Opinion ID: 1270103
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Did appellant establish selective prosecution?

Text: Appellant argues it has been selectively prosecuted by law enforcement and is entitled to discovery to prove this claim. We disagree. Courts look suspiciously on selective prosecution claims because they ask[] the court to exercise judicial power over a `special province' of the Executive. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 116 S.Ct. 1480, 134 L.Ed.2d 687 (1996) (citations omitted). Because of this balance of powers concern, a presumption of regularity supports prosecutorial decisions and, in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, courts presume that they have properly discharged their official duties. Id. at 464, 116 S.Ct. 1480 (quoting United States v. Chemical Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 47 S.Ct. 1, 71 L.Ed. 131 (1926)). To establish selective prosecution, a defendant must satisfy a two-prong test. First, a defendant must show he has been singled out for prosecution while others similarly situated have not been prosecuted for conduct similar to that for which he was prosecuted. United States v. Catlett, 584 F.2d 864 (8th Cir.1978). Second, the defendant must demonstrate that the government's discriminatory selection of him for prosecution was based upon an impermissible ground, such as race, religion or his exercise of his first amendment right to free speech. Id. at 865. See also Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465, 116 S.Ct. 1480 (The requirements for a selective-prosecution claim draw on `ordinary equal protection standards.' The claimant must demonstrate that the federal prosecutorial policy `had a discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose.') (citations omitted). Appellant claims it has been singled out by prosecutors in retaliation for its owner's public statements criticizing the Attorney General. The circuit court was correct in finding appellant did not present evidence to support a claim of selective prosecution. In the first place appellant is not being criminally prosecuted. It is merely being required to forfeit the illegal contraband in its possession. Moreover, even if this action can be interpreted to be analogous to a criminal prosecution, such that the same constitutional rights attach, appellant has not met the first prong of the selective prosecution test. That is, appellant has not alleged there are others engaging in similar conduct who have not been prosecuted. Appellant asserts only that certain members of the media are violating a state law forbidding the advertising of gambling. Appellant does not claim these media outlets are keeping illegal gambling machines on their premises in violation of § 12-21-2710. [4] Appellant further argues that the only reason it has been unable to prove the second prong of his selective prosecution claim, impermissible motive, is that it was denied discovery. The judge properly denied appellant's request for discovery when appellant was unable to make out even the barest showing on the first prong of the test. In United States v. Catlett, 584 F.2d 864 (8th Cir.1978), cited by appellant, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held the district court properly denied discovery on a selective prosecution claim when the defendant was unable to produce some evidence tending to show the existence of the essential elements of the defense and that the documents in the government's possession would indeed be probative of these elements. Id. at 865. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 116 S.Ct. 1480, 134 L.Ed.2d 687 (1996), gives an example of insufficient evidence: In the case before us, respondents'study did not constitute some evidence tending to show the existence of the essential elements of a selective-prosecution claim. The study failed to identify individuals who were not black and could have been prosecuted for the offenses for which respondents were charged, but were not so prosecuted. This omission was not remedied by respondents' evidence in opposition to the Government's motion for reconsideration. The newspaper article, which discussed the discriminatory effect of federal drug sentencing laws, was not relevant to an allegation of discrimination in decisions to prosecute. Respondents' affidavits, which recounted one attorney's conversation with a drug treatment center employee and the experience of another attorney defending drug prosecutions in state court, recounted hearsay and reported personal conclusions based on anecdotal evidence. (internal citations omitted). The evidence offered by appellant here is, if anything, less persuasive than that proffered in Armstrong. Appellant includes in the record numerous newspaper articles regarding this case and its owner's statements criticizing the Attorney General, as well as newspaper advertisements for Harrah's casino. None of this evidence demonstrates the proof required of appellant to make out even the first prong of a selective prosecution claim, that is, that others who could have been prosecuted for the same offenses were not. See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465, 116 S.Ct. 1480. [A] mere allegation of selective prosecution by the defendant does not require the government to disclose the contents of its files. Catlett, 584 F.2d at 865.