Opinion ID: 782370
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Merits of the Case: Gender Discrimination on the Basis of Pregnancy

Text: 23 Even if NCS had preserved its right to appeal the jury's verdict on the hostile work environment claim, the facts of the case support Walsh's claim that she was a member of a protected class and was discriminated against on the basis of her pregnancy. Congress amended Title VII to incorporate pregnancy discrimination within the purview of Title VII's protection against gender discrimination. The amended statute provides in part: 24 [t]he terms because of sex or on the basis of sex include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as others persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work, and nothing in section 2000e-2(h) of this title shall be interpreted to permit otherwise. 25 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). NCS argues that Walsh is alleging parent or caretaker discrimination, which is not proscribed by Title VII. See Piantanida v. Wyman Ctr., Inc., 116 F.3d 340, 342 (8th Cir.1997) (holding that childcare is not gender specific in the way that pregnancy and childbearing are, and that any discrimination experienced on the basis of a parent's decision to care for a child is not actionable because parenthood is not a protected class). Walsh asserts that she was discriminated against not because she was a new parent, but because she is a woman who had been pregnant, had taken a maternity leave, and might become pregnant again. Potential pregnancy ... is a medical condition that is sex-related because only women can become pregnant. Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 680 (8th Cir.1996). Because Walsh presented evidence that it was her potential to become pregnant in the future that served as a catalyst for Mickelson's discriminatory behavior, we will not disturb the jury verdict. 26 Once Walsh returned to work from her maternity leave, Mickelson made several discriminatory remarks to her. During a discussion about Walsh's co-worker's pregnancy, Mickelson sarcastically commented to Walsh, I suppose you'll be next. On another day, Walsh took a half-day vacation to go on a boat trip with her husband. After she returned, Mickelson stated, [w]ell, I suppose now we'll have another little Garrett 5 running around. On April 23, 1998, Walsh fainted at work and had to go to the hospital. The following day Mickelson stopped by Walsh's cubicle and said, You better not be pregnant again! Furthermore, when Walsh was pregnant, Mickelson asked Walsh for advanced notification and documentation of her doctor appointments, while other account representatives were not required to provide the same information concerning their appointments. Mickelson's comments, combined with the conduct detailed above in Section I of this opinion, provide ample support for the jury's finding that Walsh was discriminated against on the basis of her pregnancy. 6