Opinion ID: 493940
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Deference Owed the Secretary

Text: 22 It is because the Secretary's interpretation is contrary to the language, purpose, and legislative history of the Agriculture and Food Act of 1981 that we hold it to be unreasonable. We recognize that in upholding the Secretary's interpretation, the district court accorded his interpretation substantial deference, both because the Secretary is charged with the administration and execution of the 1981 Agriculture Act and because the statute is untried and new. Hall v. Block, slip op. at 4 (D.S.D. April 10, 1986) (citing South Dakota v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 740 F.2d 619, 621 (8th Cir.1984)). 23 Although the statute is indeed untried and new, such extreme deference is not warranted in this case. Here the Secretary is interpreting Congress' intent, an exercise the Supreme Court has labelled a quintessential judicial function. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 464 U.S. 89, 98 n. 8, 104 S.Ct. 439, 444, n. 8, 78 L.Ed.2d 195 (1983). In such a case, the Court has stated that the agency's interpretation, particularly to the extent it rests on factual premises within its expertise, may be influential, but it cannot bind a court. Id. (citing General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42, 97 S.Ct. 401, 410-11, 50 L.Ed.2d 343 (1976); Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 192-93, 90 S.Ct. 314, 327-28, 24 L.Ed.2d 345 (1969)). Here there are no factual issues to be resolved; the matter is strictly legal. Thus this is not a case where agency expertise or agency interpretation need be accorded substantial deference. See Sebben v. Brock, 815 F.2d 475 (8th Cir.1987). Furthermore, the Secretary's interpretation is itself untried and new and has not survived the test of time that would warrant great deference. See K. Davis, 5 Administrative Law Sec. 29.16 (2d ed. 1984) (deference particularly appropriate to consistent interpretations over a long period). 24 Reviewing courts cannot, in any case, be bound by a statutory interpretation they believe to be an aberration of Congress' intent. Reviewing courts, the Supreme Court has stated, must not 'rubber-stamp ... administrative decisions that they deem inconsistent with a statutory mandate or that frustrate the congressional policy underlying a statute. BATF, 464 U.S. at 97, 104 S.Ct. at 444 (quoting NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291, 85 S.Ct. 980, 988, 13 L.Ed.2d 839 (1965)). The Secretary's interpretation of the 1981 Agriculture Act denying mandatory disaster payments to farmers experiencing prevented planting losses in counties where multi-risk crop insurance is offered for sale is exactly such an interpretation. It cannot stand in the light of our examination of the language and legislative history of the Act, or Congress' intent as manifested by the history of the disaster payments program.