Opinion ID: 2401140
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Inextricably Intertwined Doctrine

Text: The State argues that this Court need not address any of the listed exceptions in D.R.E. 404(b), or the guidelines of Getz, because D.R.E. 404(b) does not apply to the evidence of either the bank robbery or the second shoot-out. In support of its position, the States relies upon the inextricably intertwined doctrine. See United States v. Foster, 889 F.2d 1049 (11th Cir.1989). In Foster, the Eleventh Circuit held that evidence is inextricably intertwined with the charged offenses and, therefore, does not implicate the constraints of Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence (F.R.E.) [5] if it forms an integral and natural part of the witness's accounts of the circumstances surrounding the offenses for which the defendant was indicted. Id. at 1053 (quoting United States v. Costa, 691 F.2d 1358, 1361 (11th Cir.1982)). The Eleventh Circuit held that such evidence is admissible even if it tends to reflect negatively on the defendant's character. Id. However, the decisions of various federal circuit courts which have recognized the inextricably intertwined doctrine are not uniform in their formulation or application of its precepts. See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 960 F.2d 1055, 1058 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 231, 121 L.Ed.2d 167 (1992); United States v. Hill, 953 F.2d 452, 456-58 (9th Cir.1991); United States v. Roberts, 933 F.2d 517, 519 (7th Cir.1991); United States v. Mays, 822 F.2d 793, 797 (8th Cir.1987); United States v. Mills, 704 F.2d at 1559; United States v. Masters, 622 F.2d 83, 86-87 (4th Cir.1980). The policy underlying D.R.E. 404(b), as recognized by this Court in Getz, mandates that evidence of uncharged misconduct be analyzed first, vis-a-vis the listed exceptions, even though the rule is inclusionary (i.e., the list of exceptions is not exhaustive of potentially admissible evidence). See Getz v. State, 538 A.2d at 730-31. It is only if the evidence of uncharged misconduct offered by the State is not admissible pursuant to any of the exceptions set forth in D.R.E. 404(b), or for any other consistent purpose, [6] that a trial judge may consider the admissibility of such evidence pursuant to the carefully circumscribed inextricably intertwined doctrine. [7] That doctrine's applicability is limited to inextricably intertwined evidence of uncharged misconduct which, if excluded, would create a chronological and conceptual void in the State's presentation of its case to the jury that would likely result in significant confusion. [8] See United States v. Adamo, 882 F.2d 1218, 1229, 1234 (7th Cir.1989). Compare United States v. Swiatek, 819 F.2d 721, 727-28 (7th Cir. 1987). A trial judge may only admit evidence of inextricably intertwined misconduct for the purposes of avoiding the confusion which would be caused by its exclusion, and then only after balancing the prejudicial effect of its inclusion. D.R.E. 403; United States v. Mills, 704 F.2d at 1559. [9] If the trial judge concludes that it is impractical to present the State's case on the charged crime without evidence of the uncharged inextricably intertwined act of misconduct, the jury should be instructed as to the limited purpose for which such evidence is admitted, and that the evidence of the uncharged inextricably intertwined misconduct should not be considered by it for any substantive purpose or as indicative of the defendant's character. See Getz v. State, 538 A.2d at 734; Weber v. State, Del.Supr., 547 A.2d 948, 956 (1988). Accord United States v. Lehder-Rivas, 955 F.2d 1510, 1516 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Reed v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 347, 121 L.Ed.2d 262 (1992); United States v. Mays, 822 F.2d at 797. See also Imwinkelreid, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence § 6:24, at 40 (1984); 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 365, at 287 (3d ed. 1940) (merely inseparable acts do not serve any evidential purpose). In this case, the Superior Court properly began its analysis of the State's proposal to present evidence of uncharged misconduct vis-a-vis the exceptions in D.R.E. 404(b). Because the Superior Court ruled that the State's evidence was admissible in accordance with D.R.E. 404(b), it was not necessary for the Superior Court, and it is unnecessary for this Court, to decide whether the evidence of the bank robbery and the second shoot-out were admissible pursuant to the inextricably intertwined doctrine. Accordingly, we will only review the 404(b) basis for the Superior Court's admission of the evidence of both the bank robbery and the second shoot-out, in accordance with this Court's holding in Getz and its progeny.