Opinion ID: 28185
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Juvenile confession/waiver of rights.

Text: 25 [T]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment [prohibits] states from securing criminal convictions through the use of involuntary confessions resulting from coercive police conduct. Self v. Collins, 973 F.2d 1198, 1205 (5th Cir.1992)(citing Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109, 106 S.Ct. 445, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985)). In addition to the due process prohibition against the use of coerced confessions, the now-familiar procedural safeguards established in [ Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)] also protect an accused's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination during custodial interrogation. Id. [W]hile the ultimate issue of voluntariness is a legal question requiring independent factual determination, subsidiary factual questions ... are entitled to the § 2254(d) presumption. 1 Id. at 1204 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 26 The totality of the circumstances approach established by Miranda, for reviewing a waiver of Fifth Amendment rights by adults, is adequate for the determination of whether there is a valid waiver by a juvenile of his rights to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel. See United States v. Saucedo-Velasquez, 843 F.2d 832, 835 (5th Cir.1988)(citing Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979)). The Michael C. totality of the circumstances standard is the clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States governing this circumstance. 27 Under this approach, the circumstances to be considered include evaluation of the juvenile's age, experience, education, background, and intelligence, and into whether he has the capacity to understand the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights. Michael C., 442 U.S. at 725, 99 S.Ct. 2560; Saucedo-Velasquez, 843 F.2d at 835. 28