Opinion ID: 2614001
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alleged guilt phase error requiring reversal of penalty determination

Text: Defendant contends that any error occurring at the guilt phase, if state law error, would require reversal of the penalty determination if there is a reasonable possibility that the jury would have rendered a different verdict absent the error. ( People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 446-448 [250 Cal. Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135].) Defendant also contends that if any error occurred of a federal constitutional nature, then an even stricter standard of reversal should apply. (See Yates v. Evatt (1992) 500 U.S. 391, 402-405 [114 L.Ed.2d 432, 448-449, 111 S.Ct. 1884]; Chapman. v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-711, 87 S.Ct. 824, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065].) Defendant asserts that improper admission into evidence of his statements to the police and of the photographs of the murder victims, and erroneous submission of the torture special-circumstance allegation to the jury, constituted prejudicial error at the penalty phase of defendant's trial. As indicated above, we have concluded that no error occurred with regard to these aspects of the guilt phase of the trial. Accordingly, these claims afford no basis for reversal of the penalty determination.