Opinion ID: 1953002
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Delivery of Deeds

Text: [¶ 8] First, we consider whether the court erred in finding that the deeds were legally delivered. Maureen contends that because there is no credible evidence that Leo had manually transferred the deeds to Paul or anyone else, the court's finding of delivery was clearly erroneous. Specifically, she contends that when Leo signed the deeds, he had no present intention to transfer his property; Paul's assent to the delivery of Leo's deeds could not constitute a completed delivery because there is no evidence that if Leo transferred the deeds to Charles, he did so without reservation; and the court erred in finding that the delivery to Charles as a third party was sufficient to vest title in Paul when, after Leo's death, Paul accepted delivery of the deeds. She concludes that absent proof that the deeds were delivered to Charles or were given to him without reservation for delivery to Paul, and absent any indication that Charles accepted them, there was no delivery to either brother. [¶ 9] Conversely, Paul contends that the court's finding that the two deeds were delivered is not clearly erroneous because (1) Maureen failed to carry her burden of proof; (2) there is ample evidence of manual delivery; (3) there is compelling evidence of Leo's intent; and (4) there is no want of acceptance affecting delivery. Specifically, he contends that multiple acts evince Leo's intent: his discussing with the lawyer at the VA hospital his plans to convey the property to Paul and Charles; his making a new will without a special bequest of $10,000 to Paul to thank him for having cared for Leo for many years, a bequest no longer necessary once the camp conveyance replaced it; and Leo's silence at the family gathering despite a clear opportunity to qualify or disclaim his intent as expressed in the deeds. Paul asserts that Leo signed the deeds intending to effect a present transfer, but did not date or notarize them because no lawyer or notary was available in his hospital room. The signed transfer tax forms, Paul argues, prove Leo's intent to make the deeds presently effective; they also prove delivery of the deeds to Charles, a grantee. Paul also contends that the evidence indicates that Charles had accepted the deeds when he signed the transfer tax forms in May 1985, and that he had retained possession of both after Leo gave them to him to sign. Because delivery already had occurred, it did not matter that Charles might have changed his mind several months later at the family gathering. Therefore, both Charles (for the reasons enumerated above) and Paul (because he accepted the deeds when he learned of them after Leo's death) accepted the deeds. [¶ 10] The key to determining whether the deeds were delivered is whether Leo intended to relinquish control of the property. The conveyance of title to property requires a manual transfer of the deed and an intent to pass title between a grantor and grantee. Poling v. Northup, 652 A.2d 1114, 1115 (Me.1995) (citations omitted). When the physical possession of a deed is transferred from one party to another, there is a presumption that `both parties intended to effect an immediate transfer of the title, in accordance with the terms of the deed.' Waxler v. Waxler, 1997 ME 190, ¶ 8, 699 A.2d 1161, 1163 (citation omitted). A grantee's failure to record a deed does not rebut the presumption of delivery. Id. ¶ 10, 699 A.2d at 1164. [¶ 11] We review the record for clear error to determine whether competent evidence exists to support the trial court's factual conclusions. Stickney v. City of Saco, 2001 ME 69, ¶ 13, 770 A.2d 592, 600. Findings are clearly erroneous when no competent evidence supporting the finding exists in the record; the factfinder clearly misapprehended the meaning of the evidence; or the force and effect of the evidence taken as a whole, rationally persuades us to a certainty that the finding is so against the great preponderance of the believable evidence that it does not represent the truth and right of the case. Morin v. Dubois, 1998 ME 160, ¶ 3, 713 A.2d 956, 958 (emphasis added). Maine has traditionally followed... the ... rule that delivery of a deed is a consensual act. Thus, effective delivery of a deed requires the correlative act of acceptance by the grantee. Hood v. Hood, 384 A.2d 706, 708 (Me.1978) (citations omitted). We have held that subsequent assent by a grantee to a conveyance made without such grantee's knowledge is sufficient to constitute an acceptance, at least where there has been a physical delivery of the deed, without reservation, by the grantor to a third party. [3] Id. The question of acceptance [is] one of fact. Id. The Probate Court found that [b]ased on the evidence presented at trial, ... Paul accepted the deed from Leo as soon as it was discovered by his daughter at [her home], and subsequently delivered to his home next door. [¶ 12] Further, the court saw no evidence that Leo ever tried to revoke his conveyance to either Paul or Charles, though he had a perfect opportunity to do so at the family gathering. [¶ 13] Moreover, the fact that the deed was unrecorded is irrelevant. See Waxler, 699 A.2d at 1164. The want of record of a deed does not render the instrument void. Want of record does not reinvest seizin in him who gave the deed.... The delivery of the deed, although unrecorded, [is] sufficient to transfer seizin.... Gatchell v. Gatchell, 127 Me. 328, 331-32, 143 A. 169, 170 (1928). [¶ 14] We affirm the finding that the deeds were legally delivered and that Paul holds title to the property.