Opinion ID: 2637056
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant's asserted incompetency to waive his right to the assistance of counsel and to represent himself

Text: Defendant contends his conviction and sentence are constitutionally infirm because the trial court improperly allowed him to waive the assistance of counsel and to represent himself at trial despite his asserted incompetency to do so. As we have observed: A defendant in a criminal case possesses two constitutional rights with respect to representation that are mutually exclusive. A defendant has the right to be represented by counsel at all critical stages of a criminal prosecution. ( United States v. Wade (1967) 388 U.S. 218, 223-227 [87 S.Ct. 1926, 1930-1932, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149]; Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S. 335, 339-345 [83 S.Ct. 792, 793-797, 9 L.Ed.2d 799, 93 A.L.R.2d 733]; Powell v. Alabama (1932) 287 U.S. 45, 71 [53 S.Ct. 55, 65, 77 L.Ed. 158, 84 A.L.R. 527].) At the same time, the United States Supreme Court has held that because the Sixth Amendment grants to the accused personally the right to present a defense, a defendant possesses the right to represent himself or herself. ( Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. 806, 819 [95 S.Ct. 2525, 2533]) The United States Supreme Court has concluded in numerous cases and a variety of contexts that the federal Constitution requires assiduous protection of the right to counsel. The right to counsel is self-executing; the defendant need make no request for counsel in order to be entitled to legal representation. ( Carnley v. Cochran (1962) 369 U.S. 506, 513 [82 S.Ct. 884, 888-889, 8 L.Ed.2d 70].) The right to counsel persists unless the defendant affirmatively waives that right. ( Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458, 464-465 [58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 146 A.L.R. 357].) Courts must indulge every reasonable inference against waiver of the right to counsel. ( Brewer v. Williams (1977) 430 U.S. 387, 404 [97 S.Ct. 1232, 1242, 51 L.Ed.2d 424].) ( People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 20, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 84, 931 P.2d 262.) The requirements for a valid waiver of the right to counsel are (1) a determination that the accused is competent to waive the right, i.e., he or she has the mental capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him or her; and (2) a finding that the waiver is knowing and voluntary, i.e., the accused understands the significance and consequences of the decision and makes it without coercion. ( Godinez v. Moran (1993) 509 U.S. 389, 400-01 & fn. 12, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321; People v. Lawley, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 139, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 614, 38 P.3d 461.) The trial court may not determine a defendant's competency to waive counsel by evaluating his ability to present a defense. ( Godinez v. Moran, supra, at pp. 399-400, 113 S.Ct. 2680; U.S. v. Arlt (9th Cir.1994) 41 F.3d 516, 518.) On appeal, we examine de novo the whole recordโnot merely the transcript of the hearing on the Faretta motion itselfโ to determine the validity of the defendant's waiver of the right to counsel. ( People v. Marshall, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 24, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 84, 931 P.2d 262.) Defendant essentially contends that mental illness rendered him unable to make a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to counsel because he could not appreciate how an attorney might be of assistance in his defense. Contrary to defendant's claim, however, we fail to perceive in this record evidence, overwhelming or otherwise, undermining his stated assent to self-representation after due admonition. That defendant later took missteps in his self-representation or occasionally expressed some perplexity at courtroom procedure appears to reflect his lack of legal knowledge, not necessarily mental illness or incompetency.