Opinion ID: 891577
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Unnatural or Unjust Disposition

Text: {23} The district court found that Gregoria's will was an [unjust] and unnatural disposition because [t]he conveyances and the Will were at variance with the previous declarations and known affections of Gregoria C de Baca. The Court of Appeals disagreed. It noted first that because Viola is Gregoria's daughter, [t]he devise in the present case does not fit easily into the traditional definition of an unnatural gift because although Viola is a natural object of Gregoria's bounty, so were the other eight children. . . . Chapman, 2008-NMCA-108, ¶ 19, 144 N.M. 709, 191 P.3d 567. The Court explained that the mere fact that the will did not distribute Gregoria's property as would the intestacy statutes could not contribute to a finding of undue influence; instead, the Court of Appeals required evidence that the division of property did not reflect the intent of the testator. . . . Id. The Court gave some credence to the statements of Siblings and other witnesses that Gregoria had expressed intentions and affections contrary to the will, see id. ¶¶ 22, 24-25, but found more convincing the evidence that when Gregoria wanted to make a gift, she made it. Id. ¶ 23. It also noted that [t]here is no evidence that Gregoria intended to divide her property equally among her children. . . . Id. ¶ 26. The Court concluded that the evidence does not provide insight into Gregoria's intentions and could not contribute to a finding of suspicious circumstances. Id. {24} Although we agree with the Court of Appeals that some of the evidence ostensibly contributing to the district court's ruling that the will was an unnatural or unjust disposition was not relevant, we reach this conclusion partly in a different manner. To begin, however, we concur with the Court of Appeals that Gregoria's will does not fit the traditional definition of an unnatural disposition. In Gersbach, we explained that [a] `natural disposition' has been defined as one `which provides for a testator's heirs at law. As one court succinctly put it: `[T]he natural object of a will maker's bounty is one related to him/her by consanguinity.' 1998-NMSC-013, ¶ 24, 125 N.M. 269, 960 P.2d 811 (citation omitted). Viola is one of Gregoria's children, and as such, Gregoria's testamentary gift to her was not unnatural, even if Gregoria's other children were excluded. If any transfer that diverged from the intestacy statute could be considered unnatural, testamentary freedom would be threatened. {25} However, our cases have also defined unnatural or unjust dispositions to include transfers of property at odds with a testator's previously expressed intentions and affections. For instance, in Doughty, 117 N.M. at 289-90, 871 P.2d at 385-86, the Court of Appeals upheld a trial court's finding of an unnatural or unjust disposition when one child had been effectively disinherited via inter vivos transfers to another child, but the evidence, including the decedent's will, indicated that [decedent] enjoyed a close relationship with both her children and she commented that she wanted [both children] to share her estate equally. Similarly, in Montoya, 113 N.M. at 111-12, 823 P.2d at 911-12, we upheld a trial court's finding of undue influence based in part on a suspicious unnatural or unjust disposition when the gift to [decedent's step-grandson] may have been inconsistent with [decedent]'s previously expressed intention to give the property to her son. {26} In this case, the bulk of Siblings' testimony relating to this factor concerned Gregoria's real property. Five witnesses testified that Gregoria had planned to give her house to Gilbert, who received just one dollar in the will. The only other evidence potentially going to the issue of unjust disposition concerned the falsehood of some of the assertions in the will. For instance, the will stated that Rosina had not seen Gregoria for twenty years, had stolen and never paid back $18,000, and had been unappreciative and rude. Rosina testified that she had seen Gregoria over the last twenty years, had never taken $18,000, and had not behaved as the will claimed she did. The will stated that Gilbert had refused to pay the bills while living in Gregoria's house, had made unpleasant remarks or been moody, and had never repaid loans. Gilbert testified that he had attempted to pay the bills, had a close relationship with his mother and had not made such remarks, and had provided some money to Gregoria, but had been assured by her that he did not need to repay the full amount of the loans. {27} We disagree with the Court of Appeals' reasons for rejecting this evidence. First, the Court stated that because Gregoria gave gifts when she was so inclined, the testimony about the real property was not relevant to undue influence. Our standard of review precludes us from re-weighing the evidence on appeal. See Doughty, 117 N.M. at 287, 871 P.2d at 383. Second, we can find no support for the Court's requirement of evidence that the testator intended to divide her property equally for a contrary disposition to be unjust. If the will had been intended to dispose of property contrary to Gregoria's previously stated intentions, we see no reason that such evidence should be categorically excluded from contributing to a suspicion of undue influence. [4] {28} Nevertheless, we still hold that the evidence concerning the real property was not relevant to whether the will was an unjust disposition. We reach this conclusion because there is no evidence that the will was intended to dispose of any of the real property that was the focus of Siblings' evidence. On the contrary, the warranty deeds to Viola were the instruments that were intended to dispose of Gregoria's real property, including the house that Siblings claimed was to be given to Gilbert. Although Siblings' actions to void the deeds have raised the potential that the real property could in fact pass via the residuary clause of the will, no evidence suggests that this was part of Viola's design. To the contrary, the residuary clause was added to the will at the suggestion of an attorney more than a year after the execution of the deeds. Although, as we discuss below, Viola participated heavily in drafting earlier versions of the will around the time of the execution of the deeds, these earlier versions included no residuary clause and specifically stated that the real property had already been conveyed to Viola. Because no evidence suggests that the will was intended by either Viola or Gregoria to convey Gregoria's real property, evidence about Gregoria's intentions regarding the real property are irrelevant to our determination of whether the will was an unjust disposition. {29} Without this evidence, precious little remains to show that Gregoria's will was an unjust disposition; Siblings' other testimony stated that the sentiments in the will were false, but did not suggest that Gregoria had any intention to leave other parts of her estate to them. Such evidence alone is certainly not sufficient to support a finding of suspicious circumstances. However, it would be arbitrary to refuse to consider evidence that a will is full of false or unrepresentative assertions about the people it disinherits. See 3 William J. Bowe & Douglas H. Parker, Page on the Law of Wills § 29.126, at 812 (2004) (explaining that evidence is admissible to explain the actual relations which existed between testator and the beneficiaries under the will, on the one hand, and the relations between the testator and the natural objects of his bounty, on the other, including the conduct of the beneficiaries and heirs respectively toward testator, and his actual feelings for them, as far as such conduct, feelings, and the like, furnish motives and reasons for or against the will (footnotes omitted)). Since evidence of Gregoria's relations with her children appears somewhat relevant to the question of undue influence, we see no reason to hold that the district court should not have considered it along with the other evidence.