Opinion ID: 78332
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The June 19, 2007 Statement

Text: Lopez-Garcia argues that the statements he made to Officer Diaz on June 19, 2007 should have been suppressed for two reasons. First, he claims that the statements were tainted under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine by the violation of his Fourth Amendment rights that occurred when he was initially stopped and arrested by Officer Maldonado. Second, he claims that Officer Diaz violated his Fifth Amendment rights by failing to Mirandize him prior to the interview. Lopez-Garcia's Fourth Amendment fruit of the poisonous tree argument plainly collapses since, as we have just explained, his Fourth Amendment rights were never violated. Since his seizure and arrest were constitutional, neither of his subsequent statements was tainted by those events. But, even if Lopez-Garcia's Fourth Amendment rights had been violated, his statements were too attenuated from his arrest to be regarded as fruit of the poisonous tree. In determining whether evidence is tainted by a prior violation of constitutional rights, we ask whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint. United States v. Delancy, 502 F.3d 1297, 1309 (11th Cir.2007) (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963)). This inquiry is fact-sensitive, and no single fact is decisive. However, we have enumerated three non-exclusive factors to guide the inquiry into whether a defendant's consent was tainted by his illegal arrest: [1] the temporal proximity of the seizure and the consent, [2] the presence of intervening circumstances, and, particularly, [3] the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Based on examination of these factors, we agree with the district court's conclusion that Lopez-Garcia's statements to Diaz were too removed from the arrest to have suffered any taint. To begin with, the temporal proximity between the two events is limited: Lopez-Garcia's statements to Diaz were not made until the day after the arrest. To be sure, there is no hard-and-fast rule for determining how much time must have passed before the link between an unlawful arrest and a confession can be considered sufficiently attenuated. Id. at 1310. Nevertheless, we have said that [i]f only a short period of time has passed, a court is more likely to consider the consent as a `poisonous fruit' of the illegal act. Id. Thus, we have observed that the amount of time found sufficient to meet the temporal proximity factor ranges from immediate or `close in time,' to three minutes, to two hours. Lawhorn v. Allen, 519 F.3d 1272, 1291 (11th Cir.2008) (citations omitted); United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1280 (11th Cir.2003) (period of three minutes between constitutional violation and confession favored exclusion). When compared with these other decisions, the temporal proximity in this case militates against a finding that Lopez-Garcia's statements were tainted. See also United States v. Stark, 499 F.3d 72, 76 (1st Cir. 2007) (confession made two days after the illegal search was arguably a sufficient amount of time for [the defendant] to reflect on his predicament and determine whether he wanted to speak with an attorney before making any further statements, even though the defendant was in custody the entire time). The second factorthe presence of intervening circumstancesalso supports the argument that the June 19 statements were untainted. Among other things, Lopez-Garcia's arrest on June 18 and his questioning on June 19 were conducted by different individualsMaldonado effected the arrest and Diaz performed the interview and Diaz's questioning pertained to a specific and circumscribed issue (Lopez-Garcia's immigration status) completely distinct from the subject of his arrest (suspected drug activity). Finally, the purpose and flagrancy factors also militate against finding that the June 19 statements were tainted by the arrest. Nothing in the record suggests that the stop of Lopez-Garcia's vehicle and then his arrest, were motivated by an ulterior purpose to determine Lopez-Garcia's immigration status or to prosecute him for being in the country illegally. Nor does the record indicate any flagrant behavior by Officer Maldonado or anyone else involved in Lopez-Garcia's arrest and interrogation. There is not the slightest hint in the record that Maldonado attempted to coerce, intimidate, or trick Lopez-Garcia in any way. Maldonado spoke in Spanish so that Lopez-Garcia would understand him, and he obtained Lopez-Garcia's consent before searching him and his car. Nor is there any suggestion that Officer Diaz's inquiry on June 19 was in any way designed to coerce or trick the defendant. Thus, even if we were to assume that the underlying arrest violated Lopez-Garcia's Fourth Amendment rights, there is no basis for concluding that the violation tainted the statements he made to Diaz regarding his immigration status. Nor are we persuaded by Lopez-Garcia's argument that his statements on June 19 should be suppressed because, by failing to Mirandize him beforehand, Officer Diaz violated his Fifth Amendment rights. The Fifth Amendment provides that [n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.... U.S. Const. amend. V. It is well established that the privilege against self-incrimination protects an individual not only from being involuntarily called as a witness against himself in a criminal prosecution but also privileges him not to answer official questions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings. Harrison v. Wille, 132 F.3d 679, 682 (11th Cir.1998) (quoting Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77, 94 S.Ct. 316, 38 L.Ed.2d 274 (1973)). In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the Supreme Court held that protecting a suspect's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination requires that he be warned prior to custodial interrogation that he has the right to remain silent and to have an attorney present. A defendant is in custody for the purposes of Miranda when there has been a `formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.' United States v. Brown, 441 F.3d 1330, 1347 (11th Cir.2006) (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983)). Interrogation, under Miranda means `any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.' United States v. Gomez, 927 F.2d 1530, 1538 (11th Cir.1991) (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980)). The Supreme Court has defined an incriminating response as any response whether inculpatory or exculpatorythat the prosecution may seek to introduce at trial. Innis, 446 U.S. at 302 n. 5, 100 S.Ct. 1682 (emphasis omitted). Here, the parties do not dispute whether Lopez-Garcia was in custody at the time of the interview. Instead, they join issue over whether Diaz's discussion with Lopez-Garcia amounted to an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda. That question boils down to whether Diaz should have known that his questions were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from Lopez-Garcia. Under these circumstances, we do not believe that Diaz should have known that Lopez-Garcia was reasonably likely to make self-incriminating statements during the June 19 interview. To begin with, Diaz had no reason to believe that Lopez-Garcia would confess to having illegally reentered the country. Although Diaz was aware prior to the interview that Lopez-Garcia had not been born in the U.S., he had no reason to believe that Lopez-Garcia had been deported, and still less reason to believe that he had reentered the country illegally. Indeed, Diaz specifically testified to this effect at the suppression hearing. On cross-examination Diaz was asked: So when you talk with a person regarding their immigration status, you recognized that it is possible you may be discussing criminal conduct with them, right? Diaz responded: Yes, but I do check before that, of course; I have to make sure none of that can happen. I did my checks and nothing came up. Thus, Lopez-Garcia is simply incorrect in suggesting that Diaz's questions were likely on their face to result in self-incrimination. Based on the information available to him, Diaz should not have thought it especially likely that Lopez-Garcia would admit to having committed a crime. Nor did Diaz have any basis for believing that Lopez-Garcia would be prosecuted for that offense. As we've noted, the underlying charge for which Lopez-Garcia had been arrested and incarcerated was not immigration-related, and Diaz's questioning of Lopez-Garcia was not initiated for law enforcement purposes. Diaz was simply tasked with facilitating the removal of individuals illegally present in the country; deciding whether to bring criminal charges was, as he put it, not his call. We conclude, therefore, that no Miranda warning was necessary prior to the June 19 interview.