Opinion ID: 3048946
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: johanns as applied to the pistachio commission

Text: The framework of statutes and regulations governing the Pistachio Commission and its activities essentially mirrors the scheme addressed in Johanns. Although the state of California may, in practice, exercise less oversight over the Pistachio Commission than the Secretary of Agriculture exercises over the Beef Board, on the record developed thus far, that distinction is not enough to differentiate the activities of the Pistachio Commission from those of the Beef Board. [5] The structure of the Pistachio Commission and its relationship to the State of California is nearly identical in design to that of the Beef Board at issue in Johanns. The Pistachio Commission consists of nine members, of which eight are elected by industry members and one is appointed by the Secretary of the CDFA.4 The Secretary must also concur in any nomination and election procedures adopted by the Pistachio Commission. Pistachio Act § 69069. The Pistachio Commission is directed to “promote the sale of pistachios by advertising and other promotional means,” id. § 69051(i), while the Beef Board is tasked with “carrying out a coordinated program of promotion and research designed to strengthen the beef industry’s position in the marketplace and 4 Paramount makes much of the fact that in Johanns, the entire Beef Board was “appointed” by the Secretary of Agriculture, but only one member of the Pistachio Commission is “appointed” by the Secretary of the CDFA. This distinction, while accurate, is somewhat exaggerated. The Beef Board is appointed by the Secretary of Agriculture from among a list of candidates nominated by the trade associations. 7 C.F.R. § 1260.141(b). Both boards are dominated by industry appointees, not independent third party board members. PARAMOUNT LAND CO. v. CALIFORNIA PISTACHIO COMM. 7037 to maintain and expand domestic and foreign markets and uses for beef and beef products.” 7 U.S.C. § 2901(b). The Secretary of the CDFA is authorized to attend and participate in the meetings where promotional activities are planned, Pistachio Act § 69041, just as the Secretary of Agriculture or his designee may attend the meetings where the Beef Board develops marketing plans, see 7 C.F.R. § 1260.168(h). As a practical matter, the Secretary of the CDFA or his representative routinely attends Commission board meetings. The Secretary of Agriculture approves the Beef Board’s detailed plans for promotional or marketing activities. See 7 C.F.R. §§ 1260.150(f)-(g) & 1260.169. Similarly, the Pistachio Commission must submit to the Secretary of the CDFA, for his concurrence, “an annual statement of contemplated activities authorized [by the Pistachio Act], including advertising, promotion, marketing research, and production research.” Pistachio Act § 69051(q). Although there is no provision in the Pistachio Act allowing the Secretary of the CDFA to remove members of the Pistachio Commission, compare Johanns, 544 U.S. at 563, the Pistachio Act authorizes the Secretary of the CDFA to “correct or cease any existing activity or function that is determined by the secretary not to be in the public interest or in violation of [the Pistachio Act].” Pistachio Act § 69032. And, the Secretary may suspend or discharge the Commission’s president if he has engaged in any conduct that the Secretary determines is not in the public interest. Id. § 69051(d). [6] Other factors also demonstrate the Secretary’s control over the Commission. For example, growers dissatisfied with any Commission activity may file a grievance, which can be directly appealed to the Secretary. Id. § 69092. The Secretary also must approve the Commission’s annual budget before the Commission may disburse funds, id. § 69051(p), and he may conduct a separate fiscal compliance audit whenever he deems such an audit is necessary, id. § 69051(h). Given the 7038 PARAMOUNT LAND CO. v. CALIFORNIA PISTACHIO COMM. similarities to Johanns and the level of control vested in the Secretary, Paramount has not yet demonstrated that the Pistachio Commission should be classified as a nongovernmental entity. Paramount argues that Johanns should not apply here because, in practice, the Secretary of the CDFA exercises “no control” over the Pistachio Commission’s promotional and marketing activities. In Johanns, the Court held that the speech at issue in that case more than met the requirements for qualifying as government speech. See 544 U.S. at 563 (holding that “the beef advertisements here are subject to political safeguards more than adequate to set them apart from private messages”). However, Johanns did not set a floor or define minimum requirements. Id. [7] At this stage of the proceedings, we cannot say that Paramount is likely to overcome the barrier of Johanns. Paramount has not made a sufficient showing that the Secretary of the CDFA exercises inadequate oversight over the activities of the Commission. To be sure, the Secretary of the CDFA exercises less control over the Pistachio Commission than the Secretary of Agriculture exercised over the Beef Board. Nonetheless, the marketing and promotional plans submitted to the CDFA include a significant amount of detail. For example, they include a general description of the advertisements, detail the themes to be emphasized, the actors to be used, the demographics to be targeted, and the media to be employed. Last year’s budget noted that the “proposed advertising campaign will feature three generations of [Jane] Seymour’s family . . . making the connection that heart disease is not a dicriminator of age, and that California pistachios can be an important part of lifetime heart health.” The proposal describes the specific magazines in which the advertisements will run, notes the approximate timing of their publication (in February, to coincide with the Super Bowl, for example), and often includes specific words and imagery to be used. The overall budget also includes specific line-item budgets for PARAMOUNT LAND CO. v. CALIFORNIA PISTACHIO COMM. 7039 promotional, advertising, marketing, and research activities, a report from a retained private advertising agency that discusses the advertisements generally and each selected publication and promotional activity specifically, and a 15-page overview of the entire public relations strategy, including advertising, marketing, and promotions. [8] Although the Secretary has not rejected or edited proposals, or taken a particularly active role in meetings, this passivity is not an indication that the government cannot exercise authority. See Johanns, 544 U.S. at 560 (focusing on effective control). The Secretary, through his staff, retains authority to control both the activities and the message. The fact that he has not played an active role cannot be equated with abdication of his role. Just as “[t]he Secretary of Agriculture does not write [the copy of the beef advertisements] himself” for the Beef Board, neither should such oversight be required for the California scheme to pass constitutional muster. Id. [9] We acknowledge that there are differences in actual oversight between the beef scheme and the pistachio scheme, but these factual differences are legally insufficient to justify the injunction. To draw a line between these two approaches to oversight risks micro-managing legislative and regulatory schemes, a task federal courts are ill-equipped to undertake. “The message set out in the [pistachio] promotions is from beginning to end the message established” by the state government. Id.5