Opinion ID: 793970
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: 57 The plaintiffs initially argue that this court lacks jurisdiction over the cross-appeal by the Fines and PHP. Specifically, they maintain that the defendants are attempting to appeal from the denial of summary judgment on the pendent state-law claims, and that the denial of summary judgment is not an appealable final order. Although the plaintiffs are correct that the denial of a motion for summary judgment is generally not a final order susceptible to appellate review, an exception exists where the district court has dismissed pendent state-law claims without prejudice as opposed to with prejudice. 15A Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3914.6 (2d ed.2002) (recognizing that a defendant must be allowed to appeal a dismissal without prejudice in order to argue that the dismissal should have been with prejudice). 58 The Seventh Circuit, in two opinions written by Judge Posner, has applied and explained this dismissal-without-prejudice exception to the general appellate requirement of finality. In the earlier case of LaBuhn v. Bulkmatic Transport Co., 865 F.2d 119, 121-22 (7th Cir.1988), the employer, in a suit alleging retaliatory discharge, appealed the district court's dismissal of the employee's suit without prejudice, arguing that the suit should have been dismissed with prejudice because the claim was preempted by the National Labor Relations Act. The Seventh Circuit held that it had jurisdiction over the appeal, reasoning that the defendant had been aggrieved in a practical sense because it wanted a dismissal with prejudice, and didn't get it. Id. at 122. 59 In the later case of Disher v. Information Resources, Inc., 873 F.2d 136, 137 (7th Cir.1989), corporate officers accused by a former employee of breaching their fiduciary duties appealed the district court's dismissal of two pendent state-law claims without prejudice. Following LaBuhn, the Seventh Circuit in Disher agreed that it had jurisdiction over the appeal and held that an order that ends litigation in one dispute-resolution system is final and appealable even though it kicks off litigation in another. Id. at 139; see also Amazon, Inc. v. Dirt Camp, Inc., 273 F.3d 1271, 1275 (10th Cir.2001) (stating that where [a] dismissal finally disposes of the case so that it is not subject to further proceedings in federal court, the dismissal [without prejudice] is final and appealable). 60 The present case is procedurally on all fours with LaBuhn, Disher, and Amazon. When it dismissed the plaintiffs' pendent state-law claims without prejudice, the district court permitted the plaintiffs to refile in state court, an option they have in fact exercised. Litigation in state court has thus already kick[ed] off. See Disher, 873 F.2d at 139. Moreover, like the defendants in LaBuhn, the Fines and PHP have been aggrieved because they sought dismissal with prejudice on preemption grounds, did not get it, and have now been forced to return to state court in order to remove the case back to federal court. See also Amazon, 273 F.3d at 1276 (noting that the defendant was sufficiently aggrieved because the dismissal without prejudice had given it only a part of what it sought). Because we find persuasive the caselaw permitting prevailing parties to appeal an order dismissing pendent state-law claims without prejudice in order to argue that the dismissal should have been with prejudice, we conclude that we have jurisdiction to hear the defendants' cross-appeal in the present case.