Opinion ID: 1160382
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Introduction of Statement.

Text: The appellant next contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial based on the introduction of a statement Saars allegedly made to a police officer. At the trial the district attorney asked a police officer on direct examination about the process of booking the defendant. The officer replied in narrative form. In that narrative he related that, upon finding a watch in Saars' clothing, he had asked about it and Saars had replied, I forgot about it. Defense counsel did not object at that point. On redirect, the officer, in response to a question, repeated that comment by Saars when confronted with the watch. At this point defense counsel, in chambers, moved for a mistrial. The motion was denied and the court immediately instructed the jury to disregard the question and answer. The prosecution later established that this watch found on Saars at the time of booking belonged to the victim. No other property of hers was found on him. Saars predicates his argument that it was reversible error not to declare a mistrial on the ground that his response, I forgot about it, constituted a statement which the prosecutor improperly elicited at trial after having told the court and defense counsel at a preliminary hearing that no statement by Saars existed. The appellant contends that this statement should have been furnished to the defense during discovery. Moreover, he asserts that the injection of this statement at the trial was so prejudicial that it was reversible error not to declare a mistrial. Rulings on mistrial motions are within the trial court's discretion and, absent an abuse of that discretion, the trial court's determination will not be disturbed on review. People v. Becker, 187 Colo. 344, 531 P.2d 386 (1975); People v. Steed, Colo., 540 P.2d 323 (1975); People v. Gomez, 184 Colo. 319, 519 P.2d 1191 (1974). The trial court, having observed first-hand the effect of the quoted remark on the jurors, concluded that it was not sufficiently prejudicial to require a mistrial. Moreover, since there was no defense objection when the contested statement first came into evidence, it is questionable whether prejudicial error of law can be predicated on denying a mistrial when the same four words were repeated. The trial court instructed the jury to disregard the statement, and our case law has recognized a presumption that juries follow that instruction. People v. Mejia, 188 Colo. 120, 534 P.2d 779 (1975). We hold, therefore, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial.