Opinion ID: 1345677
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Scope of the Shield Law

Text: Article I, section 2(b) provides that a newsperson shall not be adjudged in contempt ... for refusing to disclose the source of any information procured while so connected or employed [as a newsperson] ... or for refusing to disclose any unpublished information obtained or prepared in gathering, receiving or processing of information for communication to the public. (Italics added.) [5] (1) Stated more simply, article I, section 2(b) protects a newsperson from being adjudged in contempt for refusing to disclose either: (1) unpublished information, or (2) the source of information, whether published or unpublished. [6] The parties agree there is no attempt to compel the reporters to reveal the identity of a source. Delaney was the source of whatever information the reporters may have as to whether he consented to the police search of his jacket, and his identity is of course already known. [7] Rather, Delaney seeks only the reporters' testimony as to whether he consented to the search. The reporters do not contend they promised to keep confidential any information they obtained or observations they made while preparing their article on the Long Beach Police Department's task force. (2a) The question therefore is whether the shield law's definition of unpublished information includes a newsperson's unpublished, nonconfidential eyewitness observations of an occurrence in a public place. (3) (See fn. 8.) We conclude that it does. [8]
(4) We begin with the fundamental rule that our primary task is to determine the lawmakers' intent. ( Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting Co. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 711, 724 [257 Cal. Rptr. 708, 771 P.2d 406].) In the case of a constitutional provision adopted by the voters, their intent governs. ( Kaiser v. Hopkins (1936) 6 Cal.2d 537, 538 [58 P.2d 1278]; Armstrong v. County of San Mateo (1983) 146 Cal. App.3d 597, 618 [194 Cal. Rptr. 294].) To determine intent, `The court turns first to the words themselves for the answer.' ( Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting Co., supra, 48 Cal.3d 711, 724, quoting Moyer v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 222, 230 [110 Cal. Rptr. 144, 514 P.2d 1224].) If the language is clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, nor is it necessary to resort to indicia of the intent of the Legislature (in the case of a statute) or of the voters (in the case of a provision adopted by the voters). ( Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735 [248 Cal. Rptr. 115, 755 P.2d 299].) (2b) The language of article I, section 2(b) is clear and unambiguous as to the question presented in this case. The section states plainly that a newsperson shall not be adjudged in contempt for refusing to disclose any unpublished information. (Italics added.) The parties seeking discovery in this case (Delaney and the prosecutor) contend article I, section 2(b) applies only to unpublished information obtained in confidence by a newsperson. Such a construction might be possible if the voters had used the phrase unpublished information without the modifier any. They did not do so. The use of the word any makes clear that article I, section 2(b) applies to all information, regardless of whether it was obtained in confidence. (5) Words used in a constitutional provision should be given the meaning they bear in ordinary use. ( Lungren v. Deukmejian, supra, 45 Cal.3d 727, 735; Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 245 [149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 583 P.2d 1281].) (2c) In the context of article I, section 2(b), the word any means without limit and no matter what kind. (Webster's New World Dict. (2d college ed. 1982) p. 62.) To restrict the scope of article I, section 2(b) to confidential information would be to read the word any out of the section. We decline to do so. (6) Significance should be given, if possible, to every word of an act. ( Mercer v. Perez (1968) 68 Cal.2d 104, 112 [65 Cal. Rptr. 315, 436 P.2d 315].) Conversely, a construction that renders a word surplusage should be avoided. ( City and County of San Francisco v. Farrell (1982) 32 Cal.3d 47, 54 [184 Cal. Rptr. 713, 648 P.2d 935]; California Mfrs. Assn. v. Public Utilities Com. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 836, 844 [157 Cal. Rptr. 676, 598 P.2d 836].) [9] (2d) We need not rely solely on the voters' use of the word any. Article I, section 2(b) further states: As used in this subdivision, `unpublished information' includes information not disseminated to the public by the person from whom disclosure is sought, whether or not related information has been disseminated and includes, but is not limited to, all notes, outtakes, photographs, tapes or other data of whatever sort not itself disseminated to the public through a medium of communication, whether or not published information based upon or related to such material has been disseminated. Nowhere in this broad definition is there an explicit or implied restriction of article I, section 2(b) to confidential information. (7) To so limit the section, we would have to insert into it the word confidential and thus violate the cardinal rule that The constitution is to be interpreted by the language in which it is written, and courts are no more at liberty to add provisions to what is therein declared in definite language than they are to disregard any of its express provisions. ( People v. Campbell (1902) 138 Cal. 11, 15 [70 P. 918]; Ross v. City of Long Beach (1944) 24 Cal.2d 258, 260 [148 P.2d 649].) Delaney contends a reporter's percipient observations of a nonconfidential occurrence are not information within the meaning of shield law. This attempted distinction between observations and information is unpersuasive. Under Delaney's strained interpretation, a reporter or any other eyewitness to an automobile accident would have no information as to the accident. This flies in the face of reason and plain English. (8) Information includes reception of knowledge and knowledge obtained from reading, observation, or instruction. (Webster's New Internat. Dict. (2d ed. 1958) p. 1276, italics added.) When a reporter or other person is called on to testify as to his observations of an event, he is being asked to disclose information. Moreover, if the distinction between observations and information were logical, the result would be that even a newsperson's confidential observations would not be protected. That result would be contrary to the manifest purpose and language of article I, section 2(b). (2e) In short, the plain language of article I, section 2(b) leads to only one tenable conclusion. We hold that the shield law's definition of unpublished information is not restricted to information obtained in confidence by a newsperson.
The reporters rely on the legislative history of section 1070 to support their view. Delaney and the prosecutor disagree with the reporters' interpretation of that history. It is, however, beside the point for two reasons. First, as we have explained, article I, section 2(b) and section 1070 are virtually identical. In light of our determination that the language of article I, section 2(b) is unambiguous, simple logic compels the same conclusion as to the statute. Thus, we need not go beyond the words of the statute to extrinsic aids such as legislative history. ( Lungren v. Deukmejian, supra, 45 Cal.3d 727, 735.) To do so would violate the principle that, When statutory language is thus clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, and courts should not indulge in it.  ( Solberg v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 182, 198 [137 Cal. Rptr. 460, 561 P.2d 1148], italics added.) This rule is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence. ( Sturges v. Crowninshield (1819) 17 U.S. 122, 202 [4 L.Ed. 529, 550].) [10] (9) (See fn. 11.) Second, in light of the voters' incorporation of the statutory language into the California Constitution, we need construe only article I, section 2(b). [11] The legislative history of section 1070 would be relevant only if it shed some light on the meaning of its constitutional counterpart, article I, section 2(b). The history, however, is of no help in that regard. Article I, section 2(b) is plain on its face, and we need not  indeed, should not  search for external indicia of the voters' intent. ( Lungren v. Deukmejian, supra, 45 Cal.3d 727, 735.) Moreover, the legislative history of section 1070 could, as a matter of logic, reflect only the Legislature's intent. (10, 11) (See fn. 12.) That history would not provide us with any guidance as to the voters' subsequent intent because none of the indicia of the Legislature's possible intent (committee analysis and digest and letters from the statute's author) were before the voters. ( People v. Castro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 301, 311-312 [211 Cal. Rptr. 719, 696 P.2d 111]; Lungren v. Deukmejian, supra, 45 Cal.3d 727, 742.) [12] Delaney also relies on the ballot argument in favor of Proposition 5 in 1980, the measure that created article I, section 2(b). (12) Ballot arguments are accepted sources from which to ascertain the voters' intent. ( In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 888, fn. 8 [210 Cal. Rptr. 631, 694 P.2d 744]; White v. Davis (1975) 13 Cal.3d 757, 775, fn. 11 [120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 533 P.2d 222].) As with the legislative history of section 1070, however, we need not look beyond the language of the enactment (article I, section 2(b)) when its language is unambiguous. ( Lungren v. Deukmejian, supra, 45 Cal.3d 727, 735.) The ballot argument (unlike the legislative history) is, however, at least relevant to determining the voters' intent. (2f) We therefore consider the ballot argument (set forth in full in the margin) to determine if it demonstrates the voters did not mean what they said. [13] The repeated references in the argument to confidentiality and the like permit the inference the proponents of the measure intended to protect only confidential information. The same inference may be drawn from the Legislative Analyst's statement. [14] The inference, however, is far from compelling. The ballot materials emphasized the need for confidentiality but did not state that only confidential matters would be protected. The most reasonable inference is that the proponents chose to emphasize (in the limited space available for ballot arguments) what they perceived as the greatest need. We cannot conclude that, by emphasizing one purpose, perhaps the primary purpose of the measure, the argument misled voters into thinking confidentiality was the only purpose, especially when the measure itself made clear that all unpublished information would be protected. Moreover, a possible inference based on the ballot argument is an insufficient basis on which to ignore the unrestricted and unambiguous language of the measure itself. It would be a strained approach to constitutional analysis if we were to give more weight to a possible inference in an extrinsic source (a ballot argument) than to a clear statement in the Constitution itself. We decline to do so. [15]
Although the relevant amendment to section 1070 was enacted in 1974 and article I, section 2(b) was adopted in 1980, this court has never determined the substantive scope of either provision. [16] The Courts of Appeal, however, have often done so. Initially, the clear majority view in published decisions was that the shield law applies equally to non confidential as well as confidential information. ( Hammarley v. Superior Court, supra, 89 Cal. App.3d 388, 395-398; Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 154 Cal. App.3d 14, 20-22; Hallissy v. Superior Court, supra, 200 Cal. App.3d 1038.) Only one court had restricted the shield law's application to confidential information. ( CBS, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 85 Cal. App.3d 241, 250.) More recently, however, the conflict began to sharpen. In an opinion certified for publication, the Court of Appeal in this case held the shield law applies only to confidential information. Only two weeks earlier, however, a different division of the same district reached a contrary conclusion in an opinion also certified for publication, holding that the shield law protects against the compelled disclosure of any unpublished information, regardless of whether it is confidential. ( New York Times Co. v. Superior Court (1988) 215 Cal. App.3d 672 [248 Cal. Rptr. 426], review granted Oct. 27, 1988 (S006709).) We granted review in both cases to resolve the growing conflict. A third Court of Appeal panel thereafter certified for publication an opinion noting the conflict and agreeing with the Court of Appeal decision in this case, holding that a reporter's eyewitness observations of a public event are not protected by the shield law. ( Liggett v. Superior Court (1989) 211 Cal. App.3d 1461 [260 Cal. Rptr. 161], review granted Oct. 12, 1989 (S011581).) In light of the conflict that has emerged, the Court of Appeal decisions provide little clear guidance for our decision, and little would be gained by our reviewing them in detail. We note, however, two general themes that appear in the conflict. As we have done in this case, the courts that have applied the shield law to all information have relied on the explicit language of the shield law. ( Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 154 Cal. App.3d 14, 20-22; Hammarley v. Superior Court, supra, 89 Cal. App.3d 388, 395-398.) By contrast, the courts that have restricted the shield law to confidential information have paid insufficient attention to the shield law's language. For example, in CBS, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 85 Cal. App.3d 241, 250, the court seemed to conclude that no purpose would be served by protecting nonconfidential information. The court did not explain how it found in the shield law a purpose to protect only confidential information. In this case and in Liggett v. Superior Court, supra, 211 Cal. App.3d 1461, review granted October 12, 1989 (S011581), the courts relied extensively on the legislative history of section 1070 and the ballot argument for article I, section 2(b). As we have already explained ( ante, pp. 800-803), there is no need to resort to extrinsic aids when a provision is unambiguous and, in any event, the ballot argument and legislative history in this case are too equivocal to overcome the clear definition of unpublished information in article I, section 2(b)'s language. We disapprove of those Court of Appeal decisions that hold or suggest the shield law protects only confidential information.
The parties correctly approach this case as being one of application of a specific constitutional provision. Implicit in their respective arguments, however, are conflicting notions as to appropriate public policy in protecting a newsperson's unpublished information. We need not consider this issue. As we have explained, article I, section 2(b) contains an unambiguous definition of unpublished information. (13) It is bedrock law that if the law-maker gives us an express definition, we must take it as we find it.... ( Bird v. Dennison (1857) 7 Cal. 297, 307.) (14) [C]ourts, in construing the constitution, are bound to suppose that any inconveniences involved in the application of its provisions, according to their plain terms and import, were considered in its formation, and voluntarily accepted as less intolerable than those which are thereby avoided, or as fully compensated by countervailing advantages. ( People v. Pendegast (1892) 96 Cal. 289, 294 [31 P. 103]; Sturges v. Crowninshield, supra, 17 U.S. 122, 202 [4 L.Ed. 529, 550].) Our proper function is not to judge the wisdom of article I, section 2(b) or the way in which it is written.
(2g) We hold that article I, section 2(b) is not contingent on a showing that a newsperson's unpublished information was obtained in confidence. Article I, section 2(b)'s definition of unpublished information includes a newsperson's nonconfidential, eyewitness observations of an occurrence in a public place. [17]