Opinion ID: 2193254
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Parens Patriae Issue

Text: T.H. contends that [b]oth the government and the trial court ignored their obligations to [him] as parens patriae, and violated . . . statutory protections. Specifically, he faults the trial court for allowing a Maryland prosecutor to remain in the courtroom during T.H.'s trial even though the prosecutor did not request permission on the record, and hence, he states, the cloak of confidentiality attached to juvenile proceedings was breached. In addition, he argues that the District failed to take him to the Director of Social Services within a reasonable period of time, and instead, left him in police custody. Moreover, he maintains that following his adjudication, the trial court imposed a penalty on him by immediately committing him to the custody of a District agency until age 21 and by sending him to the D.C. Jail. The District maintains that the trial court committed no reversible error, that the Maryland prosecutor had a proper interest in R.K.S.' and T.H.'s case, and that a technical violation of [statutory] time limitations . . . doe[s] not require automatic dismissal. The parens patriae concept connotes the State's sovereign power of guardianship over minors and other persons under disability. In re J.J.Z., 630 A.2d 186, 193 n. 12 (D.C.1993) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In the District, both the trial court and the Attorney General, D.C. (formerly the Corporation Counsel, D.C.) play the parens patriae role. In re P.D., 664 A.2d 337, 341 (D.C.1995) (citing In re J.J.Z., supra, 630 A.2d at 194.) We have discussed and applied the parens patriae concept most often in termination of parental rights, adoption, and abuse and neglect cases. See, e.g., In re J.L., 884 A.2d 1072, 1079 (D.C.2005) (In termination of parental rights cases, including the waiver of consent, the judge acts as parens patriae on the child's behalf.) (citation omitted); In re A.H., 842 A.2d 674, 684 (D.C.2004) (citing In re T.W., 732 A.2d 254, 258 (D.C. 1999)) (The court acts in a neglect proceeding as parens patriae and has the paramount obligation and broad authority to protect the best interests of the child where the parent is unwilling or unable to do so.) (internal quotation marks omitted); In re S.G., 581 A.2d 771, 778 (D.C. 1990) (Neglect statutes authorizing state intervention on a child's behalf are remedial, and they should be liberally construed to enable the court to carry out its obligations as parens patriae. ). In a case involving assault with a deadly weapon, we reiterated that:  Parens patriae requires the juvenile court to do what is best for the child's care so long as this disposition provides adequate protection for society.  In re L.J., 546 A.2d 429, 437 (D.C.1988) (quoting Kent v. United States, 130 U.S.App. D.C. 343, 346, 401 F.2d 408, 411 (1968)) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554-55, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966) (The objectives [of Juvenile Court] are to provide measures of guidance and rehabilitation for the child and protection for society, not to fix criminal responsibility, guilt and punishment. The State is parens patriae rather than prosecuting attorney and judge.) (emphasis added). In the delinquency case before us, then, the parens patriae concept is tempered by the need to adequately protect society. Before R.K.S. and T.H.'s trial began, counsel for both juveniles attempted to convince the trial judge that a prosecutor for the State of Maryland should be excluded from the courtroom on the grounds that he was not a member of the D.C. Bar, and that juvenile proceedings are private and are not supposed to provide free discovery for the government of another jurisdiction. The trial court asked for a statutory citation and when defense counsel requested a brief pass to go to the library, presumably to find a citation to authority, the judge denied the request. On appeal, T.H. and R.K.S. claim that the trial court ignored their assertion that the Charles County prosecutor's purpose in the courtroom was to obtain information for trial in Maryland, which would be antithetical to the requirement of confidentiality. D.C.Code § 16-2316(e) (2001) provides in pertinent part: Except in hearings to declare a person in contempt of court, the general public shall be excluded from hearings arising under this chapter. Only persons necessary to the proceedings shall be admitted, but the [Family] Division may, pursuant to rule of the Superior Court, admit such other persons (including members of the press) as have a proper interest in the case or the work of the court on condition that they refrain from divulging information identifying the child or members of his family involved in the proceedings. [2] Super. Ct. Juv. R. 53 implements § 16-2316(e) by repeating the general statutory rule, but also by specifying persons deemed to have a proper interest in the juvenile proceedings and who, therefore, are not required to apply for admission into a juvenile proceeding. The list includes [a]ny member of the Bar of the District of Columbia. Rule 53(a)(2)(A). Rule 53(a)(3)(A) and (B) covers persons who must fill out an application to be admitted to the courtroom, including [a]ny attorney who is not a member of the Bar of the District of Columbia. And, Rule 53(a)(4) applies to [o]ther persons who have a proper interest and who must apply for admission and agree to safeguard the confidentiality of the proceeding. Here, the proper procedure was not followed with respect to the Maryland prosecutor, assuming he was not a member of the D.C. Bar. Nevertheless, he appeared to have a proper interest in the proceeding and the trial judge, implicitly at least, gave him permission to remain in the courtroom. Since the State of Maryland was interested in R.K.S.' and T.H.'s trial because of related events in Maryland, and at any rate would have had access to the transcripts of the proceeding under D.C.Code § 16-2331(b)(6), [3] as the trial court recognized, we discern no reversible error in that decision. See In re Ti.B., 762 A.2d 20, 30, 33 (D.C.2000) (The legislative policy of confidentiality serves important ends . . . [but] that policy is not absolute and its statutory implementation is not unlimited, and the trial court abused its discretion in excluding counsel for the father in a neglect proceeding, under D.C.Code § 16-2316(e)). T.H. also complains that he was not taken promptly to the Director of Social Services following his detention at the Seventh District police station, as Super. Ct. Juv. R. 105(c) requires, and D.C.Code § 16-2311(a)(2) mandates (A person taking a child into custody shall with all reasonable speed  . . . bring a child alleged. . . delinquent before the Director of Social Services.). Even where the precise statutory or regulatory time frame is not followed, as here however, reversal of an adjudication is not compelled. See In re D.H., 666 A.2d 462, 470 (D.C.1995) ([A] technical violation of the time limitations. . . does not require automatic dismissal. . . .); In re F.D.P., 352 A.2d 378, 382 (D.C.1976) (Where confession was completed within three hours of arrest, but appellant was not taken to the Director of Social Services, failure to do so cannot . . . vitiate an otherwise valid confession.) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, T.H. waived his Miranda [4] rights before giving a statement to the Deputy Sheriff from Charles County. With respect to both juveniles and adults, we repeatedly have held that a waiver of Miranda rights also constitutes a waiver of the right to prompt presentment. See, e.g., In re F.D.P., 352 A.2d at 382 (the waiver of Miranda rights constituted a temporary waiver of [the juvenile's] right to prompt presentment before the Director of Social Services); United States v. Bell, 740 A.2d 958, 963 (D.C.1999) (we have held repeatedly that a valid waiver of . . . Miranda rights [by an adult] is also a waiver of his Mallory [ Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957)] right to presentment without unnecessary delay.) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Nor do we see any reversible error in the trial court's decision to proceed immediately with disposition, and to commit T.H. to the District's Youth Services Administration (YSA) until his twenty-first birthday, as authorized by D.C.Code § 16-2322(a)(4) (Generally, a dispositional order vesting legal custody of a child adjudicated delinquent . . . in a department, agency, or institution shall remain in force for an indeterminate period not to exceed the youth's twenty-first birthday.). T.H. already had been committed to YSA in another case by a different judge, and was subject to being released to Maryland; therefore, we are satisfied that his immediate commitment did not constitute a penalty. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm T.H.'s adjudication on the UUV and the RSP charges. So ordered.