Opinion ID: 578165
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Tejada's Objections

Text: 44 Tejada raises two additional issues on appeal. He argues that the evidence of his guilt was insufficient as a matter of law and that Judge Walker erred in permitting rebuttal evidence that exceeded the scope of direct examination. We reject both of these arguments as unpersuasive.
45 21 U.S.C. § 846 provides that [a]ny person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in this subchapter shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the conspiracy. 21 U.S.C. §§ 812, 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B) prohibit possession with the intent to distribute cocaine. In two counts, the government charged that Tejada violated these sections, basing the latter count on an aiding and abetting theory. After a five day trial, a jury found Tejada guilty on both counts. On appeal, Tejada argues that the evidence before the jury was insufficient as a matter of law to support a conviction and that it established no more than his mere presence. We disagree. 46 A defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his conviction bears a heavy burden. United States v. Rivalta, 892 F.2d 223, 227 (2d Cir.1989). [A] conviction must be upheld if, 'after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'  United States v. Roldan-Zapata, 916 F.2d 795, 802 (2d Cir.1990) (citations omitted), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 1397, 113 L.Ed.2d 453 (1991). A jury may base its verdict on inferences from circumstantial evidence. See United States v. Mariani, 725 F.2d 862, 865-66 (2d Cir.1984). Moreover, in reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence, we must credit every inference that could have been drawn in the government's favor. Labat, 905 F.2d at 22 (citations omitted). 47 As to Count One, the conspiracy charge, once a conspiracy is shown, only slight evidence is needed to link another defendant with it. United States v. Vanwort, 887 F.2d 375, 386 (2d Cir.1989) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 906, 110 S.Ct. 1927, 109 L.Ed.2d 290 (1990). The evidence need not prove that a defendant knew all of the other co-conspirators or all of the details of the conspiracy. See Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 556-57, 68 S.Ct. 248, 256, 92 L.Ed. 154 (1947); Labat, 905 F.2d at 21 (citing Blumenthal ). 48 To convict a defendant as an aider and abettor, the government need show only  'that [a defendant] in some sort associate[d] himself with the venture, that he participate[d] in it as in something that he wish[ed] to bring about, that he [sought] by his action to make it succeed.'  United States v. Perry, 643 F.2d 38, 46 (2d Cir.) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 835, 102 S.Ct. 138, 70 L.Ed.2d 115 (1981). We properly may uphold a conviction even if a defendant did not participate  'in every phase of the criminal venture,'  United States v. Ciambrone, 787 F.2d 799, 809 (2d Cir.) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1017, 107 S.Ct. 668, 93 L.Ed.2d 720 (1986), or have a stake in the outcome of the illegal venture. United States v. Tyler, 758 F.2d 66, 70 (2d Cir.1985). 49 Tejada does not contest that the evidence in this case established a conspiracy. He only contends that the evidence was insufficient to link him to it. He asserts that he was merely present at the scene of the crime and that no evidence connected the cocaine to apartment 3k. He argues further that the evidence linking him to apartment 3k did not provide a sufficient nexus to connect him to the conspiracy. Because these arguments are not supported by the evidence, we uphold the convictions on both the conspiracy and the aiding and abetting counts. 50 Contrary to Tejada's assertions, this is not a mere presence case. Evidence clearly existed to support the jury's finding that Tejada was a knowing participant in the conspiracy and that he aided and abetted Cabrera's possession of the cocaine. After Detective Monge told Cabrera that he would be dissatisfied by anything less than a full two kilograms, Cabrera made a phone call and then suggested that he and Detective Monge go to 196th Street and Jerome Avenue. Cabrera told Detective Monge that they might find Mancebo there and that the cocaine was kept nearby. On arrival at that address, Cabrera immediately walked over to and spoke with Tejada, who was accompanied by Pumerol. After speaking to Tejada, Cabrera returned directly to Detective Monge with a report that Mancebo was in the area and that they now had the complete second kilogram of cocaine. 51 Cabrera then retrieved the cocaine from somewhere in 2800 Jerome Avenue and walked directly to Tejada and Pumerol, who were looking up and down the block. A brief conversation took place. The three men, Cabrera, Tejada and Pumerol, then approached Detective Monge's vehicle. Pumerol stood behind the vehicle and continued to survey the area. Cabrera entered the vehicle, and Tejada spoke to him in Spanish through the passenger door, saying--according to Detective Monge--Don't do the deal here. Take him around the corner. 52 Tejada argues that none of these facts suffices to connect him with the crimes for which he was charged. He argues that because the agents did not overhear the conversations between Cabrera, Tejada and Pumerol, their contents are unknown. He also argues that [w]ithout evidence of the precise words allegedly spoken by Tejada, the jury simply had no basis on which to interpret their meaning. We reject both of these arguments. 53 Immediately after speaking to Tejada, Cabrera had the information that the second kilogram of cocaine was ready. We believe that a reasonable jury could have inferred from this fact that Tejada had supplied this news to Cabrera. Moreover, we do not agree that a jury must be told the actual words spoken by a defendant to interpret what he said. Here Detective Monge, a native Spanish-speaker, testified in English as to the meaning of a Spanish sentence. This information clearly was probative, and a reasonable jury could have inferred from it that Tejada, as a member of the conspiracy, had steered a drug deal into a more private area in order to avoid detection. 54 Tejada also argues that his relationship to apartment 3k did not connect him to the conspiracy. We disagree. After speaking to Tejada and then telling Detective Monge that he was going to go up to the apartment and bring down the kilos, Cabrera entered into 2800 Jerome Avenue only to emerge a few moments later with the box that contained the cocaine. When arrested, Cabrera was carrying the keys to apartment 3k. 55 At the time of his arrest, Tejada carried a money order and a receipt for rent (although in another's name) for apartment 3k. He also was carrying a receipt from a sporting goods store listing apartment 3k as his address. We reject the notion that a reasonable jury could not have found from these facts that the conspirators used apartment 3k to store the cocaine delivered to Detective Monge and that Tejada had significant ties to the apartment and dealings that took place in it. We conclude, therefore, that a reasonable jury could have inferred both that Cabrera went to apartment 3k to obtain the second kilogram of cocaine and that Tejada was an active member of the conspiracy.
56 Tejada also contends that we should grant him a new trial because the district court allowed rebuttal evidence that exceeded the scope of direct examination. The function of rebuttal evidence is to explain or rebut evidence offered by an opponent. See United States v. Neary, 733 F.2d 210, 220 (2d Cir.1984). A district court has wide discretion in determining whether to permit evidence on rebuttal. United States v. Nussen, 531 F.2d 15, 20 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 839, 97 S.Ct. 112, 50 L.Ed.2d 107 (1976). Here, we conclude that the district court acted within its discretion in admitting the government's rebuttal evidence. 57 At trial, Diane Daiute, a private investigator hired by Tejada, testified that Detective O'Flaherty could not have seen the entrance to 2800 Jerome Avenue from his surveillance point on the date of arrest. Judge Walker allowed the government to present a witness, Agent Dongelli, to testify in the government's rebuttal case that from his surveillance position he had seen Cabrera enter 2800 Jerome Avenue empty-handed and return carrying a box. 58 Tejada argues that Judge Walker erred by allowing this testimony. Essentially, he contends that this rebuttal testimony exceeded the scope of the direct examination and should have been brought as part of the government's case-in-chief. Tejada offers no cases to support this position, however, and both of his arguments are without merit. 59 In United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1171-72 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1081, 110 S.Ct. 1138, 107 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1990), the defendants also argued that the government's rebuttal evidence was not within the permissible scope of direct. In that case, one of the defendants, Mazzurco, had testified in his own defense. On cross-examination, he had stated that he had worked as a broker and importer of precious gems, impliedly denying that he had any connection to narcotics trafficking. Responding to this testimony, the government presented rebuttal evidence that two police officers previously had seized six kilograms of cocaine and a piece of paper with Mazzurco's telephone number on it from one Guido Cocilovo. The government also presented a customs document, seized from Mazzurco's home, which linked the two men. By connecting Mazzurco to Cocilovo, who was both an importer and a drug trafficker, the government had sought to rebut the defendant's claim of innocence. 60 The defendants argued on appeal that the evidence did not rebut any of the evidence presented by the defense, but merely bolstered the government's case. Id. We rejected this contention, holding that [a] district court has wide discretion over what evidence may be presented on rebuttal. Id. (citations omitted). 61 As in Casamento, we are disinclined to overturn a district judge, who has determined--after watching a case unfold--that testimony properly rebuts an inference that a party's adversary has sought to make. Judge Walker properly concluded that Agent Dongilli's testimony was relevant and that it rebutted Ms. Daiute's testimony. In doing so Judge Walker did not abuse his discretion. 62 Tejada's argument that Judge Walker erred by allowing rebuttal testimony on matters that could have been introduced in the government's case-in-chief also fails. Trial judges have  'wide discretion in permitting the introduction of evidence in rebuttal which might well have been brought out in the Government's case in chief.'  United States v. Trapnell, 495 F.2d 22, 25 (2d Cir.) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 851, 95 S.Ct. 93, 42 L.Ed.2d 82 (1974). 63 In Weiss v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 515 F.2d 449, 457-59 (2d Cir.1975), a civil case, we considered an analogous issue. Weiss involved an automobile accident allegedly caused by a defective steering mechanism. At trial, the district judge had refused to allow the plaintiff to offer on rebuttal expert testimony that refuted the defendant's explanation of the accident. The district judge's rationale had been that the evidence should have been included in the plaintiff's case-in-chief. 64 We disagreed, holding that the exclusion of crucial evidence constituted an abuse of discretion. As we emphasized,  '[t]he plaintiff was not required to offer evidence which positively excluded every other possible cause of the accident.'  Id. at 459 (citation omitted). Any other rule would require attorneys to present evidence in advance to rebut every possible scenario that defendants might paint. This not only would be inefficient but would obfuscate the issues presented to the jury. Because the evidence here served to discredit the inference Tejada sought to create on direct examination, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence as part of the government's rebuttal case.