Opinion ID: 2633370
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Special Jury Instruction Concerning Mental Disease or Defect

Text: The prosecution proposed a special jury instruction for the sanity phase: The terms `mental disease' or `mental defect' does not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct. The instruction was taken from our opinion in People v. Fields (1983) 35 Cal.3d 329, 197 Cal.Rptr. 803, 673 P.2d 680, which in turn adopted it from subdivision (2) of the American Law Institute test for insanity. ( Fields, supra, at pp. 368-369, 197 Cal.Rptr. 803, 673 P.2d 680.) Defense counsel objected on the ground that Fields was not the applicable law at the time of the offense, and could not be applied retroactively to defendant's case. Although she asserted the instruction was misleading, she did not explain why. The trial court overruled the defense objection and delivered the instruction. Defendant now contends the trial court erred by failing to also deliver, sua sponte, another instruction further explaining the prosecution's special instruction using additional language from our Fields opinion. Thus, defendant argues the trial court erred by failing to have instructed the jury that [i]f that illness manifests itself in some other way as well, then it can be considered as a `mental disease' . . . and instances of criminal or antisocial conduct can be ascribed to that disease or cited as evidence of its severity. ( People v. Fields, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 369, 197 Cal.Rptr. 803, 673 P.2d 680.) We disagree. As defendant admits, when terms have no technical meaning peculiar to the law, but are commonly understood by those familiar with the English language, instructions as to their meaning are not required. ( People v. Anderson (1966) 64 Cal.2d 633, 639, 51 Cal.Rptr. 238, 414 P.2d 366.) In this case, the language of the special instruction (does not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal [conduct] (italics added)) clearly implies that where evidence of more than mere criminal conduct is present, such evidence can be considered as proof of a mental disease or defect. Here there was ample evidence presented to the jury at the sanity phase of the voices defendant said he heard in his head, his posttraumatic stress as a result of service in Vietnam, and other psychological problems. The jury would reasonably have understood that such evidence, if credited, coupled with the evidence of repeated antisocial behavior, could comprise evidence of insanity. Because the meaning of the prosecution's special instruction was clear, the trial court bore no sua sponte duty to give an additional instruction further explaining it. Defendant also contends counsel was ineffective for failing to request an explanatory instruction. Because the prosecution's special instruction was sufficiently clear, however, counsel's failure to seek an additional explanatory instruction could not have been prejudicial. Hence, counsel was not ineffective for failing to request more. ( People v. Kirkpatrick, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1008, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 818, 874 P.2d 248.) Moreover, because we find the prosecution's special instruction was not misleading, we reject defendant's further arguments that his sanity and penalty phase verdicts were rendered unreliable in violation of the state and federal Constitutions. Finally, we also reject defendant's additional apparent contention, raised with no supporting argument, that the instruction impermissibly lightened the prosecution's burden. It was defendant who bore the burden of proving his insanity. ( People v. Coddington, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 608, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 528, 2 P.3d 1081; see also People v. Earp, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 884, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 857, 978 P.2d 15 [we need not consider on appeal mere contentions of error unaccompanied by legal argument].)