Opinion ID: 1058577
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Enhancement of Green's Sanction

Text: Green contends that the Board erred because it effectively enhanced the 60-day sanction it originally imposed on November 19, 2004 and which had twice been reversed by this Court. He argues that the sanction was enhanced by adding time between the hearing and July 1, 2007 to its sanction. The crux of Green's argument is that the sanction is a nine-month suspension and not one of 45 days. The Bar responds that the Board has the authority to state the effective date of the sanction imposed pursuant to Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13(I)(2)(f)(2) of the Rules and that Green's 45-day suspension consecutively follows the six-month suspension imposed against him by the Panel concerning the matters in Part I, which began to run on January 1, 2007 (discussed infra, Part I). The Bar further argues that the Board did not enhance the sanction against Green because it reduced the 60-day sanction previously imposed to a 45-day sanction. We agree with the Bar. Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13(I)(2)(f)(2) of the Rules provides [i]f the Board concludes that there has been presented clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent has engaged in Misconduct, after considering evidence and arguments in aggravation and mitigation, the Board shall impose one of the following sanctions and state the effective date of the sanction imposed.  (Emphasis added.) The Board, pursuant to the Rules of this Court, has the authority to impose the sanction and to set the effective date of the sanction. In determining the effective date of a sanction, we find that the Board's decision is subject to review for an abuse of discretion. Here, the Bar imposed Green's sanction and established the effective date the sanction was to commence. The Board did not abuse its discretion when it established the effective date of the sanction as July 1, 2007 because this date immediately followed a separate six-month suspension of Green on other unrelated charges. Green has no basis upon which to claim that the two separate suspensions could be required to run concurrently. See Conner v. Commonwealth, 207 Va. 455, 457-58, 150 S.E.2d 478, 479-80 (1966) (describing a court's authority and the statutory presumption, in the criminal context, for sentences to run consecutively rather than concurrently). Upon consideration of the record in this case, we cannot say the Board abused its discretion in imposing the sanction of 45 days or in its setting the date of July 1, 2007 for that sanction to commence. Thus, Green's first assignment of error is without merit.