Opinion ID: 25914
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: 18 Here, there is no dispute that the trial court did not comply with Rule 11. The record reflects that the court failed to: address the defendants personally in open court; explain the nature of the charge; explain the effect of any supervised release term; explain that the court was required to consider applicable sentencing guidelines, but could depart from those in certain circumstances; explain the defendants' right to plead not guilty; explain the defendants' right to be tried by a jury; explain that at trial the defendants had the right to an attorney; inform the defendants of their right against self incrimination at their trial; address each defendant personally to ascertain that his plea was not the result of threats or coercion; and inquire whether the defendants' guilty pleas were the result of negotiations or discussions with the government. 19 The defendants limit their complaints here to the trial court's failure to explain: the nature of the charge; the right to plead not guilty; the right to a jury trial; the right to counsel at trial; and the right against compelled self incrimination. Accordingly, any complaints about the other variations are waived. See Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993). The Nature of the Charge 20 Rule 11's requirement that defendants understand the nature of the charge against them refers to the elements of the offense. United States v. Calderon, 243 F.3d 587, 589 (5th Cir. 2001). Here, the record reflects that the elements of 8 U.S.C. § 1326, the statute the defendants were charged with violating, were never discussed during the plea hearings. Further, the indictment was not read, and there were no written plea agreements. Nonetheless, the government asserts that its recital of the factual basis, along with the fact that the charge is simple and easy to understand, renders the court's failure to explain the nature of the charge harmless error. We disagree. 21 This Circuit has never found that recitation of a factual basis, which is a distinct and separate requirement under Rule 11, obliterated the need to ensure that a defendant understands the nature of the charge. Rather, in every case where we have found the failure to explain the nature of the charge to be harmless, there has been evidence, other than recitation of the factual basis, indicating that the defendant understood the nature of the charge. See, e.g., Cuevas-Andrade, 232 F.3d at 444 (holding failure to explain nature of charge harmless because the indictment was read to the defendant, the defendant signed a written plea agreement listing the elements of the charge, and the defendant's attorney reviewed the charges with the defendant); United States v. Smith, 184 F.3d 415, 417 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding failure to explain nature of charge harmless because the indictment was read to the defendant, and her attorney stated that he had reviewed the indictment and charges with her and that she understood them and voluntary pleaded guilty); United States v. Reyna, 130 F.3d 104, 111 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding failure to explain nature of charge harmless because the indictment was read to the defendant, the defendant stated he understood the charges, and the court asked the defendant several questions about his understanding of the nature of the offense); United States v. Guichard, 779 F.2d 1139, 1145-46 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding failure to explain nature of charge harmless because the indictment was read to the defendant, the defendant stated he had discussed charges with his attorney, and the court inquired about the defendant's understanding of the charge). 22 In support of its argument, the government relies almost exclusively on one First Circuit case. United States v. Martinez-Martinez, 69 F.3d 1215 (1st Cir. 1995). In Martinez, the court noted that the trial court's failure to explain the nature of the charges stretched the outer boundaries of Rule 11's express mandate, but, nonetheless, it found the failure to be harmless error. Id. at 1222. It explained that [r]ather than exalting form over substance, on appeal we employ a 'totality of the circumstances' test to determine if a core violation has indeed occurred. Id. at 1220. 23 The government here emphasizes the Martinez court's statement that [i]f, during the plea colloquy, the government's statement or the defendant's own version of the facts sets forth all elements and conduct of the offense, admission to that conduct sufficiently establishes the defendant's understanding of the charge. Id. at 1220. However, a closer look at the case shows that, even though the court stated that recitation of a factual basis was enough to render the failure to explain the charge harmless, the court did not rely solely on this fact. Rather, the court emphasized that (1) Martinez acknowledged twice during the plea hearing that she had discussed the charges with her counsel and understood them, (2) she waited to plead guilty until the day of trial (after months of trial preparation), (3) she signed a written plea agreement, and (4) the court did ask her if she had read the charges and consulted with her counsel about them. Id. at 1221-22. 24 Here, in contrast with the facts in Martinez, it is undisputed that neither the judge nor the prosecutor described the elements of the charge; the indictment was not read; and the judge did not ask the defendants whether they understood the charges. Thus, none of the safeguards were in place that we have in the past held might render a judge's failure to personally apprise the defendant of the nature of the charge nonetheless harmless. Accordingly, the sole basis for us to find harmless error would be that the AUSA recited the factual basis for the charges. 25 However, Rule 11 requires both that the judge explain the nature of the charge, Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1), and that the judge ascertain that there is a factual basis for the charge. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(f). Consequently, if we were to hold, as the government urges us to, that wholly failing to admonish defendants of the nature of the charge is harmless whenever the trial court establishes a factual basis, we would, in essence, obliterate the need to ever comply with Rule 11's express requirement that the court explain the nature of the charge. This we decline to do. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court's failure to admonish the defendants of the nature of the charge was harmful error. 5 26 We also take this opportunity to reiterate that, although noncompliance with Rule 11 is subject to harmless-error review, the importance of adhering to all Rule 11's requirements cannot be overstated. Indeed, when the harmless-error subdivision (h) was added to Rule 11, the Advisory Committee cautioned that: 27 [S]ubdivision (h) should not be read as an invitation to trial judges to take a more casual approach to Rule 11 proceedings. It is still true, as the Supreme Court pointed out in McCarthy, that thoughtful and careful compliance with Rule 11 best serves the cause of fair and efficient administration of criminal justice, as it will help reduce the great waste of judicial resources required to process the frivolous attacks on guilty plea convictions that are encouraged, and are more difficult to dispose of, when the original record is inadequate. It is, therefore, not too much to require that, before sentencing defendants to years of imprisonment, district judges take the few minutes necessary to inform them of their rights and to determine whether they understand the action they are taking. 28 Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (advisory committee's notes to 1983 amendment) (quoting McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 472).