Opinion ID: 2975483
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: O’Hara argues that “no credible evidence sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt was ever presented. Although Maureen Hicks testified that she was abducted and sexually assaulted, neither physical evidence nor the testimony of other witnesses supported [her] version of the events.” (Appellant’s Br. 15.) Conversely, the State argues that “overwhelming evidence was adduced as to O’Hara’s guilt.” (Appellee’s Br. 29.) The Ohio Court of Appeals, on direct review, was the only Ohio court to address the merits of this claim: Obviously the jury in this case was presented with two vastly different versions of the truth. While O’Hara disparages Hicks’s testimony as incredible, it is his version of events that requires the willing suspension of disbelief. To accept O’Hara’s version, the jury would have had to accept that Hicks had engaged in an adulterous relationship with a stranger who had approached her out of the blue in a Wal Mart store; that O’Hara had never learned her last name in the course of their entire intimate relationship, or become aware of a distinctive tattoo on her ankle; and that Hicks, outraged at the sexually perverse behavior of O’Hara’s brother (who did not testify), had concocted on the drive home from his apartment an elaborate scheme to falsely charge him with rape that would involve the police and eventually expose their illicit relationship to her husband in a court of law. The jury here would have also had to overlook the fact that O’Hara had initially given a different story to the police when he was arrested, claiming that he had had oral sex with Hicks, and that he had not known why she would falsely charge him with rape and kidnapping. In sum, even sitting as a thirteenth juror, we find no basis to disagree with the twelve in this case that the person engaging in an extraordinarily malicious fiction was O’Hara, not Hicks. O’Hara, 2001 WL 725410, at . The magistrate judge concluded that “upon viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, . . . any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that [O’Hara] was guilty of kidnapping and raping the victim.” (Mag. J. Report 22.) The magistrate judge explained that Hicks’s testimony at trial, identifying O’Hara as the individual that abducted and raped her, “was sufficient in and of itself to establish [O’Hara’s] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on the kidnapping and rape charges in this case.” (Id. 21.) Although O’Hara argued that Hicks was not a credible witness, the magistrate judge noted that O’Hara himself did not present a “credible defense, which a reasonable juror could have determined outweighed the relatively minor inconsistences cited by [O’Hara] regarding the victim’s version of events.” (Id.) Under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979), in addressing a sufficiency-of-theevidence claim we look to “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson makes clear that “a federal habeas corpus court faced with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting inferences must presume—even if it does not No. 06-3455 O’Hara v. Brigano Page 7 affirmatively appear in the record—that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.” Id. at 326. “The state need not rule out every hypothesis except that of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the reviewing court need not be convinced of petitioner’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Walker v. Russell, 57 F.3d 472, 475 (6th Cir. 1995). O’Hara argues that Hicks’s version of events “not only lacked credibility, it was simply bizarre.” (Appellant’s Br. 15.) On appeal, however, it is not for us to judge the credibility of Hicks’s testimony; the jury could reasonably have believed Hicks’s testimony while discrediting O’Hara’s. See Walker, 57 F.3d at 475-76 (explaining that the jury’s disbelief of a witnesses’s testimony was reasonable and that “[i]t is not for this Court to weigh the credibility of the witnesses”). It is the jury’s responsibility to “resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. Although O’Hara argues that Hicks’s version of events was not corroborated by other witnesses or by physical evidence, “[a] jury’s verdict ‘may be based entirely on circumstantial evidence.’” Dixon v. Miller, 293 F.3d 74, 81 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Martinez, 54 F.3d 1040, 1043 (2d Cir. 1995)); see also United States v. Spearman, 186 F.3d 743, 746 (6th Cir. 1999) (“‘Circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to sustain a conviction . . . .’”) (quoting United States v. Vannerson, 786 F.2d 221, 225 (6th Cir. 1986)); United States v. Jones, 102 F.3d 804, 807 (6th Cir. 1996) (noting that there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction even if the “circumstantial evidence does not ‘remove every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt’”) (quoting United States v. Clark, 928 F.2d 733, 736 (6th Cir. 1991) (per curiam)). Hicks testified that O’Hara abducted her and forcibly raped her by performing oral sex on her. (Mag. J. Report 21.) This testimony was sufficient to establish each element of the rape and kidnapping charges against O’Hara. See, e.g., United States v. Howard, 218 F.3d 556, 565 (6th Cir. 2000) (stating that “the testimony of a rape victim alone is sufficient to support a defendant’s conviction”). In light of the deference given to a jury’s verdict under Jackson, the Ohio Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that O’Hara’s conviction was supported by sufficient evidence. 3. Prosecution’s Failure to Disclose Exculpatory Information O’Hara claims that his Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial was violated when the prosecution withheld Hicks’s written statement to a Colerain Township police officer made immediately after the incident—evidence which O’Hara claims is material and exculpatory under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The Ohio Court of Appeals addressed this claim on direct review: According to O’Hara, the statement was favorable to the defense because in it Hicks had placed the time of the offenses at 1:45 p.m. and had never claimed that O’Hara actually had a gun. The existence of the written statement was revealed during Hicks’s testimony. Defense counsel, after Hicks had completed her testimony, moved to have the statement examined under Crim. R. 16(B)(g). That section provides, upon request of the defendant, for an in camera inspection of a witness’s statement by the court, with the attorneys participating, to determine the existence of any inconsistencies between the statement and the trial testimony. The trial court here conducted such an inquiry. Although the court did not find any inconsistencies, defense counsel felt that the 1:45 p.m. time given to the Colerain police was sufficiently inconsistent with Hicks’s earlier testimony to warrant recalling Hicks for No. 06-3455 O’Hara v. Brigano Page 8 further cross-examination. The court stated that it would allow the defense to recall Hicks for the purpose of questioning her about any perceived discrepancy. But when Hicks was later recalled by the state as a rebuttal witness on an unrelated matter, defense counsel chose not to question her about the time of the offenses. And at no time did counsel suggest that there was any inconsistency between Hicks’s testimony and her prior statement in which she had never claimed that O’Hara actually possessed a weapon. O’Hara, 2001 WL 725410, at  4. The court discussed the merits of O’Hara’s Brady claim, after outlining the requirements for establishing such a claim: The state argues that there were no discrepancies in Hicks’s statements, let alone material ones. The state points out, in this regard, that Hicks merely testified that she had gone to the La-Z-Boy store at 12:30 p.m., and that, taking into account all that had transpired later, she was probably raped at very close to 1:45 p.m. The state also argues that there was no discrepancy between her testimony that O’Hara had acted as if he had a gun by sticking his hand into his coat pocket, and her earlier statement in which she had made no claim that he actually had a gun. We agree with the state that whatever slight difference there was between Hicks’s testimony and her earlier statement was not material, and certainly was not sufficient to undermine confidence in the verdict reached by the jury. Moreover, we disagree with O’Hara that the prosecution “suppressed” the statement. The statement was appropriately produced pursuant to the procedure set forth in Crim. R. 16(B)(g). Although O’Hara argues that, because the statement was not disclosed prior to trial, he was deprived of the opportunity to effectively cross-examine Hicks, this argument ignores the fact that the trial court expressly granted defense counsel leave to recall Hicks and to inquire about the alleged time discrepancy. Counsel did not take advantage of this opportunity. Further, although O’Hara cites this court’s decision in State v. Henderson (June 9, 2000), Hamilton App. No. C 990657, unreported, as support for his position, he overlooks a very important difference between that case and this. In Henderson, the trial had concluded and the defendant had been found guilty before defense counsel discovered exculpatory evidence in police files. Here, the trial was still in progress. Had defense counsel felt prejudiced by the lack of earlier disclosure, she had the option of requesting a continuance. The fact that she did not defeats a claim of prejudice. As the Ohio Supreme Court held in State v. Edwards (1976), 49 Ohio St.2d 31, 42-43, 358 N.E.2d 1051, 1059 1060, a defendant cannot claim prejudice on the basis of surprise by the revelation, during trial, of nondisclosed evidence, when the defendant fails to move for a continuance at the time of the objection. Id. at -5. The magistrate judge concluded that O’Hara’s claim was meritless: “Brady does not apply to the case-at-hand, which involves at most the tardy disclosure of the victim’s prior written statement during trial, made in time for ‘full and adequate correction’ and where no showing has been made of any prejudice to petitioner by the delay in disclosure.” (Mag. J. Report 28.) The magistarte judge determined that O’Hara failed to show that the State improperly withheld Hicks’s prior written statement because it was disclosed during the trial. Further, even if the statement should have been disclosed prior to trial, O’Hara “has not demonstrated that ‘there is a reasonable probability that . . . the result of the [trial] would have been different.’” (Id. 29 (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).) In addition, even assuming that the discrepancy in No. 06-3455 O’Hara v. Brigano Page 9 Hicks’s testimony constituted favorable evidence for the defense, explained the magistrate judge, the Ohio Court of Appeals reasonably concluded that the evidence was not material. O’Hara raised this claim in his brief on direct review to the Ohio Court of Appeals. (JA 117, 126-129.) O’Hara also raised this claim to the Ohio Supreme Court on direct review. (JA 296, 30306.) The district court concluded that this claim was not procedurally defaulted, Mag. J. Report 22, and we agree. In Brady, the Supreme Court held that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” 373 U.S. at 87. The duty to disclose Brady evidence encompasses impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory evidence. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676; Norris v. Schotten, 146 F.3d 314, 334 (6th Cir. 1998). We explained in United States v. Bencs, 28 F.3d 555, 560 (6th Cir. 1994), that “[m]ateriality pertains to the issue of guilt or innocence, and not to the defendant’s ability to prepare for trial.” Id. (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 n.20 (1976)). In particular, “[e]vidence is material ‘only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” United States v. Phillip, 948 F.2d 241, 249 (6th Cir. 1991) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 57 (1987)). Further, reversal is not always warranted when a Brady violation occurs: “Brady generally does not apply to delayed disclosure of exculpatory information, but only to complete failure to disclose.” Bencs, 28 F.3d at 560. “Delay . . . violates Brady [only] when the delay itself causes prejudice.” United States v. Patrick, 965 F.2d 1390, 1400 (6th Cir. 1992). In sum, there are three components to a Brady violation, all of which O’Hara must establish to succeed on habeas review: (1) The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; (2) that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) prejudice must have ensued. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999). The evidence at issue here is impeachment evidence because O’Hara’s counsel could have used Hicks’s prior written statement—that the offense occurred at 1:45 p.m.—to impeach Hicks’s testimony at trial that the offense occurred between 12:45 p.m. and 1:10 p.m. Therefore, the first element of a Brady violation is satisfied. Defense counsel requested that the prosecution turn over all oral and written statements by Hicks and the prosecution responded that it had no written statements from Hicks. Although the prosecution may not have been aware of Hicks’s statement to the Colerain Township police officer, the “prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to . . . others acting on the government’s behalf in the case, including the police.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995); see also Strickler, 527 U.S. at 280-81 (explaining that “evidence known only to police investigators and not to the prosecutor” is encompassed by the Brady rule) (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, even unintentional suppression of exculpatory evidence by the prosecution will suffice to establish a Brady violation. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 282. Thus, the second element of a Brady claim is satisfied. O’Hara, however, is unable to show that he was prejudiced from the prosecution’s delayed disclosure of Hicks’s prior written statement (the third element of a Brady claim). To establish prejudice, O’Hara must show that Hicks’s prior written statement—the evidence the prosecution delayed in disclosing—was material. Evidence is material “only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682. “A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. No. 06-3455 O’Hara v. Brigano Page 10 After the trial court compared Hicks’s written statement with her trial testimony and concluded that there were no inconsistencies, O’Hara’s counsel was nonetheless given the opportunity “to recall Hicks for the purpose of questioning her about any perceived discrepancy.” O’Hara, 2001 WL 725410, at . For reasons unknown, O’Hara’s counsel did not take advantage of this opportunity. In Bencs, we explained that delayed disclosure does not violate Brady unless the “delay itself causes prejudice.” 28 F.3d at 561 (quoting Patrick, 965 F.2d at 1400). It is not clear how O’Hara was prejudiced by the delayed disclosure of Hicks’s written statement, given the trial court’s willingness to allow O’Hara’s counsel to question Hicks about the written statement and his counsel’s failure to do so. O’Hara now argues that he was prejudiced because his counsel did not have enough “time to prepare a defense, to discuss potential evidence with [O’Hara], and to subpoena supporting evidence for presentation of the defense case.” (Appellant’s Br. 20.) O’Hara, however, did not request a continuance when the evidence of Hicks’s written statement was disclosed and, further, he does not explain how earlier disclosure of this information might have changed the outcome of the proceedings. Although O’Hara claims that the evidence had a bearing on Hicks’s credibility, there is only a difference of thirty-five minutes to one hour between the time Hicks told the officer the offense occurred and the time she testified to at trial. The Ohio Court of Appeals concluded that at best this single inconsistency was minor. O’Hara, 2001 WL 725410, at . Additionally, O’Hara’s counsel admitted that the only inconsistency in Hicks’s testimony was the one regarding the time of the incident. (Mag. J. Report 23 n.3 (“[D]efense counsel expressly acknowledged that ‘[t]here was nothing else, your Honor, that I saw [in the statement] that I thought was a major inconsistency.’”) (quoting Trial Transcript “Tr.” 667).) O’Hara has not demonstrated that the evidence was material and that its tardy disclosure was prejudicial. Because O’Hara is unable to establish the third element of a Brady claim, O’Hara is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim. 4. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel1 O’Hara raised this ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim in his counsel’s brief to the Ohio Court of Appeals and the Ohio Supreme Court on direct review. O’Hara argued that his counsel was ineffective because (1) counsel improperly withdrew a motion to suppress O’Hara’s inculpatory, taped statements to police; and (2) counsel failed to object to the court’s failure to read back to the jury the testimony it requested. On direct review, the Ohio Court of Appeals explained that [i]n support of the first of these alleged deficiencies, O’Hara merely states that his inculpatory statements to the police were produced by coercion. He does not elaborate further by identifying in what manner the statements were coerced. Presumably this argument is in reference to his claim that the detective who took his statements had promised to drop the kidnapping charge in exchange for his false admission to having engaged in oral sex with Hicks. A tape of the interview, however, does not reveal such a promise. The detective testified that he had not initially charged O’Hara with anything other than rape, because he wanted the grand jury to determine any additional charges. 1 O’Hara raises two ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, one of which was addressed in our waiver discussion, and the other is addressed in this section. This ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim is not procedurally defaulted and we therefore reach the merits. The district court concluded that O’Hara’s other ineffective-assistance-ofcounsel is procedurally defaulted, and because O’Hara does not challenge that conclusion on appeal, we decline to reach the merits of the district court’s conclusion. No. 06-3455 O’Hara v. Brigano Page 11 We cannot say that defense counsel’s failure to pursue a motion to suppress, based upon the bare allegation that O’Hara’s will was overborne by an unsubstantiated promise of leniency, fell below an objective standard of representation. In order to conclude that the failure to pursue such a motion was prejudicial, we would have to assume that there was a probability of success in suppressing the statements. We find no basis to make such an assumption, given O’Hara’s obvious lack of credibility. With regard to the second alleged deficiency, our discussion under the third assignment of error suffices to establish that defense counsel did not violate an essential duty owed to her client. O’Hara, 2001 WL 725410, at -8 (internal citations omitted). The magistrate judge concluded that “[t]his claim was exhausted on direct appeal in the state courts, and is subject to review on the merits,” Mag. J. Report 30, and we agree. The district court held that the Ohio Court of Appeals properly denied O’Hara’s ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim. In addressing O’Hara’s claim that his counsel erred because she failed to object to the court’s response to the jury’s questions, the magistrate judge noted that the trial court’s instructions did not deny the jury’s request for testimony but rather asked the jury to consider whether its request for testimony was still necessary in light of the court’s answers to its questions. (Id. 32.) The magistrate judge explained that “[i]t did not fall outside the wide range of reasonable professional assistance for petitioner’s trial counsel to agree to such a procedure, which in itself did not amount to error and indeed constituted an appropriate response by the trial court to the jury’s questions.” (Id.) As to O’Hara’s claim that his counsel erred in withdrawing the motion to suppress, the magistrate judge noted that “there is no evidence in the record even remotely suggesting that petitioner’s statements to the police were coerced or otherwise involuntarily obtained.” (Id.) The