Opinion ID: 1198589
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Heading: Municipal Authority to Regulate Obscenity

Text: Under our state constitution, home rule cities are afforded significant powers to control local matters. [3] See Colo.Const. Article XX, Section 6. In the area of local and municipal matters, home-rule municipal authority may supercede within the territorial limits and other jurisdiction of said [home-rule] city or town any law of the state in conflict therewith. Colo.Const. Article XX, Section 6. See Vela v. People, 174 Colo. 465, 484 P.2d 1204 (1971) (homerule city may exercise exclusive jurisdiction by passing ordinances which supercede state statutes); Davis v. City and County of Denver, 140 Colo. 30, 342 P.2d 674 (1959). On the other hand, there exists areas of mixed state and local concern in which concurrent state and municipal power to regulate is recognized. See City of Aurora v. Martin, 181 Colo. 72, 507 P.2d 868 (1973). Finally, there are areas of exclusively state-wide concern where local power to regulate is preempted. See Vick v. People, 166 Colo. 565, 445 P.2d 220, cert. denied, 394 U.S. 945, 89 S.Ct. 1273, 22 L.Ed.2d 477 (1968); Century Electric Service & Repair, Inc. v. Stone, Colo., 564 P.2d 953 (announced May 16, 1977). This preemption is often triggered by a conflict between the state and local schemes of regulation. See Vick v. People, supra ; Sierota v. Scott, 143 Colo. 248, 352 P.2d 671 (1960); Ray v. City and County of Denver, 109 Colo. 74, 121 P.2d 886 (1942). With respect to the community standard required for determining whether given material is obscene, Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973), we have previously held that state-wide standards are required for application of a state obscenity statute. See People v. Tabron, Colo., 544 P.2d 380 (1976) (Tabron II) . In Tabron II, we also expressly reserved ruling on whether a local ordinance may impose a more restrictive standard than that prescribed in the interpretation of a state statute, but noted that a state statute should not be construed in a different manner in Denver, Littleton, Grand Junction, Colorado Springs, and Aspen. Tabron II, supra . The rationale behind this determination was that, in matters as fundamental as the exercise of free speech, to permit a balkanization of the state into a patchwork of jurisdictions imposing different standards as to what constitutes obscenity would impose an intolerable burden upon the intrastate exercise of free expression. [4] The effect is the same whether the fragmentation occurs by reason of variable construction of a state statute or variable standards imposed by municipal ordinances. The General Assembly has also recognized the statewide importance of a uniform definition of obscenity: The general assembly hereby finds and declares that the definition and regulation of obscenity as to minors, the definition and regulation of live sexual performances and sadomasochistic material and sadomasochistic performances as to minors and adults, and the definition and regulation of obscenity with regard to the printed or written word and to the public display of obscene materials (pursuant to part 4 of this article) are matters of statewide concern; that, in defining and regulating these areas, only statewide standards in a state statute are workable; and that these standards should not be construed in a different manner in the various municipalities and counties of this state. To this end, it is the intent of this part 1 and part 4 of this article to impose statewide standards for the definition and regulation of obscenity as to minors, live sexual performances and sadomasochistic material and sadomasochistic performances as to minors and adults, the printed or written word, and the public display of obscene materials, which standards shall be applicable and uniform throughout the state and all its political subdivisions. It is not the intent of the general assembly in the adoption of this part 1 to preempt the power of municipalities to adopt ordinances concerning the definition and regulation of obscenity as to adults; except that such ordinances as to adults shall not be inconsistent with those prohibitions or definitions selected by a municipality as set forth in this part 1 as to minors. 1976 Cum.Supp., section 18-7-101(1), C.R.S.1973; see also 1976 Cum.Supp., section 18-7-101(2), C.R.S.1973 (alternative regulatory measures for municipalities must be consistent with state law). Accordingly, we find that the question of the regulation of obscenity is properly a matter of state-wide concern under Colo.Const. Article XX, Section 6. [5] See generally Comment, Colorado Municipal Government Authority to Regulate Obscene Materials, 51 D.U.L.J. 75 (1974). This determination does not end the matter, however. In deciding the role of homerule cities in the regulation of obscenity in this state, we, of course, defer to the determination of our legislature that the matter of obscenity regulation is, in some respects, properly a matter for consistent state and local control. 1976 Cum.Supp., section 18-7-101, C.R.S.1973. See Woolverton v. City and County of Denver, 146 Colo. 247, 361 P.2d 982 (1961); Sierota v. Scott, supra . A further question, therefore, is posed by the determination by the trial court that the Denver ordinance exceeded and was inconsistent with the grant of power by the legislature. [6] Our review of the ordinance in question indicates that it clearly conflicts with the legislative grant of power in at least these respects: (a) the ordinance attempts to control the printed or written word, (b) the ordinance attempts to regulate obscenity as to minors, (c) the ordinance defines obscenity without regard to state-wide community standards, (d) the ordinance contains a definition of obscenity which is significantly broader than that contained in the state statute, and (e) the ordinance incorporates a definition of the required mens rea element which is materially broader than that contained in the state statute. [7] Compare Denver Revised Municipal Code 823 with 1976 Cum.Supp., section 18-7-101, et seq., C.R.S.1973. [8] While the ordinance in question contains a severability clause, Denver Revised Municipal Code 823.4, the pervasive character of its deficiencies renders futile any attempt to salvage it as a meaningful legislative enactment. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court which held the entire ordinance to be invalid.