Opinion ID: 1376095
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: history and elements of the law of affray

Text: The common-law offense of affray has a long history, with American origins dating back to the eighteenth century and before. Historically, the essential elements of affray have proved remarkably durable, surviving through the ages without substantive change. Compare In re Drakeford, 32 N.C.App. 113, 118, 230 S.E.2d 779, 782 (1977) (describing the offense as a fight between two or more persons, in a public place, that causes terror to the people), with 1 William Hawkins, A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown 134-40 (Morton J. Horwitz & Stanley N. Katz eds., Arno Press 1972) (1724) (same). However, whether emanating from North Carolina, other states, or even beyond our continental shores, [1] case law has failed to provide a clear and concise definition of a public place for purposes of establishing this essential element of an affray. This lack of clarity is reflected in the omission of the offense of affray in the North Carolina Pattern Jury Instructions for Criminal Cases. Also contributing to the confusion is the failure of case law to provide a means for determining whether the fight in question caused terror to the publicthe offense's third essential element. Therefore, we examine the case sub judice with three goals in mind: (1) to establish the criterion to assess whether a fight's attendant facts and circumstances, if proved, satisfy the public place element of an affray; (2) to establish the criterion to assess whether a fight caused terror to the people; and (3) to apply the above-referenced criteria to the present case to determine if the State met its burden of proving all three elements of affray at the hearing. An affray is defined at common law as a fight between two or more persons in a public place so as to cause terror to the public. State v. Wilson, 61 N.C. 237, 237 (1867) (per curiam); see also State v. Huntly, 25 N.C. 418, 421 (1843) (per curiam) (recognizing that the term affray is derived from the French word effrayer, meaning to affright). Thus, in order to prove the offense, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt three essential elements of the crime: (1) that there was a fight between two or more persons; (2) that the fight occurred in a public place; and (3) that the fight caused terror to persons who qualify as members of the public. Neither of the parties in the instant case takes issue with the hearing judge's conclusion that a fight took place or that it involved two personsthe juvenile and another resident of the Home. As a consequence, this, the first element of affray, is deemed satisfied and need not be further considered. This Court has not specifically defined the parameters of what constitutes a public place for purposes of establishing the second element of an affray. However, examples taken from our case law indicate that the offense may be committed in two distinct types of locales that qualify as public places. The first type includes places generally considered public by the nature of their use or intended use. Parcels and places owned and/or maintained by either a government entity or a private business and that are open to public traffic are included in this grouping. Examples include roads, streets, highways, sidewalks, shopping malls, apartment complexes, parks, and commons. Cases assessing alleged affrays that occurred in such locations have concluded, without exception, that they satisfy the public place requirement. See, e.g., State v. Griffin, 125 N.C. 692, 34 S.E. 513 (1899) (indicating that a road could be considered a qualifying public place); Huntly, 25 N.C. 418 (concluding that an affray occurred where the facts indicated that defendant was on a county highway). The second type of public place for purposes of proving an affray is private property that is situated near enough to public thoroughfares that citizens using such thoroughfares could bear witness to the altercation. Although no precise definition of such qualification has emerged from our state's case law, examples that have been held to satisfy the public place requirement include private property within view or earshot of a sidewalk or street. See, e.g., State v. Gladden, 73 N.C. 150 (1875) (indicating that a grocery store, a private business establishment, and an adjoining commercial stable, all of which were situated near a public roadway, would have qualified as a public place for purposes of an affray). [2] The above-noted examples generally comport with the treatise-based definitions of public places for purposes of an affray. See, e.g., Rollin M. Perkins & Ronald N. Boyce, Criminal Law 480 (3d ed.1982) (noting that the term public place includes any place open to public view and close enough to the public so that fighting there may tend to cause public alarm). As for the third element of affraythat the fight caused terror to the peopleprior cases have established that such terror may be demonstrated where the fight at issue `affrighteth and maketh men affraid.' Huntly, 25 N.C. at 421 (quoting 3 Edwardo Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England ). Thus, it is clear that actual fear experienced by members of the public satisfies the terror element. In Fritz, 133 N.C. 725, 45 S.E. 957, this Court implied that members of the public were assumed to be terrorized by virtue of their presence at an alleged affray, even though there was no evidence that any of the seven spectators had actually been placed in peril. This Court, however, has not definitively resolved the question of whether terror to the people may simply be presumed if the fight occurs in a qualifying public place, even if no members of the public were there to witness the event. Other states that have approved such presumed terror include Alabama, see Carwile v. State, 35 Ala. 392, 394 (1860) (concluding that an affray occurred where the fight took place at a location that could be seen from the street), and South Carolina, see State v. Sumner, 36 S.C.L. 53, 53 (S.C.Ct.App.1850) (indicating that the affray in question took place in the corporate limits of a city).