Opinion ID: 692072
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Lockwood's Mandamus Petition

Text: 6 Following the district court's decision to strike, Lockwood petitioned this court for a writ of mandamus directing the district court to reinstate his jury demand. We issued the writ, reasoning that because Lockwood's underlying claim for infringement and damages is the basis of the action at the district court and [t]he claim for infringement damages and any asserted defenses still exist in the case, Lockwood remained entitled to a jury trial on the factual questions relating to validity. 7 American presents two arguments in its petition for rehearing. American first argues that, because the district court dismissed Lockwood's claim for patent infringement damages, the only claim remaining is American's claim for a declaration of patent invalidity. As American rightly asserts, contrary to erroneous statements in our previous order, the district court will not adjudicate the issue of validity as a defense to an existing infringement claim. The infringement claim exists no more. Consequently, the particulars of Lockwood's dismissed claim can play no part in our determination whether he enjoys a Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial as to validity in American's action for a declaratory judgment. See, e.g., In re Evangelist, 760 F.2d 27, 32 (1st Cir.1985) (appellate court refused to consider dismissed claim in determining whether a jury demand should be met, even though the claim might ultimately be reinstated); Hildebrand v. Board of Trustees, 607 F.2d 705, 710 (6th Cir.1979) (court suggested that claim for damages that was dismissed on summary judgment should not be considered when determining party's asserted Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury). 3 We no longer rely on the misstatements of our previous order. 8 American further argues that its action for a declaratory judgment is entirely equitable in nature, and that Lockwood therefore enjoys no right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment in this case even as to patent validity. But American errs as much with this second argument as it hits the mark with its first. Accordingly, our disposition of Lockwood's petition remains the same, though our rationale differs. Because our original analysis was based upon a misunderstanding of the procedural posture of the case, we vacate our March 11, 1994 order and replace it with the analysis presented below.