Opinion ID: 2273030
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Excessive Jury Verdict

Text: For its second point on appeal, Travis Lumber challenges the jury's finding that the fair market value of the timber removed on or after December 17, 1997, was $347,714.25. Specifically, Travis Lumber argues that allegedly inadmissible evidence inflamed the passions and prejudices of the jury, causing it to award more in compensatory damages than Deichman had requested. When an award of damages is alleged on appeal to be excessive, we review the proof and all reasonable inferences most favorable to the appellee and determine whether the verdict is so great as to shock our conscience or demonstrate passion or prejudice on the part of the jury. Calvary Christian Sch., Inc. v. Huffstuttler, 367 Ark. 117, 132, 238 S.W.3d 58, 70 (2006). Remittitur is appropriate when the compensatory damages awarded are excessive and cannot be sustained by the evidence. Advocat, Inc. v. Sauer, 353 Ark. 29, 43, 111 S.W.3d 346, 353 (2003). The standard of review in such a case is that appropriate for a new trial motion, that is, whether there is substantial evidence to support the verdict. Id. Under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(4), a new trial may be granted due to excessive damages appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice. Id. (citing Ark. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(4) (2008)). As Travis Lumber points out, Deichman's counsel requested damages in the amount of $161,845.30, in addition to $20,915 for reforestation, during closing argument. This was based on the testimony of Carroll Cochran, who estimated that the total fair market value at the stump of the timber removed from the property between December 17, 1997, and the end of the harvest was $161,845.30. Cochran's estimate of the fair market value was broken down into three categories: $153,643.20 in pine saw logs, $4,039.60 of pine pulpwood, and $4,162.50 in hardwood. Cochran's estimate of the value of the pine saw logs was based on his opinion that the timber was worth $60 per ton and that there were 2,560.72 tons harvested between December 17, 1997, and February 16, 1998. During its deliberations, the jury posed the following question: Mr. Plunkett [Deichman's counsel], Where do you come up with this figure $161,845.30 in closing[?] According to Travis Lumber, because the jury's award of $347,714.25 was more than twice as high as what the plaintiff requested and more than any expert testified to, it is clear that the jury was influenced by passion or prejudice. Travis Lumber points to two pieces of evidence that it claims were inadmissible and led to the excessive award. First, it challenges the circuit court's ruling allowing Cochran to testify to the full value of all of the timber removed from the property, even before the date that the property was transferred to the trust, because Deichman's claims on behalf of the estate had been dismissed. [3] Second, it challenges Mooty's testimony asserting that he gave $15,000 to an associate and asked that it be delivered to a Travis Lumber employee to try to get this whole thing smoothed out. As indicated later in this opinion, we reject Travis Lumber's arguments on these evidentiary rulings. However, even assuming that this evidence was properly admitted, we cannot say that substantial evidence supports the jury's verdict. We agree that the jury's award of $347,714.25 in compensatory damages is excessive under the circumstances of this case. Based on our review of each witness's testimony, the figure of $347,714.25 appears to have been arrived at arbitrarily, for there is no numerical evidence to support it. It is true, as Deichman points out, that various witnesses for Travis Lumber testified that they agreed with some of Cochran's methodologies. For example, Terry Bryant, a Travis Lumber employee, testified that he found Cochran's use of an adjacent property, in estimating the size and number of trees on the property at issue, to be reasonable. David Reinold, a forester and appraiser who testified on behalf of Travis Lumber, stated that he generally agreed with Cochran's assumption that the property had approximately sixty stems per acre. However, Reinold disagreed with Cochran's tonnage calculations and his estimated value of $60 per ton. Tom Post, a procurement manager for another area timber company, also agreed with Cochran's stem count as well as his volume calculations; but, Post testified that he had never heard of timber selling for $60 per ton in Yell County and that the $40 per ton price paid by Travis Lumber was on the high end. In fact, no witness other than Cochran believed the $60 per ton price to be reasonable. More importantly, even assuming that Cochran's tonnage and price calculations were correct and accepted as such by the jury, the amount awarded exceeded that which would have resulted based on Cochran's estimates. Deichman asserts that the evidence would have supported an inference that there were more stems per acre than Cochran estimated, that the trees were older and thus larger than those on the adjacent property used for comparison purposes, or that the timber was worth more than $60 per ton. However, we can find no evidentiary support for these inferences. In accordance with our standard of review of damage awards, we must construe the proof and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Deichman. Even in so doing, we are unable to determine the basis of the jury's award. In short, none of the tonnage or price calculations testified to by any witness supported the finding that the fair market value of the timber harvested from December 17, 1997, through February 16, 1998, totaled $347,714.25. Deichman cites to a case from the Arizona Court of Appeals, Liberatore v. Thompson, 157 Ariz. 612, 760 P.2d 612, 621 (Ariz.Ct.App.1988), stating [t]hat a jury's award against a defendant exceeds the suggestion of plaintiff's counsel does not alone prove prejudice. We hold, however, that the compensatory damages awarded in the instant case were excessive not because they exceeded what Deichman's counsel requested, but because they were unsupported by even the testimony of Deichman's witness. In his brief, Deichman urges this court to order a remittitur in the event that the compensatory damage award is deemed excessive. As indicated, we have held that remittitur is appropriate when the compensatory damages awarded are excessive and cannot be sustained by the evidence. Advocat, Inc. v. Sauer, 353 Ark. at 43, 111 S.W.3d at 353. While remittitur generally is requested from this court in order to lower punitive damages that are found to be grossly excessive or that appear to be motivated by passion or prejudice, we have also held that it is appropriate when the compensatory damages awarded cannot be sustained by the evidence. Johnson v. Gilliland, 320 Ark. 1, 8, 896 S.W.2d 856, 859 (1995). Ordinarily, a general verdict is a complete entity that cannot be divided, requiring a new trial upon reversible error. Id. at 9, 896 S.W.2d at 860. When, however, a trial error relates to a separable item of damages, a new trial can sometimes be avoided by the entry of a remittitur. Id. Because we are presented with such a situation here, we hold that remittitur is appropriate. Where no erroneous ruling by the trial court is shown, we allow a remittitur down to the most liberal amount that we would approve if the jury had returned a verdict for that sum. Ark. State Highway Comm'n v. Bradford, 252 Ark. 1037, 1040, 482 S.W.2d 107, 108 (1972). As we have indicated, we reject Travis Lumber's challenges to the circuit court's evidentiary rulings; therefore, we must remit Deichman's compensatory damage award down to the most liberal amount that we would have accepted had the jury returned a verdict for that sum. We note that Cochran's testimony, offered on Deichman's behalf, supports a compensatory damage award of $161,845.30, representing the estimated fair market value of the timber removed from the property between December 17, 1997, and February 16, 1998. We therefore reduce the compensatory damage award from $347,714.25 to $161,845.30, with joint and several liability, less $4,288.71, which has been paid by Mooty as restitution, for a net judgment of $157,556.59. We also reduce the treble damages award accordingly, from $695,428.50 to $323,690.60. We affirm the judgment award on condition of remittitur as stated at the conclusion of this opinion.