Opinion ID: 295985
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the conspiracy count of the indictment

Text: 8 Each of the three counts of the indictment charged in substance as follows: that De Cavalcante 'did wilfully aid, abet, counsel, command, induce, procure, and cause Thomas Coogan, Morris Wasserman, Kenneth Martin and James Marion Smith to travel in interstate commerce    with intent to promote, manage, establish, carry on, and facilitate    extortion   ' 9 The problem here arises because rather than being confederates, Coogan, Wasserman, Martin and Smith were the victims of the alleged crime. The first question presented therefore is whether a crime has been charged under 18 U.S.C. 1952 when the interstate travel in question is by the victims of the extortion rather than by the alleged extorters. 10 Standing alone, 1952 is not violated by such travel. However, for unexplained reasons, the Government chose to use the aiding and abetting language of 18 U.S.C. 2: 11 '(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal. (b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal.' 12 Since one cannot aid and abet someone to do an innocent act within the meaning of 2(a), see e.g., United States v. Provenzano, 334 F.2d. 678, 691 (3rd Cir. 1964), the Government argues for the application of 2(b) to this case, based upon the inclusion in the indictment of the words 'did    cause.' 13 Applying 2(b) to 1952 in effect makes possible the separation of the travel requirement from either the intent or overt act requirements. Such separation causes both semantical and conceptual problems in applying 1952. However, the Committee on the Judiciary made clear when Title 18, United States Code was revised and codified that 2(b) was to maek culpable one who 'causes the commission of an indispensable element of the offense by an innocent agent or instrumentality.   ' H.R.Rep. No. 304, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A5 (1947). Indeed, Dyer Act prosecutions for interstate transportation of stolen automobiles, while not squarely in point, often invoke this principle. E.g., United States v. Leggett, 269 F.2d 35 (7th Cir. 1959). Similarly, in United States v. Kelley, 395 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1968), a bookmaker was found guilty-- on the basis of 2(b)-- of violating 1952 where the only use of interstate commerce was by prospective bettors calling the bookmaker on the telephone. It is true that in both Leggett and Kelley the interstate travel element was provided by the actions of one who, while innocent of a crime, could be viewed as the alter ego of the criminal. But use of the word 'causes' in the statute conveys an intent sufficiently broad to encompass not only voluntary acts of true agents, but also the involuntary acts of victims. Although the Government has pointed to no case in which actions of a victim were alleged to provide one element of the crime charged under 1952, and although the indictment in this case was no doubt inartfully drawn, we find the allegations in the indictment here to be sufficient to charge a crime under 1952. 3
14 An equally significant attack is made by the defendants upon what they view as a major difference in the theory of the crime as charged by the grand jury, and the premise upon which the defendants were convicted. The conspiracy count of the indictment charged as follows: 15 'From on or about September 27, 1966, to on or about November 16, 1966, in the State and District of New Jersey and elsewhere, the defendants SAMUEL RIZZO DE CAVALCANTE, GAETANO DOMINICK VASTOLA, and DANIEL ANNUNZIATA unlawfully, wilfully, and knowingly did combine, conspire, confederate, and agree together and with each other, and with divers other persons whose names are to the Grand Jury unknown, to commit offenses against the United States,   .' 16 The grand jury handed down this indictment on March 22, 1968. The defendants, in late April, moved for discovery and a bill of particulars, asking for, among other things, the names of all alleged co-conspirators, including specifically those denominated in the indictment as 'divers other persons.' On May 15, 1968, the United States replied 'that it does not know the identity of any co-conspirators not named in Count One of the indictment.' A similar statement was made by the Government on November 10, 1969-- eighteen months later-- at a hearing on defendants' discovery motions. Finally, on March 30, 1970, the new Assistant United States Attorney who had assumed responsibility for the case sent a letter to the defendants, saying that the statement made by his predecessor on November 10th had been 'inadvertant,' and he named Brennan and Dello Russo as co-conspirators. The case thereafter was in fact tried, despite defense objections, on the theory that Brennan and Dello Russo were co-conspirators with De Cavalcante, Vastola and Annunziata in the alleged extortion plot, acting as 'shills' in the crooked dice game to set up the opportunity whereby De Cavalcante would cause the gamblers to cross state lines and be extorted. While neither Brennan nor Dello Russo testified at trial, the Government admitted at the oral argument in this Court that their participation as co-conspirators was essential to make out the substantive crime, for otherwise there would be no basis for the theory of a conspiracy. 17 In considering this point, it is important to note first what questions are not raised on this appeal concerning the indictment. There is no Sixth Amendment 4 problem of adequate notice to the defendants of the crime charged. See e.g., Russell v. United States, 396 U.S. 749, 764, 82 S.Ct. 1038, 8 L.Ed.2d 240 (1962); Nelson v. United States, 406 F.2d 1136 (10th Cir. 1969). Defendants concede that the letter from the Assistant United States Attorney more than five months before trial adequately apprised them of the Government's theory of the case. Similarly, there is no problem of insufficient particularity of the charge in the indictment. The requirement of particularity not only serves a notice function, but also helps implement the Fifth Amendment's protection against being put twice in jeopardy for the same offense. See Russell v. United States, supra, 369 U.S. at 763-764, 82 S.Ct. 1038. The indictment here clearly charged the crime of extortion in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1952, identifying with ample specificity for double jeopardy purposes the time, place and circumstances of the crime. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 7(c). 18 What is at issue in this case is whether defendants were tried on the specific charge brought by the grand jury. The Fifth Amendment provides: 'No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury   '. 5 Although the institution of the grand jury was known as early as the twelfth century, 6 the modern requirement for a grand jury indictment seems to have grown out of abuses which developed in the practice of prosecutions brought by 'appeal'. 7 The indictment was intended to protect people from false accusations brought by others. By the mid-fourteenth century, the principle of the modern grand jury was established, although not yet always enforced, requiring an indictment by 'people of the neighborhood' before a man was called to answer for a crime. 8 In his treatise on the Constitution, Justice Story noted this shielding function of the grand jury, stating that 'grand juries perform most important public functions, and are a great security to the citizens against vindictive prosecutions, either by the government or by political partisans, or by private enemies.' 9 19 By the time of Ex Parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 9-10, 7 S.Ct. 781, 786, 30 L.Ed. 849 (1887), the following basic principles had been firmly established in this country: 'The party can only be tried upon the indictment as found by such grand jury, and especially upon all its language found in the charging part.' 10 In Bain, a writ of habeas corpus was granted where the trial court had struck certain words from the indictment on the ground that they were immaterial. The Supreme Court thought it possible that the grand jury's indictment might have been based on findings reflected by the stricken part. The prohibition against amendment of an indictment other than by the grand jury itself, enunciated in Bain, was reaffirmed in Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 80 S.Ct. 270, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960) and in Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 82 S.Ct. 1038, 8 L.Ed.2d 240 (1962). The concern represented by these cases is that the indictment under which the accused is prosecuted remains the same one as brought by the grand jury, rather than becoming through 'interpolation the indictment of the prosecutor, or the court.' See 8 Moore, federal Practice 7.04 (Cipes ed.1970); cf. United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 185-196 (5th Cir. 1965). 20 A difficult question arises, however, in distinguishing between an amendment of the indictment and a variance from the indictment. The principles articulated by Judge Skelly Wright of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia are apt: 21 'An amendment of the indictment occurs when the charging terms of the indictment are altered, either literally or in effect, by prosecutor or court after the grand jury has last passed upon them. A variance occurs when the charging terms of the indictment are left unaltered, but the evidence offered at trial proves facts materially different from those alleged in the indictment.' Gaither v. United States, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 154, 413 F.2d 1061, 1071 (1969). 22 The consequences of characterization in each case are serious because while a variance-- which raises appraisal and double jeopardy questions-- may be subject to the harmless error rule, an amendment is thought to be prejudicial per se. 11 Further, the Stirone case suggests that the critical inquiry concerning a variance is whether it is sufficiently substantial 'to amount to a constructive amendment of the indictment.' Gaither v. United States, supra, at 1072. 23 In Stirone, the defendant was indicted for interference with interstate commerce, namely, the importation of sand into Pennsylvania to be used in building a steel plant. At trial, evidence was introduced which also showed interference with the exportation from Pennsylvania of steel to be manufactured in the new plant. The jury was instructed that they could convict on either theory. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, stating that the 'variation here destroyed the defendant's substantial right to be tried only on charges presented in an indictment returned by a grand jury. Deprivation of such a basic right is far too serious to be treated as nothing more than a variance and then dismissed as harmless error.' 361 U.S. at 217, 80 S.Ct. at 273. 24 Two years later, in Russell v. United States, the Supreme Court reversed a conviction where the indictment failed to apprise adequately the defendants of the charges against them. The Court said that: 25 'to allow the prosecutor, or the court, to make a subsequent guess as to what was in the minds of the grand jury at the time they returned the indictment would deprive the defendant of a basic protection which the guaranty of the intervention of a grand jury was designed to secure. For a defendant could then be convicted on the basis of facts not found by, and perhaps not even presented to, the grand jury which indicted him.' 369 U.S. at 770, 82 S.Ct. at 1050. 26 The policy expressed by the Court in Russell 'is effectuated by preventing the prosecution from modifying the theory and evidence upon which the indictment is based.' United States v. Silverman, 430 F.2d 106, 110 (2d Cir. 1970). 12 27 In the present case, the record reveals that Brennan and Dello Russo appeared before the grand jury which returned the indictment. The grand jury deliberated on the facts presented to it for seventeen months before naming as coconspirators De Cavalcante, Vastola, Annunziata and 'other persons whose names are to the Grand Jury unknown.' There can be little question that either the indictment was drawn carelessly or that the grand jury did not charge that Brennan and Dello Russo-- key figures in the Government's case-- were co-conspirators rather than victims. 13 Our inquiry, however, is limited to 'whether on its face (the indictment) presents evidence which assures us that such essential elements were presented to the (grand) jury and deliberated upon by them in returning the indictment.' United States v. Silverman, supra at 111. 28 Each of the cases cited above on the issue of an amendment of the indictment-- from Bain to Silverman-- has examined primarily whether there has been a modification of the elements of the crime from that charged by the grand jury to that presented to the petit jury. The 'gist' of a conspiracy under18 U.S.C. 371 'is agreement among the conspirators to commit an offense attended by an act of one or more of the conspirators to effect the object of the conspiracy.' United States v. Falcone, 311 U.S. 205, 210, 61 S.Ct. 204, 207, 85 L.Ed. 128 (1949). The existence of an agreement, rather than the identity of those who agree, is essential to prove the crime of conspiracy. Accordingly, in United States v. Gasoline Retailers Association, Inc., 285 F.2d 688 (7th Cir. 1961), the court found no error where the grand jury knew the names of co-conspirators but did not specify all of them. The present case is somewhat different, for the inference from the indictment here is that while the grand jury knew of the existence of Brennan and Dello Russo, it did not know them as co-conspirators. But the frand jury did assert the existence of co-conspirators other than De Cavalcante, vastola and Annunziata. Cf. United States v. Gordon, 242 F.2d 122, 125 (3rd Cir. 1957). The later specification by the prosecutor of Brennan and Dello Russo did not modify any element of the crime charged. Such impermissible modification might well have occurred if the indictment could be read as excluding Brennan and Dello Russo as co-conspirators. We do not believe, however, that the indictment may fairly be read in this manner. Cf. United States v. Silverman, supra, at 112. 29 Although the circumstances of this case present a close question, we believe the addition of Brennan and Dello Russo as co-conspirators did not so change the basic theory of the alleged conspiratorial agreement as to constitute an amendment to the indictment. 14 Rather, we believe their addition constituted a variance which did not alter the crime charged, nor unfairly surprise the defendants, nor create an opportunity for the Government to prosecute the defendants again for substantially the same offense. Consequently, the naming of two more co-conspirators was not prejudicial to the defendants.