Opinion ID: 2545831
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Evidence Suggesting Defendant Posed a Danger While Incarcerated

Text: Again claiming violations of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution, defendant challenges certain testimony admitted during the prosecutor's redirect examination of two law enforcement witnesses, former Concord Police Officer James Blackburn and Contra Costa County Deputy Sheriff Mike Dahlstrom. These contentions are not preserved for appeal because defense counsel did not object on federal constitutional grounds, raising only state law objections. Officer Blackburn testified on direct examination that 20 years earlier, in 1971, defendant at age 18 was in possession of an illegal weapon, a sawed-off shotgun. Cross-examination by defense counsel established that Blackburn, who by the time of trial was living in Wyoming, had been reluctant to talk to defense investigators. Outside the jury's presence, Blackburn explained that when first contacted by the defense, he had cooperated, but he later refused to do so out of fear of harm to his family. Defense counsel argued that evidence of Blackburn's reasons for not cooperating would be more prejudicial than probative (Evid.Code, ง 352), but the trial court ruled Blackburn's explanation admissible to counteract any implications that were raised by the suggestion that he wouldn't talk to the defense. Back before the jury, the prosecutor asked Blackburn why he had been reluctant to talk to the defense, Blackburn testified: [B]ecause I feared basically for my family's life. No further explanation was given. Defendant contends that the admission of the Blackburn explanation was reversible error. He further contends that defense counsel was ineffective in opening up the issue of Blackburn's reluctance to assist the defense. Defendant argues that counsel should have known that Blackburn and defendant had a history. The other law enforcement witness, Deputy Sheriff Dahlstrom, testified on direct examination he overheard defendant telling another inmate that the jail guards had found a shank in defendant's cell, and that it belonged to defendant. On cross-examination, defense counsel established that shanks were not uncommon in county jail, that defendant had not assaulted custodial staff or others, and that because defendant was housed in the county jail's administrative segregation unit, he was, like the other inmates in that unit, moved to a different cell every few days. On redirect, the prosecutor asked Dahlstrom if defendant was finally transferred to another institution after the guards found the shank. Defense counsel objected on relevance grounds, but the trial court overruled the objection. Deputy Dahlstrom then responded Yes to the prosecutor's question, adding that defendant was deemed too dangerous for our facility, and thus was moved per the Penal Code ... to San Quentin Adjustment Center. Defendant characterizes Deputy Dahlstrom's answer as impermissible evidence of defendant's future dangerousness. (See People v. Murtishaw (1981) 29 Cal.3d 733, 773, 175 Cal.Rptr. 738, 631 P.2d 446 [One can imagine few matters more prejudicial at the penalty trial than testimony ... that defendant, if sentenced to life without possibility of parole, would be likely to kill again.].) He further asserts that the prosecutor, by asking whether defendant was finally transferred to another facility, improperly suggested to the jury that defendant had a history of disciplinary problems in jail. Additionally, he faults counsel for not objecting to the question. Assuming that it was error to allow the testimony of Officer Blackburn about fearing harm to his family, and the testimony of Deputy Dahlstrom that for safety reasons defendant was moved from county jail to San Quentin Prison, the errors were harmless. Defendant argues that this evidence went to the heart of the jury's penalty phase decision because it suggested that defendant posed a risk to others if sentenced to prison for life without possibility of parole. Defendant asserts that the jury would have understood fear by Officer Blackburn, who lived far away in Wyoming, to mean that defendant had the ability to exact vengeance even though incarcerated; and that the jury would have understood defendant's pretrial removal to San Quentin Prison, as described by Deputy Dahlstrom, to mean that defendant's possession of a common jailhouse weapon, a homemade knife, posed a unique danger to other jail inmates and to staff. Maybe so. But the defense effectively countered any suggestion of defendant's future dangerousness through the expert opinion testimony of former California Department of Corrections Director Raymond Procunier that defendant, if sentenced to life without parole, would behave himself and not cause ... any problems. Moreover, evidence of Blackburn's fear of defendant and of defendant's pretrial removal to San Quentin added little to defendant's life of violence of which the jury was already aware. Therefore, it is neither reasonably possible ( People v. Jackson, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1232, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254) nor reasonably probable ( Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 669, 104 S.Ct. 2052) that the testimony by Officer Blackburn and Deputy Dahlstrom altered the jury's penalty verdict.