Opinion ID: 797179
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the District Court Err When It Dismissed Abbas's Complaint Sua Sponte?

Text: 11 Because Abbas proceeded in forma pauperis, the District Court predicated its dismissal of Abbas's complaint upon 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). Those two statutes provide an efficient means by which a court can screen for and dismiss legally insufficient claims. See Shakur v. Selsky, 391 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir.2004). Section 1915 governs proceedings in forma pauperis, while § 1915A applies to all civil complaints brought by prisoners against governmental officials or entities regardless of whether the prisoner has paid a filing fee. Id. (internal quotations omitted). Sections 1915 and 1915A recite identical grounds for dismissal, compare 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii), and we have found both sections applicable to prisoner proceedings in forma pauperis.  Id. The screening provision in section 1915A(a) requires courts to review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The dismissal provision in section 1915A(b) provides that a court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint . . . if the complaint . . . is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). 12 Although section 1915A grants courts the authority to dismiss a complaint with prejudice, nothing in sections 1915 and 1915A alters [t]he settled rule . . . that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotations omitted). When reviewing a district court's decision to dismiss a prisoner complaint pursuant to section 1915A, we accept all of the facts alleged in the complaint as true and draw all inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Larkin v. Savage, 318 F.3d 138, 139 (2d Cir.2003) ( per curiam ). Such dismissals must accord the inmate an opportunity to amend the complaint unless the court can rule out any possibility, however unlikely it might be, that an amended complaint would succeed in stating a claim. Gomez v. USAA Federal Savings Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 796 (2d Cir.1999) ( per curiam ). 13 Providing a plaintiff with notice and an opportunity to be heard is often necessary to establish the fairness and reliability of a dismissal. Snider v. Melindez, 199 F.3d 108, 113 (2d Cir.1999). Indeed, courts must take care lest judicial haste in dismissing a complaint in the long run makes waste. Phelps v. Kapnolas, 308 F.3d 180, 185 (2d Cir.2002) ( per curiam ) (internal quotations omitted). Specifically, [u]ntimely dismissal may prove wasteful of the court's limited resources rather than expeditious, for it often leads to a shuttling of the lawsuit between the district and appellate courts. Lewis v. State of New York, 547 F.2d 4, 6 (2d Cir.1976). [U]nless it is unmistakably clear that the court lacks jurisdiction, or that the complaint lacks merit or is otherwise defective, we believe it is bad practice for a district court to dismiss without affording a plaintiff the opportunity to be heard in opposition. Mojias v. Johnson, 351 F.3d 606, 610-11 (2d Cir.2003) (quoting Snider, 199 F.3d at 113). Indeed, failure to afford an opportunity to oppose a contemplated sua sponte dismissal may be, by itself, grounds for reversal. Acosta v. Artuz, 221 F.3d 117, 124 (2d Cir.2000) (quotations omitted). 14 In this case, the District Court dismissed Abbas's complaint sua sponte. In so doing, the Court looked only to the face of Abbas's complaint and found no basis to toll the limitations period. Abbas v. Kelly, No. 02-cv-809Sr at 5 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2002). The pleading requirements in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however, do not compel a litigant to anticipate potential affirmative defenses, such as the statute of limitations, and to affirmatively plead facts in avoidance of such defenses. See Jones v. Bock, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 910, 920, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007) (holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915A does not require prisoners affirmatively to plead that they have exhausted their administrative remedies). Instead, Rule 8 requires a plaintiff to provide only a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. FED. R. CIV. P. 8. 15 The District Court could not tell from the face of Abbas's complaint whether he might have meritorious tolling arguments. We thus conclude that the District Court should not have dismissed Abbas's complaint on the basis of an anticipated statute-of-limitations defense without granting Abbas notice and an opportunity to be heard. 16