Opinion ID: 2069253
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Competency of child.

Text: The defendant contends that the trial court erred in failing to strike the testimony of Robin or declare a mistrial at such point as he claims it became apparent that she was an incompetent witness. The defendant claims that the competency of Robin was never properly determined by the trial court and that, in addition, the lack of competency became more apparent as she testified due to the inconsistencies in her story, the questions she was unable to answer, and the changing of her testimony with regard to seeing the defendant on the night in question which necessitated her being recalled to testify at the trial court's insistence. In holding that tender age is no bar to testimonial competency, this court in Collier v. State (1966), 30 Wis. 2d 101, 106, 140 N. W. 2d 252, reiterated the requirements for establishing that competency as follows: . . . All that this jurisdiction requires is evidence of `his ability to receive accurate impressions of the facts to which his testimony relates and to relate truly the impressions received. If he has this understanding and intelligence and appreciates the obligation to speak the truth, he is competent.' Musil v. Barron Electrical Cooperative (1961), 13 Wis. (2d) 342, 358, 108 N. W. (2d) 652. . . . See also: Love v. State (1974), 64 Wis. 2d 432, 219 N. W. 2d 294. In a situation where the competency of a witness is in doubt, this court has required that the trial court attempt to determine whether the witness meets the above-quoted requirements. DeGroot v. Van Akkeren (1937), 225 Wis. 105, 273 N. W. 725. See sec. 885.30, Stats. The determination  of the trial court relative to the competency of a witness to testify rests in the sound discretion of the trial court and will only be disturbed on appeal if there is a clear abuse of discretion. Collier v. State, supra, page 106. The defendant contends that the voir dire conducted of the victim's daughter fell short of establishing the requirements of Collier v. State, supra , in that it did not demonstrate that Robin had the ability to receive accurate impressions of the facts to which her testimony was to relate. Collier v. State requires that the ability to receive accurate impressions be evidenced. That ability can be demonstrated as well by questions and answers relating to independent facts as it can by questions and answers relating to the particular facts about which her testimony will relate. The record of the voir dire in this case conclusively demonstrates that Robin had the ability to answer questions about her age, schooling, the names of her teachers, the names of her relatives, her birthday, where she lives, the church she attends, the church she used to attend, and the names of people she was with when she went to such places as the zoo. These types of questions were precisely the types asked of the seven-year-old witness in the Collier Case wherein this court sustained the determination of the trial court that the witness was competent to testify. The record reflects that Robin was found competent to testify not once, but four times. The first was by the Hon. THOMAS J. O'BRIEN, pursuant to a voir dire examination held prior to the preliminary examination. The second ruling was by the Hon. CHRIST T. SERAPHIM at a hearing on pretrial motions wherein he relied upon the testimony of the witness at the preliminary examination in reaching his determination. The third determination was made by the trial court pursuant to the  voir dire conducted before Robin first took the stand at the trial. The fourth ruling was also by the trial court following an additional voir dire of the witness held after it had been disclosed that Robin wanted to change her story about not having seen the defendant on the night in question. This last ruling by the trial court was based on all the former testimony of the witness, including that given at the preliminary hearing. At the time of the latter ruling of the trial court, he had the benefit of substantial testimony of the witness which related the events of the day in question in great detail. The defendant places much emphasis on the inconsistencies which developed in Robin's testimony as being indicative of her lack of competency to testify. The most outstanding of the inconsistencies was her changed story with regard to whether she saw the defendant on the night in question. This court has held that where a proper determination of competency has been initially made by the trial court, subsequent discrepancies in the witness' testimony would not be proper grounds for striking the testimony, but would merely create an issue of credibility for the jury. DeGroot v. Van Akkeren, supra, page 114. This position has been extended by the current rules of Wisconsin evidence wherein every witness is competent to testify (with certain noted exceptions) and that all former competency issues now are issues of credibility to be dealt with by the trier of fact. See: sec. 906.01, Stats.; 59 Wis. 2d Rp. 157, effective January 1, 1974, and comment following. Based on a complete review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Robin was competent to testify. Thus, the trial court did not err in permitting Robin's testimony to go to the jury for an assessment of credibility.