Opinion ID: 2322590
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Douglas's Petition

Text: Douglas asserts that he was entitled to a hearing before the court denied his petition because he satisfied all of the procedural requirements of C.P. § 8-301(b). The State, though, contends that Douglas's petition does not comport with the statute's procedural requirements, including that he did not request a hearing. Specifically, the State asserts, inter alia, that the claims are procedural, not evidentiary; the petition does not indicate that the evidence was newly discovered and could not have been discovered earlier; and the petition does not assert the materiality of the evidence. We disagree. Construing Douglas's petition liberally, we conclude that the petition satisfies the statute's pleading requirements. The first requirement is easily satisfied because Douglas submitted his petition in writing. The petition also satisfies the second requirement, that Douglas state in detail the grounds on which the petition is based. C.P. § 8-301(b)(2). The petition includes several detailed allegations of error committed by the trial judge in addition to several items of evidence that were discovered years after Douglas's trial and sentencing. Douglas also includes a blanket assertion that That Statement Of Facts with Exhibits in Support of Statement Of The Case is of great importance, which will show that Douglas was an continual to be an Victim of Miscarriage Of Justice, caused by these Police Officers, Assistant State's Attorney Schenker and Judge Johnson actions and/or lack of actions and perjury' testimonies by witnesses and Douglas is actual innocence. [Sic.] We also conclude that Douglas's petition satisfied the third procedural requirement, that Douglas describe the newly discovered evidence. C.P. § 8-301(b)(3). As mentioned above, Douglas made several allegations. Among them he alleged that, on March 9, 2007, an article was published that exposed Joseph Kopera. . . as an perjurer.' [Sic.] Officer Kopera was one of the expert witnesses who had testified for the State during Douglas's trial. This allegation, viewed in the light most favorable to Douglas, could be proven to be newly discovered evidence. Douglas also satisfied the fourth requirement under C.P. § 8-301(b)(4), which requires that the petition request a hearing if one is sought. Although Douglas did not expressly state I request a hearing, we are persuaded that the petition, liberally construed, reflects Douglas's indicated desire for a hearing. [15] His petition recited the complete language of the statute, which included the provision that the petition include a request for a hearing. Additionally, he filed a proposed Writ of Habeas Corpus for the warden to produce him for a hearing. Douglas also has satisfied C.P. § 8-301(b)(5), that he distinguish the newly discovered evidence claimed in the petition from any claims made in prior petitions. We have said that a petitioner may not file multiple petitions based on the same claim, but that does not prevent a petitioner from filing subsequent petitions asserting grounds of different newly discovered evidence. The possibility of filing multiple petitions asserting different grounds gives context to the requirement that a petitioner distinguish the evidence in the instant petition from claims in prior petitions. Douglas asserts that the phrase prior petitions does not refer to every prior filing. [16] We, too, are persuaded that the language does not extend so broadly. As this was Douglas's first petition under C.P. § 8-301, he has no claims to distinguish. We conclude, therefore, that Douglas has satisfied all of the requirements of (b)(5), such that a hearing was required pursuant to C.P. § 8-301(e)(1) before the trial court denied Douglas's petition. It remains for us to consider whether the court, nonetheless, could dismiss the petition without a hearing because Douglas fail[ed] to assert grounds on which relief may be granted, pursuant to C.P. § 8-301(e)(2). We discussed above that C.P. § 8-301(e)(2) authorizes the trial court to dismiss a petition for writ of actual innocence without a hearing even though one was requested, if the court concludes that the allegations, if proven, could not entitle a petitioner to relief. In this regard, the court erred in summarily denying the petition. Douglas alleged grounds that, if proven, could entitle him to relief. Douglas asserted that there was newly discovered evidence that Officer Kopera, who had testified at Douglas's trial, had falsified his credentials. Douglas submitted as an exhibit with his petition a newspaper article explaining his allegation of newly discovered evidence. Dated March 9, 2007, the article reported that Joseph Kopera, head of the Maryland State Police firearms unit, claimed on witness stands to have degrees that he never earned. . . . Questions regarding the longtime firearms and toolmarks examiner's credentials were raised several weeks ago by state public defenders working with the Innocence Project. The article explained that the chief attorney with the . . . Innocence Project . . . became concerned about Kopera's qualifications while reviewing transcripts and noting inconsistencies regarding the credentials he testified he had earned. Given that there were hundreds of people he helped convict and that Kopera had worked for 21 years in the Baltimore Police Department's crime laboratory before he was lured away in 1991 to join the state police, viewing inferences in the light most favorable to Douglas, it could be that the evidence could not have been discovered within time to move for a new trial under Rule 4-331. Further, Douglas's petition asserted that Kopera help to denied Douglas a Fair Jury Trial, with his perjurer' testimony at Douglas' Jury Trial. [Sic.] These allegations assert a basis that the newly discovered evidence creates a substantial or significant possibility that the result [of Douglas's trial] may have been different. C.P. § 8-301(a)(1). In short, Douglas's petition satisfied the procedural requirements of C.P. § 8-301(a)(1). He is entitled to the hearing on the petition he requested. We emphasize that, although Douglas has satisfied the pleading requirement to assert grounds for relief, it does not follow automatically that he can prove his claim.