Opinion ID: 852197
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Denial of TRW's Motion for Judgment on the Evidence

Text: TRWs appeal in part challenges the trial court's denial of its motion for judgment on the evidence filed after the jury verdict and entry of judgment. TRW contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove any negligence on its part. TRW argues that its evidence showed that the seatbelt assembly was manufactured according to, and fully complied with, Ford's detailed specifications, that it fully met all applicable government vehicle safety regulations, that the seatbelt assembly design was used in the vast majority of cars produced at the time, and that the plaintiffs accident scenario was reasonably unforeseeable at the time of manufacture. Indiana Trial Rule 50 allows a party to move for a judgment on the evidence when some or all of the issues in a case tried before a jury . . . are not supported by sufficient evidence or the verdict is clearly erroneous as contrary to the evidence because the evidence is insufficient to support it. Ind. Trial Rule 50(A). When reviewing a motion for judgment on the evidence, an appellate court looks at the evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn most favorable to the non-moving party. Kirchoff v. Selby, 703 N.E.2d 644, 648 (Ind.1998). We will reverse only when there is no substantial evidence supporting an essential issue in the case. Id. Thus, to overturn a trial court's denial of a motion for judgment on the evidence and thereby take the issue from the jury, the evidence must support without conflict only one inference which is in favor of the defendant. Ross v. Lowe, 619 N.E.2d 911, 914 (Ind.1993). The plaintiff's theory of liability against TRW was that it placed into the stream of commerce a defectively designed, unreasonably dangerous product and was negligent in the design of the product, and that, as to TRW, the product at issue is the seatbelt assembly. Court's Final Instruction No. 13, Tr. at 2932. The jury was also instructed that the plaintiff must prove that the defectively designed product proximately caused, or enhanced, the injuries that resulted. Id. at 2933. As presented at trial against TRW, the plaintiff's claims were thus based on an alleged design defect in the seatbelt assembly. As noted supra, in product liability claims alleging a product design defect, the Indiana Product Liability Act substitutes a negligence standard for strict liability and prescribes the applicable standard of care. Ind.Code § 34-20-2-2. To recover damages, a plaintiff asserting a claim of defective product design must establish that the manufacturer or seller failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances in designing the product. Id. Citing the court's final jury instructions, the plaintiff argues that she was not required to set out a separate case of negligence, but only to show TRWs failure to implement a feasible alternative design. Appellee's Br. against TRW at 19. To the contrary, the trial court's Final Instruction No. 15 explicitly directed, When a plaintiff alleges a design defect in the product, the plaintiff must establish the manufacturer or seller failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances in designing the product. Tr. at 2934. This instruction is not challenged on appeal. On appeal, the plaintiff attempts to characterize its claim against TRW in a manner other than one alleging defective design, stating, TRW knew of the problem of rollovers with SUVs and light trucks. It knew that pretensioners could rectify the problem of spool out in seatbelts. Yet it sold parts to Ford which it knew were inadequate. Appellee's Br. against TRW at 15. The plaintiff explains that TRW supplied a [seatbelt] retractor it knew could cause or allow spool out in a roll over, that TRW knew that rollovers were foreseeable for SUVs, and that Ford's installation of TRWs retractor did not cause or contribute to the inherent defect of the retractor produced and sold by TRW. Id. at 20. In short, [TRW] knew it sold a product that was inadequate. Id. at 19. But a party may not change its theory of liability on appeal. Marshall County Redi-Mix, Inc. v. Matthew, 458 N.E.2d 219, 222 (Ind.1984). We therefore assess the sufficiency of evidence supporting the plaintiff's claim against TRW based on its contentions and evidence at trial. The plaintiffs theory of liability against TRW at trial was alleged negligent design, not strict liability of TRW as the manufacturer of a defective product unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer. Where properly presented, such strict liability extends to the manufacturer of a defective component part of a product. The Product Liability Act expressly provides that a product liability action based on the doctrine of strict liability in tort may be commenced or maintained against a manufacturer of the product or of the part of the product alleged to be defective. Ind.Code § 34-20-2-3 (emphasis added). However, because the plaintiff's claim against TRW at trial was predicated on an alleged design defect rather than the manufacture of a defective component part, the sufficiency of evidence for this claim must be assessed in light of the Indiana Product Liability Act's requirement that, for claims based on an alleged design defect, a plaintiff must establish that the manufacturer failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances in designing a product. Ind.Code § 34-20-2-2. The plaintiff does not dispute TRWs assertion that it merely supplied a component part according to Ford's specifications. TRWs Appellant's Br. at 30. Extensive testimony was presented at trial regarding TRWs role in building the assembly, particularly the retractor, to Ford's detailed requirements. Among the evidence were written recommendations dated April 3, 1996, in which TRW proposed to Ford the development and use of a pretensioner application that remains locked with belt tension regardless of motion, and noting that Europe has 95% usage of pretensioner in passenger vehicles versus 6% in North America. Plaintiff's Exhibit 199, Appellee's Addendum to Briefs at 19. We further note the single general observation of TRWs expert Pearson that during the development of a vehicle like an Explorer, Ford and TRW work together in [the] development process,. . . as customer and supplier. Tr. at 2579. But we find this insufficient to establish TRW's liability for negligent design. As to TRW, the alleged design negligence was the choice not to use a seatbelt assembly with pretensioners. But the plaintiff fails to identify any evidence showing that this choice is attributable to TRWs conduct. The evidence shows only that the seatbelt assembly was manufactured by TRW in compliance with Ford's design specifications. While there was evidence that an alternative seatbelt assembly design was feasible and available to Ford, there is no evidence that TRW was authorized under its contract with Ford to substitute and supply such an alternative seatbelt design. The mere availability of an alternative seatbelt design does not establish negligent design by a defendant that lacks the authority to incorporate it into the assembled vehicle. Considering as we must only the evidence and resulting inferences favorable to the verdict and judgment, we nevertheless conclude that such evidence is insufficient to establish that TRW, as manufacturer or seller, failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances in designing the seatbelt assembly involved in the incident that took the life of the plaintiff's decedent. TRWs motion for judgment on the evidence should have been granted, and we therefore vacate the judgment against TRW and the allocation of 5% fault to TRW. TRWs appellate challenge to the denial of its motion for judgment on the evidence alleged errors in addition to the insufficiency of evidence on the issue of design negligence. Because the insufficiency of design negligence evidence is dispositive, we do not address TRWs other arguments challenging the denial of its motion for judgment on the evidence. As we observed above, however, Ford's appellant's brief adopts and incorporates certain arguments contained in TRWs appellant's brief. To the extent applicable to Ford, and not otherwise already addressed in Part 1 of this opinion, these arguments allege (a) that the court erroneously permitted the plaintiff's seatbelt expert to give speculative and scientifically unreliable testimony, (b) that TRWs spool-out evidence was erroneously excluded, and (c) that the jury's determination of damages was insufficiently supported and was based upon improper closing argument.