Opinion ID: 1133622
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: The Instruction on Possession of Recently Stolen Property

Text: The trial court instructed the jury on theories of both premeditated and felony murder. In addition to instructions setting forth the elements of the crimes of robbery and burglary, the court gave the following instruction based upon CALJIC No. 2.15 (5th ed. 1988): Conscious possession of recently stolen property is not by itself sufficient to permit an inference that the defendant is guilty of the crime of robbery or burglary. Before guilt may be inferred, there must be corroboration [ sic ] evidence tending to prove the defendant's guilt. However, the corroborating evidence may only be slight and need not by itself to [ sic ] be sufficient to warrant an inference of guilt. [¶] As corroboration, you may consider the attributes of possession, time, place and manner[,] that the defendant had an opportunity to commit the crime charged, the defendant's conduct, his false or contradictory statements, if any, and/or other statements he may have made with reference to the property[, a] false account of how he acquired possession of the stolen property, [and] any other evidence which tends to connect the defendant with the crime charged. Defendant contends that this instruction permitted the jury to convict him of burglary, robbery, and felony murder  and to find burglary and robbery special circumstances  without ever considering whether he had the mental states required for the crimes of burglary and robbery. According to defendant, CALJIC No. 2.15 may be used when burglary or robbery is charged only if the sole contested issue is the identity of the perpetrator. Because in the present case it was disputed whether a robbery or burglary had been committed, and also whether the money and towel found in defendant's automobile had been stolen from the victim, defendant contends that the instruction raised an irrational permissive presumption or inference of guilt that violated his right to due process of law under the federal and California Constitutions. (See Ulster County Court v. Allen (1979) 442 U.S. 140, 157, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 60 L.Ed.2d 777 [a permissive presumption violates the due process clause only if, under the facts of the case, there is no rational way the trier [of fact] could make the connection permitted by the inference]; People v. Pensinger (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1243-1244, 278 Cal.Rptr. 640, 805 P.2d 899 [same].) Defendant maintains that there is no rational connection between conscious possession of stolen property and how that property was taken (e.g., with regard to the robbery charge, by means of force or fear with the specific intent to permanently deprive the victim of the property). [7] We have stated that where the evidence relating to `possession' [of recently stolen property] is conflicting or unclear, an unqualified instruction pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.15 should not be given, for it could easily mislead the jury into assuming that the defendant's possession has been established when, in actuality, the issue is in doubt. ( People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 40, 249 Cal.Rptr. 119, 756 P.2d 843, overruled on another point in In re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 545, fn. 6, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 446, 887 P.2d 527.) In Morris, we found insufficient evidence to warrant the giving of the instruction when the only indication that the defendant possessed stolen property was the testimony of one witness who stated the defendant had presented a credit card that had been loaned to the victim. We also held, however, that there was no likelihood the jury was misled, because other instructions cautioned the jurors that they should disregard any instruction that applied to a state of facts they determined did not exist. (46 Cal.3d at pp. 40-41, 249 Cal.Rptr. 119, 756 P.2d 843.) It is not the case, however, that CALJIC No. 2.15 is appropriate only when identity is the sole contested issue. We have upheld use of CALJIC No. 2.15 in cases in which the defendant's intent to steal was contested. ( People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 676-677, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213; People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 35-38, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 593, 859 P.2d 673.) In Johnson, it was also disputed whether the property in defendant's possession had been stolen from the victims. ( Johnson, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 36-37, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 593, 859 P.2d 673.) In both of these decisions, we found no error in giving the instruction  and no constitutional violation  when there was corroborating evidence sufficient to permit the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt possession of stolen property and intent to steal. [8] In Holt, we additionally observed: [The jury] was also instructed on all of the required elements of burglary and robbery and was expressly told that in order to prove those crimes, each of the elements must be proved. We see no possibility that giving the jury the additional admonition that it could not rely solely on evidence that defendant possessed recently stolen property would be understood by the jury as suggesting that it need not find all of the statutory elements of burglary and robbery had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Holt, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 677, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213.) Without acknowledging Holt, defendant urges us to reconsider Johnson`s conclusion in this regard. In light of our recent endorsement of Johnson in Holt, we decline to do so. In the present case, ample evidence permitted the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt possession of stolen property and intent to steal. Two witnesses testified that after arguing with Swetts regarding the $200 defendant owed her, and after she had refused to accept the $44 he offered as partial payment, defendant said that he was going to go up the hill, and when he came back, he would have the rest of her money. Within an hour, another witness observed defendant's vehicle stop near Cheryl's driveway. Cheryl's daughter saw defendant, with a knife in his hand, go inside the trailer with Cheryl. Defendant admitted going inside with his knife and killing Cheryl. During the week before her death, Cheryl had cashed a welfare check and also changed a $100 bill at the store in Glencoe. Cheryl's wallet was found lying next to her body; it contained no paper money, and two cards in the wallet were stained with blood containing genetic markers consistent with Cheryl's. The only money found in the trailer was some loose change and a $20 bill lying on the floor underneath a chair on which Cheryl's purse was hanging with the flap open. Approximately $70 was found in defendant's automobile after he was arrested, along with a towel consistent with others observed in Cheryl's bathroom. In addition, defendant purchased items at the store in Mokelumne Hill with a $20 bill found to be stained with blood consistent with Cheryl's genetic markers, and a $1 bill that fell out of his pocket when he was arrested was stained with the same type of blood. This corroborating evidence is far more extensive than that found insufficient to warrant an instruction pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.15 in People v. Morris, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pages 40-41, 249 Cal. Rptr. 119, 756 P.2d 843, and constitutes sufficient evidence to permit the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt possession of stolen property and intent to steal. ( People v. Holt, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 677, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213; People v. Johnson, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 36-38, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 593, 859 P.2d 673.) In other words, the jury rationally could connect this evidence to guilt of robbery and burglary. ( Ulster County Court v. Allen, supra, 442 U.S. at p. 157, 99 S.Ct. 2213.) Therefore, the trial court did not err in giving this instruction. Moreover, as in Holt, the jury was instructed on all the required elements of burglary and robbery, and was told expressly that in order to prove those crimes, each of the elements must be proved. As in Morris, other instructions cautioned the jurors that they should disregard any instruction that applied to or suggested facts they determined did not exist. Considering the instructions in their entirety, as we must ( People v. Musselwhite, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 1248, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 212, 954 P.2d 475), we find no possibility that instructing the jurors pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.15 suggested that they need not find that all the statutory elements of burglary and robbery had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt ( Holt, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 677, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213), or that they could ignore defendant's evidence regarding his mental state. [9]