Opinion ID: 774264
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Copyright Claims

Text: 3 Our review of the entry of summary judgment is de novo. Domnguez-Cruz v. Suttle Caribe, Inc., 202 F.3d 424, 428 (1st Cir. 2000); see also Folio Impressions, Inc. v. Byer Calif., 937 F.2d 759, 766 (2d Cir. 1991) (appropriate to review district court's evaluation of substantial similarity de novo when only visual comparisons are required).
4 Yankee claims that Bridgewater has infringed its copyright on the labels of nine candle fragrances. 1 The district court, proceeding in the following manner, concluded that Bridgewater's labels were non-infringing as a matter of law. First, applying the doctrines of merger and scene-a-faire, the court determined that, to prevail, Yankee had to show that Bridgewater's labels were nearly identical to Yankee's. Yankee I, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 145. Second, in making this comparison, the district court ignored certain similarities that it viewed as crude, physical elements not entitled to copyright protection, such as the label's rectangular shape, its gold border, and the use of a full-bleed style of photography. 2 Id. at 148. Third, the court applied the ordinary observer test to the remaining elements of the copyrighted label, ultimately concluding that no reasonable juror could conclude that any of the Bridgewater labels were substantially similar to the corresponding Yankee label. Id. at 148-50. 5 Yankee claims that the district court erred by ignoring its proffered evidence of actual copying. As a result, says Yankee, the court incorrectly engaged in a point-by-point comparison of protected elements as opposed to a broader determination based on the total look and feel of the entire label. Yankee also argues that the district court was over-enthusiastic in determining which elements of the labels were not protected, and thus used an improper baseline for its determination of substantial similarity. For purposes of this appeal, we assume that Yankee provided sufficient evidence of actual copying to survive summary judgment. 3 After applying the relevant law, we conclude that even if Bridgewater actually copied Yankee's labels, the merger doctrine operates so that no reasonable juror could have found Bridgewater's labels to be substantially similar to those of Yankee. We therefore affirm the grant of summary judgment on this basis.
6 To prevail on a claim of copyright infringement, the plaintiff must show both ownership of a valid copyright and illicit copying. Feist Pubs., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991); Matthews v. Freedman, 157 F.3d 25, 26-27 (1st Cir. 1998). There is no dispute here as to the first prong of this test; Yankee retains valid copyrights on the nine candle labels at issue. The second question is a more complicated one. 7 This Court conducts a two-part test to determine if illicit copying has occurred. First, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant copied the plaintiff's copyrighted work, either directly or through indirect evidence. Segrets, Inc. v. Gillman Knitwear Co., 207 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2000). Second, the plaintiff must prove that the copying of the copyrighted material was so extensive that it rendered the infringing and copyrighted works 'substantially similar.' 4 Id.; see also Skinder-Strauss Assocs. v. Mass. Continuing Legal Educ., Inc., 914 F. Supp. 665, 672 (D. Mass. 1995) (Even evidence of actual copying may be insufficient, however, if this copying was not substantial.). Because we assume, for purposes of this appeal, that actual copying has taken place, we move directly to the second prong. 8 Whether there is substantial similarity between copyrightable expressions is determined by the ordinary observer test. Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, 843 F.2d 600, 607 (1st Cir. 1988). The test is whether the accused work is so similar to the plaintiff's work that an ordinary reasonable person would conclude that the defendant unlawfully appropriated the plaintiff's protected expression by taking material of substance and value. Id. (quoting Educ. Testing Servs. v. Katzman, 793 F.2d 533, 541 (3d Cir. 1986)). The determination of whether an allegedly infringing label is substantially similar to its alleged model or influence is not so simple a task, however, as a strict visual comparison of the two items. Any comparison between the two works must be informed by a key theoretical foundation of copyright law: that [i]deas cannot be copyrighted, id. at 606 (citing Harper & Row, Pubs., Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 547 (1985)), and therefore that [a]n artist 'can claim to own only an original manner of expressing ideas,' not the ideas themselves, id. (quoting Cooling Sys. & Flexibles v. Stuart Radiator, 777 F.2d 485, 491 (9th Cir. 1985)). Because of this dichotomy between idea and expression, only the protected expression is relevant to an evaluation of substantial similarity. Leigh v. Warner Bros., Inc., 212 F.3d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 2000). We must first consider, then, to what extent the Yankee labels are protected expression. 5 9 In determining what aspects of the Yankee labels are protected under copyright law, we follow essentially the same path as did the district court. We first dissect the work to remove those aspects not protected by copyright. Despite Yankee's argument to the contrary, this Court has indicated that dissection analysis is an appropriate method of evaluating substantial similarity even when actual copying has occurred. By dissecting the accused work and identifying those features which are protected . . . [t]he court can also determine . . . those aspects of the work that . . . should be considered in the . . . comparative analysis under the ordinary observer test. Concrete Mach., 843 F.2d at 609. Second, we apply the doctrines of merger and scene-a-faire to determine how substantially similar the copy must be to infringe. Id. at 609 n.9 (For example, the court may find that the idea and expression are so inseparable that copying of the work is not prohibited or that only exact reproduction of the work will justify a finding of infringement.). 10 There may be a qualification to the dissection test of some importance in certain cases. In Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollywogs, Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1003 (2d Cir. 1996), the Second Circuit suggested that the dissection test may not fully resolve the legal issues where the copyright holder claims that the copyrighted material is essentially a host of uncopyrightable individual elements that have been arranged in a unique way that qualifies them for copyright protection. Cf. Feist, 499 U.S. at 362 (copyright available for compilations of unprotectible facts). This Court, however, has been more enthusiastic than the Second Circuit about the use of dissection analysis to disaggregate a visual work into its component elements for the purpose of removing the unprotectible elements contained within. Compare Concrete Mach., 843 F.2d at 609, with Knitwaves, 71 F.3d at 1003. 11 At any rate, we do not necessarily reject this qualification but think that it has no direct application here. Our reasons for thinking that there is nothing very unique in this combination of elements follows from our discussion of the nature of the unprotected elements, the issue to which we turn shortly. Moreover, we are confident that the district court, in removing the crude, physical elements described in Parts I. A and I. C, did not over-dissect the Yankee label. The fact that significant copyrightable material remained (prior to the application of the merger doctrine) is, in our minds, persuasive that the appropriate level of dissection occurred. See Leigh, 212 F.3d at 1215 (As long as the analysis is not overly detached and technical, it can adequately assess both the effect of the protected, original elements of [the work] and the contribution of those elements to the work as a whole.). 12
13 The district court determined that the rectangular, gold-bordered name plate, [the] full-bleed photos, and [the use of] similarly sized labels, were crude, physical elements [that] do not enjoy copyright protection, and therefore only evaluated the photographic images on the labels for infringement. Yankee I, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 148. Yankee contends that its choices to use such elements were discretionary, and must be protected by copyright because other choices were possible. We agree with the district court. The discretion claimed by Yankee involves (i) the use of a rectangular title plate with block lettering on a white background; (ii) the imposition of that title plate, centered, on a photographic representation of the candle fragrance; and (iii) a rectangular border around the photograph. This collection of common geometric shapes with a particular photographic technique is not sufficiently original to qualify for copyright protection. See Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 979 F.2d 242, 247 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (We do not in any way question the Register's position that 'simple geometric shapes and coloring alone are per se not copyrightable.'); Kitchens of Sara Lee, Inc. v. Nifty Foods Corp., 266 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir. 1959) (circular, rectangular, and octagonal shapes not protected); William S. Geiger Corp. v. Gigi Accessories, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 5034(JSM), 1997 WL 458668, at  (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 1997) (plaintiff has no right to copyright a geometric shape). 14 Moreover, the use of a border element is an essentially functional design choice not protected by copyright. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (providing copyright protection for works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects); CCM Cable Rep, Inc. v. Ocean Coast Props., Inc., 97 F.3d 1504, 1519-20 (1st Cir. 1996) (copyright law denies protection to forms of expression directed solely at functional considerations). A border is a common method of separating a photograph from a background; the use of gold as the border color is a common method of signifying opulence and quality. See Pubs. Int'l, Ltd. v. Landoll, Inc., 164 F.3d 337, 341 (7th Cir. 1998). Likewise, copyright does not provide protection for the particular style of photography chosen by Yankee (full-bleed). To do so would impermissibly narrow the possibilities available to other label designers. See Designer's View, Inc. v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 764 F. Supp. 1473, 1479 (S.D. Fla. 1978) (medium of artwork not protected by copyright).
15 Having separated the unprotected title plate, border elements, and style of photography from the photographs themselves, we now turn to the photographs to determine if the Bridgewater labels are infringing. The district court found that for six of the nine labels in question, there was only one way to express the idea of these fruits and flowers: by depicting their likeness. And although the district court held that the remaining three labels (French Vanilla, Spiced Apple/Apple Pie, and Cinnamon/Cinnamon Rolls) expressed more subtle ideas open to greater possibilities of representation, even for those depictions the idea merge[d] with the expression and therefore allowed for few choices of subject matter. As a result, the district court held that, as a matter of law, there could be no infringement unless Bridgewater's photographs were nearly identical to Yankee's. Yankee I, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 145-46. Yankee claims that the merger doctrine does not apply because infinite ways exist to depict a fruit, flower, or common flavor such as french vanilla. Again, we agree with the district court's approach. 16 In Concrete Machinery, we explained the rationale behind the merger doctrine: Some ideas admit of only a limited number of expressions. When there is essentially only one way to express an idea, the idea and its expression are inseparable and copyright is no bar to copying that expression. [Even] [w]hen the idea and its expression are not completely inseparable, there may still be only a limited number of ways of expressing the idea. 17 843 F.2d at 606 (internal citations omitted). In such cases, the plaintiff has the heavy burden of showing near identity between the works at issue. Id. at 606-07 (citing Sid & Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1167 (9th Cir. 1977), and Flag Fables Inc. v. Jean Ann's Country Flags & Crafts, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 1165, 1171 (D. Mass. 1990)). This heightened showing is necessary because, as idea and expression merge, fewer and fewer aspects of a work embody a unique and creative expression of the idea; a copyright holder must then prove substantial similarity to those few aspects of the work that are expression not required by the idea. Id. at 607 (citing Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 908 (3d Cir. 1975)). 18 In general, the merger doctrine is most applicable where the idea and the expression are of items found in nature, or are found commonly in everyday life. See, e.g., Designer's View, 764 F. Supp. at 1478. For example, we invoked the merger doctrine in Concrete Machinery where the idea at issue was a realistic-looking life size deer. 843 F.2d at 607; see also Leigh, 212 F.3d at 1214-15 (photograph of statue in public domain); Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971) (pin of a jeweled bee). As the district court found, six of the labels at issue were fruits and flowers found in nature; the remaining three were representations of common flavors. For the six natural items, there were few associated expressions, of which the most obvious was a realistic representation of the fruit or flower at issue. For the three flavors, the most obvious expression was a realistic representation of a food commonly associated with that flavor. 6 Because the merger doctrine applies, the copyright on Yankee's labels does not prevent Bridgewater from using the same subject matter on its labels, even if the genesis for Bridgewater's choice of subject matter was Yankee's labels. 19 The merger doctrine does not, however, allow the identical reproduction of photographs of realistic objects when there are sufficient details in those photographs to make them unique. Concrete Mach., 843 F.2d at 609-10 (finding possibility of infringement of concrete deer based on stylized posture and facial expression). If Bridgewater had scanned Yankee's labels into a computer and reproduced them exactly, it would have certainly infringed Yankee's copyrights on those labels. Even if Bridgewater had taken its own photographs, but had arranged the subjects in a nearly identical manner to that of Yankee, a jury could have found the requisite showing of substantial similarity to support copyright infringement. Moreover, although Yankee does not enjoy copyright protection on the subject matter of its photographs because of the merger doctrine, its choices as to lighting, background, angle and positioning are protected. Leigh, 212 F.3d at 1215; Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 307 (2d Cir. 1992). We now proceed to compare the specific labels at issue.
20 After accounting for the unprotected elements of the Yankee label and the constraints of the merger doctrine, the district court closely examined each of the allegedly infringing labels, and concluded that no reasonable juror could conclude that the Bridgewater label was substantially similar to the corresponding Yankee label. Yankee I, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 148-50. Although summary judgment is often inappropriate on the question of substantial similarity, Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 977 (2d Cir. 1980), where reasonable minds cannot differ, summary judgment is appropriate, Segrets, 207 F.3d at 62. Our independent review of the labels confirms the district court's analysis and holding. 7 Therefore we affirm the grant of summary judgment to Bridgewater on Yankee's copyright claims.