Opinion ID: 1899541
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Count IIThe Payton Matter

Text: On October 23, 2001, Lea Payton met with respondent to discuss her recent separation from her husband. Ms. Payton sought respondent's advice because her husband had threatened to disconnect the utilities in the family home, and she was concerned that her husband might attempt to dispose of community assets. Respondent asked Ms. Payton whether she had been physically abused by her husband, which she absolutely denied. Respondent then recommended that Ms. Payton file for divorce and seek a restraining order to prevent her husband from selling any of their property. Ms. Payton agreed to this course of action. Following the meeting, Ms. Payton telephoned respondent's office on several occasions to inquire when she should come back to sign the papers. Respondent initially told Ms. Payton the pleadings were not ready, but on October 29, 2001, he filed a petition for divorce on her behalf. Respondent did not afford Ms. Payton the opportunity to review and sign the pleading before it was filed, nor did he provide her with a copy of the pleading upon filing. Unbeknownst to Ms. Payton, the petition included allegations that she had been harassed and physically abused by her husband, and that she feared harassment and sexual or physical abuse during the pendency of the proceedings. [5] An Affidavit of Plaintiff was attached to the petition, purportedly signed by Ms. Payton, attesting that all of the allegations of fact contained [in the petition for divorce] are true and correct to the best of her information, knowledge and belief. The affidavit was notarized by respondent. On October 31, 2001, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order prohibiting Mr. Payton from disposing of or encumbering any or all of the property owned in community by Plaintiff and Defendant until further order of this Court, and from harassing or sexually or physically abusing Plaintiff. In mid-November 2001, Ms. Payton finally obtained a copy of the petition filed by respondent and discovered the false allegations of sexual and physical abuse by her husband. Ms. Payton also observed that her signature had been forged on the affidavit verifying the truthfulness of the factual allegations contained in the petition for divorce. Ms. Payton confronted respondent immediately about her concerns. Respondent informed Ms. Payton that he included the allegations of sexual and physical abuse in the petition for divorce because that is standard wording in a restraining order. Concerning the forged signature on the affidavit, respondent told Ms. Payton, I have no idea who signed that. At Ms. Payton's request, the trial court dismissed her petition for divorce on November 28, 2001. In December 2001, Ms. Payton filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC, stating that her signature was forged on the affidavit and recounting her husband's reaction to the lies I told in the divorce papers. In his reply to the complaint, dated January 9, 2002, respondent stated: As you can surmise Ms. Payton is an emotionally disturbed woman who has suffered considerable mental abuse from her husband. The divorce action was explained to her and she agreed to its contents, purposes, allegations, and objectives. She called several times a day after our first meeting wanting to expedite the filing and service as she was eager to divorce her husband and be rid of his abuse. . . . Unfortunately, she is so dependent that even the slightest resistance is met with retaliation and causes her to be made to feel at fault. The petition was a boiler plate Civil Code 102 Divorce with restraining orders. It did not contain an allegation of sexual abuse but rather requested a temporary restraining order to deter its potential. Mr. Payton has made Ms. Payton feel so guilty that now she is begging for reconciliation. She is in serious need of professional counseling for her emotional stability. I wish her well and hope that she is able to realize the real cause of her problem. By letter dated January 18, 2002, the ODC asked respondent for a response to Ms. Payton's allegation that she did not sign the affidavit filed with the petition for divorce. On January 22, 2002, respondent stated: Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 3951 requires that the petition in a Divorce pursuant to Louisiana Civil Code Article 102 be verified by affidavit. To the best of my knowledge Mrs. Payton authorized her signature on the affidavit. [emphasis added] The ODC then asked respondent to clarify whether he did, in fact, sign Ms. Payton's signature on the affidavit. In a January 28, 2002 response, respondent finally admitted that he signed Ms. Payton's name to the affidavit, notarized it, and filed it into the court record: In my letter of January 22, 2002 I stated that Mrs. Payton's signature on the verification was authorized. I would not have filed the affidavit unless she specifically authorized it. . . . With the numerous calls that came to the office insisting that divorce papers be filed immediately, it appears that I did indeed sign her name as requested. [emphasis added] In its formal charges, the ODC alleged that respondent's conduct violated Rules 1.2(a) (scope of the representation), 1.4 (failure to communicate with a client), 3.3(a)(1) (making a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal), 4.1 (truthfulness in statements to others), 8.4(a), 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), and 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Respondent answered the formal charges and denied any misconduct. Specifically, he stated that Ms. Payton demanded the immediate filing of the petition for divorce, thereby waiving the opportunity to review it, and that she authorized the notarization of the affidavit. At the hearing on the formal charges, Ms. Payton testified that she did not authorize respondent to sign the affidavit on her behalf, nor did he ever seek her permission to do so. For his part, respondent denied that it was deceitful to forge Ms. Payton's signature on the affidavit. When asked whether he had an obligation as an officer of the court not to forge his client's signature on a pleading, he said: I happen to know that others do it, and I don't pass any judgment on it. I think it's a matter of convenience to the client and to the court system.