Opinion ID: 1114117
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Claim Against Commercial Union and Flood

Text: With regard to the claim of negligence against Commercial Union and Flood, the issue is whether in its contract with Taylor-Wharton, Commercial Union and its agent Flood assumed a duty to inspect the pipe stopper to determine whether it was properly secured to the vessel and that its jaws were not mismatched. Vernda Hicks argues that under the terms of the inspection agreement between Taylor-Wharton and Commercial Union and provisions of the ASME Code incorporated therein, Flood, as the agent of Commercial Union, had a duty to inspect the pipe stopper before the commencement of the hydrostatic test. In addition to the terms of the inspection services contract and the ASME Code, Vernda Hicks also relies on the deposition testimony of Wayne McCain, an expert who testified that under the ASME Code Flood had a duty to inspect the pipe stopper. Commercial Union argues generally that under the terms of the contract itself and in accordance with the testimony of its own experts, Flood had no duty as its agent to inspect the pipe stopper. Commercial Union insists that, although Vernda Hicks wants to characterize Flood as a safety inspector, under the terms of the contract and the ASME Code the duty of Commercial Union and Flood to inspect extended only to determining whether a vessel met ASME standards of quality. Vernda Hicks relies implicitly on the following general, common law principle: `Alabama clearly recognizes the doctrine that one who volunteers to act, though under no duty to do so, is thereafter charged with the duty of acting with due care and is liable for negligence in connection therewith.' Columbia Engineering Int'l, Ltd. v. Espey, 429 So.2d 955, 966 (Ala.1983) (quoting Dailey v. City of Birmingham, 378 So.2d 728, 729 (Ala.1979)). Because there was before the Court no evidence that during testing at the Taylor-Wharton facility Commercial Union or its agents ever actually inspected vessels, pipe stoppers, or any other testing equipment for safety, Vernda Hicks must show that Commercial undertook to do so under the provisions of its contract with Taylor-Wharton. Under the contract between Taylor-Wharton and Commercial Union, Commercial Union agreed to provide manufacturer, at the fabricating facility listed above or at the vendor's premises or field erection sites, inspection services meeting the requirements of the Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, hereinafter referred to as the `Code,' and the requirements of the National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors for Shop Inspection, Testing and Certification. Section UG-99 of the ASME Code deals with the conduct of a standard hydrostatic test. Vernda Hicks bases her argument in part on paragraph (j) of § UG-99: (j) Before applying pressure, the test equipment shall be examined to see that it is tight and that all low pressure filling lines and other appurtenances that should not be subjected to the test pressure have been disconnected. (Emphasis added.) Vernda Hicks submitted the expert testimony of Wayne McCain, who concluded that Flood was negligent in allowing the hydrostatic test to proceed with a defective pipe stopper. McCain testified also that a pipe stopper attached to a vessel during a hydrostatic test is at the time of the test a part of the vessel and that, therefore, the pipe stopper that killed John Hicks should have been inspected by Flood before the test. Commercial Union contends that Taylor-Wharton, not Flood, was responsible for examining the vessel. Commercial Union and Flood submitted expert testimony indicating that Flood was not a safety inspector for Taylor-Wharton and indicating that his sole responsibility was to inspect Taylor-Wharton boilers and vessels for compliance with ASME standards of quality. Commercial Union and Flood also submitted testimony that Taylor-Wharton, not Flood, was responsible for employee safety during the hydrostatic tests. Because Commercial Union contractually undertook to provide inspection services to Taylor-Wharton in accordance with the ASME Code, the provisions of the ASME Code determine whether Commercial Union had a duty to inspect the pipe stopper. The ASME Code variously states the respective duties of both the manufacturer and the inspecting authority. Paragraph (j) of § UG-99, however, does not stipulate whether the manufacturer or the inspector has the duty to examine the test equipment and determine that it is tight before pressurizing the vessel for the test. Because the ASME Code does not clearly specify whether the manufacturer or the inspector must perform the examination provided by paragraph (j) and because it is not clear whether the duty to examine the vessel to determine that it is tight encompasses a duty to inspect pipe stoppers, we hold that the conflicting expert testimony on this issue submitted by Commercial Union and Vernda Hicks creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Commercial Union and Flood owed the alleged duty of reasonable care. Therefore, the summary judgment was improper as to Commercial Union and Flood. As to the affirmative defense of contributory negligence asserted by Commercial Union and Flood, we conclude, as we have concluded with regard to Thaxton's assertion of this defense, that the circumstantial evidence is insufficient to warrant a finding that John Hicks was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. Based on the foregoing, we reverse the summary judgment in favor of Thaxton, Inc., Hy-Tech Machine, Inc., Commercial Union, and Flood. REVERSED AND REMANDED. MADDOX, ALMON, SHORES, HOUSTON, STEAGALL and KENNEDY, JJ., concur. INGRAM, J., concurs in the result. HORNSBY, C.J., and COOK, J., concur in part and dissent in part.