Opinion ID: 4569202
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Undue-Influence Enhancement

Text: Cruz’s sole basis for challenging the reasonableness of his sentence is the district court’s application of the two-level sentencing enhancement under USSG § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B) for undue influence of a minor. We conclude the district court did not err in applying the enhancement because the court found that Cruz failed to overcome the applicable rebuttable presumption that undue influence existed by virtue of the age difference between Cruz and M.C. A two-level sentencing enhancement applies under USSG § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B), if the defendant “unduly influenced a minor to engage in prohibited sexual conduct.” The commentary to this section notes that “[i]n determining whether subsection (b)(2)(B) applies, the court should closely consider the facts of the case to determine whether a participant’s influence over the minor compromised the voluntariness of the minor’s behavior.” USSG § 2G1.3, comment., n.3(B). The same commentary note, however, also states that: No. 19-4160 United States v. Jeremy Cruz Page 7 In a case in which a participant is at least 10 years older than the minor, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that subsection (b)(2)(B) applies. In such a case, some degree of undue influence can be presumed because of the substantial difference in age between the participant and the minor. Id. This commentary is “authoritative.” United States v. Lay, 583 F.3d 436, 446 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993)). Cruz contends “the record is replete with evidence that indicates that the presumption does not apply.” Cruz misapprehends the factual predicate for the presumption of undue influence under § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B). The presumption is triggered if there is a difference of ten years between the defendant and the victim. Here, there was a difference of 25 years. As a result, the district court correctly concluded there existed a rebuttable presumption that Cruz unduly influenced M.C.2 It was therefore incumbent upon Cruz to produce evidence to rebut that presumption. Cruz failed to do so. His only argument was that “he had no knowledge” of M.C.’s actual age because she “lied to him and said she was 17,” so “[w]hen he finally met her, he believed her to be 19.” The undue-influence enhancement, however, does not contain a mens rea requirement that the defendant “know” the victim is a minor. The district court, nonetheless, considered Cruz’s sole argument and rejected it as not “credible.” Thus, as the district court concluded, there “certainly” was not “any rebuttal of the presumption that . . . the enhancement applies.” Cruz’s isolated citation to United States v. Davis, 924 F.3d 899 (6th Cir. 2019), does not command a different result. There, the district court only noted the “age gap” between the minor and the defendant, “[w]ithout further discussing the facts of th[e] case”; namely, the victim’s “trial testimony that she had previously engaged in prostitution, willingly engaged in prostitution during the events of th[e] case, contacted the defendants to have them procure her clients, and refused a client procured for her by [one of the defendants].” Davis, 924 F.3d at 903-04. None of the facts in Davis are present in this case. 2 See Presumption, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019), available at Westlaw (“A legal inference or assumption that a fact exists because of the known or proven existence of some other fact or group of facts. . . . A presumption shifts the burden of production or persuasion to the opposing party, who can then attempt to overcome the presumption.”). No. 19-4160 United States v. Jeremy Cruz Page 8 Moreover, the age difference aside, there is further evidence to support undue influence. “The undue-influence enhancement ‘is not limited to force, fraud, or coercion.’ It also reaches ‘manipulating’ and ‘preying upon’ a vulnerable victim.” United States v. Reid, 751 F.3d 763, 768 (6th Cir. 2014) (internal citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Willoughby, 742 F.3d 229, 241 (6th Cir. 2014)). In fact, we have affirmed the district court’s application of the undueinfluence enhancement where a defendant led a minor female to believe he was her boyfriend and, after the minor ran away with the defendant, the minor became dependent on this much older man for transportation and housing hundreds of miles away from her home. See, e.g., id.; Willoughby, 742 F.3d at 241; United States v. Wise, 278 F. App’x 552, 563 (6th Cir. 2008). The rationale applies with equal force here. The district court specifically found that Cruz “preyed upon this victim.” “An appellate court may not reverse a finding of fact ‘simply because [it] would have decided the case differently,’ but must affirm unless ‘left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” Lay, 583 F.3d at 446 (quoting Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242 (2001)). No mistake was made here. The record supports the court’s conclusion. Cruz maintained a sexually explicit online relationship with M.C. for two years. Nothing in the record indicates that Cruz ever attempted to end this relationship. Cruz instead picked up M.C. and drove her across the country, intending to engage in sexual activity with her. At that point, with no way to get back home, 14-year-old M.C. was entirely dependent upon Cruz. Cruz then had sex with M.C. multiple times—including after the police and M.C. had expressly told Cruz that she was a minor. Cruz’s feigned attempt to foist the blame on M.C. because she initially “lied” about her age does not rebut these facts. See Lay, 583 F.3d at 442, 446. The district court did not err in applying the undue-influence enhancement.