Opinion ID: 1167656
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the pleadings and the facts of the case

Text: We take the facts from the plaintiff's second amended complaint. The plaintiff, Robert Sheets, was employed by Tillamook County for 14 1/2 years as a building inspector. The defendants Knight, Williams and Woodward, who were Tillamook County Commissioners, informed him that unless he resigned, they would terminate his employment. He resigned and filed this action. In his first claim [1] the plaintiff alleged a breach of an express contract. He alleged that the county personnel rules, together with certain implied oral promises by the defendants, constituted an employment contract, the terms of which were violated by his termination. The plaintiff's third claim alleged that the defendants violated Oregon's Public Meetings Law, ORS 192.610 to 192.695. The plaintiff's second claim, which is the centerpiece of this controversy, contains a number of different theories of recovery. [2] It alleges that the plaintiff had an implied employment contract, the terms of which were breached by his discharge. It also claims that the plaintiff's forced resignation was a result of plaintiff's knowledge of improper activities by the defendants. Furthermore, it asserts that the defendants forced him to resign because of personal and political considerations, thereby breaching an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Finally, the second claim alleges that defendant Woodward, motivated by embarrassment and personal vengence [ sic ], sought the plaintiff's resignation on account of vindictiveness. This second claim requests damages for breach of contract and for the plaintiff's humiliation, mental and physical pain and anguish, and it seeks punitive damages. Because of the procedural questions discussed below, we will summarize the rulings made by the trial court on the morning of the day trial was to begin. The trial court dismissed the second claim for failure to state ultimate facts sufficient to constitute a claim, ORCP 21 A(8), and it granted the defendants' motion under ORCP 21 B for judgment on the pleadings with respect to the third claim. In so doing, the trial court held that the plaintiff did not state a claim for wrongful discharge because the complaint failed to allege that the plaintiff was discharged for fulfilling a societal obligation. The court declined to recognize the tort of breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing in the employment setting. The trial court also ruled that the second claim failed to state a claim for either intentional infliction of emotional distress or tortious interference with contractual relations. The plaintiff then moved to amend the complaint to attempt to plead facts sufficient to state claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and tortious interference with contractual relations. The trial court denied the motion on the ground that it was untimely. Unwilling to proceed to trial only on the contract claim, the plaintiff requested and received a voluntary dismissal without prejudice of the first claim under ORCP 54 A. The plaintiff appealed from the dismissal of the second claim, assigning as error the trial court's rulings discussed above. The Court of Appeals held that Oregon does not recognize constructive discharge and that because plaintiff resigned, even if the resignation might have been at defendants' request, he has not stated a cause of action for wrongful discharge   . Sheets v. Knight, 92 Or. App. 539, 543, 759 P.2d 307 (1988). In the alternative, it declared that even if Oregon recognized constructive discharge, the plaintiff's complaint was deficient because it did not allege that the defendants subjected the plaintiff to intolerable working conditions. 92 Or. App. at 542-43, 759 P.2d 307. Finally, the court also ruled that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint. 92 Or. App. at 543, 759 P.2d 307. The Court of Appeals did not address the plaintiff's contention that, even without amendment, the complaint alleged facts sufficient to plead claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and tortious interference with contractual relations. Because this issue was properly presented to the Court of Appeals, it is properly before us as well, ORAP 10.15(2), and will be discussed below.