Opinion ID: 369077
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: wallace fisher

Text: 152 Wallace Fisher was convicted of conspiracy and three substantive counts (Counts 3, 4, and 11) charging sale and possession with intent to sell. He was sentenced to a term of up to eight years' imprisonment under the Youth Corrections Act. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5010, 5017(d). 153 Fisher adopts the arguments, applicable to him, made by the other appellants and urges three additional points of error as to him, namely: (1) that the court refused to charge the jury on entrapment; (2) that the court denied motions to sever his case; and (3) that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he was a member of an unlawful conspiracy. Entrapment 154 The law of entrapment in this Circuit is clear, and follows the teachings of Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Sherman, 200 F.2d 880, 882-83 (2d Cir. 1952). As Judge Hand there stated, an entrapment claim presents two issues: 155 (1) did (a Government) agent induce the accused to commit the offense charged in the indictment; (2) if so, was the accused ready and willing without persuasion and was he awaiting any propitious opportunity to commit the offense. On the first question the accused has the burden; on the second the prosecution has it. 156 Although resolution of the issues raised in a claim of entrapment is largely factual, in deciding whether there Are disputed issues requiring jury determination, the trial court must be guided by the proof in the record at the time of making its decision to grant or deny a charge on the defense. The mere assertion of entrapment does not automatically require a charge thereon; nor does a mere showing that there was in fact Government inducement. Even if the accused had met his burden in showing inducement, once the Government has proved propensity by substantial evidence which stands uncontradicted, a charge on entrapment is properly denied. United States v. Licursi, 525 F.2d 1164, 1167-69 (2d Cir. 1975). 157 Fisher claims that his entrapment commenced on November 12, 1976, when Geronimo, on behalf of the Government, visited Fisher's home in an endeavor to persuade him to become part of a strategy to infiltrate the so-called Barnes organization. Since Fisher was not at home, the inducements of participation particularly the financial inducements were disclosed to one Gwendolyn Hardy, then living with Fisher, and to Fisher himself later that day. Fisher was somewhat reluctant, and he hesitated for several days. Fisher's counsel would depict Fisher as having been very much under the influence of Geronimo at that time, and as a person anxious to accommodate Geronimo and to do his bidding, as well as that of Government Agent Diaz. Certainly, the Government inducement was shown. 158 However, the Government claims that the undisputed evidence showed that Fisher had been in the narcotics business long before November 12, 1976 that from late 1974 or early 1975, he had been involved with his brother Guy Fisher in cutting and bagging drugs; and that he had trafficked in cocaine and angel dust prior to November 1976. This evidence, according to the Government, definitely established that Fisher had a propensity or predisposition to deal in drugs long before Geronimo approached him in November 1976. We agree. 159 Fisher's brief on the entrapment point omits many facts facts which the trial court had before it when it decided that a charge on entrapment was inappropriate. Indeed, as the Government points out, for a period of five years prior to November 1976, Fisher, according to Geronimo, had been bagging and cutting drugs for his brother, and had told Geronimo about the substantial amount of money to be made within the drug business itself. (Tr. 1859). When, in Spring 1975, Geronimo sought to buy heroin from Fisher, Fisher sought to buy some through Leon Johnson, but Johnson could only supply him with cocaine. (Tr. 1853-55). There was evidence that Fisher himself, prior to November 1976, had dealt in cocaine and angel dust (a narcotic). (Tr. 1859-63, 1890). And again, Geronimo testified that it was Fisher who had urged Geronimo to give more thought to becoming involved in the drug business. (Tr. 1905). It was against this background, according to the evidence, that Geronimo, in November 1976, had sought out Fisher. 160 Fisher's prior activities were proved by evidence that stood uncontradicted in the record. Indeed, aside from Geronimo's testimony, there were taped statements made by Fisher himself, uncontradicted, to show that his involvement was extensive and willing. In view of this evidence, Fisher's initial reluctance, or desire to have time to think it over, was insufficient, of itself, to negate the evidence of predisposition. See United States v. Reed, 526 F.2d 740, 743 (2d Cir. 1975), Cert. denied, 424 U.S. 956, 96 S.Ct. 1431, 47 L.Ed.2d 361 (1976). Since there was no evidence to contradict the Government's evidence of propensity, on the facts before the trial court, Judge Werker was justified in denying a charge on entrapment. United States v. Licursi, supra, 525 F.2d at 1167-69. Severance 161 In an endeavor to destroy Fisher's credibility (because much of the evidence implicating the co-defendants had come through Fisher's actions and declarations), co-defendants' counsel argued to the jury that Fisher's record showed that he was a liar, a cheat, a con man, and a dupe, willing to serve Geronimo's ends. The jury was told that Fisher had previously been arrested on a drug charge. On the basis of what has been described as this incessant character assassination (Fisher Br. 26), Fisher's counsel, on several occasions during trial, sought a severance, claiming prejudice to his client. The trial court denied the severance. Fisher claims an abuse of discretion. 162 In a multi-defendant narcotics trial it is not unusual for some defendants to claim that others are more culpable, and that they should be acquitted, even if others are found to be guilty. Here, it was in the interest of all of the defendants, Including Fisher himself, to try to establish his unreliability. 163 There is no way to avoid some spill-over effect of testimony in such multi-defendant trials except through the judge's charge. The procedural rules with respect to joinder have been drafted with judicial economy in mind, as well as the protection of individual defendants' rights. In this case, fifteen trials could have been required. Certainly, to have fifteen trials was not required. Indeed, the decisions as to joinder vary as do the facts. The discriminating process of jury analysis can only be tested by the results. Here, some defendants were acquitted of various charges; others were convicted. If testimony spilled over, it did not contaminate all. Judge Werker's decision to deny a severance was thus a proper exercise of his discretion. Insufficiency of the Evidence 164 Finally, Fisher argues that the evidence indicates only that he was a member of a purchasing team, and hence was not a seller of heroin. This, of course, would not excuse him from conspiratorial liability. A drug conspiracy customarily involves both the purchase and sale of drugs. 165 Further, the Government showed that Fisher's involvement was more far-ranging than simply having conspired with Government agents, for which no conspiratorial liability could be imposed. The jury could properly infer that Fisher had agreed with other members of the conspiracy to promote its ends. Fisher's comments to Geronimo revealed that he was fully aware of the scope and nature of the conspiracy. His actions as a middleman in three transactions with different arms of the conspiracy constituted sufficient evidence of knowledgeable participation in the operations of the conspiracy with an expectation of benefiting from them. 166 Fisher's convictions are in all respects affirmed.