Opinion ID: 1259155
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Credit for Time of Self-Imposed Withdrawal From Practice of Law

Text: Respondent urges the court to credit him with the time that he has voluntarily withdrawn from practice, citing as support In re Murray, 159 Ariz. 280, 767 P.2d 1 (1988), and In re Rivkind, 164 Ariz. 154, 791 P.2d 1037 (1990). According to Respondent, he closed his office on August 1, 1991 after learning that the Committee recommended that he be suspended for one year. Respondent argues that his voluntary withdrawal from the practice of law is a sufficient sanction in that the public has been protected during the period that Respondent voluntarily withdrew from practice. As the State Bar noted in its supplemental brief, Respondent raised this argument for the first time on his appeal to this court. Although Respondent submitted an affidavit in his reply brief averring that he closed his office on August 1, 1991, no evidence in the record on appeal supports his claim. In fact, the State Bar argues that Respondent had not withdrawn from the practice of law. Notwithstanding that it too is outside the record, the State Bar included a copy of an advertisement that was run in the April 1992 edition of the Maricopa Lawyer in which Respondent was advertising his services. Regardless of the parties' claims, our review is limited to the record on appeal. See rule 53(e), Arizona Rules of the Supreme Court; cf. Gold v. Killeen, 50 Ariz. 126, 134, 69 P.2d 800, 804 (1937) (citations omitted) (limiting appellate review in civil case to record). Because no evidence in the record supports his claims, we reject Respondent's argument that he should be credited with the time that he voluntarily withdrew from the practice of law. [8] d. Additional Sanctions The court is particularly concerned with Respondent's failure to acknowledge the wrongfulness of his conduct. Respondent has contested these charges at every step of the process and still fails to understand how his conduct ran afoul of the ethical rules. Respondent's failure to comprehend what was apparent to 14 people [9] disturbs this court because Respondent is likely to repeat that which he fails to understand. Therefore, as a condition of reinstatement, we require Respondent to successfully complete a course in ethics at an accredited college of law and pass the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination. And, to further protect the public from a repeat of Respondent's unprofessional conduct, we also require Respondent to complete the Professionalism Course offered by the State Bar of Arizona.
We now address Respondent's objections to the assessment for costs and expenses incurred by the State Bar. Respondent's objections are twofold. First, he objects to the assessment for various expenses that the State Bar incurred during this disciplinary action. Specifically, Respondent objects to the assessment for screening costs and expenses, staff investigator costs, bar counsel expenses, photocopies, binders, legal pads, and office supplies. Respondent argues that the court's power to assess costs, which are defined as all sums taxable as such in a civil action, and expenses, which are defined as all obligations in money, other than costs, necessarily incurred by the state bar in the complete performance of its duties under these rules, is limited to costs that may be taxed in a civil action. See rules 46(g)(7) and (9), Arizona Rules of the Supreme Court. Alternatively, Respondent argues that the assessment for expenses outside those recoverable in a civil action is a form of punishment, which is contrary to the stated purpose of lawyer discipline. Second, Respondent objects to the amounts requested for specific categories of costs and expenses. Respondent argues that the amount requested for hearing transcripts is unreasonable and that certain charges are duplicative. 1. Objection to Assessment of Expenses that Would Not be Recoverable in a Civil Action In his initial objection to the State Bar's statement of costs and expenses, Respondent challenged the court's authority to regulate the legal profession, stating that [t]here is no constitutional provision granting the Supreme Court the power to regulate the legal profession, and there are no longer any statutory provisions giving it such power. Respondent appears to have retreated from this position in his reply memorandum, conceding that the court has the power to regulate the legal profession. Respondent now argues that: (1) the court exceeded the scope of its authority when it promulgated rule 52(a)(8), which requires the court to impose a money judgment for the State Bar's costs and expenses on a disciplined attorney; and (2) the assessment of expenses not otherwise collectible in a civil action constitutes a form of punishment, which is contrary to the purpose of attorney discipline.
Despite acknowledging that the court has the power to regulate the legal profession, Respondent fails to appreciate the scope of the court's power in this area. We have declared repeatedly that the practice of law is a matter exclusively within the authority of the Judiciary. Hunt v. Maricopa County Employees Merit Sys. Comm'n, 127 Ariz. 259, 261, 619 P.2d 1036, 1038 (1980) (emphasis added); see, e.g., In re Bailey, 30 Ariz. 407, 411-12, 248 P. 29, 30-31 (1926). [10] The judiciary's authority to regulate and control the practice of law is universally accepted and dates back to the year 1292. State Bar of Arizona v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 90 Ariz. 76, 84, 366 P.2d 1, 7 (1961); see Hunt, 127 Ariz. at 262, 619 P.2d at 1039 (listing cases from numerous jurisdictions recognizing judiciary's authority to regulate and control practice of law); see generally Blewett Lee, The Constitutional Power of the Courts Over Admission to the Bar. 13 Harv.L.Rev. 233-55 (1899); Thomas M. Alpert, The Inherent Power of the Courts to Regulate the Practice of Law: An Historical Analysis, 32 Buff.L.Rev. 525 (1983). Because the judiciary's authority to regulate the practice of law is a widely accepted premise, we, along with other courts that have recently addressed this issue, have tended merely to pronounce our authority to regulate the practice of law without explaining the source of this power. See, e.g., In re Lewkowitz, 70 Ariz. 325, 329, 220 P.2d 229, 231 (1950). Thus, a brief explanation of the source of our power and the extent of our authority is appropriate. As we stated in Hunt, [t]he determination of who shall practice law in Arizona and under what condition is a function placed by the state constitution in this court. 127 Ariz. at 261-62, 619 P.2d at 1038-39. Our authority to regulate the practice of law is found in articles 3 and 6 of the Arizona Constitution. Article 6, § 1 vests  judicial power  in an integrated judicial department.... Article 3 provides: The powers of the government of the State of Arizona shall be divided into three separate departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and, except as provided in this Constitution, such departments shall be separate and distinct, and no one of such departments shall exercise the powers properly belonging to either of the others. Under article 3, each branch of government is independent, and no department may exercise powers belonging to the others. Ahearn v. Bailey, 104 Ariz. 250, 252, 451 P.2d 30, 32 (1969). Thus, the judicial department alone is able to exercise judicial power. See Ahearn, 104 Ariz. at 252, 451 P.2d at 32. Our constitution does not expressly grant any of the three departments of government the power to define and regulate the practice of law. However, courts that have interpreted constitutional provisions identical or similar to ours consistently have found that the power to regulate the practice of law belongs to the judicial department. See, e.g., In re Day, 181 Ill. 73, 54 N.E. 646, 651-52 (1899); In re Integration of Nebraska State Bar Ass'n, 133 Neb. 283, 275 N.W. 265, 266-68 (1937); State v. Cannon, 206 Wis. 374, 240 N.W. 441, 445, 448-50 (1932); Integration of Bar Case, 244 Wis. 8, 11 N.W.2d 604, 619 (1943). The Nebraska Supreme Court provided a thoughtful discussion of its constitutional power to regulate the practice of law when the court's rules integrating the State Bar were challenged as unconstitutional. Nebraska State Bar, 275 N.W. at 265. Nebraska's constitutional provisions are very similar to Arizona's provisions. Compare Neb. Const. Art. 5, § 1, [11] and Art. 2, § 1, [12] with Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 1, and art. 3. As the Nebraska Supreme Court explained, [i]t is a fundamental principle of constitutional law that each department of government, whether federal or state, has, without any express grant, the inherent right to accomplish all objects naturally within the orbit of that department, not expressly limited by the fact of the existence of a similar power elsewhere or the express limitations in the constitution. Nebraska State Bar, 275 N.W. at 266 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted); see, e.g., State ex inf. Hadley v. Washburn, 167 Mo. 680, 67 S.W. 592, 594-95 (1902). The court concluded, therefore, that [i]n the absence of an express grant of [the power to regulate the practice of law] to any one of the three departments, [the power] must be exercised by the department to which it naturally belongs.... Nebraska State Bar, 275 N.W. at 266. In deciding which department the power to regulate the practice of law naturally belonged, the court noted that [t]he primary duty of courts is the proper and efficient administration of justice. Nebraska State Bar, 275 N.W. at 268. The court concluded that [t]he practice of law is so intimately connected and bound up with the exercise of judicial power in the administration of justice that the right to define and regulate its practice naturally and logically belongs to the judicial department.... Nebraska State Bar, 275 N.W. at 268; see also, e.g., Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 379, 18 L.Ed. 366 (1866) (attorneys are officers of court whose duties relate almost exclusively to proceedings of a judicial nature). This analysis applies equally to Arizona's Constitution. Thus, the combination of article 3, which creates three separate government departments, and article 6, § 1, which vests judicial power with the judicial department, confers upon this court the power to discipline members of the bar. Arizona's Constitution, however, provides an even clearer directive in this area. Article 6, § 3, provides that [t]he Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all the courts of the State. Administrative is defined as: Connotes of or pertains to administration, especially management, as by managing or conducting, directing, or superintending, the execution, application or conduct of persons or things. Particularly, having the character of executive or ministerial action. In this sense, administrative functions or acts are distinguished from such as are judicial. Black's Law Dictionary 42 (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Administrative supervision contemplates managing the conduct of court personnel. See Mann v. Maricopa County, 104 Ariz. 561, 565, 456 P.2d 931, 935 (1969). Attorneys are universally recognized as officers of the court. Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 378-79; see, e.g., Day, 54 N.E. at 650-51; In re Application to Practice Law, 67 W. Va. 213, 67 S.E. 597, 601 (1910); In re Wren, 79 Ariz. 187, 191, 285 P.2d 761, 763 (1955). And, as officers of the court, attorneys are amenable to [the court] as their superior. Nebraska State Bar, 275 N.W. at 267; see Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 378-79. Through the disciplinary process, we are exercising our constitutionally granted power to manage the conduct of court officers. Similarly, article 6, § 5(5), is another constitutional provision empowering this court to admit and discipline attorneys. This provision provides that this court has the [p]ower to make rules relative to all procedural matters in any court. The admission and subsequent discipline of an attorney are some of the most basic procedural matters before any court. On numerous occasions, this court has had to determine whether a matter is procedural. See, e.g., State v. Fletcher, 149 Ariz. 187, 191, 717 P.2d 866, 870 (1986). In doing so, this court has distinguished procedural from substantive law, stating: Procedural, adjective or remedial law is that portion of the law which prescribes the method of enforcing a right or obtaining redress for the invasion of that right. Substantive law, on the other hand, is that portion of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights. Fletcher, 149 Ariz. at 191, 717 P.2d at 870 (emphasis in original); see also Daou v. Harris, 139 Ariz. 353, 358, 678 P.2d 934, 939 (1984); Black's Law Dictionary 1083 (5th ed. 1979). In promulgating rules prescribing the method of enforcing a right or obtaining redress for the invasion of that right, this court necessarily must determine first who is qualified to come before the court to perform this task. As courts, including ours, have repeatedly stated in one form or another, the purpose of the State Bar's admission process and any subsequent disciplinary action is to protect the public by insuring that attorneys have the attributes necessary to fulfill their responsibilities to the court. See, e.g., Kastensmith, 101 Ariz. at 294, 419 P.2d at 78; Daley, 549 F.2d at 475-76. In this regard, the entire admission and discipline process can be viewed as procedural. Accordingly, article 6, § 5(5) is another constitutional source of our power over admission and disciplinary matters.
Having explored the source of the court's power to discipline attorneys, we turn to the scope of the court's power and the ability of other branches of government to limit courts in the exercise of this power. Respondent argues that, when it enacted § 12-109, the legislature limited the State Bar to recovering only those costs that are taxable in a civil action. We reject Respondent's argument. The statute, by its terms, is inapplicable to disciplinary actions. Moreover, any attempt to interpret § 12-109 to encompass disciplinary actions would raise constitutional questions.
Respondent argues that § 12-109 limits the court's power to assess costs and expenses in a disciplinary proceeding to only those costs that may be taxed in a civil action. Section 12-109 provides in part: The supreme court, by rules promulgated from time to time, shall regulate pleading, practice and procedure in judicial proceedings in all courts of the state for the purpose of simplifying such pleading, practice and procedure and promoting speedy determination of litigation upon its merits. The rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify substantive rights of a litigant. (Emphasis added.) Citing State v. Griswold, 8 Ariz. App. 361, 364, 446 P.2d 467, 470 (1968), Respondent maintains that costs can be imposed only when authorized by statute. [13] He therefore argues that the court is limited to assessing only those costs that may be taxed in a civil action. Respondent argues that the taxing of expenses under rule 52(a)(8), Arizona Rules of the Supreme Court, is merely the taxing of costs under an expanded definition of costs. Thus, according to Respondent, because the rules expand the scope of costs that the State Bar can recover in a civil action, the rules modify Respondent's substantive rights, in violation of § 12-109. We reject this argument because § 12-109, by its terms, does not attempt to limit courts in the exercise of their power to regulate the practice of law. The United States Supreme Court discussed the effect of § 12-109 on Arizona Supreme Court rules regulating the conduct of attorneys. See Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 104 S.Ct. 1989, 80 L.Ed.2d 590 (1984). One of the issues addressed in Hoover was the effective date of an amendment to various rules regarding admission to the State Bar of Arizona. 466 U.S. at 561-62 n. 3, 104 S.Ct. at 1991-92 n. 3. The Court in Hoover rejected Respondent's argument that the legislature, through its enactment of § 12-109, limited the court's ability to make its amendments concerning the admission to the Bar immediately effective. 466 U.S. at 561-62 n. 3, 104 S.Ct. at 1991-92 n. 3. As the United States Supreme Court stated, this statute, by its terms, does not limit the jurisdiction of the Arizona Supreme Court to establish the terms of admission to practice law; instead, [this] section only applie[s] to Rules that regulate[] pleading, practice, and procedure in judicial proceedings in state courts. Hoover, 466 U.S. at 561-62 n. 3, 104 S.Ct. at 1991-93 n. 3. We agree with the Court's interpretation of § 12-109 and find that it is as inapplicable to the rules we promulgated concerning attorney discipline as it was to the rules that we promulgated governing admission to the Bar. Rules regulating the practice of law, from admitting an attorney to disciplining an attorney, have nothing to do with regulating pleading, practice and procedure in judicial proceedings. Accordingly we find that § 12-109 does not limit us in the exercise of our jurisdiction over disciplinary matters. Not only does this interpretation comport with the plain meaning of the statute's language, but it avoids the constitutional implications raised by the interpretation that Respondent urges on the court.
A basic tenet of statutory construction is that statutes should be construed so as to be constitutional whenever possible. Stillman v. Marston, 107 Ariz. 208, 209, 484 P.2d 628, 629 (1971) (citations omitted). The interpretation of § 12-109 that Respondent urges us to adopt would allow the legislature to limit this court in determining the range of sanctions that we could impose in disciplining an attorney. Such an interpretation unnecessarily implicates constitutional concerns. The Arizona Constitution grants this court the power to determine who shall practice law in Arizona and under what condition. Hunt, 127 Ariz. at 261-62, 619 P.2d at 1038-39. Necessarily included within this power is the power to discipline those admitted to practice law. E.g., In re Riley, 142 Ariz. 604, 607, 691 P.2d 695, 698 (1984). As we have explained previously, one is admitted to the bar only after having met the requisite qualifications. See, e.g., Bailey, 30 Ariz. at 411, 248 P. at 30, discussing Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 378-79. Correspondingly, the court has the power to remove from the practice those no longer fit. In re Greer, 52 Ariz. 385, 390, 81 P.2d 96, 98 (1938). It necessarily follows, then, that the court has the power to impose sanctions that fall short of disbarment. One of the sanctions that this court requires is the imposition of costs and expenses on disciplined attorneys. [14] See rule 52(a)(8), Arizona Rules of the Supreme Court. This court finds that imposing the costs and expenses incurred by the State Bar in a disciplinary action on disciplined attorneys is necessary to effectively carry out our constitutional duties. Recovering costs and expenses from disciplined attorneys assists us in our duty to protect the public from those attorneys who are guilty of misconduct in a number of ways. The discipline process is a costly endeavor. According to the State Bar's audited financial statements, the Bar's single largest category of expenditures was for attorney discipline. Disciplinary costs account for a large percentage of membership dues. [15] As one court noted when authorizing the State Bar to impose a special annual assessment on its members to finance disciplinary activities, the [c]ourt's duty to protect itself, the judiciary, and the citizens of [the] State from persons unfit to practice law ... should not be hampered by the absence of adequate financing to do the job.... Mississippi State Bar, 361 So.2d at 506. By shifting some of the financial burden of disciplinary procedures to those who are directly responsible for the costs, we insure the ability of the State Bar to continue its efforts in this area without having to ask the State Bar's members to further subsidize the Bar's disciplinary efforts. [16] Not only is the assessment of costs against an attorney who committed misconduct a more equitable means of financing the disciplinary process, but the imposition of costs and expenses serves the additional function of deterring other lawyers from engaging in unprofessional conduct. Moreover, as with restitution, we consider the imposition of costs and fees to be part of the rehabilitative process of our disciplinary proceeding. See Levine, 174 Ariz. at 176 n. 21, 847 P.2d at 1123 n. 21. Respondent argues that § 12-109 limits the court's ability to impose costs and fees on a sanctioned attorney. Although we have recognized the legislature's power to enact legislation in this area, we consistently have held that the legislature does not have the power to enact laws that would make it impossible, or even unreasonably difficult for the judicial department to perform its constitutional function. E.g., In re Miller, 29 Ariz. 582, 596, 244 P. 376, 380 (1926). Because we find that the imposition of costs and expenses plays an important and necessary function in our disciplinary process, we would be unnecessarily implicating constitutional questions if we were to interpret § 12-109 as applying to disciplinary actions. And this we will not do. We therefore find that § 12-109 does not apply to disciplinary actions.
In the alternative, Respondent argues that assessment of expenses outside those recoverable in a civil action is a form of punishment, contrary to the stated purpose of lawyer discipline. We agree with Respondent that the purpose of lawyer discipline is not to punish the lawyer, but to protect the public and deter similar conduct by other lawyers. E.g., Rivkind, 164 Ariz. at 157, 791 P.2d at 1040. We disagree, however, with Respondent's characterization of the imposition of costs and fees as a form of punishment. As discussed above, we view this sanction as a means of protecting the public, deterring other lawyers from engaging in unprofessional conduct, and rehabilitating the disciplined attorney. We recognize that the imposition of costs and expenses may appear punitive, but as the Washington Supreme Court noted when faced with a similar challenge, even though punishment is not the goal of attorney discipline, it is the inevitable sequela of the sanction. In re Vetter, 104 Wash.2d 779, 711 P.2d 284, 292 (1985).