Opinion ID: 2832201
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Eighth Amendment Claim Against Warden Falk

Text: Allen’s final claim is that Warden Falk acted with deliberate indifference to Allen’s safety by intentionally placing him in a living unit with STG inmates who assaulted him because he is a sex offender. Before we can reach any of the arguments Allen makes on the merits regarding this claim, however, we have an independent duty to confront the issue of our own jurisdiction. Amazon, Inc. v. Dirt Camp, Inc., 273 F.3d 1271, 1274 (10th Cir. 2001). Here, we perceive two jurisdictional questions based on the parties’ briefs and the judgments below: (1) whether Allen timely filed a Notice of Appeal and (2) whether Allen administratively exhausted his claim under the PLRA. We will consider each of these arguments in turn.3 One prerequisite to our appellate jurisdiction is the timely filing of a Notice of Appeal. United States v. Cebbalos-Martinez, 387 F.3d 1140, 1143 (10th Cir. 2004). Here, Allen needed to deposit his Notice of Appeal in the prison mail system within thirty days after the entry of judgment. See Fed. R. App. P. 4. Warden Falk challenges Allen’s timeliness, pointing out that the district court issued its Order and Judgment on January 12, 2015. He claims this means that Allen needed to deposit his Notice of Appeal in the prison mail system by February 11, 2015. Allen’s Notice of Appeal is dated February 24, 2015 and was filed on March 2, 2015. 3 Our decision to address these specific jurisdictional issues should not be read to suggest that the other threshold concerns raised by Warden Falk do not have merit. Given our “leeway ‘to choose among threshold grounds for denying audience to a case on the merits,’” we simply choose to consider only these particular jurisdictional questions, which are sufficient to fully dispose of this claim. Sinochem Intern. Co. v. Malaysia Intern. Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 431 (2007) (quoting Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 585 (1999)). 9 We conclude that Allen filed a timely Notice of Appeal. As Warden Falk notes, the district court entered judgment on January 12, 2015. But Warden Falk fails to acknowledge that Allen filed a motion for rehearing on February 2, 2015. Under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(iv), the thirty-day clock for Allen to file his Notice of Appeal did not begin to run until the court ruled on Allen’s motion. The court ruled on Allen’s motion for rehearing on February 4. Allen’s Notice of Appeal was dated February 24 and filed on March 2, well within this thirty-day limit. But on the second jurisdictional issue, Allen does not fare so well. The PLRA provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2012). The PLRA requires dismissal where a litigant has failed to exhaust before suing. See Fitzgerald v. Corrections Corp. of Am., 403 F.3d 1134, 1140–41 (10th Cir. 2005). In its regulations, the CDOC has a multi-step grievance process that includes a written informal grievance followed by a formal three-step written grievance procedure, see Colorado Department Of Corrections, Administrative Regulation 850-4 (2015) (hereinafter “AR 850-4”), and we require that an inmate must appeal through all available channels to exhaust administrative remedies. See Jernigan v. Stuchell, 304 F.3d 1030, 1032 (10th Cir. 2002). There is, however, an exception to the exhaustion requirement when an inmate is prohibited from filing a grievance. See id. On two grounds, Allen claims that he has satisfied his exhaustion requirements. 10 First, before both the district court and this court, Allen asserts that he did in fact file grievances. But as the magistrate noted, Allen appears to rely on grievances filed years before the incidents he now complains about. These stale grievances cannot serve to exhaust his remedies for later incidents. Second, Allen claims that he attempted to file grievances but was kept from doing so. Again, however, the magistrate correctly notes a fatal flaw in this argument: Colorado’s administrative regulation requires that inmates must file their first grievance “within 30 days of the discovery of the issue or complaint. . . .” AR 850-4. This means that, at latest, Allen needed to file a grievance for the last of his identified incidents by May 25, 2012. Based on our reading of the record, the only time Allen claims he attempted to file a grievance and was denied this right was on March 19, 2014, nearly two years after he needed to do so. For these reasons, we agree that Allen has not exhausted his administrative remedies regarding his Eighth Amendment Claim against Warden Falk. We therefore lack jurisdiction under the PLRA to consider this claim.4 Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis Allen also petitions this court to grant him pauper status. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, any court of the United States may grant pauper status to “allow indigent persons to prosecute, defend or appeal suits without prepayment of costs.” Coppedge 4 Although concluding it lacked jurisdiction under the PLRA, the magistrate court still considered the merits of Allen’s Eighth Amendment claim to explain why the claim should be dismissed if it indeed had jurisdiction. While we agree with the magistrate’s analysis, we decline to further consider the merits of Allen’s claim given our finding that we lack jurisdiction to consider the claim under the PLRA. 11 v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 441 (1962). Here, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), the district court certified that any appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied Allen’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. In light of that action, we will only grant pauper status if we conclude that the appeal contains a non-frivolous argument. See Rolland v. Primesource Staffing, L.L.C., 497 F.3d 1077, 1079 (10th Cir. 2007). Turning to Allen’s motion, we believe that this appeal is not taken in good faith and that Allen has failed to show the existence of a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument on the law and facts in support of the issues raised on appeal. We remind Allen that he must pay the filing and docket fees in full to the clerk of the district court. Entered for the Court Gregory A. Phillips