Opinion ID: 1113193
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: 1971 county fair arrest.

Text: (10) Defendant claims his state and federal rights to due process, a fair trial, and a reliable penalty determination were violated by admission of evidence of his resistance to arrest at the Kern County Fair in 1971. In essence, defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to show violent criminal activity in aggravation (ง 190.3, factor (b) (hereafter factor (b))) because it failed to establish all the elements of a criminal assault. (ง 241, subds. (a), (b).) In defendant's view, Deputy Leavell's testimony about their scuffle was ambiguous, did not indicate that defendant was the aggressor, and suggested a mere struggle to escape without any attempt ... to commit ... violent injury.... (ง 240.) The jury was carefully instructed on the elements of assault stemming from violent resistance to arrest, and we find ample evidence from which it could infer violent criminal activity. If one knows or should know he is being arrested by a peace officer, he has a duty to refrain from forcible resistance. (ง 834a; see also ง 148 [resisting peace officer in exercise of duty is misdemeanor].) The use of violence to overcome reasonable force employed in a lawful arrest is an assault. (See People v. Gonzalez, supra, 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1219.) Leavell testified that he assumed custody of defendant after other officers saw defendant commit an apparent theft and arrested him. According to Leavell, defendant then escaped, but, after a short chase, he caught up with defendant; Leavell's momentum caused both men to fall to the ground; a short fight then occurred, of which Leavell was the winner, and defendant was handcuffed. This evidence readily supports the inference that defendant knew or should have known he was being arrested by a peace officer, responded forcibly to Leavell's reasonable and lawful efforts to subdue him, and thus committed an assault. Since defendant had no privilege of self-defense against Leavell's use of reasonable force, concerns about who was the aggressor (compare People v. Tuilaepa, supra, 4 Cal.4th 569, 587-588; People v. Lucky (1988) 45 Cal.3d 259, 291 [247 Cal. Rptr. 1, 753 P.2d 1052]) are irrelevant. Defendant also contends that evidence about his threats to arresting Officers Leavell and Williams were inadmissible nonstatutory aggravating evidence. (See People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 777-778 [215 Cal. Rptr. 1,700 P.2d 782].) He makes the novel additional contention that the use, in aggravation, of these ineffectual, merely obnoxious utterances violated his state and federal free speech rights. Counsel's failure to object bars these contentions as direct appellate issues. Furthermore, because the threat evidence was admissible, the record does not demonstrate counsel's incompetence. Defendant argues that his menacing statements were not actual crimes involving the threat [of] ... violence (factor (b); see People v. Phillips (1985) 41 Cal.3d 29, 70-72 [222 Cal. Rptr. 127, 711 P.2d 423]) because there was no showing he spoke with intent to prevent his arrest and with the apparent ability to carry out his threats. (See ง 71 [threatening public official].) However, it is well settled that an actual violent crime admissible under factor (b) may be shown in full context. ( People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 757 [244 Cal. Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741].) Even if defendant's threats were not themselves crimes, they occurred in the course of a violent, criminal resistance to arrest (see discussion, ante, p. 916), and they were thus admissible under factor (b) to demonstrate the aggravated nature of defendant's unlawful conduct. (See People v. Tuilaepa, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 587-588.) Nor were defendant's constitutional rights infringed by the evidentiary use of his obnoxious speech for this purpose.