Opinion ID: 755555
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Complaint Clause: STAA Section 405(a)

Text: 21 Caimano's contention that he was illegally terminated because he complained of gas fumes in # 201 at the March 8 speak-out session relies on section 405(a) of the STAA, 49 U.S.C. app. § 2305(a), known as the complaint clause. 22 Section 405(a) provides that [n]o person shall discharge, discipline, or in any manner discriminate against any employee ... because such employee ... has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding relating to a violation of a commercial motor vehicle safety rule, regulation, standard, or order. STAA § 405(a), 49 U.S.C. app. § 2305(a). 23 The ALJ heard the evidence on this claim and found that there was no meaningful relationship between [Caimano's] complaints at the 'speak-out' session and his termination. To the contrary, the ALJ found that Caimano was discharged for insubordination on April 21, 1994, when he refused to work in # 201. 24 This finding was fully supported by the record of the hearing. The evidence showed that Caimano was fired on April 21 when he refused to go out in # 201, after the Brinks management had undertaken to remedy the lack of a radio set. Indeed, there was virtually no evidence supporting Caimano's contention that his discharge was motivated by his having complained of the gas fumes on March 8. When Caimano raised the issue on March 8, Brinks undertook to have any problem corrected in the fuel emissions shop. The issue was never raised again until Caimano made it a part of his allegations to the Labor Department. The evidence strongly supports the inference that the problem was corrected and that the incident had no bearing on his discharge. Based on the evidence of record, the ALJ's conclusion was well supported. 6 25 The Secretary asserted that the ALJ had failed to address the complaint clause question. The Secretary, accordingly, made findings of his own rather than review the ALJ's findings. While it is true that the ALJ did not expressly refer to the complaint clause, he considered directly the question that arose under this clause--whether Caimano was fired because of complaints he had made. As noted, the ALJ found that this was not the case. The ALJ found that Caimano was fired solely on the basis of his insubordination in refusing to take out # 201. This conclusion was supported by substantial evidence. The Secretary was therefore required under STAA Rule 109(c)(3) to consider it conclusive. See 29 C.F.R. § 1978.109(a)(3). It precluded the contrary determination that Caimano was fired because of prior complaints. See Castle Coal, 55 F.3d at 44. We must vacate the Secretary's findings and direct the entry of an order based on the ALJ's well-supported findings that Caimano failed to show violation of the complaint clause. 26