Opinion ID: 590887
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Hobbs Act Jury Instructions

Text: 42 Dischner argues that the instructions incorrectly set out the elements of extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, because they failed to require the government to prove that Dischner knew he was not lawfully entitled to the property. 14 He relies on the First Circuit's opinion in United States v. Sturm, 870 F.2d 769 (1st Cir.1989), to urge that the statute requires the government to prove that the defendant did not have any claim of right, and knew he was not legally entitled to the property in question. 43 Although Dischner asserts that objections were raised to the extortion instructions, the record provided to us fails to reflect an objection on this ground. We therefore review for plain error. United States v. Bustillo, 789 F.2d 1364, 1367 (9th Cir.1986). A plain error is a highly prejudicial error affecting substantial rights. Id. (quoting United States v. Giese, 597 F.2d 1170, 1199 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 979, 100 S.Ct. 480, 62 L.Ed.2d 405 (1979). The availability of a better instruction is not a ground for reversal, United States v. Ward, 914 F.2d 1340, 1344 (9th Cir.1990), and in determining the adequacy of jury instructions, we examine them in their entirety. United States v. Feldman, 788 F.2d 544, 555 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1067, 107 S.Ct. 955, 93 L.Ed.2d 1003 (1987). 44 We require courts to instruct on the mens rea required by the Hobbs Act. United States v. Aguon, 851 F.2d 1158, 1168 (9th Cir.1988) (en banc) (Aguon II ) ([C]riminal intent must be submitted to the jury in a case charging extortion under the Hobbs Act.... The court's failure to give an instruction on a vital element of the crime was plain error.) (adopting language from United States v. Aguon, 813 F.2d 1413, 1419 (9th Cir.1987) ( Aguon I )). In the case of extortion by inducing payment through fear of economic loss, however, we have not read other elements into the Act. 15 Dischner does not fault the court's instructions on criminal intent and, read as a whole, we believe they necessarily required a finding that Dischner knew he had no right to the payments induced. For this reason we need not decide whether the government must prove that the defendant knew he had no entitlement. 45 The district court instructed that the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the defendant induced or attempted to induce the person described in the indictment to part with money or property; (2) the defendant did so knowingly and willfully by means of extortion, as defined in the statute and in other instructions; and (3) the extortionate transaction delayed, interrupted, or adversely affected interstate commerce. The court then instructed that [e]xtortion means to obtain money or property ... by the wrongful use or threat of fear of economic loss. To commit extortion the defendant must wrongfully induce the payment; and  'wrongful' means to obtain money or property unfairly and unjustly by one having no lawful claim to it. Id. After this the court again stated: You have been instructed that the Government must prove that the particular defendant knowingly and willfully induced a payment, and that he knowingly and willfully did so by means of extortion. 46 Under these instructions the jury had to find that Dischner knowingly induced the payment of money to which he had no lawful claim by the use or threat of fear of economic loss. If Dischner knew he was extorting money--that is, he knowingly and willfully was obtaining money to which he had no lawful claim--then he necessarily knew that he had no lawful claim to it. Knowledge of the extortion encompasses knowledge of the lack of lawful claim to the property. Thus, even on Dischner's theory the error would be harmless. 47