Opinion ID: 2800843
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: standards of review and applicable law

Text: We review de novo the district court’s denial of a defendant’s motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. Stoudemire v. Mich. Dep’t of Corrs., 705 F.3d 560, 565 (6th Cir. 2013). Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Stoudemire, -10- No. 14-5859, Sutton v. Metro Govt. of Nashville, et al. 705 F.3d at 565. Summary judgment is not proper if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Stoudemire, 705 F.3d at 565. We view all facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. A government official is shielded from § 1983 liability if his actions did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). The burden rests on the plaintiff to show that the defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity. Reilly v. Vadlamudi, 680 F.3d 617, 623 (6th Cir. 2012). Thus, a plaintiff must show that the defendant violated a constitutional right and that the right was clearly established. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232. “The Fourth Amendment guarantees that government officials may not subject citizens to searches or seizures without proper authorization.” Sutton, 700 F.3d at 871 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A warrantless arrest does not violate the Fourth Amendment if the officer had probable cause to believe a crime had been committed. Id. An officer possesses probable cause when the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge at the moment of arrest are sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the plaintiff had committed a crime. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). A probable cause determination is based on the “totality of the circumstances,” and must take account of “both the inculpatory and exculpatory evidence.” Gardenhire v. Schubert, 205 F.3d 303, 318 (6th Cir. 2000). As a general rule, the existence of probable cause in a § 1983 action is a jury question, unless there is only one reasonable determination possible. Pyles v. Raisor, 60 F.3d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir. #1995). A right is clearly established if “it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001), -11- No. 14-5859, Sutton v. Metro Govt. of Nashville, et al. overruled on other grounds, Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009); Sutton, 700 F.3d at 871. As this court recently explained: [in] determining whether the rights violated were “clearly established,” we must first define the right at issue. In doing so, the Supreme Court has warned that we should not define the right in question at “a high level of generality.” Ashcroft v. al–Kidd, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2084, 179 L. Ed. 2d 1149 (2011). This holding ensures that, on the one hand, we do not define the right so broadly as to declare all police misconduct within the realm of clearly-established law. On the other hand, it also ensures that we not define the right so narrowly that, to be actionable, the circumstances of the alleged violation must be identical to cases already decided. The correct balance must be struck because, while the requirement that law must be clearly established is the lynchpin of the analysis, officers can still be “on notice that their conduct violates established law, even in novel factual circumstances.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741, 122 S. Ct. 2508, 153 L. Ed. 2d 666 (2002). Baker v. Union Twp., 587 F. App’x 229, 233 (6th Cir. 2014).