Opinion ID: 1092846
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: issues

Text: In his first issue regarding the guilt phase of the trial, Carpenter argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support a conviction for first-degree murder based upon a premeditation or felony murder theory. As more fully explained below, while we determine that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support a conviction on a premeditation theory, however, we further determine that the State did present sufficient evidence to support a conviction for first-degree felony murder with sexual battery as the underlying predicate felony offense. Carpenter argues the evidence presented at trial fails to show that (1) he actually killed Powell or was a principal in a murder committed by Pailing; (2) Powell was killed with premeditation; or (3) Powell was killed during the commission of a sexual battery. Relying on these arguments, Carpenter claims that the trial court should have granted his motions for judgment of acquittal (JOA motions) offered at the close of the State's case and at the close of all the evidence. Assuming arguendo that the State's case against Carpenter was entirely circumstantial, [8] we apply the following standards in evaluating Carpenter's contention that the trial court should have granted his JOA motions: A motion for judgment of acquittal should be granted in a circumstantial evidence case if the state fails to present evidence from which the jury can exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt.... It is the trial judge's proper task to review the evidence to determine the presence or absence of competent evidence from which the jury could infer guilt to the exclusion of all other inferences. That view of the evidence must be taken in the light most favorable to the state. The state is not required to rebut conclusively every possible variation of events which could be inferred from the evidence, but only to introduce competent evidence which is inconsistent with the defendant's theory of events. Once that threshold burden is met, it becomes the jury's duty to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Law, 559 So.2d 187, 188-89 (Fla. 1989) (citations omitted) (footnote omitted). Stated another way, [T]he sole function of the trial court ... is to determine whether there is a prima facie inconsistency between (a) the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the State and (b) the defense theory or theories. If there is such inconsistency, then the question is for the finder of fact to resolve. Orme v. State, 677 So.2d 258, 262 (Fla.1996). Carpenter's hypothesis of innocence in this case is based on his recorded statement that was played for the jury at trial. Specifically, Carpenter asserts that after he had completed consensual sexual intercourse with Powell and had retreated to the bathroom of his efficiency-style residence, Neil Pailing killed Powell by bludgeoning and strangling her after she belittled Pailing for prematurely ejaculating. Carpenter asserts that he heard the commotion, came out of the bathroom, and freaked out when he saw what Pailing was doing. He contends his involvement was limited to thereafter instructing Pailing as to how to tie Powell and place her body in the trunk of her car. Carpenter argues that such view of the evidence is reasonable and could support only a conviction for accessory after the fact, not first-degree murder on a premeditation or felony murder theory. When the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to the State, it is clear that the trial court did not err in allowing the jury to consider the degree of Carpenter's involvement in Powell's murder. Specifically, the State introduced evidence showing that Carpenter met Powell at a laundromat on Sunday, November 20, 1994, and within two days had invited her to a party at his residence with the intent of arranging a sexual encounter between Powell and Neil Pailing. Carpenter was thirty-two years old at the time, while Powell was sixty-two and Pailing was seventeen. The State presented evidence demonstrating that Carpenter lived in a small, efficiency-style residence, where his kitchen and bathroom were separated from his living area/bedroom by only a partition. The State also presented evidence establishing the relative sizes of Carpenter, Powell, and Pailing. Carpenter was approximately six feet four inches tall and weighed approximately 210 pounds, Powell was only five feet eight inches tall and weighed approximately 130 pounds, and Pailing was between five feet ten inches and six feet tall and weighed approximately 120 pounds. The medical examiner testified that Powell's death was caused by blunt trauma and neck compression, with the neck compression requiring total occlusion of the blood vessels in Powell's neck for a period of two to three minutes to cause her death. Moreover, Stephen Dakowitz, one of Carpenter's jail-mates, testified that Carpenter had originally indicated that Pailing had murdered Powell, but when Pailing was apprehended by the authorities, Carpenter became depressed and admitted to Dakowitz that it was just the opposite of what he had told him before. Finally, according to Carpenter's own recorded statement, he simply stood by and watched while Pailing beat and strangled Powell. He then instructed Pailing on how to hog-tie Powell and aided Pailing in disposing of Powell's body by placing her body in the trunk of her car. Based on the evidence listed above, the trial court had a sufficient basis to conclude that the State had presented a prima facie inconsistency with the defense theory of events. Specifically, given the relationship of the parties, their ages, their relative sizes, and the manner in which Powell was killed, the jury could have rejected Carpenter's contention that it was Pailing alone who had killed Powell while Carpenter stood by and watched because he just freaked out. Dakowitz's testimony also implicates Carpenter in Powell's murder. In addition to the above evidence presented by the State, it is clear that Carpenter's numerous statements to the police were inconsistent with one another. In similar situations, we have routinely held that the jury was free to reject the defendant's version of the events. See, e.g., Finney v. State, 660 So.2d 674, 680 (Fla.1995) (In light of Finney's inconsistent statements concerning his interactions with the victim and his activities on the day of the murder, the jury was free to reject Finney's version of events as unreasonable.); Bedford v. State, 589 So.2d 245, 250-51 (Fla.1991) (Because each of Bedford's several versions of events was inconsistent with the others, the jury reasonably could have concluded that each of these accounts was untrue.). Section 777.011, Florida Statutes (2000), [9] provides: Whoever commits any criminal offense against the state, whether felony or misdemeanor, or aids, abets, counsels, hires, or otherwise procures such offense to be committed, and such offense is committed or is attempted to be committed, is a principal in the first degree and may be charged, convicted, and punished as such, whether he or she is or is not actually or constructively present at the commission of such offense. It is clear that the State presented competent, substantial evidence to support a conclusion that Carpenter was at least a principal in a murder committed by Pailing, and, therefore, the trial court properly submitted the issue of Carpenter's involvement in Powell's murder to the jury. It is also clear that the State presented sufficient evidence for the trial court to submit Carpenter's case to the jury on a felony murder theory with sexual battery as the underlying predicate felony offense. Carpenter's hypothesis of innocence in connection with this theory is that he, Powell, and Pailing had consensual sexual intercourse as a threesome, and then Pailing killed Powell when she belittled Pailing for prematurely ejaculating. The State presented evidence showing that Powell was a religious, church-going, sixty-two year old woman who had not had sexual relations with her close friend John Post even though she and Post had slept in the same bed on several occasions. Further, the State presented evidence demonstrating that Powell suffered several injuries to her vagina which were consistent with forceful penetration. [10] Moreover, the evidence showed that Powell's own bra was placed across her mouth as a gag while she was still alive, which was inconsistent with consensual behavior and with one of Carpenter's statements to the police that Powell's bra was still on her chest with one breast exposed. Finally, the State presented evidence that there was no semen found in Powell's vagina, which was inconsistent with Carpenter's statement to the police that Powell belittled Pailing for prematurely ejaculating and that Pailing was not wearing a condom. Based upon all of the evidence presented by the State, as well as the inconsistencies in Carpenter's various versions of events, it is clear that the trial court properly submitted Carpenter's case to the jury for consideration on a felony murder theory with sexual battery as the underlying offense. See Hitchcock v. State, 413 So.2d 741, 745 (Fla. 1982) (finding that the totality of the circumstances, including the age of the victim and her previous chaste character, refuted defendant's claim that his sexual contact with the victim was consensual, and the jury thus could easily have considered Hitchcock's contention that the girl consented to be unreasonable). As for premeditation, however, we determine that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to warrant the trial court's submission of Carpenter's case to the jury on that theory. Premeditation is defined as more than a mere intent to kill; it is a fully formed conscious purpose to kill. This purpose may be formed a moment before the act but must exist for a sufficient length of time to permit reflection as the nature of the act to be committed and the probable result of that act. Norton v. State, 709 So.2d 87, 92 (Fla.1997) (quoting Coolen v. State, 696 So.2d 738, 741 (Fla.1997)). Evidence from which premeditation may be inferred includes such matters as the nature of the weapon used, the presence or absence of adequate provocation, previous difficulties between the parties, the manner in which the homicide was committed, and the nature and manner of the wounds inflicted. Holton v. State, 573 So.2d 284, 289 (Fla.1990) (quoting Larry v. State, 104 So.2d 352, 354 (Fla.1958)). During the guilt phase, the State presented evidence that Carpenter had arranged for the party at which Powell was killed, and the State also presented evidence that Powell died as a result of blunt trauma and neck compression, with the neck compression requiring total occlusion of the blood vessels in Powell's neck for two to three minutes to cause her death. As discussed above, the State also presented the testimony of Stephen Dakowitz, who testified that Carpenter had implicated himself in the murder of Ann Powell. The State argues that this evidence supports a finding of premeditation, while Carpenter argues that such evidence does not exclude every reasonable hypothesis that Powell's death was effected without a premeditated design. After reviewing the evidence and relevant case law, we find that Carpenter's position on this issue must prevail. Most instructive on this issue is our prior decision in Kirkland v. State, 684 So.2d 732 (Fla.1996). In that case, the victim's death was caused by a very deep, complex, irregular wound of the neck, which cut off the victim's ability to breathe and caused extensive bleeding. Id. at 733. The jury found the defendant guilty of first-degree murder, and he challenged that finding on appeal, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support a premeditation theory. See id. at 734-35. The State argued that a premeditation theory was supported by the nature of the victim's neck wound, which required multiple slashes, combined with other wounds caused by blunt trauma, as well as the existence of friction between the defendant and the victim. See id. In rejecting a finding of premeditation, we reasoned: [T]he State's evidence was insufficient in light of the strong evidence militating against a finding of premeditation. First and foremost, there was no suggestion that Kirkland exhibited, mentioned, or even possessed an intent to kill the victim at any time prior to the actual homicide. Second, there were no witnesses to the events immediately preceding the homicide. Third, there was no evidence suggesting that Kirkland made special arrangements to obtain a murder weapon in advance of the homicide. Indeed, the victim's mother testified that Kirkland owned a knife the entire time she was associated with him. Fourth, the State presented scant, if any, evidence to indicate that Kirkland committed the homicide according to a preconceived plan. Finally, while not controlling, we note that it is unrefuted that Kirkland had an IQ that measured in the sixties. In Hoefert [v. State, 617 So.2d 1046, 1048 (Fla.1993)], we were unable to find evidence sufficient to support premeditation in a situation in which Hoefert had established a pattern of strangling women while raping or assaulting them. Evidence was presented in that case indicating that the homicide victim, found dead in Hoefert's dwelling, was likewise asphyxiated. Despite the pattern of strangulation, the discovery of the victim in Hoefert's dwelling, and efforts by Hoefert to conceal the crime, this Court found that premeditation was not established. Hoefert, 617 So.2d at 1049. In this case, there is no evidence that Kirkland had established a pattern of extreme violence as had Hoefert. A comparison of the facts in Hoefert and the instant case requires us to find, if the law of circumstantial evidence is to be consistently and equally applied, that the record in this case is insufficient to support a finding of premeditation. Id. at 735; see also Green v. State, 715 So.2d 940, 944 (Fla.1998) (rejecting State's argument that the nature of victim's wounds, which included strangulation, supported a finding of premeditation, relying on this Court's decisions in Kirkland and Hoefert ). The State's reliance on our decisions in Holton and Hitchcock is misplaced here because even though both of those cases involved a strangulation death, there were other factors present in those cases that supported a finding of premeditation. See Holton, 573 So.2d at 289-90 (involving defendant who had fresh scratch marks on his chest the day after the murder and victim with long fingernails, suggesting that a struggle occurred which belied the defendant's assertion that the killing was accidental); Hitchcock, 413 So.2d at 745 (finding that defendant's statement to jail-mate that he choked the victim, took her outside, then choked her againall to quiet hersupported a finding of premeditation). While Carpenter's version of the events may not be true, the evidence does not exclude the reasonable hypothesis that Powell was killed, without premeditation, after she rebuffed sexual advances made by Carpenter and Pailing. Accordingly, we determine that the trial court should have granted Carpenter's JOA motion with regard to only the premeditation theory of first-degree murder.
As a second guilt phase issue, Carpenter argues that the trial court erred in instructing the jury with a modified instruction for first-degree felony murder. After reviewing the record in this case and relevant case law, we determine that Carpenter is not entitled to relief on this issue. At the jury charge conference, the State requested that the trial court modify the standard jury instruction for first-degree felony murder to incorporate a principals theory of liability. Specifically, the State requested that the trial court include the phrase or his principal immediately following Carpenter's name in paragraphs 2.a. and 2.b. of the first-degree felony murder standard jury instruction, presumably to reflect Neil Pailing's involvement in the sexual battery predicate felony offense. Thus, instead of stating: The death occurred as a consequence of and while David C. Carpenter was engaged in the commission of sexual battery[,] or the death occurred as a consequence of and while David C. Carpenter was attempting to commit sexual battery, the proposed instruction provided: The death occurred as a consequence of and while David C. Carpenter or his principal was engaged in the commission of sexual battery[,] or the death occurred as a consequence of and while David C. Carpenter or his principal was attempting to commit sexual battery. (Emphasis added.) The State also proposed the same modification to paragraphs 2.a. and 2.b. of the third-degree felony murder instruction, with aggravated battery as the asserted underlying predicate felony offense. Finally, the State requested that the trial court give the standard instruction on principals, which provided: If two or more persons help each other [commit] [attempt to commit] a crime and the defendant is one of them, the defendant is a principal and must be treated as if [he][she] had done all the things the other person or persons did if the defendant: (1) knew what was going to happen (2) intended to participate actively or by sharing in an expected benefit and, (3) actually did something by which [he][she] intended to help [commit] [attempt to commit] the crime. [11] Relevant to Carpenter's claim on appeal, defense counsel objected to the proposed first-degree felony murder instruction, specifically arguing that there was no case law supporting a deviation from the standard instruction. [12] Defense counsel asserted that if the felony murder instruction was to be given, only the standard paragraph 2.a. instruction would be appropriate. Additionally, before the trial court proceeded after agreeing to instruct the jury on proposed paragraphs 2.a. and 2.b. of the first-degree felony murder charge as modified by the State, defense counsel again raised a strenuous objection to the instruction. Further, defense counsel objected to the reading of the standard principals instruction as not being based on the evidence in the case, and the trial court noted the objection and permitted a continuing objection on the principals instruction. Finally, defense counsel argued in Carpenter's motion for new trial that the court erred in improperly instructing the jury during the guilty phase of the trial. The State asserts that even though defense counsel objected to the modified first-degree felony murder instruction during the jury charge conference, the issue has not been preserved for our review because (1) defense counsel did not renew the objection to the modified first-degree felony murder charge at the close of the charge conference or when the jury was instructed; and (2) the trial court granted defense counsel's request to give the jury a special instruction on accessory after the fact and independent acts. See Answer Brief at 17-18. Contrary to the State's position, however, the fact that defense counsel did not renew its objection to the jury instructions clearly does not bar review here. See, e.g., State v. Heathcoat, 442 So.2d 955, 955-56 (Fla.1983) (finding that defense counsel sufficiently preserved jury instruction issue for review despite counsel's failure to object where the record clearly showed that defense counsel requested a specific instruction and the trial court clearly understood the request and just as clearly denied the request); Flint v. State, 463 So.2d 554, 555-56 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (relying on Heathcoat in finding that defense counsel could appeal jury instruction issue where charge conference colloquy indicated that defense counsel preserved objection to the trial court's failure to give requested instructions); see also Hubbard v. State, 411 So.2d 1312, 1314-15 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) (en banc); Saulsberry v. State, 398 So.2d 1017, 1017-18 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). It is clear that defense counsel satisfied the requirements of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.390(d) [13] by objecting during the charge conference and specifically advising the trial court of the basis for the objection. Further, the fact that the trial court granted defense counsel's request to give an independent acts instruction does not affect the preservation issue, although it does impact the merits of the jury instruction issue. In analyzing the merits of Carpenter's jury instruction issue, we note the following: This Court has explained that a trial court has wide discretion in instructing the jury, and the court's decision regarding the charge to the jury is reviewed with a presumption of correctness on appeal. Kearse v. State, 662 So.2d 677, 682 (Fla.1995). In that regard, a trial judge in a criminal case is not constrained to give only those instructions that are contained in the Florida Standard Jury Instructions. Cruse v. State, 588 So.2d 983 (Fla.1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 976, 112 S.Ct. 2949, 119 L.Ed.2d 572 (1992). James v. State, 695 So.2d 1229, 1236 (Fla. 1997); see also Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.985; Steele v. State, 561 So.2d 638 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); see generally 15A Fla.Jur.2d Criminal Law § 3507 (1993). We also note, however, that it is preferable that a standard jury instruction be given if it adequately explains the law, see, e.g., McGuire v. State, 639 So.2d 1043, 1047 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994), and giving a non-standard instruction that misleads the jury is reversible error. See, e.g., Doyle v. State, 483 So.2d 89, 90 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). In analyzing the modified instructions given in this case, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in giving those instructions. As the State points out, Carpenter does not challenge on appeal the fact that the trial court gave the jury the standard instruction on principals. Instead, Carpenter argues that adding the phrase or his principal to the standard first-degree felony murder instruction made it easier for the State to obtain a conviction. Initial Brief at 33. Although placement and utilization of the phrase or his principal may have been inartful, it was consistent with another portion of the standard first-degree felony murder instruction. As a whole, the instruction given by the trial court read as follows: Before you can find the defendant guilty of first degree felony murder, the state must prove the following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: One, Ann Powell is dead. Two, the death occurred as a consequence of and while David C. Carpenter or his principal was engaged in the commission of sexual battery, or the death occurred as a consequence of and while David C. Carpenter or his principal was attempting to commit sexual battery. Three, David C. Carpenter was the person who actually killed Ann Powell, or Ann Powell was killed by a person other than David C. Carpenter, but both David C. Carpenter and the person who killed Ann Powell were principals in the commission of sexual battery. (Emphasis added.) The trial court followed this instruction with a proper standard instruction on the law of principals, and then gave a specially requested instruction on independent acts after it read the modified first-degree murder instruction: If you find that the murder of Ann Powell was committed by a person or persons other than David C. Carpenter, and that the felony murder first degree was a totally independent act of someone other than David C. Carpenter, and if you further find that David C. Carpenter did not participate in the felony murder first degree in that it was completed prior to any participation he might have had, then you should find David C. Carpenter not guilty of felony murder first degree. Based on the above, it is clear that the modified instruction for first-degree felony murder given by the trial court was consistent with the law of principals. Moreover, by giving the special independent acts instruction, the trial court made it clear to the jury that Carpenter could not be found guilty for acts committed solely and independently by another. Therefore, we determine that Carpenter is not entitled to relief on this issue.
As his third and final issue relating to the guilt phase of the trial, Carpenter argues that the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of William Shay and Carlos Mendoza, who were prepared to testify concerning self-inculpatory, out-of-court statements made by Pailing while Shay, Mendoza, Pailing, and Carpenter were jailed together. As more fully explained below, we determine that the trial court committed harmful error in prohibiting Shay and Mendoza from testifying concerning Pailing's statements. The issue before us primarily involves section 90.804(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2000), [14] which provides that the following are not excluded as hearsay if the declarant is unavailable as a witness: A statement which, at the time of its making, was so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest or tended to subject the declarant to liability or to render invalid a claim by the declarant against another, so that a person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless he or she believed it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is inadmissible, unless corroborating circumstances show the trustworthiness of the statement. In analyzing this issue, we note that a trial judge's ruling on the admissibility of evidence will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Blanco v. State, 452 So.2d 520, 523 (Fla.1984). According to Shay's proffered testimony, he and Pailing were in a program together at the Pinellas County Jail entitled Changing Criminal Thoughts in early 1995, and it was there that he and Pailing discussed this case. On one occasion, when Shay caused Pailing to become upset about something concerning the case, [15] Pailing said that he did it. According to Shay, Pailing explained that David [Carpenter] set him up with this woman, and they were at Dave's house.... And Neil and this woman were in the bedroom and Dave heard a bunch of noise. Dave went into the bedroom, and I guess the woman was dead there because Neil said then David justthey didn't know what to do, so Dave helped him get the body out of the house. That's when they tookhe said he took and tried to torch the car or something with the body in it. Shay testified that Pailing admitted that he did the actual murder with a gun or something, and it was in the third drawer of the dresser; he hit the woman in the head with the gun. According to Shay, Pailing also confessed, I killed her, I raped her, I burned her up. Shay admitted that he was friends with Carpenter and was housed with him for over two months, and when asked if he did not like Pailing, he stated, I still talk to him today if I seen him. According to Mendoza's proffered testimony, he was in the same pod with Pailing for about a month in 1995. Mendoza recalled an occasion when he and his cell-mate were talking together in their cell when Pailing entered and said that he raped her, he put her in the trunk of the car and burned her. Mendoza acknowledged that he was friends with Carpenter but did not get along with Pailing, describing an incident in which he almost became involved in a physical fight with Pailing. The State proffered the testimony of Detective Steffens, who had spoken with Mendoza and Shay with regard to Pailing's statements. According to Detective Steffens' proffered testimony, Shay advised him that Pailing said he was with the victim Ann Powell and they were in the bedroom and something happened, at which time Neil hit her over the head and called David Carpenter into the room and she was killed. Detective Steffens also testified that Shay did not initially tell him about the exact quote from PailingI killed her, I raped her, I burned her up but instead mentioned the quote three days after the initial interview even though Detective Steffens had pressed Shay during such interview for all relevant information. After listening to the proffered testimony, hearing oral argument from the parties, and reviewing relevant law, the trial court excluded the testimony of Shay and Mendoza despite the fact that the court found that Pailing was unavailable to testify due to his Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate himself. In so ruling, the trial court stated: I think the inherent difficulty with the proffered testimony is that, first of all, there's no corroborating evidence of the essential fact. In other words, the essential issue here is who did the murder, and I don't see any corroborating evidence to corroborate the statements that are being proffered. That's the first thing. The second thing is I think the statements are inherently unreliable because both of the inmates that want to testify or that have been proffered said in part that they didn't like Mr. Pailing, and said words that interpretedamounted to that they were friends with the defendant. And I think that the absence of corroborating circumstances to corroborate what they were saying, and the inherent untrustworthiness, makes the statements inadmissible under Florida Statute 90.804(2)(c). Further, the statements which I think basically amount to statements attributed to Pailing that, I raped her, I killed her, I burned her, do not necessarily exculpate this defendant, 'cause those statements do not say that this defendant was not involved. And for all of those reasons I'm going to rule that these two inmates whose testimony had been proffered cannot testify. The trial court did rule, however, that Shay and Mendoza could testify during the penalty phase of the trial, if there were such a phase. [16] After careful consideration, we determine that the trial court erred in ruling that the testimony of both Shay and Mendoza could not be admitted because Pailing did not explicitly state to either of them that Carpenter was not involved in the crime. Carpenter correctly notes that section 90.804(2)(c) applies to statements tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused. In Voorhees v. State, 699 So.2d 602, 613 (Fla.1997), we determined that it was improper to exclude a codefendant's self-inculpatory, out-of-court statement merely because the statement did not exonerate the defendant. See also Sager v. State, 699 So.2d 619, 622 (Fla.1997) (following Voorhees ). Importantly, the State's theory in both Voorhees and Sager, as in the present case, included a charge that both defendants were involved in the murder. In this case, while Pailing's statements did not totally exonerate Carpenter, such statements could bolster Carpenter's theory regarding his reduced degree of culpability. On this ground, the trial court erred. The trial court also excluded the testimony of both Shay and Mendoza because it found that the statements made by Pailing lacked sufficient corroboration showing the trustworthiness of those statements. We disagree. In reaching its conclusion, the trial court apparently questioned the credibility of the in-court witnesses, Shay and Mendoza. Under Florida law, however, the credibility of an in-court witness who is testifying with regard to an out-of-court declaration against penal interest is not a matter that the trial court should consider in determining whether to admit the testimony concerning the out-of-court statement. See Maugeri v. State, 460 So.2d 975, 979 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); see generally Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence, § 804.4 at 804-05 (1999). [17] Instead, it is the jury's duty to assess the credibility of the in-court witness who is testifying about the out-of-court statement. As for corroboration, Pailing's statement was consistent not only with the general version of events recounted in Carpenter's recorded statement, but it was also consistent with other evidence presented at trial, including (1) the fact that sexual contact occurred in connection with Powell's murder; (2) Powell was placed in the trunk of her vehicle; (3) Powell's vehicle was burned with her body inside; (4) Powell was bludgeoned; (5) a nongun was located in Carpenter's desk drawer; and (6) one of Pailing's fingerprints was found on Powell's vehicle. We determine that this was sufficient corroboration to allow Pailing's self-inculpatory, out-of-court statements to come before the jury for consideration pursuant to section 90.804(2)(c), Florida Statutes, [18] and we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial court's error in excluding Pailing's statements was harmless. Accordingly, we reverse Carpenter's first-degree murder conviction and remand for a new trial.
Based upon our determination to reverse Carpenter's conviction and remand for a new trial, we need not address Carpenter's proportionality arguments here. However, because Carpenter may again participate in a capital penalty phase hearing should he be found guilty of first-degree murder on remand, we address his arguments concerning his prior gross misdemeanor conviction from the state of Nevada. Indeed, this is an issue of first impression before this Court. As more fully explained below, we determine that such conviction does not qualify as an aggravating circumstance under section 921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1999). Section 921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes, provides that an aggravating circumstance may be established where [t]he defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person. As it is clear that Carpenter has not been previously convicted of another capital felony, the relevant query must be whether Carpenter has been convicted ... of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person. In Dautel v. State, 658 So.2d 88, 89 (Fla.1995), we were presented with a somewhat analogous question, but it was analyzed in the sentencing guidelines context. In that case, we construed the language set forth in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.701(d)(5)(B), which provides, When scoring federal, foreign, military, or out-of-state convictions, assign the score for the analogous or parallel Florida Statute. See Dautel, 658 So.2d at 89-90. We held that only the elements of the out-of-state conviction, not the facts underlying that conviction, should be considered in determining whether the conviction is analogous to a Florida Statute for the purpose of calculating points on a sentencing guidelines scoresheet. See id. at 91. Similarly, in Forehand v. State, 537 So.2d 103, 104 (Fla.1989), we held, again in the sentencing guidelines context, that the elements of the subject crime, not the stated degree or the sentence received, control in determining whether there is a Florida statute analogous to an out-of-state crime. The various jurisdictions may choose to punish the same acts differently, so the elements of a crime are the surest way to trace that crime. The State argues that even though Carpenter's prior Nevada conviction for battery causing substantial bodily harm was a gross misdemeanor in that state, such conviction nevertheless constitutes an aggravating circumstance in this case because it is analogous to the Florida offense of aggravated battery, which is a second-degree felony. See § 784.045(2), Fla.Stat. (1997). While it is true that the elements of the Nevada offense of battery causing substantial bodily harm and the Florida offense of aggravated battery may be similar in their elements, [19] the statutory scheme in the present case is much different than the statutory scheme discussed in Dautel and Forehand. Specifically, in those cases, we addressed the sentencing guidelines that not only allow but contemplate a comparison of out-of-state convictions to analogous Florida Statutes. In the present situation, however, the Legislature has not provided for any type of comparison and has specifically provided that only a  felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person may establish an aggravating factor under section 921.141(5)(b). § 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). Further, based on the elements and definitions in the Nevada Statutes, it is not clear that the offense would be a felony in Florida. Resolution of the issue would require a separate trial concerning the Nevada events within the trial of this case. Strictly construing this statutory language in favor of the defendant, see, e.g., Donaldson v. State, 722 So.2d 177, 184 (Fla.1998) (It is axiomatic that penal statutes must be strictly construed.), we determine that an out-of-state conviction related to an offense that has only similar but different elements and does not constitute a felony in that state does not amount to a felony in Florida as a matter of law for the purposes of establishing the prior violent felony aggravating circumstance under the present statute. Accordingly, Carpenter's prior gross misdemeanor conviction does not here constitute a felony aggravating circumstance under section 921.141(5)(b).