Opinion ID: 2595540
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Jury Deliberation Claims

Text: Defendant argues the court prejudicially erred in answering several jurors' questions during the penalty phase. We find no error. The first question asked, Please review instruction regarding severity of penalty. One juror has expressed belief that life in prison is more punishing than death. Over defendant's objection that the juror was revealing misconduct in the deliberations and inviting the judge to become the thirteenth juror, the court replied, Under the law . . . and regardless of your personal belief as to what is harder on somebody or what is more severe or what is the tougher penalty, under the law the death penalty is the more severe penalty. Life in prison is not as severe as the death penalty. That is the law and that is the law you have to follow. . . . You can't inject your own belief as to what you think is tougher or not. Defendant argues that by instructing the jury that death is the more severe penalty, the court interfered with the jury's deliberative process and thereby increased the risk of an arbitrary and capricious decision on penalty. We disagree. That death is considered to be a more severe punishment than life is explicit in California law: CALJIC No. 8.88, approved in People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 977-979, 281 Cal.Rptr. 273, 810 P.2d 131, states in pertinent part [t]o return a judgment of death, each of you must be persuaded that the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of life without parole. The court did not err in so instructing the jury. The second question asked, Please review the law regarding speculation on whether the convicted felon may later repent if given the sentence of life imprisonment. The juror later clarified that the concern was whether it would be appropriate for the jury to consider or speculate whether defendant might repent, or have a change of character, while serving a life sentence. Without objection, the court explained: In terms of whether or not you can speculate on certain things, the answer is no. The instructions taken as a whole clearly indicate that you cannot base any decision in this case or resolve any issue in this case by the process of speculating. You must base your decision upon the evidence and any reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence in the case, not just speculating which means just guesswork and so forth. Defendant now argues the court failed to address the juror's question regarding repentance and thereby sent the message that the jurors were not to consider defendant's character or propensity for repentance in their deliberations. He argues this violated his Eighth Amendment right to have the court give guidance as to the mitigating factors to be considered, citing McDowell v. Calderon (9th Cir. 1997) 130 F.3d 833. Because he failed to object to the court's response, defendant has forfeited the issue for appeal. In any event, the claim has no merit. The court's response did not, as defendant contends, directly or impliedly tell the jurors they could not consider defendant's character or propensity for repentance in their deliberative process. Rather, in light of the fact that defendant presented no evidence regarding repentance, the court properly instructed them they should not speculate about facts not before them. The third question asked, Please explain more to me mitigating and aggravating and how it fits in with factor (k) extenuating circumstances. Does that mean what positive (mitigating) things you can argue about for [ sic ] what has happen [ sic ] to the victim [ sic ] (to not give him the death penalty.) If you can give an example. The juror later clarified he was seeking an explanation of and examples of extenuating circumstances in reference to section 190.3, factor (k) (Any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime.). Over defendant's objection to giving any examples of extenuating circumstances, the court explained that factor (k) was divided into two parts, . . . the circumstances related to the crime . . . and factors peculiar to the defendant's character or background. . . . The word `extenuate,' or `extenuate the gravity of the crime' means make less severe, make a crime not so bad. . . . If someone, for example, was convicted of stealing some food and that person was hungry at the time that that person stole, that would not be a legal defense, but it would be something that the jury would consider. [¶] It would make the crime less severe. You should not steal, but there was some, not defense or excuse, but some reason perhaps that motivated it and made it less bad as opposed to somebody stealing food to resell it to buy heroin with. [¶] The other example that I thought of is if you punch somebody in the nose, you can't do that. But if you punch somebody in the nose because two minutes before that person had hit your little son on the head with a rock, some big grown-up man hit your five-year old son on the head with a rock, and you punched this fellow's nose in, you would probably end up being arrested and a jury would convict you of battery, but there is something there that extenuates the gravity of your act. Defendant now argues, as he did below, that these examples trivialized the weighing process and confused the jury by creating an unreasonable expectation of what mitigating evidence could be. He argues the examples set forth an unfair standard of comparison with the facts of the case. We disagree. The examples given were reasonable explanations of general extenuating circumstances within the context of criminal behavior, and were far enough removed from the circumstances of this crime that no reasonable juror would apply the examples as standards of evidence in mitigation. The court did not err.
The court asked the jury to return separate verdicts of either death or life imprisonment without parole on count two (the murder of Allen) and on count three (the murder of Allen's fetus). On three occasions, over three days of deliberations, the jurors informed the court they were deadlocked. The jurors reported there had been changes in the votes on count two and count three on each of the ballots taken. [8] Following each declaration of deadlock, defendant moved for a mistrial, arguing in essence that further deliberations would be futile and the court's insistence in continuing deliberations constituted coercion. He now argues the court should have declared a mistrial. We disagree. Section 1140 provides, Except as provided by law, the jury cannot be discharged after the cause is submitted to them until they have agreed upon their verdict and rendered it in open court, unless by consent of both parties, entered upon the minutes, or unless, at the expiration of such time as the court may deem proper, it satisfactorily appears that there is no reasonable probability that the jury can agree. The determination whether there is a reasonable probability of agreement rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. ( People v. Proctor, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 539, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 340, 842 P.2d 1100.) Although the court must take care to exercise its power without coercing the jury into abdicating its independent judgment in favor of considerations of compromise and expediency [citation], the court may direct further deliberations upon its reasonable conclusion that such direction would be perceived `as a means of enabling the jurors to enhance their understanding of the case rather than as mere pressure to reach a verdict on the basis of matters already discussed and considered.' ( People v. Proctor, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 539, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 340, 842 P.2d 1100.) On the first occasion, the court noted that the jury had only been deliberating for four hours and had taken only one ballot. The court polled each juror individually to determine if any readback of testimony or clarification of the law would be of benefit. The court answered questions submitted by several jurors, and sent the jury back to continue deliberations. On the second occasion, later that afternoon, the court indicated that because three additional ballots had been taken and each revealed there had been changes in the votes, it was not satisfied that a unanimous verdict could not be reached. Before sending the jurors home for the weekend, the court reminded them that each had said during the jury selection process that they were the type of folks who could choose between the penalties, that each individual juror had assured the court that he or she could vote for the punishment they thought appropriate, whether it be life without the possibility of parole or death, and that if at any time during the trial any juror felt unable to make such a decision, he or she would so inform the court. Each juror was polled and indicated he or she could make such a decision. The court instructed the jurors: Do not take any of my comments now or at any time in this trial as suggesting how any juror should vote as to penalty on either count. . . . [¶] . . . I am not going to attempt to coerce a verdict out of a jury at all, but what I will do is explore this until I am convinced that there is no reasonable possibility of a unanimous verdict. . . . [¶] . . . Please draw no inferences from anything that I have said or any question that I may have asked about how I believe or feel this case should be resolved or if it should be. On the third occasion, the following day, the court again noted changes in votes in the five ballots taken that day, and stated it was not satisfied a unanimous verdict could not be reached. Defendant argues the court's comments improperly constituted subtle insistence that a verdict should be reached and implicitly required the jurors to move toward unanimity. Further, he argues the court abandoned its responsibility to remind the jurors they should not surrender their individual beliefs in order to reach a verdict. We find no abuse of discretion. In spite of the jury's assessment that they were hopelessly deadlocked, the record reasonably supports the court's determination that the jurors had not reached an impasse. Each successive ballot taken revealed changes in the votes. Further, contrary to defendant's argument, the court's comments did not insist that a verdict be reached. The court's comments informed the jury that deliberations would continue until the court was satisfied they were deadlocked, but they were not to infer that the court believed a verdict should be reached. Finally, each juror was sufficiently reminded of his or her individual responsibilities in the deliberative process when the court polled each juror to determine if each could make a choice and reach a verdict. (Cf. People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 774-777, 230 Cal.Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113 [no error in denying mistrial motion when jury stated it was hopelessly deadlocked after 18 days of deliberations].)