Opinion ID: 4565159
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Drainage Pipe Easement

Text: ¶ 28. On cross-appeal, VTRE contests the trial court’s conclusion that the 2010 Deed of Easement grants MontChilly the right to run a four-inch inground drainage pipe across VTRE’s property on the ground that the deed was not signed by VTRE’s predecessor. Whether the drainage pipe easement is enforceable is a question of law that we review without deference. Miller v. Flegenheimer, 2016 VT 125, ¶ 11, 203 Vt. 620, 161 A.3d 524 (stating that existence of enforceable contract is matter of law reviewed without deference). ¶ 29. The 2010 Deed of Easement grants VTRE’s predecessor in interest, Schmidt, a sewer easement to allow him to connect to the Stowe town sewer. The deed also states: Grantees also covenant and agree to provide a 4-inch diameter drain pipe running from the common boundary with the Grantor through Grantee’s property to the river for the purpose of diverting water flow from the sump pump(s) located within lodging facility situated on Grantor’s property to the river. Seaberg, as grantor with respect to the sewer easement, signed the 2010 Deed of Easement but the Schmidts, as grantees, did not. ¶ 30. Pursuant to that deed, Schmidt installed the four-inch inground drainage pipe to connect MontChilly’s sump pump to the river through what is now VTRE’s property. According to Seaberg, Schmidt voluntarily maintained the drainpipe while he was the owner of that property. ¶ 31. Because the 2010 Deed of Easement was not signed by the Schmidts, VTRE argued in the trial court that it fails to meet the requirements of the Statute of Frauds, and that he is not required to allow MontChilly’s drainage pipe to cross his land. The court rejected this argument, concluding that the Statute of Frauds was satisfied upon Mr. Schmidt’s acceptance of the deed and that the drainpipe easement is therefore enforceable against VTRE. The court explained that Mr. Schmidt clearly intended to be bound by the deed, and noted that he received the benefit of the reciprocal sewer pipe easement in exchange for this obligation. 13 ¶ 32. Before the court issued these findings, however, MontChilly filed an emergency motion for specific performance, alleging that VTRE unilaterally removed the four-inch drainpipe from its property. MontChilly asked the court to order VTRE to restore the pipe, which was capped on the edge of its property, preventing the sump pumps in MontChilly’s basement from evacuating water. The court never ruled on the motion. ¶ 33. In this appeal, MontChilly asks the Court to remand the matter for a ruling by the trial court on MontChilly’s request for specific performance. On cross-appeal, VTRE renews its contention that the Statute of Frauds bars enforcement of the drainpipe covenant in the 2010 Deed of Easement. ¶ 34. We hold that the 2010 Deed of Easement granting the Schmidts sewer access binds VTRE to the reciprocal drainpipe easement contained within the deed, despite the fact that the Schmidts did not sign the instrument. Because the instrument executed in this agreement did not purport to require the signature of the grantees, it is considered a deed poll. As explained in further detail below, while the term “deed poll” is somewhat antiquated in Vermont, such deeds are nevertheless recognized and valid. The modern trend is to treat reciprocal covenants by grantees in deeds polls binding on grantees who accept the deeds. The principle of estoppel further supports our conclusion that affirmative reciprocal obligations contained in deeds poll are enforceable against grantees who accept the deeds, even when they have not signed them. The authority relied on by VTRE in its attempt to distinguish this case from those where acceptance does not bind the grantee is unpersuasive. We therefore remand for consideration of MontChilly’s motion for specific performance in light of this ruling. ¶ 35. A deed poll is a term referring to a conveyance executed unilaterally and sealed exclusively by the grantor. See Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Servitudes § 2.1 cmt. b (2000). The deed poll gets its name from the term ‘polled,’ in the sense of the flat head of an animal whose horns have been removed. See 1 Williston on Contracts § 2.7 (4th ed. 2020) (citing 2 Blackstone 14 Comm. 295); Polled, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/polled [https://perma.cc/LTA3-RQFG] (defining “polled” as “having no horns”). In the ancient common law, a deed executed unilaterally by one party was flat at its top, or polled, while deeds executed by two parties were cut in a wave along their center, creating a teeth-like pattern. See id. The term used to describe these bilaterally executed agreements was “indenture,” derived from the Latin phrase for “like teeth,” as the jagged edge on the parchment was “cut or indented in a toothlike manner, similar to that of a saw.” See id. ¶ 36. In Vermont, deeds poll have been recognized by common law, although overt reference to them ended in the early twentieth century. See, e.g., Blake v. Tucker, 12 Vt. 39, 4546 (1840) (“It is no doubt true, that the grantor in a deed poll, and, to some extent, all who claim title under him, are bound by recitals in the deed.”). This Court’s last reference to a deed poll involved a dispute over the sale of a home farm in Orange County, in which the instrument in question was briefly and anecdotally referred to as a “deed (poll)” without further discussion. Maidment v. Frazier, 90 Vt. 520, 526, 98 A. 987, 989 (1916). The term “deed poll” has dropped out of the modern lexicon, but the instrument it references remains commonplace. Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Servitudes § 2.7 cmt. g (2000) (“The standard deed used in American practice is a deed poll, which is signed only by the grantor.”). Although this Court has long recognized the enforceability of deeds poll, we have not directly considered whether reciprocal obligations in a deed poll that burden the property of the grantee are enforceable even though the grantee has not signed the instrument. ¶ 37. The modern trend among states that have considered the issue is to enforce such reciprocal covenants. At common law, deeds poll could not bind a grantee to obligations contained within because the instrument, by its design, was not sealed by the grantee. See 17 F. Dana, S.C. Jur. Covenants § 7 (2020). The overwhelming modern trend recognizes the acceptance of a deed poll as creating a binding agreement on the part of the grantee and successors to the 15 obligations of the deed, regardless of whether the grantee has signed the instrument. See id. (“Early South Carolina cases were in accord [with the common law]. Currently, however, this rule has been abandoned and South Carolina courts have enforced restrictions created in deeds signed by the grantor only, usually without discussing the point.”); see also Fort Dodge, D.M. & S. Ry. v. Am. Cmty. Stores Corp., 131 N.W.2d 515, 522 (Iowa 1964) (“The voluntary acceptance of a deed poll binds the grantee to the performance of covenants contained therein.”); Johnston v. Mich. Consol. Gas Co., 60 N.W.2d 464, 467 (Mich. 1953) (“As a rule the grantee by accepting a deed poll [is bound] to covenants therein contained.”); Barrier v. Randolph, 133 S.E.2d 655, 658 (N.C. 1963) (“[I]t is a settled principle of law that a grantee who accepts a deed poll containing covenants or conditions to be performed by him as the consideration of the grant, becomes bound for their performance, although [the grantee] does not execute the deed as a party.” (quotation omitted)); Hunt v. Curry, 282 S.W. 201, 205 (Tenn. 1926) (“Although the conveyance from [grantor] to [grantee] was by deed poll, nevertheless the covenants are binding on a grantee who accepts the benefits of such a deed.”). ¶ 38. The doctrine of estoppel supports the modern rule that reciprocal covenants in deeds poll are binding against grantees upon acceptance even though they have not signed them. The Statute of Frauds, codified at 12 V.S.A. § 181, requires a contract for the sale of an interest in land to be signed by the party against whom it is enforced. However, where one party has detrimentally relied on the promises made by the other, the doctrine of equitable estoppel permits enforcement of a contract that otherwise fails the Statute of Frauds. See Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Servitudes § 2.9 (“The consequences of failure to comply with the Statute of Frauds . . . do not apply if the beneficiary of the servitude, in justifiable reliance on the existence of the servitude, has so changed position that injustice can be avoided only by giving effect to the parties’ intent to create a servitude.”); My Sister’s Place v. City of Burlington, 139 Vt. 602, 609, 16 433 A.2d 275, 279 (1981) (holding that doctrine of equitable estoppel grants relief to parties who have acted in good faith and “changed [their] position in reliance upon earlier representations”). ¶ 39. Here, the Schmidts accepted the deed poll. They received the right to run a sewer line across MontChilly’s property, at least in part in exchange for allowing MontChilly to run a drainpipe across theirs. On the basis of the authority above, we hold that the 2010 Deed of Easements created a binding obligation on VTRE’s predecessor to allow the drainpipe easement. ¶ 40. This case is distinguishable from Jokay, Inc. v. Lagarenne, a case relied upon by VTRE. 525 N.Y.S.2d 411 (App. Div. 1988). In that case, the parties’ deed failed the Statute of Frauds for lack of the grantee’s signature. The provisions of the deed required the grantee to act as grantor in part by providing an easement to the grantor in partial exchange for conveyance of land. Jokay is distinguishable from this case in at least two ways. First, the court’s analysis suggests that the deed at issue was written in a way that anticipated a signed express grant of the reciprocal easement, whereas here, the 2010 deed poll did not require the Schmidts’ seal. See id. at 414 (“Since [grantee] did not sign this deed, an easement by express grant, as anticipated by the language utilized, could not have been created.”). By their very nature, deeds poll do not call for the signature of the grantee, and therefore the deed at issue here required only MontChilly’s signature. Second, the court found, in contrast to this case, no evidence of part performance or reliance such as to create an easement by estoppel. Id. ¶ 41. For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the trial court’s holding that the drainpipe easement is enforceable against VTRE and remand for consideration of MontChilly’s motion for specific performance in light of this ruling.