Opinion ID: 1785706
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Prejudice to Anderson

Text: In analyzing the fourth factor, we consider the interests of defendants which the speedy trial right was designed to protect. . . . :(i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. 2182. In the present case, Anderson alleges that he is currently suffering from extremely oppressive incarceration because he has been repeatedly denied work release, honor camps or lesser security level transfer, institutional jobs and educational programs that require custody. Anderson was already incarcerated when he was indicted on the current charges. Thus, Anderson has not suffered extremely oppressive incarceration apart from the obvious detriments suffered by any defendant incarcerated prior to trial. Beaver v. State, 455 So.2d 253, 255 (Ala.Crim.App.1984). See also Kimberly v. State, 501 So.2d 534, 537 (Ala. Crim.App.1986) ([V]ague allegations that the defendant had been deprived of `many Federal benefits' and programs and that the delay had affected his good time are too vague to substantiate any claim of prejudice.). Anderson also alleges that his defense has been impaired as a result of the delay. In his petition for the writ of mandamus, he states that he has lost potential witnesses to Death and Relocation, thereby rendering Anderson unable to present his alibi defense as planned. In his response brief, Anderson elaborates on the prejudice he has suffered from the delay, stating that he has lost one potential witness [Danial Pollard] to death whose testimony would have proved that [he] and Pollard [were] together all morning and all afternoon but departed in the early evening, not seeing each other for the remainder of the night, corroborating Anderson's statement given to the arresting Officer on the night he was arrested. This lost testimony would have been sufficient to refute the state witness that testified at Anderson's preliminary hearing on September 8, 2003 that Anderson and Pollard [were] together around 11 or 12:O'Clock on the night of the offense and to raise a reasonable doubt in the jurors' minds as to Anderson's innocence. Anderson further states that he has lost four potential witnesses to relocation. In the parts of the record submitted as exhibits to his petition, Anderson has made only bare allegations that his defense has been impaired because one potential witness is now deceased (Danial Pollard), and four (4) other potential witnesses have relocated and due to defendant's incarceration, the new locations are unknown. The materials contain no subpoenas for [these] witness[es] for the first trial date, nor any explanation as to what their testimony would have been. See Bishop v. State, 656 So.2d 398, 403 (Ala.Crim.App. 1994). Thus, in determining whether Anderson has been prejudiced by the alleged loss of witnesses caused by the delay, we have only Anderson's assertion in his response brief that the lost testimony would have been sufficient to refute the state witness that testified at Anderson's preliminary hearing on September 8, 2003 that Anderson and Pollard [were] together around 11 or 12:O'Clock on the night of the offense and to raise a reasonable doubt in the jurors' minds as to Anderson's innocence. However, we are unable to verify whether the lack of such testimony in fact prejudices Anderson based on the materials before us, and [t]his Court is bound by the record and cannot consider statements in brief not supported by the record. Mauldin v. Mount Hebron United Methodist Church, 289 Ala. 493, 495, 268 So.2d 770, 772 (1972). We are also unable to determine whether the testimony that could have been provided by Danial Pollard and the other missing witnesses was truly material or would have been merely cumulative. See Howard v. State, 678 So.2d 302, 304 (Ala. Crim.App.1996) (Because, however, the appellant presented other alibi witnesses at trial, the testimony of the deceased witness would have been cumulative. . . . [W]e conclude that the appellant's right to a speedy trial was not violated.). Thus, Anderson has not demonstrated that he has been prejudiced by the delay. The United States Supreme Court in Doggett [v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992),] used three hypothetical cases to demonstrate the accused's burden under the fourth Barker factor. The accused's burden `of proof in each situation varies inversely with the [State]'s degree of culpability for the delay.' In the first scenario, where the state pursues the accused `with reasonable diligence,' the delay  however long  generally is excused unless the accused demonstrates 'specific prejudice to his defense.' Thus, when the state acts with reasonable diligence in bringing the defendant to trial, the defendant has the burden of proving prejudice caused by the delay. The second situation recognized in Doggett involves bad-faith efforts by the state to delay the defendant's trial. For example, intentional delay by the state in order `to gain some impermissible advantage at trial' weighs heavily against the state, and a bad-faith delay the length of the delay in Doggett likely will `present an overwhelming case for dismissal.' Obviously, the burden on the accused to establish prejudice in this scenario would be minimal at most, and depending on how heavily the other Barker factors weigh against the state, the fourth factor's inquiry into prejudice could be rendered irrelevant. . . . The third scenario recognized in Doggett involves delay caused by the state's `official negligence.' Official negligence 'occupies the middle ground' between bad-faith delay and diligent prosecution. In evaluating and weighing negligent delay, the court must `determine what portion of the delay is attributable to the [state]'s negligence and whether this negligent delay is of such a duration that prejudice to the defendant should be presumed. The weight assigned to negligent delay `increases as the length of the delay increases.' Negligent delay may be so lengthy  or the first three Barker factors may weigh so heavily in the accused's favor  that the accused becomes entitled to a finding of presumed prejudice. When prejudice is presumed, the burden shifts to the state, which must then affirmatively show either that the delay is `extenuated, as by the defendant's acquiescence,' or `that the delay left [the defendant's] ability to defend himself unimpaired.' Walker, 928 So.2d at 267-68. Anderson's case falls within the third Doggett scenario. We do not find the State's negligent delay of approximately 25 months to be so severe as to relieve Anderson of any responsibility to demonstrate at least some actual, as opposed to conjectural, prejudice. Moreover, Anderson's own conduct in waiting 22 of those 25 months before first asserting his right to a speedy trial, and then seeking a continuance, suggests, absent some contrary explanation, that Anderson did not consider the delay to be prejudicial. In order for this Court to issue the writ of mandamus, Anderson must show that he has (1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the court. Ex parte Alfab, Inc., 586 So.2d 889, 891 (Ala.1991). Anderson has failed to do so. Moreover, we note that, although Anderson's trial has been further delayed by the filing of this petition, the trial court has specifically ordered that his case be placed on the docket for the next term of court and shall receive priority for disposition.