Opinion ID: 1039978
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Third OCCA Decision

Text: Howell appealed the jury’s Atkins determination to the OCCA, raising eleven propositions of error, including that the facts proven at trial demonstrated his mental retardation as a matter of law, and that the trial court should have placed the burden of proof on the government. The OCCA affirmed the jury’s decision. See Howell v. State, 138 P.3d 549 (Okla. Crim. App. 2006) (Howell III). Reviewing the evidence “in a light most favorable to the State,” the OCCA found the record supported the verdict. Id. at -12- 562. The court observed that Howell’s IQ scores ranged from 62 through 91—more than enough for a jury to conclude that Howell’s true IQ was not below 70. See id. at 562–63. The court also noted, “Other evidence, besides the testing scores, suggested that Howell was not limited in his abilities to understand and process information, not limited in communications [sic] skills, was able to learn from experiences or mistakes, was able to engage in logical reasoning, and was able to understand the reactions of others.” Id. at 563. The court then highlighted Howell’s handwritten letters to Watson, whom Howell married while both were in prison, and Howell’s testimony at trial in 1988 and before a judge in 1996. On Howell’s burden-of-proof argument, the OCCA re-affirmed its prior decisions giving the defendant the burden to prove mental retardation by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 562 (citing, inter alia, Myers v. State, 130 P.3d 262, 265 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005)). The court explained, “[That] a defendant is not mentally retarded is not an aggravating circumstance which the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . Eligibility for the death penalty is a different issue than proof of an aggravating circumstance.” Id. at 561 (citing Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 701.12 (2001)). The court also correctly noted that several other states—including Louisiana, New York, South Carolina, and Tennessee—likewise allocated the burden of proof to the defendant. See State v. Anderson, 996 So. 2d 973, 984–85 -13- (La. 2008); People v. Smith, 751 N.Y.S.2d 356, 357 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002); State v. Laney, 627 S.E.2d 726, 730–32 (S.C. 2006); Howell v. State, 151 S.W.3d 450, 467 (Tenn. 2004); see also Howell, 151 S.W.3d at 467 (listing more states of accord, including Georgia, Mississippi, New Mexico, Ohio, Texas, and Virginia). 5 Hence, the OCCA denied this ground for relief as well. H. OCCA’s Post-Conviction Review of the Atkins Trial After the appeal, Howell filed another petition for post-conviction relief in state court, raising several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel during the trial on mental retardation. As relevant here, Howell alleged that the prosecution struck jurors based on their race, in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), and that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to object. Howell also alleged that his trial counsel failed to exclude key parts of the state expert Dr. Hutson’s testimony, and that counsel failed to include testimony from Howell’s former high school teacher showing that Howell had been enrolled in special education classes. The OCCA denied post-conviction relief. See Howell v. State, No. PCD-2006-712, slip op. (Okla. Crim. App. Sept. 10, 2007) (unpublished) (Howell 5 The OCCA acknowledged that, at the time of its decision, a New Jersey court had placed the burden of proof on the prosecution. But following the OCCA’s decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the lower court, and now New Jersey also allocates the burden of proof to the defendant. See State v. Jimenez, 908 A.2d 181, 190 (N.J. 2006). -14- IV). The court rejected the Batson claim because “[Howell] failed to demonstrate that the prosecutor lacked a race-neutral explanation for the strikes [Howell] complains about.” Id. at 5. The court rejected the related IAC claim because it “presume[d], in the absence of any information to the contrary, that counsel had a sound strategic reason for not objecting to the removal of these panelists.” Id. And the court rejected Howell’s IAC claim regarding the failure to object to Dr. Hutson’s testimony because the court did not believe that the testimony was inadmissible in the first place, and in the alternative, it concluded the error was not prejudicial given all the other testimony from both sides about Howell’s IQ and the uncertainty of IQ testing. Id. at 8–11. Lastly, the OCCA rejected Howell’s IAC claim regarding the failure to include the teacher’s testimony because, according to the court, the error was not prejudicial. The court noted that Howell already presented his siblings’ testimony that he was in special education classes with them in high school, and the prosecution rebutted that testimony with Howell’s high school transcripts, which do not show him in special education classes (while his siblings’ transcripts do show that they were in such classes). Hence, reasoned the court, adding additional testimony that Howell actually was in special education classes still did not explain why his school records showed otherwise. The court concluded, “Given [his siblings’ testimony], along with extensive testimony from the defense expert, we fail to see how the very cursory information [Howell] provides from -15- [the teacher] would have added materially to the defense case, or how it could have altered the outcome of the trial.” Id. at 21.