Opinion ID: 2640942
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: chevron's corporate liability for the acts of its supervisors

Text: ¶ 47 Finally, Chevron's brief raises the corporate status of Chevron, suggesting that in order to hold Chevron liable for the acts of Helf's supervisors, Helf must either demonstrate that her injury was inflicted by a supervisor who was an alter ego of Chevron or that her injury was inflicted by a co-employee who acted with an intent to injure and that the act was directed or intended by Chevron. This suggestion is a slight mischaracterization of the law. ¶ 48 This court has long recognized the general rule that an employer can be held vicariously liable for the intentional tortious acts of employees under the theory of respondent superior if those acts are conducted within the scope of employment. [62] Whether or not an action is within the scope of employment is a factual inquiry that is evaluated under the three-part test announced in Birkner v. Salt Lake County. [63] Under this test, the employee's conduct must (1) `be of the general kind the employee is employed to perform,' (2) `occur within the hours of the employee's work and the ordinary spatial boundaries of the employment,' and (3) `be motivated, at least in part, by the purpose of serving the employer's interest.' [64] The employer faces no vicarious liability if the employee acts on entirely personal motives unrelated to the employer's interests. [65] ¶ 49 The rule cited by Chevron comes from specific discussion in Larson's about when an employer may be held liable for a supervisor's intentional assault on an employee. The specialized rule recognizes that assaults generally do not serve corporate interests or the employer's interests. [66] Unless the employer has commanded or expressly authorized the assault, it cannot be said to be intentional from the employer's standpoint. . . [because] to the employer, it is just one more industrial mishap in the factory of the sort the employer has a right to expect to be exclusively covered by the compensation system. [67] Helf's injury does not fall within this specialized application of the vicarious liability rule. Accordingly, Chevron's liability will depend on whether Helf's supervisors were acting within the scope of their employment when they directed her to re-initiate the neutralization process.