Opinion ID: 657832
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence Re Refusal to Take Polygraph Examination

Text: 56 Finally, Vaughn and Castle Rock contend that the district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence that the juvenile boarder, suspected of committing the theft, declined to take a polygraph examination after being interviewed by Vaughn. They argue that this evidence was irrelevant and prejudicial. 57 Under Fed.R.Evid. 401, evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Under Fed.R.Evid. 403, relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.... 58 Evidence that the juvenile boarder refused to take a polygraph examination is relevant to show what information Vaughn had before he consulted with the prosecuting attorney and before he arrested Huson. That information has some tendency to show that Vaughn did not act reasonably. 59 In the cases cited by Vaughn and Castle Rock for the proposition that the polygraph evidence is prejudical, the evidence was being used against the party who refused to take the polygraph examination. See, e.g., Aetna Ins. Co. v. Barnett Bros., Inc., 289 F.2d 30, 34 (8th Cir.1961). The danger of unfair prejudice to Vaughn, who was not the subject of the refusal to take a polygraph examination, does not outweigh the probative value of the polygraph evidence. The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting this evidence. AFFIRMED. 5