Opinion ID: 199348
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Relevant Supreme Court Precedents

Text: 16 The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant's right to counsel in all criminal prosecutions. U.S. Const. amend. VI. Defendants have a correlative right to representation that is free from conflicts of interest. Wood, 450 U.S. at 271. Even if defense counsel has a conflict, however, the court may sometimes allow the attorney to continue with the representation if the defendant makes a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver. See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 163 (1988) (district courts have substantial latitude in declining to grant waivers); Holloway, 435 U.S. at 483 n.5 (a defendant may waive his right to representation that is unhindered by a conflict of interests). The purpose of a trial court's inquiry into a possible conflict is to evaluate the conflict and ensure it is either eliminated or waived. United States v. Rogers, 209 F.3d 139, 146 (2d Cir. 2000). The inquiry thus includes an on-the-record discussion of the representation with the defendant. Cf. Fed. R. Crim. P. 44(c) ([T]he court shall promptly inquire with respect to such joint representation and shall personally advise each defendant of the right to the effective assistance of counsel, including separate representation.). When courts do not obtain a waiver to conflict-free counsel (and even sometimes when they do), defendants may challenge the representation on appeal by bringing an ineffective assistance claim. See Wheat, 486 U.S. at 162. 17 The extent of the trial court's responsibility to make an inquiry into the defendant's understanding of a possible conflict is the subject of the Supreme Court's decisions in Holloway, Sullivan, and Wood. In Holloway, one defense lawyer represented three co-defendants. In pre-trial motions and at trial, the lawyer repeatedly objected to the joint representation, telling the judge that his conflicting loyalties to his clients hindered his ability to advocate for them. The judge refused to appoint separate counsel and did not adequately inquire into the risk posed by the conflict. Holloway, 435 U.S. at 484. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment requires automatic reversal of a conviction whenever a trial court improperly requires joint representation over timely objection. Id. at 488. Holloway premised its holding on the shared responsibility of the trial court and defense counsel to prevent conflicts from infringing on the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights. Id. at 485. 3 18 In Sullivan, the Court considered two questions left open in Holloway: whether a state trial judge must inquire about multiple representation even though no party objects at trial, and whether the mere possibility of a conflict means that a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights were violated. Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 345. Emphasizing defense counsel's ethical obligation to advise a trial court when a conflict arises, the Court said that when defense counsel does not alert the court to a conflict by objecting, nothing in our precedents suggests that the Sixth Amendment requires state courts themselves to initiate inquiries into the propriety of multiple representation in every case. Id. at 346. At the same time, the Court left open some possibility, albeit a narrow one, that Holloway may apply without an objection by the defendant. 19 Absent special circumstances, therefore, trial courts may assume either that multiple representation entails no conflict or that the lawyer and his clients knowingly accept such risk of conflict as may exist. . . . Unless the trial court knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict exists, the court need not initiate an inquiry. 20 Id. at 346-47 (footnotes omitted). 21 Addressing the relationship between a possible conflict and a Sixth Amendment violation, Sullivan next held that when a defendant does not object to a possible conflict and the trial judge is not otherwise alerted to such a conflict, the defendant must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance. Id. at 348. This showing of harm need not, however, rise to the level of prejudice. Instead, prejudice is presumed when counsel is burdened by an actual conflict of interest. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984). This presumption means that a defendant need not show that he would not have been convicted but for choices his lawyer made because of conflicting loyalties. Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 349-50. Instead, the necessary showing might involve failure to cross-examine a witness whose testimony favored one defendant in a joint representation over the other. Id. at 350. 22 In Wood v. Georgia, in an unusual factual context, the Court again addressed the question of a trial court's responsibility to inquire about a possible conflict. In Wood, three employees of an adult theater and bookstore were convicted of distributing obscene materials and sentenced to probation on the condition that they make installment payments toward $5,000 and $10,000 fines. The defendants defaulted on their payments, saying that they had expected their employer to pay the fines for them. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether imprisoning a probationer because he cannot pay a fine violates the Equal Protection Clause. Wood, 450 U.S. at 264. After hearing the case, however, the Court decided it on a different due process ground. The Court noted that the employer's lawyer had represented the defendants throughout the proceedings against them, and that this lawyer did not challenge the amount of the fines imposed at sentencing. Id. at 266-268. The trial court was aware of these circumstances and the prosecutor raised the question of whether they gave rise to a conflict of interest. Id. at 272-73. 23 Based on the record, the Court concluded that a possible conflict of interest was sufficiently apparent . . . to impose upon the court a duty to inquire further. Id. at 272. In response to the dissent's argument that the majority had gone beyond Sullivan, the Court said: 24 nothing in that case rules out the raising of a conflict-of-interest problem that is apparent in the record. Moreover, Sullivan mandates a reversal when the trial court has failed to make an inquiry even though it 'knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict exists.' 25 Id. at 272 n.18 (quoting Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 347). 26 Wood thus emphasized that trial judges have a duty to inquire not only when defendants object to a possible conflict, but also when trial judges are or should be independently aware of a possible conflict. Yet the Wood Court did not impose the remedy of a new trial based on the trial judge's failure to make the required inquiry, despite the above-quoted language from its own footnote about Sullivan mandating reversal under such circumstances. Moreover, without discussing the implications for Holloway's rule of automatic reversal, the Court remanded the case for a hearing to determine whether the conflict of interest that this record strongly suggests actually existed. Id. at 273. 27 Not surprisingly, the circuit courts have ruled differently in the wake of Wood about the type of remedy that is triggered when the trial court has a duty to inquire about a possible conflict and fails to do so. Some courts have reversed for a new trial whenever the possibility of a conflict was sufficiently apparent to impose a duty to inquire. See Riggs v. United States, 209 F.3d 828, 831 n.1 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Cook, 45 F.3d 388, 393-94 (10th Cir. 1995); Dawan v. Lockhart, 980 F.2d 470, 474-75 (8th Cir. 1992). One court has held that a post-trial inquiry into a possible conflict that was evident before trial does not suffice. See Rogers, 209 F.3d at 146. By contrast, we have held that in light of Wood, automatic reversal is not required if a trial judge holds a post-trial hearing about whether an actual conflict developed that adversely affected counsel's performance, the standard for reversal under Sullivan. Brien v. United States, 695 F.2d 10, 15 n.10 (1st Cir. 1982) (petitioner's § 2255 hearing could serve the same function that the remand served in Wood). With this background in mind, we turn to the New Hampshire Supreme Court's decision in Mountjoy's appeal. 28