Opinion ID: 2647451
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standards of Review and Proof

Text: The Supreme Court in Sell did not prescribe a standard of appellate review, and this circuit has yet to address the matter. Most of our sister circuits conduct de novo review of a district court’s holding that the Government’s interest is “important” under the first prong of Sell, and assess a district court’s remaining Sell findings for clear error. See United States v. Fazio, 599 F.3d 835, 839 (8th Cir. 2010) (noting the “overwhelming majority of courts” adopting this approach); see also United States v. Diaz, 630 F.3d 1314, 1331 (11th Cir. 2011); United States v. Green, 532 F.3d 538, 546, 552 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v. Hernandez-Vasquez, 513 F.3d 908, 915-16 (9th Cir. 2007) (as amended Jan. 22, 2008); United States v. Palmer, 507 F.3d 300, 303 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227, 236, 240 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Gomes, 387 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 2004). But see United States v. Bradley, 417 F.3d 1107, 111311 14 (10th Cir. 2005) (concluding that second Sell factor, in addition to the first, is a “legal question” to be reviewed de novo). We adopt the approach taken by the majority of circuits. See Hernandez-Vasquez, 513 F.3d at 915 (following the majority’s approach of reviewing the second Sell factor for clear error, instead of the Tenth Circuit’s approach, because the question of whether medicating a defendant would “significantly further” the Government’s interest “typically involves substantial questions of fact”). We thus review de novo the District Court’s conclusion that the Government has an important interest in prosecuting Dillon, and consider whether the balance of the District Court’s findings are clearly erroneous. We hasten to add one qualification, however. To the extent that the District Court’s determination under the first prong of Sell depends on findings of fact, see Sell, 539 U.S. at 180 (“Courts . . . must consider the facts of the individual case in evaluating the Government’s interest in prosecution.” (emphasis added)), we review those findings under a clear-error standard. See Evans, 404 F.3d at 236 (observing that although the Fourth Circuit’s review under the first prong of Sell is de novo, “review [of] any factual findings relevant to this legal determination [is] for clear error”); see also United States v. Mikulich, 732 F.3d 692, 696 (6th Cir. 2013). The Supreme Court also did not establish the burden of proof to be applied to Sell determinations. Noting the absence of controlling authority in our circuit, the District Court concluded that the Government was required to establish each Sell factor under a clear and convincing standard of proof, adopting the approach taken by other courts of appeals. Dillon, 2013 WL 1859289, at  n.1 (citing United States v. 12 Bush, 585 F.3d 806, 814 (4th Cir. 2009); Green, 532 F.3d at 545 n.6). The Government has not disputed this conclusion, and Dillon has not advocated for a higher burden. We agree with the District Court’s approach and join our sister circuits in holding that factual determinations under Sell must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. See Diaz, 630 F.3d at 1331 (“Other circuit courts that have considered this issue uniformly concluded that in Sell cases the government bears the burden of proof on factual questions by clear and convincing evidence.”); United States v. Chatmon, 718 F.3d 369, 374 (4th Cir. 2013); Fazio, 599 F.3d at 840 n.2; Bradley, 417 F.3d at 1114; Gomes, 387 F.3d at 160. Holding the Government to a clear and convincing standard of proof affords due regard to the nature of the liberty interest at stake in forced-medication cases. See United States v. White, 620 F.3d 401, 422 (4th Cir. 2010) (Keenan, J., concurring) (noting “the physical violence inherent in forcible medication” and that “forcible administration of drugs necessarily requires a substantial and degrading intrusion of the body”).