Opinion ID: 760385
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Motion to Certify Louisiana Antitrust Questions

Text: 15 The appellants have moved this court to certify the remaining two issues to the Louisiana Supreme Court. Specifically, they request certification concerning whether Louisiana antitrust law affords a cause of action to indirect purchasers of infant formula and whether Louisiana law prohibiting conspiracies in restraint of trade or commerce in this state applies to alleged interstate conspiracies. 16 As a general proposition we are chary about certifying questions of law absent a compelling reason to do so; the availability of certification is such an important resource to this court that we will not risk its continued availability by going to that well too often. Jefferson v. Lead Indus. Assoc. Inc., 106 F.3d 1245, 1247 (5th Cir.1997) (per curiam). Requests to certify questions to the highest court of a state are generally denied when the primary reason for certification is that state courts have not issued a definitive answer on the particular issue. See Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp. v. Transportation Ins. Co., 958 F.2d 622, 623 (5th Cir.1992). Certification is not a panacea for resolution of those complex or difficult state law questions which have not been answered by the highest court of the state. Id. Nevertheless, certification may be advisable where important state interests are at stake and the state courts have not provided clear guidance on how to proceed. Id. The tests for certification are easily satisfied here. 3
17 Appellants argue that the district court erred in concluding that Louisiana antitrust law denies standing to consumers of infant formula who are indirect purchasers from the defendant manufacturers. Louisiana antitrust law permits any person who is injured by an antitrust violation to sue the offender for treble damages, costs, and attorneys' fees. See La. Rev. St. Ann. § 51:137 (West 1987). 4 Section 137 is nearly identical to the federal enforcement provision, § 4 of the Clayton Act, 5 which the United States Supreme Court has interpreted to deny standing to indirect purchasers. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 745-46, 97 S.Ct. 2061, 2074-75, 52 L.Ed.2d 707 (1977). Because Louisiana courts have never decided whether Louisiana's antitrust law is comparably limited, the district court decided the issue as if it were a Louisiana appellate court. See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Abraham, 137 F.3d 264, 268 (5th Cir.1998). The court concluded that Louisiana would follow the federal indirect purchaser rule because the language of the two provisions is nearly identical and Louisiana courts often look to federal antitrust jurisprudence for guidance in interpreting the state's antitrust laws. 6 18 The Frees--and the Louisiana Attorney General as amicus curiae--urge that the Louisiana Supreme Court would decline to follow the federal indirect purchaser rule. The decisions of Louisiana courts have provided mixed signals on how to interpret state antitrust statutes when a corresponding federal rule exists. For example, in Louisiana Power and Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 493 So.2d 1149, 1158 (La.1986), the Louisiana Supreme Court noted that, given the similarity between the federal and state antitrust provisions, the federal interpretation should be a persuasive influence on the [state's] interpretation. Id.; see also Reppond v. Denham Springs, 572 So.2d 224, 229-30 (La.Ct.App.1990) (finding that the sound reasoning of the federal antitrust rule justified its incorporation into state antitrust jurisprudence). In spite of this observation, however, the Louisiana Power court declined to follow the federal rule. See 493 So.2d at 1160. These cases provide little support either for adoption of the federal antitrust rule, as in Reppond, or for rejection of the federal model, as in Louisiana Power. Given the importance of the indirect purchaser issue and the lack of clear guidance from the courts of Louisiana, we certify the question to the Louisiana Supreme Court.
19 Louisiana antitrust law prohibits every conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce in this state.... La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:122 (West 1987). The parties disagree on the meaning of the term in this state. The Frees contend that it creates a cause of action for alleged interstate conspiracies that have the effect of restraining trade in Louisiana. Abbott Labs, on the other hand, argues that the statute covers only those conspiracies that are wholly intrastate. Because neither the language of the statute nor Louisiana caselaw resolves this important antitrust issue, we certify it to the Louisiana Supreme Court. 20 Each party supports its respective argument by referring to the plain language of the statute and to the canons of statutory construction. The Frees cite the last antecedent canon, 7 arguing that the qualifying phrase in this state applies to the immediately preceding phrase trade or commerce. Therefore, the statute should be read to prohibit any price-fixing conspiracy that restrains trade in Louisiana. Abbott Labs counters with a canon of its own: the act as a whole ought to be interpreted so that no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, or meaningless, if that result can be avoided. Dore v. Tugwell, 228 La. 807, 84 So.2d 199, 204 n. 6 (La.1955) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Hibernia Nat'l Bank v. Louisiana Tax Comm'n., 195 La. 43, 196 So. 15, 18 (1940)). Abbott Labs argues that because the statutory definition of commerce specifies that commerce means trade or commerce within this state, La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 51:121 (West 1987) (emphasis added), the phrase in this state found in § 122 would be superfluous if it referred to the trade or commerce involved as the Frees contend. Thus, Abbot Labs argues that to give meaning to the definition of commerce, the term in this state must apply only to the conduct prohibited by the statute and not the commerce involved. 21 In spite of these statutory arguments, the language of § 122 does not resolve the interstate/intrastate conspiracy issue. Neither do the decisions of the Louisiana courts. Each party cites HMC Management Corp. v. New Orleans Basketball Club, 375 So.2d 700 (La.Ct.App.1979), to justify its respective argument. In HMC, the plaintiffs sued the Jazz, a professional basketball team, alleging that the Jazz breached its agreement to lease a New Orleans sports venue in violation of Louisiana's antitrust statutes. The Jazz countered that they were engaged in interstate commerce, and therefore, federal antitrust laws preempted Louisiana's antitrust laws. The court agreed with the Jazz and, with respect to those claims that involved interstate commerce, held that Louisiana's antitrust law did not apply. Id. at 706-07. The lease agreement, however, might be within the reach of Louisiana's antitrust laws because it was an area of state interest, and the determination whether the Jazz violated the lease was a state question. Id. at 707; see also English v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 439 So.2d 1218, 1223-24 (La.Ct.App.1983) (holding that because the NCAA football program engages in interstate commerce, § 122 does not apply). Abbott Labs cites HMC and English for the proposition that Louisiana antitrust law applies only to intrastate conduct. 8 Not surprisingly, the Frees disagree and argue that these cases do not apply to this case because they apply only to interstate sporting associations. 22 Finally, appellants refer to Judge Posner's reasoning in In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 612-613 (7th Cir.1997), where he concluded that Alabama's antitrust statute covered interstate conduct because to hold otherwise would render the statute a dead letter and because the modern trend among state courts is to interpret antitrust statutes to cover interstate commerce. Id. The Frees thus argue that limiting § 122 to cover only intrastate commerce would likewise kill the antitrust statute because virtually no commercial activity is purely intrastate. Notwithstanding the force of this logic, however, we conclude that the Louisiana Supreme Court is better suited to decide this important state antitrust issue and therefore certify the question to the Louisiana Supreme Court. 9 CERTIFICATION 23 Because these antitrust issues are matters of Louisiana law that will determine the outcome of this case and because there are no clear controlling precedents in the decisions of the Louisiana Supreme Court, we hereby invoke the certification privilege granted by Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XII. 10 24 We certify the following questions to the Louisiana Supreme Court: 25 1) Does the Louisiana antitrust enforcement provision, La. Rev. St. Ann. § 51:137 (West 1987), follow the federal rule as outlined in Illinois Brick v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 97 S.Ct. 2061, 52 L.Ed.2d 707 (1977), and deny standing to indirect purchasers of products whose prices have been illegally fixed in an alleged conspiracy violative of the statute? 26 2) Does La. Rev. St. Ann. § 51:122 (West 1987), apply to an alleged interstate conspiracy to fix the wholesale price of infant formula that has the effect of restraining trade in Louisiana? 27 If the Louisiana Supreme Court accepts this certificate, the answers provided will determine the outcome of this appeal. We disclaim any intent that the Louisiana Supreme Court confine its reply to the precise form or scope of the legal questions certified. We retain cognizance of this case while pending before the Louisiana Supreme Court and transfer the record and appellate briefs with our certification to the Supreme Court of Louisiana. 28 Appellants' motion to certify the indirect purchaser question and the interstate conspiracy question to the Louisiana Supreme Court is GRANTED.