Opinion ID: 75947
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Dale-Rhynes Issue

Text: 39 The district court was aware of the decision of the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Dale, 178 F.3d 429 (6th Cir.1999), when it engaged in the multiple sentencings in this case. 36 The facts in Dale bear some similarity to the facts in this case. Dale was convicted of conspiracy to distribute both crack and marijuana based on a single count charging the conspiracy. Evidence was presented that supported the distribution of both drugs. The Dale court found that the conspiracy count charging more than a single type of a controlled substance, i.e. marijuana and crack, was not duplicitous; rather, the defendant's sentence that was based on a quantity of crack was improper, based on a general verdict, where the sentence exceeded the maximum sentence for conspiracy to distribute marijuana. 37 The Dale court followed the teachings of United States v. Orozco-Prada, 732 F.2d 1076, 1083-1084 (2d Cir.1984), which held that, while special verdicts were generally not favored in criminal cases, they were appropriate when the information sought is relevant to the sentence to be imposed. Id. at 1084. 40 The 1984 decision in Orozco-Prada took on more importance when it was cited by the Supreme Court in Edwards v. United States, 523 U.S. 511, 118 S.Ct. 1475, 140 L.Ed.2d 703 (1998), in a pre- Apprendi holding. In Edwards, the defendant was indicted for conspiring to possess with intent to distribute ... mixtures containing two controlled substances, namely cocaine ... and cocaine base [i.e., crack]. The district court instructed the jury that the government must prove that the conspiracy ... involved measurable amounts of cocaine or cocaine base. The jury returned a general verdict of guilty. Against that background the district court imposed a sentence that did not exceed the maximum if the defendant had been convicted of a conspiracy limited to cocaine only. The Supreme Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit's upholding of the sentence. In doing so, however, Justice Breyer, writing for a unanimous court, opined: 41 Of course, petitioners' statutory and constitutional claims would make a difference if it were possible to argue, say, that the sentences imposed exceeded the maximum that the statutes permit for a cocaine-only conspiracy. That is because a maximum sentence set by statute trumps a higher sentence set forth in the Guidelines. But, as the Government points out, the sentences imposed here were within the statutory limits applicable to a cocaine-only conspiracy, given the quantities of that drug attributed to each petitioner. 42 Edwards v. United States, 523 U.S. 511, 515, 118 S.Ct. 1475, 140 L.Ed.2d 703 (1998) (relying in part on Orozco-Prada, 732 F.2d at 1083-1084, for the proposition that a court may not sentence a defendant under statutory penalties for a cocaine conspiracy where the jury may have found only a marijuana conspiracy). 43 In the case at bar, the district court expressed some concern about the sentencing procedures as to Count 1, and mentioned both Dale and United States v. Rhynes, 196 F.3d 207 (4th Cir.1999), vacated in part en banc, 218 F.3d 310 (4th Cir.2000). 38 In Rhynes, the defendants were charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, crack, heroin and marijuana. The district court submitted a general verdict as to the conspiracy count and used the conjunction or to indicate to the jury that it could find a defendant guilty of the conspiracy count if it found that the defendant had conspired to distribute or possess with intent to distribute heroin, or cocaine, or crack, or marijuana. In that case, neither the defendants nor the government requested a special verdict as to the object of the conspiracy. The Rhynes court followed Dale and concluded, in the absence of a special verdict, that it could not sentence beyond the maximum sentence for the least serious of the four alleged controlled substances, i.e., marijuana. Rhynes, 196 F.3d at 239. 44 We turn now to examine the Government's claim that there was no sentencing error with respect to the sentences arising from the Count 1 conspiracy conviction. We begin with the jury instructions. The district court provided a copy of the jury instructions to the jury as well as a copy of the superseding indictment (Doc. No. 508). Jury instruction No. 11 contains the court's instruction on Count 1. Reading from the first three paragraphs of the superseding indictment, the district court stated: 45 In this case, as you know, the Indictment charges eight separate offenses called counts. I will not read it to you at length because you will be begin [sic] a copy of the Indictment for study during your deliberations. 46 In summary, count one charges that the defendants knowingly and willfully conspired together to possess cocaine with the intent to distribute it, in violation of the law. 47 Title 21, United States Code, Section 846 makes it a separate federal crime or offense for anyone to conspire or agree with someone else to do something which, if actually carried out, would be a violation of Section 841(a)(1). That section makes it a crime for anyone to knowingly possess cocaine or marijuana with the intent to distribute it. So, under the law, a conspiracy is an agreement or a kind of partnership in criminal purposes in which each member becomes the agent or partner of every other member. 48 (Trial Tr. vol. 36 at 201-02 (emphasis added).) 49 As the district judge read the second paragraph to the jury, he apparently became aware of the fact that the written instruction was incomplete and added a phrase at the end of the second paragraph which corrected the omission: And I think it also includes marijuana. (Trial Tr. vol. 36 at 201-02.) 50 The third paragraph in Jury Instruction No. 11 refers to Section 841(a)(1) concerning the crime of knowingly possessing cocaine or marijuana and uses the conjunction or. The district court's discussion during Gallashaw's sentencing hearing indicates persuasively that the printed jury instructions, which omitted a reference to marijuana as being a part of the charged conspiracy, were not revised prior to being handed to the jury. 39 51 In discussing the Dale-Rhynes issue, the following colloquy ensued: 52 THE COURT: Since that time I have read another case now from the Fourth Circuit, United States versus Rhynes, R-h-y-n-e-s, at 196 F.3d 207. And the Fourth Circuit agrees with Dale that the shorter maximum sentence should be used if there is a general, rather than a specific verdict. And I have been giving more thought to the situation as to count one. It only applies to count one. But under the Dale and the Rhynes opinion, if you have a conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine or marijuana and you give the jury a general verdict, how can you tell that they didn't come back with guilty of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute marijuana and not cocaine? And consequently the Dale and the Rhynes courts have said that you have to use the marijuana maximum, rather than the cocaine maximum. 53 I don't know that that's going to help Mr. Gallashaw any because, again, count 11 carries a maximum of life in prison. It's a possession with intent to distribute cocaine. And if the Court considers the relevant conduct for that one specific date to be more than 150 kilograms, it may not do Mr. Gallashaw any good. 54 But as to count one, if the Court were to find the Fourth Circuit and the Sixth Circuit opinions to be persuasive, then there is an argument that the maximum sentence that Mr. Gallashaw can get on count one is five years in prison. 55 I note that count one of the Indictment — it's a long count, but on page 3 charges that everybody listed there did knowingly and intentionally combine, conspire, confederate and agree with each other and with persons known and unknown to the Grand Jury to possess with intent to distribute a schedule two controlled substance and a schedule one controlled substance, that is, mixtures and substances containing detectable amounts of cocaine and marijuana. It doesn't say, or marijuana. It says, and marijuana. 56 So I am wondering if that distinguishes the Rhynes and the Dale situation where the concern of the Court was that those defendants had been charged alternatively with cocaine or marijuana, whereas, it looks to me like this Indictment may charge conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute both cocaine and marijuana. 57 When you look at the jury instructions that were actually used, jury instruction number 11 is, I guess, the instruction we gave them on conspiracy, and it says in summary: Count one charges that the defendants knowingly and willfully conspired together to possess cocaine with the intent to distribute it. 58 It doesn't even mention marijuana. 59 MR. CHARLES WHITE: Your Honor, I believe that there are other statutes where the conjunction and is used, and the cases have been pretty clear that and means or for purposes of the determining the criminal liability. 60 THE COURT: Well, again, I think I am going to rule consistent with what my ruling was last week on this case and on the other cases, but I am troubled by the Rhynes and the Dale opinion. And last week I was saying that had someone asked me to give a special verdict I would have done that. And I know I had read Dale before we got to the conclusion of this case, and I am troubled that I didn't do it on my own to have avoided this circumstance. But I am confident based on the language of the Indictment, the instructions that we gave, and the testimony in the case that conviction on count one was for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, and that's the way I am going to rule, but I wouldn't be shocked if the Eleventh Circuit, looking at Rhynes and Dale, were to feel differently. 61 (Trial Tr. vol. 43 at 5-7 (emphasis added).) 62 Prior to final argument and the charging of the jury, each of the Defendants requested that the jury be given a verdict form to find whether the Defendants were guilty of conspiring to distribute cocaine or conspiring to distribute marijuana. The Government objected and the district court agreed that there was but one conspiracy: cocaine, marijuana, period. 40 63 The Government contends on appeal that by using the conjunction and in Count 1 to connect the two controlled substances, it was required to prove that each Defendant agreed to be involved with both controlled substances. (Appellee's Br. at 76.) Proof of a Defendant's agreement as to only one of the controlled substances, be it cocaine or marijuana, would have required the jury to acquit as to Count 1. (Appellee's Br. at 76.) The Government's final argument at trial made no such assertion. Rather, at the beginning of its final argument, the Government made the following comments about the nature of the conspiracy: 64 The case that you have learned about over the past six weeks or so is not a difficult case. It's not difficult at all. It's a conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute narcotics. 65 (Trial Tr. vol. 35 at 189 (emphasis added).) 66 Now, members of the jury, let me just as a footnote say to you that this case is not about murder. This case is about dope, conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute narcotics. There are violent acts in this case in furtherance of the conspiracy, and we have brought forward to you situations of violence that were in furtherance of the drug conspiracy. 67 (Trial Tr. vol. 35 at 199-200 (emphasis added).) 68 The Fourth Circuit revisited the Rhynes decision in United States v. Cotton, 261 F.3d 397 (4th Cir.2001), rev'd, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002), where the jury's verdict was a general one as to a conspiracy that charged both powder cocaine and crack. In Cotton, the court held that the jury was unambiguously instructed that the charged conspiracy conviction could only be based on a finding, as charged in the indictment, that the defendants conspired to distribute or possessed with intent to distribute both substances. Continuing, the Cotton court found that the evidence was sufficient to support a construction of the verdict that a jury could find a conspiracy with respect to both substances. The district court's jury instruction, unlike in this case, required the jury to find that the materials involved in the charged conspiracy were cocaine hydrochloride (powder) and crack. The court's charge provided: 69 If you find that the materials involved in the charged conspiracy were cocaine hydrochloride and cocaine base, you need not be concerned with the quantities, so as [sic] long as you find that a defendant conspired to distribute or possessed with intent to distribute these controlled substances, the amounts involved are not important. 70 Cotton, 261 F.3d at 402 (quoting S.A. 13) (emphasis added). 71 The Fourth Circuit in Cotton relied on the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Green, which held that, with respect to a general verdict for a conspiracy, the sentencing court can still conclude that the jury found, beyond a reasonable doubt, guilt for more than just one object-offense where the jury had not been instructed in the alternative and the evidence would support such construction of the verdict actually obtained, Green, 180 F.3d at 226. Cotton, 261 F.3d at 402. 72 The Fifth Circuit in Green was confronted with a conviction of a conspiracy count that alleged over fifty kilograms of cocaine and over 50,000 tablets of phenmetrazine or preludes. The district court limited the sentence of the defendant, Green, to the statutory maximum for preludes. The Fifth Circuit reversed after considering the conjunctive language used in the indictment to describe the controlled substances that were the objects of the conspiracy, the jury instructions similar language, and the overwhelming evidence that the conspiracy involved cocaine and preludes. After finding that the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt for each of the object-offenses (i.e., the cocaine and the preludes), the court held that the verdict was not ambiguous and reversed limiting the sentence to the maximum for preludes. 73 In describing the jury instructions, the Green court opined: 74 In five instances, the jury instructions refer to the two controlled substances. In four of those five, and separates cocaine from phenmetrazine or preludes: the first, that Green is charged, in Count 1 of the indictment with conspiring to distribute cocaine and phenmetrazine or preludes, controlled substances; the second, in listing the elements of the offense, that, to find Green guilty, the jury must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt [t]hat two or more persons made an agreement to commit the crime of distribution of cocaine, phenmetrazine or preludes as charged in the indictment ; the third and fourth, in the same sentence, that [t]o distribute cocaine and phenmetrazine or preludes means for one person to intentionally transfer cocaine and phenmetrazine or preludes to another; and the fifth, and final, that at the time of the transfer the person making the transfer knew that cocaine and phenmetrazine or preludes were controlled substances. 75 Green, 180 F.3d at 226 (quoting indictment (emphasis in original)). Significantly, the Green decision also referred to Edwards in its analysis. 76 The Cotton court also cited an Eighth Circuit case involving an indictment phrased in the conjunctive. In that case, evidence of all three drugs was introduced and the court did not elicit an ambiguous or unclear verdict from the jury, United States v. Watts, 950 F.2d 508, 515 (8th Cir.1991). Cotton, 261 F.3d at 403. The court in Watts found that there was substantial evidence to support the jury finding of at least one conspiracy. 41 Watts, 950 F.2d at 512. 77 Based on the record, the Fourth Circuit in Cotton found no Rhynes violation, but concluded that the district court erred in the sentencing phase of the case by imposing sentences in excess of twenty years for seven of the eight defendants convicted. On appeal, the decision in Cotton was reversed with respect to the sentencing issues in the context of Apprendi, but the Supreme Court did not address the Dale-Rhynes issue. United States v. Cotton, 122 S.Ct. at 1787 (2002). 78 Against the background of Dale, Rhynes, Cotton, Green, and Watts, we find a Dale-Rhynes violation. 42 Here, the jury instructions were modest in describing the nature of the conspiracy. The conjunction or crept into the oral instructions. The printed instructions ignored the controlled substance marijuana as part of the conspiracy. The declaration of the district court during the Gallashaw sentencing hearing indicates that the printed instructions submitted to the jury were not corrected by adding the omitted reference to marijuana. The court's instructions, unlike the instructions in Cotton, made no reference to the necessity of finding both marijuana and cocaine as a part of the conspiracy. The final argument of the Government failed to pinpoint, as it had in opposing the motion for a special verdict, that the conspiracy concerned both cocaine and marijuana. At no time was the jury advised, either in the court's instructions or in the Government's argument to the jury, that before a charged Defendant could be found guilty of the conspiracy count, it must find that that Defendant had agreed to participate with both cocaine and marijuana. Nor did the court instruct or the parties argue to the jury that a failure of proof as to either controlled substance, be it cocaine or marijuana, would require an acquittal on Count 1. 79 Finally, we note that the Government and the district court dispute the Defendants' claim that they sought a special verdict with respect to Count 1. As indicated previously, however, we find that such a request was made. Moreover, as persuasive authority, the Second Circuit has decided that the government carries the burden to seek special verdicts with respect to a conspiracy count charging multiple controlled substances. United States v. Barnes, 158 F.3d 662, 672 (2d Cir.1998). In any event, we need not reach or decide the issue of burden because we hold that the request of the Defendants for separate verdict forms as to Count 1 constituted a motion for special verdicts. 80 In sum, we find that the Dale-Rhynes violation requires that the sentences of the six defendants as to Count 1 be vacated. The Second Circuit and the Sixth Circuit differ as to the procedure to be followed after finding a violation. 81 The Second Circuit in Orozco-Prada decided the issue of remedy once it determined that the single conspiracy count involving marijuana and crack suffered from the lack of a special verdict. The court withheld judgment on Orozco-Prada's conviction for 30 days and gave the government an opportunity to consent to a resentencing for the conspiracy conviction based on the maximum established by the lesser controlled substance, i.e., marijuana. In the absence of the government's consent, however, it would vacate Orozco-Prada's conviction on the conspiracy count and remand for a new trial. 82 The Dale court acknowledged the Second Circuit's remedy in Orozco-Prada, but indicated that it would effect the same result by remanding the case to the district court to allow the election by the government at the trial level. Dale, 178 F.3d at 434. 83 We prefer the remedy from Dale, and, thus, remand the case against the Appellants to the district court. The Government shall be granted the opportunity, in a timely fashion, to consent to a re-sentencing of the Defendants as to Count 1 based on a maximum sentence of five years or to elect to proceed against one or more of the Defendants with a new trial on Count 1 with a special verdict. 84 The recognized remedy for a Dale-Rhynes violation excludes any consideration of a harmless error review. Such a review questions whether a conviction should, despite error during the trial, be affirmed. In this case we do not set aside the convictions of the Defendants, but rather vacate the sentences and remand for re-sentencing, or at the option of the prosecution, allow for a new trial on the Count 1 conspiracy charge with the understanding that the jury will be provided a special verdict as to Count 1. 85 Smith, Gallashaw and Allen were convicted of substantive drug offenses. Consequently, we now turn to an analysis of the Apprendi issue as it applies to those defendants.