Opinion ID: 2135358
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Allegations of Ineffective Assistance of Postconviction Counsel.

Text: To prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Dunbar must ultimately show that his attorney's performance fell outside a normal range of competency and that the deficient performance so prejudiced him as to give rise to the reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. State v. McKettrick, 480 N.W.2d 52, 55 (Iowa 1992); see Schertz v. State, 380 N.W.2d 404, 412 (Iowa 1985) (same standards for competency apply to trial counsel and any subsequent counsel). Representation is presumed competent and a defendant has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel was ineffective. McKettrick, 480 N.W.2d at 55. Dunbar claims that postconviction counsel was ineffective in the following respects: (1) failing to amend his pro se postconviction application to expand upon the claims made by Dunbar and explain why those claims had not been previously raised; (2) failing to order transcripts of the guilty plea and sentencing proceedings; (3) failing to investigate Dunbar's claims; (4) failing to obtain Dunbar's attendance at the hearing on the application for postconviction relief so that Dunbar could testify; and (5) failing to file affidavits to support the application. We must now decide whether these claims present grounds which may be addressed in this appeal or preserved for further postconviction proceedings. State v. White, 337 N.W.2d 517, 519 (Iowa 1983); see Schertz, 380 N.W.2d at 412. When complaining about the adequacy of an attorney's representation, it is not enough to simply claim that counsel should have done a better job. White, 337 N.W.2d at 519. The applicant must state the specific ways in which counsel's performance was inadequate and identify how competent representation probably would have changed the outcome. See Schertz, 380 N.W.2d at 412; State v. Kendall, 167 N.W.2d 909, 911 (Iowa 1969). Here, Dunbar's allegations that postconviction counsel failed to expand on Dunbar's application and explain why his claims had not been raised earlier, that counsel failed to investigate Dunbar's claims, and that counsel failed to file affidavits are too general in nature to allow us to address these allegations or preserve them for a second postconviction proceeding. See Schertz, 380 N.W.2d at 412. For example, Dunbar does not propose what an investigation would have revealed or how anything discovered would have affected the result obtained below. Nor can we address or preserve the claim that counsel failed to have Dunbar testify at the postconviction hearing. Although this ground is specific, Dunbar does not suggest what such testimony would have been or how it would have supported his application. See id. Dunbar's last complaint concerning postconviction counsel, that he failed to order transcripts of the trial court proceedings, can be addressed in this appeal. Appellate counsel obtained copies of the transcripts of the guilty plea and sentencing proceedings and they are part of the record before us. We have reviewed these transcripts and find nothing in them to support the claims made in Dunbar's application for postconviction relief. Moreover, present counsel for Dunbar has not brought to our attention any defect in the proceedings shown by these transcripts. Because Dunbar cannot show prejudice, this alleged error by postconviction counsel affords no basis for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. State v. Bumpus, 459 N.W.2d 619, 627 (Iowa), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1001, 111 S.Ct. 563, 112 L.Ed.2d 570 (1990).