Opinion ID: 1210687
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: Incorrect and Misleading Statements

Text: The concurrence makes incorrect and misleading statements about the evidence in the trial record. The statements include the following: (1) The concurrence states that Cooper admitted being [in the Lease house] within an hour of the murders. Conc. at 640. This statement is incorrect. Sunset on June 4, 1983, was at 7:59 p.m. 1/22/85 RT 6874. Cooper testified that he waited until dark to leave the Lease house, and that he left the house right after finishing a telephone call to his former girlfriend, Diane Williams. 1/7/85 RT 5828-31. Telephone records show that the call to Williams ended at 8:30 p.m. It is impossible to fix a precise time for the murders, but it is likely that they took place quite late that night. The Ryens and their house guest, Chris Hughes, had gone to a barbeque that evening. According to a neighbor, they returned to the house sometime between 9:00 and 9:30 p.m. 10/30/84 RT 2758. Josh recounted that after the return to the house he and Chris stayed awake talking and looking at magazines, while his father stayed up watching television. 12/13/84 RT 4952-54. Josh recounted that he and Chris were wakened from their sleep. (2) The concurrence states that a bloodstained rope similar to the one in the Ryen's driveway was found in the Lease house. Conc. at 640, 641. This statement is highly misleading. There were two different ropes. One was in the driveway of the Ryen house. The other was in the closet of the Bilbia bedroom in the Lease house. The parties stipulated that one of the ropes had a center cord and the other did not. 2/5/85 RT 7694. (3) The concurrence states that there were signs of blood in the bathroom. Conc. at 640. This statement is highly misleading. A large horizontal band on the sides of the shower in the bathroom of the Bilbia bedroom tested positive for Luminol. For reasons explained above, the likely basis for the positive test is the bleach used by Katherine Bilbia in cleaning the shower. (4) The concurrence states that there were hairs consistent with the victims' hair in the drain in the Lease house. Conc. at 640. This statement is misleading. The hairs found in the drain were examined only for shape and color. They were never subjected to mitochondrial DNA testing. Further, we know that the Ryen children's maternal grandmother had owned the Lease house a few years before, and that the children had stayed with her in the house. Indeed, Josh specifically testified that he had taken showers in the house. 12/ 13/84 RT 4934-35. (5) The concurrence states that [t]he prosecution never suggested that Pro-Keds [sic] Dudes were only distributed to prisons. Conc. at 640. This statement is incorrect. In its opening statement to the jury, the prosecution emphasized that the shoes were supplied strictly for prison use within the State of California and were unavailable for retail stores within California. 10/23/84 RT 2281. Michael Newberry, a Stride Rite executive, then testified at trial that Pro Ked Dudes were sold only to prisons and institutions. In its closing statement, the prosecution again emphasized that Cooper wore a Pro Ked tennis shoe, a tennis shoe that you can't purchase in a store anywhere in this country; a tennis shoe that is manufactured only for institutions; a tennis shoe such as this which was sent to state prison in Chino[.] 2/7/85 RT 7749. It continued, Mike Newberry knows these aren't sold on the street. 2/7/85 RT 7752. (6) The concurrence states that Cooper had a prison-issued jacket with buttons like the button found on the rug in the bedroom of the Lease house where he stayed. Conc. at 640. This statement is highly misleading. The problem lies in its use of the word like. As explained above, the button found in plain view near the closet in the Bilbia bedroom was probably planted by the SBCSD. One of the reasons for believing that the button was planted was that it was not the same color as the buttons on Cooper's prison jacket. The button found in the bedroom was green, and would have come from a green prison-issued jacket. There was uncontradicted testimony at trial from Cooper, as well as corroborating testimony from a prison official, that Cooper had a brown or tan prison jacket. (7) The concurrence states that Cooper's expert agreed that the person who deposited A-41 on the wall of the hallway in the Ryen house was African-American. Conc. at 641. This statement is highly misleading. Cooper's expert, Dr. Edward Blake, testified at trial that test results obtained from blood spot A-41 indicated that blood in the spot came from someone of African-American descent. 1/30/85 RT 7405, 7409. However, when he so testified Dr. Blake was relying on tests performed on A-41 by SBCSD criminologist Daniel Gregonis. As discussed above, there is a strong likelihood that Gregonis falsified the results of those tests. During trial, Cooper's counsel forced Gregonis to admit that earlier in the trial he had repeatedly testified untruthfully about his test results for A-41. ER 746.
The concurrence embraces the opinion of the three-judge panel denying Cooper's application for habeas corpus. Conc. at 636. The last paragraph of that opinion states that the evidence of Cooper's guilt was overwhelming. Cooper, 510 F.3d at 887. This is incorrect. In fact, the evidence of Cooper's guilt at trial was quite weak. That weakness led to a violation of Cooper's constitutional right to due process under Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980). The evidence against Cooper at trial was so weak that his counsel thought there was a good chance the jury would acquit him outright. The trial judge indicated that, in his view, the evidence merited a second-degree as well as a first-degree murder instruction. He said, just before the end of trial, Just for you to chew on, it appears to me that we're going to have to have instructions on Murder One and Two but not manslaughter. 1/24/85 RT 7135. He tried to persuade Cooper's attorneys to accept a second degree instruction, saying that omitting a second degree instruction may well inure to you[r] detriment. They could find first degree, possibly. Otherwise they might only find second degree. 1/28/85 RT 7264. But because the evidence against Cooper was so weak, Cooper's attorney thought it worth a gamble. In order to eliminate the possibility of a compromise verdict and to increase the chance of acquittal, Cooper's attorneys refused to accept a second degree murder instruction: Mr. Negus [Cooper's attorney]: Mr. Cooper and I both agreed that we don't want a second degree instruction. Correct Mr. Cooper: That's true. The Court: What this does, among other things, Mr. Cooper, it prevents the jurors from compromising, I suppose. Mr. Negus: That's what we don't want.... We want them to go on the testimony. It is first degree or it is nothing. 1/28/85 RT 7264. The instructions that went to the jury contained only a first degree murder instruction. The jury deliberated for seven days before returning a guilty verdict, and deliberated for four more days before returning a death penalty verdict. Many years later, five jurors wrote to Governor Schwarzenegger asking that he grant clemency. One of those jurors wrote: There are so many unanswered questions that we may never know. Why did Josh not recognize Mr. Cooper? Why were there no fingerprints found where the evidence showed there should have been? Why wasn't information about the station wagon followed up on? What weren't the three Mexicans located and interviewed? Why with so much blood, was only one drop of Mr. Cooper's blood found? Why did the prosecution cover up evidence? Why was the jury not shown the photograph of Jessica Ryen clutching hair? Why wasn't the hair tested? Why wasn't the jury told about the convicted murderer's bloodied coveralls turned into the police? Why did the police destroy those coveralls? Why wasn't the found beer can ever tested for saliva? These are just some of the many questions I have had over the years. App. in Suppt. of Mo. to File S. or S. Application, Vol. 7, tab 145. In Beck v. Alabama , the Supreme Court held that due process requires that a lesser-included offense instruction be given in a capital case: [W]hen the evidence unquestionably establishes that the defendant is guilty of a serious, violent offensebut leaves some doubt with respect to an element that would justify conviction of a capital offensethe failure to give the jury the third option of convicting of a lesser included offense would seem inevitably to enhance the risk of an unwarranted conviction. Such a risk cannot be tolerated in a case in which the defendant's life is at stake. 447 U.S. at 637, 100 S.Ct. 2382 (emphasis added). Beck requires the trial court to instruct sua sponte on a lesser-included offense in a capital case when evidence would support such a verdict. Clabourne v. Lewis, 64 F.3d 1373, 1379-80 (9th Cir. 1995). Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.  Brady, 397 U.S. at 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463 (emphasis added). The requirement of a knowing and intelligent waiver extends to Beck claims. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 457 n. 6, 104 S.Ct. 3154, 82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984). Cooper waived his right under Beck to a lesser-included second degree murder instruction only after Negus, his counsel, misinformed him about the law and about the likely consequences of foregoing that instruction. At the end of the trial, the judge stated that he was duty bound under the law to instruct on second degree murder, despite Cooper's attorney's desire to forgo the instruction. The following opencourt colloquy then took place, during which Cooper waived his right to a second degree instruction: Mr. Negus (defense counsel): ... [Mr. Cooper and I] have discussed between ourselves that the only role that I could see a second degree verdict playing in this particular case is to give a jury a compromise verdict. I also informed you [ i.e., Cooper] that as far as the eligibility for the penalty phase in this particular case is concerned, according to the present law as it is interpreted byat least by most of the courts, it says in the statute that a verdict of second degree is the same as a first degree if you find two second degrees, then we're into the penalty phase. In order not to encourage a compromise verdict, I believe that it is in your best interest to only give the jury two choices: First degree or nothing. Do you agree to do that? Mr. Cooper: Yes. The Court: Do you join in the waiver? Mr. Negus: I certainly do. The Court: All right, I accept it. 2/5/85 RT 7711-12; ER 260-261 (emphasis added). Thus, Cooper waived his second-degree murder instruction based on his counsel's statement that he was death-eligible whether the jury convicted him of first-degree or second-degree murder. If Negus had been right about California law, it made sense to waive the second-degree murder instruction. But Negus was wrong. A conviction for second-degree murder can never support the death penalty under California law, no matter how many victims there are. On Cooper's direct appeal, the California Supreme Court acknowledged that his trial counsel's statement of California law was wrong. Cooper, 53 Cal.3d at 828, 281 Cal.Rptr. 90, 809 P.2d 865. Because Cooper was misinformed by his attorney about the consequences of foregoing the second-degree murder instruction, his waiver of his due process right under Beck was clearly invalid. Cooper specifically cited Beck in his first federal application for habeas corpus. However, the district court failed to mention Cooper's Beck claim in denying his first application. On appeal, the three-judge panel of this court rejected his Beck claim by a vote of two to one. Cooper, 255 F.3d at 1110-11, 1114-15. One of the two judges held that Cooper had failed properly to raise the claim in his application, even though he had specifically cited Beck. The other held that he had properly raised the claim, and that his due process rights under Beck had been violated, but that the error was harmless. The third judge voted to grant the writ. He would have held that Cooper properly raised his Beck claim, that his due process rights under Beck had been violated, and that the error was not harmless. An en banc call of the panel's decision failed. We cannot now go back to revisit our earlier decision on Cooper's due process claim under Beck, for it was raised and rejected in his earlier federal habeas application. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1). But the background of his Beck claim, and the fate of that claim, make two things clear. First, contrary to what the concurrence says, the evidence against Cooper at trial was not overwhelming. On the contrary, it was so weak that it led Cooper's counsel to gamble on getting an outright acquittal. Second, contrary to what the concurrence suggests, there is no way to be confident that justice has been done in this case.
Doug, Peggy and Jessica Ryen, and Chris Hughes, were horribly killed. Josh Ryen, the surviving victim, has been traumatized for life. The other members of the Ryen family, and the surviving members of the Hughes family, have also been traumatized for life. The criminal justice system has made their nightmare even worse. San Bernardino County Sheriff's Department investigators were confronted with a horrifying multiple murder, far worse than any that had previously occurred in the county. They had an obvious suspect, an escaped prisoner who had stayed for two days at a house 125 yards away from the murder victims. They were under heavy pressure from the news media from the very first moment of their investigation. They drew what seemed, at the beginning, a sensible conclusion-that Kevin Cooper, the escaped prisoner, was the murderer. They drew that conclusion by the end of the first day of their investigation, and from that time forward they organized their investigation around it. Once SBCSD investigators drew that conclusion, they manipulated and planted evidence in order to convict Cooper. In the course of their investigation, they discounted, disregarded, and discarded evidence pointing to other killers. Their decision to close their eyes early in the investigation to the possibility that someone other than Kevin Cooper might be guilty has led us to the situation in which we find ourselves today. Unfortunately, the district court made things worse. After our en banc panel granted Cooper permission to file a second habeas application, the district court obstructed and impeded Cooper and his lawyers in almost every way imaginable. Kevin Cooper has now been on death row for nearly half his life. In my opinion, he is probably innocent of the crimes for which the State of California is about to execute him. If he is innocent, the real killers have escaped. They may kill again. They may already have done so. We owe it to the victims of this horrible crime, to Kevin Cooper, and to ourselves to get this one right. We should have taken this case en banc and ordered the district judge to give Cooper the fair hearing he has never had.