Opinion ID: 1952693
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the trial court erred in failing to grant plaintiff's motion for a new trial because of defendant's attorney's remark to plaintiff's first witness concerning his religious beliefs in violation of miss.r.evid. 610.

Text: During cross-examination of Ms. Steele's expert witness on economic damages, Stan Smith, defense counsel asked, I understand, Mr. Smith, you do not have a form of religion? Mr. Smith made no response, the judge overruled the plaintiff's objection, and he instructed the jury to disregard the question. The judge then admonished the defense attorney for his improper comment outside of the jury's presence. At the close of all evidence, the judge instructed the jury to disregard any evidence which was excluded during trial and cautioned them not to speculate about possible answers to questions which the court disallowed. Ms. Steele argues that this question violated Miss. R.Evid. 610, and that the question was so prejudicial that the jury became incapable of returning a fair verdict, and that the trial judge should have granted a new trial as a result. Miss.R.Evid. 610 reads, Evidence of the beliefs or opinions of a witness on matters of religion is not admissible for the purpose of showing that by reason of their nature his credibility is impaired or enhanced. The defense attorney's question was a clear violation of Rule 610, and the trial judge properly sustained Ms. Steele's objection and instructed the jury to disregard the question. This Court has previously held, The law of error and curative instructions seems to be an analog to harmless error... . Generally speaking, our law presumes that jurors follow the trial judge's instructions, as upon their oaths they are obliged to do. Parker v. Jones County Community Hospital, 549 So.2d 443, 445-46 (Miss. 1989) (citations omitted) (combination of sustaining objection and instructing jury to disregard was sufficient to preclude reversal for improper question). The trial judge did everything possible to avoid any resulting prejudice from the defense attorney's improper question. Considering that Mr. Smith did not even answer the question, it is doubtful that the jury was so prejudiced as to prevent them from rendering a fair verdict. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion by refusing to grant a new trial based upon the improper question. We affirm the lower court's decision.