Opinion ID: 1150403
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: admissibility of hunter's statements

Text: This case requires us to evaluate whether Harvey Hunter's post-polygraph statements were the product of custodial interrogation and therefore inadmissible because not preceded by Miranda warnings. [7] The trial court made two findings: that Hunter was not in custody when he took the lie detector test, thereby making Miranda warnings unnecessary; and if warnings were necessary, the warnings given by the police fulfilled the mandates of Miranda. [8] The defense theory at the motion to suppress was that Miranda warnings were required when Hunter took the polygraph exam since, at that time, he was the focus of the burglary investigation. On appeal, the defendant no longer relies on the focus interpretation of Miranda, instead arguing alternatively that the administration of a lie detector made the interrogation custodial, that confrontation of the defendant with the results of the test made the interrogation custodial, and that, apart from Miranda, the statements were involuntary. We reject the focus test for administration of Miranda warnings and adopt instead a reasonable person perspective for determining whether a person is in custody or otherwise significantly deprived of his freedom. We conclude that, on these facts, the defendant's statements were not the product of custodial interrogation and are therefore admissible, even if not immediately preceded by Miranda warnings. We also conclude Hunter's statements were voluntary. We do not need to consider the trial court's second finding that if Miranda warnings were necessary, the warnings given to Hunter sufficed.
In Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964), the Supreme Court relied on the sixth amendment to exclude a confession because the police refused Escobedo's request for counsel made during interrogation; the interrogation occurred after the investigation had focused on the defendant. The case could be read narrowly or broadly, and a broad reading made focus of the investigation on the defendant the touchstone for sixth amendment, right to counsel, protection. [9] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 706 (1966), held that the privilege against self-incrimination applied to informal police coercion as well as formal coercion [10] and required that a suspect be advised of his fifth and sixth amendment rights before custodial interrogation: By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d at 706. The footnote to this definition of custodial interrogation states: This is what we meant in Escobedo when we spoke of an investigation which had focused on an accused. Id. at 444 n. 4, 86 S.Ct. at 1612 n. 4, 16 L.Ed.2d at 706 n. 4. [11] Some courts, familiar with the focus concept from Escobedo, required Miranda warnings because the investigation had focused on the defendant, without requiring a separate finding of custody. [12] Most courts and scholars, however, early recognized that Miranda made custody, not focus, the test for advising suspects of their rights, [13] and as time passed, most courts rejected the focus test. [14] It was not until 1976, in Beckwith v. United States , that the Supreme Court expressly indicated that focus of the investigation on the defendant, with nothing more, did not require Miranda warnings. [15] In Peterson v. State, 562 P.2d 1350, 1362 (Alaska 1977), we left as open whether `the principle of Miranda ... should be extended to cover interrogation in noncustodial circumstances after a police investigation has focused on the [subject].' We now hold that focus, per se, is not the proper test for Miranda warnings. Focus was and is still relevant, but it is relevant to a determination of custody. [16] The shift from focus to custody still leaves the courts with the far from easy task of determining whether questioning was initiated after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. United States v. Hall, 421 F.2d 540, 543-44 (2d Cir.1969) (Friendly, J.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 990, 90 S.Ct. 1123, 25 L.Ed.2d 398 (1970). The determination of custody is [p]robably the most difficult and frequently raised question in the wake of Miranda. Kamisar, Custodial Interrogation within the Meaning of Miranda, in Criminal Law and the Constitution, 335 (Reed et al. eds. 1968). [17] Here, the Supreme Court has given little express guidance. The Court's four major post- Miranda decisions on custody, like many state decisions, basically restate the Miranda definition and find custody or not on the particular facts. [18] Courts and commentators that have explicitly considered how to define custody have analyzed two approaches: a subjective test, whether this defendant thought he was in custody or whether the police officer thought the defendant was in custody; and an objective reasonable person test, whether a reasonable person would have thought he was in custody. [19] Most authority supports the objective, reasonable person test. [20] California's statement of this test in People v. Arnold, 66 Cal.2d 438, 58 Cal. Rptr. 115, 121, 426 P.2d 515, 521 (1967) (Tobriner, J.) is typical: [C]ustody occurs if the suspect is physically deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way or is led to believe, as a reasonable person, that he is so deprived. We agree that the objective, reasonable person perspective is the proper standard for determining custody. The custody determination must be made on a case-by-case basis, but the inquiry, as expressed by the court in United States v. Hall, 421 F.2d at 545, is whether: in the absence of actual arrest something ... [is] said or done by the authorities, either in their manner of approach or in the tone or extent of their questioning, which indicates [to the defendant] that they would not have heeded a request to depart or to allow the suspect to do so. [21] This requires some actual indication of custody, such that a reasonable person would feel he was not free to leave and break off police questioning. At least three groups of facts would be relevant to this determination. [22] The first are those facts intrinsic to the interrogation: when and where it occurred, how long it lasted, how many police were present, what the officers and the defendant said and did, the presence of actual physical restraint on the defendant or things equivalent to actual restraint such as drawn weapons or a guard stationed at the door, and whether the defendant was being questioned as a suspect or as a witness. Facts pertaining to events before the interrogation are also relevant, especially how the defendant got to the place of questioning  whether he came completely on his own, in response to a police request, or escorted by police officers. Finally, what happened after the interrogation  whether the defendant left freely, was detained or arrested  may assist the court in determining whether the defendant, as a reasonable person, would have felt free to break off the questioning. [23] We believe a reasonable person test for custody is faithful to the basic concerns of Miranda. The Court required a standardized set of warnings to counteract the coercive effect of custodial interrogation on the person being questioned and to tell police officers how to protect a suspect's rights during such interrogation. [24] A reasonable person test for custody gives effect to the purpose of the Miranda rules; it is not solely dependent either on the self-serving declarations of the police officers or the defendant nor does it place upon the police the burden of anticipating the frailties or idiosyncracies of every person whom they question. People v. P., 21 N.Y.2d 1, 286 N.Y.S.2d 225, 233, 233 N.E.2d 255, 260 (1967) (citation and footnote omitted). [25] Some commentaries have interpreted Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977) (per curiam), as foreclosing, as far as federal constitutional guarantees go, the reasonable person standard for custody and adopting an actual custody or custody in fact standard. [26] We think this is a misinterpretation. In Mathiason, a police officer suspected Carl Mathiason, a parolee, of involvement in a burglary and left a note asking Mathiason to call him. When Mathiason called, the officer asked where it would be convenient to meet. Mathiason had no preference, and the officer suggested the state patrol office. When Mathiason arrived, the officer told him he was not under arrest. They talked for five minutes in a closed room, and during their conversation, the officer said the police believed he was involved in the burglary and falsely stated that his fingerprints had been found at the scene. Mathiason sat for a minute or so and then said he had taken the property. After advising Mathiason of his Miranda rights and taking a taped confession, the officer told him he was not under arrest and Mathiason left. The officer said he was referring the case to the district attorney who would determine whether to bring charges. [27] The Oregon Supreme Court had excluded the statements, finding they occurred in a coercive environment. 549 P.2d at 675. The United States Supreme Court, without oral argument or full briefing by the parties, summarily reversed in a short per curiam opinion, finding on the facts before it: [T]here is no indication that the questioning took place in a context where respondent's freedom to depart was restricted in any way. He came voluntarily to the police station, where he was immediately informed that he was not under arrest. At the close of a 1/2-hour interview respondent did in fact leave the police station without hindrance. It is clear from these facts that Mathiason was not in custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. 429 U.S. at 495, 97 S.Ct. at 714, 50 L.Ed.2d at 719. [28] The Court in Mathiason does not articulate a test for custody. It cites the Miranda definition, refers to Orozco and Mathis, [29] and concludes that the questioning of Mathiason was not custodial. It does state that the police officer's lie to the defendant about his fingerprints was irrelevant to determining custody, [30] but to infuse into that sentence an analysis and rejection of the reasonable person perspective on custody is a highly questionable reading of the opinion. We decline to attribute to the United States Supreme Court, in a per curiam summary reversal, a definitive ruling on probably the most difficult question of Miranda implementation  the definition of custody  and a sub silentio overruling of a host of federal and state decisions. [31] In a well-reasoned post- Mathiason decision, State v. Paz, 31 Or. App. 851, 572 P.2d 1036 (1977) (en banc), the court, after taking due note of Mathiason, followed the reasonable person test for custody and Miranda warnings. We think Chief Judge Schwab's characterization of Mathiason is accurate: The Court there simply held that policestation interrogations of a defendant were not inherently coercive, thus requiring Miranda warnings. Id. at 1042-43. Furthermore, the new test attributed to the Court is illusory. [32] The idea that after Mathiason, all we have to do is determine actual custody or custody in fact and the implication that this is a new test is disingenuous. The Miranda test has always been custody. The problem has always been custody, or its equivalent, and how to define it. The genesis of the new test seems to be the phrase in Mathiason that the defendant's freedom to depart was not restricted during the questioning. [33] The disputed cases of custody will be, of course, those situations in which the defendant did not try to leave. The courts still must determine how they will judge whether the defendant was free to leave: do they evaluate whether these particular police officers would have allowed the defendant to leave, whether this particular defendant thought he could leave, or what a reasonable defendant, reacting to the words and actions of the police officers and the situation of the interrogation, would have believed? [34] Any new label, be it custody in fact or actual custody, cannot banish the very real problem of perspective. [35] Like many courts, we have not before explicitly delineated a test for custodial interrogation, but our previous decisions are consistent with a reasonable person standard. [36] In Pope v. State, 478 P.2d 801, 805 (Alaska 1970), [37] this court said: The courts must determine, therefore in each case whether the atmosphere and setting of an interrogation are of such coercive effect or indicate such significant restraint as to trigger the need for a Miranda warning. The standard we enunciate today provides a way to make that determination.
The inquiry in this case is whether the police, by their words or actions, led a reasonable person in Hunter's position to believe he had to take the lie detector test or had to explain the results of the test. We uphold the trial court's determination that Hunter was not in custody either before or immediately after the administration of the polygraph. Officer Shanks testified it was his normal procedure to tell suspects they were under no obligation to take the test. Investigator Smith also testified it was his normal procedure to tell suspects they didn't have to take the test. Hunter signed a form consenting to the test and to turning the results over to the authorities. Hunter said that neither officer told him that he didn't have to take the test, but that he thought he had to take it. Hunter, however, testified that it was the officers' visits to his house and their request that he take the polygraph test, in spite of his denial of involvement with the burglary, that made him believe he had to take the test. This record amply supports the trial judge's finding of lack of custody. The police had questioned Hunter twice at his home, only one additional time after he had denied involvement with the burglary. Such questioning was simply thorough investigation (Hunter was the prime suspect) and certainly did not constitute harassment. Both interviews were preceded by Miranda warnings which informed Hunter that he had a right to counsel and that he was free not to talk to the police officers. A reasonable person in the defendant's position would therefore be familiar with the concept that persons may refuse to talk to police officers and may break off questioning. It was at the second interview that the officers suggested the lie detector test. Hunter admitted the police never threatened him with any particular consequences if he didn't take the test. The trial judge heard testimony from Investigator Shanks and Smith, the polygraph examiner, of their practice to inform suspects they didn't have to take the test. Hunter was not taken to the police station but went there on his own because he hoped to terminate the investigation by beating the polygraph. He signed a form stating that he voluntarily requested the exam. There was no indication he could not have left at any time. Thus, when he came to take the test, he was not in custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any significant way. The problem in this case is that a person who lied to the police took a polygraph test because he hoped to beat it and stop the police from questioning him. If the polygraph examination indicates the suspect is lying and he makes a statement, a `fair state-individual balance' [38] does not require us to find an inherent potential for police coercion so as to require Miranda warnings from a situation the suspect chose to place himself in. [39] In this light, we do not find Smith's brief conversation with Hunter to be custodial interrogation. Smith did nothing to indicate to Hunter that he had to explain the results, the interchange was brief, and Smith sent Hunter to Investigator Shanks who did interrogate Hunter after giving him Miranda warnings. During the polygraph test, there were no physical restraints placed on Hunter, nor was a guard stationed at the door of the interview room. He was permitted to leave even after giving his formal confession to Investigator Shanks. The facts of this case when compared with Mathiason clearly indicate that Hunter was not in custody during the period of his interview with Officer Smith so as to mandate additional Miranda warnings. In situations where Miranda warnings are not required, a confession can still be challenged as involuntarily obtained and the product of coercion. [40] The Supreme Court in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte described the inquiry under the voluntariness test: In determining whether a defendant's will was overborne in a particular case, the Court has assessed the totality of all the surrounding circumstances  both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation. Some of the factors taken into account have included the youth of the accused; his lack of education; or his low intelligence; the lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights; the length of detention; the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning; and the use of physical punishment such as the deprivation of food or sleep. In all of these cases, the Court determined the factual circumstances surrounding the confession, assessed the psychological impact on the accused, and evaluated the legal significance of how the accused reacted. 412 U.S. 218, 226, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2047, 36 L.Ed.2d 854, 862 (1973) (citations omitted). In this case, there were no coercive tactics alleged such as might overcome Hunter's free will. Though a number of state decisions have found statements made after a polygraph test inadmissible, [41] the import of those decisions for the instant case is not entirely clear. [42] All decisions cited by the defendant were state decisions grounded in the federal constitution and occurred before the Supreme Court made clear that neither focus on the defendant nor questioning at the police station, per se, makes interrogation custodial. [43] Two recent decisions provide support for our conclusion that Hunter's post-polygraph statements are admissible. In People v. McCue, 48 Ill. App.3d 41, 6 Ill.Dec. 128, 362 N.E.2d 760 (1977), the defendant was suspected of stealing money from an open cash drawer at a service station. After being advised of his Miranda rights, he was questioned at his home and denied guilt. The defendant stated that he was willing to take a polygraph test. He voluntarily went to the sheriff's office at a time set for the test. He and the state examiner were alone in a room where the test was given without a fresh Miranda warning. At the conclusion of the test, the defendant was advised that he had flunked the examination. After further discussion lasting fifteen minutes to a half hour, the defendant confessed. He was permitted to depart after the interview. Based on Mathiason, the court held that the interrogation was noncustodial. [44] In State v. Paz, 31 Or. App. 851, 572 P.2d 1036 (1977), the court, utilizing a reasonable person standard, found the defendant was in custody when he made statements after taking a polygraph test and learning the polygraph administrator felt he wasn't telling the truth. The factors pointed to by the court were: the suspect had been in custody the previous day; the police took the suspect to the place where the lie detector test was performed (seated in the back seat of a squad car flanked on each side by an officer); when the defendant asked the police whether he could leave, the police said he could leave the station if he revealed the nature of his involvement in the homicide; the defendant knew he was being questioned as a suspect, not a witness. Id. at 1042-43. Except for the last, none of the factors in Paz were present in Hunter's interview with the police. We have found Hunter's post-polygraph statements admissible. We, however, are mindful of difficult questions arising as to the voluntariness of statements made by a suspect while or immediately after taking a lie detector test at the request of the police, and we are concerned that suspects receive adequate warnings before taking these tests. We also believe that a considerable amount of litigation and the necessity of ruling some confessions inadmissible may be avoided if the police give warnings in all cases before administering polygraph tests. We think that good practice dictates that police specifically inform suspects of their rights to refuse to take the [lie detector] test, to discontinue it at any point, and to decline to answer any individual questions. United States v. Little Bear, 583 F.2d 411, 414 (8th Cir.1978). [45] We also take this occasion to recommend to the police that full Miranda warnings be given in any case where it is doubtful whether the suspect taking the lie detector test is in custody.