Opinion ID: 1894732
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Admissibility of the Testimony of Mike Rensch and Joe Kussela

Text: From the transcript of the motion hearing, it appears that the trial court had the benefit of both the Sprynczynatyk and Hurd decisions. Consequently, the trial court attempted to discern what procedural safeguards had been employed. The trial court made oral findings of fact that: the hypnotist (Dr. Hilland) was a psychologist qualified in the area of hypnosis in the particular case and that he was independent of the prosecution and law enforcement; that the actual hypnotic sessions were recorded on audiotape and that Dr. Hilland conducted pre-hypnotic interviews with Kussela and Rensch to determine their pre-hypnotic recall of the events. Even though the trial court did not specify any noncompliance with any safeguards, it restricted the testimony of the witnesses to the contents of the pre-hypnotic statements given to the police and Dr. Hilland. Based upon the procedural safeguards approach of the Eighth Circuit, which we approve, the trial court's substantial compliance therewith and its subsequent order restricting the testimony to that corroborated by pre-hypnotic statements, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony of Rensch and Kussela. 3. AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING Adams contends that the imposition of punishment for both premeditated murder and aggravated kidnapping is a violation of constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy. His double jeopardy claim is that the proof of death used to substantiate aggravated kidnapping could not be what the legislature intended in requiring proof of gross permanent physical injury. SDCL 22-19-1. He argues that if the gross permanent physical injury were death, then aggravated kidnapping would be a mere duplication of felony murder (SDCL 22-16-4). The grand jury indictment charged Adams with four offenses: premeditated murder in violation of SDCL 22-16-4; felony murder in violation of SDCL 22-16-4; robbery in the first-degree in violation of SDCL 22-30-1 and 22-30-6; and kidnapping result[ing] in the victim receiving gross permanent physical injury and death in violation of SDCL 22-19-1. A jury returned convictions on the charges of premeditated murder, robbery, and kidnapping. The United States Supreme Court has held that the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy consists of three separate guarantees. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2076, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). The third guarantee protects against multiple punishments for the same offense. The rule for determining whether two separate statutory offenses providing separate punishment are actually the same offense was stated in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). [W]here the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not. 284 U.S. at 304, 52 S.Ct. at 182. The Court in Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 100 S.Ct. 2260, 65 L.Ed.2d 228 (1980), further explained: We recognized that the Blockburger test focuses on the proof necessary to prove the statutory elements of each offense, rather than on the actual evidence to be presented at trial. Thus we stated that if `each statute requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not,' [citation omitted], the offenses are not the same under the Blockburger test. [Citations omitted.] (emphasis original) 447 U.S. at 416, 100 S.Ct. at 2265. Adams was convicted of premeditated murder [10] under SDCL 22-16-4 which requires proof of: 1) homicide (the killing of one human being by another SDCL 22-16-1); 2) with the premeditated design to effect the death of the person killed or of any other human being; and 3) without authority of law. Under SDCL 22-19-1 kidnapping is: 22-19-1. Kidnapping.... Any person who shall seize, confine, ... abduct or carry away any person and hold or detain such person, ... for any of the following reasons: . . . . . (2) To facilitate the commission of any felony or flight thereafter; (3) To inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim ...; . . . . . is guilty of kidnapping. Kidnapping is a Class 1 felony, except if the person has inflicted a gross permanent physical injury on the victim, in which case it is a Class A felony. (emphassis added) A comparison of these two statutory provisions clearly demonstrates that each statute requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not. Adams misapprehends the double jeopardy test in Blockburger, supra . We must review the statutory provisions to determine if the two charges are essentially the same offense, not the evidence presented at trial. The issue of whether the legislature meant death when they established gross permanent physical injury is not presented to this court under Adams' argument on appeal. Although Adams attempts to put this argument before the court in his double jeopardy issue, his actual complaint is more closely related to sufficiency of the evidence or interpretation of the phrase gross permanent physical injury. The trial court appears to have interpreted this phrase to include death. However, this indictment required proof of gross permanent physical injury and death. This was conjunctive, not disjunctive, and reference to death can be considered surplusage. Evidence was also presented by one of the State's experts that Jensen's jaw was fractured in two places, his windpipe was fractured, his eyes blackened, he sustained other blows to his head, and knife wounds from stabbing. This evidence appears sufficient to prove gross permanent physical injury and, as noted above, is more closely related to sufficiency of the evidence to convicta question not presented in this appeal. We affirm.