Opinion ID: 577160
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Unruh Act Claim

Text: 27 The district court dismissed with prejudice appellant's claim under § 51.7 of the California Civil Code, on the ground that appellant did not fall within a group protected by that statute. 28 Cal.Civ.Code § 51.7(a) as amended in 1984, provides in relevant part, as follows: 29 All persons within the jurisdiction of this state have the right to be free from any violence, or intimidation by threat of violence, committed against their persons or property because of their race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, political affiliation, sex, sexual orientation, age, disability, or position in a labor dispute. The identification in this subdivision of particular bases of discrimination is illustrative rather than restrictive. 30 The district court found that a group of Holocaust revisionists was not a political affiliation under the terms of the statute. However, appellant claims on appeal that he is nonetheless a member of a class that is subject to invidious discrimination, whether or not labeled political, and that because the statute's list is meant to be illustrative rather than restrictive, he should be protected by it. 31 Appellees argue that the illustrative rather than restrictive language on which appellant relies was added to the statute after the events in this case, and was an enlargement of the statute's protections. The limited legislative history of the amendment is ambiguous as to whether it was intended to clarify the section or to alter it. In addition, there is only one published California case that does more than mention § 51.7 in passing, and it does not address the issue raised by the district court here. (Coon v. Joseph, 192 Cal.App.3d 1269, 237 Cal.Rptr. 873 (1987)). The California courts, however, have considered § 51.7 to be a component of the earlier-enacted Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal.Civ.Code § 51. See Long v. Valentino, 216 Cal.App.3d 1287, 1293, 265 Cal.Rptr. 96 (1989) (as modified on rehearing). 32 The Unruh Act, Cal.Civ.Code § 51, prohibits discrimination by business establishments on the basis of sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin. Despite this more restricted list, and the absence of any legislative statement that the list is not exclusive, the California courts have construed § 51's list of classes as illustrative rather than restrictive. In re Cox, 3 Cal.3d 205, 216, 474 P.2d 992, 999, 90 Cal.Rptr. 24, 31 (1970). Given that the legislative amendment to § 51.7 tracks this language, and the Cox case was cited in the Assembly Bill analysis, 5 it is reasonable to infer that the amendment was a codification of Cox 's pronouncement. At the very least, the California courts' approach to § 51 guides us in the analysis of § 51.7 as an indication of what the California courts might do in this case. See S & R Metals, Inc. v. C. Itoh & Co., 859 F.2d 814, 816 (9th Cir.1988) (in absence of express guidance, federal court must apply state law as it predicts state's highest court would). 33 The California courts have defined the classes of the Unruh Act very broadly to include individuals who wear long hair or unconventional dress, who are black, who are members of the John Birch Society, or who belong to the American Civil Liberties Union, In re Cox, 3 Cal.3d at 217-218, 474 P.2d 992, 90 Cal.Rptr. 24 students, families with children, welfare recipients, and occupational groups. Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal.3d 721, 736, 640 P.2d 115, 124, 180 Cal.Rptr. 496, 505, cert. denied 459 U.S. 858, 103 S.Ct. 129, 74 L.Ed.2d 111 (1982). 34 Appellant describes himself as a member of a class of Holocaust Revisionists, who are subject to invidious discrimination because they spread unpopular views about the history of the Holocaust. ER 35. Appellees claim that appellant's expulsion from the CLA conference was not due to his being a member of an unpopular group, but was because of his spreading lies. They argue that lying is conduct, not membership in a group, and therefore appellant does not fall within the protection of the Unruh Act. See Frantz v. Blackwell, 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 96, 234 Cal.Rptr. 178, 181 (1987) (discrimination reasonably based on a person's conduct, as opposed to his status, not prohibited by the Unruh Act; Act aims for individualized treatment). 35 On a motion to dismiss, however, the court must deem the complaint's allegations to be true. Williford v. California, 352 F.2d 474, 475-76 (9th Cir.1965). Appellant alleges that he is a member of a group espousing unpopular views. A John Birch Society or ACLU member could fall in the same kind of class, and the Cox decision is explicit that those groups would receive the protection of the Unruh Act. 36 Appellees also argue that the complaint does not sufficiently allege intimidation by threat of violence committed to plaintiff's person or property, as required by § 51.7. Liberally construed, the complaint contains one allegation of a specific threat--the AJC's alleged statement to the CLA, at the urging and request and with the knowledge, approval and cooperation of Defendants Marvin Hier ... and Simon Wiesenthal Center that if the contracts with appellant were not canceled, [d]efendant CLA's 1984 Annual Conference would be disrupted, there would be damage to property and the CLA would be 'wiped out.'  ER at 23. Appellees claim that this language can be construed only as a threat against the CLA, not against the person or property of appellant. They cite Coon v. Joseph, 192 Cal.App.3d 1269, 237 Cal.Rptr. 873 (1987), in which the court held that the plaintiff, a gay man, could not state a § 51.7 claim against a bus driver by alleging that his lover was verbally abused and struck in his presence. The court stated: 37 The complaint establishes that no violence or intimidation was committed or threatened against [plaintiff's] person and thus no cause of action exists in his own right. Following [plaintiff's] argument, any person would have the right to recover damages for himself or herself whenever the rights of any other human being of similar ... sexual orientation were threatened. 38 Id. at 1277-78, 237 Cal.Rptr. 873. 39 On a motion to dismiss, all reasonable inferences are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. United States v. City of Redwood City, 640 F.2d 963, 966 (9th Cir.1981). Appellant alleges that the appellees intended to disrupt his presentation by creating a demonstration that appellees knew and intended would create a reasonable probability of property damage and of violence against Plaintiff and members of Defendant CLA. ER 10-11. In view of all the facts pled, it is reasonable to infer that any property damage or injury threatened could be directed against appellant, because the allegations clearly link the alleged threat to an intent to disrupt appellant's exhibit and program. This case must therefore be distinguished from Coon, because it can be reasonably inferred from the complaint that the threatened violence was directed against appellant. 40 Although appellees suggest that the statute must be read as requiring the threat to be conveyed directly to the person threatened, 6 the statute requires only that the plaintiff be intimidated by threat of violence committed against his person or property. In construing a remedial state statute, on a motion to dismiss, in the absence of clear state court direction, this court is reluctant to read any unnecessary restrictions into § 51.7. 41 Finally, some appellees raise a First Amendment defense to this cause of action, arguing that there can be no liability for alleged threats of violence unless they were directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447, 89 S.Ct. 1827, 1829, 23 L.Ed.2d 430 (1969) (per curiam); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 927, 102 S.Ct. 3409, 3433, 73 L.Ed.2d 1215 (1982). We reject this argument. Both Brandenburg and Claiborne involved public speeches advocating violence, not privately communicated threats of violence as are alleged here. Privately communicated threats have traditionally been punishable where they have a reasonable tendency to produce in the victim a fear that the threat will be carried out. Wurtz v. Risley, 719 F.2d 1438, 1441 (9th Cir.1983). 42 That appellees were engaging in protected expressive activities at the same time and to the same end as the alleged threats of violence does not immunize appellees from liability for the alleged threats. In Claiborne, the Court held that NAACP official Charles Evers could not be held liable for a public speech, but the Court stated unequivocally that individuals who engaged in violence or threats of violence ... may be held responsible for the injuries that they caused. Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 926, 102 S.Ct. at 3432. Nor does the fact that appellees were politically motivated immunize them from liability if they in fact engaged in threats of violence. The boycotters who threatened and engaged in violence in Claiborne were no less politically motivated than Charles Evers whose public speech the Supreme Court held to be protected by the First Amendment. Id.; see also Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 386-87, 107 S.Ct. 2891, 2898, 97 L.Ed.2d 315 (1987) (a statement that amounted to a threat to kill the President would not be protected by the First Amendment). Appellant may not be able to support the allegations in his complaint, but those allegations are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.