Opinion ID: 1460160
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mrs. Kollintzas's status as an interested person under the FDCPA

Text: Throughout these proceedings Mrs. Kollintzas has referred to herself as an intervenor. This is procedurally incorrect. She never filed a motion to intervene, nor did the district court ever recognize her as an intervening party. The government initiated these FDCPA collection proceedings under the existing docket number in Frank Kollintzas's criminal case, and Mrs. Kollintzas participated in the proceedings through counsel after being served with the garnishment notice. We raised the question of Mrs. Kollintzas's status at oral argument, and after argument ordered supplemental briefing on the following questions: (1) whether intervention by a private party is proper in a criminal case; and (2) whether there is a basis for continuing jurisdiction in the district court to make further rulings in the criminal case. There is no provision in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for intervention by a third party in a criminal proceeding; intervention in civil proceedings is governed by Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which does not apply in a criminal case. Mrs. Kollintzas argues that the FDCPA collection proceedings, although technically part of Frank Kollintzas's criminal case, were civil in nature and therefore she could have intervened as of right pursuant to Rule 24. The government sidesteps the question whether intervention is available in FDCPA proceedings initiated in the context of a criminal case; it takes the position that Mrs. Kollintzas is not an intervenor at all but rather an interested person entitled to participate in the collection proceedings under the FDCPA in order to assert an interest in the property subject to garnishment. We need not decide whether intervention is ever appropriate in this situation; as we have noted, Mrs. Kollintzas never sought to be recognized as an intervening party, a step which can only be accomplished by motion. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24(c) (A person desiring to intervene shall serve a motion to intervene upon the parties as provided in Rule 5, which shall be accompanied by a pleading. . . .). Mrs. Kollintzas's participation in the garnishment proceedings was as a person with an interest in property subject to collection remedies under the FDCPA. That statute is applicable to the enforcement of restitution orders and requires the government to serve notice on each person whom the United States . . . has reasonable cause to believe has an interest in property to which the remedy is directed. 28 U.S.C. § 3202(c). It has been established in this and other circuits that district courts may entertain civil garnishment and other collection proceedings as postjudgment remedies within an underlying criminal case; nothing precludes the government from initiating a collection proceeding under an existing criminal docket number in order to collect a fine or restitution ordered as part of the criminal sentence. United States v. Vitek Supply Corp., 151 F.3d 580, 585-86 (7th Cir.1998) (holding the government may proceed against a corporate defendant's alter egos as a post-judgment remedy in a criminal case in order to collect on restitution obligation of individual and corporate defendants); United States v. Mays, 430 F.3d 963, 966 (9th Cir.2005) (holding FDCPA procedures are available as post-judgment remedies in criminal cases) ( cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1207, 126 S.Ct. 1416, 164 L.Ed.2d 113 (Feb. 21, 2006)); United States v. Timilty, 148 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1998) (holding the government need not reduce a restitution order to a civil judgment prior to enforcing it; the government may proceed with collection action within a criminal case); United States v. Thornton, 672 F.2d 101, 106 (D.C.Cir.1982) (stating [i]t is not necessary [for the government] to start a new action, civil or criminal, to proceed with garnishment). The Ninth Circuit's decision in Mays is instructive here. In Mays, the district court entered a restitution order against the defendant pursuant to the MVRA. The government then initiated garnishment proceedings pursuant to § 3205 of the FDCPA under the existing criminal docket number. The Ninth Circuit held this scenario was plainly contemplated by the MVRA based on the language of 18 U.S.C. § 3613(a), which specifies the civil remedies available for the satisfaction of fines, and subsection (f) of that statute, which makes the same procedures applicable to the enforcement of orders of restitution. Mays, 430 F.3d at 965. More specifically, § 3613(a) provides: The United States may enforce a judgment imposing a fine in accordance with the practices and procedures for the enforcement of a civil judgment under Federal law or State law. Subsection (f) of § 3613 provides that all provisions of this section are available to the United States for the enforcement of an order of restitution. The FDCPA is a procedural vehicle available to the United States under federal law for the enforcement of its civil judgments; the Ninth Circuit held that by importing the FDCPA's procedures into the MVRA, Congress clearly meant to make those procedures available in criminal cases. Mays, 430 F.3d at 966. Accordingly, the government's initiation of civil garnishment proceedings within the criminal case was procedurally appropriate under the MVRA and the FDCPA, and there is no concern about the district court's jurisdiction. See Vitek, 151 F.3d at 586 (The United States always gets to litigate in its own courts. See 18 U.S.C. § 3231, 28 U.S.C. § 1345. Any effort to collect a debt due to the United States presents a claim under federal law. . . .). And because the government specifically invoked the remedial procedures of the FDCPA to collect restitution in this case, Mrs. Kollintzas's participation was not improper, even though she was not a party. The FDCPA requires the government to use reasonable diligence to identify and serve notice on any person who may have an interest in the property it targets for collection proceedings under the FDCPA. See 28 U.S.C. § 3202(c) (requiring the government to serve a copy of the notice and a copy of the application for granting a remedy under this subchapter on each person whom the United States, after diligent inquiry, has reasonable cause to believe has an interest in the property to which the remedy is directed.). The FDCPA also provides that the government may proceed against jointly owned property to the extent permitted by state law. See 28 U.S.C. § 3010(a) (The remedies available to the United States under this chapter may be enforced against property which is co-owned by a debtor and any other person only to the extent allowed by the law of the State where the property is located. . . .). The FDCPA's third-party notice requirement and the provision regarding jointly owned property together imply that nonparties with an interest in the targeted property may participate in the collection proceedings for the purpose of asserting their interest in the property. Thus, we agree with the government that Mrs. Kollintzas's participation in these proceedings was as an interested person under the FDCPA and not an intervenor. [3] Because the district court's order granting the government's motion to release the funds for garnishment was a final decision as to her claim to the Assets, we are satisfied that this appeal is properly before us. United States v. Elliott, 149 Fed.Appx. 489, 492 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that preliminary forfeiture order, rather than final forfeiture order, was final because it was conclusive as to defendant's interest in the property and thus was the final order in the matter as to him); United States v. Minneman, 6 Fed.Appx. 422, 424 (7th Cir.2001) (holding disposition order concludes the garnishment proceedings and therefore that order, and not the order denying the debtor's objections, is the final order from which a debtor should appeal); Am. Oil Co. v. McMullin, 433 F.2d 1091, 1096 (10th Cir.1970) (holding order unrelated to principal lawsuit final and appealable because if there were no appeal allowed at this time, there may never be a timely appeal); see also Cleveland Hair Clinic, Inc. v. Puig, 106 F.3d 165, 167 (7th Cir.1997) (stating for nonparty found in contempt, adjudication in contempt usually is the final decision in the case; there will never be another, more conclusive, order for the nonparty); Carter Prods., Inc. v. Eversharp, Inc., 360 F.2d 868, 871 (7th Cir.1966) (holding order denying motion to compel a nonparty witness to answer questions was a final decision because it was final for all practical purposes).