Opinion ID: 477838
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Parole Officer

Text: 8 Plaintiffs also appeal the district court's dismissal of their claim against Parole Officer Balazic. The crux of their claim is that 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 was violated when Balazic failed to immediately place Nave in custody upon learning that he had violated parole and had made threats against Linda Nelson. The district court, relying on Evans v. Dillahunty, supra, held that Balazic was entitled to absolute immunity. After analyzing the function of Parole Officer Balazic, we conclude that she was only entitled to qualified immunity. 9 The United States Supreme Court has stated that qualified immunity is the general rule in cases involving constitutional violations by government officials. Only in those exceptional situations where it is demonstrated that absolute immunity is essential for the conduct of the public business will absolute immunity be accorded. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. at 507, 98 S.Ct. at 2911. In Evans v. Dillahunty this court found that parole board members when deciding whether to grant, deny, or revoke parole are performing functions sufficiently comparable to those of judges to warrant absolute immunity. 711 F.2d at 831. 10 However, in Ray v. Pickett, 734 F.2d 370 (8th Cir.1984) we held that a parole officer was only entitled to qualified immunity for the role he played in the parole revocation process because the officer's function was not so intimately associated with the judicial process that it entitle[d] [him] to an absolute immunity. Id. at 373. See also Galvan v. Garmon, 710 F.2d 214 (5th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 949, 104 S.Ct. 2150, 80 L.Ed.2d 536 (1984). In Ray the probation officer allegedly falsified a report to the United States Parole Commission to secure a parole violator's warrant. We found that a probation officer does not perform an adjudicatory function when filing this report. This is precisely what distinguishes Ray from Evans. While the decision whether to grant parole is closely akin to that made by a judge, writing a parole report bears little resemblance to a judicial function. Likewise, Balazic's decision not to take Nave immediately into custody was not a quasi-judicial function. Nor was it a prosecutorial decision. Balazic's role in the parole revocation proceeding is not sufficiently analogous to the role of a prosecutor in initiating criminal proceedings to warrant absolute immunity. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. at 515, 98 S.Ct. at 2915; Ray v. Pickett, 734 F.2d at 374. Under Missouri law the decision whether to revoke parole is made by the parole board. The parole officer merely submits a report detailing how the parolee has violated his parole. Mo.Rev.Stat. Sec. 217.720 (Supp.1984). The statute also allows the officer to arrest a parolee who the officer believes has violated a condition of parole. Id. In this regard the parole officer performs a function closely analogous to that of a police officer when determining whether probable cause exists to make an arrest. Since Balazic's actions were functionally equivalent to those of a police officer she is only entitled to qualified immunity. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 1219, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967); Schlothauer v. Robinson, 757 F.2d 196, 197 (8th Cir.1985). 11 Having held that Balazic is only entitled to qualified immunity we must now determine whether her conduct violated clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). We believe that it did not. While plaintiffs may have a remedy in state court for negligent failure to warn, they have not suffered a violation of their constitutional rights. Although a Sec. 1983 claim has been described as 'a species of tort liability,' Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417, 96 S.Ct. 984, 988, 47 L.Ed.2d 128, it is perfectly clear that not every injury in which a state official has played some part is actionable under that statute. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 285, 100 S.Ct. 553, 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 481 (1979). Further, judicial review of a parole officer's decisions 'would inevitably inhibit the exercise of discretion,' United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701, 721 (CA 7 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146 [94 S.Ct. 900, 39 L.Ed.2d 102], id. 444 U.S. at 283, 100 S.Ct. at 558; and though the release of Nave from the prison was action by the State, the action of Nave later cannot be fairly characterized as state action. Id. at 285, 100 S.Ct. at 559. 12 Even assuming arguendo that a constitutional right was violated, and we specifically do not address this issue, Balazic should be immune because such right was not clearly established at that time. See Martinez. Accordingly, Balazic is immune from suit.III. CONCLUSION 13 Because we hold Moore and Duncan are entitled to absolute immunity and Balazic is entitled to qualified immunity, we affirm the district court's judgment on the pleadings.