Opinion ID: 1679052
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the lower court erred in overruling objections to highly prejudicial testimony concerning the appellant's membership in a motorcycle gang more than twelve (12) years prior to the alleged homicide and erred in failing to grant a mistrial following the prosecutor's comments on said testimony.

Text: Appellant's mother was called to the stand by counsel for appellant to testify as to his good marriage and his good reputation for peace and veracity. During cross-examination of the witness by the prosecutor, she was asked by him: (1) Did anyone ever discuss with you the fact that your son was a member of a motorcycle gang at one time in Memphis? (2) What motorcycle gang was it, ...? Counsel for the appellant objected, and the assistant district attorney replied that the appellant had offered her as a witness concerning his reputation. There was argument by both the State and the defense, and the trial judge said Well, based on the status of the record, I'll overrule the objection. [1] The prosecutor pursued the line of questioning about the motorcycle gang and during the cross-examination asked the question, Is that what they are or are they a gang of outlaws and hoodlums that ride up and down the streets of Memphis ...? The counsel for appellant objected again specifically since the event occurred approximately seven (7) to ten (10) years previous. Assistant District Attorney Buntin stated: Judge, our position is that a leopard just doesn't change its spots that easily. Counsel for appellant objected and moved for a mistrial. Thereupon, the court ruled: I'll overrule the motion. I'll sustain the objection, and overrule the motion. The Jury will disregard the last remark by the District Attorney. Subsequent testimony of appellant revealed that he had been a member of the motorcycle gang from 1966 to 1972. Thus, the probative value of appellant's membership in the gang was questionable on its own. The fact that the membership was twelve (12) years previous diminishes the value for any purpose all the more. Rule 403, Mississippi Rules of Evidence, provides that relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.... This testimony should have been excluded by the trial judge and should not have been elicited by the assistant district attorney. They both were treading in judicial quicksand. Appellant's counsel used the motorcycle gang evidence in his case-in-chief during redirect examination of appellant, notwithstanding his claim that the evidence was irrelevant and highly prejudicial. Further, appellant's counsel twice referred to the motorcycle gang in closing arguments, viz, We're not trying to hide his motorcycle club, we're not trying to hide his service record, we're not trying to hide anything. In Houston v. State, 274 So.2d 133 (Miss. 1973), the State asked defendant's character witnesses certain questions about the victim's reputation. The victim's reputation was not in issue, and the questions were improper. However, defendant failed to object to this line of questioning and pursued the improper matter further on redirect of his own witness. This is what the appellant's counsel did in the case sub judice during redirect examination of appellant. Under these circumstances, the Houston Court held that the trial judge could not be put in error. Houston, 274 So.2d at 135. In a similar case, Hill v. State, 432 So.2d 427 (Miss. 1983), cert. den. 464 U.S. 977, 104 S.Ct. 414, 78 L.Ed.2d 352 (1983), the State elicited incompetent evidence from its own witness. The defense failed to object and further developed the incompetent evidence on cross-examination of the witness. In addition, like appellant in the case sub judice, the defense made reference to the incompetent evidence during closing argument. On appeal, the introduction of the incompetent evidence was assigned as error. This Court commented that ... defense counsel's complaint at this stage appears directed toward a trial strategy in which they were participants. What this amounts to is a trial strategy counsel aided and abetted, and now seek to criticize. Hill, 432 So.2d at 439. We are of the opinion that the admission of the evidence was error, but appellant waived the error by his failure to object at the earliest opportunity, together with his use of the evidence in his own case-in-chief and during his closing arguments. The second part of this assigned error concerns appellant's objection to the State's question, ... are they a gang of outlaws and hoodlums that ride up and down the streets of Memphis ...? In response to the objection, the assistant district attorney stated, Judge, our position is that a leopard just doesn't change its spots that easily. Appellant then moved for a mistrial. The trial judge properly sustained the objection to the question, but overruled the motion for mistrial. He directed the jury to disregard the last remark by the District Attorney. At that point, the trial judge saved the assistant district attorney from burying the State's case in the judicial quicksand by sustaining the objection and admonishing the jury to disregard the remark. The rule is well established that when an isolated prejudicial question or comment by the prosecution is promptly objected to and the objection is sustained, and particularly when the circuit judge instructs the jury to disregard the incident, there is a presumption the action on the part of the trial court cured the error. West v. State, 485 So.2d 681, 689-90 (Miss. 1985), cert. den. 479 U.S. 983, 107 S.Ct. 570, 93 L.Ed.2d 574 (1986). McFee v. State, 511 So.2d 130 (Miss. 1987); Stringer v. State, 477 So.2d 1335 (Miss. 1985); Johnson v. State, 475 So.2d 1136 (Miss. 1985); Sand v. State, 467 So.2d 907 (Miss. 1985); Fairley v. State, 467 So.2d 894 (Miss. 1985), cert. den. 474 U.S. 855, 106 S.Ct. 160, 88 L.Ed.2d 133 (1985). The assigned Error IV is rejected.