Opinion ID: 624899
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Workability

Text: The RNC argued before the District Court that there were workability issues that required modification of the Decree, as a practical matter. The District Court held that there were four workability issues that weighed in favor of modification: (1) the potential inequity of the RNC being subject to suits brought by entities who were not party to the Decree when, under the BCRA, the RNC has to defend lawsuits using hard money, while the DNC does not have to spend any money on such suits because it would not be party to them [19] ; (2) the twenty-day notice requirement for preclearance prevents the RNC from combating mail-in voter registration fraud in a number of states with later mail-in voter registration deadlines; (3) the Decree lacks a clear definition of normal poll watching activities and the parties have not provided a definition, leading the RNC to refrain from normal poll watching activities, which the Decree was never intended to prohibit; and (4) the Decree lacked a termination date. The District Court, accordingly, modified the Decree in the following ways: (1) allowed only parties to the Decree, the DNC and NJDSC, to bring an enforcement action under the Decree; (2) decreased the preclearance notice requirement from twenty days to ten days; (3) provided clearer definitions and examples of ballot security [20] and normal poll watching [21] activities; and (4) added an eight-year expiration date, December 1, 2017, to the Decree, allowing for an extension of the Decree for another eight years if the DNC proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the RNC has violated the Decree. In addition to determining whether the District Court abused its discretion by declining to make more extensive modifications to the Decree than it did based on workability concerns, we analyze, also under the abuse of discretion standard, whether the District Court's proposed modification is suitably tailored to the changed circumstance. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 391, 112 S.Ct. 748. As noted above, the modification must not create or perpetuate a constitutional violation; it should not strive to rewrite a consent order so that it conforms to the constitutional floor; and a court should not try to modify a consent order other than making those revisions that equity requires because of the change in circumstances. Id. The District Court held that the Decree should be modified because the BCRA creates a potential inequity between the RNC and the DNC if third parties are allowed to bring suits to enforce the Decree against the RNC. Without modification, the RNC would have to defend such third-party suits with limited hard money because it cannot solicit soft money under the BCRA while the DNC, not a party to such suits, would not have to expend resources on these third-party suits. Accordingly, the District Court modified the Decree so that only the DNC and NJDSC can bring an enforcement action under the Decree so that both parties would have to spend hard money on the enforcement action. This modification eliminates any potential BCRA-caused inequity in the prospective application of the Decree. In this respect, the Court revised the Decree only to the extent required because of the change in circumstances brought about by the BCRA. Limiting the ability to bring Decree enforcement actions to parties to the Decree is a modification suitably tailored to the equitable concerns brought about by the hard money restrictions in the BCRA. The RNC argues that this modification does not address the workability issues caused by the costly and distracting enforcement actions filed shortly before Election Days because the money the RNC would have to spend defending those suits takes money away from the RNC's political efforts, regardless of whether the DNC also has to spend money to bring those suits. The nature and timing of election cycles may cause the need to defend against Decree enforcement suits to arise at inconvenient times, but resolving those issues before Election Day is crucial to enforcing the Decree by ensuring access to the polls and preventing suppression of minority votes. In effect, the RNC contends that the Decree should be vacated because it is unworkable for the RNC to spend any money defending itself in enforcement actions. This argument is not persuasive. When the RNC twice consented to the Decree and gained its benefits, it should have anticipated that it would likely need to spend money defending itself in future enforcement actions. Neither modification nor vacatur are justified where a party relies upon events that actually were anticipated at the time it entered into a decree. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 385, 112 S.Ct. 748. The District Court noted that a number of states now have voter registration deadlines less than twenty days before the election and that the RNC has a valid interest in preventing fraudulent voter registration. The District Court modified the Decree by decreasing the notice requirement for preclearance from twenty days to ten days. The RNC argues that the ten-day preclearance period should be eliminated because it forces the party to reveal its Election Day strategy to the DNC in order to combat voter fraud and is, therefore, unworkable. The RNC has requested zero days for preclearance or, at least, some decrease in the time period for the preclearance notice requirement. [22] The RNC asserts that any preclearance requirement is tantamount to a prohibition on Election Day activities by the RNC because it means that the RNC must foresee Election Day issues twenty to thirty-five days in advance of an election; forc[es] the RNC to disclose its tactical thinking and Election Day strategy far enough in advance for the DNC and others to craft counter-strategies; and it requires the RNC to place equivalent numbers of poll watchers in all precincts, regardless of political or practical considerations. (Appellant's Br. at 52-54.) The RNC's argument is wholly speculative. The RNC's supposed knowledge and experience of unworkability is mere conjecture because, since the preclearance provision was added to the Decree in 1987, the RNC has never attempted to obtain preclearance. Contrary to the RNC's argument, the preclearance provision does not require the RNC to disclose its tactical thinking and Election Day strategy except with regard to ballot security activities. The RNC points to no statement of the District Court and no provision of the Decree that requires the RNC to place equivalent numbers of poll watchers in all precincts. (Appellant's Br. at 52-54.) On the contrary, the Decree does not require any preclearance for normal poll watching functions, so the Decree would in no way prohibit the RNC from placing different numbers of poll watchers in precincts. Further, there is no basis for any RNC argument that the preclearance provision requires the RNC to place the same number of voter fraud security team members at each precinct. The RNC does not know what level of program detail the District Court would require before granting preclearance. [23] The preclearance provision does not prevent the RNC from achieving its objective of normal poll-watching, carrying out approved ballot security programs, or implementing any other Election Day strategies that do not us[e], [or] appear[ ] to use, racial or ethnic criteria in connection with ballot integrity, ballot security or other efforts to prevent or remedy suspected vote fraud. (App. at 404-05.) With no preclearance provision, the RNC could implement any ballot security program and would only be subject to enforcement of the Decree after potential minority voter intimidation and suppression had already occurred. Thus, the elimination of the provision would thwart the Decree's purpose of preventing minority voter intimidation and suppression ex ante. The District Court shortened the preclearance time to allow the RNC to combat more of the potential voter registration fraud that might occur closer to Election Day, a modification suitably tailored to address the inequity the District Court identified. Although the Decree was never intended to prohibit normal poll watching activities, the RNC claims that is has refrained from engaging in normal poll watching activities because the Decree's definitions of such activities are unclear and it fears it would unintentionally violate the Decree. To address this workability concern, the District Court modified the Decree to provide clearer definitions and examples of ballot security and normal poll watching activities. With the District Court's modifications, [b]allot security is defined to include any program aimed at combating voter fraud by preventing potential voters from registering to vote or casting a ballot, [24] and [n]ormal poll-watch function is defined as stationing individuals at polling stations to observe the voting process and report irregularities unrelated to voter fraud to duly-appointed state officials. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 671 F.Supp.2d at 622. The District Court's modifications more clearly define ballot security and normal poll-watch function under the Decree and provide lists of examples of both. [25] The RNC contends that it cannot engage in normal poll-watch functions because the definitions of the terms remain unclear. Contrary to the RNC's argument that the District Court's definitions and non-exhaustive lists of examples worsen the problem, (Appellant's Br. at 55), the modifications of adding specific definitions and examples of ballot security and normal poll-watch functions give both the RNC and the DNC more clarity regarding what types of activities require preclearance, which do not require preclearance, and which are prohibited by the Decree. Given these modifications, any hardship to the RNC is not a product of the terms of the Decree. Clarity allows the RNC to engage in normal poll watching activities while still maintaining adherence to fulfillment of the Decree's purpose. The District Court's modification is suitably tailored to resolve the prior ambiguity and does not strive to conform to the constitutional floor by allowing the RNC to engage in all activities without preclearance. See Rufo, 502 U.S. at 391, 112 S.Ct. 748. The modification clarifies the previous ambiguity. The District Court agreed with the RNC that the lack of an expiration date in the Decree was inherently inequitable. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 671 F.Supp.2d at 621. The District Court modified the Decree by adding an eight-year expiration date, December 1, 2017, and allowing for an extension of the Decree for another eight years if the DNC proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the RNC has violated the Decree. The RNC argues that the District Court's December 1, 2017 expiration date is an abuse of discretion and that the appropriate Decree termination date is either eight years after the parties entered into the Decree in 1982, eight years after the Decree's modification in 1987, or, at worst, eight years after the Malone litigation. Although a considerable number of years have passed since the RNC and DNC agreed to the Decree in 1982 and 1987, the parties entered the Decree voluntarily and for over a quarter of a century neither party objected to the duration of the Decree. The District Court did not abuse its discretion by declining to vacate the Decree due to the length of time since its entry. See BCTC, 64 F.3d at 889 (declining to hold that the mere passage of time is itself sufficient to constitute the type of changed circumstances that warrant lifting of an injunction). Thus, it does not follow that the original decision not to include an expiration date requires vacatur now that the Decree has an expiration date. The District Court noted that it was imposing a termination date of eight years from its ruling because the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice, which is charged with enforcing the Voting Rights Act, also imposes consent decrees with time limits of eight years, which can be extended for good cause. The RNC has not shown that the District Court's decision to set a termination date of eight years from the date of its order modifying the Decree with provisions allowing for an extension of that termination date for good cause is arbitrary, fanciful or clearly unreasonable. Moyer, 473 F.3d at 542. By adding an eight-year expiration date, December 1, 2017, to the Decree, the District Court modified the Decree to remedy the inequity that it perceived to be caused by the lack of expiration date. [26] Accepting arguendo that the Decree without a time limit is inherently inequitable, the provision allowing for an extension of the Decree for another eight years if the DNC proves by a preponderance of the evidence the RNC has violated the Decree preserves the purpose of the Decree so that the modification does not rewrite the consent order more than equity requires. Moreover, we do not adopt the RNC's argument that the District Court abused its discretion by not starting the eight year period from the date of the entry of the Decree or from its 1987 modification, thus requiring ... immediate vacatur. (Appellant's Br. 42.) The District Court concluded, with ample record support, that the purpose of the Decree had not yet been fulfilled and vacatur would not have been suitably tailored to its findings. The RNC has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that any workability issues remaining after the District Court's modification are so acute that prospective application of the Decree is inequitable. The District Court did not abuse its discretion by declining to vacate due to workability. The RNC has not established that any of the District Court's decisions were arbitrary, fanciful or clearly unreasonable. Moyer, 473 F.3d at 542. Thus, the District Court did not abuse its discretion by holding that the RNC did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that any of the following four Rufo factors necessitated vacatur or modifications beyond those ordered by the District Court: (1) a significant change in factual conditions; (2) a significant change in law; (3) that a decree proves to be unworkable because of unforeseen obstacles; or (4) that enforcement of the decree without modification would be detrimental to the public interest. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 384, 112 S.Ct. 748. Furthermore, the District Court's modifications were suitably tailored to the changed workability circumstances.