Opinion ID: 1902219
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Modified Allen Charge

Text: Booth submits that the trial court erred by giving a modified Allen charge after the jury reported an inability to agree on his first-degree principalship. This result obtains under special rules relating to capital sentencing which, Booth argues, render a nonverdict a verdict. The facts are these. From the time the venire assembled until submission of the case to the jury, this proceeding consumed eleven days, on seven of which testimony and arguments were presented. In its charge to the jury at the conclusion of all of the evidence, the court gave a modified Allen instruction in the form requested by the defense. Defense counsel devoted approximately half of his summation to arguing that Booth was not a principal in the first degree to the Irvin Bronstein murder. The jury began deliberations at 3:00 p.m. and was dismissed for the first calendar day of deliberations at 7:15 p.m. The next morning the court, with counsel, considered four requests from the jury. In response the court advised the jurors that they could not have a dictionary and that they would have to rely on their best recollections of the testimony of a principal state's witness, Jewell (Judy) Edwards Booth. The court also repeated its instructions on reasonable doubt and preponderance of the evidence. [2] At 9:17 a.m. the jurors resumed deliberations. Lunch orders were taken. At 2:25 p.m. on the second calendar day of deliberations the court received this message from the jury: Statement: We are split on Question 1, Section 1. We are unable to come to an agreement on that statement. This note referred to the following issue on the sentencing form furnished to the jury pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-343(e): Based upon the evidence, we unanimously find that each of the following statements marked `proven' has been proven BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT and that each of those statements marked `not proven' has not been proven BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. 1. The defendant was a principal in the first degree to the murder. _____________ _________________ proven not proven That provision of the Maryland Rules is an implementation of the definition of the terms defendant and person under the Maryland death penalty statutes wherein the quoted terms include only a principal in the first degree, except in contract murders. Md.Code (1957, 1992 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27,  413(e)(1). [3] Booth's counsel, upon learning of the jury's message, moved that the court dismiss the jury and impose a sentence of life imprisonment. The motion was predicated on a statutory provision which, at the time of the murders, read: If the jury, within a reasonable time, is not able to agree as to sentence, the court shall dismiss the jury and impose a sentence of imprisonment for life. Md.Code (1957, 1982 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27,  413(k)(2). The court overruled Booth's motion and instructed the jury as follows: I am going to reread to you the charge on the law so that you are clear as to what your responsibilities are in that area. The law requires that in order for you to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the State has proven that Mr. Booth was a first degree principal in the murder of Mr. Bronstein, all of you must agree within a reasonable time, and your verdict must be unanimous. If any of you cannot conclude that the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Booth is a principal in the murder of Mr. Bronstein, then you must mark `not proven' in the form and enter the words `life imprisonment' in Section 6. In arriving at your decision, you must consult with one another and deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement, if you can do so without violence to your individual judgment. Each of you must decide the case for yourself, but you must do so only after an impartial consideration of the evidence with your fellow jurors. During your deliberations, do not hesitate to re-examine your own views. You should change your opinion if convinced you are wrong, but do not surrender your honest belief as to the weight or effect of the evidence only because of opinions of your fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of reaching a verdict. Do you understand that instruction? THE JURY: Yes. THE COURT: Very well. Then I will ask you to go back to the jury room and continue your deliberations, please. At 5:50 p.m. on the second calendar day of deliberations the jury sent a message to the judge advising that two of its members were not feeling well. The jury asked to be excused for the evening, to return the next morning to continue deliberations. The defense motion, renewed at that time, was denied. On the third calendar day of deliberations the jury assembled at 9:00 a.m. and returned with its verdict at 2:25 p.m. Unanimously, and beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury found Booth was a principal in the first degree to the murder. Unanimously, and by a preponderance of the evidence, the jury found that the seven statutorily recognized mitigating factors did not exist and that there were no other mitigating factors. Thus, having unanimously found the aggravating factor of robbery, the sentence was death. The result of a hung jury in a capital sentencing proceeding differs from that in other cases. Under former  413(k)(2) a hung jury in the instant matter would result in the court's dismissing the jury and imposing a life sentence. In other types of criminal and civil cases, the result of a hung jury is a mistrial. Booth's argument has as its premise that, because of that difference, a jury in a capital sentencing proceeding may return as a verdict a statement that it is unable to agree. A corollary to that premise is that the jury's statement that it cannot agree is conclusive in determining when that point has been reached. Applying these concepts to the facts here, Booth views the jury's message to the court as a verdict of inability to agree, thereby requiring a life sentence. In any event, Booth submits that a modified Allen charge cannot be given because the permissible verdict of inability to agree is one which the jury must be allowed to reach without any attempt by the court to produce unanimity.
Although the capital sentencing procedures of some states function in the fashion advocated by Booth, Booth's position is contrary to Maryland procedure on the principalship issue. We considered former  413(k)(2) in Calhoun v. State, 297 Md. 563, 468 A.2d 45 (1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 993, 104 S.Ct. 2374, 80 L.Ed.2d 846 (1984), where Calhoun argued that it was error for the trial judge to refuse to instruct the jury that a life sentence would be imposed if the jury could not agree within a reasonable time. Id. at 593, 468 A.2d at 59. Rejecting that contention, we said: Giving the instruction to the jury before deliberation could prompt someone to hold out for just a bit more than a reasonable time to insure that the death penalty was not imposed. It likewise could cause a jury to rush through its deliberations to avoid being called back by the court and told that because a reasonable time had passed without a verdict the sentence would be life imprisonment. The statute is a mandate directed to the court, not the jury. As the jury here reached its decision within a reasonable time, no instruction was required. Id. at 595, 468 A.2d at 60. Thus, in Maryland, it is the court's function to determine whether the jury's total deliberations have extended beyond a reasonable time. Consequently, after having made that determination, it is the court which shall dismiss the jury and impose a sentence of imprisonment for life.  413(k)(7)(iii) and former  413(k)(2). The Maryland trial judge presiding over a capital sentencing proceeding before a jury basically retains the traditional role of determining whether the jury is hung. The complexities created by a unanimity requirement for all of the questions which a jury might be required to answer in a capital sentencing proceeding were fully exposed in the majority and dissenting opinions in Mills v. State, 310 Md. 33, 527 A.2d 3 (1987), sentence vacated, 486 U.S. 367, 108 S.Ct. 1860, 100 L.Ed.2d 384 (1988). This Court filed its opinion in Mills on June 25, 1987. On July 27, 1987, this Court, as an emergency measure, adopted amendments to Maryland Rule 4-343. 14 Md. Reg. 1854. Rule 4-343 is, in addition to being an exercise of this Court's constitutional rule-making authority, Md. Const. art. IV,  18, a response to the legislative invitation in  413(1) which reads: The Court of Appeals may adopt rules of procedure to govern the conduct of a sentencing proceeding conducted pursuant to this section, including any forms to be used by the court or jury in making its written findings and determinations of sentence. Section I of the capital sentencing verdict form, as adopted in 1987 and in effect at the time of the subject sentencing, resolves the earlier debate over whether principalship in the first degree is decided at the guilt or sentencing stage. Section I of the form also explicitly requires jury unanimity for a finding that first degree principalship either has or has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. There is no middle ground. There is no verdict under  I of the Rule 4-343 form whereby some jurors conclude proven and some conclude not proven. The reason for requiring unanimity as to whether first degree principalship either has or has not been proven is found in the rule-mandated directions at the conclusion of  I of the form. If the issue on principalship is marked `not proven,' [the jury is to] proceed to Section VI and enter `Life Imprisonment.' That is a verdict. But the jury may not automatically terminate the sentencing by declaring that it is unable to agree on principalship. Comparing  IV of the capital sentencing verdict form to  I highlights the conclusion stated above. Section IV deals with mitigating factors. As to each statutorily recognized mitigating factor, and as to any additional mitigating factors, the jury is to indicate one of three possible findings: [] (a) We unanimously find by a preponderance of the evidence that the above circumstance exists. [] (b) We unanimously find by a preponderance of the evidence that the above circumstance does not exist. [] (c) After a reasonable period of deliberation, one or more of us, but fewer than all 12, find by a preponderance of the evidence that the above circumstance exists. No other section of the sentencing form for capital cases is structured similarly to the mitigating circumstances section. Section IV permits the jury in effect to conclude that a reasonable period of deliberation has expired as to a mitigating circumstance, to check option (c) as to that circumstance, and to move on. In  I, on the other hand, the jury has only two options. It must be unanimous in its conclusion as to either, and, if the jury cannot achieve unanimity, the court, rather than the jury, decides whether a reasonable period of time has expired, so that a sentence of death may not be imposed. Booth's argument ÔÇö that inability to agree is a verdict ÔÇö is inspired by Rush v. State, 491 A.2d 439 (Del. 1985) and by State v. Hunt, 115 N.J. 330, 558 A.2d 1259 (1989). The special verdict form in Rush asked two questions, whether the jury unanimously found an aggravating circumstance and, if so, whether the jury unanimously recommended death. A yes or no answer was to be supplied to each question. [4] Id. at 449 n. 12. After approximately two hours of deliberation, the jurors, who had already signed the form, advised the court that they could not reach a unanimous decision on the second question, and asked for an instruction how to fill in the special verdict form. It was in that context that the Delaware court stated: In view of the unequivocal announcement that the jury was unable to reach unanimous agreement as to the death sentence, we hold that, under all of the circumstances, such announcement constituted, by necessary implication, a verdict having the same force and effect as a written `No' answer to Interrogatory No. 2. Id. at 454. In Hunt, a trial judge received a note from a jury saying that [w]e cannot find a unanimous decision on the mitigating factor [sic] outweighing the aggravating factor. 558 A.2d at 1283. The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that, rather than immediately send the jury back for further deliberations, the trial judge should have asked whether the note stated [the jury's] verdict or whether the jury wanted more time to deliberate. Id.; compare State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 524 A.2d 188, 279-80 (1987). For reasons which involve some major leaps in logic from a concern to a likelihood, the court announced the following result: If the trial court had asked the right question, it might have learned the jury had reached a final verdict resulting in imprisonment rather than death. We are concerned that absent the trial court's error, there was `not merely a theoretical possibility but a substantial likelihood,' that a non-unanimous verdict would have been returned. Confronted with that likelihood, we cannot require defendant to run the risk that a different jury might decide he should die. On remand, defendant may not again be subjected to the death penalty. 558 A.2d at 1285 (citation omitted). Rush was argued to the Supreme Court of Georgia in Romine v. State, 256 Ga. 521, 350 S.E.2d 446 (1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1024, 107 S.Ct. 1912, 95 L.Ed.2d 517 (1987). The Supreme Court of Georgia said: [I]t does not follow that, because the consequences of a hung jury on the question of sentence differ from the consequences of a hung jury on the question of guilt, the decision of whether the jury is truly deadlocked must be taken from the sound discretion of the trial judge and given to the jury. In contrast to the policy codified in Delaware law, under Georgia law a jury is expected to review the evidence and to endeavor to reach unanimity `one way or the other' on the question of sentence, and, if possible, to affirmatively and unanimously recommend either death or mercy. 350 S.E.2d at 450. In the instant matter, whether the jury was hung on the issue in  I of the form, and whether a mistrial should have been declared and a life sentence imposed, were, like Georgia law on the sentence, questions for the trial court to decide in its discretion. See also Fretwell v. State, 289 Ark. 91, 708 S.W.2d 630, 633 (1986); Commonwealth v. Chester, 526 Pa. 578, 587 A.2d 1367, 1379-81, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 112 S.Ct. 152, 422, 116 L.Ed.2d 117, 442 (1991); Montoya v. State, 810 S.W.2d 160, 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 426, 116 L.Ed.2d 446 (1991). [5]
Closely related to Booth's non-unanimous verdict premise is Booth's argument that the modified Allen charge given in this case was coercive. The ultimate paragraph of Judge Angeletti's modified Allen charge is substantially the instruction which the United States Supreme Court found not to be coercive in the capital punishment case of Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 108 S.Ct. 546, 98 L.Ed.2d 568 (1988). Lowenfield was a Louisiana capital murder prosecution, State v. Lowenfield, 495 So.2d 1245 (La. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1153, 106 S.Ct. 2259, 90 L.Ed.2d 704 (1986), which came to the court after the denial of federal habeas corpus had been affirmed by the Fifth Circuit, 817 F.2d 285 (1987), over a dissent. The Supreme Court held: Louisiana law provides that if the jury hangs, the court shall impose a sentence of life imprisonment. Petitioner naturally urges that this difference makes the charge here impermissible under the Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment. The difference between the division of function between the jury and judge in this case and the division in Allen obviously weighs in the constitutional calculus, but we do not find it dispositive. The State has in a capital sentencing proceeding a strong interest in having the jury `express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death.' Surely if the jury had returned from its deliberations after only one hour and informed the court that it had failed to achieve unanimity on the first ballot, the court would incontestably have had the authority to insist that they deliberate further. This is true even in capital cases such as this one and Allen, even though we are naturally mindful in such cases that the `qualitative difference between death and other penalties calls for a greater degree of reliability when the death sentence is imposed.' 484 U.S. at 238-39, 108 S.Ct. at 551, 98 L.Ed.2d at 577-78 (citations omitted). Rush, decided prior to Lowenfield, had held that, in a death penalty hearing in which lack of unanimity per se results in a sentence of life imprisonment, [a modified Allen ] instruction is fatal as being overly coercive. 491 A.2d at 453. Rush was followed on this point in Ex parte Giles, 554 So.2d 1089, 1093 (Ala. 1987), which was also decided prior to Lowenfield. Here, the jury advised that its inability to agree related to the first issue, that of principalship. That is an issue on which Maryland procedure seeks unanimity. The charge which the court gave did not focus on the minority. It was not coercive simply because the proceeding involved potential capital sentencing. Compare Graham v. State, 325 Md. 398, 412-13, 601 A.2d 131, 137-38 (1992) (modified Allen charge is not per se coercive even if the jury reveals the numerical division) and Mayfield v. State, 302 Md. 624, 631-32, 490 A.2d 687, 691-92 (1985) (same). Nor, considering the evidence and the seriousness of the matter to Booth and to the community, did the court abuse its discretion in repeating the Allen -type instruction.