Opinion ID: 4549439
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Right to Confrontation at Sentencing

Text: Under the U.S. and Utah Constitutions ¶89 Drommond alleges that both the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution apply at sentencing. 8 The Confrontation Clause provides that ―[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.‖ U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Similarly, article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution gives the accused ―[i]n criminal prosecutions . . . the right . . . to be confronted by the witnesses against him.‖ When the right to confrontation applies and a witness does not testify, a ―party can only introduce [the] witness‘s testimonial statements into evidence if the witness is __________________________________________________________ 8 Drommond also argues that the hearsay testimony violated two other provisions of the Utah Constitution: article I, section 7 (the due process provision) and article I, section 9, which says in part that ―[p]ersons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor.‖ The argument based on these constitutional provisions, however, is inadequately briefed because Drommond does not provide any analysis about why those provisions specifically supply the right to confront witnesses at sentencing. See Bank of Am. v. Adamson, 2017 UT 2, ¶ 13, 391 P.3d 196 (―A party must cite the legal authority on which its argument is based and then provide reasoned analysis of how that authority should apply in the particular case . . . .‖). Drommond has thus not met his burden of persuading us that he is entitled to relief under these provisions. See id. ¶¶ 12–13. Drommond next contends that, even if there is no constitutional right to confrontation, the trial court erred by not properly evaluating whether the hearsay evidence was admissible under rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. But the Utah Rules of Evidence don‘t govern whether evidence is admissible in sentencing proceedings. UTAH R. EVID. 1101(c)(3). And whether evidence is admissible at a capital sentencing proceeding is governed by Utah Code section 76-3-207 and constitutional law. See, e.g., State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶ 297, 299 P.3d 892 (holding that due process requires that ―evidence presented in the penalty phase . . . be relevant and reliable‖). Thus, the trial court didn‘t err when it didn‘t evaluate the admissibility of the evidence under rule 403. 23 STATE v. DROMMOND Opinion of the Court unavailable to testify . . . and the opposing party had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.‖ State v. Timmerman, 2009 UT 58, ¶ 9, 218 P.3d 590. ¶90 The issue here is whether the right to confrontation applies at sentencing. We first discuss federal case law on this issue. Although the United States Supreme Court has never addressed it, every circuit court of appeals has. We then discuss our own case law on the issue. It is inconsistent and, for that reason, does not clearly resolve the issue before us. ¶91 We begin with federal case law. Whether the Confrontation Clause applies at sentencing has gone unanswered by the U.S. Supreme Court.9 But every federal circuit court of appeals has held that there is no right to confront witnesses at sentencing under the Sixth Amendment‘s Confrontation Clause.10 __________________________________________________________ 9 The U.S. Supreme Court has held that defendants have no right to confront witnesses at sentencing proceedings—even at capital sentencing proceedings—under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 245 (1949) (affirming a sentencing procedure that allowed the sentencing judge to consider information about the defendant ―even though [it was] obtained outside the courtroom from persons whom a defendant has not been permitted to confront or cross-examine‖). The Court in Williams based its holding in part on its belief that a sentencing judge must have ―the fullest information possible‖ about ―the defendant‘s life and characteristics.‖ Id. at 247. And the Court recognized ―that most of the information now relied upon by judges to guide them in the intelligent imposition of sentences would be unavailable if information were restricted to that given in open court by witnesses subject to cross-examination.‖ Id. at 250. In the end, however, Williams doesn‘t control the outcome of Drommond‘s Confrontation Clause challenge because it ―is a due process, rather than Sixth Amendment, case.‖ United States v. Fields, 483 F.3d 313, 327 (5th Cir. 2007). Indeed, the Confrontation Clause wasn‘t incorporated against the States by the Fourteenth Amendment‘s Due Process Clause until well after the Williams decision. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). 10See United States v. Zerpa-Ruiz, 784 F. App‘x 353, 356 (6th Cir. 2019); United States v. Umaña, 750 F.3d 320, 348 (4th Cir. 2014); Muhammad v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 733 F.3d 1065, 1076 (11th (continued . . .) 24 Cite as: 2020 UT 50 Opinion of the Court So although there is no binding U.S. Supreme Court precedent, recent federal case law strongly suggests that the Confrontation Clause does not apply at sentencing. ¶92 Next, we put our own case law under the microscope. The Utah Supreme Court has applied both the state and federal right to confrontation at a sentencing proceeding. We did so in State v. Carter, 888 P.2d 629 (Utah 1995), superseded on other grounds by UTAH CODE § 76-3-207(2)(a)(iii) (1999). ¶93 There, the defendant challenged a statute as violating the right to confrontation under both the U.S. and Utah Constitutions. Id. at 641. The statute applied to capital resentencing proceedings. Id. It allowed all evidence properly admitted at trial and in previous sentencing proceedings—including all exhibits and a transcript of all testimony—to be admitted into evidence at the resentencing proceeding. Id. The defendant argued that the statute violated his right to confrontation. Id. In deciding the appeal, we didn‘t question whether the right to confrontation applies at sentencing; we took as a given that it does. Id. at 642 (determining that the capital resentencing statute implicated ―a capital defendant‘s right to confrontation‖). And we incorporated into the resentencing statute ―the safeguards articulated by the United States Supreme Court in [Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)] and adopted by this court in [State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537, 539 (Utah 1981), abrogated by constitutional amendment as stated in State v. Goins, 2017 UT 61, ¶¶ 31–32, 45, 423 P.3d 1236].‖ Id. Roberts had held that an unavailable witness‘s hearsay statement could be admitted at trial under the Confrontation Clause only if the hearsay statement ―bears adequate ‗indicia of reliability,‘‖ such as when it ―falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.‖11 448 Cir. 2013); United States v. Ghiassi, 729 F.3d 690, 695–96 (7th Cir. 2013); Fields, 483 F.3d at 327; United States v. Bras, 483 F.3d 103, 109 (D.C. Cir. 2007); United States v. Robinson, 482 F.3d 244, 246 (3d Cir. 2007); United States v. Bustamante, 454 F.3d 1200, 1202 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Littlesun, 444 F.3d 1196, 1200 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Brown, 430 F.3d 942, 943–44 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Luciano, 414 F.3d 174, 179 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v. Martinez, 413 F.3d 239, 243 (2d Cir. 2005). 11 The U.S. Supreme Court overruled the Roberts ―indicia of reliability‖ test in Crawford v. Washington and instead held that an (continued . . .) 25 STATE v. DROMMOND Opinion of the Court U.S. at 66. In short, the Carter court applied article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution and the Confrontation Clause of the U.S. Constitution without even questioning whether those provisions apply at sentencing. See 888 P.2d at 646. ¶94 We have found no Utah case that predates Carter that applied the constitutional right to confrontation (be it state or federal) at sentencing, and the parties haven‘t pointed us to one either. The only case within the same ballpark analyzed whether the defendant‘s right to due process was violated when the trial court relied on hearsay statements at sentencing and precluded the confrontation of certain witnesses at sentencing. See State v. Sanwick, 713 P.2d 707 (Utah 1986). There, we relied on an Idaho Supreme Court decision that held that ―[h]earsay was admissible [at sentencing] as long as the defendant had the opportunity to rebut the adverse evidence and to challenge the reliability of the evidence presented.‖ Id. at 709 (citing State v. Johnson, 618 P.2d 759 (1980)). ¶95 Nor have we consistently applied our Carter decision in later cases. For example, we implied in State v. Kell, that the right to confrontation applies at sentencing, but we didn‘t mention Carter in that context or its requirements that the hearsay declarant be unavailable and that the hearsay statement bear adequate indicia of reliability. 2002 UT 106, ¶¶ 43–44, 61 P.3d 1019. And later, in Taylor v. State, we held that the defendant‘s appellate counsel wasn‘t ineffective for failing to challenge the trial court‘s 1991 admission of hearsay evidence at sentencing. 2007 UT 12, ¶ 108, 156 P.3d 739. Citing Carter and Sanwick, we reasoned that when the defendant appealed in 1991, ―hearsay evidence generally was considered to be admissible at sentencing‖ as long as the hearsay was ―reliable‖ and the defendant was ―given the opportunity to rebut the evidence.‖ Id. In dicta, we said that the U.S. Supreme Court‘s Crawford opinion had ―triggered some debate as to whether confrontation rights apply to sentencing.‖ Id. ¶ 108 n.4. But because the issue wasn‘t determinative in that case, we didn‘t address it. Id. ¶96 Next, in State v. Timmerman, while analyzing whether one has a constitutional right to confrontation at preliminary hearings, unavailable witness‘s hearsay statement can be admitted at trial only if it was previously ―test[ed] in the crucible of crossexamination.‖ 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004). 26 Cite as: 2020 UT 50 Opinion of the Court we held that three U.S. Supreme Court cases ―establish Supreme Court precedent confining the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause to trial.‖ 2009 UT 58, ¶ 11, 218 P.3d 590. (emphases added) (citing Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 52 (1987) (plurality opinion); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157 (1970); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968)); see also State v. Rhinehart, 2006 UT App 517, ¶ 14, 153 P.3d 830 (―The Confrontation Clause pertains to a criminal defendant‘s right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against the defendant at trial . . . .‖ (emphasis added)). And, we held, because the federal Confrontation Clause applies only at trial, it ―does not apply to preliminary hearings.‖ Timmerman, 2009 UT 58, ¶ 13. So if, as Timmerman held, the Confrontation Clause is confined to trial, then it wouldn‘t provide a right to confrontation at sentencing (assuming sentencing is not part of trial). See United States v. Ray, 578 F.3d 184, 196 (2d Cir. 2009) (―[W]e conclude that the word ‗trial,‘ as understood at the time of the Founding, would not have encompassed sentencing proceedings.‖). But see John G. Douglass, Confronting Death: Sixth Amendment Rights at Capital Sentencing, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1967, 1973 (2005) (concluding that, in 1791, ―[t]here was no distinction between trial rights and sentencing rights because, in both purpose and effect, the trial was the sentencing‖). ¶97 And, most recently, we said in State v. Maestas, that ―we have never analyzed whether a defendant in a penalty phase should be afforded the right to confront witnesses.‖ 2012 UT 46, ¶ 297, 299 P.3d 892. We said so without citing Sanwick, Carter, Kell, Taylor, or Timmerman. Id. And we didn‘t decide whether the right applied at sentencing in Maestas because we held that any alleged error in that case was harmless. Id. ¶ 298. ¶98 Taken together, our case law is somewhat contradictory as to whether the constitutional right to confrontation applies at sentencing, and, if so, how that right is satisfied. All in all, the arc of both our case law and federal case law seems to bend away from applying the right to confrontation at sentencing. But this is not the case for us to decide this issue because, even assuming the right to confrontation does apply at sentencing (or at the very least, at capital sentencing), any error in Drommond‘s case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Kell, 2002 UT 106, ¶ 54 (declining to reach constitutional questions when any potential error wasn‘t prejudicial). We look forward, however, to resolving this issue in a future case in which it is necessary to do so. See, e.g., State v. Argueta, 2020 UT 41, ¶ 55, --- P.3d ---. 27 STATE v. DROMMOND Opinion of the Court B. Any Error Was Harmless Beyond a Reasonable Doubt ¶99 The hearsay statements that Drommond complains of all came from Detective Kilpack‘s testimony: the Kilpack–Hansen Hearsay Testimony, the Kilpack–Buchanan Hearsay Testimony, and the Kilpack–Shakespeare Hearsay Testimony. See supra ¶¶ 24, 31–32. Neither Hansen, Buchanan, nor Shakespeare testified at the penalty-phase trial. The State contends that any error in allowing Detective Kilpack to testify about these witnesses‘ statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We first determine that Drommond did not preserve his objection to the Kilpack– Shakespeare Hearsay Testimony. We then hold that any constitutional error in admitting the Kilpack–Hansen Hearsay Testimony and the Kilpack–Buchanan Hearsay Testimony was indeed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶100 Drommond did not preserve his assertion that the Kilpack–Shakespeare Hearsay Testimony was improperly admitted into evidence. To preserve an issue for appeal, a party must raise a ―timely and specific objection.‖ State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, ¶ 17, 192 P.3d 867 (citation omitted). Only then will the alleged errors come ―to the trial court‘s attention to give the court an opportunity to correct the errors if appropriate.‖ Id. (citation omitted). And if ―there is no clear or specific objection and the specific ground for objection is not clear from the context[,] the theory cannot be raised on appeal.‖ Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted). ¶101 Because Drommond didn‘t raise a timely and specific objection to the Kilpack–Shakespeare Hearsay Testimony, Drommond failed to preserve his argument that it was improperly admitted into evidence. In his argument before the penalty-phase trial for the right to confront witnesses, Drommond‘s counsel excluded Shakespeare: ―There‘s one witness that‘s a cousin and her name is . . . Shakespeare. . . . She‘s clearly unavailable, so she‘s not going to fall within the confines of the argument I‘m about to present to you.‖ The trial court rejected counsel‘s request for the right to confrontation. ¶102 Then, just before Detective Kilpack testified, Drommond‘s counsel renewed his argument for the right to confront witnesses: ―Just for the record, next witness you‘re going to have is a variety of statements, not all of them are going to be hearsay. But you‘ll know it when you [h]ear it. So, I would like to renew my objection with respect to confrontation.‖ Drommond 28 Cite as: 2020 UT 50 Opinion of the Court now urges us that this statement was somehow an objection to the Kilpack–Shakespeare Hearsay Testimony. He says that this renewal ―rectified‖ the earlier ―waiver.‖ ¶103 We disagree. Drommond didn‘t raise a timely and specific objection to the Kilpack–Shakespeare Hearsay Testimony. And the trial court never had the chance to rule on the admissibility of the testimony because counsel excluded testimony about Shakespeare‘s statements from the original objection. By simply renewing that original objection before Detective Kilpack testified, Drommond didn‘t object to the Kilpack–Shakespeare Hearsay Testimony. Because Drommond failed to object to the Kilpack–Shakespeare Hearsay Testimony, his challenge to that testimony on appeal is unpreserved.12 The Kilpack–Shakespeare Hearsay Testimony was, on that basis, properly before the jury. 2. Any Error Was Harmless Beyond a Reasonable Doubt ¶104 We are left only with deciding whether the admission of the Kilpack–Hansen Hearsay Testimony and the Kilpack– Buchanan Hearsay Testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ¶105 When an error amounts to a violation of a defendant‘s constitutional right to confrontation, ―reversal is required unless the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.‖ State v. Villarreal, 889 P.2d 419, 425 (Utah 1995) (citation omitted). This harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt analysis requires us to determine ―the probable impact of the [testimony] on the minds of the average juror.‖ Id. (citation omitted). We can evaluate several factors in deciding whether an error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, such as ―the importance of the witness‘[s] testimony in the prosecution‘s case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence collaborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution‘s case.‖ Id. at 425–26 (citation omitted). ¶106 Two main pieces of evidence emerged from the Kilpack– Hansen Hearsay Testimony and the Kilpack–Buchanan Hearsay __________________________________________________________ 12 Drommond has not argued for an exception to our preservation rule. 29 STATE v. DROMMOND Opinion of the Court Testimony. The first was that Drommond had asked Hansen to break into Reed‘s house and scare her out of getting married and to drive by the houses of Reed and her fiancé to record license plate numbers. The second was that Drommond had expressed his desire to kill other members of Reed‘s family and that he had no remorse about killing Reed. ¶107 Applying the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard to each piece of evidence, we find that it wouldn‘t likely impact the mind of the average juror because (1) the prosecution‘s case was strong and (2) other testimony corroborated this evidence. ¶108 First, ―the overall strength of the prosecution‘s case,‖ id. at 426 (citation omitted), supports our holding that Kilpack‘s testimony about the Hansen and Buchanan interviews was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The State presented potent evidence upon which the jury could have relied to sentence Drommond to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Specifically, the jury heard evidence that Drommond tucked a gun in his waistband before meeting his ex-wife, who was dropping their children off for visitation. It heard that—while his children were nearby—he shot her in the body from close range. Jurors also heard that he then walked closer to Reed and shot her in the head. It heard evidence that he then shot his former fatherin-law and that he continued to fight those at the murder scene for possession of the gun. The jury also heard testimony that Drommond sent Reed threatening emails shortly before the murder. ¶109 Second, the Kilpack–Hansen Hearsay Testimony and the Kilpack–Buchanan Hearsay Testimony were corroborated by other evidence properly before the jury. ¶110 The Kilpack–Hansen Hearsay Testimony was corroborated by Carlson‘s testimony and by Kilpack‘s testimony about text messages he saw. For starters, Carlson testified that Drommond wanted to scare Reed out of dating or marrying other men. Carlson also testified that Drommond, two or three weeks before the murder, talked with him and Hansen about ―breaking into [Reed‘s] house,‖ and ―like cutting the phone line kind of thing, and like scaring her, you know with fear, if you date him then bad things will happen to you.‖ Carlson further explained that Drommond had Hansen drive by Reed‘s house ―and kind of check it out‖ and said that he and Drommond had even gone to Reed‘s house to do so. On top of hearing Carlson‘s testimony, the 30 Cite as: 2020 UT 50 Opinion of the Court jury heard Kilpack testify that he saw text messages from Drommond that corroborated the Kilpack–Hansen Hearsay Testimony. One of the texts reminded Hansen that he had been ―given $400 by Mr. Drommond for this particular situation and driving by the house.‖ And so the Kilpack–Hansen Hearsay Testimony was corroborated by other evidence. ¶111 The Kilpack–Buchanan Hearsay Testimony—which went toward Drommond‘s lack of remorse and his desire to kill members of Reed‘s family—was likewise corroborated by other evidence. First, Kilpack testified that Shakespeare told him that Drommond told her after the murder that ―he felt great because [Reed] was gone‖ and that ―if he had the power to do so, he would kill the entire Bradley family.‖ We held above that this testimony was properly before the jury because Drommond didn‘t object to it. Supra ¶ 103. It is thus proper for us to consider it in the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt analysis. Second, Carlson also testified that Drommond expressed no remorse for the murder and that it ―almost kind of seemed like a joke that he was [in jail].‖ Thus the jury heard other evidence that Drommond wanted to have members of Reed‘s family killed and that he didn‘t regret murdering Reed. ¶112 Overall, the Kilpack–Hansen Hearsay Testimony and the Kilpack–Buchanan Hearsay Testimony were just two small pieces of the State‘s case. The substance of the interviews was corroborated by other evidence before the jury and the overall strength of the prosecution‘s case was strong. Any constitutional error in admitting the evidence would not affect the mind of the average juror and was therefore harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.