Opinion ID: 2646575
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Hensley Factors

Text: Our most recent mandate in this case specified that on remand, the district court was to re-evaluate the twelve Hensley factors and determine whether any further reduction to the fee award is proper. Diaz, 704 F.3d at 154 (footnote omitted).7 The district court did not do so explicitly. Rather, in the order in which it recalculated the lodestar, the district court stated that [s]ilence on a matter reflects this Court's conclusion that its earlier opinion accurately reflects the law and the decision in this matter and requires no further elaboration. After recalculating the lodestar and again excluding hours spent on untenable claims, the district court expressly reiterated that it saw no significant reason to make any further adjustments up or down. Jiten now argues that the district court's failure to make explicit on remand its reconsideration of each Hensley factor indicated a failure to consider the factors at all. 7 The factors, enumerated in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 430 n.3 (1983), include: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the 'undesirability' of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases. -14- While the district court could have been both more responsive and more helpful had it provided a more detailed explanation as to how it was exercising its discretion on remand, its failure to do so does not lead us to adopt Jiten's conclusion. On remand, the district court explicitly noted that it [took] its earlier attorney's fees and costs determination . . . as its starting point. Although it did not again incant the reasons guiding the exercise of its discretion in declining to adjust the award in light of the Hensley factors, it had previously enumerated its reasons as to eight of them. We had then rejected its reasons for adjusting downward on the basis of the remaining four. See Diaz, 704 F.3d at 154 ([W]e conclude the district court's fee reduction improperly focused on Diaz's rejection of the settlement offer.). The district court's statement makes clear that the court declined on remand to adjust its prior analysis as to any of the factors, not that it declined to consider the factors at all. See Berman v. Linnane, 434 Mass. 301, 303 (2001) (holding that in applying the factors under the Massachusetts fee-shifting statute at issue here, a factor-by-factor analysis, although helpful, is not required). We therefore reject Jiten's claim.