Opinion ID: 3014381
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: We have plenary review of the District

Text: Court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for Alston’s principal contention on failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. appeal is that he should have been Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d permitted to have discovery so as to 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996). In considering this comply with the fact-pleading standard appeal from a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, we imposed by the District Court. This Court accept all allegations as true and attribute has long recognized the importance of all reasonable inferences in favor of discovery in the successful prosecution of Alston. Thus, we will affirm the District civil rights complaints. See Colburn v. Court’s dismissal only if it appears that Upper Darby Township, 838 F.2d 663, 666 Alston could prove no set of facts that (3d Cir. 1988) (“[I]n civil rights cases would entitle him to relief. Id. at 65. We ‘much of the evidence can be developed review the District Court’s denial of only through discovery’ of materials held reconsideration for abuse of discretion. by defendant officials.” (quoting Frazier v. Max’s Seafood Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 785 F.2d v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 673 (3d Cir. 65, 68 (3d Cir. 1986)). We acknowledge 1999). Alston’s need for discovery to present his case, which we discuss more fully below. But, the lack of discovery was not the real B. barrier blocking Alston’s path to relief. Rather, it was the stringent pleading The District Court tested Alston’s standard presupposed by the parties and complaint against a pleading requirement the District Court. Our discussion for civil rights cases based on our opinion therefore begins by examining the District in Darr v. Wolfe. The District Court Court’s requirement of factual specificity, observed that it was “well settled” that which is in conflict with Fed. R. Civ. P. Third Circuit law requires civil rights 8(a)’s simplified notice pleading standard. plaintiffs to plead with particularity. 5 We We will then consider Alston’s contention disagree. that the District Court should have Alston’s § 1983 complaint should presented an opportunity to amend the have been considered not under a complaint before dismissing it with prejudice. Lastly, we will comment on the right to discovery in actions such as this. 5 In seeking to affirm the District Court’s order, the Defendants argue that pro se
the strictures of heightened pleading. Jurisdiction was proper in the trial Brief for Appellee at 9 (citing Ressler v. court based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Our Scheipe, 505 F. Supp. 155, 156 (E.D. Pa. review is predicated on 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 1981)). 4 heightened pleading requirement, but 67; Ross v. Meagan, 638 F.2d 646, 650 under the more liberal standards of notice (3d Cir. 1981); Rotolo v. Borough of pleading. Although once enforced in Charleroi, 532 F.2d 920, 922 (3d Cir. several circuits, including ours, a fact- 1976), none of which have been expressly pleading requirement for civil rights overruled, these pronouncements preceded complaints has been rejected by the and cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Supreme Court in no uncertain terms. Court’s holdings in Leatherman and Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Swierkiewicz. Insofar as our decisions, Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 such as Darr, run counter to the principle U.S. 163, 168 (1993). In Leatherman, the of notice pleading in § 1983 actions, they Court instructed that Rule 9’s standard for are not controlling. Fundamentally, a averments of fraud and mistake should not heightened pleading requirement for civil be imported to the notice pleading rights complaints no longer retains vitality standard of Rule 8, which requires only “a under the Federal Rules.6 short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. More recently, in 6 The Defendants likewise argue on Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. appeal that Alston’s complaint lacked 506, 513 (2002), the Court reaffirmed its sufficient factual support. But a plaintiff holding in Leatherman and stated that need not plead facts. To withstand a “Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff need only applies to all civil actions, with limited make out a claim upon which relief can be exceptions.” Our Court of Appeals has granted. If more facts are necessary to r e c o gnized the Supre me C ourt’ s resolve or clarify the disputed issues, the abrogation of a heightened pleading parties may avail themselves of the civil requirement for § 1983 actions. See Ray discovery mechanisms under the Federal v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 297 (3d Cir. Rules. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512 2002) (“[T]he Court [has] explained that (“This simplified notice pleading standard courts should narrowly interpret statutory relies on liberal discovery rules . . . to language to avoid heightened pleadings define disputed facts and issues and to standards.”); Abbott v. Latshaw, 164 F.3d dispose of unmeritorious claims.”). 141, 149 (3d Cir. 1998) (observing that The need for discovery before nothing more is required of § 1983 cases testing a complaint for factual sufficiency than the notice pleading requirement of is particularly acute for civil rights Rule 8). plaintiffs, who often face informational While our ruling in Darr, 767 F.2d disadvantages. See Colburn, 838 F.2d at at 80, is one of several decisions in which 667. Plaintiffs may be unaware of the this Court imposed a higher bar for § 1983 identities and roles of relevant actors and, pleadings, see, e.g., Frazier, 785 F.2d at owing to the ir inc a r c eration or institutionalization, unable to conduct a 5 Alston’s complaint should have been subject only to the “short and plain statement” requirement of Rule 8(a). pre-trial investigation to fill in the gaps. Courts are to construe complaints so “as to But by itself, this lack of knowledge does do substantial justice,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(f), not bar entry into a federal court. The keeping in mind that pro se complaints in principles of notice pleading and the particular should be construed liberally. liberal discovery rules allow for Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d meritorious claims to proceed even if a Cir. 2003). Comprising only two confined prisoner cannot adduce all the paragraphs in all, Alston’s pro se necessary facts at the outset. For instance, complaint was “short” and, despite some our cases permit the naming of fictitious vagueness, sufficiently “plain.” Both the defendants as stand-ins until the identities District Court and the Magistrate Judge can be learned through discovery. Hindes found that the complaint, construed v. FDIC, 137 F.3d 148, 155 (3d Cir. 1998). liberally, set forth cognizable legal claims. As the Magistrate Judge here recognized, Likewise, the Defendants never argued counsel appointed under 28 U.S.C. that the complaint ran afoul of the short § 1915(d) can help litigants like Alston and plain statement requirement. 7 To the surmount these obstacles to pleading. But legal help alone is insufficient; in such cases, access to discovery may well be identification of responsible defendants or critical. See Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 the lack thereof, district courts should F.2d 637, 642 (9 th Cir. 1980) (“[T]he strongly consider granting it. Because plaintiff should be given an opportunity Alston’s complaint was dismissed before through discovery to identify the unknown an opportunity for discovery, any defendants, unless it is clear that discovery expectation of factual sufficiency was would not uncover the identities, or that premature. It is a first principle of federal the complaint would be dismissed on other civil procedure that litigants “are entitled grounds.”); see also Billman v. Indiana to discovery before being put to their Dep’t of Corr., 56 F.3d 785, 789-90 (7 th proof.” Bennett v. Schmidt, 153 F.3d 516, Cir. 1995) (Posner, C.J.) (“ The peculiar 519 (7 th Cir. 1998). perversity of imposing heightened 7 pleading standards in prisoner cases . . . is It is likely, however, that the that it is far more difficult for a prisoner to Defendants’ pleading defect argument was write a detailed complaint than for a free a reaction to the fact that portions of person to do so, and again this is not Alston’s complaint made little sense. But because the prisoner does not know the in that case, the parties and the District law but because he is not able to Court still had several procedural tools at investigate before filing suit.”). If their disposal. The Defendants, or the discovery is sought by a plaintiff, as it was District Court on its own initiative, may here, and if it would aid in the have sought a more definite statement to 6 contrary, their 12(b)(6) motion was replete discovery. Cf. McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d with defenses that responded to claims 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that a they discerned in Alston’s complaint. complaint should set forth “who is being sued, for what relief, and on what theory, Although Alston’s complaint with enough detail to guide discovery.”). arguably complies with Rule 8(a), we Thus, we have no doubt that the complaint recognize that it lacks clarity and will will require amendment. We are equally likely require amendment. Indeed, his certain that Alston may have made some c o m p l a i n t h a s y ie l d e d v a r i e d progress in that regard had he been