Opinion ID: 7196
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Adequacy of State Postdeprivation Remedy

Text: 10 We noted in Alexander I that it was clear that under applicable law, whoever held Ms. Alexander's property was required to institute a forfeiture proceeding promptly. 13 Alexander's allegation that the Defendants failed to institute a timely forfeiture proceeding convinces us that the available state remedies--which may be adequate in other circumstances 14 --were not adequate as applied to Alexander in the instant case. 11 As the purpose of the forfeiture proceeding was to determine whether the Defendants were entitled to forfeiture of Alexander's car, the Defendants' initiation of the forfeiture proceeding was a necessary predicate to adjudicating the state tort action. Consequently, even though Alexander pursued the available state remedy of filing a tort action against the Defendants seeking damages and return of her car, she could not procure relief without the Defendants' cooperation. Alexander was therefore stymied in her pursuit of her available state remedy by the very action--or, more accurately, inaction--that is the focus of her Sec. 1983 claim. 12 The Supreme Court ruled in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 15 that the Parratt/ Hudson doctrine was not designed to reach a case in which the state, pursuant to established procedures, deprives someone of an opportunity [to be heard] granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. 16 The Logan Court found that the established state procedure of foreclosing a handicapped state employee's claim of unlawful termination if the state failed to convene a timely factfinding conference unreasonably destroyed the terminated employee's entitlement without proper procedural safeguards. 17 Moreover, the Logan Court observed that the lengthy and speculative process of bringing a state tort suit--the terminated employee's only remedy--would not be constitutionally adequate to redress the employee's injuries. 18 13 The Defendants' unreasonable delay in instituting a forfeiture proceeding forced Alexander to suffer, for nearly three years, a continuing property deprivation over which she had no say or control, and it effectively denied Alexander an opportunity for redress. In light of the slow progress of Alexander's state tort action, even after the Defendants finally instituted a forfeiture proceeding, we are convinced that the available state remedies did not protect, and are not adequately protecting, Alexander's right to an opportunity to address her entitlement to the car in the Defendants' custody. We conclude that the Parratt/ Hudson doctrine does not foreclose Alexander's Sec. 1983 claim and that the Defendants' refusal to institute a forfeiture proceeding within a reasonable time after the seizure, even after Alexander's fervent, repeated requests, provides appropriate grounds for her claim that the Defendants violated her due process rights. 19