Opinion ID: 1057414
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Statute’s Context

Text: Section 2401(b)’s context includes its placement in the larger statutory scheme, as well as any relevant exceptions Congress may have legislated. It also includes the Supreme Court’s “interpretation of similar provisions in many years past.” Reed Elsevier, 559 U.S. at 168.
Provisions The majority correctly notes that “there has not been . . . a venerable, consistent line of [Supreme Court] cases treating the FTCA limitations period as jurisdictional” and, indeed, that “there is no Supreme Court precedent on the question.”27 Op. at 30. Still, the Supreme Court has examined similar provisions and offered guidance useful here. As previously stated, Kubrick and John R. Sand & Gravel, taken together, strongly suggest that § 2401(b)’s time limits are jurisdictional. The Court’s analysis in McNeil only bolsters this conclusion. There, the Court held that 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) “bars claimants from bringing suit in federal court [under the 27 The majority’s focus is—jurisprudentially speaking—far too narrow. See Reed Elsevier, 559 U.S. at 168 (“[T]he relevant question here is not . . . whether [the statute] itself has long been labeled jurisdictional, but whether the type of limitation that [the statute] imposes is one that is properly ranked as jurisdictional absent an express designation.”). Section 2401(b) expresses the same “type of limitation” the Court held jurisdictional in Soriano and John R. Sand & Gravel. See 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (“Every claim of which the United States Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction shall be barred unless the petition thereon is filed within six years after such claim first accrues.”). WONG V. BEEBE 93 FTCA] until they have exhausted their administrative remedies.” McNeil, 508 U.S. at 113. This requirement is jurisdictional. Courts cannot entertain a suit brought before exhaustion of administrative remedies, even if the claimant exhausts those remedies before “substantial progress [is] made in the litigation,” because such a suit was filed too early. Id. at 110–11. Here, there is no dispute that, like the petitioner in McNeil, Wong filed her action before denial of her administrative claim and was similarly premature. The majority emphasizes that § 2675(a) is located in chapter 171 and that Congress expressly conditioned the district courts’ jurisdiction upon plaintiffs’ compliance with the provisions of that chapter. See Op. at 23. In McNeil, however, the Court did not even mention this fact. Instead, it based its decision on two considerations: (1) the statutory text is unambiguous and expresses Congress’s intent to require complete exhaustion of administrative remedies, and (2) “[e]very premature filing of an action under the FTCA imposes some burden on the judicial system and on the Department of Justice which must assume the defense of such actions.” McNeil, 508 U.S. at 111–12. With respect to the premature filing, the Court noted that, “[a]lthough the burden may be slight in an individual case, the statute governs the processing of a vast multitude of claims,” such that “[t]he interest in orderly administration of this body of litigation is best served by adherence to the straightforward statutory command.” Id. The Court’s language suggests once again that the FTCA’s timing requirements fit into the jurisdictional category. See John R. Sand & Gravel, 552 U.S. at 133 (identifying “facilitating the administration of claims” as one of the broader, system-related goals that makes a statutory 94 WONG V. BEEBE time limit “more absolute”). In McNeil, the Court took a systemic view of its decision; it was concerned with the “orderly administration of this body of litigation” precisely because § 2675(a) “governs the processing of a vast multitude of claims.” McNeil, 508 U.S. at 112. Because the same is true of § 2401(b), our analysis should feature the same concern. And, when one takes this more systemic view of § 2401(b), one will surely find that every premature—or late—filing imposes a burden on the judicial system and on the Department of Justice and agree with the Court that “strict adherence to the procedural requirements specified by the legislature is the best guarantee of evenhanded administration of the law.” Id. at 113.28
Seeking another interpretive tool to support its position, the majority emphasizes the fact that § 2401(b) is located in 28 The majority notes that § 2675 is silent as to the deadline for filing a properly exhausted claim in the district court and concludes that “there is no contextual reason to think that the limitations period provisions are also jurisdictional.” Op. at 28. But § 2675 does not require only that individuals exhaust their administrative remedies; instead, it specifies that individuals must exhaust their administrative remedies first (i.e. before they file complaints in federal court). See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). Thus, the statute requires a particular timing of administrative exhaustion, and the McNeil Court found this timing requirement significant. See McNeil, 508 U.S. at 111 (noting that the “petitioner’s complaint was filed too early”); id. at 112 (addressing the burdens premature filings impose on the judicial system and the Department of Justice). Just as in McNeil, appellant Wong’s complaint was filed “too early” and imposed a burden on the judicial system and Department of Justice. Because late filings impose similar burdens on the courts and the Department of Justice, there is good reason to believe that the limitations period expressed in § 2401(b) is also jurisdictional. WONG V. BEEBE 95 a provision separate from the FTCA’s jurisdiction-granting provision. See Op. at 23. With respect, this fact is irrelevant. As the Court has explained, “some time limits are jurisdictional even though expressed in a separate statutory section from jurisdictional grants, while others are not, even when incorporated into the jurisdictional provisions.” Barnhart, 537 U.S. at 159 n.6 (citations omitted). “Formalistic rules do not account for the difference, which is explained by contextual and historical indications of what Congress meant to accomplish.” Id. Even more problematic to the majority’s analysis of the FTCA’s reorganization in 1948, see Op. at 26, is the inconvenient enactment of a law rejecting placement in the Act as a valid interpretive tool. The majority acknowledges that, before 1948, Congress had expressly conditioned the grant of jurisdiction over tort claims against the United States upon plaintiffs’ compliance with, among other things, the FTCA’s original limitations provision. See Op. at 26. In 1948, however, Congress reorganized the FTCA and placed the limitations provision in chapter 161 and other provisions, such as § 2675, in chapter 171. See Op. at 26. It appears the majority would conclude from this fact that Congress intended to separate jurisdictional requirements (§ 2675) from non-jurisdictional ones (§ 2401). Congress, however, expressly rejected this possible reading of its reorganization efforts by an enactment of law. See Pub. L. No. 773, 62 Stat. 869, 991 (1948) (“No inference of a legislative construction is to be drawn by reason of the chapter in Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, . . . in which any section is placed.”). The majority simply ignores this Act of Congress, perhaps because it cuts directly against the majority’s desired result: interpretive value based on the statute’s placement. 96 WONG V. BEEBE Congress clearly stated that the placement of § 2401 in chapter 161 was not intended to change the way it should be interpreted. If Congress intended to condition the grant of jurisdiction over tort claims against the United States on compliance with the limitations period, the recodification in 1948 should not be read to alter that intent. That Congress later amended the jurisdiction-granting provision to provide that the district courts would have exclusive jurisdiction over FTCA actions “[s]ubject to the provisions of chapter 171 of this title,” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1), says nothing about the jurisdictional status of a provision located in chapter 161.
“[A]s a general rule, . . . Congress’s use of certain language in one part of [a] statute and different language in another can indicate that different meanings were intended.” Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. at 825. As relevant here, § 2401(b) enumerates no exceptions, while § 2401(a) provides that “action of any person under legal disability or beyond the seas at the time the claim accrues may be commenced within three years after the disability ceases.” 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a). The relevant meaning to be inferred from Sibelius’ interpretive canon quoted above is that Congress did not intend for any exceptions to be applied to § 2401(b). The majority is correct that this canon, standing alone, does not constitute a “clear statement” by Congress. See Op. at 28. The canon can, however, “tip the scales when a statute could be read in multiple ways.” Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. at 826. I would not hold that consideration of this canon alone dictates a conclusion that § 2401(b)’s time limit is jurisdictional, but it reinforces that conclusion when considered with the statute’s text and context. WONG V. BEEBE 97