Opinion ID: 1410517
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: W.Va.Code, 14-2-2(a)(1) (1976), states:

Text: The following proceedings shall be brought and prosecuted only in the circuit court of Kanawha county: (1) Any suit in which the governor, any other state officer, or a state agency is made a party defendant, except as garnishee or suggestee. The respondents concede that the relator is a state agent; however, they contend that for the remaining defendants venue is proper in Mingo County and that once venue is proper for one defendant, it is proper for all other defendants subject to process. State ex rel. Kenamond v. Warmuth, 179 W.Va. 230, 231, 366 S.E.2d 738, 739 (1988). (Citations omitted). What the respondent fails to recognize is that this principle does not usually apply when one of the defendants is the governor, any other state officer, or a state agency[.] W.Va.Code, 14-2-2(a)(1). Indeed, we addressed this same argument nearly forty years ago in Taylor v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 138 W.Va. 313, 75 S.E.2d 858 (1953). In Taylor, the petitioner sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company and the State Road Commission to erect a fence on the property line between his land and property owned by the State Road Commission. The petition was filed in the Circuit Court of Upshur County. As here, the State Road Commission argued that because it was a state agency, proper venue was only in Kanawha County. We agreed, and in Syllabus Point 2 of Taylor, we held: Under Code, 14-2-3, as amended by Section 3, Chapter 20, Acts of the Legislature of 1941, Regular Session, the venue for a proceeding in mandamus against the State Road Commission is in Kanawha County, notwithstanding that a private corporation is a joint defendant along with such Commission. [4] Twenty-five years later, we reiterated this holding in Shobe v. Latimer, 162 W.Va. 779, 253 S.E.2d 54 (1979). In Shobe, plaintiffs brought a class action seeking a declaratory judgment that a contract between the Department of Natural Resources and Dorcas Public Service District was illegal, void, and unconstitutional. The plaintiffs filed their declaratory judgment action in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County. A question then arose on where venue was proper. We explained: When a state officer is properly made a party defendant in a civil action, venue is controlled and determined by the law embodied in W.Va. Code § 14-2-2 [1974]. If venue is properly laid against the state officer under this provision, then venue as to other defendants is also proper under traditional venue-giving defendant principles. Taylor v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and State Road Commission, 138 W.Va. 313, 75 S.E.2d 858 (1953). 162 W.Va. at 793, 253 S.E.2d at 62. (Footnote omitted). We memorialized this rule in Syllabus Point 5 of Shobe: When a state officer is properly made a party defendant in a civil action, venue is controlled and determined by W.Va. Code § 14-2-2. We also find meritless the respondents' reliance on Syllabus Point 3 of Pittsburgh Elevator Co. v. West Virginia Board of Regents, 172 W.Va. 743, 310 S.E.2d 675 (1983), where we held: The exclusive venue provision of W.Va. Code § 14-2-2 is not applicable to a cause of action wherein recovery is sought against the liability insurance coverage of a state agency. The respondents contend that this exception was carved out because the recovery sought was from private sources rather than public funds. Contrary to the respondents' assertions, this exception was recognized because it did not defeat the manifest purpose of W.Va.Code, 14-2-2. The reason for exclusive venue statutes, such as W.Va.Code, 14-2-2, is to prevent the great inconvenience and possible public detriment that would attend if functionaries of the state government should be required to defend official conduct and state's property interests in sections of the commonwealth remote from the capital. Davis v. West Virginia Bridge Comm'n, 113 W.Va. 110, 113, 166 S.E. 819, 821 (1932). See also Board of Educ. v. MacQueen, 174 W.Va. 338, 325 S.E.2d 355 (1984); Pittsburgh Elevator Co. v. West Virginia Bd. of Regents, supra . Thus, where the real party in interest is the insurance carrier which is obligated to defend the action ... there is no rational justification for application of W.Va.Code, 14-2-2. Pittsburgh Elevator Co. v. West Virginia Bd. of Regents, 172 W.Va. at 756-57, 310 S.E.2d at 689. However, in this case, the real party in interest is a state officer. The purpose of W.Va. Code, 14-2-2, could easily be defeated if every time a state officer were sued, a private citizen or corporation was also sued. We decline to sanction such a result.