Opinion ID: 2434754
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Court improperly denied standing to object to the search of the apartment of Mary Singer, thereby allowing the introduction of evidence obtained under an inadequate search warrant and affidavit.

Text: Mary Singer and her three minor children lived in Apartment 808 at the Somerset Village Apartments, Somerset, Kentucky. She and appellant were courting and he would visit with her several times each week, but never to stay overnight. Singer furnished appellant a key to her apartment; however, he was never to use the key at any time when Singer was not at home. In other words, the appellant was authorized to use the key only when Singer was at home and on no other occasion. Appellant did not maintain any property in the apartment, except possibly a bottle of after-shave lotion or a coat. On October 3, 1977, pursuant to a search warrant, the Singer apartment was searched and a vial of morphine was found in the bedroom. While the apartment was being searched, appellant was being held in the custody of Sheriff Adams in the parking lot of the apartment building. When appellant learned that the search was going on, he stated that the morphine was his not Singer's; that she knew nothing about the morphine being hid in the apartment; and that he could tell the people where it was and what it was. Further, while sitting in the car, appellant was advised of his constitutional rights, and when taken to the apartment he was again so advised. Appellant vehemently and courageously claimed ownership of the morphine, and again stated that Singer had nothing to do with it and, as a matter of fact, did not know that it was in her apartment. Appellant objected to the use of the fruits of the search against him on his trial. The trial court found that appellant had no standing to attack the search and seizure. We concur. KRS 218A.140(1) provides that, No person shall traffic in any controlled substance except as authorized in this chapter. Possession is included in the definition of trafficking. KRS 218A.010(19) states, `Traffic' means to manufacture, sell, transfer or possess with intent to sell a controlled substance. The appellant argues that since he is charged with possession, an integral part of trafficking in controlled substances, he is a person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure and has an automatic standing to challenge the search. In Rawlings v. Kentucky, ___ U.S. ___, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980), the Supreme Court of the United States entered into a detailed discussion of the right to challenge issue. Rawlings was convicted of trafficking in and possession of controlled substances. Throughout his trial objection was made to the admissibility of evidence and statements on the ground that they were the fruits of an illegal detention and an illegal search, the same as presented in the subject action. In Rawlings the trial court, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, and this court denied the right to challenge. The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed. The appellant contends that he had sufficient property interest and a reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises where the search was made so as to authorize the challenge. Appellant bears the burden of showing that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment. Rawlings, supra, at page 2561. Singer furnished appellant a door key to her apartment for his use only when she was at home and for no other time. Appellant did not show any right of control over the apartment or whether he at any time attempted to control the use of the apartment or limit Singer's use of the premises. It is true that appellant, a married man, was afforded this cloister for privacy; more than likely privacy from his wife in the event she went looking for him. This is hardly the type of privacy referred to in Rawlings . Appellant also contends that because he claimed ownership of the narcotics he was entitled to challenge the search irrespective of lack of expectation of privacy. In Rawlings we disposed of a similar issue with this statement: Petitioner contends nevertheless that, because he claimed ownership of the drugs in Cox's purse, he should be entitled to challenge the search regardless of his expectation of privacy. We disagree. While petitioner's ownership of the drugs is undoubtedly one fact to be considered in this case, Rakas emphatically rejected the notion that `arcane' concepts of property law ought to control the ability to claim the protections of the Fourth Amendment. See [ Rakas v. Illinois ], 439 U.S., at 149-150, n.17, 99 S.Ct., at 434, n.17. See also United States v. Salvucci, ___ U.S. [___], ante at ___, ___, 100 S.Ct. [2547], at 2552-2553. Had petitioner placed his drugs in plain view, he would still have owned them, but he could not claim any legitimate expectation of privacy. Prior to Rakas , petitioner might have been given `standing' in such a case to challenge a `search' that netted those drugs but probably would have lost his claim on the merits. After Rakas , the two inquiries merge into one: whether governmental officials violated any legitimate expectation of privacy held by petitioner. In sum, we find no reason to overturn the lower court's conclusion that petitioner had no legitimate expectation of privacy in Cox's purse at the time of the search. We have no hesitation in concluding that appellant had no standing to object to the search.