Opinion ID: 2509741
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Petitioner's Statement

Text: Petitioner argues trial counsel were ineffective in failing to argue during the hearing on the State's in limine motion that the statement should have been introduced because of the State's misconduct and trial counsels' detrimental reliance on the State's apparent intent to offer the statement into evidence. Petitioner contends the State engaged in trickery and abandoned its duty to seek justice by improperly arguing during the pre-trial Jackson v. Denno hearing that the statement was admissible, when the State never intended to introduce the statement at the guilt phase of trial. We disagree. A PCR applicant bears the burden of establishing he is entitled to relief. Caprood v. State, 338 S.C. 103, 525 S.E.2d 514 (2000). To prove counsel was ineffective, the applicant must show counsel's performance was deficient and the deficient performance caused prejudice to the applicant's case. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). To show prejudice, the applicant must show that, but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability the result of trial would have been different. Johnson v. State, 325 S.C. 182, 480 S.E.2d 733 (1997). A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of trial. Strickland, supra . [I]t is generally recognized that the prosecution and the defense should be afforded wide discretion in the selection and presentation of evidence. State v. Johnson, 338 S.C. 114, 525 S.E.2d 519 (2000) (citing State v. Richardson, 253 S.C. 468, 171 S.E.2d 717 (1969)). It is unquestionably true as a general matter that the prosecution is entitled to prove its case by evidence of its own choice. . . . Old Chief v. U.S., 519 U.S. 172, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997). Trial counsel testified he assumed the State would try to introduce the statement during the guilt phase because the State argued at the Jackson v. Denno hearing that the statement was voluntarily given. He acknowledged, however, that no one from the prosecution team told him affirmatively that the State intended to introduce the statement during the guilt phase. One solicitor testified the State decided well before trial not to present petitioner's statement during the guilt phase because it was contrary to what the State sought to prove. The solicitor opined that, without the statement, petitioner would have to testify and subject himself to cross-examination in order to present his version of the incident in the guilt phase. The State therefore moved in limine to bar petitioner from introducing the statement when the police officer to whom the statement was made was called as a witness during the guilt phase. Another solicitor testified the prosecution decided not to use the statement in the guilt phase unless petitioner testified. The solicitor also stated that even if trial counsel had approached him before opening argument and asked whether the State intended to introduce the statement, he would not have disclosed that information because whether or when to introduce the statement was part of their strategy in trying the case. We find there is evidence to support the PCR judge's finding trial counsel were not ineffective. Cherry, supra . The State requested the Jackson v. Denno hearing to determine the voluntariness of the statement for use in the penalty phase and in the event it decided to introduce the statement to cross-examine petitioner, should he choose to testify. In doing so, the State used the wide discretion it is afforded in the selection and presentation of evidence. Johnson, supra. The solicitors' decision not to present petitioner's statement during its case in chief did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct, but was a matter of trial strategy. For this reason, we affirm the PCR judge's order.