Opinion ID: 1402799
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: McGlothlin's tort theories

Text: As previously indicated, McGlothlin argues that factual disputes exist as to whether MOA/Ogden owed him a duty under four theories of liability: (1) retained control, (2) voluntary assumption of a duty, (3) simple negligence, and (4) negligent entrustment. His arguments lack merit. McGlothlin's retained control argument fails because there was no independent contractor-employer relationship between Carrs and MOA/Ogden. In order for a duty to arise under the doctrine of retained control, there must be an independent contractor-employer relationship between the parties. [20] Here, MOA/Ogden offered uncontroverted testimony establishing that no independent contractor-employer relationship existed between itself and Carrs, either express or implicit. Therefore, the retained control theory is not available to McGlothlin. [21] McGlothlin next contends that MOA/Ogden's failure to assist in or supervise the loading operation, and its failure to warn him of the scoreboard's weight, raise factual disputes which preclude summary judgment. This argument, too, is without basis in the record. There is no evidence that MOA/Odgen voluntarily assumed any duty to McGlothlin. Rather, the evidence indicates they delivered the scoreboard to him and left him and Lulay alone to load it themselves. Nevertheless, McGlothlin argues that the assistance given him by the third Ogden employee after he was injured indicates that MOA/Ogden had a duty to assist him initially. This argument is circular and lacks merit. While it is true that one who assumes to act, even though gratuitously, may thereby become subject to the duty of acting carefully[,] [22] it is not true that rendering assistance after an injury occurs implies a duty to do so. MOA/Ogden had no duty to assist McGlothlin. As to warning McGlothlin of the scoreboard's weight, McGlothlin admits he removed the scoreboard from the rack prior to loading it into the truck and was aware of its weight. MOA/Ogden had no duty to warn McGlothlin of an open and obvious condition of which McGlothlin was aware. [23] Finally, McGlothlin's argument that a factual dispute exists as to whether MOA/Ogden negligently entrusted [24] the scoreboard to him fails because the doctrine of negligent entrustment requires that the defendant have a greater right of possession or control of the chattel than the person to whom he or she entrusts it. [25] MOA/Ogden was returning the scoreboard to its rightful owner, Carrs. MOA/Ogden could not lawfully refuse to hand over the scoreboard. Therefore, the doctrine of negligent entrustment is not available to McGlothlin. [26] In sum, the superior court correctly found that there were no genuine issues of material fact under any of the theories of liability propounded by McGlothlin, and that MOA/Ogden was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.