Opinion ID: 1228595
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendants assert trial court erred in sustaining plaintiff's objections to evidence in three instances.

Text: The first involved a question asked plaintiff on cross-examination. He was asked But B.D.I. to your personal knowledge had shown an interest in this property of Prybil's before you got your listing, had it not? Plaintiff's objection on the ground of materiality was sustained. No offer of proof was made, and therefore no error was preserved. Busker v. Sokolowski, 203 N.W.2d 301, 303 (Iowa 1972). Also, we believe trial court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the objection. We agree with defendants that under their theory of defense evidence of the fact of B.D.I's prior interest in the property was admissible. Larson v. Thoma, 143 Iowa 338, 121 N.W. 1059 (1909). However, whether plaintiff actually knew of that interest was immaterial. The fact of B.D.I's interest was fully shown by other evidence which was admitted. For example, a realtor testified he had presented a written offer from B.D.I. to Howard in 1965. Although the court might well have overruled the objection, it did not commit reversible error in sustaining it. The other two challenged rulings occurred during the testimony of Robert Osmundson. The witness had probated the Prybil estate, represented Gladys Spies in the first partition action, later represented B.D.I., and at the time of trial was a district court judge. At one point Judge Osmundson volunteered he had advised Gladys Spies that B.D.I. was interested in purchasing the farm. Plaintiff's objection on the ground of hearsay was sustained, and the answer was stricken. The ground of the objection was good. Vine Street Corporation v. City of Council Bluffs, 220 N.W.2d 860, 862 (Iowa 1974). The Court's ruling was right. Several questions were asked seeking to elicit Judge Osmundson's opinion as to who produced B.D.I. as a purchaser. Objections to these questions were sustained. An offer of proof was made in which the witness testified he believed his efforts and not plaintiff's were the efficient cause of the sale. Plaintiff made inadequate objections to this testimony. However, since the objections were sustained the rulings will be upheld if the evidence could be held inadmissible on any theory, even though not urged in the objections. Porter v. Iowa Power and Light Company, 217 N.W.2d 221, 231 (Iowa 1974). The receipt of opinion evidence rests largely in the discretion of trial courts, and we will not reverse their rulings unless manifest abuse of discretion is shown. Ganrud v. Smith, 206 N.W.2d 311, 314 (Iowa 1973). We find no abuse of discretion here. There are at least three grounds on which the evidence could have been held inadmissible. One is that the court could have found the foundation for the opinion was inadequate. If the factual foundation for an opinion is insufficient it is nothing more than conjecture. Bernal v. Bernhardt, 180 N.W.2d 437, 441 (Iowa 1970); Tiemeyer v. McIntosh, 176 N.W.2d 819, 824 (Iowa 1970). Here the witness knew what he had done but not what plaintiff had done to effect the sale. Furthermore he was not familiar with negotiations conducted directly with plaintiff by officers of B.D.I. The court may have concluded he had insufficient information upon which to base an opinion. In addition, the court could have found the opinion to be superfluous. The witness fully testified to what he did in relation to B.D.I.'s purchase of the property. He was not testifying as an expert but simply as a witness with special knowledge of the events in which he participated. Trial court may have felt it was sufficient for the witness to detail the events and let the jury draw the inferences. An opinion which is not likely to assist the jury need not be received. See Schmitt v. Jenkins Truck Lines, Inc., 170 N.W.2d 632, 651 (Iowa 1970); Henneman v. McCalla, 260 Iowa 60, 78, 148 N.W.2d 447, 458 (1967); 7 Wigmore on Evidence, § 1918 (Third Ed. 1940); McCormick on Evidence, § 12 at 26 (Second Ed. 1972). Finally, the court may have viewed the questions as calling for an opinion on a question of law. In Grismore v. Consolidated Products Co., 232 Iowa 328, 361, 5 N.W.2d 646, 663 (1942), this court said: When a standard, or a measure, or a capacity has been fixed by law, no witness, whether expert or non-expert, nor however qualified, is permitted to express an opinion as to whether or not the person or the conduct, in question, measures up to that standard. On that question the court must instruct the jury as to the law, and the jury must draw its own conclusion from the evidence. See 7 Wigmore on Evidence, supra, § 1952; McCormick on Evidence, supra, at 28-29. The concept of efficient producing cause involves a legal standard upon which the court did later instruct the jury. We hold trial court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining plaintiff's objections to the questions calling for Judge Osmundson's opinion on that issue. III. Defendants' assignments of error relating to the court's instructions involve either instances in which error was not preserved by exceptions at trial or instances in which alleged error occurred in instructions on plaintiff's implied contract theory. Objections to instructions may not be raised for the first time on appeal, Pose v. Roosevelt Hotel Company, 208 N.W.2d 19, 25 (Iowa 1973), and, since the jury found for plaintiff on his express contract theory, any error in the instructions on implied contract is moot. We find no merit in any of defendants' assignments of error. IV. One final matter requires attention. Defendants contend plaintiff caused unjustified expense by unnecessary designation of testimony for inclusion in the appendix. See rule 344.1(b), Rules of Civil Procedure. We agree with defendants that much of the testimony designated by plaintiff had no bearing on the issues involved in the appeal. The total cost of printing the appendix was $400.50. Plaintiff is taxed with $300 of that cost. Affirmed.