Opinion ID: 422299
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prospective or Injunctive Relief

Text: 22 Because Fouche has sued an agency of the state rather than state officials, the Eleventh Amendment also bars injunctive or prospective relief. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 98 S.Ct. 3057, 57 L.Ed.2d 1114 (1978) (per curiam).II. Title VII 23 The Eleventh Amendment does not bar Fouche's Title VII claim against the Park Authority because Congress may provide for private suits against states or state officials, pursuant to its authority under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456, 96 S.Ct. 2666, 2671, 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (1976). However, the district court dismissed Fouche's Title VII claims because she had not received the appropriate right-to-sue letter. Under the provisions of 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(f)(1), 6 a right-to-sue letter must be issued by the United States Attorney General because this case involves a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision. Fouche initially received notices of right-to-sue from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission [EEOC] and filed those notices with the district court. After the Park Authority moved to dismiss the Title VII claim, Fouche's attorney wrote to the Attorney General and requested a right-to-sue letter. A representative of the Attorney General informed Fouche's counsel that the Justice Department did not intend to issue a right-to-sue notice in this case. The Justice Department's position is based on the directive of 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(d), 7 which states that the right-to-sue letter in this type of case must be issued by the EEOC, directly contradicting the statutory language of 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(f)(1). Thus, in determining whether Fouche can maintain her Title VII claim, we must first address whether the requirement of 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(f)(1) is jurisdictional or is subject to equitable waiver, modification, or estoppel. If the requirement is not jurisdictional, we must then decide whether the facts of this case warrant a modification of the requirement. 24 In Pinkard v. Pullman-Standard, 678 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 729, 74 L.Ed.2d 954 (1983), 8 the Court held that receipt of a right-to-sue letter is a condition precedent to a Title VII claim rather than a jurisdictional prerequisite. Id. at 1215. In Pinkard the plaintiffs had filed their suit before they received their right-to-sue letters from the EEOC. The district court dismissed the Title VII claim, finding that it lacked jurisdiction because 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(f)(1) provides that the right-to-sue notice must be received before suit is commenced. See footnote 6, supra. The Fifth Circuit reversed, concluding that the receipt of a right-to-sue letter is a condition precedent, which on proper occasion may be equitably modified. Id. at 1218-19. Accord Rice v. New England College, 676 F.2d 9, 10 (1st Cir.1982) (requirements of § 2000e-5(f)(1) are not jurisdictional). A brief examination of Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co., 678 F.2d 992 (11th Cir.1982), confirms the applicability of the Pinkard holding to this case. 25 In Jackson the Court explored whether Title VII's procedural requirements are jurisdictional prerequisites which if not complied with deprive a federal court of subject matter jurisdiction. After examining the language of Title VII, its legislative history, and the decisions of the Supreme Court and the former Fifth Circuit, the Jackson court concluded that the conditions precedent to filing a Title VII action are not jurisdictional prerequisites. Id. at 1003. Furthermore, although Jackson did not address the issue presented in this case, 9 it broadly declared: 26 [a]lthough the [Supreme Court and the former Fifth Circuit] have not had occasion to address the nature of each of Title VII's preconditions, we discern no rational basis for treating those that have not been considered from those that implicitly or explicitly have been held not to be jurisdictional. 27 Id. at 1009 (footnote omitted). Therefore, Jackson mandates that all Title VII procedural requirements to suit are henceforth to be viewed as conditions precedent to suit rather than as jurisdictional requirements. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982) (requirement that EEOC charge be timely filed is not jurisdictional prerequisite). 28 The Park Authority argues that the holdings of Pinkard and Jackson cannot apply to this case because those suits were against private parties and this one is against an arm of the state. According to the Authority's argument, Title VII preconditions, even if not jurisdictional prerequisites in suits between private parties, are jurisdictional prerequisites to the Title VII waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity when the defendant is an arm of the state. The Park Authority has not offered any precedent to support this distinction, and we have been unable to find any. The rationale and broad holding of Jackson militate against such a distinction. Citing Jackson, a district court in this Circuit recently rejected the same contention in a case that presented closely analogous facts to the one at hand. English v. Ware County Dept. of Family & Children Services, 546 F.Supp. 689, 692 n. 4 (S.D.Ga.1982). In English the plaintiff received an EEOC determination that it lacked reasonable cause to believe her charges were true, with an attached right-to-sue notice. The determination instructed the plaintiff that if she wished to pursue her claim she must file suit in federal district court; it said nothing about the necessity of a right-to-sue notice from the Attorney General. The court found that under these circumstances the statutory requirement of notice from the Attorney General should be suspended. Id. at 693. 29 Here the district court, without considering either Pinkard or Jackson, 10 stated that 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(d) is null and void because it conflicts with the clear language of the statute. It assumed the statutory requirement was jurisdictional, and therefore did not discuss equitable modification. In Stinson v. State of Georgia, C.A. No. 801940A (N.D.Ga. March 23, 1981), the court also held that the language of Title VII requiring the Attorney General to issue the letter is binding. Accord Davis v. Georgia Department of Human Resources, C.A. No. 81-2199A (N.D.Ga. Feb. 12, 1982). However, the Stinson Court indicated that it would consider equitable modification in appropriate circumstances. In Stinson the plaintiff had apparently not made any effort to obtain a notice from the Attorney General; the court noted that a different result might have been reached if the plaintiff was unable to obtain a right-to-sue letter from the Attorney General. Here, Fouche has conclusively demonstrated that she cannot get the required notice from the Attorney General because the Attorney General refuses to issue it to her. 30 Having concluded that the requirement that the Attorney General issue the right-to-sue letter is not jurisdictional, we must now decide whether the facts of this case warrant equitable modification of the statutory requirement. It is apparent that Fouche has diligently attempted to obtain the required notice, but the Attorney General has refused to issue it. To dismiss her Title VII claim for failure to receive the proper notice when she is unable to obtain it would obviously be unfair to Fouche. Therefore, the requirement that Fouche receive a right-to-sue notice from the Attorney General is waived. 11 31 The decision of the district court is AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent herewith.