Opinion ID: 1354792
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: mother's testimony

Text: As part of appellant's case in mitigation his mother, Maria Torrence, was called as a witness. Mrs. Torrence testified that when the appellant was around twelve years old, she divorced appellant's father and was awarded custody of her four children. Mrs. Torrence further testified that she still loved her son and was sorry for what he had done. She went on to explain that appellant began to have emotional problems after the divorce. Thereafter, the following exchange took place: Q. Do you have a basis for asking this jury to spare your son's life? MR. MYERS: Objection, Your Honor. MR. McWHIRTER: Your Honor, I have  MR. MYERS: It's not proper, Your Honor. This is the defendant, not this poor lady here. MR. McWHIRTER: Your Honor, I have a case  WITNESS: That's my son. I don't want him to die. MR. MYERS: Your Honor, I interpose an objection. THE COURT: Mr. McWhirter, you know what the purpose of this proceeding is. MR. McWHIRTER: Your Honor, I can get a case, if you will let me, that says the (sic) a mother can beg for the life of her son. THE COURT: Well, I am going to instruct you now to tell this jury, or let this witness or any other witness tell the jury something about this young man which will help them assess him and not the mama who would naturally be terribly upset about her son being in this situation. After the above exchange, Mrs. Torrence concluded her testimony by explaining that appellant has needed help with emotional problems for a number of years, but she was never able to afford it. When asked if she cared whether appellant ever got out of prison, Mrs. Torrence stated I just want someone to help him. Appellant contends the trial court erred by ruling that Mrs. Torrence could not appeal to the jury for mercy. The state, on the other hand, asserts that the line of questioning improperly went to the ultimate issue to be decided by the jury  whether to impose a life sentence or death. See State v. Adams , 277 S.C. 115, 283 S.E. (2d) 582 (1981). In Childs v. State , 257 Ga. 243, 357 S.E. (2d) 48 (1987), the Supreme Court of Georgia illustrated the distinction between a plea for mercy and the ultimate question in the following terms: [A]lthough a defendant may present witnesses who know and care for him and are willing on that basis to ask for mercy on his behalf, a defendant may not present witnesses to testify merely to their religious or philosophical attitudes about the death penalty.... Nor is a defendant entitled to present the opinion of a witness about what verdict the jury ought to reach. Id. 357 S.E. (2d) at 60 (citation omitted). We find this distinction persuasive and herein adopt its reasoning. In the present case, appellant sought only to have Mrs. Torrence make a general plea for mercy for the life of her son. He did not seek to elicit testimony about what verdict the witness thought should be imposed, as was the case in State v. Matthews , 296 S.C. 379, 373 S.E. (2d) 587 (1988). Thus, the line of questioning was not addressed to the ultimate issue. Despite the trial court's ruling which limited her testimony, Mrs. Torrence pleaded for mercy and appellant has shown no prejudice. See State v. Matthews, supra . Therefore, we conclude that the appellant has failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the trial judge's ruling. This issue is addressed only to clarify the law should the question arise on retrial.