Opinion ID: 2997098
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Litigation—Round One

Text: In March 1996, the Students filed suit in the District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin. The Students’ primary allegation was that the collection of a mandatory fee (at least that portion that was allocable) violated their rights of free speech, free association, and free exercise under the First Amendment. The Students argued that requiring them to pay the fee, part of which was distributed to RSOs, amounted to forcing them to fund RSOs engaged in political and ideological expression offensive to their beliefs. In support of their argument, the Students cited funding to groups including the Wisconsin Public Interest Research Group (“WISPIRG”), the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual Campus Center, the Campus Women’s Center, the UW Greens, the Madison AIDS Support Network, the International Socialist Organization, the Ten Percent Society, the Progressive Student Network, Amnesty International, United States Student Association, Community Action on Latin America, La Colectiva Cultural de Aztlán, the Militant Student Union of the University of Wisconsin, the Student Labor Action Coalition, Student Solidarity, Student NOW, MADPAC, and the Madison Treaty Rights Support Group. In their initial complaint, the Students stipulated that the University distributed funds through the SSFC and the SGAF to RSOs in a viewpointneutral manner. This stipulation did not, however, cover funds distributed through the referendum method of funding. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Students. This court affirmed. Southworth I, 151 F.3d 717 No. 03-2314 7 (7th Cir. 1998). The Supreme Court granted certiorari, however, and reversed. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wisconsin Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000). While recognizing that “students who attend the University cannot be required to pay subsidies for the speech of other students without some First Amendment protection,” id. at 231, the Supreme Court held that this protection was not achieved by a blanket prohibition on the use of allocable fees to fund the groups listed above (or similar groups) or a refund (or similar opt-out mechanism) to dissenting students. Id. at 230 (“[T]he means of implementing First Amendment protections adopted in [Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) and Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 (1990)] are neither applicable nor workable in the context of extracurricular student speech at a university. ”). Instead, the protection for the Students’ First Amendment rights is the requirement that the University allocate these funds in a viewpoint-neutral manner. Id. at 233 (“The proper measure, and the principal standard of protection for objecting students, we conclude, is the requirement of viewpoint neutrality in the allocation of funding support.”). The Supreme Court expressed doubt concerning, but did not rule on, the propriety of the referendum method of funding. Id. at 230 (“The student referendum aspect of the program for funding speech and expressive activities, however, appears to be inconsistent with the viewpoint neutrality requirement.”). The Court held that it was necessary to remand the case to determine “what protection, if any, there is for viewpoint neutrality in [the referendum method of funding].” Id. at 235.