Opinion ID: 1385188
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Third-Degree Burglary as a Crime of Violence

Text: Brown contends that the district court committed procedural error by interpreting § 4B1.2(a), the Guidelines definition of crime of violence, as encompassing his 1993 New York felony of third-degree burglary. We conclude, in light of (a) the residual clause at the end of the § 4B1.2(a) definition, (b) the identically worded residual clause in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)'s definition of violent felony, (c) the interpretation of § 924(e) by the Supreme Court in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990), and this Court in Andrello, 9 F.3d 247, with respect to the nature of burglaries, (d) this Court's parallel constructions of § 4B1.2(a)'s concept' of crime of violence and § 924(e)'s concept of violent felony in analyzing non-burglary felonies, and (e) the absence of a relevant statement by the Sentencing Commission interpreting § 4B1.2(a)'s residual clause, that the district court did not misinterpret the Guidelines definition. The Guidelines definition of crime of violence provided that that term means any offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that  (1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, or (2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. 2003 Guidelines § 4B1.2(a) (emphases added); see also Guidelines § 4B1.2 (a) (2007) (same). In determining whether a given crime fits within the definition of the relevant predicate offenses, we take a categorical approach; that is, we generally look only to the statutory definition of the prior offense of conviction rather than to the underlying facts of that offense. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600, 110 S.Ct. 2143. Under New York law, [a] person is guilty of burglary in the third degree when he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime therein. N.Y. Penal Law § 140.20 (McKinney 1999). Plainly, building[s] include structures other than dwelling[s]; hence, the New York crime of third-degree burglary does not categorically fit within the first clause of § 4B1.2(a)(2)'s definition of crime of violence, i.e., burglary of a dwelling. The question thus is whether third-degree burglary fits within the last clause of the § 4B1.2(a)(2) definition, i.e., the residual clause encompassing any felony that otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. Most of our Sister Circuits dealing with state laws defining crimes of burglary have struggled to determine whether interpreting § 4B1.2 (a)(2)'s residual otherwise involves clause to include burglary of a building that is not a dwelling is foreclosed by that definition's earlier specific mention of burglary of a dwelling  (emphasis added). Some Circuits have answered this question in the affirmative, concluding that only burglaries of dwellings are to be considered crimes of violence under § 4B1.2(a)(2). See, e.g., United States v. Harrison, 58 F.3d 115, 119 (4th Cir.1995); United States v. Spell, 44 F.3d 936, 938-39 (11th Cir.1995); United States v. Smith, 10 F.3d 724, 733 (10th Cir.1993). Others have concluded that burglary of a commercial building involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another, and hence burglary of such a nondwelling is also a crime of violence, falling within the scope of § 4B1.2(a)(2)'s last clause. See, e.g., United States v. Hascall, 76 F.3d 902, 906 (8th Cir.) ( Hascall ), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 948, 117 S.Ct. 358, 136 L.Ed.2d 250 (1996); United States v. Fiore, 983 F.2d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1024, 113 S.Ct. 1830, 123 L.Ed.2d 458 (1993). Still other Circuits have ruled that whether burglary of a building other than a dwelling should be considered a crime of violence within the meaning of the residual clause of § 4B1.2(a)(2) depends on the circumstances of the crime. See, e.g., United States v. Matthews, 374 F.3d 872, 880 (9th Cir.2004); United States v. Hoults, 240 F.3d 647, 651-52 (7th Cir.2001); United States v. Wilson, 168 F.3d 916, 928-29 (6th Cir.1999) (Wilson); United States v. Jackson, 22 F.3d 583, 585 (5th Cir.1994). The Sentencing Commission, for its part, has not since 1989 clarified the intended reach of § 4B1.2's definition of crime of violence. As the Sixth Circuit noted in Wilson, [t]he Sentencing Commission has considered and failed to adopt various amendments to section 4B1.2 over the years which would address the question of whether burglary of a dwelling should be interpreted broadly or narrowly. For example, in December 1992, the Commission considered a proposed amendment to the definition of a crime of violence which would have amended that section to include all burglaries, and not just burglaries of a dwelling. 57 Fed.Reg. 62832, 62856-57 (proposed Dec. 31, 1992). This proposed change was rejected. Subsequently, in 1993, another proposed amendment sought to add language to application note 2 which would have clarified that, The term `crime of violence' includes burglary of a dwelling (including any adjacent outbuilding considered part of the dwelling). It does not include other kinds of burglary.  58 Fed.Reg. 67522, 67533 (proposed December 21, 1993). The Commission also failed to adopt this approach. 168 F.3d at 928 (emphases added). The Wilson court concluded: `[w]e fail to see how the Commission's inconsistent path supports a particular view on this issue.' Id. (quoting Hascall, 76 F.3d at 906). We note that at one time the Sentencing Commission had taken the position that the Guidelines definition of crime of violence did not include burglaries of nondwellings. The original Guidelines defined crime of violence by adopting the definition of that term as it appeared in 18 U.S.C. § 16. Guidelines § 4B1.2(1) (1987) (renumbered § 4B1.2(a) in 1997, Guidelines Appendix C, Vol. I, Amendment 568, at 526 (eff. Nov. 1, 1997)); see 18 U.S.C. § 16 (defining crime of violence to encompass any felony . . . that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense). The commentary to the original § 4B1.2 stated that the Commission interpreted the crime-of-violence definition to mean that [c]onviction for burglary of a dwelling would be covered but that conviction for burglary of other structures would not be covered. Guidelines § 4B1.2 Application Note 1 (1987) (emphasis added). However, this stated interpretation was short-lived. In 1989, the Commission amended § 4B1.2 to clarify the definition of crime of violence. Guidelines Appendix C, Vol. I, Amendment 268 (eff. Nov. 1, 1989) (Amendment 268), at 133. The reference to 18 U.S.C. § 16 was deleted; the clarified Guidelines definition used the § 4B1.2(a) wording quoted in the second paragraph of this Part II.B. (wording that has remained the same through 2007), i.e., listing, inter alia, burglary of a dwelling and any felony that otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another, Amendment 268; at 131-33. The original commentary was replaced by commentary that continued to note that' crimes of violence include burglary of a dwelling; but the statement that burglary of other structures would not be covered was omitted. Id. at 132. No subsequent version of § 4B1.2 or of its commentary has stated that burglaries of nondwelling buildings are excluded from the Guidelines definition of crime of violence. This Court has not previously decided whether the New York crime of third-degree burglary is a crime of violence within the definition set out in Guidelines § 4B1.2(a). In Andrello, 9 F.3d at 249-50, however, we held that attempted third-degree burglary under New York law is a violent felony within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), a section that provides enhanced penalties for a previously convicted felon who is convicted of possessing a gun in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and who has three previous convictions . . . for a violent felony, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The term violent felony as used in § 924(e) includes a felony that is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. Id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (emphasis added). Although that definition does not specify that violent felonies include attempts, we concluded in Andrello that attempted third-degree burglary under New York law is a violent felony under § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)'s residual clause. In reaching this conclusion, we were guided by the Supreme Court's decision in Taylor, 495 U.S. 575, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607, with regard to burglary itself. As discussed in Taylor, the legislative history of § 924(e)'s sentence-enhancing provisions repeatedly revealed Congress's view that burglary is an offense that inherently poses a risk of physical injury to victims, bystanders, and law enforcement personnel. For example, the Taylor Court noted that testimony at congressional hearings focusing on burglary pointed out that even though injury is not an element of the offense, it is a potentially very dangerous offense, because when you take your very typical residential burglary or even your professional commercial burglary, there is a very serious danger to people who might be inadvertently found on the premises. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 585, 110 S.Ct. 2143 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphases added). The Court noted that Wile fact that an offender enters a building to commit a crime often creates the possibility of a violent confrontation between the offender and an occupant, caretaker, or some other person who comes to investigate. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 588, 110 S.Ct. 2143. The legislative history indicate[d] that Congress singled out burglary (as opposed to other frequently committed property crimes such as larceny and auto theft) for inclusion as a predicate offense . . . because of its inherent potential for harm to persons. Id. (emphases added). Consistent with these views of the nature of burglary, the Supreme Court has most recently ruled that attempted burglary of a structure, see Fla. Stat. § 810.02(1) (1993); id. § 777.04(1) (attempts), is a violent felony within the meaning of § 924(e) because it involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of injury to another, James v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1586, 1597-98, 167 L.Ed.2d 532 (2007). The James Court noted that the main risk of burglary arises not from the simple physical act of wrongfully entering onto another's property, but rather from the possibility of a face-to-face confrontation between the burglar and a third party-whether an occupant, a police officer, or a bystander. . . . Id. at 1594. In Andrello, this Court, noting Taylor 's description of Congress's view of burglary as reflected in the legislative history of § 924(e), concluded that attempted third-degree burglary under New York law is a violent felony within the meaning of the residual clause of § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), i.e., that the attempt involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. See 9 F.3d at 249-50. The major premise leading to that conclusion was that burglary itself is a crime that inherently involves a risk of personal injury, id. at 249. Andrello 's major premise is instructive for purposes of the present case because the residual clause of the § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) definition of violent felony and the residual clause of the Guidelines § 4B1.2(a)(2) definition of crime of violence are identical; both definitions end with the inclusion of any felony that otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. Indeed, the Guidelines § 4B1.2 `definition of crime of violence' was `derived from 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). United States v. Palmer, 68 F.3d 52, 55 (2d Cir.1995) ( Palmer ) (quoting Amendment 268, at 133). Given the identical language of the two definitions' residual clauses, this Court, in determining whether a defendant's prior non-burglary felonies were violent felonies within the meaning of § 924(e), has been guided by cases interpreting Guidelines § 4B1.2 (a)(2). See United States v. Jackson, 301 F.3d 59, 62 (2d Cir.2002) (We . . . look to cases construing U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 (career offender), which defines a `crime of violence' in wording substantially identical to the definition of `violent felony' under § 924(e).), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 952, 123 S.Ct. 2629, 156 L.Ed.2d 644 (2003). Arid conversely, in determining whether a defendant's prior non-burglary felonies were crimes of violence within the meaning of Guidelines § 4B1.2(a), we have been guided by cases interpreting § 924(e). See, e.g., Palmer, 68 F.3d at 55 (The term `violent felony' is defined by § 924(e)(2)(B) in terms that are substantially identical to the definition of `crime of violence' in USSG § 4B1.2(1).). Given the substantial similarity between the . . . definition of violent felony[ ] [in] 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B), and the Sentencing Commission's definition of crime of violence, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(1), authority interpreting one phrase frequently is found to be persuasive in interpreting the other phrase. Palmer, 68 F.3d at 55 (quoting United States v. Winter, 22 F.3d 15, 18 n. 3 (1st Cir.1994)). Such analytical cross-referencing between Guidelines § 4B1.2 (a)(2) and 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) rests not only on the fact that the residual clauses of the two provisions are identical, but also on the recognition that the inquiry into whether a particular type of conduct has the potential to present a serious risk of physical injury to another person focuses on the nature of the conduct. The inherent nature of the conduct is not dependent on the location of a provision prescribing punishment for that conduct. And where the language of two such provisions is identical, we cannot conclude that those provisions have disparate applicability to a type of conduct that inherently involves the risk specified in both provisions. Having reasoned in Andrello that attempted third-degree burglary of a building' falls within the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) because third-degree burglary itself is a crime that inherently involves a risk of personal injury, 9 F.3d at 249, we can only conclude that third-degree burglary inherently poses that same risk within the meaning of the identically worded residual clause of Guidelines § 4B1.2(a)(2). Accordingly, we conclude that in ruling that Brown's 1993 third-degree burglary in violation of New York law was a crime of violence within the meaning of the last clause of Guidelines § 4B1.2(a)(2), and thus that his record included two crimes of violence, making his base offense level 24, the district court did not misinterpret the Guidelines.