Opinion ID: 1691643
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Heading: Elements of crime. Iowa Code section 711.4 defines the crime of extortion:

Text: A person commits extortion if the person does any of the following with the purpose of obtaining for oneself or another anything of value, tangible or intangible, including labor or services: .... 3. Threatens to expose any person to hatred, contempt, or ridicule. .... Iowa Code § 711.4 (1989). The State had the burden to prove that (1) Crone threatened to expose Forman to hatred, contempt or ridicule (2) for the purpose of obtaining for himself or another (3) anything of value, tangible or intangible. Crone contends the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because there was insufficient evidence of a threat or of an attempt to gain anything of value. B. Existence of a threat. The State argued at trial that Crone threatened to circulate the illicit photographs of Forman if she did not meet with him. Crone claims on appeal that there is no evidence he actually threatened Forman. [1] Forman testified, however, that when Crone called her the day after their encounter, [h]e told me if I didn't meet him, he was going to talk to my boyfriend, my family, my friends, and start circulating these pictures. Forman said she interpreted Crone's phone calls to her as a threat. Section 711.4 does not define the term threaten, so we give this word its ordinary meaning. See State v. Ahitow, 544 N.W.2d 270, 271 (Iowa 1996); Iowa Code § 4.1(38) (1995). We look to the dictionary for guidance in determining the ordinary meaning of a word. State v. Romeo, 542 N.W.2d 543, 548 (Iowa 1996). Threaten is defined as promise punishment, reprisal, or other distress to. Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 2382 (1993). The word reprisal includes an action of retaliation. Id. at 1927. Threats need not be explicit; they may be made by innuendo or suggestion. State v. McGinnis, 243 N.W.2d 583, 589 (Iowa 1976). It is only necessary that the threat be definite and understandable by a reasonable person of ordinary intelligence. Id. We think there is substantial evidence to support a jury finding that Crone threatened Forman. A reasonable person of ordinary intelligence would have understood Crone's statements on the telephone to be a promise of a retaliatory act if Forman did not meet with him. Therefore, there is sufficient evidence of a threat by Crone. [2] C. Attempt to gain something of value. The State contended at trial that a meeting with Forman was something of value to Crone. On appeal, Crone claims the State's contention fails as a matter of law for two reasons. First, Crone asserts the exaction of a meeting with Forman is simply compelling her to do something against her will, an act not encompassed in our statute as interpreted in French v. Foods, Inc., 495 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 1993). Second, Crone argues there was no proof that a meeting had any value to him or anyone else because Crone's goal to embarrass Forman had already been accomplished by the time he called her. We find both arguments unpersuasive. Iowa's extortion statute as it existed prior to the new criminal code prohibited malicious threats done with intent to extort any money or pecuniary advantage whatever, or to compel the person so threatened to do any act against his will. Iowa Code § 720.1 (1977). In 1976, the extortion statute was rewritten to its present form, effective January 1, 1978. 1976 Iowa Acts ch. 1245, § 1104 (codified at Iowa Code § 711.4 (1979)). The statute now prohibits threats made with the purpose of obtaining for oneself or another anything of value, tangible or intangible, including labor or services. Iowa Code § 711.4 (1989). In the French case, we noted the difference between the former version of this statute and its current form: Section 711.4 is now limited to conduct aimed at obtaining something of value and no longer prohibits compelling a person to perform an act against their will. French, 495 N.W.2d at 772. Crone interprets this statement as decriminalizing a threat made to compel a person to do an act against the person's will. This reading of French is too broad. The change in language made in section 711.4 merely altered the focus of our analysis in deciding whether a threat falls within the statute; we now look to whether the defendant hoped to obtain anything of value for himself or another. Under the old statute there were alternate focal points: whether the defendant intended to extort money or a pecuniary advantage or whether the defendant attempted to compel the person threatened to do an act against that person's will. As we noted in French, the new statute did, in one sense, limit the prohibited conduct by eliminating the second alternative; a threat only designed to compel a person to do something against that person's will does not violate the statute. However, the amended statute also broadened the crime of extortion in Iowa because extortion is no longer limited to attempts to extort money or pecuniary advantage; the extortion of anything of value is now sufficient. Consequently, if a defendant's conduct is done for the purpose of obtaining something of value for himself or another, that conduct falls within the scope of the statute even though the defendant's threat might also be intended to compel the threatened person to do something that person does not want to do. We find substantial evidence that Crone's threats were intended to extort a personal meeting with Forman. If such a meeting had value to Crone, his threats are encompassed in the statute. The fact that Forman did not want to meet with Crone and that Crone intended to compel her to do so against her will is not a defense under the new statute. Thus, we now examine Crone's argument that a meeting with Forman had no value to him. Crone claims he had nothing to gain from a meeting with Forman because by the time he called Forman at home, he had already embarrassed her by showing the fliers and photographs to his friends at Maxie's. We think the jury could have found otherwise. Because the legislature did not define the word value, we use its ordinary meaning. See State of Iowa ex rel. Lankford v. Allbee, 544 N.W.2d 639, 640 (Iowa 1996); Romeo, 542 N.W.2d at 548; Iowa Code § 4.1(38) (1995). The dictionary defines value in several ways, two of which are potentially applicable here. One meaning is the monetary worth of something. Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 2530 (1993) (emphasis added). Another meaning is  relative worth, utility, or importance. Id. (emphasis added). Although the word value has two different meanings, that fact does not necessarily mean the term is ambiguous as used in section 711.4. We examine the text and structure of the statute, giving effect to its object and purpose, to decide whether reasonable minds would disagree on the meaning of the word value as used in the statute. See Ahitow, 544 N.W.2d at 271. The word value is modified in section 711.4:  anything of value, tangible or intangible.  Iowa Code § 711.4 (1993) (emphasis added). We think this language clearly points to the broader definition of value,  relative worth, utility, or importance, not the narrow definitionthe monetary worth of something. Consequently, we conclude reasonable minds would not disagree on which meaning was intended by the legislature: The statute is unambiguous. Moreover, even if we accepted Crone's argument that the statute is ambiguous, and therefore, apply rules of statutory construction, we would come to the same conclusion. A helpful tool in statutory interpretation is an examination of legislative history. See Iowa Code § 4.1(4) (1995) (if statute is ambiguous, court may consider former statutory provisions). We recently discussed the significance of amendments to a statute: Statutory amendments may either clarify or modify existing legislation. We construe revisions to a statute as altering that statute if the intent to change the law is clear and unmistakable. Moreover, any material change in the language of a statute is presumed to alter the law. Ahitow, 544 N.W.2d at 273 (citations omitted). Here the legislature changed the words money or pecuniary advantage to anything of value. We think this change is material because there is a distinct difference between monetary or pecuniary value and anything of value. The legislature must have intended to alter the scope of the statute by eliminating any limitation to monetary worth. Therefore, we conclude the term value as used in section 711.4 means the particular importance attached to something by the person making the threat. See Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 2530 (1993) (defining value as relative worth, utility, or importance); see also State v. Knutson, 220 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Iowa 1974) (holding satisfaction of defendant's sexual desires was a thing of value within meaning of kidnaping statute). Applying that definition here, we examine the record to determine whether there was substantial evidence a face-to-face meeting with Forman was important to Crone. We think there was. Crone was relentless in his efforts to exact such a meeting. He called Forman numerous times; he consistently asked her to meet with him. We reject Crone's argument that any meeting could not have had any value to him because he had already shown the photographs. It is not necessary that the jury be able to discern exactly why a meeting with Forman was important to Crone; it is enough that the evidence convinced the jury that for whatever reason a meeting with Forman was worth something to him. Such a conclusion is not unreasonable despite the fact that Crone had already shown the pictures and fliers to others. His wish for a personal meeting may have been as simple as a desire to witness the look on Forman's face when she saw the photographs. We conclude there was sufficient evidence that Crone threatened Forman with the purpose of obtaining something of value for himself. Therefore, Crone's trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge the jury's findings on these elements in his motion for judgment of acquittal.