Opinion ID: 744166
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Unreasonable Dangerousness

Text: 32 Isuzu also moved for summary judgment on the ground that there was no issue of fact on the element of unreasonable dangerousness. 7 The district court did not reach this issue because it held that Kampen's use of the tire jack was not a reasonably anticipated one. On appeal, Isuzu urges, as an alternative basis for affirming the district court's judgment, that there are no genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the tire jack was unreasonably dangerous. See Chauvin v. Tandy Corp., 984 F.2d 695 (5th Cir.1993); Brown v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 901 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir.1990)(both holding that this court may affirm a summary judgment on grounds other than those relied on by the district court). The Kampens allege three different product liability theories: unreasonably dangerous design, unreasonably dangerous construction or composition, and inadequate warning. 33 Isuzu claims that the testimony of the plaintiffs' expert does not raise a fact issue as to unreasonable dangerousness because he was unwilling to state the ultimate conclusion that the jack was unreasonably dangerous. 8 With respect to all three of the Kampens' products liability theories, Isuzu contends that Louisiana law requires expert testimony to prove that a product is unreasonably dangerous. The cases relied upon by Isuzu, however, do not support this contention. Rather, before and after the passage of the LPLA, Louisiana courts have held that the jury may infer that a product is unreasonably dangerous from the circumstances surrounding an accident. See Brown v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 514 So.2d 439, 444 (La.1987), reh'g denied, 516 So.2d 1154 (La.1988); see also Himel Marine, Inc. v. Braquet, 629 So.2d 425, 427 (La.App.1993) (citation omitted); Francis v. American Well Serv. & Drilling, Inc., 617 So.2d 1329, 1333 (La.App.1993); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Wrap-On Co., 626 So.2d 874, 878-79 (La.App.1993); Williams v. Emerson Elec. Co., 909 F.Supp. 395, 399 (M.D.La.1995). 34 This is a textbook case in which a jury could infer that the product was unreasonably dangerous from the circumstances surrounding the accident. The evidence shows that Isuzu's tire jack collapsed when used to jack up the car for which it was designed. The summary judgment evidence does not indicate that the car slipped off the jack, but that the jack collapsed because it was made of soft metal and had an inadequate load bearing surface. To be safe (or more precisely, not unreasonably dangerous) for its reasonably anticipated use, a tire jack supplied with a car should be able to withstand the weight of that car. As discussed in the following sections, there are genuine issues of material fact as to two of the three theories of unreasonable dangerousness advanced by the Kampens that preclude summary judgment on the alternative basis urged by Isuzu. 1. Unreasonably Dangerous Design 35 Under the LPLA, the jury must conduct a risk-utility balancing test to determine whether the design of a product is unreasonably dangerous. LA.REV.STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.56. A product is unreasonably dangerous in design if, at the time the product left its manufacturer's control: (1) There existed an alternative design for the product that was capable of preventing the claimant's damage; and (2) the likelihood that the product's design would cause the claimant's damage and the gravity of that damage outweighed the burden on the manufacturer of adopting such alternative design and the adverse effect, if any, of such alternative design on the utility of the product. Id. 36 This court's opinion in Lavespere v. Niagara Machine & Tool Works, Inc., contained an extensive discussion of unreasonably dangerous design. We upheld a summary judgment on unreasonably dangerous design in favor of the manufacturer of a metal press. 910 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.1990), reh'g denied, 920 F.2d 259, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 859, 114, S.Ct. 171, 126 L.Ed.2d 131 (1993). We discussed the types of evidence necessary to avoid summary judgment on a Louisiana design defect claim and faulted the plaintiff for failing to present evidence concerning the extent of the risk that the alternative design would have avoided[, such as] the frequency of accidents like his own, the economic costs entailed by those accidents, or the extent of the reduction in frequency of those accidents that would have followed on the use of his proposed alternative design. Id. at 183. 37 We made clear, however, that the rigorous evidentiary requirements imposed in Lavespere would not be applicable in all cases. We recognized that 38 there may be cases in which the judge or the jury, by relying on background knowledge and common sense, can fill in the gaps in the plaintiff's case, estimating the extent of the risk avoided, the costs of implementing the proposed design change, or the adverse effects of the design modification on the utility of the machine. For this to be possible, however, the product itself, or at least the design feature in question, must be relatively uncomplicated, and the implications of change in design must be such that a layman could readily grasp them. 39 Lavespere, 910 F.2d at 184 (citing 141 S. Main, Inc. v. Magic Fingers, Inc., 49 Ill.App.3d 724, 7 Ill.Dec. 444, 364 N.E.2d 605, 608 (1977); Duke v. Gulf & Western Mfg. Co., 660 S.W.2d 404, 412-13 (Mo.App.1983); Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61, 577 P.2d 1322, 1325-27 (1978)). We held that the plaintiff's proposed alternative design in Lavespere, however, was not the type of uncomplicated design feature to which this rule could be applied. See also McKey v. General Motors Corp., 691 So.2d 164, 169 (La.App.1997) (agreeing with Lavespere 's uncomplicated products analysis, but declining to apply it based on the facts of the particular case). 40 We conclude that this is an appropriate case in which to apply the Lavespere uncomplicated design feature analysis. The proposed alternative design implicit in the Kampens' summary judgment response is a jack made of stronger steel with a larger load bearing surface. A jury could reasonably rely on background knowledge and common sense to conclude that Isuzu could have provided a jack that would have prevented Kampen's injuries. 41 The Kampens' expert's testimony also provides some support for this common sense conclusion. Their expert compared the Isuzu jack with a jack designed for use with a 1983 Toyota Corolla, as well as a jack of undetermined origin. The Toyota and Isuzu jacks had the same basic structure, but the material used in the Toyota jack was significantly stronger than the material used in the Isuzu jack. The other jack tested was also made from stronger steel and had a larger load bearing surface as well. The expert stated that because the Toyota jack was made out of stronger steel, it could stand larger loading than the Isuzu jack. He testified that the strength of the material contributed to the failure and that the material that is used in this case has less strength than the material that is used in similar jacks.... He concluded that ... there was definitely a contribution from the material point of view and, thus, that would relate to the design point. The circumstances surrounding the accident in combination with the expert's testimony 9 present a jury question regarding unreasonably dangerous design. 42 Isuzu also argues that the jack was not unreasonably dangerous in design because it was safe if used in accordance with the instructions provided in the owner's manual, citing Jaeger v. Automotive Cas. Ins. Co., 682 So.2d 292 (La.App.1996) and Delphen v. Department of Transp. & Dev., 657 So.2d 328, 334 (La.App.1995). See also Prather v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 526 So.2d 1325, 1331 (La.App.1988). We disagree. 43 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Kampens, there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the jack could have been used safely even if the warning had been heeded. It is true that Kampen would not have suffered his precise injury if he had not placed himself beneath the car. But that does not mean that the product could be safely used if the instructions were followed. A jack that collapses under the weight of a car presents myriad potential threats to safety, irrespective of whether the person using the jack has placed himself beneath the car. To name an obvious example, the hands of a person changing a tire might be injured by the wheel well if the jack suddenly collapsed. Or, a hand or an arm could be injured reaching for a lug nut that rolled underneath the car. In other words, the jack was unreasonably dangerous (or a jury could so find) even if it had been used in perfect accord with the instructions given. Nothing about Kampen's presence under the car made the failure more or less likely to occur. 44 Further Jaeger, Delphen, and Prather appear to be in some tension with the LPLA, which treats the adequacy of a warning as merely a factor to be considered in evaluating the likelihood of damage. Section 2800.56(2) provides: 45 An adequate warning about a product shall be considered in evaluating the likelihood of damage when the manufacturer has used reasonable care to provide the adequate warning to users and handlers of the product. 46 LA.REV.STAT. ANN. § 2800.56(2); 10 see also Bernard v. Ferrellgas, Inc., 689 So.2d 554, 560 (La.App.1997) (when conducting a design defect inquiry the statute and case law further authorize the court to take into account the effect that any warnings may have on the likelihood of damage.). 47 In any event, Delphen, Jaeger, and Prather do not control the outcome here. Those cases did not involve a product that, like the jack in this case, may be unreasonably dangerous for its reasonably anticipated use even if the warning was heeded. 11 Thus, those courts were not faced with a product that a jury could find to be unreasonably dangerous even when used in accordance with its instructions. 48 Under these circumstances, we decline Isuzu's invitation to affirm the judgment of the district court on the alternative basis that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the jack's unreasonably dangerous design. See Leonard v. Dixie Well Serv. & Supply, Inc., 828 F.2d 291, 294 (5th Cir.1987); Surace v. Caterpillar, Inc., 111 F.3d 1039, 1054-55 (3d Cir.1997). 49 2. Unreasonably Dangerous Composition or Construction 50 Under the LPLA, a product is unreasonably dangerous in construction or composition if, at the time the product left its manufacturer's control, the product deviated in a material way from the manufacturer's specifications or performance standards for the product or from otherwise identical products manufactured by the same manufacturer. LA.REV.STAT. ANN. § 2800.55. The summary judgment record, viewed in the light most favorable to the Kampens, contains a genuine issue of material fact on their defective composition or construction theory. A report from the defendant's expert reveals that an Isuzu jack with the same load rating (1,320 pounds) as the jack that collapsed, began to collapse only when the weight applied to it exceeded 3,540 pounds. From this, the jury could reasonably infer that the jack involved in the accident was materially different from the exemplar Isuzu jack. Accordingly, we reject the alternative basis for summary judgment urged by Isuzu as to the Kampens' unreasonably dangerous composition or construction claims. See Leonard, 828 F.2d at 294-95; Surace, 111 F.3d at 1054. 3. Inadequate Warnings 51 We conclude that summary judgment as to the Kampens' inadequate warnings claims was proper on the alternative basis that this claim was wholly unsupported by the summary judgment record. Isuzu warned jack users not to get beneath the vehicle when using the jack and to never get beneath the vehicle when it is supported only by a jack. Under the LPLA, [a] product is unreasonably dangerous because an adequate warning about the product has not been provided if, at the time the product left its manufacturer's control, the product possessed a characteristic that may cause damage and the manufacturer failed to use reasonable care to provide an adequate warning of such characteristic and its danger to users and handlers of the product. LA.REV.STAT. ANN. 9:2800.57(A). A warning is adequate if it would lead an ordinary reasonable user or handler of a product to contemplate the danger in using or handling the product and either to decline to use or handle the product or, if possible, to use or handle the product in such a manner as to avoid the damage for which the claim is made. LA.REV.STAT. ANN. 9:2800.53(9). The Kampens presented no summary judgment evidence in support of their inadequate warning claim in response to Isuzu's motion for summary judgment. The summary judgment record quite simply contains no evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact on the Kampen's inadequate warning claim.