Opinion ID: 844251
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Defendant's Motion to Limit the Victim Impact Evidence

Text: Defendant moved to limit the scope of victim-impact evidence to evidence about the victims of which defendant was aware, or to evidence that was admitted during the guilt phase. In the alternative, he requested that the trial court give a special instruction regarding the jury's consideration of this evidence. At the hearing held on the motion, and based on the prosecutor's offer of proof of the witnesses he intended to call to testify, the court denied both motions. On appeal, defendant initially complains that the victim impact evidence admitted in this case should have been excluded because the testimony included information not within defendant's knowledge at the time the crimes were committed. He contends that in order to minimize the prejudicial effect of victim impact evidence, such evidence should be limited to testimony (1) of a single witness (see State v. Muhammad (1996) 145 N.J. 23 [678 A.2d 164, 180]); (2) describing the effect of the murder on a family member who was present at the scene during or immediately after the crime; and (3) concerning consequences of the crime that were known or reasonably apparent to the defendant at the time he committed the crime. In addition, defendant contends that an interpretation of circumstances of the crime so broad as to permit the admission of the victim impact evidence admitted here would render that aggravating factor unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. (U.S. Const., 8th & 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 7, 15 & 17.) (25) This court previously has rejected arguments that victim impact evidence must be confined to what is provided by a single witness ( People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 364 [75 Cal.Rptr.3d 289, 181 P.3d 105]), that victim impact witnesses must have witnessed the crime ( People v. Brown [, supra , ] 33 Cal.4th 382, 398 . . .), and that such evidence is limited to matters within the defendant's knowledge ( People v. Pollock (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1153, 1183 [13 Cal.Rptr.3d 34, 89 P.3d 353]). ( People v. Carrington (2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 196-197 [97 Cal.Rptr.3d 117, 211 P.3d 617] ( Carrington ).) We also have concluded that construing section 190.3, factor (a) to include victim impact evidence does not render the statute unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. ( Id. at p. 197.) Defendant provides no persuasive argument for reconsideration of these decisions. Next, defendant contends admission of the victim impact evidence here was emotionally charged and its admission rendered his trial fundamentally unfair, in violation of his rights to due process of law and to a reliable penalty determination. (U.S. Const., 8th & 14th Amends.) As we have stated, [i]n a capital trial, evidence showing the direct impact of the defendant's acts on the victims' friends and family is not barred by the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution. ( Payne v. Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. 808, 825-827 [115 L.Ed.2d 720, 111 S.Ct. 2597].) ( People v. Pollock, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1180; accord, People v. Burney (2009) 47 Cal.4th 203, 258 [97 Cal.Rptr.3d 348, 212 P.3d 639] ( Burney ).)  Payne reasoned that the prosecution has a legitimate interest in counteracting the relevant mitigating evidence that the defendant must be allowed to introduce. [Citation.] The federal Constitution bars victim impact evidence only if it is `so unduly prejudicial' as to render the trial `fundamentally unfair.' [Citation.] State law is consistent with these principles. Unless it invites a purely irrational response from the jury, the devastating effect of a capital crime on loved ones and the community is relevant and admissible as a circumstance of the crime under section 190.3, factor (a). [Citations.] ( People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 1056-1057 [47 Cal.Rptr.3d 467, 140 P.3d 775] ( Lewis and Oliver ).) Here, the testimony of the victims' family members and friends was essentially limited to explaining the direct impact of the murders and describing the residual and lasting impact [the victims' family members and friends] continued to experience. ( Brown, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 398.) Coder's fiancée, Darlene Shelton, testified that she became hysterical when police informed her of Coder's death. She was pregnant with his child when he was murdered, and her emotional reaction to his murder caused her difficulty during this pregnancy. Coder's sister, Dawn, testified that she was an emotional wreck during the week following Coder's murder and mourned his death for a year. She also attributed the worsening of her thyroid condition to her distraught condition caused by his death. Coder's mother, Suzanne, described the horror she experienced seeing Coder's partially covered body at the scene. She testified that Coder was partially deaf, had a twin, and was close to his siblings. Coder's murder had caused her to experience fits of depression. Martin's sister, Mary Ann, testified that another brother had died within six months of Martin's death and that as a result of Martin's murder, she no longer trusted people. This evidence did not exceed the bounds of admissible victim impact evidence set forth in People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 836 [1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436]. (See also People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 444-445 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391] ( Boyette ).) Finally, defendant contends the trial court erred by refusing his request to instruct the jury that the victim impact evidence must relate to the specific harm caused by defendant's crimes. [46] We disagree. In People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398 [110 Cal.Rptr.2d 324, 28 P.3d 78] ( Ochoa ), this court rejected the defendant's claim that the trial court erred by refusing to give a similar instruction. [47] We reasoned that [t]he proposed instruction would not have provided the jury with any information it had not otherwise learned from CALJIC No. 8.84.1 . . . . ( Ochoa, at p. 455; accord, Hartsch, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 511.) The jury here was given CALJIC No. 8.84.1 and, thus, was provided sufficient guidance regarding this aspect of penalty deliberations. Any additional complaint by defendant that the trial court should have admonished the jury to disregard or limit its consideration of evidence of the possible effects of the victim's death, on the ground that such speculation is improper, has been forfeited by his failure to request an admonition at trial. (See Carrington, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 197 [defendant's failure to request an admonition forfeited his claim that the trial court should have admonished the jury to ignore or limit its consideration of evidence of the possible effect of the victim's death on her mother's health].)