Opinion ID: 2744629
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Lavis’ Testimony

Text: We next consider whether admitting Lavis’ testimony interpreting the recorded telephone calls was reversible error. The defendants argue his testimony was improper because it (1) impermissibly mixed lay and expert opinions; (2) served as a conduit for testimonial hearsay in violation of Crawford, 541 U.S. 36; (3) was not the product of reliable principles and methods; and (4) included impermissible lay opinions. Although some of Lavis’ opinions about the meaning of recorded phone calls were permissible, we agree with the UNITED STATES V. VERA 17 defendants that others were erroneously admitted, and that the district court’s failure to instruct the jury in how to evaluate his testimony was plain error. After a careful review of the record, we conclude these errors warrant reversal of the jury’s drug quantity findings, but not the defendants’ convictions on Counts 1 through 3. We consider the appropriate remedy in Part IV, infra. A. Legal Background It is neither novel nor unusual for law enforcement officers to interpret the meaning of phone calls recorded as part of a narcotics investigation. Drug jargon is well established as an appropriate subject for expert testimony and investigating officers may testify as drug jargon experts who interpret the meaning of code words used in recorded calls. See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 607 F.2d 237, 240 (9th Cir. 1979). Officers may testify about their interpretations of “commonly used drug jargon” based solely on their training and experience. See id.; see also United States v. FigueroaLopez, 125 F.3d 1241, 1244–45 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that law enforcement officer testimony that certain terms constituted code words for a drug deal was erroneously admitted as lay opinion testimony, but the error was harmless because the officer testified to facts supporting his qualifications as an expert and the testimony was proper expert opinion). To interpret the meaning of coded language encountered for the first time in the specific investigation at issue, however, an officer’s qualifications, including his experience with narcotics investigations and intercepted communications, are relevant but not alone sufficient to satisfy Federal Rule of Evidence 702. See United States v. Hermanek, 289 F.3d 1076, 1093 (9th Cir. 2002). Rather, 18 UNITED STATES V. VERA Rule 702 requires district courts to assure that an expert’s methods for interpreting the new terminology are both reliable and adequately explained. See id. at 1094. “[V]ague and generalized” explanations are not sufficient; rather, the officer must explain how he applies his “knowledge to interpret particular words and phrases used in particular conversations.” Id. at 1094–95. For example, an agent may permissibly apply his knowledge of the drug manufacturing process to interpret words referring to that process or apply his familiarity with a particular method for generating code words to decode their meaning. See, e.g., United States v. Reed, 575 F.3d 900, 923 (9th Cir. 2009) (approving expert testimony interpreting terms the agent “knew to refer to the reagent used in the PCP manufacturing process”); United States v. Decoud, 456 F.3d 996, 1013–14 & n.6 (9th Cir. 2006) (approving the agent’s explanation that he interpreted “diznerty” as slang for “dirty” based on his familiarity with a common speaking style that creates slang versions of specific words by adding “e” or “ez”). A law enforcement officer testifying as an expert in drug jargon may also testify as a lay witness if he was involved in the investigation. See United States v. Freeman, 498 F.3d 893, 904 (9th Cir. 2007). Such dual capacity testimony raises additional concerns, however: an agent’s status as an expert could lend him unmerited credibility when testifying as a percipient witness, cross-examination might be inhibited, jurors could be confused and the agent might be more likely to stray from reliable methodology and rely on hearsay. See id. at 902–03 (citing United States v. Dukagjini, 326 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 2003)); see also United States v. York, 572 F.3d 415, 425 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Flores-De-Jesus, 569 F.3d 8, 21 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Conner, 537 F.3d 480, 488 (5th Cir. 2008). UNITED STATES V. VERA 19 Because these risks are reduced “[i]f jurors are aware of the witness’s dual roles,” the jury must be instructed about “what the attendant circumstances are in allowing a government case agent to testify as an expert.” Freeman, 498 F.3d at 904; see also United States v. Martinez, 657 F.3d 811, 817 (9th Cir. 2001) (approving admission of hybrid testimony when “the court instructed the jury three times on the difference between percipient and expert testimony”); United States v. Anchrum, 590 F.3d 795, 803–04 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that the district court “avoided blurring the distinction between [the case agent’s] distinct role as a lay witness and his role as an expert witness” when it “clearly separated [the agent’s] testimony into a first ‘phase’ consisting of his percipient observations, and a second ‘phase’ consisting of his credentials in the field of drug trafficking and expert testimony regarding the modus operandi of drug traffickers”). Direct and cross-examination provide additional opportunities “to clarify in the eyes of the jury the demarcation between lay and expert testimony offered by the same witness.” Freeman, 498 F.3d at 904; see also Martinez, 657 F.3d at 817 (noting that “[t]he government was nearly always exact in specifying when it was asking for [the agent’s] testimony as an expert” in affirming admission of the agent’s hybrid testimony). Finally, a law enforcement officer involved in the investigation may offer lay opinions about the meaning of intercepted phone calls, but those opinions are subject to the requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 701. See Freeman, 498 F.3d at 904–05. Rule 701 requires lay opinion testimony to be “(a) rationally based on the witness’s perception; (b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to determining a fact in issue; and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.” Accordingly, an officer may not 20 UNITED STATES V. VERA testify based on speculation, rely on hearsay or interpret unambiguous, clear statements. See Freeman, 498 F.3d at 905. But he may interpret “ambiguous conversations based upon his direct knowledge of the investigation,” including his “direct perception of several hours of intercepted conversations . . . and other facts he learned during the investigation.” Id. at 904–05; see also United States v. Gadson, 763 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2014). In sum, law enforcement officers may offer lay and expert opinions about the meaning of intercepted phone calls, but the foundation laid for those opinions must satisfy Rules 701 and 702, respectively. Further, if a single officer offers both lay and expert testimony, the jury must be informed of the fact and significance of his dual roles. B. Analysis Applying these principles to this case, we hold it was plain error not to instruct the jury on how to appropriately evaluate Lavis’ opinions and to fail to require an adequately specific foundation for those opinions. Together, these errors undermine our overall confidence in the jury verdict in some respects. If an appropriate foundation had been laid, the jury would at least have had the information it needed to evaluate Lavis’ opinions. If the jury had been instructed on how to evaluate Lavis’ opinions, it would at least have known the rules governing how much weight to give those opinions. The absence of both an adequately laid foundation and an appropriate instruction, however, substantially heightened the “risk that the jury [would] defer to the officer’s superior knowledge of the case and past experiences with similar crimes.” United States v. Hampton, 718 F.3d 978, 981–82 (D.C. Cir. 2013). UNITED STATES V. VERA 21 The defendants’ arguments for overturning their convictions for these reasons are not well taken, however, because the erroneously admitted testimony related most fundamentally to the evidence of drug quantity. Moreover, the defendants failed to object to Lavis’ interpretive testimony generally and they failed to contemporaneously object to the specific quantity opinions they belatedly challenge on appeal. Whether the defendants’ decisions were based on strategy or the result of oversight, they undermine the defendants’ argument that the errors satisfy the plain error standard, warranting reversal of their convictions, because many of the problems could have been easily corrected had they been timely brought to the district court’s attention. Nonetheless, the ultimate responsibility for assuring the reliability of expert testimony and for instructing the jury on how to evaluate case agent dual role testimony rests with the district court. See Freeman, 498 F.3d at 904. Particularly when the district court indicated it would instruct the jury on how to evaluate Lavis’ expert opinions, its failure to do so is not excused by the absence of a request from the defendants. Moreover, as the proponent of Lavis’ testimony, the government “bears the burden of laying the proper foundation for [its] admission.” City of Long Beach v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 46 F.3d 929, 937 (9th Cir. 1995). Some of the responsibility must therefore be shouldered by the prosecution as well. These general defects led to specific flaws in Lavis’ testimony, mostly relating to the reliability of his methodology, which affected several of his opinions regarding specific drug quantities. Aside from the 24 grams of heroin Reyes purchased from Armando, Lavis’ opinions interpreting the wiretapped calls were the only evidence of specific quantities at trial. Given the vital importance of 22 UNITED STATES V. VERA Lavis’ opinions to those drug quantity findings, and of those findings to the defendants’ substantial sentences, the foundational errors in Lavis’ opinions, combined with our overall lack of confidence in the jury’s ability to meaningfully evaluate his testimony, require us to vacate the jury’s drug quantity findings. We affirm the remainder of the jury verdict, however, because the defendants have not established that their convictions were materially affected by these or any other errors in the proceedings. 1. Procedural History The history of how Lavis came to be the key government witness on drug quantities is an important factor in our analysis. The government proffered him as an expert witness in its trial memorandum, filed the week before trial. The memorandum explained Lavis would also be testifying as a percipient witness about the investigation, specifically “the wiretap, the recorded calls, surveillances, and interviews he conducted,” and potentially “his familiarity with the defendants.” This proffer adequately disclosed Lavis as a witness who would be providing both lay and expert testimony. Additionally, its description of his anticipated expert testimony – that he would opine that the conspiracy involved quantities above certain threshold amounts; that he would interpret the meaning of certain words, code words and phrases used in the intercepted calls; and that he would testify as to the street values of narcotics, law enforcement techniques, drug trafficking activities in general and at Bishop Manor in particular – reasonably disclosed the contours of that testimony. What the proffer did not reveal was that Lavis’ testimony on drug jargon and drug quantity would include interpreting terminology he encountered for the first time in this UNITED STATES V. VERA 23 investigation and noncoded words (such as “that” or “one”) used in particular contexts. As a consequence, the government did not disclose the methodology he would employ in doing so or, more generally, the foundation on which those opinions would rest. The proffer of his expertise rested solely on his general qualifications, training and experience: his employment as an agent of the FBI and his six years as a member of the Santa Ana Gang Task Force. The testimony elicited by the prosecutor on direct examination to support Lavis’ expert opinions similarly focused on his general training and experience and his familiarity with this investigation in particular without discussing any expert methodology he would apply.7 Up until Lavis actually began offering his opinions about the meaning of the intercepted calls, therefore, the defendants could have reasonably assumed that his drug quantity testimony would be limited to common code words for drugs that he learned through his training and experience. On the first day of trial, the defendants filed written objections to Franks’ proffered gang expert testimony and to two recorded phone calls the government intended to offer into evidence, which also related to the gang issues. They 7 This testimony included that he had developed expertise in narcotics trafficking organizations and techniques for investigating them during his eight years of involvement in several wiretap investigations; that, during that time, he had listened to many telephone calls between narcotics traffickers; that, as to this investigation, he had reviewed all the calls the government would introduce into evidence, as well as other intercepted calls, primarily to identify the voices in the calls, as he could not understand Spanish beyond a few code phrases used in narcotics trafficking, and most of the calls were in Spanish; and that he had familiarity with code words used by traffickers “[t]o avoid detection by law enforcement” and confirmed that the defendants used code words throughout the intercepted calls. 24 UNITED STATES V. VERA explicitly disclaimed objecting “to portions of the notice regarding . . . use of ‘code words,’ [and] the street value of identified narcotics in the area at the time,” although they reserved their “right to object depending upon the ultimate foundation,” and their “right to object to any matters not specifically identified in the notice.” They objected in a footnote to any testimony of the form, “Defendant X is legally responsible for participating in a conspiracy to distribute Y amount of narcotics.” This objection was not based on foundation under 701 or 702 but on mental state under Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b). The defendants did not raise any concerns about case agents testifying in both a lay and expert capacity, nor did they request further explanation of or the opportunity to explore Lavis’ methodology or the foundation for his opinions. The defendants did argue that expert reliance on “out-ofcourt statements of individuals such as informants and arrestees” constitutes “a repackaging of testimonial statements” that is “inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause.” When the district court heard oral argument on their written objections before testimony began on the third day of trial, the court acknowledged the defendants’ standing Crawford objection, explaining their “Crawford position is preserved,” but agreed with counsel’s suggestion that they would contemporaneously object on all other issues. On the merits of the defendants’ objection, the court stated it would “be real tight on requiring compliance with 703,” and would not “let an expert walk in hearsay.” Significantly, the court further advised counsel that an expert could testify “to sources that an expert in that particular field could reasonably rely upon,” and that it would at that time instruct the jury about “how they’re to treat the expert testimony and distinguish between reliance on an opinion, UNITED STATES V. VERA 25 those facts not coming into evidence for the truth, as opposed to the expert stating the bases for his opinion, consider what he has said in terms of assessing opinion, not for the truth of the statements.” No such instruction was ever given. Aside from the standing Crawford objection, the defense affirmatively acquiesced to the admission of Lavis’ drug quantity opinions. Defense counsel did specifically raise Lavis’ drug quantity testimony as an issue with the court, characterizing that testimony as “critical to the case.” The court explained Lavis would “have to have a percipient basis for that testimony.” The government responded with an oral proffer regarding the type of opinions Lavis was expected to offer.8 This proffer should have put the defendants on notice that Lavis would testify as to the meaning of, for example, the term “one” as opposed to common drug jargon, and that his opinions would be based in part “on the calls he has listened to and his knowledge of the investigation.” Nevertheless, the defense agreed that the government could proceed to elicit Lavis’ testimony and stated that such testimony would not be “per se, improper.” The defense did request – and was granted – additional time to review the summary of Lavis’ drug quantity opinions. 8 The government explained: What I expect Special Agent Lavis to testify about is, you know, for example, Exhibit 5. There is reference to get one and cook it. He is going to opine that the call, based on his review of all the calls, that that call is about one ounce of crack cocaine. And he will opine that there’s a series of calls on 5/13/08, all referencing the attempt to get one ounce of crack cocaine; and that is, he is going to opine based on the calls he has listened to and his knowledge of the investigation and the code words used in the calls. 26 UNITED STATES V. VERA Finally, during Lavis’ testimony itself, the defense rarely objected to his opinions, and most of those objections were cured by rephrasing the question. This underscores that many of the problems the defendants identify on appeal could likely have been averted through contemporaneous objections before the district court. 2. Instructional Error On this procedural record, we review the defendants’ Crawford argument de novo, see Gomez, 725 F.3d at 1125, and their remaining arguments for plain error, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 730–36 (1993). In light of our Circuit’s clearly expressed concerns about case agents testifying in both lay and expert capacities, the district court’s failure to give an instruction explaining Lavis’ dual roles was plain error. See Freeman, 498 F.3d at 904 (emphasizing “the necessity of making clear to the jury what the attendant circumstances are in allowing a government case agent to testify as an expert”). It is particularly plain given the district court’s own statement that it would give an instruction telling the jury how to evaluate Lavis’ expert opinion testimony. The absence of such an instruction prejudiced the defendants by materially increasing the risk that the jury gave Lavis’ testimony undue deference, a risk that is particularly acute with respect to the issue of drug quantity, for which – aside from 24 grams of heroin – his opinions comprised the sole evidence. Had the jury been instructed that the “facts” on which Lavis based his expert opinions should not be considered for their truth but only to assess the strength of his opinions, the jury would have been better able to question for UNITED STATES V. VERA 27 itself the reliability of Lavis’ interpretations of wiretapped conversations. Likewise, if the court had instructed the jury that Lavis’ lay opinion testimony was “not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge,” Fed. R. Evid. 701(c), it would have deterred the jury from viewing Lavis’ opinions as having the “imprimatur of scientific or technical validity.” Freeman, 498 F.3d at 903. This is especially true as to Lavis’ opinions that speakers’ vague references such as “that, “one” or “what we talked about earlier” were linked to narcotics transactions. Given the risk of undue deference from the jury, other errors in the record that might be individually harmless instead have a cumulative impact. For example, the “helpfulness” requirement of Rules 701 and 702 prohibits a witness from opining about the meaning of clear statements. See id. at 904–05 (“Although [an expert’s] interpretation of ambiguous statements [is] permissible under Fed. R. Evid. 701, ‘the interpretation of clear statements is not permissible, and is barred by the helpfulness requirement of both Fed. R. Evid. 701 and Fed. R. Evid. 702.’” (quoting United States v. Dicker, 853 F.2d 1103, 1109 (3d Cir. 1988))). Nevertheless, Lavis was at times called upon to interpret conversations that were well within the understanding of an ordinary juror.9 Individually, such opinions did not prejudice the defendants – after all, they were impermissible because 9 For example, Lavis explained that “bad” and “no good” meant that the product was of “poor quality” or “not good.” Similarly, he interpreted the demand that a supplier “lower the price for you, fool, because tell her that it is a little expensive, fool,” as meaning that “whatever she is selling it for, Mr. Vera probably feels it’s a little more expensive than what he wants to pay for it, so he’s trying to negotiate, maybe get the price lowered.” 28 UNITED STATES V. VERA their meaning was already clear. Cumulatively, however, they may have encouraged the jury to defer to Lavis’ opinions instead of listening to the calls and reaching an independent judgment. See id. at 903 (stating that “unnecessarily repetitive” testimony “may come dangerously close to usurping the jury’s function”) (quoting Dukagjini, 326 F.3d at 54). Particularly because the jury was uninformed about how to appropriately evaluate Lavis’ opinion testimony, these errors further erode our confidence in the jury’s verdict. 3. Specific Drug Quantity Problems Having set forth our underlying concerns with the jury verdict generally, we next focus on drug quantity, the issue most seriously affected by the instructional error. Given the sentencing structure of the Controlled Substances Act, which imposes higher statutory sentencing ranges for offenses involving quantities above certain threshold amounts, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(b), it is not surprising that drug quantity was the primary issue the defendants contested at trial. Drug quantity was such a critical issue that, in closing, the defense variously characterized the jury’s role as akin to “accounting,” “arithmetic” or “a tax audit.” Moreover, when multiple substances are at issue, what quantity is attributed to a particular drug type is also material because different threshold amounts are required for different substances; the highest statutory sentencing range, for example, requires an offense involving 5 kilograms of cocaine but only 280 grams of cocaine base. See id. § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii)–(iii). Accordingly, unreliable opinions attributing particular quantities of particular substances to the defendants pose a serious risk of prejudice to their substantial rights. Careful review of the record shows that the general failure to assure an adequate foundation for Lavis’ opinions resulted UNITED STATES V. VERA 29 in the admission of specific drug quantity opinions that did not rest on reliable methods. Even though the defendants forfeited the arguments they make on appeal by failing to contemporaneously object to any of this specific testimony, the district court plainly erred by allowing the admission of such testimony in the face of its “continuing responsibility of acting as the vigilant gatekeeper[] of expert testimony to ensure that it is reliable.” Freeman, 498 F.3d at 904; see also Dukagjini, 326 F.3d at 53 (requiring “vigilance by the trial court . . . when an expert, who is also the case agent, goes beyond interpreting code words and summarizes his beliefs about the defendant’s conduct based upon his knowledge of the case”). For example, an agent’s belief that the speaker is a trafficker of a particular substance does not satisfy Rule 702’s requirement that expert opinions be based on reliable methodology. See Hermanek, 289 F.3d at 1096 (holding that the agent’s interpretation of “cryptic language as referring to cocaine simply because he believed appellants to be cocaine traffickers” was “circular, subjective reasoning” that did “not satisfy the Rule 702 reliability requirement”). Yet Lavis relied on his belief that Manuel Duarte-Aguilera was a cocaine base dealer who provided ounce quantities to Salvador to interpret a reference to a “package of tortillas” as “one ounce of cocaine base,” a substance that carries more severe sentencing consequences than powder cocaine. The flaw in this methodology was confirmed when the government later admitted that Lavis’ assumption was actually wrong. After the close of its case, the government conceded by stipulation that this call actually “involved powder cocaine, not cocaine base, and that Manuel DuarteAguilera distributed both powder cocaine and cocaine base.” Notwithstanding this stipulation, Lavis had relied on his assumption that Duarte-Aguilera was an ounce distributor of 30 UNITED STATES V. VERA cocaine base as a partial reason to infer that several other calls referred to ounce quantities of cocaine base. He employed this same methodology to interpret additional calls involving other individuals, testifying that Gloria Calderon supplied ounce quantities of cocaine base, that Javier Camacho supplied ounce quantities of cocaine base and that Ruben Orejel was a heroin dealer. At other times, Lavis used the quoted price to deduce whether the conversations concerned cocaine powder or cocaine base. For example, he twice testified that the term “work” referred to cocaine base because the supplier quoted a price consistent with an ounce of cocaine base. There is nothing inherently unreliable about this methodology, but he later testified that the price range for an ounce of cocaine base and for powder cocaine is “roughly the same.” If the price ranges for cocaine base and cocaine powder were roughly equivalent, Lavis’ method for distinguishing them was not reliable. Finally, in one instance, Lavis’ opinion plainly rested on nothing more than speculation. The jury heard this conversation: [Phone ringing] ARMANDO: Hello? FILIPP: Hey, what’s up man? Are you uh – are you around right now? ARMANDO: Yeah. FILIPP: Alright, can I come – can I come by? UNITED STATES V. VERA 31 ARMANDO: Yeah. FILIPP: Okay, I’ll be there in like ten minutes. ARMANDO: Alright. FILIPP: Alright, bye. [End of conversation] As the defendants point out, “[n]either direct nor encoded references were made that could be construed as a desire to purchase narcotics.” Nevertheless, Lavis opined that, in this call, Filipp “was contacting Armando to obtain two ounces of heroin,” and that those two ounces would be “20 grams each, so two would be 40 grams,” because that is what he “knew [Filipp] to get in the investigation.” This opinion could not have been “rationally based on the witness’s perception,” Fed. R. Evid. 701(a), because Lavis’ knowledge that Filipp had obtained 40 grams of heroin from Armando on other occasions does not support the inference that this call – which includes no inculpatory, ambiguous or coded statements – was about his desire to do so again. Surveillance confirmed that Filipp visited Bishop Manor after similar calls, but it is pure speculation to equate a visit with the purchase of 40 grams of heroin, specifically. Such speculation is inadmissible testimony whether characterized as lay opinion, expert opinion or anything else, and its admission constituted plain error.10 10 There is also reason to suspect that Lavis’ lay opinion at times rested on testimonial hearsay, violating the defendants’ Confrontation Clause rights under Crawford, although the record does not allow a conclusive determination. Lavis frequently opined about the meaning of ambiguous 32 UNITED STATES V. VERA The government argues that this court’s recent decision in United States v. Gadson, 763 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2014), requires a finding that Agent Lavis’ direct knowledge of the investigation established sufficient foundation for the admission of his testimony, including the conclusions about drug quantity. But Gadson is distinguishable: it did not involve a qualified expert slipping into lay opinion without a proper jury instruction, nor did it involve such obvious flaws in the foundation for the officer’s conclusions on specific drug quantities.