Opinion ID: 2547894
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: If, however, the officer appears and is subject to cross-examination under oath, it is within the administrative law judge's discretion to admit an unsworn report.

Text: Forensic science reports are inadmissible in the criminal context because they lack the normal components of trustworthiness. The risk that a conviction will rest on an inaccurate entry on a page motivates its exclusion. That risk can be tolerably minimized when the officer takes an affirmative oath that its contents are true. SOAH rule 159.23 adopts that approach by making it clear that sworn reports are admissible in ALR proceedings. But the rule does not end there. It provides other safeguards for both sworn and unsworn reports: However, the defendant shall have the right to subpoena the officer.... If the defendant timely subpoenas an officer and the officer fails to appear without good cause, information obtained from that officer shall not be admissible. 1 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 159.23 (emphasis added). Thus, rule 159.23 also conditions the admissibility of the peace officer's report on the subpoenaed officer's availability for cross-examination. See Richardson v. City of Pasadena, 513 S.W.2d 1, 3-4 (Tex. 1974) (noting that the right to cross-examine a witness is vital and applies even in administrative proceedings). SOAH, by rule, gives the civil ALR defendant safeguards available to criminal defendants to maximize the trustworthiness of information used to suspend or revoke a driver's license. The U.S. Supreme Court's recent hearsay and Confrontation Clause cases provide a useful comparison. The Confrontation Clause guarantees a defendant's right to confront those who `bear testimony' against him. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). A witness's testimony against a defendant is thus inadmissible unless the witness appears at trial or, if the witness is unavailable, the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 2531, 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009). Thus, an ex parte out-of-court affidavit is inadmissible in a criminal prosecution for cocaine possession, because the defendant had no opportunity to confront the analyst who prepared the report. Id. at 2542. The Flores report falls within the core class of testimonial statements that the U.S. Supreme Court described as the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause is directed. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50, 124 S.Ct. 1354. [11] Included within this class are forensic science reports, which are affidavits and are functionally identical to live, in-court testimony, doing `precisely what a witness does on direct examination.' Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2532 (citation omitted). Because [f]orensic evidence is not uniquely immune from the risk of manipulation, forensic science affidavits do not qualify as traditional official or business records. Id. at 2536-38. As the Court explained, business and public records `are generally admissible absent confrontation ... becausehaving been created for the administration of an entity's affairs and not for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact at trial they are not testimonial. Bullcoming, 131 S.Ct. at 2714 n. 6 (citing Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2539-40). Thus, forensic reports, containing testimonial statements, may not be introduced against the accused at trial unless the person who made the report is unavailable and the accused had an opportunity, pre-trial, to cross-examine that witness. Id. at 2710. The right of confrontation includes not only a personal examination, but also (1) insures that the witness will give his statements under oaththus impressing him with the seriousness of the matter and guarding against the lie by the possibility of a penalty for perjury; (2) forces the witness to submit to cross-examination, the `greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth'; [and] (3) permits the jury that is to decide the defendant's fate to observe the demeanor of the witness in making his statement, thus aiding the jury in assessing his credibility. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845-46, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990) (citations omitted). These elements of confrontationphysical presence, oath, cross-examination, and observation of the demeanor of the witness by the trier of factenhance the accuracy of the fact-finding process by ensuring that evidence admitted against the defendant is reliable and subject to rigorous adversarial testing. Id. at 846, 110 S.Ct. 3157; Romero v. State, 173 S.W.3d 502, 505 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005). Rule 159.23 provides analogous safeguards. It requires that a peace officer's report be sworn to be admissible. Even a sworn report is inadmissible if an officer does not appear in response to a subpoena. This is likely because an officer's failure to testify in support of his report indicates a lack of trustworthiness. Similarly, I would hold that unsworn reports, offered alone, are inadmissible under our evidentiary rules because they lack the same attributes of trustworthiness. On the other hand, if the officer appears, testifies under oath, and is subject to cross-examination, the concerns inherent in admitting unsworn police reports are minimized because the introduction of the report under such circumstances does not colli[de] with confrontation rights of an accused. [12] FED.R.EVID. 803(8) advisory committee's note. As noted by the dissent below, hearsay problems may be overcome by administering an oath, requiring the witness's presence at trial, and subjecting the witness to cross-examination. 363 S.W.3d 606, 615 (Jones, C.J., dissenting) (concluding that any problems with the perception, memory, narration, or sincerity of the facts stated in the unsworn report were overcome by Officer Flores's live testimony, under oath and subject to cross-examination, that the facts stated in the report were true and correct). In that situation, it is within the judge's discretion to determine whether the lack of trustworthiness accompanying an unsworn report has been overcome. The Court asserts that the verity of a declaration is thus assured by the criminal penalties for perjury, not a raised arm. 363 S.W.3d at 564. It cites to recently amended section 132.001 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which provides that an unsworn declaration may be used in lieu of a written sworn declaration, verification, certification, oath, or affidavit required by statute or required by rule. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE § 132.001(a). This version of the statute was not in effect at the time Trooper Flores's report was written, and the statute, by its terms, does not apply to the unsworn declaration in this case. See Act of June 17, 2011, 82d Leg., R. S., ch. 847, § 3, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 2119, 2120 (Section 132.001, Civil Practice and Remedies Code, as amended by this Act, applies only to an unsworn declaration executed on or after the effective date of this Act [September 1, 2011]. An unsworn declaration executed before the effective date of this act is governed by the law in effect immediately before the effective date of this Act, and that law is continued in effect for that purpose.). Even if it did, Trooper Flores's report does not comport with the statute's requirement that the unsworn declaration be subscribed by the person making the declaration as true under penalty of perjury. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE § 132.001(c)(2). Instead, the report merely states that Trooper Flores certif[ies] the following information is true and correct. By requiring that the person declare under penalty of perjury that the contents of the unsworn declaration are true, section 132.001 serves the same function as requiring a person to take an oathit impresses upon the author the seriousness of the matter and reinforces that his statement is subject to criminal penalties if untrue.