Opinion ID: 1838059
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Plaintiff's first assignment challenges the trial court's interpretation of section 613A.7 (tort liability insurance for governmental subdivisions). The section provides in pertinent part:

Text: The existence of any insurance which covers in whole or in part any judgment or award which may be rendered in favor of the plaintiff, or lack of any such insurance, shall not be material in the trial of any action brought against the governing body of any municipality, or their officers, employees or agents and any reference to such insurance, or lack of same, shall be grounds for a mistrial. During trial plaintiff made repeated attempts to introduce evidence of an agency relationship between Jimmy Harris, the insurance agent, and the Appanoose County Board of Supervisors. He also attempted to introduce evidence of the board's reliance on Harris for purposes of receiving notice. The trial court refused to admit the evidence. Plaintiff entered it in the record as an offer of proof. The court refused to consider any of this testimony because it felt prohibited from doing so by reason of section 613A.7 above quoted. Plaintiff assails this interpretation of the section. He believes the statutory proscription of insurance evidence is a mere codification of our familiar court made rule to the same effect. He argues the rule should be subject to those same limitations we have developed and recognized in the application of the common law rule. We agree. The rule was explained in an authority we approved in Stewart v. Hilton, 247 Iowa 988, 998, 77 N.W.2d 637, 643. It is clearly the general rule that in a personal injury or death action evidence is inadmissible which informs the jury that the defendant is insured against liability. Such evidence is not only inadmissible because it ordinarily is irrelevant as to any of the issues in the case, but because it tends not only to influence jurors to bring in verdicts against defendants on insufficient evidence, but to bring in verdicts for more than they would if they believed that the defendants themselves would be required to pay them. There are, however, circumstances under which such evidence is admissible.   . 4 A.L.R.2d 761, 765. Our cases in accord are legion. See Price v. King, 255 Iowa 314, 122 N.W.2d 318 and authorities. See also 29 Am.Jur. 2d, Evidence, section 405, page 459. We have held the mention of insurance does not necessarily and in all instances entitle defendant to a mistrial. Stewart v. Hilton, supra; Price v. King, supra. Chapter 613A, The Code, (tort liability of governmental subdivisions) was enacted by the 62 GA. In waiving governmental immunity in tort the legislature chose to authorize governmental subdivisions to insure the risks affected. This authority is given in section 613A.7. The trial court excluded the evidence because of the sentence quoted at the beginning of this division, believing the language that insurance evidence shall not be material and grounds for a mistrial required him to do so. The legislature was acting to expand tort liability into a new area. In doing so it took care to authorize insurance coverage. In connection with that authorization the sentence in question was added. We think it was added to assure the statutory authorization would not work to remove the existing barriers as to such evidence in the field of tort liability they were opening. We believe and hold the sentence in question codified existing law for its application in tort liability for governmental subdivisions. Upon such a holding it becomes clear the evidence offered should have been received. It falls within a recognized exception to the general rule. Evidence of insurance is admissible in certain situations. See 29 Am.Jur.2d, Evidence, section 405, page 459. Included among the exceptions are cases where it is offered to show existence of an agency, where such existence is material and disputed. See Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 761 at 776. The evidence offered establishes Harris Insurance Agency as agent to receive notices for defendant. Plaintiff's son reported to defendant board of supervisors the day after the accident. They referred him to Harris. Harris advised the son the accident would be reported and said an adjuster would contact the family. An adjuster did so. Harris also indicated he had made a written report of the accident and circumstances to the company. In the offer of proof a supervisor indicated claims were customarily referred to Harris and this was why it was done in the instant case. He regarded Harris as the board's agent in such matters. Harris himself acknowledged he advised the board of the report to him. He indicated he made written report of the accident to the company. He considered himself to be defendant's agent. The offer included plaintiff's testimony regarding an adjuster for defendant's insurer: Q. What else did this man say to you ? A. He came to the house and sat at the table and made a tape recording, asked me a lot of questions, and then he got ready to leave, he wanted to see the truck and I think that's the first time I had been away from the house. I walked across the street with him and the boy was over there and we unveiled the truck, it had a tarp over it, and he took pictures of the truck. He made a statement in the house, and he made one across the street, do not see anyone until I come back, I have two weeks of guard duty and I have two weeks vacation and I will either be back or some other representative of our company will be back to contact you. Q. When he told you this, did you believe him ? A. Yes, I did. Q. And did you rely upon the facts of the statement he told you ? A. Yes, I did. (Emphasis added) On the 90th day following the accident the adjuster advised no settlement could be made. Plaintiff contacted his attorney the following day. Suit was promptly filed.