Opinion ID: 2284344
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Relationship with the Family

Text: Prior to trial, counsel for both sides engaged in individual voir dire with Nabb, just as with other jurors. In that conversation, Nabb was asked whether he kn[ew] the [victim's] family. Nabb simply responded, No. In the months after trial, Teddy Robertson contacted Appellant's counsel and disclosed information about Nabb's past relationship with the victim and her family, suggesting possible bias. Robertson is the only person to have come forward describing any such relationship. Robertson described at a post-trial hearing how he himself was very close with the victim's family and would spend significant amounts of time at their house. Robertson also claims to have worked for Nabb for approximately twenty years and that every other day, Nabb would pick him up from the victim's family's home. According to Robertson, when Nabb came by to pick Robertson up, he would frequently converse with the victim's mother, but Robertson never heard what they were talking about. Robertson further testified that Nabb may have dated Kay Williams, but he failed to provide any substantial basis for this possibility. Robertson suggested that they may have dated because they knew each other, but when asked how they knew each other, he simply responded that everyone in their hometown of Guthrie knew one another. To that extent, Robertson further acknowledged that the relationship between Nabb and the victim and her family was not necessarily one of friendship, but more one of acquaintanceship. Robertson's testimony is not without some bias itself. He admitted that his ex-wife, Lisa Potter, with whom he remains in contact, and Appellant are life-long friends and she has long professed his innocence. In fact, Robertson admitted that his decision to provide information about Nabb was directed by Potter. Robertson's testimony was also called into question by its contradiction from others. Nabb himself died shortly after trial; however, the Commonwealth questioned Donna Nabb, Charles Nabb's ex-wife, about the juror's relationship with the victim's family. She could not recall her ex-husband having had any relationship with the victim's family and firmly denied that either he or she knew the victim herself at all. Donna Nabb further stated that neither Robertson nor anyone else ever worked for her husband. Regina Alexander, Kay Williams's sister, also testified that neither she nor her mother ever had a social relationship with Charles Nabb. Based on this post-trial testimony, Judge Harris made the following finding: The Court finds that contrary to his answer given during individual voire dire examination, juror Charles Nabb had some degree of acquaintance with the family of Virginia Meriwether (the mother of victim Kay Williams) but that the relationship was casual and not close enough to be considered more than acquaintance, as opposed to friendship. `[T]he trial judge is in the best position to determine the nature of alleged juror misconduct and the appropriate remedies for any demonstrated misconduct.' Ratliff v. Commonwealth, 194 S.W.3d 258 (Ky.2006) (quoting United States v. Sherrill, 388 F.3d 535, 537 (6th Cir.2004)). A trial judge's factual findings are reviewed only for clear error. Miller v. Eldridge, 146 S.W.3d 909, 915 (Ky.2004). The trial court's determination that Nabb and Kay Williams's family were casual acquaintances, but not friends, was not clearly erroneous. The question then becomes whether Nabb's casual acquaintance with the family is grounds for a new trial. This Court has established a three-pronged test to determine whether a new trial should be granted in this type of situation. First, a material question must have been asked. Second, the juror must have answered the question dishonestly. And finally, the truthful answer to the material question would have subjected the juror to being stricken for cause. Taylor v. Commonwealth, 175 S.W.3d 68, 74-75 (Ky.2005). Thus, if Nabb answered a material question untruthfully, where a truthful answer would have had led to him being struck for cause, a new trial must be granted. As to the first prong, there is no doubt that the question asked of NabbDo you know the family?was material. Whether Nabb knew the family members and, more importantly, had a substantial relationship with them, directly implicated his bias in the case. Any question implicating a juror's bias in such a manner must be considered material. Cf. id. at 75 (A question about whether a potential juror believes she can consider the full range of penalties upon a conviction for murder is about as material as they come.). Turning to the second prong, Nabb's response to the question was found to be false. According to Judge Harris, contrary to his answer that he did not know the family, Nabb had some degree of acquaintance with the family. (Emphasis added.) This does not necessarily mean that Nabb was dishonest, however. A juror answering contrary to the truth does not inherently equate to dishonesty; the juror could simply be mistaken. In this case, it is possible that Nabb honestly believed that he did not know the family. To know someone can have many different meanings and to know someone in a small town such as Guthrie may mean something different than in a larger city. This is not to say that Nabb was being forthright in voir dire. It is possible that Nabb was indeed trying to conceal his relationship with the family in order to hide any possible bias, but it is not this Court's role to make such a factual determination. It should be noted that any uncertainty as to Nabb's relationship with the family, or at least how Nabb described the relationship, could have been clarified by more specific and concrete questioning during voir dire, e.g., Have you ever met the victim or her family? or Have you ever conversed with them? Even if Nabb's response were found to be dishonest, Appellant has failed to meet the third prong of the test by proving that a truthful response would have led to Nabb being struck for cause. As the trial court found, and as the testimony from the post-trial hearing supports, Nabb was merely a casual acquaintance with the family, not a friend. [A] casual acquaintance [is] not the close relationship needed to imply bias on the part of the juror. Sanders v. Commonwealth, 89 S.W.3d 380, 388 (Ky.2002); see also Hatten v. Quarterman, 570 F.3d 595, 602 (5th Cir.2009) (Texas law requires more than the existence of a casual acquaintance with the victim of a crime or the victim's family to make a prospective juror subject to challenge for cause. The result is no different under the federal due process standard.). This is particularly so when whatever relationship the juror was said to have had with the family was remote in time to the trial. Marsillett v. State, 495 N.E.2d 699, 707 (Ind.1986). Absent any determination by the trial judge that the casual acquaintance led to any bias, a new trial should not be ordered. This Court has repeatedly held that being a distant relative to the victim does not inherently impute bias. See Ward v. Commonwealth, 695 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Ky.1985) (no reversal where one juror was ex-brother-in-law and another a distant cousin); Cox v. Commonwealth, 255 Ky. 391, 392, 74 S.W.2d 346, 347 (1934) (no reversal where one juror is shown to be a second cousin of the wife of a brother of the deceased, and his wife's uncle married a niece of the deceased). It is within the discretion of the trial judge to determine whether or not there is any chance of prejudice resulting from a remote blood relationship between a juror and a victim. Commonwealth v. Carter, 444 Pa. 405, 282 A.2d 375, 377 (1971). Obviously, the same standard should be applied where the juror is only a casual acquaintance of a relative of the victim. Id. at 377-78. While the trial court did not explicitly rule that the relationship was too slight to impute bias, he implicitly did so by denying Appellant a new trial. See Montoya v. Scott, 65 F.3d 405, 419 n. 29 (5th Cir.1995) (implicit finding of impartiality in [trial court's] denial of the petitioner's challenge for cause). Based on the trial court's finding that Nabb and the family were merely casual acquaintances and that no actual bias stemmed from that familiarity, it was not required to strike Nabb for cause. Thus, a new trial is not mandated on these grounds.