Opinion ID: 175117
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sexual Battery under California Penal Code section 243.4(a)

Text: At the time of Espinoza's conviction, section 243.4(a) punished touch[ing] an intimate part of another person while that person is unlawfully restrained by the accused or an accomplice, [where] the touching is against the will of the person touched and is for the purpose of sexual arousal, sexual gratification, or sexual abuse. Cal.Penal Code § 243.4(a) (1999). We have previously held that this statute does not categorically constitute a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A). United States v. Lopez-Montanez, 421 F.3d 926, 929 (9th Cir.2005). Although the definition of crime of violence in force at the time of Espinoza's sentencing differs from that at issue in Lopez-Montanez, the government does not contest, and we do not doubt, the ongoing validity of Lopez-Montanez 's holding, at least as applied to this case. To explain, we briefly discuss Lopez-Montanez 's holding and its applicability here.
We recognized in Lopez-Montanez that, although [section 243.4(a)] requires that the victim be `unlawfully restrained,' the restraint need not be physical and can be accomplished by words alone, including words that convey no threat of violence. Id. Because a section 243.4(a) offense therefore does not require the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, it does not qualify as a crime of violence under the element prong of § 2L1.2's definition. U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 cmt. n. 1(B)(iii) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Beltran-Munguia, 489 F.3d 1042, 1051 (9th Cir.2007).
In Lopez-Montanez, we also held that only offenses involving the use of physical force could constitute forcible sex offenses under the enumerated offense prong, and that sexual battery under section 243.4(a) therefore did not qualify as a forcible sex offense. Lopez-Montanez, 421 F.3d at 929-31. To be sure, the 2008 amendments to the § 2L1.2 definition of crime of violence may have abrogated this holding. At the time of Lopez-Montanez, § 2L1.2 enumerated forcible sex offenses, with no elaboration, on its list of crimes of violence. Id. at 929 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, cmt. n. 1(B)(ii) (2002)). By the time of Espinoza's sentencing in 2009, the Sentencing Commission had amended the definition to include a more detailed description of the forcible sex offenses that would constitute crimes of violence. Rather than simply listing forcible sex offenses as a crime of violence, the new definition lists forcible sex offenses (including where consent to the conduct is not given or is not legally valid, such as where consent to the conduct is involuntary, incompetent, or coerced). U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, cmt. n. 1(B)(iii). This amendment took effect on November 1, 2008. We need not decide here whether this amendment abrogates Lopez-Montanez 's holding, however, because it cannot affect the calculation of Espinoza's sentence. Although a sentencing court must generally apply the Guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing, the Ex Post Facto Clause requires a court to apply instead the Guidelines in effect at the time of the current offense if the guidelines have undergone substantive changes that would disadvantage the defendant. United States v. Stevens, 462 F.3d 1169, 1170 (9th Cir.2006). A change that would overrule an existing precedent constitutes such a substantive change. See United States v. Smallwood, 35 F.3d 414, 417 n. 8 (9th Cir.1994) (citing, among others, United States v. Saucedo, 950 F.2d 1508 (10th Cir.1991)). Thus, if the 2008 amendment to § 2L1.2's crime of violence definition abrogated Lopez-Montanez, it was substantive and therefore cannot be applied to Espinoza. In that case, the Guideline in effect at the time of his March 2008 attempted entry offensewhich, like the Guideline applied in Lopez-Montanez, enumerated forcible sex offenses, without the elaboration, as a crime of violence, U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, cmt. n. 1(B)(iii) (2007) would apply. Lopez-Montanez 's holding that sexual battery under section 243.4(a) does not categorically constitute a forcible sex offense therefore applies here, regardless of the effect of the 2008 amendment. Espinoza's conviction under section 243.4(a) thus does not categorically constitute a crime of violence under either the element prong or the enumerated offense prong of the § 2L1.2 definition.