Opinion ID: 1948186
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Statutory and Procedural Challenges.

Text: A. Fair Notice Under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.5(3). Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.5(3) provides that upon the filing of a trial information, the State must also file minutes of evidence, listing the names of all witnesses and a full and fair statement of the witnesses' expected testimony. Iowa R.Crim. P. 2.5(3). The State listed Terry Dillinger as a witness to authenticate the certified driving record in the minutes of testimony. Although listed as a prospective witness, Dillinger did not testify at trial. Shipley asserts that by offering the certified abstract of his driving record without Dillinger's testimony, the evidence was outside the minutes and should not have been admitted. Shipley further claims that by not attaching a copy of the record, he did not have fair notice of its contents. The State counters that the minutes of testimony advised Shipley that it intended to introduce into evidence at trial a copy of the Certified Driving Record obtained from the Iowa Department of Transportation. Further, a police report attached to the minutes indicated that information received by Officer Zahner relayed that dispatch ran Shipley's driver's license and that it came back revoked on June 21, 2004, for a period of two years for an OWI test failure. The State thus contends that Shipley had both fair notice of the contents of the certified abstract and that it intended to offer the certified abstract into evidence. We agree with the State. Shipley was explicitly placed on notice that the State intended to offer his driving record into evidence at trial. Although the State listed Dillinger as a witness to lay foundation for the record, the State's decision to offer a certified abstract of the operating record without a witness to lay foundation does not violate Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.5(3). While it is true, as Shipley contends, that a witness may not testify outside the content of the minutes, State v. Walker, 281 N.W.2d 612, 614 (Iowa 1979), rule 2.5(3) does not require the State to call a witness listed in the trial minutes to offer testimony which the State later determines to be unnecessary. State v. Castillo, 315 N.W.2d 63, 65 (Iowa 1982). At trial, Shipley also challenged the adequacy of the minutes because the minutes did not make clear whether the certified driving record would be introduced pursuant to Iowa Code section 321.10 or section 321A.3. Iowa Code section 321.10 provides that the director of the IDOT or such officers as may be designated may certify a copy of any record of the department. Iowa Code § 321.10. Iowa Code section 321A.3(1) states that the department may provide on request a certified abstract of the operating record of [any] person.... Id. § 321A.3. Shipley claimed the notice in the minutes that the State intended to introduce a Certified Driving Record is not sufficient to alert Shipley that the State in fact intended to introduce an abstract of the operating record prepared pursuant to Iowa Code section 321A.3(1). We reject Shipley's argument. Shipley had notice that the State intended to offer into evidence a certified IDOT document reflecting his driving record. While the document offered into evidence by the State is more precisely described as a certified abstract of the operating record and not a certified driving record, Shipley knew the certified IDOT document would show a license revocation at the time of his arrest. The contents of the certified abstract thus simply do not constitute inadmissible surprise as contended by Shipley. We further note that even if Shipley did not know the precise form of the record or its contents, he could have obtained a certified abstract of his own driving record from the IDOT pursuant to Iowa Code section 321A.3(1) and been in a position to challenge the document offered by the State in the event of any discrepancies or factual inaccuracies. Further, if notice were a real issue, Shipley could have asked for a continuance. He did not. Under the circumstances, we cannot find that the alleged lack of notice regarding the precise form of the driving record violated Shipley's due process right to a fair trial. Cf. State v. Conner, 314 N.W.2d 427, 430 (Iowa 1982) (finding no surprise or prejudice where the defendant was fully advised of the evidence against him even if such evidence was outside of the minutes of testimony); State v. Delano, 161 N.W.2d 66, 69 (Iowa 1968) (finding no due process violation for the admission of a presentence report where defendant's counsel either had been permitted to examine the report and defendant's confession or had been fully informed as to the contents of both writings before sentencing). B. Statutory Requirements for Admission of Driving Abstract. Shipley raises a number of challenges to the admission of the abstract of his operating record. Shipley claims the abstract must comply with all of the certification prerequisites established in the first paragraph of Iowa Code section 321.10. From this premise, Shipley asserts that under Iowa Code section 321.10, the State, in order to have a certified driving record admitted into evidence, must show that the record was signed by an authorized signator, that the signature was authentic and not a facsimile, and that the abstract bears a proper seal. The State contends that the abstract was certified under Iowa Code section 321A.3(1) and admitted under the general requirements of the second paragraph of section 321.10. As a result, according to the State, even if the first paragraph of section 321.10 contains heightened foundational requirements, they have no application to a record certified pursuant to section 321A.3(1). The State argues that any abstract that meets the certification requirements of section 321A.3(1) is then admissible in the same manner and with the same force and effect as if the director or the director's designee had testified in person. Iowa Code § 321.10. We agree with the State. Iowa Code section 321 is separate and distinct from Iowa Code chapter 321A. State v. Sonderleiter, 251 Iowa 106, 109, 99 N.W.2d 393, 395 (1959). [1] The document that was offered into evidence was an abstract of Shipley's operating record prepared pursuant to Iowa Code section 321A.3(1). Indeed, the abstract itself declares in bold face that it was prepared in compliance with section 321A.3. Therefore, the requirements for certification are controlled by Iowa Code section 321A.3(1), not section 321.10. The term certified is not defined in Iowa Code section 321A.3(1), nor are its requirements delineated. We hold, nevertheless, that a document that appears to be an abstract of a driving record, bears the seal of the IDOT, declares that it is a true and accurate copy of the underlying record, and bears a facsimile signature of an officer of the department, all of which have been affixed to the underlying record after the record has been printed or made, amounts to a certified driving abstract under Iowa Code section 321A.3(1). See State v. Irving, 165 Ariz. 219, 797 P.2d 1237, 1242-43 (Ct.App.1990) (holding statute allowing introduction of certified records of motor vehicle division supplements rules of evidence and allows admission of certified record with facsimile signature if record shows sufficient human involvement in certification); People v. Meadows, 371 Ill.App.3d 259, 308 Ill.Dec. 606, 861 N.E.2d 1171, 1174-75 (2007) (holding preprinted signature and certification on a form satisfy statutory certification requirement for admission of driving abstract); State v. Barckley, 54 Or.App. 351, 634 P.2d 1373, 1376-77 (1981) (holding where statute does not expressly require pen and ink original signature for certification of driving record, preprinted signature of certifying officer is sufficient). Iowa Code section 321.10 provides that a certified driving abstract prepared under Iowa Code section 321A.3(1) is admissible as if the director or his designee had testified in person. As a result, the certified driving abstract in this case was admissible without further foundation. Shipley further contends the requirements of Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.902(1), (2), and (3) apply to the admission of the abstract. Specifically, he argues the document must bear an original signature and a seal in order to be self-authenticating or must be accompanied by an affidavit establishing it is a true and accurate copy of the record. Iowa R. Evid. 5.902(2), (3). Under Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.902(4), however, a statute may provide for admission of documents without meeting the requirements of subsections (1), (2), and (3). Iowa R. Evid. 5.902(4). Iowa Code section 321.10, which allows for the admission of records certified under Iowa Code chapters 321 and 321A, is such a provision. It is clearly designed to allow for the routine introduction into evidence of certified driving records with a minimum of foundational requirements. As a result, the requirements of Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.902(1), (2), and (3) have no application to certified abstracts prepared pursuant to Iowa Code section 321A.3(1). C. Challenge to Driving Abstract and Officer Testimony on Hearsay Grounds. Shipley challenges the admission of the abstract of his driving record as containing inadmissible hearsay within hearsay as it does not fall within the public records exception established by Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.803(8). We reject the contention that the driving abstract constitutes inadmissible hearsay. The final unnumbered paragraph of Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.803(8)(B) provides that the rule shall not supersede statutory provisions regarding the admissibility of evidence. Iowa Code section 321.10 directs that certified copies of abstracts shall be admitted into evidence with the same force and effect as if the director or his designee had testified in person. Thus, the first layer of hearsay relating to the document itself is resolved by statute. Iowa R. Evid. 5.802. A second hearsay problem arises because the underlying abstract contains hearsay information concerning Shipley's prior license revocation. However, with respect to this hearsay issue, it is resolved by Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.803(8)(A), which allows admission of hearsay contained in public records setting forth its regularly conducted and reported activities, such as revocation of driving privileges. Iowa R. Evid. 5.803(8)(A). Shipley also contends that Officer Zahner's testimony regarding the information dispatch relayed concerning the status of his license constitutes inadmissible hearsay. The State, however, argued that it was not seeking to introduce this testimony for the truth of the matter asserted, but only to explain why the officer acted as he did in arresting the defendant. In State v. Reynolds, 250 N.W.2d 434, 440 (Iowa 1977), we held that a law enforcement officer was permitted to explain his or her actions based on information received and its source. Based on Reynolds, we conclude that Officer Zahner's testimony was admissible for the limited purpose for which it was offered.