Opinion ID: 1921869
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Robinson's Enhancement Issue

Text: Robinson argues that the trial court erred in imposing a sentence on her which was enhanced by seven years under the seven year mandatory minimum provision set forth in § 33-541 [5] prior to its repeal. She claims that the government's enhancement information concerned a prior drug possession rather than a prior drug distribution conviction. The government contends that the trial court properly applied the enhancement penalty under our decisions in Gilmore v. United States, 699 A.2d 1130 (D.C.1997) ( Gilmore II ); Gilmore v. United States, 648 A.2d 944 (D.C.1994) ( Gilmore I ). We agree. Our decision in Gilmore I compels us to reject Robinson's argument because the plain language of [§ 33-541] refutes [Robinson's] contention. Id. at 945. In Gilmore II, as here, the government sought to enhance appellant's sentence for distribution of heroin with a prior conviction for possession of heroin. Gilmore in turn argued that because his previous conviction was only for a misdemeanor, this `was his first felony conviction, and he should not have been sentenced as a second offender.' Id. at 1131. In rejecting his argument, we reiterated that: the statute as properly construed provides that a prior misdemeanor drug conviction under section 33-541(d) may be used to enhance a mandatory minimum sentence. . . . Id. at 1133 (referencing Gilmore I supra ) (footnote omitted). Accordingly, we are constrained to reject Robinson's argument.