Opinion ID: 204900
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alterations

Text: Section 12147(a) of title 42 does not define the terms alterations or the maximum extent feasible. However, the DOT has issued regulations that provide additional guidance as to their meaning. The implementing regulations set forth in 49 C.F.R. § 37.43(a)(1) echo the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 12147(a). The regulations define alterations to mean a change to an existing facility, including, but not limited to, remodeling, renovation, rehabilitation, reconstruction, historic restoration, changes or rearrangement in structural parts or elements, and changes or rearrangement in the plan configuration of walls ... [but not] [n]ormal maintenance, reroofing, painting or wallpapering, asbestos removal, or changes to mechanical or electrical systems ... unless they affect the usability of the building or facility. 49 C.F.R. § 37.3. Therefore, an `alteration' within the meaning of the regulations is a change that affects the usability of the facility involved. Kinney, 9 F.3d at 1072. Usability in this context has an expansive, remedial construction and should be broadly defined to include renovations which affect the use of a facility, and not simply changes which relate directly to access. Id. at 1072-73 (internal citations and quotations marks omitted). SEPTA argued in the District Court that the replacement of the stairway at the 15th Street Courtyard and the elevator repair work at the City Hall Courtyard were not alterations, but rather final acts of maintenance. As the District Court noted, however, replacing an unusable stairway with a usable one and extensively changing an inoperative escalator so that it operates again surely affects the usability of the locations they service. The complete replacement of a stairway or total overhaul of an escalator should also be considered remodeling, renovation, rehabilitation [or] reconstruction in the ordinary sense of those words. SEPTA has now abandoned the final act of maintenance argument and instead points to certain Americans with Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines (ADAAG) standards incorporated into the DOT regulations, which it contends further limit the types of construction which are alterations under the ADA. [8] It claims that the District Court did not give appropriate deference to these regulations, as mandated by Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). In particular, SEPTA relies on an ADAAG provision which reads: If an escalator or stair is planned or installed where none existed previously and major structural modifications are necessary for such installation, then a means of accessible vertical access shall be provided that complies with the applicable provisions. ADAAG § 4.1.6(1)(f). SEPTA argues that this indicates that alterations, at least with respect to stairs, includes only changes that involve major structural modifications. As it did not undertake major structural modifications of either the 15th Street or the City Hall Courtyards, it contends, it is not required to install an elevator in either location. We assume, and DIA does not dispute, that the DOT regulations should be given Chevron deference in this case. However, the courts owe no deference to SEPTA's own interpretation of these regulations, and, as the District Court concluded, SEPTA's interpretation is too narrow. The ADA is a remedial statute, meant to bring an end to discrimination against individuals with disabilities in all aspects of American life; it must be construed with all the liberality necessary to achieve such purposes. In our view, the construction carried out by SEPTA in both the 15th Street Courtyard and the City Hall Courtyard constituted alterations under the ADA, even without major structural alterations. Although ADAAG § 4.1.6(1)(f) addresses one scenario in which an accessible means of vertical access must be provided, it does not clearly indicate that this is the only scenario in which such access must be provided. SEPTA's reading is at odds with the otherwise broad accessibility mandate of 42 U.S.C. § 12147(a) and 49 C.F.R. § 37.43 and the expansive definition of usability adopted by this Circuit. In Kinney, we held that even the resurfacing of a road through the laying down of a new layer of asphalt was an alteration sufficient to require that the road be made accessible through curb cuts, 9 F.3d at 1073-74; it cannot be that the much more substantial change of a complete replacement of a set of stairs or an escalator is not an alteration unless it is accompanied by major structural modifications. The DOT regulations confirm this conclusion. SEPTA must mee[t] the requirements of [49 C.F.R. § 37] and the requirements set forth in [the ADAAG]. 49 C.F.R. § 37.9(a) (emphasis added). This language indicates that public entities must fulfill both § 37 and the ADAAG requirements. The DOT did not envisage the ADAAG by themselves to be an exhaustive statement of regulatory requirements, but rather to be a supplement to the requirements imposed by § 37. Meeting the requirements of Section 4.1.6(1)(f) is not, then, necessarily sufficient to meet the requirements of § 37, and it would be illogical to read Section 4.1.6(1)(f) of the ADAAG to radically curtail the broad mandate of § 37. Given that the ADA is to be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose of eliminating discrimination, we will not adopt SEPTA's narrow interpretation of alterations. In our view, the construction carried out by SEPTA in both the 15th Street Courtyard and the City Hall Courtyard constituted alterations under the ADA, even though it did not entail major structural alterations.