Opinion ID: 2038942
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to Permit Amendment of Defendant's Petition

Text: In recent years there has been a growing public discussion regarding possible shortcomings in the Illinois criminal justice system. Most of the discussion has centered on the cases of 13 individuals who have been released from death row in Illinois. These cases have provoked a serious reexamination of capital punishment in this state and prompted some individuals to question the integrity of our criminal justice system itself. Chief Justice Harrison, for example, has expressed this view: [L]egislatures and the courts appear to have abandoned any genuine concern with insuring the fairness and reliability of the system. Achieving `finality' in death cases, and doing so as expeditiously as possible, have become the dominant goals in death penalty jurisprudence. People v. Bull, 185 Ill.2d 179, 227, 235 Ill.Dec. 641, 705 N.E.2d 824 (1998) (Harrison, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that legal oversight of the capital punishment system has diminished and that [t]he General Assembly has drastically shortened the period in which post-conviction relief can be sought, thereby reducing the time in which exonerating evidence may be discovered). Voicing concerns over the fairness and reliability of the capital punishment system, Governor Ryan imposed a moratorium on the death penalty in January 2000. Shortly thereafter, he authorized the creation of the Commission on Capital Punishment and charged that body with making recommendations `designed to further ensure the application and administration of the death penalty in Illinois is just, fair and accurate.' T. Sullivan, Repair or Repeal-Report of the Governor's Comm'n on Capital Punishment, 90 Ill. B.J. 304, 304 (2002). In its recently issued final report, the commission makes numerous recommendations for improving the capital punishment system. Importantly, however, for purposes of the case at bar, the commission notes that many of the problems underlying the capital punishment system pertain to the criminal justice system as a whole: It became readily apparent during many of the discussions on particular points, however, that recommendations that were being made with respect to the capital punishment system could apply with equal force to other cases in the criminal justice system. During some of its discussions, Commission members were struck by the fact that particular cases received a much higher level of scrutiny because capital punishment was involved. Had those same defendants been sentenced to life imprisonment, or a term of years, their cases might not have been reviewed as carefully and by so many different parties. As a result, some of the injustices with which the public has recently become acquainted might not have been corrected. Report of the Governor's Commission on Capital Punishment, ch. 14, at 188 (April 2002). I explained previously in this dissent how the majority opinion in the case precludes a pro se defendant from amending his post-conviction petition to correct pleading deficiencies and how this holding means the possible loss of meritorious constitutional claims. It is both ironic and unfortunate that at a time when the entire Illinois criminal justice system is under intense scrutiny and serious questions have been raised regarding its fairness and accuracy, the majority has decided to completely foreclose consideration of meritorious constitutional claims, including claims of actual innocence, based on technical pleading deficiencies. As stated, our case law permits the amendment of post-conviction petitions at the summary dismissal stage. See People v. Watson, 187 Ill.2d 448, 241 Ill.Dec. 590, 719 N.E.2d 719 (1999). Even assuming, therefore, that pro se defendants should be held accountable for section 122-2's pleading requirements at the summary dismissal stage, rehearing should be granted in this case and the majority opinion modified to provide defendant with the opportunity to amend his post-conviction petition with an additional affidavit or an explanation for why such an affidavit is unavailable. The majority's decision in this case is contrary to both recent and long-established precedent of this court and, with due respect, is profoundly ill-advised. I therefore dissent from the court's denial of rehearing.