Opinion ID: 2394956
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Husband's Ability to Pay

Text: Dr. Jacobs urges on appeal that the Superior Court erred in setting the financial arrangements between the parties. The court ordered Dr. Jacobs to pay Mrs. Jacobs weekly alimony [4] and child support. In addition, the court divided the marital property and set apart for Mrs. Jacobs the family home subject to a first mortgage indebtedness of $25,000. While the divorce was pending, Dr. Jacobs had tried to encumber the home further by a second mortgage. The court ordered Mr. Jacobs to assume the aggregate indebtedness minus the sum of $25,000. Dr. Jacobs argues that the total financial burden imposed by the alimony obligation on top of that debt and the child support payments is unjust because in total it consumes by his computation 80% of his net income. A divorce court is vested with broad powers to order one spouse to pay the other alimony so long as the amount is reasonable and the court's decree has regard to [the payor] spouse's ability to pay. 19 M.R.S.A. § 721 (1981); Bryant v. Bryant, 411 A.2d 391, 395 (Me.1980). The judgment as to what is reasonable `must be the result of the exercise of sound judicial discretion.' Id. (quoting Capron v. Capron, 403 A.2d 1217, 1218 (Me.1979)). This appellate court pays great deference to the trial court's determination: Unless the Law Court can determine that the court has violated some positive rule of law or has reached a result which is plainly and unmistakably an injustice that is so apparent as to be instantly visible without argument, the ruling appealed from must be approved. Id. (quoting Capron, 403 A.2d at 1218). Under that standard we cannot say that the Superior Court exceeded its discretion in setting the amount of the alimony and other financial obligations of Dr. Jacobs. Specifically, Dr. Jacobs contends that the divorce court failed to take into consideration Mrs. Jacobs' ability to contribute to the support of the children and herself. The record, however, discloses that the Superior Court justice did expressly consider Mrs. Jacobs' earning capacity both currently and in the future. In the proceedings in the Superior Court, neither party asked the court to make specific findings of fact as to Dr. Jacobs' ability to pay. Therefore, on appeal we must assume that the Superior Court found for [Mrs. Jacobs] upon all issues of fact necessarily involved in [its] ultimate decision which was favorable to [her]. Harmon v. Emerson, 425 A.2d 978, 981 (Me.1981). The court heard conflicting evidence as to Dr. Jacobs' actual income, and there was no evidence regarding the payment schedule on the second mortgage because he had not yet made any payments. We thus must assume that the divorce court properly took into account Dr. Jacobs' ability to pay in determining his financial obligations to Mrs. Jacobs. See Smith v. Smith, 419 A.2d 1035, 1038 (Me.1980). In the absence of any pertinent factual findings, either requested by the parties or volunteered by the court, we must assume that the divorce court properly resolved the conflicting evidence of Dr. Jacobs' ability to pay. Dr. Jacobs therefore demonstrates no reversible error in the financial arrangements set by the court.