Opinion ID: 405927
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Heading: The effect of the prior Florida divorce

Text: 18 During the pendency of Verone's California suit for legal separation, and before any judgment was entered, Fred obtained in Florida a presumptively valid divorce. 7 Subsequently the California court entered a judgment of legal separation and entered the two monetary judgments concerning spousal support and property rights sought to be enforced here. Fred contends that, despite the fact that the Florida decree did not purport to adjudicate support and property rights, the Florida decree had the effect under California law of depriving the California court of further jurisdiction over Verone's legal separation action. We assume arguendo that the prior Florida decree is a matter for collateral attack 8 and find that the Florida divorce did not affect the power or jurisdiction of the California court over the judgments enforced here. 19 In California prior dissolution of the marriage is ... a complete defense to ... an action (for legal separation). DeYoung v. DeYoung, 27 Cal.2d 521, 527, 165 P.2d 457, 460 (1946) (Schauer, J., concurring); Hudson v. Hudson, 52 Cal.2d 735, 344 P.2d 295, 299-300 (1959); Patterson v. Patterson, 82 Cal.App.2d 838, 187 P.2d 113, 115 (1947). This requirement of a marriage is a jurisdictional prerequisite. Colbert v. Colbert, 28 Cal.2d 276, 169 P.2d 633, 635 (1946); Knox v. Knox, 88 Cal.App.2d 666, 199 P.2d 766, 773 (1948). Fred argues, therefore, that the California court was without subject matter jurisdiction to enter any of its judgments. 20 This argument reasons too broadly. The rationale for the rule that marriage is a prerequisite to such actions is that a prior divorce moots the prayer for legal separation or divorce. Hudson, 344 P.2d at 299 (divorce). This does not mean, however, that the prayers for relief concerning the financial matters incident to marriage are mooted. Under the concept of divisible divorce a prior divorce does not automatically adjudicate property and support rights. See Comment, Post-Dissolution Suits to Divide Community Property: A Proposal for Legislative Action, 10 Pac.L.J. 825, 827 (1979). Thus, in Hudson, supra, where the husband obtained a Nevada divorce during the pendency of the wife's California divorce action, the California Supreme Court held that, although the wife's prayer for divorce was mooted, her prayer for permanent alimony remains to be adjudicated. 344 P.2d at 299. Likewise, in Leff v. Leff, 25 Cal.App.3d 630, 634, 102 Cal.Rptr. 195, 204 (1972), the court held that an intervening Nevada divorce did not affect Wife's right to secure alimony or to share in the alleged California community property.... (T)hese issues were subject to litigation and adjudication in the California proceeding; and they were raised by the pleadings. There is no rationale or authority for distinguishing these cases on the ground that the California action we are concerned with was one for legal separation instead of divorce. In both types of actions the marital res is at issue as well as property and support rights. Prior adjudication elsewhere of the marital res does not affect the financial matters. 21 Fred next contends that although Verone's prayer for determination of her property rights might have survived the Florida divorce, it did so only as an action in equity and not as a statutory action under the Family Law Act, Cal. Civil Code § 4000 et seq., because a prayer for legal separation or divorce is a statutory prerequisite to a determination of property rights under the Act, see id. at § 4800. The distinction between an equitable and a statutory action is significant because the court's nonstatutory powers of property division are apparently more constrained. See Buller v. Buller, 62 Cal.App.2d 687, 145 P.2d 649 (1949) (no power in nonstatutory action to award an offset; division in kind is mandatory). 9 22 The argument that a statutory action for determination of property rights depends on the pendency of a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or legal separation was squarely rejected in In re Marriage of Lusk, 86 Cal.App.3d 228, 234, 150 Cal.Rptr. 63, 67 (1978). There the trial court dissolved the party's marriage and entered a judgment reserving jurisdiction over all other matters (custody, support, property division, attorney's fees). The wife challenged this bifurcation of issues on the ground that it would deprive the court of statutory jurisdiction. Although the court might have relied solely on the specific authorizations under the California Family Law Act and its rules to reserve jurisdiction over these ancillary matters, Cal.Civil Code § 4801(a); Cal. Family Law Rules 1287, it reasoned broadly: 23 (W)ife contends that adjudication of the dissolution of the marriage would leave the trial court without jurisdiction to make a subsequent order for her support under (the Family Law Act) or ex parte protective orders (under the Act) in respect to the disposition or alienation of property or restraining husband from molesting or disturbing her or the minor children.... The argument is that the language of those code sections indicate that such orders may be made only during the pendency of a proceeding for dissolution of marriage and that once the marriage is dissolved, no proceeding will any longer be pending for dissolution of the marriage. We are not so persuaded. 24 In the first place, ... (i)f the court expressly reserved jurisdiction over such matters, its jurisdiction would not be exhausted.... Secondly, if an action is commenced as one for dissolution of the marriage and involves issues of custody, support, property division and attorney fees, the fact that the marriage is dissolved does not necessarily require the conclusion that the action is no longer being prosecuted under (the Act). It would be entirely reasonable to conclude that the action continues to be prosecuted pursuant to (the Act). 25 150 Cal.Rptr. at 67. We see no persuasive grounds for not applying this reasoning here. That it might be viewed as dictum is irrelevant, for, where we are bound by state law, considered dictum is to be followed as well as a precise holding. Mooney Aircraft Inc. v. Donnelly, 402 F.2d 400, 405 (5th Cir. 1968). Also the fact that in Lusk the prior divorce was rendered by the same court in which the property and support issues were pending does not distinguish the case from this case where the prior divorce was a foreign one. In each case the argument advanced is identical, that once the marital res is adjudicated there is no longer statutory jurisdiction under the Family Law Act. 26 We therefore must conclude that the law in California is that if a marriage exists when an action is commenced under the Family Law Act, the subsequent dissolution of that marriage does not divest a California court of its statutory jurisdiction over property and support issues, even though the court might not have expressly reserved jurisdiction over those matters.