Opinion ID: 2716182
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Spencer’s Retaliation Claim

Text: I disagree with the majority that summary judgment was correctly granted to Schmidt on Spencer’s claim of retaliation. The anti-retaliation provisions of Title VII are broader than the anti-discrimination provisions. See Burlington Northern & Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 66-67 (2006). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he participated in an activity protected by Title VII; (2) his employer took materially adverse action against him; and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the materially adverse action. Aryain, 534 F.3d at 484. A materially adverse action is one that “a reasonable employee would have found . . . [to be] materially adverse, which in this context means it might well have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 68 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Trivial harms” do not rise to the level of material adverseness. Id. “An employee’s decision to report discriminatory behavior 19 Case: 13-20282 Document: 00512722328 Page: 20 Date Filed: 08/05/2014 No. 13-20282 cannot immunize that employee from those petty slights or minor annoyances that often take place at work and that all employees experience.” Id. “[T]he significance of any given act of retaliation will often depend upon the particular circumstances. Context matters.” Id. at 69. I agree with the majority that most of Spencer’s allegations fail to rise to the level required to show that a materially adverse action was taken against him, including the allegations that he was cursed at by Vidrine, Machen, and other employees. However, Spencer also alleged that an incident where he was “cornered” and questioned by Machen and Vidrine after he reported the text to the union constituted retaliation. A review of the record indicates that this claim should survive summary judgment. Spencer testified he opened the text message and reported it to a union representative, J.D. Brown, who reported the issue to a Schmidt manager within a day. Spencer testified that subsequently, he was cornered by Machen, the sender of the text, and Vidrine, a general foreman, in an elevator room where he was working. He testified that Machen “proceeded to make a circle around me while David Vidrine engaged me in conversation.” They asked him who he sent the text message to, who else knew about it, and “did I feel like . . . I was safe there.” He testified that he did not feel he could leave the room if he wanted to because “one was blocking the entrance and the other one was orbiting my body.” Though he testified that he answered their questions and did not ask to leave, he also testified that he told them he did not feel safe at the job. On the heels of being sent a text by Machen including explicit racist and threatening imagery, including Ku Klux Klan symbolism, a burning cross and a noose, Spencer was cornered and questioned by the sender and a general foreman about who he had told about the text and whether he felt safe, while one stood in front of the door and one “orbited” him in the room. I would conclude that a reasonable jury could find that this incident could make a 20 Case: 13-20282 Document: 00512722328 Page: 21 Date Filed: 08/05/2014 No. 13-20282 “reasonable employee” feel actually threatened for reporting an incident of racial harassment, which could deter a reasonable employee from making or supporting a complaint and thus rises to the level of material adverseness under Burlington Northern. Id. at 67. Spencer has raised sufficient evidence about whether this action constituted material adverseness to survive summary judgment. I would also find that the other prongs of the retaliation standard are met, sufficient to survive summary judgment. See Aryain, 534 F.3d at 484. Spencer’s complaint to the union, which he made with the expectation that the union would raise the complaint with Schmidt on his behalf, constituted “oppos[ing] any practice made an unlawful employment practice” and is protected activity. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3; see Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 304 (5th Cir. 1996). Further, Spencer testified that after he opened the text on December 20 and alerted the union, who notified Schmidt by at least December 21, Machen and Vidrine cornered him and asked him who he had shown the text message to and who else knew about it. While the record is not clear on which day the confrontation happened, it is clear that it happened between December 21 and December 28. This “very close” temporal proximity between the complaint and the alleged retaliation, see Clark County School District v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001), together with Machen and Vidrine’s questioning directly referencing the text and who Spencer had told about the text, are sufficient to raise a fact issue as to whether or not they acted because of the complaint to the union. The majority concludes that summary judgment is appropriate because the retaliation is not attributable to Schmidt. As the majority recognizes, the district court did not reach this issue, and the parties do not address it on appeal. This question depends on whether Machen and Vidrine “serve[] in a supervisory position and exercise[] significant control over . . . hiring, firing, or 21 Case: 13-20282 Document: 00512722328 Page: 22 Date Filed: 08/05/2014 No. 13-20282 conditions of employment.” See Long, 88 F.3d at 306. As I stated above, the question of whether Machen and Vidrine are supervisors is a fact-intensive issue. The retaliatory incident involved Machen, a foreman, as well as Vidrine, a general foreman. The record reflects that general foremen may supervise the work of other foremen, have input into hiring and firing decisions, and may be able to transfer, discipline or fire employees. Thus, I would also conclude that there are fact issues precluding us from concluding that Vidrine’s and Machen’s alleged retaliation against Spencer is not attributable to Schmidt. Finally, Schmidt has not indicated that there could be any other motivation for Machen and Vidrine’s intimidation and implicit threatening of Spencer, and it is difficult to imagine any other motivation, other than to frighten him and dissuade him from pursuing further corrective action regarding the alleged discrimination. There are sufficient fact issues surrounding the incident to warrant denial of summary judgment on the issue of retaliation.