Opinion ID: 2149921
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the prosecutor commit misconduct?

Text: Wren contends that there were several instances of prosecutorial misconduct, and he groups them into five different types. We turn now to an examination of each of the five types of misconduct alleged. [10] The first type of misconduct Wren alleges is the prosecutor's references to unproved threats. We recently noted that evidence of a witness's fears of or threats by a defendant may be relevant to explain inconsistencies in the witness's story. State v. McArthur, 730 N.W.2d 44, 52 (Minn.2007). We said, however, that in most cases, such evidence is best limited to redirect, after cross-examination has made it clear that such testimony is needed to rebut an attack on the witness's credibility. Id. Wren cites the prosecutor's elicitation from Detective Wehr about the demeanor of witnesses C.H. and Washington. The detective testified that these witnesses seemed frightened. But this testimony occurred only after Wren elicited testimony that C.H. and Washington had failed to identify Wren during their statements to police. Thus, eliciting the testimony at issue from Wehr was not improper on this record. Wren also refers to the prosecutor's question to Wehr, have there been continuous threats going on with these folks since the murders at the steak house? Wren objected to the question as leading, and the objection was sustained. This question was asked during Wehr's testimony as a defense witness. During re-direct, Wren elicited testimony from Wehr that Antonio Washington had not told Wehr that he was afraid of Wren. Apparently in an effort to respond to this testimony, the prosecutor asked the continuous threats question on re-cross. While the question was perhaps inartfully phrased, we conclude that it was not misconduct on this record. The second type of misconduct Wren alleges relates to the prosecutor improperly vouching for the credibility of Branch. The testimony Wren cites is the prosecutor's attempt to challenge Branch's credibility by addressing his changing version of events. The examination appears designed to show that Branch's testimony at trial was not the truth. Thus, the examination is not properly characterized as vouching. The third type of misconduct Wren alleges is that the prosecutor improperly elicited inadmissible evidence of Wren's past crimes. This claim relates to evidence of Wren's flight to Chicago after the shootings. Wren argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct because the district court ruled that there should be no testimony about appellant fleeing because of a `warrant or because he knew he'd be arrested and brought into custody.' This is not an accurate representation of the court's ruling, because the court had concluded earlier that evidence of Wren's flight and arrest was relevant and admissible. Regarding the warrant, the court stated, I don't think that the jury needs to be aware that it was a felony warrant. Although the record is not completely clear, it appears that the court ruled that the prosecution could not introduce evidence that Wren was arrested in Chicago because of a felony warrant. Wren does not contend that the prosecutor referred to a felony warrant during trial. Thus, we conclude that the prosecutor did not elicit inadmissible evidence of Wren's past crimes. The fourth type of misconduct Wren alleges is that the prosecutor improperly elicited prejudicial evidence with no probative value. Specifically, the prosecutor asked both FBI Agent Stover and Detective Wehr whether Wren was advised of his Miranda rights and whether he waived those rights before their respective interviews of Wren in Chicago. We have stated that Miranda questions may be appropriate in order to inform the jury that law enforcement did not impermissibly interrogate the defendant. See State v. Combs, 292 Minn. 317, 322, 195 N.W.2d 176, 179 (1972) (concluding that police officer's testimony that defendant was given Miranda warnings was proper foundation for admission of defendant's statement to the officer). These questions therefore do not constitute misconduct. Wren's other allegation of prejudicial evidence involves the direct examination of Wehr, during which the prosecutor elicited testimony that Wren stated that he was speaking to his girlfriend on his cell phone at the steak house. Wehr testified that cell phone records suggested that Wren was actually speaking to someone else. The prosecutor then asked Wehr what significance he placed on a suspect's statement that can be proven false. Wren objected, but the district court overruled the objection. Wehr responded, To me it's almost like a confession. Wren argues on appeal that what was essentially not an inculpatory statement was pronounced to be the functional equivalent of a confession   . As noted, the district court overruled Wren's objection, and Wren has not challenged this ruling on appeal. But the question does seem designed to elicit testimony from one witness (Wehr) about the credibility of another (Wren). We have said that, in general, one witness is not permitted to testify about the credibility of another witness. See State v. Pilot, 595 N.W.2d 511, 518 (Minn.1999) (noting that in general were they lying questions are improper); Van Buren v. State, 556 N.W.2d 548, 551 (Minn.1996) (concluding that prosecutor's elicitation of testimony from witnesses that they believed the victim's version of events was improper); State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 609-10 (Minn.1984) (With respect to most crimes the credibility of a witness is peculiarly within the competence of the jury, whose common experience affords sufficient basis for the assessment of credibility.). The prosecutor's question, therefore, which appears to have been designed to admit evidence that under our general rule should not have been admitted, was improper. The fifth type of misconduct Wren alleges relates to the prosecutor's closing argument. Specifically, Wren cites to the prosecutor's references during closing argument to north Minneapolis, the neighborhood where the shootings took place. We have stated that where the prosecutor invited the jurors to view the entire occurrence as `involving three young black males in the hood in North Minneapolis,' a world wholly outside their own, the remark ask[ed] the jury to apply racial and socio-economic considerations that would deny a defendant a fair trial. State v. Ray, 659 N.W.2d 736, 747 (Minn.2003). But where a prosecutor's comments that the defendant was not from the same world as the jurors [do] little more than prepare the jury for evidence of an unfamiliar world involving drugs, such comments are not misconduct. State v. Robinson, 604 N.W.2d 355, 363 (Minn.2000). Here, the references to north Minneapolis appear on only three pages of an almost 70-page argument, and the prosecutor appears to have had a justifiable reason for his north Minneapolis references, because they were used to explain inconsistencies in witnesses' stories. [11] Like the prosecutor in Robinson, it appears that the prosecutor was providing context for why witnesses were reluctant to cooperate or changed stories between police interviews and grand jury testimony and trial, specifically because they came from a high-crime neighborhood, which may create reluctant witnesses. There were no references to the racial or socio-economic background of the witnesses or Wren, and the prosecutor did not appear to imply that Wren should be convicted because he was from this environment. But in the same line of argument, the prosecutor noted to the jury that in the juror questionnaires, they were all asked, Is there a place in Minneapolis where you would prefer not to go? [12] The prosecutor then stated that most, if not all of you, said north Minneapolis. Well, this is north Minneapolis folks. Wren did not object to this statement, but it does seem to have been designed to appeal to jurors' prejudices and it goes beyond the evidence. It was therefore arguably improper. See State v. Clark, 296 N.W.2d 359, 371 (Minn. 1980) (noting that prosecutor's closing argument should be based on the evidence and not be calculated to inflame the passions and prejudices of the jury against the defendant). Also regarding closing argument, Wren points to the prosecutor asking the jury to recall Wehr's testimony that after Wren's brother was shot in the neck, there was no investigation because there was no assistance from witnesses. The court sustained Wren's objection to this argument as being improper and a misstatement of facts. Then the prosecutor stated that Wehr testified as to why there was no investigation, and the court overruled Wren's objection to that statement. The prosecutor then continued, saying, This is what [Wehr] testified to and this is what occurs: Rather than coming to the police and settling this so that there's no more bloodshed, too often it is taken to the streets. To this, the court sustained Wren's objection that the prosecutor was engaged in improper argument. Wehr did not testify that rather than coming to police, too often people handle things on their own (i.e. taking it to the streets and causing more bloodshed). Accordingly, to the extent the prosecutor argued that Wehr offered this testimony, this argument was improper. It was also improper for the prosecutor to tell the jury this is what occurs. See State v. Bradford, 618 N.W.2d 782, 799 (Minn.2000) (speculating about events with no factual basis in record is misconduct). Does the misconduct entitle Wren to a new trial? As set forth above, we have concluded that the prosecutor's conduct was improper in three instances, one to which there was no objection and two to which objections were lodged. We proceed now to an analysis of whether Wren is entitled to a new trial based on these three instances. We analyze the unobjected-to misconduct, the prosecutor's closing argument comments that the jurors said on the questionnaires that they did not want to go to north Minneapolis, under a modified plain error test. See Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 302. Under this test, the defendant must establish both that misconduct constitutes error and that the error was plain. Id. The defendant shows the error was plain if the error contravenes case law, a rule, or a standard of conduct. Id.; see also State v. Dobbins, 725 N.W.2d 492, 513 (Minn.2006) (finding that misconduct was plain error because it had already been addressed and disapproved in our case law). The burden then shifts to the state to demonstrate that the error did not affect the defendant's substantial rights. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 302. We conclude that Wren has not met his burden to show plain error. The prosecutor's comment, while perhaps taking the jury momentarily away from the evidence, was made within the context of attempting to explain the shifting stories of one of the state's witnesses, D.B. The comment was not directed at the defendant and it was not made in an effort to get the jury to align themselves with the state and against the defendant. Cf. Mayhorn, 720 N.W.2d at 790 (finding misconduct where prosecutor included herself with the jury and argued that the drug world was foreign to all of us because such argument may be an effort to appeal to the jury's passions.). Finally, Wren cites no case, rule, or standard of conduct that he claims was contravened by the prosecutor's reference to the jurors' answers to the questionnaire. Accordingly, on this record we hold that the comment, while improper, does not rise to the level of plain error. Wren objected to the other instances of misconduct, Detective Wehr's commentary on Wren's credibility and the taken to the streets argument in closing. We therefore analyze these instances for harmless error. As we did in Swanson, we utilize the higher standard of harmless error, requiring that the error be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and examine whether the verdict was surely unattributable to the misconduct. 707 N.W.2d at 658 (internal quotation marks omitted). [13] We recently examined our jurisprudence applying the harmless-error-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard and noted that several factors are relevant to the analysis. State v. Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d 304, 317 (Minn.2006) (concluding the admission of evidence in violation of defendant's Confrontation Clause rights was not harmless error). We look to how the improper evidence was presented, whether the state emphasized it during the trial, whether the evidence was highly persuasive or circumstantial, and whether the defendant countered it. Id. at 314. We also noted that the strength of the evidence, while not controlling, was part of the harmless error analysis. Id.; see also State v. Courtney, 696 N.W.2d 73, 80 (Minn.2005) (stating that when determining surely-unattributable question we examine the record as a whole). [14] Caulfield did not arise in the context of prosecutorial misconduct. See Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d at 306-07. But its discussion relates to the same standard we apply here, so it is appropriate to rely on these same factors in this context. In terms of its presentation, the objectionable conduct was brief. The prosecutor did not emphasize or dwell on it. And to the extent the prosecutor was able to get in any evidence through his improper question to Detective Wehr, that evidence was brief. Detective Wehr's commentary on Wren's credibility consisted of his answers to two questions and was a very small part of his lengthy testimony at the trial. This commentary was not persuasive evidence that Wren committed the crimes. Moreover, Wren's credibility was not a central issue in the trial. [15] Cf. Van Buren, 556 N.W.2d at 551-52 (concluding that erroneous admission of credibility evidence required new trial because credibility of victim versus defendant was central issue in the case). Wren countered the prosecutor's arguments about witness credibility through his counsel's examination of witnesses and closing argument. Finally, the evidence against Wren was very strong. [16] Our analysis of the Caulfield factors leads us to conclude that the jury's verdict was surely unattributable to the two instances of objected-to misconduct. See Dobbins, 725 N.W.2d at 507-08 (concluding that verdict was surely unattributable to misconduct where court sustained objections to misconduct and evidence against appellant was strong). We hold that Wren is not entitled to a new trial because of prosecutorial misconduct.
Wren also raises three issues in a supplemental pro se brief. First, Wren argues that because his indictment stated that he committed the three crimes while using a firearm and because he was charged under Minn.Stat. § 609.11 (2006), the use of a firearm in the three crimes must be submitted to the jury as a separate, substantive offense. The sentences the court imposed were unaffected by section 609.11, subd. 5, a mandatory minimum sentence statute, because the life sentences imposed for premeditated first-degree murder were mandatory and the 200-month sentence was in the presumptive range for attempted first-degree murder. Minn. Sent. Guidelines II.E., II.G. Therefore, there was no need for a jury to find that Wren committed the charged felonies with a firearm and no basis to conclude that subdivision 5 is a separate substantive offense. Second, Wren argues that the evidence presented to the grand jury did not establish probable cause to support an indictment for premeditation and attempted first-degree murder. Wren also argues that the prosecutor prevented the grand jury from seeing exculpatory evidence. An objection to an indictment must be made by a pretrial motion as provided by Minn. R.Crim. P. 10.01. Minn. R.Crim. P. 17.06, subd. 2. A failure to include any objections to an indictment in a motion pursuant to Minn. R.Crim. P. 10.01 constitutes a waiver, unless the objection to the indictment is due to the court's lack of jurisdiction over the offense or the failure of the indictment to charge an offense. Minn. R.Crim. P. 10.03. But for good cause shown, we may grant relief notwithstanding the waiver. Id. Wren does not provide a reason why he failed to raise his arguments in a pretrial motion to dismiss, and we therefore conclude that the issues relating to the indictment are waived. Third, Wren argues that the jury selection procedures used in his case were unconstitutional because the potential jurors were asked to identify their races in qualification questionnaires sent to prospective jurors. Wren asserts that this violates his equal protection right to a jury that is not selected based on a racial criterion. We have upheld the jury selection process used in Hennepin County against constitutional challenge, although we have not considered this precise issue. State v. Gail, 713 N.W.2d 851, 862 (Minn.2006). The record before us does not include the qualification questionnaire that Wren alleges is unconstitutional, and we are therefore unable to determine whether Wren may have been prejudiced by the qualification questionnaire. Because resolution of the claim requires facts not in the record, we deny the claim without prejudice. We hold that the issues raised by Wren in his supplemental pro se brief do not warrant a new trial. Affirmed.