Opinion ID: 1474553
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: Missing Witness Charge

Text: The Commonwealth, in its answer to the appellant's request for a Bill of Particulars, listed two eyewitnesses, Joy Paucke and Michelle Marshall. Neither Joy nor Michelle testified for the Commonwealth, [34] and appellant requested that a missing witness charge be given. N.T. July 16 and 17, 1980, at 261-269. In Commonwealth v. Jones, 455 Pa. 488, 317 A.2d 233 (1974), our supreme court articulated the general missing witness rule: [W]hen a potential witness is available to only one of the parties to a trial, and it appears this witness has special information material to the issue, and this person's testimony would not be merely cumulative, then if such party does not produce the testimony of this witness, the jury may draw an inference it would have been unfavorable. See McCormick, Law of Evidence, 534 (1954). See Also Bentivoglio v. Ralston, 447 Pa. 24, 288 A.2d 745 (1972), and Commonwealth v. Wright, 444 Pa. 536, 282 A.2d 323 (1971). Commonwealth v. Moore, 453 Pa. 302, 305, 309 A.2d 569, 570 (1973). Id. 455 Pa. at 495, 317 A.2d at 237. The Jones court additionally outlined the special situation where the Commonwealth had previously listed the witnesses for trial: There is no duty on the Commonwealth to call witnesses whose names appear on a bill of indictment or even eye witnesses, if it believes after examination or investigation that their testimony is unreliable, or unworthy of belief, or surplusage or irrelevant. The law in such a case merely requires a District Attorney to notify the Court and defense counsel that he does not intend to call certain persons whose names appear on the bill of indictment as Commonwealth witnesses. Commonwealth v. Palermo, 368 Pa. 28, 81 A.2d 540; Commonwealth v. Deitrick, 221 Pa. 7, 14, 15, 70 A. 275. See also Commonwealth v. Danz, 211 Pa. 507, 522, 60 A. 1070; Commonwealth v. Giacobbe, 341 Pa. 187, 195, 19 A.2d 71. . . . Id. 455 Pa. at 490-91, 317 A.2d at 234 (Quoting Commonwealth v. Schmidt, 437 Pa. 563, 567, 263 A.2d 382, 384 (1970)). The purpose of the requirement that notice be given to a defendant regarding a decision not to call listed witnesses, is to provide the defendant the opportunity to call the witnesses himself, if he so desires. Id. In Commonwealth v. Gilman, 485 Pa. 145, 401 A.2d 335 (1979), our supreme court further refined the law pertaining to notice to a defendant that listed witnesses would not be called. In Gilman, the listed witness was unable to testify through no fault of the Commonwealth, and the defendant was not given sufficient notice to call him. Since the defendant in Gilman neither asked to call the witness at any time, nor contended that he would have called him if he were available, the court found no error in the trial court's refusal to allow comment by defendant's attorney that an adverse inference should be attached to the Commonwealth's failure to call the listed witness. We find Gilman controlling. Here, the appellant never expressed a desire to call either Joy or Michelle upon notice that they would not be testifying. Joy was certainly available to him because she had been subpoenaed by the Commonwealth and was present for the trial. N.T. July 16 and 17, 1980, at 166, 265; see footnote 34, supra. No mention was made in the record as to Michelle's availability; however, the appellant did not indicate that he would have called her if she had been available. Even assuming that Michelle was unavailable to the appellant, it did not appear that she had any special information material to the case  from the testimony at trial, Michelle was never involved in any of the incidents concerning Pam. Thus, there was no error in the trial court's refusal to give the proffered missing witness charge. Appellant having raised no ground for reversal, the Judgment of Sentence at No. 44 (No. 2476 PHL80) is affirmed. JOHNSON, J., files a concurring and dissenting opinion. JOHNSON, Judge, concurring and dissenting: I join in the disposition of the appeals from the judgments of sentence at Nos. 28, 30 and 44 of 1980. I also join in the majority's disposition of appellant's claim of defective informations in the appeal at Nos. 29 and 31. I must respectfully dissent from the majority's analysis of the double jeopardy claim at Nos. 29 and 31 of 1980 and its determination to remand that case for transcription of the notes of testimony of May 15 and 16, 1980. In my view, an examination of the trial court's declaration of mistrial to determine whether that declaration was manifestly necessary is inappropriate on the law as I understand it. Following a trial at Nos. 28 and 30 on May 15 and 16, 1980, the jury was unable to reach a verdict and the trial judge declared a mistrial. On October 22 and 23, 1980, retrial was held on these same charges. In the United States Supreme Court's last term, the Court, in deciding Richardson v. U.S., ___ U.S. ___, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984), reaffirmed the principle that a failure of the jury to agree on a verdict was an instance of `manifest necessity'. Id. at 104 S.Ct. 3085. Because Richardson holds that a hung jury is not an event which terminates the original jeopardy, Id. at 104 S.Ct. 3086, there would be no reason to review the transcript of appellant's first trial. I therefore must dissent from the majority's remand of the appeal at Nos. 29 and 31 of 1980 for the purpose of reviewing the proceedings at the first trial of Nos. 28 and 30. Since I find no merit in the double jeopardy argument, I would dispose of the other issues raised by appellant on this separate appeal. Finding the arguments concerning the denial of a mistrial motion, the failure to give a missing witness charge, and the sufficiency of the evidence to be without merit, I would affirm the judgment of sentence at Nos. 29 and 31.