Opinion ID: 1848277
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Even considering this evidence obtained during the several questioned seizures which we have concluded were legal, the appellant strenuously contends that there is insufficient evidence to sustain the conviction. It is conceded that the state's entire case is circumstantial. Even so, we conclude that the circumstantial evidence is most convincing. In State v. Johnson , [16] we said: . . . A notion exists that all circumstantial evidence should be viewed with distrust because it can establish, at most, only a possibility of guilt. Such an opinion, based on the theory that circumstantial evidence can only be the basis for conjecture and is impotent to correctly indicate or to satisfactorily establish the facts upon which guilt must rest to the required degree of certainty, is unwarranted. It is true that circumstantial evidence in many cases may be so weak as not to meet the standard of proof. But circumstantial evidence may be and often is stronger and more satisfactory than direct evidence; Schwantes v. State (1906), 127 Wis. 160, 106 N. W. 237, and Spick v. State (1909), 140 Wis. 104, 121 N. W. 664, . . . . [17] In Johnson we also said, citing Kollock v. State, [18] that the principles applicable to circumstantial evidence are: . . . 1. That each of the several circumstances upon which the conclusion of guilt necessarily depends must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt; and 2. they must not only point with moral certainty to the guilt of the defendant, but must exclude to a moral certainty every other reasonable hypothesis. The rule does not require the exclusion of all other possible hypothesis or even probabilities, but only reasonable hypotheses of innocence. (Emphasis added.) [19] On this issue in this appeal it is this court's duty to determine whether the circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain the finding of guilt. [20] This court as an appellate court does not and cannot retry the case on the facts in the record to determine if it is convinced of defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The question before this court is `whether the evidence adduced, believed and rationally considered by the jury, was sufficient to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.' [21] In other words, as we have often stated, before this court will reverse a conviction because of insufficiency of the evidence, . . . the evidence when considered most favorably to the state and the conviction must be so insufficient in probative value and force that it can be said as a matter of law that no trier of the facts acting reasonably could be convinced to that degree of certitude which the law defines as `beyond a reasonable doubt.' [22] This was a ten-day trial. We have examined the record in detail, have considered the arguments of both counsel and their exhaustive analysis of the maze of details in this circumstantial case. We are satisfied that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the conviction. There are only two phases of the proof which we choose to comment on further. They are the questions of venue and the relationship of the victim and appellant.
Appellant contends that there was insufficient evidence to prove that the venue of the trial was properly in Fond du Lac county. Venue is not an element of the crime of murder but merely refers to the place of trial. It is a matter of procedure and designates the geographic division of the state in which the action is to be tried. [23] Nevertheless, venue, in Wisconsin, must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. [24] By sec. 956.01 (1), Stats., criminal actions are to be tried in the county where the crime was committed except as otherwise provided in that section. Sub. (3) of sec. 956.01, Stats., provides: . . . If a wound or other violence is inflicted . . . in one county and causes death which ensues in another county, the crime may be prosecuted in either county. Sub. (4) of sec. 956.01, Stats., provides: . . . If such wound or other violence is inflicted . . . without this state and death ensues therefrom in this state, the crime may be prosecuted and sentence be imposed in the county where the death occurs. Thus in order to establish venue in Fond du Lac county, it must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt that either (a) McKinney was shot in Fond due Lac county, or (b) McKinney died in Fond du Lac county. Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to prove either. It is undisputed that McKinney's body was found on the Dombrowski farm located in Fond du Lac county. It was also established that the cause of death was a bullet wound to the head with secondary brain damage and hemorrhage. In addition, the pathologist who performed the autopsy on the body testified that the victim probably died about an hour after being shot, that the body would stop bleeding at death, and that although the human body normally contains approximately 7,000 cc's of blood, the victim's body contained only 70 cc's. Also, it was established that there was no blood in the area where the victim's body was found and that the victim had type O blood. Furthermore, it was established that the time of death was sometime between the hours of 1 a. m. and 1 p. m. on September 11, 1967. From 4 a. m. until after 6 a. m., a red car was parked next to the disabled Dodge on the Dombrowski farm. The Dodge had been continuously parked on the farm from September 10, 1967, until after the body was found. The backseat of the Dodge was saturated with a massive quantity of type O human blood. In fact there was so much blood that it had seeped down onto the lower frame of the car. From this evidence the jury was eminently justified in concluding: that the victim was shot in the back seat of the disabled Dodge in Fond du Lac county sometime between the hours of 1 a. m. and 1 p. m. on September 11, 1967; that the victim thereafter hemorrhaged profusely until he died about an hour after being shot; and that the body, which after death stopped bleeding, was then removed to the dump area on the farm. The white sock which was found in the back seat of the Dodge and its mate which was found in the area where the body was found, although it was not established that these belonged to neither the appellant or the victim, are probative to connect the back seat of the Dodge and the dump. The portions of the rear floor mat, Exhibits Nos. 13 and 32, that matched and fit together are probative of the fact that the part of the floor mat was moved from the 1960 Dodge to the trunk of the Thunderbird. The defense attempted to explain the huge quantity of type O blood found in the Dodge by having appellant's wife testify that her daughter had suffered nosebleeds in the Dodge. This explanation would seem to be patently incredible when it is recognized that the daughter's blood type was never established, that the Dodge had been disabled and parked on the farm in Fond du Lac since September 10th, and that the blood on some of the items was not yet dry when the body was found. These above factors inexorably lead to the conclusion that the victim was murdered in Fond du Lac county beyond any reasonable doubt.
The closest the state came to directly showing that the appellant and the victim were ever together or even knew each other was through the testimony of McKinney's sister and girl friend. Both testified that they dropped McKinney off at a tavern in Chicago during the morning of September 9, 1967. It was established that the appellant was in the tavern at this time. Although no witness was produced who testified as to seeing the victim and appellant together, it could be inferred from the other testimony that they were together at the tavern. However, despite the thinness of the state's evidence of prior relationship of McKinney and the appellant, the circumstances surrounding the finding of McKinney's body on the Dombrowski farm and the many items of physical evidence tying in the 1960 Dodge and Thunderbird with the homicide, all point to the inevitable conclusion that Dombrowski murdered McKinney and left his body at the Dombrowski farm. Appellant raises two other legal issues concerning the conduct of his trial, each of which deserves comment here and neither of which presents error that would compel us to order a new trial. These issues are: Was the testimony of Attorney Schloemer violative of appellant's statutory right to have communications between attorney and client privileged from disclosure unless waived by the client? (III, infra ) Were the remarks made by the prosecuting attorney during closing argument so prejudicial as to require a mistrial? (IV, infra )