Opinion ID: 2365094
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Reference to Appellate Process

Text: Defendant contends that the prosecutor improperly diminished Juror Robert Bighan's sense of responsibility as a penalty-phase juror by providing assurance that the jury's verdict would be reviewed on appeal. The prosecutor explained to Bighan that the appellate process would be long and thorough, and asked him directly whether that information comforted him. Defendant disputes the State's assertion that the prosecutor's comments were invited by the juror's comments on the State of Illinois' death sentence moratorium and concern about the risk of executing innocent people. According to defendant, the juror merely expressed a general concern about the death penalty that was unworthy of the highly specific response given by the prosecutor. Further, defendant contends that the trial court's curative instruction increased the risk of prejudice. Instead of simply ordering the juror to disregard the prosecutor's remarks, the trial court told the jury that what was said about the appellate process was absolutely correct. In Williams II, this Court emphasized the need for a thorough and searching inquiry into the jurors' attitudes on the death penalty. 113 N.J. at 413, 550 A. 2d 1172. That inquiry is necessary given the important, delicate, and complex nature of the death qualification process. Ibid. This Court also observed in Ramseur that trial courts must be accorded a sound measure of discretion in determining whether a juror's death penalty views would prevent or substantially interfere with the juror's performance of his or her duties. Supra, 106 N.J. at 256, 524 A. 2d 188. However, as part of that delicate interaction with jurors, a trial court must be aware that any instruction that `tend[s] to dilute the jury's sense of responsibility in passing on the issue of life or death' is erroneous. Id. at 316, 524 A. 2d 188 (quoting State v. Mount, 30 N.J. 195, 214, 152 A. 2d 343 (1959) (holding that because juries bear sole responsibility in passing on the issue of life or death, juries are obligated to confront that issue without consideration of the possibility of appeal)). The United States Supreme Court in Caldwell v. Mississippi, considered the validity of a capital sentence after the prosecutor urged the jury to refrain from viewing its role as determining whether the defendant would die because the state Supreme Court would review the correctness of the death sentence. 472 U.S. 320, 323, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 2635, 86 L.Ed. 2d 231, 235-36 (1985). The Court overturned the death sentence, stating that [b]ecause we cannot say that [the State's effort to minimize the jury's sense of responsibility for determining the appropriateness of death] had no effect on the sentencing decision, that decision does not meet the standard of reliability that the Eighth Amendment requires. Id. at 341, 105 S.Ct. at 2646, 86 L.Ed. 2d at 247. The holding in Caldwell was refined later to prohibit only those remarks that mislead the jury as to its role in the sentencing process in a way that allows the jury to feel less responsible than it should for the sentencing decision. Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 183 n. 15, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 2472 n. 15, 91 L.Ed. 2d 144, 158-59 n. 15 (1986); see also Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 8, 114 S.Ct. 2004, 2009, 129 L.Ed. 2d 1, 11 (1994) (noting Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Caldwell narrowing scope of holding); State v. Koskovich, 168 N.J. 448, 536, 776 A. 2d 144 (2001) (stating that [l]ike the United States Supreme Court, we also assume that capital-sentencing jurors recognize the gravity and significance of their responsibility). Thus, to establish a Caldwell violation, the defendant has the burden of showing that the remarks to the jury on the death penalty improperly described the role assigned to them under state law. Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 407, 109 S.Ct. 1211, 1215, 103 L.Ed. 2d 435, 443 (1989). The prejudice that results from a Caldwell error was recognized in State v. Rose, 112 N.J. 454, 548 A. 2d 1058 (1988). In Rose, the prosecutor, in the course of his opening statement in the penalty phase, informed the jury that the law, not the jurors, would be responsible for the defendant's execution. Id. at 510, 548 A. 2d 1058. Citing to Caldwell, Ramseur, and Mount, this Court held that the prosecutor's remarks to the jury were knowingly misleading in the sense that they tended to dilute the jury's sense of responsibility in passing on the issue of life or death. Id. at 514, 548 A. 2d 1058. See also State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 123, 164, 548 A. 2d 887 (1988) ( Bey II ) (finding reversible error where court's penalty-phase charge failed to communicate that the jury, not the mechanics of the statute or the `law,' is ultimately responsible for the imposition of the death penalty); Flamer v. Delaware, 68 F. 3d 710, 735 (3d Cir.1995) (holding that principle in Caldwell was not violated when trial court instructed the jury that its sentencing recommendation was binding if supported by the evidence), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1088, 116 S.Ct. 807, 133 L.Ed. 2d 754 (1996). The responsibility borne by a sentencing jury is grave and the jury's perception of its signal responsibility to determine whether to impose the death penalty cannot be lightened. It is the difficult judgment that each juror must face. No dilution of the jury's singular role can be allowed to dull an individual juror's comprehension of that responsibility. Our review of the record in this matter persuades us that the prosecutor's statement did tend to minimize Bighan's sense of responsibility. For the prosecutor to have suggested that the appellate process would take care of Bighan's concern about the execution of innocents was improper and had the capacity to mislead. It could have left Bighan with a lessened sense of responsibility for his role as a juror because it assured him that a higher authority would act as a check on the correctness of a jury verdict of death. That was an impermissible suggestion for the prosecutor to convey. The risk that Bighan would take that misapprehension with him into deliberations was not ameliorated when the court informed him that the prosecutor's comments were absolutely correct. Trial courts must act to rectify any juror's misapprehension concerning his or her role in passing on a sentence of life versus death, and must be vigilant in identifying any misunderstandings that may result from suggestive remarks by counsel. The totality of the judge's interaction with and instructions to the jury may have ameliorated the possibility that this exchange with Juror Bighan was reversible error. We need not resolve that question in view of our earlier disposition. However, we urge trial courts to take vigorous and prompt measures to prevent the possibility of that type of suggestiveness in the future.