Opinion ID: 1096122
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Was the Confession a Product of an Illegal Arrest[2]

Text: ROY NOBLE LEE, Chief Justice, for the Court: Abram argues here that his confession is inadmissible because it is the product of an illegal arrest. The arrest is illegal according to Abram because of the complete lack of probable cause to issue a warrant, and because Judge Speights did not act as a neutral and detached magistrate when issuing the arrest warrant. The State counters with the argument that Sheriff Forbes had probable cause to arrest Abram without a warrant so that defects, if any, in the procurement and issuance of the warrant are of no consequence. The State further contends that Judge Speights acted neutrally and impartially, and in any event, there is no basis for finding that the confession resulted from the arrest, if illegal.
The key, initial question indeed is whether in fact Sheriff Forbes had probable cause to arrest Abram without a warrant on August 12, 1982. If Sheriff Forbes lacked probable cause, then the arrest is illegal ab initio, in which case we must proceed further to determine if the confession subsequently given is fruit of the poisonous tree. Conversely, if Sheriff Forbes did have probable cause, then the arrest is legal notwithstanding that the warrants may later prove to be invalid. Lanier v. State, 450 So.2d 69, 73 (Miss. 1984). The validity of the warrants is a moot point in either case since Abram was not technically arrested by warrant until Sunday, August 15, three days after he was functionally arrested without a warrant. In Mississippi the test is the same: In order to make a felony arrest, either with or without a warrant, the officer must have probable cause to believe a felony has been committed, and probable cause to believe the suspect to be arrested committed the felony. Floyd v. State, 500 So.2d 989, 991 (Miss. 1986), cert. denied 484 U.S. 816, 108 S.Ct. 68, 98 L.Ed.2d 32 (1987); Swanier v. State, 473 So.2d 180, 186 (Miss. 1985); Miss. Code Ann. § 99-3-7 (Supp. 1991); Unif.Crim.R.Cir.Ct.P. 1.02. [3] The first part of the test is clearly met; Sheriff Forbes knew a felony had been committed. But did he, at the time of the arrest, have probable cause to believe Abram committed that felony? Lanier, 450 So.2d at 73. Was the uncorroborated word of two confidential informants sufficient to establish probable cause to believe Abram had committed the felony? In Swanier, the Court affirmed that probable cause inquiries are case specific and based on the totality of the circumstances. The existence of probable cause or reasonable grounds justifying an arrest without a warrant is determined by factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians act. The determination depends upon the particular evidence and circumstances of the individual case. The facts necessary to uphold an arrest without a warrant must be sufficiently strong to support the issuance of a warrant for arrest. 473 So.2d at 186, quoting Smith v. State, 386 So.2d 1117, 1119 (Miss. 1980); see also, Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-32, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2328-29, 76 L.Ed.2d 527, 543-44 (1983). The basis for Sheriff Forbes' request for arrest warrants for Donald Abram (and consequently the basis for any probable cause) is found in the following excerpts from his testimony at the suppression hearing: Q. What was the basis of  of this request? A. Information that I received from an informant. Q. That the defendant was involved in  A. Capital murder/armed robbery. Q. Was this informant a reliable person? A. Yeah. Q. Did you get this information from more than one informant? A. Yeah. Q. And did you get it from on more than one occasion? A. It was several occasions. Q. Okay. Other than that information, what other probable cause did you have for requesting this warrant? A. Really, none.       Q. Okay. So  so basically, Sheriff, you had investigated an incident, and the probable cause that you had for the warrant on this defendant was related to information by informant; is that correct? A. That's correct.       Q. Okay. Up to that point [the point of arrest], your evidence consisted of hearsay statements from one or more confidential informants, correct? A. Well, it came from confidential informants. I don't know if you call it hearsay or not. It was true, anyway. Q. Well, you've testified in a prior hearing that it was hearsay information from a confidential informant; haven't you? Are you saying now it wasn't hearsay? A. Well, the fellow that told me, he tells the truth. Q. Well, that's your estimate of it. A. He hadn't never been wrong before when I got information. Q. Did he tell you he was present on Highway 35  A. Nope. Q.  when a crime occurred? A. No. Q. Did he tell you he personally talked to Donald Ray Abram? A. No. Q. Did he tell you who he talked to that indicated that they talked to Herman Barnes or Donald Ray Abram? A. No.       Q. How many confidential informants did you have? A. Well, there were at least two. Q. Okay. Two? Were these the two individuals who had overheard some people at a party say  overheard some people at a party say they heard Herman Barnes say he had blown some honkies' heads away? A. Well, I'm not going to answer the question. I figure that's like playing charades. You can keep on, and after a while, you can figure out who it was. Q. I don't care who it was. A. Well, I do because I don't want them to get in trouble. [At this point, the State objected for fear the identity of the informers would be revealed. The court added that the question narrowed it down to a party, and any further details might narrow the inquiry to a particular party and particular individuals present there. Defense counsel then chose another approach.] Q. Sheriff, would it be true to say that you don't know how your confidential informant got his information? A. No. Q. That's correct. A. That's correct. Q. Okay, and your informant didn't tell you how he came by his information? A. No. Q. He just told you he had some information, and since you knew him, you knew him to be reliable, and accepted that information? A. That's correct. Q. Okay. He didn't go into any of the facts and details? A. I didn't ask. Q. Okay, and it was based on that information that you filled out Defense Exhibit 3, page 1, Defense Exhibit 2, page 2, and Defense Exhibit 1, page 1, which are all affidavits? It was based on that, that you filled out the affidavits and presented it to Judge Speights, correct? A. Correct.       THE COURT: All right. Now, let me ask you, and I'm  I'm being very careful how I ask these questions, especially about this subject, and think about your answer, also. I'm going to ask you about the informants, but I want you to be sure that whatever your answer is, is not designed to reveal those informants. So just kind of tell me what you feel like you can tell me about them without revealing them, but you say there was more than one? THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Did those informants give you  were there more than two? THE WITNESS: What's that? THE COURT: Were there more than two? THE WITNESS: No. THE COURT: Did they give you any  any details about the incident to the point of  they did name these two individuals? THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Did they give you any details as to maybe which one did the shooting and didn't? THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. THE COURT: They distinguished between the two? THE WITNESS: Said Herman Barnes was the one that did the shooting. THE COURT: And you say that they didn't identify anyone else other than these two? THE WITNESS: No. THE COURT: You say you have used these informants in the past? THE WITNESS: One of them I had. THE COURT: One of them you have? THE WITNESS: Yeah. THE COURT: Have you known these informants for sometime, quite sometime, several years? THE WITNESS: Yeah. THE COURT: You know their general reputation in the community  THE WITNESS: Yeah. THE COURT:  for truth and veracity and their character for truth and veracity? THE WITNESS: Yes. THE COURT: And you find that they are reliable? THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. THE COURT: And this is why  when you started your investigation as to these two defendants,  THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. THE COURT:  after you received that information? THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Do you know when you received that information? Do you recall in this time sequence when you received it? THE WITNESS: It was several different times. The first incident was on  I met with them Tuesday night after the incident happened on I believe it was Friday, the 23rd, wasn't it, of August? I mean, July? THE COURT: We have the date.       THE COURT: Did you obtain some additional information after that Tuesday? THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. THE COURT: From these informants? THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. As Forbes' testimony indicates, he had information from two informants implicating Barnes and Abram. One informant he knew, from past experience, to be very reliable. They also accurately pegged Barnes as the trigger man, a fact suggesting some basis of knowledge and further reliability. Viewing this information not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement, Gates, 462 U.S. at 232, 103 S.Ct. at 2329, 76 L.Ed.2d at 544, we believe that Sheriff Forbes possessed the requisite probable cause to arrest and detain Abram without a warrant. To hold otherwise would ignore the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. Swanier, 473 So.2d at 186. A more restricted view would leave virtually no place for anonymous citizen informants. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S.Ct. at 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d at 548. Having concluded the arrest of Donald Abram was based on sufficient probable cause, we need not address his remaining claims regarding the actions of the issuing magistrate, or whether the confession is inadmissible as fruit of the poisonous tree.