Opinion ID: 165202
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 10 Norman argues on appeal that the evidence presented at trial did not support a conviction under § 922(g)(1). This section states in pertinent part: 11 (g) It shall be unlawful for any person — 12 (1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year; 13 ... 14 to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. 15 We have held that in order to prove a violation of § 922(g)(1), the government must establish the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the defendant was previously convicted of a felony; (2) the defendant thereafter knowingly possessed a firearm or ammunition; and (3) the possession was in or affecting interstate commerce. United States v. Colonna, 360 F.3d 1169, 1178 (10th Cir.2004) (citing United States v. Taylor, 113 F.3d 1136, 1144 (10th Cir.1997)). Here, Norman challenges only the second element: knowing possession. 16 Possession can be either actual or constructive under § 922(g)(1). United States v. Mills, 29 F.3d 545, 549 (10th Cir.1994). Constructive possession occurs when a person knowingly holds ownership, dominion or control over the object and premises where it is found. Lazcano-Villalobos, 175 F.3d at 843. If the defendant has exclusive possession of the premises, knowledge, dominion, and control are properly inferred. Avery, 295 at 1177 (quoting Mills, 29 F.3d at 549). However, if more than one person occupies the premises, the government must meet a higher burden. In cases of joint occupancy, where the government seeks to prove constructive possession by circumstantial evidence, it must present evidence to show some connection or nexus between the defendant and the firearm or other contraband. Mills, 29 F.3d at 549. Furthermore, in order to sustain a conviction based on constructive possession in joint occupancy cases, the government must show evidence supporting at least a plausible inference that the defendant had knowledge of and access to the weapon or contraband. United States v. Hien Van Tieu, 279 F.3d 917, 921 (10th Cir.2002) (quoting Heckard, 238 F.3d at 1228). Thus, in the joint occupancy context,  knowledge and access are required to prove that the defendant knowingly held the power to exercise dominion and control over the firearm. Colonna, 360 F.3d at 1179 (citing United States v. Gorman, 312 F.3d 1159, 1164 (10th Cir.2002)). 17 Norman argues that the government's evidence fails to show that he had knowledge of or access to the firearm. In particular, he points to the lack of direct evidence, such as fingerprints or testimony regarding how the firearm ended up in the glove compartment of Norman's car. App. Op. Br. at 5-7. He argues further that it is equally probable that the firearm belonged to Hubbard. Id. at 7. In making these arguments, however, Norman fails to take into account numerous pieces of circumstantial evidence that a jury could reasonably rely on in finding that he knowingly possessed the firearm. 18 Regarding knowledge, for example, Officers Hill and Fees both testified that Norman acted anxious and upset throughout his encounter with the police. Officer Hill also testified that upon arrest Norman quickly exited the car and opened the hood (the government argued to the jury that Norman likely hid the key to the glove compartment in the hood of the car). Norman's anxious demeanor and odd behavior support an inference that Norman had knowledge of the gun. In contrast to Norman's behavior, Hubbard sat calmly throughout the encounter, becoming agitated only when Officer Fees located the gun. Hubbard then quickly denied ownership of the gun and stated, I'm not getting in trouble for [Norman]. (R.O.A. III, at 58) The jury could infer from these facts that Norman knew that the gun was in the glove compartment, while Hubbard did not. 19 As to access, there are several facts that support Norman's possession of the gun. First, the fact that Norman was driving the car at the time of his arrest supports an inference that he had access to its contents, especially the locked glove compartment. Next, Norman told Officer Hill and Joshua Harris that the car belonged to him. The jury also heard testimony from Rutanya Simons that Norman had exclusive possession of the car on the night prior to his arrest. Although Rachel White gave contrary testimony, the issue of witness credibility is not ours to decide, but lies solely within the purview of the jury. Hien Van Tieu, 279 F.3d at 922. Finally, the record shows that Officer Fees testified that although the glove compartment was locked, it was easily opened. 20 Nevertheless, because the car was jointly occupied at the time of arrest, evidence of possession or ownership of the car is not enough to establish that Norman constructively possessed the weapon. But here, a key fact is the glove compartment key: in addition to evidence of possession and ownership, Norman also had the key to the glove compartment when he later sold the car to Joshua Harris. The key opened not only the glove compartment, but the car's doors and trunk as well. This fact along with the testimony regarding Norman's exclusive possession and ownership of the car supports the jury's determination of the needed connection or nexus between the defendant and the firearm, Mills, 29 F.3d at 549, and supports a reasonable inference that Norman had access to the gun found in the glove compartment of his car. 21 Relying on United States v. Gorman, 312 F.3d 1159 (10th Cir.2002), Norman places great weight on the fact that the glove compartment was locked. App. Op. Br. at 7 (A reasonable jury could not have concluded that Marcell Norman had access to a locked glove compartment.). In Gorman, we held that evidence was sufficient to convict under § 922(g)(1) in part because the firearm was visible and retrievable by the defendant. 312 F.3d at 1164. While the accessibility of the weapon may be a factor to consider, a defendant may constructively possess a weapon under § 922(g)(1) even though that weapon is not readily accessible at the time of arrest. See, e.g., Hien Van Tieu, 279 F.3d at 922 (holding that defendant constructively possessed firearm located between the mattresses in his bedroom); United States v. Merritt, 361 F.3d 1005, 1014-15 (7th Cir.2004) (holding that defendant constructively possessed firearms located in a locked vault); Cf. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 126-27, 118 S.Ct. 1911, 141 L.Ed.2d 111 (1998) (holding that the word carried in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) extends to one who knowingly possesses a firearm, even where the firearm is placed in a locked glove compartment or trunk of a car).