Opinion ID: 1298434
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: evaluation of totality of circumstances

Text: Based upon this record, the factors which we have concluded are appropriately within the totality of the circumstances for consideration in our de novo determination of reasonable suspicion are as follows: (1) Lee's drug arrest history, (2) Lee's nervousness, (3) Lee's divergent stories, and (4) Lee's presence in an unauthorized location within the recreation area at 9 p.m. in late November when no other activities were being conducted in the vicinity. A determination of reasonable suspicion is based on the totality of the circumstances. State v. Anderson, 258 Neb. 627, 605 N.W.2d 124 (2000). The U.S. Supreme Court has concluded that even where each factor in a reasonable suspicion determination, considered independently, is consistent with innocent activities, those same factors may amount to reasonable suspicion when considered collectively. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989). We evaluate those factors determined to be appropriate considerations in our totality of the circumstances analysis in such context. When Lee was initially stopped, she was operating her vehicle in an unauthorized location within a recreation area at approximately 9 p.m. in late November when no other activities were being conducted in the vicinity. This location, as described by Mulbery, was not well lighted and was dark. When the officers approached Lee, they found her to be really nervous. While conducting a check of Lee's license and registration, the officers learned of her prior drug arrest history. Having gained this knowledge, the officers again approached Lee. When Lee was asked a second time why she was present in the recreation area, her story turned around. This time, Lee stated that she was there to meet a boyfriend whose last name was Johnson and that Talbott was, in fact, her brother. Upon our de novo review of the totality of the circumstances, we determine that these factors, when considered collectively, amount to reasonable, articulable suspicion to believe that criminal activity was afoot. See, Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441, 100 S.Ct. 2752, 65 L.Ed.2d 890 (1980) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). Accord State v. Anderson, supra . Viewed collectively, they amount to something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or `hunch` and support Lee's continued detention. Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. at 441, 100 S.Ct. 2752. See, also, State v. Anderson, supra ; State v. McCleery, 251 Neb. 940, 560 N.W.2d 789 (1997) (officers allowed to draw specific reasonable inferences from facts in light of their experience). Having so determined, we need also consider whether the detention of Lee and her vehicle was reasonable in the context of an investigative stop. In doing so, we are guided by several considerations: We consider both the length of the detention and the efforts of police to conduct their investigation quickly and unintrusively in determining whether a detention is reasonable in the context of an investigative stop: [A]n investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Similarly, the investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period of time. U.S. v. Bloomfield, 40 F.3d 910, 916 (8th Cir.1994) (quoting U.S. v. Willis, 967 F.2d 1220 (8th Cir.1992)). First, we consider the length of Lee's detention. In U.S. v. Hardy, 855 F.2d 753 (11th Cir.1988), the court determined that a wait of 50 minutes for the arrival of a drug dog was not unreasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes. See, also, U.S. v. White, 42 F.3d 457 (8th Cir. 1994) (1-hour-20-minute wait for arrival of drug dog not unreasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes); Bloomfield, supra (1-hour wait for arrival of drug dog not unreasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes). The record indicates that just minutes after Lee was initially stopped, Uher was ordered to report to the recreation area with the drug dog, and further that Lee was detained for approximately 20 minutes. We determine that under the circumstances presented in this case, the length of Lee's detention was not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Second, we must consider whether the investigative methods employed [were] the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion. See Bloomfield, 40 F.3d at 916. In this case, the officers chose to use a canine sniff to dispel their reasonable suspicion. [A] canine sniff does not require the opening of luggage and does not reveal intimate but noncontraband items to public view. [T]he manner in which information is obtained through this investigative technique is much less intrusive than a typical search. [ United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983).] Nor does a canine sniff involve the time-consuming disassembly of luggage or an automobile frequently required in a thorough search for contraband. U.S. v. Hardy, 855 F.2d at 759. Accord State v. Chronister, 3 Neb.App. 281, 526 N.W.2d 98 (1995). We agree that a canine sniff is minimally intrusive and was also not unreasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes. Finally, we acknowledge that Mulbery called Uher, requesting the drug dog's presence, prior to Mulbery and Lytle's completion of their initial investigation. However, we find this irrelevant in our ultimate determination of reasonable suspicion. In our review of the record, it is clear that the drug dog did not arrive until after such time as the officers had reasonable suspicion to continue to detain Lee.