Opinion ID: 779503
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The State Parties' and the Sponsors' Appeal Against Audubon

Text: 20 The district court found that the Eleventh Amendment did not deprive it of jurisdiction to hear Audubon's claims for declaratory and injunctive relief based on the time-tested principle of Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908). We review de novo whether Eleventh Amendment immunity applies. See State of California v. Campbell, 138 F.3d 784, 786 (9th Cir.1998). 21 The state parties assert that the Eleventh Amendment bars all of Audubon's claims, given the district court's finding that there is no present threat of enforcement. According to the state parties, the Ex Parte Young exception require[s] a genuine threat of enforcement by a state official before a federal court can hear a party's claims. Essentially, the state argues that we should recognize a ripeness component in the Ex Parte Young exception, and cites numerous cases in support of that argument, including Snoeck v. Brussa, 153 F.3d 984, 987 (9th Cir.1998); Long v. Van de Kamp, 961 F.2d 151, 152 (9th Cir.1992); Los Angeles Branch NAACP v. Los Angeles Unified School District, 714 F.2d 946, 953 (9th Cir.1983); Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405, 417 (5th Cir.2001) (en banc) (holding that any probe into the existence of a Young exception should gauge (1) the ability of the official to enforce the statute at issue under his statutory or constitutional powers, and (2) the demonstrated willingness of the official to enforce the statute  (emphasis added)); and Children's Healthcare is a Legal Duty, Inc. v. Deters, 92 F.3d 1412, 1415 (6th Cir.1996) (holding that Young does not apply when a defendant state official has neither enforced nor threatened to enforce the allegedly unconstitutional state statute). 22 However, the cases cited by the state parties primarily address the question of whether a named state official has direct authority and practical ability to enforce the challenged statute, rather than the question of whether enforcement is imminent. These cases are concerned with plaintiffs circumventing the Eleventh Amendment under Ex Parte Young simply by suing any state executive official. That is, they are concerned with the question of who rather than when. See, e.g., L.A. Branch NAACP, 714 F.3d at 953(finding that the governor lacked power to remedy alleged violations); Okpalobi, 244 F.3d at 417(finding lack of an enforcement connection between abortion statute and the governor or attorney general); Children's Healthcare, 92 F.3d at 1417 (finding that the attorney general has no connection to enforcement of the statute). We decline to read additional ripeness or imminence requirements into the Ex Parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity in actions for declaratory relief beyond those already imposed by a general Article III and prudential ripeness analysis. The Article III and prudential ripeness requirements, which we apply infra Part II.B.2, are tailored to address problems occasioned by an unripe controversy. There is thus no need to strain Ex Parte Young doctrine to serve that purpose. 23 Based on this view, we hold that suit is barred against the Governor and the state Secretary of Resources, as there is no showing that they have the requisite enforcement connection to Proposition 4. The two state agencies are also immune from suit because they are state entities, not individual state officers. However, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suit against the Director of the California Department of Fish & Game, who has direct authority over and principal responsibility for enforcing Proposition 4. 24 The fact that only declaratory, rather than injunctive, relief may be available does not alter this conclusion. Under the principle of Ex Parte Young, private individuals may sue state officials for prospective relief against ongoing violations of federal law. See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 159-60, 28 S.Ct. 441. As subsequent cases have pointed out, Ex Parte Young itself was decided well before declaratory relief was available in the federal courts. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 466-67, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 39 L.Ed.2d 505 (1974) (explaining that the 1934 Declaratory Judgment Act was passed to provide a milder alternative to the injunction remedy (citation omitted)). Nevertheless, we have long held that the Eleventh Amendment does not generally bar declaratory judgment actions against state officers. See, e.g., Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Hardin, 223 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir.2000) (applying Ex Parte Young exception to declaratory relief against state board of equalization); Los Angeles Bar Assoc. v. Eu, 979 F.2d 697, 704 (9th Cir.1992) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment presents no barrier to the Bar Association's request for declaratory relief against an alleged ongoing violation of federal law); see also Balgowan v. New Jersey, 115 F.3d 214 (3rd Cir.1997) (finding jurisdiction to hear FSLA claim for declaratory relief against state commissioner under Ex Parte Young exception). The only question is whether the declaratory action is seeking prospective, rather than retrospective, relief. 5 See, e.g., Eu, 979 F.2d at 704 ([T]he Eleventh Amendment does not bar action seeking only prospective declaratory or injunctive relief against state officers in their official capacities. (emphasis added)). 25 The Supreme Court's holding in Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 106 S.Ct. 423, 88 L.Ed.2d 371 (1985), is consistent with the view we take in this case. In Green, the Court refused to allow a declaratory judgment because the issuance of a declaratory judgment ... would have [had] much the same effect as a full-fledged award of damages or restitution by the federal court, the latter kinds of relief being of course prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 73., 106 S.Ct. 423 In other words, a judgment in that case would have amounted to an award of retrospective relief. In a case such as this one, declaratory relief is not an end run around Green or Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974) (barring retroactive payment of moneys owed under the Eleventh Amendment), for it has no retrospective effect; rather it has purely prospective effect, either of its own force or as a basis for future injunctive relief. Audubon simply seeks a declaration that § 3003.1(c) is preempted and cannot be enforced by state officials against federal trapping efforts in the future. As long as the relief is truly prospective in nature, as it is here, the Ex Parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity applies to declaratory relief against state officials, just as it applies to injunctive relief. Accordingly, we hold that there is no Eleventh Amendment bar to Audubon's suit for declaratory relief against the Director of the California Department of Fish and Game. 26
27 Before reaching the merits, we address the justiciability of Audubon's claims.
28 We determine standing under Article III de novo. See Stewart v. Thorpe Holding Co., 207 F.3d 1143, 1148(9th Cir.2000). Under current Supreme Court case law, Audubon must demonstrate three elements, which are said to constitute the irreducible constitutional minimum of Article III standing. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). 29 First, a plaintiff must have suffered an injury-in-fact to a legally protected interest. The injury must be both concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, as opposed to conjectural or hypothetical. Id. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (citation omitted). Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the challenged statute. Id. Third, it must be likely that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Id. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 30 The state argues that the district court erred in finding standing for the Audubon plaintiffs. Because the Audubon plaintiffs are associations they may have standing only if they can meet the three-part organizational standing test: 31 [W]e have recognized that an association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit. 32 United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 553, 116 S.Ct. 1529, 134 L.Ed.2d 758 (1996) (quoting Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adv. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977)). Only the first part is in dispute in this case. 33 The state parties contend that Audubon's claim of injury is derivative of injury to the United States, and that Audubon must therefore show that the United States suffered injury-in-fact from a threat of enforcement by the state appellants. The federal parties argue, contrary to the finding of the district court, that the federal government faced a threat of prosecution sufficient to support standing. However, we agree with the district court's reasoning, which premised standing on a straightforward application of Article III's standing requirements to Audubon itself, rather than through the United States. 34 First, we hold that Audubon alleged sufficient injury to the aesthetic, recreational, and scientific interests of its members in the observation of birds and other wildlife to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562-68, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (recognizing injury to aesthetic interests for standing purposes). The Audubon plaintiffs have demonstrated that their members enjoy and observe wildlife in a number of specific areas where federal leghold trapping has occurred. Injury to their interests was actual and imminent as soon as the traps were removed because the bird population was exposed to immediate risk of harm. Second, the plaintiffs' members' injury is fairly traceable to Proposition 4 because the federal government removed traps in direct response to Proposition 4 (whether under direct threat of prosecution or not). Removal of the traps leads to a larger population of predators, which in turn decreases the number of birds and other protected wildlife. This chain of causation has more than one link, but it is not hypothetical or tenuous; nor do appellants challenge its plausibility. See Autolog Corp. v. Regan, 731 F.2d 25, 31 (D.C.Cir.1984) (holding that what matters is not the length of the chain of causation, but rather the plausibility of the links that comprise the chain). Finally, the members' injury is redressable because if Auubon wins on its preemption claims, the federal parties will resume their prior use of leghold traps, thereby redressing the injury by protecting the bird population. Lujan states that when causation and redressability ... hinge on response of the regulated (or regulable) third party to the government action, more particular facts are needed to show standing. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561-62, 112 S.Ct. 2130. But the federal government's response in this case is not in doubt. As evidenced by its resumption of trapping following the entry by the district court of its preliminary order in this case, it is clear that the federal government will resume its trapping activity if unconstrained by Proposition 4. The district court properly applied the three elements of the standing inquiry. 35 Contrary to the state parties' suggestion, there was no need to probe precisely why the federal government removed traps — whether due to an imminent threat of prosecution, general threat of prosecution, or its own desire to comply with state law—beyond the uncontested fact that the traps would not have been removed but for Proposition 4. The Audubon plaintiffs are not claiming an injury from threatened criminal prosecution, but rather injury from the fact that the federal authorities were complying with Proposition 4. The federal authorities' decision caused harm to Audubon; that decision was caused by Proposition 4; and Audubon had no ability to control that decision.
36 We review ripeness questions de novo. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. Houston, 146 F.3d 1118, 1131 (9th Cir.1998). The state appellants argue that this panel should apply the pre-enforcement challenge test for ripeness set forth in Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, 220 F.3d 1134, 1139 (9th Cir.2000) (en banc). This would be the proper inquiry if the United States (rather than Audubon) had brought suit. However, Audubon is claiming injury not from threatened criminal prosecution, but rather from the federal agencies' cessation of trapping. Audubon's injury—stemming from the very real threat of loss of birds and other wildlife—existed at the time the suit was filed because the traps had been removed in response to Proposition 4. Thus, Audubon's claims are clearly ripe for decision under Article III. 37 In addition to applying the Article III ripeness requirement, we must determine whether the claims are prudentially ripe, based on two factors: (1) whether the issues are fit for judicial resolution and (2) the potential hardship to the parties if judicial resolution is postponed. See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967). The first factor favors adjudication now because the specific facts surrounding possible actions to enforce the statute will not aid resolution of Audubon's federal preemption challenges to Proposition 4. Audubon's injury is established, and the legal arguments are as clear as they are likely to become. The second factor also favors adjudication. The USDA had removed all of its leghold traps in response to Proposition 4. Without the protection from predators that those traps provide, bird and other wildlife populations will decrease, thereby injuring Audubon's interest. We therefore conclude that Audubon's claims are sufficiently ripe under a prudential ripeness analysis as well.
38 We also review mootness de novo. See Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188, 1193 (9th Cir.2000). Audubon's interests can be divided into two categories for purposes of mootness: protection of ESA-listed species, and protection of non-ESA species. The preliminary order, entered by the district court pursuant to the parties' stipulation, states that § 3003.1(c) 39 was not intended to apply, and does not apply, to the use of padded leg-hold traps on federal or nonfederal land by a federal employee, a contractor of a federal agency, or a person acting pursuant to the authority or direction of a federal agency, for the purpose of conserving an endangered or threatened species under the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544. 40 Appellants argue, in light of the order, that Audubon's suit is moot with respect to the ESA because Proposition 4 was held in the order not to apply to ESA-related trapping. Further, they argue, there is no ongoing injury to ESA-listed species since the traps have been put back. However, two factors weigh against mootness for ESA-listed species. First, the preliminary order, according to its own terms, expired upon the district court's entry of the final summary judgment and dismissal order giving rise to this appeal. Thus, the preliminary order is no longer in force. Second, the state's willingness to stipulate in this litigation that Proposition 4 does not apply to ESA-related trapping is not enough to moot the controversy. The state's stipulation is based on an interpretation of Proposition 4 rather than on federal preemption grounds, and the state is not constrained from later adopting a different interpretation; nor are the California state courts constrained from interpreting Proposition 4 differently. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 190, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) ([T]here are circumstances in which the prospect that a defendant will engage in (or resume) harmful conduct may be too speculative to support standing, but not too speculative too overcome mootness.); United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199, 203, 89 S.Ct. 361, 21 L.Ed.2d 344 (1968) (establishing that defendants must show that subsequent events made it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur to render a claim moot based upon their own voluntary conduct). Indeed, the state's interpretation appears contrary to the plain textual meaning of the statute, which specifically bans the use of leghold traps by federal employees, and makes no exception for the ESA. See Cal. Fish & Game Code § 3003.1(c). We therefore conclude that the ESA-preemption claim should not be dismissed as moot. 41 With respect to non-ESA-listed species, we further hold that the MBTA and NWRSIA preemption claims are not moot. The state parties are not willing to stipulate that Proposition 4 is inapplicable to MBTA-listed species or other non-ESA species found on NWRs. However, they argue that the MBTA-preemption claim should nevertheless be considered moot on the ground that trapping pursuant to the ESA already protects all of the MBTA-listed species. The state parties reason that if ESA trapping is permitted under Proposition 4, there would be no injury to MBTA-listed species, since they are protected by the same traps. Even if this assertion is true, however, Audubon's MBTA and NWRSIA claims are not mooted. The MBTA-listed species can shift locations away from the ESA-listed species, and predators can appear where no ESA-listed species are now present, thus giving rise to the need for separate traps to protect MBTA-listed species. In such cases, migratory birds could be killed by predators faster than courts could react and permit trapping; the injury, as the district court found, is thus capable of repetition yet evading review. S. Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515, 31 S.Ct. 279, 55 L.Ed. 310 (1911). Audubon's NWRSIA preemption claims are not moot on the same rationale. Again, while the injury might be too speculative to support standing in a later suit, it is not too speculative to overcome mootness. See Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 190, 120 S.Ct. 693.
42 We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Clicks Billiards, Inc. v. Sixshooters, Inc., 251 F.3d 1252, 1257 (9th Cir.2001). We review federal preemption questions de novo. See Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. Metro. Water Dist. of S. Calif., 159 F.3d 1178, 1180 (9th Cir.1998). 43 The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, Art. VI, cl. 2, invalidates state laws that interfere with, or are contrary to, federal law. Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 712, 105 S.Ct. 2371, 85 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985) (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211, 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824)). Federal law can preempt state law in three ways. First, Congress may expressly preempt state law. Second, preemption may be inferred where Congress has occupied a given field with comprehensive regulation. Third, a state law is preempted to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law. Such a conflict arises when `compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility.' Id. (quoting Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 10 L.Ed.2d 248 (1963)). This last type of preemption is at issue here. The Audubon plaintiffs claim that subsection § 3003.1(c), banning leghold traps, is preempted.
44 The stated purpose of the ESA is principally to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved, [and] to provide a program for the conservation of such endangered species and threatened species. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b). The ESA mandates that all Federal departments and agencies shall seek to conserve endangered species and threatened species and shall utilize their authorities in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(c)(1). Specifically, the ESA provides that 45 [t]he terms conserve, conserving, and conservation mean to use and the use of all methods and procedures which are necessary to bring any endangered species or threatened species to the point at which the measures provided pursuant to this chapter are no longer necessary. Such methods and procedures include, but are not limited to, all activities associated with scientific resources management, such as research, census, law enforcement, habitat acquisition and maintenance, propagation, live trapping, and transplantation, and in the extraordinary case where population pressures within a given ecosystem cannot be otherwise relieved, may include regulated taking. 46 16 U.S.C. § 1532(c)(3) (emphasis added). 47 Proposition 4 expressly prohibits any person, including federal employees, from using leghold traps, except for the protection of human health or safety. Its text makes no exception for endangered species under the ESA. As the district court determined, [t]here is no probative evidence that any other meaning of that section was intended at the time Proposition 4 was approved, either in the Legislative Analyst's Digest and [sic] the voter pamphlet arguments made by the initiative's proponents. We agree with the district court that, to the extent § 3003.1(c) prevents federal agencies from protecting ESA-listed species, it is preempted by the ESA. 6 48 The state parties argue that under their current construction of Proposition 4, as evidenced in the district court's preliminary declaratory order, § 3003.1(c) does not apply to federal trapping programs under the ESA. Since there is no conflict under the state's interpretation of Proposition 4, the state parties argue, there is no basis for preemption. We view the state parties' interpretation of Proposition 4 as an unlikely reading of the text, strongly influenced by their view of the preemptive reach of the ESA. We thus reject that interpretation as a basis for avoiding federal preemption. 49 The sponsors urge against preemption on another ground. They agree with the district court that Proposition 4 makes no exception for the protection of endangered species, but argue that, even without such an exception, it is not preempted by the ESA. They point to § 6(f) of the ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1535(f), which provides: 50 Any State law or regulation which applies with respect to the importation or exportation of, or interstate or foreign commerce in, endangered species or threatened species is void to the extent that it may effectively (1) permit what is prohibited by this chapter or by any regulation which implements this chapter, or (2) prohibit what is authorized pursuant to an exemption or permit provided for in this chapter or in any regulation which implements this chapter. This chapter shall not otherwise be construed to void any State law or regulation which is intended to conserve migratory, resident, or introduced fish or wildlife, or to permit or prohibit sale of such fish or wildlife. Any State law or regulation respecting the taking of an endangered species or threatened species may be more restrictive than the exemptions or permits provided for in this chapter or in any regulation which implements this chapter but not less restrictive than the prohibitions so defined. 51 (Emphasis added.) 52 The sponsors contend that the italicized sentence carves out an exception to the ESA that allows California, through Proposition 4, to conserve the animals that would be trapped by the leghold traps prohibited by the proposition. We do not read the sentence that way. It is clear from the sentence itself (note the use of the word otherwise), from the preceding and following sentences, and from the overall purpose of the ESA, that the sentence allows the state to pass laws and promulgate regulations that would conserve wildlife, but to do so only insofar as those laws and regulations are consistent with the protection of endangered species under the ESA. We do not read the italicized sentence to carve out an exception to the ESA that would allow the state to conserve wildlife that is not endangered (such as the fur-bearing predators in this case), when the effect of that conservation would be further to endanger species already listed as endangered under the ESA.
53 The district court also found that § 3003.1(c) was preempted to the extent it conflicts with the Secretary's ability to protect migratory birds under the MBTA. However, neither Audubon nor the federal parties attempt to defend the district court's holding of preemption under the MBTA. Instead, they both argue that there is no need to decide this issue if we find preemption under the NWRSIA. We agree and therefore move directly to that statute. 54
55 The district court permitted the Audubon plaintiffs to amend their complaint to add the NWRSIA as an additional ground of preemption. The court permitted the amendment more than a year after the case was filed, and after discovery had closed, finding prejudice to be minimal because Audubon was merely adding a new legal basis for preemption (which it had pled from the beginning), and because the amendment required additional legal research but not additional fact-gathering. We review a district court's grant of leave to amend for abuse of discretion. See United States v. McGee, 993 F.2d 184, 187 (9th Cir.1993). Given the district court's careful discussion and weighing of the advantages and disadvantages of granting leave, and the fact that additional factual discovery was not necessary to respond to the new legal argument, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the amendment. 56 The district court held that § 3003.1(c) both (1) violates the Property Clause of the Constitution, and (2) is preempted by the NWRSIA, which derives its authority from the Property Clause. Neither Audubon nor the federal parties, however, defend on appeal the district court's holding that § 3003.1(c) violates the Property Clause. Because the trapping at issue occurs on NWRs, and appellees' injuries would thus be adequately addressed under NWRSIA preemption, we do not address the district court's broader holding under the Property Clause but consider only whether § 3003.1(c) is preempted by the NWRSIA. 7 57 A recent decision by the Tenth Circuit provides guidance as to the relative scope of federal and state authorities under the NWRSIA. See Wyoming v. United States, 279 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir.2002). That court rejected Wyoming's attempt to vaccinate elk living in the National Elk Refuge, holding that the Tenth Amendment did not reserve to the State an unrestricted right to manage wildlife on public lands. The court held that Congress invoked federal power under the Property Clause when it enacted the NWRSIA, and that the NWRSIA plainly vest[s] the FWS with authority to administer the Act and manage the NWRs. Id. at 1228. We agree. Because NWRs are federal government land, Congress has the authority under the Property Clause to preempt state action with respect to NWR management and has done so through the NWRSIA. We therefore hold that the NWRSIA preempts § 3003.1(c)'s regulation of federal trapping on NWRs in California because the ban on leghold traps conflicts with FWS's statutory management authority on those federal reserves. 58 The Tenth Circuit interpreted NWRSIA's savings clause, § 668dd(m), as reflecting Congress's intent for ordinary principles of conflict preemption to apply in cases such as this. Id. at 1234. That clause provides: 59 Nothing in the Act shall be construed as affecting the authority, jurisdiction, or responsibility of the several States to manage, control, or regulate fish and resident wildlife under State law or regulations in any area within the System. Regulations permitting hunting or fishing of fish and resident wildlife within the System shall be, to the extent practicable, consistent with State fish and wildlife laws, regulations, and management plans. 60 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(m) (emphasis added). We agree with the Tenth Circuit that the first sentence of the savings clause was not meant to eviscerate the primacy of federal authority over NWR management. Rather, to the extent that actual conflict persists between state and federal policies, state law is preempted by the NWRSIA. 61