Opinion ID: 479792
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: CNR's Negligence

Text: 18 Appellant's complaint alleged that CNR was liable under the FELA because it was negligent in: (1) failing to train Bailey adequately; (2) allowing the brush cutter to fall into a hazardous condition; (3) failing to maintain the track properly; (4) failing to follow its own safety rule; and (5) failing to take reasonable search and rescue steps. After trial, the district court rejected each claim and rendered a verdict in favor of CNR. 19 In reviewing the district court's determination that CNR was not negligent, we are guided by an extremely narrow standard: we may set aside its factual findings only if clearly erroneous. Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a); Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1512, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985). 20 Under the FELA, a railroad engaged in interstate commerce is liable to any employee who, during the course of his employment with the railroad, suffers an injury or death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of the railroad. 45 U.S.C. Sec. 51; see Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad, 352 U.S. 500, 507, 77 S.Ct. 443, 449, 1 L.Ed.2d 493 (1957); Miller v. Erie Lackawanna Railway, 645 F.2d 140, 144 (2d Cir.1981). In order to recover, the plaintiff must prove that the railroad, with the exercise of due care, could have reasonably foreseen that a particular condition could cause injury. The defendant's duty is measured by what a reasonably prudent person should or could have reasonably anticipated as occurring under like circumstances. Davis v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 541 F.2d 182, 185 (8th Cir.) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1002, 97 S.Ct. 533, 50 L.Ed.2d 613 (1976). 21 We find no error in Judge Billings' conclusion that CNR was not negligent in instructing Bailey on the operation of the brush cutter. The evidence at trial established that during the course of his employment, Bailey had received extensive, hands-on training from a CNR supervisor. Indeed, Reindeau testified that he and Bailey knew every bolt of the machine, and that together they had operated the brush cutter approximately twenty-six times without incident. In light of these facts, it can hardly be said that CNR breached its duty to provide Bailey with proper training. 22 With respect to the remaining theories of negligence, 4 however, we are unable to agree with Judge Billings' legal analysis and therefore vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings. 23 Our concern is with the district court's treatment of appellant's last two claims of negligence, viz., that CNR failed to follow its own safety rule and that it failed to undertake adequate search and rescue efforts. Judge Billings correctly noted that a railroad has a duty to establish safety rules for the guidance and protection of its employees and, once promulgated, the employee is generally entitled to rely on these safety rules as the appropriate standard of conduct. Slip op. at 16 (citing Ybarra v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 689 F.2d 147 (8th Cir.1982)). He went on to conclude, however, that where those rules have been nullified by custom and practice, an employee is not justified in relying on them. Slip op. at 16 (citing Wilson v. Norfolk & Western Railway, 109 Ill.App.3d 79, 64 Ill.Dec. 686, 696, 440 N.E.2d 238, 248 (1982)). 24 The safety rule at issue here required that whenever maintenance equipment was being used, two employees ... must accompany the [track] unit. Defendant's Pretrial Memorandum and Contentions of Fact and Law at 17. Although appellant failed to establish at trial the precise language of the rule, the parties seem to have accepted Judge Billings' paraphrase--that two men must work together. In finding that CNR was not negligent with respect to the rule, Judge Billings first reasoned that it was the custom and practice among CNR employees to have one worker operate the equipment on the track while the other traveled along the highway to flag his colleague at various crossings. Judge Billings then assumed that this particular practice violated CNR's rule, but concluded that such a violation was not probative of negligence because of [CNR's] employees' established pattern of violation. Slip op. at 17. 25 With respect to the adequacy of search and rescue efforts, Judge Billings found no evidence upon which to conclude that CNR had deviated from a standard of reasonableness. This finding necessarily was related to the holding that CNR was not negligent in respect of its safety rule; that is, the delay in undertaking rescue efforts was reasonable only because it was found that Bailey and Reindeau were not required to work together. Obviously, if Bailey and Reindeau had been in closer contact, rescue efforts could have been more immediate. 26 We reject the view that an employer necessarily avoids liability for violation of its own safety rule by establishing that the rule has been nullified by the custom and practice of the employees for whose benefit it was designed. Judge Billings erroneously endorsed this view because he combined two distinct issues: negligence arising from CNR's specific failure to enforce its own safety rule and negligence arising from CNR's more general failure to exercise reasonable care. 27 Judge Billings correctly assessed the former question. An employer's duty to adhere to a company safety rule may cease to exist if the rule has been effectively repealed by non-enforcement over a substantial period of time. In these circumstances, employees are not justified in relying on the rule, and the failure to observe it does not itself constitute negligence on the part of the employer, Wilson v. Norfolk & Western Railway, 109 Ill.App.3d 79, 64 Ill.Dec. 686, 696, 440 N.E.2d 238, 248 (1982), or contributory negligence on the part of the employee, Hudson v. Seaboard Air Line Railway, 176 N.C. 488, 97 S.E. 388 (1923); Louisville & Northern Railroad v. Payne's Adm'r, 117 Ky. 462, 197 S.W. 928 (1917). 28 What Judge Billings did not recognize, however, is that the conduct required by a safety rule that has been repealed, formally or by prolonged non-enforcement, may still be an ingredient of the general standard of reasonable care that the employer always owes to its employees. Though an abrogated safety rule would not itself constitute the legal standard of care, it may provide evidence of what procedures may or may not be feasible or of practical value. See Ybarra, 689 F.2d at 150 (jury entitled to consider whether railroad's customary failure to enforce safety rule constituted negligence). An employer may be liable for its employees' injuries even in, and perhaps because of, the absence of a safety rule. 29 If Judge Billings finds that CNR was negligent, he must then determine whether its negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury or death for which damages are sought. Rogers, 352 U.S. at 506, 77 S.Ct. at 448. Also to be determined is whether Bailey was contributorily negligent, and if so, to what extent any ultimate recovery should be reduced. See 45 U.S.C. Sec. 53 (1982); Meyers v. Union Pacific Railroad, 738 F.2d 328, 330 (8th Cir.1984).