Opinion ID: 1159626
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Financial Responsibility for Repairs

Text: The question of whether the Board erred in determining that Hartford was responsible for the repair of Solis' prosthetic glove is the main issue on appeal. Hartford contends that because the glove was damaged as the result of Solis' work activities, the damage constituted a distinct and separate accident making KLA liable for repairs. Analysis of this issue requires the interpretations of a statute and an administrative regulation. Interpretation of a statute is a question of law, and this court's review is unlimited. Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 263 Kan. 875, 879, 953 P.2d 1027 (1998). It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained. Where a statute is plain and unambiguous, courts must give effect to the intention of the legislature as expressed rather than determine what the law should or should not be. See In re Marriage of Killman, 264 Kan. 33, 42-43, 955 P.2d 1228 (1998). K.S.A. 44-510(a) provides: It shall be the duty of the employer to provide the services of a health care provider, and such medical, surgical and hospital treatment, including nursing, medicines, medical and surgical supplies, ambulance, crutches, and apparatus, and transportation to and from the home of the injured employee to a place outside the community in which such employee resides, and within such community if the director in the director's discretion so orders, including transportation expenses computed in accordance with subsection (a) of K.S.A. 44-515 and amendments thereto, as may be reasonably necessary to cure and relieve the employee from the effects of the injury. (Emphasis added.) The word apparatus as contained in K.S.A. 44-510 includes appliances such as glasses, teeth, and artificial members. K.A.R. 51-9-2. Thus, it was the duty of Brookover and, therefore, Hartford, to provide Solis with the prosthetic devices. Moreover, Hartford, as workers compensation carrier at the time of the accident, has the duty to repair and replace the devices as they become unusable through normal wear and tear. Hartford, however, argues that K.A.R. 51-9-2 mandates that once a prosthetic device is damaged as the result of work-related activities, the duty to repair and replace it becomes the duty of the current workers compensation carrier because the repair and replacement should be treated as a new accident. K.A.R. 51-9-2 states in pertinent part: When an appliance ... is already being worn, and its usefulness is destroyed by an accident, the question as to whether the appliance is to be replaced as a medical expense is one to be determined on the facts in each individual case. If an incident in direct connection with the work being done causes the destruction of the appliance being worn, it will be determined that personal injury by accident resulted, and the appliance is to be replaced as a medical expense. Hartford contends that a new accident may and did occur in this case by reason of Solis' increase of usage of the glove while working. More specifically, Hartford argues that a series of events such as where a physical structure gives way under the stress of usual labor may constitute an accident which is compensable. See Demars v. Rickel Manufacturing Corporation, 223 Kan. 374, 379, 573 P.2d 1036 (1978). Thus, according to Hartford, the repetitive trauma to a prosthetic device should be treated in the same manner, and where a prosthetic device is eventually rendered useless by wear and tear associated with work, it should be replaced at the expense of the employer and the employer's current workers compensation carrier. In addressing this contention the Board adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of law entered by the Assistant Director in the consolidated cases involving Solis' claim. In a well-reasoned opinion addressing the question of whether the repairs to the silicone glove were necessitated by a new accident (Hartford's contention) or merely normal wear and tear, the Assistant Director interpreted K.A.R. 51-9-2, stating: The regulation provides a definition of the term apparatus as used in K.S.A. 44-510. In addition, the regulation requires a case-by-case determination of whether the apparatus is to be replaced as medical expense. Lastly, the regulation provides a standard to be used in the determination of whether a compensable work-related accident has occurred that requires the appliance to be replaced as medical expense. An artificial member has a limited life expectancy and there is no question that with use it will eventually require repair or replacement. It makes no difference whether the use is at work or elsewhere, the artificial member will require maintenance, repair and eventual replacement. In recognition of the fact that an artificial member has a limited life expectancy the regulation was promulgated [51-9-2] to distinguish repetitive use damage that is inevitable from a specific incident that results in the destruction of the artificial member. There would be no necessity for the regulation if an artificial member were to be treated the same as the human body and subject to micro trauma or repetitive use accidents. While repetitive trauma to the human body can result in a compensable work-related accident, the regulation requires an incident that causes destruction of the artificial member before an accident can be deemed to have occurred. There is no mention of repetitive use wearing out the artificial member, instead the regulation requires a specific incident that results in destruction of the artificial member. This is a different standard than required for a repetitive use injury to the human body and simply reflects the fact that with repetitive use the artificial member will inevitably wear out whereas the human body does not always sustain injury due to repetitive use.... Because of the difficulty in determining whether the work or use elsewhere caused the artificial member to need repair or replacement, the regulation simply makes such normal and expected depreciation a non-compensable event unless the need for the repair or replacement was caused by a specific work-related incident that destroys the artificial member. A finding that a new accident has occurred each time an artificial member needs routine maintenance or repair would place an unreasonable burden on the parties to constantly litigate the cause for the needed repair or replacement. Moreover, such a policy would be a disincentive for employers to hire an individual with a prosthesis. We agree with the above analysis and interpretation of K.A.R. 51-9-2. The evidence shows that the clip prosthesis used by Solis resulted in blistering and rashes on Solis' left hand. Thereafter, Solis began using the glove prosthesis because it provided a better grip and enabled him to perform his work duties with fewer difficulties. The glove prosthesis did not cause blistering or rashes. The Assistant Director noted that Solis testified that the glove prosthesis began to wear out more rapidly when he began wearing it at work. He further testified that the wear occurred over a period of weeks. The Assistant Director concluded: It is the determination of this fact finder that the repairs to the glove prosthesis were caused by the natural wear on the device and it is specifically held that the glove prosthesis was not destroyed by an incident sufficient to meet the requirements of K.A.R. 51-9-2. [Hartford] is responsible for such repair or replacement pursuant to K.S.A. 44-510. Unless a specific incident occurs at work that destroys the glove prosthesis, the maintenance, repair and replacement of the prosthesis remains the responsibility of [The Hartford]. The Board adopted the above findings and conclusions that correctly concluded: K.S.A. 44-510(a) imposes a duty on the employer to provide the injured worker with a prothesis device or other apparatus reasonably necessary to cure and relieve the employee from the effects of his injury. The Appeals Board specifically finds when a work-related injury results in the need for a prosthesis device being provided the injured worker, then the employer is responsible for maintenance, repair, and replacement of the prosthesis device regardless of whether the device wears out from use at work or elsewhere. As its final contention, Hartford contends that the Board's decision would violate equal protection by allowing those without prosthetic devices to recover from repetitive trauma while foreclosing those with prosthetic devices from doing so. The Board refused to address this argument finding that Hartford had failed to raise it before the Assistant Director. However, because administrative agencies cannot rule on constitutional questions, the issue of constitutionality can be raised for the first time before a court of law. U.S.D. No. 443 v. Kansas State Board of Education, 266 Kan. 75, 81, 966 P.2d 68 (1998). Therefore, this court does have jurisdiction to address the issue. Hartford's argument is without merit. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection requires that persons similarly situated with respect to the legitimate purpose of the law receive like treatment. See Stephenson v. Sugar Creek Packing, 250 Kan. 768, 781, 830 P.2d 41 (1992). In this case, workers with prosthetic devices are not similarly situated as those without them. There is a fundamental difference between repetitive trauma to the human body and wear and tear on an artificial device. We conclude that K.A.R. 51-9-2 applies only where the usefulness of an appliance, including a prosthetic device, is destroyed by a specific accident. K.A.R. 51-9-2 does not apply where a prosthetic device becomes damaged through normal wear and tear. Costs associated with normal wear and tear are the responsibility of the employer and its insurance carrier at the time of the original accident. Affirmed.