Opinion ID: 1194929
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Difference between personal and official capacity suits

Text: (5) Personal-capacity suits seek to impose personal liability upon a government official for actions he takes under color of state law. ( Kentucky v. Graham (1985) 473 U.S. 159, 165 [105 S.Ct. 3099, 3105, 87 L.Ed.2d 114].) Official-capacity suits, in contrast, `generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.' ( Ibid. ; Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, supra, 491 U.S. at p. 71 [109 S.Ct. at p. 2312] [While state officials literally are persons, a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office. [Citation.] As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself.]; see Brandon v. Holt (1985) 469 U.S. 464, 471-472 [105 S.Ct. 873, 877-878, 83 L.Ed.2d 878].) As long as the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity. ( Kentucky v. Graham, supra, 473 U.S. at p. 166 [105 S.Ct. at p. 3105].) When it comes to defenses to liability, an official in a personal-capacity action may, depending on his position, be able to assert personal immunity defenses.... See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 [96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128] (1976) (absolute immunity); [citations]. In an official-capacity action, these defenses are unavailable. [Citations.] The only immunities that can be claimed in an official-capacity action are forms of sovereign immunity that the entity, qua entity, may possess, such as the Eleventh Amendment. ( Kentucky v. Graham, supra, 473 U.S. at pp. 166-167 [105 S.Ct. at pp. 3105-3106], fn. omitted.)