Opinion ID: 2611900
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Lythgoe's Arguments

Text: Lythgoe offers several arguments, each of which we find unpersuasive, in support of her assertion that Dr. Guinn should not have been accorded absolute immunity. First, she argues that Guinn was entitled to only qualified, not absolute immunity. [4] In advancing this argument, she relies exclusively on this court's decision in Aspen Exploration Corp. v. Sheffield, 739 P.2d 150 (Alaska 1987). In Aspen, a case involving a suit against the governor, the court adopted a multi-factor case-specific test to determine whether a public official is protected by absolute or qualified immunity. Id. at 159-60. In the present case, the superior court dismissed Lythgoe's argument, concluding that official immunity serves entirely different ends than does judicial immunity. Indeed, in Grimm, the Arizona Supreme Court stated that [i]t is clear that the policy reasons for official immunity are much weaker than for judicial immunity. 564 P.2d at 1232. In particular, the court noted that the concerns regarding the finality of disputes and the saving of judicial time are far less compelling outside of the judicial context. Id. The court also noted that procedural safeguards, while present in the judicial setting, are often totally lacking in the administrative context. Id. Based on these findings, the Arizona court held that absolute immunity for public officials in their discretionary functions acting in other than true judicial proceedings is ... improper. Id. (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has noted an additional rationale underlying the distinction between absolute judicial immunity and qualified executive or public official immunity. In Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 108 S.Ct. 538, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988), the Court recognized that the nature of the adjudicative function requires a judge frequently to disappoint some of the most intense and ungovernable desires that people can have... . [T]his is the principal characteristic that adjudication has in common with legislation and with criminal prosecution, which are the two other areas in which absolute immunity has most generously been provided. Id. at 226, 108 S.Ct. at 544. The concerns expressed in Forrester certainly apply in the emotional and often inflammatory divorce and child custody context. Thus, the superior court was correct in concluding that Aspen 's analysis of public official immunity is inapposite to the present case. Lythgoe also argues that granting Dr. Guinn absolute immunity violates public policy in that it fails to provide her with an adequate remedy or safeguard from Dr. Guinn's alleged misconduct. She asserts that the Superior Court's expansion of absolute immunity here gives Guinn ... greater license to perform her work in whatever manner she deems appropriate  without regard to professional standards and without fear of being held accountable for her tortious misconduct. On the contrary, several courts have noted that adequate remedies and safeguards, other than civil liability, exist to hold court-appointed experts accountable for their actions. For example, in LaLonde, the court stated that [w]hile we are cognizant of the need to prevent negligently performed evaluations, our judicial system has inherent safeguards that minimize the risk of decisions based on inaccurate, misleading, or negligently conducted evaluations. LaLonde, 539 N.E.2d at 542. In particular, the court noted that, where the expert testifies or the expert's report is presented to the court, the complaining party has the opportunity to examine the expert and bring to the judge's attention any alleged deficiencies in the evaluation. In addition, the court further noted that the complaining party is free to seek appellate review or ... request a modification of the [trial court's] order. Id.; see also Casenote, Absolute Immunity for the Negligent Expert Witness: Bruce v. Byrne-Stevens, 26 Willamette L.Rev. 1051, 1076 (1990) (noting remedies of appellate review and opportunity for cross-examination). Similarly, in Seibel, the court noted additional safeguards against tortious conduct by a court-appointed expert: Although appellees would not be civilly liable for the consequences of their alleged negligent acts, the court is able to insure that its agents will be accountable for their conduct and actions. The court, in its discretion, has the authority to impose or recommend that numerous sanctions be imposed for negligent conduct. Some of the sanctions that could be imposed include appointing another doctor to serve on the panel, prohibiting the doctor from further service to the court and reporting that doctor's behavior to the medical boards for further action. Seibel, 631 P.2d at 177 n. 8. In the present case, Lythgoe successfully availed herself of such alternative remedies. She deposed Dr. Guinn and presented her objections to the trial court, which issued an order that Dr. Guinn's report be stricken from the record. She additionally would have had the opportunity to seek appellate review had the trial court denied her motion to exclude Dr. Guinn's report. These alternative mechanisms for review are largely free of the harmful side-effects inevitably associated with exposing judges [and quasi-judicial officers] to personal liability. Forrester, 484 U.S. at 227, 108 S.Ct. at 544. Thus, Lythgoe's public policy argument is unpersuasive. Lythgoe also argues that Dr. Guinn abandoned her neutral role and assumed the role of an advocate for Wellman, thereby waiving any immunity to which Guinn was entitled. In advancing this argument, Lythgoe relies on two cases, both of which are inapposite to the instant case. In Collins ex rel. Collins v. Tabet, 111 N.M. 391, 806 P.2d 40 (1991), and Barr v. Day, 69 Wash. App. 833, 854 P.2d 642 (1993), the courts held that where a guardian ad litem acts as a private advocate for his or her ward, as opposed to a functionary of the court, he or she is not immune from suit brought by the ward for malpractice. Collins, 806 P.2d at 44; Barr, 854 P.2d at 649-50. In reaching this conclusion, the Collins court stated: Where the guardian ad litem is acting as an advocate for his client's position  representing the pecuniary interest of the child instead of looking into the fairness of the settlement ... on behalf of the court  the basic reason for conferring quasi-judicial immunity on the guardian does not exist. In that situation, he or she functions in the same way as does any other attorney for a client  advancing the interests of the client, not discharging (or assisting in the discharge of) the duties of the court. Collins, 806 P.2d at 48. The court further held, however, that where the guardian acts as an arm of the court, absolute immunity is proper, noting that the objectivity of a guardian's investigation and recommendation might be compromised by the threat of liability; and ... this could impair the judge's own ability to perform his or her judicial duties. Id. at 47-48. In the present case, all of Lythgoe's allegations arise from Dr. Guinn's role as a court-appointed custody investigator. Unlike the guardian ad litem/ward relationship, it cannot be argued that a court-appointed expert acts in the same way as does [an] attorney for a client. Id. at 48; see Howard, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 902 (psychologist mediating custody dispute is not an advocate for either parent). To accept Lythgoe's argument would render quasi-judicial immunity meaningless and defeat the purposes underlying the doctrine, as it would open the door to allegations of waiver by advocacy in every case where the quasi-judicial officer makes a recommendation contrary to a party's position. In this case, the superior court found that Lythgoe's proposed amendment to her complaint, which added the allegation of advocacy, was based on the same factual occurrences set forth in her original complaint. We agree with this conclusion and find her waiver argument unpersuasive. [5] Finally, Lythgoe argues that absolute immunity is improper in the present case, because the superior court did not rely on Dr. Guinn's report in resolving the custody issue. Lythgoe relies on Lavit, 173 Ariz. 96, 839 P.2d 1141, in advancing this argument. In Lavit, the court held that a psychologist was absolutely immune from liability in an action arising from a custody evaluation. Id. 839 P.2d at 1146. In so holding, the court stated that the psychologist's activities are protected because (1) at least to some extent, his evaluations and recommendations aided the trial court in determining child custody, and (2) his services were performed pursuant to a court order. Id. (Emphasis added). Lavit appears to stand alone in suggesting that actual assistance to the trial court is a prerequisite to the granting of quasi-judicial immunity. For example, both Howard and Seibel expressly note that absolute quasi-judicial immunity is appropriate where the findings and opinions of the quasi-judicial officer are not binding and where the final determination rests solely with the court. Howard, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 902-03; Seibel, 631 P.2d at 180. In any event, to the extent Lavit may be interpreted to require actual reliance in the present case, we find that it is bad law. As discussed above, the central policy consideration supporting the doctrine of absolute quasi-judicial immunity for court-appointed experts is the fear that [e]xposure to liability could deter their acceptance of court appointments or color their recommendations. Lavit, 839 P.2d at 1144. The rule suggested by Lythgoe would do injury to this concern. Undoubtedly, potential civil liability would discourage qualified professionals from accepting court appointments, even if such liability arose only where the court disregarded the experts' recommendations. In addition, exercise of the experts' independent judgment would be impaired, as they would have an incentive to make recommendations that are more likely to be adopted by the court. Also, the Seibel court recognized an additional danger inherent in limiting immunity to those situations of actual reliance: a fear of bringing down litigation on the [court-appointee] might color a court's judgment in some cases, and if the court ignores the danger of harassing suits, tensions between [appointee] and judge seem inevitable. Seibel, 631 P.2d at 180 (quoting Kermit Constr. Corp. v. Banco Credito Y Ahorro Ponceno, 547 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1976)). Finally, such a rule would place a court in the awkward position of determining the factors which guided a co-equal court's decision. In light of these concerns, we find unpersuasive Lythgoe's argument that actual reliance be required. [6]