Opinion ID: 349452
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: court's communication with a juror

Text: 49 A substantial claim raised by all appellants relates to the trial court's private communications with one juror during the jury's deliberations. Communications with the jury may violate the defendants' right to be present at all stages of the proceedings. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 43(a); Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 95 S.Ct. 2091, 45 L.Ed.2d 1 (1975) (reversible error to advise jury in response to jury request, without notifying defense counsel, that court would accept verdict of guilty with extreme mercy of the Court); United States v. Glick, 463 F.2d 491, 493 (2d Cir. 1972) (terming right an unequivocal mandate). Because an important right is involved, one with constitutional underpinnings, Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970), private communications with the jury have been said to create a presumption of prejudice. United States v. Treatman, 524 F.2d 320, 323 (8th Cir. 1975); see United States v. Pfingst, 477 F.2d 177, 198 (2d Cir. 1973) (Government has burden of persuasion as to harmlessness to defendant of communication), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 941, 93 S.Ct. 2779, 37 L.Ed.2d 400 (1973). This presumption may be overcome, however, by evidence showing lack of prejudice. United States v. Treatman, supra, 524 F.2d at 323; see Rogers v. United States, supra, 422 U.S. at 40, 95 S.Ct. 2091 (harmless error rule applies to private court-jury communications); United States v. Glick, supra, 463 F.2d at 493; United States v. Schor, 418 F.2d 26, 30 (2d Cir. 1969). The question could also be waived, as by the court's procuring advance consent of counsel on both sides and of the defendants themselves. 50 In the present posture of this case, we find it somewhat difficult to determine whether Judge Duffy's private communications with a juror 12 prejudiced the appellants in any way. No record whatsoever was made of the communications at the time. Some twelve hours later, the judge in camera, without the presence of any counsel or of the juror, dictated his recollection of the discussion he had had with the juror; this transcript was ordered sealed by the court. Seven months later, upon a request by this court to the district court clerk's office for the sealed transcript, it was discovered that the document had been lost (apparently either in that office or the judge's chambers), that there were no copies, and that the stenographer's notes had been destroyed. Judge Duffy then sua sponte dictated and furnished to us under seal what he considered to be the most accurate re-creation of the record possible. We have noted the substance of the communication as reported in this second sealed transcript in the margin. 13 51 There having been no informed consent to the communications, it was error for the court not to reveal the substance of these communications to counsel for both sides. Before deciding to deny the juror's request to be excused from the trial, the court should have had an informed discussion (with counsel) on the proper course to follow. United States v. Van Meerbeke, 548 F.2d 415, 418, (2d Cir. 1976). The fact that the court might then have similarly denied the request, we recently stated in a related context, is irrelevant to the right of the appellant(s) to be informed . . . and also ignores the benefits which informed discussion and debate between court and counsel may produce even where a court may be aware in the abstract of its own alternatives. United States v. Robinson, 544 F.2d 611, 621 (2d Cir. 1976), rehearing en banc granted, No. 76-1153 (Feb. 17, 1977). It also makes no difference that the matter was personal, unrelated to the trial as such, and possibly embarrassing to the juror in its details. These factors would justify informing counsel at a side bar or in chambers, rather than in open court, but they cannot outweigh a defendant's right to be present for all aspects of his trial. A slight degree of potential embarrassment faced by a juror is of little moment when compared to the potential loss of liberty faced by a defendant. 52 While we therefore have concluded that the trial court committed error, we also believe that the error was harmless under the circumstances. We note that the deliberations here continued for almost two days of the four and one-half day total after the juror spoke to the judge. During these days, moreover, there is no indication that the juror in any way renewed his request or spoke to the judge again about his problem, which suggests that he was not particularly concerned about it. While one might learn more about these factual questions by holding a hearing at which the juror could be interrogated, see United States v. Remmer, 347 U.S. 227, 74 S.Ct. 450, 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954); United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 377-80 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970, 93 S.Ct. 1443, 35 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973), we are not convinced that a hearing would assist us in resolving the ultimate question of prejudice at this late date. See United States v. Dozier, 522 F.2d 224, 228 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1021, 96 S.Ct. 461, 46 L.Ed.2d 394 (1975). The time for these potential difficulties to be aired with counsel is the time at which the juror's problem comes to the court's attention. It is regrettable that the court did not do so in this case; we trust it will not happen again. 53 There are a few other points made by appellants in this rather lengthy appeal. We have considered them all and found them without merit. In a trial that was by no means perfect, but which contained no error sufficiently heinous as to create any real prejudice to any appellant, we affirm the convictions, satisfied that there was more than sufficient evidence to support the jury verdict. 54 Affirmed.