Opinion ID: 1463389
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of the January 1998 Currency Seizure Evidence Against Shank

Text: Shank appeals the district court's admission of evidence relating to the 1998 currency seizure as plain error. She argues that the district court's actions of admitting evidence of the 1998 currency seizure at trial amounted to a constructive amendment of the indictment because the seizure occurred approximately eleven months before the indictment's in or about 1999 to at least May 9, 2002 time frame. However, the introduction of the 1998 currency evidence did not result in a constructive amendment. [W]here no specific objection is raised regarding a constructive amendment or a variance before the district court, we are limited to `plain error' review on appeal. United States v. Kuehne, 547 F.3d 667, 682 (6th Cir.2008) (citations omitted). We have held that a constructive amendment results when the terms of an indictment are in effect altered by the presentation of evidence and jury instructions which so modify essential elements of the offense charged that there is a substantial likelihood that the defendant may have been convicted of an offense other than the one charged in the indictment. United States v. Budd, 496 F.3d 517, 521 (6th Cir.2007) (citing United States v. Smith, 320 F.3d 647, 656 (6th Cir.2003)). A constructive amendment is considered per se prejudicial and reversible error. Budd, 496 F.3d at 521 (citing United States v. Prince, 214 F.3d 740, 757 (6th Cir.2000)). An indictment need not allege that criminal activity occurred on the exact date proven at trial. See Ledbetter v. United States, 170 U.S. 606, 612, 18 S.Ct. 774, 42 L.Ed. 1162 (1898). When an indictment uses the language on or about, a constructive amendment does not exist when the proof offered regards a date `reasonably near' the date alleged in the indictment. United States v. Hettinger, 242 Fed.Appx. 287, 295 (6th Cir.2007) (citing United States v. Ford, 872 F.2d 1231, 1236 (6th Cir.1989)). Shank contends that the difference of eleven months in time between the currency seizure and the beginning date of the indictment implies that the two events did not occur reasonably near one another. In Ford, we held that a similar eleven-month difference exceeded the bounds of reasonableness. 872 F.2d at 1236-37. However, there the grand jury had, by indictment, charged the defendant with possession of a handgun on or about September 28, 1987. Id. at 1233. We held that the district court, through its instructions, allowed the jury to convict the defendant of possession of the handgun, a one time criminal action, on any of three dates within an eleven-month period. Id. at 1236. The instant case is distinguished from Ford, because here the jury convicted Shank based on her role in an ongoing conspiracy for which the grand jury had already returned an indictment which covered more than three years. We have previously deemed a difference of more than a month reasonable for a one-time conspiracy with an indictment establishing a seven-day time span. See United States v. Manning, 142 F.3d 336, 339-40 (6th Cir.1998). Given the large time period covered by the indictment in the instant case, the currency seizure occurred reasonably near the dates of the indictment. Therefore, any reference at trial to the 1998 currency seizure did not constructively amend the indictment. Likewise, Shank's argument that allowing evidence of the currency seizure in Dearborn when the indictment only discussed Shank's actions in Lansing also fails as she has presented no authority to support this argument. Thus, the district court did not commit plain error. Even assuming Shank could show that the currency seizure was not reasonably near the indictment's time period or that the district court delivered erroneous jury instructions, she has failed to demonstrate a substantial likelihood that [she] may have been convicted of an offense other than the one charged in the indictment. See Budd, 496 F.3d at 521. The body of evidence linking Shank to the conspiracy-including her own testimony-implies that, even if the district court admitted evidence of the currency seizure erroneously, the jury could convict her based on the events occurring between 1999 and Humphry's death alone. As such, any error by the district court does not rise to the level of a constructive amendment. Lastly, evidence of the 1998 currency seizure is inextricably intertwined with the charged offense ... the telling of which is necessary to complete the story of the charged offense. United States v. Hardy, 228 F.3d 745, 748 (6th Cir.2000) (citation omitted). Therefore, even if introducing the evidence is considered a constructive amendment of the indictment, the evidence was properly admitted as relevant background evidence, which is not excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). Id.