Opinion ID: 1366816
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prejudice as result of the multiple jury process.

Text: Webb and Ewish both claim that using multiple juries denied them their right to a fair trial. In essence, appellants argue that cross-examination of all common witnesses by each defense lawyer in front of all three juries resulted in unwarranted finger-pointing. Without offering an exhaustive list of examples, the following were specifically referenced by appellants on appeal. Webb filed a motion in limine to exclude any references to his gang affiliation. The court delayed its ruling. At trial, the following questioning took place during the direct testimony of Benjamin Strebel (Strebel) before all three juries: Q. What do you remember Tim Webb saying? A. He pulled up and said, What's up, Blood? And I had just off [sic] work from the car wash and I had my car wash uniform on. He said, Why are you wearing all that red? Follow-up led to this question: Q. Now, what is it after the initial conversation which you have described about what you were wearing, why you were wearing all the red, what was it after that that Tim Webb said about Bobby Blackwell? Webb's counsel objected to the reference of the words blood and red, claiming that they indicated Webb's gang involvement. The court disagreed and found these statements spontaneous. Yet after urging from Webb's counsel, the court apparently granted the motion in limine and advised that no further gang references could be made in the presence of the Webb jury. Later, cross-examination of Strebel, by Ewish's counsel, resulted in a second gang reference: Q. And he [meaning defendant Webb] also said, What's up, Blood? and he started sweating you, is that correct? A. Yes. On appeal, Webb claims that the above line of questioning violated the court's prohibition of gang references and would not have occurred in a separate trial. Ewish also makes claims of undue prejudice. As an example, Ewish asserts that cross-examination of Eppie Lopez's mother resulted in improper testimony being admitted against him. Specifically, Maria Lopez referenced her son's friendship with codefendant Nelson. Ewish asserts that testimony of this friendship not only exonerated Nelson, but improperly implicated him in the firebombings. Ewish correctly points out that this testimony would not have been presented to his jury if the trials had been severed. While we agree that there was additional antagonism at trial directly attributable to the multiple jury process, such instances do not merit reversal. As a general proposition, defendants are not entitled to a retrial simply because their defense is antagonistic to a codefendant. Some form of prejudice always exists in joint trials and such occurrences are subject to harmless error review. NRS 178.598 (any trial defect not impacting substantial rights is disregarded); see also Mitchell v. State, 105 Nev. 735, 738-39, 782 P.2d 1340, 1342-43 (1989) (harmless error standard applied to joinder of claims; court tacitly recognized that same standard applied to joinder of defendants); Abram v. State, 95 Nev. 352, 356, 594 P.2d 1143, 1145 (1979) (reversal unwarranted where appellant could not prove prejudicial testimony made a difference in his conviction). In the instant case, the few references to blood and wearing red were innocuous, considering that the statements were made during the course of a four-week trial. See Emmons v. State, 107 Nev. 53, 807 P.2d 718 (1991) (one ambiguous reference to defendant's incarceration during four-day trial was harmless error). Moreover, this language did not directly label Webb as a gang member, and it is unclear whether or not a jury would understand the comments as being gang related. The district judge properly characterized the impact to the jury by the following comments made while considering a related motion for mistrial: The gang references, frankly, [were] so inconsequential, to me . . . that I didn't even remember it after your points and authorities. Similarly, Maria Lopez's reference to her son's friendship with codefendant Nelson was also inconsequential considering the length and complexity of the overall trial. Certainly, such statements, and any inference drawn therefrom, did not make a difference in Ewish's convictions. Each of the foregoing examples illustrates the natural form of antagonism inherent in nearly every joint criminal trial. We conclude that the examples, and all other claimed instances of prejudice appearing in appellants' briefing papers, are harmless in light of the overall record. Simply, appellants would not have fared any better at separate trials. The allegedly improper cross-examination testimony did not differ significantly from the testimony brought out on direct examination. Webb and Ewish would still have faced the same incriminating statements coming from the same witnesses in separate proceedings. More importantly, there was overwhelming evidence that Webb and Ewish were guilty of arson and murder. Webb took the stand and admitted throwing the molotov cocktail into the Newton home. Both Webb and Ewish did not dispute the fact that they were present at the time of both firebombings. The three codefendants were using Ewish's car. There was testimony that Ewish and Webb bragged about the killings and admitted to their direct involvement in the crimes. Considering this evidence and the weak nature of appellants' respective defenses (voluntary intoxication and lack of capacity to form specific intent for aiding and abetting), any prejudice experienced by appellants does not warrant reversing their respective convictions. In spite of the above conclusion, we dissuade any reader from misconstruing this disposition. This opinion is not an endorsement of the multiple jury device. If not implemented carefully or in the proper circumstances, using multiple juries to administer criminal trials becomes a breeding ground for curious results, tainted justice, and issues for appeal. Without guidelines authorized by this court or sanction from our state's legislature, the courts of this state are instructed to refrain from conducting trials in this manner.