Opinion ID: 1386258
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Eyewitness Identification Witness Refusal of the Trial Court to Allow the Engberg to Call an Expert Witness to Testify on the Potential for Error in Identification

Text: But just how accurate are eyewitnesses? The possibility of over 5,000 wrongful convictions in the United States annually and the steady trickle of news accounts of innocent persons imprisoned alert us to the fact that the human and legal process of identification contains risks of error. This conclusion is amply supported by research. Zalman & Siegel, The Psychology of Perception, Eyewitness Identification, and the Lineup, 27 Crim.L.Bull. 159, 160 (1991) (footnote omitted). Mistaken identification is one part of a broader misidentification problem. A comprehensive public policy approach must suggest several techniques for lessening the incidence of wrongful convictions. For example, where guilt is based entirely on eyewitness testimony, extraordinary attention must be paid to the general and specific questions of reliability. Expert witnesses must always be allowed to testify on the issue of reliability and special training be given to police officers and to high-risk employees (e.g., of banks and convenience stores) on observation and documentation during criminal incidents. Id. at 174 (footnote omitted). Before any competent counsel today puts his client on trial in a case involving significant proof by eyewitness identification, reasonable competency would require reading the current book of E. Loftus & K. Ketcham, Witness for the Defense: The Accused, The Eyewitness and The Expert Who Puts Memory on Trial (1991). The authors lead us to initial thought by a quotation from William Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act III, scene ii: Hamlet: Do you see yonder cloud that's almost in shape of a camel? Polonius: By the mass, and 'tis like a camel, indeed. Hamlet: Methinks it is like a weasel. Polonius: It is backed like a weasel. Hamlet: Or like a whale? Polonius: Very like a whale. The dedication to the book provides: We dedicate this book to the women and men who have been wrongfully accused, convicted, imprisoned, or have otherwise suffered because of faulty eyewitness testimony. As will be later related, Elizabeth Loftus was the witness called to testify in this case regarding the singularly significant eye-witness identification evidence provided for conviction. [22] One of the difficult issues of this appeal was denial to Engberg of the use of an identification expert witness. Within this fast evolving and tremendously litigated eyewitness issue involving usage of the expert witness or submission of a special jury instruction, little national consistency exists. Actually, within this state, the expert witness has been used in serious cases and, for appellate review, only this case has reached us. Similarly, the Telfaire instruction has been given and denied and denial has been previously approved on appeal. When faced with a claimed error from denial to Engberg of an expert witness, the State again contended a constitutional forfeiture by procedural default solution. This is an unsupportable resolution of the appellate issue created by trial rejection and exasperated by the failure of appellate counsel to include it in first appeal. As direction for retrial, I cannot casually disregard the constitutional rights of Engberg under Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 10, right of accused to defend, and Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 6, due process of law, in conjunction with the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Faretta, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525. This issue should be properly presented when intermixed with predominating consideration of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Curry v. Zant, 258 Ga. 527, 371 S.E.2d 647 (1988); Palmer, 635 P.2d at 960; Sims v. State, 295 N.W.2d 420 (Iowa 1980); Curtis v. State, 37 Md. App. 459, 381 A.2d 1166 (1977), rev'd on other grounds 284 Md. 132, 395 A.2d 464 (1978); Stewart v. Warden, Nevada State Prison, 92 Nev. 588, 555 P.2d 218 (1976). Cf. Valeriano v. Bronson, 209 Conn. 75, 546 A.2d 1380 (1988). I do not understand why this issue was not raised on initial appeal considering the expense incurred by the public defender (at state expense) in having the witness available for the trial. This is re-emphasized by the fact that the same witness had previously testified in another Wyoming death case also involving identification. Alberts v. State, 642 P.2d 447 (Wyo. 1982). There has to be a differentiation between justification, incapacity or misguided disinclination in adequacy of representation. Appellate counsel has a responsibility to pursue issues established at trial unless non-pursuit is mandated by research. Valeriano, 546 A.2d 1380. See McCoy, 108 S.Ct. 1895. Cf. Anders, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396. Extrication of the issue from appellate review cannot realistically be called thoughtfully unintended. See E. Arnolds, W. Carroll, M. Lewis & M. Seng, Eyewitness Testimony: Strategies and Tactics (1984) (hereafter E. Arnolds) and N. Sobel, Eyewitness Identification: Legal and Practical Problems (1988). Since the denial, neglect or negligence of appellate counsel to include this issue on appeal is unexplained, we are mandated to a substantive analysis for post-conviction review. Initially, the hypnotism issue in this case aggravates the due process concern of the eyewitness identification validity. Justice in evenhanded application should require this court to reject any double standard of due process where the kind of experts available to the prosecution, if they assist the jury with foundational knowledge, would not be the kind of experts available to defend as either not helpful or invading the provence of the jury. See Jackson v. Fogg, 589 F.2d 108 (2nd Cir.1978); State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986); and Note, Eyewitness Identification in Utah: A Changing Perspective, 1988 Utah L.Rev. 113 (1988). See also State v. Whaley, 406 S.E.2d 369 (S.C. 1991). Analysis of eyewitness identification as a function of criminal prosecution presents that timeless clash between necessity and questionable validity. Little need be said about necessity. In many cases, eyewitness identification is the only or at least the principle prosecutorial evidence. See United States v. Smith, 563 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir.1977), cert. denied 434 U.S. 1021, 98 S.Ct. 747, 54 L.Ed.2d 769 (1978), Hufstedler, J., specially concurring. Extensive and well documented research suggests that eyewitness testimony is not only suspect and frequently completely mistaken, but the degree and frequency of error in such identification remains undisclosed to the fact-finding jury. Faulty eyewitness identification, second only to perjury, is considered a major cause of the conviction of innocent persons. See Bedau & Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 Stan.L.Rev. 21 (1987). This problem was highlighted by Justice Frankfurter in F. Frankfurter, The Case of Sacco and Vanzetti (1927). We could go back even further and find that Sir Walter Raleigh lost his head as the result of both hearsay and faulty identification. Judicial consideration of the problem is not new. In the 1896 case of In re Bryant's Estate, 176 Pa. 309, 35 A. 571, 577 (1896), it was stated: The parties to the present litigation are claimants of his estate, and their claims depend upon the question of identity. There are few more difficult subjects with which the administration of justice has to deal. The carelessness or superficiality of observers, the rarity of powers of graphic description, and the different force with which peculiarities of form or color or expression strike different persons, make recognition or identification one of the least reliable of facts testified to even by actual witnesses who have seen the parties in question; and, where they have not, there is the added obstacle of the inadequacy of language to describe the minute variations of feature and color which go to make up the individual personality. The incantation to keep the jury ignorant of the high degree of erroneous eyewitness identification has not diminished over a half century. Louisiana is alert to the problem with eyewitness identification to convict. Where the key issue is the accused's identity as the perpetrator, rather than whether the crime was committed, the state is required to negate any reasonable probability of misidentification. State v. Carter, 522 So.2d 1100, 1109 (La. App. 1988). This is true since reliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony. Walker v. State, 523 So.2d 528 (Ala.Cr.App. 1988) (quoting Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977)). See also People v. Riley, 70 N.Y.2d 523, 522 N.Y.S.2d 842, 517 N.E.2d 520 (1987). One of the most thoughtful judicial treatments on this is found in People v. Anderson, 389 Mich. 155, 205 N.W.2d 461, 468 (1973): The psycho-legal fundamentals in this case derive from the tension between four factors involved in eyewitness identification in criminal cases. The four factors are: 1. The natural and usually necessary reliance on eyewitness identification of defendants by the police and prosecution; 2. The scientifically and judicially recognized fact that there are serious limitations on the reliability of eyewitness identification of defendants; 3. The scientifically and judicially recognized fact that frequently employed police and prosecution procedures often (and frequently unintentionally) mislead eyewitnesses into misidentification of the defendant; 4. The historical and legal fact that a significant number of innocent people have been convicted of crimes they did not commit and the real criminal was left at large. In United States v. Brown, 461 F.2d 134, 145 (D.C. Cir.1971), Chief Judge Bazelon responded to the problems of eyewitness identification by stating [n]o other aspect of the accusatory process creates so much opportunity for miscarriage of justice  for punishment of an innocent man. Unquestionably, identifications are often unreliable  perhaps consistently less reliable than lie detector tests, which we have in the past excluded for unreliability. Id. at 145 n. 1. [23] Erroneous eyewitness identification, many times given confidently in good faith, has led to the conviction and execution of innocent people charged with capital crimes. See Bedau & Radelet, supra, 40 Stan.L.Rev. at 91-172 (Appendix A: Catalogue of Defendants). The problem of faulty eyewitness identification has been comprehensively addressed in books, scientific publications and legal journals. For Wyoming law to be as fundamentally fair as we can make it, a defendant should be able to present evidence which can shake the confidence in eyewitness identification  just as the prosecution is free to use eyewitness identification. It is a matter of fundamental fairness. [24] After analyzing the unquestioning reliance on eyewitness identification by the legal system, two prominent scholars argue for uniform rules to govern such identification: In light of the unenumerated inadequacies of eye-witness identification and testimony, new procedural safeguards are required. The following proposed protections are not suggested as alternatives to eyewitness evidence, for such evidence can play a very vital role in investigative and trial proceedings. Rather, these safeguards are suggested in order that eyewitness evidence might be presented to a jury in its proper and least prejudicial perspective. Cunningham & Tyrrell, Eyewitness Credibility: Adjusting the Sights of the Judiciary, 37 Alabama Lawyer 563, 585 (1975). These scholars recommend that police avoid using suggestive lineups and that courts provide special jury instructions, require corroborating evidence, employ protective procedures for in-court identification, and require pretrial identification procedures ( Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967) ( Denno hearing)). The literature is nearly endless. A representative analysis is found in Levine & Tapp, The Psychology of Criminal Identification: The Gap From Wade to Kirby, 121 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1079, 1079 (1973) (quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 235, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1936, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967) and footnotes omitted), which stated: On June 12, 1967, the Supreme Court of the United States in a trilogy of cases, United States v. Wade, Gilbert v. California and Stovall v. Denno , dealt with the constitutionality of police practices and procedures in obtaining eyewitness identifications. These decisions marked the Supreme Court's first major attempt to confront the dangers inherent in eyewitness identification and the suggestibility inherent in the context of the pretrial identification. The Court's primary concern was to evolve legal standards and remedies that would substantially reduce erroneous identification. Katz & Reid, Expert Testimony on the Fallibility of Eyewitness Identification, 1 Crim.Just.J. 177, 177 (1977) describes: Many psychologists believe the testimony of an eyewitness to a crime may often be unreliable. This article addresses the question whether behavioral scientists should be permitted to testify at criminal trials to explain to the jury the inherent danger of relying on eyewitness identifications. After a discussion of the legal admissibility of this testimony, an analysis of the nature and scope of the problem is presented, followed by a discussion of specific topics upon which an expert in eyewitness identification may testify. In conclusion, this article presents some guidelines to assist the trial judge in his exercise of discretion on this matter. O'Connor, That's the Man: A Sobering Study of Eyewitness Identification and the Polygraph, 49 St.John's L.Rev. 1, 1-2 (1974) (footnote omitted) states: It is almost four o'clock in the morning, and, as he stands in the lighted doorway of the squad room at the 110th precinct, Manny Balestrero is tired  but, worse still, he is scared, more scared than he has ever been in his life. Things seem to be closing in around him. His interrogation since earlier that evening has not, by any standard, been brutal; no force has been used  just persistent, relentless, ceaseless questioning by two detectives who are so skeptically polite, so adamantly unbelieving!       The drama moves swiftly to its bitter end. Manny again senses, rather than sees, movement in the darkened room. Then come the whispered words: That's the man! Manny's whole world collapses. (After a mistrial and, in the interim, the real perpetrator was apprehended.) It is an article of faith within the legal profession that eyewitness testimony is unreliable. Pulaski, Neil v. Biggers: The Supreme Court Dismantles the Wade Trilogy's Due Process Protection, 26 Stan. L.Rev. 1097, 1097 (1974). The unreliability of eyewitness identification evidence poses one of the most serious problems in the administration of criminal justice. Identifying the defendant as the wrongdoer presents an issue, and often the sole one for determination, in every criminal trial. Yet, commentators extensively have documented the frequency of wrongful convictions resulting from mistaken identifications and long have recognized the threat that such misidentification poses to the ideals of criminal justice. As Justice Felix Frankfurter once noted, The identification of strangers is proverbially untrustworthy. The hazards of such testimony are established by a formidable number of instances in the records of English and American trials. Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 29 Stan.L.Rev. 969, 969 (1977) (quoting F. Frankfurter, supra, at 30) (footnotes omitted). The variety and detail of just a few of the other articles on this subject are astounding. [25] In current literature, Fassett, The Third Circuit's Unique Response to Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Perception: Is What You See What You Get?, 19 Seton Hall L.Rev. 697, 722 (1989) provides a thoughtfully detailed and documented exposition and then concludes: The inherent unreliability of eyewitness identification evidence, combined with the dilution of constitutional protections designed to exclude unreliable identifications, necessitates the adoption of additional judicial safeguards where such evidence is both critical and disputed. The most effective such safeguard, expert identification testimony, should be admitted far more frequently than presently allowed by the majority Amaral [488 F.2d 1148] standard. Enunciated over fifteen years ago by the Ninth Circuit, that standard is inconsistent with the more liberal criteria of the Federal Rules of Evidence and has resulted in the near-blanket exclusion of such testimony. In Downing, the Third Circuit recognized the flaws of the Amaral standard and recommended more lenient admission of expert identification testimony. However, the tremendous discretion Downing afforded district courts, coupled with its open invitation to exclude such testimony in all cases except those based solely upon a single uncorroborated identification, will regrettably prevent any significant increase in its admission. Hence, criminal defendants who require expert testimony to attack unreliable identifications shall continue to face closed doors needlessly shut by a judiciary intent on limiting the scope and duration of trials. Given the dismantling of the constitutional protections developed twenty-two years ago to ensure the exclusion of unreliable identification evidence arising from unduly suggestive pretrial procedures, those closed doors will almost certainly and tragically facilitate the conviction of innocent defendants. When invoking the reliability of the expert witness analysis in eyewitness identification, four concerns are found in review of the many cases and expansive literature: 1. The test for admissibility of expert testimony is F.R.E. 702, with application of either the Frye test, Frye v. United States, 54 App.D.C. 46, 293 F. 1013 (1923), or a currently modernized standard. 2. There are generally agreed and determined practical validity concepts for eyewitness identification testimony. 3. Fairness is implicated in equality for availability of the expert witness to the defendant as to the prosecution. 4. The nature and the essential characteristics of the trial court exercised discretion presented by contentions of identification invalidity. Judicial answers to the acknowledged problem have taken three directions. The first is to do nothing with the clearly unjustified hope that either the jury will be smart enough to adequately discount identification testimony, or second, that the other evidence is sufficient so that the invalid testimony does not really matter. Alternatively, reliance on the power of cross-examination is also frequently given as a justification for the uncontrolled procedure as an adequate validation of eyewitness identification testimony. Since none of these explanations assure reliability of result for those who are innocent in a significant number of cases, the only remaining solace comes from the possibility that the guilty individual will confess or be otherwise uncovered, post-conviction processes will be remedial or that the normal justification is sufficient of a utilitarian society concept of a wrong-place, wrong-time  so what tragedy resolution. To one federal court, this latter precept was not acceptable where unreliable eyewitness identification was used. Jackson, 589 F.2d 108. The case was critiqued by the federal appellate court as the rare case of a record almost entirely bare of credible untainted evidence of guilt as founded on eyewitness identification. Id. at 108. See similar suggestive processes of identification in United States v. Russell, 532 F.2d 1063 (6th Cir.1976). [26] The second and spreading effort to test contended prosecutorial identification reaches to education of the jury by special instructions. The most common application is the usage of some version of the Telfaire instruction which provides four factors a jury should consider when deciding how much reliance eyewitness testimony might be given. United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir.1972). See Note, Eyewitness Identification Testimony and the Need for Cautionary Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, 60 Wash. U.L.Q. 1387 (1983). In Hampton v. State, 92 Wis.2d 450, 285 N.W.2d 868 (1979) (citing Chapman v. State, 69 Wis.2d 581, 230 N.W.2d 824 (1975) and State v. Williamson, 84 Wis.2d 370, 267 N.W.2d 337 (1978)), testimony of the expert witness was permitted, although restricted in scope, while the special instruction was denied. The special instruction approach has found broad usage, but unfortunately has been previously rejected by this court in a plain error context without any substantive consideration of its broad perspective. Campbell v. State, 589 P.2d 358 (Wyo. 1979); but see Thomas v. State, 784 P.2d 237 (Wyo. 1989), Urbigkit, J., specially concurring. Cf. United States v. Hodges, 515 F.2d 650 (7th Cir.1975); United States v. Holley, 502 F.2d 273 (4th Cir.1974); State v. Wheaton, 240 Kan. 345, 729 P.2d 1183 (1986); State v. Warren, 230 Kan. 385, 635 P.2d 1236 (1981); and State v. Mastracchio, 546 A.2d 165 (R.I. 1988). The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted an intermediate position posited upon unavailable collaborative testimony. United States v. McNeal, 865 F.2d 1167 (10th Cir.), cert. denied 490 U.S. 1094, 109 S.Ct. 2439, 104 L.Ed.2d 995 (1989). The third ameliorative approach addresses the jury by the use of expert witness testimony pursuant to W.R.E. 702. [27] The decisional process used is significant, including both the propriety and advisability of a Denno hearing or motion in limine resolution in advance of trial. As general principles for expert witness testimony, the separately definable considerations by the trial court include (a) competency and qualification of the witness, see State v. Vineyard, 497 S.W.2d 821 (Mo. App. 1973) and Windmere, Inc. v. International Ins. Co., 105 N.J. 373, 522 A.2d 405 (1987); (b) appropriateness of the subject for testimony under W.R.E. 702, see People v. Cole, 47 Cal.2d 99, 301 P.2d 854 (1956); Windmere, Inc., 522 A.2d 405; State v. Spry, 87 S.D. 318, 207 N.W.2d 504 (1973), overruled sub nom. State v. Buckingham, 90 S.D. 198, 240 N.W.2d 84 (1976), modified sub nom. State v. Hartman, 256 N.W.2d 131 (S.D. 1977) and Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, A Half-Century Later, 80 Colum.L.Rev. 1197 (1980) (as affording the three-test function); (c) creation of undue prejudice under W.R.E. 403, see Foster v. State, 508 So.2d 1111 (Miss. 1987); and (d) probative value compared to prejudicial effect as a general power of exercised trial court discretion to deny a litigant his desired evidence, see Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 789 F.2d 1052 (4th Cir.1986); United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir.1973); and Fensterer v. State, 493 A.2d 959 (Del.Super.), cert. granted and judgment vacated 474 U.S. 15, 106 S.Ct. 292, 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1985). The admissibility standard for expert testimony is somewhat differently phrased by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Kozminski, 821 F.2d 1186, 1194 (6th Cir.), cert. granted 484 U.S. 894, 108 S.Ct. 225, 98 L.Ed.2d 185 (1987), judgment aff'd and remanded, 487 U.S. 931, 108 S.Ct. 2751, 101 L.Ed.2d 788 (1988) (emphasis in original) as a four-part test: For expert testimony to be admissible under Rule 702, a four-part test must be met: (1) a qualified expert; (2) testifying on a proper subject; (3) in conformity to a generally accepted explanatory theory; (4) the probative value of which outweighs any prejudicial effect. It is noteworthy that a difference can be assessed between a test for scientific evidence compared with expert testimony. Id. at 1214, Guy, J., dissenting. One of the more lucid reviews of the admissibility of expert testimony is found in statements of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Windmere, Inc. in regard to the particular topic of voice prints which was ultimately found inadmissible. That court recognized: There are generally three ways in which a proponent of expert testimony or scientific results can prove the required reliability in terms of its general acceptance within the professional community: (1) the testimony of knowledgeable experts; (2) authoritative scientific literature; and (3) persuasive judicial decisions which acknowledge such general acceptance of expert testimony. Windmere, Inc., 522 A.2d at 408. [28] That case applied a reasoned approach by factual analysis of each acceptability criteria. The Frye test has been generally superseded by F.R.E. 702, and the more current recognition of science's relationship to the fact-finding search for truth in trial inquiry. [29] The psychological principles as psycho-legal fundamentals are enumerated to be derived from four factors involved in eyewitness identification quoted earlier in Anderson, 205 N.W.2d at 468 (with exhaustive bibliography). The line of authority where trial denial resulted in reversal on appeal began in State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208 (1983) and People v. McDonald, 37 Cal.3d 351, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236, 690 P.2d 709 (1984). These cases have presented the expanding philosophy that the expert witness testimony should be admissible when properly directed and adequately presented. A principal support for the eyewitness invalidity inquiry was provided in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals case of United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1230-31 (3rd Cir.1985): [W]e find persuasive more recent cases in which courts have found that, under certain circumstances, this type of expert testimony can satisfy the helpfulness test of Rule 702.          We agree with the courts in Chapple, Smith, and McDonald that under certain circumstances expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identifications can assist the jury in reaching a correct decision and therefore may meet the helpfulness requirement of Rule 702.[ [30] ] Retained discretional jurisdiction in making the probative versus prejudicial evaluation is further reflected in United States v. Moore, 786 F.2d 1308, reh'g denied 791 F.2d 928 (5th Cir.1986) and State v. Via, 146 Ariz. 108, 704 P.2d 238 (1985), cert. denied 475 U.S. 1048, 106 S.Ct. 1268, 89 L.Ed.2d 577 (1986). The more recent realistic and responsible analyses have generally concluded that the issue whether to reject requires an affirmative conclusion of trial prejudice. See State v. Hamm, 146 Wis.2d 130, 430 N.W.2d 584, 591 (1988). Perhaps the case most viably addressing eyewitness identification invalidity and the justification for relevant expert testimony comes from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Dispensa v. Lynaugh, 847 F.2d 211 (5th Cir.1988), as now addressed after release of the defendant from state penitentiary after serving four years on the fifteen year sentence. Under present general standards which apply to discretion under W.R.E. 403 and 702, expert witnesses who evaluate the eyewitness identification clearly meet criteria of either the Frye test or the more modern approach of W.R.E. 702. Discretion in 1988 concept cannot properly be used to deny validity of knowledgeable testimony as long as the evidence is retained within proper bounds as not individualized to separately attest to the validity or invalidity of the critiqued eyewitness. It is also recognized that the discretion in exercise has a proper place under W.R.E. 403 or 706 to reject testimony which may be redundant, lacking benefit, unduly prejudicial, or otherwise excludable as would similar expert witness information on subjects such as speed, point of impact, occurrence of a sexual offense, or psychological explanation of a delayed report. See State v. R.W., 200 N.J. Super. 560, 491 A.2d 1304, cert. granted 101 N.J. 206, 501 A.2d 891 (1985), judgment aff'd and modified, 104 N.J. 14, 514 A.2d 1287 (1986) (psychiatric analysis of testimonial capacity). Clearly, the trial court is not required within the proper exercise of discretion to always permit this evidence in every case where eyewitness identification exists. Close analysis justifies the exclusion where the identification testimony is unquestionably valid, such as a case of personal acquaintanceship, significant occurrence contact, or other clear identification by an obviously competent and knowledgeable witness. Similarly, where identification is not important to conviction, exclusion is justified since the testimony serves no probative function. The Arizona courts recognized these discretionary constraints in the case of State v. Poland, 132 Ariz. 269, 645 P.2d 784 (1982). Utah has followed a similar path in State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646 (Utah 1989). The evidence reaches relevance and admissability where identification is highly significant and, perhaps, reasonably questionable. In such a case, exclusion of the expert witness may factually constitute a directed verdict of conviction against the defendant. If we define discretion in real terms of judgmental decision and apply the principles emplaced in W.R.E. 702, answers in modern terms for expert witness testimony on eyewitness identification validation assume a rational structure. Where the key issue is the accused's identity as the perpetrator, rather than whether the crime was committed, the state is required to negate any reasonable probability of misidentification. Carter, 522 So.2d at 1109. The admissibility issues for use of the expert witness should be determined in advance of trial by Denno hearing or a motion in limine resolution. State v. Porraro, 121 R.I. 882, 404 A.2d 465 (1979). This is more rationally justified by planning, scheduling and expeditious trial proceedings. Also, since the cost of the attendance of the expert will usually fall upon the public, whether or not the witness testifies, savings are accommodated by advance decision in the Denno motion disposition. This process permits (a) determination of the expert status of the witness; (b) determination of the scope of the proposed testimony; and (c) application to the case as a discretional conclusion in consideration of the trial purpose and function. Function and purpose present discretional decision assessing whether there really is a viable issue of identification about which the scientific knowledge of the expert witness can aid the jury. 6 Ordover, Criminal Law Advocacy, at 6-1 (1988). For the trial of Engberg (as was recognized in Engberg I ), identification was central to prosecution and critical in defense. First to be questioned is the competency and qualification of the witness. Second is the appropriateness of the subject for expert witness testimony in a jury trial context. Third is the conformity of the testimony to the explanatory theory, and fourth is the eternal resolution in admissibility of weighing probative value versus prejudicial effect. Dr. Elizabeth Loftus was clearly qualified by national exposure and experience and particularly so since she had testified in Alberts v. State, 745 P.2d 898 (Wyo. 1987). See E. Loftus & J. Doyle, Eyewitness Testimony: Civil and Criminal (1987). The next step in properly considered analysis is assessment of expert testimony for admissibility validity. Clearly, this criteria was met and the proposed text enunciated within the offer of proof could not justify denial as validated with a witness of national reputation with an extensive history of courtroom forensic expert appearances. Her testimony came within the parameters of Downing, 753 F.2d 1224; Chapple, 660 P.2d 1208; and McDonald, 690 P.2d 709 as defined by the proper bounds of expert testimony under W.R.E. 702. Eyewitness identification legal jurisprudence has advanced too far since 1896 in In re Bryant's Estate, 35 A. 571, and even earlier studies, to now sustain denial of use of the expert criticism of impreciseness and invalidity. Consequently, it is then in the fourth concept that the trial court should exercise discretion when presented the conflicting genesis for decision. For a proper exercise of discretion, see State v. Cooper, 708 S.W.2d 299 (Mo. App. 1986), where the jury would have been bored with unconvincing evidence or insulted with an attack on their intelligence since no real issue of identification was presented. Bruce, 779 P.2d at 652. The test for use is a function of properly exercised discretion which should be essentially the same to address the admissibility of any expert witness testimony. Discretion is reasonableness when balancing probative function as a benefit and prejudice as a detriment. Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894 (Wyo. 1986). The Supreme Court of Colorado has most recently spoken on this subject in Campbell v. People, 814 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1991) in following Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 which is the pathway in justice and logic this court should also take. In other jurisdictions, the recent case law continues without remission from State v. Galloway, 275 N.W.2d 736 (Iowa 1979) through McDonald and Chapple to People v. Sanders, 51 Cal.3d 471, 273 Cal. Rptr. 537, 797 P.2d 561 (1990), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 2249, 114 L.Ed.2d 490 (1991) and then Parker v. State, 568 So.2d 335, 339 (Ala.Cr. App. 1990); State v. Hall, 244 Mont. 161, 797 P.2d 183 (1990); Melson, 556 A.2d 836 and State v. Kinsey, 797 P.2d 424 (Utah App.), cert. denied 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990). See also Hoffheimer, Requiring Jury Instructions on Eyewitness Identification Evidence at Federal Criminal Trials, 80 J.Crim.L. & Criminology 585 (1989) and Comment, Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification: The Constitution Says, Let the Expert Speak, 56 Tenn. L.Rev. 735 (1989). Wyoming sadly fails to turn forward to modernization at this crossing in criminal law adjudication. Additionally well critiqued, we would find Loftus & Schneider, Behold With Strange Surprise: Judicial Reactions to Expert Testimony Concerning Eyewitness Reliability, 56 UMKC L.Rev. 1 (1987). [31]