Opinion ID: 1383084
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: effect of witness misconduct.

Text: Even if the trial judge had found that Clemons uttered the word probation with the intent to goad Appellee into moving for a mistrial, such conduct would not necessarily trigger the proscription against double jeopardy. It is bad faith conduct by the judge or prosecutor which triggers the narrow exception to the rule. United States v. Dinitz, supra, 424 U.S. at 611, 96 S.Ct. 1075, 1081; Tinsley v. Jackson, supra, at 332. In Johnson v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 709 S.W.2d 838, 839 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 865, 107 S.Ct. 222, 93 L.Ed.2d 150 (1986), a mistrial was declared because a witness referred to the defendant as an ex-convict. Noting that the bad-faith conduct rule is intended to discourage prosecutorial and judicial misconduct, the Court of Appeals rejected the defendant's double jeopardy claim because [t]he error in the first trial was not anything willfully or intentionally injected by the prosecutor. Id. at 840. Similarly, in United States v. Green, 636 F.2d 925 (4th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 929, 101 S.Ct. 2005, 68 L.Ed.2d 316 (1981), a federal agent testified that at the time the defendant was arrested, he was currently incarcerated for armed robbery. Noting that there was no evidence that the prosecutor planned, anticipated or condoned the remark, the court held that a retrial was not barred by double jeopardy. [I]t would be too simplistic to reach out and ensnare within the term prosecutor every federal agent involved in a criminal matter, including those involved in the collection of evidence and the preparation for trial, although control of the prosecution is strictly in the hands of others, i.e., members of the office of the United States Attorney. Id. at 928; see also State v. Barnes, 222 Ga.App. 875, 476 S.E.2d 646 (1996) (trial judge erred in dismissing the indictment on double jeopardy grounds after finding that a police officer witness deliberately caused a mistrial because it was her day off); State v. Maddox, 185 Ga.App. 674, 365 S.E.2d 516 (1988) (retrial not barred absent a showing that the prosecutor actively aided, counseled, or became a willing party to the error caused when a police officer testified that the defendant had previously been convicted of two DUI's); People v. Walker, 308 Ill.App.3d 435, 241 Ill.Dec. 842, 720 N.E.2d 297 (1999) (mistrial caused by detective's testimony about the defendant's prior sexual convictions did not bar retrial where the prosecutor had specifically warned the police officer not to give such testimony and the testimony was not responsive to the prosecutor's question); Commonwealth v. Gravely, 486 Pa. 194, 404 A.2d 1296 (1979) (police officer's testimony on cross-examination that the defendant flunked the polygraph after being warned not to mention the polygraph results was not prosecutorial misconduct). Appellee does not claim that the assistant Commonwealth's attorney who prosecuted this case encouraged or condoned Clemons's utterance of the word probation. In fact, Appellee's attorney conceded at the hearing on the motion to dismiss that he did not believe there was any misconduct on the prosecutor's part. Absent such a showing, dismissal would not be warranted even if Clemons had uttered the word probation with the intent to cause a mistrial. Accordingly, the order of the Court of Appeals is reversed and Appellee's petition for a writ of prohibition is denied. All concur.