Opinion ID: 724967
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: State Law Claims--Outrage and Invasion of Privacy

Text: 9 The district court did not err in writing that it would be appropriate to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the pendant state law claims of outrage and invasion of privacy after granting summary judgment on the Title VII claims. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350, 108 S.Ct. 614, 619, 98 L.Ed.2d 720 (1988) (exercise of pendant jurisdiction is at the district court's discretion). But, the district court went on to grant summary judgment for defendants on the state claims; and going on was no abuse of discretion. In addition, the state law claims lack any support in the record. 10 In Alabama, the tort of outrage only applies in the most egregious circumstances. Thomas v. BSE Indus. Contractors, Inc., 624 So.2d 1041, 1044 (Ala.1993). The conduct complained of must be so outrageous as to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society. American Rd. Serv. Co. v. Inmon, 394 So.2d 361, 365 (Ala.1981). 11 Thompson and Brock can be held directly liable for invasion of privacy only if the company authorized or participated in Schultz's actions or ratified his conduct after learning of the action. Potts v. BE & K Constr. Co., 604 So.2d 398, 400 (Ala.1992). It can be held vicariously liable only if Schultz's acts were done in the line and scope of employment for Thompson and Brock's benefit. Id. The record fails to include sufficient facts under either theory to withstand summary judgment. 12 AFFIRMED.