Opinion ID: 186586
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Should the CAP Have Been Remanded?

Text: 17 Finally, HHS argues the district court should have remanded to it the question whether Nebraska's proposed CAP would have been approved under its previous practice, as set forth in the 1984 Letter and the 1985 Memorandum upon which the district court relied. Nebraska insists the court did not need to remand the issue because [t]he record establishes beyond legitimate dispute ... [that the CAP] was approvable. When a final agency action is challenged in the district court, that court sits as an appellate tribunal .... [If it] determines that [the] agency made an error of law, the court's inquiry is at an end: the case must be remanded to the agency for further action consistent with the corrected legal standards. PPG Indus., Inc. v. United States, 52 F.3d 363, 365 (D.C.Cir.1995) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Esch v. Yeutter, 876 F.2d 976, 993 (D.C.Cir.1989) (court should not mak[e] the substantive decision itself). Therefore, it is clear the district court erred when it ordered approval of Nebraska's CAP. The agency must be given the first opportunity to determine whether Nebraska's program meets the standard that was in place before the announcements were issued. As the Supreme Court has explained, because agency decisions are frequently of a discretionary nature or frequently require expertise, the agency should be given the first chance to exercise that discretion or to apply that expertise. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 194, 89 S.Ct. 1657, 23 L.Ed.2d 194 (1969). 18 The wisdom of this course is brought home by examination of Nebraska's claim that the proposed CAP certainly would have been approved under the HHS guidelines previously in use. Although the 1985 Memorandum allows training to be charged entirely to Title IV-E when at least 85% of that training is directed toward a Title IV-E program, that crucial phrase may be susceptible to more than one interpretation. And it is for HHS to interpret its own policies in the first instance, see Aulenback, Inc. v. FHA, 103 F.3d 156, 162-63 (D.C.Cir.1997), subject only to quite deferential review by the courts, Carus Chem. Co. v. EPA, 395 F.3d 434, 439 (D.C.Cir.2005). The district court's decision to approve the CAP was inconsistent with this allocation of authority between the agency and the court.