Opinion ID: 710067
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Catherine Demski: Acceptance of Responsibility

Text: 90
3E1.1 91 The Sentencing Guidelines authorize a district court judge to reduce a defendant's base offense level by two points [i]f the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense. U.S.S.G. Sec. 3E1.1(a). A further reduction of one point is authorized for a defendant whose base offense level is at least 16 and who has assisted authorities in the investigation or prosecution of his case. U.S.S.G. Sec. 3E1.1(b). Demski asserts that the district court clearly erred when it denied her a reduction of three points pursuant to Sec. 3E1.1(a) and (b). 92 The sentencing judge is in a unique position to evaluate a defendant's acceptance of responsibility. For this reason, the determination of the sentencing judge is entitled to great deference on review. U.S.S.G. Sec. 3E1.1 cmt. 5. Our decisions have held that acceptance of responsibility is a factual matter that enjoys the protection of the 'clearly erroneous' standard. United States v. Beal, 960 F.2d 629, 632 (7th Cir.1992), cert. denied 506 U.S. 880, 113 S.Ct. 230, 121 L.Ed.2d 166 (1992) (citation omitted). Because the trial court's assessment of a defendant's contrition will depend heavily on credibility assessments, the 'clearly erroneous' standard will nearly always sustain the judgment of the district court in this area. Id. Furthermore, the defendant bears the burden of proving that he is entitled to a reduction in base offense level for acceptance of responsibility. United States v. Schuler, 34 F.3d 457, 460 (7th Cir.1994). 93 Demski claims that she clearly demonstrated her acceptance of responsibility by pleading guilty, 18 admitting her role in the conspiracy, and cooperating fully with law enforcement officers. She notes that counsel for the Government, consistent with the plea agreement, stated at the sentencing hearing that there was a reasonable basis for an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction. Demski also notes that the probation office recommended a reduction in its original presentence report, but then withdrew that recommendation in an amended report filed the day before the sentencing hearing. In addition to asserting that the last-minute filing of the amended PSR prejudiced her ability to prepare fully for the sentencing hearing, Demski makes a more fundamental claim: that the court, by denying an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction, punished [her] for exercising her right to challenge the accuracy of the presentence report.
94 Initially, we address Demski's claim that the filing of the amended PSR within ten days of her sentencing hearing prejudiced her ability to prepare adequately for the hearing. The amended report was filed four days after Demski made her objections to the original PSR, and just one day before the sentencing hearing. This, according to Demski, violated 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3552(d), which requires that a presentence report be disclosed to the defendant, the counsel for the defendant, and the attorney for the Government at least ten days prior to the date set for sentencing, unless this minimum period is waived by the defendant. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3552(d). 95 It is true that Demski had a right to have the PSR disclosed to her at least ten days before the sentencing hearing, and that she did not waive this right by failing to object to the late-filing at the sentencing hearing. 19 See United States v. Blythe, 944 F.2d 356 (7th Cir.1991) (a defendant waives rights under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3552(d) if he makes no objection at the appropriate time). However, we do not believe that the probation office's eleventh-hour filing of the amended PSR significantly affected Ms. Demski's right to a fair sentencing hearing. We do not believe that this procedural misstep warrants disturbing the sentence of the district court, which, as discussed elsewhere in this opinion, was well-founded and not clearly erroneous. 96 We note that when Demski's attorney raised the issue of the amended PSR at the hearing, the sentencing judge stated very directly I'm not taking it into account so you don't need to respond to it. Counsel for Demski did not request an adjournment or express any dissatisfaction with the judge's statement that she would not take the amended PSR into account. Moreover, the law is clear that a sentencing judge is not bound by the PSR's recommendations concerning sentence. United States v. Heilprin, 910 F.2d 471, 475 (7th Cir.1990). We also observe that Demski's counsel was either lucky, clairvoyant, or extremely quick on her feet, for she did present cogent arguments in favor of a reduction for acceptance of responsibility, despite the lack of time in which to prepare. Demski thus had an opportunity to comment upon the probation officer's determination and on other matters relating to the appropriate sentence, as required by Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.
97 Demski also argues that the court impermissibly denied her a 3E1.1 reduction because she challenged the accuracy of the PSR. We do not agree with this characterization of the district court's findings, nor do we think that the district court committed clear error in denying a three-level reduction pursuant to 3E1.1. We begin our analysis by reviewing the district court's reasons for denying the reduction. At the sentencing hearing, the judge stated: 98 I am not going to give you a three level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. It is perfectly appropriate to contest the amounts of drugs, the time limit of a conspiracy, just as it is appropriate to take the witness stand during the trial and to testify. It is not appropriate, however, to lie on the witness stand or to deny frivolously the extent of your involvement in the conspiracy. 99 The judge went on to note the discrepancies between Demski's version of events and all of the other information before her, repeatedly stating that Demski's version did not jibe with the accounts provided by others. She concluded by stating her opinion that Demski had tried to minimize her role in (and responsibility for) the acts of the conspiracy. In her written judgment, the judge summarized, stating it can be shown that [the defendant] made a false denial of relevant conduct regarding the extent of the conspiracy, the length of time it lasted and the amount of drugs distributed. 100 This court has interpreted the current version of Sec. 3E1.1(a) 20 to mean that [i]f a defendant denies relevant conduct and the court determines such conduct occurred, the defendant cannot claim to have accepted responsibility for his actions. United States v. Brown, 47 F.3d 198, 204 (7th Cir.1995); see also Cedano-Rojas, 999 F.2d at 1182; United States v. White, 993 F.2d 147, 150-51 (7th Cir.1993). Further, we have held that if a defendant denies the government's statement of relevant conduct ... he thereby exposes his denials to the scrutiny of the court. Brown, 47 F.3d at 204. At the same time, a defendant is not required to affirmatively 'come clean' on relevant conduct in order to obtain the reduction. Schuler, 34 F.3d at 460. In other words, silence remains an option. This understanding of Sec. 3E1.1 is consistent with the Commentary accompanying Sec. 3E1.1, which instructs the sentencing judge to consider whether the defendant has: 101 truthfully admitt[ed] the conduct comprising the offense(s) of conviction, and truthfully admitt[ed] or not falsely den[ied] any additional relevant conduct for which the defendant is accountable under Sec. 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct). Note that a defendant is not required to volunteer, or affirmatively admit, relevant conduct beyond the offense of conviction in order to obtain a reduction under subsection (a). A defendant may remain silent in respect to relevant conduct beyond the offense of conviction without affecting his ability to obtain a reduction under this subsection. However, a defendant who falsely denies, or frivolously contests, relevant conduct that the court determines to be true has acted in a manner inconsistent with the acceptance of responsibility. 102 U.S.S.G. Sec. 3E1.1, cmt. 1(a) (emphasis added). 103 After considering the PSR, the Government's account of the Taylor conspiracy, and Demski's objections to the PSR, the district court refused to accept Demski's version of events and made a specific finding that she was not credible. It did not believe Demski's claim that the conspiracy commenced in late July or August of 1992, or her claim that the conspiracy ceased after the December 1992 search of her apartment, or her assertion that the drug runs to Illinois typically involved smaller quantities of cocaine than alleged in the PSR. The district court determined that Demski was responsible for between five and fifteen kilograms of cocaine. In light of this factual finding by the court, which was supported by substantial evidence, Demski's uncorroborated and self-serving assertions must be considered a false denial of relevant conduct. Having falsely denied relevant conduct, Demski cannot also claim to have accepted responsibility for that conduct. As this court has observed, [c]ontesting the veracity of the alleged relevant conduct is no doubt permissible and often perfectly appropriate. However, if a defendant denies the conduct and the court determines it to be true, the defendant cannot then claim that he has accepted responsibility for his actions. Schuler, 34 F.3d at 461 (quotation omitted). 104 Finally, we note that the district court based its 3E1.1 determination partly on an evaluation of Demski's credibility. The sentencing judge concluded that Demski's version of events was inspired by a desire simply to make [her] role, [her] responsibility, more minimal. We have held that a desire to minimize a criminal sentence is distinguishable from acceptance of responsibility and that the former will not provide a basis for a 3E1.1 reduction. White, 993 F.2d at 151. In any case, an appellate court is ill-equipped to assess whether a particular defendant is motivated by genuine acceptance of responsibility or by a self-serving desire to minimize his own punishment. Unlike the district court judge, we do not enjoy a front row seat from which to assess Demski's statements and demeanor. Id. This difference in perspective, i.e., our inability to review the intangible factors that go into making a factual determination, further persuades us that we should not disturb the district court's denial of an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction for Catherine Demski.