Opinion ID: 894693
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Wrong Standard: Everybody Else Does It

Text: The Court points to several statewide trends as evidence of an Article VIII violation. But in our previous cases, we held that evidence just like this could not show an Article VIII violation. First, my colleagues suggest that school districts are forced to tax at maximum rates because about half of them do. While we have never stated in detail what the Article VIII standard means, we have stated one thing it does not meanthe number of districts taxing at maximum rates is not determinative. [62] In West Orange-Cove I, we expressly rejected arguments that an unconstitutional state property tax must control the rates in every district (the State's position) or most districts (the trial court's conclusion); instead, we held that an ad valorem tax is unconstitutional if it is imposed by the State, no matter how many districts it covers. [63] If the State could not use prevailing tax rates to prove the school districts should lose, why can the school districts now use them to prove they should win? Second, the Court reverses field by concluding that close-to-maximum rates show that many districts lack meaningful discretion. Only two years ago, we said close counts neither way: It may be that a school district taxing at $1.47 instead of $1.50 has exercised meaningful discretion, but that is not necessarily the case. [64] The number of districts taxing in this range simply cannot tell us whether a single district ... is constrained by the State to tax at [this] particular rate. [65] Third, the Court finds it important that districts are taxing and spending 97 percent of the revenue that would be available if every district taxed at maximum rates. [66] But in Edgewood IV we noted, and school district witnesses conceded at trial, that financial incentives in the current school-finance system encourage school districts to tax at maximum rates even if they don't have to. [67] The current system does not force districts to tax at maximum rates merely by providing incentives for them to do so. Fourth, the Court announces today that substantial transfers of tax revenues from rich districts to poor districts are a significant factor in rendering the current system unconstitutional. [68] Of course, we demanded something along these very lines when we required equalized funding in Edgewood I. Further, we held such transfers constitutional in Edgewood IV ; [69] today's opinion appears to adopt the dissent in the latter case. [70] Finally, the Court supports its constitutional conclusion by noting a marked decline since 2001 in the number of districts that exceed minimum accreditation standards. [71] We have never before tied constitutional analysis to testing or accreditation scores, and today's reference shows why we should be reluctant to enter that hotly debated area. For example, if the base year in this trend were 1994 rather than 2001, then there has been a marked increase in the number of districts exceeding minimum standards. Further, as the standards themselves are rising, declining scores may or may not reflect actual declines. And the minimum standard referenced here is academically acceptable; nothing in this rating system proves the State is forcing every school district to rate above average. Surely we were not mistaken in all our previous cases. If revenue transfers and accreditation scores were relevant to Article VIII's standard, it is curious that we have never mentioned them before. And merely looking at average tax rates cannot tell us whether any district was forced to that level or arrived there via meaningful discretion. Whether any school district in Texas has lost meaningful discretion is not a standard that can be proved by statewide trends. School districts are not forced to tax or spend money just because everyone else does it. [72] The standards this Court has established require more specific evidence of a violation of Article VIII.