Opinion ID: 768847
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Constitutionality of the Statutory Cap on Damages

Text: 50 Plaintiff cross-appeals on the basis that the statutory cap on compensatory damages found at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a is an unconstitutional violation of the Separation of Powers doctrine. Pollard argues that by creating the statutory cap, Congress impermissibly encroached upon the judiciary and its traditional responsibility for assuring against excessive verdicts on a case-by-case basis. We do not find this argument persuasive. Congress createdTitle VII, and Congress may designate the remedies under Title VII. See Northern Pipeline Construction v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 83-84 (1982) (plurality opinion) (holding that where Congress creates a statutory right, it clearly has the discretion, in defining that right, to create presumptions, or assign burdens of proof, or prescribe remedies.) The fact that the judicial branch is limited in the amount of damages which it may award does not mean that its ability to decide cases is being impaired by Congress. 51 Pollard also argues that the statutory damages provision violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in that it unfairly discriminates among those persons who wish to vindicate their rights with respect to racial discrimination and those who wish to vindicate their rights with respect to gender discrimination. Since the statute at issue is a federal one, we assume that plaintiff meant to invoke the implied equal protection clause inherent in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which is applicable to the federal government. The parties agree that the statute must stand if it bears a rational relationship to any legitimate articulated government purpose. 52 42 U.S.C. § 1981a places a $300,000 statutory cap on all intentional discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, sex, religion, or disability (as defined in the Americans with Disabilities Act). The statute is inherently equitable on its face. The difference in the application of this statute in situations of gender or race discrimination occurs due to a provision in the Act which states that nothing in section 1981a is to be construed as in any way limiting the remedies provided in section 1981 itself, which does not limit recovery for intentional discrimination based upon race or national origin. However, section 1981 provides relief for a different type of claim than encompassed by the remedies available to plaintiff in section 1981a. Section 1981 provides for relief from discrimination in the making and enforcing of contracts, while section 1981a provides for relief purely from intentional discrimination in the employment context. While section 1981 includes contracts for employment, it also includes contracts for admission to organizations, insurance and other business contracts with private persons or corporations, and admission to schools. Plaintiff cannot therefore be said to be similarly situated with section 1981 claimants. 53 Even if plaintiff is similarly situated with a section 1981 claimant due to the fact that employment discrimination is covered under both acts, her claim still fails. Discrimination on the basis of race and national origin is indisputably the cornerstone of our entire body of civil rights law. In a political compromise, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was limited in the remedies which it would provide due to a belief that unlimited damages for all forms of discrimination would force employers to institute hiring quotas for their own economic safety. See 137 Cong. Rec. S15472-01 (discussing the fear of quotas that drove the compromise which was reached in the Civil Rights Act of 1991). The adoption of the provision saving the remedies available under section 1981 was rationally related to the legitimate purpose of creating reasonable damages available to all other victims of intentional discrimination without being forced to limit the damages already available to victims of racial and ethnic discrimination. 54 For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the opinion of the district court limiting plaintiff's award pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981a. 55