Opinion ID: 1659705
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: whether the legislative mandate as to what factors justify imposition of a death sentence was flouted when the prosecution relied on arbitrary factors to advocate death, violating william holly's rights under mississippi law and the eighth amendment to the constitution of the united states.

Text: The defense is procedurally barred from asserting any error on these issues for lack of contemporaneous objection at trial to the various instructions and comments complained of Carr v. State, 655 So.2d 824, 852 (Miss. 1995); Conner v. State, 632 So.2d 1239, 1255 (Miss. 1993); Russell v. State, 607 So.2d 1107, 1117 (Miss. 1992); Fleming v. State, 604 So.2d 280, 292 (Miss. 1992); Cole v. State, 525 So.2d 365, 374 (Miss. 1987); Lockett v. State, 517 So.2d 1346, 1353 (Miss. 1987).
Instruction C-1 allowed the jury to consider as an aggravating circumstance that [t]he capital murder of David James Norwood, Jr. was committed while the defendant was engaged or was an accomplice, in the commission of armed robbery. Apparently ignoring the United States Supreme Court's decision in Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 246, 108 S.Ct. 546, 555, 98 L.Ed.2d 568 (1988), as well as this Court's application of that decision, Holly suggests on appeal that submission of this aggravating circumstance does not narrow the class of death-eligible defendants in a rational manner, thus it violates the Eighth Amendment. The United States Supreme Court has held that as long as the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty is narrowed during the guilt or sentencing phase of the trial, the fact that the aggravating circumstance duplicated one of the elements of the crime does not make this sentence constitutionally infirm. Lowenfield, 484 U.S. 231 at 246, 108 S.Ct. at 555. In Ladner v. State, 584 So.2d 743 (Miss. 1991), this Court, again rejecting the contention that aggravating factors could not be stacked, reiterated Lowenfield, stating: The United States Supreme Court held that when constitutionally required narrowing of the class of persons eligible for the death penalty is accomplished by the legislative definition of capital offenses in the guilt phase (as is done in Louisiana and Mississippi), the jury's further narrowing of the sentencing phase is not constitutionally required. [ Lowenfield, 484 U.S.] at 241-46, 108 S.Ct. at 552-55, 98 L.Ed.2d at 579-83. Ladner, 584 So.2d at 763. Since this issue has been resolved by this Court, we find no merit to Holly's argument.
There must be evidence legally sufficient to support a conviction of both the murder and the underlying felony had either been charged alone. Fisher v. State, 481 So.2d 203, 212 (Miss. 1985). Upon reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, all of the evidence consistent with the defendant's guilt is accepted as true together with any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence. Heidel v. State, 587 So.2d 835, 838 (Miss. 1991); Davis v. State, 530 So.2d 694, 703 (Miss. 1988). This Court may reverse only where the evidence regarding the elements of the crime is such that reasonable and fair minded jurors could only find the accused not guilty. Wetz v. State, 503 So.2d 803, 808 (Miss. 1987). If there is in the record substantial evidence of such quality and weight that, having in mind the beyond a reasonable doubt burden of proof standard, reasonable and fair-minded jurors in the exercise of impartial judgment might have reached different conclusions, the verdict of guilty is thus placed beyond our authority to disturb. McFee v. State, 511 So.2d 130, 133-34 (Miss. 1987). The jury must be left to resolve matters regarding the weight and credibility of the evidence. McClain v. State, 625 So.2d 774, 778 (Miss. 1993). The uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice is sufficient to sustain a conviction. Foster, 639 So.2d at 1284; Culberson v. State, 379 So.2d 499, 503 (Miss. 1979); Rich v. State, 322 So.2d 468, 469 (Miss. 1975). However, this general rule is inapplicable where the accomplice testimony is unreasonable, self-contradictory or substantially impeached. Flanagan v. State, 605 So.2d 753, 758 (Miss. 1992). Holly contends that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for the underlying offense of armed robbery because the only evidence of robbery was provided by accomplice testimony which was uncorroborated and substantially impeached. He points particularly to the fact that Kendall testified on direct examination that the money orders were taken from Norwood's person, but changed his story on cross-examination to admit that the money orders were taken from the taxi. However, we find that the evidence was sufficient to show the money was taken from Norwood. Regardless of this discrepancy in Kendall's testimony, the elements of robbery only required that the money orders were taken from Norwood's presence. The jury was made aware of this fact through the following two instructions: INSTRUCTION NO. S-1 For you to find that the defendant, WILLIAM JOSEPH HOLLY, was engaged in the crime of armed robbery, the State must prove from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) WILLIAM JOSEPH HOLLY on or about the 12th day of July, 1992, in Grenada County, Mississippi, did willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take money and money orders the personal property of Neely Cab Company and/or David James Norwood, Jr., and, (2) said taking was in the presence of, from the person of, and against the will of said David James Norwood, Jr., and was accomplished by violence to his person with a deadly weapon, and, (3) at the time, William Joseph Holly, had the intent to permanently deprive David James Norwood, Jr., of the property, then same would constitute the crime of armed robbery. INSTRUCTION NO. S-9 A thing is in the presence of a person, in respect to robbery, which is so within his reach, inspections, observation or control, that he could, if not overcome with violence or prevented by fear, retain his possession of it. The evidence was at least sufficient to establish that the money and money orders were taken from Norwood's presence. This fact was never contradicted during the course of trial. Holly even admitted at trial that the money orders were taken from the cab. It was stipulated that the money orders were found in Holly's possession upon his arrest in Decatur, Illinois. Even if Holly was not the individual who removed the money orders from the dash or wallet, the evidence was clearly sufficient to establish Holly as a principal. Finally, the jury was instructed to weigh the accomplice testimony with great care and caution and suspicion. Accordingly, this Court finds the evidence sufficient to convict Holly of capital murder during the commission of robbery.
Holly asserts that the circuit court erred in allowing into evidence three 4 x 6 color photographs taken of Norwood. They were introduced during the testimony of Deputy Coroner Eddie Robinson, who indicated that the photographs accurately depicted the large gunshot wounds Norwood sustained to his back and temple. Holly contends that the State's Exhibits Nos. 14, 17 and 18 were highly prejudicial and had no probative value, thus violating M.R.E. 403, art. III, § 28 of the Mississippi Constitution and the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In Westbrook v. State, 658 So.2d 847, 849 (Miss. 1995), this Court stated that photographs have evidentiary value where they aid in describing the circumstances of the killing and the corpus delicti, Williams v. State, 354 So.2d 266 (Miss. 1978); describe the location of the body and cause of death, Ashley v. State, 423 So.2d 1311 (Miss. 1982); or supplement or clarify witness testimony, Hughes v. State, 401 So.2d 1100 (Miss. 1981). The admissibility of photographs rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. Griffin v. State, 557 So.2d 542, 549 (Miss. 1990); Mackbee v. State, 575 So.2d 16, 31 (Miss. 1990); Boyd v. State, 523 So.2d 1037, 1039 (Miss. 1988); Smith v. State, 419 So.2d 563, 567 (Miss. 1982), cert. denied 460 U.S. 1047, 103 S.Ct. 1449, 75 L.Ed.2d 803 (1983). Furthermore, the decision of the trial judge will be upheld unless there has been an abuse of discretion. Reynolds, 658 So.2d at 859; Herring v. State, 374 So.2d 784, 789 (Miss. 1979). The discretion of the trial judge runs toward almost unlimited admissibility regardless of the gruesomeness, repetitiveness, and the extenuation of probative value. Hart v. State, 637 So.2d 1329, 1335 (Miss. 1994) (quoting Williams v. State, 544 So.2d 782, 785 (Miss. 1987)). As was noted in Taylor v. State, 672 So.2d 1246 (Miss. 1995), this Court has held photographs to be so gruesome and inflammatory as to be prejudicial in only one circumstance, a close-up photograph of a partly decomposed, maggot-infested skull. Taylor, 672 So.2d at 1270-71 (citing McNeal v. State, 551 So.2d 151 (Miss. 1989)). The pictures at issue, although certainly not pleasant to look at, are not comparable to those described in McNeal, the case upon which Holly relies. Further they serve to clarify and supplement the coroner's testimony and to describe the cause of Norwood's death. Accordingly, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting the photographs.