Opinion ID: 878810
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: issues

Text: As framed by the appellant, issue # 3 presents four sub-issues. All of them revolve around the admissibility of the confessions Barry Beach made to the Louisiana authorities. Defendant points out four grounds upon which he contends that the confessions are inadmissible. They are: A. That such statements were obtained as a result of defendant's arrest in his home without a warrant. B. Such statements were obtained after the defendant was denied his constitutional right to release on bail. C. Such statements were obtained after the defendant was denied his right to be taken before a magistrate or a judge and arraigned and advised of his rights. D. That the State failed its burden of proving the voluntariness of the statements. We address these issues in the above order. The defendant was arrested in his home on a charge of contributing to the delinquency of minors. This arrest was affected without a warrant. The United States Supreme Court has clearly stated that, absent exigent circumstances, a warrantless arrest for a minor (misdemeanor or nonviolent) crime cannot be made in the defendant's home without a warrant. Welsh v. Wisconsin (1984), ___ U.S. ___, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732; Payton v. New York (1980), 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639; Harris v. United States (1947), 331 U.S. 145, 67 S.Ct. 1098, 91 L.Ed. 1399; U.S. v. Prescott (9th Cir.1978), 581 F.2d 1343. In Brown v. Illinois (1975), 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416, the United States Supreme Court considered the admissibility of incriminating statements made by a defendant shortly after a warrantless arrest without probable cause. The Court held that the propriety of using statements following an improper arrest at trial required separate analysis under both the Fourth and Fifth Amendment:  Wong Sun [ v. United States (1963), 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441] requires not merely that the statement meet the Fifth Amendment standard of voluntariness but that it be `sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint' [Citations omitted.] ... Wong Sun thus mandates consideration of a statement's admissibility in light of the distinct policies and interests of the Fourth Amendment. The District Court examined the defendant's contentions and found that the confessions obtained were neither causally connected to the initial arrest nor involuntary. In reviewing the District Court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress we are restricted to examining the record to adduce whether it contains substantial credible evidence to support the findings, and to determine whether those findings were applied correctly as a matter of law, State v. Davison (1980), 188 Mont. 432, 439, 614 P.2d 489, 493; State v. Grimestead (1979), 183 Mont. 29, 598 P.2d 198. It is a general principle of constitutional law that statements and confessions made as a result of an unlawful incarceration are inadmissible, Taylor v. Alabama (1982), 457 U.S. 687, 102 S.Ct. 2664, 73 L.Ed.2d 314; Wong Sun v. United States, supra. But, there must be some causal connection between the original unlawful detention and the statements made, Taylor, supra, 457 U.S. at 690, 102 S.Ct. at 2667, 73 L.Ed.2d at 319. The District Court, addressing this connection stated the State has established that the statements were not the result of an exploitation of that illegality under the attenuation analysis of Wong Sun, supra, Brown v. Illinois [supra,]; [and] Dunaway v. New York [(1980), 442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824]. We affirm. The question under the first prong of this analysis is whether the evidence presented at trial was the result of an exploitation of the original illegality of the arrest. In making this judgment four factors must be considered: (1) the presence or absence of timely Miranda warnings; (2) whether there was an intervening independent act by the defendant or some third party; (3) the temporal proximity of the arrest and statement made; (4) the degree of the alleged Constitutional violation. Brown, supra, 422 U.S. at 603-04, 95 S.Ct. at 2261-2262, 45 L.Ed.2d at 426-427; Dunaway, supra at 442 U.S. 217-18, 99 S.Ct. at 2259, 60 L.Ed.2d at 839. There is substantial credible evidence in the record to support the District Court's conclusion that the defendant's confessions did not come about as a result of any alleged exploitation. First defendant was given ten Miranda warnings and executed several signed waivers thereof. As to the factor of temporal proximity, the defendant confessed more than three days after his initial arrest. This three day period is substantially longer than the several hour period discussed in Brown and Dunaway. In this regard, the United States Supreme Court's approach is to determine whether there was sufficient time for the defendant to overcome the unsettling affect that the arrest may have initially had, and to give him time to gather his thoughts. Three days appears to be enough time for this to have occurred. Furthermore, the defendant made an additional confession on January 11 in the presence of his attorney, five days after the initial arrest. This also negates any direct causal link between the anxiety causing effect of the arrest and the statement. The death threat the defendant made to Carolyn Beach can clearly be considered to be an intervening act to sever the chain of causality. Furthermore, this threat was a sufficient ground to continue the defendant in custody. As to defendant's allegation of police misconduct, the District Court specifically stated that there was no police misconduct. Again, though the record may support a differing interpretation, we find there is substantial credible evidence in the record to support this finding. Secondly, defendant argues that he was denied his constitutional right to release on bail. He alleges that Tim Beach went to the Ouachita Parish Correctional Center in order to bail the defendant out and was told by Sergeant Via and an assistant county attorney that Barry Beach would be released the next day, or that it was in the defendant's best interest to stay in jail in order to receive psychological counseling. These representations, defendant contends, had the effect of denying him his right to bail. Although the District Court did not specifically address this issue, we do not find defendant's argument to be persuasive. Assuming, arguendo, that the defendant had a constitutional right to bail, he does not show how it was denied. Bail had been set for the contributing to the delinquency of minors charge at $1,500 and was available to the defendant at the time. There is no allegation or evidence in the record that Tim Beach or anyone ever tendered bail money on behalf of the defendant. Neither the defendant, nor any of his representatives made any request for his bail to be reduced, or for a release on his own recognizance. By not diligently pursuing this right, he waived it. Furthermore, we simply cannot believe that the defendant was denied any right by several alleged misrepresentations on the part of the Louisiana authorities. In order for the defendant to persuasively argue that he was prejudiced by an alleged denial of a constitutional right, he first must show that the right was actually denied. In this regard we do not think it unreasonable to hold the defendant to a de minimis level of diligence in pursuing his rights. Thirdly, the defendant contends that his confession was obtained after he was denied his right to be taken before a magistrate or judge to be arraigned and advised of his rights. The defendant was originally incarcerated on the evening of January 4, 1983 on the contributing charge and was not brought before a magistrate for several days, until after he made his first confession. The rule in this regard is the McNabb-Mallory rule which requires the exclusion of any confession obtained as a result of unnecessary delay in the initial appearance. McNabb v. United States (1943), 318 U.S. 332, 63 S.Ct. 608, 87 L.Ed. 819; Mallory v. United States (1957), 354 U.S. 449, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479. The McNabb-Mallory rule is not based on any specific constitutional provision, but rather is a rule of supervisory control over federal courts, and has since been legislatively restricted, see 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1972). In State v. Benbo (1977), 174 Mont. 252, 570 P.2d 894, though, this Court adopted the McNabb-Mallory rule under our own supervisory power. The test as set forth in Benbo is the following: When a defendant bases a motion to suppress evidence upon a claim that he was not provided a prompt initial appearance, the burden is first on the defendant to show the delay was unnecessary. The district court should focus on the diligence of the persons who made the arrest in bringing the defendant before the nearest and most accessible judge. While the length of the time between arrest and initial appearance is not determinative of the `necessity' of the delay, it is a factor to be considered. Once a defendant has established the delay was unnecessary the burden shifts to the prosecution. The State must show the evidence obtained during the delay was not reasonably related to the delay. Absent such a showing the evidence will be excluded. (Relying on R.C.M. 1947 § 95-603(d)(3), now section 46-7-101, MCA); 174 Mont. at 262, 570 P.2d at 900. See also State v. Dieziger (Mont. 1982), 650 P.2d 800, 39 St.Rep. 1734. Addressing this point, the District Court stated the court finds that an unnecessary delay in arraignment was not established and even if it is assumed that there was such a delay, the State has still demonstrated the voluntariness of the defendant's statements by preponderance of the evidence. Under Benbo the defendant has the initial burden to show that the delay was unnecessary. This Court has applied this first element strictly and denied appeals of lower court denials of supression on motions made on this ground when the defendant failed to show the unnecessary nature of the delay. In State v. Plouffe (1982), 198 Mont. 379, 646 P.2d 533, we held that the defendant's burden in this respect is more than just pointing out that the authorities could have presented him earlier. See also State v. Lenon (1977), 174 Mont. 264, 570 P.2d 901. In one case where a similar delay was encountered, i.e. approximately five or six days, this Court found that the delay was not unnecessary, State v. Plouffe, supra. Here, the defendant does not contend any more than that the authorities could have presented him earlier. He fails to address the fact that various charges were being raised against him, investigated, and then some of them dropped. During this short period of time the Louisiana authorities had the right to keep him in custody, but their investigations had yet to produce a charge upon which the defendant could be presented. Furthermore, the period of time involved was not so long as to create any presumption of unreasonableness. We hold that the first element of Benbo was not met and that the defendant's statements should not be suppressed on this ground. As to the above point, the State contends that the Benbo rule should not be applied here because defendant was incarcerated in Louisiana and at that time subject to Louisiana law. The State points to Art. 230.1. of the Louisiana Code Crim.Proc. (West 1967), which provides that authorities have a seventy-two hour period before they are required to bring a suspect before a judge. In that statute, the remedy for the failure to do so is the release of the suspect. The statute specifically provides that a violation thereof does not require the automatic suppression of incriminating statements. The general rule is that, as to questions of evidence, the law of the forum controls, 16 Am.Jur.2d, Conflict of Laws § 131. This question is best characterized as being one of an application of the exclusionary rule, i.e. a rule of evidence. Thus Montana law should control. The State proposes that what actually is involved here is an application of substantive law, in which this Court should apply Louisiana law. This argument is not compelling for two reasons; first, the remedy requested by the defendant is not a remedy provided for by Louisiana law, but rather is a remedy provided by Montana evidence law; and secondly, we feel that whenever possible, defendants should be entitled to the fullest protection of Montana law when appearing in its courts. Finally, the defendant argues that the State failed to meet its burden of proving that the statements made by the defendant were voluntary. As stated above, when a defendant shows that his incarceration was initially illegal, the burden shifts to the State to show that the Fifth Amendment was not violated. In State v. Camitsch (Mont. 1981), 626 P.2d 1250, 1253, 38 St.Rep. 563, 565, we stated: In determining whether a confession should be suppressed, the trial judge must decide whether or not it was voluntary. [Citation omitted.] The determination of voluntariness depends upon the `totality of the circumstances,' with the burden of proof on the State to prove voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence. See also State v. Mercer (Mont. 1981), 625 P.2d 44, 47, 38 St.Rep. 312, 315; State v. Allies (Mont. 1980), 621 P.2d 1080, 1086-87, 37 St.Rep. 2089, 2097. The issue of voluntariness is largely a factual question committed to the district court's discretion. We will not reverse that court if its order is supported by substantial credible evidence, State v. Davison, supra, 188 Mont. at 439, 614 P.2d 493; State v. Grimestead, 183 Mont. supra at 29, 598 P.2d at 202. This case is especially one where the resolution of the voluntariness issue turns on the credibility of witnesses, and this Court must defer to the district judge who is in a superior position to judge the credibility of [those witnesses] ... State v. Camitsch, 626 P.2d at 1253, 38 St.Rep. at 566. One factor, not conclusive, supporting voluntariness is the presence of timely and complete Miranda advisements prior to the incriminating statement, State v. Allies (1979) 182 Mont. 323, 112, 606 P.2d 1043, 1050. The record indicates that the defendant received ten Miranda warnings between January 4 and January 11. Eight of these advisements and associated waivers were directly related to questioning in connection with the Nees murder. The defendant signed several waivers thereof. There was no evidence adduced that the defendant possessed less than average intelligence, or that by reason of mental impairment he was incapable of understanding the Miranda warnings. Sergeant Via and Commander Calhoun both testified that the defendant appeared calm, coherent and free from the influence of intoxicants during any of the interviews. The questioning sessions were not long, arduous, or designed to take advantage of the defendant's situation or fatigue. Via and Calhoun testified that no promises of benefit or threats of harm were made to the defendant. Particularly, defendant's allegation, disputed by Calhoun and Via, concerning Calhoun's fry comment was obviously not credited by the District Court. Furthermore, and most importantly, defendant made a statement on January 11 in the presence of his attorney and after opportunity to confer with him. Presumably, the Louisiana attorney had advised the defendant of his rights and consequences of waiving the same, and was diligent in protecting the defendant from coercion. The defendant has made no allegation that his Louisiana attorney failed in this regard and thus we have little difficulty holding that this confession was voluntary. On this point, the District Court found The statements of the defendant were voluntary and the voluntariness of the statements was obvious. The totality of the circumstances indicates the District Court did not err.