Opinion ID: 1374852
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Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Protection of Other First Amendment Activities

Text: The second rationale supporting the right to freedom of association is the protection of the exercise of other First Amendment activities. Board of Dir. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 544, 107 S.Ct. 1940, 1945, 95 L.Ed.2d 474 (1987); Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622, 104 S.Ct. at 3252. [I]mplicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment [is] a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious and cultural ends. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622, 104 S.Ct. at 3252. When a state attempts to interfere with individuals' selection of those with whom they wish to join in a common endeavor, freedom of association in both of its forms may be implicated. Id. at 618, 104 S.Ct. at 3249. I submit that freedom of association in both of its forms is implicated in this case with respect to the Moose Lodges. II. GOVERNMENT LICENSURE AND THE RIGHT OF FREE ASSOCIATION The majority also argues that the highly regulated nature of liquor distribution in Utah warrants the state's infringement of the right of free association because by accepting a liquor license, the Moose voluntarily acquired a public status and their private associational characteristics are therefore irrelevant. That conclusion has been rejected by the United States Supreme Court. The state's power to regulate liquor does not supersede all other provisions of the United States Constitution. The Twenty-first Amendment, which repealed Prohibition and granted states the power to regulate liquor, in essence created an exception to the normal operation of the Commerce Clause. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 205-06, 97 S.Ct. 451, 461-62, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976). That amendment was never intended to elevate state power to regulate liquor above rights guaranteed under the Constitution. Id.; see also California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 115, 93 S.Ct. 390, 395, 34 L.Ed.2d 342 (1972); Celebrity Club Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n, 657 P.2d 1293, 1299 (Utah 1982). Once passing beyond consideration of the Commerce Clause, the relevance of the Twenty-first Amendment to other constitutional provisions becomes increasingly doubtful. As one commentator has remarked: Neither the text nor the history of the Twenty-first Amendment suggests that it qualifies individual rights protected by the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment where the sale or use of liquor is concerned. Craig, 429 U.S. at 206, 97 S.Ct. at 461 (quoting Paul Brest, Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking, Cases and Materials 258 (1975)). Thus, notwithstanding its broad regulatory power over the importation, distribution, and sale of liquor, the state may not infringe other constitutionally protected rights without a compelling interest that arises out of the effects that liquor consumption may have on the public health, morals, and safety. See California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 93 S.Ct. 390, 34 L.Ed.2d 342 (1972) (holding that a regulation prohibiting licensed bars or nightclubs from displaying, either live or on film, certain sexually explicit entertainment did not violate federal constitution). In Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173, 92 S.Ct. 1965, 1971, 32 L.Ed.2d 627 (1972), the Court held that a state liquor license did not transform a private association that held such a license, a Moose Lodge, into a public or state entity, thereby empowering the state to ban the lodge's discriminatory practices. Like the statutory scheme in Utah, the statutes in Moose Lodge that governed the sale of liquor imposed pervasive regulation with respect to private clubs that had liquor licenses and limited the maximum number of licenses available to private clubs. Notwithstanding the pervasive regulation, the Court stated: [We have] never held, of course, that discrimination by an otherwise private entity would be violative of the Equal Protection Clause if the private entity receives any sort of benefit or service at all from the State, or if it is subject to state regulation in any degree whatever. . . . . ... However detailed this type of regulation may be in some particulars, it cannot be said to in any way foster or encourage racial discrimination. Nor can it be said to make the State in any realistic sense a partner or even a joint venturer in the club's enterprise. Id. at 173, 176-77, 92 S.Ct. at 1971, 1973-74 (emphasis added). In short, the recipient of a state liquor license does not lose its status as a private entity and become an arm of the state by virtue of the license. Notwithstanding the state's interest in eliminating discrimination in publicly offered accommodations, goods, and services, including the disbursement of liquor, the state has no legitimate interest in overriding associational rights with respect to private organizations. Beynon did not hold that the Utah Civil Rights Act applied to all private club liquor licensees regardless of the nature of the private association and the right of its members to freedom of association. That issue simply was not before the Court. If the Legislature had attempted to make that Act apply to all associations, it would have violated the constitutional right to associational freedom of groups that were truly private. The majority asserts that Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409, 88 S.Ct. 2186, 20 L.Ed.2d 1189 (1968), United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 86 S.Ct. 1170, 16 L.Ed.2d 239 (1966), Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 85 S.Ct. 377, 13 L.Ed.2d 290 (1964), and Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 85 S.Ct. 348, 13 L.Ed.2d 258 (1964), stand for the proposition that when private individuals enter the public marketplace or work place they are transformed into publicly regulated entities. Therefore, the majority argues, because the Moose Lodges are in the public sphere and in the stream of commerce, they voluntarily surrendered the rights they had in their private lives to discriminate. The majority misconstrues those cases; they do not stand for the proposition that all entities in the public sphere surrender their right to freedom of association. In Katzenbach, Heart of Atlanta, and Guest, the Court held that businesses that provided public accommodations could not discriminate on the basis of race. [2] In Jones, the issue before the Court was whether Congress had power under the Thirteenth Amendment to prohibit private individuals from refusing to sell or rent real property on the basis of race. The Court held that the Amendment empowered Congress to secure for all citizens the right to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, and convey property. These rights were fundamental to the maintenance of freedom.... A man who enjoys the civil rights mentioned in [42 U.S.C. § 1982] cannot be reduced to slavery. 392 U.S. at 443-44, 88 S.Ct. at 2205-06. Again, the case involved a situation in which a private individual, while opening up a service or a sale to the public, attempted to discriminate on the basis of race. Of course, a private individual or privately owned business that offers service to the public may be prohibited from discriminating. It does not follow that a private association that does not open itself to the public and exists only to provide congenial social relationships can be denied the right to be selective in its membership criteria. The majority also argues that allowing private groups that sell liquor to discriminate lessens the availability of liquor over the counter to certain classes, such as minorities and women, and could result in the total exclusion of such groups from important business opportunities. The argument is untenable. Indeed, just such an argument was rejected in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 177, 92 S.Ct. 1965, 1973, 32 L.Ed.2d 627 (1972). There is absolutely no evidence in this case that there is any impediment to minorities in obtaining liquor. The majority simply conjures the abstract possibility of such a problem. The limited number of available private liquor club licenses falls for short of conferring on private associations anything like a monopoly in dispensing over-the-counter liquor in Utah. Furthermore, but for today's decision, any group of people could apply for a private liquor club license. The Act provides for restaurant liquor licenses in numbers greater than private liquor licenses for the storage, sale, and consumption of liquor on premises operated as public restaurants. Utah Code Ann. § 32A-4-101. Restaurant liquor licensees are subject to substantially the same operational restrictions as those imposed on private club liquor licensees. Cf. Utah Code. Ann. §§ 32A-4-206, 32A-5-107. Nothing prohibits any group or class of persons from entertaining business clients and personal friends in these establishments or denies them important social opportunities that accompany the regulated sale and consumption of liquor. The majority further asserts that its decision does not impose an unconstitutional condition upon the Elks or the Moose because they  voluntarily surrendered their private status by accepting a liquor license, and thus because its ruling affects only that portion of petitioners' activities that are in the public sphere, it does not impinge upon the right to free association, a private right. (Emphasis in original.) This analysis begs the following question: Does the regulatory scheme impose the condition of giving up the constitutional rights of freedom of association for the receipt of a benefit from the state? Allowing a state to bestow benefits only on those willing to forego a constitutional right can be fundamentally destructive of our constitution fabric. The Constitution was designed to protect those who wish to exercise their constitutional rights, even in ways contrary to the will of the majority. Except in unusual circumstances, benefits or privileges cannot be granted on condition that a person surrender a constitutional right. Although a state may deny benefits or privileges for a number of reasons, [i]t may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 2697, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972) (invalidating unconstitutional condition in public employment); see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (in welfare payments); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968) (in public employment); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 1795, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) (in unemployment compensation); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 78 S.Ct. 1332, 2 L.Ed.2d 1460 (1958) (in tax exemption); Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 593-94, 46 S.Ct. 605, 607, 70 L.Ed. 1101 (1926) (in public highway access). [I]f the government could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited. This would allow the government to `produce a result which [it] could not command directly.'  Perry, 408 U.S. at 597, 92 S.Ct. at 2697 (emphasis added) (quoting Speiser, 357 U.S. at 526, 78 S.Ct. at 1342); see Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 405, 83 S.Ct. at 1795 ([C]onditions upon public benefits cannot be sustained if they so operate, whatever their purpose, as to inhibit or deter the exercise of First Amendment freedoms.). The heart of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions denies the government the power to grant a privilege on condition of surrendering a constitutional right, except in exceptional circumstances. In Frost, the Court explained: If the state may compel the surrender of one constitutional right as a condition of its favor, it may, in like manner, compel a surrender of all. It is inconceivable that guaranties embedded in the Constitution of the United States may thus be manipulated out of existence. Frost, 271 U.S. at 593-94, 46 S.Ct. at 607 (emphasis added). I submit that the state has no legitimate interest in dictating the membership practices of private associations in general, or the Moose Lodges in particular. Contrary to the majority's assertion, it is firmly established that private associations do not lose their private status and become instrumentalities of the state merely because they receive a license from the state. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173, 92 S.Ct. 1965, 1971, 32 L.Ed.2d 627 (1972); see also Kiwanis Int'l v. Ridgewood Kiwanis Club, 806 F.2d 468, 472, 477-78 (3d Cir.1986) (private club had right to enforce discriminatory trademark licensing agreement with local club regarding four Kiwanis service marks). Kiwanis Club of Great Neck, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Kiwanis Int'l, 83 Misc.2d 1075, 374 N.Y.S.2d 265, 268-69 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1975) (private club had right to discriminate in its membership, even though it received a tax exemption). As Roberts made clear, it is the characteristics of the association which dictate whether it is subject to laws regarding public accommodations. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618-20, 104 S.Ct. at 3249-51. The majority's decision, simply put, attempts to regulate that which the state has no power to regulate directly. It accomplishes this by granting a state-conferred privilege on condition that a constitutional right is relinquished. The majority states that by accepting a liquor license, private associations perform a quasi-public service and become public for purposes of the Civil Rights Act. They are free to remain private and not subject themselves to the state's membership criteria as long as they forego a liquor license, but they may not receive a liquor license and retain their right to freedom of association. That rationale, I submit, would justify a host of unconstitutional state intrusions on individual rights. Such intrusions cannot be supported on the premise that the state can regulate that which it otherwise has no power to regulate so long as the recipient of a state privilege voluntarily relinquishes a constitutional right which the state seeks to defeat. This Court ought not, in my view, endorse such state paternalism in the granting of privileges on condition of yielding a right. I submit the Commission erred in determining that the Moose Lodges violated the Civil Rights Act. I would reverse the Commission's decision suspending the private club liquor licenses of the Moose Lodges. RUSSON, J., concurs in Associate Chief Justice STEWART's opinion.