Opinion ID: 2544661
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence of Knife-scraping Tests

Text: During the guilt phase, prosecution witness Debbie Madden, a criminalist employed by the San Francisco Police Department Crime Laboratory, testified that she scraped a dried stain from a knife that defendant was carrying when he was arrested. She determined that the stain was human blood and, using electrophoretic multisystem testing, found that it contained genetic markers consistent with the blood of victim Pedersen and inconsistent with defendant's blood. Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying a timely defense motion to exclude this evidence, that its exclusion was required both by state evidence law and by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and that failure to exclude the evidence renders the resulting death judgment so unreliable as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the federal Constitution. We reject this contention and each of its parts. In People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24, 130 Cal.Rptr. 144, 549 P.2d 1240 ( Kelly) , this court held that evidence obtained through a new scientific technique may be admitted only after its reliability has been established under a three-pronged test. The first prong requires proof that the technique is generally accepted as reliable in the relevant scientific community. ( Id. at p. 30, 130 Cal.Rptr. 144, 549 P.2d 1240.) The second prong requires proof that the witness testifying about the technique and its application is a properly qualified expert on the subject. ( Ibid.) The third prong requires proof that the person performing the test in the particular case used correct scientific procedures. ( Ibid.) This court further held that proof of a technique's general acceptance in the relevant scientific community would no longer be necessary once a published appellate decision had affirmed a trial court ruling admitting evidence obtained by that scientific technique, at least until new evidence is presented reflecting a change in the attitude of the scientific community. ( Id. at p. 32, 130 Cal.Rptr. 144, 549 P.2d 1240.) Until 1993, this rule was generally known in this state as the Kelly-Frye rule because this court in Kelly had relied on the reasoning of a federal appellate court decision, Frye v. United States (D.C.Cir. 1923) 293 F. 1013 ( Frye ). In 1993, the United States Supreme Court held that the Federal Rules of Evidence had superseded Frye ( Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) 509 U.S. 579, 587, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469), and our state law rule is now referred to simply as the Kelly test or rule. { People v. Soto (1999) 21 Cal.4th 512, 515, fn. 3, 88 Cal. Rptr.2d 34, 981 P.2d 958.) During jury selection, the defense brought a motion objecting to the introduction of serological test results obtained by use of the Multisystem on Kelly-Frye grounds. In the moving papers, the defense acknowledged that a published appellate decision People v. Morris (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 377, 245 Cal.Rptr. 52 ( Morris )had affirmed a trial court ruling that electrophoretic multisystem testing of bloodstains is generally accepted in the relevant scientific community. The defense argued, however, that Morris was not controlling, that it was fundamentally flawed, that it did not decide whether multisystem results for the genetic markers esterase D(EsD) and phosphoglucomutase (PGM) were generally accepted as reliable, and that new evidence reflected a change in the attitude of the scientific community. In support of these arguments, the defense submitted more than 1800 pages of exhibits. The prosecution submitted a written response objecting to a full-blown Kelly-Frye hearing and arguing that the trial court should not receive evidence on whether the technique of electrophoretic multisystem testing had been generally accepted in the scientific community. The defense submitted a reply to the prosecution's response. After reading the papers submitted by the parties and hearing argument from counsel, the trial court scheduled an evidentiary hearing on the defense motion but limited the scope of that hearing to the third Kelly prong, which was, in the court's words, whether the prosecution can establish in this case that these particular bloodstains were validly and reliably preserved and analyzed. The Kelly evidentiary hearing began on October 22, 1990, and ended on December 5, 1990. Seven witnesses testified over the course of 16 court days. After hearing additional argument from counsel, the trial court denied the defense motion and ruled that evidence of the blood test results was admissible. Defendant argues, first, that evidence received at the hearing established that electrophoretic multisystem testing of blood is not a reliable or valid methodology for identifying the genetic markers EsD and PGM. Regarding EsD, defendant argues that the evidence showed that a multisystem reading of EsD type 2-1 (the type found on the bloodstain taken from the knife) produces a false match, or a false positive, 16 percent of the time, and for this reason electrophoretic multisystem testing of blood does not produce reliable or valid results for EsD type 2-1. We find the argument unpersuasive. Under the Kelly test, the admissibility of evidence obtained by use of a scientific technique does not depend upon proof to the satisfaction of a court that the technique is scientifically reliable or valid. ( People v. Soto, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 519, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 34, 981 P.2d 958.) Because courts are ill suited to make such determinations, admissibility depends upon whether the technique is generally accepted as reliable in the relevant scientific community. Because there was a published appellate decision holding that electrophoretic multisystem testing of blood was generally accepted as reliable in the relevant scientific community ( Morris, supra, 199 Cal. App.3d 377, 245 Cal.Rptr. 52; see also People v. Hart (1999) 20 Cal.4th 546, 635, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 132, 976 P.2d 683; People v. Wash (1993) 6 Cal.4th 215, 242, 24 Cal. Rptr.2d 421, 861 P.2d 1107; People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 214, 3 Cal. Rptr.2d 426, 821 P.2d 1302; People v. Smith (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 19, 26, 263 Cal.Rptr. 678), defendant could challenge the scientific validity of the technique only by presenting new evidence ... reflecting a change in the attitude of the scientific community. ( Kelly, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 32, 130 Cal.Rptr. 144, 549 P.2d 1240.) Defendant did not present such evidence. Therefore, the only issue before the trial court at the evidentiary hearing was whether the proposed evidence satisfied the third Kelly prong-whether the person who performed the test used correct scientific procedures. ( Id. at p. 30, 3 Cal. Rptr.2d 677, 822 P.2d 385.) Defendant argues, however, that regardless of the Kelly rule, the trial court should have excluded the electrophoretic multisystem test results under the general evidence rules for expert testimony or under the federal Constitution's due process clause or its prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment (U.S. Const, 8th & 14th Amends.). Because defendant did not object on those grounds in the trial court, they are not preserved for appellate review. (Evid.Code, § 353, subd. (a).) Moreover, even assuming that issues about the scientific validity of electrophoretic multisystem testing of blood are properly before us, we find defendant's claimthat as applied to EsD type 2-1 this testing produces a false match, or a false positive, 16 percent of the timeto be a substantial distortion or mischaracterization of the evidence. What the evidence showed was that electrophoretic multisystem testing does not distinguish EsD type 2-1 from EsD type 5-1, in that both of these blood types produce exactly the same band pattern on a multisystem run. The evidence showed that in the White population, 84 percent of the occurrences of this band pattern are type 2-1 and only 16 percent are type 5-1. Although electrophoretic multisystem testing cannot distinguish these EsD types from each other, it does reliably and consistently distinguish them from EsD types 1 and 2. Because EsD type 5-1 is significantly less common than type 2-1, a positive result for these two types is generally referred to as a type 2-1 result, although it might more accurately be described as a type 2-1 or 5-1 result. Here, Madden's electrophoretic multisystem testing of the bloodstain on the knife showed that the blood was either EsD type 2-1 or EsD type 5-1 and not any other type. This result eliminated defendant as a possible donor, because he is EsD type 1. It did not eliminate victim Pedersen because he was also EsD type 2-1 or 5-1. The inability of electrophoretic multisystem testing to distinguish EsD types 2-1 and 5-1 from each other does not affect the scientific validity of these results. Defendant makes a similar, and similarly unpersuasive, argument regarding the genetic marker PGM. With a single multisystem run, it is possible to distinguish PGM into three types: 1, 2, and 2-1. With an additional run or by using a different technique, it is possible to further refine the PGM finding to discriminate among 10 PGM subtypes. (See People v. Kaurish (1990) 52 Cal.3d 648, 672, fn. 2, 276 Cal.Rptr. 788, 802 P.2d 278.) Here, Madden testified that because of the small quantity of the stain, she was only able to perform a single multisystem run, and the band pattern on that run indicated a PGM type 1, which was consistent with the blood of both defendant and victim Pedersen. The multisystem's inability to distinguish PGM subtypes on a single run does not affect the scientific validity of these results; it merely affects their weight or significance. In summary, the inability of electrophoretic multisystem testing to distinguish EsD types 2-1 and 5-1 from each other, and its inability to distinguish PGM subtypes does not affect the scientific validity of the test results, nor does it provide any basis to question the accuracy of Madden's testimony at trial that the blood on the knife was consistent with Pedersen's blood and with the blood of 13 percent of the White population, but was inconsistent with defendant's blood. Next, defendant challenges the reliability of Madden's testimony that the stain on the knife was human blood. To determine whether the stain was human blood, Madden used a test called the Ouchterlony species test. Defendant claims that the trial court should have excluded this testimony under the third prong of the Kelly test because the defense demonstrated, during the Kelly hearing, that Madden did not use correct scientific procedures in performing the Ouchterlony species test. In particular, defendant faults Madden for not using a substrate control by simultaneously testing the unstained portion of the knife and also for reading the result after only four hours rather than allowing the plate on which the test was performed to develop overnight. We question whether defendant has properly preserved a Kelly objection to the Ouchterlony species test. His written motion objected to introduction of serological test results obtained by use of the Multisystem. ... It is not clear that the objection included also the Ouchterlony species test. In any event, assuming that the validity of the procedures used in performing the Ouchterlony species test was before the trial court under the third prong of the Kelly test, we find no error in the trial court's ruling. The evidence on whether Madden used correct scientific procedures was in conflict. Defense witnesses Patricia L. Zajac and Mary Elizabeth Reynolds testified that Madden should have used a negative control and should have allowed the testing plate to develop for 24 hours. On the other hand, Gary Alan Sims, whom the defense retained to observe the testing, testified that after observing the Ouchterlony species testing he formed the opinion that the stain was human blood, although his opinion would have been stronger if a negative control had been used. And Edward Thomas Blake testified that if a clear reaction appeared, an Ouchterlony species test result could be read after three or four hours, and that negative controls were not essential when testing a stain on a knife. The trial court resolved this conflict in the testimony by ruling in the prosecution's favor. We infer from the ruling a finding by the trial court that Madden used correct scientific procedures for the Ouchterlony species test. Because the court's implied finding is supported by substantial evidence, defendant's challenge does not succeed.