Opinion ID: 1287501
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Investigate as Deficient Performance

Text: Avery argues that his trial counsel's efforts to investigate potential alibi witnesses in preparation for trial were deficient. Strickland instructs: [S]trategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation. In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. In any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments. 466 U.S. at 690-91, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Under Strickland, trial counsel has a duty to investigate his case. Stewart v. Wolfenbarger, 468 F.3d 338, 356 (6th Cir.2006). This duty includes the obligation to investigate all witnesses who may have information concerning his or her client's guilt or innocence. Id. (quoting Towns v. Smith, 395 F.3d 251, 258 (6th Cir.2005)). Thus, the question is whether reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Here, Lankford made at least some attempt to contact the alibi witnesses whose names Avery had provided him: He sent an investigator to Crimes Auto and Towing, where Avery had told Lankford he could contact potential alibi witnesses; the investigator met with LaVelle Crimes (Damar Crimes's brother), who reported that Avery had left his car for repairs and departed with Damar Crimes to visit someone on Ardmore Street, returning at approximately 9:15 or 9:30 that evening; Lankford believed the investigator had left information on how to contact Lankford; and Lankford testified that he instructed the investigator to attempt to follow-up over the phone and in person. These efforts satisfied the Michigan Court of Appeals, which concluded that Lankford adequately investigated Avery's potential alibi witnesses and that he made a valid strategical decision not to present such a defense because the information he obtained did not provide defendant with an alibi for the time of the crime. People v. Avery, 2002 WL 31264726 at . But we believe that Lankford's investigation was far less than complete. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052. He never personally attempted to contact any of the potential alibi witnesses, and, after the investigator learned from LaVelle Crimes that Avery was with Damar Crimes during the time of the murder, the investigator did not ask for Damar's home address or phone number, even though LaVelle Crimes could have provided it. At the evidentiary hearing, Lankford testified that after the report from the investigator, he was interested ... sound[ed] like I want to talk to Damar. But at the time, LaVelle Crimes was only seventeen years old, and the investigator (and consequently Lankford) left it up to him to get back in touch with important alibi evidence in a murder trial. We agree with the district court's recognition that [t]his sequence of events shows just how unreasonable it was for a seasoned attorney like Lankford to leave it up to teenagers to get back in touch with him about important alibi evidence in a murder trial. Avery, 524 F.Supp.2d at 909. The State, nevertheless, argues that Lankford had inadequate information on which to base an alibi defense, not through lack of investigation but because of inconsistent accounts of the events on the evening of the murder. But the limitations on Lankford's investigation rendered it impossible for him to have made a strategic choice not to have Damar Crimes or Darius Boyd testify because he had no idea what they would have said. There is no reason based on professional judgment why Lankford would not have pursued speaking to Damar Crimes. The district court correctly concluded that Lankford was under a duty to reasonably investigate, which entails, at the bare minimum, asking for Damar's phone number or address and reasonably attempting to contact him. Id. The district court also correctly observed, this does not mean that Lankford was under an obligation to actually track down Damar Crimes, only that he put in a reasonable effort to do so. For these reasons, we affirm the district court's decision that the Michigan Court of Appeals unreasonably applied Strickland in deferring to Lankford's decision to end his less than complete investigation.