Opinion ID: 398932
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: evidence of private wealth

Text: 33 Appellant argues that the district court erred by admitting evidence of his purchase of two expensive, private residences because there was no evidence to connect these purchases with his operation of a continuing criminal enterprise. 20 We find no error in the admission of this evidence. 34 To prove a continuing criminal enterprise charge, the government must establish that the defendant engaged in a continuing series of felony violations of the federal narcotics laws in concert with five or more persons under his management or supervision, and that he obtained substantial income or resources from this conduct. United States v. Phillips, supra, 664 F.2d at 1012-1013; United States v. Michel, 588 F.2d 986, 1000 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 825, 100 S.Ct. 47, 62 L.Ed.2d 32 (1979); United States v. Bolts, 558 F.2d 316, 320 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 930, 98 S.Ct. 417, 54 L.Ed.2d 290 (1977). Admission of the evidence of appellant's purchase of expensive private real estate was a proper means of proving that appellant obtained substantial income or resources from his operation of a continuing narcotics enterprise. United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 147 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907, 100 S.Ct. 1833, 64 L.Ed.2d 260 (1980). Where a defendant is on trial for a crime in which pecuniary gain is the usual motive for or natural result of its perpetration and there is other evidence of his guilt, evidence of the sudden acquisition or expenditure of large sums of money by the defendant, at or after the time of the commission of the alleged offense, is admissible to demonstrate the defendant's illegal obtention of those funds. Evidence of this type is admissible even though the government does not specifically trace the source of those funds to the illegal acts charged against the defendant because a dishonest acquisition ... (is) a natural and prominent hypothesis, 1 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 154, at 601 (1940 & Supp.1981), explaining the defendant's affluence. United States v. Ariza-Ibarra, 605 F.2d 1216, 1225, 1225 n.11 (1st Cir. 1979), appeal after remand, 651 F.2d 2 (1981); United States v. Barnes, supra, 604 F.2d at 147; id. (cases cited); United States v. Viserto, 596 F.2d 531, 536 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Tramunti, 513 F.2d 1087, 1105 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 832, 96 S.Ct. 54, 46 L.Ed.2d 50 (1975); United States v. Rouse, 494 F.2d 45, 46 (5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam); United States v. Manning, 440 F.2d 1105, 1110 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 837, 92 S.Ct. 125, 30 L.Ed.2d 69 (1971); Hagan v. United States, 245 F.2d 556, 557-58 (5th Cir. 1957) (per curiam); United States v. Jackskion, 102 F.2d 683, 684 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 635, 59 S.Ct. 1032, 83 L.Ed. 1517 (1939); Commonwealth v. Mulrey, 170 Mass. 103, 49 N.E. 91, 94 (1898) (Holmes, J.) In the present case there was sufficient evidence that appellant was engaged in a large-scale continuing narcotics enterprise so as to justify, under this principle, the admission as relevant and probative evidence of his receipt of large sums of money. That the funds for these acquisitions may have stemmed from entirely lawful activities, or, as appellant claims, from his gambling, goes to the weight of the evidence rather than to its admissibility. United States v. Viserto, supra, 596 F.2d at 536; United States v. Tramunti, supra, 513 F.2d at 1105. 21 Admission of this evidence was entirely proper.