Opinion ID: 1690710
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: the findings by the jury at the sentencing phase were too uncertain and unreliable to support the sentence of death, violating doss's rights under the united states and mississippi constitutions and mississippi law.

Text: ś 123. This assignment of error is similar to Issue II, supra. Doss contends that erroneous instructions on accomplice liability which allegedly omitted the requirement of proof of intent make the jury's two findings of fact to impose the death penalty an uncertain and unreliable basis to support the death penalty. In other words, the allegedly erroneous guilt phase instructions so confused the jury from having to find individualized consideration [40] of Doss's culpability that one cannot be certain that the jury understood the Enmund findings required at the sentencing phase. The allegedly erroneous instructions were S-3 and S-4 which are presented in full under Issue II. ś 124. The State asserts another procedural bar pursuant to Foster, Chase, Cole, and Conner, supra . Doss alleges that he objected to the second aggravator in C-1, but the record discloses otherwise. The following is the objection made by Doss to C-1: BY MR. BAILEY: I object to C-1 because the jury may not be instructed to disregard sympathy in the sentencing, citing Pinkney v. State. We object to sentencing instruction, C-1, page 2 of the instruction for 2 reasons: 1, there was a failure to prove each aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt, and 2, we object to the constitutionality of the aggravating circumstances as to vagueness and its reliability. And then, more specifically, the first aggravating circumstance that he's been convicted of another capital offense, we object, stating that double jeopardy clause bars subsequent prosecution, if to establish an essential element of the offense charges in the prosecution, the State can prove the conduct that constituted an offense for which the defendant has already been prosecuted. As to number 3, avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest, we object, stating that this circumstance was not clearly supported by the evidence, and you must have a separate limiting instruction. Okay. BY THE COURT: No. C-1 is GIVEN. [41] ś 125. The record reflects that the jury found two Enmund factors of specific intent. Doss relies upon Abram v. State, 606 So.2d 1015, 1042 (Miss. 1992), for the proposition that a death sentence requires more than accomplice liability. [42] Abram discussed at length the differences between § 99-19-101(7)(c), intending that a killing take place, and § 99-19-101(7)(d), contemplating that lethal force would be employed. Abram was only found to have contemplated that lethal force would be used, which this Court held was sufficient to meet the Enmund culpability requirement. Abram v. State, 606 So.2d 1015, 1042-3 (Miss. 1992). The jury found that Doss was guilty of § 99-19-107(c), intending that a killing take place, and § 99-19-107(d), contemplating that lethal force would be employed. Therefore, the Enmund test was met and Doss's reliance upon Abram is misplaced and without merit. The record reflects that there was a reliable verdict and sentence in addition to there being a procedural bar.