Opinion ID: 198966
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 20 The defendants challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to convict them. 6 We assess whether the evidence viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict would allow a rational trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Morillo, 158 F.3d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 1998). All evidence, both direct and circumstantial, is to be considered, with conflicts resolved in favor of the verdict. See United States v. Carroll, 105 F.3d 740, 742 (1st Cir. 1997). Conspiracy 21 To prove the crime of conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 963, the government must prove the existence of an unlawful agreement between two or more persons and the defendant's knowledge of and voluntary participation in the conspiracy. See Morillo, 158 F.3d at 23. To establish a defendant's voluntary participation, the government must show both intent to agree and intent to commit the substantive offense. Id. (citations omitted). The crime is the illegal agreement; if there was such an agreement, it does not matter that the purpose of the agreement was not achieved, or even that achieving that purpose was factually impossible. See United States v. Giry, 818 F.2d 120, 126 (1st Cir. 1987). 22 If the jurors believed Vega, they could easily have found within his testimony evidence supporting the elements of the offense of conspiracy with respect to each defendant. Rodriguez formed the plan to import marijuana and recruited the others to help out. Both Saniel and Santana, by their respective parts as described by Vega, joined in the conspiracy knowing of its purpose and intending by their participation to bring about its success. The fact that their effort failed does not stand in the way of a finding by the jury that the defendants had conspired together to import marijuana. Attempt (Aiding and Abetting) 23 To convict the defendants of attempt, the government had to prove that they intended to commit the substantive offense of importing marijuana and that each of them, directly or by aiding or abetting another, performed a substantial step towards the completion of the offense. United States v. DeMasi, 40 F.3d 1306, 1315 (1st Cir. 1994). A substantial step is less than what is necessary to complete the substantive crime, but more than mere preparation. See United States v. Levy-Cordero, 67 F.3d 1002, 1019 (1st Cir. 1995). The government must prove that the defendants participated in [the attempt] as... something [they] wished to bring about, and sought by [their] actions to make it succeed. United States v. Loder, 23 F.3d 586, 590-91 (1st Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Garcia-Rosa, 876 F.2d 209, 217 (1st Cir. 1989)). 24 Again, Vega's testimony, if believed, was sufficient to permit a jury to find the defendants guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. According to Vega's account, each of the defendants personally participated in at least one direct effort to import marijuana. Saniel went with Vega to the waterfront to await the shipment from Colombia in September; in October, Santana brought his boat to St. Thomas expecting to load it with marijuana to be carried back to Puerto Rico; Rodriguez participated in both efforts. On the evidence, the jury could properly have found, with respect to each defendant, that his participation went beyond mere preparation and amounted to a substantial step toward the completion of the offense. 25 Santana points out that the indictment alleged an attempt in or about September of 1993. He argues that, except for records showing telephone calls to his home from the homes of other co-conspirators, there was no evidence that he participated in the effort to bring marijuana directly from Colombia in September. The only evidence of his participation was the October trip to St. Thomas. He therefore says that he cannot be found guilty of the attempt that is alleged in the indictment. His argument is meritless. 26 The words in or about permit some latitude in proving the time of the offense alleged, so long as the exact time of the commission of the act is not an element of the offense. See United States v. Antonelli, 439 F.2d 1068, 1070 (1st Cir. 1971). The exact time of the importation effort is not an element of the crime of attempting to import illegal drugs. Here, in addition to attempt, Santana was charged with being part of a conspiracy which, according to the indictment, existed from in or about September of 1993 to in or about October of 1993. Further, in the conspiracy count, there are specific allegations of overt acts that Santana participated in, all of which are alleged to have taken place in October, 1993. 27 Moreover, the evidence that during September telephone calls were made to Santana's residence from the other alleged co-conspirators also supported the attempt charge, because from it an inference might have been drawn not only that Santana had conspired with others to violate the law, which was the gist of the conspiracy count, but also that he participated in steps toward the commission of the substantive offense itself. Certainly, in a prosecution for a completed offense, evidence of communications among the co-conspirators would be relevant not only to prove the existence of the conspiracy but to prove that the substantive crime was committed as well. The same should be true when, instead of a completed substantive crime, an attempt is charged. 28 In any event, proof of Santana's active participation in October is sufficient proof of an offense in or about September that there is no error. See United States v. Escobar-de Jesus, 187 F.3d 148, 168 (1st Cir. 1999) (evidence about act occurring near the end of March supported proof of conspiracy alleged to have begun on or about April); United States v. Portela, 167 F.3d 687, 698 n.7 (1st Cir. 1999) (evidence of act occurring in early April 1995 could prove crime alleged to have occurred on or about March 1995).