Opinion ID: 2086451
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claims Relating to the Prosecutor's Closing Argument

Text: The defendant claims that the prosecutor's closing argument violated his due process rights. The defendant specifically finds fault in (1) the prosecutor's claim that the State's three chief witnesses had given prior consistent statements to the police when these statements were never admitted into evidence and (2) the prosecutor's comments regarding the changed appearance of the defendant. Initially, it must be noted that the defendant faces a substantial burden in attempting to achieve reversal based upon improper remarks made during closing argument. Although the prosecutor's remarks may sometimes exceed the bounds of proper comment, the verdict must not be disturbed unless it can be said that the remarks resulted in substantial prejudice to the accused, such that absent those remarks the verdict would have been different. ( People v. Pasch (1992), 152 Ill.2d 133, 185, 178 Ill.Dec. 38, 604 N.E.2d 294.) The regulation of the substance and style of the closing argument is within the trial court's discretion, and the trial court's determination of the propriety of the remarks will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion. People v. Smothers (1973), 55 Ill.2d 172, 176, 302 N.E.2d 324. Applying these principles to the present case, we cannot find that the defendant was substantially prejudiced by the prosecutor's closing arguments. The prosecutor's remarks were brief, isolated, and came after the jury had already heard an abundance of evidence regarding the defendant's guilt. The jury heard testimony from Ann Walters, Wayne Walters, and Daniel Egan individually. This testimony interconnected and strongly implicated the defendant in the murder. It was not, therefore, substantially prejudicial for the prosecutor to allude to the consistency and interconnectedness of previous statements made by these three individuals, especially when the existence of these statements was testified to at trial. Defendant also objects to comments made by the prosecutor during closing argument concerning defendant's changed appearance. The prosecutor stated: The fellow sitting right here, Ladies and Gentlemen, is Mr. Robert Byron in many forms. Back in 1980, when it was important for him to give a good image, he lied to the landlord, and lied to the phone company about his dead beat record, and calls himself John Neal.    Now, Ladies and Gentlemen, when he is facing trial for murder when he is looking at 12 strangers who don't know very much about him, he pretends, grows a beard, puts on glasses. DEFENSE COUNSEL: Objection. Objection. Objection. THE COURT: Overruled. PROSECUTOR: Looks like the county jail librarian because that's not what a murderer is suppose to look like. Everyone of them is on trial, Robert Byron, the deceiver, the liar, the pretender, the home invader, the armed robber, the murderer. Defendant cites People v. Emerson (1983), 97 Ill.2d 487, 74 Ill.Dec. 11, 455 N.E.2d 41, as authority for the proposition that such argument is impermissible and requires reversal. In Emerson, this court reversed a conviction where, during closing argument, the assistant State's Attorney insinuated that the defendant was guilty of improper conduct at the time of his arrest; stated that defense counsel has laid down a smokescreen composed of lies and misrepresentations and innuendoes and attempted to dirty up the victim to distract the attention of the jury from the defendant's crimes; and stated that if they could, defense counsel would deny that any death occurred, but since they could not realistically do that, they had to make something up. Emerson, 97 Ill.2d at 496-98, 74 Ill.Dec. 11, 455 N.E.2d 41. The distinctions between Emerson and the present case are evident. The prosecutor, unlike in Emerson, did not allege that defense counsel had deliberately lied to the jury and fabricated a desperate defense. In short, the impermissible closing arguments in Emerson were different in both substance and degree. Thus, these isolated remarks cannot be said to have sufficiently prejudiced defendant so as to require reversal of his conviction.