Opinion ID: 539884
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Alleged Fatal Variance

Text: 73 Muelle and Duque argue that the evidence at trial established the existence of multiple conspiracies rather than the single conspiracy alleged in the indictment. According to Muelle and Duque, this fatal variance requires reversal. 74 Whether a single conspiracy existed is a fact question. United States v. Whaley, 830 F.2d 1469, 1472 (7th Cir.1978). To convict a defendant for participating in a conspiracy, the government must show that the defendant was a party to an agreement to commit an unlawful act, and that one of the conspirators committed an overt act to further the agreement. See United States v. Mealy, 851 F.2d 890, 895-96 (7th Cir.1988). A single conspiracy does not exist just because a number of people committed illegal acts with the same person. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946). The government must show some connection between the participants. Id. at 755, 66 S.Ct. at 1243. But to be a member of a conspiracy, a person does not need to know or participate in every detail of the conspiracy, or to know all the conspiracy's members. United States v. Davis, 838 F.2d 909, 913 (7th Cir.1988). A conspiracy may have a small core of people with whom other conspirators act to achieve the conspiracy's goal. See id. 75 In this case, Petersen, Raffanti, and later Gorny, formed the conspiracy's core. The conspiracy's objective was to buy and resell cocaine. The structure of the alleged conspiracy in this case is very much like the structure of the conspiracy in Mealy. In Mealy, Ingold ran an organization that bought marijuana from various suppliers and sold it to various customers between 1981 and 1986. In 1983, Mealy and Rhodes sold marijuana to Ingold. In 1986, Mealy and Rhodes sold more marijuana to Ingold. At trial and on appeal, Mealy contended that he was involved in two separate conspiracies--one in 1983, and the other in 1986--rather than in one larger conspiracy as the indictment alleged. See 851 F.2d at 894-96. This court, after examining the evidence against Mealy, held that the jury could properly find that Mealy knowingly participated in Ingold's longer ongoing conspiracy. See id. at 896-97. 76 Muelle and Duque argue that Petersen and Raffanti changed suppliers at least four times during the course of their enterprise. According to Muelle and Duque, every time a new supplier came on the scene, a new conspiracy began. Not so.  'As long as the conspiracy continues and its goal is to achieve a common objective, ... parties may still be found guilty even though they join or terminate their relationship with the core conspirators at different times.'  Davis, 838 F.2d at 913 (quoting United States v. Noble, 754 F.2d 1324, 1329 (7th Cir.1985). That is exactly the situation in this case. Petersen's and Raffanti's conspiracy continued on, with the same objective--to buy and resell cocaine. The fact that old suppliers left the conspiracy and new suppliers entered does not mean that those suppliers cannot be found guilty for participating in that conspiracy. 77 Mealy and Davis show that it is proper to view the type of conspiracy charged here--an ongoing drug distribution conspiracy involving core members who buy from and sell to various suppliers and dealers who may change over time--as a single conspiracy rather than as a series of smaller separate conspiracies. The key question is whether the government presented sufficient evidence to show that the defendants outside the core who engaged in transactions with the core conspirators knew about (or must have known about, which is the same thing) the core conspirators' objective and embraced that objective. 78 The only defendant who challenges the sufficiency of the government's evidence to show that his dealings with the core conspirators amounted to knowing participation in their conspiracy is Duque. 5 Duque contends that the conspiracy ended in February 1986, when Petersen and Raffanti were arrested, and that there was no direct evidence from which the jury could find that he sold cocaine to Petersen, Raffanti, or Gorny before that time. Duque further contends that even if the conspiracy did not end until after Gorny's arrest in April 1986 (a time after which Duque concedes there is evidence to show he sold cocaine to Gorny) or if there is sufficient evidence to show he sold cocaine to the partnership before Petersen's and Raffanti's arrests, there is insufficient evidence to show that he knew about, and therefore knowingly participated in, the larger conspiracy. 79 There was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that any sales Duque made while the conspiracy was still active constituted knowing participation in the conspiracy. It does not matter that Duque did not participate in the conspiracy from the beginning, and that Duque did not know all the participants in the conspiracy; as we have seen, conspirators can come and go from an ongoing conspiracy, and a person need not know all the details of, or participants in, a conspiracy to be convicted for joining the conspiracy. The jury could find that Duque knew of, and agreed to further, the conspiracy's goals--the buying and reselling of cocaine--because there was evidence that Duque knew, or must have known, that Petersen, Raffanti, and Gorny were selling the cocaine to smaller-scale dealers. The jury could infer this from the amounts Duque sold; people do not regularly buy multiple kilograms of cocaine for personal use. Moreover, the structure of the transactions shows Duque knew Gorny was reselling the cocaine. Bell testified to making deliveries in which the cocaine he delivered had been fronted; he or Gorny were to get the money to pay for the cocaine directly from the dealer Gorny was selling to. Indeed, Bell's kidnapping resulted from such a transaction in which he failed to obtain the money from a dealer. Duque would not have conducted the transactions this way unless he knew that Gorny could sell the cocaine. Thus, the jury could find that Duque knowingly joined a conspiracy to sell the cocaine he supplied to other dealers. 80 The jury could also find that any cocaine sales Duque made to Gorny occurred while the conspiracy was still active. First, as we have seen, there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could believe that Duque was supplying cocaine to the conspiracy before Petersen's and Raffanti's arrests. Bell testified about numerous deliveries he made in January and February 1986. He also testified that his contact for these deliveries was Carricaburu. From the evidence of Bell's kidnapping in March 1986 by Duque and Carricaburu, and the evidence of the attempted sale to Gorny (and, through Gorny, DEA agent Fanter) in April, the jury could reasonably infer that Carricaburu and Duque worked together, with Carricaburu as the point man and Duque in the background. Thus, the jury could infer that Duque was involved with Carricaburu in supplying cocaine to Gorny. 81 Moreover, Petersen's and Raffanti's arrests did not end the conspiracy. A co-conspirator's arrest does not automatically terminate a conspiracy; the remaining conspirators may continue to carry out the goals of the conspiracy notwithstanding the arrest of one of the partners. Mealy, 851 F.2d at 901. Gorny, who was Petersen's and Raffanti's full partner, continued selling cocaine to the partnership's normal customers. Duque, who had joined the conspiracy before Petersen's and Raffanti's arrests, continued to supply cocaine to Gorny. Gorny and Duque continued to carry out the conspiracy's goals--the purchase and resale of cocaine--after Petersen and Raffanti were gone from the scene. The sales Duque made after Petersen's and Raffanti's arrests were still part of the conspiracy. Duque argues that the cocaine he attempted to sell to Gorny was to ultimately go to DEA agent Fanter. According to Duque, this takes that sale out of the conspiracy because a person cannot conspire with a government agent who seeks to thwart the conspiracy. That may be so but it is irrelevant here. Duque conspired with Gorny, a member of the conspiracy; it makes no difference who the ultimate buyer was. Cf. Mealy, 851 F.2d at 901 (rejecting the contention that statements made by conspirators to former compatriots who had become government agents were not made to further the conspiracy; all that mattered was that the unarrested conspirators were still capable of carrying on the ongoing conspiracy). Besides, as we have seen, there was sufficient evidence that Duque made sales to Gorny as part of the conspiracy, both before and after Petersen's and Raffanti's arrests. Duque has not shown any fatal variance in this case; his conviction for participating in the conspiracy alleged in the indictment was proper.