Opinion ID: 894886
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Penley's Pleadings

Text: Westbrook's plea to the jurisdiction challenges Penley's pleadings and not the existence of jurisdictional facts. Accordingly, we construe those pleadings in Penley's favor, taking as true the facts pled to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists in this case. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226. If the pleadings affirmatively negate the existence of jurisdiction, a plea to the jurisdiction must be granted and repleading is not allowed. Id. at 227. In determining whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, courts must look to the substance and effect of a plaintiff's complaint to determine its ecclesiastical implication, not its emblemata. Tran v. Fiorenza, 934 S.W.2d 740, 743 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no pet.) (citing Green v. United Pentecostal Church Int'l, 899 S.W.2d 28, 30 (Tex.App.-Austin 1995, pet. denied) and Natal v. Christian & Missionary Alliance, 878 F.2d 1575, 1577 (1st Cir.1989)). Here, it is clear from Penley's Second Amended Original Petition that her professional-negligence claim against Westbrook unconstitutionally impinges upon internal matters of church governance in violation of the First Amendment. Because Penley's pleading affirmatively negates the court's subject-matter jurisdiction, the trial court properly dismissed the case.