Opinion ID: 2567349
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Mental illness as aggravating factor

Text: Defendant contends that CALJIC Nos. 8.85 and 8.88, as read to the jury during the penalty phase, improperly permitted consideration of his mental illness as an aggravating factor, in violation of the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution and state death penalty law. He asserts that nothing in the instructions drawn from section 190.3, factors (a), (b), (d), and (h) expressly informed the jury that evidence of his mental illness and the role it may have played in the commission of his offenses could be considered only in mitigation, and that the evidence in this case  including expert testimony that defendant's mental illness caused him to hate the victims with a homicidal rage he could not control  could have led the jury to see him as worthier of a death verdict because of his illness. Defendant acknowledges that Tuilaepa v. California, supra, 512 U.S. at page 979, 114 S.Ct. 2630, held those sentencing factors facially constitutional, but contends the high court there did not face circumstances similar to those here, where the instructions did not preclude the jury from treating as aggravating evidence that, he contends, constitutionally can only mitigate penalty. Defendant also acknowledges our decisions in People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 801-803, 276 Cal.Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330, and People v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1191, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 832 P.2d 146, holding that penalty phase jury instructions need not explicitly label a factor such as extreme mental or emotional disturbance as mitigating, provided there is no reasonable likelihood jurors misunderstood the instruction in a way that violated the defendant's rights, but he likewise distinguishes those cases as not involving evidence of particular manifestations of mental illness that jurors could have seen as rendering defendant exceptionally dangerous and deserving of death. The Attorney General contends the contention is forfeited for purposes of this appeal under the invited error doctrine (see People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 657-658, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 788, 854 P.2d 80) because trial counsel stated he had no objection to the instructions being given. On the record before us, the invited error doctrine is inapplicable, as it does not appear trial counsel both `intentionally caused the trial court to err' and clearly did so for tactical reasons. ( People v. Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 49, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30.) We therefore address the argument on its merits (see § 1259; People v. Prieto, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 247, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 18, 66 P.3d 1123) and, as will appear, reject it. We previously have rejected the contention that the standard instruction based on section 190.3, factor (d) improperly allows the jury to consider evidence of mental illness in aggravation. ( People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 420, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708; People v. McPeters, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1191, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 832 P.2d 146; see also People v. Smith (2005) 35 Cal.4th 334, 352-356, 360-361, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 554, 107 P.3d 229 [although evidence of mental illness as extreme mental or emotional disturbance, under section 190.3, factor (d), or as a circumstance extenuating the gravity of the crime, under section 190.3, factor (k), can only be mitigating, if evidence of a defendant's mental illness relates to an aggravating factor such as section 190.3, factor (a), the circumstances of the offense, the prosecution may introduce it during its penalty phase case-in-chief, even if the evidence also bears upon a mitigating factor listed in that section, and the jury may be instructed accordingly.].) Defendant offers no persuasive reason to depart from that conclusion. Nothing in the prosecution's evidence or argument in this case suggested that defendant's mental illness should be considered in aggravation. Certain evidence that defendant cites in support of this argument  Dr. Missett's opinion that defendant was evil and acted out of a homicidal rage toward his victims  was elicited by the defense on cross-examination, apparently in an effort to show the witness's bias. Of the other evidence that defendant cites  psychiatric opinions that the murder of Sean Dannehl reflected sexual sadism and Dr. Wilkinson's diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia  none was argued as an aggravating factor. Thus, we see no reasonable likelihood the jury considered evidence of defendant's mental illness as aggravating. ( People v. Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 420, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708.) To the extent defendant is arguing that the instructions improperly permitted the jury to consider evidence of his mental illness in determining whether he had committed other violent criminal acts within the meaning of section 190.3, factor (b), we see no error. The jury was correctly instructed on the elements of the factor (b) offenses, and defendant shows no reasonable likelihood that the evidence of his current mental illness would have affected their determination whether the prosecution had proven beyond a reasonable doubt he committed those offenses, so as to permit the jury to consider them in aggravation. ( People v. Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 663, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 564, 828 P.2d 705.)