Opinion ID: 1205096
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Kurtzman Error

Text: (30) Defendant contends that the giving of an expanded version of CALJIC No. 8.75 improperly skewed the jury's deliberative process by precluding deliberation on necessarily included offenses unless and until the jury acquitted defendant of the greater offense. The jury was instructed that [y]ou must unanimously agree that the defendant is not guilty of first degree murder before you may find the defendant guilty or not guilty of second degree murder and [y]ou must unanimously agree that the defendant is not guilty of second degree murder before you find him guilty or not guilty of voluntary or involuntary manslaughter, assault with a deadly weapon or by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, possession of a deadly weapon with intent to assault, brandishing a firearm or simple assault. In People v. Kurtzman (1988) 46 Cal.3d 322 [250 Cal. Rptr. 244, 758 P.2d 572], we held that Stone v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 503 [183 Cal. Rptr. 647, 646 P.2d 809] should be read to authorize an instruction that the jury may not return a verdict on the lesser offense unless it has unanimously agreed that defendant is not guilty of the greater crime charged, but should not be interpreted to prohibit a jury from considering or discussing the lesser offenses before returning a verdict on the greater offense. ( People v. Kurtzman, supra 46 Cal.3d at pp. 324-325.) There is no reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instruction as defendant argues. ( People v. Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 663.) The instruction given in this case complies with Kurtzman, supra, 46 Cal.3d 322, in that it does not preclude the jury from considering or discussing lesser included offenses before returning a verdict on the greater offense; it merely requires the jury to acquit defendant of the greater charge before finding him guilty or not guilty of a lesser charge. ( People v. Nicolaus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 551, 580 [286 Cal. Rptr. 628, 817 P.2d 893]; People v. Hunter (1989) 49 Cal.3d 957, 976 [264 Cal. Rptr. 367, 782 P.2d 608].) Indeed, the instruction told the jury that if you unanimously agree that the defendant is not guilty of the offense of first degree murder and second degree murder charged in Count 1, you must have your foreman date and sign such verdict and return them into court regardless of what may happen in your deliberations on any lesser included offenses.... A reasonable inference from this instruction is that the jury may deliberate on lesser included offenses before it has returned its verdict on the first and second degree murder charges. Citing portions of the prosecutor's argument, defendant suggests that instruction must have misled the jury. He does not persuade us. Defendant notes that the prosecutor at one point said, I would submit to you essentially what that instruction tells you to do is you address the crime as charged first and if and only if you return a verdict of not guilty on the crimes charged do you even reach the question of the lesser and included offenses. [ถ] Your first job is to look at the crimes charged, and, ladies and gentlemen, for reasons I'm going to go into at some length, you are not going to reach those lesser and included offenses. This portion of the prosecutor's argument might support defendant's contention. Defendant acknowledges, however, that the prosecutor also argued as follows: The defendant is charged with murder in the Information in Count 1. I would submit to you your first decision is, did he do it? Was he there? Did he have a shotgun? I'll talk about those facts that show you that he did in a moment, but when you reach that conclusion, and I submit to you you will, you have got an unlawful killing of a human being. You have the intent to kill, that's malice aforethought. Before you go further because of a legislatively created mitigating circumstance called heat of passion, I submit to you the next place you have to go before you reach the question of premeditation and deliberation is manslaughter, sudden quarrel, heat of passion.  (Italics added.) It is clear that this portion of the prosecutor's argument contemplated that the jury would consider the lesser included offense of manslaughter at the same time it deliberated on the murder charge. On this record, we believe it unlikely the instruction affected the jury's deliberative process to defendant's detriment. (31) Defendant also contends that the giving of CALJIC No. 8.75 amounted to a violation of section 1097 and, consequently, a deprivation of due process. The contention is erroneous. Section 1097 provides that [w]hen it appears that the defendant has committed a public offense, or attempted to commit a public offense, and there is reasonable ground of doubt in which of two or more degrees of the crime or attempted crime he is guilty, he can be convicted of the lowest of such degrees only. In this case, the jury was instructed that [i]f you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime of murder has been committed by the defendant but you have a reasonable doubt whether such murder was of the first or of the second degree, you must give the defendant the benefit of the doubt and return a verdict fixing the murder as of the second degree. (CALJIC No. 8.71.) There is no conflict between CALJIC Nos. 8.75 and 8.71, and the instructions given in this case did not violate section 1097.