Opinion ID: 1792153
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Issue 3: Jury Misconduct/Juror Interviews

Text: Parker argues that defense counsel failed to effectively raise and preserve for review a claim that the jury engaged in misconduct by reaching its penalty phase recommendation to impose the death penalty in an improper manner based upon extrinsic considerations. The record, however, refutes Parker's argument. First, counsel brought to the court's attention an article from The Miami Herald which stated that a reporter for the Herald had talked with a member of the jury who indicated that the jury's initial seven-to-five vote was in favor of a life sentence. Second, counsel attempted to raise and preserve this issue for review. Third, counsel called a witness, Carlton Moore, to address this issue further. Moore testified that he had talked with a member of the jury and that this person stated that the jury had initially voted seven-to-five for a life sentence but the vote changed because one of the members of the jury was in a hurry. Because counsel did raise this issue at trial, Parker's claim of ineffective assistance has no merit. Parker also challenges the denial of his claim related to juror interviews and the trial court's failure to declare rule 4-3.5(d)(4) of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar unconstitutional. This claim should have been raised on direct appeal. As a result, Parker is procedurally barred from raising this issue here. See Torres-Arboleda v. Dugger, 636 So.2d 1321, 1323 (Fla.1994) (holding that issues that could have been raised on direct appeal, but were not, are not cognizable through collateral attack); accord Arbelaez v. State, 775 So.2d 909 (Fla.2000). Additionally, we have cautioned against permitting jury interviews to support postconviction relief for allegations which focus upon jury deliberations. Mitchell v. State, 527 So.2d 179, 181 (Fla.1988) (It is a well settled rule that a verdict cannot be subsequently impeached by conduct which inheres in the verdict and relates to the jury's deliberations.). Thus, counsel could not inquire into the jury's deliberations as Parker asserts.