Opinion ID: 2222186
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: payment to educational institutions

Text: The court ordered that Michael pay his one-half of Brandon's and Tiffany's accrued college tuition expenses directly to the institutions attended. Michael alleges that such an arrangement turns the institutions into third-party beneficiaries. This assertion is unfounded. As Michael admits, the parties to the agreement had no intention of benefiting these educational institutions when they formed their agreement. This precludes any third-party beneficiary status. See Marten v. Staab, 249 Neb. 299, 543 N.W.2d 436 (1996). We also determine that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Michael to pay accrued college tuition expenses directly to the institutions. The court did not explain why it required Michael to pay the educational institutions directly, and the record is unclear regarding the actual amounts presently owed to the institutions, but it is not uncommon for divorce decrees to order one party to pay certain debts directly to the creditor and not through the court or through the other party. See, e.g., Dennis v. Dennis, 6 Neb.App. 461, 574 N.W.2d 189 (1998); Else v. Else, 5 Neb.App. 319, 558 N.W.2d 594 (1997). Neither Michael nor Judy is deprived of a substantial right by the court's ordering Michael to pay the educational institutions directly. This assignment of error is without merit.