Opinion ID: 654601
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Approach for this Case

Text: 56 We conclude that factual concurrence must be viewed on a case-by-case basis to address the concerns discussed above and to insure that the purposes of unanimity are satisfied. 19 [S]ince the set of material issues changes composition with the facts of each case, precedents cannot necessarily be used to construct a clear definition of materiality. Note, Right to Jury Unanimity on Material Fact Issues: United States v. Gipson, 91 HARV.L.REV. 499, 502 & n. 27 (1977). Statutory language and construction, legislative intent, historical treatment of the crime by the courts, duplicity concerns with respect to defining the offense, and the likelihood of jury confusion in light of the specific facts presented are all necessary inquiries to be addressed before a trial judge can ascertain whether he must instruct the jury to concur in predicate facts as well as in result. In making these determinations, the court must consider exactly what conduct the statute is designed to punish and deter. United States v. Jackson, 879 F.2d 85, 88 (3d Cir.1989). The Jackson court, in construing the federal continuing criminal enterprise (CCE) statute, 21 U.S.C. Sec. 848, aptly recognized a distinction between those issues necessitating unanimity and those issues upon which the jury need not agree: 57 While the jury must reach a consensus on the fact that there were five or more underlings, which is an essential element of the CCE offense, there is no logical reason why there must be unanimity on the identities of these underlings. Unlike the three offenses necessary to constitute a series, which is the conduct which the CCE statute is designed to punish and deter, 20 the identity of these underlings is peripheral to the statute's other primary concern, which is the defendant's exercise of the requisite degree of supervisory authority over a sizeable enterprise. 58 Id. at 88-89. See alsoUnited States v. Linn, 889 F.2d 1369, 1374 (5th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 809, 111 S.Ct. 43, 112 L.Ed.2d 19 (1990). Although recognizing that the approach we advance today does not yield any brightline tests for making such determinations, we note that the dictates of due process do not often lend themselves to easy application. Against this backdrop, we turn to the case presented.