Opinion ID: 2027605
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Move to Dismiss Involuntary Manslaughter.

Text: Wissing argues that his trial attorney should have moved to dismiss the involuntary manslaughter charge. He claims that by adopting section 707.6A dealing with vehicular homicide, the legislature impliedly repealed part of the involuntary manslaughter statute. Wissing challenges his multiple convictions which he claims arise from a single act. He argues the legislature did not intend multiple punishments for the same act. The relevant parts of the vehicular homicide statute state: 1. A person commits a class C felony when the person unintentionally causes the death of another by either of the following means: a. Operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or other drug or in a combination of such substances or while having an alcohol concentration, as defined in section 321J.1, subsection 1, of.10 or more.... b. Driving a motor vehicle in a reckless manner with willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property, in violation of section 321.277. 2. A person commits a class D felony when the person unintentionally causes the death of another by operating a motor vehicle in any of the following manners: a. Drag racing, in violation of section 321.278. b. Eluding or attempting to elude a pursuing law enforcement vehicle, in violation of section 321.279. Iowa Code § 707.6A. The relevant portions of the involuntary manslaughter statute provide: 1. A person commits a class D felony when the person unintentionally causes the death of another person by the commission of a public offense other than a forcible felony or escape. 2. A person commits an aggravated misdemeanor when the person unintentionally causes the death of another person by the commission of an act in a manner likely to cause death or serious injury. Id. § 707.5. Wissing's challenge raises double jeopardy principles. The Double Jeopardy Clause protects against three things: (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense. U.S. Const. amend. V; State v. Aguiar-Corona, 508 N.W.2d 698, 701 (Iowa 1993). Because this case does not involve successive prosecution, we focus our attention upon the third issue. Because power to prescribe crimes and determine punishment is vested with the legislature, the question under the Double Jeopardy Clause whether punishments are `multiple' is essentially one of legislative intent. State v. Franzen, 495 N.W.2d 714, 716 (Iowa 1993). One way of determining whether the legislature intended multiple punishments based on a single act is by applying the rule of statutory construction articulated in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 182, 76 L.Ed. 306, 309 (1932): [W]here the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not. Wissing's conduct on the morning of August 26, 1993 amounted to three wrongful acts. He was driving while intoxicated, attempting to elude a police officer, and speeding. If he unintentionally caused the death of another, each of these acts alone would likely constitute the basis for a conviction under either the vehicular homicide or involuntary manslaughter statutes. Wissing was charged for vehicular homicide on the basis of his acts of [o]perating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, Iowa Code § 707.6A(1)(a), and [d]riving a motor vehicle in a reckless manner with willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property, Iowa Code § 707.6A(1)(b). He was charged with involuntary manslaughter on the basis of the public offense of eluding a police vehicle. Iowa Code § 707.5(1) (eluding a police vehicle is prohibited by Iowa Code § 321.279). Under these criminal charges, to prove Wissing guilty of vehicular homicide the State had to prove: (1)(a) He operated a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, or while having an alcohol concentration of .10 or more; or (b) He drove a motor vehicle in a reckless manner, and (2) His acts unintentionally caused the death of Michele R. Rydstrom. On the other hand, to prove him guilty of involuntary manslaughter the State had to prove: (1) He recklessly committed the crime of Eluding a Law Enforcement Vehicle, and (2) When he committed the crime, he unintentionally caused the death of Michele R. Rydstrom. Therefore, each count Wissing was convicted of required proof of an additional fact which the other did not. The two offenses did not constitute the same crime under the Blockburger test. If the offenses are not the same crime under Blockburger, there is a presumption that multiple punishments can be assessed. Aguiar-Corona, 508 N.W.2d at 701. The court did not violate double jeopardy principles in submitting both involuntary manslaughter and vehicular homicide to the jury. Wissing argues that he cannot be convicted under both statutes because section 707.6A impliedly repeals section 707.5 for any unintentional death caused by a motor vehicle. The Blockburger test is merely a rule of statutory construction designed to discern legislative intent. McKettrick, 480 N.W.2d at 58. Therefore, the rule should not be controlling where, for example, there is a clear indication of contrary legislative intent. Id. He asserts the legislature did not intend to make the same act illegal under two separate statutes. He contends that the special provisions of the vehicular homicide statute are controlling over the general involuntary manslaughter provisions. See Iowa Code § 4.7. Although the legislature generally does not cover the same ground in two separate statutes, when it does the special statute is considered an exception to the general statute only if the two statutes cannot be reconciled. State v. Peters, 525 N.W.2d 854, 857 (Iowa 1994) (citing State v. Perry, 440 N.W.2d 389, 390 (Iowa 1989)). There is a presumption against the implied repeal of a statute. Dan Dugan Transp. Co. v. Worth County, 243 N.W.2d 655, 657 (Iowa 1976). We have stated: The fact that two statutes provide different criminal penalties for essentially the same conduct is no justification for taking liberties with unequivocal statutory language. The adoption of one statute does not implicitly repeal another statute whenever a defendant's conduct might violate both. It is not enough to show the two statutes produce different results when applied to the same factual situation. The legislative intent to repeal must be manifest in the positive repugnancy between the provisions. Perry, 440 N.W.2d at 391 (citation omitted). If the legislature had intended section 707.6A to be the only statute addressing an unintentional death caused by a driver of a motor vehicle, it could easily have said so. See Peters, 525 N.W.2d at 858. The fact that Wissing could have been charged under either statute on the basis of the same wrongful act does not show the legislature intended to repeal part of the involuntary manslaughter statute. When a single act violates more than one criminal statute, the prosecutor may choose which charge to file, even if the two offenses call for different punishments. Id. at 859. We conclude Wissing was not charged under two separate statutes for the same act. The legislature did not intend to impliedly repeal part of section 707.5 when it passed section 707.6A. Because Wissing was appropriately convicted under both statutes on the basis of separate wrongful acts, he has failed to show he suffered prejudice as a result of his attorney's failure to move to dismiss the involuntary manslaughter charge. At sentencing counsel for Wissing urged the conviction of involuntary manslaughter should be subsumed under vehicular homicide and that he should only be sentenced on the vehicular homicide count. Although Wissing has not challenged on appeal the two convictions arising from only one homicide, we believe this issue should be addressed. Wissing was charged in separate counts of both vehicular homicide and involuntary manslaughter. Because each offense requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not, they are separate offenses and the court properly instructed the jury as to each count. Generally, a defendant who is convicted of distinct offenses may be punished for both. However, where the offenses arise from one homicide, we permit sentencing on only one of the homicide offenses. State v. Gilroy, 199 N.W.2d 63, 68 (Iowa 1972) (two sentences imposed as the result of one homicide cannot be allowed to stand); compare with State v. Criswell, 242 N.W.2d 259, 261 (Iowa 1976) (distinguishing Gilroy and permitting consecutive sentences based on two separate non-homicide offenses). The judgment entered upon conviction of involuntary manslaughter is annulled and set aside. We affirm, save and except as modified above. AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.