Opinion ID: 1156947
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: concealing stolen property

Text: Prior to trial, appellant submitted a Motion to Dismiss or for Judgment of Acquittal on Count IV. In support of that motion, he admitted that he stole the Toyota and argued that a thief could not be prosecuted for the possessory offenses of receiving or concealing stolen goods. He reiterated this position as part of a motion to acquit following the State's presentation of evidence and raises it once again on appeal. We find no merit in his argument. Appellant cites much authority for the proposition that a defendant cannot be prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced both for the larceny of property and the receipt or concealment of that same property. He correctly notes that such a situation potentially offends both state and federal constitutional proscriptions against double jeopardy, in that the possessory offenses are necessarily committed when one steals property. A defendant cannot receive multiple punishments for a single offense. See generally Howard v. State, 762 P.2d 28 (Wyo. 1988); Schultz v. State, 751 P.2d 367 (Wyo. 1988); Birr v. State, 744 P.2d 1117 (Wyo. 1987); Tuggle v. State, 733 P.2d 610 (Wyo. 1987). However, appellant's argument, and the authorities cited, are inapposite here. Appellant was merely charged with concealing stolen property. No attempt was made to try or punish him for the theft of the Toyota. He attempts to shore up this obvious weakness in his argument by contending that the possessory offenses of receiving and concealing were intended by the legislature to reach only a thief's accessories after the fact. He cites no cogent authority in support of this position, however, and ignores past decisions of this court suggesting a contrary conclusion. Where evidence strongly indicated the defendant's involvement in the underlying theft, we upheld his conviction for receiving and concealing stolen oil field drill bits based on his unexplained possession of those bits. Tageant v. State, 673 P.2d 651 (Wyo. 1983); see also Capshaw v. State, 737 P.2d 740 (Wyo. 1987). Furthermore, we expressly rejected the argument that an admitted thief could not be charged and convicted of concealing the stolen property in Pote v. State, 695 P.2d 617, 622 (Wyo. 1985). If we were to adopt appellant's argument, the State would be required to offer evidence that someone other than the possessor of stolen goods committed the actual theft. This court has repeatedly rejected such a requirement. See generally State v. Callaway, 72 Wyo. 509, 267 P.2d 970 (1954); Curran v. State, 12 Wyo. 553, 76 P. 577 (1904). Appellant fails to consider that the evil which the legislature intended to address in this instance may just as well have been the mere wrongful possession and use of stolen property. The evil character of such possessory acts does not disappear when an unproved thief engages in such acts only to magically reappear when a fence or some other third party engages in similar conduct. Where the thief can be proven to have committed the lesser offense, we will not permit him to obstruct prosecution by giving partial proof of greater guilt. Appellant was properly charged and prosecuted for concealing stolen property. Appellant's reassertion of this issue after the State's presentation of its case, however, raises the additional question of whether sufficient evidence was produced on this offense to overcome his motion for acquittal. We have frequently articulated our standard of review with respect to that question. A motion for acquittal should be denied where, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a reasonable inference can be drawn from that evidence that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The motion should be granted, however, where there is such a lack of substantial evidence such that a reasonable juror must harbor a reasonable doubt as to the existence of an essential element of the crime. Washington v. State, 751 P.2d 384, 386-87 (Wyo. 1988); Abeyta v. State, 705 P.2d 330, 332 (Wyo. 1985); Russell v. State, 583 P.2d 690, 693-94 (Wyo. 1978). The elements of the offense with which appellant was charged are set forth in W.S. 6-3-403, which provides in pertinent part: (a) A person who    conceals    property which he knows, believes or has reasonable cause to believe was obtained in violation of law is guilty of: (i) A felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or both, if the value of the property is five hundred dollars ($500.00) or more. Thus, to overcome appellant's motion, the State was required to produce evidence that, at the time and place alleged in the charging documents, appellant: (1) concealed property; (2) of a value of at least five hundred dollars; (3) with the knowledge, belief, or reasonable cause to believe that the property had been illegally obtained. Appellant concealed the Toyota, for purposes of the statute, if he placed it out of the owner's sight or prevented the owner from recognizing it. However, concealment does not require an effort to disguise or hide the vehicle; it merely requires that appellant drove the vehicle away from where the owner was likely to discover it. Hunter v. State, 704 P.2d 713, 717-18 (Wyo. 1985). Appellant's possession of the Toyota in Cheyenne, some eight hours after its theft in Laramie, is circumstantial evidence sufficient to make a prima facie showing that he concealed the car. By demonstrating that it was three years old and cost over two thousand dollars to repair, the State also provided sufficient evidence of the car's value. Finally, the State introduced considerable evidence to indicate appellant's awareness that the vehicle had been illegally obtained. Officer Zukauckas testified to appellant's admission that he took the Toyota in Laramie. The strongest possible proof that a car had been stolen and that a defendant knew that to be the case is provided by evidence of his participation in the theft. Pote, 695 P.2d at 622. Additionally, appellant's evasive actions provide strong circumstantial evidence of his guilty state of mind. The district court correctly denied appellant's motion to acquit with respect to the charge of concealing stolen property.