Opinion ID: 61991
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Futility of lesser sanctions

Text: No lesser sanctions of any kind were imposed on Raborn or her counsel before the dismissal. Therefore, we look for an express determination by the district court that lesser sanctions would have been futile in this case. “In the past, we have found that lesser sanctions would suffice in all but the most flagrant circumstances.” Boazman, 537 F.2d at 212. Where the dismissal is ordered primarily in response to counsel’s dereliction, we have stressed that alternatives to dismissal should be attempted first. See Callip v. Harris County Child Welfare Dep’t, 757 F.2d 1513, 1521-22 (5th Cir. 1985) (noting that 2 We note that if Raborn failed to comply with the district court’s discovery order, i.e. that Raborn be deposed, then IMS arguably failed to comply with that order as well. Ms. Hermes admits that she could not find time to depose Raborn until November and that she had informed Mr. Watts of this fact. Neither party was solely responsible for the failure to depose Raborn prior to October 22, 2007. 6 No. 07-20869 assessment of fines, costs, or damages against plaintiff or counsel, disciplinary measures, and explicit warnings may be effective remedies); Veazey v. Young’s Yacht Sale and Serv., Inc., 644 F.2d 475, 477 (5th Cir. 1981) (noting that “lesser sanctions are clearly preferred” over dismissal). This is particularly true where, as in this case, there is “nothing whatever in the record to indicate that the appellant had any knowledge of, or participation in, any of the derelictions of his counsel.” Flaksa v. Little River Marine Const. Co., 389 F.2d 885, 887 (5th Cir. 1968). IMS argues that the district court implicitly concluded that lesser sanctions would not deter the type of conduct exhibited by Raborn’s counsel, “namely, Mr. Watts had failed to comply with a court order and failed to appear for pretrial conference without a legitimate excuse.” As discussed above, this is not the type of “contumacious conduct” that warrants dismissal. Even if it could be characterized as “contumacious,” it is not the type of conduct that requires immediate resort to “the harshest of sanctions . . . .” Porter v. Beaumont Enterprise and Journal, 743 F.2d 269, 272 (5th Cir. 1984). Rather, it is conduct that would be better addressed by a lesser sanction in the first instance. Further, we are not confronted with the type of deliberately “hostile” litigation tactics, e.g., Woodson v. Surgitek, Inc., 57 F.3d 1406, 1407-17 (5th Cir. 1995), or utter ignorance of court orders and timetables, e.g., Link, 370 U.S. at 627-29, that have generally been found to warrant dismissal with prejudice. Here, the record indicates that Raborn implored the court to consider lesser sanctions in her motion to reinstate her suit. Raborn also asserts that she attempted to reimburse IMS’s counsel for her inconvenience.3 This type of 3 In her motion to reinstate and her brief to this court, Raborn asserts that she reimbursed IMS’s counsel in the amount of $500 for the inconvenience and costs associated with attending the October 22 conference and is willing to provide additional compensation should Ms. Hermes request it or the court order it. However, the record does not confirm that Ms. Hermes actually received a $500 check from either Raborn or Mr. Watts. The alleged $500 7 No. 07-20869 conciliatory response suggests that lesser sanctions would have been effective in spurring diligent prosecution by Raborn.