluated Jacobs and reported that he “is seriously psychologically, emotionally and cognitively impaired.” (Fleming Affidavit ¶ 4). After conducting a number of psychological and neuropsychological tests, Dr. Fleming reported that Jacobs suffers from mild mental retardation, brain damage, and cognitive and emotional impairments. (Id. ¶¶ 9, 13). At the time of the offenses, Dr. Fleming stated, Jacobs’ disturbances “substantially impaired [his] capacity to appreciate the consequences of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.” (Id. ¶ 13). In particular, his “mental retardation, brain damage and other mental health and cognitive impairments significantly diminish[ed] his capacity to premeditate and form a specific intent to kill.” (Id. ¶ 14). Dr. Fleming concluded that the facts “support the conclusion that [Jacobs] did not have the capacity to form the specific intent to kill.” (Id.). As described previously, trial counsel pursued a heat of passion and diminished capacity defense to the murder of Tammy Mock. Beyond his oral consultation with Dr. Davis, however, counsel took no further steps to discover evidence of Jacobs’ mental retardation, brain damage, or other impairments. Trial counsel was thus unable to support Jacobs’ diminished capacity defense with psychiatric evidence establishing that he suffered from any mental disorders which prevented him from formulating the specific intent to kill. Apparently the only evidence of heat of passion or diminished capacity presented at the guilt phase was Jacobs’ own testimony that he “lost it” and 13 stabbed Tammy repeatedly upon seeing their baby drowned in the bathtub. Jacobs claims that trial counsel’s failure to investigate, discover, and present mental health evidence constitutes ineffective assistance in violation of the Sixth Amendment. Sixth Amendment claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are governed by the familiar two-prong test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984): First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Id. at 687; see Williams, 529 U.S. at 390-91. Under Strickland’s first prong, Jacobs must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. The proper standard for attorney performance is that of “reasonably effective assistance” – Jacobs must show that trial counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness considering all the circumstances. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. Counsel’s reasonableness must be assessed on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct. Id. at 689. In the context of ineffective assistance based on counsel’s failure 14 to investigate, the court must determine whether counsel exercised “reasonable professional judgment.” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 522-23. In Pennsylvania, when asserting a diminished capacity defense, “a defendant attempts to negate the element of specific intent to kill and, if successful, first degree murder is reduced to third degree murder.” Commonwealth v. McCullum, 738 A.2d 1007, 1009 (Pa. 1999). According to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, “[d]iminished capacity is an extremely limited defense, which requires extensive psychiatric testimony establishing a defendant suffered from one or more mental disorders which prevented him from formulating the specific intent to kill.” Commonwealth v. Cuevas, 832 A.2d 388, 393 (Pa. 2003) (citing Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 454 A.2d 937, 943 (Pa. 1982)). The specific question posed here is whether counsel exercised reasonable professional judgment in failing to investigate further and discover Jacobs’ mental retardation, brain damage, and other impairments as evidence to support the diminished capacity defense. To his credit, counsel did ask Dr. Davis to evaluate Jacobs. (Davis Affidavit ¶ 2). Counsel did not, however, inform Dr. Davis that the Commonwealth was seeking the death penalty, nor did he provide Davis with any background information concerning the crimes or Jacobs’ history. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 3). According to Dr. Davis, if he had known that this was a capital case, he would have automatically requested testing for brain damage or other impairments that are not readily apparent from a standard evaluation. (Id. ¶ 6). Dr. Davis reported orally to counsel that he did not find any evidence of a major mental illness. (Id. ¶ 4). Upon receipt of 15 this report, counsel chose not to investigate further, although he presented the diminished capacity defense at trial. Counsel did not question any of Jacobs’ family members or friends regarding his childhood, background, or mental health history, or obtain any medical records demonstrating mental deficiencies. At the time counsel decided not to investigate further, he knew or should have known from Jacobs’ behavior and from his interactions with Jacobs that he should initiate some investigation “of a psychological or psychiatric nature.” (PCRA Hearing Tr. 5/29/97 at 29:24). Counsel knew that Jacobs, a young man with no criminal history or history of violence, admitted to stabbing his girlfriend more than 200 times. Counsel knew that Jacobs faced the death penalty, yet did not inform Dr. Davis that the Commonwealth was seeking the death penalty, nor did he provide Davis with any background information concerning the crimes or Jacobs’ history. Counsel interviewed Jacobs’ mother before trial, but did not ask her any questions regarding Jacobs’ mental health history, childhood, or background. In light of all that was known or made available to counsel, we conclude that Jacobs has satisfied the first prong of the Strickland test. He has demonstrated that counsel did not exercise reasonable professional judgment in failing to investigate further and discover evidence of Jacobs’ mental retardation, brain damage, and other impairments that could have prevented him from forming the specific intent to kill Tammy Mock. The District Court was persuaded that counsel’s performance was not deficient in this regard. See Jacobs III, 129 F. Supp. 2d at 412-13. The District Court relied on two 16 cases from other circuits that the District Court interpreted as holding that counsel is not required to investigate further unless a psychiatric evaluator indicates further information is needed. Id. One of these, on which the Commonwealth relies heavily, is Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 1995). In Hendricks, counsel hired a psychiatrist who met with the defendant for about four and one-half hours and found no evidence to support a “mental defense.” Id. at 1037. The psychiatrist posited that psychological testing might be useful and suggested that counsel consult a psychologist. A psychologist then interviewed the defendant for about fifteen hours, ran several psychological tests, reviewed records regarding the crime and the defendant’s life history, and found no evidence to support a mental defense. Counsel relied on the experts’ opinions and decided not to explore further or present a mental defense. Id. The Ninth Circuit ruled that Hendricks’ attorneys had discharged their duty to seek out a psychiatric evaluation. Id. at 1038-39. The Ninth Circuit further ruled that counsel “fell within the broad range of presumptively acceptable conduct by hiring two mental health professionals to investigate potential mental defenses and then relying on their shared, unqualified conclusion that there was no basis for a mental defense.” Id. at 1039. Attorneys, the court opined, cannot be forced to “secondguess their experts.” Id. Hendricks is dissimilar to Jacobs’ case in two significant respects. First, Hendricks involved material facts vastly different from those in Jacobs’ case. Hendricks’ attorneys 17 employed both a psychiatrist and a psychologist who evaluated the defendant separately and extensively, and with the benefit of background information. The experts agreed that no evidence existed to support a diminished capacity defense. In Jacobs’ case, while counsel asked Dr. Davis to evaluate Jacobs, there is no information to indicate that Dr. Davis’ evaluation was sufficiently extensive. His affidavit states only that he “examined Mr. Jacobs to determine if he had a major mental illness or other impairment that would render him incompetent to stand trial or that would negate or reduce his criminal responsibility.” (Davis Affidavit ¶ 4). In conducting his evaluation, Dr. Davis was not aware that Jacobs was subject to the death penalty, nor was Dr. Davis privy to any background information whatsoever. As a result, no psychological testing occurred. In turn, counsel failed to discover Jacobs’ mental retardation, brain damage, and other emotional and mental impairments. We also find the legal issue presented in Hendricks unlike the one presented in Jacobs’ case. The question raised in Hendricks was whether counsel was ineffective in deciding not to investigate more extensively before making a strategic choice not to present a diminished capacity defense at all. The question raised here is whether counsel was ineffective by failing to investigate and discover evidence to support the defense he pursued. Although subtle, the distinction is significant. An attorney’s strategic choices made after a thorough investigation “are virtually unchallengeable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91. Hendricks reiterates and applies this well established principle. Counsel’s failure to investigate adequately and discover evidence to support his strategy of choice is an entirely different 18 question, one which Hendricks does not address. See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 523. In short, Hendricks is inapposite and does not affect our conclusion that Jacobs has satisfied the first prong of Strickland by demonstrating that his attorney failed to exercise reasonable professional judgment in this regard.7 7 Our dissenting colleague suggests that counsel performed reasonably by relying on Dr. Davis’ oral report in deciding not to inquire further into Jacobs’ mental health. The dissent correctly notes that Dr. Davis did not state that he was incapable of forming a conclusion on the information available to him, nor did he ask for any additional information. Several other “highly relevant facts” prevent us from agreeing, however. It is undisputed that Dr. Davis was completely unaware that Jacobs was subject to the death penalty. (Davis Affidavit ¶¶ 2, 4, 5, 7.) At the time he offered his opinion, Dr. Davis was unaware that Tammy Mock had been stabbed more than 200 times because he was not provided with the autopsy report or other background materials concerning the killings, other than “a police report with some information concerning the alleged facts of the offense.” (Id. ¶¶ 3, 12.) Dr. Davis was unaware that the killings occurred after a heated argument between Jacobs and Mock. (Id. ¶ 12.) He knew nothing about Jacobs’ background, such as his lack of a criminal history or history of violent behavior. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 12.) As Dr. Davis later opined, these facts alone “suggest that Mr. Jacobs was highly emotionally disturbed at the time of the offense,” and that he was “overcome by a powerful and uncharacteristic emotional reaction.” (Id. ¶ 12.) In our view, in light of all the circumstances present in this capital case, it was patently unreasonable for counsel to rely solely on Dr. Davis’ 19 In addition to establishing that his attorney performed deficiently, Jacobs must demonstrate that he was prejudiced by counsel’s error. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692. The prejudice component requires Jacobs to show “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. Jacobs need not show that counsel’s deficient performance “more likely than not altered the outcome in the case” – rather, he must show only “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 693-94. This standard is not “‘a stringent one.’” Jermyn v. Horn, 266 F.3d 257, 282 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Baker v. Barbo, 177 F.3d 149, 154 (3d Cir. 1999)). We are persuaded that Jacobs has satisfied Strickland’s prejudice prong. As described above, Dr. Kessel conducted a forensic psychiatric evaluation of Jacobs. (Kessel Affidavit ¶¶ 1-2). According to Dr. Kessel, the combination of Jacobs’ mental health impairments substantially impaired Jacobs’ mental, emotional, and cognitive capacities. (Id. ¶ 5). In Dr. Kessel’s opinion, Jacobs “did not in fact have the specific intent to kill” Tammy Mock. (Id. ¶ 14). Dr. Fleming also evaluated Jacobs and concluded that Jacobs’ disturbances “substantially uninformed opinion in deciding not to investigate Jacobs’ mental health history further. The unreasonableness of counsel’s decision is compounded by the fact that he pursued a diminished capacity defense without any expert evidence to support it, as expressly required by Pennsylvania law. See Cuevas, 832 A.2d at 393. 20 impaired [his] capacity to appreciate the consequences of conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.” (Fleming Affidavit ¶ 13). Dr. Fleming also stated that Jacobs’ “mental retardation, brain damage and other mental health and cognitive impairments significantly diminish[ed] his capacity to premeditate and form a specific intent to kill.” (Id. ¶ 14). According to Dr. Fleming, the facts “support the conclusion that he did not have the capacity to form the specific intent to kill.” (Id.). In Pennsylvania, diminished capacity “is an extremely limited defense, which requires extensive psychiatric testimony establishing a defendant suffered from one or more mental disorders which prevented him from formulating the specific intent to kill.” Cuevas, 832 A.2d at 393. Both Drs. Kessel and Fleming have expressed a willingness to testify that Jacobs suffered from mental disorders that deprived him of the capacity to form the specific intent to kill Tammy Mock. In our view, Jacobs’ case is the specific type in which the diminished capacity defense as to the murder of Tammy Mock is appropriate. Moreover, we are persuaded that if the jury had heard Drs. Kessel and Fleming testify based on their extensive evaluations, there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have found Jacobs guilty of third degree murder, not first degree murder, of Tammy Mock. 8 8 We are aware, as our dissenting colleague notes, that no court heretofore has decided whether Jacobs has satisfied the prejudice prong of Strickland. Both the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and the District Court ruled that trial counsel did not 21 For these reasons, we conclude that Jacobs has demonstrated that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in violation of the Sixth Amendment. Under AEDPA, however, our determination that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court erroneously rejected this claim on the merits does not necessarily entitle Jacobs to federal habeas relief. Rather, AEDPA requires Jacobs to demonstrate that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s rejection of this claim either is contrary to, or involved an objectively unreasonable application of, Strickland. perform deficiently. Thus, neither of those courts was required to decide whether Jacobs suffered prejudice. Even so, the issue of prejudice was properly before each of those courts, as were the affidavits of Drs. Kessel and Fleming supporting Jacobs’ assertion of prejudice. The Commonwealth could have challenged Jacobs’ expert evidence by submitting expert evidence of its own. It appears that the Commonwealth made the strategic choice not to submit such evidence, a choice we do not question. Regardless, because the prejudice determination here is purely a legal one, we need not remand to the District Court to make such a determination in the first instance or to allow the Commonwealth a second opportunity to challenge Jacobs’ expert evidence. We emphasize that Jacobs need not establish his diminished capacity defense conclusively for the purpose of demonstrating a Sixth Amendment violation. Rather, as we have explained, he is required to show only a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different if trial counsel had presented evidence of Jacobs’ mental retardation, organic brain damage, and other mental deficiencies. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 22 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 520-21; Gattis, 278 F.3d at 228. In denying this claim, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not cite Strickland, nor did it apply Strickland’s two-part test. Rather, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court applied the following standard: With respect to claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, Appellant is required to establish that the claim has arguable merit; that trial counsel had no reasonable basis for proceeding as he did; and that the alleged ineffectiveness of counsel so undermined the truthdetermining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place. Jacobs II, 727 A.2d at 547-48 (citing Commonwealth v. Collins, 687 A.2d 1112, 1113 (Pa. 1996)). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court then concluded: Based on the results of the psychiatric evaluation, and given Appellant’s trial testimony, it is clear that trial counsel did investigate and pursue a diminished capacity defense on behalf of Appellant to the best of his ability. Accordingly, as trial counsel had a reasonable basis for proceeding as he did, he cannot be deemed ineffective. Jacobs II, 727 A.2d at 549. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s rejection of this claim is based solely on the finding that counsel had a reasonable basis 23 for deciding not to investigate further. In making this finding, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court placed great weight on the fact that Dr. Davis orally reported that he found no evidence of a major mental illness negating or reducing criminal liability. Apparently, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court disregarded counsel’s failure to provide Dr. Davis with the necessary information to conduct a proper evaluation, as well as several other highly relevant facts known to counsel at the time he decided not to investigate further. In our view, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision, based on a single factor to the exclusion of other relevant factors, involved an unreasonable application of Strickland.9 Strickland teaches that a court deciding any ineffectiveness claim must “determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions [of counsel] were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 (emphasis added). Specifically, in an ineffectiveness claim challenging counsel’s decision not to investigate, Strickland mandates that counsel’s decision “must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances.” Id. at 691. 9 We have previously ruled that Pennsylvania’s test for assessing ineffective assistance of counsel claims is not contrary to Strickland. See Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 204 (3d Cir. 2000). Thus, under § 2254(d)(1), the relevant question here is whether the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision involved an unreasonable application of Strickland. 24 Since Strickland, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the necessity of assessing an ineffectiveness claim in light of all the circumstances. See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 533; Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 478 (2000); Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 384 (1986). We too have underscored the importance of the circumstancespecific inquiry mandated by Strickland. See Lewis v. Johnson, 359 F.3d 646, 659 (3d Cir. 2004); Rompilla v. Horn, 355 F.3d 233, 257 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 27 (2004); Duncan v. Morton, 256 F.3d 189, 201 (3d Cir. 2001); Berryman v. Morton, 100 F.3d 1089, 1101 (3d Cir. 1996); Frey v. Fulcomer, 974 F.2d 348, 358 (3d Cir. 1992). These cases amply demonstrate that an assessment of the reasonableness of counsel’s performance under Strickland requires consideration of all the circumstances. Here, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not adhere to Strickland’s clear mandate. In light of all the relevant facts described above, we are constrained to conclude that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision involved an unreasonable application of Strickland. For these reasons, we conclude that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in violation of the Sixth Amendment at the guilt phase by failing to investigate and present evidence showing that Jacobs suffered from mental retardation, organic brain damage, and other emotional and mental impairments that prevented him from forming the specific intent to kill Tammy Mock. We further conclude that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s rejection of this claim on the merits involved an unreasonable application of Strickland. Accordingly, we will reverse the District Court’s decision denying federal habeas relief on this claim, and will remand with instructions to grant 25 the writ.10 While our decision invalidates Jacobs’ conviction for the first degree murder of Tammy Mock, the question remains whether counsel’s ineffectiveness also invalidates Jacobs’ conviction for murdering Holly. As noted previously, the diminished capacity defense requires a defendant to admit general culpability. See Commonwealth v. Legg, 711 A.2d 430, 433 (Pa. 1998). Because Jacobs denied killing Holly, the 10 Our decision is not influenced by Jacobs’ argument that the District Court’s decision denying habeas relief based on counsel’s conduct during the guilt phase is inconsistent with its grant of relief on his claim of ineffective assistance during the penalty phase. During the guilt phase, the defendant must establish that he “suffered from one or more mental disorders which prevented him from formulating the specific intent to kill.” See Cuevas, 832 A.2d at 393. Diminished capacity evidence at the guilt phase is limited to expert psychiatric testimony demonstrating that the defendant was unable to form the specific intent to kill. See McCullum, 738 A.2d at 1010. The jury’s function during the sentencing phase is to weigh mitigating factors against aggravating factors. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9711(c). At sentencing, the jury must consider “evidence of mitigation concerning the character and record of the defendant and the circumstances of his offense” and must weigh mitigating factors against aggravating factors. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 9711(c), (e)(8). In short, counsel’s duties at the guilt phase and his duties at the sentencing phase differ significantly. 26 diminished capacity defense was unavailable as to the baby’s murder. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 815 A.2d 563, 578 (Pa. 2002). That is because, as Jacobs acknowledges, a diminished capacity defense is inconsistent with an assertion of innocence.11 See Commonwealth v. Williams, 846 A.2d 105, 111 (Pa. 2004). Nonetheless, Jacobs argues that a diminished capacity defense to the murder of Holly would not be inconsistent in his case. Jacobs cites Legg for the proposition that “a diminished capacity defense is available where the defendant admits to facts which may cause a jury to hold him responsible for the killing to some degree.” (Appellant’s Supplemental Mem. at 2). Jacobs argues that because his trial counsel conceded in closing argument that Holly’s death could have been accidental and that the jury could have found Jacobs criminally responsible for her death, a diminished capacity defense would not have been inconsistent with his testimony that he did not kill Holly. To the extent that Jacobs argues that his case is similar to 11 See Appellant’s Supplemental M em. at 2. After oral argument, Jacobs’ counsel requested permission to file a supplemental memorandum addressing whether counsel’s ineffectiveness undermined Jacobs’ conviction for murdering Holly. The Commonwealth in turn requested permission to file a supplemental memorandum responding to Jacobs’ supplemental memorandum. We granted these requests and have considered the parties’ supplemental memoranda in rendering our decision. 27 Legg, we disagree. There, Betty Legg was convicted of the first degree murder of her husband and was sentenced to life in prison. Legg, 711 A.2d at 432. Legg expressly admitted that she shot and killed her husband but maintained that the shooting was accidental. Id. at 435. Counsel did not present evidence of Legg’s diminished capacity. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that a diminished capacity defense would not have conflicted with Legg’s position that the shooting was accidental, and ruled that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to present such evidence. Id. at 435. Here, Jacobs has consistently denied killing Holly and in fact blamed her death on Tammy. Under Pennsylvania law, a diminished capacity defense was simply unavailable as to Holly’s death because Jacobs maintained his innocence. We find nothing in Legg suggesting otherwise. In fact, Legg distinguishes Betty Legg’s situation from others in which the defendants maintained their innocence. See id. at 434-35 (distinguishing Commonwealth v. Cross, 634 A.2d 173 (Pa. 1993), and Commonwealth v. Mizell, 425 A.2d 424 (Pa. 1981)). Because the sole issue at trial was Betty Legg’s mental state at the time of the shooting, not whether she killed her husband, Legg’s counsel should have raised a diminished capacity defense to negate the specific intent to kill. See Legg, 711 A.2d at 435. Moreover, we do not read defense counsel’s closing argument as a concession that Jacobs could be criminally responsible for Holly’s death. Rather, defense counsel acknowledged that there was no direct evidence that Tammy Mock murdered Holly and stated that “we don’t know” how 28 Holly drowned. (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, 9/17/92 at 735:9-736:4). Regardless, counsel emphasized, Jacobs was “most sure” that he did not hurt Holly in any way and believed that Tammy Mock killed Holly. (Id. at 736:5-736:12, 739:1-739:4). Counsel concluded his closing argument by reminding the jury that Jacobs admitted causing Tammy Mock’s death but denied causing Holly’s death. (Id. at 745:20-746:4). Jacobs argues alternatively that counsel’s ineffective assistance invalidates his conviction for murdering Holly because expert testimony regarding his mental disorders and defects would have corroborated his testimony that he lashed out in a rage after finding Holly dead in the bathtub. This, he believes, would have supported his testimony that he did not kill Holly. Whether the evidence would have supported his version of the facts, however, is not the relevant inquiry. We must examine his argument in light of his specific claim that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to present such evidence. Under Strickland, we must determine whether there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different if the jury had heard expert testimony regarding his mental disorders. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. In light of Delois’ two statements that Jacobs admitted killing Holly, we cannot find a reasonable probability that the jury would have acquitted Jacobs of Holly’s murder if the jury had heard expert testimony regarding his mental disorders. For these reasons, we will reverse the District Court’s decision denying federal habeas relief as to Jacobs’ claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the guilt phase in failing to investigate and present evidence of mental disorders, but only as 29 to Jacobs’ conviction for the first degree murder of Tammy Mock. We will remand to the District Court with instructions to grant the writ conditioned upon the Commonwealth providing Jacobs a new trial on the charge of murdering Tammy Mock.