Opinion ID: 2099735
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Propriety of the State's Closing Argument

Text: The State argues that the appellate court erred in concluding that certain comments in the prosecutor's closing argument deprived the defendant of a fair trial. The trial court did not rule on the propriety of the prosecution's closing argument because the defendant did not object at trial and did not challenge the argument in a posttrial motion. The appellate court excused this procedural default under the plain error doctrine. Recently, in People v. Herron, 215 Ill.2d 167, 186-87, 294 Ill.Dec. 55, 830 N.E.2d 467 (2005), we stated: [T]he plain error doctrine bypasses normal forfeiture principles and allows a reviewing court to consider unpreserved error when either (1) the evidence is close, regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) the error is serious, regardless of the closeness of the evidence. In the first instance, the defendant must prove `prejudicial error.' That is, the defendant must show both that there was plain error and that the evidence was so closely balanced that the error alone severely threatened to tip the scales of justice against him. The State, of course, can respond by arguing that the evidence was not closely balanced, but rather strongly weighted against the defendant. In the second instance, the defendant must prove there was plain error and that the error was so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant's trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process. [Citation.] Prejudice to the defendant is presumed because of the importance of the right involved, ` regardless of the strength of the evidence.' (Emphasis in original.) [Citation.] In both instances, the burden of persuasion remains with the defendant. Before we may apply either prong of the plain error doctrine, however, there must be a plain error. See People v. Keene, 169 Ill.2d 1, 17, 214 Ill.Dec. 194, 660 N.E.2d 901 (1995) ([S]hort of a conclusion that an asserted error is a `plain' one, the so-called plain error doctrine offers no basis to excuse a procedural default); People v. Sims, 192 Ill.2d 592, 621, 249 Ill.Dec. 610, 736 N.E.2d 1048 (2000); People v. Wade, 131 Ill.2d 370, 376, 137 Ill.Dec. 608, 546 N.E.2d 553 (1989). Here, there was no error at all. The purpose of closing arguments is to give the parties a final opportunity to review with the jury the admitted evidence, discuss what it means, apply the applicable law to that evidence, and argue why the evidence and law compel a favorable verdict. T. Mauet & W. Wolfson, Trial Evidence 439 (2d ed.2001). A prosecutor has wide latitude in making a closing argument. People v. Blue, 189 Ill.2d 99, 127, 244 Ill.Dec. 32, 724 N.E.2d 920 (2000). In closing, the prosecutor may comment on the evidence and any fair, reasonable inferences it yields ( People v. Pasch, 152 Ill.2d 133, 184, 178 Ill.Dec. 38, 604 N.E.2d 294 (1992)), even if such inferences reflect negatively on the defendant ( People v. Holman, 103 Ill.2d 133, 163, 82 Ill.Dec. 585, 469 N.E.2d 119 (1984)). A closing argument must serve a purpose beyond inflaming the emotions of the jury. People v. Tiller, 94 Ill.2d 303, 321, 68 Ill.Dec. 916, 447 N.E.2d 174 (1982). We recently reemphasized that a prosecutor may not characterize the defendant as an evil person or cast the jury's decision as a choice between good and evil. People v. Johnson, 208 Ill.2d 53, 80, 281 Ill. Dec. 1, 803 N.E.2d 405 (2003), citing People v. Hudson, 157 Ill.2d 401, 457, 193 Ill.Dec. 128, 626 N.E.2d 161 (1993). But a prosecutor may comment unfavorably on the evil effects of the crime and urge the jury to administer the law without fear, when such argument is based upon competent and pertinent evidence. See People v. Hope, 116 Ill.2d 265, 277-78, 108 Ill.Dec. 41, 508 N.E.2d 202 (1986), citing People v. Jackson, 84 Ill.2d 350, 360, 49 Ill.Dec. 719, 418 N.E.2d 739 (1981); People v. Miller, 13 Ill.2d 84, 109, 148 N.E.2d 455 (1958); see also People v. Moore, 9 Ill.2d 224, 232, 137 N.E.2d 246 (1956) (holding that a prosecutor may denounce the defendant's wickedness). A closing argument must be viewed in its entirety, and the challenged remarks must be viewed in their context. People v. Cisewski, 118 Ill.2d 163, 176, 113 Ill.Dec. 58, 514 N.E.2d 970 (1987); People v. Buss, 187 Ill.2d 144, 244, 240 Ill.Dec. 520, 718 N.E.2d 1 (1999). Pure evil, as used by the prosecutor here, referred to specific actions by the defendant: getting his gun, hunting his mother in the street, pointing the gun at her, shooting her four times, stashing his gun, returning to bed, and displaying little concern about her death. The prosecutor characterized the defendant's actions as pure evil in order to preface his argument that the facts proved the defendant guilty. The prosecutor's remarks constituted a permissible comment upon the evidence. Further, even if we were to conclude that the prosecutor's remarks flirted with error (see People v. Williams, 295 Ill.App.3d 456, 467-68, 229 Ill.Dec. 734, 692 N.E.2d 723 (1998)), such putative error does not satisfy either prong of the plain error doctrine. We note that the defendant does not contend that the prosecutor's remarks deprived him of a fair trial; he simply contends that the evidence was closely balanced and that the remarks prejudiced him. We disagree. The evidence against the defendant, particularly his court-reported inculpatory statement and the oral inculpatory statements which preceded it, was strong. The brief references to pure evil were made at the beginning of the argument and were not repeated later. Further, before the arguments began, the trial court preemptively cautioned the jury: Closing arguments are made by the attorneys to discuss the facts and circumstances in the case and should be confined to the evidence and to reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Any argument made by the attorneys which is not based on the evidence should be disregarded. The court repeated this caveat in the jury instructions. We cannot say that these remarks affected the outcome of the defendant's trial. The appellate court, quoting at length from Johnson, intimated that the remarks here were so pervasive that they undermined the integrity and fairness of the defendant's entire trial. Again, we disagree. Unlike the remarks at issue in Johnson, the remarks here were isolated. They did not add their weight to a cloud of prejudice formed by a wider array of prosecutorial misconduct. The appellate court concluded, Rather than letting the evidence speak for itself, the prosecutor set out to paint Nicholas as evil. 351 Ill. App.3d at 450, 286 Ill.Dec. 364, 813 N.E.2d 1057. The people of this state, however, employ prosecutors to speak for the evidence on their behalf, and prosecutors have latitude in doing so. In light of the defendant's actions, the limited references to pure evil were well within proper bounds of a closing argument, and the appellate court improperly concluded that the prosecutor's argument was plain error.