Opinion ID: 201493
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Existence of a Constitutional Violation

Text: 26 The due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment forbid the State itself from depriving a person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of laws. 27 In order to establish a substantive due process claim, the plaintiff must first show a deprivation of a protected interest in life, liberty, or property. See Rhode Island Bhd. of Correctional Officers v. Rhode Island, 357 F.3d 42, 49 (1st Cir.2004); Macone v. Town of Wakefield, 277 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir.2002). It is not enough to claim the governmental action shocked the conscience. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722, 117 S.Ct. 2258 (1997) (The implication of a fundamental right is a threshold requirement for establishing a due process violation). The complaint alleges that Jennifer was caused to be deprived of her life, a protected interest. 28 Second, the plaintiff must show that the deprivation of this protected right was caused by governmental conduct. That is easily met when a government actor causes the injury, such as when police officers act under color of law. See Martinez v. Colon, 54 F.3d 980, 986 (1st Cir.1995) (To be sure, violence is attributable to state action if the perpetrator is acting under color of state law.). It is much more difficult when the person who inflicts the injury is a private person. The Due Process Clause acts as a check on the government, not on actions by private individuals. Here, of course, the person who killed Jennifer was a private individual. Nonetheless, there are possible scenarios of government involvement with a private individual which amount to government conduct — for example, if the police had handed the murderer the gun with instruction to shoot her, cf. Hemphill v. Schott, 141 F.3d 412, 418-19 (2d Cir.1998), or assured Pona that he could attack Jennifer with impunity, cf. Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 96-97 (2d Cir.1993). That is certainly not the case. The claimed governmental involvement in causing Jennifer's death was much more indirect: the government is said to have enhanced the danger posed by a private individual and then failed to protect against this risk. 29 The Supreme Court has stated that as a general matter, a State's failure to protect an individual against private violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989). That is because the purpose of the Due Process Clause is to protect the people from the state, not to ensure that the state protects them from each other. The Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State's power to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security, id. at 195, 109 S.Ct. 998, because [t]he Framers were content to leave the extent of governmental obligation in the latter area to the democratic political processes, id. at 196, 109 S.Ct. 998. 30 However, the Court recognized that this general principle is not absolute: in situations in which there is a special relationship, an affirmative, constitutional duty to protect may arise when the state so restrains an individual's liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself, and at the same time fails to provide for his basic human needs. Id. at 200, 109 S.Ct. 998. The affirmative duty to protect arises not from the State's knowledge of the individual's predicament or from its expressions of intent to help him, but from the limitation which it has imposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf. Id. This court has recognized that this relationship, and thus a constitutional duty, may exist when the individual is incarcerated or is involuntarily committed to the custody of the state. See Monahan v. Dorchester Counseling Ctr., Inc., 961 F.2d 987, 991-92 (1st Cir.1992). 31 The Supreme Court also suggested, but never expressly recognized, the possibility that when the state creates the danger to an individual, an affirmative duty to protect might arise: 32 While the State may have been aware of the dangers that [the plaintiff] faced in the free world, it played no part in their creation, nor did it do anything to render him any more vulnerable to them. [By returning the plaintiff's child to his abusive father, the State] placed him in no worse position than that in which he would have been had it not acted at all. 33 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201, 109 S.Ct. 998 (emphasis added). From this statement comes Rivera's argument that the Due Process Clause is implicated when the state has played a role in creating the danger or has enhanced the danger to an individual. 5 At least three circuit courts have recognized the existence of a constitutional violation when, on particular facts, the state fails to protect against private violence under this state created danger theory. See Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1066-67 (6th Cir.1998); Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122, 1125-26 (7th Cir.1993); Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 589-90 (9th Cir.1989). One circuit has flatly rejected the theory. See Beltran v. City of El Paso, 367 F.3d 299, 307 (5th Cir.2004). Other circuits have discussed the theory. See Pinder v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1169, 1175-76 (4th Cir.1995) (en banc). 34 This court has, to date, discussed the state created danger theory, but never found it actionable on the facts alleged. See Coyne v. Cronin, 386 F.3d 280, 287 (1st Cir.2004) (stating that the Due Process Clause may be implicated where the government affirmatively acts to increase the threat to an individual of third-party private harm); Hasenfus v. LaJeunesse, 175 F.3d 68, 73 (1st Cir.1999) (Where a state official acts so as to create or even markedly increase a risk, due process constraints may exist, even if inaction alone would raise no constitutional concern.); Frances-Colon v. Ramirez, 107 F.3d 62, 64 (1st Cir.1997) (recognizing that a government employee can in a rare and exceptional case, affirmatively act[ ] to increase the threat of harm to the claimant or affirmatively prevent[ ] the individual from receiving assistance); Soto v. Flores, 103 F.3d 1056, 1063-64 (1st Cir.1997) (discussing, as a possible exception to the general DeShaney rule, a substantive due process violation when the state, through its affirmative acts, creates or greatly enhances the danger faced by the plaintiff from third parties); Souza v. Pina, 53 F.3d 423, 427 (1st Cir.1995); Monahan, 961 F.2d at 992-93. 35 Even if there exists a special relationship between the state and the individual or the state plays a role in the creation or enhancement of the danger, under a supposed state created danger theory, there is a further and onerous requirement that the plaintiff must meet in order to prove a constitutional violation: the state actions must shock the conscience of the court. See Hasenfus, 175 F.3d at 73 (In a state created danger case, state behavior must be conscience-shocking or outrageous); see also Coyne, 386 F.3d at 287-88 (using shocks the conscience as a catch-all term encompassing a range of state actor behavior); Soto, 103 F.3d at 1064 (Not every negligent, or even willfully reckless, state action that renders a person more vulnerable to danger `take[s] on the added character of [a] violation[] of the federal Constitution.') (quoting Monahan, 961 F.2d at 993) (alterations in Soto ). 36 In determining whether the state has violated an individual's substantive due process rights, a federal court may elect first to address whether the governmental action at issue is sufficiently conscience shocking. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 n. 8, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998). The state action must be so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience. Id. [C]onduct intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by any government interest is the sort of official action most likely to rise to the conscience-shocking level. Id. at 849, 118 S.Ct. 1708 (emphasis added). Of course, whether behavior is conscience shocking varies with regard to the circumstances of the case. See id. at 850-52, 118 S.Ct. 1708. In situations where actors have an opportunity to reflect and make reasoned and rational decisions, deliberately indifferent behavior may suffice to shock the conscience. See id. at 851-52, 118 S.Ct. 1708. 37 Keeping all of this in mind, we echo the caution articulated in Soto: in a state creation of risk situation, where the ultimate harm is caused by a third party, courts must be careful to distinguish between conventional torts and constitutional violations, as well as between state inaction and action. Soto, 103 F.3d at 1064.