Opinion ID: 1793829
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hearsay Testimony Regarding Statements by Ms. Bauer

Text: Several witnesses testified about statements allegedly made by Ms. Bauer concerning her relationship with appellant. Ms. Bauer's brother and her friend, Kathleen Kirk, testified that Ms. Bauer told them of an incident in late November or early December 1995 in which appellant threatened to shoot Ms. Bauer. Several other witnesses testified that on different occasions Ms. Bauer said she was or appeared to be afraid of appellant. The testimony concerning Ms. Bauer's statements was hearsayout of court statements offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. See Minn. R. Evid. 801(c). Generally, hearsay is inadmissible because of its inherent lack of verification and reliability and the inability to cross-examine the declarant. See Minn. R. Evid. 802; see also State v. Scott, 501 N.W.2d 608, 616-17 (citing Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990)). There are, however, numerous exceptions to the hearsay rule. Under Minn. R. 803(2), an excited utterance, although hearsay, is admissible if it relat[es] to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition. The rationale for this exception stems from the belief that the excitement caused by the event eliminates the possibility of conscious fabrication, and insures the trustworthiness of the statement. State v. Daniels, 380 N.W.2d 777, 782 (Minn.1986). The testimony of Ms. Bauer's brother concerning the 1995 threat falls within the excited utterance exception. Ms. Bauer's brother testified that Ms. Bauer called him late one night, very upset, extremely agitated, and very afraid, and asked him to come to her house to take away a pistol belonging to appellant because appellant had threatened to shoot her. This threat obviously qualifies as a startling event. Moreover, Ms. Bauer's brother's description of her conditionextremely agitated, upset, and afraidindicates that at the time she made the statement, Ms. Bauer was still under the stress caused by the threat. Accordingly, we hold that this statement, although hearsay, fell within the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule and was therefore admissible. The admission of Kirk's testimony, however, is more problematic. According to Kirk, a crying and hysterical Ms. Bauer told her of the threat while in the process of filing for an order for protection in late December 1995 or early January 1996. Unlike Ms. Bauer's statements to her brother, Ms. Bauer's statements to Kirk occurred days or weeks after the threat was made. Although there are no strict temporal guidelines for admitting an excited utterance, [a]s the time lapse between the startling event and subsequent statement increases so does the possibility for reflection and conscious fabrication. Id. at 782. Here, because Ms. Bauer made the statements to Kirk while seeking an order for protection well after the threat occurred, she had time to reflect upon appellant's threat. Accordingly, Ms. Bauer's statements to Kirk do not fit within the excited utterance exception. The state, however, argues that Kirk's testimony, as well as the testimony from several other witnesses concerning Ms. Bauer's fear of appellant, was admissible as evidence of Ms. Bauer's then existing state of mind. Minnesota Rule of Evidence 803(3) excepts statements offered to show a declarant's then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition from the hearsay rule. The state argues that Kirk's testimony, and any hearsay statements concerning Ms. Bauer's fear of appellant, fall within this state of mind exception. Even if not violative of the hearsay rule, however, state of mind evidence is subject to exclusion if its relevance is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Minn. R. Evid. 403. A homicide victim's state of mind regarding the defendant is generally relevant only where the defendant raises the defense of accident, suicide, or self-defense. State v. Blanchard, 315 N.W.2d 427, 432 (Minn.1982). Accordingly, for such evidence to be admissible: (1) the victim's state of mind must be relevant, as when the defendant raises the defenses of accident, suicide, or self defense; (2) the probative value of the evidence must not be outweighed by its risk for unfair prejudice; and (3) a proper limiting instruction must be given to the jury. Id. at 432. These conditions are necessary because of `the risk that the jury will consider the victim's statements of fear as a true indication of a defendant's intentions or actions.' Id. (quoting Campbell v. United States, 391 A.2d 283, 287 (D.C.App.1978)). Here, because appellant did not allege that an accident, suicide, or self-defense caused Ms. Bauer's death, Ms. Bauer's state of mind was not relevant to appellant's guilt. Moreover, the court gave no limiting instructions prior to admitting the state of mind evidence. Thus, admission of this evidence was error. A determination that the admission of the state of mind evidence was error, however, does not end our analysis. When the admission of objected to evidence, although error, is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, reversal is not required. See State v. Shannon, 583 N.W.2d 579, 585 (Minn.1998); Blanchard, 315 N.W.2d at 432. An error is harmless, and reversal not required, [i]f the verdict actually rendered was surely unattributable to the error. State v. Jones, 556 N.W.2d 903, 910 (Minn.1996). In the present case, when viewed in the context of all the evidence, the state of mind evidence was insignificant and cumulative. The presence of Ms. Bauer's DNA on appellant's underwear and the testimony of Dr. McGee and Dr. Davis concerning the cause of the L-shaped abrasion on Ms. Bauer's leg provided strong, if not overwhelming, evidence of appellant's guilt. While it should not have been admitted, Kirk's testimony concerning the 1995 threat merely repeated an event Ms. Bauer's brother had already testified about. Any prejudicial potential of Kirk's testimony was further reduced by the testimony of appellant's co-worker about the second death threat appellant made against Ms. Bauer in early 1996. In addition to this properly admitted evidence of appellant's death threats, the jury also heard that Ms. Bauer had filed for and was granted an order for protection against appellant and that appellant abused Ms. Bauer and their children. In light of such evidence, the fact that Ms. Bauer feared appellant was obvious and the testimony concerning that fact cumulative. Under these facts, admission of evidence of Ms. Bauer's state of mind, although error, was harmless.