Opinion ID: 1269190
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant's Motion to Continue.

Text: The defendant next contends that the refusal of the trial court to grant a continuance until a critical witness for the defense could be present was an abuse of discretion and denied his rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution and the North Carolina Constitution. Defense counsel renewed this motion at the close of the State's case and also moved for a recess for the purpose of allowing the defendant to secure the attendance of the witness. Both motions were denied. The defendant filed a motion to continue on 26 April 1984 requesting a continuance because of the unavailability of a named witness for whom he had issued a subpoena. In a memorandum in support of motion to continue, the defendant said: 1. That [the witness] is an essential witness to the defendant's case in that she was with the defendant on the night of the alleged crimes and is able to testify to numerous pertinent facts concerning the events of that evening and other relevant information; and 2. That the defendant has kept in constant contact with [the witness] since his arrest in January of 1984. Since that time, she has known her testimony was essential in his case, and that he was to come to trial on April 30, 1984; and 3. That the defendant last spoke with [the witness] by telephone on April 21, 1984, informing her that he would need her testimony on April 30, 1984; and 4. That the defendant wrote to [the witness] on April 24, 1984, requesting that she appear in his behalf on April 30, 1984; and 5. That upon attempting to serve a subpoena on [the witness] on April 26, 1984, the defendant learned that [the witness] had left suddenly for Hawaii and would not return until on or about May 7, 1984; and 6. That [the witness] had previously expressed reservations to the defendant about testifying in his behalf.... When the defendant's case was called for trial on 30 April 1984 and while the defendant was appearing pro se, the trial judge heard arguments on the motion to continue and denied the motion. After Mr. White was reinstated as trial counsel, before jury selection began, Mr. White renewed the defendant's motion to continue and requested that the trial judge consider additional information consisting of the testimony of Mr. Edward L. Cobbler, the private investigator employed on the defendant's behalf. Without objection by the State, the trial judge allowed the defendant to present the testimony of Mr. Cobbler on voir dire regarding the information that he had obtained from the witness. In summary, the witness stated to Mr. Cobbler that the defendant came to her house in Greensboro between 5:30 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. on 19 December 1983 and remained with her until they left her house in separate cars at about 7:00 p.m. to go to his house. Although she was supposed to follow him, she lost contact about 7:15 p.m. Thereafter she looked for him at a couple of bars, on Groometown Road, at his home and at her house and could not find him until about 9:00 p.m. when she returned to his house a third time and saw his truck parked there. She went to the back door of defendant's house and he was there. He had just taken a shower, was completely nude and was doing a wash. She stated that before 7:15 p.m. he had been wearing blue jeans, his work boots, a blue-checkered flannel shirt, and one of those mesh jackets of black leather. She also said that he owned a new, large hunting knife that he got from the Army-Navy Surplus Store. According to the victim's testimony at trial, the defendant arrived at the victim's apartment around 7:30 p.m. He was wearing a black jacket, a light blue plaid flannel shirt and jeans. Other evidence for the State established that the emergency call from the victim was received at 8:52 p.m. A blue flannel shirt with a missing button was seized from the defendant's room, and the button with adhering thread and blue fabric found in the victim's living room matched the buttons, thread and fiber from the shirt. The State offered to stipulate at trial to the testimony that the witness would have given as related by Mr. Cobbler. The defendant refused to stipulate. The trial judge again denied the defendant's motion. Ordinarily, a motion to continue is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge and is reviewable only for abuse of discretion. State v. Weimer, 300 N.C. 642, 647, 268 S.E.2d 216, 219 (1980). An equally well-established rule, however, is that when a motion raises a constitutional issue, the trial court's action upon it involves a question of law which is fully reviewable by an examination of the particular circumstances presented by the record on appeal of each case. State v. Branch, 306 N.C. 101, 104, 291 S.E.2d 653, 656 (1982) citing State v. Searles, 304 N.C. 149, 282 S.E.2d 430 (1981). The defendant contends that the denial of his motion to continue denied him due process of law and his right to equal protection of the laws, as guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Ammendments [sic] to the United States Constitution and Art. 1, Sections 19 and 23 of the North Carolina Constitution. The defendant further contends that the production of a material witness is fundamental to the rights of a defendant and that the trial judge abused his discretion by denying the motion based upon his factual determination that the defendant could have committed the offense during the time that the defendant was out of the presence of the witness. The defendant contends that he should have been given the opportunity to present the witness so that the jury could determine whether the witness' statement could establish an alibi. Although not denominated such by the defendant, the constitutional issue presented by this assignment of error is whether the right of a criminal defendant to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States was violated by denial of the defendant's motion to continue when his subpoena was not served because the witness had left the state, and whether the same denial violated his right under the Constitution of North Carolina, Article I, § 23 which provides: In all criminal prosecutions, every person charged with crime has the right ... to confront the accusers and witnesses with other testimony.... When the trial judge denied the defendant's motion to continue the first time, he did not make findings of fact or state reasons for so doing. However, the District Attorney had argued that the defendant had failed to show that the witness was a material witness and had pointed out that in the defendant's motion the defendant indicated that the witness was reluctant to testify. After the question of the continuance was reopened, the private investigator who talked with the witness indicated that he had questioned the witness on 22 February 1984. A joint motion of the State and defendant to continue the case from 17 February through 2 April, dated 17 February 1984, had been filed and granted on 21 March 1984. In his written motion to continue from the 30 April 1984 date, the defendant stated that he had kept in constant contact with the witness since his arrest in January of 1984 and that since that time she has known her testimony was essential in his case and that he was to come to trial on April 30, 1984. Therefore, the record clearly shows that the defendant was aware for several weeks of his trial date and yet did not issue a subpoena for this witness, who had indicated her reluctance to testify, until 26 April 1984. Further, the defendant was unable to show any way in which the witness' testimony would be helpful to the defendant, except to show how he appeared shortly after this crime supposedly happened. Counsel admitted that the witness could not establish an alibi. As this Court has long suggested, a motion for a continuance should be supported by an affidavit showing sufficient grounds for the continuance. State v. Branch, 306 N.C. 101, 105, 291 S.E.2d 653, 657 (1982); State v. Cradle, 281 N.C. 198, 208, 188 S.E.2d 296, 303, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1047, 93 S.Ct. 537, 34 L.Ed.2d 499 (1972); State v. Gibson, 229 N.C. 497, 501, 50 S.E.2d 520, 523 (1948). Although the defendant's motion to continue was accompanied by an affidavit which suggested that the witness could establish an alibi for the defendant, the evidence offered on voir dire indicated that the testimony of the witness would not be of material aid to the defense. In State v. House, 295 N.C. 189, 206, 244 S.E.2d 654, 663 (1978) this Court addressed the identical constitutional provisions drawn into question here and stated: As we said in State v. Wells, 290 N.C. 485, 491, 226 S.E.2d 325, 330 (1976), Here, defendant's lack of diligence in placing his witnesses under subpoena when he had ample opportunity to do so, thus requiring their attendance from day to day, forestalls his belated attempt to place responsibility on the trial judge for their absence. Furthermore, as was said in Hoskins v. Wainwright, 440 F.2d 69, 71 (5th Cir., 1971), The right to compulsory process is not absolute, and a state may require that a defendant requesting such process at state expense establish some colorable need for the person to be summoned, lest the right be abused by those who would make frivolous requests. While we are not prepared to say that a defendant in all cases loses his right to a continuance as a means to protect his constitutional right to produce witnesses by his failure to issue subpoenas more than four days before trial, in the instant case, the defendant has failed to establish such colorable need for the person to be summoned as would justify delaying the trial in order to secure attendance of the witness who was known by the defendant to be reluctant and for whom no subpoena was issued until shortly before the scheduled date of trial. This assignment of error is overruled.