Opinion ID: 3063774
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: e vidence of p rior c ontrolled d rug b uys

Text: Watley argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of prior controlled drug buys not charged in the indictment. He argues that the evidence was extrinsic and that the government failed to provide notice, as required by the Federal Rules of Evidence, that it intended to admit that extrinsic evidence. He argues that the evidence of prior controlled buys was extrinsic evidence because the indictment charged him with cocaine possession on May 22, 2007, and evidence of prior drug sales on April 30, 2007 and May 18, 2007 was 2 not necessary to complete the story or explain the circumstances to the jury. Alternatively, he argues that the evidence should have been excluded because (1) it was not relevant; (2) the government did not prove that he sold drugs on the prior occasions; and (3) the probative value of showing that someone sold cocaine to the CI on those two occasions was outweighed by the prejudice of the inference that Watley had made those sales. We generally review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for a clear abuse of discretion, “revers[ing] only if the resulting error affected the defendant’s substantial rights.” United States v. Tinoco, 304 F.3d 1088, 1119 (11th Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted). “Evidence of other . . . acts is not admissible to prove . . . action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes . . . provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution . . . provide[s] reasonable notice . . . of the general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.” F ED. R. E VID. 404(b). “Evidence of criminal activity other than the charged offense is not extrinsic under Rule 404(b) if it is . . . necessary to complete the story of the crime, or [] inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offense.” United States v. Wright, 392 F.3d 1269, 1276 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Relevant evidence “may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 3 danger of unfair prejudice . . . .” F ED. R. E VID. 403. In reviewing Rule 403 determinations, we “look at the evidence in a light most favorable to its admission, maximizing its probative value and minimizing its undue prejudicial impact.” Tinoco, 304 F.3d at 1120 (quotation omitted). Since Watley was charged with possessing cocaine with intent to distribute, the government was entitled to establish, through circumstantial evidence, Watley’s knowledge of the cocaine at the house and knowledge of, if not direct participation in, the drug distributions that occurred there. See United States v. Hernandez, 896 F.2d 513, 520 (11th Cir. 1990) (knowledge, possession, and intent to distribute “can be proven by . . . circumstantial evidence”). The evidence of prior controlled buys explained Watley’s knowledge of the drugs and their distribution at the house. It also explained why the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Off ce continued investigating the house and obtained a search warrant. Since the evidence was relevant and necessary to complete the story for the jury, it was not extrinsic evidence under Rule 404(b), and the government was not required to provide notice under that rule. Nor was the evidence unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403. The government was entitled to prove its case circumstantially. The evidence could negate an inference that the drugs belonged to someone else, or that someone else was selling 4 drugs at the house. Thus, the evidence was not unfairly prejudicial. The district court did not clearly abuse its discretion by admitting it.