Opinion ID: 2077155
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Federal Compulsory Process Claims

Text: The defendant first claims that the state violated his right to compulsory process under the sixth amendment to the United States constitution. See footnote 1 of this opinion. Specifically, the defendant contends that he is entitled to a new trial because the prosecutor's release of Stevenson from his subpoena without first notifying the defendant constituted  `substantial interference' with Stevenson's ability to testify. [28] In response, the state relies on, inter alia, State v. Estrella, 277 Conn. 458, 893 A.2d 348 (2006), and State v. Rawls, 198 Conn. 111, 502 A.2d 374 (1985), and contends that the defendant has failed to prove a violation of his right to compulsory process because Stevenson's absence was not the product of state action and, most significantly, the defendant failed to seek a second continuance of the trial for purposes of exercising his subpoena rights pursuant to General Statutes § 52-143 [29] upon Stevenson's return to the jurisdiction. We agree with the state and conclude that the prosecutor's release of Stevenson from his subpoena did not violate the defendant's federal right to compulsory process. The federal constitution require[s] that criminal defendants be afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. . . . The sixth amendment . . . [guarantees] the right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, [and] is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the jury so that it may decide where the truth lies. . . . When defense evidence is excluded, such exclusion may give rise to a claim of denial of the right to present a defense. . . . The right to present a defense, and its concomitant right to compulsory process, are not unqualified; they are subject to countervailing public interests. . . such as the state's responsibility for arresting and prosecuting suspected criminals.. . . To establish a violation of the right to present a defense based on lost evidence, a defendant must show that the evidence was material and exculpatory, and that it was of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means. . . . Moreover, unless the defendant can show bad faith on the part of the state, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law. . . . Finally, the misconduct must demonstrate that the absence of [fundamental] fairness infected the trial; the acts complained of must be of such quality as necessarily prevents a fair trial. (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Estrella, supra, 277 Conn. at 487-88, 893 A.2d 348; see also United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867, 102 S.Ct. 3440, 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982) ([The] respondent cannot establish a violation of his constitutional right to compulsory process merely by showing that deportation of the passengers deprived him of their testimony. He must at least make some plausible showing of how their testimony would have been both material and favorable to his defense.); State v. Estrella, supra, at 479, 485-88, 893 A.2d 348 (tape recordings of defendant's admissions of murder to his cell mate, who had been deported prior to trial, could be admitted without violating defendant's compulsory process right because there were no authentication issues, facts of cell mate's criminal history and consideration for his help were admitted through cross-examination of federal officers, and defendant could not identify other exculpatory or impeachment evidence to be elicited from cell mate's in-court testimony). Moreover, a defendant may not successfully establish a violation of his rights to present a defense and to compulsory process without first taking reasonable steps to exercise those rights. See State v. Lubesky, 195 Conn. 475, 478-80, 488 A.2d 1239 (1985) (rejecting compulsory process claim arising from inability to find state witness who already had testified because defendant failed to request continuance or move for mistrial); Schwartzmiller v. State, 108 Idaho 329, 330-31, 699 P.2d 429 (App.1985) (defendant's diligence in exercising his sixth amendment right is relevant factual [inquiry]); State v. Timblin, 254 Mont. 48, 50, 834 P.2d 927 (1992) (noting defendant's diligence in exercising [s]ixth [a]mendment rights forms part of compulsory process inquiry). To exercise his sixth amendment compulsory process rights diligently, a defendant is required to utilize available court procedures, such as the issuance of subpoenas, as well as requests for continuances or material witness warrants that may be reasonably necessary to effectuate the service process. See, e.g., United States v. Desena, 287 F.3d 170, 176 (2d Cir.2002); State v. Lubesky, supra, at 480, 488 A.2d 1239; People v. Henderson, 133 Ill.App.2d 336, 343, 273 N.E.2d 244 (1971); State v. Green, 448 So.2d 782, 786-87 (La.App.1984); Young v. State, 191 P.3d 601, 606-607 (Okla.Crim. App.2008); Dean v. Commonwealth, 30 Va.App. 49, 56-57, 515 S.E.2d 331 (1999); accord State v. Rawls, supra, 198 Conn. at 119, 502 A.2d 374 (rejecting confrontation clause challenge to toxicological report because defendant's rights were adequately protected by the available procedures for pretrial discovery . . . and subpoenaing of the witness[es] during trial, as well as motions to strike or for a continuance to allow an opportunity to subpoena the individuals who actually performed the tests [citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted]). We conclude that the prosecutor's release of Stevenson from his subpoena did not violate the defendant's sixth amendment right to compulsory process. Specifically, there is no evidence that the prosecutor released Stevenson from his subpoena in bad faith or with the knowledge that Stevenson would then be unable to testify at the remainder of the trial. See Buie v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 10, 12 (2d Cir.1990) ([s]peculation . . . does not permit a determination of bad faith on the part of the prosecutor). Moreover, given the fact that the trial court had ruled the defendant's voluntary statement inadmissible under State v. Stepney, supra, 191 Conn. at 233, 464 A.2d 758, Stevenson's testimony was not critically important because the defendant himself had acknowledged that both inconsistencies in the victim's statement and Stevenson's actions during the investigation already had been admitted into evidence through other witnesses. Compare Buie v. Sullivan, supra, at 11-12 (no sixth amendment violation when arrest rendering witness unavailable was based on probable cause, and witness' exculpatory statements were admitted through testimony of police officer), with Singleton v. Lefkowitz, 583 F.2d 618, 623-25 (2d Cir.1978) (defendant's compulsory process rights were violated when government released from custody material witness, who previously had failed to appear in response to defendant's subpoena, and whose testimony could have rebutted defendant's involvement in drug transaction, and trial court had denied defendant's motion for additional continuance to secure witness' presence at trial), cert. denied sub nom. Abrams v. Singleton, 440 U.S. 929, 99 S.Ct. 1266, 59 L.Ed.2d 486 (1979). Finally, the defendant's lack of diligence in exercising his sixth amendment rights also leads us to reject his federal compulsory process claim. Even assuming that the defendant reasonably relied on Stevenson's presence on the state's witness list, rather than subpoenaing him at the start of trial, after the defendant unsuccessfully attempted to subpoena Stevenson during the trial, he nevertheless failed to attempt to seek the continuance that would be necessary to secure Stevenson's live testimony, stating at one point that he lacked the temerity to do so. [30] This omission is a significant factor in concluding that the defendant's federal compulsory process rights have not been violated by the prosecutor's release of Stevenson from his subpoena. See, e.g., State v. Green, supra, 448 So.2d at 786-87 (no compulsory process violation when state excused witness from subpoena before trial, and defendant thereafter requested issuance of new subpoena, but did not attempt to serve it; after verdict, defendant raised issue of witness' release from subpoena in motion for new trial, issued another subpoena for witness, but even after continuance granted, failed to serve subpoena); Dean v. Commonwealth, supra, 30 Va.App. at 56-57, 515 S.E.2d 331 (no compulsory process violation when prosecutor released witness from subpoena because defendant did not issue his own subpoena or request a continuance in order to obtain the presence of the witnesses at trial); cf. United States v. Desena, supra, 287 F.3d at 176 ([s]eeking only a missing witness charge was a strategic decision, and having failed to secure an acquittal, [the defendant] cannot now complain that other, unrequested remedies should have been granted sua sponte by the trial court). [31] Thus, we conclude that the defendant has failed to establish that the prosecutor's release of Stevenson from his subpoena constituted a federal compulsory process violation. [32]