Opinion ID: 1200797
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Constitutional Challenges to the 1978 Death Penalty Statute.

Text: (23) Defendant raises various challenges to the constitutional validity of the 1978 death penalty statute. None has merit. He contends the trial court was under a constitutional obligation to instruct the jurors, pursuant to his specially requested instructions, that they could return a verdict of death only if they were persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of each aggravating factor, that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors, and that death was the appropriate penalty. We have rejected these identical contentions in numerous prior cases and have no occasion to reconsider those holdings here. (See, e.g., People v. Allison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 879, 898-899 [258 Cal. Rptr. 208, 771 P.2d 1294] [existence of aggravating factors]; People v. Keenan, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 521 [aggravating circumstances outweighing mitigating circumstances]; People v. Hamilton, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 151 [death as the appropriate penalty]; People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 777-779 [230 Cal. Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113].) Defendant further contends the jurors should have been instructed that they must unanimously find the truth of any aggravating circumstances upon which their penalty verdict rested, and that the same prior convictions used to render him death eligible (prior-murder special circumstance) could not also be considered as aggravating circumstances under section 190.3, factor (a) or (b). Once again, we have repeatedly rejected these identical claims. (See, e.g., People v. Allison, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 899 [unanimity as to aggravating factors]; People v. Adcox, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 272 [dual use of prior convictions].) (24) Lastly, defendant argues it was constitutional error to fail to instruct the jury that a sentence of life without parole means the defendant will never be considered for parole. We have rejected this claim as well. (See People v. Bonin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 659, 698 [250 Cal. Rptr. 687, 758 P.2d 1217].) To have so instructed the jury would have been an incorrect statement of the law. ( People v. Gordon (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1277-1278 [270 Cal. Rptr. 451, 792 P.2d 251].) Nor are we persuaded by defendant's assertion that because the jury was aware he had been paroled after serving a prison sentence for the murders of his children, they might have believed he could again be paroled if a life sentence were imposed in the instant case. The jury knew only that his prior murder convictions were of the second degree; they never learned he had initially been convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death.