Opinion ID: 664140
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence of Racial Discrimination

Text: 49 Unless a classification trammels fundamental personal rights or is drawn upon inherently suspect distinctions such as race ... [courts] presume the constitutionality of the statutory discriminations and require only that the classification challenged be rationally related to a legitimate state interest. New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303-04, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 2517, 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976). Because zoning and land use issues do not implicate fundamental rights, Christian Gospel Church, Inc. v. San Francisco, 896 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 999, 111 S.Ct. 559, 112 L.Ed.2d 565 (1990), in order to invoke strict scrutiny in this case the Kawaokas must demonstrate that the City intentionally discriminated on the basis of race. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65, 97 S.Ct. 555, 563, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977). Discriminatory intent may be proved by direct or indirect evidence. Id. at 266, 97 S.Ct. at 563; Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Henderson, 940 F.2d 465, 471 (9th Cir.1991). 50 The strongest evidence of discriminatory intent consists of two statements made by Doris Olsen, a member of the City Council, to Stephanie Forrest, the Kawaokas' real estate agent, and Cheryl Christner, Ms. Forrest's assistant. Forrest contends that when informed that the City's designation of the Kawaokas' property had decreased its value, Olsen stated Why should these Japanese people make all that money? and Why should these people make so much money? (CR 35, Exh. 19). These deplorable remarks are insensitive and disturbing and are evidence of prejudice. However, they are insufficient to raise a claim that the governmental action was on account of racial discrimination. 51 The district court analogized this situation to Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Henderson, 940 F.2d at 465. See Kawaoka, 796 F.Supp. at 1330-31. In Henderson, a president of a minority-owned bank sued a federal bank regulator who encouraged the bank's board of directors to fire the president. 940 F.2d at 465. To support his claim of racial discrimination, the plaintiff pointed to a statement by the bank regulator from which one might infer discriminatory intent. Because we found rational reasons for the regulator's actions, including a federal report on the bank that stated that the president's unsatisfactory management has resulted in the bank's current insolvent condition, we ruled that one statement without additional evidence of racial discrimination was insufficient to state a claim. Id. at 469, 473 & n. 16. In the present case, given the many reasons articulated by the City to support its decisions, including the desire to preserve agriculture and the City's small-town character, its concern that infrastructure might not support immediate development, and its concerns about the water adequacy and increase in traffic, Olsen's repugnant statements are insufficient to demonstrate that she acted with discriminatory intent. 52 Furthermore, the fact that Olsen made two deplorable comments off-duty does not mean that the City may be held liable for discrimination. A municipality may only be held liable under Sec. 1983 for a violation that stems from official municipal policy. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2036, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Municipal liability attaches where there is a deliberate choice made by officials with responsibility for establishing final policy, and the question of who has final decisionmaking authority is a question of state law. City of St. Louis v. Prapotnick, 485 U.S. 112, 124-27, 108 S.Ct. 915, 924-26, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988). Under California law, Olsen did not have final decisionmaking authority because the City Council must adopt a general plan by a majority vote. Cal.Gov't Code Sec. 65356 (West Supp.1993). In this case, the council adopted the plan unanimously and there is no evidence that any other council member acted with discriminatory intent or that the council as a whole took the action with discriminatory intent. See Lake Nacimiento Ranch Co. v. County of San Luis Obispo, 841 F.2d 872, 878-79 (9th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 827, 109 S.Ct. 79, 102 L.Ed.2d 55 (1988) (county supervisor who votes on issue even though he had a conflict of interest does not have authority to establish county policy where board of supervisors may only act by majority vote). 11 53 The Kawaokas point to additional indirect evidence of racial animus, but this evidence is extremely weak. Specifically, they point to statements by Craig Kawaoka that he had observed racial discrimination against other Japanese individuals. Most of these alleged incidents of discrimination concern conditions that the City placed on the development of property owned by other Japanese landowners and are quite vague. 12 These incidences are not sufficient evidence of discrimination because it is not unusual for property to be down-zoned or for development to be subject to conditions. Unless the Kawaokas can demonstrate that non-Japanese property owners are permitted to develop their land without similar restrictions, we cannot conclude that the City's actions in these cases were racially-motivated or unreasonable.