Opinion ID: 1351145
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Granting of the People's challenges for cause.

Text: (54) Defendant asserts four prospective jurors who expressed opposition to the death penalty were improperly excused for cause because they did not make it unmistakably clear they would refuse to impose the death penalty in all situations. ( Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510, 522, fn. 21 [20 L.Ed.2d 776, 785, 88 S.Ct. 1770].) As we have held in numerous cases (e.g., People v. Guzman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 915, 954 [248 Cal. Rptr. 467, 755 P.2d 917]), the proper test for determining Witherspoon error is set out in Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424-426 [83 L.Ed.2d 841, 105 S.Ct. 844]. Under Witt the prospective juror need not demonstrate unmistakable clarity about his opposition, but may be excluded for cause if his views on the death penalty would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' ( Id. at p. 424 [83 L.Ed.2d at pp. 851-852], fn. omitted.) Defendant asserts we should not apply Witt retroactively. We have applied Witt retroactively in numerous recent cases (e.g., People v. Guzman, supra, 45 Cal.3d 915, 954-956), and we are satisfied that our practice is in conformity with constitutional principles. We thus analyze defendant's claims pursuant to Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412. (i) Prospective Juror Simonds. Carole Simonds stated she believed in the death penalty, but her religious beliefs might prevent her from actually voting for it. On further questioning about whether she could vote to impose death, she responded: I don't think I can, I don't think so, and Oh, I don't know. I don't think I could tell someone just take their life away, I don't think so. When asked if she could vote for death for Adolf Hitler, she replied, I don't think I could. I don't know. (ii) Prospective Juror Moore. Samuel Moore expressed general qualms about the death penalty, and on further questioning stated, due to my religious belief I don't feel that I could vote for the death penalty, regardless of the facts of the case. He affirmed this statement twice more, telling defendant he did not believe he could vote for death even if Hitler or Attila the Hun were on trial. (iii) Prospective Juror Fredman. Lucca Fredman told the court she did not believe in the death penalty, and twice affirmed, I do believe that I could not vote for the death penalty under any circumstances. She later told the court that even if instructed that the death penalty was a proper sentence under the law, she could not follow the law and impose death: I really believe I couldn't. I couldn't live with myself. (iv) Prospective Juror Jensen. Mark Jensen stated he did not believe he could participate in anything that may involve putting a person to death. He thereafter affirmed three times that his conscience would not permit him to vote for death under any circumstances. As in Guzman, supra, we conclude that under these circumstances the court could properly have concluded from their responses that [the] jurors' views would `prevent,' or at least `substantially impair' performance of their duties as jurors at the penalty trial. (45 Cal.3d at p. 956.) We find no error under Witherspoon, supra, 391 U.S. 510, or Witt, supra, 459 U.S. 412.