Opinion ID: 158241
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Separate Establishments

Text: 12 Plaintiffs argue that the district court failed to identify the correct establishment in assessing the applicability of the 213(b)(29) exemption. The court concluded that Keystone's ski area and non-skiing operations constitute a single establishment but that Arapahoe Basin is separate from Keystone. Plaintiffs challenge the ruling that Keystone and Arapahoe Basin are separate establishments. In their view, KRMI's operations, marketing, and strategic plan, combined with [t]he close proximity of Arapahoe Basin to Keystone's lodging facilities, and brevity of the shuttle bus ride between them show that Arapahoe Basin and Keystone comprised a single establishment during the relevant time period. Aplt. Br. at 30. 13 In focusing on administrative and economic integration, Plaintiffs misconstrue the meaning of establishment under the FLSA. Both the Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit have held that Congress used the word 'establishment' to mean a distinct physical place of business rather than an integrated business enterprise. Brennan v. Yellowstone Park Lines, Inc., 478 F.2d 285, 289 (10th Cir. 1973) (citing Phillips, Inc., v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490 (1945)). In Yellowstone Park Lines, we reasoned that, because of the physical distance between restaurants, hotels, and other types of lodging and services within Yellowstone Park, such businesses could not be considered as one integrated unit subject to exemption under [29 U.S.C. 213(a)(3)], the provision governing seasonal recreational establishments. See id. at 290. The various establishments were separate, even though central management made policy for all of them and at least two classes of employees served more than one establishment. See id. at 288-89; see also 29 C.F.R. 779.23 (1998) (the word establishment, as it appears in 213(b), means a 'distinct physical place of business' rather than . . . 'an entire business or enterprise' which may include several separate places of business). 14 The case law in at least one other circuit also supports the district court's ruling on the separate establishment issue. In Mitchell v. Birkett, 286 F.2d 474, 477-78 (8th Cir. 1961), two photography shops located nine miles apart were deemed separate establishments under the FLSA. The Eighth Circuit stated: 15 Common ownership and close functional and economic relationship between physically separated units of a business are not sufficient to make such combined units a single establishment, particularly where, as here, the geographic separation is substantial. 16 Id. at 478. Although the Yellowstone establishments were more than fifty miles apart, a much greater distance than that between Keystone and Arapahoe Basin, see Yellowstone Park Lines, 478 F.2d at 287, Birkett demonstrates that some courts consider only a few miles a substantial geographic separation for the purposes of the FLSA. See Birkett, 286 F.2d at 477-78. 17 In the instant case, Plaintiffs allege that the two ski areas marketed their operations as one enterprise, exchanged some employees, and lacked separate accounting and management. However, issues of business integration are not dispositive in determining whether establishments are separate. Given the six-mile separation between Arapahoe Basin and Keystone, we hold that they constitute separate establishments for the purposes of 213(b)(29).