Opinion ID: 2344436
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion to Suppress Results of Blood Test

Text: The State next contends that the trial court erred in suppressing the evidence of the defendant's blood test results. As noted above, when reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we defer to the trial court's factual findings unless they lack support in the record or are clearly erroneous, and we review the trial court's legal conclusions de novo. Johnston, 150 N.H. at 451, 839 A.2d 830. We confine our analysis to the State Constitution because neither party makes a federal constitutional claim. State v. Stern, 150 N.H. 705, 708, 846 A.2d 64 (2004). We rely upon federal cases only to aid in our analysis. Id. Withdrawing blood without a warrant and without consent is a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and under Part I, Article 19 of the New Hampshire Constitution. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 768, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966); Stern, 150 N.H. at 708-09, 846 A.2d 64. Warrantless searches are prohibited unless they fall within the narrow confines of a judicially crafted exception. See Stern, 150 N.H. at 708, 846 A.2d 64. The State bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a search falls within one of these exceptions. Id. Here, the State contends that the warrantless search was justified by exigent circumstances. Exigent circumstances refer to those situations in which law enforcement agents will be unable or unlikely to effectuate an arrest, search, or seizure, for which probable cause exists, unless they act swiftly and, without seeking prior judicial authorization. State v. Graca, 142 N.H. 670, 673, 708 A.2d 393 (1998) (quotation omitted). Whether exigent circumstances exist is judged by the totality of the circumstances and is largely a question of fact for the trial court, which we will not disturb unless clearly erroneous. Stern, 150 N.H. at 709, 846 A.2d 64. The exigent circumstances exception is satisfied when: (1) the police have probable cause; and (2) the delay caused by obtaining a search warrant would create a substantial threat of imminent danger to life or public safety or likelihood that evidence will be destroyed. Stern, 150 N.H. at 708-09, 846 A.2d 64. The trial court found, and the parties do not dispute, that probable cause existed for seizing the defendant's blood. Thus, we only address whether the delay caused by obtaining a search warrant would create a likelihood that the evidence would have been destroyed. We address first the defendant's contention that the issue has not been preserved. The defendant argues that the State is barred from arguing exigent circumstances because the State failed to present evidence of exigent circumstances during the hearing. Specifically, the defendant argues that the State failed to present evidence that drugs metabolize such that a delay in seizing the defendant's blood would likely have resulted in the destruction of evidence. The metabolization of drugs, however, was addressed in the trial court's order and in the State's motion for reconsideration. Therefore, because the evidentiary foundation for the issue is in the record and the trial court had an opportunity to correct any error, the matter has been preserved for appeal. State v. Tselios, 134 N.H. 405, 407, 593 A.2d 243 (1991). The trial court found that the State failed to prove exigent circumstances because it did not present evidence that the levels of the drug in the defendant's blood would dissipate so rapidly that Booth could not have obtained a warrant. Also, the trial court found it relevant that Booth did not attempt to locate a magistrate given the late hour. As to the first issue, we have previously noted that alcohol is metabolized in the body and any significant delay in taking a breathalyzer test may deprive the State of an accurate indication of the driver's condition and could result in the loss of evidence. State v. Schneider, 124 N.H. 242, 245, 470 A.2d 887 (1983). We see no reason to reach a different conclusion with regard to controlled drugs. Making a distinction between the ingestion of alcohol and that of drugs is a needless refinement and distinction. People v. Ritchie, 130 Cal.App.3d 455, 181 Cal.Rptr. 773, 775 (1982). Although some drugs may be detectable for long enough that police can obtain a warrant, police officers cannot know with certainty which drugs are affecting suspects, and even if a suspect discloses that he took a particular drug, he may be lying. See, e.g., United States v. Edmo, 140 F.3d 1289, 1291 (9th Cir.1998) (defendant told officers he consumed methamphetamine and cocaine but urine test revealed only the presence of marijuana). A clear majority of jurisdictions that have addressed the issue make no distinction between the metabolization of alcohol and controlled drugs. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 623, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989); Edmo, 140 F.3d at 1292; State v. Strong, 493 N.W.2d 834, 837 (Iowa 1992); Holloman v. State, 820 So.2d 52, 55 (Miss.Ct. App.2002); State v. Hanson, 588 N.W.2d 885, 893 (S.D.1999); Ritchie, 181 Cal.Rptr. at 775. Today, we join that majority. As for the trial court's second concern, it noted that although obtaining a search warrant at night creates delay, Booth should have attempted to locate a magistrate. When an officer is trying to obtain a blood sample at night and the evidence is time sensitive, however, locating a magistrate risks destruction of the evidence. State v. Wong, 125 N.H. 610, 630, 486 A.2d 262 (1984). Moreover, it is common knowledge that a warrant is considerably more difficult to obtain at night than during working hours. Id. Here, this difficulty was even more pronounced because it was late at night on a holiday weekend. After reviewing the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the trial court's finding of no exigent circumstances was unsupported by the evidence. Reversed and remanded.