Opinion ID: 2123530
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: limitation of the felony-murder doctrine in the united states

Text: While only a few states [45] have followed the lead of Great Britain in abolishing felony murder, various legislative and judicial limitations on the doctrine have effectively narrowed the scope of the rule in the United States. Perkins states that the rule is somewhat in disfavor at the present time and that courts apply it where the law requires, but they do so grudgingly and tend to restrict its application where circumstances permit. [46] The draftsmen of the Model Penal Code have summarized the limitations imposed by American courts as follows: [47] (1) The felonious act must be dangerous to life. [48] (2) and (3) The homicide must be a natural and probable consequence of the felonious act. Death must be `proximately' caused. [49] Courts have also required that the killing be the result of an act done in the furtherance of the felonious purpose and not merely coincidental to the perpetration of a felony. These cases often make distinctions based on the identity of the victim (i.e., whether the decedent was the victim of the felony or whether he was someone else, e.g., a policeman or one of the felons) and the identity of the person causing the death. [50] (4) The felony must be malum in se. [51] (5) The act must be a common-law felony. [52] (6) The period during which the felony is in the process of commission must be narrowly construed. [53] (7) The underlying felony must be `independent' of the homicide. [54] Some courts, recognizing the questionable wisdom of the rule, have refused to extend it beyond what is required. [W]e do want to make clear how shaky are the basic premises on which [the felony-murder rule] rests. With so weak a foundation, it behooves us not to extend it further and indeed, to restrain it within the bounds it has always known. Commonwealth ex rel Smith v Myers, 438 Pa 218; 227; 261 A2d 550, 555 (1970). We have thus recognized that the felony-murder doctrine expresses a highly artificial concept that deserves no extension beyond its required application. Indeed, the rule itself has been abandoned by the courts of England, where it had its inception. It has been subjected to severe and sweeping criticism. People v Phillips, 64 Cal 2d 574, 582-583; 51 Cal Rptr 225; 414 P2d 353, 360 (1966). [55] Other courts have required a finding of a separate mens rea connected with the killing in addition to the intent associated with the felony. In State v Millette, 112 NH 458, 462; 299 A2d 150, 153 (1972), the Court stated: Neither the legislature nor our court ever adopted a presumption of malice from the commission of an unlawful act whether felony or misdemeanor. While language in our cases defining murder may be construed to presume malice from a homicide occurring during the commission of the named inherently dangerous felonies [citations omitted] malice remains an indispensable element in the crime of murder. `Malice is not an inference of law from the mere act of killing; but like any other fact in issue, it must be found by the jury upon competent evidence.' This Court has held, at least with killings occurring during commission of non-enumerated felonies, that malice may be inferred but the nature of the felonious act must be considered. People v Jeffrey Carter, 387 Mich 397, 422; 197 NW2d 57 (1972). Similarly, New Mexico has declared that where a non-first-degree felony (this category would include many of Michigan's enumerated felonies) is involved, the presumption that the defendant has the requisite mens rea to commit first-degree murder is a legal fiction we no longer can support. State v Harrison, 90 NM 439, 442; 564 P2d 1321 (1977). The Iowa Supreme Court has recently ruled that the issue of malice aforethought necessary for murder must be submitted to the jury and that it may not be satisfied by proof of intent to commit the underlying felony. State v Galloway, 275 NW2d 736, 738 (Iowa, 1979). Many state legislatures have also been active in restricting the scope of felony murder by imposing additional limitations. [56] Kentucky [57] and Hawaii [58] have specifically abolished the felony-murder doctrine. The commentary to Hawaii's murder statute is instructive as to that state's reasoning in abolishing the doctrine: Even in its limited formulation the felony-murder rule is still objectionable. It is not sound principle to convert an accidental, negligent, or reckless homicide into a murder simply because, without more, the killing was in furtherance of a criminal objective of some defined class. Engaging in certain penally-prohibited behavior may, of course, evidence a recklessness sufficient to establish manslaughter, or a practical certainty or intent, with respect to causing death, sufficient to establish murder, but such a finding is an independent determination which must rest on the facts of each case.