Opinion ID: 1426382
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Federal and State Wiretapping Laws

Text: In addition to the Fourth Amendment and state constitutional violation, the defendant asserts that his rights under Title III of the Omnibus Crime and Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2510, et seq., and under the Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act of 1994, Tenn. Code.Ann. § 40-6-301, et seq., have been violated. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) prohibits the admission of communication evidence if a person intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication. Furthermore, oral communication is defined as any oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation.  18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) (emphasis added). Similarly, Tennessee statute states, The interception of wire, oral or electronic communications, ... when no party to the communications has consented to the interception, should be allowed only under compelling circumstances when authorized and supervised by a court of competent jurisdiction and upon a finding of probable cause. Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-6-302(b) (Supp.1996). In addition, oral communication is defined as oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communications is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation. ... Id. § 40-6-303(14) (Supp.1996) (emphasis added). Although we have not addressed the provisions of the Tennessee wiretapping law, other states have interpreted similar statutory provisions and have concluded that the standard for determining the extent of protection under the federal and state wiretap laws is the same standard employed in the Fourth Amendment cases: (1) whether the individual had an actual, subjective expectation of privacy, and (2) whether society is willing to view the individual's subjective expectation of privacy as reasonable and justifiable under the circumstances. See State v. Hauss, 142 Ariz. 159, 688 P.2d 1051 (Ct.App.1984); State v. Wilkins, 125 Idaho 215, 868 P.2d 1231 (1994). Since the federal standard regarding expectation of privacy reflects the standard applied under the Tennessee Constitution, we are persuaded that this is an appropriate interpretation and adopt the standard of the Fourth Amendment cases as the test under Tennessee statutes as well. Applying this standard to the facts we have previously outlined in the Fourth Amendment and Tennessee Constitutional analysis, we conclude that there was an intentional interception by the police of an oral communication without consent and that the defendant had a justified expectation that the communication was not subject to interception. Accordingly, we hold that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy and his statements should have been suppressed as violations of the federal and Tennessee wiretapping statutes.