Opinion ID: 1287078
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: challenges to state's rebuttal witness's testimony

Text: Copeland argues that he was denied his right to confront witnesses and present a defense as provided by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments and Const. art. I, § 22 (amend. 10) and his due process right to a fair trial when the trial court permitted State rebuttal witness Berch Henry to testify. Henry was called as a rebuttal witness to rebut defense witnesses' testimony regarding interpretation of autorads and use of the counting rule. He also testified that he examined his own database to see if there were any matches with Copeland's profile. Defense counsel objected on the ground he had not been given access to Henry's database and he had not been told Henry would be a witness. The objection was overruled. Henry testified there were no matches. Defense counsel cross-examined Henry, eliciting that Henry had not released his data for peer review. The next day defense counsel argued he should be allowed to call a surrebuttal witness. The trial court required an offer of proof. Defense counsel stated his proposed witness would testify that he was aware of the database but that no one had access to it, that the data had not been subjected to peer review, and that tests done under the FBI protocol were inconclusive. The trial court disallowed the testimony because the proposed witness had no knowledge of the database and could only provide general testimony about the FBI and other witnesses who had testified to these matters. The question of admissibility on rebuttal is largely within the discretion of the trial court. State v. Swan, 114 Wash.2d 613, 653, 790 P.2d 610 (1990) (quoting State v. White, 74 Wash.2d 386, 394-95, 444 P.2d 661 (1968)), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1046, 111 S.Ct. 752, 112 L.Ed.2d 772 (1991). Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting Henry to testify about matters raised by the defense. A defense witness advocated use of the counting rule and testified about it. Henry testified to results using the counting rule and his database. Other testimony by Henry was clearly in response to new matters. Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in concluding that the proposed surrebuttal witness would be unable to rebut the new matters raised by Henry's testimony. Further, although Copeland argues that he was unable to file a motion for court-ordered access to the database, he failed to request a continuance to seek such a court order. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the proposed testimony. Copeland claims that Henry was known to the State months before his testimony, and that the State failed to provide notice that he would be called as a witness. We conclude that Henry was a genuine rebuttal witness whom the State did not need to disclose in advance of trial. Swan, 114 Wash.2d at 654, 790 P.2d 610 (citing White, 74 Wash.2d 386, 444 P.2d 661). Copeland's constitutional challenges are without merit. He was not denied his right to confront Henry, and indeed engaged in extensive cross-examination of him which disclosed the limitations of his database and the fact his raw data was not available for review. He also was not denied the right to present a defense. He was not able to persuade the judge that his surrebuttal witness would provide any testimony which had not already been presented, and the judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to allow a witness to testify who would add nothing. He did not ask for a continuance to pursue the matter further. Copeland also argues that he was denied a fair trial because Henry testified that he found no match between Copeland's genetic profile and that of 7611 samples in his database, but Copeland did not have access to the database. He argues this testimony was prejudicial because the jury would conclude on this basis and other tainted evidence in the case that Copeland committed the crime. We disagree. Copeland's counsel's cross-examination revealed possible limitations in use of the database. Moreover, we have held that probability estimates based on use of the product rule are admissible. In light of probability estimates in the millions, we fail to see how a 1 in 7611 probability of a random match in the population could have been prejudicial.