Opinion ID: 2092747
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Testimony Regarding Myers' Occupation

Text: In an effort to rebut defendant's testimony that he was unable to eat popcorn, plaintiff presented an evidence deposition of Eva Myers, who had accompanied defendant to Acapulco in 1982 as O'Brien's guest. Myers was unavailable for trial because she was living in Jamaica. In her evidence deposition, Myers testified that defendant loved popcorn and had eaten it daily during the 1982 trip. At trial, counsel for codefendant Donald Fett, who was subsequently dismissed from the case, asked defendant if he knew the occupation of Myers. Defendant testified, over plaintiff's objection, that Myers was a call girl, a prostitute. Plaintiff objected solely on hearsay grounds, arguing that defendant only knew that Myers was a prostitute because O'Brien had told him so. The appellate court held that the testimony regarding Myers' occupation was improperly admitted because Myers was never asked about her occupation during the evidence deposition. Defendant contends that plaintiff waived this argument since plaintiff only objected on hearsay grounds at trial. While waiver may have occurred, we address this issue because it may arise on remand. A witness' general credibility may be attacked by cross-examining that witness regarding a disreputable occupation. ( People v. Winchester (1933), 352 Ill. 237, 244, 185 N.E. 580 (allowing cross-examination regarding witness' operation of a house of prostitution).) However, the use of extrinsic evidence, i.e., evidence other than the witness' testimony, to impeach is more restricted. Where the question concerns a collateral matter, the cross-examiner must accept the answer given by the witness during cross-examination. ( People v. Collins (1985), 106 Ill.2d 237, 269, 87 Ill.Dec. 910, 478 N.E.2d 267; M. Graham, Cleary & Graham's Handbook of Illinois Evidence § 607.2 (5th ed. 1990).) A matter is collateral if it is not relevant to a material issue of the case. Excluding collateral evidence prevents the jury from becoming distracted from the main issues. Tzystuck v. Chicago Transit Authority (1988), 124 Ill.2d 226, 242, 124 Ill.Dec. 544, 529 N.E.2d 525. In the instant case, extrinsic evidence regarding the occupation of Myers was improperly admitted because it was collateral to the main issuewhether defendant spilled the popcorn. Thus, defendant could properly inquire of Myers' occupation only during cross-examination of Myers. Defendant, however, failed to cross-examine Myers during her evidence deposition. Therefore, defendant cannot present Myers' alleged disreputable occupation to the jury on remand if Myers is again unavailable at trial and her testimony is presented through the evidence deposition.