Opinion ID: 468586
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exclusion of impeachment witness

Text: 29 Defendant sought to present testimony from Peter Putnam to impeach Mattlin's credibility. Putnam had testified in voir dire that he believed Mattlin's truthfulness was very bad. Putnam's assessment of Mattlin's veracity arose from an incident occurring between the two men more than eleven years before the trial. Putnam had filed a complaint against Mattlin before the National Association of Security Dealers (NASD) for making misrepresentations regarding the use of inside information. Mattlin was sanctioned as a result. Defendant contends Putnam's testimony was relevant and that his constitutional rights were violated in denying him this evidence to impeach Mattlin. 30 When Mattlin testified, however, he was confronted by Tager's counsel in a thorough cross-examination about these charges. Defendant was to call Putnam to testify about the charges and give his opinion that Mattlin was untruthful. It is not clear whether this exclusion was based on the remoteness of the incident or because it was merely cumulative. Defendant asserts that Fed.R.Evid. 608(a) permits opinion evidence and does not place temporal restrictions on a witness' testimony; rather it requires only the witness' personal knowledge. 31 Defendant relies upon United States v. Davis, 639 F.2d 239, 244 (5th Cir.1981), a case which held that under its facts it was error to exclude witnesses offered by a criminal defendant. This case is distinguishable from Davis because the event about which Putnam would have testified was remote in time. Also, the testimony of the witness sought to be impeached in Davis was described as essential and without which the government would have no case. 639 F.2d at 245. Putnam's testimony was essentially cumulative, repeating facts already admitted by Mattlin in his own testimony. 32 [S]uch evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by its needlessly cumulative nature. Fed.R.Evid. 403. Whether such evidence is needlessly cumulative to the extent that its probative value is outweighed is a determination which lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and that discretion is generally viewed as very broad. 33 Id. at 244. Even if the court's action were deemed to be an abuse of discretion, under the circumstances we are satisfied that it was harmless error. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967).