Opinion ID: 785393
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Emergency Aid Exception to the Warrant Requirement

Text: 11 Based on the facts as alleged by Martin, we conclude, as did the district court, that the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement is applicable, and thus his constitutional rights were not violated. The emergency aid exception, adopted by this court in United States v. Cervantes, has three prongs: 12 (1) The police must have reasonable grounds to believe that there is an emergency at hand and an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life or property. (2) The search must not be primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence. (3) There must be some reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched. 13 219 F.3d 882, 888-90 (9th Cir.2000) (quoting People v. Mitchell, 39 N.Y.2d 173, 383 N.Y.S.2d 246, 347 N.E.2d 607, 609 (1976)). In an emergency situation, police officers are permitted warrantless entry into a home as part of their community caretaking function. United States v. Bradley, 321 F.3d 1212, 1214 (9th Cir.2003); see also Cervantes, 219 F.3d at 889. 14 The district court correctly determined that the emergency aid exception provided the officers with qualified immunity; however, the court applied the exception under the second prong of Saucier rather than the first. In performing the initial inquiry, we are obligated to accept Martin's facts as alleged, but not necessarily his application of the law to the facts. The issue is not whether Martin states a claim for violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, but rather whether the officers actually violated a constitutional right. Because the emergency aid exception applies, we answer the threshold inquiry of Saucier in the negative. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978) ([T]he Fourth Amendment does not bar police officers from making warrantless entries and searches when they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid.). However, this minor error does not affect the ultimate determination by the district court that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. 15 As discussed in the district court order, all three prongs of the Cervantes test are satisfied in this case. First, the officers had reasonable grounds to believe that there existed an immediate need for their assistance. Traci's father phoned the police stating that he was urgently concerned for the welfare of his daughter, and that she may be in trouble inside the house. Pursuant to receiving this information, the officers arrived at Martin's residence, where both Martin's and Traci's cars were in the driveway. The suggestion by the neighbor that Martin and Traci should be home, in connection with the lack of response to repeated knocking, and an unanswered call to Traci's phone supported the officers' reasonable belief that they had a duty under the community caretaking function to investigate a potential emergency situation. 16 Second, there is no doubt that the officers' search was not motivated by an intent to arrest or to seize evidence. The only reason they were at Martin's home was in response to Traci's father's request to check the welfare of his daughter. Once the officers' identified Traci and were able to see that she was not in trouble, they left the residence shortly thereafter. Martin provides no evidence to suggest any motivation to the contrary. 17 Third, the Officers had a reasonable basis for associating a potential emergency with Martin's house. As discussed in Cervantes, in order to satisfy the third prong, an officer's search must be limited to only those areas necessary to respond to the perceived emergency. 219 F.3d at 890. The officers' reasonable conclusion that a potential emergency situation could be located inside Martin's home was sufficiently supported by a father's concern about his daughter, the neighbor's indication that the daughter should be in the residence, the presence of her car in the driveway, and the unexplained failure to respond to their knock on the door. The officers did no more than search the areas of Martin's home where Traci could potentially be located, and thus the third prong is satisfied. 18 In Murdock v. Stout, we determined that exigent circumstances justified a warrantless entry under conditions similar to those the officers confronted in this case. 54 F.3d 1437 (9th Cir.1995). Although Murdock was decided prior to Cervantes, its analysis is very similar to the three-prong approach we have since adopted. In Murdock, three police officers arrived at a house after having received a call from a passing neighbor who had observed what he believed was suspicious activity at the home. When the officers arrived, the exterior doors were secure with the exception of the rear sliding door, which was slightly open. In addition, the lights and television were on, indicating that someone was or should have been at the residence. The officers shouted their presence, but received no response. No one answered the phone when it rang. The officers entered the home through the open door, and after a cursory search found the resident taking a nap. We held that 19 indicat[ions] that a resident should have been home, but was not responding, combined with the earlier report of suspicious activity and the presence of the open door tip the scales to supply the officers with probable cause to believe... that a resident in the house might have been in danger or injured. 20 Murdock, 54 F.3d at 1442. 21 Just as in Murdock, there were indications here that either Traci or Martin should have been home, and indeed they were both inside. Id. In addition, both Murdock and the instant case involve reasonable requests that prompted the police to fulfill their responsibility to investigate potentially suspicious activity and protect the communities they serve. Id. at 1442. Therefore, the officers' warrantless entry falls squarely within the emergency aid exception and community caretaking function, and as a result Martin's Fourth Amendment right to be secure in his home clearly was not violated.