Opinion ID: 2584774
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Defendant's Absence During Response to Jury Question

Text: Shortly before noon on February 24, 1998, the jury retired to deliberate. The trial court then advised defendant that he had a right to be present every time we do anything, if we answer a question or give readback or whatever. The court asked defendant if he would allow his counsel to exercise that right on defendant's behalf and to determine when there would be a need for defendant to be brought back into the courtroom. Defendant agreed. The next morning, the jury sent this note: What time was the suspect identified by the first two witnesses? [¶] Immediately after, that evening or the next morning? The court and counsel for both parties discussed the question and agreed to respond that the suspect was identified the next morning. When the court asked defense counsel whether defendant needed to be present when the answer was given to the jury, counsel responded, If it does not go any farther than that, I would say no. The following colloquy then occurred in the jury's presence but outside defendant's presence: [The Court] We got your note. Let me read it. [¶] Once again, counsel and the court discussed it. [¶] Your question is: what time was the suspect identified by the first two witnesses immediately after? That evening or the next morning? [¶] Signed by the foreperson dated February 24th. [¶] When you say first two witnesses, you mean the first two civilian witnesses from over at the video incident? [Juror No. 8] In the first incident. Yes. [The Court] All right. Counsel has conferred and the answer is the next morning. Am I correct, gentlemen? [Prosecutor] Yes. [Defense counsel] Yes. [The Court] The next morning. [Juror No. 8] Okay. The question again, is what time the next morning. The concern is about the lapse of time in questioning the witnesses and whether there was maybe a problem in recalling the events as they occurred because there was so much time involved, as I understand the question. There was a memory lapse question. [The Court] I don't knowI don't want to know what you guys are doing. If you have another question, put it in writing and we will do our best to answer it. We have answered this one. If you have another one, fill out a form and I will keep counsel standing by here. Let's do it that way rather than just ad hoc. [Juror No. 8] Okay. The trial court then granted Juror No. 8's request to allow the jury 10 minutes for further discussion. Fourteen minutes later, the jury returned to the courtroom. When the court asked Juror No. 8, What do you need?, the juror replied that the jury had no further questions and that counsel did not have to be kept waiting any longer. The jury then resumed deliberations. Defendant contends the colloquy between the trial judge and Juror No. 8 violated his federal and state constitutional rights to confrontation and due process and his statutory right under section 977 to be present during all critical stages of the trial. As to his constitutional right, he argues the exchange between the judge and the juror exceeded his waiver of the right to be present. As to his statutory right, defendant asserts the waiver was invalid because it was not in writing. (12) A criminal defendant charged with a felony has a due process right under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as a right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment, to be present at all critical stages of the trial. [Citation.] A competent defendant may waive that right, however. [Citation.] Neither the constitutional right to confrontation nor the right to due process precludes waiver of a defendant's right to be present at a critical stage of a capital trial. [Citation.] Section 977 permits a felony defendant, with leave of court, to waive his or her presence at all stages of the trial other than arraignment, plea, presentation of evidence, and sentencing. Section 977 requires, however, that the defendant personally execute, in open court, a written waiver of the right to be present. ( People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 629 [97 Cal.Rptr.2d 528, 2 P.3d 1081].) Because defendant here did not personally execute a written waiver, his statutory right under section 977, subdivision (b)(1) to be present was violated. We need not, however, decide whether Juror No. 8's statements made in court when defendant was not present exceeded the scope of defendant's waiver of his presence for purposes of his constitutional rights. Under any standard of harmless error, the violation of the statutory right and any violation of the constitutional rights did not prejudice defendant. As mentioned earlier, the trial court did not respond to Juror No. 8's comments beyond advising the juror that any further questions by the jury should be put in writing for consideration by the court and counsel. After a brief meeting, the jury returned to the courtroom and announced it had no further questions. Under the circumstances, we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that there was no prejudice to defendant when in his absence the trial court, in the presence of counsel, responded to a question from the jury.