Opinion ID: 628626
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The September 12, 1989 Demand Letter

Text: 25 The September 12, 1989 letter seeking repayment of the progress payments is also not a final decision for jurisdictional purposes on the government's counterclaim. On its face, this letter simply states that it is a notice and demand for payment; it does not contain the customary designation final decision. The text of the September letter also makes clear that it is not a final decision because it specifically invites Sharman to submit a proposal for deferment of collection if immediate payment is not practicable or if the amount is disputed. 24 Cl.Ct. at 765. As the Claims Court itself acknowledged, such notices are tentative determinations issued to invite contractor comment rather than as final decisions. Id. at 768 (citing Crippen & Graen, 18 Cl.Ct. at 240). The September letter, therefore, is not a final decision, either viewed alone, or, as urged by the Claims Court, in the context of the earlier August letter. 26 The Claims Court's theory that the September letter quantified a government claim, implicit in the August default termination letter and therefore the two letters taken together constitute a valid final decision on a claim for jurisdictional purposes is incorrect. 7 There is no authority that supports the combining of two separate letters from the contracting officer, one constituting a final decision on a default termination--the August letter--and the other demanding a specific amount--the September letter--to create a final decision on a monetary claim. They are two entirely separate communications related to two separate and distinct matters. 8 Even assuming that combining such letters were ever permissible, the facts in this case do not support such a combination. The August letter made no reference to any money entitlement; therefore there was no claim in the August letter for the September letter to quantify, as theorized by the Claims Court. Moreover, the amount specified in the September letter was not yet in dispute at the time of the August or September letters; it had been proposed by the contracting officer and not rejected by the contractor. Therefore, these letters do not assert a claim. Dawco Constr., Inc. v. United States, 930 F.2d 872, 878 (Fed.Cir.1991) ([A] claim must seek payment of a sum certain as to which a dispute exists at the time of submission.). Indeed, the amount was later cut nearly in half by the government, unilaterally. 9 Consequently, the September letter, taken alone or in combination with the August letter, provides no final decision for jurisdictional purposes on the government's monetary claim.