Opinion ID: 1930358
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Was the appellant Seales' statement the fruit of an illegal arrest and should it have been excluded from the evidence?

Text: Appellant Seales submits that his arrest was in violation of Article 3, Section 23 of the Mississippi Constitution and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution in that the arrest was made without probable cause, and that his statement, the fruit of an illegal arrest, should have been excluded from evidence. Facts available to the officer seeking the arrest warrant were as follows: (1) Witness for the State, Louis Crowe, saw the robber leave the store in a trot and get into the passenger side of a dark green vehicle identified as a Ford LTD or or something similar to that. (2) Crowe noticed the car had no license plate and observed bright chrome in the area of the license plate. (3) Days later Officer Anderson located the car and twice drove with Crowe to view the car. (4) Crowe stated he was very confident that the car was the same that had been used in the robbery. (5) Billy Gene Seales owned the car. Based on these facts, Anderson obtained a warrant for Seales' arrest. In Hester v. State, 463 So.2d 1087 (Miss. 1985), this Court stated: In Powe v. State, 235 So.2d 920 (Miss. 1970), we said that probable cause exists where the ... available evidence makes it reasonable to infer that the particular person not necessarily was, but may have been, one of the offenders ... It is clear therefore that probable cause means less than the evidence which would justify condemnation [citations omitted] but more than bear suspicion. 463 So.2d at 1090. It appears that the information available made it reasonable to infer that Seales may have been one of the offenders, and that the arrest was lawful. The State further submits that even if the arrest was illegal, Seales' confession was properly admitted under standards set forth in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975). In Lockett v. State, 459 So.2d 246 (Miss. 1984), this Court recognized: The Court in Brown then set forth several factors which it regarded as critical to determining whether a confession obtained by an illegal arrest was the product of free will. Those factors are: (1) The giving of Miranda warnings. (2) The temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession. (3) The presence of intervening circumstances. (4) The purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. (5) Any other circumstances that seem relevant. The United States Supreme Court repeated these factors in Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979) and Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 102 S.Ct. 2664, 73 L.Ed.2d 314 (1982). In Hall v. State, 427 So.2d 957 (Miss. 1983), this Court has had occasion to recognize and apply the holding in Brown. 459 So.2d at 250. The record of the present case evidences the following facts: (1) Before Seales gave his confession, Officer Anderson read him the Miranda warnings. (2) Seales stated that he understood those rights, and signed a written waiver thereof. (3) No threats or promises were made, no violence was committed and no hopes of leniency or reward were offered. After being advised of his rights, Seales declined to make a statement before his father arrived. Seales' father and Seales were allowed to talk privately. Shortly thereafter Seales' father told Officer Anderson, Come back in. Billy Gene wants to tell you what happened. At that point Seales gave his statement. The arrest warrant was issued with probable cause and the waiver and confession given by Seales were knowingly and willingly given. The assignment of error is without merit.