Opinion ID: 170034
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: facts

Text: Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Gerber pleaded guilty to distribution of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B). Under the terms of the plea agreement, Mr. Gerber waived his right to appeal and to collaterally attack his sentence. As to the latter, Mr. Gerber specifically agreed to “knowingly, voluntarily and expressly waive [his] right to challenge [the] sentence, and the manner in which the sentence is determined, in any collateral review motion, writ or other procedure, including but not limited to a motion brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.” See Statement by Defendant in Advance of Plea of Guilty at 4 (Nov. 29, 2004) (attached as Ex. B to Pet. Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Mot. to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence) [hereinafter Statement by Defendant]. After accepting Mr. Gerber’s plea agreement, the district court sentenced him to 84 months’ imprisonment, followed by a term of 48 months’ supervised release. 1 See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Howard v. U. S. Bureau of Prisons, 487 F.3d 808, 815 (10th Cir. 2007). -2- Despite the plea agreement’s waiver language, Mr. Gerber filed a notice of appeal. He argued that “the district court erred in calculating his criminal history category, and that the sentence imposed [wa]s unreasonable because the trial judge applied the sentencing guidelines to the exclusion of other factors which should have been considered pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553.” United States v. Gerber, Case No. 05-4080, at 2 (10th Cir. Jan. 3, 2006). The government filed a motion to enforce the plea agreement’s appeal waiver. In response, Mr. Gerber argued that “his appeal [wa]s not within the scope of the waiver and that to enforce the waiver would result in a miscarriage of justice.” Id. We concluded that Mr. Gerber’s arguments lacked merit. Accordingly, we granted the government’s motion and dismissed Mr. Gerber’s appeal. Mr. Gerber next sought to collaterally attack his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming that his attorney’s conduct in relation to the sentencing proceeding was constitutionally ineffective under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Put succinctly, Mr. Gerber predicated his Strickland argument on his attorney’s failure to argue for a downward adjustment to his Guidelines offense level for his role in the offense, pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 3B1.2, after his attorney allegedly promised Mr. Gerber that he would make this argument. Mr. Gerber described this circumstance as his attorney’s failure to -3- present his “alternate defense.” See, e.g., Pet. Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Mot. to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence at 2-3 (dated Aug. 18, 2006) [hereinafter Mem. of P. & A. Mot. to Vacate]. Mr. Gerber acknowledged the collateral-attack waiver provision of his plea agreement. Citing our decision in United States v. Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2001), however, Mr. Gerber contended that he was not bound by the waiver “because he entered into the Plea Agreement upon believing that [his attorney] would file a pre-sentencing motion for a mitigating role adjustment . . . and because of believing that his former attorney would present this crucial alternate defense [at the sentencing proceeding].” Mem. of P. & A. Mot. to Vacate at 3-4. The district court concluded that the collateral-attack waiver provision of Mr. Gerber’s plea agreement was “valid and enforceable” and barred his sentencing challenge. R., Vol. I, Doc. 3, at 3 (Dist. Ct. Order, dated Oct. 13, 2006) [hereinafter Dist. Ct. Order]. It noted that Mr. Gerber “d[id] not argue that entering into his plea was unknowing or involuntary.” Id. at 2. Further, electing to reach the merits, the court found that the conduct of Mr. Gerber’s attorney was not constitutionally deficient – he acted “within the wide latitude this court must give counsel to make tactical decisions for their clients” under Strickland. Id. at 3. Mr. Gerber timely sought a COA from this court. -4-