Opinion ID: 1425855
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: a transfer may be a constructive discharge

Text: The first question presented is one of first impression  whether a transfer from a union job to a non-union job may, under the facts of this case, be construed as the constructive equivalent of a discharge or termination of employment. The majority obliquely recognizes the doctrine of constructive discharge, and that it can be the equivalent of a discharge for 85 O.S. 1981 § 5 purposes. However, it refuses to breathe any life into its recognition by allowing the question here to be left undecided by the trier of the fact, even though there are many material issues of fact which remain unresolved. Given the remedial nature of the statute, the term discharge in § 5 should be construed in a way which effectuates the manifest purpose of the Legislature which was to protect employees from retaliatory actions by employers. Obviously, the Legislature did not intend to go so far as to subject employers to liability for any change in working conditions or for any perceived slight to the employee. Conversely, however, the Legislature could not have intended to subject employees who file workers' compensation claims to retaliation so severe as to deter employees from availing themselves of the statutory protection of the Act. The legal standards developed in numerous decisions establishing the doctrine of constructive discharge most effectively strike this balance, and support the Legislative purpose in enacting § 5. Acme contends that a transfer to a different department is not a discharge under § 5. The employee argues that the question of whether the transfer was a discharge was a question of fact and should have been submitted to the jury. The employee has the burden of demonstrating that the employer's actions constituted a discharge. [2] Two theories have been propounded concerning what is necessary to prove constructive discharge: 1) The employee must prove the deliberateness of the employer's action, and the intolerability of the working conditions; [3] or 2) The employee must prove to the trier of fact that the working conditions were so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in the employee's shoes would have felt compelled to resign. [4] Either theory presents a question of fact. [5] An employer cannot do indirectly what it is not permitted to do directly [6] i.e., make a retaliatory transfer with the purpose and effect of forcing the transferred employee to quit or resign. [7] The constructive discharge doctrine has been regularly applied in the federal Circuit Courts of Appeal with divergent results. Some courts require the employee to prove the employer's specific intent to force him/her to leave. Others have adopted the less stringent objective standard requiring the employee to prove the employer has made working conditions so difficult that a reasonable person in the employee's shoes would feel forced to resign. A constructive discharge has been defined as an onerous transfer which has the purpose and effect of forcing the transferred employee to quit. [8] The theory of constructive discharge has been used in discrimination cases, [9] wrongful discharge cases, [10] and retaliatory discharge cases. [11] In Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp., 796 F.2d 340, 343 (10th Cir.1986), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded a constructive discharge case in which the trial court had determined that the employee had not been constructively discharged even though she had occupied a position on a career ladder track as an associate lease analyst, and was transferred to an accounting clerk position. The Derr Court instructed the trial court on remand to follow the standard set forth in Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61 (5th Cir.1980): A finding of constructive discharge depends upon whether a reasonable person would view the working conditions as intolerable, not upon the subjective view of the employee-claimant. When an employee contracts to fill a particular position any unjustified material change in duties or significant reduction in rank may constitute a constructive discharge. The fact that the employee receives the same salary is not determinative, because the status associated with the original position could have been the primary inducement for making the contract. [12] On the other hand, an employer has the right to transfer an employee as efficiency demands so long as the transfer is not made for an unlawful purpose. [13] Whether a constructive discharge occurred in this case cannot be determined because the cause was dismissed by the trial court before a full evidentiary hearing was held. In every action for wrongful discharge, it must be shown that the employee was discharged. The discharge may be direct  Your're fired! Or, the discharge may be less direct  I'll make things so miserable for you that you'll be forced to leave. Because the latter may be the substantial equivalent of the former, the employer's intent whether directly or circumstantially manifested, is relevant and important. If an employer is seeking to accomplish indirectly what it could not do directly, that can and should be shown. The foundation of a retaliatory discharge analysis is that an employer discharges an employee when the employer makes a unilateral decision to terminate the employee, even though the employer invites or permits the employee to quit instead. The employer's unilateral decision to dismiss the employee is the essence of the discharge, even if the employee fails either to return to work or resigns thus avoiding an actual formal dismissal. Where the claim is that the employee was forced to quit because of unacceptable working conditions, created or maintained by the employer, it is appropriate to require that the employee prove that the employer did so deliberately to rid itself of the employee. [14] Acme submitted the following in support of its motion to dismiss: 1. A doctor's report dated April 22, 1985, which concluded that the employee should not be working in an industrial environment. 2. The absence of economic loss because wages and benefits are equal. The employee's rebutting evidence was that: 1. An orthopedic surgeon's report, dated June 17, 1985, concluding that the employee was qualified to return to his normal occupation at no risk to the employer relative to his previously alleged injury; 2. Affidavits from four co-workers stating that the employee performed all his duties without any problem and there were no complaints that he was unable to physically perform his duties; 3. A performance review form stating that he was physically able to perform his job; 4) His affidavit and two union officer's affidavits stating that the transfer is to a nonunion job; 5) The transfer proceedings began two days after the employee settled his worker's compensation claim; 6) An affidavit of a professor of economics which states that a transfer from a union job to a non-union job would cause an economic loss to the employee even if the fringe benefits were the same. The majority has engaged in fact-finding which is not an appropriate role for this Court to assume on appeal. [15] It finds that the employee did not state a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge under § 5. This conclusion is implausible, to put it mildly, after reviewing the pleadings, the affidavits and the attachments. Under our notice pleading code, this result violates the spirit of 12 O.S.Supp. 1984 § 2008(F) which provides: All pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice. The result is even more baffling when the analogous unpublished case by the Court of Appeals, Cowell v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Employment Sec. Comm., No. 69,697, cert. denied, March 5, 1990, is considered. Cowell was employed by Kiamichi Production Credit Association as a secretary/office assistant. After the Association consolidated with Farm Credit Services, all jobs were eliminated, and the employees were advised to reapply for positions with the new employer. After following the recommended procedures, Cowell was offered a job as a secretary. Because she considered the new position to be a demotion in rank and benefits, and because she felt that it lacked the prestige of her former position, she turned down the offer and filed for unemployment benefits. Her application was approved by the Employment Security Commission, and Farm Credit Services appealed. The Court of Appeals held that Cowell's refusal to accept the alternative position did not preclude her from receiving unemployment compensation because her position had been eliminated and she was unemployed through no fault of her own. Although Large's position was not eliminated, the Company's Physical Qualification Program may have effectively eliminated Large from the position by finding that even though he had been performing the job competently for over a year since his accident, he was not physically qualified to stay on the job. In Cowell, the employee was faced with a position that did not carry the same rank, benefits or prestige. So, too, may have Large when he was told he was being transferred out of the collective bargaining unit to a clerical position. An employer violates the National Labor Relations Act by transferring an employee from a position inside the bargaining unit to another less desirable position outside the bargaining unit if the transfer results from the employee's union activities. [16] In N.L.R.B. v. Campbell-Harris Elec., Inc., 719 F.2d 292, 295 (8th Cir.1983), the Court held that two union employees who had worked for the alter ego company had been constructively discharged after refusing to work for the successor partnership on a non-union basis. An analogous argument can be made that an employer has constructively discharged an employee when that employee is transferred outside the bargaining unit after filing a worker's compensation claim. These are all questions of fact, and unlike the majority, I do not presume to know the answers to these questions. It is commonly recognized, however, that collective bargaining agreements typically contain negotiated benefits which include, but which are not limited to, pay rates, holidays, time off for elections and jury duty, military leave, insurance plans, safety practices, layoff procedures, recall rights, seniority, termination, promotions, union security, union dues checkoff, work hours, overtime pay, grievance procedure, arbitration, pensions, vacations, the competitive right to bid for certain jobs, and shift differential pay. [17] Large was certainly entitled to offer proof of the existence and importance of such benefits. A petition should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim. [18] Large has not been allowed to present evidence to establish that the clerical position was not as prestigious as the position from which he was transferred, or that the benefits were inferior. This matter should be remanded for a full evidentiary hearing to determine these disputed fact questions surrounding the issue of whether a constructive discharge occurred. Under the majority's analysis, it is irrelevant whether Large could prove at trial: that the Physical Qualifications Program was a sham; that being transferred from a union to a non-union position diminished the terms and conditions of his employment resulting in a substantially inferior job; that the general surgeon's findings were incompetent; that the employer deliberately disregarded his one year of satisfactory post-injury performance, and that Large was physically able to perform his job in the assembly line without impairing either his own safety or that of his co-workers; or that reassignment to a position outside the bargaining unit was a pretext behind which lay the employer's intent that Large would become so miserable that he would quit. [19] For these reasons, summary judgment was inappropriate.