Opinion ID: 1992848
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Hardship on defendant's family as a mitigating factor

Text: Defendant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to allow the jury to consider the hardship of defendant's execution on his wife and children as mitigating factors under the catch-all mitigating factor, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(h). He claims that by precluding the jury from considering those factors, the trial court violated his due process rights and his right to be protected from cruel and unusual punishment. While the penalty-phase jury selection was in progress, the State moved to bar three of defendant's proposed mitigating factors: 27. Mr. Loftin's execution would be a hardship to his family. 28. Mr. Loftin's execution would be a hardship to his five-year old daughter, Danielle. 29. Mr. Loftin's execution would be a hardship to his three-year old son, Jay. The State had not previously questioned the appropriateness of those factors, and all of the jurors who had been qualified in the first five and one-half weeks of the penalty-phase voir dire had been informed that those mitigating factors were among the factors to be presented. In striking the three mitigating factors, the trial court noted that the factors did not relate to either defendant's character, record, or the circumstances of the offense. The basis for the trial court's ruling was our opinion in DiFrisco, supra, 137 N.J. 434, 645 A. 2d 734. In that case the defendant attempted to introduce as a mitigating factor evidence that his execution would cause excessive emotional hardship to his mother, because she had already lost one son. Id. at 505, 645 A. 2d 734. The trial court denied the defendant's request to introduce the factor under the catch-all category, holding that the factor did not relate to defendant's character, record, or the circumstances of the offense. In affirming the exclusion, we held that it did not come within the catch-all factor because it neither relates to defendant's character or record, nor to the circumstances of the offense, but rather focuses on the potential impact on a third party. Its exclusion was entirely proper. Id. at 505-06, 645 A. 2d 734 (emphasis added). Because of the unique nature of the death penalty, the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require in nearly every capital case, that the sentencer not be precluded from considering as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death. Lockett, supra, 438 U.S. at 604, 98 S.Ct. at 2964, 57 L.Ed. 2d at 990; accord Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2991, 49 L.Ed. 2d 944, 961 (1976). In accordance with the Supreme Court's mandate, we have broadly interpreted the scope of the factors that may be submitted and considered under the catch-all factor. See Gerald, supra, 113 N.J. at 102, 549 A. 2d 792; see also State v. Davis, 96 N.J. 611, 620, 477 A. 2d 308 (1984) (holding that in capital case, the sentencing process should embrace an evidential inquiry `broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information that may be considered, or the sources from which it may come.') (citations omitted). Although the scope of the catch-all factor is broad, that scope is not unlimited. Gerald, supra, 113 N.J. at 103, 549 A. 2d 792. We have consistently held that the proffered evidence must be relevant to a defendant's character, record, or the circumstances of the offense. Ibid.; Davis, supra, 96 N.J. at 618, 477 A. 2d 308; accord Lockett, supra, 438 U.S. at 604, 98 S.Ct. at 2964, 57 L.Ed. 2d at 990. Indeed, in DiFrisco II, supra, 137 N.J. at 505-06, 645 A. 2d 734, we specifically held that mitigating evidence that focuses on the potential impact on a third party is not relevant to a defendant's character, record, or the circumstances of the offense, and therefore could properly be excluded. Although testimony concerning the potential impact of an execution on a third party may be excluded, a defendant is nevertheless able to provide a wealth of character evidence as revealed by his relationships with his family members. Even if the trial court's refusal to allow the jury to consider the impact of defendant's execution on his wife and children as mitigating factors was an error, the error would have been harmless, because defendant presented the jury with a multitude of character evidence that directly focused on his relationship with his wife and children. Defendant was allowed to allege and prove as mitigating factors that he has the love and support of his family (factor 30); that he was a considerate and loving son (factor 11); and that he provided siblings with a positive sense of direction (factor 12). In addition, defendant alleged and presented testimony that he shared a positive relationship with his wife and children (factor 17); that he was a loving father (factor 26); and that he maintained employment and provided for his wife and children (factor 17). The accumulation of those mitigating factors was sufficient to cure any error that might have resulted due to preclusion of the rejected mitigating factors regarding the impact of defendant's death on third parties, and therefore we hold that any such error was harmless.