Opinion ID: 2242748
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Closing Argument During Sentencing

Text: Defendant next argues that his death sentence must be vacated and the cause remanded for resentencing because of certain remarks by the prosecution during closing argument during the sentencing phase of trial. We begin our analysis by reviewing the general principles applicable to such claims. Prosecutors are allowed great latitude in their closing arguments, and a trial court's determination of the propriety of remarks will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion. People v. Byron, 164 Ill.2d 279, 295, 207 Ill.Dec. 453, 647 N.E.2d 946 (1995). The State may comment on the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom, and any allegedly erroneous comments must be viewed in context and the argument must be considered as a whole. People v. Blue, 189 Ill.2d 99, 128, 244 Ill.Dec. 32, 724 N.E.2d 920 (2000). However, `[i]t is of vital importance to society and to the defendant that any decision to impose the death penalty is, and appears to be, based upon reason rather than emotion.' [Citation.] The death penalty determination must therefore focus on the particular character and record of the defendant. [Citation.] Moreover, because of the qualitative difference between death and other forms of punishment, a high standard of procedural accuracy is required when determining whether the death penalty will be imposed. [Citations.] It is also well settled that parties in closing arguments may not go beyond the evidence presented and inferences therefrom, misstate the law, or express personal opinions on the evidence. [Citation.] In particular, prosecutorial arguments that are calculated to divert the jurors' attentions from the evidence and play upon their emotions are manifestly improper at a capital sentencing hearing. People v. Woolley, 178 Ill.2d 175, 209, 227 Ill. Dec. 497, 687 N.E.2d 979 (1997). Defendant makes numerous separate claims of error in the State's closing argument. However, defendant did not contemporaneously object to many of the arguments of which he now complains, and with respect to those few arguments to which he did object at trial, he failed to raise the points as grounds for reversal in his post-trial motion. It is well established that in order to preserve for appeal an objection to argument in the aggravation-mitigation phase of trial, a defendant must both object contemporaneously and raise the point in his post-trial motion. See, e.g., People v. Buss, 187 Ill.2d 144, 239, 240 Ill.Dec. 520, 718 N.E.2d 1 (1999); People v. Nielson, 187 Ill.2d 271, 296, 240 Ill.Dec. 650, 718 N.E.2d 131 (1999). Accordingly, all of defendant's arguments regarding the State's closing argument have been waived. However, defendant contends that we ought to consider his arguments under the plain error doctrine. See 134 Ill.2d R. 615(a). As previously noted, the plain error rule may be invoked only if the evidence was closely balanced, or the error was of such magnitude as to create a substantial risk that the accused was denied a fair and impartial trial. The second prong of the rule applies only if the error is so fundamental to the integrity of the judicial process and so prejudicial to the defendant that the trial court could not cure the error by sustaining an objection or instructing the jury to disregard the error. People v. Brooks, 187 Ill.2d 91, 136, 240 Ill.Dec. 607, 718 N.E.2d 88 (1999), citing People v. Vargas, 174 Ill.2d 355, 363-64, 220 Ill.Dec. 616, 673 N.E.2d 1037 (1996). We shall examine each of the allegedly improper remarks with these principles in mind. One of defendant's allegations of error concerns comments by the State that for defendant prison would be like a Holiday Inn or a frat house. In the opening portion of the State's closing argument, the prosecutor asked the jury: [I]s [imprisonment] an adequate punishment? Three squares, pretty much the run of the room, the day room, the phone; if he wants drugs, he can get those. It doesn't sound like prison, it sounds like the Holiday Inn. And is this what he's entitled to; is this what he shouldhow he should live the rest of his life? That's ridiculous, it doesn't make sense. And in rebuttal, the prosecutor contended that: [H]e walks through the penitentiary system, he walks through the jail, it's like a frat house, it's like a frat house of violence. He has security, he's got unlimited access to the phone, people give him money, people give him marijuana and a hooch, he controls the people. This is not hard time. These comments do not constitute plain error. For her crime of stealing approximately $50 worth of cocaine, defendant instigated a prolonged, savage beating of the 19-year-old victim, raped her, and threw her in the trunk of her own car, driving her miles away before he discharged a shotgun into her head, leaving her to die in an empty trash-strewn lot in mid-January, a pillowcase over her head. Moreover, it was uncontroverted that defendant had risen to a high rank in his gang, and that he used his power to order beatings of other prisoners while in jail. Defendant's mitigating evidence consisted chiefly of testimony that he had been a decent youth who had been teased about his facial deformity and bowleggedness and had recently ceased his gang involvement. As the State notes, there was no testimony that defendant's case of Sturge-Weber disease had progressed to a point where his judgment was impaired or that any such impairment could have caused him to commit the crime in question. Indeed, defendant's evidence in mitigation established that he was able to be polite when he desired to be. The brutal facts of this murder, balanced against the evidence offered in mitigation, render a conclusion that the evidence was not closely balanced. See People v. Burgess, 176 Ill.2d 289, 321, 223 Ill.Dec. 624, 680 N.E.2d 357 (1997) (finding aggravating evidence overwhelming, consisting chiefly of the brutal circumstances of the defendant's crimes). Nor did these comments create any risk that defendant was denied a fair and impartial trial. While colorful, the State's Holiday Inn and frat house metaphors were based on the evidence, specifically the testimony of Anderson regarding defendant's status and the conditions in which he lived while incarcerated in Cook County jail. We see no merit to defendant's argument that the conditions of his incarceration in Cook County jail cannot form a basis for an argument regarding the conditions he would endure while incarcerated at the Illinois Department of Corrections. It was a reasonable inference that if defendant enjoyed certain privileges or luxuries in one correctional facility, because of his status within the Gangster Disciples, he might enjoy similar privileges or luxuries in other correctional facilities. Plain error therefore does not excuse defendant's procedural default of this statement. As with the preceding claim, the remainder of defendant's claims regarding closing argument are cognizable only as plain error. As we have determined that the evidence in aggravation and mitigation was not closely balanced, we need only consider, for these next several claims, whether defendant was denied a fair and impartial trial such that the second prong of the plain error rule has been met. Defendant next objects to the State's contention in closing argument that the jury's decision was collective, rather than, as defense counsel suggested, one the jurors had to make individually in your hearts and in your conscience. Again, we find plain error does not excuse defendant's procedural default. This argument was not prejudicial. First, the argument was in at least some sense correct, in that all jurors had to sign whichever verdict form was to be returned. Second, the State did tell the jury that it was okay to agree to disagree. Finally, we believe that any confusion which might have resulted from the prosecution's argument would have been sufficiently cured by the jury instructions that the jury had to sign and return the verdict form directing the court not to sentence defendant to death unless the jury unanimously found that there was no mitigating factor sufficient to preclude imposition of the death sentence. See People v. Towns, 174 Ill.2d 453, 472, 221 Ill.Dec. 419, 675 N.E.2d 614 (1996) (finding no plain error in trial court having told jury during voir dire that all decisions, including the decision whether to impose the death penalty, had to be unanimous, because jury was properly instructed prior to beginning its deliberations during the aggravation-mitigation phase). Plain error does not excuse defendant's procedural default. Defendant further contends that the prosecution exceeded the bounds of proper argument by commenting on the possibility that he might be paroled. In context, the comments of which defendant complains are as follows: So this was not some sudden, impassioned reckless act of the defendant.    In jail he's looking to kill the witnesses. No witnesses, no crime. He wasn't in a hurry to go to court, he wasn't in a hurry to be tried for this murder because the witnesses were still out there. It's just a matter of finding them and having them killed, that's the only problem. Is this the same guy that's going to be rehabilitated in five, ten, twenty years? Is this the kind of guy that you think is going to walk the streets as a law abiding citizen, or is this a guy that's beyond reproach [ sic ]. Beyond reproach, he's beyond help, he's beyond rehabilitation, ladies and gentlemen. Anyone that can in a cold, calculated manner kill this 19-year old girl for absolutely no reason, no good reason at all, is this someone who is beyond help? Again, we do not find plain error. As we have previously noted, [e]ach instance of error of this kind must be examined on the facts of the case. People v. Pitsonbarger, 142 Ill.2d 353, 401, 154 Ill.Dec. 562, 568 N.E.2d 783 (1990). We believe that the prosecutor's comments are distinguishable from comments made in cases in which this court has set aside a death sentence. In People v. Gacho, 122 Ill.2d 221, 119 Ill.Dec. 287, 522 N.E.2d 1146 (1988), upon which defendant relies, a death sentence was set aside because of the prosecutor's repeated comments on the possibility of parole, though he knew there was no possibility of parole, together with other objectionable comments including one which mentioned the possibility of future violence against guards or other inmates. We held that the repeated comments diverted the jury's attention from the aggravating and mitigating factors of the case. Gacho, 122 Ill.2d at 257, 119 Ill.Dec. 287, 522 N.E.2d 1146. See also People v. Hooper, 133 Ill.2d 469, 500, 142 Ill.Dec. 93, 552 N.E.2d 684 (1989) (holding improper prosecutor's speculation that defendant might kill a guard, along with comments concerning parole). In contrast, when the State's comments in the instant case are viewed in context, we must conclude that the comments were not naked speculation, nor were they immaterial to the jury's relevant considerations. Given the evidence adduced concerning defendant's behavior during his pretrial incarceration, defendant's rehabilitative potential was a proper matter for consideration by the sentencing authority during the aggravation-mitigation phase. See People v. Henderson, 171 Ill.2d 124, 138, 215 Ill.Dec. 147, 662 N.E.2d 1287 (1996). Moreover, the prosecutor here did not specifically ask the jury to consider the possibility that defendant might be paroled if not sentenced to death. See People v. Fields, 135 Ill.2d 18, 59, 142 Ill.Dec. 200, 552 N.E.2d 791 (1990). Finally, these were brief, isolated comments in the context of an opening portion of closing argument which spanned nearly 13 pages of transcript. Thus, while we do not condone these remarks, we cannot conclude that they were of such substantial error as to threaten the integrity of the judicial process or to deny defendant a fair trial so as to satisfy the second prong of our plain error rule. Nor did the State commit plain error by its brief exhortation to the jury to prevent defendant from prey[ing] on innocent people. Although it is improper for the State to make an unsupported reference to hypothetical future crimes a defendant might commit ( Kliner, 185 Ill.2d at 174, 235 Ill.Dec. 667, 705 N.E.2d 850; People v. McNeal, 175 Ill.2d 335, 365, 222 Ill.Dec. 307, 677 N.E.2d 841 (1997)), comment on future dangerousness is proper if based on the evidence ( People v. Johnson, 146 Ill.2d 109, 148-49, 165 Ill.Dec. 682, 585 N.E.2d 78 (1991)). Here there was ample evidence from which to infer that defendant might present a danger to others, including the evidence that he called violations on others and that while in jail awaiting trial he had been attempting to effectuate the killing of his codefendant as well as the other witnesses in this case. Finally, defendant argues it was impermissible for the State to argue that defendant had manipulated or controlled Sergeant Bennett by fear or terror. This argument refers to the following comments from the rebuttal portion of the State's closing argument: Ladies and gentlemen, do you really think prison is going to be hard time for him because he intimidates and he controls and he manipulates and, ladies and gentlemen, I'll even submit to you today that you saw how he can manipulate guards inside the penitentiary system, because you had a guard come in here and talk about he was a gang leader but he doesn't hang around with the gangs, that he used to call the shots but there is a lot of people that call the shots. Ladies and gentlemen, there is fear, there is terror, there is control, not only of inmates, but of guards, and that's a reality. MR. LEE: Judge, I'm going to object to that. THE COURT: Overruled. Each attorney may comment on the evidence and inferences to be made from the evidence. Although we believe that this argument was improper, we do not believe that it rises to the level of plain error. The record reveals that the comment was an isolated one made in the context of an argument that, as transcribed, consists of over 25 pages. We note that the trial court properly instructed the jury that arguments did not constitute evidence. Given the fact that the remark was not repeated and that the jury was properly instructed as to the function of argument, we cannot say that this error was so egregious as to have denied defendant a fair sentencing hearing.