Opinion ID: 1352735
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Court of Appeal molestation decisions

Text: The issue was first presented in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kim W., supra, 160 Cal. App.3d 326 ( Kim W. ), where, as in this case, an insured admitted child molestation in violation of Penal Code section 288. The court concluded that as a matter of law a violation of Penal Code section 288 is a wilful act within the meaning of Insurance Code section 533. (160 Cal. App.3d at p. 333.) The court reasoned: One who admits that his conduct violated [Penal Code] section 288 has admitted (1) a lewd or lascivious act upon a part of the body (2) of a child under the age of 14 (3) with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust or passions or sexual desires of either the perpetrator or the child. ( Id., at p. 332, italics added.) We agree. By admitting that he intended to arouse, appeal to, or gratify sexual desire with a child, a molester necessarily admits that he intended to harm the child. Implicit in the [Legislature's] determination that children must be protected from such acts is a determination that at least some harm is inherent in and inevitably results from those acts. ( Id., at pp. 332-333.) [13] The reference in Kim W., supra, 160 Cal. App.3d 326, to inevitable harm gets to the heart of the matter before us. Some acts are so inherently harmful that the intent to commit the act and the intent to harm are one and the same. The act is the harm. Child molestation is not the kind of act that results in emotional and psychological harm only occasionally. The contrary view would be absurd. Indeed, a recent federal decision well demonstrates the point. ( State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Smith (9th Cir.1990) 907 F.2d 900 [construing Nev. law].) A father had repeatedly molested his 11-year-old daughter. As in the present case, he admitted that his acts were illegal and morally wrong, but he insisted he had meant no harm to the girl. He explained that she had expressed a growing interest in boys, [and] he was concerned that she was not ready and [he] wanted to teach her what she needed to know as she matured sexually and began dating. ( Id., at p. 901.) The court rejected this distorted view of parental education. The only difference between Smith and this case is that here the molester attempts to support his argument with psychiatric testimony that molesters do not intend to harm their victims. Except in the present case, every court since Kim W., supra, 160 Cal. App.3d 326, 332-333, has agreed that under California law child sexual molestation is not covered by a homeowner's liability policy. ( Fire Ins. Exchange v. Abbott, supra, 204 Cal. App.3d 1012, 1022-1025; Allstate Ins. Co. v. Gilbert (9th Cir.1988) 852 F.2d 449, 453; State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Estate of Jenner (9th Cir.1989) 874 F.2d 604, 607; State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. Abraio (9th Cir.1989) 874 F.2d 619, 623; see generally Cal. Judges Association, Insurance Litigation (Rutter Dec. 1-3, 1989, San Diego) p. 13 [noting consistent denials of coverage for molestation].) [14] Properly understood, defendants' argument is based not on the insured's intent, but on his motive. The gist of the argument is that his molestations were something akin to a misguided show of affection. In other words, his intent was to have sex with a child, but his motive was wholesome. (11) Motive is irrelevant for purposes of section 533. Motive is relevant only to the different question of whether the conduct was wrongful, thereby giving rise to liability. For example, an insured may intentionally shoot another person in the head at point-blank range. Obviously, the insured (if sane) intends to injure. Whether the conduct is wrongful, however, will depend on the insured's motive. For example, the motive may be self-defense. If a court finds that the insured acted justifiably, it necessarily follows that the insured did not act wrongfully. In that case, there is no liability, and the application of section 533 is not at issue. If, however, the motive for the shooting is determined to be robbery, the shooting would be wrongful and excluded from coverage by section 533. (5e) There is no motive that can justify child sexual molestation. The insured's professed motive is therefore entirely beside the point for purposes of section 533.