Opinion ID: 552750
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prosecutorial Exposure v. Independent Witness Exposure

Text: 60 No prior decision has articulated the proceedings Kastigar requires in cases involving widely disseminated immunized testimony. The trial judge here labored in uncharted territory. In cases like North's several goals and values must be accommodated: the immunized person's fifth amendment privilege; Congress' purposes in enacting the use-immunity statute; the function and integrity of the Office of the IC; and the government's need for workable guidelines. 61 As the IC's petition highlights, the central conceptual weakness of the majority's analysis is its failure to recognize that a prosecutor's exposure to immunized testimony and a witness' independent exposure to such testimony raise related but distinct issues. By holding to the same standard witnesses who have thoroughly soaked themselves in immunized testimony and prosecutors who have assiduously avoided the slightest taint, the majority renders virtually impossible any prosecution of an immunized defendant who testifies publicly. 62 Prosecutorial use of immunized testimony is the paradigmatic violation of the use-immunity statute and prosecutorial exposure is, thus, at the heart of use immunity. Indeed, as the IC's petition points out, virtually every prior case concerning use immunity involved prosecutorial knowledge of immunized testimony. We all agree that prosecutors must avoid significant exposure to immunized testimony, develop independent leads to witnesses, and refrain from using immunized testimony to lead or coach those witnesses. In this regard, the prosecution bears the continuous and uninterrupted burden of persuasion, and in this case, no one disputes that the IC has met that burden. Maj. op. at 859; Diss. op. at 921. 63 Independent witness exposure poses a different problem. Despite the prosecution's diligent, and often extraordinary, prophylactic measures, witnesses may, for a variety of reasons, soak themselves or be soaked by others in immunized testimony. For such witnesses, the prosecutor's burden to show nonuse should arguably be quite different. Initially, the prosecutor must establish a prima facie case that a witness' testimony does not constitute a prohibited use. This initial burden should, however, be met, as it was in the North case, by a five-factored showing: 64 (i) the prosecution must demonstrate that the identification of witnesses was wholly independent from immunized testimony; 65 (ii) the prosecution must demonstrate that the questions it directs to witnesses are wholly independent from immunized testimony; 66 (iii) at any grand jury proceedings, the prosecution must direct witnesses to base their answers solely on personal knowledge; 67 (iv) at trial, the judge must similarly instruct witnesses; and 68 (v) before the trial begins, the prosecution must deliver to the defense all recorded statements of witnesses, including grand jury testimony and any other interviews or statements. 2 69 Collectively, these requirements should be sufficient to establish a prima facie case that any testimony offered at trial by the IC is untainted. 70 Upon establishment of a prima facie case, the defense then bears a burden to produce some specific evidence that the testimony--either in source or content--is tainted; upon such production, the court is required to hold a hearing on the alleged taint. The defense need only produce specific, not conclusive evidence, for as Kastigar suggests, the prosecution always bears the burden of ultimate persuasion. Specific evidence might include a pattern of recollection or specificity that suggests taint, or contradictions between recorded and unrecorded testimony. As the Supreme Court stated in another allocation-of-burdens context, [i]t is sufficient [that] the defendant's evidence raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether the witness' testimony is tainted. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). 71 This allocation of burdens would be one way to reconcile the several constitutional values and statutory commands implicated by prosecutions like North's. As the Supreme Court has noted 72 This burden-shifting principle is not new or novel. There are no hard-and-fast standards governing the allocation of the burden of proof in every situation. The issue, rather, is merely a question of policy and fairness based on experience in the different situations. 73 Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 209, 93 S.Ct. 2686, 2698, 37 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (citations omitted). 74 Whether or not the best resolution of these values lies in burden shifting, the important thing is that the use-immunity statute be construed so as to accommodate the real difference between prosecutorial exposure and use--the central danger posed by use immunity--and witness exposure, which is more diffuse and beyond the immediate control of the prosecution. Respecting this critical difference, this court should seek to provide a workable and attainable standard that guarantees the integrity of use immunity while allowing for a cautious and untainted prosecution.