Opinion ID: 2310332
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Missing Witness and Missing Evidence Inference.

Text: Allen, as we have noted, admitted at trial that he killed Manning, but claimed to have done so to protect his own life. Once he had introduced that issue into the case, the government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Allen had not acted in self-defense. Bynum v. United States, 133 U.S.App.D.C. 4, 5, 408 F.2d 1207, 1208, cert. denied, 394 U.S. 935, 89 S.Ct. 1211, 22 L.Ed.2d 466 (1968). Manning was dead, and his version of the encounter was not available to the jury. In order to contest Allen's proffered justification, the prosecutor was obliged to probe Allen's account to determine if it was consistent with the claim of self-defense. The prosecutor attempted to demonstrate that although Allen's words at trial supported the claim of innocence, his conduct at the time of Manning's death did not. A principal issue at trial concerned Allen's state of mind. The question presented to the jury was whether Allen shot and killed Manning with criminal intent or in self-defense. Allen's intent could not be proved directly, because there is no way of fathoming and scrutinizing the operations of the human mind. Allen v. United States, 136 U.S.App.D.C. 381, 383 n. 1, 420 F.2d 223, 225 n. 1 (1969). Instead, his state of mind could best be inferred from the surrounding circumstances. Id. at 383, 420 F.2d at 225; see also Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, No. 3.02 (3d ed.1978). It cannot be gainsaid that, in probing Allen's conduct to determine whether it matched Allen's claimed state of mind, the prosecutor incidentally brought to the jury's attention Allen's failure to undertake efforts to collect or preserve evidence arguably relevant to self-defense, an issue as to which the government, not Allen, bore the burden of proof. We are of the opinion, however, that the trial judge acted reasonably in permitting the prosecutor to do so. The division majority thought that the government's position that the prosecutor's questioning was permissible undermines the missing evidence and missing witness rule. 579 A.2d at 232. Our view is the exact converse; Allen's attempt to extend the missing evidence doctrine to reach the facts here undermines the prosecution's right to conduct a thorough exploration and exposition of relevant facts, and therefore impairs the even-handed balance that is essential to adversarial litigation. [3] Over defense objection, the judge permitted the prosecutor to cross-examine Allen in detail about his conduct after Manning's death. Did Allen look for Gerard after the shooting? Did he ask his sister to keep the van from which he said he had shot Manning? Did he attempt to preserve a shell casing which may have popped out after he fired the fatal shot? Did he and Gerard search the van to see if there was anything in it that could support his claim that he had acted in self-defense? Did he ask Gerard to preserve the weapon with which he (Allen) had killed Manning? Did he request Gerard to keep in touch so he could say what really happened in the van? In his rebuttal argument, the prosecutor reemphasized that if Allen had truly acted in self-defense he would have scoured that van to get that shell casing and to preserve the gun and would have tried to keep Gerard or Gerald, or know his last name. He argued that Allen did nothing, nothing to preserve what would support him. A similar theme appeared in the prosecutor's initial argument as well. Allen contends that the inference the government was urging was that appellant's failure to produce the gun, the shell casing or Gerard created the presumption that the [evidence] if produced would be unfavorable. We cannot agree that the prosecutor was urging such a presumption, either directly or implicitly. Rather, the prosecutor's focus was on the plausibility of Allen's claim of self-defense in light of his pre-arrest conduct, and not on any missing witness or missing evidence inference. During cross-examination, the prosecutor sought to show that if Allen had killed Manning justifiably in self-defense, then it would have been logical for him to do what he could to enable the authorities to find out what really happened. Specifically, the prosecutor suggested that an innocent man would have kept the pistol, searched the car for clues, told his sister and brother-in-law about Manning's death, attempted with their help to preserve the van and its contents, and requested Gerard to stay in touch. Similarly, in his closing argument, the prosecutor focused on what Allen did after the killing. He did not argue or even mention Gerard's absence from the trial. As the trial judge put it, such cross-examination [4] shows the jury something about whether [Allen's] conduct is consistent with [that of] a man who tells the story he's telling here today. The missing witness and missing evidence rules focus on the impact on the jury of the defendant's nonproduction of evidence at trial. To put it in the vernacular, the prosecutoror, indeed, any attorney should not be allowed to mislead the jury by trying to make something out of nothing. We are of the opinion, however, that this wise policy is not significantly implicated here. The government was not making something out of nothing. Rather, as the trial judge recognized, the prosecutor was asking the jury to draw reasonable inferences from Allen's conduct at a time when actions spoke louder than words. Allen maintains, not implausibly, that there were legitimate reasons for his failure to preserve evidence immediately after the killing. [5] He had every opportunity, however, to explain these reasons to the jury. [6] The overall character of Allen's conduct at the timehis failure to report Manning's death or to preserve the scene for investigators, his flight, and his assumption of an assumed identitywere all relevant to an informed assessment of his state of mind. The prosecutor's concentration on this theme during cross-examination and in closing argument did not, in our view, run afoul of the missing witness or missing evidence doctrine. It is axiomatic that the trial judge, who is on the scene and has an opportunity to obtain a feel for the case which is not available to an appellate court reviewing a paper record, is invested with wide latitude in determining the permissible limits of cross-examination, see Springer v. United States, 388 A.2d 846, 854 (D.C.1978), and of closing argument, Irick v. United States, 565 A.2d 26, 32 (D.C.1989). Allen has failed to show abuse of that discretion.