Opinion ID: 1956862
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Use of Learned Treatises

Text: At trial, Majdic presented the expert testimony of Paul Glasgow, a mechanical engineer, who testified that in his opinion the power press manufactured by Cincinnati had been defective because of the absence of safety guards. During Glasgow's testimony, Majdic sought to introduce into evidence various articles from trade publications and learned treatises which Glasgow had relied upon in forming his opinion. He also offered as evidence numerous patents which suggested the availability of safety guards at the time the power press had been manufactured. Although the trial court permitted Glasgow to refer to these materials, it refused to allow them to be received into evidence or their contents to be read to the jury. The law in this Commonwealth is well-settled that an expert witness may be cross-examined on the contents of a publication upon which he or she has relied in forming an opinion, and also with respect to any other publication which the expert acknowledges to be a standard work in the field. See: Cummings v. Borough of Nazareth, 430 Pa. 255, 242 A.2d 460 (1968); Walheim v. Kirkpatrick, 305 Pa.Super. 590, 451 A.2d 1033 (1982); and, Brannan v. Lankenau Hospital, 254 Pa.Super. 352, 385 A.2d 1376 (1978), rev'd on other grounds, 490 Pa. 588, 417 A.2d 196 (1980). In such cases, the publication or literature is not admitted for the truth of the matter asserted, but only to challenge the credibility of the witness' opinion and the weight to be accorded thereto. Brannan v. Lankenau Hospital, supra, 254 Pa.Superior Ct. at 365, 385 A.2d at 1383. Learned writings which are offered to prove the truth of the matters therein are hearsay and may not properly be admitted into evidence for consideration by the jury. See: McCormick on Evidence § 321, at 899 (3d ed. 1984). Under the current state of the law in this Commonwealth, it was entirely proper for the trial court to refuse to admit into evidence the treatises and patents offered by Majdic. Because these materials were being offered to prove the truth of the matters asserted therein (i.e., that safety guards could have been added to the press in 1949), they were hearsay, and were inadmissible as substantive evidence. It was also proper for the trial court to refuse Majdic's offer to allow his expert witness to read the contents of the documents aloud in court. Excerpts from a publication which are read into evidence for the purpose of proving the truth of the statements contained therein are still hearsay and, therefore, inadmissible. This fact is not changed merely because the document is read into evidence by the witness instead of being received as an exhibit for inspection by the jury. It is the purpose for which the information is offered, not the manner in which is introduced, which makes it objectionable. Majdic concedes that information contained in private treatises is hearsay. Nevertheless, he argues that we should adopt a more liberal view towards treatises and periodicals and allow their admission when relied upon by an expert. That decision, however, is not for this Court to decide; therefore, we decline this invitation. With respect to the patents, the learned treatise exception has no application. The assurances of trustworthiness which are intrinsic in scholarly treatises do not exist where patents are concerned. Unlike learned treatises, patents are not necessarily propounded by an expert in the field in which the patent applies; rather, they may be obtained by any individual with an original idea. Moreover, they are not generally subject to the type of criticism and analysis which learned treatises usually undergo. In light of these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion either by refusing to admit the treatises and patents into evidence or by declining to allow portions thereof to be read to the jury.