Opinion ID: 1844705
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: admission of state's forensic anthropologist's testimony

Text: At trial, over Miller's objection, a forensic anthropologist testified for the State. He estimated that Kinney's body had been in the icehouse for eighteen to twenty days, based on his examination of insect larvae removed from the body, and photographs of its state of decay. He earned a doctorate in anthropology eight months before testifying, but had no degree in entomology or zoology. His estimates were extrapolated from the results he personally obtained in a unique study involving exposure of human corpses in various Louisiana locations. No similar experiments have been carried out by other scientists, and the accuracy and applicability of his methods are thus unverified. We note that the field of forensic anthropology is recognized as a scientific discipline whose practitioners have been accepted as experts to testify regarding identification of human remains, Mangialino v. White Haven Memorial Park, 132 A.D.2d 970, 518 N.Y.S.2d 532 (1987), and time, place, or manner of death, State v. Balfa, 506 So.2d 1369, 1370 (La.App.1987), cert. denied, 512 So.2d 436 (La.1987); State v. Klindt, 389 N.W.2d 670, 673 (Iowa 1986). See also People v. Knights, 166 Cal.App.3d 46, 212 Cal.Rptr. 307 (1985); Bassett v. State, 449 So.2d 803 (Fla.1984). Our recent opinion in State v. Adams, 418 N.W.2d 618 (S.D.1988), where in we reaffirmed our adherence to the test set out in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923), is determinative of this issue: Under this test, before testimony related to a scientific principle or discovery is admissible, the principle must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs. [ Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C.Cir.1923).] The necessity for such a determination is obvious. It would be impractical to place upon the trial court the sole responsibility for determining whether a scientific principle is valid. While experienced judges are perhaps better positioned than most laypersons to evaluate complex scientific data, they have not been trained to evaluate scientific principles. The Frye test does not simply elevate the opinion of the scientist over the layperson in determining the validity of scientific principles. It requires a general acceptance of the principle by those who are best equipped to evaluatethe experts in the particular scientific field. Not every scientist in a given field need embrace the principle, but a significant percentage must do so. Dismissed by some as a rather repugnant form of majoritarian head-counting, Harper v. State, 249 Ga. 519, 292 S.E.2d 389 (1982), we perceive the Frye test as requiring reasonable and necessary verification. Therefore, we continue to adhere to the Frye test as controlling the issue of admissibility of evidence involving scientific principles. State v. Adams, 418 N.W.2d at 620 (footnote omitted). The forensic anthropologist's testimony that his methodology is completely untested by other scientists would necessarily mandate our ruling that his estimate of the time of Kinney's death is inadmissible. The contrast with electrophoresis ( see Adams, id. at 620-21), a widely used form of testing of documented reliability, is striking. Given his experience and education, the forensic anthropologist's testimony as to the type of instrument used to inflict certain of Kinney's head wounds was, however, admissible. Sufficient foundation existed for that testimony. He testified that the head wounds were inflicted with a square-tipped instrument, consistent with an end of a tire iron. His expertise was based on his experience with head wounds inflicted in homicide cases in Louisiana. Does this error concerning time of death require reversal? We think not. Kinney's stomach contents, clothing, the hair, fiber, and the coroner's estimate that he had been dead two to three weeks support the verdict, especially when considered in light of Miller's own statements and actions. We deem the inadmissible evidence to be cumulative and nonprejudicial in light of the other evidence concerning the victim's approximate time of death. Where inadmissible evidence admitted at trial is cumulative only and other admissible evidence supports the result, the cumulative evidence, though inadmissible, is nonprejudicial. State v. Tribitt, 327 N.W.2d 132, 135 (S.D.1982). Another factor militating against reversal is: Miller's presence at the time Kinney was murdered need not be established to convict him of murder ( see Issue VIII below).