Opinion ID: 148961
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Is This a New Claim under AEDPA?

Text: The relief that is available under Rule 60(b) in habeas proceedings must be granted consistently with the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). Ruiz v. Quarterman, 504 F.3d 523, 526 (5th Cir.2007); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). The Supreme Court has described how AEDPA and Rule 60(b) motions operate in harmony. Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 125 S.Ct. 2641, 162 L.Ed.2d 480 (2005). Under AEDPA, any successive habeas claim that has not already been adjudicated must be dismissed unless it relies on either a new and retroactive rule of constitutional law or new facts showing a high probability of actual innocence. Id. at 530, 125 S.Ct. 2641. Where a Rule 60(b) motion raises a new habeas claim, the motion is considered a successive habeas application: Using Rule 60(b) to present new claims for relief from a state court's judgment of convictioneven claims couched in the language of a true Rule 60(b) motioncircumvents AEDPA's requirement that a new claim be dismissed unless it relies on either a new rule of constitutional law or newly discovered facts. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 531, 125 S.Ct. 2641. But there is no new habeas claim where a petitioner merely asserts that a previous ruling which precluded a merits determination was in errorfor example, a denial for such reasons as failure to exhaust, procedural default, or statute-of-limitations bar. Id. at 532 n. 4, 125 S.Ct. 2641. If neither the [Rule 60(b)] motion itself nor the federal judgment from which it seeks relief substantively addresses federal grounds for setting aside the movant's state conviction, allowing the motion to proceed as denominated creates no inconsistency with the habeas statute or rules. Id. at 533, 125 S.Ct. 2641. Balentine now alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, in violation of his rights under the Sixth Amendment, when his initial counsel failed to investigate mitigating evidence for the sentencing phase of his trial. [1] See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003). The State argues that Balentine's initial federal habeas application never raised a Sixth Amendment claim for counsel's failure to investigate mitigating evidence. If that is so, then Balentine's Rule 60(b) motion raised a new claim that constitutes a successive habeas application barred by AEDPA. See § 2244(b)(2). Consequently, whether AEDPA requires dismissal of Balentine's Rule 60(b) motion in part depends on when the issue of ineffective assistance for failure to investigate mitigating evidence was first presented in earlier proceedings. A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to investigate mitigation evidence was not raised on direct appeal. Nor was a claim of failure to investigate mitigation evidence presented in the state habeas application that was filed in 2002. Instead, the initial state habeas application made a weak assertion of a failure to present mitigation evidence. We now look for whether Balentine raised the Wiggins claim in federal district court in his Section 2254 habeas petition, filed in 2003 and amended in 2004. The State contends that Balentine's federal habeas petition did not state a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance for counsel's failure to investigate and present mitigating evidence. Rather, the State asserts that any claim regarding mitigation was an Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment challenge. The relevant section of Balentine's federal habeas application was titled Ground Eight (IAC [Ineffective Assistance of Counsel] Lockett Doctrine & Risk Assessment): Balentine was denied his federal Eighth and Fourteenth [A]mendment rights to individualized sentencing. Trial counsel failed to present any evidence at all in the punishment phase. This section of the application asserted that the trial counsel's performance was deficient. It included five arguments in support of counsel's constitutional deficiency with regard to mitigating evidence. The application then stated that such deficient performance of trial counsel raises a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different and cites to the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, and to Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The general rule is that arguments not raised before the district court are waived on appeal. State Indus. Prods. Corp. v. Beta Tech., Inc., 575 F.3d 450, 456 (5th Cir.2009). The errant heading in a brief does not waive an argument. Balentine raised a Sixth Amendment argument. Both the magistrate judge and this court ruled on it. See Belt v. EmCare, Inc., 444 F.3d 403, 409 (5th Cir.2006) (holding that an issue is preserved for appeal where the issue was sufficiently raised for the court to rule on it). The section's title gave some misdirection with the reference to Lockett, but Balentine's claim was nonetheless for ineffective assistance of counsel. The section title contained counsel's acronym for ineffective assistance of counsel, IAC, and stated that counsel failed to present any evidence at all in the punishment phase. Additionally, Balentine presented his argument in terms of Strickland v. Washington and Wiggins v. Smith , both Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel cases. Further, the section's subheadings tracked the two-prong test for ineffective counsel. Subheading 2 was titled Trial counsel's performance was deficient, and subheading 3 was titled The deficient performance raises a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different. The magistrate judge properly recognized the claim as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim and ruled on it, and on appeal this court considered the claim to be one for ineffective assistance. Balentine, 324 Fed.Appx. at 305-06. Thus, Balentine's federal habeas application stated a Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and the Rule 60(b) motion does not present a new habeas claim barred by AEDPA.