Opinion ID: 1684698
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: definition of mentally retarded.

Text: As recognized by Atkins, the definition in KRS 532.130(2) of a person qualified for the mental retardation exemption from the death penalty generally conforms to the clinical definitions set forth in Mental Retardation and DSM-IV. 536 U.S. at 317 n. 22, 122 S.Ct. at 2250 n. 22. Nevertheless, Appellant asserts that by exempting only the seriously mentally retarded, KRS 532.140(1) unconstitutionally permits the execution of mildly mentally retarded offenders. That assertion is belied by the statute's definition of the significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning criterion as an IQ of 70 or below, which includes the mildly mentally retarded per DSM-IV at 42-43, cited by Atkins, 536 U.S. at 309 n. 3, 122 S.Ct. at 2245 n. 3. Further: To be classified as mentally retarded a person generally must have an IQ of 70 or below. Under the AAMR classification system, individuals with IQ scores between 50-55 and 70 have mild retardation. Individuals with scores between 35-40 and 50-55 have moderate retardation. Severely retarded people have IQ scores between 20-25 and 35-40, and profoundly retarded people have scores below 20 or 25. Penry, 492 U.S. at 308 n. 1, 109 S.Ct. at 2941 n. 1 (emphasis added) (citing AAMR, Classification in Mental Retardation 11, 13 (H. Grossman ed.1983)). The fact that our statute refers to persons with IQs of 70 or below as severely mentally retarded does not change the fact that an IQ of 70 or below includes the mildly, moderately, severely and profoundly mentally retarded. Our statutory scheme was enacted shortly after Penry and presumably relied on Penry and the AAMR in establishing an IQ of 70 as the ceiling for the exemption. Fourteen of the twenty-six states that presently have statutes exempting the mentally retarded from the death penalty define the significantly subaverage intellectual functioning criterion as either an IQ of 70 or below [10] or two or more standard deviations below the mean. [11] The two definitions are essentially the same because the mean IQ is 100 and a standard deviation is fifteen on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (3rd ed.) (WAIS-III) and sixteen on the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale (4th ed.), the two norms that are now most frequently used to assess a person's IQ. Mental Retardation 59, 61-62 (10th ed.2002). In addition, the courts of three states that do not have death penalty exemption statutes have recognized that a person must have an IQ of 70 or below to qualify for the Atkins exemption. Ex Parte Perkins, 851 So.2d 453, 456 (Ala. 2002), cert. denied Perkins v. Alabama, 540 U.S. 830, 124 S.Ct. 69, 157 L.Ed.2d 55 (2003); Murphy v. State, 54 P.3d 556, 568 (Okla.Crim.App.2002); Ex Parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 14 (Tex.Crim.App.2004); cf. Lott, 779 N.E.2d at 1014 (rebuttable presumption that defendant is not mentally retarded if IQ is above 70). Appellant next asserts that our statute does not take into account a measurement error of approximately five points in assessing IQ, although this may vary from instrument to instrument.... Thus, it is possible to diagnose Mental Retardation in individuals with IQs between 70 and 75 who exhibit significant deficits in adaptive behavior. DSM-IV at 41-42. He also complains that our statute fails to consider the so-called Flynn effect, a finding made in the 1980s that as time passes and IQ test norms grow older, the mean IQ score tested by the same norm will increase by approximately three points per decade. James R. Flynn, Massive IQ Gains in 14 Nations: What IQ Tests Really Measure, 101 Psych. Bull. 171-91 (1987 No. 2). [12] Depending on the age of the norm, an IQ measured at 74 could actually be, e.g., 71 or 68. The psychologist chosen by Appellant's attorneys in 1990 used the Shipley-Hartford Intelligence Scale to assess Appellant's IQ at 87. The psychologist appointed by the court to examine Appellant used the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (rev. ed.) (WAIS-R) norm to assess Appellant's IQ at 86. The WAIS-R was last updated in 1981 and was superseded by the WAIS-III norm in 1997. Allen v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 289 F.Supp.2d 745, 752 n. 5 (W.D.Va.2003) (citing Charles T. Hall, Social Security Disability Practice § 7.39 (1998)). Appellant asserts that because of the potential five-point margin of measurement error and the possible three-point Flynn effect, the statutory definition of significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning in KRS 532.130(2) as an IQ of 70 or below should be interpreted to mean an IQ of 75-80 or below. As will be further discussed infra, the significance of this assertion is Appellant's claim in his brief and at oral argument that while he was in junior high school (age thirteen), his IQ was assessed at 74, which would fall within his proposed revised definition. His argument appears to be that his IQ could be as low as 69 based on the measurement at age thirteen and that his 1990 WAIS-R assessment could have been inflated by the Flynn effect and the margin of measurement error. (If so, however, the 1990 WAIS-R assessment still could not have been less than IQ 78.) Recognizing serious disagreement ... in determining which offenders are in fact retarded, and that [n]ot all people who claim to be mentally retarded will be so impaired ..., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317, 122 S.Ct. at 2250, the United States Supreme Court left it to the states to formulate their own definitions, so long as they generally conform[ed] to the clinical definitions established by the AAMR and the American Psychiatric Association as approved in Atkins. Id. at 317 n. 22, 122 S.Ct. at 2250; Hill, 300 F.3d at 682. Both the potential margin of error and the Flynn effect were known at the time our statutes were enacted. The General Assembly chose not to expand the mental retardation ceiling by requiring consideration of those factors, but instead, like most other states that quantify the definition, [13] chose a bright-line cutoff ceiling of an IQ of 70, a generally recognized level at which persons are considered mentally retarded. Atkins did not discuss margins of error or the Flynn effect and held that the definition in KRS 532.130(2) generally conform[ed] to the approved clinical definitions. 536 U.S. at 317 n. 22, 122 S.Ct. at 2250 n. 22. Arizona [14] and Illinois [15] do define significantly subaverage intellectual functioning as an IQ of 75 or below. No doubt, otherwise death-eligible defendants in those states with IQs higher than 75 will claim that those statutes should be interpreted to mean that a person with an IQ of 80 to 85 is exempt-eligible. Arkansas's statute, on the other hand, creates a rebuttable presumption of mental retardation if the defendant has an IQ of 65 or below, [16] and Atkins also held that statute to generally conform to the approved clinical definitions. Id. at 317 n. 22, 122 S.Ct. at 2250, n. 22. The remaining nine states [17] with statutory exemptions have chosen not to numerically quantify the definition of significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, presumably relegating the issue to a battle of the experts. Generally, accepted definitions within the scientific community will no doubt be refined as our knowledge of this area advances. Howell v. State, 151 S.W.3d 450, 455-56 (Tenn. 2004). However, absent proof that the statutory definition of significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning in KRS 532.130(2) is unconstitutional, any change in that definition must emanate from the General Assembly, not this Court. When it decided in Atkins to delegate to the states the authority to formulate their own definitions of mentally retarded, the United States Supreme Court obviously anticipated that the definitions would vary in some respects but would be acceptable if they generally conform[ed] to the clinical definitions approved therein. 536 U.S. at 317, n. 22, 122 S.Ct. at 2250, n. 22; Hill, 300 F.3d at 682. The General Assembly's adoption of a bright-line maximum IQ of 70 as the ceiling for mental retardation generally conform[s] to the clinical definitions approved in Atkins, thus does not implicate the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. As did the Supreme Court of Tennessee when faced with this same argument, we decline to rewrite this unambiguous statute. Howell, 151 S.W.3d at 455-56.