Opinion ID: 2997240
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: State Statute or Regulation

Text: “The presumption in Illinois is that employment is atwill . . . .” Border, 75 F.3d at 274. The relevant statute that Ms. Crull offers to rebut this presumption is the Personnel Code. See 20 Ill. Comp. Stat. 415/1-25. The Personnel Code establishes “a system of personnel administration under the Governor, based on merit principles and scientific methods.” 20 Ill. Comp. Stat. 415/2. Its rules generally provide employees subject to its procedures a hearing prior to termination for cause. See 20 Ill. Comp. Stat. 415/8b.16 (“[The rules prepared by CMS shall provide] [f]or hearing before discharge or demotion with the prior approval of the Director of Central Management Services only for cause after appointment is completed, after the person to be discharged or demoted has been presented in writing with the reasons requesting such discharge or demotion.”). Neither party disputes that the Personnel Code provides a property interest in continued employment for the employees who 5 fall under its coverage. As we noted, Ms. Crull must be able to demonstrate that, under Illinois law, a JIB employee has a property interest in her employment. She must establish that the Personnel Code actually applies to her position. Therefore, we now consider whether the Personnel Code applies to JIB employees. 4 The district court did not address whether Ms. Crull had a property interest created by statute or regulation. 5 See Powell v. Jones, 305 N.E.2d 166, 169 (Ill. 1973); Prato v. Vallas, 771 N.E.2d 1053, 1064 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (“A public employee who may be terminated only for cause has a property interest in his employment within the meaning of the due process guarantees of the United States and Illinois Constitutions.”). 12 No. 02-4093
Article VI of the Constitution of the State of Illinois addresses the Judiciary. Within that article, Section 15 specifically speaks to the retirement and discipline of judges. Sub- section “b.” creates the JIB. See Ill. Const. art. VI, § 15(b). That section then specifies that the Supreme Court shall select two members and the Governor seven; the members shall serve for four-year terms, not to exceed eight years of service. Subsection “c.” then addresses the authority and duties of the Board and subsection “d.” provides that “[t]he Board shall adopt rules governing its procedures. It shall have subpoena power and authority to appoint and direct its staff.” Ill. Const. art. VI, § 15(d).
The purpose of the Personnel Code is “to establish for the government of the State of Illinois a system of personnel administration under the Governor, based on merit principles and scientific methods.” 20 Ill. Comp. Stat. 415/2 (emphasis added). The “Jurisdictions, exemptions” section defines the scope of the Personnel Code by stating that “[a]ll offices and positions of employment in the service of the State of Illinois shall be subject to the provisions of this Act unless exempted in this or any other Act.” 20 Ill. Comp. Stat. 415/4. Among the specifically exempted positions are:
(2) All positions under the Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, State Treasurer, State Comptroller, State Board of Education, Clerk of the Supreme Court, and Attorney General. (3) Judges, and officers and employees of the courts, and notaries public. No. 02-4093 13 (4) All officers and employees of the Illinois General Assembly, all employees of legislative commissions, all officers and employees of the Illinois Legislative Reference Bureau, the Legislative Research Unit, and the Legislative Printing Unit. 20 Ill. Comp. Stat. 415/4c.
The defendants focus on the word “under” in Section 2 of the statute. They contend that Section 2 limits the scope of the Personnel Code to only those civil service employees “under the Governor.” Correlatively, they assert that the Personnel Code does not apply to entities outside the Governor’s authority and control. Because the JIB was created under Article VI of the state constitution, the section that concerns the Judiciary, the defendants assert that the JIB is not “under the Governor” for purposes of the Personnel Code. The defendants argue that any other reasoning would bring the Personnel Code statute in conflict with the constitutional grant of authority permitting the Board to appoint and direct its staff. The application of the Personnel Code to the independent JIB would permit, according to the defendants, the legislative branch to interfere with the JIB’s constitutional authority, contrary to the Illinois Constitution. See Ill. Const. art. II, § 1 (“The legislative, executive and judicial branches are separate. No branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another.”). Ms. Crull, in contrast, asserts that 20 Ill. Comp. Stat. 415/4 applies the Personnel Code to all positions in the service of the State of Illinois except for those positions exempted from the statute. She submits that JIB employees are not exempt. Specifically, she notes that many of the exempt organizations in Section 4 are not properly considered “under” the Governor’s jurisdiction. 14 No. 02-4093
When the Personnel Code is read as a whole, it does not unambiguously state whether it applies to the JIB. Section 4, describing the “jurisdictions” and “exemptions” of the chapter, states that the code applies to all positions “in the service of the State of Illinois” unless exempted, 20 Ill. Comp. Stat. 415/4; however, Section 2, discussing the purpose of the chapter, states that the Personnel Code is to establish “a system of personnel administration under the Governor.” 20 Ill. Comp. Stat. 415/2 (emphasis added). The JIB clearly is one of the “offices and positions of employment in the service of the State of Illinois,” but it is difficult to see how it is an agency “under the Governor.” We think a textual analysis of these provisions provides a fairly secure basis for determining, as various organs of Illinois government discussed earlier in the opinion have, that the Board is not subject to the Personnel Code. Nevertheless, for the sake of argument, we shall assume that these texts leave some doubt and look beyond the text to verify the intent of those provisions. At the outset, we note that Illinois courts grant “considerable deference to an agency’s interpretation of a statute it administers”; however, “an agency’s interpretation is not binding as to questions of law and will be rejected if erroneous.” See Denton v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 679 N.E.2d 1234, 1236 (Ill. 1997). The CMS is the agency in charge of administering the Personnel Code, and, therefore, we give their interpretation appropriate deference. The CMS, in a letter responding to the Board’s questions whether the Personnel Code applied, stated that JIB “employees have been considered exempt from the Personnel Code since the 1970 Constitution became effective.” R.41, Ex.4, Letter of Oct. 19, 1992, at 1. The Chief Legal Counsel for CMS further opined that “[w]hen the Constitution beNo. 02-4093 15 came effective, its grant of authority to the Board to appoint its employees [Section 15(d)] was contrary to and inconsistent with the provisions of the Personnel Code.” Id. The CMS concluded that this constitutional grant of authority “was an expression of intent that employees of the Board are exempt from the Personnel Code.” Id. The CMS also took note of the impact that the Personnel Code would have on other branches of government because it requires that most employees only be fired for cause. In light of this restriction, the CMS reasoned, the Personnel Code would impose “more than a peripheral, indirect, or collateral change in personnel administration.” Id. at 2. The CMS concluded that employees of the JIB “are exempt from the provisions of the 6 Personnel Code.” Id. at 3. We see no reason to dispute this interpretation of the statute. The CMS’s interpretation is well grounded and firmly supported by traditional principles of statutory construction. When the creation of the JIB is viewed in context with the Personnel Code as a whole, it is clear that those procedures were not intended to be applied against the JIB. 6 This interpretation is consistent with the Attorney General’s comments in response to the JIB’s inquiry whether the Personnel Code applied to its employees. See R.41, Ex.4. It also is consonant with the more recent letter from the Chief Labor Relations Counsel for CMS, Nancy Pittman, responding to Ms. Crull. Ms. Pittman informed Ms. Crull in August of 1999 that she could not answer Ms. Crull’s questions because the JIB was not “under the jurisdiction of the Governor.” R.41, Ex.9. This interpretation also conforms with JIB’s statements to its employees. For example, in adopting a vacation policy based on the Personnel Code, the Board expressly noted that “the Board is not governed by the Personnel Code” but adopted the policy because it was in the best interest of the public to do so. R.41, Ex.6. 16 No. 02-4093 Structural principles of constitutional and statutory interpretation support this conclusion. The JIB was created in the 1970 Illinois Constitution; the Personnel Code has been in existence since 1955. Obviously, the Personnel Code did not specifically address the JIB at the time of its enactment; the JIB did not exist. The Personnel Code, however, exempts all elected officers, “all Judges, and officers, and employees of the courts, and notaries public,” and all employees of the Illinois General Assembly, including employees of legislative commissions. 20 Ill. Comp. Stat. 415/4c. In sum, Section 4c exempts nearly all legislative and judicial positions, leaving only those positions in the executive branch subject to the Personnel Code. Historical factors support this structural view. Prior to the 1970 creation of the JIB, its functions were exercised by the Illinois Supreme Court. See Owen v. Mann, 475 N.E.2d 886, 890 (Ill. 1985). The JIB’s predecessor, the Illinois Courts Commission, was therefore exempt from the Personnel Code because it was under the auspices of the Supreme Court. Although JIB employees may not be considered judges or employees of the courts—those employees specifically listed in Section 4c(3)—the JIB was created as part of Article VI which addresses the Judiciary, and it seems equally likely that the Personnel Code was not intended to apply to them. The Board also was given explicit power to “appoint and direct its staff.” Id. § 15(d). The placement of the JIB in the Judiciary Article with this express grant of authority provides a very substantial reason to question the Personnel Code’s application to the JIB. See Ill. Const. art. II, § 1 (“The legislative, executive and judicial branches are separate. No branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another.”). In accord with this express power to appoint and direct its staff and establish rules governing its procedures, the only significant role another branch has over the personnel operations of the Board is that the Governor is permitted to No. 02-4093 17 appoint seven members while the Illinois Supreme Court selects two. Applying the Personnel Code’s restrictions to such an entity would impinge on the express grant of power. Because the JIB did not exist when the Personnel Code exemptions were enacted, because its predecessor was exempt and because Section 4c generally exempts positions in the legislative and judicial branches, it is reasonable to conclude that Section 2 of the Personnel Code applies only to those positions “under” the Governor, which excludes the JIB from its reach. Moreover, the CMS interpretation is consistent with the practices and interpretations over the entire 30-year life of the agency. It is consistent with Governor Ogilvie’s comments at the JIB’s initial meeting in 1971, that the JIB was an independent agency beyond his authority. See R.41, Ex.2 at 2. It is also supported by the JIB’s practice of not hiring employees through the CMS system and setting their own procedures regarding personnel. Accordingly, we conclude that the Personnel Code does not apply to JIB employees. Therefore, Ms. Crull does not have a property interest arising from the Personnel Code. This conclusion, however, does not end our inquiry, and we must now turn to consider other potential sources of property interests. 2. Clearly Implied Promise of Continued Employment Although Ms. Crull did not have a property right arising from an explicit contractual agreement or the Personnel Code, property rights are not created solely by these sources. “ ‘[P]roperty’ interests subject to procedural due process protection are not limited by a few rigid, technical forms. Rather, ‘property’ denotes a broad range of interests that are secured by ‘existing rules or understandings.’ ” Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972) (internal citations omit18 No. 02-4093 ted). Ms. Crull may establish a property interest in her employment if she can demonstrate the existence of an unwritten “common law of employment” providing a right to be terminated only for cause. Id. “A common law of employment is established through rules or ‘mutually explicit understandings’ and not solely through past practices of the employer.” Hermes v. Hein, 742 F.2d 350, 355 (7th Cir. 1984) (internal citations omitted); see Perry, 408 U.S. at 601; Miller v. Crystal Lake Park Dist., 47 F.3d 865, 867 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that a “ ‘mutually binding obligation’ is just fancy language for ‘contract’ ”); Powell, 305 N.E.2d at 169 (noting that “every public employee does not have a right to continued employment,” but “a public employee can have such a right dependent upon the surrounding circumstances including existing rules and understandings”). When basing a property interest on mutually explicit understandings, however, extreme care must be taken in evaluating the nature, quality and clarity of the purported understandings. Not anyone can bind the government. It is “firmly established that the ‘mutually explicit understandings’ that constitute property interests under the holding of Perry cannot be based on the representations of government officials who are not authorized to make such representations.” Wolf v. City of Fitchburg, 870 F.2d 1327, 1334 (7th Cir. 7 1989). We must be mindful of this restriction when considering the facts that may demonstrate a mutually explicit understanding. 7 See Fittshur v. Vill. of Menomonee Falls, 31 F.3d 1401, 1408 (7th Cir. 1994); Santella v. City of Chicago, 936 F.2d 328, 331-32 (7th Cir. 1991); Wolf v. Larson, 897 F.2d 1409, 1413 (7th Cir. 1990); Smith v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chicago, 853 F.2d 517, 521 (7th Cir. 1988); Common v. Williams, 859 F.2d 467, 472 (7th Cir. 1988); Hadley v. County of Du Page, 715 F.2d 1238, 1242-43 (7th Cir. 1983). No. 02-4093 19 a. executive director Ms. Crull primarily relies upon a statement by Executive Director Tohinaka at the time Ms. Crull was hired to establish her property interest. Ms. Crull submitted affidavit testimony that Tohinaka told her that there was a six-month probationary period after which “they have to have a reason to fire you.” R.44, Ex.3 at 21. According to Ms. Crull, this led her to believe that she would be subject to progressive discipline and that she would be given a hearing prior to termination. Ms. Crull, however, does not offer any indication that the Executive Director had the actual authority to establish her employment conditions. Ms. Crull admits that she “did not present any facts or exhibits regarding the Executive director’s authority, and the district court did not consider the issue.” Appellee’s Supp. Br. at 1; see Appellee’s Br. at 14. Ms. Crull explains that she did not proffer such evidence because the defendants “never made assertions regarding the authority of the JIB Executive Director in their statement of material Facts (Doc. 41).” Appellee’s Supp. Br. at 1. Ms. Crull acknowledges, however, that the defendant offered deposition testimony and an affidavit regarding the power of the Executive Director. See Appellants’ Br. at 14 n.4. The Executive Director has no authority, according to the defendants, to establish agency policy or make employee decisions without the approval of the Board. Specifically, Executive Director Twine averred that in her position as Executive Director she did not have the power to fire anyone. See R.44, Ex.6 at 13. The defendants submitted evidence that the Board, and not the Executive Director, determines whether to promote an employee, see R.41, Ex.14, to give an employee a raise, see R.44, Ex.6 at 14-16, and to adopt other personnel policies for the JIB, see R.44, Ex.19 at 2. When the Board hires employees, the Board sets the salary and does not offer employment 20 No. 02-4093 contracts for any time frame. See R.41, Ex.19 ¶ 4. The Board considers investigators at-will employees, and it has no policy that employees can be fired only for cause. See id. Ms. Crull had to support her assertion of mutually explicit understanding of continued employment by offering statements from someone who could bind the Board. See Wolf, 870 F.2d at 1334; see also n.9 infra. Ms. Crull had the burden, not only to demonstrate a property interest, see, e.g., Lawshe v. Simpson, 16 F.3d 1475, 1483 (7th Cir. 1994), but to demonstrate that the person making statements had the authority to create a property interest, see Schoenberger v. Chicago Transit Auth., 405 N.E.2d 1076, 1136 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (“The authority to bind a principal will not be presumed, but rather, the person alleging the authority must prove its source . . . .”); see also Yugoslav-American Cultural Ctr. v. Parkway Bank & Trust Co., 682 N.E.2d. 401, 406 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (noting that the burden on the person seeking to bind the principal “is difficult to meet because, where the existence of an agency is an issue, the mere statements of the alleged agent, made outside the presence of the principal and not subsequently approved by him, do not establish the existence of the principal-agent relationship”). Ms. Crull did not produce the facts to support her claim. Ms. Crull also submits that there are facts in the record that suggest the Executive Director had the apparent authority to change her employment terms. It is well established that, generally speaking, “[a] principal is bound equally by the authority that he actually gives his agent and by that he appears to give.” Amcore Bank v. Hahnaman-Albrecht, Inc., 759 N.E.2d 174, 183 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001). However, this general rule must be applied with great circumspection when a state entity is the principal. The JIB is a creature of the Illinois Constitution. It is composed of members that are appointed for limited terms. The Constitution specifically provides the Board with the No. 02-4093 21 authority to appoint and direct its staff. This is an unlikely situation in which to apply the common law principles of apparent authority, which would effectively permit the statements of one Executive Director, an employee of the Board, to bind all subsequent Boards and thus to restrict the Board’s specific constitutional grant of authority. See Heck v. City of Freeport, 985 F.2d 305, 311 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that property interests arising from mutually explicit understandings only could occur “if consistent with official law”). Indeed, Illinois courts have held that “it is contrary to the effective administration of a political subdivision to allow elected officials to tie the hands of their successors with respect to decisions regarding the welfare or the subdivision.” Cannizzo v. Berwyn Township, 741 N.E.2d 1067, 1071 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (citing the rule established in Millikin v. County of Edgar, 32 N.E. 493 (1892)). Applying the rule to municipalities, the court in Cannizzo held that an elected board did not have authority to employ persons in positions that were important to the effective administration of the board beyond its term. See id.; see also Grassini v. DuPage Township, 665 N.E.2d 860 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996). Because the board in Cannizzo used staggered appointments, the length of time used to measure or limit the board’s power was the term of the elected official appointing the board. The court determined that a threeyear employment contract extended beyond the board’s authority and was void ab initio. See Cannizzo, 741 N.E.2d at 1074. Furthermore, in circumstances outside the context of hiring employees, the use of apparent authority by government employees to bind the State has been circumscribed considerably in Illinois. A party who deals with a governmental body assumes the risk of ascertaining whether the agent is 22 No. 02-4093 acting within the bounds of the agent’s authority or whether 8 the agent is outside his authority. Even if apparent authority applied in the present situation, Ms. Cole has not come forward with facts to establish the apparent authority of the JIB Executive Director to guarantee that employees would be terminated only “for cause,” 8 See Rubidoux v. Northeastern Illinois Univ., 51 Ill. Ct. Cl. 275, 1998 WL 1758261, at  (1998) (noting that the doctrine of apparent authority “has limited, if any, application to the State, where contractors are required to ascertain at their peril the true authority of purported agents of the State”); see also County of Cook v. Patka, 405 N.E.2d 1376, 1380-81 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (“Anyone dealing with a governmental body takes the risk of accurately ascertaining that he who purports to act for that body stays within the bounds of his authority and this is so even though the agent himself may have been unaware of the limitations on his authority.”); Ernat v. State of Illinois, 36 Ill. Ct. Cl. 82, 90 (1984) (stating that “[t]he State cannot be bound by agents with apparent authority rather than actual authority in most situations because such a policy could be disastrous to the State’s budget”); cf. Gersch v. Dep’t of Prof ’l Regulation, 720 N.E.2d 672, 681 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (“A public entity cannot be estopped by an act of its agent which is beyond the authority expressly conferred upon that official.”); Hamwi v. Zollar, 702 N.E.2d 593, 598 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (“A municipality cannot be estopped by an act of its agent beyond the authority expressly conferred upon that official.”); Akmakjian v. Dep’t of Prof’l Regulation, 679 N.E.2d 783, 787 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (refusing to permit representations beyond the agent’s actual authority to estop a governmental body). But cf. Genie Constr. Co. v. Illinois, 51 Ill. Ct. Cl. 153, 1999 WL 33246466, at  (1999) (“Where the State vests a person with apparent authority to order services, the Claimant reasonably relied upon his apparent authority to bind the State, and the Claimant performed the services, the State cannot deny that the person had actual authority to bind the State.” (internal citations omitted)). No. 02-4093 23 would be subject to progressive discipline and would be terminated only after a hearing. “[A]pparent authority arises when a principal, through words or conduct, creates a reasonable impression that the agent has the authority to perform a certain act.” Amcore Bank, 759 N.E.2d at 183-84 (internal citations omitted). Apparent authority must be traced to some word or act of the principal, here the Board, that creates a reasonable impression that the agent, the Executive Director, has the authority to act with respect to the matter at issue, here the nature of the employment relationship. In support of her claim of apparent authority, Ms. Crull asserts that the Executive Director has been permitted to “establish[ ] employment policies without the approval of the Board, including the ‘policy for daily operations’ and rules on personal and sick days. (Doc. 41, Ex. 7, Ex. 9A).” Appellee’s Br. at 15. However, the authority cited for this proposition does not support Ms. Crull’s assertion. Exhibit 7 is a cover memo from the Executive Director informing JIB employees of changes in the “Policy for Daily Operations.” Nothing in the cover memo or in the policy itself suggests that the policy was adopted without Board approval; to the contrary, in fact, with respect to “Vacation and Personal Days,” the policy states that “[a]lthough JIB is not covered by the State Personnel Code, the Board has adopted the accumulated vacation leave policy applicable to all State employees.” R.41, Ex.7 at 2 (emphasis added). Similarly, Exhibit 9A simply is an explanation of how the sick-time policy will be administered, i.e., hourly increments in which employees may use sick time; it does not suggest that the Executive Director has the authority to make unilateral policies with respect to terms and conditions of employment, for instance, the actual number of sick days to which an employee is entitled. Furthermore, with respect to the only other termination of employment that took place prior to Ms. Crull’s, it was the Board that made the termination 24 No. 02-4093 decision (notably without a hearing). Finally, in announcing its decision to terminate Jennings, the Board expressly stated in its decision that it was authorizing the Executive Director to “determine a suitable effective date which gives him at least two weeks notice.” R.41, Ex.14. Far from giving the impression that the Executive Director has the authority to set terms of employment, these actions lead to the 9 conclusion that the authority rests strictly with the Board. Having determined that the Executive Director did not have apparent authority to offer employment with specific requirements for discharge, we turn to the question of whether the Board itself created any property interest in the employees’ continued employment. b. Board The practices of the Board also do not support a mutually explicit understanding to continued employment. Ms. Crull has not offered any evidence that the Board shared her understanding of her employment terms. The evidence submitted only leads to an inference that Ms. Crull had a misunderstanding as to her entitlements. See Wolf, 870 F.2d at 1335. There is nothing to infer that the Board reached an agreement with her or intended her to have any form of 9 Although not addressed by the parties, we note that, in support of her apparent authority argument, Ms. Crull points primarily to actions of the Executive Director and the Board taken after she accepted her employment with the Board. It is difficult, therefore, for Ms. Crull to argue that she relied on the impressions resulting from these later actions when she accepted her earlier-in-time offer of employment (and, presumably, relied on the Executive Director’s statements regarding the nature of her employment with the Board). No. 02-4093 25 tenure. Ms. Crull asserts that no JIB investigator had been terminated without cause and without an opportunity to improve their performance. She also asserts that the JIB had a practice of placing employees on probation prior to terminating them. Ms. Crull points to evidence in the record demonstrating that the Board voted to remove Executive Director Twine from probation over six months after she became the executive director. See R.41, Defendant’s Statement of Uncontested Facts ¶ 3 (noting that Twine became the Executive Director in January 1998); R.44, Ex.19 at 2 (Board minutes of October 9, 1998, removing Ms. Twine from probation). Ms. Crull also points to defendants’ statement that “[t]he JIB, through interim Director Sandra Otaka, also extended McClory’s probation during the transition between Executive Directors after Tohinaka’s death so that the new director ‘could fire [him] more easily.’ ” Appellants’ Br. at 16. Finally, she points out that the Board has adopted some 10 Personnel Code policies. Past practices of an employer are not sufficient, standing alone, to establish a mutual understanding. See Lawshe, 16 10 The fact that the JIB adopted some provisions of the Personnel Code does not create a genuine issue of material fact regarding the nature of Ms. Crull’s employment. When the Board adopted one provision of the Personnel Code, it explicitly stated it was not required to adopt it but did so because it was in the best interest of the public. If Ms. Crull assumed that the Board would adopt all of the Personnel Code based on its adoption of a few policies, this is evidence of a mistake rather than any mutual understanding. “A misunderstanding of one’s entitlements, even if reasonable, does not enlarge those entitlements.” Wolf v. City of Fitchburg, 870 F.2d 1327, 1335 (7th Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 26 No. 02-4093 F.3d at 1480; see also Hermes, 742 F.2d at 355 (“[A] common law of employment is established through rules or mutually explicit understandings and not solely through the past practices of an employer.” (internal citations omitted)). The past terminations, however, do not indicate a “common practice.” The record reveals evidence of only one other employee fired besides Ms. Crull. In effecting this termination, it is not even evident that the Board permitted him an 11 opportunity to respond to its decision. The evidence in the record regarding the Board’s understanding is that it considered JIB employees to be employed at will. Board member Parkhurst stated in a deposition that she considered Ms. Crull an at-will employee. See R.41, Ex.23, Parkhurst Dep. Significantly, in June of 2000, Board Chairman Sunderman told Ms. Crull she was an at-will employee. R.41, Ex.15 ¶ 5. Six months prior to terminating Ms. Crull, the Board asked outside counsel for an opinion explaining the status of its employees, specifically whether they were at-will employees. The outside counsel informed 11 The Board fired Tom Jennings after considering the reviews provided by the Executive Director and Jennings’ written response to the Executive Director’s criticism. At their March 14, 1997 meeting, the Board noted: With respect to annual personnel reviews the Board reviewed Director Tohinaka’s packet of materials consisting of reviews and attachments on all staff, including Tom Jennings’ March 5, 1997 memo in response to his February 24, 1997 Annual Performance Review. As a result of their discussion, the Board voted to terminate Tom’s employment with authorization granted to Director Tohinaka to determine a suitable effective date which gives him at least two weeks notice. R.41, Ex.14 at 2. No. 02-4093 27 the Board that the employees were at-will employees. See R.44, Ex.15 at 53-56. There is no indication that the Board ever came to a mutually explicit understanding with Ms. Crull to provide her with a right to only be fired for cause. Because it is the plaintiff’s burden to show mutually explicit understanding or common law of workplace that establishes a property interest, and because, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Ms. Crull, she has not met this burden, we must conclude Ms. Crull did not have a prop12 erty interest in her continued employment.