Opinion ID: 6108257
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: mr. ajak's arrest was effected before his resistance began

Text: Mr. Ajak was charged and found guilty of misdemeanor resisting arrest under section 575.150, which provides: 1. A person commits the crime of resisting or interfering with arrest, detention, or stop if, knowing that a law enforcement officer is making an arrest , or attempting to lawfully detain or stop an individual or vehicle, ... for the purpose of preventing the officer from effecting the arrest , stop or detention, the person: (1) Resists the arrest , stop or detention of such person by using or threatening the use of violence or physical force or by fleeing from such officer;  (Emphasis added). 3 To prove resisting arrest, the statute requires proof of three elements: (1) knowledge that the law enforcement officer is making an arrest; (2) purpose on the part of the defendant to prevent the officer from effecting the arrest; and (3) resisting the arrest by threatening the use of violence or physical force or by fleeing from such officer. § 575.150.1. The parties disagree as to whether Mr. Ajak's arrest was completed while he was in the kitchen with the officers. Mr. Ajak does not claim he submitted to the custody of the officers, but rather argues he was under actual physical restraint while in the kitchen, handcuffed, and surrounded by officers who told him he was under arrest and kept him there under their control. The State argues being confined in the kitchen was inadequate and Mr. Ajak had to be placed in the patrol vehicle to be under arrest. The resolution to the parties' disagreement depends on the statutory meaning of the term arrest. The State acknowledges section 544.180, RSMo 2000, defines arrest as an actual restraint of the person of the defendant, or by his submission to the custody of the officer, under authority of a warrant or otherwise, but it and the dissent nonetheless argue this definition does not apply to the resisting arrest statute, section 575.150. They do not identify any specific alternative definition of arrest they believe is controlling but rather say that because the criminal code in effect in 2015, chapters 556 to 579 of Title 38, 4 did not specifically adopt or reference section 544.180, that section's definition of arrest simply should be held to provide guidance comparable to guidance provided by common law interpretations of the term arrest. The dissent simply ignores the statute's definition, and the definition of arrest in Missouri cases, and turns to non-Missouri cases that apparently are more to its liking than Missouri precedent. This Court disagrees section 544.180 does not set out the definition of arrest applicable in determining whether Mr. Ajak resisted arrest under section 575.150. Section 544.180 and its predecessors have defined arrest in an identical manner since at least 1879. See, e.g., RSMo 1879 § 1826; RSMo 1939, § 3959. Nothing in the criminal code or in Missouri law suggests the adoption of the revised criminal code in 1979, without more and without any indication in the code the legislature thereby intended to change the definition of the term arrest, could be said to have sub silencio changed the meaning of the term arrest under Missouri law. In any event, the definition of arrest in section 544.180 and its predecessors is perfectly consistent with the meaning of arrest in Missouri case law. In fact, Missouri's courts repeatedly have relied on the definition of arrest in section 544.180 in resolving cases involving resisting arrest or escape from custody. For example, this Court relied on section 544.180 's definition of arrest in Smither v. Director of Revenue, 136 S.W.3d 797 , 798-99 (Mo. banc 2004) , in determining the defendant was under arrest even though not physically restrained by the officer, stating The term 'arrest' is defined as the 'actual restraint of the person of the defendant, or ... submission to the custody of the officer, under authority of a warrant or otherwise.' Sec. 544.180, RSMo 2000 (alteration in original). Smither held, where, the defendant  was injured and in the emergency room with the officer present, he was under arrest because the officer placed the defendant within his control to the extent the defendant's condition allowed by telling the defendant he was under arrest, reading him his rights, and staying with him while he tried to contact his lawyer. Id. State v. Sampson, 408 S.W.2d 84 , 86-87 (Mo. 1966) , citing the statute similarly held: A person may be said to be under arrest from the moment the police officer takes control of his movements. [§] 544.180, RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S. Other cases have used similar language. See, e.g., State v. Stokes, 387 S.W.2d 518 , 522 (Mo. 1965) (We agree with the finding of the trial court that defendant was under arrest from the time the officer took control of his movements and directed him to 'stand up.' Section 544.180.); cf. State v. Nicholson, 839 S.W.2d 593 , 596 (Mo. App. 1992) (citing section 544.180 in holding that a man was not yet under arrest when he fled the police because an arrest is made by either the 'actual restraint of the person of the defendant, or by his submission to the custody of the officer....' § 544.180, RSMo 1986). Of course, the legislature can choose to adopt a special definition of a term when enacting a statute, as it did in adopting a specific definition of custody in the criminal code that went into effect in 1979. § 556.061(6), RSMo 1978 . That definition remains today. § 556.061(17), RSMo 2017 . But the legislature did not adopt a special meaning for the word arrest in adopting the criminal code and nothing in the code suggests the legislature intended to change the century-long meaning of the term arrest. Indeed, if the meaning of the term arrest in chapter 544 does not govern use of the term in the succeeding chapters of the Missouri statutes setting out substantive crimes, then it is unclear for what purpose the legislature enacted that definition, for chapter 544 does not itself set out substantive crimes. Rather, it is devoted to providing general definitions and preliminary procedural rules concerning issuing warrants, bail, how arrests are to be conducted, where the arrestee is taken after an arrest, and preliminary hearing procedures governing the handling of the substantive crimes set out in the criminal code sections that follow it. See § 544.020, RSMo 2000 (issuance of warrant upon complaint); § 544.040, RSMo 2000 (bail, associate circuit judge may grant, when); § 544.190, RSMo 2000 (rights of officer in making arrests); § 544.216, RSMo 2000 (powers of arrest, arrest without warrant on suspicion persons violating any laws of state including infractions, misdemeanors and ordinances, exception-power of municipal officer in unincorporated area); § 544.260, RSMo 2000 (arrest of person, where tried); § 544.250, RSMo 2000 (preliminary hearing, when required-release, when, what conditions). The legislature does not adopt guidance but rather law. These definitions and procedures set out in chapter 544 would have little or no purpose unless they were to govern prosecution of the crimes set out in the criminal code that follows. It is well-settled: When the legislature enacts a statute referring to terms that have had other judicial or legislative meaning attached to them, the legislature is presumed to have acted with knowledge of that judicial or legislative action. Balloons Over the Rainbow, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 427 S.W.3d 815 , 825-26 (Mo. banc 2014) (citation and quotation omitted). It is the meaning of ''arrest'' as set out in section 544.180 and as interpreted in prior case law that governs here. No one disputes Mr. Ajak was restrained in handcuffs in the kitchen of his  home, with at least one and at times four to six officers present, and was told he was under arrest. The only issue is whether, on these facts, the arrest was complete before he was moved from the kitchen to the patrol vehicle, because if so, then the State failed to show  for the purpose of preventing the officer from effecting the arrest , stop or detention, the person ... (1) Resists the arrest. § 575.150 (emphasis added). Not surprisingly, the cases indicate that what is sufficient restraint is highly dependent on the particular facts and circumstances, but the key factor this Court has identified is whether the evidence showed actual restraint of the person of the defendant, Smither, 136 S.W.3d at 798 , or otherwise showed control of the defendant's movements by the officer, Sampson, 408 S.W.2d at 87 . And while, as the State notes, such restraint often is most easily shown when the defendant has been placed in a police vehicle or brought to the police station, 5 these cases do not support the State's narrow reading that an arrest requires the defendant to be put in the patrol vehicle or at least within a specific physical boundary. They could not so require, for the statute requires only restraint by the officer or submission to the officer's control. This could occur in many circumstances other than in a patrol vehicle (indeed, arrests were effected long before patrol vehicles existed) and in circumstances where physical boundaries are not available or utilized. In Smither, for instance, an arrest was completed when a severely injured defendant was told he was under arrest and placed in a room to receive treatment while the officer stood guard outside. 136 S.W.3d at 799 . And State v. Jackson, 645 S.W.2d 725 , 727 (Mo. App. 1982) , held the defendant's arrest had been effectuated once the officer placed defendant under arrest for carrying a concealed weapon, checked the X-ray room, and waited outside while a technician x-rayed defendant. When defendant then escaped the x-ray room, he was not found to have resisted arrest but rather to have escaped from custody, for the arrest already had been completed. Id. Similarly, in Sampson, the defendant was under arrest once the officers grabbed his arm on the street to prevent him from reaching for a weapon and searched him. 408 S.W.2d at 86-87 . The Court did not mention whether a patrol vehicle was nearby, for that was not relevant to whether the officers could search him incident to the arrest. Id. at 87 . In Stokes , the Court rejected a claim that defendant was not yet under arrest when he was searched after being found hiding in the weeds near where a burglary had occurred and told to stand up. 387 S.W.2d at 522 . The Court found the defendant was under arrest from the time the officer took control of his movements and directed him to 'stand up.'  Id. By contrast, if the defendant is not actually under the officer's restraint or control, the arrest has not been effectuated. For example, a defendant was guilty of resisting arrest when, after being awakened in his bed and informed he was under arrest, he had a verbal altercation and resisted arrest by threatening violence and using physical force in stiffening his arms and requiring the officers to coerce him by force. State v. Feagan, 835 S.W.2d 448 , 450 (Mo. App. 1992) ; accord, Ondo, 231 S.W.3d at 315-16 (defendant not yet under arrest when although handcuffed and  read his rights, the officer still was attempting to remove the defendant's personal items when the defendant began to move toward the door and had to be subdued with a Taser before he ceased resistance); Belton, 108 S.W.3d at 176 (the defendant was not yet arrested because the officer obviously did not have Belton restrained when, although handcuffed and told he was under arrest, the defendant was still sitting in his wife's car and she drove off). In each of these cases, the critical element in determining whether the arrest had been effected is whether the officer had control over the defendant's movements. As the State notes, in many cases it is easy to find an arrest effected when the defendant has been placed in a patrol car, for in that situation the person clearly is subject to the officer's actual restraint. But what is necessary to constitute restraint depends on the specific circumstances of each case. And this Court and the court of appeals have recognized a person may be subject to actual restraint in many different types of situations. Each case requires a fact-specific inquiry to determine at what point the arrest is complete. Indeed, a defendant who is not under the officer's restraint or control has been held to be not yet arrested even if the defendant is in the police station or patrol vehicle. See, e.g., Nicholson, 839 S.W.2d at 597 (when the defendant jumped up and ran out of the police station upon being told that he was being arrested, he had not yet been arrested as the officer had not yet physically restrained him nor had the defendant's ability to absent himself been impaired). Here, Mr. Ajak was actually restrained in his kitchen, before his walk to the patrol vehicle. The record reveals Mr. Ajak was handcuffed immediately after the officers entered the house. He remained handcuffed as he sat in the kitchen with one or more officers standing over him while the officers were at the residence. After speaking with other witnesses present, and as Mr. Ajak remained in handcuffs sitting at the kitchen table, the officers surrounded Mr. Ajak within the enclosed space of the kitchen and told him he was under arrest. At that point, Mr. Ajak's movements were completely under the officers' control; he was handcuffed and not free to leave, the officers attempted to dress Mr. Ajak for the walk to the patrol vehicle, and they took his arms in their hands and escorted him in handcuffs, at which point he resisted. His resistance, however, came only after the arrest was previously effected while in the officers' control within the kitchen. The dissent argues arrest is a continuing process that may still be being effected even after the arrestee is restrained and in the officer's control and custody. Not only is this (as the dissent acknowledges) inconsistent with section 544.180, it also is inconsistent with the definition of custody under Missouri's criminal code and with the interpretation and application of the term arrest in Missouri case law, as discussed in detail above. Indeed, the dissent relies entirely on three cases decided under the laws of Kentucky, Arizona, and New Hampshire. 6 This case, however, must be decided under Missouri law. As noted, section 544.180 says arrest occurs when there is an actual restraint of the person of the defendant, which this Court has interpreted to mean: A person may be said to be under arrest from the moment the police officer takes control of his movements Sampson, 408 S.W.2d at 86-87 . Consistent with this definition, numerous Missouri cases specifically  hold the arrest must be in progress when the 'resistance' occurs. Once the arrest has been fully effectuated a defendant should be considered to be in custody. Shanks, 809 S.W.2d at 418 ; accord, Belton, 108 S.W.3d at 175 ; Feagan, 835 S.W.2d at 449 ; Ondo, 231 S.W.3d at 316 . In fact, section 556.061 defines custody as occurring only once the person has been arrested: a person is in custody when the person has been arrested but has not been delivered to a place of confinement. § 556.061(7) (emphasis added). Similarly, section 575.200 provides custody occurs after arrest and evading police at that point is escape from custody rather than resisting arrest: A person commits the crime of escape from custody or attempted escape from custody if, while being held in custody after arrest for any crime, he escapes or attempts to escape from custody. (Emphasis added). As such, under Missouri law, Mr. Ajak could not have had the specific purpose of preventing an arrest while being walked to the police vehicle because his arrest had been previously effected when he was actually restrained by the officers and under their control in the kitchen. He was already under arrest and in custody when his alleged resistance occurred. Because arrest and custody are chronologically and legally separate events under the statutory and common law framework, if Mr. Ajak committed any crime, it would have been attempt to escape from custody, not resisting arrest. For reasons not revealed by the record, the State chose not to charge Mr. Ajak with an attempt to escape from custody. The evidence did not support the submission of resisting arrest, and the judgment finding Mr. Ajak guilty of that crime must be reversed.