Opinion ID: 796361
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ross's and Judon's Motions for New Trials

Text: 17 We review a district court's disposition of a motion for a new trial for an abuse of discretion. Peters, 462 F.3d at 957. Where, as here, the motions assert that the verdicts are contrary to the weight of the evidence, the [district] court need not view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, but may instead weigh the evidence and evaluate for itself the credibility of the witnesses. United States v. Huerta-Orozco, 272 F.3d 561, 565 (8th Cir.2001). The district court should grant the motion if the evidence weighs so heavily against the verdict that the district court believes that a miscarriage of justice may have occurred. Id. Absent a clear and manifest abuse of discretion, we uphold the district court's ruling on a motion for a new trial. Peters, 462 F.3d at 957 (internal quotation omitted). 18 In seeking new trials, both Ross and Judon argue that but for the testimony of the Davises, no evidence supports their convictions, and they invite us to assess the credibility of the Davises. Judon also argues that he should receive a new trial because the district court erred in limiting cross-examination into the circumstances surrounding Davis Jr.'s prior conviction, primarily focusing on the district court's decision to exclude evidence of the sexual nature of that conviction. 19 While Ross and Judon present reasonable arguments challenging the credibility of the Davises, the Davises' testimony was corroborated by testimony from three Mason City police investigators and an F.B.I. agent. The Government also presented audio recordings of some of the controlled purchases, further corroborating the Davises' testimony. The district court was well-positioned to assess the Davises' credibility in making its rulings on both new trial motions. See United States v. Gabe, 237 F.3d 954, 961 (8th Cir.2001) (declining to second-guess the district court's evaluation of witness credibility on a motion for a new trial). We see no abuse of discretion in the district court's determination that sufficient evidence supported the jury verdicts against Ross and Judon. 20 Judon also argues that the district court erred by limiting cross-examination of Davis Jr. We review a district court's decision to limit cross-examination for a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion. United States v. Haskell, 468 F.3d 1064, 1072 (8th Cir.2006). Judon asserts that the district court erred by excluding evidence of the sexual nature of Davis Jr.'s conviction. In United States v. Ford, 17 F.3d 1100, 1103 (8th Cir.1994), we upheld an identical limitation in nearly identical circumstances, holding that it was not a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion for the district court to exclude evidence regarding the sexual nature of the Government's primary witness's conviction. Id. at 1103-04. Judon also argues that the district court erred by limiting inquiry into the timing of Davis Jr.'s custody on the sexual assault charge relative to his cooperation and into the circumstances surrounding his subsequent plea. However, Judon does not identify in his briefs, nor does the record reflect, how the district court's limitation of cross-examination into these matters prejudiced him. Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not clearly and prejudicially abuse its discretion when it limited Judon's cross-examination of Davis Jr. 21 The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that sufficient evidence supported the jury verdicts, and it did not abuse its discretion in limiting cross-examination into the circumstances surrounding Davis Jr.'s prior conviction. We therefore affirm the district court's denials of Ross's and Judon's motions for new trials.