Opinion ID: 582690
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Merits of the FLRA's 1990 Order

Text: 16 In ordering release of the names and duty stations of those bargaining unit employees who earned commendable or outstanding ratings, the FLRA made the following findings: (1) the NWS normally maintained this information; (2) the information was reasonably available and necessary for a full and proper understanding or discussion of subjects within the scope of collective bargaining; and (3) no other provision of law, such as the Privacy Act, barred release of the information. National Weather Service Employees Organization, 38 F.L.R.A. at 128-29, 132; see also FLRA v. Department of Treasury, 884 F.2d 1446, 1449-50 (D.C.Cir.1989) (Department of Treasury ) (discussing the elements of § 7114(b)). In contesting the FLRA's order to release the names and ratings information, the NWS objects only to the FLRA's conclusions regarding the Privacy Act, and we direct our review accordingly. 17 The Privacy Act prevents the government from releasing personal information except as required by the FOIA. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(2). In turn, the FOIA allows agencies to withhold information in personnel files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. Id. § 552(b)(6). This limitation on release, known as exemption 6, requires a balance of the harm to the individual whose privacy is breached against the public interest served by disclosure. Department of Treasury, 884 F.2d at 1451 (citing Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372, 96 S.Ct. 1592, 1604, 48 L.Ed.2d 11 (1976)). 18 In its assessment of the harm to individual privacy, the Authority simply observed that it had previously approved the release of similar information and declared it found nothing stigmatizing in identifying employees with high ratings. 38 F.L.R.A. at 133-34. Nonetheless, we find that NWS employees who received outstanding or commendable ratings have a substantial interest in maintaining the privacy of their evaluations. That the information here is favorable does not diminish this interest. [D]isclosure even of favorable information may well embarrass an individual or incite jealousy in his or her co-workers. Ripskis v. HUD, 746 F.2d 1, 3 (D.C.Cir.1984) (opining that release of favorable ratings information would likely spur unhealthy comparisons among HUD employees and thus breed discord in the workplace). And, of course, a list identifying those employees who received outstanding and commendable ratings reveals by omission the identities of those employees who did not receive high ratings, creating an invasion of their privacy. 19 The Authority also erred by finding relevant the Union's assertion that it would not disseminate the information. 38 F.L.R.A. at 135. We have emphasized that a requester's intended use of information plays no role in assessing the invasion of privacy, for if information must be released to one requester, it must be released to all, regardless of the uses to which it might be put. Painting and Drywall Work Preservation Fund v. HUD, 936 F.2d 1300, 1302 (D.C.Cir.1991). Applying this law, we see nothing in the record mitigating the substantial invasion of privacy that all NWS employees would suffer if the NWS released the information requested by the Union. 20 On the disclosure side of the balance, the Authority construed the public interest to be examined as that embodied in the [FSLMRS]. 38 F.L.R.A. at 132 (citing Department of the Navy, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, 37 F.L.R.A. 515 (1990) (Portsmouth )). The Authority then concluded that the early resolution of potential grievances and the proper administration of agency performance appraisal systems are the type of public interests which disclosure of information is intended to further. Id. 21 In defining the exemption 6 public interest as incorporating values enshrined in the FSLMRS, the Authority misread the FOIA. The Department of Treasury court addressed precisely this issue, and explained that the collective bargaining values contained in the FSLMRS have no place in the exemption 6 balance. 884 F.2d at 1453. Instead, we held that for purposes of the exemption 6 balance, the public interest is defined solely by the values animating the FOIA; to wit, ensuring  'that the Government's activities be opened to the sharp eye of public scrutiny.'  Department of Treasury, 884 F.2d at 1451 (quoting Department of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 109 S.Ct. 1468, 1482, 103 L.Ed.2d 774 (1989)). By crediting early resolution of potential union grievances, we find that the Authority improperly loaded the public interest side of the exemption 6 balance with collective bargaining values. 22 A recent First Circuit decision highlights the Authority's mistake. As noted above, the Authority cited its Portsmouth decision for the proposition that the interests embraced by the FSLMRS are incorporated in the exemption 6 public interest. National Weather Service Employees Organization, 38 F.L.R.A. at 132 (citing Portsmouth, 37 F.L.R.A. 515 (1990)). This precedential pillar, though, has been removed by the First Circuit, which set aside Portsmouth based on the reasoning espoused in Department of Treasury. See FLRA v. Department of the Navy, 941 F.2d 49, 54 (1st Cir.1991) (Department of the Navy ) (agreeing with Department of Treasury that the public interest in collective bargaining and labor organization is unrelated to [the] FOIA). 23 Nevertheless, we acknowledge that this case differs from Department of Treasury and Department of the Navy, in that the Authority found that the information sought here may shed light on the NWS's operation of its rating system. 38 F.L.R.A. at 134. The requested information therefore arguably falls within the basic purpose of the [FOIA] 'to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny.'  Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. at 372, 96 S.Ct. at 1604. 24 As in Ripskis, however, we do not believe that the public interest served by release of identifying information overcomes the substantial invasion of privacy that would result. A mandatory personnel evaluation, whether favorable or not, is intensely personal, and counsel has not demonstrated that ratings have traditionally been subject to disclosure, unlike performance awards. Consequently, employees have a substantial interest in keeping this information private, and we are not convinced that the public interest in disclosure found by the FLRA outweighs this interest. 2 III. CONCLUSION 25 For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that the FLRA misapplied the balancing test required by exemption 6 of the FOIA by slighting the substantial privacy interest employees have in their ratings and by freighting the balance with interests not encompassed by the FOIA. Accordingly, we set aside the Authority's order of November 13, 1990, and hold that the NWS did not violate § 7114(b) of the FSLMRS when it refused to provide identifying information regarding those bargaining unit employees who received outstanding or commendable ratings. The petitioner's request for enforcement is therefore 26 Denied.