Opinion ID: 3053503
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Failure to Prepare a SEIS

Text: [11] An agency is not required to prepare a SEIS every time new information comes to light. See Marsh, 490 U.S. at 373. Rather, a SEIS is required only if changes, new information, or circumstances may result in significant environmental impacts “in a manner not previously evaluated and considered.” Westlands Water Dist. v. Dep’t of Interior, 376 F.3d 853, 873 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). To assist the agency in determining whether a SEIS is required, an agency may prepare an environmental report (such as a reevaluation) or an EA. See 23 C.F.R. §§ 771.119(a), 771.129, 771.130(c). [12] Here the agencies prepared both an EA and a reevaluation. In these documents, the Agencies considered the changes to the Project and the impacts of those changes. Although the changes would have somewhat different impacts from those previously analyzed in the 1999 EIS, the Agencies determined that those impacts were not significant or adverse enough to require a SEIS. NICAN argues that the Agencies acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to prepare a SEIS regarding the changes to the Project discussed in the 2005 EA and the 2006 Reevaluation. NICAN contends that a SEIS was required because of impacts to wetlands, cumulatively significant impacts, controversial or uncertain impacts, and adverse impact on historic sites. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b) (discussing factors which should be considered in evaluating intensity of impact). We disagree and hold that a SEIS was not required. As modified, the Project affected only an additional 0.32 acres of wetlands, which was also mitigated by construction of 1.1 acres of additional wetland area in a different location. See Wetlands Action Network, 222 F.3d at 1121 (holding that an agency can consider mitigation effects that minimize the impacts of a project in determining the significance of the 14116 NORTH IDAHO COMMUNITY ACTION v. DOT project’s environmental impact). Further, the changes to the Project relating to the Depot were in response to requests by the SHPO to mitigate and protect the Depot from adverse effects, and were not adverse consequences in and of themselves. Cf. Enos v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 1263, 1373-74 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that it was not arbitrary and capricious for the agency to find no adverse effect on archeological sites when that finding was consistent with the opinion of a SHPO). Moreover, the uncertainty and controversy relied on by NICAN are not directed to the changes in the Project, but to the Sand Creek Bypass alternative itself. That alternative was discussed and evaluated in the 1999 EIS, and any challenge to the selection of that alternative has been waived. Cf. Dep’t of Transp., 541 U.S. at 764-65 (holding that objections to the failure to consider alternatives beyond those evaluated in the EA were forfeited by failure to identify additional alternatives during notice and comment period). Finally, the Agencies sufficiently considered the cumulative impacts of the Project. In the 1999 EIS, the Agencies discussed and analyzed the environmental impacts of the Project as initially proposed. In the 2005 EA and 2006 Reevaluation, the Agencies determined that the changes to the Project did not significantly impact the environment in a way not previously considered. NICAN has pointed to nothing that convinces us that these determinations by the Agencies were inaccurate, let alone arbitrary or capricious. [13] We hold that the Agencies’ determination that the changes to the Project would not significantly impact the environment in a way not previously considered, and that a SEIS therefore was not required, was not arbitrary or capricious. See Marsh, 490 U.S. at 373-74; see also Westlands Water Dist., 376 F.3d at 873. NORTH IDAHO COMMUNITY ACTION v. DOT 14117 II. Alleged Violations of Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act All federally funded highway projects must comply with not only federal environmental protection laws, such as NEPA, but also with historic preservation laws, including Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470f (“§ 106”), and Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act of 1966, 49 U.S.C. § 303(c) (“§ 4(f)”). Section 106 is a procedural statute that describes the process by which a project’s impacts to historical sites are identified. It provides that before a federal agency may authorize the expenditure of funds for a federal or federally assisted project, the agency must first consider the effects of the project on “any district, site, building, structure, or object that is included in or eligible for inclusion in the National Register.” 16 U.S.C. § 470f. Section 4(f), in contrast, imposes a substantive mandate. See 49 U.S.C. § 303(c). It allows a federal project “requiring the use of land of an historic site” to be approved only if “(1) there is no prudent and feasible alternative to using that land; and (2) the program or project includes all possible planning to minimize harm to the park, recreation area, wildlife and waterfowl refuge, or historic site resulting from the use.” 49 U.S.C. § 303(c) (emphasis added). NICAN argues that the Agencies violated § 4(f) by (a) failing to survey, identify, and evaluate § 4(f) properties for all four phases of the Project, and (b) determining that a § 4(f) analysis was not required because the construction and operation of the Project would not result in “use” of the Depot. We examine each of these claims in turn. A. Failure to Evaluate § 4(f) Properties for all Four Phases of the Project NICAN argues that the Agencies violated § 4(f) by failing to survey for, identify, and evaluate the impacts on historic 14118 NORTH IDAHO COMMUNITY ACTION v. DOT properties for all four phases of the Project as required by § 106 and § 4(f). The Agencies concede that they have taken a phased approach and have conducted a detailed § 106 identification process and § 4(f) evaluation only with respect to the Sand Creek Byway phase of the Project, and have not done so with respect to the remaining three phases of the Project. Further, the Agencies correctly point out that the regulations governing the § 106 process allow a phased approach to identifying historic properties in some circumstances. See 36 C.F.R. § 800.4(b)(2); 36 C.F.R. § 800.8(a)(1). [14] However, § 4(f) and its regulations require that the § 4(f) evaluation be completed before an agency issues its ROD. See 23 C.F.R. § 771.135(b) (“Any use of lands from a section 4(f) property shall be evaluated early in the development of the action when alternatives to the proposed action are under study.”) (emphasis added); 23 C.F.R. § 771.135(i) (2007) (stating that evaluation of alternatives to using § 4(f) property should be presented in an EIS or EA); 23 C.F.R. § 771.135(l) (stating that if an EIS is required for a project, the agency should conduct the § 4(f) analysis in the EIS or ROD).7 And because the § 4(f) evaluation cannot occur until after the § 106 identification process has been completed, the § 106 process necessarily must be complete by the time the ROD is issued. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 303(d)(2) (allowing the Secretary to find § 4(f) de minimis impact only if that determination has been developed in the consultation process required under § 106). The District of Columbia Circuit reached the same conclu- 7 These regulations were in effect at the time of the Agencies’ decision in this case. They have been removed and replaced with similar ones as of April 11, 2008. 23 C.F.R. § 774.9 (a) & (b) still provide that § 4(f) properties must be evaluated early while alternatives are under study, and that the § 4(f) approval should appear in the EIS or ROD. NORTH IDAHO COMMUNITY ACTION v. DOT 14119 sion in a markedly similar case, Corridor H Alternatives, Inc. v. Slater, 166 F.3d 368 (D.C. Cir. 1999). In Corrider H, the agency approved a plan for building a lengthy highway corridor, which was divided into fourteen segments. Id. at 371. The EIS selected an alternative that required the agency to identify historic properties in each segment in sequence and provided that no work would proceed where the treatment of historic properties had not been finalized. Id. The ROD, approving the selected alternative, recognized that the § 4(f) evaluation could not be conducted until the § 106 identification process was completed. Id. at 371-72. The District of Columbia Circuit held that the agency was required to complete the § 4(f) process for the entire corridor project before issuing the ROD. See id. at 372-74 (citing 23 C.F.R. § 771.135); see also Valley Cmty. Pres. Comm’n v. Mineta, 373 F.3d 1078, 1087-88 (10th Cir. 2004) (“Section 4(f) regulations clearly require the FHWA to make the requisite Section 4(f) evaluations prior to issuing an ROD approving a proposed construction project.”); Benton Franklin Riverfront Trailway & Bridge Comm. v. Lewis, 701 F.2d 784, 788-89 (9th Cir. 1983) (criticizing agency for failing to complete Section 4(f) analysis earlier).8 [15] We hold, consistently with the District of Columbia Circuit’s decision in Corrider H, that an agency is required to complete the § 4(f) evaluation for the entire Project prior to issuing its ROD. 8 The Agencies’ reliance on City of Alexandria v. Slater, 198 F.3d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1999), is misplaced. In Slater, the agency identified historic properties along the entire project corridor, and documented its findings in a Memorandum of Agreement and a § 4(f) evaluation; the agency deferred only the determination of whether some ancillary construction activities might also impact § 4(f) properties. Id. at 873. In contrast, here the Agencies concede that they have conducted the § 106 identification process and § 4(f) evaluation only as to the Sand Creek Byway phase of the project, and have not conducted the necessary identification and evaluation for the other phases of the Project. 14120 NORTH IDAHO COMMUNITY ACTION v. DOT [16] The Agencies concede that they have taken a phaseby-phase approach, that they have not completed the § 4(f) evaluation for the entire Project, and that they already have issued the ROD. The Agencies have accordingly violated § 4(f). We therefore reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment on this issue. B. “Use” of the Depot In the 1999 EIS, the Agencies performed a § 4(f) evaluation with respect to the Depot. The Agencies concluded that there was no feasible and prudent alternative to the use of the Depot and that the proposed action included all possible planning to minimize harm to the Depot, thus allowing the Project to proceed. See 49 U.S.C. § 303(c)(1). NICAN does not challenge the Agencies’ § 4(f) evaluation contained in the 1999 EIS. Instead, NICAN argues that the Agencies acted arbitrarily and capriciously when they determined that modifications to the Project set forth in the 2005 EA will not “use” the Depot for purposes of § 4(f), and that a formal § 4(f) evaluation was therefore not required in relation to those modifications. The modifications at issue came about as a result of the Agencies’ agreement with the SHPO to perform certain repairs and make certain improvements to the Depot. The agreed-to repairs include removing the sandstone water table course, replacing missing bricks, repointing all masonry joints, and reconstructing a concrete curb and walkway at the west side. The agreed-to improvements include paving the Depot access road and parking areas, adding lighting to the pedestrian parking area, and building a handicap access ramp and brick pathway connecting the parking area to the Depot. These “modifications” will not have an “adverse effect” on the Depot, but are instead improvements that inure to the benefit of the Depot. See 49 U.S.C. § 303(c), (d)(2). And, although occurring on Depot property, these improvements do NORTH IDAHO COMMUNITY ACTION v. DOT 14121 not “permanently incorporate[ ] [the land] into a transportation facility” to bring it within the parameters of § 4(f). See 23 C.F.R. § 771.135(p)(1) (2000);9 see also Laguna Greenbelt, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., 42 F.3d 517, 533 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that properties were not actually or constructively used in a proposed project where the project would not “substantially impair the current features, activities and attributes” of parklands and bike paths). These improvements do not, therefore, involve a “use” of the Depot property under § 4(f). See 49 U.S.C. § 303(c), (d)(2); 23 C.F.R. § 771.135(p)(1) (2000). Other modifications to the Project—such as installing a construction fence and mesh grating, and excavating a trench —involve activities that are temporary and minor, that have been approved by the SHPO, and from which the land will be fully restored. These activities also do not, therefore, involve a “use” of the Depot property under § 4(f). See 23 C.F.R. § 771.135(p)(7) (describing when a temporary occupancy is so minimal it does not constitute a “use”). [17] We hold that the Agencies did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in determining that the modifications to the Project discussed in the 2005 EA would not “use” the Depot property within the meaning of § 4(f).