Opinion ID: 221339
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Reasonableness of Erwin’s Sentence

Text: This Court “review[s] a district court’s sentencing determination, under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, for reasonableness.” United States v. Bolds, 511 F.3d 568, 578 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal quotations omitted). On appeal, we generally review a sentence imposed by the district court for both procedural and substantive reasonableness. See United States v. Smith, 516 F.3d 473, 476 (6th Cir. 2008). 5 Co-defendant Alonzo Lamar Holloway, the third supervisor in the scheme, pleaded guilty to all four counts of the second superseding indictment. He was sentenced to 108 months of imprisonment on Counts I through III, and 24 months on Count IV, to be served consecutively. 7 Nos. 10-1103, 10-1843 Erwin challenges only the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. Therefore, we need not review for procedural reasonableness. See United States v. Tate, 516 F.3d 459, 469 (6th Cir. 2008). “Substantive reasonableness turns on whether the length of the sentence is unreasonable because the sentencing court ‘select[ed] the sentence arbitrarily, bas[ed] the sentence on impermissible factors, . . . or [gave] an unreasonable amount of weight to any pertinent factor.’” United States v. Brown, 579 F.3d 672, 677 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Webb, 403 F.3d 373, 385 (6th Cir. 2005)). Sentences within the advisory Guidelines range are afforded a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness, see Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007), but we will not draw a negative presumption against sentences that fall outside of that range. See Tate, 516 F.3d at 469-70. “[A] district court’s decision to exercise its discretion to depart from the advisory Guidelines, either upward or downward, is reviewed for reasonableness.” United States v. Herrera-Zuniga, 571 F.3d 568, 581 (6th Cir. 2009). This Court accords substantial deference to such decisions, as “questions concerning sentencing departures necessarily address the district court’s ‘refined assessment of the many facts bearing on the outcome, informed by its vantage point and day-to-day experience in criminal sentencing.’” Id. at 583 (citing United States v. Pluta, 144 F.3d 968, 977 (6th Cir. 1998). Erwin argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because “[h]is advisory sentencing range was based on a Guideline calculation which . . . included three points of criminal history which arose out of a conviction which was barely within the 15-year window required by the Sentencing Guidelines to count . . . [which] resulted in an over-statement of Mr. Erwin’ criminal 8 Nos. 10-1103, 10-1843 history.” (Erwin Br. at 9.) Erwin also argues that his “sentence contravenes 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) and the mandate to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparity” because it is 12-months longer than the sentences imposed on any of his co-defendants. (Id.)
Erwin’s PSR identified 19 prior adult convictions and 16 additional arrests and prosecutions. Seven of these convictions were counted toward Erwin’s criminal history for the purposes of sentencing in this offense; the remaining twelve were not counted because they were too dated. The scored convictions were: transporting, possessing and selling narcotics (3 points); transporting and selling narcotics (3 points); burglary (1 point); receiving stolen property (1 point); obtaining and possessing a credit card without cardholder’s consent (1 point); possessing or selling personal information to establish false status or identity (1 point); and driving under the influence of alcohol (1 point). At sentencing, the district court identified Erwin’s “repeated convictions for a whole bevy of offenses including drug crimes, including lesser crimes for sure, but then including a series of fraud crimes.” (Erwin Sent. Tr. at 70.) It further highlighted the trend in Erwin’s history of receiving “progressively increasing punishments,” which had “done nothing to deter the law-breaking conduct.” (Id.) Lastly, it noted that Erwin’s PSR reflected “a history of basically 25 years of law-breaking and no history of law-abiding activity.” (Id.) Having reviewed these considerations, the district court “conclude[d] that the criminal history calculation substantially underrepresents either the seriousness of [Erwin’s] criminal history or the likelihood of recidivism.” (Id. at 67-68.) 9 Nos. 10-1103, 10-1843 Erwin now argues that the three points that he was assessed for a conviction for transporting, possessing and selling narcotics, for which he served a sentence between 1991 and 1994, was “obviously considered far too strongly by the court” in reaching its sentencing determination. (Erwin Br. at 12.) This is because, while that offense conduct “barely made it in” to the 15-year criminal conduct window mandated by U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(e), it accounted for three of the 12 criminal history points that Erwin was assessed, which he argues is imbalanced with its relative importance. (Id. at 7-8.) Erwin argues that in imposing sentence without re-weighing the relative importance of his prior convictions, the district court erred in not recognizing its “wide latitude in imposing sentence and the fact that sentences must be tailored to defendants and do not depend on the Guidelines for ultimate support.” (Id. at 13.) The government responds that “the record thoroughly supports its finding that Defendant had been breaking the law since he was 18, had shown no sign of changing his ways, and had proven impervious to the deterrent of increasingly longer sentences.” (Pl.’s Br. at 18-19.) Therefore, the government contends, “the district court could, and did, correctly conclude that [Criminal History Category] V did not reflect the likelihood of Defendant’s recidivism, and that the need to protect the public warranted treating him as a [Criminal History Category] VI instead of a [Criminal History Category] V.” (Id.) An upward departure may be taken under the following circumstance: If reliable information indicates that the defendant’s criminal history category substantially under-represents the seriousness of the defendant’s criminal history or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes, an upward departure may be warranted. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a)(1) 10 Nos. 10-1103, 10-1843 An upward departure under this section does not represent a deviation from the guidance provided by the Guidelines; instead this Court has held that “a departure is expressly encouraged under § 4A1.3 where the recommended sentencing range does not adequately account for the defendant’s past criminal conduct.” Herrera-Zuniga, 571 F.3d at 583 (internal quotations omitted). As an initial matter, it should be noted that the district court clearly considered Erwin’s criminal history and made an individually tailored decision about the relative weight to give to his prior offenses. That the district court recognized its “wide latitude in imposing sentence” is proven by the fact that it determined that a departure based on Erwin’s criminal history was warranted—albeit it an upward departure. Because the scored offenses underlying the calculation of a Criminal History Category V for Erwin only extended back 15 years, they did not clearly reflect the fact that Erwin had never had a significant period of time elapse during his adult life when he was free from crime. The limited scored offenses also failed to illustrate Erwin’s propensity to commit the same kinds of crimes—involving stolen property, stolen identities, and drug offenses—over and over again. This pattern directly implicates the probability of Erwin reoffending, which the district court addressed. (Erwin Sent. Tr. at 70.) Finally, the extent of Erwin’s criminal history, and the seeming failure of previous punishment to deter him from committing further crimes, also supports the district court’s conclusion that upward departure was warranted. Having reviewed Erwin’s record, it is clear that the district court reasonably determined, “in light of all the facts and circumstances of the particular case before it, whether the range in question 11 Nos. 10-1103, 10-1843 [was] appropriate to the case.” United States v. Brown, 371 F.3d 854, 860 (6th Cir. 2004) (internal quotations omitted). This Court will not disturb that determination.
Erwin argues that “the district court abused its discretion and imposed an unreasonable sentence by sentencing [him] to 12 years of incarceration when it sentenced Mr. Holloway and the other co-defendants to less . . . . It is further unreasonable because it contravenes 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) and the mandate to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparity.” (Def.’s Br. at 16.) In response to Erwin’s latter argument, the government counters, correctly, that “‘[a] district judge is not required to consider the disparity between the sentences of co-defendants.’” (Pl.’s Br. at 14 (quoting United States v. Wallace, 597 F.3d 794, 803 (6th Cir. 2010).) Responding to Erwin’s argument that the district court generally abused its discretion in imposing disparate sentences among the co-defendants, the government asserts that “the question is not whether Defendant’s sentence is in fact disproportionate to that of Alonzo Holloway, but only whether the district court considered Defendant’s argument that he should not receive a longer sentence than Holloway.” (Id. at 15.) The government, again, takes the correct position. A district court’s consideration of disparity amongst co-defendants’ sentences is completely discretionary. See United States v. Simmons, 501 F.3d 620, 624 (6th Cir. 2007). Because Erwin raised the issue of the disparity between his and Holloway’s sentences before the district court, the court was obligated to consider the argument if it felt that it was not frivolous. See, e.g., United States v. Gale, 468 F.3d 929, 939-40 (6th Cir. 2006). But “discretionary factors are not even appealable when discretion is requested and 12 Nos. 10-1103, 10-1843 the judge refused or did not depart as far as the defendant wanted so long as the judge appreciated his discretion to downwardly depart.” Simmons, 501 F.3d at 624.6 A review of the sentencing transcript shows that the district court did consider that it was imposing upon Erwin a sentence “12 months longer than Mr. Holloway’s.” (Erwin Sent. Tr. at 68.) The district court described, at some length, its rationale in imposing a longer sentence upon Erwin than on other co-defendants, including Holloway: Things that are instrumental in the Court’s mind are, number 1, that multiple parties have indicated in their presentence report proffers that both Mr. Erwin and for that matter Mr. Holloway did act as supervisors on the trips they took. Paragraph 77 and 78 [of the PSR] talks about Mr. Erwin getting money on those trips. And in fact Mr. Holloway in that particular paragraph or set of paragraphs, I think it’s 78, indicates that the money would be turned over to Mr. Erwin on the return trip. More than that, paragraph 82 indicates that Mr. Erwin was paid separately for documents. It was simply a fee for documents, if you will, which . . . [is] unique among the codefendants. .... And similarly it appears that Mr. Erwin was the person who had the inside source, Ms. Aldridge, at Bank of America. Those documents and the inside source were critical, essential elements to this crime. It could not have been done without it. . . . I put both [Holloway and Erwin] in the same tier of what the government has characterized in its briefing as tier 1. But I do think that Mr. Erwin’s participation was still incrementally more aggravating within the meaning of the guidelines as an organizer or leader because he had access to two critical bits of information, two critical things, without which this could not have happened. . . . He had the source on the inside, and he had the ability and wherewithal to make the phony documents. 6 While Erwin frames this as a substantive reasonableness challenge, it is instead a challenge to the district court’s procedural reasonableness, as the claim goes to “the factors evaluated and the procedures employed by the district court in reaching its sentencing determination.” United States v. Webb, 403 F.3d 373, 383 (6th Cir.2005). 13 Nos. 10-1103, 10-1843 (Id. at 40-41.)7 Erwin offers no reason why the district court, having considered the relative roles of all coconspirators and found that Erwin’s role was more significant and integral to the scheme than that of any of his co-defendants, should not have sentenced him in the manner that it did. Because “[c]onsidering uniformity between co-defendants’ sentences . . . is not required by the Sentencing Guidelines or the § 3553(a) factors,” Simmons, 501 F.3d at 623, and because the district court considered the disparity between co-defendants’ and Erwin’s sentences, and presented a reasonable rationale therefor, the district court did not abuse its discretion.
For these reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that an upward departure was warranted pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3; nor was it substantively or procedurally unreasonable to sentence Erwin to a 12-month longer term of incarceration than any of his codefendants.