Opinion ID: 711154
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The First Requirement: Ongoing State Judicial Proceedings

Text: 19 The first requirement of abstention under the Middlesex test is that of ongoing state judicial proceedings. Id. The Plaintiff contends that the Michigan disciplinary proceedings are administrative proceedings, not judicial, and they therefore, fail the first part of the Middlesex test. The Supreme Court has reasoned, however, that the federalism concerns which gave rise to Younger and its progeny are fully applicable to non-criminal proceedings when important state interests are involved. Id. In New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of the City of New Orleans, the Supreme Court held that in determining whether an administrative proceeding is judicial in nature for purposes of Younger abstention, a court must examine the nature of the final act. 491 U.S. 350, 371, 109 S.Ct. 2506, 2520, 105 L.Ed.2d 298 (1989) (NOPSI ) (quoting Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226-27, 29 S.Ct. 67, 69-70, 53 L.Ed. 150 (1908)). The Court explained that [a] judicial inquiry investigates, declares and enforces liabilities as they stand on present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist. Id. at 370, 109 S.Ct. at 2519 (quoting Prentis, 211 U.S. at 226, 29 S.Ct. at 69); see also CSXT, Inc. v. Pitz, 883 F.2d 468, 474 (6th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1030, 110 S.Ct. 1480, 108 L.Ed.2d 616 (1990). Because the Board is proceeding against Fieger to enforce its Rules of Professional Conduct, it is performing an adjudicative, as opposed to a legislative, function. It therefore, satisfies the first requirement for Younger abstention. Thus, under both Middlesex and NOPSI, the Michigan proceedings are judicial in nature for purposes of Younger abstention. 20 The Plaintiff relies on the Sixth Circuit case, In re Grand Jury 89-4-72, 932 F.2d 481 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 958, 112 S.Ct. 418, 116 L.Ed.2d 438 (1991). In that case, the Michigan Attorney Grievance Commission requested disclosure of all the evidence that had been presented to a grand jury in a bribery case and that might have related to criminal or unethical conduct by a Michigan lawyer. Id. at 482. The request was based on Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(3)(c)(i), an exception to the general rule prohibiting disclosure of grand jury proceedings. The grand jury had been charged with investigating allegations that a state judge had accepted bribes from lawyers in return for favorable consideration of pending cases. The lawyer argued that disclosure to the Commission would be improper because the discipline proceedings are not themselves judicial in nature nor do they provide for a sufficient judicial role to be considered preliminary to a judicial proceeding. Id. at 484. Thus, the question that the panel in In re Grand Jury addressed was whether an investigation by the Commission was preliminary to a judicial proceeding within the meaning of Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(e)(3). Id. at 483. The panel in In re Grand Jury analyzed the case under the oft-cited standard of Judge Learned Hand from Doe v. Rosenberry, 255 F.2d 118 (2d Cir.1958), and concluded: 21 On the record here we find the Michigan attorney discipline procedures do not evidence a substantial judicial role in the proceedings. We are not prepared to call an administrative hearing before a panel of private attorneys and laypersons, funded by a private organization, with limited discretionary review to the Michigan Supreme Court, a judicial proceeding within the meaning of Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i). That the disciplinary proceedings are sanctioned under the authority of the state supreme court is irrelevant. No amount of artificial judicial procedure or due process can transform such an administrative panel into a judicial body within the meaning of the Rule. 22 In re Grand Jury, 932 F.2d at 487 (emphasis added). Though the language in this opinion at first glance appears to support Fieger's contention, the case is inapposite to the abstention context. In In re Grand Jury, this Circuit held that there is insufficient judicial involvement in Michigan lawyer discipline proceedings to warrant disclosure of grand jury evidence to the Commission, an entirely different question from whether lawyer discipline proceedings should be characterized as judicial for abstention purposes. See id. For these reasons, Middlesex and NOPSI, not In re Grand Jury, must be applied to the case at hand, and the Plaintiff's argument that the proceedings are administrative must therefore fail. 23 Even if the proceedings in this case were fairly characterized as administrative, abstention would still be appropriate. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Sch., 477 U.S. 619, 627, 106 S.Ct. 2718, 2722, 91 L.Ed.2d 512 (1986). In Dayton, the Supreme Court applied Younger abstention to state administrative proceedings in which important state interests are vindicated where in the course of those proceedings the federal plaintiff would have a full and fair opportunity to litigate his constitutional claim. Id. In rejecting the school's argument that the state administrative proceedings would not afford the opportunity to raise constitutional claims, the Court further observed that, it is sufficient ... that constitutional claims may be raised in state-court judicial review of the administrative proceedings. Id. at 629, 106 S.Ct. at 2724. Thus, even if Plaintiff's argument regarding the administrative nature of the proceedings were valid, Younger abstention would still apply to this case. See id. 24