Opinion ID: 1291295
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Admission of the Victim's Hearsay Statement Regarding Fear of Defendant

Text: As earlier outlined, FBI Special Agent George Charon testified Viivi Piirisild told him, on July 8, that defendant and Waidla had called her and asked to come to the house on the pretext of retrieving items Waidla had forgotten, that she knew there were no such items and had refused the request, that she was concerned or frightened by the call because defendant and Waidla knew her husband was out of town, and that she would call 911 if they came to her house. At trial, defendant objected to this testimony, presented in an offer of proof, as inadmissible hearsay. The court overruled the objection, finding Charon's testimony within the hearsay exception for evidence of a statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind when that state of mind is itself an issue in the action. (Evid. Code, § 1250, subd. (a)(1).) [6] The evidence was admissible under this exception, the court explained, to show that Viivi Piirisild, in fear of defendant and Waidla, would not voluntarily have given them any of her personal property and that, therefore, the only way that Mr. Waidla and Mr. Sakarias could have achieved obtained this property would have been by foul means, through robbery or other violent means. The court also weighed the prejudicial effect of the evidence against its probative value, finding the latter outweighed the former for purposes of Evidence Code section 352. After Charon testified, the court admonished the jury his testimony as to the victim's statements could be considered only to show her state of mind at the time the statements were made. Defendant contends Viivi's fear of defendant and Waidla was not truly an issue at trial because defense counsel offered to stipulate that Viivi did not make a gift of personal property to defendant and Waidla. Because the hearsay was therefore not within Evidence Code section 1250 or any other exception, he further argues, its admission violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him. In the course of the court and counsel's discussion of defendant's objection, defense counsel stated: Well, I'm willing to stipulate that he got them by surreptitious means. It hardly seems credible that he would be given to [ sic ] them as [a] gift under the circumstances. We agree with the Attorney General that this offer did not eliminate the victim's state of mind as an issue at trial. As defense counsel's own remarks suggest, the circumstances of the relationship between Viivi Piirisild and defendant in the period leading up to the killing were relevant to show that defendant and Waidla took personal property from Viivi by force, committing robbery and robbery murder. It was the People's burden to prove those offenses, which the prosecutor did through circumstantial evidence provided by a number of witnesses, including, besides Special Agent Charon, Avo Piirisild and Rita Hughes, and through defendant's statements to police, as well as through direct evidence contained in those statements. The trial court was not obliged to force the prosecutor to accept a partial stipulation on this point instead of proving it by an accumulation of circumstantial and direct evidence. At least where the defense proposal does not constitute an offer to admit completely an element of a charged crime (see People v. Bonin (1989) 47 Cal.3d 808, 849, 254 Cal.Rptr. 298, 765 P.2d 460), the `general rule is that the prosecution in a criminal case cannot be compelled to accept a stipulation if the effect would be to deprive the state's case of its persuasiveness and forcefulness.' ( People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 131, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980; People v. Garceau (1993) 6 Cal.4th 140, 182, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 664, 862 P.2d 664; People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1007, 254 Cal.Rptr. 586, 766 P.2d 1.) Any error in admitting Special Agent Charon's testimony was, in addition, harmless. Avo Piirisild testified that Viivi had received a seemingly threatening postcard from defendant and Waidla and that when, on July 4, they came to the Piirisilds' house, Viivi was so scared of them she urged Avo not to answer the door. Rita Hughes testified that on July 11, the day before her death, Viivi told Rita not to come stay with her because it was not safe. Given this additional evidence of Viivi's state of mind, the fact that Charon's testimony included no prejudicial evidence of threats or violent acts committed by defendant and Waidla, and the court's admonition limiting the jury's consideration of Charon's testimony to the state-of-mind question, we see no reasonable probability ( People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243) that Charon's testimony affected the verdicts. Defendant argues Charon's testimony may have been prejudicial on the question of intent to kill, a mental state required for the special circumstances if the jury believed defendant only assisted Waidla in the killing. ( People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1139, 240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306.) Defendant's intent to kill, however, was not only shown by overwhelming and undisputed evidence, but was expressly conceded by his attorney in argument to the jury. [7] Even assuming, then, that admission of Charon's testimony was federal constitutional error, and that defendant did not waive the constitutional objection by his failure to cite constitutional authority in the trial court, admission of the evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt ( Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24, 87 S.Ct. 824) on the issue of intent to kill, the only issue on which defendant claims he was prejudiced.