Opinion ID: 2736423
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Spoliation of Taser Evidence

Text: We review a district court’s decision to give or refuse an adverse inference instruction for abuse of discretion. Gilbert v. Cosco Inc., 989 F.2d 399, 406 (10th Cir. 1993). We review its finding of bad faith or mere negligence for clear error. Turner v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 563 F.3d 1136, 1149-50 (10th Cir. 2009). “Spoliation is . . . the intentional destruction of evidence that is presumed to be unfavorable to the party responsible for its destruction.” United States v. Copeland, 321 F.3d 582, 597 (6th Cir. 2003). Sanctions for spoliation of evidence are appropriate when the party “had a duty to preserve the evidence because it knew or should have known that litigation was imminent, and [the other party] was prejudiced 1 Moreno does not appeal the district court’s decisions regarding Deputy Garcia. -4- by the destruction of the evidence.” 103 Investors I, L.P. v. Square D Co., 470 F.3d 985, 989 (10th Cir. 2006). An adverse inference instruction may be an appropriate sanction for spoliation of evidence. See id. at 988. But to warrant an adverse inference instruction, a party must submit evidence of intentional destruction or bad faith. Henning v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 530 F.3d 1206, 1220 (10th Cir. 2008); see also Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 112 F.3d 1398, 1407 (10th Cir. 1997) (“The adverse inference must be predicated on the bad faith of the party destroying the records.”). “Mere negligence in losing or destroying records is not enough because it does not support an inference of consciousness of a weak case.” Aramburu, 112 F.3d at 1407. Moreno argues that the Taser was “the one piece of evidence that would have objectively indicated the number of times and duration that [he] was tased by [Deputy] Archuleta.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 13. He claims that because Taos County had a policy concerning the preservation of a Taser after its use, and Deputy Archuleta should have understood the importance of securing this evidence, then Deputy Archuleta’s failure to preserve was done in bad faith. See id. at 15-16. Accordingly, he argues that the district court “abused its discretion and prejudiced [Moreno] in presenting his case at trial” by refusing to give an adverse inference instruction. Id. at 13. He requests that this court “reverse the district [c]ourt [o]rder precluding an adverse inference jury instruction” and remand for a new trial. Id. at 18. -5- Although this matter went to trial, we construe Moreno’s argument as an appeal from the district court’s denial of his pretrial motion seeking an adverse inference instruction. In his motion to the district court, Moreno argued that defendants failed to preserve the Taser by failing to book the Taser and its cartridges into evidence, photograph the Taser, and photograph the Taser impact sites on his body. He also argued that Deputy Archuleta failed to include use of the Taser in the initial incident report. Moreno claimed these actions violated Taos County policy and evidenced bad faith. The district court denied the motion, finding no evidence of bad faith on the part of defendants. Relying on deposition testimony of Taos County officers, the district court reasoned that Taos County policy regarding the booking and collection of evidence after a Taser discharge did not apply. The policy to which Moreno referred was entitled “Responsibilities after Taser Discharge.” Taos County officers explained that “discharge” of a Taser requires use of a Taser in dart-mode, when the cartridge is discharged. The district court concluded that because Deputy Archuleta did not discharge the Taser, but, instead, used it in drive-stun mode, which does not use a cartridge, the policy was inapplicable. It further considered Deputy Archuleta’s deposition testimony that he understood Taos County policy to require booking the Taser and cartridge into evidence only when a cartridge had been used. The district court determined that Moreno failed to submit evidence showing that the failure to preserve was in bad faith, as opposed to mere negligence. Additionally, it -6- determined Moreno failed to show that defendants had an obligation to preserve the Taser evidence because they were aware that litigation might be imminent. We have reviewed the record and conclude the district court’s factual finding that there was no bad faith is not clearly erroneous. See Turner, 563 F.3d at 1149-50. The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying Moreno’s pretrial motion requesting an adverse inference instruction. We further note that although this action proceeded to trial, Moreno does not tell us whether he asked for a trial ruling regarding a proposed adverse inference instruction. Nor does he point to the record that he presented evidence at trial in support of an adverse inference instruction. He also does not argue that he proffered an adverse inference jury instruction at trial that was denied by the district court. And he does not provide us with a transcript of the jury instruction conference held in this matter. To the extent that Moreno seeks to challenge any such adverse trial ruling, Moreno has waived appellate review. See Perry v. Woodward, 199 F.3d 1126, 1141 n.13 (10th Cir. 1999) (“This court will not craft a party’s arguments for him.”); see also Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A) (explaining that appellant’s argument must contain contentions with citations to the authorities and parts of the record on which he relies).