Opinion ID: 2130135
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: mayor in an aldermanic form of city government has the statutory power to terminate appointive city officers.

Text: First, it must be observed that in an aldermanic form of government the mayor is the city's chief executive officer. SDCL 9-8-1. His powers and duties are generally specified in SDCL 9-8-3, and although they do not specifically mention hiring and firing of employees, it does state that the mayor shall perform such other duties as may be prescribed by the laws and ordinances[.] SDCL 9-14-13 states: In an aldermanic-governed city the mayor shall have power except as otherwise provided to remove from office any officer appointed by him, whenever he shall be of the opinion that the interests of the city demand such removal, but he shall report the reasons for his removal to the council at its next regular meeting. This court has previously held that this statute gives the mayor full and absolute power to remove appointed officers whenever, in his opinion, the interests of the city require it[.] State ex rel. Dickson v. Williams, 6 S.D. 119, 125, 60 N.W. 410, 412 (1894). See also Kierstead v. City of Rapid City, 248 N.W.2d 363 (S.D.1976) and Baker v. Jackson, 372 N.W.2d 142 (S.D. 1985) ( holding abrogated on other grounds by 1986 S.L. Ch. 73, § 1, codified at SDCL 7-18A-15.1, 9-20-18, and 9-20-19.) We continue to believe that the statute gives great power to the mayor although that power may not be absolute. We can envision scenarios where the mayor could abuse his statutory authority, but find no such abuse here. We note that it is within the exclusive province of the legislature to determine terms under which employment may be terminated. As we have so often noted, the legislature by SDCL 60-4-4 has created employment at will in this state. Breen v. Dakota Gear & Joint Co., Inc., 433 N.W.2d 221 (S.D.1988); Blote v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n of Rapid City, 422 N.W.2d 834 (S.D.1988); Bauer v. American Freight System, Inc., 422 N.W.2d 435 (S.D.1988); Hopes v. Black Hills Power & Light Co., 386 N.W.2d 490 (S.D.1986). The legislature has not seen fit to depart from that status. Similarly, despite our prior pronouncements, they have not seen fit (except as is noted below) to limit the power of a mayor to terminate appointive officers. We hasten to emphasize and point out that this holding applies only to appointive officers as that term is defined by SDCL 9-14-1. Under that statute, appointive officers include the auditor, treasurer (or combined position of finance officer), attorney, engineer, chief of police, and such other officers as needed and provided for by ordinance. It is interesting to note that prior to a 1985 amendment, the definition of appointive officers under SDCL 9-14-1 included policeman, but it is now limited to the chief of police. It is thus clear that the legislature only intended to give the mayor power to terminate the appointive officers, i.e., the department heads, rather than giving him blanket termination authority over all municipal employees.