Opinion ID: 2119163
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: authority to arbitrate.

Text: Appellant contends that there is no provision in the collective bargaining agreement that makes a denial of a request for transfer arbitrable, and therefore the arbitrator was without jurisdiction to arbitrate the dispute. . . . The arbitrators obtain their authority from the contract, and the task of interpreting the contract to determine whether the dispute is arbitrate and whether the arbitrator has jurisdiction is for a court. Jt. School District No. 10 v. Jefferson Ed. Asso., 78 Wis.2d 94, 101, 253 N.W.2d 536 (1977). . . . The arbitrator cannot, except by agreement of the parties, be the judge of the scope of his authority under the contract. . . . Id. at 101, 102. [1,2] In this case, the collective bargaining agreement is an agreement to submit certain future grievances to arbitration. Part III, Section I. A. 1. of the Agreement states: 1. Differences involving the interpretation, application or enforcement of the provisions of this Agreement or the application of a rule or regulation of the Chief of Police affecting wages, hours, or conditions of employment and not inconsistent with the 1911 Special Laws of the State of Wisconsin, Chapter 586, and amendments thereto shall constitute a grievance under the provisions set forth below. The agreement does not expressly or impliedly give the arbitrator the authority to determine the scope of his jurisdiction and make a final and binding decision on the question of arbitrability. Moreover, the parties did not submit the issue of arbitrability for a final and binding decision; the parties submitted the merits of the dispute to the arbitrator, and at the same time the appellant challenged the arbitrability of the transfer question. Therefore, this court may determine the issue of substantive arbitrabilitythat is, whether Stabbe's grievance was arbitrable within the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. When the court determines arbitrability it must exercise great caution. The court has no business weighing the merits of the grievance. It is the arbitrators' decision for which the parties bargained. In Dehnart v. Waukesha Brewing Co., Inc., 17 Wis.2d 44, 115 N.W.2d 490 (1962), this court adopted the Steelworkers Trilogy teachings of the court's limited function. The court's function is limited to a determination whether there is a construction of the arbitration clause that would cover the grievance on its face and whether any other provision of the contract specifically excludes it. . . . Jt. School District No. 10 v. Jefferson Ed. Asso., supra, at 111. In Jt. School District No. 10 v. Jefferson Ed. Asso., supra , this court held that, although the Steelworkers Cases involved broad arbitration clauses submitting questions of contract interpretation to the arbitrator and the contract in the case before the court contained a narrow arbitration clause, the fundamental pronouncements on the issue of arbitrability as set forth in the Steelworkers Trilogy were applicable to that case. [3] The present case involves a broad arbitration clause, providing for arbitration of any differences arising between the parties as to the interpretation, application or enforcement of the provisions of the agreement. Therefore the grievance alleged in this case is subject to arbitration because, as stated in the Steelworkers Cases: An order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage. United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582, 583 (1960). The provisions in the collective bargaining agreement to which appellant refers in order to support its contention that the matter of transfers is not arbitrable appear in Part II of the Agreement under Section C, MANAGEMENT RIGHTS, and state as follows: 6. The City and the Chief of Police shall have the right to transfer employes within the Police Department in a manner most advantageous to the City. 7. Except as otherwise specifically provided in this Agreement, the City, the Chief of Police and the Fire and Police Commission shall retain all rights and authority to which by law they are entitled. But respondent contends that it is precisely that provision granting the city and chief of police the right to transfer employees in a manner most advantageous to the City which gave the arbitrator the authority to arbitrate the dispute. [4] Appellant argues that subsections 6 and 7 quoted above specifically acknowledge the statutory authority of the chief to transfer. Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the chief of police and the city improperly interpreted and applied section 6 when the chief refused to grant grievant's request for a transfer. The arguments of both parties center around the interpretation to be given to subsection 6 of Part II, C of the Agreement. Thus, a difference involving the interpretation of the Agreement has arisen. The arbitration clause, therefore, covers the grievance on its face and there is no other provision of the contract which specifically excludes it. Jt. School District No. 10 v. Jefferson Ed. Asso., supra .