Opinion ID: 1106265
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: When Does the Time Period Commence?

Text: The thirty day period begins to run from the date of issuance of the rendition warrant by the executive authority of the asylum state upon the demand of the demanding state. Bergen v. Carson, 417 So.2d 1081, 1082 (Fla. 1982); see also Bolton v. Timmerman, 233 S.C. 429, 433, 105 S.E.2d 518, 520 (1958). The period is tolled if habeas corpus proceedings are instituted by the prisoner. Whatever the effects of the provision, no discharge is allowed where the delay is attributable to the actions of the prisoner which challenge his extradition. Bowersox v. State, 790 S.W.2d 363, 365 (Tex. 1990); State v. Paskowski, 647 S.W.2d 238, 240 (Tenn.Cr.App. 1983). In the case sub judice, it should be noted that Godsey refused to waive extradition from Tennessee, in violation of his agreement in the terms of his Mississippi parole. Godsey challenged this issue in state and federal courts of Tennessee unsuccessfully. The same law is applicable here, but it is not necessary for this Court to delve into whether 18 U.S.C.A. § 3182 was violated as Godsey has already been returned to Mississippi. Once a prisoner has been returned to the demanding state, the legality of the extradition is no longer subject to legal attack. The proper place for a prisoner to complain about compliance with the extradition law was in the asylum state. State v. Allen, 450 So.2d 1378, 1389 (La. 1984); see also Siegel v. Edwards, 566 F.2d 958 (5th Cir.1978); State v. Flint, 171 W. Va. 676, 301 S.E.2d 765, 772 (1983). Tennessee was the proper place for a challenge to the legality of his detention. Godsey challenged that issue in the Tennessee courts; he cannot now repeat the same challenge in Mississippi.