Opinion ID: 2603725
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: (2a) Petitioner's jurisdictional argument rests on his claim that because the arbitrator allegedly lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the fee dispute, the State Bar and this court have no jurisdiction to impose discipline in a proceeding that is, in effect, merely a means of enforcing the arbitrator's fee award to Ms. Hester. The argument fundamentally misapprehends the source and objective of this court's disciplinary jurisdiction over members of the State Bar. (3) The basic objectives of attorney discipline are the protection of the public, the preservation of confidence in the legal profession, and the rehabilitation of errant attorneys where appropriate. ( Sorenson v. State Bar, ante, 1036, at p. 1044 [272 Cal. Rptr. 858, 804 P.2d 44]; Phillips v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 944, 952 [264 Cal. Rptr. 346, 782 P.2d 587].) Ordering restitution in cases of financial injury is a rehabilitative measure designed to further the state's disciplinary objectives by forcing the attorney to `confront, in concrete terms, the harm his actions has caused.' [Citation.] ( Brookman v. State Bar (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1004, 1009 [251 Cal. Rptr. 495, 760 P.2d 1023].) (2b) This court does not sit in disciplinary matters as a collection board for clients aggrieved over fee matters; nor is our jurisdiction derivative of fee arbitration proceedings. The administration of attorney discipline, including such remedial orders as restitution, is independent of any remedy that an aggrieved client may pursue. We reject as frivolous petitioner's argument to the contrary.