Opinion ID: 2393191
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Cases Before Faust

Text: This is not a new issue for this Court. More than 150 years ago, the Court considered a claim that the trial court had erred in referring to the appellate process during its jury charge in a murder case. In Mitchell v. State, 22 Ga. 211 (1857), the alleged error was that the trial judge had charged the jury that he was responsible to the Supreme Court, if he committed an error; that he was a fallible being and liable to err, and that they might, under the statute, decide against his opinion of the law, if they thought proper to do so. Id. at 227. The Court cautioned that all reference to the Supreme Court, either by [trial court] or counsel, by way of menace or otherwise, except to cite its decisions, had best be dispensed with. Id. at 233. But the Court did not reverse the conviction, holding that [t]his complaint is not sustained by the bill of exceptions. Id. The issue arose again in 1944 in the context of comments made by counsel for the State. See Bryant v. State, 197 Ga. 641, 30 S.E.2d 259 (1944). In a capital murder case, the prosecutor objected to a question posed to a witness by defense counsel, then said I will withdraw my objection; the Supreme CourtI am scared of the Supreme Court.' Id. at 655, 30 S.E.2d 259. The trial court denied defense counsel's motion for a mistrial, which was based on the argument that the comment directed the jury's attention to the defendant's prior conviction, which the Supreme Court had reversed. See id. The Court repeated the admonition from Mitchell, that it is better practice, during the trial of cases, for the court and counsel not to make references to the power of the reviewing courts except to cite their decisions as authority. 197 Ga. at 655, 30 S.E.2d 259. As in Mitchell, however, the Court did not reverse the conviction based on the reference to the appellate court, instead holding that the statement here made by the [prosecutor] could in no wise be so construed as prejudicial to the accused. Id. The Court referred to the previous division of its opinion, which explained that any other conclusion would require this court to give the jury credit for a knowledge of legal procedure and a power of analytic reasoning that is beyond the requirements of qualification for jury service Id. at 654, 30 S.E.2d 259.