Opinion ID: 6318463
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: smith’s failure to protect was unconstitu-

Text: TIONAL, BUT DONGARRA CANNOT RECOVER DAMAGES FOR AN ASSAULT THAT NEVER HAPPENED Dongarra’s second constitutional claim alleges that Smith failed to protect him from other prisoners. Smith knew that prisoners might harm Dongarra if they thought he was a sex offender. Yet he ignored that risk when he gave Dongarra a T-shirt and ID that implied he was. Though Dongarra states an Eighth Amendment violation, he lacks a remedy. No one assaulted him, so he cannot recover damages. And the prison has already replaced his ID and T-shirt, so it is too late to grant injunctive relief. Thus, we will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of this claim too. 7 A. Smith violated the Eighth Amendment by failing to protect Dongarra Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment when they act with “deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to” a prisoner. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828–29 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). The prisoner must show both that a prison officer ignored an objectively serious risk and that he was subjectively aware of that risk. Id. at 834, 839–40. Dongarra’s complaint states both elements. Dongarra faced an objectively serious risk of harm. The risk to his safety was “very likely to cause … needless suffering.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993). If other prisoners thought he was a sex offender, they might have assaulted or even killed him. That is as serious as it gets. “Being violently assaulted in prison is simply not part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 372−73 (3d Cir. 2021). Dongarra also pleads that Smith was subjectively aware of the risk of assault. That is, Smith was both “aware of facts from which” he could infer the sufficiently serious risk and that he actually “dr[e]w th[at] inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Indeed, Dongarra told Smith that he was in danger of “being mistaken[ ] for a child molester or … sex offender” and thus “killed.” App. 32. That plausible fear was enough to warn Smith of the serious risk Dongarra faced. See Renchenski, 622 F.3d at 326–27 (noting that the sex-offender label “is 8 stigmatizing” and can induce attacks on labeled inmates (internal quotation marks omitted)). It is obvious that branding Dongarra a sex offender could make him a target of prison violence. Kedra v. Schroeter, 876 F.3d 424, 442 (3d Cir. 2017) (“[W]e have regularly relied on the obviousness of risk as a permissible and highly relevant basis from which to infer actual knowledge [of risk].”). Plus, Smith did recognize that serious risk. He allegedly said he “hop[ed] [Dongarra] kn[e]w how to fight or make[ ] and use a knife.” App. 33. This comment leaves no doubt that Smith knew of the real risk of violence. Once Smith knew that prisoners might target Dongarra, he had to do more to protect him. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832–33 (requiring prison officers to “take reasonable measures to guarantee [prisoners’] safety” (internal quotation marks omitted)). But Smith never did. So, if the complaint’s allegations are true, he violated the Eighth Amendment. B. Though Smith violated his rights, Dongarra has no remedy Rights do not always have remedies. True, Blackstone famously wrote that “where there is a legal right[,] there is also a legal remedy.” 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries . Though that maxim is a good principle, it is a poor practical guide. Often, someone can violate a right without paying full compensation. For instance, a valid claim can be blocked by sovereign or qualified immunity. So too here. Dongarra claimed administrative and injunctive relief, but he cannot get damages for any past harm. 9 1. Administrative relief came; injunctive relief is no longer needed. When a prison fails to protect a prisoner from a serious risk of harm, he can claim administrative relief or an injunction even before he is harmed. “[A] prisoner need not wait until he is actually assaulted before obtaining relief.” Helling, 509 U.S. at 34. Prisoners are “entitled to relief under the Eighth Amendment when they prove[ ] threats to [their] safety.” Id. at 33–34. Dongarra had two avenues for relief. First, the prison’s grievance process lets prisoners “seek formal review” of officers’ conduct. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 74 (2001) (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 542.10 (2001)). That process seems to have worked here. True, Dongarra says he never got a formal response to his grievance. But the prison must have noted his complaints because, within a few weeks, it replaced his ID card and shirt. Second, Dongarra could sue for an injunction. Federal courts may award prisoners temporary restraining orders, preliminary injunctions, and permanent prospective relief. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)–(2). If the prison had not fixed the situation, a court could have stepped in. But the prison did, so we cannot. 2. Bivens damages are unavailable. Though injunctive relief was available while the prison was actively violating Dongarra’s rights, he cannot get damages under Bivens for Smith’s failure to protect him from an attack that never happened. For most constitutional violations, unless a statute authorizes relief, damages are unavailable from the federal government or its officers. But Dongarra can point to no statute allowing his suit. He correctly notes that the Supreme Court has authorized suits against the government even without a statute 10 on point. But the Court has recognized these implied causes of actions for constitutional violations in only three contexts: Bivens; Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248 (1979); and Carlson, 446 U.S. at 16 n.1. To preserve the separation of powers, the Court has “consistently rebuffed” efforts to extend Bivens further. Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 743 (2020). That makes sense. The Constitution entrusts Congress, not the courts, with the power to create new federal causes of action and remedies. Reflecting these concerns, the Supreme Court has outlined a cautious two-step approach to Bivens remedies. First, we ask whether this case presents a new context—whether it is “different in a meaningful way from previous Bivens cases decided by [the Supreme] Court.” Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1859. If it is, we then ask whether “special factors counsel[ ] hesitation” in extending Bivens. Id. at 1857 (quoting Carlson, 446 U.S. at 18). This “inquiry must concentrate on whether the [j]udiciary is well suited, absent congressional action or instruction, to weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a damages action to succeed.” Id. at 1857–58. If “we have reason to pause,” we should not extend Bivens. Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 743. At the first step, this case presents a new context. Although Bivens damages are available for some deliberate-indifference claims, this case is meaningfully different. See Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1859. Carlson extended Bivens to remedy prison officers’ failure to give medical assistance. 446 U.S. at 16 n.1. But there, the prisoner died because of the officers’ neglect. Put differently, the risk that the prison officer ignored (death from not treating the prisoner’s chronic asthma) in fact resulted. Id. 11 But here, Dongarra was not attacked. The potential harm that Smith allegedly ignored (assault by other prisoners) never happened. True, it may have been foreseeable that branding Dongarra a sex offender would cause him emotional and psychological harms. But Dongarra does not claim that Smith was indifferent to those risks. So this case presents a new context. Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1859. As such, we must proceed to the second step of the Ziglar test. We ask whether there are “special factors counselling hesitation.” Id. at 1857. Here, there are two: (1) alternative remedies are available, and (2) the judiciary is poorly suited to balance the costs and benefits of allowing damages. Id. at 1857– 58. Because these factors give us “reason to pause,” we decline to extend Bivens. Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 743. First, Dongarra had two avenues for relief: the prison grievance process and a federal injunction. The prison’s grievance process lets prisoners “seek formal review” of officers’ conduct. Corr. Serves Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 74 (2001) (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 542.10). It is not only well suited to preventing an assault on Dongarra, but also seems to have worked: he complained and got a new T-shirt. And even if that process had failed, he could have asked a court for an injunction ordering the prison to fix its mistake. Second, creating a Bivens remedy would require us to make rules on when a prison official who is deliberately indifferent to one risk may be held liable for harms that result from a foreseeable yet distinct secondary risk. Dongarra did not allege that Smith was indifferent to the risk that labeling him a sex offender would lead to panic attacks, starvation, or loss of 12 sleep—only the risk of assault by other prisoners. While such a secondary risk was arguably foreseeable, it remains a step removed from the prototypical failure-to-protect case. If we were to extend Bivens here, we would need to make rules on whether liability attaches for secondary risks when an officer is alleged to have been indifferent only to a primary risk. For instance, did Smith’s subjective awareness of the risk that Dongarra would be assaulted include the risk that Dongarra might suffer mental anguish or be harmed by his efforts to avoid being assaulted? It is not obvious how far a prison official’s liability should extend. If we strike the wrong balance, we could unleash a torrent of litigation on prisons. And unlike state tort damages, the availability of a federal constitutional remedy cannot be undone by the legislature. The stakes are high, and we are poorly suited to the task. So we must leave that judgment to Congress.