Opinion ID: 1836662
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the Prosecutor Improperly Attempted the Impeachment of Witnesses Without Factual Basis.

Text: ¶ 53. Flowers argues the prosecution committed reversible error by arguing facts not in evidence when the prosecutor on cross-examination accused Latarsha Blissett, Stacey Wright and Mary Ella Fleming of harassing Clemmie Fleming and allegedly trying to get her to give false testimony. Flowers contends this same tactic was used by the State in Flowers I during the cross-examination of Connie Moore. The State argues that any impeachment questions were supported by the testimony of Investigator John Johnson. ¶ 54. Miss. R. Evid. 613, which governs prior statements of witnesses, provides: (a) Examining Witness Concerning Prior Statement. In examining a witness concerning a prior statement made by him, whether written or not, the statement need not be shown nor its contents disclosed to him at that time, but on request the same shall be shown or disclosed to opposing counsel. (b) Extrinsic Evidence of Prior Inconsistent Statement of Witness. Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is not admissible unless the witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the same and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate him thereon, or the interests of justice otherwise require. This provision does not apply to admissions of a party-opponent as defined in Rule 801(d)(2). (emphasis added). It is no longer required that the witness be directed to the statement on cross-examination as to a particular time or sequence, but the witness should be given an opportunity to explain the statement. See Miss. R. Evid. 613 & cmt. This Court has held that a stricter standard should be followed, and we have, therefore, required the questions to include, whether or not on a specific date, at a specific place, and in the presence of specific persons, the witness made a particular statement. Carlisle v. State, 348 So.2d 765, 766 (Miss.1977) (citations omitted). Then with the predicate properly laid, the witness may be impeached by showing prior statements inconsistent with the in-court testimony, so long as the statement made in court is one relevant to the issue in the case and therefore not collateral. Id. (citing Williams v. State, 73 Miss. 820, 19 So. 826 (1896), aff'd, 170 U.S. 213, 18 S.Ct. 583, 42 L.Ed. 1012 (1898)). ¶ 55. As we stated in Flowers I, it is of the utmost importance that counsel have a good faith basis for any question asked on cross-examination; therefore, counsel may not use prior inconsistent statements as a `guise of impeachment for the primary purpose of placing before the jury substantive evidence which is not otherwise admissible.' 773 So.2d at 326-27 (citing Harrison v. State, 534 So.2d 175, 178 (Miss.1988) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original); Foster v. State, 508 So.2d 1111, 1115 (Miss.1987)). This Court has stated: The asking of questions without a factual basis leaves an impression in the mind of jurors that the prosecutor actually had such facts in hand and that the insinuations through questioning contained some truth. This leaves false and inadmissible ideas in the minds of jurors that cannot be adequately rebutted by the testimony of witnesses or instructions from the court. Walker v. State, 740 So.2d 873, 884 (Miss. 1999). ¶ 56. In Flowers I, the State attempted to impeach the defense witness, Connie Moore. Id. 773 So.2d at 327-28. On direct examination, Moore testified that she bought a pair of Fila Grant Hill tennis shoes for her son. Id. at 328. On cross-examination, the State tried to show Moore had, in fact, bought them for Flowers. Id. During her testimony, the State asked Moore if Patricia Hollman was with her when she purchased the shoes. Id. Moore stated Hollman was not present when she bought the shoes. Id. Moore also testified that she did not tell Hollman she was buying the shoes as a gift for Flowers. Id. ¶ 57. After this particular questioning, this Court held the proper predicate for impeachment had been laid. Id. See also Carlisle v. State, 348 So.2d at 766. This Court further held the State was required to either continue with the impeachment by showing a basis in fact for the questions or offer a witness in rebuttal to prove the truth of the prior statement. Flowers I, 773 So.2d at 328. Because the State had no basis in fact to make the claim and because on rebuttal the State never refuted Moore's denial, this Court found the State's tactic to be in bad faith. Id. Although Patricia Hollman was called as a witness by the State, she was never questioned about either being present when Moore bought the shoes or hearing Moore state for whom she was buying the shoes. Id. Hollman was not called as a rebuttal witness after the State posed these particular questions to Moore. Id. This Court held this was clearly error by the State. ¶ 58. In the case sub judice, Flowers again argues that the State improperly attempted to impeach three witnesses without presenting a factual basis: Latarsha Blissett, Mary Ella Fleming and Stacey Wright. When cross-examining Flowers's witnesses, the State accused the witnesses of harassing their witnesses. During the cross-examination of Latarsha Blissett, the prosecutor asked her if she had tried to get Clemmie Fleming to lie for Flowers in order to get him out of jail, and if she and other family members had harassed Fleming in an effort to get her to change her story. The prosecution cross-examined Mary Ella Fleming on the premise that she had attempted to have Clemmie Fleming testify in such as way as to save Flowers. Also, Stacey Wright was cross-examined by the prosecution in such a way as to infer that she and others had been harassing Clemmie Fleming to get her to change her testimony. ¶ 59. After the above cross-examination was complete, the proper predicate for impeachment was laid. Flowers I, 773 So.2d at 328. See also Carlisle v. State, 348 So.2d at 766. According to Flowers I, the State was required to continue with the impeachment and show a basis in fact for the question, or to offer a subsequent witness in rebuttal to prove the statement[s] [were] true that [the witnesses] lied. 773 So.2d at 328. The State called Clemmie Fleming as a rebuttal witness, but on direct examination, the prosecutor failed to question Fleming about whether Latarsha Blisset, Mary Ella Fleming or Stacey Wright ever harassed her or asked her to lie. However, on redirect, the prosecution asked Fleming, [w]ho, if anyone, asked you to lie in relationship to this case? Fleming responded, Mary Fleming. Defense counsel immediately objected and asked the answer be stricken because he had no ability to cross-examine. The trial court asked the jury to disregard the witness's last statement and excused Fleming. ¶ 60. The State argues this claim is factually distinguishable from the defense's argument in Flowers I. The State contends the impeachment questions in the case sub judice were supported by the testimony of Investigator John Johnson. The State points out that when Clemmie Fleming was interviewed by Johnson, she was real nervous and upset. Although Johnson testified that Fleming did tell him why she was upset, he was not allowed to testify to any statements made by Fleming because of hearsay. Contrary to the contentions of the State, there is no evidentiary basis for this line of questioning. ¶ 61. This Court has clearly held that it is prejudicial error for questions on cross-examination to contain insinuations and intimations of such conduct when there is no basis in fact. Walker, 740 So.2d at 884 (citing Hosford v. State, 525 So.2d 789, 793 (Miss.1988)). Here, the only attempt by the prosecutor to prove that the three defense witnesses lied during cross-examination about statements made to Clemmie Fleming was to ask one question during redirect that was stricken from the record. This Court finds error in the State's failure to offer proof that Latarsha Blissett, Stacey Warren and Mary Ella Fleming lied. This line of questioning without evidentiary basis has been found by this Court to be inflammatory and highly prejudicial. This Court holds it was prejudicial to the case at bar.