Opinion ID: 1836527
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: analysis

Text: At common law, `grandparents lacked any legal right to visitation and communication with their grandchildren if such visitation was forbidden by the parents.... Indeed, the parents' obligation to allow such visitation was a moral, not a legal obligation.' Pier v. Bolles, 257 Neb. at 124, 596 N.W.2d at 4, quoting Ex parte Bronstein, 434 So.2d 780 (Ala.1983). In 1986, the Nebraska Legislature enacted the grandparent visitation statutes, 1986 Neb. Laws, L.B. 105, thereby creating a procedure for grandparents to seek court-ordered visitation. See Neb.Rev.Stat. § 43-1801 et seq. (Reissue 1998). Generally, statutes which effect a change in the common law are to be strictly construed. See, Stoneman v. United Neb. Bank, 254 Neb. 477, 577 N.W.2d 271 (1998); Popple v. Rose, 254 Neb. 1, 573 N.W.2d 765 (1998); Strauel v. Peterson, 155 Neb. 448, 52 N.W.2d 307 (1952). The statute implicated in this case, § 43-1802(2), provides: In determining whether a grandparent shall be granted visitation, the court shall require evidence concerning the beneficial nature of the relationship of the grandparent to the child. The evidence may be presented by affidavit and shall demonstrate that a significant beneficial relationship exists, or has existed in the past, between the grandparent and the child and that it would be in the best interests of the child to allow such relationship to continue. Reasonable rights of visitation may be granted when the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that there is, or has been, a significant beneficial relationship between the grandparent and the child, that it is in the best interests of the child that such relationship continues, and that such visitation will not adversely interfere with the parent-child relationship. The U.S. Supreme Court in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (plurality opinion), recognized that court-ordered grandparent visitation raises the issue of perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court, the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children. See, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925) (holding liberty of parents and guardians includes right to direct upbringing and education of children under their control); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923) (holding liberty protected by Due Process Clause includes right of parents to establish home, bring up children, and control their education). The Troxel plurality held that a Washington grandparent visitation statute was unconstitutional as applied because it violated a fit custodial parent's due process right to make decisions regarding the care, custody, and control of her children by placing the burden on the parent to prove that visitation would not be in the best interests of the children. Although none of the parties in this case frame their arguments in constitutional terms, Troxel provides context for our analysis of this conflict between a parent and grandparents over visitation rights. Nebraska's grandparent visitation statutes clearly and significantly place the burden of proof upon the grandparent seeking a visitation order. Pursuant to § 43-1802(2), a court is without discretionary authority to order grandparent visitation until a petitioning grandparent proves by clear and convincing evidence that (1) [t]here is, or has been, a significant beneficial relationship between the grandparent and the child; (2) it is in the best interests of the child that such relationship continue; and (3) such visitation will not adversely interfere with the parent-child relationship. Eberspacher v. Hulme, 248 Neb. 202, 206, 533 N.W.2d 103, 105 (1995). Clear and convincing evidence means that amount of evidence which produces in the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction about the existence of a fact to be proved. State ex rel. Special Counsel for Dis. v. Shapiro, 266 Neb. 328, 665 N.W.2d 615 (2003); In re Interest of Michael B. et al., 258 Neb. 545, 604 N.W.2d 405 (2000). In the absence of such evidence of the statutory prerequisites set forth in § 43-1802(2), court-ordered grandparent visitation is an abuse of judicial discretion. We have recognized that any inquiry into the significant beneficial relationship requirement of § 43-1802(2) will necessarily be fact-dependent. Rosse v. Rosse, 244 Neb. 967, 973, 510 N.W.2d 73, 78 (1994). We therefore examine the facts of this case in light of this requirement. Arlene's testimony establishes the nature and frequency of her contacts with the children over the years, but reveals nothing about the nature of the relationship which existed as a result of those contacts. Although she emphasizes her past role as the children's daycare provider, the evidence of this relationship does little more than establish that Arlene performed various housekeeping and transportation chores for the children. There is no testimony or other evidence upon which to base a qualitative assessment of the personal relationship that existed between Arlene and the children during this or any other period. We simply cannot determine from the record whether the relationship between Arlene and the children was congenial or acrimonious, affectionate or indifferent, trusting or deceitful, loving or simply custodial. When asked on direct examination whether she believed the relationship to be beneficial to her and the children, Arlene gave an affirmative response, but no supporting reasons or explanation. While the scant evidentiary record may not reflect the true nature of Arlene's relationship with the children, it is the only evidence we have, and it falls far short of establishing clear and convincing evidence of a significant beneficial relationship. We therefore agree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the record contains no evidence from which it can be inferred that the relationship between Arlene and the children was beneficial to the children. At most, it shows there was contact between Arlene and the children, but the nature of that contact is unknown. Nelson v. Nelson, Nos. A-02-252, A-02-512, 2003 WL 1798939 at  (Neb.App. Apr.8, 2003) (not designated for permanent publication). The evidence concerning the relationship between the McKerns and the children is even more tenuous. The McKerns had not much contact at all with the children. Jacqueline described a recent Christmas visit with the children as having gone very well, but she admits that she did not even acknowledge the children's presence during another recent visit when she and Deborah exchanged harsh words at the doorstep of her home. There is no evidence of affection, kindness, tenderness, or even civility between the McKerns and the children, and we cannot assume the existence of such emotions simply by virtue of the biological relationship. We therefore agree with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the McKerns failed to present clear and convincing evidence of a significant beneficial relationship with the children. As the Court of Appeals correctly noted, the complete failure of proof in this case can be demonstrated by contrasting it with the evidence of the grandparent relationship presented in Rosse v. Rosse, 244 Neb. 967, 510 N.W.2d 73 (1994). In Rosse, both grandparents offered evidence as to the nature of their personal relationship with their 2½-year-old grandchild, not just the amount of time they spent together. The grandmother testified that she saw her role as `loving [her granddaughter] and having her love me.' Id. at 973, 510 N.W.2d at 78. The record reflected that the child lets only the grandmother, whom she calls `Nana Therese,' read to her. Id. The grandmother testified that her granddaughter trusts her, tells her that she loves her, and has fallen asleep in her arms. Id. The grandfather testified that he plays with his granddaughter, who calls him `Grandpa Jack,' and that they have a good time together. Id. at 974, 510 N.W.2d at 78. He also testified that his granddaughter gives him kisses, which he considers a sign of affection. Id. Based on this record, and giving due consideration to the age of the child, we determined that there was clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court's finding that a significant beneficial relationship existed between the grandparents and their granddaughter. We cannot reach that conclusion on the record in the instant case. The grandparents' proof in this case fails for the additional reason that there is no evidence upon which a court could conclude that visitation would be in the best interests of the children, which must be established by clear and convincing evidence before a court can even consider ordering grandparent visitation under § 43-1802(2). Other than a general conclusory statement by Jacqueline that she felt it would be in the children's best interests to have ongoing contact with the rest of Deborah's side of the family, the only evidence regarding the best interests of the children was testimony by Deborah, summarized above, explaining why she did not believe that grandparent visitation would be beneficial to her children. In Pier v. Bolles, 257 Neb. 120, 129, 596 N.W.2d 1, 8 (1999), we held that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering grandparent visitation where the evidence consisted solely of the grandmother's statement that she had `a close, loving relationship with [the grandchild] since his birth' and that she and her husband had exercised regular visitation when permitted. Here, the evidence regarding best interests of the children does not even rise to this level. Thus, there is a completely inadequate factual basis for the finding of the district court that it [wa]s in the best interests of said children that the grandparent-grandchildren relationship continue. In announcing his holding from the bench, the district judge explained: Here is what I honestly think. I think there has been so much turmoil in these kids' lives that regardless of whether the grandparents and [Deborah] get along, I think it is of a significant beneficial relationship to these kids that they have a relationship with their grandparents and I don't think if I leave it up to [Deborah], it's going to happen. While we certainly agree with the general proposition that a strong and healthy relationship with grandparents is in the best interests of children, that is not the issue before us. In the legitimate exercise of her parental rights, Deborah has concluded that the interests of her children would not be served by an ongoing relationship with their grandparents at the present time, given the generally strained familial relationship. Whether or not we agree with that decision, we do not have legal authority to countermand it by ordering grandparent visitation in the absence of clear and convincing evidence that a significant beneficial relationship exists, or has existed in the past, between the grandparent and the child and that it would be in the best interests of the child to allow such relationship to continue. See § 43-1802(2). The statutory requirement that grandparents present such evidence before a court may even consider ordering visitation gives proper deference to the fundamental right of a fit parent to make decisions regarding their children's upbringing. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 72-73, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (plurality opinion) (the Due Process Clause does not permit a State to infringe on the fundamental right of parents to make child rearing decisions simply because a state judge believes a `better' decision could be made). Because the grandparents in this case did not meet their evidentiary burden, the Court of Appeals correctly reversed the visitation order and remanded the cause with directions to dismiss.