Opinion ID: 2518592
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Zane's only argument on appeal

Text: In Zane's answering brief, she argued in pertinent part that DaimlerChrysler's BI coverage was not applicable because DaimlerChrysler was not a tortfeasor: Liberty Mutual cites cases for the proposition that the liability policies of all parties, whether liable or not, should be considered in the credit. . . . [T]he cases cited do not apply because they do not involve . . . contribution by a non-liable party. . . . . . . . Delahoussaye[ v. Madere, 733 So.2d 679 (La.Ct.App.1999)], did not give any credit for . . . a non-liable . . . party's policy limits. . . . . . . . [The defendant] Belcher's payment and policy limits, as [those of] a non-liable party, w[ere] totally excluded by both trial and appellate courts. . . . . . . . Liberty Mutual cites Schmidt v. Clothier, 338 N.W.2d 256 (Minn.1983)[,] and Johnson v. Am[.] Family Mut[.] Ins[.] Co., 426 N.W.2d 419 (Minn.1988)[,] for the proposition that it is entitled to a credit for even non-liable parties. Neither case supports that claim. . . . . . . . It makes no sense to require Zane to forego the . . . contribution from DaimlerChrysler . . . where it was obvious that [it] was truly for nuisance value. . . . . . . . . . . Liberty Mutual's contention that Zane [should] be required to pursue a non-liable party conflicts with Taylor's rationale. . . . It is implicit from the context and reasoning . . . that the court's reference to recovery of the tortfeasor's liability coverage refers to a tortfeasor that is liable to the plaintiff. It seems academic that one who is not liable to the plaintiff is by definition not a tortfeasor. . . . . Liberty Mutual's policy requirement to exhaust insurance policy limits applies only to applicable policies. . . . DaimlerChrysler's policy was not applicable because there was no liability. . . . . [I]nsurance coverage of parties that are not liable are simply not applicable to the loss and do not violate Liberty Mutual's provision requiring exhaustion of applicable liability policies. (Citation omitted.) Then, in her response to Liberty Mutual's cert application, Zane argued: Liberty Mutual does not challenge the undisputed fact that discovery and case preparation did not support a claim against DaimlerChrysler (hence DaimlerChrysler was not a tortfeasor ). . . . The ICA's conclusion that DaimlerChrysler was not legally responsible for Zane's injuries is clearly supported. . . . . . . [T]he ICA decision was based on the fact that all parties agreed that DaimlerChrysler was not a tortfeasor after discovery and case preparation failed to develop a viable theory of liability against DaimlerChrysler. . . . . . . . [U]nlike . . . Taylor, in the instant case it was undisputed that DaimlerChrysler[] was not legally responsible for Zane's injuries and[,] thus, not a tortfeasor. Therefore, Da[im]lerChrysler's insurance was not less than its liability . . . because it was not liable . . . . . . . . . . . A party is liable within the meaning of [HRS §] 663-11[, see supra note 9,] if the injured person could have recovered damages in a direct action against that party[] had the injured person chosen to pursue such an action. Gump . . ., 93 Hawai`i [at] 422, 5 P.3d [at] 412. . . . (Some emphases added and one omitted.) (Heading omitted.) (Quoting Zane I at 24.) In sum, Zane represented on appeal [16] that DaimlerChrysler's BI coverage did not apply to the Taylor gap because DaimlerChrysler, having settled for what the parties agree was nuisance value rather than a liquidation of actual fault, was not a tortfeasor for purposes of the Taylor rule.