Opinion ID: 1059353
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Precedential Value to Denial of Petition for Appeal

Text: The contractual term at issue in this case entitles the prevailing party to an award of reasonable attorney's fees. Initially, Sheets argues that we have already decided whether a defendant is a prevailing party when the plaintiff takes a voluntary nonsuit. Sheets maintains that in a prior case before the Circuit Court of Fairfax County, the trial court decided that a defendant was a prevailing party under similar contractual provisions and that the petition for appeal was denied by the Supreme Court of Virginia. See Ayoub v. Trautner, Record No. 990491 (June 4, 1999). Sheets argues that because a petition for appeal is resolved by the Supreme Court of Virginia on the merits, our denial of the petition bestows binding precedential application of the circuit court opinion throughout the Commonwealth. We note that the Attorney General has employed a similar argument concerning unpublished opinions of the Court of Appeals of Virginia. The Attorney General has argued that unpublished opinions of the Court of Appeals which would otherwise have no precedential value (see Code § 17.1-413), nonetheless attain the status of binding precedent if a petition for appeal is refused by the Supreme Court of Virginia. See Bowman v. Commonwealth, 30 Va.App. 298, 305, 516 S.E.2d 705, 708 (1999). With the exception of cases with procedural defects and the limited number of cases for which appellate review by the Supreme Court of Virginia is dependent upon a substantial constitutional question as a determinative issue or matters of significant precedential value (Code §§ 17.1-410 and 411), the refusal of a petition for appeal constitutes a decision on the merits. See Saunders v. Reynolds, 214 Va. 697, 700, 204 S.E.2d 421, 424 (1974) ([w]e state unequivocally that a decision to grant or refuse a petition for writ of error is based upon one equally-applied criterion  the merits of the case); see also Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 283, 112 S.Ct. 2482, 120 L.Ed.2d 225 (1992) (the Supreme Court of Virginia refused the petition  a disposition indicating that the [C]ourt found the petition without merit); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 311 n. 4, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) ([e]ach petition for writ of error under Va.Code § 19.2-317 (1975) is reviewed on the merits and the effect of a denial is to affirm the judgment of conviction on the merits); Dodson v. Director, 233 Va. 303, 307 n. 5, 355 S.E.2d 573, 576 n. 5 (1987) ([i]n Virginia, aside from appeals from a capital murder conviction, criminal appeals to both the Court of Appeals and to this Court are discretionary, and `a decision to grant or refuse a petition [for appeal] is based upon one equally-applied criterion  the merits of the case.'). While a decision on the merits, including a denial of a petition for appeal, may have precedential value, discerning the grounds that formed the basis for denial is indispensable in assessing its potential applicability in future cases. Most often the refusal of a petition for appeal merely recites: Upon review of the record in this case and consideration of the argument submitted in support of and in opposition to the granting of an appeal, the Court is of opinion there is no reversible error in the judgment complained of. Accordingly, the Court refuses the petition for appeal. From such an order, the grounds upon which the Court relied as a basis for denial cannot be determined. While it may be that there is simply no error found, there are several other possibilities. To name but a few of the several possible grounds, the trial court may have been in error, but the error was harmless. See Holmes v. LG Marion Corp., 258 Va. 473, 483, 521 S.E.2d 528, 535 (1999); see also Clay v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 253, 259, 546 S.E.2d 728, 731 (2001). The trial court may have been in error, but the court reached the correct result . . . for the wrong reason. See Chesterfield County v. Stigall, 262 Va. 697, 704, 554 S.E.2d 49, 53 (2001). The trial court may have been in error, but there exists an independent basis for the trial court's judgment that has not been argued as error. See Magco of Maryland, Inc. v. Barr, 262 Va. 1, 1, 545 S.E.2d 548, 548 (2001); see also Parker-Smith v. Sto Corp., 262 Va. 432, 440-41, 551 S.E.2d 615, 620 (2001). While refusals of petitions for appeal may be grounded upon each of the reasons illustrated in these examples, among others, and the dispositions would be on the merits, there could be error in the judgments of a non-reversible nature. We restate that, with the exceptions previously mentioned, the refusal of a petition for appeal is based upon the merits of the case. However, unless the grounds upon which the refusal is based is discernible from the four corners of the Court's order, the denial carries no precedential value. To hold otherwise would result in bench and bar sifting through the records of cases buried in the office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Virginia or the clerk of the circuit court to affirm or contradict speculative assertions of the reason for the Court's denial of petitions for appeal. Such unreliability and lack of clarity is not countenanced in our jurisprudence.