Opinion ID: 1176325
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: Reference to Inapplicable Factors

Text: (24) Defendant argues that it was error on the part of the trial court to instruct on, and the prosecutor to argue on the basis of, all of the statutory aggravating and mitigating factors. We disagree. Advising the jury of all of the statutory factors is proper. By informing the jury of the factors which the state considers relevant and appropriate in the penalty decision, the court helps the jury to put the particular crime in perspective. A capital jury, lacking the overview of cases in which the death penalty has been imposed that a judge might have, may not be familiar with the range of factors by which culpability is appropriately assessed in such cases. With knowledge of the full range of factors identified by the state as particularly relevant, a capital jury is better able to place the particular defendant's conduct in perspective. If all jurors are made aware of these factors, their exercise of discretion is further channeled and directed, and the possibility of arbitrary or capricious imposition of the death penalty is lessened. Giving juries this type of guidance was encouraged by the United States Supreme Court in Gregg v. Georgia (1976) 428 U.S. 153, 192 [49 L.Ed.2d 859, 885, 96 S.Ct. 2909], where the court recognized that jury inexperience in sentencing might make it difficult for jurors to recognize and properly use information relevant to sentence choice, saying: [T]he problem will be alleviated if the jury is given guidance regarding the factors about the crime and the defendant that the State, representing organized society, deems particularly relevant to the sentencing decision. (25) Defendant also complains that in instructing on the statutory factors in aggravation and mitigation the court improperly restricted the jury's consideration of the mitigating evidence of mental defect which he offered at the penalty phase of the trial. The court did, in reciting those factors, include among them whether or not the offense was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. Had the jury's consideration of defendant's evidence been limited to evidence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, this claim would have merit. The Supreme Court has made it clear that the defendant must be free to present, and the jury to consider, any mitigating evidence relevant to the appropriate penalty. ( Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104, 111 [71 L.Ed.2d 1, 9, 102 S.Ct. 869]; Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 586, 604 [57 L.Ed.2d 973, 989-990, 98 S.Ct. 2954].) Here, however, the jury was instructed to consider all of the evidence received during any part of the trial, and that any circumstance that extenuated the gravity of the crime including defendant's mental condition should be taken into account. Defense counsel, himself, noted in argument that other parts of the instruction on mental defect did not require that the condition be extreme before it could be considered. The instructions, therefore, did not preclude jury consideration of the defense evidence.