Opinion ID: 1351612
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Heading: washington's blood shield statute

Text: The first issue to be determined in this case is whether Washington's blood shield statute governs this situation, either expressly or by implication. The statute states: The procurement, processing, storage, distribution, administration, or use of whole blood, plasma, blood products and blood derivatives for the purpose of injecting or transfusing the same, or any of them, .. . into the human body is declared to be, for all purposes whatsoever, the rendition of a service by each and every person, firm, or corporation participating therein, and is declared not to be covered by any implied warranty under the Uniform Commercial Code, Title 62A RCW, or otherwise, and no civil liability shall be incurred as a result of any such acts, except in the case of wilful or negligent conduct: Provided, however, That this section shall apply only to liability alleged in the contraction of hepatitis, malaria, and acquired immune deficiency disease and shall not apply to any transaction in which the donor receives compensation.... RCW 70.54.120. The express language of the statute clearly provides that where a donor is compensated, statutory immunity from liability does not apply to the transaction. Both parties agree that defendants compensate their donors. Consequently, defendants do not fall within the statute's immunity and the statute does not expressly apply to this case. Plaintiffs argue that [i]n enacting RCW 70.54.120, the Washington Legislature intended to apply strict liability to those products which did not meet the statute's provisos. Opening Brief of Appellants, at 48. Thus, plaintiffs argue, because defendants do not qualify for immunity under RCW 70.54.120, defendants should be strictly liable. [1, 2] As defendants note, however, the history of the legislation and its relationship with judicial decisions show that the Legislature thought the common law imposed strict liability on blood products, and saw itself as carving out an exception from this common law policy. The Legislature adopted the first blood immunity statute shortly after decisions in a number of jurisdictions applied strict liability to suppliers of whole blood. The legislative hearings focused on issues associated with whole blood and did not address the special issues regarding plasma donation and hemophilia. It is not at all clear that the Legislature would have favored strict liability for products such as factor IX concentrate, and we decline to read such an intent into the statute. In Howell v. Spokane & Inland Empire Blood Bank, 114 Wn.2d 42, 49, 785 P.2d 815 (1990), we determined that the Legislature enacted the blood shield statute in order to ensure that there was an adequate flow of blood products in this state by providing for liability only in cases of negligence. Our holding today is in accord with that goal. [3, 4] Plaintiffs further argue that in excluding compensated donor transactions from protection under the statute, the Legislature declared a policy that for-profit companies, such as Miles and Baxter, should be strictly liable notwithstanding the common law interpretation of strict liability in this state. We disagree. There is nothing in the statutory language which suggests that the Legislature intended to distinguish between for-profit and nonprofit entities. We cannot derive legislative intent from language which is not in the statute. When construing a statute, the court must ascertain and give effect to the Legislature's intent. If the statute is unambiguous, the meaning of the statute must be derived solely from the language of the statute. (Citations omitted.) In re Eaton, 110 Wn.2d 892, 898, 757 P.2d 961 (1988). Our passing reference in Howell to the blood bank's nonprofit status ( Howell, at 54) was not intended to imply that an entity's for-profit status would make it liable under common law. Other courts that have interpreted blood shield statutes have declined to attach liability based on an entity's profit or nonprofit status. In a case similar to the one before us, the Second Circuit held that Connecticut's blood shield statute applied to commercial producers and sellers of blood products. Coffee v. Cutter Biological, 809 F.2d 191 (2d Cir.1987). In Jones v. Miles Labs., Inc., 705 F. Supp. 561 (N.D. Ga. 1987), the plaintiffs argued that the blood shield statutes were not intended to apply to commercial laboratories which provide blood products to consumers on a for-profit basis. The District Court for the Northern District of Georgia relied on the Georgia Supreme Court's interpretation of that State's blood shield statute and held that the clear import of the provision was `to include not only hospitals, but entities like defendants engaged in providing blood for human use.' Jones, at 562 (citing McAllister v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 240 Ga. 246, 240 S.E.2d 247 (1977)). In sum, we hold that RCW 70.54.120 does not govern this case. We now consider whether strict liability applies under the common law.