Opinion ID: 221946
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Crofton Residence Search Warrant

Text: Finally, McIntyre argues that the search warrant for his Crofton residence is fruit of the poisonous tree stemming from the county attorney subpoena and thermal imaging warrants. According to McIntyre, [t]he affidavit and resulting search warrant for the Crofton residence was the culmination of the subpoena for electrical records and the thermal warrants. Removing or excising either of the proceeding [sic] investigative tools defeats the crescendo of probable cause established by the previous warrants and/or subpoena. McIntyre's assertion that the district court erred by declining to suppress the search warrant of his Crofton residence is based on his arguments that the district court should have suppressed the county attorney subpoena and thermal imaging search warrants. Because we have already rejected these arguments, see supra Parts A-B, his `fruit of the poisonous tree' argument fails. See United States v. Martinez, 462 F.3d 903, 910 (8th Cir. 2006). And, our independent review of the record confirms that the search warrant for the Crofton residence was supported by probable cause. Our role is to ensure that the evidence as a whole provides a substantial basis for finding probable cause to support the issuance of the search warrant for [McIntyre's] residence. United States v. Terry, 305 F.3d 818, 822 (8th Cir. 2002). Whether probable cause . . . has been established is determined by considering the totality of the circumstances, and resolution of the question by an issuing judge `should be paid great deference by reviewing courts.' United States v. Grant, 490 F.3d 627, 631 (8th Cir.2007), cert. denied, [552] U.S. [1281], 128 S.Ct. 1704, 170 L.Ed.2d 516 (2008) ( quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)). When the affidavit supporting the search warrant sets forth facts sufficient to create a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be found in the place to be searched, probable cause exists. Terry, 305 F.3d at 822. Accordingly, we examine the sufficiency of a search-warrant affidavit using a `common sense' and not a `hypertechnical' approach. Grant, 490 F.3d at 632 ( quoting United States v. Solomon, 432 F.3d 824, 827 (8th Cir.2005)). United States v. McArthur, 573 F.3d 608, 613 (8th Cir.2009). Here, considering the totality of the circumstances, probable cause existed to issue the search warrant for the Crofton residence. First, the supporting affidavit set forth Investigator Sears's encounter with McIntyre on December 8, 2008, at the Fremont residence where Investigator Sears saw a pen tubea tooter believed to be used to ingest controlled substancesin the ash tray of McIntyre's vehicle. While at the Fremont residence, Investigator Sears observed McIntyre's unusual and extremely nervous behavior and smelled raw marijuana at the residence. Second, the affidavit reported that on January 9, 2009, Investigator Sears smelled a strong odor of raw marijuana outside the garage of the Crofton residence and saw a small hose coming out from under the garage door. Third, the affidavit recounts Investigator Kelley's discovery of McIntyre's previous drug arrests. Fourth, the affidavit explains that Investigator Sears obtained the electricity usage records for the Crofton residence, which was unusually high for [a] person that lived at the residence continuously. Finally, the affidavit recounts Investigator Kelley's knowledge, from training and experience, that thermal imagery i[s] an investigative tool used by law enforcement to assist in the detection of indoor marijuana grow operations, whereas grow operations produce large amounts of heat from the grow lights. The affidavit then explains that the two thermal imagery readings of the Crofton residence showed, respectively, a higher heat signature emanating from the garage area than from the living quarters of the home and from comparable residences in McIntyre's neighborhood.