Opinion ID: 2328716
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Failure to Object Claims

Text: We turn next to Taylor's ineffective assistance claims based on trial counsel's failure to object on four separate occasions during the trial. Each of those failures, Taylor argues, implicates errors of law that warrant reversal. Again, however, because Taylor failed to raise these claims at trial and on direct appeal, those claims are procedurally barred unless they fall within an exception to Rule 61. Taylor urges that his ineffective assistance of counsel argument operates as a basis to avoid a procedural default under Rule 61. [44] First, Taylor challenges his trial counsel's failure to object to evidence of non-statutory aggravating circumstances during the penalty phase. That evidence included criminal records which contained information about prior convictions, and also about charges the State declined to prosecute, or withdrew, or that were dismissed. In addition, Taylor attacks trial counsel's decision not to object to the admission, through the testimony of a presentence officer, of presentence reports from past convictions, which indicated that Taylor's prognosis was poor. This claim fails because even if trial counsel's failure to object were deemed an unreasonably deficient performancean issue that we do not reachTaylor has not shown any resulting prejudice, as Strickland's second prong requires. As the trial court observed, the evidence to which Taylor objects was only one small part of the State's presentation. Given the overwhelming independent evidence of aggravating factors presented by the State, the disputed criminal records, even if considered by the trial judge, would not create a reasonable probability under Strickland that the outcome of Taylor's sentencing would have been different. As the trial court found, the State presented substantial statutory aggravators, far outweighing the mitigators and that given those aggravators, Taylor's complete arrest records and `poor prognosis' do not account for the jury's recommendation. Those statutory aggravating factors included Taylor's prior convictions of violent crimes and the fact that his murder victim was pregnant. In short, none of Taylor's alleged failures-to-object to non-statutory aggravators would have created a record that would have swayed a reasonable sentencing judge to decide Taylor's sentence differently. [45] Second, Taylor argues that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to object to an alleged Gardner v. Florida [46] violation resulting from the trial court's consideration of evidence that Taylor's defense counsel had compiled in a mitigation notebook. In Gardner, the United States Supreme Court held that a trial court's consideration of a presentence report that had not been fully disclosed to the defendant or his counsel, deprived the defendant of due process. [47] Here, however, the material at issuethe mitigation notebookwas prepared and submitted to the trial court by Taylor's defense counsel after being reviewed by Taylor. Gardner has no application. In an effort to show prejudice, Taylor points to the trial court's reference in its Findings After Penalty Hearing to an isolated unfavorable description of him as chronically lacking ambition. That reference did appear in the mitigation notebook. But, even if trial counsel had objected to that single notebook reference, the outcome would be the same. As the trial court found, that lone reference does not change the outcome of the weighing process. Moreover, this argument ignores the court's reason for reviewing the notebookto seek out all available mitigating evidence to aid Taylor's defense. Because trial counsel's submission of the mitigation notebook was not objectively unreasonable and the trial court's reliance on an isolated unfavorable comment did not prejudice Taylor, this claim satisfies neither Strickland prong. Third, Taylor argues that trial counsel's failure to object to a prejudicial rebuttal argument by the prosecutor constituted ineffective assistance. The prosecutor's remark was made in response to defense counsel's jury arguments at the penalty hearing, that Taylor's criminal record was related to, and resulted from, Taylor's substance abuse issues. The prosecutor told the jury that: The drug problem we recognize, . . . but it shouldn't serve as an excuse. . . . Doesn't serve as an excuse for what he did. Taylor also insists that trial counsel should have objected when the prosecutor stated, referencing Taylor's confession letter, What does it matter, the fact that the letter that he wrote may have some indication that he was going to commit suicide? . . . It has no relevance here. During the penalty phase Taylor's counsel argued that the confession note's (arguably) suicidal expressions were evidence of remorse, which is a mitigating factor. The prosecutor's remarks in response were intended to rebut that latter argument. In its decision denying postconviction relief, the trial court acknowledged that the prosecutor's remarks could plausibly have drawn objections from defense counsel. The court held, nonetheless, that the prosecutor's arguments were not unfairly prejudicial; therefore, neither was defense counsel's failure to object to them. Taylor relies on Lesko v. Lehman [48] to support this claim of error. His reliance is misplaced. In Lesko, the Third Circuit held that the prosecutor's criticism of the defendant for not expressing remorse violated the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. [49] Here, in contrast, Taylor's counsel argued to the jury that his expressed remorse was a mitigating factor. That argument opened the door to rebuttal, and the prosecutorial response at issue was made to rebut that claim, by questioning whether Taylor's arguably suicidal expressions amounted to mitigating evidence. Moreover, these prosecutorial remarks were made in the broader context of the State's presentation of other independent evidence indicating that Taylor lacked remorse. As the Lesko court recognized, the defendant could not claim a fifth amendment privilege against cross-examination or prosecutorial comment on matters reasonably related to his credibility or the subject matter of his testimony. [50] Nor can Taylor show a reasonable probability, under Strickland, that the outcome of his case would have been different had trial counsel objected to both prosecutorial remarks. Those remarks occurred during Taylor's penalty hearing and were properly made to counter mitigating evidence presented by Taylor's counsel. Reconstructing the record by presupposing that those hypothetical objections were made would not change a reasonable sentencing judge's decision on the outcome of the penalty phase. [51] Because in that context Taylor cannot be said to have suffered cognizable prejudice under Strickland, the trial court properly denied this ineffective assistance claim. Fourth, and finally, Taylor contests his trial counsel's decision not to object to the trial court's anti-sympathy jury instruction. [52] That claim ignores the fact that an anti-sympathy jury instruction is required under Delaware case law, [53] and that the United States Supreme Court has held that an anti-sympathy jury instruction does not violate the U.S. Constitution. [54] Therefore, trial counsel's failure to object to the court's anti-sympathy instruction was neither objectively unreasonable nor prejudicial under Strickland. As the trial court correctly found, for each of Taylor's failure to object claims, an objection by trial counsel was either not required or would not have been reasonably likely to change the result of the case, or both.