Opinion ID: 2197846
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Hotel as a Major or Primary Use[13]

Text: Petitioners argue that the Hotel is a major component of the PUD  a primary use  and its elimination would radically alter the mix of uses. In making this argument, they assert that the Commission must treat the modification application in the same way that it reviews the initial PUD and that major changes to a PUD cannot be permitted without sufficient cause, if at all.... Changes to existing PUDs have been allowed in the past, effectively refuting the suggestion that changes to a PUD cannot be permitted ... at all. See 1330 Connecticut Ave., 669 A.2d 708 (upholding Commission approval of modification to an existing PUD); Foggy Bottom, 639 A.2d 578 (upholding approval of changes to the International Monetary Fund PUD); note 4, supra (detailing changes to the Watergate PUD). Furthermore, applications for modifications to an existing PUD must meet the requirements for and be processed as a second-stage application.... 11 DCMR § 2409.9. There is no exception or different process for proposed modifications that affect a primary use. Petitioners rely heavily on Gray v. Trustees, Monclova Township, 38 Ohio St.2d 310, 313 N.E.2d 366 (1974), in asserting that a major use of a PUD cannot be changed. However, that decision states, more modestly that the reasonable expectations of persons that the use of these areas [referring to open spaces and recreational areas] will not be radically altered after they become residents of the PUD are relevant evidence when such an alteration is challenged. Id. at 369 (emphasis added). [14] Although Gray invalidated an amendment to a PUD, that decision rests upon a distinction between legislative zoning and administrative action that is not relevant here, and its analysis seems to be largely outmoded in Ohio. See State ex rel. Marsalek v. South Euclid City Council, 111 Ohio St.3d 163, 855 N.E.2d 811, 814 (2006) (distinguishing Gray and another decision; the acts in those cases were found to be legislative because they effected a zoning change to the properties); Comm. for the Referendum of Ordinance No. 3844-02 v. Norris, 99 Ohio St.3d 336, 792 N.E.2d 186, 190-92 (2003) (and cases discussed therein); Zonders v. Delaware County Bd. of Elections, 69 Ohio St.3d 5, 630 N.E.2d 313, 319 (1994) (where specific property is already zoned as a PUD area, approval of subsequent development as being in compliance with the existing PUD standards is an administrative act....). Most importantly, Gray is not binding upon us, and we do not find it persuasive. We do agree with a portion of petitioners' argument  that change to the PUD cannot be permitted without sufficient cause. The question is how much cause is sufficient. In this case, the Commission decided to allow change to the existing PUD, concluding that the modification offered several public benefits. Among those benefits are an increase in the housing stock in an area that badly needs it. [15] Although it recognized that the hotel was an important component of the project as originally conceived[,] the Commission found that [t]he amenities and benefits provided [by the modification were] a reasonable trade-off for the change in use.... Petitioners also protest that the Commission did not consider the PUD as a unit. To the extent they suggest that the unit must remain static, we have already rejected that argument. Moreover, its order reveals that the Zoning Commission recognized the interconnectedness of the PUD when conducting its balancing function, and the end result after the modifications will still be a mixture of uses. We reject petitioners' implicit invitation for us to weigh the evidence anew. Even if we focus upon the intent and purposes of the first-stage approval, as petitioners urge us to do, there is still substantial evidence to support the Commission's decision. The original Watergate PUD was to have approximately 1,600 dwelling units. Today, however, there are only approximately 650. By adding the 133 proposed units, the modified PUD would come closer to, yet still fall well below, the originally-contemplated number of residential units. Ultimately, all of this information (including the loss of the Hotel) must be balanced by the Zoning Commission pursuant to 11 DCMR § 2403.8. As a court of review, we must acknowledge that this question is better answered by the Zoning Commission which has the expertise to make such a broad justification based on elements of fact, policy, and experience. Dupont Circle Citizens Ass'n, 426 A.2d at 332.