Opinion ID: 166039
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ineffective trial representation.

Text: Yarbrough argues he was entitled to a new trial because his trial attorney provided ineffective representation. Specifically, Yarbrough challenges his trial attorney’s decision not to call Randy Johnson to testify as a defense witness. 5 5 In his new trial motion, Yarbrough challenged his attorney’s representation for numerous other reasons. This is the only ineffective-assistance (continued...) - 14 - Ordinarily, we will not consider ineffective-assistance claims raised on direct appeal. See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504-05 (2003); United States v. Galloway, 56 F.3d 1239, 1240 (10th Cir. 1995) (reh’g en banc). This is because there will often be a need for a record to be developed beyond the trial, see Massaro, 538 U.S. at 504-05, and because “we benefit from the views of the district court regarding such claims,” United States v. Edgar, 348 F.3d 867, 869 (10th Cir. 2003). In this case, however, the district court already addressed Yarbrough’s ineffective-assistance claims. This, then, is one of those rare cases where we will consider a defendant’s ineffective-assistance claim on direct appeal. See United States v. Montoan-Herrera, 351 F.3d 462, 465 (10th Cir. 2003). To be entitled to relief, Yarbrough must establish both that his counsel’s performance was deficient and that that deficiency prejudiced Yarbrough’s defense. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Yarbrough asserts defense counsel should have called Randy Johnson, a monitoring mechanic, who would have testified that Yarbrough’s interpretation of the LQAP was correct and that Yarbrough could properly omit failing test results from his recertification data. Yarbrough’s defense attorney asserted in an affidavit that he (...continued) 5 claim, however, that he reasserts on appeal. - 15 - had originally intended to call Johnson, but decided not to do so because Johnson’s testimony would have been irrelevant or cumulative. Defense counsel further asserted Johnson never told him about Johnson’s interpretation of the LQAP. For the first time in his reply brief to this court, Yarbrough vaguely asserts that his defense attorney failed to interview Johnson diligently before deciding not to call him as a witness. We need not address whether defense counsel’s performance was deficient because we conclude counsel’s failing to call Johnson to testify did not prejudice his defense. See id. at 697. To establish prejudice, Johnson must show that, had defense counsel called Johnson to testify, there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have acquitted Yarbrough. See id. at 695. But even with Johnson’s testimony supporting Yarbrough’s interpretation of the LQAP, there was still significant evidence indicating that Yarbrough was not actually acting upon that interpretation when he changed challenge numbers to insure the filter farm’s and chemical testing facility’s ACAMS passed the recertification tests, nor do we believe there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have acquitted Yarbrough if it had heard this testimony. The district court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in denying Yarbrough a new trial on this basis. - 16 - B. Newly discovered evidence Patti King testified falsely. Yarbrough argues that he is entitled to a new trial in light of newly discovered evidence that Patti King’s testimony, that there was a newer version of the LQAP than the December 2001 version upon which Yarbrough was relying, was false. 6 A five-part test must be applied in determining whether this “newly discovered evidence” warrants a new trial. Defendant must show (1) the evidence was discovered after trial, (2) the failure to learn of the evidence was not caused by [his] own lack of diligence, (3) the new evidence is not merely impeaching, (4) the new evidence is material to the principal issues involved, and (5) the new evidence is of such a nature that in a new trial it would probably produce an acquittal. Higgins, 282 F.3d at 1278 (quotation omitted). Here, assuming Yarbrough can meet the other four requirements, he is not entitled to relief because his newly discovered evidence is not “of such a nature that in a new trial it would probably produce an acquittal.” Id. (quotation omitted). 6 Despite being aware that there was not a later LQAP version, Yarbrough never specifically requested that the district court grant him a new trial on this basis. Yarbrough only mentioned King’s false testimony in his memorandum filed just before the district court’s post-trial evidentiary hearing on an alleged sequestration order violation. Arguably, then, Yarbrough has waived this argument. See United States v. Humphrey, 208 F.3d 1190, 1200 (10th Cir. 2000). Nonetheless, because the district court appears to have addressed King’s testimony when the court denied Yarbrough a new trial, we too will address this claim’s merit. In doing so, we note that Fed. R. Crim. P. Rule 33(b)(1) permits a defendant to assert a new trial claim such as this one, alleging newly discovered evidence, within three years from the jury’s verdict. Therefore, Yarbrough’s claim challenging King’s testimony was not untimely under Rule 33. - 17 - Yarbrough’s defense was, in part, that he interpreted the December 2001 LQAP to permit him to omit first-shot failures when he was conducting a recertification test. King testified, instead, that one always had to include all first-shot failures, even when conducting a recertification test. King’s testimony also suggested there was a newer version of the LQAP that supported her interpretation. Nonetheless, King’s testimony on this point was confusing and also suggested she was in fact referring to the same December 2001 LQAP upon which Yarbrough was relying. Q Are you familiar with table six in the L.Q.A.P. regulations? A What reg are you reading from? Q Table six in the December 2001 regulations. A That’s an old one, yeah. Q But it was in effect in 2002; is that correct? A We have a new one. Q I know, but in June of 2002, the December 2001 regulation was in effect? A No, we have a new one. Q And when was the new one enacted? A Over a year ago – over two years ago [from the trial date, July 2003,] because I went back to the – to review it. Q Well, if in December 2001 we have this particular table six, are you saying that between then and June of 2002 it was changed? - 18 - A No. They’re all the same on how you do a baseline and have been for years. .... Q So there is a new table out there somewhere that says somewhere – and it’s a table six, it’s the same table that’s -- A No. It’s rewritten. Instead of having one book now, we have two books. There’s a user guide and also a – just another guide, and it’s in the L.Q.A.P. Q And do you know whether Mr. Yarbrough when he came back to work [in June 2002,] had a copy of this new – the new stuff? A Yes, he did. Q Did you see that? Did you see him in possession of that? A Yes. Q And when did you see him with those documents? A They were in his office. .... Q And to your knowledge . . . .[the LQAP was] modified or amended sometime in 2002? A No. I . . . believe we got a new one over a year ago, so -- Q 2001? A Yeah, I do believe. Q Does that – A 2002 – maybe it’s 2002. Anyway, we’ve got – I think we get a new one every year. - 19 - Q And that one [that the witness had been reviewing] does indicate that it was in effect in December of 2001; is that correct? A That’s correct. During her testimony, King did eventually agree with defense counsel that the LQAP’s table six did not specifically state that Yarbrough had to include first-shot failures – “it doesn’t say not first challenge, so we assume – and talking to the guys that wrote this, which I have talked personally to, you go by the first challenge.” King’s testimony, then, was confusing. After a post-trial evidentiary hearing, the district court found that King’s testimony had been mistaken, but not intentionally false. At trial, no other witness testified that there was a newer LQAP than the December 2001 version. Nor did anyone testify that there was a version that explicitly required Yarbrough to include the first-shot challenges when conducting a recertification test. Other government witnesses, like King, testified that they had always included the first-shot failures when conducting recertification tests. Yarbrough acknowledged that this was true. His defense was that, at the time he conducted the recertification tests at issue in this case, he interpreted the LQAP to permit him to omit first-shot failures. As outlined above, there was significant evidence from which the jury could have inferred that Yarbrough’s interpretation of the LQAP was only a post hoc justification for his - 20 - using false numbers in his reports to insure the ACAMS passed and that, at the time he was conducting the recertification tests at issue here, he was actually not acting pursuant to his later asserted interpretation of the LQAP. In light of that significant evidence, Yarbrough’s newly discovered evidence, that there was no version of the LQAP newer than December 2001, was not evidence “of such a nature that in a new trial it would probably produce an acquittal.” Higgins, 282 F.3d at 1278 (quotation omitted). C. Improper prosecutorial argument. Yarbrough asserted he was entitled to a new trial in light of the prosecutor’s improper closing argument. We review the district court’s decision to deny Yarbrough a new trial based upon the prosecutor’s improper argument only for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Gabaldon, 91 F.3d 91, 93 & n. 1, 94 (10th Cir. 1996). Yarbrough asserts that “the prosecuting attorneys misrepresented to the jury in closing argument that Mr. Yarbrough had written down his data numbers on his data sheet moments before taking the sheets over to the statistician for input, implying clearly, and falsely, without any basis in evidence in the record, that the numbers were fabricated on the spot and were not real valid results of ACAMS challenges.” Specifically, the prosecutor argued Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, if you had been in the monitoring shop on the C.A.M.D.S. site on the morning of July 3 of - 21 - 2002, you’d have seen David Yarbrough finishing entries into that black book that he was finishing up completing just before he walked those numbers over to Cherice Day to ask her to give him a health report on the beginning of his baseline. .... Again, if you’d been in David Yarbrough’s office on the 24th of July, you’d have seen him with his personal sheets making entries – making entries onto his personal sheets before he crossed the yard and again presented his personal sheets to Cherice Day to get an INACCMO report done on the [chemical testing facility] baseline. As set forth above, there was evidence to support the prosecutor’s argument that Yarbrough made up some of the numbers he gave to Statistician Day. The question of when Yarbrough made up those numbers, right before he gave them to the statistician or much earlier, was not pertinent to the criminal charges against Yarbrough. The prosecutor’s argument, then, did not deprive Yarbrough of a fair trial. See Gabaldon, 91 F.3d at 95. Yarbrough also challenges the prosecutor’s telling jurors they should ignore the LQAP altogether; referring to operators’ testimony that was never given; misrepresenting the incriminating statement Yarbrough gave the investigator as a “confession ‘to providing false information;’” eliciting “misleading testimony about chain of custody and formal data handling procedures;” and misrepresenting that “Yarbrough instructed Harold Park to have the operators write down his first shot if it passed and not to use it if it failed.” Yarbrough did not raise these - 22 - claims initially in his new trial motion, but instead later asserted them in his memorandum filed with the district court just before the district court conducted a post-trial evidentiary hearing, almost four months after the jury’s verdict. Because these claims are not based upon allegations of newly discovered evidence, however, Rule 33(b)(2) required Yarbrough to raise them within seven days of the jury’s verdict. He did not do so. And this seven-day time frame is jurisdictional. See United States v. Quintanilla , 193 F.3d 1139, 1148 (10th Cir. 1999). Yarbrough cannot circumvent this jurisdictional time limit by later trying to amend his new trial motion to add these other claims. See id. Therefore, the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider these other claims alleging prosecutorial misconduct. And we will not consider these claims now. 7 D. Sequestration order violation. In a single sentence in his brief, Yarbrough vaguely asserts, without any further explanation, that “a key Government witness violated the district court’s sequestration order and spoke with other Government witnesses.” We will not consider such an inadequately briefed issue. See Gross v. Burgraff Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1547 (10th Cir. 1995); see also United States v. Kravchuk, 335 F.3d 1147, 1153 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 941 (2003). 7 Even if we did consider these claims’ merits, however, we are satisfied none of these allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, considered separately or together, were sufficient to warrant relief. - 23 -