Opinion ID: 867406
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Petition Forgery

Text: ¶ 18 The trial court found that Jones had presented petitions to the Arizona Secretary of State, which he had signed as the circulator, knowing that he had not obtained the signatures in his presence as required by A.R.S. § 16-321(D). This conduct, the trial court further concluded, constituted petition forgery within the meaning of A.R.S. § 16-351(F). The latter statute provides that all petitions that have been submitted by a candidate who is found guilty of petition forgery shall be disqualified and that candidate shall not be eligible to seek election to a public office for a period of not less than five years. A.R.S. § 16-351(F). ¶ 19 Jones argues both that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that he was not the circulator of the petitions containing signatures dated April 17, May 1, and May 2, and that, even if he did not circulate those petitions, his conduct in verifying them does not constitute petition forgery under A.R.S. § 16-351(F). ¶ 20 We uphold a trial court's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous as not either supported by reasonable evidence or based on a reasonable conflict of evidence. O'Hern v. Bowling, 109 Ariz. 90, 92-93, 505 P.2d 550, 552-53 (1973). ¶ 21 The trial court did not clearly err in finding that Jones was not the circulator of petitions containing signatures dated April 17, May 1, and May 2. At trial, Jones admitted that he personally collected only one of the signatures dated April 17 and did not know who otherwise had signed his petitions that day. With regard to the May 1 and May 2 signatures, Jones first testified during the July 3 trial that he personally obtained them. During the second trial, however, Jones admitted that he was in Phoenix for legislative proceedings on the afternoon of May 1 and all day on May 2. He acknowledged that he could not have collected signatures in Yuma at the same time. ¶ 22 Substantial evidence also supports the trial court's finding that Jones had presented to the Secretary of State nomination petitions that he had verified as the circulator knowing that he had not obtained the signatures in his presence as required by A.R.S. § 16-321(D). This statute identifies the circulator as the person before whom the signatures were written and requires the circulator to verify that the petitions have been signed in his presence. Similarly, the petition forms that Jones signed expressly state, immediately before his signature, that each of the names on the petition were signed in my presence on the date indicated. Jones could not have been present when petitions were signed in Yuma on the afternoon of May 1 or on May 2, yet he nonetheless submitted petitions that he verified had been signed in his presence on these dates. ¶ 23 We must next determine whether, as a matter of law, a candidate who falsely verifies a nomination petition as the circulator commits petition forgery under A.R.S. § 16-351(F). We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., 209 Ariz. 544, 547 ¶ 8, 105 P.3d 1163, 1166 (2005). ¶ 24 Petition forgery is not defined in A.R.S. § 16-351(F) or elsewhere in Arizona statutes. Because the term is undefined and subject to more than one reasonable meaning, we must look to other materials to determine the legislature's intent. To discern the intent the court will examine the policy behind the statute, the evil sought to be remedied, the context, the language, and the historical background of the statute. Clifton v. Decillis, 187 Ariz. 112, 114, 927 P.2d 772, 774 (1996). ¶ 25 Jones argues that petition forgery should be understood to refer to the conduct proscribed in A.R.S. § 16-1020 (1996), the penal provision of the election laws concerning the improper signing of nomination petitions. [1] Jones argues that he signed his own name and did not violate A.R.S. § 16-1020. ¶ 26 Moreno, on the other hand, argues that petition forgery occurs if a person violates the Criminal Code's general prohibition on forgery in A.R.S. § 13-2002(a)(3) (2001), and that this statute makes it a class four felony for a person, with the intent to defraud, to offer or present a forged instrument or one that contains false information. Id. Moreno argues that Jones forged his name as the circulator of petitions actually circulated by others. ¶ 27 Although the issue of statutory interpretation is not clear cut, for several reasons we believe the most plausible reading of A.R.S. § 16-351(F) is that petition forgery is meant to refer to the conduct proscribed by A.R.S. § 16-1020, not A.R.S. § 13-2002. First, we believe that petition forgery would ordinarily be understood to refer to falsely signing another's name to a petition or to otherwise fabricating signed petitions. See, e.g., Webster's New Third International Dictionary 891 (1976) (noting that forgery usually refers to the crime of falsely and with fraudulent intent making or altering a writing or other instrument). The definition of forgery in the Criminal Code is more expansive, embracing not only forged instruments (those falsely made, altered, or completed), but also documents merely containing false information. Compare A.R.S. § 13-2001(8) (Supp.2005) (defining forged instrument) with A.R.S. § 13-2002 (defining forgery). ¶ 28 Second, to the extent it is necessary to look to other statutes to interpret A.R.S. § 16-351(F), the most logical place to look is in other provisions of the election laws. If the statutes relate to the same subject or have the same general purpose-that is, statutes which are in pari materia-they should be read in connection with, or should be construed together with other related statutes, as though they constituted one law. State ex rel. Larson v. Farley, 106 Ariz. 119, 122, 471 P.2d 731, 734 (1970). Without some indication that the legislature actually intended to define petition forgery pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-2002, we look to other provisions within title 16. Neither A.R.S. § 16-351(F) nor other provisions of the election laws contain any suggestion that petition forgery should be defined by reference to the Criminal Code's general forgery provision in A.R.S. § 13-2002. ¶ 29 Nor do we find persuasive Moreno's reference to A.R.S. 13-102(D) (2001), which states: Except as otherwise expressly provided, or unless the context otherwise requires, the provisions of this title shall govern the construction of and punishment for any offense defined outside this title. Section 16-351(F) does not define a criminal offense, but rather provides a civil penalty (disqualification from the ballot and ineligibility for public office) for certain conduct. ¶ 30 Our conclusion regarding the meaning of the term petition forgery also is consistent with the somewhat murky legislative history of A.R.S. § 16-351(F). This provision was added by the legislature in 1996 as part of general amendments to the election laws. These amendments, as initially approved by the House of Representatives as House Bill (H.B.) 2329, did not alter the pre-existing version of A.R.S. § 16-351. ¶ 31 When H.B. 2329 was considered by the Senate Government Committee, Senator Chesley offered an amendment that would have both amended A.R.S. § 16-1020 and added a new A.R.S. § 16-351(F). Hearing on H.B. 2329 Before the Senate Comm. on Gov., 42d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz.1996). The amendment to A.R.S. § 16-1020 would have labeled the proscribed conduct as petition forgery and increased the penalty from a class one misdemeanor to a class four felony. Id. Senator Chesley's amendment also would have added a new A.R.S. § 16-351(F) with this language: ALL PETITIONS THAT HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED BY A CANDIDATE THAT IS FOUND GUILTY OF PETITION FORGERY PURSUANT TO SECTION 16-1020 SHALL BE DISQUALIFIED AND THAT CANDIDATE SHALL NOT BE ELIGIBLE TO SEEK ELECTION TO PUBLIC OFFICE FOR A PERIOD OF NOT LESS THAN TWO YEARS. Chesley Proposed Amendment, Hearing on H.B. 2329 Before the Senate Comm. on Gov., 42d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz.1996). ¶ 32 During the Senate committee discussion of the Chesley amendment, Senator Noland and a research analyst contended that forgery concerning nomination petitions was not subject to prosecution under the general Criminal Code. [2] Hearing on H.B. 2329 Before the Senate Comm. on Gov., 42d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz.1996) (statements of Senate Research Analyst Tami Ryall and Arizona State Senator Patricia Noland). Senator Noland also remarked that it would be difficult to prove criminal charges and that a class four felony could result in severe penalties. Id. After this discussion, the committee approved Senator Noland's motion to delete the language from the Chesley amendment that would have amended A.R.S. § 16-1020 to label the conduct petition forgery and to increase the penalty to a class four felony. Id. The committee, however, approved Senator Chesley's amendment to add the new A.R.S. § 16-351(F). Id. ¶ 33 The Senate Rules Committee then proposed an amendment to the proposed A.R.S. § 16-351(F) to delete its reference to A.R.S. § 16-1020. Senate Comm. on Rules Proposed Amendment, Hearing on H.B. 2329 Before the Senate Comm. on Rules, 42d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz.1996). This action, however, does not necessarily imply any substantive change in the proposed legislation. Pursuant to legislative rules, the Rules Committee is limited to considering the constitutionality and proper form and the reasonable germaneness of the bill and proposed amendments. Senate Rule 7(C)(5) (1995-96). The Rules Committee can propose corrective and technical amendments, but it cannot propose substantive amendments without concurrence from the bill's sponsor. Id. at 7(C)(4). ¶ 34 During a Committee of the Whole proceeding, the Rules Committee amendment was withdrawn and Senator Chesley proposed a floor amendment, to substitute for the Senate Government Committee amendment, that omitted the reference in proposed A.R.S. § 16-351(F) to A.R.S. § 16-1020. Bill Status Overview for H.B. 2329, 42d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz.1996). The pertinent language of Senator Chesley's floor amendment is as follows: IN ADDITION TO THE PROCEDURES SET FORTH IN THIS SECTION, ALL PETITIONS THAT HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED BY A CANDIDATE THAT IS FOUND GUILTY OF PETITION FORGERY SHALL BE DISQUALIFIED AND THAT CANDIDATE SHALL NOT BE ELIGIBLE TO SEEK ELECTION TO A PUBLIC OFFICE FOR A PERIOD OF NOT LESS THAN TWO YEARS. Chesley Proposed Floor Amendment # 2, Hearing on H.B. 2329 Before the Senate Comm. of the Whole, 42d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz.1996). ¶ 35 Senator Hartley then proposed amending this language to increase the disqualification period from two to five years. Hartley Proposed Floor Amendment to Chesley Proposed Floor Amendment # 2, Hearing on H.B. 2329 Before the Senate Comm. of the Whole, 42d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz.1996). The Senate adopted Senator Chesley's floor amendment as amended by Senator Hartley. Bill Status Overview for H.B. 2329, 42d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 1996). The House of Representatives concurred with the amended bill without substantive comment. H.B. 2329, as amended by the Senate, enacted the language currently found in A.R.S. § 16-351(F). ¶ 36 The legislative history, in summary, shows that Senator Chesley initially proposed both to increase the penalty for any person's violating A.R.S. § 16-1020 to a class four felony and to add a new § 16-351(F) providing that a candidate found guilty of violating § 16-1020 would also have all petitions disqualified and would be ineligible for elected office for two years. The Legislature ultimately determined not to increase the penalty for violating A.R.S. § 16-1020 to a class four felony, to preserve the reference to petition forgery in A.R.S. § 16-351(F) but to delete the phrase pursuant to A.R.S. § 16-1020, and to increase the disqualification from elected office to five years for candidates found guilty of petition forgery. There is no indication that any legislator contemplated that the proposed legislation would also expand the sanctions when a person improperly verifies nomination petitions circulated by others  conduct that, although not reached by A.R.S. § 16-1020, results in the voiding of the petitions under this court's 1984 decision in Brousseau. ¶ 37 We do not believe that this history suggests that the Legislature intended the disqualification in A.R.S. § 16-351(F) to be triggered by forgery under the general Criminal Code provision (which is a class four felony) rather than by a violation of A.R.S. § 16-1020. Senator Chesley introduced his amendment to increase the penalty for violating A.R.S. § 16-1020 to a felony and to add additional sanctions for candidates who violated this statute. This background suggests that the Legislature thought that the conduct subject to A.R.S. § 16-1020 coincided with petition forgery for purposes of A.R.S. § 16-351(F). The latter statute, as enacted, does omit the phrase pursuant to A.R.S. § 16-1020 after the words found guilty of petition forgery. This change, however, most likely reflects a desire to avoid suggesting that the finding that a candidate is guilty of petition forgery must occur through a criminal conviction under A.R.S. § 16-1020. Requiring a conviction to trigger A.R.S. § 16-351(F) would largely render ineffective the statute's provision disqualifying all of a candidate's submitted petitions, as a criminal conviction rarely could be obtained before the relevant election occurs. ¶ 38 We hold that petition forgery under A.R.S. § 16-351(F) refers to conduct violating A.R.S. § 16-1020. Although Jones improperly signed his name to the petitions of April 17, May 1, and May 2 as the circulator, and certainly misled the court in his July 3 testimony, his conduct did not violate A.R.S. § 16-1020. The trial court thus erred in finding Jones guilty of petition forgery. [3]