Opinion ID: 2368166
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Tort Of Intentional Spoliation In Alaska

Text: We have not expressly defined the elements of the tort of spoliation in Alaska, but they can be gleaned from our case law and they illustrate important similarities and differences between the permanent destruction and temporary concealment of evidence. As discussed below, the first two elements gleaned from the case law militate in favor of affirming the trial court's ruling that intentional concealment satisfies the requirements for spoliation. The third element illustrates why a different remedy is required when evidence is concealed but not destroyed.
The tort of spoliation was recognized by our court more than twenty years ago in Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage . [15] Hazen was arrested after a conversation with an undercover police officer in which she allegedly agreed to engage in an act of prostitution. [16] That conversation was recorded. [17] At a hearing shortly after her arrest, the charges against Hazen were dropped. [18] Hazen's attorneys requested that the recording of the conversation be preserved or that Hazen be given a copy of it because she was contemplating a civil suit. [19] Subsequently, Hazen did sue the Municipality of Anchorage and the officers who arrested her, alleging false arrest and malicious prosecution. [20] In her civil case, Hazen requested a copy of the audio recording of the conversation on which her arrest had been based, but the recording had been permanently altered under circumstances that suggested intentional destruction. [21] When she learned the tape had been altered, Hazen amended her complaint to add an independent claim for alteration or destruction of evidence. [22] The superior court allowed Hazen to pursue a claim for intentional alteration or destruction of evidence by implying a cause of action under the Alaska Constitution for deliberate violations of due process. [23] On appeal, we found a constitutional remedy unnecessary, instead holding that Hazen has a common-law cause of action in tort for intentional interference with prospective civil action by spo[li]ation of evidence. [24] Intentional action by one party to interfere with another party's ability to bring a civil cause of action is central to the tort of spoliation. [25] We have consistently held that there must be a remedy in those rare cases where evidence is intentionally destroyed. [26] The intentional concealment of evidence shares a common essential attribute with the tort of spoliation; both actions provide remedies for the purposeful interference with the ability of the injured party to pursue a civil claim.
In Estate of Day v. Willis we clarified that claims for intentional spoliation are limited to circumstances in which a valid underlying cause of action is prejudiced by the destruction of evidence. [27] As with Dooley's case, there were two court actions involved in Estate of Day. The first proceeding was a wrongful death action filed by Day's estate against the State of Alaska and security officers from Anchorage International Airport. [28] The officers initially encountered Day when they investigated cars parked near the airport after hours. The people in the area dispersed when the officers arrived; Day ran into some nearby woods. The security officers left after learning that one of the cars belonged to Day and that he was wanted on several criminal charges. Shortly thereafter, the security officers saw Day drive out of the area at high speed and gave chase. The chase culminated in Day's fatal car crash, and Day's estate brought a claim for wrongful death. The superior court granted summary judgment to the defendants, ruling that the officers did not have a duty to take Day into protective custody prior to the chase. [29] We affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the wrongful death action, but Day's estate later learned of a witness to the chase whose description of events contradicted the police officers' account. [30] Day's estate filed a second suit against the defendants, this time alleging that they intentionally failed to disclose the identity of the witness during the discovery phase of the wrongful death litigation. The superior court granted summary judgment to the defendants, dismissing the spoliation claim. We affirmed and explained, [a]n action based on the tort of spoliation is meritless unless it can be shown that a party's underlying cause of action has been prejudiced by the spoliation. [31] Day's estate failed to make out a valid claim for wrongful death because the defendants did not owe a duty to Day; it follows that the failure to disclose a witness to the chase could not have prejudiced the estate because the estate did not have a viable cause of action against the defendants. Allstate argues that an independent reason for dismissing Dooley's claim at the summary judgment level is that the absence of the Cook note did not prejudice Dooley's underlying negligence claim against Paul. The superior court correctly rejected this as a basis for the summary judgment motion. [32] Whether the Cook note would have made a difference in the Dooley v. Paul trial has not been determined. For purposes of the decision entered today, it is only important to observe that Dooley's claim for concealment of the Cook note alleges that a viable underlying cause of action was prejudiced by a defendant's intentional interference with necessary evidence.
Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage concerned the allegation that necessary evidence was intentionally destroyed and irretrievably lost. [33] We have expanded the definition of destroyed evidence only once, and only to explain that there is no functional difference between permanently destroying evidence and volitional actions that permit evidence to dissipate or disappear. [34] In Hibbits v. Sides we held that there is no difference between the intentional destruction or alteration of evidence and the intentional concealment of evidence until it is destroyed by natural causes. [35] In either circumstance, the evidence is completely unavailable for use by one party as a result of another party's decision to interfere with his or her civil cause of action. We agree with the trial court that where one party merely conceals evidence until after the conclusion of trial and the expiration of other remedies available under the civil rules, the evidence is destroyed as potential evidence in the sense that it is unavailable for trial or to support a motion filed under Civil Rule 60(b). But we also agree with Allstate that once the previously concealed evidence becomes available, the situation is markedly different from cases in which evidence is completely destroyed and its impact on the underlying proceedings is mere speculation. If evidence becomes available, our strong policy in favor of trying cases on their merits militates in favor of allowing a fact finder to determine whether concealing the evidence caused a party to incur actual damages. [36] Intentional spoliation is not the appropriate cause of action when evidence is concealed, but not destroyed, because late-produced evidence  even evidence produced after the entry of judgment  can still be presented to the fact finder for a ruling on the merits. And trials on the merits are most consistent with the truth-seeking function of the court.