Opinion ID: 3053475
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: “Viewed as Equally Effective”

Text: [2] The alternative remedy in Carlson, like the remedy here, was the FTCA. In Carlson, the Supreme Court held that Congress does not view the FTCA as providing relief that is “equally effective” as Bivens relief. There is no basis here on which to distinguish that holding from the case before us; if anything, the FTCA is a less effective remedy now than it was when Carlson was decided. Carlson enumerated four factors, “each suggesting that the Bivens remedy is more effective than the FTCA remedy.” 446 U.S. at 20. First, Bivens damages are awarded against individual defendants, while the FTCA damages are recovered from the United States. “Because the Bivens remedy is recoverable against individuals, it is a more effective deterrent than the FTCA remedy against the United States. It is almost axiomatic that the threat of damages has a deterrent effect, particularly so when the individual official faces personal financial liability.” Id. at 21 (citations omitted). Second, punitive damages are not available under the FTCA, further undermining its deterrent effect. “Punitive damages are ‘a particular remedial mechanism normally available in the federal courts,’ and are especially appropriate to redress the violation by a Government official of a citizen’s constitutional rights. . . . But punitive damages in an FTCA suit are statutorily prohibited. 13998 CASTANEDA v. HENNEFORD 28 U.S.C. § 2674. Thus FTCA is that much less effective than a Bivens action as a deterrent to unconstitutional acts.” Id. at 22 (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397) (citations omitted). Third, Bivens cases may be tried before a jury; FTCA cases cannot. Id. at 22-23. “Just as suffrage ensures the people’s ultimate control in the legislative and executive branches, jury trial is meant to ensure their control in the judiciary.” Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306 (2004). This is particularly important in the context of constitutional torts, where the actions of the government itself are on trial. Moreover, juries are well-suited to the task of apportioning damages. As Congress noted in explaining the need for jury trials under Title VII, “[j]uries are fully capable of determining whether an award of damages is appropriate and if so, how large it must be to compensate the plaintiff adequately and to deter future repetition of the prohibited conduct.” H.R. Rep. No. 102-40, at 72 (1991). Lastly, the FTCA’s limitation that the United States may be held liable “in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred,” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1), would violate the policy “obvious[ly]” motivating Bivens “that the liability of federal officials for violations of citizens’ constitutional rights should be governed by uniform rules.” Carlson, 446 U.S. at 23. This last factor was especially important to the Supreme Court. In Carlson, the plaintiff’s action would have failed under the survivorship law of the forum state, Indiana. Id. at 17 n.4.7 The Court emphasized that “only a uniform federal rule of survivorship will suffice to redress the constitutional deprivation here alleged and to protect against repetition of such conduct.” Id. at 23. 7 In particular, Indiana law provided that a personal injury claim did not survive where the acts complained of caused the victim’s death. Ind. Code § 34-1-1-1 (1976). Moreover, where the decedent was not survived by a spouse or dependent next of kin, Indiana’s wrongful death statute limited recovery to those expenses incurred in connection with the death itself. Ind. Code § 34-1-1-2 (1976). Indeed, the district court held that, because of the limitations in those two statutes, the plaintiff (the decedent’s mother) could not even meet the amount-in-controversy then required by 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a), and dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 17-18 & n.4. CASTANEDA v. HENNEFORD 13999 None of the factors listed by the Supreme Court is any less present in the case before us. The FTCA would be no more a deterrent here than it was in Carlson, because FTCA damages remain recoverable only against the United States and because punitive damages remain unavailable. 28 U.S.C. § 2674. Likewise, an FTCA plaintiff still cannot demand a jury trial. 28 U.S.C. § 2402. Moreover, the FTCA remedy continues to depend on the “law of the place where the act or omission occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). Nowhere does this reliance on state law present a greater threat to uniformity of remedy than in actions “for damage for personal injury, including death, resulting from the performance of medical, surgical, dental, or related functions.” 28 U.S.C. § 322(a). Since Carlson was decided in 1980, the United States has witnessed a revolution in state tort law, focusing on medical malpractice in particular. Reacting to a “crisis” in medical malpractice insurance costs and availability, many states began in the mid-1980s to enact legislative changes designed both to deter frivolous lawsuits and to limit the size of damage awards even in meritorious ones. See generally Cong. Budget Office, U.S. Cong., The Effects of Tort Reform: Evidence from the States 2-3 (2004), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/55xx/doc5549/ Report.pdf. Twenty-four states, for example, have abolished the collateral-source rule, often permitting collateral-source payments to offset damage awards. Am. Tort Reform Ass’n, Tort Reform Record 14-18 (July 1, 2008), available at http:// www.atra.org/files.cgi/8291_Record_07-08.pdf. Similarly, twenty-three states have placed statutory limits on noneconomic damages, many limiting medical malpractice awards in particular. Id. at 32-39. Statutory damage caps for malpractice can range from $250,000, see, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 3333.2(b), to $1.25 million, Ind. Code § 34-18-14- 3(a); see also Haw. Rev. Stat. § 663-8.7 ($375,000); Fla. Stat. § 766.118(2) ($500,000); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-3407(a) ($1 million). Other states have introduced procedural innovations to screen out meritless suits and encourage early settlement, 14000 CASTANEDA v. HENNEFORD such as requiring that plaintiffs, prior to suit, obtain expert certificates of merits, e.g., Va. Code § 8.01-20.1; W. Va. Code § 55-7B-6, or submit their claims to medical screening panels, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 09.55.536; Haw. Rev. Stat. § 67112, or participate in other compulsory alternative dispute resolution bodies, e.g., Md. Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-2A-04; Wash. Rev. Code § 7.70.100.8 Were Plaintiffs’ sole remedy for the alleged mistreatment and death of Castaneda a common law malpractice suit against the United States, as the PHS Defendants argue, the damages they could recover, and the quasi-substantive procedural hurdles they would have to surmount to bring suit in the first place, would vary from state to state even more now than in 1980. [3] The Supreme Court has never revisited its conclusion that the FTCA’s dependence on “the vagaries of the laws of the several States” prevents it from serving as an equally effective remedy for constitutional violations. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 23. While the Supreme Court has, in subsequent years, found that the congressional institution of other remedial schemes that are not fully compensatory may be a “special factor” precluding Bivens relief, see Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988) (Social Security); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983) (federal civil service); see also Adams v. Johnson, 355 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2004) (federal income tax), those cases cannot serve as a basis for distinguishing the Supreme Court’s explicit determination in Carlson that the very remedy at issue here, the FTCA, is not viewed by Congress as equally effective as Bivens. Moreover, every one of those subsequently examined schemes, however otherwise undercompensatory, nonetheless provided a uniform remedy 8 We express no opinion here as to whether or how these or similar procedural requirements would apply in an FTCA suit against the United States, although we note that several district courts have found certain of these statutes to apply to FTCA actions. See, e.g., Stanley v. United States, 321 F. Supp. 2d 805, 807-08 (N.D. W. Va. 2004); Hill v. United States, 751 F. Supp. 909, 910 (D. Colo. 1990); Oslund v. United States, 701 F. Supp. 710, 712-14 (D. Minn. 1988). CASTANEDA v. HENNEFORD 14001 across the United States. Carlson’s holding that the FTCA, in particular, is not “equally effective” because of its lack of deterrent effect, its absence of a right to a jury trial, and its dependence on variable state law remains binding on this court, and, accordingly, following Carlson, we hold that § 233(a) does not preempt Bivens relief.