Opinion ID: 2195250
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Statutes, Case LawCompetency

Text: The determination of a child's competence is within the sound discretion of the trial judge. Horsey v. State, 225 Md. 80, 82, 169 A.2d 457, 458 (1961); Robert v. State, 220 Md. 159, 165, 151 A.2d 737, 739 (1959); Saldiveri v. State, 217 Md. 412, 419, 143 A.2d 70, 74 (1958); Freeny v. Freeny, 80 Md. 406, 409, 31 A. 304, 305 (1895); Matthews v. State, 106 Md.App. 725, 740, 666 A.2d 912, 919 (1995), cert. denied, 341 Md. 648, 672 A.2d 623 (1996); Jones v. State, 68 Md.App. 162, 165, 510 A.2d 1091, 1093 (1986); Reckard v. State, 2 Md.App. 312, 318, 234 A.2d 630, 633 (1967), cert. denied, 248 Md. 734 (1968). Absent an abuse of discretion, that determination will not be disturbed on appeal. Matthews, 106 Md.App. at 740, 666 A.2d at 919. As noted by Professor Wigmore on the question of child competency, the trial court must be the one to determine finally, upon all the circumstances, whether the child has sufficient intelligence according to the foregoing requirements: Brewer, J., in Wheeler v. United States , 159 U.S. 523, 524, 16 S.Ct. 93, 40 L.Ed. 244 (1895): The decision of this question rests primarily with the trial judge, who sees the proposed witness, notices his manner, his apparent possession or lack of intelligence, and may resort to any examination which will tend to disclose his capacity and intelligence, as well as his understanding of the obligations of an oath. As many of these matters cannot be photographed into the record, the decision of the trial judge will not be disturbed on review, unless from that which is preserved it is clear that it was erroneous. 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 507 (Chadbourn rev.1979). The age of a child is not the test used to determine if a child is competent to testify. Matthews, 106 Md.App. at 741, 666 A.2d at 919. Rather, the test is whether the witness has intelligence enough to make it worthwhile to hear him [or her] at all and whether he [or she] feels a duty to tell the truth. Brandau v. Webster, 39 Md.App. 99, 104, 382 A.2d 1103, 1106 (1978). The trial court must determine the child's capacity to observe, understand, recall, and relate happenings while conscious of a duty to speak the truth. Jones v. State, 68 Md. App. 162, 166-67, 510 A.2d 1091, 1094 (1986). [5] Professor Wigmore states the essential requirements as: (1) capacity for observation; (2) capacity for recollection; (3) capacity for communication, including ability to understand questions put and to frame and express intelligent answers; and, (4) a sense of moral responsibility to tell the truth. 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 506 (Chadbourn rev.1979). Finally, as stated in Wharton's Criminal Evidence, the test of a child's competency is, intelligence; an understanding of the obligation to tell the truth; knowledge of the nature of an oath; ability at the time of the occurrence to accurately perceive it; ability to remember the occurrence; capacity to actively communicate the memories; and ability to understand and respond to simple questions about the occurrence. It is not necessary that the child be able to define an oath. The child need only understand that, upon taking an oath, the child has promised to tell the truth. A child's competency is not affected by the fact that the child makes contradictory statements on the witness stand. 2 Barbara E. Bergman, Nancy Hollander, Wharton's Criminal Evidence § 7:16 (15th ed.1998). The types of questions usually asked to determine if a child is competent to testify are not related to the trial itself and include questions like Where do you go to school?, How old are you?, . . . Do you know what happens to anyone telling a lie?. Robin W. Morey, The Competency Requirement for the Child Victim of Sexual Abuse: Must We Abandon It?, 40 U. Miami L.Rev. 245, 263 (1985) (discussing voir dire of child witnesses) (footnote omitted). The questions asked should not be complicated or tricky and should include questions that ferret out if a child understands the concept of truth and falsehood. Morey, 40 U. Miami L.Rev. at 263 n. 78. For example, Q. . . . If I were to say that I'm wearing a red jacket, would that be a lie or would that be the truth?, A. A lie[, and] Q. And why would it be a lie?, A. Because you're wearing a brown jacket. Id. In Brandau v. Webster, 39 Md.App. 99, 382 A.2d 1103 (1978), the Court of Special Appeals held that the court erred by arbitrarily determining that a five year old child was incompetent to testify in a custody hearing solely because of her young age, without conducting an examination on the matter, either in court or in chambers. Brandau, 39 Md.App. at 105, 382 A.2d at 1106. The court described the criteria to be considered by the trial court and concluded by stating, [i]t is true that the decision as to the competency of a witness is within the sound discretion of the trial court but the court must at least conduct such an examination as will disclose the factual basis on which his conclusion as to competency rests. Brandau, 39 Md.App. at 104-05, 382 A.2d at 1106. Because Brandau was a custody case, it did not address whether an inquiry into competency should be done outside the presence of a jury. In Matthews, the trial judge conducted a voir dire examination of a four-year old child outside the presence of the jury and permitted both counsel to voir dire the child. Matthews, 106 Md.App. at 740-41, 666 A.2d at 919. The child's responses indicated that she knew the difference between the truth and a lie and the trial court determined that she was competent to testify. Matthews, 106 Md.App. at 741, 666 A.2d at 919-20. The Court of Special Appeals found no error in the court's procedure in that case and noted that, [w]hen the issue is raised, the trial judge should conduct an examination out of the presence of the jury to develop the factual basis for a competency determination. Matthews, 106 Md.App. at 741, 666 A.2d at 919 (citing Burgess v. State, 89 Md.App. 522, 598 A.2d 830 (1991), in turn quoting Evans v. State, 304 Md. 487, 508, 499 A.2d 1261 (1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010, 106 S.Ct. 3310, 92 L.Ed.2d 722 (1986), motion for reconsideration denied, 305 Md. 306, 503 A.2d 1326 (1986)). In Evans, the Court of Appeals discussed the competency of a witness who had given many different accounts of an incident before trial, including accounts under oath, that were untrue. Evans, 304 Md. at 504, 499 A.2d at 1269-70. When the defense objected to the witness's testimony, the trial court elected to examine the witness, outside the presence of the jury, to determine if she knew the difference between a lie and the truth. Evans, 304 Md. at 505-06, 499 A.2d at 1270-71. The trial court also gave both counsel an opportunity to examine the witness on the question of competency. Id. The trial judge completed the inquiry by stating, That is all I wanted to know, if she knows when she is telling the truth and she knows when [she is] not telling the truth. She is a competent witness. Evans, 304 Md. at 506, 499 A.2d at 1271. In affirming the trial judge's procedure and decision that the witness was competent, Judge Eldridge, for this Court, wrote: When a substantial question is presented concerning the competency of a witness, the trial judge should ordinarily conduct a voir dire examination of the witness out of the presence of the jury. Although it is doubtful that any substantial question was presented concerning the competency of Sparrow to testify, as opposed to her willingness to lie when it suited her purposes, Judge Cathell charted a careful course and elected to voir dire the witness. Evans, 304 Md. at 508, 499 A.2d at 1271-72. (Emphasis added.) While the issue in Evans is not precisely the same as the issue before us now, the above-quoted language is persuasive. The standard requires that if a substantial question regarding competency is raised, the court should ordinarily conduct a voir dire outside the presence of the jury. [6] It is clear that merely pointing out that a witness is seven years old, does not, by itself, raise a substantial question about his or her competency to testify or trigger an automatic right to any opportunity to voir dire the child (let alone an opportunity to voir dire the child outside the presence of the jury). Section 9-103 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code provides that [i]n a criminal trial, the age of a child may not be the reason for precluding a child from testifying. Md.Code (1974, 2002 Repl. Vol.), § 9-103 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Brandau states that it would be error to automatically refuse to allow a child to testify merely because of her age, without conducting an inquiry into her competency. Brandau, 39 Md.App. at 105, 382 A.2d at 1106. It does not follow, however, that the court, in the exercise of its discretion, must conduct such an inquiry before allowing a young child to testify in every case. Md.Code (1974, 2002 Repl. Vol.), § 9-103 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Rather, the party objecting to the competency of the child witness must present a substantial question regarding competency to trigger the voir dire examination. Evans, 304 Md. at 508, 499 A.2d at 1271-72; Md. Rule 5-601 (Except as otherwise provided by law, every person is competent to be a witness); Pegg v. Warford, 7 Md. 582, 603 (1855) (stating that [t]he legal presumption being in favor of the competency of every witness produced on the stand, no objection to the competency of such witness should be entertained, unless the party making it discloses at the time the ground upon which the objection is based. A mere general, indefinite objection will not avail.); Lynn McLain, Maryland Rules of Evidence 103 (2d ed.2002) (noting that the rule places the burden on the opponent of a witness to show that the witness is incompetent). The evidence offered by the opponent to show a substantial question in Evans was that Sparrow had given various inconsistent versions of the relevant facts, had lied under oath, was a prostitute and a user of drugs, had an unfortunate background, and indicated that she would lie when it suited her purposes. Evans, 304 Md. at 509, 499 A.2d at 1272. If it is doubtful that such allegations presented a substantial question regarding competency (it is doubtful that any substantial question was presented concerning the competency of Sparrow to testify . . . Evans, 304 Md. at 508, 499 A.2d at 1272), then it is at least equally doubtful that a bald assertion that a young child may lack the ability to understand the difference between truth and fiction presents a substantial question as to her competency. [7] While we did not otherwise define substantial question in Evans, we think it clear that the ordinary meaning of substantial should apply. Substantial means consisting of or relating to substance . . . not imaginary or illusory. . . considerable in quantity. Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1170 (10th ed.2001). Baldly asserting, with no factual proffer to support the assertion, that a seven-year old child lacks the ability to understand the difference between truth and fiction, does not fit within that definition. Perry argues that the court abused its discretion by refusing to hold a separate voir dire hearing, outside the presence of the jury, to inquire into the child's competency. Perry appears to be urging this Court to declare a new rule that conducting a separate voir dire is not only the better practice but also the required practice if the child witness is young and his or her inability to understand the difference between truth and fiction is alleged, regardless of whether there is any evidence or proffer offered to support that allegation. While it may be a more careful course, there is no directive stated in Evans (or fixed by statute or other case law) that the trial judge must conduct the voir dire of the witness outside the presence of the jury. Because the determination of the competency of a child witness is within the sound discretion of the trial court, we see no reason to mandate such a procedure now. The defendant also argues that the court abused its discretion by failing to make a determination with regard to Jewel's competency before she was allowed to testify. It appears clear to us, however, that, even though the judge did not conduct a voir dire outside the presence of the jury, the record reflects that the State conducted an examination of the child regarding competency. The court permitted the State to ask the competency questions and then, hearing no objection from the defense, did not interfere with the continued examination. It is clear that the court implicitly made a competency determination because the court allowed the child to remain on the stand and testify substantively about the murders. [8] We note that in Reckard, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by allowing the testimony of a child witness because she was not, in his opinion, a qualified witness. Reckard, 2 Md.App. at 317, 234 A.2d at 633. He argued that the court erred by not allowing him the elementary right of questioning the capacity of that child on voir dire.  Id. The record in that case indicated that the State's Attorney questioned the child about telling the truth and the consequences for not doing so. Id. When the State offered the witness as qualified, defense counsel objected and asked permission to question the witness. Id. The trial court refused to allow additional questioning, noting, As I understand it, it's a prima facie case, it's in the discretion of the court. When you cross-examine you may ask questions which may reach to the weight that is given it. On the voir dire by the State's Attorney it appears sufficient to justify the Court in permitting the witness to testify. Reckard, 2 Md.App. at 317-18, 234 A.2d at 633. The Court of Special Appeals found no abuse of discretion and noted that the trial court found the witness to be qualified and competent based on her answers given in response to the questions of the State's Attorney. The capacity of children to testify `is within the discretion of the trial court.' Reckard, 2 Md.App. at 318, 234 A.2d at 633 (citations omitted). Similarly, in the case at bar, the trial court made a determination of competency after hearing the child's answers to the State's competency questions. If the court was satisfied with those answers that the child was competent to testify, it was within the court's discretion to determine that she was competent and to permit the State, thereafter, to ask substantive questions without further inquiry about competency. As previously mentioned, defense counsel did not object and ask for an opportunity to voir dire the child once the State moved from competency questions to substantive questions. [9] Neither did the defense argue, after hearing the child's answers to the competency questions, that she was not competent and should not be permitted to testify. Furthermore, the defense made no argument that the child's substantive testimony showed that she was incompetent to testify. Perry makes no argument now that the child was shown to be incompetent. In fact, having read the testimony, it is abundantly clear that this child understood the difference between a lie and the truth, knew that she was required to tell the truth, and was able to report clearly what she witnessed. In conclusion, we hold that the substantive determination of a child's competency is within the sound discretion of the trial judge. Furthermore, we hold that the procedure that should be employed to determine a child's competency is, in the first instance, also within the trial court's discretion. Odom, 736 F.2d at 111; Reckard, 2 Md.App. at 318, 234 A.2d at 633; 2 Barbara E. Bergman, Nancy Hollander, Wharton's Criminal Evidence § 7:16 (15th ed.1998) (stating that [t]he question of a child's competency as a witness may be determined either from a preliminary examination or from his testimony before the jury, or from both. Usually the child's competency is determined preliminarily by the court, and the method of conducting the examination is within the court's discretion.). In addition, as a means of guidance for the trial courts, we hold that if a substantial question as to a child's competency is raised, ordinarily, the trial judge should conduct a voir dire hearing outside the presence of the jury. See Evans, 304 Md. at 508, 499 A.2d at 1271-72. The reduced risk of unfair prejudice and mistrial makes this the more careful course. Finally, we hold that in a case where the objecting party states that a child is seven years old and baldly asserts that the child lacks the ability to understand the difference between truth and fiction, without more, a substantial question as to competency has not been raised. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED, COSTS IN THIS COURT TO BE PAID BY PETITIONER.