Opinion ID: 91
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of Stanley's Confession

Text: To be entitled to relief based on an alleged violation of his Miranda rights, Stanley must show that the state court's determination that he was not in custody when he attempted to invoke his right to silence and right to have an attorney present during questioning either was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Stanley has failed to make this showing and, therefore, is not entitled to relief on this claim. Under clearly established federal law, Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a person's freedom as to render him `in custody.' Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994) (citations omitted). [2] The ultimate inquiry underlying the question of custody is simply whether there was a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest. Id. (citation and alteration omitted). To answer this question, the reviewing court looks to the totality of the circumstances, id. at 322, 114 S.Ct. 1526, that might affect[] how a reasonable person in that position would perceive his or her freedom to leave. Id. at 325, 114 S.Ct. 1526. On direct review, the Arizona Supreme Court identified eight facts which, together, rendered Stanley's interview non-custodial. [3] First, the investigation that led officers to question Stanley was initiated by Stanley's report that his wife and daughter were missing. See Stanley, 809 P.2d at 948. Second, the interview took place at the county building rather than the police station. See id. Third, Stanley voluntarily agreed to the interview. See id. Fourth, he was told that he was not under arrest and was not a suspect. See id. Fifth, he was not disarmed of his hunting knife. See id. Sixth, the investigation was focused on a search for missing persons. . ., not on a homicide. Id. Seventh, during the interview Stanley left the office, unaccompanied, to get something to drink and use the restroom. See id. Eighth, there was no display of weapons by police, and no use of physical force or threatening language. See id. Stanley contends that the state court failed to address the increasingly accusatory nature of the questioning to which he was subjected. This argument lacks merit. An officer's expressed suspicions may be relevant to the issue of custody. See Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 325, 114 S.Ct. 1526. However, [e]ven a clear statement from an officer that the person under interrogation is a prime suspect is not, in itself, dispositive of the custody issue, for some suspects are free to come and go until the police decide to make an arrest. . . . In sum, an officer's . . . beliefs concerning the potential culpability of the individual being questioned, may be one among many factors that bear upon the assessment whether that individual was in custody, but only if the officer's views or beliefs were somehow manifested to the individual under interrogation and would have affected how a reasonable person in that position would perceive his or her freedom to leave. Id. (emphasis added). Although it is somewhat troubling that the court failed to explicitly address the accusatory nature of Saravo's questioning, the omission does not render the court's application of federal law unreasonable. In the context of determining whether a state court has reasonably applied clearly established federal law to reach its determination, the range of reasonable judgment can depend in part on the nature of the relevant rule. Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 664, 124 S.Ct. 2140. The custody test is general, id. at 665, 124 S.Ct. 2140, and [t]he more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations. Id. at 664, 124 S.Ct. 2140 (citation omitted); see also Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 494-95, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977) (per curiam) (holding that a suspect was not in custody despite being informed that he was a suspect and confronted with fabricated evidence linking him to the crime). Because the state court delineated and weighed factors comparable to those the Supreme Court has considered, cf. Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 664, 124 S.Ct. 2140, we conclude that the Arizona Supreme Court reasonably applied federal law in determining that Stanley was not in custody when he confessed.