Opinion ID: 213017
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alleged Fourteenth Amendment Violations

Text: This Circuit has recognized that a child has a constitutionally protected liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment in the companionship and society of her father. Curnow v. Ridgecrest Police, 952 F.2d 321, 325 (1991); Moreland, 159 F.3d at 371. Official conduct that `shocks the conscience' in depriving [a child] of that interest is cognizable as a violation of due process. Wilkinson v. Torres, 610 F.3d 546, 554 (9th Cir.2010). In determining whether excessive force shocks the conscience, the court must first ask whether the circumstances are such that actual deliberation [by the officer] is practical. Porter v. Osborn, 546 F.3d 1131, 1137 (9th Cir.2008) (quoting Moreland, 159 F.3d at 372 (internal quotation marks omitted)). Where actual deliberation is practical, then an officer's `deliberate indifference' may suffice to shock the conscience. On the other hand, where a law enforcement officer makes a snap judgment because of an escalating situation, his conduct may only be found to shock the conscience if he acts with a purpose to harm unrelated to legitimate law enforcement objectives. Wilkinson, 610 F.3d at 554. Here, the district court correctly applied the purpose-to-harm standard based on the deputies' snap decision that Hayes represented an immediate threat. Neill had advised Deputy King that there were no guns in the house, and the deputies entered the residence with their guns holstered, apparently not expecting a violent confrontation with Hayes. [2] After Deputy King ordered Hayes to show his hands, Hayes raised both his hands to approximately shoulder level, revealing a large knife pointed tip down in his right hand. Believing that Hayes represented a threat, both deputies immediately drew their guns and fired at Hayes. The decision to use deadly force against Hayes was a snap judgement based on the unexpected appearance of a knife in his hand. Deputy King testified that only four seconds elapsed between the time he ordered Hayes to show his hands and the time the first shot was fired, stating that he did not feel there was time to give Hayes a warning before firing. Appellant argues that the deputies could have potentially avoided the incident by obtaining more information about Hayes or requesting a psychiatric emergency response team (PERT) before entering the house, but that option expired when the deputies entered the house. The decision to employ deadly force in reaction to seeing the knife was sudden and did not include deliberation. Cf. Wilkinson, 610 F.3d at 554 (finding purpose-to-harm standard appropriate where [w]ithin a matter of seconds, the situation evolved from a car chase to a situation involving an accelerating vehicle in dangerously close proximity to officers on foot); Porter, 546 F.3d at 1139 (finding actual deliberation was not practical where a five-minute altercation between the officers and victim evolved quickly and forced the officers to make repeated split-second decisions). Accordingly, the purpose-to-harm standard is appropriate in this case. Appellant makes no claim that the deputies acted with a purpose to harm unrelated to the legitimate law-enforcement objective of defending themselves, arguing only that the deliberate-indifference standard should have been applied. Indeed, there is no evidence that the deputies fired their weapons for any purpose other than self-defense. Accordingly, Appellant failed to support her substantive due process claim. See Wilkinson, 610 F.3d at 554-55. We therefore affirm the summary judgment as to the § 1983 claim based on a violation of Appellant's rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.