Opinion ID: 3171722
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Legislative and Regulatory Context

Text: A. Early Regulation of the Mining Industry and the Coal Act Before we analyze the specific challenges brought to us by the parties, we pause to give these submissions historical context by examining the overall statutory and regulatory scheme that governs mine health and safety issues in the United States. 12 Case: 14-11942 Date Filed: 01/25/2016 Page: 13 of 83 From the late 19th century until the middle 20th, Congress enacted several discrete measures to increase mine safety. These measures established some minimum safety requirements, prohibited labor by children under twelve, established the Bureau of Mines in the Department of the Interior, and in 1947, authorized the development of safety regulations.6 Despite these efforts, mining, an essential occupation to the commercial health of a growing industrial society, remained one of the most dangerous occupations in the Nation. In 1967–68, the Country experienced a series of mine accidents that killed more than 500 miners. In one incident, a devastating mine explosion near Farmington, West Virginia, seventy-eight miners died. See H.R. Rep. No. 91-563, at 1 (1969). Shortly thereafter, Congress enacted the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 (“Coal Act”), Pub. L. 91-173, 83 Stat. 742, codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. Its express goal was to increase safety for mine workers in the United States. The enacted findings in the Coal Act stated that: (a) the first priority and concern of all in the coal mining industry must be the health and safety of its most precious resource— the miner; . . . [and] 6 See generally MSHA, History of Mine Safety and Health Legislation, www.msha.gov/MSHAINFO/MSHAINF2.HTM (last visited Dec. 20, 2015). 13 Case: 14-11942 Date Filed: 01/25/2016 Page: 14 of 83 (c) there is an urgent need to provide more effective means and measures for improving the working conditions and practices in the Nation’s coal mines in order to prevent death and serious physical harm, and in order to prevent occupational diseases originating in such mines. . . . Id. § 2. At the outset of the Title specifically setting health standards, the Coal Act also provided: Among other things, it is the purpose of this title to provide, to the greatest extent possible, that the working conditions in each underground coal mine are sufficiently free of respirable dust concentration in the mine atmosphere to permit each miner the opportunity to work underground during the period of his entire adult working life without incurring any disability from pneumoconiosis or any other occupation-related disease during or at the end of such period. Id. § 201(b). At the time of its enactment, the Coal Act was the most comprehensive statute addressing health and safety matters in the Nation’s mines. It set forth the most stringent requirements to date and, for the first time, provided for civil and criminal penalties for noncompliance. It also addressed the growing medical knowledge about the progressive respiratory diseases suffered by coal miners. The Coal Act set forth “interim mandatory” health and safety standards in Titles II and III, respectively. Id. §§ 201(a), 301(a). Congress mandated that these interim standards were to remain “applicable to all underground coal mines until superseded in whole or in part by improved mandatory” health or safety standards to be promulgated under the provisions of section 101 of the Act. Id. It is 14 Case: 14-11942 Date Filed: 01/25/2016 Page: 15 of 83 significant that the 1969 statute spoke in terms of “interim” standards. From the very outset, Congress envisioned a shifting landscape as improved health and safety measures became feasible and therefore implemented a regulatory structure that could focus on continuous improvement. Indeed, to guard against regulatory backsliding, the statute mandated that “[n]o improved mandatory health or safety standard promulgated under this title shall reduce the protection afforded miners below that provided by any mandatory health or safety standard.” Id. § 101(b). Among the issues covered by the Coal Act was air quality, known to play a significant role in the development of the respiratory diseases common among mine workers. Specifically, section 202 of the Coal Act required coal mine operators to “take accurate samples of the amount of respirable dust in the mine atmosphere to which each miner in the active workings of such mine is exposed.” Id. § 202(a). For the first three years after the Coal Act’s enactment, the maximum acceptable level of RCD was 3.0 mg/m3 of air. Id. § 202(b)(1). Following that initial period, the maximum level fell to 2.0 mg/m3. Id. § 202(b)(2). The statute then contemplated a further reduction according to a schedule promulgated through regulation, “to a level of personal exposure which will prevent new incidences of respiratory disease and the further development of such disease in any person.” Id. § 202(d). 15 Case: 14-11942 Date Filed: 01/25/2016 Page: 16 of 83 Notably, the Coal Act became law during a period when Congress addressed more broadly matters affecting the health and safety of the Nation’s workforce. In 1970, the year following the passage of the Coal Act, Congress enacted the Occupational Safety and Health Act (“OSH Act”), Pub. L. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590, codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq. This statute created the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) in the Department of Labor and gave it broad regulatory and enforcement authority with respect to workplace safety standards. The OSH Act also created NIOSH, an agency within the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (“HEW”) charged with conducting research and developing recommendations for the prevention of workrelated injuries and illnesses generally. Id. § 22, 29 U.S.C. § 671; see also Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. Dep’t of Labor, 292 F.3d 849, 854 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 671). The statute provided that, following its research, NIOSH would forward its recommendations to the Secretary of Labor for consideration of regulatory action through his designee, OSHA. Pub. L. 91-596, § 6(b)(1). Congress assigned primary responsibility for implementation of the Coal Act to the Secretary of the Interior. Pub. L. 91-173, § 3(a). But the Act also assigned specific responsibility to other cabinet-level Departments, including, importantly, HEW. Section 101 established the procedure by which these Departments would work together to develop the improved standards. The Secretary of the Interior 16 Case: 14-11942 Date Filed: 01/25/2016 Page: 17 of 83 had the responsibility to “develop, promulgate, and revise, as may be appropriate, improved mandatory safety standards for the protection of life and the prevention of injuries in a coal mine.” Id. § 101(a) (emphasis added). In arriving at these standards, however, the Secretary of the Interior was to consult with the Secretaries of HEW and Labor, and others. Id. § 101(c). For improved mandatory health standards, i.e., those items addressed substantively in Title II of the statute, and which are the principal concern of the present rule, the Coal Act required a more complicated process. In this area, the Secretary of HEW had the laboring oar and was to “develop and revise, as may be appropriate, improved mandatory health standards for the protection of life and the prevention of occupational diseases of miners.” Id. at § 101(d). In arriving at these standards, the Secretary of HEW likewise was to consult with the Secretaries of the Interior and Labor, and others. The Coal Act required a somewhat unusual step after the Secretary of HEW developed comprehensive substantive health standards: he was directed to “transmit[]” those standards to the Secretary of the Interior. Id. The Secretary of the Interior then had the responsibility to publish the HEW-authored proposed mandatory health standards in the Federal Register. After receiving comments on these proposals, the Secretary of the Interior would “transmit[]” them to the Secretary of HEW. Id. § 101(e). The Secretary of HEW would then conduct hearings, if necessary, and review the comments, make public 17 Case: 14-11942 Date Filed: 01/25/2016 Page: 18 of 83 findings of fact and substantive decisions, and, thereafter, “direct the Secretary [of the Interior] to promulgate such standards with such modifications as the Secretary of [HEW] may deem appropriate.” Id. § 101(e); see also id. §101(g). In sum, the Secretary of HEW made the substantive decisions on health standards. The Secretary of the Interior, although generally responsible for implementation of most of the Coal Act, played a largely ministerial role as the promulgator of those standards.7 Although section 101 of the Coal Act provided the overarching procedural mechanism for developing improved mandatory standards, several additional provisions played supporting roles. Section 201 designated the relevant dust provisions in section 202 as interim mandatory health standards and provided that they would remain in effect “until superseded in whole or in part by improved mandatory health standards promulgated by the Secretary [of the Interior] under the provisions of section 101 of this Act.” Id. § 201. Several additional substantive sections directed one or more of the Secretaries to act on a specific subject, frequently, though not invariably, cross-referencing section 101. See, e.g., id. § 202(d) (“[T]he Secretary of [HEW] shall establish, in accordance with the 7 The division of authority was not uncontroversial. Indeed, floor debates questioned the wisdom of having “one Cabinet-level Secretary . . . develop a set of rules and regulations and direct another Secretary to adopt them and enforce them.” 115 Cong. Rec. H32021 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 1969) (statement of Rep. Erlenborn); see also id. at H32022 (statement of Rep. Dent) (supporting the division of authority). 18 Case: 14-11942 Date Filed: 01/25/2016 Page: 19 of 83 provisions of section 101 of this Act, a schedule reducing the average concentration of respirable dust in the mine atmosphere . . . .”). Other provisions within section 202’s list of interim mandatory standards directed action by one or both Secretaries without an internal explicit cross-reference to section 101 or 201. See, e.g., id. § 202(a) (“Such samples shall be taken by any device approved by the Secretary [of Interior] and the Secretary of [HEW] and in accordance with such methods, at such locations, at such intervals, and in such manner as the Secretaries shall prescribe in the Federal Register . . . .”). The Coal Act provided that both safety standards, originating with Interior, and health standards, originating with HEW, were to “be based upon research, demonstrations, experiments, and such other information as may be appropriate.” Id. § 101(c), (d). Further, “[i]n addition to the attainment of the highest degree of . . . protection for the miner,” the statute directed the respective Secretaries to consider “the latest available scientific data in the field, the technical feasibility of the standards, and experience gained under this and other health [or safety] statutes.” Id. The Coal Act specified two separate, sequential mechanisms for determining the average dust concentration.8 For the first eighteen months after enactment, 8 The section reads, in full: (continued . . .) 19 Case: 14-11942 Date Filed: 01/25/2016 Page: 20 of 83 measurements were to be taken “over a number of continuous production shifts.” Id. § 202(f). After that initial eighteen months, the dust concentration was to be measured “over a single shift only.” Id. However, and central to the issue presented in this case, if the Secretaries of Interior and HEW jointly found that such a single measurement did not “accurately represent . . . atmospheric conditions,” the prior method would continue to be used. Id. Just months after the enactment of the 1969 Coal Act, the Secretary issued his first set of mandatory health standards implementing section 202. See Mandatory Health Standards—Underground Coal Mines, 35 Fed. Reg. 5,544 (Apr. 3, 1970). In 1972, the Secretaries finalized, and published in the Federal Register under the authority of both Departments, a summary Joint Finding that adoption of a single-shift testing scheme would not accurately measure the atmospheric conditions during the shift. Consequently, the multi-test averaging scheme For the purpose of this title, the term “average concentration” means a determination which accurately represents the atmospheric conditions with regard to respirable dust to which each miner in the active workings of a mine is exposed (1) as measured, during the 18 month period following the date of enactment of this Act, over a number of continuous production shifts to be determined by the Secretary [of the Interior] and the Secretary of [HEW], and (2) as measured thereafter, over a single shift only, unless the Secretary [of the Interior] and the Secretary of [HEW] find, in accordance with the provisions of section 101 of this Act, that such single shift measurement will not, after applying valid statistical techniques to such measurement, accurately represent such atmospheric conditions during such shift. Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, Pub. L. 91-173, § 202(f), 83 Stat. 742, 762–63 (1969). 20 Case: 14-11942 Date Filed: 01/25/2016 Page: 21 of 83 remained in place. See Notice of Finding That a Single Shift Measurement of Respirable Dust Will Not Accurately Represent Atmospheric Conditions During Such Shift, 37 Fed. Reg. 3,833 (Feb. 23, 1972) (“1972 Joint Finding”). B. The Mine Act Five years later, in 1977, mining fatalities were still more than four times as great as the average in other industries. H.R. Rep. No. 95-312, at 3 (1977). Dissatisfied with progress under the Coal Act, 9 Congress reenacted, amended, and consolidated the Coal Act and various other provisions of law, renaming it the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act (“Mine Act”), see Federal Mine Safety and Health Amendments Act, Pub. L. 95-164, 91 Stat. 1290. Procedurally, it made significant changes to its predecessor. In considering the Mine Act, the Senate Committee on Resources concluded that the prior enforcement efforts “demonstrated a basic conflict in the missions” of the Department of the Interior, which aimed to “maximiz[e] production in the extractive industries,” a goal “not wholly compatible with the need to interrupt production,” a “necessary adjunct of the enforcement scheme.” 10 To remove this conflict, the Mine Act designated the 9 “[D]espite . . . considerable Congressional attention, our nation still experiences deaths and serious injuries in our mines at a rate which casts shame on an advanced, industrialized society. Every working day of the year, at least one miner is killed and sixty-six miners suffer disabling injuries in our nation’s mines.” S. Rep. No. 95-181, at 4 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3401, 3404. 10 The relevant section of the Senate Committee Report reads, in full: (continued . . .) 21 Case: 14-11942 Date Filed: 01/25/2016 Page: 22 of 83 Secretary of Labor as having principal authority to implement the statute. It also created MSHA within the Department of Labor—a Department with experience on the issues of worker safety and with new divisions dedicated fully to safety issues. The statute placed within MSHA regulatory authority over mining health and safety standards. Mine Act § 101(a), 30 U.S.C. § 811(a); 29 U.S.C. § 557a (creating MSHA and authorizing and directing the Secretary of Labor to fulfill his functions under the Mine Act through MSHA). 11 Indeed, in making the shift from the Department of the Interior to the Department of Labor, the report of the House Committee on Education and Labor accompanying the Mine Act stated: The Secretary responsible for the health and safety of miners will no longer be the Secretary of the Interior, but rather the Secretary of The history of the Interior Department’s enforcement of these laws, either by the Bureau of Mines or by MESA, demonstrated a basic conflict in the missions of the Department. In past years, the Department has pursued the goal of maximizing production in the extractive industries, which was not wholly compatible with the need to interrupt production which is the necessary adjunct of the enforcement scheme under the Metal and Coal Acts: even though, in the Committee’s view, over the long-run, improved health and safety promotes greater productivity through reduction of “down-time” and improved employee morale. In addition, lowered workers’ compensation premiums which should result from improved safety and health, can be expected to lower production costs. On the other hand, no conflict could exist if the responsibility for enforcing and administering the mine safety and health laws was assigned to the Department of Labor since that Department has as its sole duty the protection of workers and the insuring of safe and healthful working conditions. Id. at 5. 11 The functions assigned to the Secretary of the Interior under the Coal Act were carried out from 1973–77 by the Mining Enforcement and Safety Administration (“MESA”), a predecessor entity to MSHA. 22 Case: 14-11942 Date Filed: 01/25/2016 Page: 23 of 83 Labor, who represents an agency that puts the welfare of workers above all other considerations. The committee believes that by transferring administration of the miner health and safety program, and by upgrading legislative provisions applicable to metal and nonmetal miners through consolidation of all miners under one safety law, the Nation will be better able to meet the dual objectives of increased production of mineral and energy resources, and protection of the sacred lives of those members of our society who toil in the mines to keep our country running efficiently. H.R. Rep. No. 95-312, at 2 (1977) (emphasis added). In addition to the transfer of principal authority from Interior to Labor, the Mine Act also substantially revised the general regulatory procedures. Under the Coal Act, health standards and safety standards were addressed separately. As we have noted earlier, the development of health standards specifically involved a two-step process in which the Secretary of HEW developed substantive standards, and the Secretary of Interior promulgated these in a somewhat ministerial fashion. Under the Mine Act, however, health and safety standards both are entrusted to the Secretary of Labor under a single process, although the Secretary of HHS, 12 through NIOSH, has a very significant role in the process. Specifically, the Mine Act directs the Secretary of Labor (acting through MSHA) to “develop, promulgate, and revise as may be appropriate, improved mandatory health or safety standards for the protection of life and prevention of injuries in coal or other 12 At the time the Mine Act was passed, the Department was still known by its former name, HEW. For ease of reading, we shall use its current name, HHS, in our discussion. 23 Case: 14-11942 Date Filed: 01/25/2016 Page: 24 of 83 mines.” Mine Act § 101(a), 30 U.S.C. § 811(a) (emphasis added). 13 The Mine Act gives a broad grant of authority to the Secretary of Labor and directs that “[w]henever . . . upon the basis of information submitted to him in writing by” interested parties, including the Secretary of HHS, NIOSH, or others, the Secretary of Labor “determines that a rule should be promulgated,” he may act. Id. § 101(a)(1), 30 U.S.C. § 811(a)(1). However, when he receives a recommendation, accompanied by appropriate criteria, from [NIOSH] that a rule be promulgated, modified, or revoked, the Secretary must, within 60 days after receipt thereof, refer such recommendation to an advisory committee . . . , or publish such as a proposed rule . . . , or publish in the Federal Register his determination not to do so, and his reasons therefor. Id. Significantly for our purposes, a similar process is set forth in the statute for the recommendations received of the Secretary of HHS regarding toxic agents found in mines.14 Consistent with the role it plays elsewhere in occupational 13 See NIOSH, National Respiratory Diseases Research Program: 1.2 Legislative Foundations, http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/nas/rdrp/ch1.2.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2015) (“Congress has set a clear division between the research function of NIOSH; and the regulatory and enforcement functions of MSHA and OSHA. Although NIOSH works together with MSHA and OSHA to achieve the common goal of protecting worker safety and health, NIOSH simultaneously maintains its unique identity as the sole federal government organization primarily charged to conduct occupational safety and health research.”). 14 Specifically, the statute provides: (6)(A) The Secretary [of Labor], in promulgating mandatory standards dealing with toxic materials or harmful physical agents under this subsection, shall set standards which most adequately assure on the basis of the best available evidence that no miner will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity even if such miner has regular exposure to the hazards dealt with by such standard for the period of his working life. Development of mandatory standards (continued . . .) 24 Case: 14-11942 Date Filed: 01/25/2016 Page: 25 of 83 safety, therefore, NIOSH was given a consultative, rather than regulatory, role under the main provision of the Mine Act addressing the development of health and safety standards.15 under this subsection shall be based upon research, demonstrations, experiments, and such other information as may be appropriate. In addition to the attainment of the highest degree of health and safety protection for the miner, other considerations shall be the latest available scientific data in the field, the feasibility of the standards, and experience gained under this and other health and safety laws. Whenever practicable, the mandatory health or safety standard promulgated shall be expressed in terms of objective criteria and of the performance desired. (B) The Secretary of [HHS], as soon as possible after November 9, 1977, but in no event later than 18 months after such date and on a continuing basis thereafter, shall, for each toxic material or harmful physical agent which is used or found in a mine, determine whether such material or agent is potentially toxic at the concentrations in which it is used or found in a mine. The Secretary of [HHS] shall submit such determinations with respect to such toxic substances or harmful physical agents to the Secretary [of Labor]. Thereafter, the Secretary of [HHS] shall submit to the Secretary [of Labor] all pertinent criteria regarding any such substances determined to be toxic or any such harmful agents as such criteria are developed. Within 60 days after receiving any criteria in accordance with the preceding sentence relating to a toxic material or harmful physical agent which is not adequately covered by a mandatory health or safety standard promulgated under this section, the Secretary [of Labor] shall either appoint an advisory committee to make recommendations with respect to a mandatory health or safety standard covering such material or agent in accordance with paragraph (1), or publish a proposed rule promulgating such a mandatory health or safety standard in accordance with paragraph (2), or shall publish his determination not to do so. 30 U.S.C. § 811(a)(6); see also Mine Act § 101(a)(6). 15 “Although NIOSH is authorized by 29 U.S.C. § 671(c)(1) to ‘develop and establish recommended occupational safety and health standards,’ this provision is not part of the Mine Act. The Mine Act references NIOSH and HHS as providers of information to MSHA, see 30 U.S.C. § 811(a)(1) . . . .” Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 599 F.3d 662, 671–72 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 25 Case: 14-11942 Date Filed: 01/25/2016 Page: 26 of 83 Perhaps in recognition that many of the Coal Act’s initial interim standards were either in force in the industry or already had been superseded with improved standards set by initial regulations, see generally 35 Fed. Reg. 5,544, the Mine Act itself made no substantive changes to the Coal Act’s interim mandatory health standards.16 Within Title II, therefore, specific duties assigned under the Coal Act to the Secretary of HEW (now HHS) were preserved. Among these are a number of provisions with significance to the present case, including section 202(a), 30 U.S.C. § 842(a), which requires samples of RCD to be taken in the mines “by any device approved by the Secretary [of Labor] and the Secretary of [HHS] and in accordance with such methods, at such locations, at such intervals, and in such manner as the Secretaries shall prescribe in the Federal Register.” Additionally, section 202(d) provides that “the Secretary of [HHS] shall establish, in accordance with the provisions of section 101 of this Act, a schedule reducing the average concentration of respirable dust in the mine atmosphere.” See also 30 U.S.C. § 842(d). Section 202(e), 30 U.S.C. § 842(e) provides that “concentrations of respirable dust in this title mean the average concentration of respirable dust measured with a device approved by the Secretary [of Labor] and the Secretary of [HHS],” and, likewise, section 202(h), 30 U.S.C. § 842(h) gives the Secretaries of 16 Indeed, the only change made to Title II was to eliminate reference to a particular device previously approved to measure average dust concentrations. See Pub. L. 95-164, § 202 (amending section 202(e) of the Coal Act). 26 Case: 14-11942 Date Filed: 01/25/2016 Page: 27 of 83 Labor and HHS authority to approve respiratory equipment. Section 202(f), 30 U.S.C. § 842(f) defines the term “average concentration” of RCD, and references a process for measurement that involves, in some measure, both Secretaries. The details of that provision being significant to the present dispute, we shall defer our discussion of them. Suffice it to say that the Mine Act’s intent—to draw upon health expertise, to focus on worker safety, and to minimize conflicts generated by federal agencies with an industry-driven mission—are clear. The precise mechanics of the amendments and their success in achieving those goals are an issue that we shall examine as necessary. C. Regulatory History Following the Mine Act Regulatory work under the Mine Act did not revisit immediately the singleshift issue. During the early 1990s, MSHA responded “to concerns about possible tampering with dust samples” by creating a Task Force to review the RCD program. Mine Shift Atmospheric Conditions; Respirable Dust Sample, 63 Fed. Reg. 5,664, 5,667 (Feb. 3, 1998). Out of that review, MSHA developed a spot inspection program that for the first time was based upon samples taken over a single shift or day. “Based on the data from the SIP inspections, the Task Group concluded that MSHA’s practice of making noncompliance determinations solely on the average of multiple-sample results did not always result in citations in situations where miners were known to be overexposed to respirable coal mine 27 Case: 14-11942 Date Filed: 01/25/2016 Page: 28 of 83 dust.” Id. at 5,668. Specifically, multi-sample averaging could mask significant overexposures. “In response to these findings, in November 1991, MSHA decided to permanently adopt the single shift inspection policy initiated during the SIP.” Id. Thus began a series of attempts at modifying, by administrative processes, the multi-shift sampling regime in an effort “designed to defeat suspected tampering of dust samples by mine operators.” Nat’l Mining Ass’n, 153 F.3d at 1266. For the first time, in 1994, the Secretaries jointly proposed rescission of the 1972 Joint Finding in the Federal Register. See Mine Shift Atmospheric Conditions; Respirable Dust Sample, 59 Fed. Reg. 8,357 (Feb. 18, 1994). 17 The following year, NIOSH issued a Criteria Document 18 recommending a move to single-shift sampling. In 1996, an advisory committee created by the Department of Labor to which the NIOSH recommendation had been referred also recommended single‑shift sampling. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 811(a)(1), 812. In 1998, MSHA and NIOSH, armed with the recommendations from NIOSH and the advisory 17 Unlike the present, comprehensive New Dust Rule, the 1994 proposal addressed only the Joint Finding. 18 A “Criteria Document” is the mechanism by which NIOSH fulfills its statutory duty under 30 U.S.C. § 811(a)(6)(B) to “submit to the Secretary [of Labor] all pertinent criteria regarding any . . . substances determined to be toxic” “at the concentrations in which [they are] used or found in a mine.” 28 Case: 14-11942 Date Filed: 01/25/2016 Page: 29 of 83 committee, again jointly proposed to rescind the 1972 Joint Finding, and did rescind it after notice and comment. 19 In 1998, the National Mining Association challenged the 1998 Joint Finding on the ground that MSHA had failed to comply with the procedural requirements of section 101 of the Mine Act, 30 U.S.C. § 811, and, specifically, the requirements of section 101(a)(6), 30 U.S.C. § 811(a)(6), that MSHA demonstrate feasibility, use of the best available evidence and latest scientific data, and assure that no miner will suffer a material health impairment. MSHA responded principally by arguing that it was not required to follow section 101, 30 U.S.C. § 811, in order to rescind the Joint Finding, and even if it was, it was not required to follow substantive directions in section 101(a)(6), 30 U.S.C. § 811(a)(6), that were not “procedure-setting.” Nat’l Mining Ass’n, 153 F.3d at 1268. We granted the National Mining Association’s petition and vacated the 1998 Joint Finding on the basis that MSHA was required to meet all of the requirements of section 101, 30 U.S.C. § 811, in order to rescind the 1972 Joint Finding, but had failed to demonstrate economic feasibility, and, therefore, the rescission was invalid. Id. at 1269. 19 Mine Shift Atmospheric Conditions; Respirable Dust Sample, 63 Fed. Reg. 5,664 (Feb. 3, 1998) (“1998 Joint Finding”). The 1994 proposal was summary in nature. The 1998 Final Rule was a lengthy publication with the rescission of the Joint Finding as its only substantive change, with the rest of the publication comprising supporting evidence. 29 Case: 14-11942 Date Filed: 01/25/2016 Page: 30 of 83 Following the National Mining decision, MSHA and NIOSH proposed jointly to rescind the 1972 Joint Finding. See Determination of Concentration of Respirable Coal Mine Dust, 65 Fed. Reg. 42,068 (July 7, 2000). They engaged in notice-and-comment procedures and held public hearings. They twice reopened or extended the period to allow further development of the record, specifically on new technology for testing, the CPDM. The CPDM is a technology intended to replace the testing that had been in place since the original enactment of the Coal Act in 1969, namely, the Coal Mine Dust Personal Sampler Unit (“CMDPSU”). Testing with the CMDPSU required filters to be mailed away by operators to MSHA facilities for testing and introduced a delay of at least a week before samples could be processed. The CPDM, by contrast, takes continuous samples and makes them available to the mine and MSHA in real time, thus preventing possible avenues for tampering and enabling operators to implement additional, responsive air quality measures on an as-needed basis. This administrative action resulted in the promulgation of two rules. First, in 2010, following notice-and-comment procedures, MSHA promulgated new regulations concerning standards for approval of CPDMs. See Coal Mine Dust Sampling Devices, 75 Fed. Reg. 17,512 (Apr. 6, 2010) (codified at 30 C.F.R. part 74). Pursuant to those regulations, NIOSH approved a CPDM by Thermo Fisher 30 Case: 14-11942 Date Filed: 01/25/2016 Page: 31 of 83 Scientific in 2011. See 79 Fed. Reg. at 24,818.20 Consideration of the proposed rule to rescind the 1972 Joint Finding never was completed. Also in 2010, MSHA, acting alone, proposed the present, comprehensive New Dust Rule. 75 Fed. Reg. 64,412. It issued an economic analysis to address our concerns in National Mining that it had failed to determine the economic feasibility of single-shift sampling. It also opened the record for comment and extended the comment period three times, finally closing it in June 2011. MSHA promulgated its final rule in 2014, with alterations made in response to the comments received to its proposed rule. 79 Fed. Reg. 24,814.