Opinion ID: 72458
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence – Anderson

Text: Watson next claims the jury lacked sufficient evidence for its finding that she assaulted Anderson, thus interfering with his ability to perform his security- 1 Watson does not contend that identification as a screening officer or employment by the TSA constitute elements of the offense set forth under 49 U.S.C. § 46503. Instead, Watson merely claims the Government failed to prove these facts in keeping with the underlying indictment. Accordingly, we do not address whether these facts constitute necessary elements of the § 46503 offense. 2 We do not address the question of whether the evidence at trial supported the conclusion that Clark, a Gulfport officer on loan to the airport, constituted “a federal, airport, or air carrier employee” under the statutes as Watson has failed to raise that issue. See Askanase v. Fatjo, 130 F.3d 657, 668 (5th Cir. 1997) (“All issues not briefed are waived.”). 5 Case: 09-60099 Document: 00511065331 Page: 6 Date Filed: 03/29/2010 No. 09-60099 related duties.3 Where, as here, a sufficiency of the evidence argument is raised in a timely motion for judgment of acquittal, we “examin[e] the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the verdict, and ask[] whether a rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Garcia, 567 F.3d 721, 731 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Arriaga-Guerrero v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 303 (2009). “‘It is not necessary that the evidence exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence or be wholly inconsistent with every conclusion except that of guilt, provided a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Bell, 678 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (en banc)). “‘A jury is free to choose among reasonable constructions of the evidence.’” Id. (quoting Bell, 678 F.2d at 549). Watson argues that inconsistencies in the testimony of Anderson negated his testimony that Watson shoved him as she passed through the metal detector. Specifically, Watson points to Anderson’s admission that he did not include the fact that he was shoved in his incident report. Additionally, Watson claims Anderson “abandoned” his testimony regarding the shove on cross-examination. Even assuming Watson’s contentions were correct and had the effect of negatively affecting Anderson’s credibility, no less than three other witnesses testified at trial that they saw Watson shove Anderson. The only countervailing evidence was Watson’s own self-serving testimony. We will not usurp the role of the jury to make credibility determinations or weigh contradictory evidence of this sort. Brennan’s Inc. v. Dickie Brennan & Co., 376 F.3d 356, 362 (5th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he court may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence, as those are jury functions.”). The jury had testimony from numerous 3 Watson does not dispute the definition of assault charged to the jury. Instead, the entirety of her briefing on this issue is directed at the Government’s offer of proof. Accordingly, we do not address any issues relating to that instruction. 6 Case: 09-60099 Document: 00511065331 Page: 7 Date Filed: 03/29/2010 No. 09-60099 witnesses to support its conclusion that Watson assaulted Anderson. In light of this other evidence, the jury was not required to accept Watson’s self-serving denials. See United States v. Richards, 204 F.3d 177, 209 (5th Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002). Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to find that Watson assaulted Anderson. C. The Obstruction-of-Justice Sentencing Enhancement Watson also assails the sentence imposed by the district court. Watson alleges that the district court erred when it imposed a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice at the request of the Government based on Watson’s misleading testimony at trial. More precisely, Watson contends: 1) the district court premised its decision on Watson’s denial of guilt; 2) the district court failed to identify the perjurious testimony giving rise to the enhancement; and 3) the district court failed to make a legally sufficient finding that Watson willfully lied or committed perjury. This court reviews district court sentencing decisions for an abuse of discretion. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The district court’s interpretation or application of the Sentencing Guidelines is reviewed de novo, and its factual findings are reviewed for clear error. United States v. Cisneros-Gutierrez, 517 F.3d 751, 764 (5th Cir. 2008). “[I]n order for the [obstruction-of-justice] enhancement to apply, the fact of perjury need not be tried to a jury and may instead be found by the sentencing judge by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Williams, 517 F.3d 801, 808 (5th Cir. 2008). When reviewing an obstruction-of-justice enhancement, “the district court’s factual findings – its findings as to what acts were performed – are reviewed only for clear error.” United States v. Brown, 470 F.3d 1091, 1093 (5th Cir. 2006). “A ruling that those findings permit an obstruction-of-justice enhancement is a question of law, reviewed de novo.” Id. at 1094. 7 Case: 09-60099 Document: 00511065331 Page: 8 Date Filed: 03/29/2010 No. 09-60099 Watson first contends that the district court premised the imposition of the obstruction enhancement on the basis of Watson’s denial of the charges against her. Yet the trial court clearly explained its findings and reasons for imposing the obstruction enhancement – none of which related to her denial of the charges against her. Next, to the extent Watson complains the district court failed to specify the parts of her testimony giving rise to the enhancement, the district court was under no obligation to “identify [the] specific perjurious statements” underlying its decision. United States v. Gonzalez, 163 F.3d 255, 263 (5th Cir. 1998). Finally, Watson’s broader contention that the district court failed to make proper findings to support the imposition of the obstruction enhancement is simply incorrect as a matter of law. In United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87 (1993), the Supreme Court addressed an extremely similar situation and an extremely similar set of findings.4 The Court explained that, while it is “preferable for a district court to address each element of the alleged perjury in a separate and clear finding,” it is sufficient for a district court to make a finding of obstruction of justice that “encompasses all of the factual predicates for a finding of perjury.” Id. at 95. At sentencing, the district court found on the record that: [I]t is the opinion of the Court that the record demonstrates that Ms. Watson did provide testimony which was false at trial, that the testimony was material, and there is no evidence before the Court 4 In Dunnigan, the Supreme Court expressly determined that the following entry of findings was sufficient to permit the imposition of an obstruction-of-justice enhancement: The court finds that the defendant was untruthful at trial with respect to material matters in this case. By virtue of her failure to give truthful testimony on material matters that were designed to substantially affect the outcome of the case, the court concludes that the false testimony at trial warrants an upward adjustment by two levels. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. at 95 (internal quotation marks, alterations, and emphasis omitted). 8 Case: 09-60099 Document: 00511065331 Page: 9 Date Filed: 03/29/2010 No. 09-60099 which tends to show that it was as a result of confusion or mistake or faulty memory, but was instead an intentional effort to mislead that jury. The court explained that it premised these findings on the extraordinary, irreconcilable inconsistencies between Watson’s testimony at trial and the testimony of other witnesses as well as the video evidence. The district court’s findings, which closely mirrored those reviewed by the Supreme Court, clearly meet the standard set in Dunnigan. Accordingly, the district court did not err when it imposed a two-level obstruction-of-justice enhancement in the instant case.