Opinion ID: 2643674
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Respondents’ cross-assignments of error

Text: Respondents assert four cross-assignments of error as part of their response to petitioner’s appeal; three of those assignments of error relate to the circuit court’s exclusion of three expert witnesses. Darrell Rolston, CCIM, SRPA, GAA, was substituted as respondents’ expert appraiser prior to trial. On August 27, 2012, petitioner filed a motion in limine concerning the examination of Mr. Rolston, requesting that the circuit court allow petitioner to impeach Mr. Rolston as to both his reliance on respondents’ former expert appraiser’s work and lack of credibility. Attached to that motion was an order from the West Virginia Real Estate Appraiser Licensing and Certification Board suspending the previous appraiser’s real estate appraiser license after he pled to a felony charge of submitting a false appraisal report to a federally insured lending institution. Respondents responded to that motion, and the circuit court found that Mr. Rolston could not be questioned about the criminal proceedings or disciplinary proceedings regarding the prior appraiser. However, Mr. Rolston could be examined regarding the prior appraiser’s work and Mr. Rolston’s use of or reliance upon that work. Out of the presence of the jury on the first day of the trial, counsel for respondents argued that Mr. Rolston should be permitted to testify as to the diminution in value of the horse barns on the property and the cost to cure the shocking issue related to the horses. The circuit court concluded that Mr. Rolston could not testify as to the value of the horse business because horses had been seen under the lines without any shock issues and because there is a second power line that did not interfere with the horse business. The next expert’s testimony at issue is that of Johnny B. Dagenhart. In respondents’ original witness disclosure, respondents stated simply that Mr. Dagenhart was an expert witness who would testify with respect to his report regarding respondents’ property. On September 6 and 7, 2012, the circuit court held a hearing that related largely to the admissibility of Mr. Dagenhart’s proposed testimony. Respondents stated that based on the circuit court’s prior ruling regarding the inadmissibility of the evidence on the electromagnetic field, they intended to offer Mr. Dagenhart’s testimony to confirm that there is a stray voltage issue in the area and his plan to cure. However, the circuit court did not rule as to Mr. Dagenhart’s testimony at that time. On the first day of the trial, October 1, 2012, counsel for respondents indicated that during a previous telephonic hearing the circuit court had ruled that Mr. Dagenhart would not be 5 permitted to testify. In response, the circuit court indicated that the main purpose that day was to make a record for respondents’ benefit, so the parties were permitted to present argument on that issue. The circuit court then granted petitioner’s motion to preclude the testimony of Mr. Dagenhart as to the consequences of the shocking. This holding was based, in part, on the circuit court’s belief that Mr. Dagenhart had not opined whether it was reasonable or necessary to have the proposed shield respondents contend is necessary to cure the shocking problem. “‘The admissibility of testimony by an expert witness is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the trial court’s decision will not be reversed unless it is clearly wrong.’ Syllabus Point 6, Helmick v. Potomac Edison Co., 185 W.Va. 269, 406 S.E.2d 700 (1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 908 (1991).” Syl. Pt. 1, W.Va. Div. of Highways v. Butler, 205 W.Va. 146, 516 S.E.2d 769 (1999). Rule 702 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence states that “[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.” That rule further requires that an expert’s opinion be based on scientifically or technically valid and properly applied methodology. Id. In analyzing the admissibility of expert testimony under Rule 702 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence, the trial court’s initial inquiry must consider whether the testimony is based on an assertion or inference derived from the scientific methodology. Moreover, the testimony must be relevant to a fact at issue. Further assessment should then be made in regard to the expert testimony’s reliability by considering its underlying scientific methodology and reasoning. This includes an assessment of (a) whether the scientific theory and its conclusion can be and have been tested; (b) whether the scientific theory has been subjected to peer review and publication; (c) whether the scientific theory’s actual or potential rate of error is known; and (d) whether the scientific theory is generally accepted within the scientific community. Syl. Pt. 2, Wilt v. Buracker, 191 W.Va. 39, 443 S.E.2d 196 (1993). Based upon our review of the record and the reasoning set forth by the circuit court, we find that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in excluding or limiting the areas of testimony of Mr. Rolston and Mr. Dagenhart. Respondents’ final expert issue is their contention that the circuit court erred in precluding the testimony of Gerald Smith, a licensed electrical contractor. According to respondents, Mr. Smith is the owner of Broadway Electric, and his company has worked in the electrical business for over thirty years. If he had been permitted to testify, he would have testified about the cost to cure the shocking problem using the design criteria for the shield developed by Mr. Dagenhart. However, respondents fail to cite the portion of the record evidencing the circuit court’s exclusion of Mr. Smith or respondents’ objection to such ruling. Rule 10(c)(7) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that the argument section of the briefs contain appropriate and specific citations to the record on appeal, including citations that pinpoint when and how the issues in the assignments of error were presented to the lower tribunal. The portion of respondent’s argument related to the exclusion of Mr. Smith is devoid of references to the record, and the appendix record is 1,762 pages. Due to respondent’s 6 failure to point out to this Court, with the required specificity, the circuit court’s decision to exclude Mr. Smith and respondents’ objection to that decision, we decline to address this crossassignment of error. Respondents’ final assignment of error is that the circuit court erred in limiting the testimony of respondents. In the “Proffer of Defendants, Lyle W. Daugherty and Brenda P. Daugherty,” respondents stated that Mr. Daugherty would testify that the Daugherty family had been on the subject property for six generations, as that information would be considered pertinent as to the use of the property over a period of time and would be the type of information that a prospective purchaser may wish to know with respect to any type of proposed real estate transaction. Mr. Daugherty also intended to testify about his intention to expand the use of his property by installing additional chicken barns. As set forth above, a circuit court’s ruling regarding the admissibility of evidence is subject to an abuse of discretion standard. Gentry v. Mangum, 195 W.Va. 512, 517, 466 S.E.2d 171, 176 (1995). Prior to trial, the circuit court found that no evidence or argument would be presented on behalf of respondents concerning their emotional attachment to or other particular, personal valuation of their property or their resentment about petitioner or the condemnation action. Based on the record before this Court and the facts of this case, we find that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in placing these reasonable limitations upon respondents’ testimony. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm. Affirmed. ISSUED: November 22, 2013