Opinion ID: 2634394
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The State improperly removed the only African-American juror from the jury

Text: ¶ 53 In addition to refusing to supply a remedy for the defendants' ineffective assistance of counsel, the majority errs when it upholds the trial court's denial of the defendants' Batson [5] challenge. The reasons argued by the prosecution for exercising its peremptory challenge must be examined carefully to determine if they are real or pretextual. ¶ 54 Batson holds equal protection is denied when the State excludes members of the defendant's race from the venire on the basis of their race. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). There the Court developed a three-part test to determine whether the exclusion of a juror is impermissible. First, the defendant must make a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by the State. Id. at 93-94, 106 S.Ct. 1712. Once that showing is made, the burden shifts to the State to provide valid, nondiscriminatory reasons for challenging the juror. Id. at 97, 106 S.Ct. 1712. The majority properly holds the first two parts of the Batson test were satisfied. ¶ 55 The final step Batson requires is the trial court weigh the evidence of discrimination against the reasons presented for dismissing the juror to determine whether the defendant has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991). `An invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts. . . .' Id. (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976)). A prosecutor's motives may be revealed as pretextual where a given explanation is equally applicable to a juror of a different race who was not stricken by the exercise of a peremptory challenge. McClain v. Prunty, 217 F.3d 1209, 1220 (9th Cir.2000). See also Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 1203, 1211, 170 L.Ed.2d 175 (2008) (The implausibility of this explanation is reinforced by the prosecutor's acceptance of white jurors who disclosed conflicting obligations that appear to have been at least as serious as Mr. Brooks'.). Where a proffered reason is shown to be pretextual, it gives rise to an inference of discriminatory intent. Id. at 1212. ¶ 56 Here the prosecution provided two separate rationales for exercising a peremptory challenge to remove juror nine. First, the State asserted the juror was an educator and a social worker, which the State believed made her a nonstate type juror. [6] However, juror two worked for a public assistance agency and in child care licensing. The State did not peremptorily challenge that juror, even though as a social worker, she was equally a nonstate type juror as juror nine. Since the explanation was equally applicable to both jurors, and only the African-American juror was excluded, this reason is pretextual. If a pretext, the court may not consider the claimed racially neutral reason as a legitimate reason to exclude her. See McClain, 217 F.3d at 1222. ¶ 57 The State's second proffered reason is juror nine's relationship with someone who had served time, which apparently made her a nonstate type juror as well. [7] In addition to juror nine, jurors 14, 22, 55, and 37 all had relationships with others who had been incarcerated. However, unlike juror nine, the State did not challenge those jurors. The reason given by the State applied equally to all five jurors, but only the African-American juror was excused. This gives rise to an inference of discriminatory intent in exercising a peremptory challenge to remove juror nine. Snyder, 128 S.Ct. at 1205.