Opinion ID: 1097525
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Act 233 of 1984 is unconstitutional insofar as it:

Text: A. orders the return of property to the heirs of the original owners, thereby exceeding the constitutional authority granted by Art. 7, § 14(B) which limits such return to a former owner; B. conflicts with the constitutional command that the legislature enact laws to protect, conserve and replenish the state's natural resources, Art. 9, § 1; and C. impairs the validity of contracts, Art. 1, § 23. II. The legislative pronouncement that the public and necessary purpose supporting the original expropriation has ceased to exist is erroneous and subject to judicial review as an abuse of discretion. I. A. LSA-Const. 1974, Art. 7, § 14(B) permits the return of property, including mineral rights, to a former owner from whom the property had previously been expropriated, or purchased under threat of expropriation.... Under Aquillard v. Treen, 440 So.2d 704, 707 (La.,1983), this unambiguous language must be respected. Constitutional questions must be decided on the basis of the finished product approved by the voters, rather than the drafters' debates. The Bank of New Orleans and Trust Co. v. Seavey, 383 So.2d 354, 356, n. 7 (La.,1980). The phrase former owners is not synonymous with heirs of former owners. B. The loss of the spillway and its revenues will have a severe, adverse, long-range impact in the areas of hurricane protection and flood control, requiring the raising of other levees to a greater height at a cost of $72 million. In addition, railroad tracks, utilities and port facilities will have to be raised or moved at an almost incalculable cost. This fuse plug levee prevents silt from damaging oyster beds below the levee; a side effect of the loss of the Bohemia system will be further encroachment of salt water, causing faster attrition of our fresh water marshes which protect the coastline during storms and help keep the ecological balance. Act 233 is in conflict with Art. 9, § 1, which commands the legislature to enact laws to protect, conserve, and replenish this state's natural resources. [2] C. Act 233 impairs the validity of the mineral leases and contracts of the Board of Commissioners of the Orleans Levee District, as well as the bonds held by Howard, Weil contrary to the state and federal constitutional prohibitions against impairment of contracts. [3] Series 1973A bonds issued under authority of the 1921 Constitution and held by Howard, Weil are secured, not by the full faith and credit of the state, but by the full faith, credit, and resources of the Orleans Levee District. They are payable first from tax levies and then from other funds of the District. Act 233 deprives the Board of some $4,000,000 annually (about one-fourth of its revenues) without replacing it from other sources. Orleans tax levies, presently limited by the Constitution to 5 ½ mills, are the highest in the state, and cannot be increased without approval of the district voters, which cannot be lightly assumed. The repeal of a covenant which limits the use of revenues available to pay bonds causes an impairment of contracts because it permits a diminution of the pledged revenues. United States Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 1505, 52 L.Ed.2d 92 (1977). State impairment of obligations is permissible under the contract clause of the United States Constitution only when it is reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose. [4] The admittedly important public purpose in United States Trust Company of increasing mass transit facilities was insufficient to validate a statute impairing obligations. An impairment of the United States contract clause also impairs Louisiana's contract clause. Louisiana Gas Service Co. v. Louisiana Public Service Commission, 245 La. 1029, 162 So.2d 555 (1964). A statute which destroys or impairs the means or remedy for enforcement of an obligation impairs the obligation itself. [5] The value of a contract cannot be diminished by subsequent legislation. [6] Contractual obligations can yield to a proper exercise of the police power only when the purpose is public and not arbitrary or oppressive. Louisiana Gas Service Co., supra. The state's purpose in divesting the Board of the Bohemia Spillway is neither important nor public; it is an outright gift to private persons. II. The legislative pronouncement that the Bohemia Spillway no longer serves its original public purpose is arbitrary and capricious. Testimony at trial was that the Bohemia has been used sixteen times during major high water since its opening (more times than the Bonnet Carre' and Morganza combined), was last used for major flooding in 1974, and minor flooding in 1984, and in fact had water standing in it at the time of trial. On an ongoing basis, this fuse plug levee serves to prevent silt from ruining oyster beds below. Further, its existence is taken into account in the height and location of other levees protecting the area. A constitutional provision cannot shield an exercise of police power from the scrutiny of the judiciary. State, through Dept. of Highways v. Jeanerette Lumber & Shingle Co., Ltd., 350 So.2d 847 (La.,1977). Thus, the legislative error in pronouncing the purpose of this give away to be public is reviewable by this court. I respectfully dissent.