Opinion ID: 885589
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: issues

Text: ¶ 29 Did the District Court err when it affirmed the HRC's award of $2,500 for emotional distress damages? ¶ 30 Upon a finding of discrimination, the HRC may: (a) prescribe conditions on the accused's future conduct relevant to the type of discriminatory practice found; (b) require any reasonable measure to correct the discriminatory practice and to rectify any harm, pecuniary or otherwise, to the person discriminated against; (c) require a report on the manner of compliance. § 49-2-506(1), MCA. (Emphasis added.) We have previously recognized that emotional distress damages fall within § 49-2-506(1), MCA. Vainio v. Brookshire (1993), 258 Mont. 273, 281, 852 P.2d 596, 601. ¶ 31 Vortex contends that emotional distress damages should only be allowed where a claimant introduces evidence that satisfies the burden established in Sacco v. High Country Indep. Press (1995), 271 Mont. 209, 896 P.2d 411. In Sacco, we described the degree of proof necessary to support an award of damages in an independent action for intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress. We held that absent physical or mental injury, emotional distress damages could only be awarded if there is a substantial invasion of a legally protected interest that causes a significant impact upon the claimant. Such impact must be serious and such that no reasonable person should be expected to endure it. Sacco, 271 Mont. at 237, 896 P.2d at 428. Vortex contends that the emotional distress suffered by Ben did not rise to a level serious enough to support damages based on the Sacco standard. ¶ 32 Therefore, the question before us is whether the rule established in Sacco for independent causes of action applies to emotional distress damages awarded in a discrimination context pursuant to the MHRA. We hold Sacco is inapplicable to the present case because it was based on the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, not a deprivation of human rights. This Court has not previously had an opportunity to address this question. However, because the MHRA is closely modeled after Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, reference to pertinent federal case law is both useful and appropriate. Snell v. Montana Dakota Utils. Co. (1982), 198 Mont. 56, 62, 643 P.2d 841, 844. ¶ 33 For the most part, federal case law involving anti-discrimination statutes draws a distinction between emotional distress claims in tort versus those in discrimination complaints. Because of the broad remunerative purpose of the civil rights laws, the tort standard for awarding damages should not be applied to civil rights actions. Bolden v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Auth. (3d Cir.1994), 21 F.3d 29, 34; see also Chatman v. Slagle (6th Cir. 1997), 107 F.3d 380, 384-85; Walz v. Town of Smithtown (2d Cir.1995), 46 F.3d 162, 170. As the Court said in Bolden, in many cases, the interests protected by a particular constitutional right may not also be protected by an analogous branch of common law torts. 21 F.3d at 34 (quoting Carey v. Piphus (1978), 435 U.S. 247, 258, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 1049, 55 L.Ed.2d 252). Compensatory damages for human rights claims may be awarded for humiliation and emotional distress established by testimony or inferred from the circumstances. Johnson v. Hale (9th Cir. 1991), 940 F.2d 1192, 1193. Furthermore, the severity of the harm should govern the amount, not the availability, of recovery. Chatman, 107 F.3d at 385. ¶ 34 As the HRC found, the record reveals evidence of emotional distress. Testimony showed that Ben subsequently had difficulty finding work, lost sleep given his economic hardship, had to move in with relatives, was hounded by collection agencies, had to borrow money, and had to sell his automobile for sustenance. Given the broad remedial nature of § 49-2-506(1)(b), MCA, we conclude that the tort standard for proof of independent actions for emotional distress does not apply to civil rights cases brought pursuant to the MHRA and that HRC's award of $2,500 for emotional distress damages was adequately supported by the record. ¶ 35 The judgment of the District Court is affirmed. We Concur: JIM RICE, PATRICIA COTTER, JAMES C. NELSON, and JIM REGNIER, JJ.