Opinion ID: 1927385
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: GMC's Cross-Appeal Properly Filed/Still Viable

Text: A cross-appeal rests on its own jurisdictional foundation, upon the subsequent loss of standing by the party that filed the primary appeal, if the cross-appellant could not reasonably have known of the defect in the original appeal. First American National Bank v. Alcorn, Inc., Miss.Supr., 361 So.2d 481, 493 (1978). See Akerson v. City of Bridgeport, 36 Conn.App. 158, 649 A.2d 796, 797-98 (1994); First Union National Bank v. Floyd, 198 Ga.App. 99, 400 S.E.2d 393, 394 (1990); Schurman v. Schurman, 188 Conn. 268, 449 A.2d 169, 170-71 (1982); Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority v. Harrington, George & Dunn, P.C., 208 Ga.App. 736, 431 S.E.2d 730 (1993). Compare Jones Roofing & Construction Co. v. Roberts, 179 Ga.App. 169, 345 S.E.2d 683 (1986). [7] But see Ewing Holding Corp. v. Egan-Stanley Invs., Inc., 154 Ga.App. 493, 268 S.E.2d 733 (1980). [8] When the County filed its appeal in the Superior Court, it relied upon a prior Superior Court opinion construing Section 8312(c) as vesting the County with standing to appeal. New Castle County v. Wolfgang, Del.Supr., C.A. No. 87A-NO-8, Taylor, J., 1989 WL 40943 (April 11, 1989) (ORDER). Neither the County, nor GMC, could have reasonably anticipated that another Superior Court judge would decline to follow Wolfgang in Chrysler, or that Wolfgang would be overruled by this Court when we affirmed the Superior Court's judgment in Chrysler. New Castle County v. Chrysler Corp., Del.Super., 681 A.2d 1077 (1995), aff'd Del.Supr., No. 384, 1995, Walsh, J., 1996 WL 145806 (March 8, 1996) (ORDER). Under these circumstances, the County's subsequent loss of standing can no more defeat a timely-filed cross-appeal than would any other voluntary or involuntary dismissal of what was originally a proper primary appeal. GMC's cross-appeal properly invoked the subject matter appellate jurisdiction of the Superior Court at the time it was filed. GMC's actual controversy with the Board's decision is continuing notwithstanding the mootness of the County's primary appeal. Cf. Stearn v. Koch, Del.Supr., 628 A.2d 44, 46 (1993) (appeal and cross-appeal both moot). GMC's cross-appeal should not have been dismissed.