Opinion ID: 767563
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Application of Batson

Text: 30 As we noted above, in order to establish a prima facie case of a Batsonviolation, petitioners must show that the circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used a peremptory challenge to exclude a potential juror because of race. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 96; Tolbert, 182 F.3d at 680. The petitioners contend that they made a prima facie showing that Ms. Rutherford was peremptorily struck because of her race. We disagree. 31 When the prosecutor challenged Ms. Rutherford, he had already exercised two peremptory challenges against prospective jurors who were not African-American. In United States v. Vasquez-Lopez, 22 F.3d 900 (9th Cir. 1994), we reaffirmed the well-established principle that, in order to meet Batson's prima facie burden, a petitioner need not show that the prosecution had engaged in a pattern of discriminatory strikes against more than one prospective juror because the Constitution forbids striking even a single prospective juror for a discriminatory purpose. Id. at 902. However, we were also careful to explain that the fact that the juror was the one Black member of the venire does not, in itself, raise an inference of discrimination. Id. As the district court in our case properly stated, More is required. 32 Petitioners point out that when Ms. Rutherford was challenged, one of three (or 33%) of the prosecutor's peremptory challenges had been exercised against an African-American, when only four of sixty-four (or 6%) of the prospective jurors in the venire were African-American. We have two responses. First, we agree with the district court that the sample is so small that the statistical significance of the percentages is limited. Second, we do not believe that the only relevant time at which to assess the would-be prima facie case is the time of the challenge. If an African-American is the first person called, and thus the first person struck, all (or 100%) of the prosecutor's peremptory challenges will have been exercised against African-Americans at the time of the challenge. But if that same African-American is called at the end of the voir dire, the percentage may be far lower. 33 In this case, by the end of the voir dire, two more prospective African-American jurors had been questioned. One of them, Ms. James, was challenged, but the record contains entirely plausible reasons, independent of race, why a prosecutor would not have wanted her as a juror. She had indicated that her brother had been prosecuted for burglary, that her brother used drugs, that she was somewhat familiar with the area in which the alleged crimes occurred, and that she thought that search warrants do quite a bit of damage which is unnecessary. Indeed, petitioners did not argue to the district court, and do not argue to us, that race was a factor in the challenge to Ms. James. The second African-American was seated on the jury. 34 Petitioners further argue that other jurors similarly situated to Ms. Rutherford were permitted to remain on the jury despite the fact they appeared to be less favorable. While this contention, if true, would allow us to infer racial bias and would thus support petitioners' prima facie case, the district court combed the record and found no evidentiary support for this contention. We agree with the district court. 35 Finally, petitioners point to Ms. Rutherford herself, who, they contend, would have been a model juror from the prosecution's prospective. We doubt our ability, or the ability of the parties, always to assess accurately whether a juror will be sympathetic to a particular side. To the degree that such an assessment can be made, it was not as clear to the district court (and is not as clear to us) as the petitioners claim it is to them that Ms. Rutherford would have been a model juror for the prosecution. Ms. Rutherford explained during voir dire that she had been in a car driven by a friend of a friend when the car was pulled over and the driver was arrested for drunk driving. Ms. Rutherford testified on the driver's behalf at a hearing, during which she was cross-examined by a member of the Contra Costa County District Attorney's Office, the same office that was prosecuting petitioners. Although she indicated that she believed the driver was fairly treated and that her experience with the police and in court was not bad, the district court concluded that it would be understandable if the prosecutor feared that her views might have been influenced by her experience with the criminal justice system in the same county in which she was now called to serve as a juror.