Opinion ID: 77301
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Williams's Vagueness Challenge

Text: 63 The Government contends that, since the written plea agreement references only Williams's right to appeal his pandering conviction on grounds of overbreadth, he has waived his vagueness challenge. We disagree. We recognize that vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, although logically related and similar, are distinct. 91 However, plea bargains, as we have noted, are like contracts and should be interpreted in accord with the parties' intent. 92 Further, a written plea agreement should be viewed against the back-ground of the negotiations, avoiding interpretation that directly contradicts an oral understanding; and, because it constitutes a waiver of substantial constitutional rights, should be read, where in doubt, against the government. 93 The record in this case clearly reflects the parties' intent to preserve Williams's constitutional challenges under both overbreadth and vagueness doctrines. 94 That the written memorialization of that agreement omitted the latter of these related grounds is insufficient to support waiver. 64 Laws that are insufficiently clear are void for three reasons: (1) to avoid punishing people for behavior that they could not have known was illegal; (2) to avoid subjective enforcement of the laws based on arbitrary or discriminatory interpretations by government officers; and (3) to avoid any chilling effect on the exercise of sensitive First Amendment freedoms. 95 Thus, to pass constitutional muster, statutes challenged as vague must give a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited and provide explicit standards for those who apply it to avoid arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. 96 Vagueness concerns are more acute when a law implicates First Amendment rights and a heightened level of clarity and precision is demanded of criminal statutes because their consequences are more severe. 97 65 In this case, considering a penal statute that both restricts speech and carries harsh criminal penalties, it is not at all clear what is meant by promoting or soliciting material in a manner that reflects the belief, or that is intended to cause another to believe that touted or desired material contains illegal child pornography. This language is so vague and standardless as to what may not be said that the public is left with no objective measure to which behavior can be conformed. Moreover, the proscription requires a wholly subjective determination by law enforcement personnel of what promotional or solicitous speech reflects the belief or is intended to cause another to believe that material is illegally pornographic. Individual officers are thus endowed with incredibly broad discretion to define whether a given utterance or writing contravenes the law's mandates. 98 66 Suppose, for example, the government intercepts an email claiming that the attached photographs depict little Janie in the bath—hubba, hubba! Does this reflect a belief on the sender's part that the photos are lascivious? As discussed above, the law does not require the pandered material to contain any particular content nor, in fact, that any purported material need actually exist. Since the reflects the belief portion of the statute has no intent requirement, the government establishes a violation with proof of a communication that it deems, with virtually unbounded discretion, to be reflective of perverse thought. Regardless of what is actually depicted in the photos in our example— whether they are innocent baby-in-the-bubbles snapshots or candid stills of the family Rottweiler in a No. 10 washtub— regardless, in fact, of whether any photos are attached, this communication could be interpreted as criminal behavior. And because the PROTECT Act's affirmative defense does not apply to the pandering provision, it is no defense to show that the underlying materials are not, in fact, illegal child pornography. 67 Even more complex is the determination of what constitutes presentation in a manner that is intended to cause another to believe that material contains illegal child pornography. Let us consider, for example, an email entitled simply Good pics of kids in bed. Let us also imagine that the pics are actually of toddlers in footie pajamas, sound asleep. Sender One is a proud and computer-savvy grandparent. Sender Two is a chronic forwarder of cute photos with racy tongue-in-cheek subject lines. Sender Three is a convicted child molester who hopes to trade for more graphic photos with like-minded recipients. If what the statute required was a specific intent to traffic in illegal child pornography, the identity of the sender and the actual content of the photos would be probative. Senders One and Two would be off the hook while Sender Three may warrant further investigation. 68 But again, the pandering provision requires no inquiry into the actual nature or even existence of the images and provides no affirmative defense that the underlying materials are not, in fact, illegal child pornography. The offense is complete upon communication in a manner that, in the discretionary view of law enforcement, is intended to cause another to believe that materials are illegal child pornography. Here, the manner of presentation, as well as the plainly legal underlying material, are identical in all three instances. And Sender Two clearly intended that his recipients believe, however briefly, that the attached photos were sexually explicit depictions of minors. 69 While posting in a known child pornography chat room would clearly spotlight the true child abuser, in open cyberspace, which of these communicators is a criminal? 99 The pandering provision is devoid of any contextual parameters for the restriction on conduct that might illuminate its meaning and rescue it from vagueness. 100 Absent such a contextual backdrop, the language of this law is too imprecise a standard to provide sufficient guard against arbitrary deprivation of a significant liberty interest. 70 We again recognize that Congress may regulate the distribution or solicitation of the illegal materials described in subsections (i) (obscene child pornography) and (ii) (real child pornography) of the pandering provision. If that were all the provision did, we would find no constitutional infirmity on vagueness grounds. However, the statute is unnecessarily muddled by the nebulous purported material and reflects the belief, or is intended to cause another to believe language. Because of this language, the pandering provision fails to convey the contours of its restriction with sufficient clarity to permit law-abiding persons to conform to its requirements. Because of this language, the provision is insusceptible of uniform interpretation and application by those charged with the responsibility of enforcing it. Accordingly, we find it impermissibly vague.