Opinion ID: 46230
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: molina's sentence

Text: 14 Molina argues that his sentence should be vacated because the district court erred (1) in applying the Guidelines multiplier for actual methamphetamine instead of that for a methamphetamine mixture or substance; (2) in applying a sentencing enhancement for the use of a minor; and (3) in considering sentencing factors not admitted by him, depriving him of his Sixth Amendment rights. 3
15 We review the district court's factual findings for clear error and its interpretation and application of the Guidelines de novo. United States v. Angeles-Mendoza, 407 F.3d 742, 746-47 (5th Cir.2005). A factual finding is not clearly erroneous as long as it is plausible in light of the record as a whole. United States v. Holmes, 406 F.3d 337, 363 (5th Cir.) (quoting United States v. Powers, 168 F.3d 741, 752 (5th Cir.1999)), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 375 (2005). 16
17 Molina argues that the district court erred when it calculated the marijuana equivalent of the methamphetamine seized by applying the multiplier for actual methamphetamine instead of that for a methamphetamine mixture or substance. Section 2D1.1's Drug Equivalency Table for Schedule I and II stimulants provides that one gram of a mixture or substance containing methamphetamine is equivalent to two kilograms of marijuana, whereas one gram of actual methamphetamine is equivalent to twenty kilograms of marijuana. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt. n.10 Drug Equivalency Tables. Molina contends that this ten-to-one ratio violates due process because it is irrational and because its application is arbitrary. 18 Molina first posits that the ratio is irrational because, [u]nlike the notorious difference between cocaine and crack cocaine, there is no qualitative difference involved here. Def.-Appellant's Br. 11-12 (footnote omitted). The Seventh Circuit rejected this argument in United States v. Turner, 93 F.3d 276 (7th Cir.1996): 19 We agree with the district court that the 10:1 ratio is supported by a rational basis because the pure product is more concentrated and can be cut into larger quantities for resale. Methamphetamine, as it is produced through normal chemical processes, contains a number of impurities that can be removed through further processing. The finished product can be cut into larger quantities for resale. Accordingly, the sentencing scheme for methamphetamine punishes more severely the sophisticated cooks who could otherwise manipulate the Guidelines by producing smaller quantities of more concentrated methamphetamine. We are unable to conclude that Congress lacked a rational basis when it elected to punish drug offenses involving pure methamphetamine more severely. 20 Turner, 93 F.3d at 287 (citations and quotation marks omitted). Molina has not directed us to authority contrary to Turner; moreover, we agree with Turner 's rationale. Accordingly, we reject Molina's argument that the ten-to-one ratio has no rational basis. 21 Molina also argues that the application of the ten-to-one ratio is arbitrary. He opines that the decision whether to use the actual-methamphetamine multiplier or the methamphetamine-mixture multiplier in the Guidelines calculation is determined by the indictment. In essence, he suggests that if the government chooses to present an indictment alleging possession of methamphetamine, then the harsher actual-methamphetamine multiplier is used in the Guidelines calculation; but if the government chooses to present an indictment alleging possession of a mixture or substance containing methamphetamine, then the more-lenient methamphetamine-mixture multiplier is used, resulting in a shorter sentence for the exact same conduct. 4 Because the harshness of the sentence, he suggests, is therefore within the government's discretion, the application of the ten-to-one ratio is arbitrary. 22 Molina misapprehends the operation of the Guidelines. The choice of which multiplier to use is not determined by the language of the indictment. Rather, commentary to § 2D1.1 provides: In the case of a mixture or substance containing ... methamphetamine, use the offense level determined by the entire weight of the mixture or substance, or the offense level determined by the weight of the ... methamphetamine (actual), whichever is greater. § 2D1.1(c) n.B. Thus, even if the indictment alleges possession of a mixture or substance containing methamphetamine, the Guidelines' commentary directs the court to apply the offense level determined by the weight of the pure methamphetamine in the mixture or substance if doing so would result in a higher offense level. Because the choice of multiplier is determined by the Guidelines and not by the government or the language of the indictment, we reject Molina's contention that the application of the ten-to-one ratio is arbitrary. See Turner, 93 F.3d at 287.
23 Molina next asserts that the district court erred in applying a sentencing enhancement for the use of a minor, his seventeen-year-old girlfriend. He posits that, although there is evidence that his girlfriend was present for and knew of some of his drug trafficking, her presence and knowledge is not sufficient to constitute use of a minor. We agree. 24 U.S.S.G. § 3B1.4 provides for a two-level enhancement [i]f the defendant used or attempted to use a person less than eighteen years of age to commit the offense or assist in avoiding detection of, or apprehension for, the offense. Commentary to § 3B1.4 states: `Used or attempted to use' includes directing, commanding, encouraging, intimidating, counseling, training, procuring, recruiting, or soliciting. § 3B1.4 cmt. n.1. 25 The government contends that the enhancement was proper because Molina's minor girlfriend admitted some knowledge of the drug business and admitted that she went on some of the drug runs to Corpus Christi. The government opines that Molina used his girlfriend to either drive him to the marijuana pickups or to evade suspicion by law enforcement, or both, as there is no other plausible explanation for taking her on those trips. Gov't Br. 35. 26 A number of cases have upheld sentencing enhancements for the use of a minor when the minor is present during some portion of the commission of the offense. But in each of these cases there is an additional circumstance, beyond the minor's mere presence, demonstrating that the defendant used or attempted to use the minor. For example, courts have upheld the enhancement where (1) the minor participated in loading or unloading contraband into or from a vehicle, see United States v. Ghali, 184 Fed.Appx. 391, 397 (5th Cir.) (unpublished opinion), cert. denied, 2006 WL 2736597 (Oct. 30, 2006); United States v. Rivera, 248 F.3d 677, 682 (7th Cir.2001); (2) the defendant brought the minor along so that the minor could drive the defendant's car, see United States v. Gaskin, 364 F.3d 438, 464-65 (2d Cir.2004); (3) the defendant brought the minor along for moral support because the defendant otherwise could not have committed the offense, see United States v. Paine, 407 F.3d 958, 965 (8th Cir.2005); and (4) the defendant brought minor children on a drug run to avoid detection by law enforcement, see United States v. Gutierrez, 251 F.3d 156, 2001 WL 300644, at  (5th Cir.2001) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision). 27 In this case, there is no evidence of anything more than Molina's girlfriend's presence while unlawful activity occurred. The PSR indicates that Molina's minor girlfriend and her child were present at Molina's residence when the search warrant was executed, that Molina's girlfriend knew about the presence of drugs and certain aspects of the drug operation, that she went with Molina a couple of times to pick up marijuana, and that one of the co-conspirators drove her back and forth to Corpus Christi. But there is no evidence, for example, that Molina's girlfriend assisted in carrying or loading drugs, that she ever drove Molina or his co-conspirators on the drug runs, that Molina or the co-conspirators needed moral support, that Molina believed that his seventeen-year-old girlfriend's presence in the vehicle during a drug run would assist in avoiding detection, or that Molina ever asked or encouraged his girlfriend to assist or become involved in the drug operation in any way. Moreover, contrary to the government's assertion that there is no other plausible explanation for her presence on the trips between Austin and Corpus Christi, the PSR indicates that Molina's girlfriend lived in Corpus Christi. 5 It is just as logical an inference, if not more so, that Molina's girlfriend used Molina and his co-conspirators to transport her between her residence in Corpus Christi and Molina's residence in Austin. 28 Because nothing in the record indicates more than Molina's girlfriend's presence, we conclude that the district court clearly erred in finding that Molina used a minor in the commission of the offense. See United States v. Jimenez, 300 F.3d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir.2002) (Absent other evidence, the `mere presence of a minor' is insufficient to support the application of § 3B1.4. (quoting United States v. Castro-Hernandez, 258 F.3d 1057, 1060 (9th Cir.2001))); see also United States v. Alarcon, 261 F.3d 416, 422 (5th Cir.2001) (concluding that mere presence of children in vehicle was insufficient to show use, absent evidence that defendant made, wanted, or suggested that minor children ride in vehicle to avoid detection). 6 Accordingly, we vacate Molina's sentence.
29 Molina finally contends that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated by the district court's consideration of relevant conduct that was neither proven beyond a reasonable doubt nor admitted by him. Molina concedes that this argument is foreclosed by United States v. Alonzo, 435 F.3d 551, 553 (5th Cir.2006) ( [United States v.] Booker [,] [543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005),] contemplates that, with the mandatory use of the Guidelines excised, the Sixth Amendment will not impede a sentencing judge from finding all facts relevant to sentencing. (quoting United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 43, 163 L.Ed.2d 76 (2005))). Molina presents this argument solely to preserve it for appeal to the Supreme Court if necessary. Alonzo is binding on us, absent a contrary decision of the Supreme Court or en banc reconsideration of the issue. See United States v. Stone, 306 F.3d 241, 243 (5th Cir.2002). Accordingly, Molina's argument is without merit.