Opinion ID: 205356
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The District Court's Jury Instruction and Failure To Give Wright's Proposed Jury Instruction

Text: Before trial, Wright changed his defense to argue immunity from prosecution under 21 U.S.C. § 885(d). Section 885(d) provides: Except as provided in sections 2234 and 2235 of title 18, no civil or criminal liability shall be imposed by virtue of this subchapter upon any duly authorized Federal officer lawfully engaged in the enforcement of this subchapter, or upon any duly authorized officer of any State, territory, political subdivision thereof, the District of Columbia, or any possession of the United States, who shall be lawfully engaged in the enforcement of any law or municipal ordinance relating to controlled substances. Wright argues that he was a duly authorized Louisiana officer by virtue of his commission as a deputy sheriff in the EBRSO and that, as a deputy sheriff arguably authorized to enforce the drug laws, the only inquiry into whether he is lawfully engaged in the enforcement of the drug laws was whether he intended to act as a law enforcement officer when he engaged in the conduct charged in the indictment. The district court, however, gave a jury instruction that Wright argues is impermissibly based on the public authority defense. By instructing the jury that Wright was entitled to a verdict of not guilty if he was authorized by a qualified EBRSO official to engage in the conduct alleged in the indictment, Wright argues the district court gave an incorrect statement of the law such that the court abused its discretion. Section 885(d) is silent as to what it means to be a duly authorized state officer lawfully engaged in the enforcement of the controlled substance laws. The parties argue, to different effect, that these terms are given meaning through a state's statutes regarding state officials and through other rules and policies that govern the actions and duties of law enforcement officers. [3] We agree that these terms require the application of a state's laws to determine the status of the state official and the legality of the state official's actions, a conclusion that is supported by United States v. Fuller, 162 F.3d 256 (4th Cir.1998), one case cited by Wright in support of his statutory interpretation argument. In Fuller, the Fourth Circuit in dicta determined that § 885(d) immunity did not apply to a mayor engaged in illegal drug transactions because his duties as provided by state law did not include enforcing the drug laws. Id. at 262. Nor is this approach contradicted by United States v. Reeves, 730 F.2d 1189 (8th Cir.1984), also cited by Wright. In Reeves, the Eighth Circuit affirmed a final judgment upon a jury verdict against a county sheriff in Arkansas for distributing marijuana, where the sheriff's intent to distribute outside of his law enforcement duties was a question for the jury. Id. at 1197. In that case, however, there does not appear to have been a dispute that the sheriff's official job duties included enforcement of the drug laws. Rather, the question for the jury was whether the sheriff was performing his duties or illegally selling drugs. Here, Wright appeals the district court's refusal to instruct the jury that Wright was authorized by virtue of his commission as a deputy sheriff to conduct undercover drug transactions. We will therefore look to Louisiana law to determine whether Wright is covered by § 885(d) and whether the question of Wright's intent should have gone to the jury. Under Louisiana Revised Statute § 40:2402 governing the commission of peace officers: (3)(a) Peace officer means any full-time employee of the state, a sheriff, or other public agency, whose permanent duties actually include the making of arrests, the performing of searches and seizures, or the execution of criminal warrants, and is responsible for the prevention or detection of crime or the enforcement of the penal, traffic, or highway laws of this state, but not including any elected or appointed head of a law enforcement department. (b) Peace officer shall also include those sheriff's deputies whose duties include the care, custody, and control of inmates. The statutory provision discussing the Sheriff keeper of [the] jail provides: Each sheriff shall be the keeper of the public jail of his parish, and shall by all lawful means preserve the peace and apprehend all disturbers thereof, and other public offenders. LA.REV.STAT. ANN. § 15:704. This section appears in Title 15 of the Louisiana revised statutes (Criminal Procedure) in Chapter 7 (Prisons and Correctional Institutions), Part I (Prisons and Prisoners in General). Even taking a broad view of section 15:704 and applying it outside the correctional context and to sheriff deputies, Wright was limited to using lawful means to enforce the peacenot unlawful means to gather evidence to obtain an arrest. Furthermore, Wright was a peace officer for purposes of Louisiana law because he was a sheriff's deputy whose duties included the care, custody, and control of inmates as a jailer at the parish prison under subsection (b) of section 40:2402. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:1433 (deputy sheriff appointed by sheriff of parish). Section 40:2402 assumes that deputy sheriffs have different permanent duties and that jailers' duties do not include law enforcement activities nor the prevention or detection of crime or enforcement of the penal laws. Unlike the sheriff in Reeves, Wright's statutory or formal duties as a deputy sheriff and parish jailer did not include engaging in covert undercover narcotics investigations. Nor does Louisiana otherwise support the contention that any deputy sheriff can break federal drug laws in the course of his own independent investigations in order to obtain evidence to make an arrest. [4] Regardless of whether the scope of Wright's authority determines whether he was duly authorized or could have been lawfully engaged in the conduct charged in the indictment, there is no evidence that Wright, as a jailer, was so authorized or had any such authority. In short, the district court correctly instructed the jury that deputy sheriffs are not automatically entitled to violate controlled substances laws in criminal investigations. The district court also correctly explained to the jury that Wright could have been authorized in the particular case to engage in a covert drug deal. Wright presented evidence at trial that he was in contact with Jones about a possible drug investigation, and if he was indeed authorized to engage in the narcotics transaction with Jones, § 885(d) immunity would have applied. Whether Wright subjectively believed he was legally attempting to possess narcotics in furtherance of a criminal investigation is irrelevant if he lacked that authority, as was the case with the mayor in Fuller. The district court also did not abuse its discretion in denying Wright's proposed jury instruction, given that it was both a substantially incorrect statement of the law and was already substantially covered by the instruction given.