Opinion ID: 1322929
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(1) [6] provides:

Text: (A) Without a Court Order. Subject to Rules 23(e), 23.1(c), 23.2, and 66 and any applicable federal statute, the plaintiff may dismiss an action without a court order by filing: (i) a notice of dismissal before the opposing party serves either an answer or a motion for summary judgment; or (ii) a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared. (B) Effect. Unless the notice or stipulation states otherwise, the dismissal is without prejudice. But if the plaintiff previously dismissed any federal- or state-court action based on or including the same claim, a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits. Three key aspects of Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) control our analysis. First, a filing under the Rule is a notice, not a motion. Its effect is automatic: the defendant does not file a response, and no order of the district court is needed to end the action. [7] Second, the notice results in a dismissal without prejudice (unless it states otherwise), as long as the plaintiff has never dismissed an action based on or including the same claim in a prior case. Third, the defendant has only two options for cutting off the plaintiff's right to end the case by notice: serving on the plaintiff an answer or a motion for summary judgment. Here, it is undisputed that on the date plaintiffs filed the Notice: (1) plaintiffs had never before dismissed an action based on or including the same claim; and (2) defendants had not served an answer or a motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the parties agree a timely Notice would have resulted in automatic dismissal without prejudice. The timeliness of the Notice depends on whether the action to which the Rule refers remained pending when the Notice was filed. The Rule affixes a bright-line test to limit the right of dismissal to the early stages of litigation, Manze, 817 F.2d at 1065, which simplifies the court's task by telling it whether a suit has reached the point of no return. If the defendant has served either an answer or a summary judgment motion it has; if the defendant has served neither, it has not. Id. (quoting Winterland Concessions Co. v. Smith, 706 F.2d 793, 795 (7th Cir.1983)). Up to the point of no return, dismissal is automatic and immediate  the right of a plaintiff is unfettered, Carter v. United States, 547 F.2d 258, 259 (5th Cir.1977). A timely notice of voluntary dismissal invites no response from the district court and permits no interference by it. See Marex Titanic, Inc. v. Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, 2 F.3d 544, 545, 547-48 (4th Cir. 1993) (district court may not vacate a timely filed notice of dismissal); Am. Cyanamid Co. v. McGhee, 317 F.2d 295, 297 (5th Cir.1963) ([The notice] itself closes the file. There is nothing the defendant can do to fan the ashes of that action into life and the court has no role to play. This is a matter of right running to the plaintiff and may not be extinguished or circumscribed by adversary or court.). A proper notice deprives the district court of jurisdiction to decide the merits of the case. [8] See Manze, 817 F.2d at 1065-66 (district court may not decide defendant's motion to dismiss after plaintiff's effective Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) notice); 8 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 41.33[6][e] (3d ed. 2008) (A defendant's motion for entry of a final judgment under Rule 54(b) should be denied if the action has already been dismissed by notice.); 9 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure: Civ.3d § 2367, at 559-61 (3d ed. 2008) (After the dismissal, the action no longer is pending in the district court and no further proceedings in the action are proper.). Because a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) is neither an answer nor a motion for summary judgment, its filing generally does not cut off a plaintiff's right to dismiss by notice. Manze, 817 F.2d at 1066. Only when a motion filed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) is converted by the district court into a motion for summary judgment does it bar voluntary dismissal. [9] Id. Here, defendants do not contend their motion was converted to a motion for summary judgment, or that it should be treated as an answer. In Manze, we rejected the defendant's argument that its motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) was equivalent to a motion for summary judgment that should have barred the plaintiff's dismissal by notice. Id. We acknowledged the defendant's preferred approach had some theoretical appeal because motions to dismiss may impose much labor and expense on parties and judges  sometimes they are as time-consuming as motions for summary judgment. Id. at 1065 (citing Tele-Views News Co. v. S.R.B. TV Publ'g Co., 28 F.R.D. 303, 307-08 (E.D.Pa.1961)). Moreover, Rule 41 may permit a strategic advantage for a plaintiff: if prospects for prevailing on the merits appear dim, the plaintiff can obtain a dismissal without prejudice after imposing high costs on defendants and judges. But the drafters of Rule 41 provided for only two responses  answer and motion for summary judgment  as point[s] of no return. Id. (quoting Winterland Concessions, 706 F.2d at 795). It would be improper to graft a new category onto the literal text of the Rule. Id. As in Manze, we apply the literal terms of Rule 41. [10] Furthermore, we reject defendants' contention that the District Court's granting plaintiffs the right to amend, and an extension of time within which to do so, limited or nullified the option of dismissing available to plaintiffs under the Rule. Here, the Notice was timely because defendants had filed neither an answer nor a motion for summary judgment as of the date of the Notice, and because the District Court's July 19, 2006, order had not clearly put an end to the action to which Rule 41 refers.