Opinion ID: 1463584
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Payne contends that his convictions should be overturned on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence to prove (1) that there existed a RICO enterprise, (2) that there was a single narcotics conspiracy as alleged in the indictment, rather than a group of individual, independent drug dealers, and that he was a member of the conspiracy (and the enterprise) alleged in the indictment, (3) that he committed the Clemons and Newton murders for the purpose of furthering his position within the RICO enterprise, and (4) that the racketeering acts concerning the Clemons and Newton murders and the robberies of Newton and Kinsey established a pattern of racketeering. Our standard of review for sufficiency challenges is well established. We must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, crediting every inference that could have been drawn in the government's favor. See, e.g., United States v. Chavez, 549 F.3d 119, 124-25 (2d Cir.2008); United States v. Eppolito, 543 F.3d 25, 45-46 (2d Cir.2008) ( Eppolito ), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 1027 (2009); United States v. Pimentel, 346 F.3d 285, 295 (2d Cir.2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 955, 125 S.Ct. 451, 160 L.Ed.2d 316 (2004). Assessments of witness credibility and choices between competing inferences lie solely within the province of the jury. [W]here there are conflicts in the testimony, we must defer to the jury's resolution of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. . . . United States v. Miller, 116 F.3d 641, 676 (2d Cir.1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 905 (1998); see, e.g., United States v. Jones, 393 F.3d 107, 111 (2d Cir.2004). We must uphold the conviction if  any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (emphasis in original). Given these principles, we reject all of Payne's sufficiency challenges.
The indictment alleged that from 1985 through January 2003 a number of associated individuals participated in and conducted the affairs of a RICO enterprise by, inter alia, distributing crack and powder cocaine and committing robberies and murders in furtherance of their drug distribution operations. RICO defines the term enterprise to include any . . . group of individuals associated in fact. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). The existence of a RICO enterprise may be proved by evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and by evidence that the various associates function as a continuing unit. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981). `[A]n association-in-fact is oftentimes more readily proven by what it does, rather than by abstract analysis of its structure.' United States v. Jones, 482 F.3d 60, 69-70 (2d Cir.2006) (quoting United States v. Coonan, 938 F.2d 1553, 1559 (2d Cir.1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 941, 112 S.Ct. 1486, 117 L.Ed.2d 628 (1992) (emphasis in Coonan )), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1231 (2007). An `individuals associated in fact' enterprise, 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4), may continue to exist even though it undergoes changes in membership. Eppolito, 543 F.3d at 49; see, e.g., Coonan, 938 F.2d at 1560-61. Although Payne contends that the evidence at trial merely showed a group of neighborhood friends who may have given each other sporadic assistance (Payne brief on appeal at 60), that characterization plainly does not view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. As described in Part I.A. above, there was testimony by Thomas and Hatcher that there were more than a dozen individuals distributing narcotics in the East New York section of Brooklyn; although there was no highly structured organization, Thomas and Hatcher testified that these individuals were members of a family or street family who made money together, i.e., they would sell drugs together, protect[] each other, and take care of each other by providing funds for family members who were broke or in jail. The family was protective of its territory, allowing family members to sell drugs at family spots, coordinating family members' selling hours if they used the same spot and otherwise avoiding conflicts with one another, excluding nonmembers of the family from those spots, and using violence against rivals who attempted to possess or repossess family spots. Thomas and Hatcher, by their own accounts at trial, were members of the family from the mid-1980s until they were arrested in connection with this case in 2002 and began to cooperate with the government. The evidence permitted the inference that Hatcher was a member of the family throughout that period even though he was in prison during most of the 1990s. While he was in prison, Hunter paid Hatcher's wife and father some $200,000; and Hatcher (who was always a person [Thomas] considered a boss (Tr. 1499)) kept track of what was going on in family territory through periodic reports from Hunter ( see id. at 687-90). When family members were released from prison, other family members promptly saw to it that they were supplied with money and guns. Thus, the evidence to establish the existence of a group of drug dealers who were associated in fact was abundant. There was also ample testimony that Payne became a member of the family in 1995 and fulfilled various family needs thereafter. At first he was a lieutenant for Thomas, packaging cocaine, keeping the workers supplied, collecting the proceeds of the sales, and occasionally making the purchases from Thomas's suppliers. Although Payne lost his lieutenant position in 1996, the evidence easily permitted the jury to infer that he remained a member of the family, as Thomas testified that Payne was there to provide whatever assistance was needed. Indeed, Hunter, as Thomas's drug-selling partner, considered Payne's post-lieutenancy services so integral to their operations that he tried in 1996 to persuade Thomas that the partnership's profits should be split three ways, to include Payne. In 1997, when Thomas confided to Hunter and Payne that Clemons had slept with Thomas's girlfriend, Payne participated in the ambush of Clemons and shot him to death. When Hatcher was released from prison in 1998 and arrived in Manhattan, Hunter and Payne picked him up, and Payne was introduced to Hatcher as a new shooter in the family; thereafter, Payne and Hatcher became robbing budd[ies]. When Thomas and Hatcher decided to rob and kill Newton in 2000, Hatcher enlisted Payne. In 2000, Thomas, Hatcher, and Payne agreed that Payne would distribute drugs at the Thomas-Hatcher partnership spot during the nighttime hours when Thomas and Hatcher were not operating; Payne would not have been allowed to sell there had he not been a member of the family ( see, e.g., id. at 1436, 1630). And when Payne obtained narcotics by robbing other drug dealers, he gave half of the stolen drugs to Hatcher. In sum, Payne's contention that the evidence was insufficient to permit inferences that the RICO enterprise alleged in the indictment existed, and that he participated in it, borders on the frivolous.
Payne's contention that the evidence was insufficient to show his participation in the single drug distribution conspiracy alleged in the indictment i.e., a conspiracy between 1985 and January 2003, both dates being approximate and inclusivefares no better. [A] single conspiracy is not transformed into multiple conspiracies merely by virtue of the fact that it may involve two or more phases or spheres of operation, so long as there is sufficient proof of mutual dependence and assistance. United States v. Geibel, 369 F.3d 682, 689 (2d Cir.) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 999, 125 S.Ct. 619, 160 L.Ed.2d 457 (2004). Changes in membership[ and/or] differences in time periods . . . do not necessarily require a finding of more than one conspiracy. United States v. Jones, 482 F.3d at 72. In the context of narcotics operations . . . we have held that even where there are multiple groups within an alleged conspiracy, a single conspiracy exists where the groups share a common goal and depend upon and assist each other, and we can reasonably infer that each actor was aware of his part in a larger organization where others performed similar roles. United States v. Berger, 224 F.3d 107, 115 (2d Cir.2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). The matter of whether there existed a single conspiracy as charged in the indictment, or instead multiple conspiracies that did not include the conspiracy alleged, is a question of fact for a properly instructed jury. United States v. Chavez, 549 F.3d at 125 (internal quotation marks omitted). Even if multiple conspiracies are found, the jury should convict the defendant if it finds that one of the proven conspiracies was the one alleged in the indictment and that the defendant was a member of it. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 76 F.3d 442, 454 (2d Cir.1996); United States v. Lam Lek Chong, 544 F.2d 58, 68 (2d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1101, 97 S.Ct. 1124, 51 L.Ed.2d 550 (1977); United States v. Tramunti, 513 F.2d 1087, 1107 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 832 (1975). We will affirm the jury's verdict unless, on the evidence presented, no rational factfinder could have found that the conspiracy alleged in the indictment existed. The district court here properly instructed the jury that it could not find Payne guilty on count ten unless it found that the government had proven the existence of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment and Payne's membership in that conspiracy; and we see no basis on which to overturn the jury's verdict. Payne's contentions (a) that [t]here was not one narcotic[s] conspiracy spanning eighteen years but a host of conspiracies, actually a variety of drug dealers, friendly, but running separate business[es] (Payne brief on appeal at 55), and (b) that his association with the family ended in 1996 when he was fired as Thomas's lieutenant ( see id. at 56; see also id. at 45 (arguing that Payne was thrown out of the group)) are belied by the evidence discussed in Parts I.A. and II.B.1. above. The jury was entitled to find that the alleged conspiracy existed in light of the evidence that Thomas and Hatcher became members of the drug distribution family in the mid-1980s; that, by agreement, family members would [s]ell drugs together (Tr. 1172), coordinating and not competing with each other ( see, e.g., id. at 743, 708-09), and supporting each other with money, weapons, and retaliatory actions when needed; that Thomas sold drugs throughout the 1985-2002 period; that although Hatcher spent several years in prison in the 1990s, he remained a member of the drug distribution family and was supported monetarily while incarcerated; that when Hunter was released from prison in 1996, Payne and Thomas helped him financially ( see id. at 1326); that when Hatcher was released from prison in 1998, Payne and Hunter helped him financially ( see id. at 709-10); and that Hatcher, upon his release from prison, could have, as a family member, sold drugs on the same block as Thomas, but he declined because that would have been a conflict of interest as Hatcher and Thomas were family, period ( id. at 708-09). Hatcher said, We don't do business like that. Why would we compete against ourselves? ( Id. at 709.) The record also included evidence that Hunter was a member of the conspiracy throughout the period alleged in the indictment, working first with Hatcher and later with Thomas. Although in and out of jail with considerable frequency, he was supported during periods of incarceration by Thomas and/or Hatcher. On at least one occasion while Hunter was incarcerated, he was consulted by Hatcher with respect to the appropriateness of killing a person who was acting in a manner detrimental to the interests of the family. ( See id. at 634-37.) The evidence discussed in Parts I.A. and II.B.l. above showed that Payne joined the ongoing conspiracy in 1995. He served as a lieutenant for Thomas in the procurement, packaging, delivery, and protection of crack cocaine in 1995-1996; as a killer and robber at the behest of Thomas in 1997 and 2000; as a robbery partner of Hunter in 1998; as a robbery partner of Hatcher after Hatcher was released from prison in 1998 and through at least January 2000; as a supplier of drugs to Hatcher in and after 2000; and, by agreement with Thomas and Hatcher, as a fellow seller of crack at Georgia/Hegeman beginning in 2000. In sum, the evidence was ample to permit the jury to find that there was, as alleged in the indictment, a single ongoing narcotics conspiracy of which Hatcher, Thomas, and Hunter were core members, and that Payne was a member of that conspiracy, joining in 1995 and continuing to participate in it at least until Thomas and Hatcher were arrested in connection with this case in 2002.
Payne contends that the evidence was insufficient to establish that his motivation in participating in the murders of Clemons and Newton was to further his position in the Hatcher-Thomas-Hunter enterprise, based in part on his contention that he had been thrown out of the group in 1996 (Payne brief on appeal at 45). Again, we disagree. Section 1959(a)'s phrase for the purpose of . . . maintaining or increasing position in an enterprise engaged in racketeering activity is to be interpreted in accordance with its plain terms, giving those terms their ordinary meaning, United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 671 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 897, 122 S.Ct. 219, 151 L.Ed.2d 156 (2001). Thus, on its face, section 1959 encompasses violent crimes intended to preserve the defendant's position in the enterprise or to enhance his reputation and wealth within that enterprise. Id. (emphases in original). Further, maintaining or increasing his position in the RICO enterprise need not have been the defendant's sole, or even his principal, motivation. Rather, the motive requirement is satisfied if the jury could properly infer that the defendant committed his violent crime because he knew it was expected of him by reason of his membership in the enterprise or that he committed it in furtherance of that membership. United States v. Pimentel, 346 F.3d at 295-96 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the record was ample to permit the jury to infer that Payne was not in fact thrown out of the group in 1996 but rather remained a member of the family enterprise, and that he participated in the Newton and Clemons murdersas asked or ordered ( see, e.g., Tr. 704 (`Boo' gave the order for [Clemons] to be killed)) to do by the principal leaders of the enterprisewith the requisite motivation. As described in Part I.A.1. above, after losing his lieutenant position to Clemons, Payne nonetheless remained a member of the family; Thomas testified that Payne thereafter stayed around to help us if we needed him for something. Both Thomas and Hatcher testified that Payne was upset that he had been replaced as lieutenant by Clemons, and the jury was entitled to infer that Payne's subsequent actions toward Clemonsincluding accusing Clemons of being a snitch who might jeopardize the family's security, advising Thomas that Clemons be killed, and finally shooting and killing Clemons as ordered by Thomasall reflected a desire by Payne to regain his lieutenancy and/or to enhance his position in the family. The evidence as to the killing of Newton was also sufficient to support an inference that Payne assisted in that murder in part in order to maintain his position in the family. The enterprise's purpose in robbing Newton of his 600 grams of heroin was to enrich core members of the family; the purpose of murdering Newton was to minimize the possibility of reprisals for that robbery. Payne was asked to participate by Hatcher, an enterprise boss ( id. at 1499). It was plainly permissible for the jury to infer that Payne complied with Hatcher's request to participate in that murder in order to maintain or increase Payne's position in the enterprise.
Finally, we reject Payne's contention that the murders of Clemons and Newton and the robberies of Newton and Kinsey lacked the relatedness needed to establish a pattern of racketeering activity, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). The pattern requirement is designed to prevent the application of RICO to the perpetrators of isolated or sporadic criminal acts. United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370, 1383 (2d Cir.) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811, 110 S.Ct. 56, 107 L.Ed.2d 24 (1989). Thus, to prove a pattern of racketeering activity a . . . prosecutor must show that the racketeering predicates are related, and that they amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239, 109 S.Ct. 2893, 106 L.Ed.2d 195 (1989) (emphasis omitted). To meet this test, the racketeering acts must be related both to each other and to the enterprise. See, e.g., United States v. Minicone, 960 F.2d 1099, 1106 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 950, 112 S.Ct. 1511, 117 L.Ed.2d 648 (1992). [C]riminal conduct forms a pattern if it embraces criminal acts that have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events.  H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 240, 109 S.Ct. 2893 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphases ours). [E]vidence of prior uncharged crimes and other bad acts that were committed by defendants [] may be relevant. . . to prove the existence, organization and nature of the RICO enterprise, and a pattern of racketeering activity by each defendant[]. United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52, 79 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 875 (1999). The evidence as to the killings of Clemons and Newton and the robberies of Newton and Kinsey easily met these tests. The robberies were related to the enterprise because they were designed to enrich core members of the enterprise. Thus, the robbery of Kinsey, instigated by Hunter, enriched Hunter and Payne, along with a third person, by nearly $30,000. The robbery of Newton, as planned by Hatcher, Thomas, and Payne, enriched them by the $30-$45,000 that Boobie paid them for Newton's heroin. The murders of Newton and Clemons were related to the enterprise because they, inter alia, reduced the risk of interference with the enterprise's operations. By killing Newton, the family minimized the chance of retaliation by the persons from whom Newton had obtained the heroin. By killing Clemons, the family both punished a worker for disrespecting his boss, thereby promoting internal discipline, and eliminated a person suspected of being a snitch, thereby reducing the threat of interruptions by law enforcement. Thus, the purposes of murdering Newton and Clemons were or included facilitation of the enterprise's continuation of its criminal activities. These racketeering acts were related to each other not only by their shared purposes but also by the commonality of the participants and the ways in which they were committed. The same methods were used to achieve the enterprise's goals. In each case at least two men attacked the victim at gunpoint; and in each case the victim was brutally physically assaulted, despite the fact that each was supposedly a friend of the family. Payne was a participant in all of these events; and in each of them his co-participants were either Thomas and Hunter, or Hunter, or Thomas and Hatcher. These robberies and assaults in furtherance of the enterprise's purposes were hardly isolated incidents. The essence of being a family member was described by Hatcher and Thomas as sell[ing] drugs and [s]hoot[ing] (Tr. 556), and retaliating if [s]omebody d[id] something to one of us ( id. at 1172). In addition to evidence as to the crimes specified as Payne's racketeering acts, there was other evidence that Payne was committing robberies in the late 1990s while Hatcher was still in prison ( see id. at 1362); that after Hatcher was released from prison he and Payne were doing robberies together ( id. at 1375; see also id. at 724, 729); that Payne used to rob drug dealers and get the money so that he could get drugs from them so that they could sell them on the block ( id. at 1376); that Payne and Hunter attempted unsuccessfully to rob, and had planned to kill, a woman they believed to possess $500,000 belonging to her bank-robber boyfriend ( see id. at 1375-83); and that Payne, because he was part of the family ( id. at 1452), participated in repeated attempts to locate, and kill, two individuals who had shot Thomas ( see, e.g., id. at 1446-52). In sum, the evidence was more than sufficient to permit the jury to find that the murders of Clemons and Newton and the robberies of Newton and Kinsey were not isolated incidents but instead were part of a pattern of racketeering activity.