Opinion ID: 1890965
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to define serious bodily injury

Text: Baham further argues that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to define serious bodily injury in its instructions to the jury. [T]rial courts must instruct juries on the definition of serious bodily injury in aggravated assault cases. Riddick v. United States, 806 A.2d 631, 638 (D.C.2002) (citation omitted); accord, Hudson v. United States, 790 A.2d 531, 533 (D.C.2002); Zeledon v. United States, 770 A.2d 972, 976 (D.C.2001). Thus there can be no doubt that the court's failure to do so was error. Whether this error warrants reversal, however, depends in large part on the applicable standard of review. Because Baham's counsel did not object to the jury instructions, his present argument must be assessed under the plain error standard. See Zeledon, 770 A.2d at 974. Under that standard, as set forth in United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993), Baham not only must establish error, but also must show that the error was plain and that it affect[ed] substantial rights. See Wilson v. United States, 785 A.2d 321, 326 (D.C.2001) (citation omitted). Additionally, even if Baham satisfies these three hurdles, he must then show either a `miscarriage of justice,' that is, actual innocence; or that the trial court's error `seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.' Id. (citations omitted). Although this issue has arisen in other cases, we have not yet decided whether such an error is plain. Instead, in every case thus far we have based our decision on other parts of the Olano plain error standard. Thus, for example, in Wilson we held that the defendant's substantial rights were not affected because the trial court instructed the jury on each element of aggravated assault. Wilson, 785 A.2d at 327. [17] Furthermore, even if the trial court in Wilson had defined serious bodily injury, we found it unreasonable, in light of the evidence, to conclude that a juror who voted to convict [the defendant] under the instruction given by the trial judge would have acquitted him of aggravated assault because of insufficient evidence of `serious bodily injury.' Id. at 328; see also Riddick, 806 A.2d at 639 (we are not persuaded that his conviction amounted to a `miscarriage of justice', or that the `fairness and integrity' of judicial proceedings will be undermined ... in light of the trial court's complete enumeration of all the elements of the crime of aggravated assault ... and ample evidence of the seriousness of the assault (citations omitted)). The course we followed in Wilson and Riddick is appropriate here as well. The jury was instructed on each element of AAWA, and there is no reason to believe that the jury would have voted to acquit, given Brown's testimony that he lost consciousness. Thus Baham's substantial rights were not affected. In addition, in light of the overwhelming evidence against him which we have already summarized, Baham cannot establish the final element of plain error  that is, actual innocence or a miscarriage of justice.