Opinion ID: 204386
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: facts

Text: When he commenced this action, Mr. Jordan was imprisoned at the United States Penitentiary Administrative Maximum Facility in Florence, Colorado, 2 1 (...continued) F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 2003) (citing Haines). We do not, however, assume the role of advocate. See Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005); Ledbetter, 318 F.3d at 1187–88. 2 In May 2010, Mr. Jordan filed a change-of-address notice in which he informed us that he had been transferred to a federal penitentiary in Virginia. Subsequently, in late November 2010, Mr. Jordan filed a document, titled “Motion to Supplement Record,” purportedly “to notice his release from the BOP Control Unit.” Mot. to Supplement R. at 1 (internal quotation marks omitted). In this filing, Mr. Jordan reminded us of his transfer and offered a brief argument concerning the implications of that transfer for the vitality of his appeal. Specifically, Mr. Jordan noted that he was housed in a “BOP Control Unit” when he filed this action, id. (internal quotation marks omitted); that this housing “placement was the result of the challenged disciplinary conviction,” id.; and that part of the relief that he had initially sought was “an order directing his release (continued...) -2- having been convicted in 1995 of armed bank robbery and in 2005 of murder and other related offenses stemming from his fatal stabbing of a fellow inmate while imprisoned. The disciplinary proceedings that Mr. Jordan challenges arose from an incident that occurred on October 3, 2005, while Mr. Jordan was housed in the Special Housing Unit in solitary confinement. On that date, Mr. Jordan asked Officer Shawn P. Quenelle if he could make a telephone call. Officer Quenelle did not permit Mr. Jordan to do so because he had not submitted a written request and too many calls had already been scheduled. According to Officer Quenelle, who was standing in close proximity to Mr. Jordan’s cell at the time, Mr. Jordan then stated, “this is the kind of stuff that makes me want to stab someone.” R., 2 (...continued) from the BOP Control Unit,” id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Mr. Jordan informs us that “since the completion of briefing in this appeal he has been released from the Control Unit and transferred to another facility in the BOP.” Id. Mr. Jordan seems to acknowledge that in light of the foregoing developments we are no longer situated to grant him relief with respect to Control Unit placement and, to that extent, his action is moot. However, Mr. Jordan vigorously asserts that his action is not “otherwise moot” because “he continues to suffer . . . the disallowance of good conduct time credit in which he possesses a protected liberty interest as a result of the assertedly unlawful disciplinary proceedings.” Id. at 1–2. We agree. Mr. Jordan’s transfer did not moot the remainder of this appeal. See Ross v. Mebane, 536 F.2d 1199, 1201 (7th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (noting that an action was “not moot” where a prisoner was transferred to another federal prison facility after filing his habeas action for alleged wrongful denial of good time credits because the prisoner’s “good-time credits [had not] been restored”); cf. Warnick v. Booher, 425 F.3d 842, 846 (10th Cir. 2005) (“The Warden has conceded the error of the original 155-credit reduction, so there is nothing left for judicial resolution on that matter. Accordingly, the district court’s ruling has been mooted insofar as it concerns the original reduction.”). We therefore proceed to address the merits of his appeal and, insofar as Mr. Jordan’s motion to supplement can be construed to seek that relief, we GRANT it. -3- Vol. I, at 44 (Incident Report, dated Oct. 4, 2005). On October 4, 2005, Officer Quenelle filed an incident report against Mr. Jordan, charging him with “threatening another with bodily harm” in violation of BOP Code 203. After an investigation, the incident report was referred to the Unit Disciplinary Committee (“UDC”), which held a hearing on October 6, 2005. Mr. Jordan provided a written statement to the UDC, in which he asserted that the incident report should be referred to a Disciplinary Hearing Officer (“DHO”). He also requested a particular staff representative and asked that Officer Quenelle and other prison officials appear before the DHO as witnesses. The UDC determined that Mr. Jordan had threatened another with bodily harm, referred the charges to the DHO for further hearing, and recommended that the DHO impose a sanction of disciplinary segregation if it found that Mr. Jordan was guilty of the charge. The UDC provided Mr. Jordan with written notice of the DHO hearing and an explanation of his rights. The DHO held a hearing on December 21, 2005, which Mr. Jordan attended. Mr. Jordan submitted a written statement to the DHO along with the written statement of fellow inmate George Scalf, who was housed next to Mr. Jordan at the time of the incident. Mr. Jordan alleged that Mr. Scalf had made the statement at issue 3 and Mr. Scalf’s written statement to the DHO corroborated Mr. 3 Mr. Jordan alleged that Mr. Scalf made a slightly different statement than that attributed to Mr. Jordan. He contended that Mr. Scalf stated that “[i]t’s (continued...) -4- Jordan’s version of the events. The DHO did not allow Mr. Jordan to call the witnesses that he had requested because he determined that those witnesses had not directly observed the incident. The DHO concluded that Mr. Jordan had made the statement and was guilty of violating Code 203. He imposed a sanction of thirty days of disciplinary segregation and a reduction of twenty-seven days of good-time credit. After Mr. Jordan was given a copy of the DHO’s report on April 28, 2006, he appealed to the North Central Regional Office, arguing that his disciplinary conviction was obtained in violation of both his Fifth Amendment right to due process and the APA. The Regional Director rejected his appeal on June 9, 2006, and Mr. Jordan appealed to the Central Office. That appeal was denied on September 9, 2006. Mr. Jordan filed a § 2241 petition with the United States District Court for the District of Colorado on October 20, 2006, challenging the BOP’s disciplinary proceedings against him. In his petition, Mr. Jordan argued that: (1) the prison regulation at issue, Code 203, was impermissibly vague as applied, in violation of his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment; (2) the disciplinary proceedings against him violated his procedural due process rights under the Fifth Amendment; and (3) the disciplinary proceedings violated the APA. Respondent 3 (...continued) that kind of shit that makes a motherfucker want to stab up some shit.” R., Vol. II, at 132 (Order on Pet. for Habeas Corpus, filed June 17, 2009). -5- argued that Mr. Jordan had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to his vagueness challenge and his APA claim, and challenged the merits of Mr. Jordan’s claims. The district court determined that Mr. Jordan had properly exhausted all of his administrative remedies. The court then addressed Mr. Jordan’s claims on their merits, and ultimately denied his habeas petition. First, the court held that Code 203 provided fair warning of the prohibited conduct and that Mr. Jordan “should have realized that his statement to a prison official standing directly outside of his cell door that, ‘[t]his is the kind of stuff that makes me want to stab someone,’ could constitute a violation of Code 203.” R., Vol. II, at 139. The court also determined that the disciplinary proceedings did not violate Mr. Jordan’s Fifth Amendment due process rights because: Mr. Jordan had the opportunity to present all relevant evidence; the DHO’s decision was supported by written statements from two BOP officers; Mr. Jordan’s rights were not violated by the quality of representation provided by the staff representative because he did not have a constitutional right to assistance during the disciplinary process; assuming, arguendo, that Mr. Jordan was denied access to an officer’s investigatory memorandum, any such denial had no impact on Mr. Jordan’s ability to defend himself; and Mr. Jordan did not present a meritorious retaliation claim because he “d[id] not have a protected interest in ‘jailhouse lawyering,’” and thus could not assert a due process/retaliation claim on that basis. Id. at 150. Finally, -6- the court held that Mr. Jordan’s disciplinary conviction did not violate the APA because it was supported by “some evidence” and, therefore, was not arbitrary and capricious. The district court accordingly entered judgment denying Mr. Jordan’s petition on June 18, 2009. On June 26, 2009, Mr. Jordan filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, in which he argued that the district court had misconstrued his statutory claim because he had not brought it under the APA. Consequently, he contended that his statutory claim should have been reviewed “independent of the APA” rather than under the arbitrary and capricious standard. R., Vol. II, at 156, 158 (Mot. to Alter or Amend J.). However, Mr. Jordan did not identify precisely what standard did apply. The court denied the motion because it determined that Mr. Jordan did not state a claim for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), concluding that Mr. Jordan had merely “rais[ed] the same arguments previously asserted in [his Habeas] Application.” R., Vol. II, at 236 (Order, filed Aug. 25, 2009). This appeal followed. The district court granted Mr. Jordan leave to proceed in forma pauperis.