Opinion ID: 1105900
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Definition of Mixture

Text: The dispositive issue in this case is what constitutes a mixture for purposes of § 13A-12-231(2). Neither the Code of Alabama 1975 nor this Court's cases define mixture for purposes of drug-trafficking crimes. [1] Accordingly, we look to the courts of other jurisdictions for assistance. In Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 111 S.Ct. 1919, 114 L.Ed.2d 524 (1991), the Supreme Court of the United States held that the term mixture or substance, as used in the federal drug-trafficking statutes, included blotter paper into which a detectable amount of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) had been absorbed. [2] The Supreme Court explained: Neither the statute nor the Sentencing Guidelines define the terms `mixture' and `substance,' nor do they have any established common-law meaning. Those terms, therefore, must be given their ordinary meaning.... A `mixture' is defined to include `a portion of matter consisting of two or more components that do not bear a fixed proportion to one another and that however thoroughly commingled are regarded as retaining a separate existence.' Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1449 (1986). A `mixture' may also consist of two substances blended together so that the particles of one are diffused among the particles of the other. 9 Oxford English Dictionary 921 (2d ed.1989). LSD is applied to blotter paper in a solvent, which is absorbed into the paper and ultimately evaporates. After the solvent evaporates, the LSD is left behind in a form that can be said to `mix' with the paper. The LSD crystals are inside of the paper, so that they are commingled with it, but the LSD does not chemically combine with the paper. Thus, it retains a separate existence and can be released by dropping the paper into a liquid or by swallowing the paper itself. The LSD is diffused among the fibers of the paper. Like heroin or cocaine mixed with cutting agents, the LSD cannot be distinguished from the blotter paper, nor easily separated from it. Like cutting agents used with other drugs that are ingested, the blotter paper, gel, or sugar cube carrying LSD can be and often is ingested with the drug. Chapman, 500 U.S. at 461-62, 111 S.Ct. at 1925-26 (emphasis added) (citation and footnote omitted). In response to the argument that the dictionary definition of mixture should be rejected because it would allow containers, such as glass vials or even an automobile in which the illegal drugs were being transported, to be counted, the Supreme Court stated: [S]uch nonsense is not the necessary result of giving the term `mixture' its dictionary meaning. The term does not include LSD in a bottle, or LSD in a car, because the drug is easily distinguished from, and separated from, such a `container.' The drug is clearly not mixed with a glass vial or automobile; nor has the drug chemically bonded with the vial or car. It may be true that the weights of containers and packaging materials generally are not included in determining a sentence for drug distribution, but that is because those items are also clearly not mixed or otherwise combined with the drug. Chapman, 500 U.S. at 462-63, 111 S.Ct. at 1926 (emphasis added). Similarly, our cases provide that [w]ords must be given their natural, ordinary, commonly understood meaning, and where plain language is used, the court is bound to interpret that language to mean exactly what it says. Ex parte State Dep't of Revenue, 683 So.2d 980, 983 (Ala.1996); IMED Corp. v. Systems Eng'g Assocs. Corp., 602 So.2d 344, 346 (Ala.1992). Thus, we hold that for purposes of § 13A-12-231(2), a mixture consists of two or more substances blended together so that the particles of one substance are diffused among the particles of the other(s) and yet each substance retains its separate existence. Where an illegal drug is commingled with, or diffused among, legal substances, the weight of the entire mixture should be counted. See Clark v. State, 562 So.2d 620 (Ala.Crim.App.1989) (holding that the commingling of white powder consisting of mannitol, a legal substance, with white powder consisting of cocaine, an illegal drug, was a mixture). Where, however, an illegal drug is easily distinguished from and easily separable from legal substances, only the weight of the illegal drug should be counted. Fletcher argues further that this Court should adopt the usability concept embodied in the commentary to the federal Sentencing Guidelines to more strictly define a mixture. Application note 1 in the commentary to 18 U.S.C.S. app. § 2D1.1.(a), as amended in 1993, states: `Mixture or substance' as used in this guideline has the same meaning as in 21 U.S.C. § 841, except as expressly provided. Mixture or substance does not include materials that must be separated from the controlled substance before the controlled substance can be used. Examples of such materials include the fiberglass in a cocaine/fiberglass bonded suitcase, beeswax in a cocaine/beeswax statue, and waste water from an illicit laboratory used to manufacture a controlled substance. If such material cannot readily be separated from the mixture or substance that appropriately is counted in the Drug Quantity Table, the court may use any reasonable method to approximate the weight of the mixture or substance to be counted. An upward departure nonetheless may be warranted when the mixture or substance counted in the Drug Quantity Table is combined with other, non-countable material in an unusually sophisticated manner in order to avoid detection. (Emphasis added.) See 18 U.S.C.S. app., U.S. Sent. Guidelines, app. C, amend. 484 (discussing 1993 amendment to definition of mixture set forth in the commentary to § 2D1.1). Thus, Fletcher argues that unless the legal substance is necessary for the use of an illegal drug, the legal substance should not count toward the weight of the illegal drug even if the legal substance is contained in a mixture with the illegal drug. See United States v. Rolande-Gabriel, 938 F.2d 1231 (11th Cir.1991). We disagree. The federal law's adoption of the concept of usability to restrict the term mixture comes from the 1993 amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines. [3] 18 U.S.C.S. app., U.S. Sent. Guidelines § 2D1.1, Appl. n. 1 (backg'd). This amendment was adopted in reaction to certain decisions of federal courts that adopted the plain meaning of the term mixture without a usability restriction. See 18 U.S.C.S. app., U.S. Sent. Guidelines, app. C, amend. 484 (stating that the 1993 amendment to the definition of mixture was brought about by certain decisions of the federal courts of appeal that included unusable substances in mixtures with usable controlled substances); see, e.g., United States v. Young, 992 F.2d 207 (8th Cir.1993) (holding that the weight of the entire tablet and not just the amount of the illegal hydromorphine contained therein should be used to compute the defendant's sentence); United States v. Lopez-Gil, 965 F.2d 1124 (1st Cir.) (holding that fiberglass mixed with cocaine to form a suitcase should be counted with the cocaine for purposes of computing the proper sentence), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 981, 113 S.Ct. 484, 121 L.Ed.2d 388 (1992); United States v. Restrepo-Contreras, 942 F.2d 96 (1st Cir.1991) (holding that the entire weight of beeswax-cocaine statues should be used in determining defendant's sentence), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1066, 112 S.Ct. 955, 117 L.Ed.2d 123 (1992). Unlike the United States Sentencing Commission, the Alabama Legislature has not adopted any guideline or statute that would restrict the concept of mixture to usable mixture. Absent specific direction by the Legislature, we will not construe the term mixture contained in § 13A-12-231(2) against its plain meaning and so reward the extraordinary ingenuity of the criminal mind. We hold that in determining whether a defendant has violated § 13A-12-231(2), all legal substances that are contained in a mixture should be weighed along with the illegal drug contained therein.