Opinion ID: 1704062
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Home Place

Text: We have said the trial court granted the relief prayed for in the cross bill with respect to this piece of property, on the basis of the alleged agreement of joint adventure and decreed that appellee Cager Stanford, was entitled to a one-third undivided interest in the home place. This ruling is assigned as error. By the rule of favorable presumption attending the findings below under circumstances adverted to above, we are left unconvinced that this ruling should be overturned. The most cogent argument challenging this feature of the decree is that the alleged agreement, on the basis of which Stanford was decreed a one-third undivided interest in the property, was oral and was within the bar of the statute of frauds, Subdiv. 5, § 3, Title 20, Code 1940, making void every unwritten contract for the sale of land, etc., unless the purchase money, or a portion thereof, be paid and the purchaser put into possession of the land by the seller. The contention is that Stanford was not shown to have ever been put in possession within the meaning of that term of the statute. The argument is rested on the recognized principle that in order for the purchaser to be put into possession of land by the seller to satisfy that subdivision of the statute of frauds, the possession of the purchaser must refer exclusively to the contract sought to be enforced and be such as would not be done but for it; that possession of a tenant in common who has contracted orally to buy from his cotenant is ordinarily not sufficient as an act of part performance of the contract to satisfy the statute; and if the possession may be referable to some domestic or family relationship of vendor and vendee, the possession is not considered as referable solely to the contract, citing such well-known authorities as West v. McKay, 225 Ala. 397, 143 So. 573; Formby v. Williams, 203 Ala. 14, 81 So. 682; Jones v. Jones, 219 Ala. 62, 121 So. 78; Hagood v. Spinks, 219 Ala. 503, 122 So. 815; Stacey v. Stacey, 250 Ala. 187, 33 So.2d 898; Talley v. Talley, 248 Ala. 84, 26 So.2d 586; Vickers v. Pegues, 247 Ala. 624, 25 So.2d 720. But the status of the pleading does not admit of giving effect to the stated subdivision of the statute of frauds. The cross bill did not specifically state that the agreement was oral, but counsel for the parties here concede such was its effect, and we think it should be so interpreted. Whether the cross bill contained allegations sufficient to show that the statute of frauds was not complied with was not raised by demurrer, nor was there any allegation in the answer to the cross bill or any plea thereto invoking the defense of the statute. Under such circumstances, any claim that the contract was barred by the statute was waived. Pertinent to that situation, it was observed in Shakespeare v. Alba, 76 Ala. 351, 355:    The benefit of this statute is not available, without its being specially pleaded; and if waived, and the contract is admitted, or satisfactorily proved, it will be enforced   . If the defense of the statute is not insisted on, either by demurrer or answer, it must be considered as waived, upon the familiar maxim, `Quidlibet renunciare potest juri pro se introducto.' Broom's Maxims, 546. `A man may, on principle,' it has been said, `as well renounce the benefit of the Statute of Frauds as a defense, as the statute of limitations, or a discharge in bankruptcy.' Willard's Eq. Jur. 283. And such is the theory of our law, and the practice under our decisions. Bailey v. Irwin, 72 Ala. 505; Patterson v. Ware, 10 Ala. 444. This rule has been consistently followed. The only qualification in later decisions to the principle as stated in Shakespeare v. Alba, supra, is that, rather than being voidable unless the statute is complied with, such contracts are void. Prestwood v. Carlton, 162 Ala. 327(15), 346, 50 So. 254. But whether the contract were void or voidable is not here material, since, as stated, in order to avail of the statute there should be some pleading to bring it in view. The last cited Prestwood v. Carlton case approved the principle of Shakespeare v. Alba, to the extent of holding that the benefit of the statute is not available without being specially pleaded, though the contract is void, and if not so pleaded, it is waived and the contract, if proved, will be enforced. A corollary of the rule is, of course, that the pleader may raise the question by demurrer when the bill shows on its face the invalidity of the contract by reason of the provisions of said Subdiv. 5. The principle has been consistently sanctioned by our later cases, some of which are: Dodson v. Protective Life Ins. Co., 236 Ala. 111, 181 So. 492; Ex parte Banks, 185 Ala. 275, 64 So. 74; Johnson v. Maness, 232 Ala. 411, 168 So. 452; Sloss v. Glaze, 231 Ala. 234, 164 So. 51; Johnson v. Delony, 241 Ala. 16, 1 So.2d 11. The matter, therefore, of whether the statute of frauds affects the right of the cross complainant to relief under the alleged agreement is not involved. His right is dependent upon whether the contract as alleged in the cross bill was satisfactorily proved. The court did grant the relief, and we assume that it was upon a finding as alleged in the cross bill that Lona Spruiell agreed to procure from the legal heirs of A. R. Spruiell (other than Lona herself and her sister, Corda, wife of cross complainant) his interest in the land at his death and for a consideration of Cager performing such expressed acts the three parties, Lona, Corda, and Cager, would share onethird each in the title to the land. The trial court evidently treated this as an agreement on the part of complainant, Lona, to acquire the one-third interest, which had been owned by her deceased brother, and to convey it, or cause it to be conveyed, to Cager Stanford, cross complainant. The evidence established the fact that Lona, the complainant, did procure that one-third interest, but had the title made to herself, individually. She, hence, put herself in condition where she could convey the interest to cross complainant as the cross bill alleged she agreed to do. The trial court found from the evidence that the contract was made as alleged in the cross bill and that cross complainant performed the obligations which he undertook as the consideration for the contract. We assume that the trial judge was familiar with the rules which we have stated hereinabove, and applied them. He had the witnesses before him, and we do not feel justified in reversing his finding as made. We are mindful, as we have assumed the trial court was, of the rules applicable to specific performance, and that the evidence must produce a clear conviction of the existence and terms of the contract as alleged, Harrison v. Harrison, 198 Ala. 159, 73 So. 454, by clear and satisfactory proof, Burt v. Moses, 211 Ala. 47, 99 So. 106. That is, a case of specific performance must be established by clear, definite and unequivocal evidence, and must not leave the contract or any of its terms in doubt. Wilder v. Reed, 216 Ala. 29, 112 So. 312; Nolan v. Moore, 254 Ala. 74, 46 So.2d 825; Box v. Box, 243 Ala. 437, 10 So.2d 478. But we think the tendency of the evidence proffered by appellees established the contract as alleged in the cross bill consistent with these rules. So considered, the feature of the decree relative to the home place property must be affirmed. The Kentucky Land Company Forty Acres. Title to this tract is in Cager Stanford. Appellant's bill in effect seeks to have the deed reformed so as to vest the title in the parties, a one-third undivided interest each, as in the nature of a resulting trust, on the theory that the money which paid for the land was partnership money accruing from the operation of the home place; that it was agreed between the parties that the title should be so taken, and that the court should so decree. The trial court denied relief, and we are likewise in accord with this holding. The burden rested on complainant to establish this by clear and convincing evidence, which clearly she has not done. The court was justified in finding that Stanford purchased this land for himself with the knowledge of appellant, and paid for it from the fruits of his own labor and his own funds. Indeed, there was testimony given by complainant which would seem to corroborate this. In response to the inquiry as to what was said with reference to him [Stanford] purchasing the forty acres from Kentucky Land Company, appellant testified, He said he wanted to buy it and I said we would help him buy it and give him the deed to it as we already had eighty acres, and he had no part in that, and he could have the deed with the understanding we'd all have the benefit of wood and timber on it. Our view is, appellant has failed to establish any right to or interest in the Kentucky Land Company forty acres.