Opinion ID: 2585588
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Applicable Statute of Limitations or Repose

Text: The District argues that regardless of whether this court finds that Dougan's injuries are temporary or permanent, his action is barred by the 15-year statute of limitation of K.S.A. 60-507, which provides: No action shall be maintained for the recovery of real property or for the determination of any adverse claim or interest therein, not provided for in this article, after fifteen (15) years from the time the cause of action accrued. Dougan asserts that statute is inapplicable to the facts of the case. For authority, the District relies on Johnson v. Board of Pratt County Comm'rs, 259 Kan. 305, 315, 913 P.2d 119 (1996), where the court noted that rights may be acquired in an artificial condition of water in the same way that they can be acquired in real estate generally. That statement was a response to the plaintiffs contention that she had obtained rights in the flow of water as it existed before the county altered the flow by building a new bridge. Here, the District is apparently asserting that it has acquired the right to flood Dougan's property because the flooding has existed for more than 15 years. However, the statute is inapplicable to this case because the District has not asserted it obtained a property right in Dougan's land, nor has an inverse condemnation action for taking of land been brought by Dougan against the District. The statute of limitations applicable to tort actions involving the flooding of land caused by the construction of a public improvement is K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4). See Isnard, 260 Kan. at 5. That section provides for a 2-year statute of limitations. As to when the statute begins to run, K.S.A. 60-513(b), a statute of repose, provides: [T]he causes of actions listed in subsection (a) shall not be deemed to have accrued until the act giving rise to the cause of action first causes substantial injury, or, if the fact of injury is not reasonably ascertainable until some time after the initial act, then the period of limitation shall not commence until the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party, but in no event shall an action be commenced more than 10 years beyond the time of the act giving rise to the cause of action. A statute of repose limits the time during which a cause of action can arise and usually runs from an act of a defendant. It abolishes the cause of action after the passage of time even though the cause of action may not yet have accrued. Nida, 253 Kan. at 236. The jury determined Dougan's injuries are temporary. Dougan filed his suit within the 2-year statute of limitations. Dougan's suit is not time barred.