Opinion ID: 2507854
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admissibility of Ashokkumar Patel's Dying Declaration

Text: Ashokkumar Patel, the clerk at Hanshaw's Liquor Store, was shot in the back, below his shoulder blade. When the police arrived at the liquor store, Patel told them that he had been robbed and shot and that the shooter was a short Mexican male who had arrived in a car. Those statements were admitted at trial as a dying declaration over defendant's hearsay objection. Defendant renews his hearsay objection here and, in a supplemental brief, argues for the first time that the admission of Patel's statement also violated his federal constitutional rights under Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, ___, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 ( Crawford ). The claim is without merit. As to the hearsay objection, the prosecution established the objective severity of Patel's fatal wounds as well as his subjective awareness of those wounds. A dying declaration constitutes an exception to the hearsay rule if the statement was made on personal knowledge, which is not disputed here, and under a sense of immediately impending death. (Evid. Code, § 1242.) `This sense of impending death may be shown in any satisfactory mode, by the express language of the declarant, or be inspired from his evident danger, or the opinions of medical or other attendants stated to him, or from his conduct, or other circumstances in the case, all of which are resorted to in order to ascertain the state of the declarant's mind.' ( People v. Tahl (1967) 65 Cal.2d 719, 725, 56 Cal.Rptr. 318, 423 P.2d 246.) In this case, the prosecutor relied on the declarant's statements, demeanor, and conduct, as well as his evident injuries. The gunshot pierced Patel's respiratory system, his gastrointestinal system, and his liver. The chest wound and the liver damage were each of a great magnitude and dangerous in itself. These wounds were the cause of death, which occurred 11 days later. Further, Officer Cheryl Murphy testified that at the time the statements were made, Patel knew he had been shot, was in great pain and on the ground in a fetal position, was fearful of dying, and never spoke again. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the statements under the exception for dying declarations, even though Patel lingered on for several more days before dying. ( Tahl, supra, 65 Cal.2d at pp. 725-727, 56 Cal.Rptr. 318, 423 P.2d 246.) As to the constitutional objection (and assuming without deciding that defendant did not forfeit this claim by failing to object on this basis below), we conclude that the admission of Patel's dying declaration did not violate the Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause. Defendant relies exclusively on Crawford, which repudiated the high court's prior ruling in Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597, under which an unavailable witness's statements were admissible against a criminal defendant if the statement bore adequate `indicia of reliability.' ( Id. at p. 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531.) To meet that latter test, evidence had to fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception or bear particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. ( Ibid. ) In overruling Roberts, Crawford held that out-of-court statements by a witness that are testimonial are barred under the Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause unless the witness is shown to be unavailable and the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness, regardless of whether such statements are deemed reliable by the trial court. Where testimonial statements are involved, we do not think the Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment's protection to the vagaries of the rule of evidence, much less to amorphous notions of `reliability.'... To be sure, the Clause's ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination. ( Crawford, supra, 124 S.Ct. at p. 1370.) Defendant asserts that Crawford has abrogated the exception for dying declarations. Yet the holding of Crawford does no such thing, inasmuch as the challenged out-of-court statements there were admitted by the state court under a finding that the statements bore `particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.' ( Crawford, supra, 124 S.Ct. at p. 1358.) The analysis in Crawford, which relies heavily on the right of confrontation as it existed at common law, admitting only those exceptions established at the time of the founding ( id. at p. 1365), also fails to support defendant's position. Although the high court found scant evidence that exceptions were invoked to admit testimonial statements against the accused in a criminal case at common law ( id. at p. 1367), [t]he one deviation we have found involves dying declarations. The existence of that exception as a general rule of criminal hearsay law cannot be disputed. [Citations.] Although many dying declarations may not be testimonial, there is authority for admitting even those that clearly are. [Citations.] We need not decide in this case whether the Sixth Amendment incorporates an exception for testimonial dying declarations. If this exception must be accepted on historical grounds, it is sui generis.  ( Id. at p. 1367, fn. 6.) Confronted now with that precise issue, we conclude that the dying declaration in this case passes constitutional muster. Dying declarations were admissible at common law in felony cases, even when the defendant was not present at the time the statement was taken. (T. Peake, Evidence (3d ed. 1808) p. 64.) In particular, the common law allowed `the declaration of the deceased, after the mortal blow, as to the fact itself, and the party by whom it was committed,' provided that `the deceased at the time of making such declarations was conscious of his danger.' ( King v. Reason (K.B.1722) 16 How. St. Tr. 1, 24-25.) To exclude such evidence as violative of the right to confrontation would not only be contrary to all the precedents in England and here, acquiesced in long since the adoption of these constitutional provisions, but it would be abhorrent to that sense of justice and regard for individual security and public safety which its exclusion in some cases would inevitably set at naught. But dying declarations, made under certain circumstances, were admissible at common law, and that common law was not repudiated by our constitution in the clause referred to, but adopted and cherished. ( State v. Houser (Mo.1858) 26 Mo. 431, 438; accord, Mattox v. United States (1895) 156 U.S. 237, 243-244, 15 S.Ct. 337, 39 L.Ed. 409 [from time immemorial they have been treated as competent testimony, and no one would have the hardihood at this day to question their admissibility].) Thus, if, as Crawford teaches, the confrontation clause is most naturally read as a reference to the right of confrontation at common law, admitting only those exceptions established at the time of the founding ( Crawford, supra, 124 S.Ct. at p. 1365, citing Houser, supra, 26 Mo. at pp. 433-435), it follows that the common law pedigree of the exception for dying declarations poses no conflict with the Sixth Amendment. We therefore conclude the admission of Patel's dying declaration was not error. [5]