Opinion ID: 852197
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Exclusion of Medical Causation Testimony

Text: Ford contends that the trial court erroneously excluded the testimony of Catherine Corrigan, a biomedical engineer. Corrigan had testified on direct examination, ultimately giving her opinion that the fatal injuries to the plaintiff's decedent's head and neck likely happened at different times, could have happened inside or outside the vehicle, and that he would have been at risk of a severe injury even if not ejected from the vehicle. During her cross-examination, when it was established that she is not a medical doctor, the plaintiff successfully challenged her qualifications to testify as to the cause of injury. Following an extensive discussion with trial counsel, the court gave the following admonishment: Ladies and gentlemen of the Jury, you may consider this witness' testimony in terms of biomechanics. You may not consider this witness' testimony in terms of medical causation of any of the injuries that the decedent may have sustained. Tr. at 1875. [3] Citing Brown v. Terre Haute Regional Hosp., 537 N.E.2d 54, 61 (Ind.Ct. App.1989), trans. not sought, Ford acknowledges that [s]ubstantively, Indiana law provides that lay witnesses cannot provide testimony as to medical causation but claims that Corrigan had a unique blend of medical and biomechanical engineering training that rendered her qualified to opine as to the cause of death. Ford's Appellant's Br. at 44. In addition to disputing the substance of the trial court's ruling, Ford also argues that the trial court erred in allowing the plaintiff to make an after-the-fact challenge to Corrigan's qualifications, and then compounded that error by not conducting a Rule 702 inquiry. [4] Id. at 44-45. Our requirement that evidence objections be made contemporaneously with the presentation of the evidence is for the purpose of permitting a trial court to take appropriate corrective action during the trial. Godby v. State, 736 N.E.2d 252, 255 (Ind.2000). This purpose was served in the present case. The plaintiff's objection to Corrigan's medical causation testimony was made while the witness was still on the stand and enabled the court to take timely corrective action. Any lack of plaintiff's promptness in challenging the testimony did not operate to Ford's detriment. We also decline to find error in the absence of a formal Evidence Rule 702 inquiry, which was not requested by either party, and the substance of which was in large measure served by the extended bench colloquy with the parties following the plaintiffs objection to Corrigan's medical causation testimony. Whether a party's proffered expert witness should be allowed to testify is a decision within the discretion of the trial court and is only reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion. Roach v. State, 695 N.E.2d 934, 939 (Ind.1998); Byrd v. State, 593 N.E.2d 1183, 1185 (Ind.1992). We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's admonishment of the jury consistent with established Indiana law.