Opinion ID: 1492035
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: .Transportation Company Policy 38,638

Text: Rule 32 of the commission provides that no policy shall be altered by substitution of another for the original risk without notice to and approval in writing by the Commission. Form E, adopted by commission regulation, provides that the policy to which this endorsement is attached shall not terminate either by expiration or cancellation until after twenty days' notice of such termination in writing by the insurer to the Corporation Commission. The Transportation Company contends that Ex. 5 is evidence of notice of cancellation, and the court so instructed the jury. It charged the jury, in substance, that if the original of Ex. 5 was genuine and had been issued by an officer of the motor carrier department of the commission, that it would be evidence warranting the finding that notice of cancellation was given and the policy canceled. While Ex. 5 may have been evidence that notice of cancellation was given, it was not evidence that such notice was in writing. Furthermore, Holland testified that he delivered the original of Ex. 5, with the blanks filled in except for the signature of the commission, together with policy 8007 to M. B. Hickman, and stated to the latter that policy 8007 was filed in lieu of policy 38,638. Thus it appears that the notice of cancellation was oral and not in writing, as required by the regulation of the commission. It is true M. B. Hickman testified that it was the practice, when an insurance company desired to cancel a policy, for the broker or agent representing the insured, to bring in a new policy and ask to have it stamped and filed, and for the commission then to send out in the regular course of mail an acknowledgment of receipt of notice of cancellation of the old policy. But the rules and regulations of the commission, made in conformity to the statute, had the same force and effect as if they had been incorporated into the statute itself. Caha v. United States, 152 U. S. 211, 14 S. Ct. 513, 38 L. Ed. 415; Ex parte Reed, 100 U. S. 13, 25 L. Ed. 538. The regulations here in question were not mere rules of procedure which the commission might waive. MacFayden v. Public Utilities Corp., 50 Idaho, 651, 299 P. 671; Gillis v. Public Service Comm. of Pa., 105 Pa. Super. Ct. 389, 161 A. 563. On the contrary they were substantial provisions, and became a part of the contract between the insurer and the state for the protection of the public. Their purpose was to make certain that motor carriers operating on the public highways of Oklahoma should at no time be without insurance for the protection of the public. While the commission might rescind such regulations, we doubt that it could waive them while they remained in force. Certainly, administrative assistants such as Patton and M. B. Hickman had no power to waive such regulations. The need for such regulations and for strict adherence to their requirements, is forcibly demonstrated by the facts in this case. Here we have a claim of oral notice of cancellation by the filing of a substituted policy which was shortly canceled. Policy 38,638 in the meantime remained in the files of the commission with no written evidence of any character in the files or records of the commission showing its cancellation. As a consequence no steps were taken by the commission to require a new policy or to cancel the Reynolds permit, because we must assume that, had notice of such cancellation been given in accordance with the regulations, the commission would have performed its legal duty and have required a new policy, or ordered cancellation of the permit. We conclude that the court erred in admitting evidence of the custom or practice to accept oral notices of cancellation. We further conclude that the charge of the court was erroneous in so far as it permitted the jury to find notice of cancellation of policy 38,638 other than by written notice given in accordance with regulation 32 and form E.