Opinion ID: 853626
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Counselor's Testimony

Text: Cline next contends the trial court erred by admitting certain testimony of a police Crisis Counselor. We agree, but find the error harmless. The facts are these. The State called as a witness Maureen Ward who was employed by the Indianapolis Police Department as a Crisis Counselor and had worked in that capacity for ten years. Ward explained that her duties required her to respond to any situation where someone would be in crisis; homicide, sex crimes, robberies and that type of thing. R. at 735. On May 12, 1997, Ward arrived at Cline's home in response to a report of a baby that was not breathing. When Ward heard the age of the child, she assumed it was a case of crib death. R. at 737. As paramedics were transporting Alexis to the hospital, Ward drove Cline to the hospital. Ward testified that while in route Cline asserted three different times that she would never do anything to hurt her baby. R. at 737. After further questioning the following exchanged occurred: [Prosecutor]: Okay. Did you have occasion to talk to the police yourself after this encounter with the defendant that night? [Ward]: I did mention to Detective Jones that I thought her statements were [Defense Counsel]: Judge, I'm going to object to what this witness thought about the statements. Drawing conclusions. [Prosecutor]: Judge, I believe the witness can testify [about] her impression of what was said. [Court]: I believe the question was, what did she tell Detective Jones and she may answer that question. [Defense Counsel]: Judge, I object based on relevancy along the lines of what her answer was. [Court]: Objection overruled. You may respond. [Ward]: I found it odd because I've been on a lot of crib deaths. The parents never say anything about hurting their child because they know they didn't hurt them. R. at 738-39. The examination continued: [Prosecutor]: What did you tell [Detective Jones]? [Ward]: I told him that I felt it was strange [Defense Counsel]: Judge, I object to relevancy. [Court]: Note your objection and show it overruled You may answer the question. [Ward]: I told him I felt it was strange that she said that three (3) times in the car. I just thought it was something that he should know. R. at 739. Cline contends the trial court erred in allowing Ward to testify as to what she thought about Cline's statements. Cline argues that Ward was not an expert witness and thus her opinion was not relevant. The State concedes that Ward was not qualified as an expert witness under Ind. Evidence Rule 702. However, the State argues that Ward was not testifying as an expert, but rather as a skilled lay witness and was thus qualified to give her opinion under the provision of Ind. Evidence Rule 701. [2] The parties' argument over whether Ward was a lay or expert witness misses the mark. Taken in context the above colloquy shows that Ward was not giving opinion testimony as such. That is to say, she was not asked to give the jury her opinion about the statements Cline made. Rather, Ward was asked about what she told a police officer concerning Cline's statements. The question here is whether Ward's statements given to the police officer were relevant to any issue in this case. `Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Ind. Evidence Rule 401. We conclude that Ward's statement to a police officer did not make more or less probable any issue before the jury. At most, Ward's statements may have had a bearing on the focus of the officer's subsequent investigation. However, the officer did not testify regarding Ward's statement, and the focus of his investigation was not at issue. In sum, Ward's statement was not relevant and its admission into evidence was erroneous. [3] Nonetheless, the admission of irrelevant evidence will result in reversal only if it can be shown that the testimony substantially influenced the jury's verdict. Woods v. State, 677 N.E.2d 499, 505 (Ind. 1997). Here, the evidence showed that Cline's two-month-old child died as a result of blunt force injury to the abdomen. Although Cline attempted at trial to blame her boyfriend, two witnesses testified they overheard Cline tell her cellmate that she became stressed out when the child would not stop crying and as a result she punched the child in the stomach. Both witness were inmates with Cline at the Marion County Jail when they overheard the conversation. However, the record does not show that either witness was in any way compensated for or received favorable treatment for her testimony. Essentially, the credibility of the witnesses was not substantially shaken on cross-examination. Further, Cline's father testified that when he arrived home around 5:00 p.m. on May 12, Cline appeared as though she had just got out of the shower. R. at 392. This testimony contradicts Cline's assertion that she took a shower some three hours or so earlier when Jenkins was present. As a result, Cline's contention that Jenkins was alone with Alexis for twenty minutes during the time she showered was rebutted. In sum, given the other evidence presented at trial, it is unlikely that Ward's inadmissible testimony substantially influenced the jury's verdict. Hence, although the trial court erred in admitting the testimony, the error was harmless.