Opinion ID: 888841
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Parent's Constitutional Rights

Text: ¶ 107 We have previously recognized the constitutional rights of a natural parent to parent his or her child, explaining that this right requires careful protection and is not merely a matter of legislative grace, but is constitutionally required. In re A.R.A., 277 Mont. 66, 70, 919 P.2d 388, 391 (1996). This Court has explained that there are few invasions into the privacy of the individual that are more extreme than that of depriving a natural parent of the custody of his children. In re Guardianship of Doney, 174 Mont. 282, 285, 570 P.2d 575, 577 (1977). Consequently, we have protected parents against claims adverse to these constitutional rights by repeatedly holding that a natural parent cannot be denied custody of his or her child absent termination of that person's parental rights for abuse or neglect .... In re Parenting of J.N.P., 2001 MT 120, ¶ 25, 305 Mont. 351, 27 P.3d 953 (emphasis added). We have erected high legal barriers to protect parents from claims of third parties, holding that a finding of abuse, neglect, or dependency is the jurisdictional prerequisite for any court-ordered transfer of custody from a natural parent to a third party. J.N.P., ¶ 18 (citation omitted, emphasis added). Even when considering a minimally invasive claimthe mere visitation of a child by the child's grandparentswe have rejected on constitutional grounds the failure to recognize the wishes of a fit parent. Polasek v. Omura, 2006 MT 103, ¶¶ 15-17, 332 Mont. 157, 136 P.3d 519 ([P]arents have a fundamental constitutional right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children. (citations and quotations omitted)). ¶ 108 However, the Court denies to Maniaci the constitutional protections promised to her in our previous holdings by removing the jurisdictional prerequisite, which has protected parents against the claims of third parties, and thereby opens wide the door to such claimsnot only against Maniaci, but potentially against all parents. Now, even parents who are fit and capable, like Maniaci, are potentially subject to the claims of third parties for rights to their children. ¶ 109 In reaching this conclusion, the Court misstates or misunderstands our previous constitutional holdings and offers what I believe are faulty grounds to distinguish those cases, for the apparent purpose of diminishing the reach of the constitutional rights previously declared for parents. About our pre-1999 decisions, the Court offers that the pre-1999 statutes made termination of parental rights, based upon dependency, abuse, or neglect, the only option available to the Court before it could award a nonparent a custodial interest, citing A.R.A. in support. Opinion, ¶ 56 (emphasis added). To the contrary, it was not the statutes that limited third party claims against parents in those cases, but the constitutional rights of parents. A.R.A. held that a pre-1999 statute was unconstitutional for the very reason that it permitted a third party to be awarded a custodial right before the parents' rights had been terminated. A.R.A., 277 Mont. at 72, 919 P.2d at 392 ([Section] 40-4-221, MCA, is unconstitutional to the extent that it allows the granting of a § -221 petition prior to the termination of the natural parent's constitutional rights.). As we stated when striking down a subsequent statute in J.N.P., A.R.A. [was] based on constitutional considerations. J.N.P., ¶ 20 (emphasis added). Contrary to the Court's analysis, it was not the pre-1999 statutes that limited the claims of third parties, but the Montana Constitution. ¶ 110 The Court similarly displaces the holding of our 2001 decision of J.N.P., stating that the third party claimants there could not rely upon the nonparental statutes in seeking custody of J.N.P., however, in light of their failure to comply with the statutory pre-requisites of first establishing a child-parent relationship through a petition filed under § 40-4-211, MCA. Opinion, ¶ 63. However, the third party claimants in J.N.P. did file a petition under § 40-4-211, MCA. J.N.P., ¶ 22. Their claim was rejected, not for failing to satisfy this statutory pre-requisite (similar to the statutory pre-requisite in this case), but because the parents' constitutional rights were superior to the statute: a natural parent cannot be denied custody of his or her child absent termination of that person's parental rights for abuse or neglect. ... J.N.P., ¶ 25. Thus, we struck down § 40-4-211 because it suffered from the same constitutional infirmity as the statute we invalidated in the case of In re A.R.A. J.N.P., ¶ 21. ¶ 111 The Court dismisses the constitutional basis for our holding in Polasek on the ground that the grandparent visitation statute at issue there was different because here the Legislature has explicitly provided that it is not necessary for a natural parent to be found unfit before awarding a parental interest to a third party. Opinion, ¶ 69. In Polasek, the statute permitted mere grandparent visitation claims, and yet we held that the statute's failure to consider the wishes of a fit parent was unconstitutional. Polasek, ¶¶ 15, 20. Here, as we consider a third party's claim to a parental interest of a child, the Court bows to the Legislature's determination that parental unfitness need not be shown. The Court's reasoning is a non sequitur and its retreat from constitutional principle has permitted the Legislature to legislate Maniaci's constitutional rights out of existence. [1] ¶ 112 Although the Court goes to great lengths to dismiss the constitutional basis for our decisions, these decisions clearly stand for the proposition that a natural parent cannot be denied custody of his or her child absent termination of that person's parental rights .... J.N.P., ¶ 25 (emphasis added). In my view, the Court's effort to distinguish our previous holdings is flawed and does not diminish the constitutional rights of parents we have clearly declared.