Opinion ID: 2636899
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Prosecutorial failure to disclose potentially favorable material evidence.

Text: Before McKevitt's rebuttal testimony, during the hearing on the admissibility of her testimony, district attorney investigator Hawkins testified that he spoke with David Hacker in Las Vegas when he served Hacker with an out-of-state subpoena. He showed David Hacker a copy of David Hacker's statement to McKevitt, asked him to review it, asked if there were any inaccuracies, and was told by Hacker that it was his statement. Hacker pointed out some inaccuracies that Hawkins did not consider significant. Hawkins told Hacker they could be taken up at a later time. Appellant's counsel asserted, during argument over the admissibility of McKevitt's testimony, that David Hacker told counsel on the previous night that he, David Hacker, had told the prosecutor after the prosecutor's opening statement that some of the statements attributed to David Hacker in the FBI report were inaccurate. Appellant now contends that the failure of the prosecution to disclose that David Hacker told the prosecutor, before McKevitt testified, that McKevitt's typed report of her interview with David Hacker was inaccurate in some respects violated the state's obligation to disclose all evidence, including impeachment evidence, that reasonably appears to be favorable to the defense. ( United States v. Bagley (1985) 473 U.S. 667, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481; Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215; Izazaga v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 356, 378, 285 Cal.Rptr. 231, 815 P.2d 304; People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 30, 249 Cal.Rptr. 119, 756 P.2d 843.) Appellant claims specifically that the prosecutor failed to disclose that David Hacker had denied telling McKevitt that appellant was obsessed with killing, and especially women. Appellant argues that, inasmuch as the People intended to place Hacker's statement to McKevitt into evidence, the People were obligated to reveal the impeaching evidence. First, the record does not support appellant's claim that David Hacker told investigator Hawkins that he did not tell McKevitt that appellant was obsessed with killing. Appellant implicitly concedes as much, asserting: Because the record is undisputed, that, in the only conversation they had, the one thing David told [the prosecutor] was that he had not made the obsession statement attributed to him by McKevitt, it is only reasonable to conclude the latter was one of the inaccuracies David told Hawkins about, too. Moreover, no evidence supports appellant's assertion that the record is undisputed that before he testified David Hacker told the prosecutor personally that he did not make the obsession statement. Appellant offers no citation to the record for that assumption and we have found nothing to support the claim. The only apparent basis for this claim is defense counsel's statement during argument that he had spoken with David Hacker after Hacker's testimony at which time Hacker told him that Hacker told investigator Hawkins that there were inaccuracies in McKevitt's report and that he had told the prosecutor immediately before he testified that he had not told McKevitt that appellant was obsessed with the different methods of killing people, especially strangulation by using FLEX-CUFs described in the booklet. The prosecutor did not acknowledge the truth of this assertion, which is supported only by double hearsay assertions, not evidence. Assuming arguendo that counsel's argument created an undisputed record, however, no impropriety appeared. Evidence is favorable and must be disclosed if it will either help the defendant or hurt the prosecution. In assessing a claim made on appeal that the prosecution failed to reveal material evidence, favorable evidence is considered material only if it is reasonably probable that disclosure would have affected the result. ( United States v. Bagley, supra, 473 U.S. at p. 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375; In re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 544, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 446, 887 P.2d 527.) That test is not met here. David Hacker did not testify that appellant had such an obsession. His denial that he had made such a statement could not have been used to impeach him. Neither David nor Allen Hacker disputed the accuracy of their statements that appellant was aware of the ziplock method of killing. Appellant thus fails to establish that evidence that David Hacker denied telling McKevitt that appellant was obsessed was material, favorable evidence that the prosecution was obligated to disclose. Moreover, even assuming the statement should have been disclosed, the failure to do so did not harm appellant, since defense counsel were aware of the denial at the time McKevitt testified but made no effort to re-call David Hacker to use the statement to impeach McKevitt. Additionally, the only relevance of the denial was to refute the prosecutor's assertion in his opening statement that Mr. Hacker would testify that appellant was obsessed with that method of killing. The jury was instructed that the arguments of counsel were not evidence. Thus, appellant not only fails to satisfy us that evidence of the denial could have been used to his advantage other than in an attempt to impeach McKevitt only insofar as she testified that David Hacker told her appellant was obsessed with using nylon ties for strangulation, but he was aware of the statement and could have called David Hacker as his witness. For these reasons we also reject appellant's claim that in failing to fully present this claimby arguing that Hawkins was an agent of the prosecution and thus whatever transpired between Hawkins and David Hacker was attributable to the prosecutorcounsel rendered constitutionally ineffective representation.