Opinion ID: 60708
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of Prior Copyright Lawsuit

Text: Appellants argue that the district court abused its discretion by allowing trial testimony and argument relating to Eve of Milady’s copyright infringement case against Impression. Appellants moved in limine to preclude evidence of the lawsuit, arguing that accusations of Nick Yeh unlawfully copying Eve of Milady’s designs would have a highly prejudicial effect. The district court denied the motion. Appellants also objected throughout trial to GBA’s references to the lawsuit, but the district court overruled each objection. GBA asserts that the lawsuit evidence was necessary to show the manner in which Emme was formed; i.e., Emme was formed in response to the lawsuit against Impression. Likewise, in its order denying Appellants’ motion for new trial, the district court stated that “[t]he evidence was introduced to explain why and how Emme Bridal came into existence, and was therefore relevant.” (D.E. 127 at 4.) Both Emme and the district court fail to connect the bridge; neither explains why Emme’s formation remained relevant to the discrete issues before the jury: (1) breach of contract against Impression; and (2) ISRA against 5 Impression and Emme. The evidence only remained plausibly relevant to show that Emme arose out of Impression in a manner giving rise to successorship liability thereby making Emme liable under the contract. But this was precisely the argument made by GBA at summary judgment that the district court rejected. GBA provides us with no reason, and we know of none, why the prior lawsuit had any probative value. Nonetheless, while the district court’s allowance of the evidence may have been questionable, it is clear that any prejudice suffered by Impression did not rise to the level requiring reversal. It is well established that “an erroneous evidentiary ruling is a basis for reversal only if the complaining party’s substantial rights were affected.” Proctor v. Fluor Enters., Inc., 494 F.3d 1337, 1352 (11th Cir. 2007); see also Tran v. Toyota Motor Corp., 420 F.3d 1310, 1316 (11th Cir. 2005) (“We will only reverse a district court’s ruling concerning the admissibility of evidence where the appellant can show that the judge abused his broad discretion and that the decision affected the substantial rights of the complaining party.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). To satisfy this standard, Appellants bear “the burden of proving that the error probably had a substantial influence on the jury’s verdict.” Proctor, 494 F.3d at 1352 (internal quotation marks omitted). Appellants refer to five points during the trial where GBA raised the 6 copyright lawsuit. First, GBA stated at opening argument that Eve of Milady claimed, in its copyright infringement case, that Impression “improperly copied Eve of Milady lace patterns” and that Nick Yeh told his sales reps that he was “going to do what he needed to do to preserve Impression,” which led to the formation of Emme for the purpose of manufacturing “not impermissible copies.” (Tr. Vol. 4 at 7.) Second, Gary Brown, on direct examination, testified that: (a) “there was a lawsuit filed against Impression by Eve of Milady for copyright infringement for copying lace patterns on [Eve of Milady] dresses that were declared artwork and copyrighted”; (b) the name “Emme” was created from the “initials of Eve Muscio, who was the designer of Eve of Milady, so it was sort of a way to stick it a little bit”; and (c) Emme was created to “protect Impression” and to keep Emme’s designs from becoming part of the copyright lawsuit. (Tr. Vol. 5 at 110-113.) Third, Nick Yeh, on cross-examination, was asked whether: (a) Eve of Milady claimed that Impression was making copies of Eve of Milady’s dresses (Yeh agreed); (b) as a result of the lawsuit, Impression had to stop making exact copies (Yeh agreed); (c) there was a way to copy the dresses without violating Eve of Milady’s patent rights (Yeh agreed); and (d) the compliant copies ultimately became the Emme product line (Yeh disagreed). (Tr. Vol. 8 at 84-85.) 7 Fourth, Mike Yeh, on cross-examination, was asked several questions relating to the copyright lawsuit. The heart of the exchange was as follows: Question: [Y]ou acknowledged that the dresses that Emme made initially were in fact copies of the Eve of Milady dresses, but compliant – but which didn’t improperly copy the lace designs, correct? Answer: Yes, that’s pretty much standard in the business, that other people mix in with a dress that’s similar to other people, when there’s a hot dress, hot line, everybody does the same thing. It’s a standard of the industry and Mr. Brown also knew about that and testified that also. (Tr. Vol 8 at 120.) Finally, at closing argument GBA stated: “You also heard evidence that some time around 1997 a lawsuit was filed against Impression Bridal claiming that Impression Bridal improperly copied designer styles. It was at that point in time that Emme Bridal arose, which was born.” (Tr. Vol. 10 at 68.) Appellants argue that credibility was crucial to this case because no copy of a fully executed contract existed. The jury, therefore, had to decide whether to believe GBA that there was a binding written agreement or believe Appellants that there was only a verbal agreement. The copyright lawsuit, Appellants argue, was GBA’s best evidence to put Impression’s credibility in question. After conducting a thorough examination of the trial transcript, we cannot hold that the evidence “probably had a substantial influence on the jury’s verdict.” 8 Proctor, 494 F.3d at 1352 (internal quotation marks omitted). Our review reveals that the copyright lawsuit was never a focus of the trial;2 rather, the meat of the trial involved the course of events surrounding the drafting, modifying, and alleged signing of the written contract, the method in which Impression and Emme operated their businesses, the sales and marketing efforts of GBA conducted over thirteen years, the gradual dissolution of the relationship between GBA and the Appellants, the ultimate termination of GBA, and the amount of commissions GBA asserted it was entitled to. Equally important, we do not believe that the substance of the evidence substantially put into question Impression’s credibility. The evidence was that the copyright infringement suit caused—whether by final judgment, settlement, or voluntary cessation (it was not made clear at trial)—Impression to cease its method of copying Eve of Milady’s designs. However, the evidence also showed that a Special Magistrate advised that only a slight modification was necessary to make permissible versions of Eve of Milady’s designs. In addition, the undisputed testimony of Mike Yeh was that the standard practice of the bridal manufacturing business was to “mix in” designs from other “hot line[s].” (Tr. Vol. 8 at 120). We 2 GBA represented, and Appellants did not dispute, that references made to the copyright lawsuit amounted to no more than thirty-seven lines in the transcript of a three-day trial. 9 are unpersuaded that such evidence created an impression of untrustworthiness worth any significance. Even if we were to assume it did, the impression would still have to translate to the altogether unrelated action of refusing to pay commissions due to a terminated sales representative, which stretches outside the realm of probability. We, therefore, hold that the admission of the copyright lawsuit was not sufficiently prejudicial to require reversal.