Opinion ID: 2099700
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Predisposition to Commit Sexually Violent Offenses

Text: Barnes claims there is an insufficient nexus between antisocial personality disorder and predisposition to sexually offend. He argues that an antisocial personality disorder ultimately cannot serve to establish a mental abnormality under the statute because the DSM-IV definition of the disorder does not include a predisposition to commit sex offenses. [1] Thus, because he has not been diagnosed with a paraphlia, such as pedophilia [2] or exhibitionism, [3] or any other recognized condition that is in general directly related to sexual offending, Barnes claims he cannot be adjudicated a sexually violent predator under the statute. It is in this context that Barnes asserts that commitment under chapter 229A violates due process. Consistent with the first component of mental abnormality, we observe the statute does not require a sexually violent predator to have a condition that causes people in general to sexually offend. Rather, it requires an individualized inquiry: whether the mental abnormality makes the particular individual likely to commit sexually violent offenses. See Iowa Code § 229A.2(5) (requiring a condition that predispos[es] that person to commit sexually violent offenses to a degree which would constitute a menace to the health and safety of others); id. § 229A.2(11) (requiring the offender to suffer[ ] from a mental abnormality which makes the person likely to engage in predatory acts constituting sexually violent offenses, if not confined in a secure facility) (emphasis added); cf. In re Commitment of Adams, 223 Wis.2d 60, 588 N.W.2d 336, 340 (Ct.App.1998) (stating that the Wisconsin civil commitment statute focuses on the person who is the subject of the petition and on the specific link between that person's mental disorder and the effect of that mental disorder on that person; holding that a person who has the mental disorder of `antisocial personality disorder,' uncoupled with any other mental disorder, may be found to be a `sexually violent person'). We think this individualized inquiry comports with the requirements of due process because it ultimately serves to limit civil commitment to dangerous sexual offenders. At the same time, it protects those persons inflicted with antisocial personality disorder who are not predisposed to commit sexual offenses from commitment. Thus, we conclude due process does not require the person subject to commitment to have an underlying condition or diagnosis that causes people in general to commit sexually violent offenses. Due process is satisfied as long as the condition or disorder predisposes the particular person, under his or her particular circumstances, to commit sexually violent offenses. The evidence in this case shows how the particularized inquiry satisfies due process. The opinion expressed by Dr. Roberts that Barnes's antisocial personality disorder predisposed him to commit sexual offenses included other evidence such as his psychopathy checklist score, sexually violent history, and treatment history.