Opinion ID: 2507905
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Penalty Phase Jury Instruction Challenges.

Text: Defendant argues that the trial court's refusal to give five of the 10 penalty phase instructions requested by defendant constitutes reversible error and deprived him of due process of law, equal protection, and a reliable determination of penalty in violation of his rights under the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments. We address each of the instructions in turn.
The trial court refused to give defendant's proposed instruction No. 10, which stated: In determining circumstances in aggravation, you should not double count any circumstances of the crime which are also special circumstances. Instead, the court gave CALJIC No. 8.85 to the jury, stating that in determining penalty, the jury should consider, (a) The circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding and the existence of any circumstances found to be true. Defendant contends rejection of the proposed instruction was erroneous. We already have determined that CALJIC No. 8.85 does not imply that the jury may double count evidence. ( People v. Mayfield, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 805, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 928 P.2d 485.) Even assuming that the judge should have given defendant's proposed instruction, his failure to do so was harmless. (See People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 768-769, 244 Cal.Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741.) Not only did the prosecutor argue this issue in a non-misleading manner, [15] but as a matter of common sense, [the jury] was unlikely to believe it should `weigh' each special circumstance twice on the penalty `scale.' ( Id. at p. 769, 244 Cal.Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741.) Thus, the judge did not commit reversible error by failing to give the defendant's proposed instruction.
Defendant's proposed instruction No. 8, which the judge rejected, stated: In determining whether life imprisonment without possibility of parole, or death, is the appropriate penalty, you may not consider the deterrent or non-deterrent effect of the death penalty. Defendant argues that because only statutory aggravating factors may be considered by the jury during their penalty phase deliberation, and deterrence is not a statutory aggravating factor, then the absence of an instruction informing the jury that they may not consider deterrence constitutes reversible error. We disagree. The trial court characterized this instruction as unnecessary. Deterrence was not an issue at trial, and the jury was presented neither with evidence nor argument by either side on the issue of the deterrent or nondeterrent value of the death penalty. The trial court properly refused the instruction ( People v. Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 765, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203, 976 P.2d 754; People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1066, 64 Cal. Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388), and its absence was non-prejudicial. ( People v. Bacigalupo (1991) 1 Cal.4th 103, 146, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 335, 820 P.2d 559, judg. vacated and cause remanded (1992) 506 U.S. 802, 113 S.Ct. 32, 121 L.Ed.2d 5, reaffd. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 457, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 808, 862 P.2d 808.)
Defendant's proposed instruction No. 2, which the trial court rejected, stated: The factors listed in Sections A, B and C, which are: the circumstances of the crime, the presence or absence of prior criminal activity involving the use or attempted use of force or violence, and the presence or absence of any felony conviction are the only factors that you may consider to be aggravating factors. You are not allowed to take into account any other facts or circumstances as weighing in favor of imposing the penalty of death on the defendant. Defendant's argument fails. The trial court is not constitutionally required to include an instruction identifying which factors are to be considered in aggravation. ( People v. Earp, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 898, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 857, 978 P.2d 15; People v. Musselwhite (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1216, 1266, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 212, 954 P.2d 475.) We characterized a very similar argument as display[ing] a fundamental misunderstanding of the differing constitutional requirements for the narrowing and sentence-selection aspects of a state's capital sentencing law. ( People v. Earp, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 898, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 857, 978 P.2d 15, citing People v. Musselwhite, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 1266, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 212, 954 P.2d 475.) Thus, the trial judge properly declined defendant's instruction.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to give proposed instruction No. 1. This instruction enumerated various factors to be included in mitigation, including childhood abuse suffered by defendant and defendant's lack of emotional maturity. [16] Defendant argues that under federal law, he is entitled at the penalty phase to clear instructions which not only do not preclude consideration of mitigating factors, [citation], but which also `guid[e] and focu[s] the jury's objective consideration of the particularized circumstances of the individual offense and the individual offender ...' [citation]. ( Spivey v. Zant (5th Cir.1981) 661 F.2d 464, 471, quoting Jurek v. Texas (1976) 428 U.S. 262, 274, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 929.) He is incorrect. Such a pinpoint instruction, which asks the jury to draw inferences favorable to defendant regarding particular items of evidence, properly belongs not in instructions, but in the arguments of counsel to the jury. ( People v. Wright (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1126, 1135, 248 Cal.Rptr. 600, 755 P.2d 1049.) Defendant also argues the trial court erred in refusing to give proposed instruction No. 5, which would have instructed the jury in part that [m]itigating factors are potentially unlimited. [17] The trial court correctly rejected this instruction as duplicative of CALJIC No. 8.85(k). [18] (See People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 805 n. 12, 276 Cal.Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330; People v. Farmer (1989) 47 Cal.3d 888, 889-890, 254 Cal.Rptr. 508, 765 P.2d 940.) This court has interpreted section 190.3 factor (k), which CALJIC No. 8.85(k) incorporates, as `allow[ing] the jury to consider a virtually unlimited range of mitigating circumstances.' ( People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 1007, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243, 978 P.2d 1171, quoting McPeters, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1192, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 832 P.2d 146.) The jury was thus not reasonably likely to have [been] misled ... into believing that its consideration of mitigating circumstances somehow was limited. ( People v. Smithey, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 1007, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243, 978 P.2d 1171.)
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that inmates sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of parole may not have their sentences reduced for work credits, thus violating his right to due process of law under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and a reliable determination of penalty under the Eighth Amendment. We find this contention to be without merit.
While defendant was imprisoned at the Sierra Conservation Center, he worked as an office assistant and reported to Ann Hackett. At trial, Hackett testified about defendant's work ethic. During questioning, the prosecutor asked Hackett, Do inmates get their sentence[s] reduced for working? Defense counsel objected that the issue was irrelevant to the case. The trial court sustained the defense objection before Hackett could answer the question. At a sidebar, defense counsel asked the trial court to remind the jury that a person sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of parole could not have his sentence reduced for working. The trial court responded that the issue should be dealt with later in the trial when crafting jury instructions. During a discussion of proposed jury instructions, defense counsel renewed his verbal objection, but never offered a written instruction on this issue, even after the trial court asked if proposed written instructions were available. Defense counsel did not prepare written instructions even after the prosecutor verbally proposed to stipulate to instructions that addressed some of defendant's concerns. When the trial court asked for clarification about whether defendant was also objecting to the rejection of the work credit instruction, defense counsel stated, No, I don't mean on that [one]. . . .
Even if defendant properly preserved this issue for appeal, the trial court committed no error. The court sustained defendant's objection to the prosecutor's question suggesting that work credits could reduce a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole. The prompt action on the part of defense counsel and the trial court was sufficient to dispel any prejudice from the prosecution's unanswered inquiry. ( People v. Bonillas (1989) 48 Cal.3d 757, 795, 257 Cal.Rptr. 895, 771 P.2d 844.) Furthermore, a judge need not include a legally correct jury instruction when it is duplicative of other instructions provided to the jury. ( People v. Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 560, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 751, 905 P.2d 420; see also People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 659, 123 Cal. Rptr.2d 345, 51 P.3d 224.) Here, the judge told the jurors that they should not consider any question as evidence, and should not guess the answers to any questions that were not answered because the judge sustained objections. Moreover, the jurors received a special instruction directing that if they convicted defendant of life imprisonment without possibility of parole, his sentence would be carried out and he would never be eligible for parole. These instructions conveyed the same information as defendant's verbally proposed instruction.
During the penalty phase of the trial, the trial court read the standard CALJIC No. 8.85 instruction, drawn from section 190.3, to advise jurors of the mitigating factors they should consider when choosing an appropriate sentence. Defendant now objects to factor (d) of the instruction, which states that one of the factors a juror may consider in imposing the penalty is [w]hether or not the offense was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. (Italics added.) Defendant contends that the inclusion of extreme mental or emotional disturbance under factor (d) of CALJIC No. 8.85 precluded jurors from considering lesser mental or emotional disturbance as a mitigating factor, contrary to the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. We disagree. As noted, the jury also received CALJIC No. 8.85, factor (k), the catchall provision, that informed them that they could consider any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime, and any sympathetic or other aspects of the defendant's character or record that the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less than death. [19] (See § 190.3, factor (k).) Factor (k) does not contradict, confuse, or subsume factor (d), but rather complements factor (d). Factor (k) allows the jury to consider `a mental condition of the defendant which, though perhaps not deemed `extreme,' nonetheless mitigates the seriousness of the offense.' ( People v. Sapp (2003) 31 Cal.4th 240, 316, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 554, 73 P.3d 433.) The United States Supreme Court, analyzing a predecessor version of factor (k), found that there is not a reasonable likelihood that [the jury] interpreted the instruction[ ] to prevent the consideration of [other types of] mitigating evidence..... ( Boyde v. California (1990) 494 U.S. 370, 381, 110 S.Ct. 1190, 108 L.Ed.2d 316.) Therefore, CALJIC No. 8.85, factor (k) was proper and did not violate defendant's rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. (See, e.g., People v. Sapp, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 316, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 554, 73 P.3d 433; People v. Wright (1990) 52 Cal.3d 367, 443-444, 276 Cal.Rptr. 731, 802 P.2d 221.)
Defendant claims that even if no single error justifies reversal, the cumulative effect of the asserted numerous instructional errors at the penalty phase mandates reversal. The absence of any instructional error precludes this argument. ( People v. Beeler (1995) 9 Cal.4th 953, 994, 39 Cal. Rptr.2d 607, 891 P.2d 153.)