Opinion ID: 532811
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: russo's entrapment claim

Text: 16 Michael Russo's sole claim on appeal is that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on entrapment. 1 At trial, Russo's sole theory of defense was that he was entrapped by the government into violating federal laws. In his view, the credit card scheme, which required the use of interstate phone facilities, expanded his admittedly criminal conduct from purely local violations to federal offenses. He argued that but for the government's conduct (through its involvement in NCS) in allegedly inducing him to begin accepting credit cards, he would not have agreed to engage in the conduct that made him subject to federal prosecution. 17 In examining Russo's argument, we note that this Court has adopted a four-part test for determining when a defendant is entitled to a particular theory of defense instruction. In United States v. Douglas, 818 F.2d 1317 (7th Cir.1987), we held that a defendant is entitled to an instruction on his or her theory of defense if: (1) the defendant proposes a correct statement of the law; (2) the defendant's theory is supported by the evidence; (3) the defendant's theory of defense is not part of the charge; and (4) the failure to include an instruction on the defendant's theory of defense in the jury charge would deny the defendant a fair trial. Id. at 1320-21. Applying this test to the case at bar, we find that for the reasons stated below, the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury on entrapment because the defendant failed to satisfy the second prong of Douglas: his requested instruction was not supported by the evidence. 18 A valid entrapment defense has two related elements: government inducement of the crime, and a lack of predisposition on the part of the defendant to engage in the criminal conduct. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 78 S.Ct. 819, 2 L.Ed.2d 848 (1958); Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 108 S.Ct. 883, 99 L.Ed.2d 54 (1988); United States v. Hawkins, 823 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir.1987). A defendant is entitled to an entrapment instruction whenever there exists evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in his favor. Mathews, 485 U.S. at 61, 108 S.Ct. at 887; United States v. Fusko, 869 F.2d 1048, 1051-52 (7th Cir.1989); United States v. Williams, 877 F.2d 516 (7th Cir.1989). The defendant's burden to warrant an entrapment instruction, therefore, is to produce evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find both a lack of predisposition and inducement by the government. Instructions on the entrapment defense are not required if the defendant has not met his threshold responsibility. See United States v. Hawkins, 823 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir.1987); United States v. Buishas, 791 F.2d 1310 (7th Cir.1986); United States v. Manzella, 791 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir.1986); United States v. Rodgers, 755 F.2d 533 (7th Cir.1985); United States v. Nicosia, 638 F.2d 970 (7th Cir.1980). We must examine the record de novo to determine whether there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find a lack of predisposition and government inducement. Hawkins, 823 F.2d at 1025. We find that there was not. 19 Predisposition is defined as a defendant's state of mind and inclinations before his initial exposure to government agents. United States v. Navarro, 737 F.2d 625, 635 (7th Cir.1984); United States v. Kaminiski, 703 F.2d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir.1983). A predisposed defendant is one who is ready and willing to commit an offense apart from government encouragement, and not an innocent person in whose mind the government implanted a disposition to commit an offense. United States v. Gabriel, 810 F.2d 627, 637 (7th Cir.1987) (citations omitted). The factors which we have held to be relevant in determining whether a defendant was predisposed to commit the crime include: (1) the character or reputation of the defendant; (2) whether the suggestion of criminal activity was originally made by the government; (3) whether the defendant was engaged in criminal activity for a profit; (4) whether the defendant evidenced a reluctance to commit the offense, overcome by government persuasion; and (5) the nature of the inducement or persuasion offered by the government. Fusko, 869 F.2d at 1052; United States v. Perez-Leon, 757 F.2d 866, 871 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 831, 106 S.Ct. 99, 88 L.Ed.2d 80 (1985); Kaminiski, 703 F.2d at 1008. The most important factor in determining a defendant's predisposition is whether the defendant evidenced a reluctance to engage in the criminal activity that was overcome only by repeated government inducement. Perez-Leon, 757 F.2d at 871. 20 Applying these factors to the case at bar, we find that Russo has failed to meet his burden; there is insufficient evidence on the record for a reasonable jury to find that he was not predisposed to violate federal law. With regard to the first factor, Russo essentially admits that he ran a house of prostitution at Michael's Magic Touch continuously since the early 1970's and that he bribed state officials to allow the illicit enterprise to operate, thus establishing his criminal character. Examining the second factor, we find that there is no evidence on the record that the government initially suggested to Russo that he begin taking credit cards. To the contrary, it appears that the scheme was initially presented to Russo by Marren, his co-defendant, before the government entered the scene. As to the third factor, evidence was presented at trial that Russo made a small fortune off of the illicit activities at Michael's Magic Touch and that business boomed after the club began accepting credit cards. The fourth and fifth factors can be considered together. The fourth factor is, as we have already noted, the most important in determining a defendant's predisposition. Perez-Leon, 757 F.2d at 871. The record shows that when presented with the scheme at the initial meeting with Marren and Damron, Russo demonstrated no reluctance but instead asked questions that evidenced his awareness of the scheme and a predisposition to participate willingly. As Damron explained how the system worked, Russo exhibited none of the hesitations that customarily occur when parties to a new relationship first negotiate. Moreover, the meeting took place in the noncoercive atmosphere of Russo's own night club and only one government agent (along with Russo, his brothers, and Marren) was present. No money or equipment was presented or exchanged at the meeting and Russo was free to walk away from the scheme at any time. The record fails to show that he ever expressed reluctance to commit the offense which was overcome only by repeated government inducement or persuasion. Id. 21 We also reject Russo's contention that taped conversations between Russo and Agent Damron after the government raid on the club demonstrate his lack of predisposition. These conversations discuss problems with Russo's failure to report the credit card transaction income on his federal tax returns and not his willingness to participate in the credit card scheme. The taped comments can only be properly construed as expressions of concern that the evidence seized by federal agents would lead to the discovery of tax violations. Moreover, predisposition is defined as a defendant's state of mind and inclinations before his initial exposure to government agents. United States v. Navarro, 737 F.2d 625, 635 (7th Cir.1984); United States v. Kaminiski, 703 F.2d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir.1983). [T]he principle focus ... of necessity must be on the first transaction. Fusko, 869 F.2d at 1052 (quoting United States v. Gunter, 741 F.2d 151, 154 (7th Cir.1984)). Evidence of comments made more than two years after the credit card activity began simply is too remote to have any reasonable bearing upon predisposition. 22 An analysis of these five factors demonstrates that there was insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to believe that Russo was not predisposed to violate federal laws. Russo was not an unwary innocent but instead an unwary criminal. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372, 78 S.Ct. at 821. He was a comfortable veteran of the underworld who knowingly entered into a relationship to turn an illegal profit that, in the end, backfired. 23 Turning to the second element of the entrapment defense, government inducement, we find that the defendant similarly failed to meet his burden. To prove inducement the defendant must put forth evidence showing that he or she would not have committed the crime had the particular attraction or lure that the government held out not existed. United States v. Manzella, 791 F.2d 1263, 1269 (7th Cir.1986). We find that the record is devoid of any evidence of government inducement. In fact, what the record does show is that if Russo was induced into violating federal laws, he was induced by Marren and not by the government. Marren stated to Agent Damron that I have really been trying to talk 'em (Michael's Magic Touch) into it you know, and later, Yeah, I talked 'em into it last night. Moreover, it was Marren who was responsible for the initial meeting between Russo and the government agents. No claim of entrapment can be premised upon the instigations of a co-defendant who was not serving as an agent or informant for the government. See United States v. Manzella, 791 F.2d 1263, 1269-70 (7th Cir.1986). The record clearly fails to establish any credible basis for a belief that the government induced Russo into violating federal law. 24 In sum, we agree with the trial court that there is no evidence on the record upon which a jury could reasonably find a lack of predisposition and government inducement. Russo failed to meet his burden to warrant a jury instruction. Accordingly, we find that the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury on entrapment. 2