Opinion ID: 1593630
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutionality of Sections 632.480-632.513

Text: Murrell alleges that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss the State's petition because sections 632.480-632.513 are unconstitutional in that they permit civil commitment of an individual without requiring proof that the individual's mental abnormality makes him more likely than not to commit a sexually violent offense in the immediate future. Rather, he urges, the statutes allow commitment based on a finding that a person may be a danger at some indefinite time into the future and will commit a sexually violent offense over the course of an entire lifetime and are, therefore, unconstitutional.
This Court reviews issues of law de novo. Barker v. Barker, 98 S.W.3d 532, 534 (Mo. banc 2003). Statutes are presumed to be constitutional. Suffian v. Usher, 19 S.W.3d 130, 134 (Mo. banc 2000) (citations omitted). This Court will resolve all doubt in favor of the act's validity and may make every reasonable intendment to sustain the constitutionality of the statute. Westin Crown Plaza Hotel v. King, 664 S.W.2d 2, 5 (Mo. banc 1984). If a statutory provision can be interpreted in two ways, one constitutional and the other not constitutional, the constitutional construction shall be adopted. See Asbury v. Lombardi, 846 S.W.2d 196, 199 (Mo. banc 1993).
The Missouri General Assembly has identified sexually violent predators as a very real threat to the safety of the people of Missouri. As a result, if a previously convicted sexually violent offender is found to have a mental abnormality making him dangerous at the time of scheduled release, sections 632.480 et. seq. establish the process pursuant to which he or she may be civilly committed. [7] Section 632.480 defines mental abnormality and sexually violent predator as follows: Mental abnormality, a congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses in a degree constituting such person a menace to the health and safety of others[.] . . . Sexually violent predator, any person who suffers from a mental abnormality which makes the person more likely than not to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility. [8] Sec. 632.480(2), 632.480(5). Pursuant to its police power, a state may enact SVP statutes providing for the involuntary civil commitment of dangerous persons provided the commitment takes place pursuant to proper procedures and evidentiary standards. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997); see also Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80, 112 S.Ct. 1780, 118 L.Ed.2d 437 (1992). The Supreme Court in O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 95 S.Ct. 2486, 45 L.Ed.2d 396 (1975), held that a finding of mental illness alone will not justify locking up a person against his will for an indefinite period of time. Id. at 575, 95 S.Ct. 2486. Rather, due process requires that a person be both mentally ill and dangerous in order to be civilly committed; the absence of either characteristic renders involuntary civil confinement unconstitutional. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 77, 112 S.Ct. 1780. See also Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358, 117 S.Ct. 2072. The individual must not only be dangerous at the time of, but also during, commitment, for if his involuntary confinement was initially permissible, it could not constitutionally continue after a basis no longer existed. O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 575, 95 S.Ct. 2486. Moreover, due process requires that the mental abnormality and dangerousness be inextricably intertwined, such that involuntary civil confinement [is limited] to those who suffer from a volitional impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their control. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358, 117 S.Ct. 2072. The result being, as found in Thomas, that to pass constitutional muster the statute must require a finding of future dangerousness and then link that finding to the existence of a mental abnormality or personality disorder that causes the individual serious difficulty controlling his behavior. See Thomas, 74 S.W.3d at 791-92; see also Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358, 117 S.Ct. 2072; Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. at 413, 122 S.Ct. 867.
Murrell contends that future dangerousness requires a showing that the individual poses an imminent, immediate threat of harm. Essentially, Murrell's argument is that due process requires proof that an individual will commit a sexually violent offense at a specific time. This precise issue need not be considered. As noted by the Supreme Court of California in Hubbart v. Superior Court, 19 Cal.4th 1138, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 492, 969 P.2d 584 (1999), nothing in Hendricks or the cases on which it relied suggests that a commitment scheme must require the trier of fact to pinpoint the time at which future injury is likely to occur if the person is not confined. 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 492, 969 P.2d at 600. Murrell is dangerous at the time of commitment precisely because he currently presents a danger of committing a sexually violent offense. The language of section 632.480 is written in the present tense and necessarily requires the jury to find an individual presently poses a danger to society if released. Under the plain language of the statute, a person may not be confined absent a finding he suffers from a mental abnormality that makes the person more likely than not to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility. Sec. 632.480(5). In order to be found to suffer from a mental abnormality, a person must have a condition affecting the congenital or volitional capacity that predisposes the person to commit a sexually violent offense in a degree constituting such person a menace [9] to health and safety of others. Id. Missouri's SVP statute requires a finding that, to be committed, the individual 1) has a history of past sexually violent behavior; 2) a mental abnormality; and 3) the abnormality creates a danger to others if the person is not incapacitated. That is all Hendricks requires. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357, 117 S.Ct. 2072. It is neither possible nor constitutionally required that the jury be charged with determining at what precise time Murrell's present dangerousness will result in sexually violent behavior. See Hubbart, 81 Cal. Rptr.2d 492, 969 P.2d at 600. Because the statute can be construed in a constitutional manner, it need not be invalidated for any alleged lack of specificity and need not be read to require any additional or different constitutional requirements. See Kearney Special Road Dist. v. County of Clay, 863 S.W.2d 841, 842 (Mo. banc 1993); Asbury, 846 S.W.2d at 199. In addition, Missouri's statutory scheme provides for an annual examination of the committed individual's mental health condition. Sec. 632.498.1. Following the procedures set forth in the statute, if the director, the judge, or a jury finds that the individual no longer suffers from a mental abnormality that makes him more likely than not to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence, he shall be conditionally released. Sec. 632.498.5(4). Indeed, commitment pursuant to the SVP statute is not necessarily indefinite, nor a life sentence. [T]he confinement's duration is instead linked to the stated purposes of the commitment, namely, to hold the person until his mental abnormality no longer causes him to be a threat to others. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 363, 117 S.Ct. 2072. The annual review mechanism ensures involuntary confinement that was initially permissible will not continue after the basis for it no longer exists. O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 575, 95 S.Ct. 2486. It is, of course, hoped that the committed individual responds to treatment so that he is no longer a threat. The present tense language and annual review mechanism allow Missouri's SVP statute to comport with the due process protections of the United States Constitution, and Murrell has failed to present any authority to suggest the Missouri Constitution provides any greater protection relating to the civil confinement of repeat sexual offenders. The Court's decision today is in accord with the decisions reached by courts in other states that have considered this issue. Martin v. Reinstein, 195 Ariz. 293, 987 P.2d 779, 800 (App.1999) (statute required more than a mere possibility, in that it specifically requires that an accused SVP have a mental disorder that renders him 'likely' to engage in acts of sexual violence . . . [and][w]e have defined `likely' as probable rather than merely possible); Hubbart, 19 Cal.4th 1138, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 492, 969 P.2d 584, 599 (1999), (statute upheld because the statutory criteria are expressed in the present tense, indicating that each must exist at the time the verdict is rendered); In re the Detention of Selby, 710 N.W.2d 249, 252 (Iowa App.2005) (statute upheld because the present tense language of chapter 229A requires that a person be found to be both dangerous and to have a mental abnormality at the time of the proposed commitment . . . and [it] provides for a yearly review of the individual's condition); Beasley v. Molett, 95 S.W.3d 590, 600 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2002) (declaring that by definition a menace is a threat or imminent danger and that therefore, in its own terms, the act satisfied any proof requirement of an imminent risk of future harm).