Opinion ID: 2070061
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: test for analyzing free exercise objections to state regulations

Text: The United States Supreme Court has developed a method of analyzing free exercise objections to state statutes. The following three quotations will serve as a basis for our development of a four-part test for this analysis. The first quotation is from Wisconsin v Yoder, 406 US 215, and reads as follows: [T]o have the protection of the Religious Clauses, the claims must be rooted in religious belief. The second quotation is from Sherbert v Verner, 374 US 403, and reads as follows: If therefore, the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court is to withstand appellant's constitutional challenge, it must be either because her disqualification as a beneficiary [of unemployment compensation] represents no infringement by the State of her constitutional rights of free exercise, or because any incidental burden on the free exercise of appellant's religion may be justified by a compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the State's constitutional power to regulate.... NAACP v Button, 371 US 415, 438 [83 S Ct 328; 9 L Ed 2d 405 (1963)]. The third quotation is also from Sherbert, 374 US 407, and reads as follows: [I]t would plainly be incumbent upon the appellees to demonstrate that no alternative forms of regulation would combat such abuses without infringing First Amendment rights. From these three quotations we derive the following four rules with which to analyze the instant case:
2. If the regulation poses no infringement by the State of [plaintiffs'] constitutional right[] of free exercise, Sherbert, the regulations will be upheld. If the regulation is upheld for this reason, rules three and four are inapplicable. 3. [A]ny incidental burden on the free exercise of [plaintiffs'] religion may be justified by a `compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the State's constitutional power to regulate....' Sherbert. 4. No less obtrusive form of regulation is available to the state. Sherbert. 1. THE RELIGIOUS NATURE OF THE CLAIMS There is no dispute as to the religious nature of the plaintiffs' objections to the certification requirement. The trial court found that [p]laintiffs are members of the Fundamentalist Christian movement.... The fundamentalist movement believes the church to be not only a place of worship but [a] place for instruction of the young. An outgrowth of this belief is the belief that the school is an extension of the church or a ministry of the church.... As fundamentalists, plaintiffs object to state regulation of their schools which they consider a mission ordained by God. They further object to the certification of their teachers, believing that the course of study required to obtain a certificate teaches a humanistic rather than a religious approach to education. Defendants note that they agree that plaintiffs' objections to the statute are premised on their religious beliefs.
The churches advance two ways in which the regulations burden their religious interests. The primary objection is that no one may carry out a teaching ministry in a church-school without a government permit to do so. We accept plaintiffs' claim that such licensing has an effect on their free exercise rights, and we therefore must determine whether this burden is outweighed by a compelling state interest. Second, they object to the discretion given to the state to determine whether an applicant is qualified to receive a provisional teaching certificate. The regulations require an applicant to demonstrate an acquaintance with the substance, concepts, and methods of the principal areas of human knowledge, and skills essential to communication and inquiry in modern society. 1979 AC, R 390.1122. Other portions of these regulations enable the state to implement this with virtually unlimited discretion because it is the board which determines the acceptability of particular courses from out-of-state institutions, the acceptability of out-of-state candidates with certificates from their states and the acceptability of the educational institutions themselves in Michigan. [8] We acknowledge that the regulation could be applied in a manner which discriminates against those taught at religious colleges or universities. The other plaintiffs also testified about the burden certification posed to them. A teacher at the Bridgeport Baptist Academy testified at trial that her rights would be infringed upon if she were forced to comply with the state certification requirements since attending courses taught at a state-approved school would force her to violate the Biblical command not to listen to instruction causing one to err. She stated that if compliance with the statute were ordered, she would be unable to fulfill her religious calling to teach. Parents of children attending the church schools stated that they would not want their children taught by those who were themselves taught other philosophies. For reasons discussed later, we do not find these claims to be supported by the record.
In Sherbert, 374 US 403, the United States Supreme Court stated that if there were any incidental burden on a free exercise right, it must be justified by a `compelling state interest within the State's constitutional power to regulate....' There is no doubt that a state has a compelling interest in the education of its citizens. In Pierce v Society of Sisters, 268 US 510, 534; 45 S Ct 571; 69 L Ed 1070 (1925), the Court, while ruling that a state cannot compel all students to be educated in public schools, noted that [n]o question is raised concerning the power of the State reasonably to regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise and examine them, their teachers and pupils; to require that all children of proper age attend school, that teachers shall be of good moral character and patriotic disposition, that certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be taught, and that nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public welfare. In Brown v Topeka Bd of Ed, 347 US 483, 493; 74 S Ct 686; 98 L Ed 873 (1954), the Supreme Court again emphasized the magnitude of the state's interest: Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Finally, in Central Dist No 1 Bd of Ed v Allen, 392 US 236, 245-247; 88 S Ct 1923; 20 L Ed 2d 1060 (1968), the Supreme Court explicitly acknowledged the state's interest in private schools: [A] substantial body of case law has confirmed the power of the States to insist that attendance at private schools, if it is to satisfy state compulsory-attendance laws, be at institutions which provide minimum hours of instruction, employ teachers of specified training, and cover prescribed subjects of instruction.... [I]f the State must satisfy its interest in secular education through the instrument of private schools, it has a proper interest in the manner in which those schools perform their secular educational function. Michigan particularly has a significant and deeply rooted interest in education. Our Constitution, art 8, ง 1, reflects the language of the North-west Ordinance of 1787: Religion, morality and knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged. Governor James Blanchard elaborated on this in his January 18, 1984, State of the State address: For decades, the promise of education has been the ladder of opportunity in this state. Hard-working people, honest people, lived here or came here, knowing that they themselves could earn a decent living working with their hands โ but even more important, that their children could find an even better future working with their minds because of Michigan's fine schools and colleges and universities. See also Michigan Female Seminary v Secretary of State, 115 Mich 118, 120; 73 NW 131 (1897) (It has always been the policy of this State, as indicated by the provisions of its Constitution and a long line of legislative enactments, to encourage the cause of education.). It is clear that Michigan's interest in education is long-standing and of the highest importance. A compelling state interest in education does not necessarily justify all forms of educational regulation. For example, in Yoder, 406 US 236, the United States Supreme Court balanced the religious claims of the Amish against the state's interest in requiring compulsory education until age sixteen. The Court concluded that despite the state's admittedly strong interest in compulsory education, it had failed to demonstrate with sufficient particularity how its interest would be adversely affected by granting an exemption to the Amish. The Court placed great emphasis on the adequacy of the Amish vocational education alternative to secondary education, the fact that the Amish children were not going to live in society at large, but in a closed, farming society, and the fact that compulsory high school education could ultimately destroy the Amish community. Yoder, 406 US 212. None of these factors are relevant in this case, and, more importantly, the state's interest here is not how much time should be spent in school, but the qualifications of the teachers themselves. The state's interest in education necessarily extends to an interest in teachers because a primary and vital ingredient to a good education is good teachers. James Garfield expressed this sentiment in the following manner: I am not willing that this discussion should close without mention of the value of a true teacher. Give me a log hut, with only a simple bench, Mark Hopkins on one end and I on the other, and you may have all the buildings, apparatus and libraries without him. [Address to Williams College Alumni, New York, December 28, 1871. Bartlett's Familiar Quotations (14th ed), p 741a.] Michigan has long recognized the importance of qualified teachers. In 1843, O.C. Comstock, Superintendent of Public Instruction, stated: Eligible teachers are all-important. This fact is now more deeply and generally impressed on the public mind than formerly.... It was once imagined that almost every man of a competent education could teach a school. But to this proposition there are many exceptions. It does not follow that because a man has received a liberal education, he is therefore a lawyer or physician.... And, by parity of reasoning, it is plain that an acquaintance with general literature and science does not, of necessity, prepare one for the arduous but delightful business of educating the underlying mind. Such preparation is chiefly derived from the study of the science and art of teaching. [Jackson, State Control of Public Instruction in Michigan, pp 154-155 (1926) (quoting O.C. Comstock).] Therefore, to the extent that certification of teachers furthers education, it can be considered a compelling state interest. Those certification requirements which involve gaining expertise in a particular substantive field, taking classes in a program of general or liberal education, student teaching, and taking a few basic courses in education, are clearly aimed at and closely related to the goal of producing competent teachers. [9]
While complying with the certification requirements may mean that schools will have a smaller pool of applicants from which to select their teachers, there is no evidence that acceptable, certified people are not available. Parents have stated that they have no religious objection to having their children taught by certified teachers as long as they are also religiously acceptable to them. Religious school teachers may have to receive more training in order to become certified, but the regulations do not require anyone to attend courses taught from a perspective contrary to their beliefs. The teachers can fulfill all the state certification requirements while attending either a religious or nonreligious institution. For these reasons, we find the infringement on free exercise rights is minimal and is outweighed by the state's interest. Other state courts confronted with religious objections to the state certification of teachers have found for the state. In State v Rivinius, 328 NW2d 220 (ND, 1982), cert den 460 US 1070 (1983), the North Dakota Supreme Court balanced the state's interest in education against parents' right to educate their children in the religion of their choice. The court found that the state law, which included a requirement that all teachers be certified by the state, did impose a burden on religion. However, the court found that the compelling state interest in education outbalances the resulting strain or imposition on the defendants' religious beliefs. Rivinius, 328 NW2d 229. The court relied in part on the fact that there was no evidence suggesting that a certified teacher was unable to teach in a manner consistent with the religious beliefs of the parents. See also Nebraska ex rel Douglas v Faith Baptist Church, 207 Neb 802; 301 NW2d 571 (1981), app dis 454 US 803 (1981) (state law requiring a baccalaureate degree as a prerequisite to teaching at any school upheld); State v Shaver, 294 NW2d 883 (ND, 1980) (certification requirement upheld, in part because religious convictions of the parents did not prohibit the use of certified teachers). Cf. Kentucky State Bd of Ed v Rudasill, 589 SW2d 877, 879, n 3 (Ky, 1979), cert den 446 US 938 (1980) (certification requirements for private school teachers held unconstitutional under the state constitution. The court noted, it is obvious that Section 5 of the Kentucky Constitution is more restrictive of the power of the state to regulate private and parochial schools than is the first amendment).
The plaintiffs' second allegation is that the certification regulations give the board the power to withhold certificates on the basis of an applicant's religious beliefs. Those portions of the regulations, discussed in part II(B)(2), which give the board the discretion to grant or withhold a certificate on the basis of vague and subjective criteria certainly could be applied in a discriminatory manner. Such provisions are also less clearly related to the state's goal of producing competent teachers. However, there is no evidence that any applicant who has fulfilled the objective requirements has been denied a certificate because of religious beliefs. Graduates of religious institutions, including both fundamentalist Christian and Catholic schools, have been certified. We assume from this that the board is concerned with the applicant's compliance with the objective requirements and that it does not attempt to determine whether an applicant has a humanistic world view or has taken courses taught from that perspective. We therefore find that the certification regulations, as applied, directly further the state's interest in education and do not enable the board to discriminate on the basis of religious beliefs.
We are also satisfied that there is no less intrusive method by which the state could satisfy its interest in the education of its citizens. The only alternative which has been proposed is standardized testing of private school students. This is an inadequate substitute because deficiencies in teaching would be discovered only after the damage has occurred. State v Shaver, 294 NW2d 883 (ND, 1980). Further, we are not persuaded that testing would guarantee less intrusion by the state into the functioning of the private schools. See, e.g., Rivinius, supra, 328 NW2d 229. See also Johnson v Charles City Community Schools, 368 NW2d 74, 79 (Iowa, 1985), cert den 474 US ___; 88 L Ed 2d 574 (1985) ([w]hatever limitations are imposed on the state's general right and duty to see to the education of its youth, the right extends beyond occasional testing).