Opinion ID: 891708
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mandamus Jurisdiction Is Proper

Text: {21} This Court will exercise its original jurisdiction in mandamus when the petitioner presents a purely legal issue concerning the non-discretionary duty of a government official that (1) implicates fundamental constitutional questions of great public importance, (2) can be answered on the basis of virtually undisputed facts, and (3) calls for an expeditious resolution that cannot be obtained through other channels such as a direct appeal. State ex rel. Sandel v. N.M. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 1999-NMSC-019, ¶ 11, 127 N.M. 272, 980 P.2d 55; see also N.M. Const. art. VI, § 3 (The supreme court shall have original jurisdiction in quo warranto and mandamus against all state officers, boards and commissions. . . .); NMSA 1978, § 44-2-5 (1884) (The writ shall not issue in any case where there is a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.). {22} The Attorney General's petition raises questions implicating the Land Commissioner's constitutional ability to engage in land exchanges. As noted, the scope of the Land Commissioner's authority has been the subject of the Enabling Act, congressional acts, the New Mexico Constitution, state legislative initiatives, state and federal judicial opinions, and proposed constitutional amendments. The meaning of the law that created the Land Commissioner's post and established his charge, and the outcome in this case, could have far reaching implications for millions of acres of state trust land and the trust beneficiary institutions. At issue, therefore, are fundamental constitutional questions of the greatest public importance. {23} This case also demands an expeditious resolution that can only come through our exercise of mandamus. The largest of the land exchanges has already been consummated, another is nearly complete, and the remaining two are in advanced stages of negotiation. Until this dispute is resolved, the legal status of thousands of acres of land, along with the property rights of the private parties involved, hang in the balance. Although the district court has concurrent jurisdiction in mandamus cases, when issues of sufficient public importance are presented which involve a legal and not a factual determination, we will not hesitate to accept the responsibility of rendering a just and speedy disposition. State ex rel. Bird v. Apodaca, 91 N.M. 279, 282, 573 P.2d 213, 216 (1977); see also State ex rel. Taylor v. Johnson, 1998-NMSC-015, ¶ 17, 125 N.M. 343, 961 P.2d 768 (finding that a significant and purely legal question of government-actor powers under the New Mexico Constitution would find its way to this Court, even if the action began in the district court). {24} The Land Commissioner contends that alternative channels exist to challenge the exchanges, making mandamus improper. Specifically, he suggests either an administrative contest, declaratory or injunctive relief, or a challenge to the Land Commissioner's regulations under the Administrative Procedures Act. These alternatives are all inadequate. {25} An administrative contest is permitted by any persons or corporation claiming any right, title, interest or priority of claim, in or to any state lands, covered by any lease, contract, grant or any other instrument executed by the commissioner. NMSA 1978, § 19-7-64 (1912); see also 19.2.15.1 to .18 NMAC (6/30/2004). It also allows [a] person aggrieved by a decision of the commissioner to challenge any final agency action in district court. NMSA 1978, § 19-7-67 (1999). Yet the Attorney General is not personally aggrieved by the Land Commissioner's decisions, nor does he have any right, title, interest, or priority of claim, in or to any state lands, covered by any lease, contract, grant or any other instrument executed by the commissioner. Section 19-7-64. Rather, the Attorney General is acting on behalf of state interestsstate trust land and the beneficiaries of the trustas the office requires. See NMSA 1978, § 8-5-2(A) (1975) ([T]he attorney general shall . . . prosecute and defend all causes in the supreme court and court of appeals in which the state is a party or interested.); State ex rel. Burg v. City of Albuquerque, 31 N.M. 576, 584-85, 249 P. 242, 246 (1926). {26} Declaratory judgment, although theoretically an option, does not constitute an adequate remedy at law that would preclude mandamus relief. See City of Albuquerque v. Ryon, 106 N.M. 600, 602-03, 747 P.2d 246, 248-49 (1987) (providing that declaratory judgment actions are not intended to substitute for remedies such as mandamus). Finally, the Administrative Procedures Act is not a vehicle for challenge in this case because that act only applies to agencies made subject to its coverage by law, or by agency rule or regulation if permitted by law. NMSA 1978, § 12-8-23 (1969). No laws or agency rules have been adopted making that act applicable to the State Land Office or the Land Commissioner. {27} The last issue regarding our exercise of mandamus jurisdiction turns on whether the Attorney General's petition presents a purely legal question concerning a ministerial duty of the Land Commissioner. See NMSA 1978, § 44-2-4 (1884) ([Mandamus] may be issued . . . to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station.). A ministerial act . . . is an act or thing which [a public officer] is required to perform by direction of law upon a given state of facts being shown to exist, regardless of his own opinion as to the propriety or impropriety of doing the act in the particular case. State ex rel. Four Corners Exploration Co. v. Walker, 60 N.M. 459, 463, 292 P.2d 329, 332 (1956). {28} We recognize that the Land Commissioner has broad discretion to manage state trust lands, and mandamus cannot be used to compel an executive officer acting within his discretion. See Bird, 91 N.M. at 282, 573 P.2d at 216 (citing Mitchell v. King, 537 F.2d 385 (10th Cir.1976)); see also N.M. Const. art. 5, § 1 (creating the executive department and including the commissioner of public lands). We have held, however, that mandamus is appropriate to determine the outer bounds of that discretion. See, e.g., State ex rel. Shepard v. Mechem, 56 N.M. 762, 767, 250 P.2d 897, 900 (1952); Sender v. Montoya, 73 N.M. 287, 292, 387 P.2d 860, 863 (1963) (holding that mandamus is proper when an officer is performing ministerial duties, and explaining that language . . ., to the effect that mandamus is inappropriate where interpretation and judgment are necessary, must be considered in context, not as an inflexible rule), overruled on other grounds by State ex rel. Reynolds v. Molybdenum Corp. of Am., 83 N.M. 690, 695, 496 P.2d 1086, 1091 (1972). {29} We do not question the Land Commissioner's motivation or judgment in engaging in land exchanges. Rather, we address two specific legal questions regarding the Enabling Act's limitations on the Land Commissioner's discretion. We address each of the legal questions in turn. First, Does the Enabling Act authorize the Land Commissioner to exchange land with private parties, without application of Section 10's sales provisions? This is a purely legal question that we answer in the negative in Section II. We further conclude that land exchanges for monetary (appraised) value are in-kind sales and are thus subject to the Enabling Act's sales provisions. {30} Because we conclude that land exchanges for monetary (appraised) value are subject to the Enabling Act's sales provisions, we move on to a second purely legal question: As a matter of law, do the challenged exchanges comply with the required elements for a valid sale of land, including the requirement of a public auction to the highest and best bidder? In Section III, we conclude that, as a matter of law, the exchanges do not comply with Enabling Act's Section 10 requirement that lands shall not be sold or leased, in whole or in part, except to the highest and best bidder at a public auction. The Land Commissioner is correct that he cannot be compelled to hold a public land offering. That decision is within the Land Commissioner's discretion. If he does decide to sell (or exchange) land, however, the Land Commissioner has an enforceable, ministerial duty to comply with the sales provisions of Section 10 of the Enabling Act. He has no discretion to do otherwise. {31} It is a factual determination, which we need not reach, whether making land exchanges is generally beneficial to the trust. It is also a factual determination whether the exchanges at issue would benefit the trust. The Land Commissioner makes a cogent argument supporting his conclusion that certain private land exchanges would improve the management and value of state trust lands. We accept the Land Commissioner's argument. {32} This case hinges upon the meaning of the Enabling Act that created the trust and provided for its administration. Neighbor-to-neighbor exchanges may well be in the best interest of the trust, but if the Enabling Act does not provide the Land Commissioner with authority to conduct exchanges, then they cannot be done. If they are permitted, they must conform to conditions imposed by the Act.