Opinion ID: 2272501
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: We review both dismissal and summary judgment de novo. [2] Charlton bases his claim that the Superior Court had personal jurisdiction over Mond solely on records of telephone calls between Mond and Mesquita, neither of whom is a District of Columbia resident, as well as between Mond and other parties who are District residents. Mond made the calls prior to and on the day he terminated Charlton's contract. Charlton urges us to interpret these telephone records in the light most favorable to him [3] and to conclude that they constitute sufficient grounds for personal jurisdiction over Mond. Alternatively, he argues that Mond waived his jurisdictional defense by filing a counterclaim. We hold that jurisdiction was improper in the first instance and that the trial judge erred in denying Mond's first motion to dismiss. We also hold that when a defendant first files to dismiss and the court denies the motion, the defendant does not waive an objection to the court's jurisdiction by later filing a counterclaim.
Charlton relies on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577(1) (1977) [4] to support the proposition that the situs of the defamation, venue and jurisdiction, is (sic) where the defamatory information was received. Though the situs of the alleged injury was certainly in the District because the allegedly defamatory material reached some who were indisputably District residents, we have found no case that would allow personal jurisdiction over Mond based solely on that fact. Nor do the cases Charlton relies upon support this position. [5] Had Charlton claimed personal jurisdiction over Mond as one who caus[ed] tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission in the District of Columbia, [6] his argument would have had more merit. But he cannot so argue, since Mond's phone calls originated in Maryland. Instead, Charlton must prove jurisdiction [7] under D.C.Code § 13-423(a)(4), which requires additional contacts between a defendant and the forum when the predicate act to the alleged injury originates outside the District. [8] Therefore, the proposition that the situs of a tort is located in the jurisdiction where the damage occurred, while true, does not help Charlton's jurisdictional argument. Because there is no basis for personal jurisdiction based on the phone calls themselves, [9] Charlton needed to prove additional contacts between Mond and the District of Columbia. But even after discovery had been completed, Charlton failed to present evidence of any such contacts. The cases that Charlton relies on fail to support his argument. [10] The closest case on point is Blumenthal v. Drudge, where the court held that jurisdiction existed over Drudge, a California resident who was accused of defaming a White House staffer by publishing a story about him on his web site. [11] In holding so, however, the court did not rest its decision solely on the fact that the defamatory story was available to or directed at District of Columbia residents. Instead, it concentrated on the additional multiple and persistent contacts between the defendant and the forum. [12] Charlton misinterprets Drudge when he argues that any defendant who knows the effect of his actions will be suffered in a particular forum ... should also expect to be brought into court there. [13] Here, both Charlton and Mond were Maryland residents. Charlton's business was registered in Maryland. The contract was negotiated and executed in Maryland. Charlton's work on Mond's house took place entirely within Maryland pursuant to licenses and permits issued by Maryland authorities. Other than the allegedly defamatory phone calls themselves, which originated in Maryland, Charlton has presented no evidence of persistent conduct by Mond in the District. Thus, based on the facts before us, the proper forum to resolve this dispute is a Maryland court.
Charlton also argues that Mond's counterclaim constituted a waiver of his jurisdictional objection. He relies on Overby v. Barnett, where the trial court sua sponte dismissed a contract claim pursuant to an arbitration provision after the defendants had filed a counterclaim. [14] In Overby, we held that the parties waived their right to arbitrate by filing the counterclaim, and that the trial court had erred by dismissing for lack of jurisdiction. But Overby is not on point because it addressed the subject matter jurisdiction of the court. [15] Here the issue is personal jurisdiction over Mond. Though Charlton fails to convince us that the counterclaim signified Mond's consent to the power of the court, the issue warrants further analysis. Though Charlton fails to cite them, our precedents hold that filing a counterclaim operates as a waiver of an objection to personal jurisdiction. [16] The waiver does not depend on whether the counterclaim was permissive. [17] Thus, Mond's argument that he had no choice but to file a counterclaim... to avoid res judicata and statute of limitations issues in Maryland lacks merit. Nevertheless, we are convinced that there was no waiver here. First, we note that in every case that we could find which has addressed this issue, defendants raised a jurisdictional defense after counterclaiming, unlike Mond, who objected to the court's lack of jurisdiction before filing a counterclaim. [18] In addition, as we have already explained, the trial court erred when it denied Mond's original motion to dismiss. [19] Moreover, Mond could have properly moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction concurrently with filing a counterclaim without affecting a waiver. [20] Finally, we have suggested that a denied motion to dismiss preserves the jurisdictional issue on appeal, even when the defendant counterclaims in the interim. [21] Therefore, in a case such as this, where the defendant first claims a lack of jurisdiction and later files a counterclaim, he has effectively registered his dissent to the court's jurisdiction. [22] We hold that Mond did not consent to the court's power over his person by counterclaiming after he had moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. [23]