Opinion ID: 2517889
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: american skiing properly filed a motion to dismiss the eviction action against wolf mountain

Text: ¶ 12 As discussed, the district court initially granted American Skiing's motion to dismiss the Osguthorpes' unlawful detainer action against American Skiing. Subsequent to the entry of the district court's order dismissing that claim, American Skiing filed a second independent motion to dismiss the Osguthorpes' unlawful detainer claim against codefendant Wolf Mountain. The Osguthorpes and Wolf Mountain challenge American Skiing's right to have brought the second motion. ¶ 13 The parties, as well as the district court, characterize the Osguthorpes' challenge to the second motion to dismiss as an issue of American Skiing's standing. The Osguthorpes claim American Skiing lacked standing to file the motion to dismiss because, upon the dismissal of the Osguthorpes' claims against American Skiing, American Skiing was no longer a party to the action. We disagree with the Osguthorpes' claim that American Skiing was no longer a party to the action. We also disagree with their characterization of the issue as one of standing. ¶ 14 [I]n Utah, ... standing is a jurisdictional requirement. Brown v. Div. of Water Rights, 2010 UT 14, ¶ 12, 228 P.3d 747. A challenge to a party's standing rais[es] fundamental questions regarding a court's basic authority over the dispute. Id. ¶ 13. As such, a challenge to standing is generally directed at a plaintiff and questions whether that plaintiff meets the jurisdictional requirements to air a particular grievance in court. Where a plaintiff meets the jurisdictional requirements to bring a cause of action, there is no need to evaluate whether a defendant has standing to defend the action. Here, there has been no challenge to the court's jurisdiction to hear the Osguthorpes' claims and therefore an analysis of American Skiing's standing is unnecessary. Rather, we hold that American Skiing remained a party to the action after the dismissal of the Osguthorpes' unlawful detainer claim against American Skiing, giving it the right to file a motion to dismiss the Osguthorpes' remaining claims against Wolf Mountain. ¶ 15 A party does not lose its party status in a litigation action when the district court issues a non final order dismissing the claims against that party. Until the district court finally disposes of all claims in an action, it remains free to revisit its rulings. See Hall v. Dep't of Corr., 2001 UT 34, ¶ 12, 24 P.3d 958 (A party must remain a part of the action where `a trial court is free to reassess its decision at any point prior to entry of a final order or judgment.') (quoting Ron Shepherd Ins., Inc., v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650, 654 (Utah 1994)); see also Powell v. Cannon, 2008 UT 19, ¶ 11, 179 P.3d 799 (For an order or judgment to be final, it must dispose of the case as to all the parties, and finally dispose of the subject-matter of the litigation on the merits of the case.) (Internal quotation marks omitted.). Therefore, all parties retain their party status whenever there are pending claims or cross-claims in an action. ¶ 16 In this case, the district court dismissed the Osguthorpes' claims against American Skiing, but did so in a non final order. The district court, therefore, still retained jurisdiction over American Skiing and was capable of revisiting its dismissal order at any time prior to the entry of a final judgment. Additionally, American Skiing was a named defendant in the pending cross-claims that Wolf Mountain had filed in the action. ¶ 17 Although it is clear that American Skiing remained a party to the action, the Osguthorpes assert that it was not entitled to file a motion seeking to dismiss a claim in which it was not named as a defendant. We disagree. Although the precise issue appears to be one of first impression in Utah, cases from other jurisdictions analyzing the similar situation of an intervenor's right to file motions once it becomes a party to an action persuade us to hold that any party to a lawsuit has the right to defend against any and all claims in the action. ¶ 18 Once an intervenor becomes a party to an action, it is able to file a motion to dismiss all of the plaintiff's claims against the named defendant. See e.g., Crystal v. Grzywna, 1992 WL 257788, at , 1992 Conn.Super. LEXIS 2782, at  (Conn.Super.Ct., Sept. 17, 1992) (where [s]imultaneous to filing the motion to intervene, [defendant-intervenor] filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the court does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the appeal); In re Sander Johnson, 173 N.W.2d 475, 476 (N.D.1970) (where [s]imultaneously with its motion to intervene, the [intervenor] moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction); Lofino Props., L.L.C. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2004 WL 225473, at , 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 413, at  (Ohio Ct.App. Feb. 3, 2004) (where the intervening parties filed a motion to dismiss or in the alternative a motion for summary judgment). In other words, upon proper intervention, a party has the ability to file any relevant motions regarding the subject matter of the claims. ¶ 19 As discussed, American Skiing remained a party to the action even after the district court granted its motion to dismiss. As a party, American Skiing was entitled to file any motions regarding the claims at issue in the lawsuit, including a motion to dismiss the Osguthorpes' unlawful detainer claim against Wolf Mountain. Indeed, any decision to the contrary would contravene all notions of fundamental fairness. Because American Skiing's rights to the Property are derivative of Wolf Mountain's rights, any decision implicating Wolf Mountain's rights would necessarily have implications on American Skiing's ability to operate its ski resort. For example, a judgment holding that Wolf Mountain had breached its Agreement with the Osguthorpes and was therefore in unlawful detainer of the Property could preclude American Skiing from exercising its rights to operate the ski resort under the principles of res judicata. This would result in American Skiing being forced off the Property without any recourse. In short, fundamental fairness, in addition to American Skiing's party status, dictate the conclusion that American Skiing's motion to dismiss was properly before the district court.