Opinion ID: 706993
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: when time for appeal begins to run under houston v. lack

Text: 9 In Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988) the Supreme Court held that the date of filing of a notice of appeal by a prisoner appearing pro se is the date the prisoner turns over the notice of appeal to prison officials for mailing. The Court noted in its opinion the lack of control that the prisoner has over his mail once it has left his hands; and the question arises whether a similar reasoning might require the time limit for filing a notice of appeal to be calculated from the date the prisoner receives notice of the entry of the order from which he or she appeals. 10 In United States v. Grana, 864 F.2d 312 (3d Cir.1989) the Third Circuit held that the logic of Houston applied in reverse. The court held that delays in the receipt of mail by a prisoner caused by prison officials should not be counted in determining when the time period for appeal begins to run, just as delays after the mailing of a notice of appeal are not counted in determining whether the time limit has been overstepped. 11 After due consideration of the Third Circuit's reasoning and the arguments made in this case we have determined that we are unable to apply the Grana interpretation of Houston to this case. Although many or even all of the policy arguments of Houston may apply here an attempt to apply the legal justification of the Houston holding to the delay in delivery to the prisoner in the case before us is like trying to put a square peg in a round hole. 12 Although Grana was a criminal case, the case it relied upon, Houston, was, like the case before us, a civil case. The rationale of Houston was not constitutional or equitable in nature; rather, it was based on an interpretation of the word filed in the rule and statute governing the timeliness of notices of appeal. The Court held that a notice of appeal could be deemed timely filed upon delivery to the prison authorities for mailing. In order to apply this kind of statutory interpretation in reverse we would have to look to the language determining when the time for appeal begins to run and whether that beginning point could be construed to be the time when the prisoner receives notice of the entry of the order to be appealed from. 13 F.R.A.P. 4(a)(1) provides that a notice of appeal in a civil case generally may be filed within 30 days of the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from. (emphasis added) 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2107 similarly provides that in such a case a notice of appeal may be filed within thirty days after the entry of such judgment, order or decree. The date of entry is the beginning point for when the time period begins to run and the question is whether the word entry can be construed differently in the case of prisoners who are pro se litigants. For a number of reasons it cannot be so construed. 14 Rule 4(a)(7) defines entry, providing that a judgment or order is entered under Rule 4(a) when entered in compliance with Rules 58 and 79(a). Rule 79(a), in turn, provides that the clerk shall keep a book in which all orders, verdicts, and judgments shall be entered. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Rules to provide that entry means entry on the docket. Acosta v. Louisiana, 478 U.S. 251, 106 S.Ct. 2876, 92 L.Ed.2d 192 (1986). 2 We realize that the Rules of Appellate Procedure do not purport to affect the jurisdiction of this court. FED.R.APP.P. 1(b). However, we see no reason why any different definition of entry should apply under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2107. 15 Even if there were no definition of the word entry in the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure we would not find it a reasonable definition of entry that the date of entry of a notice of appeal could be the date upon which it is received by a prisoner because such a construction defies the plain language of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2107. The absurdity of such a definition could be seen most clearly where a single order or judgment applies to several parties who are incarcerated. The date of entry for a single order could be different for each of the incarcerated parties. 16 Where a paper is deemed filed on the date it is mailed there is one filing date for the document so there is no similar problem. Although when a paper is deemed served 3 on a particular party on the date it is mailed there may be more than one date of service for each party, service is a concept that relates to individuals and documents simultaneously while entry is a concept that relates solely to the document. When a court clerk is asked what the entry date is of an order or judgment it should not be necessary for the clerk to give a different answer depending on who asks the question. Accordingly, we hold that Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988) does not affect the date on which the time for appeal begins to run.