Opinion ID: 1615671
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Nebraska Equal Protection

Text: On November 3, 1998, Nebraska voters approved L.R. 20CA, an amendment to Neb. Const. art. I, § 3, adding the following language, delineated herein by underlining: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law, nor be denied equal protection of the laws. 95th Leg., 1st Sess. 4 (May 21, 1997). On December 15, 1998, Reeves filed his second motion for postconviction relief, seeking to set aside his death sentences based, in part, upon this recently enacted constitutional amendment. Reeves claims he was denied equal protection based on race under the state Constitution in connection with his resentencing in Reeves III and in enforcement of the death penalty. The State argues on appeal that as the district court concluded, the constitutional amendment should not be applied retroactively. Under Nebraska law, a constitutional amendment operates prospectively only, unless the words employed show a clear intention that it should have a retrospective effect. Luikart v. Higgins, 130 Neb. 395, 400, 264 N.W. 903, 905 (1936). This court stated in Luikart that constitutional amendments are like statutory amendments and absent `something on the face of the enactment putting it beyond doubt that the legislature meant it to operate retrospectively,' a constitutional amendment has prospective operation only. Id. (quoting 1 Thomas M. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations at 136 (8th ed.1927)). Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court has held, in Shreveport v. Cole, 129 U.S. 36, 43, 9 S.Ct. 210, 32 L.Ed. 589 (1889), that [c]onstitutions as well as statutes are construed to operate prospectively only, unless, on the face of the instrument or enactment, the contrary intention is manifest beyond reasonable question. Our review of the current case law in this area leads us to conclude that the general rule remains unchanged. See, e.g., People v. Dean, 175 Ill.2d 244, 677 N.E.2d 947, 222 Ill.Dec. 413 (1997) (holding that constitutional amendment operates prospectively unless language of amendment clearly indicates intent to apply amendment retroactively); State v. Cousan, 684 So.2d 382 (La.1996); People v. Gornbein, 407 Mich. 330, 285 N.W.2d 41 (1979); State ex rel. Moore v. Molpus, 578 So.2d 624 (Miss. 1991). Nothing in the language of Nebraska's equal protection amendment indicates an intention, much less an intention beyond doubt, see Luikart, supra, that the amendment operate retroactively. Accordingly, we hold that the amendment to Neb. Const. art. I, § 3, providing that no person shall ... be denied equal protection of the laws operates prospectively only. Thus, Nebraska's equal protection amendment is inapplicable to Reeves' claim of denial of equal protection under the state Constitution in connection with the 1991 resentencing in Reeves III. Reeves argues that his claim of denial of equal protection based on alleged racial disparity is also addressed to his unenforced death penalty. Reeves argues that the application of the Nebraska constitutional amendment as to this claim is therefore prospective. We agree that the Nebraska equal protection amendment applies to this claim. However, Reeves further alleges that it cannot be proved that these racial disparities are the result of conscious racial discrimination by any particular state actor or group of state actors. In order to prove that a defendant's race unconstitutionally taints enforcement of the death penalty, the defendant must at a minimum establish that the decision to enforce the death penalty is based on a conscious discriminatory purpose, resulting in a discriminatory effect suffered by the defendant. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987). We apply the principles enunciated in McCleskey here. Reeves has failed to plead facts which under McCleskey entitle him to relief, admits that he cannot establish the facts to show he is entitled to relief on his claim of denial of equal protection in enforcement of the death penalty, and has pled merely conclusions. Accordingly, he is not entitled to relief on his claim of racial disparity in the enforcement of the death penalty under the state equal protection constitutional provision. See State v. Smith, 256 Neb. 705, 592 N.W.2d 143 (1999). See, also, McCleskey, supra . The district court's order denying Reeves postconviction relief based upon Nebraska's equal protection clause without an evidentiary hearing was correct as a matter of law and is affirmed.