Opinion ID: 2575574
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Scope Of The Word Swimming As Employed In The Use Agreement

Text: The scope of the Association members' easement over the Cools' beach is governed by the terms of the 1988 Use Agreement between the Association and the Powers, the Cools' predecessors in interest. That agreement grants the Association's members an easement over the beach for swimming and boating. . . . At issue here is the scope of the word swimming as understood by the original parties to the Use Agreement. [2] In its initial decision the district court determined that the term swimming as it appears in the Use Agreement was ambiguous, and this Court upheld that determination on appeal. Id. (stating [w]e hold that swimming is an ambiguous term as used in this context). As stated, the district court held that use of the beach for swimming and boating does contemplate picnics, sunbathing, and gatherings on the beach for relaxation and social interaction. Reviewing the district court's decision, this Court in Mountainview I determined the district court's interpretation of what the drafters of the Use Agreement intended by the word swimming was overly broad. 139 Idaho at 774, 86 P.3d at 488. Picnics and gatherings for relaxation and social interaction, ruled the Court, would not under any stretch be swimming. Id. This Court then remanded the case back to the district court, instructing the lower court to define the term `swimming' in accordance with this [Court's] opinion. Id. On remand, the district court defined the Association member's swimming easement in a more limited fashion. The district court ruled they are entitled to use the beach area for swimming, which is propelling themselves through the water, playing in the water, and diving; life-guarding of those who are participating in swimming; and sunbathing while wearing attire suitable for swimming. In the present appeal the Cools argue the district court ignored this Court's instructions to exclude from its definition of swimming any activities that are not done in the water, excepting only crossing the beach when entering or exiting the water. Specifically, the Cools object that the district court's amended judgment permits members of the Association to sunbathe or act as lifeguards to their children while remaining on the beach. Doing so, assert the Cools, is in contradiction of this Court's prior decision and could result in Association members using the resulting loopholes to remain for hours on the Cools' beach engaging in prohibited activities such as relaxing and socializing. The Cools maintain that if members of the Association wish to sunbathe or act as lifeguards they can do so from the adjacent public beach. Additionally, the Cools assert the district court improperly adopted language suggested by the Association in the court's amended judgment. Finally, the Cools argue the district court erred in failing to engage in additional fact finding on remand. The Cools' arguments are unpersuasive because in this instance the district court closely and accurately followed its instructions on remand. Although the Cools fault the district court for declining to engage in additional fact finding, this Court did not direct the district court to do so. Indeed, this Court in Mountainview I expressly stated that the record already contained the necessary evidence to define the meaning of swimming under the Use Agreement. 139 Idaho at 774, 86 P.3d at 488 ([t]he record contains substantial and competent evidence to define the term `swimming'). Rather than requiring additional fact finding, this Court simply instructed the district court to define the term `swimming' in accordance with this opinion.  Id. (emphasis added). Following those instructions, each of the activities the district court named in the amended judgment as coming within the definition of swimming was endorsed in this Court's decision in Mountainview I. With respect to sunbathing, this Court wrote that [s]unbathing, at least while wearing swimming attire, may be considered swimming. Id. The district court incorporated that reasoning into its amended judgment, permitting sunbathing while wearing attire suitable for swimming. The Cools seize on this Court's use of the word may in the phrase may be considered swimming to argue that this Court meant only to suggest the district court explore the issue of sunbathing rather than commanding the lower court to reach any specific conclusion. Indeed, read in context it does not appear this Court was mandating the district court permit sunbathing. See id. However, it is equally apparent this Court considered sunbathing to be an activity the district court could sensibly include as a swimming-related activity preserved to Association members by the Use Agreement. See id. The district court did so, and consequently what remains is the question of whether there was substantial and competent evidence for that finding. Id. at 772, 86 P.3d at 486. The conduct of the parties to a contract and their practical interpretation of it is an important factor when there is a dispute over its meaning. Commercial Credit Corp. v. S & E Enters., Inc., 97 Idaho 441, 443, 546 P.2d 396, 398 (1976); Weilmunster v. Weilmunster, 124 Idaho 227, 235, 858 P.2d 766, 774 (App.1993); see also Mountainview I, 139 Idaho at 773, 86 P.3d at 487 (stating that an instrument granting an easement is to be interpreted in light of the circumstances in existence at the time the easement was granted and utilized). The Cools take issue with the evidence of sunbathing, but we note that there was testimony from two witnesses that it has been customary for Association members to sunbathe in the beach area, and that this testimony was buttressed by photographic evidence. The testimony and other evidence offered at trial in this case provided ample support for the district court's finding that sunbathing was a swimming-related activity the parties to the Use Agreement intended to come within the scope of swimming. With respect to lifeguarding, this Court wrote in Mountainview I that [a]dopting the [Cools'] strict definition of swimming could lead to illogical results. Parents would be unable to lifeguard their swimming children because they themselves were not `propelling themselves through the water.' 139 Idaho at 773, 86 P.3d at 487. In accordance with that language, the district court in its amended judgment on remand added lifeguarding of those who are participating in swimming to the scope of swimming under the Use Agreement. On appeal the Cools object to the inclusion of lifeguarding as a permitted activity. They argue that this Court in Mountainview I did not intend to direct the district court to include lifeguarding as a permissible activity under the Use Agreement. That preventing parents from using the beach area to lifeguard their swimming children or other adults was illogical served as the basis of this Court's rejection of the strict definition of swimming employed by the Cools in their first appeal. [3] Id. In stating that preventing parents from serving as lifeguards on the Cools' beach would be illogical, this Court unmistakably signaled its disapproval of such a result. See id. It should be recalled that this Court's instructions on remand were to define the term `swimming' in accordance with this opinion. Id. at 774, 86 P.3d at 488. The district court's inclusion of lifeguarding within the scope of the Use Agreement was not error because such a result was mandated by this Court's opinion in Mountainview I. The Cools next contend that members of the Association should not be allowed to cross over the Cools' beach on their way to the adjacent public beach. Using the beach as a trail does not involve swimming, according to the Cools, and therefore the Use Agreement does not allow for it. In response the Association points out that the Cools could have but did not raise the issue until this case was before the district court following the first appeal. At that point the district court declined to consider it, reasoning that it fell outside the district court's scope of authority on remand. In this appeal the Cools maintain that although the issue was not raised below with specificity, the matter of whether Association members may traverse the Cools' beach comes within the broader issue of the scope of the easement, which, in turn, depends on the definition of swimming that was the subject of remand. [4] Issues not raised below but raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered or reviewed. Whitted v. Canyon County Bd. of Comm'rs, 137 Idaho 118, 122, 44 P.3d 1173, 1177 (2002). However, [t]he general rule is that, on remand, a trial court has authority to take actions it is specifically directed to take, or those which are subsidiary to the actions directed by the appellate court. State v. Hosey, 134 Idaho 883, 886, 11 P.3d 1101, 1104 (2000). This Court determines that the Association members' use of the Cools' beach as a pathway does not present a subsidiary question to the definition of swimming, and therefore the district court's ruling that it fell outside that court's authority on remand was correct. We decline to consider the question as it was not properly raised in the trial court nor upon appeal. [5] Whitted, 137 Idaho at 122, 44 P.3d at 1177.