Opinion ID: 752178
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of the Opportunity to Cross-Examine

Text: 36 Jack contends that the district court denied him his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him by totally denying him the opportunity to cross-examine one witness. During the trial, the district judge became impatient with the cross-examinations conducted by First American's and Jack's counsel. The judge objected to the jam-up honey deal the judge perceived between Jack and his majority-held corporation that led their lawyers to conduct tag team cross-examinations representing the same interest. (R.33 at 435; R.34 at 44.) Ultimately, the judge forbade Jack's counsel from examining a Government summary witness, Patricia Terris, at all. The court demanded rather that Jack share First American's counsel for the cross-examination. Jack objected 9 and now contends that the ruling compromised his Sixth Amendment confrontation rights. We consider de novo the legal question of the scope of Jack's constitutional rights, see Kennedy v. Herring, 54 F.3d 678, 682 (11th Cir.1995), and we agree with Jack. The error, however, is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 37 The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause provides that [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him. The central concern of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 3163, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990). This concern has prompted the recognition of several different rights guaranteeing adversarial testing of evidence. Accused persons enjoy a qualified right to see witnesses against them in person. See id.; Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 108 S.Ct. 2798, 101 L.Ed.2d 857 (1988). A variety of out-of-court statements may not be used against the criminal defendant. See, e.g., Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 547, 106 S.Ct. 2056, 2065, 90 L.Ed.2d 514 (1986) (admission of one defendant's out-of-court confession incriminating his codefendant forbidden in a joint bench trial); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968) (admission of one defendant's out-of-court confession incriminating his codefendant forbidden in a joint jury trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965) (forbidding admission of transcript of testimony from pretrial hearing in which defendant had no opportunity to cross-examine the witness). A third protection, which originated with Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974), ensures more than perfunctory adversarial testing by limiting the trial judge's discretion to restrict the scope of cross-examination. See, e.g., Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 737, 107 S.Ct. 2658, 2663, 96 L.Ed.2d 631 (1987); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1436, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986) (defendant not allowed to cross-examine prosecution witness on key source of bias). 38 The Government asserts that the judge at worst reached the edge of the discretion permitted under this third protection. Terris was fully cross-examined for all sources of bias, according to the Government, and thus was amply confronted. The Government further points out that Jack cannot point to a single piece of impeaching evidence that the jury did not hear. Thus, the Government concludes, his confrontation-clause rights have not been compromised. Cf., e.g., United States v. Baptista-Rodriguez, 17 F.3d 1354, 1370-71 (11th Cir.1994); United States v. Bennett, 928 F.2d 1548, 1554 (11th Cir.1996); United States v. Haimowitz, 706 F.2d 1549, 1559 (11th Cir.1983). 39 The Government's analysis overlooks what happened here: Jack did not get to cross-examine the witness at all. A trial judge may limit the scope of cross-examination after the defendant has had some opportunity to cross-examine. See, e.g., Haimowitz, 706 F.2d at 1559; United States v. Tolliver, 665 F.2d 1005, 1008 (11th Cir.1982). But because the district judge permitted Jack no cross-examination, the judge was not operating within any discretion to control the progress of the trial. The district judge's action here differed in quality from the error in the Davis line of cases and cannot be judged by their standard. 40 The judge's action rather merits its own Sixth Amendment rule in accord with other rules based on the Amendment: A trial judge may not totally deny a defendant the opportunity to cross-examine a witness against him, whatever the time constraints, number of defendants being tried, or relationship between the defendants. See Ferguson v. United States, 329 F.2d 923, 924 (10th Cir.1964). In developing other Sixth Amendment rules, the Supreme Court has repeatedly reminded us that the right to cross-examination lies at the root of the Clause's guarantees. See, e.g., Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 19-20, 106 S.Ct. 292, 294, 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1985) (The main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of cross-examination. (quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1109-10, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974)) (emphasis in Fensterer )); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294-95, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 1045, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973) (The right[ ] to cross-examine witnesses ha[s] long been recognized as essential to due process.); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418, 85 S.Ct. 1074, 1076, 13 L.Ed.2d 934 (1965) (Our cases construing the [confrontation] clause hold that a primary interest secured by it is the right of cross-examination.); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273, 68 S.Ct. 499, 507, 92 L.Ed. 682 (1948) (among the minimum standards of a fair trial is the defendant's right to examine the witnesses against him); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43, 15 S.Ct. 337, 339, 39 L.Ed. 409 (1895) (The primary object of the constitutional provision ... was to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits from being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness.). The district judge's denial of cross-examination was therefore error. 41 A thornier question is whether the district judge's error requires reversal. Jack insists that the prohibition on cross-examination amounts to a structural defect that is never subject to review for prejudice. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1264, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991) (describing distinction between trial errors, which are subject to harmless-error review, and structural defects, which are not). The Government, on the other hand, views the error as one involving the conduct of trial--in other words, a classic trial error that is not ground for disturbing the verdict if the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); see Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307-08, 111 S.Ct. at 1264 (trial error is error which occurred during the presentation of the case to the jury, and which may therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine whether its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). 42 The Government's argument comports with precedent. While no one could deny the value of the constitutional right to cross-examination, Fulminante 's definitions of trial error and structural defects make clear that the dividing line is not determined by the importance of the constitutional right. See id. at 306-07, 111 S.Ct. at 1263 (listing examples of appropriate instances for harmless-error analysis and noting that most constitutional errors can be harmless). After all, the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard already respects the constitutional origin of the right and elevates it over mere statutory or evidence-rule rights. The trial error/substantive defect distinction, rather, rests on how the error affected the trial. On one hand, there are errors that infect the whole proceeding, such as a biased judge or an absence of counsel. In those cases, there is no way of imagining how the trial would have looked to the jury without the constitutional error. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 629-30, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1717, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (structural defects infect the entire trial process (emphasis added)); Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309-10, 111 S.Ct. at 1265. For such errors, it is thus impossible to gauge the error's effect. On the other hand, trial errors typically relate only to admission or exclusion of a single piece of evidence. Such errors therefore leave enough of a constitutionally acceptable trial for the reviewing court to assess the effect of the error on the jury's verdict. See id. at 310, 111 S.Ct. at 1265. 43 This error lands squarely in the trial-error category. What has gone awry is that the jury has heard one witness's testimony that is tainted by a lack of cross-examination. Put differently, the jury has heard a piece of evidence--Terris's testimony--that it should not have. In that sense, the error is materially similar to all other Confrontation Clause error. As in the case of Bruton or Davis error, for instance, the jury has heard evidence--in Bruton, an out-of-court statement, here and in Davis, in-court testimony--that has not undergone constitutionally sufficient adversarial testing. And as far as we know, no kind of Confrontation Clause error since Chapman, including Bruton and Davis violations, has escaped harmless-error analysis under the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard. 10 See, e.g., Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681-82, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1436, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986) (restricted cross-examination in violation of Davis ); Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 430, 92 S.Ct. 1056, 1059, 31 L.Ed.2d 340 (1972) (Bruton error); see also Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1021-22, 108 S.Ct. 2798, 2803, 101 L.Ed.2d 857 (1988) (denial of face-to-face confrontation). In all of these cases, most of the trial was unaffected, and there is therefore a basis on which to assess prejudice. It is true that we cannot know what the cross-examination would have revealed. But if the impossibility of knowing what weaknesses cross-examination would have exposed does not bar harmless-error analysis of Bruton, Davis, or Coy error, it should not do so here. 44 The effect of the error in this case is so closely analogous to that of restricted cross-examination that we can readily look to the harmless-error analysis conducted in such cases for guidance. The Supreme Court has noted five factors to consider in such harmless-error analysis: (1) how important the witness's testimony was to the prosecution's case; (2) whether the testimony was cumulative; (3) the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points; (4) the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted; and (5) the overall strength of the prosecution's case. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684, 106 S.Ct. at 1438. In the present circumstances, there is one variation. For the fourth element we look to the cross-examination conducted by other defendants, rather than the complaining defendant's, to gauge the ultimate effect of Terris's testimony on the jury. 45 The denial of cross-examination is not reversible error in light of these factors. First, Terris was not a vital witness for the prosecution. An auditor, she testified merely as the author of a series of summary charts that depicted the Government's calculation of the total loss to Medicare from Jack's fraud. She knew nothing of the offense conduct; the key evidence of Jack's scheme came from other witnesses and the underlying documents. The auditors from Aetna and First American's later fiscal intermediary, Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Iowa, and witnesses with personal knowledge, such as the pilots, former employees, executives, and lobbyists, all testified as to the actual misrepresentations in the cost reports and the extent of the mail-fraud scheme. Terris's name was mentioned only twice in the Government's closing argument, and then only in passing. While Terris's testimony may have inclined the jury more to convict because it exposed the magnitude of Jack's crime, the documentary and testimonial evidence of guilt was so great that this additional piece would not have changed the jury's verdict. 46 Second, as a summary witness, Terris provided testimony that was by definition cumulative. She testified only as to her analysis of First American's financial records and reports that were in evidence. She had no personal knowledge of any of the information behind the financial reporting and so testified. The third factor yields the same result: Terris's testimony was corroborated and verifiable by inspecting the financial documents on which she based it. 47 Fourth, cross-examination by other lawyers provided a basis to argue Terris's lack of reliability. First American's lawyer pointed out a typographical error in Terris's financial calculations. Other counsel pointed out that Terris may not have reviewed all relevant documents. Jack therefore had a basis on which to argue at closing that Terris's calculation of the loss was untrustworthy. In fact, Jack tellingly identifies not a single additional area of impeachment he intended to explore. That suggests that a retrial would simply involve a different jury's hearing exactly the same evidence. 48 Finally, the prosecution's case was strong. The Government presented testimony from several of the pilots about ghost flights and ghost passengers, personal logs from the pilots showing the ghost flights, and even Post-Its with notes from Jack requesting ghost flights. The secretary, the pilot, and the fuel seller who arranged and then operated the kickback scheme all testified to Jack's involvement, and checks written to Jack were offered to corroborate their testimony. Several non-nurse agency owners, including some who did not sell, independently and consistently testified about First American's employment-based acquisition scheme. First American's lobbyists, whose expenses were claimed as consulting fees, testified to their lobbying activities; memoranda describing those activities were in evidence. Finally, executives who participated in the campaign contributions testified to the pressure they were under to contribute in exchange for a refund, and the circumstances--one executive was called in the middle of house-moving to attend the fundraiser, and another had never contributed to a campaign before giving this $500--corroborate their testimony. And Jack admitted that the bonuses (although described as being for superior performance) were in fact intended to be used for campaign contributions. 49 The defense did not meet this assault. With witness after witness, the defense was limited to diverting attention. For example, it tried to show that the executives who made political contributions at Jack's instance might have made the contributions anyway. With the lobbyists, the defense focused on the merits of PPS and the innocuousness of lobbying per se. The defense impeached some former owners with criminal histories and lawsuits against First American; from others, it elicited testimony about their respect for First American's professional standards; for others, it showed that some work had been done; and the defense offered evidence of other, lawful acquisitions. But apart from conclusory testimony of current First American employees, the defense offered no evidence that any of the former agency owners at issue worked full-time. As to the airplane-related scheme, the defense contended that the falsified and omitted records were not required and that Jim McManus had a scheme of his own that happened to benefit the Millses, not him. Throughout, the defense emphasized that Medicare regulations are complex, that Aetna was evil, and that the true economic losses to Medicare were minimal, 11 but it did not offer evidence suggesting that the various falsifications and misrepresentations were good-faith attempts to seek reimbursement in grey areas. In essence, the overarching defense was that the alleged frauds were legitimate self-defense against intrusive bureaucracy. As Jack vividly put it, [t]he moment you put [a cost] on there and protest it, you might as well put bells and whistles on it because you know it's coming out. (R.48 at 95.) The absence of Terris's summary testimony would neither have weakened the Government's case nor enhanced the defense strategy. 50 All factors point to the error's harmlessness. We conclude that the total denial of an opportunity to cross-examine, while constitutional error, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.