Opinion ID: 1128253
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: State Constitutional Provisions Regarding the Judicial Branch of Government

Text: Petitioners next argue that the provisions of A.R.S. § 45-251 to 45-260 are invalid under article 4, part 2, § 19 of the Arizona Constitution. This provision prohibits the legislature from enacting local or special laws which change rules of evidence, regulate the practice of the judicial system, limit civil actions, or grant special or exclusive privileges. The argument is premised on the fact that A.R.S. § 45-254 requires all water rights claimants to make a statement of their claim and bars all claims not in compliance with the statute. See A.R.S. § 45-254(A), (E). Petitioners contend that federal Winters rights claimants do not have access to some of the information required by the statute. A.R.S. § 45-254(C). Since it is not possible for them to comply with the statute, they urge that the statute is a special law which permits the filing of claims based on state law but not those based on rights granted by federal law. If petitioners' contention were correct, the statute would, of course, be invalid under federal law as well as state law. However, their contention is not correct. We must interpret the statute with common sense and, if possible, in a manner consistent with constitutional principle. Since federal law is supreme, it follows that claims based on rights granted by federal law, including the Winters doctrine, will be sufficient under the statute even though the information provided does not include that required to support claims based on state law. Also, see A.R.S. § 45-254(C), requiring only such information as is appropriate. Petitioners claim that the statutes violate article 6, § 5 of the Arizona Constitution by expanding the original jurisdiction of this court. We do not read the statute in that manner. Under A.R.S. § 45-252, the proceedings are filed in superior court. Under the same statute, this court assigns those adjudication proceedings to a judge of the superior court. The superior court has original jurisdiction. Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 14. In our view, the fact that the statute requires us to make the assignment does not give us original jurisdiction of the case. We sit as a reviewing court in the exercise of our appellate jurisdiction. Id. art. 6, § 5(3). Nor do we believe that the provisions of the statute which pertain to the appointment of the master (A.R.S. § 45-255), the application of the rules of evidence (A.R.S. § 45-259), and the effect of prior judgments (A.R.S. § 45-257(B)(1)) infringe upon the powers of this court as conferred by article 6, § 5(5), which gives this court the power to make procedural rules. The grant of that power, including the power to make rules of evidence, does not prevent the legislature from enacting supplementary provisions. See State ex rel. Collins v. Deason, 142 Ariz. 587, 691 P.2d 678 (1984). Nor do we agree that these provisions of the statute violate article 3 of our constitution, pertaining to distribution of power. We held in DeCamp v. Central Arizona Light & Power Co., 47 Ariz. 517, 57 P.2d 311 (1936), that article 3 was violated at a point where legislative enactments unreasonably limit or hamper the judicial system in performing its duties. Id. at 521, 57 P.2d at 313. We do not believe that the statutes in question reach that point. To the contrary, they make available to this court the resources and procedures which enable the judicial system to cope with the considerable task assigned to it. Without these resources, we would be faced with the necessity of closing the courthouse to other judicial business in order to handle the water adjudication. 3. Due Process and the Arizona Procedure Petitioners claim that the role which the statutes give the Arizona Department of Water Resources (DWR) violates the procedural due process guarantees of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution and article 2, § 4 of Arizona's constitution. Petitioners argue that the DWR is an institutional adversary of Indian reserved rights and that by conferring adjudicatory power upon DWR and its director, the legislature created an inevitable conflict of interest which will violate fundamental fairness and thus transgress the constitutional due process guarantee. The argument misconceives the functions of DWR and the nature of its involvement under the statutory scheme. Under the General Adjudication of Water Rights Act (A.R.S. §§ 45-251 to 45-260) enacted in 1979, the State Land Department has been eliminated from the adjudicatory process. Its sole involvement with the adjudicatory proceedings is that of a claimant to water rights on behalf of the state. The DWR, on the other hand, is not involved as a claimant and may not file petitions for adjudication. The separation of roles has been thorough. For instance, the attorney general of the state of Arizona represents the state with respect to claims asserted on the state's behalf, A.R.S. § 45-252(B), but the director of DWR is represented by separate legal counsel, independent from the state or its agencies. Id. With this in mind, we turn now to the functions which DWR is assigned. Once a petition for adjudication is filed, DWR is required to assist the court in several different manners. First, it helps in determining the scope of the adjudication by making a recommendation with regard to the portions of the river system subject to the adjudication. A.R.S. § 45-253(A)(2). It helps develop the form to be used for the statement of claim. Id. It serves process on all potential claimants. Id. The act provides that if a master is appointed, this court may select that master from a list of persons submitted by the director of DWR. A.R.S. § 45-255(A). While DWR is required to make such recommendations, it is this court which selects the master. Id. Nor is this court limited to the director's recommendations; the statute does not require that the appointment be made from the names so recommended. Id. The director's final and most important task with respect to the adjudication proceedings involves technical assistance, as specified in A.R.S. § 45-256. The statute requires the court or master to request technical assistance from the director on subjects with respect to which the director possesses hydrological or other expertise. Id., subsection (A). When such aid has been requested, the director is required to identify hydrological boundaries and potential claimants, locate and obtain records, conduct a general investigation or examination of the river system and source, investigate and examine facts pertaining to claims, prepare maps and plats, gather such other information as may be necessary or desirable, and report to the court or master. Id., subsections (A), (B). The report required by A.R.S. § 45-256(B) is described as follows: The technical assistance rendered by the director shall be set forth in summary form on a claim by claim basis in a report prepared by the director and filed with the court or the master, which shall then be available for inspection by any claimant. Any claimant may file with the court or the master written objections to the report or any part of the report.... Those parts of the report with respect to which no written objections have been timely filed may be summarily admitted into evidence. Those parts of the report with respect to which written objections have been timely filed shall not be admitted into evidence until such time as each claimant who has filed written objections ... shall have had a fair and reasonable opportunity to contest the validity or admissibility of those parts of the report to which his objections were directed. Each claimant who has filed written objections ... shall also have a fair and reasonable opportunity to present evidence in support of or in opposition to those parts of the report to which his objections were directed, to present evidence in support of his claim and to make objections to any other claim. Even if we were to assume that DWR, as a state agency, is so related to the state and other state agencies that it could not fairly serve in an adjudicatory role, we do not believe that the duties conferred upon the department by the new statute transgress the due process guarantee. Petitioners assume that the director will be recommending a decree to the court and that the making of such a recommendation is tantamount to participation in the adjudicatory proceedings. We do not read the statute so broadly. It does not require the director to make such a recommendation, nor, in our view, is such action by the director appropriate. We agree with the respondents that there is nothing in the statutory language that would permit or allow the department to make a report recommending a particular decree or to rank or quantify the competing claims. Ranking of claims and quantification of rights require considerable legal expertise and will be the function of the master, as to recommendations, and of the trial court, as to the final decree. The director's duties are confined to factual analysis and administrative aid. We acknowledge, of course, that the examination of facts, the making of factual findings, and the resolution of factual disputes are all part of the adjudicatory process. If DWR were vested with such responsibility or authority, it might fairly be said that DWR was a participant in the adjudicatory process. Again, however, we do not read the statute so broadly. Under the statutory plan, DWR's report will be made after an investigation of facts and will contain factual analysis and, no doubt, factual determinations. The key point, however, is that such determinations have neither validity nor presumed validity if objected to. A.R.S. § 45-256(B) provides that the portions of the report to which no objection has been made may be summarily admitted into evidence. However, the statute also provides that the portions of the report to which objection has been made shall not be admitted in evidence until the objectors shall have had a fair and reasonable opportunity to contest the validity or admissibility of those parts of the report to which [the] objections were directed. Thus, the statute contemplates that the objections to contested portions of the report shall be heard and that each objector may present evidence to support his objections to every other claim and to support or reinforce his own claim. See A.R.S. § 45-256. That evidence, we believe, is to be presented in hearings before the master. A.R.S. § 45-257 provides as follows: A. The master shall: 1...., conduct such hearings and take such testimony as shall be necessary to determine the relative water rights of each claimant. 2. Prepare and file with the court a report in accordance with rule 53(g) of the Arizona rules of civil procedure, which shall contain findings of fact and conclusions of law. Subsection B of the same statute charges the court with making the final determination of the relative rights of all claimants. In our view, therefore, DWR is to decide no contested fact or issue of law, nor any legal issue of any kind. This authority is conferred instead upon the master. The power to review the master's findings and conclusions and to make the final determination of the extent and priority date of and [to] adjudicate any interest in or right to use the water of the river system is vested in the court. A.R.S. § 45-257(B). We are aware that due process requires that a party be given a fair trial in a fair tribunal. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S.Ct. 623, 625, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955). ... Murchison has not been understood to stand for the broad rule that the members of an administrative agency may not investigate the facts, institute proceedings, and then make the necessary adjudications.... The accepted rule is to the contrary. [citing cases] Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 53-54, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 1467-68, 43 L.Ed.2d 712 (1975). We believe the Arizona procedure is well within the limits permitted by Murchison, supra, and Larkin, supra . The administrative agency, even if it is adverse to or institutionally biased against petitioners, is not an adjudicator of fact or law. It is an investigator, a provider of expert and administrative assistance, and an identifier of issues. All of these roles fall far short of participation in the actual adjudicatory process  the resolution of contested issues of fact or law. We find no violation of due process. Finally, petitioners argue that the Arizona adjudicatory procedure violates due process because it contains no provision which would permit the director, DWR, the master, or the judge to consider the federal legal basis and origin of the Indian water claims. We reject this argument. The statute may not specifically direct our courts to consider federal law in determining Indian claims, but federal law does require that this be done. See ante at 670. We find no due process violation in the legislature's failure to direct our courts specifically to consider federal law in areas where federal law is supreme. It is for the courts to determine where federal law is supreme and to apply it, regardless of directions from the state legislature.