Opinion ID: 1345019
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the Federal Agents Assault Villafranca?

Text: In Texas, the intentional tort of assault is identical to criminal assault. See Hall v. Sonic Drive-In of Angleton, Inc., 177 S.W.3d 636, 649 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) (The elements of assault are the same in both the criminal and civil context[s].). Texas Penal Code § 22.01(a) provides, in relevant part, that a person commits criminal assault if he: (1) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another ...; (2) intentionally or knowingly threatens another with imminent bodily injury ...; or (3) intentionally or knowingly causes physical contact with another when the person knows or should reasonably believe that the other will regard the contact as offensive or provocative. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a) (Vernon 2005). The Texas Penal Code also provides a civil privilege defense to an assault claim. Specifically, § 9.51(a) provides: (a) A peace officer ... is justified in using force against another when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to make or assist in making an arrest or search ... if: (1) the actor reasonably believes the arrest or search is lawful or, if the arrest or search is made under a warrant, he reasonably believes the warrant is valid; and (2) before using force, the actor manifests his purpose to arrest or search and identifies himself as a peace officer..., unless he reasonably believes his purpose and identity are already known by or cannot reasonably be made known to the person to be arrested. Id. § 9.51(a); see also Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Petta, 44 S.W.3d 575, 579-80 (Tex.2001) (holding that the elements of a criminal necessity defense under § 9.51 are the same as the civil privilege defense). [1]
The issue then is whether the Government agents' conduct is privileged under § 9.51. [2] Villafranca claims that the United States should be treated as a private person for purposes of the FTCA analysis. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674. Villafranca then argues that because the DEA agents' conduct would constitute an assault under Texas law for which a private person would incur liability, the Government is liable for assault here. [3] As support for this argument, Villafranca points to United States v. Olson, 546 U.S. 43, 126 S.Ct. 510, 163 L.Ed.2d 306 (2005). [4] In Olson, the Supreme Court held that state-defined immunity (or waiver of immunity) cannot be applied to determine whether the Government has waived immunity for a particular FTCA claim. 546 U.S. at 45-46, 126 S.Ct. 510. Instead, the Supreme Court held that even where a plaintiff brings a claim based on performance of a unique government function, the lower courts must look to like circumstances for analogies of when private citizens would be liable in order to determine the Government's liability. Id. at 46-47, 126 S.Ct. 510. Specifically, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on the ground that it was inappropriate to make the United States liable for the negligent mine inspections solely because state law would make a state or municipal entity liable for similar negligence. Instead, the Court held that the lower courts should look to similar private person analogies rather than exact state or municipal entity analogies to determine the Government's liability. Id. at 47, 126 S.Ct. 510. The district court below acknowledged Villafranca's private person argument but did not expressly resolve the issue of whether the Government was to be treated as a private person for purposes of § 9.51. Instead, the district court found that the Government is not liable for assault where, as here, its law enforcement agents cause injury while using reasonable force to make a lawful arrest for a crime actually committed[,] and did not complete the next step of the analysis. Today, we hold that the agents can invoke the Texas statutory privilege. We have previously held that the United States was entitled to claim section 9.51 as a defense to civil liability under the FTCA in the context of a Bivens [5] suit. Saldaña, 2001 WL 85862, at  (affirming the district court's judgment that the Government can invoke a privilege under § 9.51(c) concerning use of deadly force by an officer). However, in Sutton v. United States, we declined to determine whether incorporation of state law implies the adoption of limitations such as a privilege defense applicable to law enforcement officers [in FTCA actions]. 819 F.2d 1289, 1300 n. 21 (5th Cir.1987). [6] While we have not directly addressed this issue, district courts in this circuit have held that federal law enforcement agents can invoke state law enforcement privileges. In Garza v. United States, the district court concluded that the Government could invoke the Texas law enforcement privilege as a defense to the plaintiff's assault claim in an FTCA case. 881 F.Supp. 1103, 1106 (S.D.Tex.1995) (Kazen, J.). The district court in Garza reasoned that while immunity defenses were unavailable following the reasoning of Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 76 S.Ct. 122, 100 L.Ed. 48 (1955), the Government may invoke law enforcement privileges: The distinction turns on the qualitative difference between an immunity and a privilege. Unlike an immunity, which affects liability but does not diminish the tort, a privilege protects the actor from a finding of tortious conduct. Put another way, an immunity insulates an individual from liability for public policy reasons, even when that individual has engaged in conduct that would otherwise be actionable. By contrast, a privilege recognizes that, because of the nature of their duties, some public officers may perform certain acts that might otherwise be tortious if committed by someone not having those duties. Garza, 881 F.Supp. at 1106 (quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Andrade v. United States, 116 F.Supp.2d 778, 787-89 (W.D.Tex.2000) (holding that the plaintiff's FTCA claims failed because the FBI agents were privileged to use reasonable force under Texas law); McElroy v. United States, 861 F.Supp. 585, 595 (W.D.Tex.1994) (concluding that the plaintiff's FTCA assault claim failed because the officer was privileged to use reasonable force under § 9.51(a)). We find the Garza court's distinction between immunities and privileges persuasive. Olson, to the extent it is applicable in the law enforcement context, does not limit the Government's ability to invoke the Texas statutory privilege here. Section 9.51(a) does not immunize state or municipal entities from liability, but rather it privileges the conduct of all peace officers who use reasonable force to effect an arrest. See Petta, 44 S.W.3d at 579-80. Since Olson 's holding concerns only whether state or municipal entity liability is an appropriate analogy for the Government's liability, we determine that it does not preclude the Government's invocation of § 9.51(a) here. Because Texas law provides a statutory civil privilege defense under § 9.51(a) for all peace officers, we hold that the Government can invoke this privilege for its law enforcement officers as well. To hold otherwise would lead to the absurd result that all federal arrests would subject the Government to tort liability under the FTCA absent a finding that the Government's actions conformed with the state's specific law regarding private person arrests. Instead, the appropriate private person analogy here is whether an individual, acting under color of state law, would be personally liable for assault in similar circumstances. Because that individual could invoke the § 9.51 privilege to avoid personal liability under Texas law, the Government can also invoke that privilege to avoid liability here. See Petta, 44 S.W.3d at 579-80; see also Saldaña, 2001 WL 85862, at .
Given that the Government can invoke the § 9.51(a) privilege, we must then ask whether the agents' conduct conformed to the requirements of § 9.51(a). The district court's findings, which are not clearly erroneous, indicate that the agents were (1) peace officers [7] who (2) identified themselves as officers when they entered the Salon, [8] (3) reasonably believed the arrest of Villafranca was lawful based on his resistance, [9] (4) made clear their purpose to arrest Villafranca, [10] and (5) used force reasonably believed to be immediately necessary to make the arrest. [11] See also Fraire v. City of Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268, 1276-77 (5th Cir.1992) (holding that a police officer was not liable for use of excessive force since § 9.51 requirements were satisfied); Hinojosa, 834 F.2d at 1231 (concluding that a state police officer is allowed to use force in necessary situations under § 9.51); Petta, 44 S.W.3d at 579 (A police officer is privileged to use force to the degree he reasonably believes is necessary to make an arrest, taking care that the force used is commensurate with the necessity.). Accordingly, we find that the DEA agents' actions were privileged under § 9.51(a), and thus the agents did not commit a tortious assault under Texas law. Therefore, the Government is not liable on Villafranca's assault claim.