Opinion ID: 1673978
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Ivy's Sole Issue: Whether the Judge Erred in Overturning the Jury Award of Punitive Damages?

Text: Basically, Ivy contends that his version of the facts  recounted in Section I(A) of this opinion  supports the jury award of punitive damages. Thus, Ivy concludes, the trial judge erred by overturning the verdict. GMAC counters that the evidence simply did not support the award and that this Court should affirm. Disposition of this issue requires a determination of whether a preponderance of the evidence  viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict  supports the punitive-damages award. Black v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 437 So.2d 26, 28 (Miss. 1983) (discussing the applicable standard of review in a case involving a self-help repossession of a pickup truck). Mississippi law authorizes a creditor or secured party to repossess collateral without judicial process if he or she can do so without breaching the peace: Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take possession of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may proceed without judicial process if this can be done without breach of peace or may proceed by action. If the security agreement so provides the secured party may require the debtor to assemble the collateral and make it available to the secured party at a place to be designated by the secured party which is reasonably convenient to both parties. Without removal a secured party may render equipment unusable, and may dispose of collateral on the debtor's premises under the Section 9-504 [§ 75-9-504]. Miss. Code Ann. § 75-9-503 (1972); see also Martin v. Cook, 237 Miss. 267, 114 So.2d 669, 670 (1959); Butler v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 829 F.2d 568, 569 (5th Cir.1987). If the creditor breaches the peace, then the repossession [will be deemed] wrongful, and the debtor may sue the [creditor] in conversion for return of the collateral or [actual and consequential] damages, plus punitive damages in the proper case.  See 9 W. Hawkland, supra at § 9-503:03 (1991) (emphasis added). In Mississippi, this Court has allowed an award of punitive damages in cases involving a repossession attended by malice, fraud, oppression or wilful wrong evincing a disregard of the rights of the debtor. See Bradley v. Associates Discount Corp., 230 Miss. 131, 138-39, 92 So.2d 468, 471-72 (1957) (case in which this Court did not find requisite intent but did discuss cases in which it did find requisite intent); see also Rec.Vol. I, at 70 (Jury Instruction P-14: [I]n order to recover punitive damages, the plaintiff must prove ... that the actions ... was [ sic ] wanton, malicious or fraudulent in nature.); see generally Purver, Punitive Damages for Wrongful Seizure of Chattel By One Claiming Security Interest, 35 A.L.R.3d 1016, 1025 (1971 & Supp. 1992) (punitive damages warranted where malice, fraud, oppression, gross negligence, or a reckless disregard of the rights of the chattel holder is proved). Thus, a creditor must do more than cause a mere breach of peace before he or she can be held liable for punitive damages. Restated, a breach of peace may be deemed tortious  for which the creditor will be held liable for actual and consequential damages  but the tortiousness of the conduct must rise to a heightened level before punitive damages may be imposed. Cf. Andrew Jackson Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 566 So.2d 1172, 1187-88 (Miss. 1990) ([A]s a matter of law, `ordinary torts ... do not rise to the heightened level of an independent tort' which warrant imposition of punitive-damages liability.). There are a few Mississippi cases involving self-help repossession and a punitive-damages issue. In a seminal case, Commercial Credit Co. v. Spence, 185 Miss. 293, 184 So. 439 (1938), the creditor's agent repossessed the debtor's car while it was parked at a hotel, while the debtor's wife was inside the hotel. Entry was gained by breaking out one of the car's windows. The jury awarded punitive damages under these facts, and this Court affirmed. This Court rationalized its affirmance accordingly: the conduct of [the agent] in breaking into the automobile and taking it by that means was ... [an] offense ... properly to be characterized as an aggravated and oppressive trespass, for which punitive damages are allowable in the discretion of the jury. Id. at 298, 184 So. at 442. See also Kirkwood v. Hickman, 223 Miss. 372, 78 So.2d 351 (1955); [11] Furches Motor Co. v. Anderson, 216 Miss. 40, 48 & 52-54, 61 So.2d 674, 679-81 (1952); [12] Commercial Credit Co. v. Cain, 190 Miss. 866, 868-70, 1 So.2d 776, 777-78 (1941). [13] In Bradley v. Associates Discount Corp., 230 Miss. 131, 138-39, 92 So.2d 468, 469-71 (1957), the creditor's agent repossessed a delinquent debtor's Studebaker from a mechanic's parking lot where it had been left to be repaired. Upon learning of the repossession, the debtor sued for actual and punitive damages on the bases: (1) that the car had been taken without permission from where it had been left to be repaired; (2) that the agent had committed a fraud by misrepresenting to the mechanic that the debtor's lawyer had advised the creditor that the debtor was bankrupt and could not make further payments on the car; and (3) that personal belongings which were in the car during repossession were never returned to the debtor. Based on the foregoing evidence, the trial judge refused to submit a punitive-damages issue to the jury. The jury did, however, award the debtor $454.53 in actual damages for reasons not revealed in the opinion. The debtor appealed the judge's refusal to submit the punitive-damages issue, and this Court affirmed. This Court explained that the evidence fell short of proving fraud, oppression, or wilful wrong, evincing a disregard for the rights of [the debtor]. Id. at 134-39, 92 So.2d at 472 (citing Spence, 185 Miss. at 293, 184 So. at 439). In sum, Mississippi case law provides little guidance on determining whether a creditor or agent's conduct is so malicious, oppressive, or fraudulent that an award of punitive is warranted. [14] Nonetheless, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and viewing Mississippi's allowance of self-help repossession, this Court concludes that Ivy has failed to prove by a preponderance that GMAC's agents' repossession of his van was attended by malice, fraud, oppression or wilful wrong evincing a disregard of [his] the rights. In other words, their conduct did not rise to the requisite heightened level of tortiousness to warrant imposition of punitive damages. This Court therefore affirms on this issue.