Opinion ID: 2098887
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Speech or conduct

Text: ¶ 16 In order to determine if a First Amendment analysis is required, we must first consider whether conduct alone or speech, which includes expressive conduct, is being regulated. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403-04, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 105 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989); State v. Robins, 2002 WI 65, ¶ 41, 253 Wis.2d 298, 646 N.W.2d 287. If speech or expressive conduct is being regulated, the First Amendment is implicated. ¶ 17 In Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404, 109 S.Ct. 2533, the United States Supreme Court considered whether the act of flag desecration was considered speech such that it possessed sufficient communicative elements to bring the First Amendment into play. The statute at issue, Desecration of Venerated Object, provides in part: `(a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly desecrates:... a state or national flag.' Id. at 400, 109 S.Ct. 2533 (citing Texas Penal Code Ann. § 42.09(a)(3) (1989)). The defendant burned the American flag while at a protest demonstration. Id. at 399, 109 S.Ct. 2533. The Court concluded that his actions were `sufficiently imbued with elements of communication' to implicate the First Amendment. Id. at 406, 109 S.Ct. 2533 (citation omitted). As a result, the Court continued with a First Amendment analysis and ultimately concluded that the defendant's conduct was protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 407-20, 109 S.Ct. 2533. ¶ 18 In United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968), the Court considered whether the act of destroying a registration certificate [8] constituted speech. The statute at issue in O'Brien subjected a person to criminal liability if he `knowingly destroys (or) knowingly mutilates' a certificate. Id. at 375, 88 S.Ct. 1673 (citation omitted). The Court noted that the statute plainly does not abridge free speech on its face and on its face deals with conduct having no connection with speech. Id. The Court stated that [w]e cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled `speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea. Id. at 376, 88 S.Ct. 1673. Nonetheless, the Court undertook a First Amendment analysis on the assumption that the alleged communicative element in O'Brien's conduct [wa]s sufficient to bring into play the First Amendment. Id. ¶ 19 In Robins, 253 Wis.2d 298, ¶¶ 39-44, 646 N.W.2d 287, this court considered whether the child enticement statute regulated speech or conduct. The statute, Wis. Stat. § 948.07, provides that [w]hoever,... causes or attempts to cause any child who has not attained the age of 18 years to go into any vehicle, building, room or secluded place is guilty of a Class BC felony. Id., ¶ 25 (citing Wis. Stat. § 948.07 (1999-2000)(original emphasis omitted)). The defendant argued that that his conviction violated his right to free speech because statements [9] he had made to entice the child were used in his conviction. Id., ¶ 39. This court concluded that the statute did not regulate speech or any variation of speech, such as expression. Id., ¶¶ 41-43. The court, citing to Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498, 69 S.Ct. 684, 93 L.Ed. 834 (1949), stated that [t]he United States Supreme Court has rejected the contention that the First Amendment extends to speech that is incidental to or part of a course of criminal conduct. It is not `an abridgement of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed.' Robins, 253 Wis.2d 298, ¶¶ 41-42, 646 N.W.2d 287. ¶ 20 Rather than regulating speech, this court concluded in Robins that the child enticement statute regulated conduct. Id., ¶ 43. This court reasoned that Robins' internet conversations did not constitute the crime of child enticement, but rather, his internet conversations were circumstantial evidence of his intent to entice a child. Id., ¶ 44. Just because some of the proof in [a] case consists of internet `speech' does not mean the First Amendment has been implicated. Id. ¶ 21 In the case at hand, Wis. Stat. § 943.201(2) provides in relevant part: Whoever, for any of the following purposes[, e.g., to harm the reputation of the individual,] intentionally uses ... any personal identifying information ... of the individual ... without the authorization or consent of the individual and by representing that he or she is the individual, ... is guilty of a Class H felony. ¶ 22 We conclude that, as charged and as applied to the facts of this case, Wis. Stat. § 943.201(2)(c) regulates speech in addition to conduct. The statute punishes a person for using another individual's personal identifying information with the intent to harm that individual's reputation. [10] Under the facts of this case, the statute regulates conduct because it restricts the use of another's identity and the distribution of reputation-harming materials, but speech is also being regulated because the content of the e-mails is critical in order to evidence Baron's intent to use personal identifying information to harm Fisher's reputation. Therefore, this is not a case as in Robins where the conduct was merely initiated, evidenced, or carried out in part by speech. Rather, this is a case where the reputation-harming portion of the charge is evidenced by the content of the speech, i.e., the content of the e-mails. ¶ 23 Unlike in Robins, where speech was used to show the defendant's intent to entice a child, speech in this case is not used to show the defendant's intent to use another individual's personal identifying information. Absent the e-mails, i.e., speech, which were used with the intent to harm Fisher's reputation, Baron has not committed an element of the crime as alleged. Therefore, just as communicative elements were being regulated in Johnson and O'Brien, communicative elements are being regulated in this case. Under the statute as charged and applied to the facts of this case, it is the content of the e-mails, i.e., the speech, that evidences the defendant's intent to use personal identifying information to harm Fisher's reputation. Thus, here, speech in addition to conduct is being regulated. [11] ¶ 24 The State argues that the prohibited conduct under Wis. Stat. § 943.201(2)(c) is the unauthorized use of an individual's personal identifying information and not speech that is intended to harm another individual's reputation. Therefore, under the State's argument, it is only conduct that is being regulated and not speech, and thus, the First Amendment is not implicated. The State relies on State v. Derango, 2000 WI 89, ¶ 17, 236 Wis.2d 721, 613 N.W.2d 833, and bases its argument on an analogy to the child enticement statute, Wis. Stat. § 948.07. The State explains that the child enticement statute criminalizes the act of causing a child to go to a secluded place rather than the underlying sexual misconduct that is set forth in subsections (1) through (6) of the statute. ¶ 25 The child enticement statute applied in Derango reads: Whoever, with intent to commit any of the following acts, causes or attempts to cause any child who has not attained the age of 18 years to go into any vehicle, building, room or secluded place is guilty of a Class BC felony: (1) Having sexual contact or sexual intercourse with the child in violation of s. 948.02 or 948.095. (2) Causing the child to engage in prostitution. (3) Exposing a sex organ to the child or causing the child to expose a sex organ in violation of s. 948.10. (4) Taking a picture or making an audio recording of the child engaging in sexually explicit conduct. (5) Causing bodily or mental harm to the child. (6) Giving or selling to the child a controlled substance or controlled substance analog in violation of ch. 961. Id., ¶ 16 (citing Wis. Stat. § 948.07 (1995-96)). Wisconsin Stat. § 943.201(2) provides: Whoever, for any of the following purposes, intentionally uses, attempts to use, or possesses with intent to use any personal identifying information or personal identification document of an individual, including a deceased individual, without the authorization or consent of the individual and by representing that he or she is the individual, that he or she is acting with the authorization or consent of the individual, or that the information or document belongs to him or her is guilty of a Class H felony: (a) To obtain credit, money, goods, services, employment, or any other thing of value or benefit. (b) To avoid civil or criminal process or penalty. (c) To harm the reputation, property, person, or estate of the individual. ¶ 26 According to the State, an analogy to the child enticement statute shows that Wis. Stat. § 943.201(2)(c) prohibits only conduct and does not regulate speech. Under the State's theory, the prohibited conduct is the unauthorized use of another individual's personal identifying information, and therefore, subsections (a) through (c) are simply ways to carry out that identity theft. The State's argument in this regard is unpersuasive because the subsections of the child enticement statute are not analogous to the subsections of the identity theft statute. ¶ 27 The child enticement statute criminalizes one act, i.e., the act of causing a child to go into a secluded place, but the act has six different possible modes of commission. Derango, 236 Wis.2d 721, ¶¶ 15-25, 613 N.W.2d 833. This court reasoned in Derango that multiple acts were not being punished because multiple prohibited acts arise and warrant separate punishment when [the prohibited acts] are separate in time or are significantly different in nature. Id., ¶ 21. Under subsections (1) through (6) of the child enticement statute, a defendant might very often possess more than one prohibited intention when enticing a child. Id. For example, intent to have sexual intercourse also encompasses intent to expose or cause the child to expose a sex organ; or, a defendant may entice a child with the dual purpose of giving her drugs and exploiting her sexually. Id. ¶ 28 Subsections (a) through (c) of the identity theft statute, on the other hand, are significantly different in nature, and thus identity theft can occur in multiple ways. [12] As a result, the prohibited conduct charged includes more than simply the use of Fisher's identity. The way in which the State charged the offense here involved the use of Fisher's identity to distribute communications that were intended to harm the reputation of Fisher. Therefore, this statute prohibits the combination of the use of the individual's personal identifying information with the intent to harm the reputation of that individual. Since in this case, the use of another's personal identifying information was coupled with reputation-harming speech, i.e., the content of the e-mails, we conclude that, in this case, Wis. Stat. § 943.201(2)(c) regulates speech in addition to conduct. As a result, we must proceed further with a First Amendment analysis to determine whether § 943.201(2)(c) is content based or content neutral.