Opinion ID: 1858107
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Sequestration of Jury/Assignment of Error 14

Text: Defendant contends reversible error occurred when the trial court lifted its sequestration order for the jury on May 14, 1995, Mother's Day, and allowed the jurors to visit with their families for three hours without prior knowledge to, or agreement by, the defense. Defendant's representations of the record are inaccurate. By the end of the day on Saturday, May 13, 1995, and after more than five days of voir dire, the selection of the twelve-member jury was complete. At the beginning of the session on Saturday, the following colloquy took place, which clearly indicates the topic of family visits had been discussed off-record. The Court: All right. Let's go back on the record in the matter of State of Louisiana v. Allen Robertson. UhI have thought about it and I think if we take the day off, we'll let their families come and visit them or something. Mr. Perez: (Defense Attorney) Well, let's waituhI think what I would do if I was you, is not to swear the entire jury in until Monday morning, huh? Even though they're under sequestration, huh? Mrs. Burns: (Prosecutor) Yes. Mr. Perez: Huh? The Court: Yes. I mean I just wanted Mr. Perez: I mean, it would beI, I think you would have a problem if they're, if they're finally sworn than if they're not finally sworn, huh? Mrs. Burns: Yes. The Court:That's fine, I just thought since it's mother's day, if we take the day off, I'd let their families come and visit them. Mrs. Burns: Judge, do you think there might be any problem with, like, anybodyuhwho is being, like, Mr. Mom right now, like really bitching and complaining? The Court: I've thought about it. That, that's the down side, that's why I threw this out, let's talk about it. Mrs. Burns: Like, Mr., Mr. Soni, is the one I was thinking about since he's been calling. The Court: Huh? Mrs. Burns:About the kids not being used to him. That's the only thing. I would hate to get to that point. The Court: Well, you all keep thinking about it. We'll decide about it when we get through here today. Mrs. Burns: Maybe we can let them wave at them or something? The Court: Yes. The eleven jurors who had been impaneled and sworn by that point were brought into the courtroom for further instructions from the court. The trial judge informed the jury: We have eleven jurors and we're going to try and finish today so, hopefully, maybe we can take Mother's Day off or something. On Sunday, May 14, after the parties had selected the alternate and were discussing whether an additional alternate was necessary, the following discussion occurred: Mrs. Burns: Judge, we haven't had any problems with any of these other people calling in or anything so farof the other jurors that we've seated? That would be my only Mr. Perez: Yeah. The Court:We had that one woman that one day who said her husband called her. Mrs. Burns:Yes. The Court: Since then nobody else has said a word. Mrs. Burns: That's fine then. The Court: By the way, you all don't know this, but they are visiting with their families right now. Mr. Perez: Okay. The Court: I let them have a family visit in the room from two to five today. Mr. Perez: Okay. The Court: Because they asked me that when you all left last night. They said, could we do that, and I couldn't look `em in the face and tell `em no, at that point, because they've been sitting down in that room since one o'clock yesterday. I need to ask Ms. Arceneaux [the alternate] about sequestration. Bring her in. I think, as a matter of fact, the only call we've got is from Ms. Soni's husband. At the time of this trial in May of 1995, La.C.Cr.P. art. 791 provided, in pertinent part, that [i]n capital cases, after each juror is sworn he shall be sequestered. [6] Sequestration requires the jury be secluded from outside communication. Consistent with Article 791 prior to its amendment, there existed a jurisprudential rule that an accused could not consent to waive the sequestration requirement. State v. Luquette, 275 So.2d 396 (La.1973); State v. Craighead, 114 La. 84, 38 So. 28 (1905). The rationale behind the rule was that a defendant should not have to be placed in the position of having to consent or perhaps prejudice the jury by withholding consent. Taylor, 93-2201 at p. 32, 669 So.2d at 381. In Taylor, however, this court specifically overruled those cases prohibiting waiver of the sequestration requirement, finding the jurisprudentially-created prohibition unnecessary since the deliberations on whether to waive the sequestration requirement could be held outside the presence of the jury. [7] Taylor, 93-2201 at p. 33, 669 So.2d at 381. Thus in Taylor, we recognized that even under the previous version of Article 791, a defendant could consent to the waiver of the sequestration requirement. The earlier-quoted portions of the transcript of the voir dire belie defendant's claim he neither knew nor acquiesced in waiving sequestration to permit the jurors to visit with their families on Mother's Day. In fact, it was defense counsel who suggested the very procedure which effectively waived sequestration requirements by delaying swearing of the jurors as a panel under La.C.Cr.P. arts. 790 and 791. Defense counsel consented to the visit, offered a solution to the problem the trial court would have if the jurors would have been sworn in on Saturday, and did not object or express any dissatisfaction with the trial court's actions at any time. Defendant makes the additional subarguments that the sequestration order was violated when one juror received a telephone call from her spouse and that the court had improper contact with the jurors. The record is vague with respect to the phone call, although it appears one juror's husband, Mr. Soni, called to complain about the kids not being used to him. There is no indication from the record the call prejudiced defendant in any way or that the juror and her spouse discussed anything related to the case. Furthermore, defendant did not complain or object, call to question the juror individually, or request a hearing to develop evidence. The record fails to support any claim of error or prejudice on this issue. Similarly, we find no merit in defendant's assertions there was improper contact between the trial judge and jury beyond that which was necessary for the judge to respond to the jury's request to visit their families on Mother's Day, a visit we have previously explained was consented to by defendant. In Allen, 95-1754 at p. 19, 682 So.2d at 727, the defendant argued the sequestration rule was violated when the judge told jurors in the jury room they would have to go back to the courtroom for further instructions. This court held there was no error because [t]he rule of sequestration does not `bar communication between the judge and jury when such communication is within the bounds of trial related necessity.' (quoting State v. Copeland, 419 So.2d 899, 906 (La.1982)). Furthermore, as with the complained-of telephone conversation, there were no objections, complaints, or calls to question any jurors made by defendant, nor was there any request for a hearing to develop evidence made by defendant. The record fails to support any claim of error, and no prejudice has been demonstrated.