Opinion ID: 2549040
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: subjective belief as part of the objective analysis

Text: ¶ 15 The court of appeals in this case noted that the officer's lack of subjective belief clearly took the frisk outside of Terry 's limited justification for warrantless searches. State v. Warren, 2001 UT App 346, ¶ 16, 37 P.3d 270. This language could be interpreted as a per se invalidation of the frisk based solely on the officer's subjective belief. Per se invalidation of a Terry frisk based solely on a lack of subjective belief is clearly a minority view, and a view with which we disagree. We hold that courts must objectively evaluate a Terry frisk, but the officer's subjective belief may be a factor in the objective analysis. Because it is unclear how much the court of appeals relied on the officer's subjective belief in invalidating the frisk, we will now reevaluate the totality of the circumstances based on an objective standard.
¶ 16 The United States Supreme Court in Terry stated that an officer's subjective belief that a suspect is armed and dangerous is not enough alone to justify a protective frisk, but the Court has not yet determined what role an officer's lack of subjective belief plays in the analysis when reasonable suspicion is required. 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868. When probable cause is required, the Court has held that a lack of subjective belief cannot invalidate an otherwise objectively reasonable action. [3] The Court in Terry did state that an officer must justify the intrusion by pointing to articulable facts that warrant the intrusion when viewed under the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868. Thus, it appears that a Terry frisk should be measured by an objective standard. Likewise, our previous case law mandates an objective analysis, though we have not previously addressed the implications of an officer's lack of subjective belief in the Terry frisk context. State v. Roybal, 716 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah 1986); State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 659 (Utah 1985). We now discuss whether an officer's subjective belief may be a factor to consider in the objective analysis to determine whether a Terry frisk was reasonable.
¶ 17 The majority of jurisdictions that have addressed the issue of an officer's lack of subjective belief have upheld a Terry frisk or a Terry stop as long as the Terry frisk or stop was objectively reasonable. United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1225 (10th Cir.2001) (per curiam) (explaining that subjective intentions rarely play a role in a Fourth Amendment analysis and that courts instead rely on an objective view of the circumstances); United States v. Brown, 232 F.3d 589, 594 (7th Cir.2000) (holding that courts are not limited to the officer's subjective rationale); United States v. Michelletti, 13 F.3d 838, 842 (5th Cir.1994) (approving a Terry frisk under an objective standard, notwithstanding the fact that the officer stated he had no specific reason to believe the defendant was armed); United States v. McKie, 951 F.2d 399, 402 (D.C.Cir.1991) (per curiam) (holding that the court is not limited by subjective rationale, but determines reasonableness objectively); United States v. Cummins, 920 F.2d 498, 502 (8th Cir.1990) (finding a Terry search objectively reasonable, notwithstanding the officer's lack of subjective belief that the defendants were armed and dangerous).
¶ 18 On the other hand, a minority of jurisdictions evaluate a Terry frisk according to the officer's subjective belief. United States v. Lott, 870 F.2d 778, 783-84 (1st Cir.1989) ([W]e do not read [ Terry and Long ] as permitting a frisk where, although the circumstances might pass an objective test, the officers in the field were not actually concerned for their safety.); United States v. Prim, 698 F.2d 972, 975 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that an objective standard is applied to the officer's actual or perceived belief). ¶ 19 We concur with the majority of jurisdictions in holding that the reasonableness of a Terry frisk must be evaluated objectively. Furthermore, an officer's lack of subjective belief alone does not invalidate an otherwise objectively reasonable Terry frisk. We do not, however, go so far as to hold that an officer's subjective belief plays no role in the analysis.
¶ 20 Though an officer's subjective belief alone is insufficient to validate or invalidate a Terry frisk, to completely disregard an officer's subjective belief excludes a potentially important element of the analysis. In stating that subjective belief alone is not enough to justify a frisk, the United States Supreme Court appears to recognize that subjective belief may be one of the factors in determining the reasonableness of an officer's decision to perform a Terry frisk. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868. In fact, in other situations, an officer's subjective factual determination based on experience and specialized training has been given due weight as part of the objective analysis. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002). In Arvizu, an officer evaluated facially neutral facts to develop a reasonable suspicion that a family driving a van was involved in illegal drug smuggling. Id. at 270-71, 122 S.Ct. 744. The Court considered the officer's subjective interpretation of the facts as part of the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 277, 122 S.Ct. 744. Thus, the Court has demonstrated that there are subjective elements that may be considered in an otherwise objective analysis. ¶ 21 The totality of the circumstances analysis objectively evaluates all facts before the officer at the time the officer made the decision. The officer, with experience and training, is in the best position to evaluate the circumstances and determine the reasonableness of a Terry frisk. We recognize that some officers may never admit that they feared for their safety. Holt, 264 F.3d at 1225-26. Likewise, other officers may always claim they believed a stop was dangerous in order to justify a frisk. Nevertheless, an officer's own evaluation of the circumstances may provide valuable insight to factor into the objective analysis. How much weight this factor is given is a determination for the individual court, though a Terry frisk cannot be validated or invalidated based solely on a subjective belief because no one factor alone is determinative of reasonableness. Carter, 707 P.2d at 659. An officer's determination that a person may be armed and dangerous, like an officer's subjective interpretation of the facts to determine that a crime has been or is being committed, is one of several possible articulable facts a court may consider as part of the totality of the circumstances.