Opinion ID: 603512
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: is the supplementary treaty a bill of attainder as

Text: 70 APPLIED TO PETER G.J. McMULLEN? 71 In order to determine whether a congressional enactment is a bill of attainder, the Supreme Court has adopted a three-pronged conjunctive test that considers whether the act: (1) imposed punishment, (2) specified the affected persons, and (3) lacked the protection of judicial process. See Selective Serv. Sys., 468 U.S. at 847, 104 S.Ct. at 3352. Because the Supplementary Treaty does not in any sense  'inflict[ ] punishment without a judicial trial,'  Lovett, 328 U.S. at 315, 66 S.Ct. at 1078 (quoting Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 323), it cannot be classified as a bill of attainder as applied to McMullen. Although punishment may follow extradition, extradition itself never has been considered punishment. United States ex rel. Oppenheim v. Hecht, 16 F.2d 955, 956 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 769, 47 S.Ct. 572, 71 L.Ed. 883 (1927). In an extradition proceeding, the role of the judge is to determine whether there is competent evidence to justify holding the accused to await trial. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 316, 42 S.Ct. 469, 472, 66 L.Ed. 956 (1922). What is at issue in the proceeding, therefore, is not punishability but prosecutability. M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Extradition and World Public Order 524 (1974). 72 The statute entitled: Fugitives from foreign country to United States provides: 73 If, on [an extradition] hearing, [the judge] deems the evidence sufficient to sustain the charge under the provisions of the proper treaty or convention, he shall certify the same, together with a copy of all the testimony taken before him, to the Secretary of State, that a warrant may issue upon the requisition of the proper authorities of such foreign government, for the surrender of such person, according to the stipulations of the treaty or convention.... 74 18 U.S.C. § 3184. According to the statute, the extradition proceeding culminates in a surrender to the foreign government rather than in punishment of any sort. 75 McMullen has not yet had a hearing to determine whether surrender would be proper. Before that determination is made, he is entitled to the due process protections of an extradition proceeding, including notice in the form of a complaint made under oath, charging [him] ... with having committed within the jurisdiction of [the] foreign government any of the crimes provided for by such treaty, as well as a hearing at which evidence of criminality may be heard and considered. Id. The consequence of McMullen's surrender may be punishment in Great Britain, but that will follow a trial in the common law tradition from which our own criminal justice system is derived. Trial in Great Britain itself is by no means certain, because the government first must prevail at the extradition hearing. 76 There are a number of issues that McMullen is entitled to raise at an extradition hearing. One of these is provided by an important modification to the 1977 Treaty made by the Supplementary Treaty: the right to establish that the request for extradition was made with the view to punish on account of race, religion, nationality, or political opinions  or that, in the case of a surrender, there would be prejudice at trial for the same reasons. Supplementary Treaty, art. 3(a), reprinted in S.Exec.Rep. No. 17, at 16 (emphasis added). It is noteworthy that there is a right to an immediate appeal of a determination of an issue raised under Article 3(a), with expedited consideration at every stage. Id., art. 3(b), reprinted in S.Exec.Rep. No. 17, at 16. Ordinarily, extradition proceedings that result in issuance of a certificate may be reviewed at the instance of the person extradited only collaterally by a writ of habeas corpus. See United States v. Doherty, 786 F.2d 491, 501 (2d Cir.1986). 77 As noted earlier, courts have developed a series of tests to ascertain whether the enactment in question inflicts forbidden punishment for purposes of a bill of attainder. The inquiry is fact specific, and a court must consider (1) whether the challenged [act] falls within the historical meaning of legislative punishment; (2) whether the [act] 'viewed in terms of the type and severity of burdens imposed, reasonably can be said to further nonpunitive legislative purposes'; and (3) whether the legislative record 'evinces a congressional intent to punish.'  Selective Serv. Sys., 468 U.S. at 852, 104 S.Ct. at 3355 (quoting Nixon, 433 U.S. at 473, 475-76, 478, 97 S.Ct. at 2805, 2806-07, 2808). It is certain that the Supplementary Treaty as applied to McMullen does not meet the historical test for bill of attainder punishment contemplated by Nixon. In disagreement with the district court, we do not think that it meets the functional or motivational tests either. It cannot be gainsaid that the Supplementary Treaty functioned to further nonpunitive legislative purposes. Those purposes included furtherance of the United States policy of combatting international terrorism and strengthening relations with an important and traditional ally. The district court recognized these legitimate goals of the Supplementary Treaty but decided that the burdens imposed upon McMullen outweighed those goals. 78 We do not think that the burdens imposed upon McMullen are so severe that they eclipse the legitimate purposes of the Supplementary Treaty. McMullen would be subject to future extradition proceedings, despite the retroactive effect of the provision eliminating the political offense exception for the crimes of which McMullen is accused. Since an extradition hearing merely leads to a preliminary determination of probable cause, neither the doctrine of res judicata nor the Fifth Amendment protection against double jeopardy would apply. See Collins v. Loisel, 262 U.S. 426, 430, 43 S.Ct. 618, 619, 67 L.Ed. 1062 (1923). The government would be free to institute a further extradition request. Therefore, even without the retroactive provision, if the United Kingdom were again to request McMullen's extradition, his case would be reevaluated under the Supplementary Treaty. Surely, then, another extradition hearing does not constitute an unconstitutional burden. Moreover, the Supreme Court has indicated that only when a legitimate purpose is not apparent will the Court deem the purpose of the decisionmaker to be the punishment of the individual. See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 475-76, 97 S.Ct. at 2806-07. A clearly non-punitive purpose has been identified here, the district court's finding of ulterior motive notwithstanding. 79 As to the Senate's motivation, even if it were assumed that Senator Lugar spoke for the entire Senate when he said of the Supplementary Treaty that [i]ts purpose is to reverse the three cases where extradition was denied, the ratification of the Treaty did not express a motive to punish but rather a motive to extradite the three individuals for trial and possible punishment. It simply cannot be said that the legislative record evinces a congressional intent to punish. Id. at 478, 97 S.Ct. at 2808. 80 There is no basis for the contention that the Senate intended to target McMullen. It did not extend the Supplementary Treaty to bring McMullen within its coverage; it only declined to adopt the D'Amato amendment to exempt him. Had the Senate consented to the Supplementary Treaty with a reservation that imposed a new burden upon McMullen (or those previously determined to be exempt from extradition by the former political offense exception), a bill of attainder issue might well arise. No burden was added to the Treaty in this case. It actually was modified in a way that benefits McMullen in that it added considerable due process protections. The fact that the Senate rejected the D'Amato amendment and declined to make the Treaty better for McMullen than the terms of the Treaty as negotiated by the Executive Branch does not demonstrate the motive to punish that calls forth bill of attainder protection. Nor does targeting occur because some (perhaps most) senators had the facts of three cases, including McMullen's, in mind in deciding to agree with the President that the political offense exception should be narrowed for all persons. 81