Opinion ID: 1482099
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Other Arguments on Admissibility

Text: The remaining question is whether defendant's statements to police were trustworthy, reliable, and voluntarily given and therefore were appropriately admitted into evidence. Defendant makes two arguments: first, he claims that his confession was obtained only after his will was overborne and, second, that his confession was not sufficiently corroborated. As noted, the State must demonstrate the voluntariness of a confession beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Galloway, 133 N.J. 631, 654, 628 A. 2d 735 (1993). An involuntary confession can result from physical or psychological coercion. Ibid. However, unlike the use of physical coercion, use of psychologically oriented interrogation techniques is not inherently coercive. Ibid. Confessions are not voluntary if derived from very substantial psychological pressures that overbear the suspect's will. Id. at 656, 628 A. 2d 735. In determining whether a defendant's will was overborne, the totality of the circumstances must be examined, including both the characteristics of the defendant and the nature of the interrogation. Id. at 654, 628 A. 2d 735. Relevant factors include the suspect's age, education and intelligence, advice concerning constitutional rights, length of detention, whether the questioning was repeated and prolonged in nature, and whether physical punishment and mental exhaustion were involved. Ibid. (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2047-48, 36 L.Ed. 2d 854, 862 (1973); State v. Miller, 76 N.J. 392, 402, 388 A. 2d 218 (1978)). At the suppression hearing in this case, the trial court considered many of those factors: It is clear from the testimony that defendant went through a serious emotional experience in giving this statement. With intermittent breaks, he was questioned by two different officers over a nine-hour period. At no time did he request to stop or ask for a lawyer. He was given drinks and cigarettes. [He] was apparently given bathroom breaks and there is no evidence that promises were made to him. ... The defendant was a high school graduate. There was no indication that he was unwilling to speak, nor that he was excessively tired. The interrogation, although lengthy, it was all during the general work day, and there was no indication that he was sleep deprived, or that he was in any way physically or mentally abused. He was given breaks, had one meal and refused another. Although he was emotionally distraught, his will was not overborne. The emotional distress seems more related to the horrible things he was admitting than to anything else. The trial court applied the correct standards and amply explained its application of those standards when evaluating defendant's condition while he was interrogated. We agree with the trial court's conclusion, affirmed by the Appellate Division, that defendant has not shown that he was subject to substantial psychological pressure warranting suppression of his statements. We see no reason to add to the evaluation of the trial court, and therefore reject the argument advanced by defendant. Defendant also contends that his confession should have been excluded because it is uncorroborated, and that his motion for judgment of acquittal should have been granted. When the State seeks to introduce a confession into evidence, some corroboration is required as a matter of law but if there is such corroboration, [it is for] the jury [to] resolve `arguments and speculation' about its weight and sufficiency. State v. Di Frisco, 118 N.J. 253, 271-72, 571 A. 2d 914 (1990), cert. denied, DiFrisco v. New Jersey, 537 U.S. 1220, 123 S.Ct. 1323, 154 L.Ed. 2d 1076. Commentators have noted that New Jersey's requirements are narrow with respect to the quantum of evidence required to establish corroboration of a confession offered by the State for the truth of its contents. 7 J. Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence, § 2071, at 515 n. 3 (Chadbourn rev. 1978) (citing Lucas, supra, 30 N.J. 37, 152 A. 2d 50; State v. Johnson, 31 N.J. 489, 158 A. 2d 11 (1960)), quoted in DiFrisco, supra, 118 N.J. at 273, 571 A. 2d 914. Under that standard the State ... must produce only independent proof of facts and circumstances which strengthen or bolster the confession and tend to generate a belief in its trustworthiness. Lucas, supra, 30 N.J. at 56[, 152 A. 2d 50].... Or, in other words, [a]ll elements of the offense must be established by independent evidence or corroborated admissions, but one available mode of corroboration is for independent evidence to bolster the confession itself and thereby prove the offense `through' the statements of the accused. [ State v. Mancine, supra, 124 N.J. at 251, 590 A. 2d 1107 (quoting DiFrisco, supra, 118 N.J. at 273, 571 A. 2d 914 (quoting Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 156, 75 S.Ct. 194, 199, 99 L.Ed. 192, 200-01 (1954))).] Our corroboration standard requires that the trial court determine whether there is any legal evidence, apart from the confession of facts and circumstances, from which the jury might draw an inference that the confession is trustworthy. Lucas, supra, 30 N.J. at 62, 152 A. 2d 50. The corroboration requirement has both legal and factual components. As a matter of law, the trial court initially must determine whether the State has presented independent corroborative evidence of the trustworthiness of the confession. If the State presents some corroboration, DiFrisco, supra, 118 N.J. at 271, 571 A. 2d 914, the confession is submitted to the fact finder to resolve arguments and speculation about its weight and sufficiency. Id. at 272, 571 A. 2d 914 (internal quotation marks omitted). As noted by the Appellate Division, the State met its burden, producing more than sufficient evidence to corroborate the substance of defendant's confession for purposes of sending the question of its reliability to the jury for determination. The State's witnesses testified about where Suhan's body was discovered and the injuries she suffered, which information corresponded to defendant's statements about his presence at the body's location and what he observed, specifically his reference to the red thing nearby the pile he saw there, and his description of the manner in which he attacked Suhan. Furthermore, multiple witnesses testified about defendant's expressed desire to go to the roller rink on the night of the crime, and one observed injuries to defendant's right hand the day after the murder occurred. We conclude that the State presented the corroboration required under Lucas and DiFrisco, and that the trial court properly let the jury resolve how much weight the confession should be given. Moreover, it was for the jury to evaluate the strength of that evidence, weighed against the State's failure to demonstrate definitively how defendant got to South Amboy. And, although sketchy, there was evidence that defendant could drive (notwithstanding his lack of a driver's license), and that there was adequate time for him to have gotten from Somerville to South Amboy. Thus, although defendant never argued at trial that the jury's conviction was against the weight of the evidence, not having moved for a new trial on this ground in a timely manner, see Rule 2:10-1, defendant has not proven that the guilty verdict was a manifest denial of justice. We reject defendant's separate argument that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.