Opinion ID: 1771774
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 49

Heading: whether the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to exempt phase ii from sequestartion?

Text: ś 113. Prior to trial, Puckett moved that certain potential phase 2 witnesses be excluded from sequestration, so these witnesses could remain in the courtroom during the guilt phase of the trial. The trial court took this motion under advisement. Puckett later amended his motion to exempt only his mother, Mary Puckett, from the rule. However, the trial court denied Puckett's motion, indicating that even though it was a bifurcated or two-stage hearing, if the rule was invoked, she would not be privileged to be in the courtroom during any stage of the proceedings. ś 114. Puckett alleges that the exclusion of his mother from being present during the first phase of trial, and for most of the second phase of trial, did not serve the ends of justice and therefore constituted harmful and prejudicial error requiring reversal of his conviction. In support of his argument, Puckett relies on this Court's decision in Moffett v. State, 540 So.2d 1313 (Miss.1989) wherein the defense alleged a violation of the sequestration rule. However, as the State points out, the case at bar is distinguishable from Moffett in that Puckett is not arguing that the trial court violated the sequestration rule. Instead, Puckett argues that the trial judge's strict adherence to the rule constitutes reversible error. ś 115. The rule governing sequestration of potential witnesses states: At the request of a party the court shall order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses, and it may make the order of its own motion. This rule does not authorize exclusion of (1) a party who is a natural person, or (2) an officer or employee of a party which is not a natural person designated as its representative by its attorney, or (3) a person whose presence is shown by a party to be essential to the presentation of his cause. Miss. R. Evid. 615 (emphasis added). The language of the rule provides that all witnesses will be excluded unless they meet one of the exceptions. This Court has previously pointed out that under the mandatory language of the rule, the trial court does not have any discretion in its application but must apply it when a party invokes it. Brown v. State, 682 So.2d 340 (Miss.1996) ( citing Douglas v. State, 525 So.2d 1312, 1316 (Miss.1988)). The court's discretion comes in when the rule has been violated since the remedy for violation is left to the trial court's discretion. Brown, 682 So.2d at 349 ( citing Douglas, 525 So.2d at 1317 ( citing United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058, 1076 (5th Cir.1978))). The Douglas decision provides a good discussion of pre-Rule and post-Rule application of the sequestration rule. [16] In pre-Rules cases this Court generally held that it is in the trial court's discretion to allow a witness to testify on rebuttal even though he has been in the courtroom after The Rule has been invoked.... Pre-Rules cases, however, were based on the premise that the sequestration rule was a procedural matter and its enforcement at trial is left to the sole discretion of the trial judge. Under the new M.R.E. 615, judicial discretion is more limited than it was under our pre-Rules cases. Now sequestration is a matter of right except for the three categories of witnesses spelled out in the Rule, as evidenced by the language at the request of a party the court shall order witnesses excluded ... except those witnesses enumerated in the Rule. This change in practice has been noted by the federal courts in construing F.R.E. 615, from which M.R.E. 615 was adopted verbatim ....     The federal courts have also construed the Rule to apply to rebuttal witnesses â to rebuttal witnesses who have testified during the case-in-chief as well as to rebuttal witnesses who have not testified during the case-in-chief. Douglas v. State, 525 So.2d at 1316 (citations omitted). In the case at bar, Puckett does not allege there was a violation of the Rule. Additionally, Puckett does not allege that his mother fits within one of the exceptions provided by the Rule. Accordingly, this Court should not fault the trial judge for adhering to the mandatory language of Rule 615. Furthermore, since the trial judge's discretion only applies to violations of the Rule and not to the application of the Rule, Puckett's allegation that the trial judge abused his discretion is without merit. Consequently, the trial court's ruling should not be overturned.