Opinion ID: 1191875
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Circuit Court Erred in Admitting Certain Lay Opinion Testimony regarding Soth, Who Was Accused of Exerting Undue Influence over Carmen Herbert in the Execution of Her 1989 Will.

Text: Soth argues that character or disposition evidence was not an issue in the instant case and that the trial court's broad admission of character or disposition evidence unfairly prejudiced the jury against him, in violation of HRE Rule 403. As stated supra, evidence of character or disposition to exert undue influence over the testatrix or testator at the time of the execution of a will is admissible if it is relevant and not unfairly prejudicial. Soth challenges the following question posed by First Church to Ms. Parker: How would you characterize Hanno Soth? In response, Ms. Parker testified that, in her opinion, Soth was cunning, calculating, and secretive and that she did not trust him. Soth argues that Parker's response was without foundation, remotely related to the direct issue of whether undue influence was operative at the will's execution, and given solely for the purpose of proving that Soth acted in conformity with her view of his character. We agree. Although First Church elicited from Parker that she worked for Carmen Herbert for eighteen months, up until three days before Carmen died, and that she observed Carmen and Soth together on several occasions, directly before and after the execution of the 1989 Will, Parker's generalized opinion of Soth's character is not directly relevant to whether Soth exerted undue influence over Carmen at the time of the 1989 Will's execution. As stated above, the range of admissible character of evidence may be broad, but it is nevertheless limited to the exertion of undue influence over the testator or testatrix at the time of the execution of the will. General conduct without specific reference to the exertion of undue influence over the testator or testatrix at the time of the execution of the will is inadmissible. See 3 Page on Wills, supra, § 29.196, at 681-82. Therefore, the probate court erred by admitting Parker's opinion of Soth's character in this regard. [T]he trial court's error in admitting the [lay opinion testimony] into evidence `is not a basis for reversal absent substantial resulting prejudice to the rights of a party.' Lau v. Allied Wholesale, Inc., 82 Hawai`i 428, 438, 922 P.2d 1041, 1051 (1996) (citing Commentary to HRE Rule 103 (quoting Trask v. Kam, 44 Haw. 10, 22, 352 P.2d 320, 326 (1959))) (internal quotation marks omitted) (brackets added); see also Wakabayashi v. Hertz Corp., 66 Haw. 265, 272, 660 P.2d 1309, 1314 (1983); Kekua v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 61 Haw. 208, 218, 601 P.2d 364, 371 (1979). In light of the substantial evidence presented regarding Soth's disposition to exert undue influence, including, as noted above, his intent to get Carmen's house on the corner, to obtain her money for law school, and to gain control over her estate, we hold that the probate court's error did not substantially prejudice the rights of Soth and that the error was harmless. [14]