Opinion ID: 218050
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: World Wide Rush

Text: The plaintiff in World Wide Rush raised two claims: first, the plaintiff raised an as-applied claim that the Freeway Facing Sign Ban was an unconstitutionally underinclusive ban on commercial speech under Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980), because the City had, in fact, permitted some freeway facing billboards despite the Ban; and second, the plaintiff claimed that the City's blanket bans on supergraphic and offsite sign bans were facially unconstitutional as prior restraints on speech because exceptions to the bans were facially unconstitutional as prior restraints on speech because exceptions to the bans the City Council with unbridled discretion to select among preferred speakers without objective criteria. World Wide Rush, 606 F.3d at 683. The Court noted that the plaintiff had not yet initially raised a Central Hudson challenge to the supergraphic and offsite sign bans, id., and rejected the plaintiff's attempt to raise the issue on appeal, id., at 689-90. For the Freeway Facing Sign Ban, the court explained that a four-part test must be applied to assess a Central Hudson challenge: (1) if the communication is neither misleading nor related to unlawful activity, then it merits First Amendment scrutiny as a threshold matter; in order for the restriction to withstand such scrutiny, (2) the State must assert a substantial interest to be achieved by restriction on commercial speech; (3) the restriction must directly advance the state interest involved; and (4) it must not be more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest. Id. at 684 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)(quoting Metro Lights, 551 F.3d at 903). The City's substantial interests in safety and aesthetic were unquestionably advance by restrictions on billboards, so the critical question was whether the City `denigrates its interest in . . . safety and beauty and defeats its own case by permitting' freeway facing billboards at the Staples Center and in the fifteenth Street SUD [Supplemental Use District] while forbidding other freeway facing billboards. Id. at 685 (ellipsis in original) (quoting Metromedia, Inc., v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 510-11, 101 S.Ct. 2882, 69 L.Ed.2d 800 (1981)). `To put it in the context of the Central Hudson test, a regulation may have exceptions that undermine and counteract the interest the government claims it adopted the law to further; such a regulation cannot directly and materially advance its aim,' and is, therefore, unconstitutionally underinclusive. Id. (quoting Metro Lights, 551 F.3d at 905). The court found that two exceptions to the City's Freeway Facing Sign Ban did not so undermine the City's interests in safety and aesthetics as to render the ban unconstitutionally underinclusive. Id. at 685-87. The court urged judicial deference to a `municipality's reasonably graduated response to different aspects of a problem' and directed that a holistic approach must be taken when assessing exceptions to the ban, rather than looking at each exception in isolation. Id. at 685. The court found that the exception for the Staples Center actually furthered the City's interests because it was intended to remove blight and dangerous conditions from downtown Los Angeles; similarly, the exception for the Fifteenth Street SUD furthered the City's interests because it improved traffic flow on Santa Monica Boulevard and resulted in a net reduction in signs. Id. The court then distinguished Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 190-93, 119 S.Ct. 1923, 144 L.Ed.2d 161 (1999), because that case involved a prohibition on advertising and gambling in private casinos while allowing advertising for gambling on reservations, which simply channeled gamblers to the reservations instead of advancing the government's interests asserted in the case. Id. at 686. The exceptions to the Freeway Facing Sign Ban did not channel the evils sought to be eliminated elsewhere; Id. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' reliance on other cases, including Ballen v. City of Redmond, 466 F.3d 736, 743 (9th Cir.2006), because those cases involved content-based distinctions for commercial speech, and the Freeway Facing Sign Ban, as well as the exceptions, were content-neutral. Id. The court reasoned that Metro Lights was more apposite because, as in that case, where the City's interest in controlling the proliferation of signs by disparate private parties was served by limiting signs to one party over which the City's decision to allow some signs at the Staples Center and within the Fifteenth Street SUD could serve a similar purpose. Id. The court was similarly unpersuaded by the plaintiff's facial unfettered discretion challenge to the offsite and supergraphic sign bans, which granted the City the prerogative to create special plans and SUD's and to enter development agreements. Id. at 687-89. The exceptions were not susceptible to the plaintiff's unfettered discretion challenge because they involved the City's regular and well-recognized legislative power to regulate land use. Id. at 688. The legislative authority which was granted to the City elsewhere and did not arise from the offsite and supergraphic sign bans, therefore did not implicate a prior restraint concern under the First Amendment. Id. at 688-89.