Opinion ID: 779902
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Motion for Acquittal on Firearm Charge

Text: 42 Gary Lott also challenges the district court's denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal on Count 12 of possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). We review the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. United States v. Austin, 231 F.3d 1278, 1283 (10th Cir.2000). We must determine whether there is evidence from which a jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. Although we review the record to determine if there is evidence to support the verdict, we do not weigh the evidence or consider the credibility of the witnesses in making [our] determination. Id. Reversal is warranted `only if no rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.' United States v. Haslip, 160 F.3d 649, 652 (10th Cir.1998) (quoting United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453, 1462-63 (10th Cir.1995)). 43 In this case, Count 12 charged that on or about January 21, 1999, Gary Lott knowingly carried and possessed a firearm, [the Sig-Sauer automatic pistol found in the Camaro] during and in relation to and in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, that is, attempting to manufacture methamphetamine in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). This count included two distinct offenses for which the jury could have found Gary Lott guilty. The statute provides an enhanced sentence for those who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime... uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm. § 924(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added). [A] crime denounced in the statute disjunctively may be alleged in an indictment in the conjunctive, and thereafter proven in the disjunctive. United States v. Powell, 226 F.3d 1181, 1192 n. 4 (10th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, we must examine the evidence to determine whether the jury could have found Gary Lott guilty either of carrying a weapon during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense, or of possessing the weapon in furtherance of the drug trafficking offense. We find sufficient evidence to support a jury finding that Gary Lott possessed a firearm in furtherance of his attempts to manufacture methamphetamine so we need not address the carried charge. 11 44 Possession under § 924(c)(1) can be shown through either constructive or actual possession. See United States v. Wahl, 290 F.3d 370, 375-76 (D.C.Cir.2002); cf United States v. Mackey, 265 F.3d 457, 460 (6th Cir.2001) (analyzing charge under § 924(c)(1) and stating that defendant had conceded constructive possession of weapon under the statute). A person has constructive possession when he or she knowingly holds ownership, dominion, or control over the object and the premises where it is found. United States v. Mills, 29 F.3d 545, 549 (10th Cir.1994). The government may prove constructive possession by circumstantial evidence. Id. 45 In this case, Officer Fitzwilliam testified that he saw Gary Lott g[e]t in the driver's door and lean[] over the driver's seat inside the vehicle. Documents were found inside the Camaro in Gary Lott's name, including a telephone bill and various documents found in an unlocked safe found in the vehicle. After arresting Gary Lott near the Camaro, the police found the gun in question, a loaded-nine-millimeter Sig-Sauer automatic pistol, sitting on the driver's seat. A rational juror could have inferred from this evidence that Gary Lott constructively possessed the gun. He seemingly had dominion and control over the vehicle, as evidenced by entering it, and over the gun, as he was leaning over the driver's seat minutes before the gun was found there. See United States v. Valadez-Gallegos, 162 F.3d 1256, 1262 (10th Cir.1998) (stating that government need only present some evidence supporting at least a plausible inference that the defendant had knowledge of and access to the ... contraband (internal quotation mark omitted)). 46 We also believe that there is sufficient evidence to support an inference that the drug was used in furtherance of Gary Lott's drug trafficking activities. We recently have recognized factors helpful in analyzing whether a firearm was possessed in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, including the type of drug activity being conducted, the accessibility of the firearm, the type of firearm, the legal status of the firearm, whether the firearm is loaded, the proximity of the firearm to the drugs or drug profits, and the time and circumstances under which the firearm is found. United States v. Basham, 268 F.3d 1199, 1208 (10th Cir.2001). Other circuits also have approved of these factors, first articulated in United States v. Ceballos-Torres, 218 F.3d 409, 414-15 (5th Cir.2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1102, 121 S.Ct. 839, 148 L.Ed.2d 720 (2001). See Wahl, 290 F.3d at 376; Mackey, 265 F.3d at 462. Although we have instructed that mere possession of a firearm in proximity to drugs would not require a finding that a weapon was possessed in furtherance of drug trafficking, it could be considered by the jury along with other circumstantial evidence to determine whether the defendant intended to possess the weapon in furtherance of drug trafficking. Basham, 268 F.3d at 1208. The Sixth Circuit has found that mere presence of a firearm in the same premises as a drug transaction is insufficient, and that it is essential that the weapon be strategically located so that it is quickly and easily available for use. Mackey, 265 F.3d at 462. 47 In this case, a loaded, semi-automatic handgun was found on the driver's seat of the Camaro. Also found in the Camaro were various materials used in the manufacturing of methamphetamine, including a gallon each of toluene and acetone, a heating plate, various glassware, tubing, rubber stoppers, five bottles of pseudoephedrine tablets, a four once bottle of vitablend, three sixteen ounce bottles of iodine tincture, and a safe. Thus, this case is distinguishable from United States v. Iiland, 254 F.3d 1264, (10th Cir.2001), where [t]here was no evidence that the guns and drugs were ever kept in the same place or that [the defendant] kept the gun accessible when conducting drug transactions. Id. at 1274. We conclude that the placement of a loaded, semi-automatic weapon on the driver's seat of the car in which the instrumentalities of methamphetamine manufacturing were also found is sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that the purpose of the gun was to provide defense or deterrence in furtherance of attempting to manufacture methamphetamine. Therefore, we affirm the district court's denial of Gary Lott's motion for acquittal on his § 924(c)(1) charge.