Opinion ID: 885610
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Failure to inform defendant of a lesser included offense

Text: ¶ 20 Thee claims his decision to change his plea to guilty to deliberate homicide was neither voluntary nor intelligent because the decision was not based upon a complete understanding of the plea's punitive implications. Thee asserts he would have insisted upon going to trial had Olson informed him of the possibility that a jury could convict him of a lesser included offense, specifically mitigated deliberate homicide under § 45-5-103, MCA. ¶ 21 At the change of plea hearing on April 17, 1998, the District Court judge probed Thee's understanding of the implications of changing his plea. THE COURT: Did you read the plea agreement over before signing? THE DEFENDANT: It was read to me. THE COURT: Did you enter the plea agreement voluntarily? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I was broken up at the time, but yes, I did. THE COURT: Well, I mean, at the time is one thing. But we're here now. And this is an opportunity to tell the court whether or not you voluntarily are going to go forward with the plea agreement. I don't want you to feel that we're forcing you to enter into this plea agreement. Do you understand that? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. ¶ 22 The court proceeded to query Thee in detail regarding his understanding of the punishment outlined in the plea agreement. The court specifically asked Thee whether he understood he waived certain rights by pleading guilty, including the right to trial by jury or bench trial, the right to assistance of counsel through the trial process, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, the right not to be compelled to testify against himself, the right to require his guilt be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and the right to appeal. ¶ 23 The colloquy encompassed a discussion of lesser included offenses, as follows: THE COURT: And you also have the right to submit an instruction to the jury regarding lesser included offenses if they would apply. Do you understand that? THE DEFENDANT: I don't remember what me and you were talking about. THE COURT: Do you have a question? (WHEREUPON, the defendant conferred with Mr. Olson.) The transcript provides no further reference to lesser included offenses and Thee's grasp of the concept remains ambiguous in the court record. ¶ 24 Failure of an attorney to inform a client of the relevant law constitutes deficient performance under the first prong of the Strickland test. Hill, 474 U.S. at 62, 106 S.Ct. at 372, 88 L.Ed.2d at 212. However, included offenses are not relevant to Thee's situation. Neither mitigated deliberate homicide nor negligent homicide are included offenses of deliberate homicide as defined in § 45-5-102(1)(b), MCA. Sections 45-5-103(3) and 45-5-104(2), MCA (1997). Because Thee was charged with deliberate homicide under the felony murder rule of § 45-5-102(1)(b), MCA, neither mitigated deliberate homicide nor negligent homicide was considered a lesser included offense. Consequently, Thee did not waive a right to a jury instruction on a lesser included offense when he waived his right to a trial. Olson had no duty to inform Thee about the possibility of conviction at trial of a lesser included offense when such a possibility did not legally exist. Thee's claim that he pleaded guilty involuntarily because his attorney did not inform him of the possibility of a lesser included offense carries no legal weight. We find no error in the District Court's finding that Thee voluntarily changed his plea to guilty.