Opinion ID: 2526152
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Lowe Was an Escaping Prisoner

Text: Section 4-106(b) of the Tort Immunity Act provides, in part, that: Neither a local public entity nor a public employee is liable for:    (b) Any injury inflicted by an escaped or escaping prisoner. 745 ILCS 10/4-106(b) (West 2008). The Act does not require a formal arrest or imprisonment, but rather defines prisoner as a person held in custody. 745 ILCS 10/4-101 (West 2008). There can be no doubt that Lowe was an escaping prisoner under this section. The Act does not define the term custody. Black's defines it as [t]he detention of a person by virtue of lawful process or authority. Black's Law Dictionary 442 (9th ed.2009). Black's further defines physical custody as custody of a person (such as an arrestee) whose freedom is directly controlled and limited. Black's Law Dictionary 1263 (9th ed.2009). As this court noted in People v. Campa, 217 Ill.2d 243, 298 Ill.Dec. 722, 840 N.E.2d 1157 (2005), an earlier edition of Black's explained that `The term [custody] is very elastic and may mean actual imprisonment or physical detention or mere power, legal or physical, of imprisoning or of taking manual possession.' Campa, 217 Ill.2d at 254, 298 Ill.Dec. 722, 840 N.E.2d 1157, (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 347 (5th ed.1979)). Thus, in Campa, this court determined that the term custody in the speedy-trial statute was sufficiently broad to include a defendant who was in a day reporting center program. Campa, 217 Ill.2d at 255, 298 Ill.Dec. 722, 840 N.E.2d 1157. This court found support for its conclusion in decisions such as People v. Simmons, 88 Ill.2d 270, 58 Ill.Dec. 781, 430 N.E.2d 1032 (1981), wherein the court determined that a person who failed to return for an independent day release program could be considered to have escaped from custody and thus prosecuted for escape. Campa, 217 Ill.2d at 255-57, 298 Ill.Dec. 722, 840 N.E.2d 1157. In the Miranda context, in which custodial interrogation triggers the requirement of the Miranda warnings, a person is considered in custody when a reasonable person would have felt that he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave. People v. Braggs, 209 Ill.2d 492, 506, 284 Ill.Dec. 682, 810 N.E.2d 472 (2003). See also United States v. Abdulla, 294 F.3d 830, 834 (7th Cir.2002) (An individual is considered `in custody' when his movement is restrained to the degree comparable to a formal arrest.). Clearly, Lowe was an escaping prisoner as defined by the Tort Immunity Act. If the legislature had meant the term custody to be so restrictive as to include only imprisonment, the legislature almost certainly would have used the term imprisonment instead. For purposes of this case, it is not necessary to determine how broad the term custody may be, as it is certainly broad enough to include situations such as this. Here, Oliva arrived at the scene of a traffic accident and was told that Lowe had caused the accident and was attempting to flee the scene. Oliva then placed Lowe in the back of his squad car. Lowe was in custody at this point. He was being detained, and his freedom of movement had been directly controlled and limited by Oliva's lawful authority. Moreover, a reasonable person placed in the back of a squad car by a police officer would not feel free to leave. Directly contradicting the position they took at trial, plaintiffs claim that whether Lowe was a prisoner was a question of fact that should have been resolved by the jury. [2] We disagree. This was not a question of fact. Rather, we agree with the City that the relevant inquiry is the legal effect of the undisputed facts. Here, given that Lowe was placed in the back of a squad car by a police officer who had been told that Lowe was trying to flee the scene of an accident that he had caused, Lowe was being held in custody as a matter of law. Thus, he met the definition of a prisoner under the statute, and he was an escaping prisoner when he stole the car.