Opinion ID: 767758
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: What Constitutes the Facility?

Text: 66 The parties agree that no release nor threat of release occurred on Parcels 2 and 3. Therefore, the Bohatys argue, even if they are liable, a lien is appropriate only on Parcel 1. 67 (9) The term facility means . . . (B) any site or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposedof, or placed, or otherwise come to be located. 68 . . . . 69 (23) The terms remove or removal means [sic] the cleanup or removal of released hazardous substances from the environment, such actions as may be necessary taken in the event of the threat of release of hazardous substances into the environment, such actions as may be necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or threat of release of hazardous substances, the disposal of removed material, or the taking of such other actions as may be necessary to prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to the public health or welfare or to the environment, which may otherwise result from a release or threat of release. 70 42 U.S.C. § 9601. 71 All costs and damages for which a person is liable to the United States under subsection (a) of this section . . . shall constitute a lien in favor of the United States upon all real property and rights to such property which-- 72 (A) belong to such person; and 73 (B) are subject to or affected by a removal or remedial action. 74 . . . . 75 The lien imposed by this subsection shall arise at the later of the following: 76 (A) The time costs are first incurred by the United States with respect to a response action under this chapter. 77 (B) The time that the person referred to in paragraph (1) is provided (by certified or registered mail) written notice of potential liability. 78 Such lien shall continue until the liability for the costs (or a judgment against the person arising out of such liability) is satisfied or becomes unenforceable through operation of the statute of limitations provided in section 9613 of this title. 79 42 U.S.C. § 9607(l)(1). 80 The government argues that the three parcels were all subject to or affected by the removal. EPA investigators observed Parcels 2 and 3 both visually and with a magnetometer to locate any drums that might have been deposited there. The government presented evidence that the pond, upon which the investigators expended considerable energy, extends beyond Parcel 1 to Parcel 3. Are these 81 such actions as may be necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or threat of release of hazardous substances, the disposal of removed material, or . . . such other actions as may be necessary to prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to the public health or welfare or to the environment, which may otherwise result from a release or threat of release? 82 They may be, but that does not appear self-evident. 83 The record indicates that interests in the three parcels have been transferred together by the same instruments, rather than by separate instruments for each parcel, at least since 1982. The district court looked to asset-forfeiture cases, and found support for the proposition that a property is defined by the recorded instruments and documents that created the defendant's interest in the property. See United States v. Smith, 966 F.2d 1045 (6th Cir. 1992) (citing United States v. Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538, 1543 (4th Cir 1989) and United States v. Reynolds, 856 F.2d 675, 677 (4th Cir 1988)). As the district court acknowledged, looking to criminal forfeiture law to interpret CERCLA's lien provision is a tenuous proposition. 84 The government states that this court has decided the issue, relying on Kelley v. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 17 F.3d 836, 843 (6th Cir. 1994) for the proposition that a remedial investigation and feasibility study constitutes a removal action.Although Kelley does state that the term removal action should be construed broadly, the statute-of-limitations issue in that case does not illuminate the geographic issue in the case before us. Furthermore, the government's claim that the investigation in Kelley . . . examined ten contiguous sites, only one of which actually contained hazardous waste, Brief for the United States at 45, is misleading. There is no indication that the ten sites were separate parcels--they were merely ten locations in one large landfill that the EPA identified as possible locations of hazardous materials. The Kelley panel simply did not consider the issue of the geographical extent of a removal. 85 The distinctive feature of the case before this court is the fact that the three parcels have separate identities, notwithstanding that they were historically conveyed together. The hard question is whether this should make any difference. 86 The words of the statute suggest that the bounds of a facility should be defined at least in part by the bounds of the contamination. . . . However, an area that cannot be reasonably or naturally divided into multiple parts or functional units should be defined as a single 'facility,' even if it contains parts that are non-contaminated. 87 United States v. Township of Brighton, 153 F.3d 307, 313 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing Clear Lake Properties v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 959 F. Supp. 763, 767-68 (S.D. Tex. 1997)). In Brighton, we held that where it appear[ed] that the entire property was operated together as a dump, the whole parcel was a facility even though only one corner was contaminated. Ibid. To apply the teaching of Brighton, we must decide whether the fact that the Bohaty property is composed of three cartographically-denominated parcels constitutes a reasonable or natural division into multiple parts. 88 We hold that it does not. There is no evidence in the record that the parcels were, at any relevant time, considered separate for any purpose other than the land records. They were transferred on the same deed, and except for a small part of one parcel they were in the same undeveloped state. The merely formal division in the land records is not a reasonable or natural division under Brighton. 89