Opinion ID: 2542903
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Nguyen decision conflicts with Addington.

Text: ¶ 34 The Nguyen majority relied on Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979), to justify a bright-line rule that the clear and convincing standard of proof is constitutionally required whenever an interest at stake is more important than the interest against erroneous imposition of a mere money judgment. Nguyen, 144 Wash.2d at 525, 29 P.3d 689. However, in Addington, the Court held that the intermediate standard is required only to protect particularly important individual interests in various civil cases such as cases involving deportation and denaturalization. 441 U.S. at 424, 99 S.Ct. 1804. The Addington Court simply recognized that some jurisdictions use the intermediate standard and that the intermediate standard . . . `is no stranger to the civil law.' Id. (quoting Woodby v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 385 U.S. 276, 285, 87 S.Ct. 483, 17 L.Ed.2d 362 (1966)). This is a far cry from the bright-line rule that the Nguyen majority labeled a constitutional requirement. ¶ 35 Instead of adopting a bright-line rule, the Addington Court conducted a Mathews balancing test to determine whether the intermediate standard of proof was required for indefinite civil commitments. Id. at 425-27, 99 S.Ct. 1804. Subsequent United States Supreme Court decisions have upheld the preponderance standard in quasi-criminal disciplinary proceedings. See Steadman v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 450 U.S. 91, 103-04, 101 S.Ct. 999, 67 L.Ed.2d 69 (1981) (upholding the preponderance standard in a disciplinary proceeding against a stockbroker as constitutionally permissible); Rivera v. Minnich, 483 U.S. 574, 579-82, 107 S.Ct. 3001, 97 L.Ed.2d 473 (1987) (upholding the preponderance standard to determine paternity, `an interest far more precious than any property right' (quoting Santosky, 455 U.S. at 758-59, 102 S.Ct. 1388)). These decisions make it clear that, contrary to our holding in Nguyen, the Constitution does not require courts to apply a heightened standard of proof in all cases involving more than a mere money judgment. [6] ¶ 36 Ignoring this precedent, the Nguyen majority primarily relied on Painter, 998 P.2d 931, a Wyoming Supreme Court decision, to support its bright-line rule. In Painter, the Wyoming court held that [d]ue process requires that the Board prove its disciplinary cases by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 941. However, in so ruling, the Painter court noted that [t]his holding arguably gives Wyoming licensees greater due process protection than is required by the United States Constitution. Id. Unlike the Wyoming Constitution, the Washington Constitution does not provide greater procedural due process protection than is required by the United States Constitution. See, e.g., Manussier, 129 Wash.2d at 679, 921 P.2d 473. Thus, contrary to the Nguyen majority's analysis, Painter supports the conclusion that the preponderance standard is constitutionally sufficient in professional disciplinary proceedings in Washington. Accordingly, I would reject the bright-line rule adopted in Nguyen.