Opinion ID: 771081
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The district court's charge was erroneous

Text: 31 Gordon contends that the district court erred by instructing the jury that she needed to: (1) prove that the Board's agents had prior knowledge of her lawsuit; (2) prove that the Board's stated non-retaliatory reasons for its conduct were not true; and (3) work within the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Gordon is correct. 32
33 As noted earlier, to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, an employee must show that: (1) she was engaged in an activity protected under Title VII; (2) the employer was aware of plaintiff's participation in the protected activity; (3) the employer took adverse action against plaintiff; and (4) a causal connection existed between the plaintiff's protected activity and the adverse action taken by the employer. Cosgrove v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 9 F.3d 1033, 1039 (2d Cir. 1993). Generally, [i]t is the judge, not the jury, who must decide whether [a] plaintiff has satisfied the requirements of McDonnell Douglas's minimal version of a prima facie case, Sharkey v. Lasmo (AUL Ltd.), 214 F.3d 371, 374 (2d Cir. 2000); when a retaliation case does go to the jury, the jury's task is simply to determine the ultimate question of whether the plaintiff met her burden of proving that the defendant was motivated by prohibited [retaliation], id.; see also Cabrera v. Jakabovitz, 24 F.3d 372, 382 (2d Cir. 1994). 34 With respect to the second required element, both parties have conceded that the Board, qua board, knew of Gordon's protected activity. In the district court's jury charge, however, the court went further. It instructed the jury that [t]o satisfy the [knowledge requirement], the plaintiff must show that the Board of Education's agents [viz., Maurice, Miller and Pallen] . . . knew of Gordon's protected activity (emphasis added). Neither this nor any other circuit has ever held that, to satisfy the knowledge requirement, anything more is necessary than general corporate knowledge that the plaintiff has engaged in a protected activity. See id. (plaintiff established a prima facie case because the Sears corporation was aware of her EEOC complaint); Reed v. A.W. Lawrence & Co., Inc., 95 F.3d 1170, 1178 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding knowledge requirement easily proved because the corporate entity was aware of plaintiff's complaints); Alston v. New York City Transit Auth., 14 F. Supp. 2d 308, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (In order to satisfy the second prong of her retaliation claim, plaintiff need not show that individual decision-makers within the NYCTA knew that she had filed . . . . [an] EEOC complaint.). Accordingly, to the extent that the jury needed to consider whether Gordon had proven even her prima facie case of retaliation, the charge given required more of Gordon than was necessary to satisfy the minimal requirements of McDonnell Douglas. Cf. Cabrera, 24 F.3d at 382 (noting that the jury should be charged that one basis for inferring discrimination is plaintiff's proof of her prima facie case combined with the jury's disbelief of defendant's explanation for its actions). 35 The Board though, contends that to satisfy the fourth required element of causation, a plaintiff must show that the corporate agents who carried out the adverse action knew of the plaintiff's protected activity, and that therefore Judge Motley's jury charge was correct. The Eleventh Circuit has recently held as much. See Raney v. Vinson Guard Service, Inc., 120 F.3d 1192, 1197-98 (11th Cir. 1997). This Court, however, has consistently held that proof of causation can be shown either: (1) indirectly, by showing that the protected activity was followed closely by discriminatory treatment, or through other circumstantial evidence such as disparate treatment of fellow employees who engaged in similar conduct; or (2) directly, through evidence of retaliatory animus directed against the plaintiff by the defendant. See Cosgrove, 9 F.3d at 1039. 36 The lack of knowledge on the part of particular individual agents is admissible as some evidence of a lack of a causal connection, countering plaintiff's circumstantial evidence of proximity or disparate treatment. See Alston, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 312-13. A jury, however, can find retaliation even if the agent denies direct knowledge of a plaintiff's protected activities, for example, so long as the jury finds that the circumstances evidence knowledge of the protected activities or the jury concludes that an agent is acting explicitly or implicit upon the orders of a superior who has the requisite knowledge. See id. at 311. This is so, moreover, regardless of whether the issue of causation arises in the context of plaintiff's satisfaction of her prima facie case or as part of her ultimate burden of proving that retaliation played a motivating role in, or contributed to, the employer's decision. Renz v. Grey Adver., Inc., 135 F.3d 217, 222 (2d Cir. 1997) 37 Accordingly then, to the extent that the district court charged the jury that the very agents of the Board who engaged in retaliatory actions against Gordon had to know of her protected activity, it erred. 38 B. Gordon was not required to disprove the Board's proffered non-retaliatory reasons for its actions 39 The district court's instruction was also erroneous insofar as it imposed on Gordon the burden of proving the falsity of the Board's stated reasons for its adverse actions. Under the 1991 amendments, Title VII is violated when a retaliatory motive plays a part in adverse employment actions . . . whether or not it was the sole cause. Cosgrove, 9 F.3d at 1039 (a violation occurs whenever there is retaliatory animus, even if valid objective reasons for the discharge exist); see Fields v. N.Y. State Office of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities, 115 F.3d 116, 120 (2d Cir. 1997) (Title VII plaintiff can prevail by proving that an impermissible factor was a 'motivating factor,' without proving that the employer's proffered explanation was not some part of the employer's motivation.). It is therefore now settled that a plaintiff in a Title VII action need not disprove a defendant's proffered rationale for its adverse actions in order to prevail. See Fields, 115 F.3d at 120. The critical question is whether a plaintiff has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant intentionally discriminated or retaliated against the plaintiff for engaging in protected activity. Cosgrove, 9 F.3d at 1039 (internal quotation marks omitted). 40 We have previously considered jury charges regarding a plaintiff's burden in proving retaliation and stated that such a charge must inform the jury that there are two distinct ways for a plaintiff to prevail - either by proving that a discriminatory motive, more likely than not, motivated the defendants or by proving both that the reasons given by the defendants are not true and that discrimination is the real reason for the actions. See Fields, 115 F.3d at 121 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the district court's charge only instructed the jury as the second method of proof of retaliation and failed to convey to the jury that Gordon could have prevailed merely by showing that retaliation was one of a number of motivating factors. Cf. Renz, 135 F.3d at 222-23 (jury charge regarding pretext erroneous because it risked inducing jury to believe that plaintiff was required to prove that impermissible factor was the sole motivation behind employer's decision to fire her). 41 Accordingly, the district court erred insofar as it instructed the jury that Gordon was required to prove both that the Board's proffered non-retaliatory reason was pretextual and that a retaliatory reason motivated the Board's adverse employment actions. 42 C. The jury should not have been informed of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework 43 In the past, this Court has cautioned that trial judges should not 'import[] uncritically' language used in the traditional . . . McDonnell Douglas formulation into jury charges because such language - developed by appellate courts for use by judges - is 'at best irrelevant, and at worst misleading to a jury.' Renz, 135 F.3d at 223 (quoting Cabrera, 24 F.3d at 380). The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework exists to assist a trial judge in her role as a determiner of whether a case meets the legal requirements for decision by a fact-finder . . . . Cabrera, 24 F.3d at 380. A jury, on the other hand, acts only as a fact-finder. 44 In an employment discrimination or retaliation case, the job of the jury is simply to decide whether an impermissible factor was a motivating factor in the adverse employment action. The jury therefore does not need to be lectured on the concepts that guide a judge in determining whether a case should go to the jury. See id. In this case, these concepts included discussions of burden shifting and pretext - issues that were simply not the province of the jury. The shifting burdens in a McDonnell Douglas situation are akin to the operation of evidentiary presumptions, and as Learned Hand has observed, [i]f the trial is properly conducted, the presumption[s] will not be mentioned at all . . . . Alpine Forwarding Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 60 F.2d 734, 736 (2d Cir. 1932). 45 Therefore, when the district court included these concepts as part of its jury charge by using the McDonnell Douglas framework, it created a distinct risk of confusing the jury. It could easily have led the jury astray from its role - merely to decide whether an impermissible factor was a motivating factor in the adverse employment action in question. 46 II. The district court erred by failing to notify Gordon of its intended charge prior to summation 47 Gordon also argues that the district court failed to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 51 by failing to notify Gordon of its intended charge prior to summation, and thus committed reversible error. Gordon is, again, correct. 48 Rule 51 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part that: 49 [a]t the close of the evidence or at such earlier time during the trial as the court reasonably directs, any party may file written requests that the court instruct the jury on the law as set forth in the requests. The court shall inform counsel of its proposed action upon the requests prior to their arguments to the jury (emphasis added). 50 The purpose of this rule is to allow both parties to mold their closing arguments to the points of law that will be explained in the final jury charge. See Weidersum Assocs. v. Natl. Homes Constr. Corp., 540 F.2d 62, 65-66 (2d Cir. 1976). Failure to abide by this mandate is reversible error where counsel is hindered in [his] ability to present summations which fully deal[] with the issues to be placed before the jury. Id. at 66. 51 In this case, the district court not only failed to inform Gordon of its intended jury charge regarding the need to prove individual knowledge on behalf of the Board's agents, it had - until the case was being submitted to the jury - consistently stated that the knowledge element was not at issue and that Gordon's proposed jury instruction was correct. As a result, Gordon's counsel argued a theory to the jury that was diametrically at odds with the eventual instruction given by the court. This error was prejudicial, and therefore reversible error, because it destroyed counsel's credibility with the jury and Gordon's ability to direct the jury's attention to the appropriate evidence to decide her case.