Opinion ID: 2602094
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Prosecutorial References to Defendant's Refusal to Submit Sample for DNA Testing

Text: [¶24] The prosecutor referred to Mr. Smith's refusal to submit a sample for DNA testing in his opening statement and closing argument and also elicited testimony about Mr. Smith's refusal from the lead investigator. Mr. Smith claims the prosecutor's questions and comments violated his constitutional right to remain silent and amounted to prosecutorial misconduct. [¶25] The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant the right to remain silent, so as not to incriminate himself. Wyoming Constitution Art. I, § 11 provides similar protection. See, e.g., Tortolito v. State, 901 P.2d 387, 389 (Wyo. 1995) (on rehearing). The prosecutor violates a defendant's due process rights if he comments upon the accused's silence in order to infer guilt. See, e.g., Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618-19, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976); Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 291, 106 S.Ct. 634, 88 L.Ed.2d 623 (1986). Our standard of review on questions involving interpretation of constitutional rights is de novo. See State v. Naples, 2006 WY 125, ¶ 9, 143 P.3d 358, 361 (Wyo. 2006). [¶26] In addressing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, our focus is on the prejudice suffered by the defendant. In Gabbert v. State, 2006 WY 108, ¶ 21, 141 P.3d 690, 697 (Wyo. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Granzer v. State, 2008 WY 118, 193 P.3d 266 (Wyo. 2008), we described our standard of review as follows: When reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, the entire record must be considered. Whether such misconduct is reviewed on the basis of harmless error, W.R.Cr.P. 52(a) and W.R.A.P. 9.04, or on the basis of plain error, W.R.Cr.P. 52(b) and W.R.A.P. 9.05, our primary focus is whether an accused's case has been so seriously prejudiced by the error that a fair trial has been denied. Butcher v. State, 2005 WY 146, ¶ 38, 123 P.3d 543, 554 (Wyo. 2005); Lopez v. State, 2004 WY 103, ¶ 56, 98 P.3d 143, 157 (Wyo.2004). This involves a determination as to whether, based on the entire record, a reasonable possibility exists that, in the absence of the error, the verdict might have been more favorable to the accused. Lopez, ¶ 56, 98 P.3d at 157. [The appellant] bears the burden of establishing prejudicial error. Butcher, ¶ 39, 123 P.3d at 554. See also, Szymanski v. State, 2007 WY 139, ¶ 27, 166 P.3d 879, 886 (Wyo. 2007). [¶27] The United States Supreme Court has expressly ruled that the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, i.e., the right to remain silent, only extends to testimonial or communicative evidence. In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), the Supreme Court explained that blood evidence obtained from a suspect's body is not testimonial or communicative evidence and does not, therefore, fit within the Fifth Amendment privilege. [T]he privilege protects an accused only from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature, and . . . the withdrawal of blood and use of the analysis in question in this case did not involve compulsion to these ends. Id. [¶28] Expanding upon Schmerber, the Supreme Court ruled in South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 564, 103 S.Ct. 916, 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983), that the state court improperly held an implied consent statute which allowed a defendant's refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test to be used as evidence against him violated the privilege against self-incrimination. Although the decision considered South Dakota's implied consent statute, the Supreme Court's decision was not dependent upon the statutory language. Instead, the Supreme Court recognized that protecting the defendant from being compelled to testify against himself is the lynchpin of the Fifth Amendment protection. Id. [¶29] In Neville, the defendant had been given the option of taking the test or refusing. The defendant was not, however, specifically informed that, if he refused, his refusal could be used as evidence against him. Id. at 555-56. While the Court recognized the choice was not always an easy one for a defendant, using his refusal against him did not implicate Fifth Amendment concerns. The Court explained: [T]he values behind the Fifth Amendment are not hindered when the state offers a suspect the choice of submitting to the blood-alcohol test or having his refusal used against him. The simple blood-alcohol test is so safe, painless, and commonplace, see Schmerber [v. California ], 384 U.S. [757], 771, 86 S.Ct. [1826], at 1836 [16 L.Ed.2d 908], that respondent concedes, as he must, that the state could legitimately compel the suspect, against his will, to accede to the test. Given, then, that the offer of taking a blood-alcohol test is clearly legitimate, the action becomes no less legitimate when the State offers a second option of refusing the test, with the attendant penalties for making that choice. Nor is this a case where the State has subtly coerced respondent into choosing the option it had no right to compel, rather than offering a true choice. To the contrary, the State wants respondent to choose to take the test, for the inference of intoxication arising from a positive blood-alcohol test is far stronger than that arising from a refusal to take the test. . . . . We hold, therefore, that a refusal to take a blood-alcohol test, after a police officer has lawfully requested it, is not an act coerced by the officer, and thus is not protected by the privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 563-64. [¶30] This Court has expressly adopted the same principles with respect to Art. I, § 11 of the Wyoming Constitution. In City of Laramie v. Mengel, 671 P.2d 340, 345-46 (Wyo. 1983), we held that introduction of evidence that the defendant refused to take a blood alcohol test did not violate his state constitutional right against self incrimination. [¶31] In Deno v. Commonwealth, 177 S.W.3d 753, 760 (Ky. 2005), the Kentucky Supreme Court applied a similar rationale in a case involving a request for a DNA sample. The court concluded the Fifth Amendment was not implicated when the trial court admitted into evidence the appellant's refusal to provide a DNA sample and allowed the prosecutor to argue such refusal was indicative of guilt. Id. See also, Ferega v. State, 650 S.E.2d 286, 288 (Ga. App. Ct. 2007) (holding that [t]he element of coercion necessary to trigger Fifth Amendment protection was clearly absent where the defendant was specifically told that field sobriety tests were voluntary and he refused to take them). [¶32] Here, the investigators asked Mr. Smith to voluntarily give a DNA sample; after he refused, they obtained a warrant to obtain the sample. The DNA sample and the associated test results were not testimonial or communicative evidence and the State could compel him to provide the sample. By giving him the choice of providing a sample or refusing, the State did not coerce him and the evidence of his refusal did not fall within the Fifth Amendment protection. We conclude, therefore, the prosecutor did not violate Mr. Smith's privilege against self-incrimination or commit prosecutorial misconduct by eliciting testimony about, or commenting upon, his refusal to voluntarily provide a sample for DNA testing. [1]