Opinion ID: 77432
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Improper Search and Seizure

Text: 40 Smith argues that the photographs in question were seized pursuant to an unconstitutional search without a warrant, and therefore should not have been admitted at trial. The district court determined that the plain view exception to the warrant requirement authorized the seizure. Review of a district court's denial of a motion to suppress is a mixed question of law and fact. United States v. Holloway, 290 F.3d 1331, 1334 (11th Cir.2002). We review the district court's factual findings for clear error and construe those facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. Id. The application of law is reviewed de novo. Id. We agree with the district court that, because the search of the premises and lockbox was valid and the seizure was legitimately conducted pursuant to the plain view doctrine, Smith's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated and the photographs were lawfully admitted at trial. 14 41 The plain view doctrine permits a warrantless seizure where (1) an officer is lawfully located in the place from which the seized object could be plainly viewed and must have a lawful right of access to the object itself; and (2) the incriminating character of the item is immediately apparent. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 2308, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990); United States v. Hromada, 49 F.3d 685, 690 n. 11 (11th Cir.1995). The plain view doctrine allows police officers to seize any contraband in plain view if the officers have a right of access to the place where the contraband is located. United States v. Rodgers, 924 F.2d 219, 221 (11th Cir.1991). An example of the applicability of the `plain view' doctrine is the situation in which the police have a warrant to search a given area for specified objects, and in the course of the search come across some other article of incriminating character. Horton, 496 U.S. at 135, 110 S.Ct. at 2307 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2037, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) (opinion of Stewart, J.) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The officers, however, must have probable cause to believe that the object in plain view is contraband. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 2137, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993) (If . . . the police lack probable cause to believe that an object in plain view is contraband without conducting some further search of the object—i.e., if `its incriminating character [is not] immediately apparent,'—the plain-view doctrine cannot justify its seizure. (second alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Horton, 496 U.S. at 136, 110 S.Ct. at 2308 (quoting Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 466, 91 S.Ct. at 2038 (opinion of Stewart, J.)))). 42 Here, the officers were lawfully at the Smith residence pursuant to an unchallenged search warrant authorizing the officers to search for and seize evidence of illicit drug activity. The warrant specifically authorized the officers to seize photographs that would be probative to establish residency. The officers, alerted to the lockbox by a narcotics dog, were justified in searching it for evidence of drugs—either because a lockbox could reasonably contain drugs or related paraphernalia, United States v. Wuagneux, 683 F.2d 1343, 1352 (11th Cir.1982) ([A] search may be as extensive as reasonably required to locate the items described in the warrant.), or because the narcotics canine alerted the officers to the lockbox, United States v. Banks, 3 F.3d 399, 402 (11th Cir.1993) (Our circuit has recognized that probable cause arises when a drug-trained canine alerts to drugs.)—or photographs, as authorized by the warrant. It was through the lawful execution of the warrant that the officers came across the photographs at issue here. The only remaining question, then, is whether it was immediately apparent to the officers—whether they had probable cause to believe—that among what they found in the lockbox, was evidence of child pornography. 43 In dealing with probable cause . . . we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. . . . `The substance of all the definitions' of probable cause `is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt.' Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1310, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161, 45 S.Ct. 280, 288, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925) (quoting McCarthy v. Dearmit, 99 Pa. 63, 69 (1881) (internal quotation marks omitted))); see also United States v. $242,484.00, 389 F.3d 1149, 1160 (11th Cir.2004) (en banc). Although we must decide the legal issue of whether probable cause exists ourselves, we do give weight to the inferences that law enforcement agents draw from the facts. . . . United States v. $242,484.00, 389 F.3d at 1162. Officer Mayo testified, and the district court found credible, that some of the girls in the photographs looked extremely young, very very young. He thought it was very obvious that the girls were younger than eighteen. This testimony was confirmed by Detective Julie Dickie, a detective with extensive experience investigating sex crimes and child abuse. Detective Dickie testified that some of the females in the photos were clearly minors with one likely as young as eleven. Neither Officer Mayo nor Detective Dickie needed to have been correct in their assessment in order for probable cause to have existed. Nor must Officer Mayo have been a sex crimes expert—we are only concerned with what a reasonable and prudent officer might have perceived and inferred. That the district court believed that Officer Mayo saw photographs, which he perceived obviously to contain sexually explicit images of very young girls, is sufficient to make out a reasonable ground for belief of guilt. 15 44 Smith makes several other arguments as to why it could not have been immediately apparent to the officers that the photos were evidence of a crime. First, he alleges that there was no evidence that the officers knew that Smith's conduct met the technical requirements of the statute (namely, that he produc[ed] the photographs as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2256, that he had the necessary mens rea, and that the photographs either traveled in interstate commerce or were made using materials that traveled in interstate commerce). As stated, probable cause is not based on knowledge of legal technicalities, but rather on whether there is a reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed. There is no rule of law which requires an officer to know with absolute certainty that all elements of a putative crime have been completed when he seizes an article which reasonably appears to be incriminating evidence. United States v. Slocum, 708 F.2d 587, 605 (11th Cir.1983) (quoting United States v. Woods, 560 F.2d 660, 664 (5th Cir.1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Herzbrun, 723 F.2d 773, 775 (11th Cir.1984) ([P]robable cause must not be judged with clinical detachment, but with a common sense view to the realities of normal life.). Officer Mayo could reasonably have believed that the sexually explicit photographs of what he observed to be very young girls were evidence of a crime—either state, see Fla. Stat. Ann. § 847.0137 (West 2006) (criminalizing transmission of child pornography as a third degree felony), or federal—without knowing whether the legal technicalities of those crimes had, in fact, been satisfied. 45 Second, Smith contends that because the officers did not look at each photo, it could not have been immediately apparent that the ones not viewed were evidence of a crime. Even if this were true, the argument would say nothing about whether it was immediately apparent that the photographs that the officers did actually view were properly seized. Regardless, this argument has been raised before and has been rejected by this court. See United States v. Blum, 753 F.2d 999, 1002 (11th Cir.1985) (The appellant argues that there is no way the agent could immediately have recognized a box full of miscellaneous papers as evidence without going through the box and reading each item to determine its evidentiary importance. . . . Once the agents saw [some of the evidence, however,] the evidentiary value of these would be apparent.); Slocum, 708 F.2d at 606 (In these circumstances, to require a seizing officer to examine individually each document within a file or bound volume `would substantially increase the time required to conduct the search, thereby aggravating the intrusiveness of the search.' Since the individual documents contained in the file could be legitimately seized under the plain view exception, [the officer] acted reasonably in ordering the seizure of the entire file. (citations omitted) (quoting Wuagneux, 683 F.2d at 1353 (quoting United States v. Beusch, 596 F.2d 871, 876 (9th Cir.1979) (internal quotation marks omitted)))). Nor is it problematic that some of the pictures turned out to be of adult women—the scope of the plain view doctrine extends to the seizure of items that, while not contraband themselves, may be used as evidence against a defendant. See United States v. Ladson, 774 F.2d 436, 439 (11th Cir.1985) (stating that, for the plain view exception to apply, it must have been immediately apparent that the item was evidence, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure (emphasis added)). Accordingly, Office Mayo did not need to know if all the photographs were of child pornography. For that matter, he did not need to know that any were of child pornography. Rather he had to have had probable cause to believe that among the photographs, some were illegal. Having seen photos he reasonably believed to be child pornography, he had probable cause to presume, without going through each individually, that there were others among the group of photographs in the same lockbox that were either themselves child pornography or evidence thereof. 46 Finally, Smith relies on the fact that the testimony differed regarding the number of pictures seized—ranging from 200 to 500 at the suppression hearing to 1,768 at trial—and no accounting of what was seized, to challenge the officer's assertion that it was immediately apparent that the photographs were illicit. In Smith's view, if the number of photos was not immediately apparent, there is nothing about them that could reliably be considered immediately apparent. We believe, however, that the discrepancy in testimony goes solely to the credibility of the witnesses —the (un)reliability of whom does not necessarily extend from the number to the nature of the photographs. Even if we could presume that the numerical discrepancy makes the officers' testimony with respect to the number of photographs inherently unreliable, we cannot presume that the court committed clear error in crediting the officers' testimony in finding that it was immediately apparent that some of the photos—however many there were—were child pornography. 47 Because the officers could lawfully search the premises, the lockbox, and the photographs, and because the district court could reasonably find that it was immediately apparent to the officers that the photographs were evidence of a crime, their seizure was authorized by the plain view doctrine and they were lawfully admitted into evidence.