Opinion ID: 1130864
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Discovery of Discipline Imposed Under Evidence Code Section 1045

Text: (2a) We next consider whether the relevant statutes require disclosure of discipline imposed as a result of internal police investigations. (3) Our role in construing or interpreting a statute is, as we have frequently noted, to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent. ( Adoption of Kelsey S. (1992) 1 Cal.4th 816, 826 [4 Cal. Rptr.2d 615, 823 P.2d 1216], quoting Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting Co. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 711, 724 [257 Cal. Rptr. 708, 771 P.2d 406].) We will consider legislative history as an extrinsic aid to help elucidate legislative intent. ( San Francisco Police Officers' Assn. v. Superior Court (1988) 202 Cal. App.3d 183, 189 [248 Cal. Rptr. 297]; see City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court, supra, 49 Cal.3d at pp. 88-89 [employing legislative archive materials to ascertain Legislature's intent in enacting Sen. Bill No. 1436].) (2b) The parties focus on Evidence Code section 1045. Subdivision (a) of that statute provides that [ n ] othing in this article shall be construed to affect the right of access to records of complaints, or investigations of complaints, or discipline imposed as a result of such investigations, concerning an event or transaction in which the peace officer participated, or which he perceived, and pertaining to the manner in which he performed his duties, provided that such information is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation. (Evid. Code, § 1045, subd. (a), italics added.) On its face, the highlighted language clearly supports the order for disclosure of discipline imposed on the arresting officers. The City, however, contends that another portion of Evidence Code section 1045 compels a different result. It notes that subdivision (b) provides in pertinent part that [i]n determining relevance the court shall examine the information in chambers in conformity with Section 915, and shall exclude from disclosure : [¶] ... [¶] (2) In any criminal proceeding the conclusions of any officer investigating a complaint filed pursuant to Section 832.5 of the Penal Code.  (Evid. Code, § 1045, subd. (b), italics added.) In essence, the City urges that discipline imposed is the equivalent of the conclusions of an officer investigating a citizen's complaint. Subdivision (b)(2) of Evidence Code section 1045, the City argues, is a specific provision applicable in criminal cases, taking precedence over the more general provision contained in subdivision (a). We find the City's interpretation of the statute unpersuasive. In using two quite different terms  discipline imposed and conclusions of any officer investigating a complaint  the Legislature presumably intended to refer to two distinct concepts. If the City's interpretation were correct, the exception provided by subdivision (b)(2) would swallow the rule permitting disclosure as established in subdivision (a), thus rendering that part of subdivision (a) virtually meaningless. (4) We ordinarily reject interpretations that render particular terms of a statute mere surplusage, instead giving every word some significance. ( City and County of San Francisco v. Farrell (1982) 32 Cal.3d 47, 54 [184 Cal. Rptr. 713, 648 P.2d 935].) (2c) The term conclusions of any officer denotes the thought processes of, and factual inferences and deductions drawn by, an officer investigating a complaint, concerning such matters as the credibility of witnesses or the significance, strength, or lack of evidence. We see no indication that the Legislature intended the term to include the investigating body's ruling on the complaint or the nature of any discipline imposed. As Minor correctly asserts, the statutory scheme reveals a legislative intent to allow disclosure of the outcome of an investigation, i.e., the discipline imposed, without also requiring disclosure of how or why the investigating body reached that outcome. Minor's argument finds support in the legislative history of Senate Bill No. 1436. The phrase conclusions of any officer investigating a complaint did not appear in the bill until its amendment in the Assembly Committee on Criminal Justice. (Assem. Amend. to Sen. Bill No. 1436 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) Aug. 30, 1978.) The committee staff report accompanying the Assembly amendments explained the purpose of the added language as follows: The DRAFT excludes discovery in criminal cases of the conclusions of an officer who investigated a citizen's complaint while generally permitting discovery of the personnel records themselves. This approach was taken to protect the officer whose files are sought from discovery of what are unsubstantiated comments of another officer but permitting the petitioner to review all of the files which the court has deemed to be relevant to the litigation. (Assem. Com. on Crim. Justice, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1436 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) Aug. 28, 1978, p. 4.) The reference to unsubstantiated comments of another officer thus demonstrates a concern to prevent the disclosure not of the final outcome of a disciplinary process, but of preliminary determinations untested by the full panoply of investigative procedures. That the Legislature did distinguish between disciplinary results and interim conclusions by an investigating officer is confirmed by examination of a related statute contained in Senate Bill No. 1436 but not directly implicated in this case. As amended, Penal Code section 832.7 speaks in relevant part of dissemination of data regarding the number, type, or disposition of complaints (sustained, not sustained, exonerated, or unfounded). ... (Pen. Code, § 832.7, subd. (b), italics added [added by Stats. 1989, ch. 615, § 1].) Notably, in so amending Penal Code section 832.7, the Legislature did not choose to employ the term conclusion of any officer investigating a complaint; rather, it selected the more specific language just quoted, unmistakably conveying its intent with respect to dissemination of disciplinary results. One can reasonably infer that if Evidence Code section 1045, subdivision (b)(2) had been meant to exempt from disclosure information about the disposition of complaints, the Legislature would have said so in similarly precise terms. The City cites language appearing in several cases to support its contention that discovery of the results of disciplinary investigations violates Evidence Code section 1045, subdivision (b)(2). The City points to the following comment in Arcelona v. Municipal Court (1980) 113 Cal. App.3d 523, 531 [169 Cal. Rptr. 877]: While subdivision (a) of Evidence Code section 1045 implicitly recognizes the continuing vitality of judicially developed rules of criminal discovery [citation], subdivision (b)(2) represents a statutory modification of case law principles in excluding any conclusions resulting from internal investigations of citizens' complaints as being irrelevant. The cited language does not assist the City, however, since it pertains to verbatim reports of internal investigations, not to discipline imposed. ( Id. at p. 530.) Dicta in People v. Memro, supra, 38 Cal.3d at page 687, state that the conclusions resulting from internal investigations of citizens' complaints are excluded from disclosure. ( Ibid. ; see also City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 84 [[T]he courts have generally refused to disclose verbatim reports or records of any kind from peace officer personnel files, ordering instead ... that the agency reveal only the name, address, and phone number of any prior complainants and witnesses and the dates of the incidents in question.].) However, the quoted language in Memro, like that in Arcelona, supra, 113 Cal. App.3d at page 531, deals with reports of internal investigations. The City cites Carruthers v. Municipal Court (1980) 110 Cal. App.3d 439, 441-442 [168 Cal. Rptr. 33], as further authority for its position, but we note that in Carruthers, the prosecution conceded that the defendants, charged with battery on police officers, were entitled under Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 [10 L.Ed.2d 215, 83 S.Ct. 1194], to disclosure of the fact that discipline was imposed on an officer pursuant to a complaint of excessive force. ( Carruthers v. Municipal Court, supra, 110 Cal. App.3d at p. 443, italics in original.) Although the concession is nonbinding here, we concur in its implicit rationale. In sum, the cases the City relies on neither compel nor support the result it seeks. Amicus curiae San Jose Police Officers' Association asserts that requiring disclosure of the discipline imposed against officers will tend to undermine the effectiveness of police departments' internal affairs divisions in their investigatory and disciplinary functions and may discourage citizens from making complaints. Likewise, several other law enforcement organizations, as amici curiae, [3] contend that collateral use of a disciplinary decision in a criminal case would deter public agencies from single-mindedly enforcing appropriate standards of behavior for peace officers. We doubt that such untoward results will ensue. Because only the outcome of the investigation, rather than verbatim reports or records of investigations, is subject to disclosure, there should be no inhibition of officers' candor in responding to interrogation by a department's internal affairs division. Moreover, as Minor points out, a department already possesses the statutory authority to disclose investigatory results to the complainant, who is under no obligation to keep them confidential. (See Pen. Code, § 832.7, subd. (c).) Furthermore, since complainants' identities are already subject to disclosure to defendants seeking discovery on a sufficient showing of materiality, we fail to see how disclosure of the discipline ultimately imposed on an officer could deter citizens from bringing complaints.