Opinion ID: 2325337
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to conduct a sufficient inquiry into juror bias during voir dire and after the trial constitutes plain error.

Text: Defense counsel did not object to the Juror No. 8's deposition [9] nor request that the Superior Court judge conduct an evidentiary hearing in court. Failure to make an objection at trial constitutes a waiver of the defendant's right to raise that issue on appeal, unless the error is plain. [10] Plain error exists when the error was so clearly prejudicial to [a defendant's] substantial rights as to jeopardize the very fairness and integrity of the trial process. [11] We apply the plain error standard to evaluate the denial of the motion for a new trial. A precise statement of the plain error standard was set forth in Wainwright v. State : [12] Under the plain error standard of review, the error complained of must be so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process. Furthermore, the doctrine of plain error is limited to material defects which are apparent on the face of the record; which are basic, serious and fundamental in their character, and which clearly deprive an accused of a substantial right, or which clearly show manifest injustice. [13] In Baker v. State , we held that Wainwright helps us determine whether instances of misconduct to which defense counsel did not object, and which the trial judge did not address sua sponte, are nonetheless so facially egregious that they require reversal of the defendant's convictions. [14] Allowing Juror No. 8 to be empanelled in this case was so prejudicial that it jeopardized the fairness and integrity of the trial process. In Jackson v. State , this Court held that juror impartiality must be maintained not only in the interest of fairness to the accused but also to assure the integrity of the judicial process. [15] Furthermore, as stated in Banther v. State , jury bias, either actual or apparent, undermines society's confidence in its judicial system. [16] Not only was Juror No. 8 conscious of the fact that the Attorney General's Office would represent his interests as a victim two weeks after the Knox trial, but the trial judge did not conduct a sufficient inquiry during voir dire to determine whether any of the venire members were victims of a crime. This question would have allowed the trial judge to follow up with whether Juror No. 8 could be fair and impartial given his connection to the Department of Justice. Afterwards, the trial judge could strike the juror for cause, or defense counsel would, as a matter of certainty, exercise a peremptory challenge to strike Juror No. 8. Material defects apparent on the face of the record demonstrate plain error. First, Nickolas Dawkins-McMillian robbed Juror No. 8 in September of 2008. Second, the Victim Services Unit of the Attorney General's office sent Juror No. 8 a letter about their representation, and the Department of Justice assigned Deputy Attorney General Kevin Carroll to the case. Third, the trial judge did not ask whether any of the venire members were victims of a crime. Fourth, the trial judge did not conduct a post trial inquiry in court to determine whether Juror No. 8's experience as a victim in a pending trial influenced or biased him during deliberations. These facts create serious questions about Juror No. 8's ability to be objective during the Knox trial. This error deprived Knox of a substantial right. Under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution [17] and Article I, § 7 of the Delaware Constitution, [18] all defendants have a fundamental right to trial by an impartial jury. The impartiality and indifference of jurors is essential to the proper functioning of the jury. [19] This Court has held that if only one juror is improperly influenced, a defendant in a criminal case is denied his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. [20] Juror No. 8's awareness that the Attorney General's Office represented him in a separate, pending trial, deprived Knox of the inalienable right to an impartial jury. Juror No. 8 did not respond affirmatively to the rather narrow voir dire question [21] asking whether he knew Deputy Attorney General Carroll, the defense attorney, or anyone in their office. [22] Furthermore, the trial judge did not ask Juror No. 8 during voir dire whether he could be impartial given his status as a victim in a pending criminal case for the rather obvious reason that there was no information to suggest that any member of the venire was a victim; or, for that matter that any practice in Superior Court existed to ask the question as a matter of routine in the trial of a nonviolent crime. Because the trial judge failed to ask the venire members whether they were victims of a crime, Knox did not have a chance to probe Juror No. 8's potential bias during voir dire. Even if the trial judge had questioned Juror No. 8 and determined that Juror No. 8 could serve, any rational defense counsel would be alerted to exercise a peremptory challenge to strike Juror No. 8. [23] After discovery of Juror No. 8's role, the trial judge should have conducted an in court inquiry into the juror's ability to be fair and impartial and should not have relied solely on a deposition conducted out of court by counsel limited to a single question; therefore, we must conclude that the inquiry into Juror No. 8's objectivity was inadequate as a matter of law. We hold that, in the future, all post trial inquiries into juror bias must be conducted in a proceeding before the judge.