Opinion ID: 712203
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: 4'10', 65 pounds.

Text: 18 R. 77, Answers to Interrogatories, Ex. A at 27. 19 On March 18, 1993, the district court granted the plaintiffs' motion for leave to file an amended complaint. The amended complaint, which added Allied Signal as a defendant, alleged for the first time that Shad had been wearing a seat belt at the time of the accident. 20 In a subsequent deposition, Mr. Shepard testified that he and Mrs. Shepard had decided to amend the complaint after acquiring additional information about seat belts and their propensity to release during impact. He identified the source of this additional information as a segment from a television program entitled Street Stories. The segment, which had been shown to them by their attorney, illustrates how certain types of seat belts can open unexpectedly in certain types of impacts. His earlier statements that Shad had not been wearing a seat belt, Mr. Shepard explained, were mere conclusions drawn from the fact that Shad had been thrown from the Jeep. Now that he had a more complete understanding of the relevant facts--that certain types of seat belts were subject to inertial release--he could explain how Shad, who customarily wore his seat belt, had ended up outside the Jeep. Mr. Shepard further stated that, although he had not actually seen Shad buckle his seat belt, he had seen Shad reaching down between the seats for the belt prior to exiting the garage and had heard a metal clang. Mr. Shepard testified that, based on these observations, he believed that Shad was wearing his seat belt on the day of the accident. 21 The parties also took the deposition of Mrs. Shepard after the amended complaint was filed. Like her husband, Mrs. Shepard testified that she had changed her position concerning Shad's use of the seat belt. When asked what had changed her mind, she indicated that the Street Stories segment had provided her with additional information on how seat belts could release unexpectedly. Mrs. Shepard further testified that, on the day of the accident, she had seen Shad turn around in the passenger seat and bend over as if reaching for the seat belt and she had heard a clanking noise before the Jeep exited the garage. Mrs. Shafer also stated that Shad always wore his seat belt when traveling in a car. She admitted, however, that she had not actually seen Shad wearing his seat belt or holding any part of the seat belt in his hand on the day of the accident. B. Proceedings in the District Court 22 Allied Signal filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that Mr. and Mrs. Shepard, the only eyewitnesses to the occurrence, had previously admitted to numerous witnesses and in court that Shad was not wearing his seat belt at the time of the accident. The plaintiffs, who had responded to the summary judgment motion by filing copies of the Shepards' depositions taken after the amended complaint, argued that Shad, in whose name Allied Signal was sued, had not admitted anything and could not be bound by their statements. Even if the prior statements could be considered admissions, they argued, the statements are ordinary and not judicial admissions and are thus subject to rebuttal by other evidence. Neither Mr. Shepard nor Mrs. Shepard had actual knowledge of whether Shad was wearing his seat belt; they merely had been speculating when they spoke. They argued that their prior statements, which had been made without personal knowledge, amount only to lay witness reconstruction testimony and, as such, lack the required foundation for use as substantive evidence. 23 The district court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the prior statements lacked evidentiary foundation and could be used only for impeachment purposes. Such an argument, the court noted, is a red herring for purposes of the summary judgment motion. Even if the Shepards' prior statements do not bind Shad as admissions, the district court continued, Mr. and Mrs. Shepard are still the only possible witnesses to the occurrence and each had made clear statements that Shad was not wearing his seat belt. Citing Adelman-Tremblay v. Jewel Companies, 859 F.2d 517 (7th Cir.1988), the court applied the well-settled rule that a party may not establish a genuine issue of fact solely by pointing to witness' recantations of prior unequivocal statements. R. 115, Order of July 14, 1994, at 4 (emphasis in original). Careful to note that it was not passing on the Shepards' credibility, the court entered summary judgment in favor of Allied Signal. C. Contentions of the Parties
24 The plaintiffs contend that the admissible substantive evidence could lead a jury to conclude that Shad was wearing his seat belt on December 31, 1990. The district court, they submit, improperly considered evidence that was altogether inadmissible or which would be admissible only for impeachment purposes. First of all, they argue that the Shepards' statements to third parties are hearsay and thus inadmissible for substantive purposes. Moreover, the plaintiffs continue, Mr. and Mrs. Shepard were not witnesses to the occurrence. Because neither of them observed Shad without his seat belt on, their earlier statements that he had not been wearing his seat belt amount only to lay-witness reconstruction testimony that would be inadmissible at trial for want of a proper foundation. These statements therefore should not have been considered for purposes of summary judgment. 25 Sworn interrogatory answers may be considered in conjunction with a summary judgment motion only if the person answering the interrogatory had personal knowledge or was competent to testify as to the matters stated. S & S Logging Co. v. Barker, 366 F.2d 617 (9th Cir.1966). Because Mrs. Shepard did not see whether Shad completed the process of putting on his seat belt, the plaintiffs argue, her answer to the interrogatory was not based on personal knowledge and could not be considered. Essentially the same argument is made with respect to Mr. Shepard's testimony at the custody hearing. 26 The only evidence having a proper evidentiary foundation, the plaintiffs argue, supports the view that Shad was wearing a seat belt. In their view, the deposition testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Shepard was not an attempt to recant prior statements; rather, the testimony set forth for the first time their observations of Shad's interaction with the seat belt. Unlike their initial statements, which were mere conclusions drawn from the fact that Shad had been thrown from the Jeep, Mr. and Mrs. Shepard had a more complete understanding of relevant facts at the time of their depositions. Specifically, the plaintiffs contend, the Shepards became aware that the type of seat belt found in the Jeep was susceptible to inertial release. In the plaintiffs' view, their deposition testimony, which includes statements that Shad customarily wore his seat belt, provides sufficient circumstantial evidence of seat belt use to preclude summary judgment. 27 Adelman-Tremblay, the plaintiffs argue, does not prevent the district court from considering the deposition testimony. Unlike the prior statements in that case, which the court labeled a model of clarity, Adelman-Tremblay, 859 F.2d at 520, the Shepards' prior statements are ambiguous and thus subject to subsequent clarification. Unlike the present case, in Adelman-Tremblay there were two compelling reasons to disallow the contradiction of earlier statements: (1) there was no newly discovered evidence; and (2) the witness had not lacked access to material facts. See id. By contrast, the plaintiffs argue, this case involves prior statements made before the Shepards had access to a material fact: the seat belt's propensity for inertial release. Thus, the plaintiffs argue, there is no recantation; there is only explanation. Also unlike Adelman-Tremblay, their subsequent statements were not made at the eleventh hour during the pendency of a summary judgment motion. 28 In the plaintiffs' view, the district court's opinion implies that the Shepards' statements were considered as admissions against Shad. Because those statements were neither made nor adopted by a party, the plaintiffs argue, they are not admissions chargeable against Shad. Finally, because the statements did not concern facts within the peculiar knowledge of the party making them, they are not judicial admissions and are thus subject to rebuttal.
29 At the outset, Allied Signal argues, the district court expressly stated that its ruling was not based on a finding that the Shepards' statements were judicial admissions binding on Shad. Rather, it argues, the district court correctly applied the well-established rule that a party may not establish a genuine issue of fact solely by pointing to witnesses' recantations of prior unequivocal statements. The Shepards' statements were clear and unequivocal; their content is not in dispute. Moreover, Allied Signal contends, a strict application of Adelman-Tremblay is warranted by the fact that two of the prior statements--Mrs. Shepard's answer to the interrogatory 7 and Mr. Shepard's testimony at the custody hearing--were made under oath. See Donohoe v. Consol. Operating & Prod. Corp., 736 F.Supp. 845, 861 (N.D.Ill.1990), aff'd in relevant part, 982 F.2d 1130 (7th Cir.1992). 30 The Street Stories segment, Allied Signal continues, is not newly discovered evidence and does not justify departure from the Adelman-Tremblay rule. Nothing in the segment establishes that Shad was wearing his seat belt on December 31, 1990; Shad Shafer is not even mentioned in the segment. Similarly, the Shepards' lack of awareness of inertial release provides no evidence on whether Shad had on his seat belt. If Mr. and Mrs. Shepard, as the only occurrence and pre-occurrence witnesses, are now capable of testifying that they observed Shad apparently putting on his seat belt, then they were equally competent to make the prior statements that Shad was not wearing his seat belt. 31 With the subsequent recantations properly excluded, Allied Signal contends, the plaintiffs had not made out an element of their prima facie case--that Shad was wearing a seat belt. Summary judgment, it urges, was properly granted. II