Opinion ID: 4577993
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Collateral Acts Evidence

Text: Mr. Tewalt next contends the circuit court erred in admitting evidence of the September 2017 incident as collateral acts evidence under Rule 404(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence because it did not specify a particular purpose for its admission. The 10 State counters that the evidence was properly admitted under Rule 404(b), and even if it were not, the evidence would still be permitted as intrinsic evidence. In considering evidentiary admissions under Rule 404(b), we employ the following three-step standard of review: First, we review for clear error the trial court’s factual determination that there is sufficient evidence to show the other acts occurred. Second, we review de novo whether the trial court correctly found the evidence was admissible for a legitimate purpose. Third, we review for an abuse of discretion the trial court’s conclusion that the “other acts” evidence is more probative than prejudicial under Rule 403.[7] At the heart of Mr. Tewalt’s challenge on this point is our holding in Syllabus Point 2 of State v. McGinnis, 8 which sets out a procedure for the trial court to follow prior to admitting Rule 404(b) evidence, including an in camera hearing, a relevancy finding, and an instruction to the jury: Where an offer of evidence is made under Rule 404(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence, the trial court, pursuant to Rule 104(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence, is to determine its admissibility. Before admitting the evidence, the trial court should conduct an in camera hearing as stated in State v. Dolin, 176 W.Va. 688, 347 S.E.2d 208 (1986). After hearing the evidence and arguments of counsel, the trial court must be satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that the acts or conduct occurred and that the defendant committed the acts. If the trial court does not find by a preponderance of the evidence that the acts or conduct was committed or that the defendant was the actor, the evidence 7 State v. LaRock, 196 W. Va. 294, 310-11, 470 S.E.2d 613, 629-30 (1996) (footnote added). 8 193 W. Va. 147, 455 S.E.2d 516 (1994). 11 should be excluded under Rule 404(b). If a sufficient showing has been made, the trial court must then determine the relevancy of the evidence under Rules 401 and 402 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence and conduct the balancing required under Rule 403 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence. If the trial court is then satisfied that the Rule 404(b) evidence is admissible, it should instruct the jury on the limited purpose for which such evidence has been admitted. A limiting instruction should be given at the time the evidence is offered, and we recommend that it be repeated in the trial court’s general charge to the jury at the conclusion of the evidence. Mr. Tewalt first argues the circuit court’s in camera hearing failed to elicit the required information for the court to make a determination that a preponderance of the evidence showed that the September 2017 incident truly occurred. Second, he contends that the evidence was irrelevant under Rules 401 and 402. Third, he contends that the evidence was inadmissible as the risk of prejudice outweighed its probative value under Rule 403. And finally, he argues that the circuit court did not appropriately instruct the jury as required by Syllabus Point 1 of State v. McGinnis, 9 which states: When offering evidence under Rule 404(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence, the prosecution is required to identify the specific purpose for which the evidence is being offered and the jury must be instructed to limit its consideration of the evidence to only that purpose. It is not sufficient for the prosecution or the trial court merely to cite or mention the litany of possible uses listed in Rule 404(b). The specific and precise purpose for which the evidence is offered must clearly be shown from the record and that purpose alone must be told to the jury in the trial court’s instruction. 9 Id. 12 Having reviewed the record, it is abundantly clear that the circuit court conducted a proper in camera hearing to determine the admissibility of the State’s proffered Rule 404(b) evidence. At this hearing, the trial court had before it the proffered testimony of the victim and the investigating officer, as well as the police report detailing the incident and photographs of the victim’s injuries at that time. While the bulk of that hearing was devoted to addressing audio recordings which were subsequently excluded under the spousal communications privilege, the parties also openly discussed the admission of the evidence at issue here regarding the September 2017 incident. As such, we cannot agree with Mr. Tewalt that the trial court lacked sufficient information to determine by a preponderance of the evidence that the September 2017 incident occurred. Second, turning to the question of relevancy, we recognize that, by virtue of this evidence being introduced under Rule 404(b), it must be relevant to one of the permitted purposes under subsection (b)(2). As we discuss further below, the State proffered the evidence of the September 2017 incident to illustrate motive, intent, opportunity, lack of accident, and absence of mistake. We have also recognized that “[u]nder Rule 401, evidence having any probative value whatsoever can satisfy the relevancy definition. Obviously, this is a liberal standard favoring a broad policy of admissibility.” 10 Under a liberal construction, we have no trouble determining this McDougal v. McCammon, 193 W. Va. 229, 236, 455 S.E.2d 788, 795 (1995) 10 (emphasis in original). 13 evidence has some probative value and that it could be used to demonstrate that Mr. Tewalt was capable of forming the intent to strangle the victim and willfully follow through with that conduct. That evidence would similarly serve to counter any argument that Mr. Tewalt accidentally or mistakenly strangled the victim in November. Because it is clear the collateral acts evidence was introduced for a permitted purpose, and the evidence was relevant to illustrate that purpose, we conclude that the circuit court did not err in determining that the collateral acts evidence was relevant. Third, we have directly spoken on the Rule 403 balancing of probative value and the potential for unfair prejudice and held [i]t is presumed a defendant is protected from undue prejudice if the following requirements are met: (1) the prosecution offered the evidence for a proper purpose; (2) the evidence was relevant; (3) the trial court made an on-the-record determination under Rule 403 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence that the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice; and (4) the trial court gave a limiting instruction.[11] Each of these elements is clearly satisfied here. The prosecution offered the evidence for clearly specified purposes: motive, intent, opportunity, absence of mistake, and lack of accident. The evidence, as discussed above, was relevant. The trial court conducted a hearing to determine if the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice when it conducted the above-described hearing and 11 Syl. Pt. 3, State v. LaRock, 196 W. Va. 294, 470 S.E.2d 613 (1996) (footnote added). 14 subsequently permitted the introduction of this evidence. Finally, the court gave a limiting instruction twice: once when the evidence was first presented to the jury, and again before the jury was sent to deliberate. So, we find there was a presumption the evidence’s probative value was not outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice. Finally, we turn to Mr. Tewalt’s contention that the State and the circuit court violated Syllabus Point 1 of McGinnis in that they listed a “litany of possible uses” for the proffered Rule 404(b) evidence. Mr. Tewalt’s argument cannot sustain a facial challenge. Rule 404(b)(2) lists nine permitted uses: motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, and lack of accident. As noted above, the prosecution offered evidence of the September 2017 strangulation incident to prove, and the circuit court instructed the jury on, the following five possible uses: intent, motive, opportunity, absence of mistake, and lack of accident. As such, neither the prosecution nor the circuit court listed the “litany of possible uses” for this evidence as prohibited by our holding in McGinnis. We have no doubt that it is possible to admit evidence under Rule 404(b) for more than one purpose so long as the prosecution and the circuit court identify those specific purposes, as was done here. That said, we caution practitioners and the courts to be careful in their citations to the Rule 404(b) permitted uses and ensure that the evidence supports citation to the specific use or uses. Although we are satisfied the trial court did not err in permitting the State to introduce the collateral acts evidence relating to the September 2017 incident, we are also 15 cognizant that this evidence could have been admitted as intrinsic evidence and bypassed the Rule 404(b) requirements. As we held in Syllabus Point 7 of State v. McKinley, 12 “[e]vents, declarations and circumstances which are near in time, causally connected with, and illustrative of transactions being investigated are generally considered res gestae and admissible at trial.” And, we have long permitted trial courts to admit evidence of past bad acts where the acts are part of a single criminal episode, where the previous acts constitute necessary preliminaries to the charged act, or where the previous acts are inextricably intertwined with the charged act. 13 In State v. Dennis, a situation similar to this case, we upheld the trial court’s decision to allow the admission of intrinsic evidence in the form of prior acts of domestic violence. We noted that those prior acts were necessary to “‘complete the story of the crimes on trial’ or otherwise provide context to the crimes charged.” 14 Much like the prior domestic violence incidents in Dennis, the September 2017 strangulation incident here completes the story and provides context for the November 2017 strangulation incident. As such, we conclude that, even if this evidence had been inadmissible under Rule 404(b), it would have been admissible as intrinsic evidence under Dennis. 12 234 W. Va. 143, 764 S.E.2d 303 (2014). 13 State v. Dennis, 216 W. Va. 331, 351, 607 S.E.2d 437, 457 (2004). 14 Id. (quoting LaRock, 196 W. Va. at 312 n.29, 470 S.E.2d at 631 n.29). 16 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order as far as it denied Mr. Tewalt’s motion for a new trial on the basis that the court improperly admitted the collateral acts evidence.