Opinion ID: 362303
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the section 717 performances

Text: 29 We face an initial and relatively untreated difficulty in determining just what standards to apply in judging the performance of Section 717 complainants in the administrative process. Is the complainant as is usually the lot of litigants aggrieved by agency action inexorably to suffer for a procedural default regardless of type or magnitude? Or because Congress was wary enough of the administrative process in this area to have provided a trial de novo for Section 717 complainants, 74 and because it specifically criticized prior law under which judicial review was often denied for failure to exhaust administrative remedies 75 is compliance with the express, as distinguished from administratively extrapolated, demands of Section 717 alone enough? 30 On its face, Section 717 summons no more than that a litigant first complain to his employing agency 76 and file his suit, if any, within 30 days of receipt of notice of the final agency action. 77 The Supreme Court has indicated that this is Section 717's total demand that the only preconditions imposed by Section 717 are that the complainant must seek relief in the agency that has allegedly discriminated against him 78 and then or optionally after utilizing the processes of the Civil Service Commission he must bring his court action within 30 days. 79 Section 717 says nothing about procedures or time limits within the administrative phase. 80 31 Congress granted the Civil Service Commission authority to promulgate regulations effectuating Title VII. 81 But, once again we repeat, Congress expected that the administrative stage of the Title VII process would be conducted by laymen not lawyers 82 and was quite unhappy with pre-1972 administrative handling of discrimination complaints. 83 By the same token, Congress could not possibly have intended that federal agencies could permissibly extinguish rights of the many federal employees utilizing Section 717 simply by creating procedural labyrinths. 84 On the other hand, it must be remembered that Section 717 establish(es) complementary administrative and judicial enforcement mechanisms designed to eradicate federal employment discrimination, 85 and that this careful blend 86 would become unbalanced were we to sanction cavalier disregard of the rules of the administrative tribunal. Thus the touchstone must be whether the agency reasonably created and applied the particular procedural restriction governing resort to its antidiscrimination mechanisms; 87 and the basic demand on the complainant is that the agency be given sufficient, even if technically flawed, notice of the grievance.
32 Applying this standard, we find Bethel's case relatively easy. Within 30 days of receipt of the Mayor's decision, Bethel complained to both the Civil Service Commission and the District of Columbia Office of Human Rights. As we pointed out earlier, the Mayor's decision was the final step in what for Title VII purposes allegedly was a single, continuous course of discrimination that began with an incident transpiring in July, 1971. 88 Bethel sought relief from the Office of Human Rights within 15 days of receipt of the Mayor's decision, but that agency rejected his complaint because he had not first sought its aid in 1971. 33 That, we say, was not a reasonably imposed restriction on access to agency redress of discrimination. No published regulation of the Office of Human Rights 89 or of the Metropolitan Police Department 90 defined discriminatory acts in such fashion as to put Bethel on notice that he had to complain in 1971 instead of waiting to see whether and to what extent his employment status would be adversely affected. 91 Indeed, instead of removing Bethel from the force as the trial board had recommended in 1971, the Mayor in 1974 ordered a period of suspension without pay. It is quite understandable that a governmental employee would deem it wiser to refrain from rocking the boat with a complaint of racial discrimination unless and until he is confronted with a final personnel action unfavorable to him. 34 Until September, 1974, Bethel did not know whether he would suffer removal or some lesser penalty or, on the other hand, receive reinstatement and backpay. 92 Since, until then, the allegedly discriminatory conduct was inchoate for suit purposes, only by circumventing the statute could the employing agency require an earlier complaint. 93 Moreover, and all else aside, the Office of Human Rights violated its own regulation requiring it to notify Bethel of his right to appeal the decision on timeliness. 94 35 Appellee further argues that Bethel also violated a regulation requiring that an informal complaint be made to an equal employment counselor within the Metropolitan Police Department before a formal complaint is submitted to the Office of Human Rights. 95 Since the point was not adverted to in the decision of the Office of Human Rights, it cannot avail anyone here, 96 and in any event we could not accept it. Even if the Office had expressly relied upon this violation of the rule, judicial review still would not be foreclosed, 97 for we perceive no palatable excuse for not referring Bethel's complaint to such a counselor. 98 It is the duty of the Office of Human Rights and as well of the Metropolitan Police Department to root out discrimination, and that responsibility is hardly discharged by reliance on technical miscues that could easily have been rectified without harm to anyone. The legislative purpose served by administrative recourse was fulfilled when the Office of Human Rights received prompt notice of Bethel's charge, 99 and was thus accorded sufficient opportunity to resolve his employment status administratively. 100 36 In sum, Bethel reasonably attempted to bring his complaint before the administrative tribunal and it unreasonably refused to consider his claims. He could have done little more, and the agency could hardly have done less.
37 Whether Hemby adequately met the requirements of Section 717 is a more difficult question. Our review is facilitated somewhat by the fact that we need only ascertain whether he did so as to any one instance of discrimination. If he did, the District Court erred in dismissing his suit; and whether Hemby can gain a remedy for any of the other episodes must be determined originally in the District Court. 101 38 There is at least one instance of sufficient compliance with Section 717. In December, 1973, a trial board recommended that Hemby be removed from the police force. Before the Mayor acted upon this recommendation 102 perhaps to finalize it, or perhaps to order reinstatement and backpay Hemby complained to the Mayor that the Department was in violation of Title VII 103 by retaliating against him for having brought his lawsuit. 104 This was sufficient notice of Hemby's discrimination claim, for it identi(fies) precisely the substance of the cause of action subsequently asserted and the factual basis of that claim. 105 If the complaint should have been addressed elsewhere, the Mayor, we think, had an obligation to refer Hemby to the proper forum. 106 39 Though the Mayor had not disposed of the charge, Hemby amended his complaint in the District Court to include his allegation of discrimination. Since, at that point, there was no final administrative decision on that allegation, appellee could have successfully moved for dismissal. Now, however, 180 days have elapsed since the Mayor first learned of Hemby's discrimination grievance without any action thereon, and Hemby is free to sue in the District Court despite the lack of a decision by the Mayor. 107 We will not require Hemby to take the purely formal step of dismissing his complaint in the District Court and then refiling it just to gain a filing date more than 180 days later than that upon which he presented the charge to the Mayor.