Opinion ID: 2095176
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Does SORA Inflict Punishment on Appellants in Violation of the Ex Post Facto, Double Jeopardy and Due Process Clauses?

Text: Retroactive application of a law that inflicts greater punishment than did the law that was in effect when the crime was committed is forbidden by the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the Constitution. [8] See Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 439-41, 117 S.Ct. 891, 137 L.Ed.2d 63 (1997). The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment protects against multiple criminal punishments for the same offense (among other things). See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977). And the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments forbids the imposition of punishment on an insanity acquitee. See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 369, 103 S.Ct. 3043, 77 L.Ed.2d 694 (1983). Appellants contend that SORA's registration and notification regime constitutes punishment. If that is so, SORA would contravene each of the foregoing Constitutional principles. In answering the question of whether SORA imposes punishment, we are guided by the Supreme Court's resolution of the identical question about the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act in Smith v. Doe, supra . The registration and notification provisions of the Alaska Act are similar to those of SORA. All sex offenders who are physically present in Alaska must register for either fifteen years or for life. The requirement is retroactive and applicable without regard to the current dangerousness of the particular offender. A sex offender who knowingly fails to comply with the Act is subject to criminal prosecution. The offender must submit to being photographed and fingerprinted, provide virtually the same information as the District of Columbia requires, verify the information either annually or quarterly, and notify the police if he or she moves. The information that the offender furnishes is maintained by the Alaska Department of Public Safety in a central registry of sex offenders, and the Department makes much of that information available to the public on the Internet. 538 U.S. at 90-91, 123 S.Ct. 1140. The Supreme Court held that the Alaska Act is nonpunitive, and its retroactive application does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id. at 105-06, 123 S.Ct. 1140. The framework for our inquiry, the Court said, is well established; it focuses on the legislature's intentions and the statute's effects: We must ascertain whether the legislature meant the statute to establish `civil' proceedings. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997). If the intention of the legislature was to impose punishment, that ends the inquiry. If, however, the intention was to enact a regulatory scheme that is civil and nonpunitive, we must further examine whether the statutory scheme is `so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State's] intention to deem it `civil.' Ibid. (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-249, 100 S.Ct. 2636, 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980)). Because we ordinarily defer to the legislature's stated intent, Hendricks, supra, at 361, 117 S.Ct. 2072 `only the clearest proof' will suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty, Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 100, 118 S.Ct. 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450 (1997) (quoting Ward, supra, at 249, 100 S.Ct. 2636); see also Hendricks, supra, at 361, 117 S.Ct. 2072; United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 290, 116 S.Ct. 2135, 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996); United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 365, 104 S.Ct. 1099, 79 L.Ed.2d 361 (1984). Id. at 92, 123 S.Ct. 1140. Since the question before us is first of all a question of statutory construction, id. (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361, 117 S.Ct. 2072), we must begin by ascertaining the Council's intent in enacting SORA; did the Council indicate, either expressly or impliedly, whether it viewed SORA as a punitive or a regulatory enactment? Hudson, supra, at 99, 118 S.Ct. 488. Unlike the Alaska Act, SORA does not include a statement of legislative objectives or state whether it is a civil or a criminal enactment. As we commonly do when statutory language is not dispositive, however, we may look to the legislative history of SORA to determine the Council's objectives and intent. See Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 262, 121 S.Ct. 727, 148 L.Ed.2d 734 (2001) (Since deciding Hendricks, this Court has reaffirmed the principle that determining the civil or punitive nature of an Act must begin with reference to its text and legislative history.); see, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) (The legislative history of the Bail Reform Act clearly indicates that Congress did not formulate the pretrial detention provisions as punishment for dangerous individuals.). Bill 13-350, the Sex Offender Registration Act of 1999, was introduced on July 13, 1999, and was referred the next day to the Council's Committee on the Judiciary. The Judiciary Committee eventually reported favorably on the bill and unanimously recommended its enactment by the Council. We may discern the purposes and intent of the legislation from the Judiciary Committee's Report. See, e.g., O'Malley v. Chevy Chase Bank, F.S.B., 766 A.2d 964, 970 (D.C.2001) (Because the statutory language is silent on the issue, we look to legislative intent and legislative history as shown, in this instance, by the report of the Council's Committee on Housing and Economic Development.); In re B.B.P., 753 A.2d 1019, 1022 (D.C.2000) (finding the intent of the statute from the report submitted to the Council by the Committee on Human Services). The Judiciary Committee Report states that SORA's registration and notification scheme is designed to promote public safety in at least three ways: by facilitating effective law enforcement; by enabling members of the public to take direct measures of a lawful nature for the protection of themselves and their families; and by reducing registered offenders' exposure to temptation to commit more offenses. [9] The Report goes on to state explicitly that registration and notification are regulatory measures adopted for public safety purposes, and do not constitute criminal punishment.... Judiciary Committee Report at 6. We think that this is as clear and unequivocal as it needs to be. In Smith the Supreme Court found that protecting the public from sex offendersthe primary governmental interest identified by the Alaska Legislaturewas without doubt a legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective. Smith, 538 U.S. at 93, 123 S.Ct. 1140 (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 363, 117 S.Ct. 2072). That such an objective is consistent with the purposes of the ... criminal justice system ... does not make the objective punitive when it is pursued in a regulatory scheme. Id. at 94, 123 S.Ct. 1140. We are obliged to consider next whether SORA's statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the Council's] intention to deem it `civil.' Smith, 538 U.S. at 92, 123 S.Ct. 1140 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Appellants argue that certain features of SORA do contradict the explicit statement of legislative intent in the Judiciary Committee Report and reveal that the Council really did mean to inflict additional punishment on sex offenders. In Smith the Supreme Court recognized that formal attributes of a legislative enactment, such as the manner of its codification or the enforcement procedures it establishes, are probative of the legislature's intent. Id. As the Court found in Smith, however, we find here that the probative value of such formal attributes is not sufficient to override what we take to be an unambiguous legislative intention to establish a regulatory rather than a penal scheme. Thus, appellants point to the fact that SORA is codified currently in Title 22 of the District of Columbia Code, which is entitled Criminal Offenses and Penalties. This is misleading, however. At the time of its enactment, SORA was placed in Title 24, Prisoners and Their Treatment, which was (and still is) the repository for a number of nonpunitive provisions (e.g., Chapter 5, dealing with the commitment of insanity acquitees and related matters, and Chapters 6 and 7, dealing with the rehabilitation of alcoholics and users of narcotics). SORA was moved to Title 22 only as part of a subsequent recodification of all the laws of the District of Columbia in 2001 that was carried out not by the Council itself but by its Office of the General Counsel pursuant to a delegation of general authority. See District of Columbia Official Code, Preface to the 2001 Edition, at VI (West 2001). As appellee comments in its brief, this post-enactment administrative decision on which the Council did not even vote ... says nothing about the intent of the legislature when it passed SORA. If [t]he location and labels of a statutory provision do not by themselves transform a civil remedy into a criminal one, Smith, 538 U.S. at 94, 123 S.Ct. 1140, they certainly do not do so in the present case. [10] Appellants also cite the procedural integration of SORA with the sentencing of sex offenders in Superior Court. When a defendant is found to have committed a registration offense, the Superior Court is required to enter an order certifying that the defendant is a sex offender subject to the requirements of SORA and to advise the offender of his SORA duties. D.C.Code § 22-4003(a). As we have already mentioned, SORA further provides that compliance with its requirements shall be a mandatory condition of probation, parole, supervised release, and conditional release of any sex offender. D.C.Code § 22-4015. And under SORA a sex offender's registration period is to extend as long as the offender remains under such supervisionwhich can be for more than ten years, and up to lifeeven if the offender did not commit a lifetime registration offense. See D.C.Code § 22-4002(a). In addition to such procedural integration, appellants note, the implementation of SORA is committed to two criminal law enforcement agencies, the MPD and CSOSA. [11] In our view, these features of SORA, which are similar to features of the Alaska law considered in Smith, do not signify that SORA is punitive rather than regulatory in nature. By virtue of their convictions in Superior Court, sex offenders become subject to SORA's requirements, so it makes sense to coordinate the implementation of SORA with the criminal process. The Supreme Court explained in Smith why such coordination does not mean that SORA itself is part of the punishment: The policy to alert convicted offenders to the civil consequences of their criminal conduct does not render the consequences themselves punitive. When a State sets up a regulatory scheme, it is logical to provide those persons subject to it with clear and unambiguous notice of the requirements and the penalties for noncompliance.... Invoking the criminal process in aid of a statutory regime does not render the statutory scheme itself punitive. 538 U.S. at 95-96, 123 S.Ct. 1140. We conclude that the intent of the Council, like that of the Alaska Legislature, was to create a civil, nonpunitive regime. Id. at 96, 123 S.Ct. 1140. Only the clearest proof that SORA is punitive in its effect, therefore, will suffice to override [the Council's] legislative intent and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty. Id. at 92, 123 S.Ct. 1140 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Despite the cogency of appellants' objections to SORA as stigmatizing, onerous, and unfair to former offenders who have rehabilitated themselves, we do not think that appellants surmount the clearest proof hurdle. The Supreme Court's analysis in Smith of the effect of Alaska's registration and notification scheme is controlling here, for there are only minor differences between that scheme and SORA. Examining the Alaska Act in light of the several indicative factors set out in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69, 83 S.Ct. 554, 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963), [12] the Court concluded that the challengers cannot show, much less by the clearest proof, that the effects of the law negate Alaska's intention to establish a civil regulatory scheme. Smith, 538 U.S. at 105, 123 S.Ct. 1140. We perforce reach the same conclusion here. The most relevant factors, the Supreme Court stated, are whether, in its necessary operation, the regulatory scheme: has been regarded in our history and traditions as a punishment; imposes an affirmative disability or restraint; promotes the traditional aims of punishment; has a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose; or is excessive with respect to this purpose. Id. at 97, 123 S.Ct. 1140. [13] In brief, the Court held, first, that registration and public notification have not been regarded historically or traditionally as punishment; in particular any analogy to early colonial shaming punishments that were designed to inflict public disgrace would be misleading, for [t]he purpose and the principal effect of notification are to inform the public for its own safety, not to humiliate the offender. Id. at 99, 123 S.Ct. 1140. [14] Next, the registration and notification scheme does not impose a significant affirmative disability or restraint. [15] The law imposes no physical restraint, nor does it restrain activities sex offenders may pursue. Id. at 100, 123 S.Ct. 1140. Rejecting the comparison with probation or supervised release, the Court emphasized that offenders subject to registration remain free to move where they wish and to live and work as other citizens, with no supervision. Id. at 101, 123 S.Ct. 1140. Similarly, while registrants must, for example, inform the authorities after they change their facial features (such as growing a beard), ... they are not required to seek permission to do so. Id. at 101, 123 S.Ct. 1140. [16] Further, while it is true that the registration and notification scheme promotes deterrence, one of the traditional aims of punishment, [t]his proves too much, for [a]ny number of governmental programs might deter crime without imposing punishment. Id. at 102, 123 S.Ct. 1140. It is more important that the scheme undeniably has a rational connection to a legitimate nonpunitive purpose of public safety, which is advanced by alerting the public to the risk of sex offenders in their community. Id. at 102-03, 123 S.Ct. 1140 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Lastly, the Supreme Court rejected the contention that the requirements of a law like SORA are excessive in relation to its valid purpose, either (1) because the requirements apply to all sex offenders without regard to their future dangerousness or (2) because the law places no limits on the number of persons who have access to the information disseminated to the public about offenders who are obligated to register. Id. at 103, 123 S.Ct. 1140. As the Court emphasized, [t]he excessiveness inquiry ... is not an exercise in determining whether the legislature has made the best choice possible to address the problem it seeks to remedy. The question is whether the regulatory means chosen are reasonable in light of the nonpunitive objective. Id. at 105, 123 S.Ct. 1140. Thus, a state reasonably could conclude that a conviction for a sex offense provides evidence of substantial risk of recidivism that is sufficient without more to justify a regulatory response. Id. at 103, 123 S.Ct. 1140. There is ample support for recognizing that [t]he risk of recidivism posed by sex offenders is `frightening and high.' Id. (quoting McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 34, 122 S.Ct. 2017, 153 L.Ed.2d 47 (2002) and citing Department of Justice statistics). Accordingly, the Court held, a State's determination to legislate with respect to convicted sex offenders as a class, rather than require individual determination of their dangerousness, does not make the statute a punishment under the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id. at 104, 123 S.Ct. 1140. [17] While individualized assessment may be a necessary predicate where involuntary commitment is concerned, see Hendricks, supra, where only a less intrusive regulatory scheme of registration and public notification is involved, the State can dispense with individual predictions of future dangerousness and allow the public to assess the risk on the basis of accurate, nonprivate information about the registrants' convictions.... Smith, 538 U.S. at 104, 123 S.Ct. 1140. [18] The wide dissemination of information about registrants by virtue of its easy accessibility over the Internet does not render the regulatory scheme excessive either, the Court held, relying on three considerations that are equally applicable to SORA. First, the Internet notification system utilized by Alaska is a passive one: An individual must seek access to the information. Id. at 105, 123 S.Ct. 1140. [19] Second, the website warns visitors against using the information to commit criminal acts. Third, [g]iven the general mobility of our population, for Alaska to make its registry system available and easily accessible throughout the State was not so excessive a regulatory requirement as to become a punishment. Id. [20] The ease and efficiency with which the Internet can be accessed by the public are, arguably, points in favor of, not against, its use. The Supreme Court's rationale in Smith applies with undiminished force to the law at issue in this case. We hold that the District of Columbia Sex Offender Registration Act of 1999 is not punitive and does not inflict punishment on appellants in violation of the Ex Post Facto, Double Jeopardy, or Due Process Clauses of the Constitution.