Opinion ID: 778212
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Rehabilitation Act and the ADA

Text: 8 Mahon makes his claim under § 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., which requires Federal agencies and instrumentalities to implement affirmative action plans to hire, place, and advance individuals with disabilities, and which creates a private right of action against covered entities for discrimination on the basis of disability. See id. at § 791(b). 2 Although the Rehabilitation Act predates the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., analyses of claims made under the two acts run roughly parallel. See McPherson v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass'n, 119 F.3d 453, 459-60 (6th Cir.1997). By statute, the Americans with Disabilities Act standards apply in Rehabilitation Act cases alleging employment discrimination. Id. at 460 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 794(d)). Recent Supreme Court decisions sharply limiting the reach of the ADA thus also apply to cases brought under the Rehabilitation Act. See, e.g., Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 122 S.Ct. 681, 690-92, 151 L.Ed.2d 615 (2002); Sutton v. United Air Lines Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 481-89, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999). 9 To make out a prima facie employment discrimination case under either Act, a plaintiff must show (1) that she or he is an individual with a disability, (2) who was otherwise qualified to perform a job's requirements, with or without reasonable accommodation, and (3) who was discriminated against solely because of the disability. See Monette v. Electronic Data Systems Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1178 (6th Cir.1996) (ADA); Doherty v. Southern College of Optometry, 862 F.2d 570, 573 (6th Cir.1988), cert. denied 493 U.S. 810, 110 S.Ct. 53, 107 L.Ed.2d 22 (1989) (Rehabilitation Act). An individual is discriminated against when she or he is fired solely because of a disability, see Maddox v. University of Tennessee, 62 F.3d 843, 846 (6th Cir.1995), but discrimination also includes limiting, segregating, or classifying a job applicant or employee in a way that adversely affects the opportunities or status of such applicant or employee because of [their] disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 791(g). 10 A threshold question is whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the acts. To be disabled for the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, an individual must (1) have a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits him or her in at least one major life activity, (2) have a record of such an impairment, or (3) be regarded as having such an impairment. See 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B) (Rehabilitation Act definition); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (ADA definition). 11 There is no blanket rule for determining when a claimant is disabled. Congress intended the existence of a disability to be determined in ... a case-by-case manner. Williams, 122 S.Ct. at 692. 12 Here Mahon asserts alternately that he is actually disabled, having a physical impairment which substantially limits him in a major life activity, or that TVA regarded him as having such a disability. We address these claims in turn.