Opinion ID: 1058736
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Conspiracy Allegations

Text: We next consider Almy's conspiracy allegations. We decide the question whether the tort of conspiracy to intentionally inflict emotional distress should be recognized as a cause of action in this Commonwealth. We begin our analysis with the observation that, in Virginia, a common law claim of civil conspiracy generally requires proof that the underlying tort was committed. See Commercial Bus. Sys. v. Halifax Corp., 253 Va. 292, 300, 484 S.E.2d 892, 896 (1997). This general rule reflects the view of a majority of states that have considered the question. See, e.g., Macomber v. Travelers Prop. & Cas. Corp., 277 Conn. 617, 894 A.2d 240, 254-55 (2006); Paul v. Howard Univ., 754 A.2d 297, 310 n. 27 (D.C.2000); Alexander & Alexander Inc. v. B. Dixon Evander & Assocs., 336 Md. 635, 650 A.2d 260, 265 (1994); Jones v. BP Oil Co., 632 So.2d 435, 439 (Ala.1993); Middlesex Concrete Prods. & Excav. Corp. v. Carteret Indus. Ass'n, 37 N.J. 507, 181 A.2d 774, 779 (1962); Cook v. Robinson, 216 Ga. 328, 116 S.E.2d 742, 744-45 (1960). The gist of the civil action of conspiracy is the damage caused by the acts committed in pursuance of the formed conspiracy and not the mere combination of two or more persons to accomplish an unlawful purpose or use an unlawful means. Cater-Corp, Inc. v. Catering Concepts, Inc., 246 Va. 22, 28, 431 S.E.2d 277, 281-82 (1993) (quoting Gallop v. Sharp, 179 Va. 335, 338, 19 S.E.2d 84, 86 (1942)); accord, Commercial Business Sys. v. BellSouth Servs., 249 Va. 39, 48, 453 S.E.2d 261, 267 (1995). As stated above, a claim for intentional infliction of severe emotional distress requires proof of severe emotional distress proximately caused by a defendant's outrageous conduct that is intentional or reckless. See Harris, 271 Va. at 203, 624 S.E.2d at 33; Delk, 259 Va. at 136, 523 S.E.2d at 833; Jordan, 255 Va. at 499, 500 S.E.2d at 219; Womack, 215 Va. at 342, 210 S.E.2d at 148. Thus, under the common law in Virginia, a conspiracy claim based on this underlying tort would include these same elements of proof. See Halifax, 253 Va. at 300, 484 S.E.2d at 896. As we already have observed, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is not favored in the law. See Harris, 271 Va. at 204, 624 S.E.2d at 33; Russo, 241 Va. at 26, 400 S.E.2d at 162; Ruth, 237 Va. at 373, 377 S.E.2d at 416. A primary reason for the tort's disfavored status is that because the prohibited conduct cannot be defined objectively, clear guidance is lacking, both to those wishing to avoid committing the tort, and to those who must evaluate whether certain alleged conduct satisfies all elements of the tort. See Russo, 241 Va. at 26, 400 S.E.2d at 162. If we were to recognize a conspiracy claim based on an agreement to commit this tort, the difficulties resulting from this absence of clear guidance would be compounded. Courts and juries would be faced with the amorphous task of determining whether parties have entered into an agreement to engage in conduct that cannot be defined objectively. See id. Determinations of this nature would invite great uncertainty and speculation on the part of the fact finder. We also observe that, in Virginia, a plaintiff can allege joint liability of parties who acted in concert to commit the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress without the need to assert a claim of conspiracy. The case before us plainly illustrates this point. Accordingly, upon consideration of these several factors, we hold that a plaintiff may not assert a cause of action in Virginia for civil conspiracy to intentionally inflict severe emotional distress.