Opinion ID: 63413
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Policy of Tolerating Police Misconduct

Text: First, Lewis has not sufficiently demonstrated that the City or Johnson had a custom of tolerating misconduct or inadequately responding to citizen complaints. In support of her claim that Johnson had a policy of tolerating police misconduct, Lewis points to the following incidents of police misconduct. First, she submitted evidence of police misconduct at the Tomato Bowl incident in 2004. In addition, she presented evidence of another incident of alleged excessive force by Pugh, occurring on October 2, 2005, when Pugh allegedly used excessive force against Larry Lacey during a traffic stop. Further, Lewis points to Johnson’s testimony that Pugh committed a number of other sexual assaults. Lewis also cites to an incident in which three officers allegedly maced and beat up a man named “Burke,” who was being held in the city jail for DWI. Finally, Lewis presented evidence that Johnson was suspended twice – once in 2003 for allegedly lying to the City Manager and again in 2006 for improperly managing the police department. 10 No. 07-40662 However, there is simply no evidence in the record that the City “tolerated” these incidents of misconduct or other incidents of this nature. To the contrary, the testimony in the record indicates that each of these incidents was investigated,7 and in some cases, including the case of Pugh, the officers were subsequently suspended. Lewis has presented no testimony that the City or Johnson condoned officers’ use of excessive force or unlawful arrests. Further, given the relatively few number of incidents of allegedly excessive force and unlawful arrests, we cannot conclude that such behavior was sufficiently “widespread and pervasive” to demonstrate a pattern of unconstitutional behavior. See Pineda, 291 F.3d at 329 (holding that eleven incidents of allegedly unconstitutional searches were insufficient to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to whether there was a custom of unconstitutional searches); Castro v. McCord, 259 Fed. App’x 664, 669 (5th Cir. 2007) (evidence of three shooting deaths in five years prior to trial insufficient to establish a “persistent, widespread practice” of shootings by county officers); Roberts v. City of Shreveport, 397 F.3d 287, 295 (5th Cir. 2005) (evidence that officer brandished his handgun during a traffic stop, committed one other incident of deadly force, and was accused of two other claims of excessive force insufficient to establish a “pattern” of unconstitutional conduct). In addition, even if Lewis could establish that the City and Johnson had a custom of tolerating misconduct that was maintained with deliberate 7 Lewis argues that no investigation was taken after the Lacey incident, but her citation to Johnson’s deposition testimony does not support that assertion. During Johnson’s deposition, counsel for the City stated that he was unwilling to stipulate that no investigation had occurred, but would stipulate that “at this time I have seen no formal file of an internal affairs investigation.” Johnson then testified that he ordered Lieutenant Page to investigate the incident, but that he “[did]n’t remember if there was an actual internal affairs investigation, or if it was said, ‘Hey, turn this over to the FBI.’ I know we turned it over to the FBI immediately.” Nothing in the record supports Lewis’s assertion that the department never investigated the incident. Further, it is undisputed that the City held a community meeting in response to the incident. 11 No. 07-40662 indifference to the constitutional rights of the City’s residents, she failed to present any evidence that this custom was the “moving force” behind the complained of constitutional violation. As we said in Fraire v. City of Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268, 1281 (5th Cir. 1992): [A] direct causal connection must exist between the policy and the alleged constitutional deprivation. This connection must be more than a mere ‘but for’ coupling between cause and effect. To form the basis of liability under § 1983, a municipal policy must be affirmatively linked to the constitutional violation and be the moving force behind it. (footnotes omitted). The actions of Pugh in raping and assaulting Lewis in March 2005 were entirely caused by Pugh. There is simply no evidence in the record that Pugh made the decision to rape Lewis for any reason related to any City policy or custom or understanding thereof which he may have had, or for any reason other than his own motivations for assaulting Lewis. In fact, Lewis herself has referred to Pugh as a “rogue” police officer. In sum, the evidence shows no causal connection between the City’s allegedly unconstitutional policy and the actions of Pugh. See Johnson, 379 F.3d at 310-11; Hardeman v. Kerr County, 244 Fed. App’x 593, 597 (5th Cir. 2007). Therefore, the district court properly dismissed Lewis’s claim based on an alleged custom of tolerating police misconduct. 2. Inadequate Procedures for Recording Citizen Complaints Second, Lewis failed to present evidence sufficient to support her claim that the City should be held liable because it lacked proper procedures to process citizen complaints of police misconduct. Lewis directs the court to Johnson’s testimony that the police department logged only written complaints of officer misconduct, and did not keep records of verbal complaints.8 Lewis also points 8 Regarding the police department’s handling of complaints, Johnson testified that if a person came into the police station complaining of officer misconduct, the lieutenant would 12 No. 07-40662 to the testimony of Leisha Mosley, who stated that she tried to file a complaint of excessive force with the Jacksonville Police Department, but that she was told by the woman at the front desk that they did not have any forms. “Knowledge on the part of a policymaker that a constitutional violation will most likely result from a given official custom or policy is a sine qua non of municipal liability under section 1983.” Burge v. St. Tammany Parish, 336 F.3d 363, 370 (5th Cir. 2003). Where, as in the present case, “an alleged policy or custom is facially innocuous, establishing the requisite official knowledge requires that a plaintiff establish that an official policy was ‘promulgated with deliberate indifference to the known or obvious consequences that constitutional violations would result.’” Id. (citing Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 579 (5th Cir. 2001)). It is undisputed that Johnson is a final policymaker and that Lewis suffered a violation of her Fourth Amendment rights, however Lewis has failed to produce any evidence that Johnson had knowledge that a Fourth Amendment violation would be a highly likely consequence of the record keeping policy. See Id. (affirming dismissal of § 1983 claim where plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence to establish deliberate indifference or knowledge on the part of the Sheriff that a Brady violation would be a highly likely consequence of the manner in which his office managed its records). Thus, the district court’s grant of summary judgment was proper. listen to the complaint, ask him to fill out a “packet,” and then to return the “packet” so the department could investigate the misconduct. If the “packet” was returned, the complainant would keep a copy, the officer accused of misconduct gets a copy, and the officer’s supervisor would get a copy in order to determine what investigation was necessary. Johnson testified that complaints made verbally of police misconduct were not documented or kept on file by the police department, but that written complaints were filed in the personnel file of the individual officer accused of misconduct. He testified that there was no central place where all complaints of excessive force or unlawful arrest were filed and that he wasn’t aware of whether the department’s current computer system contained a database of complaints. He indicated that the department was in the process of updating the computer system so that there would be a data bank of complaints. 13 No. 07-40662 Even assuming that Lewis could prove that the City and Johnson were “deliberately indifferent” in not documenting oral complaints of misconduct, Lewis’s claims were properly dismissed because she failed to establish the necessary “direct causal link” between this policy and the constitutional deprivation at issue – the rape committed by Pugh. See Johnson, 379 F.3d at 310-11