Opinion ID: 5197
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Discharge of a Firearm.

Text: Secondly, Lara objects to the imposition, by analogy to section 2B3.2(b)(2)(A), of a five-level increase in her offense level for the discharge of a firearm. The propriety of such a departure is beyond peradventure, as section 5K2.0 expressly provides that if a weapon is a relevant factor to sentencing for an immigration violation, the court may depart for this reason. Nor is the extent of the departure unreasonable. Section 5K2.6 notes that [t]he discharge of a firearm might warrant a substantial sentence increase. We can find no fault with the district court's application of the guidelines in this instance. Lara argues, instead, that there is no evidence in the record that Lara, as opposed to her co-defendant, ever used the gun. Moreover, she claims, she was present on only one occasion when the firearm was brandished and not at the time it was discharged. The 7 We acknowledge that [i]t would throw the structure of the guidelines out of kilter to say that a defendant may receive more time on a `departure' than he could have received had he been convicted of the crimes leading the judge to depart. Ferra, 900 F.2d at 1063. See also United States v. Kim, 896 F.2d 678, 684-85 (2d Cir. 1990). But cf. Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d at 51-52 (rejecting any such strictures on district court's discretion to depart). We do not, however, believe that such a characterization properly describes the actions of the court in the instant case. Here, the court raised Lara's base offense level of 9 under § 2L1.1 by 9 points, by analogy to § 2B3.2's base offense level of 18. We note, however, that had Lara been separately convicted under § 2B3.2 for conduct sufficiently unrelated to her immigration offense to avoid the grouping of counts under § 3D1.1-5, her total offense level would have been computed at 27, not 18. 12 short answer to Lara is that the PSI, the pertinent parts to which Lara failed to object, reveals that Lara in fact was present on both occasions. It is true that her co-defendant, Ramos-Flores, apparently was the only one actually to use the gun in the commission of the offense. But Lara was more than merely present when Ramos-Flores brandished and discharged the gun; she was, in fact, the registered owner of the firearm. When arrested, moreover, she led the police directly to its hiding place under her bed. We cannot accept her contention that the guidelines personalize an individual's conduct to such an extent that the district court may not consider the relevant conduct of a co-defendant plainly authorized by his accomplice.8 The district court did not clearly err in relying upon the PSI's factual findings to depart on the basis of the discharge of the revolver.