Opinion ID: 6324062
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Commonwealth Law Claims

Text: Lahens argues that the district court erred in dismissing his Puerto Rico law claims with prejudice. At oral argument Lahens stated that a favorable appellate outcome would necessarily revive his Commonwealth claims that the district court dismissed with prejudice in its order granting summary judgment and its order granting AT&T's motion for reconsideration. We disagree. Law 44 and Law 100 are the Puerto Rico law analogues of the ADA and ADEA, respectively, and require the same elements of proof. See, e.g., Torres v. House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of P.R., 858 F. Supp.2d 172, 194 (D.P.R. 2012) ([Law 44] was modeled after the ADA. It was intended to harmonize Puerto Rico law with the federal statutory provisions of the ADA. Thus, the elements of proof for a claim under Law 44 are essentially the same as for a claim under the ADA. (internal citations omitted)); Varela Teron v. Banco Santander de P.R., 257 F. Supp. 2d 454, 462 (D.P.R. 2003) (Law No. 100 is the Puerto Rico equivalent of the federal ADEA.). To the extent that Lahens has failed to make out valid ADA and ADEA claims, he similarly cannot succeed on his Law 44 and Law 100 claims. Our analysis of Lahens' ADA and ADEA claims similarly dispenses with his Law 115 claim, which is the Puerto Rico equivalent of Title VII's antiretaliation provision. See Wirshing - 24 - v. Banco Santander de P.R., 254 F. Supp. 3d 271, 277 (D.P.R. 2015). Because Lahens failed to meet his burden of showing that AT&T's stated reason for his dismissal was pretextual he cannot successfully allege that he was retaliated against in violation of Law 115. See Salgado-Candelario v. Ericsson Caribbean, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 2d 151, 177 (D.P.R. 2008) (Inasmuch as plaintiff has failed to make [a showing that the alleged reason for her termination was a pretext], plaintiff's retaliation claim under Law 115 fails.). Similarly, under Law 80, Puerto Rico's wrongful discharge statute, a plaintiff who cannot meet his burden to show pretext under the McDonnell Douglas framework cannot make out a claim for wrongful discharge under Law 80 because the employer has good cause for the termination. See Acevedo v. Stericycle of P.R., Inc., No. 19-1652 (JAG), 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39720, at  (D.P.R. Mar. 6, 2020) ([A]n employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason proffered to sustain its burden under the McDonnell Douglas framework constitute[s] good cause under Law No. 80. (citing Sanchez Borgos v. Venegas Constr. Corp., No. 071592(SEC), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28180, at  (D.P.R. Mar. 31, 2009))); Sanchez Borgos, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28180, at  (These economic reasons [resulting in a reduction in force and a reduction in operations] are understandable, and constitute good cause both under ADEA, Law 115, and Law 80.). - 25 - Given the outcome of this appeal, our analysis above disposes with Lahens' Law 80 claim. Finally, to the extent that Lahens appeals his Article 1802 claim, we deem it waived. Unlike the Law 44, 80, 100, and 115 claims, the district court's dismissal with prejudice of the Article 1802 claim did not rest on the coterminous merits of the federal claims. Instead, the district court ruled that Lahens could not proceed with an Article 1802 claim grounded on the same facts underpinning his statutory employment claims and, therefore, the statutory claims superseded his Article 1802 claim. On this point, Lahens may not rely on appeal on the coterminous federal statutory employment arguments because the issues presented by the Article 1802 claim are not coterminous with the federal issues. Lahens failed to mention a basis for challenging the district court's ruling that the employment statutes superseded his Article 1802 claim. Specifically, Lahens provides no supporting argument that the district court improperly barred his Article 1802 claim or that AT&T committed tortious conduct separate from his employment claims and therefore waives this issue on appeal. United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) (explaining that it is a settled appellate rule that issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived). - 26 -