Opinion ID: 70986
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Attempted Rape

Text: Esqueda–Pina contends that his attempted rape conviction does not provide a basis for enhancement under § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). Esqueda–Pina was indicted for rape but pled guilty to the lesser included offense of attempted rape. 4 Case: 08-40418 Document: 00511013486 Page: 5 Date Filed: 01/27/2010 No. 08-40418 Count Two of the Ohio indictment contained the rape charge and stated, in relevant part: [I]n violation of section 2907.02 of the Ohio Revised Code, [Esqueda–Pina] did engage in sexual conduct, to wit: vaginal intercourse, with [the female victim], not his spouse and the said [victim] being less than thirteen (13) years of age, to wit: twelve (12) years of age, and/or . . . Esqueda having purposely compelled [the victim] to submit by force or threat of force. The parties do not dispute that only two subsections of § 2907.02 correspond to the conduct described in the indictment. These subsections read: (A)(1) No person shall engage in sexual conduct with another who is not the spouse of the offender or who is the spouse of the offender but is living separate and apart from the offender, when any of the following applies: .... (b) The other person is less than thirteen years of age, whether or not the offender knows the age of the other person. .... (2) No person shall engage in sexual conduct with another when the offender purposely compels the other person to submit by force or threat of force. O HIO R EV. C ODE A NN. § 2907.02 (1994). The 1997 judgment reflects that Esqueda–Pina “entered a plea of guilty to the stipulated lesser included offense of Count Two of the Indictment, to wit: attempted Rape, a violation of Section 2923.02 as it relates to 2907.02 of the Ohio Revised Code.” 1 Esqueda–Pina does not dispute that if he had pled guilty to an attempted violation of either § 2907.02(A)(1)(b) or § 2907.02(A)(2), the subsections that correspond to the indictment, the resulting conviction would provide a basis for 1 Section 2923.02 provides in relevant part that “[n]o person, purposely or knowingly, and when purpose or knowledge is sufficient culpability for the commission of an offense, shall engage in conduct which, if successful, would constitute or result in the offense.” OHIO REV . CODE ANN . § 2923.02(A). 5 Case: 08-40418 Document: 00511013486 Page: 6 Date Filed: 01/27/2010 No. 08-40418 imposing the crime of violence enhancement under § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). As to § 2907.02(A)(1)(b), this is consistent with our precedents, which hold that sexual contact with a child fulfills the enumerated offense under § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) of “sexual abuse of a minor.” See, e.g., United States v. Najera–Najera, 519 F.3d 509, 512 (5th Cir. 2008). As to § 2907.02(A)(2), this is consistent with the plain language of the definition of crime of violence under § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), which states that the enhancement should apply to any crime that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(iii). Esqueda–Pina argues, however, that it is not clear from the judgment that he pled guilty to attempt under those subsections. Esqueda–Pina points out that the judgment reflects only that he pled guilty to an attempted version of § 2907.02 generally, and argues that the judgment might therefore reflect that he pled guilty to attempting to violate a different subsection of that statute—one that does not qualify as a crime of violence under § 2L1.2.2 In support of this argument, Esqueda–Pina points to United States v. Turner, 349 F.3d 833 (5th Cir. 2003), in which the defendant was indicted for “burglary of a habitation”—a crime of violence under our precedents, see United States v. Hornsby, 88 F.3d 336, 339 (5th Cir. 1996)—but pled guilty to the lesser included offense of “burglary of a building.” Turner, 349 F.3d at 835–36. The judgment did not include facts indicating that the building at which the burglary occurred was a habitation. Id. at 836. We held that the district court erred in looking to the indictment and PSR to supply this fact, holding that the 2 Esqueda–Pina contends, for example, that the subsections of § 2907.02(A) applicable to rape committed by administering a drug or intoxicant or rape committed by engaging in sexual conduct with a person whose ability to resist or consent is substantially impaired do not qualify as crimes of violence. OHIO REV . CODE ANN . § 2907.02(A)(1)(a), (b); see also United States v. Gomez–Gomez, 547 F.3d at 244 (rape committed by duress does not have as an element the use of physical force). 6 Case: 08-40418 Document: 00511013486 Page: 7 Date Filed: 01/27/2010 No. 08-40418 appropriate inquiry was limited to the “conduct of which the defendant was convicted.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Analyzing the general elements of the lesser-included offense of burglary of a building, we concluded that the defendant had not committed a crime of violence. Id. Esqueda–Pina urges that under Turner, this court is limited to analyzing the general elements of attempted rape in determining whether he committed a crime of violence, and that not all types of attempted rape would so qualify. The government has not provided briefing as to whether Turner controls, and we decline to make that determination here. Assuming without deciding that Turner does prevent Esqueda–Pina’s attempted rape conviction from providing a basis for enhancement under § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), we conclude that the crime of violence enhancement was nevertheless appropriate because, as discussed below, the enhancement was supported by Esqueda–Pina’s gross sexual imposition conviction.