Opinion ID: 1998540
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Constitutional and Legal Principles

Text: The legal principles governing this matter are well-settled. The Fourth Amendment of the federal constitution as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment requires that an officer have reasonable cause to stop a vehicle for investigatory purposes. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1401, 59 L.Ed.2d 660, 673 (1979); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879-80, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 906 (1968); Aschenbrenner, 289 N.W.2d at 619; State v. Cooley, 229 N.W.2d 755, 759 (Iowa 1975). In order to establish reasonable cause, the State carries the burden to show that the officer had specific and articulable cause to support a reasonable belief that criminal activity may have occurred. Aschenbrenner, 289 N.W.2d at 619; see also Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663, 99 S.Ct. at 1401, 59 L.Ed.2d at 673; Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d at 906; Hilleshiem, 291 N.W.2d at 316; Cooley, 229 N.W.2d at 760. Unparticularized suspicion is not an adequate reason for a stop, but an officer may make an investigatory stop with `considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.' State v. Richardson, 501 N.W.2d 495, 496-97 (Iowa 1993) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585, 104 L.Ed.2d 1, 10 (1989)). We measure the reasonableness of a stop using an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the [stop] `warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken was appropriate? Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22, 88 S.Ct. at 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d at 906 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162, 45 S.Ct. 280, 288, 69 L.Ed. 543, 555 (1925)); see also United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621, 628 (1981). We hold officers to their true reason for stopping a vehicle in question and will not allow them to justify a stop with reasons upon which they did not actually act. State v. Rosenstiel, 473 N.W.2d 59, 61 (Iowa 1991); Aschenbrenner, 289 N.W.2d at 619; Cooley, 229 N.W.2d at 757-59. If the State does not carry its burden, the underlying constitutional principles require that we suppress evidence and statements the State acquired as a result of the improper stop. Aschenbrenner, 289 N.W.2d at 619. Like the constitutional principles at issue, the rationale supporting the suppression of such evidence is also well-settled. We have stated that the essential purpose of the Fourth Amendment search and seizure proscriptions is to impose a standard of reasonableness upon the exercise of discretion by government officers, including law enforcement officials, in order to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions. Hilleshiem, 291 N.W.2d at 316. In Terry, the United States Supreme Court noted: Anything less [than the above-articulated test] would invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches ... And simple good faith on the part of the arresting officer is not enough. If subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people would be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects only in the discretion of the police. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S.Ct. at 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d at 906 (citations omitted). While we recognize these principles to be of undeniable importance, we also note the enormous problem law enforcement officers face in controlling narcotics as well as the difficulties inherent in the apprehension of drug offenders. People v. Parisi, 393 Mich. 31, 222 N.W.2d 757, 759 (1974). It is our task to properly and effectively manage the necessar[y] ... conflict between the need to apply realistic standards of law enforcement in such cases and the need to protect citizens from unreasonable intrusions into their privacy. Id.