Opinion ID: 6378
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mullins's Individual Contentions

Text: Mullins contends that the district court erroneously refused to invalidate for the purpose of sentencing four state felony convictions to which he had pleaded guilty on November 24, 1986. Three of these four convictions were for violations of the Texas Controlled Substances Act; the fourth conviction was for theft.6 The violations of the Controlled Substances Act were serious drug 6 Mullins has two other felony convictions--a 1974 conviction for delivery of marijuana and a 1976 conviction for the sale of marijuana--that he does not challenge. As noted below, a person who has been convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and has three or more prior serious drug offenses, is subject to an enhanced sentence under the 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). All five of Mullins's prior drug convictions meet the statutory definition of a serious drug offense; thus, all five of these convictions were counted towards application of § 924(e). If Mullins's attack on the four 1986 felony convictions has merit (particularly the three counts for violating the Texas Controlled Substances Act), then he would have only two serious drug offenses, and § 924(e) would not be applicable. 13 offenses under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), and were thus used to enhance Mullins's sentence under that law.7 Mullins maintains that these convictions were constitutionally invalid because his guilty pleas were not voluntarily and intelligently given. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). Specifically, he argues that he never actually declared that he was guilty of the four offenses, that he was not adequately advised of the nature of the charges against him, and that a sufficient factual basis for his guilty pleas did not exist. The district court held a hearing concerning the constitutional validity of Mullins's 1986 convictions.8 At this hearing, the district court examined a copy of the transcript of 7 Section 924(e) provides: In the case of a person who violates section 922(g) of this title and has three previous convictions by any court referred to in section 922(g)(1) of this title for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions different from one another, such person shall be fined not more than $25,000 and imprisoned not less than fifteen years, and . . . such person shall not be eligible for parole with respect to the sentence imposed under this subsection. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). Furthermore, although Mullins's initial offense level was 24, because Mullins was subject to an enhanced sentence as an armed career criminal under § 924(e), his adjusted offense level was required to be 33. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4(b). 8 In such a hearing, the government has the initial burden of submitting evidence of past convictions that expose the defendant to punishment under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). Unless such evidence reveals unconstitutionality on its face, it will suffice to prove the existence of valid convictions. Once the government establishes the fact of the prior convictions, the defendant must then prove the constitutional invalidity of any conviction that he or she attacks by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Barlow, 17 F.3d 85, __ (5th Cir. 1994). The district court's factual findings will be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. 14 the November 24, 1986 state court arraignment and sentencing hearing. The district court determined that Mullins had knowingly and intelligently pleaded guilty to the four challenged state court convictions. Agreeing with the district court below, we conclude that Mullins's state court guilty pleas were properly accepted. The record reflects that Mullins voluntarily and intelligently pleaded guilty and had an understanding of the rights that he waived and the consequences of his pleas. Mullins's first argument is that since he never actually declared that he was guilty of the four offenses, he never entered a valid plea of guilty to the four crimes.9 However, an examination of the record belies Mullins's contention that he did not plead guilty. In the state court proceeding, the court first informed Mullins of the nature and elements of the offenses with which he was charged and determined that he understood the charges against him. The court then questioned Mullins as follows: THE COURT: Papers that are filed in your cases indicate to the Court that when you are arraigned you will plead guilty, is that true? MULLINS: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Are you pleading guilty of your own free will and accord? 9 This argument is premised on the proposition that, in order for there to be a valid plea of guilty, a defendant must personally utter the word Guilty after the court asks How do you plead? We have found no cases that contain such a holding. Instead, our review of the case law demonstrates that there is no fixed colloquy, no set sequence or number of questions and answers, no minimum length of the hearing, no talismanic language that is required to be used in guilty-plea hearings. Stewart v. Peters, 958 F.2d 1379, 1384 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 239 (1992). 15 MULLINS: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Has anyone promised you anything, coerced you or threatened you or done any violence to you to make you plead guilty in any of these four cases? MULLINS: No, sir. The court then informed Mullins of the range of punishment that he was facing for each crime. Next, Mullins's own attorney questioned him: Q: Michael, you are the same person named in these four indictments, is that correct? A. Right. Q: Did I explain to you your right to have separate jury trials in these cases? A: Right. Q: I had your permission to give up those rights? A: Yes, sir. Q: And in entering you [sic] plea of guilty, have I had sufficient time to go over the facts of the cases with you? A: Yes, sir. The court then admitted a signed Judicial Confession for each crime. In these confessions, Mullins waived his constitutional rights and confessed to committing the crimes alleged in the four indictments. Later, the prosecutor questioned Mullins: Q: You signed a judicial confession in each of the four cases? A. Yes, I guess I did, I did, yes. Q: Did you commit the offenses as those confessions say you did? A: Yes. 16 These colloquies, when coupled with the written confession that Mullins signed for each offense, demonstrate that the defendant did in fact plead guilty to the four charges against him. In the context of this case, it is of no consequence that Mullins did not specifically utter the words I am guilty. Although this is plainly the better course, we do not require such a talismanic incantation, so long as the language used is expressive of the defendant's culpability. Furthermore, a review of the state court arraignment and sentencing hearing also reveals that Mullins's remaining contentions cannot withstand scrutiny. The record reveals that Mullins was adequately advised of the nature of the charges against him and that there was a sufficient factual basis for his guilty pleas. Finally, at his federal sentencing hearing, Mullins claimed to be high on heroin when he entered his 1986 guilty pleas. However, at the federal hearing, Mullins acknowledged that, during his state hearing, he understood that he was pleading guilty to four separate counts, that he signed separate confessions for each offense, and that he committed each of the offenses with which he was charged. Mullins also acknowledged that he was telling the truth at the state sentencing hearing. Mullins has failed to show that any drugs that he may have been taking so affected him that he was incapable of making a voluntary and intelligent waiver of his trial rights. Cf. Godinez v. Moran, 113 S. Ct. 2680 (1993) (test of mental competency to plead guilty is whether the defendant has 17 a sufficient present ability to consult with a lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.). In sum, we conclude that the district court did not err when it concluded that Mullins had knowingly and intelligently waived his rights and validly pleaded guilty to the charges against him.