Opinion ID: 1948183
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: exclusion of the defendant from the proceedings

Text: When the grand jury was summoned, the state requested that the defendant not be allowed to attend the proceedings because he was an experienced criminal defense attorney. The court granted the request, and the defendant was given no notice of the investigation until the indictment was returned. The defendant contends that he had a right to attend the taking of evidence, and that the denial of this alleged right invalidates the indictment. We disagree. There is no doubt that from the earliest times an accused has generally been allowed to attend the grand jury proceedings and to cross-examine witnesses. See, e.g., State v. Menillo, supra, 274-75; State v. Wolcott, 21 Conn. 272, 279 (1851); Lung's case, 1 Conn. 428 (1815). Although in State v. Stallings, supra, 282, we mistakenly referred to this practice as a right, the correct rule is stated in State v. Hamlin, 47 Conn. 95,104-105 (1879): It was contended upon the argument in behalf of that defendant that under the rule adopted by the judges of the Supreme Court of Errors in Lung's case, 1 Conn. [428], he had the right to be present before the grand jury while the witnesses produced by the State were under examination by that body, and to put to those witnesses any proper questions. But the rule referred to was intended to confer no such right. It is directory merely. Its purpose was to secure uniformity in the proceedings of grand juries throughout the state so far as it might be done without imposing limitations or restrictions upon the discretionary powers of the court. Before the adoption of the rule it had been the practice of the court to grant to persons accused of capital crimes, if in custody of the sheriff of the county in which the crimes were committed, the privilege of going before the grand jury while their cases were under investigation and interrogating the witnesses produced by the State against them. But it always rested in the discretion of the court to grant the privilege or to deny it; and the rule in Lung's case was not intended to interfere with the exercise of that discretion. The grand jury had, therefore, no authority, unless directed by the court, to cause the defendant Davis to come before them. (Emphasis added.) More recently, in State v. Menillo, supra, we clearly indicated that the practice of allowing the defendant to attend the grand jury proceedings was grounded upon sound judicial discretion which could be exercised to exclude the defendant for good cause. We there stated where [the accused] is in custody within this state or his whereabouts are either known to the state or readily ascertainable, we think that, in the absence of good cause or reason to the contrary, he should be given the usual opportunity, although of course he cannot be compelled, to be present in the grand jury room during the examination of the state's witnesses against him. (Emphasis added.) State v. Menillo, supra, 278. In Menillo the defendant was excluded because of threats made to witnesses who were expected to testify before the grand jury. This did not invalidate the grand jury proceedings, although it was a departure from the usual Connecticut practice. Id. [5] We find that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the defendant from the grand jury proceedings merely because he is an attorney. The defendant, however, has failed to show that he was harmed by this abuse of discretion. Therefore, although the court's action was wrong, it does not constitute reversible error.