Opinion ID: 2352178
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was the seizure lawful?

Text: Having concluded that Ware was seized, we must [now] determine whether there was `articulable suspicion' or probable cause of criminal activity, or some other legal basis for the seizure. Hawkins, supra, 663 A.2d at 1225. Ware argues that the anonymous tip that prompted the officer to act was unreliable and hence insufficient to arouse a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity [was] afoot. Terry v. Ohio, supra note 5, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct. at 1884. According to Ware, the tip from the unidentified woman amounted, at most, to a mere rumor of past criminal activity. We said in Peay v. United States, 597 A.2d 1318 (D.C.1991) (en banc): To justify an investigative detention under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), the police must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion. Id. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1880. This minimal level of objective justification is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989). In determining whether a Terry stop is lawful, the court must look to the totality of the circumstances. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2416, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990), quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 694, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). Even if each specific act by a suspect could be perceived in isolation as an innocent act, the observing police officer may see a combination of facts that make out an articulable suspicion. United States v. Bennett, 514 A.2d 414, 416 (D.C.1986). Id. at 1319-1320. Under this standard, [t]he requirement of `articulable suspicion' is not an onerous one. Gomez v. United States, 597 A.2d 884, 888 (D.C.1991). Thus the government argues that if Ware was seized by Officer Jones, that seizure was a permissible Terry stop (see note 5, supra ), supported by articulable suspicion based on an anonymous, but corroborated, tip from a citizen. On several occasions we have held that [t]he requisite articulable suspicion for the stop can be furnished by an anonymous tip, and the police may stop a suspect after promptly corroborating innocent details of the tip without first observing illegal conduct. Holston v. United States, 633 A.2d 378, 381 (D.C.1993) (citations omitted); accord, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 540 A.2d 1090, 1092 (D.C.1988); Allen v. United States, 496 A.2d 1046, 1049 (D.C.1985); United States v. Mason, 450 A.2d 464, 466 (D.C. 1982) (upholding Terry stop based on anonymous tip where all innocent details have been quickly corroborated on the scene). The Supreme Court has similarly held that under the totality of the circumstances [an] anonymous tip, as corroborated, [can exhibit] sufficient indicia of reliability to justify [an] investigatory stop.... Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2417, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990). Because there are obvious risks in relying indiscriminately on anonymous tips from citizens to justify Terry stops, we have emphasized that each case must be carefully evaluated on its facts, and that an anonymous tip must be supported by sufficient corroboration in order to avoid abuse of the Terry doctrine. Johnson, supra, 540 A.2d at 1091; see Alabama v. White, supra, 496 U.S. at 332, 110 S.Ct. at 2417 (upholding Terry stop when significant aspects of the [anonymous tip] were verified); Brown v. United States, 590 A.2d 1008, 1015 (D.C.1991) (courts are properly wary of sustaining seizures on the basis of anonymous tips, and require a substantial measure of corroboration of information). Since Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), this court has adopted a totality of the circumstances test when determining the reliability of information received from anonymous sources. See, e.g., Gomez, supra, 597 A.2d at 889; Brown, supra, 590 A.2d at 1014. [9] In the instant case, as in most cases, this test requires us to consider the informant's credibility and reliability and the basis for his or her knowledge, ... the sufficiency of the informant's description and the degree to which [Ware] matched it, as well as [Ware's] conduct on the scene and any inferences that may fairly be drawn from that. Id. at 1014-1015. To this list we must add, as circumstances warrant, the facts known to the officers from personal observation, Alabama v. White, supra, 496 U.S. at 330, 110 S.Ct. at 2416, the amount of time between receipt of the tip and the officer's independent corroboration, Holston, supra, 633 A.2d at 381, and the tipster's ability to predict future behavior of the suspect. Illinois v. Gates, supra, 462 U.S. at 245, 103 S.Ct. at 2335-2336. [10] Applying these standards, we hold that the anonymous tip that Officer Jones received was sufficiently corroborated. While we agree with Ware that it is difficult to assess the tipster's credibility, see Brown, supra, 590 A.2d at 1015, this court has long recognized a `presum[ption] that a citizen is prima facie a more credible source than a paid police informant.' Allen v. United States, supra, 496 A.2d at 1048 (citing Rushing v. United States, 381 A.2d 252, 255 (D.C. 1977)). We have also said that when a citizen appears to have personally observed a crime, the reliability of his or her information is greatly enhanced. Allen, supra, 496 A.2d at 1048 (citations omitted). [11] Finally, the fact that the tip was given in person, rather than over the telephone, further strengthens its credibility. See Brown, supra, 590 A.2d at 1016 (an anonymous telephone tip is of the `weakest reliability'); Lawson v. United States, 360 A.2d 38, 40 (D.C.1976) (there may be cause to make [the] distinction in some circumstances between anonymous tips received in person and those received by telephone). [12] We note also that the details of the tip were corroborated by the officer's own observations. The woman gave information that precisely identified Ware's outfit and his method of drug distribution. She described the drug dealer as wearing bicycle shorts, sneakers, no shirt, and no socks. She also said that the man was selling drugs out of a woman's purse. Officer Jones had just seen Ware in an outfit that matched the woman's description. Moreover, as the officer approached him, Ware blurted out, I bet you're wondering why I got a female's purse. These corroborative details, in our view, gave the anonymous tip sufficient reliability to support the officer's reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Ware relies heavily on the Brown case, in which this court held that an anonymous tip had not been sufficiently corroborated to provide articulable suspicion. We find both Brown and Cauthen v. United States , which reached a similar result, to be distinguishable. In Brown the information given to the police by telephone identified the defendant only as a black man wearing blue jeans and a white shirt with writing on the front. Besides finding this description deficient, we noted that Brown's actual appearance failed to match the few details which the tipster did provide. 590 A.2d at 1023 n. 23. Similarly, in Cauthen we found the content of the anonymous tip to be inadequate because there was no physical description at all, and no other information that the police could rely on: The tip stated that three or four persons were [at a certain location] selling drugs. Other than describing the number of participants, it gave no physical description of the suspects by sex, race, size, clothing or any other distinguishing feature; nor did it describe any object, such as a car or storefront, in the vicinity of which they could be located. Cauthen, supra note 11, 592 A.2d at 1023 (footnotes omitted). In each case we also held that there was insufficient corroboration to overcome the weakness of the tip itself. In Brown there was no corroboration of any prediction of future conduct, the description of the seller was scanty, and the match-up between that description and Brown's appearance was in some measure flawed, 590 A.2d at 1023, and in Cauthen we were troubled by the delay of at least fifteen minutes in the arrival of the police at the reported location, a delay which we deemed a key factor in the circumstances of the case. 592 A.2d at 1023. In the instant case, however, we are satisfied that both the tip itself and the corroborating information are considerably stronger than in either Brown or Cauthen. See also Speight v. United States, 671 A.2d 442, 447-448 (D.C.1996) (distinguishing Brown and Cauthen ). For these reasons we hold that the anonymous tip, corroborated by Officer Jones' personal observations, gave the officer a reasonable suspicion that appellant Ware was engaged or about to engage in criminal conduct, and that his seizure of Ware's person therefore did not violate the Fourth Amendment.