Opinion ID: 4512152
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Judicial Documents7

Text: The first inquiry—whether the video excerpts are judicial documents—is easily resolved here. Under our decisions in CBS and Graham, there can be little doubt that the video excerpts played for the jury constitute judicial documents.8 In CBS, we held “that the common law right to inspect and copy judicial records applies to videotaped depositions of witnesses,” and allowed the television network access to such videos for copying and potential broadcast. 828 F.2d at 959. As we explained in that decision, judicial documents include “any item entered into evidence at a public session of trial, 7 We note at the outset that Dressler sought the video recording of the entire deposition. The District Court denied that request and we, too, dismiss it out of hand because the jury did not see the entire recording, which appears to have been edited by the parties for the sake of an efficient presentation of the relevant testimony and not based on the repugnance of the substance. We therefore focus only on those portions of the video that were presented to the jury. 8We recognize that courts are not unanimous, however, in holding that recordings of testimony displayed to a jury or other factfinder—whether or not introduced into evidence—are judicial documents subject to the common law right of access. The Eighth Circuit, for example, has held that, where the relevant video or audio tape is “merely an electronic recording of witness testimony[,] . . . the public ha[s] a right to hear and observe the testimony at the time and in the manner it was delivered to the jury in the courtroom.” United States v. McDougal, 103 F.3d 651, 657 (8th Cir. 1996). That court recognizes no additional common law right to copy that recording, however. Id.; cf. Fisher v. King, 232 F.3d 391, 397‐98 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that the First Amendment right of access to criminal proceedings does not guarantee members of the general public access to original recordings entered in evidence). Our Circuit has taken a different approach, as described in the text. 12 excluding only those items entered under seal, but not distinguishing evidence on the basis of whether it was real or testimonial.” Id. (emphasis in original). That the parties did not seek admission as an exhibit either the entire video‐ recorded deposition at issue here or even just the portions shown to the jury makes no difference. Some other courts have distinguished between recordings that are introduced into evidence as exhibits and those that merely serve as a substitute for live testimony. See, e.g., Apple iPod iTunes Antitrust Litig., 75 F. Supp. 3d 1271, 1274 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (declining to apply a presumption of access to video of deposition that was played to the jury but was not admitted into evidence as exhibit). Our Circuit, however, rejected that distinction in Graham, where we held that video and audio recordings played at a pre‐trial detention hearing but not introduced into evidence as exhibits were nonetheless judicial documents subject to the presumption of public access. 257 F.3d at 152. In so doing, we held that “the definition of a ‘judicial document’ . . . extend[s] to any material presented in a public session of court relevant to the performance of the judicial function and useful in the judicial process whether or not it was formally admitted.” Id. at 153 (emphasis added). The District Court thus correctly ruled that those portions of the video‐recorded deposition that were played for the jury in the Mirlis proceedings are judicial documents and are therefore subject to the common law presumptive right of access, notwithstanding that they were not formally introduced into evidence.