Opinion ID: 2590272
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Denial of motion for sequestered Hovey voir dire

Text: Defendant contends the trial court's denial of his motion for sequestered voir dire pursuant to Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1 [168 Cal.Rptr. 128, 616 P.2d 1301] was erroneous and violated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution and parallel provisions of the California Constitution, requiring reversal of the guilt and penalty judgments. This claim is without merit. (9) `In Hovey v. Superior Court [, supra, ] 28 Cal.3d 1, 80 . . ., this court decided that in capital prosecutions the death-qualification portion of each prospective juror's voir dire should be sequestered, meaning that it should be conducted out of the presence of other prospective jurors. This court did not hold that sequestered voir dire was constitutionally required; instead, we mandated this practice as a rule of procedure.' ( Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 493, quoting People v. Jurado, supra, 38 Cal.4th 72, 100; see also People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 287-288 [25 Cal.Rptr.3d 337, 106 P.3d 990]; People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 628 [25 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 863 P.2d 635].) `In 1990, however, the voters abrogated this aspect of Hovey by enacting Proposition 115, which added section 223 to the Code of Civil Procedure. That statute provides, in part, that where practicable the trial court must conduct voir dire in the presence of the other jurors in all criminal cases, including death penalty cases. (Code Civ. Proc., § 223.)' ( Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 493.) We review the trial court's denial of defendant's motion for individual sequestered voir dire under the abuse of discretion standard. ( People v. Navarette (2003) 30 Cal.4th 458, 490 [133 Cal.Rptr.2d 89, 66 P.3d 1182]; People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 713-714 [94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46].) A trial court abuses its discretion only if its ruling falls outside the bounds of reason. ( People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 714.) In the present case, defendant requested that the prospective jurors be examined outside the presence of the other jurors as to all issues, because individual questioning would lead the jurors to respond more truthfully and extensively, would prevent them from being influenced or affected by responses made by other prospective jurors, and would protect the privacy of prospective jurors. The trial court denied the motion without giving a statement of reasons, but indicated it would revisit its decision if necessary after the commencement of voir dire. The court informed counsel, however, that it would conduct questioning to ensure that a jury satisfactory to both sides was selected, and that if the allotted peremptory challenges proved inadequate, the court would provide additional challenges to all sides until a satisfactory jury was seated. It is evident, from the trial court's statement, that the court intended to revisit the issue of individualized voir dire if necessary and that it understood it had discretion to conduct individual voir dire, but that it declined to do so because it felt that group voir dire, with questioning conducted by the trial court and with ample peremptory challenges provided to defendant, adequately would safeguard defendant's constitutional right to an impartial jury. In view of the circumstance that defendant offered only generalized grounds for conducting individual voir dire, not specific to his case, the trial court's ruling did not fall outside the bounds of reason. (See People v. Jurado, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 102.) On appeal, defendant contends he was prejudiced by the court's refusal to conduct sequestered voir dire of the prospective jurors. He points to a comment made by the court to one of the prospective jurors during voir dire. This prospective juror, who expressed strong support for the death penalty for any defendant found guilty of murder, erroneously believed that only one of the three defendants was charged with murder. The court and the prospective juror then engaged in the following colloquy: The Court: Only [for] one of the defendants will the people be seeking the death penalty. [¶] Juror D.M.: Oh, Okay. [¶] The Court: The prosecutor, the district attorney of the county, elects who, if anyone, he chooses to seek the death penalty on. [¶] And at the time of the penalty phase he will explain to you, I'm sure, the reasons that he had for selecting one defendant over the other two, assuming that any of these people ever get convicted of anything. [¶] Can you accept that even though we're talking to you about penalty, these folks still have a presumption of innocence and are still presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proven? [¶] Juror D.M.: Yes, that I do.... [¶] The Court: Would you accept the proposition that the prosecution has the right to seek the death penalty for certain individuals that fall in the category of these three defendants out here, if they choose, and you won't second guess the prosecutor as to why he chose to seek the death penalty on one defendant over the other two? [¶] Juror D.M.: No. The prospective juror ultimately was excused for cause. [11] Defendant argues that the trial court's comment illustrates the prejudice he suffered from the court's refusal to conduct sequestered voir dire. According to defendant, the court's comment tainted the jury pool by diminishing the prospective jurors' sense of responsibility and giving them the impression that the prosecutor had authority to determine the penalty to be imposed. He claims the court's comments reinforced the view that defendant deserved the penalty of death. Defendant's generalized assertions of prejudice are without merit. The court's questioning of the juror who ultimately was excused for cause clearly made reference to the prosecution's decision to seek the death penalty against only one of the three defendants and, even under the most strained reading, could not reasonably be understood to advise prospective jurors that defendant deserved death. Defendant was not prejudiced by the court's refusal to conduct sequestered voir dire, and accordingly was not unconstitutionally deprived of a fair and impartial jury.