Opinion ID: 2582262
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alleged Misconduct By the Victim's Mother

Text: Defendant contends that certain actions by the victim's mother require reversal.
During jury selection, defense counsel stated that Mrs. Lo Bue was speaking loudly and emotionally to the prosecutor's wife in the presence of some prospective jurors. At defense counsel's request, the wife was sworn and testified in limine. She related that Mrs. Lo Bue had said this was very difficult for her, but said nothing about the case. Defense counsel stated he did not want any of the prospective jurors who might have heard Mrs. Lo Bue to be excused. He also withdrew an earlier request that the prospective jurors be questioned about what they may have heard. The court admonished Mrs. Lo Bue to keep her voice well modulated. During defendant's guilt phase testimony, Mrs. Lo Bue stated, Excuse me, can you put the microphone close, please? A short time later, when defendant testified that he had repeatedly stabbed the victim in a blind rage, Mrs. Lo Bue interrupted by saying, Are you satisfied now? The prosecutor asked the court whether it wanted to take a recess. At that point, Mrs. Lo Bue said, No, no I promise. I'm sorry. The court told her, I'm going to have to admonish you . . . that you have to refrain from speaking in any way or you will have to leave the courtroom, and Any more outbursts and I'll have to ask you to leave. She repeated that she was sorry. Defense counsel submitted a proposed instruction telling the jury it must decide this case solely on the evidence presented here in the courtroom and completely disregard any display of emotion, words spoken, or feelings received from the presence of spectators including the mother of Ms. Lo Bue. Not wanting to single out any individual, the court agreed to give the requested instruction omitting the reference to Mrs. Lo Bue. Defense counsel sought no further admonition. Before the guilt phase argument, at defense counsel's request and outside the presence of the jury, the court admonish[ed] all individuals present in the courtroom that during these proceedings any type of conduct that can be noticed by the jury, any sounds or motions or direction is entirely inappropriate and would cause serious concern by the Court. And I certainly don't want to exercise my authority in excluding any individual from the proceedings, but if there's any form of outburst or disruption, conduct that is inappropriate, I will be forced to take that action. During a break in defense counsel's argument, outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel stated that two or three times during his argument, Mrs. Lo Bue had made some sounds, and at least one or two jurors looked at her each time. He requested that the court ask her not to whisper or make any sounds until we're finished. The district attorney, who sat between her and the jury, expressed the opinion that she had spoken only very softly, and that her conduct has been appropriate and exemplary at this point. Defense counsel said that he merely wanted the court to restate the admonition. The court stated that it had informally asked my staff at the break, my deputy, clerk and reporter, and each have indicated to me, and the Court will indicate that it has not noticed any commotion or conduct that I would consider justifying exclusion or further restraint by the Court. Nevertheless, at defense counsel's request, it admonished Mrs. Lo Bue to try and contain yourself as much as humanly possible during these proceedings. She said, I'll try. During guilt phase instructions, the court told the jury, at defendant's request, that it must decide this case solely on the evidence presented here in the courtroom and must also completely disregard any display of emotion, words spoken, or feelings received from the presence of spectators. During Mr. Lo Bue's penalty phase testimony he described going to the morgue and seeing his daughter's body. Mrs. Lo Bue spoke up and said, I do too. I did too. Later, outside the jury's presence, defense counsel claimed that before and during Mr. Lo Bue's testimony, counsel had also heard some audible sobbing from that area where the Lo Bue family was sitting. He moved for a penalty mistrial. The prosecutor agreed that the fact that she was tearful is apparent, but he argued that even if she weren't here, every juror would assume that she would be acting precisely in that fashion. The court denied the mistrial motion. It did not believe the jury is unduly prejudiced as a result of the conduct as it would be something that would be assumed by the jury, and I believe the instructions are sufficient to cure any prejudice occurring. It readmonished the jury that it must decide this case solely upon the evidence presented here in the courtroom and must also completely disregard any display of emotion, words spoken or feelings received from the presence of spectators. And you're reminded of this instruction and admonished to follow it closely. The trial then proceeded without further interruptions.
Defendant contends Mrs. Lo Bue's behavior requires reversal. The Attorney General initially responds that this claim is not cognizable on appeal. He is partially correct. At the guilt phase, the court did everything defendant asked of it regarding Mrs. Lo Bue's behavior. It investigated the facts and admonished Mrs. Lo Bue both upon request and sua sponte. It gave defendant's requested jury admonitions. Defendant did not move for a guilt phase mistrial. A defendant's failure to object to and request a curative admonition for alleged spectator misconduct waives the issue for appeal if the objection and admonition would have cured the misconduct. ( People v. Hill (1992) 3 Cal.4th 959, 1000, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 475, 839 P.2d 984 ( Hill ).) Similarly, a defendant who receives a curative admonition, but who makes no other objection and seeks no other action, may not complain on appeal. Defendant may not argue that the court should have granted a mistrial he did not request, and the strictures of double jeopardy could, in any event, severely restrict such an action. (See generally People v. Upshaw (1974) 13 Cal.3d 29, 33, 117 Cal. Rptr. 668, 528 P.2d 756.) At the penalty phase defendant unsuccessfully sought a mistrial, and his challenge to the denial of that motion is therefore cognizable. (See Hill, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 1000, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 475, 839 P.2d 984, and cases cited therein.) There are no grounds for reversal here. The trial court intervened correctly to demand appropriate behavior and to cure any impropriety. Spectator misconduct is a ground for mistrial if it is of such a character as to prejudice the defendant or influence the verdict. ( People v. Lucero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1006, 1022, 245 Cal.Rptr. 185, 750 P.2d 1342 ( Lucero ).) In Holbrook v. Flynn (1986) 475 U.S. 560, 572, 106 S.Ct. 1340, 89 L.Ed.2d 525, the Supreme Court framed the federal constitutional question as whether what the jury saw was so inherently prejudicial as to pose an unacceptable threat to defendant's right to a fair trial . . . The trial court is entrusted with broad discretion to determine whether spectator conduct is prejudicial. ( Lucero, at p. 1022, 245 Cal. Rptr. 185, 750 P.2d 1342.) Here, several incidents cited as misconduct are easily disposed of. Having investigated defendant's complaints of loud speech or other sounds, the court essentially found no conduct perceptible to the jury. The remaining challenges, involve two incidents: (1) Mrs. Lo Bue's interruption of defendant's testimony to say, Are you satisfied now? and (2) her interjection that she too had viewed her daughter's body. A trial is the recreation of a human event. When the event involves life and death, the aftermath for all those affected is profound and emotions run high. Courts must be vigilant to ensure that the proper legal resolution is untainted by extraneous influence. Anticipatory rulings and directions are appropriate, as are curative admonitions. Different people manage grief, anger, loving support, and other human feelings in different ways. Surely, we would not say that the mother of either the victim or of the accused should be excluded from the courtroom simply because she might act beyond the strictures of accepted legal deportment. Courts have a responsibility to manage this reality but they cannot ignore it. [B]ecause a spectator does not wear the same cloak of official authority as a prosecutor, most instances of spectator misconduct will likely be more easily curable than those of a prosecutor. ( Hill, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 1000, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 475, 839 P.2d 984.) Mrs. Lo Bue's outbursts were unrelated to defendant's guilt or innocence. . . . ( Id. at p. 999, 13 Cal. Rptr.2d 475, 839 P.2d 984; cf. Lucero, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 1022-1023, 245 Cal.Rptr. 185, 750 P.2d 1342 [no prejudice even though the outburst at issue may have informed the jury of facts outside the record].) They provided the jury with no significant information it did not already know or might not readily surmise. Even without observing Mrs. Lo Bue in person, any reasonable juror would know that the crime had caused the victim's family anguish. Under the circumstances, `prejudice is not presumed. Indeed, it is generally assumed that such errors are cured by admonition, unless the record demonstrates the misconduct resulted in a miscarriage of justice.' ( Hill, at p. 1002, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 475, 839 P.2d 984, quoting Lucero, at p. 1023, fn. 9, 245 Cal.Rptr. 185, 750 P.2d 1342.) This particular record establishes no prejudice. The trial court acted within its discretion in denying the mistrial motion. ( Lucero, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1024, 245 Cal.Rptr. 185, 750 P.2d 1342.) Whether a particular incident is incurably prejudicial requires a nuanced, fact-based analysis. The trial court is entrusted with broad discretion in ruling on mistrial motions. ( People v. Haskett (1982) 30 Cal.3d 841, 854, 180 Cal.Rptr. 640, 640 P.2d 776.) Here, there was no abuse of discretion, and no unmet special `need for reliability' in the penalty decision. ( Johnson v. Mississippi (1988) 486 U.S. 578, 584, 108 S.Ct. 1981, 100 L.Ed.2d 575.) We are confident that these outbursts did not yield a verdict based on caprice, or on impermissible or irrelevant factors. ( Id. at pp. 584-584, 108 S.Ct. 1981.)