Opinion ID: 815314
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Since-Vacated State Conviction

Text: During the pendency of this appeal, Mr. Tavares’s Massachusetts criminal conviction, which was given a score of three in the PSR, was reversed and its verdict set aside. See Commonwealth v. Tavares, 959 N.E.2d 449, 451-52 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011). According to the PSR, Mr. Tavares’s criminal history category was VI; had this conviction not been counted, it would have been V. He contends that the inclusion of this since-vacated state conviction in his guidelines sentencing range calculation requires resentencing. As we have noted earlier, Mr. Tavares’s sentence was not imposed as a result of his guidelines sentencing range calculation; his criminal history category did not affect the district court’s of the sentencing hearing does not reflect that the district court addressed the Guidelines range at all.” “The applicable Guidelines range was not discussed during the hearing by either attorney or by the judge,” so the court found it “impossible to determine with certainty what sentencing range the district court relied on, and whether the district court meant to impose a sentence within or above that range.” Id.; see also United States v. Novales, 589 F.3d 310, 314 (6th Cir. 2009) (remanding for resentencing where “the district court never mentioned any specific, numeric Guidelines range at any point during the [sentencing] hearing”). -44- sentencing. Because failing to determine Mr. Tavares’s guidelines sentencing range is harmless error, any error in calculating the guidelines sentencing range, such as improperly including a prior conviction, is harmless. We have recognized that, in some cases, an erroneous calculation or designation “can be influential even if not treated as controlling.” United States v. McGhee, 651 F.3d 153, 159 (1st Cir. 2011). In McGhee, the district court had classified the defendant as a career offender under the Guidelines but the case on which it relied to do so subsequently was overruled. We therefore were required to “treat that [designation] retrospectively as error.” Id. at 158. Moreover, in explaining the defendant’s sentence, the district court made ambiguous remarks concerning its rationale for the sentence’s length. As a result, we held that “we think the transcript is less clear than it was in Teague that the career offender designation was entirely irrelevant.” Id. at 159. In Teague, we concluded that the district court had made clear that its erroneous designation of the defendant as a career offender had not mattered to its sentencing--only the circumstances of prior crimes and the defendant’s role in the crime of conviction had been considered. 469 F.3d at 209. Therefore no remand was required. Id. at 209-10. This case is not like McGhee. We do not believe that the record supports the view that the district court was influenced -45- materially by the inclusion of Mr. Tavares’s since-vacated conviction in his PSR. On the contrary, the record indicates that the district court considered only Mr. Tavares’s crimes of conviction in imposing his sentence, not his since-vacated conviction. After initially stating its chosen sentence, the district court explained its rationale: I believe that this is a crime that can be deterred because it’s the lifestyle choice, and if the cost of this lifestyle is 30 years in prison, then it seems to me that others will pause. I’m going to accept the government’s recommendation because I sat through the testimony of women that was about the most disturbing testimony that I’ve heard since I’ve been on the bench.[38] The court repeatedly connected trial testimony39 and Mr. Tavares’s victims40 in his crimes of conviction to his sentence of 300 months. Mr. Tavares’s since-vacated conviction was not mentioned by the district court and there is no evidence in the record that the district court was in any way relying on, or influenced by, this conviction or the PSR’s guidelines sentencing range calculation which included it. As we have noted earlier, the district court 38 R.308 at 43. 39 Id. 40 Id. at 45. -46- did not view Mr. Tavares’s criminal history as operative in the determination of the sentence. It made clear that it would have imposed the same sentence had Mr. Tavares’s criminal history category been V; its focus was the nature and the circumstances of the crimes of conviction. See Teague, 469 F.3d at 209-10 (affirming the defendant’s sentence where the district court erroneously believed that the defendant was a career offender under the Guidelines and then used its discretion to depart downward from the guidelines sentencing range after considering the defendant’s role in the crime of conviction). We therefore conclude that the inclusion of Mr. Tavares’s since-vacated conviction in his PSR was harmless error.