Opinion ID: 3009746
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Effect of the Relief Sought

Text: Nevertheless, despite the need for the PUC to determine liability on Te third-party claim, the PUC is not empowered to award damages, and Teleconce damages in the nature of indemnification. See Elkin, 420 A.2d at 374 (the P authority to award damages). However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has a 36 bifurcated procedure where, as here, a plaintiff sues a public utility base latter's purported failure to provide adequate, reasonable or sufficient ser seeks damages as a remedy. See Elkin, 420 A.2d at 375-76; Ostrov, 586 A.2d this bifurcated procedure, the issue of liability is transferred to, and ini by, the PUC. If necessary, the appropriate trial court thereafter determine See Elkin, 420 A.2d at 377; DeFrancesco, 453 A.2d at 596 n.3. Accordingly, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies where the ad agency cannot provide a means of complete redress to the complaining party a dispute involves issues that are clearly better resolved in the first instan administrative agency charged with regulating the subject matter of the dis 586 A.2d at 413. The doctrine requires a court to transfer an issue that in administrative expertise to the administrative agency charged with exercisin discretion. Richman Bros., 953 F.2d at 1435 n.3. Essentially, the doctrin workable relationship between the courts and administrative agencies wherein appropriate circumstances, the courts can have the benefit of the agency's v within the agency's competence. Elkin, 420 A.2d at 376. In Optimum Image, supra, the plaintiff sued the Philadelphia Electric (PECO) alleging that the utility wrongfully, negligently, carelessly and reasonable cause delivered, over an extended period of time, unreasonably de electrical power to plaintiff's business premises. The trial court transfe determination of liability to the PUC. The Pennsylvania Superior Court affi [Plaintiff alleges that] the electrical power supplied by PECO exceeded the ten percent variation allowed by PECO's tariff filed the PUC. In addition, [plaintiff] . . . alleges that the power wi which it was supplied was substandard and outside the regulatory requirements and that the problem it experienced was not investiga with the proper equipment. . . . . In response, PECO contends that it at all times provided electrica power in compliance with its tariff filed with the PUC and otherwi furnished and maintained adequate, efficient, safe and reasonable services and facilities to [plaintiff]. 37 Id. at 556-57. The controversy between Teleconcepts and Bell is analogous. that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction required the district court to uti bifurcated procedure established for resolving questions of liability where sought in a matter involving the special expertise of the PUC. Thus, althou district court had jurisdiction over the third-party claim, the court erred the question of liability. That claim must be transferred to the PUC for s determination. If the PUC concludes that Teleconcepts is entitled to indemni Bell, the district court may then make an appropriate award to Teleconcepts. Image,, 600 A.2d at 557. We are aware that language in some decisions of the United States Supr our sister Courts of Appeals seems to suggest a contrary result here. For ex Reiter v. Cooper, 113 S. Ct. 1213 (1993) the Court stated: Referral of the issue to the administrative agency does not depri the court of jurisdiction; it has discretion to either retain jurisdiction or, if the parties would not be unfairly disadvantage to dismiss the case without prejudice. 113 S. Ct. at 1219. See also, U.S. v. Philadelphia National Bank, 83 S. Ct. (comparing primary jurisdiction to a prudential doctrine of abstention and n primary jurisdiction merely postpones and does not preclude the exercise of by a federal court), Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. County of Kent, Mich., 114 (1994) (failure to brief primary jurisdiction resulted in waiving considerat doctrine), Gross v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 51 F.3d 703, 706 (7th Cir. 195 found the parties had waived any consideration of primary jurisdiction and this respect, primary jurisdiction is quite different from subject matter jurisdiction[]), and U.S. v. Henri, 828 F.2d 526, 527 (9th Cir. 1987) (th primary jurisdiction, despite what the term may imply, does not speak of th jurisdictional power of the federal courts[]). However, none of these case 38 the issue of the authority of a federal court to adjudicate a matter that a legislature had placed within the exclusive domain of a state administrative Accordingly, our analysis here is consistent with the results reached in suc U.S. v. Western Pacific Railroad, 77 S. Ct. 161, 165 (1956). There, the cour [t]he doctrine of primary jurisdiction thus does 'more than prescr the mere procedural timetable of the law suit. It is a doctrine allocating the law making power over certain aspects' of commercia relations. 'It transfers from court to agency the power to determ some of the incidents of such relations. 77 S. Ct. at 166 (emphasis added). See also, Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W. R. 577 (1950), and Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Day, 79 S. Ct. 1322 (1959), an Hotel and Casino, supra. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has committed the issues raised by Te claim against Bell to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania Public Commission and a federal court can not amend state law by exercising supplem jurisdiction. Indeed, a contrary holding would mean that the federal courts to decide matters of state law that courts in the affected state lack author resolve. Since the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held that the Public U Commission has been vested by the legislature with exclusive original jurisd of the issues which this suit requires us to resolve, Behrend v. Bell Tele A.2d 346, 347 (1968), we must remand to the district court for appropriate p Accordingly, we will reverse the district court's grant of summary jud of Bell and remand so that the district court can transfer the third-party PUC for a determination of liability. The district court retains jurisdicti matter pending the liability determination by the PUC.0 0 We realize that after the district court disposes of the allocatio distance charges between MCI and Teleconcepts in accordance with this opinio will be left with only the third-party claim founded on state law. It is f court to decide whether to retain supplemental jurisdiction at that point, o the third-party claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). 39