Opinion ID: 171804
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Exhaustion – Defendant Lewis

Text: We review de novo the district court's finding of failure to exhaust -4- administrative remedies. Jernigan v. Stuchell, 304 F.3d 1030, 1032 (10th Cir. 2002). Starks concedes he did not resubmit his grievance to the Administrative Review Authority after he received his noncompliance notice. He maintains, however, his appeal contained only one issue. Because he provided the reviewing authority the opportunity to review his claim but it erroneously refused to consider it, he exhausted his administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). He is mistaken. The PLRA provides, “No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). An inmate who begins the grievance process but does not complete it is barred from pursuing a § 1983 claim under the PLRA for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. Jernigan, 304 F.3d at 1032. Starks’ belief the reviewing authority improperly rejected his grievance is irrelevant. The rejection notice, rightly or wrongly, directed Starks to the deficiencies he needed to cure and invited him to do so within ten calendar days. Contrary to Starks’ assertions, this administrative remedy remained available. He simply chose not to take advantage of the opportunity to clarify any misunderstanding that, in his opinion, the reviewing authority -5- entertained. As we have stated before, an inmate “may not successfully argue that he had exhausted his administrative remedies by, in essence, failing to employ them and since he may now be time barred from pursuing them, they are exhausted by default.” Id. at 1033.