Opinion ID: 1936773
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Polygraph Reference

Text: During the testimony of Nancy Langan, the prosecution questioned her regarding Harnish's reaction to his interview with the police. Q. ... And did he say anything to you when he was finished with his interview? A. That he was upset. Q. Did he say why he was upset? A. They were trying to say thatthey wanted him to take a lie detector test. No objection was raised. After posing several additional questions, the prosecution asked: Q. Now, you said that after this interview he came out, and I guess you were already done, and he said that he was upset? A. Yes. Q. Did he say why he was upset again? At this point Harnish's lawyer requested a sidebar conference, objected to the question and moved for a mistrial because of the polygraph reference. He explained that he had not moved for a mistrial earlier in order to avoid focusing the jury's attention on the remark. The prosecutor explained that he had anticipated that the witness would testify that Harnish said he was upset because the police had accused him of involvement in the homicide. The presiding justice responded, You're skating on thin ice, .. Do you want to withdraw the question? The prosecutor withdrew the question, no curative instruction was requested and the court denied Harnish's motion for a mistrial. Under our precedents, the results of polygraph tests and a party's willingness or unwillingness to take such a test are inadmissible, State v. Trafton, 425 A.2d 1320, 1322 (Me.1981), because of our view that such tests have a non-existent value when it comes to determining credibility. Heselton v. Wilder, 496 A.2d 1063, 1066 (Me.1985) ( quoting State v. Mottram, 158 Me. 325, 330, 184 A.2d 225, 228 (1962)). Nevertheless, we have refused to adopt any per se rule requiring a mistrial for any reference by a witness to the fact that he or she has taken such a test. State v. Edwards, 412 A.2d 983, 984 (Me.1980) (emphasis supplied). Instead, we have stated that if the reference to a polygraph is inadvertent, there is cause for a mistrial if, but only if, the reference to the test raises an inference about the result that substantially prejudices the defendant's case. Id. at 985 (citations omitted). In reviewing denials of mistrials, we review solely for abuse of discretion because of the trial court's superior vantage point in assessing the impact of objectionable testimony. State v. Jones, 523 A.2d 579, 581 (Me.1987). Such an abuse occurs only where there is a reasonable possibility that the objectionable evidence might have been a contributing factor productive of a guilty verdict. State v. Hilton, 431 A.2d 1296, 1302 (Me.1981). We have stated repeatedly that: The trial court should deny a motion for mistrial except in the rare case when the trial cannot proceed to a fair result and no remedy short of a new trial will satisfy the interests of justice. The determination by the trial court of whether the exposure to potentially prejudicial extraneous evidence incurably tainted the verdict of the jury stands unless clearly erroneous. State v. Mason, 528 A.2d 1259, 1260 (Me. 1987); accord, State v. Allard, 557 A.2d 960 (Me.1989); State v. Baker, 423 A.2d 227, 231 (Me.1980). These are strong words and we see no reason to step back from them when considering references to a possible polygraph test. Applying the analysis of our case law, we first observe in accordance with Edwards that the polygraph inference here was unintentional: the testimony at trial concerning a test was a surprise to everyone. Second, under Edwards the evidence raises no inference about possible test results: there was absolutely no reference to test results or unwillingness to take the test or even faltering by Harnish when asked to take a test. Instead, the gist of the testimony was simply that Harnish was upset because the murder investigation had focused on him: Q. Did he say why he was upset? A. They were trying to say thatthey wanted him to take a lie detector test. Third, considering substantial prejudice under Edwards, we observe that this was the one and only reference to the subject during the course of four days of testimony by 37 witnesses. No curative instruction was ever requested. In response to the mistrial motion, the trial court made the discretionary judgmentafter reviewing all the evidence with the opportunity that we lack to observe the witness and the jurythat the reference to the polygraph test was not prejudicial to the defendant. Given the circumstances, we have no basis to reject this finding as clearly erroneous, State v. Mason, supra , and to assert that the trial court had to find the contrary possibility reasonable. State v. Hilton, supra .