Opinion ID: 1933405
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Montgomery Petition

Text: Petitioners from Montgomery challenge the Legislature's establishment of a new House district composed of the town of Montgomery, which is in Franklin County, and four towns from Orleans County. Petitioners argue that the Legislature ignored Vermont constitutional and statutory law by joining the town of Montgomery in a district with four Orleans County towns with which it has little in common. According to petitioners, the Legislature gave no consideration to any constitutional or statutory criteria, aside from equality of population among districts. We agree that there is no indication that the Legislature considered all relevant constitutional and statutory criteria with respect to the establishment of this district. Accordingly, we send this matter back to the Legislature for further consideration. [4] There is no doubt that the overriding duty of the Legislature in establishing a redistricting plan is to assure substantial equality of population among districts. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 1385, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964) (the Equal Protection Clause requires that the seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a population basis); see In re Senate Bills 177 & 83, 132 Vt. at 286, 318 A.2d at 160 (other considerations such as maintaining integrity of county lines must yield to that of equal representation). Our constitutional and statutory language makes this point clear. The constitution mandates that House and Senate districts shall afford equality of representation, whereas the constitution requires only that the Legislature seek to maintain geographical compactness and contiguity and to adhere to boundaries of counties. Vt. Const. ch. II, §§ 13, 18. Statutory law requires the Legislature, insofar as practicable, to draw districts consistent with policies of preserving existing political lines, maintaining communities of interest, and using compact territory. 17 V.S.A. § 1903(b). Nevertheless, state reapportionment laws are not subject to the same strict [equal representation] standards applicable to reapportionment of congressional seats. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 763, 93 S.Ct. 2332, 2338, 37 L.Ed.2d 314 (1973). Early on, the Supreme Court acknowledged the practical impossibility of arranging state legislative districts so that each one has an identical number of residents, and required only that a State make an honest and good faith effort to construct districts... as nearly of equal population as is practicable. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. at 577, 84 S.Ct. at 1390; see also Vt. Const. ch. II, § 73 (Legislature shall maintain equality of representation among the respective districts as nearly as it is practicable). Thus, minor deviations from mathematical equality among state legislative districts are insufficient to make out a prima facie case of invidious discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment so as to require justification by the State. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. at 745, 93 S.Ct. at 2327. As a general rule, an overall deviation under 10% within a redistricting plan is considered a minor deviation that does not require justification by some rational state policy. Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842, 103 S.Ct. 2690, 2696, 77 L.Ed.2d 214 (1983); see Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. at 745, 93 S.Ct. at 2327 (de minimis deviation does not violate equal protection clause whether it is considered alone or compared with another plan with lower deviations); In re Legislative Districting, 299 Md. 658, 475 A.2d 428, 440 (1984) (plan with less than 10% deviation was well within the permissible limits for state legislative districts under federal constitution); Holmes v. Farmer, 475 A.2d at 988 (overall deviation of 5.4% is a minor deviation that is prima facie constitutional absent a showing of bad faith). Accordingly, nonnumerical [5] constitutional and statutory criteria are not rendered superfluous either by the primary concern for the one-person, one-vote requirement or by the flexibility the legislature has in meeting the nonnumerical criteria. See Schrage v. State Board of Elections, 88 Ill.2d 87, 58 Ill.Dec. 451, 454, 430 N.E.2d 483, 486 (1981) (dominant equal protection requirement should not be read as death knell to compactness requirement); Ater v. Keisling, 312 Or. 207, 819 P.2d 296, 300, 303 (1991) (redistricting statute with criteria similar to those in Vermont statute viewed as giving legislature latitude in applying criteria). Indeed, this Court has a mandate to retain jurisdiction over redistricting until the Legislature produces a plan that conforms to  all constitutional and statutory requirements. 17 V.S.A. § 1909(e) (emphasis added). All of the nonnumerical criteria at issue herethe maintenance of political lines, the use of compact and contiguous territories, and the preservation of communities with common interestsare not only important but are related to one another in that they share the common purpose of assuring more effective representation. See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. at 748-49, 93 S.Ct. at 2329 (fair and effective representation does not depend solely on mathematical equality among district populations); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. at 578-79, 84 S.Ct. at 1390 (Indiscriminate districting, without any regard for political subdivision or natural or historical boundary lines, may be little more than an open invitation to partisan gerrymandering.). Thus, the preservation of town and county boundaries is important because the sense of community derived from established governmental units tends to foster effective representation. Carstens v. Lamm, 543 F.Supp. 68, 88 (D.Colo.1982). Local governmental units have various responsibilities incident to the operation of state government in a wide range of areas, including the court system, law enforcement, education, mental health, taxation, and transportation. Consequently, unnecessary fragmentation of these units limits the ability of local constituencies to organize effectively and increases voter confusion and isolation. Id.; see Davenport v. Apportionment Commission, 124 N.J.Super. 30, 304 A.2d 736, 745 (1973) (`citizens of each county have a community of interest by virtue of their common responsibility to provide for public needs') (quoting Jackman v. Bodine, 43 N.J. 453, 205 A.2d 713, 718 (1964)). Voters in a community are less effectively represented when their elected representative's principal constituency lies outside their community and has interests different from their own. See In re Reapportionment Plan for Pennsylvania General Assembly, 442 A.2d at 669 (Nix, J., dissenting). These considerations are particularly relevant in this state, which has a long history of preserving the independence and integrity of local government. See In re Senate Bills 177 & 83, 132 Vt. at 287, 318 A.2d at 160. Similarly, compactness and contiguity requirements ultimately concern the ability of citizens to relate to each other and their representatives and ... the ability of representatives to relate effectively to their constituency. Wilson v. Eu, 1 Cal.4th 707, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 379, 387, 823 P.2d 545, 553 (1992). These relationships are fostered through shared interests and membership in a political community. Id.; see In re Reapportionment Plan for Pennsylvania General Assembly, 442 A.2d at 669 (Nix, J., dissenting) (requirements of contiguity and compactness go beyond geographical concern and embrace concept of homogeneity of district). They are undermined, however, when geographic barriers that severely limit communication and transportation within proposed districts are ignored. See Wilson v. Eu, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d at 400, 823 P.2d at 574 (Appendix I). Thus, the statutory criteria contained in § 1903(b), including recognition and maintenance of patterns of geography, social interaction, trade, political ties and common interests, are an implementation and extension of our constitutional requirements that the Legislature seek to maintain geographical compactness and contiguity and to adhere to boundaries of counties and other existing political subdivisions. Vt. Const. ch. II, §§ 13, 18. We now examine the findings of the master, which are not in dispute. The towns of Jay, Troy, Westfield, Lowell, and Montgomery comprise the challenged district, Orleans-Franklin 1, which has a population of 3,829 and an overall deviation of 2.05%. The northern spine of the Green Mountains divides Montgomery from the Orleans County towns, affecting transportation and communication between them, particularly in the winter. Although there are two roads that run east from Montgomery over the spine, one is a seasonal road and the other is difficult to travel in the winter. Because of the natural barriers to the east, Montgomery's economic, social, educational and political ties have always faced away from the mountains toward Richford, Enosburg and other Franklin County towns. For example, trade and commerce generally moves westward from Montgomery, children go to high schools in towns in the school district to the west, social and sporting events generally take place with towns to the west, serious health problems are dealt with in hospitals to the west, and except for a few Montgomery residents who work at the Jay Peak ski area, the work force moves in a westerly direction. Because of the lack of shared interests between towns in the two counties, the weekly and daily newspapers of Franklin and Orleans counties generally do not cover local events outside their own counties. In sum, these findings, and other evidence presented at the hearing before the master, indicate that Montgomery was placed in a district with towns from a different county separated by a mountain range that greatly limits transportation and communicationand therefore, social, political and economic interactionbetween the two areas. [6] The only explanation for the placement provided by the State is that the Orleans-Franklin 1 district did not present an equal protection problem. When asked why Montgomery was joined in a district with Orleans County towns, the minority leader of the House Government Operations Committee stated that the Committee felt that there was a connection with Jay Peak and that historically and in many ways there is a strong connection in Montgomery and Franklin County. But we were bound by numbers.  (Emphasis added.) He was unable to provide details or support for any connection between the two communities. [7] Although the minority leader stated how difficult it was to put together districts around the State without exceeding a 16.4% maximum deviation, [8] he never indicated that the Committee considered nonnumerical criteria but was unable come up with a plan that satisfied both equal population concerns and the other criteria. Rather, he testified that there were numerous ways the Committee could have gone, and that there was no specific vote on Montgomery. Further, he conceded that the redistricting was based primarily upon numbers and that it was driven by arithmetic. In short, there is nothing in the record before us, including the State's brief, indicating either that the Legislative Apportionment Board or the Committee considered nonnumerical criteria with respect to the Orleans-Franklin 1 district, or that the Board or Committee could not produce a plan that adhered to all criteria with regard to that district. [9] Cf. State ex rel. Lockert v. Crowell, 656 S.W.2d 836, 838 (Tenn.1983) (court affirmed lower court decision rejecting redistricting plans that were drafted with sole objective of obtaining low percentages of total deviation, with no effort made to consider other nonnumerical criteria); compare In re Reapportionment of Colorado General Assembly, 828 P.2d at 195-96 (plan returned to redistricting commission for reconsideration and resubmission because plan joined in one district towns of different counties separated by mountains), with In re Reapportionment of Colorado General Assembly, 828 P.2d 213, 216 (Colo.1992) (resubmitted plan approved, though similar to the one rejected earlier, because commission provided court with sufficient basis for judicial review of its actions). Instead, the State argues that the equal population requirement is paramount and contends that putting Montgomery in a Franklin district, without making any other changes, would violate that requirement. Although we give great deference to the Legislature's redistricting decisions, such decisions are not foreclosed from further review when the Legislature makes only a general reference to equal population and does not justify or explain why a district fails to satisfy any of the nonnumerical criteria. To hold otherwise would be to render meaningless those nonnumerical criteria. Petitioners argue that placing Montgomery with other Franklin County towns in the Franklin 2 district would satisfy all constitutional and statutory criteria. The master found that placing Montgomery in the Franklin 2 district, and not otherwise changing the House plan, would improve the deviation in that district from 8.3% to 2.3%. The deviation in the Orleans-Franklin 1 district, however, would widen from 2.1% to 19.9%, thereby creating an overall deviation within the House plan of 28.8%, approximately 11.2% greater than that of the current plan. Petitioners contend that such a deviation, if justified by legitimate state policies, such as maintaining county lines or communities of common interest, would pass constitutional muster under the equal protection clause. We disagree; the case law provides no such assurance. The United States Supreme Court, in permitting an overall deviation of 16.4% in one state redistricting plan based on rational state objectives, warned that this percentage may well approach tolerable limits. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 329-30, 93 S.Ct. 979, 987, 35 L.Ed.2d 320 (1973); see State v. Crowell, 656 S.W.2d at 839 (overall deviation of 21% would be unacceptable under Mahan ). Indeed, this Court has already rejected on equal protection grounds a Senate plan that had a maximum deviation of 25.3%. In re Senate Bill 177, 130 Vt. at 370, 294 A.2d at 659-60. Petitioners contend, however, that recent federal case law allows much greater deviation when justified by rational state objectives, but the cases they cite do not support their argument. In Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440, 444-46, 87 S.Ct. 569, 572-73, 17 L.Ed.2d 501 (1967), the Court actually rejected a plan with a maximum deviation of 26%, see Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. at 328, 93 S.Ct. at 987, and only suggested by negative inference that the State's presentation of rational state policies could have changed the result. In Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. at 839, 846, 103 S.Ct. at 2694, 2698, the Court avoided ruling on the constitutionality of a Wyoming redistricting plan with a 89% maximum deviation that resulted from giving a representative to a sparsely populated county. Because of the limited review in that case and Wyoming's unique situation, the Brown opinion has been considered an aberration with little precedential value. See id. at 850, 103 S.Ct. at 2700 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (it is worth stressing how extraordinarily narrow [the holding] is, and how empty of likely precedential value); State v. Crowell, 656 S.W.2d at 840 (the unusual single deviation in Brown may well be inapplicable elsewhere); see also New York City Board of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 702, 109 S.Ct. 1433, 1442, 103 L.Ed.2d 717 (1989) (citing, among other cases, Brown v. Thomson , Court noted that no case of ours has indicated that a deviation of some 78% could ever be justified). Assuming that the Legislature's only choice was to place Montgomery in the Orleans-Franklin 1 district or the Franklin 2 district, we could not conclude that its decision to place Montgomery with towns in Orleans County was irrational or illegitimate. Citing a plan appended to another petition, petitioners also argue that the Legislature could have kept Montgomery with Franklin County towns and achieved minimal population deviations in the overall plan. Because the plan has never been presented as part of this case, [10] we do not consider it here. Regardless of the merits of the cited alternative plan, petitioners contend that because they have shown that the statutory criteria have not been adhered to, it is up to the Legislature, not them or this Court, to come up with an alternative plan that satisfies both equal population and the other criteria. The apparent flaw in this argument is that, unless there is some showing that such an alternative plan can be produced, it is unclear whether the Legislature has ignored its duty to consider the nonnumerical criteria. Nevertheless, we believe that further legislative consideration is appropriate in this instance, where (1) petitioners have shown that none [11] of the nonnumerical statutory or constitutional criteria were adhered to with regard to the Town of Montgomery; (2) the State has failed to provide any rational reason for Montgomery's placement, other than a general reference to equal population; and (3) the State has not shown, by evidence or affidavit, that an alternative plan satisfying the various constitutional and statutory criteria could not be produced. As we have noted, redistricting is a legislative function, and equal population is the overriding objective. We have a duty, however, to review redistricting plans to assure that the Legislature has given full consideration to all constitutional and statutory criteria. We cannot allow equal population to be elevated from an overriding objective to the sole consideration. The nonnumerical criteria are neither superfluous nor unimportant. They assure that our citizens obtain effective representation by being placed in districts comprised of communities with shared interests. Petitioners' burden is not to establish that there exists a preferable alternative, but to demonstrate that a plan does not meet constitutional or statutory standards. In re 1991 Pennsylvania Legislative Reapportionment Commission, 609 A.2d at 136. Once petitioners have made such a showing, the State must demonstrate why a better alternative was not possible, or that an alternative plan submitted by the petitioners is flawed. See Davenport v. Apportionment Commission, 304 A.2d at 746-47 (where reapportionment commission failed to show whether, or to what extent, compactness was considered, court remanded plan for commission to determine whether it would be possible to devise an alternative plan that considered state constitutional criteria); State v. Crowell, 656 S.W.2d at 843 (house reapportionment plan held to be unconstitutional because legislature failed to justify substantial crossing of county lines); cf. In re Legislative Districting of General Assembly, 193 N.W.2d at 791 (legislature failed to sustain its burden to show why it could not comply with state constitutional compactness requirement). But see In re 1983 Legislative Apportionment, 469 A.2d at 831 (petitioners must show that district could be improved without creating constitutional violations elsewhere in state). Accordingly, we return the House plan to the Legislature for consideration of the nonnumerical criteria with respect to the Orleans-Franklin 1 district and determination of whether Montgomery can be placed in a district that satisfies those criteria without creating constitutional or statutory violations elsewhere in the state.