Opinion ID: 1427400
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Was the Officers' Search Valid Due to Consent?

Text: Finally, as an alternative basis to uphold the district court's denial of Hardin's motion to suppress, the government argues that, even if we view the apartment manager as an agent of the government, the manager's search of Apartment 48 was legal due to consent obtained through the use of the ruse. Appellee Br. at 35-36. This argument lacks merit. The only evidence regarding the issue of consent [9] demonstrates that the manager did not obtain consent prior to entry, making the entry illegal. At the suppression hearing, Hardin testified that the manager, using his own key, simply entered the apartment and called out Maintenance after he entered. J.A. at 221-22 (Hr'g Tr. at 79-80). This evidence demonstrates that the apartment manager entered the apartment without receiving any communication or consent from any individual inside. [10] Even if a consent later followed, [w]hen an individual consents to a search after an illegal entry is made, consent is not valid and `suppression is required of any items seized during the search . . ., unless the taint of the initial entry has been dissipated before the consents to search were given.' United States v. Chambers, 395 F.3d 563, 569 (6th Cir.2005) (quoting United States v. Buchanan, 904 F.2d 349, 356 (6th Cir.1990)); see also United States v. Hotal, 143 F.3d 1223, 1228 (9th Cir.1998) (Consent to search that is given after an illegal entry is tainted and invalid under the Fourth Amendment.). Furthermore, even assuming that the apartment manager merely called out through the closed door and did obtain consent prior to physically entering the apartment, then the manager's use of the ruse that he was investigating a water leak invalidated any possible consent. As a general proposition, although a ruse or officers' undercover activity does not usually violate individuals' rights, [11] we have noted that [w]here, for example, the effect of the ruse is to convince the resident that he or she has no choice but to invite the undercover officer in, the ruse may not pass constitutional muster. United States v. Copeland, No. 95-5596, 1996 WL 306556, at  n. 3 (6th Cir. June 6, 1996) (citing People v. Jefferson, 43 A.D.2d 112, 350 N.Y.S.2d 3 (N.Y.App.Div.1973), as holding that consent was not voluntary and search violat[ed the] Fourth Amendment where officers obtained entry by saying that they were investigating [a] gas leak); see also 2 Wayne R. LaFave et al., CRIM. PROC. § 3.10(c) (3d ed. 2007) ([W]hen the police misrepresentation of purpose is so extreme that it deprives the individual of the ability to make a fair assessment of the need to surrender his privacy . . . the consent should not be considered valid.). Likewise, in United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 588 (6th Cir.2004) (en banc), we recognized that [a] number of cases . . . have held that the confrontation between police and suspect was impermissibly tainted by `duress, coercion [or] trickery.' (quoting Jones, 641 F.2d at 429) (second alteration in original); see also Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301, 87 S.Ct. 408, 17 L.Ed.2d 374 (1966) (The Fourth Amendment can certainly be violated by guileful as well as by forcible intrusions into a constitutionally protected area.) We therefore conclude that the record does not show that the manager obtained consent when he entered the apartment; he simply used his own key and entered the unit. Additionally, even if the manager did receive consent, the ruse regarding the water leak presented a situation in which an individual would feel no choice but to invite the undercover officer in and any consent was invalid. Copeland, 1996 WL 306556, at  n. 3; see also United States v. Giraldo, 743 F.Supp. 152, 153-55 (E.D.N.Y.1990) (granting defendant's motion to suppress evidence when officer pretended to be a gas company worker and told defendant she was checking for a gas leak because `[c]onsent' was obtained by falsely inducing fear of an imminent life-threatening danger). [12] In sum, we conclude that whether Payton involves a probable-cause standard or a lesser reasonable-belief standard remains an open question in our circuit, to be settled in an appropriate case. Further, we hold that the apartment manager in this case was acting as an agent of the government and that the officers' remaining information failed to establish even a reasonable belief that Hardin was inside Apartment 48. The search of Apartment 48 therefore violated Hardin's Fourth Amendment rights, and all evidence obtained as a resultthe entirety of the evidence in this caseshould have been suppressed. [13]
For the reasons discussed above, we REVERSE the district court's denial of Hardin's motion to suppress, VACATE Hardin's conviction, and REMAND the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.