Opinion ID: 1879629
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: appellate review; negligence cases

Text: A party against whom a motion to dismiss is directed is entitled to have all such party's relevant evidence accepted or treated as true, every controverted fact as favorably resolved, and every beneficial inference reasonably deducible from the evidence. Rahmig v. Mosley Machinery Co., 226 Neb. 423, 449, 412 N.W.2d 56, 73-74 (1987). A court cannot decide an issue as a matter of law unless the facts adduced on an issue are such that reasonable minds can draw but one conclusion from the evidence. Rahmig v. Mosley Machinery Co., supra . In a jury trial, when evidence compels but one reasonable conclusion regarding an issue or question in the litigation, a court can properly direct a verdict on such issue or question. Edwin Bender & Sons v. Ericson Livestock Comm. Co., 228 Neb. 157, 421 N.W.2d 766 (1988). See, also, Rahmig v. Mosley Machinery Co., supra . [I]n a jury trial of a negligence action, the trial court must decide whether a plaintiff is guilty of negligence, and, if so, must then decide whether evidence is such that only one reasonable conclusion is permissible  the plaintiff's contributory negligence which, as a matter of law, bars recovery and authorizes a directed verdict for the defendant. [Citations omitted.] If, as the result of such initial consideration of the evidence, the trial court determines that the jurors may reasonably draw different conclusions from the evidence, existence of the plaintiff's negligence or contributory negligence and comparative negligence are questions of fact for the jury. Rahmig v. Mosley Machinery Co., supra 226 Neb. at 451, 412 N.W.2d at 75. To determine whether conduct constitutes negligence, the invariable standard is reasonable care, although reasonable care is directly proportional to the danger inherent in conduct and may vary depending on the circumstances.... .... One who is capable of understanding and discretion but fails to exercise ordinary care and prudence to avoid obvious dangers is negligent or contributorily negligent. Lynn v. Metropolitan Utilities Dist., 225 Neb. 121, 126-27, 403 N.W.2d 335, 339 (1987). See, also, Prime Inc. v. Younglove Constr. Co., 227 Neb. 423, 418 N.W.2d 539 (1988); Rahmig v. Mosley Machinery Co., supra .