Opinion ID: 1391727
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: fact of violation

Text: Appellant argues that § 14-3-105, W.S. 1977 (indecent liberties statute) was repealed by implication through the enactment of § 6-4-305, W.S. 1977 (fourth-degree sexual assault statute) and § 6-4-504, W.S. 1977 (child abuse statute), which, he contends, are more specific with regard to the prohibited acts, and the provisions of which, he contends, are inconsistent and repugnant to § 14-3-105. Appellant concludes that he could not be accused of violating § 14-3-105 inasmuch as it was repealed by implication; that he could not be accused of violation of § 6-4-305 inasmuch as there was not a four-year differential between his age and that of the victim (he lacked three days of being four years older than the victim); and that he could not be accused of violation of § 6-4-504 inasmuch as he was not an adult (he was 18 years of age). Not only is appellant's contention subject to criticism in that § 14-3-105 is a later enactment (last enacted in 1978) than §§ 6-4-305 and 6-4-504 (enacted in 1977), but the question of inconsistency and implied repeal was not presented to the trial court. A contention for error first raised on appeal will not be considered unless it qualifies as plain error. Hampton v. State, Wyo., 558 P.2d 504 (1977). The plain-error doctrine is to be applied cautiously and in exceptional circumstances. Hampton v. State, supra; Downs v. State, Wyo., 581 P.2d 610 (1978).    For this court to invoke the plain-error rule, as embodied in Rule 49(b), W.R.Cr.P., three specific criteria must be fulfilled: first, the record must be clear as to the incident that occurred at trial that is alleged as error; second, the proponent of the rule must demonstrate a violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law; and third, the proponent must prove that a substantial right has been violated and that the defendant has been materially prejudiced by that violation. [Citations.] These requirements must be fulfilled even if constitutional rights are involved. Madrid v. State, Wyo., 592 P.2d 709, 710 (1979). The violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law has not been here demonstrated. In this respect, it is appropriate to review the law as it relates to probation revocation. The imposition of probation and, therefore, the revocation, lie in the sound discretion of the district court. `   All that is essential is the court's conscientious judgment after hearing the facts that the violation has occurred. This should not be an arbitrary action and should include a consideration of both the reasons underlying the original imposition of conditions, the violation of these, and the reasons leading to such violation.   ' State v. Reisch, Wyo., 491 P.2d 1254, 1255 (1971). See Sanchez v. State, Wyo., 592 P.2d 1130 (1979). Buck v. State, Wyo., 603 P.2d 878, 879 (1979). The sufficiency of the evidence to sustain an order revoking probation is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court and its action will be reversed only upon a clear showing of abuse of discretion. The court cannot act arbitrarily, however, or according to whim or caprice. 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law § 568, p. 536 (1965). The evidence need not establish the violation beyond a reasonable doubt. 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1572(4), p. 505 (1961); State v. Fortier, 20 Or. App. 613, 533 P.2d 187, 188 (1975). A probationer or parolee is not entitled to the full panoply of rights that attend a criminal prosecution. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972); United States v. Strada, 8 Cir.1974, 503 F.2d 1081. In such final hearing, the usual rules of evidence need not be applied, United States v. Cates, C.A. 4th (1968), 402 F.2d 473, 474[5], and it is not required that the evidence have shown beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Mills violated the conditions of his probation, Manning v. United States, C.A. 5th (1947), 161 F.2d 827, 829[7], certiorari denied (1947), 332 U.S. 792, 68 S.Ct. 102, 92 L.Ed. 374. If the evidence satisfies the presiding judge that the conduct of the probationer has not measured-up to the terms and conditions of his probation, in its discretion the Court will revoke the probation. See Burns v. United States (1932), 287 U.S. 216, 221, 53 S.Ct. 154, 77 L.Ed. 266, 269.    United States v. Mills, E.D.Tenn., 444 F. Supp. 26, 27 (1977). Revocation of probation because of a violation of law is not precluded although the probationer is acquitted in a criminal proceeding predicated on such violation. Johnson v. State, 142 Ga. App. 124, 235 S.E.2d 550 (1977); Jones v. State, 142 Ga. App. 274, 235 S.E.2d 681 (1977); Bernal-Zazueta v. United States, 9 Cir.1955, 225 F.2d 64. A few jurisdictions have taken a contrary position as to this point. See Annotation, Probation Revocation-Following Acquittal, 76 A.L.R.3d 564 (1977). Probation may be revoked on the basis of conduct which falls short of criminal conduct. United States v. Chambers, 3 Cir.1970, 429 F.2d 410; State v. Reisch, supra. In general, it can be said that the determination of whether or not a probationer has violated the terms and conditions of his probation is within the sound discretion of the court and is not subject to reversal on appeal unless the discretion is abused. State v. Reisch, supra. A court does not abuse its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances. In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could reasonably conclude as it did. An abuse of discretion has been said to mean an error of law committed by the court under the circumstances.    Martinez v. State, Wyo., 611 P.2d 831, 838 (1980). Turning then to the action taken in this case by the trial court, it carefully informed appellant of the consequences of violation of the terms of probation. The following was said at the time of sentence: THE COURT: It's the judgment and sentence then of this court, Mr. Ketcham, that you are hereby sentenced for a period of from two to five years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary. I'm going to suspend the imposition of the sentence and place you on probation for a five-year period upon the following terms and conditions; that you be under the supervision of the Wyoming State Probation and Parole Department and that you abide by the rules and regulations of the State Probation and Parole Department; that you not commit any other crimes during that five-year period, which is the term of your probation, because if you violate any of the laws of any municipality, of any state, or of the nation during that time period, you would be brought before this Court on an order to show cause and if it's determined that you violated the laws, then you will have to serve your two to five year sentence in the Wyoming State Penitentiary. Do you understand that? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Now, you can't treat that lightly because there are probably a half a dozen people from this county who are now in the penitentiary who violated the terms of their probation, and apparently when they were placed on probation they thought that had gotten off scott-free and nothing else would ever happen, so I say that to you just as a word of warning. Do you understand that? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: I can almost guarantee you that if you violate the terms of your probation, you go to the penitentiary on this charge. You would also have to answer to any charges of any other crimes you might be involved in. Do you understand that? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: And knowing all that, is it still your wish for your plea of guilty to stand? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: All right, the prosecuting attorney will prepare the judgment and sentence and the order of probation and he will make arrangements for the probation and parole officer to get in touch with you, or for you to get in touch with him. You will have to abide by their rules and regulations, and you'll have to sign a receipt that you've received a copy of the judgment and sentence and the terms of your probation. Do you understand that? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Again, let me say to you that I hope you get your life straightened out. One of the reasons that I placed you on probation is the fact that you had not previously been guilty of any major offenses and because of your age. I think that society is justified in taking another chance with you, but believe me, if you get involved in anything else again, then you go to the penitentiary; it's just that simple. Do you understand what I'm saying to you? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do, your Honor. (Emphasis supplied.) Included in the probation agreement signed by appellant, and as part of the rules and regulations of the Department of Probation and Parole, is the following: I will demean myself while at large in a law-abiding manner and live a worthy, respectable life, obey all local, state and federal laws, and conduct myself as a good citizen. It cannot be said that the trial court could not reasonably conclude as it did-that it acted in a manner which exceeded the bounds of reason-i.e., that it abused its discretion in deciding that appellant did not meet the terms and conditions of his probation when he took a 14-year-old girl from her school, kept her secreted from her parents for four or five days, and had sexual intercourse with her during the interim. The trial court specified as the cause for revocation of appellant's probation the violation by him of § 14-3-105. On the date appellant was placed on probation, § 14-3-105 was part of the criminal code. The trial court knew that such section proscribed the taking of immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with any child. [4] Appellant is presumed to have had like knowledge. The prohibition against doing such proscribed acts became part of the terms and conditions of the probation. Appellant does not contend that he did not do that proscribed by § 14-3-105. He only contends that the statute was repealed by implication through enactment of §§ 6-4-305 and 6-4-504. As previously noted, a conviction of another crime is not a prerequisite for the revocation of probation. [5] It is sufficient if the trial court is reasonably satisfied that the probationer has violated the terms and conditions of his probation, such as engaging in those actions which are defined as a crime. This is in recognition of the differences in the required degree of proof between a criminal proceeding and a probation revocation proceeding, and in recognition of the different nature of the two proceedings. As in other matters involving judicial discretion, the court cannot act arbitrarily or capriciously or according to whim and caprice. In this instance, appellant did that which the trial court could reasonably have concluded was contrary to the terms and conditions of his probation, and which probationer himself must have recognized to be such. Finally, with reference to the plain-error rule, appellant does not have standing to invoke it. Inasmuch as the four-year age differential did not exist between him and the victim, he is not subject to violation of § 6-4-305. The concept is well stated in People v. Wimer, 197 Colo. 191, 591 P.2d 87, 88-89 (1979), as follows: The defendant's first argument is that sections 18-3-202(1)(e) and 18-3-203(1)(f) proscribe indistinguishable behavior. We find it unnecessary to reach the merits of this contention. We stated in People v. Blue, 190 Colo. 95, 544 P.2d 385 (1975), that `no one is entitled to assail the constitutionality of a statute except as he himself is adversely affected.' The defendant in this case could not have been prosecuted under section 18-3-203(1)(f) because he was not lawfully confined or in custody as the terms of that statute require. Because that statute could not have been applied to the defendant under the facts of this case, he was not adversely affected by prosecution under the more severe provisions of section 18-3-202(1)(e), C.R.S. 1973. He thus has no standing to challenge the constitutionality of the distinction between the two statutory provisions. As such, we do not reach the merits of that issue. Similar in tenor are State v. Kaneakua, Hawaii, 597 P.2d 590 (1979); State v. Blinzler, Mont., 599 P.2d 349 (1979); and Northend Cinema, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 90 Wash.2d 709, 585 P.2d 1153 (1978). Substantially the same concept in a civil context is encompassed in Mahaney v. Hunter Enterprises, Inc., Wyo., 426 P.2d 442 (1967).