Opinion ID: 4531772
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Objections Raised by Resnick

Text: Like Lacerda, Resnick also raises several additional issues on appeal. He claims that (1) the government suppressed material evidence; (2) the District Court miscalculated the number of his victims and the loss amount for those victims, and so erred at sentencing; (3) his due process rights were violated when his sentencing hearing was delayed; and (4) the District Court’s restitution order was procedurally unsound and substantively unreasonable. We will address each argument in turn.
Violation Resnick asserts that the government violated its obligations under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by withholding evidence which he might have used to impeach Special Agent Mesisca. Specifically, Resnick claims that the government withheld the documents that were the basis of a victim’s, Dorothy Gerlach’s, FD-3027 and withheld Gerlach’s later-produced “Declaration of Victim’s Losses.” Resnick preserved this argument by raising it to the District Court in a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. The District Court correctly denied that motion. Under Brady, the government has a duty to disclose “evidence that is favorable to the defense and material to the defendant’s guilt or punishment.” Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. 73, 75 (2012). Thus, there are three prerequisites to a Brady violation: (1) the government must have failed to disclose evidence; (2) that evidence must have been favorable to the defendant; and (3) that evidence must have been material. 7 The FD-302, commonly referred to simply as a “302”, is the form commonly used by FBI agents to summarize witnesses’ statements and interviews. 26 Evidence is “material” only if there is a reasonable probability that its disclosure would have led to a different outcome at trial, and so undermines confidence in the verdict. Turner v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1885, 1893 (2017). The evidence Resnick claims was withheld fails to satisfy each of the three prerequisites. Contrary to Resnick’s assertions, the government did not withhold the evidence. The documents underlying Gerlach’s 302, labeled as “DG-3”, were disclosed before trial. The Declaration of Victim’s Losses, “DG-2”, was received by the probation office in May 2013, but not forwarded to the prosecutor until late in 2014. The prosecutor disclosed the declaration with other documents in January 2015. Resnick is correct that the failure to disclose information known only to police investigators can still implicate the prosecution, even when the prosecutor was unaware of the information. Youngblood v. West Virginia, 547 U.S. 867, 869–70 (2006). But probation officers in the federal system are not police investigators; they are “the court’s eyes and ears and provide information and recommendations to the court.” United States v. Amatel, 346 F.3d 278, 279 (2d Cir. 2003). We will not impute to the prosecution the Probation Office’s failure in 2013 to disclose Gerlach’s “Declaration of Losses” to Resnick. But even if we did impute to the prosecution the Probation Office’s failure to disclose, it still would not constitute a Brady violation. Far from being material evidence that could have undermined Resnick’s conviction, this evidence reinforces the jury’s verdict. Resnick admitted that “he pitched a bank settlement deal to Ms. Gerlach.” App. 7737:19–21. There were two parts to the bank settlement pitch: VOG promised to help the victims pay off their debt and keep their timeshare property, and then, in a bait and switch, sold them a second timeshare through VOG. Gerlach’s declaration, which expresses confusion over not receiving points she was promised, highlights that bait and switch. Thus, the declaration was not exculpatory; it was inculpatory. We conclude that the government did not violate its obligations under Brady. 27
Violate His Sixth Amendment or Due Process Rights Resnick next claims that his speedy sentencing rights were violated when his sentence was not imposed for more than two-and-a-half years following his conviction. We once recognized a right to a speedy sentencing hearing under both the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause. See Burckett v. Cunningham, 826 F.2d 1208, 1219–21 (3d Cir. 1987). But the Supreme Court of the United States has since clarified that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to a speedy trial, not a speedy sentencing. Betterman v. Montana, 136 S. Ct. 1609, 1613 (2016). “That does not mean, however, that defendants lack any protection against undue delay at [sentencing].” Id. at 1617. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(b)(1) requires courts to “impose sentence without unnecessary delay.” Id. And, the Supreme Court noted, the convicted defendant maintains his due process rights. Id. Thus, while Betterman overruled our speedy sentencing precedent under the Sixth Amendment, our precedent under the Due Process Clause survives. Under that precedent, we apply the same framework adopted by the Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, considering: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right; and (4) any prejudice suffered by the defendant. 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). Consideration of these factors leads us to the conclusion that Resnick suffered no deprivation of his due process right to a speedy sentencing. First, the length of the delay between conviction and sentencing—more than two-and-a-half years—was substantial. This factor favors Resnick. But second, as the District Court found, three things contributed to the delay in getting to sentencing. (1) This was a very complex fraud scheme involving 18 separate defendants, and the deliberation necessary to address the scheme and its victims required time. (2) Resnick sought several continuances of his sentencing. The government, on the other hand, never requested a continuance. (3) The District Court delayed sentencing to research Resnick’s claims that 28 some of the purported victims were not really victims. So any unnecessary delays, if there were unnecessary delays, are mainly attributable to Resnick. None are attributable to the government. This factor weighs heavily against Resnick. Third, Resnick asserted his right to a speedy sentencing in a motion filed on March 3, 2016. Ironically, that motion also sought leave to serve a Rule 17(c) subpoena to obtain additional documents, which would have further delayed sentencing. (Id.) Resnick’s sentencing hearing took place on April 22, 2016, seven weeks after he filed his request. If this factor favors Resnick, it does so with little weight. Fourth and finally, Resnick asserts that the delays to his sentencing prejudiced him because the government was able to identify additional victims and adduce sufficient evidence to prove their losses by a preponderance of the evidence. We do not think this argument is well taken. Allowing the government time to identify additional victims did not affect his Sentencing Guidelines range. Resnick’s victim and loss total—whether calculated in 2014 under the initial PSR at 124 victims with $1.2 million in losses, or the government’s initial filing of 192 victims with $2.1 million in losses, or in 2015 under the government’s revised filing of 253 victims with $2.7 million in losses—always yields a 16-level enhancement. Compare U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1) (2014), with U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1) (2015). Thus, Resnick’s Guidelines range was unaffected, and he has failed to show prejudice. This factor also weighs heavily against Resnick. Taking the four factors together, we conclude that Resnick has failed to show that his due process right to a speedy sentence was violated.
Sentencing Guidelines In Fashioning Resnick’s Sentence Resnick next challenges several of the District Court’s findings at sentencing. We “review factual findings relevant to the Guidelines for clear error and … exercise plenary review over a district court’s interpretation of the Guidelines.” United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 570 (3d Cir. 2007). 29 First, Resnick claims that by adopting the government’s proposed timeline for VOG’s operations the District Court allowed the government to inflate its victim and loss figures. He argues that, because the government limited the timeframe for its evidence at trial, any victims found outside of that limited timeframe should not count. Of course, because the VOG-conspirators continued operations during their trial— through 2014—some victims arose after the government’s limited timeframe. It was appropriate for those victims to be included. And we again note that the government’s calculation of victims’ losses did not affect Resnick’s ultimate Guidelines range. The Sentencing Guideline that applies to Resnick’s fraud is § 2B1.1, covering various forms of theft. Following the 2015 amendment, a six-level enhancement should be applied when the crime “resulted in substantial financial hardship to 25 or more victims.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(C). That is the highest-level enhancement for number of victims. The definition of “substantial financial hardship” includes “suffering substantial harm to his or her ability to obtain credit.” See U.S.S.G. application notes § 4(F)(vi). As the credit ratings of all the victims of VOG were severely damaged by VOG’s schemes, Resnick began on the wrong side of that threshold. That the government ultimately identified more than 250 victims was immaterial for the Guidelines calculation. And, as discussed in section IV(B), whether using the initial victim and loss estimates in 2014, or the more comprehensive totals following the 2015 amendment, Resnick’s victims’ loss total yields the same 16-level enhancement. Second, Resnick challenges the District Court’s finding that VOG was a fraudulent enterprise from beginning to end. Resnick argues that not all VOG’s employees knew that they were part of a fraudulent scheme, so there must have been some non-fraudulent work at VOG. This conclusion does not follow from Resnick’s premise because those employees’ alleged ignorance is not imputed to Resnick and his co-defendants. A conviction for mail or wire fraud requires both objective misrepresentations and the defendant’s subjective knowledge of the misrepresentations. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343. The jury found that Resnick knowingly participated in VOG’s 30 fraud, so the argument based on others’ alleged knowledge does not help him. Resnick also argues that the finding is inconsistent with the District Court’s willingness to consider his argument that not all VOG victims were equally victimized. The District Court noted that VOG had engaged in various types of fraud. That the Court recognized that some instances of VOG’s fraud were more flagrant than others does not undermine the District Court’s overall finding that VOG was a wholly fraudulent enterprise. Rather, having carefully reviewed this case, we conclude that the Court’s finding was supported by substantial evidence and will be affirmed. Third, like Lacerda, Resnick argues that services like debt cancellation and the sale of new timeshares should be credited against the victims’ losses. We addressed this argument in section III(D)(1), and our analysis applies equally to Resnick. Cancellation was achieved only because the victims defaulted on their loans, not because of some valueadding intervention from VOG. The defaults impacted the victims’ credit ratings in significant and negative ways. The District Court was correct to not credit VOG’s alleged “services” against the losses suffered by Resnick’s victims. And like Lacerda, Resnick is not entitled to credit against his victim’s losses for payments VOG made to perpetuate its fraudulent schemes. See Hartstein, 500 F.3d at 800; Whatley, 133 F.3d at 606; Blitz, 151 F.3d at 1012. Fourth and finally, Resnick argues that, under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, refunded monies by third parties should be credited against his victim’s losses. The Guidelines provides that the victim’s loss “shall be reduced by … [t]he money returned … by the defendant or other persons acting jointly with the defendant, to the victim before the offense was detected.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(3)(E)(i) (emphasis added). Resnick argues that he is entitled to credit for refunds to victims made by “escrow compan[ies] utilized to procure third party timeshares” and other “timeshare developers.” Appellant Resnick’s Br. 71. But there is no evidence that the escrow agents and timeshare developers were “acting jointly” with Resnick, or that the refunds were made “before the offense was 31 detected.” The District Court correctly denied any credits against Resnick’s victims’ losses.
District Court’s Restitution Order Because of the many complexities of this case, restitution was delayed until sometime after sentencing. While Resnick filed a timely notice of appeal from his judgment and sentence, he never appealed from the later-entered order of restitution. Resnick now raises various challenges to the District Court’s award of restitution entered against him under 18 U.S.C. § 3663A. But the government contends that we must dismiss Resnick’s challenges because of his failure to file a separate notice of appeal from the restitution order. The government is correct. This issue raises a jurisdictional question, over which we exercise plenary review. Hamilton v. Bromley, 862 F.3d 329, 333 (3d Cir. 2017). Resolution of this question is controlled by Manrique v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1266, 1274 (2017), in which the Supreme Court held “that a defendant who wishes to appeal an order imposing restitution in a deferred restitution case must file a notice of appeal from that order.” Deferred restitution cases, the Supreme Court explained, involve two appealable judgments, not one. Id. at 1273; see also Dolan v. United States, 560 U.S. 605, 616–18 (2010). Both the statute and rules governing appeals “contemplate that the defendant will file the notice of appeal after the district court has decided the issue sought to be appealed.” Manrique, 137 S. Ct. at 1271 (emphasis original). So notices of appeal filed before the restitution order cannot be “for review” of the restitution order and are not filed timely from that order. Id. The Supreme Court held that filing a timely notice of appeal from an order of restitution was at least a mandatory claimprocessing rule, id. at 1272 (citing Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 252–53 (2008)), and when the government raises the failure to timely file the notice, our duty to dismiss the appeal is also mandatory, id. (citing Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 15, 19 (2005)). Resnick did not file a timely notice of appeal from the order of restitution, and the government has raised this failure 32 on appeal. Thus, under Manrique, Resnick at least violated a mandatory claim-processing rule and we have a mandatory duty to dismiss this issue.