Opinion ID: 1801839
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Challenges

Text: (11) Defendant contends the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to excuse four prospective jurors because they were African-American, in violation of defendant's state and federal constitutional rights. ( People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 [148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748], overruled in part by Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162 [162 L.Ed.2d 129, 125 S.Ct. 2410]; Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 [90 L.Ed.2d 69 106 S.Ct. 1712].) `In [ Wheeler ] . . . we held that the use of peremptory challenges by a prosecutor to strike prospective jurors on the basis of group membership violates the right of a criminal defendant to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community under article I, section 16, of the California Constitution. Subsequently, in Batson . . . the United States Supreme Court held that such a practice violates, inter alia, the defendant's right to equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.' ( People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 116 [109 Cal.Rptr.2d 31, 26 P.3d 357].) (12) The Batson three-step inquiry is well established. First, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has made a prima facie showing that the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge based on race. Second, if the showing is made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to demonstrate that the challenges were exercised for a race-neutral reason. Third, the court determines whether the defendant has proven purposeful discrimination. The ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike. ( Rice v. Collins (2006) 546 U.S. 333, 338 [163 L.Ed.2d 824, 126 S.Ct. 969].) The three-step procedure also applies to state constitutional claims. ( People v. Bonilla [(2007)] 41 Cal.4th [313,] 341 [60 Cal.Rptr.3d 209, 160 P.3d 84]; People v. Bell (2007) 40 Cal.4th 582, 596 [54 Cal.Rptr.3d 453, 151 P.3d 292].) ( People v. Lenix (2008) 44 Cal.4th 602, 612-613 [80 Cal.Rptr.3d 98, 187 P.3d 946].) At the third stage of the Wheeler/Batson inquiry, `the issue comes down to whether the trial court finds the prosecutor's race-neutral explanations to be credible. Credibility can be measured by, among other factors, the prosecutor's demeanor; by how reasonable, or how improbable, the explanations are; and by whether the proffered rationale has some basis in accepted trial strategy.' ( Miller-El [ v. Cockrell (2003)] 537 U.S. [322,] 334 [154 L.Ed.2d 931 123 S.Ct. 1029].) In assessing credibility, the court draws upon its contemporaneous observations of the voir dire. It may also rely on the court's own experiences as a lawyer and bench officer in the community, and even the common practices of the advocate and the office that employs him or her. (See Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 281.) ( People v. Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 613, fn. omitted.) Review of a trial court's denial of a Wheeler/Batson motion is deferential, examining only whether substantial evidence supports its conclusions. ( People v. Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 341-342.) `. . . We presume that a prosecutor uses peremptory challenges in a constitutional manner and give great deference to the trial court's ability to distinguish bona fide reasons from sham excuses. [Citation.] So long as the trial court makes a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate the nondiscriminatory justifications offered, its conclusions are entitled to deference on appeal. [Citation.]' ( People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 864 [129 Cal.Rptr.2d 747, 62 P.3d 1].) ( People v. Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 613-614, fn. omitted.) After the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to excuse four of the five African-American prospective jurors examined to that point, defendant, who is also African-American, made a  Wheeler motion. The trial court found a prima facie case of discriminatory challenges and asked the prosecutor to explain why he had excused the four prospective jurors. In response, the prosecutor addressed each of the four challengesC.C., V.H., G.S. and T.J. individually. The prosecutor also noted he had so far used 12 peremptories in total and did not intend to challenge the remaining African-American juror, Juror No. 2. [16] The trial court sought clarification on one point and gave defendant an opportunity to address the prosecutor's explanation. Discussing the challenges individually, the court concluded the prosecutor had sufficient nondiscriminatory reasons for each, though the challenge to C.C. was close. The court concluded: I can't say that they come to the point that he is purposely excluding Blacks. So, at this time I will deny the motion. (13) We discuss each of the four challenges individually. As part of our analysis, we consider as bearing on the trial court's factual finding regarding discriminatory intent ( People v. Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 607) the comparisons of prospective jurors challenged and unchallenged that defendant expounds in his briefs, though few if any of these comparisons were made in the trial court. At the same time, we are mindful that comparative juror analysis on a cold appellate record has inherent limitations. ( Id. at p. 622.) In addition to the difficulty of assessing tone, expression and gesture from the written transcript of voir dire, we attempt to keep in mind the fluid character of the jury selection process and the complexity of the balance involved. Two panelists might give a similar answer on a given point. Yet the risk posed by one panelist might be offset by other answers, behavior, attitudes or experiences that make one juror, on balance, more or less desirable. These realities, and the complexity of human nature, make a formulaic comparison of isolated responses an exceptionally poor medium to overturn a trial court's factual finding. ( Id. at p. 624.)