Opinion ID: 2158073
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Did Osterman and Zamberletti owe Korey Stringer a Personal Duty?

Text: We must now apply the two-prong personal duty test to determine whether Osterman and Zamberletti (1) took direct action toward or directed another to take direct action toward Stringer and (2) acted outside the course and scope of their employment. Application of this test will enable us to determine whether summary judgment on the personal duty allegation in Count I of the complaint was appropriate. There is no dispute that the first prong of the personal duty test has been met; the parties do not disagree that Osterman and Zamberletti both took direct action toward Stringer. Thus, the focus of our analysis is on the second prong of the test. Under the second prong of the test, Osterman and Zamberletti must have been acting within their authorized course and scope of employment to not owe a personal duty to Korey Stringer. When an employee engages in acts exceeding his authorization, including the violation of an instruction or a rule, he is acting outside the course and scope of his employment. Bartley v. C-H Riding Stables, Inc., 296 Minn. 115, 117, 206 N.W.2d 660, 662 (1973) (denying workers' compensation benefits to employee thrown from a horse he was instructed not to ride); see also Lange v. Mpls.-St. Paul Metro. Airports Comm'n, 257 Minn. 54, 57, 99 N.W.2d 915, 918 (1959). In Lange, we distinguished between the performance of authorized acts in a prohibited manner and the performance of prohibited acts. Id. at 57, 99 N.W.2d at 918. We explained that the performance of prohibited acts is outside the scope of employment and does not come within the protection of the statute. Id. at 57, 99 N.W.2d at 918. We have held that an activity not explicitly within the employee's defined duties can nevertheless be related to the employee's duties if the work is in furtherance of the employer's business. Ramczik v. Winona Mach. & Foundry Co., 174 Minn. 156, 158, 218 N.W. 545, 545 (1928). [16] An employer may also extend the scope of employment by directing or requesting an employee to perform some act outside the usual scope of employment. Weidenbach v. Miller, 237 Minn. 278, 292, 55 N.W.2d 289, 296 (1952). The rule that a person's scope and course of employment can be extended also may apply to rescue activities, where the scope and course of an employee's employment may be impliedly extended in an emergency to include the performance of any act designed to save life or property in which the employer has an interest. 2 Larson, § 28.01(1), at 28-2; Carey v. Stadther, 300 Minn. 88, 95-96, 219 N.W.2d 76, 80 (1974) (reversing a denial of benefits to a widow of a sales employee who died attempting a rescue where the employer had actively encouraged its employees to perform acts of community service in order to enhance sales). But not every act which might benefit the employer is in the course and scope of employment. 2 Larson, § 27.01(3), at 27-6. And not every rescue is in the course and scope of employment. Weidenbach, 237 Minn. at 279-81, 293, 55 N.W.2d at 289-90, 297 (upholding a denial of benefits to dependents of a deceased worker who attempted to rescue a person who had fallen through the ice because there was no express direction by his employer to help the person in peril). In this case, Osterman and Zamberletti were employed by the Vikings to provide some level of care for the Vikings' players and the record demonstrates that their actions toward Stringer occurred within work-related limits of time and place. Further, while we would prefer that the record contain more specific information regarding Osterman's and Zamberletti's duties and responsibilities, [17] we conclude that the record does contain sufficient information to enable us to determine their specific duties with coinciding expectations, responsibilities, and authorization. Thus, on the record before us, we are able to determine whether Osterman and Zamberletti acted within the course and scope of their employment and whether their actions were in furtherance of the interests of the Vikings' organization. The record provides information about Osterman's degree program to become an athletic trainer, including training he received on recognizing the signs and symptoms of heat emergencies. The job description for Zamberletti as Coordinator of Sports Medicine includes the following as Zamberletti's job duties for the period from January 1999 through January 15, 2002: on-field rehabilitation of players classified physically unable to play and conditioning of developmental and injured reserved players. The record indicates that Zamberletti has been certified as an athletic trainer since 1970 and has been employed with the Vikings since 1961. We also note that the Vikings' Athletic Training Intern Handbook states, Realize your limitationsnever make an assessment. All assessments on players will be done by Chuck [Barta], Fred [Zamberletti], or Dr. Fischer. Here, Osterman's and Zamberletti's obligations to Stringer directly resulted from their employment by the Vikings and the Vikings' efforts to provide a safe workplace for their players. The record shows that the purpose for employing trainers was to protect the health and safety of the players. The Vikings required at least one trainer to remain on the field until the last player finished with practice. While on the field, the trainers' duties included monitoring practice, providing players with water, and evaluating and treating player injuries. Osterman's and Zamberletti's actions with respect to Stringer conformed with these duties. Osterman testified that while he thought Stringer was doing fine, he did take Stringer to the air-conditioned trailer as a preventive measure. While in retrospect we may want or expect that Osterman and Zamberletti would have responded to Stringer's condition differently, they nonetheless were acting within their scope of employment, and any duty they had toward Stringer did not exist absent their employment status. We recognize that any time medical attention or care is involved, a great deal of trust is placed in the discretion of the caregiver. Caregivers must not exceed the level of care they are trained and authorized to provide. Those who provide health care services must realize their limitations and those who provide health care services must not make decisions or take actions they are not qualified to make. But we also want those who provide health care services to be able to perform their duties and respond to emergencies without unduly worrying about being subject to personal liability for their acts. We also acknowledge that in this context the course and scope of employment may be difficult to ascertain, especially when employees such as Osterman and Zamberletti have the authority to exercise discretion in making assessments. In such situations, an appropriate baseline of job duties, expectations, and authorizations is necessary for a court to determine if an employee exceeded the course and scope of his employment. We conclude that such a baseline exists in the record before us. Accordingly, based on all of the foregoing, we conclude that summary judgment on the issue of whether Osterman and Zamberletti had a personal duty to Korey Stringer was appropriate and therefore we hold that the district court did not err when it granted summary judgment for the respondents.
Having decided that the district court properly granted summary judgment for the respondents under the personal duty requirement, we need not address whether the district court properly granted summary judgment for the respondents based on gross negligence; therefore, we decline to address this issue. Affirmed. PAGE, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.