Opinion ID: 2508855
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: Exclusion of Certain Family History Evidence

Text: Dorothea Holloway, defendant's mother, testified she left her parents' family when she was 17 years old to go with Walter Holloway to Oakland, where defendant was born. Defense counsel then sought to ask Dorothea about her parents' reaction to her going with Walter Holloway, but the prosecution objected on hearsay grounds. At the bench, counsel represented that Dorothea would testify her parents had disowned her, leaving her to raise her children without any help from an extended family while Walter was out floundering. Counsel argued the evidence, offered for the nonhearsay purpose of showing Dorothea's knowledge of her own situation, would illuminate defendant's family life as well as his mother's character. The court observed that the evidence would be taken as an implied opinion of Dorothea's parents on Walter's character and excluded the offered testimony on the grounds that the probative value of [defense counsel's articulated] non-hearsay purpose, if there is such a value, . . . is outweighed by the substantial danger of prejudice that is going to be misused by the jury. The court's ruling excluding the proposed testimony as more prejudicial, confusing or distracting than probative, under Evidence Code section 352, is reviewed for abuse of discretion. ( People v. Rowland, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 264, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 841 P.2d 897.) We find no such abuse of discretion. Though Walter Holloway's deficiencies as a father and role model for defendant were relevant subjects for proof in mitigation, Walter Holloway's character itself was not at issue. The defense penalty case, which rested heavily on proof of the deleterious effects of Walter's behavior on defendant, created a substantial danger the jury's attention and deliberations would incorrectly focus on Walter's character, a danger the court sought to reduce by excluding what could be taken as opinion on that subject. On the probative value side of the scale, the reaction of defendant's maternal grandparents to their daughter's relationship with Walter was of only indirect and remote relevance to defendant's character and experience. Nor was the proposed testimony needed in order to illuminate the family environment of defendant's childhood, for Dorothea or other members of defendant's nuclear family could have testified that she received no emotional or financial support from her parents in raising her family, without elaborating on the cause of this circumstance. The court did not abuse its discretion, much less deprive defendant of his Eighth Amendment right to present evidence in mitigation (see People v. Fauber (1992) 2 Cal.4th 792, 856, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 831 P.2d 249), by excluding this marginally relevant testimony because of its potential for prejudice and distraction.