Opinion ID: 2241998
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Special Damage or Injury

Text: We must next determine whether plaintiff's complaint adequately pleaded special injury or damage. Like the favorable termination requirement, the necessity of pleading some special injury or damage is firmly rooted in our jurisprudence. In one of the earliest references to the requirement, this court, in 1898, examined whether damages can be recovered for the malicious prosecution of an ordinary civil suit, begun by personal service of process, and unaccompanied either by an arrest of the person or by seizure of property. Smith v. Michigan Buggy Co., 175 Ill. 619, 624, 51 N.E. 569 (1898). The underlying suit in question in Smith was an unsuccessful action for fraudulent misrepresentation brought by an employer against one of its salesmen. Citing both American and English common law principles, this court determined that without the arrest of the person or the seizure of the person's property or some other special injury, a cause of action for the malicious prosecution would not lie in civil actions. Smith, 175 Ill. at 627, 51 N.E. 569. In reaching this conclusion, the court stressed its decision was grounded upon the fact that the courts are open to every citizen to claim what he deems to be his right without fear of being prosecuted for heavy damages. Smith, 175 Ill. at 628, 51 N.E. 569. Thus, the ordinary trouble and expense which arise from ordinary forms of legal controversy, should be endured by the law-abiding citizen as one of the inevitable burdens, which men must sustain under civil government. (Emphasis added.) Smith, 175 Ill. at 629, 51 N.E. 569. The issue of what type of lawsuit constitutes an ordinary form of legal controversy was again addressed by this court some 22 years later in Norin v. Scheldt Manufacturing Co., 297 Ill. 521, 130 N.E. 791 (1921). There, the Scheldt Manufacturing Company filed a petition in bankruptcy against Norin, requesting that Norin be adjudged a bankrupt. Scheldt filed the petition on publication alone. When Norin failed to appear in the proceeding, the court entered a bankruptcy judgment against him. Norin later learned of the bankruptcy action and began vacatur proceedings. During the hearing to set aside the default, one of Scheldt's officers admitted he had known Norin's place of residence at the time service by publication was obtained. Moreover, Scheldt admitted that it had been unable to prove Norin's insolvency at the time it filed its petition. Accordingly, the court vacated its previous judgment and dismissed the bankruptcy petition. Norin thereafter brought suit against Scheldt to recover damages for the malicious prosecution of the bankruptcy action. Scheldt contended that Norin had failed to satisfy the special injury requirement because (i) the bankruptcy judgment had ultimately been vacated, and (ii) Norin's property had not been seized. Scheldt concluded therefore that the bankruptcy litigation constituted a mere ordinary civil action. On appeal, this court rejected that argument. In doing so, we concluded that the bankruptcy action could not be considered ordinary because of the far-reaching and drastic effects associated with that proceeding. Norin, 297 Ill. at 525, 130 N.E. 791. In fact, because of the peculiar, sui generis nature of a bankruptcy action, this court deemed irrelevant the fact that Norin's property was not seized. We explained that suits which are themselves unusual in their effect upon the defendant fall outside the special injury requirement established in Smith. Norin, 297 Ill. at 527, 130 N.E. 791. Subsequently, in Shedd v. Patterson, 302 Ill. 355, 134 N.E. 705 (1922), this court had further opportunity to shape the contours of the special injury requirement. In that case, the plaintiff brought a malicious prosecution action against defendant after the defendant had filed nine successive lawsuits against plaintiff, all of which related to the foreclosure of a leasehold estate for unpaid rents. The circuit court dismissed the action, and the appellate court affirmed. The appellate court ruled that under this court's decisions in Smith and Norin, the nine unsuccessful prior actions constituted ordinary litigation; therefore, plaintiff had not suffered any special injury. This court thereafter granted plaintiff leave to appeal and reversed the judgment of the appellate court. Although this court initially acknowledged that the Illinois courts are open to all litigants for the settlement of their rights without fear of retributive litigation, it nevertheless held that Smith and Norin could not be viewed as providing immunity in the case of successive suits after a party has had his or her rights finally adjudicated. Shedd, 302 Ill. at 360, 134 N.E. 705. Specifically the court stated that after a party has had his day in court and his right has been conclusively determined, he may not return to court to harass the same opponent about the same issues. Shedd, 302 Ill. at 360, 134 N.E. 705. It is against this precedential backdrop, and, in particular, Shedd, that we must examine whether the special injury rule has been satisfied by the facts as alleged in this case. Defendants maintain that although multiple suits are involved here, the instant case is distinguishable from Shedd because all of the prior actions here were brought by different plaintiffs in different jurisdictions, concerning different sets of operative facts. Defendants also point out that all of the prior actions in Shedd, unlike those here, were filed successively after the first action had been finally and conclusively determined. Plaintiff, on the other hand, acknowledges the dissimilarities between the cases, but nevertheless submits that the principles concerning multiple suits announced in Shedd apply with equal force to the case at bar. Plaintiff contends that the filing of 21 meritless lawsuits against plaintiff during a 17month period constitutes a special injury regardless of the fact that the suits were filed concurrently rather than consecutively. Plaintiff submits, therefore, that it should be allowed a remedy for this harm. We agree with defendants that Shedd is factually distinguishable from the case at bar. In Shedd, this court was confronted with a single litigant who, having invoked the power of the judiciary to decide his grievance and having lost, refused to accept the judgment of the court and continued to litigate the matter. This court would not permit the court system to be used in such a manner, and thus it stated in pertinent part: Law is the foundation of civil government, and its administration and the means for its enforcement are essential to the maintenance of rights and the stability of the social order. To that end courts are created and maintained at the public expense, and are, and should be, open for the redress of grievances and the enforcement of rights, but that affords no reason for requiring them to employ their time to the prejudice of other litigants and the public business, to enable a party whose rights have been finally and conclusively determined to harass the same party about the same thing.    In this case the courts had repeatedly decided that the defendant had no grievance, and the substantial questions involved were finally and conclusively settled [15 years earlier] in Patterson v. Northern Trust Co. 231 Ill. 22, 82 N.E. 840. Shedd, 302 Ill. at 360-61, 134 N.E. 705. Clearly, what concerned this court in Shedd, to a large extent, was the fact that a litigant who had already been given his day in court, and had lost, continued to use the same purported grievance as a subterfuge for conducting a personal crusade of harassment under the guise of rightful litigation. In this case, however, the same plaintiff is not involved in repeated litigation and the multiple suits in question were not filed successively but concurrently. Therefore, Shedd is factually inapposite to the case at bar. Nevertheless, the fact that Shedd is not factually on all fours with the present case does not spell victory for defendants. A common theme with respect to the special injury rule which runs throughout all of this court's opinions on the subject, including Shedd, is this court's recognition of its responsibility to maintain a proper balance between the societal interest in preventing harassing suits and in permitting the honest assertion of rights in our court rooms. See Shedd, 302 Ill. at 360, 134 N.E. 705. As our case law amply demonstrates, it is this balance which lies at the heart of the special injury rule (see Smith, 175 Ill. at 628-29, 51 N.E. 569; Norin, 297 Ill. at 526-27, 130 N.E. 791; see also Friedman v. Dozorc, 412 Mich. 1, 67, 312 N.W.2d 585, 612 (1981) (Coleman, C.J., dissenting in part and concurring in part); Note, Groundless Litigation and the Malicious Prosecution Debate: A Historical Analysis, 88 Yale L.J. 1218, 1230 (1979)), and it is this balance, and not the facts in Shedd, which ultimately must determine the propriety of the instant action. Ironically, it is one of the critical differences between the facts in Shedd and the facts as alleged in this case which compels the conclusion that this delicate balance has been upset in this case. In contrast to Shedd, which involved only two litigants disputing the foreclosure of a leasehold estate, the present case involves allegations that a large national corporation improperly induced its members to engage in a national campaign of simultaneous malicious prosecution. Plaintiff has alleged that the Church of Scientology instituted the simultaneous suits, not to resolve any legal dispute between the parties, but to keep plaintiff from engaging in its business of disseminating information regarding religious freedom. The invidiousness of the alleged conspiracy is best reflected in the fact that plaintiff was sued 21 times over the course of a 17-month period in jurisdictions ranging from New York to California. Such a sustained onslaught of litigation can hardly be deemed ordinary if plaintiff can prove that the actions were brought without probable cause and with malice. In view of these circumstances, we believe that plaintiff has set forth facts, which if proved true, satisfy our special injury rule. Notwithstanding the above, defendants submit that if this court were to conclude that the special injury requirement has been met in this case, we would be infringing upon defendants' exercise of their first amendment rights. Specifically, defendants rely upon several United States Supreme Court decisions which have held that the litigation activities of a national membership organization, including encouraging, financing, and coordinating a series of lawsuits challenging discriminatory practices, are protected by the first amendment. See National Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 83 S.Ct. 328, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963); United Mine Workers of America, District 12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 88 S.Ct. 353, 19 L.Ed.2d 426 (1967). While we do not dispute the correctness of these Supreme Court decisions, we do dispute the defendants' reliance upon them. The Constitution affords protection to the honest litigator in search of resolutions to true legal disputes; however, it does not provide the right to any individual to assist another, with money or otherwise, in the prosecution of a suit which has been filed with malice and without probable cause. In any event, we stress that defendants have challenged plaintiff's complaint by way of a section 2-615 motion to dismiss. Such a motion merely addresses the allegations contained within the four corners of plaintiff's complaint. Therefore, defendants' constitutional argument, which is a fact-dependent defense to the action grounded in probable cause, cannot be considered in the context of the present motion to dismiss. Nothing in our opinion prevents defendants from raising the first amendment's protections at the appropriate juncture in this case. As a final matter, we wish to stress that our holding with respect to the special injury requirement should not be viewed as a rejection of the rule as set forth in our earlier opinions. We further emphasize that today's decision should not be read to mitigate the strict requirement that a malicious prosecution plaintiff show not only that the action complained of has been terminated, but that it was commenced maliciously and without probable cause. These latter two required elements are no easy hurdle for a plaintiff, as many courts and commentators have noted. See Barrett, 530 So.2d at 735-36; Friedman, 412 Mich. at 65-66, 312 N.W.2d at 611 (Coleman, C.J., dissenting in part and concurring in part); Kauffman v. Shefman, 169 Mich. App. 829, 840, 426 N.W.2d 819, 824 (1988); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 675, Comments a through d (1976). An action for malicious prosecution remains one that is disfavored in law.