Opinion ID: 2600675
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prosecutorial misconduct affecting right to a fair trial at both phases of the proceedings

Text: (17) Defendant raises several claims of prosecutorial misconduct in the misuse of voir dire in commenting upon defendant's failure to testify, in indoctrinating potential jurors, proffering evidence of defendant's sexual misconduct with the Richards girls, and impugning the motives of defense counsel and a defense expert. Prior to examining these claims, we recall the general principles governing a prosecutor's conduct during trial in the context of a claim of prosecutorial misconduct. A prosecutor who uses deceptive or reprehensible methods to persuade the jury commits misconduct, and such actions require reversal under the federal Constitution when they infect the trial with such `unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.' ( Darden v. Wainwright (1986) 477 U.S. 168, 181 [91 L.Ed.2d 144, 106 S.Ct. 2464]; see People v. Cash (2002) 28 Cal.4th 703, 733 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 545, 50 P.3d 332].) Under state law, a prosecutor who uses deceptive or reprehensible methods commits misconduct even when those actions do not result in a fundamentally unfair trial. [Citation.] ( People v. Cook (2006) 39 Cal.4th 566, 606 [47 Cal.Rptr.3d 22, 139 P.3d 492], italics added; see People v. Lopez (2008) 42 Cal.4th 960, 965 [71 Cal.Rptr.3d 253, 175 P.3d 4] ( Lopez ); People v. Hoyos, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 923; People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 726 [47 Cal.Rptr.3d 326, 140 P.3d 657].) A defendant may not complain on appeal of prosecutorial misconduct unless in a timely fashion, and on the same ground, the defendant objected to the action and also requested that the jury be admonished to disregard the perceived impropriety. ( Thornton, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 454.) A defendant whose counsel did not object at trial to alleged prosecutorial misconduct can argue on appeal that counsel's inaction violated the defendant's constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel, but the appellate record rarely demonstrates that the failure to object was the result of counsel's incompetence; generally, such claims are more appropriately litigated on habeas corpus, which allows for an evidentiary hearing where the reasons for defense counsel's actions or omissions can be explored. ( Lopez, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 966; see People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 267 [62 Cal.Rptr.2d 437, 933 P.2d 1134].) a. Voir dire: assertion that defendant was the best source of his state of mind Defendant contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct by repeatedly questioning potential jurors during voir dire, and by recalling those questions during closing argument, in a manner designed to emphasize that jurors should consider defendant's statements to be the best source of his state of mind during the commission of the murders. Defendant asserts the prosecutor thereby committed error under Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609, 611 [14 L.Ed.2d 106, 85 S.Ct. 1229] ( Griffin ) and also impermissibly attempted to indoctrinate the jury to discount expert testimony concerning defendant's mental state. In the course of general voir dire, during which three of the jurors who eventually served on the case were presentD.D., D.H., and J.M.the prosecutor posed questions to several potential jurors relating to whether on a particular date, the potential juror or instead someone else would have been the best source of information concerning that potential juror's state of mind, suggesting in effect that the best source would be the potential juror himself or herself. After a prospective juror (who did not serve on the jury) asked for clarification, the prosecutor indicated the best the question is obviously going to be not [ sic ] what's in my mind or your mind at any given time during this trial but what was in Mr. Salcido's mind. The prospective juror then commented that defendant was not on the witness list. The trial court explained that this circumstance did not necessarily signify defendant would not testify as a witness. After further exchange with the prospective juror on a different topic, the prosecutor indicated that the question he was trying to ask was that if people give opinions about what other people are thinking at a given moment and what I'm raising to you is that we should look with some caution about those kinds of opinions, and if we have available to us more direct evidence, perhaps of what a person is feeling or what a person did and why they did it, then we ought to look to that as well. So that's all I'm trying to get at. After the voir dire of prospective jurors concluded for the day, the trial court and counsel outside the presence of the jury discussed scheduling and evidentiary issues. At that point, defense counsel objected to the foregoing questioning by the prosecutor as improper comment on defendant's failure to testify, in violation of Griffin, and requested that the trial court instruct the prosecutor from now on not to inquire as to who is the best judge of what was going on in defendant's mind. The trial court cautioned the prosecutor against arguing his case in voir dire, and the prosecutor agreed to phrase his questions more accurately. It is apparent that defendant failed to timely object during voir dire to the prosecutor's line of questioning and thus has forfeited this claim on appeal. Moreover, in response to defendant's belated objection and request, the trial court instructed the prosecutor to refrain from questioning any additional potential jurors in that manner. ( People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 670 [106 Cal.Rptr.2d 629, 22 P.3d 392].) The prosecutor did not press the matter in closing argument. Finally, the prosecutor's questions do not reflect that his sole purpose was to indoctrinate the potential jurors. (See People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 209 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 426, 821 P.2d 1302].) Accordingly, we reject defendant's claim. b. Voir dire: additional indoctrination of the jury Defendant asserts that the prosecutor otherwise attempted to indoctrinate potential jurors by questioning them regarding their experiences relating to alcohol consumption, specifically with regard to its effect on their capacity to make decisions. This questioning did not improperly attempt to educate potential jurors concerning the facts of the case or to secure their votes, and thus was proper. (See People v. Fierro, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 209.) c. Proffer of unredacted statements and evidence of sexual misconduct Defendant contends that the prosecutor introduced grossly inflammatory evidence of defendant's sexual misconduct with the Richards girls. As explained above, the testimony and related evidence properly were admitted. d. Impugning defense counsel and defense expert Defendant contends the prosecutor impugned the motives of defense expert Dr. Crinella by, among other things, suggesting his testimony was the result of his long friendship with defense counsel. Defendant forfeited his present claim of prosecutorial misconduct by failing to object at trial and seek an admonition. ( Prince, supra, 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1244; People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 753 [85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203, 976 P.2d 754].) Even assuming this claim was not waived, the prosecutor has considerable leeway in suggesting an expert may testify a certain way for financial gain or other reasons, without committing misconduct. ( People v. Monterroso (2004) 34 Cal.4th 743, 784 [22 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 101 P.3d 956].)