Opinion ID: 1801755
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to instruct on lingering doubt as to guilt

Text: Defendant contends the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury that it could consider lingering doubt concerning defendant's guilt, in determining the appropriate penalty, violated his rights to due process of law, a fair trial, and a fair and reliable determination of penalty under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and his parallel rights under the California Constitution. Defendant requested the following instruction: 1. The adjudication of guilt is not infallible and any lingering doubts you entertain on the question of guilt may be considered by you in determining the appropriate penalty, including the possibility that at some time in the future, facts may come to light which have not yet been discovered. [¶] 2. It may be considered as a factor in mitigation if you have a lingering doubt as to the guilt of the defendant. The trial court refused to give this instruction, stating that the topic was addressed by factor (k) of section 190.3 and CALJIC No. 8.85, and observing that the language of the proposed instruction called upon the jury to speculate concerning facts that might be discovered in the future. The trial court allowed defense counsel to argue to the jury that it should consider lingering doubt, but instructed counsel not to invite the jury to speculate concerning the discovery of facts in the future. (10) Although a defendant may assert his or her possible innocence in mitigation, and the jury may consider lingering doubt in determining the appropriate penalty, there is no requirement that the court specifically instruct the jury to consider lingering doubt. ( People v. Page (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1, 55 [79 Cal.Rptr.3d 4, 186 P.3d 395] ( Page ); see also § 190.3, factors (a) [the trier of fact shall take into account the circumstances of the crime and any special circumstance found to be true], (k) [the trier of fact shall take into account any other circumstance in mitigation].) In the present case, the trial court permitted defendant to assert his innocence, and the defense articulated to the jury why it believed the jurors should have lingering doubt concerning their verdict. (11) Defendant claims, however, that the prosecutor argued to the jury that the jurors could not consider lingering doubt, and contends that this circumstance mandated the giving of an instruction that lingering doubt was a mitigating factor. Defendant did not object to the prosecutor's closing argument or request any further instruction in response to the closing argument. (See Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1333 [the defense must make a timely objection to preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, and such a claim is reviewable only if an admonition would not have cured the harm].) Moreover, the record reflects that, although the prosecutor argued the jury should have no doubt concerning its verdict, he did not tell the jurors they could not consider lingering doubt as a mitigating factor. [42] (12) Defendant also claims the circumstance that an instruction specifically addressing lingering doubt may be given in some capital cases, and rejected in others, reflects improper inconsistency in application of the death penalty. The sole authority he cites in support of this proposition is Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104 [71 L.Ed.2d 1, 102 S.Ct. 869], which holds that the sentencer in a capital case must be allowed to consider any relevant mitigating factor. ( Id. at p. 112 [a consistency produced by ignoring individual differences is a false consistency].) The jury in the present case was instructed to take into account and be guided by various factors, including [a]ny other circumstance that extenuates the gravity of the crime. . . . (CALJIC No. 8.85; see § 190.3, factor (k).) Thus, the instructions in the present case comply with the holding of Eddings v. Oklahoma . There is no requirement that identical instructions concerning mitigating circumstances be given to every capital jury.