Opinion ID: 3036690
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Certification of Final Judgment

Text: [10] AmerisourceBergen also appeals the district court’s certification of final judgment on Dialysist West’s counterclaim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). Rule 54(b) provides that final entry of judgment should be made on individual claims in multiple claim suits “upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Review of a district court’s certification of a final 3050 AMERISOURCEBERGEN v. DIALYSIST WEST judgment involves a two-step process. See Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 12 (1980). In the first step, we review the district court’s entry of judgment de novo and evaluate “such factors as the interrelationship of the claims so as to prevent piecemeal appeals.” See Gregorian v. Izvestia, 871 F.2d 1515, 1519 (9th Cir. 1989). The second step of review requires an assessment of the equities. We apply the “substantial deference” standard, reversing the district court only if we find the district court’s conclusions clearly unreasonable. Id. [11] The district court found that there was no risk of duplicative effort by the courts because any subsequent judgments in this case would not vacate its judgment on Dialysist West’s counterclaim. See Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S. at 8 (holding that proper factors for 54(b) review include “whether the claims for review were separable from the others . . . and whether the nature of the claims already determined was such that no appellate court would have to decide the same issues more than once”). We agree. Because Dialysist West’s counterclaim to recover for non-Epogen sales was not legally or factually related to AmerisourceBergen’s Epogen claim, no court need revisit this judgment. See Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc. v. Archer, 655 F.2d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 1981). [12] AmerisourceBergen contends that, as a matter of equity, the district court’s certification of its judgment on Dialysist West’s counterclaim should not be upheld because Dialysist West is insolvent. We recognize that insolvency is a factor that should weigh against the final entry of judgment on Dialysist West’s counterclaim. See Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 270 (1993) (acknowledging that “even a ‘threat of insolvency’ of the party seeking separate judgment is a factor weighing against it”). But as the Supreme Court held in Reiter: “[W]e cannot say that insolvency is an absolute bar [to certification].” Id.; see also Shintom Am. Inc. v. Car Tels. Inc., 45 F.3d 1107, 1110 (7th Cir. 1995) (affirming district court’s entry of final judgment under 54(b) despite the “preAMERISOURCEBERGEN v. DIALYSIST WEST 3051 carious financial condition and potential insolvency of the plaintiff”). In weighing the equities of Rule 54(b) certification, the district court concluded that certification was warranted because this result: (1) aligned with the set-off principles of the UCC; (2) helped avoid unreasonable delay; and because (3) AmerisourceBergen owed Dialysist West approximately $2.2 million. See AmerisourceBergen Corp., No. CIV-02-1472 PHX JWS, slip op. at 14-15. These factors are a sufficient basis for certifying final judgment in favor of Dialysist West. See Schieffelin & Co. v. Valley Liquors, Inc., 823 F.2d 1064, 1065-1067 (7th Cir. 1987) (permitting certification where defendant filed counterclaims and plaintiff asserted defenses that were “at least plausible”); C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Med. Elecs. Corp., 529 F. Supp. 1382, 1388 (D. Mass. 1982) (stating that court “saw no reason why plaintiff should be denied” use of substantial funds “while awaiting disposition of . . . counterclaims”). Moreover, the district court’s decision to favor Dialysist West’s creditors as a matter of equity is not erroneous where AmerisourceBergen has not shown that the debt it seeks to set-off is related to Dialysist West’s counterclaim. See Newbery Corp., 95 F.3d at 1399 (“[S]etoffs run contrary to fundamental bankruptcy policies such as the equal treatment of creditors and the preservation of a reorganizing debtor’s assets.”). [13] “The task of weighing and balancing the contending” equities of a case is “peculiarly one for the trial judge.” Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S. at 12. It is not the appellate court’s role to “reweigh the equities.” Id. at 10. The district court’s conclusions for certifying the judgment were not “clearly unreasonable.” We decline to vacate the certification of judgment. 3052 AMERISOURCEBERGEN v. DIALYSIST WEST