Opinion ID: 2780756
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Right to Bodily Integrity

Text: Villanueva’s final argument is Moreno used his position as police chief to coerce her into a sexual relationship, violating her right to bodily integrity. “‘The Eighth Circuit has recognized a substantive due process violation in some instances of sexual misconduct by police officers.’” Cavataio v. City of Bella Villa, 570 F.3d 1015, 1022 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Schmidt v. City of Bella Villa, 557 F.3d 564, 574 (8th Cir. 2009)); see, e.g., Hawkins v. Holloway, 316 F.3d 777, 783-86 (8th Cir. 2003); Rogers v. City of Little Rock, Ark., 152 F.3d 790, 796-97 (8th Cir. 1998); Haberthur v. City of Raymore, Mo., 119 F.3d 720, 723-24 (8th Cir. 1997). And in Rogers, we specifically found a due process violation when a police officer mentally coerced—rather than physically forced—a woman into sexual intercourse. See Rogers, 152 F.3d at 797. A violation of the right to bodily integrity must be “‘so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience.’” Id. (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 n.8 (1998)). Villanueva contends Moreno, knowing she was vulnerable because of her history of spousal abuse, used his authority to entice her into a sexual relationship. Villanueva acknowledges she did not object to the relationship with Moreno, but maintains she felt forced to continue the relationship because she needed Moreno’s help with the neighborhood watch and to escape her abusive ex-husband. Villanueva likens her situation to that in Rogers, claiming “Moreno took advantage of his position and [Villanueva’s] mental state[,] over time coercing [Villanueva] to engage in an unwanted sexual relationship.” -8- The factual differences between Villanueva’s situation and the situation in Rogers are substantial. In Rogers, an on-duty, armed, and uniformed officer followed a woman home after pulling her over for a broken tail light. See id. at 793. The officer entered the woman’s house, demanded she undress, and had sexual intercourse with her. See id. at 793-94. Although the woman never objected, we still recognized this encounter as a rape: “an egregious, nonconsensual entry into the body which was an exercise of power without any legitimate governmental objective.” Id. at 797. In contrast to Rogers, Villanueva’s sexual encounters with Moreno occurred while Moreno was off-duty, were not connected to any exercise of Moreno’s authority as an officer, and can only be described as a consensual sexual relationship between adults. Although Villanueva now claims to have been coerced, her contemporaneous email and diary notes show she was attracted to Moreno and consented to the relationship with him. Villanueva, relying on the testimony of her counselor, argues Moreno coerced her by engaging in what the counselor describes as a “primping process” or “pruning process” where Moreno“set[] the stage for [Villanueva] to become a sexual partner.” Through this process, Villanueva asserts Moreno—knowing of Villanueva’s fragile mental state and that she sought his help as a law enforcement agent—set up meetings where Moreno could see Villanueva alone and began casually touching Villanueva in an attempt to escalate their relationship beyond friendship. Villanueva’s counselor acknowledged, however, that “[i]n all [romantic] relationships there is a pruning process.” The evidence does not suggest Moreno coerced Villanueva into sexual relations through an abuse of his authority so egregious and outrageous that it shocks the conscience. See id. Although Moreno arguably acted inappropriately in pursuing a relationship with Villanueva, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable toVillanueva, Moreno’s conduct cannot be likened to the rape perpetrated in the Rogers case and does not rise to the level of a due process violation. -9-