Opinion ID: 182229
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ortiz’s Apprendi Claim

Text: Ortiz argues that, under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), whether his two cocaine trafficking convictions in 2000 occurred on different occasions is a fact that must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Because Ortiz raises his Apprendi argument for the first time on appeal, our review is for plain error. See United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1298 (11th Cir. 2005). Under the plain error standard, we may reverse only if there is (1) error; (2) that is plain; (3) that affects substantial rights; and (4) that “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. Under Apprendi, “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63 (emphasis added); see also Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 239-47, 118 S. Ct. 1219, 1227-33 (1998) (concluding, preApprendi, that the fact of a prior conviction, when used as the basis for a sentencing enhancement, need not be proven to a jury); United States v. Greer, 8 440 F.3d 1267, 1273-74 (11th Cir. 2006) (explaining that, even after Apprendi and its progeny, we are bound by Almendarez-Torres). Ortiz argues that the “different occasions” inquiry of the ACCA does not fall within the “fact of the prior conviction” exception of Apprendi because it “necessitates a finding of more than the mere existence of a prior conviction.” This Court has already rejected the narrow distinction Ortiz tries to draw. See Greer, 440 F.3d at 1275. Specifically, in Greer, the district court refused to apply the ACCA’s fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence. Id. at 1269. The district court construed Almendarez-Torres and Apprendi to permit a sentencing court to determine only “the existence of a prior conviction” and not the “factual nature of a prior conviction.” Id. at 1275. Thus, the district court concluded that it could not look at Shepard-approved materials to determine whether a prior conviction for terroristic threats was a “violent felony” within the meaning of the ACCA. Id. at 1272-73. This Court reversed, concluding that “[t]here is implicit in the Shepard rule . . . a recognition that if the nature of the prior conviction can be determined from those types of records, under existing law the trial judge may make the determination.” Id. at 1275. The Greer Court explained that “Shepard does not 9 bar judges from finding whether prior convictions qualify for ACCA purposes; it restricts the sources or evidence that a judge (instead of a jury) can consider in making that finding.” Id. Although Greer involved the determination of whether a prior conviction was a violent felony, Greer’s reasoning applies equally to whether the offenses occurred on different occasions. And, indeed, this Court has concluded that the sentencing court may properly determine whether the offenses occurred on different occasions so long as it uses Shepard-approved materials. See, e.g., Sneed, 600 F.3d at 1332-33. Given our binding precedent, the district court did not commit error, much less plain error, in finding by a preponderance of the evidence that Ortiz’s two cocaine trafficking offenses in 2000 were committed on occasions different from one another.2