Opinion ID: 616880
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Arguable Ambiguity

Text: Strohm also argues that, even if not fundamentally ambiguous, the question regarding her involvement in the Production Audio sale was arguably ambiguous because (1) she understood her connection to the Production Audio sale as one of awareness, not participation, (2) the government provided no evidence regarding what the questions meant to her, and (3) the government failed to present evidence of the preliminary injunction hearing's context. A claim that a question was arguably ambiguous is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, which we review de novo. Farmer, 137 F.3d at 1269. When assessing sufficiency, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and consider whether a reasonable jury could have found all elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Hooks, 551 F.3d 1205, 1212 (10th Cir.2009). We will reverse a conviction on sufficiency grounds only if no reasonable jury could have reached the challenged verdict. Id. A question is arguably ambiguous where more than one reasonable interpretation of a question exists. But even so, a witness can still intend, and in fact give, a response that was literally false. Richardson, 421 F.3d at 33. The meaning of a prosecutor's question and the truthfulness of a defendant's answer are best left to the jury. Farmer, 137 F.3d at 1269. To mitigate the ambiguity, the government must present evidence of the examiner's interpretation of the question as well as what the defendant understood it to mean. See United States v. Sainz, 772 F.2d 559, 562 (9th Cir.1985) (Our central task is to determine whether the jury could conclude . . . that the defendant understood the question as did the government and that, so understood, the defendant's answer was false.) (quotation omitted). In Farmer, we also addressed whether the questionHave you talked to Mr. McMahon, the Defendant about your testimony here today?was arguably ambiguous. 137 F.3d at 1270. We concluded the question was arguably ambiguous because the defendant could reasonably have believed the prosecutor to ask whether she had spoken with McMahon on the day of his pretrial hearing, rather than whether she had ever spoken with McMahon about the substance of her testimony that day. Id. That is, the defendant could have given a truthful answer to the question as she understood it. In subsequent testimony, the defendant admitted speaking with McMahon in the days prior, but not on the day of the hearing, which supported defendant's understanding that the question asked whether she had spoken to McMahon on the day of the pretrial hearing. The prosecutor did not follow up to clarify whether the defendant's answer referred to when she spoke with McMahon or whether she had discussed the substance of her testimony with McMahon. In reversing the conviction, we found the prosecutor failed to pin her down with specific questions and determine exactly what the defendant meant by her testimony. Id. The government simply did not offer any evidence to suggest what the question meant to [the] Defendant and that it was [o]nly by surmise and conjecture could the jury conclude the defendant understood the question as the prosecutor did. Id. Accordingly, we held there was insufficient evidence to support the defendant's conviction under § 1623(a). As applied here, we review the sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether a rational jury could find Strohm's testimony was knowingly false. [4] Strohm contends a reasonable interpretation of the term involved refers to participation in the Production Audio sale: soliciting, negotiating, or concluding the sale. She argues her relation to the sale was one of awareness, not participation, and claims this is how she understood the question. Thus, in her understanding, because involvement required participation, and she was aware but did not participate in the sale, she was not involved and her testimony was not false. We question this understanding that involvement is limited to participation. But we need not analyze the issue because, even under Strohm's interpretation that involvement denotes participation, there was sufficient evidence for a rational jury to conclude Strohm participated in the Production Audio sale. The Production Audio sale was finalized on June 29, 2002, just one day before the end of ClearOne's fiscal year. Strohm was calculating whether ClearOne would reach its revenue projections and realized she made an error. To cover the shortfall and meet the revenue projections, ClearOne had to increase the prices on products they were shipping. Strohm did just that, and increased the price on the Production Audio sale to a level higher than it normally paid. A jury could reasonably conclude that, when Strohm unilaterally increased the price of the Production Audio sale, she was both involved and participated in the sale. She further claims she was not involved in the solicitation, negotiation, or conclusion of the Production Audio sale. But the fact is, no one solicited, negotiated, or concluded an agreement for the sale. The product was invoiced and shipped without consulting Production Audio. [5] We find there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Strohm knowingly made a false statement when she testified she was not involved in the Production Audio sale. Strohm also argues the government failed to provide the proper context for her testimony at the preliminary injunction hearing. Only one page of Strohm's testimony was admitted, and she contends the government only provided conclusory testimony from an SEC attorney regarding the hearing. [6] Though the jury only received one page of her testimony, there was sufficient context to assess Strohm's testimony. The SEC attorney testified and explained to the jury why the SEC sought a preliminary injunction and its investigation into ClearOne's revenue recognition practices. Strohm's counsel's question refers to the SEC's allegations regarding the sale of ClearOne product to Production Audio. Aple. Supp.App., Vol. V at 1767. And Strohm even corrected her counsel regarding the year of the sale, demonstrating she knew precisely what he was asking about. There was sufficient context for the jury to assess how Strohm understood the question and whether her response was truthful when she denied involvement in the Production Audio sale.