Opinion ID: 796729
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Edwards was Prejudiced by Meyers' Ineffective Assistance

Text: 70 To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, Edwards must also show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The second trial judge explicitly found that Edwards was prejudiced by the waiver of his marital privilege, stating that without Gaines' testimony: 71 the verdict may well have been a different one. So that I want to make it clear that if I'm wrong on this, I do think it's reversible, from my standpoint, for whatever the court of appeals wants to decide because this is a key issue in this case. This testimony was very damaging. 72 The trial court's unequivocal assessment of prejudice is entitled to deference under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) and was not objectively unreasonable. 73 When a state trial court reaches a reasoned conclusion that the appellate court subsequently does not address, traditionally we have treated the trial court's determination as the last reasoned decision. See Hirschfield v. Payne, 420 F.3d 922, 928 (9th Cir.2005) (reviewing trial judge's oral decision to deny petitioner's motion to represent himself because state appellate court did not address the ruling). The trial court's finding is the only determination on prejudice in the entire state court record. Affording the state trial court's determination adequate deference under AEDPA, we cannot say that its finding of prejudice was objectively unreasonable. Without the confession, the only evidence linking Edwards to the crime was circumstantial and the impeached testimony from the victim's cousin that Edwards threatened to fuck you up too. A defendant's own confession is the most damning sort of evidence available against him. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 139-40, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968) ([T]he defendant's own confession is probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted against him.). Because a confession is so damaging, we are persuaded that under the circumstances, the trial judge reasonably concluded that Edwards was prejudiced by the waiver of his marital privilege.