Opinion ID: 1426747
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ordinance Exceeds Police Power

Text: Article XI, section 11, substantively delegates legislative authority to local units of government to make and enforce local police, sanitary, and other regulations.... This ordinance is particularly susceptible to the challenge that it exceeds the legitimate scope of the police power because it is so broad and absolutely prohibitory. Were the ordinance limited in effect to specific conduct in specific areas of real concern for safety or the environment, a constitutional challenge under article XI, section 11, might be most problematic; however, to prohibit the use of personal watercraft adjacent to every square foot of 375 miles of county shoreline surrounding 172 named islands [9] for several miles offshore into and including international shipping lanes stretches the judicial test of reasonableness well out to sea. The majority opines that this delegation of state authority is limited by a judicial reasonableness test. Majority at 284. Thus, by inference, it would appear to be the majority's position that the authority delegated to local units of government by article XI, section 11, to enact police regulations is either (1) absolute in scope or (2) absolute at least to the point where it deprives one of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. Const. art. I, § 3. [10] Although this view is not without recent precedential support, [11] and its practical effect must depend on the substantive application of article I, section 3, I posit this approach has the viscerally unsatisfactory result of denying article XI, section 11's reference to police regulations any independent textual significance. Compare Washington Econ. Dev. Fin. Auth. v. Grimm, 119 Wash.2d 738, 746, 837 P.2d 606 (1992) (We have, however, consistently stated that statutes or constitutional provisions should be construed so that no clause, sentence or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.). Given our oft-stated adherence to that self-evident rule of constitutional interpretation which requires us to construe the constitution by its ordinary language as understood at the time of its ratification, I posit the term police ... regulation, as originally understood is a relevant subject of inquiry.
As evidenced by treatises, legal precedent, and complementary constitutional provisions, the original understanding of police power prevalent and popular at the dawn of our constitution in 1889 defined the legitimate role of the State as the protector of persons and property. This understanding is best summarized in the Latin maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas. [12] Thus police power, as originally understood, conveyed not only a grant of authority, but its limitation as well. Historically it must be concluded such was the understanding even prior to statehood in Washington territorial days as the Territorial Court interpreted the Organic Act which granted the territorial legislative power extending to all rightful subjects of legislation, not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States (9 Stat. 325, § 6 (1848)) to imply that there are some subjects of legislation that are not rightful. Maynard v. Valentine, 2 Wash. Terr. 3, 14, 3 P. 195 (1880). [13] Few men were closer to birth of the Washington Constitution than Theodore Lamm Stiles, first elected to serve on the Washington State Supreme Court by the same electorate which ratified the constitution itself in 1889. Justice Stiles played a leading role at the constitutional convention, chairing the committee on county, township, and municipal organizations while also serving on the rules, judiciary, and public lands committees. He soon developed a reputation as a scholar and as the state's leading authority on the Washington Constitution. Charles H. Sheldon, The Washington High Bench: A Biographical History of the Supreme Court, 1889-1991, at 327 (1992). In an address to the Washington State Bar Association, Justice Stiles set forth, in colorful language, that founder's commitment to jealously maintain traditional limitations of police regulation against threats of radical expansion: Laws have been passed in one state and another abridging the right of contract, the right to sell merchandise, the right to labor upon public works, the right to labor more than a certain number of hours, the right to freely come and go, the right to pursue legitimate trades, and a mass of others. Some of these laws go directly to the point, but the majority proceed by indirection. Too many succeed in evading the decree of unconstitutionality and bear oppressively on natural rights. The selfish interest of classes ever anxious to push on their own fortunes, reckless of what destruction is wrought to others, is their moving cause. Legislatures, pliantly serviceable to the demands of influential cliques and unchecked by weak-kneed governors, spread them on the statute books, and there they stand, discouraging prophecies of the decadence of popular rights under democracy. They hide in swarms, behind the newly coined phrase, police power, and that other more venerable phrase, the public welfare, both of which, like public policy, are often, if one may use such an expression, liveries of heaven stolen to serve the devil in. C.S. Reinhart, History of the Supreme Court of the Territory and State of Washington 49-50 (n.d.). A further exemplar and early explanation of the limited nature of the police power is aptly set forth in City of Seattle v. Ford, 144 Wash. 107, 111, 257 P. 243 (1927): It is to be observed, therefore, that the police power of the government, as understood in the constitutional law of the United States, is simply the power of government to establish provisions for the enforcement of the common as well as civil-law maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas. ... Any law which goes beyond that principle, which undertakes to abolish rights, the exercise of which does not involve an infringement of the rights of others, or to limit the exercise of rights beyond what is necessary to provide for the public welfare and the general security, cannot be included in the police power of the government. It is a governmental usurpation, and violates the principles of abstract justice, as they have been developed under our republican institutions. . . . . To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.....[The Legislature's] determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police powers, is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the courts. Id. at 111-12, 257 P. 243 (emphasis added) (quoting Christopher G. Tiedeman, A Treatise on State and Federal Control of Persons and Property in the United States 4-5 (1900)). Recognition of the limitation of a state's plenary police power is further evidenced in the earliest history of our nation. See, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 387-88, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798) (Chase, J., seriatim ) (I cannot subscribe to the omnipotence of a state legislature, or that it is absolute and without control; although its authority should not be expressly restrained by the constitution, or fundamental law of the state.... The purposes for which men enter into society will determine the nature and terms of the social compact; and as they are the foundation of the legislative power, they will decide what are the proper objects of it.... There are acts which the federal, or state legislature cannot do, without exceeding their authority.). In fact, this recognition predates the establishment of the American Republic. Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 8-1, at 560 (2d ed.1988). The majority notes that the scope of the state's police power has not declined. Majority at 280. I would not argue with that assertion; however, the problem is more nearly the opposite. Without benefit of any formal amendment to the constitutional text, we have allowed police power, as a substantive limitation on governmental authority, to significantly erode from its point of origin: [14] While originally it was used as a rule to indicate the protective function of the government, its development of late years has been in the direction of the function of the state that cares for the general welfare, City of Tacoma v. Boutelle, 61 Wash. 434, 443, 112 P. 661 (1911), and we have opined it is not a rule, it is an evolution, allowing its redefinition as often as changed conditions require or compel. State v. Mountain Timber Co., 75 Wash. 581, 588, 135 P. 645 (1913), aff'd, 243 U.S. 219, 37 S.Ct. 260, 61 L.Ed. 685 (1917). Notwithstanding, we have also occasionally [15] repaired to its origin: The germ of police power, in so far as it assumes to interfere with private rights, is to be found in the power of the state to suppress nuisances. This right was forced upon the state in the exercise of its functions, or rather duty, to preserve that equilibrium of relative right which must be preserved wherever society is organized. Id. at 584, 135 P. 645. Such equilibrium is the process by which the rights of one individual are protected against the trespasses of another. This original understanding of the police power, as an expression of the core but limited governmental purpose and function to protect lives and property, is certainly consistent with, and confirmed by, Constitution article I, section 1, which similarly provides: Governments ... are established to protect and maintain individual rights. Even under the most expansive definitions of potential plenary power it is clear that where, as here, the acts of the county exceed the State's constitutional delegation the act nevertheless exceeds legitimate authority. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20, 57 S.Ct. 216, 81 L.Ed. 255 (1936) (noting the plenary power of the president in international relations like every other governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution.); Southcenter Joint Venture v. National Democratic Policy Comm., 113 Wash.2d 413, 443, 780 P.2d 1282 (1989) (State's plenary power as sovereign is limited by the state's own constitution). Applying the principle of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas to the case at bar we would ask: What individual right is abridged by the continued use of personal watercraft on the marine waters of San Juan County?
In a similar vein, the majority would ask in the name of that process which is due whether the ordinance is aimed at achieving a legitimate public purpose, whether it uses means reasonably necessary to achieve that purpose, and finally whether it is unduly oppressive upon individuals. Majority at 279-280; 286-287. Although there may be differences in outcome depending upon which of the two police power tests may be employed in any given situation, I posit this ordinance exceeds the legitimate scope of the police power under either formulation. Such is a judicial question in at least the same sense as would be any alleged transgression of government beyond its constitutionally defined limitations. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176-80, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803) (Marshall, C. J.). [16]
I have no doubt that the use or misuse of personal watercraft is quite capable of invading private rights and public interests in a particular, as well as a global, sense under a host of imaginable circumstances. However we must shape the answer to fit the parameters of the question posed by this particular ordinance. At the threshold the court must recognize the ordinance is a two-year temporary measure passed coincident with a resolution to study the effects of personal watercraft in San Juan County. Resolution 19-1996, ex. 250. However since the ordinance constitutes a virtual prohibition of such watercraft, it seems illogical in the sense that it clears the laboratory of the very specimen alleged to be the object of study. Thus a negative inference flows that this ordinance is not based upon a demonstrable police power interest, at least one sufficiently broad in scope to justify to total prohibition, but rather a possible interest not sufficiently identified absent further study. From this inauspicious beginning one notes the ordinance affirmatively finds that the effect of PWC operation on marine life in San Juan County is unknown. Ordinance Finding 24. Although there is no constitutional rule which requires the ordinance to include findings, Petstel, 77 Wash.2d at 151, 459 P.2d 937, I know of no rule of law which requires us to disregard findings which have in fact been made. Certainly the majority does not. (Majority at 276-278.) I would therefore posit a demonstrably unknown effect on an interest of otherwise legitimate concern to the police power is no basis for its exercise. We are then left to consider the effect of PWC operation on shoreline property owners or, possibly, other marine craft. Although these craft admittedly make noise, that noise is strictly regulated by state statute in the same manner as any other watercraft, and there is nothing in this ordinance to support discrimination between the two. Moreover, this ordinance does not purport to regulate noise. Of course, these personal watercraft might be problematic if operated adjacent to coastal residents; however, the ordinance does not prohibit only that but absolutely prohibits the operation of these craft even where there are no residents to be found and even when operated at considerable distance from shore in the most reasonable manner. Nor does the ordinance require any particular reasonable mode of operation. Its prohibitions are absolute. Thus, I would conclude the ordinance lacks a legitimate purpose to protect a private interest, or even a public one, as I am unable to articulate one, or even imagine one, as broad in scope as is the prohibition which must be justified. Here I must acknowledge my imagination is somewhat challenged by the perception that an exercise of the police power, to be proper, must be at least hypothetically protective of a legitimate interest. Not all interests, however, are indeed legitimate for police power purposes. For example, courts have held community displeasure cannot be a legitimate constitutional predicate for governmental action. Maranatha Mining, Inc. v. Pierce County, 59 Wash.App. 795, 804, 801 P.2d 985 (1990); Marks v. City of Chesapeake, 883 F.2d 308, 311 (4th Cir.1989) (`[p]rivate biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect' (citations omitted)). Cf. Anderson v. City of Issaquah, 70 Wash.App. 64, 82, 851 P.2d 744 (1993) ([W]hether a community can exert control over design issues based solely on accepted community aesthetic values is far from `settled' in Washington case law.) (citing Polygon Corp. v. City of Seattle, 90 Wash.2d 59, 70, 578 P.2d 1309 (1978) and Duckworth v. City of Bonney Lake, 91 Wash.2d 19, 30, 586 P.2d 860 (1978)). If the purpose of the ordinance were in reality an effort to enforce the cultural preferences of the island majority to the quiet prosperity (Ordinance Finding 13) of island living at the expense of the recreational preferences of those less prosperous, I would also find a paucity of legitimate police power. Such a prohibition on this economical means of recreation brings to mind those sumptuary laws imposed on the display of a pauper's wealth during the middle ages. Such laws purported to limit extravagance in expenditures [a]nd the common people were subjected to the control of these sumptuary laws, in order that by reducing their consumption they may increase the sum of enjoyment of the privileged classes. Christopher G. Tiedeman, supra, at 187. The existence of such laws caused Judge Cooley to remark: [T]he ideals which suggested such laws are now exploded utterly, and no one would seriously attempt to justify them in the present age. The right of every man to do what he will with his own, not interfering with the reciprocal right of others, is accepted among the fundamentals of our law. Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest Upon the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union 476-77 (5th ed. 1883); Christopher G. Tiedeman, supra, at 187. In the same vein it might well be argued this ordinance by design, or at least effect, reserves and prohibits the use of a public resource, marine waters, simply to appease the cultural or aesthetic values of the riparian landowners or interior residents. If so, such would exceed the legitimate scope of the police power, as well. If there are other legitimate police power objectives served by this ordinance, I am unenlightened by the majority opinion as to their existence.
If the purpose of the ordinance is to preserve public safety, abate a nuisance, or preserve the environment, I cannot find the means employed by this ordinance reasonably necessary to accomplish its objective. If the ordinance is related to study of a possible problem with an eye toward possible future action, then I would find the prohibit-now and study-later provision irrational. If the ordinance is aimed at alleviating a problem associated with shoreline residents, then I would expect it would limit its scope, at the least, to regulation of operation close to a populated shoreline. If its purpose is to save the environment (notwithstanding an affirmative ordinance finding that the effect of PWCs on the environment is unknown), then I would expect that the ordinance would focus its regulation upon areas of particular environmental concern. But the scope of the ordinance knows no boundaries and, concomitantly, the requirement that it promote its legitimate objectives is similarly boundless. To find this absolute sweeping ban necessary to promote a legitimate police power interest is an act of fantasy reserved for the majority.