Opinion ID: 1827509
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the circuit court erred in construing sdcl 32-23-11.1.

Text: Appellants argue that the language of SDCL 32-23-11.1 is unambiguous. They argue that the words pleads guilty contained within the statute mean that they were merely required to tender a guilty plea to avoid revocation under SDCL 32-23-11. Thus, appellants conclude that whether the plea was accepted by the magistrate court is irrelevant and immaterial. We disagree. SDCL 32-23-11.1 provides: A person's license to drive is not subject to revocation as provided in § 32-23-11 if he pleads guilty to violating § 32-23-1 prior to the departmental hearing, or, if a hearing is not requested, prior to a revocation order being issued. (Emphasis added.) SDCL 2-14-12 provides that our code's provisions and all proceedings under it are to be liberally construed with a view to effect its objects and to promote justice. Also, [a] statute must be construed according to its manifest intent [and] [s]uch intent must be derived from the statute as a whole, as well as other enactments relating to the same subject. Simpson v. Tobin, 367 N.W.2d 757, 763 (S.D.1985). In In re Fischer, 395 N.W.2d 598 (S.D.1986), we stated that [a]mbiguity is a condition of construction, and may exist where the literal meaning of a statute leads to an absurd or unreasonable conclusion.' Fischer at 600 quoting Matter of Sales Tax Refund Applications, 298 N.W.2d 799, 803 (S.D. 1980). Furthermore, [s]tatutes should be given a sensible, practical and workable construction, and to such end, the manifest intent of [the] legislature will prevail over literal meaning of words. Fischer, at 600. In State v. Bunnell, 324 N.W.2d 418, 420 (S.D.1982), we stated that the intent and purpose of SDCL 32-23-11.1 was to encourage drivers to plead guilty and accept the consequences of their driving and drinking while preserving their right to refuse to submit to a chemical test. The obvious intention behind the implied consent law is to achieve the objective of `a fair, efficient, and accurate system of [the] detection and prevention of drunken driving.' Peterson v. State, 261 N.W.2d 405, 408 (S.D.1977) (citations omitted). In sum, one goal of the statute is to promote public safety. Peterson, supra citing Beare v. Smith, 82 S.D. 20, 25, 140 N.W.2d 603, 606 (1966). [2] To adopt appellants' argument that the mere act of pleading guilty meets the requirements of SDCL 32-23-11.1 would not only violate the intent of the implied consent statutes, but also produce an absurd result. We agree with State that, should appellants' interpretation be adopted, those drivers who are appropriately asked to submit to chemical analysis of their blood, breath or urine would be provided a sure method of avoiding the consequences of a refusal. Appellants seem to further argue that the statute (SDCL 32-23-11.1) must afford one innocent of DUI the same benefits as one who is guilty and since this statute does not, there is a violation of what they call equal treatment. They specifically disclaim any constitutional equal protection infirmities. First, no authority is cited to support this proposition and thus the issue could be deemed waived. State v. Jones, 416 N.W.2d 875 (S.D.1987); State v. Banks, 387 N.W.2d 19 (S.D.1986). Secondly, we find no merit in their position.