Opinion ID: 807691
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Javell’s Bruton Claim

Text: Although this Court typically reviews a district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion, a district court’s application of the principles promulgated in Bruton and its progeny is reviewed de novo. United States v. Green, 648 F.3d 569, 574 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. McGowan, 590 F.3d 446, 453 (7th Cir. 2009). The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution declares, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted by witnesses against him . . . .” U.S. C ONST. amend. VI. 6 No. 11-3044 To review: in Bruton v. United States, Bruton and his accomplice had been charged with armed postal robbery, and at joint-trial, a postal inspector testified that the accomplice had orally confessed to having committed the crime with Bruton, but the accomplice himself never took the stand. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 124. Both Bruton and the accomplice were convicted. Id. On appeal to the Eighth Circuit, the accomplice’s conviction was set aside because the court ruled the confession had been obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. Id. “However, [the Eighth Circuit] . . . affirmed Bruton’s conviction because the trial judge instructed the jury that although [the accomplice]’s confession was competent evidence against [the accomplice,] it was inadmissible hearsay against [Bruton] and therefore had to be disregarded in determining [Bruton]’s guilt or innocence.” Bruton, 391 U.S. at 124-25. See also, Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232 (1957) (holding that inadmissible hearsay against a defendant could still be entered into evidence as long as the declarant was the co-defendant and the jury was given proper limiting instructions not to consider the statements against the defendant). On retrial, the accomplice was acquitted. Id. at 125-26. On certiorari, the Supreme Court held that “because of the substantial risk that the jury, despite instructions to the contrary, looked to the incriminating extrajudicial statements in determining [Bruton]’s guilt, admission of [the accomplice]’s confession in this joint trial violated petitioner’s right of cross-examination secured by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 126. Twenty-one years later, Richardson v. Marsh refined Bruton. In that case, a defendant and his co-defendant No. 11-3044 7 were charged with murder and assault. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 202 (1987). At trial, the co-defendant did not testify but his confession was admitted into evidence. Richardson, 481 U.S. at 203-04. All references to the defendant and his participation in the crime were redacted from the confession and the jury was in- structed not to consider the co-defendant’s confession with regard to the defendant. Id. However, the de- fendant’s subsequent testimony linked him to the codefendant’s confession and the defendant was convicted. Id. at 205. The defendant’s appeal was denied by the Michigan Court of Appeals, and his writ of habeas corpus was denied by the district court. Id. However, the Sixth Circuit reversed, relying on Bruton, and ruled that an omission or redaction of a reference to the defendant was effectively diminished if forthcoming evidence would ultimately connect the defendant to the non-testifying co-defendant’s “powerfully incriminating” confession. Id. at 205-06 (quoting Marsh v. Richardson, 781 F.2d 1201, 1213 (6th Cir. 1986)). On certiorari, the Supreme Court upheld the admissibility of the co-defendant’s confession and stated, “[t]he Confrontation Clause is not violated by the admission of a non-testifying co-defendant’s confession with a proper limiting instruction when, . . . the confession is redacted to eliminate not only the [defendant]’s name, but any reference to his or her existence.” Richardson, 481 U.S. at 211. In Gray v. Maryland, Gray and Bell were indicted for beating a man to death. Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 188 8 No. 11-3044 (1998). At trial, the prosecution sought to enter Bell’s confession which implicated Gray. Gray, 523 U.S. at 188. The court ordered the confession be redacted and it was subsequently read into evidence during trial and published in written form to the jury. Id. However, the confession’s redactions only went as far as inserting a blank space or the word “deleted” or “deletion” where Gray’s name otherwise would have been. Id. The confession was accompanied by an instruction to the jury that the confession be considered only with respect to Bell, and that it was not to be considered with respect to Gray. Id. at 189. Both Bell and Gray were convicted and Gray appealed. Id. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals set aside Gray’s conviction, ruling that admitting the confession violated Bruton. Id. However, Maryland’s supreme court reinstated the conviction. Id. On certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court found that Bell’s confession contained inferences and implications which were distinguishable from Bruton and Richardson because they directly incriminated Gray, as opposed to incriminating him “only when linked with evidence introduced later at trial.” Id. at 196 (citing Richardson, 481 U.S. at 208 (quotations omitted)). “Moreover,” the Court continued, “the redacted confession with the blank prominent on its face . . . facially incriminates [Gray] . . . and the accusation that the redacted confession makes is more vivid than inferential incrimination, and hence more difficult to thrust out of mind.” Gray, 523 U.S. at 196 (citing Richardson, 481 U.S. at 208-09 (internal quotations omitted)). In other words, so long as it was accompanied by a proper limiting instruction to No. 11-3044 9 the jury and it did not facially incriminate the defendant, the co-defendant’s redacted confession was admissible at trial. Similarly in the recent mortgage-fraud case United States v. Green, the government introduced the confession of a co-defendant with the defendant’s name redacted and replaced with “straw buyer.” United States v. Green, 648 F.3d 569, 573 (7th Cir. 2011). Later, evidence was introduced making it clear to the jury that “straw buyer” was a substitute for the defendant’s name. Green, 648 F.3d at 573. The defendant moved for a mistrial but the district court denied the motion. Id. at 574. On appeal, this Court affirmed the district court’s ruling that the use of “straw buyer” in the redacted confession “was not so obvious a reference to the defendant as to violate Bruton,” and that “[t]aken alone, nothing in the [co-defendant]’s statement . . . suggest[ed] that the [defendant] was the straw buyer.” Id. at 575-76. Despite Javell’s repeated arguments to the contrary, not one of the cases above support his position that the government’s Bruton statement violated his Sixth Amendment rights. Each of the aforementioned cases dealt with redacted confessions which facially incriminated or indirectly implicated the defendant. The fact remains that in Javell’s case, nothing in the government’s Bruton statement was facially incriminating, nor did any part of the statement even reference Javell indirectly, as for instance in Greene, by redacting and replacing his name with a more innocuous phrase. Instead, any reference to Javell or Bell Capital that was not already 10 No. 11-3044 redacted by the government, was redacted by the district court at the Bruton hearing. For example, the government’s original Bruton statement included a sentence which read, “[a]s a Loan Processor, it is Arroyo’s responsibility to take loan applications and other mortgage-related paperwork from the Loan Officers at [redacted] and ensure the paper is in order prior to submitting the paperwork for loan approval.” (Emphasis added.) The district court ordered the word “at” to be redacted because the court thought it ran “the risk of facially calling attention to Bell [Capital],” and the district court knew that such a redaction would prevent a Gray scenario from occurring. The district court made four more similar redactions to the government’s Bruton statement which resulted in a statement that if presented in isolation from other evidence, would prevent a jury from knowing anyone other than Arroyo was involved; after the final redactions were made, there was no indication that Javell or Bell Capital even existed. This poses the question: What if the government had never introduced their Bruton statement or any other evidence of Arroyo’s confession? Could a reasonable juror still have concluded that Javell was guilty of mortgage-based wire fraud? Yes. The government properly introduced a plethora of other evidence against Javell, including recordings of Javell discussing the fraudulent mortgage application and the need for Adham to secure a seasoned bank account. Addi- tionally, the government also presented evidence to No. 11-3044 11 show that after closing on the Everett property, Javell advised the CI and the UC on how best to let the property fall into foreclosure; that failing to make the first few mortgage payments could raise red flags with the FBI, who Javell had heard was investigating such things. The government’s Bruton statement did not violate Bruton or its progeny and the district court was correct to admit it. Javell’s Sixth Amendment rights were not affected. We find no error.