Opinion ID: 522904
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Balancing Test Applied.

Text: 27 Thus, the threshold question we face here is whether the employee's speech activities deserve first amendment protection because they may be fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern. Rankin, 107 S.Ct. at 2897 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 1689-70, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983)). The question is answered by examining the content, form, and context of a given statement as revealed by the whole record. Id. 28 The district court found that at least some of Price's statements and activities were directed to matters of public concern and therefore protected. The court drew a distinction between Price's statements within the facility and those made outside the facility, finding that the statements made within the facility consisted almost exclusively of unsubstantiated rumors, with little or no actual evidence. The court concluded that, given the volatility of the patients at the facility, the need for security, and hence, the need for prompt and accurate reporting of unlawful activity, the disruption and danger which Price's internal statements presented for the facility far outweighed any of Price's free-speech interests in making those statements. 29 Though in other circumstances we would defer to the factfinding of the district court with respect to the content, form, and context of the speech, cases involving the exercise of first amendment rights in the workplace require a different standard of review. Our review is limited in this context by our constitutional obligation to assure that the record supports [the court's] conclusion: '[W]e are compelled to examine for ourselves the statements in issue and the circumstances under which they [were] made to see whether or not they ... are of a character which the principles of the First Amendment ... protect.'  Rankin, id. (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 150 n. 10, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92 n. 10). 30 After our own review of the record, we do not find the distinction between Price's internal and external statements as marked, and consequently do not find that, with respect to the constitutional protection to be afforded to the internal statements, the balance tips so obviously in favor of defendants. A public employee who engages in whistleblowing does not 'forfeit[ ] his protection against governmental abridgement of freedom of speech if he decides to express his views privately rather than publicly.'  Brown, 804 F.2d at 337 (quoting Givhan, 439 U.S. at 414, 99 S.Ct. at 696). 31 Hence, many of Price's internal statements could be considered protected speech along with his reports to outside authorities. First among these would be Price's informing patients that they had the right to obtain outside legal counsel and prosecute civil actions against officials within the facility who were mistreating them. Further, Price stated that he informed many of the patients that they could contact the Justice Department with information regarding the civil suit pending against the facility. In fact, he claims to have assisted some patients in doing so. 32 The defendants do not deny that Price gave this advice, nor are they able to controvert the truth of these statements. Thus, we cannot dismiss, as did the district court, all of Price's internal statements as unsubstantiated rumor, even if Price was engaged in some self-aggrandizement in the process. 5 As we turn to the task of balancing Price's free-speech interests against the facility's concern for orderly administration, we therefore find Price's interests weightier than did the district court. 33 Following the Supreme Court's lead, in assessing the weight to be accorded to the plaintiff's free-speech interests we also consider the extent to which that speech implicates matters of public concern. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 152, 103 S.Ct. at 1692-93. 6 Without doubt, the welfare of the patients at such a facility and the protection of their civil rights are matters of serious public concern. For this reason, we find Price's first amendment interests to be still greater. 34 Nonetheless, at the end of this sophisticated balancing test we reach the same result as did the district court. We base our decision chiefly upon the context in which Price made his statements: The facility houses individuals who are disturbed and dangerous, many of whom are doubtless paranoid or prone to hostile reaction. Statements to patients and staff about drug-pushing, beatings, and even murders, which might otherwise be speech deserving the highest degree of protection, become, in these circumstances, dangerously disruptive. Brittain observed in his testimony that 35 the facility itself was old, dilapidated, did not have the layout that allowed for adequate movement of the patients, did not have the layout that [made] for easy observation [by] correctional officers, did not have the proper staffing, [and] did not have a lot of things that it needed.... Now, in the midst of that kind of shortage of manpower, dealing with very volatile patients, some of whom were committed to [the facility] for very heinous crimes, where they had both a judgment of being a criminal and also criminally insane, ... we had to manage that facility.... It was in that kind of environment that Mr. Price was creating the disruption that we had mentioned earlier. 36 Hence, we conclude that here the employer's need to prevent disruption and violence was paramount. Price's communications to the staff and patients of the facility therefore were not protected expression. 7 37 However, the balancing test does not produce the same results when applied to Price's direct communications with the Justice Department and other law enforcement agencies. We agree with the district court that these statements must be considered protected speech, since they can be considered disruptive only in the sense that they assisted the government in a self-policing action already underway. There are no competing concerns regarding fomenting mistrust among patients and staff. See Brown, 804 F.2d at 337. 38