Opinion ID: 2968018
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Other Evidence of Discriminatory Intent

Text: Kandies’ next argument is that the trial court ignored statistically significant evidence that supported a finding of discrimination. Specifically, he contends that [t]he prosecutor exercised fifteen peremptory challenges, nine of which were directed against African Americans. When Kandies objected to each of them, the trial court did not determine if a prima facie case had been presented. Rather, the prosecutor simply volunteered explanations for these challenges. The trial court then decided if these explanations were race-neutral. By proceeding in this fashion, the trial court never judged the strength of Kandies’ prima facie case. In other words, the trial court neither considered the number of strikes the prosecutor exercised against African Americans nor evaluated the dramatic difference in the percentages of strikes against African Americans as opposed to whites. Because it never determined the strength of the prima facie case, the trial court could not factor it into the ultimate determination . . . contrary to Batson. Brief of Appellant at 22-23. Kandies supports his claim of statistical disparity by explaining that the prosecutor used peremptories on eight of eleven otherwise qualified African-American jurors (73%), but that he used peremptory challenges on only four of twenty-six (15%) prospective Caucasian jurors. Kandies contends that the trial court was required to, but did not, weigh the asserted [race-neutral] justification against the strength of [his] prima facie case under the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Hill, 146 F.3d 337, 342 (6th Cir. 1998). Kandies bases this argument primarily on language in Miller-El suggesting that the ultimate determination of whether, despite the neutral explanation of the prosecution, the peremptory strikes . . . were race based should include the facts and circumstances that KANDIES v. POLK 65 were adduced in support of the prima facie case. Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340 (emphasis added). The Court concluded that the district court failed to consider fully petitioner’s prima facie evidence that prosecutors struck 91% of the eligible African-American venire members — which was alone enough to create a sufficiently debatable Batson issue that warranted a certificate of appealability under § 2253. Id. at 342. To me, it appears that Kandies’ argument encompasses two discrete contentions based on these snippets from Miller-El. Because Kandies never presented any statistical evidence to the state trial court in support of his Batson challenges (so far as I can tell), Kandies’ argument would mean, first, that a state trial court could not properly skip the first step in Batson, requiring a determination of whether a prima facie case had been made. It bears repeating that it was perfectly acceptable under the circumstances for the trial court to bypass any specific analysis of whether Kandies had establshed a prima facie case. As the Supreme Court has explained, and this court has reiterated, [o]nce a prosecutor has offered a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenges and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant had made a prima facie showing becomes moot. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359; see Bell, 332 F.3d at 240 n.5. Moreover, Kandies, who would have benefitted from not having to clear the first Batson hurdle, never insisted at trial that the court make a prima facie determination rather than proceeding as if a prima facie showing had been made. For him to suggest now that the trial court was derelict for not having done so strikes me as disingenuous. Kandies’ argument would also alleviate his burden of proof to a certain extent. Miller-El, however, does not alter the three-step Batson analysis or its allocation of the burden of proof to the opponent of the peremptory strike. Rather, it confirms that statistical evidence of a discriminatory pattern of peremptory strikes is relevant to a prima facie case. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97; see also Howard v. Moore, 131 F.3d 399, 407 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc). Although Kandies was not actually required to make a prima facie case here, neither was he prohibited from adducing evidence that bolstered his allegations that the State was striking African-Americans because of their race. Technically, what he is suggesting is that the trial court take into consider66 KANDIES v. POLK ation evidence that he could have used, but did not, to support a prima facie case. I am not aware of such a requirement in Miller-El or any other case. In fact, the very language Kandies relies on indicates that the trial court should consider facts adduced in support of a prima facie case. Moreover, although the trial court was not presented with statistical evidence, the record reveals that the trial court did consider, following each round of peremptory strikes, the number of strikes exercised against African-American jurors vis-a-vis Caucasian jurors. For example, after the first round of peremptory strikes by the State, the trial court prefaced its ruling on Kandies’ Batson motion by noting that the State exercised six peremptory challenges, . . . three [of which] . . . have been exercised as to the members of the black race. J.A. 135. After the second round of strikes, the trial court prefaced its ruling as follows: [F]ollowing the exercise of the State’s first [six] peremptory challenges . . . six replacement jurors [were] called, three by their questionnaires indicated that they were members of the Black race. . . . The District Attorney has passed one of the prospective jurors called as a replacement juror who is a member of a minority race and had peremptorily excused [the other] two [African-American jurors]. J.A. 168A. In both cases, as discussed in detail above, the court went on to find that the State had articulated a valid basis for striking each of the African-American jurors and, ultimately, that the peremptory strikes had not been exercised on the basis of race. In sum, this does not constitute the clear and convincing evidence needed to rebut the presumption of correctness enjoyed by the state court’s finding that there was no discrimination. Finally, Kandies contends that the trial court ignored the prosecutor’s alleged personal history of purposely excluding prospective minority jurors on the basis of race. This evidence was nothing more than a conclusory statement by defense counsel that he had never in the past seen the prosecutor leave a minority panel member on the jury. He cites Miller-El in support, but a bare, unsubstantiated statement by defense counsel is nothing like the extensive testimony in Miller-El about the history of discrimination and the official policy adopted by the district attorney’s office to exclude minorities from jury duty. See Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 334-35. In short, defense counKANDIES v. POLK 67 sel’s comment is insufficient to rebut the trial court’s factual determination by clear and convincing evidence.