Opinion ID: 164037
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Does Simmons apply to Oklahoma's capital sentencing scheme?

Text: 44 In Johnson, 254 F.3d 1155, this court analyzed whether the instructions by the trial court in that case regarding Oklahoma's capital punishment sentencing scheme violated Simmons or Simmons' successor case, Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36, 121 S.Ct. 1263, 149 L.Ed.2d 178 (2001). The trial court in Johnson had instructed the jury on the three Oklahoma sentencing options. During deliberations, the jury asked whether life without parole meant the defendant could never be paroled, and the trial court responded that `[i]t is inappropriate for you to consider the question asked.' Johnson, 254 F.3d at 1164. 45 We held in Johnson that the state trial court's answer violated Simmons and Shafer, and therefore reversed the federal district court's dismissal of the habeas petition. The majority opinion in Johnson recognized that Oklahoma law (permissibly) precludes instruction on the inner workings of the parole system, but noted that this preclusion does not obviate the need for a correct instruction concerning the three options, including life without parole. Johnson, 254 F.3d at 1165 (citing Simmons, 512 U.S. at 166, 114 S.Ct. 2187). That a state may limit the information given to juries about parole, we noted, does not eliminate the need to inform the jury of parole ineligibility where future dangerousness is at issue. Id. (citing Simmons, 512 U.S. at 168-69, 114 S.Ct. 2187) (emphasis supplied). 46 The Oklahoma instructions at issue in this case are the same as those that were at issue in Johnson. See Johnson, 254 F.3d at 1165 (In this case, the trial judge instructed the jury on its three discrete sentencing options available under Oklahoma law-death, life imprisonment[,] and life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.). Nonetheless, the State argues that this Court has not addressed the State's assertion that Simmons is inapplicable to Oklahoma's triple-option sentencing scheme. Aplt's Br. at 17. 47 We disagree. We did not in Johnson reserve the issue of the applicability of Simmons to Oklahoma's sentencing scheme by assuming without deciding that Simmons applied; rather, a necessary logical predicate to our holding was that the trial judge's instructions violated Simmons, and therefore, that Simmons applied. The State's argument is therefore foreclosed by Johnson. 48 Moreover, even if the issue were an open one, we do not see why Simmons' false choice concern should apply any less to Oklahoma's sentencing scheme. As we recognized in Johnson, Simmons rests upon eliminating a jury's misunderstanding so the jury will not perceive a `false choice' between sentencing to death or a limited period of incarceration when future dangerousness is at issue. Id. at 1166. We also note that the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals cited and distinguished Shafer and Johnson in Williams v. State, 31 P.3d 1046, 1050 (Okla.Crim.App.2001), noting that in Williams, unlike in Shafer and Johnson, the jury was not presented with a `false choice' as to its sentencing options. (citing Johnson, 254 F.3d at 1167 (Henry, J., concurring)). As evidenced by the facts of Johnson and those of this case, this concern is no less potentially implicated by Oklahoma's capital sentencing scheme than those of other states. Accordingly, we reject the State's argument that Simmons is inapplicable to Oklahoma's capital sentencing scheme. 49 2. Did the district court in this case create a false choice under Simmons in violation of Mr. Mollett's due process rights? 50 Next, argues the State, even if Simmons does apply to Oklahoma's capital sentencing scheme, Simmons does not apply because no false choice arose in this case. The State argues that because the jury in Mr. Mollett's case did not find that the prosecution had proven that Mr. Mollett was a continuing threat to society, Mr. Mollett is [therefore] not entitled to relief because unlike the juries in Simmons, Shafer, and Johnson, Mollett's jury actually rejected a statutory aggravator requiring a finding that [Mr.] Mollett was a continuing threat to society. Aplt's Br. at 17. 2 The State's view reflects an unjustifiably narrow reading of those three cases, which we now turn to discuss in some detail to illustrate this important point. 51 First, in Simmons, 512 U.S. 154, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 129 L.Ed.2d 133, the Supreme Court reviewed South Carolina's capital sentencing scheme, which ha[d] a life-without-parole sentencing alternative to capital punishment for some or all convicted murderers but refuse[d] to inform sentencing juries of th[at] fact. Id. at 168 n. 8, 114 S.Ct. 2187. However, the defendant in Simmons was parole ineligible under that scheme because of prior convictions for crimes of violence. See S.C. Stat. Ann. § 24-21-640; Simmons, 512 U.S. at 156, 114 S.Ct. 2187 (plurality opinion); id. at 176, 114 S.Ct. 2187 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The jury, in a note to the judge during sentencing deliberations, asked: Does the imposition of a life sentence carry with it the possibility of parole? Id. at 160, 114 S.Ct. 2187 (plurality opinion). Over defense counsel's objection, the trial judge in Simmons instructed: Do not consider parole or parole eligibility [in reaching your verdict]. That is not a proper issue for your consideration. Id. After receiving this response from the court, the jury in Mr. Simmons' trial returned a sentence of death, which Mr. Simmons unsuccessfully sought to overturn on appeal to the South Carolina Supreme Court. Id. at 160-61, 114 S.Ct. 2187. 52 A divided Supreme Court reversed the South Carolina Supreme Court. Justice Blackmun's plurality opinion, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg, explained that the trial court had violated the defendant's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights because [t]he State may not create a false dilemma by advancing generalized arguments regarding the defendant's future dangerousness, while, at the same time, preventing the jury from learning that the defendant never will be released on parole. Id. at 171, 114 S.Ct. 2187 (emphasis supplied). The plurality noted that [w]hile juries ordinarily are presumed to follow the court's instructions, we have recognized that in some circumstances the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). 53 Similarly, Justice Souter, joined by Justice Stevens, concurred, stating that  juries in general are likely to misunderstand the meaning of the term `life imprisonment' in a given context,  and that therefore  the judge must tell the jury what the term means, when the defendant so requests.  Id. at 174, 114 S.Ct. 2187 (Souter, J., concurring) (emphasis supplied). It is, moreover, clear, stated Justice Souter, that at least one of these particular jurors did not understand the meaning of the term, since the jury sent a note to the judge asking, `Does the imposition of a life sentence carry with it the possibility of parole?' The answer here was easy and controlled by state statute. The judge should have said no. Id. 54 Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy, also concurred, holding that  [w]here the State puts the defendant's future dangerousness in issue, and the only available alternative sentence to death is life imprisonment without possibility of parole, due process entitles the defendant to inform the capital sentencing jury — by either argument or instruction — that he is parole ineligible. 512 U.S. at 178, 114 S.Ct. 2187 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis supplied). In Simmons, Justice O'Connor's three Justice concurrence represented the narrowest grounds for a holding and, as such, represents the holding of the Court. Smallwood v. Gibson, 191 F.3d 1257, 1280 n. 15 (10th Cir.1999). 55