Opinion ID: 151938
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Riley Was Properly Convicted under Count 6, Though He Was Already Subject to an Enhanced Penalty for Using a Dangerous Weapon

Text: Riley challenges his conviction on Count 6, for carrying, using, or possessing a firearm or destructive device in connection with a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)-(B). Relying on a 1980 case, Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 100 S.Ct. 1747, 64 L.Ed.2d 381 (1980), he urges, for the first time on appeal, that his conviction on this count was precluded by the fact that he was already subject to a penalty enhancement for the use of a dangerous weapon for his conviction under Count 2, 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(2). See Busic, 446 U.S. at 399-400, 100 S.Ct. 1747 (holding that § 924(c) does not apply to a defendant who uses a firearm in the course of a felony that is proscribed by a statute which itself authorizes enhancement if a dangerous weapon is used). This argument fails. Congress explicitly amended § 924(c) to include a mandatory penalty for the use of a firearm during a federal crime of violence and to statutorily overrule ... Busic. United States v. Centeno-Torres, 50 F.3d 84, 85 (1st Cir.1995) (per curiam) (footnote omitted); see also id. (Congress intended to completely revise § 924(c) so that it would serve as a cumulative punishment in addition to that provided for the underlying violent crime.). 4. There Was No Error in the Verdict Form or Jury Instructions a. The District Court's Instructions on Reasonable Doubt Were Correct Gerhard and Gonzalez claim the court committed reversible error when it instructed that [a] reasonable doubt does not mean a mere possibility that the defendant may be not guilty; nor does it mean a fanciful or imaginary doubt, nor one based upon groundless conjuncture. It means a doubt based upon reason. They argue there was a reasonable likelihood the jury misunderstood the reasonable doubt standard. See Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 6, 114 S.Ct. 1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994) (noting that the correct standard for prejudice is not whether jurors could have applied an instruction unconstitutionally but whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jurors did so). Their objections are misplaced both as to the specific language cited and in the context of the instructions overall. Defendants concede it is permissible to instruct the jury that doubt may not be imaginary or speculative, but they say even a small doubt may be enough to be a reasonable doubt. They rely on Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 111 S.Ct. 328, 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990) (per curiam), overruled in part by Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 73 n. 4, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991), which stated that certain terms, not those used here, impermissibly suggest a higher degree of doubt than is in fact required. Id. at 41, 111 S.Ct. 328. In Victor, the Supreme Court expressly found no error in an instruction that reasonable doubt is not a mere possible doubt. 511 U.S. at 17, 114 S.Ct. 1239. There, as here, the phrase was followed by a description that reasonable doubt is not some possible or imaginary doubt. Id. Following the command of Victor, we have found no error in similar instructions. See United States v. Rodriguez, 162 F.3d 135, 145-46 (1st Cir.1998). The language under attack, in any event, must be seen against the charge as a whole. Id. at 145. In its instructions to the jury, the court repeatedly emphasized the presumption of innocence and the government's burden of proof. The reasonable doubt instruction was not error and there was no reasonable likelihood the jury was misled.