Opinion ID: 2332538
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: wal-mart's motion for new trial

Text: [¶ 34] After the verdict Wal-Mart moved for a new trial arguing that the verdict must be vacated because the damages amounted to an award of punitive damages. Wal-Mart further contends that the damages were excessive and the size of the verdict demonstrates that the judge and jury were biased against Wal-Mart. [¶ 35] When a court refuses to grant a new trial on the ground of an excessive damage award, the ruling will not be reversed except for clear and manifest abuse of discretion. Gilmore v. Central Maine Power Co., 665 A.2d 666, 670 (Me.1995). Evidence must be construed in the light most favorable to the jury verdict, and a damage award will not be overturned unless it is without rational explanation. Cope v. Sevigny, 289 A.2d 682, 684 (Me.1972); see Michaud, 390 A.2d at 536. [¶ 36] Walter's total medical bills and expenses equalled $71,042.63. The jury awarded Walter $550,000 in damages. Presumably, the additional $479,000 of Walter's recovery is in compensation for her pain and suffering. The jury heard several witnesses, including Walter herself, testify about the painful treatment she received in the hospital, the long recovery process, and the continuing difficulties she faces. In light of this evidence, which must be considered favorably to Walter, the jury's award of damages is rational. Although the verdict may seem large, it reflects the considered opinion of the jury within the range of evidence of sufficient probative character.... Michaud, 390 A.2d at 537 (quoting Fotter v. Butler, 145 Me. 266, 273, 75 A.2d 160, 164 (1950)). [¶ 37] Punitive damages were never an issue in this case. They were not requested by Walter. They were not mentioned during the arguments of counsel, and no instructions were given from which the jury could have awarded any damages other than compensatory damages. The court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a new trial because of the amount of damages. [¶ 38] Wal-Mart, argues that certain conduct of the trial judge contributed to an excessive verdict, and for that reason, the verdict cannot stand. The complained of conduct of the trial judge consists of two incidents: (1) during the trial, but at a time when the jury was not present, the judge exited the courtroom after ruling on certain jury instructions and left counsel with the court reporter so that counsel could make further arguments on an instruction for the record; and (2) after the verdict was returned, the judge made an unseemly comment to the jurors. Because the first conduct complained of by Wal-Mart took place outside of the presence of the jury, it could not have contributed to the amount of the verdict. While we do not condone this conduct by the judge, [8] it did not demonstrate bias toward one party or the other. Both parties were put in the same position of making their arguments for the record outside of the presence of the judge. [¶ 39] The second action by the judge occurred after the verdict was returned. The judge, in thanking the jury members for their service, said that the jury had sent a message about the duty and care of a pharmacist. The judge went on to say that it was a step we took together. While it is appropriate for a judge to thank jurors for their service, the judge must take pains to remain neutral. Judges shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice and shall not commend or criticize jurors for their verdict except in an opinion or court order. MAINE CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT CANONS 3(B)(5) and (10) (1999). Telling the jury that it had sent a message and suggesting that both the judge and the jury had worked together in doing so allows for a perception that the judge lacked neutrality. This particular comment had no effect on the verdict because it was made after the verdict was returned. Although it is possible that such a comment could have the effect of illuminating other judicial comments or verifying bias on the part of a judge, such was not the case here. We do not find any other comment or ruling by the judge in this proceeding to convey judicial bias or prejudice. This statement by the judge did not demonstrate a deepseated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. In re William S., 2000 ME 34, ¶ 9, 745 A.2d 991, 995. We conclude that the judge's statement to the jury, while improper, is not enough in and of itself to support Wal-Mart's contention that the judge was, in fact, prejudiced or biased against Wal-Mart in this case. The entry is: Judgment affirmed. WATHEN, C.J., with whom RUDMAN and DANA, JJ., join, concurring. [¶ 40] I concur in the result, but I reach that result on different grounds. It is problematic whether a judgment as a matter of law in favor of a plaintiff in a negligence action can ever be upheld in the absence of a testimonial confession by the defendant or an admission by counsel. See Lewis v. Knowlton, 1997 ME 12, 688 A.2d 912. In my judgment, defense counsel in this case admitted liability in his opening statement when he told the jury that Wal-Mart had never denied liability and that the only issue concerned the amount of fair and just compensation. Having made that statement, he then sought to try the issue of liability behind the jurors' backs. To countenance such a strategy would be to ignore the requirement of the Maine Bar Rules that trial counsel employ such means only as are consistent with truth, and shall not seek to mislead the ... jury... by any artifice or false statement of fact or law. M. Bar R. 3.7(e)(1)(i). I would affirm the judgment on the basis that defense counsel admitted liability.