Opinion ID: 1870470
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Furnishings, and Automobile

Text: The parties own the marital home and one-half (1/2) acre of land as joint tenants by the entirety. This property is subject to a deed of trust held by Farmers Home Administration. In January of 1988 Lucille left the marital home in Jasper County because of her husband's acts of cruelty. John moved back into the home after Lucille moved out. Lucille does not own an automobile and was spending $60.00 a month for transportation expenses. This factor, as do most of the other factors, belongs on Lucille's side of the slate. A Brabham analysis clearly favors Lucille, the nonoffending spouse who was granted the divorce because of John's wrongdoing. The facts demonstrate she has been left in need. The chancellor found that Lucille had made monetary contributions to the marriage during the time the parties were together. Under the facts of this case, we think the chancellor abused his discretion and was manifestly wrong in denying periodic alimony. As to reasonable needs, [t]he wife is entitled to a support corresponding to her rank and condition in life, and the estate of her husband. Jenkins v. Jenkins, 278 So.2d 446, 449-50 (Miss. 1973). Lucille did not request an exaggerated amount of alimony. The judgment of the lower court denying the defendant any award of periodic alimony is reversed and the case is remanded with directions to award Lucille Gammage periodic alimony in the amount of Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00) per month, retroactive from September 7, 1990, the date of the final decree.
Lucille contends the chancellor erred in failing to order division of the marital home. Among the relief sought by Lucille in her counterclaim for divorce was an order by the chancellor directing John Gammage to purchase, at fair market value, Lucille's equitable interest in the marital home. Relying largely upon Johnson v. Johnson, 550 So.2d 416 (Miss. 1989), she now asks this Court to enter an order directing the chancellor to partition the one-half (1/2) acre of land upon which the marital home is situated and further directing that the proceeds from a partition sale be divided equally among both parties. Lucille, in effect, seeks from this court lump sum alimony in an amount representing one-half (1/2) the value of the marital home. In his bench ruling issued on March 13, 1990, the chancellor opined: Both of these parties own a home which has a substantial equity; and, being jointly owned and neither party being given paramount right, it should be partied and sold, at which point they would both reap quite a substantial sum of money. Under the unique and singular facts of this case, we cannot say the chancellor was manifestly wrong in deciding against granting unto either party the paramount right to the marital home and the one-half (1/2) acre of real property. While the chancellor, by virtue of Johnson, supra, may have had the authority to order a partition and sale of the home and the one-half (1/2) acre and to order equal distribution of the proceeds, his failure to do so in this case cannot be said to have been manifestly wrong. This is especially true where, as here, the issue of permanent custody of the minor child had not been resolved at the time of final judgment; rather, the chancellor succinctly indicated in his judgment of divorce this issue would be fully addressed at a later date. In the meantime, temporary custody of the child would remain with the Jasper County Welfare Department pending the conduct by the department of home studies and the child's educational needs. Thus, the chancellor made it perfectly clear that placement of permanent custody with either of the two parents remained a viable option.
This issue involves the awarding of attorney's fees in domestic relation cases to salaried attorneys employed by East Mississippi Legal Services. According to Lucille there is no legal impediment prohibiting the awarding of attorney's fees to Legal Services. We need not address the question of whether or not legal services attorneys are entitled to attorney's fees in a domestic relation case because the proof, in any event, was defective. Lucille requested in her counterclaim that John be ordered to pay a reasonable attorney fee. She was represented in the divorce proceedings by East Mississippi Legal Services. Her lawyer acknowledges in her brief, and he also acknowledged during trial, that Lucille has not paid any legal fees and has not been charged any fees. There is very little, if anything at all, contained in the official record concerning the identity and status of East Mississippi Legal Services Corporation or the purpose of its existence. The record itself is devoid of matters concerning its financial guidelines, litigation costs, fees, salaried employees, and other policies and procedures. All of this information is attached to Lucille's appellate brief in the form of Appendix I through Appendix IV, upon which trial counsel strongly relies to support his claim for attorney's fees. Regrettably, these papers cannot be considered here. Saucier v. State, 328 So.2d 355, 357 (Miss. 1976). See also Shelton v. Kindred, 279 So.2d 642, 644 (Miss. 1973); Wortham v. State, 219 So.2d 923, 926-27 (Miss. 1969) [affidavit contained in appellant's brief could not be considered]. By virtue of the individual facts found in this case, we are satisfied the chancellor's denial of attorney's fees to Lucille and to East Mississippi Legal Services was neither manifestly wrong nor an abuse of judicial discretion. This Court is persuaded, on the other hand, the denial of periodic or continuing alimony was manifestly wrong. Accordingly, the cause is reversed on the issue of periodic alimony and remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART WITH DIRECTIONS TO AWARD LUCILLE J. GAMMAGE TWO HUNDRED DOLLARS ($200.00) PER MONTH PERIODIC ALIMONY, RETROACTIVE FROM SEPTEMBER 7, 1990. ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., and PRATHER, ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN, PITTMAN, BANKS and McRAE, JJ., concur. DAN M. LEE, P.J., dissents without written opinion.