Opinion ID: 779826
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: county of yakima and state taxation of indian land

Text: 12 It is a well established principle of Indian law that state and local governments lack the power to tax reservation Indians or their land `[a]bsent cession of jurisdiction or other federal statutes permitting it.' County of Yakima, 502 U.S. at 258, 112 S.Ct. 683 (quoting Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148, 93 S.Ct. 1267, 36 L.Ed.2d 114 (1973)). This general exemption from state taxation is lifted only when Congress has made its intention to do so unmistakably clear. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. at 765, 105 S.Ct. 2399; see also Lummi Indian Tribe v. Whatcom County, 5 F.3d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir.1993). The prohibition on state taxation of Indian tribes has been described as a per se rule. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 215 n. 17, 107 S.Ct. 1083, 94 L.Ed.2d 244 (1987). 13 The Supreme Court applied this principle in County of Yakima, where it considered whether Yakima County could impose an ad valorem tax on Indian-owned reservation fee land and an excise tax on the sales of such land. 502 U.S. at 253, 112 S.Ct. 683. The Court held that the Indian General Allotment Act of 1887, under which the land at issue had been allotted and fee-patented, evinced Congress's clear intent to subject the Yakima Nation's reservation fee land to state real estate taxes. Id. at 263-64, 112 S.Ct. 683. The Court reasoned that when the General Allotment Act rendered the allotted lands alienable and encumberable, it also rendered them subject to assessment ... for taxes. Id.; see also Cass County v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 U.S. 103, 110-11, 118 S.Ct. 1904, 141 L.Ed.2d 90 (1998) (Congress has manifested such an intent [to permit state taxation] when it has authorized reservation lands to be allotted in fee to individual Indians, thus making the lands freely alienable and withdrawing them from federal protection.); Lummi Indian Tribe, 5 F.3d at 1357 ([N]o matter how the [reservation] land became patented, it is taxable once restraints against alienation expire.). 14 The Court's conclusion that the Indian land was taxable did not, by itself, determine the extent of permissible state taxation. To resolve that issue, the Court turned to § 6 of the General Allotment Act, 24 Stat. 390, as amended by the Burke Act of 1906, 34 Stat. 182, codified at 25 U.S.C. § 349. Section 6 provides: 15 At the expiration of the trust period and when the lands have been conveyed to the Indians by patent in fee, ... then each and every allottee shall have the benefit of and be subject to the laws, both civil and criminal, of the State or Territory in which they may reside.... Provided, That the Secretary of the Interior may, in his discretion, and he is authorized, whenever he shall be satisfied that any Indian allottee is competent and capable of managing his or her affairs at any time to cause to be issued to such allottee a patent in fee simple, and thereafter all restrictions as to sale, incumbrance, or taxation of said land shall be removed.... 16 Id. (second emphasis added). Significantly, the Court held that the Burke Act proviso describe[d] the entire range of jurisdiction to tax. And that description is `taxation of ... land.' County of Yakima, 502 U.S. at 268, 112 S.Ct. 683 (emphasis in original). 17 The Court then assessed whether the two taxes at issue were permissible taxation of ... land as contemplated by the Burke Act proviso. Because liability for Yakima County's ad valorem tax flow[ed] exclusively from ownership of realty on the annual date of assessment and create[d] a burden on the property alone, the tax constituted a valid taxation of ... land. Id. at 266, 112 S.Ct. 683. 18 Yakima County's excise tax on the sale of the Nation's fee land was, however, another matter. Yakima County advocated a reading of the Burke Act proviso that would subject an Indian allotment to wholesale state taxation once the land had been patented in fee. Id. at 268, 112 S.Ct. 683. The Court rejected Yakima County's all-encompassing position. In so doing, the Court acknowledged that the county's broad interpretation of taxation of ... land [did] not exceed the bounds of permissible construction. Id. (emphasis added). Yet, the Court observed, such a construction was surely not ... the phrase's unambiguous meaning .... It is quite reasonable to say, in other words, that though the object of the sale here is land, that does not make land the object of the tax, and hence does not invoke the Burke Act proviso. Id. at 268-69, 112 S.Ct. 683 (emphasis in original). Employing the canon of construction by which ambiguous statutory provisions are interpreted to the Indians' benefit, the Court narrowly construed the General Allotment Act, as amended by the Burke Act: Because the Allotment Act explicitly authorizes only `taxation of ... land,' not `taxation with respect to land,' `taxation of transactions involving land,' or `taxation based on the value of land,' the excise tax was invalid as applied to sales of the Yakima Nation's fee land. Id. at 269, 112 S.Ct. 683. 19 Here, like the property at issue in County of Yakima, the reservation land transferred by the Nation in trust to the United States was made alienable under the Indian General Allotment Act of 1887. See Quinault Allottee Ass'n v. United States, 202 Ct.Cl. 625, 485 F.2d 1391, 1394 (1973) (discussing allotment history on the Quinault Reservation); Anderson & Middleton Lumber Co. v. Quinault Indian Nation, 130 Wash.2d 862, 929 P.2d 379, 382-83 (1996) (same). Thus, we must determine whether Grays Harbor's tax qualifies as a taxation of ... land of the sort authorized by the General Allotment Act and upheld in County of Yakima.