Opinion ID: 794672
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Mr. Heitmeier and Mr. Gourguechon's Liability

Text: 95
96 Section 2114, at the time of the events in this case, limited its scope to owner[s], charterer[s], managing operator[s], agent[s], master[s], [and] individual[s] in charge of a vessel. § 13(a), 98 Stat. at 2863. Riverboat's contention that this language does not encompass either Mr. Heitmeier or Mr. Gourguechon is without merit. The plain meaning of the phrase individual in charge of a vessel refers to persons who have control over or responsibility for the vessel's operation. American Heritage Dictionary (4th ed.2000) (defining the phrase in charge of); see also Black's Law Dictionary 685 (5th ed.1979) (defining in charge of as in the care or custody of, or intrusted to the management or direction of). Mr. Heitmeier, as the President, sole shareholder and member of the Board of Directors of both Riverboat Services, Inc. and Riverboat Services of Indiana, Inc., certainly exercises substantial control over the M/V Showboat and its operations; it would be preposterous to suggest otherwise. Similarly, Mr. Gourguechon, as the Director of Marine Operations for Riverboat during the events in this case, was in a position of significant responsibility; among other things, he was in charge of managing the vessel's crew, including making promotion and termination decisions. Indeed, Mr. Gourguechon played a large, if not dispositive, role in the termination decisions in question in this case. Were § 2114 construed so as to not permit the plaintiffs to sue the director of personnel matters—the person actually responsible for the discharges—the statute indeed would be enfeebled. We therefore hold that both Mr. Heitmeier and Mr. Gourguechon qualify as individual[s] in charge of a vessel and may be sued in their individual capacities under the terms of § 2114.
97 Riverboat also submits that the district court erred in holding Mr. Heitmeier liable, given that, until after this litigation began, he did not know about the plaintiffs' letters to the Coast Guard. Instead, according to the defendants, Mr. Heitmeier believed that the plaintiffs were involved in the disruption and miswiring of the vessel and directed Mr. Gourguechon to fire them for this reason. Specifically, the defendants submit that, at the time of the plaintiffs' discharges, Mr. Wallace 98 had at least three run-ins with the MEBA, and in one instance, members of the union barged into [Mr.] Wallace's East Chicago office and were escorted out by security. [Mr.] Wallace . . . directed [Mr.] Heitmeier to get rid of any employee involved in the union activity because he did not want to deal with the aggravation of the union activity. 99 R.191 at 9 (summarizing trial testimony). Mr. Heitmeier, in turn, conveyed this request to Mr. Gourguechon, who was solely responsible for drafting the termination letters and delivering these letters to the plaintiffs. 100 The district court made factual findings that the defendants' proffered reason for terminating the plaintiffs— primarily their union involvement and related activities—was unconvincing and based on speculation and conjecture. Id. at 27. As a general rule, we shall defer to such findings unless they are shown to be clearly erroneous; moreover, these findings are compatible with the district court's conclusion that Riverboat fired the plaintiffs in retaliation for their protected communication with the Coast Guard. See supra. 101 Nevertheless, in Mr. Heitmeier's case, the district court's findings, while affording a factual basis for discrediting Mr. Heitmeier's given reasons for terminating the plaintiffs, do not provide a basis for establishing the requisite causation between Mr. Heitmeier's direction that Mr. Gourguechon fire the plaintiffs and the retaliation for their report of a violation of safety regulations to the Coast Guard. In finding a causal link between the plaintiffs' communications with the Coast Guard and their subsequent terminations, the district court relied heavily upon the smoking gun in the case—Mr. Gaffney's termination letter which cited the Coast Guard correspondence. Although the plaintiffs suggest that Mr. Heitmeier retained supervisory responsibility for the drafting of this letter, the record contains no affirmative evidence to support this contention; there is no evidence that Mr. Heitmeier even knew of the letter's contents before it was delivered to Mr. Gaffney. Instead, Mr. Gourguechon testified that he typed that letter and chose its words, including reference to the phrase unauthorized communication and correspondence with regulatory bodies having jurisdiction over the operation of the vessel. Tr.IV at 113. Moreover, Mr. Gourguechon admitted at trial that he made the ultimate decision to terminate the plaintiffs: 102 Q: You made the decision to terminate Mike Gaffney, and only after you made that decision you went to Captain Heitmeier and told him that and he just said okay, go ahead. 103 A: Yes, that could be correct. 104 Q: So you did make the decision to terminate Mike Gaffney? A: Yes. 105 Id. at 76-77. 106 Additionally, there is no evidence that Mr. Heitmeier knew of the plaintiffs' letters to the Coast Guard until the complaint was served on the M/V Showboat on January 14, 1998; by that date, Mr. Gaffney, as well as four other plaintiffs, had been fired in retaliation for their protected communications with the Coast Guard. Absent proof that Mr. Heitmeier knew of the plaintiffs' reports of a safety violation on board the M/V Showboat prior to the drafting of Mr. Gaffney's termination letter, and, indeed, prior to the termination of five of the ten plaintiffs, there is no support, direct or circumstantial, for the conclusion that Mr. Heitmeier was motivated by this communication in ordering the plaintiffs' terminations.