Opinion ID: 487461
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Phase II: Prevailing Party

Text: 39 Appellants contend that the district court erred in holding that they were not prevailing parties in Phase II, which witnessed the Secretary's withdrawal of the 1984 EIS several weeks prior to the scheduled trial. In its request for fees, appellants argued that but for its challenge, the 1984 EIS would not have been withdrawn and supplemented. The government countered that it withdrew the 1984 EIS because of the availability of new information from various sources. The district court concluded: 40 I find that although this litigation certainly had some effect on the government's decision to supplement the 1984 EIS, it was not the cause for the supplementation. The government drafted a document it thought complied with NEPA standards. Thereafter, it received information from various sources outlining the deficiencies of the document and it then withdrew that EIS in order to correct those shortcomings. Thus, I find that plaintiffs are not prevailing parties for this portion of the litigation, and decline to award them attorney's fees for phase II. 41 A party need not obtain formal relief on the merits to be deemed a prevailing party. McQuiston I, 707 F.2d at 1085. When the case ends before a final judgment is reached, a party may be deemed a prevailing party if it establishes  'some sort of clear, causal relationship between the litigation brought and the practical outcome realized.'  Greater Los Angeles Council on Deafness v. Community Television, 813 F.2d 217, 220 (9th Cir.1987) (quoting American Constitutional Party v. Munro, 650 F.2d 184, 188 (9th Cir.1981)). This standard was grounded on the pronouncements of other circuits: 42 The efforts of prevailing parties have been labelled variously as at least a 'contributing ... factor' in the bringing about of [the desired] procedural changes, although not the sole cause, as a material factor in bringing about the defendant's action, and as contributing in a significant way. 43 American Constitutional Party, 650 F.2d at 187 (footnotes omitted). Hence, we have applied a test that inquires whether the suit was at least a 'material factor'  or played a catalytic role in bringing about the desired result. Id. at 188. At a minimum, the lawsuit must have been a catalyst that prompted the opposing party to take action. McQuiston I, 707 F.2d at 1085; accord McQuiston v. Marsh, 790 F.2d 798, 800 (9th Cir.1986) [hereinafter McQuiston II ]; Harris v. McCarthy, 790 F.2d 753, 759 (9th Cir.1986); Rutherford v. Pitchess, 713 F.2d 1416, 1422 (9th Cir.1983). 44 The district court seems to have applied a legal standard that required a higher degree of causation, perhaps because of the way in which the appellants initially framed their position. Its decision does not discuss the appropriate legal standard of whether the litigation was a material factor or played a catalytic role in the Secretary's action. Cf. McQuiston II, 790 F.2d at 801 (upholding a finding that the plaintiff was not a prevailing party when the district court specifically found that no causal nexus existed between the ... lawsuit and the [government's] action, and that his lawsuit did not prompt [the action]). The court's finding that this litigation certainly had some effect on the government's decision suggests that, had the correct legal standard been applied, a finding that the appellants were prevailing parties would have been warranted. 7 See Pitchess, 713 F.2d at 1419-22 (reversing a denial of attorneys' fees when the district court's findings acknowledged that the pendency of the proceedings resulted in improvements in the defendant's conduct and the litigation had an impact on encouraging the defendant's good faith efforts). 45 Although it appears that the district court most likely did not apply the material factor/catalytic role test, we pretermit our discussion of this issue. Even if we were to conclude that the appellants were prevailing parties, we would have to remand to determine whether the government's position on the adequacy of the 1984 EIS was substantially justified. See Lummi Indian Tribe, 720 F.2d at 1126. The prudent course to take with this ambiguously resolved attorneys' fees issue is to vacate this portion of the district court's decision. Cf. id. at 1125 (reversing a decision denying attorneys' fees because the district court plainly applied an incorrect standard for determining prevailing parties). On remand, the district court should clarify whether it in fact employed the material factor/catalytic role standard. If not, it should make the required factfinding applying the correct standard and, if necessary, decide whether the government's position was substantially justified and determine the amount of any award by assessing the extent of OEC's and FOE's success. Id. 46