Opinion ID: 203289
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Constructive Amendment of the Indictment and Alleged Variances

Text: Bucci argues in his pro se brief that the district court erred by permitting a constructive amendment of the indictment. Constructive amendments are forbidden by the Fifth Amendment, which guarantees defendants the right to be tried only on charges indicted by a grand jury. U.S. Const. amend V; United States v. Fornia-Castillo, 408 F.3d 52, 66 (1st Cir. 2005). A constructive amendment is considered prejudicial per se and grounds for reversal of a conviction. United States v. DeCicco, 439 F.3d 36, 43 (1st Cir.2006). To determine whether a constructive amendment has occurred, we examine whether the terms of the indictment were altered, either literally or in effect, by prosecution or court after the grand jury has last passed upon them. Id. (quoting United States v. Fisher, 3 F.3d 456, 462 (1st Cir.1993) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Our review is de novo. United States v. Hernandez, 490 F.3d 81, 83 (1st Cir.2007). Bucci also alleges two different but related variances between the indictment and the evidence adduced against him at trial. A variance arises when the proof at trial depicts a scenario that differs materially from the scenario limned in the indictment. United States v. Cianci, 378 F.3d 71, 94 (1st Cir.2004) (quoting United States v. Villarman-Oviedo, 325 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks omitted)). A variance mandates reversal only where it is both material and prejudicial. Id. In his brief, Bucci conflates his constructive amendment argument with his variance claim. Rather than engage in a futile endeavor to parse the two, we address them simultaneously. His underlying challenge lacks merit under either theory. First, Bucci asserts that while the indictment alleged a conspiracy to distribute cocaine, the evidence at trial supported only a conspiracy to commit robbery. Second, Bucci contends that the indictment was faulty because it failed to allege a Hobbs Act conspiracy. Bucci asserts that this failure prejudiced him because some of the jurors may have relied upon the drug rip-off to convict Bucci of conspiracy to distribute cocaine. Bucci's challenges appear to rest upon two faulty premises. First, while it is possible that the evidence could have supported other charges, a grand jury is under no obligation to indict every conceivable crime potentially implicated by a defendant's conduct. The possible Hobbs Act violation Bucci describes is not mutually exclusive with the charges contained within the indictment. Second, Bucci's argument consists of little more than utter speculation that the jury disregarded its instructions by convicting him of an uncharged offense. Given the substantial evidence indicating that Bucci did, in fact, conspire to possess and distribute cocaine, we cannot infer that any jurors decided that Bucci did not conspire to possess and distribute cocaine, but convicted him of that offense, heedless of the law, on the basis that he conspired to commit robbery. He has utterly failed to demonstrate either a constructive amendment of the indictment or a variance between the indictment and the evidence adduced at trial. He cannot obtain relief on the counterintuitive theory that the jury could have convicted him of other, additional crimes that were neither charged nor detailed in the jury instructions.