Opinion ID: 2249712
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Specific Problems

Text: Defendant next contends that there are specific problems with the shoeprint evidence in this case. He first points to the fact that defendant's shoe was a low-cut, white Nike-brand tennis shoe. These features, he maintains, made it merely a common shoe. We note that since most shoes today have been mass produced, and identical shoes may be sold to many people, new shoes generally differ very little from one to another. Therefore, pattern and other general characteristics, alone, are seldom sufficient for identification purposes. (43 Proof of Facts 2d § 1, at 225 (1985). See Hutt v. State (1987), 70 Md.App. 711, 523 A.2d 643.) However, when shoes are worn, even for a limited period of time, the soles begin to show peculiar signs of wear, nail marks, cuts, and other accidental markings. Consequently, shoeprints may offer sufficient individual, unique markings and characteristics upon which to base a positive identification. 43 Proof of Facts 2d § 1, at 225 (1985). In this case, Sherk testified not only to the general pattern and size of the shoe, but also to peculiar signs of wear. Thus, the evidence in this case does not suffer for lack of evidence of peculiarities. See, e.g., Casel v. State (Tex.Crim.App.1980), 605 S.W.2d 609 (no special characteristics or peculiarities in footprints and shoes to authorize conclusion that footprints could have been made only by shoes in question); see also Abrams v. Commonwealth (Ky. 1951), 243 S.W.2d 902; Thomas v. State (1945), 148 Tex.Crim. 526, 535, 189 S.W.2d 621, 625; State v. Sigman (1935), 220 Iowa 146, 261 N.W. 538. Defendant next argues that questions are raised by the police officers' three-day delay in securing defendant's shoe. He maintains that the delay created special problems with the shoeprint comparison in two ways. First, the delay created a greater possibility that the defendant had recently acquired the shoes. Where the shoes are secured very soon after the incident, defendant asserts, it can be said with some confidence that the defendant had them at the time the offense was committed. We note that shoeprint evidence is circumstantial. Circumstantial evidence is the proof of facts or circumstances which gives rise to a reasonable inference of other facts which tend to establish the guilt or innocence of a defendant. ( People v. Jones (1985), 105 Ill.2d 342, 355, 86 Ill.Dec. 453, 475 N.E.2d 832; People v. Rhodes (1981), 85 Ill.2d 241, 249, 52 Ill.Dec. 603, 422 N.E.2d 605.) Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction if it satisfies proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the elements of the crime charged. See People v. Brown (1963), 27 Ill.2d 23, 187 N.E.2d 728. It is not necessary, however, that the jury be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt as to each link in the chain of circumstances. It is sufficient if all the evidence taken together satisfies the jury beyond a reasonable doubt of the accused's guilt. ( Jones, 105 Ill.2d at 350, 86 Ill.Dec. 453, 475 N.E.2d 832, citing People v. Foster (1979), 76 Ill.2d 365, 374, 29 Ill.Dec. 449, 392 N.E.2d 6.) Further, in weighing evidence, the trier of fact is not required to disregard inferences which flow normally from evidence before it ( People v. Kelley (1963), 29 Ill.2d 53, 59, 193 N.E.2d 21), nor need it search out all possible explanations consistent with innocence and raise them to a level of reasonable doubt ( Rhodes, 85 Ill.2d at 249, 52 Ill.Dec. 603, 422 N.E.2d 605). At defendant's trial, Officer Fonck testified that he retrieved the shoe from defendant while defendant was at the Joliet police station. Admittedly, the trial court was not required to infer from this evidence that defendant owned and had exclusive possession over the shoe. However, no contradictory circumstances to rebut the inference of exclusive and continuous ownership having been offered, we believe such an inference to have been reasonable. Further, where the evidence presented is capable of producing conflicting inferences, the matter is best left to the trier of fact for proper resolution. (See Publication Corp. v. Chicago River & Indiana R.R. Co. (1977), 49 Ill.App.3d 508, 514, 7 Ill.Dec. 362, 364 N.E.2d 523.) The following cases are helpful on the ownership issue: People v. Robbins (1974), 21 Ill.App.3d 317, 324, 315 N.E.2d 198 (reviewing court stated defendant's argument that there was no testimony that would give rise to an inference that defendant owned the boots overlooked undisputed fact that defendant was wearing the boots when arrested); see also Harrott v. State (1931), 116 Tex.Crim. 536, 34 S.W.2d 270 (fact that there was no showing that defendant wore shoes used for comparison on date of homicide went to weight of evidence); cf. Thomas v. State (1945), 148 Tex.Crim. 526, 536,189 S.W.2d 621, 626 (where defendant did not own shoes which made tracks and provided evidence of alibi, court stated, conceding that tracks were shown to have been made by defendant, that there remained no proof that defendant was wearer of shoes when tracks were made). Defendant invites our attention to State v. Larose (1980), 138 Vt. 281, 415 A.2d 210, and State v. Palmer (1949), 230 N.C. 205, 52 S.E.2d 908, in support of his argument that shoeprint identification fails if it cannot be shown that a defendant had the shoes at the time of the offense. We note that Larose has been overruled by State v. Derouchie (1981), 140 Vt. 437, 440 A.2d 146. Additionally, we do not read People v. Palmer (1949), 230 N.C. 205, 52 S.E.2d 908, as standing for the proposition which defendant asserts. Rather, as explained in a later case, State v. Jackson (1981), 302 N.C. 101, 107, 273 S.E.2d 666, 671, proof that the crime in Palmer was committed was solely circumstantial. The evidence tending to identify the defendants as the perpetrators was shoeprints and automobile tracks found near the victim's body and evidence of a possible motive. The shoe evidence provided no connection between the shoeprints and the crime itself or those persons accused of the crime. In dealing with the shoeprint evidence, the court in Palmer stated that evidence of shoeprints has no legitimate or logical tendency to identify an accused as the perpetrator of a crime unless the attendant circumstances support this triple inference : (1) That the shoeprints were found at or near the place of the crime; (2) that the shoeprints were made at the time of the crime; and (3) that the shoeprints correspond to shoes worn by the accused at the time of the crime. (Emphasis added.) ( Palmer, 230 N.C. at 213, 52 S.E.2d at 913.) These three circumstances, enumerated in Palmer, test the weight to be given shoeprint evidence. As we have stated, on this evidence, we believe the trial court could properly have inferred that defendant here owned and was in exclusive possession of the shoes. The second problem caused by the delay, defendant asserts, is that those individual characteristics identified by Sherk could have coincidentally arose after the date of the incident and were not there at all on March 9. We are not persuaded by this argument. We find it unlikely, as apparently did the trial court, that the six similar individual characteristics could all be the result of coincidence. Were there only one similar characteristic, we would be more inclined to accept this argument. However, we believe that even one individual characteristic, depending on the nature and uniqueness, could be enough for a valid comparison. Defendant urges another point on the issue of coincidence as it relates to the lack of evidence of dissimilarities. He states that the expert ignored dissimilarities, explaining that any dissimilarity would be attributable to wear upon or injury to the shoe occurring after the test print had been impressed. Defendant argues that if subsequent wear caused dissimilarities, it is reasonable that the same wear attributed to coincidental similarities. He further maintains that since the expert ignored the dissimilarities, the appellate court properly discounted his comparison. While the expert's testimony regarding dissimilarities lacked clarity on the issue, we are not prepared to state, based on the whole of his testimony, that he ignored any dissimilarities. Further, we are mindful that conflicts and inconsistencies in testimony are properly for the trial court to resolve. We note, incidentally, that in shoeprint comparison, the first step in the analysis is to note any fundamental differences between the shoe and the shoeprint. A fundamental difference is one such as size, shape, or make, that precludes any further comparison. Absent fundamental differences, points of similarity are located and recorded. Explainable dissimilarities are differences between the shoe and the shoeprint which may have resulted from dust or dirt. 43 Proof of Facts 2d § 7, at 237-38 (1985). We are not persuaded that the lack of evidence of dissimilarities here rendered the shoeprint evidence unreliable. While points of dissimilarity may affect the results of a comparison, they do not necessarily invalidate an identification. The lack of evidence of dissimilarities goes to the weight of the evidence. The value of that evidence is determined by the trier of fact, which has the opportunity to view it. Defendant next attempts to analogize fingerprint evidence to shoeprint evidence. He points out that fingerprint analysis depends upon similarities, and that a dissimilarity between a test print and a defendant's fingerprint defeats an identification. It would seem, defendant opines, that the same should be true as to the far less precise science of shoeprint analysis. Defendant's argument is flawed. Presumably, fingerprints do not essentially change and no two fingerprints are the same. ( United States v. Buck (10th Cir. 1971), 449 F.2d 262, 276.) Shoeprints, as defendant concedes, do change. Thus, while a dissimilarity in a fingerprint may not be subject to explanation, such is not the case with shoeprint evidence. See People v. Lomas (1981), 92 Ill.App.3d 957, 48 Ill.Dec. 377, 416 N.E.2d 408 (trial court, in rendering decision, made certain findings regarding dissimilarity of markings made by right shoe; specifically, judge suggested that elongated gouge which showed up in some of test prints but in none of original prints was of recent origin and may have been made after defendant's arrest). Defendant next contends that an additional specific problem with the shoeprint evidence in this case is that proof of only six similarities was presented. This, defendant asserts, is very weak. He maintains that items having only a few similarities may be the product of coincidence, and that the expert must establish enough similarities to overcome that coincidence and give substance to his opinion. He maintains, citing to A. Moenssens, Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases § 7.08, at 433-34 (3d ed. 1986), that fingerprint examiners in the United States demand 8 to 10 points of similarity. Our research has revealed no Illinois cases which expressly state a requisite number of points of similarity for either shoeprint or fingerprint evidence to be sufficient. We note only incidentally that in People v. Cheek (1982), 93 Ill.2d 82, 93, 66 Ill.Dec. 316, 442 N.E.2d 877, the detective testified that he found 10 points of similarity between two fingerprints and in People v. Reno (1975), 32 Ill.App.3d 754, 757, 336 N.E.2d 36, the fingerprint technician testified that he found 20 different points of identical comparison. We note further that fingerprint evidence of identity has been held admissible in some cases where the expert found five points of similarity, and in another in which the expert found only four. The courts, in those cases, took the position that the paucity of points of similarity went to the weight accorded to the evidence. See 36 Proof of Facts 2d § 4, at 298 (1983) (and cases cited therein). While we agree with defendant that the greater number of similarities, the stronger the evidence (see, e.g., People v. Collins (1953), 117 Cal.App.2d 175, 255 P.2d 59 (20 points of similarity between palm print on windowsill and accused's print were conclusive of identity), we decline to arbitrarily assign a number for purposes of determining sufficiency. We believe that the problems inherent in doing so are apparent. We hold that the number of similarities found between a test print and the defendant's shoe goes to the weight of the evidence and, thus, whether there is a sufficient number to make a positive identification is a question for the jury. Defendant's reliance on People v. Thomas (1977), 47 Ill.App.3d 402, 5 Ill.Dec. 694, 362 N.E.2d 7, is misplaced. There the criminalist testified that based on the similar class characteristics and some individual characteristics, it was his opinion that the defendant's shoe probably produced the shoeprint. His opinion was based on the word Florsheim, two intersecting lines, two pit marks and the width of the shoe. However, the appellate opinion states, the criminalist testified that there were insufficient individual characteristics for a positive identification to be made. Clearly the word Florsheim and the width of the defendant's shoe in Thomas were general characteristics. However, it is not clear from the opinion whether the intersecting lines and the pit marks constituted individual or general characteristics. Assuming they were not general, they amounted to two individual characteristics. Whatever the number, the criminalist testified that it was insufficient for a positive identification. Contrarily, in this case, Sherk testified that the six individual characteristics were a sufficient number upon which to base a positive identification. Cf. State v. Pinyatello (1968), 272 N.C. 312, 158 S.E.2d 596 (expert testified that he identified between 20 and 25 points that were built into the shoe, no points of dissimilarity, and 11 different identifying points or marks that were not built into the shoe heel); see also Giacone v. State (1933), 124 Tex.Crim. 141, 62 S.W.2d 986 (21 points of similarity observed); People v. Henne (1988), 165 Ill. App.3d 315, 116 Ill.Dec. 296, 518 N.E.2d 1276 (facts that boot could not be positively identified as boot which made prints and that measurements of boot made in court differed from prints were held to be factors to be considered by jury in determining what weight, if any, to give evidence). Finally, defendant contends that in order to connect the defendant with the offense, as with fingerprint evidence, there must be proof that the shoeprint was made at the time the offense was committed. He argues that while Miller could testify that the envelope was on the table when he left the house, Miller did not testify that the shoeprint was not there prior to the burglary. He maintains that the dearth of evidence regarding the freshness of the print on the envelope leads to questions about whether the print was made during the burglary. In contrast to this case, defendant cites State v. Austin (La.1981), 399 So.2d 158 ( overruled in State v. Graham (La.1982), 422 So.2d 123), where the victim specifically testified that the test print was not present prior to the offense. The State has not specifically responded to defendant's argument. Initially, we note that a foundational requirement often asserted for the admissibility of a print is that the print found at the crime scene must be shown to have been made at or near the time the crime was committed. This requirement may be satisfied with testimony that the footprints appeared fresh or were recently made in view of the weather conditions. 43 Proof of Facts 2d § 3, at 229 (1985). We believe that any attack on the evidence on this basis would have been more appropriate at the stage in the trial when it was offered into evidence. However, our review of the record reveals that defendant made no objection to its admissibility. That notwithstanding, defendant is correct in his assertion that in order to sustain a conviction solely on fingerprint evidence, fingerprints corresponding to those of the defendant must have been found in the immediate vicinity of the crime under such circumstances as to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that they were impressed at the time the crime was committed. ( People v. Rhodes (1981), 85 Ill.2d 241, 249, 52 Ill.Dec. 603, 422 N.E.2d 605; People v. Gomez (1991), 215 Ill.App.3d 208, 216, 158 Ill.Dec. 709, 574 N.E.2d 822.) Further, we agree with defendant that the same time/placement requirement should exist for shoeprint evidence. However, in either case, the State is not required to seek out and negate every conceivable possibility that the print was impressed at some time other than during the commission of the offense. See Rhodes, 85 Ill.2d at 249, 52 Ill.Dec. 603, 422 N.E.2d 605. In some cases, evidence of the particular location of the fingerprint satisfies the time/placement requirement, as does the prosecution's proof of the chain of contact of the touched item, which would show that the item could have been touched only at the time of the crime. ( People v. Donahue (1977), 50 Ill.App.3d 392, 394, 8 Ill.Dec. 472, 365 N.E.2d 710.) Additionally, attendant circumstances may well support an inference that the print was made at the time of the commission of the offense. See People v. Taylor (1965), 32 Ill.2d 165, 204 N.E.2d 734 (defendant's fingerprints on inside of window sash in apartment of rape and burglary victim sufficient evidence to establish guilt, since presence of defendant's prints unexplained); People v. Reno (1975), 32 Ill.App.3d 754, 336 N.E.2d 36 (unexplained presence of defendant's thumbprint on package of cigarettes found in purse which had been stolen from residence of murder, standing alone, was sufficient evidence to support conviction of murder). We believe that there are sufficient attendant circumstances here to support the inference that the shoeprint was made at the time the offense was committed. Miller testified that when he and Buchanan left the house for work, the Illinois Bell envelope was on the kitchen table. He gave no permission to anyone to enter the house during his absence. Upon his returning home, the envelope was on the floor. Sherk testified that the shoeprint on the Illinois Bell envelope shared sufficient similar individual characteristics with shoes in the possession of the defendant for him to make a positive identification. This evidence, while not conclusive on the issue of when the print was impressed, has some tendency to establish that the defendant was at the scene of the crime, and further that the impression was made at the time the offense was committed. Cf. People v. Donahue (1977), 50 Ill.App.3d 392, 8 Ill. Dec. 472, 365 N.E.2d 710 (where evidence that defendant had been in victim's apartment some time prior to murder, and State did not rule out possibility that fingerprint could have been impressed at time other than when crime was committed, fingerprint evidence was insufficient to convict); see State v. Pinyatello (1968), 272 N.C. 312, 158 S.E.2d 596 (expert's testimony regarding shoeprint evidence would permit jury to reasonably infer from his testimony that heel print on letter corresponded to a shoe worn by accused at time of commission of crime).