Opinion ID: 2515085
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Interpretation of the term general law in Hawai'i is limited.

Text: Article XI, section 5 of Hawai`i's Constitution provides, in relevant part: [t]he legislative power over the lands owned by or under the control of the State and its political subdivisions shall be exercised only by general laws [.] Haw. Const. art. XI, ง 5 (emphasis added). Several other provisions of Hawai`i's Constitution also require the use of general laws. See, e.g., Haw. Const, art. V, ง 5 (requiring a general law to authorize the governor to grant pardons); art. VII, ง 12 (requiring a general law to authorize political subdivisions to issue bonds); art. VIII, ง 1 (requiring a general law to confer powers on political subdivisions); art. VIII, ง 2 (requiring a general law to set limits and procedures on the power political subdivisions have to frame and adopt a charter); art. IX, ง 6 (requiring the State and its political subdivisions to plan and manage the growth of the population by general law); art. XVI, ง 3.5 (requiring a general law to decrease the salary of an officer of the State during a term of office); art. XVIII, ง 6 (providing that a general law establish default policies and methods of real property tax assessment if not provided by ordinance). The meaning of a general law as used in these constitutional provisions has been interpreted by this court on only one prior occasion: in Bulgo v. County of Maui, 50 Haw. 51, 430 P.2d 321 (1967). In Bulgo, this court addressed whether a newly enacted statute, which included specific facts that affected only Maui County at the time of enactment, was a special law in violation of Article VII, section 1 of the Hawai'i Constitution. Id. at 57-59, 430 P.2d at 325-27.
At the time of the lawsuit in Bulgo, Article VII, section 1 provided that: Each political subdivision shall have and exercise such powers as shall be conferred under general laws. Id. at 54, 430 P.2d at 324. The plaintiff in Bulgo argued that Act 47 of the Session Laws of 1967 was a special law because one of its provisions could not possibly apply to any county other than Maui. Id. at 57, 430 P.2d at 326. Act 47 provided, in relevant part: SECTION 1. Chapter 138 of the Revised Laws of Hawaii 1955 is amended by adding a new section as follows: Section 138-____. Special elections. If a person elected in a general election to the office of chairman of the board of supervisors of a county dies before January 2 following his election, the governor shall issue a proclamation within ten days after the occurrence of the death requiring special elections to be held to fill the vacancy so created. The proclamation shall provide that a primary election be held within sixty days after, but no sooner than forty-five days after, the occurrence of the death to nominate candidates for a general election to be held thirty days after the primary election. The governor shall issue a proclamation within ten days after the approval of this Act requiring special elections to be held if any person elected in the general election of 1966 to the office of chairman of the board of supervisors of a county died before January 2, 1967, and such proclamation shall provide that a primary election be held within sixty days after, but no sooner than forty-five days, after the approval of this Act to nominate candidates for a general election to be held thirty days after the primary election. In any case, the tenure of any holdover or temporary chairman then serving shall terminate when the successor chairman shall be so elected in a general election and qualified. If any special election is held in the county within one hundred and twenty days after, but no sooner than forty-five days, after the occurrence of the death or approval of this Act, as the case may be, then such special election shall be held in conjunction with the general election provided by this Act. ... SECTION 2. This Act shall apply to each county in the State unless a county adopts a charter which provides for succession of the office of chairman of the board of supervisors under the contingency covered by this Act. ... SECTION 5. This Act shall take effect upon its approval. 1967 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 47 at 34-35. The plaintiff in Bulgo challenged the following provision in Act 47: The governor shall issue a proclamation within ten days after the approval of this Act requiring special elections to be held if any person elected in the general election of 1966 to the office of chairman of the board of supervisors of a county died before January 2, 1967, and such proclamation shall provide that a primary election be held within sixty days after, but no sooner than forty-five days, after the approval of this Act to nominate candidates for a general election to be held thirty days after the primary election. Bulgo, 50 Haw. at 53, 430 P.2d at 323. As alleged by the plaintiff in Bulgo, and as observed by this court, [a]t the time of approval of the Act, the county of Maui was the only county in which the person elected as county chairman in the 1966 general election had died before January 2, 1967. Id. at 54, 430 P.2d at 324. In interpreting Article VII, section 1, this court determined that the constitutional language was not vague and that it required the legislature to confer powers upon the counties only by general laws. Id. at 58, 430 P.2d at 326. The determinative question was whether the provision constitutes a general law or a special law. Id. In the context of Article VII, section 1, this court defined general laws as laws which apply uniformly throughout all political subdivisions of the State. Id. The court noted, however, that a law may apply to less than all of the political subdivisions and still be a general law, if it applies uniformly to a class of political subdivisions, which, considering the purpose of the legislation, are distinguished by sufficiently significant characteristics to make them a class by themselves. Id.
Relying on the unchallenged portion of section 1 in Act 47, this court determined that Act 47 applied to a class of political subdivisions consisting of every county other than a county which adopts a charter providing for succession to the office of county chairman when a chairman-elect dies before January 2 following his election. Id. The Bulgo court noted that under Article VII, section 1, the thing that is required to have uniform application is the power given to, and exercised by, political subdivisions. Id. at 59, 430 P.2d at 326. The court further observed that [t]he power given by Act 47 is the power to hold special elections for successor county chairman [sic] where the chairman-elect dies before January 2 following his election. The Act confers this power upon every county in which the contingency occurs so long as the county is within the class of political subdivisions encompassed by it. The Act provides for the timing of the special elections in three different situations. The challenged provision covers one situation. Such timing provision does not confer any power and relates only to the exercise of the power that has been granted. Id. The Bulgo court concluded that Act 47, including the challenged provision, was a general law because [t]he challenged provision does not give the county of Maui any power which is different from that which the Act gives to the counties of Hawaii and Kauai. It neither favors nor discriminates against Maui. The contingency contemplated in the Act now exists on Maui. The provision brings Maui within the scope of the Act in the present situation. Id. at 59, 430 P.2d at 327.
Bulgo is distinguishable from this case in two significant ways. First, Act 47 conferred a power to each county in the State unless a county had adopted a charter that provided an alternate process for addressing the situation described in Act 47. Act 47, ง 2 at 35. At least two other counties existed when Act 47 was enacted, and they also received the power conferred by the Act at the time of its enactment. See id. at 59, 430 P.2d at 327. In this case, only one member of the class created by Act 2 existed at the time of its enactment. Section 2 of Act 2 provides the following definitions: Large capacity ferry vessel means any inter-island ferry vessel that transports, is designed to transport, or is intended to transport per voyage at least five hundred passengers, two hundred motor vehicles, and cargo between the islands of the state. Large capacity ferry vessel company means any company that owns or operates a large capacity ferry vessel. Act 2, ง 2 at 7. Unlike Bulgo, in this case there is no evidence in the record that any company, other than Superferry, met the definition provided by section 2 when Act 2 was enacted. Secondly, the Bulgo court did not contemplate a statute that was subject to automatic repeal on a particular date or upon the happening of a one-time event. Compare Act 47 at 34-35 with Act 2, ง 18 at 20-21. Section 18 of Act 2 mandates such a repeal. Section 18 provides: This Act shall take effect upon its approval; provided that this Act shall be repealed on the earlier of: (1) The forty-fifth day, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, following adjournment sine die of the regular session of 2009; or (2) Upon acceptance of the final environmental impact statement as provided in this Act; and provided further that: (1) The final environmental impact statement by the department of transportation that is accepted by the office of environmental quality control under this Act shall be and remain effective for all purposes under the laws of this state, notwithstanding the repeal of this Act; and (2) Section 16 of this Act shall not be repealed when this Act is repealed. [9] Act 2, ง 18 at 20-21 (emphasis added). In contrast, the Bulgo court considered an Act that was unlimited in duration. As such, it was possible that future circumstances would require another county to exercise the power conferred by Act 47. Such a possibility is highly unlikely, if not impossible, in this case. The rights and privileges conferred to a large capacity ferry vessel company by Act 2 exist for a limited period of time (less than twenty-one months) and the possibility that a company other than Superferry would be able to exercise those same rights before they are extinguished is beyond remote. See infra Part IV.A.2.c.ii. Thus, while Bulgo informs our approach to distinguishing between general and special laws, it is limited in its application, as the Bulgo court did not consider a statute that created a class with only one member nor did it consider a statute that was limited in duration. Therefore, we look to the case law of other jurisdictions. After reviewing other approaches to distinguishing between special and general laws, we believe that guidance on this issue is best found in the Colorado Supreme Court's approach in People v. Canister, 110 P.3d 380 (Colo.2005). The Nebraska Supreme Court and Arizona Supreme Court provide further guidance in analyzing the future applicability of a class. See Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 467 N.W.2d 836, 848-49 (1991); Republic Inv. Fund I v. Town of Surprise, 166 Ariz. 143, 800 P.2d 1251, 1258-59 (1990).