Opinion ID: 1194884
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: The district court erroneously sentenced appellant by relying on impermissible evidence

Text: The defense called Nancy Clark, a professional who provided an alternate sentencing report based on interviews with people involved in the case. The district judge asked Clark approximately 100 questions, many of which concerned information the judge obtained from presiding over the criminal proceedings involving Cody Rice or from reading Cody's presentence report. Christie asserts this conduct indicates that in sentencing Christie, the district court judge improperly relied upon information never provided to the defense. In particular, Christie complains about the district judge's professed disbelief that Christie was unaware of Cody's drug and alcohol abuse. NRS 176.156(1) governs the disclosure of presentence reports and states: The court shall disclose to the district attorney, the counsel for the defendant and the defendant the factual content of the report of the presentence investigation and the recommendations of the division and afford an opportunity to each party to object to factual errors and comment on the recommendations. In Shields v. State, 97 Nev. 472, 634 P.2d 468 (1981), this court concluded that the trial court's failure to provide the defense counsel with police reports which were contained in the presentence report violated NRS 176.156 and deprived the defendant of due process. This due process violation was highlighted by the fact that the district judge's sentencing decision manifestly was affected by information contained in the reports. Id. at 473, 634 P.2d at 469. In this case, the district judge spent quite a bit of time questioning Clark about the credibility of Christie's professed unawareness of Cody's drug and alcohol use. In his questioning of Ms. Clark, it was apparent that the judge was relying on the information furnished by Cody in his presentencing report and sentencing hearing. Repeatedly, the district judge asked how Christie could not have known of Cody's alcohol and drug abuse when Cody's habit and conduct as described by him would have been obvious to anyone. In effect, the judge was accepting Cody's statements of continual and excessive drug use as true and asking Clark to square Christie's professed lack of knowledge of Cody's drug problem with such statements. This was part of the larger inquiry the district judge was making about whether Christie had lied when she testified. A judge should always disclose information he has received from third parties concerning the sentencing of a defendant. Todd v. State, 113 Nev. 18, 931 P.2d 721 (1997). And if it appears from the record that the judge used such material or relied on it, the use of the information is deemed prejudicial if not divulged to the defendant. Id. at 26, 931 P.2d at 726; see also U.S. v. Copeland, 902 F.2d 1046 (2d Cir.1990) (defendant entitled to opportunity to respond to information considered by sentencing court); U.S. v. DeVore, 839 F.2d 1330 (8th Cir.1988) (court permitted defendant to review co-defendant's presentence investigation containing codefendant's version of the robbery). There is no evidence in the record that the defense was provided with a copy of Cody's presentence report or that Christie's attorney stipulated to its use at Christie's sentencing. The district judge's perception of Christie's veracity was critical. Christie called numerous witnesses at the sentencing hearing who portrayed her as a responsible young adult who had no prior criminal record of any type and would almost certainly do well on probation. The district judge admitted as much. I don't doubt a word of what all your friends and relatives and employers have said about you. By every single account from every source, you are a positive, productive, intelligent, able person. You're a person with good judgment. You're extremely industrious. In striking contrast to most of the defendants who come before the Court, you don't have any history of drug abuse, alcohol abuse, unemployment. You have a record every parent would hope for their child: an A student, a good employee, a participant in a program for gifted and talented students, a manager of other employees at a young age. In short, a model life. In viewing Christie's positive life before the birth of her child and the criminal neglect of which she was convicted, the district judge posed the following two extremes: Either she shouldn't be in prison or [on] probation, just congratulate her for being a nice person and go home, or she should be punished very severely. The judge later speculated that perhaps Christie knowingly let her child be severely abused by Cody to take [the child] out of the picture and remove the obstacle to the flourishing of her life with her husband. The judge's opinion of Christie's credibility did in large measure determine whether she received the lightest or the most severe sentence. In accepting Cody's statements in the presentence report and using them in a critical analysis of whether Christie had fabricated her testimony, the judge apparently came to the conclusion that Christie had lied and that she was partly responsible for the child's death. Cody's presentence report was just as important to Christie as was the police report in the Shields case, and perhaps more so. The prosecutor even referred to Cody's presentence report in his closing argument. Therefore, we believe that since the district court's use and reliance upon Cody's presentence report without providing the defense with a copy constituted prejudicial error, we are compelled to reverse the sentence in this case and remand for resentencing. To eliminate any problem with what the sentencing judge may remember from the sentencing of Cody, the resentencing shall be conducted by another district court judge. Since we conclude that the use of Cody's presentence report requires us to reverse this sentence, it is not necessary to consider Christie's remaining claims of error committed at sentencing.