Opinion ID: 4281393
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: R. Audit Servs., Inc. v. Tuttle , 2017 ND 68, 891 N.W.2d 757 (internal citations omitted).

Text: [¶8] Pettinger alleged the Estate wrongfully possessed his investment funds. Under N.D.C.C. § 28-01-16(4), “[a]n action . . . for the specific recovery of personal property must be commenced within six years after the claim for relief has accrued.” “Generally, the statute of limitations begins to run from the commission of the wrongful act giving rise to the cause of action; however, that rule is subject to a discovery rule.” Larson v. Midland Hosp. Supply, Inc. , 2016 ND 214, ¶ 11, 891 N.W.2d 364. The discovery rule postpones a claim’s accrual until the plaintiff knew, or with reasonable diligence should have known, of the wrongful act and its resulting injury. Id. (citing Wells v. First Am. Bank W. , 1999 ND 170, ¶ 10, 598 N.W.2d 834). Courts use an objective standard for the knowledge requirement under the discovery rule, focusing on whether the plaintiff was aware of facts that would place a reasonable person on notice a potential claim exists, without regard to the plaintiff’s subjective beliefs. Larson , at ¶ 11 (citing Wells , at ¶ 10). The determination of when a plaintiff’s cause of action has accrued is generally a question of fact, but if the relevant facts are undisputed, the determination is for the court. Larson , at ¶ 11. [¶9] Both parties agree that the applicable statute of limitations is six years and the issue on appeal is limited to when the limitations period began to run. In other words, when did Pettinger’s cause of action against his brother accrue? The parties agree to the relevant facts and contest only the legal significance of those facts. Pettinger argues the district court wrongfully concluded that there are no material questions of fact about when his cause of action arose, erred in concluding his cause of action arose in 2007, and erred in concluding his cause of action was time barred. [¶10] The district court concluded Pettinger’s cause of action accrued in 2007 and reasonable persons could reach only one conclusion from the evidence. After addressing the applicable law, including the discovery rule, the court provided the following analysis: Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Robert, Robert discovered that his brother James would not be returning the funds no later than 2007, when he definitively, by his own admission, had a serious conversation with James about the funds. After that conversation, James “walked away” after years of “putting it off” over and over again. Under these facts, there is no question that Robert was aware his brother intended to keep the money indefinitely. A reasonable person under the same circumstances should have known that a potential cause of action existed, because after repeatedly requesting the return of their funds, they had not been returned and the person who possessed them kept refusing to speak about the funds or release them for over ten years. . . . Robert discovered the cause of action in 2007, and therefore the cause of action began to accrue in 2007. A claim based on a taking of personal property has a statutory limit of six years. Because Robert did not file an action until long after 2013, his claim is statutorily barred. . . . The parties do not disagree about whether Robert asked for his funds back, or that James may have taken the funds, instead they disagree only about the legal significance of the events. As a result, the determination is for this Court. The Court finds that there is no dispute of facts regarding these incidents. A reasonable person would have [been] on notice that a cause of action existed. Robert gave funds to his brother, expecting them to be returned. The funds were not returned after years of asking. Robert chose to do nothing rather than investigate or exercise his legal rights. [¶11] Pettinger inquired about his money for years, and his brother refused to discuss the issue or return the funds. Pettinger testified in a deposition that in 2003 he approached his brother “four or five times, and he just kept putting it off and putting it off and putting it off.” Pettinger testified that later in 2003 he “called him a couple, two, three times and he just come up with some excuse every time.” Pettinger testified that a few years later in 2007 he had subsequent conversations with his brother about the funds: Q. Okay. And so at that point in time did you ask him for all your money back? A. Yeah. Q. And did he refuse? A. Right. Q. Tell me a little bit about— A. He just blew it off. He didn’t want to talk about it. . . . . Q. So this would have been 2006, 2007— A. Right. Q. — you had a serious conversation with him? A. Yeah. Q. Tell me about that. A. I brought it up to him and he didn’t want to talk about it. He just walked away. Q. What did you say to him? A. I told him I wanted my money. Q. And he didn’t give you your money. A. He just didn’t want to talk about it. . . . . Q. Did that concern you? A. Yes, very much so. . . . . Q. At that point were you concerned you weren’t going to get paid? A. I was very concerned, yes. Q. And that he wouldn’t hold up his end of the agreement? A. Right. And I probably should have done something legal at that point. . . . . Q. And then you had subsequent conversation after that in 2007, 2008, and again you didn’t get—he wouldn’t give you your money? A. Right. Q. And were you still concerned at that point in time that— A. Very concerned. [¶12] When Pettinger knew or should have known that his brother was unwilling to return the money would ordinarily be resolved as a question of fact. The district court concluded that because only one conclusion could be reached from the relevant facts, that particular question of fact could be answered as a matter of law. See A.R. Audit Servs., Inc. , 2017 ND 68, ¶ 5, 891 N.W.2d 757 (questions of fact may become questions of law when reasonable persons can reach only one conclusion from the evidence). We agree with the district court that only one conclusion can be reached from the evidence. A reasonable person under the same circumstances should have known a cause of action existed after repeatedly requesting a return of his or her funds for years without success. Pettinger knew or should have known his brother was not going to return the money no later than 2007 and his cause of action should have been brought no less than six years later. The district court did not err in concluding the six-year statute of limitations under N.D.C.C. § 28-01-16(4) barred Pettinger’s lawsuit.