Opinion ID: 165930
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defining voluntary manslaughter mens rea

Text: 55 This takes us directly to the issue at hand, determining what without malice ... [u]pon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion means in the context of 18 U.S.C. § 1112(a) and what mental state is intended by this language. The common law recognized heat of passion as one mitigating factor pursuant to which an otherwise intentional or reckless killing would constitute the less serious offense of voluntary manslaughter and be, because of that mitigating circumstance, without malice. See Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 693, 95 S.Ct. 1881; see also 2 Wharton's CRIM. LAW § 155 (15th ed.) (As a concession to human frailty, a killing [in the heat of passion], which would otherwise constitute murder, is mitigated to voluntary manslaughter.) (emphasis added); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 15.2, at 493 (2d ed.2003) (hereinafter LaFave ) (The usual view of voluntary manslaughter thus presupposes an intent to kill (or perhaps to do serious injury or to engage in very reckless conduct), holding that in spite of the existence of this bad intent the circumstances may reduce the homicide to manslaughter.) (emphasis added). As the Fifth Circuit explained: 56 [t]he separate offense of voluntary manslaughter emerged [at common law] as an intentional killing that is nonetheless deemed to be without malice because it occurs in what the courts called the heat of passion, a passion of fear or rage in which the defendant loses his normal self-control as a result of circumstances that would provoke such a passion in an ordinary person, but which did not justify the use of deadly force. Again, the federal statute simply declares the language of the common-law offense, and so when the defendant ... actuated by a sudden passion of fear or rage arising from attendant circumstances that would provoke such passion in an ordinary person, kills intentionally (or with one of the other mental states that constitutes malice), the killing is nevertheless deemed to be in the absence of malice under the federal statute. The malice that would otherwise attach is negated by the fact that the intentional killing occurred in the heat of passion in response to a sufficient provocation. 57 Browner, 889 F.2d at 552 (citations omitted). 58 We agree with the Fifth Circuit that this common law understanding is carried into § 1112 where [v]oluntary manslaughter encompasses all of the elements of murder: it requires proof of the physical act of unlawfully causing the death of another, and of the mental state that would constitute malice, but for the fact that the killing was committed in adequately provoked heat of passion or provocation. Id. at 553. Thus, the only difference between second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter in the homicide hierarchy is that voluntary manslaughter is committed in the heat of passion, and the presence of this mitigating factor negates the malice that would otherwise attach given an intentional or reckless mental state. 6 See id. 59 While our court has not yet reached this issue directly, our case law directly supports this understanding. We have, without much detailed discussion, consistently noted that heat of passion in the voluntary manslaughter context has the effect of negating malice. Lofton, 776 F.2d at 920 (The heat of passion defense is directly at odds with malice ... the defense serves to negative malice.) (quotation and citation omitted); United States v. Scafe, 822 F.2d 928, 932 (10th Cir.1987) (Malice is negated by heat of passion.). 60 Although we have used this language of negation in reference to malice, we have never suggested that heat of passion eliminates the requirement of an intentional or reckless killing implicit in the common law and in the structure of the homicide hierarchy. To the contrary, we have frequently referred to voluntary manslaughter as a general intent crime. See, e.g., Soundingsides, 820 F.2d at 1242; United States v. Hatatley, 130 F.3d 1399, 1405 (10th Cir. 1997); see also United States v. Fortier, 180 F.3d 1217, 1228 (10th Cir.1999). Thus, malice is negated in the voluntary manslaughter context only in the sense that the killing is no longer without excuse as it would have to be to establish malice for second degree murder. 7 61 At least two other circuits have similarly construed 18 U.S.C. § 1112 as incorporating this common law understanding and requiring the mens rea of an intentional or reckless killing as an element of voluntary manslaughter. See United States v. Paul, 37 F.3d 496, 499 (9th Cir.1994) (striking down a jury instruction for voluntary manslaughter similar to the instruction given in the instant case that did not require the jury to find that the defendant had the mental state of intending to kill, stating [i]f the defendant killed with the mental state required for murder (intent to kill or recklessness with extreme disregard for human life), but the killing occurred in the heat of passion caused by adequate provocation, then the defendant is guilty of voluntary manslaughter. The finding of heat of passion and adequate provocation negates the malice that would otherwise attach.) (emphasis added) (citations omitted); United States v. Velazquez, 246 F.3d 204, 212 (2nd Cir.2001) (approving language that voluntary manslaughter requires a mental state that would be malice except for heat of passion or provocation) (emphasis added). 62 In addition, two other circuit decisions contain language suggesting that they also agree that a voluntary manslaughter conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1112 requires proof of the defendant's intent to cause the death of the victim. See Wakaksan v. United States, 367 F.2d 639, 645 (8th Cir. 1966) (An essential element of [voluntary manslaughter] was to establish that the appellant intentionally caused the death of the victim.); cf. United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923, 942, 944 n. 54 (D.C.Cir. 1973) (interpreting District of Columbia manslaughter statute). 63 Therefore, taking this all together, we read the statutory language of 18 U.S.C. § 1112 in accordance with our sister circuits' interpretations and with the history of the common law. Voluntary manslaughter requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted, while in the heat of passion or upon a sudden quarrel, with a mental state that would otherwise constitute second degree murder—either a general intent to kill, intent to do serious bodily injury, or with depraved heart recklessness.