Opinion ID: 199936
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Cause and Prejudice or a Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice

Text: 25 Having ruled that the SJC's judgment rests on an adequate and independent state procedural ground — default of the merger doctrine argument — we describe what are the normal subsequent analytic steps for a federal habeas court. The next question to ask is whether petitioner has shown that there was cause for the default and actual prejudice, or that there was a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546; see also Levasseur v. Pepe, 70 F.3d 187, 192 (1st Cir.1995). The district court did not go through this analysis because it erroneously concluded there was no procedural default. 26 The general requirement for cause for a procedural default is that the prisoner must show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986). One factor accepted as cause is ineffective assistance of counsel at a level which violates the Sixth Amendment. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752, 111 S.Ct. 2546. As the Court said in Carrier: 27 So long as a defendant is represented by counsel whose performance is not constitutionally ineffective under the standard established in Strickland v. Washington, [466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)], we discern no inequity in requiring him to bear the risk of attorney error that results in a procedural default. 28 Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639. Because the claimed error here was by counsel at trial and on first appeal, the Strickland right adhered. See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 535-36, 106 S.Ct. 2661, 91 L.Ed.2d 434 (1986) (applying Strickland to a claim of attorney error on appeal); cf. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 755-57, 111 S.Ct. 2546 (refusing to consider attorney error on an appeal from a denial of state postconviction relief as a possible cause). 29 When, however, the habeas petitioner wants to use ineffective assistance of counsel to establish cause to excuse a state procedural default, that ineffective assistance claim must itself ordinarily be fairly presented to the state courts and exhausted. Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 450-54, 120 S.Ct. 1587, 146 L.Ed.2d 518 (2000); Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488-89, 106 S.Ct. 2639. An ineffective assistance claim requires a great deal of factual development. As the Court stated in Carrier, without exhaustion requirements for ineffective assistance claims, [i]n order to determine whether there was cause for a procedural default, federal habeas courts would routinely be required to hold evidentiary hearings to determine what prompted counsel's failure to raise the claim in question. 477 U.S. at 487, 106 S.Ct. 2639. The factual development for an ineffective assistance claim, like that for any other constitutional claim on habeas, should occur in the state court system. Alternatively, where petitioner has failed to exhaust the ineffective assistance claim, petitioner must show cause for and prejudice from his failure to do so. Carpenter, 529 U.S. at 453, 120 S.Ct. 1587. 30 Here, the parties dispute whether the ineffective assistance claim was fairly presented to the state court. Raising a claim for the first time to the state's highest court on discretionary review is not fair presentation for purposes of exhaustion. See Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351, 109 S.Ct. 1056, 103 L.Ed.2d 380 (1989). The Supreme Court in Castille held that where the claim has been presented for the first and only time in a procedural context in which its merits will not be considered unless there are important and special considerations, it has not been fairly presented. Id. 31 In this case, Gunter presented the ineffective assistance claim for the first and only time in the petition for rehearing to the SJC. The Massachusetts rule which provides for petitions for rehearing clearly states that [a]ction upon a petition is in the discretion of [the] quorum or panel that decided the appeal. Mass.R.App.P. 27(a). Just as in Castille, petitioner here raised the claim for the first time to the state's highest court on discretionary review. He did not fairly present it to the state court, giving it a full opportunity to deal with the claimed constitutional violation and develop the facts surrounding this claim. 32 There was an alternative available for Gunter to exhaust the ineffective assistance claim. Gunter could have filed a motion for a new trial as he was entitled to do as of right under Massachusetts law. Mass.R.Crim.P. 30(a). Federal habeas review does not demand that a petitioner in every case ask the state for collateral relief where he has already fairly presented the claim and the evidence on direct appeal. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 447, 73 S.Ct. 397, 97 L.Ed. 469 (1953). However, where the claim has not been fairly presented on direct appeal, as happened here, it should be fairly presented to the state court through a motion for collateral relief. Byrnes v. Vose, 969 F.2d 1306, 1307-08 (1st Cir.1992) (applying this requirement). Because Gunter did not do so, he has not exhausted his claim of ineffective assistance. 1 33 And even if we were to assume that the ineffective assistance claim was exhausted, that there was sufficient cause for and prejudice from the procedural default, 2 and that a state's discretionary miscarriage of justice review may be subject to some form of constitutional constraint in these odd circumstances, Gunter still has no habeas-worthy constitutional claim. The district court's ultimate conclusion, is, in our view, simply wrong. 34 There is no serious question of fair notice to the defendant of the crimes involved either under the SJC's bystander assault felony murder theory or under the assault on the murder victim felony murder theory. As the SJC noted, the statutory form of indictment was all that was required as to notice, and the indictment charged assault in a dwelling house with a dangerous weapon. Proof of the assault on the bystanders was part of the Commonwealth's case all along, and the evidence of those assaults was produced before the jury. Nor do we see any constitutional infirmity in the jury instruction worthy of habeas relief. To the extent the district court was concerned that the jury had not been instructed that it needed to find assault on each bystander, this court has rejected that concern as a basis for habeas. In Stewart v. Coalter, 48 F.3d 610 (1st Cir.1995), we said: 35 Ironically, if the joint venture were one to commit robbery, it appears that [the defendant] would still have been guilty of murder under the felony murder rule followed in Massachusetts and in many other states. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Claudio, 418 Mass. 103, 634 N.E.2d 902, 906-07 (1994). Of course, that would not be a basis for sustaining [the defendant's] conviction on direct appeal since he was never charged with felony murder. But we doubt whether it would be part of the office of habeas corpus to release a prisoner whose defense in seeking the writ was that he had committed murder but only on a theory not properly presented to the jury. 36 Stewart, 48 F.3d at 617. The same is true here. 37 This reasoning also disposes of any argument that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would occur if we fail to consider the claim. To show that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would occur in the habeas context, petitioner must establish actual innocence. Simpson v. Matesanz, 175 F.3d 200, 210 (1st Cir.1999). To do this, petitioner must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327, 115 S.Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995). Here, there is no credible argument that Gunter is actually innocent of felony murder on a joint venture theory. 38 The district court's order granting habeas corpus is reversed, the writ is vacated, and the petition is dismissed.