Opinion ID: 425935
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the constitutional standard for reviewing the censorship scheme

Text: 13 In Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n. 3, 100 S.Ct. 763, 765 n. 3, 62 L.Ed.2d 704 (1980) (per curiam), the Supreme Court held that the CIA could, consistent with the first amendment, recover damages for breach of a secrecy agreement under which a former agent promised to submit CIA-related writings to the CIA for prepublication clearance. The Court found the secrecy agreement to be a reasonable means for protecting the secrecy of information important to our national security and the appearance of confidentiality so essential to the effective operation of our foreign intelligence service. Id. In Snepp, the former agent published CIA-related information without submitting his manuscript for prepublication review. The government's action in Snepp, therefore, did not depend upon whether [Snepp's] book actually contained classified information .... The Government simply claim[ed] that ... Snepp should have given the CIA an opportunity to determine whether the material he proposed to publish would compromise classified information or sources. Id. at 511, 100 S.Ct. at 766. 14 In this case, by contrast, McGehee adhered to his secrecy agreement. He submitted his manuscript for prepublication review, and deleted portions of his article in accordance with the CIA's orders. At issue here is the constitutionality of the CIA's substantive criteria and scheme for deciding how to classify, and thereby censor, writings of former agents. 15 We note, to begin with, that McGehee's secrecy agreement applies only when he seeks to publish classified information that has come or shall come to [his] attention by virtue of [his] connection with the Central Intelligence Agency. 8 The agreement does not extend to unclassified materials or to information obtained from public sources. The government may not censor such material, contractually or otherwise. United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1313 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063, 93 S.Ct. 553, 34 L.Ed.2d 516 (1972). The government has no legitimate interest in censoring unclassified materials. Moreover, when the information at issue derives from public sources, the agent's special relationship of trust with the government is greatly diminished if not wholly vitiated. 9 Accord Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. at 513 n. 8, 100 S.Ct. at 767 n. 8 (dictum) (if in fact information is unclassified or in the public domain, neither the CIA nor foreign agencies would be concerned). 16 As in McGehee's case, the CIA requires all of its employees to enter into a secrecy agreement as a condition of employment. 10 This fact is critical to our first amendment analysis because numerous Supreme Court decisions establish that: 17 [T]he State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general. The problem ... is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees. 18 Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 1734, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968); see Connick v. Myers, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 1686, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983) (quoting Pickering ). We must, then, apply a balancing test in determining whether the CIA's censorship of ex-agents' writings violates the first amendment. 19 The Snepp Court discussed the relevant balancing standard as if it were well settled: 20 [T]his Court's case makes clear that ... the CIA [can] act[ ] to protect substantial government interests by imposing reasonable restrictions on employee activities that in other contexts might be protected by the First Amendment. 21 444 U.S. at 509 n. 3, 100 S.Ct. at 765 n. 3 (1980). A review of relevant cases, however, shows that the precise standard for balancing is not that well settled. 22 In United States Civil Service Commission v. National Association of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 93 S.Ct. 2880, 37 L.Ed.2d 796 (1973), the Supreme Court upheld the Hatch Act's proscription on partisan politicking by government employees. In doing so, the Court quoted the Pickering balancing test and then provided the terse explanation that: 23 [T]he balance [Congress] has ... struck is sustainable by the obviously important interests sought to be served by the ... Hatch Act. 24 413 U.S. at 564, 93 S.Ct. at 2890. The Court concluded with a lengthy analysis of the statute, construing it narrowly to avoid overbreadth and vagueness problems. Id. at 568-81, 93 S.Ct. at 2892-98. 25 Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676, 92 S.Ct. 1332, 31 L.Ed.2d 593 (1972), the culmination of a series of Supreme Court cases reviewing loyalty oaths required of government employees, sheds some additional light on the proper balancing standard. Under Cole, a loyalty oath must not require an employee to forego protected speech activities and must not be unduly vague; moreover, inquiry into associational activities must be narrowly confined to avoid infringement upon constitutional rights. Id. at 680, 92 S.Ct. at 1335. 26 More closely related to the case before us is Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 100 S.Ct. 594, 62 L.Ed.2d 540 (1980). There the Court upheld against a first amendment challenge an Air Force regulation that prohibited  'any [Air Force] member ... in uniform or ... in a foreign country' from soliciting signatures on a petition without first obtaining authorization from the appropriate commander, id. at 349, 100 S.Ct. at 597 (quoting Air Force Reg. 30-1(9) (1971)), and provided that  '[n]o member of the Air Force will distribute or post any printed or written material ... within any Air Force installation without permission of the commander ...,'  id. at 349-50, 100 S.Ct. at 597 (quoting Air Force Reg. 35-15(3)(a)(1) (1970)). The Court upheld this scheme of precirculation clearance because it protect[s] a substantial Government interest unrelated to the suppression of free speech, id. at 354, 100 S.Ct. at 599, namely, the  'overriding demands of discipline and duty'  in the military services, id. (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 744, 94 S.Ct. 2517, 2556, 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974)). Moreover, the Court found that the regulations restrict speech no more than is reasonably necessary to protect th[is] substantial governmental interest. Id. at 355, 100 S.Ct. at 600. 27 We discern from these cases two consistent themes, best articulated in Brown v. Glines. First, restrictions on the speech of government employees must protect a substantial government interest unrelated to the suppression of free speech. 11 Id. at 354, 100 S.Ct. at 599; see Snepp, 444 U.S. at 509 n. 3, 100 S.Ct. at 765 n. 3 (substantial government interest); National Association of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 564, 93 S.Ct. at 2890 (important interests). Second, the restriction must be narrowly drawn to restrict speech no more than is necessary to protect the substantial government interest. Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. at 355, 100 S.Ct. at 600; see National Association of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 580, 93 S.Ct. at 2897 (Hatch Act not impermissibly overbroad); Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. at 680, 92 S.Ct. at 1335 (loyalty oath must be narrowly confined). 28 With these two principles in mind, we now turn to examine the CIA scheme for classification and censorship of secret information. 29