Opinion ID: 1887015
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Challenge Under the Interpreter Act

Text: We consider first Castellon's argument that his consent to the search was obtained in violation of the Interpreter Act. Specifically, he contends that assuming that he voluntarily consented to the search, the air pistol and any other evidence seized during the search must be suppressed because his consent was obtained through an interpreter who was not qualified within the meaning of the Act. The section of the Act relevant to Castellon's argument provides: [w]henever a communication-impaired person is arrested and taken into custody for an alleged violation of a criminal law, the arresting officer shall procure a qualified interpreter for any custodial interrogation, warning, notification of rights, or taking of a statement. D.C.Code § 2-1902(e) (2004). The government concedes that Castellon was a communication-impaired person within the meaning of the Act and that Officer Chaparro, who interpreted for him and secured his consent to the search had not been certified as a qualified interpreter. [8] However, the government argues that this provision is inapplicable under the circumstances of this case because Castellon had not been arrested and taken into custody at the time he gave his consent to the search. The plain language of § 2-1902(e) imposes the requirement for a qualified interpreter only when the eligible person is arrested and taken into custody and is subject to custodial interrogation, warning, notification of rights, or taking of a statement. This listing of circumstances is stated in the disjunctive, thereby presenting alternative situations in a custodial setting when a qualified interpreter must be provided. A request for a consent to search the property of one who is not in custody is not among the enumerated circumstances covered, and this court will not read into a statute language that is clearly not there. [9] See, e.g., 1618 Twenty-First St. Tenants' Ass'n v. Phillips Collection, 829 A.2d 201, 207 (D.C.2003) (citing Iselin v. United States, 270 U.S. 245, 251, 46 S.Ct. 248, 70 L.Ed. 566 (1926)). The maxim of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, lends support to the conclusion that consent searches are not within the requirements of the statute. This doctrine stands for the proposition that the express inclusion of one (or more) thing(s) implies the exclusion of other things from similar treatment. In re Uwazih, 822 A.2d 1074, 1078 & n. 5 (D.C.2003) (quoting WILLIAM D. POPKIN, MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: POLITICAL LANGUAGE AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS 217 (3d ed.2001) (parentheticals in original)). We apply the maxim with a considerable measure of caution, since legislative omission does not always reflect intentional preclusion. Council of the District of Columbia v. Clay, 683 A.2d 1385, 1390 (D.C.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1169, 117 S.Ct. 1434, 137 L.Ed.2d 542 (1997). The maxim is only an aid to statutory construction, and therefore is subordinate to `clear and contrary evidence of [legislative] intent.' Id. (quoting Neuberger v. C.I.R., 311 U.S. 83, 88, 61 S.Ct. 97, 85 L.Ed. 58 (1940) (alterations in original; other citation omitted). The maxim's force turns on whether, considering the statutory structure and legislative history, we can be confident that the draftsman, in expressing one thing, would have likely considered alternatives. See Shook v. District of Columbia Fin. Responsibility & Mgmt. Assistance Auth., 328 U.S.App. D.C. 74, 81, 132 F.3d 775, 782 (1998). In this case, the statute itself and the legislative history persuade us that the legislature likely considered alternatives and chose to limit the reach of the Act to the circumstances it expressly identified. The legislative history of the Act does not mention or suggest that an effort to secure a consent to search during a crime scene investigation is one of the circumstances for which a qualified interpreter must be secured for a communication-impaired person. D.C. COUNCIL REPORT ON BILL 7-108, INTERPRETERS FOR HEARING IMPAIRED AND NON-ENGLISH SPEAKING PERSONS ACT OF 1987 (1987) (Report). Rather, the Report specifies clearly that the problem being addressed in section (e) concerns custodial interrogation, which is described as when a person has been arrested and is being questioned. Id. at 3. It explains further that [t]he purpose of this section is to guarantee that the rights already held by communication-impaired persons in respect to custodial interrogation are not violated. Id. (emphasis added). The Report's description of custodial interrogation and its statement of purpose leave no reason to doubt that the limitation on applicability of the section to only custodial interrogation was intended. Additional references in the Report reinforce our confidence that the drafters likely considered and rejected extending the qualified interpreter requirement to other citizen-police encounters. See Shook, supra, 328 U.S.App. D.C. at 81, 132 F.3d at 782. Significantly in this regard, the Report explains that it is under circumstances where Miranda rights are triggered that this particular qualified interpreter provision comes into play. Report at 3. In discussing the provision for a waiver of rights to an interpreter under section 3(e) (D.C.Code § 2-1902(e)), the Report explains that the Miranda standard should apply. [10] In Miranda, while the Supreme Court held that Miranda warnings must be provided to an individual subjected to police interrogation while in custody at the station or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way, it stated that its ruling did not apply to on-the-scene questioning for the purpose of obtaining evidence. Miranda, supra note 5, 384 U.S. at 477-78, 86 S.Ct. 1602 . In that regard, the Court stated: [o]ur decision is not intended to hamper the traditional function of police officers in investigating crime. When an individual is in custody on probable cause, the police may, of course, seek out evidence in the field to be used at trial against him. Such investigation may include inquiry of persons not under restraint. General on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process is not affected by our holding. It is an act of responsible citizenship for individuals to give whatever information they may have to aid in law enforcement. In such situations the compelling atmosphere inherent in the process of in-custody interrogation is not necessarily present. Id. (emphasis added; internal citations omitted). Thus, the Supreme Court refused to extend the need for warnings under Miranda for custodial interrogation situations to the typical consent search. See id.; see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 232, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477-78, 86 S.Ct. 1602). In Schneckloth, the Court reasoned that a search pursuant to consent may result in considerably less inconvenience for the subject of the search, and, properly conducted, is a constitutionally permissible and wholly legitimate aspect of effective police activity. Id. at 228, 93 S.Ct. 2041. On the other hand, it explained that the circumstances where most consent searches arise  in a car, home, or office  are generally informal and unstructured conditions, immeasurably far removed from [the] custodial interrogation described in Miranda. Id. at 232, 93 S.Ct. 2041. Therefore, in Schneckloth, the Supreme Court rejected the position that proof of the individual's knowledge of the right to refuse consent is a prerequisite to demonstrating that the consent was voluntary. Id. at 232-33, 93 S.Ct. 2041. It held that [r]ather, it is only by analyzing all the circumstances of an individual consent that it can be ascertained whether in fact [consent] was voluntary or coerced. Id. at 233, 93 S.Ct. 2041. Given their reliance on Miranda, it is reasonable to infer that the drafters of the Interpreter Act understood the Supreme Court's rationale for imposing greater precautions in the compelling atmosphere inherent in a custodial setting than it did for an on-the-scene investigation, and chose to follow a similar course. Just as the Supreme Court considered that it would be thoroughly impractical to impose on the normal consent search the detailed requirements of an effective warning, Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 231, 93 S.Ct. 2041, so too the drafters of the Interpreter Act must have recognized that it is equally, or conceivably more impractical to impose a requirement that the police retain a qualified interpreter in the typical investigatory situation where a consent to search might be sought and intentionally declined to impose such a requirement. Again, making a comparison with Miranda, the legislators expressed their intention to provide that a communication-impaired person may waive his or her right to a qualified interpreter without the assistance of a qualified interpreter, upon proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the statement was voluntary. Report at 3 (emphasis in original). They effectuated that intent in D.C.Code § 2-1902(e) which provides for admission of a statement, otherwise excludable from evidence because obtained without a qualified interpreter, if the communication-impaired person waives the right to such an interpreter and the court makes a special finding upon proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the answer, statement, or admission made by the communication-impaired person was made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. No doubt, the drafters were aware that similar protections exist for consent searches under prior court decisions. In view of the fact that the legislators chose to permit a waiver of the right to a qualified interpreter for custodial interrogation without the assistance of a qualified interpreter, it is inconceivable that the drafters would have required one for consent searches even had they chosen to include such searches within the coverage of the Act. No doubt, they recognized that the individual's rights could be adequately protected by prior court decisions involving consent searches. In order to pass constitutional muster, the government is obligated to demonstrate that any consent to search is in fact voluntary and not the result of coercion. Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 248, 93 S.Ct. 2041. The voluntariness of the consent to search is a factual question to be determined from a careful examination of the unique facts and circumstances of each case. See id. at 233, 248-49, 93 S.Ct. 2041. Whether the interpreter conveyed the pertinent information to the person whose consent was sought and whether that person understood it are factors for consideration in determining voluntariness. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the Act's requirement for a qualified interpreter applies only to custodial interrogation. Therefore, we consider next whether Castellon was in custody at the time he consented to the search of his bedroom.