Opinion ID: 2742088
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Title VII and the FCRA

Text: Butterworth contends a jury could conclude from the evidence that LabCorp retaliated against her because she communicated concerns about gender 3 Case: 13-15021 Date Filed: 10/14/2014 Page: 4 of 15 discrimination to her superiors on several occasions. The close proximity of her complaints in June 2007 to her termination created a material question of fact regarding the causal connection between her complaints and her termination. Title VII prohibits employers from retaliating against an individual because she has opposed a practice prohibited by Title VII, or participated in filing a charge of discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). If a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of retaliation and the employer articulates a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the challenged employment action, the employee may show by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the employer for taking the adverse action were pretexts for unlawful retaliation. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000). Although Butterworth demonstrated she engaged in protected activity by complaining of discrimination, and her termination constituted a materially adverse action, she failed to demonstrate a causal connection between them. See Chapter 7 Trustee v. Gate Gourmet, 683 F.3d 1249, 1258 (11th Cir. 2012) (“A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of retaliation by showing that: (1) she ‘engaged in statutorily protected activity’; (2) she ‘suffered a materially adverse action’; and (3) ‘there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse 4 Case: 13-15021 Date Filed: 10/14/2014 Page: 5 of 15 action.’”). Outside of the January “skit” dispute, 3 Butterworth identified only two instances in which she complained of sex discrimination: her complaints on June 15 and June 22, 2007. She did not demonstrate that these were causally related to her termination. Although the exact date that LabCorp management became aware of the RTS website is unclear, undisputed email evidence demonstrated that Farrell, Bob Nelson, and John Gornto were discussing the conflict of interest issue related to the website as early as June 12, three days before Butterworth complained that her operational concerns were being ignored because of her gender. Similarly, Butterworth’s June 22 complaint and her comment during the meeting at which she was terminated were subsequent to LabCorp’s investigation into RTS. While the actual decision to fire many not have been made until she refused to discuss the incident, a recommendation to fire her had been made previously, which undercut her efforts to show causation in that respect. See Drago v. Jenne, 453 F.3d 1301, 1308 (11th Cir. 2006) (stating when an employer contemplates an adverse action before an employee engages in protected activity, temporal proximity between the protected activity and a later adverse action does not “suffice to show causation”). 3 While Butterworth mentions the January 2007 skit in her brief on appeal, she does not expressly challenge the court’s conclusion that this was too remote from her firing to establish causation. Accordingly, any claim in that respect is abandoned. See Access Now v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding a claim that has not been adequately briefed is deemed abandoned). 5 Case: 13-15021 Date Filed: 10/14/2014 Page: 6 of 15 However, even assuming Butterworth established a prima facie case of retaliation, her involvement in the RTS website and related corporate policy concerns constituted a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for officials to conduct an investigation, and evidence showed that when the investigation could not proceed due to her failure to cooperate, her termination resulted. Butterworth did not demonstrate the reasons given by LabCorp for firing her were false. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993) (explaining reasons are not pretextual unless it is shown both that the reasons were false, and that retaliation was the real reason). Specifically, Butterworth failed to rebut each proffered reason head on, as the evidence did not undermine LabCorp’s contentions that she was involved in the RTS website with subordinates, that the website advertised a “full-time commitment” from the listed sellers, including Butterworth, that LabCorp had a conflict of interest policy in place that prohibited both actual and potential conflicts and that prohibited any activity that might impact an employee’s objectivity at LabCorp, not just competing with LabCorp, and that she refused to discuss the website with Terry Farrell and Kate Sumison. See Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1030 (11th Cir. 2001) (stating the plaintiff must meet each proffered reason “head on,” and she cannot succeed by simply disputing the wisdom of the employer’s proffered reasons). Instead, Butterworth argues her undisputed conduct did not actually violate the policy, disagreeing with the 6 Case: 13-15021 Date Filed: 10/14/2014 Page: 7 of 15 wisdom of LabCorp’s conclusions rather than showing that its bases for her termination were false. This is insufficient to demonstrate falsity. See id. Butterworth further failed to show her June complaints were the but-for cause of her termination. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2528 (2013) (holding “Title VII retaliation claims require proof that the desire to retaliate was the but-for cause of the challenged employment action”). Evidence showed that Sznapstajler, a male comparator, was also fired on the same day for the same conduct, although he was also caught using his phone for RTS business while working for LabCorp. Moreover, to the extent Butterworth seeks to rely on her own affidavit to support her claim that retaliation was the but-for cause of her termination, her conclusory, self-serving statements are insufficient as a matter of law to establish but-for causation. See Mayfield v. Patterson Pump Co., 101 F.3d 1371, 1376 (11th Cir. 1996) (stating conclusory allegations of retaliation, without more, are not sufficient to carry a plaintiff’s burden). Finally, the disputed evidence of Farrell’s potentially discriminatory comments, his prior knowledge of the RTS site, and Polege’s encouragement to sell personal properties on the side is a mere scintilla of proof potentially supporting Butterworth’s case. This is not enough to demonstrate that retaliation was the but-for cause of her termination. See Brooks v. County Comm’n of Jefferson County, Ala., 446 F.3d 1160, 1162 (11th Cir. 2006) (“A mere scintilla of 7 Case: 13-15021 Date Filed: 10/14/2014 Page: 8 of 15 evidence supporting the opposing party’s position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for that party.” (quotations omitted)). Without establishing but-for causation, Butterworth failed to adequately support her claim, and summary judgment was appropriate. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. at 2528. Thus, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to LabCorp on Butterworth’s claims of retaliatory termination under Title VII and the FCRA.