Opinion ID: 19557
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Multiplicitous Counts and Double Jeopardy

Text: 45 Lankford challenges the district court's denial of his motion seeking to force the government to eliminate either Count 1 or Count 2 of the indictment, an act argued to be required because the two counts are multiplicitous. Counts 1 and 2, Lankford argues, charge a single kidnappingoffense. 9 Because the jury instructions did not restrict the jury to finding guilt on Count 1 only on the basis of finding guilt of sexual abuse, the jury may have convicted him of kidnapping under Count 2, and interstate domestic violence by kidnapping in Count 1. Moreover, he contends that his conviction and sentence violates the Double Jeopardy Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. V, because kidnapping is a lesser included offense of interstate domestic violence. See Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 301 (1996) (As long as [18 U.S.C.] 3013 stands, a second conviction will amount to a second punishment.); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 168 (1977) (concluding that a greater offense is . . . by definition the 'same' for purposes of double jeopardy as any lesser offense included in it.). Although Lankford did not raise his Double Jeopardy arguments below, we may consider them. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b); United States v. Stovall, 825 F.2d 817, 821 (5th Cir. 1987) (A complaint about multiplicity of sentences . . . can be raised for the first time on appeal.). We review questions of multiplicity de novo. See United States v. Soape, 169 F.3d 257, 265 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 119 S. Ct. 2353 (1999); United States v. Flores-Peraza, 58 F.3d 164 (5th Cir. 1995). Because the double jeopardy arguments are being considered for the first time on appeal, we review for plain error. 46 In general, two counts are multiplicitous when a single offense is charged under more than one count of an indictment. See Soape, 169 F.3d at 266 (citing United States v. Nguyen, 28 F.3d 477, 482 (5th Cir. 1994)). The chief danger raised by a multiplicitous indictment is the possibility that the defendant will receive more than one sentence for a single offense. United States v. Cluck, 143 F.3d 174, 179 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Swaim, 757 F.2d 1530, 1537 (5th Cir. 1995)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 119 S. Ct. 808 (1999). The primary test for whether a single offense has been charged in an indictment and for whether a defendant has been punished twice for the same offense is that offered in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932): [W]here the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not. 284 U.S. at 304; see, e.g., Rutledge, 517 U.S. at 297 (identifying the Blockburger test as the principal test for determinations of whether the Double Jeopardy Clause has been violated); Soape, 169 F.3d at 266 (applying the Blockburger test to question of whether indictment was multiplicitous). In applying this test, we examine not the particular circumstances involved in the case before us, but the statutory elements. See Soape, 169 F.3d at 266 (The focus in determining the issue of multiplicity is on the statutory elements of the offenses, not on their application to the facts of the specific case before the court.); United States v. Singleton, 16 F.3d 1419, 1422 (5th Cir. 1994) (Determining whether statutory offenses are separate for double jeopardy purposes involvesparsing the statutes apart from the facts of any particular case.). 47 An application of the Blockburger test reveals that Counts 1 and 2 of Lankford's indictment are not multiplicitous. The kidnapping statute requires that the state show that the victim was abducted and was held for purposes beneficial to the kidnapper at the time state lines were crossed. The interstate domestic violence statute requires that the victim be a spouse or intimate partner of the defendant, that the defendant crossed state lines with the intent to injure, harass, or intimidate the victim, that a crime of violence was engaged in intentionally either in the course of or as the result of such travel, and that as a result of that crime of violence, bodily injury to the victim occurred. It can therefore be said that a kidnapping conviction requires proof of a fact not required by the interstate domestic violence statute (e.g., that the victim be held for purposes beneficial to the defendant at the time state lines were crossed), and that a conviction for interstate domestic violence requires proof of a fact not required by the kidnapping statute (e.g., that the victim be a spouse or intimate partner, that bodily injury to the victim resulted). See United States v. Sickinger, 179 F.3d 1091, 1093 (8th Cir. 1999)(identifying facts that are unique to both 1201(a) and 2261(a)); United States v. Bailey, 112 F.3d 758, 766-67 (4th Cir. 1997) (same); United States v. Frank, 8 F.Supp.2d 253, 282 n.26 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (same). Moreover, we cannot say that the district court committed plain error when it determined Lankford's sentence. That kidnapping is a lesser included offense of interstate domestic violence is by no means clear or obvious under current law. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993) (defining plain error to be error that is clear or obvious); Sickinger, 179 F.3d at 1093 (considering whether kidnapping was a lesser included offense within interstate domestic violence and finding no plain error). 48