Opinion ID: 2563933
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Murder of Victor Esparza

Text: Defendant alleges that her confession to the murder of Victor Esparza should have been suppressed because it was not made freely and voluntarily, but instead was induced by (1) misleading statements concerning the extent of defendant's exposure to criminal liability, (2) improper promises of leniency, (3) her unduly prolonged interrogation, and (4) improper appeals to her religious convictions. Viewed under the totality of the circumstances, defendant's confession was the product of her free will. As an initial matter, defendant urges that deceptive comments made by the officers at the conclusion of the second interview relating to the nature of the charges and the potential punishment facing defendant coerced her into subsequently confessing to the murder of Esparza. The second interview was conducted from 11:42 p.m. to 12:52 a.m. by Sergeant Sherman and Detective Steve Blanc of the Redwood City Police Department. During this interview defendant promptly confessed to shooting Dr. Marks and to the burglary of the premises at 801 Brewster Avenue in Redwood City. Defendant does not challenge the admissibility of this confession. By the end of the interview, however, Sergeant Sherman shifted the questioning to the subject of the Esparza homicide, informing defendant that a person was shot and killed . . . late at night in San Carlos [w]hen the building was unoccupied. Sherman urged defendant to confess to that crime and pointed out that [a]t this point, to us you have nothing else to lose and that her admission to this homicide wouldn't make any difference. He continued: I want you to pretty much purge yourself of all these bad things that you've done, so at least you can start again. (11) Defendant claims that Sherman's statement that admitting she murdered Esparza wouldn't make any difference was deceptive, because a prosecutor more likely would seekand a jury more likely would imposea death sentence if a defendant admitted to committing two murders rather than a single murder. The use of deceptive statements during an interrogation, however, does not invalidate a confession unless the deception is `of a type reasonably likely to procure an untrue statement.' ( People v. Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 299 [70 Cal.Rptr.2d 793, 949 P.2d 890]; see People v. Thompson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 134, 167 [266 Cal.Rptr. 309, 785 P.2d 857].) Considered in this context, the gist of Sergeant Sherman's comments was that, in view of the overwhelming evidence against defendant, her denial of participation in the Esparza homicide was unlikely to alter the outcome of the case against her. Moreover, when law enforcement officers describe the moral or psychological advantages to the accused of telling the truth, no implication of leniency or favorable treatment at the hands of the authorities arises. ( People v. Nelson (1964) 224 Cal.App.2d 238, 251 [36 Cal.Rptr. 385].) Here, Sergeant Sherman focused on the benefit that defendant reasonably could expect from purging [her]selfnamely, psychological and moral relief. Furthermore, we conclude that Sergeant Sherman's comments did not affect defendant's decision to confess to the murder of Esparza, because she maintained her innocence during the remainder of the second interview and, during the third interview, revealed that she already was aware that confessing to an additional murder would increase the severity of the punishment: You know, yeah, I'm quite sure that it might come down harder or what have you, especially this particular case here. The comments made by Sergeant Sherman during the second interview were not unduly coercive and did not amount to a promise affecting the reliability of the subsequent confession, and there is no indication that defendant relied upon those comments in deciding to confess. The third and final interview was conducted by Detective Steve Jackson of the San Carlos Police Department, Sergeant Sherman of the Redwood City Police Department, and Detective Lindsay of the Palo Alto Police Department. The interview continued from 1:25 a.m. to 4:03 a.m., focusing upon the homicide of Esparza and the burglary committed at 1123 Industrial Road in San Carlos. In initiating the interview, the officers confronted defendant with various similarities between the San Carlos homicide and the crimes to which she had confessed earlier. The officers pointed out that the same gun was used in all three shootings, that defendant previously had worked as a janitor in the buildings in which the killings occurred, and that the perpetrator had entered the building on Industrial Road through the same door defendant had used when she worked there as a janitor. Defendant acknowledged that everything points to me, but refused to accept responsibility in the San Carlos case. Sergeant Sherman then explained that he wanted to present a package to the district attorney in which he would be able to say that in all cases that you have been charged with, all the cases you've been involved with, that you helped and assisted the police in their investigation. When asked whether she was not telling the truth because she sought to avoid a harsher penalty, defendant responded: Okay just depends on the judge and DA and how are they going to prosecute it. You know, yeah, I'm quite sure that it might come down harder or what have you, especially this particular case here. Sergeant Sherman then introduced the possibility that the crime had been an accident, and he urged without success that defendant confess. Detective Jackson also suggested that perhaps defendant bumped into the victim, became frightened, and shot him as a result. Detective Lindsay then intervened, telling defendant that she was looking at special circumstances and that refusing to discuss the San Carlos incident would work against her. Defendant replied she was aware of that and would have to take her chances. Lindsay proceeded: I think that you'd be hard pressed to find a public defender or a defense attorney who could look at the similarity in style, the exact same gun, the exact same bullets, and not say Celeste, if I'm going to represent you, I need to at least know if this really did happen, the one in San Carlos. Lindsay then made the following statements, which ultimately prompted defendant's confession: You shot that janitor in San Carlos, and we know you shot that janitor in San Carlos, and God Bless you, you can sit here and you can tell me that you didn't, there's someone up above, bigger than both of us looking down saying Celeste, you know that you shot that person in San Carlos and it's time to purge it all. It is like a cancer that is eating away at you. You felt good, I know you felt good when you told us what really happened in Palo Alto and what really happened in Redwood City, it was like a 50 [pound] weight off your shoulder. Lindsay continued: Someone up above is looking at us, and I'll tell you what. If that big guy up there or gal is looking at us and he said hey Lindsay, you better not be selling her a lot of Bullshit, cause you won't sleep well tonight. That's what the big guy is going to say to me. He's telling me be honest with her, be straight up with her. Look her in the eyes and be straight up because if you are not, then whoever that big person is up in the sky is looking at you going, how can you look at these two guys, and how can you tell them that that didn't happen in San Carlos. You can't do it. A few moments later, defendant confessed to the murder of Victor Esparza and later explained that it had been difficult for her to confess, because the victim did not stumble upon her as Detective Jackson suggested, but rather defendant just turned and shot him. Defendant contends that during this interview the police improperly attempted to convince her that she would receive more lenient treatment if she confessed. Defendant contends that promises of leniency were made initially, when Sergeant Sherman suggested it would be beneficial to defendant if the officers could deliver to the district attorney an entire package encompassing all the crimes and inform the prosecution that defendant fully cooperated with the police. Defendant contends additional promises of leniency were made when the officers suggested that they merely were interested in understanding defendant's motivations in committing the crimes and that the Esparza homicide may have been an accident because she may have snapped or been frightened. The statements made by the officers did not imply that by cooperating and relating what actually happened, defendant might not be charged with, prosecuted for, or convicted of the murder of Esparza. The interviewing officers did not suggest they could influence the decisions of the district attorney, but simply informed defendant that full cooperation might be beneficial in an unspecified way. Indeed, defendant understood that punishment decisions were not within the control of the police officers. As noted above, she said it just depends on the judge and DA and how are they going to prosecute it. Under these circumstances, Sergeant Sherman's statement that he would inform the district attorney that defendant fully cooperated with the police investigation did not constitute a promise of leniency and should not be viewed as a motivating factor in defendant's decision to confess. (See People v. Jones, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 298.) (12) We reject the contention that Detective Lindsay's comments relating to the prospect of special circumstances, and his suggestion that defendant's denial of responsibility for the Esparza homicide would worsen her position, represented an implied promise of leniency. The possibility that special circumstances would be alleged was realistic, because defendant already had confessed to committing a murder during the commission of a burglary. No constitutional principle forbids the suggestion by authorities that it is worse for a defendant to lie in light of overwhelming incriminating evidence. `[M]ere advice or exhortation by the police that it would be better for the accused to tell the truth when unaccompanied by either a threat or a promise does not render a subsequent confession involuntary.' ( People v. Howard (1988) 44 Cal.3d 375, 398 [243 Cal.Rptr. 842, 749 P.2d 279]; see People v. Higareda (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1399, 1409 [29 Cal.Rptr.2d 763].) Here, the officers did not make statements that were coercive; they did not threaten defendant and did not specify how her continued denial of criminal involvement could jeopardize her case. (13) Defendant's contention that the police officers engaged in improper conjecture concerning the accidental nature of the killing also must be rejected. As noted in our review of the claims related to defendant's confession to the murder of Gleason, the police properly may confront, and even debate with, a suspect regarding theories based on the circumstances of the crimes and even debate with the suspect the merits of those theories. ( People v. Holloway, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 115.) Defendant's contention that Detective Lindsay improperly associated the function of the police with that of defense counsel, by telling defendant that the officers merely were attempting to obtain the same information that defense counsel would need, is not supported by the record. In essence, Detective Lindsay remarked that eventually defendant would have to tell her lawyer the truth. He did not suggest that defendant's lawyer and the district attorney would share information or use her testimony for the same purpose. (14) Defendant further contends that the period over which the series of interrogations was conducted was so lengthy that her will was overborne. A police interrogation that is prolonged may be coercive under some circumstances. (See Mincey v. Arizona (1978) 437 U.S. 385, 398-399 [57 L.Ed.2d 290, 98 S.Ct. 2408] [the defendant's statements to the police were not the product of a free and rational choice under the circumstances, where he was questioned for more than three hours, had been seriously wounded several hours earlier, was confused and unable to think clearly, and stated repeatedly that he did not wish to speak without having a lawyer present]; Spano v. New York (1959) 360 U.S. 315, 320-324 [3 L.Ed.2d 1265, 79 S.Ct. 1202] [confession made by young, emotionally unstable man after eight-hour interrogation, continued despite his requests to speak to his attorney and his repeated refusals to answer questions, was involuntary].) In the present case, although the questioning continued over the course of eight hours, it does not appear that defendant's will to resist was overborne. The questioning was not aggressive or accusatory. Instead, the interviewing officers chose to build rapport with defendant and gain her trust in order to persuade her to tell the truth. There is no indication that defendant was induced by fear to make a statement. She appeared lucid and aware throughout the entire interrogation session and never asked the police officers to terminate the interview. Defendant spoke with confidence, and her answers were coherent. Moreover, the police repeatedly offered defendant food and beverages, provided her with four separate breaks, and allowed her to meet privately with her partner, Jackie. We conclude that under the totality of the circumstances, the length of the interrogation did not render defendant's confessions involuntary. (15) Finally, defendant asserts that her confession to the murder of Victor Esparza was obtained through improper appeals to religious belief, because during the interrogation Detective Lindsay stated there's someone up above, bigger than both of us looking down saying Celeste, you know that you shot that person in San Carlos and it's time to purge it all. [T]he tactic of exploiting a suspect's religious anxieties has been justly condemned. ( People v. Kelly (1990) 51 Cal.3d 931, 953 [275 Cal.Rptr. 160, 800 P.2d 516]; see People v. Adams (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 970, 989 [192 Cal.Rptr. 290] [confession suppressed when the interrogating officer, who attended the same church as the defendant, made repeated references to the defendant's sin, guilt, apostasy, and `reprobate mind'].) When police comments are not calculated to exploit a particular psychological vulnerability of [the] defendant, however, and no acute religious anxiety or sense of guilt was apparent from prior questioning, appeals to religion are unlikely to be a motivating cause of a defendant's subsequent confession. ( People v. Kelly, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 953.) Here, Detective Lindsay's remarks were not calculated to exploit anxieties or vulnerabilities that might have arisen had defendant held strong religious beliefs. Religion was not discussed in prior questioning, and defendant stated no particular religious affiliation. Moreover, although the interrogation was lengthy, defendant exhibited no sign of being in a particularly fragile mental state that would render her vulnerable to manipulation by reference to religion. The substance of Detective Lindsay's comments sought to evoke defendant's better nature by persuading her that purg[ing] it all was morally the right thing to do and would provide her with psychological relief. Lindsay was effective in awakening defendant's sense of guilt; prior to confessing, she asked whether the detective was a counselor before joining the police force and apologized for not telling the truth earlier. After confessing, defendant volunteered that she had maintained her silence because the murder of Esparza was not an accident, as the police officers suggested, but an intentional act. The compulsion to confess wrong has deep psychological roots, and while confession may bring legal disabilities it also brings great psychological relief. ( People v. Andersen (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 563, 583-584 [161 Cal.Rptr. 707], fn. omitted.) Detective Lindsay did not coerce defendant into confessing through an impermissible appeal to her religious beliefs. Because the record does not reflect coercive tactics, the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress that evidence.