Opinion ID: 1771464
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: C.U. Investigations, Inc. v. Jones, 780 So.2d 685, 688 (Ala.2000).

Text: Alabama has long recognized that a wrongful intrusion into one's private activities constitutes the tort of invasion of privacy. See I.C.U. Investigations, Inc. v. Jones, 780 So.2d at 688; Johnston v. Fuller, 706 So.2d 700, 701 (Ala.1997); Smith v. Doss, 251 Ala. 250, 37 So.2d 118 (1948). `This Court defines the tort of invasion of privacy as the intentional wrongful intrusion into one's private activities in such a manner as to outrage or cause mental suffering, shame, or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities.' Rosen v. Montgomery Surgical Ctr., 825 So.2d 735, 737 (Ala.2001)(quoting Carter v. Innisfree Hotel, Inc., 661 So.2d 1174, 1178 (Ala. 1995)). It is generally accepted that invasion of privacy consists of four limited and distinct wrongs: (1) intruding into the plaintiff's physical solitude or seclusion; (2) giving publicity to private information about the plaintiff that violates ordinary decency; (3) putting the plaintiff in a false, but not necessarily defamatory, position in the public eye; or (4) appropriating some element of the plaintiff's personality for a commercial use. Norris v. Moskin Stores, Inc., 272 Ala. 174, 132 So.2d 321 (1961). Johnston, 706 So.2d at 701. Butler claims that Jennings invaded her privacy by placing her in a false position in the public eye. Applying Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E (1977) and the following comments, this Court has adopted the following definition for false light invasion of privacy: `One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if `(a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and `(b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed.' Schifano v. Greene County Greyhound Park, Inc., 624 So.2d 178, 180 (Ala.1993)(emphasis omitted)(quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E (1977)). A false-light claim does not require that the information made public be private; instead, the information made public must be false. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E cmt. a. (1977). Additionally, it is integral to a false-light claim that the untrue information be publicly communicated. Comment a. to § 652E states, The rule stated here is, however, limited to the situation in which the plaintiff is given publicity. On what constitutes publicity and the publicity of application to a simple disclosure, see § 652D, Comment a., which is applicable to the rule stated here. Comment a. to § 652D states: `Publicity,' as it is used in this Section, differs from `publication,' as that term is used in § 577 in connection with liability for defamation. `Publication,' in that sense, is a word of art, which includes any communication by the defendant to a third person. `Publicity,' on the other hand, means that the matter is made public, by communicating it to the public at large, or to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as substantially certain to become one of public knowledge. The difference is not one of the means of communication, which may be oral, written or by any other means. It is one of a communication that reaches, or is sure to reach, the public. Thus it is not an invasion of the right of privacy, within the rule stated in this Section, to communicate a fact concerning the plaintiff's private life to a single person or even to a small group of persons. On the other hand, any publication in a newspaper or a magazine, even of small circulation, or in a handbill distributed to a large number of persons, or any broadcast over the radio, or statement made in an address to a large audience, is sufficient to give publicity within the meaning of the term as it is used in this Section. The distinction, in other words, is one between private and public communication. See Rosen v. Montgomery Surgical Ctr., 825 So.2d at 739; Johnston v. Fuller, 706 So.2d at 703; Ex parte Birmingham News, Inc., 778 So.2d 814, 818 (Ala.2000). Butler claims that Jennings publicly placed her in a false light when he (1) conversed with Fore and other individuals about matters concerning her, (2) received a copy of the above-quoted transcript and other materials into the minutes at a city council meeting, (3) distributed a letter in which he stated that he and Butler had discussed the possibility of dismissing her ticket in exchange for a donation by her, and (4) gave an interview to a reporter from the Birmingham News. Because of the detailed nature of each of Butler's allegations, we will review each claim individually.
Butler asserts that Jennings placed her in a false position in the public eye when he made untrue statements about her to various individuals. Specifically, Butler alleges that Jennings disseminated false information about her to Fore; to the police chief of Argo, Norman Watson; and to various individuals in the clerk's office of the city hall. Each of those allegations, however, fails to rise to the level of invasion of privacy by false light because Jennings did not give publicity to the information as that term is defined by Alabama law. In Rosen, 825 So.2d at 735, the plaintiff Rosen brought an invasion-of-privacy claim against the Montgomery Surgical Center and others (referred to collectively as the MSC defendants) for wrongfully informing one of Rosen's coworkers of a surgical procedure she had undergone at the Center. Rosen's coworker then told two more coworkers of Rosen's medical procedure. Quoting extensively from Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. a. (1977), this Court determined that the MSC defendants did not communicate the matter of Rosen's surgery to so many people that it was `substantially certain to become one of public knowledge.' 825 So.2d at 739 (quoting Restatement(Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. a. (1977)). In fact, at the very most, the MSC defendants communicated the information to one person, who, in turn, communicated it to two more people. Because Rosen failed to produce substantial evidence indicating that the MSC defendants had widely disseminated the information about her, we held that Rosen could not try her invasion-of-privacy claim to a jury. See also Ex parte Birmingham News, Inc., 778 So.2d at 814 (holding that the plaintiff failed to produce substantial evidence of publicity when her employer communicated information about her to one other person in addition to the plaintiff, and other coworkers were told only pursuant to an investigation into the matter). In this case, Butler alleges that Jennings gave publicity to false information about her by discussing that information with Fore, Chief Watson, and a few unnamed individuals in the clerk's office. [14] Like the MSC defendants in Rosen, supra, Jennings's communications in these instances were not of such a nature that would make the matter substantially certain to become one of public knowledge. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. a. (1977). Jennings's discussion of matters with two police officers and a few city employees was not the widespread dissemination required to support Butler's allegations that Jennings gave publicity to information about her that placed her in a false light in the public eye. Thus, Jennings's comments about Butler to just a few city employees does not constitute a communication that reaches, or is sure to reach, the public.
Butler contends that Jennings placed her in a false light in the public eye when he received a copy of the transcript, a copy of a petition, and Ayres's resolution into the minutes of the city council meeting on May 4, 1998, upon Ayres's submission of the materials to the city council. Specifically, Butler argues that although Ayres introduced, discussed, and submitted the transcript, petition, and resolution, those documents became matters of public record only after Jennings received them and a clerk stamped and signed them, making them part of the official minutes of the meeting. Thus, according to Butler, Jennings's actions gave the required publicity to the materials to make them substantially certain to become matters of public knowledge. Jennings argues that his mere receipt of the materials during the meeting does not constitute an intentional communication to the public. While Butler contends that Jennings should have refused to receive Ayres's submissions or that he should have redacted certain portions of the materials before handing them to the clerk, Jennings claims that, at city council meetings, he receives materials submitted by council members without exercising any discretion as to what is accepted and without the option to redact any portion of the submissions. The materials would then be stamped and signed by a clerk and would become part of the official minutes of the city council meeting. We note that Butler has failed to provide any legal authority to support her argument that Jennings's act of receiving documents handed to him by Ayres constituted an intentional communication to the public. Furthermore, the parties have given this Court no framework or authority on which to evaluate Jennings's actions. It is not clear exactly when Ayres's materials became a part of the public record and whether Jennings's actions even contributed to the materials' becoming a part of the public record. Neither party has explained whether the materials were made part of the public record when Ayres read them aloud at the city council meeting, when she submitted them to become part of the minutes, when Jennings received the materials, when he handed the materials to the city clerk, or when the clerk stamped and signed them. Butler, in focusing on the public aspect of the record of the actions of the city council, fails to provide us with any legal basis from which one could conclude that the mere administrative act of receiving materialssubmitted by someone else which later become the official minutes of a city council meeting constitutes an intentional communication of information to the public by the person receiving the documents. [15] It appears that Jennings passively received materials handed to him by Ayres. Although those materials ultimately became a part of the public record, we cannot conclude, as argued by Butler, that Jennings's actions gave publicity to the materials. Therefore, Butler has failed to demonstrate that Jennings actually communicated false information about her during the city council meetings.
Butler argues that Jennings portrayed her in a false light in the public eye when he wrote and disseminated his June 1, 1998, letter. Specifically, Butler alleges that in the letter Jennings falsely stated that he and Butler had discussed the possibility of her making a donation to a civic group in exchange for his getting her ticket dismissed. Jennings distributed the letter to the city council, to every person in attendance at the city council meeting, and to newspaper reporters for the Birmingham News and the St. Clair News-Aegis. The letter and portions of the letter were then published in the two newspapers. It is undisputed that the letter was widely disseminated. It is also undisputed that Butler and Jennings did not discuss dismissing the ticket in exchange for a donation. Instead, Butler told Jennings that she was willing to pay the ticket but that she did not want the fact that she had gotten a ticket to be revealed to her insurance company, if possible. Butler claims that Jennings's assertion in his letter that they discussed the possibility of her making a donation to a local civic group in exchange for a dismissal of the ticket places her in a false light in the public eye because the statement is defamatory. Although it is undisputed that the statement was false, Butler fails to explain how this particular mistaken comment could be `highly offensive' to a reasonable person, as required for a false-light claim. Schifano v. Greene County Greyhound Park, Inc., 624 So.2d at 180. Jennings's letter does not impute any wrongdoing to Butler, and, when the letter is read in its full context, it is clear that Butler gave nothing in exchange for the dismissal of the ticket. [16] Because Butler has failed to demonstrate that Jennings's statement was capable of being highly offensive to a reasonable person, her false-light claim must fail as to this allegation.
Butler contends that Jennings placed her in a false light in the public eye when he discussed false information about her with a reporter from the Birmingham News. Although Jennings admits in his testimony that he received many telephone calls from the newspaper reporter, there is no indication in the record as to when the calls took place, and there is absolutely no information in the record as to what was said during the conversations. This scant information falls far short of the substantial evidence needed to create an issue of fact for the fact-finder to resolve as to this allegation. Because Butler has failed to produce substantial evidence as to each of her allegations of false light against Jennings, the trial court should have entered a JML for Jennings as to Butler's false-light claim.