Opinion ID: 853130
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Wrongful Death Claims

Text: Wrongful death actions are purely statutory. Ed Wiersma Trucking Co. v. Pfaff, 643 N.E.2d 909, 911 (Ind.Ct.App. 1994), adopted by 678 N.E.2d 110 (Ind. 1997). At common law, there was no tort liability for killing another because personal injury actions did not survive the injured party's death. Id. Indiana's general wrongful death statute (WDS) allows personal representatives of decedents' estates to recover damages on behalf of surviving spouses, dependent children or next of kin, and service providers such as funeral homes. Ind.Code Ann. § 34-23-1-1 (West 1999). Our child wrongful death statute (CWDS) allows parents or guardians to obtain damages for the wrongful death of unmarried children who had no legal dependents and were under twenty years of age (or under twenty-three and still in school). [2] Ind. Code Ann. § 34-23-2-1 (West 1999). The CWDS therefore allows recovery without proof of dependency or the necessity of opening an estate. [3] Both statutes allow damages for loss of services; loss of love, care, and affection; and expenses such as medical, funeral and burial expenses. See Ind.Code §§ 34-23-1-1, 2-1; Ed Wiersma Trucking Co., 643 N.E.2d at 913. The two statutes are disjunctive, so if the decedent fits the CWDS description (unmarried, under age twenty, no dependents), that statute provides the exclusive remedy for the wrongful death. Ed Wiersma Trucking Co., 643 N.E.2d at 912; City of Indianapolis v. Taylor, 707 N.E.2d 1047, 1060 (Ind.Ct. App. 1999) (quoting Vera Cruz v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 192 F.Supp. 958, 958 (N.D.Ind.1961)) (The Indiana Wrongful Death Act and the Indiana statute allowing recovery by a parent for the loss of services of a child create independent and mutually exclusive actions. They neither afford optionally alternative remedies nor are they actions that can be pursued together.). Judge Baker correctly observed that only a personal representative may bring an action under the WDS. Estate of Sears, 752 N.E.2d at 219 (Baker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Ind.Code § 34-23-1-1. Therefore, Marci as next friend of Elizabeth lacked standing to bring such a claim, and the trial court correctly rejected it. Nonetheless, the question whether Elizabeth qualified as a dependent is important in evaluating the estate's wrongful death claim because the determination of which statute applies (WDS or CWDS) turns on whether Evan died without dependents. Ind.Code § 34-23-2-1(a). A decedent need not have been legally obligated to support an individual for that person to qualify as a dependent next of kin under the WDS. N.Y. Cent. R. Co. v. Johnson, 234 Ind. 457, 464, 127 N.E.2d 603, 606-07 (1955). Neither is total dependence required. 234 Ind. at 464-65, 127 N.E.2d at 607. The person claiming dependence must, however, show a need or necessity for support ... coupled with the contribution to such support by the deceased. 234 Ind. at 465, 127 N.E.2d at 607. As explained in Luider v. Skaggs, 693 N.E.2d 593, 596-97 (Ind.Ct.App.1998) (citation omitted), Pecuniary loss is the foundation of the wrongful death action. This loss can be determined in part from the assistance that the decedent would have provided through money, services or other material benefits. Evidence such as a legal obligation to support and claiming dependency for tax purposes may be considered, although they are not dispositive. See N.Y. Cent. R. Co., 234 Ind. at 464, 127 N.E.2d at 606-07 (citation omitted) (It is not necessary for the decedent to have been under a legal obligation to support the next of kin, but it may be of weight in determining the amount of pecuniary loss.); see also Koger v. Reid, 417 N.E.2d 1142, 1143, 1145 (Ind.Ct.App.1981) (rejecting claim that father and younger brothers were dependent next of kin of seventeen-year-old decedent who took over household maintenance chores after her mother died and chauffeured brothers to school activities and church; no necessitous want where father paid all household expenses including daughter's maintenance and his attitude regarding dependency status was indicated on his income tax return). Although Elizabeth undoubtedly depended on her older brother in the everyday sense of the word, the legal definition is what matters here. The complaint alleged that Elizabeth was dependent on Evan for love, affection, support, transportation, comfort, counseling, and guidance. (R. at 6.) Although the record is not yet developed, it would be quite unusual for a twelve-year-old with both parents living to be dependent on her teen-age sibling for services and/or financial support that the parents could not or would not provide in that sibling's absence. Services must go beyond merely helping other family members, even those who have relied on that assistance. In Chamberlain v. Parks, 692 N.E.2d 1380, 1381, 1384-85 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), a twenty-five-year-old helped his retired mother in and out of chairs, drove her to doctor appointments, carried groceries, helped his father with lawn care and snow removal, and performed other household tasks. The court found these services not sufficiently tangible and material to establish the parents' dependence; they amounted to no more than gifts, donations and acts of generosity expected of a son to whom free housing, most of his board, gasoline money and automobile insurance was provided. Id. at 1384. The support must also be more than just a service or benefit to which the claimed dependent had become accustomed. In Wolf v. Boren, 685 N.E.2d 86, 87 (Ind.Ct.App. 1997), a father and three adult siblings of a forty-four-year-old decedent claimed dependent next of kin status because the decedent maintained a Lake Monroe vacation home which he had allowed the family to use. Although [i]n a general sense, [decedent's] family was depending on [decedent] to provide his vacation home as a family retreat, the court declined to extend coverage of the WDS that far. Id. at 88. [4] We find no cases establishing dependency for purposes of the WDS based on purely emotional support, or on financial support and/or services that parents were capable of providing and would be obligated to provide in the absence of a deceased sibling. Unless more than this is proven on remand, Evan died without legal dependents and recovery for his wrongful death lies under the CWDS, not the WDS. [5]