Opinion ID: 2718100
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jury Selection: Batson/Wheeler Challenge

Text: Defendant, who is black, contends that the trial court erred in overruling his objection to the prosecutor‘s use of peremptory challenges against three black prospective jurors. We disagree. 28 a) Factual Background The prosecutor exercised five of his first 11 peremptory challenges against black prospective jurors. Defense counsel did not object to the first four of those challenges. After the prosecution exercised a preemptory challenge against a fifth black prospective juror, defense counsel made a motion under People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 (Wheeler). She pointed out that the prosecutor had struck five black jurors. Defense counsel argued: ―It appeared to me that certain jurors were very neutral on everything.‖ The trial court noted that it was ―an interesting time to bring the motion‖ because the last prospective juror, Prospective Juror A.I., had been excused for an obvious reason, i.e., she had said that she was not sure she could be fair because defendant was so young. Defense counsel replied that youth is a mitigating factor and added that she ―couldn‘t see the reason for the peremptory on the first woman who was excused which was Juror [J.R.].‖ Defense counsel then listed the specific prospective African-American jurors that the prosecutor had excused. When the trial court inquired if there was ―anything else that [defense counsel] wish[ed] to add,‖ defense counsel responded: ―Nothing at this time.‖ Shortly thereafter, defense counsel acknowledged that the challenged prospective jurors had expressed ―some degrees [sic] of hesitation‖ about their ability to impose the death penalty, but suggested that other prospective jurors who had not been challenged had expressed some degree of hesitation as well. The prosecutor at first declined to comment because no prima facie case of discrimination had been shown. He took the opportunity, however, to clarify the record. The prosecutor noted that he had exercised 11 peremptory challenges: six against women, five against men, five against black jurors, two against white jurors, three against Hispanic jurors, and one against an Asian-American juror. The trial court added that defense counsel had peremptorily struck 10 prospective 29 jurors, comprised of two Hispanics, three Asian Americans, three whites, one black, and one man from the Philippines. The prosecutor said the current panel included four blacks, two white men, an Armenian man, two white women, an Asian-American woman, and a man of uncertain racial background. Defense counsel agreed that there were four blacks on the jury panel but classified the Armenian man as white and the man of uncertain race as Hispanic. The trial court concluded that no prima facie showing had been made. It noted that defense counsel had exercised 10 peremptory challenges, only one of which was against a black prospective juror. Defense counsel‘s strikes were relevant, the trial court reasoned, ―not because there is anything impermissible, but [because] it artificially skews things.‖ ―[W]hen the defense does not excuse jurors of a particular sex or race, or what have you, the other side is left in a situation where mathematically as a matter of probability the chances will rise dramatically that the prosecution will exercise challenges [against members of the group in question].‖ ―If you take out the green socks out of the drawer and leave the blue ones in,‖ the trial court explained, ―any challenge will be made to a blue sock.‖ The trial court further observed that each of the challenged black prospective jurors ―gave answers in their questionnaire that present[ed] an ample ground in this case for the prosecution to exercise peremptories.‖ While it was true that all the prospective jurors had ―passed the cause muster, which is not that difficult to do,‖ the trial court found that there were ―things in the questionnaire‖ that could legitimately ―bother‖ the prosecution. The trial court then informed the prosecutor that he was permitted, but not required, to indicate his reasons for striking the five black prospective jurors. The prosecutor responded, ―I think it is creating a problem for me to justify when there is no prima facie showing. [¶] I would say that the questionnaires speak for 30 themselves in terms of the answers written there. [¶] The number of answers they provided while they were seated in the box either caused me discomfort or concern on their ability to impose the death penalty. [¶] That is why I excused all of these people was for inability to impose the death penalty.‖ Asked if she had anything to add, defense counsel noted that although blacks comprised about one-third of the entire panel of 150 jurors, the prosecution had exercised almost half of his peremptory challenges against black jurors. The trial court reiterated that, under the circumstances, it was difficult to draw any inference from the number of challenges alone because ―when you don‘t exclude jurors of a particular race, that means by the nature of math and counting that more of that group will be excluded from the other side because that is what is left when the side makes its challenges.‖ The trial court also said: ―Given the answers of those jurors that you complain of, and many other jurors, not just those, other jurors that were excused in this case by the prosecution, it is obvious to the court that the reason the jurors were being excused has to do with answers given in the questionnaire. [¶] . . . [¶] Each of those jurors expressed problems with the concept of the death penalty and its imposition and doubts about their ability and confusion in some cases. [¶] Many I don‘t know answers and things of that nature. [¶] Many other things that would certainly give pause to a reasonable opponent in a criminal case.‖ The seated jury consisted of six black and six white jurors. b) Analysis ― ‗The prosecution‘s use of peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors based on group bias, such as race or ethnicity, violates a defendant‘s right to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community under article I, section 16 of the California Constitution and his right to equal protection 31 under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.‘ ‖ (People v. McKinzie (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1302, 1319; see Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79, 89 (Batson); Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 276–277.) Although defense counsel invoked only Wheeler, a Wheeler objection preserves a Batson claim. (People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 117−118.) A Batson/Wheeler objection triggers a three-step inquiry. ―First, the defendant must make out a prima facie case ‗by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.‘ [Citation.] Second, once the defendant has made out a prima facie case, the ‗burden shifts to the State to explain adequately the racial exclusion‘ by offering permissible raceneutral justifications for the strikes. [Citations.] Third, ‗[i]f a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide . . . whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination.‘ [Citation.]‖ (Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162, 168, fn. omitted; see People v. Thomas (2011) 51 Cal.4th 449, 473.) Here, the trial court first found that there was no prima facie case with respect to any of defendant‘s Batson/Wheeler claims. Nonetheless, after initially hesitating, the prosecutor accepted the court‘s invitation to explain his strikes and stated that all three jurors were struck because of what he perceived to be their reluctance to impose the death penalty. The trial court agreed with the prosecution that the challenged jurors had demonstrated reluctance about the death penalty. ―We have characterized such a circumstance as a ‗first stage/third stage Batson hybrid,‘ which renders ‗ ―moot‖ ‘ whether defendant established a prima facie showing of a discriminatory purpose. [Citations.] ‗Accordingly, we express no opinion on whether defense counsel established a prima facie case of discrimination and instead skip to Batson‘s third stage to evaluate the prosecutor‘s 32 reasons for dismissing [the] African-American prospective jurors.‘ ‖ (People v. Riccardi (2012) 54 Cal.4th 758, 786–787.) At the third stage of Batson, the ―critical question . . . is the persuasiveness of the prosecutor‘s justification for his peremptory strike.‖ (Miller-El v. Cockrell (2003) 537 U.S. 322, 338–339.) Usually, ―the issue comes down to whether the trial court finds the prosecutor‘s race-neutral explanations to be credible. Credibility can be measured by, among other factors, the prosecutor‘s demeanor; by how reasonable, or how improbable, the explanations are; and by whether the proffered rationale has some basis in accepted trial strategy.‖ (Id. at p. 339.) ― ‗As with the state of mind of a juror, evaluation of the prosecutor‘s state of mind based on demeanor and credibility lies ―peculiarly within a trial judge‘s province.‖ ‘ ‖ (Ibid.) Thus, in reviewing a trial court‘s reasoned determination that a prosecutor‘s reasons for striking a juror are sincere, we typically defer to the trial court and consider only ―whether substantial evidence supports the trial court‘s conclusions.‖ (People v. Lenix (2008) 44 Cal.4th 602, 627 (Lenix).) In this case, defendant challenges the trial court‘s ruling with respect to three of the five black jurors struck by the prosecutor: J.R., R.W., and A.I. Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in considering the fact that defendant‘s decision to strike only one black juror rendered it statistically more probable that the prosecutor would strike black jurors at a higher rate than the rate at which such jurors were represented in the venire. We disagree. In deciding whether substantial evidence supports a trial court‘s determination that a peremptory challenge was not motivated by race, we must consider the ―entire record‖ before the court. (Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 621.) In this case, as the trial court explained, the manner in which defense counsel exercised her peremptory challenges provided relevant context. Because black jurors comprised roughly a third of the venire, the fact that defense counsel had exercised only one 33 of her 10 peremptory challenges against a black juror increased the percentage of blacks remaining on the panel, thus increasing the likelihood that the prosecutor would exercise a disproportionate share of his peremptory challenges against black jurors for entirely permissible reasons. Moreover, the disparity between the percentage of blacks in the entire jury pool and the percentage of peremptory challenges the prosecutor exercised against black prospective jurors is not very significant. The prosecutor used about 45 percent of his peremptory challenges to remove black jurors. Had he removed one fewer black juror, that percentage would have fallen to about 36 percent, almost equal to the percentage of blacks in the entire jury pool. And at the time defendant made his Wheeler motion, four of the 12 prospective jurors on the panel — exactly one-third — were black. Given the small sample size at issue, the trial court reasonably refused to infer a discriminatory intent on the basis of these statistics. (See People v. Cleveland (2004) 32 Cal.4th 704, 734 (Cleveland) [where the jury‘s minority composition is ultimately ―either slightly higher or slightly lower‖ than the venire‘s, such statistics are ―probative‖ although not necessarily ―dispositive‖ of a lack of discriminatory intent].) Second, defendant argues that the prosecutor‘s stated reason for excusing each of the three prospective jurors — their ―inability to impose the death penalty‖ — is belied by the record. He further argues that the prosecutor‘s initial reluctance to explain the reasons for his challenges is ―suspect.‖ If the prosecutor ―had valid, race-neutral reasons for challenging each of the jurors,‖ defendant argues, ―then logically it would create no problem for him to justify those challenges in a succinct statement to the court.‖ As an initial matter, the prosecutor was not obliged to state his reasons for challenging any prospective juror because the trial court concluded that defendant had not made a prima facie case of discrimination. (People v. Carasi (2008) 44 34 Cal.4th 1263, 1292.) Thus, there is nothing suspect about any reluctance the prosecutor may have had to state his reasons. In any event, the trial court‘s conclusion that defendant did not carry his burden of demonstrating that the prosecutor acted with discriminatory intent is supported by substantial evidence. The prosecutor offered valid race-neutral reasons for excusing each of the three prospective jurors. All three prospective jurors answered the written questionnaire in a manner that suggested a significant degree of confusion or hesitation regarding their ability to impose the death penalty. Prospective Juror J.R. circled both ―yes‖ and ―no‖ in response to question 31(f) of the questionnaire, which asked: ―Regardless of your views on the death penalty, would you as a juror, be able to vote for the death penalty on another person if you believe after hearing all the evidence, that the penalty was appropriate?‖ During voir dire, J.R. explained that the question ―didn‘t have an ‗I don‘t know‘ so I put a yes and no.‖ When asked if ―don't know‖ was her answer, J.R. stated, ―Well, I understood it, but my answer to that is I don‘t know anything much about the death penalty.‖ Similarly, J.R. selected ―don‘t know‖ in answer to questions 33 and 34. Question 33 asked, ―In this penalty phase would you automatically, in every case, regardless of the evidence, vote for life in prison without the possibility of parole?‖ And question 34 asked, ―Do you have any conscientious objections to the death penalty which you believe might impair your ability to be fair and impartial in a case in which the prosecution is seeking the death penalty?‖ Prospective Juror R.W. responded to question 30 of the questionnaire by writing: ―I have never given a serious thought to the death penalty I would have to say I honestly don‘t know if I could vote on putting some one to death.‖ Question 31(e) of the questionnaire asked, ―Do you feel California should have the death penalty?‖ to which Prospective Juror R.W. responded, ―I don't know. I don‘t see it 35 as a way to stop crime because we don‘t kill everybody who commits a crime.‖ She also wrote, in answer to a later question: ―I don't know what the purpose [of the death penalty] is because it still doesn‘t stop crime!‖ In response to question 34, she selected ―don‘t know‖ as to whether she had any conscientious objections to the death penalty. During voir dire, when questioned by the court about her answers to these questions, R.W. twice stated only that she ―th[ought]‖ she would be able to impose the death penalty if she found the aggravating factors to outweigh the mitigating factors. Prospective Juror A.I.‘s written and oral answers also revealed that she had qualms about the death penalty and wasn‘t sure she could serve as an impartial juror because of defendant‘s age. In response to question 33, A.I. selected, ―don‘t know.‖ When asked at voir dire if she could ―think of any reason [she] would tend to favor one side or the other,‖ A.I. hesitated to answer and then at the court‘s urging replied, ―I don‘t know. He seems very young. I might hesitate.‖ Prospective Juror A.I. also told the trial court that she would have difficulty looking at pictures of ―autopsies‖ and the ―murder scene.‖ Defendant correctly observes that none of these three prospective jurors would have been excusable for cause because each expressed a willingness to follow the law if selected for the jury. However, ―[a] prosecutor‘s reasons for exercising a peremptory challenge ‗need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause.‘ ‖ (People v. Hamilton (2009) 45 Cal.4th 863, 901 (Hamilton).) ―Moreover, even when jurors have expressed neutrality on the death penalty, ‗neither the prosecutor nor the trial court [i]s required to take the jurors‘ answers at face value.‘ [Citation.] If other statements or attitudes suggest that the juror has ‗reservations or scruples‘ about imposing the death penalty, this demonstrated reluctance is a race-neutral reason that can justify a peremptory 36 challenge, even if it would not be sufficient to support a challenge for cause.‖ (People v. Lomax (2010) 49 Cal.4th 530, 572.) In sum, substantial evidence supports the trial court‘s determination that the prosecutor‘s strikes of Prospective Jurors J.R., R.W., and A.I. were motivated by the answers on their juror questionnaires indicating ambivalence about the death penalty. Our determination is additionally supported by the fact that at the time defendant made his Batson motion, the jury‘s racial composition exactly matched the venire‘s and by the fact that half of the jurors ultimately seated were black, a higher ratio than in the venire. This is a significant ― ‗indication of the prosecution‘s good faith in exercising his peremptories.‘ ‖ (People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 236; see Cleveland, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 734.) For the first time on appeal, defendant identifies over two dozen unchallenged prospective jurors, three of whom ultimately served on the jury, who circled at least one ―don‘t know‖ answer to questions 32, 33, and 34. Assuming that defendant has not forfeited this argument by waiting until his reply brief to raise it, the comparative juror analysis he urges does not demonstrate that the strikes at issue were based on the jurors‘ race. First, the answers of the prospective jurors who never made it into the jury box are irrelevant because they do not prove that the prosecutor would have accepted such jurors. Nor is it relevant whether a prospective juror circled ―don‘t know‖ with respect to question 32, which asked whether a juror would always vote to impose the death penalty. Second, with respect to the three jurors who ultimately served on the jury, none circled ―don‘t know‖ in answer to both questions 33 and 34, and none took the step of indicating uncertainty in response to question 31(f), as Prospective Juror J.R. did. None wrote explicit comments akin to R.W.‘s indicating that he or she doubted the efficacy of the death penalty, nor did any give repeated equivocal 37 answers akin to R.W.‘s at voir dire. To the contrary, each of the three seated jurors indicated strong support for the death penalty and a clear willingness to impose such a sentence in both their juror questionnaires and their voir dire. Similarly, none came close to demonstrating the type of reservations expressed by A.I. about imposing the death sentence on this particular defendant because of his youthful appearance. Third, the trial court had the opportunity to see the demeanor of all of the relevant jurors, and it stated on the record that the challenged jurors had demonstrated more reluctance to impose the death penalty than other jurors whom the prosecution did not challenge. Thus, even considering the comparative juror analysis urged by defendant, substantial evidence supported the trial court‘s determination that the prosecutor‘s peremptory challenges against Jurors J.R., R.W., and A.I. were proper. 2. Whether Defendant Was Properly Convicted of Willful, Deliberate, and Premeditated Attempted Murder of Latasha W. Defendant argues that the trial court erred by permitting the jury to convict him of the willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder of Latasha W., a crime with which he was not expressly charged in the indictment. We do not decide whether defendant consented to be tried for willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder because we agree with defendant that the jury was not properly instructed on the meaning of the terms ―willful,‖ ―deliberate,‖ and ―premeditated‖ in any event. We therefore order a reduction of defendant‘s conviction on count 2 to a conviction for regular attempted murder. We conditionally impose a lower term sentence on that count, but permit the prosecution to seek resentencing should it wish to do so. 38 a) Factual Background In count 2 of the indictment, defendant was charged with attempted murder, in violation of Penal Code, sections 664 and 187, subdivision (a). Count 2 alleged that ―On or about July 1, 1996, in the County of Los Angeles, the crime of attempted murder, in violation of Penal Code section 664/187(A), a felony, was committed by [defendant], who did willfully, unlawfully and with malice aforethought attempt to murder Latasha [W.], a human being.‖ (Some capitalization omitted.) The indictment did not allege that the attempted murder was ―deliberate‖ or ―premeditated.‖ That omission is significant because the sentence for regular attempted murder is a determinate term of ―five, seven, or nine years‖ of imprisonment. (§ 664, subd. (a).) The sentence for attempted ―willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder,‖ by contrast, is ―life with the possibility of parole.‖ (Ibid.) Nor was the jury instructed on a theory of attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder. When discussing CALJIC No. 8.20, which is the instruction regarding the definitions of the terms ―willful,‖ ―deliberate,‖ and ―premeditated,‖ in the context of one of the first degree murder charges, the parties informed the court that they had agreed that the instruction would be given only with respect to the Michael Haney murder, of which defendant was acquitted. The parties did not discuss giving CALJIC No. 8.67, the analogous instruction pertaining to willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder, with respect to count 2. When orally instructing the jury regarding the elements of count 2, the trial court described the count only as alleging ―attempted murder.‖ The court said nothing suggesting that defendant was charged with attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder of Latasha W., and it did not give CALJIC No. 8.67 or otherwise define those terms with respect to count 2. 39 The court did define the terms ―deliberate‖ and ―premeditated‖ when it read CALJIC No. 8.20 to the jury in connection with count 7, the Haney murder. Immediately before doing so, however, the court explicitly told the jury that the instruction ―applies to the Haney homicide charge only.‖ The word ―HANEY‖ is handwritten at the top of the copy of CALJIC No. 8.20 that was given to the jury. Nonetheless, during closing argument the prosecution asserted that defendant‘s actions demonstrated that defendant‘s attempt to kill Latasha W. was willful, deliberate, and premeditated. The prosecution had argued a similar theory to the grand jury when securing the indictment. There was no discussion between the parties and the court regarding the jury verdict form for count 2. That form first asked the jury to find whether defendant attempted to murder Latasha W. It then asked the jury to find true or not true the allegation that the attempted murder was ―willful, deliberate and premeditated.‖ The jury found the allegation to be true. b) Analysis Defendant contends that because he was not charged in the indictment with willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder, it was statutory and constitutional error for the court to permit the jury to consider whether he acted with deliberation and premeditation and then to sentence him on that basis rather than for having committed regular attempted murder. Alternatively, he says that the trial court‘s failure to instruct the jury on the meanings of ―willful,‖ ―deliberate,‖ and ―premeditated‖ deprived him of his right to a jury trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. He therefore urges that his life sentence on count 2 for attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder be reduced to a determinate sentence for regular attempted murder. 40 The Attorney General responds that defendant forfeited his claim that he was not properly charged in the indictment by failing to raise it at trial. Alternately, defendant impliedly consented to being tried with that enhancement by not objecting to the jury verdict form. The Attorney General also argues that the indictment reflects a mere ―technical inadequacy‖ because defendant was on notice of the prosecution‘s intent to charge him with willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder, both because count 2 alleged that defendant acted ―willfully‖ and because the grand jury transcript revealed the prosecutor‘s theory. As to the trial court‘s failure to properly instruct the jury, the Attorney General concedes the error but argues that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Because we find that the trial court prejudicially erred in failing to instruct the jury on the meanings of ―willful,‖ ―deliberate,‖ and ―premeditated,‖ we do not address whether defendant consented to having those allegations placed before the jury. Assuming without deciding that defendant was properly charged with willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder, the trial court was required to instruct the jury on what those terms mean. The willful, deliberate, and premeditated nature of an attempted murder is ― ‗the functional equivalent of an element‘ ‖ of the offense insofar as it increases the punishment for an attempted murder. (People v. Seel (2004) 34 Cal.4th 535, 548.) As such, it must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond reasonable doubt. (Id. at p. 549; see Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490.) In turn, because the willful, deliberate, and premeditated nature of an attempted murder is the functional equivalent of an element of the offense, the trial court was required to instruct the jury on those elements even though defendant did not request such an instruction. (See, e.g., People v. Montoya (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1027, 1047 [―It is settled that, even in the absence of a request, a trial court must 41 instruct on general principles of law that are commonly or closely connected to the facts before the court and that are necessary for the jury‘s understanding of the case.‖].) Thus, the trial court erred in permitting the jury to consider the charge of attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder without a proper instruction on what those terms mean. The failure to instruct the jury on an element of an offense is federal constitutional error because it violates the defendant‘s due process and Sixth Amendment rights to have a jury adjudicate guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Gonzalez (2012) 54 Cal.4th 643, 662–663; People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 560.) Such error is ―harmless only if, after conducting a thorough review of the record, the court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury verdict would have been the same absent the error.‖ (Bolden, at p. 560; see Gonzalez, at p. 663; Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.) On the facts here, we cannot be certain beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have found defendant guilty of attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder had it been properly instructed. In order to find defendant guilty of that charge, the jury would have had to conclude that his acts were the result of ― ‗ ― ‗careful thought and weighing of considerations‘ ‖ ‘ ‖ rather than an ― ‗ ―unconsidered or rash impulse.‖ ‘ ‖ (People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 577 (Manriquez); see People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 26–27; see also CALJIC No. 8.67.) That standard is not met by showing only that a defendant acted willfully and with specific intent to kill. ―By conjoining the words ‗willful, deliberate, and premeditated‘ in its definition and limitation of the character of killings falling within murder of the first degree the Legislature apparently emphasized its intention to require as an element of such crime substantially more reflection than may be involved in the mere formation of a 42 specific intent to kill.‖ (People v. Thomas (1945) 25 Cal.2d 880, 900, italics added.) Latasha W. testified that defendant shot Coleman in the head at point-blank range shortly after entering Coleman‘s house and again before departing. But defendant did not take equally deliberate steps toward killing Latasha W. Instead, one of his confederates tied her up with a telephone cord. Then, only as defendant was on the verge of leaving the house, did he fire a shot at Latasha W. that grazed her ear. No doubt there is sufficient evidence from which a rational factfinder could infer that defendant acted with deliberation and premeditation. But the pertinent question here is whether there is no reasonable possibility that the jury could have concluded otherwise had it been properly instructed. The manner in which defendant shot Coleman and later, for good measure, shot him a second time plainly indicates that defendant killed him with deliberation and premeditation. But the manner in which defendant shot at Latasha W., while sufficient to support a finding of intent to kill, does not necessarily compel a finding that defendant fired the single shot at her as a result of ― ‗ ―careful thought and weighing of considerations‖ ‘ ‖ as opposed to an ― ‗ ― ‗unconsidered or rash impulse‘ ‖ ‘ ‖ just before exiting the home as his two accomplices waited outside. (Manriquez, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 577.) On these facts, we cannot say it would have been unreasonable for the jury, had it been properly instructed, not to find deliberation and premeditation. The Attorney General‘s argument that the jury likely relied upon the definition of the terms ―willful,‖ ―deliberate,‖ and ―premeditated‖ contained in the instructions regarding the murder of Haney is not persuasive. The court specifically instructed the jury to consider that instruction as ―to the Haney homicide charge only.‖ (Italics added.) We ―presume the jury followed the court‘s instructions.‖ (People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 172.) 43 Furthermore, because the jury found defendant not guilty of the Haney murder, in which defendant was charged with both first degree and second degree murder, the jury would have had little cause to consider what the critical terms ―deliberate‖ and ―premeditated‖ mean in connection with that charge. Thus, when the jury was deliberating on the attempted murder charge, the only instructions it likely would have considered are the ones the court gave regarding regular attempted murder, which did not explain the standard for a finding of deliberation and premeditation. The Attorney General is similarly unpersuasive in her contention that the court‘s instructional error was harmless because the jury verdict form told the jurors that they should only find willfulness, deliberation, and premeditation if they could do so beyond a reasonable doubt. This contention simply begs the question as to what legal question the jury thought it was answering. Because the instructional error with respect to count 2 was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we reverse the penalty enhancement under section 664, subdivision (a) for ―willful, deliberate, and premeditated‖ attempted murder. Defendant‘s conviction for attempted murder remains intact. Rather than remand for resentencing on the attempted murder conviction, we impose the lower term sentence of five years and permit the prosecution to request resentencing before the superior court within 60 days after the filing of our remittitur should it choose to do so. We recently followed the same approach in People v. Boyce (July 24, 2014, S092240) __ Cal.4th __. There, as here, we found an error that affected the noncapital portion of the sentence imposed upon a capital defendant. Recognizing that the length of the noncapital sentence would ―have little practical significance given our affirmance of the special circumstances and death sentence‖ and that there is considerable ―time and expense involved in resentencing a capital prisoner‖ (id. at p. ___ [p. 73]), we imposed the lower term sentence but permitted the prosecution to request resentencing (id. at pp. __, __ 44 [pp. 73, 76]). Here, the trial court imposed the mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of parole for a conviction of attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder. The trial court therefore had no chance to consider what sentence would be appropriate for a conviction of regular attempted murder. Because we do not know what sentence the trial court would have imposed had it had a chance to consider the proper term, we follow the same approach we adopted in Boyce. Our disposition is without prejudice to the prosecution retrying defendant for the willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder of Latasha W. if doing so is consistent with statutory and constitutional double jeopardy principles, a question that was not briefed and that we do not address. 3. Sufficiency of the Evidence that the Foster Homicide was Committed in the Course of an Attempted Robbery Defendant contends that there is insufficient evidence to sustain the finding that he harbored the specific intent to steal from Charles Foster, the victim who was shot at the ATM. If correct, defendant‘s argument would require us to vacate defendant‘s convictions on count 9 (robbery of Foster) and count 8 (first degree murder of Foster on a felony-murder theory). We conclude that the jury could have reasonably inferred the elements of an attempted robbery from the totality of the circumstances. Therefore, there is sufficient evidence to sustain the convictions on both counts. a) Background The evidence showed that at 1:13 a.m. on July 26, 1996, Foster walked up to an ATM while Yvonne McGill and Sandra Johnson waited 12 feet away in a parked truck. At 1:23 a.m., defendant approached the passenger side of the truck and pointed a handgun at McGill. As Johnson and McGill drove away, defendant turned and approached Foster at the ATM. 45 The prosecution introduced a videotape of time-lapse photographs from two cameras on either side of the ATM. The videotape provides a time-stamped account of the moments leading to Foster‘s death. The events recorded on the videotape are as follows. After Johnson and McGill drove away, defendant stood immediately behind Foster for 25 seconds before he raised his gun to fire the fatal shots. At one point during those 25 seconds, defendant placed a hand on Foster‘s arm while brandishing his gun. Thereafter, Foster turned to face the ATM while defendant observed with his gun at his side. For the next 11 seconds, Foster was partially turned toward defendant. Then, without any further physical contact or gesturing, defendant raised his gun and, with Foster then facing him, shot Foster. b) Analysis In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we ―review the whole record to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime or special circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] The record must disclose substantial evidence to support the verdict — i.e., evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value — such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] In applying this test, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably have deduced from the evidence. [Citation.]‖ (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357 (Zamudio).) Moreover, ― ‗ ―[c]ircumstantial evidence may be sufficient to connect a defendant with the crime and to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.‖ ‘ ‖ (People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 514.) Accordingly, ―[w]e ‗must accept logical inferences that the jury might have drawn from the circumstantial evidence. [Citation.]‘ ‖ (Zamudio, at p. 357.) 46 Defendant contends that the mere fact that the homicide occurred at an ATM is insufficient evidence to infer he had the specific intent to steal. He says there is no evidence that he demanded or reached for any of Foster‘s property either before or after the shooting. Thus, he contends, inferring the specific intent element of robbery is entirely speculative. We disagree. Time-lapse photographs from two cameras show defendant interacting with Foster for approximately 25 seconds before raising his gun to fire. During that time, defendant touched Foster‘s arm, brandished his gun, and stood by as Foster attempted to use the ATM. A trier of fact could reasonably infer from the totality of these circumstances that defendant had the specific intent to steal from Foster. (See People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1129–1130 [jury‘s finding of an attempted robbery sufficiently evidenced by the totality of circumstances, even though attackers had not specifically demanded money or drugs], citing People v. Gilbert (1963) 214 Cal.App.2d 566, 567−568 [―where two armed men appeared in market shortly after closing time and simultaneously displayed their weapons,‖ lack of phrases such as ― ‗hand over your money‘ ‖ does not bar the reasonable inference that a forceful taking of property was intended‖].) (Rodrigues, at pp. 1129-1130.) For example, the jury could have reasonably inferred that defendant intended to rob Foster but fled after shooting him, knowing that Johnson and McGill would be summoning the police. (See People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 984 [affirming a jury‘s reasonable inference that the defendant fled without completing the robbery because he knew someone had telephoned the police].) Alternatively, the jury could have reasonably found that defendant shot Foster because Foster refused to give him money, as evidenced by the possible argument between the two men, or because defendant realized that, having failed to use the ATM, Foster likely had no money to steal. (Cf. People v. Carroll (1970) 1 Cal.3d 581, 584−585 [finding that robbery and shooting of victim 47 constituted one indivisible transaction where defendant shot the victim after becoming angry when the victim turned out to have no money].) Because the ― ‗circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact‘s findings‘ ‖ that defendant attempted to steal money from Foster, reversal of the convictions on counts 8 and 9 is unwarranted. (People v. Thomas, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 514.) For the same reason, substantial evidence supports the jury‘s true finding on the special circumstance allegation that the murder was committed during the commission of an attempted robbery. 4. Instruction on Second Degree Murder as Lesser Included Offense Defendant contends the trial court committed error under California law by failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on second degree murder as a lesser included offense of the felony murder of Foster charged in count 8 of the indictment. We agree but find the error harmless. We reject defendant‘s related argument that the failure to instruct on second degree murder violated his federal constitutional rights under Beck v. Alabama (1980) 447 U.S. 625 (Beck). a) Background Count 8 charged that defendant ―did willfully, unlawfully, and with malice aforethought murder Charles Foster, a human being.‖ It further alleged that the murder occurred while defendant ―was engaged in the commission of the crime of attempted robbery, within the meaning of Penal Code section 190.2(a)(17).‖ When discussing the jury instructions, the prosecution informed the court that it intended to proceed only on a felony-murder theory with respect to count 8 instead of arguing a first degree premeditated malice murder theory as well. The following colloquy then occurred between the court and defense counsel: ―[The Court:] [The prosecution] is asking for felony murder only on the last of the homicides over at the A.T.M. [¶] This will be more up to the defense, it 48 would seem to me . . . . [¶] I think a logical inference to be drawn is that the fellow was killed at the A.T.M. to try to get money. [¶] But that is not necessarily the only inference. [¶] You have some evidence, how strong it is is up to the jury, but you have evidence of some sort of an argument taking place, verbal argument. And the only thing there to suggest a robbery is the fact that the guy is at the A.T.M. window. [¶] You have no words of demand or property taken as far as we know. ―[Prosecutor]: Well, he walked up on him with a shirt wrapped around his head to conceal his identity. ―The Court: And then shot him in the head and walked away. [¶] The eyewitnesses say nothing about the logical thing happening and the guy goes to the wallet. ―[Prosecutor]: That‘s true. ―The Court: I mean it — [¶] I think I probably know what happened. Most people die at ATM‘s, it is probably a robbery. But here you have evidence that something else could have been going on. [¶] Some sort of fight. I don‘t know. [¶] Anyway, on that one, if they want to go felony murder only, what do you want to do on that? [¶] First or second on that one? ―[Defense counsel]: No. ―The Court: Felony murder only? ―[Defense counsel]: Yes. ―The Court: Fair enough.‖ Defense counsel then asked the court if it would also be willing to instruct on manslaughter as a lesser included offense if defendant agreed to the jury being instructed on second degree murder. The court rejected defense counsel‘s proposal because ―[t]here is nothing to reduce this to a manslaughter. No way, 49 shape or form.‖ Defense counsel did not then request a second degree murder instruction with respect to count 8. The jury was instructed that it could find defendant guilty of murder only on a felony-murder theory on count 8. The jury found defendant guilty of count 8 and found true the allegation that the murder was committed in the course of an attempted robbery. As noted, the jury also found defendant guilty of count 9, attempted robbery of Foster. b) Analysis Defendant argues that the court should have instructed the jury on second degree murder as a lesser included offense with respect to count 8, even though defense counsel declined to request such an instruction when invited to do so. Defendant‘s primary argument is not that second degree murder is always a lesser included offense of felony murder. Rather, he argues that second degree murder is a lesser included offense of count 8 as charged in the indictment. The Attorney General does not respond directly to defendant‘s argument that second degree murder is a lesser included offense of felony murder as charged in count 8. Instead, she contends that second degree murder is not a lesser included offense of felony murder as a general matter because felony murder does not require the prosecution to prove malice, a key element of second degree murder. In the alternative, the Attorney General argues that there was insufficient evidence to support a second degree murder instruction on these facts because defendant did not introduce evidence to support a theory that the shooting of Foster was perpetrated for any reason other than robbery. Finally, the Attorney General argues that even if there was instructional error, such error was harmless. 50 The Attorney General does not argue that defendant invited any error by declining the trial court‘s offer to instruct on second degree murder. We therefore do not address whether counsel‘s conduct amounted to invited error. ― ‗ ― ‗[I]t is settled that in criminal cases, even in the absence of a request, the trial court must instruct on the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence. [Citations.] The general principles of law governing the case are those principles closely and openly connected with the facts before the court, and which are necessary for the jury‘s understanding of the case.‘ [Citation.] That obligation has been held to include giving instructions on lesser included offenses when the evidence raises a question as to whether all of the elements of the charged offense were present [citation], but not when there is no evidence that the offense was less than that charged. [Citations.]‖ ‘ ‖ (People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 115 (Valdez).) The rule that juries must be instructed on lesser included offenses ― ‗prevents either party, whether by design or inadvertence, from forcing an all-ornothing choice between conviction of the stated offense on the one hand, or complete acquittal on the other. Hence, the rule encourages a verdict, within the charge chosen by the prosecution, that is neither ―harsher [n]or more lenient than the evidence merits.‖ ‘ ‖ (People v. Smith (2013) 57 Cal.4th 232, 239–240 (Smith).) Because instructing on lesser included offenses serves to increase the accuracy of verdicts, the requirement to do so applies ― ‗even when as a matter of trial tactics a defendant not only fails to request the instruction but expressly objects to its being given.‘ [Citation.]‖ (Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 115.) ―On appeal, we review independently the question whether the trial court improperly failed to instruct on a lesser included offense.‖ (People v. Souza (2012) 54 Cal.4th 90, 113 (Souza).) ―For purposes of determining a trial court‘s instructional duties, we have said that ‗a lesser offense is necessarily included in a 51 greater offense if either the statutory elements of the greater offense, or the facts actually alleged in the accusatory pleading, include all the elements of the lesser offense, such that the greater cannot be committed without also committing the lesser.‘ ‖ (Smith, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 240, italics added.) When applying the accusatory pleading test, ―[t]he trial court need only examine the accusatory pleading.‖ (Id. at p. 244.) ―[S]o long as the prosecution has chosen to allege a way of committing the greater offense that necessarily subsumes a lesser offense, and so long as there is substantial evidence that the defendant committed the lesser offense without also committing the greater, the trial court must instruct on the lesser included offense.‖ (Ibid.) Here, under the accusatory pleading test, second degree murder was plainly a lesser included offense of felony murder as charged in count 8. Count 8 charged defendant with willfully killing Foster with malice aforethought. ― ‗Second degree murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice, but without the additional elements . . . that would support a conviction of first degree murder.‘ ‖ (People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 623 (Taylor).) Thus, it is evident that second degree murder was a lesser included offense of felony murder as charged in count 8, which alleged not merely that defendant killed in the course of a robbery but that he did so willfully and maliciously. Accordingly, the trial court was required to instruct the jury on second degree murder so long as substantial evidence would have supported such a finding. We therefore need not and do not reach the question raised by the Attorney General of whether second degree murder is a lesser included offense of felony murder under the statutory elements test. The evidence of second degree murder in the Foster shooting, though not particularly strong, was sufficient to obligate the trial court to instruct on second degree murder. The ―substantial evidence requirement is not satisfied by ‗ ―any 52 evidence . . . no matter how weak‖ ‘ but rather by evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude ‗that the lesser offense, but not the greater, was committed.‘ ‖ (People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 705.) The ATM video and witness testimony in this case established that a gunman approached Foster at the ATM. The two engaged in some sort of discussion (perhaps an argument), and Foster turned toward the ATM before being shot. As noted, this evidence was sufficient for the jury to infer that defendant was attempting to commit robbery. However, Manzanares testified that Foster and the gunman were arguing, and there was no evidence that defendant took any property or money from Foster after the shooting. As the trial court observed, ―I think a logical inference to be drawn is that the fellow was killed at the A.T.M. to try to get money. [¶] But that is not necessarily the only inference. [¶] You have some evidence, how strong it is is up to the jury, but you have evidence of some sort of an argument taking place, verbal argument.‖ Thus, the evidence permitted the inference that defendant shot Foster with malice in the course of an argument or fight, not necessarily in the course of a robbery. Because the evidence was sufficient to support a theory of second degree murder, the trial court should have instructed the jury on that theory. We nonetheless find the error harmless. Our precedent holds that an erroneous failure to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense is subject to harmless error analysis under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 837, and that evidence sufficient to warrant an instruction on a lesser included offense does not necessarily amount to evidence sufficient to create a reasonable probability of a different outcome had the instruction been given. (See People v. Beames (2007) 40 Cal.4th 907, 970–971; People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 176.) Here, there is no reasonable probability that the evidence of an argument between defendant and Foster, minimal as it was, would have led the jury, had it been 53 properly instructed, to conclude that defendant shot Foster at the ATM out of malice unrelated to any robbery. As the trial court observed, even though there was ―some evidence‖ otherwise, the far more plausible inference is that the ―fellow was killed at the A.T.M. to try to get money.‖ Thus, the trial court‘s failure to instruct on second degree murder was harmless. Defendant‘s reliance on Beck, supra, 447 U.S. 625 for the proposition that the failure to instruct on second degree murder violated the United States Constitution is unavailing under our precedents. After Hopkins v. Reeves (1998) 524 U.S. 88, we have repeatedly rejected Beck claims in light of the differences between California‘s death penalty scheme and the Alabama scheme at issue in Beck. (See Taylor, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 625; People v. Wilson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1, 17–18; People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 143, disapproved of on other grounds by People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22; People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1268–1269; Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th at pp. 118–119; People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 736, fn. 15.) 5. Hearsay Defendant next contends the trial court violated his constitutional rights under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and analogous provisions of the state Constitution by admitting Officer Martinez‘s testimony recounting what Latasha W. had told him about the events at the Coleman residence. As explained below, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the evidence to be introduced under the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule. a) Background Officer Martinez testified about statements Latasha W. made in the twohour period of time following the events that occurred at the Coleman residence. 54 Officer Martinez first encountered Latasha W. at approximately 3:00 a.m. as she was ―running in the middle of the street yelling frantically . . . in hysterics . . . crying.‖ In response to defense questioning, Officer Martinez also testified that ―over the course of the two hours [Latasha W.] was able to calmly relate descriptions and things that went on in the house‖ in ―a chronological time and sequence of events. However, by the end of the two hours, she was ―shocked still‖ and was crying and shaking from the ordeal. Concluding that the prosecution had established that Latasha W.‘s statements were excited utterances or spontaneous declarations, the trial court overruled four hearsay objections to Officer Martinez‘s testimony. b) Analysis Under the spontaneous declaration hearsay exception, hearsay testimony is admissible if it ―(a) [p]urports to narrate, describe, or explain an act, condition, or event perceived by the declarant; and [¶] (b) [w]as made spontaneously while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by such perception.‖ (Evid. Code, § 1240.) ― ‗To render [statements] admissible [under the spontaneous declaration exception] it is required that (1) there must be some occurrence startling enough to produce this nervous excitement and render the utterance spontaneous and unreflecting; (2) the utterance must have been before there has been time to contrive and misrepresent, i.e., while the nervous excitement may be supposed still to dominate and the reflective powers to be yet in abeyance; and (3) the utterance must relate to the circumstance of the occurrence preceding it.‘ ‖ (People v. Poggi (1988) 45 Cal.3d 306, 318 (Poggi).) ―When the statements in question were made and whether they were delivered directly or in response to a question are important factors to be considered on the issue of spontaneity. [Citations.] But . . . ‗[n]either lapse of time between the event and the declarations nor the fact that the declarations were elicited by questioning deprives the 55 statements of spontaneity if it nevertheless appears that they were made under the stress of excitement and while the reflective powers were still in abeyance.‘ ‖ (Id. at p. 319.) ―Under the same reasoning, the fact that the declarant has become calm enough to speak coherently also is not inconsistent with spontaneity.‖ (Ibid.) ―Whether the requirements of the spontaneous statement exception are satisfied in any given case is, in general, largely a question of fact. [Citation.] The determination of the question is vested in the court, not the jury. [Citation.]‖ (Poggi, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 318.) Thus, if supported by substantial evidence, we must uphold the trial court‘s determination of preliminary facts. (People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 541.) Defendant argues that Latasha W.‘s statement to Officer Martinez did not meet the second Poggi requirement, i.e., the declaration was not made while Latasha W.‘s reflective powers remained in abeyance. We disagree. When Officer Martinez first encountered Latasha W., after she had run from Coleman‘s residence, she was ―crying,‖ ―flinging her arms [and] screaming loud[ly],‖ ―[f]rightened,‖ ―[h]ysterical,‖ ―[v]ery emotional,‖ and ―[s]peaking very rapidly.‖ At the end of the approximately two hours she spent with Officer Martinez, Latasha W. ―was shocked . . . [a]nd still shaking by the ordeal.‖ Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the two-hour period of time during which Latasha W. made her statements did not deprive them of their spontaneity. (See, e.g., People v. Brown, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 541 [statements made two and one-half hours after event held spontaneous where ―the declarant continued to labor mightily under the emotional influence of the disturbing events he perceived, so much so that he could not stop his body from shaking nor stem the flow of tears‖].) Defendant relies on People v. Lynch (2010) 50 Cal.4th 693, where we held that a victim‘s statements made approximately two hours after she was attacked 56 were not spontaneous utterances. (Id. at p. 754.) But the ―[m]ost critical[]‖ reason for our holding was that there was ―no testimony . . . demonstrat[ing] that . . . [the victim] was excited or frightened as she spoke, or that her physical condition at the time of her statements precluded deliberation.‖ (Ibid.) Here, there was significant evidence that Latasha W. was still emotionally distraught throughout her conversation with Officer Martinez. (See Poggi, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 319 [―[T]he fact that the declarant has become calm enough to speak coherently also is not inconsistent with spontaneity.‖].) Finally, ―the fact that the statements were delivered in response to questioning does not render them nonspontaneous.‖ (Poggi, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 319–320.) Nothing in the record suggests that Officer Martinez‘s questions throughout the ensuing two hours were anything but routine and nonsuggestive inquiries. Thus, substantial evidence supports the trial court‘s determination that all of Latasha W.‘s statements to Officer Martinez were ―made under the stress of excitement and while the reflective powers were still in abeyance.‖ (Id. at p. 319, italics omitted.) 6. Latasha W.’s Redirect Testimony Defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting Latasha W.‘s redirect testimony that her friendship with Coleman was based upon his having served as her protector after she was raped by a different individual on a prior occasion. Defendant is incorrect. This testimony was admissible because it was relevant to rebutting defense counsel‘s attack on Latasha W.‘s credibility. a) Background In response to defense counsel‘s cross-examination, Latasha W. testified that she was aware that Coleman was a drug dealer and a gang member. She also testified that she had previously spent the night at Coleman‘s house. On redirect, 57 the prosecutor asked Latasha W. about the nature of her relationship with Coleman. Latasha W. explained that he was her best friend but not her boyfriend. Over defense objection, she further testified that the basis for their close friendship was that Latasha W. had previously been raped by another individual who had continued to harass her. Coleman had threatened that individual, successfully ending that individual‘s harassing behavior. And in response to a prosecution question about her having spent the night at Coleman‘s house, Latasha W. explained that on one occasion she had gone to the house with her sister and stayed overnight when the hour became late. b) Analysis Defendant argues that the testimony about Latasha W.‘s prior rape and the story of her having spent the night at Coleman‘s house should have been excluded both as irrelevant and as impermissible victim impact testimony. As an initial matter, we reject the Attorney General‘s argument that defendant forfeited his claim that the testimony was impermissible victim impact testimony. Defendant objected that the testimony was irrelevant. Labeling the objection ―impermissible victim impact testimony‖ does not affect whether the evidence in question is relevant or more probative than prejudicial. (See People v. Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 731, fn. 20.) The substance of the objection is that the testimony in question, which happens to pertain to victim impact, is not relevant to or sufficiently probative of any disputed fact during the guilt phase. ―[T]he proposition that the admission of irrelevant victim-impact evidence constitutes an error‖ is no ―different from the admission of any other irrelevant evidence. Thus, defendant‘s ‗relevance‘ objection preserved his [claim that the evidence was irrelevant victim impact evidence].‖ (Ibid.) Thus, defendant‘s claim that the 58 testimony constituted impermissible guilt phase victim impact testimony is simply an objection that the testimony was irrelevant or more prejudicial than probative. Nor is there merit to the Attorney General‘s contention that defendant forfeited his argument that the story about spending the night at Coleman‘s house was irrelevant. Defense counsel had already lodged an objection to the line of questions about Latasha W.‘s relationship with Coleman, and it was not incumbent upon defense counsel to disrupt the trial by continuing to object to each subsequent question in order to preserve the objection. On the merits, defendant‘s claims fail. ― ‗ ―It is well settled that when a witness is questioned on cross-examination as to matters relevant to the subject of the direct examination but not elicited on that examination, he [or she] may be examined on redirect as to such new matter.‖ ‘ [Citation.] ‗ ―The extent of the redirect examination of a witness is largely within the discretion of the trial court.‖ ‘ ‖ (Hamilton, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 921.) Here, defense counsel elicited information that Latasha W. was best friends with Coleman despite knowing him to be a drug dealer and a gang member. That testimony served little purpose other than to impeach Latasha W.‘s credibility by impliedly connecting her to Coleman‘s illicit activities. We discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court having permitted the prosecutor to establish that the basis for Coleman‘s and Latasha W.‘s friendship was not gang or drug related. Because the testimony was admissible, there is no merit to defendant‘s further argument that admission of the testimony violated his right to due process. 7. Confrontation Clause Defendant contends that Dr. Cotton‘s testimony about the DNA sample taken from Latasha W. denied him his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him because Dr. Cotton relied on DNA testing done by other 59 individuals who did not testify. We do not decide the merits of this issue because any error was harmless in light of the fact that Dr. Cotton testified about her own independent scientific conclusions. This unrebutted testimony, which did not violate defendant‘s rights under the confrontation clause, convincingly established that defendant‘s DNA matched that of Latasha W.‘s assailant. a) Background Dr. Cotton testified that analysts at her laboratory performed DNA tests on the vaginal swab taken from Latasha W. that was sent to Cellmark. She testified that based on testing at nine different DNA loci, the tests established that defendant could not be excluded as a match to the sperm portion of the swab sample and that Latasha W. could not be excluded as a match to the nonsperm portions of the sample. The statistical likelihood of any given African-American individual‘s DNA matching the sperm portion of the sample was one in 17 million. Dr. Cotton explained that Cellmark‘s DNA tests produce a thin gel on a glass plate. Those results are then copied onto an X-ray film. Because the glass plates cannot be stored for long periods of time, the X-ray films are what are kept in Cellmark‘s permanent files. Dr. Cotton testified that she reviewed the X-ray film of the tests of both the sperm and nonsperm portions of the sample taken from Latasha W. She concluded that the results were of a particularly high quality. The prosecutor then asked Dr. Cotton whether she ―concur[red] with the findings [of the two Cellmark analysts who originally reviewed the DNA data] in the case.‖ Dr. Cotton responded: ―Yes. [¶] I went back and analyzed the data in preparation of coming to court so I can discuss it. And I looked at all of their interpretations and I did my own and mine are the same as theirs.‖ The prosecution then asked: ―So three 60 scientists have looked at this data and all are in agreement in terms of these findings?‖ Dr. Cotton responded that a fourth scientist had actually looked at some of the results as well, but then reiterated that in ―preparation for court I had to look at the information.‖ b) Analysis Defendant argues that Dr. Cotton‘s testimony regarding the laboratory results prepared by other Cellmark analysts violated his right under the Sixth Amendment to confront the witnesses against him. He relies on Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 (Crawford) and its progeny. (See Williams v. Illinois (2012) __ U.S. __ [132 S.Ct. 2221] (Williams); Bullcoming v. New Mexico (2011) __ U.S. __ [131 S.Ct. 2705] (Bullcoming); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts (2009) 557 U.S. 305 (Melendez-Diaz).) As an initial matter, the Attorney General is incorrect that defendant forfeited this argument by failing to object at trial. Crawford was decided more than five years after defendant‘s trial. Because Crawford ―was a dramatic departure from prior confrontation clause case law,‖ a defendant‘s failure to raise a Crawford claim in a pre-Crawford trial ―is excusable because defense counsel could not reasonably have been expected to anticipate this change in the law.‖ (People v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 804, 840.) Thus, defendant‘s Crawford claim is not forfeited. As demonstrated by the passages above, Dr. Cotton‘s testimony can be divided into two categories. First, she testified that she had reviewed the X-ray films of the DNA results generated by Cellmark analysts and, based on her independent review of those results, concluded that defendant‘s DNA matched Latasha W.‘s assailant‘s. Nothing suggests that the X-ray films, which were prepared by other Cellmark analysts, were signed or attested to under oath. 61 Second, Dr. Cotton testified that her conclusions were the same as those reached by the analysts who prepared the X-ray films, although no reports by those analysts were introduced into evidence. In Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. 36, the high court held that criminal defendants have a constitutionally protected right to cross-examine any witness whose testimonial hearsay is offered against them. (See id. at pp. 50–56.) In a series of decisions applying Crawford to the introduction of scientific evidence, shifting majorities of the high court have variously defined what makes hearsay testimonial. (See Melendez-Diaz, supra, 557 U.S. at pp. 310–311 [lab analysts‘ affidavits describing results of testing they performed were testimonial hearsay]; Bullcoming, supra, __ U.S. at p. __ [131 S.Ct. at p. 2717] [lab analyst‘s certification as to his lab results, which complied with specific state laws for admission of lab reports into evidence, was testimonial hearsay]; Williams, supra, __ U.S. at p. __ [132 S.Ct. at p. 2228] (plur. opn. of Alito, J.); id. at p. __ [132 S.Ct. at p. 2225 (conc. opn. of Thomas, J.) [holding that an expert witness could testify based on her assumption that unsworn results received from a DNA lab were accurate, but disagreeing as to whether the unsworn nature of the data relied on by the witness or the fact that the testimony was conveyed by an expert was the reason the lab tests were not testimonial].) Like many courts around the country, we have struggled to interpret and apply the high court‘s confrontation clause cases. Nonetheless, a few rules emerge from our cases. First, the introduction of machine-generated data does not implicate the confrontation clause because ―unlike a person, a machine cannot be cross-examined.‖ (People v. Lopez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 569, 583 (Lopez).) Second, an expert witness‘s reliance on statements or reports by other individuals that ―merely record objective facts‖ do not implicate the confrontation clause because ―[s]uch observations are not testimonial in nature.‖ (People v. Dungo (2012) 55 62 Cal.4th 608, 619 (Dungo) [holding that a pathologist‘s ―statements describing . . . anatomical and physiological observations about the condition‖ of a body upon which an autopsy was being performed were not testimonial].) Finally, we have held that a lab technician‘s act of initialing a report describing actions he or she has taken with respect to a particular lab test is insufficient to convert that report into a testimonial statement because initialing lacks the requisite formality, absent (at the least) a signature, certification, or other form of swearing to the truth. (Lopez, at pp. 584–585.) Dr. Cotton‘s testimony regarding the opinions of the other analysts may have violated defendant‘s right to confront those analysts, although it is difficult to assess this claim because those analysts‘ reports are not in the record. However, any error that may have occurred would be harmless because Dr. Cotton testified that she independently reviewed the X-ray films and concluded from those films that defendant could not be excluded as a match to the sperm portion of the sample. Dr. Cotton testified as an expert witness observing objective scientific data — the X-ray film output of a DNA test. Defendant does not suggest that the X-ray films that Dr. Cotton relied on, which were not introduced into evidence, were formally attested to by the Cellmark analysts or that they conveyed anything other than objective scientific data. Thus, under Lopez and Dungo, defendant has not demonstrated that Dr. Cotton‘s testimony as to her own conclusions based on the X-ray films violated defendant‘s right to cross-examination. (See Dungo, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 619; Lopez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 570–571.) Although Dr. Cotton‘s testimony about her own conclusions may have been slightly bolstered by the constitutionally dubious portion of her testimony about other analysts‘ conclusions, any error that may have occurred was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant was unable to seriously impeach Dr. Cotton‘s expert 63 opinion and introduced no evidence that would have led a reasonable jury to doubt Dr. Cotton‘s own analysis. 8. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Based on Opening Statement Defendant argues that his attorney rendered ineffective assistance when, during her opening statement, she referenced a partial confession defendant had made to the police that the prosecution did not plan to introduce into evidence. We need not determine whether counsel‘s error amounted to ineffective assistance because defendant has not demonstrated a reasonable probability that but for counsel‘s error, the result would have been more favorable to him. (See Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 694 (Strickland).) a) Background On August 21, 1996, defendant admitted to homicide officers in a videotaped interview that he was present at the scene of the Coleman killing but denied having killed Coleman or having raped Latasha W. During her opening statement, defense counsel told the jury: ―The givens are this: [¶] Mr. Banks admitted to the police when he was questioned that he was present at the Coleman murder. [¶] He denied that he was the shooter. [¶] He denied raping [Latasha W.]. [¶] But he did admit that he was present.‖ The prosecutor asked to approach and at sidebar informed both the court and defense counsel that he had no intention of introducing defendant‘s confession. Defense counsel said she assumed that the prosecutor had intended to introduce the confession. The court responded, ―I don‘t know why they would put that in when they have what they have, including an eyewitness. [¶] Again, one way to find out rather than assuming is certainly to try to ask ahead of time.‖ The next day, defense counsel moved for a mistrial on grounds of her own incompetence. The trial court denied the motion, stating, ―I don‘t see how it could 64 be incompetence to comment on what you believe the evidence will prove in the case. [¶] If you have a belief that the evidence will show a particular thing, so be it. [¶] If the people do not put that evidence on, that happens too. [¶] I say it is a better idea for counsel to wait until the people have rested to make a statement but I am not a defense attorney.‖ b) Analysis Defendant first argues that defense counsel‘s conduct was so egregious as to constitute complete abandonment under the high court‘s decision in United States v. Cronic (1984) 466 U.S. 648. Under Cronic, if defense counsel ―entirely fails to subject the prosecution‘s case to meaningful adversarial testing, then there has been a denial of Sixth Amendment rights that makes the adversary process itself presumptively unreliable,‖ and the conviction must be reversed without further prejudice analysis. (Id. at p. 659.) ―A complete denial of counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings‖ is sufficient to trigger the Cronic presumption of prejudice. (People v. Benavides (2005) 35 Cal.4th 69, 86.) ―But when the defendant is represented by counsel, the [Cronic] presumption of prejudice will only stand when counsel entirely failed to subject the prosecution‘s case to meaningful adversarial testing. (Bell v. Cone (2002) 535 U.S. 685; Cronic, at p. 659.)‖ (Benavides, at p. 86.) Otherwise, ―specific errors and omissions‖ by trial counsel must generally be litigated as ineffective assistance of counsel claims under Strickland. (Cronic, at p. 657, fn. 20.) Here, defense counsel unwisely told the jury the evidence would show that her client admitted to being present at Coleman‘s house but not to shooting Coleman or raping Latasha W. When the matter was brought to her attention, she did not persist. In her closing argument, counsel reminded the jury that some of the evidence the parties discussed during their opening statements was not 65 presented and that ―[w]hat we said in opening statements and what we say now is not the evidence in the case. What came from the stand is the evidence in the case.‖ Furthermore, counsel did not concede any critical element of the Coleman murder, the robbery special circumstance, the attempted murder, or the rape charges. Thus, defendant‘s ineffective assistance of counsel claim must be analyzed under Strickland because his ―argument is not that his counsel failed to oppose the prosecution throughout the . . . proceeding as a whole, but that his counsel failed to do so at specific points.‖ (Bell v. Cone, supra, 535 U.S. at p. 697; see In re Avena (1996) 12 Cal.4th 694, 727–728.) In order to demonstrate prejudice under Strickland, a ―defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel‘s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.‖ (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694.) Where no prejudice showing has been made, there is no need to inquire whether counsel‘s efforts were in fact ineffective. (Id. at p. 697.) Both DNA evidence and Latasha W.‘s eyewitness testimony convincingly established that defendant was not only present at the scene of the Coleman shooting but that he was the person who raped Latasha W. and shot Coleman. Thus, there is no reasonable probability that defense counsel‘s error impacted the jury‘s guilty verdict with respect to any of the crimes that occurred at Coleman‘s home. 9. CALJIC No. 17.41.1 — the “Juror Snitch” Instruction At both the guilt and penalty phases, the trial court instructed the jury in accordance with CALJIC No. 17.41.1, the now-defunct ―so-called ‗antijury nullification‘ instruction.‖ (People v. Rogers (2013) 57 Cal.4th 296, 339 (Rogers).) The instruction provided: ―The integrity of a trial requires that jurors, at all times during their deliberations, conduct themselves as required by these instructions. Accordingly, should it occur that any juror refuses to deliberate or 66 expresses an intention to disregard the law or to decide the case based on [penalty or punishment, or] any [other] improper basis, it is the obligation of the other jurors to immediately advise the Court of the situation.‖ (CALJIC No. 17.41.1 (6th ed. 1996).) Defendant argues that giving this instruction to the jury violated his rights to a jury trial and due process under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution. We have previously rejected identical claims, and defendant provides no reason why we should reach a different conclusion here. In People v. Engelman (2002) 28 Cal.4th 436, 445–449, we exercised our supervisory powers to order that the anti-nullification instruction should not be given in future trials. We explained that ―it is inadvisable and unnecessary for a trial court to create the risk of intrusion upon the secrecy of deliberation or of an adverse impact upon the course of deliberations by giving such an instruction.‖ (Id. at p. 445.) At the same time, we said ―we are not persuaded that, merely because CALJIC No. 17.41.1 might induce a juror who believes there has been juror misconduct to reveal the content of deliberations unnecessarily (or threaten to do so), the giving of the instruction constitutes a violation of the constitutional right to trial by jury or otherwise constitutes error under state law.‖ (Id. at p. 444.) We have repeatedly affirmed Engelman‘s holding that CALJIC No. 17.41.1 does not violate a defendant‘s right to a fair trial. (See, e.g., Rogers, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 340; Souza, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 144.) Nor did giving CALJIC No. 17.41.1 violate defendant‘s right to due process here, where there is no suggestion that any juror was hampered in his or her deliberation or was coerced into changing his or her views as a result of the instruction. (See People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 656–657.) 67 10. Judicial Bias Defendant launches a multi-pronged attack on the overall fairness of his guilt phase trial, arguing that the trial court made ―repeated one-sided rulings and remarks directed against defense counsel and appellant, disparaging counsel and weakening the defense‘s ability to present evidence countering the charges against appellant.‖ Defendant says that these rulings and comments violated his due process right to a fair trial before an unbiased judge. However, none of the trial court‘s remarks in isolation or in the aggregate demonstrated bias on the part of the judge or denied defendant his right to a fair trial. a) Defendant’s pretrial absences First, defendant argues that a series of comments made by the trial judge during pretrial proceedings regarding defendant‘s repeated absences from those proceedings demonstrate bias. As explained below, the record reflects that throughout the pretrial proceedings defendant was taking a variety of psychiatric medications and was absent from at least six hearings or proceedings, often on account of self-inflicted injuries or suicide attempts. On March 18, 1998, defendant was absent from a pretrial conference. Officials at the prison where defendant was housed informed the trial court that defendant said he felt ill, refused to leave his cell, and claimed that if forced to come to court, he would hurt himself or others. Defendant was on suicide watch, and defense counsel advised the court that he had attempted suicide twice during the preceding weeks. The trial court decided not to order a forcible cell extraction but told defense counsel to warn defendant that ―he can‘t set the pace over here‖ and to alert him that the court might order extraction in the future. The court then proceeded to hear argument on the issues scheduled for the conference but made tentative rulings only. 68 Defendant was absent from another pretrial conference on April 21, 1998. The bailiff informed the trial court that defendant had ―overdosed on something.‖ The court then denied a defense motion to delay trial, which appears to have been based not on defendant‘s overdose but on defense counsel‘s needing to do ―some other things . . . that I have just found out about.‖ On May 4, 1998, defendant was absent from yet another pretrial conference. Defense counsel informed the court that defendant had recently been hospitalized after another suicide attempt, although the bailiff informed the court that defendant was in his cell but refusing to come to court. Seemingly in response to the similarity between the judge‘s name (Horan) and the last name of an officer at the jail (Herran) who spoke to the bailiff, the trial court quipped, ―I was working last night over there [at the jail]‖ and ―Who else is going to think there is a conspiracy going on with Mr. Banks?‖ On August 3, 1998, the day pretrial preparations were scheduled to begin, defendant was absent. The bailiff informed the court that defendant ―took 20 pills and they had to pump his stomach this morning and . . . he will be listed day to day.‖ The court stated that defendant ―seems to want to come to court when he wants to come to court and when he does not, he doesn‘t. [¶] He either injures himself, although none of his injuries are life threatening. [¶] He comes sometimes and other times he does not. [¶] The sad fact is that we have to try this case at some point.‖ Defense counsel told the court she was ―concerned about the court‘s characterization. [¶] Mr. Banks is mentally ill. [¶] He is brain damaged and mentally ill and he doesn‘t understand and work on the same level that we do and most of the other defendants do. [¶] He has had a long, long history of suicide attempts, not just since this case has happened. [¶] He has had a long history of doing damage to himself.‖ 69 ―Apparently unsuccessfully,‖ the court responded. After another brief colloquy with defense counsel, the court discussed defendant‘s ―attempts, as you want to characterize them, I would not characterize them as suicide attempts. [¶] If a guy has been trying to kill himself his entire life, one would suspect that one would succeed. [¶] I am not trying to minimize your client‘s problems. I assume he has problems. But when he has a court date that he does not want to make, his so-called attempts seem to coincide with my court calendar.‖ The court then told defense counsel to inform her client that ―the court will consider his next medical problem that is self-induced to be an attempt to delay this trial.‖ And ―if the law — if I conclude that the law allows me to proceed [in defendant‘s absence], I will.‖ Otherwise, ―what I will do is explain to the jurors the reason for their inconvenience and use the same bunch and tell them that: ‗The defendant will not come to court from jail and, therefore, folks, we have dragged you down here and will have to ask your indulgence,‘ because I am not going to play a game wherein we keep ordering up and have — go to the trouble of bringing 150 — I think it is 150 — people into the courtroom while we wait patiently for the defendant to feel like coming.‖ The next day, defendant was transported to court and made it as far as lockup. But the bailiff explained to the court that when he went to bring defendant to the courtroom, defendant told the bailiff ―he needs his medication and that his jaw is locking up because he needs his medication and he needs to go and he requested paramedics.‖ Defense counsel then informed the court that she had relayed the court‘s warnings to defendant and that he had told counsel that he was ―starting to feel ill‖ and explained that ―when they pumped his stomach, they give him certain medications and it locks up his jaw and it was starting — and he was starting to get dizzy and did not feel well.‖ 70 The court stated: ―It seems that while I don‘t doubt that the defendant may have some problems that are beyond the ability of this court to diagnose, it seems, again, that the bulk of his problems revolve around his court dates. [¶] His ‗suicide attempts,‘ all of which have been fruitless, revolve around his court dates. [¶] His refusal to come to court on certain occasion, it has not been the matter of a suicide attempt or medication or anything else other than Mr. Banks notifying deputies at the county jail that he refuses to come in and I have not ordered a cell extraction.‖ Counsel noted that defendant had made additional suicide attempts, not coinciding with his court dates, of which the court had not been apprised, and she requested that defendant be seen by a psychologist at the University of Southern California (USC). The court responded that ―[t]here is not a thing wrong with this fellow when he is in court. [¶] He is responsive and is like any other defendant that I have ever seen. [¶] The problem is getting him into a courtroom. [¶] Once he is in court he is controllable. [¶] Nothing will happen in this courtroom, guaranteed.‖ After hearing argument from the prosecution, the court concluded by noting that the jury was set to arrive the following day and ordered defendant to be there. The court said that it would ―contact the county jail and explain that we are going to have [defendant] here tomorrow.‖ The following morning, August 5, 1998, defendant was not present because, according to the bailiff, he ―was saying that he is too sick to come to court.‖ The court stated that it ―spent about three hours yesterday, after counsel left, speaking to the doctors at the county jail, specifically the medical doctor who is in charge of the county jail medical system, Dr. Clark. [¶] He, at the court‘s request, became personally involved in the case and spoke directly to Dr. Ortego . . . at the men‘s central jail health staff. [¶] It is the opinion of Dr. Ortego that in spite of his suicidal gestures that Mr. Banks is not a serious threat, i.e., re suicide, 71 however, he should be watched while in transit and in the holding area to prevent delays in the trial proceedings. [¶] They are also of the opinion that he is mentally stable to start trial and that he has been medically clear and is physically able to proceed with his trial.‖ The court then concluded that defendant‘s claimed medical problems the prior day were an instance of malingering. Defense counsel expressed concern that neither doctor mentioned by the court was known to her as being the psychiatrists who were treating defendant. She requested a brief delay in proceedings to permit a USC psychiatrist to examine defendant and prescribe appropriate medication. The court denied defense counsel‘s request. Some time later, after a brief recess, defendant appeared in court, having finally agreed to appear without resort to a forced extraction. The court informed defendant that if he failed to appear during the rest of the trial, the court would order forcible cell extraction and later advised defendant that if he failed to appear, the court would inform the jury that ―the reason for any delay is the recalcitrance of the defendant refusing to come to court.‖ Finally, on August 12, 1998, proceedings began late due to a delay in getting defendant to court. The court informed the prospective alternate jurors who were present at the time that ―[t]here was a problem obtaining the presence of the defendant in a timely fashion this morning. He is now here and we can go forward.‖ Defendant argues that these interchanges, in particular the court‘s skepticism about the severity of defendant‘s mental health situation, betrayed judicial bias that infected the whole trial. We disagree. The record shows that the trial court was frustrated with defendant‘s repeated absences, and understandably so. The record also shows that the court characterized defendant‘s repeated attempts to harm himself (including an 72 overdose that required his stomach to be pumped) as malingering or recalcitrance, and threatened to inform the jury accordingly, without consulting a mental health expert. When the court eventually did consult a mental health professional, the court reported information from ex parte off-the-record conversations with prison medical staff without indicating whether the physicians in question were directly responsible for defendant‘s care. A better course would have been to conduct a hearing on the issue or to have defendant examined by a court-appointed psychiatrist, as urged by defense counsel. (Cf. People v. Lewis (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 994 [court properly concluded defendant was feigning mental incompetence where such a finding ―w[as] supported by the record, including expert testimony introduced at a hearing on [the defendant‘s] competence‖].) Nevertheless, defendant does not argue that the court violated state or federal law in its attempts to secure defendant‘s attendance, or that it violated state or federal law by holding preliminary hearings in his absence or by engaging in ex parte communications with prison medical staff. His only argument is that the court‘s comments demonstrate bias against defendant that infected the entire trial. We do not agree that the court‘s skepticism as to the reasons for defendant‘s pretrial absence demonstrated bias toward any facet of defendant‘s guilt phase case, in which defendant did not assert any mental health-based defenses. (See People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1112 [―adverse or erroneous rulings, especially those that are subject to review, do not establish a charge of judicial bias‖].) Rather, the court‘s comments reflected frustration with the disruptions caused by defendant‘s repeated absences. Nothing suggests that the court developed a generally antagonistic stance toward defendant that bled into some other facet of the guilt phase trial. Equally important, defendant does not demonstrate any way in which the court‘s pretrial comments impacted the jury. (See People v. Sturm (2006) 37 73 Cal.4th 1218, 1237 (Sturm) [―Trial judges ‗should be exceedingly discreet in what they say and do in the presence of a jury lest they seem to lean toward or lend their influence to one side or the other‘ ‖ (italics added)].) The only comment the court made in front of (prospective) jurors was the remark that proceedings had been delayed one morning because of a ―problem obtaining the presence of the defendant in a timely fashion.‖ But that comment did not blame defendant for the delay, nor did it indicate that the court had an unfavorable view of defendant, his mental health, or his cooperation with prison authorities. Thus, the trial court‘s exchanges with defendant and defense counsel regarding defendant‘s repeated absences and mental health did not deprive defendant of his due process right to a fair trial. b) Interruption of Opening Statement During her opening statement, defense counsel stated: ―Each homicide [of those charged] is a totally different case and you have to decide on them totally separately. [¶] They are not being charged together so you can[not] use one for the other. [¶] If a piece of evidence that you feel belongs to one or the other, that is fine. But they are three separate cases and you need to decide them individually. [¶] It is fine for you to discuss and you should — ‖ The court interrupted: ―Counsel, let me remind you that this is not an argument. [¶] That will come at the end of the case. [¶] Go ahead and make your statement.‖ Defendant is incorrect that the court‘s interruption demonstrates judicial bias. Regardless of whether the trial court was correct that there was anything improper about counsel‘s opening statement (a question we do not address), the trial court‘s intervention does not approach the type of ― ‗discourteous and disparaging remarks to defense counsel‘ ‖ that we have found to constitute judicial misconduct. (Sturm, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1223; see, e.g., id. at pp. 1235–1236 74 [court told counsel the line of questioning was ― ‗going nowhere‘ ‖ and counsel was ― ‗not grasping my ruling,‘ ‖ accused counsel of ― ‗trying to sneak [forbidden questions] by,‘ ‖ referred to the ― ‗inordinate amount of time whereby objections are raised with regard to questions by [defense counsel],‘ ‖ and described counsel to the jury as having ― ‗supposedly learn[ed] the rules of evidence‘ ‖ in law school (italics omitted)].) c) Court’s ruling on an evidentiary objection Finally, defendant objects to the trial court‘s handling of the prosecution‘s objection to defense counsel‘s cross-examination of Dr. Cotton, the prosecution‘s DNA expert. On cross-examination, defense counsel sought to explore the fact that Dr. Cotton‘s lab had originally conducted the DNA test at only five loci, resulting in a one in 8,000 probability that any particular African-American might be the source of the sperm sample. A later test involving nine loci decreased the probability of a match within the African-American population to one in 17 million. Defense counsel then asked Dr. Cotton, ―So basically under the first set of testing, the prosecution indicated they didn‘t like the statistics.‖ The prosecution objected ―to that characterization.‖ The court sustained the objection as follows: ―Look, this is so objectionable. [¶] What the lady [Dr. Cotton] said was the following: [¶] They tested several loci and stopped, were asked to do more and said fine and kept going and kept up with their results. [¶] So please, counsel, I assume you understand and please do not ask questions that misstate the evidence in the case or that assume facts not shown by the evidence in the case. [¶] Please don‘t do that.‖ Defendant did not object to the court‘s comments. Shortly thereafter, and without the jury present, the trial court further criticized counsel for the question 75 she posed to Dr. Cotton. Defense counsel defended her conduct but did not object to the court‘s comments to the jury or request a specific admonition with respect to them. As to any claim that the particular remark, on its own, constituted judicial misconduct sufficient to warrant reversal, that claim is forfeited by defendant‘s failure to object. A claim of pervasive judicial bias does not necessarily require an objection to be preserved because such an objection may be futile, but ―[a]s a general rule,‖ isolated ―judicial misconduct claims are not preserved for appellate review if no objections were made on those grounds at trial.‖ (Sturm, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1237.) We therefore consider defendant‘s claim only for purposes of determining whether it demonstrated pervasive judicial bias against defendant. A trial court must avoid making ―comments implying that defense counsel was behaving unethically or in an underhanded fashion‖ in front of the jury. (Sturm, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1241.) Here, when defense counsel alleged that ―the prosecution indicated they didn‘t like the statistics‖ from the initial test, the court properly admonished defense counsel against assuming facts not in evidence. However, the court‘s remark — ―They tested several loci and stopped, were asked to do more and said fine and kept going and kept up with their results. [¶] So please, counsel, I assume you understand and please do not ask questions that misstate the evidence in the case . . . .‖ — arguably implied that defense counsel made an allegation that she knew to be specious, when in fact there had been no evidence up to that point, one way or the other, as to why Dr. Cotton‘s lab had been ―asked to do more.‖ But whether or not this particular admonition of defense counsel was improper, this isolated incident does not support defendant‘s claim that the trial court was pervasively biased against him. Defendant relies primarily on Sturm, where we reversed a conviction due to the trial court‘s pervasive misconduct. 76 There, the trial court ―belittled defense witnesses on several occasions‖ (Sturm, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1233), repeatedly answered questions (once incorrectly) for a defense witness (id. at p. 1239), ―disparaged defense counsel‖ on multiple occasions (id. at p. 1234), and ―interposed [its] own objections to questions asked by defense counsel‖ on ―numerous occasions‖ (id. at p. 1235). The trial court also compounded its behavior by admonishing the jury that it was not biased against defense counsel, but doing so in a way that implied that defense counsel did not understand the rules of evidence. (Id. at p. 1236). Here, by contrast, the trial court‘s remark did not demonstrate pervasive bias against defendant either in isolation or in combination with its pretrial comments about defendant‘s mental health. (See People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186, 1221 [―Even if improper . . . two brief remarks ‗ ―fall short of the intemperate or biased judicial conduct [that] warrants reversal.‖ ‘ ‖]; People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1107 [―A trial court commits misconduct if it ‗persists in making discourteous and disparaging remarks to a defendant‘s counsel . . . and utters frequent comment from which the jury may plainly perceive that the testimony of the witness is not believed by the judge, and in other ways discredits the cause of the defense . . . .‘ ‖ (italics added)].) In sum, defendant has not demonstrated judicial bias in the guilt phase. 11. Cumulative Error Defendant argues that even if any of the individual errors he believes infected his trial were harmless, the errors are prejudicial in the aggregate. The only errors we have found are the trial court‘s failure to instruct the jury on the penalty enhancement for deliberate and premeditated attempted murder of Latasha W., which we have corrected, and the trial court‘s failure to instruct on the lesser included offense of second degree murder with respect to the Foster murder, 77 which we have found harmless. We have also concluded that the court‘s pretrial remarks about defendant‘s mental health and its admonition in response to defense counsel‘s cross-examination of Dr. Cotton did not demonstrate pervasive bias. We see no basis for reversal based on cumulative prejudice.