Opinion ID: 2361148
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Present Disability

Text: The hearing examiner ruled that an alternative basis for denying petitioner's claim was that her condition was not presently disabling inasmuch as she could work full-time. See D.C.Code § 36-301(8) (`Disability' means physical injury or mental incapacity because of injury which results in loss of wages.) Insofar as it relates to petitioner's normal work status and expectation, this finding is supported in the record. We take special note in that regard that the presumption of work-relatedness has no application in determining the nature and extent of the disability. Baker, supra, 611 A.2d at 550; Dunston v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Services, 509 A.2d 109, 111 (D.C.1986). Dr. Cohen, who conducted a physical examination and a review of petitioner's records in March of 1992, concluded that based on her condition and the sedentary nature of her work, I see no reason why she cannot work 8 hours a day. Dr. Dennis himself, in his May 1992 deposition, stated that petitioner could work a full eight hour day if the job description did not require lifting, pulling, pushing; if she could have intermittent breaks ... but that she should not sit more than four hours in an eight-hour day. [9] Petitioner, by her own admission, testified that she was permitted to take breaks during her work hours, in addition to a one hour lunch. There is no evidence to suggest that the job required her to sit in a fixed position for hours at a time. Petitioner herself noted that her tasks included xeroxing and frequent walks to and from other buildings. Dr. Dennis opined that she could do such work full-time, stating that intermittent sitting, gett[ing] it down to four hours, stand[ing], walk[ing] around, do[ing] other things, like most clerical jobs are not just focused on the computer terminal, I think that she could do that.
However, there is a lingering problem. Dr. Cohen himself acknowledged that petitioner would continue to have intermittent episodes of low back pain, which may require periods of rest and anti-inflammatory care. Dr. Dennis likewise had expressed his view that petitioner's back problem waxes and wanes, with intermittent severe episodes of pain. The hearing examiner did not address this undisputed testimony of both medical experts in ruling that appellant was no longer disabled in any regard. [10] Apparently recognizing this vulnerability in the hearing examiner's outright denial of any present disability affecting wages to any degree, intervenors assert that the ruling was warranted because the back pain was found to be a function and result of the natural progression of the preexisting back condition. However, as indicated in part II of this opinion, that rationale cannot stand in the face of the record here and thus cannot serve to make irrelevant the assertions of both medical doctors with regard to recurrence of back pain and its possible effect on disability. Accordingly, on remand, the question of the petitioner's return to full-time employment capability should be revisited to take into account the effect, if any, of intermittent periods of apparent relapse. Furthermore, even if petitioner can work full-time, the fact that an employee is not eligible to receive disability benefits under D.C.Code § 36-308 does not necessarily preclude her from receiving reimbursement of causally related medical expenses under D.C.Code § 36-307. The right to medical benefits is separate and distinct from the right to income benefits. Santos v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Services, 536 A.2d 1085, 1089 n. 6 (D.C.1988). Therefore, even if petitioner can work full-time, she would appear to be entitled to such medical benefits insofar as they are causally related to the work-place aggravation in 1987. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. So ordered.