Opinion ID: 78594
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: AEDPA Deference for State Habeas Court

Text: As an initial matter, a question presented is whether the district court erred when it afforded no AEDPA deference to the State court's adjudication of Williams' ineffective assistance of counsel claim on the issue of whether the jury instructions shifted the burden to prove intent. To reiterate, AEDPA affords a high level of deference when the State court adjudicates a constitutional claim on the merits. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Therefore, if the State court adjudicated the merits of Williams' claim that the jury instructions unconstitutionally shifted the burden to prove intent, the State court is entitled to deference where principles of federal law are not violated. However, the district court reviewed this claim de novo. After review, we find that the district erroneously reviewed Williams' burden-shifting portion of his claim under a de novo standard. Doc. 21 at 34-35. The district court presented a concise reason for applying the de novo standard, explaining that the State court was unaware that a constitutional, burden-shifting claim had also been asserted. See id. at 34. However, we are reluctant to agree. The record indicates that the State court was aware of Williams challenge to the jury instructions, which he alleged shifted the burden of proving intent to him. In his Rule 32 petition as amended, Williams raised the claim that counsel were ineffective for failing to object to jury instructions that shifted the burden to prove that he had the requisite mental state of intent to kill. Vol. VIII, Tab P-13, at 17-19. In support of his Rule 32 amended petition, Williams also filed a post-hearing brief with the State court. Vol. XI, Tab P-36 at R-346. As the district court notes, Williams argued that a jury charge invoking the presumption of intent may unconstitutionally shift the burden of proof to the defendant. Vol. XI, Tab P-36 at R-368. Williams' argument, however, conflates the requirements of asserting the affirmative defense of insanity, the defense of voluntary intoxication, the presumption of sanity, and the burden the State must carry in order to prove intent to commit capital murder, into one burden, which he says shifted to him in an unconstitutional manner. Vol. XI, Tab P-36 at R-346. Albeit confusing, this argument was before the State court. Because both the Rule 32 petition and the post-conviction hearing brief present this argument, we are unable to agree with the district court that the State was unaware of the burden-shifting argument. The question now becomes whether the State court's decision on Williams' Rule 32 petition regarding the burden to prove intent constituted an adjudication on the merits. After reviewing the State court's order of the Rule 32 petition, the record indicates that the State court did in fact adjudicate on the merits Williams' burden-shifting claim. A decision that does not rest on procedural grounds alone is an adjudication on the merits, regardless of the form in which it is expressed. Blankenship, 542 F.3d at 1271 n. 4 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, § 2254(d)(1) requires only an adjudication on the merits in State court proceedings. Wright v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 278 F.3d 1245, 1254 (11th Cir.2002). The chief responsibility of judges is to decide the case before them. They may, or may not, attempt to explain the decision in an opinion. Id. at 1255. That is, [t]he statutory language focuses on the result, not on the reasoning that led to the result. Id. Thus, a State court is not required to list an entire rationale as to why it rejects the merits of a claim properly before it. See id. After review of the record, we find that the State court adjudicated the merits of Williams' claim that counsel were ineffective for failure to object to certain jury instructions that shifted the burden to prove intent. In its October 2, 2009 order, the State court made the following statement regarding the Rule 32 petition: The Court has reviewed the evidence contained in the record of the original proceedings, the evidence presented at the Rule 32 evidentiary hearing, the pleadings and arguments of counsel for the State and Petitioner, and has reviewed the relevant law. This Court finds that Williams' trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance during Williams' guilt phase trial. Vol. VIII, Tab P-17 at 22. This statement constitutes an adjudication on the merits. Having already met the requirements of adjudication under § 2254(d)(1), the State court engaged in analysis and explained that the defendant had the consistent burden of proving insanity. Vol. VIII, Tab P-17 at 28. The State court also clarified Williams' misreading of the law, and explained that voluntary intoxication is a defense that the defendant also had the burden to prove during a trial. Vol. VIII, Tab P-17 at 28. The State court reasoned that jury instructions that note correct statements of law are not erroneous. Vol. VIII, Tab P-17 at 28. The State court then concluded that trial counsel were not ineffective for failing to object to such instructions. Vol. VIII, P-17 at 28. Indeed, we read these statements to mean that the State court adjudicated the merit of Williams' challenge to the jury instructions; it properly determined that the charge did not inappropriately shift the burdens between the parties. [14] Accordingly, the district court erroneously applied a de novo review, and should have afforded AEDPA deference to the State court's adjudication of Williams' ineffective assistance of counsel claim with regard to the jury instructions. However, this error is harmless because the district court correctly applied the principles of Strickland, and it found that the counsel's performance was not ineffective. See Blankenship, 542 F.3d at 1272 (affirming the district court's denial of a federal habeas petition after the district court erroneously afforded no AEDPA deference to the state court's adjudication of Blankenship's ineffective assistance of counsel claim). With the proper principles of deference in place, we next determine whether the State court's application of federal law is contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law.