Opinion ID: 77711
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Douglas's Motion for Continuance

Text: 35 Douglas argues that the denial of his motion for a continuance to meet with a psychologist was a violation of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights because he was unable to secure the assistance of an expert at sentencing. 36 We review a district court's denial of a motion to continue sentencing for abuse of discretion. United States v. Lee, 427 F.3d 881, 896 (11th Cir.2005). The defendant has the burden to demonstrate that the denial was an abuse of discretion and that it produced specific substantial prejudice. United States v. Smith, 757 F.2d 1161, 1166 (11th Cir.1985). In determining whether the denial of a motion for continuance was proper, we must decide in light of the circumstances presented, focusing upon the reasons for the continuance offered to the trial court when the request was denied. United States v. Knowles, 66 F.3d 1146, 1160-61 (11th Cir. 1995). In so doing, we consider four factors: (1) the diligence of the defense in interviewing the witness and procuring his testimony; (2) the probability of obtaining the testimony within a reasonable time; (3) the specificity with which the defense was able to describe the witness's expected knowledge or testimony; and (4) the degree to which such testimony was expected to be favorable to the accused, and the unique or cumulative nature of the testimony. United States v. Wright, 63 F.3d 1067, 1071 (11th Cir.1995). 37 Here, the district court granted Douglas two continuances with regard to sentencing to enable him to meet with a psychologist. Yet, at the time the district court denied the final motion for continuance, the psychologist still had not met with Douglas and no definite appointment had been scheduled. Furthermore, as Douglas had not met with the psychologist, there was no way for Douglas to demonstrate what testimony might be offered or whether the testimony would be at all helpful to the defense. As such, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Douglas's final motion for a continuance.