Opinion ID: 626043
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Rehabilitation Act and ADA Claims

Text: The standard for retaliation claims under the Rehabilitation Act is the same as the standard under the ADA. See Reinhardt v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 595 F.3d 1126, 1131 (10th Cir.2010). To make out a prima facie case of retaliation under the familiar burden-shifting framework articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801-03, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), a plaintiff must show that (1) he or she engaged in protected conduct, (2) he or she was subjected to an adverse action by the defendant, and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected conduct and the adverse action. See Carreras v. Sajo, García & Partners, 596 F.3d 25, 35 (1st Cir.2010); Reinhardt, 595 F.3d at 1131; Quiles-Quiles v. Henderson, 439 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.2006). Once a plaintiff makes such a showing, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory explanation for the adverse action. See Carreras, 596 F.3d at 36. If the defendant does so, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the proffered legitimate explanation is pretextual, meaning that the defendant was motivated by a retaliatory animus. See id. The general thrust of appellants' claims is that the Sutton school system retaliated against them for advocating on behalf of D.B.'s right under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA to be free from disability-based discrimination in the provision of a FAPE. Such advocacy plainly constitutes protected conduct under these statutes. See Reinhardt, 595 F.3d at 1132 ([A]ttempting to protect the rights of special education students constitutes protected activity under the Rehabilitation Act.); Barker v. Riverside Cnty. Office of Educ., 584 F.3d 821, 826 (9th Cir.2009) (holding that advocacy on behalf of disabled students on issues related to their civil rights is protected activity under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA); Weixel v. Bd. of Educ. of New York, 287 F.3d 138, 149 (2d Cir.2002) (holding that seeking reasonable accommodation for disabled student's disability is protected activity under the Rehabilitation Act and ADA). Moreover, we assume without deciding, as we have done in other cases, see, e.g., Martinez-Burgos v. Guayama Corp., 656 F.3d 7, 13 (1st Cir.2011), that the school system subjected appellants to a number of adverse actions. An adverse action is one that might well dissuade a reasonable person from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. See Colón-Fontánez, 660 F.3d at 36-37; Reinhardt, 595 F.3d at 1133. The actions appellants cite as adverse include downplaying D.B.'s potential for learning and self-sufficiency; failing to timely apprise appellants of a June 22, 2005 meeting concerning D.B.'s 2005 IEP; misstating narrative accounts of meetings concerning the 2005 IEP; failing on one occasion to respond to a letter from appellants; refusing to incorporate the Lindamood-Bell Learning Center curriculum into the 2005 IEP; preventing D.B.'s parents from escorting D.B. to his classroom; and placing in D.B.'s file for any school system employee to see a copy of the letter in which his father criticized D.B.'s therapist, which had been redacted in such a way as to blur its meaning. We also assume without deciding that appellants have shown a causal connection between their protected conduct and these actions. All of the relevant events in this case took place within a condensed time frame. We have said that close temporal proximity between protected conduct and an adverse action sometimes may suffice for a prima facie case of retaliation. Carreras, 596 F.3d at 38; see also Quiles-Quiles, 439 F.3d at 8-9. In response to appellants' prima facie case of retaliation, the school system must articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory explanation for its actions. See Carreras, 596 F.3d at 36. Most of the adverse actions in appellants' litany involve either the substantive adequacy of D.B.'s 2005 IEP or the school system's handling of the IEP process. The school system has explained that the contents of the 2005 IEP reflect a careful pedagogic assessment of the services necessary to provide D.B. with a FAPE under the IDEA. For example, the decision not to incorporate the Lindamood-Bell Learning Center curriculum into the 2005 IEP was made because the school system's own multi-sensory, structured learning program was thought to be sufficient to meet D.B.'s educational needs. The school system also has explained that its conduct of the IEP process, which anticipates a vigorous dialogue, conformed to the IDEA'S procedural requirements and reflected a good-faith effort to collaborate with appellants. For example, the failure to timely apprise appellants of the June 22, 2005 meeting concerning the 2005 IEP was the result of an oversight involving the school system's attorneys, and notice was mailed to appellants on June 17, 2005, once the oversight was discovered. Compliance with the IDEA does not necessarily disprove a claim under the Rehabilitation Act or the ADA that a school system retaliated against a disabled student, or the student's family, for advocating on behalf of the student's right to be free from disability-based discrimination in the provision of a FAPE. For example, a school system that is compliant with the IDEA might retaliate against a disabled student by withholding additional services or accommodations the student otherwise would have received. A school system also might retaliate by making the process of designing the student's curriculum unusually contentious. However, in the face of a school system's compliance with the IDEA, as in this case, a plaintiff who asserts that the content of an IEP or the conduct of an IEP process was retaliatory must show evidence of something more than a disappointing IEP or the predictable back-and-forth associated with the IEP process in order to survive summary judgment. Appellants have not done so, and thus have not shown that the school system's legitimate, non-retaliatory explanations for its actions were pretextual. Accordingly, no reasonable fact finder could find in their favor on their Rehabilitation Act and ADA retaliation claims. [10]