Opinion ID: 2392544
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: The Points Raised by the Appellant

Text: In regard to the points raised by the appellant concerning the alleged incompetence of the appellant's court appointed counsel, as permitted by our order, already mentioned, we find that there is no merit in them. First of all, there was no suggestion by the appellant at any time during the trial that his counsel was incompetent and none of the five points now raised by him was mentioned by the appellant during the trial or at the time of sentencing. The trial court before sentencing the appellant gave the appellant full opportunity to speak. The record shows the following: THE COURT: Bartholomey, stand up. In addition to what has been said, is there anything you want to say before the Court determines the sentence in these cases? THE DEFENDANT JOSEPH JAMES BARTHOLOMEY: No, I don't think it would really make any difference to knock myself out. THE COURT: Very well, if you have nothing further to say you may be seated. The trial judge then proceeded to give his reasons for imposing the death sentence in the two first degree murder cases, pointing out that he had deliberately delayed sentencing until December 30, 1969  some two and one-half months after the verdict on October 8, 1969, and some two months after the denial of the motion for a new trial on October 29, 1969  so that he could carefully consider the pre-sentence report of the Department of Parole and Probation as well as the facts in the entire case. The appellant was present at the argument upon his motion for a new trial; but he made no suggestion at that time that his counsel was incompetent even after the trial court overruled his motion. When the appellant, on January 26, 1970, executed his affidavit as an indigent to have counsel on appeal appointed for him, he did not indicate that his trial counsel, Mr. Garrity, should not be appointed as such appellate counsel because of any alleged incompetency; and Mr. Garrity was in due course so appointed. Mr. Garrity was quite active on the appellant's behalf prior to the trial of the case on October 8, 1969. He had the case removed from Wicomico to Charles County. He obtained Orders from the lower court for the independent examination of the appellant by psychiatric and psychological experts, for the employment of an investigator, for the employment of Thomas J. Aversa, Esquire, as additional counsel to assist him (all this at the expense of the State), and an elaborate Order requiring the State's Attorney to disclose certain relevant and material evidence in his possession. On September 29, 1969, Mr. Garrity petitioned for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum to obtain the attendance of an inmate of the Maryland Penitentiary to testify for the appellant. On the same day, he issued subpoenas for 10 witnesses to testify. On October 2, 1969, he issued a subpoena duces tecum for the records of the appellant at the Crownsville State Hospital as well as subpoenas for two physicians and a subpoena duces tecum for the records of the Department of Juvenile Services. At the beginning of the trial, he had the prospective jurors examined on their voir dire, presenting seven relevant questions to them. A careful consideration of the entire record  including the matters preliminary to the trial itself, the 19 requests for instruction presented by counsel for the appellant, his exceptions to the charge of the trial court  resulting in some amplification and correction of the charge  his argument to the jury, his motion for a new trial and his argument on that, his request for a pre-sentence report and his moving plea at the time of sentencing that capital punishment not be imposed, and his later application for review of sentence  indicates to us that counsel for the appellant was a competent attorney, well versed in the criminal law and gave the appellant complete and fair representation in this case. This is not surprising in view of the fact that Mr. Garrity had been at one time an Assistant State's Attorney in Baltimore City and after leaving that office had, in private practice, defended persons accused of crime. Counsel for the appellant did state in the course of his pre-sentencing remarks that in his nine years of law practice, either as defense counsel or as prosecutor, he had never been involved in a case in which the death penalty had been imposed, but also indicated that he had never asked that the death penalty be imposed. In his peroration of his plea prior to the sentencing counsel for the appellant, after remarking that he had been present in court on one occasion in which the death penalty was imposed and the court added May God have mercy on your soul, stated that if such a sentence should be imposed in the present case: ... that God will not only have mercy on this defendant's soul, but all of us here who have been participants, you as the Judge who would impose it, if it is imposed, for perhaps maybe not showing compassion, Christ-like compassion that we should try to adhere to in my belief. To me, perhaps because maybe I didn't give enough to this defendant, maybe I wasn't eloquent enough or clever enough to give him as much as perhaps someone else could have; to the State because maybe they pushed too hard for the taking of someone else's life, because two other persons life's [sic] were taken. I plead with Your Honor that God will have mercy on our souls. This apparently is the source of the appellant's fourth point raised by himself. It is apparent to us that counsel for the appellant was thoroughly familiar with the evidence presented on behalf of the appellant in the trial below, both expert and lay. His trial tactics were sound, in our opinion; and he obviously had obtained in his five visits to the appellant in prison sufficient information to prepare and properly present a competent defense for the appellant. The appellant does not state the name of the witness he requested be called to testify, or what testimony was expected to be elicited from that witness. The material alleged in the fifth point, if assumed to be factual, obviously resulted in no prejudice to the appellant. We were favorably impressed with the brief filed by counsel for the appellant and by his argument before us on behalf of the appellant. This opinion rather indicates that he omitted no possible points and did not neglect those points raised in his brief and argument before us. In our opinion, the appellant was quite adequately represented by his counsel at the trial below and in this Court. He had a fair and impartial trial in which he was forcefully and competently defended by his counsel. Judgments affirmed.