Opinion ID: 1829562
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: An Afterword

Text: In the case sub judice, this Court is concerned with the issue of whether an insurer's production of a certificate of mailing constitutes conclusive proof that the insured received notice of cancellation. Relevant case law is sparse. In the decades-old case of Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Nosser, six of nine justices of the Mississippi Supreme Court concluded that a provision in an insurance policy which makes the mailing of notice sufficient to cancel the policy, even though such notice is not actually received by the insured, is not invalid as contrary to public policy. [2] 250 Miss. 542, 164 So.2d 426, 432 (Miss. 1964) (citing cases from other jurisdictions). More recently, in State Farm Ins. Co. v. Gay, 526 So.2d 534, 536 (Miss. 1988), the appellants asked this Court to construe the word given in Miss. Code Ann. § 83-11-5 (1972). This section provides: No notice of cancellation of a policy to which section 83-11-3 applies shall be effective unless mailed or delivered by the insurer to the named insured at least twenty (20) days prior to the effective date of cancellation; provided, however, that where cancellation is for nonpayment of premium at least ten (10) days' notice of cancellation accompanied by the reason therefor shall be given. Unless the reason accompanies or is included in the notice of cancellation, the notice of cancellation shall state or be accompanied by a statement that upon written request of the named insured, mailed or delivered to the insurer not less than fifteen (15) days prior to the effective date of cancellation, the insurer will specify the reason for such cancellation. This section shall not apply to nonrenewal. [3] Quoted in Gay, 526 So.2d at 536 (Miss. 1988) (emphasis added) (We decide no issue here except the narrow question presented by the insured... which, in effect, is no more than the meaning of the word `given' in § 83-11-5.). Justice Griffin, writing for the Court, concluded that proof of mailing satisfies the notice requirement. Id. at 538. Although the opinion was narrowly-drawn, the Court seems to have reached its conclusion by reading § 83-11-5 in conjunction with other sections of Chapter 11, which is entitled Automobile Insurance. One of these sections is 83-11-9, which the legislature passed in 1970: Proof of mailing of notice of cancellation, or of intention not to renew, or of reasons for cancellation to the named insured by a certificate of mailing, at the address shown in the policy, shall be sufficient proof. The insurance industry's general disregard for whether the cancellation notice actually reaches the insured's last known address or is lost or delayed through a miscarriage of mail is outmoded and nonsensical. Such disregard can no longer prevail for the simple reason that it is clearly the antithesis of a notice requirement and its purposes. This is deemed the antithesis because, as aptly noted by the Rhode Island Supreme Court a few years ago: [T]he purpose of a notice of cancellation of an insurance policy is to furnish the insured sufficient time to seek out and obtain coverage elsewhere before the termination of the existing policy. Larocque v. Rhode Island Joint Reinsurance Ass'n, 536 A.2d 529, 531 (R.I. 1988) (holding that the insured must provide actual notice ); see also Donarski v. Lardy, 251 Minn. 358, 88 N.W.2d 7, 10-12 (1958) (noting that, if the policy could be cancelled at any time by merely depositing the notice in the mail without regard to whether the notice is actually received, then the purpose of a notice requirement may essentially be nullified); Nosser, 164 So.2d at 448 ([An insured should be provided a] chance to protect himself by the purchase of other insurance.) (Lee, C.J., dissenting). Accordingly, this Court believes that clarification of its previous holdings and dicta pertaining to the statutory notice requirement is in order. Contrary to what some may have contended in the past, production of a certificate of mailing does not constitute conclusive proof of the insured's actual receipt of the cancellation notice. A certificate of mailing establishes a presumption that the notice reached its destination (the insured's last known address). Cf. Larocque, 536 A.2d at 531-32 ([actual] receipt may be presumed by proof of an ordinary mailing) (citing Osborne v. Unigard Indemnity Co., 719 S.W.2d 737, 741 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986); Campbell v. Royal Indemnity Co. of N.Y., 256 Pa.Super. 312, 317, 389 A.2d 1139, 1142 (1978)). However, this presumption may be rebutted by the insured who contends that he or she did not actually receive the notice. But mere denial of receipt is insufficient to create a triable issue of fact. [4] In other words, [p]roof of mailing of notice of cancellation ... shall be sufficient proof of notice  absent countervailing evidence of sufficient weight to rebut the presumption that it was received. Miss. Code Ann. § 83-11-9 (1972). In sum, mere mailing of a cancellation notice is not conclusive with regard to whether the insured actually received the notice. Insurers would thus be prudent to take whatever steps are reasonably necessary to ensure that a cancellation notice actually reaches the insured's last known address.