Opinion ID: 1449891
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: introduction

Text: This case involves application of the so-called credit-as-true rule. When an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) makes an adverse credibility finding with respect to a witness's testimony in a Social Security case, he or she must make specific findings justifying that decision. Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 502 (9th Cir.1989) (citing Varney v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs. ( Varney I ), 846 F.2d 581, 584 (9th Cir.), modified on reh'g, 859 F.2d 1396 ( Varney II ) (9th Cir.1988); Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 1407 (9th Cir.1986)). According to the credit-as-true rule, when an ALJ fails to provide specific, articulable reasons to support an adverse credibility finding, this court should `not remand solely to allow the ALJ to make specific findings regarding that testimony. Rather, [it should] take that testimony to be established as true.' Id. (quoting Varney II, 859 F.2d at 1401). I concur with the entirety of Judge Selna's opinion, including application of the credit-as-true rule in this case. In the dissent's view, however, there is an internal conflict among Ninth Circuit case law that makes resolution of the credit-as-true issue impossible here. I write separately to clarify why application of the credit-as-true rule is appropriate and why this case does not present an opportunity for en banc review of the conflict identified by the dissent.