Opinion ID: 181032
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: Warshak argues that the government's warrantless, ex parte seizure of approximately 27,000 of his private emails constituted a violation of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures. [12] The government counters that, even if government agents violated the Fourth Amendment in obtaining the emails, they relied in good faith on the Stored Communications Act (SCA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701 et seq., a statute that allows the government to obtain certain electronic communications without procuring a warrant. The government also argues that any hypothetical Fourth Amendment violation was harmless. We find that the government did violate Warshak's Fourth Amendment rights by compelling his Internet Service Provider (ISP) to turn over the contents of his emails. However, we agree that agents relied on the SCA in good faith, and therefore hold that reversal is unwarranted. [13]
The Stored Communications Act (SCA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701 et seq., permits a `governmental entity' to compel a service provider to disclose the contents of [electronic] communications in certain circumstances. Warshak II, 532 F.3d at 523. As this court explained in Warshak II: Three relevant definitions bear on the meaning of the compelled-disclosure provisions of the Act. [E]lectronic communication service[s] permit users... to send or receive wire or electronic communications, [18 U.S.C.] § 2510(15), a definition that covers basic e-mail services, see Patricia L. Bellia et al., Cyberlaw: Problems of Policy and Jurisprudence in the Information Age 584 (2d ed. 2004). [E]lectronic storage is any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication ... and ... any storage of such communication by an electronic communication service for purposes of backup protection of such communication. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17). [R]emote computing service[s] provide computer storage or processing services to customers, id. § 2711(2), and are designed for longer-term storage, see Orin S. Kerr, A User's Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator's Guide to Amending It, 72 Geo. Wash. L.Rev. 1208, 1216 (2004). The compelled-disclosure provisions give different levels of privacy protection based on whether the e-mail is held with an electronic communication service or a remote computing service and based on how long the e-mail has been in electronic storage. The government may obtain the contents of e-mails that are in electronic storage with an electronic communication service for 180 days or less only pursuant to a warrant. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a). The government has three options for obtaining communications stored with a remote computing service and communications that have been in electronic storage with an electronic service provider for more than 180 days: (1) obtain a warrant; (2) use an administrative subpoena; or (3) obtain a court order under § 2703(d). Id. § 2703(a), (b). 532 F.3d at 523-24 (some alterations in original).
Email was a critical form of communication among Berkeley personnel. As a consequence, Warshak had a number of email accounts with various ISPs, including an account with NuVox Communications. In October 2004, the government formally requested that NuVox prospectively preserve the contents of any emails to or from Warshak's email account. The request was made pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f) and it instructed NuVox to preserve all future messages. [14] NuVox acceded to the government's request and began preserving copies of Warshak's incoming and outgoing emailscopies that would not have existed absent the prospective preservation request. Per the government's instructions, Warshak was not informed that his messages were being archived. In January 2005, the government obtained a subpoena under § 2703(b) and compelled NuVox to turn over the emails that it had begun preserving the previous year. In May 2005, the government served NuVox with an ex parte court order under § 2703(d) that required NuVox to surrender any additional email messages in Warshak's account. In all, the government compelled NuVox to reveal the contents of approximately 27,000 emails. Warshak did not receive notice of either the subpoena or the order until May 2006.
The Fourth Amendment provides that [t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.... U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by government officials. Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 528, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967); see Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 613-14, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989) (The [Fourth] Amendment guarantees the privacy, dignity, and security of persons against certain arbitrary and invasive acts by officers of the Government or those acting at their direction.). Not all government actions are invasive enough to implicate the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment's protections hinge on the occurrence of a `search,' a legal term of art whose history is riddled with complexity. Widgren v. Maple Grove Twp., 429 F.3d 575, 578 (6th Cir.2005). A search occurs when the government infringes upon an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984). This standard breaks down into two discrete inquiries: first, has the [target of the investigation] manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search? Second, is society willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable? California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211, 106 S.Ct. 1809, 90 L.Ed.2d 210 (1986) (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979)). Turning first to the subjective component of the test, we find that Warshak plainly manifested an expectation that his emails would be shielded from outside scrutiny. As he notes in his brief, his entire business and personal life was contained within the ... emails seized. Appellant's Br. at 39-40. Given the often sensitive and sometimes damning substance of his emails, [15] we think it highly unlikely that Warshak expected them to be made public, for people seldom unfurl their dirty laundry in plain view. See, e.g., United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 417 (C.A.A.F.1996) ([T]he tenor and content of e-mail conversations between appellant and his correspondent, `Launchboy,' reveal a[n] ... expectation that the conversations were private.). Therefore, we conclude that Warshak had a subjective expectation of privacy in the contents of his emails. The next question is whether society is prepared to recognize that expectation as reasonable. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 740, 99 S.Ct. 2577. This question is one of grave import and enduring consequence, given the prominent role that email has assumed in modern communication. Cf. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352, 88 S.Ct. 507 (suggesting that the Constitution must be read to account for the vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private communication). Since the advent of email, the telephone call and the letter have waned in importance, and an explosion of Internet-based communication has taken place. People are now able to send sensitive and intimate information, instantaneously, to friends, family, and colleagues half a world away. Lovers exchange sweet nothings, and businessmen swap ambitious plans, all with the click of a mouse button. Commerce has also taken hold in email. Online purchases are often documented in email accounts, and email is frequently used to remind patients and clients of imminent appointments. In short, account is an apt word for the conglomeration of stored messages that comprises an email account, as it provides an account of its owner's life. By obtaining access to someone's email, government agents gain the ability to peer deeply into his activities. Much hinges, therefore, on whether the government is permitted to request that a commercial ISP turn over the contents of a subscriber's emails without triggering the machinery of the Fourth Amendment. In confronting this question, we take note of two bedrock principles. First, the very fact that information is being passed through a communications network is a paramount Fourth Amendment consideration. See ibid.; United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972) ([T]he broad and unsuspected governmental incursions into conversational privacy which electronic surveillance entails necessitate the application of Fourth Amendment safeguards.). Second, the Fourth Amendment must keep pace with the inexorable march of technological progress, or its guarantees will wither and perish. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001) (noting that evolving technology must not be permitted to erode the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment); see also Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General Approach, 62 Stan. L.Rev. 1005, 1007 (2010) (arguing that the differences between the facts of physical space and the facts of the Internet require courts to identify new Fourth Amendment distinctions to maintain the function of Fourth Amendment rules in an online environment). With those principles in mind, we begin our analysis by considering the manner in which the Fourth Amendment protects traditional forms of communication. In Katz, the Supreme Court was asked to determine how the Fourth Amendment applied in the context of the telephone. There, government agents had affixed an electronic listening device to the exterior of a public phone booth, and had used the device to intercept and record several phone conversations. See 389 U.S. at 348, 88 S.Ct. 507. The Supreme Court held that this constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment, see id. at 353, 88 S.Ct. 507, notwithstanding the fact that the telephone company had the capacity to monitor and record the calls, see Smith, 442 U.S. at 746-47, 99 S.Ct. 2577 (Stewart, J., dissenting). In the eyes of the Court, the caller was surely entitled to assume that the words he utter[ed] into the mouthpiece w[ould] not be broadcast to the world. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352, 88 S.Ct. 507. The Court's holding in Katz has since come to stand for the broad proposition that, in many contexts, the government infringes a reasonable expectation of privacy when it surreptitiously intercepts a telephone call through electronic means. Smith, 442 U.S. at 746, 99 S.Ct. 2577 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ([S]ince Katz, it has been abundantly clear that telephone conversations are fully protected by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.). Letters receive similar protection. See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 114, 104 S.Ct. 1652 (Letters and other sealed packages are in the general class of effects in which the public at large has a legitimate expectation of privacy[.]); Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733, 24 L.Ed. 877 (1877). While a letter is in the mail, the police may not intercept it and examine its contents unless they first obtain a warrant based on probable cause. Ibid. This is true despite the fact that sealed letters are handed over to perhaps dozens of mail carriers, any one of whom could tear open the thin paper envelopes that separate the private words from the world outside. Put another way, trusting a letter to an intermediary does not necessarily defeat a reasonable expectation that the letter will remain private. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351, 88 S.Ct. 507 ([W]hat [a person] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.). Given the fundamental similarities between email and traditional forms of communication, it would defy common sense to afford emails lesser Fourth Amendment protection. See Patricia L. Bellia & Susan Freiwald, Fourth Amendment Protection for Stored E-Mail, 2008 U. Chi. Legal F. 121, 135 (2008) (recognizing the need to eliminate the strangely disparate treatment of mailed and telephonic communications on the one hand and electronic communications on the other); City of Ontario v. Quon, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2619, 2631, 177 L.Ed.2d 216 (2010) (implying that a search of [an individual's] personal e-mail account would be just as intrusive as a wiretap on his home phone line); United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 511 (9th Cir.2008) (holding that [t]he privacy interests in [mail and email] are identical). Email is the technological scion of tangible mail, and it plays an indispensable part in the Information Age. Over the last decade, email has become so pervasive that some persons may consider [it] to be [an] essential means or necessary instrument[] for self-expression, even self-identification. Quon, 130 S.Ct. at 2630. It follows that email requires strong protection under the Fourth Amendment; otherwise, the Fourth Amendment would prove an ineffective guardian of private communication, an essential purpose it has long been recognized to serve. See U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. at 313, 92 S.Ct. 2125; United States v. Waller, 581 F.2d 585, 587 (6th Cir.1978) (noting the Fourth Amendment's role in protecting private communications). As some forms of communication begin to diminish, the Fourth Amendment must recognize and protect nascent ones that arise. See Warshak I, 490 F.3d at 473 (It goes without saying that like the telephone earlier in our history, e-mail is an ever-increasing mode of private communication, and protecting shared communications through this medium is as important to Fourth Amendment principles today as protecting telephone conversations has been in the past.). If we accept that an email is analogous to a letter or a phone call, it is manifest that agents of the government cannot compel a commercial ISP to turn over the contents of an email without triggering the Fourth Amendment. An ISP is the intermediary that makes email communication possible. Emails must pass through an ISP's servers to reach their intended recipient. Thus, the ISP is the functional equivalent of a post office or a telephone company. As we have discussed above, the police may not storm the post office and intercept a letter, and they are likewise forbidden from using the phone system to make a clandestine recording of a telephone callunless they get a warrant, that is. See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 114, 104 S.Ct. 1652; Katz, 389 U.S. at 353, 88 S.Ct. 507. It only stands to reason that, if government agents compel an ISP to surrender the contents of a subscriber's emails, those agents have thereby conducted a Fourth Amendment search, which necessitates compliance with the warrant requirement absent some exception. In Warshak I, the government argued that this conclusion was improper, pointing to the fact that NuVox contractually reserved the right to access Warshak's emails for certain purposes. While we acknowledge that a subscriber agreement might, in some cases, be sweeping enough to defeat a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of an email account, see Warshak I, 490 F.3d at 473; Warshak II, 532 F.3d at 526-27, we doubt that will be the case in most situations, and it is certainly not the case here. As an initial matter, it must be observed that the mere ability of a third-party intermediary to access the contents of a communication cannot be sufficient to extinguish a reasonable expectation of privacy. In Katz, the Supreme Court found it reasonable to expect privacy during a telephone call despite the ability of an operator to listen in. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 746-47, 99 S.Ct. 2577 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Similarly, the ability of a rogue mail handler to rip open a letter does not make it unreasonable to assume that sealed mail will remain private on its journey across the country. Therefore, the threat or possibility of access is not decisive when it comes to the reasonableness of an expectation of privacy. Nor is the right of access. As the Electronic Frontier Foundation points out in its amicus brief, at the time Katz was decided, telephone companies had a right to monitor calls in certain situations. Specifically, telephone companies could listen in when reasonably necessary to protect themselves and their properties against the improper and illegal use of their facilities. Bubis v. United States, 384 F.2d 643, 648 (9th Cir.1967). In this case, the NuVox subscriber agreement tracks that language, indicating that NuVox may access and use individual Subscriber information in the operation of the Service and as necessary to protect the Service. Acceptable Use Policy, available at http://business.windstream.com/Legal/acceptable Use.htm (last visited Aug. 12, 2010). Thus, under Katz, the degree of access granted to NuVox does not diminish the reasonableness of Warshak's trust in the privacy of his emails. [16] Our conclusion finds additional support in the application of Fourth Amendment doctrine to rented space. Hotel guests, for example, have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their rooms. See United States v. Allen, 106 F.3d 695, 699 (6th Cir.1997). This is so even though maids routinely enter hotel rooms to replace the towels and tidy the furniture. Similarly, tenants have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their apartments. See United States v. Washington, 573 F.3d 279, 284 (6th Cir.2009). That expectation persists, regardless of the incursions of handymen to fix leaky faucets. Consequently, we are convinced that some degree of routine access is hardly dispositive with respect to the privacy question. Again, however, we are unwilling to hold that a subscriber agreement will never be broad enough to snuff out a reasonable expectation of privacy. As the panel noted in Warshak I, if the ISP expresses an intention to audit, inspect, and monitor its subscriber's emails, that might be enough to render an expectation of privacy unreasonable. See 490 F.3d at 472-73 (quoting United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir.2000)). But where, as here, there is no such statement, the ISP's control over the [emails] and ability to access them under certain limited circumstances will not be enough to overcome an expectation of privacy. Id. at 473. We recognize that our conclusion may be attacked in light of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 96 S.Ct. 1619, 48 L.Ed.2d 71 (1976). In Miller, the Supreme Court held that a bank depositor does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of bank records, checks, and deposit slips. Id. at 442, 96 S.Ct. 1619. The Court's holding in Miller was based on the fact that bank documents, including financial statements and deposit slips, contain only information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business. Ibid. The Court noted, The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to the Government.... [T]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed. Id. at 443, 96 S.Ct. 1619 (citations omitted). But Miller is distinguishable. First, Miller involved simple business records, as opposed to the potentially unlimited variety of confidential communications at issue here. See ibid. Second, the bank depositor in Miller conveyed information to the bank so that the bank could put the information to use in the ordinary course of business. Ibid. By contrast, Warshak received his emails through NuVox. NuVox was an intermediary, not the intended recipient of the emails. See Bellia & Freiwald, Stored E-Mail, 2008 U. Chi. Legal F. at 165 ([W]e view the best analogy for this scenario as the cases in which a third party carries, transports, or stores property for another. In these cases, as in the stored e-mail case, the customer grants access to the ISP because it is essential to the customer's interests.). Thus, Miller is not controlling. Accordingly, we hold that a subscriber enjoys a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of emails that are stored with, or sent or received through, a commercial ISP. Warshak I, 490 F.3d at 473; see Forrester, 512 F.3d at 511 (suggesting that [t]he contents [of email messages] may deserve Fourth Amendment protection). The government may not compel a commercial ISP to turn over the contents of a subscriber's emails without first obtaining a warrant based on probable cause. Therefore, because they did not obtain a warrant, the government agents violated the Fourth Amendment when they obtained the contents of Warshak's emails. Moreover, to the extent that the SCA purports to permit the government to obtain such emails warrantlessly, the SCA is unconstitutional.
Even though the government's search of Warshak's emails violated the Fourth Amendment, the emails are not subject to the exclusionary remedy if the officers relied in good faith on the SCA to obtain them. See Krull, 480 U.S. at 349-50, 107 S.Ct. 1160. In Krull, the Supreme Court noted that the exclusionary rule's purpose of deterring law enforcement officers from engaging in unconstitutional conduct would not be furthered by holding officers accountable for mistakes of the legislature. Ibid. Thus, even if a statute is later found to be unconstitutional, an officer cannot be expected to question the judgment of the legislature. Ibid. However, an officer cannot be said to have acted in good-faith reliance upon a statute if its provisions are such that a reasonable officer should have known that the statute was unconstitutional. Id. at 355, 107 S.Ct. 1160. Naturally, Warshak argues that the provisions of the SCA at issue in this case were plainly unconstitutional. He argues that any reasonable law enforcement officer would have understood that a warrant based on probable cause would be required to compel the production of private emails. In making this argument, he leans heavily on Warshak I, which opined that the SCA permits agents to engage in searches that clearly do not comport with the Fourth Amendment. 490 F.3d at 477. However, we disagree that the SCA is so conspicuously unconstitutional as to preclude good-faith reliance. As we noted in Warshak II, [t]he Stored Communications Act has been in existence since 1986 and to our knowledge has not been the subject of any successful Fourth Amendment challenges, in any context, whether to § 2703(d) or to any other provision. 532 F.3d at 531. Furthermore, given the complicated thicket of issues that we were required to navigate when passing on the constitutionality of the SCA, it was not plain or obvious that the SCA was unconstitutional, and it was therefore reasonable for the government to rely upon the SCA in seeking to obtain the contents of Warshak's emails. [17] But the good-faith reliance inquiry does not end with the facial validity of the statute at issue. In Krull, the Supreme Court hinted that the good-faith exception does not apply if the government acted outside the scope of the statute on which it purported to rely. 480 U.S. at 360 n. 17, 107 S.Ct. 1160. It should be noted that this portion of the Krull Court's opinion was merely dicta, and it appears that we have yet to pass on the question. However, it seems evident that an officer's failure to adhere to the boundaries of a given statute should preclude him from relying upon it in the face of a constitutional challenge. [18] Once the officer steps outside the scope of an unconstitutional statute, the mistake is no longer the legislature's, but the officer's. See ibid. (In that context, the relevant actors are not legislators or magistrates, but police officers who concededly are engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Therefore, use of the exclusionary rule is once again efficacious in deterring officers from engaging in conduct that violates the Constitution. Ibid. Warshak argues that the government violated several provisions of the SCA and should therefore be precluded from arguing good-faith reliance. First, Warshak argues that the government violated the SCA's notice provisions. Under § 2703(b)(1)(B), the government must provide notice to an account holder if it seeks to compel the disclosure of his emails through either a § 2703(b) subpoena or a § 2703(d) order. However, § 2705 permits the government to delay notification in certain situations. The initial period of delay is 90 days, but the government may seek to extend that period in 90-day increments. In this case, the government issued both a § 2703(b) subpoena and a § 2703(d) order to NuVox, seeking disclosure of Warshak's emails. At the time, the government made the requisite showing that notice should be delayed. However, the government did not seek to renew the period of delay. In all, the government failed to inform Warshak of either the subpoena or the order for over a year. Conceding that it violated the notice provisions, the government argues that such violations are irrelevant to the issue of whether it reasonably relied on the SCA in obtaining the contents of Warshak's emails. We agree. As the government notes, the violations occurred after the emails had been obtained. Thus, the mistakes at issue had no bearing on the constitutional violations. Because the exclusionary rule was designed to deter constitutional violations, we decline to invoke it in this situation. But Warshak does not hang his hat exclusively on the government's violations of the SCA's notice provisions. He also argues that the government exceeded its authority under another SCA provision § 2703(f)by requesting NuVox to engage in prospective preservation of his future emails. [19] Under § 2703(f), [a] provider of wire or electronic communication services or a remote computing service, upon the request of a governmental entity, shall take all necessary steps to preserve records and other evidence in its possession pending the issuance of a court order or other process. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f) (emphasis added). Warshak argues that this statute permits only retrospective preservationin other words, preservation of emails already in existence. He notes that the Department of Justice (DOJ) generally agrees with his construction of the statute, pointing to the DOJ's own computer-surveillance manual, which states: [Section] 2703(f) letters should not be used prospectively to order providers to preserve records not yet created. If agents want providers to record information about future electronic communications, they should comply with the [Wiretap Act and the Pen/Trap statute]. [20] Ultimately, however, this statutory violation, whether it occurred or not, [21] is irrelevant to the issue of good-faith reliance. The question here is whether the government relied in good faith on § 2703(b) and § 2703(d) to obtain copies of Warshak's emails. True, the government might not have been able to gain access to the emails without the prospective preservation request, as it was NuVox's practice to delete all emails once they were downloaded to the account holder's computer. Thus, in a sense, the government's use of § 2703(f) was a but-for cause of the constitutional violation. But the actual violation at issue was obtaining the emails, and the government did not rely on § 2703(f) specifically to do that. Instead, the government relied on § 2703(b) and § 2703(d). The proper inquiry, therefore, is whether the government violated either of those provisions, and the preservation request is of no consequence to that inquiry. Warshak's next argument is that the government violated § 2703(d) by failing to provide any particularized factual basis when seeking an order for disclosure. Under § 2703(d), such an order shall issue only if the governmental entity offers specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic communication ... are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation. To the extent that he is arguing that the government's application was insufficient, Warshak is wrong. The government's application indicated that it was investigating a complex, large-scale mail and wire fraud operation based in Cincinnati, Ohio. The application also indicated that interviews of current and former employees of the target company suggest that electronic mail is a vital communication tool that has been used to perpetuate the fraudulent conduct. Additionally, the application observed that various sources [have verified] that NuVox provides electronic communications services to certain individual(s) [under] investigation. In light of these statements, it is clear that the application was, in fact, supported by specific and articulable facts, especially given the diminished standard that applies to § 2703(d) applications. See United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1202 (10th Cir.2008) (noting that the `specific and articulable facts' standard derives from the Supreme Court's decision in Terry ); Warshak I, 490 F.3d at 463 (The parties agree that the standard of proof for a court order'specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents ... or records ... are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation'falls short of probable cause.). Finally, Warshak argues that a finding of good-faith reliance is improper because the government presented the magistrate with an erroneous definition of the term electronic storage. As noted above, if an email is in electronic storage for less than 180 days, the government may not compel its disclosure without a warrant. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a). In applying for the subpoena and the order that eventually resulted in the disclosure of Warshak's NuVox emails, the government suggested to the magistrate that an email is not in electronic storage if it has already been accessed, viewed, or downloaded. Warshak argues that this definition of electronic storage does not comport with the Ninth Circuit's decision in Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1071 (9th Cir.2004), which held that prior access is irrelevant to whether the [emails] at issue were in electronic storage. Warshak further argues that, because the government failed to mention the Ninth Circuit's definition, it usurped the court's function to determine whether an email ... [is] in `electronic storage[.]' Appellant's Br. at 38. As an initial matter, it is manifest that the decisions of the Ninth Circuit are not binding on courts in this circuit. It therefore cannot be said that the government somehow violated § 2703 by failing to cite an out-of-circuit decision that it thought to be wrongly decided. Incidentally, the government is not alone in thinking that the Ninth Circuit's definition of electronic storage is incorrect. One commentator has noted that Theofel is quite implausible and hard to square with the statutory test. Kerr, A User's Guide to the Stored Communications Act, 72 Geo. Wash. L.Rev. at 1217; see also United States v. Weaver, 636 F.Supp.2d 769, 773 (C.D.Ill. 2009) (Previously opened emails stored by Microsoft for Hotmail users are not in electronic storage, and the Government can obtain copies of such emails using a trial subpoena.). Furthermore, it does a disservice to the magistrate judge to suggest that the government usurped the role of the court. The government's application did include a proposed definition of the term electronic storage. That does not mean, however, that the magistrate judge unhesitatingly received that definition, and, as the government notes, the magistrate presumably [had] the opportunity to consider and review relevant precedent. Appellee's Br. at 117. Consequently, we find that, although the government violated the Fourth Amendment, the exclusionary rule does not apply, as the government relied in good faith on § 2703(b) and § 2703(d) to access the contents of Warshak's emails. [22]

During the government's investigation of Berkeley, case agents came into possession of myriad documents that were ostensibly subject to the attorney-client privilege. Many of the documents were obtained during a March 16, 2005 search of Berkeley's headquarters, in which agents copied the contents of over 90 computers. Other documents were procured earlier through the subpoena and court order issued to NuVox, which granted investigators access to the contents of Warshak's email accounts. In all, case agents had access to approximately 60,000 email communications from or to attorneys representing Berkeley and Warshak, communications facially and presumptively protected by the attorney-client privilege. Appellant's Br. at 41. On July 5, 2007, Warshak filed a motion to bar the government from using the evidence obtained in violation of the defendants' attorney-client and work product privileges and to dismiss the indictment since privileged material was used to secure it. United States v. Warshak, No. 1:06-CR-00111, 2007 WL 3306603, at  (S.D.Ohio Nov. 5, 2007). In the motion, the defendants requested that the district court hold a hearing in the framework of Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 92 S.Ct. 1653, 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972), at which the government would bear the burden of establishing that its case was untainted by attorney-client and work product privileged materials. Warshak, 2007 WL 3306603, at . To an extent, the district court granted the motion, setting a Kastigar -like hearing with the narrow purpose of eliciting the sworn testimony of government agents as to their handling of evidence. Ibid. In ordering the hearing, the district court found that [the] [d]efendants had raised enough of a question about the amount of time U.S. Postal Inspector Alejandro Almaguer (`Almaguer') possessed privileged data, as well as the government's methodology in screening data for privileged information, to merit a response. Ibid. The hearing was held on September 27 and 28, 2007. During the hearing, the government proffered evidence and the testimony of Almaguer, the [d]efendants were afforded [an] opportunity to cross-examine Almaguer and examine other agents on direct, and the parties argued their respective positions concerning the propriety of the government action in this case. Ibid. In addition, the defendants called Peter Horstmann, an expert witness who used software to analyze the electronic documents the government produced to [the] [d]efendants. Ibid. After the hearing, the district court held that the government had satisfied its burden, stating as follows: The [c]ourt's original concerns that triggered the grant of the Kastigar -like evidentiary hearing were rooted in the amount of time that Almaguer allegedly had access to privileged materials, and in the fact the government had proffered no sworn statements backing its contention that it did not use privileged materials to obtain witness proffers. The government has completely allayed the [c]ourt's concerns. The United States has met its burden to demonstrate its agents have acted properly and that its case is untainted by privileged information. Id. at .
Warshak argues that the Kastigar -like hearing was inadequate. More precisely, he argues that the district court failed to hold[] the government to the burden prescribed by Kastigar and subsequent cases applying it. Appellant's Br. at 48. He complains that the district court simply accepted the government's blanket denials that it used privileged materials in preparing its case against defendants, and shifted the burden to [him] to show that privileged materials contributed to the return of the indictment. Ibid. (internal citations omitted). In short, he argues that the district court improperly loosened the stringent demands of Kastigar. In Kastigar, the Supreme Court held that when a witness is compelled to give incriminating testimony under a grant of statutory immunity and is thereafter prosecuted for any matter related to the compelled testimony, the government must shoulder the heavy burden of proving that all of the evidence it proposes to use was derived from legitimate independent sources. 406 U.S. at 461-62, 92 S.Ct. 1653; see also United States v. Turner, 936 F.2d 221, 224 (6th Cir.1991). This burden of proof ... is not limited to a negation of taint; rather, it imposes on the prosecution the affirmative duty to prove that the evidence it proposes to use is derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled testimony. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460, 92 S.Ct. 1653. While Kastigar is clearly concerned with the use of testimony obtained despite an assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, this court has suggested that Kastigar concerns may arise in the context of other privileges, such as the privilege accorded to attorney-client communications. Specifically, this court has hinted, in dicta, that the leaking of privileged materials to investigators would raise the spectre of Kastigar -like evidentiary hearings. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 454 F.3d 511, 517 (6th Cir. 2006). However, no other appellate court appears to have joined us in suggesting that Kastigar is implicated whenever investigators come into possession of materials subject to the attorney-client privilege. One circuit, the Fourth, has engaged in a fairly lengthy analysis of Kastigar 's applicability in the arena of non-constitutional privileges. In United States v. Squillacote, 221 F.3d 542 (4th Cir.2000), the Fourth Circuit was faced with a scenario in which government investigators had legally conducted electronic surveillance on several defendants pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. [23] During the surveillance, the agents heard and recorded a number of conversations between one of the defendants and her psychotherapists. Subsequently, the defendants moved to suppress any evidence derived from the privileged communications, arguing that they were entitled to a hearing to vindicate the principles set forth by the Supreme Court in [ Kastigar ]. Id. at 558. Ultimately, the court determined that Kastigar was simply ... not applicable. Ibid. In so holding, the Squillacote court began by conceding that the conversations at issue, which the government had obtained during surveillance, were privileged. According to the court, [t]he question, then, [was] whether the mere existence of this privileged information br[ought] to bear the full weight of Kastigar. Id. at 559. The court held that it did not, finding that a Kastigar analysis is not triggered by the existence of evidence protected by a privilege, but instead by the government's effort to compel a witness to testify over the witness's claim of privilege. Ibid. (emphasis added). However, the court also opined that Kastigar -like protections may be required in cases involving testimony compelled over the assertion of a non-constitutional privilege. Ibid. Nonetheless, in concluding its analysis, the court reiterated that because the government's right to compel testimony in the face of a claim of privilege is the issue at the heart of Kastigar, its protections do not apply in cases where there is privileged evidence, but no compelled testimony. Id. at 560. We agree, and hold that, absent compelled testimony, the full protections of Kastigar are inapplicable. As further justification for its holding in Squillacote, the Fourth Circuit observed that suppression of any evidence derived from the privileged conversations would be [im]proper in this case, given that the privilege is a testimonial or evidentiary one, and not constitutionally-based. Ibid. In making this assertion, the court observed that, as of the year 2000, no court had applied the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine to derivative evidence obtained as a result of improper access to materials covered by a non-constitutional privilege. Ibid. (quoting United States v. Marashi, 913 F.2d 724, 731 n. 11 (9th Cir.1990)); see also Nickel v. Hannigan, 97 F.3d 403, 409 (10th Cir.1996) ([W]e decline to apply the `fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine to the possible breach of attorney-client privilege in this case.). We have found no subsequent authority indicating that such derivative evidence is subject to suppression, and we agree that it is unwise to extend the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine beyond the context of constitutional violations. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51, 100 S.Ct. 906, 63 L.Ed.2d 186 (1980) (indicating that testimonial privileges must be balanced against the need for probative evidence in the administration of criminal justice). In the present case, the privileged materials were not obtained from Warshak as a result of compelled testimony. Instead, they were garnered pursuant to a subpoena, a court order, and a search warrant, much like the psychotherapist-patient conversations at issue in Squillacote. Thus, because the documents were not the product of compelled testimony, a full Kastigar hearing was not required. Moreover, there is no indication that the government made any direct use of the privileged communications, either at trial or before the grand jury. Consequently, given the fact that evidence derived from a violation of the attorney-client privilege is not fruit of the poisonous tree, Warshak's argument withers.
The volume of discovery in the present case was prodigious. Indeed, the government turned over millions of pages of discovery, but that discovery appears to have come from relatively few sources. Most of the discovery came from Berkeley itself, when, in March 2005, inspectors executed a search warrant and imaged (i.e., copied) the electronic contents of the company's computers and servers. After the search, the computers and servers remained on Berkeley's premises, except for several laptops, which were taken offsite and returned two days later. All told, the electronic evidence originating at Berkeley filled three tera-drives and numbered 17 million pages. In addition to the electronic evidence, agents seized approximately 506,000 pages of hard-copy documents, all of which the defendants were eventually permitted to copy. On top of the evidence obtained at Berkeley, discovery included 275 discs of material gathered by the grand jury and 13 discs of potential trial exhibits compiled by the government. The defendants make three arguments with respect to the immense volume of discovery in this case. First, they argue that the district court abused its discretion and violated their right to a fair trial by allowing the government to turn over stupendous quantities of evidence in a disorganized and unsearchable format. Next, they argue that the government was improperly permitted to abdicate its Brady obligations by producing gargantuan haystacks of discovery that swallowed any needles of exculpatory information. Appellant's Br. at 52. Finally, the defendants argue that the district court erroneously denied a 90-day continuance, which was requested to enable the defendants to continue sifting through the mountains of discovery furnished by the government. Ultimately, none of these arguments is persuasive. [24]
The defendants' first argument is that the district court erroneously permitted the government to produce titanic amounts of electronic discovery in formats that were simultaneously disorganized and unsearchable. Specifically, the defendants assert that the electronic images of the Berkeley computers and the discs of potential trial exhibits were difficult to search. The defendants further contend that the government's failure to supplement the discovery materials with indices was prejudicial to the preparation of an adequate defense. [25] In making this argument, the defendants lean heavily on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34(b)(2)(E)(i), which requires a party to produce [discovery materials] as they are kept in the usual course of business or [to] organize and label them to correspond to the categories in the request. The defendants acknowledge that there is no corresponding provision in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16, which governs criminal discovery, but they argue that due process mandates enforcement of the civil rule in the criminal context. A district court's decision on a discovery matter is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Gray, 521 F.3d 514, 529 (6th Cir.2008) (citing United States v. $174,206.00 in U.S. Currency, 320 F.3d 658, 663 (6th Cir.2003)); see United States v. Maples, 60 F.3d 244, 246 (6th Cir.1995) (It is well settled that a district court has considerable discretion under Rule 16....). As an initial matter, it must be noted that the defendants cite scant authority suggesting that a district court must order the government to produce electronic discovery in a particular fashion. [26] Furthermore, it bears noting that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16, which governs discovery in criminal cases, is entirely silent on the issue of the form that discovery must take; it contains no indication that documents must be organized or indexed. Thus, if we are to find that the district court abused its discretion, we must do so despite a pronounced dearth of precedent suggesting that the district court was wrong. There are a number of factors that counsel against such a finding. First, the overwhelming majority of the discovery at issue was taken directly from Berkeley's computers, which means the defendants had ready access to that information. It also means that the defendants had access to the documents as they [were] kept in the usual course of business. Fed.R.Civ.P. 34(b)(2)(E)(i). Thus, any difficulty that the defendants had in accessing the copies is arguably immaterial. [27] Furthermore, there is reason to believe that the defendants were experiencing little difficulty in accessing the contents of the electronic discovery. Though the defendants claim that they were provided with data that had been rendered in unsearchable formats, they were citing discovery material to the district court in their motions, leading the district court to observe that the [d]efendants' motion[s] demonstrate[d] [that] they [were] capably navigating discovery. Additionally, at the Kastigar -like hearing held before the district court, an expert witness who testified for the defense indicated that, with the use of certain software, he could perform very quick and thorough searches of the electronic discovery. Consequently, it does not appear that the discovery materials were nearly as unsearchable as the defense purports. Lastly, it should be observed that the government did provide the defense with something of a guide to the electronic discovery. In response to the defense's discovery request, the government furnished the defendants with a detailed room-by-room inventory of all items seized from the company, including a listing of the various computers that were imaged. Appellee's Br. at 127. That listing surely offered the defendants some aid in identifying and marshaling the documents relevant to the litigation. Accordingly, we decline to hold that the district court abused its discretion in failing to order the government to produce discovery in a different form.
The defendants next argue that the government shrugged off its obligations under Brady by simply handing over millions of pages of evidence and forcing the defense to find any exculpatory information contained therein. In essence, the defendants contend that the government was obliged to sift fastidiously through the evidence the vast majority of which came from Berkeley itselfin an attempt to locate anything favorable to the defense. This argument comes up empty. In United States v. Skilling, 554 F.3d 529 (5th Cir.2009), vacated in part on other grounds, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2896, 177 L.Ed.2d 619 (2010), the Fifth Circuit confronted and rejected a nearly identical argument. There, disgraced Enron CEO Jeffrey K. Skilling advanced the following contentions: Skilling ... asserts that the government's use of an open file failed to satisfy its Brady obligation to disclose material evidence. Skilling contends that the government's open file, which consisted of several hundred million pages of documents, resulted in the effective concealment of a huge quantity of exculpatory evidence. As the government never directed Skilling to a single Brady document contained in the open file, Skilling argues that the government suppressed evidence in violation of Brady. Id. at 576. In dismissing Skilling's argument, the Fifth Circuit noted that, [a]s a general rule, the government is under no duty to direct a defendant to exculpatory evidence within a larger mass of disclosed evidence. Ibid. (citing United States v. Mulderig, 120 F.3d 534, 541 (5th Cir. 1997)). However, the Skilling court added a caveat: We do not hold that the use of a voluminous open file can never violate Brady. For instance, evidence that the government padded an open file with pointless or superfluous information to frustrate a defendant's review of the file might raise serious Brady issues. Creating a voluminous file that is unduly onerous to access might raise similar concerns. And it should go without saying that the government may not hide Brady material of which it is actually aware in a huge open file in the hope that the defendant will never find it. These scenarios would indicate that the government was acting in bad faith in performing its obligations under Brady. Id. at 577. Here, the government did not engage in any conduct indicating that it performed its Brady obligations in bad faith. First, there is no proof that the government larded its production with entirely irrelevant documents. [28] Furthermore, it cannot be said that the government made access to the documents unduly onerous. While access to the documents may have been somewhat hampered due to the format in which they were transferred, the district court noted that the defendants' motion practice demonstrate[d] they [were] capably navigating the discovery, which primarily all came from [the] [d]efendants in the first place. [29] Finally, there is no indication that the government deliberately concealed any exculpatory evidence in the information it turned over to the defense. [30] Consequently, the government has not abdicated its duties under Brady.
On December 28, 2007, the defendants requested a 90-day continuance, which would have pushed the commencement of the trial from January 8, 2008 to April 8, 2008. In making the request, the defendants contended that they had been afforded insufficient opportunity to review the evidence, stating: [i]t is as if the government has pointed the defendants to the Earth's oceans, saying `there is your discovery.' The district court declined to grant the request, noting that [c]ounsel for [the] [d]efendants outnumber counsel for the government, and have all been working on this case for a substantial amount of time. [31] The defendants now argue that the district court's denial of their request for a continuance was error. The district court's denial of a motion for a continuance is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Crossley, 224 F.3d 847, 854 (6th Cir.2000). Denial amounts to a constitutional violation only if there is an unreasoning and arbitrary `insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay.' To demonstrate reversible error, the defendant must show that the denial resulted in actual prejudice to his defense. United States v. Gallo, 763 F.2d 1504, 1523 (6th Cir.1985) (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 744 F.2d 701, 704 (9th Cir.1984)). The defendant demonstrates `actual prejudice' by showing that a continuance would have made relevant witnesses available or added something to the defense. United States v. King, 127 F.3d 483, 487 (6th Cir.1997); see also United States v. Faulkner, 538 F.2d 724, 729 (6th Cir.1976) (No absolute rule can be articulated as to the minimum amount of time required for an adequate preparation for trial of a criminal case.). The defendants argue that they were prejudiced in two ways. First, they argue that their counsel could not satisfy their constitutional obligation to review all the evidence in the government's possession, custody, or control. [32] Appellant's Br. at 60. In making this argument, they allege that the entirety of the government's 360,000 pages of trial exhibits ... were largely disclosed on November 29, 2007, only six weeks before trial. Id. at 59. Second, the defendants argue that [t]he defense simply did not have sufficient time to locate and then utilize material and exculpatory evidence that was hidden within the millions of pages of discovery. Id. at 60. These arguments lead nowhere. With respect to the first, it must be noted that more than a year elapsed between the time the indictment was handed down and the time the trial began, affording the defendants ample opportunity to construct a defense. [33] Additionally, the discovery time line does not indicate that the defendants were shortchanged with respect to preparation time. The bulk of the documents in question were in the company's possession as early as April 2005. [34] Furthermore, the entirety of the discovery material in the case was in the defendants' hands by June 2007, more than six months in advance of the trial. While the government did not provide the defense with thirteen discs of potential trial exhibits until November 29, 2007approximately six weeks before trial was to beginthose exhibits were ostensibly culled from the discovery material that the government had already provided. [35] It is true that this case involved millions of pages of documents, but there is no dispute that the defendants were given months to comb through the bulk of them. As a result, it cannot be said that the district court's unwillingness to postpone the trial was the product of an undue insistence on haste. The defendants' second argumentthat they were not given enough time to mine exculpatory evidence from the mountains of discovery dumped at their feetsimilarly fails. As an initial matter, it should be noted that this argument assumes that exculpatory evidence exists. In the absence of such evidence, the lack of time to look for it would be harmless. In other words, it would not be prejudicial if the defendants were denied the chance to excavate in a mine that contained no ore. On that score, the most the defendants can say is that they fervently believe[] ... that with sufficient time they would unearth the necessary volume of emails to counter the government's accusations. Appellant's Brief at 60. Consequently, the defendants have failed to demonstrate that the denial of a continuance worked any prejudice with respect to their ability to glean exculpatory evidence. [36]
The next issue is whether the district court erred in denying Warshak's motion for a new trial, which was based on the assertion that the government had suppressed exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady. This court reviews [the] denial of a motion for new trial based on Brady violations under an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Graham, 484 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir.2007) (citing United States v. Jones, 399 F.3d 640, 647 (6th Cir.2005)). However, the district court's determination as to the existence of a Brady violation is reviewed de novo. Id. at 416-17 (citing United States v. Miller, 161 F.3d 977, 987 (6th Cir. 1998)). To establish a violation of Brady, the [defendant] has the burden of establishing that the prosecutor suppressed evidence; that such evidence was favorable to the defense; and that the suppressed evidence was material. Carter v. Bell, 218 F.3d 581, 601 (6th Cir.2000). [E]vidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A `reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985); see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) (holding that the touchstone of materiality is a `reasonable probability' of a different result). Moreover, in determining whether undisclosed evidence is material, the suppressed evidence is considered collectively, rather than item-by-item, to determine if the `reasonable probability' test is met. Schledwitz v. United States, 169 F.3d 1003, 1012 (6th Cir.1999). In this case, the information alleged to constitute Brady material was discovered post-trial while Warshak was defending himself in a civil action involving the FTC. During that litigation, Warshak deposed Sue and Greg Cossman, his sister and brother-in-law, whom the government had interviewed extensively in the run-up to Warshak's criminal trial. [37] In their depositions, the Cossmans spoke favorably of Berkeley and testified that government investigators were pushing a particular version of the facts. In addition to the depositions, Warshak's involvement in the FTC litigation led to the discovery of (1) several recordings of Berkeley sales calls during which disclosure of the auto-ship program was made and (2) several printouts of Berkeley's website on which disclosure of the auto-ship program could be seen. Warshak argues that this evidence was exculpatory and should have been turned over prior to trial. However, Warshak's argument fails because the evidence at issue was not material for Brady purposes. First of all, with respect to Sue Cossman's deposition testimony, it must be noted that, as Warshak's sister and a participant in the Berkeley fraud, she had plenty of incentive to stretch the truth in Warshak's favor. Furthermore, many of the favorable things she said in her deposition were echoed in the statements of trial witnesses, who stated that they did not realize what they were doing was wrong. Thus, the cumulative nature of her deposition testimony cuts against a finding of materiality. See Spence v. Johnson, 80 F.3d 989, 995 (5th Cir.1996) ([W]hen the undisclosed evidence is merely cumulative of other evidence, no Brady violation occurs.). Finally, her testimony would not have undermined confidence in the finding of fraud, as numerous witnesses and scores of emails confirmed that Berkeley executives were engaging in deliberately deceitful practices. See Jones, 399 F.3d at 648 (Given the overwhelming evidence of guilt, a new trial under Brady was inappropriate.). Greg Cossman's deposition testimony is likewise immaterial. Critically, Greg Cossman took the stand at Warshak's trial, at which time he actually made most of the favorable remarks that later appeared in his post-trial deposition. [38] For example, Cossman testified at trial that, while [he] was participating at Berkeley, [he] had no suspicion of participating in a conspiracy doing anything that was criminal. Also, Cossman apparently testified that the government's investigators were calculating, ruthless, relentless and intimidating. In light of these statements, Greg Cossman's post-trial deposition testimony adds nothing new to the mix, and it therefore does not constitute Brady material. Nor can it be said that the tapes and printouts meet the materiality requirement. Though the recorded calls do contain disclosure of the auto-ship program, that fact is not particularly helpful to Warshak's case, given the testimony that the disclosures were designed to be ineffective. Similarly, the appearance of the disclosure on the company website at a given instant in time is also unhelpful; there was testimony that the disclosure on the website appeared, shifted, and disappeared like water in the vision of a desert traveler. As a consequence, these materials do not generate a reasonable probability of a different result. [39] Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555. Accordingly, the district court did not err in finding that Warshak failed to demonstrate a Brady violation.
The defendants also argue that a new trial is warranted in light of serious improprieties in the government's rebuttal argument. Appellant's Br. at 69. Specifically, the defendants assert that the following acts constitute reversible misconduct: The government's attorney vouched for the honesty and integrity of the prosecution team. The government's attorney expressed his personal opinion with respect to the guilt of the defendants, describing the defendants as weak and self-aggrandiz[ing]. The government's attorney described his personal life, relating anecdotes about his time in the JAG Corps and his association with a military celebrity. The government suggested to the jury that the fact that the grand jury had found probable cause ... was evidence of ... guilt. Appellant's Br. at 72. The government improperly asserted that the defendants' guilt was supported by evidence that had not been presented during trial. The government impermissibly argued that the guilty pleas of coconspirators were evidence of a conspiracy. The government employed rebuttal to give a second principal closing argument. Appellant's Br. at 74. [40] In determining whether a prosecutor's remarks and conduct merit a new trial, [41] this court utilizes a two-part test. Cristini v. McKee, 526 F.3d 888, 899 (6th Cir.2008) (citing Girts v. Yanai, 501 F.3d 743, 758-59 (6th Cir.2007)). First, we must determine whether the prosecutor's conduct and remarks were improper. United States v. Carter, 236 F.3d 777, 783 (6th Cir.2001) (citing United States v. Carroll, 26 F.3d 1380, 1387 (6th Cir.1994)). Second, if the conduct and remarks were improper, the court must ... consider and weigh four factors in determining whether the impropriety was flagrant and thus warrants reversal. Ibid. The four factors are: (1) whether the conduct and remarks of the prosecutor tended to mislead the jury or prejudice the defendant; (2) whether the conduct or remarks were isolated or extensive; (3) whether the remarks were deliberately or accidentally made; and (4) whether the evidence against the defendant was strong. Ibid. Additionally, [w]hen considering challenges to a prosecutor's statements at trial, we examine those statements within the context of the [entire] trial to determine whether they were prejudicial error. Cristini, 526 F.3d at 899 (citing Girts, 501 F.3d at 759). The flagrancy analysis does not necessarily end this court's inquiry. But if the improper statements were not flagrant, reversal of a conviction is warranted only if 1) the proof of the defendant's guilt is not overwhelming; 2) the defense objected to the statements; and 3) the trial judge did not cure the impropriety through an admonishment to the jury. United States v. Galloway, 316 F.3d 624, 632 (6th Cir.2003); see also United States v. Cobleigh, 75 F.3d 242, 247 (6th Cir.1996).
The first step in the prosecutorial-misconduct analysis is to determine whether the conduct and remarks at issue were improper. The first set of allegedly inappropriate remarks related to the honesty and moral character of the prosecution team. Responding to a number of comments made during closing arguments for the defendants, the government's attorney, Mr. Kadon, suggested that the defense had labeled the prosecution team abusive and horrible and evil people. Kadon then stated: First of all, I think the biggest thing you heard [during the defense's argument] was that this is a big conspiracy, that the conspirators are not seated behind me; the conspirators are seated over there where I am. I mean, I'm a conspirator, I guess; that Ms. Porter, Mr. Josephs, the federal police that have been investigating this case, somehow the Postal Inspection Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Food and Drug Administration, the Department of Justice, the United States Attorney's Office and the Criminal Investigation Division of the Internal Revenue Service all got together and conspired, that over the last several years all we thought about every single day when we came to work was how we were going to get these guys. Kadon then suggested that he hope[d] [the jury] d[id]n't believe that, and he went on to argue that it is kind of preposterous that we would all get together and lie to do this, that this case is somehow worth everythingour reputations, our lives, our familiesjust because convicting this guy or these people is so important to us. The defendants contend that these remarks constitute improper prosecutorial vouching, which typically occurs when a prosecutor supports the credibility of a witness by indicating a personal belief in the witness's credibility[,] thereby placing the prestige of the office of the United States Attorney behind that witness. Francis, 170 F.3d at 550 (emphasis added). Here, however, Kadon did not vouch for the credibility of a witness. Rather, he spoke to the likelihood that the government's attorneys had engaged in a monomaniacal witch-hunt. Furthermore, he did not overtly suggest that the government's attorneys were honest or morally superior. Instead, he suggested that the prosecution team had no motive to lie. That said, we do think Kadon went a bit overboard, and his remarks veered into dangerous territory. The next allegedly improper remarks pertained to Kadon's opinion of the defendants. At one point, Kadon posed and then answered the following series of rhetorical questions: Do I believe that these people were weak, that they sought self-aggrandizement, personal gain, and they sought it at the expense of other people, consumers? And, in fact, it's okay to lie to banks, because who cares about them anyway? Do I believe that they believe that? Yes. These remarks were also inappropriate. As the defendants correctly note, it is improper for a prosecuting attorney in a criminal case to state his personal opinion concerning ... the guilt of a defendant. United States v. Krebs, 788 F.2d 1166, 1176 (6th Cir.1986) (quoting United States v. Daniels, 528 F.2d 705, 709 (6th Cir.1976)); see also United States v. Bess, 593 F.2d 749, 755 (6th Cir.1979) (Implicit in an assertion of personal belief that a defendant is guilty, is an implied statement that the prosecutor, by virtue of his experience, knowledge and intellect, has concluded that the jury must convict. The devastating impact of such `testimony' should be apparent.). In this case, Kadon plainly voiced a personal belief regarding the guilt of the defendants. While he did not directly state that he believed the defendants were guilty, he stated that, in his mind, they were weak and sought wealth and notoriety at the expense, both literal and figurative, of the consuming public. Thus, Kadon's remarks were improper. Next, we must consider Kadon's statements about his time in the JAG Corps. In the middle of his summation, Kadon remarked: And, you know, when I was on active duty, I worked for a guy named Gary Harrell, whohe was kind of a famous guy. If you have ever seen the movie Black Hawk Down, he was in the movie Black Hawk Down. He's a Green Beret. And he would always tell me when we talked about thingsI was his JAG officer, but I don't fly Black Hawkshe would always say, you know, Karl, life is full of choices. You make your choices and accept the consequences, about the things that we were doing with respect to prosecuting the war on terror. The defendants argue that the prosecutor's remarks about his military service and his quasi-famous colleague were improper. With respect to these remarks, the government concedes impropriety, acknowledging that the remarks were entirely irrelevant to the closing argument. We agree. The remarks served no purpose other than to enhance Kadon's stature in the eyes of the jury, and they were therefore inappropriate. This conclusion is especially apparent when one considers the good guys/bad guys dichotomy that the remarks create when paired with Kadon's statements regarding the weakness and cupidity of the defendants. The fourth set of statements at issue touched on the relevance of the grand jury's decision to indict the defendants. Following his comments about his stint in the armed forces, Kadon noted that all 112 counts in the indictment were things that a grand jury determined were probable cause, these people committed these crimes, that's what that means. Sometime thereafter, Kadon returned to the mindset of the grand jury, stating that [t]he grand jury believed [the defendants] committed crimes. These remarks were plainly out of bounds. As this court stated in Bess, it is always improper for a prosecutor to suggest that a defendant is guilty merely because he is being prosecuted or has been indicted. 593 F.2d at 754; see United States v. Bowen, 500 F.2d 41, 42 (6th Cir. 1974) (holding that it was improper for a prosecutor to state that an eyewitness identification was good enough when it was presented to the grand jury). Here, there is no question that Kadon invoked the grand jury's probable-cause determination when arguing for a finding of guilt. His remarks were therefore improper. The fifth set of remarks at issue involved individuals who had filed complaints but had not testified at trial. [42] First, Kadon stated that, despite floods of complaints to Berkeley and the BBB, the government had made a strategic decision not to bring[] in a million people or hundreds of thousands of people to testify that Berkeley was shipping them unwanted supplements. Then, Kadon remarked that thousands of callers had unsuccessfully attempted to call Berkeley and that the government did not have to go and have everyone here say: I called; it was a problem. The defendants argue that these comments impermissibly convey[ed] the impression that evidence not presented to the jury, but known to the prosecutor, support[ed] the charges against the defendant[s] and ... thus jeopardize[d] the defendant[s'] right to be tried solely on the basis of the evidence presented to the jury. Hodge v. Hurley, 426 F.3d 368, 378 (6th Cir.2005). However, the defendants are incorrect. The remarks in question merely alluded to evidence already before the jury, namely, testimony that droves of customers had complained and that scores of others had tried in vain to do the same. In suggesting that those witnesses could have testified, the government was simply explaining their absence. As a result, these remarks were permissible. The penultimate allegation of prosecutorial impropriety stems from a remark about the coconspirators who testified at trial. [43] Specifically, Kadon stated: And if you believe that there was an agreement to put this on between the people here at the table, the ones who were charged and the people that testified, they pled guilty to doing that, that's one part of the conspiratorial element right there, those people. This declaration was not improper. While it is true that a jury may not ... consider the guilty plea of any [other] person as evidence of guilt on the part of the defendant [standing trial], United States v. Stavroff, 149 F.3d 478, 484 (6th Cir.1998), Kadon's remark did not directly implore the jurors to consider the guilty pleas of the defendants' coconspirators. Instead, Kadon simply added an identifier as to whom the charged defendants were shown to have conspired witha number of other defendants who had pleaded guilty. That portion of his statement did not lie at the core of the message he was intending to convey, which was that the jurors should convict if they found the existence of a conspiratorial agreement. Consequently, Kadon's statement should not be deemed inappropriate. [44] Lastly, the defendants argue that Kadon engaged in improper conduct, specifically by employing the government's rebuttal argument as an impermissible second attempt at a full-scale closing. The defendants contend that the government deliberately limited its initial closing argument to a 45-minute long [sic] broad-brush overview of its evidence, and withheld many of its most pointed arguments for rebuttal. Appellant's Br. at 75. However, the defendants' argument fails. True, a number of cases suggest that the government may not advance any new contentions on rebuttal. See, e.g., United States v. Gleason, 616 F.2d 2, 26 (2d Cir.1979) (indicating that prejudice might have arisen if a rebuttal argument containing new assertions had not been followed by surrebuttal). However, the defendants point to nothing in Kadon's rebuttal argument that was raised for the first time after their summation. Furthermore, to the extent that Kadon made any new arguments in response to assertions made by the defense, those new arguments were permissible. See United States v. Sarmiento, 744 F.2d 755, 765 (11th Cir. 1984).
Having determined that a number of Kadon's remarks were improper, we must now proceed to the flagrancy analysis, which involves the application of the four factors delineated above. None of the four factors is dispositive. Galloway, 316 F.3d at 632. On balance, it appears that the prosecutor's remarks, though improper, were not flagrant enough to render [the] trial fundamentally unfair. Carson, 560 F.3d at 574.
The first factor requires us to consider whether the remarks in question were misleading or prejudicial. Carter, 236 F.3d at 783. As an initial matter, it must be noted that the defendants did not immediately object to any of the remarks. In some cases, the defendants did not object at all. That cuts in favor of a finding that the remarks were not particularly prejudicial, as anything significantly deleterious would presumably prompt a swift objection from experienced defense counsel. See United States v. Trutenko, 490 F.2d 678, 680 (7th Cir.1973) (We are inclined to believe[,] however, that if the comment were sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal, counsel who was present at the time either would have objected forthwith or else would have requested the trial judge to give a curative instruction.). [45] Setting aside the failure to lodge an immediate objection, it seems evident that a number of the improper remarks would tend, in isolation, to prejudice the defendants. The perceptions of the jury were surely impacted to some extent when the prosecutor suggested that he believed the defendants to be weak, greedy, and capable of criminal designs. See Bess, 593 F.2d at 755. Furthermore, it is plain that Kadon's military anecdote was likely to stir the patriotic fibers of at least several jurors, shifting their focus, if only slightly, away from the critical issue of whether the defendants were actually guilty. In addition, the defendants were surely injured when Kadon suggested that the grand jury had formed an opinion as to their guilt. See Bess, 593 F.2d at 754 (indicating that a prosecutor commits an egregious error when he opines that a defendant is guilty merely because he ... has been indicted). Thus, in a vacuum, Kadon's remarks would appear to entail a certain measure of prejudicial force. [46] However, to the sting of potential prejudice was applied the salve of forceful curative instructions. Once closing arguments were completed, and following a brief recess, the district court warned the jurors that the closing arguments were not evidence. The district court also stated, [I]t is not appropriate for the lawyers ... to express a personal opinion about the truthfulness of a witness' testimony. That is for you to decide. In addition, the district court commanded the jurors to disregard any personal opinions or personal backgrounds of counsel. The district court also touched on the issue of Kadon's references to the grand jury. In light of these ameliorative instructions, any prejudice precipitated by Kadon's comments was either extinguished entirely or diminished drastically. See Carson, 560 F.3d at 576 (holding that any prejudice resulting from the comments was `cured, or at least minimized, by curative instructions to the jury'); Carter, 236 F.3d at 787 (Ordinarily, a court should not overturn a criminal conviction on the basis of a prosecutor's comments alone, especially where the district court has given the jury an instruction that may cure the error.). [47] Accordingly, the first factor does not cut in favor of the defendants.
The second factor requires this court to assess the pervasiveness of the improper remarks; that is, this court must determine whether the remarks were isolated or extensive. If a prosecutor's comments were simply isolated remarks made during the course of a long trial, then the error caused by such misconduct may be harmless. Carter, 236 F.3d at 788 (citing United States v. Leon, 534 F.2d 667, 679 (6th Cir.1976)). In this case, it is tempting to describe the remarks as isolated, as they were confined to a single portion of the trial. Indeed, when the remarks are viewedas they must beagainst the backdrop of the trial as a whole, they are certainly fairly localized. See Macias v. Makowski, 291 F.3d 447, 453 (6th Cir.2002) (The prosecutor's statement took place during rebuttal closing argument, and Macias does not contend that the prosecutor acted inappropriately at any other point during the trial. Because the comments were isolated, this factor does not weigh in Macias's favor.); Cobleigh, 75 F.3d at 247 (holding that there was no prosecutorial misconduct where the defendants complained of a few unrelated statements and events from an eight-defendant trial that lasted one month and involved the testimony of dozens of witnesses and the presentation of more than 200 exhibits). However, the fact that the remarks were confined to the rebuttal argument does not mean that they are sufficiently isolated to merit a finding of harmlessness. In some instances, a single forbidden comment is sufficient to poison the entire trial. See United States v. Smith, 500 F.2d 293, 297 (6th Cir.1974) ([E]ven a single misstep on the part of the prosecutor may be so destructive of the right of the defendant to a fair trial that reversal must follow. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Ultimately, we think the remarks, though confined to the rebuttal argument, were numerous enough to escape categorization as isolated. But, at the same time, the remarks were not plentiful enough to merit a finding that they were pervasive. Thus, the second factor is a wash.
Next, this court must consider whether the remarks were deliberate or accidental. Carter, 236 F.3d at 783. Here, only two sets of allegedly improper remarks appear to have been deliberatethe statements regarding the good intentions of the prosecution team and the statements regarding Kadon's experiences as a JAG officer. The remaining remarks appear to have been made on the spur of the moment, sometimes coming in the middle of wholly unrelated sentences. As a consequence, it does not appear that either side benefits tremendously from this factor. In any event, the prosecutor's intent in making certain remarks is a fairly rough proxy for the ultimate question, which is whether the remarks at issue contaminated the trial with unfairness.
The final factor is the strength of the evidence. Ibid. In this case, the force of the government's evidentiary presentation weighs heavily against a finding of flagrancy. The government introduced the testimony of multiple Berkeley executives, each of whom testified that the company knowingly attempted to deceive its customers. The executives also testified that the company was manipulating its financial information in order to remain in relationships with its banking partners. The case against the defendants also included copious emails. In short, the evidence against the defendants was extensive. Thus, the fourth and final factor militates in favor of the conclusion that Kadon's remarks, though imprudent, were ultimately harmless. Accordingly, we hold that, on balance, Kadon's improper comments did not rise to the level of flagrancy.
As noted above, a holding that the remarks at issue were non-flagrant does not put the analysis to rest. Reversal is nonetheless appropriate if three conditions are met: (1) the evidence against the defendants was not overwhelming; (2) the defendants objected to the prosecution's remarks; and (3) the district court failed to issue a curative instruction. See Galloway, 316 F.3d at 632. Here, only one of the prerequisites was met: the defendants objected to several of the improper remarks. However, the evidence against the defendants was strong, and the district court offered a curative instruction. Thus, reversal under Galloway is not appropriate.
Warshak and Harriet contend that the evidence was insufficient to establish the existence of a conspiracy to commit mail, wire, and bank fraud. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). A defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence bears a very heavy burden. United States v. Prince, 214 F.3d 740, 746 (6th Cir.2000) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). [W]e will reverse a judgment for insufficiency of evidence only if, viewing the record as a whole, the judgment is not supported by substantial and competent evidence. United States v. Blakeney, 942 F.2d 1001, 1010 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing United States v. Ellzey, 874 F.2d 324, 328 (6th Cir.1989)). A conviction for conspiracy to commit ... fraud requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly and willfully joined in an agreement with at least one other person to commit an act of ... fraud and that there was at least one overt act in furtherance of the agreement. United States v. Cantrell, 278 F.3d 543, 546 (6th Cir.2001) (citing Crossley, 224 F.3d at 856). Circumstantial evidence that a reasonable person could interpret as showing participation in a common plan may be used to establish the existence of a conspiracy agreement. Ibid. Furthermore, a conspiracy to achieve two or more unlawful goals, in the conjunctive, can properly be supported by proof of any of the alleged goals. United States v. Thomas, 54 F.3d 73, 81 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 56-57, 112 S.Ct. 466, 116 L.Ed.2d 371 (1991)).
Warshak argues that the government failed to satisfy its burden of proof in several respects. First, he argues that, even if the government proved that a conspiracy existed, the government's proof was insufficient to show that the conspiracy lasted for the entirety of the period alleged in the indictment. Second, Warshak argues that there was simply no proof that he entered into a conspiracy to commit mail, wire, and bank fraud. He argues that all of the practices that the government labeled fraud were simply the missteps of a fledgling business attempting to find its footing while simultaneously experiencing radical growth. Third, he argues that there was no conspiracy to commit bank fraud as the chargeback-manipulation efforts were never intended to harm a bank. All three of these arguments fail. [48] Warshak's first argument is a non-starter. While the indictment did allege a conspiracy lasting from 2001 to 2006, the government was under no obligation to prove that the conspiracy spanned the entirety of that time frame. As the Tenth Circuit explained in United States v. Henderson, the temporal scope of a conspiracy is not an `essential' or `material' element of the charge. 179 Fed.Appx. 535, 538 (10th Cir.2006) (quoting United States v. Cina, 699 F.2d 853, 859 (7th Cir.1983)); see United States v. Davis, 679 F.2d 845, 852 (11th Cir.1982) (Neither is time an essential element so long as the time frame proved was within the period alleged in the indictment.) (citing Russell v. United States, 429 F.2d 237, 238 (5th Cir.1970)). Thus, the evidence was sufficient so long as the government proved a conspiracy within the relevant chronological bounds. And the government did. Though Warshak claims that his company's early practices were the result of his status as a managerial neophyte, and that the company later took corrective measures to ensure that any deceptive practices were remediated, a reasonable juror could nonetheless conclude that Warshak and his associates conspired to defraud both customers and merchant banks. As a number of former Berkeley executives testified, the existence of the auto-ship program was not disclosed to customers for the first year that Berkeley was in business, leading to scores of unauthorized credit-card transactions. Furthermore, though disclosures were eventually made during sales calls, the disclosures were designed to fail. They were made at the end of the calls and came on the heels of information relating to sexually transmitted diseases. A reasonable juror could easily conclude that any supposedly remedial measures were simply undertaken to create plausible deniability. As a result, there was sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that the defendants conspired to commit mail and wire fraud. [49] Under Thomas, that is enough to sustain a conviction on Count 1. See 54 F.3d at 81 (holding that proof of any single illegal aim of the conspiracy is sufficient to sustain a conviction). A reasonable juror could also conclude that the defendants conspired to commit bank fraud. Though Warshak argues that the chargeback-manipulation scheme was not intended to harm any banks, a reasonable juror could nonetheless conclude that the scheme was concocted and implemented with fraudulent intent. According to a number of Berkeley insiders, Warshak and his employees manipulated the chargeback ratio because, if they did not, their merchant accounts would be terminated. Thus, a reasonable juror could find that the intent of the chargeback-manipulation scheme was to deceive merchant banks (and credit-card processors) into continuing to provide a service that they would otherwise have declined to provide. That action would constitute fraud by increasing a risk of loss, even if no actual monetary loss were shown. United States v. Reaume, 338 F.3d 577, 581 (6th Cir.2003). Consequently, there was sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that Warshak and the other named defendants conspired to commit bank fraud. [50]
Harriet argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that she knowingly joined the conspiracy. She argues that, although she was in charge of processing continuity shipments at Berkeley, her job amounted to little more than pushing a button. In addition, she contends that she was not made privy to any emails discussing the auto-ship program or the chargeback ratio. In sum, she asserts that she was oblivious to any fraud that was occurring at the company and that she was convicted simply by virtue of her name. However, there is competent evidence in the record suggesting that Harriet was a knowing participant in the pervasive fraud at Berkeley. According to Shelley Kinmon, Harriet was used to input auto-ship charges because she was the only one Warshak trusted. Furthermore, there is testimony that Harriet was present at staff meetings where the need to manipulate the chargeback ratio was discussed. From this evidence, a rational factfinder could properly determine that Harriet knowingly joined the conspiracy. [51]
Warshak also argues that the government failed to offer sufficient evidence that he was guilty of the twelve mail-fraud counts alleged in the indictment (Counts 2-13). Mail fraud [under 18 U.S.C. § 1341] consists of (1) a scheme or artifice to defraud; (2) use of mails in furtherance of the scheme; and (3) intent to deprive a victim of money or property. United States v. Turner, 465 F.3d 667, 680 (6th Cir.2006). Notably, the mail ... fraud statute[] do[es] not require proof that the intended victim was actually defrauded; the actual success of a scheme to defraud is not an element of ... § 1341.... United States v. Merklinger, 16 F.3d 670, 678 (6th Cir.1994). Indeed, [u]sing the mail to execute or attempt to execute a scheme to defraud is indictable as mail fraud ... even if no one relied on any misrepresentation. Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 648, 128 S.Ct. 2131, 170 L.Ed.2d 1012 (2008) (citing Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 24-25, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999)). The first element of mail fraud, the requirement of a scheme or artifice to defraud, escapes precise definition. In United States v. Daniel, we held that `[a] scheme to defraud includes any plan or course of action by which someone intends to deprive another by deception of money ... or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.' 329 F.3d 480, 485 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Gold Unlimited, Inc., 177 F.3d 472, 479 (6th Cir. 1999)). However, we have acknowledged that the scheme to defraud element required under § 1341 is not defined according to a technical standard. The standard is a `reflection of moral uprightness, of fundamental honesty, fair play and right dealing in the general and business life of members of society.' United States v. Van Dyke, 605 F.2d 220, 225 (6th Cir. 1979) (quoting United States v. Bruce, 488 F.2d 1224, 1229 (5th Cir.1973)). Mail fraud's second element, the requirement of a mailing in furtherance of the scheme, is also fairly expansive. See United States v. Wood, 364 F.3d 704, 726 (6th Cir.2004) ([T]he Supreme Court has minimized the importance of mailings in establishing a mail fraud offense[.]). As the Supreme Court noted in Schmuck v. United States, [t]he relevant question ... is whether the mailing is part of the execution of the scheme as conceived by the perpetrator at the time. 489 U.S. 705, 715, 109 S.Ct. 1443, 103 L.Ed.2d 734 (1989). [T]he use of the mails need not be an essential element of the scheme. Id. at 710, 109 S.Ct. 1443 (citing Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8, 74 S.Ct. 358, 98 L.Ed. 435 (1954)). Rather, [i]t is sufficient for the mailing to be incident to an essential part of the scheme, or a step in the plot. Id. at 710-11, 109 S.Ct. 1443 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Those who use the mails to defraud proceed at their peril. Id. at 715, 109 S.Ct. 1443. In the present case, the mail-fraud charges involved specific customers who ordered a free trial of some Berkeley productwhether over the phone, online, or through the mailand thereafter received an unwanted (and unauthorized) additional shipment. In a number of cases, the customers were never informed during the ordering process that they would be charged for anything beyond the shipping-and-handling costs associated with the trial offer. In other cases, customers were notified that they would be receiving additional shipments and incurring additional charges, but those customers were also told that they could remove themselves from the auto-ship program within a certain period of time. Those customers later attempted to cancel their enrollment in the program but were unsuccessful, some despite receiving confirmation numbers. In addition, the majority of the customers, including those to whom disclosure was not made, reported encountering great difficulty in obtaining a refund. Warshak argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions on these charges, as the government failed to demonstrate the existence of an intentional scheme to defraud. Appellant's Br. at 102-10. Warshak notes that, in some cases, the customers involved were aware that they had been enrolled in the auto-ship program. Warshak also notes that a number of customers were able to obtain full or partial refunds. He contends that, at best, the evidence shows a number of classic dispute[s] between company and customer. Appellant's Br. at 108. He also posits that a number of the shipments at issue might be attributable to individual mistakes on the part of telephone operators. But Warshak misses the point. The government's theory was that Berkeley's method of doing business was deliberately geared toward deceiving customers into purchasing additional supplements through the auto-ship program, and there was certainly sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to conclude that the government's theory was correct. At trial, James Teegarden testified that the auto-ship program was the life blood of the company and that no pre-sale disclosure of the auto-ship program was made in the early stages of the business. Both Teegarden and Shelley Kinmon testified that, while disclosures were later implemented after the company was inundated with complaints, the disclosures were designed to be ineffective because nobody would sign up for continuity if it were properly described. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that Berkeley's whole sales operation was simply one gargantuan scheme to defraud. Whether the individual consumers named in the mail-fraud counts were actually deceived is immaterial; the success of the scheme is not an essential element of mail fraud. See Bridge, 553 U.S. at 648, 128 S.Ct. 2131; Merklinger, 16 F.3d at 678. All that matters is that the customers were the targets of an intentional scheme to defraud, and there is certainly sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to conclude that they were. Additionally, there is sufficient evidence to establish the mailing element of the offense. Each of the customers testified that he or she received an additional, unwanted shipment of herbal supplements through the mail. Without those shipments, Berkeley would have had absolutely no justification for placing additional charges on its customers' credit cards. Only with the subsequent shipments could Berkeley even begin to create the illusion that the unauthorized charges were legitimate. Thus, the shipments plainly satisfy the mailing requirement, as they were clearly part of the execution of the scheme. Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 715, 109 S.Ct. 1443.

The defendants' first argument is that the district court's instructions permitted the jury to convict them under a legally erroneous theory of bank fraud. We review a jury instruction to determine `whether the charge, taken as a whole, fairly and adequately submits the issues and applicable law to the jury.' United States v. Hoglund, 178 F.3d 410, 412 (6th Cir.1999) (quoting United States v. Martin, 740 F.2d 1352, 1361 (6th Cir.1984)). To obtain a conviction for bank fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1344, the government must demonstrate three elements: (1) that the defendant knowingly executed or attempted to execute a scheme to defraud a financial institution; (2) that the defendant did so with the intent to defraud; and (3) that the financial institution was insured by the FDIC. United States v. Everett, 270 F.3d 986, 989 (6th Cir.2001). At trial, the district court instructed the jury that the government could demonstrate the requisite intent to defraud ( i.e., the second element of the offense) in several different ways, and stated that it is not necessary that a bank be the intended target of the fraud. The district court also suggested that the government can... show that the defendant had the requisite intent to defraud, even if the intended target ... was a third party, if it proves... that: (1) the defendant exposed a bank to risk of loss or intended to do so; or (2) caused the bank to transfer funds that were in its possession or control. The defendants argue that these instructions were improper because they allowed the jury to convict on the basis of an intent to defraud the credit-card processors, as opposed to an intent to defraud the merchant banks. The defendants contend that the language of the bank-fraud statute clearly requires that any fraudulent scheme be directed at an FDIC-insured bank and not at any other entity or person. [52] Appellant's Br. at 112. In support of their contention, the defendants point to several out-of-circuit decisions holding that, to prove bank fraud, the government must show that the defendant intended to defraud the bank itself or that the defendant intended to harm the bank. See, e.g., United States v. Leahy, 445 F.3d 634, 647 (3d Cir.2006) ([W]here there is no evidence that the perpetrator had an intent to victimize the bank, ... an intent to victimize some third party does not render the conduct actionable under § 1344.); United States v. Laljie, 184 F.3d 180, 189-90 (2d Cir.1999) ([A] conviction under § 1344 is not supportable by evidence merely that some person other than a federally insured financial institution was defrauded in a way that happened to involve banking, without evidence that such an institution was an intended victim.). But the state of the law is different in this circuit. In Everett, we definitively held that to have the specific intent required for bank fraud the defendant need not have put the bank at risk of loss in the usual sense or intended to do so. 270 F.3d at 991. Rather, [i]t is sufficient if the defendant in the course of committing fraud on someone causes a federally insured bank to transfer funds under its possession and control. Ibid.; see United States v. Reaume, 338 F.3d 577, 581 (6th Cir.2003) ( Everett ... can be said to stand for the proposition that the bank fraud statute is violated, even if the intended victim of the fraudulent activity is an entity other than a federally insured financial institution, when the fraudulent activity causes the bank to transfer funds.). In Reaume, this court extended the principle articulated in Everett, find[ing] that intent to defraud the federally insured institution itself is satisfied where: (1) the intent to defraud some entity was present; and (2) that intended fraud placed a federally insured financial institution at a risk of loss. 338 F.3d at 582. Accordingly, it is clear that the district court's instructions did not misstate the law. In the Sixth Circuit, a defendant may be convicted of bank fraud if he intends to defraud someone and implements a fraudulent scheme that either causes a federally insured financial institution to transfer funds or exposes that institution to some degree of risk.
Next, the defendants argue that the district court's instructions, when coupled with the government's evidentiary presentation, resulted in a constructive amendment to the indictment. Constructive amendments ... occur[] when an indictment's terms are effectively altered by the presentation of evidence and jury instructions that `so modify essential elements of the offense charged that there is a substantial likelihood the defendant [was] convicted of an offense other than that charged in the indictment.' United States v. Combs, 369 F.3d 925, 936 (6th Cir.2004) (quoting United States v. Hathaway, 798 F.2d 902, 910 (6th Cir.1986)). Here, no constructive amendment occurred. The offense charged in the indictment was bank fraud, and the district court's instructions did not add any elements extrinsic to that offense. Cf. Combs, 369 F.3d at 936 (holding that a constructive amendment had occurred where the jury instructions mixed elements of two distinct offenses). Indeed, the instructions simply clarified that one of the familiar elements of bank fraud namely, intent to defraudcould be shown through proof of intent to defraud a third party. Thus, it cannot be said that there is a substantial likelihood that either of the defendants was convicted of an uncharged offense. [53] Nor was there a prejudicial variance. A variance takes place when the charging terms of an indictment are left unaltered, but the evidence offered at trial proves facts materially different from those alleged in the indictment. United States v. Ford, 872 F.2d 1231, 1235 (6th Cir.1989) (quoting Gaither v. United States, 413 F.2d 1061, 1071 (D.C.Cir.1969)). For a variance to merit reversal, it must be prejudicialthat is, it must detrimentally affect the ability of the defendants to defend themselves. Hathaway, 798 F.2d at 910-11 (quoting United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130, 138 n. 5, 105 S.Ct. 1811, 85 L.Ed.2d 99 (1985)). In this case, the facts proved at trial were entirely congruent with the facts delineated in the indictment. The bank-fraud counts alleged that the defendants misled merchant banks and credit-card processors about the chargeback ratio. At trial, the government introduced evidence to the same effect. Additionally, the bank-fraud counts alleged that the defendants submitted falsified applications to numerous merchant banks and credit-card processors for the purpose of establishing merchant accounts. Again, the evidence proffered at trial corresponded with the allegations. It is therefore plain that no variance occurred.
Lastly, the defendants argue that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to support their bank-fraud convictions (Counts 15, 23, & 27). In each of the bank-fraud counts, the defendants were charged with scheming to defraud a merchant bank in two ways. First, they were alleged to have falsely inflated the number of sales transactions in order to cause the corresponding ratio of credit card chargebacks from disputed credit card charges to appear lower than, in fact, it was. Second, they were alleged to have submitted falsified applications to obtain credit-card processing services from merchant banks and processors. [54] The defendants argue that the government failed to prove that the manipulation of the chargeback ratio caused any of the merchant banks to transfer funds. The defendants claim that [t]here was ... no testimony from any banker or processor that any bank ever transferred money to Berkeley, nor were any bank, processor, or customer account records introduced reflecting such a transfer. Appellant's Br. at 114-15. The defendants claim that the testimony instead showed that the processors transferred Berkeley's own credit card proceeds to Berkeley, subtracting any transaction fees and chargeback penalties or reserves from the operating revenues. Id. at 115 (emphasis added). In short, the defendants claim that there was no evidence that the banks lost access to any of their funds for any period of time whatsoever. Ibid. However, there is evidence in the record suggesting the that the merchant banks did indeed transfer funds as a result of the chargeback-manipulation scheme. According to Hector Rodriguez, who managed VISA's chargeback-monitoring program, credit-card processing relationships inherently require merchant banks to transfer funds. In other words, if a credit-card transaction is processed, money flows through a merchant bank. There appears to be some question as to whether the money goes directly into the hands of the merchant, but the record clearly indicates that the merchant bank is at the very least integral to the transferit debits the card holder's account and credits someone. [55] Therefore, if Berkeley's merchant accounts had been terminated, the merchant banks would no longer have made transfers on the company's behalf. As a number of witnesses testified, without the chargeback scheme, the company's merchant accounts would have been terminated. Thus, a reasonable juror could easily conclude that the fraudulent scheme caused merchant banks to continue to release money under their control. The defendants also argue that the evidence was insufficient to show that the chargeback-manipulation scheme exposed the merchant banks to a risk of loss. As an initial matter, it should be noted that, since there is sufficient evidence to show that the merchant banks transferred funds under their control, the conviction may be sustained even if the government failed to prove that the banks took on risk as a result of the scheme. See Everett, 270 F.3d at 991; see also Mehul Madia, Comment, The Bank Fraud Act: A Risk of Loss Requirement?, 72 U. Chi. L.Rev. 1445, 1452-53 (2005) (The Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have all held that a risk of loss requirement is not necessary for conviction under [§ 1344].). Nonetheless, there is competent evidence in the record indicating that the efforts to depress Berkeley's chargeback ratio saddled the merchant banks with risk. First of all, there was abundant testimony that the merchant banks provided Berkeley with lines of credit. It is axiomatic that the extension of credit is accompanied by the risk of loss. [56] Thus, in maintaining its processing relationship with Berkeley, each bank was subjecting itself to risk. Furthermore, there was testimony indicating that the merchant banks would have cut off their respective relationships with Berkeley if the chargeback ratio had exceeded 1%. Consequently, one may reasonably conclude that, because of the chargeback scheme, banks retained risks that they would otherwise have shed. As a result, there was sufficient evidence to suggest that the defendants acted with the requisite intent to defraud. Finally, Harriet argues that the evidence proffered at trial fails to establish that she knowingly participated in the chargeback-manipulation scheme. She argues, as she did with respect to the conspiracy count, that she was merely a maternal marionette in her son's operation. She contends that she simply hit a button and had no knowledge that she was being used to manipulate the chargeback ratio. For the reasons addressed ante at II.F.2, this argument again falls flat.