Opinion ID: 728163
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Jackson's Sentence Pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines

Text: 107 Defendant Jackson raises several objections to the applications of the sentencing guidelines to his sentence. Review of the district court's determination that Jackson's sentence should have been enhanced under U.S.S.G. §§ 2F1.1, 3C1.1, and 2T1.1 is subject to a clearly erroneous standard of review. See United States v. Cannon, 41 F.3d 1462, 1467 (11th Cir.) (§ 2F1.1), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 86, 133 L.Ed.2d 44 (1995); United States v. Jones, 32 F.3d 1512, 1519 (11th Cir.1994) (§ 3C1.1). The district court's determination that the specific offense characteristic in U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1(b)(2)(B) applies to the recipient of a payment is a question of law subject to de novo review. 108 Jackson first claims that the district court erroneously calculated the amount of loss under U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1. The district court used $669,653.03 as the amount of loss involved in the fraud. Jackson claims that this amount should be reduced by $400,000, which constitutes the loan amounts. Curiously, Jackson does not provide any factual or legal basis on which this reduction should be made. We do not think that the loss amount, which consisted of the money that Jackson received from the scheme after November 18, 1988, should be reduced by any loan amount, because the loans involved in this case were proven to be illegitimate. Therefore, Jackson's argument is meritless. 109 Next, Jackson argues that the district court erred in enhancing his sentence under § 3C1.1 for committing perjury at his trial. That section provides that [i]f the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice during the investigation, prosecution or sentencing of the instant offense, increase the offense level by two levels. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. The district court made a factual finding that Jackson committed perjury during the trial in a number of instances, particularly when he denied having breakfast meetings with Harold Echols. On that basis, the district court enhanced his sentence for obstruction of justice. Defendant Jackson has failed to establish that the district court was clearly erroneous in its determination that he testified untruthfully at trial. See Jones, 32 F.3d at 1519 (noting that the comments to § 3C1.1 allow the enhancement if the defendant commits perjury or provides materially false information to a judge). While Jackson claims that the district court erred because it penalized him merely for his failure to plead guilty, that was not the case. Therefore, Jackson's obstruction of justice challenge must fail. 110 The district court further found that Jackson used sophisticated means to impede discovery of the existence or extent of the tax offense. See U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1(b)(2) (allowing two-level increase if sophisticated means were used to impede discovery of a tax offense). Jackson claims that the district court erred in enhancing his sentence under this section because he claims that the evidence presented in the case did not support a finding that sophisticated means were used. The government argues, however, that it presented ample evidence that Jackson routinely transferred money through shell corporations, such as Options International, Inc., in an attempt to conceal his transactions. In light of the evidence presented at trial, we agree with the government and find that the district court did not clearly err in enhancing Jackson's level based on the use of sophisticated means. 111 Finally, Jackson's offense level was increased under U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1, which provides that [i]f the offense level involved more than one bribe or extortion, increase by two levels.... If the offense involved a payment for the purpose of influencing an elected official or any official holding a high level decision-making or sensitive position, increase by eight levels. U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1(b)(1) & (2)(B). Jackson claims that his sentence should not have been enhanced under this section because he was the payee, not the payor, of the bribes. The background to that section of the guidelines directly refutes Jackson's contention, because it states that the guideline applies to a public official who solicits or accepts such a bribe. In light of this background statement and in the absence of any case law to the contrary, Jackson's contention must be rejected.