Opinion ID: 2623166
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Comparison of the judicial determination to protect the public at ordinary sentencing and extended term sentencing

Text: Justice Acoba, in his dissent, contends that the crucial factors in determining whether Blakely applies to HRS § 706-662 in the present matter were (1) the circuit court's determination that sentencing Rivera to extended terms of imprisonment was necessary for protection of the public and (2) the fact that such a pronouncement subjected Rivera to greater punishment than that which could be imposed on the basis of the guilty verdict only. Dissenting opinion at ___-___, 102 P.3d at 1070. It could be said that the analogue of Blakely's statutory standard range prescribed by Hawaii's indeterminate sentencing scheme for a class C felony is the statutory alternative between a sentence of probation and a five-year term of imprisonment, pursuant to HRS §§ 706-605 (1993 & Supp.2003) [11] and 706-660, see supra note 9. As noted supra in Section III.A.1, the commentary to HRS §§ 706-660 explains that [t]he court's discretion is limited to choosing between imprisonment and other modes of sentencing and, [h]aving decided on imprisonment, the court must then impose the maximum term authorized. See Kido, 3 Haw.App. at 525, 654 P.2d at 1358. Thus, had the circuit court imposed upon Rivera a sentence falling within the standard range for a class C felony in Counts I and II, it would have chosen either probation or a five-year term of imprisonment, pursuant to HRS § 706-660. For mandatory guidance in determining whether to impose a sentence of probation or imprisonment, the circuit court would then have looked to the traditional factors considered in imposing a sentence, pursuant to HRS § 706-606, see supra note 8. As a general matter, when exercising its broad discretion to impose any particular sentence so as to fit the punishment to the offense as well as to the needs of the individual defendant and the community, the sentencing court bec[omes] obligated to consider the HRS § 706-606 factors as part of its decision making process. .... ... HRS § 706-606(2) [(1993)] mandates consideration of the four classic penal objectives  retribution/just punishment, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation[.] Gaylord, 78 Hawai'i at 149-50, 890 P.2d at 1189-90 (footnotes and citations omitted). Specifically, HRS § 706-606(2)(c) provides that the sentencing court shall consider the need for the sentence imposed to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant[.] HRS § 706-606(2)(c) reflects the penal objective of incapacitation. Incapacitation is the idea of simple restraint: rendering the convicted offender incapable, for a period of time, of offending again. Whereas rehabilitation involves changing the person's habits or attitudes so he or she becomes less criminally inclined, incapacitation presupposes no such change. Instead, obstacles are interposed to impede the person's carrying out whatever criminal inclinations he or she may have. Usually, the obstacle is the walls of a prison, but other incapacitative techniques are possible  such as exile or house arrest. [A. von Hirsch and A. Ashworth,] Principled Sentencing at 101 [(1992)]. For the latest and probably most definitive empirical study of the relationship between incapacitation and crime reduction, see F. Zimring and G. Hawkins, Incapacitation (1995). Gaylord, 78 Hawai'i at 148 n. 35, 890 P.2d at 1188 n. 35. Therefore, as this court explained in Gaylord, sentencing courts are required to consider the four classic penal objectives embedded in HRS § 706-606(2) when imposing any sentence, whether for ordinary or extended terms. Most relevant to our present analysis, sentencing courts must evaluate the  need for the sentence imposed ... [ t]o protect the public from further crimes of the defendant [.] HRS § 706-606(2)(c) (emphasis added). Consequently, in the case of sentencing a defendant to our statutory scheme's standard range for a class C felony, the jury's verdict alone authorizes a sentence of either probation or a five-year indeterminate maximum term of imprisonment under HRS § 706-660, and that authorization by the jury's verdict includes the requirement that the sentencing court consider all the factors set forth in HRS § 706-606 when determining the particular sentence to be imposed. In the present matter, the circuit court was required first to consider the factors set forth in HRS § 706-606 in imposing a sentence; in doing so, the circuit court obviously determined that the indeterminate maximum term of imprisonment for each of Rivera's class C felonies, rather than probation, was the appropriate sentence. See supra Section I. Furthermore, the circuit court expressly noted in its written FOFs, COLs, and orders granting the prosecution's motions for extended terms of imprisonment as a persistent and multiple offender that it had considered the sentencing factors enumerated in HRS § 706-606 and had determined that extended term sentences were appropriate in order to protect the public from further crimes committed by Rivera. Id. Thus, the circuit court determined under HRS § 706-606 that the classic penal objective of incapacitation took primacy in the sentencing of Rivera in order to accomplish the goal of rendering him incapable of offending again for the indeterminate maximum period of time. As the circuit court demonstrated in its findings, such an analysis under HRS § 706-606 was the basis for its determination that prison for an indeterminate maximum term, rather than probation, was the appropriate sentence for Rivera. Admittedly, a sentencing court's imposition of an extended term sentence requires the determination that it is necessary for protection of the public. HRS § 706-662. Nevertheless, such a determination is effectively the same one that the sentencing court has made upon concluding that a defendant should be sentenced to an indeterminate maximum term of imprisonment rather than probation under ordinary sentencing principles. The factor that justifies the enhancement of the sentence to extended prison terms, therefore, is the fact of prior or multiple felony convictions. See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 243, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998) (noting that recidivism ... is a traditional, if not the most traditional, basis for a sentencing court's increasing an offender's sentence). Thus, the sentencing judge acquires the authority to impose an extended term sentence under HRS § 706-662(1) only upon finding the Apprendi -approved additional fact of a prior conviction. Moreover, HRS §§ 706-662(1) and 706-662(4) expressly mandate that the sentencing court shall not make such a finding that an extended term sentence is necessary for protection of the public unless the defendant has prior or multiple felony convictions. Hence, the necessary for protection of the public determination alone is insufficient to subject a defendant to extended terms of imprisonment. In contrast, the sentencing court's finding in Blakely that the defendant acted with deliberate cruelty, was the sole aggravating factor that extended the defendant's sentence to ninety months from the fifty-three-month statutory maximum of the standard range. To recapitulate, inasmuch as both HRS §§ 706-606 and 706-662 require the determination of whether the sentence imposed is needed to protect the public, the sole determining factor remaining that increases the penalty under Hawaii's extended term sentencing in HRS § 706-662(1) is the fact of a prior conviction, a fact that the Supreme Court expressly authorized the sentencing court to find in Apprendi and again in Blakely. Similarly, the sole factor, beyond those already enumerated in HRS § 706-606 and already considered by the sentencing court, which extends an indeterminate prison term pursuant to HRS § 706-662(4)(a), is the fact that a defendant is a multiple offender. The multiple offender determination, pursuant to HRS § 706-662(4)(a), mirrors the prior conviction exception in Apprendi because the defendant has either already pleaded guilty, and thereby admitted guilt, or the trier of fact has found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has committed two or more felonies for which he is currently being sentenced. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (reasoning that both the certainty that procedural safeguards attached to any `fact' of prior conviction, and the reality that [the defendant] did not challenge ... that `fact[,]' ... mitigated the due process and Sixth Amendment concerns otherwise implicated in allowing a judge to determine a `fact' increasing punishment beyond the maximum of the statutory range). To underscore our point, we note that, within the range of discretion that the Hawai'i Penal Code affords courts in imposing sentences, HRS § 706-668.5 (1993) [12] authorizes sentencing courts to impose sentences consecutively under certain circumstances. HRS § 706-668.5 (1993) permits consecutive sentencing if multiple terms of imprisonment are imposed on a criminal defendant at the same time. The legislative purpose of the statute is to give the sentencing court discretion to sentence a defendant to a term of imprisonment to run either concurrently or consecutively. Discretionary use of consecutive sentences is properly imposed in order to deter future criminal behavior of the defendant, to insure public safety, and to assure just punishment for the crimes committed. Absent clear evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that a sentencing court will have considered all factors before imposing concurrent or consecutive terms of imprisonment under HRS § 706-606 (1993). State v. Tauiliili, 96 Hawai'i 195, 199-200, 29 P.3d 914, 918-19 (2001) (footnotes and citations omitted). In the present matter, the circuit court had the discretion under HRS § 706-668.5 to sentence Rivera to serve two consecutive five-year indeterminate maximum terms of imprisonment for his convictions of class C felonies in Counts I and II because multiple terms of imprisonment [were] imposed on [him] at the same time[.] Again, the circuit court would have been required to consider the factors set forth in HRS § 706-606  including the need to protect the public contained in HRS § 706-606(2)(c)  when determining whether to impose consecutive or concurrent terms of imprisonment. [B]y the plain language of HRS § 706-668.5(2)  although subject, pursuant to HRS § 706-668.5(1), to presumptively concurrent sentencing in connection with multiple prison terms imposed at the same time  , the sentencing court [is] obligated to consider the factors set forth in [HRS § ] 706-606 when determining whether multiple indeterminate prison terms were to run concurrently or consecutively. .... ... [T]he fact that HRS § 706-606 is incorporated by reference into HRS § 706-668.5 has profound significance. Bearing in mind that all indeterminate (including consecutive) prison terms are inherently incapacitative, the legislative sentencing philosophy permeating HRS ch. 706 in general and HRS § 706-606 in particular dictates that discretionary consecutive prison sentences, pursuant to HRS § 706-668.5, may properly be imposed only if the penal objectives sought to be achieved include retribution (i.e., just deserts) and deterrence. Gaylord, 78 Hawai'i at 150, 890 P.2d at 1190 (footnotes omitted). Had the circuit court sentenced Rivera to consecutive terms of imprisonment in Counts I and II, the effect would have been a ten-year indeterminate maximum term of imprisonment, a term equal to the two concurrent ten-year extended terms of imprisonment that the circuit court actually imposed in this case. See supra Section I. It defies logic that the circuit court could, consistent with Blakely, legitimately impose the same ten-year sentence, comprised of two consecutive five-year indeterminate maximum terms, under ordinary sentencing principles, but run afoul of Blakely by imposing concurrent ten-year extended terms of imprisonment based on the finding of prior or multiple concurrent convictions.