Opinion ID: 1255994
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: This Court must now determine whether the information contained in the affidavit prepared by Detective Hobby presented sufficient information to enable a magistrate to make a threshold determination of probable cause. In so doing, we note that the parties do not challenge the superior court's findings of fact. Therefore, the scope of our inquiry is limited to the superior court's conclusions of law, which are fully reviewable on appeal. State v. Smith, 346 N.C. 794, 797, 488 S.E.2d 210, 212 (1997). As this Court acknowledged in State v. Beam, when addressing whether a search warrant is supported by probable cause, a reviewing court must consider the totality of the circumstances. 325 N.C. 217, 220-21, 381 S.E.2d 327, 329 (1989); see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527, 548 (1983); State v. Riggs, 328 N.C. 213, 219-20, 222, 400 S.E.2d 429, 433-34 (1991); State v. Arrington, 311 N.C. 633, 641, 319 S.E.2d 254, 259 (1984). In applying the totality of the circumstances test, this Court has stated that an affidavit is sufficient if it establishes reasonable cause to believe that the proposed search ... probably will reveal the presence upon the described premises of the items sought and that those items will aid in the apprehension or conviction of the offender. Probable cause does not mean actual and positive cause nor import absolute certainty. Arrington, 311 N.C. at 636, 319 S.E.2d at 256 (citations omitted). Thus, under the totality of the circumstances test, a reviewing court must determine whether the evidence as a whole provides a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause exists. Beam, 325 N.C. at 221, 381 S.E.2d at 329; see also Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39, 103 S.Ct. at 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d at 548 (concluding that the duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a `substantial basis' to conclude that probable cause existed) (citation omitted). In adhering to this standard of review, we are cognizant that great deference should be paid a magistrate's determination of probable cause and that after-the-fact scrutiny should not take the form of a de novo review. Arrington, 311 N.C. at 638, 319 S.E.2d at 258. We are also mindful that: A grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts toward warrants is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment's strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant; courts should not invalidate warrant[s] by interpreting affidavit[s] in a hypertechnical, rather than a commonsense, manner. [T]he resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this area should be largely determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants. Riggs, 328 N.C. at 222, 400 S.E.2d at 434-35 (alterations in original) (citations omitted). Most importantly, we note that a magistrate is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the material supplied to him by an applicant for a warrant. Id. at 221, 400 S.E.2d at 434. To that end, it is well settled that whether probable cause has been established is based on `factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent [persons], not legal technicians, act.' Id. at 219, 400 S.E.2d at 433 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1310, 93 L.Ed. 1879, 1890 (1949)) (alteration in original), quoted in Gates, 462 U.S. at 231, 103 S.Ct. at 2328, 76 L.Ed.2d at 544.  Probable cause is a flexible, common-sense standard. It does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true than false. A practical, nontechnical probability is all that is required. State v. Zuniga, 312 N.C. 251, 262, 322 S.E.2d 140, 146 (1984) (emphasis added). Here, the magistrate was entitled to rely on his personal experience and knowledge related to residential refuse collection to make a practical, threshold determination of probable cause. Based on the facts before him, the magistrate was entitled to infer that the garbage bag in question came from defendant's residence and that items found inside that bag were probably also associated with that residence. This conclusion is particularly bolstered by the location of the garbage bag and the fact that Detective Hobby retrieved it from defendant's yard at approximately 8:00 a.m. on the regularly scheduled garbage collection day in defendant's neighborhood. The marijuana plants gathered from the garbage bag, taken in conjunction with defendant's drug-related criminal history and the information obtained by the Raleigh Police Department linking defendant to a heroin sale and overdose established, based on the factual and practical considerations of everyday life, that there was a fair probability that contraband and evidence of a crime would be found in defendant's residence. Thus, the information contained in Detective Hobby's affidavit constituted a substantial basis for the magistrate to find probable cause sufficient to issue a search warrant for defendant's residence. For the reasons stated above, the superior court's conclusion is inconsistent with the jurisprudence of this State, which establishes that a magistrate's [r]easonable inferences from the available observations, particularly when coupled with common or specialized experience, long have been approved in establishing probable cause. Riggs, 328 N.C. at 221, 400 S.E.2d at 434. As a result, the search warrant was properly issued and the superior court erred in granting defendant's motion to suppress the evidence of the 1 October 2002 search of his residence. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. This case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further remand to the Wake County Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. REVERSED AND REMANDED.