Opinion ID: 1257044
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: kelly pearce

Text: Appellant's first contention is that respondent Pearce was ineligible to run for the office of probate judge while serving as a probation officer because of the provisions of both the state merit or personnel system (I.C. § 67-5311; Merit System Rule XV, § 1, P. 34), and by the Federal Hatch Act, in particular 5 U.S.C.A. § 118k(a) and (f). Both of these statutes, if applicable to Pearce, would prohibit him from taking active part in political campaigns and presumably from running for office. Although the District Court in its memorandum opinion determined that respondent Pearce was not subject to the provisions of the law pertaining to the state merit or personnel system or to the Hatch Act, we find it unnecessary to discuss their applicability to Pearce. Neither piece of legislation purports to declare an office holder ineligible to run for another office; they merely purport to apply sanctions against those who so choose to run. I.C. § 67-5312 provides that anyone subject to the state personnel system who violates the no politics rule of I.C. § 67-5311 and the Merit System Rule XV shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. Appellant does not contend that conviction of a misdemeanor would render respondent Pearce ineligible to run for the office of probate judge. Since the legislature provided an express penalty for violation of the no politics rule, an additional unexpressed penalty cannot be presumed. State v. Fair Lawn Service Center, 20 N.J. 468, 120 A.2d 233 (1956). The Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 118k(b), provides for withholding of federal funds from states that permit violators of the Act to stay in their old jobs in the face of federal demands that they be removed. The Act does not purport to say who is eligible for state office. Since neither the state merit or personnel system nor the Hatch Act gave appellant a cause of action against anyone to have his candidacy declared invalid, it becomes unnecessary to determine whether the two legislative enactments were applicable to respondent Pearce. Appellant's second contention is that Idaho Const. art. 2, § 1, rendered Pearce ineligible to run for the office of probate judge while still serving as a probation officer. This constitutional provision reads: The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct departments, the legislative, executive and judicial; and no person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted. Although appellant asserts that as probation officer, Pearce was exercising executive powers and that by campaigning for the office of probate judge he was seeking to exercise judicial powers, it is self-evident that merely seeking the office of probate judge as a candidate does not involve the exercise of judicial powers. Appellant further advances the theory that campaigning for office is one of the functions of the office campaigned for. However, merely running for office cannot be considered as exercising a function of that office.