Opinion ID: 2051038
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Proportionate Penalty

Text: We next consider whether the stalking statute violates the proportionate penalties clause of our State constitution. (Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 11.) In cause No. 76151, the trial judge found that the stalking statute was unconstitutional because it gave unfettered discretion to prosecutors in charging violations of the statute, thereby nullifying the assault and disorderly conduct statutes (720 ILCS 5/12-1, 26-1(a)(1) (West 1992)). The trial judge believed that the stalking statute combined conduct already prohibited by the disorderly conduct and assault statutes, yet punished that conduct more severely than disorderly conduct or assault. As a result, the trial judge concluded that prosecutors would charge defendants under the stalking statute in order to seek a more severe sentence, thereby nullifying the disorderly conduct and assault statutes. We disagree. A person commits the offense of assault when, without lawful authority, he engages in conduct which places another in reasonable apprehension of receiving a battery. (720 ILCS 5/12-1 (West 1992).) A person commits a battery if he intentionally or knowingly without legal justification and by any means, (1) causes bodily harm to an individual or (2) makes physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with an individual. (720 ILCS 5/12-3 (West 1992).) The offense of disorderly conduct is committed when a person knowingly [d]oes any act in such unreasonable manner as to alarm or disturb another and to provoke a breach of the peace. 720 ILCS 5/26-1(a)(1) (West 1992). Although under some circumstances, conduct constituting stalking might also constitute the offenses of assault and disorderly conduct, the three offenses do not contain identical elements. For instance, assault is not limited to particular kinds of conduct such as following or surveillance. Further, stalking requires an intent to place the victim in reasonable apprehension of bodily harm, while the assault statute encompasses the less serious harm of apprehension of insulting or provoking contact. Stalking also requires the transmitting of a threat, while disorderly conduct can be committed simply by disturbing or annoying another, rather than intending to place the victim in reasonable apprehension of bodily harm. Moreover, stalking requires affirmative acts of following or surveillance, while disorderly conduct does not. Therefore, the trial court's conclusion that the existence of the stalking statute gives prosecutors unfettered discretion in charging violations of the statute, thereby nullifying the assault and disorderly conduct statutes, is unwarranted. Moreover, as this court has previously stated, the availability of different punishments for separate offenses based on the commission of the same acts does not offend the constitutional guarantees of equal protection or due process. ( People v. Wade (1989), 131 Ill.2d 370, 379, 137 Ill.Dec. 608, 546 N.E.2d 553, citing United States v. Batchelder (1979), 442 U.S. 114, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 60 L.Ed.2d 755, and People v. McCollough (1974), 57 Ill.2d 440, 313 N.E.2d 462; cf. People v. Christy (1990), 139 Ill.2d 172, 151 Ill.Dec. 315, 564 N.E.2d 770.) Accordingly, the trial court erred in concluding that the stalking statute violated the proportionate penalties clause. We also reject Bailey's contention that stalking is a less serious offense than assault and disorderly conduct, and therefore the sentence under the stalking statute is disproportionate. Bailey's argument is premised on the fact that stalking does not include the phrase without lawful authority. As a result, Bailey maintains that the stalking statute punishes less serious conduct as a felony, while similar conduct done without lawful authority is punished as the misdemeanor offense of assault. However, as this court as previously explained, the stalking statute only sought to punish conduct performed without lawful authority. Therefore, Bailey's argument fails on this basis alone. However, it also fails for a more fundamental reason. All penalties are to be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship. (Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 11.) While this court has acknowledged that article I, section 11, places some restraint on the right of the legislature to establish penalties for crimes, this court has been reluctant to invalidate penalties prescribed by the legislature, since, institutionally, the legislature is better able to gauge the evils affecting our society and more capable of measuring the seriousness of various offenses than the courts. (People v. Simmons (1991), 145 Ill.2d 264, 270, 164 Ill.Dec. 568, 583 N.E.2d 484; People v. Hamm (1992), 149 Ill.2d 201, 219, 172 Ill.Dec. 179, 595 N.E.2d 540; People v. Steppan (1985), 105 Ill.2d 310, 319, 85 Ill.Dec. 495, 473 N.E.2d 1300.) Accordingly, this court will only invalidate a penalty when it is `cruel,' `degrading' or `so wholly disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of the community.' People v. Gonzales (1962), 25 Ill.2d 235, 240, 184 N.E.2d 833, quoting People ex rel. Bradley v. Illinois State Reformatory (1894), 148 Ill. 413, 421-22, 36 N.E. 76; see also People v. Farmer (1995), 165 Ill.2d 194, 210, 209 Ill.Dec. 33, 650 N.E.2d 1006; Hamm 149 Ill.2d at 219,172 Ill.Dec. 179, 595 N.E.2d 540. We do not believe that the sentencing scheme for stalking imposes penalties which are unconstitutionally disproportionate to the offense. The stalking laws reflect the legislature's decisions that stalking is fundamentally different from other offenses like assault and disorderly conduct and therefore the penalties for stalking must be correspondingly more severe. While conduct which constitutes assault and disorderly conduct may also constitute stalking, these other statutes do not address the repetitive nature of the conduct and the harm attendant on victims subjected to the repeated conduct. Because the statutes have different purposes, it is presumed that the legislature considered different factors in enacting each penalty provision. ( People v. Wisslead (1985), 108 Ill.2d 389, 92 Ill.Dec. 226, 484 N.E.2d 1081; Steppan, 105 Ill.2d at 321, 85 Ill.Dec. 495, 473 N.E.2d 1300.) We believe the imposition of greater sentences for stalking reflects the seriousness of the offense and is reasonably designed to remedy the evils of stalking and its attendant social repercussions. We therefore find no reason to depart from the presumptive validity of this legislative enactment. See Terrell, 132 Ill.2d at 216, 138 Ill.Dec. 176, 547 N.E.2d 145.