Opinion ID: 2209625
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Timeliness of the Claim

Text: With limited exceptions, defenses and objections based on defects in the indictment must be raised prior to trial in a pre-trial motion. Super. Ct.Crim. R. 12(b)(2). [7] Failure to raise such an objection prior to trial constitutes a waiver of the objection, but the Court for cause shown may grant relief from the waiver. Super. Ct.Crim. R. 12(d). A defendant who fails to object to an error in an indictment in a pre-trial motion waives the right to challenge the indictment on appeal unless it is so deficient as to be `totally lacking in the statement of offense.' Nichols v. United States, 343 A.2d 336, 341 (D.C.1975) (quoting Bush v. United States, 215 A.2d 853, 855 (D.C.1966)). When no objection is made during trial, our review is limited to determining (1) whether the indictment sets forth the elements of the offense, and (2) if so, whether the claimed flaw prejudiced the defense. Nichols, 343 A.2d at 341. In this case, appellant acknowledges that he did not raise a challenge to the indictment prior to trial. Nevertheless, he argues on appeal that the conspiracy count was poorly drafted and should have been stricken as bizarre, superfluous, and violative of at least the spirit of the Wharton'[s] Rule. [8] Setting aside for a moment appellant's claim based upon Wharton's Rule, we consider whether he has waived his other challenges to the indictment. These challenges include that the conspiracy statute, D.C.Code § 22-105a [9] (1996), charging him only with conspiring with Carpenter and Mitchell to commit criminal offenses and citing the armed robbery statutes, D.C.Code §§ 22-2901, -3202, with the object of the conspiracy being the armed robbery of Israel Jones. [10] These challenges are defects in the indictment within the meaning of Super. Ct. R. 12(b)(2) which are waived under Super. Ct. R. 12(d) if not raised prior to trial. See United States v. Weathers, 337 U.S.App. D.C. 362, 366-67, 186 F.3d 948, 952-53 (1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1005, 120 S.Ct. 1272, 146 L.Ed.2d 221 (2000). Appellant seems to concede this, but argues that he has shown cause for relief from any waiver pursuant to Rule 12(d). As cause for the default, appellant argues that the trial court expressed concern about the way that the indictment was drafted, and his trial counsel, whose effectiveness he challenges, was not at the top of his form. Essentially, appellant's claim is that his trial counsel's failure to challenge the indictment constituted ineffective assistance of counsel and cause for failure to raise the claim earlier. Assuming, without deciding, that appellant has met the requirements to show cause and avoid the waiver, we conclude that appellant has shown no prejudice which would warrant reversal. The sufficiency of an indictment is determined by (1) [w]hether it contains the elements of the offense intended to be charged, and sufficiently apprises the defendant of what he must be prepared to meet, and (2) whether the record adequately shows that the defendant may plead a former acquittal or conviction in the event any other proceedings are initiated against him later for a similar offense. Nichols, supra, 343 A.2d at 340 (citing Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763-64, 82 S.Ct. 1038, 8 L.Ed.2d 240 (1962)). If this standard is met, that the indictment could have been made more definite and certain is not material. Roberts v. United States, 752 A.2d 583, 587 (D.C.2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1044, 121 S.Ct. 2012, 149 L.Ed.2d 1013 (2001) (citing Hagner v. United States, 285 U.S. 427, 431, 52 S.Ct. 417, 76 L.Ed. 861 (1932)). Here, the indictment adequately informed appellant of the conspiracy charge he faced and protected him from future prosecution for that offense. The elements of the crime of conspiracy to commit robbery are that: (1) two or more persons formed an agreement to commit a robbery; (2) the defendant knowingly participated in the conspiracy with the intent to commit the offense; and (3) at least one person involved in the conspiracy committed one of the charged overt acts. Robinson v. United States, 608 A.2d 115, 116 (D.C.1992) (citing Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, No. 4.93 (4th ed.1993)); see also United States v. Treadwell, 245 U.S.App. D.C. 257, 263, 760 F.2d 327, 333 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1064, 106 S.Ct. 814, 88 L.Ed.2d 788 (1986). The indictment provided fair notice of the conspiracy charge. It specified each of these elements. As to the first and second elements it stated that appellant, Carpenter and Mitchell knowingly and willfully conspired and agreed to commit together criminal offenses in violation of D.C.Code §§ 22-2901, -3202, the armed robbery statutes. The indictment specified that the object of the conspiracy was to rob Israel Jones while armed. Since that was the only armed robbery specified, the reference to criminal offenses in the plural was not misleading. The indictment also lists various overt acts which the named conspirators, including appellant, were alleged to have committed. These overt acts included arming themselves in preparation for committing the armed robbery, searching out the intended victim, Israel Jones, breaking into the victim's apartment, and forcing Jones to ride to his apartment with them for the purpose of committing the armed robbery. Although the indictment made no reference to D.C.Code § 22-105a, Conspiracy to Commit Crime, it alleged a conspiracy by its terms. Our rules provide that an [e]rror in the citation or its omission shall not be ground[s] for dismissal of the indictment or information or for reversal of a conviction if the error or omission did not mislead the defendant to the defendant's prejudice. Super. Ct.Crim. R. 7(c). Appellant has neither alleged nor established any prejudice resulting from the omission of the citation to § 22-105a. A common sense construction must be given to an indictment. Craig v. United States, 490 A.2d 1173, 1176 (D.C. 1985). Read as a whole, the indictment in this case apprised appellant of the conspiracy charge he faced and stated it sufficiently to avoid any future prosecution for the same offense. See Nichols, supra, 343 A.2d at 340 (citing Russell, supra, 369 U.S. at 763-64, 82 S.Ct. 1038). Even if defective, an indictment which adequately protects these interests of fair notice of the charges and avoidance of future prosecutions will not be dismissed. Craig, 490 A.2d at 1176 (citations omitted).