Opinion ID: 2734122
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: On appeal, the department and the assessor con- tend that the Tax Court erred in concluding that ORS 305.287 applies only to proceedings before the Magistrate Division. According to the department and the assessor, the statute applies to all levels of review, save review by this court. Taxpayers maintain that the Tax Court correctly concluded that ORS 305.287 applied only to Magistrate Division appeals. In the alternative, taxpayers contend that, even assuming that the statute applies to appeals to the Regular Division, it does not apply in this particular case, because there is no indication that the legislature intended the statute to apply retroactively. A. Whether ORS 305.287 Applies Only to Appeals to the Magistrate Division The parties’ contentions require us to construe ORS 305.287. In performing that task, we are guided by the interpretive principles of PGE v. Bureau of Labor and 174 Village at Main Street Phase II v. Dept. of Rev. Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-12, 859 P2d 1143 (1993), and State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171, 206 P3d 1042 (2009). That is, we seek to determine the meaning of the statute that the legislature most likely intended by examining the text in context, any relevant legislative history, and, if necessary, pertinent canons of construction. Id. at 171-72. We begin with the text. For convenience, we repeat it here: “Whenever a party appeals the real market value of one or more components of a property tax account, any other party to the appeal may seek a determination from the body or tribunal of the total real market value of the property tax account, the real market value of any or all of the other components of the account, or both.” ORS 305.287. For at least three reasons, that wording strongly suggests that the legislature had in mind more than one level of appeal. First, ORS 305.287 states that it applies “whenever” a party appeals. As used in that statute, the word functions as a subordinating conjunction, which introduces the dependent clause that begins the sentence and connects it to the balance. See generally Fowler’s Modern English Usage 171 (3d ed 1996) (explaining subordinating conjunctions). Used in that sense, “whenever” ordinarily means “at any or all times that : in any or every instance in which.” Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 2602 (unabridged ed 2002); see also American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1971 (5th ed 2011) (“at whatever time that :    every time that”).3 Thus, the ordinary meaning of the statutory term contemplates more than one instance in which a relevant event—in this case, an appeal—occurs. Second, the statute refers broadly to an “appeal” of an assessment. As we have noted, the relevant statutes setting out the four levels of review of a property tax assessment 3 The Tax Court observed that the word “whenever” has a more limited meaning when used as an adverb. See Webster’s at 2602 (defining adverb “whenever” as “at whatever time : no matter when”). But, as we have noted, in ORS 305.287, the word does not function as an adverb. And, in any event, it is not so clear to us that the definition of the adverb is quite as limited as the Tax Court suggested. “[A]t whatever time” and “no matter when” do not necessarily imply only a single event. Cite as 356 Or 164 (2014) 175 refer to each of those four levels as “appeals.” Under the circumstances, the general assumption of consistency counsels us to assume that the legislature intended the same word to have the same meaning throughout related statutes unless something in the text or context of the statute suggests a contrary intention. See, e.g., State v. Cloutier, 351 Or 68, 99, 261 P3d 1234 (2011) (“[I]n the absence of evidence to the contrary, we ordinarily assume that the legislature uses terms in related statutes consistently.”). There may well be indications in related statutes suggesting that the legislature did not intend ORS 305.287 to apply to all four levels of appeal. Still, nothing in the text of that statute itself suggests that it applies to only one such level. Third, ORS 305.287 refers to appeals to a “body or tribunal,” suggesting that the legislature understood it to apply to more than one level of appeal and to different types of appellate entities. Indeed, if the legislature had intended to limit the application of ORS 305.287 to a single entity, the broad phrasing of the statute in terms of an appeal to a “body or tribunal” would serve no apparent purpose. See Crystal Communications, Inc. v. Dept. of Rev., 353 Or 300, 311, 297 P3d 1256 (2013) (“As a general rule, we construe a statute in a manner that gives effect, if possible, to all its provisions.”). On the face of the statute, then, ORS 305.287 would appear to apply to any property tax appeal. Nothing in its wording suggests that it is limited to one level of appeal. The legislative history of ORS 305.287 on the issue is sketchy, but pertinent portions appear to confirm our reading of the statute. During the floor debate on the bill that became ORS 305.287, Representative Barnhart—the carrier of the bill—explained that, under then-current law, a party could appeal one component of a real property assessment through “various appeal levels.” Audio Recording, House Floor Debate, House Bill (HB) 2572, May 16, 2011, at 39:46-42:05 (statement of Rep Phil Barnhart). That limited, he explained, what the “various appeals bodies” could consider. Id. Under Measure 50, however, that meant that, if a taxpayer challenged only one component of the assessment, an error in the other component could not be corrected 176 Village at Main Street Phase II v. Dept. of Rev. later. Id. He said that the bill was intended to remedy that problem and prevent under-evaluations that could not later be corrected. Id. Thus, Representative Barnhart explained that what is now ORS 305.287 was intended to remedy the fact that the “various appeal levels” and “various appeals bodies” were precluded from addressing certain errors in property assessments. Before the Senate Committee on Finance and Rev- enue, Representative Barnhart similarly explained that, under then-current law, if a taxpayer appealed one component of an assessment, Measure 50 would preclude reassessment of the other component. Audio Recording, Senate Committee on Finance and Revenue, HB 2572, May 25, 2011, at 36:04-38:22 (statement of Rep Phil Barnhart). The bill before the committee, he explained, was intended to allow “the local appeals board and the tax court” to consider all components of a tax account, not just the one that the taxpayer challenges. Id. During the same hearing, the policy coordinator for the Association of Oregon Counties submitted a statement to the committee asserting that the purpose of the bill was to permit “the magistrate or judge in a property tax appeal to ensure the correct final valuation of property in the process of making the component value adjustment requested by the taxpayer.” Testimony, Senate Finance and Revenue Committee, HB 2572, May 25, 2011, Ex DD (statement of Gill Riddell, Association of Oregon Counties). Thus, it appears that the legislature was aware that, at the least, ORS 305.287 would apply to “various appeals bodies,” including “the local appeals board” and “the magistrate or judge” in the Tax Court. Nothing in the legislative history suggests that ORS 305.287 was intended to apply to only one level of property tax appeal, much less that the sole level of “appeal” for the purposes of that statute is to the Magistrate Division of the Tax Court. That does not necessarily foreclose a conclusion that the statute nevertheless has a more limited application. Analysis of other related statutes and other evidence of legislative intent may reveal that the legislature did not intend ORS 305.287 to apply to all four levels of property tax Cite as 356 Or 164 (2014) 177 appeals. We turn, then, to each of the four levels of property tax review to determine whether there is evidence that the legislature intended such a more limited application. 1. County BOPTA appeals We begin with the first level of appeal, to a county BOPTA. As we have noted, the very name of the board—a board of property tax appeals—indicates that the legislature understood that review by a county BOPTA is, at least in some sense, an “appeal.” Moreover, as we have also noted, ORS 305.287 refers to appeals to a “body or tribunal.” A county BOPTA certainly qualifies as one or the other. Finally, as we have also noted, the legislative history appears to confirm that the legislature understood that the statute applied to appeals to, among other things, “the local appeals board.” The Tax Court nevertheless concluded that ORS 305.287 does not apply to appeals to a county BOPTA for two reasons. We find neither reason persuasive. The Tax Court first noted that applying ORS 305.287 to appeals to a county BOPTA would introduce a conflict among statutes. The court noted that relevant statutes permit only a taxpayer to appeal to a county BOPTA. The court then observed that ORS 305.287 is not limited to cases in which the taxpayer appeals. “Accordingly,” the tax court concluded, “the appeal referred to in ORS 305.287 cannot be the ‘one-sided’ appeal to a BOPTA.” 20 OTR at 530. The argument does not follow, however. ORS 305.287 merely states that “[w]henever a party appeals” (emphasis added) the value of real property, other parties may seek a determination of other components of the valuation the appealing party may not be challenging. As we have noted, the statute is written in terms that apply to multiple levels of appeal. The fact that the generic term “a party” is not limited to taxpayers does not mean that the statute cannot apply to taxpayer appeals to a BOPTA. There is no inconsistency between ORS 305.287 and the limitation that only taxpayers may initiate an appeal. The Tax Court next observed that, under ORS 309.026(2), a county BOPTA may entertain petitions to reduce 178 Village at Main Street Phase II v. Dept. of Rev. a valuation, but not increase it. Nothing in ORS chapter 309, however, limits a county BOPTA’s authority to increase a component of a valuation, so long as the total value does not exceed the current assessment. Again, there is no inconsistency between ORS 305.287 and the statutory authority of a county BOPTA. 2. Appeals to the Magistrate Division of the Tax Court We turn to the second level of property tax appeals— the Magistrate Division of the Tax Court. The Tax Court concluded that ORS 305.287 applies to appeals to the Magistrate Division, and all parties agree. So do we. As we have noted, relevant statutes refer to review by the Magistrate Division as an “appeal.” Moreover, ORS 305.287 applies to appeals to a “body or tribunal,” and the Magistrate Division plainly qualifies. The parties have not identified any text or context that otherwise suggests that ORS 305.287 should not apply to the Magistrate Division, and we are aware of none. To the contrary, the legislative history suggests that the legislature understood the statute to apply to proceedings before the Magistrate Division. See Testimony, Senate Finance and Revenue Committee, HB 2572, May 25, 2011, Ex DD (statement of Gil Riddell, Association of Oregon Counties) (stating that bill “permits the magistrate or judge in a property tax appeal to ensure the correct final valuation of property”) (emphasis added). 3. Appeals to the Regular Division of the Tax Court We next address appeals to the Regular Division of the Tax Court, the third level of property tax appeals. As is true with appeals to both the county BOPTA and the Magistrate Division, ORS 305.287 on its face appears also to apply to appeals to the Regular Division. The legislature has labeled Regular Division review as an “appeal.” And the Regular Division certainly constitutes a “body or tribunal.” Moreover, as we have just noted, the legislative history suggests that the legislature understood that the statute would apply to the “magistrate or judge in a property tax appeal.” Testimony, Senate Finance and Revenue Committee, HB 2572, May 25, 2011, Ex DD (statement of Gil Riddell, Association of Oregon Counties) (emphasis added). Cite as 356 Or 164 (2014) 179 The Tax Court nevertheless concluded that “[t]he mechanisms of the Regular Division and ORS 305.287 do not fit together well.” 20 OTR at 530. In support of that assertion, the court cited ORS 305.501(1), which the court read to state a general principle that Tax Court appeals must first be heard by the Magistrate Division before going to the Regular Division. We are not persuaded. ORS 305.501(1) provides that, if a case has not been assigned to mediation, “an appeal to the [T]ax [C]ourt shall be heard by a [T]ax [C]ourt magistrate unless specially designated by the Tax Court judge for hearing in the regular division.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, that statute itself expressly allows the Tax Court to permit tax appeals to be heard by the Regular Division in the first instance, without further legislative limitation. And, in fact, Tax Court rules provide that the Tax Court may designate by rule entire categories of cases to come directly to the Regular Division or may authorize by order individual appeals to be heard by the Regular Division without having gone to the Magistrate Division. TCR 1 C. Given that the statute already contemplates exceptions to the notion that all Tax Court appeals must originate in the Magistrate Division, it is not clear to us why applying ORS 305.287 to the Regular Division is incompatible with the existing statutory scheme. To the contrary, a review of the statutes defining the relationship between the Magistrate Division and the Regular Division suggests that allowing a new issue to be raised on appeal to the Regular Division is consistent with the role of the Regular Division. As we have noted, proceedings before the Magistrate Division are informal, not reported, and not subject to the rules of evidence. See ORS 305.430(1) (Magistrate Division proceedings not reported); ORS 305.501(4)(a) (Magistrate Division proceedings generally not subject to rules of evidence). Such proceedings do not produce a “record” in the ordinary sense that the Regular Division later reviews. In contrast, Regular Division proceedings are “original, independent proceedings.” ORS 305.425(1). They do not entail reviewing a record created by the Magistrate Division. Rather, they entail the creation of a new record, de novo. 180 Village at Main Street Phase II v. Dept. of Rev. See id. Any findings of fact by the Magistrate Division— and the evidence on which it based those findings—do not bind the Regular Division in any way. See White I v. Dept. of Rev., 19 OTR 47, 49-50 (2006) (because ORS 305.425(1) requires Regular Division proceedings to be original, independent, and de novo, the Regular Division “cannot rely on factual statements contained in the magistrate’s decision as proof of their truth”); Dept. of Rev. v. Guardian Management Corp., 16 OTR 17, 20 (2002) (“[T]he mandate of   [ORS