Opinion ID: 3015192
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: State “Employees” as State Actors

Text: Leshko would like us to resolve the public function question in her favor on the simple ground that under Pennsylvania law the Servises were public employees. We cannot do so, though we acknowledge the force in her argument. In Pennsylvania, “[a]ny person who is acting or who has acted on behalf of a governmental unit, whether on a permanent or temporary basis, whether compensated or not,” is an employee of that governmental unit. 42 Pa.C.S. § 8501. As we noted earlier, a Pennsylvania appellate court has held that under § 8501 foster parents are employees of the county Children and Youth Services agency that designates them foster parents. See Patterson, 815 A.2d at 661. The District Court dismissed Leshko’s tort claim against the Servises in light of that case, -11- holding that the immunity provided by Pennsylvania’s tort claims statute applied to the Servises as county employees. Leshko finds it “anomalous” that the Servises successfully contended in the District Court that they are employees of the County, and yet claim here not to be state actors for purposes of liability under § 1983. We acknowledge the seeming heads-we-win-tails-youlose aspect of the Servises’ litigation strategy, but the law is on their side. It is true that the Supreme Court in West declared that “state employment is generally sufficient to render the defendant a state actor,” 487 U.S. at 24 (quoting Lugar, 457 U.S. at 935 n.18), and observed that the only time it had held that a state employee was not a state actor was in the case of a public defender, who was tasked with acting as the state’s adversary. Id. at 50 (citing Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981)). Nevertheless, by its own terms, West does not allow state definitions to dictate federal court decisions under § 1983. The doctor in West was employed part-time by contract with the state, but that employment did not automatically make him a state actor. The ultimate question in West, as in all state action cases, was whether the doctor’s conduct was “fairly attributable to the State.” Id. at 54. “It is the physician’s function within the state system, not the precise terms of his employment, that determines whether his actions can fairly be attributed to the State,” the Court explained. Id. at 55-56. West’s approach fits with the Supreme Court’s teaching -12- that state-hired private contractors are not automatically state actors under § 1983, even if the state is their only patron. See Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 840-41. It also accords with the principle that labels are not dispositive in state action cases. See Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 296. Looking to the reality over the form of the Servises’ relationship with Pennsylvania, see Crissman, 289 F.3d at 243, it is clear that they much more closely resemble the private nursing home contractor held not to be a state actor in Rendell-Baker than the officials the Supreme Court has held acted under color of state law by virtue of their governmental positions. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184 (1961) (police officers); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535-36 (1981) (prison officials); Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 13536 (1990) (state hospital officials). As we rejected in Crissman the notion that a state law designating private actors as state “agents” makes them state actors per se, 289 F.3d at 243-44, we reject the proposition that Pennsylvania’s characterization of the Servises as “employees” automatically makes them state actors. See Rayburn v. Hogue, 241 F.3d 1341, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that possession of immunity from tort suit as “employees” of state does not make foster parents state actors).