Opinion ID: 1354921
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sufficiency of IndictmentCounts 2, 9 & 10

Text: Counts 2, 9 and 10 of the indictment in the case now before this Court charged that the appellant, a licensed practitioner of dentistry in this state, did, on the respective dates and within McDowell County, West Virginia, knowingly, intentionally, unlawfully and feloniously deliver to the named patient a designated quantity of Tylox, a Schedule II controlled substance, for a designated amount of money paid to the appellant, in violation of West Virginia Code 60A-4-401(a), as amended, by prescribing such controlled substance even though it was not necessary in the medical treatment and care of the named patient, against the peace and dignity of the State. The appellant argues, as he did briefly during the hearing on his motion to set aside the verdicts, that these counts of the indictment are void because, in referring to the invalidity of the prescriptions involved therein, these counts used the language, not necessary in the medical treatment and care, rather than the statutory language ( W.Va.Code, 60A-1-101(v) [1983]), specifically, outside the course of professional practice or research or the pertinent regulation's language (1 W.Va.Code of State Rules § 15-2-9.5(a) (1982)), specifically, not for a legitimate purpose by an individual practitioner acting in the usual course of his [or her] professional practice. The appellant claims that the not necessary language of counts 2, 9 and 10 was vague and impermissibly reduced the State's burden of proof. That is, the appellant claims that a prescription may be issued for a legitimate purpose but one which is not actually necessary, and the State, under counts 2, 9 and 10, must only show the easier proved point that the prescriptions were not necessary, instead of showing they were not for a legitimate purpose. We disagree. This Court has established the tests for the sufficiency of indictments in general and of indictments charging a violation of W.Va.Code, 60A-4-401(a), as amended, in particular. For example, in syllabus points 1-2 of State v. Nicastro, ___ W.Va. ___, 383 S.E.2d 521 (1989), we held: `An indictment for a statutory offense is sufficient if, in charging the offense, it substantially follows the language of the statute, fully informs the accused of the particular offense with which he is charged and enables the court to determine the statute on which the charge is based.' Syl. pt. 3, State v. Hall, 172 W.Va. 138, 304 S.E.2d 43 (1983). 'An indictment that [substantially] follows the language of W.Va.Code, 60A-4-401(a), is sufficient on its face.' Syl. pt. 1, State v. Meadows, 170 W.Va. 191, 292 S.E.2d 50 (1982). Therefore, we do not require that the indictment track the exact statutory language. State v. Nester, ___ W.Va. ___, ___, 336 S.E.2d 187, 189 (1985). Furthermore, [a] reference to a code section in an indictment necessarily carries with it all of the [implicit] elements of the offense charged under that section. Id. at ___n. 1, 336 S.E.2d at 189 n. 1. [16] In accordance with Nester, we believe that counts 2, 9 and 10 of the indictment here, by referring to W.Va.Code, 60A-4-401(a), as amended, necessarily averred all of the implicit elements of the offense of a felonious prescribing of a controlled substance, particularly, the element requiring an intentional act outside the course of professional practice or research[.] Moreover, the language in these three counts charging that the prescriptions involved therein were issued although they were not necessary in the medical treatment and care of the respective patients sufficiently notified the appellant (and the grand and petit juries) of the offense charged. This language on the face of counts 2, 9 and 10 of the indictment in essence charged that the prescriptions were issued without a legitimate purpose[.] Because W.Va.Code, 30-4-11 [1986], quoted in the last paragraph of subsection II(A) of this opinion supra, authorizes a dentist to prescribe drugs as may be necessary to the proper treatment of the patient, the legislature intended for necessary, in this context, to have essentially the same meaning as legitimate, which is contained in the legislatively approved regulation of the state board of pharmacy. In addition, other courts have used, or have upheld the use of, necessary and legitimate interchangeably in the context of indictments charging felonious prescribing of controlled substances. See, e.g., United States v. Kirk, 584 F.2d 773, 775 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1048, 99 S.Ct. 726, 58 L.Ed.2d 708 (1978); Commonwealth v. Perry, 391 Mass. 808, 812 n. 3, 464 N.E.2d 389, 392 n. 3 (1984); State v. Kane, 586 S.W.2d 812, 813 (Mo.Ct. App.1979). This flexibility in the selection of the charging terms in indictments for felonious prescribing of controlled substances is generally approved by the courts. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 576 F.2d 46, 48 (5th Cir.1978) (indictment charged that defendant physician acted knowingly, intentionally and unlawfully with respect to controlled substances, under the guise and artifice of operating a clinic; court held that indictment was sufficient, as it obviously embraced activities lacking legitimate medical purpose, even though it did not use the magic words of the Supreme Court in United States v. Moore , namely, outside the usual course of professional practice); State v. Vakas, 242 Kan. 103, 104-07, 744 P.2d 812, 813-15 (1987) (statute proscribed distribution of controlled substances other than for a medical purpose; indictment of physician used, for other than a legitimate medical purpose; court upheld indictment, rejecting defendant's assertion that use of additional word legitimate in indictment changed elements of crime, charged different crime, failed to state crime or lessened prosecution's burden of proof; rule of strict construction of penal statutes is subordinate to rule that judicial interpretation must be reasonable to effectuate obvious intent of legislature, and legislature obviously had not authorized prescriptions for an illegitimate, as well as for a legitimate, medical purpose). In view of the foregoing this Court holds that a count in an indictment charging that a registered practitioner violated W.Va. Code, 60A-4-401(a), as amended, by knowingly, intentionally, unlawfully and feloniously delivering a controlled substance by prescribing the substance even though it was not necessary in the medical treatment and care of the purported patient sufficiently states the elements of the offense.