Opinion ID: 1215594
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: relation of the parties to the property to which the chattel is annexed and for which the chattel was acquired

Text: The majority concedes it only looks at the application of the law because the facts are not in dispute; however, in doing so the majority loses sight of the unique circumstances of the individual case requiring separate analysis to determine whether a tangible personal property has become a fixture when used to serve a real estate purpose. Clearly, whether an item is a fixture is a mixed question of law and fact to be determined on the evidence presented in each individual case. Anderson v. Englehart, supra, 108 P. at 979; Corning Bank v. Bank of Rector, 265 Ark. 68, 576 S.W.2d 949, 952 (1979); Rayl v. Shull Enterprises, Inc., 108 Idaho 524, 700 P.2d 567, 570 (1984); Cook v. Beermann, 201 Neb. 675, 271 N.W.2d 459, 461 (1978), modified by 202 Neb. 447, 276 N.W.2d 84 (1979); Western Ag Land Partners v. State Dept. of Revenue, 43 Wash. App. 167, 716 P.2d 310, 311 (1986); Nearhoff v. Rucker, 156 Wash. 621, 287 P. 658, 661 (1930). The majority's analysis of analogizing a key as possibly being annexed to the realty only underscores the need to fully develop and examine each individual case by a jury. [3] Unless the security agreement evidences a clear intent, summary judgment is rarely justified when dealing with the issue of whether goods have become fixtures since the inquiry is fact dependent and more for the jury than for the court. See Frost v. Schinkel, supra, 238 N.W. at 670-671; and 9 Hawkland, Uniform Commercial Code Series, § 9-313:02, at 206-207 (1986). One cannot blindly ignore the facts of this case and uphold the partial summary judgment when weighing of facts is required for decision. The facts show that the Board unquestionably had a purchase money mortgage in the pipe by providing the money for purchase and taking a real estate mortgage on the property and installed irrigation system. The record demonstrates that on January 24, 1978, the Board loaned the Rumerys $87,000 for the specific purpose of purchasing and installing an irrigation system on their farm property. This acquisition of an irrigation system included the gated pipe and the entire system was a real estate improvement. The majority glosses over the relationship of the parties and totally disregards it apparently in favor of simplicity sake by applying one rule to all relationships concerning whether a chattel has become a fixture. However, the area of fixtures is complex because of the various relations which can arise. Simply stated, the same rule regarding fixtures cannot apply to all parties across the board without regard for the variant relationships that may exist. Planter's Bank v. Lummus Cotton Gin Co., supra. As Judge Thornton dissenting in Far West Modular Home Sales, Inc. v. Proaps, 43 Or. App. 881, 604 P.2d 452, 456 (1979) astutely phrased the law: Whether or not an article annexed to the real property is a fixture is a question of fact to be determined upon the evidence in a particular case, and the question is determined not only by the manner in which the article is affixed to the realty, but also by the relationship of the parties to the controversy. Bell v. Bank of Perris, 52 Cal. App.2d 66, 125 P.2d 829, 833 (1942). (Emphasis added.) The relationship of the parties is also important because when an owner or mortgagor attaches a tangible item to real estate, a presumption arises that it was annexed with the intention of enriching the freehold and thus, it becomes a part of the realty. Energy Control Services, Inc. v. Arizona Dept. of Economic Sec., 135 Ariz. 20, 658 P.2d 820, 823 (1982); Corning Bank v. Bank of Rector, supra; Frost v. Schinkel, supra; Planter's Bank v. Lummus Cotton Gin Co., supra; Western Ag Land Partners v. State Dept. of Revenue, supra; Nearhoff v. Rucker, supra; Hall v. Dare, 142 Wash. 222, 252 P. 926, 928 (1927). Consequently, with no evidence to rebut the presumption which derived from the relationship of the parties in the evidentiary material supporting the partial summary judgment motion, it was improvident to grant summary judgment at this stage. The manner and circumstance of installation principles should not be ignored as has been done by this court in majority opinion. See Hall v. Dare, supra. Irrigation pipe is not unnoticed in fixture litigation. Energy Control Services, Inc. v. Arizona Dept. of Economic Sec., supra; Rayl v. Shull Enterprises, Inc., supra; Johnson v. Hicks, 51 Or. App. 667, 626 P.2d 938 (1981), as a solar water heating system; Western Ag Land Partners v. State Dept. of Revenue, supra, 716 P.2d 310.