Opinion ID: 387055
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Procedural Hurdle

Text: 24 When the Board rejected the ALJ's recommendation of a bargaining order, it substituted an extensive list of alternative remedies. Neither the general counsel nor the Union as charging party had taken exception to the ALJ's failure to impose these remedies. When they finally appeared in the Board decision, the Employer did not petition for reconsideration. 25 The Board argues that this court is precluded from hearing the Employer's objections, even though these remedies were imposed sua sponte by the Board, because section 10(e) of the Act provides that (n)o objection that has not been urged before the Board, its member, agent, or agency, shall be considered by the court, unless the failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be excused because of extraordinary circumstances. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1976). It has been observed that this requirement affords the Board the opportunity to bring its labor relations expertise to bear on the problem so that (the court) may have the benefit of its opinion when we review its determinations. N.L.R.B. v. Allied Products Corp., 548 F.2d 644, 654 (6th Cir. 1977). And it has been held that mere sua sponte adoption of a remedy does not in itself amount to the extraordinary circumstances required by the statute, because reconsideration is available at the Board level. Id. at 655. 26 We think that the plight of this Employer is different, however, because the Employer's objections to Board-designed remedies became entangled with the Union's petition for review of the Board decision and the Board's cross-petition for enforcement. The Board issued its decision on June 12, 1979, and the Union filed its petition for review with this court on June 14. Once the Union's petition was filed, the Board became obligated to file the record with the reviewing court, and that court acquired jurisdiction to enforce the Board's order. Act § 10(f), 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1976). Once the record was filed, our jurisdiction became exclusive, and the Board no longer had any authority to reconsider its decision without a specific remand from this court. 27 If an employer is barred from presenting his objections to the reviewing court in such circumstances, then the court faces a Hobson's choice between enforcing the Board order without contest, and remanding the case in its entirety to give the employer an opportunity to make the ritual application for reconsideration. The unfairness of the former course is evident, and the inefficiency of the latter course would prevent the Union from seeking review until the Employer has exhausted his administrative remedies. We do not believe that such a jurisdictional conflict between the court and the Board was intended by Congress, and we find it inconsistent with orderly judicial review. We consider it preferable to hold that, after sua sponte adoption of new remedies by the Board, the filing of a petition for judicial review by another aggrieved party can constitute the extraordinary circumstances that preven(t) a matter which should have been presented to the Board from having been presented at the proper time. N.L.R.B. v. Allied Products Corp., 548 F.2d at 654. We point out that the Union filed its petition first in this case; our holding is limited to this sequence, and might be different if the Employer had successfully engaged in the all-too-frequent race to the courthouse.