Opinion ID: 844235
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Instructional and Constitutional Challenges to California's Death Penalty Law

Text: Defendant contends various features of California's death penalty statute and related standard jury instructions violate the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal Constitution, parallel provisions of the state Constitution, and prevailing international law. We have rejected each of those challenges in the past. (See People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 208-209 [112 Cal.Rptr.3d 746, 235 P.3d 62]; People v. Schmeck (2005) 37 Cal.4th 240, 303-304 [33 Cal.Rptr.3d 397, 118 P.3d 451].) We reaffirm our prior holdings. The statutory special circumstances that qualify a defendant for the death penalty (§ 190.2) are not unconstitutionally overbroad. ( People v. Verdugo (2010) 50 Cal.4th 263, 304 [113 Cal.Rptr.3d 803, 236 P.3d 1035]; People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, 365 [33 Cal.Rptr.3d 509, 118 P.3d 545].) California homicide law and the special circumstances listed in section 190.2 adequately narrow the class of murderers eligible for the death penalty. ( People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 406 [106 Cal.Rptr.3d 771, 227 P.3d 342]; People v. Barnwell (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1038, 1058 [63 Cal.Rptr.3d 82, 162 P.3d 596].) Factor (a) of section 190.3, which permits the jury to consider [t]he circumstances of the crime in deciding whether to impose the death penalty, does not license the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty. ( People v. Brady (2010) 50 Cal.4th 547, 589 [113 Cal.Rptr.3d 458, 236 P.3d 312]; People v. Cook (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1334, 1366 [58 Cal.Rptr.3d 340, 157 P.3d 950]; see also Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 974-980 [129 L.Ed.2d 750, 114 S.Ct. 2630].) The instruction that tells a jury to consider whether or not (§ 190.3) certain mitigating factors were present does not impermissibly invite the jury to aggravate on the basis of nonexistent or irrational aggravating factors. ( People v. Morrison (2004) 34 Cal.4th 698, 730 [21 Cal.Rptr.3d 682, 101 P.3d 568].) The use in the sentencing factors of such restrictive adjectives as extreme and substantial in section 190.3, factors (d) and (g), does not act as an unconstitutional barrier to the consideration of relevant mitigation evidence. ( People v. Schmeck, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 305.) Neither unanimity nor proof beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally required for the jury's findings on the aggravating factors in this case. ( People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 566 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 802, 58 P.3d 931].) The reasonable doubt standard does not apply to the jury's determination that death is the appropriate penalty, and the jury should not have been instructed as to the burden or standard of proof in selecting the penalty to be imposed. ( People v. Stanley (2006) 39 Cal.4th 913, 964 [47 Cal.Rptr.3d 420, 140 P.3d 736].) `Nothing in Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270 [166 L.Ed.2d 856, 127 S.Ct. 856], Apprendi v. New Jersey [(2000)] 530 U.S. 466 [147 L.Ed.2d 435, 120 S.Ct. 2348], or Ring v. Arizona [(2002)] 536 U.S. 584 [153 L.Ed.2d 556, 122 S.Ct. 2428], affects our conclusions in these regards.' ( People v. Curl (2009) 46 Cal.4th 339, 362 [93 Cal.Rptr.3d 537, 207 P.3d 2]; see also People v. Thomas (2011) 51 Cal.4th 449, 506 [121 Cal.Rptr.3d 521, 247 P.3d 886].) The federal Constitution does not impose on the prosecution a burden of proof as to penalty, and the state need not prove beyond a reasonable doubt whether aggravating circumstances exist, that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, or that death is the appropriate penalty. ( People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 533 [75 Cal.Rptr.3d 588, 181 P.3d 947].) The federal Constitution does not require that the jury be unanimous as to which aggravating factors apply. ( People v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 628 [94 Cal.Rptr.3d 322, 208 P.3d 78].) The instructions were not defective in failing to require that the jury provide express findings regarding the presence of aggravating factors. ( People v. Bunyard (2009) 45 Cal.4th 836, 861 [89 Cal.Rptr.3d 264, 200 P.3d 879].) Nothing in Apprendi v. New Jersey, supra, 530 U.S. 466, or its progeny, requires a different result. ( People v. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 534.) Our state death penalty statute is not unconstitutional for failing to require intercase proportionality review or disparate sentence review. ( People v. Verdugo, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 305; People v. Cox (2003) 30 Cal.4th 916, 970 [135 Cal.Rptr.2d 272, 70 P.3d 277]; see also Pulley v. Harris (1984) 465 U.S. 37, 50-51 [79 L.Ed.2d 29, 104 S.Ct. 871]; Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 560-561 [161 L.Ed.2d 1, 125 S.Ct. 1183].) Defendant's sentence does not violate international law. ( People v. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 539.) Our death penalty law does not deprive capital defendants of equal protection by denying procedural safeguards to capital defendants that are afforded to noncapital defendants. ( People v. Hinton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 839, 913 [38 Cal.Rptr.3d 149, 126 P.3d 981].) Finally, we reject defendant's claim that, when viewed as a whole, our sentencing scheme fails to provide a meaningful or reliable basis for selecting the relatively few offenders subjected to capital punishment. Having concluded that none of defendant's challenges to our state's capital sentencing scheme have merit, we reject this general claim as well.