Opinion ID: 207675
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Patent-Related Issues

Text: In finding the '556 patent not infringed, the district court first construed the claim term soluble CaSO4 anhydride. The court defined anhydride, primarily using a dictionary, as a compound formed from an acid by removal of water. '684 Indefiniteness and '556 Noninfringement and Laches Opinion, 2004 U.S. Dist. Lexis 29580, at . The court reasoned that, if the claim drafter had intended to refer to calcium sulfate from which water has been removed, which was Ultimax's interpretation, it would have used the term anhydrous CaSO4 or anhydrite, which is a specific term for anhydrous calcium sulfate. Id. The court acknowledged the observation of the neutral court-appointed expert, Dr. Seible, that `given the context in which anhydride is used in Patent '556, claims 9-11, it is not unreasonable to assume that the author meant anhydrite and not anhydride.' Id. at -42 (quoting Dr. Seible's report). However, the court decided that the specification did not redefine anhydride or alter its ordinary meaning, which would require an acid. Id. at -45. Even though one skilled in the art might realize that the drafter intended the claim to refer to anhydrite instead of anhydride, the court held that it could not substitute terms, as that would constitute redrafting the claims, which was forbidden even when the failure to substitute terms would lead to a strange result. Id. Thus, according to the court, the claim term soluble CaSO4 anhydride required that the compound include not only calcium sulfate, but also an acid from which water has been removed. Because CTS's cement did not contain an acid from which water had been removed, the court granted summary judgment of noninfringement. Id. at . Ultimax argues that the district court erred in construing soluble CaSO4 anhydride to refer to a compound derived from an acid. According to Ultimax, the court erroneously used the stand-alone definition of anhydride, without context. Ultimax asserts that the dictionary definition treats anhydride as a stand-alone compound, but in the context of the claim, it is a modifier, modifying the compound calcium sulfate. Ultimax further argues that the court found its own definition inconsistent with the specification and unknown in the art, and that the neutral expert's finding also refuted the court's construction. According to Ultimax, even CTS's documents use anhydride and anhydrite interchangeably. Thus, Ultimax argues, the court should have adopted a definition consistent with the specification and the art. CTS responds that the district court correctly gave anhydride its ordinary meaning, which is different from the meaning of anhydrite and refers to an acid from which water has been removed. CTS's product does not contain such a material. According to CTS, the court correctly based its decision on the specification's lack of use of the term anhydrite and neutral expert testimony. We agree with Ultimax that the district court erroneously construed soluble CaSO4 anhydride to mean a compound formed from an acid by removal of water and hold that the term should be construed as soluble anhydrous CaSO4, or soluble anhydrous calcium sulfate. We review claim construction de novo on appeal. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed.Cir.1998) (en banc). We begin a claim construction analysis by considering the language of the claims themselves. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed.Cir.2005) ( en banc ). However, claims must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part. Id. at 1315 (quotation marks omitted). [A] court should also consider the patent's prosecution history, if it is in evidence.... Like the specification, the prosecution history provides evidence of how the [Patent Office] and the inventor understood the patent. Id. at 1317 (citations and quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, courts may rely on dictionary definitions when construing claim terms, so long as the dictionary definition does not contradict any definition found in or ascertained by a reading of the patent documents. Id. at 1322-23 (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1584 n. 6 (Fed.Cir.1996)). However, [a] claim should not rise or fall based upon the preferences of a particular dictionary editor, or the court's independent decision, uninformed by the specification, to rely on one dictionary rather than another. Id. at 1322. Indeed, the authors of dictionaries or treatises may simplify ideas to communicate them most effectively to the public and may thus choose a meaning that is not pertinent to the understanding of particular claim language. The resulting definitions therefore do not necessarily reflect the inventor's goal of distinctly setting forth his invention as a person of ordinary skill in that particular art would understand it. Id. (internal citation omitted). Here, without the benefit of our opinion in Phillips, which was issued after the district court's opinion in this case, the court erroneously relied on expert testimony and a single dictionary definition to the exclusion of other dictionary definitions and, most importantly, the context in which the term was used within the claim and the specification. Although the word anhydride appears in the term soluble CaSO4 anhydride, its proper construction requires consideration of the context of the rest of the term. Anhydride, when placed next to CaSO4, is intended as a modifier, modifying CaSO4, or calcium sulfate. In other words, the term refers to calcium sulfate from which any associated water has been removed. Indeed, dictionaries other than that relied on by the court allow anhydride to refer to a compound other than one obtained by removing water from an acid, based on context. For example, the definition that Plaintiffs proffered defines anhydride as [a] chemical compound formed from another, often an acid, by the removal of water. J.A. 3749 (emphasis added) (citing definition from The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (2000)). Thus, especially in light of the ambiguity of the proffered dictionary definitions, the context must define what compound has had water removed. Here it is calcium sulfate, not an acid. The context of the entire specification further supports the conclusion that soluble calcium sulfate anhydride means soluble anhydrous calcium sulfate. First, the word anhydride never appears alone in the specification, but only as a modifier of calcium sulfate. See '556 patent Abstract, col.3 l.51, col.3 l.55, col.8 l.6, col.8 ll.8-9, col.9 l.43, col.10 l.19, col.10 l.21, col.10 l.43, col.10 l.50 (referring to the same compound as soluble CS anhydride), col.5 l.16 (referring to soluble calcium sulfate anhydride), col.9 ll.40-41 (referring to the same compound as soluble cS anhydride), col.9 ll.45-46 (referring to CS anhydride), claims (referring to both soluble CaSO4 anhydride and soluble CS anhydride). As the court recognized, [n]owhere in the teachings of patent '556 is there a discussion of forming a compound from an acid by removal of its water. '684 Indefiniteness and '556 Noninfringement and Laches Opinion, 2004 U.S. Dist. Lexis 29580, at . There is no evidence shown of any acid from which water is removed to yield CaSO4, as there is for acetic acid or maleic acid, which, when water is removed, yield acetic anhydride and maleic anhydride, respectively. Any water removed here is that associated with the method of obtaining calcium sulfate, such as mining, not water originally associated with an acid. As a result, contrary to the district court's conclusion, the context of the specification requires that soluble calcium sulfate anhydride be construed as anhydrous calcium sulfate. Furthermore, contrary to the district court's conclusion, interpreting the claim term to mean soluble anhydrous calcium sulfate is not rewriting the claim or correcting a typographical error. The drafters could not have intended to claim soluble calcium sulfate anhydrite, as that would have been redundant because the word anhydrite itself means anhydrous calcium sulfate. See, e.g., Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged (1986) (defining anhydrite as a mineral consisting of an anhydrous calcium sulfate CaSO4...). Instead, the term soluble calcium sulfate anhydride simply means, in the context of the '556 patent, the same thing as soluble anhydrous calcium sulfate. The neutral expert, Dr. Seible, agreed that the context of the specification led to the conclusion that the patent drafter likely meant anhydrite and not anhydride, referring to the entire claim term. Id. at -42. As Ultimax points out, CTS and Rice himself, a person of at least ordinary skill in the art, use the word anhydride when they mean anhydrite, with no resulting confusion. Ultimax Br. at 13-14. Thus, interpreting the claim in that way merely restates its plain meaning. We therefore disagree with the district court's interpretation of soluble CaSO4 anhydride to require derivation from an acid, and we instead construe the term to mean soluble anhydrous CaSO4, or soluble anhydrous calcium sulfate. Because we have reversed the court's claim construction, we vacate its holding of noninfringement and remand to the district court the issue of infringement of the '556 patent.
The district court also held that the '556 patent was unenforceable due to laches, granting CTS's motion for summary judgment. See '684 Indefiniteness and '556 Noninfringement and Laches Opinion, 2004 U.S. Dist. Lexis 29580, at -51. The court found that Plaintiffs had waited twelve years to sue after the '556 patent issued and should have known of CTS's use of the patented cement at the time of issuance, creating a presumption of laches. Id. at . According to the court, Ultimax should have known of its claim because of Kunbargi's history of working on cement mixtures with, and then having a falling out with, CTS's owner, Rice, and because of Kunbargi's prior affiliation with CTS. Id. at -49. The court found that, because Kunbargi had demonstrated his invention to Rice before the '556 patent issued, Kunbargi was on inquiry notice at the time the patent issued. Id. Although Plaintiffs argued that it was not possible to analyze CTS's cement to determine if it infringed the '556 patent, the court maintained that Ultimax could have also proven infringement of the method claims by investigating CTS's methods. Id. at . The court also found that Kunbargi's hiring of a private investigator in 1997, whose results were inconclusive, did not fulfill his obligation to investigate infringement. Id. The court found unpersuasive Kunbargi's assertion that Rice had assured him that CTS's products did not infringe the '556 patent, especially in light of the declaration of CTS's witness, Collins, stating that Kunbargi had expressed his intent to sue CTS as early as 1997, but was waiting for Rice to build up the business. Id. at . Finally, because of the delay, the court presumed prejudice to CTS, and it further found prejudice in the loss of testimony of a CTS employee who had died in the interim and the loss of records from a test that had occurred while Kunbargi was working at CTS. Id. at -51. Ultimax argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment of laches for the '556 patent, as there was no evidence that Ultimax knew or should have known of infringement until it conducted discovery on the '684 patent after filing suit in 2002. Ultimax asserts that it was impossible to test for soluble anhydrite in CTS's product, so it could not have known of the infringement until it saw in CTS's discovery materials that CTS used a process that infringed the '556 patent. In fact, according to Ultimax, Rice had assured Kunbargi that CTS did not infringe because it did not use soluble anhydrite in its cement, which it was not unreasonable for Kunbargi to accept. Further, Ultimax argues that CTS was not prejudiced by the delay because alternative witnesses and documents remained available to replace those that were unavailable. CTS responds that Ultimax waited thirteen years to add the '556 patent to the suit and should have known of the alleged infringement at least at the time the '556 patent issued. Thus, according to CTS, the laches presumption applies, and Ultimax did not rebut it. CTS argues that Kunbargi knew of CTS's activities even before the '556 patent issued because he had worked for CTS. According to CTS, it was also easy for Ultimax to test CTS's cement's compressive strength and to test for the presence of calcium sulfate. Finally, CTS argues that it was prejudiced by the delay, as a witness had died, records were not preserved, and CTS had invested in producing the accused cement. We agree with Ultimax that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment that the '556 patent is unenforceable due to laches, as it is not clear that Ultimax knew or should have known of CTS's alleged infringement before it conducted discovery on the '684 patent in 2002. Summary judgment is appropriate only where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Thus, if genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment of laches, we need not apply [the abuse of discretion] standard[ ] of review that generally applies to laches. Wanlass v. Fedders Corp., 145 F.3d 1461, 1463 (Fed.Cir.1998). To prevail on a defense of laches, CTS must prove two elements: (1) Plaintiffs delayed filing suit for an unreasonable and inexcusable length of time from the time they knew or reasonably should have known of their claim against CTS, and (2) the delay operated to the prejudice or injury of CTS. Id. at 1463-64 (quoting A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1032 (Fed.Cir.1992) (en banc)). Plaintiffs' delay is measured from the time [they] knew or reasonably should have known of [CTS's] alleged infringing activities to the date of suit. Id. (citing A.C. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1032). [T]he underlying critical factors of laches are presumed upon proof that the patentee delayed filing suit for more than six years after actual or constructive knowledge of the defendant's alleged infringing activity. Id. (quoting A.C. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1035-36). CTS does not dispute that Ultimax could not have tested CTS's product for the presence of soluble anhydrite. Without access to CTS's internal procedures, Kunbargi could not have investigated CTS's methods to determine infringement. Even Kunbargi's hiring of a private investigator led to no conclusive result that CTS's products infringed the '556 patent. An infringer does not escape liability merely by infringing in secret. Ultimax could only have asserted infringement of the '556 patent upon a reasonable belief that CTS infringed all of the limitations of the claims, including the limitation requiring soluble anhydrite. See Antonious v. Spalding & Evenflo Cos., 275 F.3d 1066, 1074 (Fed.Cir.2002) ([A]n attorney violates [Fed.R.Civ.P.] 11(b)(3) when an objectively reasonable attorney would not believe, based on some actual evidence uncovered during the prefiling investigation, that each claim limitation reads on the accused device either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents.). Thus, because Ultimax alleges, and CTS does not rebut, that Ultimax had no such reasonable belief before 2002, summary judgment of laches should have been precluded. Although, as CTS argues and the district court found, twelve (or thirteen) years is a long time between patent issuance and filing suit, the only time relevant to the laches presumption is that after Ultimax knew or should have known of the allegedly infringing product. In the case of a claim limitation whose presence is undetectable in a finished product, it is reasonable that Ultimax might not have known or been able to find out whether CTS infringed. Furthermore, there is a genuine issue as to whether Kunbargi fulfilled his duty to investigate by hiring a private investigator, especially given Kunbargi's allegation that Rice assured him that CTS was not infringing because it did not use soluble anhydrite. Genuine issues of material fact thus precluded summary judgment that Plaintiffs knew or should have known of CTS's alleged infringement before 2002, so we need not address prejudice caused by any alleged delay. We reverse the court's grant of summary judgment of laches and remand for a trial on laches relating to the '556 patent.
The district court granted summary judgment holding claim 17 of the '684 patent indefinite. See '684 Indefiniteness and '556 Noninfringement and Laches Opinion, 2004 U.S. Dist. Lexis 29580, at -35. The court found the claim to be indefinite based on its recitation of the formula (C,K,N,M)4(A,F,Mn,P,T,S)3(cl,S), which the specification refers to as crystal X, and the formula C9S3S3Ca(f cl)2. Id. The court reasoned that the formula for crystal X is that of a solid solution, a crystalline compound in which various elements can substitute for one another at a particular site on the crystalline structure. Id. at . Thus, for example, the compound (Mg, Fe)2, (Mg = magnesium and Fe = iron) can have four different combinations because it can consist of Mg on both sites, Fe on both sites, Mg on the first site and Fe on the second, or Fe on the first site and Mg on the second. Id. According to the court-appointed expert, the formula for crystal X, with all of its possible permutations, yielded over 5000 possible different compounds. Id. at -27. The court declined to limit crystal X to a single compound and held that it was too broad and thus indefinite. [7] Id. at -30. The court also found the asserted claim indefinite because it lacked a comma between f and cl, indicating that both fluorine and chlorine needed to be present in the claimed compound C9S3S3Ca(f cl)2. Id. at -35. The court declined to correct the error, holding that it was not apparent on the face of the patent, even though it might be clear to one of ordinary skill in the art. Thus, even though the neutral expert recognized that there should be a comma between f and cl, the court found that inconsistencies in the specification and the claims made the proper formulation debatable. Id. at -35. Ultimax argues that the district court erred in finding the '684 patent indefinite as a matter of law. According to Ultimax, there were genuine issues of material fact regarding the proper interpretations of both the formula for crystal X and the formulation (f cl), with even CTS's witness, its director of research, agreeing with Ultimax's proposed interpretations. Ultimax asserts that the '684 patent explains that the crystal X formula is a solid solution with substitutions, rather than allowing for 5000 distinct compounds or being overly broad. And, according to Ultimax, the specification also shows that (f, cl) is equivalent to the claimed (f cl), as the experts understood. CTS responds that the formula for crystal X encompasses over 5000 different, undisclosed compositions, such that one skilled in the art cannot determine the bounds of the claims. CTS also argues that the formula containing the notation (f cl) is insolubly ambiguous because of the error that results from the lack of a comma. Further, according to CTS, even if expert opinions conflict, the court correctly determined as a matter of law that an ordinarily skilled reader could not determine the bounds of the claims. We agree with Ultimax that the district court erred in granting summary judgment that claim 17 of the '684 patent is indefinite, as crystal X, even if construed to be as broad as the district court construed it to be, does not render the claim insolubly ambiguous, and the notation (f cl) must be viewed through the lens of one of ordinary skill in the art. We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, reapplying the standard applicable at the district court. Young v. Lumenis, Inc., 492 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed.Cir.2007). A determination that a patent claim is invalid for failing to meet the definiteness requirement in 35 U.S.C. § 112, [paragraph] 2 is a legal question [also] reviewed de novo.  Id. at 1344. A patent is presumed to be valid, so CTS further faces an evidentiary burden of clear and convincing evidence to show facts supporting a conclusion of invalidity. Id. at 1345. Summary judgment is appropriate only where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, the specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention, which is known as the definiteness requirement. Id. Claims are considered indefinite when they are not amenable to construction or are insolubly ambiguous. Thus, the definiteness of claim terms depends on whether those terms can be given any reasonable meaning. Indefiniteness requires a determination whether those skilled in the art would understand what is claimed. Young, 492 F.3d at 1346 (internal citations and quotations marks omitted). The purpose of the definiteness requirement is to ensure that the claims, as interpreted in view of the written description, adequately perform their function of notifying the public of the scope of the patentee's right to exclude. Honeywell Int'l, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 341 F.3d 1332, 1339 (Fed.Cir. 2003) (quotation marks omitted). Regarding crystal X, as the district court pointed out, aided by Dr. Seible's expertise, [s]olid solutions are crystalline compounds where various elements can substitute for one another at a particular site on the crystalline structure. '684 Indefiniteness and '556 Noninfringement and Laches Opinion, 2004 U.S. Dist. Lexis 29580, at . Thus, in the crystal X compound, (C,K,N,M)4(A,F,Mn,P,T,S)3(cl,S), C can be substituted by K, N, and M in such a way that [arguably] over 5000 possible combinations can come out of this formula. Id. at -27. However, a claim to a formula containing over 5000 possible combinations is not necessarily ambiguous if it sufficiently notifies the public of the scope of the claims. If a member of the public had made, for example, a compound of pure C4A3cl or one of C4A3cl with some K molecules substituted for some of the C molecules (using the '684 patent's notation), he would know that the compound fit within the set of compounds described by the claims. If, on the other hand, he made a compound with fluorine substituted for chlorine, written in the notation of the '684 patent as C4A3f, he would know that he did not infringe the literal scope of the claims. Merely claiming broadly does not render a claim insolubly ambiguous, nor does it prevent the public from understanding the scope of the patent. See In re Gardner, 57 C.C.P.A. 1207, 427 F.2d 786, 788 (1970) (Breadth is not indefiniteness.). Moreover, while the formula for crystal X is obviously complex, it is not necessarily indefinite. Thus, the presence of crystal X in the asserted claims does not render the claims indefinite. Ultimax has argued, to overcome the court's finding of indefiniteness, that a person of ordinary skill would read crystal X narrowly, based on the prosecution history, to be essentially limited to C4A3S. However, because the court's broader interpretation of crystal X is not indefinite as a matter of law, nor is the formula for crystal X indefinite under Ultimax's argued interpretation, we need not decide whether the term should in fact be construed more narrowly. As for the formula including the notation (f cl), the district court erred in declining to view the notation in light of the knowledge of one of ordinary skill. As the district court recognized, there was a possible drafting error in the '684 patent, namely, that there should be a comma between the symbols for fluorine and chlorine. '684 Indefiniteness and '556 Noninfringement and Laches Opinion, 2004 U.S. Dist. Lexis 29580, at . The court recognized that one of ordinary skill in the art would know that there should be a comma between f and cl, as Dr. Seible did, but it held that it could not correct a typographical error if it was only clear based on the understanding of one of ordinary skill; it needed to be clear on the face of the patent. Id. at -35. According to the court, without a comma, both fluorine and chlorine must be present in the compound. A comma changes the possible makeup of the formula allowing for the presence of either fluoride or chloride or both, but not requiring the presence of both molecules. Id. at . We have held that [a] district court can correct a patent only if (1) the correction is not subject to reasonable debate based on consideration of the claim language and the specification and (2) the prosecution history does not suggest a different interpretation of the claims. Novo Indus., L.P. v. Micro Molds Corp., 350 F.3d 1348, 1357 (Fed.Cir.2003). Those determinations must be made from the point of view of one skilled in the art. Claim definiteness is analyzed not in a vacuum, but always in light of the teachings of the prior art and of the particular application disclosure as it would be interpreted by one possessing the ordinary level of skill in the pertinent art. Energizer Holdings v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 435 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed.Cir.2006) (quotation marks omitted). Thus, although courts cannot rewrite claims to correct material errors, id., if the correction is not subject to reasonable debate to one of ordinary skill in the art, namely, through claim language and the specification, and the prosecution history does not suggest a different interpretation, then a court can correct an obvious typographical error. In that regard, we note that the court has determined that the claimed formula C9S3S3Ca(f cl)2 corresponds to no known mineral, and that one of ordinary skill in the art would know that the formula should contain a comma. We therefore reverse the district court's summary judgment determinations that the formula for crystal X and the compound including the notation (f cl) are indefinite. We also direct the court to enter summary judgment that claim 17 is not indefinite based on either formula.
The district court granted CTS's motions for summary judgment that the '534 patent was invalid as anticipated, obvious, and lacking written description support, and that it was not infringed. See '534 Anticipation and Obviousness Opinion, No. SA CV 02-578; '534 Written Description Opinion, No. SA CV 02-578; '534 Noninfringement Opinion, No. SA CV 02-578. In its briefs, Ultimax requested reversal of the court's determinations, particularly its noninfringement determination. However, at oral argument, Ultimax stated, with respect to claims 10 and 11 of the '534 patent, that it was not concerned with the court's finding of invalidity of claims 10 and 11. See Oral Arg. 12:55-14:58, Oct. 5, 2009, available at http://oralarguments. cafc.uscourts.gov/mp3/XXXX-XXXX.mp3. Because Ultimax has waived the argument that the '534 patent is not invalid, its argument as to infringement is moot. We therefore dismiss Ultimax's appeal with respect to the '534 patent.