Opinion ID: 21695
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ambiguities in the Contract's Terms

Text: 15 The parties disagree as to what services were performed after execution of the December 24, 1996 contract. Kimmons argues that although Jordan continued to provide consulting services to Kimmons until October 1997, Jordan did not make any introductions of persons to Kimmons that resulted in investments after December 24, 1996. Therefore, Kimmons argues, Jordan is not entitled to any finder's fees under the direct efforts clause of the December 1996 contract. Jordan contends that it is entitled to such finder's fees because of its direct efforts which resulted in new investors for Kimmons after the contract execution date. Resolution of this issue turns on the meaning of direct efforts in the December 1996 contract. 16 Jordan contends that summary judgment is not appropriate because the terms of the contract are ambiguous and create a genuine dispute as to a material issue of fact for the jury. However, while an ambiguous contractual term may create a fact issue for the jury, [w]hether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law for the court to decide by looking at the contract in light of the circumstances existing at the time the contract was entered into. Reilly v. Ranger Management, Inc., 727 S.W.2d 527, 529 (Tex. 1987). 17 If [an] agreement is worded so that this Court can ascertain a certain or definite meaning, it is not ambiguous. If the agreement, however, is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation, it is ambiguous. A contract is not ambiguous merely because the parties disagree upon the correct interpretation or upon whether it is reasonably open to just one interpretation. If the agreement is ambiguous, summary judgment is improper because interpretation of the agreement is a fact question for the jury. 18 Childers v. Pumping Systems, Inc., 968 F.2d 565, 569 (5th Cir. 1992). 19 Applying that rule, we conclude that the direct efforts clause of the December 24, 1996 contract is not ambiguous in any material respect. The clause provides that Jordan will be paid a fee should [a] [Jordan] contact make a direct equity investment in [Kimmons] through the direct efforts of [Jordan] with no broker, attorney, finder, financial consultant or other person or entity due any fees from [Kimmons] arising from the transaction. This provision of the December 1996 contract is not ambiguous in any sense relevant to this case and thus does not, without more, raise a genuine dispute as to a material issue of fact. Jordan did not introduce any evidence from which it reasonably could be found or inferred that Jordan produced a particular investor after December 24, 1996 who purchased an investment from Kimmons. We affirm the district court's summary judgment for Kimmons on this issue. 20 Jordan also contends that the finder's fee provision, in conjunction with the initial granting of shares, applies to services provided by Jordan prior to, as well as after, the execution of the Consulting Agreement. Kimmons argues that the initial granting of the 75,000 shares was full compensation for all past services and that the Consulting Agreement contemplates that only future services were to be compensated through finder's fees. The initial granting of shares section provides that the granting of the 75,000 shares serves as compensation for all services rendered prior to the date of execution of this agreement as well as those services rendered pursuant to this agreement. The finder's fee section of the Consulting Agreement provides that Kimmons will pay to [Jordan] . . .[a] finder's fee for contacts with brokers or other financial consultantswhose clients make an equity investment in the Corporation. The plain words of the Consulting Agreement support Kimmons' reading of the contract. 21 Jordan produced no evidence beyond its conclusory allegations and its pleadings to show any valid grounds for its interpretation of the contract. Finding that the initial grant of shares clause alone was meant to compensate Jordan for prior services rendered to Kimmons harmonizes the provisions of the contract, which otherwise would be in conflict, and most probably reflects the intention of the parties. See Ogden v. Dickinson State Bank, 662 S.W.2d 330, 332 (Tex. 1983). 22