Opinion ID: 742440
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of Officer Testimony

Text: 5 Ochoa argues that the district court improperly permitted narcotics officers to testify as experts that Ochoa and Morales's driving techniques and their possession of the items found in the Sentra were consistent with the modus operandi of drug dealers. Ochoa never objected to the officer's testimony on the grounds he raises on appeal. Thus, we review for plain error. United States v. Gomez-Norena, 908 F.2d 497, 499-500 (9th Cir.1990). 6 [W]e have consistently held 'that government agents or similar persons may testify as to the general practices of criminals to establish the defendants' modus operandi.'  United States v. Gil, 58 F.3d 1414, 1422 (9th Cir.), (quoting United States v. Johnson, 735 F.2d 1200, 1202 (9th Cir.1984)), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 430 (1995). The testimony admitted in this case was similar to modus operandi testimony that we allowed in Gil and other cases. The district court did not plainly err in admitting it. 7 Ochoa also argues that the expert testimony was inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) because it constitutes testimony on his state of mind and his guilt. Officers Bolanos and Willhite merely described the typical practices of drug traffickers. Thus, their testimony did not invade the province of the jury and was properly admitted. See United States v. Lockett, 919 F.2d 585, 590-91 (9th Cir.1990). Although Officer Rinks's testimony verges on an opinion as to the likelihood of Ochoa's guilt, any error in admitting this testimony does not rise to the level of plain error. See United States v. Stewart, 770 F.2d 825, 831 (9th Cir.1985); United States v. Alonso, 48 F.3d 1536, 1541 (9th Cir.1995). 8 Finally, Ochoa incorrectly argues that the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993), governs the admission of expert testimony regarding the modus operandi of criminals. Because the expert testimony in this case constitutes specialized knowledge of law enforcement, not scientific knowledge, the Daubert standards for admission simply do not apply. United States v. Cordoba, No. 95-50492, slip op. at 107 (9th Cir. Jan. 7, 1997).