Opinion ID: 1946175
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Motion to Dismiss Juror

Text: In his next claim, Weiss argues that the trial court committed reversible error in failing to excuse Juror No. 3 (David Thorton), after it came to light that this juror had a sister who had been murdered thirty years previously. The following discussion occurred in chambers after the trial court became aware of an issue that had arisen regarding this particular juror. THE COURT: Hi, Mr. Thorton. Have a seat there. Don't be afraid of all these people present. I'm just going to ask you a couple of questions. You were the juror who came in late and missed part of the voir dire that happened when I had all the jurors together. MR. THORTON: Correct. THE COURT: And among other questions, I would have asked orwould have askedor I did ask you was has any member of your family been the victim of a serious crime. And what would your answer be to that? MR. THORTON: No. THE COURT: No? Did you talk to a deputy last night? MR. THORTON: Yes, I did. Well, see, what I told him, like see I had a sister that got stabbed to death about 30 years ago. THE COURT: Okay. All right. That would be the victim of a serious crime. MR. THORTON: Okay. THE COURT: Okay. My next question is the fact that somethingthat something has happened like that, do you feel that would make it impossible for you to render a fair and impartial verdict MR. THORTON: No I don't. THE COURT:in this case? MR. THORTON: It was just one of those things, I mean like I didn't think it would botherIt was just one of those little things, but it would not THE COURT: It wouldn't affect your ability to renderlisten to and weigh the evidence and make a verdict you think is correct? MR. THORTON: Correct. THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thanks a lot. Okay. You can go back upstairs. MR. THORTON: Okay. (Mr. Thorton excused.) THE COURT: All right. I'm going to permit him [to] stay on here. Notes of Testimony (N.T.) 7/9/97, pp. 600-01. Weiss argues to this Court that Juror No. 3 should have been excused for cause. It is well established that: The test for determining whether a prospective juror should be disqualified is whether he is willing and able to eliminate the influence of any scruples and render a verdict according to the evidence, and this is to be determined on the basis of answers to questions and demeanor.... It must be determined whether any biases or prejudices can be put aside on proper instruction of the court.... A challenge for cause should be granted when the prospective juror has such a close relationship, familial, financial, or situational, with the parties, counsel, victims, or witnesses that the court will presume a likelihood of prejudice or demonstrates a likelihood of prejudice by his or her conduct or answers to questions.... The decision on whether to disqualify is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed in the absence of a palpable abuse of discretion .... Commonwealth v. Wilson, 543 Pa. 429, 672 A.2d 293, 299 (1996) (emphasis added), (quoting Commonwealth v. Colson, 507 Pa. 440, 490 A.2d 811, 818 (1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140, 106 S.Ct. 2245, 90 L.Ed.2d 692 (1986)). The trial court, in its opinion denying the post-trial motions of Weiss, addressed the issue of disqualifying this juror and stated that it had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the juror and finds no new reasoning that convinces it that the juror was not forthcoming in his answers and responses that indicated he could render an impartial verdict. Trial court opinion at 5. It was the trial court that observed the juror's demeanor and heard his responses; it was, therefore, the trial court that was in the best position to assess the credibility of the juror's statements that he could be fair. Commonwealth v. Wilson, 672 A.2d at 300. Further, the court may properly refuse to excuse a juror for cause when the trial judge believes that the juror would be fair and impartial. Commonwealth v. Chambers, 546 Pa. at 392, 685 A.2d at 107 (1996). Such was the case in the instant matter. Accordingly, we find no palpable abuse of discretion in the trial court's refusal to disqualify this juror, and Weiss is entitled to no relief on this allegation of error. [6]