Opinion ID: 209980
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Preference Database Claims

Text: Luma argues that the district court erred in construing the “graphical objects” claim limitation to exclude text. Luma argues that nothing in the specification excludes text from the ambit of graphical objects, particularly in light of the fact that, as noted in the specification, modern computer operating systems treat text as pictures of letters (e.g., anti-aliased text). Luma also asserts that even if the district court’s construction 2007-1353, -1378 -4- were correct, it has presented sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of fact as to whether the appellees’ accused products infringe under the narrower construction. Appellees respond that the district court correctly construed the limitation in light of its use in the specification and the prosecution history of the patent. Appellees argue that both the specification and the prosecution history treat text and “graphical objects” as two distinct forms of more general “visual representations.” Appellees add that Luma has failed to point out any evidence that would create a genuine issue of material fact as to infringement under the district court’s construction. We review claim construction de novo on appeal. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Tech., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc). “We review a district court's grant of summary judgment of noninfringement without deference and draw all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the nonmovant.” Elbex Video, Ltd. v. Sensormatic Elec. Corp., 508 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2007). We conclude that the district court correctly construed the limitation “graphical objects” to exclude text alone. We begin by considering the language of the claims because “the claims themselves provide substantial guidance as to the meaning of particular claim terms.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (citations omitted). The language of claim 14 indicates that “graphical objects” are a subset of the more general category of “visual representations,” but provides no insight as to the inclusion or exclusion of text as part of “graphical objects.” Dependent claim 15 indicates that “text” is a subset of the category “visual representations” as well but does not indicate the relationship between “text” and “graphical objects.” 2007-1353, -1378 -5- We turn next to the specification in order to determine if it provides a clearer indication of the scope of “graphical objects.” “[C]laims must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part.” Id. at 1315 (quotations and citation omitted). We find the specification to be indeterminate as to whether one of ordinary skill in the art would understand “graphical objects” to include text alone. Several passages from the specification indicate by their grammatical structure that “graphical objects” and “text” are different things. For example, the inventor stated, “The one or more visual representations may include text that is anti-aliased for improved appearance, graphical objects, or an additional image or images that may be obtained from an additional input device.” ’801 patent col.2 ll.33-36; see also col.17 ll.45-48 (“[p]rompting is performed via a graphical object or a text clue imposed on the displayed image”); id. at col.19 ll.5659 (“the operator . . . selects the text or graphical objects with which to annotate the image”). The use of the disjunctive “or” suggests that “graphical objects” and “text” are alternatives rather than overlapping categories. However, other parts of the specification blur the line between “graphical objects” and “text.” For example, after stating that an “input device” is used “to locate the text or graphical object” on an image, the patent adds that “[o]bject attributes such as font, color, and size can be selected manually or may be supplied by [the] preference database.” Id. at col.19 ll.59-63. The antecedent of the word “object” would seem to be “graphical object” and yet the specification refers to the “font” of the object—an attribute commonly associated with text. Similarly, the specification explains that “[a]nti-aliased text is used extensively throughout the interactions with the system. The anti-aliased text uses broadcast standard anti-aliasing technology in which text and background 2007-1353, -1378 -6- colors are manipulated on a pixel by pixel basis to give the illusion of smooth transition and well-defined text borders . . . .” Id. at col.19 ll.12-17; see also col.19 ll.30-34 (explaining that “raster anti-aliased text” uses “a color map picture for each letter”). On balance, however, the specification supports the district court’s claim construction. Turning to the prosecution history, we find information that is more conclusive that would influence one of ordinary skill in the art’s understanding of “graphical objects.” “[A] court should also consider the patent's prosecution history, if it is in evidence. . . . Like the specification, the prosecution history provides evidence of how the PTO and the inventor understood the patent.” Philips, 313 F.3d at 1318. The originally filed version of claim 14 (designated claim 21) did not include the language “said one or more visual representations comprising graphical objects” at the end of the “preference database” clause. Also, a dependent claim (designated claim 22) added the limitation “wherein said one or more visual representations comprise text.” The examiner rejected each of those claims (21 and 22) as anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). However, the examiner stated that a second claim dependent from claim 21 (designated claim 24) recited allowable subject matter if rewritten in independent form. Claim 24 added the limitation “wherein said one or more visual representations comprise graphical objects.” The patentee did not traverse the rejection and rewrote claim 24 as suggested by the examiner, which then became claim 14 of the ’801 patent. Given that claim 22 that was limited to text was rejected as anticipated while claim 24 that was limited to graphical objects was not, the examiner clearly understood graphical objects not to include text alone. The patentee acquiesced in that understanding by 2007-1353, -1378 -7- amending his claims in the manner suggested. Thus, we conclude that the district court correctly construed the limitation “graphical objects” to exclude text alone. Luma further contends that summary judgment of noninfringement was nonetheless improper because it had submitted sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact as to infringement even under the district court’s construction excluding text. Even construing the facts in the manner most favorable to Luma, we agree with the district court that Luma has failed to indicate any genuine issues of material fact with respect to the “preference database” of “visual representations comprising graphical objects.” The problem with the very vague marketing materials cited by Luma as support for its argument is that they only reference one out of many linked limitations necessary to meet the claim limitations. Customization alone is insufficient. Likewise, status icons alone that may or may not be customizable (i.e., capable of pre-stored preferences associated with a user or type of procedure) are insufficient to meet Luma’s burden. The claims require that pre-stored preferences for the addition of graphical objects to an input image for output to an output device be applied according to information retrieved from a pre-stored database and associated with a particular user or procedure type. Even considered together, the materials referenced by Luma do not indicate this combination of elements in the accused devices.