Opinion ID: 8123149
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: R.C.P. 11(a)(1) (2003) (emphasis added).

Text: Rule 11 was subsequently amended in 2016. The amendment modified the sanction language from Rule 11(a)(1) and moved it to a separate subsection. Rule 11 now reads, in pertinent part, (a) Signature. Every pleading, written motion, and other paper must be signed by at least one attorney of record licensed in the State of Idaho, in the individual attorney’s name, or by a party personally if the party is unrepresented. The paper must state the signer’s address, e-mail address, and telephone number. Unless a rule or statute specifically states otherwise, a pleading need not be verified or accompanied by an affidavit. The court must strike an unsigned paper unless the omission is promptly corrected after being called to the attorney’s or party’s attention. (b) Representations to the Court. By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper, whether by signing, filing, or submitting, or later advocating it, an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances: 8 (1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law; (3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and (4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of information. (c) Sanctions. (1) In General. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court determines that Rule 11(b) has been violated, the court must impose an appropriate sanction on any attorney, law firm, or party that violated the rule or is responsible for the violation. A law firm may be held jointly responsible for a violation committed by its partner, associate, or employee. ... I.R.C.P. 11 (emphasis added). The 2016 amendments removed the requirement that the district court impose a sanction for pleadings signed in violation of Rule 11(a), and directed that a sanction will only be imposed for violations of Rule 11(b), which concerns representations to the court. Here, in granting Rohel’s motion to strike and motion to dismiss, the district court relied on this Court’s reasoning in Black and concluded that the original Complaint should be stricken because it was signed in violation of Rule 11(a). As a result, it could not be cured by the filing of the proposed Amended Complaint, and any proposed Amended Complaint would not relate back to the original Complaint. We hold that the district court erred because the remedy we applied in Black is no longer applicable in light of the subsequent amendments to Rule 11. To the extent the district court’s decision relied on the common law rule of nullity, this Court has expressly rejected the rule. See Trimble v. Engelking, 130 Idaho 300, 302, 939 P.2d 1378, 1381 (1997). In Trimble, an individual injured in an automobile collision sued the deceased driver of the other vehicle five days before the statute of limitations ran but did not name the decedent’s estate as a party. Id. at 300–01, 939 P.2d at 1379–80. The complaint was dismissed on the grounds that a deceased person cannot be sued. Id. at 301, 939 P.2d at 1380. 9 The plaintiff then moved the district court to amend the complaint to add the estate as a party and to allow the amended complaint to relate back to the filing date of the original complaint. Id. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the original complaint was a nullity and therefore, the amended complaint would have nothing to which it could relate back. Id. This Court vacated the district court’s order dismissing the complaint, reasoning that the rule of nullity “would frustrate the purpose of our modern rules of pleading which seek to promote the resolution of disputes on their merits rather than to bar suit based on antiquated pleading requirements.” Id. at 302, 939 P.2d at 1381 (citing I.R.C.P. 1(a)). Accordingly, this Court declined to adopt the nullity rule in Idaho and held that “where a party has been named improperly, amendment and relation back should be allowed where the requirements of I.R.C.P. 15(c) are met.” Id. at 302–03, 939 P.2d at 1381–82. We find no reason to depart from our holding in Trimble and decline to apply the rule of nullity in this case. The current version of Rule 11(a) only provides a consequence for unsigned papers. See I.R.C.P. 11(a) (“The court must strike an unsigned paper unless the omission is promptly corrected after being called to the attorney’s or party’s attention.”) We hold that when a party moves to amend an improperly signed pleading, written motion, or other paper to cure a violation of Rule 11(a), a district court has the discretion to permit a party to cure the signature, depending on the circumstances of the particular case. In light of our holding that the district court erred by applying the rule of nullity in this case, we remand this matter to allow the district court to exercise its discretion and determine whether to allow Clemmons to cure the improper signature. Further, as both Rohel and the district court appear to have relied on it, we clarify that our opinion in Pierce v. McMullen, 156 Idaho 465, 328 P.3d 445 (2014) did not adopt the rule of nullity in Idaho. In Pierce, this Court held that the district court erred in denying the plaintiff damages when the defendant failed to appear at trial and contest the plaintiff’s evidence of damages. 156 Idaho at 468, 471, 328 P.3d at 448, 451. The plaintiff obtained an entry of default when the defendants, McMullen and Highland Financial, LLC, failed to appear at trial. Id. However, the plaintiff subsequently filed an amended complaint seeking punitive damages, which waived the entry of default. Id. at 469, 328 P.3d at 449. After the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, McMullen, who was not licensed to practice law in Idaho, filed a notice of appearance and answer on behalf of himself and Highland Financial. Id. In reciting the factual 10 background of the case, this Court stated that filings by McMullen on behalf of Highland Financial were “nullities.” 156 Idaho at 468, 471, 328 P.3d at 448, 451. We do not read this Court’s passing use of the term “nullities” to imply that this Court was adopting the rule of nullity. Moreover, even if we were to read Pierce as referencing the rule of nullity, the discussion was dicta and therefore is not binding on this Court. See, e.g., State v. Hawkins, 155 Idaho 69, 74, 305 P.3d 513, 518 (2013) (“If the statement is not necessary to decide the issue presented to the appellate court, it is considered to be dictum and not controlling.”). C. The district court did not err in finding that Ethel’s incapacity did not toll the statute of limitations. Christopher argues the district court erred in denying Clemmons’s motion for reconsideration because Ethel’s incapacity tolled the statute of limitations. The district court found that Ethel was “not legally incompetent, as a petition for a finding of incapacity and appointment of guardian [had] not been filed with the Court, as required by Idaho law, and thus a hearing to determine [Ethel]’s competency was not held.” Therefore, the district court concluded it was required to apply the legal presumption that Ethel was competent. The district court determined, Clemmons’ argument that the Court failed to address its legal or equitable duty to protect incompetent parties under I.C. § 5-306 and under I.C. § 5-230 . . . . falls on deaf ears as it is not this Court’s duty to thwart a legal presumption that Ms. Luck is competent when Luck, and others on her behalf have done absolutely nothing to overcome that presumption. Additionally, the district court concluded that even if Ethel had been deemed legally incompetent, section 5-230 would not toll the statute of limitations, because the “record is devoid of any evidence indicating that Luck was [incompetent] at the time the vehicle accident occurred.” That code section provides that “[i]f a person entitled to bring an action” is either a minor or insane “at the time the cause of action accrued,” then “[t]he time of such disability is not a part of the time limited for the commencement of the action, provided however, that the time limited for the commencement of an action shall not be tolled for a period of more than six (6) years on account of minority [or] incompetency . . . .” I.C. § 5-230 (emphasis added). Christopher argues that the district court should have granted Clemmons’s motion for reconsideration because at that point it had Clemmons’s second declaration, which established that Ethel was incapacitated on the day of the accident. Christopher fails to acknowledge, however, that the district court granted Rohel’s motion to strike Clemmons’s second declaration 11 because it was untimely, inappropriately raised new facts, and contained statements that were inadmissible because there was no foundation laid to establish Clemmons’s qualifications to opine on Ethel’s competency. Christopher did not appeal the district court’s decision striking Clemmons’s second declaration. As a result, Christopher’s argument on this issue is without merit because there is no evidence in the record to support Christopher’s claim that Ethel was incompetent at the time of the accident. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s decision denying Clemmons’s motion for reconsideration. D. We do not need to address whether the district court erred in dismissing Clemmons’s Complaint with prejudice. As a final matter, Christopher argues the district court erred when it dismissed the case with prejudice because Ethel’s incapacity tolled the statute of limitations. For the reasons stated previously, Clemmons failed to establish that Ethel was incapacitated at the time of her accident with Rohel. Additionally, given our holding today, vacating the district court’s decision and remanding this matter, we do not need to address this issue.