Opinion ID: 184903
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Are MSHA Officials Persons Under the Mine Act?

Text: 18 Section 105(c)(1) of the Mine Act provides, in relevant part, that [n]o person shall ... in any manner discriminate against ... or cause discrimination against or otherwise interfere with the exercise of the statutory rights of any miner, [or] representative of miners ... because such miner [or] representative of miners ... has filed or made a complaint under ... this chapter.... 30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(1). The matter of our jurisdiction resolved, we now face a rather narrow question of statutory interpretation; i.e., whether the word person, as used in this statutory provision, encompasses MSHA officials acting under color of their authority. 8 Faced with a dispute between the Secretary of Labor and the Commission over the proper interpretation of the Mine Act, our analysis necessarily begins with Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). See Secretary of Labor v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 111 F.3d 913, 916 (D.C.Cir.1997) (applying Chevron to interpretive dispute between the Secretary and the Commission). 19 When reviewing an agency's construction of the statute it administers, Chevron directs the courts first to ask whether Congress has spoken to the specific question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842, 104 S.Ct. 2778. In undertaking this assessment, we recognize that difficulty and ambiguity are not synonymous; in other words, the presence of a difficult question of statutory construction does not necessarily render that provision ambiguous for purposes of Chevron. However demanding the exercise, we must discern whether Congress had an intent on the precise question we face. Utilizing the traditional tools of statutory construction, as the Supreme Court instructed in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987), we find that the text and structure of the Mine Act, as well as the legislative history, inexorably lead to a single conclusion. The Mine Act's anti-discrimination provision does not apply to MSHA employees for actions taken under color of their authority. 9 20 As always, the starting point of analysis is the text of the statute. The Mine Act defines the term person to mean any individual, partnership, association, corporation, firm, subsidiary of a corporation, or other organization. 30 U.S.C. § 802(f). The UMWA contends that, in ordinary usage, MSHA officials 10 are clearly individuals, and should therefore be held subject to suit under section 105(c). In response, petitioners point to a number of statutes in which Congress has expressly included public officials or employees within the definition of the term persons. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 330(2) (person means any individual, corporation ... or any other organization ... performing weather modification activities, except where acting solely as an employee, agent, or independent contractor of the Federal Government); 16 U.S.C. § 470bb(6) (person means an individual, corporation ..., or any other private entity or any officer, employee, agent, department, or instrumentality of the United States); 16 U.S.C. § 4903(4) (defining person as an individual, corporation, partnership, trust, association, or any other private entity; or any officer, employee, agent, department, or instrumentality of the Federal Government ...); 18 U.S.C. § 2510(6) (person means any employee, or agent of the United States or any State or political subdivision thereof, and any individual, partnership, association, joint stock company, trust, or corporation); 33 U.S.C. § 1402(e) (person means any private person or entity, or any officer, employee, agent, department, agency, or instrumentality of the Federal Government ...); 50 U.S.C. § 1801(m) (person means any individual, including any officer or employee of the Federal Government ...). Given the fact that Congress has elsewhere utilized the term person both to include and to exclude government officials from its coverage, we do not believe that because MSHA employees are literally individuals, that they are necessarily encompassed by the Mine Act's use of that term. See Bell Atlantic Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 131 F.3d 1044, 1045 (D.C.Cir.1997) (plain meaning and literal meaning are not equivalents). Focusing on the text alone, the plain meaning is elusive. 11 21 For clarification, we next look to the text and structure of the Mine Act as a whole, and to the dual-enforcement regime established thereby. In so doing, we follow the cardinal rule that a statute is to be read as a whole, King v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221, 112 S.Ct. 570, 116 L.Ed.2d 578 (1991) (citing Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 115, 109 S.Ct. 1668, 104 L.Ed.2d 98 (1989)), since the meaning of statutory language, plain or not, depends on context. Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 515, 113 S.Ct. 1562, 123 L.Ed.2d 229 (1993). This shift in perspective is ultimately dispositive; by moving beyond the text of section 105(c) to examine the statutory scheme in which it reposes, the implausibility of the UMWA's proffered construction becomes undeniable. Cf. Hiler v. Brown, No. 98-5014, 1999 WL 314633, at  3, --- F.3d ----, ---- (6th Cir. May 20, 1999) (rejecting literal reading of person where individual capacity suits against federal officials for unlawful retaliation would frustrate the Rehabilitation Act's statutory framework). Replicating the division of responsibilities between the Secretary of Labor and the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, the Mine Act places adjudicative authority in the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, an independent agency whose sole function lies in resolving claims brought under the Mine Act. Responsibility for enforcement of its protections, by contrast, rests primarily in the Secretary of Labor's hands. 12 When a miner files a section 105(c) discrimination complaint, the Mine Act directs the Secretary to undertake an immediate investigation and, should the Secretary countenance the discrimination claim, to file an immediate complaint with the Commission. See 30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(2). In addition, the Secretary prosecutes such claims before the Commission, see Wagner, 12 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 1185, and proposes appropriate relief. See 30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(2). 13 Were the term persons read to encompass MSHA officials acting in their official capacity, this distribution of authority would leave the Secretary in the anomalous position of initiating formal proceedings against its own subordinates before an independent agency. We cannot assume that Congress intended such a bizarre administrative scheme. 22 To the extent that MSHA officials merit reprobation for their on-the-job behavior, the Secretary has the power (subject to the protections articulated in the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA)) to dispense discipline directly. We do not lightly cast aside a comprehensive enforcement regime like the CSRA, which was designed to govern the federal employer-employee relationship and to normalize the procedures for sanctioning federal employee misconduct. Congress enacted the CSRA in 1978, Pub.L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (codified as amended in sections of 5 U.S.C. (1996)), specifically to replace the haphazard arrangements for administrative and judicial review of personnel action, United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 444, 108 S.Ct. 668, 98 L.Ed.2d 830 (1988), and the prior 'patchwork' system of laws governing federal employment.... Wildberger v. FLRA, 132 F.3d 784, 787 (D.C.Cir.1998). It seems implausible that the identical Congress, without any discussion, would make a considered judgment to create a totally different mechanism for malfeasance by federal officials involved in the mining arena. In addition, reading section 105(c) to encompass MSHA officials would also displace the basic quadrumvirate of remedies--Bivens, the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), the Tucker Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act--otherwise available for those claiming legally redressable injury from federal action (or inaction). 14 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971); 28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq. (FTCA); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1491 and other scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. (Tucker Act); 5 U.S.C. §§ 702-06 (APA). In the absence of even a congressional hint pointing in that direction, we will not presume this additional mechanism for miners seeking redress. 23 Those provisions of the Mine Act discussing the quiver of remedies and penalties available to the Secretary and the Commission lend further support to our construction of the Act's anti-discrimination provision. Section 105(c)(2) and (c)(3), for example, each grant the Commission power to order the rehiring or reinstatement of the miner to his former position with back pay and interest, 30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(2)-(3), while section 105(c)(3) additionally provides authority to order such remedy as may be appropriate.. Though the residual grant of equitable authority can be read as permissive, the focus of the provision as well as the nature of the enumerated remedies strongly imply that Congress was considering remedies limited to those available against mine operators and their agents. This focus can be seen as well in the Senate Report accompanying passage of the Mine Act, which contains a similar trilogy of remedies--reinstatement with full seniority rights, back-pay with interest, and recompense for any special damages sustained as a result of the discrimination. S.Rep. No. 95-181 at 37, 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3437. In light of this purposive statement, we believe it follows that the residual grant of authority to order any other remedy is designed to ensure that the Commission can fully compensate miners for unforeseeable damages; it cannot by itself carry the heavy baggage of extending the statute's coverage to MSHA employees. 24 The two additional provisions to which section 105(c) crossreferences also evidence an intent to limit the meaning of the term persons to those affiliated or associated with mining operations. Relevant language in section 105(c) provides that [v]iolations by a person of paragraph (1) [forbidding discrimination] shall be subject to the provisions of sections 818 and 820(a) of this title. 30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(3). 30 U.S.C. § 818 gives the Secretary authority to institute a civil action for relief against a mine operator, and grants jurisdiction to the federal district courts to provide whatever relief they deem appropriate. 30 U.S.C. § 820(a) allows the Secretary to assess civil penalties of up to $10,000 against mine operators for violations of either the Mine Act or any of the mandatory health and safety standards promulgated by the Secretary. Like the remedies specifically mentioned in section 105(c), neither provision provides for remedies extending beyond the individuals and entities involved in the mine industry. 25 The legislative history only reinforces our construction of the Mine Act's text and structure; not a single word in any of the committee reports accompanying its passage even remotely intimates that the anti-discrimination provisions were intended to apply to the actions of government employees taken under color of their authority. The Mine Act responded to a series of highly publicized mine disasters which engendered a pervasive belief that the existing administrative regime had grossly failed to ensure compliance with safety standards. Exercising its oversight authority, Congress had previously identified two broad areas--standard making and penalty assessment/collection--in which it deemed the Department of Interior's enforcement regime excessively lax. See S.Rep. No. 95-181, at 8-9, 15-16, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3408-09, 3415-16. Accordingly, Congress removed authority over mine safety from the Interior Department and placed it in the Department of Labor which, it reasoned, already supervised most other industries through the Occupational Safety and Health Act. The Mine Act also created the independent Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, providing a specialized adjudicative body in which miners and operators alike could expeditiously contest orders and proposed penalties issuing from the Labor Department. 26 The Senate Report repeatedly references the need for miners and mine operators each to share responsibility for ensuring compliance with mine safety regulations. Believing miners to be in the best position to detect and report hazards, the Act created a number of mechanisms through which they could notify the MSHA of dangerous conditions, including written complaints, requests for inspection, and the right to point out hazards. See 30 U.S.C. § 813(g). According to the Report, section 105(c) was enacted to protect miners against any possible discrimination which they might suffer as a result of their participation in this collective effort to promote safety. See S.Rep. No. 95-181, at 35, 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3435. Though Congress did not explicitly name those it envisaged would fall inside and outside of its anti-discrimination prescription, its attention clearly focused upon mine operators, as well as any other person directly or indirectly involved with them. Id. at 36, 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3436. While this additional language clearly provided a bulwark against third-party retaliation under the behest of a mine owner or operator, nothing in the legislative history signals that Congress considered it as radically extending the Act's coverage to MSHA employees. 27 Overall then, nothing in the text, structure, or legislative history of the Mine Act provides enough support for the UMWA's contention that section 105(c) applies to MSHA officials acting under color of their authority to overcome the natural presumption against such an inference. Indeed, the thrust of the text, statutory structure and legislative history goes the other way. We recognize that it might be more convenient for miners to pursue their complaints against MSHA officials under this provision, particularly in light of the expedited regime for processing claims that the Mine Act mandates. In its current form, however, the Mine Act does not express any clear congressional intent to displace or augment the alternative avenues of relief available to those claiming injury from official action. It is for the legislative branch to balance the benefits of any extension against the costs thereby engendered.