Opinion ID: 1929169
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Confidentiality of Assessments

Text: Our review of summary judgment orders is for correction of errors at law. Iowa R.App. P. 4; Ciha v. Irons, 509 N.W.2d 492, 493 (Iowa 1993). We will uphold a summary judgment when the movant shows there is no genuine issue of material fact and is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Iowa R. Civ. P. 237(c); C-Thru Container Corp. v. Midland Mfg. Co., 533 N.W.2d 542, 544 (Iowa 1995). In reviewing the record, we will consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Hoffnagle v. McDonald's Corp., 522 N.W.2d 808, 811 (Iowa 1994).
Iowa's open records law, as codified in chapter 22 of the Code, ensures that [e]very person shall have the right to examine and copy public records and to publish or otherwise disseminate public records or the information contained therein. Iowa Code § 22.2(1) (1995). We have found the purpose of this statute to be to open the doors of government to public scrutiny to prevent government from secreting its decision-making activities from the public, on whose behalf it is its duty to act. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n v. City of Des Moines, 313 N.W.2d 491, 495 (Iowa 1981). Similarly, chapter 22 establishe[s] a liberal policy of access from which departures are to be made only under discrete circumstances. City of Dubuque v. Telegraph Herald, Inc., 297 N.W.2d 523, 526 (Iowa 1980). Accordingly, there is a presumption of openness and disclosure under this chapter. Id. at 527. Section 22.7 provides specific exceptions to the otherwise liberal policy of access. This court has held these exceptions are to be construed narrowly, subject to two caveats. Id. First, the narrow construction principle should not be over utilized such that its use frustrates legislative intent. Id. Second, where the expressed exception is broadly inclusive, the narrow construction principle will not aid in the determination of legislative intent. Northeast Council on Substance Abuse, Inc. v. Department of Pub. Health, 513 N.W.2d 757, 759 (Iowa 1994); City of Sioux City v. Greater Sioux City Press Club, 421 N.W.2d 895, 897 (Iowa 1988). At issue here are two enumerated exceptions to disclosure, found at sections 22.7(3) and 22.7(19). Section 22.7 provides: The following public records shall be kept confidential, unless otherwise ordered by a court, by the lawful custodian of the records, or by another person duly authorized to release such information: . . . . 3. Trade secrets which are recognized and protected as such by law. . . . . 19. Examinations . . . to the extent that their disclosure could reasonably be believed by the custodian to interfere with the accomplishment of the objectives for which they are administered. We will first address whether the assessment is excluded under the examination exception of section 22.7(19). Plaintiff does not contend that the eleventh grade assessment does not sufficiently constitute an examination such that it would not fall within the scope of section 22.7(19). Rather, she claims that since the test has already been circulated to the public (both by her own actions and allegedly by those of the district) it is no longer confidential and thus should no longer be exempted from release. Plaintiff bases her argument on the statutory construction of the word confidential. She argues the assessment should not be considered confidential because it is available for public inspection at the Library of Congress (as a result of the district's copyright application), a copy was previously given to plaintiff (who proceeded to distribute it to the public), and a general publication of its content occurred prior to the copyright application (when the assessment was field tested). According to the plaintiff, the assessment is not confidential as a result of these circumstances. Plaintiff, however, has misconstrued the language of section 22.7. Section 22.7(19) specifically excludes examinations from the general rule of disclosure, characterizing them as being confidential by their very nature. Accordingly, section 22.7 does not exclude a general class of records labeled as confidential as the plaintiff would argue, but instead provides that certain, expressed types of public records shall be kept confidential, one type of which is examinations. Iowa Code § 22.7. In other words, the assessment's confidentiality as it relates to chapter 22 is dependent on its being an examination whose disclosure the custodian reasonably believes would destroy the objectives of the test. Id. The statute makes no reference to any other extrinsic factors to be considered in making such a determination and it is not required that the examination be kept from all eyes but the custodian's. Even if records are deemed to be confidential, the custodian still may disclose them, subject to the constraints of the law. Such disclosure does not remove them from the general protection of section 22.7 as it relates to the public. See, e.g., Citizens' Aide/Ombudsman v. Miller, 543 N.W.2d 899, 900 (Iowa 1996) (holding investigatory power of citizens' aide allows disclosure of otherwise confidential records, but confidential status is maintained); Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 313 N.W.2d at 495 (holding statutory exceptions are inapplicable when Commission issues subpoena duces tecum, but other protections afforded by law may apply). In making a determination of whether the assessment is a confidential record, it is necessary to decide whether Flynn reasonably believed that its disclosure would interfere with the stated objectives of the examination. Iowa Code § 22.7(19). The district court found as a matter of law that he did reasonably so believe, and the record supports this determination. Both Flynn's testimony by deposition and the affidavit submitted with his motion for summary judgment are uncontested and are consistent with the district court's determination. Plaintiff contends that because the school district had already released copies of the assessment to the public via the field testing, there could be no reasonable expectation that release in its entirety would be detrimental to its objectives. We disagree. It was reasonable for Flynn to believe that a full disclosure would jeopardize the integrity of the assessment; to allow students and parents unfettered access to examination questions, answers, and scoring rubrics would defeat the purpose of the assessment. Certainly, it is a reasonable belief that an examination whose questions and answers are known by the students beforehand cannot adequately assess the students' problem solving abilities. Neither the field testing of the assessment nor its actual administration to the students removes it from the protection of section 22.7(19). In this sense, the field testing of the assessment can be analogized to what is referred to as a limited publication under copyright law. A copyright is not destroyed by a limited publication which occurs when tangible copies of the work are distributed, but to a limited class of persons and for a limited purpose. Burke v. National Broadcasting Co., 598 F.2d 688, 692 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 869, 100 S.Ct. 144, 62 L.Ed.2d 93 (1979); see also White v. Kimmell, 193 F.2d 744, 746-47 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 957, 72 S.Ct. 1052, 96 L.Ed. 1357 (1952) (holding a limited publication communicates the contents of a [work] to a definitely selected group and for a limited purpose, . . . .). Here, the assessment was distributed for field testing to a select group of students for the limited purpose of determining the examination's usefulness, not to place it into general circulation in the community. The field testing did not compromise the assessment's confidentiality since it occurred prior to the district's assertion that it was confidential. Presumably, Flynn did not believe that field testing would destroy the objectives of the examination, thus there was no issue of breach of confidentiality. Gabrilson further contends that because the district secretary provided her with a copy of the test, it has lost its confidentiality. We find no authority, however, for the proposition that these documents are removed from the definition of confidential records merely because they have erroneously been released. In fact, the record indicates that the secretary was never authorized to release the assessment. The affidavits of both the secretary and her superior indicate that the release of the materials to Gabrilson was unauthorized. Both of these affidavits are uncontested. Thus, the district court was correct in its finding that Flynn made a reasonable determination that release would be detrimental to the objectives of the assessment.
Plaintiff urges us to consider whether the content of the assessment sufficiently constitutes a trade secret and what effect, if any, federal copyright law has on its confidentiality as it relates to section 22.7(3). Having found, however, that the assessment is excluded from disclosure by section 22.7(19), this issue need not be resolved as it has no bearing on the outcome of the case. There is no allegation of copyright infringement or misuse of a trade secret so we need not reach this question.
Plaintiff argues that even if the assessment is deemed confidential under section 22.7, we must still engage in a balancing test to determine whether the public's right to know outweighs the school district's interest in secrecy. Gabrilson cites Northeast Council for the proposition that, after determining the examination is confidential under section 22.7, we must then engage in a balancing test of policy interests. In Northeast Council, however, the law was clearly established to the contrary. We repeat that it is not our responsibility to balance competing policy interests. This balancing is a legislative function and our role is simply to determine the legislature's intent about those policy issues. Northeast Council, 513 N.W.2d at 761. When construing section 22.7(19) narrowly, the only statutorily expressed extrinsic factor to be considered is whether the custodian reasonably believes that disclosure would frustrate the purpose of the examination. There is no indication that the legislature sought a balancing of policy interests when construing section 22.7(19), as plaintiff proposes. Cf. Hawk Eye v. Jackson, 521 N.W.2d 750, 753 (Iowa 1994) (holding language of section 22.7(5) exception expressly requires a three part balancing test); Northeast Council, 513 N.W.2d at 761 (holding language of § 22.7(6), Reports to governmental agencies which, if released, would give advantage to competitors and serve no public purpose requires a balancing of policy interests). In addition, plaintiff asserts that the confidential protection afforded the assessment by section 22.7(19) only applies before it is administered. Once the examination is given, she contends, then the public right to know its content outweighs any school interest in maintaining its confidentiality. She cites no authority for the proposition that the assessment should be treated differently once it is administered. In determining that the assessment is a confidential record under section 22.7(19), we find no distinction between the need for confidentiality before it is administered and after. The record indicates that Flynn, as custodian of the records, reasonably believes that release of the assessment and the corresponding scoring rubrics would be detrimental to the objectives of the examination. There is no indication that the same reasons behind this belief do not hold true both before the assessment is administered and after. To compel disclosure after administration would force the school district to develop a new assessment each yeara result which certainly is unreasonable and untenable. Thus, we construe section 22.7(19) as not requiring a determination of whether the public right to know outweighs the school district's interest in maintaining the confidentiality of the assessment or whether the school district can evaluate school children in secrecy.