Opinion ID: 2015982
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: transmission of documents by department

Text: Much of the NHCA's argument on appeal is based on the fact that the Department sent the documents at issue to the individual nursing homes from which it was seeking information. The NHCA argues that since the documents have left the Department, they are no longer subject to the investigatory records exception. In support of this proposition, the NHCA refers us to § 84-712.05, which states, in relevant part, that the documents described by that section's exceptions may be withheld unless publicly disclosed in an open court, open administrative proceeding, or open meeting or disclosed by a public entity pursuant to its duties. . .. The NHCA argues that by sending the documents to nursing homes, the Department has disclosed the documents pursuant to its duties, therefore excluding them from the § 84-712.05 exceptions. We disagree. The term disclose has been defined as [t]o bring into view by uncovering; to expose; to make known; to lay bare; to reveal to knowledge; to free from secrecy or ignorance.... Black's Law Dictionary 464 (6th ed.1990). See, also, 26A C.J.S. Disclose at 971 (1956 & Supp. 1998); State v. Krokston, 187 Mo.App. 67, 172 S.W. 1156 (1915). Simply stated, the Department did nothing with the documents at issue that meets the criteria of this definition. Disclosure, within the meaning of this statute, refers to the exposure of documents to public view and not simply to the transmission of a document to the subject of an agency's investigation. Moreover, if we were to accept the NHCA's interpretation of this statute, the consequences to personal privacy would be very detrimental. Citizens are currently authorized, under a number of statutory provisions, to review information in the possession of the government that is personal to them. In fact, much of the information described in the disclosure exceptions of § 84-712.05 can be accessed by the particular persons to whom the information relates or from whom it was gathered. For instance, § 84-712.05(2) provides an exception for medical records. Some of those medical records are made available by statute to the subjects of the records and to certain third parties. For example, under Neb.Rev.Stat. § 81-666 (Reissue 1996), the Department is authorized to release collected personal medical records to medical researchers for research purposes. Under the NHCA's suggested reading of the public records statutes, the transmission of private records to carefully chosen researchers would place those records in the public domain. As further illustration, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 83-109 (Cum.Supp.1996) provides that patients at state medical and psychiatric institutions may access their own records from those institutions. The NHCA's interpretation of the statute would require us, then, to allow the public at large to access medical records at any time after they have been reviewed by the person whose medical history they contain. We reject the construction of § 84-712.05 offered by the NHCA. In construing a statute, it is presumed that the Legislature intended a sensible, rather than an absurd, result; an appellate court will, if possible, try to avoid a construction which would lead to absurd, unconscionable, or unjust results. Hoiengs v. County of Adams, 254 Neb. 64, 574 N.W.2d 498 (1998), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 119 S.Ct. 339, ___ L.Ed.2d ___. We conclude that records that have been disclosed within the meaning of § 84-712.05 are only those records that a public body has, in its official capacity, already made available to the general public. That has not happened in the instant case, and the NHCA's argument is without merit.