Opinion ID: 901080
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sufficiency of evidence supporting compensatory damages

Text: [¶ 25.] Farner contends that there was insufficient evidence to support an award of compensatory damages and that the award of $25,000 was excessive, arbitrary and a result of passion or prejudice and not supported by the evidence. Farner claims that the trial court erred in denying its motion for judgment n.o.v., its motion for a new trial and alternatively argues that the compensatory damage award should be remitted. When considering whether a jury verdict is sustained by the evidence: [W]e are not to speculate or query how we would have viewed the evidence and testimony, or what verdict we would have rendered had we been the jury. The real and only question to be solved and answered is, Is there any legal evidence upon which the verdict can properly be based, and the conclusions embraced in and covered by it be fairly reached? Biegler, 2001 SD 13 at ¶ 32, 621 N.W.2d at 602 (quoting Bakker v. Irvine, 519 N.W.2d 41, 49 (S.D.1994) (emphasis in original)). [¶ 26.] Generally, [t]he amount of damages to be awarded is a factual issue to be determined by the trier of fact. Estate of Pamela He Crow, 494 N.W.2d 186, 192 (S.D.1992). However, [a]n award of compensatory damages must not be the product of passion and prejudice and must be supported by the evidence. Engels v. Ranger Bar, Inc., 2000 SD 1, ¶ 30, 604 N.W.2d 241, 247. The test for determining if the jury verdict is the product of passion or prejudice is: The damages, therefore, must be so excessive as to strike mankind, at first blush, as being, beyond all measure, unreasonable and outrageous, and such as manifestly show the jury to have been actuated by passion, partiality, prejudice or corruption. Stormo v. Strong, 469 N.W.2d 816, 826 (S.D.1991) (quoting Schuler v. City of Mobridge, 44 S.D. 488, 184 N.W. 281, 283 (1921) (citations omitted)). We review the issue on appeal under the clearly erroneous standard. He Crow, 494 N.W.2d at 192 (citation omitted). [¶ 27.] In Kjerstad, 517 N.W.2d at 424-25 we indicated there was competent evidence to support an award for compensatory damages on an invasion of privacy claim when the record reflected evidence that the plaintiffs had suffered both physical and emotional reactions to the invasion and had incurred medical expenses. We held the evidence supported compensatory damage awards of $500 and $200 in invasion of privacy claim when plaintiffs presented evidence that defendant had observed them using the restroom. However, we did not indicate that plaintiffs bringing invasion of privacy claims were required to demonstrate they had incurred medical expenses as a result of the invasion. [¶ 28.] Other courts that have been asked to review awards for compensatory damages in invasion of privacy claims have struggled in their attempts to measure damages. See Hill v. McKinley, 311 F.3d 899, 906-07 (8th Cir.2002)(affirming jury's award of $2,500 in compensatory damages on invasion of privacy claim); Mitchell v. Globe International, 817 F.Supp. 72, 74-75 (W.D.Ark.1993) (remitting compensatory damage award in invasion of privacy claim on remand from Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals with directions to substantially remit award); Rohrbaugh v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 212 W.Va. 358, 572 S.E.2d 881, 888 (2002) (adopting Restatement (Second) of Torts' (1977) position on damages for invasion of privacy claim and, additionally, holding that if none of the Restatement damages are proven, nominal compensatory damages are to be awarded). [3] [¶ 29.] The Mitchell case involved an invasion of privacy claim based on publication of a picture of the 96-year-old plaintiff, a resident of Mountain Home, Arkansas, in a supermarket tabloid to illustrate a story about `Paper Gal, Audrey Wiles' in Sterling, Australia, who had become pregnant by one of her customers, a `reclusive millionaire' she met on her newspaper route.' Mitchell, 817 F.Supp. at 72. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded that case for a substantial remittitur of compensatory damages after concluding that while the evidence supported a compensatory damage award, the amount awarded by the jury$650,000was shocking and exaggerated. Id. at 73. [¶ 30.] In its decision remitting the compensatory damage award the federal district court believed the Harrison, Arkansas, jury, chosen from all walks of life, was better situated to make that decision than this court[.] It said, This is an especially difficult task where the damages to be awarded are based on intangibles such as damage to reputation and mental suffering. Id. at 73. Ultimately, the court remitted the compensatory damage award to $150,000, because it believed the damages suffered by plaintiff due to the defendant's conduct were worth that much. [¶ 31.] Additionally, in Sabrina v. Willman, 4 Neb.App. 149, 540 N.W.2d 364, 370-71 (1995), the Nebraska Court of Appeals addressed the issue of damages for a statutory invasion of privacy claim. The court indicated that its review of other jurisdictions revealed that the gravamen of this tort is `the injury to the feelings of the plaintiff, and the mental anguish and distress caused thereby.' Id. at 370 (quoting Fernandez v. United Acceptance Corp., 125 Ariz. 459, 462, 610 P.2d 461, 464 (Ariz.Ct.App.1980)). Once a party has established that the defendant has intruded, the defendant is liable for damages. Sabrina, 540 N.W.2d at 370. [¶ 32.] In addressing invasion of privacy claims, courts have recognized that damages in this area can be difficult to ascertain or measure by a pecuniary standard[.] Sabrina, 540 N.W.2d at 370 (citations omitted). Therefore, [r]ealizing the difficulty in determining damages, courts have found that a trier of fact is uniquely qualified to assess damages. Id. The Nebraska court concluded that in an invasion of privacy claim the amount of damages should almost always be in the hands of the jury. Id. at 371. [¶ 33.] In this case, a South Dakota jury found Farner had committed an unreasonable, unwarranted, serious and offensive intrusion upon the seclusion of another. See Kjerstad, 517 N.W.2d at 424. Furthermore, the jury found the invasion at issuethe opening, reading, photocopying and dissemination of Roth's mailwas one which would be offensive and objectionable to a reasonable man of ordinary sensibilities. See Shope, 286 N.W.2d at 808. [¶ 34.] Additionally, the jury heard testimony from Roth that he felt angry, betrayed and devastated upon learning of the invasion. Roth also testified that he sought help with his feelings over the intrusion from his sponsor and friends at Alcoholic's Anonymous. Roth also testified that one of the documents in the intercepted package was a handwritten note, created upon the advice of his attorney, which documented Roth's experiences and feelings during his last few months of employment at Farner. Roth's wife testified that he was very hurt upon learning of the invasion, felt deceived and could not believe that somebody would open his mail and do that. She further testified that Roth could not sleep at night and drank a lot of coffee. Upon hearing the evidence and being instructed to fix the amount of damages based on findings of the harm to Roth's privacy interest and emotional distress suffered, the jury awarded the sum of $25,000 in compensatory damages. [¶ 35.] Although the amount of the jury's award in this case gives us pause, we cannot say that there was no legal evidence upon which it could be based. [T]his Court cannot `reweigh the evidence or gauge the credibility of the witnesses' when reviewing the jury's verdict. Sporleder v. VanLiere, 1997 SD 110, ¶ 27, 569 N.W.2d 8, 15 (quoting Andreson v. Black Hills Power & Light Co., 1997 SD 12, ¶ 8, 559 N.W.2d 886, 888 (citations omitted)). Furthermore, we cannot say the trial court, after hearing the evidence, erred in denying Farner's motion for judgment n.o.v. or its motion for a new trial on this issue.