Opinion ID: 604145
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Moore's Claim of Age Discrimination

Text: 12 The district court assumed that Moore had established a prima facie case of age discrimination. As Lilly does not contest this point on appeal, and all of the elements are clearly met, we make the same assumption. 13 Lilly asserted as its legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Moore's termination that he was discharged because he falsified the records discussed above. In support of this contention, Lilly presented considerable deposition testimony by Moore and others. It is clear to us, as it was to the district court, that the cognizant executives of Lilly could have reasonably believed that Moore requested the alteration of his sample distribution records without verifying what he had distributed to the doctors. When he was informed of the impossibility of the distribution under the alteration that he had requested in his letter, he immediately asked that the letter be returned to him. From these actions Lilly could have reasonably inferred that Moore had something to hide, namely, his falsification of the drug sample records. Such a reasonable belief by Lilly is undeniably a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its termination of Moore's employment. The fact that the employers' reasonable belief eventually proves to have been incorrect--if, for example, Moore were eventually to be vindicated from the charges of falsifying records--would not change the conclusion that the firing had been non-discriminatory. To survive summary judgment, therefore, Moore had the burden of producing some evidence that Lilly's proffered explanation is mere pretext. In the language of Hanchey, Moore had to carr[y] [his] burden of showing a genuine issue of fact regarding the pretext issue. 20 Our review of the summary judgment evidence satisfies us that Moore simply failed to meet this burden. 14 Moore misapprehends the burden shifting process. At times, he even appears to argue that he has no pretext burden at all. He complains that the trial court improperly ruled that his prima facie proof was not itself sufficient to raise any inference whatsoever that Moore's age was the motive. Moore thus demonstrates his belief that his prima facie case is sufficient to meet his second evidentiary burden of demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact regarding pretext in order to defeat Lilly's summary judgment motion. This belief in turn demonstrates Moore's failure to grasp fundamental principles of this area of law. 15 Moore cites, inter alia, an Eighth Circuit case, Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Center, 21 for the proposition that after 'pretext' has been established, the prima facie case can have an impact on the case in favor of the plaintiff. We agree with our Eighth Circuit colleagues that if a plaintiff is able to demonstrate that the employer's facially legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its action is pretext, the inference created by the prima facie case could well be the basis for a favorable verdict for the plaintiff. The plaintiff need not necessarily respond to defendant's non-discriminatory reason if (but only if) plaintiff anticipatorily demonstrated in his or her prima facie case that the reason was pretext. 22 In Hicks, for example, the plaintiff had proved all of defendants' proffered reasons for adverse employment actions to be pretextual. Following the plaintiffs' discrediting of all of the defendants' proffered reasons for their actions,defendants were in a position of having offered no legitimate reasons for their actions. In other words, defendants were in no better position than if they had remained silent, offering no rebuttal to an established inference that they had unlawfully discriminated against plaintiff on [an illegal basis]. 23 16 Moore's problem, however, is his total failure to produce any evidence of pretext, either in connection with establishing his prima facie case or subsequently in response to Lilly's demonstration of a non-discriminatory reason for its action. He protests that the district court imposed on him a new pretext burden which the court plucked from the wording of our Hanchey opinion. Not so. The district court was merely requiring Moore to do what all of the relevant case law demands that he do: produce some evidence of pretext. 24 17 Moore attempts, in two assertions, to produce satisfactory evidence that Lilly's reason for his termination was pretext: (1) that a series of comments made by his supervisor, Yelverton, demonstrated discriminatory intent in connection with Moore's termination, and (2) that certain irregularities in the procedures followed by Lilly in connection with Moore's termination demonstrate discriminatory intent. As we shall explain, however, none of Moore's evidence establishes a sufficient nexus between his age and his termination to create a genuine issue of material fact concerning pretext. It cannot therefore defeat Lilly's motion for summary judgment.
18 Moore asserts that a number of comments made by his supervisor demonstrates that he had a bias against older workers in general, and Moore in particular. Phrased in the vernacular of our prior opinions, Moore is asserting that even if Lilly's stated reason is facially valid, it is a mere cover or pretext for illegal discrimination--i.e., that a discriminatory reason motivated [Lilly]. 25 Moore submits that his termination was a product of the discriminatory intent evidenced by Yelverton's remarks and was not a product of the drug record falsification reason given by Lilly. Not only do the statements that Moore attributes to Yelverton fail directly to refute Lilly's explanation of Moore's termination as pretextual, they fail to demonstrate discriminatory intent vel non. 19 Moore asserts that when Yelverton learned that he was going to become the supervisor of the division in which Moore worked, Yelverton asked the outgoing supervisor a series of questions concerning the ages of the current employees and whether any of the older employees planned to retire soon. 26 These questions, however, cannot be said to represent, as Moore asserts, a discriminatory intent by Yelverton. Without more, they merely demonstrate a new supervisor's reasonable inquiries about the ages of the members of his work force and their known plans for the future--facts on which to gauge the anticipated longevity of his crew. 27 20 The other set of statements that Moore proffers as proof of discriminatory intent concerning his termination are two more Yelverton remarks that simply do not have any negative implications about Moore or his age. The first was a comment made by Yelverton when he and Moore were on a sales call together. Yelverton stated that if he were in Moore's position he would be out seeing the world. Such musings about eventual retirement simply do not evidence discriminatory intent. Neither do tasteless but innocuous pottie humor comments, such as one made by Yelverton to Moore. 28 21 Moore adds that he was told by other Lilly supervisors not to recommend people over thirty-five years of age for new sales positions. The implication of that advice--that Lilly wanted to make training investments in employees of an age that would predict long range employment--is not indicative of age bias and certainly did not affect Moore, who long before had been hired as a salesman. Moore also stated in a deposition that he was the oldest man in the district office. But again, the fact that the oldest employee in the district was terminated simply does not demonstrate that the facially age-neutral reason Lilly offered for that termination was pretextual. 29
22 Moore next claims that the pretextual nature of Lilly's alleged reason for termination is obvious from the facts surrounding his termination. With this argument, Moore continues his attempt to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding Lilly's stated reason, insisting that it is a mere cover or pretext for illegal discrimination or that a discriminatory reason motivated [Lilly]. 30 23 Moore argues that six facts surrounding his termination (noting that the list could easily be continued) demonstrate Lilly's discriminatory intent. These facts, which for purposes of this review we assume to be true, are: (1) that Lilly has told inconsistent stories concerning the termination; (2) that Moore was terminated for falsifying records before Yelverton knew the elements of the offense; (3) that Yelverton varied Lilly's discharge procedures and disobeyed orders from his supervisors in deciding to terminate Moore; (4) that Moore was terminated for attempting to correct a situation caused by someone else's mistake; (5) that the sample accountability department only placed him on the daily log (a lesser penalty) but Yelverton decided to terminate him; and (6) that Yelverton shot first and asked questions later--making his inquiry only after he terminated Moore. Concerning these six assertions, the district court stated: While these conflicting accounts indicate a factual dispute as to exactly how Moore was terminated, their existence does not provide direct (or even indirect) proof that he was fired because of age. We agree. 24 Proof that an employer did not follow correct or standard procedures in the termination or demotion of an employee may well serve as the basis for a wrongful discharge action under state law. As we have stated, however, the ADEA was not created to redress wrongful discharge simply because the terminated worker was over the age of forty. 31 A discharge may well be unfair or even unlawful yet not be evidence of age bias under the ADEA. To make out an ADEA claim, the plaintiff must establish the existence of discrete facts that show some nexus between the employment actions taken by the employer and the employee's age. Here, there is no demonstrated connection other than Moore's bald assertion that one exists. That simply will not suffice. III