Opinion ID: 1107865
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: did the chancery court err in denying the board's motion to dismiss the original and amended bill of discovery?

Text: The bill of discovery is one of the ancient bills used in equity practice. Griffith, Mississippi Chancery Practice, 1925, § 427 p. 422. The Board argues that the bill is no longer available as a discovery devise in Mississippi practice as it was abolished or rendered obsolete by the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure effective January 1, 1982. This Court disagrees with this premise. Griffith, supra, addresses the Bill of Discovery: But here is a distinct bill in chancery known, strictly speaking, as the bill of discovery, by the use of which disclosure may be required of material facts exclusively within the knowledge or possession of the defendant and which without such discovery no full and adequate proof of them could be made. It had its origin out of the common law rule that no party in interest was a competent witness in any case; and it began at an early date to be allowed in the court of chancery in order to relieve against what otherwise would have resulted in a denial of justice when it happened that the facts or the documents establishing a right or materially aiding therein rested in the exclusive possession or control of the opposite party; and, originally its office was simply to aid a pending suit at law or one about to be brought, and the chancery part of the proceedings were usually deemed as concluded upon the coming in of the full answer making the disclosures or producing the documents sought. In other words, the obtaining of the discovery was the sole object and end of the bill, no relief other than the discovery being prayed. It was therefore purely ancillary to a trial in some other case and ordinarily in some other forum. at pp. 422, 423. Rule 82(a), M.R.C.P. makes clear that nothing in the rules alters the jurisdiction of any court, nor is the power of any court to grant substantive relief changed from what it was before the rules. It is true that the nomenclature of the legal practice was changed by the abolition of the names of the old writs and procedural names. M.R.C.P. Rule 2. See Dye v. State Ex Rel. Hale, 507 So.2d 332, 337 n. 4 (Miss. 1987). As such, the terminology of a Bill of Discovery has been rendered obsolete, and procedurally it is referred to as a complaint. However, the adoption of the rules affected procedure, not substance. The power and authority of the Chancery Court to grant the substantive relief of discovery remains viable and available although it has been broadened and simplified by M.R.C.P. 26-37. The need for this substantive remedy is evident by this lawsuit. The chancellor was correct in allowing the amendment of the complaint to make the complaint substantively a bill of discovery. In this case, the matter substantively at issue has by law been committed to the authority and jurisdiction of the State Oil & Gas Board, subject to the Board's procedures. The Chancery Court's authority as to that matter is limited to judicial review. In Mississippi State Tax Com'n v. Mississippi-Alabama St. F., 222 So.2d 664 (Miss. 1969), this Court stated that: Our courts are not permitted to make administrative decisions and perform the functions of an administrative agency. Administrative agencies must perform the functions required of them by law. When an administrative agency has performed its function, and has made the determination and entered the order required of it, the parties may then appeal to the judicial tribunal designated to hear the appeal. The appeal is a limited one, however, since the courts cannot enter the field of the administrative agency. Mississippi State Tax Com'n at 665. Provision for judicial review of the Board's action is contained in § 53-1-39, Miss. Code Ann. (Supp. 1988), which provides in part: In addition to other remedies now available, the state, or any interested person aggrieved by any final rule, regulation or order of the board, shall have the right, regardless of the amount involved, of appeal to the Chancery Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County, Mississippi, or to the chancery court of the county in which all or a part of appellant's property affected by such rule, regulation or order is situated, which shall be taken and perfected as hereinafter provided, within thirty (30) days from the date that such final rule, regulation or order is filed for record in the office of the board; and the said chancery court may affirm such rule, regulation or order, or reverse same for further proceedings as justice may require. Miss. Code Ann. § 53-1-39(a) (Supp. 1988) (emphasis added). Judicial review may be had of any final rule, regulation or order of the Board. Prior to an appeal from a final rule, regulation, or order, as contemplated by the statute, the Chancery Court has no jurisdiction to participate in the administrative process and it was error to do so when the effect amounted to an intervention in the pending proceeding. However, a litigant is not shut off from all remedies for discovery merely because the rules of civil procedure do not apply or because the roles of the administrative agency do not promote it. In appropriate cases a pure bill for discovery will lie and statutory remedies may be available to the end that due process be afforded. However, the hearing on the discovery bill has been held, and that question is now moot as to this suit, but this Court holds that this case falls within the exception to the mootness rule where the activity is of short duration, but the length of time required to file an appeal is lengthy. The Court addresses this issue that is capable of repetition, but would otherwise evade judicial review. Pascaqoula Mun. Sep. Dist. v. Doe, 508 So.2d 1081 (Miss. 1987), Strong v. Bostick, 420 So.2d 1356 (Miss. 1982). AFFIRMED. ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., HAWKINS and DAN M. LEE, P.JJ., and ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN, ANDERSON and BLASS, JJ., concur. PITTMAN, J., not participating.