Opinion ID: 1134602
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Validity of the 1952 Order

Text: Plaintiff contends that the 1952 order is invalid because the resolution on which it was based contained no statement of public necessity or, alternatively, because the signature of her predecessor in interest does not appear on any of the documents found in the public records. The trial court agreed with plaintiff's first contention, concluding that the statement of public necessity is jurisdictional and that the failure to include such a statement rendered the 1952 order void. The Court of Appeals rejected plaintiff's first contention. However, it agreed with her alternative position, concluding that in order for the county court to acquire jurisdiction to widen a road by agreement, the signatures of all affected property owners had to appear in the record. It is important to observe at the outset that the characterization of a statutory mandate as jurisdictional simply states a conclusion. In the context of a case such as this, it means that this court has concluded that failure to comply with the statutory requirement renders the government action void as to this particular party. The characterization is, therefore, the ending point in our analysis, not the starting point. In a number of cases, however, this court has characterized statutory requirements as jurisdictional with little or no analysis. Thus, in various challenges to the establishment or alteration of roads, we have held that the county court acted without jurisdiction when it relied on an earlier non-final order by the same court, Columbo et al. v. Hewitt et al., 221 Or. 121, 350 P.2d 893 (1960); when no statement of public necessity appeared in the authorizing resolution, Latourette v. County Court, 121 Or. 323, 255 P. 330 (1927); when an affidavit disclosed that notice was not posted according to statutory requirements, Lauderback et al. v. Multnomah County, 111 Or. 681, 226 P. 697 (1924); when a recitation in the record did not disclose the manner in which notice had been posted, State of Oregon v. Officer, 4 Or. 180 (1871); when the petition to establish the road did not describe the road's terminal points, Johns v. Marion County, 4 Or. 46 (1870); and when there was no recital in the record that notice had been given to affected landowners, Thompson v. Multnomah County, 2 Or. 34 (1861). At the same time, we have dismissed challenges on the ground that the alleged defects were not jurisdictional, holding that once jurisdiction is established, the county court proceedings are presumed regular. See Morton v. Hood River, 88 Or. 144, 171 P. 584 (1918); French Glenn Co. v. Harney County, 36 Or. 138, 58 P. 35 (1899). It is difficult, if not impossible, to determine from these cases why certain statutory requirements are considered jurisdictional and others not. Our decisions also seem to apply the concept of jurisdiction indiscriminately without distinguishing legislative or policy-making functions from quasi-judicial or fact-determining functions. Cf., Fasano v. Washington Co. Comm., 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973). We are now of the opinion that clear analysis in this area requires that we establish criteria for determining what statutory requirements are indispensable to the validity of the challenged action. We are also of the opinion that our analysis will be facilitated if we abandon the use of the label jurisdiction in cases such as this and focus instead on the specific statutory language that permits the government to affect the rights and obligations of its citizens. ORS 368.405 [4] provides that proceedings for the establishment and alteration of public roads may be instituted by petition of freeholders, by resolution of the county court, by grant of owners of necessary rights of way, or by condemnation proceedings. The mechanics of establishing a road by petition are described in ORS 368.430-.465, and the mechanics of establishing a road by resolution are described in ORS 368.470. Because ORS 368.470 requires that the county court, when establishing a road by resolution, give notice as provided for upon the filing of a petition for such purposes and that it follow like proceedings    as in the case of the filing of a petition, the procedures are basically the same whether the court acts under a petition or a resolution. ORS 368.470(7) also allows the county to procure right of way by agreement. Subsection (7) was apparently designed to permit the county to dispense with some of the formalities described below when all the affected property owners agree to the action. However, the subsection must be read to mean that absent agreement of all the property owners affected, the same proceedings must be followed as in the case of the filing of a petition. ORS 368.445(1) provides that when the petition authorized by ORS 368.430 is presented to the court:    [I]t shall be accompanied by satisfactory proof by affidavit that: (a) Notice has been posted at the place of holding county court and at three public places in the vicinity of the proposed road to be located, laid out, relocated or changed, 30 days previous to the presentation of the petition, notifying all persons concerned that the application will be made to the court at its next term. (b) Notice has been forwarded by mail, postage prepaid, not less than 30 days prior to the date of presentation of the petition, to each record owner of land, on or over which the proposed road or portion thereof is to be laid out, relocated or changed, at the last-known post-office address of the owner. ORS 368.445(2) provides: If the address of the owner is unknown to the person mailing the notice mentioned in paragraph (b) of subsection (1) of this section, it may be mailed to the address given on the latest tax roll in the office of the tax collector of the county. If the address is unknown to the person mailing the notice, cannot with reasonable diligence be ascertained and cannot be found on the latest tax roll, the notice may be addressed to the owner at the county seat of the county where the land is situated. ORS 368.455 requires that the notice contain a description of the proposed road, the date of presentation to the county court, and, if the road is initiated by petition, the signature of one or more of the petitioners. ORS 368.450 provides that any owner of land affected by the proposed road who signs the petition waives all further notice. ORS 368.460 provides that upon presentation of the petition with satisfactory proof of posting and mailing notice, the county court shall appoint a board of road viewers to survey the proposed road and assess damages. Having done this, the viewers are required to file a report, which must be read at public meetings by the county court at least twice. ORS 368.480, 368.485. ORS 368.490 then provides: At any time prior to the expiration of the day on which the report mentioned in ORS 368.480 is publicly read for the second time, any person whose lands are directly affected by the report may file a petition for damages, and any freeholder, residing in the road district where the road is located, whose name does not appear upon the petition, may file a remonstrance against the proposed establishment.    Failure to file a petition for damages within the time allowed by this section is a waiver of all rights thereto by every person interested therein, except minors or other persons under disability. After considering the report by the road viewers and any claims for damages or remonstrances, the county court may adopt or reject the report and enter an order to that effect. ORS 368.495, 368.500. That order may be appealed to the circuit court, as may the award of damages, within 20 days after the report is adopted. ORS 368.525. On appeal, the circuit court's scope of review is limited by ORS 368.535, which provides: No final order establishing, altering or relocating any road or highway shall be set aside or annulled upon appeal or review, nor shall any county court refuse to render any such final order, on account of any defect or irregularity in the petition or resolution, or notice thereof, which does not materially affect the substantial rights of an interested party. The following irregularities are immaterial defects: (1) Errors of description of the intermediate points, courses or distances of the proposed road, when the proposed road can be otherwise definitely located. (2) Errors in the posting of the notices, where it can be shown that all persons objecting to the proceedings for the proposed road had actual notice thereof prior to the time of the first reading of the petition or resolution. (3) Errors in or omissions of the names of the petitioners appearing on the notice, where no remonstrance is filed. (Emphasis added.) As we read the above statutes, they demonstrate a legislative intent to place the burden of objecting to a proposed road on the property owners who may be affected by the decision to establish or alter the road. At the same time, however, the statutes impose strict requirements on the county to ensure that affected property owners receive actual notice of the proposal insofar as possible. On appeal, an order of the court may not be set aside for minor irregularities, but may be set aside if the irregularity affects the substantial rights of an interested party. In establishing a statutory scheme for road development, the legislature was faced with two competing policies. On one hand, it wished to ensure that county orders establishing roads would be final and unassailable. At the same time, it wished to ensure that all parties who might be affected by the road would have an opportunity to participate in the decision-making process. This was particularly true with respect to property owners over whose land the road would be established and who had a property interest as well as a general civic interest in the decision. Accordingly, the legislature, while limiting the nature of the defects that could be used to attack an order, established elaborate procedures for ensuring that affected property owners receive actual notice of the proceedings. From our reading of the statutory scheme, we conclude that with respect to persons whose property must be acquired for the road, compliance with the notice requirements contained in ORS 368.445 is indispensable to the validity of the action and that failure to comply with those requirements prevents the county from barring claims for compensation by owners who do not receive notice. We also conclude that compliance with the other statutory requirements is not indispensable to the validity of the action unless the noncompliance in some way renders the notice ineffective. We think this conclusion reflects the balance that the legislature struck in enacting ORS 368.405 et seq. To the extent the cases cited above are inconsistent with our holding today, they are disapproved. It follows from this that we must reject plaintiff's claim that the 1952 order by the Lane County Court is void because the court's failure to include a statement of public necessity deprived it of jurisdiction. No contention is or could be made that a statement of public necessity was necessary to give plaintiff's predecessor in interest fair notice of the County Court proceedings. A different question, however, is presented by plaintiff's second contention. Plaintiff contends, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that where a county court attempts to establish a road by agreement pursuant to ORS 368.470(7), it can obtain jurisdiction so as to cut off a landowner's claim to compensation only if the record affirmatively shows the agreement of all the affected landowners. Because the signature of plaintiff's predecessor in interest does not appear in the county court records, the Court of Appeals held that the Lane County Court did not have jurisdiction when it acted in 1952. Insofar as the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals refers to the jurisdiction of the county court to widen the road, it reflects the analytical error found in past opinions by this court. It also illustrates why we believe it is preferable that the label be abandoned in the context of cases such as this. A county court that decides to widen a road is not acting judicially at all but rather is making a policy decision. The concept of jurisdiction is judicial in nature and is out of place in the legislative context. Nevertheless, we agree with the Court of Appeals' ultimate conclusion. As noted above, we read ORS 368.470(7) as allowing the county to procure right of way by agreement only if the agreement includes all the property owners whose land will be taken for the road. If the agreement does not include all the property owners, the county may cut off the claims of nonparticipating owners only by complying with the notice requirements contained in ORS 368.445. Either agreement or notice is indispensable to the validity of the order if the effect of the order is to deprive persons of their property. We therefore examine the record before us to see if these requirements are met. The City admits that plaintiff's predecessor in interest did not sign the three pages of agreement found in County Road File 2178, and there is nothing else in the record that indicates plaintiff's predecessor agreed to the widening or received notice thereof pursuant to ORS 368.445. The City, however, contends that the statement in Resolution 2178 that the widening of Barger Drive was All as agreed to by the property owners abutting said road is prima facie evidence that all the affected property owners agreed to the widening, that there is no affirmative evidence to rebut the recitation, and that absent such evidence, the recitation is sufficient to show that the County Court validly widened Barger Drive by agreement. We shall assume, without deciding, that a recitation that all the affected property owners agreed to the widening would have the effect contended for by the City. [5] The fact remains that Resolution 2178 does not contain such a recitation. The resolution simply states that the widening was All as agreed to by the property owners abutting said road. It does not necessarily mean to state that the widening was agreed to by all the property owners. Given the state of the record, particularly the contents of County Road File 2178, we decline to give the recitation the broader construction contended for by the City. It is just as reasonable to conclude that the recitation was intended to mean that the widening was agreed to by the property owners who signed the three-page document in the file as it is to conclude that the recitation refers to all the property owners. [6] This is particularly true in light of the sequence of events occurring from 1950 through 1952. In 1950, a group of property owners signed the document found by the parties in the county road file. On January 31, 1951, the County Court adopted Resolution 2178 declaring that the widening was all as agreed to by the property owners abutting said road. There is nothing in the official record, the file, or the stipulated facts to indicate an investigation by the county to determine whether there were property owners abutting Barger Drive in addition to those who signed the document. It is reasonable to conclude from this that the language used in the recitation was intentional, because at the time it adopted Resolution 2178 the County Court may not have known whether all the property owners agreed to the widening. We do not say, of course, that the City's interpretation of the recitation is an unreasonable one. Nevertheless, we believe that if a bare recitation in a public record is to be considered prima facie evidence of the fact alleged, this court should not extend the effect of the recitation beyond what it literally states, at least in cases where the matters dealt with in the recitation concern elements of procedural fairness and there is evidence tending to indicate that the recitation may not have been a carefully considered one. Cf., State of Oregon v. Officer, supra (holding a recitation that proof of posting notices had been made to the satisfaction of the Court insufficient to prove that it had been made as required by statute.) The City also relies on the statutory presumption contained in ORS 41.360(15) that official duty has been regularly performed. We hold that the presumption cannot be applied to establish that the Lane County Court gave notice to plaintiff's predecessor in interest. In a long line of prior decisions, this court has held that a county court that seeks to establish or alter a road can bar the claims of affected property owners to compensation for the taking of their property only if it actually appears in the records that the county complied with the notice statutes. Lauderback v. Multnomah County, supra; State of Oregon v. Officer, supra; Thompson v. Multnomah County, supra. We think this rule has developed out of more than a formalistic concern over jurisdictional requirements and that the primary concern is one of fairness to the property owners. It is not unreasonable to require the county to make some record, at least by way of allegation or recital, that notice requirements have been complied with when it attempts to acquire property of others. On the other hand, to presume that notice was given simply by virtue of the fact that an order was entered would impose an almost insurmountable burden of proof on the property owner to prove lack of notice, particularly in a case such as this when the county does not act on its order until over 20 years after it is entered. [7] Moreover, even were we to hold the presumption available in this case, one of the conditions precedent to the operation of the presumption is that the circumstances of the particular case add some element of probability. Highway Com. v. Heintz Constr., 245 Or. 530, 539, 423 P.2d 175, 179 (1967). For the reasons stated above, we do not believe the circumstances of this case suggest an element of probability that plaintiff's predecessor in interest received notice of the 1951 proceedings. Contrary to the position taken by plaintiff, however, we do not conclude from this that the 1952 order is void for lack of jurisdiction. We agree with the conclusion reached by Judge Joseph in his concurring opinion in the Court of Appeals that the failure of the Lane County Court to procure the agreement of plaintiff's predecessor did not deprive the County Court of jurisdiction to acquire the property of the persons who signed the agreement. The County Court complied with the initial requirements of ORS 368.470 when it declared its intention by resolution to widen Barger Drive and when it posted notices to that effect. The passage of the resolution being a legislative act, it was not necessary at this stage of the proceedings for the County to acquire jurisdiction over anyone. In order to acquire the property necessary for the road, however, it was necessary that the County comply with the notice requirements contained in ORS 368.445, which include a requirement that notice be mailed to the last known address of each affected owner. With respect to the property owners who joined in the 1950 agreement, however, mailed notice was not required. ORS 368.450 provides that any owner of land who signs the petition authorized by ORS 368.430 waives all further notice. By analogy, and under general common law principles of waiver, [8] a county court that attempts to authorize a road by resolution need not send mailed notice to persons who have signed an agreement to give up their property for the road. It follows that insofar as the property owners who signed the 1950 agreement are concerned, the Lane County Court had the power to acquire their property. In summation, we hold that (1) the Lane County Court validly acquired the property of those persons who signed the 1950 agreement, and (2) the Lane County Court did not validly acquire the property of plaintiff's predecessor in interest because it does not appear in the record, either by proof or by recital, that plaintiff's predecessor agreed to or received notice of the proposed widening.