Opinion ID: 2980205
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Gardner’s failed arguments

Text: Gardner argues on appeal that the district court erred in granting the motion to dismiss based on collateral estoppel. He maintains that the district court’s “implied reasoning process appears to have been that pleading guilty to a crime of intent somehow foreclosed proof of causation with respect to the VA’s prior negligent treatment.” Br. of Appellant at 11. According to Gardner, Tennessee law does not foreclose a psychiatric malpractice action simply because a person pleads guilty to a crime or commits an intentional act. In support of this argument, Gardner cites a line of Tennessee state cases involving situations where individuals committed suicide and suits were then brought against care providers.2 Gardner’s “suicide” argument (and the cases offered in support) was never raised below and is therefore forfeited. See United States v. Ninety-Three Firearms, 330 F.3d 414, 424 (6th Cir. 2003) (“This court has repeatedly held that it will not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal unless our failure to consider the issue will result in a plain miscarriage of justice”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). However, irrespective of forfeiture, Gardner’s argument lacks merit, as the cited cases specifically involve the intentional act of suicide (which is not illegal under 2 See Stewart v. Fakhruddin, 2010 WL 2134150 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010); White v. Lawrence, 975 S.W.2d 525 (Tenn. 1998); Drake v. Williams, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 240 (Ct. App. 2008). Gardner also cites to Rains v. Bend of the River, 124 S.W.3d 580 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), where the parents of a man who committed suicide brought suit against the seller of the ammunition used by the decedent. 8 No. 09-6308 United States v. Gardner Tennessee law, despite Gardner’s claims—without citation—to the contrary3) and were suits resulting from failure to provide proper medical care. None of those cases involve an individual who waived an insanity defense, plead guilty to a general intent crime in federal court, and then brought suit against their medical provider claiming the provider’s negligence made them insane and caused them to commit the crime.4 Those cases do not even discuss the issue of collateral estoppel. Gardner also contends that, when he pled guilty, he never conceded that improper medical care was not a factor in his criminal acts and thus this issue, which is the gravamen of this suit, was never actually litigated. His state of mind, in his view, “is irrelevant” to his civil action. However, this argument misses the mark, as Gardner’s entire complaint is premised on a claim of negligent treatment that resulted in his becoming insane and then committing the underlying offenses. Indeed, Gardner amended his complaint to include the allegation that he was insane when he committed aggravated assault. In such a suit, the fact finder would thus have to evaluate his state of mind. Gardner further directs the court to an Illinois state-court decision, Talarico v. Dunlap, 177 Ill. 2d 185 (1997), and a Kentucky state-court decision, Gossage v. Roberts, 904 S.W.2d 246 (Ky. 1995), maintaining that those cases support a holding that collateral estoppel does not bar the claims 3 Assisting someone in suicide is a crime under Tennessee law. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-216. An individual is also permitted to use force to prevent a suicide. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-613. However, the act itself is not illegal. 4 Gardner also cites Turner v. Jordan, 957 S.W.2d 815 (Tenn. 1997) but that case has no bearing on the instant matter. Collateral estoppel and the public policy issues raised in the instant matter were not discussed. The case also involved a suit against a psychiatrist by a victim of an attack, not a situation where the attacker was suing the psychiatrist. 9 No. 09-6308 United States v. Gardner at issue here. Gardner’s reliance on these cases is misplaced, as both are state-law cases that do not determine what federal law is regarding collateral estoppel.