Opinion ID: 1450589
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Award of Summary Judgment in Favor of Plaintiff

Text: After discovery concluded, the parties cross-moved for summary judgment on the question of liability. The district court observed that, because Barfield was paid, and in that sense employed, by the nursing referral agencies, the critical liability question was whether Bellevue was also Barfield's `employer' under the terms of the FLSA. Barfield v. N.Y. City Health & Hosps. Corp., 432 F.Supp.2d at 392; see also 29 C.F.R. § 791.2 (stating that individual may be employed by more than one entity at same time). In addressing this issue, the district court looked to six factors identified in Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61, 72 (2d Cir.2003) (identifying factors relevant to determining whether entity has functional control over workers even in the absence of ... formal control so as to qualify as employer). See Barfield v. N.Y. City Health & Hosps. Corp., 432 F.Supp.2d at 392-94. [4] With regard to the first four factors, the district court concluded that it was undisputed that (1) Barfield performed her work on Bellevue's premises using Bellevue's equipment; (2) no referral agency shifted its business as a unit from one putative joint employer to another, but, instead, each agency assigned the same agency employees to the same hospitals whenever possible  in Barfield's case, to Bellevue  in order to promote more continuity of care and to increase the productivity of the nurses and the value of their services; (3) Barfield performed work integral to Bellevue's operation; and (4) Barfield's work responsibilities remained the same regardless of which agency referred her. Id. at 393 (internal quotation marks omitted). With regard to Zheng 's supervision factor, the district court concluded that the evidence established as a matter of law that (5) Bellevue demonstrate[d] effective control on the terms and conditions of the plaintiff's employment in light of Bellevue's degree of control over Barfield's schedule. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Although Bellevue disputed that it scheduled shifts directly with agency health care employees, the district court noted that Bellevue conceded its frequent communication of tentative work shifts to referred employees, requiring them to call the hospital a few hours before the start of these shifts to confirm the assignments. See id. In addition, the district court found that, on several occasions, Bellevue solicited Barfield to work a double shift even before she began the first assignment. See id. The district court further observed that it was undisputed that (6) Barfield worked exclusively for Bellevue. See id. at 394. Thus, the district court concluded that all of the Zheng factors point, to a greater or lesser degree, toward plaintiff's being employed by Bellevue. Id. To the extent Zheng advised further consideration of any other factors that a court deems relevant to its assessment of the economic realities of a given employment situation, id. (quoting Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d at 71-72), the district court found it undisputed that Bellevue exercise[d] at least some control over which agency nurses are permitted to work for the hospital because it regularly evaluated the performance of agency employees and could prohibit particular employees from working further at Bellevue and receive overtime either because it determined that the individual had violated a hospital rule or because it was generally dissatisfied with the individual's performance. Id. Accordingly, the district court concluded that the circumstances of the whole activity viewed in light of economic reality demonstrate[ ] that Bellevue exercised functional control over plaintiff and was her joint employer. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Defendants asserted that, even if the district court concluded that Bellevue was Barfield's joint employer under the FLSA, plaintiff was not entitled to recover overtime wages for two reasons: (1) at least one of Barfield's referral agencies had specifically informed her that she could not work more than 40 hours per week at Bellevue, and (2) Barfield's use of multiple referral agencies to secure assignments to Bellevue prevented defendants from determining how many hours she had worked at the hospital. See id. In rejecting these arguments, the district court determined that Bellevue could not rely on the agency's notice of limited temporary work hours at the hospital to avoid FLSA liability because Bellevue itself had never informed Barfield of any such restriction on her overall employment at the hospital. See id. The district court further observed that Bellevue did not dispute that Barfield had filled out the sign-in sheets Bellevue provided for temporary workers, that the hospital had collected these sheets and cross-referenced them against work verification forms signed by supervising nurses after each shift, and that Bellevue employees had encouraged Barfield to work extra shifts beyond those scheduled in advance. See id. at 394-95. Finally, the court noted undisputed evidence that at least one Bellevue supervisor was aware that temporary health care workers were sometimes referred to the hospital by multiple agencies. See id. at 395. On this record, the district court determined that no other conclusion was possible than that Bellevue knew or had reason to know the total number of hours Barfield worked for them each week, making them responsible for overtime compensation when those hours exceeded 40. See id. at 394-95.
Having concluded, as a matter of law, that Bellevue was liable under the FLSA for Barfield's overtime compensation, the district court awarded her compensatory overtime in the amount of $887.25. See Barfield v. N.Y. City Health & Hosps. Corp., 2006 WL 2356152, at , . Further, having observed that nothing in the record indicated that defendants had made any effort to ensure that their employment of temporary health care workers complied with the FLSA, see Barfield v. N.Y. City Health & Hosps. Corp., 432 F.Supp.2d at 395, the district court ordered defendants to pay Barfield liquidated damages in an equal amount, for a total damages award of $1,774.50, see Barfield v. N.Y. City Health & Hosps. Corp., 2006 WL 2356152, at , . [5] Insofar as Barfield also sought costs and fees, the district court directed defendants to pay costs in the amount of $6,565.79, see id. at , but it declined to award attorney's fees in the requested amount of $340,375. In determining for itself what constituted a reasonable fee for the case, the district court found that Barfield's counsel's hourly rate of $350 was consistent with his level of experience. See id. at  1. Nevertheless, the court imposed a 25 percent reduction on almost 400 hours that counsel charged to the case because the vague nature of many of the entries made it impossible to determine whether the number of recorded hours expended in pursuit of this litigation was reasonable. Id. Indeed, the district court found it obvious that the total of nearly 400 hours that plaintiff's counsel says he spent on this case seems entirely disproportionate to the time the case reasonably should have involved. Id. The court further determined that 5.75 hours billed by counsel involved tasks that should have been performed by a paralegal; consequently, it concluded that this time should be compensated at only $75 per hour. See id. at . Similarly, the district court determined that 2.3 hours of travel time by counsel should be compensated at half-rate, in accordance with established court custom, and that 4 spent on administrative tasks should not be compensated at all. See id. Finally, the district court rejected defendants' request to eliminate from consideration all time spent by Barfield's counsel in seeking to certify the case as an FLSA collective action, finding that plaintiff's certification application was inextricably intertwined with her successful motion for summary judgment as both involved a `common core of facts' and a `related legal theory.' Id. (quoting Quaratino v. Tiffany & Co., 166 F.3d 422, 425 (2d Cir. 1998)). Nevertheless, after determining the lodestar figure, the district court invoked its authority to adjust the lodestar to reflect a number of factors, including the results obtained. Id. The district court concluded that plaintiff's primary aim in this litigation, as reflected in both the complaint and in the first four months of litigation before this Court, was collective action certification. Id. Because plaintiff (and her counsel) had failed in this objective, the district court concluded that Barfield had achieved only limited success in the litigation as a whole, which justified a 50 percent reduction in the lodestar. Id. at  (explaining that award of full lodestar amount would be tantamount to awarding a fee as if plaintiff had prevailed on her collective action motion, a result which would hardly encourage counsel to vigorously litigate such motions and could encourage counsel to bring them even when there is little basis for doing so). Accordingly, the district court awarded $49,889 in attorney's fees, which, when added to the compensatory and liquidated damages and costs, yielded plaintiff a total award of $58,229.29. See id. The parties filed cross appeals, Barfield challenging the judgment awarding attorney's fees and defendants challenging the summary judgment determination liability.