Opinion ID: 1057985
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: substitution of trial judge

Text: After the jury was sworn and opening statements had been made, but prior to any witnesses being called, the original trial judge announced that he had suffered a death in his immediate family. Stating that there was simply no way [he] can proceed with this trial this week under these circumstances, the judge explained that he considered himself unable to proceed by reason of a disability as contemplated by Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 25(a). The judge further explained that another trial judge was preparing to proceed with the trial. Defense counsel objected, requesting that the trial be continued instead. Defendant's objection was denied. Later that afternoon, Judge Jon Kerry Blackwood from Somerville recommenced the trial. Defense counsel renewed their objection, stating that they would consent to a continuance rather than having a special judge come in to hear the matter. Judge Blackwood overruled the objection, and the trial proceeded. Defendant now contends that the original trial judge should have declared a mistrial, arguing that the death in the original trial judge's immediate family did not constitute a disability under Rule 25(a). We disagree. Our Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that, If by reason of death, sickness or other disability the judge before whom a jury trial has commenced is unable to proceed with the trial, any other judge regularly sitting in or who may be assigned to the court, upon certifying that he or she has become familiar with the record of the trial, may proceed with and finish the trial. Tenn. R.Crim. P. 25(a) (emphasis added). The meaning of other disability in this provision is a matter of first impression in Tennessee. Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 25 is modeled after Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 25. See Tenn. R.Crim. P. 25 Advisory Commission Comments. Neither our Rule nor its federal counterpart contains a definition of the term other disability. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 25. Our research has revealed no case addressing the issue of whether the term includes a death in the original judge's immediate family. We now hold that it does. This Court has previously recognized that the rules of construction applicable to statutes are likewise applicable to the Rules of Criminal Procedure. State v. Crowe, 168 S.W.3d 731, 744 (Tenn.2005). One of those rules of construction is ejusdem generis, which means that where general words follow special words which limit the scope of the statute, general words will be construed as applying to things of the same kind or class as those indicated by the preceding special words. Lyons v. Rasar, 872 S.W.2d 895, 897 (Tenn.1994). With respect to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 25(a), the special words are death and sickness. The general words are other disability. Thus, we look to things of the same kind or class as a trial judge's death or sickness in construing the term other disability. Obviously, a judge's death renders him or her unable to proceed with the trial. Similarly, a judge's illness may render him or her at least temporarily unable to proceed with the trial. Both of these events are beyond a judge's immediate control. Neither of these events is the result of a simple scheduling conflict or a conflict in professional priorities. All persons, in all walks of life, are subject to the sometimes sudden demands of their health. Similarly, all persons, including trial judges, are subject to the sometimes sudden demands of the health of their immediate families. In this case, the original trial judge's mother-in-law died unexpectedly. As with a bout of serious personal illness, the personal demands upon the judge immediately became urgent and imperative. As with a bout of serious personal illness, those demands rendered the judge temporarily but unavoidably unable to proceed with the trial. In terms of rendering a judge temporarily unable to proceed with a trial, we see little difference in cause or effect between a judge's own illness and a death in the judge's immediate family. Accordingly, we construe the term other disability as used in Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 25(a) to encompass the death of an immediate family member of the original trial judge. We note that the term other disability is not limited to other physical disability. Thus, we do not construe the term as requiring that the judge experience some physical impairment to have suffered an other disability. We further note that subsection (b) of Rule 25 permits a substitution of judges after a verdict of guilt, where the original judge is unable to perform the duties to be performed by the court after a verdict of guilt, by reason of absence, death, sickness or other disability. Tenn. R.Crim. P. 25(b) (emphasis added). Because the term other disability is used in addition to the term absence in this provision, it is clear that the two terms have different meanings. Obviously, absence is a broader category than other disability, although we construe the term absence in this provision as, again, being of the same type as death, sickness, or other disability, in that it would be an absence caused by some unforeseen and unavoidable event: for instance, travel delays caused by weather or accidents. Upon the original judge's disability, a substitute judge may proceed with the trial upon certifying that he or she has become familiar with the record of the trial. In this case, Judge Blackwood stated on the record that he had familiarized himself with the record in this cause. Judge Blackwood further entered an order certifying that he had reviewed the pleadings in this matter and [had] sufficiently familiarized [himself] with the record in this matter in compliance with Rule 25 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. The trial then proceeded. Defendant points to no prejudice he suffered as a result of Judge Blackwood's assumption of the original judge's duties, and the record does not indicate that Defendant suffered any inherent prejudice resulting from the substitution. Both the original and substitute judges complied with Rule 25(a). We hold that Defendant was not entitled to a continuance or the declaration of a mistrial upon the original trial judge's disability and that he is not now entitled to a new trial on the basis of the substitution.