Opinion ID: 1259155
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Limitations on the Court's Power

Text: Having explored the source of the court's power to discipline attorneys, we turn to the scope of the court's power and the ability of other branches of government to limit courts in the exercise of this power. Respondent argues that, when it enacted § 12-109, the legislature limited the State Bar to recovering only those costs that are taxable in a civil action. We reject Respondent's argument. The statute, by its terms, is inapplicable to disciplinary actions. Moreover, any attempt to interpret § 12-109 to encompass disciplinary actions would raise constitutional questions.
Respondent argues that § 12-109 limits the court's power to assess costs and expenses in a disciplinary proceeding to only those costs that may be taxed in a civil action. Section 12-109 provides in part: The supreme court, by rules promulgated from time to time, shall regulate pleading, practice and procedure in judicial proceedings in all courts of the state for the purpose of simplifying such pleading, practice and procedure and promoting speedy determination of litigation upon its merits. The rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify substantive rights of a litigant. (Emphasis added.) Citing State v. Griswold, 8 Ariz. App. 361, 364, 446 P.2d 467, 470 (1968), Respondent maintains that costs can be imposed only when authorized by statute. [13] He therefore argues that the court is limited to assessing only those costs that may be taxed in a civil action. Respondent argues that the taxing of expenses under rule 52(a)(8), Arizona Rules of the Supreme Court, is merely the taxing of costs under an expanded definition of costs. Thus, according to Respondent, because the rules expand the scope of costs that the State Bar can recover in a civil action, the rules modify Respondent's substantive rights, in violation of § 12-109. We reject this argument because § 12-109, by its terms, does not attempt to limit courts in the exercise of their power to regulate the practice of law. The United States Supreme Court discussed the effect of § 12-109 on Arizona Supreme Court rules regulating the conduct of attorneys. See Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 104 S.Ct. 1989, 80 L.Ed.2d 590 (1984). One of the issues addressed in Hoover was the effective date of an amendment to various rules regarding admission to the State Bar of Arizona. 466 U.S. at 561-62 n. 3, 104 S.Ct. at 1991-92 n. 3. The Court in Hoover rejected Respondent's argument that the legislature, through its enactment of § 12-109, limited the court's ability to make its amendments concerning the admission to the Bar immediately effective. 466 U.S. at 561-62 n. 3, 104 S.Ct. at 1991-92 n. 3. As the United States Supreme Court stated, this statute, by its terms, does not limit the jurisdiction of the Arizona Supreme Court to establish the terms of admission to practice law; instead, [this] section only applie[s] to Rules that regulate[] pleading, practice, and procedure in judicial proceedings in state courts. Hoover, 466 U.S. at 561-62 n. 3, 104 S.Ct. at 1991-93 n. 3. We agree with the Court's interpretation of § 12-109 and find that it is as inapplicable to the rules we promulgated concerning attorney discipline as it was to the rules that we promulgated governing admission to the Bar. Rules regulating the practice of law, from admitting an attorney to disciplining an attorney, have nothing to do with regulating pleading, practice and procedure in judicial proceedings. Accordingly we find that § 12-109 does not limit us in the exercise of our jurisdiction over disciplinary matters. Not only does this interpretation comport with the plain meaning of the statute's language, but it avoids the constitutional implications raised by the interpretation that Respondent urges on the court.
A basic tenet of statutory construction is that statutes should be construed so as to be constitutional whenever possible. Stillman v. Marston, 107 Ariz. 208, 209, 484 P.2d 628, 629 (1971) (citations omitted). The interpretation of § 12-109 that Respondent urges us to adopt would allow the legislature to limit this court in determining the range of sanctions that we could impose in disciplining an attorney. Such an interpretation unnecessarily implicates constitutional concerns. The Arizona Constitution grants this court the power to determine who shall practice law in Arizona and under what condition. Hunt, 127 Ariz. at 261-62, 619 P.2d at 1038-39. Necessarily included within this power is the power to discipline those admitted to practice law. E.g., In re Riley, 142 Ariz. 604, 607, 691 P.2d 695, 698 (1984). As we have explained previously, one is admitted to the bar only after having met the requisite qualifications. See, e.g., Bailey, 30 Ariz. at 411, 248 P. at 30, discussing Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 378-79. Correspondingly, the court has the power to remove from the practice those no longer fit. In re Greer, 52 Ariz. 385, 390, 81 P.2d 96, 98 (1938). It necessarily follows, then, that the court has the power to impose sanctions that fall short of disbarment. One of the sanctions that this court requires is the imposition of costs and expenses on disciplined attorneys. [14] See rule 52(a)(8), Arizona Rules of the Supreme Court. This court finds that imposing the costs and expenses incurred by the State Bar in a disciplinary action on disciplined attorneys is necessary to effectively carry out our constitutional duties. Recovering costs and expenses from disciplined attorneys assists us in our duty to protect the public from those attorneys who are guilty of misconduct in a number of ways. The discipline process is a costly endeavor. According to the State Bar's audited financial statements, the Bar's single largest category of expenditures was for attorney discipline. Disciplinary costs account for a large percentage of membership dues. [15] As one court noted when authorizing the State Bar to impose a special annual assessment on its members to finance disciplinary activities, the [c]ourt's duty to protect itself, the judiciary, and the citizens of [the] State from persons unfit to practice law ... should not be hampered by the absence of adequate financing to do the job.... Mississippi State Bar, 361 So.2d at 506. By shifting some of the financial burden of disciplinary procedures to those who are directly responsible for the costs, we insure the ability of the State Bar to continue its efforts in this area without having to ask the State Bar's members to further subsidize the Bar's disciplinary efforts. [16] Not only is the assessment of costs against an attorney who committed misconduct a more equitable means of financing the disciplinary process, but the imposition of costs and expenses serves the additional function of deterring other lawyers from engaging in unprofessional conduct. Moreover, as with restitution, we consider the imposition of costs and fees to be part of the rehabilitative process of our disciplinary proceeding. See Levine, 174 Ariz. at 176 n. 21, 847 P.2d at 1123 n. 21. Respondent argues that § 12-109 limits the court's ability to impose costs and fees on a sanctioned attorney. Although we have recognized the legislature's power to enact legislation in this area, we consistently have held that the legislature does not have the power to enact laws that would make it impossible, or even unreasonably difficult for the judicial department to perform its constitutional function. E.g., In re Miller, 29 Ariz. 582, 596, 244 P. 376, 380 (1926). Because we find that the imposition of costs and expenses plays an important and necessary function in our disciplinary process, we would be unnecessarily implicating constitutional questions if we were to interpret § 12-109 as applying to disciplinary actions. And this we will not do. We therefore find that § 12-109 does not apply to disciplinary actions.