Opinion ID: 1158185
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Argument Based on Biblical Principles

Text: The prosecutor began his closing argument with a lengthy discussion (three and one-half transcript pages) of biblical religious principles as they related to the death penalty. The prosecutor began with the words, Thou shalt not kill. He quoted from the Book of Exodus, the Book of Leviticus and the Book of Numbers as supporting capital punishment. The prosecutor summarized his religious discussion this way: God recognized there'd be people like Mr. Wash. That's why those commandments were delivered. That's why that message is throughout the Old Testament. [¶] Who must be punished for what they have done and if they have done things like he's done they must forfeit their lives for what he's done. [1] This argument was severe misconduct. As this court has recently and unanimously stated, a prosecutor's reference to Old Testament support for capital punishment [is] improper  such an argument tends to diminish the jury's sense of responsibility for its verdict and to imply that another, higher law should be applied in capital cases, displacing the law in the court's instructions. (See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Chambers (1991) 528 Pa. 558 [599 A.2d 630].) ( People v. Wrest (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1088, 1107 [13 Cal. Rptr.2d 511, 839 P.2d 1020].) The majority proposes that the issue of misconduct was waived because the defense failed to object to it. [2] I conclude that defense counsel's failure to object deprived defendant of the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. As the high court has explained, in order to amount to constitutionally ineffective assistance, an attorney's act or omission must fall below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and must have resulted in prejudice to the defendant. ( Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693, 104 S.Ct. 2052].) Defense counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's extensive argument that defendant should be put to death based on biblical principles is inexcusable. Although we have stated that a failure to object to a prosecutor's argument seldom establishes incompetence ( People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 772 [239 Cal. Rptr. 82, 739 P.2d 1250]), in this case there could be no legitimate tactical justification for counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's dramatic and specific biblical argument. We cannot say here, as we could in Ghent, that [c]ounsel may well have tactically assumed that an objection or request for admonition would simply draw closer attention to the prosecutor's isolated comments. ( Id. at p. 773.) Here, the prosecutor's religious argument was not isolated, but expansive and fully developed. No objection could have drawn any closer attention to this main theme of the prosecutor's argument that the prosecutor had drawn himself. As the majority notes, defense counsel not only failed to object to the prosecutor's remarks, but countered them by citing a number of religious authorities to support his argument against the death penalty. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 260.) [3] But it is improper to answer one impermissible argument not based on the facts or the law applicable to the case with another impermissible argument not based on the facts or the law applicable to the case. A religious argument against the death penalty is no more acceptable at the penalty phase of a capital case than a religious argument in favor of the death penalty. ( People v. Sandoval (1992) 4 Cal.4th 155, 194 [14 Cal. Rptr.2d 342, 841 P.2d 862] [What is objectionable is reliance on religious authority as supporting or opposing the death penalty. The penalty determination is to be made by reliance on the legal instructions given by the court, not by recourse to extraneous authority.]; Commonwealth v. Daniels (1992) 531 Pa. 210 [612 A.2d 395, 404] [same].) Our courts are not ecclesiastical courts, and our juries do not base their decisions on religious law no matter whom such law may be said to favor. Because arguments by both the prosecutor and defense counsel exceeded the bounds of inferences that may be drawn from the evidence and considerations that may properly be brought to bear under the factors specified in the death penalty statute, both arguments were improper. It follows that defense counsel's decision to respond to the prosecutor's religious argument by relying on opposing religious authority cannot be considered a legitimate tactical choice that would excuse his failure to object to the prosecutor's impermissible religious argument. As noted above, a defendant who seeks to establish that his or her Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel was violated must show that defense counsel's defective performance resulted in prejudice. I will return to the question of prejudice after I discuss another closely related instance of prosecutorial misconduct during the penalty phase closing argument in this case.