Opinion ID: 2506435
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Negligence versus Recklessness, Willfulness, and Wantonness

Text: This Court has long noted the troublesome question of the distinction to be made in the degrees of negligence. Hicks v. McCandlish, 221 S.C. 410, 414, 70 S.E.2d 629, 631 (1952). An examination of these distinctions will be helpful in considering Berberich's arguments. [N]egligence is the failure to use due care, i.e., that degree of care which a person of ordinary prudence and reason would exercise under the same circumstances. Hart v. Doe, 261 S.C. 116, 122, 198 S.E.2d 526, 529 (1973). It is often referred to as either ordinary negligence or simple negligence. Recklessness implies the doing of a negligent act knowingly; it is a conscious failure to exercise due care. Yaun v. Baldridge, 243 S.C. 414, 419, 134 S.E.2d 248, 251 (1964) (citation omitted). If a person of ordinary reason and prudence would have been conscious of the probability of resulting injury, the law says the person is reckless or willful and wanton, all of which have the same meaningthe conscious failure to exercise due care. Id.; see also Rogers v. Florence Printing Co., 233 S.C. 567, 577, 106 S.E.2d 258, 263 (1958) (The test by which a tort is to be characterized as reckless, wil[l]ful or wanton is whether it has been committed in such a manner or under such circumstances that a person of ordinary reason or prudence would then have been conscious of it as an invasion of the plaintiff's rights.). The element distinguishing actionable negligence from willful tort is inadvertence. Rogers, 233 S.C. at 578, 106 S.E.2d at 264. It is well settled `that negligence may be so gross as to amount to recklessness, and when it does, it ceases to be mere negligence and assumes very much the nature of willfulness.' Jeffers v. Hardeman, 231 S.C. 578, 582-83, 99 S.E.2d 402, 404 (1957) (quoting Hicks v. McCandlish, 221 S.C. 410, 415, 70 S.E.2d 629, 631 (1952)). [1] [T]he terms `willful' and `wanton' when pled in a negligence case are synonymous with `reckless,' and import a greater degree of culpability than mere negligence. Marcum v. Bowden, 372 S.C. 452, 458 n. 5, 643 S.E.2d 85, 88 n. 5 (2007). Evidence that the defendant's conduct breached this higher standard entitles the plaintiff to a charge on punitive damages. Id. Punitive damages are appropriate where there is evidence the tortfeasor's conduct was reckless, willful, or wanton. Cartee v. Lesley, 290 S.C. 333, 350 S.E.2d 388 (1986). Ordinarily, the test is whether the tort has been committed in such a manner or under circumstances that a person of ordinary reason or prudence would have been conscious of it as an invasion of the plaintiff's rights. Id. at 337, 350 S.E.2d at 390.