Opinion ID: 2968024
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: In failing to fire stop concealed horizontal

Text: spaces . . . . 10 R.J. GRIFFIN v. BEACH CLUB II f. In failing to properly install the . . . stud sys- tem in violation of the Standard Building Code. ... J.A. 99. These and other acts (improper installation of the stucco system, for example) alleged in paragraph ten are premised on violations of legal duties imposed on builders by South Carolina common law. Again, a [South Carolina] builder may be liable to a home buyer in tort . . . where (1) the builder has violated an applicable building code; (2) the builder has deviated from industry standards; or (3) the builder has constructed housing that he knows or should know will pose serious risks of physical harm. Columbia Lumber, 384 S.E.2d at 738. Even if the Association could have asserted a claim against Griffin for breaching the general contract, that does not mean the Association cannot bring a case based on extra-contractual duties that South Carolina law imposes on a builder. South Carolina holds that if a builder performs construction in such a way that he violates a contractual duty only, then his liability is only contractual. If he acts in a way as to violate a legal duty, however, his liability is both in contract and in tort. Columbia Lumber, 384 S.E.2d at 737. Griffin thus has two sets of duties: one arises out of its role as a builder, and the other arises out of its construction contract with Drake. The Association’s claims are premised on the former; its claims do not hinge on any rights it might have under the general contract. See Schwabedissen, 206 F.3d at 418. This means that Griffin’s liability will be determined by its duties as a builder under South Carolina common law, not by its duties under the general contract. Accordingly, the Association, in asserting its claims, is not seeking a direct benefit from the provisions of the general contract it did not sign, and the doctrine of equitable estoppel cannot be used to force the Association to arbitrate. Our conclusion does not mean that a nonsignatory may use artful pleading to avoid arbitration when in substance . . . [it] is attempting to hold [a party] to the terms of [an] agreement. Hughes Masonry Co., 659 F.2d at 838. For example, if the Association brought a negligence or breach of implied warranty claim because the developer had contracted [with Griffin] for blue paint but instead received brown, Columbia Lumber, 384 S.E.2d at 737 n.3, Griffin would have a case for arbitration. That is because Griffin’s failure to provide the R.J. GRIFFIN v. BEACH CLUB II 11 correct color of paint would violate a duty created solely by [the general] contract. Id. at 737. But here the Association is seeking to enforce extra-contractual common law rights created by South Carolina to protect homeowners from shoddy construction practices. A homeowner (or his or her association) asserting these rights [i]n a Suit at common law is entitled to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment. See U.S. Const. amend. VII. A party may, of course, waive the jury trial right by signing an agreement to arbitrate or by binding itself to arbitration as a nonsignatory through traditional principles of contract or agency law. See Schwabedissen, 206 F.3d at 41617. In this case, the Association did not sign the general contract, and it did not otherwise bind itself to arbitrate under that contract.