Opinion ID: 203229
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Discovery and an Evidentiary Hearing

Text: The district court dismissed the plaintiffs' original action for insufficient service of process under Rule 12(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The plaintiffs do not argue that the existing record substantiates that they provided adequate service of process to any of the defendants. Rather, they contend that the district court erred by denying their request for limited discovery and an evidentiary hearing for the purpose of determining whether McNamara was authorized to accept service of process for the defendant officers. In relevant part, Rule 4(e)(2) of the Federal Rules permits a plaintiff to effect service by delivering a copy of [the summons and complaint] to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2)(C). This action was brought in a federal district court located in Massachusetts, and service was attempted in Massachusetts; therefore, the plaintiffs were also permitted to serve the defendants in accordance with Massachusetts state law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1). Massachusetts likewise allows a plaintiff to effect service [u]pon an individual by . . . delivering a copy 7 Under Rule 15(c)(1)(B), an amended complaint relates back to a prior complaint where the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set outor attempted to be set out--in the original pleading. -10- of the summons and of the complaint to an agent authorized by appointment or by statute to receive service of process. Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1). The district court declined the plaintiffs' requests for discovery and an evidentiary hearing based on its determination that they were merely grasp[ing] at straws without any realistic prospect of success. Blair v. City of Worcester, Nos. 02-40152-FDS, 02-40153-FDS, 2006 WL 1581582, at  (D. Mass. Mar. 13, 2006). A district court generally retains broad discretion in determining whether to grant jurisdictional8 discovery. United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 274 F.3d 610, 626 (1st Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). Accordingly, [t]he standard for reversing a district court's decision to disallow jurisdictional discovery is high. Id. To obtain relief, the aggrieved party must show that the lower court's discovery order was plainly wrong and resulted in substantial prejudice. Id. (citation omitted).9 8 Several cases to which we cite technically pertain to dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or Rule 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction. Nonetheless, these cases lend insight to our present inquiry. We note that the parties and district court have cited such cases interchangeably, as well. 9 As a preliminary matter, the plaintiffs argue that application of the ordinary abuse of discretion standard is inappropriate in this case. They reason that an erroneous legal assumption underlying the district court's analysis of the returns of service executed by Deputy Richard tainted its subsequent review of all of the issues pertaining to this appeal. Thus, the plaintiffs contend that de novo review is appropriate, given the purported legal error. Because we reverse even under the abuse of -11- In contrast, the threshold showing that a plaintiff must present to the district court to merit limited discovery is relatively low. See Surpitski v. Hughes-Keenan Corp., 362 F.2d 254, 255-256 (1st Cir. 1966) (per curiam) (explaining that a party should be allowed to conduct jurisdictional discovery when its position is not frivolous); see generally Swiss Am. Bank, 274 F.3d at 637 (As a general matter, discovery . . . should be freely permitted . . . . (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Edmond v. U.S. Postal Serv. Gen. Counsel, 949 F.2d 415, 425 (D.C. Cir. 1991))). Moreover, factual disputes regarding agency should typically be resolved only after a live hearing, see Rivera-Lopez v. Municipality of Dorado, 979 F.2d 885, 887 (1st Cir. 1992), in order to explore issues of credibility and resolve . . . unanswered questions implicated by the parties' briefing. Padilla-Mangual v. Pavia Hosp., 516 F.3d 29, 34, (1st Cir. 2008). Indeed, we may find an abuse of discretion even where the lower court's decision is by no means wholly unsupported by the record. Id. Thus, where a plaintiff can demonstrate the existence of a plausible factual disagreement or ambiguity, our jurisprudence favors permitting the litigants the opportunity to flesh out the record. See id. Here, the returns of service executed by Deputy Richard state, in relevant part: discretion standard, we need not resolve this question. -12- I hereby certify and return that on 11/25/2002 at 11:59 AM I served a true and attested copy of the Summons, Complaint and Jury Demand in this action in the following manner: To wit, by delivering in hand to KATHERIN [sic] MCNAMARA, agent, person in charge at the time of service for [the defendant officer] at WORCESTER POLICE DEPARTMENT, 9-11 LINCOLN SQ, WORCESTER, MA. As the defendants point out, the language of the returns seems designed to indicate both service of an agent under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2) and Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1), and service of a person in charge of [a] business under Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(2), which provides one method for the service of corporations and unincorporated associations. Quite obviously, Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(2) is completely inapplicable to service of the defendant officers in their individual capacities. A return of service generally serves as prima facie evidence that service was validly performed. See, e.g., O'Brien v. R.J. O'Brien & Assocs., Inc., 998 F.2d 1394, 1398 (7th Cir. 1993); Curley v. Radow, No. 00-10956-GAO, 2007 WL 2060015, at -5 (D. Mass. July 16, 2007); Johnson v. Witkowski, 573 N.E.2d 513, 524 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991). Whether or not this return of service qualifies as such evidence, the defendants have adduced sufficient rebuttal evidence to refute any presumption of valid service. In an affidavit, McNamara stated that: I have not been authorized or appointed by Peter Towler, Thomas Dowd, Daniel Dowd, Thomas