Opinion ID: 6330492
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Enhancement for Use of a Computer

Text: Procell argues for the first time on appeal that the district court erroneously applied the two-level sentencing enhancement for use of a computer pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(3)(A). We therefore review this claim for plain error. Guidelines section 2G1.3(b)(3)(A) states that a twolevel enhancement should be applied to the offense level for specified sexual offenses if the offense involved the use of a computer or an interactive computer service to (A) persuade, induce, entice, coerce, or facilitate the travel of, the minor to engage in prohibited sexual conduct[.] The PSR applied this enhancement based on Procell's communications via computer with Minor A, including sending her images of his own genitalia in an effort to coerce Minor A to send a similar photograph. Procell, however, reads the guideline to apply only when the defendant's computer use is connected to travel of the minor. In other words, he maintains that all of the specified computer uses -- i.e., to persuade, induce, entice, coerce, or facilitate -- refer solely to influencing or assisting the minor to travel . . . to engage in prohibited sexual conduct. He thus argues that, because there was no finding that he used a computer to influence or assist Minor A to travel, the enhancement should not have been applied to him. - 7 - Although we have not previously construed U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(3)(A), we readily conclude that Procell's interpretation is untenable. In asserting that the phrase the travel of should be viewed as the object of the verbs persuade, induce, entice, coerce, or facilitate, Procell ignores the comma that separates the phrase facilitate the travel of from the latter part of the sentence referring to the minor and prohibited sexual conduct. Rather than setting forth a series of separate activities all related to the minor's potential travel -- i.e., persuading, inducing, enticing, coercing, and facilitating that travel -- the guideline, through placement of the comma following or facilitate the travel of, plainly includes facilitat[ing] . . . travel as one of five alternative means by which the use of a computer to engage a minor in prohibited sexual contact will trigger the enhancement. As the Second Circuit has observed, [t]he comma after 'of' makes clear that 'the travel of' is not the object of all of the preceding verbs. United States v. Watkins, 667 F.3d 254, 262 (2d Cir. 2012). The meaning derived from the provision's punctuation is reinforced by its semantics. As the Watkins court observed, it is linguistically awkward (at best) to refer to 'the use of a computer . . . to . . . persuade . . . the travel of [a] minor to engage in prohibited sexual conduct.' A person does not 'persuade' travel. Id. The language does flow properly, however, if it is - 8 - read to apply the enhancement when a defendant uses a computer to persuade, induce, entice, or coerce a minor to engage in prohibited sexual conduct, or uses a computer to facilitate the travel of a minor for that purpose. Furthermore, we note that the underlying statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2422, has two subsections, both of which contain the persuade/induce/entice/coerce language that is found in the guideline provision. Subsection (b) -- the basis for Procell's conviction -- targets the use of the mail or other means of interstate or foreign commerce to persuade[], induce[], entice[], or coerce[] unlawful sexual activity,3 while subsection (a) targets persuad[ing], induc[ing], entic[ing], or coerc[ing] an individual to travel for the purpose of unlawful sexual activity.4 It is thus unsurprising that § 2G1.3(b)(3)(A) -- which 3 Section 2422(b) provides: Whoever, using the mail or any facility or means of interstate or foreign commerce, or within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any individual who has not attained the age of 18 years, to engage in prostitution or any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title and imprisoned not less than 10 years or for life. 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). 4 Section § 2422(a) provides: - 9 - applies to § 2422 in its entirety -- includes facilitating travel by means of a computer among the triggering activities. By contrast, we can imagine no reason why the Sentencing Commission would have limited the enhancement to computer-based behaviors involving only the facilitation of travel, a result at odds with the breadth of the underlying statute's two subsections. For that additional reason, Procell's narrow interpretation of the enhancement is unsound. Procell offers several other arguments that we find without merit. The only one that warrants our response centers on a related guideline provision, U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(6)(B),5 which Whoever knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any individual to travel in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or Possession of the United States, to engage in prostitution, or in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 2422(a). 5 In full, the child pornography guideline provides: If, for the purpose of producing sexually explicit material or for the purpose of transmitting such material live, the offense involved (A) the knowing misrepresentation of a participant's identity to persuade, induce, entice, coerce, or facilitate the travel of, a minor to engage [in] sexually explicit conduct; or (B) the use of a computer or an - 10 - enhances the sentences of those who sexually exploit minors through the production of explicit material. Procell notes that this provision repeats the list of activities contained in § 2G1.3(b)(3) but adds text pertaining to solicitation. He asserts that an interpretation of persuade induce, entice, coerce, or facilitate the travel of other than the one he advances would render the additional language in U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(6)(B) superfluous. We disagree that the addition of the catch-all solicitation phrase in § 2G2.1(b)(6)(B) reinforces Procell's construction of § 2G1.3(b)(3)(A). The added text -- or to otherwise solicit participation by a minor in such conduct -- simply ensures that any form of solicitation not specified by the terms that precede it is covered in the context of child pornography. The inclusion of that text in § 2G2.1(b)(6)(B) does not change the natural reading of the guideline applicable to Procell's offense. In sum, neither the plain language of U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(3)(A) nor the text of any related Guidelines provision interactive computer service to (i) persuade, induce, entice, coerce, or facilitate the travel of, a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct, or to otherwise solicit participation by a minor in such conduct; or (ii) solicit participation with a minor in sexually explicit conduct, increase by 2 levels. U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(6). - 11 - supports Procell's argument that his preferred interpretation fits more rationally in the overall framework of the Government's interests in sentencing for sex crimes than a straightforward, grammatical reading of the provision. Thus, the district court did not err -- let alone commit plain error -- by imposing the two-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(3)(A).