Opinion ID: 771799
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Textual Interpretation

Text: 30 We begin with the text of the statute. Section 1437d(l)(6) provides that any drug-related criminal activity on or off such premises, engaged in by a public housing tenant, any member of the tenant's household, or any guest or other person under the tenant's control, shall be cause for termination of tenancy. HUD essentially argues that any  means all, asserting that if a drug-related crime occurs by any of the enumerated individuals, then the statute clearly permits eviction of all tenants under the lease, regardless of personal involvement in or knowledge of the crime. The language of the statute, however, does not appear as plain as HUD would like it to be. The statutory provision does not expressly address the level of personal knowledge or fault that is required for eviction, or even make it clear who can be evicted. Although the statute permits termination of tenancy, it does not answer the question of whose tenancy. In situations with multiple tenants, does the statute authorize eviction of the offending party only, or all persons on the lease? 31 The parties debate the significance that should be attributed to the use of the phrase under the tenant's control. HUD argues that this phrase modifies only the term other person and that control means only that this other person has the tenant's consent to be in the tenant's unit. The tenants contend that control involves the exercise of a restraining or directing influence over another, and that this applies to all of the words in the group, i.e., household members, guests and other persons. The tenants further argue that it is implicit from the use of this wording that Congress intended tenants to be held accountable for the actions of those persons who are subject to their control, but that the statute does not impose sanctions on tenants who have taken reasonable steps to prevent criminal drug activity from occurring, but, for a lack of knowledge or other reason, could not realistically be expected to exercise control over the conduct of another. 32 The text of subsection (6), viewed in isolation, does not compel either party's interpretation. We therefore turn to the specific context in which the language is used and the broader context of the statute as a whole. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997).
33 In examining the language of the statute, we must look to its place in the overall statutory scheme and fit, if possible, all parts into a harmonious whole, Brown & Williamson, 120 S.Ct. at 1301 (quoting FTC v. Mandel Bros., Inc., 359 U.S. 385, 389 (1959)). First established in 1937, the public housing program was a response to an acute shortage of decent and safe dwellings for low-income families.  42 U.S.C. 1437. Understanding that these low income tenants face grave adversity if evicted, Congress has put a number of protections in place that limit the ability of local PHAs to evict. In 1437d(l) itself, the local PHAs are prohibited from using leases with unreasonable terms and conditions. Another subsection also provides that the leases must not permit the PHA to terminate tenancies except for serious or repeated violation of the terms or conditions of the lease or for other good cause. 1437d(l)(5). We believe reading section (l) as a harmonious whole, requires us to presume that Congress also intended subsection (6) to be construed as a reasonable lease term and to permit eviction only if there is good cause. 34 It is, of course, our task to determine the meaning of subsection (6) and not its wisdom. Our task is to examine HUD's construction of subsection (6) in light of and in relation to the other provisions of section (l). There is undisputedly a significant problem with crime and drugs in public housing. The goal of providing safe and drug-free public housing is well served by permitting the local PHAs to evict tenants who engage in the proscribed criminal activities. It is also furthered by imposing a duty on tenants to take reasonable steps to control the drug or criminal activity of family members and guests or face eviction. There is no dispute that the eviction of tenants who personally engage in drug activity or of tenants who turn a blind eye to the activities of household members or guests falls squarely within the language of the statute under either party's reading. 35 While the policy considerations pointed out by the dissent may apply to the eviction of culpable tenants [Dissent at 1073-78], we do not believe they support the eviction of innocent ones. Imposing the threat of eviction on an innocent tenant who has already taken all reasonable steps to prevent third-party drug activity could not have a deterrent effect because the tenant would have already done all that tenant could do to prevent the third-party drug activity. Likewise, evicting the innocent tenant will not significantly reduce drug related criminal activity in public housing, since the tenant has not engaged in any such activity personally or knowingly allowed such activity to occur. HUD's construction of subsection (6) would allow such irrational evictions, and thus would require PHAs to include an unreasonable term in their leases and permit eviction without good cause. Read in the context of the overall statutory scheme and in light of the legislative history (discussed below), we cannot say Congress intended such a result.
36 Another amendment enacted at the same time as the original version of 1437d(l)(6) also leads to the conclusion that Congress did not intend to allow the eviction of innocent tenants. In the same chapter and subtitle of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Congress passed both the original version of subsection (6) and also amended a pre-existing civil forfeiture provision of the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. 881(a). The two statutes at issue were enacted together as parts of a single legislative scheme to combat drug abuse in public housing. The legislative history indicates how Congress envisioned the statutes working together: 37 Chapter 1 of this subtitle codifies current HUD guidelines granting public housing agencies authority to evict tenants if they, their families or their guests engage in drug-related criminal activity. It also allows the federal government to seize housing units from tenants who violate drug laws by clarifying that public housing leases are considered property with respect to civil forfeiture laws. 38 134 Cong. Rec. S17360-02 (Nov. 10, 1998) available at 1988 WL 182529 (Cong. Rec.). 39 The forfeiture provision was amended by inserting the phrase (including any leasehold interest) into the text of the pre-existing statute. The amended statute then read in relevant part: 40 The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States. . . . 41 . . . . 42 (7) All real property, including any right, title and interest (including any leasehold interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land and any appurtenances or improvements, which is used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, a violation of this sub chapter . . . except that no property shall be forfeited under this paragraph, to the extent of an interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by that owner to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner. 21 U.S.C. 881(a) (emphasis added). 1 43 HUD suggests we should place no importance on the availability of what clearly was an innocent owner defense in the forfeiture provision, pointing to the differences between civil forfeiture and lease eviction proceedings. Although different animals, the Supreme Court instructs that the meaning of one statute may be illuminated by the language of another. Brown & Williamson, 120 S. Ct. at 1300-01. When dealing with two different statutes which not only govern the same subject matter but were also enacted at the same time in the same chapter of the same Act, we presume Congress meant them to be read consistently. HUD correctly points out that the forfeiture provision deals with forfeitures of the leasehold to the federal government, while 1437d(l)(6) deals with eviction by local PHAs. Although different processes, the purpose of both is the same. Moreover, the result is the same: the tenant loses the leasehold interest, which is taken over by a governmental entity. It makes little sense to provide protections for the innocent tenant from the federal government but not from local housing authorities. 2 44 HUD and the dissent also argue that the forfeiture provision illustrates that Congress knows how to provide an innocent tenant defense when it wants to, and that since it did not use the very same language in 1437d(l)(6), it must not have intended for one to be available. [Dissent at 1067]. We agree that the innocent tenant defense in 881(a)(7) was more clear; it was also drafted by a different Congress than the one which enacted 1437d(l)(6), which significantly weakens HUD's argument. Cf. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 330 (1997) (negative implication argument is strongest when different provisions were joined together and considered simultaneously when the language giving rise to the implication was inserted). The concurrent amendment of 881(a)(7) did not touch the previously drafted innocent owner defense; it merely extended the forfeiture provision to include leasehold interests. 45 We are unpersuaded by the negative implication argument. To say Congress could have drafted the defense more explicitly in 1437d(l)(6) is not to say it did not do so at all.
46 HUD asserts that its interpretation of 1437d(l)(6) is reinforced by a version of 1437d(c)(4)(A)(iii) which was in effect until 1996. This version prohibited individuals or families who were evicted because of drug-related criminal activity from receiving a statutory housing preference for three years, but exempted any member of a family of an individual who the agency determined clearly did not participate in and had no knowledge of such criminal activity. HUD argues that if innocent tenants could not be evicted under 1437d(l)(6), there would have been no need for such an exemption, which would have rendered 1437d(c)(4)(A)(iii) surplusage. 47 The language HUD relies on is no longer part of the statute. We are therefore hesitant to even address an argument for harmonious interpretation when there is no longer a provision to harmonize. We do, however, note that even as originally drafted, 1437d(c)(4)(A)(iii) was not entirely inconsistent with the tenants' interpretation of 1437d(l)(6). For example, an entire family, including minor children, can be evicted under 1437d(l)(6) if the parent engages in drug-related activities. These children, upon reaching the age of eighteen, would become eligible for public housing. The prior version of 1437d(c)(4)(A)(iii) would have waived the three-year disqualification period for such children if they were not participants in the criminal activity which caused the family to be evicted, which means that this provision would not have been surplusage under the tenants' interpretation.
48 Section 1437d(l)(6) is not a picture of clarity and may be subject to varying interpretations. When read in conjunction with the remainder of 1437d(l) and other provisions enacted at the same time, however, it appears that Congress did not intend subsection (6) to apply to the eviction of innocent tenants. Any doubts that persist about Congress's intentions, however, are firmly resolved by the legislative history and the principles of statutory construction we discuss below.