Opinion ID: 200920
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Unequal Pay Claim.

Text: 64 This leaves the appellant's claim that she was discriminated against in terms of her pay. In support of this claim, she identifies several male employees who, she asserts, were performing work substantially similar to hers for higher wages, despite the fact that each of the men had less seniority with AutoZone. She attributes this pay disparity to her gender. 65 As a preliminary matter, we must determine which (if any) of the alleged instances of pay discrimination might give rise to actionable claims. We restrict that grouping to those instances in which male employees who held the same position as the appellant were rewarded more handsomely in the same time frame. Four male PSMs fit this description: Allen, Rios, Feliz, and McDougall. 66 We gauge the proof as to these four individuals under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. See supra Part IV(A). With respect to all four, the appellant has made out a prima facie case: she has adduced evidence tending to show that she is a member of a protected class; that she performed her job in keeping with her employer's expectations; and that she was paid less than men who held the same position. See Cullen v. Ind. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 338 F.3d 693, 703-04 (7th Cir. 2003); Belfi v. Prendergast, 191 F.3d 129, 139-40 (2d Cir.1999). AutoZone's response is that its nondiscriminatory application of its standard compensation system accounts for the appellant's lower pay. 67 To this end, AutoZone introduced evidence that, each year, it promulgates revised compensation guidelines. These guidelines are in tabular form. They apply only to new hires or newly-promoted individuals and have no retroactive effect. 68 Each year's table lists a range of starting wage rates for each job title. To illustrate, the table for 1999 dictates that an employee who became a PSM that year (as did the appellant) would earn somewhere between $7.46/hr. and $11.03/hr. to start. Where a particular employee falls within that range depends on the quartile into which she is placed. This placement devolves from AutoZone's assessment of the employee's skills, experience, ability, and knowledge. The placement determination can have a significant monetary impact. For example (again using the 1999 table), if a new PSM were placed in Quartile No. 4, she would earn between $10.13/hr. and $11.03/hr., but if placed in Quartile No. 1, she would earn between $7.46/hr. and $8.34/hr. 69 Employees also receive raises based on annual performance reviews. AutoZone issues guidelines for merit-based raises for each region, typically ranging from 3% to 5% of an employee's hourly rate. The guidelines are hortatory, and the company sometimes bestows raises exceeding the suggested increments. The appellant has adduced no evidence showing that raises have been allocated on the basis of gender. Because the raises have a percentage-based focus, however, discriminatory quartile determinations may well influence the amount of future raises. 70 AutoZone has met its burden of articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the pay disparity. The salary framework itself provides part of the justification. The appellant's starting salary as a PSM, $8/hr., fell within the standard guideline range for PSMs hired in 1999 ($7.46 to $11.03/hr.), and the starting salaries paid to the four male PSMs all fell within the ranges applicable to their respective start dates. AutoZone further notes that the PSM salary ranges escalated significantly after 1999, thus explaining, in part, why Rios, Feliz, and McDougall began at higher hourly rates. The fact that the company chooses to compensate employees based in part on start dates can have the perverse effect of penalizing seniority, but that fact, in and of itself, is gender-neutral and, in any event, does not undermine the legitimacy of the employer's explanation. 71 Nevertheless, the start date differences alone do not fully account for the divergence between the appellant's wages and those of her male comparators. Allen, for example, was hired a year earlier than the appellant and paid $1/hr. more despite the fact that the guideline range remained the same for both years. Allen's higher hourly rate stems not from the forced application of an inflexible guideline but from AutoZone's decision to place him in Quartile No. 2 while placing the appellant in Quartile No. 1. By the same token, the company promoted Rios in 2000, placed him in Quartile No. 2, and paid him $11/hr.; promoted Feliz in 2002, placed him in Quartile No. 3, and paid him $10.50/hr.; and promoted McDougall in 2001, placed him in Quartile No. 4, and paid him $12/hr. 72 As quartile placement is a discretionary exercise, governed by a very general set of principles, the employer bears the burden of presenting legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its differential decisions. AutoZone has carried this burden of production. Its affidavits suggest that the four men in question received higher quartile placements due, inter alia, to their auto parts knowledge, leadership experience, and linguistic abilities. 73 The appellant has tendered evidence designed to cast doubt on this explanation. She offers two examples. With respect to AutoZone's averment that it placed McDougall in Quartile No. 4 because, inter alia, he had previously worked as a warehouse supervisor, she points out that McDougall's employment application lists his previous job as forklift driver and describes his duties as using a forklift to move pallets of shoes. With respect to AutoZone's averment that it placed Feliz in Quartile No. 3 because, inter alia, he previously worked in a body shop, she suggests that Feliz spent only a single month at an auto body shop (and, then, as a shipping clerk). According to the appellant, these discrepancies, taken together with her prima facie case, raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether AutoZone's professed rationales were pretexts for gender discrimination. 74 We do not agree. In the first place, the record does not support the claimed discrepancy as to Feliz. The only place in which we can find an indication that Feliz spent no more than a month in an auto body shop is in the appellant's affidavit. The difficulty is patent. The affidavit refers to Exhibit T, but the last exhibit attached to it is Exhibit S. The only Exhibit T that we can locate in the record — an AutoZone exhibit — contains no mention whatever of Feliz. Given the elusiveness of Exhibit T, we are left with the appellant's unsupported statement about Feliz's employment history — a statement that addresses a matter about which the appellant lacks (or, at least, has not demonstrated any basis for) personal knowledge. Thus, her statement cannot be accorded any weight in the summary judgment calculus. See Cadle Co. v. Hayes, 116 F.3d 957, 961 n. 5 (1st Cir.1997); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) (stating that affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein). 75 This leads us naturally to a larger problem with the appellant's proffers. Even if fully credited, they succeed only in calling into doubt one of several rationales that AutoZone has advanced for its decision to assign these men higher quartiles. AutoZone placed McDougall in Quartile No. 4 not only because of his past employment history but also because he was bilingual. So too Feliz, who began in Quartile No. 3 due in part to his military experience and linguistic abilities. These additional rationales are unrebutted. On this record, we simply cannot say that the scattered inconsistencies noted by the appellant bear the weight that she attempts to pile upon them. Summary judgment was, therefore, warranted. See Cullen, 338 F.3d at 704; Belfi, 191 F.3d at 140. 76 In a last-ditch effort to salvage her unequal pay claim, the appellant adverts to a chart prepared by AutoZone listing all the PSMs in the relevant region as of February 23, 2000, their gender, and their wage rates. The sample consists of 114 PSMs, roughly 18% of whom are female. Of the twenty lowest-paid PSMs (those making $9/hr. or less), 30% are female. Of the twenty-seven highest-paid PSMs (those making $11/hr. or more), only 11% are female. In the appellant's view, this data supports an inference that her comparatively low wage rate falls into an overall pattern of pay disparity at the PSM level. 77 Statistical evidence is permissible in the disparate treatment context to show that the employer's conduct conformed to a general pattern of discrimination. See Freeman, 865 F.2d at 1342 (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 805, 93 S.Ct. 1817). But [t]he probative worth of statistical testimony must be evaluated in light of the methodology employed, the data available, and the factual mosaic unique to the case at hand. Id. at 1342 n. 5, 93 S.Ct. 1817. While we have not universally required sophisticated statistical comparisons in disparate treatment cases, see, e.g., Cuello-Suarez v. P.R. Elec. Power Auth., 988 F.2d 275, 278 (1st Cir.1993); Freeman, 865 F.2d at 1342 & n. 5, the analysis must still cross a threshold of dependability. The chart stumbles on that threshold. The rudimentary analysis, conducted by the appellant's counsel rather than by a qualified expert, makes no attempt to ascertain the extent to which the apparent disparities may be attributable to factors other than gender. That is a significant shortcoming. See Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1283 (9th Cir.2000); Sheehan v. Daily Racing Form, Inc., 104 F.3d 940, 942 (7th Cir.1997); Carter v. Ball, 33 F.3d 450, 457 (4th Cir.1994). So too is the absence of any indication of statistical significance. See Bennett v. Total Minatome Corp., 138 F.3d 1053, 1062 (5th Cir.1998); Ottaviani v. State Univ. of N.Y., 875 F.2d 365, 370-74 (2d Cir.1989). Without more methodical treatment, we cannot say that this analysis, standing alone, is probative of discriminatory intent.