Opinion ID: 1591333
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Evidence of Other Health Problems.

Text: Over the plaintiff's objection, the trial court permitted evidence that Pexa was diagnosed with an aggressive form of prostate cancer in 1997, two years prior to the accident, and that he subsequently underwent hormone therapy and radiation treatment. Evidence that Pexa was undergoing treatment for this condition at the time of the 1999 accident was also allowed. In addition, the court admitted evidence that Pexa was diagnosed with an aggressive form of bladder cancer two years after the accident, requiring hospitalization and surgical treatment. Pexa's treating physician was allowed to testify that several of the cancer therapies and treatments caused discomfort and had other disagreeable side effects. Pexa objected to this evidence on the grounds of relevancy. He also argued the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighed any probative value it might have. We review for an abuse of discretion. Spahr v. Kriegel, 617 N.W.2d 914, 917 (Iowa 2000). Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Iowa R. Evid. 5.401. The plaintiff contends the cancer-related evidence was not relevant because he did not claim the 1999 accident contributed in any way to his cancer and he did not seek to recover any of the medical expenses associated with this condition. The trial court ruled the challenged evidence was probative of Pexa's damages, and we agree. Pexa sought past and future damages for loss of use of body and for pain and suffering. One component of pain and suffering is loss of enjoyment of life. See Poyzer v. McGraw, 360 N.W.2d 748, 753 (Iowa 1985). Evidence concerning other medical conditions that have and will impact Pexa's physical and mental well-being and his ability to enjoy life are clearly relevant to the plaintiff's damage claims. We also reject the plaintiff's assertion the prejudicial effect of this evidence outweighed its probative value. The trial court has discretion to exclude relevant evidence when its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Iowa R. Evid. 5.403 (emphasis added); see 2 Joseph M. McLaughlin et al., Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 403.04[1][a], at 403-33 (2d ed. 2004) (Virtually all evidence is prejudicial to one party or another. To justify exclusion under Rule 403, the prejudice must be unfair.) [hereinafter  Weinstein's Federal Evidence ]. Unfair prejudice arises when the evidence prompts the jury to make a decision on an improper basis, often an emotional one. Waits v. United Fire & Cas. Co., 572 N.W.2d 565, 569 (Iowa 1997). The adverse effect of relevant evidence due to its probative value is not unfair prejudice. See 1 John W. Strong et al., McCormick on Evidence § 185, at 645 (5th ed. 1999) (stating prejudice does not simply mean damage to the opponent's causefor that can be a sign of probative value, not prejudice, and noting prejudice arises from facts that arouse the jury's hostility or sympathy for one side without regard to the probative value of the evidence  (emphasis added)). Pexa has not identified any unfair prejudice resulting from the admission of evidence relating to his cancer conditions and neither have we. While this evidence is prejudicial in the sense the jury might conclude the impact of the plaintiff's accident related injuries was negligible in view of the much more serious health problems from which the plaintiff suffered, the jury's use of the evidence for this purpose is not improper or unfair. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence relating to the plaintiff's cancer, his treatment for this disease, and its impact on his general well-being.