Opinion ID: 2074839
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Voluntariness-Due Process Clause

Text: Defendant also argues that his incriminating statements to Dye were involuntary in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Pursuant to the due process test, known as the voluntariness requirement, `certain interrogation techniques, either in isolation or as applied to the unique characteristics of a particular suspect, are so offensive to a civilized system of justice that they must be condemned.' People v. Easley, 148 Ill.2d 281, 314, 170 Ill.Dec. 356, 592 N.E.2d 1036 (1992), quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109, 106 S.Ct. 445, 449, 88 L.Ed.2d 405, 410 (1985); People v. Mays, 176 Ill.App.3d 1027, 1034, 127 Ill.Dec. 14, 532 N.E.2d 843 (1988). In Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986), the United States Supreme Court discussed the constitutional voluntariness of a statement made under circumstances not requiring Miranda warnings. The Court held that coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a statement is not voluntary within the meaning of the due process clause. While mental condition is relevant to an individual's susceptibility to police coercion, the mere examination of the declarant's state of mind can never conclude the due process inquiry. A voluntariness analysis under the due process clause must focus on the crucial element of police overreaching. Easley, 148 Ill.2d at 312-13, 170 Ill.Dec. 356, 592 N.E.2d 1036; Mays, 176 Ill.App.3d at 1034-35, 127 Ill.Dec. 14, 532 N.E.2d 843 (both cases discussing Connelly ). Thus, in the present case, the constitutional voluntariness of defendant's statements depends on the absence of police overreaching. Our inquiry is, therefore, confined to an analysis of Dye's conduct and whether that conduct was causally related to defendant's confession. We must decide whether, under the totality of the circumstances, Dye obtained defendant's statements in a manner that comports with due process. See Easley, 148 Ill.2d at 312, 170 Ill.Dec. 356, 592 N.E.2d 1036. The State has the burden of establishing the voluntariness of a defendant's confession by a preponderance of the evidence. Also, the trial court's findings on the question of the voluntariness of a confession will not be disturbed on review unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Redd, 135 Ill.2d 252, 292-93, 142 Ill.Dec. 802, 553 N.E.2d 316 (1990). The trial judge found as follows. Dye did not physically or mentally coerce defendant. Dye did not make any material misrepresentation to defendant, except that Dye was an informant, which defendant already knew. Also, defendant was extremely intelligent, well-oriented, and experienced based on his former roles of police officer and informant. Our review of the record does not reveal any evidence that Dye ever threatened defendant or promised him a benefit to obtain his incriminating statements. Also, the conversations between Dye and defendant were not lengthy, and defendant was always free to walk away from Dye, or at least stop talking to him. For an incriminating statement to be involuntary under the due process clause, the threats, promises, misinformation and the like must emanate from the police. True, defendant testified that he feared what Dye could cause to be done to him in jail. However, the only reason to suppress a confession on federal constitutional grounds is coercion by a public officer. In this context, [t]he Constitution has not yet been interpreted to protect people against themselves. Johnson v. Trigg, 28 F.3d 639, 642 (7th Cir. 1994). We cannot say that the trial court's findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Defendant next contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Where a criminal conviction is challenged based on insufficient evidence, a reviewing court, considering all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, must determine whether any rational fact finder could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the essential elements of the crime. A criminal conviction will not be set aside unless the evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory as to create a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt. People v. Eyler, 133 Ill.2d 173, 191, 139 Ill.Dec. 756, 549 N.E.2d 268 (1989). Defendant views the State's case as depending on the testimony of Dye, whom defendant characterizes as a jailhouse informant and an experienced liar. Defendant argues that Dye's uncorroborated testimony should never be the basis for any conviction. Jailhouse informants are motivated by the desire to help themselves and are notoriously dishonest and unreliable witnesses. According to defendant, without Dye's testimony, the remainder of the State's case is testimony that the victim was going to meet defendant on the day the victim disappeared, and that the bullets found in defendant's storage locker were the same caliber of the fatal bullet, but had a different metal composition. Defendant argues that this evidence, taken as a whole, fails to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. It is not the function of a reviewing court to retry a defendant when considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Rather, it is the function of the jury to assess the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given their testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence. People v. Tye, 141 Ill.2d 1, 13, 152 Ill.Dec. 249, 565 N.E.2d 931 (1990). Specifically, it is quite established that the credibility of a government informant, as with any other witness, is a question for the jury. See, e.g., United States v. Trujillo, 959 F.2d 1377, 1384-85 (7th Cir.1992); United States v. Molinaro, 877 F.2d 1341, 1347 (7th Cir.1989); People v. Irby, 237 Ill.App.3d 38, 58-59, 177 Ill.Dec. 177, 602 N.E.2d 1349 (1992). The jury was aware of the factors that would allow it to adequately judge the credibility of Dye. Thus, we cannot substitute our judgment for that of the jury. See People v. Carter, 168 Ill.App.3d 237, 243-44, 118 Ill. Dec. 983, 522 N.E.2d 653 (1988). Regarding defendant's insinuation that someone else murdered the victim, we note that speculation that another person might have committed the offense does not necessarily raise a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused. People v. Herrett, 137 Ill.2d 195, 206, 148 Ill.Dec. 695, 561 N.E.2d 1 (1990). We have reviewed the entire record in the light most favorable to the prosecution. We note that the evidence against defendant was not ample or overwhelming. However, we cannot say that the evidence was so improbable or unsatisfactory that no rational fact finder could have found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of first degree murder and armed robbery.
Defendant next raises several evidentiary issues. The admissibility of evidence at trial is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling may not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. People v. Illgen, 145 Ill.2d 353, 364, 164 Ill.Dec. 599, 583 N.E.2d 515 (1991).