Opinion ID: 2787578
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Determinate Sentence

Text: Bruch argues that his sentence is indeterminate because the trial court added a term of community custody 'for the entire period of earned early release.' Pet'r' s Supp'l Br. at 10-11 (quoting State v. Winkle, 159 Wn. App. 323, 327, 245 P.3d 249 (2001)). Bruch suggests that the phrase shall be reduced in RCW 9.94A.701(9) means that the trial court, not the DOC, must determine the end date of any community custody. Bruch has the potential to earn up to one-third of early release on his 116-month term of confinement, which equals 387'3 months. RCW 9.94A.729(3)(e). 3 Under Bruch's view, he can serve no more than four months of community custody, although he may earn up to 387'3 months of community custody in lieu of early release from his 116-month term of confinement. We reject this view. A sentence is not indeterminate just because an offender may earn early release credits. RCW 9.94A.030(18). Because an offender may reduce his term of confinement through earned early release, the exact amount of time he will serve on community custody can almost never be determined when the sentence is imposed by the court. Brooks, 166 Wn.2d at 674. But, his total sentence is set at no more 3 At the time of Bruch's sentencing, subsection (3)(e) was codified at (3)(d). LAWS OF 2014, ch. 130, § 4. -8- State v. Bruch (Matthew), No. 90021-3 than 116 months of confinement and no less than four months of community custody. Here, the trial court followed RCW 9.94A.701(9) when it reduced Bruch's term of community custody from three years to four months to ensure the total combined sentence would not exceed the 120-month statutory maximum. Any community custody Bruch earns in lieu of early release is the result of RCW 9.94A.729(5), which provides the DOC authority to transfer a portion of confinement time into community custody in lieu of early release. It is not the result of the trial court's community custody term imposed under RCW 9.94A.701. While the community custody sentencing statute, RCW 9.94A.701, no longer vests authority in the DOC to _set the end date for a community custody term, the DOC still has significant authority to determine how long an offender will actually remain in confinement. See RCW 9.94A.729(l)(a) (earned release time shall be for good behavior and good performance, as determined by the correctional agency having jurisdiction). Thus, trial courts still necessarily impose variable community custody periods in the sense that terms of confinement may later be shortened, within statutory limits, based on the offender's behavior and the DOC's policies. Id. Bruch contends that under Boyd, 174 Wn.2d 470, the trial court, not the DOC, was required to reduce his term of community custody. Boyd, however, involved different circumstances. In Boyd, the trial court imposed a 54-month term of confinement for a class C felony and a fixed, 12-month term of community custody after the effective date ofRCW 9.94A.701(9), resulting in a combined sentence that -9- State v. Bruch (Matthew), No. 90021-3 plainly exceeded the 60-month statutory maximum. Id. at 471. To prevent the aggregate sentence from exceeding the statutory maximum, the trial court included a Brooks notation in the judgment and sentence. I d. This court held that Boyd's sentence violated RCW 9 .94A. 701 (9), notwithstanding the Brooks notation, because in cases sentenced after the effective date of RCW 9.94A.701(9), such as Boyd's case, the trial court is required to reduce the term of community custody at the time of sentencing. Id. at 473. The trial court's notation in Bruch's case, however, is not equivalent to a Brooks notation. Unlike the notation in Boyd, it does not require the DOC to monitor Bruch's sentence to ensure he does not serve a term of community custody that exceeds the statutory maximum. The trial court reduced Bruch's term of community custody and imposed a fixed, four-month term so that the sentence, in total, does not exceed the 120-month statutory maximum. The trial court's notation, plus all accrued earned early release, CP at 7, references the DOC's distinct authority to grant Bruch early release time, which by statute is transferred to community custody under RCW 9.94A.729(5). Any community custody in lieu of early release Bruch earns is a reduction from his confinement time, meaning his term may never exceed the statutory maximum. Bruch suggests that he may serve only four months of community custody in total because the trial court's reference to early release in the judgment and sentence is improper in light of dicta in State v. Franklin, 172 Wn.2d 831, 837 n.8, 263 P.3d -10- State v. Bruch (Matthew), No. 90021-3 585 (2011). In Franklin, this court considered similar arguments but declined to rule on the issue that was not before the court: Franklin urges this court to overturn State v. Winkle, 159 Wn. App. 323,330, 245 P.3d 249 (2011), in which the Court of Appeals held that former RCW 9.94A.729(5)(a) (2010) allowed the trial court to impose a term of community custody in lieu of earned release. The plain meaning of the relevant statutes support Franldin' s contention that RCW 9.94A.701 and RCW 9.94A.702-not RCW 9.94A. 729-govern the trial court's imposition of community custody at the time of sentencing. I d. In Winkle, the trial court imposed the statutory maximum term of confinement and a term of community custody 'for the entire period of earned early release awarded.' 159 Wn. App. at 327. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's sentence, reasoning that the SRA requires that a defendant convicted of a sex offense must be transferred to community custody in lieu of earned early release. !d. at 325. Unlike in Winkle, here the trial court imposed a fixed term of community custody under RCW 9.94A.701(1) and referenced the community custody in lieu of earned early release that the DOC may supervise. We do not find that a trial court is prohibited from referencing in the judgment and sentence the procedures under RCW 9.94A.729(5). There is no indication that the legislature intended for offenders such as Bruch to serve only the fixed, court-imposed community custody term, as Bruch suggests. Supp'l Br. of Pet'r at 16. When the legislature enacted RCW 9.94A.701(9) (requiring trial courts to reduce terms of community custody -11- State v. Bruch (Matthew), No. 90021-3 that may exceed the statutory maximum), it did not modify the DOC's ability to convert early release under RCW 9.94A.729(5). See supra n.2. There is no indication that the amendments to RCW 9.94A.701 rendered the DOC's authority under RCW 9.94A.729(5) inconsistent with the SRA or that community custody in lieu of early release renders an offender's sentence indeterminate. 4 We hold that Bruch's sentence is not indeterminate merely because he may earn early release in lieu of community custody. B. Statutory Maximum Three-Year Term of Community Custody Bruch further argues that the trial court violated RCW 9.94A.701(1) by failing to ensure that his term of community custody did not exceed three years. He construes the three-year period prescribed in subsection (1) as a statutory maximum term of community custody, and relies on Franklin and Boyd to argue that the trial court impermissibly passed on to the DOC the responsibility of determining his community custody term. The DOC, as amicus, similarly construes the three-year 4 This is another aspect of Winkle that is not implicated here. In Winkle, the Court of Appeals permitted the DOC to transfer an offender's earned early release to community custody in the absence of the defendant receiving a court-imposed, fixed term of community custody. The statutory framework ofRCW 9.94A.729 suggests that there are two prerequisites to the DOC's ability to transfer[] to community custody in lieu of earned release time, RCW 9.94A.729(5)(a): (1) being convicted of a particular crime, i.e., certain serious violent crimes or certain sex offenses, RCW 9.94A.501(4)(a), and (2) being sentenced to a fixed term of community custody by a trial court. This issue arises, as it did in Winkle, when a trial court imposes the statutory maximum term of confinement, preventing it from imposing a fixed-term of community custody under RCW 9.94A.701(1). Though it is hard to imagine the legislature intended no community custody in such an instance, the statutory language needs to be addressed in an appropriate case. It is not implicated here because Bruch was sentenced to 116 months of confinement-four months less than the statutory maximum-and a fixed, four-month term of community custody under RCW 9.94A.701(1) and (9). -12- State v. Bruch (Matthew), No. 90021-3 period as a statutory maximum but argues that the judgment and sentence can be corrected by adding a notation that the total period of community custody cannot exceed three years. We question the premise ofBruch's and the DOC's arguments. Neither points to evidence in the SRA that RCW 9.94A.701(1) operates as a statutory maximum comparable to the 120-month maximum that limits Bruch's total sentence. Where the SRA contains an obligation to sentence within the statutory maximum, it refers to the maximum sentences set forth in RCW 9A.20.021. See RCW 9.94A.701(9). In contrast, the requirement that a trial court sentence offenders such as Bruch to a three-year community custody period establishes a fixed period, not a maximum. RCW 9.94A.701(1). The statute allows for reducing this period only when necessary to avoid exceeding the statutory maximum. RCW 9.94A.701(9). These provisions of RCW 9.94A.701 are not cross-referenced in RCW 9.94A.729(5)(a), which requires the DOC to transfer early release time to community custody for certain offenders. When such a transfer is made, there is no risk of exceeding the statutory maximum under RCW 9A.20.021 because the effect is to reduce the imposed confinement time. Bruch's reliance on Franklin and Boyd is misplaced. Those cases involved sentences that plainly exceeded the statutory maximum, and the question was whether, in light of the 2009 amendments to the SRA, the trial court could simply include a Brooks notation. See Franklin, 172 Wn.2d at 839-41; Boyd, 17 4 Wn.2d at 472-73. We held that RCW 9.94A.701(9) required the trial court to reduce the term -13- State v. Bruch (Matthew), No. 90021-3 of community custody it imposed under subsection (1) in order to avoid exceeding the statutory maximum. Here, the trial court did just that. It reduced Bruch's threeyear term of community custody to a fixed, four-month term so that the total sentence fell within the 120-month statutory maximum. The trial court's notation, plus all accrued earned early release, CP at 7, can be understood as acknowledging the DOC's distinct statutory authority to grant Bruch early release time, which must be transferred to community custody pursuant to RCW 9.94A.729(5)(a). This directive has no effect on the 120-month statutory maximum, as it can reduce only the 116month term of confinement. 5 The SRA provides trial courts and the DOC with different sources of authority with respect to community custody. The trial court imposes a fixed term of community custody governed by RCW 9.94A.701. RCW 9.94A.729, on the other hand, governs the DOC's authority to grant early release time and convert that time into community custody for certain offenders. The statute generally describes how the DOC has the discretion to reduce an offender's term of confinement by granting early release for good behavior and good performance. Subsection (5)(a) requires the DOC to transfer early release time-earned by offenders such as Bruch-into community custody. The statute reads, in pertinent part: 5 The court's notation was not strictly necessary. The mandate to transfer early release time to community custody in RCW 9.94A.729 is directed to the DOC, not the trial court. See Franklin, 172 Wn.2d at 837 & n.8. The scope of the DOC's obligations under RCW 9.94A.729 is not before us, but we will not presume that in fulfilling these obligations, the DOC will act in a manner that is contrary to the SRA. See Brooks, 166 Wn.2d at 672-73 (noting the DOC's statutory discretion with regard to community custody); Franklin, 172 Wn.2d at 843 (refusing to order amendment of judgment and sentence where the DOC can act within authority consistent with the SRA). -14- State v. Bruch (Matthew), No. 90021-3 A person who is eligible for earned early release as provided in this section and who will be supervised by the department pursuant to RCW 9.94A.50 1 or 9.94A.5011, shall be transferred to community custody in lieu of earned release time. RCW 9.94A.729(5)(a). The referenced statute RCW 9.94A.501 governs the DOC's authority to supervise community custody imposed by a trial court. RCW 9.94A.501, in turn, cross-references RCW 9.94A.701, the statute that provides trial courts the applicable length of community custody terms. The statute reads, in pertinent part: [T]he department shall supervise an offender sentenced to community custody regardless of risk classification if the offender: (a) Has a current conviction for a sex offense or a serious violent offense and was sentenced to a term of community custody pursuant to RCW 9.94A. 701, 9.94A.702, or 9.94A.507. RCW 9.94A.501(4) (emphasis added). The trial court is required to ensure that the offender's total sentence does not exceed the 120-month statutory maximum for the crime committed and to impose a term of community custody under RCW 9.94A.701. In turn, the DOC must supervise the fixed term of community custody imposed by the trial court and supervise community custody in lieu of any earned early release time it awards under RCW 9.94A.729. Under this statutory framework, the trial court has not passed on to the DOC its obligation to direct Bruch's sentence because the trial court's judgment and sentence ensures that (1) the combined total does not exceed the statutory maximum of 120 months and (2) the term of community custody imposed meets the statutory requirements under RCW 9.94A.701(1) and (9). Contrary to the -15- State v. Bruch (Matthew), No. 90021-3 concurrence/dissent's characterization, the DOC has not assumed sentencing authority. See concurrence/dissent at 2. Even if Bruch earned all of his potential early release of 38% months, the DOC's supervision of community custody in lieu of that earned early release would not be improper. Here, the trial court's four-month sentence of community custody does not exceed three years. The dissent and the DOC believe that Bruch's judgment and sentence must be amended to specify that he will not serve more than a maximum three-year term of community custody, whether imposed by the court under RCW 9.94A.701 or as a result of transferred early release time under RCW 9.94A.729(5)(a). The DOC suggests that the judgment and sentence could include any of the following notations: 'four months or the period of earned early release, whichever is greater, not to exceed three years' or 'four months plus the period of earned early release, not to exceed three years.' Amicus Curiae Br. of DOC at 5-6. Absent such a notation, the DOC argues that [s]upervision for longer than a court-imposed community custody term is prohibited. Id. at 7. We disagree. The effect of such a notation is no different from the practice under former versions of the SRA, in which the trial court imposed alternative community custody periods, whichever is longer, and incorporated whatever period of community custody in lieu of earned early release the DOC granted. See former RCW 9.94A.715(1). But here, instead of a Brooks notation not to exceed the statutory maximum, the DOC would add a Bruch notation not to exceed the community custody term prescribed in RCW 9.94A.701(1). -16- State v. Bruch (Matthew), No. 90021-3 The DOC's argument relies on RCW 9.94A.501(5), which reads: The department is not authorized to, and may not, supervise any offender sentenced to a term of community custody ... unless the offender ... is one for whom supervision is required under this section .... (Emphasis added.) This subsection, however, limits only the DOC's ability to supervise offenders sentence[d] by a trial court to a fixed-term of community custody under RCW 9.94A.701(1). It does not prohibit the DOC from supervising a term of community custody in lieu of earned early release. The DOC does not sentence Bruch to a term of community custody when it transfers his early release under RCW 9.94A.729(5), and trial courts do not have the authority to sentence offenders to early release in lieu of community custody. RCW 9. 94A.50 1(5) plainly applies to court-imposed terms of community custody. 6 We hold that Bruch's court-imposed term of community custody does not violate RCW 9.94A.701(1). 6 The State suggests that Bruch's judgment and sentence should be corrected to expressly state that both types of community custody run concurrently from the date of release. It believes this is what the legislature intended when it required an offender to be 'transferred to community custody in lieu of earned early release time.' Supp'l Br. of Resp't at 8 (emphasis added) (quoting RCW 9.94A.729(5)(a)). But, the meaning of transferred in this context is not entirely clear. The same statute allows the DOC to transfer an offender to partial confinement when he does not qualify for community custody. RCW 9.94A.729(5)(d)(i). As noted, the limits of the DOC's authority under RCW 9.94A.729 are not before us. For present purposes, it is enough to note that the trial court's reference to at least 4 months, plus all accrued earned early release time at the time of release, CP at 7, is not inconsistent with running the court-imposed period of community custody concurrently with the period resulting under RCW 9.94A.729, if that is what the DOC is required to do. The trial court's language can be understood as recognizing the separate statutory sources for community custody and reflecting its intent that both will apply, i.e., that Bruch will be subject to the court-imposed term plus the DOC-granted term. -17- State v. Bruch (Matthew), No. 90021-3