Opinion ID: 883585
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: issues

Text: Does Article II, Section 11, of the Montana Constitution, prohibit warrantless searches and seizures, under the circumstances in this case, on private land that falls outside the curtilage of a dwelling? We review a district court's conclusions of law regarding a motion to suppress to determine whether the district court's interpretation of the law was correct. State v. Pastos (Mont.1994), 887 P.2d 199, 201. The defendants contend that the elk discovered by the State pursuant to its warrantless entry onto Peterson's property, and any further evidence which resulted from the discovery of that carcass, including statements made by both defendants, should be suppressed based upon the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article II, Section 11, of the Montana Constitution, which guarantee the defendants the right to be free from unlawful searches and seizures. As evidence that the State's entry upon Peterson's land and seizure of the elk carcass were unlawful, the defendants point out that no search warrant had been issued, that permission had not been given for Anderson and Dawson to enter Peterson's land, and that the search which led to discovery of the elk was not made pursuant to any statutory exception provided for game wardens at § 87-1-506(2), MCA. They contend that pursuant to State v. Osteen (1985), 216 Mont. 258, 261, 700 P.2d 188, 191, and State v. Carlson (1982), 198 Mont. 113, 119, 644 P.2d 498, 501, the plain view doctrine does not apply because the law enforcement officers were not legally at the place where they first observed the elk carcass; that pursuant to the criteria set forth in United States v. Dunn (1987), 480 U.S. 294, 301, 107 S.Ct. 1134, 1139, 94 L. Ed 2d 326, 334-35, the carcass was located in the curtilage of Peterson's home, rather than in the open field and that at that location defendants had a subjective expectation of privacy which should be recognized as reasonable by society. The State responds that Anderson's presence on Peterson's property, and his observation of and subsequent seizure of contraband at that location, was constitutionally permissible pursuant to the open fields doctrine recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in Oliver v. United States (1984), 466 U.S. 170, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214, and previously recognized by this Court in State v. Charvat (1978), 175 Mont. 267, 573 P.2d 660, and subsequent cases. The State also contends that the location of the elk carcass did not meet the criteria for constitutionally protected curtilage set forth in Dunn, and that pursuant to § 87-1-502(6), MCA, Anderson had the authority to inspect the carcass at any location other than a residence or dwelling. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. Article II, Section 11, of the Montana Constitution, provides similarly that: The people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and effects from unreasonable searches and seizures. No warrant to search any place, or seize any person or thing shall issue without describing the place to be searched or the person or thing to be seized, or without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation reduced to writing. Pursuant to these provisions, searches conducted without warrants are presumed to be unreasonable subject to a few delineated exceptions. Osteen, 700 P.2d at 191 (citing Katz v. United States (1967), 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576, 585). The State contends that a search of open fields was either never intended for protection pursuant to these amendments, or is an exception to the warrant requirement, depending on which precedent is considered. Because of what appear to be seeming inconsistencies in the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, our prior willingness to apply those decisions under circumstances which were different than those presented in this case, and contrary decisions in other jurisdictions based on the same high regard for privacy that prevails in this State, we deem it appropriate to trace the origins of the open fields doctrine, and reconsider its applicability to Article II, Section 11, of the Montana Constitution. The open fields doctrine was first established in Hester v. United States (1924), 265 U.S. 57, 44 S.Ct. 445, 68 L.Ed. 898. In Hester, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment protects persons, houses, papers, and effects, and is not extended to the open fields. Hester, 265 U.S. at 59, 44 S.Ct. at 446 (citing 4 Bl. Comm. 223, 225, 226). Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court clarified that the Fourth Amendment provides protection from invasion of one's house or curtilage. Olmstead v. United States (1928), 277 U.S. 438, 466, 48 S.Ct. 564, 568, 72 L. Ed 944, 951. Subsequently, however, that Court recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects people  not places  from unreasonable searches. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507. [1] In Katz, the Court stated that the Fourth Amendment protects individual privacy against certain kinds of government intrusion, but its protections go further and often do not relate to privacy. Katz, 389 U.S at 350, 88 S.Ct. at 510. A person's right to privacy, or right to be let alone, is largely left to the law of the states. Katz, 389 U.S. at 350-51, 88 S.Ct. at 510-11. What a person knowingly exposes to the public is not protected, but what an individual seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351, 88 S.Ct. at 511. Finally, the Court discredited the previous notion that property interests control the government's right to search and seize. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353, 88 S.Ct. at 512. However, the two-part test that this Court has followed since Charvat to determine whether a search is unlawful was set forth in Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz, 389 U.S. at 361, 88 S.Ct. at 516 (Harlan, J., concurring). That test requires that (1) a person have an actual expectation of privacy; and (2) the expectation must be one society is willing to recognize as reasonable. In a seeming return to concepts discredited in Katz, the Court reaffirmed notions grounded in Hester in Oliver v. United States (1984), 466 U.S. 170, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214. Oliver was based on two similar fact patterns where law enforcement officials ignored No Trespassing signs and fences, entered private property, and observed illegal drug activity. The Court held that the specific language of the Fourth Amendment does not include open fields. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 177, 104 St.Ct. at 1740-41. The amendment's protection extends only to the curtilage area immediately surrounding one's home. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 178, 104 S.Ct. at 1741. Following Oliver, it appears that if an area is not curtilage, it is an open field unprotected by the Fourth Amendment. Despite the Court's intent to eliminate case-by-case determinations, the Oliver Court did not discuss how courts were to determine the distinction between curtilage and open fields. Based on this omission, the Supreme Court suggested a four-part test for determining the extent of the curtilage area in Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301-03, 107 S.Ct. at 1139-41. In Dunn, officers who did not initially obtain a warrant, crossed a perimeter fence, entered a ranch, and observed a drug operation through an open barn door. The Court concluded that the barn and the area surrounding the barn were beyond the curtilage and were not protected by the Fourth Amendment. Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301, 107 S.Ct. at 1139. The Court stated that curtilage questions should be resolved with particular reference to the following factors: [T]he proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by. Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301, 107 S.Ct. at 1139-40 (citing California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 221, 106 S.Ct. 1809, 1817, 90 L.Ed.2d 210, 222 (Powell, J., dissenting)). Each party in this case contends that the Dunn factors weigh in his or its favor. However, based on this State's Constitution, and its expressed regard for individual privacy, we decline to follow the U.S. Supreme Court's distinction between curtilage and open fields, and therefore, will not consider the applicability of the Dunn criteria to this case. Although we have not previously followed Dunn, we have, in the past, applied the open fields doctrine in cases which are factually distinguishable from this case. Before Montana's Constitution was amended in 1972, the doctrine was discussed in several cases. We initially followed Hester and held that the constitutional protections of Montana's analogous provision to the Fourth Amendment do not extend to an open field. State v. Arnold (1929), 84 Mont. 348, 275 P. 757; State v. Ladue (1925), 73 Mont. 535, 237 P. 495. Relying on Arnold and Ladue, we held that open pastures and farm lands are not protected by the Fourth Amendment, State v. Perkins (1969), 153 Mont. 361, 457 P.2d 465, or Montana's analogous constitutional provision, State v. Johnson (1967), 149 Mont. 173, 424 P.2d 728. Following the amendment of Montana's Constitution in 1972, and after Katz, this Court began to analyze the open fields doctrine differently. In State v. Charvat (1978), 175 Mont. 267, 573 P.2d 660, relying on Hester, this Court held that neither the Fourth Amendment, nor Article II, Section 11, of the Montana Constitution, extended protection to open fields. Charvat, 573 P.2d at 661. However, because Katz was decided after Hester, we stated that the determination of whether an intrusion was unreasonable depended upon whether one had an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy that society would recognize as reasonable. Charvat, 573 P.2d at 662. This Court, like the Court in Katz, cited authority for the proposition that the focus of search and seizure analysis is no longer on common law property concepts. Charvat, 573 P.2d at 662 (citing Wattenburg v. United States (9th Cir.1968), 388 F.2d 853). In State v. Dess (1982), 201 Mont. 456, 464, 655 P.2d 149, 153, we held that the reasonableness of his expectation of privacy turned on the defendant's right to exclude others from the premises. Because the defendant admitted he had a diminished expectation of privacy in a public campground, and because of other facts, we held that the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched. Dess, 655 P.2d at 154. In 1983, we addressed an appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress evidence seized from an area of the defendant's fields. State v. Bennett (1983), 205 Mont. 117, 666 P.2d 747. In Bennett, a deputy sheriff following an anonymous tip observed marijuana plants growing in the defendant's garden through a 60 power scope from a nearby road. We concluded that the area surrounding the fenced portion of the property was open field, and that the use of the spotting scope did not violate the defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy in an area that could be observed from a public road. Bennett, 666 P.2d at 749 (citing Hester, 265 U.S. 57, 44 S.Ct. 445). Where no reasonable expectation of privacy exists, there is neither a `search' nor a `seizure' within the contemplation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution or Article II, Section 11 of the Montana Constitution. Bennett, 666 P.2d at 749. We concluded that the defendant voluntarily exposed the marijuana to the public by growing it in a garden near a county road, and therefore, that even if the defendant had a subjective expectation of privacy, it was not one society would recognize as reasonable. Bennett, 666 P.2d at 749. Finally, in another case involving a marijuana grow operation, we held that the defendant did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy. In State v. Sorensen (1990), 243 Mont. 321, 792 P.2d 363, law enforcement officials, who were acting on a tip that the defendant was growing marijuana on forest service land and storing it on his property, began observing the defendant's property. The officers later obtained a warrant and seized evidence of the marijuana operation. The defendant contended that Article II, Section 10, of the Montana Constitution, protected him from trespass by law enforcement, and he contended they must have trespassed, or they could not have described his buildings in such detail in the search warrant. We acknowledged that Montana's constitutional right of privacy is broader than the right of privacy under the Federal Constitution. Sorensen, 792 P.2d at 366 (citing State v. Sierra (1985), 214 Mont. 472, 692 P.2d 1273). However, we concluded that [t]he open fields doctrine, providing that the right of privacy in one's home does not extend to open fields within the view of the public, has been recognized under Montana's right of privacy. Sorensen, 792 P.2d at 366 (citing Charvat, 573 P.2d at 661). [2] We held that the defendant did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy that would prevent law enforcement officers from observing buildings located on his unfenced land. Sorensen, 792 P.2d at 366. As these developments illustrate, we have followed the principles established in Katz, but have applied the open fields doctrine to our consideration of whether a person's expectation of privacy is one that society would consider reasonable. However, we have not had occasion to consider reasonableness under precisely the circumstances presented in this case. Nor have we discussed the distinction between curtilage and open fields, or the impact of Dunn on Montana's constitutional guarantee of freedom from unreasonable searches. Therefore, we look to other jurisdictions which have addressed the open fields doctrine as applied to state constitutional provisions similar to ours under circumstances similar to those presented in this case. In 1988, the Oregon Supreme Court held that that state's nearly identical right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures provided broader privacy protection in open fields than the United States Supreme Court had provided pursuant to the Fourth Amendment. State v. Dixson/Digby (Or. 1988), 766 P.2d 1015. In Dixson, sheriff's deputies received information that marijuana was growing on heavily forested land owned by a lumber company. After an officer flew over the land and observed marijuana, officers were granted permission to drive on the land. As they approached the land, they came to an impassable dirt logging road which was on property being purchased by the Dixsons, who resided on the land. The officers walked on, passed several no hunting signs, pushed some brush aside, and observed marijuana plants located on the Dixsons' property. Dixson, 766 P.2d at 1016. The next day, officers returned and discovered Lorin Dixson and Jeff Digby near the plants, arrested both of them, and seized the plants. The defendants moved to suppress the evidence based on the Fourth Amendment and the Oregon Constitution. The trial court denied the motion but was reversed by the Court of Appeals. On appeal, that court was urged by the state to adopt the open fields exception to Oregon's constitutional warrant requirement based on the rationale in Oliver. However, that court, based on the same constitutional language considered by the U.S. Supreme Court in Oliver, declined to do so. It began its analysis by pointing out that the term open fields is not precise. In fact, it was applied in Oliver to lands which were neither fields nor, in any fair sense of the word, open; the open fields doctrine denies Fourth Amendment protection to all undeveloped and unoccupied land outside the curtilage of a residence. Dixson, 766 P.2d at 1020 (citing Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. at 1742, n. 11). The court went on to explain that neither is the common law concept of curtilage applicable to constitutional analysis. It explained that: The rationale underlying the curtilage concept as it was used at common law  to provide a zone of protection to sleeping residents from the midnight terror of burglary  simply is not the same as the rationale underlying Article I, section 9, or, for that matter, the Fourth Amendment, each of which protects the privacy of the individual from warrantless invasion and scrutiny by the government and its minions. Reliance on the common-law concept of curtilage to justify excluding land outside the curtilage from the protections of either constitutional provision is misplaced. Dixson, 766 P.2d at 1023. The Oregon court pointed out that that state's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures was based not on a person's reasonable expectation of privacy but upon each individual's interest in freedom from scrutiny, i.e., his privacy. Dixson, 766 P.2d at 1023. The court next concluded that land owners who have, at some expense, taken steps to exclude others from their property by use of signs, fences, or other measures, have expressed an intention to establish privacy which is protected under Oregon's constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. For that reason, the Oregon court established the following test to enable police to determine whether an uninvited intrusion on private property constitutes a search under that state's constitution which requires a warrant: An individual's privacy interest in land he or she has left unimproved and unbounded is not sufficient to trigger the protections of Article I, section 9. Thus, it is not sufficient that the property in question is privately owned, or that it is shielded from view by vegetation or topographical barriers, because those features do not necessarily indicate the owner's intention that the property be kept private. A person who wishes to preserve a constitutionally protected privacy interest in land outside the curtilage must manifest an intention to exclude the public by erecting barriers to entry, such as fences, or by posting signs. This rule will not unduly hamper law enforcement officers in their attempts to curtail the manufacture of and trafficking in illegal drugs, because it does not require investigating officers to draw any deduction other than that required of the general public: if land is fenced, posted or otherwise closed off, one does not enter it without permission or, in the officers' situation, permission or a warrant. Dixson, 766 P.2d at 1024. Applying this rule, however, to the facts in that case, the Oregon Court held that the search was not illegal. The Court of Appeals of New York has also refused to follow the United States Supreme Court's distinction between curtilage and an open field. People v. Scott (N.Y. 1992), 593 N.E.2d 1328. In Scott, police had information that the defendant was growing marijuana on his property which consisted of 165 acres of rural, undeveloped woodlands. In spite of the fact that the property was conspicuously posted with no trespassing signs, and without the defendant's permission, police entered upon the property where they personally observed plants. Based on those observations, and testimony of a private citizen, the police obtained a search warrant, pursuant to which they found and recovered marijuana plants beyond the curtilage of the residence which was located on the property. The defendant moved to suppress that evidence. However, based upon Oliver, New York's trial court and appellate division denied that motion. On appeal, New York's highest court was asked to decide whether it should follow Oliver and exclude open fields from the protection of its state constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. After thoughtful consideration, it declined to apply Oliver in the State of New York for the following reasons: (1) the conclusion that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to land was contrary to the basic concept of post- Katz decisions that the amendment protects a person's privacy, not places; (2) the constitutional history relied upon in Oliver was inapplicable to the comparable provision in New York's Constitution; (3) its effect was incompatible with Justice Brandeis's Olmstead dissent declaring the right to be let alone  the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men; (4) that state's private property laws indicated that the interest in privacy on land beyond the curtilage was one that New York society was prepared to recognize as reasonable; and (5) giving state agents unbridled license to roam freely on private land without permission was repugnant to basic notions of fairness in that state's criminal law. Scott, 593 N.E.2d at 1334-37. For these reasons, the New York Court held that: [W]here landowners fence or post No Trespassing signs on their private property or, by some other means, indicate unmistakably that entry is not permitted, the expectation that their privacy rights will be respected and that they will be free from unwanted intrusions is reasonable. Scott, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 930, 593 N.E.2d at 1338. Therefore, that court held that the warrantless entry by police on the defendant's land violated that state's constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Like the Dixson court, the Scott court recognized that the Fourth Amendment was not literally interpreted in Katz. Neither a telephone booth, nor a conversation therein, can be described as a person, house, paper, or effect. Scott, 593 N.E.2d at 1334-35. Moreover, the Court had extended protection beyond the Fourth Amendment's literal language, e.g., business premises are protected but not included in the literal language. Scott, 593 N.E.2d at 1335 (citing Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. (1978), 436 U.S. 307, 311, 98 S.Ct. 1816, 1819, 56 L.Ed.2d 305, 310; G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States (1976), 429 U.S. 338, 358-59, 97 S.Ct. 619, 631, 50 L.Ed.2d 530, 547). In its final analysis, however, the court found those contradictions irrelevant because it was concerned with a provision in a different Constitution with its own unique history. Scott, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 927, 593 N.E.2d at 1335. That court refused, as this Court has in the past ( see State v. Sawyer (1977), 174 Mont. 512, 571 P.2d 113), to march [l]ockstep with the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of similar provisions in the federal constitution. Instead, it agreed, as we do, with the observation by former Justice William Brennan that state courts cannot rest when they have afforded their citizens the full protection of the federal Constitution and without the independent protective force of state law ... the full realization of our liberties cannot be guaranteed. Scott, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 930, 593 N.E.2d at 1338 (citing Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489, 491). Finally, and most recently, a Washington Court of Appeals found additional protection based on its state constitution. State v. Johnson, (1994 Wash. Ct. App. Div. 2), 879 P.2d 984. In Johnson, federal and state officers, acting on information they received that Johnson was growing marijuana on his property, drove to his property and walked to the edge, but were unable to view any buildings. Johnson's property was bounded with a fence and a closed chain link gate and was posted with Private Property and No Trespassing signs on trees nearby. Aerial photographs were taken and DEA officers returned a couple days later at about 1:00 a.m., found the gate unlocked, and proceeded down a dirt road toward Johnson's property. They observed a barn, smelled marijuana growing, used a thermal imaging device, and discovered a grow operation. The officers later received and executed a warrant based partly on these observations. Johnson, 879 P.2d at 987. Johnson's motion to suppress was denied, and on appeal he argued that the DEA activity violated the Washington Constitution. The court first stated that the Washington Constitution provides more protection than the Fourth Amendment, partly because Washington has a strong tradition of protecting private property from unwanted intrusions and recognized criminal trespass for similar conduct. Johnson, 879 P.2d at 990. The court acknowledged that the officers did not enter the curtilage, but that did not end its analysis under the Washington Constitution. Neither the open fields doctrine, nor the reasonable expectation test, was dispositive, but both were factors used to determine if the entry unconstitutionally intruded into a person's private affairs. That court concluded that its Constitution does not foreclose a person's ability to protect his or her private affairs in an open field. Johnson, 879 P.2d at 993. It held that fields that are fenced and posted with no trespassing signs are protected, and therefore, that the agents' entry was an unreasonable intrusion into Johnson's private affairs. Johnson, 879 P.2d at 993. Like our sister states, Montana has a strong tradition of respect for the right to individual privacy. The Montana Constitution also provides that the people shall be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Mont. Const. Art. II, § 11. Although the language of this provision is nearly identical to that contained in the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, we recognize that such a provision in the Montana Constitution may be interpreted so as to provide a greater amount of rights than that contained in the Federal Constitution. See, State v. Johnson (1986), [221] Mont. [503, 513], 719 P.2d 1248, 1254-55; and Butte Community Union v. Lewis (1986), [219] Mont. [426, 433], 712 P.2d 1309, 1313. Additionally, the Montana Constitution provides that the right of individual privacy shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest. Mont. Const. Art. II, § 10. There is no similar textual language in the United States Constitution and we have therefore recognized that this section grants rights beyond that inferred from the United States Constitution. See generally, Montana Human Rights Division v. City of Billings (1982), 199 Mont. 434, 649 P.2d 1283. Because Montana's Constitutional protections have an existence which is separate from the Federal Constitutional protections it is necessary to offer an independent analysis of the privacy and search and seizure provisions of the Montana Constitution. State v. Brown (1988), 232 Mont. 1, 9-10, 755 P.2d 1364, 1370. We conclude, based on this State's strong tradition of respect for individual privacy as reflected in our own unique Constitution, that the preceding discussions from our sister states are persuasive. States are free to grant citizens greater protections based on state constitutional provisions than the United States Supreme Court divines from the United States Constitution. State v. Sawyer (1977), 174 Mont. 512, 515, 571 P.2d 1131, 1133 (overruled on other grounds by State v. Long (1985), 216 Mont. 65, 700 P.2d 153). We have chosen not to march lock-step with the United States Supreme Court, even when applying nearly identical language. State v. Johnson (1986), 221 Mont. 503, 512, 719 P.2d 1248, 1254. In addition, we have held that Montana's unique constitutional language affords citizens a greater right to privacy, and therefore, broader protection than the Fourth Amendment in cases involving searches of, or seizures from, private property. Sawyer, 571 P.2d at 1133. As the New York Court of Appeals stated in Scott, the rule that an individual may never have an expectation of privacy in open fields would be repugnant to our State's explicit recognition of privacy as a fundamental right which will not be violated absent a compelling state interest. Mont. Const. art. II, § 10. Likewise, as the Washington Court stated in Johnson, the fact that the officers did not enter the curtilage does not end our analysis based on Article II, Section 11. In this case, we decline to apply the United States Supreme Court's Oliver decision to Article II, Section 11, of the Montana Constitution. We conclude that in Montana a person may have an expectation of privacy in an area of land that is beyond the curtilage which the society of this State is willing to recognize as reasonable, and that where that expectation is evidenced by fencing, No Trespassing, or similar signs, or by some other means [which] indicate[s] unmistakably that entry is not permitted ( Scott, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 930, 593 N.E.2d at 1338), entry by law enforcement officers requires permission or a warrant. As in our prior decisions, however, this requirement does not apply to observations of private land from public property. To the extent that our prior decisions in Charvat, Dess, Bennett, and Sorensen are inconsistent with this holding, they are overruled. We next discuss whether the State's entry onto Peterson's property without a warrant, and without permission, was prohibited under the circumstances in this case. Peterson's cabin was initially built near a public road. However, due to vandalism, he moved his cabin away from the road to where it is barely visible from the road. After the move, Peterson's cabin was located in a forested area approximately 334 feet down a private road. A fence separated Peterson's property from the public road and a large metal gate controlled access to his property. Although the gate was open on this occasion, trees on either side of the gate were posted with No Trespassing signs. It was stipulated that people in the past, including members of the Jefferson County Sheriff's Department, requested permission to enter his land. Peterson took numerous precautions to ensure that others would not enter his property without permission. We conclude that Peterson's expectation of privacy was reasonable. Therefore, under these circumstances, we hold that the entry onto Peterson's property and observation of the elk carcass, which could not have otherwise been observed, was an unreasonable search in violation of Article II, Section 11, of the Montana Constitution. Evidence that was gathered thereafter as a result of the unlawful search was inadmissible by virtue of the exclusionary rule. See Wong Sun v. United States (1963), 371 U.S. 471, 486-88, 83 S.Ct. 407, 417, 9 L.Ed.2d 441, 455. The State contends that Peterson allowed Anderson to inspect the elk and offered to take the officers to the kill site, and therefore, that the evidence was obtained from consensual activity which does not violate either the Fourth Amendment or its Montana counterpart. Even if Peterson consented, it was after the officers wrongfully entered his property and saw the elk. Consequently, it flowed from the unlawful intrusion and cannot be used to justify it. We affirm the District Court's denial of the defendants' motion to dismiss. However, we hold that the District Court erred when it failed to grant the defendants' motion to suppress evidence obtained after the officers entered Peterson's property without permission or a warrant and observed the elk carcass. Because we base our decision on this issue, we do not find it necessary to address the other issues raised on appeal. TURNAGE, C.J., and NELSON, GRAY, HUNT, WEBER and LEAPHART, JJ., concur.