Opinion ID: 1215982
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: aggravating circumstances in the penalty phase

Text: Defendant claims that section 76-3-207 is unconstitutional because it fails to limit the aggravating circumstances which may be relied upon by juries in imposing the death penalty. Subsection (2) of that statute states: In these sentencing proceedings, evidence may be presented as to any matter the court deems relevant to sentence, including but not limited to the nature and circumstances of the crime, the defendant's character, background, history, mental and physical condition, and any other facts in aggravation or mitigation of the penalty. Any evidence the court deems to have probative force may be received regardless of its admissibility under the exclusionary rules of evidence... . Aggravating circumstances shall include those as outlined in 76-5-202. Defendant's challenge herein is specifically directed only at the introduction of evidence in the penalty phase regarding his past criminal convictions. He relies on the theory that such evidence may only be properly used by the State in rebuttal when a defendant relies upon and asserts the statutory mitigating circumstance that he has no significant history of prior criminal activity. [102] That theory is erroneous. [103] Furthermore, evidence of past criminal convictions is clearly within the scope of the statutory reference to the defendant's character, background, [and] history. Thus, the evidence to which defendant objects was specifically authorized by the statute and did not fall within the category of any other facts in aggravation, which language defendant claims is constitutionally infirm. Therefore, because the evidence admitted related to a specific statutory category and because it was properly admitted, we need not reach the question of constitutional infirmity. [104]