Opinion ID: 1122968
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: examinations by the state's mental health experts

Text: Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in overruling his objection to the state's use of two mental health experts to rebut the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance (EED). The relevant chronology is as follows. As mentioned earlier, Cochran, a psychologist, examined defendant shortly after his arrest, at the request of the district attorney's office. At the outset of that examination, defendant signed a consent form that stated that he was willing to be examined. Several months after his arrest, defendant filed a notice of intent to rely upon the affirmative defenses of EED and insanity due to mental disease or defect. Thereafter, over defendant's objection, Dr. Suckow, a state-hired psychiatrist, examined defendant pursuant to ORS 161.315 and 163.135(5). [5] Defendant then withdrew his notice of intent to rely upon the defense of insanity; however, he continued to assert the defense of EED. At trial, over defendant's objection, both Cochran and Suckow testified that defendant was not acting under the influence of EED when he committed his crimes. Defendant's assignment of error concerns the applicability of two statutes, ORS 161.315 and 163.135(5). [6] ORS 161.315, which relates to the affirmative defense of insanity due to mental disease or defect, provides, in part:  Upon filing of notice    by the defendant [of intent to introduce evidence of insanity due to mental disease or defect] as provided in ORS 161.309(3), the state shall have the right to have at least one psychiatrist or licensed psychologist of its selection examine the defendant. The state shall file notice with the court of its intention to have the defendant examined. (Emphasis added.) ORS 163.135(5), which relates to the affirmative defense of EED, provides, in part:  After the defendant files notice [of intent to introduce evidence of EED] as provided in this section, the state shall have the right to have at least one psychiatrist of its selection examine the defendant in the same manner and subject to the same provisions as provided in ORS 161.315. (Emphasis added.) Defendant contends that, under those statutes, the trial court erred in allowing both the examinations and the testimony by two state-hired mental health experts. Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in allowing Suckow's examination, because Cochran already had examined him. He also argues that [t]here must be some showing, by implication, that more than one expert is necessary, and the state must make this showing before the testimony of the second mental health expert can be admitted. In this case, no such showing was made. We conclude that defendant's contention is not well taken. [7] When construing a statute, this court's task is to discern the intent of the legislature. ORS 174.020; PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or. 606, 610, 859 P.2d 1143 (1993). In our first level of analysis, we examine the text and context of the statutes at issue. PGE, 317 Or. at 610-11, 859 P.2d 1143. We begin with the text of the statutes, which provides the best evidence of the legislature's intent. See id. at 610, 859 P.2d 1143 (stating principle). Defendant focuses upon the wording that the state shall have the right to have at least one [mental health expert]    examine the defendant (emphasis added) and argues that that wording suggests that the state may conduct one examination of a defendant, such as Cochran's examination, but that any additional examinations, such as Suckow's, require a demonstration that more than one examination is necessary. We disagree that the text of ORS 161.315 and 163.135(5) supports defendant's reading of those statutes. To the contrary, the wording at least one clearly grants the state the opportunity to examine a defendant more than once, after that defendant has filed a notice of intent to rely upon either insanity or EED. Moreover, the statutes do not speak to any examinations conducted before a defendant files such a notice, suggesting that an examination such as Cochran's does not fall under either statute. The wording the state shall have the right to    examine the defendant (emphasis added) also is instructive, because that wording suggests that the state has an unequivocal opportunity to examine a defendant who has filed a notice of intent to rely upon either insanity or EED, regardless of that defendant's willingness to cooperate. Stated another way, despite a defendant's objection to being examined, ORS 161.315 and 163.135(5) allow the state to conduct at least one examination if the defendant has filed such a notice. We conclude that the text of ORS 161.315 and 163.135(5), that the state shall have the right to conduct at least one examination of a defendant who has filed a notice of intent to rely upon either insanity or EED, concerns only nonconsensual examinations conducted after the defendant files such a notice. In other words, the statutes do not preclude consensual examinations conducted before a defendant files a notice of intent to rely upon certain affirmative defenses but, rather, serve simply to provide the state with an unequivocal right to examine a defendant who has filed such a notice. Nothing in the context of either statute compels a different conclusion. In this case, Cochran conducted a consensual examination of defendant before defendant filed his notice of intent to rely upon insanity and EED. Consequently, Cochran's examination was not within the purview of either ORS 161.315 or 163.135(5). Rather, only Suckow's examination is subject to the statutory requirements. Because, under both statutes, the state shall have the right to have at least one psychiatrist examine the defendant after a notice is filed, Suckow's examination and testimony were proper.