Opinion ID: 2160381
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Assault on Alice Fisher

Text: The trial court held that Alice Fisher could not recover for the negligent acts or omissions of the police department and the officers involved because, as a matter of law, she failed to establish that there was owed to her a special duty. It is, of course, well settled that a government and its agents are under no general duty to provide public services to any particular individual citizen. Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d 1, 4 (D.C.1981) (en banc) (citations omitted). Or, in the context of this case, when a municipality or other governmental entity undertakes to furnish police services, it assumes a duty only to the public at large and not to individual members of the community. Id. (citations omitted). The special duty doctrine recognizes an exception to this rule. The general duty owed to the public may become a specific duty owed to an individual if the police and the individual are in a special relationship different than that existing between the police and citizens generally. Id. In Morgan v. District of Columbia, 468 A.2d 1306, 1315 (D.C.1983) (en banc), this court expounded on this principle, saying: Absent a special relationship . . . the police may not be held liable for failure to protect a particular individual from harm caused by criminal conduct. A special relationship exists if the police employ an individual in aid of law enforcement, but does not exist merely because an individual requests, or a police officer promises to provide protection. Where the police by their actions affirmatively undertake to protect an individual under circumstances creating a special relationship or there is a statute or regulation which mandates protection of a particular class, and where the individual justifiably relies upon such undertaking of the police, or the statute or regulations, the special relationship is sufficient to support a finding of liability. (Footnote omitted.) This case, then, turns on whether the police officers involved specifically undertook to protect Alice Fisher under circumstances creating a special relationship and, if so, whether she justifiably relied upon any such undertaking. In framing a special relationship appellants point principally to the heightened vulnerability of Mrs. Fisher due to her husband's unlawful arrest and Officer Poland's negligent response to her plight. Citing Morgan, supra, 468 A.2d at 1312, appellants submit that the police raise[d] significantly the quotient of risk facing Fisher and that therefore it was error for the trial court to hold, as a matter of law, that no special duty was owed to her. While, at first glance, this position is alluring, it cannot be sustained. In this jurisdiction, the special duty doctrine does not test whether some police conduct raised significantly the quotient of risk to a particular citizen. More precisely, in the appropriate case we look to see whether the police have acted  on behalf of a particular citizen in such a way as to raise significantly the quotient of risk over and above the risks assumed by every other member of the community. . . . Id. (emphasis added). Thus, before a special duty can be imposed it must first be shown that the police acted on behalf of the individual to whom, it is argued, the special duty was owed. It is for this reason that appellants' heightened vulnerability argument must fail. The arrest of Robert Fisher, whether lawful or unlawful, was not action undertaken by the police on his wife's behalf. Consequently, she cannot successfully rest upon his purported unlawful arrest to establish the requisite special relationship. [5] A more difficult question is whether the conduct of Officer Poland, who stopped to investigate the problems of Mrs. Fisher, Boyle, and Duckett, gave rise to a special duty. To be sure, the mere fact that he stopped and inquired of their situation is insufficient to create a special relationship. Moreover, no such relationship arose as a result of Mrs. Fisher's request for transportation to the station, for it is also settled that a special relationship does not come into being simply because an individual requests assistance from the police. Morgan, supra, 468 A.2d at 1313 (citations omitted). The central question, then, becomes whether Officer Poland took affirmative action to protect or assist Alice Fisher under circumstances creating a special relationship and, if so, whether she justifiably relied upon his undertaking. See id. at 1315 (quoted supra ). The facts viewed favorably to appellants suggest that at some point after Duckett stopped the Fishers' truck, the three women got out and approached Poland, who by then had gotten out of his car. Duckett explained their predicament to Poland and then left to drive herself, in her car, to the station. Although Duckett told Poland that she was leaving her sisters in his care, Poland did not verbally agree to this undertaking. Shortly thereafter, Fisher and Boyle asked Poland to drive them to the station but he refused, giving them directions to the precinct instead. Upset that Poland would not assent to their request, Fisher then told Poland to leave. [6] After further discussion, Poland directed Boyle to park the Fishers' truck in a nearby lot. [7] She did so, leaving Fisher and Poland standing together talking. When Boyle returned, both were gone. Fisher was later assaulted. We cannot infer on this record that Officer Poland took affirmative action to protect or assist Fisher once Boyle left them to park the Fishers' truck. Appellants have posited no facts, in their pleadings or otherwise, which suggest that to be true. Absent such an allegation, this case presents no tenable basis for application of the special duty exception. In sum, it appears that we would have to strain the special duty doctrine to find a special relationship in this case. As precarious as her situation was following her husband's arrest, under these circumstances police would ordinarily have no obligation to provide individual protection. As the trial court correctly observed, [Alice] Fisher and her sisters were citizens on the street entitled to police protection to the same extent as any other members of the general public. Thus, even though Mrs. Fisher may have been stranded as a result of police conduct, or misconduct as the case may be, no special relationship can be found since there was no affirmative undertaking by any of the officers involved to protect or assist her and the circumstances were not such as would otherwise create a special relationship. Therefore, summary judgment on this claim was properly entered.