Opinion ID: 1246136
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Unreasonable, Arbitrary, and Capricious Argument.

Text: Hollinrake contends that, while Iowa Code section 80B.11(4) gives the academy the authority to set minimum standards of physical fitness, that authority was administered in an unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious manner. Others in similar situations, he argues, have been certified. He contends he is fully qualified to perform his duties, and it was arbitrary and capricious to deny him the certification. His argument under this division is quite similar to his argument under division III, that he was entitled to a hearing. He also contends an agency must provide for a hearing so that a waiver can be granted to a person fully qualified to perform a job. He argues that the failure of the rules to provide for a waiver is unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, and illegal, but he cites no authority for this proposition. If it is held that a rule which does not provide a procedure for waiver is illegal, then this would require a case-by-case adjudication of every agency decision, which would undercut the very purpose of rule-making. Reliance on rules, rather than on individualized determinations, is not unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious. In fact, it is a well-accepted alternative to such individualized cases. In Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 467, 103 S.Ct. 1952, 1957, 76 L.Ed.2d 66, 74 (1983), the Supreme Court stated that: It is true that the statutory scheme contemplates that disability hearings will be individualized determinations based on evidence adduced at a hearing. But this does not bar the Secretary [of Health and Human Services] from relying on rulemaking to resolve certain classes of issues. The Court has recognized that even where an agency's enabling statute expressly requires it to hold a hearing, the agency may rely on its rulemaking authority to determine issues that do not require case-by-case consideration. A contrary holding would require the agency continually to relitigate issues that may be established fairly and efficiently in a single rulemaking proceeding. (Citations omitted.) The Court noted the general principle of due process that, when an agency takes official or administrative notice of facts, a litigant must be given an adequate opportunity to respond. It then noted: This principle is inapplicable, however, when the agency has promulgated valid regulations. Its purpose is to provide a procedural safeguard: to ensure the accuracy of the facts of which an agency takes notice. But when the accuracy of those facts already has been tested fairly during rulemaking, the rulemaking proceeding itself provides sufficient procedural protection. Id. at 470, 103 S.Ct. at 1959, 76 L.Ed.2d at 76 (citations omitted). Under the facts of this case, no individualized determination need be made with respect to the minimum vision standards adopted by the academy. Hollinrake contends, however, that others have been certified without compliance with the vision requirements of the academy. Even if so, the fact that other officers might have been certified in violation of the agency rule does not provide a sound basis for certifying this applicant in view of the fact that he did not meet the requirements of the rule. Hollinrake gave no details as to who these unknown persons might be or how many there might be.