Opinion ID: 4191525
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alleged Improper Speculation

Text: First, Defendant argues that the district judge procedurally erred by basing his sentence off of improper speculation about future changes Congress might make to the current sentencing regime. In order to understand the import of Defendant’s argument, it is necessary to briefly recount how the district court calculated Defendant’s sentence. As recited earlier, Defendant was convicted of one count of conspiracy to commit bank robbery, two counts of aiding and abetting a bank robbery with forced accompaniment, one count of aiding and abetting an armed bank robbery, and three counts of aiding and abetting the brandishing of a firearm during an armed bank robbery. For the four non-brandishing counts, the district court calculated Defendant’s total offense level at 34, and classified him as a category III offender, yielding a Guidelines range of 188–235 months’ imprisonment that could not be lowered below 120 months because the forced accompaniment charges triggered a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 2113(e) (“Whoever, in committing any offense defined in this section . . . forces any person to accompany him without the consent of such person, shall be imprisoned not less than ten years.”). Additionally, for the brandishing counts, federal law imposes a mandatory minimum sentence of seven years for the first count, and twenty-five years for each successive count, all to be served consecutively with each other and any other sentence the defendant may receive. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) (“[I]f the firearm is brandished, [the defendant] shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 7 years.”); id. § 924(c)(1)(C)(i) (“In the case of a second or subsequent conviction under this subsection, the person shall . . . be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 25 years.”); id. § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii) (“[N]o term of imprisonment imposed on a person under this subsection shall run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment imposed on the person.”). The district court sentenced Defendant to the bottom of the Guidelines range for the nonbrandishing counts (188 months), plus the required fifty-seven years for the brandishing counts, to reach a total of 872 months’ imprisonment. 18 No. 16-2063 Understandably, given the lengthy mandatory minimums he was facing, Defendant asked the district court to use its limited discretion to give him a below-Guidelines sentence on the four non-brandishing counts. Defendant argued that a sentence significantly below 188 months (but presumably above the 120 month mandatory minimum) would be sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to punish his conduct. In rejecting Defendant’s request, the district court recounted the seriousness of Defendant’s crimes, the psychological scars that Defendant’s crimes would leave on the tellers and customers that were present during the robberies, and Defendant’s failure to take responsibility for his actions despite overwhelming evidence of his guilt. The district court also acknowledged that due to the mandatory minimum sentences required by § 924(c), it had relatively little discretion to give Defendant a more lenient sentence even if his conduct had warranted leniency. The district court further stated that: Regarding the 188 months is where I do have some discretion. And I am fearful that if I say, let’s just pick a number out, let’s say I say 160 months or 120 months then we have a change in statutes. Maybe I shouldn’t worry about the future, and I don’t think it makes a lot of difference actually. (R. 136, Sentencing Tr., PageID #742.) Defendant argues that this passage shows that the district court refused to grant his downward departure because it worried that Congress might one day eliminate the mandatory enhancements for § 924(c) offenses, and thereby leave Defendant with too light a sentence. Defendant concludes that his sentence was thus infected by improper speculation. We disagree. When that passage is read in context of the entire sentencing transcript, it is clear that the district court denied a downward departure because it felt that a lower sentence would not reflect the seriousness of Defendant’s offenses. The district court focused on the tremendous risk the robberies posed to innocent bystanders, the brazenness of the crimes, and Defendant’s general refusal to take any responsibility for his conduct. The district court felt that granting a departure would signal that Defendant’s crimes were less serious than they actually 19 No. 16-2063 were, and concluded that Defendant’s sentence—even with the high mandatory minimums—was sufficient, but not greater than necessary, punishment. We can discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision. The two cases Defendant cites in support of his argument are not on point. In United States v. Recla, 560 F.3d 539, 545–46 (6th Cir. 2009), we held that a district court cannot give a defendant a greater sentence on the understanding that the sentence may later be reduced by a Rule 35(b) motion filed by the government. The district court here did not inflate Defendant’s sentence in anticipation of Congress eventually eliminating the mandatory minimums in § 924(c), but rather found that a below-Guidelines sentence would not reflect the seriousness of Defendant’s offenses. And further, Dean v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1170, 1176–77 (2017), merely held that nothing “in § 924(c) restricts the authority conferred on sentencing courts by § 3553(a) and the related provisions to consider a sentence imposed under § 924(c) when calculating a just sentence for the predicate count.” The Supreme Court did not hold that district courts are required to factor in § 924(c) mandatory minimums when calculating an appropriate sentence for the predicate offenses. Accordingly, we hold that Defendant’s sentence was not tainted by improper speculation.