Opinion ID: 1717272
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: rehabilitative alimony of $210 per month for 120 months.

Text: We have discussed the issue of rehabilitative alimony in numerous cases. In determining alimony and division of property, the trial court must consider: (1) the length of the marriage; (2) the respective earning capacity of the parties; (3) the financial condition of each, after the division of the property; (4) the respective age, health, and physical condition of the parties; (5) the station in life and social standing of each; and (6) the relative fault of each in the termination of the marriage. Booth v. Booth, 354 N.W.2d 924 (S.D.1984); Goehry v. Goehry, 354 N.W.2d 192 (S.D. 1984). The trial court found that: (1) the parties had been married almost 19 years at the time of trial; (2) Bernard's net income was $1,900.00 per month and he had a better income-earning potential; Phyllis was presently unemployed and would only be able to earn income at a minimum wage without enhancement and rehabilitation of her skills; (3) an equal division of the equity of the home after the youngest child reaches his majority was appropriate; personal property was to be divided to give Bernard approximately $2,600 and Phyllis approximately $6,700 (which included a vehicle for her use and one for the use of the children); Phyllis was entitled to 42% of Bernard's future retirement payments; (4) both parties were 41 years of age at the time of trial and Phyllis' health was fair because of chronic health problems; (5) the parties had a middle class status and both enjoyed an upper middle class social standing as a result of his military rank; (6) Bernard bears a greater fault for the termination of the marriage. Bernard contends that the trial court's award of reimbursement or restitutional alimony must be set aside because Phyllis did not contribute to Bernard's professional advancement. Bernard uses these terms interchangeably. Bernard does not cite any reference to nor does the record disclose any reference to reimbursement alimony. The trial court consistently refers to rehabilitative alimony in its findings of fact and conclusions of law. However, the judgment refers to rehabilitative and restitutional alimony. Although we urge the use of careful and consistent language, the issue is not the name placed on alimony, but whether the record supports the award. This court has consistently held that rehabilitative alimony is proper where it is necessary to enable the supporting spouse to refresh or enhance the job skills he or she needs to earn a living. Saint-Pierre, supra at 262; see Tesch, supra ; Booth, supra ; Goehry, supra; Martin v. Martin, 358 N.W.2d 793, 799 (S.D.1984). The trial court heard testimony that the skills and experience which Phyllis may have possessed years earlier were outdated. Two witnesses who were familiar with Phyllis' background and the present labor market testified that Phyllis would not be able to obtain better than minimum wage employment without further training or education. The trial court was also aware that the $900 per month in alimony and child support was insufficient to cover the expenses of Phyllis and the three boys. Phyllis would have to earn approximately $479 per month to meet current expenses. [2] Bernard cites Stemper v. Stemper, 403 N.W.2d 405 (S.D.1987), modified on rehearing, 415 N.W.2d 159 (S.D.1987), in support of his argument that the trial court improperly considered his retirement income in awarding alimony. First, both Bernard and Stemper wholly fail to point out where or how the respective trial courts supposedly improperly considered retirement income in awarding alimony. Secondly, Stemper has been modified. For these and other reasons ( see my dissenting opinion in Stemper at 409-10, joined by Judge Konenkamp), Stemper's authority should be and is severely limited. Phyllis is to receive 42% of the retirement payments as part of the property division. Bernard testified that he could not retire from the military before March of 1988 and that his inclination was to retire at that time. The findings of fact and conclusions of law, based upon extensive testimony at trial, indicate that the trial court presumed that Bernard would remain employed past 1988, either with the Air Force or with a civilian employer. The alimony award would not be paid from the retirement fund, but from his salary, unless he were not employed at all during the remaining eight years of the alimony award (i.e., if he were unemployed continually to age fifty-one). In Nauman v. Nauman, 320 N.W. 2d 519 (S.D.1982), this court distinguished the inability to pay support obligations from a simple lack of funds. Nauman makes it clear that support obligations will not be eliminated simply because the responsible party chooses not to work or refuses to work. [3] Phyllis has filed a separate motion for attorney fees, tax and costs. It is verified and itemized as required by Malcolm v. Malcolm, 365 N.W.2d 863 (S.D. 1985). In determining the award of attorney fees, we consider factors such as the property owned by each party, their relative incomes, the liquidity of assets, and whether either party unreasonably increased the time spent on the case. Storm v. Storm, 400 N.W.2d 457 (S.D.1987). In light of these factors we award Phyllis $1,255.64 attorney fees. WUEST, C.J., and MORGAN and MILLER, JJ., concur. HENDERSON, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.