Opinion ID: 2640090
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Appointment of Special Masters

Text: {5} Judge Rodella argues to this Court that the Commission is a political entity and that it acted improperly by failing to refer the investigation and fact finding in this matter to special masters in order to ensure objectivity. He contends that this Court has already recognized the potential for undue influence over judicial affairs by the Executive through JSC proceedings. See State ex rel. Judicial Standards Comm'n v. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, 134 N.M. 59, 73 P.3d 197. Judge Rodella suggests that the executive branch, having previously encouraged the judge to resign, was displeased with his subsequent election and also had a contentious relationship with the judge's wife, who is a member of the New Mexico Legislature. Judge Rodella also represents that because the executive director of the Commission was appointed by the governor, the proceedings were politically biased. {6} We are not persuaded that the Commission is either inherently biased or that there is evidence that it was biased in its investigation or examination of Judge Rodella. In Espinosa, we reviewed the history of the Commission, recognizing that it was intended to be an independent body composed of judges, members of the bar, and citizens to `oversee and investigate the performance, conduct and fitness of members of the judiciary.' Id. ¶¶ 2, 10 (quoting the 1967 Report of the Constitutional Revision Commission at 88). We also observed that while our Constitution expressly permits the encroachment of the executive branch into the judicial branch, id. ¶ 9, the Commission has no power to remove or sanction judges, but only makes recommendations to this Court, which has final decision making authority, id. ¶ 13. Thus, we concluded, the Commission plays no role in the traditional functions of the judiciary. Id. {7} We also emphasized that the Commission works in near total confidentiality. The Governor has no access to the complaints filed before the Commission unless and until they are made public when a recommendation is made to this Court. Thus, the Governor will not be in a position to interfere with an ongoing investigation, and our Constitution has thereby provided another check on potential abuse of power. Id. ¶ 15. Accordingly, there are sufficient checks on political influence, both in the form of confidentiality, and in this Court's power to review the Commission's actions, to ensure the independence of the Commission in fulfilling its role in overseeing judicial conduct. {8} Having created the Commission as an independent body, Article VI, Section 32 of the New Mexico Constitution, provides that the Commission may order a hearing to be held before it concerning the discipline, removal or retirement of a justice, judge or magistrate, or the commission may appoint three masters who are justices or judges of courts of record to hear and take evidence in the matter and to report their findings to the commission. Consistent with the Constitution, NMSA 1978, § 34-10-2.1(A)(3) (1977), provides that the Commission shall, if the commission deems it necessary or convenient, appoint three masters, who are justices or judges of courts of record, to hear and take evidence ... who shall report their findings to the commission. And Rule 20 of the Judicial Standards Commission Rules, promulgated under the authority of Article VI, § 32, provides that [t]he commission, by a majority vote of its members, may appoint three (3) masters who are judges of courts of record to hear and take evidence in any hearing and to report their findings to the commission. Thus, the decision whether to appoint special masters is left to the discretion of the Commission, and we have been presented with no evidence of an abuse of that discretion. Indeed, we note that the examiner in this matter was neither the executive director of the Commission nor a regular member of the Commission's staff, but a former New Mexico Supreme Court Justice, who had been appointed to this Court by a prior governor. And though the Commission retained the ultimate authority to recommend removal to this Court, as noted above, we independently review the proceedings below to determine, de novo, whether to accept the recommendation of the Commission. {9} We therefore turn to the merits of the case and address the Commission's findings and Judge Rodella's defenses in the context of each of the three separate incidents, examining whether the evidence demonstrates that Judge Rodella committed willful misconduct in office, and if so, whether his conduct was sufficiently egregious to warrant removal from the bench. As we have previously written, `[willful] misconduct in office is improper and wrong conduct of a judge acting in his official capacity done intentionally, knowingly, and, generally, in bad faith. It is more than a mere error of judgment or an act of negligence.' In re Locatelli, 2007-NMSC-029, ¶ 8, 141 N.M. 755, 161 P.3d 252 (per curiam) (quoting In re Martinez, 99 N.M. 198, 203, 645 P.2d 861, 866 (1982)).