Opinion ID: 1998534
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence in Aggravation and Closing Arguments

Text: Defendant raises several challenges to evidence introduced or excluded at the second phase of the capital sentencing hearing. Defendant also challenges the trial court's rulings regarding closing arguments. Defendant first challenges the admission of certain evidence presented by the State in aggravation. More specifically, defendant refers to testimony by Officer Richard Stuebe regarding information he received from university officials and students concerning prior criminal conduct by defendant while attending Northeastern Illinois University, including charges of assault and complaints involving defendant's threats to others; testimony by Officer Frank Bresnahan regarding a threatening phone call allegedly made by defendant from Cook County jail to Steven Smith in Ontario, Canada, on January 28, 1995; and the admission of defendant's Chicago police department rap sheet, which indicated defendant's prior arrests. Defendant argues that such evidence was unreliable because the testimony by Officers Stuebe and Bresnahan amounted to uncorroborated hearsay and the prior arrests noted in the rap sheet did not result in convictions. Defendant maintains that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting this evidence. Defendant therefore requests a new sentencing hearing. At the second phase of the death penalty hearing, evidentiary rules are relaxed because it is important that the sentencing authority have before it the fullest information possible regarding the defendant's life, character, criminal record and the circumstances of the particular offense. See People v. Johnson, 128 Ill.2d 253, 283-84, 131 Ill.Dec. 562, 538 N.E.2d 1118 (1989). It is well settled that the standard for admissibility of evidence proffered during the aggravation and mitigation phase of a capital sentencing hearing is that the evidence be relevant and reliable, the determination of which lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge. See People v. Foster, 119 Ill.2d 69, 96, 115 Ill.Dec. 557, 518 N.E.2d 82 (1987); People v. Eddmonds, 101 Ill.2d 44, 65, 77 Ill.Dec. 724, 461 N.E.2d 347 (1984). Hearsay evidence of crimes that did not result in prosecution or conviction is admissible at the second phase of the death sentencing hearing provided it meets the requirements of relevancy and reliability. See People v. Williams, 181 Ill.2d 297, 331, 229 Ill.Dec. 898, 692 N.E.2d 1109 (1998); People v. Moore, 171 Ill.2d 74, 111, 215 Ill.Dec. 75, 662 N.E.2d 1215 (1996); People v. Hudson, 157 Ill.2d 401, 450, 193 Ill.Dec. 128, 626 N.E.2d 161 (1993). Moreover, evidence relating to a defendant's past criminal conduct, including a rap sheet, is relevant to the sentencing phase because it provides an insight into the defendant's character. See People v. Richardson, 123 Ill.2d 322, 361-62, 123 Ill.Dec. 908, 528 N.E.2d 612 (1988); People v. Lego, 116 Ill.2d 323, 346-47, 107 Ill.Dec. 647, 507 N.E.2d 800 (1987). In this case, defendant argues that the aforementioned evidence is unreliable because it was not corroborated at his death penalty proceeding. In addressing defendant's claim, we note that, where the trial court alone conducts the sentencing hearing, the trial court is presumed to have considered only properly admitted evidence in determining the sentence. See People v. Cortes, 181 Ill.2d 249, 291, 229 Ill.Dec. 918, 692 N.E.2d 1129 (1998); People v. Johnson, 119 Ill.2d 119, 149, 115 Ill.Dec. 575, 518 N.E.2d 100 (1987); Eddmonds, 101 Ill.2d at 65-66, 77 Ill.Dec. 724, 461 N.E.2d 347. There is nothing in this record to rebut that presumption. We observe that the trial court, in stating its findings, made it clear that it was not relying on all of the evidence offered by the State in aggravation. In fact, the trial judge specifically announced that she had rejected any evidence she did not find to be sufficiently reliable. The trial judge stated: I would like to state that I have had to sort through some of this evidence. Some of the State's evidence was not necessarily reliable or reliable enough, and the Court has not considered that evidence in sentencing here today. Additionally, the record indicates that the trial judge did not cite to any of the evidence here challenged by defendant in announcing the factors she considered in aggravation. Consequently, defendant was not prejudiced by the admission of such evidence. See Cortes, 181 Ill.2d at 291, 229 Ill.Dec. 918, 692 N.E.2d 1129; People v. Erickson, 117 Ill.2d 271, 300, 111 Ill.Dec. 924, 513 N.E.2d 367 (1987); Eddmonds, 101 Ill.2d at 66, 77 Ill.Dec. 724, 461 N.E.2d 347. Therefore, the trial court's admission of the preceding evidence, even if erroneous, did not deprive defendant of a fair sentencing hearing. Defendant also contends that the trial court erred in refusing to allow the defense to impeach a State witness who gave evidence in aggravation at the sentencing hearing. The defense attempted to attack the credibility of John Apel, Sr., by inquiring of Alvin Goldstein, who was defendant's step-father and Apel's brother-in-law, about Apel's reputation for truthfulness. The trial court sustained the State's objection. Defendant claims that the trial court erred in its ruling because Goldstein would have testified about Apel's poor reputation for truth and veracity. Defendant therefore seeks a new sentencing hearing. It is well established that a witness in a criminal case may be impeached by proof of reputation for untruthfulness. See M. Graham, Cleary & Graham's Handbook of Illinois Evidence § 608.2 (6th ed.1994). The proper procedure to introduce evidence of truthfulness is to ask the impeaching witness whether he knows the general reputation of the principal witness' truthfulness in the neighborhood in which he lives or amongst those with whom he works or socializes. See M. Graham, Cleary & Graham's Handbook of Illinois Evidence § 608.3 (6th ed.1994). The testimony must relate to the witness' reputation at the time of trial. See M. Graham, Cleary & Graham's Handbook of Illinois Evidence § 608.3 (6th ed.1994). As noted above, evidentiary determinations at a capital sentencing hearing are examined under an abuse of discretion standard. See Eddmonds, 101 Ill.2d at 65, 77 Ill.Dec. 724, 461 N.E.2d 347. With these principles in mind, we examine defense counsel's attempted impeachment of Apel. The record shows that defense counsel did not ask Goldstein for Apel's reputation in the neighborhood in which he now lived or among those with whom he worked or socialized. Moreover, Goldstein could not report Apel's reputation at the time of trial because Goldstein indicated that he had not seen much of Apel after 1990, which is six years prior to the trial. Accordingly, under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing this evidence. In addition to evidentiary errors, defendant claims that he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing because of the trial court's rulings regarding closing arguments. In closing argument, the prosecutor argued: It's clear from the record of this man and everything that he has done that as long as he is alive even in a jail cell, the lives of others are going to be in constant danger. And there is only one way to protect the lives of others from this individual, and that's by putting an end to his life. Defendant claims that this argument was improper because it suggested defendant's future dangerousness should a death sentence not be imposed, and thereby improperly influenced the decision to impose the death penalty in this case. We note that the possibility of committing future crimes is irrelevant to the consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors. See Edgeston, 157 Ill.2d at 241, 191 Ill.Dec. 84, 623 N.E.2d 329. Nevertheless, when the trial judge is the sentencer, it is presumed that the trial judge based his decision upon competent and reliable evidence, which does not include arguments of counsel. See People v. Johnson, 149 Ill.2d 118, 154, 171 Ill.Dec. 401, 594 N.E.2d 253 (1992); Evans, 125 Ill.2d at 95, 125 Ill.Dec. 790, 530 N.E.2d 1360. It is also presumed that the trial judge ignored irrelevant, inflammatory or emotional factors in determining the sentence. See Johnson, 149 Ill.2d at 154, 171 Ill.Dec. 401, 594 N.E.2d 253. There is no evidence in this record that shows the trial judge here made a decision on the basis of these remarks by the prosecutor. See Johnson, 149 Ill.2d at 154-56, 171 Ill.Dec. 401, 594 N.E.2d 253. Consequently, there is no reasonable possibility that the prosecutor's remarks improperly influenced the sentencing decision of the judge. Therefore, we find that defendant was not denied a fair sentencing hearing. Defendant also contends that the trial court erred in refusing to overrule the prosecutor's objection to defense counsel's reference in closing argument to residual doubt as a mitigating factor. We disagree. This court has previously held that residual doubt is not relevant to the imposition of the death penalty because it is not relevant to the circumstances of the offense or the defendant's character. See McDonald, 168 Ill.2d at 456, 214 Ill.Dec. 125, 660 N.E.2d 832; Edgeston, 157 Ill.2d at 244-45, 191 Ill.Dec. 84, 623 N.E.2d 329. We find no reason to depart from this court's prior decisions. We therefore reject defendant's claims of error during the second stage of the death penalty hearing and find no basis warranting the granting of a new sentencing hearing.