Opinion ID: 422177
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Collateral Estoppel Against Sears and Stare Decisis.

Text: 24 Stevenson's first contention is that Sears should be collaterally estopped from asserting the invalidity of his patent because the CCPA has previously held his patent to be valid. We believe, however, that it would be inappropriate in the situation here to bind Sears to the CCPA's prior determination on validity. The only parties in the previous action before the ITC (which the CCPA reviewed) were Stevenson and certain foreign defendants. Sears was neither a party to that action nor in privity with any of the parties; therefore, we do not believe it should be bound by that decision. 4 See Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 329, 91 S.Ct. at 1443; Boutell v. Volk, 449 F.2d 673, 678, 171 USPQ 668, 672 (10th Cir.1971) (Neither the actual decision of the Supreme Court [in Blonder-Tongue ] nor the language of the opinion suggests that the mutuality requirement is relaxed as to a new infringer following an adjudication of validity. To so hold would deprive the alleged infringer of a trial. Thus, the obvious distinction is that it is not inequitable to relax mutuality in a situation in which the patentee has fired his best shot, so to speak, and has missed. On the other hand, it is grossly inequitable to bind a party to a judgment of validity rendered in an action against some other party.) (emphasis in text). See also 4 D. Chisum, Patents § 19.02[e], at 19-30 to 31 (1982). 25 Stevenson's second contention is that under the doctrine of stare decisis we are bound by the CCPA's prior holding of validity. We do not agree. Blonder-Tongue dictates that our function here is not to decide the validity or invalidity of a patent, but to decide whether the patentee should be collaterally estopped. Thus, our scope of review is limited to deciding whether the patentee had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the validity of his patent in the prior unsuccessful suit. 26 Furthermore, we note that the doctrine of stare decisis is generally an inappropriate one in patent litigation. As stated earlier, patents cannot be held valid under all circumstances. Rather, a court merely decides in a particular case that the one attacking validity has not overcome the statutory presumption of validity. Thus, even if our function here were to determine the validity or invalidity of Stevenson's patent (which we do not believe it is), we would not necessarily be bound by the CCPA's prior decision in Stevenson v. International Trade Commission. To be sure, a prior holding of validity should be given weight in a subsequent suit on the issue of validity. But the prior holding does not necessarily have stare decisis effect. 5 See Penn International Industries v. Pennington Corp., 583 F.2d 1078, 1083, 200 USPQ 651, 655-56 (9th Cir.1978); Graham v. Cockshutt Farm Equipment, Inc., 256 F.2d 358, 359, 117 USPQ 439, 440 (5th Cir.1958). But see Cold Metal Process Co. v. E.W. Bliss Co., 285 F.2d 231, 236, 128 USPQ 49, 53 (6th Cir.1960) (rule of stare decisis is applicable unless court is convinced of very palpable error in law or fact in prior ruling of validity). [I]t must be remembered that the issue of patent validity is often 'as fugitive, impalpable, wayward, and vague a phantom as exists in the whole paraphernalia of legal concepts.... If there be an issue more troublesome, or more apt for litigation than this, we are not aware of it.' ... Because of the intrinsic nature of the subject, the first decision can be quite wrong, or derived from an insufficient record or presentation. Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. United States, 372 F.2d 969, 978, 153 USPQ 298, 304, 178 Ct.Cl. 543 (1967) (quoting Harries v. Air King Products Co., 183 F.2d 158, 162 (2d Cir.1950) (L. Hand, C.J.)). 27 Thus, despite Stevenson's contentions, we believe that our function here as dictated by the Supreme Court's decision in Blonder-Tongue is to determine whether Stevenson had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the validity of his patent against Grentec, Inc., in Suit I. This, of course, does not mean that the CCPA's prior decision in Stevenson v. International Trade Commission is to be ignored. Its effect, however, is limited. As we have indicated, the decision serves only as a red flag warning to the district court to apply the full and fair criteria very carefully; it does not change the inquiry to one of correctness. 28