Opinion ID: 771148
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Petitioner's In-Court Outburst

Text: 17 Petitioner's mother testified as a rebuttal witness for the prosecution. During her testimony, Petitioner interrupted her. He accused her of lying on the stand and of beating him when he was a child, and he called her an evil woman,  bitch, and an evil fucking bitch. Petitioner was removed from the courtroom. 18 Out of the presence of the jury, the court ruled that Petitioner could reappear in court only if he would wear shackles. Petitioner declined to reappear. The jury was recalled, and the trial court instructed the jurors that they should not consider the fact that Petitioner was absent. 19 At the start of the proceedings the next day, the trial court instructed the jury, without objection from the defense: 20 Yesterday, as I'm sure you all remember, Mr. Drayden made some statements in open court. I remind you that those statements were not under oath, that he was not subject to cross-examination at the time that he made those statements. However, they are statements of the defendant. It is up to you, as the triers of fact, to weigh and value those statements in the same way that you weigh and value any statements of a defendant which are not made - which are admitted into this court not having been made under oath. 21 Both the prosecution and the defense discussed Petitioner's outburst during closing arguments. 22 Petitioner now argues that the trial court's admission of the outburst violated due process by allowing the jury to convict him based on hostility, prejudice, and character evidence. Assuming that the outburst was evidence, as the parties assume in their arguments, the admission of evidence in state court is not subject to federal habeas review unless the admission of the testimony was arbitrary or fundamentally unfair. Colley v. Sumner, 784 F.2d 984, 990 (9th Cir. 1986). The improper admission of evidence does not violate the Due Process Clause unless it is clearly prejudicial and rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. Kealohapauole v. Shimoda, 800 F.2d 1463, 1466 (9th Cir. 1986). 23 In this case, even assuming that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that it could consider Petitioner's outburst, the error was neither substantially prejudicial nor egregious enough to render Petitioner's trial fundamentally unfair. The trial court reminded the jury that Petitioner's statements were neither made under oath nor subject to cross-examination and encouraged the jurors to weigh and value the statements accordingly. More importantly, instead of objecting, the defense strategically used the outburst by discussing it at length in closing argument, asserting that it bolstered Petitioner's claim that he was subject to spontaneous rage due to childhood abuse. Finally, notwithstanding Petitioner's arguments to the contrary, it is unlikely that the outburst prejudiced Petitioner by causing the jurors to think less of him than they did before the outburst. After all, he had testified already that he had killed and robbed Quinton. 24 In summary, the district court did not err in holding that there was no violation of due process.