Opinion ID: 215845
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Facts of Mr. Yelloweagle's Case

Text: In 2005, Mr. Yelloweagle pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado to abusive sexual conduct in Indian country, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2244(a)(2) and 1153. He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of a year and a day, to be followed by a one-year term of supervised release. One of the conditions of Mr. Yelloweagle's supervised release was that he register with the state sex offender registration agency in the state where [he] resides, works, or is a student. R., Vol. 1, at 105 (J. in Crim. Case, filed Mar. 30, 2005). After his sentencing, but before the expiration of his term of supervised release, Congress enacted SORNA. Mr. Yelloweagle maintained his registration information in Colorado until May 13, 2007, when he missed a scheduled registration update. He eventually turned up in Oklahoma, where he was implicated in another sex crime. Federal authorities in Colorado subsequently indicted him for violating 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)(2)(A). [1] Mr. Yelloweagle moved to dismiss the indictment, contending, inter alia, that Congress lacked the power under the Constitution to enact either the registration requirement, § 16913, or the enforcement provision, § 2250(a)(2)(A). First, as to the registration requirement, Mr. Yelloweagle asserted that § 16913 was invalid because it purported to require registration of all sex offenders, regardless of whether they had crossed state lines. He argued that Congress lacked the authority to impose such a requirement under the Commerce Clause, see U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.), or under any other provision of the Constitution. Because registration under § 16913 is an element of § 2250(a), Mr. Yelloweagle reasoned that if the registration requirement was invalid, then his indictment must be dismissed. Second, even if § 16913 passed constitutional muster, Mr. Yelloweagle argued that § 2250(a)(2)(A) itself was invalid because it purported to criminalize the failure to register by all federal sex offenders. He contended that Congress lacked the power under the Commerce Clause, or any other provision of the Constitution, to enact such a broad enforcement provision. The district court denied Mr. Yelloweagle's motion, concluding that Congress's authority to criminalize defendants' initial sex offenses empowered it to enact the statute at issue here. Congress, the district court stated, does not need to provide any outside source of authority for this legislation. R., Vol. 1, at 203 (Order, filed Dec. 23, 2008). Mr. Yelloweagle subsequently pleaded guilty to violating § 2250(a)(2)(A), but reserved the right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss. He filed a timely notice of appeal. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.