Opinion ID: 169653
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: RithThe Tenth Circuit's Reading of Matlock

Text: In this circuit, we have read Matlock to establish the following standards for assessing actual authority to consent to a search of a residence: (1) mutual use of the property by virtue of joint access, or (2) control for most purposes over it. Rith, 164 F.3d at 1329 (emphasis added). The first of these standardsmutual use by virtue of joint accessis a fact-intensive inquiry. Id. at 1330. We require the government to show that the third party entered the premises or room at will, without the consent of the subject of the search. Id.; see, e.g., McAlpine, 919 F.2d at 1464 (concluding that a women held in the defendant's home against her will had actual authority to consent to a search because she had resided in the home for two months, regularly slept in the back bedroom where the guns were found and kept her personal possessions throughout the trailer, thus demonstrating mutual access . . . and use [of the entire home] on a daily basis). In contrast, the second standardcontrol for most purposes over the property is a normative inquiry dependent upon whether the relationship between the defendant and the third party is the type which creates a presumption of control for most purposes over the property by the third party. Rith, 164 F.3d at 1330. If the presumption of control is not rebutted, then the third party has actual authority to consent to a search of the defendant's property. Id. Parent-child and husband-wife relationships trigger this presumption, but a simple co-tenant relationship does not create a presumption of control and actual access would have to be shown. Id. In applying these principles of actual authority, we must be mindful of the Supreme Court's recent observation that: [t]he constant element in the assessing reasonableness in the consent cases . . . is the great significance given to widely shared social expectations, which are naturally enough influenced by the law of property, but not controlled by its rules. Randolph, 126 S.Ct. at 1521. Thus, whether the defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy was infringed by the third party's consent to the search is a paramount concern. See McAlpine, 919 F.2d at 1463 (observing that, if [actual] authority is established, the person whose property is searched is unjustified in claiming an expectation of privacy in the property because that person cannot reasonably believe that the joint user will not, under certain circumstances, allow a search in her own right).