Opinion ID: 165317
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint Based Upon the Libel-Proof Plaintiff Doctrine

Text: 16 In concluding that the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine barred Mr. Lamb's claims, the district court resolved Mr. Rizzo's motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Notwithstanding, the court clearly relied upon and incorporated into its order granting the motion material derived from documents outside the four corners of Mr. Lamb's complaint. In so doing, the court converted the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Nichols v. United States, 796 F.2d 361, 364 (10th Cir.1986). We must therefore review the record under summary judgment standards, and affirm the district court's ruling if it is clear from the record on appeal that there are no genuine issues of fact to be tried and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.; Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. 3 17 On appeal, Mr. Lamb argues that the district court knew that Kansas did not have a libel-proof plaintiff doctrine and knowingly violated his rights by applying that federal doctrine to his case. Aplt. Br. at 6. In the alternative, he apparently argues that even if the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine is applicable, it cannot be used to bar his claims thirty-one years after the only crime that could have labeled [him]... libel-proof. Id. at 7. Mr. Lamb's arguments, however, are misplaced. 18 As a preliminary matter, although Mr. Lamb concedes that the substantive law of the forum state applies, see Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938), he fails to recognize that [i]n the absence of authoritative precedent from the Kansas Supreme Court ..., our job is to predict how that court would rule, Carl v. City of Overland Park, 65 F.3d 866, 872 (10th Cir.1995). Additionally, and contrary to Mr. Lamb's contention, the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine is not an exclusively federal doctrine. It is a judicially created doctrine that has been applied in a number of jurisdictions for more than two decades. 4 It recognizes that damage to one's reputation is the core of a defamation action, and essentially holds 19 that when a plaintiff's reputation is so diminished at the time of publication of the allegedly defamatory material that only nominal damages at most could be awarded because the person's reputation was not capable of sustaining further harm, the plaintiff is deemed to be libel-proof as a matter of law and is not permitted to burden a defendant with a trial. 20 Eliot J. Katz, Annotation, Defamation: Who is Libel-Proof, 50 A.L.R.4th 1257 (2004); accord 1 Robert D. Sack, Sack on Defamation § 2.4.18 (3d ed.2004); see generally Note, The Libel-Proof Plaintiff Doctrine, 98 Harv. L.Rev.1909 (1985). Stated another way: 21 When ... an individual engages in conspicuously anti-social or even criminal behavior, which is widely reported to the public, his reputation diminishes proportionately. Depending upon the nature of the conduct, the number of offenses, and the degree and range of publicity received, there comes a time when the individual's reputation for specific conduct, or his general reputation for honesty and fair dealing is sufficiently low in the public's estimation that he can recover only nominal damages for subsequent defamatory statements. 22 First Amendment considerations of free press and speech, promoting society's interest in uninhibited, robust, and wide-open discussion, must prevail over an individual's interest in his reputation in such cases. An individual who engages in certain anti-social or criminal behavior and suffers a diminished reputation may be libel proof as a matter of law, as it relates to that specific behavior. 23 Wynberg, 564 F.Supp. at 928. 24 The libel-proof plaintiff doctrine was first enunciated in Cardillo v. Doubleday & Co., where a prisoner, Cardillo, brought a libel suit asserting that the authors and publishers of My Life in the Mafia incorrectly reported that he had participated in certain specific crimes. 518 F.2d at 639-40. After recounting Cardillo's record and relationships, the Second Circuit concluded that it could not envisage any jury awarding, or any court sustaining, an award under any circumstances for more than a few cents' damages, id. at 640, and held Cardillo libel-proof, i.e., so unlikely by virtue of his life as a habitual criminal to be able to recover anything other than nominal damages. Id. at 639. 25 Having set forth a description of the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine and where it first took hold, we now turn to the district court's prediction that the Kansas Supreme Court would, on these facts, adopt the doctrine and hold that it is a bar to Mr. Lamb's claims. 26 [A] federal court's prediction of state law looks to (1) lower state court decisions and state Supreme Court dicta; ... (3) the general rule on the issue; (4) the rule in other states looked to by [Kansas] courts when they formulate their own substantive law, and (5) other available legal sources, such as treatises and law review commentaries. 27 DP-Tek, Inc. v. AT & T Global Info. Solutions Co., 100 F.3d 828, 831 (10th Cir.1996) (alterations in original) (quoting Menne v. Celotex Corp., 861 F.2d 1453, 1464-65 n. 15 (10th Cir.1988)). 5 See also Carl, 65 F.3d at 872 (Kansas Supreme Court dicta, which represents that court's own comment on the development of Kansas law, is an appropriate source from which [a] prediction may be made.). 28 Libel is governed by state law. In Kansas, 29 damage to one's reputation is the essence and gravamen of an action for defamation. Unless injury to reputation is shown, plaintiff has not established a valid claim for defamation, by either libel or slander.... It is reputation which is defamed, reputation which is injured, reputation which is protected by the laws of libel and slander. 30 Gobin v. Globe Pub. Co., 232 Kan. 1, 649 P.2d 1239, 1243 (1982); see also Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 275, 91 S.Ct. 621, 28 L.Ed.2d 35 (1971) ([D]amage to reputation is, of course, the essence of libel.). The libel-proof plaintiff doctrine has not been adopted by the Kansas Supreme Court, but, in Ruebke v. Globe Communications Corp. , the court recognized the doctrine's existence. 241 Kan. 595, 738 P.2d 1246, 1249-50, 1252 (1987). Although the court did not find the doctrine applicable given the facts of that case, in recognizing the existence of the doctrine, the Kansas court observed in dicta that the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine applied in cases where the plaintiff had already suffered from a lowered reputation in the community because of the plaintiff's prior convictions for the crime alleged in the publication or for a similar crime. Id. at 1249. In Ruebke , however, the allegedly defamatory article was published before Mr. Ruebke was convicted of the crimes he was accused of committing. Therefore, said the Kansas Supreme Court, the alleged defamer could not rely on Mr. Ruebke's subsequent criminal convictions to render him libel proof. Id. at 1249-50. By contrast, the facts surrounding Mr. Lamb's case fit within the Kansas Supreme Court's description of when the doctrine might apply. Mr. Lamb, unlike Mr. Ruebke, was convicted long before Mr. Rizzo's allegedly defamatory articles were published. Thus, Mr. Lamb had already suffered from a lowered reputation in the community [due to his] prior convictions for the crime alleged in the publication or for a similar crime. Id. at 1249. 31 Since the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine's inception, it has been said that [t]he cases that most compellingly invite [the doctrine's] application are those cases, like Cardillo, in which criminal convictions for behavior similar to that alleged in the challenged communication are urged as a bar to the claim. Finklea, 742 S.W.2d at 515 (citing Wynberg, 564 F.Supp. 924; Logan, 447 F.Supp. 1328; and Jackson, 394 Mass. 577, 476 N.E.2d 617). This is just such a case. The communication Mr. Lamb challenged related specifically to his past criminal conduct, and it matters not that thirty-one years had passed since what he characterizes as the only crime that could have labeled [him] libel-proof. Aplt. Br. at 7. 32 This is not a case, resolved the district court, 33 in which the substance of the plaintiff's reputation-destroying actions are in any doubt. Given the utter heinousness of the offenses which led to the plaintiff's three consecutive sentences of life imprisonment, the uncontroverted nature of those offenses, and the widespread notoriety attached to the convictions of the plaintiff as well as his periodic escapes from custody, the plaintiff has not and cannot present an actionable case of libel based upon the purported misstatements contained in Rizzo's articles. 34 Lamb, 242 F.Supp.2d at 1038; see also State v. Lamb, 497 P.2d at 285 (acknowledging that Mr. Lamb's crimes against Ms. Kemmerly and Ms. Childs were widely covered and reported by the news media). 35 In considering whether the Kansas Supreme Court would adopt this doctrine, we have looked to the required sources: Kansas Supreme Court dicta, the general rule on the issue, treatises, and law review commentaries. DP-Tek, Inc., 100 F.3d at 831. We affirm the district court's holding that the Kansas Supreme Court would adopt the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine. And, reviewing the record under summary judgment standards, we also affirm the district court's determination that the Kansas Supreme Court would hold it applicable to Mr. Lamb. This case presents us with one of those narrow instances where ... allegedly libelous statement[s] cannot realistically cause impairment of reputation ... [and] the [plaintiff's] claim[s] should be dismissed. Guccione, 800 F.2d at 303; see also Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882, 889 (2d Cir.1976) (warning that the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine is a limited, narrow [principle]). It is clear that there are no genuine issues of fact and that Mr. Rizzo is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We therefore affirm the district court's determination and conclude that the allegedly libelous articles written by Mr. Rizzo are not actionable as a matter of law. 36