Opinion ID: 2575903
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Evidence of Prior Violent Criminal Activity

Text: Defendant contends that introducing evidence of three prior unadjudicated criminal incidents under section 190.3, factor (b), violated several of his constitutional rights and rights conferred by state decisional law, as specified below. We do not agree. Before an individual juror may consider evidence of other violent criminal activity in aggravation, he or she must find the existence of such activity beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] There is no requirement, however, that the jury as a whole unanimously find the existence of other violent criminal activity beyond a reasonable doubt before an individual juror may consider such evidence in aggravation. ( People v. Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 536, 585, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 743, 93 P.3d 344.) In each instance at issue here, defendant argues that absent evidence that should have been excluded, there was insufficient evidence of the uncharged crimes to meet the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. In each case, however, we conclude that the evidence he believes should have been excluded was properly admitted, and once it was introduced, a rational juror could have found the essential elements of each unadjudicated crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
In the pretrial notice to defendant of the aggravating evidence it planned to introduce, the district attorney's office included [t]he incident ... in which the defendant burglarized the apartment of Doris Dantes ... and violently resisted his apprehension immediately following that offense.... In moving to exclude the evidence, defendant cited the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution, section 190.3, factor (b), and People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 215 Cal.Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782, in which we held that only violent crimes against people, not property, may be introduced in aggravation as evidence of prior violent criminal activity. ( Id. at pp. 776-777, 215 Cal.Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782.) Defendant argued in the court below that there was insufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to find true beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed any crimes against any person during the Dantes episode. Denying the motion, the trial court reasoned that, based on its reading of prior testimony, the incident involved a battery and the jury could hear evidence of it under section 190.3, factor (b). As described more fully in the factual background, ante, Doris Dantes testified that she awoke to find defendant standing on a stepladder and shining a flashlight through her first floor apartment window in San Francisco. The two of them were looking at each other through the window, separated by only a couple of feet. She was unable to scream, but told him to go away. After unsuccessfully trying to grab a telephone to call police, she fled. As she ran for the front door, defendant hurled a brick through the window, almost striking her, and she was injured by flying shards of glass. Then she began to scream, left the apartment, and sought help from a neighbor. When she returned later, she saw that her purse was missing. A neighbor who pursued defendant also testified. In trying to escape, defendant threw his flashlight at him. Defendant also threatened to take revenge on the neighbor, who was holding defendant on the ground, while they awaited the police. Defendant maintains that under People v. Boyd, supra, 38 Cal.3d 762, 776-777, 215 Cal.Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782, evidence of the incident was inadmissible because the episode involved only violence against property, namely an effort to obtain Dantes's purse by breaking a window with a brick. He discerns violations of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as error under Boyd. We do not agree. [18] First, from Dantes's testimony, a rational jury could have decided that defendant committed robbery when he threw the brick at Dantes to force her to abandon her purse, and then entered the apartment and stole the purse. Robbery may be accomplished when fear prevents a victim from retaining possession of property within her reach that she could have retained absent the robber's intercession. ( People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th 894, 955, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183.) Second, he threw his flashlight at a neighbor in pursuit of him. That is assault. (ї 240.) The incident fell squarely within factor (b) of section 190.3, and evidence of it was properly admitted.
In the pretrial notice to defendant of the aggravating evidence it planned to introduce, the district attorney included [t]he incident ... in which the defendant robbed Semadar Barzel of her purse and contents . . . and the separate incident of an assaultive purse-snatching robbery that injured Regena Mannello. Rejecting a challenge that introducing evidence of the Barzel incident would violate defendant's Fourth Amendment rights because the evidence was obtained by means of an unlawful detention, the trial court permitted the prosecution to introduce the evidence. Defendant renews his Fourth Amendment claim on appeal. He maintains that the police lacked sufficient reason to justify an investigative stop and detention. Without the evidence obtained from that stop, he contends, there was insufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to find true beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed any crimes against Barzel. In a pretrial proceeding in this case, a police officer testified that he and his partner detained defendant after they observed him loitering at night in a crime-ridden residential neighborhood for an extended period, perching on the trunk of a parked automobile, entering an automobile from the passenger side before attempting to drive it away (the police later learned that he was trying to steal it), and following both a woman and a police officer (who may have been dressed in plain clothes) in a suspicious manner, as if stalking them. Pursuant to the detention, the officer performed a patdown search on defendant and felt a hard object. At that point, defendant fled and was tackled by the police, who recovered a gun. Assuming for purposes of argument that the Fourth Amendment may be invoked in an attempt to exclude evidence the prosecution wishes to present solely at a capital sentencing proceeding (but see U.S. v. Ryan (10th Cir.2001) 236 F.3d 1268, 1271 [ordinarily the exclusionary rule does not bar the introduction of the fruits of illegal searches and seizures during sentencing proceedings]), it is plain that the police had sufficient cause to detain and question defendant. [A]n officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. [Citation.] While `reasonable suspicion' is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, the Fourth Amendment requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop. [Citation.] The officer must be able to articulate more than an `inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch' of criminal activity. [Citation.] [І] ... An individual's presence in an area of expected criminal activity, standing alone, is not enough to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion that the person is committing a crime. [Citation.] But officers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation. Accordingly, we have previously noted the fact that the stop occurred in a `high crime area' among the relevant contextual considerations.... ( Illinois v. Wardlow (2000) 528 U.S. 119, 123-124, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570.) In making such a stop, police may conduct a protective patdown search for weapons. ( Id. at p. 121, 120 S.Ct. 673.) The circumstances here justified an investigative detention of defendant. He was following a woman and a police officer in a suspicious manner; he was loitering in a high-crime residential area at night; and he entered a car in a peculiar manner and then tried to drive it away. Lurking in the dark by residences in the wee hours of the morning is unusual for law-abiding persons ( Battle v. State (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 2004) 868 So.2d 587, 589), and the officer[s] had reasonable suspicion that appellant was loitering and prowling ( ibid. ). In Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 6, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, the court noted the defendant's measured pacing and peering, similar to defendant's conduct before the officers detained him. The evidence of the Barzel robbery was properly admitted.
In the pretrial notice to defendant of the aggravating evidence it planned to introduce, the district attorney's office included [t]he incident ... in which the defendant assaulted and robbed Linda R. Incardine.... Defendant moved to exclude evidence that Incardine identified him as the robber, arguing that the procedure used to have her identify him was unduly suggestive, in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution. When defendant assaulted Incardine, he was wearing a blue sweatshirt with the hood up, which she had a further opportunity to observe as he fled up the street in her view. In a pretrial proceeding in 1990 at which Incardine also identified defendant in court, she testified that officers took her to where they had arrested him and asked her if she recognized him. At the arrest scene, she asked to have him raise his sweatshirt hood, and once he did, she positively identified him. The trial court denied the motion to exclude the identification, ruling that the identification procedure was constitutionally sound. Defendant asserts that the identification procedure violated the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution and that without the identification evidence there was insufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to find that he assaulted and robbed Incardine. We do not agree that any Sixth Amendment violation occurred. [19] In order to determine whether the admission of identification evidence violates a defendant's right to due process of law, we consider (1) whether the identification procedure was unduly suggestive and unnecessary, and, if so, (2) whether the identification itself was nevertheless reliable under the totality of the circumstances, taking into account such factors as the opportunity of the witness to view the suspect at the time of the offense, the witness's degree of attention at the time of the offense, the accuracy of his or her prior description of the suspect, the level of certainty demonstrated at the time of the identification, and the lapse of time between the offense and the identification. [Citations.] [І] The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating the existence of an unreliable identification procedure. ( People v. Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th 926, 989, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 25 P.3d 519.) Defendant has not met his burden of establishing unreliability. Incardine identified defendant by his distinctive clothing and his general description within an hour after he assaulted and robbed her. She had a good opportunity to view his clothing as he fled. As she had done in 1990 during a pretrial proceeding, she identified him in court without hesitation. The foregoing indicia of reliability sufficed to make the identification evidence admissible. (See People v. Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th 926, 990, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 25 P.3d 519.)
The district attorney's office notified defendant that it would use against him his statement to Alameda County Sheriff's Deputies that he felt no remorse for killing Lees and would repeat the crime if given the opportunity. Defendant opposed the statement's prospective admission, arguing that doing so would violate the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the federal Constitution and Evidence Code section 352. The trial ruled that the statements could be admitted. Defendant argues that his extrajudicial statement should have been excluded because it was procured in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent and to counsel while under custodial interrogation ( Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694) and his Sixth Amendment right not to be interrogated outside counsel's presence (see Massiah v. United States (1964) 377 U.S. 201, 205-207, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246). We do not agree. In an in limine hearing on the admissibility of defendant's statement, Alameda County Deputy Sheriff Allen Boyd testified that on May 16, 1991, he and Deputy Lavada Spence were escorting Huggins to court. According to Boyd, defendant asked Spence if she would applaud if he were given the death penalty, and she said she would. Defendant and Spence briefly engaged in a mild squabble, and Boyd commented, I see you're still making friends. Defendant replied, according to Boyd, Don't nobody like me anyway, and if I had it to do again I'd do it the same way. I don't have any remorse. If I did have remorse, I wouldn't have done it in the first place. Spence testified to the same effect, and explained that the conversation in question had been precipitated because she had clapped in defendant's presence when another jailer pointed out to defendant that he was a convicted criminal. Spence clapped because she was happy defendant had been convicted. No Miranda warnings preceded the conversation among her, Boyd, and defendant. The jailer to whom Spence was referring, Alameda County Sergeant Gary Schellenberg, testified that defendant's behavior had irritated him and he told defendant he was glad defendant was facing the death penalty and hoped defendant would receive a death sentence. Schellenberg, who had discovered Lees's body at the crime scene ( ante, 41 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 611, 131 P.3d at p. 1010), denied making his comments in an effort to provoke defendant into an admission; he was merely taking out his frustration on him. Defendant denied that the conversation with Spence and Boyd ever occurred. After the court ruled that the testimony was admissible, Boyd and Spence testified before the jury to the same effect as their in limine testimony. As we stated in our prior discussion of a Miranda claim, `Clearly, not all conversation between an officer and a suspect constitutes interrogation. The police may speak to a suspect in custody as long as the speech would not reasonably be construed as calling for an incriminating response.' ( People v. Haley, supra, 34 Cal.4th 283, 301, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 877, 96 P.3d 170; see People v. Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th 926, 993, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 25 P.3d 519.) Defendant initiated the conversation by asking Spence if she would applaud if he received the death penalty. Focus[ing] primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect ( Rhode Island v. Innis, supra, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682), we conclude that nothing in the exchanges that followed suggests that the sheriff's deputies made any statement that might reasonably be construed as calling for a response that might reflect unfavorably on defendant in later trial proceedings. Defendant's Massiah claim also lacks merit. The Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution provides in pertinent part: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. This right attaches `at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings Б─■ whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.' [Citation.] After it both attaches and is invoked, any incriminating statement the government deliberately elicits from a defendant in counsel's absence is inadmissible at that defendant's trial. [Citations.] ( People v. Slayton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1076, 1079, 112 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 32 P.3d 1073.) `The question here is whether under the facts of this case a Government agent deliberately elicited incriminating statements ... within the meaning of Massiah '.... ( Fellers v. United States (2004) 540 U.S. 519, 524, 124 S.Ct. 1019, 157 L.Ed.2d 1016.) This inquiry is objective and does not focus on the subjective intentions of the state officer. ( Beaty v. Stewart (9th Cir.2002) 303 F.3d 975, 991.) We conclude that the officers did not deliberately elicit incriminating statements from defendant. The Sixth Amendment is violated only by deliberate action, not `whenever Б─■ by luck or happenstance Б─■ the State obtains incriminating statements from the accused after the right to counsel has attached.' ( Beaty v. Stewart, supra, 303 F.3d 975, 991.) At most, Spence needled defendant by clapping in his presence when Schellenberg commented on his conviction and the possible punishment. This may have been provocative, but it was not calculated to elicit incriminating statements, and defendant made none. Later, defendant began a conversation, outside Schellenberg's presence, by asking if Spence would applaud again if he received the death penalty, and she said she would. It was only at that point that he volunteered a statement that could be used in aggravation. Spence merely replied to defendant's question and did not, in our view, solicit any response. In sum, at no point did defendant's jailers intentionally create[ ] a situation likely to induce [him] to make incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel. ( People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th 894, 993, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183.)
The district attorney's office notified defendant that it planned to introduce aggravating evidence of certain unadjudicated violent criminal activity (ї 190.3, factor (b)); namely, evidence of the incident occurring on or about July 24, 1987, in which the defendant was [caught] in possession of a razor blade in the North County Jail in Oakland, California ..., a violation of section 4574, subdivision (a). The notice alleged that similar incidents occurred on or about February 5 and March 25, 1988. Defendant sought to exclude the evidence, contending that the alleged incidents had transpired so long ago that he was denied his due process rights because he could not properly defend against the charges Б─■ e.g., any razor blades that may have been confiscated were no longer available for examination regarding their potential for abuse. The court disagreed and ruled against him. Thereafter, as noted, sheriff's deputies testified about three occasions on which they found defendant possessed contraband razor blades, and defendant testified that he had innocent reasons for possessing them. Defendant argues that all three incidents were stale at the time of trial and the statute of limitations to prosecute him for them had expired. He contends that to introduce evidence of them violated his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution and to a reliable penalty determination under the Eighth Amendment thereto. He has failed to preserve his Eighth Amendment claim for review. (See ante, 41 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 648, 131 P.3d at pp. 1041-1042, fn. 18.) In any event, both claims are without merit. In People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060[, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1], we concluded that the admission of violent criminal conduct occurring many years before the penalty trial is not necessarily inconsistent with a defendant's rights to due process, a speedy trial and a reliable penalty determination. We reasoned that `the state has a legitimate interest in allowing a jury to weigh and consider a defendant's prior criminal conduct in determining the appropriate penalty, so long as reasonable steps are taken to assure a fair and impartial penalty trial.' ( Id., at p. 1161[, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1].) We identified those `reasonable steps' as including notice of the evidence to be introduced, the opportunity to confront the available witnesses, and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. When these steps have been taken, we concluded, the remoteness of the offense affects its weight, not its admissibility. ( Ibid. ) ( People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 136-137, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186, 72 P.3d 1166.) So it is here. Defendant acknowledges our precedents, but urges a different result in his case because the razor blades were not available for inspection. We disagree. The incident reports contained ample information about the incidents. Furthermore, the witnesses' testimony provided a full opportunity for cross-examination, and defendant availed himself of it. Finally, each juror was instructed not to consider any of the alleged incidents in the calculus of penalty unless he or she concluded individually that the prosecution had proved it beyond a reasonable doubt (see People v. Griffin, supra, 33 Cal.4th 536, 585, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 743, 93 P.3d 344). We adhere to our prior conclusions. (See People v. Yeoman, supra, 31 Cal.4th 93, 136-137, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186, 72 P.3d 1166.)