Opinion ID: 167633
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Arguments Pertaining to Defendant Finton

Text: 35 Pursuant to Rules 50 and 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Ms. Escue asked the district court to grant a new trial, or in the alternative, grant judgment as a matter of law as to each of her three claims against Mr. Finton: (1) deprivation of constitutional rights, actionable under § 1983; (2) assault and battery under state law; and (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress under state law. We review de novo the district court's denial of Ms. Escue's motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Loughridge v. Chiles Power Supply Co., 431 F.3d 1268, 1280 (10th Cir.2005). We make all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Id. Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate only if the evidence points but one way and is susceptible to no reasonable inferences which may support the nonmoving party's position. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 36 We review the district court's denial of Ms. Escue's motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion, viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. Snyder v. City of Moab, 354 F.3d 1179, 1187-88 (10th Cir.2003). [A] motion for a new trial on the grounds that the jury verdict is against the weight of the evidence normally involves a review of the facts presented at trial, and thus involves the discretion of the trial court. Black v. Hieb's Enters., 805 F.2d 360, 363 (10th Cir.1986). Thus, even if we do not necessarily agree with the jury's verdict, it must be upheld unless it is clearly, decidedly or overwhelmingly against the weight of the evidence. Id.
37 The district court instructed the jury that, to find in favor of Ms. Escue on this claim, it had to find the following to be true: (1) Mr. Finton had deprived her of a constitutional right, (2) he acted under color of state law, and (3) his actions were the proximate cause of the injuries and damages she sustained. Aplt's App. vol. IV, at 864; see 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The jury was instructed that, with regard to the second prong of that test, Mr. Finton had acted under color of state law. Aplt's App. vol. IV, at 866. 38 The district court further instructed that, with regard to the first prong of that test, Mr. Finton violated Ms. Escue's constitutional right to be free from sex discrimination under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if the jury found that: (1) Mr. Finton's conduct subjected her to sex discrimination, (2) the conduct was unwelcome, and (3) the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive as to interfere unreasonably with her school performance and create a hostile or abusive educational environment. Id. at 865; see also Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 898 (1st Cir.1988) (explaining that, under the equal protection clause, a plaintiff makes a prima facie case of hostile environment harassment by showing that he or she was subjected to unwelcome sexual advances so `severe or pervasive' that it altered his or her working or educational environment) (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986)). Therefore, if the jury determined that the conduct was not unwelcome or that Ms. Escue consented to the contact, it could not have found in favor of her on this claim. 39 The Supreme Court has observed that the question whether particular conduct was indeed unwelcome presents difficult problems of proof and turns largely on credibility determinations committed to the trier of fact. Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 68, 106 S.Ct. 2399 (examining a sexual harassment suit brought under Title VII). Although a jury could have found in Ms. Escue's favor on this claim had it favored her testimony about the incidents, if a jury did not credit her version of events, there was sufficient evidence for it to find that Mr. Finton's conduct was not unwelcome. 40 Ms. Escue testified that she did not welcome the conduct, and Mr. Meyer testified that the look on her face during the incidents that he witnessed showed that Mr. Finton's actions were unwelcome. However, the jury need not have found this testimony credible. Moreover, the jury could have found that some of Ms. Escue's testimony tended to show that Mr. Finton's conduct was not unwelcome: Ms. Escue admitted that she never verbally objected to any of the conduct, that she explicitly consented to the sternum adjustment and voluntarily laid on Mr. Finton's office floor, and that she sent Mr. Finton a Valentine's Day card. Mr. Meyer's testimony that Ms. Escue went to Mr. Finton's office to give Mr. Finton back massages and showed him tattoos that were under her clothing also could have permitted the jury to draw the inference that Mr. Finton's conduct was not unwelcome. Therefore, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Finton, the jury's verdict on Ms. Escue's § 1983 claim was not against the weight of the evidence, and the district court correctly denied Ms. Escue's motions for a directed verdict and new trial.
41 The district court instructed the jury that even if it found that an assault or battery occurred, [d]efendant is not liable to Plaintiff on her claim of assault or her battery claim if he proves his affirmative defense of consent. Aplt's App. vol. IV, at 870; see also Taylor v. Hesser, 991 P.2d 35, 39 (1998). Mr. Finton could have proved consent by showing that Ms. Escue led him reasonably to believe that she consented to his contact, and that the contact was the same or substantially similar to the contact to which she consented. Aplt's App. vol. IV, at 870. Mr. Finton argues that the jury had sufficient evidence to find that he proved his affirmative defense of consent. 42 Under Oklahoma law, consent does not always need to be verbal; it can be inferred from a person's actions. `If words or conduct are reasonably understood by another to be intended as consent, they constitute apparent consent and are as effective as consent in fact.' Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1219 (10th Cir.2003) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 892(2)) (applying Oklahoma law). Similarly, the Third Circuit has explained that [e]xpress consent may be given by words or affirmative conduct and implied consent may be manifested when a person takes no action, indicating an apparent willingness for the conduct to occur. Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 148 (3d Cir.1998) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 892 cmt. b & c). 43 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Finton, the jury verdict is not against the weight of the evidence. Even if Mr. Finton's own admissions during trial showed that he committed the prima facie elements of both assault and battery, as Ms. Escue contends, the jury could have found that Ms. Escue led Mr. Finton to believe that she consented to his contact, or contact that was substantially similar. As explained above with respect to her § 1983 claim, Ms. Escue admitted that she never objected to Mr. Finton's conduct, she voluntarily went to his office on a number of occasions, gave him back massages, gave him a Valentine's Day card, consented to the sternum adjustment, and remained in his office after the sternum-adjustment incident. Mr. Finton maintained at trial that, during the sternum adjustment, he did not, in fact, touch Ms. Escue's breasts. The jury was not required to credit Ms. Escue's testimony that she did not consent to or welcome Mr. Finton's conduct because [i]t is the jury's exclusive province to assess the credibility of witnesses and determine the weight to be given to their testimony. Lamon v. City of Shawnee, 972 F.2d 1145, 1159 (10th Cir.1992). From Ms. Escue's admissions, coupled with Mr. Meyers's and Mr. Finton's testimony, a reasonable jury had sufficient evidence to find that she implicitly consented to the conduct. 44
45 As the district court instructed, for the jury to find in favor of Ms. Escue on her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, she had to prove that: (1) Mr. Finton's conduct was so extreme and outrageous that it went beyond all possible bounds of decency; (2) the conduct would be considered atrocious and intolerable in a civilized society; and (3) Mr. Finton intentionally or recklessly caused severe emotional distress to Ms. Escue beyond that which a reasonable person could be expected to endure. Aplt's App. vol. IV, at 868; see also Gaylord Entm't Co. v. Thompson, 958 P.2d 128, 149 (Okla.1998) (characterizing tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress as narrow and explaining that [c]onduct which, though unreasonable, is neither `beyond all possible bounds of decency' in the setting in which it occurred, nor is one that can be `regarded as utterly intolerable in a civilized community' falls short of having actionable quality) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46). 46 As explained above, a reasonable jury could have concluded that Ms. Escue consented to the events that occurred. Given this, it follows that the same jury would likely not have found that Mr. Finton's conduct was extreme and outrageous, or beyond all possible bounds of decency. Gaylord Entm't Co., 958 P.2d at 149 (quotation marks omitted). 47 Even if Mr. Finton's conduct had met this high standard, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the emotional distress Ms. Escue suffered was not severe enough to impose liability on Mr. Finton. In Daemi v. Church's Fried Chicken, we held that there was insufficient evidence to establish that the plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress, where the plaintiff alleged that he was sick to his stomach, nervous, insecure, unrestful, no longer acted like himself, and that he had to discuss the complained-of conduct with a therapist he was consulting for different problems. 931 F.2d 1379, 1389 (10th Cir.1991) (applying Oklahoma law). We explained that to prevent a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress from becoming a panacea for all of life's ills, . . . distress [sufficient to support the claim] is often accompanied by shock, illness, or other bodily harm, but bodily harm is not a prerequisite. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 48 Here, Ms. Escue complains that, as a result of Mr. Finton's conduct, she suffered from fear, could not sleep, had nightmares, suffered from depression, and was subjected to ridicule and humiliation by her peers. The jury could have reasonably found that Ms. Escue's testimony regarding these effects was not credible, as Ms. Escue did not proffer any evidence besides her own testimony to prove that she suffered emotional distress. Moreover, her allegations are quite similar to those that we held legally insufficient in Daemi —inability to sleep, personality changes, physical manifestations of stress (in Daemi through stomach problems, and for Ms. Escue, depression), nervousness, and fear. See id. Therefore, the jury did not act against the weight of the evidence by finding that Ms. Escue had not met her burden of proof with respect to the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.