Opinion ID: 2358047
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: statutory right to counsel and appeal

Text: The flaw in Merrick 's reasoning was its failure to recognize that the reason Wine focused solely on constitutional issues was that it involved only the denial of a first appeal because of ineffective assistance of counsel, thus falling squarely within the constitutional parameters of Douglas and Evitts . Wine was not required to address whether the loss of a statutory right of appeal because of counsel error would justify granting a reinstated or belated appeal. KRS 22A.020(1) provides: Except as provided in Section 110 of the Constitution, an appeal may be taken as a matter of right to the Court of Appeals from any conviction, final judgment, order, or decree in any case in Circuit Court, ... unless such conviction, final judgment, order, or decree was rendered on an appeal from a court inferior to Circuit Court. (Emphasis added.) This statute was previously compiled at KRS 21.140(1) and, before that, codified at Section 334 of the Criminal Code of Practice. In Commonwealth v. Schumacher, 566 S.W.2d 762 (Ky.App.1978), the Court of Appeals held that the portion of KRS 22A.020(4) that requires the Attorney General's approval before a prosecutor can appeal a ruling of a circuit court to the Court of Appeals is unconstitutional as an infringement of the Kentucky Supreme Court's constitutional authority to prescribe rules governing practice and procedure in the Court of Justice. Id. at 764 (construing Ky. Const. § 116). However, in Commonwealth v. Bailey, 71 S.W.3d 73 (Ky.2002), we noted that the Judicial Amendment authorized the General Assembly to prescribe the appellate jurisdiction of the newly created Court of Appeals. Id. at 77; see also Ky. Const. § 111(2) (In all other cases, [the Court of Appeals] shall exercise appellate jurisdiction as provided by law.). KRS 22A.020(1) purports to confer jurisdiction only upon the Court of Appeals, thus does not affect Section 116 (The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe rules governing its appellate jurisdiction.... (Emphasis added.)). Thus, in addition to the constitutional right to  at least one appeal to another court, Ky. Const. § 115 (emphasis added), the General Assembly has created a statutory matter-of-right appeal to the Court of Appeals from any order of a circuit court. McIntosh v. Commonwealth, 368 S.W.2d 331, 335 (Ky.1963) (construing former KRS 21.140(1)). In Commonwealth v. Stamps, 672 S.W.2d 336 (Ky.1984), we recognized that RCr 11.42 creates a conditional right to counsel, and that KRS 31.110 authorizes appointment of counsel in such a proceeding if the person seeking relief is a needy person. Id. at 339. Specifically, RCr 11.42(5) provides, inter alia: If the answer raises a material issue of fact that cannot be determined on the face of the record the court shall grant a prompt hearing and, if the movant is without counsel of record and if financially unable to employ counsel, shall upon specific written request by the movant appoint counsel to represent the movant in the proceeding, including appeal. (Emphasis added.) KRS 31.110 provides, inter alia: (1) A needy person who is being detained by a law enforcement officer ... is entitled: (a) To be represented by an attorney to the same extent as a person having his own counsel is so entitled; .... .... (2) A needy person who is entitled to be represented by an attorney under subsection (1) of this section is entitled: .... (c) To be represented in any other post-conviction ... proceeding that the attorney and the needy person considers [sic] appropriate. However, if the counsel appointed in such post-conviction ... remedy, with the court involved, determines that it is not a proceeding that a reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to bring at his own expense, there shall be no further right to be represented by counsel under the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis added.) We construed these two provisions together in Fraser v. Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 448 (Ky.2001), and concluded that RCr 11.42(5) establishes when a judge must appoint counsel for an indigent movant and that KRS 31.110(2)(c) establishes when the DPA may provide legal services even without judicial appointment. Id. at 456 (overruling Commonwealth v. Ivey, 599 S.W.2d 456, 457 (Ky.1980), insofar as it held that a judge was required to appoint counsel in an RCr 11.42 proceeding upon request regardless of the stage of the proceedings). Finally, KRS 31.219(1) provides: It shall be the duty of the attorney representing a client under any public advocacy plan to perfect an appeal if his client requests an appeal. We do not regard the statutory right to counsel and to an appeal to be a useless formality. Cullins v. Crouse, 348 F.2d 887, 889 (10th Cir.1965). For this court to recognize that an indigent has a statutory right to counsel, but then refuse to require some modicum of competency by such counsel, seems repugnant to the obvious legislative intent. Brown v. State, 278 Kan. 481, 101 P.3d 1201, 1203 (2004) (quoting McCarty v. State, 32 Kan.App.2d 402, 83 P.3d 249, 253 (2004) (Greene, J., dissenting)). The specification of the authority and duties of the DPA in KRS 31.030 clearly anticipates that the representation provided to indigent defendants will be at least minimally competent. See also KRS 31.071(1)(b) (In order to be qualified for appointment as [local] public advocate, a person must have been admitted to the practice of law and licensed to practice in the Commonwealth of Kentucky and be competent to counsel and defend a person charged with a crime.  (Emphasis added.)). Our holding in this regard should not be construed as sanctioning the filing of a subsequent RCr 11.42 motion for the purpose of claiming ineffective assistance of counsel in litigating a previous RCr 11.42 motion. Such potentially interminable post-conviction proceedings would certainly bring our judicial system to its knees. Wine, 694 S.W.2d at 694. However, when incompetence of counsel, especially state-appointed counsel, costs an indigent defendant a statutory right of appeal, that defendant ought to be entitled at least to a reinstated or belated appeal. See Whitney v. State, 334 Ark. 581, 976 S.W.2d 391, 392 (1998) (granting belated appeal from denial of post-conviction relief where attorney admitted fault in failing to timely file notice of appeal); Rosado v. State, 864 So.2d 533, 534 (Fla. Dist.Ct.App.2004) (granting belated appeal where indigent defendant requested that attorney appeal from order denying post-conviction relief and attorney refused because defendant did not forward filing fee, which indigents were not required to pay); Brown, 101 P.3d at 1203-04 (granting belated appeal from order denying post-conviction relief where appointed counsel failed to notify defendant of his appointment, of the date of the evidentiary hearing, of the denial of the motion, and of the right to appeal); Austin v. State, 305 S.C. 453, 409 S.E.2d 395, 396 (1991) (remanding for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether defendant requested and was denied an opportunity to seek appellate review of order denying post-conviction relief). Thus, we reject the dictum in Merrick, 132 S.W.3d at 221, that suggests that a reinstated or belated appeal is never available except in a direct first appeal of a judgment of conviction. Whether denominated ineffective assistance or incompetence, filing a notice of appeal in the wrong court and thereby costing an indigent defendant the statutory right of appeal is undoubtedly inadequate legal representation that warrants the granting of a belated appeal in this case. As in Rosado, 864 So.2d at 533, there is no need to remand No. 2004-SC-0552-DG for an evidentiary hearing with respect to whether Hawkins condoned, agreed to, or in some way contributed to the loss of his right to appeal. Wine, 694 S.W.2d at 695. The Commonwealth does not suggest that Hawkins did not request that the attempted appeal be filed; and, obviously, the notice of appeal would have been timely filed if counsel had simply mailed it to the correct circuit court. Thus, we reverse the Court of Appeals and remand No. 2004-SC-0552-DG to that Court with instructions to grant Hawkins's motion for belated appeal. However, application of the principles set forth herein and in Fraser requires a different result in No. 2004-SC-0550-DG. As explained, supra, Appellant Moore did not have a constitutional right to counsel or effective assistance of counsel in prosecuting his RCr 11.42 motion or in appealing the denial thereof. Nor was he entitled to appointment of counsel under RCr 11.42(5), because the allegations in his motion could be determined on the face of the record without an evidentiary hearing. Fraser, 59 S.W.3d at 452-53; cf. Stamps, 672 S.W.2d at 339 (any error assignable under Ivey was harmless because transcript of Boykin hearing clearly refuted allegations contained in RCr 11.42 motion). Although KRS 22A.020(1) created a statutory right of appeal, the provisions of KRS 31.110(2)(c) and KRS 31.219(1) do not apply to Moore because the trial court did not appoint the DPA to represent him. Thus, though he was entitled to appeal, it was his obligation to exercise that right by taking the action he finally took on May 2, 2002, more than two months too late. Obviously, he contributed to his own failure to timely file a notice of appeal. Thus, the Court of Appeals properly denied his motion for a belated appeal. Wine, 694 S.W.2d at 695.