Opinion ID: 2071623
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Link to Discrimination Claim

Text: Appellant contends for the first time on appeal that her defamation claim, even if falling within the purview of the CMPA, was nonetheless so closely related to her discrimination claim that jurisdiction was proper. She invokes our holdings that the Superior Court may properly hear those common law tort claims otherwise grievable only pursuant to the Act if they are fundamentally linked to discrimination claims, which are not grievable under the CMPA. [12] King v. Kidd, supra, 640 A.2d at 663-64. See also Estate of Underwood v. National Credit Union Administration, 665 A.2d 621, 635-36 (D.C.1995); Webb v. Hyman, 861 F.Supp. 1094, 1100-02 (D.D.C.1994). In Kidd, we sustained the court's jurisdiction to hear both plaintiff's sex discrimination claim and her pendent [13] tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress because the latter was essentially premised upon the former; plaintiff had alleged that her emotional distress arose from the sexual harassment and retaliation by the defendants. 640 A.2d at 664. It is axiomatic that appellate courts normally will not consider points not presented to the trial court. Little v. United States, 665 A.2d 977, 980 (D.C.1995) (Questions not properly raised and preserved during the proceedings under examination, and points not asserted with sufficient precision to indicate distinctly the party's thesis, will normally be spurned on appeal) (citing Miller v. Avirom, 127 U.S.App.D.C. 367, 369-70, 384 F.2d 319, 321-22 (1967)). It is equally axiomatic in our jurisdiction that trial court rulings come with a presumption of correctness and that it is the responsibility of the appellant to furnish an appellate record evidencing the claimed trial court error. Cobb v. Standard Drug Co., 453 A.2d 110, 111 (D.C.1982). Stockard has failed to include her complaint in the record on this appeal. We gather from the briefs that the sex discrimination claim was based upon allegations that Stockard's male counterparts in the athletic department who were accused of misappropriation were not discharged, but rather were allowed to reimburse the school. However, it is not at all apparent from these descriptions that this claim was fundamentally related to the defamation count in the manner found in Kidd. Indeed, it was unnecessary for Stockard to prove any facts tending to show that her male counterparts were treated more favorably in order to prevail upon her defamation claim at trial. Thus, even if we were to reach the merits of the belatedly raised argument, we would be unable to make a meaningful determination whether her common law claims fall under the rubric of those preserved by Kidd or those extinguished by Thompson. Roache v. District of Columbia, 654 A.2d 1283, 1284 (D.C.1995). There is simply nothing in the record before us upon which to base a conclusion that the defamation and discrimination claims were fundamentally linked in a manner warranting the bypass of the administrative grievance procedure. See Cobb, supra, 453 A.2d at 111. Affirmed. WAGNER, Chief Judge, dissenting: I cannot agree that the Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act (CMPA) [1] preempted the jurisdiction of the Superior Court over Stockard's tort claim for slander. The CMPA does not preempt all common law tort claims that an employee has against the District, but provides the exclusive remedy for only those arising out of employer conduct in handling personnel ratings, employee grievances, and adverse actions. District of Columbia v. Thompson, 593 A.2d 621, 635 cert. denied, 502 U.S. 942, 112 S.Ct. 380, 116 L.Ed.2d 331 (1991) ( Thompson II ); King v. Kidd, 640 A.2d 656, 663 (D.C.1993). Stockard's claim for slander does not appear to fall within that category. Stockard, a tenured professor, had a separate contract for coaching services which the University of the District of Columbia (UDC) refused to renew. Moss v. Stockard, 580 A.2d 1011, 1014 (D.C.1990). Stockard claimed that after UDC refused to renew her coaching contract, its athletic director, Orby Moss, falsely told basketball team members and other university employees that the reason for the non-renewal was her misappropriation of funds. Id. at 1016-17, 1022. The CMPA preempts common law action only if the alleged wrongful treatment is cognizable as a personnel issue. Id. Stockard is not claiming an injury or damages cognizable as a personnel issue under the CMPA. See King, supra, 640 A.2d at 663. Rather, Stockard claims injury to her reputation due to the tortious conduct of a university employee for which the CMPA does not afford relief. Thus, her slander action is more like an assault and battery claim which has been recognized as falling outside the coverage of the CMPA, even though the tortious conduct occurred in the workplace, and therefore within the jurisdiction of the court. Id. at 663 (citing Thompson II, supra, 593 A.2d at 624 n. 2, 635). Contrary to the majority, in my view, there is a meaningful distinction between Moss' slanderous remarks in this case and the defamatory remarks found to preclude an action in the Superior Court against the District in Thompson II, supra. In Thompson II, the plaintiff sued her employer, the District, and her supervisor for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. These claims were based on statements the supervisor made in twenty-two memoranda which repeatedly advised and warned [Thompson] to follow the correct leave request procedures and notified her of problems in the performance of her duties.... Thompson II, supra, 593 A.2d at 625 (quoting District of Columbia v. Thompson, 570 A.2d 277, 281 (D.C.1990) ( Thompson I )). Thompson claimed that the statements in the memoranda were false. Id. This court characterized the memoranda as letters of warning, written reprimands, or corrective actions within the meaning of the union collective bargaining agreement or within the CMPA. Id. at 627. This court also found that some of the memoranda appeared to be directed toward discipline under the CMPA. Id. Thus, all of the alleged statements were found to be tied to provisions of documents governing the employees rights and responsibilities under the CMPA or a CMPA-sanctioned union contract. [2] Id. In contrast, Moss' allegedly false post-contract statements were made to persons with no claimed connection to any disciplinary process and unconnected with any contemplated or pending adverse action. The slanderous remarks cannot be said to fall clearly within the scope of CMPA so as to preempt the Superior Court's jurisdiction to entertain Stockard's slander claim. Moss' statements cannot be fairly said to have been made for the purpose of warning, reprimanding, or taking adverse action against Stockard. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the court.