Opinion ID: 2637353
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alaska Wage and Hour Act. [48]

Text: In addition to her other claims, Lindfors also asserted a claim for overtime pay under the Alaska Wage and Hour Act (AWHA). The jury rejected this claim. Lindfors argues on cross-appeal that the superior court erred by allowing the jury to decide if she was a professional exempt from overtime pay under the AWHA. Lindfors in effect claims that the court should have granted her motion for a directed verdict on this issue. The superior court concluded that a reasonable jury could find that Lindfors was an exempt professional because as a commercial airline pilot, she had participated in hundreds of hours of training in mathematics, aerodynamics, weather, and navigation and was entrusted with the lives of commercial passengers. The AWHA requires an employer to pay overtime compensation unless it proves that the employee is employed in a bona fide ... professional capacity. [49] The employer's classification of the employee is not dispositive. [50] Rather, an employee is an exempt professional if four factors are met: 1) the employee's primary duty is to perform work requiring knowledge of an advanced type; 2) the work requires consistent exercise of discretion; 3) the work is predominantly intellectual and varied; and 4) the work is compensated on a fee basis. [51] Lindfors argues that the superior court should have held as a matter of law that she was not an exempt professional because Era did not demonstrate that there were material facts in dispute. She relies on this court's ruling in Dayhoff v. Temsco Helicopters, Inc . that a helicopter pilot was not an exempt professional under the AWHA. [52] But our decision in Dayhoff was limited to the specific facts of that case. Dayhoff was primarily self-educated: He obtained his commercial helicopter license through self-study and obtained his flight instructor certificate following only ten hours of formal instruction. [53] Moreover, he did not exercise the type of discretion that would characterize him as a professional: He claimed he spent sixty-two percent of his time on non-aviation duties, and had no authority over flight assignments and routes. [54] In contrast, Era presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Lindfors was an exempt professional. Lindfors did not assert that she spent time on non-aviation duties. Moreover, Era's pilots were far more extensively trained than the helicopter pilot in Dayhoff. Dale Ferguson, Era's director of training for the fixed-wing division, testified that a commercial pilot's certificate required a private pilot's license and up to 250 hours of additional flying time. For Twin Otter pilots, Era further required a multi-engine rating, an instrument rating, three to four days of ground school, and up to seven hours of flight training. To fly the Convair, pilots needed up to 1,200 hours of flying time on the Twin Otter, an additional eighty hours of ground school training and twenty hours of flight training. There was evidence that both pilots and co-pilots exercised considerable discretion. And Lindfors and other Era pilots testified that they viewed themselves as professionals. In American Restaurant Group v. Clark, we made clear that the question of the nature of the activities performed for purposes of determining if an employee is a professional under the AWHA should be decided by the trier of fact. [55] Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Era, reasonable jurors could differ on the issue of whether Lindfors was a professional employee. The court thus did not err in denying Lindfors's motion for a directed verdict and allowing the issue of overtime pay to go to the jury.
Lindfors also argues on cross-appeal that she should have been awarded enhanced attorney's fees under the lodestar method because discrimination cases are often taken on a contingency fee basis and have limited financial benefits. [57] She argues that a contingent risk multiplier is necessary to ensure that competent counsel are available to take such cases. The superior court denied Lindfors's motion for enhanced or lodestar attorney's fees, reasoning that there was no basis for departing from the Alaska Civil Rule 82 schedule for attorney's fees because the litigation was not unreasonably complex or lengthy given the size of the award; a substantial portion of the plaintiff's efforts were directed towards claims on which she did not prevail; and the defendant did not engage in vexatious conduct. We agree with the superior court. Rule 82 provides an adequate mechanism for the court to grant enhanced fee awards in appropriate cases. [58] This court has affirmed lodestar or risk-enhanced fees only in exceptional circumstances, when there was a strong public interest involved, or the attorneys stood to receive no compensation other than the fees granted by the court. [59] Lindfors argues that sex discrimination cases are like class action, worker's compensation, and public interest cases, and that the superior court as a policy matter should have awarded enhanced fees. But Lindfors does not establish the factors this court has found compelling in prior cases: that she is a public interest plaintiff; [60] that her attorneys stand to receive no compensation beyond the fees awarded by the court; [61] or that her case is of the type that would make it difficult to attract capable counsel without the potential of enhanced fees. [62] Instead, she argues that a multiplier should be applied simply because of the risk involved in contingent fee cases. [63] We agree that [c]ivil rights cases, including those where only money damages are sought, may have a public value which cannot be measured economically. [64] But contingency fee cases do not involve the same risk of discouraging capable counsel presented by cases in which we have endorsed risk enhancement. An attorney operating on a contingencyfee basis pools the risks presented by his various cases: cases that turn out to be successful pay for the time he gambled on those that did not. [65] Moreover, in this case, the contingency fee arrangement does not threaten to deprive Lindfors of the compensation to which she is entitled, because the bulk of her award is in the form of punitive damages. Punitive damages are not intended to compensate the victim, but to punish the defendant; thus they are, from the plaintiff's standpoint, a windfall. [66]
The jury's verdict that Era is liable for discrimination and retaliation is AFFIRMED. The superior court's decisions to allow the issue of overtime pay to go to the jury and to deny enhanced attorney's fees are also AFFIRMED. Because the punitive damages award is excessive, we order a remittitur to $500,000. If Lindfors does not accept this award, a new trial shall be held on the issue of punitive damages. FABE and CARPENETI, Justices, not participating.