Opinion ID: 200973
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of Spencer Press's Motion for a New Trial

Text: 24 We review the district court's denial of Spencer Press's motion for a new trial for an abuse of discretion. 4 Marrero v. Goya of P.R., Inc., 304 F.3d 7, 14 (1st Cir.2002). In doing so, we recognize that motions for a new trial are generally directed to the trial court's discretion and th[e] remedy is sparingly used. Dall v. Coffin, 970 F.2d 964, 969 (1st Cir.1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). A district court should only grant such motions if the outcome is against the clear weight of the evidence such that upholding the verdict will result in a miscarriage of justice. Ramos v. Davis & Geck, Inc., 167 F.3d 727, 731 (1st Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). 25 The jury found in favor of Johnson on his workplace harassment claim based on religion. Spencer Press argues that there was no causal link to religion and that the harassment was not severe and pervasive. To prevail on a harassment claim based on a supervisor's conduct, Johnson needed to carry his burden that: (1) he was a member of a protected class; (2) he was subject to uninvited harassment; (3) the offending conduct was because of his religion; (4) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to affect the terms and conditions of employment; (5) the offending conduct was both objectively and subjectively offensive; and (6) there was a basis for employer liability. Rivera v. P.R. Aqueduct & Sewers Auth., 331 F.3d 183, 189 (1st Cir.2003); O'Rourke, 235 F.3d at 728. Spencer Press argues that the jury's conclusion in favor of Johnson was against the clear weight of the evidence on both prongs (3) and (4). 26 In advancing the claim that any harassment was not due to religion, Spencer Press relies heavily on Rivera, in which we noted a conceptual gap between an environment that is offensive to a person of strong religious sensibilities and an environment that is offensive because of hostility to the religion guiding those sensibilities. 331 F.3d at 190. 5 Although Spencer Press admits that there may have been several isolated incidents in which the harassment manifested itself in comments implicating religion, it argues that this was not sufficient for the jury to conclude that Johnson was harassed because of his religion. 27 The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to grant a new trial. Soon after Halasz was promoted to custodial supervisor, he became aware that Johnson was a religious person. At approximately the same time, he started making extremely inappropriate and lewd comments to Johnson. At first, only some of these remarks explicitly targeted Johnson's religion: Halasz repeatedly said that Johnson must be Catholic because he did not want to do certain things. Gradually, though, the harassment came to focus unabashedly on Johnson's religious views. Halasz repeatedly called Johnson a religious freak, told him not to talk about religious bullshit, said that because of his religion he was not getting sex, and told him to take [the Virgin] Mary and turn her upside down and pull her dress over her head. 28 Almost all of the inappropriate comments concerning Johnson's religion focused on a consistent theme: that Johnson was too chaste and sober for Halasz's taste and that this was because of Johnson's religious beliefs. Halasz did not make similarly inappropriate and offensive comments to other Spencer Press employees. Given the consistency of the harassment that specifically invoked Johnson's religion and the more frequent harassment that did not, the jury could easily have concluded that the underlying motivation — religious discrimination — was the same for each. The jury also could have easily concluded that this motivation stemmed from Halasz's animosity towards Johnson's religious beliefs; indeed, Halasz explicitly attributed Johnson's chastity and sobriety to his religious convictions. As explained in Rivera, conduct need not be explicitly religious to constitute harassment because of religion. 331 F.3d at 190 n. 2; see Venters v. City of Delphi, 123 F.3d 956, 973 (7th Cir.1997) (religious harassment can be established through indirect comments that are not on their face about religion); cf. Landrau-Romero v. Banco Popular De Puerto Rico, 212 F.3d 607, 614 (1st Cir.2000) (Alleged conduct that is not explicitly racial in nature may, in appropriate circumstances, be considered along with more overtly discriminatory conduct in assessing a Title VII harassment claim.). 29 For similar reasons, we reject Spencer Press's argument that it was against the clear weight of the evidence for the jury to find that the harassment endured by Johnson was sufficiently severe or pervasive to affect a term, condition, or privilege of employment. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986). Whether the harassment was severe or pervasive must be answered by reference to `all the circumstances,' including the `frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance.' Marrero v. Goya of Puerto Rico, Inc., 304 F.3d 7, 18 (1st Cir.2002) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993)). Subject to some policing at the outer bounds, it is for the jury to weigh those factors and decide whether the harassment was of a kind or to a degree that a reasonable person would have felt that it affected the conditions of her employment. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 30 The description of facts set forth earlier provides more than ample support for the jury's conclusion. Halasz repeatedly and continuously insulted Johnson and mocked his religious convictions. The harassment occurred throughout Johnson's work day, including when he was attempting to perform his custodial duties. On multiple occasions, Halasz threatened Johnson with violence and once he actually placed the point of a knife under Johnson's chin. In sum, there was more than ample evidence to support the jury's conclusion that the harassment was severe and pervasive. See White v. N.H. Dep't of Corr., 221 F.3d 254, 260-61 (1st Cir.2000) (finding that disgusting comments and conversations that occurred everyday could support a finding that harassment was severe and pervasive). 31