Opinion ID: 162773
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Berkovitz Second Prong

Text: 49 Having concluded that decisions regarding the placement of warnings and barriers at the Middle Emerald Pools involved discretionary judgment, we must now determine under the second prong of the Berkovitz test whether that judgment is of the kind that the discretionary function exception was designed to shield. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536, 108 S.Ct. 1954. 50 Only decisions susceptible to policy analysis are protected by the exception. United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 325, 111 S.Ct. 1267, 113 L.Ed.2d 335 (1991). The pertinent inquiry is whether the decision implicates the exercise of a policy judgment of a social, economic, or political nature. Duke, 131 F.3d at 1411. Plaintiffs argue that it does not. In essence, they contend that the decisions regarding barriers and signs at the Middle Emerald Pools involved no policy analysis because the park officials' sole relevant consideration was public safety. We disagree. For one thing, park officials must weigh the cost of safety measures against the additional safety that will be achieved. Even inexpensive signs may not be worth their cost. (One FTCA plaintiff dove off a bridge lined by a granite block wall despite six signs warning DANGEROUS TO DIVE FROM BRIDGE. Blackburn, 100 F.3d at 1428. Would an additional sign have helped?) 51 More importantly, in a national park whose purpose is to preserve nature and display its beauty to the public, any safety measure must be weighed against damage to natural resources and aesthetic values. These considerations are expressed in NPS policy. The NPS is charged under the NPS Organic Act with 52 promot[ing] and regulat[ing] the use of... national parks ... by such means and measures as conform to the fundamental purpose of the said parks ... which purpose is to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations. 53 16 U.S.C. § 1. Park officials are thus required by statute to balance preservation with public access. 54 Various NPS operating manuals reflect this policy, requiring park management to consider the impact that any safety measure would have on a park's scenery and natural resources. For example, the NPS Management Policies manual states: 55 Where practicable and not detrimental to NPS mandates to preserve park resources, known hazards will be reduced or removed. Where it would be inconsistent with congressionally designated purposes and mandates or where otherwise not practicable to make physical changes, efforts will be made to provide for persons' safety and health through other controls, including closures, guarding, signing, or other forms of education. 56 NPS Management Policies, Ch. 8:5-8:6 (Dec.1988). Under that manual, park management must limit signs to the minimum number, size, and wording required to serve their intended functions, so as to minimally intrude upon the natural or historic setting, and place signs where they do not interfere with park visitors' enjoyment and appreciation of park resources. Id. at Ch. 9:11. 57 The NPS Sign Manual conforms to the Management Policies manual, instructing park management to bear in mind long standing NPS policy to minimally intrude upon the natural or historic setting in National Park System areas, and to avoid an unnecessary proliferation of signs, while striving to ensure for the safety of park visitors. NPS Sign Manual, at 1-1 (Jan. 1988). Reflecting the difficulty of the choices that must be made, it adds that [t]he decision to utilize a particular sign at a particular location requires the professional judgment of the park manager. Id. 58 In this case, the government contends that the decision not to post additional warning signs or erect barriers at the Middle Emerald Pools involved the consideration of a number of factors, including (1) the practicality and effectiveness of any change, (2) preservation of park resources and the natural environment, (3) preservation of visitors' enjoyment of the environment, and (4) cost. Plaintiffs counter that Defendant has not and cannot point to a shred of objective, contemporaneous evidence, demonstrating that Zion National Park officials considered the competing policy considerations asserted as justification for failing to warn of or correct the hazard at the Middle Emerald Pools. 59 Plaintiffs misconceive the nature of the inquiry. Application of Berkovitz's second prong does not require proof of the thought processes of the pertinent decisionmakers. On the contrary, courts should not inquire into the actual state of mind or decisionmaking process of federal officials charged with performing discretionary functions. Franklin Sav. Corp. v. United States, 180 F.3d 1124, 1135 (10th Cir.1999). See Kiehn, 984 F.2d at 1105 (The lack of record evidence describing an analysis of public policy factors in the NPS decision not to post warnings is immaterial.) The focus of the inquiry is not on the agent's subjective intent in exercising the discretion conferred by statute or regulation, but on the nature of the actions taken and on whether they are susceptible to policy analysis. Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 325, 111 S.Ct. 1267. If the decisionmaker's subjective intent were relevant to application of the discretionary function exception, summary judgment could be granted rarely, if ever, thereby prolonging disruptive litigation that the exception was intended to foreclose. See Franklin Sav. Corp., 180 F.3d at 1134-41. The approach taken by the Supreme Court relies on objective factors: 60 [I]f a regulation allows the employee discretion, the very existence of the regulation creates a strong presumption that a discretionary act authorized by the regulation involves consideration of the same policies which led to the promulgation of the regulations. 61 .... 62 When established governmental policy, as expressed or implied by statute, regulation, or agency guidelines, allows a Government agent to exercise discretion, it must be presumed that the agent's acts are grounded in policy when exercising that discretion. 63 Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 324, 111 S.Ct. 1267. Accordingly, we presume in this case that the decisions at Zion were grounded in the NPS policies noted above. 64 Of course, the facts of the specific case may overcome the presumption to which the government is entitled under Gaubert. In certain circumstances, it may be obvious that a decision implicates none of the public policies that ordinarily inform an agency's decisionmaking. For example, in Duke we held that the discretionary function exception did not exempt the government's decision not to warn of falling rocks at a campground in the Gila National Forest. Duke, 131 F.3d at 1412. In that case, the government acknowledged that cost was not a factor in its decision. Id. And we could discern no public policy (such as preserving natural beauty) that was implicated by the decision not to install a warning sign at the campground, which was located on the side of a road that also served as a parking lot. Id. at 1411-12. See also Boyd v. United States ex rel. U.S. Army, Corps of Eng'rs, 881 F.2d 895, 898 (10th Cir.1989) (government's failure to warn swimmers of dangerous conditions in a popular swimming area does not implicate any social, economic, or political policy judgments with which the discretionary function exception properly is concerned). 65 That is not the situation here. The Middle Emerald Pools is not a parking lot, but a scenic attraction. The area may not be remote from civilization (it is near Zion's main lodge). Yet, because of its scenic value, many of the same interests are at stake as in cases recognizing the discretionary function exception as a defense to claims arising out of dangers in the wilderness. See Kiehn, 984 F.2d at 1105 (The decision not to post warning signs in remote areas of a national monument inherently requires a balancing of public policy objectives, such as resource allocation, visitor safety and scenic preservation.); Johnson v. United States Dep't of Interior, 949 F.2d 332, 337 (10th Cir.1991) (decisions regarding regulation of mountain climbing in Grand Tetons [b]y their very nature,... involve balancing competing policy considerations pertaining to visitor safety, resource availability, and the appropriate degree of governmental interference in recreational activity); Zumwalt, 928 F.2d at 955 (decision not to warn of known hazards along trail through wilderness area of national monument implicated protected policy decision to maintain trail in a wilderness state). 66 People visit the Middle Emerald Pools for the express purpose of seeing natural beauty. The Middle Emerald Pools could be made perfectly safe by installing around it a 10-foot-high chain link fence with spikes on top. But few would want to visit such a site. Zion officials have to decide the extent of safety precautions that can be justified in a scenic park. Physical barriers undoubtedly spoil the view and the experience of communing with nature. Although some warning signs may be necessary, their number, size, and even content must be measured against the very purposes of a national park, which include to conserve the scenery and provide for public enjoyment. 16 U.S.C. § 1. 67 Plaintiffs contend that the government has not explain[ed] how Zion National Park officials' alleged negligence in failing to warn Park visitors of the specific nature and location of the imminent death hazard posed by the sub-surface slippery algae at the Heaps Creek stream, was the result of any political, social or economic decisions the discretionary function exception was designed to protect. Appellant's Reply Brief 17. In our view, however, it is difficult to see how any means of warning here could fail to implicate public policy. Plaintiffs challenge the adequacy of the signage existing at the time of the accident, including the two signs that said, Danger — Cliff. Slippery Sandstone. Unstable Rock Edge. Wet Rock Hazardous. But what would constitute an adequate warning: Bigger signs? Signs embedded in the sandstone immediately next to each stream? Such solutions, however, have an impact on park aesthetics. And even if Plaintiffs are contending only that the wording of existing signs should have been altered to mention algae specifically, such a change would necessitate a chain of further decisions. Would not Zion managers then have to decide whether it is necessary to add signs that explain how to identify algae (Tyler's stepmother testified that the algae blended with the rocks and was not real noticeable, App. 00186) or that warn of the hazards of wet rock not covered by algae, and whether such additional signage would impair the scenery too much, as well as numb visitors to all warnings? 68 In the context of the Middle Emerald Pools, one cannot isolate a particular possible warning sign (or other safety measure, for that matter) and say whether its absence constitutes negligence. The adequacy of one safety measure depends on what other safety measures have been taken. If there is negligence, it is negligence in the design of the entire safety package. Yet park management must judge the totality of the safety package in terms of its impact on other public policies besides safety. Thus, it would be impossible to resolve Plaintiffs' negligence claims without evaluating decisions protected by the discretionary function exception. 69 We conclude that the second prong of the Berkovitz test has been satisfied and the government is entitled to the protection of the discretionary function exception. Accordingly, we need not consider Plaintiffs' argument that Zion would be liable in tort under Utah's Limitation of Landowner Liability Act, Utah Code Ann. § 57-14-1, et seq. When the discretionary function exception applies, it applies regardless of whether the discretionary acts themselves constitute actionable negligence. Kiehn, 984 F.2d at 1108; Johnson, 949 F.2d at 340.