Opinion ID: 2209739
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Definition of Obscenity

Text: Initially, we point out that obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957). Accord New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 754, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982). Thus, obscene speech can be prohibited or otherwise regulated without violating the prohibitions of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The Supreme Court has limited the definition of obscenity to those materials which, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 24, 93 S.Ct. 2607. See, Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 97 S.Ct. 1756, 52 L.Ed.2d 324 (1977); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 94 S.Ct. 2750, 41 L.Ed.2d 642 (1974). Sexually oriented materials are not obscene unless all three elements of the Miller test are satisfied. U.S. v. Various Articles of Obscene Merchandise, 709 F.2d 132 (2d Cir.1983). First, a matter is not obscene under Nebraska law unless, taken as a whole, an average person applying contemporary community standards would find that the work... predominantly appeals to the prurient interest or a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion. § 28-807(10)(a). This phraseology varies slightly in detail, but not significantly, from the Miller requirement that `the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 24, 93 S.Ct. 2607. To decide this question of fact, the triers of fact must look at the work depicting sexual conduct as a whole and determine whether its dominant theme is one which goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in appealing to a shameful or morbid interest in sex. See, Miller v. California, supra ; Roth v. United States, supra . The triers of fact must use an average citizen of that Nebraska community, not a particularly susceptible or particularly insensitive one, as a norm for this determination. See Miller v. California, supra . Triers of fact may not use their own views as appropriate local norms, but may use their knowledge of the views of average people in their own community as an appropriate norm for deciding if a matter. `appeals to prurient interest.' Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 102, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974). Second, even though a matter depicts hardcore sexual conduct which appeals to the prurient interest, it is not obscene unless, taken as a whole, the work ... depicts or describes in a patently offensive way sexual conduct specifically set out in sections 28-807 to 28-829. § 28-807(10)(b). In Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973), the Court took occasion to give examples of the type of sexual conduct that may be regulated by state law: It is possible, however, to give a few plain examples of what a state statute could define for regulation under part (b) of the standard announced in this opinion, supra: (a) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated. (b) Patently offensive representation or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals. The Legislature, taking its cue from Miller v. California, supra , has chosen to regulate the patently offensive depiction of certain sexual conduct that includes acts of masturbation ... or prolonged physical contact with a person's clothed or unclothed genitals.... § 28-807(15). Consequently, triers of fact must decide whether a local Nebraska citizen of average susceptibilities would be patently offended by depictions of certain defined sexual conduct at issue in a case. Third, even though the material appeals to the prurient interest and is patently offensive, it cannot be obscene constitutionally unless the work taken as a whole lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. § 28-807(10)(c). Miller v. California, supra . Material dealing with sexual conduct in a manner which advocates ideas, which contributes to or illustrates scientific discussion, or which adds to the general body of art and literature in our culture is protected by the 1st and 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. See Miller v. California, supra . Therefore, appellate courts examine decisions on this third prong more closely in order to ensure that First Amendment protection of ideas, however unpopular, is maintained. Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 97 S.Ct. 1756, 52 L.Ed.2d 324 (1977). It is clear that Nebraska's statutory definition of obscenity is patterned upon, and coextensive with, the language of Miller v. California, supra . See State v. Embassy Corp., 215 Neb. 631, 340 N.W.2d 160 (1983). The State bears the burden of proving all three elements of obscenity to the satisfaction of the trier of fact. See U.S. v. Various Articles of Obscene Merchandise, 709 F.2d 132 (2d Cir.1983). The critical question in this court, as in the courts below, is whether Harrold's videotape is obscene within the meaning of § 28-807(10) and First Amendment jurisprudence.