Opinion ID: 2539405
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: facts and analysis

Text: ¶ 3 C.S. was born on October 5, 1999 to Amy Sampey (formerly Amy Singleton) and Kelly Singleton. Due to substance abuse Ms. Sampey ceased taking care of C.S. on September 5, 2002, and a trial court found C.S. dependent on November 5, 2002. A child is dependent when he or she is abandoned, abused, neglected, or otherwise endangered for lack of a suitable caregiver. See RCW 13.34.030(6). A dependency is a period during which parents have an opportunity to correct parental deficiencies. In re Dependency of A. W., 53 Wash.App. 22, 28, 765 P.2d 307 (1988); see also RCW 13.34.020, .025(1), (2)(a). ¶ 4 During C.S.'s dependency the State provided Ms. Sampey with services to address her only identified parental deficiency, substance abuse. Numerous attempts to treat her substance abuse failed, but in November 2004 she entered and successfully completed a substance abuse treatment program. [1] She has remained sober since that time, verified by urine samples twice a week, and actively and regularly attends Alcoholics Anonymous, Narcotics Anonymous, and an outpatient program. The State did not identify any additional parental deficiencies as a basis to continue the dependency nor did it offer additional remedial services. Yet the State did not seek to reunite Ms. Sampey with C.S., even though she had overcome her identified parental deficiency. ¶ 5 Instead the State filed a termination petition on November 8, 2005 asserting Ms. Sampey's substance abuse was a parental deficiency warranting termination. This is extraordinary considering Ms. Sampey had been sober for the year preceding that petition. See In re Dependency of A. W., 53 Wash.App. at 28, 765 P.2d 307 (Only if it is determined that the efforts to cure parental deficiencies have been unsuccessful and additional services will not remedy those deficiencies in the foreseeable future, will a termination petition be filed.); see also In re Welfare of H.S., 94 Wash.App. 511, 523, 973 P.2d 474 (1999) (The issue at termination is current unfitness.). ¶ 6 A biological parent has fundamental liberty and privacy interests in raising his or her child, and the State can infringe upon those interests only when the parent is endangering the child's physical or emotional welfare. See In re Sumey, 94 Wash.2d 757, 762, 621 P.2d 108 (1980); see also In re Custody of Smith, 137 Wash.2d 1, 20, 969 P.2d 21 (1998) (Short of preventing harm to the child, the standard of `best interest of the child' is insufficient to serve as a compelling state interest overruling a parent's fundamental rights.), aff'd sub nom. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) ([T]here is a presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of their children.). The United States Constitution mandates that the State can completely and irrevocably sever the rights of a parent to his or her natural children only where the parent's unfitness has been shown by at least clear and convincing evidence. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982). ¶ 7 To satisfy this mandate Washington's termination statute requires certain statutory factors be proved by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence before termination may be considered. See RCW 13.34.180(1), .190(1)(a); In re Dependency of K.R., 128 Wash.2d 129, 141-42, 904 P.2d 1132 (1995). Two of the factors the State must prove are that the State has provided all necessary services, reasonably available, capable of correcting the parental deficiencies, RCW 13.34.180(1)(d), and that there is little likelihood that conditions will be remedied so that the child can be returned to his or her parent in the near future, RCW 13.34.180(1)(e). ¶ 8 At this termination hearing the trial court concluded Ms. Sampey had remedied her substance abuse and any psychological incapacity [or] mental deficiency. Clerk's Papers at 47 para. 2 (Trial, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Ruling) (addressing RCW 13.34.180(1)(e)). However, it also concluded she lacked the patience, presence of mind, skills, experience, time in a day, and availability to care for [C.S.]given his special needs, and these conditions showed there was little likelihood C.S. could be returned to Ms. Sampey in the near future. Id. para. 3. The trial court terminated Ms. Sampey's parental rights. ¶ 9 C.S. has been diagnosed with ADHD, oppositional-defiant disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and sensory integration disorder, and these conditions make him difficult to manage at times. Ms. Arlette Porter, his foster parent, had difficulties addressing C.S.'s conditions until the State provided her training on how to effectively deal with them and C.S. was put on medication. This combination of training and medication has shown great success. ¶ 10 The State did not offer Ms. Sampey this training. [2] RCW 13.34.180(1)(d) requires all necessary services, reasonably available, capable of correcting the parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future have been expressly and understandably offered or provided. [3] Since this training, deemed necessary to address C.S.'s behavioral problems, was not offered to Ms. Sampey, termination of her parental rights was not warranted (even if this court assumes arguendo, as the State asserts, that Ms. Sampey's inexperience in addressing C.S.'s conditions can serve as a basis for termination). [4] See RCW 13.34.180(1)(d), .190(1)(a). The termination order must be reversed.