Opinion ID: 2226822
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: What Type of State Interest Justifies First Amendment Intrusion

Text: Although the First Amendment is not absolute the state must demonstrate a particular type of interest to justify constitutional intrusions. The question which we must resolve is what type of state interest is necessary. To characterize the quality of the governmental interest which must appear, the Court has employed a variety of descriptive terms: compelling; substantial; subordinating; paramount; cogent; strong. United States v O'Brien, 391 US 367, 376-377; 88 S Ct 1673; 20 L Ed 2d 672 (1968). For example, in affirming an order that injunctive relief be given to state government employees threatened with being discharged solely because they were not affiliated with or sponsored by the Democratic Party, the Supreme Court held: It is firmly established that a significant impairment of First Amendment rights must survive exacting scrutiny. Buckley v Valeo, 424 US, at 64-65; NAACP v Alabama, 357 US 449, 460-461 (1958).    Thus encroachment `cannot be justified upon a mere showing of a legitimate state interest.' Kusper v Pontikes, [414 US 51, 58; 94 S Ct 303; 38 L Ed 2d 260 (1973)]. The interest advanced must be paramount, one of vital importance, and the burden is on the government to show the existence of such an interest. Elrod v Burns, 427 US 347, 362; 96 S Ct 2673; 49 L Ed 2d 547 (1976) (plurality). Similarly when analyzing whether Illinois' state interest in protecting the effective right to participate in political primaries justified a state court injunction prohibiting a group of party members from acting as convention delegates the Supreme Court held: Even though legitimate, the `subordinating interest of the State must be compelling   ' to justify the injunction's abridgment of the exercise by petitioners and the National Democratic Party of their constitutionally protected rights of association. NAACP v Alabama, 357 US 449, 463 (1958). Cousins v Wigoda, 419 US 477, 489; 95 S Ct 541; 42 L Ed 2d 595 (1975). Thus the First Amendment must yield to state intrusion when there is a compelling state interest present.