Opinion ID: 1354506
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: NEPA Ruling

Text: We next address whether we have jurisdiction over the Intervenors' cross-appeal challenging the district court's NEPA ruling. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 this court has appellate jurisdiction only if an order of the district court is a `final decision.' A `final decision' generally is one which ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment. Giordano v. Roudebush, 565 F.2d 1015, 1017 (8th Cir.1977) (internal quotations and citations omitted). [N]umerous cases have held that an order remanding to a federal agency for further proceedings is not a final order within the meaning of § 1291. Borntrager v. Cent. States, Southeast, & Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 425 F.3d 1087, 1091 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing Giordano, 565 F.2d at 1017 and cases cited therein); see also Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. S.E.C., 873 F.2d 325, 329 (D.C.Cir.1989) (The Supreme Court has apparently never addressed the issue of whether an order remanding a case for further proceedings before an administrative agency is `final' within the meaning of § 1291, nor has it had occasion to decide whether the collateral order exception has any application to such an order. The courts of appeals that have considered the question, however, have uniformly held that, as a general rule, a remand order is `interlocutory' rather than `final,' and thus may not be appealed immediately (unless, of course, it is certified pursuant to § 1292).). Here, in its NEPA ruling, the district court remanded the case to the Forest Service, instructing it to prepare an [EIS] assessing the sound impact of each of the proposed South Fowl Trail routes on the adjoining wilderness area, but also enjoined [the Forest Service] from conducting any further activity on the proposed trail pending completion of the EIS. Therefore, the district court both remanded the matter to the agency for further proceedings and granted injunctive relief. As to the remand order, we find no circumstances warranting a less restrictive application of the final judgment rule and therefore hold that we lack jurisdiction over the Intervenors' appeal of the remand order. The collateral order doctrine or a similar administrative law exception to the final judgment rule may well apply when an agency seeks to appeal a remand order to raise an issue that could not be appealed after the proceedings on remand. See Davies v. Johanns, 477 F.3d 968, 971 (8th Cir.2007); Alsea Valley Alliance v. Dept. of Commerce, 358 F.3d 1181, 1184 (9th Cir.2004); Occidental, 873 F.2d at 329; United States v. Alcon Labs., 636 F.2d 876, 884-85 (1st Cir.1981); Cohen v. Perales, 412 F.2d 44, 48 (5th Cir.1969); Bender v. Clark, 744 F.2d 1424, 1428 (10th Cir.1984); Huie v. Bowen, 788 F.2d 698, 703 (11th Cir. 1986). This principle might apply, for example, if the Forest Service had appealed to argue that it should be permitted to consider whether a modified EA and FONSI would be sufficient, rather than a more costly and time-consuming EIS. But no such issue is raised here. We do have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) to consider the district court's grant of an injunction suspending work on the South Fowl Trail pending completion of an EIS. But the Forest Service has not appealed the injunction. Even if the district court had not granted this relief, or if this court now vacated the injunction, the Forest Service would have authority to halt further activity on the proposed trail pending its completion of an EIS. At oral argument, the Forest Service advised that its normal practice is to halt activity pending further review. In these circumstances, Intervenors may not obtain relief from the preliminary injunction because they are not being irreparably injured by it. The district court of course retains jurisdiction to modify the injunction if circumstances change before completion of the proceedings on remand.