Opinion ID: 1865883
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: child support payment: modification of decree

Text: A party seeking to modify a marital dissolution decree concerning custody, support, or visitation of a child has the burden to show a material change of circumstances affecting the best interests of the child. See, Huffman v. Huffman, supra ; Kennedy v. Kennedy, 221 Neb. 724, 380 N.W.2d 300 (1986); Hoschar v. Hoschar, 220 Neb. 913, 374 N.W.2d 64 (1985); Krohn v. Krohn, 217 Neb. 158, 347 N.W.2d 869 (1984). To justify a modification of a divorce decree, there must be a showing of a material change in the circumstances subsequent to the entry of the dissolution decree.... Material change in circumstances in reference to modification of child support is analogous to modification of alimony for good cause. ... Material change in circumstances eludes precise and concise definition. Courts may consider various factors to determine if a material change in circumstances has occurred. Among some of the factors or circumstances considered by a court are a change in the financial resources or ability to pay on the part of the parent obligated to pay support, needs of the child or children for whom support is paid, good or bad faith motive of the obligated parent in sustaining a reduction of income, and the duration of the change, namely, whether the change is temporary or permanent.... Alteration and passage from one condition to another is essential for a material change in circumstances. (Citations omitted.) Morisch v. Morisch, 218 Neb. 412, 413, 355 N.W.2d 784, 785-86 (1984). See, also, Fogel v. Fogel, 184 Neb. 425, 168 N.W.2d 275 (1969) (one may in good faith make an occupational change even though that change may reduce financial ability to satisfy child support obligations, unless such change is made to avoid child support obligations or made in bad faith). The paramount concern and question in determining child support, whether in the initial marital dissolution action or in proceedings for modification of a decree, is the best interests of the child. Dobbins v. Dobbins, 226 Neb. 465, 411 N.W.2d 644 (1987); Wagner v. Wagner, 224 Neb. 155, 396 N.W.2d 282 (1986). Neb.Rev.Stat. § 42-364(4) (Reissue 1988) provides in part: In determining the amount of child support to be paid by a parent, the court shall consider the earning capacity of each parent.... Consequently, we hold that parental earning capacity is a factor to be considered with the best interests of a child in determining the amount of child support. Although the amount of Arnold's income has changed from entry of the initial decree, we find that his earning capacity has not altered and diminished after the initial decree. Also, Jones' testimony indicates that Arnold could have earned reasonably substantial income as a painter after dissolution of the Schulze-Jones partnership and before the modification hearing. As far as we can determine, the reduction in Arnold's income is attributable to his personal wishes and not the result of unfavorable or adverse conditions in the economy, Arnold's health, or other circumstances affecting Arnold's earning capacity. Consequently, we conclude that there is no change of circumstances warranting a modification of the child support payments prescribed by the dissolution decree of March 26, 1987. For that reason, the district court abused its discretion when it modified the Schulze dissolution decree concerning child support. See Ensrud v. Ensrud, supra (abuse of discretion characterized; child custody question).