Opinion ID: 1196789
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Requests for New Counsel

Text: Anderson contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying his requests for new counsel and that the court failed to make a thorough inquiry into his dissatisfaction with Henderson following Anderson's letters to the court. We review denial of a request for new counsel for abuse of discretion. United States v. Boone, 437 F.3d 829, 839 (8th Cir.2006). Anderson must show justifiable dissatisfaction with Henderson, which can arise from irreconcilable conflict, a complete breakdown in communication, or any other factor interfering significantly with an attorney's ability to provide zealous representation. See id. However, Anderson cannot establish justifiable dissatisfaction merely by showing that he was frustrated with Henderson's performance or that he disagreed with Henderson's tactical decisions. See id. We find that the record does not support Anderson's argument. With respect to Anderson's first letter complaining about Henderson, the court provided Anderson with an opportunity to present his concerns during the February 1 hearing. Anderson told the court that his letter never stated that he wanted new representation and that [t]here has been some reading between the lines there when the district court suggested the letter was a motion for new counsel. Given Anderson's statements that he did not want new counsel, we conclude that the district court made an adequate inquiry into Anderson's first complaint, see United States v. Webster, 84 F.3d 1056, 1062 n. 2 (8th Cir.1996) (finding that the district court made a satisfactory inquiry into the basis of the defendant's dissatisfaction where the court granted [the defendant] leave to freely explain the reason for his discontent), and did not abuse its discretion in finding that Anderson did not carry the burden of showing justifiable dissatisfaction with appointed counsel, see United States v. Mentzos, 462 F.3d 830, 839 (8th Cir.2006) (noting that the defendant bears the burden of showing justifiable dissatisfaction with appointed counsel). The district court held another hearing on February 26, 2008, concerning Anderson's next two letters. The district court again questioned Anderson and Henderson about their relationship. Henderson stated that he and Anderson had discussed Anderson's concerns and that they no longer had a disagreement about tactics leading up to sentencing. Anderson spoke only of his problems with the plea agreement, and he did not express further dissatisfaction with Henderson. As a result, the district court withdrew Anderson's guilty plea. Because the district court gave Anderson the opportunity to present his position and Anderson raised no criticisms of Henderson at the hearing, we conclude that the district court made an adequate inquiry into Anderson's concerns, see Webster, 84 F.3d at 1062 n. 2, and did not abuse its discretion in failing to appoint new counsel after receiving Anderson's second and third letters, see Mentzos, 462 F.3d at 839. Finally, at the hearing concerning Henderson's ex parte motion to withdraw, Henderson told the court that he [did not] know exactly what the nature of [Anderson's] problem is and that he believed Anderson just does not want to work with [me] as his counsel. Anderson agreed with Henderson's account of their relationship. The district court concluded that the problem is mostly the failure of [Anderson] to communicate effectively with Mr. Henderson. Accordingly, the court denied the ex parte motion, finding that the only purpose for this motion from Mr. Anderson's point of view is purposes of delay and to manipulate the court into giving him the lawyer that he wants. As with the other incidents, we conclude that the district court conducted an adequate inquiry into the facts underlying Anderson's complaints at the March 13 hearing, see Webster, 84 F.3d at 1062 n. 2, and did not abuse its discretion in denying Henderson's ex parte motion because Anderson failed to show that there was a total communication breakdown rather than an unwillingness on Anderson's part to communicate with Henderson, see United States v. Barrow, 287 F.3d 733, 738 (8th Cir.2002) (affirming a district court's denial of a defendant's motion for new counsel where there was no total breakdown in communication, only an unwillingness on [the defendant's] part to communicate with counsel); see also United States v. Redd, 318 F.3d 778, 783 (8th Cir.2003) (assuming without deciding that a defendant can raise a challenge to the district court's denial of defense counsel's motion to withdraw). [4]