Opinion ID: 4057169
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: predicate termination grounds

Text: The trial court predicated termination of Mother’s parental rights on subsections L and O of section 161.001(1) of the Texas Family Code. Mother does not challenge the subsection L finding on appeal. An unchallenged fact finding is binding on an appellate court “unless the contrary is established as a matter of law, or if there is no evidence to support the finding.” McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex. 1986); see In re E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d 239, 249 (Tex. 2013) (unchallenged findings of fact supported termination under section 161.001(1)(O) because record supported those findings); In re C.N.S., No. 14–14–00301–CV, 2014 WL 3887722,  (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 7, 2014) (mem. op.) (same). As discussed below, our review of the record leads us to conclude there is no evidence of one of the facts necessary to support a finding under subsection L. Therefore, that finding, even though unchallenged by Mother, is not binding on us.
Subsection L permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows the parent “has been convicted or placed on community supervision, including deferred adjudication community supervision, for being criminally responsible for the death or serious injury of a child under . . . [certain] sections of the Penal Code. . . .” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(L); In re A.L., 389 S.W.3d 896, 900 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.). “Serious injury” is not defined in the Family Code. When a term is not defined in a statute, we apply its ordinary meaning. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 312.002 (West 2013); City of San Antonio v. Hartman, 201 S.W.3d 667, 672 n.19 (Tex. 2006); In re A.L., 389 S.W.3d at 901. We previously described “serious injury” as follows: 5 “Serious” means “having important or dangerous possible consequences,” while “injury” means “hurt, damage, or loss sustained.” In re A.L., 389 S.W.3d at 901 (following C.H. v. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., No. 01–11–00385–CV, 01–11–00454–CV, 01–11–00455–CV, 2012 WL 586972,  (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 23, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.). One of the enumerated sections of the Penal Code is section 22.041, which concerns abandoning or endangering a child. Id. § 161.001(1)(L)(x). A person commits an offense under section 22.041 if she “knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence, by act or omission, engages in conduct that places a child younger than 15 years in imminent danger of death, bodily injury, or physical or mental impairment.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.041(c) (West 2011). Subsection L requires proof of two facts: (1) the death or serious injury of a child, for which (2) the parent was convicted or placed on community supervision. See In re A.L., 389 S.W.3d at 900–01 (“serious injury” requirement applies to each offense listed in subsection L). The Department introduced evidence of two deferred adjudications for Mother: one for endangering Jason in 2013 (the offense for which she was arrested when this case began), and one for endangering David in 2011. Mother pleaded guilty to both charges. Charge of endangering Jason. Mother signed a judicial confession in which she agreed that on or about June 22, 2013, she intentionally and recklessly placed Jason in danger of bodily injury by leaving him in the apartment without food or adult supervision.4 4 However, in her statements to Department personnel and in her testimony at trial, she 6 Charge of endangering David. The record does not contain the judicial confession or the indictment for the 2011 deferred adjudication concerning David, so we do not know the facts she confessed. Mother testified about that charge at trial, though: Q. [Y]our conviction in 2011, you left your children home alone; is that correct? A. Yes. Q. And you pled guilty to endangering your children and leaving them home alone? A. Yes. Q. In that case, they were home alone all night and your children went in to a neighbor’s house at midnight and fell asleep on a neighbor’s couch; is that accurate? A. No. Q. But you still pled guilty? A. Part of it is accurate and the other part not accurate. Q. But you pled guilty to that, correct? A. Yes. There is evidence of both deferred adjudications, but there is no evidence of a serious injury to either Jason or David that resulted from Mother’s endangering them. While death or serious injury is an inherent element of some of the offenses listed in subsection L (e.g. murder, manslaughter, and assault), “serious injury is not an element of child endangerment.” In re N.M., No. 07–13–00325–CV, 2014 WL 718657,  (Tex. App.—Amarillo Feb. 21, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) For that reason, the Department was required to prove the child suffered a serious injury. Because we do not know the facts underlying the 2011 deferred adjudication, we denied leaving him alone. She said she was advised to “plead guilty or [the Department is] going to terminate my rights while I was on trial for the criminal case.” 7 cannot say if David suffered a serious injury. Therefore, the Department failed to meet its burden of proof with regard to subsection L. Because we are not bound by the trial court’s finding on subsection L, we will not affirm the judgment on the basis of that finding. Accordingly, we will review the evidence to support the trial court’s finding under subsection O. B. Failure to Comply with Court Order (Subsection O) Termination is warranted if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent: failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for the parent to obtain the return of the child who has been in the permanent or temporary managing conservatorship of the Department of Family and Protective Services for not less than nine months as a result of the child’s removal from the parent under Chapter 262 for the abuse or neglect of the child. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(O). Mother concedes (1) she failed to comply with the court-ordered family service plan, and (2) the Department had temporary managing conservatorship of David for not less than nine months. However, she contends the Department did not prove the third element: that David was removed from her care due to abuse or neglect. 1. “Removal . . . for the abuse or neglect of the child” In the past, courts of appeals disagreed about what it meant for a child to be removed for abuse or neglect. Some held only the actual abuse or neglect satisfied that portion of subsection O.5 At least one held “abuse or neglect” under subsection O includes the risk of abuse or neglect.6 5 See, e.g., In re C.B., 376 S.W.3d 244, 252 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2012, no pet.); Mann 8 In 2013, the Texas Supreme Court agreed with the latter holding and concluded subsection O contemplates both actual abuse or neglect and the risk of abuse or neglect. In re E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d at 246. The court wrote: “[A]buse or neglect of the child” necessarily includes the risks or threats of the environment in which the child is placed. Part of that calculus includes the harm suffered or the danger faced by other children under the parent’s care. Id. at 248. Mother argues that although she was arrested for endangering Jason, the Department did not prove she abused or neglected David. That argument is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, the supreme court rejected it in In re E.C.R. Evidence of “danger faced” by Jason is some evidence that David was removed for abuse or neglect. See id. at 248. Second, as we discuss next, the record contains legally and factually sufficient evidence of Mother’s actual neglect of David, not just a risk of neglect due to her neglect of one of his brothers. 2. Evidence of abuse or neglect of the children Mother was charged twice for child endangerment. She pleaded guilty to each charge. She admitted at trial that she left the children, who were not old enough to care for themselves, alone on the day she was arrested and they were removed. Considering all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding, and disregarding all the evidence the trial court could reasonably have disbelieved, we conclude the evidence is legally sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that David was removed from Mother’s care due to abuse or neglect. v. Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., No. 01–08–01004–CV, 2009 WL 2961396, at –8 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 17, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re S.A.P., 169 S.W.3d 685, 706–07 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005, no pet.). 6 In re M.L.J., No. 02–07–00178–CV, 2008 WL 1932076,  (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 1, 2008, pet. denied) (mem. op.). 9 At trial Mother said her guilty plea to one of two charges of child endangerment was false in that she did not leave her children alone. She also contended the children were supervised by her neighbor. That testimony is relevant to our factual sufficiency review, in which we consider the entire record, including disputed or conflicting evidence. However, we cannot say her denials are so significant that the trial court could not have reasonably found David was removed due to abuse or neglect. We are mindful of our role as reviewers; we give due deference to the trial court’s findings, and we cannot substitute our judgment for the trial court’s judgment. See In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 108. Mother concedes (1) she failed to complete court-ordered services, and (2) the Department was David’s temporary managing conservator for not less than nine months. The trial court’s finding as to the third requirement of section 161.001(1)(O), that David was removed from Mother’s care for abuse or neglect, is supported by legally and factually sufficient evidence. We overrule Mother’s first issue.