Opinion ID: 1790946
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: whether the trial court erred in giving the state's aiding and abetting instruction.

Text: ¶ 29. Jury Instruction # 10, on the issue of aiding and abetting, was offered by the State and given by the circuit court: The Court instructs the Jury that each person present at the time of, or consenting to and encouraging, aiding or assisting in any material manner in the commission of a crime, or knowingly and willfully doing any act which is an ingredient in the crime, is as much a principal as if he had with his own hands committed the whole offense. Therefore, if you believe from the evidence in this case beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime charged in this case did take place and that Dale Leo Bishop was present at the time and place where the crime was committed, and that he knowingly and willfully encouraged, aided, or assisted in any material manner in the commission of that crime or knowingly and willfully did any act which is an ingredient in that crime, then he is as much a principal as if he had with his own hands committed the whole offense. ¶ 30. Bishop argues that the instruction is confusing and allowed the jury to convict him if it found that he committed only one element of the crime. He further argues that it does not distinguish between the crimes of murder or capital murder. Bishop did not specifically object to the legal correctness of the instruction at trial, but instead stated, We think it's confusing. Notwithstanding the procedural bar, we will address Bishop's argument as assigned. See Doss v. State, 709 So.2d 369, 378 (Miss.1996) ([A]n objection on one or more specific grounds constitutes a waiver of all other grounds.) quoting Conner v. State, 632 So.2d 1239, 1255 (Miss.1993). ¶ 31. The aiding and abetting instruction used by the circuit court is similar to the instruction found to be erroneous, though harmless, in Hornburger v. State, 650 So.2d 510 (Miss.1995). Hornburger argued that the aiding and abetting instruction told the jury that if they found he had committed any act which was an element of burglary or led to its commission, they could find him guilty as charged, without first finding that he was present at, consented to and encouraged the commission of the crime. 650 So.2d at 515. We found, however, that the error was harmless at most when the aiding and abetting instruction was read with the other instructions. ¶ 32. We further discussed Hornburger 's erroneous instruction in Liggins v. State, 726 So.2d 180, 184 (Miss.1998): Both instructions are objectionable in their effect. In Hornburger, it was pointed out that [the aiding and abetting instruction] basically says if you find [the defendant] did any act which is an element of the crime of burglary, you shall find [the defendant] guilty as charged. [Citation omitted.] As Liggins objected at trial, [the aiding and abetting instruction] lessens the burden of the State to prove every element of a crime by suggesting that if they can show any act which is an element of the crime, then the instruction directs them to find the defendant guilty. Liggins basically argued that the State must simply show an act which is an element of the crime, rather than prove every element, to require a jury to find a defendant guilty. We found that the instruction in Hornburger was harmless error because of its sufficient sister instruction and because the term should was used as opposed to the shall utilized in the instant case. Further, Hornburger 's instruction required a greater burden on the state to prove the necessary elements, whereas the instant case's instruction, lessened the state's burden. Hornburger is not this case. It is reversible error in this case. Liggins, 726 So.2d at 184-85. ¶ 33. In Milano v. State, 790 So.2d 179 (Miss.2001), we held harmless an erroneous aiding and abetting instruction when accompanied by three instructions correctly placing the burden on the State: Contrary to these instructions, there were three instructions preceding these two that specifically addressed the burden of the State. For example, S-4, S-6-A, and S-7 each provide that [i]f the State has failed to prove any one or more of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you shall find the Defendant not guilty of [the crime]. Each jury instruction that specifically addressed the crimes charged also specifically stated that the State must prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt or the defendant is to be found not guilty. However, in this case, there were three preceding instructions that properly placed the burden on the State to prove every element of the crime. The jury was fully instructed that if all the elements were not proven beyond a reasonable doubt, Milano was to be found not guilty. Accordingly, the jury could not have been confused when all instructions were considered and read together. We thus find the error harmless. 790 So.2d at 184-185. ¶ 34. Jury Instruction C-5, [6] on the burden of proof, placed the burden on the State of proving beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the crime with which the defendant was charged.... Failing to prove any material element of the crime charged required a finding of not guilty. Jury Instruction 8, [7] on capital punishment, properly instructed the jury of the elements of capital murder while engaged in the crime of kidnaping. Jury Instruction 11, [8] on lesser offenses, required the jury to find the defendant not guilty if the State failed to one of the essential elements of capital murder. Jury Instruction 12 [9] properly set out for consideration the lesser crime of murder. ¶ 35. Jury Instruction 10, on aiding and abetting, when read with the other instructions which required the jury to find the State had to prove all elements of the offense before Bishop could be found guilty, was harmless error. In Milano, we prospectively adopted the pattern instruction of the Fifth Circuit on aiding and abetting. 790 So.2d at 185. A defendant must voluntarily have participated in the murder, and the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that every element of the crime was committed to find the defendant guilty. ¶ 36. This issue is without merit.