Opinion ID: 8704097
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jurisdiction and Sovereign Immunity 16

Text: The FSIA provides immunity to foreign states from suit and denies United States courts jurisdiction over such actions. 28 U.S.C. § 1604. However, under certain circumstances, courts obtain original jurisdiction for suits against foreign states, and the sovereign immunity of those states can be waived. Based on the evidence presented by plaintiffs here, these conditions have been met. The state-sponsored terrorism exception provides that federal courts possess original jurisdiction over suits against a foreign state if (1) money damages are sought, (2) against a foreign state for (3) personal injury or death that (4) was caused (5) by an act of hostage taking, or the provision of material support or resources for such an act. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(l); see also Oveissi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 879 F.Supp.2d 44, 50-51 (D.D.C.2012). The state-sponsored terrorism exception provides that a waiver of a foreign state’s sovereign immunity occurs where (6) the foreign state was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism at the time of the act and remains so designated when the claim is filed, (7) the claimant or the victim was, at the time of the act a national of the United States and (8) “in a case in which the act occurred in the foreign state against which the claim has been brought, the claimant has afforded the foreign state a reasonable opportunity to arbitrate the claim.” 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(i)-(iii). Here, all eight of these prerequisites are met. First, plaintiffs’ complaint seeks “money damages.” See Compl. at 17, ECF No. 3. Second, Syria is a foreign state. Third, the Complaint contains claims arising out of Syria’s provision of material support to a terrorist organization responsible for the kidnapping of Marvin Wilson and Ronald Wyatt which resulted in “personal injury” to both men. 17 See supra ¶¶ 28-30. Fourth and fifth, plaintiffs’ evidence establishes that Syria provided material support for PKK’s terrorist activities for the purpose of undertaking attacks such as the 1991 hostage taking of Marvin Wilson and Ronald Wyatt. See supra ¶¶ 23-27. Section 1605A(h)(3) defines “material support or resources” as having the same meaning as in 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, which defines it to include any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more individuals who may be or include oneself), and transportation, except medicine or religious materials. Here, plaintiffs’ evidence, reviewed above, shows that Syria provided a variety of forms of material support to the PKK, including: (1) weapons and ammunition; (2) financial assistance; (3) safe haven and shelter in Syria to PKK leadership; and (4) terrorist training by members of the Syrian armed forces and intelligence agencies. See supra ¶¶ 23-27. This support falls squarely within the definition of “material support or resources” in 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, and by extension, 28 U.S.C. § 1605A. As to “causation,” as Judge Urbina held in an earlier opinion in this case, “[t]o establish jurisdiction under the terrorism exception to the FSIA, the plaintiffs ‘need not establish that the material support or resources provided by [Syria] for terrorist acts contributed directly’ to the hostage-taking.” Wyatt, 736 F.Supp.2d at 112 (quoting Kilburn v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 699 F.Supp.2d 136, 153 (D.D.C. 2010)). Rather, “the plaintiffs must ‘alleg[e] facts sufficient to establish a reasonable connection between a country’s provision of material support to a terrorist organization and the damage arising out of a terrorist attack.’ ” Id. (quoting Rux v. Republic of Sudan, 461 F.3d 461, 473 (4th Cir.2006) (citing Kilburn v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 376 F.3d 1123, 1128 (D.C.Cir.2004))). Plaintiffs’ evidence, demonstrates such a “reasonable connection” between Syria’s material support of PKK and the kidnapping by showing that Syria bankrolled, armed, and otherwise supported the organization with full knowledge of the violent tactics the group employed. See supra ¶¶ 23-26. Plaintiffs’ injuries must also have a “reasonable connection” to Syria’s material support of the PKK in order to support jurisdiction. Plaintiffs assert four types of injuries: (a) physical and psychological injuries to the hostage plaintiffs during and after their kidnapping; (b) emotional distress caused to the family member plaintiffs during and after the kidnapping; (c) the subsequent death of Ronald Wyatt; and (d) economic losses to the hostage plaintiffs. As to (a), the physical and psychological injuries suffered by Ronald Wyatt and Marvin Wilson during the kidnapping which endured for long after the kidnapping was over plainly have a reasonable connection to Syria’s material support of the PKK. These injuries are direct consequences of the abuse these men were subjected to at the hands of the PKK — an organization armed, funded and otherwise supported by Syria. See swpra ¶¶ 23-30. As to (b), courts have set forth the following standard for emotional distress claims under FSIA’s state-sponsored terrorism exemption: “One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.” Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 659 F.Supp.2d 20, 26 (D.D.C.2009) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46(1)). The scope of recovery for these harms is limited to “member[s] of [the injured person’s] immediate family.” Fain v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 856 F.Supp.2d 109, 123-24 (D.D.C.2012) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46(2)(a)-(b)). Physical presence at the place of the outrageous conduct is not required. See Bodoff v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 907 F.Supp.2d 93, 103-04, 08-cv-547, 2012 WL 5995690 at  (D.D.C. Dec. 3, 2012) (.Bodoff II) (citing Heiser, 659 F.Supp.2d at 26-27; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46). Here, this test is satisfied. “First, a terrorist attack constitutes extreme and outrageous conduct.” Bodoff v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 424 F.Supp.2d 74, 85 (D.D.C.2006) (Bodoff I) (citing Stethem v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 201 F.Supp.2d 78, 89 (D.D.C.2002)). Second, by bankrolling and otherwise supporting a terrorist organization responsible for the kidnapping Marvin Wilson and Ronald Wyatt, Syria did act recklessly to cause severe emotional. distress to their family members. Third, each of the family member plaintiffs suffered severe emotional distress as a result of this kidnapping, which they state in detail in affidavits submitted to this court. See supra ¶¶ 31^10. Fourth, all of the family member plaintiffs are either spouses or children of the kidnapping victims and thus fall into the definition of “immediate family.” See Fain, 856 F.Supp.2d at 123-24; Valore v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 700 F.Supp.2d 52, 79 (D.D.C.2010). As to (c), Plaintiffs’ complaint also alleges that the kidnapping “caused harm to and interference with the business and commercial enterprise of Wyatt and Wilson, causing them to sustain economic loss.” Compl. ¶ 45. Marvin and Renetta Wilson allege that they suffered economic injuries as a result of the kidnapping, in the form of: (i) “counseling, therapy, or other medical costs” Renetta Wilson Decl. ¶ 18; (ii) the “lost business opportunity in completing and reaping the rewards of the Noah’s Ark excavation” when the “British aerospace company that was going to sponsor the excavation and the rather ambitious ensuing commercial development plans, estimated to be worth several millions of dollars, backed out of the project entirely.” Id. ¶ 19; see also Marvin Wilson Decl. ¶ 33 (“the company had anticipated building a tourist park at the site of Noah’s Ark, including an airport and hotels, which would involve millions of dollars of investments”); Id. ¶34 (“[H]ad the PKK not abducted us, we likely would have been responsible for one of the most fantastic archeological discoveries in history. The prestige, benefit to reputation, and financial rewards that would have resulted are immeasurable.”), and (iii) the failure of the British aerospace company to reimburse the men for the expense of the trip itself. Id. The Court finds that plaintiffs have not introduced adequate evidence in support of these harms. As to (i) medical costs, plaintiffs have failed to introduce any evidence of what costs specifically were incurred. As to (ii) the lost business opportunity of developing a Noah’s Ark tourist park in Turkey, this is simply too speculative to credit. And, as to (iii) the failure to be reimbursed for travel expenses, plaintiffs failed to introduce any evidence supporting this claim. Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiffs’ claims of economic harms are not adequately proven and thus fail to have a “reasonable connection” to Syria’s material support of terrorists. Finally, as to (d), Mary Wyatt also suggests that her husband Ron’s death from cancer is traceable to this kidnapping, in that (i) the financial hardship caused him to defer seeking treatment for his cancer until it had already progressed beyond repair, and (ii) the “intense stress Ron was under” following his ordeal “helped to cause his cancer to grow and spread more quickly.” Mary Wyatt Decl. ¶ 14; see also Proposed Findings 92 (“Family members of Rob Wyatt attribute his eventual death from cancer as resulting from the physical and psychological abuse he endured during his captivity.”). The Court rejects this theory because plaintiffs have not provided adequate evidence to establish a “reasonable connection” between Mr. Wyatt’s death from cancer and Syria’s material support of the PKK. Plaintiffs have established a “reasonable connection” between some, but not all of their purported injuries and Syria’s support of the PKK. The Court only has jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claims that are based on the physical and psychological injuries suffered by the hostage plaintiffs and the severe emotional distress of the family plaintiffs. Sixth, Syria has been designated as a state sponsor of terrorism continuously since 1979. See U.S. Dep’t of State, State Sponsors of Terrorism, http://www.state. gov/j/ct/list/cl4151.htm. Seventh, both Marvin Wilson and Ronald Wyatt were United States citizens at the time of their kidnapping, as are all of the family member plaintiffs. See supra ¶¶ 1-12. Eighth, the kidnapping occurred in Turkey, not Syria, so the FSIA’s requirement that defendants be given an opportunity to arbitrate this claim is inapplicable. Accordingly this court has jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claims based on injuries to hostage plaintiffs and emotional distress of the family member plaintiffs, and Syria’s sovereign immunity is waived under § 1605A.