Opinion ID: 1979294
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: We explore this question in light of principles that, while well-recognized, nonetheless are difficult to apply. Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 5(a) mandates that appeals to this court must be taken within thirty days from the entry of the order, judgment, or decree. The requirements of this rule are mandatory and jurisdictional. Failure to comply with rule 5(a) requires dismissal of the appeal. Kunau v. Miller, 328 N.W.2d 529, 530-31 (Iowa 1983); Neff v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 253 Iowa 98, 102, 111 N.W.2d 293, 296 (1961). Our case law is clear that there may be two final judgments or decrees in the same cause, the one settling the substantial merits of the case, and the other based upon further necessary proceedings, from each of which an appeal will lie. Iowa Public Service Co. v. City of Sioux City, 254 Iowa 22, 28, 116 N.W.2d 466, 469 (1962) (quoting 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 101, at 283 (1957)); see Rowen v. LeMars Mutual Insurance Co., 357 N.W.2d 579, 582 (Iowa 1984) (We find that the adjudication is final because the case falls within the rule that a case may have more than one final order.); Green v. Advance Homes, Inc., 293 N.W.2d 204, 207 (Iowa 1980) (A case, for purposes of appeal, may have more than one final order. Such an initial final order must establish the substantial rights of the parties and must place beyond the issuing court the power to return the parties to their original positions. (citations omitted)); Lyon v. Willie, 288 N.W.2d 884, 887 (Iowa 1980) (Two final orders are possible in a single case, one putting it beyond the power of the court to put the parties in their original positions in relation to a specific issue, and the other adjudicating remaining issues in the case.); In re Fenchel, 268 N.W.2d 207, 208-09 (Iowa 1978) (The original decree was final concerning the matters adjudicated, even though it expressly provided for a supplemental decree.); see also Moody v. Muscogee Manufacturing Co., 134 Ga. 721, 730-32, 68 S.E. 604, 608-09 (1910); McMurray v. Day, 70 Iowa 671, 672-74, 28 N.W. 476, 477 (1886). Every final adjudication of any of the rights of the parties in an action is a judgment. Iowa R.Civ.P. 219. In deciding what is a final adjudication we have refused to exalt form over substance, stating: The use of particular forms of words is not essential to a judgment. The sufficiency of a writing claimed to be a judgment is to be tested by its substance rather than its form. If it corresponds with the definition of a judgment and appears to have been intended by the court as the determination of the rights of the parties, and shows in intelligible language the relief granted, the absence of language commonly deemed especially appropriate to final judgments is not fatal. Flynn v. Lucas County Memorial Hospital, 203 N.W.2d 613, 614-15 (Iowa 1973) (quoting Whittier v. Whittier, 237 Iowa 655, 662, 23 N.W.2d 435, 440 (1946)). We consider the intentions of the trial court relevant to the issue of finality. Loudon v. Hill, 286 N.W.2d 189, 191 (Iowa 1979) (Moreover, the test of finality is whether the determination is dispositive of the case, and the intention of the trial court is relevant on that issue.). If it appears trial court intended its acts to be the entry of a judgment we should, if possible, avoid impairing its operation and validity. See Flynn, 203 N.W.2d at 615. Although ordinarily a judgment or decree incorporating a money award should specify the amount, absence of a stated sum is not necessarily fatal: The general rule is that a final judgment for money must specify the amount awarded or the means for determining that amount. Such award must be certain and definite as to the amount thereof, or be susceptible of being made so by proper construction or by mere mathematical computation.... Although some authorities do not permit reference to any aid outside the judgment to ascertain the amount for which it is rendered, ordinarily the amount of recovery, if not specified or if ambiguously stated in the adjudicating part of the judgment, may be supplied not only from other portions of the judgment, but also from the record as a whole, including the pleadings, the verdict of the jury, and bonds or other instruments filed in the case. 46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 81 (1969); cf. City of Fort Wayne v. Bentley, 181 Ind.App. 114, 122, 390 N.E.2d 1096, 1102-03 (1979) (Judgment was not defective for uncertainty when amount due the prevailing parties could be determined through a simple calculation.); Scheldrup v. Gaffney, 243 Iowa 1297, 1303-04, 55 N.W.2d 272, 275-76 (1952) (Judgment in equity was certain and definite even though provision awarding alimony and child support did not specify an exact dollar amount and required a mathematical calculation.). With these concepts in mind, we examine the January 23, 1985, Order, Judgment and Decree to determine whether it was a final judgment, and was so intended by the trial court. This instrument extends nineteen pages of legal-size paper in the district court file, not counting the master's report incorporated by reference, which in turn was spread on twenty pages of legal-size paper. The Order, Judgment and Decree was so captioned by the court. Separate divisions are subcaptioned Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Application for Temporary Injunction and Motion to Dissolve Injunction, and finally, Order, Judgment and Decree. The final division ordered Kerns to reimburse the corporation certain specified sums, held certain leases invalid, struck the provision of the stock pledge agreement waiving Hayes' right of redemption, transferred issues that should have been brought in equity to equity, dissolved the corporation and ordered its assets liquidated, provided for fees for the master, fixed attorney fees, and provided for division of costs. Most significant here is paragraph F of the final division, which states: All obligations of plaintiff on the promissory note dated February 13, 1979, are excused as of August 13, 1982, the date of the petition. Defendant shall have judgment against plaintiff for all principal and interest payments accrued to the date of the petition, in the amounts provided by law and by the agreement between parties. Defendant shall further be awarded judgment for interest, at the amount provided by law, for the period from the date of the petition to the date of this Order, Judgment and Decree. Defendant shall certify to Clerk of Court the amount due. These provisions plainly are final and definitive. See Citizens State Bank v. Central Savings Association, 267 N.W.2d 33, 34 (Iowa 1978) (The general test of finality is whether the trial court's ruling is decisive of the case.). The promissory note was reproduced in full in the pleadings and its execution and delivery there admitted. Trial court's fact-findings disclosed Hayes paid the installments of principal and interest due January 2, 1980, and January 2, 1981, and made no subsequent payments. There is no controversy concerning these facts. When the court excused Hayes from all obligations on the note following the filing of the petition on August 13, 1982, and provided for judgment against Hayes for all principal and interest accrued prior to that date, it is clear the reference could be only to the unpaid principal and interest due January 2, 1982, a point neither party contests. The remainder of the award against Hayes involves what should have been a simple mathematical computation of interest, utilizing the provisions of the note and the Iowa Code relating to interest. Although it is true, as Kerns contends, that a ruling is not final when the district court intends to do something further to signify its final determination of the case, In re Marriage of McCreary, 276 N.W.2d 399, 400 (Iowa 1979), trial court obviously intended its January 23, 1985, Order, Judgment and Decree to be final. Defendant was to compute and certify the amount, not to the court, but to the clerk of court, apparently for entry. The court reserved nothing for its further consideration. The final provision in the court's judgment and decree was significant as a clear warning to the parties: If no appeal is filed or perfected within the required time, Clerk of Court shall release the exhibits to the owner or their attorneys of record, upon a proper receipt executed on the docket by the recipient; otherwise, the exhibits may be destroyed by the Clerk [after] one year from this date as provided by Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure No. 253.1. [3] (Emphasis added.) Kerns concedes the January 23, 1985, judgment and decree is final in some respects because he contends we have no jurisdiction to review Hayes' claim that he should have been granted full rescission, an issue Kerns asserts was adjudicated in that determination and not appealed by Hayes. Kerns' contention he is rightfully here rests on the fragile premise that the second Supplemental Judgment, Order and Decree, drafted by him, contained the provision that the balance of the promissory note in the amount of $151,086.94 be and the same is hereby canceled. The controversy between these parties that arose subsequent to the January 23, 1985, judgment and decree, however, did not relate to the excused balance of the promissory note, nor to the unpaid installment of principal and interest due January 2, 1982, but related only to the computation of other interest. We are convinced the provision last quoted, relating to cancellation of the balance on the note, adds nothing to the holding of the first judgment, which excused Hayes from all payments subsequent to August 13, 1982. That determination, absent the posttrial motions identified in rule 5, placed it beyond the power of the court to return the parties to their original positions. See Green, 293 N.W.2d at 207. There was no appeal from that judgment and decree: Kerns' appeal was from the supplemental judgment and decree. Thus we likewise cannot modify that result unless we are in some manner foreclosed from reexamining the issue of our own jurisdiction. As bearing on this point we have written: Untimely appeals present questions of subject matter jurisdiction. The fact that lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time in a proceeding reflects the seriousness with which courts view jurisdictional matters. We raise matters of jurisdiction on our own motion. Our rules of civil and appellate procedure reflect that concern. District court may not relieve a party who fails to make a timely appeal, even when the failure is wholly due to the fault of another. Though we may enlarge or shorten the time prescribed by the rules of appellate procedure for the doing of any act, we are prohibited from enlarging the time for appeal except for the limited power provided by Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 20(b). Uchtorff v. Dahlin, 363 N.W.2d 264, 267 (Iowa 1985) (citations omitted); see Tigges v. City of Ames, 356 N.W.2d 503, 510 (Iowa 1984); State v. Ryan, 351 N.W.2d 186, 187 (Iowa 1984). Even though a three-justice panel of this court (a statutory quorum under Iowa Code section 602.4101(1)) has overruled Hayes' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, we hold that as long as the case is before us we may reexamine our jurisdiction in light of further study and oral submission of the case. This holding is consistent with the rule in trial court that provides, [u]ntil ... a final order or decree [is] rendered, the trial court will have the power to correct any of the rulings, orders, or partial summary judgments it has already entered. Mason City Production Credit Association v. Van Duzer, 376 N.W.2d 882, 885 (Iowa 1985); see Davenport Bank & Trust Co. v. City of Davenport, 318 N.W.2d 451, 455 (Iowa 1982); Avoca State Bank v. Merchants Mutual Bonding Co., 251 N.W.2d 533, 539 (Iowa 1977); Cowman v. La Vine, 234 N.W.2d 114, 124 (Iowa 1975). We hold the January 23, 1985, unappealed judgment and decree was a final adjudication of all the issues raised by the appeal and cross-appeal except the subsequent controversy relating to interest. We thus have jurisdiction to consider only that issue.