Opinion ID: 1874198
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Excited Utterances: KRE 803(2).

Text: Michelle Roberts testified that on Saturday, April 1, 2000, in her presence, her mother called Cincinnati Bell Telephone Company to inquire about long-distance calls charged to her account, and that during the conversation she overheard her mother exclaim, Oh my God! The next night, April 2, 2000, Michelle called her mother and perceived that she was very upset. When Michelle asked her what was wrong, Roberts told Michelle that she had just had an argument with Appellant and that he had slammed the door on his way out of the house. Roberts explained that the argument occurred because she had locked Appellant's television and VCR in a bathroom in the house to induce Appellant to pay the telephone bill, but that he had refused to pay the bill because he needed the money for his car payment. Michelle then testified that she asked her mother, How did it end? and that Roberts responded that Appellant told her that she better have the TV and VCR out of the bathroom when he got home, and slammed the door. Michelle testified that she advised her mother to call the police but that Roberts told her it wouldn't do any good because there was nothing they could do. According to Michelle, Roberts remained upset during the entire conversation, which lasted approximately ten minutes. KRE 803(2) allows admission of hearsay statements relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition. The eight most significant criteria for determining whether a statement qualifies under KRE 803(2) are: (1) the lapse in time between the main act and the declaration; (2) the opportunity or likelihood of fabrication; (3) the inducement to fabrication; (4) the actual excitement of the declarant; (5) the place of the declaration; (6) the presence, in that place, of visible results of the act to which the utterance relates; (7) whether the utterance was made in response to a question; and (8) whether the declaration was against interest or self-serving. Jarvis v. Commonwealth, 960 S.W.2d 466, 470 (Ky.1998). The testimony as to the Oh my God exclamation was not even hearsay, as it was not offered to establish its own truth. KRE 801(c). Even if that were not so, however, the exclamation, itself, was a self-proving excited utterance. The April 2, 2000, telephone conversation took place shortly after a heated argument between Roberts and Appellant, [3] and Roberts remained at the place where the argument occurred when she made the utterances. Most importantly, Roberts remained upset from the argument throughout the ten-minute conversation, indicating no opportunity to reflect and falsify. See Honaker v. Crutchfield, 247 Ky. 495, 57 S.W.2d 502, 504 (1933) (`Spontaneity,' as distinguished from the mere matter of time, has come to be considered the determining factor [in the excited utterance analysis].). It is not controlling that the declarations were in response to questioning by Michelle where, as here, the questions were brief and not suggestive, and the declarant remained agitated throughout the entire discussion. See Estes v. Commonwealth, 744 S.W.2d 421, 426 (Ky. 1987), abrogated on other grounds by Slaven v. Commonwealth, 962 S.W.2d 845, 851 (Ky.1997); see also United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 85-86 (8th Cir.1980). The trial court's finding that Roberts's statements to Michelle during their telephone conversation were excited utterances was supported by substantial evidence, thus was not clearly erroneous.