Opinion ID: 2636560
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the cumulative error at warren's fourth trial

Text: ¶ 37 Whether the prejudicial effect of an individual instance of error independently requires reversal, the cumulative effect of numerous errors may be such that reversal is required. See State v. Coe, 101 Wash.2d 772, 789, 684 P.2d 668 (1984) (reversal required because of accumulated evidentiary errors and prosecutorial misconduct). After analyzing the prosecutorial misconduct from Warren's fourth trial, I would hold the cumulative error requires reversal. ¶ 38 As stated above, when alleged prosecutorial misconduct does not directly infringe a constitutional right, the defendant must establish the prosecutor's improper conduct and its prejudicial effect. State v. Dhaliwal, 150 Wash.2d 559, 578, 79 P.3d 432 (2003) (citing Pirtle, 127 Wash.2d at 672, 904 P.2d 245, and State v. Furman, 122 Wash.2d 440, 455, 858 P.2d 1092 (1993)). The court evaluates the conduct in light of the total argument, issues, evidence, and jury instructions. State v. Davis, 141 Wash.2d 798, 872, 10 P.3d 977 (2000). ¶ 39 Normally, where the defendant fails to object to the prosecutor's allegedly improper conduct, the defendant waives any resultant error unless the conduct is so flagrant and ill-intentioned that it causes an enduring and resulting prejudice that could not have been neutralized by a curative instruction to the jury. State v. Brown, 132 Wash.2d 529, 561, 940 P.2d 546 (1997). Reversal is also not required if the prejudice could have been cured by a jury instruction, which the defendant did not request. State v. Russell, 125 Wash.2d 24, 85, 882 P.2d 747 (1994). ¶ 40 Here, however, the trial judge rendered futile any objection based on factual mischaracterizations during closing arguments. Therefore, we should analyze the prosecutor's conduct and defense counsel's failure to object with this limitation in mind. The prosecutor committed three instances of misconduct. ¶ 41 First, the prosecutor improperly vouched for the testimony of the victim witness, stating the testimony had the badge of truth and the ring of truth. RP (Nov. 18, 2003) at 12. It is improper for a prosecutor personally to vouch for the credibility of a witness. State v. Brett, 126 Wash.2d 136, 175, 892 P.2d 29 (1995) (citing State v. Sargent, 40 Wash.App. 340, 344, 698 P.2d 598 (1985)); see also RPC 3.4(e). A prosecutor may argue reasonable inferences from the evidence, but a prosecutor may not make a `clear and unmistakable' expression of personal opinion. Brett, 126 Wash.2d at 175, 892 P.2d 29 (quoting Sargent, 40 Wash.App. at 344, 698 P.2d 598). ¶ 42 The State argues the prosecutor was merely drawing reasonable inferences from the testimony. The prosecutor's hyperbole, however, went beyond drawing reasonable inferences from the testimony; the prosecutor's statements were a clear expression of opinion. It is one thing to emphasize the reliability of one witness over another; it is something else to state a personal belief that a witness told the truth. ¶ 43 Second, the prosecutor improperly argued facts not in evidence, discussing the phenomenon of delayed disclosure of sexual abuse. RP (Nov. 18, 2003) at 9. This line of argument would have been proper had the State offered some expert testimony on the claimed phenomenon of delayed reporting of sexual abuse. But as it was, the prosecutor impermissibly argued prejudicial facts not in the record, permitting the jury to speculate on facts not before it. See State v. Rose, 62 Wash.2d 309, 312, 382 P.2d 513 (1963); see also Belgarde, 110 Wash.2d at 508, 755 P.2d 174 (A prosecutor has no right to call to the attention of the jury matters or considerations which the jurors have no right to consider.). ¶ 44 Last, in rebuttal the prosecutor disparaged Warren's counsel by arguing Warren's counsel mischaracterized the facts. Disparaging counsel is clearly misconduct. See State v. Reed, 102 Wash.2d 140, 146-47, 684 P.2d 699 (1984). ¶ 45 The State concedes the prosecutor committed misconduct by arguing facts not in evidence and disparaging defense counsel; yet the majority does not perceive reversible error. See majority at 946. The jury was left with the impression it should not disbelieve the victim-witness despite her delay in reporting the incident, and it should not believe defense counsel. While it is possible that some of these errors, standing alone, might not be of sufficient gravity to constitute grounds for a new trial, the combined effect of the accumulation of errors most certainly requires a new trial. Coe, 101 Wash.2d at 789, 684 P.2d 668.