Opinion ID: 1251758
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Sufficiency of the EvidenceDrug Tax Stamp Offense.

Text: The jury convicted Maghee of the drug tax stamp offense covered in count III of the trial information. The offense has three elements: 1. The defendant was a dealer of a taxable substance. 2. The defendant did not pay the State excise tax imposed on dealers and obtain stamps, labels, or other official indicia of payment. 3. The defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed the taxable substance without affixing the appropriate stamps, labels, or other official indicia. See Iowa Code § 453B.12. As to the third element, the law requires the dealer to affix the tax stamp on the taxable substance immediately after receiving the taxable substance. Id. § 453B.3. On appeal, Maghee makes three arguments to challenge his conviction for failure to affix a drug tax stamp. First, he contends there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that he failed to pay the tax. Second, he argues there was insufficient evidence to show he possessed any drugs. Last, he asserts there was insufficient evidence to generate a jury question on whether he had failed to immediately affix a drug tax stamp after receiving possession. The State responds that Maghee preserved none of these arguments for our review. In his motions for judgment of acquittal, Maghee made the following record on the drug tax stamp offense: On the third issue of failure to possess a tax stamp, I submit that the record is totally devoid on that point. By testimony of law enforcement officers, they say, We took something into the room `we' meaning Craig Hamilton I took something into the room which had been prepared by the police to be cocaine. From the evidence seen and from the testimony of officer Hamilton and Kelly Evans saying there was no time for any person to purchase a tax stampthat is, they walk in, drop off a suitcase. The suitcase has cocaine in it. There's no tax stamp on the cocaine. Officer Hamilton walks across the hall, opens the door. The police come in and arrest them in there, and they say, Well, you're in possession of cocaine, and there's no tax stamp on it. Therefore you're guilty of not having a tax stamp, when there's been no evidence in the record of Mr. Maghee or Mr. Gress ever picking up the suitcase or carrying it or doing anything to possess what's actually in there. The point being they arrested him too soon, and there certainly was no opportunity for any person to get a tax stamp by the testimony of the law enforcement officers. They say, We don't have to have a tax stamp `cause we're law enforcement officers. And we take it in there, and since there's no tax stamp on it, you're guilty of possessing it without having a tax stamp. That is, We bring the substance. We don't put a tax stamp on it. It was totally in our control up to that point. We pop them, and therefore they're guilty of not having a tax stamp. I submit as a matter of law that's insufficient evidence. We see no suggestion in this motion that Maghee was contending there was a lack of evidence on whether he paid the tax. Maghee failed to object to this element in the marshalling instruction. He therefore preserved no error on this issue. Maghee did, however, contend generally that there was no evidence to show he ever possessed the cocaine. His argument was one of lack of actual possession: [T]here's been no evidence in this record of Mr. Maghee or Mr. Gress ever picking up the suitcase or carrying it or doing anything to possess what's actually there. He therefore preserved error on his claim that there was no evidence to show he actually possessed the cocaine. Maghee also contended in the motion for judgment of acquittal that there was no opportunity for any person to get a tax stamp. He therefore preserved error on his claim that there was a lack of evidence to generate a jury question on whether he had failed to immediately affix a drug tax stamp on the cocaine after receiving possession. When reviewing the propriety of a ruling denying a motion for judgment of acquittal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, including all legitimate inferences and presumptions that may fairly and reasonably be deduced from the evidence. State v. Padavich, 536 N.W.2d 743, 751 (Iowa 1995). We will not disturb such a ruling, unless commission of the offense is not supported by substantial evidence. Id. Substantial evidence is that evidence that would convince a rational trier of fact that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
Possession can be actual or constructive and sole or joint. The word possession includes actual as well as constructive possession, and also sole as well as joint possession. A person who has direct physical control of something on or around [his][her] person is in actual possession of it. A person who is not in actual possession, but who has knowledge of the presence of something and has the authority or right to maintain control of it either alone or together with someone else, is in constructive possession of it. If one person alone has possession of something, possession is sole. If two or more persons share possession, possession is joint. Id. Additionally, we held that a fact finder may infer constructive possession when the thing is found in a place which is subject to the defendant's dominion and control, or to the joint dominion and control of the defendant and other persons. Id.; accord State v. Simpson, 528 N.W.2d 627, 632 (Iowa 1995). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, we conclude there was substantial evidence that Maghee had constructive possession of the cocaine. The officers seized the cocaine in Maghee's room. Although officer Hamilton rented the room for him, Maghee had the key. Thus the evidence would support a reasonable inference that Maghee had dominion and control over the room where the cocaine was seized. Additionally, there was substantial evidence that Maghee knew the suitcase contained cocaine. He was there to buy cocaine. When Hamilton left the room to get a knife so Gress could test the cocaine, the officer left the cocaine in Maghee's and Gress's joint possession. At that point the pair had the authority or right to maintain control of the cocaine. These facts are additional substantial evidence supporting our conclusion that Maghee had constructive possession of the cocaine or at the very least shared with Gress joint constructive possession of the cocaine. B. Failure to immediately affix drug tax stamp. As to this issue, Maghee relies in part on his argument that the instruction defining constructive possession was erroneous in that the instruction used the language intention to take control over something. More specifically, Maghee is contending that no obligation to affix drug tax stamps arises until the dealer possesses the taxable substance. No such obligation arose here, Maghee argues, because he never had possession of the cocaine. In division IV we determined Maghee did not preserve error on this argument and that the instruction thereby became the law of the case. We also determined in division V(A), that there was substantial evidence Maghee had constructive possession of the cocaine. Thus, Maghee's lack-of-possession argument must fail. As to Maghee's contention that there was no opportunity to obtain a drug tax stamp, we have rejected similar arguments in two cases. In State v. White, 545 N.W.2d 552, 556 (Iowa 1996) (en banc), we defined immediately in section 453B.3 to mean without delay and does not include within a reasonable time. Because the tax stamps may be purchased at any time and refunds may be obtained without any fear of reprisal, we held that there was no need for a window of opportunity to purchase and affix the tax stamps within a reasonable time following the transaction. Id.; accord State v. Predka, 555 N.W.2d 202, 215 (Iowa 1996). Thus, requiring that the tax stamps be affixed at the very time of acquisition does not make it impossible to comply with the statute. White, 545 N.W.2d at 556; accord Predka, 555 N.W.2d at 215. The evidence shows that Maghee had two days before the transaction to purchase the stamps. Before meeting Hamilton, Maghee could have purchased them. Maghee offered no reason why he could not have done so. See Predka, 555 N.W.2d at 215 (holding that district court properly excluded evidence that it was impossible for nonresident drug dealer to purchase drug tax stamps on a Saturday because before the trip to Iowa dealer should have arranged to acquire stamps before he picked up marijuana). Maghee's lack of opportunity argument must likewise fail.