Opinion ID: 1788315
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the trial court erred in allowing expert testimony concerning blood patterns.

Text: ¶ 9. Our well-established standard of review for reviewing the trial court's admissibility of evidence, including expert testimony, is abuse of discretion. Miss. Transp. Comm'n v. McLemore, 863 So.2d 31, 34 (Miss.2003); McGowen v. State, 859 So.2d 320, 328 (Miss.2003); Haggerty v. Foster, 838 So.2d 948, 958 (Miss.2002). Unless we can safely say that the trial court abused its judicial discretion in allowing or disallowing evidence so as to prejudice a party in a civil case, or the accused in a criminal case, we will affirm the trial court's ruling. McGowen, 859 So.2d at 328. ¶ 10. Turning to the evidence in today's case, the tee shirt has continuously been the focus of Jones's attention by way of written pre-trial motions, at pre-trial suppression hearings, during the trial, and after the trial through post-trial motions and on appeal to this Court. The trial judge did not rush to judgment on the admissibility of the shirt. At an evidentiary hearing on the issue of the admissibility of the tee shirt just moments before Graham was to be called to the witness stand to testify on the third day of trial, the trial court allowed the shirt into evidence, over the objection of defense counsel. ¶ 11. On appeal, Jones argues that the trial court committed reversible error in allowing Grant Graham, the State's expert, to testify about the stain patterns on the shirt because Graham could do nothing more than assume that the stains were in fact blood stains. Jones claims that there was only a very small spot on the front of the tee shirt [which] tested positive for human blood. Jones likewise asserts that one of the areas of the shirt about which Graham testified as to stain patterns had been tested and determined to be inconclusive as to the existence of human blood. Finally, Jones argues that no DNA testing was done to link the stain on the tee shirt to the murder victim. ¶ 12. To address this issue, we must go deeper into the record and read together the testimony of Christine Smith, the Crime Lab serologist, and Grant Graham, the bloodstain pattern analyst. Since this is a circumstantial evidence case, and since the testimony of Smith and Graham is critical to this case, we feel compelled to quote extensively from the record. Regarding her examination and testing of Jones's tee shirt, Smith testified:             A. First of all, I took the actual bag, cut it open, removed the item; made some documentation regarding what the item was, which is a white tee shirt. Then I made some notes as to where any reddish brown stains were located on the shirt. Did aperformed a screening test which tells us that certain stains might be blood, if it's positive. Once I performed that test, I then cut out on the stains. Which you can see here, I've removed them from the tee shirt. And did further testing to determine if in fact they were human blood or not. And in this particular case, I did cut those stains out and identified human blood on the front of this tee shirt.             A. On the front of this tee shirt, I've marked an area called T-3, and that just means test site three. With each particular area of the shirt, I start with one and then number the stains sequentially after that. And T-3, which would be this general area on the front of the tee shirt just below the neck, from those stains that I cut out, that blood was actually identified in that particular area.             A. Where you see the holes cut out on the front of this tee shirt just below the neck, human blood was identified in this area. And you can still see some of the reddish brown stains that were left out on the tee shirt that I did not cut out.             A. Uhm, you're referring to another cutout area just below where I've marked T-3, and that's just another area of that particular test site. So I basically tested this large giant area here. Q. And that was blood? A. Yes. Now, what you were referring to down here is another test site located on the front bottom seam, and I labeled that test site four. It did screen positive, which means it might be blood. But based on the stain from T-3, I just used that, because it was more concentrated and identified human blood and there was really no need to continue to identify blood over and over on the tee shirt.             Q. So, would it be your expert opinion, based on a reasonable degree of forensic certainty, that this area from the neck all the way down to, say, the belly button would be covered with blood? A. Uh, I would say that there was definitely human blood in that particular area that you're referring to. (emphasis added). ¶ 13. Smith likewise testified that she cut out other parts of the shirt and that one area which she tested was inconclusive for human blood, and she attributed the inconclusiveness of the test to the stain not being concentrated enough to give positive results. Smith likewise testified that the other cut outs screened positive, meaning that it might be blood, but she saw no reason to perform further testing because of the positive test results she had already obtained. Smith further testified that Jones's pants tested positive for human blood, as well as two door knobs. Jones's shoes and a box cutter had insufficient stains to test further and still have some left for possible DNA testing. Also, two other door knobs had no blood on them. On cross-examination, Smith testified as to why she did not test each of the twelve cut outs from the shirt. Q. And how many spots on the front of that tee shirt did you have a positive identification of blood? A. One. Q. What was the purpose of cutting the others out? A. Uh, because of the way that the stains are on the tee shirt, they are, I would say, light to medium in color. I took a larger portion of that particular stain so I would have plenty for human testing and then for any subsequent testing.             Q. What was the purpose of cutting T-3 out? A. Uh, because what I did is took this general area and if the stain looked similar in color and consistency to the stain at the top of the tee shirt, I considered this one area. Q. Oh, I see. You just assumed that what was down here was the same down on the lower part as what was up on the upper part of the chest area, is that right? A. Based on the color and consistency of the stain, yes. Q. All right. Did you tell me that on the sleeve area you found human blood? A. Uh, that stain I screened but did not test further. Q. Well, what was the purpose of cutting it out, if you weren't going to test it? A. Well, when I look at the item and I mark them with the test site numbers, screen it, if they are all positive, I cut out everything that's positive. Then when I go to determine whether it's human blood, I evaluate the stains and take the best stain as far as concentration and color, and do further testing on it. Smith testified that to her knowledge, no DNA testing was performed. ¶ 14. We now turn to the testimony of Grant Graham, who specializes in crime scene analysis and bloodstain pattern analysis as part of his duties with the Biloxi Crime Lab. Graham also examined and tested Jones's tee shirt. Graham concluded that there were transfer patterns of bloodstains on Stewart's bandana (scarf) which were consistent with the transfer patterns found in the upper chest area on the front of Jones's tee shirt. Graham also testified that his examination of the shirt caused him to conclude that certain bloodstains on the shirt were consistent with a medium velocity or cast off event associated with blunt force trauma or stabbing incident. It is readily apparent that Jones believes the following testimony from Graham undergirds his argument that Graham's opinions are based on conjecture, suspicion, and assumptions. During the cross-examination of Graham, we find this colloquy: Q. All right. Now, I believe that you're not a serologist, are you? A. No, I'm not. No. Q. So you have to defer to the serologist as to whether this is bloodstain or other stain, do you not? A. Yes. Q. And assuming thatwell, strike that. When you look at a stain, you are assuming that it is blood, is that right? A. No. I haveI look at a stain. It's a red stain. It justvisually, if I look at a stain and it visually looks like blood to me, I will do a bloodstain pattern analysis of it. The determination of whether or not the stain is blood is made by a serologist, not by me. For instance, if I get a shirt that has red staining similar to what we have in this case, as well as purple stains that look like it could come from an ink pen that may have broken or something, obviously the stains that appear to be ink are something that unless the pen was used as a weapon, I wouldn't be concerned with those kind of stains. I would be concerned with the stains that appear to be blood. Q. Okay, then let me go a step further. If it's a red stain, you view it asand you arewhen you are analyzing that stain, you assume that it is blood for the purposes of your analysis, is that right? To seewhen you are looking to see what shape it is and thatand the, uh to see whether it's cast off or not, you assume it's blood? A. Well, now, to say that I assume it's blood, I think is not the proper word for it. Q. What would be the proper word? A. It is possibly blood. Again, I don't know it's blood until it's been tested by a serologist. If a stain looks like blood visually to me, then I will do a bloodstain pattern analysis of it. If the serologist does a test and it doesn't turn out to be blood, at least I've done my analysis properly. That's my job. Q. That's my point, when you look at when you do your analysis, you are doing it as though it is blood? A. Yes. ¶ 15. In the trial of any criminal case, much less a circumstantial evidence case, the jury has to put the evidence together like pieces of a jigsaw puzzle, and in the end, view the evidence as a whole. By the time that Graham testified before the jury as to his bloodstain pattern analysis regarding, among other things, Jones's shirt, the jury had already heard extensive testimony from Smith, the serologist, regarding the human blood she found on Jones's shirt. Neither this Court, nor the jury, is required to view the evidence in a vacuum. ¶ 16. Effective May 29, 2003, this Court amended Miss. R. Evid. 702 to clarify the gate-keeping responsibilities of our trial courts in evaluating the admissibility of expert testimony. Our current Rule 702, which is now identical to Fed.R.Evid. 702, states: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. The comment to this amended rule clearly reveals this Court's effort to address the United States Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). [8] Thus, after years of applying the Frye standard [9] on the issue of the admissibility of expert testimony, we now apply the Daubert standard. See, e.g., Hughes v. State, 892 So.2d 203, 210 (Miss. 2004) (fn 1); Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc. v. Bailey, 878 So.2d 31, 60 (Miss.2004); Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc. v. Armond, 866 So.2d 1092, 1103 (Miss.2004) (Graves, J., specially concurring); Mississippi Transp. Com'n v. McLemore, 863 So.2d 31, 35-40 (Miss.2003); McGowen v. State, 859 So.2d 320, 340-41 (Miss.2003). ¶ 17. In McLemore, we acknowledged that under the Frye standard: [I]t is not necessary that one offering to testify as an expert be infallible or possess the highest degree of skill; it is sufficient if that person possesses peculiar knowledge or information regarding the relevant subject matter which is not likely to be possessed by a layman. 863 So.2d at 36 (citing Kansas City S. Ry. v. Johnson, 798 So.2d 374, 382 (Miss.2001) (quoting Hooten v. State, 492 So.2d 948 (Miss.1986))). ¶ 18. In adopting the Daubert test concerning expert testimony, we stated in McLemore that our state trial courts perform a critical gatekeeping role in addressing the admissibility of expert testimony, but that this role does not replace the adversary system. 863 So.2d at 39. There is a two-pronged inquiry which the trial court must perform in making a determination as to whether expert testimony is admissible, in that the trial court must first determine if the proffered testimony is relevant, and if relevant, then is the proffered testimony reliable. Id. at 38. We acknowledged that Daubert provides a non-exhaustive, illustrative list of reliability factors to aid the trial courts in exercising their discretion to determine whether expert testimony is admissible. Id. at 36. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-94, 113 S.Ct. 2786. Finally, in McLemore, we stated: The gatekeeping function of the trial court is consistent with the underlying goals of relevancy and reliability in the Rules. Daubert ensures that the relevancy requirements of the rules are properly considered in an admissibility decision. Rule 702 gives the judge discretionary authority, reviewable for abuse, to determine reliability in light of the particular facts and circumstances of the particular case. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 158, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238. We are confident that our learned trial judges can and will properly assume the role as gatekeeper on questions of admissibility of expert testimony. The modified Daubert test does not require trial judges to become scientists or experts. Every expert discipline has a body of knowledge and research to aid the court in establishing criteria which indicate reliability. The trial court can identify the specific indicia of reliability of evidence in a particular technical or scientific field. Every substantive decision requires immersion in the subject matter of the case. The modified Daubert test will not change the role of the trial judge nor will it alter the ever existing demand that the judge understand the subjects of the case, both in terms of claims and defenses. We are certain that the trial judges possess the capacity to undertake this review. 863 So.2d at 39-40. ¶ 19. The record in today's case clearly reveals that the trial judge was acutely aware of his responsibilities under Daubert, and our this Court's decision in McLemore and its progeny. Prior to the commencement of the court proceedings on the third day of trial, defense counsel again objected to the testimony of Graham, who was about to be called to the witness stand in open court. Outside the presence of the jury, when this issue was brought to the trial judge's attention, he stated let's go straight into a Daubert hearing. With the jury out, Graham took the witness stand and was questioned by counsel for the State and Jones. After the proffer, the following occurred: BY THE COURT: For the record, the Daubert hearing has been held. The defense attorney has spoken with the blood spatter expert and has an objection for the record. Mr. Shackelford. BY MR. SHACKELFORD: Your Honor, to exclude all evidence of all stains with the exceptionon the tee shirt with the exceptionor any of the clothing, with the exception of that designated as 9T3E, which is a cutting from the chest area, that being the only cutting which was confirmed to be blood by the serologist, Christie Smith, and in my conference with Mr. Graham, he tells me that he has to defer to the serologist because he is not one. The trial court denied defense counsel's motion in limine to exclude the blood spatter testimony on the grounds that Graham's testimony was based on the assumption that the stains on the shirt were in fact human blood. In applying Daubert to the facts and circumstances peculiar to the case sub judice, the trial court quite appropriately denied Jones's motion to exclude Graham's testimony, which was relevant and reliable as to his bloodstain analysis of the stains on Jones's tee shirt, which had by that time been identified by Christie Smith before the jury as human blood. In our adversary system of justice, Jones, through counsel, was able to extensively cross-examine both Smith and Graham as to their testimony, including their opinions and conclusions. Graham readily admitted on cross-examination that if the serologist determined that certain stains he tested turned out not to be human blood, then so be it, because he had done his job. In other words, in today's case, it was Smith's job to determine if the stains were human blood and it was Graham's job to analyze the stain patterns on the shirt and come to conclusions as to how they got there. Again, no case is tried in a vacuum. ¶ 20. The jury had every right to believe or disbelieve any part of, or all of, the testimony of Smith and/or Graham. This same right existed as to Jones's expert testimony offered through Paul Kish. The trial court properly instructed the jury, inter alia, that the jury's duty was to determine the facts from the evidence which had been presented in open court, and that the jury could exercise its discretion in determining what weight and credibility to assign to the testimony and any supporting evidence of each witness who had testified in the case. Concerning expert testimony, the trial court also instructed the jury via Instruction No. C-24, which stated in pertinent part: You will recall that individual(s) has/have testified as (an) expert(s) in this case. You should consider each expert opinion received in evidence in this case and give it such weight as you may think it deserves. If you should decide that the opinion of an expert witness is not based upon sufficient education and experience, or if you should conclude that the reasons given in support of the opinion are not sound, or that the opinion is outweighed by other evidence, then you may disregard the opinion entirely. Thus, the jury was more than adequately instructed by the trial court that if the jury felt that Smith was mistaken or simply wrong in her opinion regarding the presence of human blood on Jones's tee shirt, and/or that Graham was basing his blood pattern analysis on the erroneous belief or unsubstantiated assumptions that the stains were that of human blood, then the jury could disregard this expert testimony in its entirety. If the jury felt that Kish's testimony was more credible than that of Graham, then the jury certainly could have accepted Kish's testimony that one of the blood stains was a transfer pattern consistent with Jones merely picking up Stewart and placing her on the bed while she was bloody, thus supporting Jones's theory that he discovered the homicide and was moving Stewart to the bed upon discovering her body. By its verdict of guilty, the jury obviously chose to accept the State's expert testimony, which had been admitted by the trial court in performing its gatekeeping role under Daubert. ¶ 21. For these reasons, we find that the trial court did not commit error in allowing Grant Graham's expert testimony concerning blood patterns on Jones's tee shirt. Thus, this assignment of error is without merit.