Opinion ID: 2103784
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Flexibility of the Undue Burden Standard

Text: The majority's primary criticism of the undue burden standard is that it provides no standard at all by which to review abortion regulations. Without a doubt, reasonable minds will sometimes disagree as to whether a particular regulation constitutes an undue burden on the right to obtain an abortion. Indeed, reasonable disagreement as to the meaning of rules and standards is commonplace in many parts of our law and is a direct consequence of the common law system of adjudication inherited from England. Despite its shortcomings, though, the flexibility of the undue burden standard is its very strength, and this more flexible standard allows courts to accommodate various interests and to fashion appropriate relief under the circumstances of an individual case. By way of contrast, the application of strict scrutiny is not flexible at all, and I can find no case in this state where application of this standard has resulted in upholding the challenged law. With the adoption of strict scrutiny, this Court has forced the State of Tennessee into an all-or-nothing scenario, where only the most impeccably drafted legislation withstands the slightest possibility of darkening the constitutional doorway. I simply cannot fathom that the people of Tennessee, who outlawed the practice of abortion until Roe v. Wade , intended to remove all power from themselves to enact reasonable regulations on abortion. Nevertheless, this is the very conclusion reached by the majority today. Even despite the majority's admittedly legitimate concerns, the undue burden standard is practically no more flexible than any other standard of review. After all, even strict scrutiny analysis begs the question of how a right achieves fundamental status, [17] or even how a state interest becomes compelling, rather than merely important or legitimate. [18] Other objective constitutional standards, such as the reasonableness of a search, or the fairness of a trial, are just as capable of lawless decision making by judges who refuse to follow precedent or who wish to place their own imprimatur upon the law. The undue burden standard, though, is not subjective or without definition as the majority asserts. As Casey defined the standard, the phrase undue burden is shorthand for those regulations which have the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus. 505 U.S. at 877, 112 S.Ct. 2791 (emphasis added). Surely the majority does not shy away from the undue burden standard because it requires an examination of the purpose of a statute, as this task is performed daily within the halls of this hallowed institution. Moreover, an examination of the effects of a regulation requires only that the parties fully develop and document the appellate record and that the reviewing court diligently consider the relevant parts of that record. Contrary to the majority's assertions, therefore, a court that is faithful to its duty to declare what the law is does have an objective benchmark by which to measure whether a regulation places an undue burden on the right to obtain an abortion. Without any citation to legal authority or analysis whatsoever, the majority boldly declares that it would find that all of the challenged regulations also place an undue burden on the right to obtain an abortion. The majority then uses my disagreement with this statement to illustrate the subjective nature of the undue burden standard. The majority is certainly correct that application of the undue burden standard can result in subjective analysis, but only when that analysis consists of bald declarations of unconstitutionality. The reasoned judgment of the Courtnot the adoption of strict scrutinyis the check in our system against the arbitrary exercise of judicial power. So long as the judgment of the court can be supported by experience, logic, and precedent, then I cannot conceive that any standard, including the undue burden standard, offers no real guidance and engenders no expectation among the citizenry that governmental regulation of abortion will be objective, evenhanded, or well-reasoned. [19] It is true that by using the undue burden standard, we are forced to put our trust and faith in judges of good character who are dedicated to sound and reasoned interpretations of law, and I agree that we would be in trouble if the judges took it upon themselves to make law rather than interpret it. So long as the Court is able to make a reasoned decision, the majority's fears concerning the undue burden standard should be minimized. It is my hope and expectation, perhaps navely so, that reason and sound judgment would prevail at the end of the day. The flexibility of the undue burden standard is simply not a legitimate reason to adopt the wrought-iron hammer of strict scrutiny.