Opinion ID: 867239
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prescreening Evaluation

Text: ¶ 6 The State filed its notice of intent to seek the death penalty in September 2005. The trial court failed to order a competency prescreening, and Delahanty did not object or himself request one. He now claims that the court erred in not ordering a competency prescreening. Because Delahanty did not object below, he must show both that fundamental error exists and that the error in his case caused him prejudice. State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 567 ¶ 20, 115 P.3d 601, 607 (2005). ¶ 7 When the State seeks the death penalty, A.R.S. § 13-754(A) provides that the superior court shall appoint a psychologist or psychiatrist to conduct a prescreening evaluation to determine whether there is a reasonable basis to order further examination of the defendant's competence to stand trial. Because the statutory language is mandatory, see State v. Harrod, 218 Ariz. 268, 277 ¶ 28, 183 P.3d 519, 528 (2008), the superior court erred in not ordering an evaluation, cf. State v. Armstrong, 218 Ariz. 451, 458 ¶ 15, 189 P.3d 378, 385 (2008) (finding error in failure to order statutorily required mental retardation prescreening). ¶ 8 However, Delahanty cannot establish fundamental error. A competency hearing is required only if on the basis of the facts and circumstances known to the trial judge, there was or should have been a good faith doubt about the defendant's ability. . . to participate intelligently in the proceedings. State v. Cornell, 179 Ariz. 314, 322-23, 878 P.2d 1352, 1360-61 (1994) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Odle v. Woodford, 238 F.3d 1084, 1087 (9th Cir.2001) (finding competency hearing required if the evidence raises a bona fide doubt about the defendant's competence to stand trial). The critical inquiry is whether [the defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understandingand whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960) (per curiam); see also Ariz. R.Crim. P. 11.1. ¶ 9 The record is replete with evidence that Delahanty understood the proceedings against him and was able to assist in his own defense. Delahanty testified in a pre-trial hearing on a motion to dismiss, filed a pro se motion for hybrid representation on the attempted arson count, and spoke directly with the trial judge about an alleged conflict of interest with counsel. The trial court observed Delahanty throughout the trial and characterized his behavior as appropriate. ¶ 10 Delahanty nonetheless contends that the trial court's appointment of a psychologist in connection with his waiver of mitigation and the report of Dr. Joseph Wu submitted at sentencing on the non-capital counts raised a bona fide doubt as to his competence. We disagree. Before ordering Dr. Kushner to evaluate Delahanty, the trial court made clear that it had no doubts about Delahanty's ability to understand the proceedings, but simply wanted to make sure that he understood the consequences of the waiver. Cf. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 401 n. 12, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993) (noting that competency involves the defendant's general ability to understand proceedings, but the purpose of the knowing and voluntary inquiry . . . is to determine whether the defendant actually does understand the significance and consequences of a particular decision) (internal quotation marks omitted). Dr. Kushner concluded that Delahanty understood the consequences of waiving mitigation, and nothing in his report raised any doubt as to Delahanty's competence. ¶ 11 Nor does Dr. Wu's report suggest a contrary conclusion. Dr. Wu opined that Delahanty suffered from physical trauma to the brain and that brain damage of that nature reduces the ability of an individual to control impulsive violent urges. Volatility, however, should not be equated with mental incompetence to stand trial. Burket v. Angelone, 208 F.3d 172, 192 (4th Cir.2000). ¶ 12 Accordingly, Delahanty has failed to establish fundamental error. We nonetheless caution all participants in a capital murder trialdefense counsel, the State, and the trial judgethat a competency prescreening is required unless waived, even when the defendant does not request one.