Opinion ID: 906344
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: analysis

Text: 1. § 29-3001(4) The question is whether Smith timely filed his motion for postconviction relief. Section 29-3001(4) states, in rel­ evant part: Nebraska Advance Sheets 80 286 NEBRASKA REPORTS A one-year period of limitation shall apply to the filing of a verified motion for postconviction relief. The one-year limitation period shall run from the later of: (a) The date the judgment of conviction became final by the conclusion of a direct appeal or the expiration of the time for filing a direct appeal; .... (e) August 27, 2011. Smith’s convictions became final when his direct appeal concluded with this court’s denial of his petition for further review on April 27, 2005, several years before August 27, 2011. See § 29-3001(4)(a). Since August 27, 2011, is later than the date Smith’s judgments of conviction became final, the 1-year period in § 29-3001(4) began to run on August 27, 2011, and expired on August 27, 2012. [3] Unless the context is shown to intend otherwise, the word “year” in a Nebraska statute means a “calendar year.” See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 49-801(25) (Reissue 2010). In Licht v. Association Servs., Inc., 236 Neb. 616, 463 N.W.2d 566 (1990), we determined that a 2-year period beginning on April 4, 1986, expired on April 4, 1988. In application, when the period is given in terms of months or years, the last day of the period is the appropriate anniversary of the triggering act or event, unless that anniversary falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or court holiday. Id. Because the 1-year period for Smith’s postconviction motion began to run on August 27, 2011, it expired on the 1-year anni­ versary of that date, Monday, August 27, 2012. Smith’s motion was file stamped on August 28, 2012, 1 day after the 1-year period expired. 2. Filing by Mail (a) Prison Delivery Rule Smith contends he filed his motion on August 24, 2012. He asserts that the district court abused its discretion by disre­ garding the prison delivery rule set forth in Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 108 S. Ct. 2379, 101 L. Ed. 2d 245 (1988). In Houston, the prisoner delivered his notice of appeal to prison authorities for mailing to the district court within the 30-day Nebraska Advance Sheets STATE v. SMITH 81 Cite as 286 Neb. 77 time period mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 2107 (1988). His notice of appeal was not stamped “filed” by the district court until 1 day after the required filing period. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the notice was timely filed. It concluded that a pris­ oner acting pro se “files” a notice of appeal on the date it is delivered to prison authorities for forwarding to the clerk of the district court. The Court noted that a pro se prisoner liti­ gant cannot travel to the courthouse, but has to rely on prison authorities, who may have a reason to delay the filing. The State argues Smith’s motion was filed on August 28, 2012, as shown by the filing stamp of the clerk of the district court. It claims there is no evidence that Smith placed his motion in the mail on August 24. It admits Smith signed the motion on August 24 but asserts that the date the motion was signed is not controlling. The State claims that Nebraska courts have declined to adopt a prison delivery rule. In State v. Parmar, 255 Neb. 356, 586 N.W.2d 279 (1998), we rejected the prison delivery rule. After we affirmed both his conviction for murder and the denial of his first postcon­ viction motion, LeRoy J. Parmar filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief. The district court denied the motion. We dismissed the appeal because Parmar had not timely perfected it. The postconviction appeal presented the ques­ tion whether a prisoner’s pro se poverty affidavit, which was necessary to perfect the appeal, was filed on the date it was delivered to prison authorities for mailing rather than the date it was received in the office of the clerk of the district court. Because the notice of appeal and the poverty affidavit were received in the clerk of the district court’s office more than 30 days after the rendition of the judgment, we were with­ out jurisdiction to consider the appeal. Parmar argued that his pro se notice of appeal and poverty affidavit were timely filed under the prison delivery rule announced in Houston v. Lack, supra. We distinguished Nebraska’s filing requirements in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1912 (Reissue 1995) from 28 U.S.C. § 2107 (1994). Section 25-1912 required an appeal to be filed in the office of the clerk of the district court, and we could not construe “‘in the office of’” to mean “‘in the hands of prison Nebraska Advance Sheets 82 286 NEBRASKA REPORTS authorities for forwarding to the office of.’” See State v. Parmar, 255 Neb. at 362, 586 N.W.2d at 283. To say we had jurisdiction based on anything other than the plain words of the statute would have been the equivalent of judicial legislation. Id. We continue to hold that the prison delivery rule does not apply in Nebraska. (b) § 49-1201 Smith relies on Neb. Rev. Stat. § 49-1201 (Reissue 2010), which provides for a presumption of mailing “if the sender establishes by competent evidence that the report, claim, tax return, tax valuation, equalization, or exemption protest, or tax form, petition, appeal, or statement, or payment was deposited in the United States mail on or before the date for filing or paying.” Smith alleges he has provided evidence of mailing through the signature and notarization on his motion for post­ conviction relief, which are dated August 24, 2012. He asserts that August 24 was a Friday; that all institutional mail would not leave the institution until the next Monday, August 27; and that the fact that the clerk of the district court’s office received the motion on August 28 was competent evidence he mailed the motion on or before August 27. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, which we review independently of the lower court’s determination. Watkins v. Watkins, 285 Neb. 693, 829 N.W.2d 643 (2013). Smith’s reliance on § 49-1201 is misplaced. This court has not applied § 49-1201 to postconviction actions. Section 49-1201 relates to tax matters and is inapplicable in postcon­ viction actions. Words grouped in a list should be given related meaning. See State v. Kipf, 234 Neb. 227, 450 N.W.2d 397 (1990). The terms “tax return,” “tax valuation,” “equalization,” “exemption protest,” “tax form,” “petition,” “appeal,” “statement,” and “payment” relate to tax matters. Giving the words “report” and “claim” a related meaning excludes a motion for postconvic­ tion relief from coverage under § 49-1201. Section 49-1201 does not apply to Smith’s motion. [4] A defendant requesting postconviction relief must establish the basis for such relief, and the findings of the Nebraska Advance Sheets STATE v. BRANCH 83 Cite as 286 Neb. 83 district court will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Robinson, 285 Neb. 394, 827 N.W.2d 292 (2013). “The entry of filing by the clerk is the best evidence of the date of filing and is presumed to be correct until the contrary is shown.” State v. Hess, 261 Neb. 368, 377-78, 622 N.W.2d 891, 901 (2001). The district court’s finding that Smith filed his motion outside the 1-year period was not clearly erroneous.