Opinion ID: 2675341
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Hispanic Prospective Jurors

Text: After the trial court denied defendant’s Batson/Wheeler motions concerning African-American jurors, defendant made two similar motions concerning a total of five Hispanic prospective jurors: L.C., D.Q., C.P., D.L., and G.H.22 After reviewing the questionnaires, the trial court observed that there were several evident reasons for excusing C.P. and D.Q., but found that a prima facie case had 22 Defense counsel conceded that, in the case of an additional Hispanic prospective juror, R., there was an apparent race-neutral reason for the prosecutor’s peremptory challenge, and excluded R. from his motion. 47 been made, at least as to L.C., D.L., and G.H. After hearing the prosecutor state his reasons for challenging these prospective jurors, the court found they were race-neutral and “honestly stated,” and denied the Batson/Wheeler motions. We find substantial evidence supports the trial court’s rulings. Prospective Juror C.P. The prosecutor was not required to state his reasons for his peremptory challenge of C.P. because “[j]ustifications for the challenged peremptories need only be given if the court rules that a prima facie case does exist.” (People v. Fuentes (1991) 54 Cal.3d 707, 717, fn. 5.) Defendant, however, contends the trial court erred because, in the course of finding the defense had made no prima facie case as to C.P., the court remarked on an apparent race-neutral reason for the challenge and thereby improperly assisted the prosecutor by supplying its own reason for excusing C.P. After defense counsel made his first Batson/Wheeler motion regarding four Hispanic prospective jurors, the trial court stated that it had reviewed the questionnaires of C.P and D.Q., and “[t]here very well may be a good reason for the district attorney to dismiss them.” It then said, “As to [L.C.] and [D.L], I don’t know what the reasons would be. I do believe there’s a prima facie case shown sufficient to have the district attorney explain his reasons for the dismissal of these jurors.” By “these jurors,” the court apparently referred only to L.C. and D.L, and defendant has adopted this view in his summary of the procedural facts. The court discussed the apparent race-neutral reasons the prosecutor may have had for dismissing C.P. and D.Q., observing that C.P. had written that he was “generally against the death penalty” but “believe[d] in special cases it’s proper.” The court said this comment “shows somewhat of a reluctance to apply the death penalty, as he indicated during the examination for cause.” As to D.Q., the trial court observed she had answered a question about good or bad experiences with law 48 enforcement by writing: “A police report regarding the molestation of my son was closed by Riverside P.D. because I refused to bring my 4-year-old son down to the police station for questioning.” The court observed that this comment indicated a bias against police, which would be a reason for the use of a peremptory challenge. Although the trial court appeared to rule a prima facie case had not been made as to C.P. or D.Q., the prosecutor nonetheless stated his reasons as to D.Q. The prosecutor then gave reasons for excusing L.C. and D.L., for whom the court expressly found that a prima facie case had been made. Finally, the court asked the prosecutor: “[D]id you speak to [C.P.], I believe you did. Is that correct?” To which counsel for defendant answered: “Yes.” The trial court’s late question about C.P. raises a possible ambiguity about whether it had found no prima facie case as to C.P. However, because the trial court initially had appeared to find no prima facie case as to C.P., the burden was on defendant to resolve this ambiguity. Wheeler requires that the moving party make as complete a record as feasible, and the general rules of appellate review require appellants to demonstrate error. (People v. Morris (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 402, 408.) Here, by incorrectly stating that the prosecutor had addressed C.P., counsel for defendant foreclosed any elaboration of why the court mentioned C.P. at this point. 23 Defendant therefore failed to make a record that the trial court had ruled a prima facie case existed as to C.P. Accordingly, we treat the trial court’s ruling as to C.P. as a first stage denial. 23 A trial court occasionally will find that no prima facie case has been made but will ask the prosecutor to state reasons out of an abundance of caution. (See People v. Howard (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1000, 1018 (Howard).) 49 Citing our comment that “ordinarily the court should not attempt to bolster a prosecutor’s legally insufficient reasons with new or additional factors drawn from the record” (People v. Ervin (2000) 22 Cal.4th 48, 77), defendant contends the trial court improperly assisted the prosecutor by supplying its own reasons for excusing C.P. In Ervin, it is not clear whether the trial court stated additional factors before or after the prosecutor stated his reasons. In any event, there is no question here of the trial court’s bolstering the prosecutor’s reasons for excusing C.P. because the prosecutor never stated his reasons for doing so. We regard the trial court’s discussion of possible reasons for the peremptory challenges of C.P and D.Q. as part of its ruling that a prima facie case had not been made as to them. When reviewing the denial of a first stage Batson/Wheeler inquiry, we sustain the trial court’s ruling if, upon our independent review of the record, we conclude the totality of the relevant facts does not give rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose. (Howard, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 1018.) The record reveals that C.P. was reluctant to impose the death penalty. He rated himself a 2 on the 10-point scale. As the trial court observed, when asked to describe his feelings about the death penalty, C.P. wrote: “I am generally against the death penalty. But I believe in special cases it is the proper penalty.” When the prosecutor asked whether C.P. would consider the death penalty appropriate in a case involving the murder of one person and a defendant who did not have a significant prior criminal record, C.P. stated it depended on the circumstances of the case, but “the one I can think of that I’m not against is like the guy who abducted Polly Klaas.” Because C.P.’s comments suggested he was reluctant to impose the death penalty for anything other than a case as notorious as the murder of Polly Klaas, we conclude the totality of relevant facts does not give rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose in the prosecutor’s peremptory challenge of