Opinion ID: 889494
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Heading: Did the District Court properly dismiss Neighbors' private nuisance claims?

Text: ¶ 31 Montana law defines a public nuisance as one that affects an entire community or neighborhood or any considerable number of persons. Section 27-30-102, MCA. A private nuisance, by contrast, includes every nuisance not included in the definition of public nuisance. Section 27-30-102, MCA. The District Court reasoned that the noise from the shooting range could not constitute both a public and private nuisance by application of the legal definition of Section 27-30-102, MCA. ¶ 32 Montana adopted § 27-30-102, MCA, verbatim from California Civil Code § 3480. This Court follows the construction placed on the statute by the highest court of the state that first enacted the statute. Barnes, ¶ 19. The California Court of Appeals has recognized that a nuisance may qualify as both a public and private nuisance. Koll-Irvine Ctr. Prop. Owners Assn. v. Co. of Orange, 24 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1041, 29 Cal. Rptr.2d 664 (1994). The Koll-Irvine court determined that the plaintiff must show an injury specific to the use and enjoyment of his or her land in order to proceed on a private nuisance theory. The injury need not be different in kind, however, from that suffered by the general public. Koll-Irvine, 24 Cal.App.4th at 1041, 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 664. ¶ 33 The District Court determined that the noise from the Ranch's shooting range represents a condition common to all the plaintiffs. As noted in Koll-Irvine, however, a district court should focus on the injury  whether the alleged nuisance interferes with a specific plaintiff's use and enjoyment of his land. Koll-Irvine, 24 Cal.App.4th at 1041, 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 664. The court should not focus on whether the condition constituting the alleged nuisance is unique to a particular plaintiff. Koll-Irvine, 24 Cal.App.4th at 1041, 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 664. ¶ 34 Some degree of increased noise from the Ranch's shooting range may present a condition common to Neighbors' public and private nuisance claims. The injuries alleged in Neighbors' private nuisance claims, however, are unique to each member of the group. For example, Neighbors' private nuisance claims allege interference with the Triple D. Game Farm, which supplies animals for still and cinema photography, and obstruction of Rob Rice's home recording studio. These injuries, including potential pecuniary losses associated with them, are unique and specific to particular residents in the Tally/Bissell Zoning District. The District Court improperly focused on the condition common to all plaintiffs in the form of increased noise from the shooting range. The court should have focused on the injuries alleged by specific plaintiffs. ¶ 35 Did the District Court properly dismiss Neighbors' trespass claim? ¶ 36 The District Court reasoned that the definition of trespass requires a person or thing to enter the property of another. The court determined that sound did not constitute a tangible thing. Neighbors contend that the modern view supports an action for trespass based upon intangible intrusions. ¶ 37 Neighbors point to cases from a variety of jurisdictions that recognize intangible invasions such as noise, light, airborne gases, and electromagnetic fields to support actions for trespass. See Cook v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 273 F.Supp.2d 1175, 1200 (D.Col.2003) (plutonium plume contaminants), Mock v. Potlatch Corp., 786 F.Supp. 1545, 1551 (D.Idaho 1992) (noise from plant's electrical generator), Elton v. Anheuser-Busch Beverage Group, Inc., 50 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1307, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 303 (1996) (fire and smoke). All these jurisdictions have required a showing of actual physical damage, however, in bringing a trespass action based upon noise or some other intangible invasion. ¶ 38 The recognition of a trespass claim based upon an intangible invasion, yet requiring a showing of actual damage, maintains the distinction between trespass and nuisance. The law predicates the tort of trespass upon a party's right to exclusive possession of his property. Cook, 273 F.Supp.2d at 1199; see also the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 163, cmt. d.(1965). A nuisance action, by contrast, serves to protect a party's right to free use and enjoyment of his property. Section 27-30-101, MCA. The entry of another person or thing obstructs a property owner's exclusive possession. A party need not establish actual harm or damages in a traditional trespass action. Cook, 273 F.Supp.2d at 1199-1200. ¶ 39 With respect to an intangible trespass, however, the majority of courts have reasoned that the party's right to exclusive possession has not been infringed. Cook, 273 F.Supp.2d at 1200. As a result, courts generally require a showing of actual damage to support a cause of action for trespass based upon an intangible item. Cook, 273 F.Supp.2d at 1200. We agree with the analysis employed by these courts and recognize an intangible invasion, accompanied by actual damages, to support a cause of action for trespass. The District Court failed to recognize that Neighbors may be able to establish actual damages in support of their intangible trespass claim. The District Court denied Neighbors the opportunity to develop facts and evidence sufficient to establish actual damage when it prematurely dismissed their trespass claim. ¶ 40 Did the District Court properly dismiss Neighbors' attractive nuisance claim? ¶ 41 Neighbors argue that the anticipation of injury proves sufficient to sustain an attractive nuisance claim. Neighbors cite Montana cases where this Court has contemplated injunctions brought under nuisance theory grounded in tort. See Purcell v. Davis, 100 Mont. 480, 488, 50 P.2d 255, 256 (1935); Boyer v. Karagacin, 178 Mont. 26, 32, 582 P.2d 1173, 1177 (1978); Dutton v. Rocky Mtn. Phosphates, 151 Mont. 54, 74, 438 P.2d 674, 685 (1968). ¶ 42 Under the Ranch's argument, attractive nuisance represents a tort theory that requires a showing of causation and damages. The Ranch contends that Neighbors failed to allege causation and damages in their complaint. The Ranch seeks to distinguish nuisance from attractive nuisance on the basis that Montana law has codified nuisance in a statute that expressly provides for injunctive relief as a remedy. Sections 27-30-202, 301, MCA. ¶ 43 Injunctive relief represents a principle of equity. Wells v. Young, 2002 MT 102, ¶ 12, 309 Mont. 419, 47 P.3d 809 (2002) (overruled in part on other grounds). This Court has long recognized that flexible, not cast-iron, rules govern courts of equity. State ex rel. Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v. Dist. Ct. of Third Jud. Dist. Co. of Powell, 267 Mont. 1, 24, 881 P.2d 594, 607 (1994). These rules call upon the courts of equity to adapt themselves to the exigencies of the particular case. State ex rel. Farm Credit Bank of Spokane, 267 Mont. at 24, 881 P.2d at 607. ¶ 44 Even though the Legislature now has codified nuisance law in Montana, nuisance theory sounds in general tort principles just like attractive nuisance. As a result, a court sitting in equity may grant injunctive relief for anticipated or potential danger under a tort claim such as attractive nuisance, as long as the plaintiff meets the requirements of an attractive nuisance claim. These requirements include: 1) an artificial condition maintained by the possessor of land in a place which the possessor knows or should know that children are likely to trespass; 2) the condition involves an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm; 3) children because of their youth will be unable to discover the condition or realize the danger; 4) the utility of maintaining the condition is slight compared to the risk it presents to young children; and 5) the possessor fails to exercise reasonable care to eliminate the danger or otherwise protect the children. Big Man v. State of Montana, 192 Mont. 29, 38, 626 P.2d 235, 240 (1981). ¶ 45 This approach comports with the statutory standard for granting injunctions. A preliminary injunction under § 27-19-201, MCA, requires a showing that the commission or continuance of some act during the litigation would produce a great or irreparable injury to the applicant. Section 27-19-201(2), MCA (emphasis added). A court may grant a permanent injunction where pecuniary compensation would not afford adequate relief. Section 27-19-102(1), MCA. The flexible nature of equitable principles allows Neighbors to attempt to establish a prima facie case for a preliminary injunction by showing that it is at least doubtful whether or not [they] will suffer irreparable injury. Benefis Healthcare v. Great Falls Clinic, LLP, 2006 MT 254, ¶ 14, 334 Mont. 86, 146 P.3d 714. ¶ 46 The Neighbors properly alleged in their complaint all the elements of attractive nuisance from Big Man. The court denied Neighbors the opportunity, however, to develop facts of an actual threat of irreparable injury. The District Court acted too hastily in dismissing the Neighbors' attractive nuisance claim. ¶ 47 Did the District Court properly dismiss Neighbors' constitutional and statutory claims? ¶ 48 This Court refused in Shammel v. Canyon Resources Corp., 2007 MT 206, 338 Mont. 541, 167 P.3d 886, to determine whether Article II, Section 3, and Article IX, Section 1, right to a clean and healthful environment, support a cause of action for money damages between two private parties where adequate alternative remedies exist under common law or statute. Shammel, ¶ 8. Neighbors also have failed to demonstrate how common law or statutory remedies would not adequately address any potential damages. Sunburst School Distr. No. 2 v. Texaco, Inc., 2007 MT 183, ¶ 64, 338 Mont. 259, 165 P.3d 1079. We agree with the District Court's decision to dismiss Neighbors' claim for monetary damages based upon Article II, Section 3, and Article IX, Section 1. ¶ 49 Neighbors next claim that operation of the shooting range near an elementary school would violate Article X, Section 1(1) and (3) of the Montana Constitution. These provisions guarantee all Montanans equality of educational opportunity, and that the Legislature shall provide a basic system of free quality public elementary and secondary schools. Mont. Const. Art. X, Sec. 1. Article X, Section 1 of the Montana Constitution requires the Legislature to fund a quality educational system. Columbia Falls Elementary School Dist. No. 6 v. State, 2005 MT 69, ¶ 31, 326 Mont. 304, 109 P.3d 257. Nothing in these provisions directly address the conduct of private parties. The District Court correctly dismissed Neighbors' claim based upon Article X, Section 1. ¶ 50 A similar analysis applies to Neighbors' statutory claim. Section 76-9-105, MCA, provides that established shooting ranges may not be prevented from operation by a state agency, unit of local government, or court unless the range presents a clear and provable safety hazard to the adjacent population. We already have determined that Neighbors may proceed with the common law nuisance and trespass claims contained in their complaint. A decision by a court to enjoin or abate a nuisance or trespass would encompass any clear and provable safety hazard to the adjacent population posed by the shooting range. As a result, we need not determine whether § 76-9-105, MCA, provides for a private right of action. ¶ 51 Did the District Court properly dismiss Robert Hayes as a defendant? ¶ 52 Neighbors' complaint alleges that Hayes initiated construction of the shooting range before selling the property to the Ranch. The complaint alleges that the noise from the operation of the shooting range forms the basis of the various claims. The complaint further alleges that this noise began simultaneously with construction of the shooting range. Thus, the complaint alleges that the nuisancenoise from shotgun blastsbegan at the same time as initial construction of the shooting range. Hayes still owned the property at the start of the construction process. Neighbors allege that Hayes created the nuisance before he transferred the property to the Ranch. ¶ 53 Taking the allegations of the well-pled complaint as true, Neighbors properly included Hayes as a defendant. Neighbors cannot now enjoin Hayes from operating a shooting range that he no longer owns. Neighbors can seek, however, to prove that they suffered damages as a result of Hayes' actions in creating the alleged disturbance from the shotgun blasts while he owned the property. Meagher, ¶ 13; §§ 27-30-103, 104, MCA. ¶ 54 Section 27-30-105, MCA, provides that every successive owner of property who neglects to abate a continuing nuisance upon or in the use of such property, created by a former owner, is liable in the same manner as the one who created the nuisance. The Ranch stands as a successive landowner under § 27-30-105, MCA. Neighbors properly seek to enjoin the Ranch and recover damages from the Ranch based on the Ranch's continued operation of the shooting range.