Opinion ID: 1782594
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: D'Amario

Text: In D'Amario, Clifford Harris, a minor, was injured when the car in which he was riding as a passenger collided with a tree and then burst into flames. The car was driven by a friend of Harris who was allegedly intoxicated and speeding at the time of the accident. [4] As described in the opinion below: A witness to the crash circled the car twice and noticed a fire in the engine area. Some minutes later, the fire spread and an explosion occurred, engulfing the car in flames. Harris was severely injured, losing three limbs and suffering burns to much of his body. D'Amario, 732 So.2d at 1145. Harris, and his mother, Karen D'Amario, sued Ford alleging that a defective relay switch in the automobile caused Harris's injuries. The plaintiffs did not seek damages against Ford for the injuries to Harris caused by the initial collision with the tree. Rather, they sought damages for the injuries caused by the alleged defective relay switch only. Ford asserted as an affirmative defense that the injuries were proximately caused by the negligence of a third party, although in its answer to the complaint, Ford did not specifically identify the vehicle's driver as a non-party tortfeasor. At trial, the two sides advanced conflicting theories as to the cause of the fire and Harris's injuries. The plaintiffs' theory of liability was that a relay switch failed, thus preventing it from disrupting the flow of power to the fuel pump. Id. Plaintiffs' experts testified that gasoline continued to be pumped after the impact and caused the fire. Id. On the other hand, Ford's experts countered that the relay switch and fuel pump properly worked and that the original crash caused an oil pan to burst, which resulted in an oil-based fire. [Ford] pointed to the slow spreading nature of the fire in support of its theory. Id. Hence, clear lines and choices for the jury were drawn between the positions of the parties, the plaintiffs asserting the failure of the manufacturer's product, and the manufacturer countering that its products worked properly and no failure occurred. Prior to jury selection, the plaintiffs moved to exclude evidence about the driver's alcohol consumption on the day of the accident and the trial court ruled that evidence of the driver's alcohol consumption would be excluded. [5] The court reasoned that the acts leading up to the collision were not at issue, rather, the issue as to Ford's liability concerned events occurring after the initial collision with the tree. However, at trial, Ford moved to amend its affirmative defenses to include an allegation that Harris's injuries were caused by the fault of a third party, and proffered evidence of the driver's intoxication and excessive speed. The trial court granted Ford's request and held that an apportionment defense was available and evidence of the driver's actions in causing the initial accident could be admitted in support of such defense. In the face of such ruling, the parties stipulated to the jury that the negligent and excessive speed of the driver caused the initial accident and that at the time the driver had a blood alcohol level of.14 percent. Following deliberations, the jury returned a verdict for the defense, finding that Ford was not a legal cause of the injuries to Harris. Because the jury found for the defense, it did not reach the question on the interrogatory verdict form as to the driver's comparative negligence. D'Amario subsequently moved for a new trial, alleging that the court erred in permitting evidence of the driver's intoxication to go to the jury. D'Amario also contended that the court erred in permitting Ford to amend its affirmative defense to include the driver as a Fabre party [6] and to include him on the jury verdict form, where the defense had failed to comply with the advance pleading requirements of Nash v. Wells Fargo Guard Services, Inc., 678 So.2d 1262 (Fla.1996). In a supplemental memorandum to the court, D'Amario asserted that the driver's conduct was not a legal cause of Harris's injuries, and that the court's ruling during trial further prejudiced the plaintiffs because it came after the jury was selected, hence depriving the plaintiffs of the right to question the venire panel about potential bias towards alcohol consumption and driving while intoxicated. The trial court granted the plaintiffs' motion for new trial. With regard to the apportionment defense issue, the trial court ruled there was no prejudice in allowing the defense to amend its affirmative defense during trial. However, the court ruled that it had erred in permitting evidence of the driver's alcohol content to go to the jury: The Court now finds that by permitting the publication of the blood alcohol content to the jury, coupled with the remarks of defense counsel in closing arguments to the effect that the animal in the car was `alcohol,' caused undue emphasis to be placed on alcohol as a primary cause of the injury.... The Court found that under the Kidron [7] case that the Defendant was entitled to a jury finding of percentage of fault, if any, on the part of anyone whose negligence was the proximate cause of Plaintiff's damages.... While generally the right to amendment of pleadings declines as trial approaches, the Court here found no real prejudice was present in allowing Defendants to amend their affirmative defenses as was done and especially so since there was no doubt from the pleadings before the amendment as to whom the driver was. Nothing in the evidence offered before or after the amendment changes now the conclusion that under F.S. [§]90.403 the Court should have excluded the remote condition of alcohol from the case. When Ford appealed, the Second District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that [o]n the facts in this crash-worthiness case, the appellant [Ford] properly raised an apportionment defense. D'Amario, 732 So.2d at 1145 (citing Kidron, Inc. v. Carmona, 665 So.2d 289 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)).