Opinion ID: 716155
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Full and Fair State Litigation

Text: 5 It is clearly established that Helton may not be granted habeas relief on his Fourth Amendment claim where the state has provided him with an opportunity to fully and fairly litigate that claim. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976). Here, citing Riley v. Gray, 674 F.2d 522 (6th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Shoemaker v. Riley, 459 U.S. 948 (1982), Helton claims that because the state court of appeals denied his suppression claim for lack of standing, his opportunity fully and fairly to litigate the merits of that claim was frustrated. The district court held that Riley is distinguishable and Helton's claim is without merit. 6 The district court's conclusion that this case must be distinguished from Riley is clearly correct. Riley involved the denial of a motion to suppress that took place before the automatic standing rule of Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), was overruled by United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980). Riley's habeas proceedings took place after Salvucci was decided, and as the Supreme Court did in Salvucci itself, we remanded the case to allow the defendant to prove that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises that had been searched. Since Salvucci, there can be no question that every defendant who seeks the protection of the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment must demonstrate that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated. See United States v. McNeal, 955 F.2d 1067, 1072 (6th Cir.1992). Helton is not in the position of a criminal defendant [who was] not allowed to fully present his Fourth Amendment claim in the state courts because of unanticipated and unforeseeable application of a procedural rule which prevent[ed] state court consideration of the merits of the claim. Riley, 674 F.2d at 527. Helton was required to establish affirmatively that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated because the premises from which the evidence was seized were premises in which he had a legitimate expectation of privacy. A review of the record reveals that he failed to do so. 7 In the state trial court, Helton moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the search of his sister's shed and the automobile on her premises, claiming that since these were under his control, his sister lacked the authority to consent to a search. 1 The trial court reviewed all of the evidence presented by Helton regarding his control over the premises and concluded that Helton's sister owned the premises and that the police officers' belief that she had authority to consent was reasonable. The state court of appeals affirmed, on the basis that the evidence presented to the trial court showed that Helton neither owned nor occupied the premises, and therefore lacked standing to challenge his sister's consent. Both courts thoroughly addressed the factual basis of Helton's claim, namely his control over and reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises. After exhaustively reviewing the proceedings in the state courts relative to Helton's claims regarding the propriety of the searches, the district court concluded that the propriety of the search was actually litigated in the state courts. Our review of the record leads us to the same conclusion. 8 We find no error in the district court's conclusion that Helton's Fourth Amendment claim was fully and fairly litigated in the state courts. 9