Opinion ID: 2515943
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Is Sprucewood's Appeal of the TRO Moot?

Text: As a preliminary matter, Sprucewood appeals the superior court's grant of a temporary restraining order, essentially arguing that Judge Savell erred in granting the TRO because he improperly interpreted the contract. But AHFC argues that its sale of the buildings to Jalasco Investments has rendered Sprucewood's appeal of the TRO moot, as Sprucewood would not be able to do anything with or to buildings Sprucewood does not own even if this court reversed the grant of the TRO. In reply, Sprucewood argues that the sale of the buildings to Jalasco Investments has not rendered all of the legal issues in the case moot, as the legal issue of whether AHFC owed NCE and Sprucewood money for damages ... is far from moot. This court will refrain from deciding questions `where the facts have rendered the legal issues moot.' [7] A case is moot if the party bringing the action would not be entitled to any relief even if they prevail. [8] We have noted that Alaska Civil Rule 65(b) states that a TRO expires by its own terms within 10 days unless the restrained party agrees to an extension and the reasons for extension are entered of record. [9] Judge Savell entered a temporary restraining order pending a trial on the merits or determination of a preliminary injunction. The TRO has long since expired and does not constrain Sprucewood's freedom of action. Because Sprucewood does not need, and thus could not receive, relief from the TRO, its appeal of the TRO is moot. Our conclusion would be no different if the superior court had entered a preliminary injunction instead of a TRO. We have previously held that a dispute is technically moot where a party has submitted to an order by the superior court, the effects of which cannot be undone. [10] Sprucewood does not deny that it complied with the terms of the court's restraining order, or that it no longer has possession of the buildings. A reversal of the restraining order would not enable Sprucewood to do anything to the Spruce Park buildings, as they are now owned by Jalasco Investments. As the effects of the superior court's order cannot be undone, Sprucewood's appeal of the order is moot. [11] Although Sprucewood concedes that it complied with the terms of the TRO, it insists that the TRO ruling cannot be moot because Sprucewood still possesses viable damages claims against AHFC. But Sprucewood confuses the survival of its case with the survival of an issue in its case. Compliance with a preliminary injunction does not moot a party's damages claims, only an appeal from the injunction. [12] Sprucewood's damages claims can be adequately addressed in Sprucewood's appeal from the superior court's grant of summary judgment, so the existence of those claims does not save Sprucewood's appeal of the TRO from mootness.