Opinion ID: 2341614
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Deferred Sentence Hearing

Text: Tate has alleged that he was denied meaningful assistance of counsel in December, 1969 when another justice of the Superior Court denied his request for a hearing on whether he had violated the terms of the deferred sentence agreement which grew out of the breaking and entering episode. [10] It is true, of course, that since O'Neill v. Sharkey, 107 R.I. 524, 268 A.2d 720 (1970), a probationer, while not given all the due process requirements guaranteed for a strict or formal trial, is entitled to counsel, be heard in his own defense and question any witnesses who may testify at the hearing concerning his alleged violation of the terms of probation. However, we emphasized in O'Neill that the standards promulgated therein were to be applied prospectively. Consequently, Tate's fate is to be determined by the holding in Walker v. Langlois, 104 R.I. 274, 243 A.2d 733 (1968), where we said that an accused probation violater should be given an opportunity to explain away his alleged misbehavior. The record shows that State was not permitted to utter one word. He was told that he had all the hearing he was to have when he appeared before the District Court on the issue of probable cause. The sentencing justice's sole reliance on what transpired in the District Court completely dissolved Tate's right to the procedural due process to which he was then entitled. The petition for habeas corpus is granted. The respondent is directed to release the petitioner from custody insofar as Tate's detention is related to the sentence imposed because of the rape conviction. State is to be brought forth with before the Superior Court at which time he can be heard on his status as a deferred sentence violator.