Opinion ID: 782204
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Preclusion of Cross-Examination

Text: 63 As to the second issue certified for appeal, whether the complete preclusion of cross-examination of Echevarria violated the Confrontation Clause, respondent argues that we cannot consider this issue because (1) it lies outside of the certificate of appealability issued by the District Court; (2) petitioner failed to exhaust this claim on direct appeal; and (3) petitioner is procedurally barred from raising this claim because he failed to make a timely objection at trial. For the reasons that follow, we reject respondent's arguments, and conclude that it is appropriate to consider the merits of petitioner's claim.
64 As a threshold matter, we must determine the scope of the certificate of appealability (COA). Respondent argues that we cannot consider the question of whether Cotto's cross-examination claim is procedurally defaulted because the District Court did not explicitly include its procedural default ruling in the COA. 65 Although the COA fails to expressly include the District Court's procedural default finding, we may construe the filing of a notice of appeal to be a request to this Court for a COA on all issues raised in the appeal. See El Rhagi v. Artuz, 309 F.3d 103, 106 (2d Cir.2002) (per curiam) (petitioner's notice of appeal construed as an application for a COA on the procedural-bar issue); Fed. R.App. P. 22(b)(2) (authorizing the Court of Appeals to construe the notice of appeal as a request for a certificate of appealability). 66 We may therefore amend the COA to include the procedural-bar issue, even if the District Court declined to include the procedural-bar question in its initial COA, if Cotto makes the necessary showing that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court's resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 1034, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003) (citing Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000)). Because we conclude that Cotto has made the necessary showing in this case, see infra, we hereby amend the COA to include the procedural-bar issue.
67 Respondent further argues that petitioner is barred from raising the cross-examination claim on federal habeas review because the claim was not fairly presented to the state courts. It is well-established that a state prisoner must normally exhaust available state judicial remedies before a federal court will entertain his petition for habeas corpus. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275, 92 S.Ct. 509, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971) (citing Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 6 S.Ct. 734, 29 L.Ed. 868 (1886)). This exhaustion requirement is rooted in considerations of comity, and is codified by statute at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) & (c). See Strogov v. Attorney Gen. of N.Y., 191 F.3d 188, 191 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1264, 120 S.Ct. 2723, 147 L.Ed.2d 987 (2000); Dorsey v. Kelly, 112 F.3d 50, 52 (2d Cir.1997). A petitioner satisfies the fair presentation aspect of the exhaustion requirement by presenting the essential factual and legal premises of his federal constitutional claim to the highest state court capable of reviewing it. Ramirez v. Attorney Gen. of N.Y., 280 F.3d 87, 94 (2d Cir.2001). 68 Respondent argues that Cotto's claim was not fairly presented because on direct appeal, petitioner explicitly eschew[ed] reliance on the federal constitution. Respondent points out that in his briefs to both the Appellate Division and Court of Appeals, petitioner argued that the problem with the complete preclusion of cross-examination of Echevarria was that the trial court explicitly abandon[ed] state law in favor of the federal rule. We disagree with respondent's characterization of petitioner's argument on direct appeal, and agree with petitioner and the District Court that the claim was fairly presented to the state courts. 69 First, we reject respondent's suggestion that petitioner explicitly eschewed reliance on federal constitutional law; rather, petitioner questioned the state court's decision not to follow Geraci, the seminal opinion of the New York Court of Appeals relating to the forfeiture of federal confrontation rights through misconduct. Indeed, Geraci 's discussion of the constitutional right of confrontation is supported by cites exclusively to federal cases. Geraci, 85 N.Y.2d at 366, 625 N.Y.S.2d 469, 649 N.E.2d 817. As we have previously recognized, a state defendant may fairly present to the state courts the constitutional nature of his claim, even without citing chapter and verse of the Constitution so long as he relies on pertinent federal cases employing [the relevant] constitutional analysis or alleges a pattern of facts that clearly implicates a specific constitutional provision. See Strogov, 191 F.3d at 191 (quoting Daye v. Attorney Gen., 696 F.2d 186, 191 (2d Cir. 1982) (in banc)). 70 Second, unlike other cases when we have ruled that a habeas claim was not fairly presented to the state courts, the cross-examination claim was explicitly advanced in petitioner's brief to the Court of Appeals. In the relevant section of petitioner's Court of Appeals brief, petitioner mentions in the first sentence the right to cross-examine, and the second and third sentences of this section of petitioner's brief both reference confrontation rights. Indeed, as respondent pointed out in its own Court of Appeals brief, Geraci itself analyzed the loss of the valued Sixth Amendment confrontation right. (Brief at 34; quoting Geraci, 85 N.Y.2d at 367, 625 N.Y.S.2d 469, 649 N.E.2d 817). 8 71 In light of these facts, we reject the notion that the New York Court of Appeals was not adequately apprised that Cotto's challenge to the full-scale abrogation of [his] confrontation rights, as he put it in his brief to that court, was based on the Sixth Amendment. Indeed, the Court of Appeals' dissent, with its discussion of how the trial court's ruling deprived the defendant of his right of confrontation, belies respondent's argument that the court was unaware of the federal constitutional basis of Cotto's cross-examination claim.
72 Under the independent and adequate state grounds doctrine, the Supreme Court will not review a question of federal law decided by a state court if the decision of that court rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). This rule applies whether the state law ground is substantive or procedural. Id. Although the independent and adequate state grounds doctrine first arose in the context of direct appeals to the Supreme Court from state court judgments, the Supreme Court has applied it as well in deciding whether federal district courts should address the claims of state prisoners in habeas corpus actions. Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 375, 122 S.Ct. 877, 151 L.Ed.2d 820 (2002) (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729, 111 S.Ct. 2546.) In the habeas context, however, the doctrine is prudential rather than jurisdictional. See Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 522-23, 117 S.Ct. 1517, 137 L.Ed.2d 771 (1997); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 730, 111 S.Ct. 2546 (1991); Spence v. Super., Great Meadow Corr. Facility, 219 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir.2000) (The doctrine of procedural default is based on considerations of comity and finality, and not on a jurisdictional limitation on the power of a federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to look beyond a state procedural default and consider the merits of a defaulted claim that asserts a constitutional violation.). 9 73 Here, in considering the claim that the trial court improperly precluded [Cotto] from any cross-examination of Echevarria, the Court of Appeals concluded that this contention was not raised by objection before the trial court and is thus unpreserved for our review. Cotto, 92 N.Y.2d at 78, 677 N.Y.S.2d 35, 699 N.E.2d 394. As a result, the Court of Appeals declined to address the merits of Cotto's claim that complete preclusion of cross-examination was improper, based on its implicit conclusion that Cotto did not comply with the contemporaneous objection rule codified in N.Y. Criminal Procedure Law § 470.05(2) at trial. Cotto, 92 N.Y.2d at 78, 677 N.Y.S.2d 35, 699 N.E.2d 394. The question, then, is whether this case falls within the small category of cases in which [the] asserted state grounds are inadequate to block adjudication of the federal claim or in which the exorbitant application of a generally sound rule renders the state ground inadequate to bar consideration of the federal constitutional claim. Lee, 534 U.S. at 376, 381, 122 S.Ct. 877.
74 In this case, there is no question that the claimed procedural bar constitutes an independent state ground of decision; the dispute is over whether the asserted bar is adequate to preclude federal habeas review. [T]he question of when and how defaults in compliance with state procedural rules can preclude ... consideration of a federal question is itself a federal question. Garcia v. Lewis, 188 F.3d 71, 77 (2d Cir.1999) (quoting Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587, 108 S.Ct. 1981, 100 L.Ed.2d 575 (1988) (internal quotations omitted)); Lee, 534 U.S. at 375, 122 S.Ct. 877 (it is not within the state's prerogative to decide whether a state rule is sufficient to bar consideration of a federal claim; adequacy itself is a federal question). Before accepting a procedural bar defense, a federal court must examine the adequacy of the alleged procedural default. Garcia, 188 F.3d at 77. For although the procedural bar rule rests on considerations of comity, [s]tate courts may not avoid deciding federal issues by invoking procedural rules that they do not apply evenhandedly to all similar claims. Id. (quoting Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 263, 102 S.Ct. 2421, 72 L.Ed.2d 824 (1982)). As we explained in Garcia: 75 [A] procedural bar will be deemed adequate only if it is based on a rule that is firmly established and regularly followed by the state in question. When a federal court finds that the rule is inadequate under this test the rule should not operate to bar federal review. Nonetheless, the principles of comity that drive the doctrine counsel that a federal court that deems a state procedural rule inadequate should not reach that conclusion lightly or without clear support in state law. 76 Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). 10 77 Since Garcia, our last extended discussion of the adequacy doctrine on federal habeas review, the Supreme Court has clarified the nature and scope of the adequacy inquiry. In Lee, the Supreme Court made clear that although [o]rdinarily, a violation of `firmly established and regularly followed' state rules ... will be adequate to foreclose review of a federal claim, there are exceptional cases in which exorbitant application of a generally sound rule renders the state ground inadequate to stop consideration of a federal question. 534 U.S. at 376, 122 S.Ct. 877. In determining that Lee's case fit within that limited category, id., the Court relied on three considerations: (1) whether the alleged procedural violation was actually relied on in the trial court, and whether perfect compliance with the state rule would have changed the trial court's decision; (2) whether state caselaw indicated that compliance with the rule was demanded in the specific circumstances presented; and (3) whether petitioner had substantially complied with the rule given the realities of trial, and, therefore, whether demanding perfect compliance with the rule would serve a legitimate governmental interest. Although these three factors were not presented as a test for determining adequacy, we use them as guideposts in evaluat[ing] the state interest in a procedural rule against the circumstances of a particular case. 534 U.S. at 381-85, 122 S.Ct. 877. Most importantly, Lee clarified, over strong dissenting objections by three Justices, that the adequacy of a state procedural bar is determined with reference to the particular application of the rule; it is not enough that the rule generally serves a legitimate state interest. 534 U.S. at 387, 122 S.Ct. 877. 78 After Lee, then, respondent's argument that it is firmly established and regularly followed that New York's contemporaneous objection rule applies to all trial-related proceedings, including Sirois hearings, misses the point. Cotto does not claim that New York's contemporaneous objection rule is generally inadequate to preclude federal habeas review, but rather that the rule is misapplied in his case in particular. Garcia, 188 F.3d at 79. More precisely, the relevant question here is not whether New York's contemporaneous objection rule applies to Sirois hearings, whether the Court of Appeals right[ly] or wrong[ly] decided that the claim was unpreserved under state law, or even whether the Court of Appeals' decision has a fair or substantial basis in state law. El Rhagi, 309 F.3d at 107 (quoting Garcia, 188 F.3d at 77-78). 11 Rather, the question is whether application of the procedural rule is firmly established and regularly followed in the specific circumstances presented in the case, an inquiry that includes an evaluation of the asserted state interest in applying the procedural rule in such circumstances. See Lee, 534 U.S. at 386-87, 122 S.Ct. 877 (questioning whether the dissent would fully embrace the unyielding theory that it is never appropriate to evaluate the state interest in a procedural rule against the circumstances of a particular case).
79 As described above, after Echevarria testified that he did not see who shot Davilla, the trial court excused Echevarria and the jury, and discussed with the parties the appropriate step to take, including the possibility of a Sirois hearing. The ensuing discussion of whether or not to have such a hearing included the following colloquy: 80 Defense Counsel: I mean we are now going to pile on witnesses that we can't cross-examine. It just seems it's a bit over much ... 81 I can only say that we have an investigator on this case, our investigator does all our investigation and we had decided given Mr. Echevarria's prior record, that there was no need for any further investigation that we would rely completely upon what we had learned using that prior record in order to impeach him and discredit his testimony. 82 The Court: Certainly he has quite a record.... Anything else ...? 83 Defense Counsel: No, Judge, I think that Geraci went into some lengths in discussing that this State will hold the highest standard for this kind of hearing which would be clear and convincing proof, that indeed the person was somehow connected and did waive by his misconduct the right to cross-examine a witness. In this case where the — as I see it, each of the eyewitnesses is non identifying until such point that the District Attorney's office get a hold of them and to not allow me to cross-examine Mr. Echevarria on any or all of his background and to allow them to put in this statement is really totally completely unfair. 84 The Court: OK. Thank you. I'm going to let the People have a chance at a hearing to try to meet their burden of providing clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Cotto is responsible for Echevarria's refusal to testify as he has in the past. I think that's the appropriate step for me to take now. 85 (Tr. 385-87) (emphasis added). 86 At the close of the Sirois hearing a few days later, the trial court made both factual and legal findings, concluding: 87 I am following what I believe to be the line of cases emanating from Reynolds v. United States in 1878 and continuing through Geraci which I think under the circumstances indicates that when the Court finds the defendant has committed misconduct which results in the unavailability of witness he forfeits his right for confrontation as for all purposes as to that witness. I will not permit cross of Mr. Echevarria by the defense as to his testimony thus far because the jury will have before it Echevarria's live direct testimony as well as his conflicting out-of-court statement to the police, none of which the defense will be cross-examining about. 88 (Tr. 1085-86.) 12 89 When the trial court had finished summarizing its ruling, defense counsel said: Can I just get some clarification on the limits of cross-examination. When Police Officer Vargas and Detective Quinones take the stand, my understand [sic] being is that I cannot question them at all about the res gestae of the statement, I guess, of the statement, I would say. Respondent argues — and the Court of Appeals apparently agreed — that because defense counsel did not specifically object at that time, after the trial court's Sirois ruling, that cross-examination of Echevarria was completely precluded, the claim was unpreserved for review.
90 The question, then, is whether the requirement of an additional objection was firmly established and regularly followed in these circumstances. The Supreme Court has noted that the contemporaneous objection rule rests on the general principle that an objection which is ample and timely to bring the alleged federal error to the attention of the trial court and enable it to take appropriate corrective action is sufficient to serve legitimate state interests, and therefore sufficient to preserve the claim for review. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 125, 110 S.Ct. 1691, 109 L.Ed.2d 98 (1990) (quoting Douglas, 380 U.S. at 422, 85 S.Ct. 1074). Like the Lee and Osborne courts, that overall principle, along with the three factors relied upon in Lee, guides our judgment in this case.
91 In reaching the conclusion that the procedural bar was inadequate in Lee, the Supreme Court relied in part upon the fact that the lack of compliance with the procedural rule at issue was not mentioned in the trial court as a reason to deny Lee's motion for continuance. This rationale — whether the alleged procedural violation was actually relied on in the trial court — is less applicable in this case because the lack of a contemporaneous objection would not, almost by definition, be mentioned by the trial court. Thus this factor does not weigh as heavily in favor of Cotto as it did for Lee. 92 However, as to whether perfect compliance with the state rule would have changed the trial court's decision, there are similarities between the circumstances in this case and Lee. Here, the trial court was certainly aware of defense counsel's desire to cross-examine Echevarria, given counsel's statement that to not allow me to cross-examine Mr. Echevarria on any or all of his background ... is really totally completely unfair at the beginning of the Sirois hearing, and the court's own written and oral ruling precluding such cross-examination at the close of the hearing. Cotto was precluded from cross-examining Echevarria because the trial court determined that cross-examination would serve no truth-seeking purpose, and because the trial court concluded that our prior decision in Aguiar indicated that Cotto had forfeited any opportunity to cross-examine Echevarria through his misconduct. Thus, if defense counsel had repeated her pre-hearing objection, that it would be unfair to not allow cross-examination of Echevarria altogether, after the trial court's ruling, there is no reason to believe that the trial court would have changed its mind. 13 93 On the other hand, the likely impact of a timely objection involves a certain degree of speculation. Indeed, the purpose of the contemporaneous objection rule is to give the trial court a clear opportunity to correct any error. Although requiring an additional objection after the trial court made its waiver ruling may not have changed matters, it is possible that defense counsel, either before the hearing began or during the course of the hearing, could have argued to the trial court that Aguiar did not stand for the proposition that cross-examination of a testifying witness was forfeited through misconduct. Through argument, or perhaps a request for an opportunity to brief the issue, the trial court may well have come to a different conclusion. Therefore, although we agree with petitioner's basic argument that this is not a case where a party failed to apprise the trial court of the ruling sought, we do not think that this factor weighs as heavily in Cotto's favor as it did for the petitioner in Lee.
94 New York's preservation rule, codified at N.Y. Criminal Procedure Law § 470.05(2), specifies that: 95 [f]or purposes of appeal, a question of law with respect to a ruling or instruction of a criminal court during a trial or proceeding is presented when a protest thereto was registered, by the party claiming error, at the time of such ruling or instruction or at any subsequent time when the court had an opportunity of effectively changing the same. Such protest need not be in the form of an exception but is sufficient if the party made his position with respect to the ruling or instruction known to the court, or if in response to a protest by a party, the court expressly decided the question raised on appeal. 14 96 In analyzing the adequacy of the claimed procedural bar, we look to the statute and caselaw interpreting New York's statutory preservation rule in criminal proceedings. See, e.g., Lee, 534 U.S. at 382, 122 S.Ct. 877 ([N]o published Missouri decision directs flawless compliance with [the state procedural rule] in the unique circumstances this case presents.); Arce v. Smith, 889 F.2d 1271, 1273 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 937, 110 S.Ct. 2185, 109 L.Ed.2d 513 (1990) (analyzing New York cases to determine whether the claim raised by the petitioner is not regularly the subject of a procedural default in New York). 97 Respondent cites several New York cases, and our own opinion in Garcia, in support of the proposition that New York's contemporaneous objection rule is firmly established and regularly followed in these circumstances. Petitioner cites several New York cases in support of the opposite conclusion. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that petitioner has the better of the argument. 98 Respondent contends that the issue here is whether after the court has issued its ruling on the merits and announced the relief it was awarding the moving party, New York regularly requires a complaint about that relief [granted] to preserve the claim that the relief ordered was wrong. In support of such a requirement, respondent primarily cites several Appellate Division cases involving Hinton hearings, state proceedings to determine whether the courtroom should be closed, either completely, or to certain individuals, during the course of trial. See, e.g., People v. Lucas, 290 A.D.2d 304, 736 N.Y.S.2d 332 (1st Dep't 2002); People v. Williams, 287 A.D.2d 337, 731 N.Y.S.2d 436 (1st Dep't 2001); People v. Lanhorn, 283 A.D.2d 254, 724 N.Y.S.2d 608 (1st Dep't 2001). Respondent also argues that the circumstances here are very similar to those in Garcia, a case also involving a Hinton hearing. 99 We conclude, however, that these cases are distinguishable. In Garcia, we relied on the fact that the defendant had failed to put the trial judge on notice as to what the defendant now claims he wanted — in that case, the presence of his mother's companion in the courtroom — and so failed to preserve his claim. Garcia, 188 F.3d at 80-81. Similarly, in the Appellate Division cases cited by respondent, the defendants expressed no dissatisfaction with the relief ordered. Here, in contrast, before the Sirois hearing even began, defendant made clear his position on the preclusion of cross-examination: [T]o not allow me to cross-examine Mr. Echevarria on any or all of his background ... is really totally completely unfair. Given Lee 's case-specific inquiry, we conclude that the cases cited by respondent do not control here, where the trial court could not have doubted that counsel wanted to cross-examine Echevarria. 100 Further, other New York cases interpreting the scope of CPL § 470.05(2) undercut respondent's claim. Since our decision in Garcia and the Court of Appeals' decision denying Cotto's direct appeal, the Court of Appeals has held that, under similar circumstances to those presented in this case, an issue of law is preserved even if it is not specifically raised by the defendant so long as the trial court expressly rules on the issue following an earlier objection. In People v. Edwards, 95 N.Y.2d 486, 719 N.Y.S.2d 202, 741 N.E.2d 876 (2000), the Court of Appeals reached the merits of a probable cause issue, decided by the trial court at the close of a suppression hearing. In so doing, the court specifically held that contrary to the People's contention, the issue of probable cause to arrest is preserved for our review because, in its written decision denying defendant's motion to suppress, the trial court `expressly decided' the question in response to a `protest by a party.' Id. at 491 n. 2, 719 N.Y.S.2d 202, 741 N.E.2d 876 (citing CPL § 470.05(2)). 101 Intermediate appellate courts in New York have followed the same principle. See, e.g., People v. Ayala, 142 A.D.2d 147, 157, 534 N.Y.S.2d 1005, 1011 (2nd Dept 1988), aff'd, 75 N.Y.2d 422, 554 N.Y.S.2d 412, 553 N.E.2d 960 (1990) (in case where protest was made by the government, issue pressed by defense on appeal was still preserved because a question of law is preserved if the point was expressly decided by the trial court in response to a protest, even though the protesting party overlooked that argument when making the protest) (quoting Preiser, Supp. Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons. Laws of NY, Book 11A, CPL 470.05, 1988 Pocket Part, at 5) 15 ; People v. Seabrook, 241 A.D.2d 325, 326, 659 N.Y.S.2d 463, 464 (1st Dept 1997) (defense counsel's motion to share responsibilities with counsel for co-defendant preserved issue of law as to all parts of ruling despite failure to specifically object); People v. Duncan, 177 A.D.2d 187, 190-91, 582 N.Y.S.2d 847, 849-50 (4th Dept 1992) (defendant's litigation of Batson hearing preserved issue of law as to ruling on prosecutor's peremptory challenges); People v. Johnson, 144 A.D.2d 490, 491, 534 N.Y.S.2d 207, 209 (2d Dept 1988) (defense objection to the admissibility of photographs preserved issue of law as to whether they were admissible under collateral evidence rule, even though the ground was not specifically raised at trial). In short, CPL § 470.05 and the governing New York caselaw does not indicate that Cotto was required to make an additional objection after the litigated hearing in order to preserve his confrontation claim for appellate review.
102 In evaluating whether Cotto substantially complied with CPL § 470.05, Lee, 534 U.S. at 382, 122 S.Ct. 877, we return to the asserted state interest behind the contemporaneous objection rule — to ensure that the parties draw the trial court's attention to any potential error while there is still an opportunity to address it. See Osborne, 495 U.S. at 125, 110 S.Ct. 1691; see also Preiser, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons. Laws of New York (1994), Book 11A, CPL 470.05, at 12 [hereinafter Practice Commentaries] ([T]he rules ... are best understood in the context of the purpose for requiring a protest, which is to call the trial court's attention to the claimed error while there still is time to correct it.). The Supreme Court has recognized that contemporaneous objection rules of this kind serve [] legitimate state interest[s] in ensuring that judges are promptly alerted to errors at trial, see Garcia, 188 F.3d at 78, and we in no way question the importance of that interest here. However, for the reasons that follow, we conclude that Cotto's conduct at trial served the purpose underlying the rule, and therefore CPL § 470.05(2)'s essential requirements ... were substantially met in this case. Lee, 534 U.S. at 385, 122 S.Ct. 877. 103 First, we again note that before the Sirois hearing even began, defense counsel indicated that a total bar on cross-examination was unfair. Although defense counsel did not (and was not required to) use the specific words Confrontation Clause, it is well established, and certainly no secret to criminal law practitioners and judges, that cross-examination of testifying witnesses is mandated by the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause. Moreover, defense counsel then spent three days, in the middle of trial, litigating the Sirois hearing in order to challenge the prosecution's contention that Cotto had forfeited his confrontation rights through misconduct. At this point, it seems difficult to argue that defendant had not made his position with respect to the ruling known to the court. CPL § 470.05(2). Indeed, the litigation of the hearing itself was an assertion of Cotto's right to confront Echevarria. As the Court of Appeals dissent put it, [i]t should be clear ... that defense counsel did oppose the prosecutor's efforts to admit the out-of-court statements into evidence, arguing that the evidence that defendant threatened the witness was not clear and convincing and protesting the loss of the right of cross-examination. Thus, in accordance with CPL § 470.05, defendant made clear what ruling was desired. Cotto, 92 N.Y.2d at 84, 677 N.Y.S.2d 35, 699 N.E.2d 394 (Smith, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 104 Despite these ample and timely indications of the alleged federal error that no doubt caught the attention of the trial court, Osborne, 495 U.S. at 125, 110 S.Ct. 1691, respondent argues that defendant failed to make his position sufficiently clear. After the court's ruling, defense counsel asked only for clarification of the bounds of cross-examination of the police officers, who were about to testify, and it is the lack of continued objection at this point, according to respondent, that is fatal to petitioner's claim. 105 We must disagree. Like the Court in Lee, our inquiry is guided by the realities of trial — namely, that defense counsel's final query came (1) after the conclusion of a three-day hearing to consider whether Cotto had forfeited his confrontation right and hearsay objections with respect to Echevarria; (2) after a prior, explicit objection to the preclusion of cross-examination; and (3) with the awareness that two police officers were about to take the stand and provide the first, and only, testimony that an eyewitness had identified Cotto as the shooter. Thus, like the Court in Osborne, we ask whether anything would be gained by requiring Cotto's lawyer to object a second time, and similarly answer the question with a firm `no.' See Lee, 534 U.S. at 379, 122 S.Ct. 877 (discussing Osborne ). In sum, although the assertion of the state procedural bar here is not as egregious as in Lee, we conclude that unyielding application of the general rule in the circumstances of this case, given Cotto's substantial compliance with CPL § 470.05, would disserve any perceivable [state] interest. 534 U.S. at 381, 122 S.Ct. 877. 106 Finally, we note that Cotto's compliance with New York's preservation rule here was arguably literal, and not just substantial. In 1986, the last clause of CPL § 470.05(2), beginning or if in response..., was added by the Legislature to  further broaden the circumstances under which a protest during a criminal trial or proceeding will be sufficient to preserve the question of law for subsequent appellate review. Practice Commentaries, at 11 (emphasis added); see also L. 1986, c. 798, § 1 (reprinted in 2 McKinney's 1986 Session Laws of New York 1882). As the Practice Commentaries further point out, this amendment means that a question of law is now preserved if the point was expressly decided by the trial court in response to a protest, even though the protesting party overlooked that point when articulating the protest. Id. at 11. 107 Here, as described above, the prosecution asked that Echevarria's out-of-court statements be admitted, and the defendant opposed this request — a protest by a party. Then, after the parties litigated the Sirois hearing, the trial court made an oral and written ruling, in which it expressly decided the question raised on appeal, whether defense counsel would be able to cross-examine Echevarria. Therefore, the question of law appears to have been preserved, even if the protesting party had overlooked that point when articulating the protest. Id. 16 Even before the 1986 amendment, it seems that the issue would have been preserved because the point was not overlooked, and defense counsel did make her position with respect to the ruling ... known to the court. CPL § 470.05(2). 17 108 Moreover, even if Cotto did not satisfy either of these two grounds for preservation, a third ground in § 470.05(2) was plainly met. Under § 470.05(2), regardless of whether any actual protest thereto was registered, a party who has either expressly or impliedly sought or requested a particular ruling or instruction, is deemed to have thereby protested the court's ultimate disposition of the matter. (emphasis added). Certainly, counsel's statement that it would be really totally completely unfair to not allow me to cross-examine Mr. Echevarria on any or all of his background constitutes an implied request to be allowed to cross-examine Echevarria. 109 Nonetheless, as respondent quite correctly points out, Cotto's noncompliance with CPL § 470.05 has already been decided as a matter of state law by New York's highest court. Our task is not to determine whether that ruling was correct, but to determine its adequacy to preclude federal habeas review. That is a federal question, and the Supreme Court's jurisprudence demands that we independently consider the degree to which § 470.05 was complied with to determine whether federal habeas review should be precluded. 110 After considering that question, we conclude that once a party has made his position known to the court, the law does not require [him] to make repeated pointless protests after the court has ruled. People v. Mezon, 80 N.Y.2d 155, 161, 589 N.Y.S.2d 838, 603 N.E.2d 943, 946 (1992). At a minimum, such a practice is not firmly established and regularly followed in the circumstances presented in this case. We therefore conclude that the New York Court of Appeals' application of the contemporaneous objection rule to this situation is inadequate to preclude federal habeas review of this claim. 18
111 Because the preclusion of cross-examination claim is not procedurally barred, we proceed to address the merits of this claim.
112 Petitioner argues that the decision to preclude any cross-examination of Echevarria was an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. Under the unreasonable application clause of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme Court's] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Although it is clear that the question is whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable, Williams, 529 U.S. at 409, 120 S.Ct. 1495, the precise method for distinguishing objectively unreasonable decisions from merely erroneous ones is less clear. See, e.g., Francis S. v. Stone, 221 F.3d 100, 111 (2d Cir.2000); Lainfiesta v. Artuz, 253 F.3d 151, 155 (2d Cir.2001). However, it is well-established in our circuit that the objectively unreasonable standard of § 2254(d)(1) means that petitioner must identify some increment of incorrectness beyond error in order to obtain habeas relief. See Fuller, 273 F.3d at 219; Francis S., 221 F.3d at 111. 113 Petitioner argues that the state courts unreasonably applied the forfeiture-by-misconduct doctrine — far beyond the admission of out-of-court statements — to permit the complete preclusion of cross-examination of a witness who actually testified at trial. For the reasons that follow, we agree with petitioner, and hold that the state court decision to preclude all cross-examination was an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law. 114 The Appellate Division, the highest state court to consider the merits of the claim, ruled that the court's ruling barring cross-examination of the witness was appropriate under the circumstances presented since the witness's testimony was at complete variance with his prior statement to the People. Cotto, 658 N.Y.S.2d at 279. In support of its conclusion, the Appellate Division cited to People v. Geraci, even though the witness did not testify in that case, and held that the scope of the waiver included the introduction of hearsay statements and a bar on cross-examination on the substance of the out-of-court statements. 85 N.Y.2d at 366, 625 N.Y.S.2d 469, 649 N.E.2d 817. Nonetheless, we are determining the reasonableness of the state courts' `decision,' 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), not grading their papers. Cruz v. Miller, 255 F.3d 77, 86 (2d Cir. 2001). As a result, [a]lthough sound reasoning will enhance the likelihood that a state court's ruling will be determined to be a `reasonable application' of Supreme Court law, deficient reasoning will not preclude AEDPA deference. Id. (citations omitted). To answer the question of the reasonableness of the Appellate Division's ultimate decision, we must turn to the intersection of clearly established Supreme Court law under two doctrines: the right of cross-examination, and the waiver of confrontation rights through misconduct.
115 The right of cross-examination, though not absolute, is one of the most firmly established principles under Supreme Court law. Cross-examination is the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested. Davis, 415 U.S. at 316, 94 S.Ct. 1105. In Davis, the Supreme Court held that the constitutional right to cross-examine a witness includes the opportunity to expose a witness's biases and possible motives to lie. The Court held that the defendant should have been allowed to cross-examine a prosecution witness about his relationship with law enforcement, which may have provided the witness with a motive to fabricate accusations against the defendant in order to obtain leniency. Id. at 316-18, 94 S.Ct. 1105. As the Court stated, the exposure of a witness' motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination. Id. at 316-17, 94 S.Ct. 1105. This principle has been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court and our court ever since. See, e.g., Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986); Fuller, 273 F.3d at 219; Henry v. Speckard, 22 F.3d 1209, 1214 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1029, 115 S.Ct. 606, 130 L.Ed.2d 517 (1994) (The motivation of a witness in testifying, including her possible self-interest and any bias or prejudice against the defendant, is one of the principal subjects for cross-examination.); cf. United States v. Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d 934, 955 (2d Cir.1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1233, 111 S.Ct. 2858, 115 L.Ed.2d 1026 (1991) (The court should avoid any blanket prohibition on exploration of an area that is central to an assessment of the witness's reliability.). In addition to demonstrating bias, the defendant is entitled to use cross-examination to impeach the witness's recollection, ability to observe, and general credibility. See, e.g., United States v. Reindeau, 947 F.2d 32, 36 (2d Cir.1991); Harper v. Kelly, 916 F.2d 54, 57 (2d Cir.1990). 116 The Confrontation Clause is violated when a defendant is prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed ... `to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors ... could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.' Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680, 106 S.Ct. 1431 (quoting Davis, 415 U.S. at 318, 94 S.Ct. 1105). Most of the cases involving this type of Confrontation Clause violation involve a trial court limiting cross-examination into a particular subject, see, e.g., Davis, 415 U.S. at 316, 94 S.Ct. 1105; Mehler et al., FEDERAL CRIMINAL PRACTICE: A SECOND CIRCUIT HANDBOOK § 8-2, at 109 (Matthew Bender 2002) (collecting cases), where the question is whether the jury is in possession of facts sufficient to make a `discriminating appraisal' of the particular witness's credibility. United States v. Roldan-Zapata, 916 F.2d 795, 806 (2d Cir.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 940, 111 S.Ct. 1397, 113 L.Ed.2d 453 (1991) (quoting United States v. Singh, 628 F.2d 758, 763 (2d Cir.1980)). 117 The impingement on the confrontation right here, where defendant was completely precluded from cross-examining the only living person to identify Cotto as the shooter, is particularly stark. The Appellate Division's decision is not objectively unreasonable only if it was reasonable to conclude that the waiver of confrontation rights can extend even to the cross-examination of a prosecution witness who actually takes the stand and testifies.
118 The Supreme Court has considered only one case involving a waiver through misconduct of the right to cross-examine. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 159, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1878); Kroger, supra, at 846 (Despite a sharp split between the circuits on the manner in which courts should apply the rule, the Supreme Court has repeatedly declined to hear contemporary confrontation waiver cases.) (footnotes omitted). 19 Since Reynolds, the Court has decided only two other cases involving a waiver of the right to cross-examine, and neither involved misconduct. See Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 5, 86 S.Ct. 1245, 16 L.Ed.2d 314 (1966) (petitioner did not intelligently and knowingly waive his right to cross-examine witnesses, despite his counsel's representations); Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 452-53, 32 S.Ct. 250, 56 L.Ed. 500 (1912) (defendant waived Confrontation Clause objections to introduction of prior testimony because his own lawyer introduced the prior testimony about which he complained on appeal). 119 Reynolds remains the governing Supreme Court case on waiver of the right to cross-examine a witness through misconduct, although this doctrine has been more fully developed in the federal courts of appeals. In Reynolds, after a finding that the defendant had procured the witness's unavailability, the Court upheld, over a Confrontation Clause challenge, the admission of prior witness testimony from a trial of the same defendant on the same charge. The Court relied in large part upon the fact that the accused was present at the time the testimony was given, and had full opportunity of cross-examination. 98 U.S. at 161. As a result, the Court concluded, [t]his brings the case clearly within the well-established rules. Id. (citing 1 Wharton on Evidence § 177). Because this witness did not testify at the second trial, cross-examination of a testifying witness was not at issue. Although the courts of appeals, including our court, have since expanded the types of testimony which will be admitted, see, e.g., Aguiar, 975 F.2d at 47, the holding of Reynolds itself is narrow. And clearly established Federal law under § 2254(d)(1) refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta of the Supreme Court's decisions. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495. 120 The Supreme Court has never dealt with this precise question of the scope of a waiver of the right to cross-examine a witness because of misconduct, when the witness actually takes the stand at trial. Although our task is to determine whether the state courts reasonably applied clearly established Supreme Court law, we think it appropriate to make some examination of how the federal courts of appeals have analyzed the issue. Cruz v. Miller, 255 F.3d 77, 85 (2d Cir.2001). Like the Supreme Court, no federal court of appeals has faced the waiver issue in this particular situation: where the witness actually takes the stand at trial. The trial court reached its conclusion based on our decision in U.S. v. Aguiar, 975 F.2d 45 (2d Cir.1992), concluding that the scope of waiver was broader under the law of our circuit than under New York state law. See Cotto, 642 N.Y.S.2d at 796 (citing Aguiar, 975 F.2d at 47). We agree with petitioner that the trial court, and implicitly the Appellate Division, improperly read Aguiar as precluding cross-examination in these circumstances. 121 In Aguiar, the prosecution had proven in a hearing, like the Sirois hearing in this case, that the defendant had intimidated a prosecution witness into not testifying at trial. See Aguiar, 975 F.2d at 47. Nonetheless, defendant challenged the admission of the witness's statements to law enforcement officers on the ground that only sworn testimony, such as testimony before a grand jury, could be admissible under the Confrontation Clause, even if the defendant had forfeited his confrontation right through misconduct. Id. We rejected this contention, holding that forfeiture of confrontation rights extended for all purposes, referring to both sworn and unsworn statements. Id. Because the witness in that case never took the stand, the issue of preclusion of cross-examination of an actual prosecution witness at trial was not before the Aguiar court. To the extent that Aguiar can be read more broadly, it must be considered dicta. 20
122 Several factors lead us to conclude that the Appellate Division's determination that the preclusion of cross-examination was proper was objectively unreasonable. First, there is the lack of any precedent supporting this result in the Supreme Court or any federal court of appeals. Petitioner argues that the result in this case, where a defendant is completely precluded from cross-examining a prosecution witness who takes the stand, is unprecedented in more than 200 years of American jurisprudence. Though we are not as confident in our command of the nation's legal history as petitioner's counsel, respondent has pointed to no other case — and our research reveals none — in which this occurred. More specifically, we find no other cases where the jury was presented with direct, in-person testimony from the witness, and the witness's prior out-of-court statements, but no cross-examination whatsoever was permitted. In contrast, in Williams v. Taylor, the case where the Supreme Court first defined unreasonable application standard under AEDPA, several federal courts of appeals, as well as many state courts, had applied the law in the same way as Virginia's highest court had in that case. See 2 Liebman and Hertz § 32.3, at 1449 & n. 47 (citing Respondent's Brief in Williams v. Taylor, which in turn cited opinions from eight federal circuits). Nonetheless, the Supreme Court still found the decision of the Virginia Supreme Court objectively unreasonable. 529 U.S. at 397, 120 S.Ct. 1495. 123 Certainly, one could argue that the lack of any Supreme Court precedent directly on point supports the conclusion that the state court determination was not unreasonable. See, e.g., Hines v. Miller, 318 F.3d 157, 163 (2d Cir.2003) (relying in part on the absence of any Supreme Court decision concerning this type of claim in holding that the Appellate Division's decision was not unreasonable). We have also said, however, that the lack of Supreme Court precedent addressing forfeiture of a particular constitutional right does not mean that any determination that such a fundamental right has been forfeited ... would survive habeas review. Gilchrist v. O'Keefe, 260 F.3d 87, 97 (2d Cir.2001). Moreover, in Hines, we also relied on the many divergent approaches and outcomes in federal courts that have applied clearly established Supreme Court precedent to the facts at issue — a factor that was also present with respect to the first issue certified on appeal here, see supra, but is not present with respect to the preclusion of cross-examination. 318 F.3d at 163. Indeed, in this case, the reasonableness of the state courts' determination of the scope of the waiver must be evaluated in light of the countervailing, clearly established right to cross-examine for bias. Cf. Jones v. Stinson, 229 F.3d 112, 119-20 (2d Cir.2000) (although the Supreme Court had not decided the specific circumstances under which a criminal defendant must be allowed to introduce evidence of prior non-criminal conduct, court evaluated whether decision was objectively unreasonable in light of Supreme Court precedent that the opportunity to present a defense is one of the constitutional requirements of a fair trial). 124 Second, we are influenced by the lack of any specific reasons for extending the ban on cross-examination this far. Both the Appellate Division, in citing Geraci, and the trial court, in citing our opinion in Aguiar, seemed to believe that the automatic consequence of a finding that the defendant had procured the witness's unavailability was a complete preclusion of cross-examination. While there might be a circumstance where a complete preclusion of cross-examination could be justified, this would be exceedingly rare. For example, there could be a witness who took the stand who was so thoroughly intimidated by the defendant that she refused to answer any questions at all, despite entreaties from the trial court. Certainly, nothing in this record indicates that this case presented such a circumstance, however, and neither the Appellate Division nor the trial court presented any reasons why this case might fall into such a rare category. 125 Finally, the preclusion of cross-examination is inconsistent with the purpose behind the forfeiture-by-misconduct rule. As articulated by the Supreme Court, [t]he rule has its foundation in the maxim that no one shall be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 159. In allowing Echevarria's prior statements to be presented to the jury, we ensure that the jury has the benefit of statements which may assist in its truth-seeking function, statements which the jury ostensibly would have heard directly from the witness were it not for the defendant's misconduct. The rule is a remedial one designed to protect the truth-seeking process. 126 Cross-examination serves the same purpose: helping the jury determine the truth. The right to cross-examination... is essentially a `functional' right designed to promote reliability in the truth-finding functions of a criminal trial. Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 737, 107 S.Ct. 2658, 96 L.Ed.2d 631 (1987). Indeed, the Supreme Court has emphasized that cross-examination is the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970) (quoting Wigmore on Evidence). One of the jury's central tasks in this trial was to determine whether Echevarria told the truth when he said that he saw Cotto shoot Davilla. To deprive the jury of the powerful tool of cross-examination, when the witness was literally available, harmed the truth-seeking process as much as it did Cotto. 127 In sum, the above factors — (1) the absence of any Supreme Court holdings extending the forfeiture of confrontation rights to complete preclusion of cross-examination of a prosecution witness who actually testifies at trial, juxtaposed against the clearly established right to cross-examine adverse witnesses for bias and motive to lie; (2) the lack of any reasons why a complete ban was necessary and appropriate in this case; and (3) the centrality of cross-examination to the truth-seeking process — lead us to conclude that the state court determination to preclude cross-examination of Echevarria entirely was an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law. 128 Because we conclude that the state courts' determination that the complete preclusion of cross-examination did not violate petitioner's Sixth Amendment rights was an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law, we necessarily would reach the same result under a de novo standard. We therefore need not decide whether the claim was actually adjudicated on the merits within the meaning of § 2254(d). As in previous cases, [w]e need not and do not resolve today the question of whether § 2254(d)'s standard of review applies because nothing turns on it here. Washington v. Schriver, 255 F.3d 45, 55 (2d Cir.2001); see also Cohen v. Senkowski, 290 F.3d 485, 488 (2d Cir.2002); Leka v. Portuondo, 257 F.3d 89, 97-98 (2d Cir.2001) (We need not decide what level of deference to accord those rulings, because even under AEDPA's deferential standard of review, the rejection of Leka's claim ... was unreasonable.). 129 For the reasons stated, the decision to preclude any cross-examination of Echevarria was objectively unreasonable, and violated Cotto's constitutional right of confrontation.

130 A violation of a defendant's confrontation rights does not, standing alone, require reversal of a judgment of conviction. Rather, violations of the Confrontation Clause are subject to harmless error analysis. See Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684, 106 S.Ct. 1431; see also Henry, 22 F.3d at 1215. In a case like this one, where a reviewing court concludes that the trial judge has improperly curtailed cross-examination, the inquiry is whether, assuming that the damaging potential of the cross-examination were fully realized, a reviewing court might nonetheless say that the error was harmless .... Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684, 106 S.Ct. 1431. The burden of persuasion is on the government, meaning that if `the matter is so evenly balanced that [the federal judge] feels himself in virtual equipoise as to the harmlessness of the error,' the petitioner should prevail. Lainfiesta v. Artuz, 253 F.3d 151, 158 (2d Cir.2001) (quoting O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 435, 115 S.Ct. 992, 130 L.Ed.2d 947 (1995)), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1019, 122 S.Ct. 1611, 152 L.Ed.2d 625 (2002). 131 In Van Arsdall, a case which reached the Supreme Court on direct appeal from the state courts, the Court applied the harmless error standard set out in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), where a conviction infected by constitutional error must be overturned unless a reviewing court can say that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 24, 87 S.Ct. 824. Petitioner argues that that the Chapman standard should apply in this case as well, although for cases on collateral review, an error is generally considered harmless if it did not have a `substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.' Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946)). In this case, harmless error was never reached in the state courts, and there is therefore no state ruling which commands AEDPA deference. 132 In Santana-Madera v. U.S., 260 F.3d 133, 140 (2d Cir.2001), we noted that [n]either the Supreme Court nor this Court has definitively established a proper harmless error standard to apply when a constitutional error is being evaluated [for harmlessness] for the first time on collateral review. 22 In that case, we noted differences among the circuits on this issue, but concluded that the case did not require us to settle the question. Id. Similarly, we need not decide the issue here because, even under the Brecht standard, the error cannot be called harmless.
133 In Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986), the Supreme Court outlined a series of factors to consider when a Confrontation Clause violation should be considered harmless error: the importance of the witness' testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and ... the overall strength of the prosecution's case. We assess each of these factors in order to determine whether the preclusion of cross-examination of Echevarria was harmless error. 134 The first factor — the importance of Echevarria's testimony in the prosecution's case — weighs in favor of petitioner. Although Echevarria's incriminating statements came in as prior out-of-court statements through the testimony of the police officers, they were extremely important because Echevarria was the only witness to identify Cotto as the shooter. The significance of Echevarria's prior statements is demonstrated by the prosecution's reliance on them in its summation to the jury: 135 You know, he's in my office, Anthony Echevarria ... It's a secured place and he's comfortable enough that he says, hey look, I know who did it. It was Richie Cotto. Richie Cotto did this crime. He says it. Then he comes into the courtroom, right. And he takes the stand he takes a oath. Now, it's a different ballgame again. The defendant is here, he's confronted by the defendant.... [T]hese are different rules. It's different in here. 136 In closing, the prosecution again emphasized Echevarria's identification: The fact that the deceased [Davilla] says it was Richard Cotto who did it, I submit there's no dispute. The fact that Anthony Echevarria says that it is Richie Cotto who does the shooting, I submit there is no dispute. 137 Echevarria's trial testimony and out-of-court statements were not cumulative — the second Van Arsdall factor — as he was the only person besides Davilla to identify Cotto as the shooter. Similarly, looking at the third factor, the degree of corroborating or contradictory evidence on material points of the witness's testimony, the victim's apparent identification of Cotto in the ambulance does corroborate Echevarria's statements to the prosecutor and police. However, Echevarria's trial testimony, and statements shortly after the shooting, are contradictory evidence, as well as (arguably) Officer Anderson's acknowledgment that he saw another man arguing with Davilla shortly before the shooting. 23 Moreover, because the preclusion of cross-examination was complete, the fourth Van Arsdall factor — the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted — weighs heavily in favor of the petitioner and highlights the unusual nature of this case. 138 The final factor to consider — the overall strength of the prosecution's case — also weighs in petitioner's favor, as the case against Cotto was less than overwhelming. Respondent argues that there is no possibility that Cotto would have been acquitted, even if Echevarria's testimony had been completely discounted by the jury, because of the victim's identification of Cotto as the shooter in the ambulance, as recounted to the jury by Officer Anderson and corroborated by the emergency medical technician who was in the ambulance. According to the officer, Davilla even provided details such as the apartment where Cotto lived and the kind of car that he drove. But the defense raised questions throughout the trial about the reliability of this identification, suggesting that both Davilla and Officer Anderson, each with a history of disputes with Cotto, had a motive to point the finger at the defendant. And the absence of further corroborating evidence might well have led the jury to conclude that the prosecution had not met its burden. 24 It appears there was no ballistics or other physical evidence linking Cotto to the murder, and the prosecution's case rested primarily on the hearsay statements of Davilla and Echevarria. 139 Most importantly, the lack of cross-examination deprived the defendant of the opportunity to highlight and emphasize to the jury Echevarria's potential bias — that Echevarria made the statements when he was incarcerated on an unrelated charge and therefore had a motive to curry favor with law enforcement in return for leniency in his upcoming parole hearing. Given Echevarria's two prior statements to the police shortly after Davilla's shooting, in which he said that he could not identify the shooter, and Echevarria's belated identification of Cotto, such cross-examination may well have influenced the jury's assessment of Echevarria's credibility. 140 Respondent argues that the jury already had sufficient evidence to evaluate Echevarria's credibility. Indeed, arguably Echevarria's direct testimony, where he discussed his prior criminal record and said that he could not identify the shooter, was more than sufficient to raise serious doubts in the minds of the jury about Echevarria's credibility and the reliability of his prior statements. In defense counsel's summation, she was able to tell the jury: Testifying under oath he told you that he never looked at the shooter and that he `went for cover.' Of course, you also heard what he said in the DA's office last week to Police Officers Vargas and Detective Quinones and it's going to be up to you to decide whether this uncorroborated hearsay, in the District Attorney's office, in the face of 6 or 7 law-enforcement officials in a 10 by 10 office can probably or possibly be the truth. Moreover, defense counsel was able to attack Echevarria's credibility in summation by invoking his criminal history, brought out on direct examination. 25 Certainly, the circumstances are unusual in this case, because cross-examination would be targeted at impeaching Echevarria's prior statements rather than the trial testimony. 26 But the harmlessness inquiry is focused on the effect on the jury if the damaging potential of the cross-examination were fully realized. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684, 106 S.Ct. 1431. 141