Opinion ID: 1121458
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Use of Mayland's Testimony for Purposes Other Than the Limited Purpose for Which It Was Admitted

Text: (26) Defendant claims prejudice resulting from references by the prosecutor during his summation at both the guilt and penalty phases to statements that defendant made to Mayland. Essentially, defendant contends that the prosecutor used the statements as substantive evidence relating to the manner in which the crimes were committed, rather than for the limited purpose for which they were admitted โ to illuminate the reliability of expert opinions. Our review of the arguments discloses three instances where the prosecutor's statements arguably tended to obscure the limited nature of the evidence in question. Any harm flowing from these remarks readily could have been cured by an appropriate admonition following an objection by the defendant. Defendant objected during trial to only the comment made during the prosecutor's rebuttal statement during the guilt phase; therefore, his objections to the other two comments were waived. ( People v. Haskett, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 244.) With respect to the comment during rebuttal, we find no prejudice occurred. [30] The trial court sustained defendant's objection. Although the trial court failed to give a specific admonition regarding the limited use for which defendant's statements to Mayland were admitted, the trial court provided a general admonition. [31] The jury was instructed, however, both prior to the argument and again later during deliberations in response to questions regarding whether any of defendant's statements to the experts were admissible evidence, that such testimony was not to be considered as evidence of the truth of the facts disclosed by the statements. Therefore, although a specific admonition was not immediately given by the trial court, any potential prejudice was dissipated by the trial court's instructions. ( People v. Mickey, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 689, fn. 17.) There is no reasonable likelihood that the jury was misled. (See People v. Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 663.) Further, we find that, given the repeated admonitions and instructions that the jury was not to consider defendant's statements to the defense experts for their content, no prejudice arose from any of the challenged comments by the prosecutor, whether these comments are viewed individually or cumulatively. (Cf. People v. Mickey, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 689, fn. 17; People v. Hawthorne (1992) 4 Cal.4th 43, 79 [14 Cal. Rptr.2d 133, 841 P.2d 118].)