Opinion ID: 1250040
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the scope of the domestic violence act

Text: Turning to the merits of William Ellibee's contentions, we must first determine whether the Domestic Violence Act was a proper vehicle for Lucille to obtain a protection order against her former husband in favor of Tolen, which is clearly a question of law. In making that determination, we keep in mind the Act's underlying goal, and the legislature's mandate of liberal construction: The purpose of this act is to address domestic violence as a serious crime against society and to assure the victims of domestic violence the protection from abuse which the law and those who enforce the law can provide. It is the intent of the legislature to expand the ability of the courts to assist victims by providing a legal means for victims of domestic violence to seek protection orders to prevent such further incidents of abuse. It is the intent of the legislature that the official response to cases of domestic violence shall stress the enforcement of the laws to protect the victim and shall communicate the attitude that violent behavior in the home is criminal behavior and will not be tolerated. The provisions of this chapter are to be construed liberally to promote these purposes. I.C. § 39-6302 (Supp. 1991) (emphasis added). [2] A statute is to be construed in consideration of the reason for the statute, its object and purpose and thereby ascertain and render effective the legislative intent. State v. Hoch, 102 Idaho 351, 352, 630 P.2d 143, 145 (1981). To buttress his argument that the Domestic Violence Act was inapplicable in this case, William quotes a portion of § 39-6306 which provides, [u]pon a showing that there is an immediate and present danger of domestic violence to the petitioner the court may, if requested order for a period not to exceed three (3) months that... . (Emphasis added). Since Lucille herself did not claim to be in any immediate danger, William argues, the court had no jurisdiction to enter the protection order. In order to determine what individuals the legislature intended to protect under the Act we must construe all applicable sections and provisions of the Act together. See Lebrecht v. Union Indem. Co., 53 Idaho 228, 22 P.2d 1066 (1933). The plain language of the Domestic Violence Act ostensibly includes children within its purview. The Act defines domestic violence as the physical injury, sexual abuse or forced imprisonment or threat thereof of a family or household member. I.C. § 39-6303(1). As originally enacted, the Act defined family or household member as spouses, former spouses, adult persons related by blood or marriage, persons who reside or have resided together, and persons who have a child in common regardless of whether they have been married or have lived together at any time. 1988 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 341, § 39-6303(2) (emphasis added). However, after I.C. § 39-6303(2) was amended in 1989, family or household member was defined as spouses, former spouses, persons related by blood or marriage, ... . conspicuously excluding the adult requirement, and implicitly including minor children under its authority. I.C. § 39-6303(2) (Supp. 1991) (emphasis added). Idaho Code § 39-6304(2) was also amended in 1989 to provide that [a] person may seek relief from domestic violence by filing a petition based on a sworn affidavit with the magistrates division of the district court, alleging that the person or a family or household member, whether an adult or a child, is the victim of domestic violence. I.C. § 39-6304(2) (Supp. 1991) (emphasis to show added language). Section 39-6304(2) also demonstrates that it is entirely consistent with the scheme of the Domestic Violence Act for Lucille to move in her own name as petitioner to protect her children. If any doubt remains on these points, it must be dispelled upon discerning the legislative intent behind the amendments. The introduction to the 1989 session law amendments specifically provide that I.C. §§ 39-6303 and 39-6304 were revised to redefine family or household member, and to provide expedient relief from domestic violence whether the victim is an adult or a child. 1989 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 136, p. 305. Apparently, the gist of William's contention is that because he had joint legal custody of his children, Judge Harden lacked authority to apply the Act. A review of the language of I.C. § 39-6306 cited by William demonstrates that that section confers upon courts the authority to temporarily affect child custody rights or visitation rights of parties even though prior custody orders are in force: Upon a showing that there is an immediate and present danger of domestic violence to the petitioner the court may, if requested, order for a period not to exceed three (3) months that: (a) Temporary custody of the minor children of the petitioner or of the parties be awarded to the petitioner or respondent if exercise of such jurisdiction is consistent with the provisions of section 32-1103, Idaho Code, and consistent with prior custody orders entered by a court of competent jurisdiction unless grounds exist pursuant to section 32-717, Idaho Code... . [3]