Opinion ID: 2087907
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Vacation of the Arbitral Award[5]

Text: In this appeal, Umana's principal argument is that the arbitral award should be set aside due to the bias of the neutral third arbitrator, Robert Pitofsky. He argues that the trial court's statement in denying the Rule 60(b) motion for a new trial, that Pitofsky's failure to disclose his prior relationship with Ferguson violated both the AAA Rules requiring disclosure and the oath he took as an arbitrator, had two legal effects: 1) it demonstrated Pitofsky's evident partiality sufficient for vacation of the award under D.C.Code § 16-4311(a)(2), and 2) it rendered the award ineffective as a matter of contract law because the agreement required that he arbitration be in accordance with the AAA Rules which the trial court found Pitofsky to have violated. Umana further argues that Pitofsky's actions in conducting the arbitration, particularly in his rulings concerning discovery, prove that he was biased in favor of the defendants. Umana places most of his reliance on language from Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 89 S.Ct. 337, 21 L.Ed.2d 301 (1968), that an arbitrator is required to disclose to the parties any dealings that might create an impression of possible bias, id. at 149, 89 S.Ct. 337, and that failure of an arbitrator to volunteer information about business dealings with one party will, prima facie, support a claim of partiality or bias. Id. at 154, 89 S.Ct. 337 (Fortas, J., dissenting). We disagree with these contentions. [6]