Opinion ID: 3032300
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Discrimination Claims Against the SLHA

Text: Counts I, II, and III allege that the SLHA discriminated on the basis of race, sex and familial status, in violation of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) & (b), by implementing the proposed revitalization plan. In addressing these claims the district court stated: “[a]lthough the court did not analyze these counts, it would like to note that it found absolutely no evidence of discrimination.” Mem. Op. at 21 n.17. We recognize the district court “found absolutely no evidence of discrimination.” Id. We also acknowledge that there may be cases where the evidence is so lacking that a statement similar to the one made by the district court in this case may be sufficient. However, the appellants presented evidence of disparate impact discrimination and we believe that the district court should have provided some explanation as to why that evidence is insufficient. See United States v. Badgett, 976 F.2d 1176 (8th Cir. 1992) (setting out the proper test to apply when analyzing alleged discrimination under the Fair Housing Act). As such, these three counts are remanded to the district court for a more thorough explanation on the appellants’ disparate impact claims. 2. Failure to Affirmatively Further Fair Housing Claims Against HUD Counts XIII, XVII, & XVIII all involve assertions that HUD failed to fulfill its duty to affirmatively further fair housing when it approved the HOPE VI plan and the City’s Section 108 loan. In addition to the brief statement made by the district court in footnote 17, that it “did not analyze these counts,” the district also made the following statement: Finally, plaintiffs requested that the Court enjoin the federal defendants to ‘take all necessary steps to further fair housing affirmatively in the HOPE VI program.’ Obviously, HUD believes that it has taken all necessary steps to further fair housing. If plaintiffs are requesting that 15 the Court set out detailed steps, it will not do so. First, although the Court can review agency decisions, it has little authority to direct an agency on exactly what to do, exactly how to do it, and exactly how to fund it. Similarly, the Court is not going to give specific instructions to the defendants, telling them how they should involve plaintiffs in the planning, implementing, and monitoring of the HOPE VI plan. Mem. Op. at 19. In light of these two statements, we are convinced that the district court failed to make sufficient findings that HUD had complied with its duty to affirmatively further fair housing. HUD has a duty to affirmatively further fair housing. See 42 U.S.C. § 3608(e)(5) (providing HUD’s duty to “administer the programs and activities relating to housing and urban development in a manner affirmatively to further the policies of this subchapter”). Appellants have presented evidence that HUD failed to consider the ramifications of the proposed HOPE VI program on HUD’s obligation to affirmatively further fair housing. This evidence was not discussed by the district court. Instead the court stated only that “HUD believes that it has taken all necessary steps to further fair housing.” This statement does not involve the analysis required by F.R.C.P. 52(a). Both parties cite to N.A.A.C.P. v. Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, 817 F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1987). This case explains the extensive scope of HUD’s requirements to affirmatively further fair housing. [42 U.S.C. § 3608(e)(5)] does not limit HUD’s liability to purposive support of discrimination by others, nor does it limit HUD’s “discriminatory action” to activity that itself forecloses housing opportunities on the basis of race. Rather, it includes within the scope of such action a failure to “consider the effect of a HUD grant on the racial and socio-economic composition of the surrounding area.” And, the need for such consideration itself implies, at a minimum, an obligation to assess negatively those aspects of a proposed course of 16 action that would further limit the supply of genuinely open housing and to assess positively those aspects of a proposed course of action that would increase that supply. N.A.A.C.P. at 156 (emphasis in original). Given the scope of this requirement, on remand the district court should provide a more detailed explanation for its conclusion that HUD appropriately considered its duty to affirmatively further fair housing. Finally, we note that if the district court determines that HUD did not fulfill its duty to affirmatively further fair housing, the district court has the authority to review HUD’s decision. 5 U.SC. § 706(2) states that a court shall “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be – (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law.” A district court’s authority to review HUD’s decisions was explained by the court in N.A.A.C.P.: Clearly, HUD possesses broad discretionary powers to develop, award, and administer its grants and to decide the degree to which they can be shaped to help achieve Title VIII’s goals. This fact, however, does not in itself mean that HUD is immune from review for “abuse of discretion” in exercising those powers. Id. at 157. If the district court determines that HUD abused its discretion, the district court has the authority to enjoin the use of HOPE VI grant funds or Section 108 loan guarantees until HUD satisfies the court that it has taken appropriate steps to affirmatively further fair housing. 3. Allegations that the SLHA Failed to Comply with the Requirements of the HOPE VI Program Counts VI & VIII allege that the SLHA violated the requirements of the HOPE VI program in adopting the revitalization plan for the Darst-Webbe complex. The 17 appellants conceded in their reply brief that their claim in Count VIII is not enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002). Because appellants have waived this count, we will not analyze it and we affirm the district court’s decision in favor of the appellees on Count VIII. The SLHA also argued that appellants’ claim in Count VI was unenforceable in light of Gonzaga. Because we have determined that appellants have not prevailed on this claim, we need not address whether the Court’s decision in Gonzaga would bar this claim. Count VI alleges that the SLHA is violating the requirements of the HOPE VI program because it is not replacing the demolished units at the Darst-Webbe complex with sufficient affordable and large family housing units to accomodate the displaced tenants. Unlike the discrimination claims against the SLHA and the allegations that HUD failed to affirmatively further fair housing, the appellants’ arguments regarding Count VI involve an interpretation of law. We disagree with appellants’ assertion that the district court did not comply with F.R.C.P. 52(a) in addressing this count and that it needs to be remanded for further findings of fact and conclusions of law. Appellants assert that Congress required recipients of HOPE VI grants to provide housing for all displaced tenants. Appellants point to language contained in the 1992 appropriations legislation for the HOPE VI program which states, “persons displaced by the reconstruction activities provided for herein shall be eligible for these replacement units. . . .” Pub. L. No. 102-389, 106 Stat. 1571 (1992). Appellants contend that Congress intended the “eligibility” requirement as a mandate that HOPE VI grant recipients provide sufficient affordable replacement housing units for all displaced tenants. They argue that the SLHA has not complied with this requirement because the revitalization plan includes provisions for constructing only 80 lowincome housing units, instead of replacing the over 200 units that were occupied at the time the revitalization plan was submitted. They also claim that the displaced tenants cannot afford to live in the other units being built. 18 We do not agree with appellants that Congress meant to equate eligibility with affordability. Additionally, even if Congress intended to require HOPE VI grant recipients to provide replacement housing for all displaced tenants, the SLHA has met this requirement by offering all displaced tenants Section 8 housing vouchers. Finally, we note that even if eligibility originally meant affordability, that requirement has now been superseded by the 1998 amendments to 42 U.S.C. § 1437v. Equating eligibility with affordability and thus requiring recipients of HOPE VI grants to provide the same number of low-income rental units that existed prior to the enactment of this legislation would run contrary to the goals of the HOPE VI program. Among the goals Congress envisioned is decreasing the density of public housing complexes. 58 Fed. Reg. 16590, 16591 (March 29, 1993). While adding 120 additional public housing units in this case might not run contrary to this goal, requiring HOPE VI grant recipients to always provide sufficient low-income housing units for displaced tenants would. We also note that the SLHA has attempted to provide housing for the displaced tenants in other ways than building the requested number of low-income units. The SLHA provided each displaced tenant with a Section 108 voucher to use in finding replacement housing. Additionally, the SLHA has granted the displaced residents priority in applying for the replacement housing that is being created through the HOPE VI revitalization project. Finally, we note that to the extent the SLHA’s plan would conflict with the requirements specified in the 1992 appropriation’s legislation, those goals, at least in regards to replacement housing, have been superseded by subsequent legislation. In particular, 42 U.S.C. § 1437v (e)(3) was added in 1998. It allows HOPE VI grants to be awarded for “demolition only.” This change indicates that even if Congress originally intended HOPE VI grant recipients to provide sufficient replacement housing by imposing an eligibility requirement, Congress no longer intends to require HOPE VI grant recipients to replace demolished housing units. 19 Because we do not find that the district court erred as a matter of law in determining that the SLHA was not required under the HOPE VI program to provide additional low-income public housing units, we affirm the district court’s decision on Count VI.