Opinion ID: 2971901
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The date of the contract

Text: Crossley claims that its contractual relationship with NCI came into existence on February 4, 1997, when Crise incorporated Crossley’s purchase order on NCI’s contract form, and not on February 10, 1997, as the district court concluded. In support of this argument, Crossley contends -4- Nos. 03-6512 & 03-6540 Crossley Constr. Corp. v. NCI Bldg. Sys. that “it was the intent of the parties to form an agreement using a combination of their respective forms. This contract included Crossley’s standard purchase order form, including the delivery schedule deadlines supported by the clear contract provision that ‘Time is of the Essence.’” Crossley also points to the Uniform Commercial Code provision contained in Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-2-207, which states that (1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms. (2) [A]dditional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the contract unless: (a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer; (b) they materially alter it; or (c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is given within a reasonable time after notice of them is received. Crossley argues that because the purchase order constituted either a “definite and seasonable expression of acceptance” or a “written confirmation,” the parties had a contract on February 4, 1997. As the district court noted, however, Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-2-207 applies only when an agreement has been reached either orally or by informal correspondence between the parties and is followed by one or both of the parties sending formal memoranda embodying the terms so far as agreed upon and adding terms not discussed. Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-2-207 cmt. 1. The key question is therefore whether an agreement had been reached by the parties before Crise added the purchase order in his handwritten note. If no agreement had been reached, then Crossley’s purchase order cannot be said to be a “definite and -5- Nos. 03-6512 & 03-6540 Crossley Constr. Corp. v. NCI Bldg. Sys. seasonable expression of acceptance,” and the accompanying provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-2- 207 are not triggered. See, e.g. United Foods v. Hadley-Peoples Mfg. Co., No. 02A01-9305-CH-00111, 1994 Tenn. App. LEXIS 277, at  (Tenn. Ct. App. May 20, 1994) (unpublished) (finding no “definite and seasonable expression of acceptance” when the two parties differed about the price on orders of cotton). In the present case, there is substantial evidence indicating that NCI did not view Crise’s handwritten incorporation of the purchase order on February 4, 1997 as a “definite and seasonable expression of acceptance.” This evidence is described in great detail in the district court’s opinion, making another exhaustive discussion unnecessary. Of particular importance, however, is Stewart’s testimony that “[s]tandard policy with NCI at the time is [that] we do not work from our customers’ purchase orders on a project of this magnitude. They need to sign our contract proposal.” His immediate response to receiving NCI’s own contract back with Crise’s handwritten incorporation of the Crossley purchase order on it was to reject the revised terms. Stewart further testified that “we called Don [Crise] back, again reiterating that his purchase order was not accepted and will not be part of our proposal.” Nowhere does Stewart indicate that the handwritten incorporation of the purchase order was viewed as an acceptance of any previously discussed agreement. To the contrary, his testimony indicates that inclusion of Crossley’s purchase order into the final contract was explicitly rejected. Moreover, even if the purchase order constituted a “definite and seasonable expression of acceptance,” Crossley’s argument is unpersuasive under Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-2-207(c), which limits the incorporation of additional terms where “notification of objection to them has already been -6- Nos. 03-6512 & 03-6540 Crossley Constr. Corp. v. NCI Bldg. Sys. given or is given within a reasonable time after notice of them is received.” Stewart’s testimony establishes that he immediately objected to the incorporation of the purchase order into the contract. Because the inclusion of the purchase order cannot be said to constitute a “definite and seasonable expression of acceptance,” the provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-2-207 are not triggered. We therefore find no error in the district court’s conclusion that the contract between Crossley and NCI was reached on February 10, 1997, not February 4, 1997.