Opinion ID: 200209
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Audio Recording of Psychiatric Examination

Text: 6 Prior to trial, Gruning's counsel suggested that there might be an insanity defense. Accordingly, the court allowed the Commonwealth's motion for a psychiatric examination pursuant to Mass. R.Crim. P. 14(b)(2)(B) (2002). At Gruning's request, the examination was audio-recorded. The examining psychiatrist subsequently issued a report to the trial court as required by Mass. R.Crim. P. 14(b)(2)(B)(iii). The trial judge then ordered that the report be redacted to prevent disclosure of petitioner's privileged statements. Gruning requested that the judge release a copy of the audiotape only to the defense. Analogizing the recording to a psychiatric report, which Massachusetts law permits a judge to release to both parties, 6 the trial judge denied Gruning's request for exclusive access to the tape. 7 Gruning argues that he and his attorney needed exclusive access to the audiotape to assist them in making the decision of whether Gruning should waive his privilege of silence. They claim that denying them sole access to the tape violated both petitioner's right against self-incrimination and his due process right to the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932). Gruning's arguments rely upon an expansive reading of Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 92 S.Ct. 1891, 32 L.Ed.2d 358 (1972). In Brooks, petitioner successfully argued that a Tennessee statute requiring that a criminal defendant who wished to testify do so before any other witnesses for the defense testify violated the constitutional rights of criminal defendants. Id. at 612, 92 S.Ct. 1891 (quoting Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-2403 (1955)). 8 The Brooks Court held that forcing the defendant to testify first, if at all, violated his privilege against self-incrimination because the rule penalized him for remaining silent at the close of the state's case by excluding him from the stand later in the trial. Pressuring the defendant to take the stand, by foreclosing later testimony if he refuses, is not a constitutionally permissible means of ensuring his honesty.... It fails to take into account the very real and legitimate concerns that might motivate a defendant to exercise his right of silence. Brooks, 406 U.S. at 611-12, 92 S.Ct. 1891. In addition, the Court held that the statute denied the defendant the `guiding hand of counsel' in the timing of [a] critical element of his defense because the statute forced the defendant and lawyer to decide whether the defendant should testify without an opportunity to evaluate the actual worth of their evidence. Id. at 612-13, 92 S.Ct. 1891. Crucial to the Court's decision was the harshness of the penalty; if the defendant did not testify first, he could not testify at all. Id. at 612, 92 S.Ct. 1891. 9 We can discern two arguments from petitioner's citation to Brooks. First, petitioner has a right to evaluate the evidence against him before deciding whether to waive his privilege against self-incrimination. Second, petitioner has a right to have his attorney evaluate the evidence and assist petitioner in making this decision. However, these rights to examine the evidence before waiving privilege are not without bounds, and the law ordinarily considers a waiver knowing, intelligent, and sufficiently aware if the defendant fully understands the nature of the right and how it would likely apply in general in the circumstances — even though the defendant may not know the specific detailed consequences of invoking it. United States v. Ruiz, ___ U.S. ___, ___-___, 122 S.Ct. 2450, 2455-57, 153 L.Ed.2d 586 (2002) (holding that the Constitution does not require the Government to disclose material impeachment evidence prior to entering a plea agreement with a criminal defendant). 10 In the case before us, petitioner did not have a constitutional right to hear the audiotape before deciding if he wished to waive his privilege against self-incrimination. The Constitution does not `require that the police supply a suspect with a flow of information to help him calibrate his self-interest in deciding whether to speak or stand by his rights.' Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 576-77, 107 S.Ct. 851, 93 L.Ed.2d 954 (1987) (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 422, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986)). Of course, the more information the defendant has, the more aware he is of the likely consequences of a plea, waiver, or decision, and the wiser that decision likely will be. But the Constitution does not require the prosecutor to share all useful information with the defendant. Ruiz, ___ U.S. at ___, 122 S.Ct. at 2455. [A] suspect's awareness of all the possible subjects of questioning in advance of interrogation is not relevant to determining whether the suspect voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Fifth Amendment privilege. Spring, 479 U.S. at 577, 107 S.Ct. 851. Without hearing the audiotape, both Gruning and his attorney understood the nature of petitioner's right against self-incrimination and how it would likely apply in general in the circumstances, thus satisfying constitutional requirements. See Ruiz, ___ U.S. at ___, 122 S.Ct. at 2455. 11 Massachusetts law did give petitioner the opportunity to hear the audiotape before deciding whether petitioner should waive his privilege, conditioned upon allowing the prosecution access to the recording. The defense made the tactical decision to choose witnesses without listening to the tape, rather than to allow the prosecution access. We realize that the defense would prefer exclusive access to the evidence and that, from the defense's point of view, the mere possession of incriminating evidence by the prosecution creates a disadvantage for the defense. But the question we are concerned with is whether this disadvantage rises to the level of a constitutional infirmity, and we believe that this type of condition is not the type of coercion or compulsion that the Fifth Amendment guards against. See Spring, 479 U.S. at 572-74, 107 S.Ct. 851 (finding that defendant's allegation that the police failed to supply him with certain information does not relate to any of the traditional indicia of coercion: `the duration and conditions of detention ..., the manifest attitude of the police toward him, his physical and mental state, the diverse pressures which sap or sustain his power of resistance and self-control' (quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602, 81 S.Ct. 1860, 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961))). Allowing the prosecution to hear the audiotape was a mild condition, far removed from Fifth Amendment compulsion. Gruning could have chosen both to listen to the audiotape and to invoke his privilege against self-incrimination. The prosecution would have had possession of incriminating statements, but could not have used the statements in court unless the defense put the psychiatric evaluation into issue by having petitioner or his psychiatric expert testify. Mass. R.Crim. P. 14(b)(2)(B)(iii). Gruning's decision of whether or not to waive his privilege against self-incrimination was knowing and intelligent, and did not require the court to provide him sole access to the audiotape of his psychiatric examination.