Opinion ID: 198294
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Determination of Assets

Text: 131 Reyes-Padilla contends that she was denied the right to have the jury determine whether the Montanez Property could be forfeited. She also asserts that there was no principal asset for which the Montanez Property could properly be substituted. 132 The forfeiture of substitute assets is a matter left solely to the court. See Hurley, 63 F.3d at 23 (the statute says that an order substituting assets is to be made by 'the court' ). As this Court explained in Hurley, the defendant has a right to have the amount subject to forfeiture determined, in the first instance, by the jury. See 63 F.3d at 23; see also Fed.R.Crim.P. 31(e) (stating that the initial forfeiture is sought in the indictment and is specified in a special verdict). But the jury has no role in determining, subsequently, whether the property has been dissipated and whether the government is thereby entitled to seek the forfeiture of substitute assets. Indeed, the government might not even know that substitution is necessary until it seeks to take possession of the property specified in the initial forfeiture order. Hurley, 63 F.3d at 23. 133 In this case, the jury determined--by rendering the special verdict--that the conspiracy realized $6,000,000 in proceeds from the commission of the specified offenses, and that the defendant and others were jointly and severally liable for that amount. Thus, the jury determined that the $6,000,000 was the principal asset subject to forfeiture. In having the jury determine that amount, the defendant was afforded all of the procedural protections regarding the determination of the forfeiture by the jury to which she was entitled.