Opinion ID: 583325
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Request to Withdraw the Guilty Plea

Text: 84 Under Rule 32(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 85 [i]f a motion for withdrawal of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is made before sentence is imposed, the court may permit withdrawal of the plea upon a showing by the defendant of any fair and just reason. At any later time, a plea may be set aside only on direct appeal or by motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 86 FED.R.CRIM.P. 32(d). Although the decision to grant a motion to withdraw a plea before sentencing is committed to the sound discretion of the district court, there are several factors which this court has identified as particularly relevant to that decision. First, where the motion ... assert[s] legal innocence, presentence withdrawal should be rather freely allowed. United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208, 220 (D.C.Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1013, 95 S.Ct. 2420, 44 L.Ed.2d 682 (1975). The assertion of innocence, however, does not entitle defendant to an automatic withdrawal of his plea. Id. 87 The second factor is the possible existence of prejudice to the government's case as a result of the defendant's untimely request to stand trial. United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 39 (D.C.Cir.1982). The defendant's reasons for withdrawing the plea must meet exceptionally high standards where the delay between the plea and the withdrawal motion has substantially prejudiced the Government's ability to prosecute the case. Barker, 514 F.2d at 222. 88 Finally, and most importantly, the district court must consider whether there was some defect in the original plea. It should go without saying that the standard [for granting a motion to withdraw a guilty plea] is very lenient when the plea was entered unconstitutionally or contrary to Rule 11 procedures. Id. at 221. A guilty plea cannot be considered voluntary under Rule 11 if it is induced by threats or misrepresentation, or if the defendant is not 'fully aware of the direct consequences' of the plea. Russell, 686 F.2d at 38 (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1472, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970)). 19 89 Appellant asserts that his guilty plea on September 5, 1990, was based on the assumption [295 U.S.App.D.C. 308] that the court would give him credit for the six and one-half years he served in connection with the murder charge of which he was subsequently acquitted. See Appellant's Brief at 16. Appellant argues that as soon as he learned that the district judge would not reduce the mandatory minimum sentence for time already served, he sought to withdraw his plea. It was, according to appellant, an abuse of discretion for the court to deny his motion. 90 Appellant relies heavily on the colloquy between appellant's counsel and the court on May 9, 1990, in which the district judge said that he would make some allowance for time served. See Transcript (D.D.C. May 9, 1990) at 7-8. This colloquy occurred before the court had determined that the 1975 robbery conviction was a violent felony and that appellant would therefore be subject to the mandatory minimum sentence. But as the district court itself noted in denying appellant's motion for reconsideration, the Court had no idea what the applicable guideline range would be and whether it would be above the 15-year minimum. Memorandum and Order (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 1990) at 5. In other words, even with the mandatory minimum, the court might have had the possibility of taking into account the time served on the murder charge in sentencing appellant at the low end of the Guidelines range. 20 91 When appellant inquired, on the day before his guilty plea, whether the court would consider arguments that would entitle him to a sentence below the mandatory minimum, the court responded that that's a matter of--for further discussion at sentencing. Transcript (D.D.C. Sept. 4, 1990) at 28. 21 Appellant argues that the reason he did not seek to withdraw his guilty plea prior to the day of sentencing (November 16, 1990) was because he had been assured by the court that there would be further discussion of these arguments at sentencing. 92 But further discussion is precisely what occurred at sentencing. Fully thirteen of the twenty-nine pages of the sentencing hearing transcript are filled with arguments by appellant's counsel about the authority of the court to reduce appellant's sentence below the mandatory minimum under the circumstances of the case. See Transcript (D.D.C. Nov. 16, 1990) at 8-21. Before he knew what the applicable guidelines range would be and before he knew what arguments appellant's counsel would make concerning his authority to reduce the sentence below the mandatory minimum, the district judge promised that further discussion would occur at sentencing; he never promised that appellant would receive credit for time served. The court never promised to give appellant credit, and there is nothing in this record to support the conclusion that appellant reasonably relied on statements by the court that he would receive credit. 93 Applying the three-factor test to the circumstances here, we find that while it is true that the government has not been unreasonably prejudiced by a delay were this case to proceed to trial, appellant neither asserts his innocence of the underlying crime nor claims that he pled guilty on the basis of threats or promises in violation of Rule 11(c). The district court did not [295 U.S.App.D.C. 309] abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion to withdraw the guilty plea. It appears that the only reason appellant sought to withdraw the guilty plea was the prospect of a fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence. This, alone, would have been insufficient grounds for the district court to justify granting a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. Loughery, 908 F.2d at 1017 (fact that the defendant waited to withdraw her plea until after determining the tenor of the punishment meted out to co-defendants is a factor militating against allowing withdrawal); United States v. McKoy, 645 F.2d 1037, 1040 n. 3 (D.C.Cir.1981) (it may be fair and just to deny a pre-sentence motion for withdrawal of a guilty plea when a defendant seeks to withdraw his plea after he has reason to believe his sentence will be more severe than he anticipated at the time of his guilty plea). It is most certainly insufficient grounds for us, on review, to conclude that the district court abused its discretion.