Opinion ID: 805640
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion to Suppress/Franks Hearing

Text: Gordon argues the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence without holding a Franks2 hearing. At trial, the Government introduced evidence seized by the Louisville police in the execution of a search warrant for Gordon’s house and business in 2006 after investigating Commonwealth’s billing practices. The seized financial records, documents, and hard drives were later released to the IRS. Under Commonwealth’s agreement with the LMHA, off-duty police officers working as security guards commanded a higher rate than civilian security guards. Louisville police suspected that Gordon improperly billed the LMHA for hours worked by civilians at the higher rate. Gordon asserts that the officer who applied for the warrant made a knowingly false statement in the warrant’s affidavit.3 Specifically, the officer referenced the “contract” between Commonwealth and the LMHA when no such written instrument existed. This argument is without merit. The standard of review for the sufficiency of an affidavit “is whether the magistrate had a substantial basis for finding that the affidavit established probable cause to believe that the evidence would be found at the place cited.” United States v. Davidson, 936 F.2d 856, 859 (6th Cir. 1991). The district court issued a comprehensive memorandum and order detailing its reasons for denying Gordon’s motion. We agree with those reasons. 2 A Franks hearing refers to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), which established the right to challenge the veracity of statements in a warrant’s affidavit. 3 In the district court, Gordon argued the warrant was defective for lack of particularity and the officers impermissibly exceeded the proper scope of the search. On appeal, Gordon limits his argument to the district court’s denial of a Franks hearing. 8 First, the affidavit describes information gathered from interviews with multiple Commonwealth employees who reported first-hand knowledge of forgery and fraud. The officer related the steps he took to investigate and verify the allegations. Probable cause did not turn on the existence of a written contract. Whether Gordon and the LMHA memorialized their agreement in writing is irrelevant. Moreover, the only place the words “contract” or “contractual” appear in the search warrant or affidavit is in the list of items to be seized. Accordingly, the magistrate had more than a substantial basis for finding probable cause. Gordon’s argument lacked merit in the district court, as it does now.