Opinion ID: 2067713
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Dunn's de minimis argument fails.

Text: Finally, Dunn asks us to overturn his conviction because his violation of the law, if any, was de minimis. We decline to do so. Dunn's argument (and, to some extent, the government's response) conflates two distinct ideas: one, that some trivial violations of the assault statute may be, as Dunn argues, too slight to constitute a criminal assault, and two, that there should be a de minimis defense to assault. The arguments are related, but different. The difference is between arguing that driving at 56 mph in a 55 mph zone is not speeding and arguing that driving at 56 mph in a 55 mph zone is speeding, but does not warrant a fine because, as one might say, c'mon, judge, it's only one mile over. The first aspect of the argument is really Dunn's sufficiency argument by another name, and it fails for the same reasons. As mentioned above, it is settled in this jurisdiction that an assault conviction will be upheld when the assaultive act is merely offensive, even though it causes or threatens no physical harm to the victim. Ray, 575 A.2d at 1199. Put differently, just as breaking the speed limit by only one mile per hour is speeding, an assault is an assault, even if it causes no physical injury. Therefore, under our established law, Dunn's shove was an assault even if it did not cause Agneu any physical harm. Dunn's arguments for why his shove nonetheless does not amount to assault do not withstand scrutiny. As an initial matter, Dunn's claim that the circumstances gave the 6'4, 215-pound Agneu reason only to feign[ ] offense at Dunn's pushing him does not do justice to what transpired. Rather, we think that a reasonable mind might fairly conclude, see Blakeney, 653 A.2d at 369 n. 3, that Agneu, a security guard who was not employed by the company that allegedly kills beagle puppies, was offended when a masked stranger chanted at and then pushed him without provocation. That inference is supported by the fact that, when he was pushed, Agneu protested: what in the hell are youdo you think you're doing? It makes no difference that Dunn moved his hands only five to six inches in striking Agneu. The action was sufficient to move Agneu backward, and there is no reason to doubt that, as a general matter, even a slight hand movement can offend someone. Dunn also claims that Agneu was not offended by the shove because Agneu did not reach out to police. But Agneu said that he felt no need to call the police because during these protests, we, we always have plain clothes officers that are somewhere around the area, and, indeed, Detective Horn witnessed the confrontation from across the street. Likewise, Dunn's claims that the police coached Agneu to file a claim, and that the litigation was driven by the police, not Agneu, are no reasons to reverse. For one thing, there is no evidence in the record that the police coached Agneu to file a claim Agneu expressly denied that anyone from the police pressured him to file a complaint with the police. For another thing, the judges of [this] court endeavor not to decide appeals based on who the litigants are, who their lawyers are, or what we may believe their motives to be. Severance v. Patterson, 566 F.3d 490, 493 n. 2 (5th Cir.2009) (responding to dissent's allegation that litigation was driven by ideological interest group), see id. at 504-05 (Wiener, J., dissenting). Thus, it is irrelevant whether the police or Agneu instigated the litigation. The question for this court is whether the facts establish that Dunn committed an assault. Dunn's argument that he should be able to plead a de minimis defensein our earlier example, to be able to say that speeding by one mile per hour, albeit technically a violation, just does not deserve a penaltyalso fails. We appreciate that there is no evidence that Dunn frightened Agneu or that Agneu had trouble getting over Dunn's encroachment on his personal space. Similar minor violations of the assault statute may well happen every day, yet it is exceedingly rare for the U.S. Attorney's Office to get involved. Why, then, should Dunn not be able to argue that his shove was too minor to warrant a criminal penalty? The answer is that Dunn fails to cite any authority for a de minimis defense in the District. Some jurisdictions have recognized de minimis -type defenses, but they have done so through legislation, not judicial decree. New York, for instance, has a statute that permits trial judges to dismiss certain criminal charges where some compelling factor, consideration or circumstances clearly demonstrat[es] that conviction or prosecution of the defendant ... would constitute or result in injustice. N.Y.CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.40(1) (1979). And a few other states have adopted provisions based on MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.12 (2001), which authorizes courts to exercise a power inherent in other agencies of criminal justice to ignore merely technical violations of law. Id., Explanatory Note; see Stanislaw Pomorski, On Multiculturalism, Concepts of Crime, and the De Minimis Defense, 1997 B.Y.U. L. REV. 51 & n. 2; see, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:2-11 (2005); ME.REV.STAT. ANN. 17-A, § 12 (2006); 18 PA. CONS.STAT. § 312 (1998). The D.C. Council, however, has not joined ranks with the very limited number of states that have adopted the defense. Pomorski, 1997 B.Y.U. L. REV. 51. As a result, we lack the power to give Dunn the relief that he seeks. That the assault was slight is reflected in the minor sentence that Dunn received: seven days' imprisonment, execution of sentence suspended, six months unsupervised probation, and $100 in fines.