Opinion ID: 159763
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Michael Youngpeter

Text: Youngpeter is the only defendant presently before us who filed his § 2255 motion in the district court before the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) took effect. His appeal, however, postdates AEDPA. Under United States v. Kunzman , 125 F.3d 1363, 1364 n.2 (10th Cir. 1997) , this court does not require COA in these circumstances for appeals arising in either §§ 2254 or 2255 proceedings. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Slack v. McDaniel , 120 S. Ct. 1595, 1600 (2000), however, affects Kunzman and, in turn, Youngpeter. In Slack , the Supreme Court held that a petitioner in a state habeas proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 must now obtain a certificate of appealability if his appeal is filed after AEDPA’s effective date, despite the fact that the petition was filed in district court prior to AEDPA. See id. at 1600, 1601. Although the Supreme Court’s decision addresses a § 2254 habeas petition, and not a § 2255 motion, the Court construed AEDPA’s § 2253 COA requirement in general terms. See id. at 1602-03. That section applies to both §§ 2255 and 2254 proceedings. -7- Based on the Supreme Court’s superseding decision in Slack –which contradicts this court’s holding in Kunzman –we do not apply Kunzman . See In re Smith , 10 F.3d 723, 724 (10th Cir. 1993) (“We are bound by the precedent of prior panels absent an en banc reconsideration or a superseding contrary decision by the Supreme Court.”). A defendant, like Youngpeter, who files his § 2255 motion in district court before AEDPA’s effective date, but files his appeal of the district court’s denial of that motion in this court after AEDPA’s effective date, must now obtain COA. Accordingly, we construe Youngpeter’s request for CPC as a request for COA. 2 We note, however, that because Youngpeter’s motion does not merit our issuance of COA, we would have reached the same result if we had conducted a full merits review of his § 2255 motion . A jury convicted Youngpeter in September 1991 of conspiracy to manufacture, possess, and sell methamphetamine. He was sentenced to 188 months’ imprisonment. He filed his § 2255 motion in 1994 alleging, among other things, that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to make the government prove at sentencing the specific type of methamphetamine involved in 2 We further note that Youngpeter erroneously moved for CPC, which was never required of a § 2255 movant, but rather only of a pre-AEDPA § 2254 petitioner. See United States v. Lopez , 100 F.3d 113, 117 n.3 (10th Cir. 1996). Youngpeter’s request for CPC was perhaps precipitated by our earlier decision in his case wherein we erred procedurally by granting CPC. See Youngpeter , 1998 WL 171838, at . Because of the Supreme Court’s decision in Slack requiring COA, however, Youngpeter’s request for CPC was prescient. -8- the conspiracy and failed to conduct a chemical analysis of the methamphetamine. We affirmed the district court’s denial of that motion, based on the district court’s factual finding that there was no way to conduct a chemical analysis because the government did not recover any methamphetamine. See United States v. Youngpeter , No. 95-5179, 1996 WL 221386, at  (10th Cir. May 2, 1996). We also held that Youngpeter failed to show that he was prejudiced by his attorney’s alleged incompetence, again noting that without samples, drug tests could not be performed. See id. at . Subsequently, based on our intervening decision in Robert Glover , 97 F.3d 1345, we recalled the mandate in Youngpeter’s case, and remanded, directing to the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing. See Youngpeter , 1998 WL 171838, at . Shortly after our remand, the district court held an evidentiary hearing on the same issue as to yet another of the defendants involved in the conspiracy, James Barnes, apropos to our remand of Barnes’s § 2255 motion. See id. The evidence at Barnes’s hearing established that the methamphetamine was a combination of d- and l-methamphetamine. See id. at . Instead of holding a separate hearing on remand of Youngpeter’s § 2255 motion, the district court again denied the motion, applying the outcome of Barnes’s hearing. See id. We found that denial deprived Youngpeter “of both his right to be present and his -9- right to be represented during this hearing.” See id. at . Thereafter, the district court held the evidentiary hearing at issue in these companioned appeals. Youngpeter now argues that the government’s evidence at the February 23, 1999 hearing is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. In particular, he argues that, because the district court accepted the government’s representations that it did not recover any methamphetamine from the scene, and that it did not perform any drug tests, the district court made a “finding of ultimate fact.” Appellant’s Br. (Youngpeter) at 7. Hence, he asserts that “[b]ased on the doctrine of collateral estoppel the court cannot allow any party to reverse field and suddenly argue facts directly contradicting matters previously presented by that same party.” Id. at 8. Youngpeter is correct that “when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit. Ashe v. Swenson , 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970). In order to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel, this court requires that: (1) the issue previously decided is identical with the one presented in the action in question, (2) the prior action has been finally adjudicated on the merits, (3) the party against whom the doctrine is invoked was a party, or in privity with a party, to the prior adjudication, and (4) the party against whom the doctrine is raised had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action. Dodge v. Cotter Corp. , 203 F.3d 1190, 1198 (10th Cir. 2000). -10- Youngpeter’s characterization of the district court’s statement that the government did not recover any drugs, nor perform any chemical analyses, as a finding of “ultimate fact,” is not correct. An ultimate fact is “a factual conclusion essential to the result.” Flavor Corp. of Am. v. Kemin Indus. Inc. , 493 F.2d 275, 280 n.5 (8th Cir. 1974) (distilling Judge Learned Hand’s definition of the “ultimate fact” from The Evergreens v. Nunan , 141 F.2d 927, 928 (2d Cir. 1944)); see also Black’s Law Dictionary at 1522 (6th ed. 1990). Here, the district court relied on the government’s stated position. Hence, the government’s recovery of drug samples and testing was neither litigated nor adjudicated–for collateral estoppel purposes–until after the evidentiary hearings held apropos to this court’s various remands. See Dodge , 203 F.3d at 1198 Admittedly, there is something compelling about Youngpeter’s argument. Its draw is based on the government’s eight-year stance denying the existence of drug samples and chemical analyses until the eve of the first such evidentiary hearing. This court has commented negatively on the government’s last minute fortuitous discovery. See Youngpeter , 1998 WL 171838, at  (noting as questionable the “trustworthiness of records” that “vanished for eight years” and “magically reappeared in the nick of time”). The district court’s recitation of the government’s earlier position, however, does not implicate the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Rather, Youngpeter’s argument falls within the doctrine of -11- judicial estoppel. Specifically, he seeks to estop the government from presenting evidence in the context of a § 2255 hearing, based on its proffer in earlier proceedings that the evidence did not exist. See Rascon v. U S West Communications, Inc. , 143 F.3d 1324, 1330 (10th Cir. 1998) (“Judicial estoppel bars a party from adopting inconsistent positions in the same or related litigation.” (quotation omitted)). This circuit has expressly rejected the doctrine of judicial estoppel. See id. The district court, after numerous hearings, found that the government met its burden to show d-methamphetamine. In doing so, it necessarily credited the testimony of both the DEA agent who collected the samples and the DEA forensic chemist who tested the samples. In its decision, the district court stated that, although unexplained, the government’s long delay did not prejudice defendants nor benefit the government. The district court did not err in allowing the forensic evidence and testimony concerning the type of methamphetamine underlying the conspiracy. Indeed, the district court fulfilled our specific mandate, directing it to hold an evidentiary hearing in order to determine the methamphetamine type. As this court stated earlier, “[i]f the government can establish that the substance was in fact d-methamphetamine, [defendants] obviously would not be entitled to resentencing.” Robert Glover , 97 F.3d at 1350 (footnote omitted). -12- Accordingly, we deny Youngpeter’s request for COA and dismiss his appeal.