Opinion ID: 171611
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: applying the garcetti/pickering test

Text: The test for determining whether Ms. Dixon was denied her constitutional rights by being terminated for speaking on matters of public concern is the Pickering test, now modified by the Supreme Court's decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 126 S.Ct. 1951, 164 L.Ed.2d 689 (2006). See Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Academy, 492 F.3d 1192, 1202 (10th Cir.2007) (describing what we now call the ` Garcetti/Pickering ' analysis); see also Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968). The test comprises five elements, called prongs: (1) whether the speech was made pursuant to an employee's official duties; (2) whether the speech was on a matter of public concern; (3) whether the government's interests, as employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public service are sufficient to outweigh the plaintiff's free speech interests; (4) whether the protected speech was a motivating factor in the adverse employment action; and (5) whether the defendant would have reached the same employment decision in the absence of the protected conduct. Id. at 1202-03. The first three prongs are said to be issues of law to be decided by the court; the last two are factual issues to be decided by the factfinder. Id. at 1203.
The first, fourth, and fifth elements of the Garcetti/Pickering test are not challenged by the appellant. The OBVME and Ms. Kirkpatrick conceded below that it was not a part of [Ms. Dixon's] duties to opine on the used [sic] of OBVME funds in investigations or discuss ongoing investigations. The first element of the test, which was added by Garcetti, is therefore deemed satisfied for purposes of this appeal. Ms. Kirkpatrick devotes many pages of her appellate brief to summarizing facts in the record regarding Ms. Dixon's allegedly poor work performance. Appellant's Br. 4, 5-6, 19. According to the appellant, as a result of Ms. Dixon's belief that OBVME should not have become involved in the dogfighting investigation, Ms. Dixon intentionally performed lower quality work and became uncooperative and disruptive. These facts might well justify the plaintiff's termination under the fourth or fifth element in the test, but the defendants did not argue this either in support of their summary judgment motion in district court or in the legal argument section of their brief in this court. For purposes of this appeal, therefore, we will assume that Ms. Dixon was terminated because of her speech.
There is some controversy about whether the matter of public concern element of the test was conceded below. In her Request for Admissions, the plaintiff asked the defendants to Admit Plaintiff spoke to Cathy Kirkpatrick and James Stock, D.V.M., on matters of public concern. After objecting to the form of the request, the defendants responded: it is admitted, upon information and belief, that Plaintiff did speak, on occasion, to those persons on matters of `public concern.' R. 209. In their motion for summary judgment, however, the defendants denied the admission, noting that they had also stated that the request for an admission on this point was vague, ambiguous, susceptible to interpretation and undefined in terms of scope, date or subject matter. They added: To the extent it holds any significance, Defendant OBVME supplements the response to `Denied.' Both Oklahoma and federal rules of civil procedure provide that [a]ny matter admitted under this section is conclusively established unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission. 12 Okla. Stat. § 3236(B). Cf. Fed.R.Civ.P. 36(b). There is no indication that OBVME or Ms. Dixon ever moved to withdraw or amend their original admission. Ms. Dixon contends that this precludes their challenge to the denial of summary judgment on this issue. We agree that the defendants are bound by their admission, but regard the admission as limited in practical effect. Defendants admitted that Ms. Dixon spoke on occasion to Ms. Kirkpatrick and Dr. Stock on matters of public concern, but they were not asked and did not volunteer which statements those were. We do not regard the admission as conclusive with respect to each and every statement Ms. Dixon made to these two persons, but only to preclude the appellant from arguing that none of Ms. Dixon's speech fell into that constitutionally protected category. The speech involved in this case may be divided into three categories: (1) Ms. Dixon's internal complaints to Ms. Kirkpatrick and others about the investigator's conduct and other matters, (2) her complaint to Dr. Stock that the dogfighting investigation was unauthorized and improper, and (3) her complaints to Dr. Stock about the way Mr. Fullerton and Ms. Kirkpatrick carried out their responsibilities. In rejecting the defendants' motion for summary judgment on this issue, the district court did not distinguish among these various categories of speech. The court held that improper expenditures of public funds, illegal behavior by OBVME employees including speeding in state-owned vehicles, and discriminatory practices were matters of public concern. Improper expenditures of public funds is apparently a reference to Ms. Dixon's claim that the dogfighting investigation was beyond its authority. See Appellee's Br. 17. [4] We conclude that Ms. Dixon's conversations with Dr. Stock regarding the supposedly improper use of OBVME resources to investigate the dogfighting ring involved matters of public concern, but that none of the other subjects raised in her conversations were entitled to constitutional protection under the second prong of Garcetti/Pickering. The appellant argues that Ms. Dixon's disagree[ment] with the investigation and disclos[ure of] its existence to one veterinarian outside of any public forum or any forum which could effect change in government policy amounted to nothing more than the airing of a work related grievance. We find this argument unpersuasive. OBVME's involvement in the dogfighting investigation was the subject of extensive reporting in a major local daily newspaper. Dr. Stock, indeed, initiated his conversation with Ms. Dixon based on his reading of a story in the newspaper. Moreover, Dr. Stock was not just one veterinarian; he was a member of the legislative committee of the veterinary professional association, which engaged in public advocacy on the subject of veterinary regulation and was concerned about the investigation. Both Ms. Dixon and Dr. Stock testified that they engaged in the conversation with a view to his raising the issue with the authorities. Armed with the information he received from Ms. Dixon, Dr. Stock confronted the director of OBVME at a legislative committee meeting and demanded an explanation. That is sufficient to support the district court's legal conclusion that Ms. Dixon's speech on this subject was a matter of public concern. No such argument can be made about Ms. Dixon's complaints about Mr. Fullerton's conduct and Ms. Kirkpatrick's management style. These were mostly trivial in nature. They included such things as manner of dress, use of tobacco, driving habits, temperament, a mislabeled $13 expense charge, and so forth. Serious complaints about discrimination can certainly be a matter of public concern, but the record reveals discussion of nothing more than a few stray comments. None of the issues other than the dogfighting investigation generated any press coverage, nor were they related to any legislative concerns. Dr. Stock repeatedly stated in his deposition that his only concern was whether OBVME was conducting an investigation in the absence of any involvement by a veterinarian. When he learned, contrary to the impression he had received from Ms. Dixon, that veterinarians had in fact been involved in the dogfighting operation, Dr. Stock was satisfied and did not think there was any other problem with the investigation. When Ms. Dixon asked him whether he had brought up Mr. Fullerton and how things are being run there, Dr. Stock told her, I don't really care how that's being run. I didn't feel like that was any of my business to tell them how to run their business. R. 275-76 (Stock dep.). Whether speech is a matter of public concern is a legal issue, to be determined by the district court as a matter of law and reviewed de novo by the court of appeals. We conclude that, other than the issue of the dogfighting investigation, Ms. Dixon's complaints about individual co-workers and personnel issues were internal matters not of public concern. See, e.g., Curtis v. Okla. City Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 147 F.3d 1200, 1212 (10th Cir. 1998).
The third prong of the Garcetti/Pickering test is the nub of this case. After determining that the employee's speech is protected (which we have just done), we go onin step threeto decide whether the employee's interest in commenting on the issue outweighs the interest of the state as employer. Brammer-Hoelter, 492 F.3d at 1203 (quoting Casey v. W. Las Vegas Indep. Sch. Dist., 473 F.3d 1323, 1327 (10th Cir.2007)). Although this element is framed as a balancing test, this Court has held that First Amendment rights are protected `unless the employer shows that some restriction is necessary to prevent the disruption of official functions or to insure effective performance by the employee.' Gardetto v. Mason, 100 F.3d 803, 815 (10th Cir.1996) ( quoting Wren v. Spurlock, 798 F.2d 1313, 1318 (10th Cir. 1986), in turn quoting Childers v. Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 676 F.2d 1338, 1341 (10th Cir.1982)); see Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (The question becomes whether the relevant government entity had an adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any other member of the general public.); Brammer-Hoelter, 492 F.3d at 1207 (the question is whether the employer `has an efficiency interest which would justify it in restricting the particular speech at issue', ( quoting Cragg v. City of Osawatomie, 143 F.3d 1343, 1346 (10th Cir.1998))). In other words, unless the government employer can show that the termination was based on legitimate reasons grounded in the efficient conduct of public business, there is no need to proceed to balancing, and the First Amendment interest of the plaintiff prevails. This Court has explained that in assessing this third prong, a court should generally consider whether the [speech] impairs discipline ..., has a detrimental impact on close working relationships ..., or impedes the performance of the speaker's duties or interferes with the regular operation of the enterprise. Gardetto, 100 F.3d at 815. We have cautioned that the employer cannot rely on purely speculative allegations that certain statements caused or will cause disruption. Id. Citing Gardetto, but without further explanation, the district court denied summary judgment to the defendants on the ground that they have failed to present sufficient evidence of actual disruption to outweigh Plaintiff's interest in her speech. Dist. Ct. Op. at 5. It is difficult to know, from this brief holding, to what evidence the district court is referring and therefore what pure issue of law we are asked to address in this interlocutory appeal. See Johnson, 515 U.S. at 319, 115 S.Ct. 2151. The record in this case is lengthy. It contains a great deal of evidence, some of it conflicting, about the permissibility of a person in Ms. Dixon's position divulging information regarding current or ongoing investigations. Both parties pointed to record evidence relevant to these issues in their summary judgment briefs. We do not know whether to interpret the district court's cryptic ruling as a statement of the court's factual assumptions (i.e., that the defendants had not carried their burden to show undisputed evidence in support of their position) or as a statement of the court's legal conclusion (i.e., that given the facts established by the record, OBVME's reasons for discharging Ms. Dixon were illegitimate). It would be helpful in Garcetti/Pickering cases, when the third prong is contested, for the district court to insist that the defendants identify precisely what interests in the efficiency of the public service they believe were served by the termination, and for the district court to state in any order denying summary judgment on this ground whether its ruling is based on a factual insufficiency in the record or on a legal conclusion regarding the legitimacy of the asserted reasons for the termination. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 n. 6, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Lacking any such clarity in this case, we are forced to delve more deeply into the record than should be necessary in an interlocutory appeal of this sort. [5] See Johnson, 515 U.S. at 319, 115 S.Ct. 2151 (where the district court does not state the facts upon which it based its decision, a court of appeals may have to undertake a cumbersome review of the record to determine what facts the district court, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, likely assumed). The appellant argues primarily [6] that Ms. Dixon was discharged because, as an employee in an investigative office with access to confidential information, she should not have divulged information about an ongoing investigation to outside parties. Ms. Dixon's response rests primarily on the claim that although she discussed the investigation with an outside party, she did not divulge any information that was confidential and had not already been exposed in the press. The appellant notes that even if there is no evidence that Ms. Dixon revealed specific information that was confidential, she was apparently a source of misinformation: she led Dr. Stock to believe, falsely, that no veterinarians were involved in the dogfighting investigation, thus creating the impression that the investigation was illegitimate. Ms. Kirkpatrick also argues that it was constitutionally permissible for the agency to fire an employee for discussing an ongoing investigation with an outside party even if there was no evidence of specific confidential disclosures. We agree with the appellant on both points. If a government employer is entitled to dismiss an employee for divulging accurate confidential information not otherwise known to the public, the same must be true of false information. Certainly, the conveyance of false information would interfere[] with the regular operation of the enterprise. Gardetto, 100 F.3d at 815. Ms. Dixon's indiscretion led an influential member of the professional association regulated by the OBVME to suspect agency wrongdoing, and to raise those suspicions at a meeting of his legislative committee. In this instance, the Executive Director was able to dispel his concerns at an early stage; but had the circumstances been different or Dr. Stock been less cautious, the damage to the investigation and to OBVME's reputation would have been more serious. Citing to her own affidavit, the plaintiff responds that it is a disputed issue of fact whether Ms. Dixon actually told Dr. Stock that no veterinarians were involved in the dogfighting operation, or even implied it. She avers that she made it clear that a veterinarian was involved, R. 268-69 (Dixon affidavit), though she never explains what she said to Dr. Stock that effected this clarification. We do not regard this dispute as material. Whether or not Ms. Dixon imparted misinformation, it is undisputed that Dr. Stock interpreted her responses as confirming his suspicion that no veterinarians were involved in the dogfighting operation. Her own affidavit confirms that she discussed whether a veterinarian was involved. Whether the information she imparted to Dr. Stock was false or whether it was true, both participants confirm that their conversation touched on an important bit of information that was not reported in the press or known to the public: whether OBVME's investigation involved any veterinarians. Ms. Dixon does not dispute that she was not authorized to divulge nonpublic information to outside parties. We also agree with the appellant, as a matter of law, that under these circumstances disclosure by a clerical employee of information about an ongoing investigation was a constitutionally sufficient basis for dismissal, even assuming the employer could not know whether she leaked specific information not known to the press and public. The reasons for forbidding such disclosures are manifold. Press reports are not always accurate; confirmation by agency insiders can supply important information in the form of corroboration. (That is why the CIA regularly responds to inquiries by saying it can neither confirm nor deny.) Questioners with special knowledge or background are often capable of eliciting new information even when their informant is unaware she is going beyond the public record. Sometimes one question leads to another, and a well-intentioned informant discovers she has unintentionally spilled the beans. And however circumspect the agency employee may be, her supervisors are not usually able to monitor all conversations; a blanket rule against discussing ongoing investigations is easier to enforce. Even drawing all factual inferences in Ms. Dixon's favor, and assuming she did not compromise the investigation merely by speaking to Dr. Stock, the salient point, we believe, is that she was an employee who had access to confidential information, and was repeatedly discussing an ongoing investigation with an interested party outside her office. The (presumed) fact that she did not disclose any specific confidential information is less important than that she could and might haveperhaps even without being aware she was doing so. Ms. Kirkpatrick was the point woman to whom inquiries regarding OBVME investigations were to be addressed. Having unauthorized employees taking it upon themselves to open up alternative channels of inside information about the organization and its practices plausibly constitutes a disruption in the operation of the organization. Gardetto, 100 F.3d at 815. In response, the plaintiff argues first that there is no evidence in the record of a formal OBVME policy against disclosure of information about an ongoing investigation, other than specific confidential information not already known to the press and public. Appellee's Brief at 27. We do not entirely agree. Testimony by the chairman of the OBVME, by Ms. Kirkpatrick, and by the plaintiff herself indicates that such a policy existed, was common knowledge among employees, and was known to Ms. Dixon. See supra 3-4, above. One member of the board, however, described the prohibition as a matter of prudent judgment while saying that it was not a requirement. R. 380. Drawing all factual inferences in favor of the plaintiff as the party opposing summary judgment, we assume that no such policy was formalized or officially made a requirement of the job. But we do not think the dispute is material. Nothing in the First Amendment jurisprudence of the Supreme Court or this Court (or, so far as we are aware, that of other Courts of Appeals) holds that public employees may not be terminated for speech that is disruptive to agency operations unless the agency had promulgated a formal policy on the issue in advance. Whether the employer's action was pursuant to a properly promulgated and announced official policy may be a question of contract law, employment law, or administrative law, but it is not a concern of the First Amendment. The question before us is whether the government employer's interest in restricting the employee's speech is sufficient to outweigh the employee's First Amendment interest. The existence of a formal policy may well strengthen the employer's argument in cases where such a policy has been promulgated, but its absence does not render the employer helpless to discipline an employee whose speech has disrupted the work of the agency. The plaintiff argues next that there could be no genuine policy against disclosing information about an ongoing investigation because the board itself, and Ms. Kirkpatrick, made public statements regarding the investigation. Appellee's Br. 27. See R. 301 (Kirkpatrick dep.) (explaining what information she would provide in response to public inquiries). This is a non sequitur. It was part of Ms. Kirkpatrick's job as Executive Director to address the media on OBVME's behalf. R. 343 (Kirkpatrick dep.). It does not follow from the fact that agencies or heads of agencies must sometimes provide information to the public about investigations that low-level employees who have access to confidential materials may take it upon themselves to reveal information about investigations. A district attorney will often speak to the press about an investigation; that does not mean that every employee in the homicide division is free to do the same. The plaintiff argues next that a policy prohibiting Ms. Dixon from disclosing information about investigations would have violated state law. Appellee's Br. 28, citing the Oklahoma Open Records Act and Oklahoma Statute Tit. 51, § 24A.1 et seq. This Act does not require or permit clerical employees or investigative assistants to speak to outsiders about investigations. The obligations run to the agency, not to Ms. Dixon. Moreover, Ms. Dixon does not specify which record she was prevented from disclosing to the public. Her unofficial conversations with Dr. Stock in his veterinary office on her own time had nothing to do with providing public records to anyone during regular business hours. Okla. Stat. Tit. 51, § 24A.5. The plaintiff's final argument on this point is that such a policy would be a prior restraint on speech, which would violate the First Amendment on its face and as applied to Ms. Dixon. Appellee's Br. 28. This argument defies both law and common sense. Ms. Dixon was not restrained before the fact; she was terminated after the fact for speech believed to be disruptive of agency operations. [U]nlike an adverse action taken in response to actual speech, [a prior restraint] chills potential speech before it happens. Brammer-Hoelter, 492 F.3d at 1209 (quoting Arndt v. Koby, 309 F.3d 1247, 1251 (10th Cir.2002)). Typically, a prior restraint is a requirement that a speaker obtain government approval for her message in advance of publishing itor, in rare cases, a gag order targeted at particular speech. Arndt, 309 F.3d at 1251-52. There is nothing in this case to suggest that OBVME's response to Ms. Dixon's speech was anything other than an adverse action that was taken in response to actual speech. Having concluded that OBVME had a legitimate reason for terminating Ms. Dixon, rooted in the disruptive effect of disclosures by employees of information about ongoing investigations, we must turn to the balancing. Ms. Dixon's speech regarding the conduct of the dogfighting investigation arguably sought to expose what she perceived to be the misuse of public funds by Mr. Fullerton and, by extension, OBVME. Characterized as such, that speech was of public concern, and putting aside its allegedly misleading character as we must (even false speech deserves some First Amendment protection), even of some public importance. See Conaway v. Smith, 853 F.2d 789, 797 (10th Cir.1988) (Speech that seeks to expose improper operations of the government... clearly concerns vital public interests.). But we have to weigh Ms. Dixon's interest in making that speech, and the interest of her audience in hearing it, against the interests of her government employer. Brammer-Hoelter, 492 F.3d at 1207. While there is no easy formula for `weighing' an employee's First Amendment speech against an employer's interest in an efficient and disciplined work environment, Id. (quoting Casey, 473 F.3d at 1333), the balance in this case clearly tips towards OBVME. The Supreme Court has recognized the employer's significant interest in regulating speech that interferes with the regular operation of the enterprise. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388, 107 S.Ct. 2891, 97 L.Ed.2d 315 (1987); see also Flanagan v. Munger, 890 F.2d 1557, 1566 (10th Cir.1989) (citing employer's interest in avoiding direct disruption ... of the public employer's internal operations and employment relationships.). Certainly having to worry about the possibility that Ms. Dixon would leak confidential information counts as disruptive of the everyday operations of OBVME. OBVME has every reason for a policy that discourages employees from speaking out on outgoing investigations, especially employees who have regular access to confidential and sensitive information. Pickering also alludes to the interests of an employer in speaking in a single, consistent voice. Pickering, 391 U.S at 572-73, 88 S.Ct. 1731. See also Cass R. Sunstein, Government Control of Information, 74 Cal. L.Rev. 889, 919 (1986) (In its capacity as employer, the government has two interests that come up in many contexts: the desire to avoid disruption of working relationships and the need to set out a uniform official position.). By speaking out, unauthorized by her employer, Ms. Dixon not only risked compromising the dogfighting investigation (an investigation that was still going on) but also frustrated the ability of OBVME to control and fashion its own message. Both of these are important interests, and in this case we find that, when balanced against Ms. Dixon's speech rights, they should win out. We need not, and could not, decide today the full range of circumstances in which a government employer is entitled to forbid discussion of agency operations with outside parties. We can address only the circumstances of this case. Among the circumstances that inform our decision are (1) that OBVME is an investigative agency with legitimate concerns about confidentiality; (2) the breach of confidence involved an ongoing investigation; (3) the employee involved was in investigative assistant, with access to confidential information because of her typing and filing duties but no discretionary authority over the matters she discussed; (4) the employee was aware that the agency did not want its employees to discuss investigations with outside parties, but instead to refer inquiries about investigations to the executive director; (5) the disclosures did not involve criminal misconduct [7] or other serious wrongdoing, but at worst the employee's disagreement about the use of agency resources; and (6) the disclosures were made to an interested outside party and not to a public body with authority to investigate or redress her employers' wrongdoing if there were any. We offer no opinion regarding other potential cases. We therefore hold that, on de novo review of this issue of law, the defendants' termination of an employee for unauthorized disclosure of information about an ongoing investigation, under the circumstances of this case, was necessary to prevent the disruption of official functions or to insure effective performance by the employee.' Gardetto, 100 F.3d at 815. The appellant is entitled to qualified immunity on the ground that the defendants' actions did not violate the plaintiff's First Amendment rights.