Opinion ID: 1391736
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Delay in Disclosing Prosecution Witness

Text: (23) Defendant asserts that the prosecutor unduly delayed the delivery to defense counsel of information regarding the probable testimony of defendant's cellmate Mark Mikles concerning defendant's admissions to him. The record reflects that Mikles' name was added to the prosecutor's witness list shortly before trial commenced. When defense counsel learned that Mikles would be called, he complained to the trial court that he had been given insufficient notice that the witness would be called. In response the trial court granted a brief continuance and appointed an investigator to assist defense counsel in preparing his defense to Mikles' testimony. In addition, the prosecutor offered to permit counsel to interview Mikles. Finally, defense counsel obtained a full preview of Mikles' testimony during a special foundational hearing (Evid. Code, § 402) conducted prior to Mikles' appearance on the witness stand. The grant or denial of continuances for discovery purposes is a matter peculiarly within the discretion of the trial court ( People v. Duck Wong (1976) 18 Cal.3d 178, 188-189 [133 Cal. Rptr. 511, 555 P.2d 297]) and defendant must demonstrate some resulting prejudice from the denial of a continuance ( People v. Laursen (1972) 8 Cal.3d 192, 204 [104 Cal. Rptr. 425, 501 P.2d 1145]). In the present case, a continuance was granted, and defendant fails to indicate in what manner the relief obtained by him was insufficient to protect his interests as it related to Mikles' testimony. Defendant suggests that the prosecutor acted improperly in failing to furnish to defense counsel, prior to trial, copies of all documents or reports summarizing the evidence to be offered at trial. Although we have held that the People must furnish, sua sponte, any evidence favorable to defendant (see People v. Nation (1980) 26 Cal.3d 169, 175 [161 Cal. Rptr. 299, 604 P.2d 1051]; People v. Ruthford (1975) 14 Cal.3d 399, 406 [121 Cal. Rptr. 261, 534 P.2d 1341]; In re Ferguson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 525, 533 [96 Cal. Rptr. 594, 487 P.2d 1234]), we have never required pretrial disclosure of unfavorable evidence, at least in the absence of a proper request therefor. We accordingly conclude that, no prejudice being shown, defendant's present contention of untimely or inadequate evidentiary disclosure is untenable.