Opinion ID: 2653538
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Cline and Bacon

Text: Nor is a contrary conclusion dictated by this court’s determination in both Cline and Bacon that circumstantial evidence permitted an inference that the decision maker was aware of the protected activity. In Cline, an offer of employment was withdrawn after the decision maker was told by a supervisor that the company was “in litigation with Mr. Cline and that he may not be the best person to do the [job] because of the litigation factor.” 521 F.3d at 513. Unlike this case, a reasonable jury could infer awareness of the protected activity when the supervisor suggested withdrawing a job offer because the plaintiff was in litigation with the employer. In Bacon, which was discussed in Cline, the plaintiff had engaged in numerous instances of protected activity by making internal complaints about race discrimination, filing multiple civil rights charges, and participating in two lawsuits asserting class claims of race discrimination. Bacon v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 192 F. App’x 337, 343 (6th Cir. 2006). One of many adverse actions at issue was a transfer to a new position which was made at the suggestion of a vice president who also added that there were “legal concerns.” Id. at 340. This court found that the remark by the vice president to the manager in connection with the transfer was sufficient to create a question of fact whether the decision maker knew of the plaintiff’s No. 13-1376 15 protected activity. Id. at 343. Here, what Trujillo conveyed to Gasperut was a brief, non-specific complaint expressing generalized discomfort with comments by Rollins that Gasperut reasonably assumed to refer to the harsh and profane ranting they had both just witnessed during dinner about the competence (or lack thereof) of the controller and other staff at the plant in Mexico. Neither the evidence concerning what was actually said during the brief exchange, nor what was conveyed by Gasperut’s warning, could lead a reasonable juror to conclude that Gasperut, or one or more members of the executive team, knew Trujillo had engaged in protected opposition activity. The district court did not err in finding that plaintiff failed to satisfy the second element of the prima facie case. Trujillo, 2013 WL 811449, at . AFFIRMED.