Opinion ID: 2136070
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Testimony of Detective Thomas Perlewitz.

Text: In rebuttal the prosecutor called Detective Thomas Perlewitz. Perlewitz testified that after advising Stanley Johnson of his rights, I also asked him if he understood what I told him and he said he did, and he did not wish to make any statement. Defense counsel then asked to be heard in the absence of the jury and moved for a mistrial. The motion was denied and when the jury was recalled the first question the prosecutor asked was: Officer Perlewitz, after Mr. Johnson indicated that he didn't want to talk to you anymore about the Hopkins Savings & Loan holdup, did you continue to interrogate him? Defense counsel did not object and Detective Perlewitz testified that Johnson had struck up a conversation in which he said that he knew there was a robbery warrant out for him and that he knew his brother's funeral was staked out and that he had managed to outsmart the police by attending the funeral disguised as a woman. Again the prosecutor asked Perlewitz: Did Mr. Johnson make any statements to you on the aircraft coming back from San Francisco concerning directly concerning the robbery at the Hopkins Savings & Loan on the 4th of February, 1970? This was objected to by defense counsel for the same reason was I previously exposed on the record. The court replied: Yes. He is not required to make any statements. He has a constitutional privilege not to, and we won't go into it any further. As a matter of fact, if counsel for either side want any instructions concerning the inadvertent interpolation of that in the presence of the jury, I will be glad to give it. Objection sustained to the question. He didn't have to make any statements and there should be no inference against him because he did not. It is his constitutional right. The only reason for this inquiry is with regard to another matter, and has nothing to do with any statements concerning the alleged offense itself. So the jury is not to get any inference against him because of what has been so far testified to concerning the advice given to him as to his constitutional rights, and his indication that he didn't want to respond concerning any inquiries about that particular matter that is referred to in the charge here. He is not required to do so, and the jury will exclude that from their consideration. There is some question about defense counsel's raising adequate objection to the three offensive statements. Although the third instance of Detective Perlewitz' testimony concerning Stanley Johnson's failure to make a statement was objected to, the second instance was not objected to, and the defense counsel moved for a mistrial after the first remark. In any event, in the absence of a strategic waiver (which was not present here) a trial court objection is not necessary to preserve the right to raise constitutional errors on appeal. [8] This alleged error has constitutional dimensionsa reference to the exercise of a constitutional right to remain silent. The actual instruction given by the trial court did cover all three remarks and it is immaterial whether precise objections were made to the first two remarks since the instruction given actually covered all three remarks anyway. Even constitutional errors, however, are subject to the harmless-error rule. [9] In Buckner v. State [10] this court considered the precise question of whether, when a police officer testified that a defendant had told him that he understood his rights but did not want to say anything, the allowance of this testimony into evidence operated to the defendant's prejudice. There the trial court gave a thorough curative instruction, as here, but not until the day after the remark. It was there held that the curative instruction rendered harmless the potentially prejudicial effect of the officer's testimony. So here the completely curative instruction of the trial court, given immediately after the last objectionable remark, rendered harmless the potentially prejudicial effect of Detective Perlewitz' testimony as to Johnson's statement that he did not want to say anything.