Opinion ID: 2618245
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 32

Heading: Comment on a Defendant's Silence by Other Than a Prosecutor

Text: (35) As we discussed, ante, at pages 153-154, a prosecutor may not comment on a defendant's failure to testify. ( Griffin, supra, 380 U.S. 609.) Defendants argue, and the People concede, that the rule is not limited to prosecutorial comment. Thus, in a joint trial of multiple codefendants, comment by an attorney representing one defendant on the silence of a codefendant violates the codefendant's constitutional right to freedom from adverse comment on his silence at trial. ( People v. Jones (1970) 10 Cal. App.3d 237, 243-244 [88 Cal. Rptr. 871] [affirming trial court ruling prohibiting defendant from commenting on codefendant's silence]; People v. Haldeen (1968) 267 Cal. App.2d 478, 481 [73 Cal. Rptr. 102] [affirming grant of new trial on this ground]; U.S. v. Castro (9th Cir.1989) 887 F.2d 988, 997 [harmless error]; U.S. v. Mena (11th Cir.1989) 863 F.2d 1522, 1533-1534 [same]; U.S. v. Patterson (9th Cir.1987) 819 F.2d 1495, 1506 [same]; United States v. Moreno-Nunez (9th Cir.1979) 595 F.2d 1186, 1187 [same]; United States v. Alpern (7th Cir.1977) 564 F.2d 755, 761 [same]; De Luna v. United States (5th Cir.1962) 308 F.2d 140 [pre- Griffin ; reversible error]; 75A Am.Jur.2d (rev.) Trial, § 586, pp. 180-181; but see U.S. v. Anderson (8th Cir.1989) 879 F.2d 369, 379, fn. 4 [declining to resolve issue].) When improper comment on a defendant's silence occurs, the error requires reversal of the judgment unless a reviewing court concludes the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ( United States v. Hasting, supra, 461 U.S. at pp. 507-509 [76 L.Ed.2d at pp. 105-106]; Hovey, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 572.) Although it is error for either the prosecutor or counsel for a codefendant to comment on a defendant's silence, we recognize that the identity of the speaker can make a difference when determining whether an improper remark was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, a comment alluding to the silence of a defendant that would require reversal if made by a prosecutor may be deemed harmless  or even not error  if made by a codefendant's attorney. Two factors convince us to recognize this difference. First, although a defendant has a Fifth Amendment right to freedom from adverse comment on his silence, a codefendant has a concurrent Sixth Amendment right to a full and vigorous defense. Courts balancing these two rights have thus concluded that oblique or indirect references by a codefendant to a defendant's silence, while improper, do not require reversal. ( U.S. v. Castro, supra, 887 F.2d at p. 997 [indirect reference deemed harmless]; U.S. v. Patterson, supra, 819 F.2d at p. 1506 [statements only indirectly referred to defendants' failure to testify; error deemed harmless]; United States v. Alpern, supra, 564 F.2d at p. 761 [isolated and oblique reference to his codefendants' failure to take the stand]); United States v. Shuford (4th Cir.1971) 454 F.2d 772, 779 [oblique references may be harmless].) In other words, [improper comment] by counsel for codefendant does not constitute reversible error where the reference is indirect and the defendants' positions are not antagonistic, or where there is substantial incriminating evidence against all defendants. (75A Am.Jur.2d (rev.) Trial, § 586, p. 180, fns. omitted.) Thus, the rule permits a codefendant to emphasize to the jury that his credibility is strong because he took the stand and submitted to cross-examination. In addition, if such argument indirectly or obliquely refers to a codefendant's silence, the error is generally found harmless. For example, in U.S. v. Patterson, supra, 819 F.2d 1495, counsel for defendant Patterson, who testified, argued: `[Patterson] is different than the other defendants in this case. He's different for one reason among many, but the one reason is that he has taken the stand and faced his accusers. He's allowed himself to be cross-examined. He has no obligation to do that in this country. [¶] ... [¶] The point that I am making is that when you gauge ... [Patterson's] testimony and his courage in taking the stand, and any nervousness that you may have seen, you have to put him in the context in which he is testifying. He has no protection. He is totally exposed and he is at the mercy of you 12 people.' ( Id. at p. 1506.) The Patterson court ruled that while counsel's comments were improper, they did not cross the line of reversible error. The statements only indirectly referred to the [other] defendants' failure to testify. They do not benefit Patterson at the expense of the other defendants. Nor do they stress any inference that the defendants were guilty because they chose to remain silent. ( U.S. v. Patterson, supra, 819 F.2d at p. 1506.) After noting the jury was properly instructed not to infer guilt from the failure to testify, the court concluded the error was harmless. A second reason why comment by a codefendant's counsel on a defendant's silence is different from comment by a prosecutor is the unique role a prosecutor plays in a criminal trial. Given the prosecutor's institutional role, when the prosecutor merely `comments' on the failure of an accused to testify, the reference is in all likelihood calculated to encourage the jury to equate silence with guilt; reasonable judicial economy thus permits a finding of reversible error. When the `comment' comes from an actor (such as counsel for a codefendant) without an institutional interest in the defendant's guilt, however, it would be inappropriate to find reversible error as a matter of course. Instead, the court should ask whether the comment actually or implicitly invited the jury to infer guilt from silence. ( U.S. v. Mena, supra, 863 F.2d at p. 1534, italics in original.) (36) We agree with the Mena court's assessment and apply those principles to Stone's comments in this case. The first comment (Mr. Lasting got up, had a chance to cross-examine everyone of them ) was arguably aimed at insinuating that codefendant Morgan was disadvantaged because he was unable to question Reilly, one of his principal accusers. Lasting's objection, however, prevented Stone from finishing the thought and in the subsequent discussion in chambers, the trial court made clear that Stone was prohibited from commenting on Hardy's and Reilly's silence. Under any standards, then, the first challenged statement did not run afoul of Griffin, supra, 380 U.S. 609. Stone's next questionable remark concerned his inability to know Reilly's version of the lunchtime conversation with Morgan. Although the comment (We have to guess at what Mr. Reilly's side of that conversation was....) arguably alluded to the fact that Reilly did not testify, the reference is clearly tangential and indirect. We conclude that, even if improper, the comment does not require reversal of Reilly's conviction. Moreover, because Hardy was not mentioned at all, this remark does not implicate his rights under Griffin, supra, 380 U.S. 609, and its progeny. The most troublesome statement Stone made in his closing argument was this: If you know a man has nothing to hide, he gets up on that witness stand and he tells you what's on his mind.... But [Morgan] can't get the one person that's accusing him to tell him what went on. This statement most clearly illustrates the difference between prosecutorial comment and comment by another defense attorney. If the challenged statement was made by the prosecutor, it might constitute reversible error as to Reilly [15] because, coming from a prosecutor, the probable meaning of the statement is a call to the jury to improperly infer guilt from Reilly's silence. Coming from a prosecutor, it might be difficult to conclude the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The remark here, however, was uttered by a lawyer for a codefendant. We thus cannot be so quick to conclude Stone necessarily intended the prohibited inference. Instead, the comment is subject to the equally plausible interpretation that the jury should believe Morgan's testimony because he took the stand and subjected himself to cross-examination. Indeed, that is how the trial court interpreted the remark. Under such circumstances, [we] should ask whether the comment actually or implicitly invited the jury to infer guilt from silence. ( U.S. v. Mena, supra, 863 F.2d at p. 1534, italics in original.) It is clear Stone did not actually ask the jury to infer Reilly was guilty because of his silence. Instead, he said If you know a man has nothing to hide, he gets up on that witness stand and he tells you what's in his mind. And that's what Cliff did.  (Italics added.) After emphasizing that Morgan was cross-examined by the prosecutor, Stone continued: that's the soul of a man who's been in jail for two years for a crime he did not commit; he has wasted away physically and mentally, and he is frustrated. But he can't get the one person that's accusing him to tell him what went on. That's why Mr. Morgan looks the way he does.  (Italics added.) Thus, rather than urging the jury to infer Reilly was guilty because he declined to testify, Stone instead used Reilly's silence to embellish his point that Morgan was frustrated and that was why he looked drawn and haggard. Nor can we conclude Stone's comments implicitly invited the jury to draw prohibited inferences. Although the nothing to hide comment conceivably could be construed as an improper comment on Reilly's silence, the interpretation is a tenuous one. Moreover, we are not privy to Stone's vocal inflections or gestures. As a result, we must rely on the interpretation of the trial judge, who was present and better able to discern the true meaning of a statement which appears ambiguous on the face of the cold record. (Cf. People v. Sanders (1990) 51 Cal.3d 471, 501 [273 Cal. Rptr. 537, 797 P.2d 561] [when ruling on a motion to quash the jury venire, we grant considerable deference to trial judges because of `their powers of observation, their understanding of trial techniques, and their broad judicial experience'].) Significantly, the trial judge  who was sensitive to defendants' Griffin claim and directed Stone not to comment on their silence  found Stone was not insinuating defendants were guilty because they remained silent. Instead, the court concluded: All he is saying is that Mr. Morgan has nothing to hide and that's why he got up on the witness stand and testified. We agree and conclude the challenged statement did not implicitly urge the jury to draw a prohibited inference. On these facts, then, we find no Griffin error. Even were we to find some impropriety, any misstep in this regard must be considered harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ( United States v. Hasting, supra, 461 U.S. at pp. 507-509 [76 L.Ed.2d at pp. 105-106].) To paraphrase the high court, we ask whether, absent Stone's allusion to Hardy and Reilly's failure to testify, is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have returned a verdict of guilty? ( Id. at pp. 510-511 [76 L.Ed.2d at p. 107].) We must answer that question in the affirmative. As we explained, ante, at page 154, the evidence of guilt was overwhelming, consisting of the testimony of numerous witnesses who, by and large, complemented each other, reinforcing their credibility. Both Hardy and Reilly admitted their guilt to others. There was physical evidence that was consistent with the stories of the various persons involved (fish knife, blood on the shoe, bolt cutters, coin collection, diamonds from the ring, rifle), evidence of opportunity (Hardy's alibi was undercut when Colette Mitchell changed her story), evidence of intent (several people knew of the insurance policies, the first attempt with Marc Costello), and payment (Sean Fitzgerald counted out $2,500 that Morgan gave Reilly). Significantly, the trial court instructed the jury at the guilt phase of the trial not to draw any adverse inference of guilt from the fact that neither Hardy nor Reilly testified. (See United States v. Patterson, supra, 819 F.2d at p. 1506 [citing trial court's admonishment on this point in support of its conclusion the error was harmless].) Under these circumstances, we find any error harmless. Because we find it certain beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have convicted defendants even absent the Griffin error committed by the prosecutor and any error in admitting Stone's comments, we also conclude that, considered together, any error was harmless. We also reject Hardy's further contentions that the challenged remarks violated his right to a fair trial under the Sixth Amendment and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and his right to a reliable penalty determination under the Eighth Amendment.