Opinion ID: 3020766
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appellants’ Severance Motions

Text: Salehi, Sampson, and Azzizi each contend they were prejudiced when the District Court denied their pre-trial motions to sever. Sampson and Azzizi each claim prejudice from evidence of Salehi’s prior drug dealing activities admitted against Salehi; Salehi and Azzizi each claim prejudice from Sampson’s post-arrest inculpatory statement which was admitted for use against Sampson. 7 We review for abuse of discretion, United States v. Hart, 273 F.3d 363, 369 (3d Cir. 2001), under which Appellants face “a heavy burden.” United States v. Console, 13 F.3d 641, 655 (3d Cir. 1993). “The trial judge is in the best position to balance the possible prejudice to a defendant of a joint trial against the concerns of judicial economy. Therefore, an appellant must meet a particularly heavy burden to show that the trial court abused its discretion in denying a motion to sever.” United States v. Sebetich, 776 F.2d 412, 427 (3d Cir. 1985) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1017 (1988); accord United States v. Niederberger, 580 F.2d 63, 66 (3d Cir. 1978) (“a severance motion will not be disturbed in the absence of a clear showing of an abuse of discretion”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 980 (1978). To obtain a reversal, an appellant “must demonstrate ‘clear and substantial prejudice resulting in a manifestly unfair trial.’ ” Console, 13 F.3d at 655 (quoting United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 307 (3d Cir. 1989)) (emphasis in Sandini). Appellants do not prevail under this standard. The District Court removed potential prejudice with appropriate limiting instructions that assisted the jury in properly compartmentalizing the evidence. See Console, 13 F.3d at 655. More fundamentally, no Appellant has met his burden of demonstrating “clear and substantial” prejudice rising to the level of a “manifestly unfair” trial. Id. Accordingly, this ground has no merit.