Opinion ID: 2513918
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Heading: The Sibling Relationship Exception

Text: California has a comprehensive statutory scheme establishing procedures for the juvenile court to follow when and after a child is removed from the home for the child's welfare. (§ 300 et seq.; see generally Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 247-250, 19 Cal. Rptr.2d 698, 851 P.2d 1307.) The objective of the dependency scheme is to protect abused or neglected children and those at substantial risk thereof and to provide permanent, stable homes if those children cannot be returned home within a prescribed period of time. ( In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 307, 19 Cal. Rptr.2d 544, 851 P.2d 826.) When the child is removed from the home, the court first attempts, for a specified period of time, to reunify the family. ( Cynthia D. v. Superior Court, supra, at pp. 248-249, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 698, 851 P.2d 1307.) In this case, those efforts have failed. When that occurs, the court must terminate reunification efforts and set the matter for a hearing pursuant to section 366.26 for the selection and implementation of a permanent plan. (§ 366.21, subd. (g).) ( Id. at p. 249, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 698, 851 P.2d 1307.) This appeal concerns the section 366.26 hearing, also called a permanency planning hearing ( In re Marilyn H., supra, at p. 298, fn. 2, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 851 P.2d 826), that was held in February 2002. Once reunification services are ordered terminated, the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability. ( In re Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 309, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 851 P.2d 826.) A section 366.26 hearing ... is a hearing specifically designed to select and implement a permanent plan for the child. ( Id. at p. 304, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 851 P.2d 826.) It is designed to protect children's compelling rights ... to have a placement that is stable, permanent, and that allows the caretaker to make a full emotional commitment to the child. ( Id. at p. 306, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d.544, 851 P.2d 826.) The Legislature has declared that California has an interest in providing stable, permanent homes for children who have been removed from parental custody and for whom reunification efforts with their parents have been unsuccessful. ( Id. at p. 307, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 851 P.2d 826.) The court has four choices at the permanency planning hearing. In order of preference the choices are: (1) terminate parental rights and order that the child be placed for adoption (the choice the court made here); (2) identify adoption as the permanent placement goal and require efforts to locate an appropriate adoptive family; (3) appoint a legal guardian; or (4) order long-term foster care. (§ 366.26, subd. (b).) Whenever the court finds that it is likely the child will be adopted, the court shall terminate parental rights and order the child placed for adoption. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) The circumstance that the court has terminated reunification services provides a sufficient basis for termination of parental rights unless the court finds a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child due to one or more of specified circumstances. ( Ibid. ) The Legislature has thus determined that, where possible, adoption is the first choice. Adoption is the Legislature's first choice because it gives the child the best chance at [a full] emotional commitment from a responsible caretaker. ( In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1348, 93 Cal. Rptr.2d 644.) Guardianship, while a more stable placement than foster care, is not irrevocable and thus falls short of the secure and permanent future the Legislature had in mind for the dependent child. ( In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1344, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 562.) We thus see that if the child is adoptableand no one disputes that Celine and Angel areadoption is the norm. Indeed, the court must order adoption and its necessary consequence, termination of parental rights, unless one of the specified circumstances provides a compelling reason for finding that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child. The specified statutory circumstancesactually, exceptions to the general rule that the court must choose adoption where possiblemust be considered in view of the legislative preference for adoption when reunification efforts have failed. ( In re Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1348, 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 644.) At this stage of the dependency proceedings, it becomes inimical to the interests of the minor to heavily burden efforts to place the child in a permanent alternative home. ( Cynthia D. v. Superior Court, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 256, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 698, 851 P.2d 1307.) The statutory exceptions merely permit the court, in exceptional circumstances ( In re Jasmine D., supra, at pp. 1348-1349, 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 644), to choose an option other than the norm, which remains adoption. Until recently, section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1), contained four exceptions to the normal requirement of adoption. Effective January 1, 2002, the Legislature added a fifth exception, the one at issue here: There would be substantial interference with a child's sibling relationship, taking into consideration the nature and extent of the relationship, including, but not limited to, whether the child was raised with a sibling in the same home, whether the child shared significant common experiences or has existing close and strong bonds with a sibling, and whether ongoing contact is in the child's best interest, including the child's long-term emotional interest, as compared to the benefit of legal permanence through adoption. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(E); Stats.2001, ch. 747, § 3.) This new exception now permits the court to consider the sibling relationship in deciding whether a compelling reason exists to choose something other than adoption. At the hearing in this case, counsel for the children expressed concern that Crystal might be hurt and saddened if Celine and Angel were adopted. The issue before us is whether the sibling relationship exception permits the court to consider whether adoption would be detrimental, not to the children being considered for adoption, but to a sibling. The trial court and Court of Appeal in this case held that the new exception permits the court to consider possible detriment to the child being considered for adoption, but not detriment to a sibling. As the Court of Appeal explained, Crystal was not the subject of the termination hearing.... The court had previously selected for her a permanent plan of long-term foster care. Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1) and its exceptions pertain to the child for whom the court is conducting the hearing to select and implement a permanent plan. The purpose of the February 2002 hearing was to select and implement a permanent plan for Celine and Angel. In order for the court to refrain from selecting adoption as the permanent plan for Celine and Angel, given their adoptability, it would have to `find a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child,' in this case them. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) We agree with the courts below that the sibling relationship exception permits the trial court to consider possible detriment to the child being considered for adoption, but not a sibling of that child. The plain language of the new exception compels this conclusion. Although it concerns the sibling relationship in general, the statute continually refers to that relationship's impact on the child being considered for adoption, not the impact on the sibling or anyone else. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(E).) [T]he language focuses exclusively on the benefits and burdens to the adoptive child, not the other siblings. The court is specifically directed to consider the best interests of the adoptive child, not the siblings, and must ultimately determine whether adoption would be detrimental to the adoptive child, not the siblings. ( In re Daniel H. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 804, 813, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 475.) Nothing in the statute suggests the Legislature intended to permit a court to not choose an adoption that is in the adoptive child's best interest because of the possible effect the adoption may have on a sibling. Counsel for the children argues that the court must examine the relationship among all the siblings in considering the sibling relationship exception and may not restrict its inquiry to the children at issue in the hearing before the court. In a way, this is correct. The sibling's relationship with the child is not irrelevant. Certainly, evidence of the sibling's relationship with the child and, if the sibling is articulate, perhaps of the sibling's views of that relationship, might be relevant as indirect evidence of the effect the adoption may have on the adoptive child. A nonadoptive sibling's emotional resistance towards the proposed adoption may also implicate the interests of the adoptive child. In an appropriate case, the court should carefully consider all evidence regarding the sibling relationship as it relates to possible detriment to the adoptive child. But the ultimate question is whether adoption would be detrimental to the adoptive child, not someone else. This conclusion does not mean that the court must totally disregard the interests of the sibling or the significance of the sibling relationship when it orders adoption. When appropriate, the court can encourage the adoptive parents to agree to visits among the siblings although, as the court recognized in this case, it cannot require them to do so. .(§ 366.29; Fam.Code, § 8714.7; see In re Daniel H., supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 812, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 475.)