Opinion ID: 766255
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Count 6: Conspiracy to Distribute Crack

Text: 22 Although the government produced sufficient evidence of drug conspiracies in Counts 1 and 4, we agree with Defendant that the same cannot be said for Count 6, which targeted conduct from March 1996 through May 21, 1996 and charged Defendant with a conspiracy to manufacture, distribute, and possess with intent to distribute crack cocaine in violation of § 841(a)(1) and § 846. (J.A. at 35.) To prove a conspiracy under § 846, the government must show an agreement by two or more persons to violate federal drug laws and knowledge of, intention to join, and participation in the conspiracy on the part of each conspirator. See United States v. Maliszewski, 161 F.3d 992, 1006 (6th Cir. 1998). Here, the government failed to show that two or more persons agreed to manufacture, distribute, and possess crack with intent to distribute, and thus failed to prove a violation of §841(a)(1) and §846. 23 The sum total of the government's evidence regarding Defendant's involvement with crack cocaine came from the testimony of Rhonda Pearce. Pearce testified that she saw crack cocaine at Defendant's residence after Hicks arrived there, and that she thereafter began using crack cocaine regularly with Defendant, Ables and Hicks. Although Pearce stated that Ables would serve as Defendant's lookout during his powder cocaine sales, Pearce did not characterize Ables as a lookout during times they used crack together. Pearce also testified that Defendant did not charge her for the crack cocaine, although he charged her for powder cocaine. Pearce testified that she saw others using crack at Defendant's home; not that others purchased crack at Defendant's home. 24 At best, the government proved that Defendant himself distributed crack and possessed crack with intent to distribute--an offense for which the government charged and convicted Defendant in Count 7 under § 841(a)(1). See United States v. Washington, 41 F.3d 917, 920 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that a person who shares drugs with a friend possesses the drug with an intent to distribute in violation of § 841(a)(1)). The offense charged in Count 6 is conspiracy to distribute or to possess with intent to distribute crack cocaine, and is different from that in Count 7 only by virtue of the fact that a conspiracy conviction requires proof of an agreement to commit the substantive offense. See United States v. Fife, 573 F.2d 369, 373 (6th Cir. 1976). Thus, without proof of an agreement between Defendant and Pearce, Hicks, Ables or some other person to distribute crack or to possess crack with an intent to distribute it, the government failed to prove a separate offense of conspiracy. 5 Cf. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) (describing separate offenses in double jeopardy context as ones where each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not). 25 Notably, the government may have proved that Defendant conspired with others to use crack cocaine--at most, a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a), which criminalizes simple possession. Pearce, Ables, and Hicks appear to have conspired only to possess crack for personal use, and not to possess crack with the intent to distribute it. See United States v. Swiderski, 548 F.2d 445, 450 (2d Cir. 1977) (observing that where two individuals acquire possession without an intent to distribute the drug to a third person, neither serves as a link in the chain of distribution and they must therefore be treated as possessors for personal use than for further distribution). Moreover, the government did not introduce evidence of a large quantity of crack to support the inference of a conspiracy to distribute, as opposed to a conspiracy to possess crack. See United States v. Vincent, 20 F.3d 229, 233 (6th Cir. 1994). Again, what is lacking is proof of an agreement between Defendant and one other person to distribute or to possess with intent to distribute. Indeed, there is no evidence that Defendant and another person conspired to distribute crack, or that Defendant and another person had a tacit agreement to possess crack with the intention of distributing it. In the absence of such a showing, we find that the government did not present sufficient evidence of a crack conspiracy to sustain Defendant's conviction on Count 6 of the indictment.