Opinion ID: 1850369
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: voluntary confession

Text: Thomas argues that his statements were not voluntarily made because they were obtained by a promise of leniency. Thomas specifically argues that the police investigators' comments about the sentence for premeditated murder, when felony murder would carry the same sentence, was an improper promise of leniency that overbore his will and resulted in his statement. The Due Process Clause of U.S. Const. amend. XIV and the due process clause of Neb. Const. art. I, § 3, preclude admissibility of an involuntary confession. State v. Garner, supra . The State has the burden to prove that a defendant's statement was voluntary and not coerced. Id. In making this determination, a totality of the circumstances test is applied, and the determination reached by the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly wrong. Id. While the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement and the characteristics of the individual defendant at the time of the statement are potentially material considerations, coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not voluntary within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986); State v. Garner, supra . Thus, the inquiry is whether the trial court was clearly wrong in finding that police conduct, in the context of the totality of the circumstances, did not render the accused's confession involuntary. State v. Garner, supra . The confession of an accused may be involuntary and inadmissible if obtained in exchange for a promise of leniency. Id.; State v. Martin, 243 Neb. 368, 500 N.W.2d 512 (1993); State v. Porter, 235 Neb. 476, 455 N.W.2d 787 (1990), disapproved on other grounds, State v. Messersmith, 238 Neb. 924, 473 N.W.2d 83 (1991). However, mere advice or exhortation by the police that it would be better for the accused to tell the truth, when unaccompanied by either a threat or promise, does not make a subsequent confession involuntary. State v. Garner, 260 Neb. 41, 614 N.W.2d 319 (2000). In addition, an improper promise of leniency will not render a confession involuntary unless it overcomes the defendant's free will and impairs his or her capacity for self-determination. Smith v. Bowersox, 311 F.3d 915 (8th Cir.2002). In Smith v. Bowersox, 311 F.3d at 917, a police detective in Missouri told an accused that he would not `get the chair' because `they don't do that in this state,' and the accused later confessed. Although the statement was technically correct because Missouri uses lethal injection instead of an electric chair, the Eighth Circuit determined that the statement was an improper, deceptive promise of leniency. The Eighth Circuit also determined, however, that the deceptive promise of leniency would not by itself render the confession involuntary. Noting that the investigator later backed away from the statement, the court determined that when all the circumstances were considered, the statement was voluntary. Here, without specifically stating so, the investigators incorrectly indicated that premeditated murder would receive a greater sentence than felony murder. But a deceptive statement about possible sentences is only one of several factors to be considered. See Smith v. Bowersox, supra . After discussing premeditated murder, the officers returned to the theme that Thomas was a good person instead of a hardened core criminal and repeated the evidence against him. Several minutes after the discussion of premeditated murder, Thomas stated, He tried to rush me and I got scared and I just started shooting. Thomas then stated that his life was over and that he would probably get a life sentence. An investigator responded that he did not know what sentence Thomas would get, after which Thomas provided specific details of the shooting. We do not ignore the investigators' incorrect statements to Thomas that premeditated murder is worse than felony murder. Although the investigators did not make specific promises, the comments incorrectly presented the idea that premeditated murder would receive a greater sentence than felony murder. But the record does not show that Thomas' confession was caused by misinformation about possible sentences. Instead, Thomas gave in to the general theme that he was not an animal or hardened core criminal. This conclusion is supported by several factors: (1) Between the discussion of premeditated murder and Thomas' confession, the investigators returned to their previous themes without specifically discussing penalties; (2) both before and after his confession, Thomas indicated a knowledge that he could get a life sentence for the crime; and (3) Thomas provided the specific details after an investigator told him that they did not know what sentence he would get. This conclusion is further supported, because after providing details of the crime, Thomas, while crying, stated, I'm not worried about the time... cause it's too late now I'm just hurt right now. It been hurting every [sic] since Friday. This is how, exactly how I've been feelin' but I ain't been showin' nobody. Thus, Thomas indicated that a general remorse about the crime was the primary reason for his confession. The record supports the conclusion that the primary reason for Thomas' confession was a general concern that he should do the right thing to show that he was not a hardened core criminal, as the investigators had suggested. Under the totality of the circumstances, and after viewing the videotape, we conclude that the references to premeditated murder did not overbear Thomas' will to cause the confession. We conclude that the district court's determination that Thomas' confession was voluntary was not clearly wrong.