Opinion ID: 555459
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Search of the Ayers' Residence

Text: 45 Eddie Ayers contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized from his house upon execution of a search warrant on February 28, 1985. Eddie Ayers first asserts that the affidavits supporting the search warrant were insufficient to establish probable cause that his son, Eric Ayers, was engaged in narcotics trafficking. Eddie Ayers also argues that under the facts of this case, the search of the entire house, including rooms which were not occupied by Eric Ayers, was unreasonable. Eddie Ayers maintains further that reversal is compelled because the district court denied his request for an evidentiary hearing. 46 On February 28, 1985, police officers from the San Pablo Police Department conducted a search of Eddie Ayers' residence located at 3044 Glynis Drive in Richmond, California. The search was conducted pursuant to a search warrant. The affidavits supporting the search warrant alleged that a confidential reliable informant had personally observed Eric Ayers selling cocaine from his automobile in North Richmond. The informant gave a description of Eric Ayers and his automobile. The informant also advised the affiant, Detective Buehler, that Eric Ayers lived on Glynis Drive in Richmond. 47 Detective Buehler checked the San Pablo Police Department records which revealed previous contacts with Eric Ayers. The previous contacts included a traffic citation on February 18, 1985, ten days prior to the execution of the search warrant, and an arrest for possession of cocaine on January 17, 1984. Eric Ayers told the police on each occasion that he resided at 3044 Glynis Drive. Detective Buehler also verified Eric Ayers' residence address by checking the official records concerning his driver's license and the utilities billing records. 48 When the police officers arrived at the Glynis Drive residence to execute the search warrant, Mrs. Ella Ayers informed them that Eric Ayers no longer lived there. The police proceeded to search the entire residence. During the search, the officers discovered and seized approximately $469,925.00 in cash from the closet in Eddie Ayers' bedroom. 49
50 Eddie Ayers contends that the search warrant was not supported by probable cause because the only information regarding Eric's alleged narcotics trafficking was provided by a confidential informant whose reliability was not sufficiently established in the underlying affidavit. In support of his argument, Eddie cites a California case, People v. Mason, 132 Cal.App.3d 594, 183 Cal.Rptr. 246 (1982). Mason holds that the simple recitation that an informer participated in controlled buys is insufficient to establish probable cause. Id. at 599, 183 Cal.Rptr. 246. However, Mason is not controlling in the case before us. The warrant in Mason was reviewed under the two-prong Aguilar-Spinelli test. This standard was expressly rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). Furthermore, Mason is not binding authority in the federal courts. United States v. Little, 753 F.2d 1420, 1434 (9th Cir.1984) (Evidence obtained in violation of neither the Constitution nor federal law is admissible in federal court proceedings without regard to state law. ). Finally, the facts in Mason differ significantly from those in the present case. 51 Magistrates and judges must examine the totality of the circumstances set forth in the affidavit to determine whether there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). The circumstances which a magistrate or judge may consider include an informant's reliability or basis of knowledge. Id. However, a deficiency in one of these elements may be compensated for, in determining the overall reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the other, or by some other indicia of reliability. Id. at 233, 103 S.Ct. at 2329. One of the indicia of reliability discussed in Gates is the corroboration of details of an informant's tip by independent police work. Id. at 241, 103 S.Ct. at 2334. The standard of review for the issuance of a search warrant requires us to examine whether the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that the affidavit in support of the warrant established probable cause. United States v. Angulo-Lopez, 791 F.2d 1394, 1396 (9th Cir.1986) (citing United States v. Seybold, 726 F.2d 502, 503 (9th Cir.1984)). This inquiry is less probing than de novo review and shows deference to the issuing magistrate's determination. Id. 52 The totality of the circumstances set forth in the supporting affidavit discloses sufficient indicia of reliability of the confidential informant's tip. The affidavit stated that the informant personally observed Eric Ayers participate in the sale of cocaine. The informant knew the substance was cocaine because he had possessed and used it on prior occasions. The affidavit detailed the informant's prior activities in connection with the police, including participating in approximately 15 to 18 controlled buys of contraband under the direction of officers from the Contra Costa County Sheriff's Department and the San Pablo Police Department. The affidavit further stated that the informant had never been known to give any false information to the Contra Costa Sheriff's Narcotics Unit or to the affiant. 53 Detective Buehler also conducted an independent investigation to verify the identity and address of Eric Ayers. This investigation disclosed that Eric Ayers had previously been arrested for the possession of drugs. Based on the totality of the circumstances set forth in the affidavit, the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that the informer's tip was reliable. 54 Eddie Ayers also contends that the search warrant was not supported by probable cause because the affidavit failed to establish a nexus between Eric Ayers' alleged narcotic sales and the Glynis Drive residence. The key case upon which Eddie Ayers relies is United States v. Bailey, 458 F.2d 408 (9th Cir.1972). In Bailey, we determined that the denial of a motion to suppress evidence of a bank robbery was erroneous. Travelers' checks stolen from the bank were seized from an automobile in which the two suspects were seen six weeks following the robbery. Id. at 411. Clothing worn during the robbery was seized from a house where one of the suspects was arrested. Id. We found that the facts recited in the affidavit were insufficient to support the affiant's conclusions that the house and the automobile contained any objects of the search. Id. at 412. 55 Eddie Ayers' reliance on Bailey is misplaced. We begin our analysis by noting that Bailey involved a robbery suspect instead of a drug dealer. To find probable cause, a magistrate or judge is entitled to draw reasonable inferences about where evidence is likely to be kept, based on the nature of the evidence and the type of offense. United States v. Angulo-Lopez, 791 F.2d 1394, 1399 (9th Cir.1986). In Bailey, we concluded that it is not reasonable to seek evidence of a bank robbery which occurred six weeks earlier, at a house where the defendant may be staying only as a social guest. Bailey, 458 F.2d at 412. We have also concluded, however, that  '[i]n the case of drug dealers, evidence is likely to be found where the dealers live.'  United States v. Fannin, 817 F.2d 1379, 1382 (9th Cir.1987) (quoting United States v. Angulo-Lopez, 791 F.2d 1394, 1399 (9th Cir.1986)). See also United States v. Foster, 711 F.2d 871, 878 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1103, 104 S.Ct. 1602, 80 L.Ed.2d 132 (1984). 56 It is also clearly established that in weighing the evidence supporting a request for a search warrant, a magistrate may rely on the conclusions of experienced law enforcement officers regarding where evidence of a crime is likely to be found. Fannin, 817 F.2d at 1382. The affidavit supporting the search warrant set forth facts detailing Detective Buehler's training and experience in narcotics investigations. Detective Buehler alleged that it was his experience that drug traffickers have contraband and other evidence of their crime in their residences. Under the law of this circuit, the affidavit established a sufficient nexus between Eric Ayers' alleged drug trafficking and his place of residence on Glynis Drive. The district court did not err in determining that the totality of the circumstances set forth in Detective Buehler's affidavit established a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed for the issuance of a search warrant.
57 Eddie Ayers also contends that the officers acted unreasonably and in bad faith in executing the search warrant. He asserts that the affidavit submitted by Ted Cassman in support of the motion to suppress establishes that the police confirmed Mrs. Ayers' statement that Eric no longer lived at the Glynis Drive residence before they conducted the search. He argues that once the officers had established Mrs. Ayers' statement that Eric Ayers no longer lived at the residence, they had no right to execute the warrant. [T]he lawfulness of a search presents a mixed question of law and fact that is reviewed de novo. United States v. Limatoc, 807 F.2d 792, 794 (9th Cir.1987). 58 The record demonstrates that the officers had a right to execute the warrant, notwithstanding Mrs. Ayers' assertion that Eric Ayers no longer lived there. The information disclosed by the police investigation gave them a reasonable basis for discrediting Mrs. Ayers' statement. Eric Ayers had given the Glynis Drive address as his current residence when he received a traffic citation just ten days prior to the execution of the warrant. Eric Ayers had also given that address as his residence on other records in the police files. Detective Buehler independently confirmed the address by checking the official records concerning Eric Ayers' drivers license. In addition, Detective Buehler observed Eric Ayers' automobile parked in front of the Glynis Drive address at 7:15 a.m. on the morning that the search warrant was executed. It was reasonable for the officers to infer from these facts that Eric Ayers still resided at 3044 Glynis Drive. The officers had no duty to accept Mrs. Ayers' statements as truthful in light of the facts known to them prior to their search. 59 Eddie Ayers argues that if the police did have a right to search, they exceeded the scope of the search warrant by searching the entire house, including his bedroom over which Eric clearly did not have common control. Whether police exceed the scope of a warrant in their search is reviewed de novo. United States v. McLaughlin, 851 F.2d 283, 286 (9th Cir.1988). 60 The police did not exceed the scope of the warrant by extending their search to Eddie Ayers' bedroom. The warrant authorized the search for narcotics throughout the entire single family residence located at 3044 Glynis Drive. 61 Eddie Ayers' has directed our attention to cases involving multi-tenant buildings to support his argument that the search should not have included Eddie Ayers' bedroom. The principal case upon which Eddie Ayers relies is Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 107 S.Ct. 1013, 94 L.Ed.2d 72 (1987). In Garrison, the police officers obtained a search warrant for the entire third floor of a building, not knowing that there were actually two separate apartments on the third floor. In determining whether a search of the wrong apartment was valid, the Supreme Court applied the following standard: [T]he validity of the search of respondent's apartment pursuant to a warrant authorizing the search of the entire third floor depends on whether the officers' failure to realize the overbreadth of the warrant was objectively understandable and reasonable. Id. at 88, 107 S.Ct. at 1018. 62 A search warrant for the entire premises of a single family residence is valid, notwithstanding the fact that it was issued based on information regarding the alleged illegal activities of one of several occupants of a residence. See 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, Sec. 4.5(b) at 219-20 (2nd ed. 1987) and the cases cited therein. In People v. Gorg, 157 Cal.App.2d 515, 321 P.2d 143 (1958), the California Court of Appeal considered facts similar to those before us. The California court held that a search of an entire apartment shared by three persons, including their separate bedrooms, was proper pursuant to a warrant naming only one of the tenants. Id. at 522-23, 321 P.2d 143. The bedroom of each tenant opened onto the common areas and was not locked. Id. at 523, 321 P.2d 143. The court found the apartment to be one distinct living unit occupied by three persons instead of distinct living quarters occupied by different persons. Id. See also Hemler v. Superior Court, 44 Cal.App.3d 430, 118 Cal.Rptr. 564 (1975) (search of bedroom of person not named in the search warrant appropriate where bedroom opened onto common hallway and was not locked). 63 As previously discussed, a drug dealer's narcotics and related paraphernalia is likely to be found in his residence. Fannin, 817 F.2d at 1382. Furthermore, such contraband can be hidden in any portion of the residence. The most obvious place for the police to search would be the drug dealer's bedroom. Therefore, any other portion of the house would be a more secure hiding place. Thus, the search of the entire premises located at 3044 Glynis Drive was not overbroad or unreasonable. See United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1301 (9th Cir.1985) ([A] warrant is valid when it authorizes the search of a street address with several dwellings if the defendants are in control of the whole premises, if the dwellings are occupied in common, or if the entire property is suspect.). 64 Eddie Ayers also claims that his request for an evidentiary hearing to determine precisely what the police knew before they proceeded with their full-scale search should have been granted. Whether to hold an evidentiary hearing on a motion to suppress is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Walczak, 783 F.2d 852, 857 (9th Cir.1986). An evidentiary hearing on a motion to suppress ordinarily is required if the moving papers are sufficiently definite, specific, detailed, and nonconjectural to enable the court to conclude that contested issues of fact going to the validity of the search are in issue. Id. 65 In support of his motion to suppress, Eddie Ayers submitted the declaration of Ted Cassman. Ted Cassman was one of the attorneys of record for Gregory and Eddie Ayers. Ted Cassman declared: 66 Upon entering the premises 3044 Glynis Drive on February 28, 1985, the San Pablo Police officers were confronted by Ella Ayers, the wife of defendant EDDIE AYERS and the mother of defendant GREGORY AYERS. Mrs. Ayers was given a copy of the search affidavit, and then informed the officers that her son, Eric Ayers, no longer lived at 3044 Glynis Drive. Instead, she told the officers Eric Ayers now lived on 18th Street in Richmond, near Roosevelt. Soon thereafter, the officers confirmed that Mrs. Ayers' information was correct. Nevertheless, the officers continued to search the entire residence. 67 Eddie Ayers argues that the allegations contained in Cassman's declaration compelled the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing concerning the lawfulness of the conduct of the officers in executing the warrant following Mrs. Ayers statement that Eric Ayers did not live there any longer. We disagree. The Cassman declaration contains only the conclusions and hearsay statements of a non-percipient witness. The district court was not apprised of the name of any percipient witness who would testify that the accuracy of Mrs. Ayers' report was confirmed before the search. Under these circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying an evidentiary hearing.