Opinion ID: 759361
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Discriminatory Termination of Employment Claim

Text: 15 The district court dismissed Witherspoon's discriminatory discharge claims because he could not produce direct evidence of discrimination, nor could he satisfy the elements of a prima facie case of race-based termination. The district court found that the only direct evidence of race-based discrimination by Nash-Finch management were comments made by Rick Hoy, the warehouse superintendent until June 1993. Nash-Finch transferred Hoy to another city at that time, more than 18 months prior to Witherspoon's termination. During the year and a half following Hoy's transfer, plaintiff presented no direct evidence of discrimination by Nash-Finch management. The connection that plaintiff attempts to draw between Hoy's conduct and plaintiff's termination is not supported by the record. Accordingly, we agree with the district court that the plaintiff has produced no direct evidence of discriminatory discharge. 16 We also agree that Witherspoon has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. In order to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge in violation of Title VII or 42 U.S.C. § 1981, a plaintiff must show that (1) he belongs to a protected class, (2) he was qualified for the position, (3) that despite his qualifications, he was discharged, and (4) that after his discharge the job remained available. See Lowe v. Angelo's Italian Foods, Inc., 87 F.3d 1170, 1174-75 (10th Cir.1996). The district court found that Witherspoon could not show the second element of the prima facie test, i.e., that he was qualified for a position at Nash-Finch at the time of his termination. The court based its conclusion on the following exchange that occurred during the defendant's deposition of Witherspoon: 17 Q: Other than the fork job you said you wanted, was there any other job given your medical restrictions you could have done that was available at the Nash-Finch warehouse in January, 1995? 18 A: None that my seniority would let me have. 19 Witherspoon v. Nash-Finch Co., No. 95-1128-MLB, slip op. at 31 (D. Kan. filed Mar. 3, 1997). The court also cited to Witherspoon's explanation of the reasons he refused a Nash-Finch offer of reemployment as a freezer selector in January 1996: 20 Q: Have you told me the reasons you didn't accept the position? 21 A: Well, I didn't--I failed to mention that my work--because of my physical. 22 Q: Because of your physical? 23 A: My physical, I couldn't do the job because of my physical condition. 24 Q: So the job--you felt like you could not perform physically the position that was offered to you in the January 12th, 1996 letter? 25 A: Yes. 26 Id. at 32. Witherspoon raises several arguments why the above-quoted testimony is not decisive on his discharge claims. 27 First, he argues that his testimony actually reflects his belief that he was physically able to perform selector positions, but could not meet the company's productivity system because it was slanted against blacks. Appellant's Br. at 16. We are unable to draw any such inference from the testimony quoted above or from the record as a whole. The plaintiff plainly admitted that he was no longer physically qualified to perform any available positions. 28 Even if this court were to accept the plaintiff's characterization of his testimony, he would nonetheless fail to make his prima facie showing. An employer is entitled to determine when an employee's failure to meet certain objective criteria renders him or her unqualified for employment, provided that such criteria are related to job performance, see Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971), and applied evenhandedly to members of all races, see McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 283, 96 S.Ct. 2574, 49 L.Ed.2d 493 (1973). Thus, Witherspoon's admission that he could not meet the productivity requirements at Nash-Finch may be regarded as an admission that he was unqualified for employment, absent evidence that the productivity system was indeed slanted against blacks. Nash-Finch's productivity system is a direct measure of job performance and the record, as a whole, does not support the plaintiff's assertion that Nash-Finch's productivity system was applied differently based on an employee's race. Therefore, plaintiff has failed to prove that he was qualified for a position at Nash-Finch at the time he was terminated. 29 Second, plaintiff cites authority which purportedly supports the assertion that Witherspoon can make a prima facie case of race-based termination even if he is unable to show that he was qualified for a position at Nash-Finch at the time of his termination. We agree with the district court that the cases cited by plaintiff are inapposite. 30 Lastly, plaintiff asserts that the district court's finding allows Nash-Finch to circumvent race discrimination and retaliatory discharge law by causing injury to an employee in the course of its discriminatory and retaliatory acts and be exculpated from responsibility by claiming the employee is no longer physically qualified for the position. Appellant's Br. at 16. We need not address this contention because we agree with the district court that there is no evidence or reasonable inference which supports Witherspoon's assertion that Nash-Finch harassed him with the intent to cause a disabling injury that would, in turn, force him to quit. Witherspoon, slip op. at 36. Thus, we affirm the district court's grant of defendant's summary judgment motion on Witherspoon's discriminatory discharge claims.