Opinion ID: 1788913
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Imputation of Son's Negligence to Father in Action by Father Against Son.

Text: The trial court denied appellant Russell Dombeck's motion for judgment against defendants Richard Dombeck and Integrity Mutual on the ground that Richard's negligence must be imputed to his father under the provision of sec. 343.15 (2), because the latter had sponsored Richard's application for a driver's license. [2] This statute provides in part: Any negligence or wilful misconduct of a person under the age of 18 years when operating a motor vehicle upon the highways is imputed to the person who signed the application for such person's license. The question of whether this statute is applicable to an action by the sponsoring parent against the minor whose driver's license application was signed by the parent is one of first impression in this state. The Seventh circuit court of appeals, however, did pass on this identical question in Gilbertson v. De Long (7th Cir. 1962), 301 Fed. (2d) 284. By a split decision that court determined that no exception was to be read into the statute which would exclude its application to an action between sponsoring parent and child. The dissenting opinion asserted that the legislative purpose was to protect the public from damage caused by youthful drivers and not for the protection of such youthful drivers against liability for their own negligence. Given the broad interpretation placed upon this statute by the majority opinion in the Gilbertson Case, a parent would be precluded from recovering for the tortious act of a child whose driver's license the parent had sponsored where a principal-agent or joint-venture relationship existed. The general rule is that a principal may recover from his agent for loss or damage caused the principal by the negligent act of the agent. Restatement, 2 Agency (2d) p. 911, sec. 401; 3 Am. Jur. (2d) Agency, p. 583, sec. 202; 3 C. J. S., Agency, p. 46, sec. 162. The negligence of the agent will be imputed to the principal in an action by the latter against a third person, or by a third person against the principal. 38 Am. Jur., Negligence, p. 922, sec. 236. See also Restatement, 2 Torts, p. 1267 et seq., secs. 485, 486; Prosser, Law of Torts (2d ed.), p. 299, sec. 54. However, the negligence of the agent is not to be imputed to the principal in an action by the principal against the agent. Archer v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co. (1934), 215 Wis. 509, 515, 255 N. W. 67, 95 A. L. R. 851; 8 Am. Jur. (2d) Automobiles and Highway Traffic, p. 223, sec. 672. Likewise, while the negligence of one of two joint venturers is imputed to the other in actions against third persons, there is no such imputation where the action is between the joint venturers themselves. Johnsen v. Pierce (1952), 262 Wis. 367, 373, 55 N. W. (2d) 394; Klas v. Fenske (1946), 248 Wis. 534, 544, 22 N. W. (2d) 596; Restatement, 2 Torts, p. 1273, sec. 491. This court stated in Employers' Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Haucke (1954), 267 Wis. 72, 75, 64 N. W. (2d) 426, that the legislative purpose of sec. 343.15 (2), Stats., is to protect the public from damage caused by the negligent operation of vehicles by youthful drivers. It accomplishes this purpose by imputing the negligence of the sponsored minor driver to the sponsoring parent, guardian, or employer, where without the statute such imputation would not result because of the lack of a principal-agent or jointventure relationship. At the time of the enactment of sec. 343.15 (2), Stats., in 1941 (then numbered sec. 85.08 (9) (b)), the legislature probably gave no thought to a situation where a sponsoring parent might be suing the sponsored minor for damages caused the parent through the negligent operation of a motor vehicle by the sponsored minor. This is because of the then-prevailing rule in Wisconsin that a parent could not sue his unemancipated minor child in tort. See footnote 2, supra. However, a majority of this court considers it would work an unreasonable and absurd result if the statute were to be construed to abrogate, as between sponsoring parent, guardian, or employer and sponsored child, the rule that the negligence of an agent or joint venturer is not to be imputed to his principal or other joint venturer in an action between the parties. Thus we invoke the rule of statutory interpretation that a statute should not be construed to work an absurd result, even when the language seems clear and unambiguous. Connell v. Luck (1953), 264 Wis. 282, 58 N. W. (2d) 633; Laridaen v. Railway Express Agency, Inc. (1951), 259 Wis. 178, 47 N. W. (2d) 727; Pfingsten v. Pfingsten (1916), 164 Wis. 308, 159 N. W. 921. In view of the foregoing, we determine that, with respect to appellant Russell Dombeck's causes of action against defendants Richard Dombeck and Integrity Mutual, Richard's negligence is not to be imputed to his father. This requires that portion of the judgment which dismissed Russell Dombeck's complaint against these defendants be reversed, and that the cause be remanded for the entry of a proper judgment awarding him judgment against such defendants for the damages awarded him by the verdict for medical and miscellaneous expenses incurred by him for the injuries to Carol, for the funeral expenses incurred by him for Gail, and for one half the damages awarded for the wrongful death of Gail, together with costs and disbursements. By the Court. That part of the judgment which dismissed plaintiff Russell Dombeck's complaint against defendants Richard Dombeck and Integrity Mutual Insurance Company is reversed, and cause remanded for the entry of a judgment in behalf of this plaintiff against these defendants consistent with this opinion; in all other respects the judgment is affirmed.