Opinion ID: 796141
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Board Members' Qualified Immunity from Scarbrough's First Amendment Retaliation Claim

Text: 48 Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, `government officials performing discretionary functions are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would know.' Hager v. Pike County Bd. of Educ., 286 F.3d 366, 371 (6th Cir.2002) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). Thus, determining whether qualified immunity shields a defendant involves a two-part inquiry. Id. First, a court must ask whether the plaintiff suffered a violation of his constitutional rights. Id. Second, the court must ask if the constitutional right in question was a clearly established constitutional right of which a reasonable person would know. Id. As discussed above, Scarbrough has a constitutional right to express his religious beliefs without being subjected to adverse action on account of his expression. Thus, whether the Board members are entitled to qualified immunity hinges on whether Scarbrough's right was clearly established such that a reasonable person would know that the alleged decision to hire Freels violated Scarbrough's right. 49 We throughly addressed whether an employee's First Amendment right to be free of retaliation is clearly established in Williams v. Kentucky, 24 F.3d 1526, 1533-38 (6th Cir.1994). We noted that in free speech cases, the employee's right to speak must be so clear at the time in question that reasonable minds could not differ on the constitutionality. Id. at 1534. We acknowledged that because Pickering and Connick require courts to balance competing interests to determine if an employee's speech is protected, in many public employee free speech cases it would be unclear to a reasonable official what the outcome of the balancing inquiry should be. Id. at 1537. However, the greater the speech's relationship to a matter of public concern and the more minimal the effect on office efficiency the more likely a reasonable person would be to understand that the employer's actions violated the Constitution. Id. Here, Scarbrough's right to express himself was clearly established, and thus, the Board members are not entitled to qualified immunity. III. CONCLUSION 50 For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment to the Board, Strand, Spurling and Lively on Scarbrough's First Amendment retaliation, § 1983 claim, and affording Defendants qualified immunity, and AFFIRM the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Scarbrough's free exercise and association claims, and his equal protection claim and the grant of summary judgment for Harlan on the § 1983 claim. This case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, against the Board and Strand, Spurling, and Lively individually.