Opinion ID: 3065942
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Four “Danger Signs”

Text: Justice Breyer’s opinion in Randall identified four “danger signs” to look for in a campaign contribution statute: “(1) The limits are set per election cycle, rather than divided between primary and general elections; (2) the limits apply to contributions from political parties; (3) the limits are the lowest in the Nation; and (4) the limits are below those we have previously upheld.” Id. at 268 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (listing Justice Breyer’s “danger signs”). We considered, in some form, each of these “danger signs” in Eddleman. First, we found that the Montana contribution limits “apply to ‘each election in a campaign,’ [so,] the amount an individual may contribute to a candidate doubles when the candidate participates in a contested primary.” Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1088. By comparison, Vermont’s limits applied to a “twoyear general election cycle.” Randall, 548 U.S. at 238. Second, although Eddleman did not specifically deal with the limit on campaign contributions by political parties, there was no need to do so, because in Montana the aggregate contribution limits for political parties is much higher than the individual and political committee contribution limits. See Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1094 (“[W]hile decreasing PAC and individual contributions, [Montana’s contribution limit statute] simultaneously increased the amount of money political parties may contribute to a candidate, almost doubling the amount that may be contributed in some races.”); see also Mont. Code Ann. § 13-37-216(3). In this regard, Montana’s statute stands in stark contrast with Vermont’s, which applied the same low contribution limit to individuals, PACs, and political parties alike. Randall, 548 U.S. at 238-39. 12688 LAIR v. BULLOCK Third, we acknowledged that Montana’s limits were “some of the lowest in the country,” but also observed that this was “unsurprising in light of the fact that Montana is one of the least expensive states in the nation in which to mount a political campaign.” Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1095. As Randall shows, Montana retains some of the lowest contribution limits in the nation, but it is not the lowest, a distinction that belonged to Vermont. See Randall, 548 U.S. at 250-51.5 Fourth, while Eddleman did not specifically compare Montana’s contribution limits with other instances where the Court has upheld a contribution limit as constitutional, we did compare the change in Montana’s total campaign spending with other instances where the Court had upheld limits that involved greater decreases in total campaign spending. Eddleman, 434 F.3d at 1094 (“Indeed, the Shrink Missouri Court upheld contributions limits despite a decrease of more than 50% in total spending in Missouri elections, nearly twice the decrease present here.”). We also considered that there are “provision[s] preventing incumbents from using excess funds from one campaign in future campaigns. Such provision[s] keep incumbents from building campaign war chests and gaining a fundraising head start over challengers.” Id. at 1095. We stressed that, in the end analysis, it is not the dollar amount that is critical, it is 5 The district court appears to read Randall’s “danger signs” as condemning Montana’s contribution limits. Opinion and Order at 28 (concluding without analysis that Montana’s limits violate Randall’s “danger signs” merely because “the U.S. Supreme Court has previously observed that Montana’s limits, like Vermont’s former limits, are among the lowest in the country”). This reading of Randall is flawed. Randall referred to Montana’s contribution limits—along with those of Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Maine, Massachusetts, and South Dakota—only as a method for illustrating that Vermont’s limits raised one “danger sign” and solidifying Vermont’s status as an outlier among other states with regards to contribution limits. Randall, 548 U.S. at 250-51. Nothing in Randall even hints that Montana’s limits are unconstitutional. LAIR v. BULLOCK 12689 whether a candidate can amass the resources necessary to mount an effective campaign, id., a position in harmony with Randall, see 548 U.S. at 248-49. Thus, all of Randall’s “danger signs” were considered in one form or another. Most importantly, and consistent with Randall, our decision in Eddleman “review[ed] the record independently and carefully with an eye toward assessing the statute’s ‘tailoring.’ ” Id. at 249. We think Eddleman took ample account of the “danger signs” identified in Randall.