Opinion ID: 28298
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to investigate background of victim.

Text: Zimmerman argues that trial counsel, Linda C. Cansler, rendered ineffective assistance by failing to investigate the background of the victim in order to support his claim of self defense. As set forth above, Zimmerman must show: (1) that his counsel’s performance was deficient in that it 11 fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the result of the trial would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-94, 104 S.Ct. at 2065-67. Zimmerman asserts counsel should have discovered that the victim had a history of criminal violence, including battering at least two of his wives, and a pattern of violent aggression against strangers when drinking alcohol. Such evidence he argues would have served to support his theory of self defense. Even if we assume that counsel’s failure to investigate the victim’s tendency toward violence constituted deficient performance, Zimmerman has not shown Strickland prejudice. As the state court found, the victim received over thirty stab wounds (some inflicted upon the victim’s back) compared to the one wound Zimmerman received. We agree with the district court’s conclusion that evidence of the victim’s past violence would have been “outweighed by the July 26, 1988 letter from Zimmerman to the district attorney,” which provided as follows: I was gonna try to buck this Capit[a]l Murder charge on a self-defense issue, but because of the fact that I know I am a dangerous threat to myself and the free world, I’m going to tell the truth because I have to be stop[p]ed. Mr. Hooks never stabbed me and we never got into a fight. Mr. Hooks had 4 or 5 hundred dol[l]ars on him and we were drinking so I decided to kill him and take his f—ing money. I took out my knife and opened it and started stabbing him an[d] in the course of me stabbing [him] I accidentally got stab[b]ed in my arm. After he was dead and I robbed – I rolled him over took the money out of his front pocket and took his wallet . . . We likewise agree with the district court’s conclusion that because “Zimmerman’s admissions in his letter were significantly more probative on this issue than the evidence of Hooks’s propensity for violence . . . there is not a reasonable probability that, had the jury been presented with evidence of the victim’s propensity for violence, the result in either the guilt-innocence phase or the punishment 12 phase of the trial.” We therefore deny a COA with respect to this issue. 2. Failure to investigate Zimmerman’s mental health. Zimmerman argues that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to investigate his mental health. He asserts evidence of his mental health problems should have been presented as mitigating evidence during the punishment phase of his trial.7 While riding his bicycle as a child, Zimmerman had an accident during which he hit his head on a culvert and lost consciousness. As a result of this accident, a metallic plate was inserted in his skull. Zimmerman argues that if counsel had interviewed his family, she would have learned that after the head injury he began to suffer “mental problems.” Zimmerman admits that counsel interviewed his mother regarding his injury and that his mother testified at trial regarding the accident and the subsequent surgery. However, he argues that testimony should have been presented regarding the effect of the injury on his behavior. According to Zimmerman, “[p]rior to his bicycle injury, his behavior was normal and appropriate. It was only after the frontal lobe injury that he became violent.” Zimmerman faults counsel for failing to interview his father, Bobby Zimmerman. During the state habeas proceedings, counsel explained that she did leave messages for Zimmerman’s father, but 7 Zimmerman’s motion for COA contains a section entitled: “Failure To Present the Mental Health Evidence In Conjunction with the Self-Defense Evidence.” In that section he asserts that “as shown above, trial counsel failed to develop information that would have been directly relevant to Zimmerman’s mental state and to both phases of the trial.” However, Zimmerman does not specifically indicate how the evidence would have supported a theory of self defense at the guiltinnocence phase. Indeed, the principal argument contained within this section refers to Zimmerman obtaining a life sentence instead of a death sentence. Even assuming that he properly briefed the issue regarding the guilt-innocence phase in his COA, we do not believe he can show prejudice. As previously set forth, the victim received over thirty stab wounds compared to the one wound Zimmerman received. Moreover, Zimmerman admitted that he killed the victim for the money and that the victim did not start the fight. 13 he never returned her call. He also faults counsel for failing to interview his aunt, Jonell Smith, regarding his mental health after the accident. His aunt noticed “subtle changes from when the plate was placed in his head.” His aunt also knew that Zimmerman had an abnormal EEG as a child but counsel failed to obtain his records. Once again, we will assume arguendo that counsel rendered deficient performance by failing to investigate evidence regarding Zimmerman’s mental health problems subsequent to his head injury. Zimmerman argues that the quality of this mitigating evidence is such that had it been presented to the jury, there is a reasonable probability of a different outcome. As previously indicated, counsel did introduce to the jury evidence of Zimmerman’s head injury and the subsequent surgery in which a metallic plate was positioned in his skull. The jury did not learn of his violent tendencies that appeared after the injury. As the district court recognized, this evidence constitutes the classic double-edged sword.8 More specifically, this evidence “mitigated his culpability and at the same time it indicated that he would be dangerous in the future.” Lackey v. Scott, 28 F.3d 486, 488 (5th Cir. 1994). Furt her, in light of Zimmerman’s admission in the letter to the district attorney that he decided to kill the victim to take the cash, the mitigating value of this evidence would have been diminished. Under these circumstances, we conclude that Zimmerman has not shown that, had this evidence been before the jury, there is a reasonable probability of a different outcome. See Callins v. Collins, 998 F.2d 269, 278 (5th Cir. 1993) (rejecting ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on failure to investigate mitigating evidence because the evidence “cuts both ways” did not establish 8 Before the district court, Zimmerman also contended that counsel should have offered the following testimony of Dr. Alan Childs: “Zimmerman is not and was not a violent predator who planned any act of violence, but rather he was given to brief explosive rages during which both behavioral control and memory function were grossly disturbed.” He does not reurge this contention in his motion for a COA. 14 prejudice). We deny a COA as to this issue. 3. Failure to evaluate Zimmerman’s competency. Zimmerman also contends that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to have him evaluated for competency to stand trial. It is well established that “[d]ue process prohibits the conviction of a person who is mentally incompetent.” Bouchillon v. Collins, 907 F.2d 589, 592 (5th Cir. 1990) (footnote and citation omitted). The test for determining competency is whether, at the time of trial, the defendant has “sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding--and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). To prevail on an ineffective assistance claim based on counsel’s failure to obtain a competency evaluation, the petitioner must demonstrate a reasonable probability that he was incompetent to stand trial. Id. at 595. Zimmerman argues that counsel was aware that “something was not quite right about Zimmerman.” In support of his assertion that counsel should have obtained a competency evaluation, Zimmerman relies on the results of an Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 (MMPI) evaluation completed three weeks prior to trial and letters he wrote to the trial court and the prosecutor containing threats and a demand to be charged with capital murder.9 As set forth by the district court, the MMPI-2 profile provided as follows: Although the profile is probably valid, it may reflect some 9 In a footnote, Zimmerman asserts that he had written letters to his first lawyer indicating that he wanted a competency examination. He does not provide a record cite. The State responds that Zimmerman “has never once provided copies of any of these alleged letters for any court to review to determine the actual nature of his ‘competency request.’” The district court provides that the record contains three such letters. 15 exaggeration of symptoms. The client appears to be quite confused and disorganized, and is experiencing severe personality deterioration. His MMPI-2 profile also reflects an active florid psychotic process, which includes a loss of contact with reality, inappropriate effect, and erratic, possibly assaultive behavior . . . . In an interview, he is likely to be circumstantial, tangential, and disorganized. It is unlikely that he could contribute to his own defense at a legal hearing, since his behavior is inappropriate and his thoughts are illogical.10 (emphasis added). The results indicating that it was unlikely Zimmerman could contribute to his defense render the question of deficient performance, under the standard for granting a COA, adequate to deserve encouragement further. Cf. Bouchillon, 907 F.2d at 597 (explaining that counsel’s lack of investigation after notice of past institutionalization constituted deficient performance). As previously indicated, to meet the prejudice prong of Strickland and prevail on the merits, Zimmerman must show that had counsel investigated his competence to stand trial, “there was a reasonable probability that he was in fact incompetent.” Theriot v. Whitley, 18 F.3d 311, 314 (5th Cir. 1994). A reasonable probability is a lesser burden of proof than the preponderance standard. Bouchillon, 907 F.2d at 595. Although the MMPI results, “suicidal” letters, and head injury may not ultimately demonstrate a reasonable probability that he was incompetent to stand trial, we believe Zimmerman has demonstrated that this question is “adequate to deserve encouragement further.” Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 893 n.4, 103 S.Ct. at 3394 n.4 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We therefore grant a COA with respect to this claim.