Opinion ID: 1298680
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: viability of a strict liability claim

Text: In trial pleading, appellant alleged both manufacturing and design defect and failure to warn. Upon appeal, appellant asserts Michelin and Cobre Tire are subject to strict liability on the basis that the tires were defective because they were unsuitable and unsafe for their intended use and defective because of the failure to warn. Again, I perceive the claim as presenting a case of design defect of product insufficiency for its intended use. Cryts v. Ford Motor Co., 571 S.W.2d 683 (Mo. App. 1978). In Ogle, 716 P.2d at 344, we enumerated the elements in a products strict liability case that the (1)    sellers were engaged in the business of selling the product that caused the harm; (2)    product was defective when sold; (3)    product was unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer; (4)    product was intended to and did reach the consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it was sold; and (5)    product caused physical harm to the plaintiff/consumer. See also 2 American Law of Products Liability 3d, supra, § 10:40 at 55-56 (citing Ogle ). The intrinsic elements of that strict liability claim are: (1) injury resulting from a condition or defect of the product; (2) condition of product was an unreasonably dangerous one; and (3) condition or defect existed when product left defendant's control. Ostendorf v. Brewer, 51 Ill. App.3d 1009, 9 Ill.Dec. 780, 367 N.E.2d 214, 217 (1977); Mays v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 233 Kan. 38, 661 P.2d 348, 360 (1983). See also 2 American Law of Products Liability 3d, supra, § 16:42 at 57. In strict liability, the focus is on the nature of the product rather than the conduct of the defendant, and fault is not an element of liability proof. 63 Am.Jur.2d Products Liability § 532 at 730 (1984). The strict liability claim may be proven by circumstantial evidence. Stewart, 107 Ill.Dec. 40, 506 N.E.2d 783; Moslander, 628 S.W.2d 899. See also Colorado Serum Co. v. Arp, 504 P.2d 801 (Wyo. 1972), where this court utilized circumstantial evidence as predating adoption of strict liability in the 1986 Ogle case as such evidence is sufficient to make out a prima facie case if it tends to negate other reasonable causes or there is an expert opinion that the product was defective. Lucas v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 458 F.2d 495 (5th Cir.1972); Stewart, 107 Ill.Dec. 42, 506 N.E.2d at 785. Mays, 661 P.2d at 360 states that: Because liability in a products liability action cannot be based on mere speculation, guess or conjecture, the circumstances shown must justify an inference of probability as distinguished from mere possibility. While a plaintiff is not normally required to prove his case at the summary judgment stage, he must present some facts to support the elements of his claim. Establishing the defectiveness of a product may be less difficult under strict products liability than under negligence. Professor Prosser stated: The bare fact that an accident happens to a product, that an automobile goes into a ditch, is usually not sufficient proof that it was in any way defective.    On the other hand, the addition of very little more in the way of other facts, as for example   , that the defect had given trouble before the accident,    or the elimination of other causes, or the aid of expert opinion, may be enough to support the inference. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 Minn. L.Rev. 791, 843-44 (1966) (footnotes omitted). Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 402A, comment g provides: Defective condition. The rule stated in this Section applies only where the product is, at the time it leaves the seller's hands, in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him. Unreasonably dangerous is defined as: Unreasonably dangerous.    The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics. Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 402A, comment i. The restatement definition of defect is known as the consumer expectations test. Fischer, Tort Law: Expanding the Scope of Recovery Without Loss of Jury Control, 11 Hofstra L.Rev. 937, 967 (1983). Under this test, strict liability may be imposed if the product is unsafe beyond the extent reasonably contemplated by the ordinary consumer. Sims, 751 P.2d 357; Gomulka v. Yavapai Mach. and Auto Parts, Inc., 155 Ariz. 239, 745 P.2d 986 (1987); Controlled Atmosphere, Inc., 748 P.2d 686. [9] The consumer expectations test is substantially the same as the definition of defectiveness which was applied in discussion in appellant's negligence theory. The rule from Valentine, 665 P.2d at 462 (quoting Tweedy, 2 Ill.Dec. at 285, 357 N.E.2d at 452), is equally applicable under a strict liability theory (and under a warranty theory to be discussed infra): A prima facie case that a product was defective and that the defect existed when it left the manufacturer's control is made by proof that in the absence of abnormal use or reasonable secondary causes the product failed `to perform in the manner reasonably to be expected in light of [its] nature and intended function.' Additionally, in a strict liability case, proof of causation requires proof that the unreasonably dangerous condition of the product must have been a producing cause of the harm. Bell Helicopter Co., 594 S.W.2d 519; 63 Am.Jur.2d, supra, § 558; Restatement (Second) Torts, supra, § 402A(1). Proof of causation may be sufficient where the defect is demonstrated to be only a contributing cause and direct or circumstantial evidence which tends to exclude secondary causes establishes a prima facie case and a plaintiff need not disprove every cause of the injury other than the one alleged. Ostendorf, 9 Ill.Dec. 780, 367 N.E.2d 214. The evidence submitted by appellant indicated that the tires bounced and vibrated excessively commencing with first use, and that before the accident, Bridger mechanics could not isolate any cause of the abnormal bounce and vibration of the scraper other than the claimed defective tires. With other evidence of normal use and an intended function of the tires, I conclude that under strict liability, appellant has presented a case structuring factual issues of the requisite liability elements sufficient to require a jury analysis of the contested evidence. Davenport v. Epperly, 744 P.2d 1110 (Wyo. 1987). [10]