Opinion ID: 765358
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Mixed Motive Dismissal

Text: 34 For the reasons explained in Section I, supra, the plaintiff has sufficient factual support to proceed under the theory that he was retaliated against in violation of his rights under the First Amendment. As explained in Section II, supra, the defendants will prevail, however, if a finder of fact ultimately determines that the plaintiff was fired solely for reasons of political patronage. In this section, we consider the legal implications of a factual determination that the plaintiff was fired for a combination of reasons, i.e., because of both his wife's litigation and political patronage.
35 The District Court properly recognized that a policy-making employee, vulnerable to discharge solely because of his political affiliation, nonetheless has some constitutional protection against a discharge impermissibly motivated by other factors. As we pointed out in McEvoy, 124 F.3d at 102, a policy-maker may not be discharged for such reasons as race, sex, or national origin. In McEvoy, we considered whether a policy-maker, vulnerable to discharge because of political affiliation, was protected against a discharge motivated by his exercise of his right of free speech. We ruled that he was not, deeming it anomalous that a policy-maker whose provocative speech arguably interferes with work-place efficiency should enjoy greater protection than a policy-maker who 'quietly, inoffensively, undemonstratively belongs to the wrong political party.' Id. at 101 (quoting Wilbur v. Mahan, 3 F.3d 214, 218 (7th Cir. 1993)). 36 In the pending case, Judge Scullin understood McEvoy to remove First Amendment protection for any policy-maker discharged in part for political affiliation whenever the employer's motivation also included any aspect of the employee's First Amendment rights. Though that is a plausible reading of McEvoy, we think it goes too far and is not consistent with the rationale of McEvoy. McEvoy was based on the close relationship between a public employer's justified concern about a policy-making employee's political affiliation and concern about that employee's public expressions. Protection for the policy-maker in McEvoy would not only have created the anomaly noted by the Seventh Circuit in Wilbur, it would also have obliged courts to make extremely fine distinctions between the threat to the proper functioning of a government office posed by the political affiliation of policy-makers and that posed by their political speeches. 37 However, where the employer's motivation rests in part on the exercise of First Amendment rights that are not closely related to political affiliation, the rationale of McEvoy is inapplicable. Firing someone because of his relationship with his spouse, for instance, is entirely distinct from firing someone because of his party affiliation. The factual complications likely to arise in determining where patronage ends and speech begins are not a concern in the context of a First Amendment claim of intimate association. Adler contends that he was discharged because of his wife's lawsuit. He alleges that the discharge impaired his First Amendment right of intimate association--the protected right to associate with his wife. If he can persuade the trier of such motivation, McEvoy would not bar his claim, even though he held a policy-making position.
38 Even if Adler can prove that his discharge was motivated entirely, as he contends, or even in part as a retaliation for his wife's lawsuit, the State is entitled to present the affirmative defense of dual motivation, see Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), and seek to persuade the trier of fact that it would have discharged Adler solely for a permissible motive. The dual motivation defense requires the trier to consider, not what the motivation was, but whether the employer would have taken the same adverse action because of an available permissible motive. See id. at 287; Brock v. Casey Truck Sales, Inc., 839 F.2d 872, 876-78 (2d Cir. 1988). Thus, in this case, the State is entitled to prove that it would have fired Adler solely because of his political affiliation, or solely because of some other legitimate reason, such as disclosure to his wife of confidential information of his employer, a circumstance vaguely suggested in the State's papers.