Opinion ID: 42479
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Right to Fair Trial

Text: The Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of “[d]ue process is satisfied only by a full and fair hearing.” Ibrahim v. INS, 821 F.2d 1547, 1550 (11th Cir. 1987). “The presence of a competent interpreter is important to the fundamental fairness of a hearing, if the alien cannot speak English fluently.” Vasquez-Acevedo, 131 Fed. Appx. at 184 (internal quotation and citation omitted). An alien must raise objections to the insufficiency of the translation or hearing accommodations during the proceedings, however, to demonstrate a due process violation. See Soares v. INS, 449 F.2d 621, 623 (5th Cir. 1971); cf. Valladares v. United States, 871 F.2d 1564, 1566 (11th Cir. 1989) (“To allow a defendant to remain silent throughout the trial and then, upon being found guilty, to assert a claim of inadequate translation would be an open invitation to abuse.”). Moreover, to prevail on a due process challenge to the sufficiency of removal proceedings, an alien must show substantial prejudice, which typically requires a showing that the outcome would have differed had the due process violation not occurred. See Ibrahim, 821 F.2d at 1550. 9 Based on the foregoing precedent, we conclude that Rageevan’s due process rights to a fair hearing were not violated. Although Rageevan argues that there were some miscommunications with the translator during his removal proceedings, the record does not reflect that he made any mention or objection regarding these purported miscommunications during the proceedings, and therefore he fails to state a due process violation. Soares, 449 F.2d at 623. Moreover, the one particular miscommunication Rageevan cites—the IJ’s failure at the first removal hearing to repeat at the translator’s request in toto his instruction for Rageevan to complete his asylum application—fails to state a due process violation because the IJ repeated the directive about the need to complete the asylum application later in the first proceeding. In addition, we reject Rageevan’s argument that his due process rights were violated on account of the IJ’s failure to personally review his asylum application because the proceeding took place via televideo. Had the IJ been physically present to review Rageevan’s asylum application, the fact remains that Rageevan did not complete the application because he did not identify that he was part of a particular social group that would subject him to persecution in Sri Lanka. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.3(c)(3) (“An asylum application that does not include a response to each of the questions contained in the Form I-589 . . . is incomplete.”). Because his application was incomplete, the IJ’s physical review of Rageevan’s application would not have changed the outcome of the removal proceedings and 10 therefore was not a reversible due process violation. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.31(c) (noting that if an alien fails to submit an application within the time set by an IJ, the IJ may deem the application abandoned); see also Gonzalez-Quintero v. U.S. Att’y Gen., No. 04-14592 (11th Cir. July 7, 2005) (finding no due process violation where the IJ deemed an alien’s asylum application abandoned because the alien failed to file a completed asylum application by time ordered by the IJ). Moreover, we note that neither before the BIA nor on appeal did Rageevan argue that the application was complete or that he was part of a particular social group that would have affected the IJ’s determination. Thus, we reject Rageevan’s argument that his due process rights were violated because he was not afforded a full and fair hearing.