Opinion ID: 1611878
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Overview of the Law Governing Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims.

Text: To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the applicant must demonstrate both ineffective assistance and prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693 (1984); Oetken, 613 N.W.2d at 683; State v. Artzer, 609 N.W.2d 526, 531 (Iowa 2000); State v. Risdal, 404 N.W.2d 130, 131-32 (Iowa 1987). Both elements must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Ramirez, 616 N.W.2d 587, 593 (Iowa 2000); Oetken, 613 N.W.2d at 683; Carrillo, 597 N.W.2d at 499; State v. Wissing, 528 N.W.2d 561, 563 (Iowa 1995); State v. Tracy, 482 N.W.2d 675, 679 (Iowa 1992); State v. Johnson, 604 N.W.2d 669, 673 (Iowa Ct.App.1999). However, both elements do not always need to be addressed. If the claim lacks prejudice, it can be decided on that ground alone without deciding whether the attorney performed deficiently. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. at 2069, 80 L.Ed.2d at 699; Wissing, 528 N.W.2d at 564; State v. Bumpus, 459 N.W.2d 619, 627 (Iowa 1990); Taylor v. State, 352 N.W.2d 683, 685 (Iowa 1984).
To establish the first prong, the applicant must demonstrate the attorney performed below the standard demanded of a reasonably competent attorney. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2064-65, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693-94; Artzer, 609 N.W.2d at 531; State v. Lockheart, 410 N.W.2d 688, 695 (Iowa Ct.App.1987). Thus, we measure the attorney's performance against prevailing professional norms. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d at 694; Risdal, 404 N.W.2d at 132. As such, we begin with the presumption that the attorney performed competently. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d at 694-95; Oetken, 613 N.W.2d at 683; State v. Westeen, 591 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Iowa 1999); Risdal, 404 N.W.2d at 131. Moreover, we avoid second-guessing and hindsight. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d at 694; Caldwell, 494 N.W.2d at 215; Burgess v. State, 585 N.W.2d 846, 847 (Iowa Ct.App.1998). Instead, we scrutinize each claim in light of the totality of the circumstances. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2064-65, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693-94; Artzer, 609 N.W.2d at 531; Lockheart, 410 N.W.2d at 695. In the end, the inquiry is transformed into an individualized fact-based analysis. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1512, 146 L.Ed.2d 389, 416 (2000). Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel can arise from most any stage in the criminal proceedings, and can involve most any action or inaction of counsel. 3 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 11.10(c), at 714 (2d ed.1999) (citing J. Burkhoff & H. Hudson, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel §§ 6.02, 8.01 (1998)) [hereinafter LaFave]. Thus, claims can center, as in this case, on both the failure to investigate and advising a defendant against exercising the right to testify. Considering the standard of reasonableness utilized in determining ineffective assistance claims, ineffective assistance is more likely to be established when the alleged actions or inactions of counsel are attributed to a lack of diligence as opposed to the exercise of judgment. Id. Clearly, there is a greater tendency for courts to find ineffective assistance when there has been an abdicationnot an exerciseof ... professional [responsibility]. McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207, 216 (8th Cir.1974). Miscalculated trial strategies and mere mistakes in judgment normally do not rise to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel. Wissing, 528 N.W.2d at 564; Caldwell, 494 N.W.2d at 214. Thus, claims of ineffective assistance involving tactical or strategic decisions of counsel must be examined in light of all the circumstances to ascertain whether the actions were a product of tactics or inattention to the responsibilities of an attorney guaranteed a defendant under the Sixth Amendment. 3 LaFave § 11.10(c), at 716. On the other hand, a decision by counsel based upon tactical judgment does not completely immunize the decision from an ineffective assistance challenge. Id. at 717. While strategic decisions made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable, strategic decisions made after a less than complete investigation must be based on reasonable professional judgments which support the particular level of investigation conducted. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d at 695. The accompanying investigation must be reasonable under the circumstances. See id. at 691, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d at 695. Moreover, there can be a point when the tactical or strategic decisions made by counsel from a host of competing options fall outside the broad scope of a reasonably competent attorney.
Once the applicant proves ineffective assistance, it must also be shown that the error caused prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693, 104 S.Ct. at 2067, 80 L.Ed.2d at 697; Westeen, 591 N.W.2d at 211. To sustain this burden, the applicant must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d at 698; see Artzer, 609 N.W.2d at 531; Tracy, 482 N.W.2d at 680. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d at 698; see Wissing, 528 N.W.2d at 564; Bumpus, 459 N.W.2d at 627. In defining this prejudice prong in Strickland v. Washington , the Supreme Court rejected the claim by the defendant that prejudice was established when the attorney's unprofessional errors resulted in a mere impairment of the presentation of the defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693, 104 S.Ct. at 2067-68, 80 L.Ed.2d at 697. It found that if such a standard were adopted, every criminal defense attorney would be subjected to a successful ineffective assistance claim, as every error by counsel would conceivably impair a defense. Id. On the other hand, the Court did not want the standard to be so stringent that no defendant could ever satisfy the prejudice prong. Thus, the Court also rejected the stringent outcome-determinative test of requiring a defendant to show that counsel's deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in the case. Id. at 693, 104 S.Ct. at 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d at 697. Instead, the Court crafted the governing question to be whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the fact finder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt. Id. at 695, 104 S.Ct. at 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d at 698. To satisfy this requirement, an applicant must meet the burden of showing that the decision reached would reasonably likely have been different absent the errors. Id. at 696, 104 S.Ct. at 2069, 80 L.Ed.2d at 699. In explaining the application of the prejudice standard, the Court stressed that the ultimate concern should be the overriding fundamental fairness of the proceeding. Id. Yet, this concern over fundamental fairness does not serve to supplement the prejudice inquiry except in those instances where a defendant attempts to demonstrate prejudice by urging considerations that do not deprive the defendant of substantive or procedural rights recognized under the law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 392-93, 120 S.Ct. at 1513, 146 L.Ed.2d at 417-18. In those cases where the performance of counsel does deprive a defendant of a procedural or substantive right recognized in the law, the straightforward prejudice test pronounced in Strickland guides the analysis. Id. at 391, 120 S.Ct. at 1512-13, 146 L.Ed.2d at 417-18. We first defined the standard for determining whether a defendant has demonstrated the requisite prejudice in State v. Miles, 344 N.W.2d 231, 234 (Iowa 1984). In Miles, we interpreted the prejudice prong to require a defendant to prove his attorney's error worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions. Miles, 344 N.W.2d at 234 (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 1596, 71 L.Ed.2d 816, 832 (1982)). However, Miles was issued prior to the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Strickland v. Washington . Moreover, Miles relied upon the Fifth Circuit case, Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir.1982), rev'd, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), in forming its definition of prejudice, which case was subsequently reversed by the Court in its Strickland decision. We have never disavowed our analysis of the prejudice prong set forth in Miles. Instead, we have labeled that interpretation an actual prejudice standard, finding it to be the same standard adopted in Strickland. State v. Propps, 376 N.W.2d 619, 623 (Iowa 1985). However, in Taylor v. State, 352 N.W.2d 683, 685 (Iowa 1984), we expressly adopted the reasonable probability of a different result test articulated in Strickland for analyzing resultant prejudice. See Propps, 376 N.W.2d at 623; Mark v. State, 370 N.W.2d 609, 612 (Iowa Ct.App.1985). Since Taylor, we have applied the Strickland test as the appropriate prejudice standard. See Artzer, 609 N.W.2d at 531; Carrillo, 597 N.W.2d at 500; Wissing, 528 N.W.2d at 564; Tracy, 482 N.W.2d at 680; State v. Hill, 449 N.W.2d 626, 628 (Iowa 1989); Risdal, 404 N.W.2d at 132; Propps, 376 N.W.2d at 623. The fundamental fairness of the proceedings is not utilized by our courts as the standard, unless it fits into one of those unique situations described in Williams v. Taylor. See Wanatee v. Ault, 101 F.Supp.2d 1189, 1197 (N.D.Iowa 2000). Although we have at times considered the fundamental fairness of the proceeding, we believe the reasonable probability of a different result is our governing inquiry. In applying this standard it is also necessary to consider what is meant by a different result. Strickland seemed to define result as the decision rendered. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696, 104 S.Ct. at 2069, 80 L.Ed.2d at 699. Many courts also interpret result in the same manner, requiring a showing of the reasonable probability of a different verdict, or that the fact finder would have possessed reasonable doubt. See Abdur'Rahman v. Bell, 226 F.3d 696, 707 (6th Cir.2000); Montoya v. Johnson, 226 F.3d 399, 408 (5th Cir.2000); Espy v. State, 246 Ga.App. 1, 539 S.E.2d 513, 516 (2000); Watson v. State, 243 Ga.App. 636, 534 S.E.2d 93, 96 (2000); Vogel v. State, 31 S.W.3d 130, 136 (Mo.Ct.App.2000); McAllister v. State, 28 S.W.3d 72, 76 (Tex.App.2000); Burruss v. State, 20 S.W.3d 179, 186 (Tex.App.2000). We believe this is how result should be interpreted in Iowa, and how it has most often been interpreted. See Westeen, 591 N.W.2d at 211; Tracy, 482 N.W.2d at 680; Bumpus, 459 N.W.2d at 627; Hill, 449 N.W.2d at 629; Taylor, 352 N.W.2d at 686; see also Wanatee, 101 F.Supp.2d at 1197-98; Burgess, 585 N.W.2d at 847. Finally, it is important to observe that Strickland defines the legal standard to govern the prejudice component of a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. Strickland establishes that prejudice exists when there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d at 698. This standard does not modify our requirement for the defendant to establish the elements of a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel by a preponderance of the evidence. See Oetken, 613 N.W.2d at 683; Carrillo, 597 N.W.2d at 499; Wissing, 528 N.W.2d at 563. Instead, in making the decision whether there is a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different, the burden of proof is on the defendant to establish this standard by a preponderance of the evidence. With this in mind, we now apply these concepts to the specific claims raised in this case.