Opinion ID: 3031369
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: (2)(B)(ii).

Text: [2] Limon sought a waiver pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(k), which provides that: Any alien, inadmissible from the United States under paragraph (5)(A) or (7)(A)(i)2 of subsection (a), who is in possession of an immigrant visa may, if otherwise admissible, be admitted in the discretion of the Attorney General if the Attorney General is satisfied that inadmissibility was not known to, and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of reasonable diligence by, the immigrant before the time of departure of the vessel or aircraft from the last port outside the United States and outside foreign contiguous territory or, in the case of an immigrant coming from foreign contiguous territory, before the time of the immigrant’s application for admission. (emphasis added). [3] Prior to the enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”), this court reviewed denials of § 212(k) waivers. See Senica v. INS, 16 F.3d 1013, 1015 (9th Cir. 1994). We have not addressed the reviewability of these waivers since IIRIRA’s enactment. There have, however, been several decisions exploring the parameters of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) and IIRIRA’s other jurisdiction-stripping provisions. [4] In Spencer Enter., Inc. v. United States, 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003), this court enunciated the general framework for applying the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of 2 This is the provision that applies to Limon, who did not appeal the IJ’s determination that she was not “in possession of a valid unexpired immigrant visa” pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). LIMON v. GONZALES 4395 § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). There, we noted that, in order for this provision to apply, the discretionary authority had to be “specified” under the INA. Id. at 689. Section 212(k) clearly satisfies this requirement, as it specifies that the ultimate waiver determination lies in the hands of the Attorney General. 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (k) (“may . . . be admitted in the discretion of the Attorney General”); see also San Pedro v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1156, 1157 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that similar language in 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H) clearly specifies that the waiver is in the Attorney General’s discretion). In Spencer Enterprises we also considered the “authority” component of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), concluding that “[i]f the authority for a particular act is in the discretion of the Attorney General . . . the right or power to act is entirely within his or her judgment or conscience. Such acts are matters of pure discretion, rather than discretion guided by legal standards.” 345 F.3d at 690. We noted that a decision such as whether to classify an alien’s past offense as a “particularly serious crime” is lacking in statutory guidelines, and thus left entirely to the discretion of the Attorney General, which renders the decision unreviewable. See id. (discussing Matsuk v. INS, 247 F.3d 999, 1002 (9th Cir. 2001)). [5] Applying these principles, we recently confronted an appeal from a denial of a waiver of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H). San Pedro, 395 F.3d at 1157. As does § 212(k), § 1227(a)(1)(H) clearly commits the decision to grant or deny the waiver to the discretion of the Attorney General, and it also sets forth various eligibility requirements for the waiver, such as being the spouse, parent, son or daughter of a U.S. citizen or LPR, and being in possession of an immigrant visa. In San Pedro, the IJ had found the petitioner statutorily ineligible for the waiver because he failed to possess an immigrant visa or equivalent document, and also alternatively denied the waiver in the exercise of discretion. Id. The BIA summarily affirmed. We remanded for the BIA to specify the basis for its affirmance, explaining that if it 4396 LIMON v. GONZALES affirmed the IJ’s discretionary determination, we would lack jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). Id. On the other hand, we noted, we would have jurisdiction to review the nondiscretionary statutory eligibility elements, if they instead formed the basis of the BIA’s decision. Id. We have reached similar conclusions in other contexts. In dealing with cancellation of removal, we have exercised jurisdiction over various non-discretionary eligibility requirements, such as the determination as to whether there has been “continuous physical presence” in the United States, even though we lack jurisdiction to review the ultimate discretionary decision by the Attorney General. See Lopez-Alvarado v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 847, 850-51 (9th Cir. 2004). In the same context, however, we held that the existence of “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” is a subjective, discretionary inquiry, and that we lack jurisdiction to review this discretionary determination by the Attorney General. Romero-Torres v. Ashcroft, 327 F.3d 887, 892 (9th Cir. 2003). In Nakamoto v. Ashcroft, 363 F.3d 874 (9th Cir. 2004), we determined that we have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s finding that an alien committed marriage fraud. Similar to the language in § 212(k), the provision at issue in Nakamoto provides that an alien shall be deportable if “it appears to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that the alien has failed or refused to fulfill the alien’s marital agreement which in the opinion of the Attorney General was made for the purpose of procuring the alien’s admission as an immigrant.” Id. at 879 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(G)(ii)) (emphasis added). We found that the phrases “to the satisfaction of the Attorney General” and “in the opinion of the Attorney General” were used to identify the decision-maker, and not to specifically grant discretionary authority to the Attorney General. See id. at 879-80. We further concluded that the determination of whether an individual had procured a visa by marriage fraud is “a question of fact, determined through the application of traditional legal standards . . . . The Attorney General must LIMON v. GONZALES 4397 undertake an objective inquiry and refrain from imposing his or her own subjective values on the interpretation of the facts.” Id. at 881. Thus, we determined that the decision was not entirely discretionary and that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) did not deprive this court of jurisdiction. Id. [6] Applying the principles from this line of cases, it seems likely that we would lack jurisdiction over the ultimate exercise of discretion as to whether or not to grant the § 212(k) waiver. Cf. San Pedro, 395 F.3d at 1157-58. However, in this case the BIA did not actually exercise that discretion. Rather, the BIA determined that Limon had not met her burden of proving eligibility for the waiver, because she did not exercise reasonable diligence to ascertain the validity of her visa. Accordingly, the question before us is whether the phrase “if the Attorney General is satisfied that inadmissibility was not known to, and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of reasonable diligence,” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(k), is a discretionary or nondiscretionary eligibility element. [7] We conclude that this element is nondiscretionary. The determination of whether the petitioner knew or should have known of her inadmissibility is essentially factual in nature, “determined through the application of traditional legal standards.” Nakamoto, 363 F.3d at 881. Likewise, “reasonable diligence” is a factual determination, resolved by the application of a legal standard to the facts in question. Indeed, “reasonableness” is a common legal standard, and an objective one at that, indicating that this is not a determination the Attorney General makes “solely according to the dictates of his or her conscience.” Id.; see also San Pedro, 395 F.3d at 1157 (“The specified discretion must be pure and unguided by legal standards.”); Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 345 F.3d 824, 83335 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that “extreme cruelty” is a nondiscretionary question, determined through the application of legal standards). Therefore, because the BIA denied Limon’s request based on this nondiscretionary eligibility requirement, 4398 LIMON v. GONZALES we have jurisdiction over Limon’s petition for review of this issue.