Opinion ID: 203825
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: standard of review

Text: This court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). Succar v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 8, 20 (1st Cir.2005). The APA gives a court power to `hold unlawful and set aside' not only agency action that is `arbitrary' or `capricious,' but also agency action that is `otherwise not in accordance with law' or is `in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right.' Id. (quoting Cousins v. Sec'y of the United States Dep't of Transp., 880 F.2d 603, 608 (1st Cir.1989) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (C))). We review de novo an agency's construction of [a] statute which it administers according to established principles of deference. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Counsel, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984); Muñiz v. Sabol, 517 F.3d 29, 34 (1st Cir.2008); Pérez-Olivo v. Chávez, 394 F.3d 45, 48 (1st Cir.2005). Our review entails a two-step approach. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778. First, we must ask whether `Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.' Succar, 394 F.3d at 22 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842, 104 S.Ct. 2778). We do this by determin[ing] whether the language of [the] statute is susceptible to more than one natural meaning. Strickland v. Comm'r, Me. Dep't of Human Servs., 96 F.3d 542, 547 n. 5 (1st Cir.1996). If the statutory text is plain and unambiguous, the court must apply the statute according to its terms. Carcieri v. Salazar, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1058, 1063-64, 172 L.Ed.2d 791 (2009); see also Succar, 394 F.3d at 22 ([C]ourts, as well as the agency, `must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.' (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778)). Thus, [i]f, after employing all the traditional tools of construction, the statute's text seems unambiguous and the ordinary meaning of that unambiguous language yields a reasonable result, the interpretive odyssey is at an end. Morales v. Sociedad Española de Auxilio Mutuo y Beneficencia, 524 F.3d 54, 57 (1st Cir.2008). In other words, we need not defer to an agency's construction if we hold the agency's interpretation to be contrary to congressional intent. Succar, 394 F.3d at 23. However, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778; Herrera-Inirio v. INS, 208 F.3d 299, 304 (1st Cir.2000). ` Chevron [ ] deference to [an agency's] statutory interpretation is called for only when the devices of judicial construction have been tried and found to yield no clear sense of congressional intent.' Succar, 394 F.3d at 22 (alterations in original) (quoting Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 600, 124 S.Ct. 1236, 157 L.Ed.2d 1094 (2004)). Here, we conclude that the plain language of § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i)'s second sentence does not deprive Mrs. Taing of her status as an immediate relative. Thus, we need not reach the second step of the Chevron framework.