Opinion ID: 187215
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Interfere With Maintenance

Text: Section 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) requires EPA to ensure that SIPs contain adequate provisions prohibiting sources within a state from emitting air pollutants in amounts which will contribute significantly to nonattainment in, or interfere with maintenance by, any other State with respect to any [NAAQS]. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) (emphasis added). North Carolina argues that EPA unlawfully ignored the interfere with maintenance language in section 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I), divesting it of independent effect in CAIR. It contends that instead of limiting the beneficiaries of CAIR to downwind areas that were monitored to be in nonattainment when EPA promulgated CAIR and were modeled to be in nonattainment in 2009 and 2010, when CAIR goes into effect, CAIR, 70 Fed.Reg. at 25,244, EPA should have also included in CAIR upwind states, such as Georgia, that send pollution into downwind areas that are projected to barely meet attainment levels of NAAQS in 2010. North Carolina only contests EPA's interpretation of the interfere with maintenance prong as applied to EPA's determination of which states are beneficiaries of CAIR for the ozone NAAQS. North Carolina explains that even though all of its counties are projected to attain NAAQS for ozone by 2010, several of its counties are at risk of returning to nonattainment due to interference from upwind sources. Specifically, it notes that Mecklenburg County, which projections show will have ozone levels of 82.5 ppb in 2010 (2.5 ppb below the 85.0 ppb NAAQS) without help from CAIR, could fall back into nonattainment because of the historic variability in the county's ozone levels. Technical Support Document for the Final Clean Air Interstate Rule, Air Quality Modeling, at Appendix E (March 2005) (Technical Support Document). EPA has stated that historical data indicates that attaining counties with air quality levels within 3 ppb of the standard are at risk of returning to nonattainment. EPA, Corrected Response to Significant Public Comments on the Proposed Clean Air Interstate Rule, at 148 (April 2005) (Corrected Response). The information also indicates that even if CAIR receptors were to [be] 3-5 ppb below the standard, they would have a reasonable likelihood of returning to nonattainment. Id. And in the case of Fulton County, Georgia, EPA determined that the interfere with maintenance provision justified imposing controls on upwind states in 2015 even though it is projected to attain the NAAQS by a margin of 7 or 8 ppb because its ozone levels have varied by at least that margin several times in the recent past. Id. at 150. North Carolina argues that EPA must utilize this historic variability standard to determine which downwind areas suffer interference with their maintenance in 2010, not just 2015. If it did so, EPA would see that Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, has varied by at least 3 ppb (the relevant margin between attainment and nonattainment for that county in 2010) six times in the recent past and consequently would include in CAIR any state, such as Georgia, that is contributing an unlawful amount of pollution to this downwind area. Id. at 1042. EPA contends that it interpreted interfere with maintenance just as it did in the NOx SIP Call, in which it gave the term a meaning much the same as the one given to the preceding phrase, contribute significantly to nonattainment. CAIR, 70 Fed. Reg. at 25,193 n. 45. EPA maintains that the `interfere with maintenance' prong may come into play only in circumstances where EPA or the State can reasonably determine or project, based on available data, that an area in a downwind state will achieve attainment, but due to emissions growth or other relevant factors is likely to fall back into nonattainment. Id. In the NOx SIP Call, it meant that areas monitored to be in attainment when that rule was promulgated but which were modeled to be in nonattainment in 2007, when the rule went into effect, were considered downwind areas with which upwind sources' emissions interfered. NOx SIP Call, 63 Fed.Reg. at 57,379. EPA states it gave effect to the interfere with maintenance prong in CAIR by using it as a basis for implementing further emissions reductions in Phase Two of CAIR, by which time some downwind states will have attained NAAQS. CAIR, 70 Fed. Reg. at 25,195. First, we note that we did not consider EPA's interpretation of interfere with maintenance in Michigan. Thus any interpretation it used in that rulemaking cannot provide support for EPA's contention that its current interpretation, even if identical to that in the NOx SIP Call, comports with the statute. So we analyze EPA's interpretation of interfere with maintenance for the first time here. Despite using interfere with maintenance as a justification for imposing further emissions controls in 2015, CAIR gave no independent significance to the interfere with maintenance prong of section 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) to separately identify upwind sources interfering with downwind maintenance. Under EPA's reading of the statute, a state can never interfere with maintenance unless EPA determines that at one point it contribute[d] significantly to nonattainment. EPA stated clearly on two occasions that it would apply the interfere with maintenance provision in section 110(a)(2)(D) in conjunction with the significant contribution to nonattainment provision and so did not use the maintenance prong to separately identify upwind States subject to CAIR. FIP, 71 Fed.Reg. at 25,337 (citing CAIR, 70 Fed.Reg. at 25,193); see also Corrected Response, at 63. EPA reasoned that this interpretation avoid[s] giving greater weight to the potentially lesser environmental effect and strikes a reasonable balance between controls in upwind states and in-state controls. FIP, 71 Fed.Reg. at 25,337. EPA stated that an interpretation that permitted states that are able to attain NAAQS on their own to benefit from CAIR could even create a perverse incentive for downwind states to increase local emissions. Id. All the policy reasons in the world cannot justify reading a substantive provision out of a statute. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 485, 121 S.Ct. 903, 149 L.Ed.2d 1 (2001). Areas that find themselves barely meeting attainment in 2010 due in part to upwind sources interfering with that attainment have no recourse under EPA's interpretation of the interference prong of section 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I).2010 is not insignificant because that is the deadline for downwind areas to attain ozone NAAQS. See 42 U.S.C. § 7511 (setting forth deadlines for attaining ozone NAAQS). An outcome that fails to give independent effect to the interfere with maintenance prong violates the plain language of section 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I). The provision at issue is written in the disjunctive: SIPs must contain adequate provisions prohibiting ... any source or other type of emissions activity within the State from emitting any air pollutant in amounts which will contribute significantly to nonattainment in, or interfere with maintenance by, any other State.... 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) (emphasis added). Canons of construction ordinarily suggest that terms connected by a disjunctive be given separate meanings, unless the context dictates otherwise.... Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979). There is no context in section 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) directing an alternate result; therefore EPA must give effect to both provisions in the statute. EPA contends in its brief that CAIR is just one step in carrying out its section 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) duties, hinting that it may later choose to give independent effect to the interfere with maintenance language. There is some general language in the record to support this contention. See CAIR, 70 Fed.Reg. at 25,175 (This overall plan is well within the ambit of EPA's authority to proceed with regulation on a step-by-step basis.). But more specific language in the rule belies this claim. The [section 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I)] violation is eliminated once a State adopts a SIP containing the CAIR trading programs (or a SIP containing other emission reduction options meeting the requirements specified in CAIR), or EPA promulgates a FIP to achieve those same reductions. FIP, 71 Fed.Reg. at 25,340. Because EPA describes CAIR as a complete remedy to a section 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) violation and does not give independent significance to the interfere with maintenance language to identify upwind states that interfere with downwind maintenance, it unlawfully nullifies that aspect of the statute and provides no protection for downwind areas that, despite EPA's predictions, still find themselves struggling to meet NAAQS due to upwind interference in 2010. For this reason, we grant North Carolina's petition on this issue. Although North Carolina challenged CAIR on the interfere with maintenance issue only with regard to ozone, the rule includes the same flaw with regard to PM2.5. The court does not address North Carolina's separate contention that EPA failed to comply with notice-and-comment requirements regarding its proposed test for an interfere with maintenance violation, or the propriety of the test itself.