Opinion ID: 1661491
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Selection of the Chairman and Vice-Chairman

Text: The trial judge's disposition of this issue was based on the following factual findings and legal conclusions: Defendants contend that trustees Joe L. Reed and Rev. James Smith have not been confirmed by the senate since their 1987 redesignation/reappointment caused by the 1986 amendment [to § 16-50-20]. The defendants argue this is in violation of Article I, Section 2, of the Bylaws, which states, `The Chairman and Vice-Chairman shall serve two-year terms, may be reelected, but shall not serve beyond their term as members of the Board. A member who is appointed to the Board, but not confirmed for the specific term by the Senate, shall be ineligible to hold an office of the Board.' The evidence shows that Chairman Reed and Rev. Smith were serving as trustees in 1986 when [§ 16-50-20] was amended, inter alia, to add Sentence [Seven], which states: `Provided, however, no trustee who is currently serving on the Board or whose term has just expired or who has been previously confirmed by the Senate, shall be required to be reconfirmed for the new term under this section, once appointed by the Governor.' All trustees serving in 1986 had previously been confirmed by the Senate. All trustees now serving (except Ms. Coley) were reappointed by Governor Wallace to a redesignated term and did not require confirmation by the Senate under the provisions of Sentence [Seven]. The court interprets Sentence [Seven] as giving Senate approval to the reappointments of all trustees serving in 1986; or in the alternative, as waiving the necessity of further Senate confirmation of the reappointment of such trustees. In light of that interpretation of Sentence [Seven], Article I, Section 2, of the Bylaws does not affect the eligibility to office of persons who have been `grandfathered' in their position by Sentence [Seven]. [3] The court finds that the Board bylaw restricting trustees who have not been confirmed from holding office has no application to these redesignated terms. To the extent that the bylaws conflict with a ... statute, it is well known that the ... statute controls. The defendants also raised at trial the theory that the March 30, 1989, changes in the bylaws were illegally adopted because the November 1977 bylaws required amendments to the bylaws be adopted at `regular meetings.' If the March 30, 1989, bylaws are voided, the November 1977 bylaws would prohibit the Chair[man] and Vice-Chair[man] from serving more than two (2) one-year terms. The March 30, 1989, meeting was a regular meeting because it was an adjourned meeting, rather than one called by the Governor as a special meeting. Although there is a conflict in the testimony on this point, the court finds that the Secretary of the Board gave more than ten days' notice of the substance of the changes to the bylaws to each trustee. Consequently, the court holds that trustees Joe L. Reed and Rev. James Smith have been lawfully elected chairman and vice-chairman, respectively. As the trial judge observed, the defendants also contended that the Board had met at an illegal session to adopt its 1989 Bylaws, which repealed a section in the previous Bylaws that would have precluded the services of Dr. Reed and Reverend Smith as chairman and vice-chairman, respectively. Regarding this contention, the trial judge stated: Section 16-50-26, [4] Code of Alabama 1975, sets out the method and manner of both regular and special meetings of the Board. Special meetings are not at issue in the instant action. The statute sets regular meetings for the `first Thursdays in May and November at the university unless the board shall, in regular session, determine to hold its meetings at some other time and place.' [5] Defendants contend that the admitted practice of the Board to recess or adjourn at the `call of the Chairman' is a violation of the statute. The court disagrees and finds that Section 16-50-26 gives the Board discretion in setting more meetings than the two (2) minimum meetings mandated in the statute. The only requirement is that the Board, `in regular session, determine [to meet] at some other time and place.' The court finds that the Board, in its regular meetings, has consistently voted to recess or adjourn at the call of the Chairman. A majority of Board members have agreed to this practice, and it does not violate the statute which gives the Board members the right to meet as often as they desire, Section 16-50-26. There are four (4) types of meetings of the ASU Board: (1) those on the dates established by statute (which are to be used if the Board has not otherwise provided); (2) those on dates established by the Board for recurrent meetings, such as a meeting on the Founders' Day Weekend; (3) those set ad hoc by the Board, such as `adjourn to May 1,' ... (4) meetings called by the Governor. The first three (3) types are `regular meetings' because they are called by action of a majority of the Board, while the fourth is a `special meeting' because it is called by a minority of the Board (the Governor or four members). There is nothing in Section 16-5-26, Code of Ala.1975, that forbids the Board from recessing or adjourning its meetings. The law applicable to corporations is that they may adjourn their meeting from a duly noticed board meeting to a later time if there is a quorum present to take the action of adjournment. See Oleck, Non-profit Corporations, Organizations, and Associations, 403 (3d ed. 1974).... Also, the court is aware that other public bodies, such as county commissions who are required by law to meet on certain days, quite often meet on the appointed day and adjourn their meetings to a time before the next statutory meeting date so as to be able to carry out business more efficiently. See, e.g., Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 748 F.Supp. 819, 827 n. 12 (M.D.Ala.1990) (county commission approved settlement of lawsuit in adjourned meeting). Based on the foregoing analysis, the court will enter a declaratory judgment that there is no prohibition on recessing or adjourning meetings, and the Board possesses the power to do so. The court denies the requested injunction. We find no reason to reverse the trial court's judgment in case number 1910751 and we adopt the quoted portions of its order as part of the opinion of this Court.