Opinion ID: 2975596
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: 1998 Demotion Claim

Text: Austion asserted his 1998 demotion claim under both Title VII and the THRA. A plaintiff must comply with specific administrative requirements in order to file a lawsuit under Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. The first requirement is that a plaintiff must file a discrimination charge with a state or local agency within 300 days after the occurrence of the “alleged unlawful employment action.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). Austion’s EEOC complaint alleging that his 1998 demotion was discriminatory was not filed until August 2002, well after the 300-day time limit. Nevertheless this 300-day time period for filing a charge with the EEOC may be subject to equitable tolling. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002). The continuingviolations theory is a specific equitable doctrine that tolls this filing period. Kovacevich v. Kent State 7 Univ., 224 F.3d 806, 829 (6th Cir. 2000). The Supreme Court’s decision in Morgan largely curtailed the continuing-violations theory when applied to “discrete discriminatory acts,” see Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114 (rejecting the “serial violations” version of the continuing-violations theory), but we have recognized that the continuing-violations theory still applies to discrete discriminatory acts that are part of a “longstanding and demonstrable policy of discrimination,” see Sharpe v. Cureton, 319 F.3d 259, 268 (6th Cir. 2003) (“The second category of continuing violations, involving a longstanding and demonstrable policy of discrimination, is not implicated by Morgan.”). The district court held as a matter of law that Austion “provided substantial testimonial, statistical, and documentary evidence tending to show that [Clarksville] engaged in a longstanding and demonstrable policy of discrimination,” and therefore found that Austion’s 1998 demotion claim was saved by the continuing-violations theory. We disagree and find that the 1998 demotion claim was not timely filed with the EEOC. To establish a longstanding and demonstrable policy of discrimination, a plaintiff “must demonstrate something more than the existence of discriminatory treatment in his case.” Haithcock v. Frank, 958 F.2d 671, 679 (6th Cir. 1992). A plaintiff must establish that the employer’s “standing operating procedure” included intentional discrimination against the class of which plaintiff was a member. Sharpe, 319 F.3d at 269 (quoting EEOC v. Penton Indus. Publ’g Co., 851 F.2d 835, 838 (6th Cir. 1988)). “Unrelated incidents of discrimination will not suffice to invoke this exception; rather there must be a continuing over-arching policy of discrimination.” LRL Properties v. Portage Metro Hous. Auth., 55 F.3d 1097, 1106 (6th Cir. 1995). Generally this exception is strictly construed and is satisfied only where the defendant has a known policy or rule supporting discrimination. See, e.g., Dixon v. Anderson, 928 F.2d 212, 217 (6th Cir. 1991) (finding an “over-arching policy” of 8 discrimination where that policy appeared plainly in the Ohio Revised Code and administrators openly adhered to the Code); Alexander v. Local 496, Laborers’ Int’l Union, 177 F.3d 394, 408-09 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding a “longstanding and demonstrable policy” where the union’s “working-inthe-calling” rule, which was memorialized in its constitution and bylaws, resulted in the “de facto exclusion” of African Americans from union membership). But see Jackson v. Quanex Corp., 191 F.3d 647, 668 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding “a longstanding and demonstrable policy . . . of tolerating a racially hostile environment in which racial graffiti and slurs and the disparate treatment of AfricanAmerican workers took place regularly”). After thoroughly reviewing the statistical and documentary evidence submitted to the district court, we find that the evidence fails to demonstrate that Clarksville maintained a “standard operating procedure” of discriminating against AfricanAmericans. Accordingly, the district court erred in applying the continuing-violations theory, and we hold that Austion’s 1998 demotion claim was not timely filed under Title VII. Austion also brought his 1998 demotion claim under the THRA. A claim under the THRA must be filed “within one year after the alleged discriminatory practice ceases.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-311(d). Austion did not file suit in the district court until September 2003, which is much more than one year after his 1998 demotion. In an attempt to save his claim, Austion again appeals to the continuing-violations theory. The Tennessee Supreme Court has recognized that the plain language of the “THRA’s statute of limitations incorporates the continuing[-]violation exception.” Booker v. Boeing Co., 188 S.W.3d 639, 647 (Tenn. 2006). However, “the THRA’s statute of limitations does not operate to extend the limitations period on discrete acts of discrimination.” Id. (citing Weber v. Moses, 938 S.W.2d 387, 391 (Tenn. 1996)). Because the 1998 demotion is a discrete act of discrimination, the THRA’s statutorily 9 incorporated continuing-violations exception does not extend the limitations period here. Moreover, even if Tennessee courts would extend the THRA limitations period where the employer engages in a “longstanding and demonstrable policy” of discrimination, see id. at 646 n.2 (noting that the Tennessee Supreme Court was not addressing and therefore not expressing an opinion concerning a “pattern-or-practice” claim, which is equivalent to the Sixth Circuit’s “longstanding and demonstrable policy” claim), Austion has failed to establish that such a policy existed in the CPD. Therefore Austion did not timely file his 1998 demotion claim under the THRA. Because Austion did not timely assert his 1998 demotion claim under either Title VII or the THRA, there is no jurisdictional basis for that claim, and the district court erred in refusing to dismiss it.