Opinion ID: 617714
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Lisa E’s Coverage Applied

Text: GAIC contends that the explosion did not implicate the policy on the Lisa E and the district court mistakenly granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. OPA90, it argues, only holds liable the vessel that spilled the oil—the EMC 423. OPA90 states: Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject to the provisions of this Act, each responsible party for a vessel or a facility from which oil is discharged, or which poses the substantial threat of a discharge of oil, into or upon the navigable waters 28 Nos. 11-1266 & 11-1346 or adjoining shorelines or the exclusive economic zone is liable for the removal costs and damages specified in subsection (b) of this section that result from such incident. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a). OPA90 defines “responsible party” as, “in the case of a vessel, any person owning, operating, or demise chartering the vessel.” 33 U.S.C. § 2701(32)(A). It defines vessel as “every description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water, other than a public vessel.” 33 U.S.C. § 2701(37).4 Because the Lisa E did not, itself, discharge any oil into the canal, GAIC maintains that the vessel is beyond the scope of coverage. Assuming arguendo that, despite the EMC 423’s de- pendence upon the Lisa E for propulsion and navigation, the two vessels may not be considered a single vessel for purposes of OPA90, GAIC ignores that OPA90 holds liable not only those vessels that discharge oil, but also that “pose[] the substantial threat of a discharge of oil” as well. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a). The Lisa E satisfies OPA90’s definition of “vessel.” Furthermore, while the tug did not itself house the petro- 4 GAIC is correct that OPA90 separately defines “tank vessel” as “a vessel that is constructed or adapted to carry, or that carries, oil or hazardous material in bulk as cargo or cargo residue . . . .” 33 U.S.C. § 2701(37). However, it does not clearly articulate why this distinction is relevant for purposes of understanding liability under OPA90, which does not distinguish between a vessel and a tank vessel with respect to its elements of liability. See U.S.C. 33 § 2702(a). Nos. 11-1266 & 11-1346 29 leum cargo within its hull, it was attached to the EMC 423, which did. Specifically, the Lisa E was the sole means of propulsion and navigation for the EMC 423. By virtue of its propelling the EMC 423 and its petroleum cargo through Illinois’ waterways, the Lisa E posed a substantial threat of a discharge of oil and is, therefore, subject to liability under OPA90.5 Interpreting the statute as GAIC suggests and treating the Lisa E and EMC 423 as entirely separate entities for purposes of coverage yields a curious result. For purposes of OPA90, a vessel is a watercraft “used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water.” 33 U.S.C. § 2701(37). Without the Lisa E, or another means of propulsion, the EMC 423 would not satisfy this definition: it would not be used or would be capable of being used as a means of transportation on water because it could not power itself or steer. The EMC 423 and its petroleum cargo would be exempt from liability under OPA90.6 This perverse result thwarts OPA90’s intent and suggests that the Lisa E, to the extent it subjects the EMC 423 to coverage and, by propelling the barge, 5 We note that OPA90 offers no further definition or elaboration for the term “substantial threat.” 6 One could argue that EMC 423 could satisfy OPA90’s definition of “facility,” which is “any structure, group of structures, equipment, or device (other than a vessel) which is used for one or more of the following purposes: exploring for, drilling for, producing, storing, handling, transferring, processing, or transporting oil,” 33 U.S.C. § 2701(9), but this is a definitional stretch not worth pursuing. 30 Nos. 11-1266 & 11-1346 threatens a discharge of oil, must be subject to liability under the statute. The district court appropriately granted summary judgment in favor of EMC and SWS on this point, and the explosion implicated the Lisa E’s $5,000,000 policy such that those funds are available to the plaintiffs.