Opinion ID: 6108657
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Analysis: Constitutional Right to Present a Complete Defense

Text: We now address whether the trial court's application of Rule 411 to exclude the evidence in question violated Mouton's constitutional right to present a complete defense. A trial in which a constitutional  error occurred must be reversed unless the reviewing court finds the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Olden , supra ; Chapman, supra. We conclude that the trial court's decision in this case did not violate Mouton's constitutional right to present a complete defense. While a defendant certainly has a constitutional right to present a complete defense at trial, it does not follow that any and all evidentiary exclusions adverse to the defendant will constitute a violation of that right. The Supreme Court has noted, [T]he Constitution guarantees criminal defendants 'a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense,'  Crane v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 683 , 690, 106 S.Ct. 2142 , 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986) ( quoting California v. Trombetta , 467 U.S. 479 , 485, 104 S.Ct. 2528 , 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984) ), but we have also recognized that state and federal rulemakers have broad latitude under the Constitution to establish rules excluding evidence from criminal trials, Holmes v. South Carolina , 547 U.S. 319 , 324, 126 S.Ct. 1727 , 164 L.Ed.2d 503 (2006) ( quoting United States v. Scheffer , 523 U.S. 303 , 308, 118 S.Ct. 1261 , 140 L.Ed.2d 413 (1998) ). Only rarely have we held that the right to present a complete defense was violated by the exclusion of defense evidence under a state rule of evidence. See 547 U.S., at 331 , 126 S.Ct. 1727 (rule did not rationally serve any discernible purpose); Rock v. Arkansas , 483 U.S. 44 , 61, 107 S.Ct. 2704 , 97 L.Ed.2d 37 (1987) (rule arbitrary); Chambers v. Mississippi , 410 U.S. 284 , 302-303, 93 S.Ct. 1038 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973) (State did not even attempt to explain the reason for its rule); Washington v.Texas , 388 U.S. 14 , 22, 87 S.Ct. 1920 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967) (rule could not be rationally defended). Nevada v. Jackson , 569 U.S. 505 , 509, 133 S.Ct. 1990 , 186 L.Ed.2d 62 (2013). While it may not always be stated in identical terms, a consistent theme in the cases from both the Arkansas Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court addressing the constitutional right to present a complete defense is that a defendant's ability to verbally cross-examine the witnesses presented against him will not be impeded, provided that the cross-examination pursues an evidentiary hypothesis underpinned by sufficient supporting facts. See, e.g. , Davis , 415 U.S. 308 , 94 S.Ct. 1105 , 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (defendant's theory was that complaining witness identified defendant as the burglar because complaining witness was afraid that authorities thought he was the actual burglar and wanted to divert suspicion; prosecution presented no evidence to foreclose defendant's theory); Olden , 488 U.S. 227 , 109 S.Ct. 480 , 102 L.Ed.2d 513 (defendant's theory was that victim levied rape accusation against defendant to discourage third party from ending his romantic relationship with victim after she had consensual sex with defendant; prosecution presented no evidence to foreclose defendant's theory); Marion , 267 Ark. 345 , 590 S.W.2d 288 (defendant's theory was that victim levied rape accusation against defendant in retaliation for fight over defendant contracting venereal disease from victim; prosecution presented no evidence to foreclose defendant's theory). Furthermore, we are guided by our ruling in Marion , that [t]he offer of proof [in support of introducing rape-shield evidence to the jury] need not be stated with complete precision or in unnecessary detail but it should state an evidentiary hypothesis underpinned by a sufficient statement of facts to warrant the conclusion or inference that the trier of fact is urged to adopt (,) .... (and) it ought to enable  a reviewing court to act with reasonable confidence that the evidentiary hypothesis can be sustained and is not merely an enthusiastic advocate's overstated assumption. Marion , 267 Ark. at 349 , 590 S.W.2d at 290 . Applying these principles to the case at hand, the trial court's exclusion of evidence of the sexual nature of KV's and EP's relationship did not violate Mouton's right to present a complete defense. Mouton's theory was that the allegations against him were fabricated by McKinney, Pippenger, EP, and KV in retaliation after Mouton fired McKinney. Mouton argues that evidence of the sexual nature of KV's relationship with EP was necessary to show the extent to which KV was aligned with EP's interests. The State argues that the timeline of Mouton's theory is fatally flawed in terms of when the allegation was first made and when it was first reported to authorities. Pippenger reported the allegations to authorities when EP disclosed them to her after the Mouton-McKinney blowup, and EP had no contact with KV between learning about the blowup and disclosing the allegations to Pippenger. EP already knew of the allegations from when KV revealed them to her approximately one year prior. The State argues, therefore, that Mouton's theory (that the allegations were a fabricated retaliation for McKinney's firing) would garner no factual support from any sexually related bias between KV and EP since the motivation for the alleged McKinney-Pippenger-EP-KV alliance to retaliate did not exist until approximately one year after KV had disclosed the allegations to EP. In response, Mouton argues that the very notion that KV had previously disclosed the allegations to EP could be another made-up component of the McKinney-Pippenger-EP-KV alliance's retaliation. This is where Mouton's evidentiary basis for probing into KV's and EP's past sexual relationship at trial fails. All the evidence in the record before us supports the conclusion that KV disclosed the allegations to EP while the two were dating, several months before the Mouton-McKinney blowup. The only actual evidence in the entire record that could suggest that this prior disclosure was never made is Mouton's testimony at trial generally denying that anything improper ever occurred between him and KV. This no more supplies an evidentiary hypothesis underpinned by sufficient supporting facts than would Mouton's plea of not guilty, and it is therefore insufficient to establish a constitutional violation. Accordingly, Mouton's constitutional right to present a complete defense was not violated, Chapman's harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of review has not been triggered, and the trial court's decision on this question is affirmed.