Opinion ID: 3168517
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Elements Necessary to State a Claim

Text: We thus begin by taking note of the elements Connelly must plead to state her claims. With respect to her disparate treatment claim, Title VII makes it an “unlawful employment practice for an employer … to discriminate against any individual …, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). See also Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 92-93 (2003). In 1991, Congress amended Title VII to further specify that, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this subchapter, an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for “two-pronged approach,” 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009), the Supreme Court noted the elements of the pertinent claim before proceeding with that approach, id. at 675-79. Thus, we have described the process as a three-step approach. Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 n.4 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Santiago, 629 F.3d at 130). 10 any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). In Watson v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, we interpreted that amendment to apply only to the category of discrimination cases that involve a “mixed-motive.” 207 F.3d 207, 214-20 (3d Cir. 2000). Generally speaking, in a “mixedmotive” case a plaintiff claims that an employment decision was based on both legitimate and illegitimate reasons. Such cases are in contrast to so-called “pretext” cases, in which a plaintiff claims that an employer’s stated justification for an employment decision is false. A Title VII plaintiff may make a claim for discrimination “under either the pretext theory set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green[, 411 U.S. 792, (1973)], or the mixed-motive theory set forth in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins[, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)], under which a plaintiff may show that an employment decision was made based on both legitimate and illegitimate reasons.”5 Makky v. Chertoff, 541 5 An employee proceeding under the McDonnell Douglas pretext framework bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case by showing: (1) that she was a member of a protected class, (2) that she was qualified for the job, and (3) another person, not in the protected class, was treated more favorably. See Scheidemantle v. Slippery Rock Univ. State Sys. of Higher Educ., 470 F.3d 535, 539 (3d Cir. 2006). If the employee establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to establish a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its employment action. Id. If the employer provides such a reason, the burden shifts back to the employee to show that the proffered reason was mere pretext for actual discrimination. Id. Notwithstanding this 11 F.3d 205, 213 (3d Cir. 2008). As we recognized in Watson, the “pretext” and “mixed-motive” labels can be misleading because, even in a case that does not qualify for a burdenshifting instruction under Price Waterhouse, the employer’s challenged conduct may nevertheless result from two or more motives, and the plaintiff “need not necessarily show ‘pretext’ but may prevail simply by showing, through direct or circumstantial evidence, that the challenged action resulted from discrimination.” 207 F.3d at 214 n.5 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). Under either theory of discrimination, the plaintiff must establish that her protected status was a factor in the employer’s challenged action. The difference is in the burden-shifting framework, a plaintiff who produces “direct evidence” of discrimination may proceed under the mixedmotive framework of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. 490 U.S. 228, 276 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring). As we explained in Armbruster v. Unisys Corp.: [I]n the Price Waterhouse framework … the evidence the plaintiff produces is so revealing of discriminatory animus that it is not necessary to rely on any presumption from the prima facie case to shift the burden of production. Both the burden of production and the risk of non- persuasion are shifted to the defendant who … must persuade the factfinder that even if discrimination was a motivating factor in the adverse employment decision, it would have made the same employment decision regardless of its discriminatory animus. 32 F.3d 768, 778 (3d Cir. 1994). 12 degree of causation that must be shown: in a “mixed-motive” case, the plaintiff must ultimately prove that her protected status was a “motivating” factor, whereas in a non-mixedmotive or “pretext” case, the plaintiff must ultimately prove that her status was a “determinative” factor. See id. at 214-20 (summarizing the distinction in standards of causation that apply to “pretext” and “mixed-motive” cases and concluding that the 1991 amendment to Title VII did not alter that distinction). Connelly’s Amended Complaint does not specify whether she intends to proceed under a “mixed-motive” or a “pretext” theory, and understandably so. The distinction between those two types of cases “lies in the kind of proof the employee produces on the issue of [the employer’s] bias,” Starceski v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 54 F.3d 1089, 1097 (3d Cir. 1995), and identifying the proof before there has been discovery would seem to put the cart before the horse. Indeed, we have said that, even at trial, an employee “may present his case under both theories,” provided that, prior to instructing the jury, the judge decides whether one or both theories applies. Id. at 1098 (internal citation omitted); see also Radabaugh v. Zip Feed Mills, Inc., 997 F.2d 444, 448 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating that “[w]hether a case is a pretext case or a mixed-motives case is a question for the court once all the evidence has been received”). Thus, for purposes of noting the elements Connelly must plead to state a disparate treatment claim, we take it as given that she may advance either a mixed-motive or a pretext theory. The District Court, however, incorrectly evaluated the Amended Complaint as if Connelly were confined to showing pretext. Moreover, the Court’s analysis proceeded with a 13 point-by-point consideration of the elements of a prima facie case required under a pretext theory. It is thus worth reiterating that, at least for purposes of pleading sufficiency, a complaint need not establish a prima facie case in order to survive a motion to dismiss.6 A prima facie case is “an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement,” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002), and hence is “not a proper measure of whether a complaint fails to state a claim.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 213 (3d Cir. 2009). As we have previously noted about pleading in a context such as this, [a] determination whether a prima facie case has been made … is an evidentiary inquiry – it defines the quantum of proof [a] plaintiff must present to create a rebuttable presumption of discrimination. Even post-Twombly, it has been 6 In Makky v. Chertoff, we held that the plaintiff could not avoid dismissal of his mixed-motive discrimination claim if there was “unchallenged objective evidence” that he did not possess the “baseline qualifications” to do his job, because such a plaintiff would inevitably fail to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination after the pleading stage. 541 F.3d 205, 215 (3d Cir. 2008). However, our analysis explicitly assumed the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s pleadings, id. at 214, and we limited our “necessarily narrow” holding to those rare mixed-motive cases in which the plaintiff’s lack of baseline qualifications is “capable of objective determination before discovery,” as when the job requires consideration of a license or similar prerequisite, id. at 215. Thus, that opinion expressly recognized that the prima facie case is a separate inquiry that generally cannot occur until after discovery. 14 noted that a plaintiff is not required to establish the elements of a prima facie case … . Id. at 213 (citation omitted). Instead of requiring a prima facie case, the post-Twombly pleading standard “‘simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of’ the necessary element[s].” Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Should her case progress beyond discovery, Connelly could ultimately prevail on her disparate treatment claim by proving that her status as a woman was either a “motivating” or “determinative” factor in Lane’s adverse employment action against her. Therefore, at this early stage of the proceedings, it is enough for Connelly to allege sufficient facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will uncover proof of her claims. For the same reasons, Connelly’s retaliation claim may survive Lane’s motion to dismiss if she pleads sufficient factual allegations to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the following elements: (1) she engaged in conduct protected by Title VII; (2) the employer took adverse action against her; and (3) a causal link exists between her protected conduct and the employer’s adverse action. Charlton v. Paramus Bd. of Educ., 25 F.3d 194, 201 (3d Cir. 1994).