Opinion ID: 6320161
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Judicial-Like Procedures

Text: Indeed, our ability to predict an answer to that question is complicated by the fact that, in identifying certain government administrative proceedings as quasi-judicial in Kelley and Craig, the Connecticut Supreme Court not only reiterated Petyan’s law-to-fact requirement, but also highlighted the employment of certain procedures akin to those used in traditional judicial proceedings to “ensure . . . reliability.” Kelley v. Bonney, 221 Conn. at 571, 606 A.2d 693. Specifically, in both the Board of Education and Police Department proceedings at issue in those cases, (1) either witnesses (in Craig) or the complainant (in Kelley) were required to be under oath; and (2) parties were permitted (a) to “be present throughout the hearing,” (b) to “be represented by counsel,” (c) “to call and crossexamine witnesses,” and (d) “to present oral argument.” Id. at 56970, 606 A.2d 693; see Craig v. Stafford Const., Inc., 271 Conn. at 87-88, 856 A.2d 372. To be sure, in Petyan, the Connecticut Supreme Court had held that the absence of an oath requirement was not fatal to identifying a proceeding as quasi-judicial. See Petyan v. Ellis, 200 Conn. at 251-52, 510 A.2d 1337. 24 And in Kelley and Craig, the court observed that non-public, even ex parte, proceedings can be “judicial.” 24 The employer in Petyan certified—but did not swear to—the truthfulness of his form responses. See id. at 250, 510 A.2d 1337. 29 See Kelley v. Bonney, 221 Conn. at 566, 606 A.2d 693; accord Craig v. Stafford Const., Inc., 271 Conn. at 84-85, 856 A.2d 372. 25 Nevertheless, the emphasis that Kelley and Craig place on traditional reliabilityensuring judicial procedures suggests that the more such procedures are employed in an administrative proceeding, the more likely it is to be identified as quasi-judicial. See also Hopkins v. O’Connor, 282 Conn. at 831 & n.3, 925 A.2d 1030 (citing “significant procedural protections afforded in [court] commitment proceedings”—including rights to be present at hearing, to appointed counsel, and to cross-examination— in identifying such proceedings as “judicial” for purposes of immunity); Vidro v. United States, 720 F.3d at 152 (citing Craig in stating that whether statement is “taken under oath is . . . relevant to whether it deserves an absolute privilege”). Presumably, no lesser standard would apply to non-government proceedings. By that standard, it is difficult to identify Khan’s UWC hearing as quasi-judicial. Nothing in the present record indicates that UWC hearing witnesses testify under oath—only that there can be adverse disciplinary consequences for failing to testify truthfully (though what those might be for persons such as Doe, who have graduated and left Yale, is not clear). See App’x at 77. What the record does show is that a person under investigation is specifically not permitted to be physically present throughout UWC hearings. Rather, when a complainant is interviewed by the committee—even remotely by teleconference, as in Doe’s case—the person under investigation is 25 The most obvious non-public, ex parte proceeding to which absolute judicial immunity applies is a grand jury proceeding. See Vidro v. United States, 720 F.3d at 152. 30 excluded from the hearing room and provided with only an audio feed of the proceeding. See id. at 80. Moreover, cross-examination is expressly denied, and there appears to be no opportunity for closing argument. As for an attorney, a person may enlist counsel as his hearing advisor, but the attorney may not speak on the party’s behalf, question witnesses, raise objections, or actively participate in ways generally associated with the idea of “representation” in judicial proceedings. See id. at 78. Moreover, to the extent these departures from traditional judicial proceedings were informed or sanctioned by DOE’s 2011 “Dear Colleague Letter,” the result appears to have been intentional. See id. at 90 (stating that “school’s Title IX investigation” into sexual misconduct “is different from any law enforcement investigation”). Thus, even assuming the possibility of the Connecticut Supreme Court recognizing a non-government proceeding as quasijudicial, at least when law is being applied to facts, it is difficult to predict whether that court would recognize Yale’s UWC hearing as quasi-judicial in the absence of so many of the judicial reliability procedures emphasized in Kelley and Craig.