Opinion ID: 1390030
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Blue Shirt

Text: Petitioner alleges a Brady violation occurred when the prosecution failed to disclose to the defense that Laurel Epler reported finding a blue shirt possibly with blood on it on Peyton Drive on the afternoon of June 6, 1983. Petitioner is incorrect. The dispatch log referencing the report of a blue shirt was disclosed to the defense before trial. ( See IV RT 6.) If Petitioner's counsel at trial was on notice as to the possible existence of material evidence and did not raise that at trial, there is a lack of diligence in raising a Brady violation. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 435, 120 S.Ct. 1479. In this instance, defense counsel was on notice of the possible existence of the blue shirt. The state court trial record documents that defense trial counsel received the daily logs from the San Bernardino Sheriff's Department, which contains the reference to a blue shirt with possible blood being reported on June 6, 1983, on Peyton Drive, by Laurel Epler at 2:41 p.m., in August of 1983. ( See I CT 75-75; III (8/12/83) RT 14-15, 19; IV (9/2/83) RT 6.) Petitioner's counsel represented to the Court that he received the daily logs; the record confirms his statement. (IV RT 6.) On January 16, 1984, an amended [49] attachment to the subpoena duces tecum for materials including the complete daily logs, dispatch records, tape recordings of dispatch or communications made from June 2, 1983, to July 31, 1983, by the Sheriffs or any deputy of the SBSO concerning the investigation and search for suspects in the deaths occurring at 2943 English Road, Chino, on June 4 or 5, 1983, DR XXXXXXX-XX, and the escape and attempt to apprehend David Trautman, aka: Kevin Cooper, from CIM on June 2, 1983. (I CT 75-76.) Defense trial counsel Negus' declaration regarding items of discovery stated: The logs, dispatch records, and tape recordings include actions of officers which may not be memorialized in reports. The actions are relevant to the integrity of physical evidence, other suspects to the crime, and the issue of flight. (I CT 90.) On September 2, 1983, defense trial counsel Negus stated: I can indicate to the court that with respect to the four items in the amended subpoena [ see I CT 7576], that with respect to Item 1 [complete daily logs, dispatch records, tape recordings of dispatch or communications made from June 2, 1983, to July 31, 1983], all items except the tapes that were requested have been received. Mr. Kochis and I have agreed that the tapes will be held by the sheriff's office until such time as we can agree on what part of those tapes will be needed to be recorded for trial. If we cannot agree, then we will be coming back to the court at some future time, but mainly the tapes will be preserved until we can work that out. (IV RT 6.) The trial prosecutor confirmed the accuracy of Mr. Negus' representations to the trial court. (IV RT 6.) Moreover, it is clear that defense trial counsel appreciated the relevance of the information as it related to the integrity of physical evidence and other suspects to the crime at the time he sought the daily logs and dispatch information. ( See I CT 75-76.) John Kochis, one of the prosecuting attorneys in the Petitioner trial, testified at the evidentiary hearing that discovery and documents related to the dispatch records were provided to Petitioner's defense at trial by way of a subpoena duces tecum. (8/13/04 HRT 183-84.) Mr. Kochis testified that the San Bernardino Sheriff's daily logs from June 4-6, 1983 (Resp't Evidentiary Hr'g Ex. MMMM-PPPP), as well as the documents pertaining to the burglary of the Ryen chiropractic business in 1983 (Resp't Evidentiary Hr'g Ex. UUUU), were turned over to Petitioner's defense team at trial. (8/13/04 HRT 182-84.) Petitioner represented to the trial court that he had a copy of the daily log prior to trial. ( See I CT 75-75; III (8/12/83) RT 14-15, 19; IV (9/2/83) RT 6.) Because Petitioner represented to the trial judge that he had the daily logs, the Court relies on his representation made on the record to the court at that time. As an attorney, trial counsel has a professional obligation to be truthful to the Court. Rule of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of California 5-200. Petitioner had the daily logs referencing the report of a blue shirt and the collection of that evidence was disclosed to the defense before trial. [50] Petitioner has not presented a viable Brady claim, or any other constitutional violation warranting habeas relief. The fact that Petitioner claims that trial counsel has no recollection of a blue shirt twenty-two years later is not surprising. Laurel Epler had no recollection of a blue shirt when she was interviewed about the shirt. ( See 04-CV-656, NOL filed Aug. 18, 2004, Doc. No. 187 at 5, 12-13 and 20.) Ms. Epler was contacted on August 3, 2004 about the shirt. In the recorded statement, Ms. Epler stated that she does not remember calling law enforcement regarding the shirt, she does not recall the color of the shirt, and she does not remember where the shirt was found. (04-CV-656, NOL filed August 18, 2004, Doc. No. 187 at 5, 12-13, and 20.) Ms. Epler testified before this Court that her statements at that interview were true and correct and were to the best of her best recollection. (8/26/04 HRT 124.) At the evidentiary hearing, Ms. Epler testified that she vaguely remembers finding the blue shirt when she was driving home. (8/26/04 HRT 133-34.) She testified that she could not recall exactly where the shirt was found and that she could not recall driving and seeing the shirt on the side of the road, although she believes that it must have been close to Peyton and Glenridge because that is where she regularly drove her car. (8/26/04 HRT 133-34.) She also testified that her memory of the shirt was very vague and it was only after referencing the log that mentioned the blue shirt and speaking to Petitioner's defense investigators that she recalled anything about the shirt. (8/26/04 HRT 123-24, 149.) Finally, Ms. Epler testified that she had been influenced by letters shown to her by Petitioner's attorneys regarding alleged suppression of evidence and law enforcement cover-ups in this case. (8/26/04 HRT 179-80.) She stated that she did not think Petitioner committed the murders after reading the materials sent to her by Petitioner's attorneys. (8/26/04 HRT 179-80.) Due to Ms. Epler's previous statements where she did not recall the T-shirt, its color, or the location or time it was found and given the passage of many years and failure of recollection, the Court questions whether Ms. Epler actually recalls a blue shirt. Notwithstanding, the daily logs referencing the call placed to the Sheriff's Office regarding the shirt were turned over to the defense counsel at trial and therefore are not a proper basis for a habeas claim. Respondent contends that the report of a blue shirt found on Peyton Drive listed on the Sheriff's daily log of June 6, 1983, is actually the tan T-shirt at issue in this case (Trial Ex. 169). According to Mr. Kochis, none of the documents logging the evidence at the San Bernardino Crime Lab show a blue shirt. (8/13/04 RT 198-201.) Rather, those documents only reflect the receipt of the T-shirt introduced at trial by the defense (Trial Ex. 169). (8/13/04 RT 198-201.) Moreover, Deputy Fields, now deceased, is the officer listed on the daily logs as picking up the blue shirt on Peyton Drive after Laurel Epler reported the shirt to the San Bernardino Sheriff's Office on June 6, 1983.(Resp't Evidentiary Hr'g, Ex. OOOO, at 9; 04-CV-656, Doc. No. 143.) Mr. Kochis testified that the only shirt Deputy Fields turned over to the crime lab was the T-shirt in this case (Trial Ex. 169). (8/13/04 RT 199-200.) The existence of the tan shirt is not in dispute. In fact, photographs of the tan T-shirt were taken at the time it was picked near the side of the road on Peyton Drive. (Resp't Evidentiary Hr'g, Ex. CCCCC-1 through CCCCC-5.) Petitioner argues that the tan shirt was picked up by Detective Fields on June 7, 1983, the day after the blue shirt was picked. The daily log of June 7, 1983 has no entry regarding a tan shirt. ( See NOL filed May 5, 2005 of Daily Log of June 7, 1983 for In Camera Review.) Although Detective Fields' report, dated June 10, 1983, states he picked up the tan shirt on June 7, 1983, he may have meant June 6, 1983. In any event, the tan shirt that was picked up by Detective Fields and photographed was collected and tagged with Property Tag No. A-58046 and stored in the Sheriff's evidence locker. (Traverse, Ex. 160.) At trial, Detective Fields identified the tan shirt (Trial Exhibit 169) as the T-shirt he recovered on the side of the road. (101 RT 6511.) Therefore, the blue shirt reported on June 6, 1983 is most likely the tan T-shirt (Tr. Exhibit 169) at issue in this case as testified by Mr. Kochis. (8/13/04 HRT 198-201.) Even if there were a blue shirt, there is no showing of a material Brady violation. Petitioner's blood and the victims' blood were on the tan shirt. Detective Fields, the officer who was dispatched to pick up the blue shirt, is now deceased, (04CV-656, Doc. No. 143), and Sergeant Billy Arthur, his supervisor in homicide is also deceased. (4/22/05 HRT 22.) Any further investigation would be of limited value as the two main individuals that would have any significant knowledge regarding the blue shirt are deceased, and there has been no showing of bad faith in light of the fact that defense counsel represented to the Court that he had received the daily logs. In evaluating the merits of Petitioner's claim, this Court accords deference to the California Supreme Court decision denying Petitioner's claim on the merits. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The state court's denial of Petitioner's claim on the merits is not contrary to clearly established federal law, and does not rest on an unreasonable determination of the facts within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This Court also denies this claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) because Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the facts underlying his claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for the constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have found him guilty of the Ryen/Hughes murders. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). Petitioner's guilt was demonstrated by overwhelming evidence at trial, and has been reaffirmed through post-conviction DNA testing.