Opinion ID: 2745692
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure-to-Suppress-Evidence Claim

Text: Frazier next claims that his trial counsel provided constitutionally defective representation by not moving to suppress oral statements that Frazier made to the police.9 Specifically, Frazier argues that his counsel should have objected because Frazier lacked the 9 Frazier also offers a single statement, arguing that counsel should have moved to suppress evidence gathered pursuant to various search warrants. See Pet’r Br. at 51. He offers no further elaboration on this point, and therefore, we decline to consider it. Barany-Snyder v. Weiner, 539 F.3d 327, 331 (6th Cir. 2008) (“This cursory argument has been waived, for issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived.” (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)). No. 11-4262 Frazier v. Jenkins Page 19 mental capacity to waive his Miranda rights knowingly and intelligently. On direct appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court rejected this claim, holding, in part, that “there [was] no evidence of police coercion or overreaching rendering Frazier’s statement involuntary” and that “there [was] no evidence that Frazier was incapable of making a voluntary statement.”10 Frazier, 873 N.E.2d at 1285. This conclusion was not objectively unreasonable, and we must therefore affirm the denial of Frazier’s petition on this claim. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Supreme Court recognized that the Fifth Amendment grants suspects in custody “[the] privilege against self-incrimination and [the] right to retained or appointed counsel.” Id. at 475 (citing Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 n.14 (1964)). If the government interrogates a suspect “without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant [voluntarily,] knowingly[,] and intelligently waived his [rights].” Id. Determining whether a waiver is valid requires a two-part inquiry. First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if the “totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation” reveals both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986) (quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979)). Frazier does not dispute that his Miranda waiver was made voluntarily; rather, he argues that his mental retardation (or diminished mental capacity) precluded him from knowingly or intelligently waiving his rights. The problem for Frazier is that he cites no cases holding that 10 A valid waiver must be “made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.” Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 566 (1987) (citation omitted). The Ohio Supreme Court, however, discusses only voluntariness explicitly. Nevertheless, we conclude that the Ohio Supreme Court evaluated whether Frazier’s waiver met all three requirements because it considered “the totality of the circumstances, including the age, mentality, and prior criminal experience of the accused; the length, intensity, and frequency of interrogation; the existence of physical deprivation or mistreatment; and the existence of threat or inducement.” Frazier, 873 N.E.2d at 1285 (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, the Ohio Supreme Court engaged with Frazier’s argument that his “low intelligence” rendered his waiver invalid. See id. (“[Frazier’s] videotaped statements show that Frazier comprehended the investigators’ questions, and he was able to express his thoughts and recall his actions in a rational manner.”). No. 11-4262 Frazier v. Jenkins Page 20 mental retardation or a diminished mental capacity necessarily renders a person’s waiver unknowing or unintelligent. To the contrary, this court and other courts have concluded that “diminished mental capacity alone does not prevent a defendant from validly waiving his or her Miranda rights.” Garner v. Mitchell, 557 F.3d 257, 264 (6th Cir. 2009) (en banc). Nor does Frazier give specific reasons for why his particular intellectual disabilities made his waiver invalid. As a result, we cannot conclude that there is a reasonable probability that a motion to suppress would have succeeded, and therefore Frazier has failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by his attorney’s failure to file such a motion. Consequently, we AFFIRM the denial of Frazier’s petition on this point.