Opinion ID: 1193581
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Disclosure of testifying witness's address.

Text: Appellant attempted to ascertain the home address of Officer Huggins, the undercover officer who testified at trial. The proffered motive for the request was to enable appellant to investigate the witness's background for possible impeachment. The court inquired whether Brown had an offer of proof to indicate why the officer's home address was necessary and when the defense stated it had no offer, the court refused to permit disclosure. In Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 1068, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965), the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him is a fundamental right ... made obligatory on the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. We query whether appellant was denied that right. Brown cites Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 88 S.Ct. 748, 19 L.Ed.2d 956 (1968) and Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 51 S.Ct. 218, 75 L.Ed. 624 (1931), for the proposition that a defendant is entitled to know the address of a prosecution witness. However, we interpret Smith and Alford as protecting an accused's right to a meaningful cross-examination, not as establishing a per se requirement of disclosure. The court in United States v. Harris, 501 F.2d 1, 9 (9th Cir.1974), recognized that in some instances the trial court could legitimately permit the witness not to disclose his residence. . If the answer may subject the witness to harassment, humiliation, or danger, then nondisclosure of the witness' home address may be justifiable. There is ample authority holding that an undercover law enforcement officer need not divulge his residence. United States v. Alston, 460 F.2d 48 (5th Cir.1972); People v. Pleasant, 69 Mich. App. 322, 244 N.W.2d 464 (1976). In Smith, supra, a narcotics case, a prosecution informer refused to reveal both his home address and true name. Confronted with not only this absence of information, but further the fact that the witness was unemployed, the defense was denied the right to reasonably explore the witness's circumstances for purposes of discrediting the testimony in chief. There, as here, the witness was essential to the prosecution's case. Alford, supra, bears a close similarity to Smith, magnified by the fact that there the witness in question might himself have been incarcerated at the time of trial. In those cases, the right of confrontation guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment was significantly impaired. In the instant case, the witness testified that he was an undercover police officer, working as such at the time of trial, gave his full name and city of residence, gave his employment history in law enforcement in reasonable detail, and fully described his involvement in Operation Switch. The only element of his status that Officer Huggins did not disclose was his actual home address. Further, he was extensively cross-examined by appellant. Finally, sufficient reason was given for nondisclosure, thereby allowing the trial judge to make an informed ruling. See, Alston, supra . Here, the appellant had adequate pre-trial opportunity to investigate the undercover officer's background, including his employment record, and failed to do so. The court in Alston, supra, stated that [i]t is significant here that [the witness] is an agent, not an informer. In almost every other case of this ilk, the witness whose address is requested is merely an informer, one who is under absolutely no obligation to provide information and who is subject to no official supervision... . [T]here appears to be less need to require a home address for an identified agent ... than there might be for a witness whose motive or background might be subject to considerably less supervision and correspondingly greater doubt. 460 F.2d at 53. Appellant's right of confrontation was not violated.