Opinion ID: 599011
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Consent to Search Forms

Text: 12 Rodriguez contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress all statements made, and all evidence seized as a result of the consent to search forms. 2 In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, this court will not substitute [its] judgment for the factual findings of the district court unless those findings are clearly erroneous. See United States v. Walker, 933 F.2d 812, 815 (10th Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1168, 117 L.Ed.2d 414 (1992). 13 Although a search is generally deemed unreasonable unless it is conducted pursuant to a valid warrant, it is well-settled that an exception exists for searches made following voluntary consent by an individual with authority over the place searched. United States v. Marin, 669 F.2d 73, 82 (2d Cir.1982). Rodriguez asserts that the consent forms in the instant case were not signed voluntarily. To prove voluntary consent, the government must show that there was no duress or coercion, express or implied[,] [and] [t]he consent must be 'unequivocal and specific' and 'freely and intelligently given.'  United States v. Price, 925 F.2d 1268, 1270 (10th Cir.1991) (citing Villano v. United States, 310 F.2d 680, 684 (10th Cir.1962)); see generally Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). 14 Claiming that the first consent form was voluntarily signed before Miranda warnings were given, the government asserts that the search of the blue Chevrolet was valid. As in United States v. Moreno, 897 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1009, 110 S.Ct. 3250, 111 L.Ed.2d 760 (1990), when Rodriguez signed the first consent form, he was in custody, had not been apprised of his Miranda rights, and was without assistance of counsel. However, a person placed in official custody is not thereby rendered incapable of giving his free and voluntary consent to a warrantless search. Id. at 33. The fact that Rodriguez had not been informed of his Miranda rights does not affect our conclusion, since Miranda does not 'require[ ] the conclusion that knowledge of a right to refuse is an indispensable element of a valid consent.'  Id. (citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 246, 93 S.Ct. at 2058). 15 Therefore, all three consent forms may be similarly evaluated to determine whether they were signed voluntarily. To determine voluntary consent, neither the presence nor the absence of any single criteria can be controlling.... Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226, 93 S.Ct. at 2047. 16 In the instant case, the consent forms were typewritten in English and handwritten and read to Rodriguez in Spanish. Whether or not Rodriguez comprehended the handwritten Spanish, Agent West believed that Rodriguez understood the forms and their contents. Nonetheless, it is clear that Rodriguez understood the spoken language. Rodriguez was consistently addressed in Spanish and he similarly responded, invoking his Miranda rights, indicating he was aware of his interests and how to protect them. Agent West could not specifically recall explaining the ramifications of signing the forms or indicating that Rodriguez was not required to sign. However, he testified that Rodriguez expressed no reservations or concerns. Rodriguez' words and conduct indicate that he freely consented to the three searches in issue. He provided agents with keys to both the Chevrolet and the storage unit and did not attempt to stop or restrict the searches in any way. See United States v. Corral, 899 F.2d 991, 993-94 (10th Cir.1990). 17 Furthermore, we find no evidence of coercion or duress. Though Rodriguez asserts that he was held in the DEA vehicle for between one hour and one hour and twenty minutes, testimony indicated that he was inside his apartment during the residential search. While armed agents were present at Rodriguez' apartment, there is no evidence that Rodriguez was abused, frightened or otherwise threatened. Aside from Rodriguez' testimony that he was pushed into the snow while being arrested, there is no evidence of contact between Rodriguez and agents present. There is similarly no evidence that agents forced or in any way coerced Rodriguez into signing the forms. In view of the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that Rodriguez voluntarily consented to the searches of the two vehicles and the storage unit, and hold that the district court's findings are not clearly erroneous. 18 Finally, Rodriguez claims that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence of the cash found in his apartment. Rodriguez asserts that no testimony indicated that the $2,700 was tied to a crime of which he was charged. 19 The district court has broad discretion under Fed.R.Evid. 405, 28 U.S.C., when balancing probative value against prejudicial effect, and reversal is appropriate only upon a showing of abuse. Though in this case we are not dealing with a sizeable amount of cash which might otherwise be viewed as a tool of the trade, the possibility that the seized cash was the product of entirely lawful activities goes to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. United States v. Martinez, 938 F.2d 1078, 1085 (10th Cir.1991). Furthermore, it is not necessary that every piece of evidence admitted ... be sufficient by itself to prove the crime alleged. Id. The government notes that, at trial, Rodriguez did not object to the introduction of this evidence but instead explained that he had earned the money in his job. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to admit evidence of the discovery of $2,700.