Opinion ID: 2752520
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Disparaging Remarks

Text: Having no property interest, at-will employees are only entitled to a hearing in connection with their discharge if the employer “creates and disseminates a false and defamatory impression about the at-will employee in connection with the discharge.” Speer v. City of Wynne, Ark., 276 F.3d 980, 984 (8th Cir. 2002). To prevail on this liberty interest claim, the chiefs “must demonstrate: ‘(1) an official made a defamatory statement that resulted in a stigma; (2) the defamatory statement occurred during the course of terminating the employee; (3) the defamatory statement was made public; and (4) an alteration or extinguishment of a right or legal status.’” Crooks v. Lynch, 557 F.3d 846, 849 (8th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted) (quoting Brown v. Simmons, 478 F.3d 922, 923 (8th Cir. 2007)). To recover for the lack of a post-termination name clearing hearing, the chiefs also “must prove [they] sought one before litigation.” Winskowski v. City of Stephen, 442 F.3d 1107, 1112 (8th Cir. 2006). The chiefs’ claim fails from the start, because they have not identified any admissible evidence containing a sufficiently stigmatizing statement. -8-
At summary judgment, the requisite “genuine dispute,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), must appear in admissible evidence. See Nooner v. Norris, 594 F.3d 592, 603 (8th Cir. 2010). As evidence of Evans’s and Swyers’s injurious statements, the chiefs offer the minutes of the open Monarch board meetings and news media articles purporting to quote or paraphrase Evans and Swyers. The newspaper articles are “‘rank hearsay’” that do not fit a hearsay exception. Id. (quoting Miller v. Tony & Susan Alamo Found., 924 F.2d 143, 147 (8th Cir. 1991)); see also Jones v. McNeese, 746 F.3d 887, 899 (8th Cir. 2014). While the allegedly defamatory statements themselves may not be hearsay, see Fed. R. Evid. 801(c)(2), (d)(2)(A), the second level—each newspaper’s out-of-court assertion that Evans and Swyers in fact made these statements—is hearsay. See Jones, 746 F.3d at 899; Nooner, 594 F.3d at 603. We will consider only the statements in the board meetings’ minutes.
The chiefs challenge statements made in two public board meetings. In one of the meetings, Swyers justified the decision to terminate the chiefs by explaining Monarch had “created an atmosphere, as stated in the Appellate Court, of abusive, hostile discrimination against female employees.” At other points during the meetings, Swyers explained to the board and the public that the Missouri Court of Appeals had described Monarch’s workplace as “hostile, pervasively discriminating and abusive.” Evans similarly quoted the Missouri court’s decision as stating “[t]he harassment was evasive [sic] enough to create an abusive work environment.” Evans explained the board does not “tolerate an abusive work environment” and Monarch “do[es] not promote discrimination in [its] workplace.” According to Evans, the chiefs’ terminations sent this message. “For a defamatory statement to be actionable under § 1983, it must go beyond ‘alleging conduct [by the plaintiff] that fails to meet professional standards’” and instead “must ‘damage[] a person’s standing in the community or foreclose[] a person’s freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities.’” Jones, 746 -9- F.3d at 898 (alterations in original) (quoting Raposa v. Meade Sch. Dist. 46-1, 790 F.2d 1349, 1354 (8th Cir. 1986)). “The stigma must be significant, and it usually involves allegations of dishonesty, immorality, racism, or a similar characterdemeaning charge.” Howard v. Columbia Pub. Sch. Dist., 363 F.3d 797, 802 (8th Cir. 2004). We have “distinguished claims of general misconduct or unsatisfactory performance from claims involving direct dishonesty, immorality, criminality or racism.” Stodghill v. Wellston Sch. Dist., 512 F.3d 472, 477 (8th Cir. 2008) (emphasis added). In Mascho v. Gee, 24 F.3d 1037, 1039 (8th Cir. 1994), the employer publicly accused a supervisor of “not performing the functions of a supervisor” and “fail[ing] to comply with the spirit of the drug-free workplace policy by failing to report suspected drug usage.” Though the supervisor was said to have looked the other way when confronted with criminal conduct, “we characterized this as an accusation of unsatisfactory performance”—he was just an inept supervisor. Stodghill, 512 F.3d at 477 (discussing Mascho). In Stodghill, a school administrator claimed to be stigmatized by statements that in recent years “[c]heating had occurred in” his school district. Id. We reasoned this statement was “not a direct assault on [the administrator’s] honesty,” but instead “challenge[d the administrator’s] performance in effectively overseeing the district”—the accusation “simply stated cheating occurred on his watch.” Id. As in Stodghill and Mascho, Evans and Swyers focused on the discriminatory environment of the fire district and on the chiefs’ failure to stop the discrimination or implement effective anti-discrimination policies. We find no instance in which either director accused the chiefs of direct discrimination or harassment, nor is there any clear statement that any of the chiefs condoned the harassment for which they were fired. In every instance of alleged defamation, neither Evans nor Swyers purported to assess independently the character or conduct of the chiefs, because each only -10- paraphrased the Missouri court’s description of the workplace. There was no stigma sufficient to deprive the chiefs of a liberty interest.