Opinion ID: 1882598
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Giglio and Massiah Claims

Text: To establish a Giglio [6] violation, a petitioner must show that (1) some testimony at trial was false; (2) the prosecutor knew that the testimony was false; and (3) the testimony was material. Craig v. State, 685 So.2d 1224, 1226 (Fla.1996). This Court applies a mixed standard of review to Giglio claims, defer[ring] to the factual findings made by the trial court to the extent they are supported by competent, substantial evidence, but review[ing] de novo the application of those facts to the law. Sochor v. State, 883 So.2d 766, 785 (Fla.2004) (quoting Lightbourne v. State, 841 So.2d 431, 437-38 (Fla.2003) (alterations in original)). Suggs claims that the State committed a Giglio violation by presenting the false and misleading testimony of two inmates who were in the same jail cell with Suggs while he was in the Walton County Jail awaiting trial on the murder charge and other related charges in this case. James Taylor and Wallace Byars testified at trial that Suggs confessed to killing the victim and that they were not promised favors in exchange for their testimony. The postconviction court denied relief and held the following: Gerald Shockley, an investigator for prior collateral counsel, testified regarding the results of his investigation into the placement of Wallace Byars and James Taylor in a cell with the Defendant Suggs. According to Mr. Shockley, James Taylor was interviewed at the Houston County Jail in Dothan, Alabama on January 16th, 1996. Although Mr. Taylor stated that he and Byars fabricated the admission by the Defendant to the murder of Pauline Casey because they wanted preferential treatment from the Sheriff's Office, Mr. Taylor refused to testify or provide a written statement regarding this allegation. Thus, no evidence has been presented to support this allegation. Postconviction Order at 2-3 (footnotes omitted). Suggs asserts the related claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a violation under Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964). Suggs contends that his trial counsel should have raised the issue in the trial court that his constitutional right to counsel was violated because the State placed James Taylor and Wallace Byars in his cell in order to obtain incriminating statements. Suggs maintains that counsel should have claimed that Taylor and Byars were State agents. In Massiah, the United States Supreme Court held that incriminating statements elicited by a government agent outside the presence of counsel cannot be admitted against a defendant at trial. In United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 100 S.Ct. 2183, 65 L.Ed.2d 115 (1980), the United States Supreme Court interpreted Massiah to apply when a state places an undercover jailhouse informant in the same cell as a defendant and instructs the informant to be alert to any incriminating statements made by the defendant. The postconviction court denied Suggs' claim and held that counsel could not be found ineffective because no evidence existed to support a Massiah claim. In particular, the court found: As to the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to file motions pursuant to Massiah, there is no credible evidence that either Taylor or Byars were agents for the State. In fact, Quinn McMillan, former Sheriff of Walton County, testified that Taylor and Byars were not instructed to attempt to obtain a confession from the Defendant. Further, as Mr. Kimmel explained during the evidentiary hearing, they did not have any evidence that Taylor and Byars were planted. After taking depositions of both Taylor and Byars and all the people surrounding them, no evidence was ever found to support that they were planted. .... Defendant Suggs has not established either prong of the Strickland test. Thus, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a motion based on Massiah where no evidence to support the motion existed. Postconviction Order at 4-5 (footnotes omitted). Suggs premises both the Giglio claim and the Massiah claim on the factual allegation that Walton County Sheriff's Department employees conspired with Byars and Taylor to fabricate a confession by Suggs in order to secure a conviction. The postconviction court found that the trial record and the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing provided no support for this allegation. Suggs now argues that the postconviction court ignored the various pieces of evidence he presented at the evidentiary hearing that proved the alleged scheme, including the testimony of George Broxson and Gerald Shockley. George Broxson was an inmate residing in the cell with Suggs, Taylor, and Byars. Broxson's testimony mostly consisted of hearsay statements, which Broxson claimed were made to him by Taylor and Byars. Broxson also testified as to his opinions and assumptions concerning Taylor, Byars, and the Walton County Sheriff's Department employees who operated the jail. Gerald Shockley was a former agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation who was hired by prior collateral defense counsel to investigate potential postconviction claims. Shockley's testimony consisted of hearsay testimony based upon his interviews with George Broxson and James Taylor. Notably, Taylor and Byars did not testify at the postconviction evidentiary hearing. Thus, the sum of the testimony in support of Suggs' claims of a Giglio violation and of ineffective assistance of counsel based on a Massiah violation was (1) the hearsay testimony of Broxson and Shockley as to what Byars and Taylor allegedly said to each of them; and (2) the assumptions made by Broxson about the conduct of the Sheriff's Department employees. There was no testimony by either Byars or Taylor, or factual evidence in support of these claims. Furthermore, at the evidentiary hearing, the State called as a witness the Walton County Sheriff, who had been in charge of the jail at the time of Suggs' incarceration. Sheriff McMillan unequivocally denied instructing Byars or Taylor to extract or manufacture a confession. It was for the trial judge to evaluate the credibility and weight of the evidence presented in the postconviction evidentiary hearing. We do not find that the postconviction court erred in finding that the evidence presented was insufficient to support Suggs' allegation that the confessions were fabricated. Additionally, we do not find that the postconviction court erred in finding insufficient evidence to support the claim that Byars and Taylor were state agents who were placed in Suggs' cell in violation of Massiah as part of an overt scheme to obtain incriminating statements from Suggs. See Lightbourne v. State, 438 So.2d 380, 386 (Fla.1983) (holding that a Massiah claim requires proof of an overt scheme in which the State takes part to obtain incriminating statements). Because we affirm the postconviction court's finding in respect to the Massiah violation, we also affirm the court's finding that defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a motion based on Massiah. As the postconviction court noted, trial counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that they investigated Taylor and Byars and did not find any information that Taylor and Byars were planted State agents. Trial counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to file a motion that could not be supported by the evidence.