Opinion ID: 183941
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appellate Jurisdiction Over the District Court's Order

Text: Before reaching the parties' arguments on the merits, we must determine whether we have jurisdiction. We have appellate jurisdiction over the district court's order denying the motion for a protective order only if the order is final under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. In the domestic criminal context, we lack interlocutory appellate jurisdiction over an order denying a motion to quash a subpoena, because the order is non-final. Silva v. U.S. Dist. Court (In re Grand Jury Subpoena Issued to Bailin), 51 F.3d 203, 205 (9th Cir.1995). In order to appeal the order, the person subpoenaed must refuse to comply and contest the validity of the subpoena by appealing a contempt determination. Id. The person subpoenaed undoubtedly faces a difficult choicecomply and lose the right to appeal, or refuse to comply and possibly suffer contempt sanctions. But the Supreme Court has consistently held that the necessity for expedition in the administration of the criminal law justifies that rule. United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 533, 91 S.Ct. 1580, 29 L.Ed.2d 85 (1971) (citing Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 60 S.Ct. 540, 84 L.Ed. 783 (1940); Alexander v. United States, 201 U.S. 117, 26 S.Ct. 356, 50 L.Ed. 686 (1906)). Balancing the witness' interest with the need for expedition in the underlying criminal case, the Court has held that the witness' ability to force review by refusing to comply with the subpoena is adequate for his protection without unduly impeding the progress of the [underlying criminal] case. Cobbledick, 309 U.S. at 327, 60 S.Ct. 540 (quoting Alexander, 201 U.S. at 121, 26 S.Ct. 356). But there is an important difference between an appeal from an order concerning an ongoing domestic criminal case and an appeal from an order concerning a request under the procedural mechanism of 28 U.S.C. § 1782. [3] In a domestic criminal appeal, the district court's order enforcing a subpoena is but one step toward the ultimate resolution of the underlying criminal case; it is not the final step taken by the district court in that criminal case. In a § 1782 appeal, however, the district court's subpoena order is the district court's last, or final, order because, critically, the underlying case in a § 1782 appeal necessarily is conducted in a foreign tribunal. Once the district court has ruled on the parties' motions concerning the evidentiary requests, there is no further case or controversy before the district court. For that reason, the courts have permitted appeals from a district court's orders under § 1782, even if the complaining party has not subjected himself or herself to contempt sanctions. The Third Circuit succinctly explained in Bayer AG v. Betachem, Inc., 173 F.3d 188, 189 n. 1 (3d Cir.1999): Only the discovery dispute under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 is occurring in the United States. Therefore, because the underlying litigation is in [a foreign court], this discovery order is immediately appealable. In In re Letters Rogatory Issued by Director of Inspection of Government of India, 385 F.2d 1017, 1018 (2d Cir.1967), Judge Friendly explained for the Second Circuit thatlike an order enforcing the subpoenas of independent administrative agencies, an order granting a subpoena in aid of an extradition proceeding, and an order to appear before the Internal Revenue Servicean order pursuant to § 1782 is final and appealable. The distinction between such cases and the Alexander-Cobbledick line of authority is that in these instances the proceeding before the district court to compel testimony stands separate from the main controversy. Id. ; see also Kestrel Coal Pty. Ltd. v. Joy Global Inc., 362 F.3d 401, 403 (7th Cir. 2004) (Orders [issued under § 1782], like orders enforcing subpoenas, are final and appealable because they dispose of all issues in the proceeding.). Our sister circuits have ruled that they have appellate jurisdiction over orders issued under § 1782 without qualification or exception. Phillips v. Beierwaltes, 466 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir.2006); Foden v. Gianoli Aldunate (In re Application of Gianoli Aldunate), 3 F.3d 54, 57 (2d Cir. 1993); Janssen v. Belding-Corticelli, Ltd., 84 F.2d 577, 578 (3d Cir.1936); see also Weber v. Finker, 554 F.3d 1379, 1385 (11th Cir.) (noting, but not reaching, the argument that a Motion to Compel under § 1782 is a final, dispositive order because, although there is an ongoing action in a foreign tribunal, the Motion to Compel is the final order to be issued by the United States court), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 59, 175 L.Ed.2d 23 (2009). Our sister circuits also have held that they have appellate jurisdiction over the district court's denial of a motion to quash even when the subject of the subpoena in the federal case also happens to be a party in the underlying foreign litigation. Kestrel Coal, 362 F.3d at 403; Foden, 3 F.3d at 56-57. Our own jurisprudence is less absolute. In most cases, we have simply stated, without clarification or explanation, that we have appellate jurisdiction. Sealed 1, 235 F.3d at 1203; Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 292 F.3d 664, 666 (9th Cir.2002); Okubo v. Reynolds (In re Letters Rogatory from Tokyo Dist. Prosecutor's Office), 16 F.3d 1016, 1018 n. 1 (9th Cir.1994); In re Kevork, 788 F.2d 566, 569 (9th Cir.1986); see also Four Pillars, 308 F.3d at 1078 (exercising jurisdiction without explanation). In a little-cited case decided in 1974, however, we held that, when the subject of the subpoena in the federal case is also a party to the foreign litigation, the rule from the domestic criminal context applies: Appellate jurisdiction lies only if the interested party suffers contempt. In re Letters Rogatory from Haugesund, Norway, 497 F.2d 378, 380-81 (9th Cir.1974). We explained a few years later, in In re Request for Judicial Assistance from Seoul District Criminal Court, 555 F.2d 720, 722 (9th Cir.1977), that the exception announced in Haugesund is narrow: We have appellate jurisdiction so long as the appellant in the federal case is not the interested party in the underlying foreign proceeding. Although the government had not challenged our jurisdiction in Seoul, we felt compelled to explain:  Haugesund, however, is inapplicable because the order there was directed against a party to the suit in Norway for which the letter rogatory was issued. Here, the subpoena is directed against a bank, not the appellant who is the party of interest in the proceeding before the foreign tribunal. Id. Here, the subject of the subpoena is Global Fishing, which is not a party to the underlying criminal case in Russia against Gontmakher. A corporation is a separate legal entity from its employees, including its president. See, e.g., Abrahim & Sons Enters. v. Equilon Enters., LLC, 292 F.3d 958, 962 (9th Cir. 2002). The narrow Haugesund exception therefore does not apply. We reject the government's argument that we should extend the Haugesund exception to these circumstances simply because Gontmakher is the president of Global Fishing and thus Global Fishing has some abstract interest in the Russian criminal proceeding. Given our narrow interpretation of the Haugesund exception in Seoul, the fact that we have not mentioned the exception in more than three decades, and the fact that no other circuit court even recognizes the exception, we are disinclined to expand its scope here. Accordingly, we hold that we have appellate jurisdiction over the district court's order denying the motion for a protective order. [4]