Opinion ID: 201174
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Pretermitting the Application for Suspension of Deportation

Text: 35 Afful contends that it was error to pretermit her application for suspension of deportation. An application is pretermitted when disqualified for failure to meet the threshold eligibility requirement that an alien have resided in the United States for a sufficient period of time to obtain the discretionary relief of suspension of deportation. Under the former INA, the requisite period of residence was seven years, and the period continued to accrue until the alien applied for suspension of deportation. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1994) (repealed 1996). The passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) in 1996 established a stop-time rule that caps an alien's cumulative period of residence once a notice to appear is issued. IIRIRA § 309(c)(5); 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (d)(1); see Suassuna v. INS, 342 F.3d 578, 581 (6th Cir.2003) (Prior to the enactment of the stop-time rule, aliens would often delay their deportation proceedings until they accrued sufficient continuous presence in the United States to qualify for relief.) (citing H.R. Rep. 104-879 (1997)). IIRIRA also changed the name of the relief from suspension of deportation to cancellation of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1). 36 Afful arrived in the United States in October 1989 and was served with an order to show cause on April 21, 1995. Afful argues that the stop-time provision in 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1) was erroneously applied to her case. As the sole support for this contention, Afful points to one of several transitional rules included in the IIRIRA to address the applicability of the amendments to persons already in proceedings with the INS prior to April 1, 1997, as she was. Section 309(c)(1), GENERAL RULE THAT NEW RULES DO NOT APPLY, provides that: 37 Subject to the succeeding provisions of this subsection, in the case of an alien who is in exclusion or deportation proceedings as of the title III-A effective date — 38 (A) the amendments made by this subtitle shall not apply, and 39 (B) the proceedings (including judicial review thereof) shall continue to be conducted without regard to such amendments. 40 IIRIRA § 309(c)(1), Pub.L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-627 (1996) (emphasis added). The general rule is relevantly excepted in this case by a succeeding provision of the subsection in § 309(c)(5), which states the transitional rule with regard to suspension of deportation: 41 Paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 240A(d) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (relating to continuous residence or physical presence) shall apply to notices to appear issued before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this Act. 42 IIRIRA, § 309(c)(5), Pub.L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996). This language, then, provides that even if an alien had been served with a notice to appear prior to April 1, 1997, the new stop-time rule would apply. While Afful was issued an order to show cause (OSC) instead of a notice to appear, the availability of a differing treatment for these terms under § 309(c)(5) was foreclosed the following year with the passage of the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA) which, among other things, extensively and retroactively amended § 309(c)(5) to read as follows: 43 (5) Transitional rules with regard to suspension of deportation. — 44 (A) In general. — Subject to subparagraphs (B) and (C), paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 240A(d) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (relating to continuous residence or physical presence) shall apply to orders to show cause (including those referred to in section 242B(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as in effect before the title III-A effective date), issued before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this Act. 45 NACARA § 203(a)(1), Pub.L. No. 105-100, 111 Stat. 2160 (1997) (emphasis added). After the passage of NACARA, the BIA issued a decision construing IIRIRA's transitional rule in § 309(c)(5) as clarified by the NACARA amendments to apply the stop-time rule to all applications for this particular type of relief, whether in the form of suspension of deportation proceedings or cancellation of removal. In re Nolasco-Tofino, 22 I. & N. Dec. 632, 637, 1999 WL 261565 (BIA 1999). 46 Since NACARA and In re Nolasco-Tofino, every circuit to have addressed the question has found that the stop-time rule applies retroactively to orders to show cause issued prior to the enactment of the IIRIRA. See Suassuna v. INS, 342 F.3d 578 (6th Cir.2003); Ram v. INS, 243 F.3d 510 (9th Cir.2001); Pinho v. INS, 249 F.3d 183 (3d Cir.2001); Angel-Ramos v. Reno, 227 F.3d 942 (7th Cir.2000); Ayoub v. INS, 222 F.3d 214 (5th Cir.2000); Afolayan v. INS, 219 F.3d 784 (8th Cir.2000); Rivera-Jimenez v. INS, 214 F.3d 1213 (10th Cir.2000); Tefel v. Reno, 180 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir.1999). We agree and conclude that the BIA correctly affirmed the pretermittance of Afful's application for suspension of deportation.