Opinion ID: 599272
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sufficiency of Evidence of Defendants as Conspirators

Text: 27 Sam notes that the testimony against him was presented by the Eichens and Mr. Utley--drug dealers and convicted felons. All testified in furtherance of desired downward departures at sentencing. Sam argues that allowing a conviction to stand on the basis of testimony of such people derogates the system. Their testimony was not, however, unbelievable on its face; accordingly, such arguments are for the trier of fact and not a reviewing court. United States v. Van Wyhe, 965 F.2d 528, 531 (7th Cir.1992). 28 Further, Sam's argument ignores that he and Angela were arrested very near the site of the Holiday Inn. Presence alone is not sufficient to prove conspiracy, United States v. Burrell, 963 F.2d at 988, but Sam's presence corroborates the testimony of the Eichens and Mr. Utley. It is true, as Sam argues, that he was not parked in a position to see the transaction, as the Eichens say he was to do; the government sought to counter this argument at trial by presenting testimony explaining counter-surveillance, in which one watches for others watching. This court need not determine whether Sam's chosen parking spot was a clever site for counter-surveillance or merely a botched try at surveillance; the government was not required to prove that Sam performed his assigned task well. It is enough that the evidence allowed the jury to find that Sam went to the Holiday Inn area to play a role in the conspiracy of which he was a part. 29 Sam also suggests that he could not be a conspirator because he was a mere buyer, and evidence of a mere buyer-seller relationship is not sufficient to establish a conspiracy conviction. United States v. Haddad, 976 F.2d 1088, 1092 (7th Cir.1992). Although Sam intended to buy, his role greatly exceeded that of a buyer: he intended to distribute what he was going to buy; he brokered the larger sale to provide his seller with inventory. His participation involved far more than the simple exchange of money for drugs intended for personal use. United States v. Aquilla, 976 F.2d at 1051. 30 The evidence of Angela's participation, although weaker than the evidence as to Sam, likewise was sufficient to support her conviction. The record contains no evidence from which Angela's agreement or participation could be inferred until shortly before the transaction. Before that time, the government's proof showed only her presence while Sam discussed the transaction with others, but that presence supports an inference of her knowledge of what Sam was doing. Armed with that knowledge, and with a handgun, Angela then travelled, with Sam at the wheel of her car, to the scene of the transaction. The jury could have found that Sam told the Eichens he would have a gun. No gun was found on his person; Angela's presence with possession of a gun supports an inference that Angela had thrown her lot with Sam. Angela's involvement exceeded mere presence, United States v. Brigham, 977 F.2d 317, 319 (7th Cir.1992), and greatly exceeded simple knowledge of Sam's activities, making this a different case from United States v. Williams, 798 F.2d 1024, 1027-29 (7th Cir.1986). The jury could have found that Angela knew of the conspiracy and intentionally joined and associated herself with its criminal purpose. United States v. Villasenor, 977 F.2d 331, 335 (7th Cir.1992). 31 A reasonable jury could have found that both Angela and Sam knowingly joined the conspiracy charged in the indictment. The evidence on the conspiracy count was sufficient.