Opinion ID: 1559793
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the trial court erred in denying vaughn's motion to amend rulings of the court.

Text: ¶ 33. Vaughn filed a Motion to Amend Rulings of the Court on April 22, 2008. In this motion, Vaughn made the alternative argument that, should the trial court strike Nurse Keller, it should grant Vaughn more time to offer a second expert. Vaughn argued that the expense of an appeal and the interest of accommodating a fair and impartial trial supported her motion for more time to procure an expert who could opine as to proximate cause. ¶ 34. Baptist Hospital, in its response to Vaughn's motion, argued that Vaughn had not met the requirements of Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) in that Vaughn had failed to articulate justification for failure to designate a legally sufficient expert. Baptist points to the fact that its motion for summary judgment was filed after one-and-one-half years of discovery, including amended scheduling orders and extensions of time to designate expert witnesses; thus, according to Baptist, Vaughn had sufficient time to develop requisite expert testimony but failed to do so. Based on the grounds and arguments set forth in this response, the trial court ruled that Vaughn's motion was not well-taken and declined to grant Vaughn additional time to find another expert. ¶ 35. Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) states: Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such order as is just. The decision to grant additional time for discovery in lieu of summary judgment is within the sound discretion of the trial judge and will not be reversed by this Court unless the decision can be characterized as an abuse of discretion. Miss. Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. MS Cas. Ins. Co., 947 So.2d 865, 876 (Miss.2006) (citing Marx v. Truck Renting & Leasing Assn., 520 So.2d 1333, 1344 (Miss.1987); Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1193 (5th Cir.1986)). This Court has stated that in order to reap the benefit of Rule 56(f): [T]he party resisting summary judgment must present specific facts why he cannot oppose the motion and must specifically demonstrate how postponement of a ruling on the motion will enable him, by discovery or other means, to rebut the movant's showing of the absence of a genuine issue of fact. United States v. Little Al, 712 F.2d 133, 135 (5th Cir. 1983), [citing Securities & Exchange Commission v. Spence & Green Chemical Co., 612 F.2d 896, 901 (5th Cir.1980)]. The party opposing the motion for summary judgment may not rely on vague assertions that discovery will produce needed, but unspecified, facts particularly where there was ample time and opportunity for discovery. Securities & Exchange Commission v. Spence & Green Chemical Co., 612 F.2d 896, 901 (5th Cir.1980). Marx v. Truck Renting and Leasing Ass'n Inc., 520 So.2d 1333, 1344 (Miss.1987). ¶ 36. Vaughn's request for more time under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) contained only vague assertions that further discovery would enable her to survive summary judgment. We agree that a period of one-and-one-half years was more than ample time for Vaughn to obtain expert testimony in an effort to avoid a grant of summary judgment against her. Therefore, we cannot find that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Vaughn more time to procure an additional expert.