Opinion ID: 761767
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: defendants' attempt convictions

Text: Both Mekvichitsang and Yossunthorn challenge the sufficiency of the evidence for their convictions of attempted possession with intent to distribute heroin. Because Yossunthorn's attempt conviction is based on Pinkerton liability, it is derivative of Mekvichitsang's attempt conviction. Thus, Mekvichitsang's and Yossunthorn's attempt convictions can stand only if the government proved (1) that Mekvichitsang intended to violate 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (criminalizing drug possession with intent to distribute), and (2) Mekvichitsang took a substantial step toward completing the violation. United States v. Nelson, 66 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir.1995) (An attempt conviction requires evidence that the defendant intended to violate the statute, and that he took a substantial step toward completing the violation.). There is no question that there was sufficient evidence that Mekvichitsang intended to possess heroin with intent to distribute. Kovittamakron testified that on December 4-7, he and Mekvichitsang discussed Mekvichitsang's interest in purchasing heroin from Kovittamakron's latest shipment. This testimony was corroborated by recorded phone conversations and by Mekvichitsang's conduct driving around the McDonald's restaurant where Mekvichitsang and Kovittamakron had agreed to meet to discuss arrangements to complete the transaction. The more critical issue is whether Mekvichitsang's conduct during the period of December 5-7 constituted a substantial step toward acquiring the heroin. As this court has noted in the past,  '[w]hen criminal intent is clear, identifying the point at which the defendants' activities ripen into an attempt is not an analytically satisfying exercise.'  Nelson, 66 F.3d at 1043 (quoting United States v. Harper, 33 F.3d 1143, 1148 (9th Cir.1994)). Nevertheless, the requirements are distinct: Even when the defendant's intent is clear, his actions must 'cross the line between preparation and attempt' by unequivocally demonstrating that the crime will take place unless interrupted by independent circumstances. Id. at 1042 (quoting United States v. Still, 850 F.2d 607, 609 (9th Cir.1988)). The conduct cannot be mere preparation, see United States v. Buffington, 815 F.2d 1292, 1301 (9th Cir.1987) (citing United States v. Taylor, 716 F.2d 701, 712 (9th Cir.1983)), but must be [a] substantial step ... strongly corroborative of the firmness of a defendant's criminal intent, see id. (citing United States v. Mandujano, 499 F.2d 370, 376 (5th Cir.1974)). The government offers two theories to prove that Mekvichitsang's conduct constituted a substantial step. Neither suffices to uphold Mekvichitsang's attempt conviction.
The government initially argued that by sending Yossunthorn to the McDonald's parking lot and by driving by the McDonald's at the time he had prearranged with a heroin supplier, Mekvichitsang conducted countersurveillance designed to detect law enforcement activity. The government contended that such countersurveillance constituted a substantial step toward possession of heroin with intent to distribute. The government argued that Mekvichitsang drove away from the McDonald's without entering the parking lot because he detected the government agents and/or because he discovered that Kovittamakron had not shown up for the meeting. Mekvichitsang's countersurveillance activity is similar to the reconnoitering by the defendants in United States v. Buffington, 815 F.2d 1292, 1295 (9th Cir.1987), where we found insufficient evidence of a substantial step toward bank robbery. In Buffington, the police observed the defendant twice drive slowly by a bank while staring into it, drive to the rear of the bank, enter a nearby store and walk to a window overlooking the bank, leave the store and join his two codefendants as they stood facing the bank. See id. at 1295. We held that the evidence of reconnoitering was insufficient to uphold the attempt convictions: Not only did appellants not take a single step toward the bank, they displayed no weapons and no indication that they were about to make an entry. Standing alone, their conduct did not constitute that requisite 'appreciable fragment' of a bank robbery.... Id. at 1303. The Buffington court distinguished United States v. Stallworth, 543 F.2d 1038 (2d Cir.1976), where the defendant not only reconnoitered the bank he intended to rob but was armed, had stolen materials for disguises and had moved toward the bank. The reasoning of Buffington is bolstered by two other cases reversing attempted bank robbery convictions for lack of a substantial step. In United States v. Still, 850 F.2d 607, 609-610 (9th Cir.1988), the accused attempted bank robber, wearing a wig, was parked in his car with the motor running 200 yards from the bank he admitted he intended to rob. The court reversed the attempt conviction because the facts did not establish actual movement toward the bank or actions that are analytically similar to such movement. Id. at 610. In United States v. Harper, 33 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir.1994), the defendant, in preparation for a robbery, had left money in an ATM machine to create a bill trap that would bring service people to the ATM. Reversing the conviction, we stated that [m]aking an appointment with a potential victim is not of itself such a commitment to an intended crime as to constitute an attempt, even though it may make a later attempt possible. Id. at 1148. Had Mekvichitsang intended to rob the McDonald's, under these authorities his countersurveillance activities, without more, would clearly be insufficient evidence of an attempt. A fortiori, Mekvichitsang's act of surveying the McDonald's not to rob it or even to take possession of drugs, but merely to ensure the security of an alleged meeting to make arrangements for some future drug purchase, did not constitute an appreciable fragment of the crime of drug possession with intent to distribute and, thus, is insufficient evidence of an attempt. Buffington, 815 F.2d at 1302 (quoting Mandujano, 499 F.2d at 376).
At oral argument, the government argued that Mekvichitsang's substantial step took place before he went to the McDonald's. The government contended that because Mekvichitsang and Kovittamakron had an established relationship in which Kovittamakron fronted heroin to Mekvichitsang at a fixed price, Mekvichitsang's phone call to Kovittamakron ordering heroin constituted a substantial step. As a factual matter, the record does not reflect that Mekvichitsang and his suppliers had agreed on a price for the heroin. Even assuming an agreed price, however, we hold that Mekvichitsang's conduct was not a substantial step toward heroin possession when he ordered drugs from Kovittamakron. The government's theory rests on the premise that all major elements of the drug transaction were accomplished and that Mekvichitsang's and Kovittamakron's scheduled McDonald's meeting was merely to arrange ministerial details. Yet the government concedes that Mekvichitsang and Kovittamakron had agreed neither on the quantity of heroin that Mekvichitsang would purchase nor on the delivery time and method. 5 Therefore, even assuming that Mekvichitsang and Kovittamakron had a prior agreement to a fixed price, and that the heroin would be fronted to Mekvichitsang by Kovittamakron, there were essential elements of the transaction yet to be arranged. United States v. Smith, 962 F.2d 923 (9th Cir.1992), is instructive. In Smith, we found a substantial step toward possession with intent to distribute cocaine where the defendant arrived at a house where cocaine was picked up by the codefendants, drove off later in another car, and circled the parking lot of the restaurant where the cocaine deal was scheduled to take place before parking there with a shotgun in his lap to fill the role of  'the heavy in the background.'  Id. at 926. In upholding the conviction, we stated that [Smith] did all that he could do to ensure the deal's completion. If the deal had been completed as planned, without any interference, Smith would not have been required to engage in any further acts. In fact, he committed all the steps necessary on his part to the completion of the substantive offense. Under those circumstances, a jury could certainly conclude that Smith's conduct went beyond mere preparation. Id. at 930-31. Similarly, the defendant cocaine purchaser in United States v. Davis, 960 F.2d 820 (9th Cir.1992), had gone beyond mere preparation. Davis entered into negotiations with an undercover DEA agent to purchase cocaine after price and quantity had been negotiated by a middleman, continued the negotiations, arranged for his people to deliver the money, and was on his way to pick up the cocaine when he was arrested. See id. at 823-24, 826. In contrast to Smith and Davis, Mekvichitsang had not committed all the steps necessary on his part to the completion of the substantive offense. Smith, 962 F.2d at 930-31. He merely initiated the transaction by indicating his desire to purchase heroin and scheduling a meeting with Kovittamakron to negotiate a deal. When key elements of the drug deal are incomplete, making an appointment with a known drug supplier, even one who has previously fronted drugs to the defendant at a fixed price, is analogous to the situation in Harper: Making an appointment ... is not of itself such a commitment to an intended crime as to constitute an attempt, even though it may make a later attempt possible. 33 F.3d at 1148. The Seventh Circuit reached the same conclusion in United States v. Cea, 914 F.2d 881 (7th Cir.1990). In Cea, the defendant, who had been negotiating for the purchase of cocaine with undercover agents, was arrested after leaving his home following a phone call in which he had agreed to meet the agents, presumably to pick up the drugs. See id. at 887-88. The court reversed the conviction because the evidence did not establish that a location had been agreed on for the meeting or that the defendant had the money with him to purchase the drugs. While [t]he government does not have to wait until the transaction is complete[,] ... it needs more evidence of a substantial step.... Id. at 888. The government's reliance on United States v. Acuna, 9 F.3d 1442, 1447 (9th Cir.1993) is misplaced. Acuna held that purchasing all necessary precursor chemicals, negotiating for the purchase of glassware, and promising to sell at a fixed price, constituted a substantial step toward manufacturing methamphetamine. See 9 F.3d at 1447. The court found Acuna's case distinguishable from Buffington and Still because Acuna's conduct [was] strongly corroborative of his intent to manufacture methamphetamine. Id. at 1448. The government argues that Mekvichitsang's ordering heroin from a supplier who had fronted him heroin in the past was also strongly corroborative of his intent. This argument improperly conflates the distinct elements of the crime of attempt. See Nelson, 66 F.3d at 1042-44 (Even when the defendant's intent is clear, his actions must 'cross the line between preparation and attempt' ....) (quoting United States v. Still, 850 F.2d 607, 609 (9th Cir.1988)). As we said there, Nelson's expressed eagerness to consummate the [used car trade-in money laundering scheme] and his efforts towards doing so are evidence of intent, rather than evidence [of a substantial step toward the crime of money laundering]. Id. at 1043-44. Mekvichitsang's steps toward the consummation of the offense were manifestly less substantial than those taken by Acuna. Acuna had completed all steps necessary, short of actually manufacturing the methamphetamine. Mekvichitsang, on the other hand, had not agreed to purchase any particular quantity of heroin or arranged for its delivery. In the absence of evidence of a substantial step toward possession of heroin, his attempt conviction must be reversed. Because we hold that Mekvichitsang's conviction cannot stand, Yossunthorn's attempt conviction must also be reversed, since it was based solely on Pinkerton liability for the crimes of Mekvichitsang, his coconspirator.