Opinion ID: 2068703
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: testimony of theodore ruckman

Text: [7] Michael B. sought to admit the testimony of Theodore Ruckman, a neighbor of Laura and Michael's at the time of the assault. Ruckman was to testify that he had seen Laura and her brother David playing together in a tire swing in the early summer of 1990; the children were facing each other in the swing, David's pants were undone, and the children spent two or three minutes touching each other's private parts. The judge ruled the testimony irrelevant and therefore inadmissible. The court of appeals affirmed on the ground that the evidence was excluded under the Wisconsin rape shield law. We agree with both conclusions and therefore affirm this evidentiary ruling. Insofar as Ruckman's testimony was to suggest that someone else, i.e., David, sexually assaulted Laura, the evidence is irrelevant to the charges filed against Michael B. To win Michael's conviction, the state need only prove that he had sexual contact or intercourse with Laura R. Evidence going to prove one sexual encounter does not assist the trier of fact in determining whether a separate sexual encounter also occurred the two events are not mutually exclusive. Accordingly, evidence that David might have sexually assaulted Laura on a previous occasion does not make the existence of a material fact, namely Michael's physical contact with Laura during the week of April 22, more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Denny, 120 Wis. 2d at 623. More troublesome is Michael's contention that Ruckman's testimony would provide an alternate explanation for the source of Laura's sexual knowledge and her enlarged hymenal opening. Michael further asserts that the testimony would permit him to test Laura's credibility regarding statements made to Doctor O'Brien that something like the alleged April attack has never happen [sic] before or since and thus determine whether she fabricated the entire story to protect David. As counsel for Michael argued in his motion before the judge, the testimony goes to her credibility . . . to her bias . . . to her prejudice. We do not doubt the soundness of Michael's claim that information tending to prove an alternate source of Laura's physical condition and sexual knowledge would be relevant to his defense. Nonetheless, we agree with the reasoning of the court of appeals and conclude that sec. 972.11, Wisconsin's rape shield law, prohibits the admission of evidence relating to Laura's sexual history. The law was enacted in large measure to protect victims of sexual assault from themselves becoming the focus of scrutiny during trial and thereby misleading or confusing the jury with collateral issues. See State v. Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d 633, 647, 456 N.W.2d 325 (1990). In the instant case, evidence of Laura's conduct with her brother would deflect attention away from the question of whether Michael had sexually assaulted Laura and focus the jury's attention on Laura's character and past behavior. In addition, Wisconsin's rape shield law silenced widely held but outmoded beliefs that a woman's sexual past would shed light on the veracity of her complaint and the likelihood she had consented to the conduct. See State v. Herndon, 145 Wis. 2d 91, 104-05, 426 N.W.2d 347 (Ct. App. 1988); State v. Gavigan, 111 Wis. 2d 150, 156, 330 N.W.2d 571 (1983). Section 972.11, Stats., fills a slightly different role, however, in respect to child sexual assault cases in which the victim's physical condition, such as an enlarged hymenal opening, is pivotal to the state's case. One generally presumes that an eight-year-old child does not have a sexual history. Therefore, if confronted with physical evidence to the contrary one may unjustly infer that the child must have been sexually assaulted on the occasion at issue in the litigation. The child victim of sexual assault may best be likened to that of an adult victim whom the prosecution asserts was a virgin prior to the alleged assault. In State v. Clark , this court ruled that evidence relating to a victim's alleged virginity prior to the assault in question was inadmissible under Wisconsin's rape shield law. State v. Clark, 87 Wis. 2d 804, 817, 275 N.W.2d 715 (1979). [7] Section 972.11(2)(b), Stats., prohibits the admission of any evidence related to the victim's prior sexual conductincluding the absence of sexual activity. Clark, 87 Wis. 2d at 817. See also State v. Mitchell, 144 Wis. 2d 596, 609, 424 N.W.2d 698 (1988) ( citing Gavigan, 111 Wis. 2d at 150; State v. Penigar, 139 Wis. 2d 569, 408 N.W.2d 28 (1987)). Michael nevertheless maintains that a dilated hymen should be considered a disease within the meaning of sec. 972.11(2)(b)2, which allows evidence of specific instances of sexual conduct showing the source or origin of semen, pregnancy or disease, for use in determining the degree of sexual assault or the extent of injury suffered. [8] We reject this broadening of sec. 972.11(2)(b)2 for several reasons, for the statute is written narrowly to allow evidence of specific instances of sexual conduct only insofar as they may show a source of semen, pregnancy or disease and only for the limited purpose of determining the extent of injury or degree of assault at issue in the case. We agree with the assessment of the court of appeals that according to the plain meaning of the statute the source of semen, pregnancy or disease is not an issue, and M.R.B. is not challenging the degree of sexual assault or the extent of L.R.'s injury . . .. It strains linguistic credibility to define disease as including the condition of a child's hymen. [9] Black's Law Dictionary defines disease as the [d]eviation from the healthy or normal condition of any of the functions or tissues of the body. . . . See Black's Law Dictionary (1987). Central to the definition is a concept of damage which does not apply to a dilated hymen regardless of the individual's age. Since the legislature's adoption of sec. 972.11(2)(c), this court has restricted its interpretation of sec. 972.11(2)(b). Section 972.11(2)(c) provides: Notwithstanding s. 901.06, the limitation on the admission of evidence of or reference to the prior sexual conduct of the complaining witness in par. (b) applies regardless of the purpose of the admission or reference unless the admission is expressly permitted under par. (b) 1, 2, or 3. (Emphasis added.) In State v. Mitchell , we rejected evidence of the claimant's virginity for the purpose of identifying the defendant as the person from whom the claimant had contracted gonorrhea on the ground that 972.11(2)(c) absolutely prohibits this court from expanding the scope of the statute's listed exceptions. State v. Mitchell, 144 Wis. 2d at 612. See also Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d at 642-44. So too, we now reject Michael B.'s assertion that Ruckman's testimony should be admitted to show an alternate source of Laura's physical condition.