Opinion ID: 1846260
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether The Jury was Properly Instructed on the Elements of a Capital Murder Conviction and a Conviction on Manslaughter.

Text: ¶ 17. On Kolberg's first appeal before us he complained that he was denied the right to present the jury with a manslaughter instruction. Kolberg I, 704 So.2d at 1315. We agreed. Kolberg was charged with capital murder during felonious child abuse. Id. We relied on one of our previous decisions where we noted ... the anomaly in our murder statutes. The elements of capital murder during the course of felonious child abuse, see Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-19(2)(f), are indistinguishable from the elements of felony manslaughter. See also Miss.Code Ann. § 97-5-39(2) (1972). Id. (citing Butler v. State, 608 So.2d 314 (Miss.1992)). Thus, we held: It is not an even-handed administration of justice in turn to deny the defense a manslaughter instruction where the accused, as is the case here, could have been lawfully indicted and prosecuted for manslaughter as easily as capital murder. And especially is this true where one verdict can bring a sentence of death and the other a maximum of twenty years imprisonment. Id. at 1316 (citing Butler, 608 So.2d at 320). We concluded by holding that the trial court had erred in denying Kolberg the manslaughter instruction. Id. ¶ 18. At the second trial, both a murder and manslaughter instruction were given. However, Kolberg now complains that [t]he jury could not be told that it could convict of capital murder or manslaughter, based on precisely the same elements and facts, without being given any way to distinguish between the two. Specifically, Kolberg asserts that matters were only made worse when the State proposed, and the trial court accepted, instructions which told the jury that it must convict of capital murder, and that it must convict of manslaughter based on precisely the same elements. Kolberg seeks to have this Court hold that the State must elect between charging him with simple murder, with the lesser offense of manslaughter, or charging him only with manslaughter. ¶ 19. Kolberg now complains of two specific jury instructions. The State's capital murder instruction (S-2), which was given by the trial court, stated: If you believe from all the evidence in this case, beyond a reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence, that the [Appellant], on or about August 24, 1988, in the First Judicial District of Hinds County, Mississippi, did wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously, with or without deliberate design, then and there, kill Madison Watson, a human being, without authority of law, when engaged in the commission of the crime of felonious child abuse and/or battery, then, if you so believe from all of the evidence, the defendant is guilty of capital murder, and it is your sworn duty to say so by your verdict. The State's manslaughter instruction (S-4), which was given by the trial court, stated: If you believe from the evidence in this case, beyond a reasonable doubt, and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence, that, [Appellant], on or about August 24, 1988, in the First Judicial District of Hinds County, Mississippi, did kill Madison Watson, a human being, without malice, by the act, procurement, or culpable negligence of [Appellant], while the said [Appellant] was engaged in the perpetration of the crime of felonious child abuse, then, if you so believe from all the evidence in this case, the defendant is guilty of manslaughter, and it is your sworn duty to say so by your verdict. (emphasis added). ¶ 20. Kolberg's grievance seems to emanate from the language it is your sworn duty to say so by your verdict. He argued before the trial judge to amend that portion of the instruction to read you may find the defendant guilty of capital murder. Kolberg also complains that the error with the mandatory language was compounded by the fact that the jury was told that they must find him guilty of capital murder if they found the same elements that would support a manslaughter instruction. The State acknowledges that our decision in Kolberg I found these two crimes indistinguishable. However, the State submits that the consequence of our holding in Kolberg I was that instructions on both crimes were to be given upon remand, and that is precisely what was done. ( Id. ) The State further submits that there was nothing in Kolberg I or in Butler which would prevent the prosecution from placing both capital murder and culpable negligence manslaughter (Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-27) before the jury. ( Id. ) Thus, the State concludes that it complied with our decision in Kolberg I by proceeding with both. The following reflects the arguments before the trial judge: MR. SMITH [for Kolberg]: Are we on six, Judge? I tell you what the difference between 6 and state's 1 isand this is fairly crucial in this case. In state's 1, they have the same elements of capital murder but in the final sentence it says, The defendant is guilty of capital murderwell, it's capital A murder, a typoand it is your sworn duty to say so by your verdict. The problem in this case, as the Supreme Court identified on appeal, is you've got two identical elements so you can't say you must find capital murder if you have that set of facts. You can't say you must find manslaughter either because they're both identical. So we are in an imponderable position, of course, due to the crazy state of the law, and we have noted our objection to that previously. But we certainly can't give an instruction that says, it's your sworn duty to do one thing when the instructions allow you to do either. So that's why we amended the state's version to what's marked as defense 6 to say, You may find the defendant guilty of capital murder. By doing that we are not waiving our objection to the inchoately insane and arbitrary and violative of the 6th, 8th, and 14th amendments and the state of the law. I just want to make that absolutely clear for anyone coming along later. MS. LEE [for the State]: I didn't know it was decided by the Supreme Court, though, but that waswe could go into THE COURT: I am going to adopt the state's instructions ...    MR. SMITH: We would note our objection to that, Judge, just because it is irreconcilable. It can't be their sworn duty, and we object to the sworn duty there anyhow ... THE COURT: All right. Objection will be overruled ... ¶ 21. While the two quoted instructions above might alone be confusingly similar, the record reflects that the jury was given yet another instruction to aid them in considering the issue of culpable negligence manslaughter. It reads: The Court instructs the jury that the killing of a human being by the act, procurement, or culpable negligence of another, without authority of law, is manslaughter, and the Court further instructs the jury that culpable negligence is defined as negligence of a degree so gross as to be tantamount to a wanton disregard of, or utter indifference to, the safety of human life. If you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence, that the death of Madison Watson was caused by the act, procurement or culpable negligence of Bryan Kolberg, then you may find the defendant guilty of the crime of manslaughter. We are satisfied that this instruction more than adequately defines manslaughter and culpable negligence to the degree that any perceived confusion which even possibly could have been caused by the two instructions of which Kolberg now complains would be rendered virtually impossible. Jury instructions are not to be read unto themselves, but with the jury charge as a whole. Edwards v. State, 737 So.2d 275, 316 (Miss.1999) (citing Carr v. State, 655 So.2d 824, 848 (Miss.1995)). [D]efects in specific instructions do not require reversal `where all instructions taken as a whole fairlyalthough not perfectlyannounce the applicable primary rules of law.' Wallace v. Thornton, 672 So.2d 724, 729 (Miss. 1996); Rawson v. Midsouth Rail Corp., 738 So.2d 280, 290 (Miss.Ct.App.1999). Although Kolberg argues that the jury was given no way to distinguish between capital murder and manslaughter, it is clear from the record that the jury instructions, taken as a whole and read together, clearly distinguished between the crimes of capital murder and culpable negligence manslaughter. Consequently, this assignment of error is without merit.