Opinion ID: 681035
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: personal jurisdiction over christopher

Text: 27 Chief Judge Posner correctly sets out that in Illinois in this diversity case there is no personal jurisdiction over an individual whose presence and activity in the state ... were solely on behalf of his employer or other principal. Plaintiff concedes in his brief that if an individual's [Christopher's] only contacts with a forum are solely the result of acts as a corporate fiduciary, personal jurisdiction over the individual may not be grounded on such contacts. 1 28 There is no question but that Christopher was in Illinois at all times pertinent to this case as a corporate officer with oversight over plaintiff and that in all respects he purported to act on behalf of Nova. In my view, whether Christopher's disciplinary actions were unfounded, as plaintiff claims, or whether, as a consequence, Nova lost the services of a long-standing employee with an excellent service record, Rice was an at will employee subject to discharge by his authorized superior. As Judge Posner points out, [t]he record contains no evidence that Christopher in firing Rice was on a frolic of his own. It was not alleged or shown that Christopher acted without the scope of his authority. Indeed, if that were the case, it is hard to see how Nova would be responsible for any interference with Rice's relationship or for defamation or for retaliatory discharge. 29 Corporate officers are not outsiders intermeddling maliciously in the business affairs of the corporation. They are privileged to act on behalf of their corporations, using their business judgment and discretion. Loewenthal Securities Co. v. White Paving Co., 351 Ill. 285, 300, 184 N.E. 310, 316 (1932). Since officers hold policy-making positions, their freedom of action aimed toward corporate benefit should not be curtailed by fear of personal liability.... 30 George A. Fuller Co. v. Chicago College of Osteopathic Medicine, 719 F.2d 1326, 1333 (7th Cir.1983). 31 There is neither logic nor demonstrated basis in any assertion that Christopher's actions were to further [his] personal goals. Id. Christopher was not alleged, or shown, to have any substantial financial stake in Nova so as to advance, in some fashion, his financial goals. The jury found that there was no retaliation against Rice by Christopher or by Nova. Such a finding by the jury is inconsistent with any claim of intentional interference with employment against Christopher. It should be noted that the only case cited by plaintiff in his brief to support the proposition that an allegation that a corporate officer acted contrary to the best interest of his employer is sufficient to overcome a fiduciary-shield defense is Zeman v. Lotus Heart, Inc., 717 F.Supp. 373 (D.Md.1989). That case turned on the individual officer's direct financial stake in the corporate employer. 32 It would violate a sense of fairness to permit the Burrowses to solicit, negotiate, and consummate corporate business in Maryland in which they personally had so direct and substantial an interest and then allow them to avoid responding in Maryland to legal charges addressed to them personally, which arise from those transactions. 33 Id. at 378. Zeman sets out the following factors to consider in respect to the fiduciary-shield doctrine: 34 Therefore, when (1) an employee has pursued conduct in a state solely at the direction of the corporation in furtherance of the corporation's interest; (2) he has not pursued a personal interest in the state that was direct and substantial; and (3) he has not diverted significantly from the corporate purpose and policies while in the state, his contact with the state should not subject him to the jurisdiction of a court in the state.... 35 Id. at 376-77. 36 The majority opinion, moreover, acknowledges that Christopher probably was entitled, prima facie at least, to the protection of the fiduciary-shield doctrine because, so far as the record of the trial reveals, he was not in fact in Illinois to serve his personal interests. Since the doctrine is equitable, I would not only agree with the above language, but I would add that it would be unfair and destructive of such a doctrine to permit a plaintiff to overcome it by simply asserting, without any particularity, that Christopher was acting, in substance, contrary to the best interests of his employer. The law does indeed, moreover, require the plaintiff to prove, not merely assert, that a court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant. 37 I would hold that the district court erred in not applying the fiduciary shield doctrine and in accepting personal jurisdiction over Christopher. I would not find that Christopher ever waived this defense. But even if personal jurisdiction were deemed appropriate for purposes of tortious interference with Rice's employment, I would find reversible error with respect to other district court actions as to defendant Christopher.