Opinion ID: 889440
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Issue 1. Did Pavey reserve his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds?

Text: ¶ 9 Pavey argues that the District Court erred in denying his motions to dismiss for violation of his right to a speedy trial. As a threshold matter, however, we agree with the State that Pavey did not reserve this issue for appeal. ¶ 10 At the second change-of-plea hearing, held June 2, 2009, the District Court (at defense counsel's request) used the Defendant's Acknowledgement and Waiver of Rights by Plea of Guilty signed by Pavey and filed November 19, 2008, in conjunction with his prior change of plea. Among other things, this document states (with emphasis added): 3. I understand by pleading guilty I give up the following: a. The presumption of innocence b. The right to remain silent c. The right to a jury trial d. The right to a speedy and public trial e. The right to have the State prove each element of the offense(s) beyond a reasonable doubt. f. The right to summon witnesses on your behalf; g. The right to cross-examine the State's witnesses. Pavey initialed just to the left of the 3.; and during the colloquy with the District Court, he verbally affirmed that he recalled the Acknowledgement and Waiver document from his prior change of plea. In addition, the court asked Pavey whether he understood that by pleading guilty, he would be giving up various rights, including the right to a speedy trial, and Pavey stated that he understood this. The court then found that Pavey has knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights and has knowingly and voluntarily entered pleas of guilty. Pavey does not challenge either of these findings. ¶ 11 We have said that a defendant waives the right to appeal all nonjurisdictional defects upon voluntarily and knowingly entering a guilty plea, including claims of constitutional violations which may have occurred prior to the plea. State v. Violette, 2009 MT 19, ¶ 16, 349 Mont. 81, 201 P.3d 804. Consequently, after the plea, the defendant may attack only the voluntary and intelligent character of the plea, any jurisdictional defects, and any specified adverse pretrial rulings he has reserved the right to appeal. See Violette, ¶ 16. In this regard, § 46-12-204(3), MCA, provides that [w]ith the approval of the court and the consent of the prosecutor, a defendant may enter a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, reserving the right, on appeal from the judgment, to review the adverse determination of any specified pretrial motion  (emphasis added). The alleged violation of the right to a speedy trial is a nonjurisdictional-defect claim. State v. Collier, 277 Mont. 46, 53, 919 P.2d 376, 381 (1996). As such, the right to obtain review of an adverse determination on a speedy trial motion must be reserved. ¶ 12 Pavey argues that the thrust of § 46-12-204(3), MCA, is that a defendant should not be able to appeal constitutional claims that he expressly waived per a plea of guilty. The language of the statute, however, clearly indicates that a claim must be specifically reserved in order to be appealable, not that a claim is automatically appealable unless it is expressly waived. Moreover, far from reserving his right to appeal the denial of his speedy trial motions, Pavey specifically waived that right in writing (in the Defendant's Acknowledgement and Waiver of Rights by Plea of Guilty) and verbally (during the colloquy with the District Court at the second change-of-plea hearing). ¶ 13 We therefore hold that Pavey did not reserve his right to appeal the denial of his speedy trial motions under § 46-12-204(3), MCA.