Opinion ID: 2102034
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Irrevocable Mutual Wills

Text: Appellants first maintain that John and Mary Lemp entered into an oral contract not to revoke their 1973 wills. There can be no doubt that the two instruments are mutual wills, separate instruments containing reciprocal or substantially similar terms. 1 W. BOWE & D. PARKER, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 11.1, at 553 (1960) (hereinafter PAGE ON WILLS). But that does not mean that they were irrevocable. The mere fact that mutual wills exist is insufficient proof of an accompanying contract not to revoke. Coveney v. Conlin, 20 App.D.C. 303, 329 (1902); accord, e.g., 1 PAGE ON WILLS, supra, § 11.1, at 554. To prove that the mutual wills were made irrevocable by an oral or written contract, District of Columbia law requires that such a contract be complete, definite in its terms, and proved with clearness and certainty. Coveney v. Conlin, supra, 20 App.D.C. at 328 (citations omitted). Acknowledging that this is the law, appellants contend that the evidence necessary to prove a contract may be found in the circumstances surrounding the execution of the mutual wills. Specifically, appellants claim that the purpose of the mutual wills was to provide first for the surviving spouse and then for Colonel Lemp's children. The Lemps stated this twofold intention to Mr. Peter, who drafted the wills, and Colonel Lemp later repeated it to his son James. Appellants reason that, in order to ensure that their goals would be realized, their father and stepmother must have entered into an agreement to make the wills irrevocable. We cannot agree. Although this evidence may be persuasive to prove a common testamentary scheme, it does not establish the existence of a contract. The court in Coveney v. Conlin, supra , did not state exactly what kind of evidence would be sufficient to prove an agreement not to revoke, but it did make clear that evidence of a common testamentary scheme was insufficient. 20 App.D.C. at 329. [7] Most courts which have been directly faced with the issue have required some independent evidence that the testator actually entered into a contract. E.g., In re Estate of Moore, 137 Ariz. 176, 179, 669 P.2d 609, 612 (1983); Woll v. Dugas, 104 N.J.Super. 586, 602, 250 A.2d 775, 783-784 (1969), aff'd, 112 N.J.Super. 366, 271 A.2d 443 (1970); Oursler v. Armstrong, 10 N.Y.2d 385, 389, 179 N.E.2d 489, 490, 223 N.Y.S.2d 477, 479 (1961); see also Notten v. Mensing, 20 Cal.App.2d 694, 696, 67 P.2d 734, 735 (1937); Neipp v. Toolen, 313 Ill.App. 28, 31-32, 38 N.E.2d 980, 981-982 (1942); Neff v. Poboisk, 281 Minn. 475, 476-78, 161 N.W.2d 823, 824-825 (1968); Willbanks v. Goodwin, 300 Or. 181, 202, 709 P.2d 213, 225 (1985); Fanning v. Fanning, 111 R.I. 116, 119-20, 302 A.2d 299, 301 (1973); Kirk v. Beard, 162 Tex. 144, 152-53, 345 S.W.2d 267, 272 (1961). [8] Appellants have presented no evidence of an agreement to make irrevocable wills; indeed, Mr. Peter, the draftsman of the wills, testified that the Lemps did not make such an agreement. In Oursler v. Armstrong, supra, 10 N.Y.2d at 392-393, 179 N.E.2d at 492, 223 N.Y.S.2d at 482, similar testimony from the drafting attorney helped to persuade the court that evidence of an agreement was lacking. In this case all that appellants have proven is that their father and stepmother executed mutual wills and intended common testamentary goals. This evidence, in our view, is legally insufficient to prove the existence of a contract not to revoke either will. Viewed in the light most favorable to appellants, the evidence shows nothing more than that the reciprocity or similarity in the dispositive provisions of the two wills results from similar tastes and affections that have resulted from years of living together, and [that] the making of identical or similar wills was a spontaneous thing unaccompanied by even so much as a thought on the part of either husband or wife that they should enter into a contract with each other. 1 PAGE ON WILLS, supra, § 11.1, at 554.