Opinion ID: 1280331
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Reconciling Sentences

Text: We turn next to whether Long's various sentences may be reconciled. All the parties have addressed the issue of apparent conflicts among the sentencing instructions of the various county courts. These conflicts have turned out to be phantoms. Subsection (3) of RCW 9.94A.400 applies to multiple current offenses committed while the defendant was on parole for a prior felony. Subsection (2) places all the multiple current offense sentences consecutive to the prior felony sentence because the multiple offenses were all committed while the defendant was under sentence for that felony. However, relative to each other, the multiple current offenses were not committed while the defendant was under sentence of felony. Subsection (3) controls the setting of sentences for multiple current offenses relative to each other. Subsection (3) states that such sentence shall run concurrently with any felony sentence which has been imposed ... subsequent to the commission of the crime being sentenced unless the court pronouncing the current sentence expressly orders that they be served consecutively. (Italics ours.) This gives each successive sentencing court control over the relationship of its sentence to sentences previously imposed. The words has been imposed refer to a past even, so the later sentencing courts always set the relationship of their sentence to the former. We apply this framework to the sentences in this case. The correct copy of the Mason 1 sentence states: The sentence herein shall run consecutively with the sentence in an other [ sic ] cause to which he's been sentenced. This means the 1987 Mason County theft sentence was not intended to be set consecutively to the Pierce and Thurston County sentences. Those sentences had not yet been imposed. The words to which he's been sentenced are a contraction for to which he has been sentenced. This wording refers to a past event. The language does not indicate an intent to impose consecutive sentences prospectively. Rather, it indicates that Long's sentence should be served consecutively to a past sentence. This interpretation is entirely consistent with our reading of RCW 9.94A.400(2)-(3). The Mason 1 sentence, under statute, could not and did not speak to what were as yet unimposed Pierce and Thurston County sentences. Rather, it speaks to a prior sentencing, the sentence for which petitioner was on parole. No other sentences were imposed on Long until 5 months later, in May 1988. Petitioner's sentences were consistent, not in conflict. We interpret them as follows: Mason 1  The sentence did not instruct a term consecutive to the latter sentences. It said: The sentence herein shall run consecutively with the sentence in an other [ sic ] cause to which he's been sentenced. This was a reference to the sentence from which Long was already on parole. Pierce  The sentence stated it should run concurrently with Mason 1 and Thurston. The Pierce County court lacked authority to set this sentence concurrent with the later Thurston sentence, but there was no conflict because the Thurston County sentence runs concurrently with the Pierce County sentence by operation of law. Thurston  Since the judge did not expressly order that this term be served consecutively to the previous sentences, subsection (3) of RCW 9.94A.400 mandates this sentence be served concurrently with the Mason 1 and Pierce County sentences. Mason 2  The Mason County escape sentence of 70 months was set to run consecutively to all other matters. It runs after completion of the three sentences above, as it was expressly imposed under the discretion of the sentencing judge. Although there is no conflict among the sentencing orders in this case, the Department of Corrections has asked for guidance as to the proper application of RCW 9.94A.400(2)-(3). The latest sentence always prevails in its own concurrent or consecutive instruction relative to prior sentences. A sentencing court has no authority to determine whether a current sentence shall run consecutively to or concurrently with a sentence yet to be imposed in the future. The discretion to impose sentences concurrently with, or consecutively to, prior sentences is reserved to the court imposing the subsequent sentence. Linderman, 54 Wn. App. at 139.