Opinion ID: 1676738
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Prohibition of Evidence

Text: The evidence adduced at trial revealed that on October 2, 1997, at approximately ten o'clock in the morning, appellant went to the home of a neighbor, William Ishmael, and asked Mr. Ishmael to drive him to a pawn shop because he wanted to buy an SKS rifle. Mr. Ishmael drove appellant to the pawn shop, where appellant purchased the weapon. The two then proceeded to the local Wal-Mart store and purchased shells. Then, after purchasing some beer, the two drove out to an area where they could fire their guns, according to Mr. Ishmael. After shooting for a while, appellant asked Mr. Ishmael to drop him off near a small shed off Highway 284. This drop-off point was less than one-half mile from the victim's residence. Mr. Ishmael testified that appellant told him a friend would be picking him up there to go hunting, although it was not gun season, according to Mr. Ishmael, it was bow season. Mr. Ishmael testified that it was probably around noon when he dropped appellant off near the shed. Valerie Chappell, wife of the deceased, testified that sometime between eight and nine o'clock, on the evening of October 2, 1997, gunshots began being fired into her residence near the patio. She testified that her daughter, Kim Chappell Kail, ex-wife of the appellant, was staying at her home and had already gone to bed when the shooting commenced. Mrs. Chappell stated that her husband was wounded by one of the shots and that she saw the appellant standing inside the patio doors with the rifle in his hand. Mr. Chappell later died as a result of the gunshot wound. At trial, appellant attempted to offer evidence regarding alleged marital discord between appellant and the deceased's daughter, Kim Chappell Kail, in an attempt to prove that appellant was suffering from an extreme emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable excuse, as set forth in Ark.Code Ann. § 5-10-104 (Repl.1997), in order to justify a lesser included instruction for manslaughter. The trial court precluded appellant from offering said evidence. Further, the court precluded the appellant from offering any evidence from medical experts or psychological experts to establish an extreme emotional disturbance. The trial court upheld the position taken by the State that pursuant to the cases of Spann v. State, 328 Ark. 509, 944 S.W.2d 537 (1997) and Rainey v. State, 310 Ark. 419, 837 S.W.2d 453 (1992), a criminal defendant is not entitled to present any evidence whatsoever with respect to a claim of extreme emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable excuse, in the absence of some physical provocation in close proximity to the homicide. Appellant contends that this ruling is in error when applied to the case at bar and that, as a result, he was denied a fair trial. Appellant contends that the court's refusal to give the lesser included instruction of manslaughter amounted to error because he contends it is reversible error to refuse to give an instruction on a lesser included offense when the instruction is supported by even the slightest evidence. See Spann, supra . We have held that a trial court is accorded wide discretion in evidentiary rulings and will not be reversed on such rulings absent a manifest abuse of discretion. See Skiver v. State, 336 Ark. 86, 983 S.W.2d 931 (1999). Here, the trial court found the evidence sought to be admitted by appellant to be remote, due to a lack of provocation; further, the court found the evidence to be prejudicial, confusing, and a waste of time under Ark. R. Evid. 403. The court explicitly stated, when appellant sought to present evidence of his marital strife and divorce from Kim Chappell Kail, the victim's daughter, that it did not want to have a divorce trial within the context of the appellant's criminal trial. Regardless of the trial court's reasons for determining that appellant's proffered evidence should be excluded, appellant has failed to demonstrate what prejudice he suffered by said exclusion by failing to establish how the inclusion of such evidence would have provided a rational basis supporting a manslaughter instruction pursuant to Ark.Code Ann. § 5-10-104(a)(1). Appellant is correct in stating that an instruction on a lesser included offense should be given if it is supported by the slightest evidence. See Spann, supra . However, we have held that we will affirm a trial court's decision to exclude a lesser included offense instruction if there is no rational basis for giving the instruction. Id. We held in Spann that it is not error to refuse to give an instruction on manslaughter where there is no evidence of extreme emotional disturbance. Id. at 513, 944 S.W.2d at 539. We further held that: [P]assion springing from anger, resentment, fear, or terror will not alone reduce a homicide from murder to manslaughter; there must be a provocation inducing the passion such as physical fighting, a threat, or a brandished weapon which makes the passion irresistible. Spann, 328 Ark. at 514-15, 944 S.W.2d at 540, quoting from Rainey v. State, 310 Ark. at 423, 837 S.W.2d at 455, quoting Wootton v. State, 232 Ark. 300, 337 S.W.2d 651 (1960). Despite feelings of individuals who are suffering marital discord, the frustration, anger, and resentment that can result fails to constitute, on its own, a rational basis for giving an instruction on voluntary manslaughter. Whether expressed in terms of heat of passion, (as it was formerly referred) or scientifically defined as extreme emotional disturbance, see Rainey, 310 Ark. at 424, 837 S.W.2d at 456, the instruction requested by the appellant requires a basis in fact indicating that the appellant killed Larry Chappell in the moment following provocation in the form of physical fighting, a threat, or a brandished weapon, as we stated in Spann . Clearly, no evidence of provocation has been demonstrated in this case. Appellant argues that he had witnesses who would have testified that Larry Chappell had threatened to kill him in the past. However, the trial court ruled that this evidence would be hearsay and that it was unlikely such testimony would be otherwise admissible. Therefore, even in the face of the appellant's proffered hearsay evidence of prior verbal threats allegedly made by Larry Chappell, remote in time from the homicide, no evidence of provocation existed in this case. The evidence adduced at trial is clear that appellant armed himself, invaded the victim's home, and shot him dead. It is true that his divorce from Mr. Chappell's daughter may have aroused unbalancing passion within the appellant, but absent any provocation, no rational basis existed upon which the trial court could instruct the jury on manslaughter due to extreme emotional disturbance. As such, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in prohibiting such evidence.