Opinion ID: 2258485
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Propriety of a Fitness Requirement for Reinstatement

Text: Bar Counsel argues that a fitness requirement should be imposed as a condition of reinstatement because: (1) respondent's conduct did not fall short of the type of egregious conduct where a fitness requirement has been imposed in other cases; and (2) [r]espondent's psychological/emotional/mental state also calls for a showing of fitness. It is the Board's position that [r]espondent's level of cooperation in this proceeding and acknowledgment of misconduct distinguishes this case from the egregious disregard of the disciplinary process emblematic of misconduct requiring a showing of fitness. With respect to Bar Counsel's second ground for a fitness showing, the Board argues that this argument was not preserved and that, in any event, the evidence was insufficient to support a fitness requirement on the basis of any alleged psychological problem. We consider each of these arguments in turn.
We have held that `in circumstances where the respondent has repeatedly evinced indifference (or worse) toward the disciplinary procedures by which the Bar regulates itself, a requirement that the attorney prove fitness to resume practice [together with a thirty-day suspension] is entirely reasonable.' Delaney, supra, 697 A.2d at 1213 (quoting In re Lockie, 649 A.2d 546, 547 (D.C.1994)) (in turn citing In re Siegel, 635 A.2d 345, 346 (D.C.1993)). In Delaney, like the present case, respondent was found to have violated D.C. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(d) and D.C. Bar R. XI, § 2(b)(3). 697 A.2d at 1212. After an ethical complaint was filed against Delaney, he never submitted any responses to the charges, to Bar Counsel's inquiries or to the Board's order. Id. at 1213. Significantly, the Hearing Committee found that Delaney had evaded service of documents sent to him, necessitating extreme measures to effect service, and, unlike the present case, Delaney did not appear at the hearing. Id. at 1213 & n. 3. This court adopted the recommendation of the Board [9] for a thirty-day suspension with a requirement that Delaney prove fitness as a condition of reinstatement. In adopting the recommendation, however, we observed that since neither respondent nor Bar Counsel excepted to the recommendation, our review of the Board's recommendation is `especially deferential.' Id. at 1214 (quoting In re Jeffries, 685 A.2d 1165 (D.C.1996)). In Mattingly, supra, 790 A.2d at 579, and In re Giles, 741 A.2d 1062 (D.C.1999), cited by Bar Counsel, we imposed a thirty-day suspension with a fitness requirement for reinstatement for violations of D.C. Bar R. XI, § 2(b)(3) and D.C. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(d). Again, neither Bar Counsel nor the respondent opposed the recommended sanction; therefore, our review, as in Delaney, supra, was especially deferential. Mattingly, 790 A.2d at 580; Giles, 741 A.2d at 1062. In Mattingly, it was the second time that respondent had been suspended for the same misconduct. 790 A.2d at 580. In Giles, the record showed that respondent repeatedly and deliberately failed to respond to written inquiries by Bar Counsel seeking his cooperation in the investigation, and ignored an order of the Board compelling him to respond to Bar Counsel's inquiries. 741 A.2d at 1062. Thus, in determining whether to impose a fitness requirement in cases involving violation of rules 8.4(d) and XI, § 2(b)(3), our focus has been upon the egregiousness of the attorneys' deliberate disregard for the disciplinary process. Delaney, supra, 697 A.2d at 1214.
In this case, the Board concluded that respondent's conduct was not so egregious as to warrant the imposition of a fitness requirement. Specifically, the Board was persuaded by respondent's level of cooperation in the proceedings, including his general denial of the charges, participation in the hearing and legitimate objections to Bar Counsel's interrogatory-like questions. Thus, respondent's conduct differed from cases where an egregious disregard of the system was found, thereby warranting a fitness requirement. See Giles, supra, 741 A.2d at 1062 (fitness requirement imposed where attorney repeatedly and deliberately failed to respond to Bar Counsel's inquiries and disregarded the Board's order); Wright, supra, 702 A.2d at 1257 (holding that [r]espondent's failure to participate at any stage of the disciplinary process reflects an egregious disregard for his obligations within the disciplinary system . . . [and] is an aggravating factor for purposes of arriving at a sanction); Delaney, supra, 697 A.2d at 1213-14 (fitness requirement imposed where attorney failed to respond to Bar Counsel's letters, motion, complaint or participate in the hearing and evaded service); Lockie, supra, 649 A.2d at 547 (deliberate and repeated disregard of Bar Counsel's inquiries and Board's order preventing completion of investigation of two serious charges warranted proof of fitness to resume practice). The Board's recommended sanction, which excludes a fitness showing before reinstatement, is consistent with the discipline in cases where the conduct was less egregious than the cases in which the requirement was imposed. See In re Beller, 802 A.2d 340 (D.C.2002) (thirty-day suspension imposed for counsel's failure to respond to repeated inquiries from Bar Counsel and the Board regarding three complaints with reinstatement conditioned on cooperation with Bar Counsel in the cases); In re Beaman, 775 A.2d 1063 (D.C.2001) (thirty-day suspension for counsel's conceded failure to respond to inquiries from Bar Counsel and orders of the Board); In re Nielsen, 768 A.2d 41 (D.C.2001) (public censure for violations of D.C. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(d) and D.C. Bar R. XI, § 2(b)(3) for failure to respond timely to the requests of Bar Counsel and the Board); In re Lilly, 699 A.2d 1135 (D.C.1997) (thirty-day suspension because counsel ignored repeatedly Bar Counsel's requests for information and a Board order, with reinstatement conditioned upon full compliance with Bar Counsel's request for information). We agree with the Board that respondent's conduct did not evidence the level of egregiousness warranting a fitness requirement, and consistent with our deferential standard, we see no reason not to defer to its unanimously recommended sanction. See Steele, supra, 630 A.2d at 199 (This court will adopt the Board's recommended sanction `unless to do so would foster a tendency toward inconsistent dispositions for comparable conduct or would otherwise be unwarranted.') (quoting D.C. Bar R. XI, § 9(g) (1992)) (other citations omitted). Respondent's initial response to Bar Counsel, subsequent participation in the disciplinary hearing where he testified, meeting with Assistant Bar Counsel and production of some documents and acknowledgment of misconduct distinguish this case from those in which a fitness requirement has been imposed. As we have recognized, the imposition of a fitness requirement operates to increase the length of the suspension. In re Smith, 649 A.2d 299, 300 (D.C.1994). Although respondent is not without fault during the proceedings, his conduct is not so egregious as to indicate a need for a fitness showing with its inevitable prolongation of the suspension.
Bar Counsel argues for the first time in this court that respondent should be required to show fitness before reinstatement because of his psychological/emotional/mental state. The Board argues that, having failed to present the point to the Board, Bar Counsel has waived the argument. Alternatively, the Board contends that the record does not support a finding that respondent has psychological or emotional problems warranting a showing of fitness for reinstatement. Rather, the Board states that the evidence is more fairly characterized as [respondent's] acknowledgment of the misconduct and remorse, factors appropriately considered in mitigation, not aggravation, of sanction. We have held consistently that an attorney who fails to present an issue to the Board waives it and cannot present it for the first time to this court. In re Holdmann, 834 A.2d 887, 889 (D.C.2003) (citing In re Abrams, 689 A.2d 6, 9 (D.C.), cert denied, 521 U.S. 1121, 117 S.Ct. 2515, 138 L.Ed.2d 1017 (1997); In re Ray, 675 A.2d 1381, 1386 (D.C.1996); In re Williams, 464 A.2d 115, 118 (D.C.1983)) (other citation omitted). In Holdmann, respondent argued for the first time before this court that public censure should not be imposed as reciprocal discipline because he agreed to private reprimand without an admission of the facts underlying the conceded disciplinary violations. Id. This court held that Holdmann had waived the issue by not presenting it to the Board. Id. Presentation of an issue in the first instance to the Hearing Committee and the Board provides an opportunity for a full development of the record. Unless Bar Counsel is held to the same requirement, respondents would be denied notice of Bar Counsel's claim and an opportunity to meet it at a meaningful time. In Holdmann, however, this court made clear that since the final decision lies with the court, it can relieve a party of the waiver, although it declined to do so in that case. Id. at 890. Similarly, there is nothing in this record to indicate that relief from the waiver is warranted. In any event, as the Board points out, the scant testimony upon which Bar Counsel relies for a fitness recommendation on this ground is more fairly characterized as an acknowledgment of the misconduct and remorse, factors appropriately considered in mitigation, not aggravation, of sanction. [10] See Dunietz, supra, 687 A.2d at 212 (holding concession of misconduct and remorse constitute mitigation evidence). Bar Counsel cites Steele, supra, 630 A.2d at 196, as support for the proposition that a possible psychological inability to comply with ethical obligations requires a showing of fitness for reinstatement even when the Board disagrees. Steele is distinguishable. In that case, we imposed a fitness requirement where the attorney neglected a legal matter, failed to cooperate with Bar Counsel and acknowledged unidentified personal problems that adversely affected her emotional stability and caused her to abandon a client's case. Id. at 201. The attorney stated in a letter to Bar Counsel that she had become more emotionally stable, but left unanswered the question whether she is sufficiently stable to practice law. Id. Thus, the attorney in Steele placed in question her continued fitness to resume practice, and this court found it necessary to impose a fitness requirement to assure that `[her] resumption of the practice of law [would] not be detrimental to the integrity and standing of the Bar, or to the administration of justice, or subversive to the public interest.' Id. (quoting In re Roundtree, 503 A.2d 1215, 1217 (D.C.1985)). In contrast to the attorney in Steele, respondent is not before the court for neglect of a client matter, nor do the facts of record disclose a history of personal problems leading to emotional instability or raise questions as to respondent's present emotional stability. While respondent did not cooperate with Bar Counsel's investigation, conduct for which he is being disciplined, he did respond to Bar Counsel's initial inquiry, and he appeared at the hearing and represented himself pro se. We agree with the Board that the circumstances do not provide grounds for imposing a fitness requirement in a case of this type. See In re Steinberg, 761 A.2d 279, 284 (D.C.2000) (holding that an attorney's consultations with a psychiatrist for issues related to marital stress do not suggest the mental instability and lack of reliability that led to the imposition of fitness requirement in [ Steele, supra, 630 A.2d at 201]). [11]