Opinion ID: 805979
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Price-Fixing Claims

Text: Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides that “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce . . . is . . . illegal.” 15 U.S.C. § 1. Notwithstanding its broad language, this provision prohibits “only unreasonable restraints of trade.” Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988). Per se liability attaches, however, to “plainly anticompetitive” agreements. Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006). An agreement between competitors to fix prices, known as a horizontal price-fixing agreement, categorically constitutes an unreasonable restraint, and, accordingly, is unlawful per se. Id. To prevail on a claim of horizontal price fixing, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendants entered into a conspiracy “formed for the purpose and with the 16 effect of raising . . . price[s].” Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 223. In other words, the evidence must show that: (1) the defendants conspired to raise prices, and (2) this conspiracy caused injury to the plaintiff in the form of artificially inflated prices. See Apex, 822 F.2d at 253; In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 356 (3d Cir. 2004). Parallel pricing among competitors, also known as “conscious parallelism,” is often proffered as evidence of a price-fixing agreement. “Conscious parallelism” describes “the process, not in itself unlawful, by which firms in a concentrated market might in effect share monopoly power, setting their prices at a profit-maximizing, supracompetitive level by recognizing their shared economic interests and their interdependence with respect to price and output decisions.” Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227 (1993). Conscious parallelism alone, however, does not establish an antitrust violation. Such behavior is consistent with both unlawful conspiracy and lawful independent conduct. See Apex, 822 F.2d at 253. Accordingly, when the defendants’ parallel pricing forms the basis for a price-fixing claim, a plaintiff must show additional circumstances—often referred to as “plus factors”—which, when viewed in conjunction with the parallel conduct, would permit a fact-finder to infer a conspiracy. Id. Such “plus factors” may include, for example: a common motive to conspire; evidence that the parallel acts were against the apparent economic selfinterest of the individual alleged conspirators; or evidence of “a high level of interfirm communications.” Id. at 254. 17 Section 1 of the Sherman Act does not itself provide a private right of action. That right is established by section 4 of the Clayton Act, which authorizes private suits by “any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws,” 15 U.S.C. § 15, and affords prevailing plaintiffs a claim to three times their actual damages.