Opinion ID: 1212962
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Is Loss of Enjoyment of Life Compensable in Addition to Compensation for Pain and Suffering?

Text: We have discovered no Wyoming case dealing explicitly with an award for loss of enjoyment of life. In Fox v. Fox, 75 Wyo. 390, 296 P.2d 252, 262 (1956), we held that loss of mobility may be compensable even if it doesn't result in loss of earnings because mobility is the right to be a normal human being. This suggests that appellee's neck injury, which has caused him to curtail some of his physical activities, should be compensable because it has deprived him of ordinary human pleasures. A Colorado court has definitively stated: Defendants object to an instruction given by the trial court which advised the jury that in assessing actual damages, they could consider, inter alia, the loss of enjoyment of life. It is not error for this element to be included in an instruction where evidence of such has, as here, been introduced during trial. [Citation omitted.] Hildyard v. Western Fasteners, Inc., 33 Colo. App. 396, 522 P.2d 596, 601 (1974). In upholding a one million dollar personal injury award to a plaintiff rendered quadraplegic, the Supreme Court of Minnesota recently said: The award ... was clearly not excessive, given the settled factors applicable to the assessment of personal injuries: Past and future pain and suffering, permanent disability, life expectancy, loss of earning power, the effect on plaintiff's enjoyment of the amenities of life, degree of disfigurement, and the inflationary trend of the economy... . Ossenfort v. Associated Milk Producers, Incorporated, Minn., 254 N.W.2d 672, 685 (1977). (Emphasis supplied.) See also, Bush v. Albert D. Wardell Contractor, Inc., 165 Mont. 312, 528 P.2d 215, 219 (1974). A Nebraska Supreme Court decision is particularly helpful to us: The defendant contends the court erred, in including as a part of its general instruction on damages for a personal injury, a statement that the jury could `take into consideration' the `loss of enjoyment of life experienced and reasonably certain to be experienced in the future.' The argument is that this part of the instruction represents a duplication of the elements of permanent disability and of pain and suffering, and thus the jury was permitted to award double damages for the same loss. There was evidence introduced to support the plaintiff's diminished capacity to enjoy life with respect to activities formerly enjoyed, deprivations of pleasure, and inconvenience. ... A majority of courts, however, have approved inclusion of loss of enjoyment of life as a consideration that may be instructed upon in a proper case and be considered by the jury ... Loss of enjoyment of life may, in a particular case flow from a disability and be simply a part thereof, and where the evidence supports it, may be argued to the jury. A separate instruction therein may be redundant. We do not recommend such an instruction be given, but find that under the facts of this particular case, where there is evidence from which the jury could find the injuries and resulting disability did cause loss of enjoyment of life, there was no error in giving the instruction, and we do not believe the jury was in any way misled. (Emphasis supplied.) Swiler v. Baker's Super Market, Inc., 203 Neb. 183, 277 N.W.2d 697, 700 (1979). In view of the above authorities, we hold that loss of enjoyment of life is a compensable damage. Since loss of enjoyment of life is compensable, the fact finder  in a case in which loss of enjoyment of life is proved  may either make a separate award for loss of enjoyment of life or take into consideration the loss of enjoyment of life in arriving at the total general damages. [3] In either case, it is the total award for general damages to which an appellate court must look to determine if the general damages awarded are supported by the evidence, whether they are excessive or insufficient, or whether they are the result of passion and prejudice.