Opinion ID: 883736
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Did the conviction of the offense of sexual assault violate Black's constitutional right to due process?

Text: Black's due process arguments are premised on his assertion that he did not have notice of the offense of which he ultimately was convicted. We have concluded to the contrary based on the statute. Black had notice of the possibility of a conviction of sexual assault pursuant to § 46-16-607(1), MCA, which specifically authorizes a conviction for an offense included in the charged offense. Little more need be said. Both the Montana Constitution, Article II, § 24, and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantee accused defendants certain due process, including the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. Relying on State v. Barker (1993), 260 Mont. 85, 858 P.2d 360, Black argues that his conviction of the offense of sexual assault violated his due process rights. In Barker, we concluded that a justice court conviction for reckless driving after a charge of driving under the influence of alcohol violated due process. Barker, 858 P.2d at 362. We stated that it is elementary that a party cannot be charged with one offense and convicted of another independent offense. Barker, 858 P.2d at 362 (citation omitted). The quoted language establishes the distinguishing factor between Barker and the present case: Barker involved two independent offenses. Indeed, we specifically stated therein that reckless driving is not a lesser included offense of driving under the influence and, on that basis, concluded that Barker could not be convicted of an offense independent from that charged. Barker, 858 P.2d at 362. Barker has no application here. Like the California court in Lohbauer, we conclude that the notice required by the constitutional guarantee of due process is afforded where an offense is included within the charged offense and a conviction of the included offense is authorized by statute. We hold that Black's due process rights were not violated, under the circumstances of this case, by his conviction of the offense of sexual assault.