Opinion ID: 610843
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Morgan Was Seized

Text: 35 Stops under the Fourth Amendment fall into three categories. First, police may stop a citizen for questioning at any time, so long as that citizen recognizes that he or she is free to leave. Florida v. Bostik, --- U.S. ----, ----, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 2386, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991). Such brief, consensual exchanges need not be supported by any suspicion that the citizen is engaged in wrongdoing, and such stops are not considered seizures. Second, the police may seize citizens for brief, investigatory stops. This class of stops is not consensual, and such stops must be supported by reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879-80, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); United States v. Holzman, 871 F.2d 1496, 1502 (9th Cir.1989). Finally, police stops may be full-scale arrests. These stops, of course, are seizures, and must be supported by probable cause. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148-49, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1924, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972). 36 Defendants contend that Searle did not seize or detain Morgan until after Morgan allegedly became violent and tried to take a swing at Searle. Prior to that point, they contend that because Searle was merely questioning Morgan and Morgan was free to leave, the encounter was a consensual exchange not requiring either reasonable suspicion or probable cause. They contend that although Morgan was indeed seized after he allegedly became violent, the seizure was not unconstitutional because it was justified by Morgan's conduct at that point. Defendants also contend that a determination of whether Morgan was seized requires a resolution of facts in dispute, and that this issue therefore should have been left for the jury. 37 In considering whether a stop is a seizure or merely a consensual exchange, the Supreme Court has observed: 38 [A] person is seized only when by means of physical force or a show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained.... As long as the person to whom questions are put remains free to disregard the questions and walk away, there has been no intrusion upon that person's liberty or privacy as would under the Constitution require some particularized and objective justification. 39 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1876-77, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (emphasis added). Thus, the essential inquiry is whether the person stopped reasonably believed that he or she was not free to leave. United States v. Patino, 649 F.2d 724, 726-27 (9th Cir.1981) (citations omitted). This inquiry is largely a factual one which depends on the totality of the circumstances. Id. In granting a JNOV, however, the district court found that even on the facts as construed in the defendants' favor, Morgan was seized well before any alleged physical altercation took place. We agree. Based on the events that, according to Searle's own testimony, took place before Morgan allegedly freaked out, we find that the district court was quite justified in finding that Morgan reasonably believed that he was not free to leave. 40 By definition, a consensual exchange between police and citizens cannot take place in the absence of consent. When a citizen expresses his or her desire not to cooperate, continued questioning cannot be deemed consensual. In this case, according to Searle himself, Morgan never consented or otherwise conveyed a willingness to cooperate with Searle. Rather, Searle testified that after he approached Morgan, Morgan indicated in no uncertain terms that he did not want to be bothered. Despite Morgan's unwillingness, Searle insisted that Morgan answer his inquiries and demanded that Morgan come with him. We find that Morgan's unequivocal expression of his desire to be left alone demonstrates that the exchange between Morgan and Searle was not consensual. 5 Because the exchange was nonconsensual, we do not hesitate to find that Morgan was indeed seized well before he allegedly became violent. The district court correctly found that Morgan was seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 41