Opinion ID: 2517308
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Max and George

Text: The trial court acknowledged that Pam was very active and involved as a grandparent to Max and George, and that they spent a great deal of time with her both with and without their parents. But the court found that despite the family's chaotic and nomadic lifestyle, the children were with the parents most of the time, the parents made the decisions where the children would reside, and without exception the parents brought the children to medical appointments or for emergency treatment. The court found that the children were not consistently or exclusively in Pam's care; rather it was the parents who maintained both legal and physical custody of the boys[,] and objectively the facts do not support the proposition that either parent ceded legal custody or transferred temporary physical custody to Pam. Accordingly, the court found that Pam was not Max and George's Indian custodian through physical custody. Pam's challenge to the finding that she is not Max and George's Indian custodian through physical custody is built on (1) attacking the trial court's underlying finding about Mark's consistent involvement in decision-making for the children; (2) arguing as a matter of statutory interpretation that ICWA allows one parent to transfer physical custody of children to an Indian custodian; and (3) arguing that as a matter of law there is insufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that Sally did not transfer temporary physical custody of Max and George to Pam. Pam's attack on the court's finding about Mark's involvement with the children has some merithe may have had frequent contact with the children before May 2005, but his contact with them after his incarceration for assaulting Sally was infrequent at best. But while Mark's role as an active parent may have been overstated by the trial court, after considering the entire record we hold that the court's finding that neither parent transferred physical custody to Pam is not clearly erroneous. The court heard conflicting testimony, [20] made credibility determinations, weighed the evidence, and reached its conclusion. We defer to the trial court and therefore affirm the finding, without having to address Pam's statutory interpretation argument that only one parent is necessary for the transfer of physical custody to an Indian custodian.