Opinion ID: 1318394
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: sce & g franchise fee

Text: The City claims that it is entitled to receive $78,599.43 which was forwarded to NCD on June 29, 1975, by the South Carolina Electric & Gas Company (SCE & G). This amount represents the license fee due to NCD from SCE & G for calendar year 1976. NCD contends that the City has already received one franchise fee for each contract year and that NCD is under no continuing obligation to transfer funds to the City for calendar year 1976, during which there was no contract between the parties. The record clearly reflects that the City actually received two SCE & G franchise fees from NCD. The franchise fee for calendar year 1974 was delivered to NCD on or about July 10, 1973, and was forwarded to the City on September 4, 1973. The franchise fee for calendar year 1975 was delivered to NCD on June 28, 1974, and was forwarded to the City on August 30, 1974. The question for this Court to determine is whether the 1974 contract contains language which entitles the City to a third franchise fee for calendar year 1976. The City contends that these funds were received by NCD on June 29, 1975, and that Section 6.02 of the 1974 contract requires that they be paid to the City. Section 6.02 requires NCD on July 1, 1974 , to transfer all funds in its accounts to the City and to assign certain assets. With the exception of back taxes, there is no language in the 1974 contract which creates or imposes a continuing obligation on NCD to transfer any funds or assets received later in the contract year. The clear meaning of the phrase on July 1, 1974 is to limit the duty of NCD to transfer and assign only those assets held by NCD on July 1, 1974. To construe the provisions of the contract in any other way would be to eradicate the essential term on July 1, 1974. which is contrary to the general rule of contract construction. See Bruce v. Blalock , 241 S.C. 155, 127 S.E. (2d) 439 (1962). The license fee was not received by NCD until two (2) days before the end of the 1974-75 contract period, and the parties did not have a contract for calendar year 1976 in which the franchise fee applied. In addition, Exhibit VII to the stipulation of exhibits shows the relevant franchise fee as deferred income and not as an asset at the time of receipt by the City. We agree with the trial court and conclude that there is no language in the contract to support the City's claim that it is entitled to receive the franchise fee for calendar year 1976. We affirm the order of the trial court. Affirmed. NESS, C.J., and GREGORY, HARWELL and CHANDLER, JJ., concur.