Opinion ID: 2675537
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: A Preliminary Observation About “Facts”

Text: Throughout this opinion, I assume readers’ familiarity with the panel opinions, see United States v. Taylor (“Taylor I”), 736 F.3d 661 (2d Cir. 2013), superseded by United States v. Taylor (“Taylor II”), 745 F.3d 15 (2d Cir. 2014), and I generally detail relevant facts only as necessary to explain why en banc review is warranted. At the outset, however, it is important to note that the panel’s troubling legal analysis rests on a suspect factual characterization of defendant Curtis Taylor’s condition at the time of the challenged confessions. 2 Notably, the panel asserts, based on its own reading of the record, that Taylor was “in and out of consciousness,” “in a trance or a stupor,” “largely stupefied,” and “unable to focus” even when awake during his first interrogation. Taylor II, 745 F.3d at 20, 25. Such characterizations are findings of fact and, as such, outside the purview of an appellate court. They are, moreover, at odds with factual findings of the district court that were not clearly erroneous. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996). After an evidentiary hearing, the district court expressly found that, “during the questioning,” Taylor was “sufficiently lucid,” “awake,” and “competent” to exercise his constitutional rights. Suppression Hr’g Tr. (“Tr.”) 387:23–388:14, Supplemental App’x (“S.A.”) 387–88. In making these findings, the district court credited interviewing officers who testified that, during the first interrogation, Taylor was “coherent,” “fluid,” “knew what was going on,” and never asked for questioning to cease. Id. 18:25–20:3, S.A. 18–20. While acknowledging that Taylor may have “nodd[ed] off” two or three times during the initial two‐to‐three hour interview, an FBI agent explained that, upon verbal prompting, Taylor was able to focus on the questions posed: he “would respond that he knew what he was being asked and he would repeat the questions back 3 to us to show that he was understanding what was being asked of him and knew what was going on.” Id. 45:7–21, S.A. 45. As to the next day’s interview—which Taylor himself requested—the agent testified that Taylor remained awake throughout, “appeared fine,” and participated in a “lucid give and take”; indeed, “[h]e was probing with information that he wanted to clarify, and that led to my [i.e., the agent’s] questions to him. I didn’t note any confusion . . . aside from what he wanted to clarify.” Id. 216:17–21, S.A. 216. To support its own contrary factual assessment, the panel highlights other hearing evidence suggesting that at different times on the dates in question, Taylor fell asleep easily or experienced difficulties with mental focus and verbal expression.2 But the task of weighing any competing evidence was committed to the district court, not the panel. Cf. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 2 A pre‐trial services officer, who interviewed Taylor shortly after his second confession, reported him frequently falling asleep and needing to be roused. Nevertheless, the officer acknowledged that Taylor was able to provide the information necessary for the officer to complete his report to the court. See Tr. 319:19–320:11, 321:24–323:6, 325:16–22, S.A. 319–20, 321–23, 325. Meanwhile, a prison psychologist testified that prison records indicated that in admission interviews between his two confessions, Taylor was “vague” in responding to questions. Taylor II, 745 F.3d at 26 (quoting Tr. 110:14–24, S.A. 110). As that same witness testified, however, what Taylor was “vague” about was his mental health—a subject he may well have been reluctant to discuss with a prison psychologist. He was willing and able to provide coherent responses to questions seeking information about where he grew up, his family, education, and drug use. See Tr. 122:13–123:12, S.A. 122–23. 4 557 (1980) (“[B]ecause the trial court’s finding [that defendant had acted voluntarily in accompanying police to station] was sustained by the record, the Court of Appeals was mistaken in substituting for that finding its view of the evidence.”); United States v. Isiofia, 370 F.3d 226, 232 (2d Cir. 2004) (upholding district court’s finding that consent to search was not voluntary “even though . . . had we been sitting as the trier of fact, we would have weighed the evidence differently” (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)). Indeed, absent identification of clear factual error—which the panel does not make here—it cannot substitute its own factual assessment of Taylor’s condition at the time of his confessions for that of the district court. See United States v. Khalil, 214 F.3d 111, 121–22 (2d Cir. 2000) (deferring to district court’s voluntariness finding even though circumstances surrounding confession might have supported contrary inference); see generally Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985) (“Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”). To the extent the panel does so, such a departure from long‐standing precedent might itself warrant correction en banc. Here, however, it is sufficient 5 to note this factfinding concern before discussing the relevant legal issues, which warrant en banc review even under the panel’s own assessment of the facts.