Opinion ID: 3179189
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Ms. Lockett was “Current on the Rent”

Text: In the complaint initiating this action Blue Ocean alleged that “[t]he rental for the premises is $795.00 per month” – the fixed monthly payment originally required by the lease. It is undisputed that, although $795 was the monthly rent provided by the lease when Ms. Lockett entered into it with the original landlord in 2010, that figure had risen as a result of annual renewals to $837 by the time of trial. Blue Ocean has conceded that Ms. Lockett had paid that amount as of August 15, 2014, but argues that she was delinquent in paying other fees and charges − such as the gas charges for three months, the late fee for one month, and a court filing fee owed to the landlord − which were “deemed rent” or 15 “additional rent” under the lease.7 (Ms. Lockett disputed the extent to which she actually owed those charges). Blue Ocean reasons that all of those charges should be considered part of the “rent” that she allegedly owed to Blue Ocean as of August 15, 2014, and that she was therefore not current on her rent as of the date of the second alleged act of retaliation. In concluding that the evidence was “muddled” on whether Ms. Lockett was “current on the rent” as of August 15, 2014, the Circuit Court apparently accepted Blue Ocean’s argument that the disputed charges were part of “rent” for purposes of RP §8- 208.1(d). The question before this Court is whether these charges are “rent” for purposes of RP §8-208.1(d). If so and if the dispute over those charges was not resolved in her favor, Ms. Lockett would be ineligible for relief under the anti-retaliation statute even if she proved, to the satisfaction of the Circuit Court, that the filing of the tenant holding over action was an act of retaliation. If not, she would be eligible for relief.8
Blue Ocean moved to dismiss Ms. Lockett’s appeal pursuant to Maryland Rule 8- 603(c), based on Maryland Rule 8-602(a)(1) (“the appeal is not allowed by these rules or other law”). Blue Ocean argues that the issue of the meaning of “rent” was not raised in 7In its brief to us, Blue Ocean refers to $837 as the “base rent,” a phrase that does not appear in the lease. 8 The question of what specific relief she would be entitled to is not before us. 16 the Circuit Court, so the issue is not preserved for review under Maryland Rule 8-131, and this Court cannot consider it, so the appeal should be dismissed. The short answer is that these grounds are not a basis for dismissing an appeal. The longer answer – if Blue Ocean’s motion is considered an argument about preservation of the legal issue for appellate review – is that the issue was adequately preserved. Grounds for dismissal of an appeal First, failing to meet the requirements of Maryland Rule 8-131 is not grounds for dismissing the appeal under Maryland Rule 8-602. See State Ctr., LLC v. Lexington Charles Ltd. P’ship, 438 Md. 451, 495, 92 A.3d 400 (2014) (“Neither a lack of preservation nor failure to present an argument in the petition for writ of certiorari is listed as a permissible ground upon which this Court may dismiss an appeal.”). Thus, while a failure to comply with Rule 8-131 might affect whether we address the particular issue in our decision, it would not mandate dismissal of the appeal. In any event, this issue has been preserved in accordance with the requirements of Rule 8-131. Raised below Rule 8-131(a) provides, in pertinent part: “Ordinarily, the appellate court will not decide any other issue,” except subject-matter and personal jurisdiction of the trial court, “unless it plainly appears by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court ....” The definition of “rent” does plainly appear to have been raised in the trial court. Testimony and documentary evidence was introduced in the Circuit Court, including the lease, related documents, and ledger sheet that concerned Ms. Lockett’s obligation to pay 17 rent and other charges and her history of payment. Both sides presented argument to the Circuit Court as to what that court should consider in resolving whether Ms. Lockett was current on her rent. For example, in closing, counsel for Ms. Lockett told the Circuit Court: [The] District Court, both in the failure to pay rent action in June and in the rent escrow case[,] had made a determination [of] what the rent owing would be and Ms. Lockett paid those amounts as the Court specified her to pay. Blue Ocean can’t come now and say that there are other amounts that they did not specify as rent and allege now that she was not current on the rent at that time. (emphasis added). Similarly, in closing rebuttal, counsel for Blue Ocean said: You’ve heard testimony from Ms. Lockett that she believed she didn’t owe different monies on [May 28 and August 15], but, in fact, a careful review of the record and the ledger shows that she did, in fact, owe monies. Those monies could be included or were counted as rent. And as such she wasn’t current on rent on the days of alleged retaliation. (emphasis added). Thus, counsel for both sides disputed the definition of rent in the Circuit Court and whether she was “current on the rent” at the time the tenant holding over action was filed. The Circuit Court found, as to whether Ms. Lockett was current on her rent on August 15, 2014, that it was “fairly muddled and it was unclear to the Court and I cannot find that on [August 15] that — that Ms. Lockett was up to date on her rent.” Because there was no dispute that Ms. Lockett had paid fixed monthly installments of $837 as of August 15, the court’s reluctance to find that she was current on the rent necessarily includes a legal holding that her “rent” for purposes of RP §8-208.1 was more than $837− that is, it included at least some of the additional charges. 18 To raise an issue, a party need not discuss it at length. See Brock v. State, 203 Md. App. 245, 270, 37 A.3d 1030 (2012) (party preserved the question of the admissibility of a statement for impeachment purposes by mentioning impeachment in a single sentence of an argument mostly devoted to admissibility for substantive use). When, as here, both parties discussed the issue and the court necessarily decided it in reaching its decision, the issue has been raised for the purposes of Rule 8-131(a). Raised in the petition and preserved for review Raising the issue below is not all that is ordinarily required. In addition, Rule 8- 131(b)(1) provides, “Unless otherwise provided by the order granting the writ of certiorari, in reviewing a[n appellate] decision, the Court of Appeals ordinarily will consider only an issue [1] that has been raised in the petition for certiorari or any cross-petition and [2] that has been preserved for review by the Court of Appeals.” As to the first prong, the petition for certiorari in this case stated the following question, “Did the trial court err in relying on the landlord’s claim of certain non-rent charges due and owing to conclude that the tenant was not current on her rent and thus not eligible for relief on her claim for retaliatory eviction in violation of RP § 8-208.1?” This question raises the issue of the definition of rent because it asks whether the trial court erred in considering other charges beyond the fixed monthly amount of $837 as “rent” for the purposes of the statutory condition. The second prong requires that the issue be preserved for review, but Rule 8-131(a) already pertains to preservation in the trial court. Hence, the second prong of Rule 8-131(b) 19 essentially adds that the issue must not have been waived in an intermediate appeal. Here, there was no intermediate appeal, so this prong is satisfied. For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss is denied and this issue is properly before this Court under Rule 8-131.
The term “rent” is not defined in the anti-retaliation statute. Nor is the term defined elsewhere in Title 8 of the Real Property Article. It seems safe to say that it is a dollar amount to be derived in some way from the lease or other agreement that allows the tenant to occupy the property. Blue Ocean argued to the Circuit Court – and to us – that it is simply a matter of applying the provisions of Ms. Lockett’s lease that characterize various types of tenant obligations as “rent.” But while the Legislature undoubtedly contemplated that a court would refer to the lease to identify “rent” for purposes of determining whether a tenant is “current on the rent” for purposes of RP §8-208.1(d), it is not at all clear that the courts are required to defer to the lease and to regard as “rent” anything that is labeled so by the lease. Commercial v. Residential Leases Blue Ocean relies on two prior cases that construed the meaning of “rent” in commercial leases. In the context of a summary ejectment case involving a commercial lease, the Court held that “charges which may be definitely ascertained, paid by the tenant, going to [the tenant’s] use, possession, and enjoyment of rental commercial premises, are rent if such was the intention of the parties.” University Plaza Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Garcia, 279 Md. 61, 67, 367 A.2d 957 (1977); see also Shum v. Gaudreau, 317 Md. 49, 20 62, 562 A.2d 707 (1989) (“at least under some circumstances the parties’ intention could determine what was rent”). In those cases, however, the Court explicitly limited its holding to commercial leases which are more likely to be the product of an arms-length negotiation. The Court reasoned that “there is little likelihood of successful overreaching on the part of the landlord and of coerced adhesion on the part of the tenant” and thus the resulting lease “would fairly represent the actual intention of the parties.” Garcia, 279 Md. at 67. The Court signaled that it was less likely to defer to a lease’s characterization of a particular charge as “rent” in the context of a residential lease where there is unequal bargaining power and “other policies … would not allow free rein in the definition of rent….” Shum, 317 Md. at 63 & n.9. In this case we are not only dealing with a residential lease, but are construing a statute – RP §8-208.1 – that applies only to residential leases. It is unlikely that parties to a residential lease actually negotiate the definition of “rent.” Residential leases are more likely to be provided on a take-it-or-leave-it basis and, as here, to be provided after the tenant has already agreed to lease the premises and to be signed by the tenant without being read. Given that residential leases are normally drafted by the landlord and not the subject of extensive negotiation, deferring to the lease’s definition of “rent” would incentivize landlords to characterize all possible debts from the tenant to the landlord as “rent” so as to make it less likely that a tenant could obtain any relief under RP §8-208.1, even if the landlord had retaliated against the tenant for protected conduct. RP §8-208.1(d) does not require that the tenant owe no money at all to the landlord; it requires only that the tenant be “current on the rent.” 21 Ms. Lockett’s Lease An examination of Ms. Lockett’s lease reveals that it does not speak with one voice. The second paragraph of the lease recites that the landlord is leasing the premises to Ms. Lockett for an annual “rent” payable in equal monthly amounts. While Blue Ocean has referred to this figure as “base rent” in its brief to us, the lease itself does not use that phrase and refers to the fixed amount simply as “rent.” Paragraph 44 of the lease seems to have this version of “rent” in mind in specifying the procedure for establishing a “higher rent.” On the other hand, paragraph 34 of the lease, entitled “Definition of Rent,” states that “all payments” that the tenant owes to the landlord are “deemed rent.” A careful reading of the lease reveals that there are many potential payments that may be owed by the tenant to the landlord under a variety of circumstances – returned check charges (paragraph 4), late fees (paragraph 5), administrative and attorneys’ fees (paragraph 6), indemnification of landlord liability (paragraph 11), and repairs (paragraph 13), to mention a few. An addendum to the lease refers to certain utility charges as “additional rent.” It thus appears a more accurate characterization of the lease to say that it provides for “rent” in a fixed monthly amount and for “deemed rent” and “additional rent” that may or may not exist in any particular month and that can vary wildly in amount, depending on what other payments the tenant may owe the landlord. 22 Blue Ocean’s internal records, which track payments under the lease, appear to use the term “rent” to mean the fixed monthly charge.9 The ledger relating to Ms. Lockett’s apartment uses the term “rent” for the fixed monthly payment and uses different terms for other amounts owed or paid by Ms. Lockett, many or all of which would fall into the categories of “deemed rent” and “additional rent.” Accordingly, even if we were to defer completely to the definition of “rent” in the lease for purposes of RP §8-208.1, it is not clear what definition to derive from this lease. Ordinary meaning Having concluded that determining the “rent” for purposes of RP §8-208.1(d) is not simply a matter of accepting whatever a residential lease defines “rent” to be, we resort to the normal tools of statutory construction for guidance. To construe a statute, we typically “begin with the normal, plain meaning of the language of the statute.” Lockshin v. Semsker, 412 Md. 257, 275, 987 A.2d 18 (2010). When the statute does not define a word, “we look to the ordinary and popular understanding of the word . . . to determine its meaning.” Chow v. State, 393 Md. 431, 445, 903 A.2d 388 (2006). Title 8 of the Real Property Article does not define the term “rent.” Therefore, to determine the meaning of “rent” in RP §8-208.1, we first consider the ordinary meaning of the term. “Rent” ordinarily means the periodic sum paid for the use or occupancy of property. This is the typical dictionary definition. See, e.g., Merriam-Webster's Collegiate 9 Blue Ocean also referred to the fixed monthly charge as the “rent” for Ms. Lockett’s apartment in the complaint initiating this action and in its summary ejectment action that preceded this case. 23 Dictionary (11th ed.), available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/rent (defining “rent” as “a usually fixed periodical return made by a tenant or occupant of property to the owner for the possession and use thereof”). It also matches the general legal definition. See Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining “rent” as “[c]onsideration paid, usu[ually] periodically, for the use or occupancy of property (esp[ecially] real property).”). Other instances of “rent” in the Real Property Article In construing statutes, we consider the plain language “within the context of the statutory scheme to which it belongs ....” Lockshin, 412 Md. at 276. “We presume that the Legislature intends its enactments to operate together as a consistent and harmonious body of law, and, thus, we seek to reconcile and harmonize the parts of a statute, to the extent possible consistent with the statute's object and scope.” Id. In particular, other uses of the term “rent” are relevant, because “[w]hen a word susceptible of more than one meaning is repeated in the same statute or sections of a statute, it is presumed that it is used in the same sense.” Whack v. State, 338 Md. 665, 673, 659 A.2d 1347 (1995). Context suggests that “rent” in RP §8-208.1 ordinarily means the periodic amount paid by a tenant for use or occupancy. The anti-retaliation statute itself refers to “rent” in another provision that contemplates the ordinary meaning of that term. In addition to the requirement that the tenant be “current on the rent” in order to get relief under RP §8-208.1, the term “rent” appears in the provision describing the amount of the judgment that the court may award in an action under that statute. In particular, the court may award − to a tenant whose retaliation claim is successful, or to a landlord who successfully resists a bad24 faith retaliation claim − “damages not to exceed the equivalent of 3 months’ rent,” as well as attorneys’ fees and court costs. RP §8-208.1(c). This suggests that “rent” is an ascertainable amount that is readily trebled.10 Other references to “rent” in the subtitle relating to residential leases − subtitle 2 of Title 8 (Landlord and Tenant) of the Real Property Article − require similar clarity and definiteness. See RP §§8-203(b) (security deposit limited to two months’ rent), 8-203(i) (surety bond may not exceed two months’ rent), 8-212.1 (tenant in active duty military not liable for more than 30 days’ rent under certain circumstances), 8-212.2 (limiting liability of tenant with certain medical conditions who vacates premises to two months’ rent). If “rent” means a periodic sum, then it is likely to be easily ascertainable. If “rent” includes additional charges that vary by month and circumstance, then it is not. We think it unlikely that the General Assembly intended such indeterminacy, so statutory context suggests that “rent” in RP §8-208.1 means “a periodic amount paid for occupancy.” Other provisions of Title 8 use the term “rent” in a way that appears to exclude the variable charges at issue in this case. For example, RP §8-212.3 expressly contemplates that “rent” is distinct from “payments made to a utility service provider for utility service,” 10If “rent” were an unpredictably variable figure from month to month, there would be inherent uncertainty as to whether to treble the figure from a particular month and, if so, which month, or whether to cumulate the figures from particular months and, if so, which months. In this case, although the Circuit Court apparently believed that the other charges might be part of the “rent” that had to be paid as a condition of obtaining relief under RP §8-208.1, it did not hesitate to use the fixed monthly amount to calculate treble damages – i.e., the court multiplied the monthly rent of $837 by three to compute $2,511 as damages. 25 because it allows such payments to be deducted from rent under certain circumstances. Likewise, RP §8-401 provides that a landlord may recover, for nonpayment of rent for a residential tenancy, both “late fees” and “costs of the suit” indicating that the statute treats “rent” as distinct from late fees. In these provisions at least, the Real Property Article appears to treat utility charges (such as the gas charges here) and late fees as separate from rent. Legislative purpose “A court's primary goal in interpreting statutory language is to discern the legislative purpose, the ends to be accomplished, or the evils to be remedied by the statutory provision under scrutiny.” Lockshin, 412 Md. at 274. We seek to “construe the statute in a way that will advance [the statute’s] purpose, not frustrate it.” Neal v. Fisher, 312 Md. 685, 693, 541 A.2d 1314 (1988). One possible statutory purpose is to “provide a remedy, or improve or facilitate remedies already existing for the enforcement of rights and the redress of injuries.” Langston v. Riffe, 359 Md. 396, 408, 754 A.2d 389 (2000) (quoting 3 Norman J. Singer, Sutherland's Statutory Construction, § 60.02, at 152 (5th ed. 1993)). When a statute provides remedies not available at common law, the statute is remedial. Neal, 312 Md. at 693 (construing rent escrow statute). “[O]nce we have determined that a statute is remedial in nature . . . it must be liberally construed . . . in order to effectuate [its] broad remedial purpose.” Pak v. Hoang, 378 Md. 315, 326, 835 A.2d 1185 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted) (construing statute providing remedies for tenant when landlord wrongfully withholds security deposit). For similar reasons, “exemptions from remedial legislation 26 must be narrowly construed.” State Admin. Bd. of Election Laws v. Billhimer, 314 Md. 46, 64, 548 A.2d 819 (1988). RP §8-208.1 is designed to protect tenants in residential properties against retaliation by landlords. It provides remedies for a tenant when a landlord retaliates in certain ways against the tenant for a variety of reasons. These remedies were not available at common law; indeed, the remedies available under Maryland law were much more limited until RP §8-208.1 was rewritten in 2011. See Chapter 264, Laws of Maryland 2011 (among other things, eliminating the requirement that the landlord act “solely” for a retaliatory purpose and allowing retaliation claims based on landlord actions other than an eviction). Hence, RP §8-208.1 is remedial, and RP §8-208.1(d), which is an exemption from a remedial statute — exempting a landlord who has violated RP §8-208.1 from being required to provide relief to a tenant if the tenant is not current on the rent — is to be construed narrowly. Consequently, when choosing between a broader, uncertain definition of “rent” that includes more than the periodic sum and a more specific definition that includes only that amount, we will employ the more specific definition. For purposes of RP §8-208.1, “rent” means the periodic sum owed by the tenant for use or occupancy of the premises.