Opinion ID: 1780860
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: P. Timberlands, 726 So.2d at 108 (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567, 80 S.Ct. 1343, 4 L.Ed.2d 1403 (1960)) (emphasis added).

Text: ¶ 90. A recent decision of the U.S. Supreme Court helps to clarify what is and what is not open to a court to decide with regard to arbitration: `procedural' questions which grow out of the dispute and bear on its final disposition are presumptively not for the judge, but for an arbitrator, to decide. John Wiley, supra, at 557, 84 S.Ct. 909 (holding that an arbitrator should decide whether the first two steps of a grievance procedure were completed, where these steps are prerequisites to arbitration). So, too, the presumption is that the arbitrator should decide allegation[s] of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, supra, at 24-25, 103 S.Ct. 927. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84, 123 S.Ct. 588, 592, 154 L.Ed.2d 491 (2002) (emphasis added) (holding that arbitrator, not court, must decide whether expiration of time limit for compelling arbitration acted to bar complainant from arbitrating). In their brief for the circuit court, the Gatlins raised the issue of default. Section 3 of the FAA addresses default as follows: If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (emphasis added). ¶ 91. The Gatlins read this section as providing that the determination of whether Sanderson Farms is in default and thereby waives its right to compel arbitration should be made by the trial court, and they argue that by failing to pay half of the filing fee, Sanderson Farms defaulted in proceeding with the arbitration.
¶ 92. A preliminary issue which must be addressed is the application of § 3 in state courts. Section 3 refers to any of the courts of the United States. Maryland's highest court has read this reference as limiting § 3 to the federal courts. Wells v. Chevy Chase Bank, F.S.B., 363 Md. 232, 768 A.2d 620, 625-26 (2001). ¶ 93. The U.S. Supreme Court has never reached the issue of whether § 3 (and § 4, which refers to any United States district court) are binding on the states. In Southland Corp. v. Keating , the Court noted in passing that we do not hold that §§ 3 and 4 of the [Federal] Arbitration Act apply to proceedings in state courts. Section 4, for example, provides that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply in proceedings to compel arbitration. The Federal Rules do not apply in such state-court proceedings. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 16 n. 10, 104 S.Ct. 852. Five years later, the Court observed that Southland Corp. had expressly reserv[ed] the question whether those sections applied in state courts. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476 n. 6, 109 S.Ct. 1248, 103 L.Ed.2d 488 (1989). The Volt Court did not reach the question either, observing that we need not resolve it to decide this case. Id. at 477, 109 S.Ct. 1248. ¶ 94. In neither Southland Corp. nor Volt did the Court mention its footnote in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983), in which the Court stated: Although § 3 refers ambiguously to a suit in any of the courts of the United States, the state courts have almost unanimously recognized that the stay provision of § 3 applies to suits in state as well as federal courts, requiring them to issue the same speedy relief when a dispute is referable to arbitration. (The North Carolina Supreme Court has so held, although not until after the District Court ordered this stay. Burke County Public Schools Board of Education v. Shaver Partnership, 303 N.C. 408, 279 S.E.2d 816 (1981).) This is necessary to carry out Congress's intent to mandate enforcement of all covered arbitration agreements; Congress can hardly have meant that an agreement to arbitrate can be enforced against a party who attempts to litigate an arbitrable dispute in federal court, but not against one who sues on the same dispute in state court. See also Prima Paint, 388 U.S., at 404, 87 S.Ct., at 1806. 460 U.S. at 27 n. 34, 103 S.Ct. 927 (emphasis added). I note especially the language that the application of § 3 to state courts is necessary to carry out Congress's intent. The citation to Prima Paint likewise points us to the unmistakably clear congressional purpose that the arbitration procedure, when selected by the parties to a contract, be speedy and not subject to delay and obstruction in the courts. 388 U.S. at 404, 87 S.Ct. 1801. Insofar as § 3 fulfills that intent and that purpose, it must be binding on the states, since Southland Corp. held that Congress overrode state law insofar as necessary to implement its national policy favoring arbitration. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 10, 104 S.Ct. 852. ¶ 95. The Texas Supreme Court has interpreted note 34 to Moses H. Cone as applying § 3 to state courts. In re Bruce Terminix Co., 988 S.W.2d 702, 704 n. 2 (Tex.1998). The Florida Supreme Court has approved the decision of one of its intermediate courts that § 3 applies to state courts. See Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith v. Melamed, 405 So.2d 790, 793 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1981), aff'd, 476 So.2d 140 (Fla.1985). See also Wolff v. Fid. Brokerage Servs., Inc., 2002 WL 31382606, at  (Mass.Super.Ct. Sept. 5, 2002); Stokes v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 351 S.C. 606, 571 S.E.2d 711, 715 (2002). ¶ 96. Although this Court has never addressed the issue of § 3's applicability, we have repeatedly cited federal law with regard to waiver of arbitrability. In this Court's recent decision in Russell v. Performance Toyota, Inc ., we stated that a party waives arbitration if it substantially takes advantage of the judicial process and quoted the Fifth Circuit for the rule that to establish a waiver, the objector to arbitration must establish `that a party seeking arbitration substantially invokes the judicial process to the detriment or prejudice of the other party.' Russell, 826 So.2d at 724 (quoting Subway Equip. Leasing Corp. v. Forte, 169 F.3d 324, 326 (5th Cir.1999)) (emphasis added). See Cox v. Howard Weil, Labouisse, Friedrichs, Inc., 619 So.2d 908, 913-14 (Miss.1993) (applying FAA and federal case law for rule that a party defaults on or waives a demand for arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act when that party `actively participates in a lawsuit or takes other action inconsistent with [the right to arbitration]' ); see also Univ. Nursing Assocs., PLLC v. Phillips, 842 So.2d 1270, 1276-77 (Miss.2003) (relying on cases interpreting FAA, even while skeptical of whether FAA applicable to instant facts). ¶ 97. The decisive consideration, however, is that the substantive provisions of the FAA (which are expressly binding on state courts) are frequently enforceable only in state courts. As the Fifth Circuit recently reiterated, there is no independent federal subject-matter jurisdiction under the FAA. Bank One, N.A. v. Shumake, 281 F.3d 507, 513 (5th Cir.2002). Hence, where no diversity or federal-question jurisdiction exists, parties seeking to enforce the FAA will have no choice but to turn to state courts for relief. As the Florida court in Melamed correctly stated: Fairness, logic, and constitutional constraints require us to enforce federal rights in state courts whenever Congress allows. Congress has allowed state courts to enforce federal arbitration rights, and has made state courts the exclusive forum for vindication of those rights except in those instances when the litigant can invoke federal jurisdiction on some independent ground. We should not and cannot make the substance of a federal right depend on the fortuity of the existence of an independent ground of federal jurisdiction. Melamed, 405 So.2d at 793 (emphasis added). The FAA creates a body of federal substantive law establishing and regulating the duty to honor an agreement to arbitrate. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 25 n. 32, 103 S.Ct. 927. As the Tennessee Supreme Court has observed, in holding that this body of federal substantive law is binding on the states: To rule otherwise would permit and even encourage forum shopping, prevent and undermine the need for nationwide uniformity in the interpretation and application of arbitration clauses in foreign and interstate transactions, and permit individuals to circumvent the national law relating to arbitration agreements called for by the Federal Arbitration Act. Tenn. R. Pulp & Paper Co. v. Eichleay Corp., 637 S.W.2d 853, 857 (Tenn.1982). ¶ 98. These considerations would, I think, strongly influence the U.S. Supreme Court if and when it is squarely confronted with the applicability of § 3 to the states. The Court's statement in Moses H. Cone that Congress can hardly have meant that an agreement to arbitrate can be enforced against a party who attempts to litigate an arbitrable dispute in federal court, but not against one who sues on the same dispute in state court suggests that it would not allow the determination of whether or not a suit can be arbitrated to hang upon which court a party petitions for a stay. And as the Court remarked in Southland Corp., since the overwhelming proportion of all civil litigation in this country is in the state courts, it would encourage and reward forum shopping to allow the choice of forum to be effectively determinative of whether arbitration can be enforced. 465 U.S. at 15, 104 S.Ct. 852. We are unwilling to attribute to Congress the intent, in drawing on the comprehensive powers of the Commerce Clause, to create a right to enforce an arbitration contract and yet make the right dependent for its enforcement on the particular forum in which it is asserted. Id. ¶ 99. In its arbitration decisions after Southland Corp. and Volt, the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly reiterated its broad support for arbitration, with an overall tendency of expanding, not curtailing, the reach of the FAA. In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 111 S.Ct. 1647, 114 L.Ed.2d 26 (1991), the Court held that statutory claims are arbitrable, rejecting any arguments that arbitration was in any way defective in protecting the civil rights of claimants. In Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 115 S.Ct. 834, 130 L.Ed.2d 753 (1995), the Court put the broadest possible construction on the FAA's application to transaction[s] involving commerce, confirming that the FAA reaches to the farthest extent of Congressional power under the Commerce Clause. In Casarotto, as we have seen, the Court affirmed the states' limited power to invalidate arbitration clauses under § 2 while declaring invalid any state laws that would undermine the goals and policies of the FAA. Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 688, 116 S.Ct. 1652 (quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at 478, 109 S.Ct. 1248). And in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, as I have noted above, this Court held that the FAA applies to nearly all employment contracts. Given the Court's much broader application of the FAA in the almost 20 years since Southland Corp., I find it highly implausible that the Court would take a giant leap backwards by holding that states need not consider themselves bound to follow § 3. ¶ 100. This point is missed by the Fifth Circuit when it conclude[s] from the Supreme Court's opinions that state courts do not necessarily have to grant stays of conflicting litigation or compel arbitration in compliance with the FAA's sections 3 and 4. McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Lloyds Underwriters of London, 944 F.2d 1199, 1210-11 (5th Cir.1991). Consider parties whose dispute does not provide an independent basis for federal jurisdiction. They have agreed to arbitrate, but one party refuses. The other party cannot seek a stay in federal court, under Shumake. If the state courts can choose not to compel arbitration, then how can the FAA be said to apply to the states in any meaningful fashion? Against the Fifth Circuit's not necessarily, this Court cites the [t]his is necessary to carry out Congress' intent language of the U.S. Supreme Court in Moses H. Cone. ¶ 101. If state courts were free to create expansive definitions of waiver or default, thus defeating stay applications that would have met the federal standard, the substantive guarantees of the FAA would be denied to that great majority of aggrieved parties whose disputes do not qualify for federal jurisdiction. I cannot imagine that, upon due consideration (going beyond mere footnotes), the U.S. Supreme Court would approve such a two-tiered regime of arbitration law. To do so would eviscerate Southland Corp. ¶ 102. Therefore, and also because our Mississippi jurisprudence has long relied on the federal case law arising out of § 3, I would hold that § 3 governs applications for stays of arbitration under the FAA in our state courts. What suffices to show waiver or default under § 3, by the same token, must be neither more nor less than what suffices under federal law.
¶ 103. The Fifth Circuit has observed that: There is a strong presumption against a finding that a party waived its contractual right to arbitrate, and any doubts thereabout must be resolved in favor of arbitration. Ordinarily a party waives its right to arbitrate when it initially pursues litigation and then reverses course and attempts to arbitrate.... However, waiver can also result from `some overt act in Court that evinces a desire to resolve the arbitrable dispute through litigation rather than arbitration.' Gulf Guar. Life Ins. Co. v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 304 F.3d 476, 484 (5th Cir.2002) (citations omitted). The Fifth Circuit also requires a showing of material prejudice if waiver is to be found. Walker v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 938 F.2d 575, 578 (5th Cir.1991). ¶ 104. The procedure to be followed where § 3 is invoked has been carefully and clearly explained by the Fourth Circuit. Section 3 call[s] for an expeditious and summary hearing, with only restricted inquiry into factual issues. Glass v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 114 F.3d 446, 453 (4th Cir.1997) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 22, 103 S.Ct. 927). The court presented with a motion to stay under § 3 must first determine if the issues in dispute meet the standards of either `substantive arbitrability' or `procedural arbitrability.' Id. Substantive arbitrability is shown upon the court's finding that (1) a valid arbitration agreement exists and (2) the specific dispute falls within the scope of what the parties agreed to arbitrate. Id. Cf. Taylor, 826 So.2d at 713. Once the court finds affirmatively on these two questions, the dispute must then be referred to arbitration. Id. All other issues raised before the court not relating to these two determinations fall within the ambit of procedural arbitrability, which includes but is not limited to, `whether grievance procedures or some part of them apply to a particular dispute, whether such procedures have been followed or excused, or whether the unexcused failure to follow them avoids the duty to arbitrate.' 114 F.3d at 453 (quoting John Wiley, 376 U.S. at 557, 84 S.Ct. 909) (emphasis added). The Fourth Circuit stated: It is clear from these decisions, which represent over thirty years of Supreme Court and federal circuit court precedent, that issues of `substantive arbitrability' are for the court to decide, and questions of `procedural arbitrability,' as defined in John Wiley, are for the arbitrator to decide. Id. at 454 (emphasis added). Hence, in reviewing the trial court's order denying a stay in the present case, it is important to keep this distinction clearly in mind. ¶ 105. The trial court should therefore have confined itself to the issue of substantive arbitrability. Sanderson Farms argues that the underlying dispute in this case is clearly arbitrable pursuant to the Agreement. In fact, the Gatlins admit as much in their complaint, which alleges wilful and intentional acts and omissions of the Defendant, Sanderson Farms, Inc. constituting breach of the contract between the parties (emphasis added). Further, the arbitration clause of the Agreement clearly says: Any controversy or claim arising between the parties..., including, but not limited to, disputes relating to this Agreement, or any breach of this Agreement, ... will be settled by binding arbitration. (emphasis added). ¶ 106. The Gatlins' complaint claims breach of contract, and the Agreement says that any claim of breach of the agreement will be settled by binding arbitration. Further, Mr. Gatlin, in effect, admitted that there was a valid arbitration agreement by initiating arbitration proceedings pursuant to the agreement. He only abandoned that pursuit a year later because he allegedly was unable to afford the costs. Thus, the test of substantive arbitrability is met. ¶ 107. The Gatlins' argument that Sanderson Farms waived or defaulted on [19] any right to enforce the arbitration clause by failing to pay half of the filing fee is procedural, having to do with whether procedures have been followed, as John Wiley puts it. The merits of the Gatlins' claim that Sanderson Farms should have paid $1,000 towards the filing fee are simply not before this Court, or any court, in view of the FAA's purpose of expediting arbitration by curtailing judicial involvement. ¶ 108. In the case sub judice, Sanderson Farms has not actively participated in the lawsuit and has not substantially invoked the litigation machinery. To the contrary, every action taken by Sanderson Farms has been an effort to have the suit dismissed and arbitration compelled. It thus cannot be said that Sanderson Farms has substantially invok[ed] the litigation machinery. Mercury Constr. Corp., 656 F.2d at 940 (citation omitted).
¶ 109. Numerous precedents agree that the proviso in § 3that a stay shall be granted `providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration'refer[s] to a party `who, when requested, has refused to go to arbitration or who has refused to proceed with the hearing before the arbitrators once it has commenced,' or who by long delay has waived any right to arbitrate. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Distajo, 66 F.3d 438, 454 (2d Cir.1995) (quoting Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 989 (2d Cir.1942)). [20] Waiver is decidable by the courts where the waiver defense was based on prior litigation by the party seeking arbitration, as opposed to other forms of waiver defenses, which are for the arbitrators to decide. Id. Cf. Howsam, 123 S.Ct. at 592 (the presumption is that the arbitrator should decide `allegation[s] of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability'); Necchi Sewing Mach. Sales Corp. v. Carl, 260 F.Supp. 665, 668 (S.D.N.Y.1966) (distinguishing waiver in terms of delay, which court may decide, from failure to comply with procedural requirements of the arbitration clause, which arbitrator decides). See also Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Mc-Donald, 758 So.2d 539, 542-43 & n. 4 (Ala.1999) (following Glass in distinguishing substantive, court-decided issues from procedural, arbitrator-decided issues; waiver due to procedural error not same as default under § 3). As we have seen, this Court's decisions in Cox, Russell, and Phillips are in line with the position of the federal circuits. ¶ 110. I have been unable to find any state or federal case in which a disagreement over the proper party to pay fees was held to be a default under § 3. [21] In fact, the only case nearly on point held the exact opposite. See Munsey v. Walla Walla Coll., 80 Wash.App. 92, 906 P.2d 988, 990 (1995). Although the state court in Munsey applied Washington state arbitration law, rather than the FAA, it relied on principles identical to those governing the application of the FAA: The only question, therefore, for the superior court here should have been whether the parties bound themselves to arbitrate the particular dispute. And that is because [i]f the dispute can fairly be said to involve an interpretation of the agreement, the inquiry is at an end and the proper interpretation is for the arbitrator. The court here did more. It necessarily decided that the Claimants' failure to timely pay their portion of the arbitration fee and failure to timely respond to discovery requests amounted to a default of the arbitration agreement. And, as a sanction it then refused to compel arbitration and effectively terminated the agreement. The agreement provided for payment of the arbitration fee pursuant to the terms and conditions of payment imposed by [WAMS]. Agreement to Arbitrate Dispute, Section 3.03. Those terms and conditions were established by the arbitration agreement, and, accordingly, the arbitrator, not the superior court, should have decided whether the agreement had been breached and what sanctions, if any, should follow. The superior court erred in deciding both questions. The superior court had authority here only to compel arbitration. It erred in refusing to do so. Id. at 990 (citations omitted). (Note the similarity of the quoted authorities to those already cited regarding the FAA.) Because the parties had agreed to arbitrate all their disputes, including therefore those arising from the arbitration agreement, procedural questions of who pays what when, were reserved for the arbitrator to decide. ¶ 111. Prejudicial delay, as this Court has stated, can waive the right to arbitrate. See Cox, 619 So.2d at 913-14. But see Gulf Guar., 304 F.3d at 484 (mere delay falls far short of the waiver requirements). Had Sanderson Farms simply refused to pay for arbitration, so that the proceedings were stalled indefinitely, that presumably would have at some point sufficed for a default. However, Gatlin went ahead and paid the disputed fee, apparently with the expectation that the arbitrator could ultimately decide that issue as well. ¶ 112. As I have already noted, the plain language of the Agreement states: Any controversy or claim arising between the parties ..., including, but not limited to, disputes relating to this Agreement, or any breach of this Agreement, ... will be settled by binding arbitration. (emphasis added). Merely showing a breach does not suffice to void the arbitration agreement. The standard instead is that enunciated above as constituting a default under 9 U.S.C. § 3. To hold that a dispute over who pays which fees, or some other procedural dispute, was inconsistent with the right to arbitrate and thus a default, would make nonsense of the U.S. Supreme Court's distinction between procedural and substantive issues. In Howsam, the party seeking arbitration was argued to have been doing so after the six-year time limit set by the arbitration agreement, yet the merits of that issue were held to be for the arbitrator, and the Court did not even consider the notion that by arguably breaching the arbitration agreement's terms, the party was in default. Howsam, 123 S.Ct. at 590 & 593. Analytically, that issue does not materially differ from the fee issue raised today by the Gatlins. If the arbitration agreement provides for a time limit, or for the parties to split some fees, or for the parties to wear full evening dress at the arbitration hearing, failures to comply with those rules may well result in the arbitrator's finding that a party has waived its right to arbitrate by failing to follow the rules but that determination is left to the arbitrator, not to the courts. For courts to decide the merits of such issues would undo the fundamental premise of arbitration, which is that where the parties have agreed to arbitrate a dispute, the courts' attitude to the entirety of that dispute should be hands off. ¶ 113. For Gatlin to show that the alleged breach by Sanderson Farms rose to the level of a default, he would have to show that Sanderson Farms acted in a manner inconsistent with the very right to arbitrate which it sought to enforce. As the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Howsam implies, any procedural error by Sanderson Farms made a procedural error by in not splitting the filing fee with Mr. Gatlin, is the kind of question that is itself left to the arbitrator to decide, not an act inconsistent with the right to arbitrate. The plurality fails to cite any authority in favor of determining otherwise. ¶ 114. `There is a strong presumption against' a finding that a party waived its contractual right to arbitrate, and `any doubts thereabout must be resolved in favor of arbitration.' Gulf Guar., 304 F.3d at 484 (quoting Texaco Exploration & Prod. Co. v. AmClyde Engineered Prods. Co., 243 F.3d 906, 911 (5th Cir. 2001)) (emphasis added); see Russell, 826 So.2d at 724 ([w]aiver of arbitration is not a favored finding, and there is a presumption against it) (quoting Miller Brewing Co. v. Fort Worth Distrib. Co., 781 F.2d 494, 497 (5th Cir.1986)) (emphasis added); Taylor, 826 So.2d at 713 (as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24-25, 103 S.Ct. 927 (emphasis added)). ¶ 115. Therefore, under federal and Mississippi precedents, I would hold that no showing of default was made that would justify the circuit court's order. The circuit court exceeded its proper jurisdiction in ruling on the breach of contract claim. I would reverse on the issue appealed by Sanderson Farms. ¶ 116. One of the real benefits to the enforcement of arbitration provisions is supposed to be avoid[ing] the costs of litigation. Adams, 532 U.S. at 124, 121 S.Ct. 1302. That benefit diminishes drastically when arbitration costs soar into the tens of thousands of dollars. And when those costs have the pernicious effect of extinguishing a party's right to legal redress, they become not merely exorbitant but unconscionable. The apparent substantive unconscionability of the Agreement, in view of the thousands of dollars which Gatlin seemingly must pay simply to obtain a hearing, necessitates remand to the trial court for necessary findings of fact. The other issues raised by the Gatlins may well be meritorious, but as I have demonstrated, the law of arbitration requires that the arbitrator, not the courts, weigh those merits. I am not unmindful that, by following the established precedents stated herein, a final resolution of this case cannot be reached by this Court today, which would surely be the desire of all parties. However, as we blaze this trail through the jungle known as arbitration, it is imperative that we do so deliberately, and with meticulous attention to detail, lest we unintentionally complicate or unknowingly contradict established law. ¶ 117. Therefore, and for all the reasons stated herein, I would reverse and remand to the Jones County Circuit Court, Second Judicial District, for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. The circuit court should first order Mr. Gatlin to seek a diminution or waiver of fees from the AAA, while retaining jurisdiction over the case. Upon the AAA's making its finding regarding hardship, the circuit court should then conduct a hearing to determine whether Mr. Gatlin's financial situation prevents him from affording the arbitration fee, if it has not been waived. (Sanderson Farms may present evidence at this stage to support the position that Mr. Gatlin is able to bear the cost of arbitration.) If the circuit court determines that the arbitration costs remain unconscionable, it should then apply the Agreement's severability clause to strike the arbitration clause from the Agreement. SMITH, P.J., AND CARLSON, J., JOIN THIS OPINION.