Opinion ID: 2538024
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: government agent

Text: The United State Supreme Court addressed the issue of jailhouse informants in United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 100 S.Ct. 2183, 65 L.Ed.2d 115 (1980). The facts there were as follows: On November 21, 1972, shortly after Henry was incarcerated, Government agents working on the Janaf robbery contacted one Nichols, an inmate at the Norfolk city jail, who for some time prior to this meeting had been engaged to provide confidential information to the Federal Bureau of Investigation as a paid informant. Nichols was then serving a sentence on local forgery charges. The record does not disclose whether the agent contacted Nichols specifically to acquire information about Henry or the Janaf robbery. Nichols informed the agent that he was housed in the same cellblock with several federal prisoners awaiting trial, including Henry. The agent told him to be alert to any statements made by the federal prisoners, but not to initiate any conversation with or question Henry regarding the bank robbery. In early December, after Nichols had been released from jail, the agent again contacted Nichols, who reported that he and Henry had engaged in conversation and that Henry had told him about the robbery of the Janaf bank. Nichols was paid for furnishing the information. . . . . Nichols testified at trial that he had an opportunity to have some conversations with Mr. Henry while he was in the jail, and that Henry told him that on several occasions he had gone to the Janaf Branch to see which employees opened the vault. Nichols also testified that Henry described to him the details of the robbery and stated that the only evidence connecting him to the robbery was the rental receipt. The jury was not informed that Nichols was a paid Government informant. Henry, 447 U.S. at 266-67, 100 S.Ct. 2183 (footnotes omitted). Henry was convicted in federal district court, but the circuit court reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing into whether Nichols was acting as a government agent. At the hearing, a federal agent submitted an affidavit describing his relationship with Nichols: I recall telling Nichols at this time to be alert to any statements made by these individuals [the federal prisoners] regarding the charges against them. I specifically recall telling Nichols that he was not to question Henry or these individuals about the charges against them, however, if they engaged him in conversation or talked in front of him, he was requested to pay attention to their statements. I recall telling Nichols not to initiate any conversations with Henry regarding the bank robbery charges against Henry, but that if Henry initiated the conversations with Nichols, I requested Nichols to pay attention to the information furnished by Henry. Henry, 447 U.S. at 268, 100 S.Ct. 2183 (quoting agent's affidavit). The federal agent's affidavit also stated that the agent never requested anyone affiliated with the Norfolk city jail to place Nichols in the same cell with Henry. Id. The district court again denied relief, and the circuit court again reversed, concluding that the government had violated Henry's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The government sought review. The United States Supreme Court framed the Sixth Amendment right to counsel issue as follows: This Court first applied the Sixth Amendment to postindictment communications between the accused and agents of the Government in Massiah v. United States, [377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964)]. There, after the accused had been charged, he made incriminating statements to his codefendant, who was acting as an agent of the Government. In reversing the conviction, the Court held that the accused was denied the basic protections of [the Sixth Amendment] when there was used against him at his trial evidence of his own incriminating words, which federal agents had deliberately elicited from him. The Massiah holding rests squarely on interference with his right to counsel. The question here is whether under the facts of this case a Government agent deliberately elicited incriminating statements from Henry within the meaning of Massiah. Three factors are important. First, Nichols was acting under instructions as a paid informant for the Government; second, Nichols was ostensibly no more than a fellow inmate of Henry; and third, Henry was in custody and under indictment at the time he was engaged in conversation by Nichols. Henry, 447 U.S. at 270, 100 S.Ct. 2183 (citation omitted). The Court then affirmed based on the following reasoning: By intentionally creating a situation likely to induce Henry to make incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel, the Government violated Henry's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. This is not a case where, in Justice Cardozo's words, the constable. . . blundered, People v. DeFore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926); rather, it is one where the constable planned an impermissible interference with the right to the assistance of counsel. Henry, 447 U.S. at 274-75, 100 S.Ct. 2183 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). In the present case, based on the evidence now before the Court as a result of the 2007 evidentiary hearing, we conclude that the State intentionally created a situation likely to induce Johnson to make incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel. [11] First, James Smith was an experienced informant who had been working with Investigator Wilkerson for at least a month on pending cases prior to encountering Johnson in the visitation area of the jail. Second, according to prosecutor Pickard's notes and testimony at the 2007 evidentiary hearing, during Smith's initial meeting with Wilkerson, Smith was told to go back and keep his ears open and take notes and then presumably disclose the notes to the State. Third, a few days after Smith's initial meeting with Wilkerson, Smith was transferred from his cell on the third floor of the Polk County jail to a semi-isolation cell directly adjoining Johnson's semi-isolation cell in a secluded area on the second floor, where the two could talk freely and privately. [12] And finally, Smith was not operating as a passive listener with respect to Johnson, but rather was actively engaging Johnson in conversation and questioning him concerning his case and then reporting back to Investigator Wilkerson on a regular basis [13] and prosecutor Pickard was aware of this at the time of the suppression hearing. For example, Smith testified as follows at his July 20, 1981, pretrial deposition, which was attended by Pickard, on direct examination by defense counsel: Q. OK. You trying towere you trying to ask him questions to find out what was going on? A. Well, sometimes I asked him a question, you know. And sometimes then he just, you know, come right out and want to talk, and so I'd talk to him, you know. I didn't necessarily like always ask him, you know, down wanting toI wasn't always talking about this. I was Q. I guess that would make him suspicious. A. I don't know. A lot of times he'd bejust start talking, you know. Especially when he felt really bad, I mean after he talked to [his wife] Cheryl and little Paul or something. That's when he started talking, you know. Talked a lot about escaping and this and that. Q. You figured that you hadn't been planted down there because of what Ben [Wilkerson] said that they couldn't do that; is that right? A. Right. Q. OK. Did you figure that as long as you were there you'd find out what you could? A. Yeah . . . . Q. So you figured you'd find out what you could while you were there? A. (Nods head.) Q. Is that a yes? A. Yes. . . . . Q. Did he say what happened when deputy Burnham arrived? A. Yeah. I asked him, you know, why he killed him. He said justlet's put it he got killed in the line of duty. . . . . Q. Did you ever talk about the cab driver again? A. Yeah. We talked about it, you know. And I told him the [dispatcher] might be able to identify his voice because he had told me that he remembered talking on the radio a little bit. But he didn't remember what he said. And I said, Well ain't you worried about the [dispatcher] identifying your voice?  And he goes, No. Because he said, When you're all f'd upyou know, I ain't going to say the word. Said, When you're all f'd up, he said, You know yourself you talk different and stuff. (Emphasis added.) Further, as noted above, Smith testified as follows at the August 28, 1981, suppression hearing, which was also attended by Pickard, on direct examination by defense counsel: Q. And you've told investigators, haven't you, that while you were next door toin the next cell to Mr. Johnson you had some conversations with him about his case; is that right? A. Correct. Q. Did you ask him about his charges and how his case was going? A. Yeah, and he would just come out and tell me. Q. Sometimes he would? A. Well, you know, we would be talking about all the while we were back there. Q. Sometimes you'd ask him about his case and sometimes he'd volunteer things; is that right? A. Yeah. (Emphasis added.) Smith testified at the suppression hearing that while he was housed next to Johnson, he met with Investigator Wilkerson at least three or four times and turned in his notes. Wilkerson also testified that he met with Smith at least three or four times during this period and that Smith turned in his notes. And prosecutor Pickard's notes indicate that he too met with Smith on at least two occasionsFebruary 16 and 19, 1981during this period and that they discussed Johnson's case in detail. As it turned out, shortly after Smith testified at Johnson's trial, Smith's seven-year prison sentence was vacated and he was set free. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Smith, after his initial meeting with Investigator Wilkerson, was acting as a government agent, and his testimony and notes concerning Johnson's statements should have been suppressed.