Opinion ID: 1992041
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: special legislation benefiting certain classes

Text: Swanson's fourth argument as to how L.B. 839 violates the Constitution of the State of Nebraska is that the common levy constitutes a special law that solely benefits certain owners of taxable property. Neb. Const. art. III, § 18, prohibits the Legislature from passing local or special laws that grant to any corporation, association, or individual any special or exclusive privileges, immunity, or franchise whatever.... In all other cases where a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted. When the Legislature confers privileges on a class arbitrarily selected from a large number of persons standing in the same relation to the privileges, without reasonable distinction or substantial difference, then the statute in question has resulted in the kind of improper discrimination prohibited by the Nebraska Constitution. Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 467 N.W.2d 836 (1991). A legislative act can violate article III, § 18, in one of two ways: by creating a totally arbitrary and unreasonable method of classification, or by creating a permanently closed class. Haman, supra . Although Swanson does not specify by which of those means L.B. 839 constitutes special legislation, he appears to assert that L.B. 839 creates an arbitrary and unreasonable method of classification. Swanson argues that L.B. 839 establishes two classes of taxpayers within every Class VI school system: those who will pay property taxes in excess of the requirements of their Class I and Class VI school districts, and those taxpayers whose districts receive the benefits of the former class' overpayments. This argument fails for the same reason that Swanson's previous arguments of commutation and uniformity fail: because the Class VI school system, and not the individual Class I and Class VI school districts within it, is the taxing district in question. Swanson also suggests another illegal classification ostensibly created by L.B. 839: those taxpayers located in integrated K-12 districts with a single board of education, and those located in Class I and Class VI districts which have multiple districts and multiple boards of education, but which are tied together for property tax support purposes. Swanson does not, however, explain how this classification violates article III, § 18. Even if treated as a claim that L.B. 839 permits taxation without representation, the claim fails. In Ratigan v. Davis, 175 Neb. 416, 122 N.W.2d 12 (1963), the plaintiffs lived in a part of the city where they were not entitled to vote for the school board which appointed the regents who governed the city's university, as established under state law. The plaintiffs objected to paying the taxes to support the university levied by the regents on the ground that they were being taxed without representation. In rejecting the plaintiffs' claim, the Ratigan court observed that the maxim of government declaring that there should be no taxation without representation is not contained in the Constitution and is to be given a very restricted meaning. The court further wrote that the maxim does not mean that no person can be taxed unless, in the body that determines the amount of the tax to be levied, he is represented by someone for whom he has a right to vote. Id. at 419, 122 N.W.2d at 15. Rather, the Ratigan court reasoned, [S]ince plaintiffs were represented in the Legislature that enacted the law... they had the representation required by the maxim.... Id. at 420, 122 N.W.2d at 15. Because no unreasonable classification arises from L.B. 839, this law does not contravene the prohibition against special legislation. Inasmuch as none of Swanson's arguments have merit, we declare L.B. 839 to be constitutional. JUDGMENT FOR RESPONDENTS. FAHRNBRUCH, J., concurs.