Opinion ID: 1251758
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Weight of Mixture Versus Purity of Cocaine; Sufficiency of Evidence to Support Possession of More Than 500 Grams of Cocaine.

Text: Maghee's final contention presents a question of statutory interpretation. He contends that the statutory scheme under which he was charged required the State to prove he possessed more than 500 grams of pure cocaine. It was not enough to prove he possessed a mixture exceeding 500 grams that contained an unknown amount of pure cocaine. Because the evidence falls short of showing the mixture contained more than 500 grams of pure cocaine, Maghee also contends the evidence was insufficient to establish that he possessed more than 500 grams of cocaine.
1. Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to ... possess with the intent to . . . deliver . . . a controlled substance . . . or conspire with one or more other persons to . . . possess with the intent to ... deliver . . . a controlled substance . . . . .... b. Violation of this subsection with respect to the following controlled substances... is a class B felony, and in addition to the provisions of section 902.9, subsection 1 [confinement for no more than twenty-five years], shall be punished by a fine of not less than five thousand dollars, nor more than one hundred thousand dollars: .... (2) More than five hundred grams but not more than five kilograms of any of the following: (a) Coca leaves, except coca leaves and extracts of coca leaves from which cocaine, ecgonine, and derivatives of ecgonine or their salts have been removed. (b) Cocaine, its salts, optical and geometric isomers, and salts of isomers. (c) Ecgonine, its derivative, their salts, isomers, and salts of isomers. (d) Any compound, mixture, or preparation which contains any quantity of any of the substances referred to in subparagraph subdivisions (a) through (c). Iowa Code § 124.401(1)( b )(2). The State argues the italicized language in subsection (d) is unambiguous: The amount of the controlled substance within the mixture is irrelevant; rather, it is the weight of the mixture that establishes the penalty, without regard to purity. Thus, for example, a person possessing a mixture of 500 grams of baking soda and one gram of cocaine is guilty of a Class B felony. Not so, contends Maghee. Subdivision (d) simply means that the State must prove in excess of 500 grams of a combination of coca leaves and cocaine. He gives an example: A person could be convicted of possession with intent to deliver in excess of 500 grams where the substance consisted of 400 grams of coca leaves and 150 grams of cocaine. Thus, according to Maghee, subdivision (d) merely recognizes the distinction between types of coca-cocaine substances. Maghee attempts to back up his argument by pointing out that the more serious offense (class B felony carrying a 50-year sentence) requires the State to prove more than five kilograms of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of any cocaine. Iowa Code § 124.401(1)( a )(2) (emphasis added). The legislature omitted the mixture with detectable amount language in the provision under which Maghee was convicted. Maghee argues this omission is significant: The legislature intended the purity of the controlled substance or substances in the mixture should dictate the penalty, not the weight of the mixture. Although Maghee presents an intriguing argument, it is of no help to him here. Maghee did not preserve the issue for our review in his motion for judgment of acquittal. See State v. Crone, 545 N.W.2d 267, 270 (Iowa 1996) (holding defendant failed to preserve argument that evidence regarding threat or anything of value elements of extortion charge was insufficient to support conviction for extortion by not mentioning those elements in motion for judgment of acquittal). Again we turn our attention to Maghee's motion for judgment of acquittal: [As to all counts], I submit that in each of those, there's the concept that they've got to have a measurable amount of cocaine. They don't have it.... There's nothing in the record to establish what the purity of that cocaine was that was taken from the earlier cases. When they say 33 grams of cocaine, we don't know if that's 33 grams of cocaine or if it's actually one gram of cocaine. We don't know the purity of it, whether it's zero percent purity or 100 percent purity at 33 grams.... We don't know if that cocaine they used initially was 100 percent pure or one-thousandth of a percent pure. And where Kelly Evans says you've got to have a detectable amount and the state laboratory said something in excess of five grams, their rough calculation, they say, We took 33 grams. We mixed it with enough stuff to make a total of 3000 grams. Then we divided it into three different bricks. Therefore we've got 11 grams in each is an assumption on their part.... The record is devoid of there being measurable cocaine in each of the three kilogram bricks that they say exists. That it was incumbent upon the State to bring in expert testimony on the issue of there being a detectable amount of cocaine in each of the bricks, that their assumption is just thatan assumption, that it fails because there is no determination of the purity of the cocaine originally used to mix with other matters to reach what they say is 3000 grams .... So as a matter of law, because they cannot prove a detectable amountthat there was cocaine therethat adds to the propositions of failure to prove as a matter of law on the issue of possession of a controlled substance, cocaine, with the intent to deliver and failure to possess a tax stamp in Count III. Maghee was arguing that the State had to prove a detectable amount of cocaine in each brick of the mixture. This is opposite from what he is arguing now: The statute in question required the State to prove there was more than 500 grams of pure cocaine in the mixture. To support his argument to the district court, Maghee was merely asserting that the State had failed to prove the purity of the cocaine taken from earlier cases. We are at a loss as to the significance of this assertion, unless Maghee was arguing there was no evidence of any cocaine in each brick of the mixture sufficient to constitute a detectable amount. In any event, the State and Maghee tried the case on the theory that the State had to prove there was a detectable amount of cocaine in each brick of the 3000 plus grams of mixture. The State produced substantial evidence of that fact. Officer Evans testified that he mixed 33 grams of cocaine taken from earlier cases with powdered sugar and flour to produce a 3000 plus gram mixture containing cocaine. Although the chemist could not determine the purity of the cocaine used in the mixture, he did testify that he found cocaine to be present in each of the three bricks of cocaine. The chemist went into great detail explaining the testing he did to make that determination. The testimony of both witnesses provided substantial evidence that there was a detectable amount of cocaine in each of the three bricks of the mixture. B. Possession of more than 500 grams of cocaine. As mentioned, the parties tried the case on the theory that the State had to prove a detectable amount of cocaine in each brick of the mixture. Thus, under this theory, the State was not required to prove Maghee possessed more than 500 grams of pure cocaine as Maghee contends. Rather, the State had only to prove that Maghee possessed three bricks of mixture each containing a detectable amount of cocaine. Substantial evidence of this fact flowed from the testimony of officer Evans and the state chemist.