Opinion ID: 782204
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standard for Adequacy

Text: 74 In this case, there is no question that the claimed procedural bar constitutes an independent state ground of decision; the dispute is over whether the asserted bar is adequate to preclude federal habeas review. [T]he question of when and how defaults in compliance with state procedural rules can preclude ... consideration of a federal question is itself a federal question. Garcia v. Lewis, 188 F.3d 71, 77 (2d Cir.1999) (quoting Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587, 108 S.Ct. 1981, 100 L.Ed.2d 575 (1988) (internal quotations omitted)); Lee, 534 U.S. at 375, 122 S.Ct. 877 (it is not within the state's prerogative to decide whether a state rule is sufficient to bar consideration of a federal claim; adequacy itself is a federal question). Before accepting a procedural bar defense, a federal court must examine the adequacy of the alleged procedural default. Garcia, 188 F.3d at 77. For although the procedural bar rule rests on considerations of comity, [s]tate courts may not avoid deciding federal issues by invoking procedural rules that they do not apply evenhandedly to all similar claims. Id. (quoting Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 263, 102 S.Ct. 2421, 72 L.Ed.2d 824 (1982)). As we explained in Garcia: 75 [A] procedural bar will be deemed adequate only if it is based on a rule that is firmly established and regularly followed by the state in question. When a federal court finds that the rule is inadequate under this test the rule should not operate to bar federal review. Nonetheless, the principles of comity that drive the doctrine counsel that a federal court that deems a state procedural rule inadequate should not reach that conclusion lightly or without clear support in state law. 76 Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). 10 77 Since Garcia, our last extended discussion of the adequacy doctrine on federal habeas review, the Supreme Court has clarified the nature and scope of the adequacy inquiry. In Lee, the Supreme Court made clear that although [o]rdinarily, a violation of `firmly established and regularly followed' state rules ... will be adequate to foreclose review of a federal claim, there are exceptional cases in which exorbitant application of a generally sound rule renders the state ground inadequate to stop consideration of a federal question. 534 U.S. at 376, 122 S.Ct. 877. In determining that Lee's case fit within that limited category, id., the Court relied on three considerations: (1) whether the alleged procedural violation was actually relied on in the trial court, and whether perfect compliance with the state rule would have changed the trial court's decision; (2) whether state caselaw indicated that compliance with the rule was demanded in the specific circumstances presented; and (3) whether petitioner had substantially complied with the rule given the realities of trial, and, therefore, whether demanding perfect compliance with the rule would serve a legitimate governmental interest. Although these three factors were not presented as a test for determining adequacy, we use them as guideposts in evaluat[ing] the state interest in a procedural rule against the circumstances of a particular case. 534 U.S. at 381-85, 122 S.Ct. 877. Most importantly, Lee clarified, over strong dissenting objections by three Justices, that the adequacy of a state procedural bar is determined with reference to the particular application of the rule; it is not enough that the rule generally serves a legitimate state interest. 534 U.S. at 387, 122 S.Ct. 877. 78 After Lee, then, respondent's argument that it is firmly established and regularly followed that New York's contemporaneous objection rule applies to all trial-related proceedings, including Sirois hearings, misses the point. Cotto does not claim that New York's contemporaneous objection rule is generally inadequate to preclude federal habeas review, but rather that the rule is misapplied in his case in particular. Garcia, 188 F.3d at 79. More precisely, the relevant question here is not whether New York's contemporaneous objection rule applies to Sirois hearings, whether the Court of Appeals right[ly] or wrong[ly] decided that the claim was unpreserved under state law, or even whether the Court of Appeals' decision has a fair or substantial basis in state law. El Rhagi, 309 F.3d at 107 (quoting Garcia, 188 F.3d at 77-78). 11 Rather, the question is whether application of the procedural rule is firmly established and regularly followed in the specific circumstances presented in the case, an inquiry that includes an evaluation of the asserted state interest in applying the procedural rule in such circumstances. See Lee, 534 U.S. at 386-87, 122 S.Ct. 877 (questioning whether the dissent would fully embrace the unyielding theory that it is never appropriate to evaluate the state interest in a procedural rule against the circumstances of a particular case).