Opinion ID: 2088132
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Application of the Village Food Test

Text: ¶ 95 In this case, the State sued ECI, alleging violations of the Wisconsin Statutes and the Wisconsin Administrative Code. It is thus necessary to apply the Village Food test to the State's causes of action to determine whether ECI had a constitutional right to have the State's claims tried to a jury. The analysis begins with the first prong of the Village Food test to resolve whether the causes of action in this case existed, were known or recognized at common law at the time of the adoption of the Wisconsin Constitution. 1. First Prong of the Village Food Test ¶ 96 The inquiry under the first prong requires that we examine the statutory causes of action in this case and to determine whether they are of the same nature or are essentially counterparts to any causes of action that existed at common law in 1848. See Village Food, 254 Wis.2d 478, ¶¶ 27, 28, 647 N.W.2d 177. We search for common law causes of action that were the forerunners of the statutory causes of action in this case. Id., ¶ 27. The fact that the present causes of action differ slightly from a common law cause of action does not vitiate the analogy. Id., ¶ 28. ¶ 97 The State alleged violations of requirements imposed by the Wisconsin Statutes and by the Wisconsin Administrative Code, namely certain provisions in Wis. Stat. chs. 281, 283, 289, 291, and certain provisions in Wis. Admin. Code chs. NR 211, 261, and 615. Before delving into the specific allegations of the claims the State took to trial, I review the general nature of the statutory chapters. ¶ 98 Wisconsin Stat. chs. 281 (Water and Sewage), 283 (Pollution Discharge Elimination), 289 (Solid Waste Facilities), and 291 (Hazardous Waste Management) are environmental statutes designed to enable the State to carry out its role in protecting the environment and public health from improper management of wastewater and hazardous waste. [18] The purpose of subchapter II of Wis. Stat. ch. 281 is to grant necessary powers and to organize a comprehensive program under a single state agency for the enhancement of the quality management and protection of all waters of the state, ground and surface, public and private. Wis. Stat. § 281.11. Any person who violates this chapter or any rule promulgated under this chapter is subject to civil forfeitures for each violation. See Wis. Stat. § 281.98(1). The policy of Wis. Stat. ch. 283 is to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of [Wisconsin] waters to protect public health, safeguard fish and aquatic life and scenic and ecological values, and to enhance the domestic, municipal, recreational, industrial, agricultural, and other uses of water. Wis. Stat. § 283.001. The provisions of this chapter are intended to effectuate that policy. Id. Any person who violates this chapter or any rule promulgated under this chapter may be proceeded against civilly or criminally. See Wis. Stat. § 283.91(1), (2), and (3). Chapter 289 requires the promulgation of rules establishing minimum standards for the location, design, construction, sanitation, operation, monitoring, and maintenance of solid waste facilities. Wis. Stat. § 289.05(1). Any person who violates this chapter or any rule promulgated under this chapter is subject to civil forfeitures. See Wis. Stat. § 289.96. The policy of Wis. Stat. ch. 291 is to ensure proper management of hazardous waste in order to protect against substantial danger to the environment, public health, and safety. Wis. Stat. § 291.001. Any person who violates this chapter or any rule promulgated under this chapter may be proceeded against civilly or criminally. See Wis. Stat. § 291.97(1) and (2). ¶ 99 Wisconsin Admin. Code ch. NR 211 is a set of rules promulgated pursuant to Wis. Stat. ch. 283 and its purpose is to: establish, under s. 283.55(2), Stats., the responsibilities of industrial users and of publicly owned treatment works [POTW] in preventing the discharge into publicly owned treatment works of pollutants which will interfere with the operation of the POTW, which will pass through the POTW treatment works insufficiently treated, or which will impair the use or disposal of POTW sludge. Wis. Admin. Code § NR 211.01 (Oct., 2002). Wisconsin Admin. Code ch. NR 261 is also promulgated pursuant to Wis. Stat. ch. 283, and its purpose is to establish standards of performance, effluent limitations, and pretreatment standards for discharges of wastes from the metal finishing point source category into the waters of the state and POTWs. Wis. Admin. Code § NR 261.01 (Sept., 1997); see Wis. Stat. § 283.21(2). Finally, Wis. Admin. Code ch. NR 615 is promulgated under Wis. Stat. ch. 291 and its purpose is to specify the requirements that apply to the generators of large quantities of hazardous waste. Wis. Admin. Code § NR 615.01 (May, 1998); see Wis. Stat. § 291.05. ¶ 100 The court must decide whether causes of action brought under these chapters existed, were known or recognized in 1848. ECI argues that these causes of action were cognizable in 1848 as common law nuisance actions. The court of appeals certified the case to us with a question that implicitly asked us to compare the causes of action in this case to common law nuisance. Thus, our inquiry focuses on whether the statutory causes of action in this case are of similar nature or are essentially counterparts to the common law nuisance action. [19] ¶ 101 At common law, nuisances were of two types: public or common nuisances and private nuisances. The historical definition of a public nuisance was very broad and came to include `any act not warranted by law, or omission to discharge a legal duty, which inconveniences the public in the exercise of rights common to all Her Majesty's subjects.' William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 86, at 572 (4th ed.1971) (quoting Stephen, General View of the Criminal Law of England 105 (1890)). William Blackstone defined public nuisances as a species of offences against the public order and []economical regimen of the state; being either the doing of a thing to the annoyance of all the king's subjects, or the neglecting to do a thing which the common good requires. 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, ch. 13, at 166-67 (1769). A classic example of a public nuisance was obstructing the king's highway and all those who happen to travel there. Soltau v. De Held, (1851) 61 Eng. Rep. 291, 295. Other historic examples of public nuisances include the keeping of hogs in any city or market town, disorderly inns or ale houses, lotteries, and the making and selling of fireworks. 4 Blackstone, supra, at 167. [20] ¶ 102 A private nuisance, on the other hand, was defined as an invasion of interests in the use or enjoyment of land. [21] Id. Historic examples of private nuisances include the erection of a house or other buildings so near to another's that they obstruct the ancient lights or windows; the keeping of hogs or other noisy animals so near the house of another that the stench of them incommodes him and makes the air unwholesome; and the act of diverting water that used to run to another's meadow[ ] or mill. 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, ch. 13, at 217-18 (1768). ¶ 103 In sum, private nuisances involve injuries to individual property, and public nuisances involve injuries to the properties of mankind. Attorney-Gen. v. Sheffield Gas Consumers' Co., (1853) 43 Eng. Rep. 119, 125. Private nuisances were brought at the suit of the individual, while public nuisances were brought at the suit of the attorney general. [22] George V. Yool, An Essay on Waste, Nuisance, and Trespass 85 (1863). ¶ 104 Nuisance actions were often authorized by statute. For instance, Section 129 of the 1827 Revised Code of Laws of Illinois authorized prosecution of any person who shall in any wise obstruct or pollute any water course, lake, pool, marsh, or common sewer, or continue such . . . pollution, so as to render the same offensive or unwholesome. Revised Code of Laws of Illinois, § 129, p. 150-51 (1827). Section 129 provides: If any person shall obstruct or injure or cause or procure to be constructed or injured, any public road or highway, or common street or alley of any town or village, or any public bridge, causeway, public river, or other stream declared navigable by law; or shall continue such obstruction, so as to render the same inconvenient or dangerous to pass; or shall erect or establish any offensive trade, manufacture or business, or continue the same, after it has been erected or established to the common disturbance, annoyance, nuisance or detriment of the county, town, village, or neighborhood where the same may be erected or established; or shall in any wise obstruct or pollute any water course, lake, pool, marsh, or common sewer, or continue such obstruction or pollution, so as to render the same offensive or unwholesome to the county, town, village or neighborhood thereabout; every person so offending shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not exceeding one hundred dollars; and every such nuisance may, by order of the circuit court before whom the conviction shall take place, be removed and abated by the sheriff of the proper county; and any inquest and judgment thereon had, under the provisions of any law authorizing a writ of ad quod damnum, shall be no bar to prosecution under this section. Revised Code of Laws of Illinois, § 129, p. 150-51 (1827) (emphasis added). ¶ 105 In 1832 the Territory of Michigan authorized local officials to take such measures as they may deem effectual for the preservation of the public health. Laws of the Territory of Michigan, § 1, p. 561 (1833). Every person who shall violate any order, rule, or regulation, made in pursuance of the powers granted to the said [local officials], shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by fine or imprisonment, in the discretion of the court before whom the offender shall be tried. Id., § 2, p. 562. Other parts of this Act describe putrid articles and articles likely to endanger the public health. Id., § 4, p. 562. ¶ 106 In 1839 the Statutes of the Territory of Wisconsin contained a similar provision for preservation of the public health. The statute addressed any unsound or putrid articles . . . likely to endanger the public health. Statutes of the Territory of Wisconsin, § 5, p. 125 (1839). Failure to remove such articles resulted in a forfeiture. Id. There were also forfeitures for persons who destroyed dams or filled ditches or drains. Id., § 34, p. 355; § 44, p. 112. ¶ 107 In 1848 Wisconsin recognized actions for both public and private nuisances. Chapter 110 of the Wisconsin Revised Statutes of 1849 recognized actions for private nuisances, while chapter 26 recognized actions for public nuisances. See Wis.Rev.Stat. chs. 26, 110 (1849). ¶ 108 The public nuisance statute reads: The board of health may examine into all nuisances, sources of filth, and causes of sickness, and make such regulations respecting the same as they may judge necessary for the public health, and safety of the inhabitants; and every person who shall violate any order or regulation, made by any board of health, and duly published agreeably to the provisions of this chapter, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and punished by a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars, or by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding three months. Wis.Rev.Stat. ch. 26, § 3 (1849). [23] Notably, the Revised Statutes also provided for a forfeiture of a sum not to exceed fifty dollars if the owner failed to remove the nuisance within twenty four hours. Wisconsin Rev. Stat. ch. 26, ¶ 5 states, Whenever any nuisance, source of filth, or cause of sickness shall be found on private property, the board of health shall order the owner or occupant thereof, at his own expense, to remove the same within twenty-four hours; and if the owner or occupant shall neglect to do so, he shall forfeit a sum not exceeding fifty dollars. Thus, nuisances were prosecuted under the Wisconsin Statutes. ¶ 109 In determining whether the causes of action in the present case are similar to actions at common law, the appropriate focus is on public nuisance rather than private nuisance. Nonetheless, private nuisance cases may serve to illustrate the kind of injuries to land or water that were actionable at common law and that might be deemed public nuisances if they harmed or seriously inconvenienced the public. Cf., Walker v. Shepardson, 2 Wis. 282 [], 291 [] (1853) (concluding that a public nuisance that caused private and special injury to the plaintiff was actionable in law or equity). ¶ 110 The causes of action in this case, dealing with water pollution and hazardous waste, are based upon what can be fairly characterized as environmental statutes. Scholarly commentary recognizes the link between modern statutory environmental law and the common law of nuisance. As one commentator has noted, The deepest doctrinal roots of modern environmental law are found in principles of nuisance. William H. Rodgers, Jr., Handbook on Environmental Law § 2.1, at 100 (1977). The Seventh Circuit in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 101 F.3d 503 (7th Cir.1996), acknowledged that the interests [of environmental statutes] overlap to a great extent the interests that nuisance law protects. Id. at 505. Other commentators have noted that [w]hen you go back to the early history of environmental law, the one substantive area that you would want to turn to more than any other would be the common law of nuisance. Richard A. Epstein, RegulationAnd ContractIn Environmental Law, 93 W. Va. L.Rev. 859, 862 (1990-91). ¶ 111 Yet another commentator has noted, Because of its flexibility, common law nuisance continues to play a vital role in complementing statutory environmental enforcement tools. . . . Environmental harm is the quintessential public nuisance. In fact, modern environmental and energy statutes are codifications of the common law of public nuisance. Matthew F. Pawa & Benjamin A. Krass, Behind the Curve: The National Media's Reporting on Global Warming, 33 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L.Rev. 485, 487-88 (2006). [24] ¶ 112 The Wisconsin Legislature has formally adopted this principle by labeling the violations of the environmental statutes at issue in this case a public nuisance. Wisconsin Stat. § 299.95 states, For purposes of this proceeding where chs. 281 to 285 and 289 to 295 or this chapter or the rule, special order, license, plan approval, permit or certification prohibits in whole or in part any pollution, a violation is considered a public nuisance.  Wis. Stat. § 299.95 (emphasis added). ¶ 113 This authority supports the conclusion that, on a general level, the common law of nuisance is a forerunner to modern environmental statutory law. Of course, there are distinctions between the common law of nuisance and modern environmental statutory law. Modern environmental statutory law tends to be regulatory and focuses more on preventing the cumulative and future effects of conduct than the common law of nuisance. The term nuisance, which is derived from the Latin word nocumentum, meaning simply harm, [25] requires a showing of substantial and unreasonable harm to interests in the use and enjoyment of land. [26] See Prosser, supra, at 580. Under the common law of nuisance, a party should not seek recovery until an actual nuisance has been committed, or at all events until it is quite clear that the [conduct] will inevitably result in a nuisance. Yool, supra, at 95; see also Haines v. Taylor, (1846) 50 Eng. Rep. 511. Under modern environmental statutory law, on the other hand, the conduct need not result in actual or imminent harm of the same magnitude for it to be actionable. Modern statutory environmental law regulates more subtle and attenuated harms [27] and seeks to prevent harm before it occurs. ¶ 114 This distinction is not significant enough to invalidate the analogy between the common law of public nuisance and modern environmental statutory law. Harm is a key element of public nuisance; thus some environmental claims do not warrant a jury trial because these environmental statutes are largely preventative and seek to regulate conduct in which the resulting harm is neither direct nor immediate. Claims under other environmental statutes do warrant a jury trial because these environmental statutes proscribe conduct in which the resulting harm is direct and immediate. [28] In this case, then, the task is to analyze each claim to determine whether the claim alleges some harm that, although not necessarily of the same magnitude required at the common law, is direct and immediate, and not merely speculative or remote. [29] The existence of a criminal counterpart for the claim may prove helpful in the analysis by demonstrating the seriousness of the claim as determined by the legislature. ¶ 115 In its first claim, the State alleged that ECI violated Wis. Admin. Code § NR 211.10(1) (Oct., 2002) every time it caused the City to exceed the discharge standards under its permit. ECI allegedly discharged surfactant-laden wastewater into the City's treatment system, which destroyed the microbes required to properly treat the City's wastewater and resulted in an upset at the City's wastewater treatment plant. This, in turn, caused or significantly contributed to the City's violations of its permit limits for oxygen-consuming organic waste. ¶ 116 There is similarity in this claim to the common law public nuisance claim in People v. Corporation of Albany, 11 Wend. 539 (N.Y.1834). In Corporation of Albany, the corporation of the city of Albany was charged by indictment and found guilty by a jury of: permitting . . . the basin in the Hudson river, at the termination of the Erie Canal, to be foul, filled and choked up with mud, rubbish, and dead carcas[s]es of animals; whereby the citizens were not only deprived of the benefit and advantage of using the water for the convenience of themselves and families, but the mud . . . became offensive and nauseous, corrupting the water, and causing noisome and unwholesome smells, infecting the air to the damage and common nuisance of the citizens residing in the vicinity and those passing and re-passing the basin. Id. ¶ 117 The decision speaks of the water being corrupted and that the water became unfit for drinking or culinary purposes. The court said a common nuisance . . . seems to be an offense against the public. Id. at 543. ¶ 118 A more vivid case of discharging wastewater came out of Indiana: [Taylor] was charged with urinating in a spring of water near a public highway, out of which many persons in the vicinity, and travelers along the road, were accustomed to use water, thereby rendering the spring unfit for use . . . to the obstruction of the free use of the water thereof by the citizens of the State. The information was quashed on the ground that it did not charge a public offense. State v. Taylor, 29 Ind. 517, 517 (May Term, 1868). The Indiana Supreme Court reversed, saying: Our statute, perhaps, gives as accurate a definition of the term nuisance, as understood at common law, as can be found elsewhere: Whatever is injurious to health, or indecent, or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as essentially to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property. If the injury were limited to an individual, it gave a private right of action; if it affected the public, it was the subject of a public prosecution. That the present information is within the common law definition is, we think, recognized in Sloan v. The State, 8 Ind. 312. The motion to quash should have been overruled. Id. ¶ 119 In a Wisconsin case, Luning v. State, 2 Pin. 215 (Wis.1849), the party was indicted and found guilty by a jury for erecting and maintaining a mill-dam, which caused the water to overflow a large tract of heavily timbered land . . . and which was alleged created unpleasant and unwholesome vapors and sickness to the inhabitants of that village. Luning, 2 Pin. at 218-19. At trial, witnesses testified that an offensive effluvia was produced by the spreading of the water over a much larger tract of land than was covered by the stream in its natural state. Id. at 216. The court discussed the effects created by the dam as the public nuisance. Id. at 220. ¶ 120 The allegations in claim 1 are of similar nature. Like the corporation in Corporation of Albany, ECI allegedly discharged wastewater into the City's treatment plant that, in essence, fouled, filled, and choked up the City's wastewater treatment plant with surfactant-laden wastewater that destroyed valuable microbes. Although the State in claim 1 did not allege harm that caused sickness to inhabitants, it did allege that discharged water caused upsets at the City's treatment plant. This allegation of direct harm is sufficient to analogize this claim to the common law of nuisance. Furthermore, the legislature has reinforced the serious nature of this claim by providing the option for criminal prosecution of violations alleged in this claim. See Wis. Stat. § 283.91(3). ¶ 121 Claims 4, 5, and 7 are also similar to the public nuisance claims in Corporation of Albany, Luning, and Taylor because they involve allegations of illegal discharge of wastewater, which results in unauthorized pollution of the City's sewer system. Again, although the State does not allege harm of the same magnitude required at common law, the State does allege direct harm in the form of unauthorized pollution of the City's sewer system. Claims 4 and 5 involve violations of either Wis. Admin. Code chs. NR 211 or 261, both of which are promulgated under Wis. Stat. ch. 283. Wisconsin Stat. ch. 283 allows for criminal prosecution of violations alleged under the chapter or rules promulgated under the chapter. Wis. Stat. § 283.91(1), (2), and (3). Thus, the legislature has reinforced the serious nature of these claims and the violations alleged in these claims to cause direct, serious harm to the environment. [30] ¶ 122 In claim 4 the State alleged that ECI exceeded its discharge limits of concentrations of certain pollutants. Specifically, the State alleged that ECI violated the oil and grease, copper, zinc, lead, and cyanide limits, meaning that ECI discharged these pollutants into the sewer system. The exceedance of discharge limits is a direct harm to the City's sewer system and was likely to cause further harm, such as an upset described in claim 1. ¶ 123 In claim 5 the State alleged that ECI failed to notify the City of any substantial change in the character of the pollutants in its discharge, namely high concentrations of phosphorous, oxygen consuming organic waste, surfactant-laden waste, and wastes with high concentrations of metals. To prevail on this claim, the State was required to prove that ECI's discharges contained these unauthorized pollutants. Failure to notify the City of a substantial change in the character of the pollutants in its discharge reflected a direct harm to the City's sewer system in the form of unauthorized pollution. ¶ 124 In claim 7 the State alleged that ECI failed to comply with approved plans by discharging water without adequately treating it, operating without a flow meter or sampler, discharging wastewater without passing through the flow meter, discharging wastes and sludge through the truck bay manhole, accepting unauthorized wastes, and following improper waste acceptance procedures. This broad claim also included allegations of direct harm in the form of unauthorized pollution. For example, discharging waste without adequately treating it and discharging wastes and sludge through the truck bay manhole involved direct pollution of the City's sewer system. ¶ 125 All three claims involved unlawful discharge of wastewater and therefore alleged direct harm of pollution to public resources. This is the essence of public nuisance. ¶ 126 Claim 12 is also similar to the common law of public nuisance. Claim 12 dealt with the improper disposal of hazardous waste. In claim 12 the State alleged that ECI disposed of hazardous waste at a non-hazardous, solid waste landfill not authorized to accept such waste. This is analogous to dumping waste. ¶ 127 This claim is similar to the claim in State v. Buckman, 8 N.H. 203 (1836). In Buckman, the defendant was indicted for throwing into a well the carcass of an animal which tainted and corrupted the water used by a family. The court held that this act constituted a public nuisance because water infected with the noisome particles and effluvia of a dead animal thrown into it, must partake of a character so poisonous and unwholesome as properly to come within this class of offences. Id. at 205. The State brought the action notwithstanding the fact that the well appeared to be private rather than public. ¶ 128 Like the dead carcass in Buckman, the hazardous waste in this case was inappropriately handled and disposed of at an inappropriate site. The characterization of the waste as hazardous implies that it is also of a character so poisonous and unwholesome as to qualify as a sufficient analogy to the harm in Buckman. Hazardous waste is defined as waste thatbecause of its quantity, concentration, or physical, chemical, or infectious characteristicsmay cause or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or otherwise harm human health or the environment. Black's Law Dictionary 1584 (7th ed.1999). By allegedly disposing of this waste at an improper site, ECI caused direct and immediate harm to human health and the environment. ¶ 129 Furthermore, claim 12 involves an alleged violation of Wis. Stat. 291.21(9). The legislature has reinforced the seriousness of this claim by providing the option for criminal prosecution of the violations alleged in this claim. See Wis. Stat. § 291.97. ¶ 130 By contrast, although the legislature has provided the option to proceed criminally against violations alleged in claims 3, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, and 14, these claims are not sufficiently similar to the common law of public nuisance to require a jury trial because they do not involve allegations of direct and immediate harm. Any harm that may result under these claims is remote and speculative. ¶ 131 Claims 3, 8, 11, 13, and 14 involve ECI's improper acceptance or storage of waste, including hazardous waste. These claims attempt to head off the improper disposal of waste by prohibiting the improper acceptance or storage of waste. Hence, the harm to water or land is contingent upon disposal. The harm may be probable, but it is not direct and immediate. ¶ 132 In claim 3 the State alleged that ECI failed to notify the City that it was accepting new types of categorical waste, such as organic chemical wastewater, pharmaceutical wastewater, surfactant-laden wastewater, phosphorus-laden wastewater, unknown wastewater, and septage. The State alleged that ECI's treatment system was not designed to properly treat any of the wastes. In claim 8 the State alleged ECI failed to implement proper waste acceptance procedures and as a result, improperly accepted wastes [it] was incapable of properly treating, and wastes reasonably expected to cause exceedances of the City's effluent limits. In claim 11 the State alleged that ECI's treatment of certain wastewater generated a hazardous waste and that ECI failed to characterize this waste as hazardous. In claim 13 the State alleged that ECI operated a hazardous waste facility without an operating license. In claim 14 the State alleged that ECI illegally handled hazardous waste by failing to label the tank as containing hazardous waste and by leaving the tank open. ¶ 133 In sum, these claims allege conduct that could lead to harm, as opposed to claims 1, 4, 5, 7, and 12 that alleged conduct that did lead to direct and immediate harm in the form of unauthorized pollution. ¶ 134 Claims 9 and 10 are also not similar to a public nuisance. These claims involve purely regulatory administrative provisions in the sense that they allege only a failure to sample discharge or to submit paperwork. Purely regulatory requirements such as sampling discharge or submitting semi-annual reports are not the type of actions that would have been recognized as a public nuisance in 1848. Harm resulting from failure to sample discharge or submit paperwork is at best indirect. ¶ 135 To illustrate, the State alleged in claim 9 that ECI failed to undertake sufficient sampling and analysis of its effluent to assess whether it complied with its permit limits. The complaint alleged that on at least 260 occasions between July 2001 and August 2002, defendants failed to take representative samples to assess compliance with permit limits. By implication, defendants could have taken representative samples on approximately 150 occasions during this period. The failure to take other samples would not in itself have caused harm to the municipal sewer system. Thus, the State's cause of action does not allege sufficient harm to be analogous to a common law nuisance action. It is a purely regulatory requirement that does not require a trial by jury. ¶ 136 In claim 10, the State alleged that ECI submitted incomplete semi-annual reports to the City. Specifically, the State alleged that the reports provided sampling results data and flow volumes but failed to contain other required information, such as the name and address of each waste's generator, the volume and date of arrival of each wastewater, and the applicable pretreatment standards. This claim does not warrant a civil jury trial. Whether ECI's failure to submit complete semi-annual reports caused any harm is too speculative. ¶ 137 Claims 1, 4, 5, 7, and 12 are of similar nature to a public nuisance because they involve allegations of harm that, although not of the same magnitude required at the common law, is direct and immediate, and not speculative or remote. Furthermore, the legislature reinforced the seriousness of the violations alleged in these claims (except claim 7) by providing the option for criminal prosecution. Claims 3, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, and 14 are not of similar nature to a public nuisance because, although the legislature has provided the option for criminal prosecution of the violations alleged in these claims, they do not involve allegations of direct and immediate harm. 2. Second Prong under the Village Food Test ¶ 138 Under the second prong of the Village Food test, the court must determine whether a public nuisance action was regarded as at law in 1848. Village Food, 254 Wis.2d 478, ¶ 16, 647 N.W.2d 177. ¶ 139 Before the adoption of the constitution, the line between law and equity (and therefore between jury and non-jury trial) was not a fixed and static one. There was a continual process of borrowing by one jurisdiction from the other. Fleming, supra, at 658. This borrowing led to a very large overlap between law and equity. Id. Therefore, the historical inquiry into the character of the action in 1848 is a complicated one. ¶ 140 The difference between a court of common law and a court of equity is best summarized by considering the different natures of the rights they are designed to recognize and protect, the different natures of the remedies which they apply, and the different natures of the forms and modes of proceeding which they adopt. Joseph Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence 19 (Isaac F. Redfield, addt'l author, 9th ed. 1866 (1834)). Historically, courts of equity were able to administer remedies for rights that courts of common law d[id] not recognize at all; or, if they d[id] recognize them, they le[ft] them wholly to the conscience and good-will of the parties. Id. at 21. In addition, the remedies in courts of equity were often very different from the remedies in courts of common law. Id. Courts of equity interfered by way of injunction to prevent wrongs; whereas, courts of common law were generally able to award only damages after the wrong was done. Id. at 21-22. In cases of nuisance, courts of common law were also able to invoke the legal remedy of abatement. 3 Blackstone, supra, at 222. [31] Lastly, [t]he modes of seeking and granting relief in equity [we]re also different from those of courts of common law. The latter proceed[ed] to the trial of contested facts by means of a jury[,] . . . [whereas] courts of equity tr[ied] causes without a jury. Story, supra, at 22. ¶ 141 The State argues that public nuisance actions were actions only in equity in 1848. The State cites numerous cases for this proposition, such as Kamke v. Clark, 268 Wis. 465, 478c, 67 N.W.2d 841 (1955), which stated that [i]njunctions to prevent nuisances have always been rendered in courts of chancery and not by courts of law. ¶ 142 The State's arguments do not answer ECI's arguments that public nuisance actions were considered criminal actions (actions at law) long before 1848 and before the equitable remedy of injunction. Case law and other historical sources support ECI's arguments. To illustrate, Blackstone stated that no action lies for a public or common nuisance, but an indictment only. 3 Blackstone, supra, at 219. Blackstone also wrote that public nuisances are punishable by public prosecution, and subject to fine according to the quantity of the misdemeanor. 4 Blackstone, supra, at 167. ¶ 143 The Wisconsin Revised Statutes of 1849 also acknowledged criminal jurisdiction for a public nuisance. Wis.Rev.Stat. ch. 26, § 3 (1849). In Luning, the plaintiff in error was indicted for a public nuisance and was tried before a jury. In Douglass v. State, 4 Wis. 403 [] (1854), the defendant was indicted and found guilty by a jury for a public nuisance, and the court ordered the nuisance to be abated. In Stoughton v. State, 5 Wis. 291 (1856), the defendant was indicted and found guilty by a jury for a public nuisance, and the court entered a judgment for the abatement of the nuisance and fined the defendant $50.00 and costs. ¶ 144 In Attorney General v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co., 35 Wis. 425 (1874), this court noted that a public nuisance was historically the subject of criminal jurisdiction and was a proceeding at law. The court noted the following: A public nuisance being the subject of criminal jurisdiction, the ordinary and regular proceeding at law is by indictment or information, by which the nuisance may be abated, and the person who caused it may be punished. . . . Besides this remedy at law, it is now settled that a court of equity may take jurisdiction in cases of public nuisance, by an information filed by the attorney general. This jurisdiction seems to have been acted on with great caution and hesitancy. Id. at 538 (quoting Georgetown v. Alexandria Canal Co., 37 U.S. 91, 97-98, 9 L.Ed. 1012 (1838)). ¶ 145 Traditionally, [c]ourts of equity ha[d] no jurisdiction over criminal proceedings, except that under certain circumstances, they w[ould] restrain a public nuisance. James P. Holcombe, An Introduction to Equity Jurisprudence 13 (1846). Courts of equity would interfere, however, only when the court of common law would not afford an adequate and sufficient remedy. Denis G. Lubè, Equity Pleadings 6 (1846). [32] ¶ 146 This authority supports a holding that a public nuisance action was generally an action at law in 1848 and was sometimes an action in equity when a party sought injunctive relief. I therefore analyze the relief sought in this case to determine whether it would have been an action at law or an action in equity. See Village Food, 254 Wis.2d 478, ¶ 33, 647 N.W.2d 177 (concluding that action was legal in nature in 1848 after analyzing nature of relief sought by plaintiffs). ¶ 147 In this case, the State did not proceed criminally against ECI, although it might have done so under Wis. Stat. § 283.91 and potentially under Wis. Stat. § 291.97. [33] The State proceeded civilly and sought forfeitures. A statutory . . . forfeiture proceeding is usually an action by a governmental unit for the recovery of a money penalty. County of Columbia v. Bylewski, 94 Wis.2d 153, 161-62, 288 N.W.2d 129 (1980). Such a proceeding smacks of a remedy at law. See id.; Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 422, 107 S.Ct. 1831, 95 L.Ed.2d 365 (1987) (stating, A civil penalty was a type of remedy at common law that could only be enforced in courts of law.). While the State's complaint also asked for appropriate injunctional relief, this prayer for relief was only incidental to its prayer for monetary compensation and therefore did not change the nature of relief sought. [34] See Tull, 481 U.S. at 424, 107 S.Ct. 1831. It is important to note that ECI's facility was closed for more than a year before the State sued. ¶ 148 Finally, although the action in this case is civil, not criminal, that distinction is not dispositive. The fact that one is undertaken in the civil context, rather than the criminal context, should not deprive the parties of a jury trial in this instance. Village Food, 254 Wis.2d 478, ¶ 29, 647 N.W.2d 177. ¶ 149 In short, a public nuisance action involving the type of forfeitures sought in this case was an action at law in 1848. ¶ 150 A majority of this court is unable to accept this overall analysis. Instead, it severs the historic connection between public nuisance at common law and modern environmental regulation. Ostensibly, the majority does not preclude the right to a civil jury trial in all environmental regulatory cases, but it provides no guidance to circuit judges on when that might be appropriate. This is a sad day for Wisconsin. ¶ 151 I concur with the majority's denial of a jury trial on claims 3, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, and 14. I dissent from the majority's denial of a jury trial on claims 1, 4, 5, 7, and 12.