Opinion ID: 1566486
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Jailhouse Statements of the Defendant

Text: A major issue revolves around the admissibility of certain admissions, confessions, and statements made by the defendant after indictment, while in Greeneville City Jail, to a member of the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation posing as a prisoner. As a prelude to a discussion of this issue, the time sequence becomes important. A search warrant was executed on March 31, 1978. During the course of the search the defendant handed Agent Baird a letter signed by his counsel advising of his right to have an attorney present during any conversations with the police and giving other appropriate advice to his client. On April 17, 1978, the presentment was returned. On that same day the District Attorney General requested Agent David Rhea of the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation to meet with Agent Baird, Sheriff Colyer of Greene County, and Agent Denny of the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation for the purpose of formulating a false charge upon which he might be placed in jail along with the defendant. It was determined that he would be charged with drunken driving, possession of marijuana, going armed, with a hold for armed robbery in Kentucky. A newspaper story was planted in the local newspaper, and Rhea entered the jail as Michael David Turnblazer. He was actually confined on April 18, 1978. Also on April 18, 1978, the defendant was arrested, on a capias, in Nashville by Sheriff Gale Colyer of Greene County and Agents Baird and Denny. While still in Nashville, and immediately following the arrest, counsel for the defendant called Sheriff Colyer by long distance, advised him that he represented the defendant and requested that he not be questioned. The Sheriff agreed and promised that he would not be questioned. This was one day after the Sheriff had participated in the planning conference and after it had been determined that a TBI agent, posing as an accused criminal, would be placed in the Greeneville City Jail along with defendant. To say the least the Sheriff was somewhat less than candid about the matter, lulling Lawyer Bowman into a false sense of security. Thus it was that the ruse of placing a TBI agent, posing as a criminal, in jail with the defendant, occurred after defendant had been indicted, after his custodians knew he was represented by counsel and after defendant's counsel had been promised there would be no interrogation, and while defendant was secure in the knowledge that he would not be interrogated. David Rhea, the TBI agent, testified that he was placed in jail, under an assumed name and posing as a prisoner, to determine what, if any action, Russell Berry was taking as far as taking the life of Bobby Baird. The trial court found that the agent had gone into the cell, not for the purpose of interrogating defendant or of obtaining a statement about this particular crime, but to determine what harm was in the making for the prosecution witnesses. This is the theory of the State. Substantial effort was made to prove threats against Agent Baird. We find scant proof of any threat made to or about Agent Baird. Indeed there is no testimony of any direct threat except to sue for slander. During the course of the trial Agent Baird represented to the court that several persons had communicated threats to him. He declined to reveal their identity. The Trial Judge directed him to submit to the court the names of those persons who tell you about threats made. The submission made by Agent Baird, pursuant to those instructions, appears in this record in a sealed envelope. Examination reveals that the identity of a single person was disclosed  Mrs. Clyde Phillips, a sister of Zelma Shanks. No direct statement is attributed to her. The statement simply recites she is very apprehensive about actions toward her by defendant Keith Berry. It is noteworthy that Mrs. Phillips testified as a witness for the State and nothing in her testimony touches upon this assertion. Assuming arguendo that the meager proof presented a reasonable ground for belief that the defendant would inflict death or some bodily harm upon Agent Baird or any other witness  and overlooking the fact that he did not do so from the time of the murder on February 8, 1978, until his incarceration on April 18, 1978, more than two months later  the validity of the action of the State in placing a law enforcement officer, posing as a prisoner, in the cell with defendant is not thereby established. The testimony of the agent may or may not be competent in the context of another trial on another charge, e.g., solicitation to commit murder or arson, but it is not admissible in this trial. Further, assuming the statements made by the defendant to have been voluntary, as found by the Trial Judge, and as insisted by the State, they do not necessarily become admissible. See infra. Agent Rhea testified that as soon as defendant entered the cell he started talking. After about two hours he stated that he would like to have Agents Baird and Denny killed and was willing to pay a price. Turnblazer offered to kill these two individuals if there was enough money in it. After further discussion they agreed on a price of $5,000.00 each. The deed was to be accomplished before the following Monday because this was the date of the bond hearing. Defendant stated that these two agents knew more about the case than anyone and the way to win was to eliminate witnesses. Defendant suggested the use of dynamite as a good way to eliminate Baird. As a part of the conversation, Turnblazer told defendant that he had contacted his girl friend and had mentioned to her that they could make some money. In due course, Rita Sisson, another agent for the TBI, showed up at the jail and was introduced to defendant as Turnblazer's girl friend. They talked some fifteen to twenty minutes about the details and plans for the murder of the two agents. They agreed on $500.00 front money. Still later, according to Turnblazer, defendant's wife, Robin Berry, came to the jail. Defendant begged her for a gun but she refused unless and until he was convicted. On two or three occasions during her visits he asked her for $500.00 and told her that he had hired Turnblazer to kill Agent Baird. During a visit by defendant's wife after they had discussed the front money, she stated she had checked all their bank accounts and advised defendant that they had no money. Defendant admitted he had lied to her about various money affairs and further admitted to her that he had lied about his employment. During the various conversations, defendant made numerous damaging admissions concerning the murder of his father-in-law. He discussed various portions of the proof against him and outlined his alibi defense. He discussed the ball-peen hammer but said he was not concerned about this because it was not listed on the search warrant and could not be used in court. He discussed various details about the events of February 8, 1978, but stopped short of a direct admission of murder. Taken, however, in context with the total proof, he fairly established his guilt. He clearly established his presence in the Knoxville area and left little doubt that he was at the Shanks' residence the day of the murder. It is evident from this record that the statements made by the defendant were voluntary and made while under the belief that Turnblazer was a tough character. It is further evident that they were made during the course of extended conversation interspersed with questions by the agents. We see no essential difference between this and a normal interrogation wherein a police officer takes a statement from one accused of crime. Instead of the conventional interrogation the agents listened and carried on the conversation, interrupting from time to time to ask questions designed to keep the conversation going and the information flowing. As said by the Court in United States v. Brown, 466 F.2d 493 (10th Cir.1972): We do not pause to discuss any purported significance as to whether Byers obtained the information by direct question or otherwise. Form does not control the substance in determining the legality of interrogation and very often subtlety is more effective than other methods of coercion. 466 F.2d at 495. This was an interrogation. The only question is whether the information given by the defendant while in the jail house, after indictment, after employment of counsel, after the law enforcement authorities knew of counsel's employment and had promised no interrogation, is admissible merely because it was voluntarily made. We respond in the negative. Our analysis of the legal issues must start with Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964). There government agents surreptitiously recorded the conversation of the defendant with a co-defendant, after indictment, and after the employment of counsel, while the defendant was on bail. The Court held that: [T]he petitioner was denied the basic protections of [the Sixth Amendment] when there was used against him at his trial evidence of his own incriminating words, which federal agents had deliberately elicited from him after he had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel. 377 U.S. at 206, 84 S.Ct. at 1203, 12 L.Ed.2d at 250. We should note at the outset that there is a distinction between the Miranda Fifth Amendment right to counsel, which is designed to protect against coercion, and the Massiah Sixth Amendment right to counsel which guarantees to a criminal defendant the right to legal assistance in any critical confrontation with state officials, irrespective of coercion. Here we deal with the Sixth Amendment. In Hancock v. White, 378 F.2d 479 (1st Cir.1967), the Court was concerned with incriminating statements made to law enforcement officials during an automobile trip, after indictment. At the time of the statements the defendant had not requested counsel in the pending case. He was not interrogated; the statements were volunteered, and no chicanery, trickery or subterfuge was involved. The Court applied the Massiah rule, holding that: [T]he Massiah rule is not limited to Massiah circumstances but applies to exclude post-indictment incriminating statements of an accused to government agents in the absence of counsel even when not deliberately elicited by interrogation or induced by misapprehension engendered by trickery or deception. 378 F.2d at 482. The case of Miller v. California, 392 U.S. 616, 88 S.Ct. 2258, 20 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1968), was decided per curiam. Because the language of the dissent (four justices) is so appropriate to the case at bar and because it involves the use of testimony by a falsely booked government agent, we quote extensively: In the State's view, so long as Fisk acted simply as a listening post, she could testify as to any statements made to her by petitioner. That view was, however, rejected in Massiah itself. The Government in that case pointed to the fact that the record did not reveal that its agent had induced the defendant by persuasion (there based on friendship) to discuss his activities, and urged that providing a defendant an opportunity to talk did not violate his right to counsel. See also Beatty v. United States, 389 U.S. 45[, 88 S.Ct. 234, 19 L.Ed.2d 48] (1967), reversing 377 F.2d 181 (CA 5th Cir.). At all events, Fisk was not put in the cell to discuss the weather, to console petitioner, or merely to provide her with companionship. Her presence itself was an inducement to speak, and an inducement by a police agent. While petitioner's statements to her were not obtained by coercive means, they certainly were not given, in light of the deception, through a knowing and intelligent waiver of petitioner's rights. Furthermore, it is clear on this record that Fisk was planted in petitioner's cell in order to subvert her right to counsel, with the express purpose of attempting to obtain evidence out of her mouth. On one occasion, Fisk was given a newspaper clipping concerning the case and was told to show it to petitioner, which she did with some accompanying statement, such as the press is ruining you. On another occasion, pursuant to instructions, Fisk told petitioner of a conversation that she had supposedly overheard in a hall between four men whom she thought were from the district attorney's office, in which one of the men, as the ruse went, said: Getting back to the Miller case, Arthwell Hayton came in and blew the top off the case. Fisk also told petitioner I put all my trust in Mr. Bland [the sheriff] and maybe it would do some good for you if you tried the same. Finally, Fisk said that she had at one time been represented by an attorney who did not do me much good and indicated that perhaps petitioner should suspect hers. Such deliberate police deception and subversion of a defendant's rights should not be condoned. The District Court of Appeal said in this case: It is almost incredible that in these days of enlightened treatment by prosecution authorities of persons charged with crime, the Peggy Fisk incident could have occurred.    392 U.S. at 625-26, 88 S.Ct. at 2266-2267, 20 L.Ed.2d at 1337-38. Miller involved pre-indictment incriminating statements. Had the statements been made after indictment the results, under Massiah , no doubt would have been different. We adopt the reasoning of the dissent, as being applicable to the instant case. We next discuss the landmark case of Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977), wherein Massiah is endorsed and the Court makes it clear that the Sixth Amendment attaches once adversary proceedings have commenced. [T]he clear rule of Massiah is that once adversary proceedings have commenced against an individual, he has a right to legal representation when the government interrogates him. 430 U.S. at 401, 97 S.Ct. at 1240, 51 L.Ed.2d at 438. The facts of Brewer v. Williams are familiar to students of criminal jurisprudence. Briefly stated, they are that Williams was arrested in Davenport, Iowa, after having called his lawyer in Des Moines who advised him to surrender. He was given Miranda warnings. The Davenport police called their counterparts in Des Moines and reached them while Williams' lawyer was still at the police station. Williams talked with his lawyer who advised that he would be returned to Des Moines but would not be questioned en route and he was not to talk with the officers. The lawyer agreed with the police that Detective Leaming and a fellow officer would go to Davenport and return Williams to Des Moines but that they would not question him. Detective Leaming knew that Williams had a history of mental difficulties and was extremely religious. On the return trip, Leaming made his famous Christian burial speech. First, addressing Williams as Reverend, he pointed out the existing extreme weather conditions with several inches of snow predicted, and that only Williams knew the location of the child he was accused of killing and whose body he had hidden. Next he pointed out that if it snowed on top of that body even Williams would have difficulty finding it. Then he delivered his coup de grace : [S]ince we will be going right past the area ... I feel that we could stop and locate the body, that the parents of this little girl should be entitled to a Christian burial for the little girl who was snatched away from them on Christmas [E]ve and murdered. 430 U.S. at 392-93, 97 S.Ct. at 1236, 51 L.Ed.2d at 433. This speech had its intended effect and Williams took them to the body. In one fell swoop, the Supreme Court disposed of virtually all issues: [T]here is no need to review in this case the doctrine of Miranda v. Arizona, a doctrine designed to secure the constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, (citation omitted). It is equally unnecessary to evaluate the ruling of the District Court that Williams' self-incrimination statements were, indeed, involuntarily made (citation omitted). For it is clear [to us] that the judgment [grant of habeas corpus] before us must in any event be affirmed upon the ground that Williams was deprived of a different constitutional right  the right to the [effective] assistance of counsel. 430 U.S. at 397-98, 97 S.Ct. at 1239, 51 L.Ed.2d at 435-36. Thus, Brewer v. Williams rests squarely on Sixth Amendment grounds, and the Court makes it clear that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments mean[s] at least that a person is entitled to the help of a lawyer at or after the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated against him  `whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.' 430 U.S. at 398, 97 S.Ct. at 1239, 51 L.Ed.2d at 436. (Emphasis supplied). Further, the Court said [t]here can be no serious doubt, either that Detective Leaming deliberately and designedly set out to elicit information from Williams just as surely as  and perhaps more effectively than  if he had formally interrogated him. 430 U.S. at 399, 97 S.Ct. at 1240, 51 L.Ed.2d at 436-37. Counsel for the Government conceded that the Christian burial speech was tantamount to interrogation. The Supreme Court agreed with both lower courts that a form of interrogation was involved. Moreover, the Court said [t]hat the incriminating statements were elicited surreptitiously in the Massiah case and otherwise here, is constitutionally irrelevant. 430 U.S. at 400, 97 S.Ct. at 1240, 51 L.Ed.2d at 437. Lastly, the Court makes a pronouncement that judges having criminal jurisdiction, at all levels, must heed: The pressures on state executive and judicial officers charged with the administration of the criminal law are great, especially when the crime is murder and the victim [is] a small child. But it is precisely the predictability of those pressures that makes imperative a resolute loyalty to the guarantees that the Constitution extends to us all. (Emphasis supplied). 430 U.S. at 406, 97 S.Ct. at 1243, 41 L.Ed.2d at 441. Two cases decided by the Supreme Court of Rhode Island are of significance. The first, State v. Travis, 116 R.I. 678, 360 A.2d 548 (1976), involved a statement surreptitiously obtained by an undercover police officer. Defendant was arrested, given a Miranda warning and refused to make any statement, advising that he wished to consult with an attorney. Shortly thereafter, an undercover police officer entered his cell, dressed in modtype clothing and wearing a beard and having very long hair. The defendant talked, and subsequently he was indicted. In reversing the conviction the Court used the following significant language: We attach no significance as to whether the agent in the cell asked questions of the duped defendant or not. United States v. Brown, 466 F.2d 493, 495 (10th Cir.1972); Hancock v. White, 378 F.2d 479, 482 (1st Cir.1967). To allow into evidence admissions made to an agent in the cell who made casual conversation with a defendant while carefully avoiding any questions regarding the specific crime under investigation, but to disallow that agent's testimony if he asked a question pertaining to a defendant's reason for being incarcerated, would be to play games with an individual's constitutional guarantees. This we will not do. The mere presence of Langlois was an inducement to speak, and an inducement by a police officer. We see no significant difference between a uniformed police officer asking questions of defendant and Langlois' presence inside the cellblock with defendant. There was no knowing and intelligent waiver by defendant of his constitutional rights and one will not be presumed lightly. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). The undercover agent's ruse amounted to proscribed further interrogation. The police were not allowed to interrogate defendant directly. There is no authority in these circumstances for the police to do indirectly what they may not do directly. United States v. Brown, supra at 495; State v. Smith, 107 Ariz. 100, 104, 482 P.2d 863, 867 (1971); State v. McCorgary, 218 Kan. 358, 543 P.2d 952, 958 (1975). 360 A.2d at 551. The second case is State v. Innis, 391 A.2d 1158 (R.I. 1978). Innis was arrested on the streets of Providence for armed robbery and armed robbery and murder. Both crimes were perpetrated with a shotgun but he did not have it in his possession when arrested. He was promptly given the Miranda warnings. After the third such warning he stated that he wanted to see an attorney. He was transported to the patrol station and before departing the transporting officers were instructed not to interrogate him. En route to the station, one officer speaking to the other, expressed concern that a child from a nearby school for handicapped children might find the missing shotgun and injure himself. Defendant thereupon asked officers to return him to the scene of his arrest so that he might show them where he had hidden the shotgun. He was again advised of his Miranda rights, following which he led the police to the gun hidden under a pile of rocks in a nearby field. The Court held that both statements should have been suppressed. Two issues were identified and discussed, viz: (1) whether defendant was interrogated within the meaning of Miranda, and (2) whether he waived his right against self-incrimination. As to the first question, the Court said: The defendant, alone in a police wagon with three officers at 4 a.m., underwent the same psychological pressures which moved Williams to lead police to the body of his victim. Police officers in such a situation must not be permitted to achieve indirectly, by talking to one another, a result which the Supreme Court has said they may not achieve directly by talking to a suspect who has been ordered not to respond. The same `subtle compulsion' exists. ... we believe that defendant was interrogated within the meaning of Miranda in the absence of counsel after requesting to see an attorney. 391 A.2d at 1162. The Court held that there was no waiver of defendant's right against self-incrimination. The Rhode Island Court did not rely upon the Sixth Amendment; however, it did place strong reliance upon Brewer v. Williams, supra , a Sixth Amendment case. In this connection, it should be noted that the action of the defendant in leading officers to the hidden gun occurred prior to the initiation of judicial proceedings. Thus, Innis is not as strong, in principle, as the case at bar. Williams involved interrogation after preliminary arraignment. Innis, therefore, is of questionable precedential value in the consideration of the instant case. Further, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari and the case is docketed for hearing at the present term. Rhode Island v. Innis, 440 U.S. 934, 99 S.Ct. 1277, 59 L.Ed.2d 492 (1979). Also docketed for hearing at this term is Henry v. United States, 590 F.2d 544 (4th Cir.1978). This is a split opinion by the Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, and is analagous to the case at bar. It raises the specific question of whether Henry's rights were infringed by the admission of statements he made in the course of general conversation with a cellmate who had agreed to act as government informer but had been instructed not to question defendant. Henry was indicted for armed bank robbery and confined in the Norfolk City Jail. Shortly thereafter an FBI agent contacted another inmate at the jail who had been a paid informer for the FBI for over a year. The agent instructed the informer to be alert to any statements about charges pending but was specifically warned not to initiate conversation with or question Henry regarding the bank robbery. Subsequently, Henry engaged him in conversation during the course of which he described the details of the bank robbery. At all pertinent times Henry was in custody, had been indicted and had not waived his right to counsel. In holding that Henry's right to counsel was violated, the Court said: An undisclosed government agent may effectively interrogate a defendant by simply engaging the defendant in a general conversation and if the response is a confession of guilt, the agent need not make any further more pointed inquiries (citation omitted). ... even if we assume that Nichols obeyed his instructions not to interrogate Henry about the bank robbery, Nichols did testify that he engaged in conversation with his cellmate Henry. If, by association, by general conversation, or both, Henry developed sufficient confidence in Nichols that Henry bared his incriminating secrets to an undisclosed paid informer, we think that there was interrogation within the meaning of Brewer. 590 F.2d at 547. The concurring opinion adds: [T]he informant's conclusory statement that he did not question the defendant is not determinative. The critical issue is whether, after judicial proceedings had been initiated against the defendant, an informant  acting as an agent of the government  elicited information from him in the absence of defense counsel. 590 F.2d at 547. On the basis of the record, we conclude (1) that defendant was indicted for first degree murder; (2) that he was given Miranda warnings; (3) that he employed counsel; (4) that the law enforcement officials knew he was represented by counsel; (5) that he was confined in the Greeneville City Jail; (6) that Agent Rhea of the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation, posing as a captured felon, was placed in jail with him; (7) that defendant, believing him to be a tough character, and not having any idea or suspicion of his true identity, initiated a conversation with him; (8) that during the course of this conversation numerous incriminating statements were made; (9) that Rhea did not interrogate him in the conventional sense, but did engage in general conversation during the course of which he asked questions and received answers; and (10) that there was no waiver of his right to counsel. In the light of the authorities discussed herein we conclude that there was a form of interrogation. All will agree that had the officer entered the cell, identified himself, and asked questions which produced incriminating information, such information would not have been admissible. The law will not permit law enforcement officials to do by ruse, trickery, deceit and deception that which it is not permitted to do openly and honestly. Nor will the law permit the State to dishonor its commitment and renege on its promise to defendant's counsel. We, therefore, hold that the Trial Judge erred in failing to suppress the testimony of the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation agents relating to the jailhouse conversations and statements relating to this case, to include threats made against witnesses and plans for their extermination. In short, no parts of this interrogation may be presented to the jury on retrial. We predicate this holding on the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. It should be noted that this holding is confined to the retrial of this defendant on this charge. We have no occasion to consider the question of admissibility of evidence at a trial based on any other charge.