Opinion ID: 1212385
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Reasonableness of Alexander's sentence

Text: Turning now to the reasonableness of his sentence, Alexander argues that it is procedurally unreasonable because the district court failed to address certain issues that he allegedly raised during the sentencing hearing. But the only objection that Alexander actually raised during the hearing (apparently abandoned on appeal) was that the sentence should have been lower because he accepted responsibility for the crime by pleading guilty. The three objections that Alexander presents in his brief are thus raised for the first time on appeal. This means that we will not set aside the district court's sentence unless these purported procedural errors are plain. See United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 386 (2008) (concluding that failing to object to the court's explanation of the defendant's sentence undermine[s] [a defendant's] right to challenge the ... explanation on appeal, and concluding that this court should therefore apply plain-error review to the explanation). First, Alexander argues that the district court erred by not responding to Alexander's assertion that the predicate offenses that resulted in Mr. Alexander['s] being classified a career offender were very minor. But the district court did, in fact, observe that although none of his prior crimes would be considered very serious, his lengthy criminal history suggested a life of constant crime and that he had not learned his lesson from the light sentences that he had previously received. The court further explained that long-term incarceration was the only way to deter this particular defendant, noting not only Alexander's tendency to fight with police and resist arrest, but also his arrest while out on bond pending trial. There is every indication that, with respect to this argument, the sentencing judge listened ..., considered the supporting evidence, was fully aware of the defendant's circumstances and took them into account in sentencing him. Vonner, 516 F.3d at 387 (citing Rita, 127 S.Ct. at 2469) (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court's explanation is not so lacking as to be obvious or clear that a plain error has occurred. See Koeberlein, 161 F.3d at 949. Second, Alexander argues that the district court inadequately explained its consideration of the crack/powder cocaine disparity. The court opined, however, that they might change the law regarding crack/powder ratios and then we may have to ... resentence 30,000 people ... [,] so we will be very very busy doing that if that occurs. The Sentencing Commission has indeed changed the Guidelines in a manner that has retroactively lowered the recommended sentencing ranges for several crack-cocaine offenses. See United States v. Poole, 538 F.3d 644 (6th Cir.2008) (remanding for resentencing based on retroactive amendments to the Guidelines). But these amendments do not help Alexander because the sentencing range applied to his case is derived exclusively from the Guidelines' unamended career-offender provision set forth in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a), not the amended drug-quantity table listed at U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. The district court's discussion of the crack/cocaine disparity therefore had no effect on Alexander's sentence. Finally, Alexander argues that district court did not adequately explain why it refused to take into account Alexander's congestive heart failure and his renal disease. But this court has made clear that a district court may exercise discretion in determining how much explanation is necessary, and that `when a judge decides simply to apply the Guidelines to a particular case, doing so will not necessarily require lengthy explanation.' United States v. Madden, 515 F.3d 601, 610 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Rita, 127 S.Ct. at 2468). The district court did in fact take into account Alexander's health, indicating that Alexander might actually benefit from long-term incarceration because he would be guaranteed health care in prison. Moreover, the court remarked that Alexander had already abused the leniency shown to him by committing new crimes while out on bond. The district court further imposed a sentence that was at the low end of the sentencing spectrum based on Alexander's status as a career offender, which presumably took into account Alexander's health problems. These remarks therefore reflect the district court's full consideration of Alexander's circumstances and do not justify a finding that the court plainly erred.
Alexander next challenges the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. In evaluating this issue, we apply a presumption of reasonableness for within-Guidelines sentences. United States v. Williams, 436 F.3d 706, 708 (6th Cir.2006). Alexander argues that his sentence is too long despite receiving the lowest sentence suggested by the Guidelines range given his career-offender status (360 months of imprisonment). Alexander has neither rebutted this presumption of reasonableness nor demonstrated that the district court abused its discretion in so sentencing him. The first argument raised by Alexander is that his 360-month prison term does little to protect the community from crack cocaine dealers because others stand ready to fill his shoes. As formulated, this argument proves too much, suggesting that all similarly situated drug dealers should receive below-Guidelines sentences because there will always be others eager to replace them. Alexander's rationale is bereft of legal support, and the district court committed no substantive error in rejecting it. Second, Alexander argues that his criminal history is of a petty nature that justifies a sentence much lower than 360 months of imprisonment, a sentence that would be sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes of sentencing as set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). But Alexander is still a career offender  regardless of whether he characterizes his prior felony convictions as petty. Indeed, despite being a career offender, and despite having already abused the district court's leniency when committing other drug-related offenses while out on bond, Alexander was sentenced at the low end of the recommended Guidelines range. This suggests that the court was mindful of both the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). Alexander has not persuaded us that the district court abused its discretion by imposing a sentence that is greater than necessary to effectuate the purposes of sentencing. Finally, Alexander renews his crack/powder argument as an objection to the substantive reasonableness of the sentence. But this objection is without merit because his sentence was based upon his status as a career offender, not because of the nature of his drug offense.