Opinion ID: 2608707
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The denial of petitioners' offer of additional evidence.

Text: Petitioners rely upon ORS 215.422, which then provided: (1) A party aggrieved by the action of a hearings officer may appeal the action to the planning commission or county governing body, or both, however the governing body prescribes.    The procedure and type of hearing for such an appeal or review shall be prescribed by the governing body. An appeal or review proceeding shall be based upon, but not limited to, the record of the hearings officer's action. (2) A party aggrieved by the final determination may have the determination reviewed under ORS 34.010 to 34.100. (Emphasis added) A first impression from reading the last sentence of this statute may be that in view of the words not limited to a party appealing to a county board of commissioners from an action by a hearings council, as in this case, cannot be limited to the record of the action by the Hearings Council, but has a right to offer additional evidence. If this be correct, then it must follow that petitioners had a right to offer additional evidence relevant to the issues to be decided by the Board of Commissioners, and counsel for the city of Gold Hill conceded in oral argument before this court that evidence that market value of adjacent property would be impaired by construction of the sewage treatment plant is relevant to the question whether the use allowed by the approval of a permit for such a plant would be injurious to property and improvements in the area. We conclude, however, that this contention by petitioners is not well taken. First of all, such an interpretation of the words but not limited to would appear to be inconsistent with the previous provision of that statute that the procedure and type of hearing for such an appeal shall be prescribed by the governing body. This would appear to permit a county board of commissioners to decide for itself whether appeals such as this are to be heard on the record, rather than de novo. If, however, an appealing party has the right to offer additional evidence, such a procedure and type of hearing could not be prescribed. As a result of this apparent inconsistency, we believe that ORS 215.422(1) is ambiguous, at least when read as a whole, requiring a consideration of its legislative history in an effort to determine the intent of the legislature in its use of the words but not limited to. Upon examination of the legislative history of ORS 215.422(1), we find that prior to 1977 that section read as follows: A party aggrieved by the action of a hearings officer taken under subsections (1) to (4) of ORS 215.416 may appeal such approval or denial to the governing body of the county. The governing body may, on its own motion, review any action taken under subsections (1) to (4) of ORS 215.416. At the 1977 session of the Oregon Legislature SB 846 was offered and would have provided: A party aggrieved by the action of a hearings officer may appeal the action to the planning commission or county governing body, or both, however the governing body prescribes. The appellate authority on its own motion may review the action. The procedure and type of hearing for such an appeal or review shall be prescribed by the governing body. Upon appeal or review the appellate authority shall consider the record of the hearings officer's action. That bill was apparently sponsored by the Association of Oregon Counties (AOC), which explained the purpose of this change to be as follows: The purpose for the revisions to ORS 215.422 is to allow each county to set the rules for appeals from hearings officers. The county ordinance may designate the governing body or the planning commission or both as the appellate body for hearings officer decisions. And, as revised, an appeal to either or both appellate bodies may be `on the record' or the county ordinance could conceivably allow for `de novo' review of certain types of hearings officer decisions. In either situation, as a minimum the appellate authority must give some consideration to the record of the hearings officer's action. An alternative proposed amendment to the last sentence of ORS 215.422(1) was then submitted by the Associated Oregon Industries (AOI), which would have provided that: An appeal or review proceeding shall be based upon the record of the hearing officer's action. At a hearing on SB 846 on June 2, 1977, before the Senate Environment and Energy Committee, Mr. Hawes, representing AOI, stated that: We would simply ask that the language in SB 100  ORS 197.305(1)  be used instead  `upon the record of the hearings officer's action.' The point to make very simply is that that's why you have the due process hearings procedure which the counties do have in the statutes now. Build a record and then rely on it. Mr. Mattis, representing AOC, then responded as follows: Well, the problem which I suggest with the AOI plan is that I'm not suggesting that we not consider the record or even conceivably base their opinion on it, but this addresses the type of hearing. Some counties, from the smaller ones, there is still a desire by the governing body to retain the ability to have an evidentiary hearing, or what the courts consider a de novo hearing, to consider the quasi-judicial action anew ... Consider it anew and make a judgment. If they choose to have that type of hearing, the language on page 23 would require that they at least consider the hearings officer record. The problem I suggest with the AOI proposal is that I feel it implies that there cannot be a de novo hearing process allowed at the local level. After some further discussion, including suggestions that some changes be made in the last sentence of the amendment proposed by AOC in order to satisfy the objections by AOI, the following appears: Mr. Hawes: Perhaps `shall be based upon, but not limited to, the record of the hearing officer's action.' Mr. Mattis: That takes care of my problem. A motion was then made and carried to amend SB 846 by the adoption of that proposal. From the foregoing, we believe it to be clear that the intent of the 1977 legislature in its adoption of the amendment proposed by AOC was not to confer upon any appealing party an unlimited right to offer any relevant new evidence, but rather to further accommodate the desire of the counties to be permitted flexibility in deciding for themselves the procedure and type of hearing to be held in such an appeal, including the question whether new or additional evidence should be permitted or excluded at such a hearing. As previously noted, Jackson County adopted rules of procedure for such appeals under which new or additional evidence could be offered only upon a showing that consideration of such evidence is required by the public interest or that such evidence could not have been offered to the Hearings Council in the exercise of due diligence. That rule of procedure was proper under the provisions of ORS 215.422 and was not improperly applied by the Board of Commissioners in this case, in view of the discretion reserved by it under the provisions of that rule. It is also of interest to note that the 1979 session of the Oregon legislature removed this ambiguity in the provisions of ORS 215.422(1) by further amending that section to read as follows: A party aggrieved by the action of a hearings officer may appeal the action to the planning commission or county governing body, or both, however the governing body prescribes. The appellate authority on its own motion may review the action. The procedure and type of hearing for such an appeal or review shall be prescribed by the governing body. According to explanatory comments appearing as a part of the record of a hearing on SB 435 on March 14, 1979, before the Senate Legislative Committee on Trade and Economic Development:    ORS 215.422 is amended to remove the existing, possibly ambiguous language (requiring that land use appeals within county government be `based upon but not limited to the record') so as to clarify that the county has discretion to hear a case de novo or on the record under language in ORS 215.422 (providing that `the procedure and type of hearing shall be prescribed by the governing body'). For these reasons we hold that petitioners were not entitled as a matter of right under ORS 215.422 to offer additional evidence at the hearing before the Jackson County Board of Commissioners and that it could decide for itself, as its rules permit, whether or not to reject the additional evidence offered by the petitioners at that hearing upon finding that the public interest did not require it to consider such evidence or that the evidence could have been produced with due diligence at the hearing before the Hearings Council. Petitioners make no contention the Board could not properly make such findings in this case. Petitioners also complain that they were told at the conclusion of the hearing before the Hearings Council that they should get some expert testimony to offer at the hearing on appeal to the Board of County Commissioners. Obviously, any such statements by members of the Hearings Council were not binding upon the Board of Commissioners and could not impose upon that Board the duty to receive such evidence. Also, as previously noted, no attempt was made by petitioners (who were not then represented by an attorney) to offer expert testimony at the hearing before the Hearings Council and they were not precluded by it from offering such evidence.