Opinion ID: 4578648
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prong two: Whether the errors were plain

Text: Mr. Miller next asserts that the district court’s errors were plain. For an error to be plain, it must be an error that “is clear or obvious under current, well-settled law.” United States v. DeChristopher, 695 F.3d 1082, 1091 (10th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks omitted). Typically for an error “to be contrary to well-settled law, either the Supreme Court or this court must have addressed the issue.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Although the failure to cite Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit authority that has clearly endorsed the appellant’s view is “an omission that ordinarily . . . would fatally undercut [his] attempt to show plain error,” United States v. Finnesy, 953 F.3d 675, 702 n.14 (10th Cir. 2020), we have held that “the absence of circuit precedent [does not] prevent[] the clearly erroneous application of statutory law from being plain error,” United States v. Brown, 316 F.3d 1151, 1158 (10th Cir. 2003) (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Evans, 155 F.3d 245, 252 (3d Cir.1998)). As noted above, the purported constitutional delegation error was not in fact error. We therefore need not analyze the remaining elements of the plain-error standard with regard to that argument. See United States v. Gantt, 679 F.3d 1240, 1246 (10th Cir. 2012) (“Because all four [plain error] requirements must be met, the failure of any one will foreclose relief and the others need not be addressed.”). As 30 explained below, we conclude that the statutory delegation and failure-to-makefindings errors were plain.
Mr. Miller argues that the district court’s delegation of authority to his probation officer was plainly erroneous because it violates clear statutory language. We agree. First, and most significantly, the language of § 3583(d) is not subject to differing reasonable interpretations. As discussed supra, multiple Courts of Appeals have interpreted the statutory language “the defendant shall . . . submit to one drug test within 15 days of release . . . and at least two periodic drug tests thereafter (as determined by the court)” in § 3583(d) to mean what it says: i.e., that the number of drug tests, beyond the three required by the statute, must be “determined by the court.” The government cites no caselaw holding otherwise. Further, the sole circuit to consider whether this statutory delegation error was plain held that it was. See Melendez-Santana, 353 F.3d at 106.7 The government counters that the error was not plain because Mr. Miller “identifies no cases from this circuit or from the Supreme Court addressing this condition and these issues.” Aple. Br. at 20. But as indicated above, “the absence of 7 The Melendez-Santana court held both that the statutory error committed by the district court was (1) plain (satisfying the second element of plain-error review), and (2) satisfied the third and fourth elements of the plain-error test. The first holding was upheld; the second was overruled in an en banc decision in United States v. Padilla, 415 F.3d 211 (1st Cir. 2005). 31 circuit precedent [does not] prevent[] the clearly erroneous application of statutory law from being plain error.” Brown, 316 F.3d at 1158 (alterations in original) (quoting Evans, 155 F.3d at 252). Here, the statute expressly vests the power to determine the maximum number of drug tests in the district court and only the district court. The government further asserts that the “one Tenth Circuit case [it] could find where a defendant challenged a similar condition on delegation grounds” was United States v. Lopez-Casillas, and there, this court “rejected that attack.” Aple. Br. at 20 (citing United States v. Lopez-Casillas, 750 F. App’x 766, 767 (10th Cir. 2019) (unpublished)). But the defendant there did not challenge his supervised-release condition on the ground that it violated § 3583. Indeed, § 3583 is not mentioned, let alone interpreted, in that unpublished decision. Because the supervised release condition at issue is not quoted in that decision, it is uncertain what authority was delegated to the probation officer. Lopez-Casillas is therefore of little help to the present inquiry. For the above reasons, we hold that the district court’s statutory delegation error was plain.
The government does not appear to argue that the district court’s error in failing to make findings on the record supporting the challenged condition was not plain. Nor could it do so successfully, as this requirement “is clear . . . under current, well-settled law.” DeChristopher, 695 F.3d at 1091 (quotation marks omitted). See, 32 e.g., United States v. Koch, No. 19-8034, 2020 WL 5987494 (10th Cir. Oct. 9, 2020);8 Martinez-Torres, 795 F.3d at 1237; Burns, 775 F.3d at 1223; United States v. Smith, 606 F.3d 1270, 1283 (10th Cir. 2010); Hahn, 551 F.3d at 982; United States v. Edgin, 92 F.3d 1044, 1049 (10th Cir. 1996). We hold that this error was plain. c. Prong three: Whether the errors affected Mr. Miller’s substantial rights Turning to the third prong of the plain-error test, we must determine whether the errors affected Mr. Miller’s substantial rights. “An error affects substantial rights if there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings.” Burns, 775 F.3d at 1224. “In the sentencing context, we ask: Is there a reasonable probability that but for the court’s error, [the defendant] would have received a lesser sentence?” Id.9 8 Our recent decision in United States v. Koch, concludes that the defendant met the plain error test where the district court failed to make findings supporting a special condition of supervised release that impinged on the defendant’s First Amendment rights. No. 19-8034, 2020 WL 5987494, at -7 (10th Cir. Oct. 9, 2020). As discussed, the special condition here does not impact Mr. Miller’s constitutional rights. 9 Mr. Miller asserts that “[t]his Court’s plain-error precedent dictates that an effect on substantial rights is established by showing ‘doubt’ about the sentencing outcome.” Aplt. Reply Br. at 10 (quoting United States v. Hasan, 526 F.3d 653, 665 (10th Cir. 2008)). To the extent Mr. Miller suggests that our Hasan decision sets forth a lesser burden on the appellant under the third prong of the plain-error test, his contention is mistaken. Hasan uses the language of “doubt” in the same breath as it explains the “reasonable probability” standard discussed above. Hasan, 526 F.3d at 664–65. More specifically, we explained in that case that the district court’s “apparently conflicting factual findings” pertaining to the error at issue caused us to “doubt the outcome” of a remand. Id. We then went on to hold that “[u]nder these circumstances, and in the current absence of a ruling from the district court reconciling the two sets of seemingly inconsistent factual findings, we believe 33 Here, Mr. Miller must show that, on remand, there is a reasonable probability the district court would not impose the special condition pertaining to drug testing, or that it would impose it in a less restrictive way. See United States v. RosalesMiranda, 755 F.3d 1253, 1258 (10th Cir. 2014). The right affected by the district court’s delegation error is Mr. Miller’s right to have the district court, rather than the probation officer, determine the maximum number of drug tests to which Mr. Miller may be subjected during his term of supervised release. Mr. Miller argues the district court’s failure to make the requisite supporting findings for the special drug-testing condition suggests the district court may not have imposed the condition at all. For the reasons explained below, we conclude that neither error affected Mr. Miller’s substantial rights. i. Delegation to probation to determine maximum number of drug tests To determine whether the district court’s delegation error satisfies the third prong of the plain-error test, the relevant question is whether there is a reasonable probability that granting this discretion to probation rendered Mr. Miller worse off. In other words, Mr. Miller must show there is a reasonable probability that the probation officer would demand more tests than the district court would have set as the maximum to show the error affected his substantial rights. Mr. Miller cannot make this showing. Mr. Hasan has indeed shown a reasonable probability that his motion . . . would have been granted,” thereby warranting remand. Id. at 665 (emphasis added). 34 First, as the government notes, multiple circuits have held that defendants’ challenges to similar testing conditions have failed plain-error review under the substantial rights prong. For example, the First Circuit, sitting en banc, explained: The case at hand is peculiar in that we are dealing with two unknown variables: the limit the district court would have set on drug tests and the number of tests that the probation officer will demand. It is, therefore, nearly impossible for Padilla to show a reasonable probability that he is worse off because the probation officer, rather than the district court, has the power to determine the maximum number of drug tests. Under these circumstances, we do not see how Padilla can demonstrate that, but for the delegation error, the supervised release condition likely would have been more favorable to him. This, in turn, undercuts his argument that the error should be corrected. See Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 394–95 (1999) (“Where the effect of an alleged error is so uncertain, a defendant cannot meet his burden of showing that the error actually affected his substantial rights.”). Padilla, 415 F.3d at 221. The First Circuit’s reasoning is equally applicable here. “It is . . . nearly impossible” for Mr. Miller “to show a reasonable probability that he is worse off because the probation officer, rather than the district court, has the power to determine the maximum number of drug tests.” Id. Accordingly, Mr. Miller cannot show that “but for the delegation error, the supervised release condition likely would have been more favorable to him.” Id. Similarly, in United States v. Tejeda, the district court entered as a special condition of supervised release that the co-defendants “participate in a program of testing . . . for drug and alcohol abuse, as approved by [their] supervising probation officer[s],” and the district court did not specify the maximum number of drug tests that the probation officers could demand. 476 F.3d 471, 472–73 (7th Cir. 2007). The Seventh Circuit found that the district court’s statutory delegation error was clearly 35 established (satisfying the second element of the plain-error standard), but that the defendants could not satisfy the third prong of plain-error review. The Tejeda court reasoned that, “[a]s the court said in Padilla, it cannot be shown that the defendant would have been better off had the judge imposed the details of the drug testing himself.” Id. at 475. In response to the government’s arguments, Mr. Miller asserts that “[i]t is reasonably probable that on remand, the district court would decide that any need for [Mr. Miller] to be drug tested is adequately met by the mandatory drug testing condition and the substance abuse treatment condition.” Aplt. Reply at 10. To the extent Mr. Miller argues the district court’s imposition of the drug testing condition may have been unintentional and may not be reimposed on remand, we address this contention in the next section dealing with the failure to make findings. As to the district court’s delegation error, Mr. Miller does not address the government’s argument—or the persuasive authority it marshals in support thereof—that he cannot show that he is “worse off because the probation officer, rather than the district court, has the power to determine the maximum number of drug tests.” Padilla, 415 F.3d at 221. For these reasons, Mr. Miller cannot show that the district court’s delegation of authority to probation to determine his maximum number of drug tests affected his substantial rights. Mr. Miller therefore fails to satisfy the third prong of the plainerror test with respect to the statutory delegation error, and our inquiry need proceed no further. See Gantt, 679 F.3d at 1246. 36 ii. Failure to make supporting findings We have held that although a district court need not provide reasons for each special condition it imposes, it must at least provide a statement of generalized reasons for why it imposed the condition. Martinez-Torres, 795 F.3d at 1237–38; Mike, 632 F.3d at 693. Should the district court fail to make such a generalized statement, however, a special condition nonetheless survives under the third prong of plain-error review if “the record reveals a basis” for the condition. United States v. Francis, 891 F.3d 888, 898–99 (10th Cir. 2018). According to the government, the record reveals a basis for the special drugtesting condition because Mr. Miller’s history of alcohol abuse justifies requiring drug tests. In support of this argument, the government cites to our recent decision in United States v. Richards, 958 F.3d 961 (10th Cir. 2020), as well as decisions of the First, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, which acknowledge the connection between different forms of addiction or “vice.” See Aple. Br. at 15–16 (citing United States v. Brown, 235 F.3d 2, 6 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Paul, 542 F.3d 596, 600 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Sales, 476 F.3d 732, 735–36 (9th Cir. 2007)). In Richards, the defendant was convicted of a child pornography offense, and the district court imposed special conditions of supervised release relating to substance abuse testing and treatment. 958 F.3d at 963–64. Mr. Richards objected on the ground that his past substance abuse was too remote to support these conditions. Id. at 965. On appeal, we held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the challenged conditions, reasoning that “[b]ased on [Mr. Richards’s] 37 history and background, the district court could have reasonably concluded conditions preventing further use of drugs and alcohol will help ensure [Mr. Richards] does not trade one vice for another and that he will remain on the path to rehabilitation during his supervised release.” Id. at 966. Mr. Miller admits the district court could have imposed the special drug testing condition, if it had supported its decision to do so with specific findings. But he argues that the district court’s failure to make such findings suggests it did not intend to impose the special drug-testing condition in the first place. See, e.g., Aplt. Reply Br. at 10 (“The district court’s improper and perhaps unintentional imposition of a third drug testing condition that has the potential to subject [him] to mandatory revocation of his supervised release and a new term of imprisonment clearly affects his substantial rights.” (emphasis added)). Therefore, he argues that “[i]t is reasonably probable that on remand, the district court would decide that any need for [Mr.] Miller to be drug tested is adequately met by the mandatory drug testing condition and the substance abuse treatment condition.” Aplt. Reply Br. at 10. In support of this argument, Mr. Miller cites our decision in Burns, in which we held that the defendant had satisfied the third prong of plain-error review where the district court had failed to make supporting findings before imposing a special condition of supervised release. The condition at issue there required the defendant to obtain approval from probation before he could contact his daughter. We noted that “[a]t sentencing, neither the pretrial services officer nor government counsel spoke of a need to restrict Mr. Burns’s right to visit his daughter.” Burns, 775 F.3d at 1224. 38 Given the interest at stake—namely, an intrusion upon Mr. Burns’s constitutional right to familial association—we concluded the district court’s failure to make supporting findings was indicative of its probable inadvertence in imposing the condition. See id. at 1222 (noting that the “restriction intrudes on Mr. Burns’s constitutional right to familial association”); id. at 1225 (“[T]he district court likely would have softened the contact restrictions if the issue had been raised.”). In support of our holding, we cited a Tenth Circuit decision authored by the judge who imposed Mr. Burns’s sentence in which we stated that a restriction on contact with a defendant’s young relatives was unconstitutional notwithstanding the allowance of contact upon permission of a probation officer. See id. at 1225 & n.4 (citing United States v. Lonjose, 633 F.3d 1292, 1303 (10th Cir. 2011)). It is true that certain similarities exist between the circumstances in Burns and the instant case. As there, here “neither the pretrial services officer nor government counsel spoke of a need” to impose the challenged condition. See id. But the condition at issue in Burns was a significantly greater intrusion on the defendant’s rights than the one imposed on Mr. Miller. Contrasted with restrictions on visiting one’s young child, the intrusion on Mr. Miller’s rights caused by drug testing is slight. As we have already explained, the special condition here did not implicate Mr. Miller’s constitutional rights. Moreover, unlike in Burns, we do not have caselaw from Mr. Miller’s sentencing judge strongly suggesting that, had the issue been raised, the judge likely would not have imposed the challenged condition. And finally, whereas in Burns there was an “absence of any evidence or argument on a 39 need to protect” Mr. Burns’s daughter from him, here there are compelling reasons to impose a drug-testing condition on a defendant who suffers from alcohol addiction. See, e.g., Richards, 958 F.3d at 964–66 (upholding special conditions relating to drugs and alcohol, reasoning that “[b]ased on Defendant’s history and background, the district court could have reasonably concluded conditions preventing further use of drugs and alcohol will help ensure Defendant does not trade one vice for another and that he will remain on the path to rehabilitation during his supervised release”); Brown, 235 F.3d at 6 (noting the relationship between the special condition imposed [abstention from alcohol] and Mr. Brown’s offense of conviction [cocaine distribution], stating “it is hardly a secret that there is a tie between drug abuse and alcohol abuse”); Paul, 542 F.3d at 596–601 (affirming imposition of drug testing supervised-release condition for defendant with history of alcohol abuse and gambling, reasoning that that “[b]oth of those [latter] factors are consistent with an addictive personality which might well lead him to the use of illegal drugs,” and “[a] regime of drug screening [would] help to ensure that [Mr. Paul] does not trade one vice for another and that he remains on the path to rehabilitation”). And the condition discourages Mr. Miller from trying new substances, thereby reducing the risk that, in an altered state in which his judgment is impaired, he will revert to alcohol use. For these reasons, although the district court’s failure to make supporting findings in Burns was indicative of its probable inadvertence in imposing the challenged supervised-release condition, the same is not true here. The special condition is directly related to Mr. Miller’s alcohol addiction and does not violate his 40 constitutional rights. Thus, Mr. Miller has not shown a “reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings.” Burns, 775 F.3d at 1224. See Jones, 527 U.S. at 394–95 (“Where the effect of an alleged error is so uncertain, a defendant cannot meet his burden of showing that the error actually affected his substantial rights.”). Therefore, while the district court plainly erred in failing to make specific findings supporting the special condition, Mr. Miller’s claim fails on the third prong of plain-error review. d. Prong four: Fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings Because the arguments Mr. Miller raises on appeal fail under the first (in the case of the constitutional-error argument) or third (in the case of the statutory delegation error and the failure to make specific findings) prongs of plain-error review, we do not analyze the final element. See Gantt, 679 F.3d at 1246 (“Because all four [plain error] requirements must be met, the failure of any one will foreclose relief and the others need not be addressed.”).