Opinion ID: 2015103
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Witherspoon Excusal of Venireperson

Text: Relying on Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968), defendant contends the trial court erred in excusing venireperson Scott for cause. Witherspoon and its progeny provide that the right to an impartial jury, guaranteed by the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution, prohibits the exclusion of venirepersons for cause in capital cases because they express only general objections to the death penalty. People v. Brisbon, 129 Ill.2d 200, 224-25,135 Ill.Dec. 801, 544 N.E.2d 297 (1989); People v. Mahaffey, 128 Ill.2d 388, 416, 132 Ill.Dec. 366, 539 N.E.2d 1172 (1989). Defendant seeks a new capital sentencing hearing. The State initially responds that defendant waived this issue for review. The record shows that defendant both contemporaneously objected to the excusal and included this specific averment in his written post-trial motion, alleging: This court erred in granting the State's Motion to Excuse Prospective Juror Scott based on the Witherspoon decision. However, the State argues that defendant was required to allege that the error violated his rights under the sixth and fourteenth amendments to preserve the issue for review. The State's waiver argument lacks merit. To preserve an issue for review, a defendant must both contemporaneously object at trial and include the alleged error in a written post-trial motion. The failure to raise an issue in a written post-trial motion constitutes a waiver of the issue and it cannot be considered on appeal. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill.2d 176, 186-87, 119 Ill.Dec. 265, 522 N.E.2d 1124 (1988). Specific references in post-trial motions to the reasons why a trial judge's actions or rulings were wrong enable the judge to reconsider their propriety in a less pressured environment. If prejudicial error actually occurred, the judge can order a new trial, thus avoiding the delay and expense of appellate review. People v. Jackson, 84 Ill.2d 350, 359, 49 Ill.Dec. 719, 418 N.E.2d 739 (1981). The emphasis is necessarily factual and is not aided by mere constitutional citations. See, e.g., People v. Turk, 101 Ill.App.3d 522, 532-33, 56 Ill.Dec. 918, 428 N.E.2d 510 (1981). Applying these principles to the present case, it is clear that defendant preserved this issue for review. In his written post-trial motion, he identified the specific event giving rise to the alleged error, with a reference to Witherspoon. An additional citation to the sixth and fourteenth amendments would not have assisted the trial court in considering the allegation. Turning to the merits, defendant contends that the trial court erroneously excused venireperson Scott for cause. According to defendant, although Scott voiced general objections to the death penalty, he unequivocally could impose it. A venireperson who opposes the death penalty may not be excused for cause unless his or her views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of the venireperson's duties as a juror in accordance with his or her instructions and oath. People v. Pitsonbarger, 142 Ill.2d 353, 381, 385, 154 Ill.Dec. 562, 568 N.E.2d 783 (1990); Mahaffey, 128 Ill.2d at 416, 132 Ill.Dec. 366, 539 N.E.2d 1172. A venireperson's remarks must not be considered in isolation, but as a whole. Also, the trial court is in a superior position to evaluate a venireperson's response. People v. Gaines, 88 Ill.2d 342, 357, 58 Ill.Dec. 795, 430 N.E.2d 1046 (1981). The determination whether to allow a challenge for cause is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. People v. Seuffer, 144 Ill.2d 482, 502, 163 Ill.Dec. 805, 582 N.E.2d 71 (1991). The record shows that the trial court began Scott's voir dire with general questions, to which Scott responded that he would be fair to both defendant and the State, and would follow the court's instructions on the law regardless of his personal feelings. During questioning by a prosecutor, Scott responded that he was strongly against the death penalty, and that he did not believe in taking another person's life. Further, based on the strength of his personal beliefs, Scott would automatically reject the death penalty no matter what facts were found at trial. Scott was then questioned by defense counsel, requestioned by a prosecutor, and then further questioned by the trial court. Scott stated that the only circumstance under which he could vote for the death penalty would be the murder of a law enforcement officer. He repeatedly stated that, in all other cases, he would automatically vote against the death penalty. He would not consider the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and would disregard the trial court's instructions on the law. After reviewing the record, we uphold the trial court's excusal of venireperson Scott for cause. Scott repeatedly stated that he would disregard the evidence and the law and would automatically vote against the death penalty. His sole potential exception to his opposition, the murder of a law enforcement officer, did not ameliorate his intransigence. See People v. Ganus, 148 Ill.2d 466, 474-75, 171 Ill.Dec. 359, 594 N.E.2d 211 (1992). We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in excusing Scott.