Opinion ID: 2515085
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: waiver of sovereign immunity renders the State liable to the same extent as other litigants

Text: Despite the waiver of the State's sovereign immunity by HRS ง 343-7, DOT contends that the legislature has nowhere waived the State's sovereign immunity for attorney's fees resulting from HRS chapter 343 litigation. As such, DOT argues that attorney's fees cannot be awarded against the State in this case. Id. We disagree. We addressed a similar question in Fought and determined that the State would be not be treated differently from private parties when awarding attorney's fees against the non-prevailing party in actions of assumpsit. Fought, 87 Hawai'i at 54-55, 951 P.2d at 504-05. In Fought, this court held that the doctrine of sovereign immunity did not prevent an award of attorney's fees against DOT under HRS ง 607-14, which authorized attorney's fees awards `in all actions in the nature of assumpsit and in all actions on a promissory note or other contract in writing' and does not limit an award of [attorney's] fees to non-governmental parties. 87 Hawai'i at 54, 951 P.2d at 504 (quoting Hawaiian Isles Enters. v. City & County of Honolulu, 76 Hawai'i 487, 493, 879 P.2d 1070, 1076 (1994)). This court reconfirmed in Fought the broad interpretation of HRS ง 607-14 that allowed an award of attorney's fees against the State where a statute did not specifically address governmental parties. The analysis in Fought further addressed and distinguished the proposition that an award of [attorney's] fees ... is precluded by the principle that statutes of general applicability do not bind the state unless their plain language expressly so indicates[,] id. at 55, 951 P.2d at 505, as was announced in A.C. Chock, Ltd. v. Kaneshiro, 51 Haw. 87, 451 P.2d 809 (1969): Thus, in Chock, there was no clear waiver of the state's sovereign immunity from suit. Were the same true here, the imposition of costs and [attorney's] fees against the DOT would obviously be prohibited. However, in contrast to the statute at issue in Chock, HRS ง 661-1(1) expressly waives the state's immunity from suit upon any contract, expressed or implied[.] When the state has consented to be sued, its liability is to be judged under the same principles as those governing the liability of private parties.... HRS ง 607-14 does not create a novel claim for relief, but merely establishes the circumstances under which the prevailing party in any action in the nature of assumpsit or on some other contract may recover the expenses of litigation as an additional element of the prevailing party's damages. Accordingly, a further waiver of sovereign immunity is not necessary in order for HRS ง 607-14 to apply to the state and its respective agencies in matters in which, by virtue of the express waiver of sovereign immunity set forth in HRS ง 661-1, the state (or any of its agencies) has become a party. Fought, 87 Hawai'i at 56, 951 P.2d at 506 (emphasis in original). The distinction identified in Fought is relevant in this case. When the [S]tate has consented to be sued, its liability is to be judged under the same principles as those governing the liability of private parties. Id. In this case, as discussed previously, there has been a clear waiver of the State's sovereign immunity from suit through HRS ง 661-1(1) and HRS ง 343-7. See Part IV. C.3.c.i. As such, DOT will be judged under the same principles as those governing the liability of Superferry for attorney's fees resulting from a violation of HRS chapter 343. As the facts of this case satisfy all three prongs of the private attorney general doctrine, DOT and Superferry are jointly liable for the attorney's fees award granted to Sierra Club pursuant to the private attorney general doctrine. [30] Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in relying on the private attorney general doctrine as a basis for its award of attorney's fees against DOT and Superferry jointly.