Opinion ID: 618676
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Forgery Incident

Text: Nagle argues that any personal interest she may have had in speaking about the forgery incident does not do away with whatever First Amendment protection the speech is entitled to. We agree that the primary question for First Amendment purposes is whether the matter is of public concern, not whether the speech was also made to serve some private interest. Cf. Reuland, 460 F.3d at 415 (holding that the absence of a motivating desire to address a matter of public concern was not dispositive as to whether [the] speech addressed a matter of public concern). Nagle further argues that the fact that the forgery was not considered criminal activity by the police does not by itself negate First Amendment protection. We, similarly, do not doubt that non-criminal activities may also be . . . matters of public concern. Cioffi v. Averill Park Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 444 F.3d 158, 164 (2d Cir.2006). Accordingly, we believe that the district court erred in its conclusion that because Nagle's speech about the forgery was not focused on the public welfare but was instead advanc[ing] some . . . personal agenda, that speech necessarily was not protected. Order at 19. The court below also erred in stating that because no authority. . . would treat the events at issue as a crime, the speech could not be of public concern. Id. at 16. The district court's reasoning contradicts Reuland 's holding that motivation is not dispositive and Cioffi 's conclusion that matters of public concern need not involve crimes. Nevertheless, we conclude that the forgery incident did not implicate a matter of public concern. No authority supports Nagle's argument that reporting an alleged crime always implicates matters of public concern. The forgery of Nagle's signature, even if such conduct were criminal, had no practical significance to the general public. As Nagle well understood, her signature did not indicate agreement with the document or have any other effect beyond confirming its receiptwhich is not disputed. Viewed in the light most favorable to Nagle, the evidence suggests (a) that Assistant Principal Marron forged Nagle's signature on the document, (b) that Marron then denied having done so, and (c) that Marron did this even though Nagle's signature had no bearing on the report's efficacy. Although Nagle's own desire to get to the bottom of this puzzling situation is understandable, Nagle does not claim that the forgery revealed an ongoing pattern of conduct or even a particularly important instance of bad judgment on Marron's part that might have elevated the forgery to a matter of public concern. We therefore affirm, albeit on different grounds, the district court's holding that Nagle's speech related to the alleged forgery was not protected under the First Amendment.