Opinion ID: 4524722
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: New York Memo & 1985 Conviction

Text: The New York Memo provides that certain “violations” of New York local laws, rules, and ordinances shall not be considered disqualifying misdemeanors for purposes of the TPS program. The “violations” addressed by the New York Memo are those that “are not considered ‘crimes’ under state law, do not constitute misdemeanors or felonies, and may not be punished by more than 15 days of 6 Case: 19-12114 Date Filed: 04/13/2020 Page: 7 of 11 imprisonment.” The New York Memo explained that -- although these “violations” would qualify technically as “misdemeanors” under 8 C.F.R. § 244.1 - - “deeming such New York violations as disqualifying an individual for TPS would be in tension with the humanitarian purpose of the TPS program and would lead to incongruous results.” Plaintiff seeks to apply the policy established in the New York Memo to his 1985 Florida conviction for refusal to pay transit fare. Because his 1985 conviction was for a violation of a county ordinance, Plaintiff contends that the conviction should be excluded from consideration in determining his eligibility for TPS. The AAO rejected Plaintiff’s argument. Plaintiff’s convictions have no contact with New York or New York law. The AAO provided a reasoned explanation for concluding that the New York Memo was inapplicable to Plaintiff’s 1985 conviction. The AAO first explained that the policy established in the New York Memo was based both on New York’s statutory classification of offenses and also on the prescribed maximum punishments for those offenses. The AAO’s interpretation of the New York Memo is consistent with the Memo’s plain language. The AAO also determined reasonably that Plaintiff’s 1985 Florida conviction is distinguishable from the kinds of violations addressed by the New York Memo. The AAO determined that Florida law -- the misconduct happened in 7 Case: 19-12114 Date Filed: 04/13/2020 Page: 8 of 11 Florida -- provided identical maximum punishments for both ordinance violations and for second degree misdemeanors. Florida law also provided that violations of county ordinances would be prosecuted in a manner identical to the prosecution of misdemeanors. The AAO thus concluded that Florida -- unlike New York -- “neither classifies nor considers ordinance violations as less severe than those offenses it has designated as misdemeanors . . ..” As a result, the AAO determined that Plaintiff’s 1985 conviction was not subject to an exemption “under the rubric of the New York memorandum.” In support of his arguments on appeal, Plaintiff seems to place greater stress on the single-sentence policy statement in the New York Memo (noting the “humanitarian purpose of the TPS program” and the need to avoid “incongruous results”) than on the defining characteristics of the New York “violations” exempted by the Memo. That Plaintiff’s interpretation (even if a reasonable one) about the scope of the New York Memo differs from the AAO’s interpretation is no evidence (or is insufficient evidence) that the AAO’s interpretation is arbitrary or capricious.