Opinion ID: 845579
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: MCL 257.625a(6)(d)

Text: The question before this Court is whether the Legislature intended that a violation of MCL 257.625a(6)(d) should result in dismissal of the case because the officer unreasonably denied defendant's request for an independent chemical test administered by a person of his own choosing. [3] The primary goal in construing a statute is `to give effect to the intent of the Legislature.' We begin by examining the plain language of the statute. People v. Stewart, 472 Mich. 624, 631, 698 N.W.2d 340 (2005) (citations omitted). The right to a reasonable opportunity to have an independent chemical test is created by statute, MCL 257.625a(6)(d): A chemical test described in this subsection shall be administered at the request of a peace officer having reasonable grounds to believe the person has committed a crime described in section 625c(1). A person who takes a chemical test administered at a peace officer's request as provided in this section shall be given a reasonable opportunity to have a person of his or her own choosing administer 1 of the chemical tests described in this subsection within a reasonable time after his or her detention. The test results are admissible and shall be considered with other admissible evidence in determining the defendant's innocence or guilt. If the person charged is administered a chemical test by a person of his or her own choosing, the person charged is responsible for obtaining a chemical analysis of the test sample. [Emphasis added.] Notably, the Legislature did not specify what remedy to apply if a police officer failed to advise, or denied, a defendant of his or her right to a reasonable opportunity to obtain an independent chemical test. By contrast, the Legislature has clearly specified that if a prosecutor fails to comply with subsection 8 of MCL 257.625a, the remedy available to a defendant for violation of subsection 8 of the statute is suppression of the results of the state-administered chemical test. [4] Had the Legislature intended a comparable remedy for a violation of subsection 6(d)or even the more drastic remedy of dismissalit could have so specified. People v. Monaco, 474 Mich. 48, 58, 710 N.W.2d 46 (2006) (citation omitted) (`Courts cannot assume that the Legislature inadvertently omitted from one statute the language that it placed in another statute . . . .'). MCL 257.625a(7) is also noteworthy. At the time defendant was arrested, MCL 257.625a(7) provided, in pertinent part, as follows: [5] The provisions of subsection (6) relating to chemical testing do not limit the introduction of any other admissible evidence bearing upon the question of whether a person was impaired by, or under the influence of, intoxicating liquor. . . . [6] Subsection 7 indicates that, notwithstanding the provisions regarding chemical testing evidence set forth in subsection 6, the Legislature intended to allow the prosecution to go forward on other evidence establishing impaired operation of a motor vehicle. Given this statutory language, a prosecutor could adduce evidence relating to a defendant's erratic driving, inability to perform field sobriety tests, or slurred speech, as well as other evidence tending to establish the defendant's impairment. Reading this subsection together with subsection 6, it would seem that the Legislature's intent, whether or not MCL 257.625a(6)(d) was violated, was to permit a prosecutor to go forward under MCL 257.625(1)(a) (OUIL) using other evidence, beyond chemical testing, to establish guilt. Dismissal, therefore, was not an anticipated remedy. [7] Notwithstanding the absence of statutory language mandating dismissal for a violation of MCL 257.625a(6)(d), the trial court and the Court of Appeals held that dismissal of the charges against defendant was required because of this Court's ruling in Koval, supra . This Court interpreted a previous version of MCL 257.625a(6)(d) in Koval, supra . In that case, the defendant was stopped for driving while intoxicated. Koval, supra at 456-457, 124 N.W.2d 274. The police officers failed to advise the defendant of his right to have an independent chemical test, contrary to defendant's statutory right. [8] The previous version of the statute, like the present version, did not provide a remedy. This Court held that noncompliance with the mandatory statutory requirement required dismissal of the charges against the defendant. Id. at 459, 124 N.W.2d 274. In reaching this conclusion, this Court cited the mandatory form of the statute and noted that the statute was enacted for the protection and benefit of a defendant charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Id. at 458, 124 N.W.2d 274. [9] As discussed, the text of the statute makes clear that the Legislature did not intend the remedy of dismissal to follow from a violation of the right to a reasonable opportunity for an independent chemical test. Additionally, our case law supports the conclusion that neither dismissal nor suppression of the evidence is an appropriate remedy for a violation of MCL 257.625a(6)(d). In People v. Hawkins, 468 Mich. 488, 512-513, 668 N.W.2d 602 (2003), this Court held that the exclusionary rule is a harsh remedy designed to sanction and deter police misconduct where it has resulted in a violation of constitutional rights . . . . (Emphasis partially deleted.) This appeal also involves violation of a statutory right, not a constitutional right. [10] This Court reaffirm[ed] that where there is no determination that a statutory violation constitutes an error of constitutional dimensions, application of the exclusionary rule is inappropriate unless the plain language of the statute indicates a legislative intent that the rule be applied. Id. at 507, 668 N.W.2d 602. Where there is nothing in the statutory language indicating that the exclusionary rule applies to a violation of a statute, this Court should decline to infer such legislative intent, because [t]o do otherwise would be an exercise of will rather than judgment.  People v. Stevens (After Remand), 460 Mich. 626, 645, 597 N.W.2d 53 (1999) (emphasis in original). This Court has repeatedly applied these principles in holding that suppression of the evidence is not an appropriate remedy for a statutory violation where there is no indication in the statute that the Legislature intended such a remedy and no constitutional rights were violated. See, e.g., Hawkins, supra; People v. Hamilton, 465 Mich. 526, 638 N.W.2d 92 (2002), overruled in part on other grounds in Bright v. Ailshie, 465 Mich. 770, 775 n. 5, 641 N.W.2d 587 (2002); People v. Sobczak-Obetts, 463 Mich. 687, 625 N.W.2d 764 (2001) [11] ; and Stevens, supra . Applying similar reasoning, we hold that dismissal, which is an even more drastic remedy, is not an appropriate remedy for a statutory violation unless the statute clearly provides otherwise. The language of MCL 257.625a does not reveal that the Legislature intended to impose the drastic remedy of dismissal or suppression of the evidence when an officer fails to give a defendant a reasonable opportunity for an independent chemical test. Accordingly, neither of these remedies is appropriate for a violation of MCL 257.625a(6). [12] We overrule Koval 's holding to the contrary. [13] But while the text of MCL 257.625a shows that the Legislature did not intend that dismissal or suppression of the evidence follow from a violation of subsection 6(d), the language of the statute does not render this Court powerless to act in the face of a police agency's violation of a defendant's statutory right to obtain potentially exculpatory evidence under MCL 257.625a(6)(d). Through MCL 257.625a(6)(d), the Legislature conferred on defendants a statutory right to develop potentially exculpatory evidence to refute the results of a police-administered chemical test. Thus, when a police officer denies a defendant his or her statutory right to a reasonable opportunity for an independent chemical test administered by a person of his or her own choosing, the officer prevents the defendant from exercising a statutory right to discover potentially favorable evidence in his or her defense. The jury should be permitted to weigh the police officer's wrongful conduct as well as the statutory right that the officer denied. When the defendant argues before trial that he was deprived of a reasonable opportunity for an independent chemical test, the trial court must determine, after an evidentiary hearing if necessary, whether the defendant was in fact deprived of this statutory right. If the court determines that a statutory violation occurred, then it is free, upon request of defense counsel, to inform the jury of this violation and instruct the jury that it may determine what weight to give to this fact. Such a jury instruction is an appropriate consequence for the violation of a mandatory statutory right to a reasonable opportunity for an independent chemical test because it will accord meaning to the right created in subsection 6(d) without creating a remedy that the Legislature did not intend. A jury instruction will also presumably deter police officers from violating that right in the future. We offer the following possible instruction for violations of MCL 257.625a(6)(d): Our law provides that a person who takes a chemical test administered at a peace officer's request must be given a reasonable opportunity to have a person of his or her own choosing administer an independent chemical test. The defendant was denied such a reasonable opportunity for an independent chemical test. You may determine what significance to attach to this fact in deciding the case. For example, you might consider the denial of the defendant's right to a reasonable opportunity for an independent chemical test in deciding whether, in light of the nonchemical test evidence, such an independent chemical test might have produced results different from the police-administered chemical test. [14] The court's authority to give such an instruction derives from the inherent powers of the judiciary. Const. 1963, art. 6, § 5, entrusts this Court with the authority and duty to prescribe general rules governing the practice and procedure in all courts in the state. [15] See People v. Glass (After Remand), 464 Mich. 266, 281, 627 N.W.2d 261 (2001). `It is also well settled that under our form of government the Constitution confers on the judicial department all the authority necessary to exercise its powers as a coordinate branch of government.' Maldonado v. Ford Motor Co, 476 Mich. 372, 390, 719 N.W.2d 809, 818 (Docket No. 126274, decided July 31, 2006), quoting In re 1976 PA 267, 400 Mich. 660, 662-663, 255 N.W.2d 635 (1977). The judicial powers derived from the constitution may not be diminished, exercised, or interfered with by other branches of the government. Lapeer Co. Clerk v. Lapeer Circuit Court, 469 Mich. 146, 162, 665 N.W.2d 452 (2003). Exercising this authority, our Court has enacted court rules that require the trial court to instruct the jury on the applicable law and give the court the discretion to comment on the evidence: Before or after arguments or at both times, as the court elects, the court shall instruct the jury on the applicable law, the issues presented by the case, and, if a party requests as provided in subrule (A)(2), that party's theory of the case. The court, at its discretion, may also comment on the evidence, the testimony, and the character of the witnesses as the interests of justice require. [MCR 2.516(B)(3).] [16] Additionally, the Legislature has directed the judiciary to instruct the jury on the law and permitted a court to comment on the evidence: It shall be the duty of the judge to control all proceedings during the trial, and to limit the introduction of evidence and the argument of counsel to relevant and material matters, with a view to the expeditious and effective ascertainment of the truth regarding the matters involved. The court shall instruct the jury as to the law applicable to the case and in his charge make such comment on the evidence, the testimony and character of any witnesses, as in his opinion the interest of justice may require. [MCL 768.29.] Thus, the judiciary has the authority and obligation under both court rule and statute to instruct the jury on the applicable law and the discretionary power to comment on the evidence as justice requires. The Legislature has not stripped the judiciary of these powers in this context. [17] It is also well-established in our case law that the trial court must instruct the jury on the law applicable to the facts of the case: [I]t is the duty of the circuit judge to see to it that the case goes to the jury in a clear and intelligent manner, so that they may have a clear and correct understanding of what it is they are to decide, and he should state to them fully the law applicable to the facts. Especially is this his duty in a criminal case. [ People v. Henry, 395 Mich. 367, 373-374, 236 N.W.2d 489 (1975), quoting People v. Murray, 72 Mich. 10, 16, 40 N.W. 29 (1888).] The trial court must instruct the jury not only on all the elements of the charged offense, but also, upon request, on material issues, defenses, and theories that are supported by the evidence. People v. Rodriguez, 463 Mich. 466, 472-473, 620 N.W.2d 13 (2000); People v. Reed, 393 Mich. 342, 349-350, 224 N.W.2d 867 (1975). The trial court's authority to comment on the evidence encompasses the power to summarize the evidence relating to the issues, call the jury's attention to particular facts, People v. Lintz, 244 Mich. 603, 617, 222 N.W. 201 (1928), and point out the important testimony so as to lead the jury to an understanding of its bearings, Richards v. Fuller, 38 Mich. 653, 657 (1878). The trial court's comments must be fair and impartial, Burpee v. Lane, 274 Mich. 625, 627, 265 N.W. 484 (1936), and the court should not make known to the jury its own views regarding disputed factual issues, People v. Young, 364 Mich. 554, 558, 111 N.W.2d 870 (1961), the credibility of witnesses, People v. Clark, 340 Mich. 411, 420-421, 65 N.W.2d 717 (1954), or the ultimate question to be submitted to the jury, Lintz, supra at 617-618, 222 N.W. 201. [18] The instruction we offer falls within the court's inherent authority to instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case and the discretionary power to comment on the evidence. [19] A defendant who is denied the statutory right to a reasonable opportunity for an independent chemical test administered by a person of his or her own choosing may advance the defense that the police-administered test was inaccurate, [20] and that the police deprived him or her of the opportunity to raise a reasonable doubt of guilt through an independent test. The trial court may instruct and inform the jury on the requirements of MCL 257.625a(6)(d) and properly comment on the evidence by bringing to the jury's attention that the defendant's statutory right has been violated. Such an impartial instruction will communicate no opinion and compel no outcome, but will only inform the jury of the law and the facts and allow the jury to draw its own conclusions. Thus, it will not encroach upon the exclusive province of the jury to weigh the testimony and draw inferences therefrom. People v. Larco, 331 Mich. 420, 430, 49 N.W.2d 358 (1951); People v. Dupree, 175 Mich. 632, 639, 141 N.W. 672 (1913). Such an instruction will also advance the judiciary's duty to assist the jury in ascertaining the truth. The late Joseph D. Grano once stated that the goal of discovering the truth should play a dominant role in designing the rules that govern criminal procedure. Grano, Confessions, Truth, and the Law (Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press, 1993), p. 6; see also Grano, Implementing the objectives of procedural reform: The proposed Michigan Rules of Criminal ProcedurePart I, 32 Wayne L. R. 1007, 1011, 1018 (1986); and Grano, Special issue: Introduction The changed and changing world of constitutional criminal procedure: The contribution of the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Policy, 22 U. Mich. J. L. Reform 395, 402-404 (1989). In analyzing the underlying purposes and objectives of procedural reform, Grano stated: [T]he primary objective of criminal procedure is to facilitate the ascertainment of truth. To some extent, therefore, fairness must encompass this concern. Accordingly, rules are unfair when they do not provide either party an adequate opportunity to develop and present his case. The special concern with fairness for the defendant, however, stems from the special abhorrence of erroneous conviction. Thus, basic agreement exists that a rule is unfair if it denies the defendant an adequate opportunity to defend against the charges. [Grano, Implementing the objectives of procedural reform: The proposed Michigan Rules of Criminal Procedure Part I, 32 Wayne L. R. 1007, 1018 (1986).] Promoting the truth-seeking process is one of the judiciary's primary goals in determining the appropriate action to take when one party prevents the other from obtaining evidence. Justice Markman has explained that [t]he discovery of the truth is essential to the successful operation of the system's mechanisms for controlling crime and mitigating its consequences. Markman, Special issue: Foreward: The truth in criminal justice series, 22 U. Mich. J. L. Reform 425, 428 (1989). [21] By placing all the facts before the fact-finder, the instant instruction will further the pursuit of the truth and give real effect to the right in MCL 257.625a(6)(d). This instruction will promote a basic premise of our justice system, that providing more, rather than less, information will generally assist the jury in discovering the truth. It will communicate an accurate account of what transpired and allow the jurors to apply the law to the facts as they decide. Where evidence or a witness is unavailable or compromised because of the conduct of prosecutors and police officers, the court should not keep more evidence away from the jurors, but should rather give the jurors all the pertinent information, including what has been denied to them, and allow them to assess the consequences. [22] Prohibiting the trial court from instructing the jury regarding a violation of MCL 257.625a(6)(d) would keep relevant information from the jury by concealing the denial of the defendant's statutory right to develop potentially exculpatory evidence. Not only would this impede the jury's search for the truth, but it would permit police officers to ignore a defendant's mandatory statutory right to a reasonable opportunity for an independent chemical test administered by a person of his own choosing without consequence. Thus, in light of our general power to instruct and comment on the evidence in criminal cases, and the trial's goal of promoting the search for truth, we conclude that in these narrow circumstances, the courts may give a jury instruction informing the jury that MCL 257.625a(6)(d) was violated. While we hold that the trial court may give a jury instruction where there is a violation of MCL 257.625a(6)(d), an instruction is not necessarily appropriate for a violation of every statutory right where the statute does not provide a remedy. It is appropriate in this case because it gives meaning to the statutory right to a reasonable opportunity for an independent chemical test administered by a person of his or her own choosing and is consistent with the judicial power to instruct on the law and comment on the evidence in the interests of justice. We limit application of the instruction to the statute at issue.