Opinion ID: 216201
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of the Worrell Test to Ms. Leverington's Claims Against Peters

Text: Having decided that the Worrell test applies to Ms. Leverington's claim against Peters, it is apparent that her claim was properly dismissed because Peters is entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the first prong of the this test. Specifically, it was not clearly established that Ms. Leverington was engaging in constitutionally protected activity when she made her statement to Peters. The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 129 S.Ct. 808, 815, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). In resolving a motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity, a court must consider whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged. . . make out a violation of a constitutional right, and whether the right at issue was clearly established at the time of defendant's alleged misconduct. Id. at 816 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court in Pearson made clear that courts have discretion to decide which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand. Id. at 818. The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. Thomas v. Durastanti, 607 F.3d 655, 669 (10th Cir.2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, it was not clearly established that Ms. Leverington's statement to Peters did not constitute a true threat unprotected by the First Amendment. See Nielander v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 582 F.3d 1155, 1168 (10th Cir. 2009) (distinguishing between protected speech and unprotected threats). In Nielander, we found that because it was debatable whether a reasonable officer would have considered the plaintiff's statement to be a threat, we cannot say that the applicable law [was] clearly established such that [the defendant] acted unreasonably in writing a probable cause determination. 582 F.3d at 1169. We therefore held that where a question of ultimate fact (in this case, whether a reasonable officer would be unreasonable in concluding that [a statement] was a true threat under clearly established federal law) cannot be resolved as a matter of law, the law is not clearly established and qualified immunity is appropriate. Id. Here, even drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Ms. Leverington, it is debatable whether a reasonable officer in Peters's position would have considered her statement to be a threat. Accordingly, Ms. Leverington's free-speech rights in this context were not clearly established, and Peters is entitled to qualified immunity on this basis. In addition, it was not clearly established that Ms. Leverington's statement was protected for another reasonas discussed above, it was not on a matter of public concern. We have stated in the Garcetti/Pickering context that the public-concern test determines whether a government employees speech is protected. See Dixon, 553 F.3d at 1303-04 (applying public-concern test to determine whether a government employee's speech is constitutionally protected); Brammer-Hoelter, 492 F.3d at 1203 (If the speech is not a matter of public concern, then the speech is unprotected and the inquiry ends.); Worrell, 219 F.3d at 1205 (stating, in applying Pickering test, that only matters of public concern . . . are protected by the First Amendment in this context). Thus, in order to survive the first prong of Worrell, Ms. Leverington would have to establish that the public-concern test does not apply to a free-speech retaliation claim under Worrell. We have substantial doubt that this is the case. Whether an employer's adverse employment action is permissible depends on whether the employee's speech is on a matter of public concernif not on a matter of public concern, we deem the employer's action to be permissible under the First Amendment. It would make little sense to punish third parties for chilling private speech that does not enjoy protection from the government employer. If the First Amendment does not protect Ms. Leverington against the consequences of her statement (termination by Memorial), then it would be incongruous to nonetheless impute liability to Peters. We note that the Supreme Court in its recent Phelps decision underscored the importance of the public-concern inquiry in determining how much protection is afforded to speech: Whether the First Amendment prohibits holding [defendants] liable for [their] speech in this case turns largely on whether that speech is of public or private concern, as determined by all the circumstances of the case. [S]peech on matters of public concern . . . is at the heart of the First Amendment's protection. The First Amendment reflects a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open. That is because speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government. Accordingly, speech on public issues occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values, and is entitled to special protection. [N]ot all speech is of equal First Amendment importance, however, and where matters of purely private significance are at issue, First Amendment protections are often less rigorous. That is because restricting speech on purely private matters does not implicate the same constitutional concerns as limiting speech on matters of public interest: [T]here is no threat to the free and robust debate of public issues; there is no potential interference with a meaningful dialogue of ideas; and the threat of liability does not pose the risk of a reaction of self-censorship on matters of public import. Snyder v. Phelps, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1207, 1215-16, 179 L.Ed.2d 172 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). However, we need notand do notdecide here whether the public-concern test applies in the context of a Worrell inquiry. It is sufficient that the law was not clearly established on this point, and thus that Peters is entitled to qualified immunity on this basis as well. [10]