Opinion ID: 4027532
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Science of Eyewitness Identifications

Text: 52 J.A. 226-27. 53 J.A. 228-29. 12 As I noted at the outset, we have long known that eyewitness identifications are not always as reliable as witnesses (and jurors) may believe them to be. In 1927, long before the explosion of research in this area, Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote: “[t]he hazards of [eyewitness identification] testimony are established by a formidable number of instances in the records of English and American trials.”54 In 1932, well before the availability of DNA analysis, Yale Law professor Edwin M. Borchard documented almost seventy cases involving eyewitness errors that caused miscarriages of justice.55 Over thirty years later, the Supreme Court acknowledged this problem in United States v. Wade.56 There, the Court famously proclaimed that “[t]he vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken identification.”57 In the ensuing decades, the scientific community has made significant strides in understanding this phenomenon.58 A combination of basic and applied research on human visual perception and cognition has revealed that the reliability of eyewitness identifications is largely contingent on the conditions under which memories are created, stored, and then 54 Felix Frankfurter, The Case of Sacco and Vanzetti: A Critical Analysis for Lawyers and Laymen 30 (Universal Library ed., 1962). 55 Edwin M. Borchard, Convicting the Innocent; Sixty-Five Actual Errors of Criminal Justice (1932). 56 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 57 Id. at 228. 58 See, e.g., Gary L. Wells, Nancy K. Steblay, & Jennifer E. Dysart, Double-Blind Photo Lineups Using Actual Eyewitnesses: An Experimental Test of a Sequential Versus Simultaneous Lineup Procedure, 39 L. & Hum. Behav. 1, 1 (2015); Laura Smalarz & Gary L. Wells, Contamination of Eyewitness Self-Reports and the Mistaken-Identification Problem, 24 Current Directions Psychol. 120, 120 (2015); Brian L. Cutler & Steven D. Penrod, Mistaken Identification: The Eyewitness, Psychology, and the Law (1995); Eyewitness Testimony: Psychological Perspectives (Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth A. Loftus eds., 1984). 13 later recalled. “At its core, eyewitness identification relies on brain systems for visual perception and memory: The witness perceives the face and other aspects of the perpetrator’s physical appearance and bearing, stores that information in memory, and later retrieves the information for comparison with the visual percept of an individual in a lineup.”59 Research has shown that certain variables can impact the processes of these memory functions with serious implications for the reliability of the subsequent memories. These variables generally fall into two basic categories: system variables and estimator variables.
System variables are the procedures and practices law enforcement use to elicit eyewitness identifications.60 Examples of system variables include the instructions law enforcement officers give to witnesses when they ask them to provide identifications, the comments of police to witnesses during the identification process, and the types of procedures (lineup, photo array, etc.) used to solicit the identification. These factors are important not only because they heavily influence the reliability of identifications, but also because they largely lie within the exclusive control of the criminal justice system. The following section explores a few critical system variables and their effects on the accuracy of eyewitness identifications.
One of the most important system variables that law enforcement can control is the blinding of identification procedures.61 Blinding occurs when the officer administering an identification procedure, such as a photo array, knows who the suspect is but cannot determine when the witness is 59 National Research Council, Identifying the Culprit, supra, at 14-15. 60 See id. at 16, 72, 76. 61 See State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 896-97 (N.J. 2011), holding modified by State v. Chen, 27 A.2d 930 (N.J. 2011); National Research Council, Identifying the Culprit, supra, at 24-25, 26. 14 viewing the suspect’s photo. “In one common ‘blinded’ procedure, the officer places each photo in a separate envelope or folder and then shuffles the envelopes/folders so that only the witness sees the images therein.”62 This blinding can also be doubled: for example, when an officer who neither knows the suspect’s identity nor position in the photo array shows the array to an eyewitness. Such blinding is used to prevent the officer from giving the witness conscious or unconscious cues that can affect the witness’ identification.63 Common sense suggests that identification procedures administered without some degree of blinding are inherently untrustworthy, and research confirms this.64 Typically, the greater the level of blinding, the more reliable the procedure. One of the foremost experts on eyewitness identifications has concluded that blind lineup administration is “the single most important characteristic that should apply to eyewitness identification.”65 Social psychologists believe this is crucial to avoiding the “expectancy effect”: “the tendency for experimenters to obtain results they expect . . . because they have helped to shape that response through their expectations.”66 In a seminal meta-analysis of 345 studies across eight broad categories of behavioral research, researchers found that “[t]he overall probability that there is no such thing as interpersonal expectancy effects is near zero.”67 “Even seemingly innocuous words and subtle cues—pauses, gestures, hesitations, or smiles—can influence a witness’ behavior.”68 Moreover, the witness usually remains completely 62 National Research Council, Identifying the Culprit, supra, at 25. 63 Id. at 25. 64 See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 896-97; National Research Council, Identifying the Culprit, supra, at 24-25, 26. 65 Henderson, 27 A.3d at 896 (internal quotation marks omitted). 66 Robert Rosenthal & Donald B. Rubin, Interpersonal Expectancy Effects: The First 345 Studies, 3 Behav. & Brain Sci. 377, 377 (1978). 67 Id. 68 Henderson, 27 A.3d 896 (citing Ryann M. Haw & Ronald P. Fisher, Effects of Administrator-Witness Contact on Eyewitness Identification Accuracy, 89 J. Applied Psychol. 15 unaware of the signals she has been given or their effect on her identification. Outside the realm of law enforcement, in scientific experiments for instance, it is standard practice to use blinding. The importance of blind administration is so great that a failure to implement such a policy can affect even seemingly objective processes, such as the analysis of DNA samples. In one experiment, researchers gave seventeen experienced DNA analysts a mixed sample of DNA evidence from an actual crime scene—a gang rape committed in Georgia.69 All seventeen analysts worked at the same accredited government laboratory in the United States.70 Years earlier, prosecutors had relied on this evidence to convict a man named Kerry Robinson.71 In the real investigation, two analysts from the Georgia Bureau of Investigation concluded that Robinson “could not be excluded” as a suspect based on his DNA profile relative to the crime scene sample.72 Nevertheless, of the seventeen analysts involved in the study of this case, only one agreed that Robinson “could not be excluded.”73 Four analysts found that the evidence was inconclusive, and the other twelve said he could be excluded.74 All seventeen analysts were blinded to contextual information about the case. 75 Experts speculated that a failure to blind the DNA testing in the real investigation could explain the inconsistency between the results the Georgia Bureau of Investigation and the seventeen independent analysts obtained. “The difference between you giving them the data and saying ‘what do you make of it?’ and 1106, 1107 (2004) and Steven E. Clark, Tanya E. Marshall, & Robert Rosenthal, Lineup Administrator Influences on Eyewitness Identification Decisions, 15 J. Experimental Psychol.: Applied 63, 66-73 (2009)). 69 Linda Geddes, Fallible DNA Evidence Can Mean Prison or Freedom, 2773 The New Scientist: Special Report 1, 5 (2010). 70 Id. 71 Id. 72 Id. 73 Id. 74 Id. 75 Id. 16 the local district attorney giving them the data and saying ‘We’ve arrested someone, is his profile in here?’ is huge.”76 The Supreme Court has recognized the significance of such cues for decades. In 1967, in United States v. Wade, the Court ruled that a pretrial lineup is a “critical stage” of prosecution at which a defendant had a right to the presence of counsel.77 The Court explained: The fact that the police themselves have, in a given case, little or no doubt that the man put up for identification has committed the offense, and that their chief pre-occupation is with the problem of getting sufficient proof, because he has not “come clean,” involves a [] danger that this persuasion may communicate itself even in a doubtful case to the witness in some way.78 The importance of conscious and unconscious police persuasion cannot be overstated in the context of a trial because it negates the effect that strenuous cross-examination may otherwise have on the witness’ confidence in her identification. “[E]ven though cross-examination is a precious safeguard to a fair trial, it cannot be viewed as an absolute assurance of accuracy and reliability.”79 Obviously, if an eyewitness is completely unaware that her identification has been shaped by subliminal cues communicated by investigators, it is incredibly difficult, if not impossible, to dissuade that witness of the accuracy of her identification. As was true for Jennifer Thompson in the rape case discussed earlier, vigorous crossexamination may serve only to reinforce the witness’ certainty of her identification.80 The Supreme Court recognized in Wade that once a pretrial identification is made, the identifying witness becomes “the sole jury.”81 Thus, “[t]he trial which 76 Id. at 6 (internal quotation marks omitted). 77 388 U.S. 218, 236-37 (1967). 78 Id. at 235 (internal alterations, quotation marks, and citation omitted). 79 Id. 80 See 60 Minutes, supra. 81 Wade, 388 U.S. at 235. 17 might determine the accused’s fate may well not be that in the courtroom but that at the pretrial confrontation.”82 None of the identifications in Dennis’ case were obtained through processes that included blinding. The officers who showed the photo arrays and conducted the lineup knew that Dennis was the suspect, and they knew his position in the arrays and in the lineup. As the above studies make clear, it is entirely possible that the officers investigating Williams’ killing gave the witnesses unconscious cues about their suspicions. Dennis’ jurors would have been in a far better position to assess the reliability of the three courtroom identifications had they been informed of the importance of blinding procedures and their absence here.
The instructions police give witnesses prior to attempting to elicit an identification constitute a second important system variable. There is broad consensus that police must instruct witnesses that the suspect may not be in the lineup or array and that the witness should not feel compelled to identify anyone.83 In two meta-analyses, researchers found that providing this information to witnesses in advance significantly increased the reliability of the results in targetabsent lineups.84 In one study, the number of people that chose innocent fillers in target-absent lineups increased by forty-five percent when the lineup administrators failed to tell the subjects that they need not choose a suspect.85 82 Id. 83 State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 897 (N.J. 2011), holding modified by State v. Chen, 27 A.2d 930 (N.J. 2011). 84 See Steven E. Clark, A Re-examination of the Effects of Biased Lineup Instructions in Eyewitness Identification, 29 Law & Hum. Behav. 395, 418-20 (2005); Nancy M. Steblay, Social Influence in Eyewitness Recall: A Meta-Analytic Review of Lineup Instruction Effects, 21 Law & Hum. Behav. 283, 285-86, 294 (1997). 85 See Roy S. Malpass & Patricia G. Devine, Eyewitness Identification: Lineup Instructions and the Absence of the Offender, 66 J. Applied Psychol. 482, 485 (1981). 18 One hardly needs to engage in a protracted review of the wealth of data on this point to appreciate its implications. Without such instructions, witnesses may misidentify innocent suspects merely because they assume the suspect is present and the person misidentified bears the strongest resemblance to the actual perpetrator. Research confirms this.86 It is therefore critical that courts inform jurors of this system variable where present. Such information enables jurors to consider the impact that the absence of such instructions may have had on witness identifications. The record in Dennis’ case shows that the investigators failed to give such instructions to the witnesses. Accordingly, there is a real risk that the witnesses identified Dennis because he most closely resembled Williams’ killer. Indeed, that is a fair interpretation of this record. Upon seeing Dennis’ photo, Howard did not say “that’s him,” or “I think this is the shooter.” Instead, she tentatively told officers: “This one looks like the guy, but I can’t be sure.”87 Like Howard, Bertha and Cameron also initially responded to these arrays in a manner that strongly suggests that they selected Dennis because his photograph bore a closer resemblance to the shooter than any of the fillers. They qualified their selection of Dennis by saying: “Number 1 looks familiar but I can’t be sure”88; and “that looks like the one that was running with the gun.”89 It simply cannot be assumed that either statement was the equivalent of proclaiming: “that’s him,” or “he’s the one.”
Researchers have also found that the way that a photo array or live lineup is constructed can affect the reliability of the resulting identifications. A number of considerations are critical. First, not surprisingly, mistaken identifications are more likely where the suspect stands out in comparison to the 86 See Clark, Effects of Biased Lineup Instructions, supra, at 421; Steblay, Social Influence in Eyewitness Recall, supra, at 284. 87 J.A. 1537 (emphasis added). 88 J.A. 1548 (emphasis added). 89 J.A. 1555 (emphasis added). 19 fillers.90 Using fillers that are relative look-alikes forces a witness to examine her memory, whereas placing the suspect among a group of individuals that bear little resemblance to him causes him to stand out. “[A] biased lineup may [also] inflate a witness’ confidence in the identification because the selection process seemed easy.”91 As of yet, there is no clear agreement among researchers about whether fillers should more closely resemble a witness’ pre-lineup description of the suspect or the actual suspect.92 However, whether the fillers more closely resemble the suspect or the witness’ pre-lineup description, the fillers’ appearances should not make the suspect stand out. Second, all lineups should include a minimum of five 93 fillers. The logic here, which appears to be a matter of general agreement, is again clear: the greater the number of choices, the less the chance of making a lucky guess, and the more the 90 See Roy S. Malpass, Colin G. Tredoux, & Dawn McQuiston-Surrett, Lineup Construction and Lineup Fairness, in 2 The Handbook of Eyewitnesses Psychology 155, 156-58 (2007). 91 State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 898 (N.J. 2011), holding modified by State v. Chen, 27 A.2d 930 (N.J. 2011) (citing David F. Ross et al., When Accurate and Inaccurate Eyewitnesses Look the Same: A Limitation of the ‘Pop-Out’ Effect and the 10-to 12-Second Rule, 21 Applied Cognitive Psychol. 677, 687 (2007) and Gary L. Wells & Amy L. Bradfield, Measuring the Goodness of Lineups: Parameter Estimation, Question Effects, and Limits to the Mock Witness Paradigm, 13 Applied Cognitive Psychol. S27, S30 (1999)). 92 Compare Steven E. Clark & Jennifer L. Tunnicliff, Selecting Lineup Foils in Eyewitness Identification Experiments: Experimental Control and Real-World Simulation, 25 L. & Hum. Behav. 199, 212 (2001), and Gary L. Wells, Sheila M. Rydell, & Eric P. Seelau, The Selection of Distractors for Eyewitness Lineups, 78 J. Applied Psychol. 835, 842 (1993), with Stephen Darling, Tim Valentine, & Amina Memon, Selection of Lineup Foils in Operational Contexts, 22 Applied Cognitive Psychol. 159, 165-67 (2008). 93 See Nat’l Inst. of Justice, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement 29 (1999). 20 witness is forced to rely on her own memory to identify the suspect. Third, for similar reasons, lineups should not feature more than one suspect. In its landmark decision on the issue of eyewitness identification, the Supreme Court of New Jersey emphasized that, “if multiple suspects are in the lineup, the reliability of a positive identification is difficult to assess, for the possibility of ‘lucky’ guesses is magnified.”94 The trial judge here noted that the composition of the lineup was somewhat suggestive because Dennis was slightly shorter than the rest of the participants, causing him to stand out. The jurors were therefore able to consider this disparity as they evaluated the reliability of the identifications. However, the court did not provide the jury with an explanation of how this may have affected the witnesses’ identifications of Dennis in that lineup. Nor did it give the jurors information that would allow them to consider the lineup construction in context with all of the other factors that were involved in the identifications of Dennis. 4. Interactions with Witnesses: Witness Feedback Another critical system variable is whether law enforcement provides a witness with any feedback or other information in the course of her identification. As I touched on in my discussion of blinding procedures, “[t]he nature of law enforcement interactions with the eyewitness before, during, and after the identification plays a role in the accuracy of eyewitness identifications and in the confidence expressed in the accuracy of those identifications by witnesses.”95 Elizabeth Loftus, a pioneering researcher in the field of human memory and cognition, has thoroughly documented the effects of received information on memory accuracy. In one study, she 94 Henderson, 27 A.3d at 898 (internal quotation marks omitted). 95 National Research Council, Identifying the Culprit, supra, at 91 (citing Steven. E. Clark, Tanya E. Marshall, & Robert Rosenthal, Lineup Administrator Influences on Eyewitness Identification Decisions, 15 J. of Experimental Psychol.: Applied 63 (2009)). 21 showed college students a video of a car crash on a country road.96 Afterward, she asked them to estimate how fast the car was going. Half the students were asked how fast the car was going when it “passed the barn” along the country road; the other half were simply asked how fast the car was going “along the country road.”97 A week later, she asked the same students whether they had seen a barn in the film. Approximately seventeen percent of the students who were given the “passed the barn” cue recalled seeing the barn in the video.98 In contrast, less than three percent of the non-barn cue group remembered a barn.99 In reality, there was no barn in the video.100 This demonstrates the very subtle—yet extremely powerful—effect statements at the time of memory recall can have. In the eyewitness identification context, such information often comes in the form of pre- or postidentification information that may reinforce an identification. For example, research confirms the intuitive proposition that when investigators give cues that suggest “you got the right guy,” the witness’ confidence in the identification is artificially inflated. A meta-analysis of twenty studies covering 2,400 identifications found that witnesses who received feedback “expressed significantly more retrospective confidence in their decision compared with participants who received no feedback.”101 Such feedback not only causes a witness to misjudge the reliability of her identification, it can also result in the witness embellishing the opportunity she had to observe the perpetrator and the crime. “Those who receive a simple post-identification confirmation regarding the accuracy of their identification significantly inflate their reports to suggest better witnessing conditions at the time of the crime, stronger 96 See Elizabeth F. Loftus, Leading Questions and the Eyewitness Report, 7 Cognitive Psychol. 560, 566 (1975). 97 Id. 98 Id. 99 Id. 100 Id. 101 Amy B. Douglass & Nancy M. Steblay, Memory Distortion in Eyewitnesses: A Meta-Analysis of the Postidentification Feedback Effect, 20 Applied Cognitive Psychol. 859, 863 (2006). 22 memory at the time of the lineup, and sharper memory abilities in general.”102 Furthermore, confirmational feedback need not be immediate to corrupt a witness’ memory. One study showed that the effects of confirmational feedback may be the same even when it occurs two days after an identification.103 Other research further substantiates that these effects can withstand the passage of time.104 The particular perils of witness feedback are evident in many of the documented cases of false identifications. Here again, the story of Ronald Cotton and Jennifer Thompson is illustrative: officer feedback led Thompson to harden her false memory of Cotton as her rapist. In the process, her memory was effectively immunized from any impact cross-examination may otherwise have had on her confidence, which impeded the jury’s ability to properly assess her testimony. I realize, of course, that law enforcement officials are not completely in control of the feedback witnesses receive. Interactions among witnesses outside the confines of police proceedings, for instance, can affect the reliability of the witnesses’ identifications.105 For example, if one witness talks 102 Id. at 864-65; see also Gary L. Wells & Amy L. Bradfield, “Good, You Identified the Suspect”: Feedback to Eyewitnesses Distorts Their Reports of the Witnessing Experience, 83 J. Applied Psychol. 360 (1998). 103 See Gary L. Wells, Elizabeth A. Olson, & Steve D. Charman, Distorted Retrospective Eyewitness Reports as Functions of Feedback and Delay, 9 J. Experimental Psychol.: Applied 42, 49-50 (2003). 104 See Jeffrey S. Neuschatz et al., The Effects of PostIdentification Feedback and Age on Retrospective Eyewitness Memory, 19 Applied Cognitive Psychol. 435, 449 (2005). 105 See, e.g., Rachel Zajac & Nicola Henderson, Don’t It Make My Brown Eyes Blue: Co-Witness Misinformation About a Target’s Appearance Can Impair Target-Absent Line-up Performance, 17 Memory 266, 275 (2009) (“[P]articipants who were [wrongly] told by the [co-witness] that the accomplice had blue eyes were significantly more likely than control participants to provide this information when asked to give a verbal description.”); Lorraine Hope et al., “With a Little Help from My Friends . . .”: The Role of 23 to another, she can alter or reinforce the other’s memory of the same event. “[P]ost-identification feedback does not have to be presented by the experimenter or an authoritative figure (e.g. police officer) in order to affect a witness’ subsequent crimerelated judg[]ments.”106 In one study, after witnesses made incorrect identifications, they were told either that their cowitness made the same or a different identification.107 Not surprisingly, confidence rose among the witnesses that were told that their co-witness had agreed with them and fell among those told that co-witnesses had disagreed.108 Though law enforcement officials may not be able to completely insulate witnesses from this system variable, police did not even attempt to guard against it here. The witnesses Co-Witness Relationship in Susceptibility to Misinformation, 127 Acta Psychologica 476, 481 (2008) (noting that all participants “were susceptible to misinformation from their co-witness and, as a consequence, produced less accurate recall accounts than participants who did not interact with another witness”); Helen M. Paterson & Richard I. Kemp, Comparing Methods of Encountering Post-Event Information: The Power of Co-Witness Suggestion, 20 Applied Cognitive Psychol. 1083, 1083 (2006) (“Results suggest that co-witness information had a particularly strong influence on eyewitness memory, whether encountered through co-witness discussion or indirectly through a third party.”); John S. Shaw III, Sena Garven, & James M. Wood, Co-Witness Information Can Have Immediate Effects on Eyewitness Memory Reports, 21 Law & Hum. Behav. 503, 503, 516 (1997) (“[W]hen participants received incorrect information about a co-witness’s response, they were significantly more likely to give that incorrect response than if they received no co-witness information.”); C.A. Elizabeth Luus & Gary L. Wells, The Malleability of Eyewitness Confidence: Co-Witness and Perseverance Effects, 79 J. Applied Psychol. 714, 717-18 (1994). 106 Elin M. Skagerberg, Co-Witness Feedback in Line-ups, 21 Applied Cognitive Psychol. 489, 494 (2007). 107 Luus & Wells, The Malleability of Eyewitness Confidence, supra, at 717-18. 108 Id.; see also Skagerberg, supra, at 494-95 (showing similar results). 24 who identified Dennis viewed the lineup in the same room and at the same time. Detective Wynn’s instruction to the witnesses not to react or show emotion during the lineup reduces the risk of feedback, but this instruction did not eliminate it. Therefore, the risk that the witnesses’ reactions may have influenced the results of the lineup cannot be discounted, and the jurors should have been instructed about this possibility. Furthermore, the record of Bertha’s photo array identification establishes the existence of at least some officerto-witness feedback. Detective Santiago asked Bertha to affirm his identification: “Can you be sure that photo #1 is the male that you saw get away from the girl and run at you with the gun after the gunshot?”109 Only then did Bertha state he was “sure”110 Dennis was the shooter as opposed to his initial statement that Dennis’ photo merely “look[ed] like”111 the shooter. I am not suggesting that Detective Santiago’s question ultimately negated Bertha’s ability to make an in-court identification. Nor am I suggesting that Detective Santiago intentionally tried to reinforce Bertha’s confidence in his identification or “prime” him for a subsequent in-court identification. I am, however, suggesting that the jury should have been informed of how Detective Santiago’s response to Bertha’s initial selection of Dennis’ photo may have affected the reliability of Bertha’s lineup identification and, as I next explain, his subsequent in-court identification as well. 5. Multiple viewings Another crucial system variable—and one that was clearly present here—is the opportunity to engage in multiple viewings of a suspect. Allowing a witness to view a suspect more than once during an investigation can have a powerful corrupting effect on that witness’ memory. It creates a risk that the witness will merely identify a suspect based on her past views of him rather than her memory of the relevant event. Meta-analysis has revealed that while fifteen percent of 109 J.A. 1556. 110 Id. 111 J.A. 1555. 25 witnesses mistakenly identify an innocent person during the first viewing of a lineup, that percentage jumps to thirty-seven percent if the witness previously viewed that innocent person’s mug shot.112 This phenomenon is known as “mug shot exposure.” Related studies have also shown the existence of “mug shot commitment.” This refers to the fact that once witnesses positively identify an innocent person from a mug shot, “a significant number” then “reaffirm[] their false identification” in a later photo lineup.113 This is true even when the real suspect is actually present in the lineup.114 Nonetheless, multiple viewings seem to have no impact on the reliability of a lineup identification “when a picture of the suspect was not present in photographs examined earlier”115 by the witness. The incredible story of John White that I mentioned at the outset serves as a powerful example of the impact that multiple viewings can have on witness identifications. In 1979, John White was accused of breaking into the home of a seventy-four-year-old woman and then beating and raping her.116 After the victim picked White out of a photo array, he was placed in a live lineup.117 White was the only person repeated in both the photo array and live lineup. The victim 112 Kenneth A. Deffenbacher, Brian H. Bornstein, & Steven D. Penrod, Mugshot Exposure Effects: Retroactive Interference, Mugshot Commitment, Source Confusion, and Unconscious Transference, 30 L. & Hum. Behav. 287, 299 (2006). 113 See Gunter Koehnken, Roy S. Malpass, Michael, S. Wogalter, Forensic Applications of Line-Up Research, in Psychological Issues in Eyewitness Identification 205, 219 (Siegfried L. Sporer, Roy S. Malpass, Gunter Koehnken eds., 1996). 114 Id. 115 Id. at 218. However, as noted earlier, Dennis’ picture was presented in photo arrays that witnesses saw prior to viewing the lineup. 116 The Innocence Project, John Jerome White, http://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/john-jerome-white/ (last visited July 5, 2016). 117 Id. 26 identified White from that live lineup.118 DNA analysis later revealed that the victim’s actual assailant was not White, but a man named James Parham. By the cruelest of ironies, Parham had actually been placed in the live lineup with White as a filler when the victim identified White as her assailant. Despite having an opportunity to view her real rapist in the lineup, the victim affirmed her initial selection of White. Her erroneous identification led to a life sentence for White, who served twenty-seven years before the DNA evidence exonerated him.119 A leading researcher offered the following explanation of White’s case: The witness had already identified John White from a photographic lineup. And, John White was the only person who was in both the photographic lineup and the live lineup. Hence, what we have here, I believe, is a strong example of how a mistaken identification from one procedure (a photo lineup) is repeated in the next procedure (a live lineup) even though the real perpetrator is clearly present in the second procedure. Repeating the same mistake can occur for several reasons. One possibility is that the initial mistaken identification changed the memory of the witness; in effect John White’s face “became” her memory of the attacker and the face of Parham no longer existed once she mistakenly identified John White. Another possibility is that she approached the live lineup with one goal in mind - find the man she had identified from the photos. Perhaps she never really looked at Parham because she quickly saw the man she identified from photos and did not need to look further.120 118 Id. 119 Id. 120 Gary Wells, The Mistaken Identification of John Jerome White, 27 The witnesses who identified Dennis at trial were given not two, but three, opportunities to view Dennis. These multiple views could help explain why initially tentative guesses became certain identifications by the time the witnesses took the stand. The possibility cannot be ignored that the witnesses here, like the victims in White and Cotton’s cases, selected Dennis in the live lineup because they were looking for the man they had already identified from the photo arrays. The jurors should have been informed of the impact of multiple viewings so that they could have considered that effect in determining how much weight to afford the lineup identifications and/or the in-court identifications. Absent that information, the jurors were ill equipped to assess the possibility that Howard, Bertha, and Cameron’s lineup and incourt identifications of Dennis may have been based on prior viewings of his picture rather than their memories of the crime. These system variables on the accuracy of eyewitness identifications highlight the importance of the procedures law enforcement officials use when soliciting identifications. As the Oregon Supreme Court has explained, “it is incumbent on courts and law enforcement personnel to treat eyewitness memory just as carefully as they would other forms of trace evidence, like DNA, bloodstains, or fingerprints, the evidentiary value of which can be impaired or destroyed by contamination. Like those forms of evidence, once contaminated, a witness’ original memory is very difficult to retrieve.”121
Estimator variables are the conditions present during memory formation or storage. They can also have a substantial impact on the reliability of eyewitness identifications.122 https://public.psych.iastate.edu/glwells/The_Misidentification _of_John_White.pdf (last visited July 6, 2016). 121 State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673, 689 (Or. 2012). 122 See State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 895 (N.J. 2011), holding modified by State v. Chen, 27 A.2d 930 (N.J. 2011); National Research Council, Identifying the Culprit, supra, at 1, 72, 92-93. 28 Crucial estimator variables include, but are not limited to, the amount of stress on the observer, the presence of weapons, and visibility conditions. Unlike system variables, estimator variables are beyond the control of the criminal justice system. Nevertheless, asking jurors to consider eyewitness identifications without properly instructing them on the impact that such estimator variables may have had erects yet another barrier to accurate evaluation of identifications.
First, high levels of stress at the time of memory formation can negatively impact a witness’ ability to accurately identify the perpetrator.123 Stressful conditions impair a witness’ ability to identify key characteristics of an individual’s face.124 A meta-analysis of the effect of high stress on eyewitness identifications found that stress hampers both eyewitness recall and identification accuracy.125 A recent study examining the effects of stress on identifications at a U.S. Military mock prisoner-of-war camp illustrates this phenomenon.126 In this study, 509 active-duty military personnel, with an average of 4.2 years in the service, underwent two types of interrogations.127 After twelve hours of confinement, participants experienced either a high-stress interrogation involving real physical confrontation followed by a low-stress interrogation without physical confrontation, or 123 See Charles A. Morgan III et al., Accuracy of Eyewitness Identification Is Significantly Associated with Performance on a Standardized Test of Face Recognition, 30 Int’l J.L. & Psychiatry 213 (2007); Kenneth A. Deffenbacher et al., A Meta-Analytic Review of the Effects of High Stress on Eyewitness Memory, 28 L. & Hum. Behav. 687 (2004); Morgan et al., Accuracy of Eyewitness Memory, supra. 124 See Charles A. Morgan III et al., Misinformation Can Influence Memory for Recently Experienced, Highly Stressful Events, 36 Int’l J.L. & Psychiatry 11, 15 (2013). 125 Deffenbacher et al., Effects of High Stress, supra, at 699. 126 Morgan et al., Accuracy of Eyewitness Memory, supra, at 266. 127 Id. at 267-68. 29 vice versa.128 The interrogations were separated by approximately four hours, and about half the participants received the high-stress interrogation first, while the other half experienced the low-stress interrogation first.129 Both interrogations lasted about forty minutes.130 Twenty-four hours after the interrogations, the participants were asked to identify their interrogators from live lineups, sequential photo arrays, or simultaneous photo arrays.131 Across all identification procedures, subjects had far more difficulty accurately identifying their high-stress interrogators.132 Sixty-two percent of subjects could identify their low-stress interrogators in live lineups, while only thirty percent of subjects could accurately identify their high-stress interrogators from such lineups.133 Furthermore, fifty-six percent of subjects erroneously identified a person who was not their interrogator (false positive) during live lineups, while only thirty-eight percent of subjects did so for their low-stress interrogations.134 This study is particularly stunning when one considers that the subjects all had a prolonged and unobstructed opportunity to view their interrogators, and the interrogators were all within arm’s reach of their subjects. The subjects’ ability to see the faces of their interrogators was therefore exponentially better than the opportunity witnesses to most violent crimes have to see perpetrators. Their views were certainly better than those of Howard, Bertha, and Cameron. As the study’s authors explained, [c]ontrary to the popular conception that most people would never forget the face of a clearly seen individual who had physically confronted them and threatened them for more than 30 min[utes], . . . [t]hese data provide robust evidence that eyewitness memory for persons encountered during events that are personally 128 Id. at 268. 129 Id. 130 Id. 131 Id. at 269-70. 132 Id. at 272. 133 Id. 134 Id. 30 relevant, highly stressful, and realistic in nature may be subject to substantial error.135 Notably, this study further found that memories formed during a stressful event are highly susceptible to modifications from misinformation received after the event. That has particular relevance here given the presence of the system variables described above. Stress almost certainly affected all of the witnesses who saw Chedell Williams gunned down. The shooting undoubtedly caused Howard—the prosecution’s star witness—a significant amount of stress. Not only was she herself chased, but she also watched as the perpetrator grabbed her best friend and shot her at point-blank range. It is not surprising that multiple witnesses recalled hearing Howard screaming. Stress also likely affected Bertha’s ability to later make an accurate identification. He saw the shooter as the shooter rushed him, head on, pistol in hand. Jurors cannot properly assess eyewitness identification testimony where stress was present at memory formation unless this variable is explained to them.
The presence of weapons is a second, and related, estimator variable. The National Research Council has stated, “[r]esearch suggests that the presence of a weapon at the scene of a crime captures the visual attention of the witness and impedes the ability of the witness to attend to other important features of the visual scene, such as the face of the perpetrator . . . . The ensuing lack of memory of these other key features may impair recognition of a perpetrator in a subsequent lineup.”136 In 1992, an analysis of weapon focus studies concluded that the presence of a weapon significantly reduced witnesses’ ability to recall their perpetrators.137 A more recent study of the pertinent literature confirms that weapon presence 135 Id. at 274. 136 National Research Council, Identifying the Culprit, supra, at 93. 137 Nancy K. Steblay, A Meta-analytic Review of the Weapon Focus Effect, 16 L. & Hum. Behav. 413, 415-17 (1992). 31 has a consistently negative impact on both feature recall accuracy and identification accuracy.138 Here, the jury was never informed that visibility of the perpetrator’s gun may well have hampered the witnesses’ ability to observe and/or form an accurate memory of the assailant’s face. Howard, Bertha, and Cameron all provided clear descriptions of the gun, revealing their focus on it. But the jury was never informed of how this powerful estimator variable may have affected them.
The period between memory formation and memory recall is known as the “retention interval” and constitutes another important estimator variable. A meta-analysis of fiftythree facial memory studies found “that memory strength will be weaker at longer retention intervals than at briefer ones.”139 Most of the studies analyzed in this meta-analysis examined retention intervals of less than one month, many of them less than one week. This meta-analysis also found agreement among experts that “the rate of memory loss for an event is greatest right after an event and then levels off over time.”140 Furthermore, [t]he effect of the retention interval also is influenced by the strength and quality of the initial memory that is encoded, which, in turn, 138 Jonathan M. Fawcett et al., Of Guns and Geese: A MetaAnalytic Review of the ‘Weapon Focus’ Literature, Psychol., Crime & L. 1, 22 (2011). 139 Kenneth A. Deffenbacher et al., Forgetting the Once-Seen Face: Estimating the Strength of an Eyewitness’s Memory Representation, 14 J. Experimental Psychol.: Applied 139, 142 (2008); see also Carol Krafka & Steven Penrod, Reinstatement of Context in a Field Experiment on Eyewitness Identification, 49 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 58, 65 (1985) (finding a substantial increase in the misidentification rate in target-absent arrays from two to twenty-four hours after event). 140 Deffenbacher et al., Forgetting the Once-Seen Face, supra, at 143. 32 may be influenced by other estimator variables associated with witnessing the crime (such as the degree of visual attention) and viewing factors (such as distance, lighting, and exposure duration).141 The in-court identifications of Dennis were made nearly one year after the crime occurred—a very significant retention interval under the relevant studies. Research is hardly necessary to appreciate the difficulty of trying to accurately recall the details of this chaotic and traumatizing event— lasting only a matter of seconds—a year later. The jurors should have been informed of that difficulty and its possible impact on the accuracy of these identifications. They were not.
As one would expect, exposure duration, distance, and lighting affect the accuracy of eyewitness identifications.142 The charge that was given here did alert the jurors to the impact of these factors on the accuracy of an identification.143 141 National Research Council, Identifying the Culprit, supra, at 99. 142 Brian H. Bornstein et al., Effects of Exposure Time and Cognitive Operations on Facial Identification Accuracy: A Meta-Analysis of Two Variables Associated with Initial Memory Strength, 18 Psychol., Crime & L. 473 (2012) (metaanalysis of the effect of exposure duration on facial identification accuracy); R.C.L. Lindsay et al., How Variations in Distance Affect Eyewitness Reports and Identification Accuracy, 32 Law & Hum. Behav. 526 (2008) (study of the effect of distance on identification accuracy). 143 Race-bias—referring to the relative races of the witness and perpetrator—is another crucial estimator variable. Although this variable does not raise concerns here because the three eyewitnesses and the perpetrator were all Black, it is nevertheless worth noting because it again shows the extent to which circumstances (other than opportunity to observe) can greatly impact the reliability of an eyewitness identification. Research has thoroughly documented a phenomenon known as “own-race bias” wherein people more accurately identify faces within their own race as compared to those of members 33 However, as I explain in the following section, it did not adequately convey the impact these factors can have on incourt identifications. C. The Dissent’s Dismissal of Estimator Variables As the Majority recounts, nearly all of the eyewitnesses who mentioned the shooter’s height in their initial police interviews described him as between 5’8” and 5’10”.144 The witnesses also described the shooter as having a dark complexion and weighing about 170 to 190 pounds. James Dennis is 5’5” tall and weighed between 125 and 132 pounds at the time of trial. The Dissent dismisses and tries to rationalize away this considerable size discrepancy. In an attempt to reinforce the reliability of the three witnesses, the Dissent relies on research that concludes eyewitnesses tend to underestimate the height and weight of taller and heavier targets and overestimate the height and weight of shorter and lighter targets.145 The of a different racial group. See National Research Council, Identifying the Culprit, supra, at 96; Roy S. Malpass & Jerome Kravitz, Recognition for Faces of Own and Other Race, 13 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 330 (1969). The Innocence Project analyzed 297 DNA exonerations and found that a cross-racial misidentification occurred in forty-two percent of the cases in which an erroneous eyewitness identification was made. Edwin Grimsley, What Wrongful Convictions Teach Us about Racial Inequality, The Innocence Project (Sept. 26, 2012), http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/What_Wrongful_C onvictions_Teach_ Us_About_Racial_Inequality.php. 144 In fact, one eyewitness—Joseph DiRienzo Jr.—described the shooter’s height in terms of his own height: “about my height, about 5’9”.” J.A. 1649. 145 Dissent at 3 (Fisher, J.) (citing Christian A. Meissner, Siegfried L. Sporer, & Jonathan W. Schooler, Person Descriptions as Eyewitness Evidence, in 2 Handbook of Eyewitness Psychology 3, 8 (Rod C.L. Lindsay et al. eds., 2007) and Rhona H. Flin & John W. Shepherd, Tall Stories: Eyewitnesses’ Ability to Estimate Height and Weight Characteristics, 5 Hum. Learning 29, 34 (1986)). 34 Dissent’s use of that research is cruelly ironic. The finding of those studies was not that we should disregard eyewitness inaccuracy, as the Dissent’s citation implies. Those researchers found just the opposite. The studies discovered that eyewitness identifications are frequently unreliable.146 As two of the researchers explained, “[t]he width and range of subjects’ errors for the targets’ height and weight in this study showed clearly that some subjects experience great difficulty in accurately judging another individual’s physical characteristics.” 147 The Dissent also focuses on the strength of three estimator variables. The Dissent reminds us that “the visual conditions were excellent,”148 the witnesses saw the shooter at “close range,”149 and none of the identifications were crossracial.150 This is not only misleading, it also ignores many other system and estimator variables that were at least as important (if not more important) than the ones the Dissent focuses upon. I agree that the lighting was good. However, the lighting here was likely no better than that in the rooms where the military personnel who failed to recognize the faces of their interrogators were questioned under stressful conditions.151 The witnesses here were in close proximity to the shooter. However, they were not as close as Jennifer Thompson was to Ronald Cotton or John White’s accuser was to him. Moreover, these witnesses only had a matter of seconds to view the perpetrators. Howard saw the shooter as he rushed towards her, Cameron in the seconds the crime occurred, and Bertha as the shooter ran past him. All of the witnesses’ views occurred under highly stressful circumstances and their focus appears to have been as much on the gun in the shooter’s hand as on the 146 Meissner, Sporer, & Schooler, Person Descriptions as Eyewitness Evidence, supra, at 8 (citing the Flin and Shepherd study); Flin & Shepherd, Tall Stories, supra, at 36. 147 Flin & Shepherd, Tall Stories, supra, at 36. 148 Dissent at 2 (Fisher, J.). 149 Id. 150 Id. at 3 (citing Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 72 n.8). 151 Morgan et al., Accuracy of Eyewitness Memory, supra, at 268. 35 shooter’s face. As I will explain in greater detail below, the charge that the jurors received did not focus their attention on any of those considerations. The lack of blinding, the presence of officer feedback, the fact that the record suggests that the witnesses thought they had to select someone from the photo arrays, the multiple viewings of Dennis, and the witnesses’ viewing of the live lineup in the same room, all suggest that the identifications may have been corrupted by cues from law enforcement and/or other witnesses. We would be justifiably skeptical of any clinical trial where the researcher knew which sample was a placebo or who received the placebo. Yet, we do not think twice about allowing someone to be convicted of a crime and sentenced to death on the basis of identification procedures where the investigator presenting the photo array or lineup is fully aware of who the suspect is. The witnesses who identified Dennis at trial had not one, but three opportunities to view Dennis. And none of the procedures included any level of blinding. Nothing in this record suggests that anyone other than Dennis was present in both the photo array and lineup. Yet, the jury was not made aware of the potential importance of any of these considerations. That should sound a note of caution in assessing the reliability of these identifications. Finally, we should not ignore the fact that the majority of the witnesses that police interviewed after the crime were unable to identify Dennis as the shooter. Jurors did not know that Joseph DiRienzo, Joseph DiRienzo, Jr., Clarence Verdell, and David LeRoy all were unable to identify Dennis from the photo array. Although Anthony Overstreet did identify Dennis from this array, he did not think Dennis was the shooter once he had an opportunity to view him in the lineup. Overstreet had expressed the most confidence in his ability to positively identify the shooter during the initial police interviews.152 152 The fact that Overstreet and other non-identifying witnesses could theoretically have been called by defense counsel is no answer. No defense attorney in her right mind would put such witnesses on the stand, knowing that the witnesses had seen photographs of the defendant and would 36 When the totality of circumstances is viewed in context, the evidence of Dennis’ guilt is not as uncompromising as the Dissent suggests. Moreover, concerns about the reliability of these identifications should not be assuaged by evidence that was introduced in an attempt to corroborate the identification testimony. As the Majority explains, aside from eyewitness testimony, the Commonwealth presented testimony from Charles Thompson, who told detectives that he saw Dennis with a gun the night of the murder. Thompson identified an illustrative .32 chrome revolver (previously admitted as a Commonwealth exhibit) as being similar to the one he saw in Dennis’s possession. As the Majority notes, Thompson had an open drug-possession charge at the time of trial, but testified that he was not expecting help from the Commonwealth in exchange for his testimony. Years after trial, Thompson recanted his testimony, averring that he had never seen Dennis with a gun and that his testimony at trial was false. I realize, of course, that it can be argued that Thompson’s recantation is not necessarily relevant to the force of the eyewitness identifications because it happened after trial. However, his testimony clearly corroborated the identification evidence, and it underscores the dangers of the inadequate identification instructions. The fact that the jurors were not given a sufficient basis to assess the identifications of Dennis severely undermined the potential force of Dennis’ alibi testimony. Why would jurors believe such testimony (especially since it was offered by his father) when three neutral witnesses identified Dennis as the shooter? Had the jurors been able to assess the identifications with an appropriate understanding of the variables I have discussed, Dennis’s alibi testimony may well have had much greater force, and jurors would have been in a better position to weigh Dennis’ alibi against Thompson’s testimony that appeared to corroborate the three eyewitnesses. That is particularly true when we factor in the evidence of the Cason receipt that the know the person sitting at counsel table was the person the police had arrested for the crime. A criminal justice system seeking fairness and justice should not countenance the creation of such an absurd dilemma. 37 Majority explains.153 The Cason receipt could have further bolstered Dennis’ alibi testimony and raised a reasonable doubt about the accuracy of the eyewitness identifications.