Opinion ID: 1098032
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Granting of Cause Challenge Based on Juror's Views Against Death Penalty

Text: Muhammad claims error in the trial court's granting of the State's cause challenge because of juror Ranieri's views on the death penalty. The test for determining juror competency is whether the juror can lay aside any bias or prejudice and render a verdict solely on the evidence presented and the instructions on the law given by the court. Smith v. State, 699 So.2d 629, 635 (Fla.1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1008, 118 S.Ct. 1194, 140 L.Ed.2d 323, and cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1020, 118 S.Ct. 1300, 140 L.Ed.2d 466 (1998). We acknowledge that this Court has found it reversible error for a trial court to excuse a juror for cause where the juror, while having reservations about the death penalty, clearly states that he or she can follow the court's instructions with regard to its imposition. See, e.g., Farina v. State, 680 So.2d 392, 396 (Fla.1996). In Farina, the juror clearly responded that she would be able to set aside her personal views on the death penalty; thus, we found the trial court abused its discretion in excusing the juror for cause. See id. In contrast, in this case we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the State's challenge for cause. The record reveals that the prospective juror stated that she would not be able to impose the death penalty in any case besides that of a serial murderer. The juror also stated that she could not follow the law on weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances except with serial murders. In one instance, the juror did respond that she could follow the law, but that was in response to a specific question by the defense lawyer concerning whether the fact that Florida uses the electric chair would affect her ability to follow the law. When the juror's responses are considered together, the trial court in this case could have had a reasonable doubt as to whether this juror would be able to follow the law in imposing the death penalty. The later response concerning the electric chair did not dispel the juror's earlier equivocation concerning her ability to follow the law regarding the imposition of the death penalty. Based on the totality of the record in this case, we do not find that the trial court abused its discretion in excusing the juror for cause. See San Martin v. State, 705 So.2d 1337, 1343 (Fla. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 841, 119 S.Ct. 105, 142 L.Ed.2d 84 (1998); Reaves v. State, 639 So.2d 1, 4 (Fla.1994); Randolph v. State, 562 So.2d 331, 337 (Fla.1990).