Opinion ID: 4521869
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Third party culpability defense

Text: During the direct examination of Patty Taboga, defense counsel attempted to question her about whether she spoke to Mary Mercedes about defendant and Pamela’s divorce. In response to the prosecution’s hearsay objection, defense counsel argued that the exception for statements against penal interest applied because Taboga was going to describe Mercedes “savaging Pam” and would testify to other statements Mercedes made showing her “animus, her intent, motive to kill Pam.” The trial court explained that animus towards Pamela was not enough and that Mercedes’s statements had to be against her “penal interest.” However, the record does not disclose that defendant laid any foundation for admitting this evidence. On appeal, defendant asserts that these hearsay statements were admissible to prove Mercedes’s “state of mind, emotion, or physical sensation.” (Evid. Code, § 1250, subd. (a)(1).) The Attorney General maintains that defendant sought admission of the statements only under Evidence Code section 1230 and “invited” any error by limiting himself to this exception. For reasons stated below, we conclude that any error in excluding Mercedes’s hearsay statements that she hated Pamela was harmless. As noted above, the trial court permitted defendant to present a third party culpability defense that Mercedes, and not defendant, solicited the murder of Pamela. Even if statements that Mercedes harbored animus towards Pamela tended to show her motive to kill Pamela, their admission would have made little difference to the success of this defense. As discussed above (see ante, at p. 64), the prosecution thoroughly undercut Taboga’s testimony about Mercedes’s solicitation to kill Pamela, 71 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. characterizing it as illogical and unbelievable. The defense itself was not plausible, and the fact that Mercedes may have hated Pamela would have done little to save the defense. Moreover, defendant was not otherwise precluded from presenting this evidence from other sources. Defendant also points out that based on the prosecution’s hearsay objection, the trial court struck Taboga’s testimony that when she had asked Mercedes whether defendant knew about this phone call and her request that Taboga’s husband kill Pamela, Mercedes had replied, “No.” Because defendant did not argue below for the statements’ admissibility, he has forfeited any claim that these hearsay statements were admissible under an exception. (See People v. Morrison (2004) 34 Cal.4th 698, 711.) Finally, defendant claims that the trial court erred in excluding any evidence of Taboga’s March 9, 2011 letter to defendant, in which she first accused Mercedes of soliciting Pamela’s murder back in May 2008. To rebut the prosecution’s assertion that Taboga was lying about Mercedes’s solicitation, defendant argued the letter was a prior consistent statement under Evidence Code section 1236. (See Evid. Code, § 791.) However, the prosecution countered that it had never questioned what Taboga said in the letter was somehow inconsistent or consistent with her testimony at trial. The trial court excluded the letter as inadmissible hearsay. The trial court did not err in refusing to admit Taboga’s March 9 letter to defendant. Contrary to defendant’s contention, it is not sufficient that Taboga’s consistent statement simply be made “prior to” her trial testimony. (People v. Riccardi (2012) 54 Cal.4th 758, 802.) Rather, the relevant 72 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. time is “before the bias, motive for fabrication, or other improper motive is alleged to have arisen.” (Evid. Code, § 791, subd. (b).) Here, Mercedes allegedly asked Taboga in May 2008 if her husband would kill Pamela. Pamela was killed on July 28, 2008, and a complaint charging defendant with Pamela’s murder was filed on September 15, 2008. Arguably, Taboga would have had a motive to fabricate Mercedes’s solicitation after defendant was charged with Pamela’s murder. Rather than writing this letter to defendant before or around that time, Taboga wrote the letter three years later. “[I]f the consistent statement was made after the time the improper motive is alleged to have arisen, the logical thrust of the evidence is lost and the statement is inadmissible.” (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., Deering’s Ann. Evid. Code, supra, foll. § 791, p. 501.)