Opinion ID: 552369
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defrauding a Bank

Text: 15 Former subsection (a)(1) prohibits a scheme or artifice ... to defraud a financial institution. Briggs contends that this section is inapplicable to her conduct, as her employers suffered the losses, not the banks. The banks were not even exposed to liability, so far as the record indicates. Accordingly, Briggs argues, she may have defrauded her employers, but not the banks. 16 Now, in light of the fact that the mail and wire fraud statutes have been used to prosecute frauds against intangible property rights, one might construct a response to Briggs' suggestion. Conceivably, the banks, though they are not Briggs' employers, have a right to expect honesty in the performance of her duties related to wire transfers. Maybe this right is an intangible property right. Perhaps Briggs defrauded the banks of this property. In a strictly grammatical sense, the charges to which Briggs pled guilty might seem open to such an interpretation, because the verb to defraud appears in both without an indirect object specifying what she stole. 5 17 However, the government does not make this argument (or any argument with respect to subsection (a)(1)). It is not hard to understand why. Even if grammatically plausible, an intangible property rights interpretation of these charges would be strained at best. Neither the indictment nor the information to which Briggs pled guilty mention intangible property or the right to honest services. As overt acts supporting the charges, both cite only the theft of funds. Accordingly, we think the fair reading of the indictment and information is that Briggs was charged with defrauding the financial institutions of money and funds. 6 18 Under this reading, Briggs' bank fraud conviction cannot be sustained under Sec. 1344(a)(1). She simply did not defraud the banks out of anything belonging to them. 19