Opinion ID: 2814864
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The First Appeal to the OCCA

Text: On appeal to the OCCA after his first trial, Owens raised what the court interpreted as two distinct sufficiency of the evidence arguments. The first was a traditional sufficiency argument that the evidence presented at trial could not sustain the murder conviction or the Jesus robbery conviction. On this ground, the court “d[id] not hesitate to conclude that the evidence presented . . . was more than sufficient to sustain Owens’ convictions.” Id. at 223. Specifically with regard to the murder conviction, the court found that “despite the jury’s decision to acquit Owens of the armed robbery of Javier (Count IV), the evidence presented at trial was also sufficient to convict Owens of this robbery and to convict him of the felony murder of Javier, with this robbery as the underlying felony (Count II).” Id. at 224. The second argument before the OCCA was that the evidence must have been insufficient to convict him of felony murder because the jury acquitted on the predicate felony. The OCCA interpreted this as an argument that the verdict was “logically inconsistent and result[ed] in an inconsistent verdict.” Id. at 225. Citing Supreme Court precedent, the OCCA found that the logical inconsistency in the verdicts did not impugn the validity of the murder conviction. The court did not stop there, however. Relying on the trial court’s closing instructions and the jury notes, the court found that “it [was] far from clear that the jury who tried Owens was choosing to render an inconsistent verdict.” Id. at 226–27. Rather, -8- the court believed “the record strongly suggest[ed] that the jury was struggling to figure out how to interpret the court’s felony murder jury instructions and that the jury was, in fact, attempting to render a verdict that was both logical and consistent with instructions that the jury found confusing, particularly regarding the felony murder counts and the relationship between Counts II and IV.” Id. at 227. The court accordingly reversed and remanded the murder conviction for plain error, finding the cumulative effect of the open-ended jury instruction and the trial judge’s failure to adequately respond to jury questions resulted in the substantial possibility that “[t]he jury may well have convicted Owens on Count II, the felony murder of Javier, based upon a crime that was not charged as the underlying felony of this murder (the robbery of ‘both’ Carranzas), rather than the crime that was actually charged as the underlying felony (the robbery of Javier only).” 4 Id. at 231. 3. The Second Trial and the Second Appeal to the OCCA On remand, Owens moved to dismiss the murder charge on the ground that retrial would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. The trial court denied the 4 Owens’s brief on his first appeal is not in the record, but the OCCA dissent criticized the majority for “sua sponte creating an issue that was not raised by an appellant” because Owens’s brief had “not even address[ed] the jury’s notes nor does he argue the jury was in any way confused about what they were to do.” R., Vol. I at 236. -9- motion, and the State successfully tried Owens for felony murder. 5 Owens appealed the conviction to the OCCA, again contending that the Double Jeopardy Clause should have been a bar to his retrial. Owens made two double-jeopardy arguments to the OCCA. He first argued that because greater and lesser included offenses are the “same offense” for purposes of double jeopardy, the acquittal on the lesser included offense—the robbery of Javier—terminated jeopardy not only as to that charge, but also on the greater included felony murder charge. Retrial on the felony murder charge therefore violated his right not to be in jeopardy twice for the same offense. Owens also argued the retrial was barred by constitutional principles of collateral estoppel. He contended that the jury’s acquittal on the Javier robbery charge necessarily determined an issue of ultimate fact—that he did not commit the robbery—by a valid and final judgment. Because the retrial involved the same parties and the robbery of Javier was an element of the felony murder charge, he argued collateral estoppel should apply. The OCCA rejected both arguments. The court recognized that the jury’s acquittal on the Javier robbery charge terminated jeopardy as to that charge, but the court disagreed that robbery and felony murder were the “same offense” for purposes of double jeopardy. Because they were not the same offense, Owens 5 It is undisputed that the State could not have tried Owens again for the robbery of Javier. The first jury’s acquittal terminated jeopardy on that charge. See Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962). -10- was still subject to continuing jeopardy on the felony murder count. In rejecting the collateral estoppel argument, the court held that the inconsistency between the felony murder conviction and robbery acquittal meant collateral estoppel could not apply because it was impossible to know what the jury decided by its acquittal. 4. Federal Habeas Proceedings Owens reasserted his double jeopardy claims in his federal habeas petition. Although his arguments in his initial petition did not go into any great detail (perhaps due to the inherent limits of the form petition provided to pro se prisoners), his reply to the State’s opposition brief clearly spelled out his double jeopardy arguments. In fact, Owens recited the arguments made by his counsel to the OCCA on his second appeal nearly word for word. The district court denied the petition and a COA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c)(1)(A) (requiring a COA to appeal to this court). On Owens’s application for a COA from this court, we granted a COA, appointed counsel, and ordered supplemental briefing on the following issue: “Did the prosecution of petitioner on felony murder charges in the second trial, following his acquittal of the underlying felony in the first trial, violate any aspect of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States (specifically including the Double Jeopardy Clause’s collateral estoppel component).” Owens v. Addison, No. 13-5066 (10th Cir. Oct. 8, 2013) (order granting COA). -11-