Opinion ID: 1036248
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Voir Dire and Juror Challenges

Text: To understand the role of peremptory challenges in jury selection, we must first consider the purposes and general framework of jury selection as a whole. The underlying goal of the jury selection process is to discover bias in prospective jurors and to remove prospective jurors who will not be able to follow [] instructions on the law, and thus, to ensure an impartial jury, a fair trial, and the appearance of fairness. State v. Davis, 141 Wn.2d 798, 824-26, 10 P.3d 977 (2000). The jury selection process includes the questioning of jurors during voir dire and the exercise of causal and peremptory challenges to remove individual prospective jurors from the venire, until a sufficient number of qualified jurors have been designated for service in the case. See CrR 6.3, 6.4, 6.5; CR 47; RCW 4.44.120-.250. The nature and scope of voir dire is left largely to the discretion of the trial court. See, e.g., Skilling v. United States,_ U.S._, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2917, 177 L. Ed. 2d 619 (2010); Davis, 141 Wn.2d at 825. We have noted that the scope of this process should be coextensive with its purpose. State v. Laureano, 101 Wn.2d 745, 758, 682 P.2d 889 (1984), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 111 Wn.2d 124, 132-33, 761 P.2d 588 (1988). Challenges for cause are the primary method of excluding prospective jurors from service. Unlike peremptory challenges, for which no reason need be given, 10 State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5 Gonzalez, J. concurring challenges for cause require a showing to the satisfaction of the trial court that a particular juror is unqualified for service in the case. A general causal challenge alleges that a prospective juror is unqualified to serve in any case because of insufficient age, lack of citizenship, lack of local residency, inability to sufficiently communicate or comprehend, disenfranchisement, or a substantial and material insufficiency in mind or body. See RCW 4.44.150, .160; RCW 2.36.070; see also CrR 6.4( c )(1 ), (2). A particular causal challenge alleges that a prospective juror is unqualified to serve in the particular case before the court, due to a blood relation, other special relationship, or personal interest that renders the prospective juror unqualified as a matter of law (implied bias); or due to inability to be impartial in fact (actual bias); or due to some bodily condition that renders the juror unable to serve in the particular case. See RCW 4.44.150, .170, .180, .190; see also, e.g., State v. No/tie, 116 Wn.2d 831, 838, 809 P.2d 190 (1991). Jurors also may be excused upon a showing of undue hardship, extreme inconvenience, public necessity, or any reason deemed sufficient by the court ....  RCW 2.36.100(1); State v. Roberts, 142 Wn.2d 471, 519, 14 P.3d 713 (2000). One primary purpose of the voir dire process is to determine whether prospective jurors harbor actual bias and are thus unqualified to serve in the case. See, e.g., Tharp, 42 Wn.2d at 499. To be free from actual bias, a juror must be able to ( 1) set aside personal beliefs, opinions, or values insofar as is necessary to follow the law and decide the case fairly, see, e.g., Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722, 81 S. Ct. 11 State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5 Gonzalez, J. concurring 1639,6 L. Ed. 2d 751 (1961); State v. Moody, 18 Wash. 165, 169-70, 51 P. 356 (1897); (2) adjudicate disputed factual issues based solely on the evidence that is allowed and presented at trial, see, e.g., Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2913; State v. Patterson, 183 Wash. 239, 246, 48 P.2d 193 (1935); and (3) be free from the undue influence of any special relationships or personal interests (even if such relationships or interests do not qualify as implied bias), see Stinson v. Sachs, 8 Wash. 391, 393, 36 P. 287 (1894). In any given case, the appropriate resolution of a challenge for actual bias is left to the discretion of the trial court. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. (8 Otto) 145, 155,25 L. Ed. 244 (1878); Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2923-24; State v. Gilcrist, 91 Wn.2d 603, 611, 590 P.2d 809 (1979). A deferential standard of review is appropriate for two primary reasons. First, an adjudication of actual bias usually will incorporate factual findings and a consideration of the totality of the circumstances. See Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1036 n.12, 104 S. Ct. 2885, 81 L. Ed. 2d 847 (1984); Patterson, 183 Wash. at 244-45. For example, a juror's mere assertion that she or he is impartial (or is overly biased) is not dispositive, in part because jurors may not fully appreciate or accurately state the nature of their own biases. See, e.g., Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2925; Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424-25, 105 S. Ct. 844, 83 L. Ed. 2d 841 (1985); Patterson, 183 Wash. at 245; Moody, 18 Wash. at 169. Second, there is no rule of general applicability that can be effectively constructed to govern determinations of actual bias. See Irvin, 366 U.S. at 724-25 (noting that 12 State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5 Gonzalez, J. concurring ' [i]mpartiality is not a technical conception' and there is no 'ancient and artificial formula' or 'particular tests' by which to determine actual bias (quoting United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 145-46, 57 S. Ct. 177, 81 L. Ed. 78 (1936))). In some cases, whether a given juror must be excluded will be 'fairly debatable' and thus will remain subject to the trial court's discretion. State v. Sisouvanh, 175 Wn.2d 607, 624, 290 P.3d 942 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Walker v. Bangs, 92 Wn.2d 854, 858,601 P.2d 1279 (1979)); compare Gilcrist, 91 Wn.2d at 611 (in suit brought by two prison inmates, no abuse of discretion in refusing to exclude grounds keeper of junior college who had previously worked with some inmates taking classes and didn't like the way the inmates 'conducted themselves' there or 'the way they took care of equipment'), with Beach v. City of Seattle, 85 Wash. 379, 384, 148 P. 39 (1915) (in suit by plaintiffs injured in transit from social dance, no abuse of discretion in excluding juror who was decidedly opposed to dances). But in other cases, the need to excuse a juror for actual bias will be so apparent that the trial court's refusal to do so will be deemed an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., State v. Parnell, 77 Wn.2d 503, 507-08, 463 P.2d 134 (1970) (abuse of discretion in failing to exclude juror who had attended criminal defendant's preliminary hearing and then gave an obviously hostile answer to defense counsel's question on the subject), overruled on other grounds by State v. Fire, 145 Wn.2d 152, 163,34 P.3d 1218 (2001). 13 State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5 Gonzalez, J. concurring The allowance of causal challenges remains the primary method by which we ensure impartial juries in this state. There is no limit on the number of causal challenges allowed. The basis for a causal challenge must be specified and proved, in order to create a sufficient record for appeal, to avoid sharp practice and to serve the ends of justice. State v. Biles, 6 Wash. 186, 188, 33 P. 347 (1893); see State v. Lloyd, 138 Wash. 8, 14-15, 244 P. 130 (1926) (rules of evidence apply); RCW 4.44.240. In contrast, litigants are afforded a limited number of peremptory challenges and generally need not specify any reasons for such challenges. See CrR 6.4(e)(1); RCW 4.44.130, .140. The use of peremptory challenges is intended to supplement our overarching framework of excluding unqualified jurors for cause.