Opinion ID: 1292545
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Plaintiffs' Equal Protection Challenge

Text: We must first determine whether the Equal Protection Clause of Article I, Section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution requires any degree of population proportionality in the districts drawn for the election of superior court judges. We conclude that it does. The Equal Protection Clause of Article I, Section 19 of the State Constitution prohibits the State from denying any person the equal protection of the laws. Stephenson v. Bartlett, 355 N.C. 354, 377, 562 S.E.2d 377, 393 (2002). Equal protection requires that all persons similarly situated be treated alike. Richardson v. N.C. Dep't of Corr., 345 N.C. 128, 134, 478 S.E.2d 501, 505 (1996) (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982)). The Equal Protection Clause necessarily operates as a restraint on certain activities of the State that either create classifications of persons or interfere with a legally recognized right. See White v. Pate, 308 N.C. 759, 766-67, 304 S.E.2d 199, 204 (1983) (detailing the levels of scrutiny applied in equal protection analysis depending upon the type of classification or the right allegedly infringed). This Court's analysis of the State Constitution's Equal Protection Clause generally follows the analysis of the Supreme Court of the United States in interpreting the corresponding federal clause. However, in the construction of the provision of the State Constitution, the meaning given by the Supreme Court of the United States to even an identical term in the Constitution of the United States is, though highly persuasive, not binding upon this Court. Bulova Watch Co. v. Brand Distribs. of N. Wilkesboro, Inc., 285 N.C. 467, 474, 206 S.E.2d 141, 146 (1974) (citing State v. Barnes, 264 N.C. 517, 520, 142 S.E.2d 344, 346 (1965)). The right to vote is one of the most cherished rights in our system of government, enshrined in both our Federal and State Constitutions. See U.S. Const. amend. XV; N.C. Const. art. I, §§ 9, 10, 11. No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17, 84 S.Ct. 526, 11 L.Ed.2d 481 (1964). The right to vote on equal terms in representative electionsa one-person, one-vote standardis a fundamental right. Northampton Cty. Drainage Dist. No. One v. Bailey, 326 N.C. 742, 747, 392 S.E.2d 352, 356 (1990). Although federal courts have articulated that the one-person, one-vote standard is inapplicable to state judicial elections, there is considerable tension in the jurisprudence, as clearly illustrated by Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 111 S.Ct. 2354, 115 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991). Chisom first reaffirms that the one-person, one-vote constitutional standard used in legislative and executive branch elections does not apply to judicial elections. Id. at 402, 111 S.Ct. 2354 ([W]e have held the one-person, one-vote rule inapplicable to judicial elections .... (citing Wells v. Edwards, 409 U.S. 1095, 93 S.Ct. 904, 34 L.Ed.2d 679 (1973))). When the Supreme Court first held the rule inapplicable, it summarily affirmed a district court decision based on the rationale that `[j]udges do not represent people, they serve people.' Wells v. Edwards, 347 F.Supp. 453, 455 (M.D.La.1972) (quoting Buchanan v. Rhodes, 249 F.Supp. 860, 865 (N.D.Ohio), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 3, 87 S.Ct. 33, 17 L.Ed.2d 3 (1966), judgment vacated per curiam, 400 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1968)), aff'd mem., 409 U.S. 1095, 93 S.Ct. 904, 34 L.Ed.2d 679 (1973). Yet, even in Chisom, the Supreme Court observed that judges were representatives for purposes of the Federal Voting Rights Act. 501 U.S. at 401, 111 S.Ct. 2354 ([I]t seems both reasonable and realistic to characterize the winners [of judicial elections] as representatives of that [judicial] district.). Moreover, in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that elected members of the judiciary are separate from the enterprise of `representative government.' 536 U.S. 765, 784, 122 S.Ct. 2528, 153 L.Ed.2d 694 (2002). Thus, the Supreme Court has indicated both that judges are representatives and that they do not represent people. The presence of this seeming contradiction is not surprising. Judges are often called upon to disregard, or even to defy, popular sentiment, creating a fundamental tension between the ideal character of the judicial office and the real world of electoral politics. Chisom, 501 U.S. at 400, 111 S.Ct. 2354. That fundamental tension is manifested in the dueling conclusions that judges both are and are not representatives of the people. We agree with the Supreme Court that this tension cannot be resolved by crediting judges with total indifference to the popular will while simultaneously requiring them to run for elected office. Id. at 400-01, 111 S.Ct. 2354. Rather than wholly ignoring that tension, this Court acknowledges it by holding that our State's Equal Protection Clause requires a heightened level of scrutiny of judicial election districts. At the same time, we readily recognize that many important interests are relevant to the crafting of judicial districts aside from mere population numbers. For instance, [c]onvenience is an essential factor in arranging an effective judicial system, since it is often necessary for a judge to hear emergency measures. Buchanan, 249 F.Supp. at 864. The importance of this interest is reflected by the language used in our State Constitution requiring the legislature to divide the State into a convenient number of judicial districts. N.C. Const. art. IV, § 9. Further, there may be diversity in [the] type and number of cases ... in various localities and varying abilities of judges and prosecutors to dispatch the business of the courts. Stokes v. Fortson, 234 F.Supp. 575, 577 (N.D.Ga.1964). The General Assembly has recognized the importance of the convenience of the people when traveling to county courthouses. While superior court sessions are generally held in the convenient, centralized location of the county seat, the General Assembly has allowed sessions of superior court to be held in larger cities that are not county seats. See N.C.G.S. § 7A-42 (2007). Because there are many important policy interests to be weighed in addition to population, we agree with the Supreme Court that strict scrutiny according to the one-person, one-vote rule is inappropriate here. See Chisom, 501 U.S. at 402-03, 111 S.Ct. 2354. We conclude that judicial elections have a component that implicates the fundamental right to vote and a separate component that is ordinarily the province of the legislature, subject only to review for rationality by the courts. The right to vote on equal terms for representatives triggers heightened scrutiny, see Stephenson, 355 N.C. at 377-78, 562 S.E.2d at 393, even as the nonrepresentative aspects inherent in the role of the judiciary preclude strict scrutiny on a one-person, one-vote standard. Thus, neither rational basis nor strict scrutiny is an appropriate standard of review. Rather, we conclude the applicable standard lies somewhere in between. Federal equal protection analysis provides us with another framework under which plaintiffs' claims should be decided. Federal courts have applied intermediate scrutiny in cases involving semisuspect classes, such as distinctions based upon gender, Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (majority), 210-11, 97 S.Ct. 451 (Powell, J., concurring) (1976); undocumented alien children, Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223-24, 230, 102 S.Ct. 2382; and nonmarital children, Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461, 108 S.Ct. 1910, 100 L.Ed.2d 465 (1988). In Plyler, the Supreme Court determined the constitutionality of a Texas statute and school district policy that excluded funding for children who were not legally admitted into the United States and also authorized local school districts to deny enrollment of such students in the public schools. 457 U.S. at 205, 102 S.Ct. 2382. The Court noted that illegal immigrants are not a suspect class and public education is not a fundamental right guaranteed by the United States Constitution. Id. at 223, 102 S.Ct. 2382. After asserting that public education is not a right, the Court stated: But neither is it merely some governmental `benefit' indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation. Id. at 221, 102 S.Ct. 2382. Thus, considering the importance of education and how the statute at issue imposes a lifetime hardship on a discrete class of children not accountable for their disabling status, id. at 223, 102 S.Ct. 2382, the Court held that the statute can hardly be considered rational unless it furthers some substantial goal of the state, id. at 224, 102 S.Ct. 2382. The dissenting opinion in Plyler recognized that the Court had patch[ed] together bits and pieces of what might be termed [a] quasi-suspect-class and quasi-fundamental-rights analysis. Id. at 244, 102 S.Ct. 2382 (Berger, C.J., dissenting). Other federal courts have recognized that quasi-fundamental rights are subject to a higher level of scrutiny than rational basis and a lower level of scrutiny than strict scrutiny. See United States v. Harding, 971 F.2d 410, 412 n. 1 (9th Cir.1992) (stating that the Supreme Court in Plyler recognized that infringements on certain `quasi-fundamental' rights, like access to public education, also mandate a heightened level of scrutiny), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1070, 113 S.Ct. 1025, 122 L.Ed.2d 170 (1993); Lowrie v. Goldenhersh, 716 F.2d 401, 411 (7th Cir.1983) (stating that intermediate level review is limited to cases involving quasi-fundamental rights or quasi-suspect classes (citing John E. Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection GuaranteeProhibited, Neutral, and Permissive Classifications, 62 Geo. L.J. 1071, 1082 (1974))); Alma Soc'y Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1234 n. 18 (2d Cir.) (noting that quasi-fundamental interests are subject to intermediate scrutiny), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 995, 100 S.Ct. 531, 62 L.Ed.2d 426 (1979); Sam v. United States, 230 Ct.Cl. 596, 682 F.2d 925, 935 (1982) (stating that rational basis is the proper standard when neither fundamental nor quasi-fundamental rights are at stake), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1146, 103 S.Ct. 786, 74 L.Ed.2d 993 (1983); Houk v. Furman, 613 F.Supp. 1022, 1029 n. 3 (D.Me. 1985) (stating that commentators have noted that the application of intermediate scrutiny is limited to cases involving `a quasi-fundamental right or an almost suspect classification' (quoting Martin H. Redish, Legislative Response to the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: Constitutional Implications, 55 Tex. L.Rev. 759, 773 (1977))); Felix v. Milliken, 463 F.Supp. 1360, 1370 (E.D.Mich.1978) (recognizing that the Supreme Court in Craig v. Boren arguably put legislatures on notice that a substantially closer relationship between the means chosen and the goals sought to be promoted by virtue of those means would be required in the future, at least where `quasi-suspect' or `quasi-fundamental' rights were affected); Frederick L. v. Thomas, 408 F.Supp. 832, 836 (E.D.Pa.1976) (recognizing that education is a quasi-fundamental interest). The North Carolina Constitution calls for the election of superior court judges and thus guarantees an individual right of the people to vote in those elections. N.C. Const. art. IV, § 9. [A] constitution cannot be in violation of itself, and [] all constitutional provisions must be read in pari materia[.]  Stephenson, 355 N.C. at 378, 562 S.E.2d at 394 (internal citations omitted). Thus, although North Carolina is under no mandate to give its citizens the right to vote for superior court judges, once it has done so in its constitution, that provision must be construed in conjunction with the Equal Protection Clause to prevent internal conflict. See id. Stated simply, once the legal right to vote has been established, equal protection requires that the right be administered equally. See Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31, 5 S.Ct. 357, 28 L.Ed. 923 (1885) (stating that equal protection and security should be given to all under like circumstances in the enjoyment of their personal and civil rights). The dual nature of the nonrepresentative and representative aspects of elected superior court judges and the tensions inherent in any attempt to reconcile the right of the people to vote for superior court judges, the right to equal protection, and the legislature's duty to draw convenient districts prevent us from declaring the right asserted by plaintiffs to be fundamental and entitled to strict scrutiny. However, the right asserted by plaintiffs is literally enshrined in the North Carolina Constitution and, as such, is distinguishable from other citizenship privileges that receive rational basis review. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221, 230, 102 S.Ct. 2382 (majority). Accordingly, we hold that the right to vote in superior court elections on substantially equal terms is a quasi-fundamental right which is subject to a heightened level of scrutiny. Federal jurisprudence offers an analogous situation in the realm of free speech. Individuals have challenged laws on the theory that regulation of certain types of conduct impermissibly restricts the First Amendment right to free speech. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 370, 376-77, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968) (upholding a statute banning destruction of selective service cards when defendant asserted First Amendment right to protest the draft by doing so). Acts of symbolic speech, or expressive conduct, combine speech and nonspeech elements in the same course of conduct. See id. at 376, 88 S.Ct. 1673. The restriction on speech implicates fundamental First Amendment rights, even though regulation of nonspeech conduct is ordinarily subject only to rational basis review. The Supreme Court held that when protected speech is combined with generally unprotected conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms. Id. The Court then stated the level of scrutiny to be applied: [W]e think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. 391 U.S. at 377, 88 S.Ct. 1673. The Supreme Court has referred to this formulation as intermediate scrutiny. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 185, 117 S.Ct. 1174, 137 L.Ed.2d 369 (1997). In Turner, the Supreme Court, citing O'Brien, stated succinctly that an act reviewed under intermediate scrutiny will be sustained under the First Amendment if it advances important governmental interests unrelated to the suppression of free speech and does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to further those interests. Id. at 189, 117 S.Ct. 1174 (citing O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377, 88 S.Ct. 1673). Expressive conduct, which combines elements of a fundamental right with conduct generally subject to regulation reviewed only for a rational basis, is analogous to judicial elections, in that such elections combine representative and nonrepresentative aspects. We therefore apply a similar standard of intermediate scrutiny when considering equal protection challenges to judicial districts. Judicial districts will be sustained if the legislature's formulations advance important governmental interests unrelated to vote dilution and do not weaken voter strength substantially more than necessary to further those interests. We have already noted several important governmental interests, but decline to fashion an exhaustive list. In addition to compliance with federal voting rights laws, see Chisom, 501 U.S. at 404, 111 S.Ct. 2354, legitimate factors for the legislature's consideration include geography, population density, convenience, number of citizens in the district eligible to be judges, and number and types of legal proceedings in a given area. On remand, the parties are free to present other interests. We emphasize that a plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of considerable disparity between similarly situated districts in order to trigger constitutional review. In the instant case, plaintiffs have demonstrated gross disparity in voting power between similarly situated residents of Wake County. In Superior Court District 10A, the voters elect one judge for every 32,199 residents, while the voters of the other districts in Wake County, 10B, 10C, and 10D, elect one judge per every 140,747 residents, 158,812 residents, and 123,143 residents, respectively. Thus, residents of District 10A have a voting power roughly five times greater than residents of District 10C, four and a half times greater than residents of District 10B, and four times greater than residents of District 10D. No other subdivided district in the State comes close to the degree of disproportionality found in District 10. Even comparing District 10A with dissimilar districts throughout the State, the voting strength disparity between District 10A and the other subdivisions of District 10 is unique. According to documents filed with this Court, District 10A has the lowest resident-to-judge ratio of any district in the State, while District 10C has the second highest resident-to-judge ratio. [1] No other districts that divide a county have a voting strength disparity among the districts remotely approaching the ratios found in District 10. In order to make a prima facie showing of significant voting strength disparity, a plaintiff must demonstrate a disparity in voting power closely approaching the gross disparity in District 10 as divided into its four election districts, a phenomenon not currently present in any other judicial district in the State, as evinced by the record before us. In sum, plaintiffs have made the required prima facie showing, triggering the State's duty to demonstrate significant interests that justify the legislature's subdivisions within District 10 and to show that the disparity in voter strength is not substantially greater than necessary to accommodate those interests. In the event the trial court finds a violation of state equal protection law, it should defer initially to the General Assembly for resolution. See, e.g., Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 358 N.C. 605, 599 S.E.2d 365, 395 (2004) (recognizing our limitations in providing specific remedies for [constitutional] violations committed by other government branches in service to a subject matter ... that is within their primary domain). Accordingly, we remand this case to the Court of Appeals for further remand to the trial court with orders to hold a new hearing and determine whether the State can meet its burden as set forth in this opinion.