Opinion ID: 1092846
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: first-degree felony murder jury instruction

Text: As a second guilt phase issue, Carpenter argues that the trial court erred in instructing the jury with a modified instruction for first-degree felony murder. After reviewing the record in this case and relevant case law, we determine that Carpenter is not entitled to relief on this issue. At the jury charge conference, the State requested that the trial court modify the standard jury instruction for first-degree felony murder to incorporate a principals theory of liability. Specifically, the State requested that the trial court include the phrase or his principal immediately following Carpenter's name in paragraphs 2.a. and 2.b. of the first-degree felony murder standard jury instruction, presumably to reflect Neil Pailing's involvement in the sexual battery predicate felony offense. Thus, instead of stating: The death occurred as a consequence of and while David C. Carpenter was engaged in the commission of sexual battery[,] or the death occurred as a consequence of and while David C. Carpenter was attempting to commit sexual battery, the proposed instruction provided: The death occurred as a consequence of and while David C. Carpenter or his principal was engaged in the commission of sexual battery[,] or the death occurred as a consequence of and while David C. Carpenter or his principal was attempting to commit sexual battery. (Emphasis added.) The State also proposed the same modification to paragraphs 2.a. and 2.b. of the third-degree felony murder instruction, with aggravated battery as the asserted underlying predicate felony offense. Finally, the State requested that the trial court give the standard instruction on principals, which provided: If two or more persons help each other [commit] [attempt to commit] a crime and the defendant is one of them, the defendant is a principal and must be treated as if [he][she] had done all the things the other person or persons did if the defendant: (1) knew what was going to happen (2) intended to participate actively or by sharing in an expected benefit and, (3) actually did something by which [he][she] intended to help [commit] [attempt to commit] the crime. [11] Relevant to Carpenter's claim on appeal, defense counsel objected to the proposed first-degree felony murder instruction, specifically arguing that there was no case law supporting a deviation from the standard instruction. [12] Defense counsel asserted that if the felony murder instruction was to be given, only the standard paragraph 2.a. instruction would be appropriate. Additionally, before the trial court proceeded after agreeing to instruct the jury on proposed paragraphs 2.a. and 2.b. of the first-degree felony murder charge as modified by the State, defense counsel again raised a strenuous objection to the instruction. Further, defense counsel objected to the reading of the standard principals instruction as not being based on the evidence in the case, and the trial court noted the objection and permitted a continuing objection on the principals instruction. Finally, defense counsel argued in Carpenter's motion for new trial that the court erred in improperly instructing the jury during the guilty phase of the trial. The State asserts that even though defense counsel objected to the modified first-degree felony murder instruction during the jury charge conference, the issue has not been preserved for our review because (1) defense counsel did not renew the objection to the modified first-degree felony murder charge at the close of the charge conference or when the jury was instructed; and (2) the trial court granted defense counsel's request to give the jury a special instruction on accessory after the fact and independent acts. See Answer Brief at 17-18. Contrary to the State's position, however, the fact that defense counsel did not renew its objection to the jury instructions clearly does not bar review here. See, e.g., State v. Heathcoat, 442 So.2d 955, 955-56 (Fla.1983) (finding that defense counsel sufficiently preserved jury instruction issue for review despite counsel's failure to object where the record clearly showed that defense counsel requested a specific instruction and the trial court clearly understood the request and just as clearly denied the request); Flint v. State, 463 So.2d 554, 555-56 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (relying on Heathcoat in finding that defense counsel could appeal jury instruction issue where charge conference colloquy indicated that defense counsel preserved objection to the trial court's failure to give requested instructions); see also Hubbard v. State, 411 So.2d 1312, 1314-15 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) (en banc); Saulsberry v. State, 398 So.2d 1017, 1017-18 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). It is clear that defense counsel satisfied the requirements of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.390(d) [13] by objecting during the charge conference and specifically advising the trial court of the basis for the objection. Further, the fact that the trial court granted defense counsel's request to give an independent acts instruction does not affect the preservation issue, although it does impact the merits of the jury instruction issue. In analyzing the merits of Carpenter's jury instruction issue, we note the following: This Court has explained that a trial court has wide discretion in instructing the jury, and the court's decision regarding the charge to the jury is reviewed with a presumption of correctness on appeal. Kearse v. State, 662 So.2d 677, 682 (Fla.1995). In that regard, a trial judge in a criminal case is not constrained to give only those instructions that are contained in the Florida Standard Jury Instructions. Cruse v. State, 588 So.2d 983 (Fla.1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 976, 112 S.Ct. 2949, 119 L.Ed.2d 572 (1992). James v. State, 695 So.2d 1229, 1236 (Fla. 1997); see also Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.985; Steele v. State, 561 So.2d 638 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); see generally 15A Fla.Jur.2d Criminal Law § 3507 (1993). We also note, however, that it is preferable that a standard jury instruction be given if it adequately explains the law, see, e.g., McGuire v. State, 639 So.2d 1043, 1047 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994), and giving a non-standard instruction that misleads the jury is reversible error. See, e.g., Doyle v. State, 483 So.2d 89, 90 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). In analyzing the modified instructions given in this case, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in giving those instructions. As the State points out, Carpenter does not challenge on appeal the fact that the trial court gave the jury the standard instruction on principals. Instead, Carpenter argues that adding the phrase or his principal to the standard first-degree felony murder instruction made it easier for the State to obtain a conviction. Initial Brief at 33. Although placement and utilization of the phrase or his principal may have been inartful, it was consistent with another portion of the standard first-degree felony murder instruction. As a whole, the instruction given by the trial court read as follows: Before you can find the defendant guilty of first degree felony murder, the state must prove the following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: One, Ann Powell is dead. Two, the death occurred as a consequence of and while David C. Carpenter or his principal was engaged in the commission of sexual battery, or the death occurred as a consequence of and while David C. Carpenter or his principal was attempting to commit sexual battery. Three, David C. Carpenter was the person who actually killed Ann Powell, or Ann Powell was killed by a person other than David C. Carpenter, but both David C. Carpenter and the person who killed Ann Powell were principals in the commission of sexual battery. (Emphasis added.) The trial court followed this instruction with a proper standard instruction on the law of principals, and then gave a specially requested instruction on independent acts after it read the modified first-degree murder instruction: If you find that the murder of Ann Powell was committed by a person or persons other than David C. Carpenter, and that the felony murder first degree was a totally independent act of someone other than David C. Carpenter, and if you further find that David C. Carpenter did not participate in the felony murder first degree in that it was completed prior to any participation he might have had, then you should find David C. Carpenter not guilty of felony murder first degree. Based on the above, it is clear that the modified instruction for first-degree felony murder given by the trial court was consistent with the law of principals. Moreover, by giving the special independent acts instruction, the trial court made it clear to the jury that Carpenter could not be found guilty for acts committed solely and independently by another. Therefore, we determine that Carpenter is not entitled to relief on this issue.