Opinion ID: 149504
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the district court correctly apply the standard of review?

Text: Flava Works maintains that the district court correctly applied the state law standard of review by finding that the Code Enforcement Board failed to observe the essential requirements of law. While the parties disagree on whether the district court correctly applied the standard of review, both agree that Florida's standard of review for writs of certiorari should be applied. In Florida, [o]nce the local agency has ruled ... the parties may seek review in the court system, twice. First, a party may seek certiorari review in circuit court, i.e., `first-tier' certiorari review. Although termed `certiorari' review, review at this level is not discretionary but rather is a matter of right and is akin in many respects to a plenary appeal. Dusseau v. Metropolitan Dade County Bd. of County Com'rs, 794 So.2d 1270, 1274 (Fla.2001). Next, a party may seek certiorari review of the circuit court decision in the district court, i.e., `second-tier' certiorari review. Review at this level is circumscribed and is similar in scope to true common law certiorari review. Id. [1] These two standards of review were clarified by the Florida Supreme Court in City of Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant : Where a party is entitled as a matter of right to seek review in the circuit court from administrative action, the circuit court must determine [1] whether procedural due process is accorded, [2] whether the essential requirements of the law have been observed, and [3] whether the administrative findings and judgment are supported by competent substantial evidence. The district court, upon review of the circuit court's judgment, then determines whether the circuit court [1] afforded procedural due process and [2] applied the correct law. 419 So.2d 624, 626 (Fla.1982). In Florida Power & Light Co. v. City of Dania, the Florida Supreme Court concluded that [t]he first prongs of both standards (i.e., the due process prongs) are the same, and the second prongs (i.e., the `essential requirements of the law' and `applied the correct law' prongs) also are equivalent. However, the Court noted a key difference: The third prong in the circuit court standard (i.e., the `competent substantial evidence' prong) is absent from the district court standard. 761 So.2d 1089, 1092-93 (Fla.2000). Competent substantial evidence is tantamount to legally sufficient evidence. Dusseau, 794 So.2d at 1274. In the instant case, the district court exercised supplemental jurisdiction over the petition for writ of certiorari, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. As such, state law applies to any issue not governed by the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress. See 28 U.S.C. § 1652; Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S.Ct. 817, 822, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). According to the parties, this not only includes Florida substantive law but Florida law regarding the standard of review. Thus, the district court must apply first-tier certiorari review and we are limited to second-tier certiorari review under Florida law. Under this second-tier certiorari review we review the local ordinance de novo. See City of Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant, 419 So.2d 624, 626 (Fla. 1982); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kaklamanos, 843 So.2d 885, 890-91 (Fla.2003); City of Coral Gables Code Enforcement Bd. v. Tien, 967 So.2d 963, 965-66 (Fla. Dist.Ct.App.2007). We find no merit in the City of Miami's argument that the district court re-weighed the evidence. The district court neither re-weighed the evidence nor challenged the factual determinations of the Code Enforcement Board. In fact, there was no need for fact-finding by either the agency or the reviewing court because the facts were undisputed by the parties. Instead, the district court found that the Code Enforcement Board's ruling was legal error. Under Florida's first-tier certiorari review, the district court was required to ask in the second-prong of that standard whether the essential requirements of the law have been observed. While we disagree with the district court's conclusion, it did not exceed its authority under the state standard of review.