Opinion ID: 2518840
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Challenges to Judge Eric Smith

Text: Alyssa argues that (1) the trial court erred in denying her peremptory challenge to Judge Smith before the termination trial; (2) Judge Smith erred in refusing to recuse himself for cause; and (3) Judge Smith erred in refusing to dismiss the case and disqualify himself due to an alleged pecuniary interest in the matter and cooperative agreement with Alyssa's adversaries. Under Civil Rule 42(c), a judge or master may be peremptorily challenged as a matter of right. [17] But Civil Rule 42(c)(4) provides that a party waives this right to change a judge if the party knowingly participates before that judge in [a]ny judicial proceeding which concerns the merits of the action and involves the consideration of evidence or of affidavits. [18] Shortly after receiving notice that a petition of termination had been filed and that a hearing on the petition had been scheduled before Judge Smith, Alyssa filed a Notice of Change of Judge, seeking to peremptorily challenge Judge Smith from the case. In challenging Judge Smith after receiving notice of the termination petition, Alyssa appears to have implicitly viewed the termination proceeding as a separate proceeding from the previous adjudication and disposition hearings in her case, over which Judge Smith had presided. But this view misconstrues the character of a termination proceeding. As recognized by Alaska's CINA Rules, when the state files a petition to terminate parental rights to a child who has already been adjudicated a child in need of aid, [t]he termination hearing is a disposition hearing to the court on the question of whether the parental rights to [the] adjudicated child in need of aid should be terminated. [19] Hence, a termination proceeding is simply a procedural continuation of the earlier proceedings in the existing CINA case. And because it does not initiate a new proceeding, the petition does not create the right to a new peremptory challenge under Civil Rule 42(c). [20] Accordingly, Alyssa's time for exercising the peremptory challenge to Judge Smith ran from the notice of his assignment in the initial proceedings in the CINA case. That time had long expired, and because Alyssa had knowingly participated in previous judicial proceedings concerning the merits of that action, she retained no right to peremptorily disqualify Judge Smith under Rule 42(c) upon receiving notice that he would still be handling the case after the state filed the petition to terminate Alyssa's parental rights. Alyssa's motion also sought to disqualify Judge Smith for cause, alleging that he was biased. [21] This claim lacks merit because Alyssa fails to show that Judge Smith abused his discretion in refusing to disqualify or recuse himself; she does not establish that Judge Smith had either a conflict of interest or bias against her. We also point out that Alyssa's claim for an independent judge was separately reviewed and denied by Superior Court Judge John Suddock. Alyssa fails to establish any abuse of discretion in Judge Suddock's ruling.