Opinion ID: 344772
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Injuries to Senate Work

Text: 46 With respect to appellant Metcalf's asserted injuries to his Senate committee work, we conclude that there has been no judicially cognizable injury stated. This conclusion flows from the fact that appellant has alleged no particular concrete injury 119 which amounts to a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm. 120 Rather, appellant presents a generalized grievance that a particular source of information which is relied upon by those who appear before and submit information to his subcommittee is not of the quality that it should be. Any detrimental effects of this allegedly biased information will occur at some unspecified time in the future; in addition, the nature of any prospective impact is equally unspecified and indeterminate. The effects of the Council's advice simply have not been traced into the context of a specific live grievance. 121 Appellant's failure to allege specific injury convinces us that he has not, in the words of the Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr, alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure (the) concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues . .. 122 Appellant Metcalf makes much of the fact that his asserted injuries relate to his legislative responsibility in a specific subject area and on a specific subcommittee. 123 In so arguing, appellant misconceives the nature of the specificity requirement in the law of standing. It is the injury which must be specific, not merely the interest on which the injury has been inflicted. Thus, the injury alleged by appellant Metcalf is not of the type of which we can take cognizance and still remain within the constitutional limitations imposed by Article III on the federal courts. 47 An additional objection to appellant Metcalf's claim to standing as a Senator relates to the purely subjective nature of his asserted injury. As noted previously, appellant's injury derives from his belief that he cannot produce the best possible legislative product because of the Council's allegedly tainted advice. There are no objective standards to determine when a legislative product is the best that it can be; such a determination necessarily rests on each legislator's individual view of the countless variety of factors which go into the formulation of legislation. Were we to accept the pure subjectivity put forth by appellant Metcalf in his capacity as an individual legislator, the federal courts would become a forum for the vindication of value preferences with respect to the quality of legislation enacted by our national legislature. Such a role for the courts is clearly inconsistent with the cases or controversies limitation of Article III. 48 The subjective nature of appellant Metcalf's claimed injury is particularly disturbing in the context of this case. This case is concerned with the flow of information from those who have particular expertise in given subject areas to those who formulate government policy. Indeed, Congress specifically stated in FACA that advisory committees, such as the NPC, are a useful and beneficial means of furnishing expert advice, ideas, and diverse opinions to the Federal Government. 124 One would hope that any governmental entity which formulates national policy, be it DOI, FEA, the Congress or any other group, would seek out, consider and balance all available information before arriving at final decisions. In this case, appellant Metcalf seeks to eliminate or alter a particular source of information so that he can produce what he believes to be the best possible legislative product. The relief which appellant requests would not only prevent council advice from eventually flowing to appellant himself, but it would deny this information to all of his colleagues in the Congress and to the federal agencies which have found it to be of inestimable value. 125 If subjective feelings of injury were sufficient to confer standing, the rather drastic consequences of a curtailed information flow could result quite easily and often. We do not mean by this that advisory committees cannot by their actions inflict judicially cognizable injuries on individuals; rather, we express this concern to show the particular need for the requirement of objective harm in this case. 126 49 Appellant Metcalf's asserted injuries relating to his Senate committee work are generalized and subjective complaints about the operation of the legislative process; these complaints are quite different from those presented in Kennedy v. Sampson 127 on which appellant places primary reliance. 128 In this case appellant has alleged no diminution in his power as an individual legislator or as a subcommittee chairman. Appellant Metcalf, in his capacity as a subcommittee chairman, continues to have the unimpaired power to develop a variety of sources of information which do not in any way depend on the NPC. The appellant's power to act to acquire what he believes to be accurate, competent, balanced and unbiased information is completely intact. 129 In the words of this court in the Kennedy case, appellant's official influence upon the legislative process . . 130 is undiminished as a result of the alleged illegality associated with the NPC. 50 Appellant Metcalf believes that a denial of standing to him in his capacity as a Senator would close the door to all suits, under virtually any circumstances, brought by federal legislators in federal courts. . . . 131 This is clearly not the effect of our denial of standing in this case. Appellant Metcalf has merely failed to meet the minimum constitutional requirement of injury in fact, a standard to which all litigants, regardless of status, are held in the federal courts. The federal courts are open to all litigants who can satisfy the requirements of the standing doctrine as developed by the Supreme Court. Appellant Metcalf's particular claim of legislator standing in this case fails to meet these requirements.