Opinion ID: 3002495
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Competency to Waive Post-Conviction Review

Text: Corcoran cross appeals the district court’s holding that Corcoran was competent to waive his post-conviction proceedings. Corcoran argues that the Indiana Supreme Court’s conclusion that Corcoran was competent to waive post-conviction review was unreasonable and made despite clear evidence to the contrary. As we noted above, a federal court may set aside a state court’s “decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented,” and a federal court may not overturn a state court’s factual determinations unless it concludes that they are not “fairly supported by the record.” § 2254(d)(2), (8); Demosthenes v. Baal, 495 U.S. 731, 735, 110 S.Ct. 2223, 109 L.Ed.2d 762 (1990) (per curiam). The Supreme Court has held that a state court’s conclusion regarding a defendant’s competency is entitled to such a presumption. Demosthenes, 495 U.S. at 735, 110 S.Ct. 2223. The petitioner has a “tougher row to hoe” when challenging his competence in postconviction proceedings than when he is challenging his competence to stand trial. Holmes v. Buss, 506 F.3d 576, 579 (7th Cir. 2007). Under Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312, 86 S.Ct. 1505, 16 L.Ed.2d 583 (1966), when determining a petitioner’s mental competence to forego judicial proceedings, a court must ask “whether he has capacity to appreciate his position and make a rational choice with respect to continuing or abandoning 22 Nos. 07-2093 and 07-2182 further litigation,” or “whether he is suffering from a mental disease, disorder, or defect which may substantially affect his capacity in the premises.” 384 U.S. at 314, 86 S.Ct. 1505; Wilson v. Lane, 870 F.2d 1250, 1254 (7th Cir. 1989); see also Holmes v. Buss, 506 F.3d 576, 579 (7th Cir. 2007) (“If . . . the question is whether a petitioner for habeas corpus who has been sentenced to death is competent to withdraw a petition for certiorari filed on his behalf challenging the denial of habeas corpus, . . . the answer is unlikely to require that he understand more than that the withdrawal of his petition will almost certainly terminate any legal challenge to his death sentence.”) (internal citations omitted). Corcoran believes the record clearly established that his decision to waive his rights was not based on “rational thinking” as discussed in Rees. He argues that three medical experts testified that he suffered from a mental illness and that his decision to waive any further appeal of his sentence was the product of the delusions and pain he was experiencing as a result of his illness. Corcoran also contends that the Indiana Supreme Court erred in finding that he was aware of his legal position and the consequences of his waiver. The Indiana Supreme Court gave careful consideration of all the evidence presented at the post-conviction hearing. The court acknowledged that the experts testified that Corcoran suffered from paranoid schizophrenia and his resulting delusions caused him to waive further review of his sentence, but the court also found that Corcoran had a clear awareness of the status of his Nos. 07-2093 and 07-2182 23 case and what was at risk if he waived further review. The court took into account Corcoran’s own conduct and testimony at the hearing, in which he stated that his decision to waive further proceedings was based on his remorse for his crime, and not on any “delusions” he was said to have been experiencing. Although the experts believed otherwise, the Indiana Supreme Court was entitled to accept Corcoran’s contention that his request to waive further proceedings was based on his belief that death is a just punishment for his crimes. See United States v. Collins, 949 F.2d 921, 926 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding that statements of the defendant are appropriate evidence for the court to consider when evaluating competency). The Indiana Supreme Court has recognized that “[w]hile most people consider death the ultimate penalty, some murderers faced with life imprisonment may rationally disagree.” Smith v. State, 686 N.E.2d 1264, 1273 (Ind. 1997) (considering a defendant’s preference for death over life imprisonment, where there was an indication of his desire not to spend the rest of his life in prison and noting that to do so is not “per se irrational”); see also Wilson v. Lane, 870 F.2d 1250, 1254 (7th Cir. 1989) (in affirming a district court’s finding of a death row inmate’s competency to waive further appeals even though the inmate was ruled mentally incompetent, the Court considered the inmate’s unwavering testimony that he was aware of his position and of the federal review options available to him, and that he based his decision not on the conditions of his confinement, but on his belief that death was a better option than life in prison). Further, under the Rees standard, there is no support for Corcoran’s contention that a petitioner who has 24 Nos. 07-2093 and 07-2182 been diagnosed with a mental illness is not competent to waive post-trial proceedings. The question under Rees is whether a mental illness substantially affects the capacity to appreciate his options and make a rational choice among them. See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 166, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990) (citing Rees, 384 U.S. at 314, 86 S.Ct. 1505); see also Dennis v. Budge, 378 F.3d 880, 889-92 (9th Cir. 2004) (rejecting the claim that under Rees, a prisoner on death row should not be allowed to waive his post-conviction remedies if there is any possibility that the decision is a product of a mental disease, disorder or defect); Smith v. Armontrout, 812 F.2d 1050, 1057 (8th Cir. 1987) (“It is very probable that in every case where a death-row inmate elects to abandon further legal proceedings, there will be a possibility that the decision is the product of a mental disease, disorder, or defect . . . [y]et Rees clearly contemplates that competent waivers are possible.”). Our review of the transcripts and the evidence before the Indiana Supreme Court reveals that it (as well as the two other courts that considered Corcoran’s competency) thoroughly and conscientiously examined Corcoran’s claims of incompetency, and its findings that he had a “rational understanding of and [could] appreciate his legal position” are factually supported by the record. Therefore, because the Indiana Supreme Court’s decision was based on a reasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence, we defer to the determination of the Indiana Supreme Court that Corcoran was competent. Nos. 07-2093 and 07-2182 25