Opinion ID: 2994581
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Role Of The Jury’s Recommendation Of Death

Text: A death sentence may not be based on a determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant’s death rests elsewhere. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 328-29 (1985). Lowery complains that he was denied due process and a fair sentencing determination because the court and prosecutor demeaned the jury’s sense of responsibility in a materially inaccurate and misleading manner that violated Caldwell. The court told the jury during voir dire that it’s not the function of the jury to sentence a defendant. It is solely the responsibility of the Judge, me, and the Judge must make the final decision. The jury’s decision is merely a recommendation. The prosecutor spoke likewise. In Caldwell, the prosecutor, apparently hoping to sway timid jurors, argued to the jury that if it decided to impose the death penalty, its decision would not be the final decision, and that its decision was automatically reviewable by the state’s supreme court. The Supreme Court held that these comments were inappropriate and required reversal because the suggestion that the responsibility for any ultimate determination of death will rest with others presents an intolerable danger that the jury will in fact choose to minimize the importance of its role. Id. at 333. Any decision based upon a jury’s inaccurate perception about its role in the imposition of a death sentence is, under the reasoning of Caldwell, unconstitutional. Lowery argues to us that the court’s and prosecutor’s statements were inaccurate and require reversal of his sentence because they minimized the jury’s role and made the juror’s believe their role in imposing a death sentence was almost ceremonial. We do not agree. To violate Caldwell, the remarks to the jury must inaccurately describe the role of the jury under state law. Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 9 (1994); Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 401 (1989); Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 183- 84 n.15 (1986). Under Indiana law, the jury recommends to the judge whether the death penalty should be imposed. The judge must consider the jury’s recommendation, but, the final decision is his. Ind. Code sec.35-50-2-9(e). In this case, the jury was informed that its role was to recommend to the trial judge whether or not to impose the death penalty. Contrary to Lowery’s suggestion, the jury was properly instructed as to its role and there was no Caldwell violation. We recently addressed, in Fleenor v. Anderson, 171 F.3d 1096, 1099-101 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. den’d, 120 S.Ct. 215 (1999), the application of Caldwell to the jury recommendation procedure in Indiana. There, the jury was repeatedly informed that its role in sentencing was to make a recommendation to the trial judge, who would make the final sentencing decision. The judge advised the jury during voir dire: In Indiana, after the trial of a case, if a defendant is found guilty, then another hearing is held before the jury, where the parties have an opportunity to present . . . evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the case and then the jury again retires to make a recommendation to the court from the jury whether they recommend the death penalty. It’s not the function of a jury to sentence a defendant. It is solely the responsibility of the Judge, me, and the Judge must make the final decision. The jury’s opinion is merely a recommendation to me. Lowery, 69 F.Supp.2d at 1101, citing state court record, exhibit 28 at page 48. These words mirror, almost exactly, the words given to Lowery’s jury. We found in Fleenor, and we find here, that telling the jury that its role is advisory and that the court makes the final sentencing determination does not violate