Opinion ID: 2353279
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Sentencing Statutes

Text: [¶ 12] At the time of Keene's crimes, both of which were Class A, the sentence for Class A crimes was as follows: In the case of a Class A crime, the court shall set a definite period not to exceed 40 years. The court may consider a serious criminal history of the defendant and impose a maximum period of incarceration in excess of 20 years based on either the nature and seriousness of the crime alone or on the nature and seriousness of the crime coupled with the serious criminal history of the defendant. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1252(2)(A). Applying Schofield to this case, where the heinous nature of the offense was not tried to the jury, the maximum that the court could impose on either of the convictions was twenty years. Thus, the court acted within the available maximum for each crime when it sentenced Keene to twenty years for manslaughter and sixteen years for kidnapping. See Schofield, 2005 ME 82, ¶ 14, 895 A.2d at 931. [¶ 13] When determining how the two sentences would be served, the court was guided by 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1256(2): [T]he court shall state in the sentence of imprisonment whether a sentence shall be served concurrently with or consecutively to any other sentence previously imposed or to another sentence imposed on the same date. The sentences shall be concurrent unless, in considering the following factors, the court decides to impose sentences consecutively: A. That the convictions are for offenses based on different conduct or arising from different criminal episodes; B. That the defendant was under a previously imposed suspended or unsuspended sentence and was on probation, under incarceration or on a release program at the time the person committed a subsequent offense; C. That the defendant had been released on bail when that person committed a subsequent offense, either pending trial of a previously committed offense or pending the appeal of previous conviction; or D. That the seriousness of the criminal conduct involved in either a single criminal episode or in multiple criminal episodes or the seriousness of the criminal record of the convicted person, or both, require a sentence of imprisonment in excess of the maximum available for the most serious offense. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1256(2). [¶ 14] Applying these provisions, the court imposed consecutive sentences based on subsection (B) because Keene was on probation at the time of his criminal acts, and subsection (D) because the court determined that Keene's criminal conduct and criminal record were serious enough to consider a sentence in excess of the maximum twenty years available for either crime. [¶ 15] Because the court made a factual determination in imposing consecutive sentences, we must address the question Keene has presented: whether the court's imposition of consecutive sentences of twenty and sixteen years, resulting in a total incarceration of thirty-six years, [8] carries with it the constitutional infirmity identified in Apprendi and Blakely, which involved single sentences that had been elevated beyond their statutory maximums. We begin with a review of Supreme Court jurisprudence.