Opinion ID: 1924747
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Michigan constitutional and legislative history favors appointee holdover.

Text: Our brother WILLIAMS' opinion strongly suggests that there has existed in Michigan an historical preference that appointees to vacancies in the Michigan Supreme Court not be permitted to hold over in office beyond the expiration of the term during which the appointment was made. Specifically, our brother's opinion states that in Michigan there is an historical preference for an elected judiciary and non-holdover Supreme Court terms, [6] indicating, together with other factors, that the more limited appointment was the intent of the people. While there can be no question that the people of this state have indeed indicated an historical preference for an elected judiciary, [7] it is clear beyond peradventure that the Michigan constitutional and legislative history reveals consistent adherence to a policy favoring the holdover of appointees to judicial vacancies until a successor is elected. From 1850 until the constitutional convention of 1961, every constitutional and statutory provision which was concerned with the subject of judicial vacancies included provision for the appointee to hold over until a successor is elected. Even the plaintiff concedes that prior to the 1963 Constitution, Michigan law would permit an appointee to hold over beyond the expiration of a current term and into the commencement of a new term. Plaintiff's brief of January 3, 1983, p 17. Const 1850, art 6, § 14 provided: When a vacancy occurs in the office of judge of the supreme, circuit or probate court, it shall be filled by appointment of the governor, which shall continue until a successor is elected and qualified. When elected, such successor shall hold his office the residue of the unexpired term. An implementing statute, 1851 PA 172, § 3, defined what circumstances created a vacancy, and another statute, 1857 PA 146, § 4, provided both that the appointee to the vacancy could hold over until a successor was elected and fixed the date of such election. Similarly, the 1908 Constitution provided, in art 7, § 20: When a vacancy occurs in the office of judge of any court of record, it shall be filled by appointment of the governor, and the person appointed shall hold the office until a successor is elected and qualified. When elected, such successor shall hold the office the residue of the unexpired term. A statute, 1954 PA 116, § 404, enacted as part of the 1954 Elections Code, preserved the constitutional right of an appointee to serve until his successor is elected and qualified. When the statute was amended in 1955, and again in 1963, the provision for the appointee to a vacancy to hold over until the election of a successor was preserved. Other statutory provisions, while not specifically implementing the holdover provision of Const 1908, art 7, § 20, cannot be interpreted as prohibiting holdover. See 1915 PA 314, ch 1, § 4, part of the Judicature Act of 1915, which became 1948 CL 601.4, and continued in substantially the same form as RJA § 204 until its repeal in 1963. MCL 600.204; MSA 27A.204. Therefore, before the ratification of the 1963 Constitution, Michigan had an uninterrupted history of constitutional provision for the appointee to a Supreme Court vacancy to hold over until a successor was elected and qualified, with statutory implementation declaring when such election would occur. The 1963 Constitution, while doing away entirely with gubernatorial appointment to the Supreme Court, continued the historical tradition of allowing a Supreme Court appointee to hold over until the successor is elected and qualified. Const 1963, art 6, § 23, as enacted. Within five years, however, the mistake, as this Court characterized it, of doing away with gubernatorial appointment was rectified with the adoption, by the people, of present art 6, § 23. That provision perpetuated Michigan's historical preference for the holdover by an appointee to a Supreme Court vacancy and incorporated in the same provision what had historically been a legislative provision, fixing, with specificity, the time at which the election of a successor would be held. The history, therefore, is one of continuous constitutional approval for an appointee to a Supreme Court vacancy to hold over until a successor is elected and not, as our colleagues' opinion suggests, a history of non-holdover indicating that the more limited appointment was the intent of the people. We conclude that Const 1963, art 6, § 23, standing alone, provides sufficient authority to sustain DOROTHY COMSTOCK RILEY'S claim to the office of Justice of the Michigan Supreme Court. However, since some of our colleagues disagree, we will discuss whether MCL 168.399; MSA 6.1399 provides an additional, independent basis for Justice RILEY'S position.