Opinion ID: 615193
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: State Postconviction and Federal Habeas

Text: James filed numerous postconviction petitions. We discuss them only to the extent that they pertain to the claims now before us. In his first Petition for Postconviction Relief (PCR), filed in 1985, James argued that Pillinger provided ineffective assistance by failing adequately to investigate and present evidence of James's LSD intoxication at the time of the murder, and by failing to interview witnesses who could have testified to James's potential for rehabilitation. The Maricopa County Superior Court dismissed the claim as procedurally barred and denied James's request for an evidentiary hearing. The court cited Ariz. R.Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3), which at the time provided that relief could not be granted on any claim [k]nowingly, voluntarily and intelligently not raised at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding. See also ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-4232(A)(3). The Arizona Supreme Court denied review. In his second PCR, filed in 1991, James did not present an ineffective assistance of counsel claim as a freestanding basis for relief. However, in an attempt to circumvent the procedural bars to relief on claims finally adjudicated in a prior proceeding, ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-4232(A)(2); Ariz. R.Crim. P. 32.2(a)(2), or not raised in a prior proceeding, ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-4232(A)(3); Ariz. R.Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3), James argued that his trial, appellate, and first PCR counsel were all ineffective. The Maricopa County Superior Court dismissed the petition, finding that no facts have been presented which would rise to the level of a colorable [ineffective assistance of counsel] claim. . . . Additionally, the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel at the trial level and on appeal and in the first petition for post-conviction relief was presented in the first petition for post-conviction relief. This court is precluded from granting relief on this issue now. The Arizona Supreme Court denied review. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. James v. Arizona, 507 U.S. 928, 113 S.Ct. 1304, 122 L.Ed.2d 693 (1993). James filed a federal habeas petition in 1993. Based on the Wertsching affidavit, see supra pp. 862-63, James raised claims under Brady, Giglio, and Napue. The district court dismissed James's habeas petition without prejudice so that he could exhaust his state remedies on this claim. James therefore filed a third PCR in state court in 1995, in which he raised the three claims now before us. The Maricopa County Superior Court denied relief and again denied James's request for an evidentiary hearing. With respect to the Brady/Giglio claim, the court assumed that Wertsching's affidavit was true and that the state had entered a secret agreement to treat Norton as a juvenile before Norton gave his December 29 statement. The court denied relief on the rationale that any nondisclosure was not material. See Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154, 92 S.Ct. 763; Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194. Referring to Norton's November 19 statement to Detective Davis and his November 26 statement to Detective Hackworth, the court wrote, Prior to the time there was any agreement, Norton had already made statements to the police that incriminated [James]. These statements were made before he was represented by counsel. Therefore, his motive [to testify] was not based on the agreement. . . . Although the statements [Norton] made while being interrogated by the police were not necessarily consistent, the statements either implicated or connected [James] with the murder or were statements where Norton denied having knowledge of how the crime occurred. Moreover, the court determined that [t]he existence of the agreement has little impeachment value. The defense had a copy of the plea agreement that was signed after Norton gave his statement to the prosecutor. The agreement was introduced in evidence. Norton was cross-examined about the plea agreement. He was questioned about prior inconsistent statements. The jury knew Norton had a motive to cooperate with authorities. Because of the overwhelming evidence of James's guiltincluding McIntosh's testimony that James bragged about the murder and James's role in driving the group to the mineas well as the jury's rejection of James's duress defense, [t]he outcome of the trial would not have been affected by knowledge of Norton's agreement. With respect to the Napue claim, the court reached the identical conclusion that any false testimony about the agreement was not material. See Napue, 360 U.S. at 271, 79 S.Ct. 1173. Even assuming the existence of a secret agreement, there was no reasonable likelihood that the false testimony affected the verdict or sentence due to overwhelming independent evidence of [James's] guilt, including his confession to McIntosh and his own incredible testimony. Additionally, . . . the jury had substantial reason to question Norton's motives even without knowledge of the alleged agreement. Finally, the court determined that James's ineffective assistance of counsel claim remained procedurally barred. The first PCR court had held James's ineffective assistance claim precluded because James could have raised it on direct appeal. See Ariz. R.Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3). The third PCR court explained that [t]o the extent that the claims were precluded in the first petition, they were precluded in the second, and are precluded now in the third petition. . . . Those issues were and are precluded under Rule 32.2(a)(3). That is the law of the case. The court then added an alternative procedural bar. Rule 32.2(a)(3) prevented consideration of James's ineffective assistance of counsel claim because James waived any such argument by failing to cite in his second petition specific errors of counsel and he failed to indicate how he was actually prejudiced by any alleged errors. . . . [James] could have raised his claims in the second petition, but failed to do so. James filed this federal habeas petition in 2000. He raised 33 claims for relief and expanded the record by presenting 82 exhibits, most of them related to his claim that Pillinger provided ineffective assistance at the penalty phase by failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence. See Rule 7 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. James also sought an evidentiary hearing. Without conducting a hearing, the district court denied relief and denied a subsequent motion to amend the judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). The court granted a certificate of appealability on the three claims now before us, and James appealed.