Opinion ID: 1706950
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: the sentencing phase issue

Text: ¶ 64. At trial, Bell objected to sentencing instruction S-1, which listed those aggravating circumstances the jury could consider, on the grounds that the Tennessee incident occurred subsequent, not prior, to the murder of Bert, arguing that such an offense, in order to be an aggravating circumstance, must occur prior not only to the trial but also to the commission of the charged crime. He now abandons that objection and argues eight different flaws in this instruction, none of which were asserted at trial. For that reason, all of those claims of defect are waived and procedurally barred. Carr, 655 So.2d at 856 (applying the procedural bar to claims of error in sentencing instructions on aggravating circumstances); Conner, 632 So.2d at 1255 (holding that an objection on one or more grounds waives objections on other grounds not presented to the trial court). Nevertheless, as to these newly-raised objections we observe the following.
¶ 65. One of the elements of aggravation presented to the jury was whether defendant, Frederick Bell, was previously convicted of another capital offense or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person. Bell argues that the State presented evidence showing that Bell had, in Tennessee, been indicted for first degree murder but convicted of second degree murder. The certificate which accompanied the indictment (which was not admitted into evidence) made reference to the charge in the indictment of murder in the first degree. Second degree murder is not a capital offense in Tennessee. Therefore, the reference in the instruction to another capital offense as an aggravator is, Bell argues, fatal to the instruction as a whole. He asserts that both state and federal law prevent this Court from performing reweighing or harmless error analysis where an aggravating circumstance is invalid. Wilcher v. State, 635 So.2d 789, 790-91 (Miss.1993). It is certainly true that we did in Wilcher hold that we will not and cannot apply harmless error analysis to aggravating factors. ¶ 66. The instruction, using the phrasing of the statute, Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-101(5)(b), stated the alternatives under this aggravator disjunctively: convicted of another capital offense or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence. (Emphasis added). This disjunctive language does not render the aggravator invalid. While it would have been better form, and one that we commend to trial courts, to choose one or the other (conviction of a capital offense or of a felony involving violence) for its aggravator, there was sufficient evidence that Bell had been convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person. Capital murder was never argued by the State or brought up in any way and only found on a rather insignificant piece of evidence. Thus, Bell's argument that some of the jury may have been thinking capital murder was the aggravator fails. It simply is not strong enough in the face of the State's submission of the judgment of conviction for second degree murder and closing argument. ¶ 67. The argument is not unlike that of the defendant in Shell v. State, 554 So.2d 887 (Miss.1989), claiming that the disjunctive presentation of the heinous, atrocious or cruel aggravator made it impossible to know whether some of the jury found the murder heinous, some atrocious, and some cruel. There, as here, the jury founded the death penalty on multiple aggravating circumstances, including the fact the killing occurred in the commission of a robbery. ¶ 68. The Court stated: [o]nly one crimethe murder of Mrs. Johnson while in the commission of a robberywas considered by the jury. The list of aggravating circumstances applies only to this one crime. The issue for the jury to determine was whether the aggravating circumstances as a whole applied to the murder of Mrs. Johnson, a question they answered in the affirmative. Furthermore, the jury found two aggravating circumstances overall, that the murder was committed during the course of a robbery, and that the murder was heinous, atrocious, or cruel. Even should this Court find that the aggravating circumstance challenged here is invalid, the remaining circumstance is sufficient to uphold the death sentence. Shell, 554 So.2d at 906. ¶ 69. Bell's jury additionally found that the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding lawful arrest. We find no error here, harmless or otherwise.