Opinion ID: 214331
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: A Conflict Exists Between the Relevant Massachusetts and Rhode Island Law

Text: [T]he usual first step in applying conflict of law principles is to ascertain whether there is a conflict among the laws of the various States involved. Cohen v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 389 Mass. 327, 450 N.E.2d 581, 584 n. 7 (1983). The Rhode Island Act provides that, except in circumstances not alleged in this appeal, [t]he right to compensation... and the remedy for an injury granted by [the Rhode Island Act], shall be in lieu of all rights and remedies as to that injury now existing ... against an employer, or its ... employees. R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-29-20. The defendants assert, as the district court concluded, that this employer immunity extends to special employers that is, person[s] who contract[] for services with a general employer for the use of an employee, id. § 28-29-2(6)(ii)and their employees. See Sorenson v. Colibri Corp., 650 A.2d 125 (R.I.1994). Accordingly, the defendants contend, the Rhode Island Act bars Robidoux's claims against James Construction, the special employer, and its employee, Muholland. On appeal, Robidoux does not dispute this interpretation of Rhode Island law, and we therefore assume that the Rhode Island Act, if applicable, would bar this action. The question therefore becomes whether the Massachusetts Act would similarly bar Robidoux's claims against the defendants. [2] We conclude that it would not. Generally, the [Massachusetts Act] bars employees from recovering against their employers for injuries received on the job. Barrett v. Rodgers, 408 Mass. 614, 562 N.E.2d 480, 482 (1990) (citing Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 152, §§ 23, 24). [3] An injured employee retains the right, however, to bring suit against third parties who may be liable for injuries compensable under the [Massachusetts] Act. Id. (citing Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 152, § 15). More specifically, nothing in [section fifteen], or in section eighteen or twenty-four shall be construed to bar an action at law ... against any person other than the insured person employing such employee and liable for payment of the compensation provided by this chapter ... and said insured person's employees. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 152, § 15 (emphasis added); cf. Searcy v. Paul, 20 Mass.App.Ct. 134, 478 N.E.2d 1275, 1278 (1985) ([T]he [above-quoted statutory language] was taken by text and periodical writers as broadly abolishing the so-called `common employment' doctrine and permitting third party actions by ... an injured employee against all but his immediate insured employer.). In short, for an employer to be immunized pursuant to the Massachusetts Act (1) a `direct employment relationship must exist' between the injured party and the person claiming immunity, and (2) `the employer must be an insured person liable for the payment of compensation.' Roberts v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 599 F.3d 73, 77 (1st Cir.2010) (quoting Fleming v. Shaheen Bros., Inc., 71 Mass.App.Ct. 223, 881 N.E.2d 1143, 1146 (2008)). Turning to the second prong of this test, an insured person is an employer who has provided by insurance for the payment to his employees by an insurer of the compensation provided for by this chapter, or is a self-insurer ... or is a member of workers' compensation self-insurance group. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 152, § 1(6). Further, Massachusetts law requires that, absent an agreement to the contrary, in circumstances involving a special employer and a general employer, the liability for the payment of compensation for the injury shall be borne by the general employer or its insurer. Id. § 18 (emphasis added). James Construction is not an insured person liable for the payment of [workers'] compensation. To the contrary, pursuant to the express terms of their agreement, Labor Systems assumed responsibility for providing Robidoux's workers' compensation insurance. Although James Construction may have paid a rate that effectively reimbursed Labor Systems for that insurance, James Construction does not point to any authority suggesting that such an arrangement equates to provid[ing] workers' compensation insurance and being liable for payment of workers' compensation. Cf. Numberg v. GTE Transp., Inc., 34 Mass.App.Ct. 904, 607 N.E.2d 1, 2 (1993) (finding that special employer was not an insured person liable for payment of workers' compensation, even though it reimbursed general employer for the cost of workers' compensation benefits, because there was no agreement that special employer would provide those benefits). Consequently, Robidoux's claims against James Construction are not barred by the Massachusetts Act. [4] Nor would the Massachusetts Act immunize Muholland, as a co-employee, from this action. The defendants do not point to any case law suggesting that co-employee immunity exists beyond that which is derived from an employer's immunity. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 152, § 15 (Nothing in this section, or in section eighteen or twenty-four shall be construed to bar an action ... against any person other than the insured person employing such employee and liable for payment of the compensation provided by this chapter ... and said insured person's employees.  (emphasis added)); Fredette v. Simpson, 440 Mass. 263, 797 N.E.2d 899, 901-02 (2003) (citing section 15 as creating the Massachusetts Act's co-employee immunity). Because James Construction does not meet the Massachusetts Act's prerequisites for immunity, neither does Muholland.