Opinion ID: 2613608
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Modified Allen Instruction

Text: Noriega next argues it was error for the trial court to provide a modified Allen instruction prior to the jury retiring to deliberate. Since he did not object to the instruction at trial, he must now establish that, even if the instruction was erroneous, the jury would have returned a different verdict in the absence of this instruction. The challenged instruction provided: As you know this case has been exhaustively tried by both sides. If you are unable to agree on a verdict, the Court will then declare a mistrial and this matter will have to be tried again to another jury. There is no reason to think that a jury better qualified than you would be chosen to try this case. The Court suggests that in your deliberations on the case that you listen to arguments of other jurors with an open mind and be disposed to be convinced by them and scrutinize your opinions in light of the evidence presented and the Court's instructions. This instruction is a substantially modified version of the Allen instruction found at PIK Crim.3d 68.12, which provides: This is an important case. If you should fail to reach a decision, the case is left open and undecided. Like all cases, it must be decided sometime. Another trial would be a heavy burden on both sides. There is no reason to believe that the case can be tried again any better or more exhaustively than it has been. There is no reason to believe that more evidence or clearer evidence would be produced on behalf of either side. Also, there is no reason to believe that the case would ever be submitted to 12 people more intelligent or more impartial or more reasonable than you. Any future jury must be selected in the same manner that you were. [These matters are mentioned now because some of them may not have been in your thoughts.] This does not mean that those favoring any particular position should surrender their honest convictions as to the weight or effect of any evidence solely because of the opinion of other jurors or because of the importance of arriving at a decision. This does mean that you should give respectful consideration to each other's views and talk over any differences of opinion in a spirit of fairness and candor. If at all possible, you should resolve any differences and come to a common conclusion [so that this case may be completed]. You may be as leisurely in your deliberations as the occasion may require and take all the time you feel necessary. Noriega points out that the PIK instruction does not refer to a mistrial and does not tell the jurors that they should be disposed to be convinced by other jurors. Noriega complains that the instruction as given was coercive, inaccurately defined the role of the jury, and improperly encouraged the jury to reach agreement by compromise and by surrender of their convictions. The State asserts that the instruction was not erroneous because, as required, it was read to the jury prior to deliberations and the jury was not under pressure of deadlock at that time. The State also argues that the instruction did not urge but merely suggested that the jurors have open minds. The State notes there was no emphasis placed on this particular instruction and, in fact, the jury was instructed not to single out any particular instruction. A similar instruction was challenged by the defendant in State v. Whitaker, 255 Kan. 118, 872 P.2d 278 (1994). The Whitaker court noted the challenged instruction and the PIK instruction are similar to the dynamite or Allen instruction. The Whitaker court observed that the former appellation is derived from the explosive effect the instruction engenders when given after a jury has been deadlocked. The giving of the instruction to a deadlocked jury sometimes immediately results in a verdict. 255 Kan. at 126 (citing United States v. Kahaner, 317 F.2d 459 [2d Cir. 1963]). The term Allen instruction memorializes the case in which the United States Supreme Court approved the use of this type of instruction. Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501-02, 41 L. Ed. 528, 17 S. Ct. 154 (1896). The Allen Court concluded that while the verdict of the jury should represent the opinion of each individual juror, it by no means follows that opinions may not be changed by jury conference. The very object of the jury system is to secure unanimity by a comparison of views and by arguments among jurors. It certainly cannot be the law that each juror should not listen with deference to the arguments and with a distrust of that juror's own judgment, if the juror finds a large majority of the jury taking a different view of the case. See Whitaker, 255 Kan. at 126. The State argues that Noriega failed to show that his substantial rights were prejudiced by the giving of the instruction. Noriega asserts that the fact that the jury requested a readback of a substantial portion of the testimony of Bobby Shutts and Tracy Anderson indicates that rendering of the verdict was not a particularly simple, straightforward process. The record reflects, however, that the jury requested a readback of Shutts' testimony because it had trouble understanding Shutts' testimony due to frequent interruptions by Shutts' counsel. Furthermore, as the State asserts, the fact that the readback was requested merely indicates that the jury was careful in its deliberations. As in Whitaker, here the instruction given does not require that jurors change their vote or compromise their individual judgments for the sake of reaching an agreement or judicial expediency. The instruction clearly applies to each member of the jury, not just those jurors espousing a minority view during deliberations. The instruction was given before the jury retired to deliberate; the instruction was not singled out or emphasized at any point. Noriega consented to the giving of the instruction. Although there were no compelling or articulable reasons to have departed from the PIK instruction, Noriega has not shown his right to a fair trial or a unanimous verdict was prejudiced. Burden of Proof Instruction Noriega contends Instruction No. 12, the burden of proof instruction, was erroneous. The instruction stated: The State has the burden to prove the defendant is guilty. The defendant is not required to prove he is not guilty. You must presume that he is not guilty until you are convinced from the evidence that he is guilty. The test you must use in determining whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty is this: If you have a reasonable doubt as to the truth of any of the claims made by the State, you must find the defendant not guilty. If you have no reasonable doubt as to the truth of any of the claims made by the State, you should find the defendant guilty. The defendant did not object to the above instruction at trial; therefore, the clearly erroneous standard applies. This instruction duplicates PIK Crim.3d 52.02. The defendant first argues that the use of the words not guilty in the first portion of the instruction, rather than a statement that the defendant is presumed innocent, is clearly erroneous because it dilutes the presumption of innocence guaranteed by statute and, in addition, does not accurately convey the law and the fundamental constitutional right to the presumption of innocence. As authority, defendant relies on the analysis of Flores v. State, 896 P.2d 558 (Okla. Crim. App.), reh. denied 899 P.2d 1162; cert. denied 133 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1995). We note at the outset that there is no constitutional requirement that the jury be instructed on the presumption of innocence. Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 60 L. Ed.2d 640, 99 S. Ct. 2088 (1979); Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 489-90, 56 L. Ed.2d 468, 98 S. Ct. 1930 (1978). This same issue was decided in State v. Pierce, 260 Kan. 859, 869-70, 927 P.2d 929 (1996), where we held that the instruction at issue preserves the defendant's presumption of innocence. We noted that we adopted an opposing view to that in Flores in State v. Keeler, 238 Kan. 356, 364, 710 P.2d 1279 (1985), where we held that not guilty was preferable to innocent in an instruction to the jury. 260 Kan. at 860. In Pierce, we also observed that in State v. Johnson, 255 Kan. 252, 259, 874 P.2d 623 (1994), the same challenge to PIK Crim. 3d 52.02 arose. In Johnson, we found Keeler to control the issue and held that the instruction was not clearly erroneous. Keeler and Johnson control here. We determine that the provisions of PIK Crim.3d 52.02 accurately reflect the law of this State and properly advise the jury in a criminal case of the burden of proof, the presumption of innocence, and reasonable doubt. The defendant also argues that the use of claims made by the State in the burden of proof instruction rather than elements of the crime allowed the jury to make a finding of guilt based on other reasons than whether the prosecution carried its burden for each element of the crime. He asserts that this instruction violated his due process rights. A similar argument was also made and rejected in State v. Pierce . Again, the defendant's argument fails to consider the instructions as a whole. Upon review of a challenged jury instruction, the instructions must be considered together and read as a whole without isolating any one instruction. If the instructions properly and fairly state the law as applied to the facts in the case, and if the jury could not reasonably have been misled by them, then the instructions do not constitute reversible error, although they may be in some small way erroneous. State v. Johnson, 255 Kan. 252, Syl. ¶ 4. A consideration of the instructions as a whole given in this case verifies that the instruction complained of properly and fairly stated the law as applied to the facts and that the jury could not reasonably have been misled by the instruction. At no time in the trial court's instructions was the phrase elements of the offense used. Each time the trial court instructed on charges, it used the language [t]o establish this charge, each of the following claims must be proved. (Emphasis added.) The trial court instructed the jury that [i]f you have a reasonable doubt as to the truth of any of the claims made by the State, you must find the defendant not guilty. If you have no reasonable doubt as to any of the claims made by the State, you must find the defendant guilty. (Emphasis added.) Clearly, the claims made by the State language refers directly to the claims the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt to convict the defendant. The language used in the trial court's instruction clearly defined the responsibility of the jury. The language used is taken directly from PIK Crim.3d 52.02. Following Pierce, we approve the language used as a clear statement of the burden of the State in criminal trials.