Opinion ID: 3050601
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Post-Sale Communication

Text: On September 25, 1998, eight years after Goodstein told Industrial that he was “not presently making any claims” under the Sternoff policies, Goodstein sent a letter to Industrial indicating that the Renton and Marginal properties had been sold. Goodstein stated: Previous correspondence on my behalf had notified . . . Industrial Indemnity, as an insurer of Sternoff, of potential claims arising out of the environmental contamination of properties owned and/or operated by Sternoff. The extent of the contamination has now been more fully investigated, and the properties have now been sold. I am, therefore, now in a posi- GOODSTEIN v. INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY 15577 tion to fully present and settle the environmental claims related to those properties. In that letter, Goodstein also stated: I hereby demand payment of $473,000 for the loss on the Marginal Way property, and $4.839 million for the loss on the Renton properties. These amounts are calculated based on the appraised value of the sites if uncontaminated less the sales price of the sites in their contaminated condition. Industrial responded a month later with a letter disclaiming any coverage for the losses claimed by Goodstein on behalf of the Sternoffs. D. Procedural History Four years later, in 2002, Goodstein filed this lawsuit. The second amended complaint — the operative pleading for the purposes of this appeal — sought, in relevant part, a declaratory judgment that Industrial owed a duty to defend and to indemnify Goodstein under the CGL policies and asserted a claim for breach of contract based on Industrial’s failure to fulfill those duties. Industrial thereafter moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Goodstein’s claimed losses due to the allegedly reduced proceeds5 from the property sales were not covered by the policies and that Goodstein had never invoked the duty to defend. In opposing the summary judgment motion, Goodstein 5 For the purposes of the summary judgment motion, Industrial assumed that the Sternoffs received less money for the properties in their “as is” contaminated state than they would have had they first remediated the pollution. 15578 GOODSTEIN v. INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY offered evidence that he and the purchaser of the Renton property, Zelman Renton LLC (“Zelman”), had entered into an oral agreement “to ensure that all rights to insurance coverage for environmental damage at the Renton site are consolidated and assigned to the Receiver.” Specifically, the declaration stated that “the Receiver and Zelman have agreed that: 1) all rights the Receiver had to insurance coverage for environmental contamination will be transferred to Zelman; and 2) Zelman will transfer all rights it has to insurance coverage back to the Receiver.” The declaration attesting to the cross-assignment indicated that “[t]he agreement has not yet been finalized.” No such agreement evidencing the transfer and cross-transfer was submitted in support of Goodstein’s opposition to summary judgment. The district court granted Industrial’s summary judgment motion on July 11, 2005, finding that Industrial had neither a duty to defend nor a duty to indemnify Goodstein under the policies. In rendering its decision, the court did not consider the evidence purporting to establish a cross-assignment. Goodstein thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration, this time supported by a new declaration that stated that “all the material terms [of the cross-assignment agreement] had been negotiated by, agreed to, and known to the parties as of January 27, 2005.” A written cross-assignment agreement was also submitted as evidence. The district court denied the motion for reconsideration on August 5, 2005, holding that Goodstein failed to comply with the local rules governing such motions. Goodstein timely filed the instant appeal. On appeal, Goodstein challenges the district court’s failure to consider the cross-assignment evidence at the summary judgment and reconsideration stages, as well as the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Industrial on Goodstein’s duty to indemnify and duty to defend claims.6 6 On appeal, we “review de novo a grant of summary judgment and must determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the GOODSTEIN v. INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY 15579