Opinion ID: 1103678
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Affirmative Charge for Power Company.

Text: Refusal of the affirmative charge with hypothesis requested by the Power Company is assigned as error. The argument is that plaintiffs failed to prove actionable negligence on the part of the Power Company because the record shows a complete absence of evidence of notice of the use of a crane in this construction. The argument of the Company appears to be that the use of the crane may have rendered the 2400-volt lines dangerous to workmen on the roof, but that the lines were not shown to be dangerous in the absence of the crane, and, because it was not shown that the Power Company had actual notice of the use of the crane or, under the circumstances, ought to have anticipated its use, there was a failure to show any breach of any duty on its part which proximately caused the death of Smith. The duty of one who maintains a power line has been stated as follows:    `The duty of an electric company in conveying a current of high potential, to exercise commensurate care under the circumstances, requires it to insulate its wires, and to use reasonable care to keep the same insulated, wherever it may reasonably be anticipated that persons, pursuing business or pleasure, may come in contact therewith. This statement of the rule implies that, in the absence of statute or municipal ordinance, it is not necessary to insulate wires which are so placed that no one could reasonably be expected to come in proximity to them. Curtis on Law of Electricity, § 510.' [Dwight Mfg. Co. v. Word] 200 Ala. [221] 224, 75 So. 979, 982. (Emphasis Supplied) Alabama Power Company v. Cooper, 229 Ala. 318, 320, 156 So. 854, 856. An electric company is not an insurer nor is it under obligation to so safeguard its wires that by no possibility can injury result therefrom. Its duty is to exercise that degree of care commensurate with the danger involved. (Citations Omitted) Alabama Power Company v. Berry, 254 Ala. 228, 233, 48 So.2d 231, 235. See also: Alabama Power Company v. Irwin, 260 Ala. 673, 72 So.2d 300. The familiar rule is that when the affirmative charge is refused and the party who requested the charge appeals, the entire evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the opposite party, and where reasonable inferences may be drawn adverse to the party who requested the charge, the action of the trial court in refusing the charge must be affirmed. Louis Pizitz Dry Goods Company v. Harris, 270 Ala. 390, 118 So.2d 727. The evidence does not show that the Power Company had actual notice that the crane would be used. The crane came onto the job site the morning of the accident and we do not think that it can be fairly said that the Power Company, in the discharge of its duty of reasonable inspection, ought to have discovered the presence of the crane. On the other hand, we are of opinion that certain tendencies of the evidence do support a reasonable inference that the Power Company had notice that workmen would be rightfully present and employed in dangerous proximity to its 2400-volt line, that in failing to guard against injury to such workmen the company failed to exercise that degree of care commensurate with the danger involved, and that the failure to exercise such care was a proximate cause of Smith's death. As we understand the record, three high voltage wires crossed the roof at a height of fifteen feet three inches above it. Each of these wires was the same height, they were separated horizontally, and contact with any one of them by a person connected to the gound was dangerous to human life. Below these three wires, and from the same poles, three additional wires were strung across the roof. One of the additional wires, called a common neutral, carried no voltage. It was two to two and a half feet below the three high voltage wires. About two feet below the common neutral was the second additional wire which was not carrying any voltage at the time of the accident. The third additional wire was a telephone wire not dangerous to human beings. It appears to have been less than a foot above the roof. The high voltage line had been constructed several years prior to the commencement of construction of the new wing on the school building. A month or more before the accident, J. W. Breedlove, Jr., District Engineer for the Power Company, advised F. D. Kimbrough, job superintendent for the contractor, that the Power Company planned to retain the existing lines as they then were. Kimbrough testified that he had a conversation with Breedlove on the job site ten days prior to Smith's death, and that he, Kimbrough, asked if the high powered line was going to stay over the new wing, that Breedlove said yes, and that he, Kimbrough, said he did not like it and thought it was dangerous, and that Breedlove said he thought it complied with the law. Kimbrough testified that steel rods used to reinforce the roof concrete were then in plain view on the job site; that the rods were of varying lengths up to forty feet; that use of such rods was customary in constructing such roofs; that Breedlove was on the job on subsequent occasions prior to Smith's death; that he stated to Breedlove that he, Kimbrough, would like to have those wires removed. Kimbrough testified that the steel rods were not a hazard. Mosley, consulting electrical engineer, testified that handling the longer rods would not constitute the same hazard as would handling the shorter rods, that a workman handling a 10 or 12-foot rod might swing it up and get in contact with the dangerous wire. Mosley testified further that if the crane were eliminated and the rods were properly handled there would be no danger from leaving the wires in place during construction, but he also testified that There would have been a certain amount of danger in handling reinforced rods there, although, if the men had been instructed to handle the rods without holding them up in the air there would not be any danger there With the exception of human error. Mosley testified that two precautions could have been taken to render the wires less dangerous, to wit, keep the crane away from or deenergize the wires, and that deenergizing was not difficult. He further said it is a common practice to use cranes on such construction jobs. Kimbrough also testified that cranes were commonly used by contractors on such work. Mosley testified that the high voltage lines complied with the National Safety Code in that they were more than eight feet above the roof, but also said that the Code does not take into consideration men working under the wires. Our recent case of Housing Authority of Birmingham Dist. v. Morris, 244 Ala. 557, 566, 14 So.2d 527, otherwise states the applicable rule as follows: If common experience has demonstrated that dangers lurk in the method adopted or in the instrumentality maintained by a person he rests under the obligation of ascertaining the peril and taking precautions to avoid injury therefrom. And, ordinarily, culpability for dereliction in this regard is a jury question, determinable under the particular circumstances. Briggs [v. Birmingham Ry., Light & Power Co.] case, supra, 188 Ala. [262] at page 270, 66 So. [95] at page 97. Sullivan v. Alabama Power Co., 246 Ala. 262, 268, 20 So.2d 224, 228. `When a given state of facts is such that reasonable men may fairly differ upon the question as to whether there was negligence or not, the determination of the matter is for the jury. It is only where the facts are such that all reasonable men must draw the same conclusion from them that the question of negligence is ever considered as one of law for the court.' (Citations Omitted.) Alabama Power Company v. Irwin, 260 Ala. 673, 676, 72 So.2d 300, 302. We are of opinion that the evidence in the instant case is such that reasonable men may fairly differ on the question as to whether or not the Power Company was negligent in failing to anticipate and guard against the injury to Smith, and that it cannot be fairly said that the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn is that Smith's injury could not reasonably have been anticipated. We do not think the evidence reasonably requires exclusion of the inference that injury to workmen from handling the steel rods on the roof or from the use of the crane should have been anticipated. Mosley's testimony is to effect that there was danger of electrocution of workmen handling the rods on the roof. There is evidence that Breedlove, the Power Company's engineer, was on the premises when the rods were in plain view. Use of rods on such construction was said to be a common practice. We think the evidence reasonably supports an inference that the company should have anticipated danger from the rods. There was testimony by Mosley and Kimbrough that cranes were commonly used in such construction. We do not think it can be fairly said that the jury could not reasonably infer that the Power Company should have anticipated use of the crane. The exhaustive briefs filed on behalf of the Power Company cite a number of cases where injury or death resulted from a crane coming into contact with a power line. The cited cases hold that the defendant power company in those cases was not liable. We have carefully examined all of them but do not think a detailed statement concerning each case would serve any useful purpose. These cases appear to turn either on the holding that the power company was not, under the facts shown, under a duty to anticipate the use of a crane or on the holding that negligence in maintaining the wires was not the proximate cause of the injury and that operation of the crane was the proximate, independent, intervening cause. A New York case is typical of these holdings. A workman who was laying a sewer was killed when a crane came in contact with overhead wires. The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, in affirming dismissal of the complaint against the power company said:    The negligence of the power company has not been demonstrated. No notice coming to it that the decedent's employer Stage would use a crane with a boom long enough or in such manner as to come in contact with high tension wires 33 feet above the ground has been demonstrated. The mere fact the utility company knew a sewer was being laid near its poles is not enough to cast on it foresight of this kind of an occurrence. Mikolasko v. New York State Electric & Gas Corporation, 8 A.D.2d 648, 185 N.Y.S.2d 95, 96. The cases cited by the power company, as we understand them, apply the same test which we undertake to apply here. The courts in those cases concluded that the power company was not bound to anticipate the danger. A different result was reached by the Court of Appeals of New York in an action for wrongful death of a workman which occurred when the cable of a crane came in contact with a power line. The workman was directing the cable which was being used to unload structural steel from a truck. The steel was for use in a building there being constructed. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and held that the issue of whether or not the defendant power company was negligent in failing to protect workmen from its wires was for the jury. The New York Court of Appeals said:    When a representative of that defendant called at 950 Georgia Avenue on December 13, 1949, he observed there the unloading of building materials and noticed the completed installation of a number of footings on which the overhead structure was to rest. The defendant Consolidated Edison Compa(n)y was not unaware of the common use of cranes and booms in the erection of buildings and, in the opinion of a witness who was a member of its engineering staff, the use of an 80-foot boom on the occasion in question was not at all extraordinary. A division engineer in the company's transmission and distribution bureau testified that its Georgia Avenue high tension wires could have been de-energized by other equipment in the company's possession. Even so, the defendant Consolidated Edison Company says it was entitled to `actual notice' of the time when a crane would be in operation at 950 Georgia Avenue and the Appellate Division so held. We cannot adopt that idea, because (as we have seen) the defendant Consolidated Edison Company had full, exact and early information of the nature of the building operation that was being carried on at 950 Georgia Avenue and thus that company had been warned of the probability that workmen erecting the overhead structure there would perchance be exposed to the undisclosed deadly peril which caused the death of the intestate. In these circumstances, the defendant Consolidated Edison Company was bound to ascertain the time when the work of building the overhead structure at 950 Georgia Avenue was to begin, in order to enable itself to protect workmen against the danger that was there hidden in its high tension wiresor so a jury could find (Citations Omitted.). Pike v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, 303 N.Y. 1, 99 N.E.2d 885, 886. An annotation on the liability of electric power company for injury resulting from contact of crane or other machine with electric line appears in 69 A.L.R.2d 93. Cases are listed in which liability has been upheld, in which liability has been denied, in which negligence was held to be a question for the jury, and in which it was held that the power company was not negligent as a matter of law. See Kingsport Utilities v. Brown, 201 Tenn. 393, 299 S.W.2d 656, 69 A.L.R.2d 87, there annotated. In the case at bar, for the reasons we have undertaken to show, we are of opinion that the jury could infer that the power company, in exercise of care commensurate with the circumstances, was bound to anticipate the probable danger to workmen from the wires over the roof where Smith was injured, and that this duty rested on the power company even though it had no actual notice that a crane would be used. A question due to be considered in deciding the correctness of refusing the company's requested affirmative charge is whether or not the jury could find that negligence in maintaining the high voltage line was a proximate cause of Smith's death. We think that if the jury could find that the company was negligent in maintaining the wires as they were maintained (and we have already said the jury could so find), the jury could find also that such negligence was a proximate, concurring cause of the death. It is true that Smith's death would not have occurred in the manner in which it did occur without the operation of the crane in the manner in which it was operated. The concurring cause, to wit, operation of the crane, was not the sole proximate cause of the death, or at least the jury could so find; and, as we view it, the jury could find that the operation of the crane did not break the causal connection between negligent maintenance of the wires and Smith's death. The jury could find that negligent maintenance of the high voltage wires was a continuing negligence endangering persons on the roof, without which negligence the injury would not have occurred. In all cases of concurring negligence, it may be said the one would not have produced the result without the other. If this be a defense, both would escape, although both be in the wrong. A present danger caused by present maintenance of wiring in a negligent manner concurring with present negligence of another, both creating the conditions causing the mishap, renders both liable. Alabama Power Company v. McIntosh, 219 Ala. 546, 122 So. 677. We are of opinion that when the evidence is viewed according to the rule of Louis Pizitz Dry Goods Company v. Harris, supra, the Power Company's requested affirmative charge was refused without error.