Opinion ID: 886735
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: issues

Text: ¶ 27 When McCarthy did not appear the second day of trial, did the District Court err when it accepted McCarthy's written waiver of appearance? ¶ 28 McCarthy argues the District Court erred when it granted his motion to be tried in abstentia without first determining whether the motion was signed knowingly and voluntarily. He proclaims that although his counsel presented him a waiver, there is no indication he was fully advised of the consequences of signing the waiver, specifically that he would relinquish his right to testify later in the trial. He also argues since it is required that a waiver be given by the defendant in court, on the record, neither the statement by [his] counsel that the defendant waived his right to be present nor the written document was sufficient to result in a waiver. The State asserts the District Court correctly accepted McCarthy's written waiver of appearance as it was made intelligently, knowingly and voluntarily. We agree with the State. ¶ 29 Whether a criminal defendant's right to be present at the critical stages of his or her trial has been violated is a question of constitutional law, and our review of questions of constitutional law is plenary. State v. Kennedy, 2004 MT 53, ¶ 13, 320 Mont. 161, ¶ 13, 85 P.3d 1279, ¶ 13 (citation omitted). We review a district court's conclusions of law to determine whether its interpretation of the law is correct. Kennedy, ¶ 13. ¶ 30 A defendant has a fundamental right to be present at all stages of a criminal proceeding under both the federal and Montana Constitutions. The federal constitutional right to be present at all criminal proceedings is one of the most basic rights contained in the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. State v. Tapson, 2001 MT 292, ¶ 14, 307 Mont. 428, ¶ 14, 41 P.3d 305, ¶ 14 ( citing Illinois v. Allen (1970), 397 U.S. 337, 338, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1058, 25 L.Ed.2d 353). Art. II, Sec. 24 of the Montana Constitution states: In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel.... Since the right to appear and defend in person is found within Montana's Declaration of Rights, it is a fundamental right. A right is fundamental under Montana's Constitution if the right is either found in the Declaration of Rights or is a right without which other constitutionally guaranteed rights would have little meaning. Tapson, ¶ 15. This Court recognized in 1922, when interpreting an identical provision of the 1889 Montana Constitution, that the defendant must be present throughout the entire trial. Tapson, ¶ 16 ( citing State v. Reed (1922), 65 Mont. 51, 56, 210 P. 756, 757). ¶ 31 Section 46-16-122, MCA, outlines those instances in which a defendant may be absent in felony cases after the trial has commenced in his presence. The pertinent portion states: (3) After the trial of a felony offense has commenced in the defendant's presence, the absence of the defendant during the trial may not prevent the trial from continuing up to and including the return of a verdict if the defendant: .... (b) is voluntarily absent and the offense is not one that is punishable by death. ¶ 32 A defendant can waive his fundamental right to be present at trial in two ways: (1) failing to appear, or (2) through an express personal waiver. Tapson, ¶ 24. Waiver is defined as the voluntary abandonment of a known right. State v. Bird, 2001 MT 2, ¶ 35, 308 Mont. 75, ¶ 35, 43 P.3d 266, ¶ 35 (citations omitted). We will not engage in presumptions of waiver; any waiver of one's constitutional rights must be made specifically, voluntarily, and knowingly. Bird, ¶ 35 (citations omitted). Before a defendant can waive a fundamental right, such waiver, to be recognized by the courts, must be informed and intelligent for there can be no waiver by one who does not know his rights or what he is waiving. Bird, ¶ 36 (citations omitted). If a defendant chooses to waive his right to be present at a critical stage of the trial, the court must obtain an on-the-record personal waiver by the defendant acknowledging the defendant voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly waives that right. Bird, ¶ 38. ¶ 33 McCarthy refers us to Bird and Tapson to support his proposition that the court erred when it accepted his written waiver of appearance at trial and allowed the trial to proceed in his absence because the court never made a determination of whether his waiver was voluntary and whether he fully understood the implications of his waiver. In Tapson, we concluded the District Court violated Tapson's constitutional right to be present during a critical stage of the criminal proceeding when the judge took verdict forms into the jury room without Tapson or his counsel present and without a waiver by Tapson of his constitutional right to be present. We determined Tapson was not apprised of his rights, nor did he personally make a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of his right to be present. In Bird, we concluded the District Court violated Bird's constitutional right to be present during a critical stage of the criminal proceeding when it granted the State's motion to conduct individual voir dire of some of the prospective jurors in-chambers with both the prosecutor and defense counsel present, but with Bird absent. We determined that Bird not only did not waive his right to be present, he was never afforded an opportunity to waive that right. ¶ 34 Unlike the defendants in Tapson and Bird, McCarthy was apprised of his rights through his counsel, he was afforded an opportunity to waive his right, he made a knowing, intelligent and voluntary written waiver of his right to be present, witnessed by his counsel, which was presented to and accepted by the court and is part of the District Court record. In that waiver, McCarthy states he knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waives his right to appear. ¶ 35 McCarthy finds fault with the fact his waiver was presented to him by his counsel and maintains there is no indication he was fully advised of the consequences of the waiver and instead, he should have personally given the waiver in the District Court and on the record. However, as the State points out, the District Court cannot bear the fault for accepting McCarthy's written waiver because unlike Tapson and Bird, where the defendants were in court and the court could personally receive their waivers, McCarthy chose not to appear in court. His voluntary absence precluded the court from obtaining an on-the-record personal waiver. McCarthy's written waiver was obtained and presented by his counsel. Although McCarthy claims he did not know what he was signing, his counsel explained to the District Court that McCarthy was fully informed and voluntarily signed the waiver. The following discussion occurred prior to beginning the second day of trial: THE COURT: Counsel, I understand there's matters that the Court needs to be informed of on the record. MR. BARTLETT: Thank you, Your Honor. When I arrived at the Law and Justice Center this morning, I learned that there was a problem with Mr. McCarthy in the jail. I went over and found him in a holding cell with two or three other officers there. Roman was in tears and obviously had been crying for some time. His eyes and face are puffy and swollen. I observed hishe was sitting in an awkward position on a bed and I observed what I had thought was probably a bad back. And his neck is stiff. He cannot comfortably sit and cannot sit tall in front of the jury. Last night, Mr. McCarthy apparently was in an altercation with jail staff and the result of that was some injuries to his back and neck. I asked him, Roman, what do you want to do about this? Do you want to waive your appearance at trial this morning? And he said, yes, he did. I expect that Roman should be taken to the hospital for an examination as soon as possible. So I move the Court, pursuant to XX-XX-XXX. sub (3), subparagraph (b), that Roman be allowed to voluntarily absent himself from the rest of the proceedings. The record will note that he was here yesterday at the time the trial commenced. And I don't think it would be in his best interest to appear in front of the jury in his present state. And given his present state, there may even be some sort of blow-up. So I think it's in his best interest, and he agrees, that he not appear for this morning's proceedings. We have drafted a waiver, which I will present to Mr. McCarthy for his final decision. And upon obtaining his signature, we will file that. The State countered with its position: Your Honor, it's the State's position, of course we would prefer the defendant to be here, consistent with his rights. But if it is his knowing and intelligent and voluntary decision not to be here, he has that right pursuant to the criminal code of the State.... I would ask that the Court consider the proposed waiver submitted by Mr. Bartlett. It says that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waives his right to appear. Given the precise instructions of the statute, I would ask that the word voluntarily be included in that last sentence as well. Bartlett and the court agreed that voluntarily be included, the court granted McCarthy's absence and held the court in recess while Bartlett returned to the Law and Justice Center to obtain McCarthy's signature. The signature was obtained, the waiver was filed in the record, jury instructions were discussed and closing arguments were presented. ¶ 36 The trial had commenced in McCarthy's presence, therefore, pursuant to § 46-16-122, MCA, he could choose to be voluntarily absent the second day. The written waiver, and the circumstances surrounding that waiver, establish McCarthy was informed of his right to be present, he understood that right, and knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to be present. ¶ 37 McCarthy also claims the District Court should have ordered a mental health evaluation and conducted a competency hearing to determine whether he was capable of voluntarily waiving his appearance at trial. As discussed before, there was not substantial evidence before the court that McCarthy was incompetent, and neither Bartlett nor McCarthy questioned McCarthy's competence. The District Court had no reason to conduct a competency hearing prior to accepting the waiver. ¶ 38 We conclude the District Court correctly accepted McCarthy's written waiver of his presence at the second day of trial.