Opinion ID: 1418861
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: appellant wakinekona

Text: Appellant Wakinekona was the first to be tried. On November 10, 1970 he was found guilty on all counts. On appeal he raises several issues concerning the use of testimony of co-defendant Kalani who later pleaded guilty to second degree robbery and the question of the applicability of our recent ruling in State v. Santiago, 53 Haw. 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971) to his decision to decline to take the witness stand. Appellant Wakinekona asserts that he was entitled to an in camera hearing as to the voluntariness of Kalani's testimony to be adduced. Appellant's theory is that Kalani's oral testimony would amount to a confession to all crimes charged in the indictment and could not be admitted against appellant without an in camera showing of voluntariness. The argument that HRS § 621-26 requires such a hearing is without merit. HRS § 621-26 provides that No confession shall be received in evidence unless it is first made to appear to the judge before whom the case is being tried that the confession was in fact voluntarily made... . The above language applies only to the extra-judicial statements of the defendant who is on trial. The argument that the rudimentary requirements of due process of law dictate that an in camera hearing be held requires some discussion. The requirements of due process prevent the state's use of an accused's extra-judicial admissions of guilt where such admissions are the product of coercion. [1] Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 80 S.Ct. 274, 4 L.Ed.2d 242 (1960); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 79 S.Ct. 1202, 3 L.Ed.2d 1265 (1959); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 60 S.Ct. 472, 84 L.Ed. 716 (1940). The basic considerations which require the exclusion of confessions obtained through force or coercion are the inherent untrustworthiness of involuntary confessions, a desire that criminal proceedings be accusatorial rather than inquisitorial and a desire that the police not become law breakers in the process of achieving society's valid law enforcement objectives. While there is dicta to the contrary, [2] the standard of due process of law does not require that pleas of guilty be free of inducements resulting from negotiation with the state. Lupo v. United States, 435 F.2d 519 (8th Cir.1970); Ford v. United States, 418 F.2d 855 (8th Cir.1969); Brown v. Beto, 377 F.2d 950 (5th Cir.1967); Shelton v. United States, 242 F.2d 101, rev'd on rehearing en banc, 246 F.2d 571 (5th Cir.1957), rev'd on confession of error, 356 U.S. 26, 78 S.Ct. 563, 2 L.Ed.2d 579 (1958). The facts of the instant case do not support appellant's theory that Kalani's testimony was involuntary. There was no showing that the state had wrung the testimony from Kalani's lips by means of unduly harsh physical or psychological methods. The theory advanced is that Kalani's testimony must be considered involuntary as a matter of law because his testimony on cross-examination was that one of the inducements to testify was that the prosecutor might try to help him out. We do not think that such an inducement rendered Kalani's testimony inadmissible. People v. Mullins, 28 Ill.2d 412, 192 N.E.2d 840, cert. denied, 376 U.S. 924, 84 S.Ct. 685, 11 L.Ed.2d 619 (1964). The fact that there had been a negotiation with the state which resulted in some inducement to testify went to the weight, rather than to the admissibility of the testimony. Caton v. United States, 407 F.2d 367 (8th Cir.1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 984, 89 S.Ct. 2149, 23 L.Ed.2d 773 (1969); Peel v. United States, 316 F.2d 907 (5th Cir.1963), cert. denied, Crane v. United States, 375 U.S. 896, 84 S.Ct. 174, 11 L.Ed.2d 125 (1963); United States v. Agueci, 310 F.2d 817 (2d Cir.1962), cert. denied, Guippone v. United States, 372 U.S. 959, 83 S.Ct. 1013, 10 L.Ed.2d 11 (1963). Positive inducement running from prosecutor to defendant does not render a guilty plea unacceptable, nor should it render a co-defendant's confession unacceptable. As to appellant's claim that there should have been an in camera hearing on the voluntariness of Kalani's confession, examination of the record reveals there was in fact such a hearing. Appellant Wakinekona asserts that the state's use of the testimony of Kalani amounted to a knowing use of perjured testimony in violation of Wakinekona's basic right to a fair trial. In Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959), cited by appellants, the evidence of perjury by the state's witness came directly from one Webb, who, as an assistant state's attorney, had prosecuted Napue's case. Here, on direct examination Kalani testified that he had been promised nothing in return for his testimony; later, on cross-examination, Kalani stated that while nothing had been promised, the prosecution had indicated that he might get a lesser charge. It further appears that Kalani subsequently pleaded and was found in accordance with his plea, guilty of second degree robbery. We are not drawn to the conclusion that the use of the testimony of Kalani amounted to the knowing use of perjured testimony by the state. Appellant Wakinekona contends that he has been denied the equal protection of the laws because a suggestion of prosecutorial leniency in return for testimony was made to Kalani but not to him. This argument must fall inasmuch as the prosecutor is entitled to exercise such discretion in the interests of justice. Asserting that his decision not to take the witness stand was based upon fear that the prosecution would introduce evidence of prior convictions, appellant Wakinekona argues, on the authority of State v. Santiago, supra, 53 Haw. 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971), that he was denied due process of law. We do not agree. Our decision in Santiago, supra, does not constitute authority for a direct appeal on that point, since appellant did nothing to call the point to the attention of the trial court, thereby advising the court of the question presented and affording the court an opportunity to consider the matter and make a correction if necessary. See S & W Crane Serv. Inc. v. Dependents of Berard, 53 Haw. 161, 489 P.2d 419 (1971).