Opinion ID: 1404747
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Wisconsin's Fleeing Offense as a Violent Felony under Begay

Text: We have previously determined that Wisconsin's vehicular-fleeing offense qualifies as a violent felony under the residual clause. See United States v. Howze, 343 F.3d 919, 921-22 (7th Cir.2003). Begay 's alteration of the framework for deciding residual-clause cases requires us to reconsider the matter. We start, as the categorical approach requires, with the statutory definition of the crime: No operator of a vehicle, after having received a visual or audible signal from a traffic officer, or marked police vehicle, shall knowingly flee or attempt to elude any traffic officer by willful or wanton disregard of such signal so as to interfere with or endanger the operation of the police vehicle, or the traffic officer or other vehicles or pedestrians, nor shall the operator increase the speed of the operator's vehicle or extinguish the lights of the vehicle in an attempt to elude or flee. WIS. STAT. § 346.04(3) (2000). This statute is divisible in the sense that brings the modified categorical approach into playthat is, it defines more than one category of vehicular fleeing. See Woods, 576 F.3d at 411. The first category is fleeing or attempting to elude an officer by willful or wanton disregard of [the officer's] signal so as to interfere with or endanger the operation of the police vehicle, or the traffic officer or other vehicles or pedestrians. WIS. STAT. § 346.04(3). The second is increas[ing] the speed of the operator's vehicle or extinguish[ing] the lights of the vehicle in an attempt to elude or flee. Id. Because the statute is divisible, we may consult the charging document or other comparable judicial record from the underlying case to determine the specific crime Dismuke committed. See Woods, 576 F.3d at 405-06; Smith, 544 F.3d at 786. The criminal complaint reflects that Dismuke was charged with committing the second variety of fleeing an officer. The complaint alleged that on March 3, 1998, Dismuke was the operator of a vehicle and after having received a visual and audible signal from a marked police vehicle, did increase the speed of his vehicle in an attempt to flee, contrary to Wisconsin Statutes Section[] 346.04(3). As we have explained, to qualify as a violent felony under the residual clause after Begay, this crime must involve conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another and must also be roughly similar, in kind as well as in degree of risk posed, to the example[] crimes of burglary, arson, extortion, or use of explosives. Begay, 128 S.Ct. at 1584-85. The similar in kind aspect of this inquiry asks whether the predicate crime encompasses conduct that is similarly purposeful, violent, and aggressive to the example crimes. To put it more succinctly, after Begay, a residual-clause predicate crime must (1) present a serious potential risk of physical injury similar in degree to the enumerated crimes of burglary, arson, extortion, or crimes involving the use of explosives; and (2) involve the same or similar kind of purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct as the enumerated crimes. Dismuke does not contend that Wisconsin's fleeing offense fails the first part of this inquiry. He apparently concedes that the offense involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury and is sufficiently similar to the residual clause's enumerated crimes in respect to the degree of risk posed to satisfy this part of the Begay framework. [3] He argues instead that Wisconsin's fleeing offense is not similar in kind to the enumerated crimes because it is not similarly purposeful, violent, and aggressive. The government responds by invoking United States v. Spells, 537 F.3d 743, 751-53 (7th Cir. 2008), an early post- Begay decision that classified Indiana's fleeing offense as a violent felony under the residual clause. Wisconsin's fleeing offense is narrower than Indiana's, [4] so it is tempting to simply accept the government's argument and rely on Spells as subsuming the question presented here. But in light of an analytical omission we have noted in Spells and intervening developments in the caselaw, we think the issue calls for independent consideration. The first requirement of Begay 's similarity in kind equationthat the predicate offense be categorically purposefulis easily satisfied here. In Woods we held that Begay 's purposeful requirement focuses on the mens rea element of the predicate crime: [T]he residual clause encompasses only purposeful crimes; crimes with the mens rea of recklessness do not fall within its scope. 576 F.3d at 412-13. Wisconsin's vehicular-fleeing offense is a purposeful crime. Section 346.04(3) provides: No operator of a vehicle, after having received a visual or audible signal from a traffic officer, or marked police vehicle, shall knowingly flee or attempt to elude the officer. (Emphasis added.) After this prefatory clause, the statute specifies two alternative modes of fleeing: (1) by willful or wanton disregard of the officer's signal so as to interfere with or endanger the officer, other vehicles, or pedestrians; and (2) by increas[ing] the speed of the ... vehicle or extinguish[ing] the lights of the vehicle in an attempt to elude or flee. WIS. STAT. § 346.04(3). The state courts have interpreted the statute to require that the offender knowingly flee or attempt to elude by one or the other of the alternative methodsby willfully or wantonly disregarding the officer's signal in a way that interferes with or endangers others or by increasing the speed or extinguishing the lights of the vehicle in an attempt to elude or flee. See State v. Sterzinger, 256 Wis.2d 925, 649 N.W.2d 677, 680-81 (2002); see also WISCONSIN JURY INSTRUCTIONSCRIMINAL 2630 (2003). Dismuke maintains that to be purposeful under Begay, the predicate crime must have as its purpose the infliction of physical harm upon another. We disagree. Although all of the crimes enumerated in the residual clause are purposeful crimes (as opposed to crimes with a mens rea of recklessness, negligence, or strict-liability crimes), none of them require that the offender act with the specific purpose of inflicting physical harm on another. Dismuke's interpretation would make subsection (ii) of the violent-felony definition redundant. Subsection (i) of the definition covers crimes that have as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, § 924(e)(2)(B)(i); this part of the definition already captures crimes committed with the purpose of inflicting physical harm on another. Wisconsin's fleeing offense requires a knowing act of fleeing; this satisfies Begay' s purposeful requirement. Before proceeding, we note that on this point the circuits are in agreement. In Spells, decided shortly after Begay, we addressed Indiana's fleeing statute, which criminalizes using a vehicle to `knowingly or intentionally ... flee[] from a law enforcement officer.' 537 F.3d at 752. We summarily held that this knowingly and intentionally element satisfied Begay 's requirement of purposeful conduct. Id. at 752-53. Other circuits have addressed fleeing statutes with similar mens rea requirements and are uniformly in accord. [5] See, e.g., United States v. Young, 580 F.3d 373, 377 (6th Cir.2009) (holding that the Michigan fleeing statute's requirement of willful failure to stop clearly involved purposeful conduct); United States v. LaCasse, 567 F.3d 763, 766 (6th Cir.2009) (same holding regarding a different subsection of Michigan's fleeing statute); United States v. Tyler, 580 F.3d 722, 725 (8th Cir.2009) (Minnesota's fleeing statute requires intent to elude and is therefore purposeful under Begay, but is not categorically violent and aggressive); United States v. Harrimon, 568 F.3d 531, 534 (5th Cir.2009) (considering Texas's fleeing statute and noting unlike the DUI statute at issue in Begay, fleeing by vehicle requires intentional conduct); United States v. Harrison, 558 F.3d 1280, 1295 (11th Cir. 2009) (concluding that the Florida statute's requirement of willful fleeing satisfied Begay' s purposeful requirement but the crime was not sufficiently violent and aggressive); United States v. West, 550 F.3d 952, 970-71 (10th Cir.2008) (holding that the Utah fleeing statute's requirement of willfulness satisfies Begay 's purposeful requirement). The circuits are divided, however, on whether vehicular fleeing satisfies Begay 's requirement that the predicate crime involve conduct that is similarly violent and aggressive as the residual clause's enumerated crimes. The Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits have held that fleeing satisfies Begay' s violent and aggressive requirement. See Harrimon, 568 F.3d at 534-35; Young, 580 F.3d at 377-78; LaCasse, 567 F.3d at 767; West, 550 F.3d at 969-70. [6] The Eighth and Eleventh Circuits have come to the opposite conclusion. See Tyler, 580 F.3d at 725-26; Harrison, 558 F.3d at 1295-96. Spells preceded these opinions; ours was the first circuit to address whether vehicular fleeing qualifies as a violent felony after Begay. Spells held that Indiana's fleeing offense is not only purposeful but is also categorically aggressive and on this basis held that it satisfied the Begay framework. 537 F.3d at 752. Our decision in Spells, however, did not address whether fleeing is violent in the way required by Begay. We do so here and hold that Wisconsin's crime of vehicular fleeing involves conduct that is similarly violent and aggressive to burglary, arson, extortion, or crimes that involve the use of explosives. First, it bears emphasizing that the Supreme Court's categorical approach focuses on the generic crime as ordinarily committed; it is not necessary, therefore, that every conceivable violation of the statute meet the Begay test. See James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 208, 127 S.Ct. 1586, 167 L.Ed.2d 532 (2007); see also Woods, 576 F.3d at 404. Instead, the proper inquiry is whether the conduct encompassed by the statutory elements of the crime, in the ordinary or typical case, presents a serious potential risk of physical injury and (as Begay requires) bears sufficient similarityboth in kind and degree of risk posedto the conduct encompassed by the enumerated crimes of burglary, arson, extortion, or crimes involving the use of explosives. See Woods, 576 F.3d at 404. If the conduct encompassed by Wisconsin's fleeing statute is violent and aggressive in this generic sense, then the requirements of Begay are satisfied and the conviction was properly counted as a violent felony. The fleeing offense at issue here makes it a crime for the driver of a vehicle to knowingly disregard a police signal and take flight by accelerating his speed or extinguishing the lights of his vehicle in an attempt to flee or elude the pursuing officer. For reasons we will explain, we think this conduct is violent and aggressive in the sense required by Begay. Dismuke's argument to the contrary relies largely on this statement from Begay: By way of contrast, statutes that forbid driving under the influence, such as the statute before us, typically do not insist on purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct. ... 128 S.Ct. at 1586 (emphasis added). He urges us to take the Supreme Court's use of the phrase insist on quite literallythat is, as limiting the residual clause to crimes that require or insist on a violent act. This strikes us as an overreading of this singular sentence and a misreading of the opinion as a whole. The crimes enumerated in the residual clause are violent and aggressive not because they invariably involve acts of violence but because they are characterized by aggressive conduct that carries the genuine potential for violence and thus physical injury to another. Unlike Begay 's purposeful requirement, which focuses on the mens rea element of the predicate crime, see Woods, 576 F.3d at 408, Begay' s violent and aggressive requirement is a descriptive phrase and focuses on the character of the conduct encompassed by the elements of the crime, not the elements themselves. The Supreme Court observed in Begay that the enumerated crimes in the residual clause typically involve violent and aggressive conduct and therefore limited the reach of the clause to like crimes. None of the enumerated crimes, however, requires an act of violence. Burglary doesn't require an act of violence; neither does extortion or arson. Perhaps crimes involving the use of explosives could be said to require an act of violence in that an explosion is inherently violent. Even so, we do not read the Begay insists on language in the strictly literal sense that Dismuke suggests. We conclude instead that the violent and aggressive limitation requires only that a residual-clause predicate crime be characterized by aggressive conduct with a similar potential for violence and therefore injury as the enumerated offenses, not that it must insist on or require a violent act. The Supreme Court's decision in Chambers v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 687, 172 L.Ed.2d 484 (2009), confirms this understanding of how to apply Begay' s violent and aggressive requirement. The predicate conviction in Chambers was the version of Illinois' escape crime that consists of a failure to report for custody. The Court distinguished the failure-to-report version of this offense from one that involved an actual escape from physical custody. The behavior that likely underlies a failure to report would seem less likely to involve a risk of physical harm than the less passive, more aggressive behavior underlying an escape from custody. Id. at 691. The Court continued: Conceptually speaking, the crime amounts to a form of inaction, a far cry from the `purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct' potentially at issue when an offender uses explosives against property, commits arson, burgles a dwelling or residence, or engages in certain forms of extortion. Id. at 692 (quoting Begay, 128 S.Ct. at 1586) (emphasis added). The Court concluded that a conviction for failure to report for custody was not a violent felony under the residual clause. Id. at 693. Chambers is relevant here in two respects. First, as a general matter, Chambers confirms that the required comparison between the predicate and enumerated crimes tests whether the predicate crime is characterized by aggressive conduct with a similar potential for violence as the enumerated offenses. And second, more specifically to the point here, Chambers implies that unlike a failure to report, which does not have these characteristics, an escape from physical custody would meet this test. Our decision in Spells was issued before Chambers, but we noted there that in the ordinary case, [t]aking flight [in a vehicle] calls the officer to give chase, and aside from any accompanying risk to pedestrians and other motorists, such flight dares the officer to needlessly endanger himself in pursuit. Spells, 537 F.3d at 752. In West, also decided before Chambers, the Tenth Circuit elaborated on this point: [T]he offense of failing to stop at the command of a police officer will typically lead to a confrontation with the officer being disobeyed. It is likely to lead, in the ordinary case, to a chase or at least an effort by police to apprehend the perpetrator. All of these circumstances increase the likelihood of serious harm to the officers involved as well as any bystanders that by happenstance get in the way of a fleeing perpetrator or his pursuers. For these reasons, we conclude that the crime of failing to stop at an officer's command is, in the ordinary case, an offense involving violent and aggressive behavior. 550 F.3d at 970. The Fifth Circuit's decision in Harrimon had the benefit of both Begay and Chambers, and the court drew the same implication from Chambers as we do here. Th[e] active defiance of an attempted stop or arrest is similar to the behavior underlying an escape from custody, which, as the Supreme Court noted in Chambers, is `less passive' and `more aggressive' than that likely underlying failure to report. Harrimon, 568 F.3d at 535. The court noted that [f]leeing by vehicle requires disregarding an officer's lawful order, which is a clear challenge to the officer's authority and typically initiates pursuit. Id. The court continued: [F]leeing by vehicle `will typically lead to a confrontation with the officer being disobeyed,' a confrontation fraught with risk of violence. Id. (quoting West, 550 F.3d at 970). On this reasoning, the court concluded that the Texas crime of fleeing by vehicle satisfied Begay' s violent and aggressive requirement and qualified as a violent felony under the definition's residual clause. Id. Likewise, the Sixth Circuit relied on the discussion of escape in Chambers to conclude that Michigan's fleeing statute satisfies the requirements of Begay. See LaCasse, 567 F.3d at 767. The court observed: What is fleeing and eluding but an attempt to escape? It is certainly not a form of inaction and, for that reason, we read Chambers to stand, albeit tacitly, for the proposition that an attempt to escape from law enforcement officials may represent a violent felony under the ACCA because it includes aggressive conduct. ... Id. Although, as we have noted, the Eighth and the Eleventh Circuits have reached the opposite conclusion, see Tyler, 580 F.3d at 725-26; Harrison, 558 F.3d at 1295-96, we think our colleagues in the Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits have the better of the argument. [7] Accordingly, we hold that Wisconsin's vehicular-fleeing crime satisfies Begay' s violent and aggressive requirement. Dismuke's fleeing conviction was therefore properly classified as a violent felony for purposes of the ACCA. His resulting 15-year sentence, the mandatory minimum under the ACCA, was statutorily required. AFFIRMED.