Opinion ID: 1447258
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: direction of verdict and matter of instructions

Text: Counsel does not separately present argument that the court should have directed verdict for the defendant but states only that for reasons elsewhere set forth the court erred in not directing the verdict because of lack of proof. We have alluded to this contention previously and consider that there was sufficient proof to justify the court's having permitted the matter to go to the jury and that there was substantial evidence upon which the jury could have found that a contract existed. Defendant's objections to instructions involve 5, 6, 9, 11, and 12. As to Instruction 12 her position seems to be that because of lack of proof as to net value and damages the widow may very well be deprived of a full one-half of the estate. For reasons heretofore noted, it is unnecessary to further discuss this matter. Defendant criticizes Instruction 5 as enabling plaintiff to prove her contention by a preponderance of the evidence when in fact a stricter rule should have been applied, but at the time of the trial even defendant admitted that the matter was explained in other instructions and her concern was only with the possibility that the jury might be confused. If this instruction is read and construed in conjunction with the others which were given, there would be no reasonable cause for complaint, and this is particularly true in the light of Instruction 6, which after stating that plaintiff's proof must be clear and convincing concluded, The plaintiff's burden is something more than a mere preponderance of the evidence in this respect, but this does not require the plaintiff to prove her case beyond all reasonable doubt. We hold there to have been no error. Defendant claims Instruction 6 told the jury that they could find an offer by simply reviewing the letters introduced and determining if they expressed a purpose and urges this to have been error as the instructions provided no other definition of offer. We have carefully reviewed each paragraph of the instruction and find defendant's position untenable. Apparently the sentence which defendant refers to is, In this case there is evidence in the handwriting of the deceased, which you may consider as to his offer to make a contract. (Emphasis supplied.) While the thought of that sentence may have been more artfully expressed, the meaning was clear, and we view defendant's objection to be groundless. Instruction 9 read,    the removal of an alien from the land of his birth and from his parents and relatives to the United States, may constitute sufficient consideration to support a contract, and defendant argues that the instruction selected one piece of the evidence, commented upon it, thus placed undue emphasis upon only a portion of the case  invading the province of the jury  and constituted an improper definition of consideration, quoting as a definition therefor that set out in 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 70. Plaintiff responds that this instruction simply stated the law enunciated in Pangarova v. Nichols, supra, which, in turn, is based upon law from other jurisdictions so holding. Although we are of the view that it is not propitious to extract portions of an appellate court opinion to be used as an instruction even though the identical case is concerned, under the circumstances here no prejudicial error is shown  even were we to hold arguendo that Instruction 9 should not have been given. Further, it is to be noted that defendant did not herself present any other instruction on the subject at the time of the trial. Instruction 11 read,    if the contract provided that Tsetsy Pangarova, the plaintiff herein, had to perform and do certain things and services or other conditions and if you find that Tsetsy Pangarova did not perform these things, services or conditions, then you must find against plaintiff and for the defendant, unless you find that she was excused from performance by defendant or those for whom he was responsible. Defendant argues that in this instruction there was no reference to decedent whatsoever and that the defendant, as the executrix of the estate, had nothing whatever to do with the contract or its performance. It would appear obvious that the use of defendant in the phrase that she was excused from performance by defendant or those for whom he was responsible was a stenographic error, decedent having been intended, and that had this been drawn to the court's attention at the time of trial it would have been corrected, but in any event defendant did not observe any miswording at the time of presentation of objections regarding the instructions since she then asked only that the final six words be stricken and that or someone for him  (emphasis supplied) be substituted therefor. We find no reversible error because of this matter. Defendant's statement concerning the court's failure to give her proposed Instructions A, B, C, D, E, F, and G, consists of five sentences, and consequently, we do not propose to examine each of the instructions individually. Suffice to say that after careful examination of those which were given to the jury we cannot hold that reversible error occurred in their refusal. From a careful analysis of the record together with the views presented by the briefs and argument of counsel, we conclude that (1) there was presented in the trial court evidence of promises and understandings between the deceased Nichols and his niece, Tsetsy Pangarova, which though not concentrated in a single document, warranted the case's having been submitted to the jury, (2) the evidence was sufficiently substantial upon which the verdict could be predicated, provided such amount was not over one-half of the net value of the estate at the time of death less just debts and proper expenses of administration, and (3) no prejudicial errors occurred during the trial which justify a reversal. Affirmed.