Opinion ID: 698133
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Charter and Settlement Agreements

Text: 13 Air National claims that the doctrine of law of the case prevented Judge Aguilar from granting a motion for summary judgment that Judge Ingram had already denied. Contrary to Air National's arguments, the doctrine of law of the case does not apply to pretrial rulings such as motions for summary judgment. Id. at 904. We have specifically held that a district court judge may grant a motion for summary judgment that was previously denied by another district court judge. Id. We conclude that Judge Aguilar was not bound to follow Judge Ingram's previous partial denial of Charter's motion for summary judgment.
14 Air National concedes that the settlement agreement was intended as an accord and satisfaction and designed to fully resolve the parties' prior disputes. Accord and satisfaction is a method of discharging a contract, or settling a cause of action arising either from a contract or from tort, by substituting for such contract or such cause of action an agreement for the satisfaction thereof, and executing such substituted agreement. See 1 C.J.S. Accord and Satisfaction Sec. 2 (1985). Therefore, notwithstanding Air National's claim that Charter fraudulently induced it to enter into the settlement agreement, Air National's arguments concerning Charter's alleged breach of the underlying charter agreement must fail.
15 Air National complains that Charter breached the settlement agreement by refusing to make the June 8th escrow payment. Despite its promise to begin flights again on June 14, on June 7, the day after the parties had entered into the settlement agreement, Air National advised Charter that it was canceling services for the upcoming flights. Charter immediately advised Air National that it would not make the escrow payment unless Air National confirmed that it would provide services for the June 14th flights. We believe that there is no genuine issue of material fact that Air National's June 7th telex constituted an unequivocal repudiation of the settlement agreement, relieving Charter of its obligation to make the escrow payment. See Kossler v. Palm Springs Devs., Ltd., 161 Cal.Rptr. 423, 433-34 (Cal.Ct.App.1980) (It is well settled that an unequivocal repudiation of the contract by one party prior to material breach of the contract by the other party excuses the other party from tendering performance of his concurrently conditional obligations.).