Opinion ID: 1233313
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS. This is the longest section of appellant's brief (some 66 pages).

Text: We disagree completely with the appellant as to the function of a grand jury in this state. In the period when an indictment by a grand jury was a prerequisite to a prosecution for a felony, it was said (and the appellant seems to have assumed its present day applicability) that a grand jury was meant to be a shield between the defendant and the zeal of the prosecutor. For the most part, the cases upon which the appellant relies come either from the time when a grand jury indictment was necessary, or from jurisdictions where it is still a requisite. The grand jury in this state is not and was not intended to be a shield for the accused. Our state constitution provides that, ... Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment may be prosecuted by information, or by indictment, as shall be prescribed by law. Art. I, § 25, Washington state constitution. Furthermore, ... No grand jury shall be drawn or summoned in any county, except the superior judge thereof shall so order. Art. I, § 26, Washington state constitution. The prosecutor's information has become the standard means of bringing charges in this state, as in all other states which authorize its use. It has long been settled that there is no denial of Federal constitutional rights involved in the substitution of the prosecutor's information for the grand jury's indictment. Hurtado v. People of California (1884), 110 U.S. 516, 4 S.Ct. 111; State v. Nordstrom (1893), 7 Wash. 506, 35 Pac. 382; affirmed 164 U.S. 705. The grand jury is now used not as a shield against the zealous prosecutor, as in times past, but to replace, on occasion, the prosecutor who is not sufficiently zealous (for whatever reason), and, more often, as presently, as a valuable but expensive weapon (hence, used sparingly) to assist a prosecutor in investigating conditions and people insulated from investigation by the usual procedures. It has been said that, The inquisitorial power of the grand jury is the most valuable function which it possesses to-day and, far more than any supposed protection which it gives to the accused, justifies its survival as an institution. As an engine of discovery against organized and far-reaching crime, it has no counterpart.... In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 4 F. Supp. 283, 284 (E.D. Pa. 1933). It must be accepted for what it is: an inquisitorial body, an accusing body, and not a trial court. Its functions are investigative and not judicial. It is not concerned that the evidence, then available, establish the commission of crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Lawler (1936), 221 Wis. 423, 267 N.W. 65, 105 A.L.R. 568. The end result of a grand jury's deliberations is not a judgment and sentence, but merely a charge; consequently, the concepts of procedural due process do not apply to the grand jury, except as they may be necessary to prevent prejudice to an accused or a witness in subsequent proceedings; thus, a grand jury may not deny the constitutional privilege against self incrimination, and it may not impair the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. The grand jury is the voice of the community accusing its members, (Judge Learned Hand in In re Kittle, 180 Fed. 946, 947 (S.D.N.Y. 1910)), and it may properly reflect the sentiment of the community. It ... breathes the spirit of a community into the enforcement of law. Its effect as an institution for investigation of all, no matter how highly placed, creates the elan of democracy.... United States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 279, 291 (N.D. Cal. S.D. 1952). The appellant, on the other hand, suggests that the grand jurors were disqualified because they presumably reflected the sentiment of the community from which they came. The inference from the appellant's argument is that a person who can secure a large amount of adverse publicity from newspapers, radio, and television, thereby becomes immune from grand jury investigation; the more notoriety he achieves, the more reason he should not be investigated. Investigative agencies  city, county, state, or federal  do not wait for the hue and cry to die down before they begin to investigate or to file a charge against an accused. Nor do we see why a grand jury investigation should be handicapped or delayed because of publicity of whatever kind or character. Because a grand jury merely makes the accusation and does not try the accused, the general rule is that, barring statutory provisions to the contrary, bias or prejudice on the part of one or more of the grand jurors is not a ground for quashing the indictment. In United States v. Knowles, 147 F. Supp. 19, 21 (D.C. 1957), it was said, The basic theory of the functions of a grand jury, does not require that grand jurors should be impartial and unbiased. In this respect, their position is entirely different from that of petit jurors. The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States expressly provides that the trial jury in a criminal case must be `impartial'. No such requirement in respect to grand juries is found in the Fifth Amendment, which contains the guaranty against prosecutions for infamous crimes unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury. It is hardly necessary to be reminded that each of these Amendments was adopted at the same time as a part of the group consisting of the first ten Amendments. A grand jury does not pass on the guilt or innocence of the defendant, but merely determines whether he should be brought to trial. It is purely an accusatory body. This view can be demonstrated by the fact that a grand jury may undertake an investigation on its own initiative, or at the behest of one of its members. In such event, the grand juror who instigated the proceeding that may result in an indictment, obviously can hardly be deemed to be impartial, but he is not disqualified for that reason. In Coblenz v. State (1933), 164 Md. 558, 166 Atl. 45, 88 A.L.R. 886, 894, 895, it is said: ... we find no ground for imposing a requirement that they must be unprejudiced, as the objection demands. On the contrary, such a requirement would seem inconsistent with their freedom to accuse upon their own knowledge, for persons who come with knowledge sufficient to serve as a basis of indictment are likely to come with the conclusion and prejudice to which that knowledge leads. They must act upon their own convictions, after conferring secretly and without any interference; but they are not required to come without any prejudice.... And in United States v. Rintelen, 235 Fed. 787 (S.D.N.Y. 1916), Judge Augustus N. Hand said (p. 789), ... An intelligent grand juror can hardly be found who has not decided opinions derived from his general knowledge as to any case of public notoriety. He may have even passionate feelings on the subject, which in general affect and actuate him. The question is not what his feelings were, but whether he voted for an indictment honestly and upon competent evidence. That an indictment can be quashed because the grand jurors had personal prejudices, even ill-founded ones, would leave every indictment in an important case, irrespective of the evidence on which it was found, open to attack.... We reiterate, as the quoted authorities establish, that the general rule is that, barring statutory provisions to the contrary, bias or prejudice on the part of one or more of the grand jurors is not a ground for a quashing of a grand jury indictment, or for setting aside the judgment based on the verdict of a petit jury after a trial on such an indictment. The appellant says our consideration of this case must be based upon the premise that he, as a matter of law, was entitled to an impartial and unprejudiced grand jury. If we assume that the premise is correct, we are confronted with the fact that there is no showing that any member of the grand jury was biased or prejudiced against the appellant. His contention is that some or all of the members of the grand jury must be biased or prejudiced against him because of the unfavorable publicity which he had received. Jury verdicts will not be set aside on such unsupported suppositions. However, the premise is not correct unless, as the appellant urges, our 1854 grand jury statute requires that grand jurors be impartial and unprejudiced. The only support for the suggestion that there is such a statutory requirement is contained in one section which relates to the long-gone situation where a grand jury met for the purpose of considering whether persons then in custody or released on bail and held to answer for an offense should be indicted or released. Such a person might challenge the panel because it was not drawn properly (RCW 10.28.010), or might challenge individual grand jurors ... for reason of want of qualification to sit as such juror; and when, in the opinion of the court, a state of mind exists in the juror, such as would render him unable to act impartially and without prejudice. (RCW 10.28.030. There was a reason for such a challenge by a person in custody or held to answer for an offense, but the appellant was not such a person. When a modern grand jury starts its investigative process it seems ridiculous to suggest that as each new personality comes under scrutiny the proceedings must stop until it can be determined whether any member of the grand jury is biased or prejudiced against him; and, if a grand juror is so biased or prejudiced, the investigation is at an end. Such a situation was not contemplated, even in territorial days, for our statute provides that a grand juror must testify of his own knowledge of offenses committed, and this testimony may initiate such investigation as would lead to an indictment. RCW 10.28.130. A grand juror so testifying is disqualified from joining in the deliberations and voting. RCW 10.28.140. Both sections assume that a grand juror so testifying is properly a member of the panel, and, as stated in Coblenz v. State, supra , any requirement that such grand juror be completely unprejudiced is inconsistent with his right and obligation to share his information with the grand jury. To summarize this phase of the case: 1. We are unable to conclude that because a statute gave any person in custody or held to answer for an offense the right to challenge a grand juror for prejudice, there is a statutory or any other requirement that grand jurors be without bias or prejudice against any one indicted by them. Persons for whose benefit that statute was enacted are of course entitled to its protection. 2. That, absent such statutory requirement, bias or prejudice on the part of one or more of the grand jurors is not a ground for setting aside a judgment based on a verdict of guilty returned by a petit jury. 3. There is no showing of bias or prejudice. The charge to the grand jury is criticized and said to constitute prejudicial error. As we have indicated, a grand jury in this state is convened only for a special purpose. It was not necessary to leave to the clairvoyant powers of this grand jury the determination that they had not been called to investigate all of the persons then held in the King county jail on felony charges, as RCW 10.28.010 and 10.28.030 seem to contemplate; and it was proper to advise them they had been called for a special purpose. It is stated, as a general rule, that the court has a wide discretion in calling matters of concern to the attention of the grand jury. 24 Am. Jur. 864, Grand Jury, § 45; 38 C.J.S. 1012, Grand Juries, § 21(b). Some courts have said that the court's charge to the grand jury is not subject to judicial review. United States v. Smyth, supra ; Bethel v. State (1924), 162 Ark. 76, 257 S.W. 740, 31 A.L.R. 402; State v. Lawler, supra . As Judge James Alger Fee said in his opinion in United States v. Smyth, supra , in discussing the subject of grand jury instructions (p. 292), ... He [the court] may give instructions which do not constitute precedents and which cannot be controlled or corrected by appellate courts. These may be political manifestoes. They may be entirely erroneous. These may include cautions and admonitions to fit local conditions and guard against dangers which the judge believes exist at the moment.... and, in a footnote (36), he says, There has never been an instance where instruction to a grand jury was held error by an appellate court. If the indictment is good and the trial fair, that ends the matter, irrespective of what the judge may have said to the grand jury. It must be remembered that it was not only the prerogative but the duty of the superior court to direct the grand jury's attention to those matters which the superior court judges, who had called the grand jury, believed to merit investigation by it. In so doing, it was proper for the court to make note of facts publicly known and allegations publicly heard, as a frame of reference from which the grand jury should begin its investigation.