Opinion ID: 741074
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Suppression of Gun Found in Johnson's Car

Text: 20 In reviewing a denial of a suppression motion, the court reviews the district court's factual findings for clear error and the district court's legal conclusions de novo. United States v. McKinnon, 92 F.3d 244, 246 (4th Cir.1996), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 784, 136 L.Ed.2d 726 (1997). The critical issue in the instant case is whether the Deputies' warrantless searches of Johnson's car fall within one of the recognized exceptions. The exceptions for a warrantless search are: (1) search based upon probable cause; (2) search made incident to arrest; and (3) an inventory search. Of course, a defendant can also consent to the search. 21 In the instant case, the Deputies conducted two searches, and the legality of both searches, especially the second one, forms the basis for Johnson's challenge. The first search occurred after the Deputies stopped Johnson's vehicle. After patting Johnson down and finding no contraband or weapons, the officers asked Johnson if they could search his car. Johnson said yes. During the course of the Deputies' search, however, Johnson stated wait a minute. The officers then ceased searching the vehicle. After Johnson was removed from the scene, the Deputies moved Johnson's car to the front of the shopping center. A second search of the car was done, and at that time the gun was found under the passenger seat. 22 On appeal, Johnson argues that the second search of his vehicle can not be justified under any of the recognized exceptions to warrantless searches. 3 Moreover, Johnson contends that he revoked his consent when he stated wait a minute, and as such, the second search can not be justified as consensual. The Government contends that the second search can be justified as search incident to arrest, and a lawful consent search. 4 The district court, based upon the magistrate judge's recommendation, agreed that the first search was valid as a search incident to arrest, and the second search was valid as consensual search. 5 23 With respect to the search incident to arrest for the second search, the Government relies upon United States v. Han, 74 F.3d 537 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 1890, 135 L.Ed.2d 184 (1996). In Han, the court identified the critical issue as whether a search is incident to arrest when a delay exists between the arrest and the search after elimination of safety concerns. 6 Id. at 542. In United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 94 S.Ct. 1234, 39 L.Ed.2d 771 (1974), the Supreme Court held that a delay before the search does not render the search invalid. The Court stated: 24 [O]nce the defendant is lawfully arrested and is in custody, the effects in his possession at the place of detention that were subject to search at the time and place of his arrest may lawfully be searched and seized without a warrant even though a substantial period of time has elapsed.... 25 Id. at 807, 94 S.Ct. at 1239. 26 In United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977), however, the Supreme Court appeared to change course. 7 Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, stated that: 27 Once law enforcement officers have reduced luggage or other personal property not immediately associated with the person of the arrestee to their exclusive control, and there is no longer any danger that the arrestee might gain access to the property to seize a weapon or destroy evidence, a search of that property is no longer an incident of the arrest. Id. at 15, 97 S.Ct. at 2485. 8 28 Reconciling the above cases, the Han court stated that Belton stands for the proposition that justification for a search incident to arrest continues even after the likelihood of danger or destruction of evidence has subsided, but that Chadwick indicates that the justification does not continue indefinitely. Han, 74 F.3d at 543. Hence, the determinative issue, the Han court opined is whether the time and distance between elimination of the danger and performance of the search is unreasonable. Id. 29 The court noted that the bag was in the immediate control of the defendant at the beginning of the encounter; the delay lasted just a few minutes; and the search occurred at the scene of the arrest; and the delay was objectively reasonable. Id. Hence, the court held that: 30 [W]e hold that when a container is within the immediate control of the defendant at the beginning of an encounter with law enforcement officers; and when the officers search the container at the scene of the arrest; the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a reasonable delay, such as the one in this case, between the elimination of danger and the search. 31 Id. 32 Applying Han to the facts at hand, no doubt exists that the car was within Johnson's immediate control at the beginning of his encounter with the officers; the search was conducted at the scene of the arrest, after the officers moved the car to the front of the shopping center mall into a better lighted area; and the delay between the elimination of the danger--Johnson--and the search was not unreasonable. Although not entirely clear how much time elapsed between Johnson's arrest and the second search, the record appears to indicate that as Deputy Poole was driving Johnson to the police station, Poole received a call from the other Deputies informing him of their discovery of the handgun. Upon receipt of that information, Deputy Poole, as the arresting officer, returned to the scene of the arrest to recover the handgun. Thus, the second search is justified as a search incident to arrest. Accordingly, the district court's denial of Johnson's motion to suppress is affirmed. 9