Opinion ID: 1977406
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Presiding Trial Judge's Extrajudicial Contact with the Jurors Claim

Text: Next, Gattis argues that the Superior Court erred in determining that the presiding trial judge's extrajudicial contact with several of the trial jurors, which occurred after discharge of the jurors on the case but before the judge announced his sentencing decision, did not constitute egregious circumstances creating a presumption of prejudice sufficient to warrant vacating Gattis's death sentence. [70] To support this argument, Gattis points to a 1992 article printed in the Wilmington News Journal as newly discovered evidence that would excuse the procedural bars of Rule 61(i)(1) and (2). [71] The Superior Court denied this argument because it found that the claim was available to Gattis when he made his first motion in 1994. [72] In addition to Rules 61(i)(1) and (2) barring the claim, [73] the Superior Court also found that Gattis had not met his burden of establishing a colorable claim that a miscarriage of justice occurred because of a constitutional violation under Rule 61(i)(5). [74] Gattis argues that his counsel is not obligated to search all media sources for any potential claim which may have arisen as a result of the conduct outside the record. When discussing whether new evidence warrants a new trial, this Court has held the defendant must establish (1) that the evidence is such as will probably change the result if a new trial is granted; (2) that it has been discovered since the trial and could not have been discovered before by the exercise of due diligence; and (3) that it is not merely cumulative or impeaching. [75] We need only address the second prong of this analysis to conclude that Gattis's argument lacks merit. The newspaper article, which was published in a newspaper of general circulation, was public information well before Gattis's postconviction motion. Although it was not discovered until later, Gattis has not established that the newspaper article could not have been discovered before postconviction relief by the exercise of due diligence. [76] The Superior Court correctly applied the procedural bars to Rule 61(i)(1) and (2) to this claim. We also conclude that the Superior Court correctly determined that the fundamental fairness exception of Rule 61(i)(5) does not apply either. Gattis argues the interaction between the presiding trial judge and the jurors created the presumption of prejudice and, at a minimum, the appearance of impropriety, either of which would be sufficient to warrant vacating Gattis' death sentence. [77] The Superior Court found that the presiding trial judge was not improperly influenced in his sentencing decision and that even if the presumption of juror prejudice from out-of-court contact for some reason applied to judges, the evidence produced at three hearings on the matter has rebutted that presumption beyond a reasonable doubt. [78] The record supports these findings. Because Gattis has not demonstrated that the complained of contact between the presiding trial judge and the jury was prejudicial to his case, this argument lacks merit.