Opinion ID: 2221649
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: per se ineffective assistance of counsel

Text: Generally, we have resolved the question of whether a criminal defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of his or her Sixth Amendment rights by applying the familiar two-part test enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), to the actual performance of defense counsel. Under this test, in order to establish a right to postconviction relief based on a claim of ineffective counsel, a defendant has the burden to first show that counsel's performance was deficient; that is, counsel's performance did not equal that of a lawyer with ordinary training and skill in criminal law in the area. Next, the defendant must show that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defense in his or her case. State v. Williams, supra ; State v. Smith, 256 Neb. 705, 592 N.W.2d 143 (1999); State v. Ditter, 255 Neb. 696, 587 N.W.2d 73 (1998). The Strickland analysis necessarily involves examination of specific acts and omissions on the part of counsel which are alleged to constitute deficient performance which was prejudicial to the defense of the accused. Some courts, however, have held that in certain circumstances, legal representation by a particular individual constitutes a per se violation of a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel, regardless of the particulars of such representation. For example, in Solina v. United States, 709 F.2d 160 (2d Cir.1983), the accused was represented by an individual who had graduated from an accredited law school but was unsuccessful in passing the bar examination and thus was never admitted to practice as a lawyer. The court held that this constituted a per se violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to `assistance of counsel' which the court construed as signifying nothing less than representation by a licensed practitioner. 709 F.2d at 167. In U.S. v. Novak, 903 F.2d 883 (2d Cir.1990), the same court followed a similar rationale in concluding that representation by Joel Steinberg, who had been admitted to the bar on the basis of false representations regarding his legal education, constituted a per se Sixth Amendment violation. The court concluded that [i]n general, the Sixth Amendment guarantee is not satisfied if the accused is represented by a person who, for failure to meet substantive bar admission requirements, has never been admitted to the practice of law in any jurisdiction. 903 F.2d at 887. See, also, People v. Chin Min Foo, 144 Misc.2d 589, 545 N.Y.S.2d 55 (1989), and People v. Williams, 140 Misc.2d 136, 530 N.Y.S.2d 472 (1988) (both holding representation by Steinberg constituted per se violation of Sixth Amendment). Similarly, the Florida Court of Appeals has determined that representation by an individual who graduated from law school and passed the bar examination but was denied a license to practice due to lack of moral character is per se ineffective. Huckelbury v. State, 337 So.2d 400 (Fla. App.1976). The court determined that the individual who represented the defendant was in effect an imposter, because the right to court-appointed counsel presupposes appointment of counsel fully accredited by competency and moral standards to practice law. Id. at 403. It further noted that the case presented a situation where one without proper credentials as a lawyer in any state or federal jurisdiction posed as a lawyer. And, he who so posed has not been considered to be of sufficient moral fiber to bear the stamp of approval of the Florida Bar. Id. Some courts have recognized per se ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel was suspended or disbarred prior to the representation. In In re Johnson, 1 Cal.4th 689, 822 P.2d 1317, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 170 (1992), the court found that representation by an attorney who had been suspended from the practice of law and had submitted his resignation to the state bar with disciplinary proceedings pending was per se ineffective. The court, however, based its decision on the resignation, reasoning that the submission of a resignation with charges pending caused an immediate transfer of the attorney to inactive status. Notably, it reasoned that the suspension alone did not amount to per se ineffectiveness, because admission of an attorney to the bar establishes that the State deems him competent to undertake the practice of law before all our courts, in all types of actions. ... An attorney who is professionally competent does not become any less competent upon the filing of an order ... suspending the attorney from practice. (Citation omitted.) Id. at 697, 822 P.2d at 1320-21, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d at 173-74. See, also, People v. Hinkley, 193 Cal.App.3d 383, 238 Cal.Rptr. 272 (1987) (holding criminal defendant received per se ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney's practice had been taken over by state bar and court pursuant to statute which allowed takeover after determination that attorney was incompetent to represent clients); Ex Parte Williams, 870 S.W.2d 343 (Tex.App.1994) (holding representation per se ineffective where attorney disbarred 2 months before trial and therefore no longer counsel within meaning of Sixth Amendment under Texas law which provides disbarred lawyer is deemed incompetent to represent criminal defendant as matter of law). Other courts, however, have declined to apply a per se rule in assessing the performance of a disbarred lawyer in a criminal proceeding. For example, in State v. Smith, 476 N.W.2d 511 (Minn. 1991), the court found there was no per se ineffective assistance of counsel when the attorney was suspended during the final day of trial. The court distinguished the case from those where counsel was an imposter who had never been admitted to the bar. It found that unlike those cases, where counsel had been admitted to the bar but had lost his or her license because of suspension or disbarment, the reasons for such loss of license could be so varied in kind and degree that a per se rule was not appropriate. In United States v. Mouzin, 785 F.2d 682 (9th Cir.1986), the court found that representation in U.S. District Court by counsel who had been disbarred by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit for unrelated conduct was not per se ineffective. In so holding, the court noted: The principle applied in [cases in which a person poses as a lawyer] is that one never admitted to practice law and therefore who never acquired the threshold qualification to represent a client in court cannot be allowed to do so, and no matter how spectacular a performance may ensue, it will not constitute effective representation of counsel for purposes of the Sixth Amendment. Conversely, the infliction of discipline upon an attorney previously qualified and in good standing will not and should not transform his services into ineffective assistance. 785 F.2d at 697. The court noted that his admission to the bar allowed it to assume that counsel had the training, knowledge, and ability to represent a client, regardless of his disbarment for unrelated conduct by another court. Circumstances similar to those before us in the present case were considered in Vance v. Lehman, 64 F.3d 119 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, Vance v. Horn, 516 U.S. 1059, 116 S.Ct. 736, 133 L.Ed.2d 686 (1996). In that case, defense counsel had originally been properly admitted to practice law in California. After disciplinary proceedings were brought against him in that state, he relocated to Pennsylvania, where he passed the bar examination but falsely reported on his application that he had no pending professional misconduct charges. The attorney's Pennsylvania license was revoked shortly after his representation of the defendant. In determining that the representation was not per se ineffective, the court noted: The courts have consistently looked to the licensing authorities of the legal profession to determine in circumstances of this kind the boundaries of the per se exception to the Strickland rule. If a lawyer is authorized by those authorities to practice law, his or her performance on a criminal defendant's behalf is acceptable for Sixth Amendment purposes so long as the Strickland criteria are not met. 64 F.3d at 122. The court further noted that the attorney was not an imposter, in that he had graduated from an accredited law school, was originally certified by California as competent to practice law, had practiced law for a decade, and had been tested and found knowledgeable about Pennsylvania law. It also noted that his breaches of conduct were unrelated to his representation of the client. See, also, Bellamy v. Cogdell, 974 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied 507 U.S. 960, 113 S.Ct. 1383, 122 L.Ed.2d 759 (1993) (declining to find per se ineffective assistance of counsel where attorney represented client while disciplinary proceedings were pending against him and was then suspended following trial due to health concerns); Waterhouse v. Rodriguez, 848 F.2d 375 (2d Cir.1988) (holding representation at a suppression hearing by lawyer disbarred on final day of hearing not per se ineffective); Wilson v. People, 652 P.2d 595 (Colo.1982), cert. denied 459 U.S. 1218, 103 S.Ct. 1221, 75 L.Ed.2d 457 (1983) (holding representation by attorney who met all requirements for obtaining license but failed to take oath for admission not per se ineffective, distinguishing circumstance from representation by someone impersonating lawyer); People v. Pubrat, 451 Mich. 589, 548 N.W.2d 595 (1996) (holding attorney's suspension during proceedings did not result in per se ineffective assistance of counsel, distinguishing case from those in which laypersons masquerade as attorneys). In State v. Bennett, 256 Neb. 747, 591 N.W.2d 779 (1999), we were presented with the issue of whether Radosevich's representation of a criminal defendant in Nebraska after his disbarment in Colorado but before he was disbarred by this court constituted per se ineffective assistance of counsel. However, we did not reach the issue because of our determination that Bennett's failure to raise it on direct appeal procedurally barred his motion for postconviction relief. In McCroy's cases, however, no direct appeals were filed, allegedly because of Radosevich's failure to carry out McCroy's request to do so. Thus, the question of whether Radosevich's representation of McCroy constituted per se ineffective assistance of counsel is directly before us. Vance v. Lehman, 64 F.3d 119 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, Vance v. Horn, 516 U.S. 1059, 116 S.Ct. 736, 133 L.Ed.2d 686 (1996), and other authorities discussed above recognize what we perceive to be a valid distinction between representation by one who has never been qualified to practice law and one who was properly admitted in the first instance but is subsequently suspended or disbarred. Here, Radosevich graduated from an accredited law school, passed the bar examination, and was duly admitted to practice law in Nebraska in the first instance. Although he had been disbarred in Colorado, he was licensed to practice law in Nebraska at the time of his representation of McCroy, and his subsequent disbarment by this court was unrelated to that representation. We decline to adopt a per se determination of ineffective assistance of counsel under these circumstances and conclude that McCroy's motion for postconviction relief based upon ineffective assistance of counsel should be analyzed under the Strickland test based upon Radosevich's actual performance in representing McCroy.