Opinion ID: 2595325
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Reasonable Range of Conduct

Text: ¶ 44 The first factor we consider is whether Price's counsel's conduct falls below the objectively reasonable representation demanded by the Sixth Amendment. ¶ 45 In his opening statement, Jefferson's counsel stated: [A]t the end of this case the evidence will showbecause Mr. Jefferson will tell youthat he is guilty, no doubt, of a partner/family member assault and perhaps felony assault, but I submit to you ... that beyond a reasonable doubt you will not find Leonard Jefferson Guilty of attempted deliberate homicide. ¶ 46 Jefferson's counsel made the following statement in his closing argument: There is no doubt that [Jefferson] assaulted Felicia. He admitted it. There is no doubt that he pointed a gun. That in and of itself is felony assault. Jefferson maintains that these admissions are indefensible in light of the fact that he could have entered a plea agreement for felony assault and not faced the risk of being convicted for the more serious attempted deliberate homicide charges. ¶ 47 The State counters that the record is silent as to why Jefferson's counsel admitted guilt and cannot rebut the presumption of adequate assistance. Therefore, Jefferson's reliance upon the result as evidence of incompetence is insufficient to prove that he received inadequate assistance of counsel. ¶ 48 There is a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional conduct. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89, 104 S.Ct. at 2064-65. [T]he defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action `might be considered sound trial strategy.' Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana (1955), 350 U.S. 91, 101, 76 S.Ct. 158, 100 L.Ed. 83). The acts or omissions that a defendant alleges were not the product of professional judgment are reviewed by this Court to determine whether the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066. Counsel's conduct must be reviewed in consideration of all of the circumstances of the case. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. ¶ 49 When an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is based on facts of record, it is properly raised on direct appeal. State v. Fields, 2002 MT 84, ¶ 31, 309 Mont. 300, ¶ 31, 46 P.3d 612, ¶ 31. Normally, the record on appeal must adequately document why counsel acted in a particular manner in order for this Court to determine whether counsel's action falls below the reasonable standard for professional conduct. State v. Harris, 2001 MT 231, ¶ 21, 306 Mont. 525, ¶ 21, 36 P.3d 372, ¶ 21. ¶ 50 The record on appeal does not contain any direct evidence of why Jefferson's counsel made the challenged statements. However, there is no plausible justification for counsel's conduct under these circumstances. Jefferson's letter to Judge Fagg on February 23, 1999, by which he withdrew from his agreement to plead guilty to felony assault, indicates that Jefferson wanted the opportunity to be acquitted, or to be convicted of a less serious offense than felony assault. However, at trial, counsel admitted guilt to felony assault during the opening and closing statements, and undermined the very purpose for which Jefferson withdrew from the plea agreement. His remarks had the effect of entering a plea for Jefferson without his consent and by which the jury was not bound. Counsel's statements directly contravene the reason Jefferson accepted the risk involved in facing the more serious charge of attempted deliberate homicide in a jury trial. Counsel's admission cannot be considered a trial strategy or tactical decision under the circumstances of this case. ¶ 51 We conclude that counsel's conduct falls below the reasonable range of professional conduct required and that the first element of the Strickland test has been satisfied.