Opinion ID: 406141
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Heading: Interpreting the Applicable Statutes of Limitations

Text: 9 Three California appellate courts have now construed the meaning of the applicable statutes of limitations, whose conflicting provisions provide: 10 § 340.5 In an action for injury or death against a health care provider based upon such person's alleged professional negligence, the time for the commencement of action shall be three years after the date of injury .... 11 § 364 (a) No action based upon the health care provider's professional negligence may be commenced unless the defendant has been given at least 90 days' prior notice of the intention to commence the action. 12 (d) If the notice is served within 90 days of the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, the time for the commencement of the action shall be extended 90 days from the service of the notice. 13 § 356 ... When the commencement of an action is stayed by injunction or statutory prohibition, the time of the continuance of the injunction or prohibition is not part of the time limited for the commencement of the action. 14 In the earliest case, Gomez v. Valley View Sanitorium, 87 Cal.App.3d 507, 151 Cal.Rptr. 97 (1978), the court construed the sections to allow a plaintiff, if she gives the requisite notice within 90 days of the end of the original limitations period, a new limitations deadline of 180 days after notice is served: 15 Because Code of Civil Procedure section 364 prohibits the commencement of an action until 90 days have expired when a plaintiff serves the required notice of intention to commence it, that 90-day period must be excluded when calculating the applicable statute of limitations. Where section 364 also operates to extend the period of limitations because notice is served within 90 days of the expiration of the statute, the plaintiff is entitled to that extension (90 days under § 364(d) ) as well as the tolling of the statute during the 90 days plaintiff is prohibited from filing his action. 16 87 Cal.App.3d at 510, 151 Cal.Rptr. at 98 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). The Gomez court held that a complaint filed after the expiration of the original limitations period, and after the 90-day extension of section 364(d), was nevertheless timely because of the 90-day tolling period required by section 356. 17 In the next case, Braham v. Sorenson, 119 Cal.App.3d 367, 174 Cal.Rptr. 39 (1981), the court rejected the contention that plaintiff was entitled to more than 90 days after the expiration of the original limitations period. The court first construed sections 364(a) and 356 together as requiring a 90-day extension to the original limitations period in all cases in which a 90-day notice was required by section 364(a). 119 Cal.App.3d at 370-71, 174 Cal.Rptr. at 41. The court then declined to interpret section 364(d) as adding 90 days, or any other period, to the 90-day extension already construed. The court distinguished Gomez on the basis that the Gomez plaintiff did file within 90 days after the original limitations period expired. See 119 Cal.App.3d at 372-73, 174 Cal.Rptr. at 42-43. 18 Finally, in Banfield v. Sierra View Local District Hospital, 124 Cal.App.3d 444, 177 Cal.Rptr. 290 (1981), the Court of Appeal, after an extended discussion of the limitations provisions and the prior cases, concluded that the Braham construction was correct. The majority rejected the dissenter's argument that section 364(d) was rendered superfluous, concluding that the Legislature enacted subdivision (d) to make clear that a plaintiff who is prohibited from filing suit against a health care provider for 90 days, will receive at least an additional 90 days within which to file suit. 124 Cal.App.3d at 460, 177 Cal.Rptr. at 298 (emphasis added). The majority and dissent agreed that the Gomez language relied upon by plaintiff was dictum, since the Gomez plaintiff had timely filed even under the Braham rule. See 124 Cal.App.3d at 458, 461, 466, 177 Cal.Rptr. at 297, 299, 302. 19 Under the Erie doctrine, a federal court sitting in diversity is not free to reject a state judicial rule of law merely because it has not received the sanction of the state's highest court, but it must ascertain from all available data what the state law is and apply it. West v. A. T. & T. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 236-37, 61 S.Ct. 179, 183-184, 85 L.Ed. 139 (1940). An intermediate state appellate court decision is a datum for ascertaining state law which is not to be disregarded by a federal court unless it is convinced by other persuasive data that the highest court of the state would decide otherwise. Id. at 237, 61 S.Ct. at 183. 20 In this case the District Court, faced with conflicting appellate decisions concerning a complex question of statutory interpretation, see Banfield, 124 Cal.App.3d at 462, 177 Cal.Rptr. at 300, decided that the Braham construction was more logical and more in accord with the manifested legislative intent. IV Reporter's Transcript at 6. Considering the language of the statutes and California principles of statutory construction, however, we are convinced that the highest court of California would be compelled to adopt the interpretation advanced by plaintiff. 21 In Banfield, the only California decision that thoroughly discusses the problem of construing sections 364(a), 364(d), and 356, the majority reasoned that principles of statutory construction followed in People v. Ventura Refining Co., 204 Cal. 286, 268 P. 347 (1928), should apply: When a statute is fairly susceptible of two constructions, one leading inevitably to mischief or absurdity and the other consisting of sound sense and wise policy, the former should be rejected and the latter adopted. Id. at 292, 268 P. at 350 (quoting In re Haines, 195 Cal. 605, 613, 234 P. 883, 885 (1925)). The Gomez construction, the court reasoned, engenders mischief by (1) rewarding the dilatory plaintiff-one who does not serve notice until within the last 90 days of her limitations period-with more than the 90 extra days that a more diligent plaintiff receives, and (2) causing this additional period awarded the dilatory plaintiff to vary with the actual date notice is served, a result not consistent with the notion of a uniform limitations period. See Banfield, 124 Cal.App.3d at 461, 177 Cal.Rptr. at 290. 22 On the other hand, as the Banfield dissent noted, the Braham construction of the statute renders section 364(d) superfluous. If every plaintiff is entitled only to the 90-day tolling period when notice is required, there is no reason to examine the date notice is served-the date specified by section 364(d). Thus, it is questionable whether the words are sufficiently flexible to admit of some other construction .... Ventura Refining Co., 204 Cal. at 292, 268 P. at 350. Also, it is not unreasonable to assume the Legislature intended a variable limitations period since the words of section 364(d) refer expressly to a variable date (the date of service of the notice). See Banfield, 124 Cal.App.3d at 467-68, 177 Cal.Rptr. at 303 (Woolpert, J., dissenting). 23 We agree with the Banfield dissent that the Gomez construction is the only one that breathes life into section 364(d). See id. at 467, 177 Cal.Rptr. at 302 (Woolpert, J., dissenting). We are not persuaded that the California Supreme Court would adopt a construction of these statutes that renders one of them meaningless. Even though statutes of limitations are to be viewed favorably as affording to parties, who may by the lapse of time have lost the ability to procure evidence, security from stale claims, Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co., 24 Cal.3d 773, 787, 157 Cal.Rptr. 392, 400, 598 P.2d 45, 53 (1979); People v. Universal Film Exchanges, Inc., 34 Cal.2d 649, 659, 213 P.2d 697, 703 (1950), statutes of limitations are to be strictly construed and the court must find the intention of the Legislature from the statute itself, Skidmore v. County of Alameda, 13 Cal.2d 534, 540, 90 P.2d 577, 581 (1939). 24 The Braham/Banfield interpretation yields a result that wholly ignores the dictates of section 364(d): to extend the time for the commencement of the action, i.e., the limitations period, for a period of 90 days measured from the date notice of intent to sue is served. From the language of section 364(d) it is apparent that the Legislature intended (1) that for a plaintiff who serves notice within the last 90 days of the original limitations period that period is extended for a variable period beyond the initial expiration date, not tolled for an automatic 90 days, and (2) that the extension be calculated from the date of service of the notice, by its terms a date that varies with each case. 25 We cannot accept the view that the Legislature intended section 364(d) as a mere clarification to litigants as to the operation of section 356 upon the limitations period. See Banfield, 124 Cal.App.3d at 460, 177 Cal.Rptr. at 298. The operation of section 356 is perfectly clear without the clarification of section 364(d); moreover, such clarification comes only as a result of distorting the language of section 364(d) (the section does not read at least 90 days, as construed in Banfield ). 26 With respect to the argument that this interpretation creates certain anomalies, we again agree with the Banfield dissent: (1) it is evident that the Legislature intended a variable limitation period, for the section dictates measuring the extension from a variable date (the date of service); (2) the apparent inequity in the operation of the statute does not justify read(ing) code sections, validly enacted by the Legislature, out of existence just to reach an otherwise socially desirable result. Id. at 467, 177 Cal.Rptr. at 303 (Woolpert, J., dissenting). Even conceding that it is apparent from these statutes that the Legislature did not intend such a benefit to plaintiffs facing the last 90 days of their limitations periods, a conclusion that we regard as questionable, we conclude that the words of section 364(d) are not sufficiently flexible to admit of (a) construction ... to effectuate that intention. People v. Ventura Refining Co., 204 Cal. 286, 292, 268 P. 347, 350 (1928). 27 Plaintiff served her Notice of Intent to commence an action on April 21, 1980, less than 90 days before the expiration of the original limitations period. 1 Her complaint was timely filed within 180 days after the date of service of the Notice of Intent. The summary judgment for defendants, therefore, must be reversed. 2 28