Opinion ID: 1798751
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Errors in Evidence and Instructions.

Text: Appellant has numerous complaints in regard to either the introduction or rejection of certain evidence. First, that it was error to allow respondent Mary Zweifel to testify on direct examination that she went to work after graduating from high school instead of going to college because . . . my parents could not afford it. In Kelly v. Southern Wisconsin R. Co. [10] this court said that it was error to admit evidence of the financial condition of the plaintiff's father, but concluded that such an error was of minor character and not prejudicial under the circumstances. In the present case, any error resulting from admitting the testimony in question was likewise nonprejudicial. This is because the reply was directed to the financial condition of Mr. Zweifel, who was also a party plaintiff, and since the special-verdict question relating to his damages was answered by the court the jury could not have helped him had they wanted to. In addition, the jury was well instructed as to the items of damages that could be awarded to respondent. Appellant relies on Dietz v. Goodman, [11] but this case is distinguishable because the improper question and answer concerned the inability of plaintiff to obtain employment and this was held together with [other] matters to constitute error under the circumstances. [12] Second, that it was error to refuse to allow written statements taken by a deputy sheriff from respondent and Propst after the accident to be introduced into evidence. Portions of these statements dealt with whether Propst had swerved from his lane. It is true that where a witness does not have an independent recollection of the facts but has to rely on a memorandum to refresh his memory, the notes or written statement may be introduced into evidence as a part of his testimony. [13] Even if it was error not to admit the statements, and this is doubtful since the rule is couched in permissive and not mandatory terms, the error is not prejudicial since the statements were read to the jury anyway. Third, that the trial court erred in not allowing Propst to be impeached with his own unsigned statement. Shortly after the accident Propst gave a statement to appellant's counsel but refused to sign it. Appellant contends that since there is no distinction between oral and written declarations, [14] the statement is admissible as an admission against interest, and it was error to deny admission of the statement. It is not necessary to consider whether there was any error in this refusal since, in any event, there was no prejudice to the appellant because the information in the statement was elicited upon Propst's cross-examination. [15] For example, appellant wanted to show that Propst found Rowley's coming alongside a complete surprise. This very point was brought out when appellant's counsel read portions of Propst's adverse into the record. Fourth, that the trial court erred in refusing to permit appellant to show that Propst had been instructed by his insurance company not to sign any statements. Since this testimony had no material bearing on any of the issues in the case, it was not error to exclude it. Fifth, that it was error for Propst's counsel to ask appellant, [W]hile the doctor was treating you and about a week after the accident, were you in another accident? Although Propst submits that the question was proper since Rowley had filed a cross complaint for damages for his injuries, and innocuous because there was no reference to Rowley's driving an automobile, it is apparent that this question, asked without proper foundation, could well influence the jury to the end that they would doubt his driving ability. However, any error was not prejudicial. When it was developed that there were no injuries to Rowley in this other accident, the subject was dropped and the jury was immediately and carefully admonished to disregard the question because it had no bearing on the case. Conwell v. Milwaukee Automobile Mut. Ins. Co., [16] cited by appellant, is distinguishable not only because it involved a long series of questions but the questions on their face were clearly of a more objectionable nature. Sixth, that it was error to refuse to allow Propst to testify whether he reported the accident to his insurance company. Appellant contends that this ruling precluded him from determining whether Propst had ever given a statement to his insurance company. But appellant already knew that there was no such statement. Propst testified on his adverse examination that he didn't recall signing any statement and added at a conference, out of the presence of the jury, that he did not believe he had even made any statement. Propst's counsel denied knowledge of any statement. Seventh, that it was error not to allow the jury to consider Rowley's hospital report. This record, which was received in evidence, contained the notation old healed fract of nose with septal deviation under the Diagnosis heading. Sec. 327.25 (2), Stats., [17] permits introduction of hospital records except for portions which constitute a medical opinion or diagnosis. Appellant offered to cover up the Diagnosis section but the trial court refused to let the report go to the jury. Whether or not an exhibit should be submitted to the jury is a matter within the discretion of the trial court. Although there might be situations where it is imperative that the jury have the opportunity to study a report, this was not such a case. Appellant was not seriously injured and the facts relating to his injury and treatment were fully brought out in the testimony. Clearly, there was no abuse of discretion by the trial court on this matter. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that Propst could operate his vehicle oblivious to traffic behind him until he heard a signal. The jury was told: (1) That the front driver could assume that there was no car to his rear until he becomes aware of the car by signal or otherwise; (2) that the front driver was obliged to keep a lookout to the rear if caution requires; (3) that the front driver must look to the rear before operating his car in a manner which would create a hazard to the following vehicle; (4) that a driver cannot deviate from his course until such movement can be made with reasonable safety; and (5) that before any driver moves to the left on the highway he must determine the presence, location, distance, and speed of any vehicle that might be affected. A consideration of the instructions as a whole [18] discloses that the jury was properly instructed. We have reviewed the entire record of this week-long vigorously contested trial and are of the opinion that justice has been done. By the Court. Judgment affirmed with costs. Motion to strike portions of the transcript denied without costs.