Opinion ID: 2212854
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Answers to the special verdict.

Text: Nagle's motion to change certain answers of the special verdict questions the sufficiency of the evidence to support those answers. When there is credible evidence which under any reasonable view fairly admits of an inference which is sufficient to support the jury's findings, the findings should not be changed. Repinski v. Clintonville Federal Savings & Loan Asso. (1970), 49 Wis. 2d 53, 181 N. W. 2d 351; St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Burchard (1964), 25 Wis. 2d 288, 130 N. W. 2d 866. This is especially true on review in this court where the verdict has the approval of the trial court. Shoemaker v. Marc's Big Boy (1971), 51 Wis. 2d 611, 187 N. W. 2d 815; Capello v. Janeczko (1970), 47 Wis. 2d 76, 176 N. W. 2d 395. The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. Shoemaker v. Marc's Big Boy, supra ; St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Burchard, supra . Question number one of the special verdict asked, in substance, whether there was an agreement between the parties permitting Toulon to purchase $10,000 worth of stock with an option for him to purchase from Nagle within five years 50 percent of the original stock at the issuing price with a finder's fee of $2,500. The jury answered this question affirmatively and Nagle contends that the answer should be changed to No as there was no proof that the parties ever agreed as to the source of the stock Toulon could purchase. Toulon testified that the original agreement between the parties, based on a corporate equity capitalization of $50,000, called for an initial investment by him of $10,000 for $12,500 worth of stock after crediting the finder's fee. He was then to be permitted to purchase the additional shares, up to 50 percent, for a total investment of $22,500. The testimony raises the reasonable inference that the parties agreed the finder's fee stock and the shares purchased after the initial investment were to come from Nagle as his initial investment was to be $40,000. Toulon also testified, and the subsequently issued letter of intent reflected, that the initial $10,000-$40,000 investment ratio was to result in a 25-75 percent ownership. This raised the further reasonable inference that the stock for the $2,500 finder's fee had to come from Nagle, otherwise the corporation would have had outstanding stock of $52,500, of which $12,500 would not represent 25 percent. Nagle denied that the source of the stock had been agreed upon; however, both Toulon's lawyer and Nagle's lawyer testified that they were unsure what the understanding was in this regard. Based upon the testimony of Toulon, which the jury could believe, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, there is sufficient credible evidence to sustain the jury finding. Question number five of the special verdict inquired whether the agreement was subsequently amended so as to permit Toulon to exercise the option for 50 percent of the stock even though he had not made a timely tender of his initially required $10,000 investment. Nagle contends that his offer of a written stock option agreement, which was rejected by Toulon in December, 1967, shows that there was no agreement as to a modification of the original agreement. Toulon testified that he rejected the proposed stock option agreement for the precise reason that it did not comply with the terms of the parties' original agreement. He also testified that when he told Nagle in January, 1967, that he would not be able to make his initial investment, Nagle told him to get it in the sooner the better. Nagle himself stated that up until March 2, 1968, he would have been satisfied if Toulon had come up with the remaining $5,000 of Toulon's initial investment. That day was the day of the proposed meeting for selling 50 percent of the stock to Toulon, a meeting which was not held because Nagle discharged Toulon. There is no evidence in the record that Nagle at any time informed or demanded that Toulon put up his $10,000 or their business arrangements would terminate. There is sufficient evidence of an amendment to the agreement making timely tender of Toulon's initial investment nonessential to the exercise of the stock option to support the finding of the jury. Question six of the special verdict inquired whether Toulon was ready, willing and able, and did he make a bona fide and timely offer to purchase the option stock. The jury also answered this question in the affirmative. Nagle asserts that the evidence showed that Toulon was not able to purchase the stock on March 5, 1968, nor was his offer bona fide. Toulon testified that Whitehill was prepared to loan him the money for the purchase on the day in question. In fact, Whitehill had loaned Toulon part of the $5,000 in September, 1967, with which Toulon made his initial stock purchase. Whitehill testified that he was prepared to make the loan if Toulon's offer was accepted. The money was to be supplied by the immediate execution of a cashier's check to be drawn on a local bank. Dudley Davis, Toulon's lawyer who was at the meeting of March 5, 1968, testified that Toulon had his checkbook in front of him. Robert Downs, vice-president of VW, who was also present at the March 5, 1968, meeting, had testified at the trial of Nagle Motors v. Volkswagen N.C. Distributor . Part of that testimony was introduced at this trial. In that testimony Downs indicated that Toulon had a check ready for payment when the exercise of the option was tendered. Every witness to the tender testified that the offer was summarily rejected by Nagle. The evidence was sufficient to sustain the finding of the jury. Question number seven inquired of the jury what money damages were sustained by Toulon for his loss of the benefit of the agreement. The jury answered the question $56,761, with one dissenting juror who believed that it should have been $99,261. Nagle's position, reduced to its essentials, is that there is insufficient evidence in the record to show that Toulon suffered any damage on account of the alleged breach. Toulon asserts that the court can reduce damages awarded by a jury verdict only in the case of liquidated damages. Koepke v. Miller (1942), 241 Wis. 501, 6 N. W. 2d 670. This rule recognizes that the determination of damages normally involves a question of fact, properly within the province of the jury, and that a court which decides the issue, deprives the person of his constitutional right to a jury trial. Campbell v. Sutliff (1927), 193 Wis. 370, 214 N. W. 374. The rule does not prohibit a court from reducing an excessive verdict if an option for a new trial on the issue is provided. Powers v. Allstate Ins. Co., supra ; Campbell v. Sutliff, supra . Moreover, when the question raised is whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain any damages, and not whether the damages are excessive, the constitutional question is not raised. The issue is whether the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law. Nagle relies on the fact that the corporation had certain cash needs which had to be met before any profits could be distributed to the shareholders. Thus, the corporation was indebted to Nagle in the amount of $60,500. The 1968 objectives for the dealership showed a cash need in order to meet its dealer objective requirements. The respondent's argument falls short of showing a lack of evidence of any damages. The fact that any profits made would not be distributed but rather had to be used to pay the outstanding loans of the corporation, does not reduce the benefit to be derived from the profits. It affects the form in which the benefit is received by the shareholders. There was sufficient evidence to sustain the findings of the jury that the appellant was damaged by the breach of the agreement in question. Our independent review of the record leads us to conclude that there was sufficient credible evidence to sustain each of the jury's answers against the challenges made by Nagle on the cross appeal. With the exception of the challenge to the amount of the damages, we conclude that there would be no probable miscarriage of justice if the jury's verdict was permitted to stand.