Opinion ID: 3134295
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prevention of Abuse.

Text: (1) Protective Orders. The court may at any time on its own initiative, or on motion of any party or witness, make a protective order as justice requires, denying, limiting, conditioning, or regulating discovery to prevent unreasonable annoyance, expense, embarrassment, disadvantage, or oppression. (2) Supervision of Discovery. Upon the motion of any party or witness, on notice to all parties, or on its own initiative without notice, the court may supervise all or any part of any discovery procedure.” (Emphasis added.) 166 Ill. 2d R. 201. Rule 201 and related rules governing specific discovery methods form a comprehensive scheme for fair and efficient discovery with judicial oversight to protect litigants from harassment. The consent procedure under section 2–1003(a) is inconsistent with this scheme and substantially undermines it. First of all, the consent procedure set forth in section 2–1003(a) is simply unauthorized by Rule 201(a), which specifies that information is obtainable “as provided in these rules” and enumerates the authorized methods of discovery. More importantly, section 2–1003(a) circumvents the relevance requirement set forth in Rule 201(b)(1). To be certain, the scope of information considered “relevant” under this court's discovery rules is expansive, including not only evidence that would itself be admissible at trial, but also information leading to the discovery of admissible evidence. See Monier v. Chamberlain , 31 Ill. 2d 400, 403 (1964); 166 Ill. 2d R. 201(b), Committee Comments. The concept of relevance facilitates trial preparation while safeguarding against improper and abusive discovery. In addition, the relevance requirement has a constitutional dimension which is discussed later. Unlike our rules, however, section 2–1003(a) places no limitation whatsoever on the scope of medical information subject to disclosure. To the contrary, the mandated disclosure is described in the broadest possible terms. The plaintiff must consent to the disclosure of medical information by “ each person or entity who has provided health care at any time ,” and must authorize them to furnish “a complete copy of the chart or record of health care in the possession of the provider.” (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/2–1003(a) (West 1996). The plaintiff must also authorize ex parte communications with his or her health care providers concerning medical history and the health care provider's observations related to “the patient's state of health, prognosis, etiology, or cause of the patient's state of health at any time .” (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/2–1003(a)(4) (West 1996). There is no language in this provision in any manner restricting the consent requirement to the injury which is the subject of the lawsuit or to related medical conditions. Under section 2–1003(a), as a condition of proceeding with his or her lawsuit, an injured party must consent to the disclosure of medical information wholly unrelated the injury for which recovery is sought. Indeed, under the unqualified language of section 2–1003(a), the injured party may have to consent to the release of complete medical records held by health care providers who have never treated the injured party for any condition even remotely related to the subject matter of the lawsuit. The consent procedure set forth in section 2–1003(a) goes well beyond the legitimate objectives of discovery as reflected in this court's rules. Instead, section 2–1003(a) seems to be designed to discourage tort victims from pursuing valid claims by subjecting them to the threat of harassment and embarrassment through unreasonable and oppressive disclosure requirements. Defendants and the Attorney General have attempted to justify section 2–1003(a) on the basis that the physician-patient privilege did not exist at common law (see Parkson v. Central DuPage Hospital , 105 Ill. App. 3d 850, 852-53 (1982)) but is instead a creature of statute. Thus, defendants and the Attorney General contend that the General Assembly is empowered to redefine the scope of the privilege. But section 2–1003(a) goes beyond merely delineating the scope of the physician-patient privilege: rather it essentially provides a mechanism for discovery of medical information that, by failing to meet the requirement of relevance, would not be discoverable regardless of the privilege. Stated differently, defendants and the Attorney General ignore the fact that the relevance requirement is an independent constraint on discovery: information does not become relevant–and thus subject to discovery–simply because it is not privileged. Defendants and the Attorney General also insist that section 2–1003(a) affords the trial court discretion to limit disclosure, thereby safeguarding against the improper and abusive use of the consent procedure. They submit that the existence of such discretion is implicit in certain language in the statute and is supported by the legislative history of the provision. Plaintiffs respond that section 2–1003(a) provides for no such judicial oversight. We agree with plaintiffs. The question presented is one of statutory construction, and familiar principles apply. The cardinal rule of statutory construction, to which all other canons and rules are subordinate, is to ascertain and give effect to the true intent and meaning of the legislature. Solich v. George & Anna Portes Cancer Prevention Center of Chicago, Inc. , 158 Ill. 2d 76, 81 (1994). In doing so the court should look first to the statutory language, which is the best indication of the legislature's intent. Solich , 158 Ill. 2d at 81. Where the meaning of an enactment is unclear from the statutory language itself, the court may look beyond the language employed and consider the purpose behind the law and the evils the law was designed to remedy. Solich , 158 Ill. 2d at 81. Where statutory language is ambiguous, it is appropriate to examine the legislative history. People v. Hickman , 163 Ill. 2d 250, 261 (1994). However, when the language is clear, it will be given effect without resort to other aids for construction. Hickman , 163 Ill. 2d at 261; Solich , 158 Ill. 2d at 81. Here, the language of the statute at issue is clear and unequivocal. In unqualified and unconditional terms, the statute directs personal injury plaintiffs to deliver signed consents to the release of medical information. There is no reference whatsoever to any form of judicial oversight or any discretionary power to safeguard against abusive use of the consent procedure. As written, section 2–1003(a) envisions disclosure of medical information without limitation, and without regard to the relevance of the information or the oppressive nature of disclosure. There is no rule of construction which authorizes a court to declare that the legislature did not mean what the plain language of the statute imports, and a court is not at liberty to depart from the plain language of a statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations or conditions that the legislature did not express. Solich , 158 Ill. 2d at 83. In support of their construction, defendants and the Attorney General note language in section 2–1003(a) indicating that “[t]he provisions of this subsection (a) do not restrict the right of any party to discovery pursuant to rule.” Defendants and the Attorney General apparently believe the “right to discovery pursuant to rule” embraces the right to apply for a protective order against requests for consents under section 2–1003(a). We disagree. Under our rules, discovery methods consist of depositions, written interrogatories to the parties, discovery of documents, objects or tangible things, inspection of real estate, requests to admit, and physical and mental examination of persons. 166 Ill. 2d R. 201. The issuance of a protective order is not a type of discovery, rather it is a means of limiting discovery . The language in section 2–1003(a) preserving the right to discovery pursuant to rule only means that the legislature did not intend for the consent procedure to be exclusive, and that litigants may avail themselves of the methods of discovery provided for by our rules. In no way does this language place any limits on the consent procedure under section 2–1003(a). Defendants and the Attorney General also rely on the portion of section 2–1003(a) stating that “[a] request for a Consent  does not preclude such subsequent requests as may reasonably be made seeking to expand the scope of an earlier Consent which was limited to less than all the authority permitted by subdivisions (1) through (4) of this subsection (a) .” (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/2–1003(a) (West 1994). Defendants and the Attorney General maintain that because the statute provides for expansion of a consent previously limited by a court, it necessarily recognizes the court's discretion to limit the scope of consents. The flaw in this argument is that this portion of the statute makes no reference to the consent being limited “by a court.” Rather the reference to a limited consent simply means one which is limited by its own terms or is limited on its face. This provision contemplates the situation where, for whatever reason, a defendant initially requests consent to disclosure of less than all the types of medical information authorized under the statute, and later seeks to expand the request. Defendants' and the Attorney General's interpretation that “limited” means limited by the court is not a reasonable or plausible alternative. Any authority on the part of the trial court to limit the scope of a consent would be meaningless if the requesting party could simply submit additional consents seeking the same type of disclosure. Defendants and the Attorney General also rely on legislative history to support their view that section 2–1003(a) provides for judicial oversight of the release of medical information. During the proceedings in the House of Representatives, the sponsors of this measure indicated that under the consent procedure, the plaintiff had 28 days to obtain a court order limiting the extent of disclosure. See 89th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, February 16, 1995, at 142 (statements of Representative Cross); 89th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, February 16, 1995, at 164-65 (statements of Representative Ryder). However, because the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, we have no occasion to consider its legislative history. Envirite Corp. v. Illinois Environmental Protection Agency , 158 Ill. 2d 210, 216-17 (1994). We further note that while courts give some consideration to statements by a sponsor of a bill, such statements are not controlling. People v. Hickman , 163 Ill. 2d 250, 262 (1994). The statutory language at issue here is clear. The plaintiff's obligation to consent to the disclosure of medical information is absolute and unqualified; nowhere is it provided that the trial court may regulate the scope of disclosure. Defendants and the Attorney General also direct our attention to a number of decisions where this court has upheld procedural statutes against separation of powers challenges. See, e.g. , DeLuna v. St. Elizabeth's Hospital , 147 Ill. 2d 57 (1992); Strukoff v. Strukoff , 76 Ill. 2d 53 (1979); People v. Walker , 119 Ill. 2d 465 (1988); Niven v. Siqueira , 109 Ill. 2d 357 (1985). The cases cited are inapposite, however, as they do not involve any claimed conflict between a statute and a supreme court rule. The trial court correctly ruled that section 2–1003(a) represents an impermissible encroachment upon the authority of the judicial branch.