Opinion ID: 2284545
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: election to be sentenced by the court

Text: The next issue raised by Gilliam in this appeal asserts two reasons why Gilliam's election to be sentenced by a court rather than by a jury was not knowingly and intelligently made. Gilliam claims he was misadvised about the sentencing that would result if the jury was deadlocked, and also about the deliberation process required by the Supreme Court in Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 108 S.Ct. 1860, 100 L.Ed.2d 384 (1988). In Harris v. State, 295 Md. 329, 338-40, 455 A.2d 979, 984 (1983), we held that before a defendant may effectively waive a jury sentencing proceeding, he must be informed of the provisions of subsection (k)(2) of Md.Code (1957, 1987 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27 § 413, which states: If the jury, within a reasonable time, is not able to agree as to whether a sentence of death shall be imposed, the court may not impose a sentence of death. Section 413(k)(6) states: If the State gives the notice required under § 412(b) of this article of intention to seek the death penalty in addition to the notice of intention to seek a sentence of imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole, and the court or jury determines that a sentence of death may not be imposed under the provisions of this section, that court or jury shall determine whether to impose a sentence of imprisonment for life or imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole. If a jury is elected for sentencing, it is clear from these provisions that if after a reasonable period of time the jury is unable to agree about whether to impose a death sentence and thereby deadlocks, it is that same deadlocked jury that decides whether the ensuing life sentence will be with or without the possibility of parole. Before the trial began, the court advised Gilliam that: The jury is only allowed a reasonable period of time to deliberate and after that reasonable period of time if they do not reach a decision one way or the other, then I'm required to bring the jury back to dismiss the jury and impose a sentence of life or life imprisonment without parole. (Emphasis added.) Gilliam asserts that this statement by the trial court was wrong as a matter of law because it suggested that both the deadlocked jury and the judge would have a chance to decide whether the ensuing sentence of life imprisonment would be with or without the possibility of parole. In other words, this potential ambiguity could have led Gilliam to think that if he elected to be sentenced by a jury he would face a double possibility of life without parole. The jury would have the power to impose that sanction, but if it were to deadlock, then the judge could do so. The gist of this argument is that no one operating under such a misapprehension would elect a jury sentencing believing that it carried with it the potential to be twice exposed to a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. Therefore, Gilliam asserts his election to be sentenced by the court was not knowingly and intelligently made. We do not accept Gilliam's contention that his decision of whether a jury or judge would determine the sentence of life or death was affected by speculation on what would occur if the jury deadlocked on the issue of life or life without parole. Even assuming Gilliam misunderstood this advice from the trial court when it was given to him before the trial on June 5, 1989, we think he was sufficiently advised of the distinction between a court and jury sentencing several weeks later in a hearing held on June 23, 1989, for the sole purpose of explaining these distinctions. The court stated at the June 23rd hearing: Now another thing, and the last thing. The State also has asked as an alternative for you to be sentenced to life without parole. If a jury determines or if the judge determines as the sentencing trier of fact that you should receive life, then it would be up for the jury or the judge to determine whether that life sentence should be without parole. And the judge, if the judge would do the sentencing or the jury, if the jury would do the sentencing, would have to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty, if life was to be imposed, that life sentence should be life without parole. Because this adequately instructed Gilliam about the distinctions between a court and jury sentencing, we find no reversible error on this point. The second point Gilliam raises in challenging his election to be sentenced by the court was that the trial court misadvised him of the jury deliberation process required by Mills v. Maryland . Gilliam maintains that the trial court failed to explain that if some, but less than all, of the jurors believed that at least one mitigating factor existed and was not outweighed by the aggravating factor(s), the result would be a deadlocked jury. Once deadlocked, the jury could not impose a sentence of death. The trial court explained: Suppose five jurors believe that one mitigating factor is in fact a mitigating factor but the other seven don't, and suppose seven other jurors agree upon another mitigating factor. All that is required is that the jury believe that some mitigating factor exists sufficient that they don't believe that the State has sustained its proof beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors. In other words, the jurors do not have to agree unanimously on the same mitigating factor. In Mills, the Supreme Court undertook to determine whether a reasonable juror understood the verdict form to mean that every time no was marked beside a mitigating factor the jury was indicating its unanimous conclusion that the defendant had not proved the relevant mitigating factor by a preponderance of the evidence, or instead, whether the jury believed that a mark of no on the form indicated its failure to unanimously agree that a mitigating factor existed. This latter construction would prevent jurors from considering a mitigating factor which one or more, but not all, jurors believed existed. Mills, 486 U.S. at 375-76, 108 S.Ct. at 1866, 100 L.Ed.2d at 394-95. Concluding that there was a substantial risk the jury thought they were precluded from considering a mitigating factor unless all 12 jurors agreed on the existence of a particular mitigating factor, the Supreme Court remanded the case for resentencing. Id. at 384, 108 S.Ct. at 1870, 100 L.Ed.2d at 400. Gilliam contends that the judge's example failed to advise him that the weighing of aggravating against mitigating circumstances occurs when one or more, but not all, jurors find that a mitigating circumstance exists. We find that, although a better example could have been chosen, the trial court's explanation was adequate. While the trial court's Mills instruction may not have included every possible example of the jury deliberation process, it offered one example in which jury unanimity was not required on a single mitigating factor. This was not an erroneous instruction. More importantly, the record is clear that Gilliam discussed the significance of the Mills decision with his attorney, as well as its effect on his election to be sentenced by the court. Before trial, when Gilliam was to elect whether to be tried by the court or by a jury, the trial court instructed him on the Mills decision. The court then asked if Gilliam understood the instruction and the record shows the following: THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: All right. Mr. Daneman, I take it you have been over this with your client before? MR. DANEMAN: I have. At no time did defense counsel object to the court's Mills instruction. Further, it is clear that Gilliam's attorney had already thoroughly instructed him on the matter. Therefore, absent clear evidence that Gilliam was in doubt about the effect of Mills on his election to be tried and sentenced by the court, we presume that he was fully informed by his counsel. The ambiguity, if any, in the judge's explanation of Mills does not undermine the judge's finding of a knowing and voluntary election to be sentenced by the court.