Opinion ID: 2582839
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether the district court abridged the appellant's right to confrontation when it limited the scope of his cross-examination of the victims?

Text: [¶ 7] The constitutional right to confront a witness arises under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Wyoming Constitution. [2] A district court's limitation on a defendant's constitutional right to confrontation is a question of law which we review de novo. Hannon v. State, 2004 WY 8, ¶ 11, 84 P.3d 320, 328 (Wyo.2004). Restrictions on a defendant's right to confront witnesses are subject to harmless error analysis. Id. We have previously addressed the application of the harmless error standard of review to an alleged abridgment of the right to cross-examine a witness as follows: [T]he correct inquiry is whether, assuming that the damaging potential of the cross-examination were fully realized, a reviewing court might nonetheless say that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Whether such an error is harmless in a particular case depends upon a host of factors, all readily accessible to reviewing courts. These factors include the importance of the witness testimony in the prosecutions case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecutions case. Id. at ¶ 25, 84 P.3d at 332-33 (quoting Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 232-33, 109 S.Ct. 480, 483-84, 102 L.Ed.2d 513 (1988)). [¶ 8] We recently summarized the limits that a court may properly place upon cross-examination: The primary right secured by the Confrontation Clause of the United States and Wyoming Constitutions is the right of cross-examination. In order for there to be a violation of the right of confrontation, a defendant must show more than just a denial of the ability to ask specific questions of a particular witness. Rather, a defendant must show that he was prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness ... `to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors ... could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.' Hannon, ¶ 18, 84 P.3d at 330 (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1436, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986)). The Confrontation Clause guarantees a defendant an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679, 106 S.Ct. at 1435 (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20, 106 S.Ct. 292, 295, 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1985) ( per curiam ) (emphasis in original)). A defendant's right to cross-examination of a witness is not unfettered, but is subject to the trial court's discretion to reasonably limit cross-examination to prevent, among other things, questioning that is repetitive or of marginal relevance. Hannon, ¶ 22, 84 P.3d at 331-32 (quoting United States v. DeSoto, 950 F.2d 626, 629-30 (10th Cir. 1991)); see also Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 232, 109 S.Ct. 480, 483, 102 L.Ed.2d 513 (1988) ( per curiam ). Miller v. State, 2006 WY 17, ¶ 8, 127 P.3d 793, 796 (Wyo.2006) (some citations omitted; emphasis in original). Thus, a district court may reasonably limit a defendant's right to cross-examination without abridging his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. See Id. at ¶¶ 7-13, 127 P.3d at 796-97; Jensen v. State, 2005 WY 85, ¶¶ 7-13, 116 P.3d 1088, 1091-1093 (Wyo.2005); Schmidt v. State, 2001 WY 73, ¶ 30, 29 P.3d 76, 85-86 (Wyo.2001). [¶ 9] Prior to trial, the appellant filed a Motion to Admit Evidence of Alleged Victims wherein he described character evidence he intended to address during cross-examination for the purpose of showing the victims bias or prejudice. The evidence included allegations related to the victims past sexual conduct, evidence of their lying, their manipulative character traits, and their propensity for meanness. The appellant also requested that he be allowed to cross-examine the older sister regarding a burn book and that it be admitted into evidence. This burn book was a notebook containing disparaging and strongly-worded statements regarding friends, acquaintances, and schoolmates. The state filed a response and the district court held a hearing. In it's Order on Defendant's Motion to Admit Evidence of Alleged Victims, the district court examined and specifically addressed each category of character evidence the appellant hoped to use. The district court determined that it would allow the appellant to cross-examine the victims regarding evidence of specific acts of untruthfulness or character for truthfulness, evidence of turning on and off their affections toward appellant, and any facts showing meanness or manipulation that were directly related to the appellant. Also, although the district court refused to allow the appellant to offer the entire burn book into evidence, it ruled that the appellant could use one page specifically related to the appellant. The district court, however, refused to permit the appellant to cross-examine the victims about alleged past sexual conduct or other reputation or character evidence not directly related to their interactions with, or attitudes toward, the appellant. [¶ 10] In this appeal, the appellant contends that the district court erred when it refused to allow him to cross-examine the victims about 1) past sexual conduct, 2) manipulation, and 3) meanness. In sexual assault cases, such as this, the admissibility of this type of evidence is governed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. 6-2-312 (LexisNexis 2009), commonly referred to as the Rape Shield Law. [3] This statute sets forth a specific procedure the defendant must follow if he intends to offer evidence of the prior sexual conduct of the victim, reputation evidence or opinion evidence as to the character of the victim. Wyo. Stat. Ann. 6-2-312(a); Grady v. State, 2008 WY 144, ¶ 20, 197 P.3d 722, 729 (Wyo.2008). The statute requires the defendant to give notice of intent to use such evidence and make an offer of proof of it's relevancy to the defense, with accompanying affidavits. Wyo. Stat. Ann. 6-2-312(a)(i) and (ii); Velos v. State, 752 P.2d 411, 414 (Wyo. 1988). If the district court finds the offer of proof sufficient, it conducts an in-camera hearing to decide the admissibility of the evidence by examining whether the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighs the probability that it's admission will create prejudice. Wyo. Stat. Ann. 6-2-312(a)(iv); Velos, 752 P.2d at 414. [¶ 11] The appellant's motion, filed pursuant to this statute, set forth the following allegations with respect to the three above-mentioned categories of evidence: 1. Evidence of both girls manipulation of the Budig and [girls' father] families. These girls have threatened the Budig family with threats of returning to California at times when they didn't get their ways. On the other hand, in the summer of 2004 when the girls wanted to stay in Casper, they called their father a dick. The girls do a variety of actions depending upon where they want to stay. Recently, and may be pertinent to the present case, they referred to [another family] as the perfect family long before they were placed with them. This evidence is relevant in that it provides the motivation and the intent, among other things, for these girls to make false accusations. 2. Evidence of the girls' meanness. These girls have displayed mean characteristics from time to time. Examples of mean behavior include making fun of a disabled aunt and then lying about it. Upon hearing their father, .... being pistol whipped in an armed robbery, that for a long period of time they laughed about it, calling him such things as a pussy and stating that if he was a real man like their dad, [the appellant], it wouldn't have happened to him. . . . . 4. Evidence of the girls' past sexual conduct. This evidence is relevant in that without some evidence being put forth of these girls' prior sexual knowledge, any fact finder might believe these little girls couldn't possibly know anything about sex unless [the appellant] had done what he is accused of. Instead, the truth of the matter is that [the older sister] has had at least one groping and heavy petting relationship with a boy (her step cousin) a few years older than her, in which she crawled into bed with him on a couple of occasions. [The younger sister] has repeatedly grabbed a boy in the crotch or kicked him in the crotch. It further appears that these girls set up a My Space porn account which they never acknowledged. In a so-called Burn Book attached, [the older sister] refers to fingering on numerous pages. Fingering is the sex act the defendant is accused of doing. In a recording, the girls laugh about there being nothing to do at their house other than [f___]. 5. In [the older sister]'s Burn Book. This book speaks for itself and the finder of fact should be entitled to determine her character from what is written in that book. It is relevant in that it is an indication of her meanness, her knowledge of sex, her sexual accusations against others, her attitude towards any young girl who might submit to any sex by an older male, as well as a page that shows her attitude toward her step dad. [¶ 12] The appellant summarizes his argument that the above evidence should have been admitted as follows: Because the girls were mean to their family members as well as friends and classmates in their burn book, their disregard for peoples feelings and reputation was not isolated, but prevalent in all aspects of their lives, and social lives, family lives, and school lives. Therefore, it is likely that the girls would have the motivation to lie about accusing their step-father of sexual assault because they demonstrated a past of not being sensitive to an individuals reputation. Thus, character evidence of the girls past sexual conduct, manipulation, and meanness are all relevant to proving that the girls may have had a motive to fabricate allegations of sexual assault. The appellant's position is simply flawed. These allegations, even if true, do virtually nothing to show the victims bias or prejudice against the appellant. Because none of the evidence relates directly to the appellant, it's relevance is marginal and it's probative value, if any, is very limited. Furthermore, to allow the appellant to argue to the jury that the victims made false allegations against the appellant because they had been manipulative or mean to other family members or peers in the past requires a significant leap in logic and has the potential to confuse the issues. [¶ 13] Finally, we turn to the appellant's contention that the evidence of the victims past sexual conduct should have been admitted. These allegations regarding the victims prior sexual knowledge are in the class of evidence the rape shield law is specifically designed to exclude. However, the appellant attempts to avoid application of the rape shield law by arguing that the evidence was merely intended to show that the victims had independent sexual knowledge, and not to embarrass or prejudice the victims or show that they were more likely consensually to engage in the conduct of which he is accused. The appellant's attempted circumvention of the rape shield law runs counter to the intent and stated purpose of the statute. Wyoming, along with most other jurisdictions, enacted a rape-shield statute to bring under control a long-standing tradition that rape victims could be discredited as witnesses based on prior sexual conduct. This tradition was based on the faulty notion that women who engaged in nonmarital intercourse were immoral and likely to engage in such conduct on any given occasion, and was deemed prejudicial and humiliating to the victim. Stogner v. State, 792 P.2d 1358, 1362 (Wyo. 1990) (citations omitted). We have said that this statute is designed to protect the victim from embarrassment and abuse at trial and also to encourage the reporting of sexual assaults to the authorities. They are not enacted for the protection of the accused. Heinrich v. State, 638 P.2d 641, 646 (Wyo. 1981) (emphasis in original). To allow this type of evidence under the appellant's proffered justification would open the door for defendants in sexual assault prosecutions (particularly cases involving children) to explore freely the knowledge and prior sexual practices/experiences of their victims. Such a result would be entirely inconsistent with the intent of our enacted rape shield law. [¶ 14] We hold that because the evidence of meanness, manipulation, and prior sexual conduct was not admissible, and because the appellant was given the opportunity to challenge the victims credibility, motives, and biases using other admissible evidence, the appellant was not denied his constitutionally protected right to confrontation.