Opinion ID: 201790
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Pre-Trial through Post-Trial Proceedings

Text: 9 Richardson moved to dismiss all four counts in the superseding indictment on March 7, 2003, arguing with respect to Count One that the perjury charges against her were insupportable as a matter of law because her statements before the grand jury were literally true, the indictment took those statements out of context, and her statements were made in response to the prosecutor's fundamentally ambiguous questions during the grand jury colloquy. Judge Stearns heard argument and took the motion under advisement on May 29, 2003. 4 10 On August 11, 2003, one week before Richardson's trial was scheduled to begin, Judge Stearns, who had not yet ruled on Richardson's motion to dismiss the superseding indictment, recused himself. On August 13, 2003, the case was reassigned to Judge Wolf, who immediately recused himself, and then to Judge Lindsay. During the parties' first appearance before Judge Lindsay on September 22, 2003, Richardson requested a trial date, noting that the time period for trial permitted by the STA either had already expired or was due to expire. Judge Lindsay stated that his trial calendar was booked through much of January, with the exception of the week of October 14, 2003. Richardson acknowledged that an October trial date would leave too little time for Judge Lindsay to decide her motion to dismiss the superseding indictment. Judge Lindsay therefore declined to set a trial date. 11 On October 16, 2003, Judge Lindsay denied Richardson's motion to dismiss the superseding indictment. When the parties appeared before Judge Lindsay again on November 17, 2003, he inquired about the speedy trial status of the case. The government stated that the docket showed no ruling by the court on Richardson's objections to a magistrate judge's order denying her motion to strike material from the government's opposition to her motion to dismiss the superseding indictment. Richardson reminded the court and the government that Judge Lindsay had declared the matter to be moot in his October 16, 2003 decision because he had excluded the material subject to Richardson's motion to strike from his consideration of her motion to dismiss the superseding indictment. As a result, no motions had been pending since late October. 12 The government then requested a trial date of January 19, 2004 because its chosen trial attorney was already engaged in another trial expected to run through part of December. Richardson indicated her readiness for an immediate trial. Judge Lindsay then stated: there are two problems, one is that — one of the counsel for the government is not ready because he's engaged elsewhere. And I have two criminal cases preceding this one in December. He concluded: if we are impinging on [Richardson's speedy trial] rights, . . . then I'm going to have to refer this to another judge who can try it before January 19th, even if a different government attorney would have to try the case. Richardson again requested an immediate trial and asked that the case be reassigned quickly. 13 The government protested, predicting that if we end up being [reassigned] to another judge, we'll be even later than January 19th. Judge Lindsay then accepted the government's suggestion that the government submit its calculation of the number of days remaining on the speedy trial clock so that Judge Lindsay could determine whether his earliest available trial date of January 19, 2004 would satisfy the requirements of the STA, or whether the case would instead have to be reassigned to another judge. Accordingly, Judge Lindsay requested that the government report to my clerk by noon the next day on the speedy trial status of the case. 14 The government timely filed its report, captioned a Motion to Set a Trial Date of January 19 and for Excludable Delay for the Period Between November 17, 2003 and January 19, 2004, in which it calculated that the STA required Richardson's trial to commence on or before December 18, 2003. The government nevertheless requested that the court schedule trial for January 19, 2004 and exclude the period of time between November 17, 2003 and January 19, 2004 from the speedy trial clock as a continuance in the interest of justice pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A). 5 As grounds for the continuance, the government asserted that: (1) a trial date earlier than January 19, 2004 would unreasonably deny. . . the Government continuity of counsel because its chosen trial attorney had been involved since mid-October in another trial that was unlikely to end before December 10, 2003, justifying a continuance for that period of time; (2) the court could require the parties to file any motions in limine by [November 24, 2003] . . . as a legitimate case management tool, thereby tolling the STA clock where the defendant is likely to have such motions; and (3) because it was unlikely that the case could be reassigned to another judge who could schedule the case for trial on or before December 18, 2003, any transfer to another judge in this district will likely result in a miscarriage of justice because the case will probably have to be dismissed without prejudice due to a violation of the [STA]. 15 Upon the November 19, 2003 request of Judge Lindsay's clerk, Richardson submitted a letter to the court on November 20, 2003 addressing the impact under the [STA] of the Government's November 18 filing. In the letter, Richardson disputed the government's STA calculation and argued that November 20, 2003 was the last day on which a trial could begin in compliance with the STA. Richardson also asserted that despite its caption, the government's report was not a motion whose filing on November 18, 2003 operated to toll the speedy trial clock pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F), 6 but was instead a mere status report that acknowledged that the first date on which the Court could try the case [January 19, 2004] indeed present[s] problems under the [STA], even by the Government's calculation. In Richardson's view, the government's attempt to characterize its filing as a motion was a pretext for avoiding the STA's requirements. 16 The government filed a reply to Richardson's letter on November 24, 2003 contesting Richardson's STA calculation and reiterating the arguments made in its November 18, 2003 filing. Richardson filed a Memorandum in Opposition the next day, November 25, 2003, seeking dismissal of the indictment with prejudice for violation of the STA. Without formally responding to any of the parties' papers filed between November 18 and November 25, 2003, and without determining how many days, if any, remained on the speedy trial clock, Judge Lindsay had the case reassigned to a fourth judge on December 1, 2003. 7 17 When the parties appeared before Judge Young that same day, December 1, 2003, Richardson maintained that the time period within which the STA required her trial to begin had expired on November 20, 2003. Judge Young stated that he thought the speedy trial clock had not yet expired, but was about to. Although he offered to empanel a jury on December 8, 2003, he advised the parties that his schedule that week would not permit an uninterrupted trial. In the alternative, Judge Young offered to set a trial date of January 5, 2004 and to exclude the time between December 8, 2003, and January 5, 2004 as a continuance in the interest of justice under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A), without prejudice to Richardson's right to seek dismissal of the indictment under the STA on the theory that the speedy trial clock had expired on November 20, 2003. The parties eventually agreed to set a trial date of January 12, 2004 and to exclude the time between December 8, 2003 and January 12, 2004 as a continuance in the interest of justice. 8 18 On December 5, 2003, Richardson renewed her motion to dismiss the superseding indictment, reiterating her previous arguments that all of the charges against her were facially insufficient. On December 16, 2003, continuing to press her claim that the speedy trial clock had expired on November 20, 2003, Richardson moved to dismiss the indictment with prejudice for violation of the STA. On that same day, the government filed a Further Submission on Speedy Trial Act Issues in which it informed the court that it had miscalculated the number of days that had run on the speedy trial clock in its November 18, 2003 filing, and that, as of November 17, 2003, the STA required Richardson's trial to begin no later than December 3, not December 18, 2003. 19 The government agreed to dismiss Counts Three and Four of the superseding indictment on December 17, 2003. On December 29, 2003, Richardson filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude allegedly irrelevant and unduly prejudicial evidence. On January 12, 2004, the date of trial, the court denied Richardson's motion to dismiss the indictment on STA grounds. The court also denied her motion in limine without prejudice. 20 Richardson's trial took place from January 12, 2004 through January 23, 2004. At the close of the government's evidence, Richardson moved for an acquittal under Fed.R.Crim.P. 29. The court permitted the trial to proceed, and Richardson presented evidence in her defense. On January 23, 2004, the jury returned a general verdict finding Richardson guilty of perjury as charged in Count One, but acquitting her of obstruction of justice as charged in Count Two. After receiving an extension of time, Richardson filed a motion for acquittal notwithstanding the jury verdict on February 10, 2004, arguing that at least one of the nineteen allegedly false statements forming a possible ground for the guilty verdict was legally insupportable. The court denied the motion after oral argument on March 16, 2004, reserving the right to reconsider its decision, as well as Richardson's oral motion for a new trial, while expressly stating that it made no promise of any further decision. 21 On April 29, 2004, the court sentenced Richardson to six months of imprisonment, to be followed by two years of supervised release (including four months of home confinement), a fine of $3,000, and a special monetary assessment of $100. The court entered a final judgment of conviction on April 30, 2004, and Richardson timely appealed. On May 11, 2004, the court, citing Richardson's STA claim, allowed her motion to stay execution of her sentence pending appeal. See 18 U.S.C. § 3143 (providing for detention pending appeal except where judicial officer finds that appeal is not for purposes of delay and raises a substantial question of law. . . likely to result in a different disposition). On July 13, 2004, the court issued a memorandum explaining its reasons for denying Richardson's motion to dismiss the indictment on STA grounds. See United States v. Richardson, 324 F.Supp.2d 339 (D.Mass.2004).