Opinion ID: 1297188
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Testimony of Witness Horton

Text: (10) Carmen Maria Horton testified under a grant of immunity that defendant told her he was the one who shot the victim during the robbery, and that the shooting was an accident. Defendant contends she should not have been allowed to testify without a prior hearing as to her competency as a witness, and that the prosecution improperly withheld the terms of her immunity. Defendant did not seek a hearing on Horton's competence, or make any objection or motion relevant to this contention, thus waiving the claim. ( People v. Sully (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1195, 1216 [283 Cal. Rptr. 144, 812 P.2d 163].) Moreover, the claim lacks merit. The order granting immunity, issued in 1984 at the time of the preliminary hearing and signed by Judge Golde, was not originally part of the appellate record. The record has now been augmented to include it. It ordered Horton to answer the questions with respect to her knowledge in this case, and further ordered unconditionally that she shall not be prosecuted or subjected to penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any fact or act concerning which, in accordance with the Order, she was required to answer. Nothing suggests the terms of the grant of immunity were withheld from the defense. No conditions were attached to the grant, and no reason appears to question Horton's competence to testify. Defendant also claims that the district attorney committed misconduct by implying to the jury that the judge vouched for [Horton's] credibility. The district attorney concluded his direct examination of Horton as follows: [Question]: Now, prior to coming to court today back in August the 9th of 1984, you appeared in this courtroom; correct? [Answer]: Yes, I did. [Question]: And Judge Golde, the judge present here, granted you immunity? [Answer]: Yes, he did. [Question]: That was requested by the prosecution as to any offenses you may have committed in your involvement in this? [Answer]: Yes. This questioning, defendant contends, was a bold insinuation to the jury that the trial judge had vouched for Carmen Horton's credibility by granting her immunity and, as such, was a foul blow. Again, the claim has been waived by the failure to object. ( People v. Ashmus, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 976.) Moreover, there was no misconduct. The questions merely informed the jury that Horton had received immunity for her testimony. No reasonable juror would interpret the questions as implying that the judge, or anyone else, had vouched for her credibility. ( People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 445 [3 Cal. Rptr.2d 106, 821 P.2d 610] [A reasonable juror would be unlikely to view the statement that immunity was `not contrary to the public interest' as an endorsement of [the witness's] credibility.].) Defendant also argues that the terms of the grant of immunity were stated differently in the 1984 written order (Horton shall not be prosecuted or subject to penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any fact or act concerning which, in accordance with the Order, she was required to answer, i.e., her knowledge in this case) and in the direct examination of the witness at trial (immunity as to any offenses you may have committed in your involvement in this). Although slightly different language was employed, the substance was the same. Horton was required to testify about her knowledge in the entire case, so, in effect, she was granted immunity as to any offenses she may have committed in the case. Defendant claims the 1984 order did not grant immunity from prosecution as an accomplice, while the 1987 formulation would have. We disagree. Horton's compelled testimony implicated her as an accessory under Penal Code section 32, although not as a principal; that fact or act was clearly covered by the 1984 order. Moreover, even if, hypothetically, the prosecutor had stated the terms of immunity more broadly in front of the jury than in the written order, that would not aid defendant. Both formulations granted unconditional immunity; neither suggests any reason to doubt Horton's competence to testify. In addition, the broader the grant of immunity the greater tendency it has to cast doubt on the credibility of the witness. Defendant argues that Horton refused to testify at the preliminary hearing, and that before trial, the prosecutor expressed doubts that she would testify at all. This is correct, but again does not suggest in the slightest she was incompetent when she did testify. He also argues the prosecutor said, I will alert this Court ahead of time if she's coming and any possible problems. Although there was no alert on the record before she testified, this may merely mean there were no problems. There is no showing Horton was incompetent to testify, or that the prosecutor committed any form of misconduct. Defendant finally argues his attorneys were incompetent in not asking for a competency hearing and in their limited cross-examination of the witness. There is no reason apparent in the record for counsel to have requested a hearing on Horton's competence. Moreover, as discussed below regarding counsel's alleged concession of guilt, defense counsel had difficult tactical decisions to make as a result of Horton's testimony. The cross-examination was brief, and limited to eliciting evidence that defendant told Horton the shooting was an accident, testimony obviously beneficial to the defense. Counsel left it to counsel for the codefendant to cross-examine Horton on questions of credibility. We see no incompetence.