Opinion ID: 1196239
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: evidentiary claims of error

Text: The decisions of the district court concerning the admission of witness testimony and the admission of evidence procured from a second search of the trailer are reviewed under the same standard of review. We recently summarized the considerations relevant to review of evidentiary rulings in Solis v. State, 981 P.2d 34 (Wyo.1999): Evidentiary rulings are within the sound discretion of the trial court and include determinations of the adequacy of foundation and relevancy, competency, materiality, and remoteness of evidence. Punches v. State, 944 P.2d 1131, 1136-37 (Wyo. 1997). This court will generally accede to the trial court's determination of the admissibility of evidence unless that court clearly abused its discretion. Brown v. State, 944 P.2d 1168, 1170 (Wyo.1997); Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 218 (Wyo. 1994). In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, the query is whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did, and whether its ruling was arbitrary or capricious. Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151-52 (Wyo.1998). The burden of establishing such abuse lies with the defendant. Barnes v. State, 858 P.2d 522, 527 (Wyo.1993). If the trial court erred by admitting evidence, we then must ascertain whether the error affects any substantial rights of the accused, providing grounds for reversal, or whether it is harmless. The harmless error standard is set out in W.R.A.P. 9.04: Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded by the reviewing court. See also W.R.Cr.P. 52. An error is harmful if there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been more favorable to the defendant if the error had never occurred. Kolb v. State, 930 P.2d 1238, 1247 (Wyo.1996); Kerns v. State, 920 P.2d 632, 641 (Wyo.1996). To demonstrate harmful error, the defendant must show prejudice under circumstances which manifest inherent unfairness and injustice, or conduct which offends the public sense of fair play. Johnson v. State, 790 P.2d 231, 232 (Wyo.1990); see also Roderick v. State, 858 P.2d 538, 550 (Wyo.1993). Id. at 36.
Rosemary Bratton has extensive experience working with both battered and battering spouses and has previously testified as an expert on the subject of Battered Woman Syndrome (BWS). BWS experts generally attempt to explain the irrational behavior of battered spouses, such as seeking withdrawal of a protective order or continually returning to an abusive spouse. Here, however, the State made known to defense counsel that Bratton would also testify about the characteristics of batterers and the kind of conduct they tend to exhibit. Ryan objected to that portion of the Bratton testimony pertaining to anything he might have done. While the trial judge admitted that he was having trouble determining the relevancy of Bratton's testimony concerning Ryan's actual or possible actions; ultimately, she was allowed to testify. At trial, Bratton began by explaining the now familiar characteristics of BWS to the jury. She explained the cyclical pattern of violence often present in abusive relationships and then went on to describe a phenomena termed, separation violence: Q. Now, is there any particular phase of this cycle of violence which tends to be more dangerous than another? A. Yes. And we actually term it now as separation violence. What I know from my experience and what we know from the literature and the research that has been done is that the time that the victim is planning to leave or has left this relationship is the time of the greatest danger. That's the time more homicides are committed, that's the time when there's greater physical injury, and it happens because perpetrators of domestic violence who need to maintain power and control over their partner become extremely upset, nervous, agitated when they feel that they are losing that control. When they feel that that person is actually going to leave them, then it becomes far more dangerous for the victim, because the violence will escalate to whatever it takes to prevent this person from actually leaving. They are losing control, they are losing access to this individual, and it's a very very dangerous time for victims. Q. Now, this separation violence is what you've termed this; is that correct? A. That's correct. Q. And have there been any studies done here in Wyoming on that issue? A. Yes, there have. There's a study that our coalition sponsored. We started this study in the early '90s, and we went back to 1985 and looked at those incidents of domestic homicides in our state, and one of the interesting facts that we learned was that of theof the 38 individuals that that are a part of our research, 16 of those had actually left the relationship. Bratton added that the majority of the women involved in the study were killed with guns. She then described those characteristics exhibited by batterers. She testified that batterers tend to control and isolate their spouses by such means as constant calls to their place of employment, demanding to know where they are, who they are with, and when they will return. Bratton stated that batterers will often threaten to commit suicide in order to force their partner to remain in the relationship. She testified that batterers tend to abuse their spouses emotionally through constant criticism. She also testified that batterers tend to exhibit pathological jealousy often accusing their spouses of having adulterous affairs with random strangers. The prosecutor argued, and the district court agreed, that separation violence is a logical extension of BWS. Ryan argued that under W.R.E. 404(a), such an extension is not admissible. W.R.E. 404(a) prohibits use of evidence of a person's character if used to prove that he acted in conformity therewith. If offered pursuant to W.R.E. 404(b) [3] , evidence which implies bad character is admissible for a limited purpose, but not to show conduct conforming to character. A large part of the testimony which portrayed Ryan as an angry and violent person who expressed that violence toward his wife was admitted for W.R.E. 404(b) reasons. That testimony was not offered for the purpose of showing that he acted in conformity therewith, but rather to show motive, intent, or identity. The expert testimony on separation violence, however, was not offered under W.R.E. 404(b), and, therefore, we must determine if it violates W.R.E. 404(a). W.R.E. 404(a), provides in pertinent part: (a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion[.] Mueller and Kirkpatrick explain the rule's purpose this way: FRE 404(a) states the crucial principle that evidence of the character of a person is generally inadmissible to prove conduct on a particular occasion. There are important exceptions, but the principle applies broadly in both civil and criminal cases. The idea is that character should not be used, for the most part, as circumstantial evidence of behavior. The principle blocks resort to the general propensity argumentthe argument that since a person is, for instance, by disposition violent, it follows that he likely committed the violent act giving rise to the present charges. Christopher B. Mueller and Laird C. Kirkpatrick, 1 Federal Evidence, § 100, at 539 (2d ed.1994). Justice Jackson more forcefully explained in Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 69 S.Ct. 213, 93 L.Ed. 168 (1948): Courts that follow the common-law tradition almost unanimously have come to disallow resort by the prosecution to any kind of evidence of a defendant's evil character to establish a probability of his guilt. Not that the law invests the defendant with a presumption of good character, ... but it simply closes the whole matter of character, disposition and reputation on the prosecution's case-in-chief. The state may not show defendant's prior trouble with the law, specific criminal acts, or ill name among his neighbors, even though such facts might logically be persuasive that he is by propensity a probable perpetrator of the crime. The inquiry is not rejected because character is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to weigh too much with the jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular charge. The overriding policy of excluding such evidence, despite its admitted probative value, is the practical experience that its disallowance tends to prevent confusion of issues, unfair surprise and undue prejudice. Id., 335 U.S. at 475-76, 69 S.Ct. at 218-19 (citation and footnotes omitted). At the outset, we must determine whether separation violence evidence falls within the emerging field of social framework and syndrome evidence. In general, BWS and other syndrome evidence is considered a proper subject for expert testimony, and does not implicate the proscription against character evidence. See Mueller and Kirkpatrick, 3 Federal Evidence, § 351 (2d ed.1994). According to Mueller and Kirkpatrick: Usually framework and syndrome evidence is offered by prosecutors and relates to the victim, as in sexual assault and child abuse trials. But sometimes it is offered by the defense and relates to defendants, as in the setting of homicide trials of women charged with killing husbands or intimate companions. And typical patterns of usage do not always hold true, for defendants sometimes offer evidence that patterns of behavior or attitudes in the alleged victim did not fit the syndrome and prosecutors sometimes offer evidence of battered women syndrome in trials of men to explain the victim's behavior. Id. at 633 (Emphasis added.) When such evidence is raised by the prosecution in its case-in-chief and relates to the defendant, however, the testimony draws close to commenting directly on what likely happened and looks like character evidence after all. Id. at 637. In such situations, Mueller and Kirkpatrick recognize that: The traditional sensitivity accorded to defense rights in criminal cases warrants special care when government experts are talking about the defendant, even if their testimony stops at one remove from direct comments on what the defendant likely did or thought. Id. at 637. Expert testimony on BWS which relates to the victim is entirely proper. Evidence concerning the defendant's involvement, however, demands close scrutiny under the character evidence rules. This is so even if reference to the defendant may only be inferred from the testimony. Bratton did not say that because Ryan was possessed of a violent character he acted in conformity therewith on the night of the murder. She was more subtle, but the effect was the same. After showing that the subjects of the study tended to commit homicide when faced with the prospect of separation, she impliedly invited the jury to group Ryan among those subjects and by this method determine conduct. Finding guilt by reference to common characteristics of a class of individuals to which one belongs raises the specter of profile evidence. Profile or syndrome evidence is developed through expert testimony and tends to classify people by their shared physical, emotional, or mental characteristics. State v. Percy, 146 Vt. 475, 507 A.2d 955, 960 (1986) (citing 1 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence § 401[10], at 88-91 (1985)). In the context of drug courier profiles, a profile has been characterized as, an informal compilation of characteristics often displayed by those trafficking in drugs, and as an `abstract of characteristics found to be typical of persons transporting illegal drugs.' Similarly, Chief Justice Rehnquist has described the profile as essentially an investigative tool involving characteristics recognizable to trained officers. A `profile' is, in effect the collective or distilled experience of narcotics officers concerning characteristics repeatedly seen in drug smugglers. United States v. Quigley, 890 F.2d 1019, 1021 (8th Cir.1989) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1091, 110 S.Ct. 1163, 107 L.Ed.2d 1066 (1990). Translated into the battering spouse context, a profile is a compilation of characteristics repeatedly seen in those who batter their spouses. While our research has not disclosed any case dealing specifically with battering spouses, other jurisdictions in different contexts have dealt with similar attempts to construct a criminal profile for the purpose of proving conduct in conformity therewith. Those jurisdictions that have considered profiles of battering parents, pedophiles, rapists, and drug couriers unanimously agree that the prosecution may not offer such evidence in its case-in-chief as substantive evidence of guilt. These cases generally articulate three evidentiary bases for excluding evidence tending to establish that the defendant fits a particular profile: 1) relevancy; 2) probative value substantially outweighed by prejudicial effect; and 3) impermissible character evidence. Many courts find profile evidence irrelevant. [4] Commonwealth v. Day, 409 Mass. 719, 569 N.E.2d 397 (1991) aptly articulated the reasoning for such a conclusion: A criminal trial is by its very nature an individualized adjudication of a defendant's guilt or legal innocence. Testimony regarding a criminal profile is nothing more than an expert's opinion as to certain characteristics which are common to some or most of the individuals who commit particular crimes. Evidence of a child battering profile does not meet the relevancy test, because the mere fact that a defendant fits the profile does not tend to prove that a particular defendant physically abused the victim. Id. at 399. See also, Percy, 507 A.2d at 960 (Evidence that other rapists often excused or explained their conduct the way the defendant did was not relevant.); State v. Clements, 244 Kan. 411, 770 P.2d 447, 454 (1989) (Evidence which only describes the characteristics of the typical offender has no relevance to whether the defendant committed the crime in question.); United States v. Simpson, 910 F.2d 154, 157 (4th Cir.1990) (Proof that a person fits the drug courier profile, unsupported by evidence of drug trafficking, proves nothing.); State v. Maule, 35 Wash.App. 287, 667 P.2d 96, 99 (1983) (The relevance of testimony that the majority of child abuse cases involved a male parent figure is not readily discernable.); State v. Brown, 370 S.2d 547, 552 (La.1979) (Unable to see how evidence of drug courier profile is relevant to any issue of innocence or guilt at the trial on the merits.); Duley v. State, 56 Md.App. 275, 467 A.2d 776, 780 (1983) (Evidence of child abuser profile is totally irrelevant because it does not tend to prove that the defendant committed the acts of abuse attributed to him.); United States v. Hernandez-Cuartas, 717 F.2d 552, 555 (11th Cir. 1983), rehearing denied, 721 F.2d 822 (11th Cir.1983) (Drug courier profile evidence is nothing more than the opinion of those officers conducting an investigation, and it cannot be used as substantive evidence of guilt.); State v. Hansen, 304 Or. 169, 743 P.2d 157, 161 (1987) (That child abusers use certain techniques to get near their victims has no bearing on whether a person who does these things is a child abuser.); and People v. Bradley, 172 Ill.App.3d 545, 122 Ill.Dec. 523, 526 N.E.2d 916, 921 (1988) (Evidence showing characteristics of child abuse perpetrators was in no way probative or relevant to the question of whether the defendant committed the crime.). Even assuming that profile testimony is in some degree relevant to the issues at trial, the danger of unfair prejudice to the accused has generally been found to outweigh the probative value. [5] See Percy, 507 A.2d at 960-61; Simpson, 910 F.2d at 157; Maule, 667 P.2d at 99; Duley, 467 A.2d at 780; Brown, 370 S.2d at 552; Day, 569 N.E.2d at 399; United States v. Jones, 913 F.2d 174, 177 (4th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1052, 111 S.Ct. 766, 112 L.Ed.2d 785 (1991); and Bradley, 122 Ill.Dec. 523, 526 N.E.2d at 921. Finally, profile evidence is often found to be an impermissible attack on the defendant's character. [6] See State v. Hester, 114 Idaho 688, 760 P.2d 27, 33 (Id.1988); In the Interest of D.L., 401 N.W.2d 201, 203 (Iowa App.1986); People v. Walkey, 177 Cal.App.3d 268, 223 Cal.Rptr. 132, 138 (1986); State v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 58, 62-64 (Minn.1981); Sanders v. State, 251 Ga. 70, 303 S.E.2d 13, 18 (1983); Haakanson v. State, 760 P.2d 1030, 1035-36 (Alaska 1988); and Bradley, 122 Ill.Dec. 523, 526 N.E.2d at 921. We hold that the evidence pertaining to separation violence was inadmissable. Our ruling does not, however, proscribe BWS testimony in general, and we reaffirm our prior decisions which have allowed expert testimony to explain the behavior of a battered spouse. See Trujillo v. State, 953 P.2d 1182, 1183 (Wyo.1998). We must now determine whether the error was harmless. [7] Generally, profile evidence consists of a compilation of otherwise innocent characteristics, coupled with an implicit invitation to infer criminal conduct from those characteristics. In the present case, however, the characteristics of the profile consist of prior bad acts, which have independent evidentiary significance. That is, they tend to prove motive, intent, and identity. Aside from the formidable body of prior bad acts evidence, there was substantial physical evidence indicating Ryan's guilt. Keri was killed while lying prone on the bed. Her body was moved and the gun placed under her hand after she was shot. There was no evidence of struggle or suicide. After shooting Keri, Ryan admittedly shot himself and called 911, but it was his, rather than Keri's, impending demise that prompted the call. The objectionable statements consist of two short answers made during more than a week of testimony, and the prosecutor only briefly discussed the testimony in closing argument. Where, as here, there is substantial evidence of guilt, and the State has not unduly emphasized the objectionable testimony, we cannot say that there is a reasonable probability that the result would have been more favorable to Ryan had the error never occurred. The error was harmless.
Ryan also claimed in a pretrial motion that Stephanie Ryan (Stephanie), his five-year-old daughter, was incompetent to testify. Stephanie inaccurately stated during her deposition that she heard her mother say Please don't kill me when the police were in the trailer. As Keri was dead at the time the officers arrived, this statement was verifiably inaccurate. Additionally, Ryan claimed that Keri's parents, who took custody of the children after the shootings, bore undisputed malice toward Ryan and had influenced Stephanie's proposed testimony. The trial judge read Stephanie's deposition and found that while there were some inconsistencies in the child's testimony, she was competent to testify. At trial, Stephanie demonstrated that she knew her birthday, her age, where she went to school, her address, her telephone number, and the names and ages of the people and animals with whom she lived. She remembered that she used to live in Green River in a trailer with her parents. She remembered her teacher and fellow students from her time in school in Green River. She stated that she knew the difference between the truth and a lie and gave examples of each. She also stated that she understood the oath to be a promise to God. Stephanie then testified that on December 11, 1996, her parents had been fighting throughout the day. She remembered that her mother made her Spaghettios for dinner. She testified that Ryan telephoned his employer and stated that he could not come to work that evening. This testimony was corroborated by Ryan's employer. Stephanie then testified that she heard Ryan say, We're going to work this out until we both die. At some point later in the evening, Stephanie also heard Keri say, Please don't kill me. Consistent with her deposition testimony, Stephanie stated that officers were present when she heard her mother beg for her life. The State also presented testimony from Keri's parents and a counselor from Southwest Counseling Service who interviewed Stephanie in April of 1997, which showed that Stephanie's testimony had remained consistent throughout the period between the shootings and trial. The competency of child witnesses is determined by the application of a five-part test. The child must demonstrate: (1) an understanding of the obligation to speak the truth on the witness stand; (2) the mental capacity at the time of the occurrence concerning which he is to testify, to receive an accurate impression of it; (3) a memory sufficient to retain an independent recollection of the occurrence; (4) the capacity to express in words his memory of the occurrence; and (5) the capacity to understand simple questions about it. English v. State, 982 P.2d 139, 145 (Wyo. 1999), (quoting Larsen v. State, 686 P.2d 583, 585 (Wyo.1984)). Moreover, we have said that, Intelligence, not age, is the guiding criteria in determining the competency of a witness. Id. (quoting Baum v. State, 745 P.2d 877, 879 (Wyo.1987)). Stephanie demonstrated an understanding of the obligation to speak the truth by her statement that the oath was a promise to God. The accuracy with which she recalled the verifiable details about the night her mother was shot demonstrates that she had sufficient mental capacity to receive an accurate impression of the event. That Stephanie's memory proved fallible on one point does not demonstrate the absence of an independent recollection. Her memory of the event as a whole must be considered in ascertaining whether she actually had an independent recollection of the events. Clearly, she did. Her recitation of the events to which she was privy on that night has not changed since her initial interview, and much of her testimony has been corroborated without her knowledge. There is no question that Stephanie has been able to communicate what she recalled and to understand simple questions about the event. Regarding Ryan's claims that Stephanie has been tainted by her grandparents, we find no evidence supporting such a claim. Recently, in English, supra, we stated that a party claiming that a child's testimony has been tainted by improper influences must show some evidence of improper influence before a competency hearing is necessary. English, 982 P.2d at 146. Ryan has failed to present any evidence that Stephanie's maternal grandparents, the prosecution, or anyone else, influenced her testimony by either undue suggestiveness or outright coercion. We find that the district court's determination that Stephanie was competent to testify was proper.
Jeanette Hopkins (Hopkins), who had been Keri's friend since high school, had witnessed Ryan abuse and control Keri several times. The State notified defense counsel in a pretrial motion of its intent to present testimony via video teleconference because Hopkins, a resident of Georgia, was in the midst of a high risk pregnancy and had been advised by her doctor not to travel. Before Hopkins testified, the trial judge advised defense counsel that there is usually a delay inherent in teleconferences and defense counsel should view the procedure himself prior to Hopkins' testimony. Counsel did not avail himself of this opportunity. The Hopkins testimony was transmitted to Western Wyoming Community College, and the jury was seated before the receiving unit. Before testifying, Hopkins was sworn in Georgia. Hopkins testified about instances of abuse that she witnessed between Ryan and Keri, and only after the jury was removed from the teleconference facility did defense counsel move that all of Hopkins' testimony be stricken. Defense counsel asserted that he could not view her demeanor, and that she could not see Ryan, except for the moment when defense counsel stated that he had no questions. Defense counsel argued that the inability of the jury to assess Hopkins' credibility and her inability to see Ryan violated his right to confrontation. The trial judge stated: I will agree with you, [defense counsel], that the three images that we saw, the images of the Green River audience and the attorneys speaking was of one quality. In between was the image from thethe [operator] in [Cheyenne]. . . . . Okay. That was an in-between quality that did have a delayed image, but it was of a better quality picture, I felt, and then the third image, which was of a third quality was the image of thethe witness, Ms. Hopkins, who was testifying. I do not believe that this deprived the Defendant of his right of confrontation, and so I'm denying your motion. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 10, of the Wyoming Constitution secure to all criminal defendants the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. The right to confrontation: (1) insures that the witness will give his statements under oaththus impressing him with the seriousness of the matter and guarding against the lie by the possibility of a penalty for perjury; (2) forces the witness to submit to cross-examination, the `greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth'; [and] (3) permits the jury that is to decide the defendant's fate to observe the demeanor of the witness in making his statement, thus aiding the jury in assessing his credibility. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970) (footnote omitted). Thus, the right to confrontation primarily secures the reliability of the evidence offered by the State. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990). While it has been broadly stated that the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees the defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact, Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016, 108 S.Ct. 2798, 101 L.Ed.2d 857 (1988), it is generally accepted that the confrontation clause actually reflects a preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial. Craig, 497 U.S. at 849, 110 S.Ct. 3157 (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980)) (emphasis in original). The preference must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243, 15 S.Ct. 337, 39 L.Ed. 409 (1895). Where the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured or an important public policy will be furthered, a criminal defendant may be denied the right to confrontation. Craig, 497 U.S. at 850, 110 S.Ct. 3157. In the present case, Ryan asserts that the State did not show that denial of a face-to-face confrontation furthered an important public policy, or that the reliability of the testimony was otherwise assured by circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness; therefore, he was entitled to a face-to-face confrontation. We agree. Ryan does not, however, assert that had the technology worked perfectly, he would have been denied the functional equivalent of a face-to-face confrontation. Therefore, the question presented is whether poor picture quality can eviscerate the face-to-face character of teleconference technology and, if so, whether such was the case here. In Commonwealth v. Bergstrom, 402 Mass. 534, 524 N.E.2d 366 (1988), the court found that the quality of videotaped testimony was insufficient to allow the jury to properly fulfill its responsibilities. After reviewing the tapes, the court said, Many of the technical aspects of these videotapes are troublesome. The color and sound were not true.... The court reporter, who watched the jury's monitor, at times had difficulty hearing the proceedings, as did we. At one point, the screen went blank. Sounds that ordinarily would be minor background noisessuch as a truck passing outside, or one of the attorneys ripping a piece of paper from a padwhen carried over the audio portion of the transmission were highly magnified and distracting. Often the child [witness] would play with the microphone wire, creating very loud crackling noises that interfered with both sound and concentration. Due to the camera angle, throughout much of the first child's appearance her right hand fully or partially obscured her face; at times, when she leaned back in the chair, her face was nearly out of camera range. The electronic techniques that were used showed neither the face of the judge presiding nor the image of the attorneys. The disembodied voices of the participants in the interrogations were transmitted. Also, unidentified persons were seen on the screen without explanation. Id. at 375. The court went on to conclude that the videotaped testimony was not equivalent to personal observation by the jury. There is a point where insufficient technology can jeopardize substantive rights. That point, however, is not readily ascertainable from the cold record. Whether testimony taken by electronic means sufficiently allows the jury to measure the witness' demeanor and provides face-to-face confrontation between the accused and the accuser lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. The trial judge witnessed Hopkins' testimony, and determined that, while the picture was not perfect, it did not deprive Ryan of his right to confrontation. There was no objection to the quality of the sound, and no one complained that they could not hear the testimony. Moreover, Hopkins' testimony was merely cumulative of other prior bad acts evidence. The district court properly denied the motion to strike Hopkins' testimony.
In a motion for discovery the State requested access to the trailer so that its out-of-state expert witness could examine it. In response, defense counsel stated, Well, I think that that needs to be dealt with as a search warrant. I'm not consenting. The court and counsel then discussed whether the district court had authority to grant permission to the State to enter without a search warrant. Neither party produced any pertinent authority on the question, and the matter was left with the understanding that if there's a legal basis for [the district court] to issue an order without a warrant or remove a warrant, [the State will] approach it that way, let [defense counsel] know it's coming, and if not, [the State will] do a search warrant. Ultimately, the State did seek and was issued a search warrant from the county court. Ryan moved to suppress any evidence obtained from the search, and that motion was denied. Ryan contends that the county court was without jurisdiction to issue the search warrant, as the case had been transferred to the district court pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 5.1 [8] Additionally, Ryan asserts that once a case has been transferred to the district court, that court has exclusive jurisdiction to manage discovery, pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 16. The State responds that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-7-101, [9] which authorizes county court judges to issue warrants, is controlling. The authority of the county court to issue a search warrant is statutory and cannot be abrogated or altered by court rule. Pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-2-114 (LEXIS 1999): The supreme court of Wyoming may from time to time adopt, modify and repeal general rules and forms governing pleading, practice and procedure, in all courts of this state, for the purpose of promoting the speedy and efficient determination of litigation upon its merits. However, (b) Such rules shall neither abridge, enlarge nor modify the substantive rights of any person nor the jurisdiction of any of the courts nor change the provisions of any statute of limitations. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-2-115(b) (LEXIS 1999). Therefore, county courts cannot be divested of their authority to issue a search warrant by W.R.Cr.P. 5.1. Ryan correctly notes that the district court has exclusive jurisdiction to control discovery. Pursuant to that authority, the court may at any time order that the discovery or inspection be denied, restricted, or deferred, or make such other order as is appropriate. W.R.Cr.P. 16(d)(1). Therefore, while the district court has no power to prevent the issuance of a warrant from the county court, it does have the authority to prevent the litigants before it from seeking a search warrant, or, pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 16(d)(2), from using evidence obtained thereby at trial. In the absence of such an order directing discovery, however, litigants are free to pursue any authorized avenue of discovery available to them. There has been no contention that the warrant was not supported by probable cause, that Ryan's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures has been violated, or that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence. Therefore, we find that admission of the evidence obtained by the second search warrant was proper.