Opinion ID: 2640775
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Delegation of judicial function

Text: The legislature may constitutionally delegate some adjudicative power to an executive agency, but it may not delegate judicial power. [38] The attempt to distinguish between a judicial function, which cannot be delegated, and a quasi-judicial function, which can be, is not new. In his treatise on state administrative law, Professor Frank Cooper notes that in delegation cases, courts have tried to distinguish purely legislative or judicial functions from quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial functions and concludes that no court has successfully distinguished the two. [39] Although there is not a clear line of demarcation, courts have looked at several factors in analyzing whether a particular delegation of power to an administrative agency is constitutional. Among the factors are the limited jurisdiction of administrative agencies, the lack of finality of agency decisions, the availability of judicial review, and the amount of discretion available to an agency.
One factor that courts rely on to determine that an agency exercises only quasi-judicial authority is the limited jurisdiction of the administrative agency. [40] One of the policy justifications for the existence of administrative adjudication is that as a result of their limited jurisdiction, administrative agencies are able to develop expertise in a narrow area. [41] Some courts have decided that a grant of judicial power to an administrative agency is acceptable when the administrative body resolve[s] factual issues underlying a purely statutory right. [42] Administrative agencies do not have jurisdiction to decide issues of constitutional law. [43] Delegation to an administrative agency is upheld as long as the administrative tribunal stays within the bounds of its authority. [44] The Appeals Commission's jurisdiction is limited to hearing and determination of all questions of law and fact arising under the Alaska Workers' Compensation Act in matters that have been appealed to the Appeals Commission. [45] The scope of its jurisdiction is not that different from the Board's jurisdiction, [46] except that the Appeals Commission performs a quasi-judicial function that is akin to appellate review, while the Board performs a quasi-judicial function that resembles that of a trial court. We recognize that the Appeals Commission, like the Board, may be required to apply equitable or common law principles in a specific case, [47] but both of these quasi-judicial agencies can only adjudicate in the context of a workers' compensation case. Neither the Appeals Commission nor the Board has jurisdiction to hear any action outside of a workers' compensation claim. [48] Although AKPIRG's main argument is that the Appeals Commission has usurped a judicial function and therefore cannot really be a quasi-judicial agency, it does not appear that AKPIRG argues that all administrative appellate review is unconstitutional. AKPIRG lists the Board's authority to hear appeals from decisions of the reemployment benefits administrator (RBA) as one of the Board's functions. In appeals from a decision of the RBA, the Board is limited by statute to reviewing the action for abuse of discretion. [49] AKPIRG does not attack the Board's appellate authority as an excessive delegation and does not explain why a delegation of appellate review to the Appeals Commission would be suspect when a delegation of a similar, though narrower, function to the Board is permissible. The superior court considered whether appellate review is a uniquely judicial function and decided that it was not. In Alaska, multi-level agency review is used in unemployment claims [50] as well as contract claims against the state. [51] Decisions of fair hearing officers in public assistance cases must be reviewed by the division director before they can be appealed to the court. [52] The procedures used by the Appeals Commission may be more formal and more closely resemble the courts' procedures, but that does not render them unconstitutional. AKPIRG also urges us to declare the Appeals Commission a court because its function, to review Board decisions, was formerly performed by the superior court. The fact that an administrative body performs a function previously performed by a court does not automatically make it a court. Several years after Congress amended the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act to provide for administrative appellate review by the Benefits Review Board and judicial review by the United States Courts of Appeal, two members of the Benefits Review Board, who had been removed from their positions, claimed that the Benefits Review Board was in fact an Article III court, in part because its review function replaced a function that had previously been performed by the District Court. [53] In deciding that the Benefits Review Board was not an Article III court, the D.C. Circuit observed, Article III requires only that the ultimate `judicial power' be reserved in the Article III courts; it does not require that all adjudicative bodies exercising the review `standards' that Article III courts exercise be constituted as Article III courts. [54] Similarly, the fact that the Appeals Commission reviews Board decisions and uses standards of review and procedures that closely parallel those of the court does not make the Appeals Commission a court. The Appeals Commission's limited jurisdiction supports the conclusion that it is a quasi-judicial agency rather than a court.
Another factor that courts have looked at in assessing the constitutionality of an agency's power is whether an agency can enforce an order that it creates. [55] As we recognized in a previous separation of powers case, the essence of judicial power is the final authority to render and enforce a judgment. [56] Neither the Appeals Commission nor the Board has the ability to enforce its own orders. AKPIRG contends that after the legislature removed the superior court's jurisdiction to hear workers' compensation appeals, this court alone can enforce Board or Appeals Commission orders. We disagree. The superior court retains jurisdiction to compel compliance with Board subpoenas [57] and to enter judgments when a party to a workers' compensation proceeding defaults on payment of a compensation order. [58] The superior court's authority to enter a judgment when an employer defaults on payments is independent of its power to hear appeals. [59] In addition, nothing deprives the superior court of jurisdiction to hear declaratory actions related to the Alaska Workers' Compensation Act. [60] Because the Appeals Commission cannot enforce its own orders, it lacks one of the essential attributes of a court.
Delegation of power to an administrative agency is more likely to be found constitutional if the grant of power minimizes agency discretion. [61] For example, in workers' compensation cases, the amount of benefits is set by statute so that the Board has minimal discretion in awarding benefits as compared to a jury awarding tort damages. [62] Courts also sometimes look at whether the area of delegation is one that historically has been subject to administrative regulation. [63] Workers' compensation is an area of law that has been subject to administrative adjudication for a considerable period of time. [64] The Alaska Workers' Compensation Board was created in 1959, the same year that Alaska became a state. [65] AKPIRG does not question the Board's power to perform a quasi-judicial function. The Appeals Commission has no more discretion to award damages than the Board since its jurisdiction is limited to review of Board decisions. This lack of discretion weighs in favor of the Appeals Commission being a quasi-judicial agency rather than a court.
Courts have also looked at the availability of judicial review in determining whether an agency has been properly delegated quasi-judicial authority. [66] We have found a right to judicial review of agency action in the absence of an explicit statutory provision [67] and a right to limited review even in cases where the legislature has precluded judicial review. [68] Decisions of the Appeals Commission are subject to judicial review by this court, so judicial review is available. [69] AKPIRG contends that the legislature may not constitutionally provide for direct appeals from administrative agency decisions to this court because article IV, section 2 of the Alaska Constitution provides that the supreme court has final appellate jurisdiction. But we agree with the State's argument that this court can have both initial and final jurisdiction to hear administrative appeals, just as it has initial and final jurisdiction to hear civil appeals from the superior court. [70] AKPIRG points to no authority that there is a right of intermediate appellate review in agency decisions or otherwise, and we find none in the Alaska Constitution. Superior court review of administrative agency decisions is a statutory, not a constitutional, right, even though the separation of powers doctrine and principles of due process require an opportunity for judicial review. The court reviewing the administrative action does not need to be the superior court, however. Among the goals of the legislature in changing the Workers' Compensation Act were decreasing costs and speeding the processing of claims. The Appeals Commission was created to help achieve these goals: it was intended to provide consistent, legally precedential decisions in an expeditious manner. [71] The legislature hoped that the Appeals Commission would provide necessary expertise and thereby improve the appeals process. Other states have workers' compensation systems similar to that which was created by chapter 10, FSSLA 2005. At the request of the superior court, the State provided information about five other states with direct appeals to their supreme courts in workers' compensation appeals. A number of other states have workers' compensation statutes which have two-tier administrative decisionmaking, with initial determinations reviewed within the agency or department, followed by judicial review by an appellate court. [72] We are not aware of any successful constitutional challenge to a similarly structured workers' compensation appellate procedure. Constitutional challenges to similar statutes were rejected in New Hampshire [73] and Kansas. [74] Because the Appeals Commission has limited jurisdiction and discretion and because its decisions are subject to judicial review, the legislature validly delegated quasi-judicial power to the Appeals Commission. AKPIRG contends that because the legislature did not explicitly call the Appeals Commission a quasi-judicial agency as it did when it created the Office of Tax Appeals in the Department of Administration, the Appeals Commission is not in fact a quasi-judicial agency. A comparison to the Alaska Workers' Compensation Board shows that AKPIRG's argument is flawed. The Alaska Workers' Compensation Board was an early quasi-judicial agency, created by the legislature in 1959. [75] At the time of its creation, it was not explicitly labeled a quasi-judicial agency, yet we have recognized that it is one. [76] AKPIRG does not question the Board's status as a quasi-judicial agency or the legitimacy of its power: in fact, AKPIRG uses the Board as a model quasi-judicial agency with which to compare the Appeals Commission. AKPIRG also argues that the Appeals Commission cannot be considered a valid quasi-judicial agency because of its limited function. It alleges that the only power delegated to the Appeals Commission is the authority to hear appeals in workers' compensation cases. While it is true that the Appeals Commission has a more limited function than the Board, its limited function does not disqualify it as a quasi-judicial agency. [77] Delegates to the Constitutional Convention appeared to be more concerned that the scope of powers delegated to a quasi-judicial agency would be too broad, rather than too narrow. [78] Furthermore, the Appeals Commission, like other quasi-judicial agencies, is empowered to adopt regulations consistent with its function. [79] It can also hold hearings and receive evidence on a limited number of issues. [80] The legislature acted within the authority to create quasi-judicial agencies accorded to it by the constitution when it established the Appeals Commission.