Opinion ID: 786420
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The maintenance plan

Text: 30 When a state submits to the EPA a request for redesignation, § 175A requires that the state submit a SIP revision to provide for the maintenance of the NAAQS for at least ten years after the redesignation. 42 U.S.C. § 7505a(a). Section 175A(d) provides: 31 Each [maintenance plan] submitted under this section shall contain such contingency provisions as the Administrator deems necessary to assure that the State will promptly correct any violation of the standard which occurs after the redesignation of the area as an attainment area. 32 42 U.S.C. § 7505a(d) (emphasis added). The language clearly indicates that Congress expressly delegated authority to the EPA to determine what contingency measures are necessary. We give such determinations by regulation controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778. Petitioners argue that the EPA's determination in this case is all three. We disagree. 33 In response to comments regarding the maintenance plan, the EPA stated that Ohio's enforcement program, commitment of resources, and legal authority are adequate and assure that measures in the SIP (including maintenance plan measures) will be implemented. 65 Fed.Reg. 77,315. It noted that the Ohio SIP contained contingency measures that had been approved by the EPA on May 6, 1996. Ibid. (citing Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; Ohio, 61 Fed.Reg. 20,139 (May 6, 1996)). When the EPA approved these contingency measures, the EPA stated that Ohio's contingency measures provided for a reasonable level of continued progress toward the attainment goal during an interim period between any prospective determination that the SIP has failed to ... provide for timely attainment of the NAAQS and the additional formal air quality planning following the determination. 61 Fed.Reg. at 20,141. 34 In its rulemaking redesignating Cleveland as an attainment area, the EPA stated that [s]ection 175A(d) does not dictate that the maintenance plan contingency measures be sufficient by themselves to correct any violation of the standard. Instead, these measures need only be sufficient in EPA's judgment to help assure that the State will promptly correct any future violation. 65 Fed.Reg. at 77,315. It reasoned that PM 10 is emitted from a variety of sources, and therefore it could not reasonably expect maintenance plan contingency measures by themselves to address all possible future violations. Ibid. The EPA also reasoned that it must make a judgment call as to which types of future violations are most likely and consider other factors which help assure that the State will correct any future violations. Ibid. The EPA identified as additional factors provisions in Ohio's regulations that allow the State to impose additional source controls if violations occur and provisions in the Clean Air Act Section 110(h) (provisions for SIP calls). Ibid. 35 It concluded that these contingency measures, approved May 6, 1996 and adopted pursuant to § 172(c)(9), 4 were adequate to satisfy § 175A(d), and that these contingency measures ... in combination with other factors, assure that Ohio will promptly correct any future violations in these areas. Ibid. 36 Petitioners claim that Ohio's maintenance plan is woefully inadequate and they raise a number of objections as to why the plan does not come close to fulfilling the statutory requirements. First, they argue that the statute requires that the contingency measures themselves should be sufficient to assure correction of a violation, and not just help assure a correction. They add that the statute does not authorize the EPA to use other measures outside the maintenance plan to assure these corrections. Second, Petitioners contend that the EPA has not identified a schedule for implementing the contingency measures, nor has it identified triggers or specific indicators that would be used to determine when contingency measures need to be implemented. In support of this argument, they cite a September 4, 1992 memorandum to various EPA air pollution directors from the Director of the Air Quality Management Division of the EPA, John Calcagni, entitled Procedures for Processing Requests to Redesignate Areas to Attainment (the Calcagni Memorandum). They add that the EPA's assertion that a violation of the NAAQS is the trigger for implementation of the contingency measures is not sufficient. Third, they argue that the word promptly in § 175A(d) reflects Congressional intent that the corrective measures be immediately available in the event the area once again exceeds the standard. H.R.Rep. No. 490, 101st Cong., 2d. Sess., pt. 1 at 226-27 (1990). According to Petitioners, however, the contingency measures in question would not be implemented until either the state or the EPA made a determination that the area has violated the NAAQS. Fourth, Petitioners allege that the EPA offered no explanation of the factual bases upon which it made its determination that Ohio's maintenance plan was adequate and simply deemed the requirements of § 175A(d) to have been met. 37 With respect to Petitioners' claim that these measures are insufficient, we agree with the EPA's conclusion that Ohio's maintenance plan is in fact sufficient to fulfill the requirements of § 175A. We find persuasive its reasoning that it cannot expect Ohio to provide contingency measures that are capable of addressing any imaginable violation from the mildest to the most severe. The EPA argues that Congress clearly contemplated a situation in which the federally-controlled contingency measures contained in the maintenance plan might not be sufficient to correct a violation of the NAAQS. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 7410(k)(5), the EPA is authorized to require a state to revise an approved SIP if it finds that it has become substantially inadequate to maintain the NAAQS. Moreover, § 175A allows the EPA, in its discretion, to require the state to submit a revised SIP should the area fail to maintain the NAAQS. 38 [A]ny final determination regarding the adequacy of a maintenance plan will be made `in light of the particular circumstances facing the area proposed for redesignation and based on all relevant information available at the time.' Wall v. EPA, 265 F.3d 426, 431 (6th Cir.2001) (quoting Calcagni Memorandum, at 8). Ohio's SIP contains contingency measures approved May 6, 1996. The EPA deemed these measures as sufficient to assure that Ohio would reach attainment, which it did, and sufficient to assure that it would promptly correct any violation of the standard after redesignation. The EPA stated that other factors will help assure prompt correction. Petitioners argue that the contingency measures themselves are not sufficient to do so and argue that under the EPA's logic, a state could submit a plan with no contingency provisions and merely assert that other measures will correct the violation. However, the EPA did not do so in the present case. The contingency measures submitted clearly contemplate future violations, along with the possibility that Ohio could again be subject to strict regulations. 39 The EPA is correct when it states that no maintenance plan could, or should be expected to, cover every possible contingency. Any maintenance plan included in a SIP could never assure that the State will promptly correct any violation of the standard. Violations could be of any degree of severity, and caused by any number of sources of particulate matter. The EPA argues that it had to judge which types of violations were most likely, and judged Ohio's maintenance plan in that context. The Administrator has been granted broad discretion by Congress in determining what is necessary to assure prompt correction. The EPA has approved Ohio's maintenance plan, concluding that its contingency measures provide a means to deal with likely violations. We do not believe that this determination is arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778. 40 As the EPA notes, the other factors (such as Ohio's general environmental regulations) it included in its December 11, 2000 rulemaking are available should the contingency measures by themselves fail to correct the violation. Petitioners respond that if Congress had thought that the state's general regulatory authorities would be adequate to assure the prompt correction of a violation, it would not have required a maintenance plan to contain specific contingency measures that a state is obligated to implement in the event of a violation. However, the EPA stated that the contingency measures themselves are sufficient to help assure that the State will promptly correct any future violation, and that the other factors in addition to the contingency measures will assure that Ohio will promptly correct any future violations in these areas. 65 Fed.Reg. at 77,315. Therefore, the EPA stated that the contingency measures themselves were sufficient to help assure prompt correction, and that the additional factors also were available to help assure prompt correction. Again, without knowledge of the severity or source of a NAAQS violation, any combination of contingency measures cannot assure prompt correction to an absolute certainty, and can only be promised to help assure prompt correction. 41 The quarrel between whether the state's measures will assure or only help assure corrections of violations is largely a semantic one. The approved maintenance plan is based, in part, on measures that Ohio has committed to implement in case of need, and that, ultimately, the EPA can compel. On that state of facts, whether the EPA's own measures are said to assure or only help assure, the essential fact is that the remedial measures will occur in case of need, and that the EPA has deemed those measures (collectively) as adequate to remedy any future violation. 42 Petitioners' second argument was that the maintenance plan lacked both schedules for implementing the contingency measures and triggers or other specific indicators that would be used to determine if the contingency measures needed to be implemented. The EPA disagrees. The EPA explains that Ohio added contingency measures to regulate industrial sources in Cleveland because such sources were the principal cause of particulate matter nonattainment. 61 Fed.Reg. at 20,140; Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; Ohio, 58 Fed.Reg. 41,218 (Aug. 3, 1993). It has stated that, in the event of a violation of the NAAQS, five industrial source facilities in the Cleveland area are required to reduce particulate emissions by either 15% or 25%, depending on the severity of the violation. 61 Fed.Reg. at 20140; OAC 3745-17-14(C); OAC 3745-17-02. The EPA states that, once a violation of the NAAQS has occurred, the principal contributors of particulate matter are required to reduce emissions, and that this is sufficient. 43 With this background in mind, we turn to the Petitioners' specific allegations about how and when these measures would take effect in the event of a violation. With respect to triggers, the EPA correctly argues that monitored violations of the NAAQS can be possible triggers. Calcagni Memo at 12. The contingency measures may be triggered upon notification by the Ohio EPA or the United States EPA of a determination by either agency that a violation has occurred. With respect to schedules, the EPA correctly explains that the contingency measures were initially developed pursuant to § 172(c)(9), which requires that the measures take effect without further action by the State or the EPA, which the EPA interprets to mean that no further rulemaking activities by the State or EPA would be needed to implement the contingency measures. State Implementation Plans; General Preamble for the Implementation of Title I of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 57 Fed.Reg. 13,498, 13,512 (April 16, 1992). The Calcagni Memorandum also states that [f]or the purposes of section 175A, a State is not required to have fully adopted contingency measures that will take effect without further action by the State in order for the maintenance plan to be approved. Calcagni Memorandum at 12. Thus, no pre-determined schedule for adoption of the measures is necessary in each specific case. 44 We also reject Petitioners' third argument and find that the EPA's interpretation of what promptly means is reasonable. It is unclear how petitioners expect the EPA to recognize a violation unless it is able to make a determination based on the data collected from the air quality monitoring sites and its subsequent evaluation. Petitioners assert that there is no requirement that the EPA make this determination expeditiously. However, there is no indication in the record that the EPA or the Ohio EPA will not make such a determination when justified by its data collection and evaluation. 45 Finally, Petitioners argue that the EPA did not meet minimal administrative law requirements by failing to base its determination upon facts in the administrative record. They argue that the EPA did not provide any explanation for its action. However, in the December 11, 2000 rulemaking, the EPA referenced the May 6, 1996 rulemaking, which approved the contingency measures contained in Ohio's SIP. The May 6 rulemaking stated that the implementation of the contingency measures contained within would result in an emissions reduction of 34 pounds of PM per hour in Cuyahoga County. 61 Fed.Reg. at 20,139. In the rulemaking approving redesignation, the EPA stated that [a] variety of sources emit PM 10 , so nonattainment can occur for a variety of reasons. 65 Fed.Reg. at 77,315. 46 We must `consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment.... Although this inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. The court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.' Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285, 95 S.Ct. 438, 42 L.Ed.2d 447 (1974) (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971)). The agency must articulate a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made. Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168, 83 S.Ct. 239, 9 L.Ed.2d 207 (1962). While we may not supply a reasoned basis for the agency's action that the agency itself has not given, we will uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency's path may reasonably be discerned. Bowman Transp., Inc., 419 U.S. at 286, 95 S.Ct. 438 (internal citation omitted). 47 Although the EPA's rationale is less than completely clear in its December 11, 2000 rulemaking, its path may reasonably be discerned. Ibid. The May 6, 1996 rulemaking, adopting the contingency measures contained in Ohio's SIP, and clearly referenced in the December 11, 2000 rulemaking, extensively discusses the Ohio EPA's interaction with the principal facilities in the PM nonattainment areas, 61 Fed.Reg. at 20,140, and Ohio's success in attaining sufficient reductions from several of those sources in the event that the area failed to timely attain the applicable NAAQS. Ibid. While it is true that the earlier rulemaking was somewhat limited in scope in that it focused primarily on particular industries, the EPA had previously determined that these industrial sources were primarily responsible for the excessive particulate emissions in Cleveland. In addition, and as noted above, the contingency measures require these major sources to reduce particulate emissions should a future violation occur. Therefore, we do not believe that the EPA has committed a clear error of judgment and do not substitute our judgment for that of the agency.