Opinion ID: 778334
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Procedural sufficiency

Text: 17
18 Betzold argues that because he was never served with process, the district court improperly subjected him to the terms of the SPI. It is elementary that one is not bound by a judgment in personam resulting from litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of process. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 110, 112, 89 S.Ct. 1562, 23 L.Ed.2d 129 (1969) (holding that an injunction was improper because the defendant had not been served with process). In order to object to a court's exercise of personal jurisdiction, it is no longer necessary to enter a special appearance. Instead, [a] defendant must attack the validity of service of process pursuant to Rule 12(b). Haile v. Henderson Nat'l Bank, 657 F.2d 816, 820 n. 4 (6th Cir.1981). 19 Betzold attempted in his motion to intervene to reserve his right to object to the district court's exercise of personal jurisdiction. This attempt, however, was unsuccessful, because a motion to intervene is fundamentally incompatible with an objection to personal jurisdiction. United States v. Oregon, 657 F.2d 1009, 1017 n. 18 (9th Cir.1981) (holding that [t]he court below gained personal jurisdiction over [the defendant] when it intervened as of right); City of Santa Clara v. Kleppe, 428 F.Supp. 315, 317 (N.D.Cal.1976) (holding that [b]y voluntarily intervening in this action under Rule 24, F.R.C.P., [the defendant] has submitted to the jurisdiction of this court). We therefore conclude that Betzold has waived his objections to the district court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over him. 20
21 Rule 65(d) provides that an injunction is binding only upon the parties to the action.... Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(d). Betzold became a party when the district court granted his motion to intervene on April 12, 2000, the same day that the SPI was issued. As a result, the district court's issuance of the SPI against Betzold did not contravene Rule 65(d). 22
23 Pursuant to Rule 65(a)(1), [n]o preliminary injunction shall be issued without notice to the adverse party. Fed. R.Civ.P. 65(a)(1). The type of notice required is not specified. In Betzold's motion to intervene, he objected to the district court's issuance of any orders that might adversely affect his interests. Betzold therefore demonstrated his actual notice of the fact that proceedings had been initiated that might result in a preliminary injunction against him. 24 But the notice requirement of Rule 65(a)(1) also implies a hearing in which the defendant is given a fair opportunity to oppose the application and to prepare for such opposition. Williams v. McKeithen, 939 F.2d 1100, 1105 (5th Cir.1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). This court has held that Rule 65 contemplates that the issuance of a preliminary injunction shall be upon notice to the adverse party and after a hearing.  Carpenters' Dist. Council v. Cicci, 261 F.2d 5, 8 (6th Cir.1958) (emphasis added). 25 The plaintiffs argue that a hearing was not required because Betzold did not contest the factual basis underlying the SPI. A hearing on whether a preliminary injunction should issue, however, embodies the right to be heard on the controverted facts, as well as upon the law.  Id. (emphasis added). In his motion to intervene, Betzold gave the court notice of his intention to challenge the legal basis for the issuance of any future injunction against him. He was therefore entitled to a hearing before the SPI issued. Id. 26 The district court, in denying Betzold's motion to dissolve the injunction, held that his motion to intervene constituted a hearing prior to the issuance of the SPI. We are of the opinion, however, that Betzold's motion to intervene cannot be so construed. Betzold's motion to intervene quite properly focused on establishing the requirements for intervention. He reserved his right to argue the merits of any injunction in the future, and accordingly did not set forth such arguments as part of his motion to intervene. The district court could not fairly expect Betzold to anticipate that his motion to intervene would constitute his only opportunity to be heard concerning the substantive basis for denying an injunction. His motion to intervene therefore did not constitute a hearing on the merits of the SPI. The district court thus failed to comply with Rule 65(a)(1) when it issued the SPI before Betzold had an opportunity to be heard. 27 Betzold, however, did eventually have a hearing. In his motion to dissolve the SPI, Betzold did not limit himself to arguing that the SPI was procedurally deficient. Instead, he set forth substantive arguments on the merits of the injunction, contending that it should not have issued because the ODC lawfully disclosed to him the registration materials that he had received, and because the injunction was a prior restraint that violated his First Amendment rights. These are essentially the same arguments he makes on appeal. We therefore conclude that the district court's consideration of Betzold's motion to dissolve constituted a hearing on whether an injunction should issue. Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corp., 76 F.3d 624, 628 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that where legal, and not factual, issues are in dispute, the notice requirement of Rule 65(a)(1) does not require an oral hearing, and that the court's consideration of legal memoranda may constitute a hearing so long as both parties are given `ample opportunity to present their respective views of the legal issues involved') (citation omitted). As a result, the SPI ceased to suffer from procedural defects from the time of the district court's ruling on Betzold's motion in December of 2000. Banke v. Novadel-Agene Corp., 130 F.2d 99, 101 (6th Cir.1942) (holding that a rehearing on a motion to set aside a permanent injunction cured the lack of prior notice of the injunction). The SPI against Betzold is therefore procedurally sufficient.