Opinion ID: 1126552
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: attempted impeachment of michael perry

Text: In the course of the trial below, the prosecution relied primarily on the testimony of Michael A. Perry to establish its case against the appellants. Perry admitted that he had surveyed the Warburton Jewelry Shop at Moose Pass with an eye to burglarizing it, and that he had discussed the project with Bassett and Fields. Perry stated that he concluded that the burglary would be too risky, and thus abandoned the project. According to Perry, several days after the robbery he was contacted by Bassett and Fields, who asked him to assist them in selling some gold. Perry agreed, and actually succeeded in selling a portion of the gold which had been given to him. He returned the proceeds from the sale along with the remaining gold to Fields. Perry further claimed that he learned from Fields that the gold which he sold had been stolen from the jewelry shop at Moose Pass. Defense counsel made concerted efforts to impeach Perry's testimony. On cross-examination, inquiry was made into Perry's motives for testifying. Perry revealed that, in return for his testimony, the district attorney had promised him immunity from prosecution stemming from the alleged incident. He acknowledged the fact that he had given testimony in other criminal cases in return for immunity. Additionally, Perry freely admitted that he had been convicted of felonies on numerous previous occasions. The defense further sought to discredit Perry's testimony by attempting to show, both on cross-examination and through the testimony of witnesses, that Perry had used and was addicted to narcotics. On cross-examination by Bassett's counsel the following exchange occurred: Q. Are you a dope addict? A. No, I'm not. Q. Are you under the influence of any narcotic right now? A. No I'm not. Q. Could I have a look at your arm? A. Yeah, you can look. [PROSECUTOR]: Object as being irrelevant and immaterial, Your Honor. The witness has testified. If counsel wishes to bring forward some evidence to substantiate his inference that this witness at this time is under any type of drug the state has no objection to it, but the question has been asked, it has been answered and I object to any type of inferences being raised by the witness' negative answer. THE COURT: Sustained. This attempted impeachment was temporarily abandoned, and no offer of proof was made by defense counsel. At a later point counsel for Fields probed further into this subject. Perry denied that he was a narcotics addict, either in the past or currently. Although the prosecutor objected to these questions, and most of the objections were sustained, answers in the negative were given. No motion to strike these responses was made by the state. Later in the proceedings, one Donald Chambers was called by the defense. Counsel offered to prove that Chambers observed Perry injecting himself with heroin in July or August of 1968. The court refused to admit this testimony. The defense also sought to introduce testimony by Mildred McGalliard that Perry entered her house in the fall of 1968 with black and blue arms, and that he admitted to shooting smack. Again the court excluded this testimony. We turn first to the question whether evidence of heroin addiction should be routinely admissible to impeach the testimony of a witness. Some courts have taken this view. State v. Fong Loon, 29 Idaho 248, 158 P. 233 (1916); State v. Prentice, 192 Iowa 207, 183 N.W. 411 (1921); Diblee v. State, 202 Ind. 571, 177 N.E. 261 (1931); Beland v. State, 86 Tex.Cr.R. 285, 217 S.W. 147 (1919). Such cases usually proceed from the premise that heroin addicts become, by virtue of their use of the drug, depraved, pathological liars who are incapable of distinguishing reality from appearance. These cases represent a distinctly minority view. [42] There may, in fact, be justification for introducing evidence of heroin use and addiction to impeach a witness where the evidence pertains either to the time of the occurrences which the witness has observed or to the time of trial. In such instances, use of heroin could potentially affect the capacity of the witness to accurately observe or relate details of the events which he has seen. But we cannot accept a rule under which persons who use or are addicted to heroin are considered necessarily and inherently unreliable as witnesses. The rule thus stated is based upon a common knowledge which is scientifically unsound and which has been rejected by the more penetrating judicial opinions on the subject. [43] See, e.g., Kelly v. Maryland Cas. Co., 45 F.2d 782 (W.D.Va. 1929); People v. Williams, 6 N.Y.2d 18, 187 N.Y.S.2d 750, 159 N.E.2d 549 (1959); see also People v. Bell, 138 Cal. App.2d 7, 291 P.2d 150, 152-153 (1955). We therefore hold that evidence of narcotics use or addiction will not be admissible where its only purpose would be to impeach a witness by showing that he is, by sole virtue of his addiction, inherently unreliable. Our holding does not mean that evidence of addiction to heroin will never be admissible to impeach a witness. Where evidence of addiction tends to show that the witness was under the influence of narcotics either at the time of trial or at the time of the occurrence to which he testifies, where the evidence proves that his ability to perceive, remember, and testify are substantially affected by his habit, or where such evidence would be independently admissible under some other theory, it should not be excluded. Turning next to a consideration of the circumstances of the present case, we conclude that the evidence proffered by the appellants against Michael Perry should have been admitted. Initially, we feel that the proof excluded by the trial court was at least somewhat probative of the issue of Perry's condition at the time of trial. The very exclusion of that proof makes it impossible to know whether the appellants would have succeeded in establishing that Perry was under the influence of narcotics at the time his testimony was rendered. Yet it would seem that the appellants' efforts at impeachment were more than a random and unfounded fishing expedition; the significant observation is that the appellants might well have proven successful in their efforts had not the trial court so readily excluded the evidence which they sought to produce. [44] Although we are inclined to think that the evidence offered by the appellants was not wholly irrelevant on the question of Perry's condition on the stand, we believe that there is a compelling, independent reason for the admission of this evidence even assuming that it was not sufficiently probative of Perry's condition at the time of trial. In the circumstances of the present case, the rejected evidence of heroin use by Perry was, in our view, independently relevant apart from its tendency to establish that Perry was unreliable in the sense that all drug addicts are unreliable. To be specific, we hold that Perry's use of narcotics was crucially relevant to show the possibility that his testimony was colored by bias  the slanting effect upon human testimony of the emotions or feelings of the witness toward the parties or the self-interest of the witness in the outcome of the case. [45] In Whitton v. State, 479 P.2d 302, 316-318 (1970), this court addressed itself to the issue of bias, stating: Because this human tendency is so common and well known, reasonable latitude must be allowed in the cross-examination of a witness, and also in the introduction of extrinsic testimony, to bring out facts and circumstances which, when tested by human experience, tend to show that the witness may be biased. [46] This court further noted in Whitton the particular susceptibility to bias of state informers, quoting with approval the language of Hughes v. United States, 427 F.2d 66, 68 (9th Cir.1970): [T]he defense should always have the opportunity to show by way of cross-examination or otherwise that the actions of a government informer may have been impelled by an expectation of leniency.    Here, like in Whitton, the bearing of the excluded evidence on the issue of bias may be easily perceived. As a witness, Perry was serving in the capacity of a police informer, and had been promised immunity from prosecution on any charges relating to the incident concerned in the case. Given this information alone, a jury might reasonably conclude that Perry's sole motive for testifying was the desire for immunity, and that his testimony could therefore be relied upon as truthful. Yet proof that Perry was a user of narcotics would have revealed additional possible motives for his testimony, and these motives would hardly have been conducive to testimonial accuracy. Users of narcotics regularly engage in behavior deemed reprehensible by society and proscribed by law. Heroin addicts require regular doses of the drug. Given these two facts, it is not difficult to see that pressure to testify can easily be brought to bear on the addict by police. Threatened by prosecution for possession of contraband or faced with the prospect of seeing the source of his supply dried up, a heroin user might in many instances be quite willing, regardless of the truth, to tell a story which he feels will be likely to please the authorities and to work to his advantage. [47] It is just such an inference which proof of Perry's drug use would have tended to raise. Under the well settled rules of evidence, the appellants should have been entitled to prove bias. The ruling of the trial court excluding the testimony of Chambers and McGalliard and preventing Perry from showing the condition of his arms unjustifiably thwarted the appellants' attempts to this end, thereby preventing a full and fair disclosure of Perry's possible motives for testifying. Again, it is relevant to consider that Perry's testimony was vital to the prosecution, and that the issue of his credibility was therefore a crucial one. Because of the plain bearing of the evidence offered by the appellants on the issue of bias, we think that its exclusion was unwarranted. An alternative basis for the admission of the evidence of Perry's heroin use exists and is worthy of mention. Perry testified, in response to questions posed by defense counsel, that he had not previously used narcotics. The evidence offered by the appellants should properly have been admitted to contradict Perry's statements on the stand. [48] If the testimony of witnesses McGalliard and Chambers was not independently admissible, it might be regarded as collateral and therefore inadmissible for the sole purpose of contradicting Perry. [49] However, the established evidentiary rule is that contradiction of a witness' testimony is permissible by means of extrinsic evidence when such evidence is not collateral  that is to say when the extrinsic evidence would otherwise be admissible. Because we believe that the testimony of Chambers and McGalliard would have been admissible on the issue of bias, it would not have been collateral. [50] Moreover, the appellants' request to have Perry bare his arms was obviously directed at contradiction of his testimony. This request was part and parcel of the appellants' cross-examination; it was in no sense extrinsic evidence, and should therefore have been admissible for the purpose of contradiction regardless of whether it might otherwise have been collateral. [51] The next claim of error centers around the attempt to impeach Michael Perry by showing that his community reputation for truth and veracity was bad. At trial, the defense called the witnesses Chambers and McGalliard to testify concerning the reputation of Perry for truth and veracity. After objection, this proffered testimony was excluded by the court for lack of an adequate foundation. Appellant contends a proper foundation had been laid and that the trial court committed prejudicial error in failing to admit the testimony. The state argues that a proper foundation was not laid and that the testimony was correctly excluded. The requirement of a proper foundation before a witness is allowed to testify concerning another witness' reputation in the community is an important one, and must not be wholly disregarded. Yet this is an area which has often proven unnecessarily confusing, and in which technicalities have frequently been permitted to prevail over substance. The ultimate goal of the foundation requirement has been well described in Whiting v. United States, 296 F.2d 512, 517 (1st Cir.1961) (citations omitted): It is fundamental that to qualify a witness as competent to give testimony concerning a defendant's character and reputation in the community it is usually required that there be a showing that the statements uttered by the witness are representative.    In short, there must be some demonstrable basis evincing the competence of the witness to give his opinion. Upon review of the record, we are convinced that an adequate basis for the reputation evidence was presented below. Rejection of this evidence by the trial court resulted, in our view, in an overly restrictive application of the foundation requirement. [52] Were this the only error committed by the trial court, we would be inclined to hold that it was harmless. However, in view of the other errors below, we do not think that the exclusion of the reputation evidence may properly be regarded as insignificant. The appellants' convictions are reversed, and these cases are remanded to the superior court for a new trial to be conducted in conformity with the views expressed in this opinion. ERWIN, J., not participating.