Opinion ID: 1955192
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the Board properly found Specifications 1, 2(a), 2(c), and 3 proven.

Text: This Court has held that the Board's findings of fact should be approved if they are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record. See, e.g., Florida Bd. of Bar Exam'rs re G.J.G., 709 So.2d 1377, 1379 (Fla.1998); Florida Bd. of Bar Exam'rs re M.C.A., 650 So.2d 34, 35 (Fla. 1995); Florida Bd. of Bar Exam'rs re E.R.M., 630 So.2d 1046, 1048 (Fla.1994). As to Specification 1, Doe does not deny that his pending battery charge was not final at the time he filed his re-application to the law school from which he had been excluded. Rather, Doe argues that he assumed that the case was final, and that such an assumption was reasonable. Doe stated that he became aware that the charge had not been dismissed only after he submitted his reapplication to the school. On the other hand, the Board found that Doe willfully concealed his pending criminal charge from the school. In reaching this finding, the Board noted that Doe wrote in his answer to Specification 1 that at the time of his reapplication he believed the charge had been, or was about to be, dismissed and that he should have verified that his case had actually been dismissed when he filed his application. Such a statement provides competent substantial evidence that Doe lacked candor in filing his reapplication with the law school. As the Board convincingly argues in its reply brief, [t]he simple, straightforward question on his admissions application did not allow him the option of concealing information because a pending criminal charge `was about to be dismissed.' The test of candor required disclosure. Doe failed such test. Therefore, we find Specification 1 to be proven. As to Specifications 2(a), 2(c), and 3, Doe does not contest that he was excluded from a law school in February, 1990 for failing two courses. Rather, Doe argues that he had been sick during his first semester of law school, the time during which he failed those classes. He states that the date that he voluntarily withdrew from law school for medical reasons was the same date that the Academic Standing Committee's letter excluding him from the school was sent. The letter arrived after his withdrawal and he inadvertently forgot about it. Thus, he honestly believed at the time of filing his application to the Bar, the filing of his amendments, and his testimony at the investigative hearing that he voluntarily withdrew from school. The Court usually defers to the Board's findings on a witness's credibility because the Board has had the opportunity to observe the witness during testimony. See Florida Bd. of Bar Exam'rs re C.W.G., 617 So.2d 303, 304 (Fla.1993) (adopting Board's finding that applicant lacked candor where the Board observed that [the applicant's] credibility, during his testimony, was lessened by his demeanor, including the manner in which he answered questions and the time he took to answer them); Florida Bd. of Bar Exam'rs re R.D.I., 581 So.2d 27, 30 (Fla.1991) (noting that [t]he Board did not have to believe the petitioner's version of events). Further, the Board may find that facts are proven by circumstantial evidence where the inference of the fact preponderates over other inferences. Id. at 29. In the instant case, the Board found that there was a conflict between the position taken by Doe in his answers and affirmed by him during his formal hearing testimony and the circumstantial evidence supporting the allegations of the specifications. The Board determined that Doe's testimony was not credible. The Board further found that circumstantial evidence, including a letter written by Doe to the Academic Standing Committee prior to his exclusion in which he stated, I hope that the committee will pass favorably on my petition to continue studies at ... law school, demonstrated that Doe intentionally failed to disclose his academic exclusion from the law school. Given that Doe admitted to writing the above-referenced letter to the committee, and his admission at the formal hearing that he received the committee's February 8, 1990, letter excluding him from law school, there is competent substantial evidence in the record to support the Board's finding that Doe intentionally failed to disclose his academic exclusion. Therefore, we defer to the Board and find that Specifications 2(a), 2(c), and 3 have been proven.