Opinion ID: 608091
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Appellant's Complaints of Pain

Text: 49 After hearing appellant's testimony, ALJ Harap stated that: 50 in [his] opinion the claimant has exaggerated the chronicity, intensity and frequency of his symptoms. In this regard, the Administrative Law Judge notes that the claimant has had no medical treatment since 1975. He has not undergone any active exercise or physical therapy program. He has not been admitted to a pain clinic. He is not taking prescription medication. Doctors who have examined the claimant have not described him as suffering from any significant distress. Further, although the claimant testified that he cannot sit or stand for more than ten minutes each, the description of his daily activities shows that he does sit for more than ten minutes at any one time. 13 51 App. at 73 (footnote added). Accordingly, despite the appellant's subjective complaints of pain, the ALJ did not find the pain sufficient to prevent appellant from engaging in sedentary work. The district court upheld the ALJ's decision, noting the ALJ's discretion to arrive at an independent judgment [regarding the credibility of a claimant's account of pain] in light of medical findings and other evidence regarding the true extent of the pain alleged by claimant. App. at 16 (citing LaCorte v. Bowen, 678 F.Supp. 80, 83 (D.N.J.1988)). Appellant argues that the ALJ failed to give due consideration to his subjective complaints of pain. 52 An ALJ must give serious consideration to a claimant's subjective complaints of pain, even where those complaints are not supported by objective evidence. Ferguson v. Schweiker, 765 F.2d 31, 37 (3d Cir.1985). While there must be objective evidence of some condition that could reasonably produce pain, there need not be objective evidence of the pain itself. Green, 749 F.2d at 1071. Where medical evidence does support a claimant's complaints of pain, the complaints should then be given great weight and may not be disregarded unless there exists contrary medical evidence. Carter, 834 F.2d at 65; Ferguson, 765 F.2d at 37. 53 We do not quarrel with the ALJ's entitlement to draw an inference adverse to appellant from the fact that appellant has not sought medical assistance to relieve his professed pain. See, e.g. Welch v. Heckler, 808 F.2d 264, 270 (3d Cir.1986). However, the ALJ's treatment of appellant's complaints of pain cannot stand in light of our holding that the ALJ was not on sound ground in rejecting Dr. Hillsman's medical report. Had the ALJ given due consideration to Dr. Hillsman's medical report, the ALJ's analysis of the appellant's complaints of pain might have been significantly affected. 54 As noted above, the ALJ relied mainly on Dr. Bagner's medical report. By Dr. Bagner's report, appellant would not appear to be in great pain. For example, Dr. Bagner noted that the appellant sat comfortably during the interview, got on and off the examination table with little difficulty, and undressed and dressed himself. 14 55 Dr. Hillsman's report, on the other hand, depicts a patient experiencing very substantial pain. Dr. Hillsman recorded that the various exercises during the course of the exam produced lumbar hamstring pain, severe lower abdominal pain, ipsolateral right lower extremity pain, contralateral thigh pain, and diffuse lumbar, flank and gluteal pain. App. at 169-70. Indeed, when examined by Dr. Hillsman, appellant apparently suffered a spasm of such severity that Dr. Hillsman interrupted the examination for a period of time. Id. As part of her report, Dr. Hillsman recommended that appellant undergo a neuropsychiatric evaluation with respect to appellant's chronic pain pattern. Id. 56 We faced a similar situation in Carter v. Railroad Retirement Board. There the Referee disregarded the claimant's subjective complaints of pain, finding that there was  'no medical evidence of record describing a condition that could reasonably be expected to cause extensive and constant pain alleged by the appellant.'  834 F.2d at 64. In reaching this conclusion, the Referee had, without explanation, dismissed the treating physician's medical evidence that the claimant was disabled from even part-time work. On appeal, we concluded that the treating physician's medical evidence should not have been ignored and described a condition that could reasonably be expected to cause pain. We noted that: 57 [t]he Referee's disregard of [the treating physician's] conclusion not only minimized the weight given to the objective medical evidence, but also diminished the credibility of petitioner's subjective pain complaints. 58 Carter, 834 F.2d at 65. 59 Similarly, in this case, the ALJ cannot be assumed to have given appellant's subjective complaints of pain the substantial weight they are due--particularly since the complaints were deprived of the weight of substantiation by medical evidence. Furthermore, the medical evidence supporting appellant's complaints of pain obligated ALJ Harap to credit appellant's testimony unless there existed contrary medical evidence. Carter, 834 F.2d at 65. It was therefore improper for ALJ Harap to conclude that appellant exaggerated the chronicity, intensity and frequency of his symptoms without first indicating what medical evidence contradicted Dr. Hillsman's report. 15 III. Conclusion 60 Accordingly, the decision of the Secretary is vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings before the ALJ consistent with this opinion.