Opinion ID: 2036980
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Probable Cause for the Search and Seizure.

Text: Like article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution, the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution also protects persons from unreasonable searches and seizures. See U.S. Const.amend. IV; Iowa Const. art. I, § 8. The Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 1691, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 1090 (1961). Any evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is generally inadmissible, no matter how relevant or probative the evidence may be. State v. Predka, 555 N.W.2d 202, 205 (Iowa 1996). Because the language of article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution is nearly identical to the Fourth Amendment, we generally deem these two provisions to be identical in scope, import, and purpose. See Cline, 617 N.W.2d at 281, 284. One notable exception, of course, is the good-faith exception. See id. at 293. Our discussion of probable cause here will focus on the Fourth Amendment. Nevertheless, what we say is equally applicable to Gillespie's claim under the Iowa Constitution. We review de novo the ultimate conclusion a district court reaches on a motion to suppress concerning Fourth Amendment issues. See State v. Heminover, 619 N.W.2d 353, 358 (Iowa 2000). A district court's fact-findings on such a motion are binding on the appellate courts if those findings are supported by substantial evidence. See id. The search here was a warrantless one. For that reason, the search is per se unreasonable unless it falls within a recognized exception. Cline, 617 N.W.2d at 282. One of those exceptions exists when there is probable cause for the search, and exigent circumstances necessitate an immediate search. Id. The State must prove the exception by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. The district court believed probable cause for the search and seizure here did not exist because Butler testified he did not feel he had probable cause to search. The district court pointed out that, in response to questioning at the suppression hearing, Butler consistently indicated that his reasons for stopping the pickup were the careless driving that he observed and that he believed he could search the vehicle incident to the citation for such driving. Additionally, the court explained: While [Butler] indicated that his desire to search the vehicle was based on the suspicious activity he had previously witnessed, he did not reach the conclusion at the time of the search that that activity provided any independent basis for conducting the search. Since he did not reach that conclusion at the time, this court cannot declare that the facts could have warranted such a conclusion, then justify the search as if the officer had reached such a conclusion when in fact he had not. Such a ruling could encourage searches in borderline situations in which the officer did not truly feel there was probable cause, but conducted a search anyway in the hopes that a court would justify the search after the fact. This court cannot agree with the assertion of the State that officer Butler's belief was irrelevant. (Emphasis added.) In short, according to the district court, the test for probable cause to search is a subjective one: whether the officer believed he had probable cause. We rejected such reasoning in Cline. There, we said: The defendant appears to dismiss the State's probable cause argument on the ground that the officer did not justify the search on the basis of probable cause. [In Cline, the officer testified she made the search incident to a citation.] The defendant's focus on the officer's stated reasons for conducting the search is misplaced. The constitutional reasonableness of a search or seizure is determined by an objective standard. Consequently, the legality of a search and seizure under circumstances such as those present here does not depend on the actual motivation of the individual officer involved. Therefore, the State is not limited to the reasons stated by the investigating officer in justifying the challenged search or seizure. Cline, 617 N.W.2d at 281 (citations omitted) (quoting Predka, 555 N.W.2d at 205). We concluded that failure of the police officer to mention probable cause as a reason for her search did not preclude the State from proving the existence of probable cause to uphold the search. See id. In short, the test for probable cause to search is not subjective but objective. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 507, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1329, 75 L.Ed.2d 229, 242 (1983) (plurality opinion) (holding that an officer's testimony at the suppression hearing that there was no probable cause and that the search was consensual or based on reasonable suspicion under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), did not preclude the state from arguing that the search was justified on the basis of probable cause); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.2(b), at 33-37 (3d ed.1996). As one court aptly explained: [T]he mere subjective conclusions of a police officer concerning the existence of probable cause is not binding on this court which must independently scrutinize the objective facts to determine the existence of probable cause.... Moreover, since the courts have never hesitated to overrule an officer's determination of probable cause when none exists, consistency suggests that a court may also find probable cause in spite of an officer's judgment that none exists. United States ex rel. Senk v. Brierley, 381 F.Supp. 447, 463 (M.D.Pa.1974) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Day, 455 F.2d 454, 456 (3d Cir.1972) (Here, the policeman testified that he did not have probable cause to search, and at best was merely suspicious. Of course, we would not consider ourselves bound by a police officer's inability to articulate his conclusions if the facts clearly demonstrated the existence of probable cause....). A police officer has probable cause to search an automobile when the facts and circumstances would lead a reasonably prudent person to believe that the vehicle contains contraband. The facts and circumstances upon which a finding of probable cause is based include the sum total ... and the synthesis of what the police [officer has] heard, what [the officer] knows, and what [the officer] observe[s] as [a] trained officer[ ]. State v. Edgington, 487 N.W.2d 675, 678 (Iowa 1992) (quoting United States v. Strickland, 902 F.2d 937, 942-43 (11th Cir.1990)). The determination of probable cause, as the name implies, is based on probabilities and not mere suspicion. See State v. Shea, 218 N.W.2d 610, 614 (Iowa 1974). The exigency requirement is satisfied `when the car is mobile ... and the car's contents may never be found again if a warrant must be obtained.' Predka, 555 N.W.2d at 207 (quoting Edgington, 487 N.W.2d at 678). Here, Butler, regardless of his motivation, unquestionably had probable cause to stop the pickup because he observed a traffic offensethe careless driving. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1772, 1774, 135 L.Ed.2d 89, 95, 97 (1996) (holding that the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes where the police have probable cause to believe a traffic offense has occurred regardless of the actual motivation of the officer); Predka, 555 N.W.2d at 205 (same). Additionally, exigent circumstances existed because Gillespie's pickup was mobile, and its contents could have been lost if a search warrant had to be obtained. The more difficult question is whether Butler had probable cause to conduct the subsequent search. On this point, the State contends the following facts support a finding of probable cause to search: (1) Butler saw a vehicle, later determined to be Gillespie's pickup, leaving the anhydrous ammonia facility at 12:30 a.m.; (2) the facility had experienced several thefts in the weeks immediately preceding this event; (3) Butler knew from his drug training that anhydrous ammonia is a common component in the manufacture of methamphetaminea controlled substance; (4) Gillespie led Butler on a high-speed pursuit; (5) even after Butler signaled Gillespie to stop, Gillespie attempted further evasive action; and (6) once stopped, Gillespie's version of events was not believable. For reasons that follow, we disagree. The fact that the vehicle was seen leaving at a high rate of speed from an area near the site of several recent thefts does not alone amount to probable cause. See Cline, 617 N.W.2d at 283 (holding that the defendant's presence in an area of drug dealing and her flight from the police did not rise to the level of probable cause to believe that the defendant had actually committed a crime). Additionally, there was no evidence that a crime had been committed at the time and that Butler was responding to or investigating an in-progress crime report. Furthermore, before the vehicle fled the area around the facility, Butler saw no one leaving the facility area. Finally, the vehicle's headlights were not even seen pointing to the facility. Had they been, this might have afforded at least some suspicion that the vehicle was involved in criminal activity at the facility at that time of night by assisting in any attempted theft from the facility. A fair inference from the record is that, except for the final seconds of the pursuit, one can hardly say Gillespie was fleeing from the officer. The hour was late at night on back county roads; Butler did not use his vehicle's flashing red lights, siren, or loudspeaker to identify himself; and until the end of the pursuit, Butler never got close enough to read the pickup's license plate. Given these circumstances, Gillespie's response that he did not realize he was being pursued by a police officer is not only plausible, but likely. Indeed, Butler testified there was no way the people in the pickup could have realized he was a police officer. From Gillespie's perspective, he was simply being pursued by a private citizen, in which case his actions were not indicative of criminal behavior. See State v. Haviland, 532 N.W.2d 767, 769 (Iowa 1995) (We do not know of any case law or other authority which suggests that a private citizen's avoidance of another private citizen as opposed to the police is indicative of criminal behavior.). As to the final thirty seconds of the pursuit when Butler finally activated his vehicle's flashing lights, the record is not clear to what extent Gillespie was actually attempting to elude Butler. Given the speed Gillespie was traveling, stopping within a quarter of a mile to a mile may not have been unreasonable under the circumstances. One thing is clear, however, Gillespie voluntarily came to a stop after Butler activated the flashing lights. Butler did not have to run Gillespie off the road to stop him. Finally, the State asserts that Gillespie's version of the events was not believable. The State specifically points out that, when Butler finally stopped the pickup, it was not heading in the direction of Worthington, Missouri, the town to which Gillespie had claimed he and his companion were traveling. Gillespie's story was that earlier a vehicle had run his pickup off the road, and he thought Butler's vehicle was that vehicle coming back after him for some reason. Although suspicious, Gillespie's story is consistent with his actions of changing directions to avoid this threat. We also find no inconsistency in Gillespie's statement that he was never at the facility. Butler never testified that he saw Gillespie or his companion near any anhydrous ammonia tanks. In fact, Butler testified he only saw headlights and never saw the vehicle that was near the facility because the large tank on the facility's premises was blocking it. Clearly, none of these facts alone rise to the level of probable cause justifying the search. However, even when taken together, we conclude the facts do not satisfy the probable-cause requirement. In Shea, we held that mere opportunityfor example, presence in a drug traffic areaplus likelihoodfor example, an informant's tip that a particular officer is a drug dealer, does not establish probable cause to believe a vehicle contains contraband. See 218 N.W.2d at 614. In the present case, at most there might have been opportunity. If opportunity and likelihood are not enough to establish probable cause, then opportunity alone is surely inadequate. While there may have been some basis to suspect suspicious activity, we conclude there was not sufficient evidence that could lead a reasonably prudent officer to conclude the pickup contained contraband. While we are not bound by Butler's testimony as to whether probable cause existed, we think that at most the record supports what Butler described as a suspicion of criminal activity. Such a suspicion, however, does not rise to the level of probable cause to believe the pickup contained contraband.