Opinion ID: 2623595
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Marlow's Contentions

Text: Marlow contends the trial court erred in permitting any cross-examination concerning the Orange County offenses because no evidence had been admitted against him, and he had not testified, concerning that incident. Marlow further contends that once the trial court ruled his invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination regarding the Orange County crimes was proper, it erred in requiring him to assert the privilege in front of the jury and informing the jury that he did so each time because the answer would tend to incriminate him. (See People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 440-442, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388.) Finally, the instruction advising the jury to draw no adverse inference from Marlow's invocation of the privilege did not, he contends, eliminate the prejudice stemming from these circumstances. Respondent contends Marlow waived his Fifth Amendment privilege as to the Orange County crimes by testifying, on direct examination, that he did not want to kill anybody, inferentially including Lynell Murray, and that he therefore actually no longer had a privilege to assert before the jury. Consequently, respondent urges, Marlow received the benefit of an instruction (CALJIC No. 2.25, telling the jury to draw no adverse inference from the assertion of the privilege) to which he was not entitled. Moreover, respondent points out, the jury was instructed regarding the limited purpose of evidence of the Orange County murder, an offense for which he was not on trial in the present proceeding. We conclude that Marlow's direct examination response denying he ever wanted to kill Novis or anybody else did open the door to questioning regarding the Orange County murder, and the trial court abused its discretion in implicitly ruling to the contrary. A defendant who takes the stand to testify in his own behalf waives the privilege against self-incrimination to the extent of the scope of relevant cross-examination. [Citations.] `It matters not that the defendant's answer on cross-examination might tend to establish his guilt of a collateral offense for which he could still be prosecuted.' ( People v. Thornton (1974) 11 Cal.3d 738, 760-761, 114 Cal.Rptr. 467, 523 P.2d 267, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 684, fn. 12, 160 Cal.Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1, and abrogated on other grounds in People v. Martinez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225, 234, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 533, 973 P.2d 512; Jenkins v. Anderson (1980) 447 U.S. 231, 236, fn. 3, 100 S.Ct. 2124, 65 L.Ed.2d 86.) None of [the] fundamental principles [underlying the rule precluding the prosecution from cross-examining a testifying defendant beyond the scope of direct examination, upon the case generally] . . . imply that when a defendant voluntarily testifies in his own defense the People may not fully amplify his testimony by inquiring into the facts and circumstances surrounding his assertions, or by introducing evidence through cross-examination which explains or refutes his statements or the inferences which may necessarily be drawn from them. ( People v. Schader (1969) 71 Cal.2d 761, 770, 80 Cal.Rptr. 1, 457 P.2d 841; see also United States v. Hearst (9th Cir.1977) 563 F.2d 1331, 1340-1341.) In the context of the trial, following Coffman's testimony that Marlow killed Murray, Marlow's testimony denying he wanted to kill anybody reasonably would have been understood as referring to Murray, and it would have been unfair not to permit Coffman and the prosecutor to amplify it. Cross-examination of Marlow concerning the events in Orange County, we conclude, thus was relevant and proper, and his purported assertion of the privilege was ineffective. [19] From this conclusion it follows that the trial court did not commit Griffin error (see Griffin v. California, supra, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229) in explaining to the jury the meaning of Marlow's purported assertions of the privilege. The trial court should not then have instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 2.25, or perhaps, on request, should have stricken Marlow's direct testimony regarding his lack of desire to kill anybody. Nevertheless, we see no reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome in the absence of these irregularities, for Marlow was not charged in this proceeding with the Orange County offenses, and we presume the jury followed the instruction to draw no adverse inferences from his assertion of the privilege. ( People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 436, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391.) [20] Marlow further contends that both the prosecutor and Coffman's counsel violated his right against self-incrimination by commenting, in their respective summations, on his failure to testify about the Orange County homicide. ( Griffin v. California, supra, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229; People v. Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 157, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 825 P.2d 781 [ Griffin rule applies to comment by codefendant as well as prosecutor].) Specifically, the prosecutor commented: Now the abduction out of that cleanersâ and we have only heard Miss Coffman's version of itâ is that they are starting to be a good team. Coffman's counsel stated: When you compare what Miss Coffman did, and starting at the beginning and recounting and answering questions, to what Mr. Marlow did, including picking and choosing what he wanted to talk about, I think that the differences are very extreme. [ļ] And I offer that as a suggestion to you. [ļ] I do not want to suggest that by exercising his right under the Fifth Amendment, that for that reason, you should disregard Mr. Marlow's testimony, because instruction 2.25 indicates that a person has a right to rely on that. Finally, in his penalty phase closing argument, Coffman's counsel stated: Greg Marlow never told the police anything about Lynell Murray. And he took the Fifth Amendment, as I remember, here in court when he was asked about what occurred in Orange County. Marlow forfeited any appellate challenge to the foregoing comments by failing to make a contemporaneous objection at trial or to ask that the jury be appropriately admonished. ( People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 873-874, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 219, 905 P.2d 1305.) As he contends counsel's failure to do so constitutes ineffective assistance, we turn to the merits of the claim. Because Marlow's direct testimony that he did not want to kill anybody opened the door to cross-examination concerning the Orange County offenses, as discussed above, the Fifth Amendment no longer shielded him from cross-examination thereon, and both the prosecutor and his codefendant's counsel were free to comment on his silence or failure to explain the evidence. (See Jenkins v. Anderson, supra, 447 U.S. at p. 236, 100 S.Ct. 2124; People v. Schader, supra, 71 Cal.2d at pp. 770-771, 80 Cal. Rptr. 1, 457 P.2d 841; Pen.Code, § 1127; Evid.Code, § 413.) Moreover, the remarks by Coffman's counsel seem aimed not at implying that Marlow's failure to testify concerning Orange County signaled his guilt, but rather at suggesting Coffman's credibility was comparatively strong because she took the stand and submitted to cross-examination. In any event, brief and mild references to a defendant's failure to testify, unaccompanied by any suggestion that the jury should draw an inference of guilt from it, are, like the comments Marlow cites, generally held to be harmless. ( People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 771, 239 Cal.Rptr. 82, 739 P.2d 1250.) We see no reason to reach a different conclusion here.