Opinion ID: 2053330
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: the county's remaining arguments

Text: In further support of the appellate court's decision, the county further notes the direct conflict found by the court between AFSCME's proposal to bargain over the matter at issue and sections 3-14013 and 3-14016 of the Code. 204 Ill.App.3d at 377. In citing that conflict, the county simply begs the essential question before this court, viz., whether the appellate court correctly held that the conflict which it found between AFSCME's bargaining proposal and the provisions of the Code exempted the county from the duty to bargain imposed by section 7. Merely citing the conflict does nothing to convince us that it did. The county also notes that this case, unlike City of Decatur, does not involve, as an additional consideration supporting a finding of a duty to bargain, the public policy favoring arbitration as a means of public labor dispute resolution. The county is correct as to the absence here of arbitration as a consideration supporting a finding of a duty to bargain. However, we do not find that distinction a sufficient ground upon which to conclude that City of Decatur is not dispositive of the issues here. In noting that this case does not involve arbitration, the county simultaneously ignores the first basis for our decision in City of Decatur. That basis, explicitly expressed by the legislature, was the public policy of the State to grant public employees full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing for the purpose of negotiating wages, hours and other conditions of employment or other mutual aid or protection. Ill.Rev.Stat. 1989, ch. 48, par. 1602. That public policy, as a consideration supporting the finding of a duty to bargain in this case, is as relevant here as it was in City of Decatur. When coupled with the optional nature of the civil service system under which the county operates, that public policy sufficiently justifies a finding of a duty to bargain here, notwithstanding the noninvolvement of arbitration in this case. The appellate court erred in ruling to the contrary. The county also cites this court's holding in Levin v. Civil Service Comm'n (1972), 52 Ill.2d 516, 288 N.E.2d 97, that it is for the legislature to determine whether those who have served as temporary employees for extended periods of time, like the computer operators in this case, should be given any preferential status in employment. We do not find Levin of any avail to the county. The actions of the Cook County civil service commission challenged therein occurred prior to the adoption of the Constitution of 1970. As such, it was presumed, and rightfully so, that the provisions of the Counties Act pursuant to which the county undertook those actions were mandatory upon the county. That presumption is not applicable in this case. With regard to the temporary status of the employees concerned in this case, the county further argues that the fact that they had become members of its employees' collective-bargaining unit is irrelevant to their civil service status. The county asserts that such membership allows AFSCME to bargain on their behalf only over matters not covered by the civil service commission. In so arguing, the county again ignores the optional nature of the civil service system it has chosen to employ and, thus, of the rules promulgated thereunder. Because that system and the rules promulgated thereunder are optional and, thus, can be altered, amended or even abandoned at any time, they cannot be held to prevail over the rights of public employees, who, like the three computer operators involved in this case, have become members of a collective-bargaining unit duly authorized by the employees and recognized by the employer. The county also poses the question whether temporary employees, not required to comply with the prerequisites for certification under its civil service system, would be entitled to the benefits of such certification, such as the protection of the rules dealing with discipline and discharge. This and similar matters we deem a proper subject of the bargaining, which we find the county has a duty to engage in with AFSCME, rather than a basis for finding no duty to bargain here. The problematic nature of such matters is not sufficient to compel the conclusion that the county has no duty to bargain in this case. The county next cites Chicago Bar Association v. County of Cook (1984), 102 Ill.2d 438, 81 Ill.Dec. 709, 467 N.E.2d 580, as directly supportive of the conclusion that any attempt to exempt certain public employees from the examination requirements of its civil service system, even if attempted pursuant to its home rule powers, would nonetheless violate State law. We now state explicitly what we have previously implied in our discussion of Kanellos: it is the very nature of Cook County as a home rule unit of local government which: (1) renders optional in nature the civil service system which the county chose to employ beyond the adoption of the Constitution of 1970; and (2) thus imposes upon it a duty to bargain over the matter at issue in this case. The Chicago Bar Association case does not compel, or even support, a contrary conclusion. In citing that case, the county ignores the basis of this court's holding therein that it could not change, through its home rule and ordinance-making powers, the number of commissioners on the county board of tax appeals or the procedures by which the board made its decisions regarding the assessment of property taxes. The county had passed an ordinance to those effects with the express intent of superseding certain sections of the Revenue Act of 1939. In holding the county's ordinance invalid, this court concluded that the assessment of real estate for tax purposes was not a matter pertaining to the county's local government and affairs within the contemplation of article VII, section 6(a), of the Constitution of 1970. In reaching that conclusion, the court found no distinction between the functions of collecting and assessing taxes which rendered Bridgman v. Korzen (1972), 54 Ill.2d 74, 295 N.E.2d 9, inapplicable in Chicago Bar Association. In Bridgman, this court concluded that the collection of property taxes was not a power or function pertaining to the government and affairs of the county for the reason that, in collecting and distributing tax monies, the county acted both for itself and the other taxing bodies authorized to tax property within the county. Therefore, we reasoned that the collection of taxes did not pertain to the county's government and affairs to any extent greater than to the government and affairs of the other taxing bodies for whose benefit it acted. The power of the county involved in this case, viz., to adopt civil service provisions differing from those of the Code, whether by altering, amending or even abandoning the latter, is clearly, unlike the powers at issue in the Chicago Bar Association and Bridgman cases, one which pertains to the government and affairs solely of the county. The exercise of that power would not impact in the slightest manner upon any other unit of local government's control of its government and affairs. The Bridgman and Chicago Bar Association cases are thus clearly inapposite here. In arguing that, unlike the civil service system involved in City of Decatur, the civil service provisions under which it operates are imposed by the State, the county notes that AFSCME has not demanded that it bargain over the enactment of a home rule civil service ordinance and that, as such, it has no obligation to do so. In this same regard, the county also argues that the enactment of a civil service system by a home rule unit is a matter which falls squarely within the management rights clause of section 4 of the Act (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1989, ch. 48, par. 1604). This argument completely misconstrues the holding in City of Decatur. We did not hold therein that the city was obligated to bargain over the enactment of civil service provisions in substitution of those of the Municipal Code. Rather, we held only that, because those provisions did not bind the City of Decatur, it could not rely upon them as preempting the duty to bargain with respect to proposals relating directly to wages, hours or other conditions of employment. Similarly, we do not hold in this case that the county is obligated to engage in collective bargaining with AFSCME over the enactment of civil service provisions in substitution of those enacted pursuant to the Code. Rather, we hold only that the county cannot rely upon those provisions as preempting a duty to bargain over the civil service examination requirement at issue here. The county also argues that imposing upon it a duty to bargain over that requirement would require it to violate the rule of its civil service commission prescribing the manner in which amendments to the rules are to be made. The county concludes that the duty to bargain provided for in the Act does not require such attempts to amend its commission's rules. In attempting to interpose its civil service commission rules as barring a duty to bargain over the matter involved here, the county has ignored our previous rejection of a narrow reading of section 7 of the Act in City of Decatur. In City of Decatur, this court observed that [w]e do not believe that the legislature intended to make the broad duties imposed by the Act hostage to the myriad of State statutes and local ordinances pertaining to matters of public employment. ( City of Decatur v. American Federation of State, County, & Municipal Employees, Local 268 (1988), 122 Ill.2d 353, 364, 119 Ill.Dec. 360, 522 N.E.2d 1219.) To the State statutes and local ordinances mentioned in City of Decatur, we now add local civil service commission rules as not precluding the broad duty to bargain recognized in section 7. In view of our conclusion that the county's status as a home rule unit of local government renders the civil service provisions of the Code optional upon it and that, therefore, they do not preclude the recognition of a duty to bargain in this case, we need not address whether the county has that duty under section 15 of the Act (Ill. Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 48, par. 1615), relating to conflicts between the Act's provisions and other laws, executive orders or administrative regulations relating to wages, hours and conditions of employment. Similarly, in view of the fact that our decision is based solely on the arguments of AFSCME, we need not consider whether, as argued by the County, the Board lacks standing to participate in the appeal to this court. The judgment of the appellate court is reversed; the decision of the Illinois Local Labor Relations Board is affirmed; the cause is remanded to the Board for further proceedings consistent herewith. Appellate court reversed; Illinois Local Labor Relations Board affirmed; cause remanded. BILANDIC, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.