Opinion ID: 551278
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Christmas Lists.

Text: 57 Among the desiderata introduced by the government to corroborate Gottlieb's testimony were two exhibits listing the names of police officers (including Devin), public officials, and others to whom Gottlieb regularly made payments during the holiday season. These Christmas lists identified, inter alia, a Boston municipal court judge and a private citizen (who subsequently became and, at the time of trial was serving as, a federal judge). When moving introduction of the exhibits into evidence, the government suggested deleting these two names. The prosecutor's point was twofold: (1) the names were irrelevant to the case, and (2) broadcasting the identities might bring the judges into public disrepute although neither person had been implicated in any wrongdoing. Defendant argued that the lists should either be excluded or admitted in their entirety. The district court allowed the evidence, removing the judges' names to save them from unnecessary embarrassment, exposure and humiliation. Later, when limited in cross-examining Gottlieb about the deleted names, defense counsel moved for a mistrial. The motion was summarily denied. 58 On appeal, Devin complains that redaction deprived him of his rights to confrontation and cross-examination because the jury could not be shown the full scope of the witness' immunity and motivation for testifying. In particular, Devin insists that striking the names left the jury in the dark as to Gottlieb's potential exposure to prosecution for seeking to influence a judge. The plaint contains more bleat than wool. 59 In Boylan, while acknowledging that the right to cross-examine opposing witnesses is constitutionally guaranteed, we observed: 60 The guarantee extends to the elicitation of information about the immunity granted to a witness in exchange for his testimony. Nevertheless, the right to cross-examine is not unfettered. Defendants cannot run roughshod, doing precisely as they please simply because cross-examination is underway. So long as a reasonably complete picture of the witness' veracity, bias, and motivation is developed, the judge enjoys power and discretion to set appropriate boundaries. Indeed, the judge has the responsibility to do so. 61 898 F.2d at 254 (citations omitted). The claim which we rejected in Boylan was not materially different from the claim before us now. In that case, the defendants urged that limitations placed on testimony regarding the prosecution witnesses' (1) procurement of male prostitutes for a public official and (2) sexual orientation prevented the full scope of the witnesses' immunity and testimonial motivation from being revealed. We nonetheless upheld the trial court's restrictions, finding that vigorous cross-examination of the witnesses on the immunity granted, on their bribes to public officials, and on their involvement in myriad crimes had been more than sufficient to enable the jury to form a complete and accurate picture of the breadth of the immunity, the [witnesses'] potential motivations, and their likely prejudices. Id. at 255. This finding, coupled with our belief that the excluded evidence had a far greater potential to obscure than to enlighten, left us no principled choice but to approve the trial judge's exercise of his discretion. Id. 62 Much the same can be said here. During a grueling cross-examination, defense counsel probed the numerous payoffs Gottlieb had made to an assortment of public officials other than Devin, all of which, as counsel repeatedly pointed out, were shielded by the grant of immunity. As a result, there can be little doubt that the jury was in possession of evidence sufficient to permit it to make a discriminating appraisal of [the witness'] motives to testify. United States v. Tracey, 675 F.2d 433, 439 (1st Cir.1982). And while it may be true, as appellant asserts, that in a fixer's lexicon a jurist is a big fish compared to a police captain, there was no evidence that Gottlieb had actually hooked either of the individuals whose names were stricken. To have let the names be made public would have done nothing to enlighten the jury as to the scope and ramifications of Gottlieb's deal with the government. Such evidence was much more likely to have created a sideshow, unnecessarily distracting the jury's attention from the legitimate issues in the case. Under the circumstances, we find that the court's redaction of the lists was a wise and responsible exercise of its authority. 63