Opinion ID: 2637349
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The ex post facto prohibitions

Text: Article I, section 10, clause 1 of the federal Constitution and article I, section 9 of the state Constitution prohibit the passage of ex post facto laws. ( Grant, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 158, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 295, 973 P.2d 72.) California's ex post facto law is analyzed in the same manner as the federal prohibition. (Ibid.) [T]he ex post facto clauses of the state and federal Constitutions are `aimed at laws that retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase the punishment for criminal acts.' (Grant, at p. 158, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 295, 973 P.2d 72 quoting California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales (1995) 514 U.S. 499, 504, 115 S.Ct. 1597, 131 L.Ed.2d 588.) Here, the court security fee does not alter the definition of a crime; the question is whether it increases punishment. In making this determination we consider whether the Legislature intended the provision to constitute punishment and, if not, whether the provision is so punitive in nature or effect that it must be found to constitute punishment despite the Legislature's contrary intent. ( People v. Castellanos (1999) 21 Cal.4th 785, 795, 88 Cal. Rptr.2d 346, 982 P.2d 211.) If the intention of the legislature was to impose punishment, that ends the inquiry. If, however, the intention was to enact a regulatory scheme that is civil and nonpunitive, we must further examine whether the statutory scheme is `so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State's] intention to deem it civil.' [Citations.] Because we `ordinarily defer to the legislature's stated intent,' [citation], `only the clearest proof' will suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty,' [citations]. ( Smith v. Doe (2003) 538 U.S. 84, 92, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164; see also People v. Castellanos, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 794-795, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 346, 982 P.2d 211.) The legislative history demonstrates that the court security fee was enacted as part of an emergency budgetary measure for the nonpunitive purpose of funding court security. ( People v. Wallace, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at pp. 874-878, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 152.) [3] The stated reason for enacting the $20 court security fee appears in section 1465.8, subdivision (a)(1), `To ensure and maintain adequate funding for court security....' The maintenance of `adequate funding for court security' purposes is unambiguously a non-punitive objective. Assembly Bill No. 1759 was one of 24 trailer bills which were part of a `mechanism to implement critical provisions' of the fiscal year 2003-2004 state budget. (Assem.3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1759, as introduced Mar. 11, 2003, p. 1.) The only expressed rationale for making Assembly Bill No. 1759 an urgency statute was a budgetary reason, 'In order to provide for changes to implement the Budget Act of 2003, it is necessary that this act take effect immediately.' (Stats.2003, ch. 159, § 29.) Moreover, the $20 court security fee was imposed not merely upon persons convicted of [a] crime. Government Code section 69926.5, subdivision (a), which was adopted pursuant to section 19 of Assembly Bill No. 1759, required a $20 court security surcharge also be imposed on the first paper filed on behalf of a plaintiff or a defendant in any limited and unlimited civil action or special proceeding and in probate matters. (Stats.2003, ch. 159, § 19; Gov.Code, §§ 26820.4, 26826, 26827, 72055, 72056.) Moreover, section 1465.8, subdivision (a)(2) requires that the $20 surcharge be imposed when a traffic violation charge is dismissed because the alleged violator attends traffic school. Further, section 1465.8, subdivision (c) requires that the $20 court security fee be collected when bail is posteda scenario which includes arrestees who will never be charged in an information, indictment, or complaint with a crime. Additionally, section 1465.8 could only go into effect if specified levels of trial court funding were enacted by the Legislature. (Stats.2003, ch. 159, § 27.) Although it conceivably could happen, it is difficult to divine a punitive purpose for a fee that would go into effect only if specified trial court funding levels ($2,186,864,000 `or more' for item XXXX-XXX-XXXX and $1,001,001,000 `or more' for item XXXX-XXX-XXXX in the 2003 Budget Act) were enacted. (Ibid.) ( Wallace, supra, 120 Cal. App.4th at pp. 875-876, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 152.) The Legislature generally does not adopt punitive statutes that are dependent on trial court funding levels in budget line items. ( People v. Wallace, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 876, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 152.) The Legislature also referred to the $20 amount due upon conviction by a nonpunitive term, labeling it as a fee and not a fine. (Ibid.) Considering these factors in conjunction with the express legislative purpose of maintain[ing] adequate funding for court security (§ 1465.8(a)(1)), the Wallace court concluded the fee was imposed for a nonpunitive purpose. (Wallace, at p. 876, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 152.) Because the legislative intent is clear, the analysis is correct. [4] The court security fee is not so punitive in nature or effect that it constitutes punishment. The United States Supreme Court has articulated certain nonexclusive factors governing this determination. The factors most relevant to our analysis are whether, in its necessary operation, the regulatory scheme: has been regarded in our history and traditions as a punishment; imposes an affirmative disability or restraint; promotes the traditional aims of punishment; has a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose; or is excessive with respect to this purpose. ( Smith v. Doe, supra, 538 U.S. at p. 97, 123 S.Ct. 1140; see also Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez (1963) 372 U.S. 144, 168-169, 83 S.Ct. 554, 9 L.Ed.2d 644.) Only the clearest proof will suffice to override the Legislature's intent and transform a civil remedy into a criminal punishment. ( People v. Wallace, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 876, 16 Cal. Rptr.3d 152.) We conclude the fee is not so punitive as to override the Legislature's express intent. Fines arising from convictions are generally considered punishment. ( People v. Wallace, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 877, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 152.) However, several countervailing considerations undermine a punitive characterization. The purpose of the court security fee was not to punish but to ensure adequate funding for court security. (Ibid.) The fee is not imposed only in a criminal context. [T]he same fee is imposed in limited and unlimited civil and probate cases as well. (Ibid.) Finally, whether or not the fee provision became effective was completely dependent on the funding of other budget line items. (Ibid.) Whether the court security fee imposes an affirmative disability or restraint depends on how the challenged statute affects those subject to it. If the disability or restraint is minor and indirect, its effects are unlikely to be punitive. ( Smith v. Doe, supra, 538 U.S. at p. 100, 123 S.Ct. 1140.) A $20 fee is relatively small, and less onerous than other consequences that have been held to be nonpunitive. For example, in holding that Alaska's sex offender registration act was not punitive, the high court stated, The Act imposes no physical restraint, and so does not resemble the punishment of imprisonment, which is the paradigmatic affirmative disability or restraint. [Citation.] The Act's obligations are less harsh than the sanctions of occupational debarment, which we have held to be nonpunitive. [Citations.] ( Smith v. Doe, supra, 538 U.S. at p. 100, 123 S.Ct. 1140.) We have likewise held California's sex offender registration requirement and the compelled submission of convicted felons to AIDS testing, [5] to be nonpunitive for ex post facto purposes. ( People v. Castellanos, supra, 21 Cal.4th 785, 799, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 346, 982 P.2d 211 [sex offender registration]; People v. McVickers (1992) 4 Cal.4th 81, 90, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 850, 840 P.2d 955 [submission to AIDS testing].) The impact of the $20 fee is minimal in comparison to these registration and testing requirements. [6] Other examples of far more onerous postcrime disabilities that have survived ex post facto challenges include allowing the relaxation of procedures used to find juvenile probation violations, ( John L. v. Superior Court (2004) 33 Cal.4th 158, 171-186, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 261, 91 P.3d 205), the denial of rehabilitation and pardon applications to sex offenders, ( People v. Ansell (2001) 25 Cal.4th 868, 883-893, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 24 P.3d 1174), and the postprison commitment of an individual as a sexually violent predator, ( Hubbart v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1138, 1170-1179, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 492, 969 P.2d 584.) In People v. Rivera (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 705, 707-711, 76 Cal. Rptr.2d 703 the court concluded a jail booking fee of $135 and jail classification fee of $33 were not properly classified as punishment. Thus we conclude that the fee at issue here does not impose an affirmative disability or restraint for the purposes of our ex post facto analysis. We look next to whether the court security fee promotes the traditional aims of punishment: retribution or deterrence. (See People v. Castellanos, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 804, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 346, 982 P.2d 211 (cone. & dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).) The stated purpose of the court security fee is [t]o ensure and maintain adequate funding for court security .... (§ 1465.8(a)(1).) As originally enacted, the fee was part of an extensive statutory scheme applicable to both criminal and specified civil cases designed to fund and coordinate court security.... ( People v. Wallace, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 878, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 152.) It promotes court safety, not punishment and retribution. (Ibid.) In addition, the amount of the fee is not dependent on the seriousness of the offense. Thus, it does not meet the objectives of punishment and is distinguishable from a fine. Indeed, the same fee is imposed in unlimited civil and probate cases. Finally, federal and state ex post facto protections serve to ensure a fair warning of the consequences of violating penal statutes. ( Weaver v. Graham (1981) 450 U.S. 24, 28, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17; Hubbart v. Superior Court, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1171, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 492, 969 P.2d 584.) It is inconceivable that defendant would have decided not to commit his crime had he known in advance that this $20 fee would be imposed in addition to his 40-year-to-life sentence. The fee is also rationally related to its nonpunitive purpose security goal. ( People v. Wallace, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 878, 16 Cal. Rptr.3d 152.) The $20 fee is not excessive and imposes no physical restraint. It furthers the purpose of section 1465.8, subdivision (a)(1) which, as part of Assembly Bill No. 1759, [ensures] appropriate funding levels for court operations and providing a more rational process for planning court security. ( People v. Wallace, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 878,16 Cal.Rptr.3d 152.) In light of these factors and the Legislature's express intent, imposition of the fine serves a nonpunitive purpose. ( Smith v. Doe, supra, 538 U.S. at p. 92, 123 S.Ct. 1140.) Accordingly, it does not violate either federal or state prohibitions against ex post facto statutes. (Accord People v. Wallace, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 878, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 152.)