Opinion ID: 392693
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the interstate commerce question

Text: 31 In recent cases the Supreme Court has developed a test to determine the validity of government actions challenged under the interstate commerce clause. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 90 S.Ct. 844, 25 L.Ed.2d 174 (1970); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 101 S.Ct. 715 (1981). In Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1736, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979), the Court presented the test as follows: 32 (W)e must inquire (1) whether the challenged statute regulates evenhandedly with only incidental effects on interstate commerce, or discriminates against interstate commerce either on its face or in practical effect; (2) whether the statute serves a legitimate local purpose; and, if so, (3) whether alternative means could promote this local purpose as well without discriminating against interstate commerce. 33 In the present case, there is no indication that the City's actions are protective measures designed to discriminate against interstate commerce. The appropriation of value under the police power falls on local people who vote in Akron, not on people from out of town. The effect on commerce is minimal. The City continues to sell the recyclable metals in commerce just as did the private collectors. The fact that the city burns some paper and cardboard that would otherwise be sold in commerce by the private collectors does not discriminate against or substantially burden interstate commerce. The paper is converted to energy that is sold to Akron tire plants and other businesses. The record does not indicate that any national or regional market for paper is substantially affected by Akron's conduct or that supply would be restricted enough to affect prices. The only identifiable costs imposed are local. 34 Unlike the statutes in Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 71 S.Ct. 295, 95 L.Ed. 329 (1951) (municipal enactment requiring that milk be pasteurized within five mile radius of city violates commerce clause), City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 98 S.Ct. 2531, 57 L.Ed.2d 475 (1978) (state law prohibiting importation of garbage into state invalidated under commerce clause as an economic protectionist measure designed to impose burden on residents of other states), and other commerce clause cases relied on by plaintiffs, Akron's legislation does not have the effect of taxing or preventing competition by nonresidents. It is not special interest legislation that discriminates against out-of-town people who vote elsewhere in favor of local residents and local voters. The economic costs of the Akron measure fall hardest on people who generate and collect garbage in the City of Akron. Since the Akron ordinance does not discriminate against, or otherwise seriously burden, interstate commerce, the plaintiffs' arguments based on the commerce clause are unpersuasive. Defendants' regulations, therefore, do not violate any of the standards set forth by the Supreme Court in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. and Hughes v. Oklahoma, supra.