Opinion ID: 1729109
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: mcbride fee

Text: [8, 9] McBride's fees are the proper subject of a fee award under § 44-359, but the issue presented in this appeal goes to the amount of the award. To determine proper and reasonable attorney fees under § 44-359, it is necessary for the court to consider the nature of the litigation, the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions raised, the skill required to properly conduct the case, the responsibility assumed, the care and diligence exhibited, the result of the suit, the character and standing of the attorney, and the customary charges of the bar for similar services. [22] There is no presumption of reasonableness placed on the amount offered by the party requesting fees. [23] We examine these factors as they bear upon the reasonableness of McBride's fee. This was an action on a homeowner's insurance policy to recover for alleged storm damage to a roof, flashing, gutters, skylight, and air-conditioning units. The Youngs originally claimed damages of approximately $35,000.00. Midwest took the position that its liability under the policy was no more than $561.02. The record reflects that between January 7, 2002, and April 5, 2004, McBride devoted a total of 170.7 hours to the case and billed his time at the rate of $120 per hour for a total of $20,484. But the record does not show that all of this time was devoted to the action on the policy. An attorney fee awarded under the provisions of § 44-359 must be solely and only for services actually rendered in the preparation and trial of the litigation on the policy in question. [24] During some of the time reflected on McBride's billing records, the Youngs were pursuing a second count alleging a claim for damages based upon the tort of bad faith. This claim was not an action upon any type of insurance policy within the meaning of § 44-359, [25] and in any event, it was resolved against the Youngs by an order of partial summary judgment. Some of McBride's billing entries refer specifically to the bad faith claim, but the record does not permit any precise determination of what services were devoted solely and specifically to the breach of contract claim. Although the record does not include specific evidence regarding the skill required to properly conduct the case, we note from the record that this was a contested case involving discovery and utilization of expert witnesses and that it was tried to a jury. The first trial, in which McBride represented the Youngs, ended with a mistrial after the opening statement. The second trial, in which Thomas represented himself and Jennie after McBride had withdrawn, resulted in a verdict in favor of the Youngs in the amount of $940. This was approximately $379 more than Midwest had admitted it was obligated to pay under the policy. The record does not include evidence upon which we can assess the remaining factors applicable to the reasonableness of McBride's fees as reflected on his billing statement, including responsibility assumed, care and diligence exhibited, character and standing of the attorney, and the customary charges of the bar for similar services. Based upon our review of the record, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in awarding an attorney fee of $25,000. We conclude that no more than $5,000 can be justified for McBride's services, given the amount at issue, the marginally favorable result obtained, and the uncertainty regarding the amount of McBride's time which was reasonably necessary for the prosecution of the action on the policy, as opposed to the bad faith claim. Accordingly, we modify the attorney fee award by reducing it from $25,000 to $5,000.