Opinion ID: 2008580
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Conduct of the Trial

Text: Sumabat further objects to courtroom security measures taken at trial, to the testimony of the State's fingerprint expert, and to the admission in evidence of the victim's pants and belt. We find no abuse of discretion in the court's ruling on security and no reversible error in admission of the testimony and other evidence. During Sumabat's trial two security officers dressed in civilian clothes were seated in the courtroom directly behind the defense. Although one of the officers was armed, the firearm was not readily noticeable. The court found this arrangement necessary because of Sumabat's previous attempt to escape from jail, in which he had taken a hostage, and because of concerns that Sumabat might make another escape attempt with outside help. Sumabat does not challenge the court's finding that the increased security was necessary; instead, he argues that this unusual arrangement prejudiced the jury. Sumabat did not, however, request a curative instruction nor did he object to the instructions that were given at trial when he had the opportunity to do so. The increased security in this case was neither unduly prejudicial nor an abuse of the court's discretion. See State v. Cormier, 535 A.2d 913, 916 (Me.1987). Sumabat next contends that the court should have declared a mistrial because the State's fingerprint expert, in response to cross-examination by the defense, testified that he received copies of Sumabat's fingerprints from North Carolina and Colorado. Sumabat argues that this testimony constituted evidence of Sumabat's prior criminal activity used in violation of M.R.Evid. 404(b) to prove Sumabat's conformity therewith in this case. This argument lacks merit. At most, this was a situation in which jurors might have inferred that Sumabat had some kind of criminal record in those other states. Since the defense itself elicited the response, then declined a curative instruction when the presiding justice offered to make one, there was no abuse of discretion in the presiding justice's refusal to grant a mistrial. See State v. Lavoie, 561 A.2d 1021, 1022 (Me.1989); State v. Harnish, 560 A.2d 5, 8 (Me.1989). Sumabat finally contends that the presiding justice erred in admitting a pair of green pants and a belt, allegedly worn by the victim when he was killed; Sumabat argues that they were not sufficiently identified. In any event, Sumabat was not prejudiced from the admission of these items because their significance at trial lay only in the fact that a set of keys that usually hung from a clip on the victim's belt was missing. Sumabat did not object to the testimony of the medical examiner performing the autopsy and of the forensic lab technician that there were no keys attached to the belt, nor did he object to Cain's testimony that Sumabat told her that he had taken those keys from the victim during the robbery and hidden them under a mattress at Sumabat's apartment. The admission of the physical evidence, if error, was harmless since Sumabat shows no prejudice whatever from its admission. See State v. True, 438 A.2d 460, 467 (Me. 1981). The entry is: Judgments affirmed. All concurring.