Opinion ID: 1796846
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: whether the circuit court erred in excluding the testimony of the petitioner's expert.

Text: Neal contends that the trial court's refusal to allow Dr. Kaufman to testify was reversible error. He argues she was an expert and would have offered relevant testimony, and therefore, excluding that testimony was a violation of Miss.R.Evid. 702. See Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So.2d 856, 874 (Miss. 1985); Hardy v. Brantley, 471 So.2d 358, 365-69 (Miss. 1985). See also, Hecklar v. State, 503 So.2d 269 (Miss. 1987); Hooten v. State, 492 So.2d 948 (Miss. 1986); Henry v. State, 484 So.2d 1012 (Miss. 1986). This entire argument hinges on the contention that due to his mental capacity, Neal did not make a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to testify. Again this goes to his competence. The trial court refused to allow Dr. Kaufman's testimony, stating that this same matter was gone into at trial and the evidence presented at the hearing was cumulative and did not amount to a substantial showing of denial of the State or Federal right. The trial court held: Now, the Court finds from this proffer that this would go to Neal's entire competence and could not be extracted for the sole purpose of whether or not he understood his right to testify or whether or not he was, quote, denied the right to testify because he did not have the competence to make that decision. The one point that I think is totally being missed here, that even if the Court admitted this testimony, the opinion of the Supreme Court on Page 11 and the prior filings in this court state that Neal claims that he was denied the right to take the witness stand to testify in his own behalf. And obviously because he would have mitigated the sentence that was ultimately imposed on him by the jury. And the Court finds that had Mr. Neal been allowed to testify to what is now before the court, and that is, that he wanted to go and ask the jury to give him the death penalty, the result would have been no change in results in that the jury did exactly that what Mr. Neal, from the proof before this court, was seeking to want to testify to. This court finds that usually to obtain relief the Movant in a trial such as this, as reiterated on Page 7 of the Supreme Court (sic), is that Neal has the burden to show a reasonable probability that the result of his trial would have been different. And this court finds that from this point on this witness, without any further bases (sic) or any other incidences (sic) that could be utilized to show that he was denied the right to testify to some facts or facet of the case that would have produced a different result, that this is not a matter that would actually be complained of by the Movant. So for this reason the relevancy of the testimony, the fact that it has already been ruled on by the Mississippi State Supreme Court, and the fact that it encompasses Mr. Neal's entire competency throughout the entire trial, all of this again is just a rehashing of the same matters that have been before the Supreme Court and ruled upon by the members of the Supreme Court, and not assigned to this court for hearing. So for all these reasons the testimony of this witness will not be allowed, and the objection to her testimony is sustained. Dr. Kaufman's testimony was being offered to showed that because of Neal's mental retardation, he could not make a knowing, intelligent or voluntary waiver of his right to testify. Again this goes to his overall competence to stand trial and cannot be separated to encompass only the issue before us now. Neal was found competent to stand trial and all the evidence presented was merely cumulative. This issue is res judicata under Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-21(3) (Supp. 1993). Rephrasing direct appeal issues for post-conviction purposes will not defeat the procedural bar of res judicata. Lockett v. State, 614 So.2d 888, 893 (Miss. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1040, 114 S.Ct. 681, 126 L.Ed.2d 649 (1994); Irving v. State, 498 So.2d 305 (Miss. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1042, 107 S.Ct. 1986, 95 L.Ed.2d 826 (1987); Gilliard v. State, 446 So.2d 590 (Miss. 1984). This issue is without merit.