Opinion ID: 2075762
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: VIOLATIONS OF H.R.'s CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RIGHTS

Text: I conclude, on this record, that H.R. has not abandoned his opportunity interest in developing a relationship with Baby Boy C. because state action unlawfully interfered with H.R.'s rights. Before explaining this conclusion, however, I outline the context. At the time the Barker Foundation and the O. family initiated adoption procedures, H.R. did not even know that his son had been born. L.C. had left Zaire, hinting that she would get an abortion and return to Africa within a couple of weeks. This intention was confirmed by a mutual acquaintance who told H.R. in July that L.C., in fact, had had an abortion in Washington, D.C. When H.R. received the letters from Barker in August 1983, postmarked in May, stating that L.C. has recently been working with our agency with a view to placing the child she expects in July, 1983 for adoption, H.R. had every reason to believe that an intervening abortion had mooted these plans. Nonetheless, he sought to learn what had happened and finally, in October 1983, learned that he was indeed the father of a child. Unfortunately for H.R., Barker had already placed Baby Boy C. with the O. family, eliminating any possibility for the development of custodial, financial, or emotional ties between himself and his son. The only way H.R. could have grasped his opportunity interest would have been to assert his legal rights to custody at a judicial proceeding. Again, unfortunately for H.R., neither L.C. nor Barker nor the court notified him that there was a pending judicial proceeding that vitally affected his legal rights to his son. Moreover, H.R.'s own efforts to identify the judicial proceeding proved fruitless. In sum, by cutting off the possibility of a current parent-child relationship, and then failing to inform H.R. for more than eighteen months of the legal proceeding which offered him his only means of ensuring a future relationship with his son, the District of Columbiaprimarily the Barker Foundation as a state actordeprived H.R. of any greater opportunity than he asserted to become a parent to his child. If the District's (including Barker's) actions were lawfulif the burden to learn the facts and the law were entirely on H.R.then presumably the failure to grasp his opportunity for custody of Baby Boy C. would have been his own responsibility. But, the reality is otherwise. State action violated H.R.'s procedural rights guaranteed by the due process clause of the Constitution and by the law of the District of Columbia. The trial court erred as a matter of law in holding otherwise. [25] As background for this conclusion, we should note that the Supreme Court has held the state may not deprive a person of a liberty or property interest without affording that individual notice and an opportunity to be heard. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 657, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950). This right to be heard has little reality or worth unless one is informed that the matter is pending and can choose for himself whether to appear or default, acquiesce or contest. Id. Moreover, a court assessing whether a litigant has been afforded a right to be heard must look to the realities of the case before it, Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 451, 102 S.Ct. 1874, 1879, 72 L.Ed.2d 249 (1982), in assessing whether the opportunity to be heard has been granted, as the Constitution demands, at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 1191, 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965).
I agree with H.R.'s argument that the information Barker furnished him failed to provide the minimal notice required by due process to enable him to assert his right to custody of Baby Boy C. at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. In its initial letter to H.R. mailed in May 1983, Barker told H.R. that he had a right to acknowledge or deny paternity and provided him with forms to enable him to consent to the adoption. Barker's February 1984 letter, sent in response to H.R.'s request for clarification concerning his rights, stated only that the law requires that an effort be made in good faith to inform the biological father of the plans for adoption and that Barker's May 1983 letter, with accompanying consent forms, had informed him of this. Neither of these letters, however, informed H.R. of his basic right to seek custody of Baby Boy C. and of his right to participate at a court hearing that would be scheduled to determine the permanent placement of his child. [26] This court in Ford v. Turner, 531 A.2d 233 (D.C.1987), held that the personal representative of an estate was deprived of procedural due process when the police seized guns from the decedent's apartment and failed to notify the representative about the seizure and her right to a hearing to contest it. District of Columbia law provided that within thirty days after the police department's property clerk assumed custody of a dangerous article, any person could file with the clerk a claim for possession of the item. The law, however, did not provide for notification to parties whose property had been seized. The representative eventually learned that the guns were in police custody and wrote to the property clerk on several occasions, challenging the authority of the clerk to retain the guns and suggesting that she might seek to regain possession. The clerk replied only once but did not explain why he would not turn over the guns. Nor did he tell the representative how she could regain possession. We concluded that the failure to give [the representative] notice `reasonably calculated' to inform her of the reasons why the Property Clerk held the guns and of the means by which [she] could challenge [the clerk's] continued custody of them violated due process. Id. at 237-38 (citing Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 14, 98 S.Ct. 1554, 1562, 56 L.Ed.2d 30 (1978) (The purpose of notice under the Due Process Clause is to apprise the affected individual of, and permit adequate preparation for, an impending `hearing.' (citation omitted))). We stated that, [a]t a minimum, she was entitled to notice that certain property had been seized, that the District sought to retain the property pursuant to specified authority, and that a claimant could take particular steps to challenge the District's action. [27] Id. at 238. As the Supreme Court recognized in Santosky v. Kramer , it is `plain beyond the need for multiple citation' that a natural parent's `desire for and right to the companionship, care, custody and management of his or her children' is an interest far more precious than any property right. 455 U.S. 745, 758-59, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1397, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982) (quoting Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 2159, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981) (citation omitted)). I believe that Barker's role as a state actor in the adoption process requires that it provide a natural father a minimum amount of information concerning his procedural rights in an adoption proceeding. Barker's May 1983 letter with consent forms and its February 1984 follow-up letter fell far short of providing this minimally required constitutional protection. According to the statute governing placement of children in family homes, rules and regulations were to be promulgated by a committee composed of social service, licensing, and charitable organization representatives, reviewed annually, and amended when necessary, subject to approval of the Mayor. D.C.Code § 32-1003 (1988). Regulations were not issued, however, until a notice of proposed rulemaking was published on January 26, 1990 seeking comments on proposed regulations. See 37 D.C.Reg. 859 (Jan. 26, 1990). [28] Unfortunately, these regulations, which have recently become effective, 37 D.C.Reg. 3033-3071 (May 11, 1990), in respects relevant to this case are inadequate. Adopted as a new chapter 16 for 29 DCMR, §§ 1600-1645.1 (1990), the regulations are entitled Standards of Placement, Care, and Services for Child-Placing Agencies. As to notice to birth parents, these regulations provide: 1629.1 When one or more individuals have been named as the possible birth father, the child-placing agency shall notify all named individuals of the plan for adoption by certified or registered mail return receipt requested. 1629.2 The child-placing agency shall report to the court a birth parent's failure to respond to a notice of a plan for adoption, if the birth parent fails to respond within thirty (30) days of receipt of notification. [29] 37 D.C.Reg. 3058 (1990). The regulations, however, do not define the plan for adoption of which the parent is entitled to notice. But even if that plan can be fairly inferred to some extent, there is no indication the plan covers what appears to be a significant omission that cannot be overlooked: there is no required notice of the birth parents' rights in respect of custody. Given the absence of adequate regulations, and in light of the rights at stake, I believe we should announce additional guidelines to govern child-placement practices until such time as the concerns they identify can be incorporated into formal regulations. A child placement agency, upon notification of the mother's intent to relinquish her parental rights to the agency, should inform the putative father that (1) the mother (named) of a child has stated her intent to relinquish her parental rights to her child to the agency; (2) as a child placement agency licensed by the District of Columbia, it seeks to place the child for adoption by new parents, but if the putative father acknowledges paternity he himself has a right to seek custody of the child; (3) if the putative father does want custody, he should inform the child placement agency immediately of his intentions and should retain an attorney; (4) assertion of the putative father's right to custody may involve a formal legal proceeding before the Family Division of the Superior Court (address provided), at which a judge will preside; (5) before the formal proceeding occurs, the putative father will receive notice of the hearing of the case and an order to appear; and (6) any information which the putative father provides the child placement agency shall be included in a report to the Family Division on the placement agency's recommendation for the best placement of the child. [30] If the putative father cannot be located until after the mother has relinquished her rights and the child has been placed in an adoptive home, the foregoing notification should be amended accordingly. If the putative father is not located until after the filing of the petition for adoption, the agency letter seeking his consent to the adoption should inform the putative father of the docket number of the case in addition to the above-required information. Any written communication the child placement agency has with the putative father after the filing of the petition should contain the name and address of the court, the docket number of the case, and the name of the presiding judge. I recognize that a child placement agency supporting termination of parental rights and approval of a proposed adoption is in a potentially difficult position when acting as agent for the court in officially notifying the putative fatherwho may have objectionsabout the situation. The court, however, is not limited to relying on the placement agency to provide the required notice. Pursuant to D.C.Code § 32-1010 (1988), the Department of Human Services is authorized to make such investigations and inspections as are necessary to carry out the provisions of the statute and, as a consequence, could work with the court to notify the putative father if the courtor the child placement agency were to prefer that approach.
H.R. also claims he was denied his procedural rights under District of Columbia law when no effort was made to give him immediate notice of the filing of the adoption petition. His point is well taken. Local statutory law provides natural parents a right to notice of, and participation in, adoption proceedings concerning their children. See D.C.Code §§ 16-304, -306 (1989). Given the fleeting nature of a non-custodial, unwed father's opportunity interest in gaining custody of his child, his constitutional right to notice of the adoption proceeding will be ephemeral unless he is given notice immediately upon the filing of an adoption petition. This constitutional imperative is reflected in D.C.Code § 16-306(a) (1989), which requires that due notice of pending adoption proceedings shall be given to each person whose consent is necessary thereto, immediately upon the filing of the petition. The notice shall be given by summons, by registered letter sent to the addressee only, or otherwise as ordered by the court. [Emphasis added.] H.R.'s statutoryand constitutional right to notice, therefore, was violated when the court failed to provide him with immediate notice of the filing of the O. family petition to adopt Baby Boy C. The failure to provide H.R. with immediate notice appears to have been not an oversight but the normal practice of the Family Division of the Superior Court. [31] The hearing testimony of Alice Avery of the Barker Foundation confirmed that, as a regular practice, the Family Division sends notice of an adoption proceeding to the opposing parties when a show cause order is issued, not immediately upon the filing of the petition. I conclude that the Family Division practice of providing notice to interested parties only upon the issuance of the show cause order violates the statute. In this jurisdiction, the legislature has decided to protect both the participation rights of natural parents (among others whose consent to an adoption is required) and the best interests of the child by providing immediate notice of a pending adoption proceeding. Immediate notice informs interested persons of their legal rights to participate in the proceeding and allows them, if they so desire, to register their opposition and to obtain a hearing as early as practicable. Immediate notice also furthers the best interests of the child in the earliest possible resolution of the adoption process. Because the development of a child's relationship with parental figures is of critical importance in resolving the ultimate placement, minimizing the time expended in the adoption proceeding is crucial. Waiting until issuance of the show cause order to notify a known, interested party of the proceeding is not a reasonable interpretation of the statutory command that due notice of a pending adoption proceeding be sent immediately. Accordingly, the procedures of the Family Division should be changed to comply with the statuteand the Constitution.
H.R.'s final contention concerning deprivation of his procedural rights, with which I also concur, is that Barker violated his constitutional right to procedural due process by failing to use due diligence to find H.R. in order to provide timely service of the required immediate, official notice of the adoption proceedings. According to H.R., the delay engendered by Barker's lack of diligence caused him to be unable to assert his legal rights early enough to prevail at the custody hearing. Mullane established the fundamental principles for determining the constitutional sufficiency of notice for due process purposes: An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections. The notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the required information....       [P]rocess which is a mere gesture is not due process. The means employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it. 339 U.S. at 314-15, 70 S.Ct. at 657 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Mullane's requirement that the means employed reflect an actual desire to inform the absent party of the proceedings applies not only to the form of service chosen but also to the efforts to ensure that such service is effective. This court has held that violations of the Superior Court rules which provide for notice and opportunity to be heard have the effect of denying a litigant due process of law. Evans v. Evans, 441 A.2d 979, 980 (D.C.1982). In Bearstop v. Bearstop, 377 A.2d 405, 408 (D.C.1977), this court described the kind of information which plaintiffs, unable to achieve personal service of process in a divorce proceeding, should provide the court before the court allows notice by publication pursuant to the Domestic Relations Rules: (1) the time and place at which the parties last resided together as spouses; (2) the last time the parties were in contact with each other; (3) the name and address of the last employer of the defendant either during the time the parties resided together or at a later time if known to the plaintiff; (4) the names and addresses of those relatives known to be close to the defendant; and (5) any other information which could furnish a fruitful basis for further inquiry by one truly bent on leaning the present whereabouts of the defendant. We held that the plaintiff, using this basic information, should detail for the Family Division the particular efforts which had been made to ascertain the defendant's address. Id. As Judge Schwelb said in his January 25, 1984, denial of petitioner's petition for an interlocutory order of adoption in this case, the rights of the father here in question are certainly not less significant than those at issue in Bearstop.  See also Matter of E.S.N., 446 A.2d 16, 17-18 (D.C. 1982) (requirements of due diligence met in proceeding to terminate parental rights where appellant had not been heard of for six years and no record of his residence existed, social worker contacted appellant's brother and aunt and hired an investigator, and [a]ll possible leads were explored and affidavits regarding these efforts were presented in court and made part of the record). Accordingly, the efforts to locate H.R. at a minimum had to incorporate the due diligence required in Bearstop. Barker's efforts did not approach the standard of diligence required to satisfy due process. Barker assumed a casual attitude toward ascertaining H.R.'s whereabouts. Avery's testimony indicates that Barker did not obtain the addresses of H.R.'s relatives because L.C. wanted to keep the entire matter as confidential as possible. In Barker's crucial December 1984 report to the court, Avery wrote that L.C. did not know H.R.'s whereabouts; but Avery admitted on deposition that she did not tell the court that L.C. had other possible addresses for H.R. See Kickapoo Tribe of Oklahoma v. Rader, 822 F.2d 1493, 1499-1500 (10th Cir.1987) (due process rights of natural father violated when state human services agency did not make diligent efforts to provide him with personal service: (1) social worker did not press mother of child for father's address or ask her if she had communicated with him; (2) social worker knew of father's relatives but did not attempt to gain information concerning his whereabouts from them, nor did he inform court that relatives could be located). Avery also admitted that her statement that L.C. did not know H.R.'s address was based on an August conversation she had had with L.C. four months before the submission of the December report. Indeed, at deposition, Avery admitted that she had been relying on old information and had not made an attempt to update it, despite the fact that L.C. had told Avery that the university address would not be good after July 1983. See In re Marriage of McDaniel, 54 Or.App. 288, 294, 634 P.2d 822, 825 (1981) (no due diligence in locating father in custody dispute where, among other things, affidavit of mother failed to indicate when her inquiries concerning father's whereabouts occurred `so as to show that they were made recently enough that a diligent person would be justified in relying upon them at the time of application for an order authorizing service ... by publication'). In January 1984, Judge Schwelb explicitly told Barker that an Order to Show Cause directed to H.R.'s last known address, without further reasonable inquiry into his present whereabouts, would not be sufficient. Yet, in August 1984, Judge Mencher was only in a position to issue an Order to Show Cause to an old address, one in Zaire, which Barker had obtained seven months earlier. More specifically, at the time of the August 1984 Order to Show Cause, Barker knew or should have known that H.R. was no longer in Zaire. In H.R.'s January 17, 1984 phone conversation with Barker, he had mentioned that he was planning to go to Canada or France in the spring and that he hoped to come to the District of Columbia to see the baby. In May 1984, Barker had received correspondence from L.C. indicating that H.R. in fact was in Paris. And yet, three months later, rather than calling L.C. to ascertain H.R.'s Paris address, Barker instead allowed the court to mail the show cause order to an address which H.R. had given Barker seven months earlier. H.R. never received the August 1984 Order, and in October 1984 an interlocutory decree of adoption was entered for petitioners, Mr. and Mrs. O. In February 1985, after H.R. retained an attorney, Barker received a letter from H.R. in which he stated he refused to consent to the adoption. That letter contained H.R.'s Paris address, which then became the basis for all further communication with him. Also in February, H.R. wrote another letter to Barker stating that he had retained a lawyer and had formally admitted paternity. H.R. asked Barker to inform the court that he did not intend to abandon his child. Barker never answered either of these letters. The only notification H.R. ever received from anyone informing him of the adoption proceeding was an order from Judge Riley issued in April 1985, more than one year after Barker's February 1984 letterand at a time when his son was already twenty months oldextending the interlocutory decree of adoption to June 30, 1985, and informing H.R. that he must file pleadings and appear at a hearing on that date. [32] I reject the trial court's assertion (as well as Judge Belson's assertion, see post at p. 1202, n. 11) that H.R. had the responsibility to keep the parties, in this case Barker, informed of his current address if he wished to have prompt notice of the legal proceeding. There was no indication whatsoever in any of the information Barker sent to H.R. that there was a pending judicial proceeding, let alone that Barker and H.R. were parties to that proceeding. More specifically, Barker never informed H.R. that there was an adoption petition pending in a court of law and that H.R., pursuant to District of Columbia law, was entitled to notice of and participation in a hearing on that petition. Perhaps we could attribute some legal significance to H.R.'s failure to keep Barker informed of his whereabouts ifbut only ifBarker had informed H.R. that it needed to be updated on his changes of address because it was serving as an investigator for a court that would be sending H.R. notice of a hearing in which Barker would be challenging H.R.'s rights to custody of his son. As it was, H.R. only knew that the Barker Foundation was seeking his consent to the adoption of his childconsent which he was unwilling to give.
In sum, the Barker Foundation and the court denied H.R. the following procedural rights, guaranteed by the due process clause: (1) notice of the legal procedures involved in the adoption process, and the agency's role in those procedures; (2) immediate notice of the adoption petition, filed by the O. family, which initiated the official judicial proceeding to terminate H.R.'s parental rights (a statutory violation as well); and (3) diligent efforts by the Barker Foundation to ascertain H.R.'s whereabouts, in order to assure the required immediate notice of the judicial proceeding so that H.R. could exercise his rights to seek custody of his child at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Given the communications he did receive, H.R. did all he could reasonably have been expected to do to claim custody of his child. [33] For these reasons, H.R.'s opportunity interest remained intact.