Opinion ID: 783228
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Factual Impossibility

Text: 30 Collins next argues that he had at least a partial factual impossibility defense that the jury disregarded despite being specifically instructed that Collins was incarcerated during various periods within the time-frame in the indictment. Collins argues that when he was detained during these various dates, it was impossible for him to commit the crime of conspiracy. He also argues that although Matejka testified that the two of them completed at least thirty-five drug deals between July and October 2000, these deals could have only taken place during July and August because Collins returned to custody in September of 2000. Collins offers no legal argument to support his claim. 31 Factual impossibility refers to those situations in which a circumstance or condition, unknown to the defendant, renders physically impossible the consummation of his intended criminal conduct. The oft-cited example is of the would-be thief who attempts to pick an empty pocket. See United States v. Frazier, 560 F.2d 884, 888 (8th Cir.1977) (internal citations omitted); United States v. Darnell, 545 F.2d 595, 597 (8th Cir.1976). Here, however, the facts indicate that the commission of the charged crime was not factually impossible. Collins had sufficient time over the period charged in the indictment to sell the quantity of drugs he sold, and the indictment's inclusion of months in which Collins was in prison does not defeat the inclusion of months in which he was not in prison.