Opinion ID: 1804987
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Return of the King: Our Subsequent Jurisprudence and Failure to Forge a Majority View

Text: Neither Bottoson nor King, therefore, finally settled the question of whether Ring applies in Florida. As if to emphasize that fact, virtually every post-conviction appeal filed in this Court continues to raise the Ring issue. In the ensuing months, we have repeatedly denied relief under Ring in both direct appeals and post-conviction cases, relying for the most part on citations to Bottoson and King. [16] Chief Justice Anstead has reminded us, however, that neither Bottoson nor King garnered a majority. [17] Despite the ever-growing mountain of cases raising this issue, we have come no closer to forging a majority view about whether Ring applies in Florida than we did in Bottoson and King. See Allen v. State, 854 So.2d 1255, 1263 (Fla.2003) (noting that we have not yet as a Court determined whether Ring has any applicability to Florida's death penalty scheme or if so, whether any aspect of that holding would be retroactive to cases already final) (Pariente, J., specially concurring). Some of us, however, have staked out clear positions. For example, Justice Wells, Justice Quince, and I rely on the United States Supreme Court's admonition not to assume that the Court has overruled its prior decisions unless it does so explicitly. [18] Chief Justice Anstead, on the other hand, believes that Ring applies in Florida and that it requires a jury to determine all aggravating factors. [19] And Justice Pariente believes that Ring applies but that its requirements are satisfied as long as the jury finds one aggravating factor  which in most cases will be the prior violent felony aggravator  because that finding renders the defendant eligible for the death penalty. [20] Curiously, although both Bottoson and King involved post-conviction relief  that is, the convictions of both defendants had become final  and although the State contended that Ring did not apply retroactively, only Justice Shaw, in his separate opinion in Bottoson, has analyzed whether Ring applies retroactively. 833 So.2d at 711-19. Even after Bottoson and King, none of our cases have addressed that issue; and neither Chief Justice Anstead nor Justice Pariente, who believe that Ring requires a Florida jury to determine either some (J. Pariente) or all (C.J. Anstead) aggravators, has analyzed whether such requirements apply retroactively. The United States Supreme Court has long considered retroactivity a threshold issue, which must be considered first in determining whether a defendant seeking post-conviction relief is entitled to the benefits of a new decision. In Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989), in which the Supreme Court changed the standard for determining whether a newly created criminal rule should be applied retroactively, the Court noted that retroactivity is properly treated as a threshold question. Id. at 300, 109 S.Ct. 1060 (plurality opinion). [21] Florida courts, too, consider the issue of retroactivity as a threshold matter. See State v. Will, 645 So.2d 91, 94 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); Dupont v. State, 514 So.2d 1159, 1160 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). Recently, the Eleventh Circuit considered retroactivity as a threshold issue. On appeal from denial of federal habeas relief, the court refused to consider whether Florida's capital sentencing scheme violates Ring because it determined the issue was procedurally barred and that under Teague, Ring did not apply retroactively anyway. See Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir.2003), cert. denied, No. 03-9251, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 2104, 158 L.Ed.2d 718 (U.S. 2004). [22] Considering retroactivity first makes sense because, if we address the merits of a claim in a post-conviction case but then decide that a prior case does not apply retroactively, our discussion of the merits becomes mere dictum. Yet by discussing the merits, we risk creating confusion in the bench and bar because many  perhaps even we  will interpret our discussion as a holding or will assume that we have implicitly held the prior decision retroactive. [23] We should not announce broad statements of law, or even address such issues  as we did in Bottoson and King  unless and until we decide that such a discussion would apply to the case under review. That this Court has not routinely addressed retroactivity first, as Justice Pariente contends, specially concurring op. at 933, provides no justification for continuing the practice. Before considering the merits of any claims raised in the appeals and petitions before it, this Court generally addresses a number of asserted procedural and jurisdictional bars. We determine whether the issue was preserved, whether a claimed error constitutes fundamental error that may be raised for the first time on appeal, or whether notice of appeal was timely filed. The retroactivity of new decisions presents a similar procedural issue. Nor does it matter, as Justice Pariente suggests, specially concurring op. at 934, that the issue of Ring's retroactivity is currently pending in the United States Supreme Court. Unless this Court adopts my view that we should apply a Teague analysis to retroactivity issues (see part II A below), that case will not determine Ring's retroactivity under this Court's Witt analysis (which is precisely why I believe we should adopt the same test the Supreme Court uses). Because we continue to address the Ring issue on the merits, even in post-conviction appeals, a growing number of petitioners have argued that we already have decided that Ring applies retroactively. Of course that is not the case. As I stated earlier, only one justice on this Court has even addressed the issue of retroactivity. But the fact that we have not addressed it, coupled with our repeated discussion of the merits of Ring claims, apparently has created this impression. Therefore, because many post-conviction appeals we decide raise the Ring issue, because the issue of retroactivity should be a threshold question in a post-conviction case determining the applicability of a new case, and because a majority of this Court thus far has been unable to agree on whether Ring applies to Florida's death penalty scheme, we should address whether Ring would apply retroactively. I now turn to that issue.