Opinion ID: 793777
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The District Court's Application of the Sentencing Guidelines

Text: 15 With § 3553(b)(2) excised, the applicable sentencing regime for Mr. Grigg is the advisory Guidelines approach set forth by the Supreme Court in Booker. See 543 U.S. at 246-47, 125 S.Ct. 738; see also United States v. Woodard, 408 F.3d 396, 399 (7th Cir.2005). In this case, the district court's statements regarding its understanding as to whether the Feeney Amendment constrained its discretion to sentence Mr. Grigg below the range recommended by the Sentencing Guidelines may be inconsistent. For instance, although the court stated at the hearing's outset that it would consult the Sentencing Guidelines when fashioning a sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2), as required by  Blakely, Booker, Fanfan and Paladino, R.37 at 5, it later stated that Congress has seen fit in the Protect Act and the Feeney Amendment, basically, to prohibit departures from Sentencing Guidelines, id. at 41. As the hearing progressed, the court again seemed to indicate that the Feeney Amendment's provisions are mandatory, noting that they virtually prohibit judges from departing from the otherwise applicable Sentencing Guidelines. Id. at 44. Later, the court indicated in a more explicit manner that it considered itself bound to apply the Guidelines: 16 [A]gainst the entire backdrop of what underlies what Congress had in mind when child pornography was criminalized, and, more to the point, what Congress had in mind last year when they adopted the Child Protect Act and the Feeney Amendment, which basically precludes judges [from] departing from the Sentencing Guidelines in cases of this type, I'm obliged to impose the minimum sentence under the Guidelines. 17 Id. at 46 (emphasis added). 18 Although the court acknowledged elsewhere that the Guidelines are advisory, see, e.g., id. at 5, these statements are nonetheless unclear given that the court also asserted that the Feeney Amendment prohibits discretionary sentences outside of the guidelines range. For example, at the close of the hearing, the Government asked the district court, [I]s it the Court's position today that it doesn't believe it can go outside the advisory Guidelines[?] Id. at 56. The court replied, No, but then remarked: 19 The Court is very much aware—Congress has spoken. And this is [a] very unique area of the law. Congress created the Protect Act. 20 And for the reasons that are—I articulated, Congress is, in the vernacular, damn mad at judges who were continually putting people on probation because they had the wherewithal to bring in an expensive psychiatrist and say, This isn't going to happen again. 21 Id. at 56. 22 Viewing the record in its entirety, we must conclude that the district court may have plainly erred in treating the Guidelines as binding authority. Following the procedure established in United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471, 483-84 (7th Cir. 2005), a limited remand is in order. 3 The district court should state whether it understood that, notwithstanding the mandatory language of the Feeney Amendment, it was not bound by the Guidelines, and if it did not, whether, in light of our opinion in this case, it wishes to resentence Mr. Grigg.