Opinion ID: 688156
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Bostick's encounter with agents Johnson and Fulkerson.

Text: 17 Bostick argues that the district court erred when it held that his encounter with agents Fulkerson and Johnson was a consensual stop rather than a seizure that implicated the Fourth Amendment. [A] person has been seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment ... only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave. McArthur, 6 F.3d at 1275 (internal quotations and citations omitted, brackets in the original). Further, [A] seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions. So long as a reasonable person would feel free to 'disregard the police and go about his business,' the encounter is consensual and no reasonable suspicion is required. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1990) (internal citations omitted). 18 This court has identified a number of circumstances relevant to our objective inquiry. In McArthur, we noted that among the factors relevant to this inquiry are: (1) whether the encounter took place in a public area or whether the person questioned by the police was moved to another location; (2) whether the police informed the person that he was not under arrest and was free to go; (3) whether the police indicated to the person that he was a suspect or the specific target of a police investigation; (4) whether the person was deprived of documents without which he could not continue on his way; and (5) whether there was physical touching, a display of weapons, or other threatening behavior. McArthur, 6 F.3d at 1276. Whether the person agreed to speak with the law enforcement officers is also an important consideration. Robinson, 30 F.3d at 782. 19 First, we note that the district court properly disregarded Bostick's testimony concerning his personal belief that he could not go about his business in favor of the objective inquiry of whether a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave. See United States v. Soto-Lopez, 995 F.2d 694, 697-98 (7th Cir.1993) (rejecting defendant's claim that encounter with police was an investigatory stop because it occurred in a somewhat isolated area and defendant was facing a wall throughout the entire encounter). We can understand that, given Bostick's illegal activity, he may have feared that a refusal to cooperate would engender additional suspicion, but that subjective perception is not the focus of our inquiry. See McArthur, 6 F.3d at 1275 (The test for determining whether a seizure has occurred for purposes of the Fourth Amendment is expressed in objective terms ...); United States v. Rem, 984 F.2d 806, 810 (7th Cir.1993) (same). 20 Likewise, the district court did not err when it held that Bostick's conversation with agents Johnson and Fulkerson was a consensual encounter. Fulkerson and Johnson were dressed in plain clothes and had their weapons concealed when they approached Bostick. No weapons were displayed during the conversation. They did display their credentials, but only to identify themselves. Bostick agreed to speak with them and reentered the vestibule. They spoke for about five minutes in an area open to the public; Bostick was not taken to a remote area for questioning. Bostick did let Fulkerson look at his identification, but Fulkerson returned the license after briefly scrutinizing the document. At no time in the encounter did Fulkerson or Johnson touch Bostick or restrain him. Bostick had his back to the radiator, but he was not surrounded by the officers. Fulkerson told Bostick that he did not have to allow a search of his shoulder bag and that search was brief; again, the whole encounter took about five minutes. We agree with the district court that Bostick's encounter with agents Fulkerson and Johnson was not a seizure which implicated the Fourth Amendment. See McArthur, 6 F.3d at 1276 (initial encounter between DEA agents and defendant was consensual where agents in plain clothes approached defendant in public concourse of train station in non-confrontational manner, defendant was not moved to a remote area for questioning, she agreed to speak with the agents, and agent quickly returned license to her after briefly inspecting it); Soto-Lopez, 995 F.2d at 698 (initial encounter between defendant and DEA agents at airport was consensual where, inter alia, defendant was approached in public place, police asked to speak with him, briefly examined his license and plane ticket); United States v. Adebayo, 985 F.2d 1333, 1338 (7th Cir.1993) (initial encounter between DEA agents and defendant at airport was consensual where, inter alia, encounter took place in public area, defendant consented to speak with agents who were wearing plain clothes, never displayed weapons, and never touched him); United States v. Withers, 972 F.2d 837, 842 (7th Cir.1992) (initial encounter between DEA agents and defendant in airport was consensual where, inter alia, entire encounter occurred in public place, she was not moved to another area for questioning, and conversation was for only a brief time.) 21