Opinion ID: 2622674
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Kidnapping and contemporaneous robberies

Text: Evidence at trial indicated that Mendoza and two cohorts entered Mr. Canon's residence with guns, tied him up, looted the premises and robbed other members of the Canon family. During these robberies, Mr. Avalos, an employee of Mr. Canon, arrived at the residence to retrieve his paycheck. The intruders seized Mr. Avalos, took him inside, severely beat him, and took his keys and wallet. The criminal information filed in the district court included individual charges of robbery with the use of a deadly weapon of Mr. Canon and Mr. Avalos, and individual charges of first-degree kidnapping with the use of a deadly weapon in connection with those robberies. Ultimately, the jury convicted Mendoza of robbery as to both Mr. Canon and Mr. Avalos, and convicted Mendoza of kidnapping Mr. Avalos. It acquitted Mendoza on the kidnapping charges concerning Mr. Canon. [4] The district court gave two kidnapping instructions, instructions 24 and 25. Instruction 24 stated as follows: Every person who willfully seizes, confines, inveigles, entices, decoys, abducts, conceals, kidnaps or carries away any person by any means whatsoever with the intent to hold or detain, or who holds or detains, the person: One, for the purpose of committing robbery upon or from the person; or two, for the purpose of killing the person or inflicting substantial bodily harm upon him; is guilty of kidnapping in the first degree. The law does not require the person being kidnapped to be carried away for any minimal distance. The term inveigle means to lead astray by trickery or deceitful persuasion. Instruction 25 went on to state the criteria for dual convictions for robbery and kidnapping arising from the same course of conduct: In order for you to find the defendant guilty of both first degree kidnapping and an associated offense of robbery, you must also find beyond a reasonable doubt either: One, that the movement of the victim was not incidental to the robbery and that the movement of the victim substantially increased the risk of harm to the victim over and above that necessarily present in the robbery; or, two, that the victim was physically restrained and such restraint increased the risk of harm to the victim or had an independent purpose or significance. Physically restrained includes but is not limited to tying, binding, or taping. In summary, the district court instructed the jury via instruction 24 that it could convict Mendoza of kidnapping if he detained either Guillermo Canon or Jose Avalos for the purpose of committing robbery. Instruction 25 imposed an asportation or increased risk of harm requirement to maintain concomitant charges of robbery and kidnapping. Mendoza contends that these two instructions, when read together, suggest that a person who commits a robbery will always be guilty of kidnapping. We disagree. Instruction 24 set forth the statutory definition of kidnapping as a stand-alone offense. [5] Instruction 25 set forth the parameters under this court's decisions in Wright v. State [6] and Hutchins v. State [7] for dual convictions for both robbery and first-degree kidnapping arising from a single incident. In Wright, this court reversed kidnapping convictions imposed by the district court in the context of an armed robbery where the victims were moved from one room to another at the crime scene over a short period of time, and then tied up hand and foot with tape. Wright embraced the California position taken in People v. Daniels. [8] In this, we observed the following: If . . . the movement of the victim is incidental to the robbery and does not substantially increase the risk of harm over and above that necessarily present in the crime of robbery itself, it would be unreasonable to believe that the legislature intended a double punishment. . . . On the other hand, if the movement of the victim results in increased danger over and above that present in the crime of robbery itself, a kidnap[p]ing charge also may lie. [9] In reversing the kidnapping convictions, we noted that under the factual scenarios at issue, the movement of the victims during the robbery was incidental to the robbery and without an increase in danger to them. [10] Interestingly, we did not address whether the physical restraint applied to the victims played a role in the analysis, other than to say that, [i]n these circumstances, the convictions for kidnap[p]ing must be set aside. [11] Two subsequent decisions of this court, Clem v. State [12] and Hutchins, [13] apply the Wright doctrine to cases involving physical restraint. Interestingly, Clem falsely distinguishes itself from Wright on the ground that Clem's victim was physically restrained, and Hutchins does not at all refer to Wright. More particularly, Hutchins states as follows: While the plain language of NRS 200.310(1) does not require asportation, the court has required it when the kidnapping is incidental to another offense, such as robbery, where restraint of the victim is inherent with the primary offense. However, if the victim is physically restrained, this, in itself, establishes kidnapping as an additional offense.  [14] Although Hutchins appears to expand the rule in Wright to state that physical restraint during the course of a robbery per se proves dual culpability under the Nevada kidnapping and robbery statutes, we went on to further explain that a kidnapping is not incidental to the underlying offense if `the restraint increased the risk of harm' or `had an independent purpose and significance as [being] essential to the accomplishment of' the other offense. [15] Thus, under Hutchins, it remains unclear as to whether restraint must substantially increase the risk of harm to the victim over and above that necessarily present in the crime of robbery to justify dual culpability. Reading Wright and Hutchins together, an issue of semantics arises over the use of the term incidental. Wright seems to indicate that incidental action in aid of a robbery only implicates the kidnapping statute when the action increases the risk of harm to the victim. Hutchins seems to indicate that physical restraint is never merely incidental to the underlying charge. More recently, in Garcia v. State, [16] a panel of this court attempted a retreat from Hutchins and return to the test in Wright. However, in attempting to paraphrase Wright, the decision embraced the test for dual culpability for second-degree kidnapping and robbery adopted in Jefferson v. State , to wit: that, where a person has been charged with second degree kidnap[p]ing and a separate, associated crime, the charge of second degree kidnap[p]ing will lie only where the movement of the victim is over and above that required to complete the associated crime charged. [17] In Jefferson, we noted that the test for dual culpability for second-degree kidnapping and robbery differed from the test for dual culpability for first-degree kidnapping and robbery under Wright. [18] In short, the Wright test focuses upon increased danger while the Jefferson test focuses upon unnecessary movement or personal seizure. We conclude that the distinctions between these tests are only semantical. Both involve legitimate considerations in determinations of dual criminality under Nevada's kidnapping statutes. We now clarify that movement or restraint incidental to an underlying offense where restraint or movement is inherent, as a general matter, will not expose the defendant to dual criminal liability under either the first-or second-degree kidnapping statutes. However, where the movement or restraint serves to substantially increase the risk of harm to the victim over and above that necessarily present in an associated offense, i.e., robbery, extortion, battery resulting in substantial bodily harm or sexual assault, or where the seizure, restraint or movement of the victim substantially exceeds that required to complete the associated crime charged, dual convictions under the kidnapping and robbery statutes are proper. [19] Also, per Hutchins, dual culpability is permitted where the movement, seizure or restraint stands alone with independent significance from the underlying charge. The evidence against Mendoza justified the district court's instructions on both of the alleged kidnapping offenses. Interestingly, the jury acquitted Mendoza of kidnapping Canon, the case in which physical restraint was clearly shown. As to the kidnapping conviction involving the seizure and restraint of Jose Avalos in Canon's residence, the seizure and restraint resulted in increased danger and injury to Avalos, thus falling within the purview of instruction 25. In short, Avalos was seized, physically restrained, assaulted and then robbed. [20] To conclude, we hold that to sustain convictions for both robbery and kidnapping arising from the same course of conduct, any movement or restraint must stand alone with independent significance from the act of robbery itself, create a risk of danger to the victim substantially exceeding that necessarily present in the crime of robbery, or involve movement, seizure or restraint substantially in excess of that necessary to its completion. Thus, we retreat somewhat from the statement in Hutchins that physical restraint per se satisfies that requirement. For future guidance, we suggest the following instruction be given in these situations: In order for you to find the defendant guilty of both first-degree kidnapping (or second-degree kidnapping) and an associated offense of robbery, you must also find beyond a reasonable doubt either: (1) That any movement of the victim was not incidental to the robbery; (2) That any incidental movement of the victim substantially increased the risk of harm to the victim over and above that necessarily present in the robbery; (3) That any incidental movement of the victim substantially exceeded that required to complete the robbery; (4) That the victim was physically restrained and such restraint substantially increased the risk of harm to the victim; or (5) The movement or restraint had an independent purpose or significance. Physically restrained includes but is not limited to tying, binding, or taping. We note finally that instructions 24 and 25 given below comport with our retreat from Hutchins and, thus, substantially provided proper guidance to the jury on these issues.