Opinion ID: 1223875
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: latent danger test failure adequately to warn

Text: As noted above, Clark also contends that the open and obvious nature of the straddle carrier's blind spot precluded any possible liability based on the latent danger test and that the circuit court therefore erred in instructing the jury that the straddle carrier could be found to be defective solely by virtue of a failure to give adequate warnings of the danger involved in its use. For the reasons discussed below, we agree. A duty to warn of latent defects in a product arises under both negligence and strict liability theories. See Wagatsuma, 10 Haw.App. at 570, 879 P.2d at 585. However, the appellate courts in this jurisdiction have repeatedly recognized that a manufacturer's duty to warn only extends to known dangers which the user of the manufacturer's product would not ordinarily discover. Id. (citation omitted). See also Masaki, 71 Haw. at 25, 780 P.2d at 579 (`[A] manufacturer must give appropriate warning of any known dangers which the user of its product would not ordinarily discover[.]' (Quoting Ontai, 66 Haw. at 248, 659 P.2d at 743.)). Consequently, a product cannot be defective merely because the manufacturer failed to provide an accompanying warning regarding an open and obvious danger. Having held as a matter of law that the danger involved in using the Series 510 straddle carrier was open and obvious, see supra at section III.C.1.b, it therefore follows, and we so hold, that the circuit court erred in instructing the jurors that they could find the straddle carrier defective solely on the basis of a failure on Clark's part to give adequate warnings regarding that danger. However, in this case, the circuit court's latent danger instruction was erroneous for yet another reason. As the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) held in Wagatsuma that, [g]enerally, a products liability claim based on either negligence or strict liability has three elements: (1) a duty to anticipate and design against reasonably foreseeable hazards; (2) breach of that duty; and (3) injury proximately [i.e., legally] caused by the breach.  10 Haw.App. at 564, 879 P.2d at 583 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Thus, in order for a manufacturer to be liable for failing to provide an appropriate warning, it must not only be subject to a legal duty to warn, but the breach of that duty ( i.e., the failure to give an adequate warning) must have been the legal cause of the plaintiff's injuries. See Aga v. Hundahl, 78 Hawai`i 230, 236, 891 P.2d 1022, 1028 (1995) (reaffirming proposition that the best definition and the most workable test of proximate or legal cause so far suggested seems to be this: The actor's ... conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if ... his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (some ellipsis points in original and some added)); Dunbar v. Thompson, 79 Hawai`i 306, 314, 901 P.2d 1285, 1293 (App.1995) ([I]n Hawai`i, an actor's negligence can be a legal cause of harm to another only if such negligence is causative, i.e., a `substantial factor in bringing about the harm.' (Quoting Knodle v. Waikiki Gateway Hotel, Inc., 69 Haw. 376, 390, 742 P.2d 377, 386 (1987).)). In the present case, it is undisputed that both Terminals and Dias were aware of the blind spot caused by the design of the Series 510 straddle carrier and that all relevant persons, including Tabieros, were familiar with the dangers that the straddle carriers posed to employees in their vicinity. Indeed, the entire layout of and work procedures pertaining to the loading dock areas were organized around the movement of the straddle carriers precisely because of the dangers that they posed to those employees. Thus, even if the open and obvious character of the danger posed by the straddle carrier's blind spot were deemed somehow not to have relieved Clark of its duty to warn, nevertheless, Clark could not be liable to the plaintiffs in this case by virtue of having failed to warn Tabieros of a danger of which he was already aware because such a breach could not have been a legal cause of Taberios's accident. Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court erred in giving the latent danger instruction  which could have led the jury to conclude that liability might legitimately be founded on Clark's failure to warn  for this reason as well.