Opinion ID: 723914
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Informer Criterion and Section 3E1.1

Text: 28 The question whether U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 permits the informer criterion to be considered in determining acceptance of responsibility is unsettled at best. Compare McKinney, 15 F.3d at 854 (holding that informer criterion is relevant only to § 5K1.1 departure) with United States v. Apple, 915 F.2d 899, 913 n. 23 (4th Cir.1990) (upholding use of informer criterion under pre-November 1989 guidelines, but skirting question whether subsequent § 3E1.1 amendments foreclose it) with United States v. Cross, 900 F.2d 66, 70 n. 1 (6th Cir.1990) (expressing uncertainty) (dictum) with United States v. Tellez, 882 F.2d 141, 143 (5th Cir.1989) (upholding denial of adjustment for acceptance of responsibility for defendant who never identified the person or persons who had hired him to smuggle the contraband into the United States). 29 Turning first to the specific guideline language itself, see United States v. Perez-Franco, 873 F.2d 455, 458 (1st Cir.1989), we find no explicit indication that the Sentencing Commission intended to preclude consideration of the informer criterion in appropriate circumstances. Moreover, the U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 commentary expressly provides that its listing of relevant considerations for a two-point adjustment under subsection (a) is nonexhaustive. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, comment. (n.1(a)-(g)) (include, but are not limited to, the following....). 8 Thus, the absence of an explicit reference, in section 3E1.1 itself, to voluntary assistance to authorities in implicating other criminal participants is not conclusive. 30 Although the McKinney court noted that section 3E1.1 in general, and the nonexhaustive listing in its commentary in particular, focus solely on the defendant's disclosures relating to his own criminal conduct, that is, his personal responsibility, see McKinney, 15 F.3d at 854 (citing U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1) (emphasis added), personal responsibility may be manifested in various ways and the acceptance-of-responsibility determination under section 3E1.1 necessarily envisions a fact-specific inquiry in each case, see United States v. Talladino, 38 F.3d 1255, 1258 (1st Cir.1994). Moreover, by prescribing a nonexhaustive listing in its commentary, the Sentencing Commission left sentencing courts the latitude to consider all reliable, probative indicia tending to demonstrate, or countervail, the genuineness of the particular defendant's remorse. 31 We can discern no sound basis for a general rule barring a defendant's voluntary cooperation in truthfully identifying criminal associates from consideration by the sentencing court in determining the genuineness of the defendant's remorse. Rather, unless otherwise foreclosed by the Sentencing Guidelines, but see infra, we think a defendant's refusal to provide such cooperation may be weighed, along with all other relevant evidence, in determining acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. Nor do we think this basic premise is rendered unsound by the concern that [a] cunning but not contrite defendant may buy his way out of trouble by providing evidence against someone else, and an entirely contrite defendant may out of fear, ignorance of information useful to the prosecutors, or other reason, fail to provide assistance. Vance, 62 F.3d at 1157. To be sure, such informing will not always prove a reliable or bona fide indicium of the defendant's remorse. Be that as it may, however, similar credibility determinations and inferential findings are consigned routinely to sentencing courts, and, without more, present no sound basis for a per se rule barring the informer criterion from consideration under section 3E1.1, as one more among the totality of the circumstances that the sentencing court considers in assessing a defendant's true motives for informing (e.g., sentence manipulation), or not informing (e.g., lack of remorse, inability to inform, desire to protect accomplices for personal or illicit reasons, or genuine fear of retaliation). 32 Nunez suggests, however, that the narrowly focused language in U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b) (three-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility) requiring, inter alia, that the defendant timely provid[e] complete information to the government concerning his own involvement in the offense, see supra note 1, necessarily forecloses consideration of the informer criterion under section 3E1.1. We do not agree. Subsection (b) requires that a defendant first meet the relevant criteria prescribed in subsection (a), and since the informer criterion is not barred by the nonexhaustive listing included in the Commission commentary to subsection (a), see U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, comment. (n.1(a)-(g)), it may be weighed in the balance under the threshold subsection (a) inquiry. Nothing in subsection 3E1.1(b) purports to supplant the requirements of subsection (a). Instead, the subsection (a) requirements are explicitly made independent. Thus, there is no sound basis for the view that the imposition of additional requirements in subsection (b) alters the threshold factors appropriate for consideration under subsection (a). A defendant must satisfy either subsection (b)(1) or (b)(2), as well as subsection (a), in order to qualify for the extra-point adjustment permitted under § 3B1.1(b). 33 Section 5K1.1 likewise focuses on the informer criterion, even to the exclusion of other criteria, and imposes additional conditions precedent to sentence mitigation such as the requirement that a defendant's cooperation in identifying accomplices be sufficiently comprehensive to constitute substantial assistance as certified by a government motion recommending a downward departure. Commentary to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 provides that 34 [t]he sentencing reduction for assistance to authorities shall be considered independently of any reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Substantial assistance is directed to the investigation and prosecution of criminal activities by persons other than the defendant, while acceptance of responsibility is directed to the defendant's affirmative recognition of responsibility for his own conduct. 35 U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, comment. (n.2) (emphasis added). 36 At first blush this commentary may seem to support Nunez' contention, but it is far from conclusive. At most it indicates simply that the sentencing court is to undertake sequential inquiries under sections 3E1.1 and 5K1.1, since the two independent standards require the court to balance and weigh different criteria. Unlike section 5K1.1, moreover, section 3E1.1 requires the sentencing court to balance many divergent factors, consistent and inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility. Nothing in application note 2 to section 5K1.1 suggests, however, that these sequential inquiries may not involve overlapping criteria, in particular the informer criterion. See United States v. Singh, 923 F.2d 1039, 1044 (3d Cir.) (§§ 3E1.1 and 5K1.1 are to be assessed independently, but involve related concepts), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 937, 111 S.Ct. 2065, 114 L.Ed.2d 469 (1991). 37 Since reason and common sense suggest that a particular criterion may bear relevance to the inquiries required in assessing a sentencing factor under more than one guideline, and no sentencing guideline indicates otherwise, we are unable to credit Nunez' contention that the informer criterion may not be considered under section 3E1.1. Compare U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 (upward offense-level adjustment for obstruction of justice) with § 3E1.1, comment. (n.4) (Conduct resulting in an enhancement under § 3C1.1 ... ordinarily indicates that the defendant has not accepted responsibility for his criminal conduct. There may, however, be extraordinary cases in which adjustments under both §§ 3C1.1 and 3E1.1 may apply.). For example, assistance in identifying, apprehending, or prosecuting accomplices might buttress a cooperating defendant's statements of remorse under section 3E1.1, without regard to whether the government considers the cooperation sufficiently helpful to warrant a substantial assistance departure under section 5K1.1. 38 Finally, section 5K1.2 provides that [a] defendant's refusal to assist authorities in the investigation of other persons may not be considered as an aggravating sentencing factor. The October 1988 version of U.S.S.G. § 5K1.2 included a single commentary: The Commission ... rejected the use of a defendant's refusal to assist authorities as an aggravating sentencing factor. Refusal to assist authorities based upon continued involvement in criminal activities and association with accomplices may be considered, however, in evaluating a defendant's sincerity in claiming acceptance of responsibility. The Sentencing Commission deleted this commentary in November 1989, explaining that it intended to delete the unnecessary commentary containing an unclear example. U.S.S.G.App. C, amend. 292, at 178 (November 1995) (emphasis added). 39 The current version of section 5K1.2 does not preclude the informer criterion under section 3E1.1. First, given its location in the guidelines section dealing with departures, section 5K1.2 clearly forbids reliance on a defendant's failure to identify accomplices as a basis for an upward departure. But it neither expressly nor impliedly forbids such reliance for purposes of sentencing adjustments such as section 3E1.1. In all events, since any adjustment under section 3E1.1 can only be downward, the informer criterion under section 3E1.1 can never constitute an aggravating sentencing factor, only a mitigating factor. See, e.g., United States v. Gordon, 895 F.2d 932, 936-37 (4th Cir.) (§ 3E1.1 reduction bespeaks mitigation, not aggravation), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 846, 111 S.Ct. 131, 112 L.Ed.2d 98 (1990). 40 Notwithstanding the November 1989 amendment, it remains clear that the commentary to section 5K1.2 contemplated that sentencing courts were to consider the informer criterion under section 3E1.1 in appropriate circumstances. Significantly, the 1988 version purported to allow the court to deny a section 3E1.1 adjustment where the defendant did not identify accomplices because his criminal associations were ongoing. Further, it seems that the 1989 amendment deleted the unclear commentary not because the Commission had altered its view on the propriety of the section 3E1.1 practice described in the commentary, but because it concluded that the current text in sections 3E1.1 and 5K1.1 was sufficiently clear to support such a sentencing practice ---- without further elaboration. We therefore conclude that the 1989 amendment was meant to clarify, not to effect a substantive change in sentencing policy. See United States v. Campbell, 61 F.3d 976, 985 (1st Cir.1995) (court should presume that Commission did not intend substantive change where guideline amendments are unaccompanied by language declaring intention to abandon earlier sentencing practice), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 1556, 134 L.Ed.2d 657 (1996). This conclusion is confirmed by the Commission's failure to effect a conforming 1989 modification to the nonexhaustive listing in section 3E1.1. See supra note 8. 41 Insofar as McKinney, Vance, and Leonard might be thought to suggest a per se rule, but see McKinney, 15 F.3d at 854 (Where the defendant's refusal to assist authorities in the prosecution of his codefendants does not detract from his clear contrition for his own actions, he is still entitled to the acceptance of responsibility reduction.), we must respectfully disagree. In appropriate circumstances a sentencing court is permitted to consider, as relevant evidence of the defendant's sincerity in accepting responsibility for his own crimes, at least whether a defendant truthfully has identified accomplices in the crimes to which the defendant has pled guilty. For example, where a defendant does not disclose accomplices because he has elected to continue his criminal associations, the sentencing court may consider such conduct along with any other indicia of failure to accept responsibility. On the other hand, should the court determine that a defendant has not identified his accomplices because he genuinely fears retaliation, but that the defendant's conduct otherwise demonstrates genuine remorse, a downward adjustment under section 3E1.1 might yet be found appropriate, as the sentencing court's balancing and weighing of the relevant criteria under section 3E1.1 is entitled to great deference on appeal. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, comment. (n.5). 42