Opinion ID: 1997833
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Vicarious or Joint Tort Liability

Text: A. Plaintiff-appellants also argue that defendant passenger Fritz is liable to them because Fritz, the passenger, and Ische, the driver, were engaged in a joint enterprise, so that the driver's admitted negligence is imputed to his passenger. We disagree. As appellants correctly point out, the trial court erred in denying their joint enterprise theory on the ground that no business relationship existed between Fritz and Ische. A business relationship is needed for a joint venture but not for a joint enterprise. Delgado v. Lohmar, 289 N.W.2d 479, 482 n. 2 (Minn.1979). Nevertheless, the trial court reached the right result, if for the incorrect reason. What is required for a joint enterprise is: (1) a mutual understanding for a common purpose, and (2) a right to a voice in the direction and control of the means used to carry out the common purpose. Id. at 482. The second requisite, a right to a voice in the direction and control, has been held to require the legal right to control the means used to carry out the common purpose. Id., citing Murphy v. Keating, 204 Minn. 269, 283 N.W. 389 (1939). Here the passenger Fritz had no legal right to exercise control over the operation of Ische's car. Realistically speaking, the joint enterprise concept is seldom applicable to the passenger and driver relationship. Burdick v. Bongard, 256 Minn. 24, 32, 96 N.W.2d 868, 874 (1959). See Wettschreck v. Kozlowski, 314 N.W.2d 836, 838 (Minn.1982) (trial court dismissed on both the social host theory and the joint enterprise theory, and this court affirmed but without discussing joint enterprise). But cf. Feeser v. Emery, 270 Minn. 435, 134 N.W.2d 23 (1965); Murphy v. Keating, 204 Minn. 269, 283 N.W. 389 (1939) (joint enterprises recognized in group trips where all occupants of the car shared costs and responsibilities on the trips). We hold, therefore, that as a matter of law defendant Fritz and the driver-owner Ische were not engaged in a joint enterprise and that plaintiff-appellants cannot recover under this theory. B. Amicus Mothers Against Drunk Drivers (MADD) submit that plaintiffs should recover under a theory of joint concerted tortious conduct, citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876 (1977), which reads in part: For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he (a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant to a common design with him, or (b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself,   . [Emphasis added.] Amicus maintains that both subdivisions (a) and (b) apply to the facts of this case, because defendant Fritz' willingness to drink and ride with Ische substantially encouraged Ische's conduct. Further, they assert that venturing out on the highway in a drunken state constituted a tortious act committed in concert by the two men. In support of this theory, amicus argues by analogy to a Tennessee criminal case, Eager v. State, 205 Tenn. 156, 325 S.W.2d 815 (1959). There a passenger was held jointly guilty with the intoxicated driver of involuntary manslaughter. The Tennessee Supreme Court stated: [W]hen one sits by the side of another and permits him without protest to operate the vehicle on a highway in a state of intoxication as the jury was clearly warranted that these people were doing herein, the one sitting by is as guilty as the man at the wheel. Id. at 169, 325 S.W.2d at 821. Amicus fail to point out, however, that the same Tennessee Supreme Court subsequently refused to apply its Eager holding to create civil liability on a nonowner passenger who permits a drunk driver to drive. Cecil v. Hardin, 575 S.W.2d 268 (Tenn.1978). We prefer the reasoning of the Cecil decision and of the Massachusetts court in Stock v. Fife, 13 Mass.App. 75, 430 N.E.2d 845, 849 n. 10 (1982), where, in rejecting a section 876 claim under the Restatement, the Massachusetts court said: In the tort field, the doctrine [of section 876] appears to be reserved for application to facts which manifest a common plan to commit a tortious act where the participants know of the plan and its purpose and take affirmative steps to encourage the achievement of the result.. . . [T]he mere presence of the particular defendant at the commission of the wrong, or his failure to object to it, is not enough to charge him with responsibility. [Citing Prosser.] Here there is not the kind of situation where it can be said the driver and passenger were acting in accordance with an agreement to cooperate in a particular line of conduct or to accomplish a particular result. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876, comment (a) (1977). Nor is there the kind of substantial encouragement by the passenger of the driver's conduct needed to impose joint tort liability. Fritz was with Ische, partying with others, each doing his own drinking voluntarily, and Fritz voluntarily accompanied Ische on his return trip to Norwood in a guest-host driving situation. We hold that, as a matter of law, plaintiff-appellants do not have a cause of action against defendant Fritz under section 876 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. C. Finally, plaintiff-appellant Olsons raise on appeal, though they failed to do so below, the claim that the facts permit an inference of violation by defendant Fritz of the open bottle law, Minn.Stat. § 169.122 (1982), which would be prima facie evidence of negligence, and thus summary judgment for Fritz is precluded. Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, it might be inferred that Fritz had a plastic cup of beer with him in the car. Although this issue is not properly before us, we will consider it. Assuming arguendo that defendant Fritz was negligent in having an open container of beer in the car, there is no showing how Fritz' possession or consumption of beer was a cause of Ische's negligent driving. If the claim is that Fritz furnished the beer to Ische either before they got in the car or while in the car, an entirely different theory of liability would be presented, one not even raised here by appellants probably because the legislature, by the Civil Damages Act, has preempted any dramshop or common-law action for liquor liability against a social host. Cole v. City of Spring Lake Park, 314 N.W.2d 836 (Minn.1982). We hold as a matter of law that there is no direct cause between any open bottle violation and plaintiffs' injuries.