Opinion ID: 187350
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Fear of Torture

Text: Like the detainees here, the petitioners in Munaf asked the district court to enjoin their transfer because they feared they would be tortured in the recipient country. The Court recognized the petitioners' fear of torture was of course a matter of serious concern, but held in the present context that concern is to be addressed by the political branches, not the judiciary. Id. at 2225. The context to which the Court referred was one in whichas herethe record documents the policy of the United States not to transfer a detainee to a country where he is likely to be tortured. Id. at 2226. Indeed, as the present record shows, the Government does everything in its power to determine whether a particular country is likely to torture a particular detainee. Decl. of Pierre-Richard Prosper, United States Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues ¶¶ 4, 7-8, Mar. 8, 2005. The upshot is that the detainees are not liable to be cast abroad willy-nilly without regard to their likely treatment in any country that will take them. Under Munaf, however, the district court may not question the Government's determination that a potential recipient country is not likely to torture a detainee. 128 S.Ct. at 2226 (The Judiciary is not suited to second-guess such determinationsdeterminations that would require federal courts to pass judgment on foreign justice systems and undermine the Government's ability to speak with one voice in this area). In light of the Government's policy, a detainee cannot prevail on the merits of a claim seeking to bar his transfer based upon the likelihood of his being tortured in the recipient country. [5] The detainees seek to distinguish Munaf on the ground that the habeas petitioners in that case did not raise a claim under the Convention Against Torture, as implemented by the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring (FARR) Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231 note. See Munaf, 128 S.Ct. at 2226 n. 6. That distinction is of no help to them, however, because the Congress limited judicial review under the Convention to claims raised in a challenge to a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(4) (Notwithstanding any other provision of law ... including section 2241 of Title 28, or any other habeas corpus provision, ... a petition for review [of an order of removal] shall be the sole and exclusive means for judicial review of any cause or claim arising under the Convention). Here the detainees are not challenging a final order of removal. As a consequence, they cannot succeed on their claims under the FARR Act, and Munaf controls. [6]