Opinion ID: 1259709
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dodds, et al. v. Stuckey, et al.

Text: The second case challenges the residency requirements of the at large elections for Charleston County Council as repugnant to the Home Rule Act. The lower court upheld the district residency provisions and we affirm. Appellant Dodds, a resident of an unincorporated area outside the City of Charleston, sought to file for election to County Council in the Republican Primary for a seat held by resident of the City of Charleston. [5] Her application was denied by the Republican Election Commission as she was not a resident of the geographical area designated for that seat. The only issue preserved in this appeal by her single exception is whether the Home Rule Act abrogated district residency requirements. [6] By Act No. 94, 1969 ( § 14-1162, Code of Laws) Charleston County was divided into four districts for residency purposes attendant to at large elections. The Home Rule Act provides: Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter, unless otherwise determined by referendum prior to July 1, 1976, the county concerned shall, beginning on that date, have the form of government including the method of election, number, composition and terms of the governing body most nearly corresponding to the form in effect in the county immediately prior to that date, which the General Assembly hereby determines to be as follows: For the counties of ... Charleston ... the council-administrator form of government as prescribed in article 4 of this chapter. § 14-3701(b), Code of Laws (1975 Cum. Supp.). It is conceded that had the county opted to select its form of government pursuant to the procedure provided in the Home Rule Act, only two alternatives would have been available in regard to the method of election: single member districts or pure at large elections. Absent other legislative directives, the intent and design of the enactment would necessitate judicial interpretation. However, again the legislative design is unmistakable dictating literal application. Henderson v. Evans, supra. Section 14-3701(b), as quoted above, specifically provides that in the absence of a referendum the county is to maintain the form of government most nearly corresponding to that form in effect prior to July 1, 1976. Form of government is statutorily defined to include the method of election, number, composition and terms of the governing body. Unquestionably, Act No. 94 (1969) was effective prior to July 1, 1976, and it prescribed at large elections with district residency requirements. As the trial court correctly observed, there can be no manifestation of correspondence closer than absolute identity. Appellant asserts that the approval of district residency requirement will perpetuate prior structured forms of local governments and emasculate uniformity. A similar argument was advanced in Duncan v. York, supra , wherein we resolved that a transition period is necessary to realize an orderly implementation of reform. The initial form of government may be changed by referendum after two years and subsequent electoral review may be had four years after a referendum. § 14-3701 (c), Code of Laws, (1975 Cum. Supp.). A certain degree of stability must be guaranteed at all levels of governments lest we condemn them prior to their trials. The uniformity contemplated by the Home Rule Act is the realization of complete local autonomy. It is not the desire to stereotype local governing bodies. Home Rule implies a certain degree of flexibility and individuality as indicated by the legislative scheme to provide four [7] alternative forms of local government. District residency requirements in no way ameliorate the intended uniformity of the Home Rule Act. We, therefore, reverse the judgment of the lower court in Infinger, et al. v. Edwards, et al. and affirm the lower court in Dodds, et al. v. Stuckey, et al . Reversed in part; affirmed in part. LITTLEJOHN and RHODES, JJ., concur. LEWIS, C.J., and GREGORY, J., concur in the result.