Opinion ID: 204110
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Constitutional Adequacy of the Procedure

Text: Constitutional adequacy is measured against the fundamental principle that individuals whose property interests are at stake are entitled to 'notice and an opportunity to be heard.' Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 167 (2002) (quoting United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 48 (1993)). Beyond that, however, due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation -6- demands. Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 930 (1997) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). There is no question that Ramos-Mercado was on notice of PREPA's position as of April 19, 2007, when she acknowledges having received the first letter from Rodríguez-Ruiz. That letter informed her of PREPA's decision not to reinstate her and adequately described the basis for that decision. The only question, then, is whether Ramos-Mercado was given a sufficient opportunity to contest PREPA's decision. See Chmielinski v. Massachusetts, 513 F.3d 309, 316 (1st Cir. 2000). In that regard, we note that Ramos-Mercado could have sought post-deprivation judicial review of PREPA's decision in the Commonwealth court system. See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 3, §§ 2102, 2171-2176; id. tit 4, § 24y(c). Although the availability of comprehensive post-deprivation procedures of that sort does not necessarily eliminate the need for a pre-deprivation check against mistaken decisions, it does affect the necessary scope of such predeprivation procedures. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 545-47 & n.12 (1985); Mard, 350 F.3d at 193. PREPA argues that, under the facts of this case, the exchange of letters between Ramos-Mercado and Rodríguez-Ruiz provided Ramos-Mercado with a constitutionally adequate predeprivation opportunity to challenge PREPA's position. As we have indicated, Ramos-Mercado clearly articulated her legal argument in -7- opposition to PREPA's position in her April 20, 2007, letter. Rodríguez-Ruiz then replied on June 11, 2007, indicating that PREPA had considered and rejected her argument. Only one fact was material to PREPA's decision: the fact that the Puerto Rico Supreme Court removed Ramos-Mercado from her judicial office. That independently verifiable fact has never been disputed. Gilbert, 520 U.S. at 933 (citing Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 627-28 (1977) (per curiam)). Ramos-Mercado and PREPA differed only as to the proper interpretation and application of Commonwealth law and PREPA's personnel regulations.2 Given the purely legal character of the dispute, the nature of the interests involved, and the availability of postdeprivation judicial review, we conclude that the opportunity for Ramos-Mercado to present her legal argument in writing was all the process that was due prior to the deprivation in this case. See Gilbert, 520 U.S. at 933-34; Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 113-14 (1977); Penobscot Air Servs. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 164 F.3d 713, 723-24 (1st Cir. 1999). Ramos-Mercado has therefore failed to 2 Although Ramos-Mercado has never disputed the fact of her removal from the judiciary, she suggested for the first time on appeal that there were other factual disputes between her and PREPA. We deem that argument waived. In any event, it is beside the point because the supposedly disputed facts were not material to PREPA's decision, which turned solely on the fact that RamosMercado had been removed from office. See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 3, § 1462g(1) (removal from public service renders individual ineligible for public employment until habilitated); P.R. Elec. Power Auth., Regulations for Career Service Personnel Management, § VIII(G) (Oct. 2006) (same). -8- state a due process claim. Our disposition makes it unnecessary to address the individual capacity appellees' qualified immunity arguments.