Opinion ID: 2163595
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: TRANSFERRED INTENT UNDER ง 53a-54a(a)

Text: We next address the defendant's related contention that the trial court misapplied the doctrine of transferred intent by permitting the state to rely on that legal principle in establishing that the defendant had murdered Antonia. Specifically, the defendant asserts that his intent to kill Rodgers could not be transferred to Antonia because, at the time he assaulted and killed Rodgers, Antonia was not yet a person within the meaning of ง 53a-54a(a). According to the defendant, the transferred intent principle has never been applied to situations in which the defendant's intent to kill a person is transferred to another entity that had not legally attained the status of a `person' at the time the defendant acted. Our recognition of the applicability of the born alive rule to the law of homicide also is dispositive of the defendant's transferred intent claim. The doctrine of transferred intent operates to render a defendant culpable of the murder of a third person when the defendant causes the death of that third person with the intent to cause the death of someone else. See, e.g., State v. Higgins, 265 Conn. 35, 51-52, 826 A.2d 1126 (2003); State v. Henry, supra, 253 Conn. at 359, 752 A.2d 40. The principle, which is reflected in the express language of ง 53a-54a(a), represents a policy determination by the legislature that a defendant who engages in such conduct is no less culpable than if he had killed his intended victim. As we previously explained, under the born alive rule, a person who inflicts injuries on a fetus in utero with the intent to kill that fetus is guilty of murder if the fetus is born alive but subsequently dies as a result of the injuries suffered in utero. Consequently, the born alive rule operates to render the fetus a person for purposes of our homicide statutes if that fetus, having been injured in utero, nevertheless is born alive and then dies of the injuries sustained in utero. Put differently, in that particular factual scenario, the fetus is treated like any other person. Thus, a defendant who, intending to kill a pregnant woman, inflicts injuries on the fetus that prove to be fatal only after the fetus is born alive, that is, once the fetus has achieved the status of a person under the born alive rule, is guilty of murder by operation of the transferred intent doctrine embodied in ง 53a-54a(a). In other words, because a fetus that is born alive is a person for purposes of our homicide statutes, the transferred intent provisions of ง 53a-54a(a) are equally applicable to a fetus that is born alive as they are to any other person. The defendant has provided no persuasive reason why these two principles, each of which represents the public policy of this state as determined by the legislature, should not be applied in tandem for purposes of interpreting our statutory scheme. In the absence of any such reason, we reject his claim that the transferred intent provisions of ง 53a-54a(a) are inapplicable to the present case. [69]