Opinion ID: 2205235
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Funding of Court-Appointed Counsel for Indigent Parolees.

Text: The district court ruled the amendments revoking authority for the state public defender to represent indigent alleged parole violators and removing authorization to pay for such representation from the appropriation made to the state public defender's office were constitutional. The court also concluded that with the elimination of this source for payment, there was no public funding available to pay for constitutionally required indigent defense in parole revocation proceedings. The plaintiffs do not challenge the constitutionality of the amendment directed to the participation of the state public defender in providing representation where mandated by Gagnon, but they do assert it violates parolees' due process rights when the state refuses to pay for appointed counsel. The board responds that while it has no stake in the issue of payment for appointed counsel, there is support for the district court's decision that no source [for payment] exists. Notwithstanding such support, the board does not dispute that funding may be available elsewhere. It argues, however, that because [t]he district court only considered funding mechanisms set forth in Iowa Code chapter 815, this court should not go beyond that chapter in searching for possible funding sources. Unlike our analysis of the right-to-counsel issue, which applied equally to the federal and state constitutional claims, our discussion of the issue of payment for court-appointed counsel focuses on state constitutional law. We rely on cases interpreting state constitutional requirements because, as our subsequent discussion explains, these cases require that court-appointed attorneys in proceedings instituted by the state be compensated from the public fisc. Therefore, we need not consider whether the federal constitution requires a state to pay for constitutionally mandated counsel. See Bolyard v. Berman, 274 N.J.Super. 565, 644 A.2d 1122, 1129 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1994) (holding  Gagnon does not require that counsel assigned to represent indigent parolees be compensated by the State). Initially, we note the inapplicability of the Maghee case upon which the board relies for its statement that there exists support for the district court's decision that the state has no obligation to pay court-appointed counsel. See Maghee, 639 N.W.2d at 31. In Maghee, we determined that inmates did not have a constitutional right to counsel in disciplinary proceedings. Id. at 30. This court went on to state that even if the district court had the inherent power to appoint counsel to assist the court in conducting a proceeding, that power did not necessarily carry with it the power to order the state to compensate counsel thus appointed. Id. at 31 (emphasis added). Thus, the issue in Maghee was whether the court had inherent power to appoint counsel and to order counsel's payment at public expense. In contrast, here, we are concerned with whether constitutionally required counsel must be paid by the state. Maghee is inapposite. More on point is our decision in McNabb v. Osmundson, 315 N.W.2d 9 (Iowa 1982). In McNabb, we held an indigent facing a possible jail sentence for contempt for nonpayment of child support had a due process right to an attorney. 315 N.W.2d at 11, 14. We concluded this entitlement included a right to court-appointed counsel in an original certiorari action in the supreme court to challenge the district court's decision in the contempt action. Id. at 15. Although no statutory authority existed for payment of the indigent's attorney fees in the appellate court proceeding, we noted that [s]ince 1850 Iowa has stood among that strong minority of states ... holding lawyers compelled to represent indigents must receive reasonable compensation. Id. at 16. We concluded, therefore, that when the constitution mandates the appointment of counsel, the state has a concomitant responsibility to pay the court-appointed attorney. Id. at 16-17. Although this obligation is limited to those proceedings brought by the state in the public interest, see Lalla v. Gilroy, 369 N.W.2d 431, 433-34 (Iowa 1985), it applies to fees incurred in district court proceedings, as well as fees incurred in the appellate courts, see Lunde v. Ruigh, 356 N.W.2d 566, 568 (Iowa 1984). See generally State Pub. Defender v. Iowa Dist. Ct. for Muscatine County, 594 N.W.2d 38, 40 (Iowa 1999) (holding counsel appointed under McNabb reasoning must be compensated using as a benchmark rates set in Iowa Code section 815.7). Notwithstanding the state's obligation to pay the fees of constitutionally required counsel, there is no constitutional infirmity in the amendment to section 815.11, which eliminates the state public defender's responsibility for court-appointed counsel fees in parole revocation matters. This conclusion is based on the fact there continues to be statutory authority for the payment of such fees. Iowa Code section 815.1, entitled Costs payable by state in special cases, provides: All costs and fees incurred in a parole revocation proceeding ... are waived if the prosecution fails, or if the person liable to pay the costs and fees cannot pay the costs and fees. An award of attorney fees to a court-appointed attorney incurred in these cases shall be paid out of the state treasury from the general fund if the prosecution fails or if the person liable to pay the attorney fees cannot pay them. Iowa Code § 815.1 (2003) (emphasis added). Thus, there is statutory authority for payment from the general fund of court-appointed counsel's fees in parole revocation proceedings when the parolee is indigent. See generally State v. Iowa Dist. Ct. for Lyon County, 348 N.W.2d 221, 224 (Iowa 1984) (noting in cases specified in section 815.1, State is liable for attorney fees); State v. Iowa Dist. Ct. of Sioux County, 286 N.W.2d 22, 24 (Iowa 1979) (same). Even though we disagree with the district court's conclusion that the legislature has not provided for payment of court-appointed counsel in these matters, we find no error in the district court's ultimate ruling that the amendments to section 13B.4(1) and section 815.11 are constitutional. These amendments simply changed the mechanics of providing and paying counsel for indigent parolees; instead of relying on the state public defender's office and budget, the court must now appoint private attorneys who will be paid from the general fund. Because the court is not precluded from appointing counsel when constitutionally required or from providing for payment of such counsel, there is no infringement on parolees' due process rights by the amendments to sections 13B.4(1) and 815.11.