Opinion ID: 2520945
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Cases Requiring Exhaustion of Internal Remedies

Text: We have in the past and continue to recognize the value of internal remedies. In Westlake, supra, 17 Cal.3d 465, 131 Cal.Rptr. 90, 551 P.2d 410, we held that a doctor must exhaust the internal remedies a private hospital offered before filing suit challenging the propriety of its decision to deny or withdraw her hospital privileges. Westlake noted that where the policy considerations which support the imposition of a general exhaustion requirement remain compelling, parties may be required to exhaust their administrative remedies even if they seek remedies not available through administrative action. ( Id. at p. 476, 131 Cal.Rptr. 90, 551 P.2d 410.) Rojo explained that [t]he `context' to which Westlake properly applies is where the party or entity whose `quasi-judicial' determination is challenged  be it hospital, voluntary private or professional association, or public entity  has provided an internal remedy. [Citations.] [¶] The reason for the exhaustion requirement in this context is plain.... `[W]e believe as a matter of policy that the association itself should in the first instance pass on the merits of an individual's application rather than shift this burden to the courts.' ... [¶] Though Westlake, supra, 17 Cal.3d 465, 131 Cal.Rptr. 90, 551 P.2d 410, concerned the exhaustion of private internal remedies, many courts have nevertheless relied on its reasoning to require exhaustion of `external' administrative remedies in a variety of public contexts. In so doing, the courts ... have expressly or implicitly determined that the administrative agency possesses a specialized and specific body of expertise in a field that particularly equips it to handle the subject matter of the dispute. ( Rojo, supra, 52 Cal.3d at pp. 86-87, 276 Cal.Rptr. 130, 801 P.2d 373.) Rojo observed that the Legislature did not intend to require employees filing non-FEHA discrimination claims in court to exhaust the Department's remedies. ( Rojo, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 86, 276 Cal.Rptr. 130, 801 P.2d 373.) We explained, a judge or jury is fully capable of determining whether discrimination has occurred. ( Id. at p. 88, 276 Cal.Rptr. 130, 801 P.2d 373.) However, the Legislature did intend that the plaintiffs who desire to pursue an FEHA remedy to have the benefit of the efficiency and expertise the Department and Commission bring to bear in investigating and determining [not reviewing determinations made by internal panels of the employer regarding] statutory discrimination cases.... ( Ibid. ) In Moreno v. Cairns (1942) 20 Cal.2d 531, 127 P.2d 914 ( Moreno ), we specifically recognized the exhaustion requirement with respect to the City Charter provision at issue in this case. We held that a coerced resignation fell under the unlawful discharge language of former section 112 1/2 of the City Charter, and that the plaintiff's failure timely to utilize the internal appeal procedure barred his writ of mandate to the superior court seeking reinstatement with the City fire department. The gist of Westlake, Rojo, and Moreno is a respect for internal grievance procedures and the exhaustion requirement where the Legislature has not specifically mandated its own administrative review process, as in the FEHA. [5] This court, however, has never held that exhaustion of an internal employer procedure was required where an employee made a claim under FEHA or another statutory scheme containing its own exhaustion prerequisite. The distinction is compelling.