Opinion ID: 1206429
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: discovery of causes of action

Text: Section 15-3-545, supra , requires that medical malpractice actions be commenced within three years from the date of discovery or when it reasonably ought to have been discovered, not to exceed six years from the date of occurrence. The appellants contend they timely filed suit within the three year statutory period provided in § 15-3-545, supra , after they discovered a potential claim might exist against the doctor. The Smiths raised concerns and questions about potential malpractice before Mrs. Smith left the hospital in late 1979. The day after she was released from the hospital, she and her husband conferred with an attorney in Charlotte, North Carolina, about the possibility of a medical malpractice action against the doctor. In the spring of 1980, an attorney in Rock Hill, South Carolina, was consulted regarding a possible malpractice action. The same Rock Hill attorney was consulted again in late 1982. Around this same period of time, the Smiths had also obtained and reviewed copies of the medical records pertaining to her treatment during her pregnancy. It is important to note the Smiths were ultimately paid $45,000 in settlement of their claim against the attorney in Rock Hill because of his failure to timely file an action against Doctor Smith. This Court in Snell v. Columbia Gun Exchange, Inc. , 276 S.C. 301, 278 S.E. (2d) 333 (1981), considered a discovery provision in S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-535, (1976) which is similar to the provision in § 15-3-545, supra. The statute involved in Snell, supra , requires that a cause of action be commenced within six years after the plaintiff knows or, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known that he had a cause of action. The Court held in Snell that: [T]he exercise of reasonable diligence means simply that an injured party must act with some promptness where the facts and circumstances of the injury would put a person of common knowledge on notice that some right of his has been invaded or that some claim against another party might exist. The statute of limitation begins to run from this point and not when advice of counsel is sought or a full blown theory of recovery developed. 278 S.E. (2d) at 334. Although Snell and the case of bar are distinguishable, the language of Snell is instructive and persuasive as to when a cause of action reasonably ought to have been discovered. The Smiths' consultation with an attorney in Charlotte in 1979 and with counsel in Rock Hill in the spring of 1980 indicates the Smiths had discovered or reasonably ought to have discovered the potential medical malpractice action no later than 1980. The Smith's delay in filing suit until March of 1985 exceeds the three-year statutory period in § 15-3-545, supra , and therefore, their lawsuits are barred.