Opinion ID: 2979098
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion for a Sentence Reduction

Text: “A district court may modify a defendant’s sentence only as authorized by statute.” United States v. Pembrook, No. 08-6452, ___ F.3d ____, 2010 WL 2499656, at  (6th Cir. June 11, 2010). Gudger argues that the district court had the authority to reduce his sentence pursuant to § 3582(c)(2), which states: in the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(o), . . . the court may reduce the term of imprisonment . . . if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The applicable policy statement upon which Gudger relies states in relevant part: -7- No. 09-5651 United States v. Gudger (1) In General.—In a case in which a defendant is serving a term of imprisonment, and the guideline range applicable to that defendant has subsequently been lowered as a result of an amendment to the Guidelines Manual listed in subsection (c) below, the court may reduce the defendant’s term of imprisonment as provided by 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). As required by 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), any such reduction in the defendant’s term of imprisonment shall be consistent with this policy statement. (2) Exclusions.—A reduction in the defendant’s term of imprisonment is not consistent with this policy statement and therefore is not authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) if— (A) none of the amendments listed in subsection (c) is applicable to the defendant; or (B) an amendment listed in subsection (c) does not have the effect of lowering the defendant’s applicable guideline range. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a). Amendment 706 reduced the base offense levels for most crack cocaine offenses by two levels. For example, a defendant convicted of a crime involving more than 50 grams but less than 150 grams of crack cocaine, like Gudger, would have had a base offense level of 32 prior to Amendment 706’s enactment, but now would have a base offense level of 30. Amendment 713 added Amendment 706 to the list of amendments included in subsection (c) of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10. Therefore, a defendant convicted of a crack cocaine offense may be eligible for a sentence reduction if these amendments lowered the Guidelines range (1) that the defendant’s sentence was “based on” under § 3582(c)(2), and (2) that was “applicable to that defendant” under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(1). See United States v. Hameed, No. 09-3259, slip op. at 14 (6th Cir. July 26, 2010). We conclude that Gudger is not eligible for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2) because the Guideline range “applicable to” him was not lowered by the crack cocaine amendments. Amendment 706 did lower the Guidelines range that would have been applicable to Gudger had he -8- No. 09-5651 United States v. Gudger not been subject to the statutory mandatory minimum 240-month prison sentence. However, because Gudger was subject to the statutory mandatory minimum sentence, the crack cocaine Guidelines range was not “applicable to” him even though the court departed downward from that minimum and arrived at a sentence of 120 months, which fell within that range. We previously have held “that the appropriate starting point for calculating a downward departure under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) is the mandatory minimum sentence itself.” United States v. Stewart, 306 F.3d 295, 332 (6th Cir. 2002). Further, in determining the extent of a downward departure for substantial assistance under § 3553(e) and U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, a district court is permitted to consider “only factors relating to [the] defendant’s cooperation.” United States v. Bullard, 390 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Thus, in calculating Gudger’s sentence after granting the Government’s motion for a downward departure, the district court’s task was to start at the 240month statutory minimum and determine the extent to which it was appropriate to depart downward based solely on the assistance Gudger provided to law enforcement officials in prosecuting others. Amendment 706 had no effect on Gudger’s statutory minimum sentence of 240 months imprisonment. Therefore, none of the Guidelines ranges lowered by Amendment 706 were “applicable to” Gudger. Gudger argues that he still is eligible for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2) because, in calculating the extent of his downward departure, the district court specifically relied upon the Guidelines range that would have been applicable absent his being subject to the statutory minimum. Indeed, the sentencing hearing transcript indicates that the district court considered this range and the § 3553(a) factors in determining Gudger’s sentence. See Hameed, No. 09-3259, slip op. at 7 (“In -9- No. 09-5651 United States v. Gudger determining whether a sentence was based on a subsequently lowered guideline range . . . we look to what the district court actually said and did at the original sentencing.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). However, we need not consider the extent to which this means that Gudger’s sentence was “based on” a subsequently lowered Guidelines range under § 3582(c)(2) because there is no question that this range was not “applicable to” Gudger under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a). See United States v. Doe, 564 F.3d 305, 310 (3d Cir. 2009) (concluding that it was appropriate to “decline to address the Appellants’ ‘based on’ argument” because they could not satisfy the “applicable to” requirement of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)). Gudger also argues that requiring a defendant to satisfy the conditions of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 in order to become eligible for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2) violates the Supreme Court’s holdings in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), and Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007). This argument fails because § 3582(c)(2) “authorize[s] only a limited adjustment to an otherwise final sentence and not a plenary resentencing proceeding.” Dillon v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2683, 2691 (2010). The Supreme Court has concluded that “[g]iven the limited scope and purpose of § 3582(c)(2), . . . proceedings under that section do not implicate the interests identified in Booker.” Id. at 2692.