Opinion ID: 751094
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Equal Protection Claim Against Grayson2

Text: 6 The Fourteenth Amendment mandates that no State deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. U.S. Const. amend XIV. Thus, although there is no constitutional right to police protection, State executive and law enforcement officials may not selectively deny ... protective services to certain disfavored minorities. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197 n. 3, 109 S.Ct. 998, 1004 n. 3, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989). 7 Plaintiffs rely on City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985), for their contention that the district court should not have applied the equal protection test governing race and gender classifications, which necessitated that plaintiffs show that Grayson acted with discriminatory intent. Instead, plaintiffs argue, in cases involving less invidious but nonetheless arbitrary classifications, such as child victims of domestic sexual abuse, Cleburne simply envisions that plaintiffs prove that the defendant's decision lacked a rational basis, without regard to any discriminatory intent. 3 8 Plaintiffs misconstrue the Cleburne decision. There the Supreme Court expressly noted the finding made by the district court that the municipality's principal reason for denying the requested zoning permit had been that the residents of the [plaintiff] home would be persons who are mentally retarded, id. at 437, 105 S.Ct. at 3253, a finding which was never challenged on appeal. Thus, it was only because the city's discriminatory motive had been established ab initio that the Court addressed whether the city need demonstrate a compelling or important state interest--criteria theretofore reserved for race and gender discrimination--or need simply articulate a rational basis for its decision. Id. at 440-41, 105 S.Ct. at 3254-55. Accordingly, Cleburne did not hold that no threshold proof of intent to discriminate is required in cases involving less invidious arbitrary classifications. 4 9 The motivation underlying a municipal decision is not always so apparent as in Cleburne, of course, especially if the challenged decision does not expressly single out a particular class of persons for disadvantageous treatment. Even in such instances, however, members of the plaintiff class quite understandably may consider it no mere coincidence that a facially neutral decision causes a disproportionately unfavorable impact on their particular class. Nevertheless, even evidence of a widely disproportionate impact on the plaintiff class normally is not enough, standing alone, to establish an equal protection violation. See, e.g., Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274-75, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 2293-94, 60 L.Ed.2d 870 (1979) (upholding veteran's preference in civil service hiring, although vast majority of veterans hired were male). Rather, plaintiffs must adduce competent evidence of purposeful discrimination. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 243-44, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2049-50, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976); Soto v. Flores, 103 F.3d 1056, 1067 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 71, 139 L.Ed.2d 32 (1997). 10 The burden is an onerous one:  'Discriminatory purpose' ... implies that the decisionmaker ... selected or reaffirmed a course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279, 99 S.Ct. at 2296 (emphasis added; citation omitted); Soto, 103 F.3d at 1067. Thus, unless these plaintiffs established the requisite discriminatory intent, their equal protection claim cannot succeed even assuming the Grayson decision not to investigate lacked a rational basis. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265, 97 S.Ct. 555, 563, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977); Semple v. City of Moundsville, 963 F.Supp. 1416, 1433 (N.D.W.Va.1997). 11 Plaintiffs claim that the district court disregarded competent evidence that Grayson harbored archaic stereotypes regarding female-child sexual abuse in the home and singled out its victims for unfavorable treatment in determining whether to investigate. The record does not support their contention, however. 5 12 At no time did Grayson indicate to anyone that he would not investigate allegations of child sexual abuse in the home because he thought the victims were undeserving of equal law-enforcement protection. Instead, he explained to a fellow officer that he had refrained from investigating plaintiffs' allegations at their mother's request. 6 Another police officer confirmed that it was Grayson's policy not to intervene where a family member (e.g., nonabusive parent or spouse) requested that there be no investigation. 13 Plaintiffs essentially claim, nonetheless, that their evidence supported, respectively, rational inferences that Grayson intended to treat all domestic crime differently from nondomestic crime, all crimes against children differently from crimes against adults, and all sexual abuse crimes differently from nonsexual crimes. 7 Once again the evidence does not bear out their claim. 14 Plaintiffs' proffer disclosed that the nonintervention policy attributed to Grayson may have been much broader than plaintiffs allow, in that it applied not merely to domestic child sexual abuse, but to other crimes in circumstances where general concerns for family integrity and family privacy predominated. 8 Thus, their proffer may be seen to belie their contention that Grayson sought to discriminate against them because of, rather than in spite of, their status as victims of child sexual abuse in the home. See Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279, 99 S.Ct. at 2296. Far from demonstrating general condonation of child sexual abuse in the home, therefore, the proffer simply supported a reasonable inference that Grayson would investigate virtually any allegation of crime absent an appropriate request from a nonoffending spouse to refrain from intervention in circumstances where legitimate, competing family interests were thought to predominate. Accordingly, although the evidence may well have demonstrated that the Grayson nonintervention policy had a disproportionate adverse impact in cases involving allegations relating to the various victim classes in which plaintiffs claimed membership, it did not demonstrate that Grayson harbored a discriminatory animus toward those victim classes. Id. at 274, 99 S.Ct. at 2293-94 (upholding veteran's preference in civil service hiring, even though vast majority of veteran hirees were male). 15 Similarly, plaintiffs presented evidence that Grayson, on two other occasions, failed to investigate allegations of child sexual abuse in the home. Once again, however, there was no evidence that Grayson was motivated by a discriminatory animus, as distinguished from a neutral nonintervention policy. Moreover, Grayson proffered undisputed evidence that he had investigated at least two other domestic child sexual abuse cases, as well as eight nondomestic child sexual abuse cases. Cf. Willhauck v. Halpin, 953 F.2d 689, 712 (1st Cir.1991) (in analogous context of equal protection claim founded on selective prosecution, [i]t must be shown that others similarly situated have not been prosecuted and that the decision to prosecute has been motivated by an impermissible reason). 16 Finally, in an ironic twist, the discriminatory focus essential to plaintiffs' equal protection claims was irredeemably blurred by their proffer that the Grayson nonintervention policy extended well beyond domestic child sexual abuse cases (e.g., to DWI and vandalism), and may even have been due to Grayson's dishonesty, chronic lassitude, alcohol abuse, or desire to wage personal vendettas against particular individuals rather than groups. See New Burnham Prairie Homes, Inc. v. Village of Burnham, 910 F.2d 1474, 1481 (7th Cir.1990) (noting that [d]iscrimination based merely on individual, rather than group, reasons will not suffice to establish equal protection violation). That is to say, although their scattershot approach might enable a rational inference that Grayson was a poor police chief, it cannot sustain a nonspeculative inference that he failed to investigate these allegations because plaintiffs were children who had been sexually abused, or because plaintiffs had been sexually abused in the home. See Soto, 103 F.3d at 1072 (Whether this deplorable scenario is actionable under Puerto Rican law we leave, as we must, to others.). 9 17