Opinion ID: 2333029
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Testimony of Strong

Text: Neal contends that the trial judge committed prejudicial error by admitting the testimony of Strong. He raises three issues related to this claim which we will address separately. Neal maintains that the misconduct of the Commonwealth violated his constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial. According to Neal, the misconduct occurred when the Commonwealth blocked the access of his defense counsel to Strong until after it had concluded its own private interview with him. This issue is completely without merit. Strong had the right to speak with any party he desired. The Commonwealth did not improperly exclude defense counsel from its interview with Strong. Yates v. Commonwealth, Ky., 958 S.W.2d 306 (1997), provides that the prosecution must supply the defense with a copy of any witness statement, but it also contemplates that defense counsel has the choice of conducting his own separate interview of the witness. There is nothing in Yates indicating that defense counsel has a right to be present during the interview of a witness by the prosecution. Taylor v. Commonwealth, Ky., 545 S.W.2d 76 (1976), does not state that one of the duties of defense counsel is to be present at any of the interviews with potential witnesses by the prosecution. Accord United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 93 S.Ct. 2568, 37 L.Ed.2d 619 (1973). Next, Neal claims that Strong should not have been permitted to testify to his (Neal's) suppressed statement. Before testifying, Strong was admonished by the trial judge not to mention the statement made by Neal to the police because it had been suppressed. During cross-examination by defense counsel, Strong made several references which indicated that Neal had given the police information and had blamed him. On re-direct, the Commonwealth was permitted to ask Strong if there was another important reason why he made his statement to the police. Strong indicated that the reason he made the statement was because Neal had given the police information. He confirmed that Neal blamed him before he made his own statement. The trial judge did not err in permitting this testimony because defense counsel opened the door to this line of questioning. In any event, the error, if any, was certainly harmless. RCr 9.24. The testimony Neal now complains of was first elicited during cross-examination by his defense counsel and was cumulative. Neal also complains that Strong should not have been permitted to testify concerning his own suppression hearing. He asserts that this information along with the references made by Strong concerning why he made a statement, would allow the jury to conclude that he (Neal) made an incriminating statement that was thrown out on a legal technicality. This issue is purely speculative and completely without merit. Under all the circumstances, the trial judge did not commit error in allowing the testimony of Strong.