Opinion ID: 2621771
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: There Exist Genuine Issues of Material Fact Regarding the State's Liability for Colonel Clark's Alleged Negligence.[33]

Text: We have generally adopted the view that vicarious liability or respondeat superior claims only arise within the scope of employment. [34] Under this doctrine, two requirements must be met in order for an employer to be liable for an actor's negligence: (1) that the actor was an employee of the employer; and (2) that the alleged negligent act occurred within the scope of the employee's employment. However, as we first recognized in Reader v. Ghemm Co., [35] there is an exception to the general rule of respondeat superior: An employer who borrows the employee of another can, in certain circumstances, be held liable for the negligent acts of the borrowed employee. [36] We later modified the doctrine of the borrowed employee [37] in Kastner v. Toombs in a manner that left both the lending employer and the borrowing employer potentially liable for the negligent acts of the employee under a system that apportioned fault between the two employers. [38] Under the statutory system in place at that time, fault and liability were apportioned according to contribution and indemnity. [39] Alaska has since moved to a system of comparative negligence for apportioning liability according to fault. [40] Thus, liability under the doctrine of the borrowed employee is apportioned between the two employers according to comparative negligence. But we need not reach that issue here; it suffices to note that the state could be found liable to the families under the doctrine of the borrowed employee. Therefore, in order for the court to grant summary judgment on this issue, there must exist no genuine question as to whether Colonel Clark was either an employee of the state or a borrowed employee acting on behalf of the state.

An Army National Guard technician such as Colonel Clark is an employee of the United States. [41] As a technician, Colonel Clark was required to (1) be a member of the National Guard; [42] (2) hold the military rank appropriate for the position; [43] and (3) wear the appropriate uniform. [44] Colonel Clark's position as a technician was that of Supervisory Aircraft Pilot/State Aviation Officer. The Alaska Army National Guard stated that at the time of the crash: Col. Clark was a Federal Excepted Military Technician. He was a federal employee which required him to hold a position in the Alaska Army National guard and wear the military uniform. He was not on active duty orders to fly because it was part of his position description as the SAO [State Aviation Officer]. Col. Clark was acting in his official capacity as the pilot and the SAO. The families argue that Colonel Clark's status as the State Aviation Officer/State Supervisory Pilot made him a state employee. As discussed above, these duties were his position as a technician, not separate as the families infer. Even assuming for the sake of argument that the families' inference was correct, it is clear that State Aviation Officer/State Supervisory Pilot position is a federal one. In the federal Position Description for this position, Colonel Clark was assigned a federal pay and responsibility grade of GM-14.
If, at the time of the crash, Colonel Clark was acting only as an Alaska Army National Guard member who had been placed on Active Guard Reserve (AGR) status, then he would have been a state employee at the time of the crash. [45] The families argue that Colonel Clark was in AGR status because he was a member of the Alaska Army National Guard. This is incorrect. Merely being in the National Guard does not mean the Guard member is in AGR status. To be in AGR status, the Guard member must be ordered into it. [46] While there is a record of Colonel Wood, Sergeant Major Kahklen, Sergeant First Class Brink, and Sergeant Schmidt being so ordered, there is no such record for Colonel Clark. Additionally, as previously discussed, both the Alaska Army National Guard and the United States Department of Justice stated that Colonel Clark was acting as a federal employee in his role as a technician serving as the State Aviation Officer at the time of the crash. [47] In sum, since Colonel Clark was indisputably a federal and not a state employee at the time of the crash, the state cannot be vicariously liable as his employer for his alleged negligence.
As previously noted, Alaska has reconciled the doctrine of respondeat superior with the doctrine of the borrowed employee so that when one employer borrows the employee of another employer, both may be held responsible for the negligent acts of that employee. [48] Accordingly, the State of Alaska may be liable for the acts of Colonel Clark if he was a borrowed employee acting for the state at the time of the accident. In announcing the original doctrine of the borrowed employee, we stated: A[n employee] directed or permitted by his [employer] to perform services for another may become the [employee] of such other in performing the services. He may become the other's [employee] as to some acts and not as to others. [49] The decisive question is whether the employee was loaned as to the particular acts at issue. [50] And the test turns on the question of control, or the transfer of control. [51] We have previously stated that [t]he control which the borrowing [employer] must acquire for the servant to become loaned is not merely control over the [employee's] specific acts, but rather control in a broader sense. [52] Evidence in the record suggests that the state may have exerted control over Colonel Clark regarding the acts in question. For example, the Position Description for Colonel Clark's job states that the State Army Aviation Officer and Safety Officer for a State Army National Guard (ARNG) [m]anages the ARNG aviation program of the state which includes planning, coordinating, implementing and directing all aviation assets within the State ... [and acts] as a liaison with all organizations concerning matters relevant to aviation support. (Emphasis added.) Further, this position [c]ontrols the aviation program for the state ... and the provisions of the U.S. Army Aircrew Training program must be complied with when acting as a pilot in an Army aircraft assigned to the State. (Emphasis added.) And, several of the passengers on the flight had been called into AGR status and were thus considered state employees. There is at least some evidence in the record that acts of Colonel Clark, in his capacity as the State Aviation/Safety Officer, may have been controlled by the state both specifically and generally. Whether the state exerted such control is therefore a disputed material fact. Upon remand, the plaintiffs are entitled to trial on this issue.