Opinion ID: 2747913
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Nardinger Warrant and the Motion to

Text: Suppress7 The Nardinger Warrant was facially valid when issued but the execution of it violated Franz’s Fourth Amendment rights because, as presented to Franz, it did not contain a particularized list of items to be seized. See Bartholomew v. Pennsylvania, 221 F.3d 425, 429-30 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[G]enerally speaking, where the list of items to be seized based on conduct separate from that underlying the charge for receipt. 6 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231; we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 7 We “review[] the District Court’s denial of a motion to suppress for clear error as to the underlying factual findings and exercise[] plenary review of the District Court’s application of the law to those facts.” United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 336 (3d Cir. 2002). 14 does not appear on the face of the warrant, sealing that list, even though it is ‘incorporated’ in the warrant, would violate the Fourth Amendment.”). The question before us is thus not whether there was a constitutional violation; there was.8 The question is whether that violation necessitates the suppression of the evidence obtained pursuant to the Nardinger Warrant. Franz contends that the constitutional defect in the execution of the warrant rendered it facially invalid and that no further analysis is required or allowed. Based on the comment in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), that “a warrant may be so facially deficient – i.e., in failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized – that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid[,]” id. at 923, Franz argues that the exclusionary rule applies without exception to facially invalid warrants. He says that the District Court erred by looking beyond the facial invalidity of the warrant and assessing Nardinger’s culpability. He further argues that, even if culpability is considered, the exclusionary rule should still apply because Nardinger acted deliberately, in consultation with federal prosecutors. 8 The government concedes a “mistake” was made in light of Bartholomew. (Government’s Br. at 18.) But it argues that Bartholomew was wrongly decided. We need not spend time on that argument; sitting as a panel of this Court, we cannot overrule prior precedent. Reich v. D.M. Sabia Co., 90 F.3d 854, 858 (3d Cir. 1996) (“[A] panel of this court is bound by, and lacks authority to overrule, a [precedential] decision of a prior panel … .”). 15 We disagree and hold that there is no need to exclude evidence based on Nardinger’s mistake in failing to present Attachment B to Franz in executing the warrant.9 More particularly, we reject Franz’s argument that a good-faith analysis is unnecessary. While our case law may not always have been clear on the need to consider good faith,10 see United States v. Graves, 951 F. Supp. 2d 758, 769-71 & n.5 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (discussing Virgin Islands v. John, 654 F.3d 412 (3d Cir. 2011), United States v. Tracey, 597 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2010), and United States v. Wright, 493 F. App’x 265 (3d Cir. 2012)), both the Supreme Court’s precedents and our own have been consistent in requiring a case-specific analysis of whether the exclusionary rule applies, rather than a categorical approach. 9 Although Attachment A was also withheld, Franz challenges only the withholding of Attachment B. We limit our discussion accordingly. 10 A circuit split also exists on the issue of whether an officer’s culpability is relevant to an exclusionary rule analysis when dealing with a facially invalid warrant. Compare United States v. Lazar, 604 F.3d 230, 237-38 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that a culpability analysis does not apply when dealing with a facially invalid warrant), with United States v. Rosa, 626 F.3d 56, 64-66 (2d Cir. 2010) (concluding that “[n]ot every facially deficient warrant … will be so defective that an officer will lack a reasonable basis for relying on it”), United States v. Allen, 625 F.3d 830, 838 (5th Cir. 2010) (same), United States v. Hamilton, 591 F.3d 1017, 1028-29 (8th Cir. 2010) (same), and United States v. Otero, 563 F.3d 1127, 1133-34 (10th Cir. 2009) (same). 16 The Fourth Amendment provides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The exclusionary rule is a prudential doctrine designed to enforce the Fourth Amendment by deterring law enforcement from unreasonable searches and seizures. The rule achieves that end by preventing the government from relying at trial on evidence obtained in violation of the Amendment’s strictures. Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2426 (2011); United States v. Katzin, --- F.3d ----, No. 12-2548, 2014 WL 4851779, at  (3d Cir. Oct. 1, 2014) (en banc). Because it comes at the cost of hiding often crucial evidence from a fact-finder, though, “[s]uppression of evidence … has always been our last resort, not our first impulse.” Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006); see also Leon, 468 U.S. at 918 (stating that evidence should be suppressed “only in those unusual cases in which exclusion will further the purposes of the exclusionary rule”). In determining whether the exclusionary rule applies, we engage in a cost-benefit analysis, balancing the “deterrence benefits of suppression” against its “‘substantial social costs.’” Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 907); accord Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009); Leon, 468 U.S. at 910. “To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system.” Herring, 555 U.S. at 144; accord Katzin, 2014 WL 4851779, at , 17. In other words, “the deterrence benefits of exclusion ‘var[y] with the culpability of the law enforcement conduct’ at issue.” Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 17 2427 (alteration in original) (quoting Herring, 555 U.S. at 143). When law enforcement “exhibit[s] ‘deliberate,’ ‘reckless,’ or ‘grossly negligent’ disregard for Fourth Amendment rights, the deterrent value of exclusion is strong and tends to outweigh the resulting costs.” Id. (quoting Herring, 555 U.S. at 144); accord Katzin, 2014 WL 4851779, at . Similarly, “the exclusionary rule serves to deter … recurring or systemic negligence.” Herring, 555 U.S. at 144. “But when the police act with an objectively reasonable goodfaith belief that their conduct is lawful, or when their conduct involves only simple, isolated negligence, the deterrence rationale loses much of its force, and exclusion cannot pay its way.” Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427-28 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Herring, 555 U.S. at 137; accord Leon, 468 U.S. at 919; Katzin, 2014 WL 4851779, at . Indeed, the Supreme Court recently suggested that the absence of culpability is dispositive of the deterrence balancing test. See Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2428-29 (“[T]his acknowledged absence of police culpability dooms Davis’s claim.”). In Leon, the Supreme Court identified several scenarios in which officers would not be able to establish an objectively reasonable good-faith belief that their actions were lawful, including reliance on a facially deficient warrant: [D]epending on the circumstances of the particular case, a warrant may be so facially deficient – i.e., in failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized – that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid. 18 468 U.S. at 923.11 Franz relies on that language to argue that, because the Nardinger Warrant was facially deficient when it was presented to him, we should automatically apply the exclusionary rule. Any balancing of costs and benefits has, he says, already been performed by the Supreme Court in Leon. But Franz ignores the introductory language in Leon, which conditions its discussion “on the circumstances of the particular case.” Id.; see also id. at 918 (noting that “suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant should be ordered only on a case-by-case basis”). The Supreme Court’s recent cases concerning the exclusionary rule have focused on the culpability of law enforcement officers, as in Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 11 We have paraphrased those scenarios as follows: 1) where the magistrate judge issued the warrant in reliance on a deliberately or recklessly false affidavit; 2) where the magistrate judge abandoned his or her judicial role and failed to perform his or her neutral and detached function; 3) where the warrant was based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable; or 4) where the warrant was so facially deficient that it failed to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized. Tracey, 597 F.3d at 151. 19 135, 143-45 (2009), and on the knowledge of such officers, as in Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2428-29 (2011). Those cases are not, however, a departure. The Court’s earlier applications of Leon also make clear that a factspecific analysis is required and that the need to weigh the costs and benefits of exclusion is constant. So, for example, while Leon dealt with a facially valid warrant, 468 U.S. at 902, the Supreme Court applied the reasoning of Leon to a facially deficient warrant in Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984), a companion case issued the same day as Leon. Rather than categorically excluding evidence due to the facially deficient warrant, the Supreme Court examined the circumstances of the case. Sheppard, 468 U.S. at 989-91. The Court focused particularly on the officer’s knowledge and actions, including his reliance on the statements of a district attorney and the judge who issued the warrant. Id. at 989. The Court ruled that the deterrent purposes of the exclusionary rule would not be served by suppression in that case. Id. at 988, 990-91. The Supreme Court’s application of Leon in Sheppard thus forecloses the argument that there is a categorical rule that automatically resolves the question of suppression when there is a facially deficient warrant.12 12 Franz ignores Sheppard and instead points to Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004), a qualified immunity case in which the Supreme Court relied on the “facial deficiency” language in Leon to conclude that it would have been clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful when he executed a warrant that did not contain a particularized list on its face and the supporting documents were not incorporated by reference. Id. at 557, 565. But the Supreme Court did not adopt a categorical rule in Groh that ignored the reasonableness of the officer’s actions under the 20 We have, of course, followed the Supreme Court’s lead. In United States v. Tracey, 597 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2010), we addressed the application of the exclusionary rule to a case involving a warrant that failed to incorporate an attached affidavit that would have cured the warrant’s lack of particularity. Id. at 149. We stated that the “limited exceptions [identified in Leon, including the facially deficient warrant exception,] are consistent with the approach taken in Herring because each of these circumstances involve conduct that is ‘deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent,’ and thus the benefits of deterring future misconduct ‘outweigh the costs’ of excluding the evidence.” Id. at 151 (quoting Herring, 555 U.S. at 141, 144). We then examined whether the nature of the deficiency in the warrant made the warrant “‘so facially deficient’ that no reasonable officer could rely on it,” id. at 152-53, and whether the officer’s actions in obtaining and executing the warrant indicated that the deterrent purposes of the exclusionary rule would be served, id. at 153. circumstances. Rather, the Court considered the “glaring” nature of the deficiency and the officer’s knowledge and actions – including his preparation of the warrant and the department guidelines that would have alerted him to the deficiency. See id. at 563-64. Thus, the Court rejected the officer’s argument that he was simply negligent, and concluded that the warrant was “‘so facially deficient – i.e., in failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized – that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.’” Id. at 565 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 923). Groh does not contradict that an officer’s knowledge and actions are important components of a good faith analysis. 21 We took a similar approach in Virgin Islands v. John, 654 F.3d 412 (3d Cir. 2011), a case involving a warrant affidavit that did not support a finding of probable cause to search for evidence of the crime listed on the face of the warrant. Id. at 413. After determining that one of Leon’s four scenarios applied, we turned to the culpability of the officer, determining that “her behavior was, at a minimum, grossly negligent.” Id. at 420-21. Most recently, in an en banc opinion in a case involving a warrantless search, we rejected the argument that a good-faith analysis is applicable only in certain situations already identified by the Supreme Court. Katzin, 2014 WL 4851779, at -10 (stating that to apply the Supreme Court’s precedent in such a limited manner would “improperly elevate [the Court’s previous] holding[s] above the general good faith analysis from whence [they] came”). Franz’s argument that a facially deficient warrant renders Nardinger’s culpability irrelevant thus runs counter to numerous cases emphasizing that, in examining the totality of the circumstances, we consider not only any defects in the warrant but also the officer’s conduct in obtaining and executing the warrant and what the officer knew or should have known. Nardinger’s conduct was, on the whole, objectively reasonable. He sought and obtained a valid warrant and acted in consultation with federal prosecutors. See Sheppard, 468 U.S. at 989-90 (highlighting as evidence of reasonableness the fact that the officer consulted with the district attorney and sought a warrant from a neutral magistrate); Katzin, 2014 WL 4851779, at  (same); Tracey, 597 F.3d at 153 22 (same).13 The District Court found that Nardinger had “no intention of concealing the subject matter of the warrant or the information on Attachment B.” (App. at 21.) In executing the search, Nardinger explained to Franz what items the warrant authorized him to search for and seize, and the agents did not exceed the scope of that authorization. See Tracey, 597 F.3d at 153 (highlighting as evidence of reasonableness that the agent who led the search told the occupants what he was authorized to search for and limited the search accordingly). While Franz disputes that the search of his home was appropriately limited, he has not established and, given the record, cannot establish that the District Court’s finding on that point was clearly erroneous. Finally, the District Court concluded that Franz presented no evidence that the constitutional violation in question was “recurring or systemic.” Herring, 555 U.S. at 144. Although Franz argues on appeal that “this case is [a] small example of the systemic problems in criminal investigatory practices that are sanctioned through legal counsel” (Appellant’s Reply Br. at 5), he has cited no support for that bald assertion. Here, an inexperienced agent made a mistake, but it appears to have been only that: an isolated mistake.14 13 Franz appears to argue that consultation with legal counsel somehow makes the officer’s actions more culpable. That argument is inconsistent with Sheppard, Katzin, and Tracey. In Katzin, however, we cautioned that we should “not place undue weight on this factor” because prosecutors are “not neutral judicial officers.” Katzin, 2014 WL 4851779, at -16 (internal quotation marks omitted). 14 Franz takes issue with the District Court’s finding that this was the first warrant that Nardinger had applied for and executed. But Franz has not shown that this finding is 23 Our conclusion is confirmed by looking at the magistrate judge’s order sealing the attachment, which Nardinger thought prohibited him from showing the attachment to Franz. The order stated that “agents executing the search warrant are authorized, as required by Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(d), to leave a copy of the search warrant and a receipt for the property seized with the person searched or at the property searched.” (App. at 68.) As the District Court noted, that language is somewhat unclear, and the officer understood from it that he was authorized to leave the warrant face sheet and an inventory but not the supporting documents. In Sheppard, the Supreme Court emphasized that a reasonable officer should be expected to rely on a judge’s assurances that a particular course of action is authorized, not to disregard those assurances. See 468 U.S. at 989-90 (“[W]e refuse to rule that an officer is required to disbelieve a judge who has just advised him, by word and by action, that the warrant he possesses authorizes him to conduct the search he has requested.”).15 Even though Nardinger was mistaken, his clearly erroneous. 15 The state of the law is a relevant, though not the sole, factor in the deterrence analysis. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2428-29; Leon, 468 U.S. at 919; Katzin, 2014 WL 4851779, at , 10-17 (“Davis did not begin, nor end, with binding appellate precedent. Rather, binding appellate precedent informed – and ultimately determined – the Supreme Court’s greater inquiry: whether the officers’ conduct was deliberate and culpable enough that application of the exclusionary rule would ‘yield meaningfu[l] deterrence,’ and ‘be worth the price paid by the justice system.’” (quoting Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2428)). Based on Bartholomew, Nardinger should have known that he was required to present Attachment B to Franz, 24 reliance on the sealing order mitigates the blame that necessarily follows his error. In light of the foregoing, we cannot say that Nardinger acted deliberately, recklessly, or with gross negligence in executing the warrant. Nardinger should have shown the attachment to Franz, but that misstep – stemming from his inexperience and misunderstanding of the magistrate judge’s order – does not mean that he deliberately violated Franz’s Fourth Amendment rights. In short, application of the exclusionary rule would provide little deterrent effect and would not justify the costs of suppression. Therefore, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of Franz’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained pursuant to the Nardinger Warrant. see 221 F.3d at 429-30 (“[G]enerally speaking, where the list of items to be seized does not appear on the face of the warrant, sealing that list, even though it is ‘incorporated’ in the warrant, would violate the Fourth Amendment.”), despite the possibility of rare exceptions to that rule, see id. at 430 (acknowledging the “rare case” where sealing may be justified); United States v. Leveto, 540 F.3d 200, 211-12 (3d Cir. 2008) (stating that an overbroad warrant was cured by a subsequent search that was limited to the narrower confines of the sealed, unattached, unincorporated affidavit). However, Nardinger’s “simple, isolated negligence” does not warrant the heavy price of exclusion. See Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427-28 (“[W]hen [law enforcement] conduct involves only simple, isolated negligence, the deterrence rationale loses much of its force, and exclusion cannot pay its way.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 25