Opinion ID: 2585456
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: utah establishment clause claim

Text: ¶ 18 On appeal, Snyder argues that this case is controlled by Society of Separationists v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916 (Utah 1993), and that the trial court erred as a matter of law in applying this court's precedent in that case to the matter at issue in this case. We agree. Society of Separationists is controlling authority in the instant case, and the trial court erred in its application and interpretation of that decision here. ¶ 19 In Society of Separationists, this court reviewed the constitutionality of Salt Lake City's practice of opening its city council meetings with prayer and upheld that practice as constitutional. In doing so, we concluded that article I, section 4 of the Utah Constitution [3] does not impose an absolute ban on government expenditure of public funds or use of public property in support of religion or religious institutions. Id. at 937. Instead, a neutrality requirement was read into the no public money or property language of article I, section 4, and this court concluded: The middle ground we [adopt] rests on the concept of governmental neutrality [that] underl[ies] our constitution's religion and conscience clauses, which in this instance means neutrality in the use of public money or property. When the state is neutral, any benefit flowing to religious worship, exercise, or instruction can fairly be characterized as indirect because the benefit flows to all those who are beneficiaries of the use of government money or property, which may include, but is not limited to, those engaged in religious worship, exercise, or instruction. Id. ¶ 20 Having read the neutrality requirement into article I, section 4, this court then went on to set forth the analytical elements of neutrality that must be present in order for a benefit to be found constitutionally indirect and therefore permissible. [U]se of public money or property that benefits religious worship, exercise, or instruction or any ecclesiastical establishment qualifies as an indirect benefit and survives constitutional scrutiny only if [(1) ] the money or property [is] provided on a nondiscriminatory basis [and (2) ] the public money or property [is] equally accessible to all. Id. at 938. ¶ 21 Pursuant to this analytical approach, in Society of Separationists it was first determined whether public money or property had been used for religious worship, exercise, or instruction or for the support of any ecclesiastical establishment and then determined whether the benefit from the use of public money or property was direct and therefore constitutionally invalid. We employ the same approach in this case. ¶ 22 In the instant case, the first inquiry is whether Murray City uses public money or property in support of religious worship, exercise, or instruction. Society of Separationists held that the prayerful address of a deity, by its very nature, is a `religious exercise' [and that therefore] a religious exercise occurs at City Council meetings when prayer is given as an opening thought. Id. at 932. Under this court's precedent in Society of Separationists, there is no doubt that any prayer offered at the opening ceremony of Murray City's municipal council meetings constitutes religious exercise and that the provision of public funds and property in the execution and furtherance of Murray City's policy and practice of including an opening prayer supports or benefits religious exercise. ¶ 23 The district court in this case, however, concluded that Snyder's proposed prayer did not qualify as a prayer and thus its recitation would not have constituted religious exercise. We disagree. ¶ 24 In Society of Separationists, prayer was defined as an address of entreaty, supplication, praise or thanksgiving directed to some sacred or divine spirit, being or object. That it may contemplate some wholly secular objective cannot alter the inherently religious character of the exercise. Id. at 931 (quoting Karen B. v. Treen, 653 F.2d 897, 901 (5th Cir.1981), aff'd mem., 455 U.S. 913, 102 S.Ct. 1267, 71 L.Ed.2d 455 (1982)). Here, Snyder's proposed prayer meets this definition. Snyder's prayer begins with an entreaty of a divine being for blessing and guidance for the participants of the council meeting. The fact that the prayer also contemplates that there is no divine being does not prevent it from being a prayer. It then goes on to ask that the participants see the errors of their ways and to follow God's law regarding prayer in public. It asks the divinity to punish the participants if they do not make good decisions and see the error of their ways. All of these requests to the divinity qualify the statement as a prayer. Therefore, the district court erred in concluding that Snyder's proposed prayer was not a prayer and that such a prayer would not be religious exercise under Society of Separationists. ¶ 25 The district court also focused on the issue of whether Snyder's beliefs were sincere and whether they were deeply held by him. This is irrelevant for purposes of the definition of prayer and whether prayer is a religious exercise under Utah caselaw interpreting the state constitution's religion clauses. The district court's analysis is drawn from the federal cases analyzing whether a free exercise claim will stand under the federal Free Exercise Clause. In that analysis, the threshold question is whether the plaintiff's beliefs are religious in nature and whether those religious beliefs are sincerely held. This analysis has never been incorporated into our interpretation of our state constitution's religion clauses. Instead, Society of Separationists held that prayerful address of a deity, by its very nature, is a `religious exercise.' Id. at 932. No inquiry as to the depth or sincerity of belief is required, and the district court erred in incorporating that analysis into its decision. ¶ 26 Having concluded that Snyder's proposed prayer does qualify as a prayer, that the offering of prayer during the Murray City municipal council meeting does constitute religious exercise under article I, section 4 of the Utah Constitution, and that inclusion of prayer at the Murray City municipal council meetings does involve the expenditure of public money or the provision of public property for the support or benefit of religious exercise, we must then determine whether that benefit is constitutionally direct or indirect under our neutrality analysis. ¶ 27 As previously discussed, public money or property that benefits religious worship, exercise, or instruction or any ecclesiastical establishment qualifies as an indirect benefit and survives constitutional scrutiny if it is provided on a nondiscriminatory basis and is equally accessible to all. Id. at 938. If Murray City fails to satisfy either of the two elements of the neutrality analytical model, then the benefit of public expenditure provided to religion would not be constitutionally indirect and would violate article I, section 4. ¶ 28 While both requirements of the neutrality test must be satisfied, this case turns on the first element. Society of Separationists sets forth the nondiscriminatory basis element of the neutrality requirement. If a city permits groups to use city-owned facilities, that use must be permitted without regard to the belief system of the user. Lutherans or Latter-day Saints who wish to use the facilities must have access on exactly the same terms as the Loyal Order of Moose, the American Atheist Society, or the Libertarian Party. Id. In other words, Murray City is prohibited from examining the content of Snyder's proposed prayer to determine whether the beliefs expressed therein were appropriate or acceptable. Murray City did just that in this case. ¶ 29 Murray City, after reviewing an advance copy of Snyder's prayer, rejected it because it determined that the text of the proposed prayer [was] unacceptable. Murray City argues that it did not reject Snyder's prayer because it disagreed with his religious beliefs but rather because Snyder's prayer did not fall within the subject-matter restriction which the City has properly placed on the Opening Ceremony. The imposition of a subject-matter restriction for the reverence portion of Murray City's municipal council meeting agenda invites Murray City to review the contents of prayers and subjectively determine whether a particular subject is appropriate or acceptable. This constitutes nothing more than content, or belief, control by another name. At times, it is nearly impossible to distinguish the political from the religious in the course of prayer. One person's political manifesto is another person's prayer. ¶ 30 Here, the use of public money or property for facilitating the giving of opening prayer at the Murray City municipal council meeting was not made on a nondiscriminatory basis, that is, without regard to the belief system of the [prayer]. Id. at 939. Murray City's rejection of Snyder's prayer was discriminatory in that the rejection was made after a review of the prayer's content and was based upon Murray City's disagreement with the beliefs expressed therein. Because Murray City's means of selecting those entitled to offer the prayer at the opening of its city council meetings was not nondiscriminatory, and therefore not neutral, the city's practice of opening its meetings with prayer constitutes a direct benefit to the exercise of religion and violates article I, section 4's prohibition that [n]o public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction.. . . ¶ 31 For the foregoing reasons, the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Murray City. If Murray City chooses to continue to open its city council meetings with prayer, it must strictly adhere to the neutrality requirements set forth herein and in Society of Separationists. Under those neutrality requirements, Snyder should be allowed to offer his prayer.