Opinion ID: 2599941
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 27

Heading: Constitutionality of Witness-killing Special Circumstance

Text: Defendant contends that the witness-killing special circumstance is unconstitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution because it fails to reasonably distinguish between persons who deserve the death penalty and those who do not. In essence, defendant argues that the witness-killing special circumstance under the 1977 death penalty law is underinclusive because it applies only to witnesses in criminal, not juvenile proceedings; it applies only to killings to prevent testimony, not to prevent a crime report or arrest; and it applies only to killings to prevent future testimony, not killings in retaliation for actual testimony. (Compare former § 190.2, subd. (c)(2) with current § 190.2, subd. (a)(10) [special circumstance applicable to killing of a witness to prevent or retaliate for testimony in a criminal or juvenile proceeding].) To pass constitutional muster, a capital sentencing scheme must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder. ( Zant v. Stephens (1983) 462 U.S. 862, 877, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235.) The witness-killing special circumstance serves this function by reasonably assigning greater culpability to those who kill in order to prevent a witness from testifying. Furthermore, the Legislature's decision to single out for greater punishment those who kill in order to prevent testimony at a criminal proceeding is not, as defendant contends, entirely arbitrary. Because juveniles are not subject to the death penalty and the consequences of juvenile proceedings generally are less severe than those of a criminal prosecution, the Legislature reasonably could have concluded that murders of witnesses in criminal proceedings posed a greater threat. It also could have reasonably concluded that a murder to prevent future testimony should be treated more seriously than a retaliatory killing because such a killing would undermine the underlying criminal prosecution. A special circumstance is not unconstitutional merely because it does not apply to every defendant who may be otherwise deserving of the death penalty. Alternatively, defendant argues that the witness-killing special circumstance is unconstitutionally vague, because a jury might apply it more broadly than the Legislature intendedfor example, to a killing committed for purposes of revenge or avoiding arrest. We find no merit in this argument. A statute defining a special circumstance is not vague if the ordinary meaning of its language adequately communicates the parameters of the statutory requirements. ( People v. Estrada (1995) 11 Cal.4th 568, 581, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 586, 904 P.2d 1197.) The special circumstance applies if the murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated and if the victim was intentionally killed for the purpose of preventing his testimony in any criminal proceeding. (Former § 190.2, subd. (c)(2), added by Stats.1977, ch. 316, § 9, p. 1258.) In People v. Sanders, supra, 51 Cal.3d 471, 273 Cal.Rptr. 537, 797 P.2d 561, the defendant argued that the instructions that were given concerning the offense of dissuading a witness from testifying confused the jury regarding the elements of the witness-killing special circumstance. We stated that because the instruction on the witness-killing special circumstance, which was given in the language of the statute, expressed its meaning in such a straightforward manner, we find the possibility that the jury sustained the special circumstance without finding these explicit elements is quite remote. ( Sanders, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 518, 273 Cal.Rptr. 537, 797 P.2d 561.) Because the words in the witness-killing special circumstance statute can be readily understood and applied, it is not unconstitutionally vague. Finally, defendant contends that the witness-killing special circumstance is unconstitutional because it does not include a requirement that the defendant kill with malice aforethought. The special circumstance requires that the defendant physically aid or commit the act causing death and that the killing be intentional, deliberate, and premeditated. (Former § 190.2, subd. (c)(2).) These elements satisfy constitutional requirements. (See Cabana v. Bullock (1986) 474 U.S. 376, 386, 106 S.Ct. 689, 88 L.Ed.2d 704 [Eighth Amendment is satisfied so long as the defendant killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill]; People v. Anderson, supra, 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1140, 240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306 [Constitution does not require that felony-murder special circumstance provide that actual killer intended to kill].)