Opinion ID: 1495930
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Punitive Damages Statutes

Text: In enacting KRS 411.184 and KRS 411.186, the General Assembly intended to preempt the common law on punitive damages and to occupy the field. It said as much in KRS 411.184(5): This statute is applicable to all cases in which punitive damages are sought and supersedes any and all existing statutory or judicial law insofar as such law is inconsistent with the provisions of this statute. The Court of Appeals construed this and similar language found in KRS 411.186 as authorizing punitive damages in all cases in which the statutory elements of fraud, oppression or malice were present. But the more likely interpretation of this language is that the statutes apply only to those cases in which punitive damages are already authorized by common law or by statute. This construction flows from the nature of the two statutes themselves, which established procedures and guidelines for awarding punitive damages in civil actions. KRS 411.184(1)(f) defines punitive damages. KRS 411.184(2) sets forth the type of conductfraud, oppression or malicethat may be subject to punitive damages and the standard of proof for proving punitive damages. KRS 411.184(1)(a)-(c) defines fraud, oppression and malice. KRS 411.186(1) states that the issue of punitive damages shall be determined concurrently with all other issues presented, i.e., punitive damages are not to be bifurcated from the issues of liability and compensatory damages. Finally, KRS 411.186(2) sets out the factors that the trier of fact should consider if it determines that punitive damages may be assessed in a case. The provisions of these statutes provide clear guidelines for the awarding and assessment of punitive damages. There is nothing to indicate that the General Assembly intended to expand the availability of punitive damages in enacting these statutes. In fact, the General Assembly's statutory treatment of punitive damages since the enactment of KRS 411.184 and KRS 411.186 indicates a contrary intent. Since enacting these two statutes, the General Assembly has enacted a number of statutes that expressly provide for punitive damages as a remedy for violation of the statute. In fact, two of these, which were enacted in 1992, fall within the KCRA: KRS 344.660 and KRS 344.665, both of which provide for both actual and punitive damages for discriminatory housing practices. The express inclusion of punitive damages in these statutes is redundant and unnecessary if KRS 411.184 and KRS 411.186 created the right to punitive damages in all cases where the statutory elements for punitive damages are present. Such a result violates the universal rule ... that in construing statutes it must be presumed that the Legislature intended something by what it attempted to do. Reyes v. Hardin County, Ky., 55 S.W.3d 337, 342 (2001) (emphasis in original). Therefore, we hold that KRS 411.184 and KRS 411.186 do not make punitive damages available under KRS 344.450.
The trial court ordered that the judgments against Appellants should bear post-judgment interest. The Court of Appeals concluded that this award was in error because the KCRA does not specifically provide for interest and, thus, the order cannot be enforced against the Commonwealth, its agencies or officers. On cross-appeal, McCullough argues that the Court of Appeals got this issue wrong. We disagree. State agencies are not liable for interest unless there is statutory authority or a contractual provision authorizing the payment of interest. Powell v. Board of Education of Harrodsburg, Ky.App., 829 S.W.2d 940, 941 (1992). Moreover, because of sovereign immunity principles, a statute waiving immunity must be strictly construed and cannot be read to encompass the allowance of interest unless so specified. Id. While the KCRA specifically provides that a plaintiff may recover costs, it makes no provision for interest. Therefore, we hold that interest may not be awarded against the Commonwealth or its agencies in connection with a judgment obtained under the KCRA. Likewise, interest may not be awarded against Warden Sowders because judgment was rendered against him in his official capacity. See Yanero v. Davis, Ky., 65 S.W.3d 510, 522 (2001).
The Court of Appeals held that McCullough could maintain a claim against Warden Sowders for punitive damages and remanded the case for a trial on that claim. Appellants' appeal that holding. But our holding that punitive damages are not available under the KCRA makes this issue moot. Our holding also renders moot McCullough's argument that she is entitled to a missing evidence instruction at retrial on the issue of punitive damages against Sowders. Finally, we briefly address an issue decided by the Court of Appeals, but not raised on appeal to this Court by either party. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in awarding attorneys' fees without proper findings to justify the award given. Because this holding is not raised on appeal or cross-appeal, we will not discuss it on the merits. We mention this only to clarify why the case is being remanded for reconsideration of attorneys' fees.