Opinion ID: 1158402
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alleged vagueness

Text: (2) Morse contends section 17537.6 is vague regarding whether it applies to attorneys and that it thus violates his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Subdivision (e)(1) of section 17537.6, which defines a homestead filing service, excludes any service performed by an attorney at law authorized to practice in this state for a client who has retained that attorney or an employee of that attorney.... Morse contends the statute does not define the word retained, and thus does not adequately inform the reader whether the client has to be an existing client or one who had retained the attorney for other matters before discussing a homestead declaration, or whether the retained exemption applies only to an attorney being hired to prepare a homestead declaration. We disagree. Regardless of how the statute might be read in some other context, there is no ambiguity in the present case. No reasonable attorney could fairly read section 17537.6 to exempt mass mailings to millions of strangers. As the review department observed, [N]one of the 4,000,000 persons to whom [Morse] sent advertisements were clients who had already retained him, and approximately 3,900,000 never completed the `retainer' agreement or used his homestead services. He does not argue that these 3,900,000 persons had retained him. Moreover, he knew that he ordinarily provided no services characteristic of a retained attorney to the persons who responded to his advertisements. Typically, no attorney in his office dealt with these persons or prepared declarations for them. We also agree with the Court of Appeal that the legislative history eliminated any asserted ambiguity in the statutory language. In considering whether a legislative proscription is sufficiently clear to satisfy the requirements of fair notice, we consider not only the language of the challenged statute, but also its legislative history. ( Walker v. Superior Court (1988) 47 Cal.3d 112, 143 [253 Cal. Rptr. 1, 763 P.2d 852].) `We thus require citizens to apprise themselves not only of statutory language but also of legislative history ... and underlying legislative purposes....' ( Ibid. ) [¶] ... Prior to its final passage, the bill that became section 17537.6 provided in relevant part: `Homestead filing service does not include any service performed by an attorney at law authorized to practice in this state....' (Assem. Amend. to Assem. Bill No. 684 (1987-1988 Reg. Sess.) May 4, 1987.) The Senate amended this provision of the bill to its final form by adding the phrase, `for a client who has retained that attorney....' (Sen. Amend. to Assem. Bill No. 684 (1987-1988 Reg. Sess.) Aug. 17, 1987.) According to the legislative history, the purpose of this amendment was to `narrow the exemption for homestead filing services provided by attorneys or their employees to services provided to a client of the attorney's. Otherwise, the bill would have permitted attorneys or their agents to engage in the reprehensible mail order practices barred by this bill.' Thus, it is clear that the exclusion applies only to services an attorney provides to preexisting clients, and that the Legislature intended to prohibit attorneys from doing precisely what Morse did in this case. We therefore reject Morse's vagueness challenge. ( People v. Morse, supra, 21 Cal. App.4th 259, 270-271, italics & fn. omitted.) We agree.