Opinion ID: 1789370
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Refusal to Permit Browne to Represent Himself.

Text: Defendant had three attorneys who represented him in tandem at different stages in the proceedings below, from the time of his arraignment (June 18, 1962) to the time of sentencing (March 14, 1963). He often quarreled with his counsel in open court and repeatedly expressed dissatisfaction with each. Although represented by counsel, on several occasions he engaged in running colloquies with the trial court. At the beginning of the actual trial Browne requested that he be allowed to represent himself and counsel called the court's attention to the fact that Browne wanted to terminate his services. The trial court then stated that the attorney had been appointed on the specific request of Browne, that the court was satisfied that counsel was prepared, and that the appointment stood. Defendant contends that the trial court's refusal of Browne's request to represent himself was a per se denial of a state constitutional right, guaranteed by sec. 7, art. I, Wisconsin constitution. True, in Dietz v. State [19] this court held that the right to counsel, under sec. 7, art. I of the Wisconsin constitution included the flat right to be heard `by himself' as well as by counsel. Therefore, the court concluded that if a person was mentally competent, he must be permitted to represent himself in a criminal prosecution, if that is his desire. However, this general principle must be modified in the light of subsequent development of constitutional doctrine, state and federal, relating to the right to counsel. Presently, an indigent defendant has a flat state and federal constitutional right to state-appointed-and-financed counsel in all prosecutions for serious offenses in which a substantial penalty might be imposed. [20] Moreover, a body of constitutional law, both state and federal, has developed to determine whether or not a defendant has intelligently and understandingly waived his right to counsel. This question is an objective determination of law made by the court based upon an evaluation of three general factors: (1) The ability of the defendant to appreciate his circumstances, [21] (2) the complexity of the charges he faces, [22] and (3) the role of the trial court in apprising the defendant of his circumstances. [23] Because of the evolution of the law as to waiver, some modification of Dietz is required. In Dietz, the court did not focus upon the waiver problem. Because Dietz was, in fact, permitted to represent himself, the only issue as the court viewed the problem was whether or not he conducted a competent defense. Here, where the court denied a defendant's request to represent himself, the relevancy of the waiver doctrine to the Dietz principle is seen more clearly. The fundamental purpose of the right to counsel is to insure reliable guilt determination. It is clear that as a general proposition, a defendant's position is more secure if represented by counsel. But, due process also requires that throughout the criminal process the state must treat a defendant as a person possessing human dignity (after all it is the defendant who is going to suffer if he makes the wrong decision and forgoes a lawyer) and, in most instances, a defendant would be denied this treatment if counsel were imposed upon him against his wishes. However, in approaching the problem of waiver, it is highly important to consider that many persons lack the capacity to evaluate intelligently their circumstances during the course of a criminal prosecution. In determining whether a defendant who was represented by counsel appointed by the trial court on the specific request of the defendant was denied his constitutional right to act as his own counsel, the critical question is not whether, as a matter of law, he lacked the capacity intelligently to waive his counsel. Rather, the critical question is whether, under the circumstances, the trial court had reasonable grounds for a good-faith belief that the defendant lacked the capacity to appreciate his circumstances and thus to conduct his own defense and to waive intelligently his right to counsel. The determination of intelligent waiver is a matter of law (or constitutional fact) which this court may independently determine, giving very careful consideration to the determinations made by the trial court, [24] and applying the legal standards outlined above. Where the trial court, as in the case at bar, concludes that the defendant lacked the capacity to intelligently waive, then it would be unreasonable to reverse the conviction solely because this court determined that the defendant possessed the capacity to waive. In the instant case, the trial court had grounds for a good-faith belief that Browne lacked the capacity to intelligently waive: (1) After his initial counsel had moved to suppress admission of physical evidence on constitutional grounds, and the motion had been denied, Browne wanted him dismissed because he was incompetent. Surely a motion to suppress under the circumstances of this case was an intelligent strategy. The fact that Browne deemed his attorney incompetent after this move is evidence that Browne did not appreciate the realities of a criminal prosecution. (2) Later, Browne demanded that his second counsel be dismissed because he did not know the chemical composition of paregoric, or whether paregoric was a narcotic drug. Surely, in the posture of this case, whether or not paregoric was a narcotic drug was not a meaningful issue. Ch. 161, Stats., specifically labels paregoric as a narcotic drug. [25] Browne's interrogation of his counsel on this issue is evidence of a lack of appreciation of the issues in the litigation. (3) When requesting dismissal of his third counsel, who tried the case, Browne argued that he wanted to introduce certain lines of evidence, but his counsel refused. However, this evidence went to the legality of the arrest, a matter already resolved and not relevant to the issues at the trial to the jury. We conclude that the trial court had reasonable grounds for a good-faith belief that Browne lacked the capacity to appreciate his circumstances, and properly denied Browne's request to represent himself. By the Court. Judgment affirmed. DIETERICH, J., took no part. On motion for rehearing: For the plaintiff in error there was a brief by Jackson M. Bruce, Jr., and Norman L. Winn of counsel, both of Milwaukee. For the defendant in error there was a brief by George Thompson, attorney general, William A. Platz and Betty R. Brown, assistant attorneys general. The following opinion was filed November 12, 1964.