Opinion ID: 2086340
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Inherent Tension Between Independence and Accountability

Text: Inherent in the Act 312 scheme, as well as such delegation schemes in general, is the tension, if not apparent dichotomy, between the act's dual objective of affording arbitrators sufficient decisional independence to resolve complex disputes on the one hand, and, on the other, maintaining public responsibility and accountability of those arbitrators. [59] Indeed, since the act specifically seeks to speedily resolve complex contractual impasses in the dynamic critical-service public labor sector, this tension is especially and necessarily enhanced by the scheme's need to allow flexibility in the resolution of those disputes. However, we find that these inevitable tensions have been adequately balanced in view of the act's provision for standards, the extremely public atmosphere in which the Act 312 mechanism operates, and the § 12 provision for judicial review. As we have seen, operational flexibility has been successfully maintained within the context of legislatively prescribed standards both to check unfettered exercise of arbitral authority and to provide the arbitrators with guideposts of decisional consideration which have been deemed significant by the people through their representatives. Although the panel operates with a certain degree of independence in fashioning economic as well as noneconomic awards, its exercise is significantly guided by a well-articulated series of standards for resolving those previously negotiated and sharpened, yet unresolved, matters. This tension between independence and accountability is further alleviated by the extremely public atmosphere in which the chairperson is appointed by MERC and the Act 312 panel operates. Indeed, the context in which the matter proceeds is one of high visibility and profound scrutiny, where publicity is sharply focused on both MERC's selection and the panel's deliberations. Such public attention undoubtedly enhances the accountability of both the appointers and the appointees. Since both bodies are the focal point of great public and political interest during this intense session of activity, any affront to either the legislative mandates or the public will would likely invite immediate and effective reaction. The twin facts that, first, permanent panelists do not serve for a fixed term but are removable at any time at the discretion of the MERC and, second, seek continuing employment in this area of concern, presumably quicken the arbitrator's awareness that statutory guidelines are to be closely heeded, thereby encouraging enhanced accountability. Further balancing the exercise of arbitral independence is the act's § 12 provision for judicial review. See Part V, A, for interdependence of §§ 8 and 9 requirements with § 12. This section resembles the Const 1963, art 6, § 28 provision for review of administrative orders [60] which is more expansive than the restrictive court rule provision for the review of arbitral awards in general, GCR 1963, 769.9(1), which precludes judicial inquiry into the factual merits of an arbitrator's resolution. [61] As such, § 12 significantly incorporates all appropriate bases for review without either permitting expansive de novo litigation as some jurisdictions have provided [62]  which would likely frustrate the binding and expeditious nature of the Act 312 concept  or, as in the case of GCR 1963, 769.9(1), so narrowly restricting the judiciary's basis for review as to arguably shelter such significant arbitral decisions from judicial inquiry. [63] The inclusion of similar provisions in other acts has likewise recommended their wisdom. [64] Because Act 312, as amended, provides standards as reasonably precise as the subject matter requires or permits, Osius, supra, and since we find, as a practical matter, that the scheme exhibits adequate accountability, we find the amended act constitutional.