Opinion ID: 776501
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Special Circumstances Retrial

Text: 21 Our conclusion that Dr. Shoor's testimony was not prejudicial with respect to the first trial does not apply, however, with respect to the special circumstances retrial; to the contrary, it is clear that the introduction of Dr. Shoor's testimony at that proceeding was prejudicial. At the retrial, the finding of special circumstances required that the State prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Ghent's murder of Mrs. Bert was willful, deliberate, and premeditated. See Cal.Penal Code § 190.2(a)(3). Accordingly, the issue of premeditation and deliberation was the central issue of the special circumstances retrial. The prosecutor himself repeatedly characterized that issue as the major issue in this case. See Henry v. Kernan, 197 F.3d 1021, 1030 (9th Cir.1999) (noting that, [i]mportantly, the prosecutor referred to [defendant's] motivation [and subject of erroneously admitted testimony] as `the crux of the case'). 22 Dr. Shoor's testimony was critical to the theory that Ghent premeditated and deliberated with respect to the murder. In his opening statement, the prosecutor stated that Dr. Shoor gave Ghent a mental examination and determined that this guy is fine. He has no diminished capacity. Contrary to the State's argument, Dr. Shoor's testimony was not solely general in nature. Rather, it clearly included his opinion as to Ghent's mental state at the time of the murder. He testified that Mr. Ghent had the mental capacities at that time which were well within the range of normal reasonable thinking. (emphasis added). Dr. Shoor also testified that Ghent had the mental capacities to premeditate whatever he did. (emphasis added). Although Dr. Shoor spoke specifically in terms of Ghent's capacity to premeditate, given the context of his testimony and the fact that he had met with Ghent shortly after the crimes took place, it is clear that Dr. Shoor's evidence was offered to and did provide strong support for the State's theory that Ghent in fact premeditated and deliberated with respect to the murder, and that his testimony would be so construed by reasonable jurors. The prosecutor himself stated that Dr. Shoor's testimony would be given to assist the jury in determining what David Ghent's state of mind was at the time of the incident. Although Dr. Shoor's statements at the special circumstances retrial were comparatively brief, they were direct and to the point: they constituted the only direct evidence offered by the prosecution as to Ghent's state of mind. 5 23 The defense relied heavily on the testimony of two mental health experts, both of whom disagreed with Dr. Shoor's assessment. Dr. Raffle (forensic psychiatrist) testified that Ghent did not deliberate the murder and Dr. Delman (psychologist) testified that Ghent did not premeditate or deliberate the murder. In his closing argument, defense counsel relied on the testimony of these two defense experts to show that Ghent did not premeditate or deliberate with respect to the murder. Dr. Shoor's testimony was introduced to immunize the jury against this crucial defense evidence. Indeed, Dr. Shoor's testimony went to the heart of Ghent's defense. See Henry, 197 F.3d at 1030 (holding error prejudicial because State's use of erroneously admitted testimony went to the root of their burden to prove ... intent); People v. Walker, 29 Cal.App.3d 448, 105 Cal.Rptr. 672, 676-77 (1972) (finding it prejudicial error to admit testimony of police psychologist whose interview violated defendant's Fifth Amendment rights because testimony went directly to the heart of the defense of diminished capacity). 24 The prosecutor not only used Dr. Shoor's testimony to discredit the testimony and theories of the two defense expert witnesses but also to attack Ghent's credibility and truthfulness. In the special circumstances retrial, Ghent's credibility was a critical issue; Ghent himself testified regarding his memory loss surrounding the crimes. The two defense experts, Drs. Raffle and Delman, also attempted to explain Ghent's memory loss and his untruthfulness to the jury. Thus, Dr. Shoor's testimony was admitted to counter directly both the defense theory and Ghent's credibility and truthfulness. The prosecutor introduced Dr. Shoor's testimony by stating that Dr. Shoor would tell the jury that Ghent is a liar, he's dishonest. Moreover, the California Supreme Court stated, in justifying its finding of harmlessness, that the jury's finding of special circumstances was based in part on its rejection of the `lost memory' theories of Drs. Raffle and Delman. Ghent, 239 Cal. Rptr. 82, 739 P.2d at 1259. The only expert mental health testimony presented by the State that could have enabled the jury to reject those theories was the erroneously admitted testimony of Dr. Shoor. See Eslaminia v. White, 136 F.3d 1234, 1238 (9th Cir.1998) (stating that when credibility is a central issue in trial and erroneously admitted evidence casts doubt on that credibility, such error is prejudicial); cf. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 298, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991) (holding error prejudicial as jury's assessment of another of defendant's statements could have depended in part on erroneously admitted evidence). 25 The State's own actions at trial belie its current arguments regarding the importance of Dr. Shoor's testimony. Its actions demonstrate just how critical the State believed the erroneously admitted evidence to be. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 444, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995); United States v. Bauer, 132 F.3d 504, 512 (9th Cir.1997). The prosecutor in this case fought vigorously for the admission of Dr. Shoor's statements. Furthermore, he relied heavily on Dr. Shoor's testimony during both opening and closing arguments, 6 emphasizing the credibility of the doctor's opinion. The prosecutor qualified Dr. Shoor as an expert in psychiatry and stressed Dr. Shoor's experience, truthfulness, and Stanford University training. It is clear that the State recognized the importance of Dr. Shoor's testimony, not only from an examination of the prosecutor's own statements, but also from the fact that the State reordered its proof in the special circumstances retrial so as to make Dr. Shoor its second witness in its case-in-chief (instead of using him only as a rebuttal witness, as it did at the first trial). This trial strategy reflects the State's firmly held belief that Dr. Shoor's testimony was critical to proving that Ghent premeditated and deliberated with respect to the murder of Mrs. Bert. In light of all these circumstances, we view with some skepticism, indeed with considerable skepticism, the State's argument that Dr. Shoor's testimony was tangential. United States v. Brooke, 4 F.3d 1480, 1488 (9th Cir.1993) (quoting United States v. Hill, 953 F.2d 452, 459 (9th Cir.1991)). 26 We would add, finally, that we find it highly significant that the prosecutor argued that one reason that Dr. Shoor's testimony was highly credible was that he had interviewed Ghent before Ghent was able to contact his lawyers. The State made use of — and sought to benefit from — this unconstitutional attribute of Dr. Shoor's behavior. By doing so, it only emphasized and exacerbated the violation. Moreover, the State's claim that Dr. Shoor's testimony merely duplicated that of the defense, is patently erroneous, particularly as the prosecutor himself emphasized the uniqueness of that testimony. 27 In sum, it is clear that Dr. Shoor's testimony in the special circumstances retrial had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637, 113 S.Ct. 1710. His testimony stands out both because of his qualifications as a medical doctor specializing in psychiatry and because of the powerful content of his message. Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 259, 108 S.Ct. 1792, 100 L.Ed.2d 284 (1988). Accordingly, the special circumstances verdict cannot stand. 7 Without the special circumstances finding, Ghent is ineligible for the death penalty. See Cal.Penal Code § 190.2. Therefore, we vacate his death sentence and remand the matter so that the State may conduct a new special circumstances trial, if it so elects. 8 See People v. Roy, 207 Cal.App.3d 642, 255 Cal.Rptr. 214, 223 (1989); see also Wade v. Calderon, 29 F.3d 1312, 1322-23 (9th Cir.1994). Otherwise, it shall resentence Ghent on the charge of first degree murder, without any special circumstance finding.