Opinion ID: 203035
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: What Constitutes the Portrayal of Sadistic Conduct

Text: Hoey argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that the image portrayed sadistic or masochistic conduct. He argues that the image must portray sadistic conduct that actually occurred: the prosecutor must show not only that the child is real, but that the sadism is as well. This is a matter of interpretation of the Guidelines, which provide that [i]f the offense involved material that portrays sadistic or masochistic conduct or other depictions of violence, increase by 4 levels. U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4). The premise of Hoey's argument is wrong, and we reject it. That an image  portrays sadistic or masochistic conduct does not require that it depict actual sadistic conduct, id. (emphasis added); if that were the Sentencing Commission's intent, there would be express language to that effect. The language it did choose is to the contrary. Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines portray as to represent by drawing, painting, engraving, to describe in words, and to enact. The Guidelines simply do not require the image to be an accurate documentation of real sadistic conduct. There is no conflict between section 2G2.2(b)(4) and the child pornography statute as interpreted by Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition and New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982). Ferber upheld a criminal ban on the distribution of child pornography because of the legitimate state interest in protecting the physiological, emotional, and mental health of the child. Id. at 758, 102 S.Ct. 3348. The Court emphasized that the child is harmed not only through the actual production of pornography, but also by the knowledge of its continued circulation. Id. at 756-59 & n. 10, 102 S.Ct. 3348; see also Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 249, 122 S.Ct. 1389 (Like a defamatory statement, each new publication of the speech would cause new injury to the child's reputation and emotional well-being.). Based in significant part on this psychological harm, the Court later upheld a statute criminalizing the mere possession of child pornography. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 110-11, 110 S.Ct. 1691, 109 L.Ed.2d 98 (1990) ([T]he materials produced by child pornographers permanently record the victim's abuse. The pornography's continued existence causes the child victims continuing harm by haunting the children in years to come.). It is this continuing psychological harm that Hoey overlooks. An image of an identifiable, real child involving sadistic conduct  even if manipulated to portray conduct that was not actually inflicted on that child  is still harmful, and the amount of emotional harm inflicted will likely correspond to the severity of the conduct depicted. For these reasons, the child pornography statute defines child pornography as including a visual depiction [that] has been created, adapted, or modified to appear that an identifiable minor is engaging in sexually explicit conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(C) (emphasis added). While the Supreme Court in Ashcroft held that the definitions of child pornography previously contained in § 2256(8)(B) and (D) were unconstitutional because they reached images that were completely fabricated, it carefully reserved consideration of § 2256(8)(C) and noted that manipulated images of identifiable children implicate the interests of real children and are in that sense closer to the images in Ferber.  Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 242, 122 S.Ct. 1389. Based on similar reasoning, the Eighth Circuit has held that an image in which the face of a known child was transposed onto the naked body of an unidentified child constituted child pornography outside the scope of First Amendment protection. United States v. Bach, 400 F.3d 622, 629-32 (8th Cir.2005). We agree. The district court committed no error in interpreting or applying the guideline.