Opinion ID: 1716246
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Is penetration statutorily required for anal-genital copulation and for oral-genital copulation, so as to be within the conduct proscribed by the crime-against-nature statutes?

Text: By motions for directed verdict, and a new trial (alleging that an essential element of the crime was not proved), and in arrest of judgment (alleging that the bill of information does not charge a crime, since an essential averment is omitted, La.C.Cr.P. art. 859(1) [4] ), the defendant contends that the prosecution falls because it did not charge or prove that there was actual penetration of the anus (Count 1) (Assignments 3, 5). By motion in arrest of judgment, he further contends that the Count 2 of the bill of information is defective because it does not allege penetration of the mouth (Assignment 5).
As earlier stated, the anal-genital crime against nature between human beings proscribed by our statute has jurisprudentially been held to be the conduct proscribed by the common-law crime of sodomy. State v. Murry, 136 La. 253, 66 So. 963 (1914); State v. Long, 133 La. 580, 63 So. 180 (1913); State v. Williams, 34 La. Ann. 87 (1882). See State v. Lindsey, 310 So.2d 89, concurring opinion 310 So.2d 92 (La.1975). Only because of this definite meaning of the statutory language has the enactment been saved from unconstitutional vagueness. The crime of sodomy, or anal-genital intercourse, was clearly defined at common law, and penetration of the anus by the penis was an essential element. Perkins on Criminal Law 389-90 (2d ed. 1969); Clark & Marshall, A Treatise on Crimes, Section 11.07 (7th ed., 1967). See also discussion and citation of authority in State v. Morrison, 25 N.J.Super. 534, 96 A.2d 723 (1953). The charge by Count 1 was the defendant did place his penis in the area of the anus of the victim. The only evidence on this count at the trial was that the defendant placed his penis between the victim's legs. There was thus no evidence of the essential element of penetration. The defendant's motion for a directed verdict and for a new trial on Count 1, because of the total lack of evidence as to this essential element, is therefore well founded. In arguing that penetration is not required, the state relies upon the 1975 amendment's exclusion from the crime against nature of anal sexual intercourse under circumstances constituting the rape crimes, La.R.S. 14:41, 41.1, 42, and 43 (see italicized clause in La.R.S. 14:89 (1975) quoted in full in Appendix 1). Since penetration is required for the rape crimes, the state contends that it is not required in order for anal-genital conduct to constitute a crime against nature. The rape crimes, however, concern sexual intercourse, whether anal or vaginal, committed without the consent of the other party. In the case of a juvenile, it is deemed to be without the consent of the victim . . . [w]here the victim is under the age of twelve years. La.R.S. 14:42(3) (1975). Under the statutory scheme, where the anal sexual activity is committed with the consent of the other participant, or with the consent of a juvenile over the age of twelve and under seventeen years, the criminal conduct violates the crime-against-nature statutes rather than the rape statutes. We therefore find no merit to the state's contention that, because of the exclusion of rape offenses from the crime against nature statute, penetration is no longer required for a crime against nature committed by anal-genital activity. We should note that the circumstance that the present type of anal-genital conduct with a juvenile is not technically punishable as a crime against nature does not mean that it is exempt from criminal responsibility. See, e. g., the statute defining indecent behavior with juveniles, with punishment up to imprisonment at hard labor for five years imposed for its violation. La. R.S. 14:81 (1977). (The statute which punishes contributing to the delinquency of a juvenile through sexually immoral acts, with punishment by imprisonment up to two years at hard labor, likewise appears to be applicable. La.R.S. 14:92(7) (1976).) For reasons previously stated, we find that the state presented no evidence of an essential element of the crime charged by Count 1. We therefore conclude that the defendant's conviction on this count must be reversed, and a judgment of acquittal ordered by us to that count.
The defendant likewise contends that Count 2 of the bill of information was insufficient to charge a crime against nature, in that it alleged only that the defendant did place his mouth upon the penis of the victim. The defendant contends that penetration is likewise an essential element of the crime against nature of the oral-genital nature. In the first place, if this were a deficiency in the indictment, it is of a nature of insufficient detail in the description of the crime rather than total failure to charge any crime: The indictment's language is susceptible to the construction that it encompassed penetration of the mouth by the sexual organ, and it clearly gave notice to the accused of the charge against him and adequately protects him against double jeopardy by re-trial for the conduct charged. An attack upon the indictment for technical deficiencies of this nature may not be made for the first time after the jury verdict. State v. James, 305 So.2d 514 (La.1974). [5] However, we prefer to rest our decision upon a broader rationale. Oral-genital conduct punished by the crime-against-nature statute was first criminally prohibited by an 1896 amendment proscribing unnatural copulation committed with the mouth. See footnote 3. Despite dicta in State v. Long, 133 La. 580, 63 So. 180 (1913) that penetration is required, the weight of the jurisprudence is against such a restrictive interpretation of the statutory meaning. The jurisprudential interpretation of the oral-genital copulation proscribed by the crime against nature statute in its present version is that any actual joining or connection of a genital organ of one person and the mouth of another constitutes the crime. State v. Young, 249 La. 1053, 193 So.2d 243, 245 (1966). See also State v. Lindsey, 310 So.2d 89, 92 (La.1975). Accordingly, we find no merit to the contention that the oral-genital conduct charged by Count 2 did not constitute the crime against nature statutorily proscribed.