Opinion ID: 657197
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Statement Regarding Willingness to Take a Polygraph Test

Text: 36 At trial, DEA Agent Hendrie testified that when Kilbourn was arrested at the Denny's restaurant he told Agent Hendrie that he had gone to the restaurant with Morgan to discuss the establishment of a water distilling business. In the same statement, Kilbourn also expressed his willingness to take a polygraph test in the presence of his attorney. The test was never taken, and the trial court declined to admit Kilbourn's statement regarding the polygraph. On appeal, Kilbourn claims that the failure to admit this statement was error, for it allegedly bolstered his credibility. The government responds that the statement was only marginally relevant, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that admission of the statement might tend to confuse the jury. Further, the government argues that Kilbourn offered to take the test only in the presence of his attorney and did not stipulate that the results of the polygraph would be admissible in evidence, thereby diluting any relevance the statement itself might have. 37 In limited circumstances, evidence of a party's willingness to submit to a polygraph may, within the discretion of the trial court, become admissible if it is relevant at trial. Wolfel v. Holbrook, 823 F.2d 970, 972 (6th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1069, 108 S.Ct. 1035, 98 L.Ed.2d 999 (1988). In considering the admissibility of polygraph-related evidence, this circuit follows Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Thus, the trial court must first determine whether the proffered evidence is relevant. If the court finds that the evidence is relevant, it must then balance the probative value of the evidence against the hazard of unfair prejudice and jury confusion. Id.; Murphy v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 772 F.2d 273, 277 (6th Cir.1985). We review the court's conclusion on this matter for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Betancourt, 838 F.2d 168, 175 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1013, 108 S.Ct. 1748, 100 L.Ed.2d 210 (1988). 38 We agree with the government that Kilbourn's willingness to submit to polygraph testing, in the presence of an attorney, was marginally relevant at best on the issue of credibility. Kilbourn did not agree to allow the results of any such examination, whatever they might reflect, to be admitted into evidence at a subsequent trial. Hence, he did not have the requisite adverse interest at stake to cloak his willingness with credibility. Wolfel, 823 F.2d at 974; see also Barnier v. Szentmiklosi, 810 F.2d 594, 597 (6th Cir.1987). In Barnier, we concluded that the trial court had erred in admitting evidence of a polygraph examination to bolster plaintiffs' credibility, for we doubted that the plaintiffs, who had sued a local prosecutor for malicious prosecution, would volunteer to take the test unless for the purpose of reporting its results to the prosecutor if the results were deemed by their attorney to be favorable. If unfavorable, presumably the results would not have been revealed. Id. Thus, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow admission of Kilbourn's statement regarding the polygraph.