Opinion ID: 1127695
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The determination as an enforcement decision committed to agency discretion

Text: Citing Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 105 S.Ct. 1649, 84 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985), and Vick v. Board of Electrical Examiners, 626 P.2d 90 (Alaska 1981), ADF & G and the Commission argue that the agency's determination that Meyer's case is not supported by substantial evidence is presumptively unreviewable because that determination is an exercise of prosecutorial discretion. This presumption was first articulated by the Supreme Court in Heckler, where the Court reasoned that even where the legislature has expressed no intent to preclude review, review is not available under the federal APA if the statute is drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency's exercise of discretion. 470 U.S. at 831, 105 S.Ct. at 1655. According to the Court, this presumption helps avoid the problem of how to apply an abuse of discretion standard when there are no judicially manageable standards available for judging how and when an agency should exercise its discretion. Id. We reject the argument of ADF & G and the Commission that the presumption of unreviewability applies here. In Vick the question was whether a board decision not to process an accusation against a licensee was subject to judicial review. We stated concerning this issue: Questions of law and fact, of policy, of practicality, and of the allocation of an agency's resources all come into play in making such a decision. The weighing of these elements is the very essence of what is meant when one speaks of an agency exercising its discretion. 626 P.2d at 93. We further stated that [w]hen a matter falls within an area traditionally recognized as within an agency's discretionary power, courts are less inclined to intrude than when the agency has acted in a novel or questionable fashion. Id. Unlike Vick or Heckler, Meyer's case does not involve the exercise of prosecutorial discretion at all. The statute here provides that if the executive director or designated staff member conducting the investigation finds substantial evidence of discrimination, the investigator shall ... try to eliminate the discrimination complained of by conference, conciliation, and persuasion. AS 18.80.110. If the problem is not eliminated informally, the Commission shall conduct a hearing and issue an order at the completion of the hearing. AS 18.80.120, .130(a). Thus, the statute grants no discretion to discontinue the process once the investigator finds substantial evidence of discrimination, unlike the statutes at issue in Vick and Heckler. [10] This case is instead closely akin to Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 95 S.Ct. 1851, 44 L.Ed.2d 377 (1975), which the Supreme Court reaffirmed in Heckler. The statute at issue in Dunlop provided: The Secretary [of Labor] shall investigate such complaint [by a union member] and, if he finds probable cause to believe that a violation ... has occurred, ... he shall ... bring a civil action.... 421 U.S. at 563 n. 2, 95 S.Ct. at 1855 n. 2. After investigating the complainant's claims, the Secretary of Labor declined to file suit and the complainant sought judicial review under the APA. The Supreme Court held that review was available and that the Secretary's decision not to file suit was not an unreviewable exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Id. at 567 n. 7, 95 S.Ct. at 1858 n. 7. The Heckler Court stated that in Dunlop, [t]he statute being administered quite clearly withdrew discretion from the agency and provided guidelines for exercise of its enforcement power. 470 U.S. at 834, 105 S.Ct. at 1657. The Heckler Court thus found Dunlop consistent with a general presumption of unreviewability of decisions not to enforce. Id. In Simpson v. District of Columbia Office of Human Rights, 597 A.2d 392 (D.C. 1991), the court held that prosecutorial discretion was not an obstacle to review: In the present case, however, OHR was not purporting to exercise prosecutorial discretion, nor did it reject Ms. Simpson's complaint on the ground that it lacked resources for enforcement. Rather, OHR found that there was no probable cause to believe that the Human Rights Act had been violated. Whether right or wrong, that determination was not one of the kind to which the doctrine embraced by the District can reasonably be applied. We conclude the OHR's determination is subject to judicial review. Id. at 398-99. As Meyer correctly argues, the statute now before us provides no reason to dismiss a case other than a lack of substantial evidence. ADF & G and the Commission argue that the Commission staff and executive director have wide discretion to determine whether an allegation of discrimination is supported by substantial evidence. ADF & G makes the following argument: Whether a violation has occurred, whether the Commission's resources are best spent on one violation or another, whether the Commission is likely to succeed if it acts, whether the particular enforcement action requested best fits the Commission's overall policies, and whether the Commission has enough resources to undertake the action at all are issues that the Commission, and not the courts, should decide. The Commission also argues that these discretionary issues are policy reasons why this court should find the decision of the Commission staff or executive director to be unreviewable: The Commission must have discretion to decide whether to prosecute. The Commission has an important policy interest in the results of each of its investigations because of its role in developing the body of civil rights law in Alaska and because of its statutory obligation to enforce Alaska's civil rights laws. The Commission must employ its limited resources in the most effective manner possible in order to meet these obligations. The Commission further argues that it will become nothing more than a complaint taking agency if it cannot exercise prosecutorial discretion in deciding whether a claim is supported by substantial evidence. These arguments strongly support judicial review of staff or executive director determinations that there is no substantial evidence. These passages indicate, as the Commission confirmed during oral argument, that the staff or executive director, contrary to statutory mandate, is closing cases not for lack of evidence of discrimination but to control budget and docket. We are sympathetic to the Commission's claim of lack of resources. We recognize that it might be highly desirable for the Commission staff to have the power to administratively dismiss cases which have individual merit but no widespread impact. However, if the Commission wants its staff to have this discretionary authority, it must be obtained from the legislature, not the judiciary. We cannot import these social, political, and economic concerns into the clear scheme of the existing statute. An opportunity for judicial review is also necessary because the federal EEOC may, and in some circumstances must, accord substantial weight to findings made by state authorities. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b); Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 470 n. 8, 474-75, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 1892 n. 8, 1893-94, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982); Cottrell v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 590 F.2d 836, 838 (10th Cir.1979). [11] Furthermore, such findings may affect workers' perceptions of potential employers and vice versa. [12] Finally, as noted above, Alaska's anti-discrimination statutory scheme is a mandate to seek out and eradicate discrimination in employment, and did not simply create a complaint-taking agency. Hotel, Motel, Restaurant, Constr. Camp Employees & Bartenders Union Local 879 v. Thomas, 551 P.2d 942, 945 (Alaska 1976). A human rights complainant in Alaska has the statutory right to expect that his or her claim will be decided on the merits, not pre-determined by budgetary constraints.