Opinion ID: 1259336
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Did the trial court's factual findings support termination of parental rights?

Text: In its Second Order, the trial court found clear and convincing evidence of abandonment, stating: Instead of acting, [the father] gave up the fight, but said he never intended to give up the child.       He abandoned his child by failing to attempt to establish a normal parental relationship with her without just cause for a period of six months. He did not provide support to her, nor did he attempt to establish contact with her and that appeared to be what he intended to do for an indefinite period of time. Second Order at 6. The father contends that the trial judge abused her discretion in making this finding.
The mother testified that after she moved to Tucson she frequently called the father, but he rarely called her, though he knew how to reach her. On several occasions she asked him to send money, and although he said he would, he never did. After the father learned the baby was placed for adoption, he never asked about her or to see her. He did not try to communicate with the child until her first birthday, when he sent a gift through the adoptive parents' attorney. The father justifies this conduct by saying he assumed the mother's and adoptive parents' attorneys were adversaries and would not help him because they were interested in facilitating the adoption. However, because the father never tried, we cannot say what the attorneys would have done or whether a substantial relationship might have developed. Nevertheless, had he tried, it is possible that a relationship would have been created. In its first review of this case, the trial court focused on the father's actions before the child's birth. The court found that the father acted like a young man responsibly facing fatherhood: he bought baby furniture, began saving money, and purchased wedding rings in anticipation of marriage. Although these actions are responsible, they do not answer the question at hand because they responded to a different set of circumstances  the mother's expected return with the baby. They do not address the father's conduct once the facts changed. Nor do they satisfy the most important requirement: that the father act to create a bond with his child. The father's actions after the child's birth support the trial judge's finding that, even though the father learned of the impending adoption, he failed to make a meaningful effort to develop a relationship with his child. Even if this finding was incorrect  and we do not intimate that it was  the result is the same. The ultimate question must be whether the father has, in fact, created a relationship. Even if this father had taken all possible steps to bond with his child and failed, Lehr' s message is that to protect his interest, and the child's well-being, he must do more. For in the child's eyes, a valiant but failed attempt to create a relationship means little. Severing long-established bonds with others is equally harmful to the child, regardless of whether the father first attempted to create a relationship. Therefore, if the father's parenting attempts are unsuccessful, he must rapidly turn to legal recourse so that the child may obtain a final placement as quickly as possible. In this area, as in few others, there must be prompt recourse to the law.
The father also argues that although he could not form a relationship, he did assert his legal rights at the first opportunity by responding to the petition to sever. As previously noted, we place the burden of action on the parent. Ante at 96-98, 876 P.2d at 1131-1133. The father only asserted his interests in response to the petition to sever. If the adoptive parents had not acted, the evidence suggests that the father would have continued to do nothing. He had stopped calling attorneys after the first few months and made no attempt to obtain a hearing to block the adoption, seek custody, or establish paternity and assume the responsibility of support. He explained his behavior by saying he wanted to take it slow. Reporter's Transcript of Severance Hearing at 59 (Dec. 1, 1992) (hereinafter R.T.). He apparently believed he could sit back and wait because they're going to come to me. Reporter's Transcript of Dependency Hearing at 86 (Sept. 27, 1993). This Fabian tactic is rational, but it does not fulfill the requirement that an unwed father must grasp [the] opportunity. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262, 103 S.Ct. at 2993. The mother's attorney told the father that if he wanted to pursue custody, he must do so immediately because the child was bonding with her adoptive parents. R.T. at 67. We believe the trial court reasonably concluded that the father needed to do more than just wait to respond or oppose after the attorneys came to him  he needed to affirmatively act to establish his rights. We find, therefore, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the father abandoned the child because he failed to promptly and persistently grasp the opportunity to develop a relationship with his child or assert his legal rights.
The father argues that he had just cause for failing to assert his rights. The statute states that [f]ailure to maintain a normal parental relationship with the child without just cause ... shall constitute prima facie evidence of abandonment. § 8-546(A)(1) (emphasis added). The father claims he was prevented from developing a relationship with the child for two reasons: first because the mother gave her up, and then because attorneys manipulated the system against him, though they knew he did not want to lose his child. We agree he was hindered but disagree with his conclusion. In Yuma County Juvenile Court Action No. J-87-119, a father faced with termination of his parental rights attempted to excuse his failure to develop a relationship with his child on the grounds that the mother had hidden the child. In finding abandonment, the court held: [C]ommon sense suggests that a person in this father's shoes who really intended to maintain a relationship with his son would have done more than this father did to try to find his child .... Even if every allowance is made for lack of sophistication and limited resources, the trial court was not compelled to believe that the father was actually stymied.... 161 Ariz. 537, 540, 779 P.2d 1276, 1279 (Ct. App. 1989) (emphasis added). As in the Yuma County Juvenile case, the father here contacted a few attorneys in Arizona and Texas to ask some questions. However, he did not ask any of them how he could protect his rights. Nor did he retain an attorney. He stayed in Texas, sent no support, and made no inquiries. In effect, he did nothing. Had the father immediately and unequivocally stated to any of these attorneys that he was willing to take action to get his child back, we must assume that the attorneys would have at least directed him to pro bono counsel or to the courts. Had the father done so, and had the attorneys ignored his demands, this case might have a different cast. However, on this record, we agree with the trial court's conclusion that [a]lthough the father had many legitimate reasons for not following up on suggestions by attorneys ... about how to fight for his child, none of those reasons rises to the statutorily required good cause. Second Order at 6.
The father claims that his procedural due process rights were violated by requiring him to assert his legal rights when he could not afford an attorney, one was not appointed to him until too late, and he did not have the knowledge, ability, or resources to proceed on his own. He claims such a procedure deprived him of meaningful notice and opportunity to be heard. We agree that an unwed father has a right to develop a constitutionally protected relationship with his child. Therefore, we look closely at what process the constitution provides an unwed father: [I]f the two elements of a constitutionally protected parent-child relationship are the biological link and commitment to and exercise of custodial responsibility, the state may not deny biological parents the opportunity to establish a protected custodial relationship. Buchanan, Constitutional Rights, 45 OHIO ST.L.J. at 351 (footnotes omitted). The state may not deprive a natural father of his parental rights without notice. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 263-64, 103 S.Ct. at 2994 (holding that New York's putative fathers' registry provides adequate notice); Appeal of H.R., 581 A.2d at 1165-66 (where state agency made no attempt to give notice of adoption to known father, father's due process rights were violated). However, in this case it was not the state that deprived the father but the child's mother, who gave the child up for adoption without the father's consent. In addition, a November 1, 1991 letter from the mother's attorney gave the father prompt notice of the pending adoption. He later learned that he had to take immediate action to safeguard his parental rights. R.T. at 38. When the father responded to the motion to terminate his parental rights, counsel was appointed for him. The father now argues that the attorney's appointment came too late for any meaningful opportunity to be heard, as due process requires. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334, 96 S.Ct. 893, 902, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (due process is related to time, place, and circumstances); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972). We disagree. The facts establish that the father's own inaction kept him from the courtroom. Considering the many lawyers supposedly consulted, the father or his parents could have asked what to do, what court to contact, or where to get pro bono services. Instead, the father's own testimony indicates that he did not want to go to court but just wanted to go slowly. Even if no attorney would provide services, the father, with the help of his parents, could have tried to protect his rights pro se. Many civil litigants cannot afford counsel but still gain access to the judicial system. Even given this father's difficulties accessing the judicial system, we require something more than telephone calls to un-named attorneys. Even if it were possible to excuse the father's failure to protect his rights, his argument still fails. In response to the petition to terminate parental rights, the court appointed counsel for the father on June 4, 1992. On January 5, 1993, the court had to order him to establish formal paternity, a necessary prerequisite to custody. Even then, the father did not begin the process until seven months after the court ordered him to act. In short, the father did not begin to assert his legal rights in a meaningful way that would have furthered his relationship with his daughter until twenty months after her birth and several months after obtaining counsel. The father was not denied his due process rights; he consciously failed to assert his legal rights in a timely manner. 5. Is termination of the father's parental rights in the best interests of the child? Even though we have concluded that the father abandoned his child, we must still determine whether termination of his parental rights is in the child's best interest. [16] Maricopa County Juvenile No. JS-500274, 167 Ariz. at 5, 804 P.2d at 734 (best interests of the child are a necessary ... condition for an order of termination). Social services personnel report that the child is thriving in her adoptive home. She has been with the adoptive parents since shortly after birth and is deeply attached to them. Although not dispositive, studies show that removing a child from familiar surroundings at this age may cause substantial harm. These factors support the trial judge's conclusion that the child's interests would be better served by leaving her in her current home.