Opinion ID: 1815062
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: resolution 678-75

Text: WHEREAS, the City Council of the City of Montgomery has received the recommendations of the Citizens' Participation Group; and WHEREAS, the Citizens' Participation Group developed those recommendations after holding the appropriate public hearings; and WHEREAS, the City Council has reviewed and considered the recommendations of the Citizens' Participation Group; and WHEREAS, the Community Development Program as prepared by the City Council on this date, is made a part of this resolution; and WHEREAS, the Community Development Program has been developed in accordance with relevant Department of Housing and Urban Development procedures published to date in the Federal Register: NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF MONTGOMERY, ALABAMA, that the City Council hereby approves the aforesaid budget and authorizes Jim Robinson, Mayor, to direct the Department of Planning and Development to prepare the Community Development Block Grant Application ... The minutes then show a breakdown of the budget and how the money was to be spent. The crucial language of the minutes shows: Councilman Folmar moved the adoption of the foregoing resolution. The resolution was adopted by the following vote: AYES: Peak, Golson, Oliver, Harris, Dixon, Folmar, and Williamson. NAYS: Reed and Caswell. [Emphasis added.] Nowhere do the minutes reflect that the Council voted upon the consideration of the resolution. Therefore, assuming that the City of Montgomery's contention is valid in construing these statutes, the essential requirements of unanimous consent were not satisfied. I believe, however, that the City's construction does not conform to the language nor the purpose of the statute; and I would hold that the words unanimous consent refer to the voting on the passage of the proposed resolution. The pertinent part of the statute is indeed broken into two alternatives, each referring either to shall be passed or passage when unanimous consent is used. Nowhere is the term consideration used or alluded to in this statute. A more logical interpretation would be that the statute allows two methods of recording the votes and determining whether passage was by unanimous consent: (1) by a voice vote, All those in favor say aye; all those opposed say nay; or (2) by a formal roll call vote with each vote recorded separately. The statute states the first method for recording the vote as follows: No ordinance of permanent operation shall be passed at the meeting at which it was introduced except by unanimous consent of all members of the council present, and such unanimous consent shall be shown by the yea and nay votes entered upon the minutes of said meeting: [Emphasis added.] The second method is stated in the concluding parts of this same sentence: [P]rovided, however, that if all members of the council present vote for the passage of the ordinance and their names are so entered of record as voting in favor thereof, it shall be construed as giving unanimous consent to the action upon such ordinance at the meeting of which it is introduced. [Emphasis added.] The City of Montgomery further contends Resolution No. 678-75 met the requirements necessary for passage as set forth in Section 17, Ordinance No. 77-75 (cited above, of the City of Montgomery, because the vote for consideration was unanimous). We are not called upon to rule on the validity of Montgomery Ordinance 77-75, Section 17, but the interpretation urged by the City of Montgomery is in conflict with the legislative act. To adopt the City of Montgomery's interpretation would in effect nullify a state law. A basic principle of our system of government is the superiority of state law. City of Mobile v. Garrett-Montgomery, Inc., 281 Ala. 204, 201 So.2d 42 (1967). A city does not have the power to, by ordinance, change its municipal charter as granted by the state legislature. A review of the evidence clearly shows that the vote on the passage of the resolution was not by unanimous consent. This can be shown by a study of the minutes of the meeting of November 25, 1975, which were offered into evidence as plaintiff's exhibit Number 5. It is shown that Reed and Caswell voted against Resolution No. 678-75. It is settled Alabama law that records of a municipal council are not only properly admissible in evidence to prove the facts stated therein but are the best evidence of such facts. Mayor and City Council of Anniston v. Davis, 98 Ala. 629, 13 So. 331 (1892); Alabama City, G. & A. Ry. Co. v. City of Gadsden, 185 Ala. 263, 64 So. 91 (1913). Such a record, when regular and complete on its face, may not be attacked in a collateral proceeding. Mayor and City Council of Anniston v. Davis, supra. Thus, on the record before us, it is clear that there was no unanimous consent and the resolution, in my opinion, is void. While granting or refusing an injunction is largely discretionary with the trial Court, the term discretion implies sound judicial discretion which is reviewable on appeal. Cullman Property Co. v. H. H. Hitt Lumber Co., 201 Ala. 150, 77 So. 574 (1917). This discretion is based upon a study of the facts and the application of the law based upon those facts. Under the state of the evidence as disclosed by the record, I would hold that the trial Judge misapplied the law and thus erred in upholding the validity of Resolution No. 678-75. Therefore, I would hold that the trial Court's order denying the injunction is not supported by competent evidence. HEFLIN, C. J., and FAULKNER and SHORES, JJ., concur.