Opinion ID: 2443539
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Statements Made During Closing Arguments

Text: Petitioner also argues that he deserves a new trial because of statements that the prosecutor made during closing arguments. He contends that the prosecutor both improperly vouched for the credibility of Detectives Taylor and Rice and improperly urged the jury to convict Petitioner to combat the drug problem in Baltimore City. We agree that these statements were improper. We further conclude that these statements may have influenced the jury's verdict and that Petitioner therefore deserves a new trial. Closing arguments are an important aspect of trial, as they give counsel an opportunity to creatively mesh the diverse facets of trial, meld the evidence presented with plausible theories, and expose the deficiencies in his or her opponent's argument. Henry v. State, 324 Md. 204, 230, 596 A.2d 1024, 1037 (1991). In Lee v. State , we quoted the Supreme Court of the United States on the purpose and importance of closing arguments: It can hardly be questioned that closing argument serves to sharpen and clarify the issues for resolution by the trier of fact in a criminal case. For it is only after all the evidence is in that counsel for the parties are in a position to present their respective versions of the case as a whole. Only then can they argue the inferences to be drawn from all the testimony, and point out the weaknesses of their adversaries' positions. And for the defense, closing argument is the last clear chance to persuade the trier of fact that there may be reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt. The very premise of our adversary system of criminal justice is that partisan advocacy on both sides of a case will best promote the ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free. 405 Md. 148, 161-62, 950 A.2d 125, 132-33 (2008) (quoting Herring v. N.Y., 422 U.S. 853, 862, 95 S.Ct. 2550, 2555, 45 L.Ed.2d 593, 600 (1975)). In keeping with the importance of closing argument, we have explained that counsel are afforded great leeway when presenting that portion of their case. Degren v. State, 352 Md. 400, 429, 722 A.2d 887, 901 (1999); Henry, 324 Md. at 230, 596 A.2d at 1037. We explained in Spain v. State : The prosecutor is allowed liberal freedom of speech and may make any comment that is warranted by the evidence or inferences reasonably drawn therefrom. In this regard, generally, . . . the prosecuting attorney is as free to comment legitimately and to speak fully, although harshly, on the accused's action and conduct if the evidence supports his comments, as is accused's counsel to comment on the nature of the evidence and the character of witnesses which the [prosecution] produces.    While arguments of counsel are required to be confined to the issues in the cases on trial, the evidence and fair and reasonable deductions therefrom, and to arguments of opposing counsel, generally speaking, liberal freedom of speech should be allowed. There are no hard-and-fast limitations within which the argument of earnest counsel must be confined no well-defined bounds beyond which the eloquence of an advocate shall not soar. He may discuss the facts proved or admitted in the pleadings, assess the conduct of the parties, and attack the credibility of witnesses. He may indulge in oratorical conceit or flourish and in illustrations and metaphorical allusions. 386 Md. 145, 152-53, 872 A.2d 25, 29 (2005) (quoting Degren, 352 Md. at 429-30, 722 A.2d at 901-02). Great leeway notwithstanding, not all statements are permissible during closing arguments. As we explained in Mitchell v. State: For instance, counsel may not `comment upon facts not in evidence or . . . state what he or she would have proven.' It is also improper for counsel to appeal to the prejudices or passions of the jurors, or invite the jurors to abandon the objectivity that their oaths require. 408 Md. 368, 381, 969 A.2d 989, 997 (2009) (citations omitted). It is also improper for counsel to make golden rule arguments in which counsel asks the jury to put themselves in the shoes of the victim, Lee, 405 Md. at 171, 950 A.2d at 138, Hill v. State, 355 Md. 206, 215, 734 A.2d 199, 204 (1999), or for counsel to vouch for or against the witnesses' credibility, Spain, 386 Md. at 153, 872 A.2d at 30. A.