Opinion ID: 423691
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Standard As Applied

Text: 20 Although the Commission's interpretation of section 1910.94(d)(7)(iii) is reasonable, its application of the standard to the facts of this case cannot withstand scrutiny. In evaluating the Commission's application of section 1910.94(d)(7)(iii), we are constrained by 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) (1976) which makes the Commission's findings of fact conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. CCI, Inc. v. OSHRC, 688 F.2d 88, 89 (10th Cir.1982); Super Excavators, Inc. v. OSHRC, 674 F.2d at 594. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477, 71 S.Ct. 456, 459, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951), quoted in American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 522, 101 S.Ct. 2478, 2497, 69 L.Ed.2d 185 (1981). While we are not free to pick and choose between the conflicting findings of the ALJ and the Commission, we are entitled to evaluate the Commission's conclusions in light of the contrary findings of the ALJ. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft v. Secretary of Labor, 649 F.2d at 105. 21 Unlike most of the Secretary's safety and health standards, section 1910.94(d)(7)(iii) does not presume the existence of a safety hazard. See Modern Drop Forge Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 683 F.2d 1105, 1114-15 (7th Cir.1982). Instead, the standard proscribes common venting only in circumstances where the substances removed may alone or in combination pose a threat to employee safety. Thus, to establish a prima facie case of a violation of section 1910.94(d)(7)(iii), the Secretary must show more than the mere use by an employer of a common exhaust system; he must show that (1) substances are or are likely to be removed which (2) either alone or in combination (3) pose a fire, explosion, or chemical reaction hazard. Cf. Super Excavators, Inc. v. OSHRC, 674 F.2d at 595 (To state a prima facie violation of the [OSHA] Act, the Secretary need only prove a regulatory standard and its violation, where the standard is specific.). Moreover, the Secretary must show more than the mere possibility of injury; he must show that the potential hazard presents a significant risk of harm. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft v. Secretary of Labor, 649 F.2d at 104. 22 Whether there exists a significant risk depends on the seriousness of the potential harm and the likelihood of that harm being realized. Cf. W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 31, at 147 (4th ed. 1971) (As the gravity of the potential harm increases, the apparent likelihood of its occurrence need be correspondingly less. (footnote omitted)). The question is one part empirical and one part policy-based. Industrial Union Department, 448 U.S. at 655 n. 62, 100 S.Ct. at 2871 n. 62. The likelihood of injury and the corresponding measure of harm resulting therefrom are factual determinations which, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive. 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) (1976). Whether there exists a significant risk is a determination that is also subject to the substantial evidence rule, provided, of course, that the determination is consistent with OSHA. Texas Independent Ginners Association v. Marshall, 630 F.2d 398, 404 & n. 22 (5th Cir.1980); see K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 29.00-1, at 525-26 (Supp.1982) (as applied to policy decisions, the substantial evidence standard must be equated to the test of reasonableness). 23 A. Fire, Explosion and Chemical Reaction Hazard From the Combination of Acid Mists and Cyanide Mists in the Common Ducts 24 Hydrogen cyanide gas (HCN gas) is a very potent poison capable of causing death or serious bodily harm. The gas is also flammable and explosive. It is undisputed that each of the seven plating lines at Pratt & Whitney's North Haven plant contained open tanks of acids and cyanides and that HCN gas can evolve from a combination of acid mists and cyanide mists. 25 The Secretary alleged and the Commission found that acid mists and cyanide mists could rise from the open tanks and combine in the common ducts to create a fire, explosion and chemical reaction hazard. The Commission relied primarily on the testimony of the Secretary's expert witness, David A. Padden. Although Padden had never visited the North Haven plant, he explained that HCN gas would probably form if a common duct were used to vent the acids and cyanides used in plating operations. 26 We hold that on the record as a whole the Commission's finding is not supported by substantial evidence. Donovan v. Daniel Construction Co., 692 F.2d 818 (1st Cir.1982). The Secretary offered no evidence to prove that HCN gas is present in the common ducts, that cyanide mists are present in the common ducts, that cyanide mists rise from the plating lines, or that such mists are likely to rise from the open tanks. Although simple tests are available to detect HCN gas, the Secretary did not use them. The Secretary's expert witness, Padden, acknowledged that he did not know the concentration, if any, of HCN gas in the common duct, the velocities of the exhaust systems, or the temperatures of the solutions in the open tanks--information, he conceded, that would have helped him form an expert opinion. When asked how he was able to conclude without this information that a hazard existed, Padden responded: The common duct work does make it possible that there may be a reaction between the cyanides and the acids, an intermixing of those. J.App. at 113 (emphasis added). 27 To establish a violation of section 1910.94(d)(7)(iii), the Secretary must show more than the mere possibility of a fire, explosion, or chemical reaction hazard. At a minimum he must show the existence of conditions likely to lead to the formation of HCN gas in the common ducts. In his brief on appeal, the Secretary asserts: Acid and cyanide mists naturally will rise from the surface of plating line tanks containing these solutions. Br. of Respondent at 3. Yet, there is no evidence in the record to support this assertion. 28 Similarly, there is virtually no evidence to support the Commission's finding that [s]ince parts were constantly being immersed into the solutions, ... the solutions could become sufficiently agitated that cyanide mists could be drawn into the ductwork, react with the acid mists and vapors that were undisputedly already there, and form HCN. J.App. at 195. While Pratt & Whitney concedes that acid mists and cyanide mists would be likely to rise from the open tanks if the solutions were severely agitated or heated to boiling, the Secretary offered no evidence to establish the likelihood of these circumstances occurring. Chairman Rowland's careful evaluation of the evidence led him to conclude in dissent that: 29 [T]he record does not contain any evidence about the extent to which the surfaces of the acid and cyanide solutions were agitated during actual plant operations, nor does the evidence show any appreciable likelihood of HCN being formed as a result of agitation of the surfaces of the acid or cyanide solutions. Indeed, [Pratt & Whitney's] expert, Doyle, testified from personal experience that the cyanide solutions in the tanks only released water vapor and an ammonium compound into the air to be carried into the ductwork above the cyanide tanks. 30 J.App. at 202-03. On the record before us, it was not reasonable for the Commission to conclude that the testimony of the Secretary's expert, based upon what the ALJ aptly described as textbook theory, J.App. at 11, carried the Secretary's burden of proof in the face of expert testimony for Pratt & Whitney that was based upon personal observation and testing. See Modern Drop Forge Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 683 F.2d 1105, 1112 (7th Cir.1982); Olin Construction Co. v. OSHRC, 525 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir.1975) (per curiam). 31 B. Fire and Explosion Hazard From Combinations of Hydrogen Peroxide, Acetic Acid and Heated Slushing Oil 32 One of the seven plating lines in Pratt & Whitney's North Haven plant contained open tanks of hydrogen peroxide, acetic acid and heated slushing oil. The Secretary alleged that (1) hydrogen peroxide and heated slushing oil could combine in the common duct to create a fire or explosion hazard, and (2) hydrogen peroxide could combine with acetic acid to form peracetic acid, an extreme oxidizing agent which could cause an explosion if combined in the common duct with heated slushing oil. 33 Relying primarily on the testimony of the Secretary's expert witness, Padden, the Commission reinstated the Secretary's citation for this alleged violation of section 1910.94(d)(7)(iii). The Commission reasoned: 34 Padden, testifying for the Secretary, explained that if [Pratt & Whitney's] ventilation system failed, and the production of heated slushing oil and hydrogen peroxide continued, small globules of oil and chemicals would be emitted from the plating line tanks which could be drawn through the exhaust system into the common duct and cause a chemical reaction. When Padden was asked about the effect of a failure of [Pratt & Whitney's] ventilation system on the mixture of peracetic acid and slushing oil mists, he testified that the two substances would meet without diffusion. These reactions could result even if a down-draft did not occur. As noted above, the Secretary's industrial hygienist, Larsen, had testified earlier that exhausting peracetic acid and heated oil through the same duct presented fire and explosion hazards. Mr. Dupre, [Pratt & Whitney's] safety engineer, testified that a fire had previously occurred in [Pratt & Whitney's] ductwork. Consequently, in light of the above testimony and particularly in light of the abundant testimony from both the Secretary's and [Pratt & Whitney's] witnesses about failures in [Pratt & Whitney's] ventilation system, we find that the Secretary has proven there was a significant risk of fire and explosion in [Pratt & Whitney's] common duct system as a result of a combination of the aforementioned substances. 35 J.App. at 197 (footnote omitted). 36 The Commission's findings with respect to the alleged fire and explosion hazards suffer from the same deficiencies as its findings with respect to the alleged HCN hazards. Chairman Rowland's dissenting opinion forcefully attacks the majority's findings and exposes the flimsy evidentiary foundation supplied by the Secretary and relied on by the Commission: 37 Even assuming, as the majority states, that [Pratt & Whitney's] industrial hygienist Dunstan conceded that hydrogen peroxide and oil entered the common duct, Dunstan did not state that the mixing of hydrogen peroxide and heated oil would therefore occur. Rather, his testimony was to the contrary. Dunstan stated that there were two tanks of cyanide solution between the hydrogen peroxide and the oil tanks and that as the hydrogen peroxide moved through the common duct it would be decomposed into water by the cyanides before it could even reach any oil. In fact, Dunstan further stated that he tested for the presence of oil in the ductwork and found only a dry residue, indicating oil was not present in the ductwork. Dunstan also testified that a reaction between hydrogen peroxide and slushing oil would require a temperature of about 390 ? F. The temperature of the oil, however, was no more than about 300 ? F., while the hydrogen peroxide was not heated. According to Dunstan, he measured the temperature of the air entering the duct from the oil tank at about 85 ? F. Based on a measured air flow of about 6000 cubic feet per minute, Dunstan estimated the temperature inside the duct to be only about 90 ? F. He concluded, therefore, that heated oil and hydrogen peroxide did not present a hazard. 38 The Secretary did not rebut Dunstan's testimony. Indeed, the Secretary's own expert witness, Padden, admitted on rebuttal that he did not actually know if hydrogen peroxide or slushing oil entered the common duct. Padden also admitted that a knowledge of the velocities of the exhaust system would have been helpful to him in arriving at his opinion on the likelihood of the occurrence of hazardous chemical reactions. Yet, neither Padden nor the Secretary's industrial hygienist, Larsen, measured the airflow into the duct system. 39 The majority opinion also finds that the Secretary proved his allegation of hazards stemming from the formation of peracetic acid. Dunstan, however, testified that a temperature between 140 ? -180 ? F. is required for the formation of peracetic acid and that it takes some period of time before any appreciable amount of the acid can be developed. Although Larsen claimed that heat was not required to produce peracetic acid, he did concede, as did Padden, that peracetic acid did not present an explosion hazard unless it was heated to 230 ? F.; Padden stated that the flash point of peracetic acid is 105 ? F. Yet, as previously noted, Dunstan estimated the duct temperature to be only at about 90 ? F. Larsen admitted that he had made no determination regarding the temperature in the ducts. 40 J.App. at 204-06 (footnotes omitted). 41 The Commission's decision cannot be sustained on either the facts or the law. The Secretary bore the burden of establishing a violation of section 1910.94(d)(7)(iii), yet he offered no evidence to prove that circumstances existing at the plating lines are likely to lead to the alleged hazards. A risk cannot be deemed significant absent some showing by the Secretary of the circumstances likely to give rise to the alleged hazard. Without such a showing, the Secretary's allegations fail to rise above sheer speculation. The facts of this case cannot support a reasonable inference that the substances removed through the common ducts pose a significant risk of the hazards defined in section 1910.94(d)(7)(iii). Padden's testimony that the industry practice is to vent separately the substances involved is no substitute for evidence tending to show a significant risk of fire, explosion, or chemical reaction hazard in the common ducts servicing plating operations at Pratt & Whitney's North Haven plant. 42 Because the parties chose not to introduce additional evidence on remand, they were apparently satisfied with the present state of this eight year old record. Accordingly, we will not remand again. The petition for review is granted and the Commission's order, to the extent that it affirmed the citation for a violation of 29 C.F.R. § 1910.94(d)(7)(iii), is set aside.