Opinion ID: 555084
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Establishment Clause Issues.

Text: 33 The more compelling problem with the application of the doctrine in this case is that it potentially invited the jury to judge the reasonableness of the Jehovah's Witnesses' religion. See Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 109 S.Ct. 2136, 2146, 104 L.Ed.2d 766 (1989); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87, 64 S.Ct. 882, 886, 88 L.Ed. 1148 (1944). We conclude that in an appropriate case, application of the case-by-case approach to religiously motivated refusals to mitigate damages can involve weighing the reasonableness of religious beliefs and thus arguably would violate the establishment clause. However, because here the court's application of this approach was designed to assist Munn in circumventing the avoidable consequences doctrine, we need not address squarely the constitutionality of the case-by-case approach, for in any event Munn is entitled to no relief. 34 Application of the case-by-case approach allows a jury to consider the religious nature of a plaintiff's refusal to avoid the consequences of a defendant's negligence. Accordingly, otherwise unreasonable conduct may be deemed reasonable. However, the question of whether a jury decides to label such conduct as reasonable may depend upon its view of the religious tenet that motivated the plaintiff's failure to mitigate damages. See Comment, supra, at 1484. 35 If the jury finds the religion plausible, it will more likely deem the conduct reasonable; on the other hand, if the particular faith strikes the jury as strange or bizarre, the jury will probably conclude that the plaintiff's failure to mitigate was unreasonable. Because the plaintiff's religion is the only basis upon which otherwise unreasonable conduct can be deemed reasonable, the jury undoubtedly assesses the plaintiff's religion in reaching its conclusion. A strong case can be made that the first amendment forbids such an assessment. 36 However, simply because the case-by-case approach might involve impermissible assessment of a religion's reasonableness does not mean that Munn is entitled to a new trial. Munn himself interjected religion into the case, seeking to explain his wife's conduct. Had he been prohibited from doing so, the jury undoubtedly would have deemed her decision unreasonable. 11 In short, the jury's assessment of Elaine Munn's religion did not harm Munn's case. Consequently, we find the court's application of the case-by-case approach to be, at most, harmless error. 12 37