Opinion ID: 1263487
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Right Against Self Incrimination under the Fifth Amendment

Text: The Supreme Court has drawn a distinction between a defendant's silence prior to any Miranda warnings and silence after such warnings. Hall was arrested months after the probate hearing. Thus, Hall's silence at the probate hearing amounted to pre- Miranda silence. The Fifth Amendment guarantees No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.... The Fifth Amendment's right to silence applies to a defendant in a state court proceeding under the Fourteenth Amendment. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965). In general, a defendant's decision to remain silent cannot be used as substantive evidence of guilt. Id. This rule clearly applies to a defendant's silence after the defendant actually invokes the right to remain silent. See id. ; cf. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976) (precluding the use for impeachment purposes of a defendant's post- Miranda silence). However, as a panel of this court recently observed, The constitutionality of using a defendant's pre- Miranda silence as substantive evidence of guilt [has] not been addressed by the Supreme Court. Jones v. Trombley, 307 Fed.Appx. 931, 933 (6th Cir. 2009) (unpublished). The circuit courts have split on this issue. See Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 282-83 (6th Cir.2000) (collecting cases). While this court has held that pre- Miranda silence cannot be used as substantive evidence of guilt, it did so under a pre-AEDPA, de novo standard of review. See id. at 283. It is, therefore, not controlling in this case, Hereford v. Warren, 536 F.3d 523, 532 (6th Cir.2008); Jones, 307 Fed.Appx. at 934 n. 1, notwithstanding the district court's conclusion to the contrary, Hall, 551 F.Supp.2d at 668-69. Apart from substantive evidence, a defendant's pre- Miranda silence can be used to impeach his credibility as a witness. Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 69, 120 S.Ct. 1119, 146 L.Ed.2d 47 (2000) (The prosecutor's comments in this case, by contrast, concerned respondent's credibility as a witness, and were therefore in accord with our longstanding rule that when a defendant takes the stand, his credibility may be impeached and his testimony assailed like that of any other witness. (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original)); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 238, 100 S.Ct. 2124, 65 L.Ed.2d 86 (1980) (We conclude that the Fifth Amendment is not violated by the use of prearrest silence to impeach a criminal defendant's credibility.). When a defendant chooses to testify at trial, he has opened his credibility to attack like any other witness. As the Supreme Court explained in Raffel v. United States, We can discern nothing in the policy of the law against self-incrimination which would require the extension of immunity to any trial, or to any tribunal, other than that in which the defendant preserves it by refusing to testify. 271 U.S. 494, 499, 46 S.Ct. 566, 70 L.Ed. 1054 (1926). Moreover, a prosecutor can refer to a defendant's silence if doing so would be a fair reply to a defense theory or argument, for example, when defense counsel asserts that the government did not give his client an opportunity to tell his side of the story. United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 34, 108 S.Ct. 864, 99 L.Ed.2d 23 (1988) (holding that the prosecutor can refer to the defendant's silence at trial when defense counsel argued that his client was precluded from telling his side of the story); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 595, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978) (rejecting the Fifth Amendment claim of the defendant because her own counsel had clearly focused the jury's attention on her silence, first, by outlining her contemplated defense in his opening statement and, second, by stating to the court and jury near the close of the case, that Lockett would be the `next witness'). When the prosecutor goes no further than to take defense counsel up on an invitation, that conduct will not be regarded as impermissibly calculated to incite the passions of the jury. 2 Crim. Prac. Manual § 57:18 (2009) (citation omitted). This invited reply rule is limited, though, to the scope of the invitation. Id. The Michigan Court of Appeals did not provide any analysis in support of its finding that the testimony elicited by the prosecutor and the prosecutor's remarks were improper, other than to note that both the Federal Constitution and the State of Michigan's Constitution provide an individual with the right to remain silent. Hall, slip op. at 5. To the extent that any of the testimony elicited by the prosecutor or the prosecutor's remarks during closing arguments constituted impeachment or invited reply, the Michigan Court of Appeals' decision would be contrary to Supreme Court precedent on the scope of permissible uses of pretrial silence under the Federal Constitution. Robinson, 485 U.S. at 34, 108 S.Ct. 864; Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 238, 100 S.Ct. 2124. If, however, the testimony or arguments went beyond these permissible uses and were used instead in a substantive way to prove Hall's guilt, then the state court's finding would not conflict with any then-existing Supreme Court precedent and would be in line with this court's holding in Combs. It is difficult to see how Hall's silence could have been used to impeach his credibility as a witness. There are generally five types of impeachment evidence: self-contradiction; bias; character; capacity to observe, remember, or recount events; and specific contradiction. 1 McCormick on Evid. § 33 (6th ed.2006 update). It seems clear that Hall's silence could not be used to show bias, impugn his character, or undercut his capacity. That leaves only self-contradiction and specific contradiction. The Warden argues that the prosecutor used Hall's silence only on cross-examination and not in the government's case-in-chief. Warden's Br. at 21. That is inaccurate. While Hall's defense counsel did argue during his opening statement that his client was a victim of governmental persecution and did first elicit testimony from Hall's daughter about whether her father or step-mother testified at the hearing, the prosecutor asked Det. Kellogg on direct examination whether Hall had testified at the probate hearing. [A]nticipatory impeachment of a witness is generally disfavored and, given the importance of the right against compelled self-testimony, it should be strictly circumscribed in the criminal context. See United States v. Banks, 29 Fed.Appx. 276, 283 (6th Cir.2002) (unpublished) (Mr. Banks had not yet taken the stand when Agent Cannon testified, however, and the government's anticipatory impeachment theory seems to have no support in the caselaw.). This form of impeachment presents the defendant with the same dilemma as when an officer's testimony about the defendant's silence is used as substantive evidence of guilt. Rather than impeachment of Hall as a witness, the testimony and arguments are better viewed as a reply to the defense theory of governmental persecution. When considering whether the prosecutor acted properly in replying to a defense theory, it is critical that we examine the prosecutor's questions and remarks in their context. Robinson, 485 U.S. at 33, 108 S.Ct. 864. As the Supreme Court explained in United States v. Young, [A] criminal conviction is not to be lightly overturned on the basis of a prosecutor's comments standing alone, for the statements or conduct must be viewed in context.... 470 U.S. 1, 11, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985). With regard to the probate hearing, defense counsel argued from the outset that the hearing was abruptly arranged and lacked certain features of due process (e.g., the victim did not testify or swear out a complaint). Defense counsel then went one step further and actually raised the issue of Hall's silence during the daughter's cross-examination. Importantly, it was defense counsel, not the prosecutor, who first broached the topic of whether Hall testified during the probate hearing. Defense counsel did so presumably to show that the probate court failed to hear any evidence from family members, but instead made its decision based solely on evidence from Det. Kellogg and the written petition, i.e., evidence from government sources. By doing so, however, he invited the prosecutor to explore whether Hall had received a fair hearing, including whether he had been given the opportunity to testify and whether he took advantage of that opportunity. In short, defense counsel opened the door on Hall's silence when he asked the daughter whether her father had testified at the hearing. The testimony about Hall's silence was not elicited by the prosecutor for an improper purpose, but rather in reply to the defense theory that Hall was the subject of governmental persecution throughout the investigation. Beyond the witnesses' testimony about his silence, Hall also complains that the prosecutor treated his silence as substantive evidence of guilt during the prosecutor's closing statements. Viewed in isolation, the prosecutor's closing remarks are troubling. He described Hall as cower[ing] in fear during the probate hearing, as the guilty man in [c]ourt, and as having guilt working there and guilty knowledge. Again, though, the question is not whether the prosecutor referred to Hall's motives for not testifyingthe prosecutor clearly did. The question, instead, is whether the defense strategy somehow fairly invited the prosecutor to characterize Hall's motives in this manner. Recall that during cross-examination of Hall's daughter, defense counsel first advanced the notion that custody of the children was stripped from Hall and his wife with no testimony from the daughter or any family member. Hall later testified that he did not understand exactly what was going on during the hearing, i.e., that he could be stripped of custody of his children. This theme of governmental overreach was extended during closing. Defense counsel argued to the jury that the probate hearing was hastily arranged, contended that there was no opportunity for family members to testify, and, most strikingly, strongly implied that the referee did not want to hear from Hall's daughter or any other family member about what's going on before taking the children from their parents. This defense theme fairly invited the prosecutor's comments during closing that Hall had not been denied the opportunity to testify, but instead had refused to testify because doing so would have undermined his plan to cover up the sexual conduct. By delving into the purported motives of the government actors, defense counsel left the door open for the prosecutor to respond by delving into Hall's own motives at the hearing. With that said, the prosecutor arguably went beyond even that fairly wide opening by explicitly characterizing Hall's refusal to testify as evidence of guilt. In general, it is improper for a prosecuting attorney in a criminal case to state his personal opinion concerning the credibility of witnesses or the guilt of a defendant. Byrd v. Collins, 209 F.3d 486, 537 (6th Cir.2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Young, the Supreme Court identified two dangers from a prosecutor's personal opinion about a defendant's guilt: [S]uch comments can convey the impression that evidence not presented to the jury, but known to the prosecutor, supports the charges against the defendant and can thus jeopardize the defendant's right to be tried solely on the basis of the evidence presented to the jury; and the prosecutor's opinion carries with it the imprimatur of the Government and may induce the jury to trust the Government's judgment rather than its own view of the evidence. 470 U.S. at 18-19, 105 S.Ct. 1038 (citing Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88-89, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935)). In the present case, there is little danger that the jury believed that the prosecutor knew of evidence not presented to the jury because his remarks about guilt were not made in some general, free-standing statement, but rather in direct reference to the probate proceedings and why Hall did not testify at those proceedings. As to the imprimatur of the government, this court has found less inflammatory remarks of prosecutors to have violated a defendant's right against self-incrimination or due process, although those remarks took place during trials where the defendant did not testify or did not otherwise initiate some discussion about his pretrial silence. See, e.g., Combs, 205 F.3d at 279, 286 (holding that the prosecutor violated the defendant's right to remain silent by eliciting testimony that the defendant told police to talk to my lawyer and the prosecutor argued during closing that the statement was evidence that he realizes the gravity of the situation and at this time gave that particular comment or response to police; however, the defendant did not testify at trial); Gravley v. Mills, 87 F.3d 779, 787-88 (6th Cir.1996) (in post- Miranda silence context, holding that repeated references by prosecutor to the defendant's pretrial silence were improper; however, prosecutor was the first to introduce testimony that the defendant had chosen to remain silent during a police interrogation). Because the matter of harmless error/prejudice permits clearer resolution of this case, we presume without deciding that the prosecutor's specific remarks regarding guilt went beyond the scope invited by the defense strategy.
Improper remarks by a prosecutor about a defendant's right to remain silent do not constitute a structural error requiring automatic reversal. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 629, 638, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (characterizing a violation of the right to silence as a trial error, rather than a structural one). The Michigan Court of Appeals concluded that Hall was not prejudiced by the improper actions of the prosecutor in light of the overwhelming evidence that was properly admitted from which the jury could find [Hall] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Hall, slip op. at 5 (citing People v. Graves, 458 Mich. 476, 581 N.W.2d 229, 232 (1998)). This is the familiar harmless-error standard of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) ( Graves cites People v. Anderson, 446 Mich. 392, 521 N.W.2d 538, 545 (1994), which explicitly relies upon Chapman for the harmless-error test). This was a legal determination of the state court, not a factual one as suggested by the Warden, and thus it does not enjoy AEDPA's strong presumption in favor of a state court's finding of historical fact. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); cf. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 642, 113 S.Ct. 1710. In the normal course, the next step would be to consider whether, pursuant to Brecht, the prosecutor's actions had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury's verdict. Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 127 S.Ct. 2321, 2328, 168 L.Ed.2d 16 (2007) (holding that the Brecht harmless-error standard, rather than the Chapman formulation, is applicable on federal habeas review). This would entail a de novo examination of the trial record. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 642, 113 S.Ct. 1710. However, as explained below, Hall has procedurally defaulted his Fifth Amendment claim. In order to excuse the default, Hall relies solely on the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. The prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance analysis subsumes the Brecht harmless-error review. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 436, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) (explaining that Agurs 's materiality standard, later adopted as the prejudice standard for ineffective assistance of counsel, is stricter vis-à-vis a habeas petitioner than is the Brecht harmless-error standard). If Hall can show that he was prejudiced by his attorney's failure to object during closing, then he necessarily satisfies Brecht ; if, alternatively, Hall fails to establish that he was prejudiced, then we cannot excuse his default and it is immaterial whether he can otherwise satisfy Brecht.
Hall's trial counsel did not object during the prosecutor's closing or rebuttal. Michigan had a contemporaneous-objection rule at the time of Hall's trial. In keeping with that rule, the Michigan Court of Appeals treated the claim on direct appeal as waived and reviewed it only for plain error. Accordingly, his trial counsel's failure to object resulted in the procedural default of the Fifth Amendment claim. Ege v. Yukins, 485 F.3d 364, 378 (6th Cir.2007); Joseph v. Coyle, 469 F.3d 441, 458-59 (6th Cir.2006). A defendant can overcome a procedural default by showing (a) cause for the default and (b) actual prejudice from it. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986). To show cause for the default, a petitioner must show more than mere error, he must establish a substantial reason to excuse the default. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that `cause' may be established through a showing of counsel's ineffectiveness in failing properly to preserve a claim for review in state court. Ege, 485 F.3d at 378 (citation omitted). An argument that ineffective assistance of counsel should excuse a procedural default is treated differently than a free-standing claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 379-80 n. 7; Joseph, 469 F.3d at 459. The latter must meet the higher AEDPA standard of review, while the former need not. Joseph, 469 F.3d at 459 (Although Joseph must satisfy the AEDPA standard with respect to his independent IAC claim, he need not do so to claim ineffective assistance for the purpose of establishing cause.). To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, it must be shown that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense so as to render the trial unfair and the result unreliable. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Not just any deficiency in counsel's performance will do, however; the assistance must have been so ineffective as to violate the Federal Constitution. Ege, 485 F.3d at 378 (internal quotation marks omitted). The prejudice analysis for the procedural default and the prejudice analysis for the ineffective assistance of counsel argument are sufficiently similar to treat as the same in this context. [E]stablishing Strickland prejudice likewise establishes prejudice for purposes of cause and prejudice. Joseph, 469 F.3d at 462-63 (citing Mincey v. Head, 206 F.3d 1106, 1147 n. 86 (11th Cir.2000); Prou v. United States, 199 F.3d 37, 49 (1st Cir.1999)). To establish prejudice under Strickland, Hall must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. As explained above, much of what undergirds Hall's Fifth Amendment claim was not unconstitutionalall of the testimony about his silence during the probate hearing was proper as invited reply to the defense strategy. Defense counsel's strategy employed three complementary themes: Hall did not touch his daughter in a sexual manner; his daughter came up with the story so that she could live with her birth mother in Kansas; and the government rushed to judgment within a matter of days. These themes provided both an actual innocence component and a reason other than guilt for why the charges were brought against him. It is clear from his opening and closing statements that defense counsel wanted to generate sympathy for his client by showing that the government took his children away from him with just a couple of hours' notice. Hall was, it was alleged, essentially shell-shocked at the hearing. Although ultimately unsuccessful, defense counsel's strategy, including raising the matter of Hall's silence, was not constitutionally deficient. No doubt, though, this defense strategy did carry risks. One risk was that the prosecutor would rebut the persecution theme with evidence that Hall had received a fair hearing before the probate court and had chosen not to testify for some reason other than lack of time to prepare, e.g., on the advice of counsel. Because Hall's silence was first raised by defense counsel, and because his silence fit within the defense's sound trial strategy, defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor's questions about Hall's silence. With respect to the prosecutor's remarks at closing, defense counsel opened the door for the prosecutor to explore Hall's motives for not testifying. If the jury rejected the defense's theory that Hall did not testify because the hearing was rushed and the referee did not want to hear from family members, then it would have been logical for the jury to conclude that he did not testify for some other, less favorable reason. The prosecutor gave voice to that alternate interpretation. While the prosecutor may have gone too far in doing so, [3] the strategy of the defense created the risk in the first place. In short, Hall employed a high risk/high reward trial strategyany prejudice attributable to defense counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's closing remarks has to be measured in comparison with this strategy. Had defense counsel objected during the prosecutor's closing and rebuttal, counsel would have presumably requested that the trial court admonish the prosecutor and instruct the jury that arguments of counsel were not evidence. Shortly after the prosecutor finished his rebuttal closing, the trial court instructed the jury about what was and what was not evidence, thereby at least partially alleviating the lack of a contemporaneous instruction. Although a general instruction at the end of closing statements may not be sufficient to cure the full impact of a prosecutor's improper remarks in every case, see, e.g., United States v. Carter, 236 F.3d 777, 787 (6th Cir., 2001) (We believe that measures more substantial than a general instruction that `objections or arguments made by lawyers are not evidence in the case' were needed to cure the prejudicial effect of the prosecutor's comments during closing arguments. (footnote omitted)), the instruction does lessen the impact of such remarks, as the jury is presumed to follow all of the court's instructions, see United States v. Sivils, 960 F.2d 587, 594 (6th Cir.1992), not just the contemporaneous ones. As to whether the evidence of guilt was overwhelming, the district court and state court came to differing conclusions. The district court correctly noted that the direct evidence of sexual misconduct came down largely to a matter of credibility Hall's versus his daughter's. Hall, 551 F.Supp.2d at 672. No other witness testified seeing Hall massage his daughter's breast. Yet, well before the prosecutor's closing remarks, Hall had explained that he did not testify at the probate hearing because his lawyer told him to remain silent. As explained above, this testimony was brought out on cross-examination and was well within the scope of the invited reply. This testimony was in some tension with the defense theory of a hasty hearing held by a referee who did not want to hear from family members. Thus, while Hall's credibility may have been damaged illegitimately by the prosecutor's closing remarks, it was also damaged legitimately by his own testimony that he remained silent on the advice of counsel. Given all of this, we find that Hall was not prejudiced by defense counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's closing remarks. This case is relatively rare in that a central component of the defense's theory was the defendant's silence at an earlier hearing. Unlike most cases, the testimonythe actual evidence that the jury was instructed to considerabout Hall's silence was entirely proper, either as directly prompted by the defense or fairly invited by it. Any prejudice to Hall by the prosecutor's remarks during closing was lessened by the trial court's subsequent instruction. Finally, if Hall's credibility suffered from the prosecutor's characterization of his motive for not testifying, it also suffered from his own explanation. While the prosecutor's remarks might have negatively impacted Hall's case, the magnitude of that impact, when evaluated against the properly admitted testimony about his earlier silence, was not enough to undermine confidence in the jury's verdict of guilt. Accordingly, Hall cannot show that he was prejudiced by his counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's closing statements. He defaulted his Fifth Amendment claim and that default is not excused by any ineffective assistance of counsel. Likewise, because his nested ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails, his independent claim necessarily fails under the stricter AEDPA standard of review. See Joseph, 469 F.3d at 459. We reverse the district court's conditional grant of habeas relief on Hall's Fifth Amendment claim and independent ineffective assistance of counsel claim.