Opinion ID: 2747138
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prospective juror Howe

Text: After defendant questioned and passed prospective juror Howe, the prosecutor asked: “Q.    Do you think you could decide whether or not this living, breathing human being deserves to die for the crime she committed? “A. Probably, yeah. “Q. And I ask you that because I notice there was a lot of ‘I don’t know’ or ‘I don’t understand,’ you know, responses to some of these questions [in the juror questionnaire]— “A. Yeah. “Q. —and so I—we need to take some time to figure out what is it you’re thinking about when you say you don’t understand. What comes to mind? You haven’t really elaborated on any of that with regard to the death penalty. “A. There w[ere] a few questions on there that I didn’t really understand— “Q. Yeah. “     “Q. Ms. Howe, I’m looking at page 7 [of the juror questionnaire]. I’ll give you a chance to get there. And I’m looking at (d) there. It’s basically asking you about, you know, religious, moral or just even philosophical, you know, really, objections to the death penalty. And you said there you didn’t understand. Do you understand the question or— “A. Um, yeah, the question. “     “Q. All right. And so that’s sort of what the question’s getting at there. You know, if you have beliefs maybe religious or otherwise that would actually, you know, prohibit you from making this kind of decision? “A. Yeah. “Q. Can you expand on that? Do you have any such beliefs? Cite as 356 Or 432 (2014) 465 “A. I’m not sure. I don’t think so. “Q. And what would happen if you ended up sitting on the jury is you’d be posed, essentially, with four questions; and three of those would be highly factually driven, and the fourth is a discretionary one, and it would be: ‘Do you think the defendant should receive the death penalty?’ And again, I want to—would you be able to personally make that decision? “A. Yeah. “Q. Why? What would you be looking for? What kind of evidence? “A. I’m not sure. I mean, it would have to be pretty good evidence to decide that. I don’t know. I mean— “Q. That’s what I’m getting at. Do you know you could do this or are you still unsure? “A. I’m still pretty unsure. “Q. And it’s okay. You’re in a tough spot and there’s no right or wrong answer. This is just the time that we would need to find that out now rather than later— “A. Yeah. “Q. —if you could do that. And so, again, you know, if charged with the responsibility of deciding, are you just unsure if you’d be able to consider death penalty for this defendant? “A. Yeah, I’m pretty unsure.” The prosecutor then asked that Howe be removed for cause. On defense counsel’s attempt to rehabilitate Howe, the following exchange occurred: “Q. It’s a tough position. I hope we’re not picking on you at all. I appreciate your being honest about it. But you did say in the questionnaire that you do—you do believe in the death penalty? “A. Yeah. “Q. Is that correct? “A. Yeah. “Q. And it’s one of the three [possible sentences] you would consider? 466 State v. McAnulty “A. Yeah. “Q. But it wouldn’t be easy to make that vote? “A. Yeah. “Q. But could you make that vote if the facts came in— “A. Yeah. “Q. —and the instructions came in and you decided in your mind and conscious [sic] that that’s the decision that has to be made? “A. Yeah. “Q. But you also would consider the other two [sen- tencing options] and might impose any of the three [sentencing options], correct? “A. Yeah.” Defense counsel then objected to the excusal of juror Howe. The trial court granted the state’s motion and excused Howe. Defendant argues that Howe’s statements generally demonstrated a willingness to consider the evidence notwithstanding her hesitancy about questions relating to the death penalty. We agree that neither Howe’s indication that it would be difficult to vote to put a person to death or her statement that, to garner her vote, the evidence would have to be “pretty good,” constituted sufficient reason to exclude her for actual bias. The decision that Howe and other jurors were asked to make was indeed difficult, and the jury is required to base its sentencing decision on the evidence presented. The fact that Howe stated, at the outset of the case, that to support a sentence of death, evidence would have to be “pretty good” was not an indication that Howe would not be able to make her sentencing decision fairly and impartially. That does not mean, however, that the trial court erred in excluding Howe. The state challenged Howe for “cause,” and a trial court permissibly may grant such a motion for reasons other than actual bias. See ORCP 57 D(1)(a), (b) (challenges for cause); ORS 136.210(1) (applying ORCP 57 D(1)(a) and (b) to criminal cases). Howe expressed confusion and a lack of comprehension with respect to a Cite as 356 Or 432 (2014) 467 number of questions appearing on the juror questionnaire and in response to questions directed to her during voir dire. In addition, Howe said that she was unsure whether she could make the sentencing decision that she would be required to make. The trial court could have understood Howe’s response as an indication that she did not have the ability to make any sentencing decision, rather than as an indication that she was biased in favor or against any particular sentencing decision. We have carefully reviewed the voir dire of all of the jurors in this case and are satisfied that the trial court correctly considered whether the jurors exhibited actual bias that would impair their ability to make the sentencing decision fairly and impartially. The record demonstrates that a number of jurors stated that the sentencing decision would be difficult or that the evidence indicating that death should be imposed would have to be persuasive, but who, nevertheless, remained on the jury panel after challenges for cause were taken. In fact, in one instance, a juror stated, in response to questions by the prosecutor, that it would be “hard to imagine anything heinous enough that you would have to vote for the death penalty. It’s hard.” Nevertheless, the court denied the state’s challenge for cause. That juror was different from Howe, however, in that she exhibited a strong ability to understand the complex issues presented and to follow the court’s instructions. We conclude that the trial court was in a position to assess Howe’s demeanor and qualifications and did not abuse its discretion in excluding her for cause other than actual bias.