Opinion ID: 2551919
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Motion to Replace Public Defender with Private Attorney

Text: On November 14, 1984, Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Douglas A. McKee held a pretrial status conference, at which Deputy Public Defender Michael O. Clark, defendant's appointed trial counsel, announced that defendant would like to have a Marsden motion. (See People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118, 84 Cal. Rptr. 156, 465 P.2d 44.) After the prosecutor left the courtroom, defendant then submitted a document, apparently written by another inmate at defendant's direction, stating reasons for defendant's dissatisfaction with counsel. The document stated that counsel had advised defendant to waive his statutory speedy trial rights because without a waiver the matter would be transferred to Judge (now Chief Justice) Ronald George, and counsel had also advised defendant that Judge George would probably treat defendant unfairly. After reading the document, the court asked defense counsel to leave the courtroom, and in his absence explained that counsel was correct that without a time waiver the matter would have to be transferred to Judge George for assignment because Judge McKee was then presiding over another trial that had not yet concluded. Judge McKee said that if the case was transferred to Judge George for assignment, there was no way to predict which judge would ultimately preside over the trial and he had no reason to think that the judge who ultimately presided over defendant's trial would treat him unfairly. Judge McKee said he himself had formed no opinion on the merits of defendant's case and if he presided over the trial he would try to be fair. Judge McKee asked defendant if he had any other complaints, and defendant alleged that counsel had told a witness at the preliminary hearing that defendant would get the death penalty and that counsel seemed to be preparing only for the penalty phase and not for the guilt phase. Judge McKee then had defense counsel return to the courtroom to respond to defendant's allegations. Counsel said he had told a witness at the preliminary hearing that the prosecution probably would seek the death penalty, and that he had never told anyone that defendant was going to get the death penalty. Counsel said he planned to contest guilt but in view of defendant's confession, other incriminating evidence, the abolition of the diminished capacity defense, and the time pressure caused by defendant's insistence on a speedy trial, he was devoting most of his energies to preparing for the penalty phase. Judge McKee declined to rule on the Marsden motion and transferred the matter to Judge George. After the transfer, Judge George asked defendant to state his complaints against his trial counsel. Defendant said that counsel was misleading him, and he referred Judge George to the letter the inmate had written on his behalf. After reading the letter, Judge George asked defendant if he wished to say anything else. Defendant answered, No. Judge George then asked trial counsel whether in his opinion there was a conflict of interest that would justify relieving the public defender's office. Counsel answered in the negative. Judge George then denied the motion to relieve the public defender's office. We reject defendant's contention that Judge George abused his discretion in denying the motion to relieve appointed counsel. Defendant argues that Judge George failed to make an adequate inquiry into defendant's reasons for requesting substitute counsel. The record shows, however, that Judge George asked defendant three times to state the grounds of his motion, never interrupted defendant's explanation, and read and considered the letter that defendant submitted. This was sufficient to satisfy the court's duty of inquiry. (See People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1023-1024, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388.) Applying the deferential abuse of discretion standard of review to the court's ruling denying the motion to relieve counsel ( People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 876, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 857, 978 P.2d 15), we discern no such abuse here. Defendant's vague allegations that his attorney was misleading him or pressuring him to waive his speedy trial rights fall well short of establishing that counsel was not providing adequate representation or had become embroiled in such an irreconcilable conflict with defendant that ineffective representation was likely to result. ( Ibid. )