Opinion ID: 767535
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Discharging a Weapon Conviction

Text: 9 Staples argues that his conviction for discharging a weapon should not have been counted in his criminal history because the Guidelines specifically exclude convictions for local ordinance violations, except in limited circumstances. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual sec. 4A1.2(c)(1). The Guidelines, however,permit counting local ordinance violations that are also criminal offenses under state law. Id. The question today is whether Staples' conviction for discharging a weapon was a criminal offense under Illinois law. We review de novo a sentencing court's conclusions of law. See United States v. McClanahan, 136 F.3d 1146, 1149 (7th Cir. 1998). 10 Police arrested Staples and Brown on August 14, 1995, and charged them with shooting a Crossman 760 Pumpmaster pump air rifle at street lights and at a train. Staples pleaded guilty on February 16, 1996, to discharging a weapon and was fined $280. The Illinois Air Rifle Act, 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 535/3 (West 1993), makes it unlawful for any person to discharge any air rifle from or across any street, sidewalk, road, highway or public land or any public place except on a safely constructed target range. Shooting an air rifle at street lights and a train violates this section and therefore must be counted under sec. 4A1.2(c). 11 Staples nonetheless argues that the government did not carry its burden of proof on this issue when it failed to cite the air rifle statute at sentencing. However, in the matter of exclusions from Guidelines calculations under sec. 4A1.2(c)(1), the defendant and not the government carries the burden of proof. See United States v. Booker, 71 F.3d 685, 688 (7th Cir. 1995). The government's failure to cite the state law similar to the local ordinance was not error since the government did not carry the burden of proof on this issue. 12 Next, Staples argues that the air rifle conviction should be excluded because it was similar to disorderly conduct or disturbing the peace, which would not be counted in this situation. Under Illinois law, a person commits disorderly conduct when he knowingly does any act in such unreasonable manner as to alarm or disturb another and to provoke a breach of the peace. 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/26-1(a)(1). While Staples and Brown obviously violated this section when they shot the air rifle, there are few offenses--felonies or misdemeanors--that do not satisfy this definition. The question is not whether they disturbed the peace, but whether their criminal conduct most appropriately should be considered as one of those offenses similar to [disturbing the peace], by whatever name they are known. U.S.S.G. sec. 4A1.2(c)(1). We look to the actual offense conduct and the sentence deemed appropriate by the sentencing judge to determine if the acts are similar. See United States v. Boyd, 146 F.3d 499, 501-02 (7th Cir. 1998). 13 The fact that the Illinois General Assembly saw fit to criminalize air rifle offenses separately rather than leave it to the disorderly conduct statute provides at least some evidence that lawmakers considered the offense dissimilar to disturbing the peace. Disturbing the peace in Illinois is a Class C misdemeanor, punishable by up to a year in jail. See 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/26-1(b)(1). Discharging an air rifle is a petty offense, punishable only by a fine. See 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 535/7. This distinction provides another point of dissimilarity, but weighs in the defendant's favor as probative evidence that the air rifle offense is less serious in the eyes of state lawmakers. However, the state legislature's classification of crimes is not dispositive; the application of the Guidelines is a matter of federal law. See Booker, 71 F.3d at 688-89. 14 The sentencing judge ordered Staples to pay a $280 fine, an indication that the offense was deemed minor, but the underlying conduct for which the defendant was sentenced weighs most heavily in this analysis. In this case, a comparison of the conduct weighs strongly in favor of treating the weapons conviction differently than disturbing the peace. The disorderly conduct statute is aimed at annoying and disruptive actions, such as calling in false fire alarms, making unreasonable noise, urinating in public, inciting a fight and a variety of other harassing and threatening behaviors. Staples' crime went beyond this, potentially putting at serious risk the safetyof the public by shooting at a vehicle with a weapon. Trains, even the cargo variety, are operated and inhabited by people, and the danger of serious injury from shooting at a train is obvious. The list of offenses in sec. 4A1.2(c)(1) does not include discharging a weapon for a good reason: It is a dangerous and serious behavior that need not be treated for sentencing purposes as lightly as disorderly conduct, fish and game violations and insufficient funds check. See U.S.S.G. sec. 4A1.2(c)(1). Staples' conviction for discharging a weapon was in fact more serious than disturbing the peace and was properly included in his criminal history.