Opinion ID: 2994082
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Title IX Background

Text: Title IX provides that [n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. 20 U.S.C. sec. 1681. As noted in Part I above, the Civil Rights Remedies Equalization Act, 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000d-7(a)(1), expressly made the States subject to suits to enforce the guarantees of Title IX. It is well settled that sexual harassment of a student in a federally funded educational program or activity, if it is perpetrated by a teacher or other employee of the funding recipient, can render the recipient liable for damages under Title IX. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 63-64, 76; Smith v. Metropolitan Sch. Dist. Perry Township, 128 F.3d 1014, 1021 (7th Cir. 1997). What is less clear, and what is before this Court today, is whether a school (or other educational fund recipient) can be liable for failing to take prompt, appropriate action to remedy known sexual harassment of one student by other students. Three courts of appeals have considered the question, with two finding no liability, see Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc); Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir. 1996), certiorari denied, 117 S. Ct. 165, and one finding such liability if the school knew or should have known that the harassment was occurring, see Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997). Further, a number of district courts have found such liability to exist under Title IX. See, e.g., Doe v. Londonderry Sch. Dist., 970 F. Supp. 64, 74 (D.N.H. 1997); Nicole M. v. Martinez Unified Sch. Dist., 964 F. Supp. 1369, 1377 (N.D. Cal. 1997); Bruneau v. South Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 935 F. Supp. 162, 173 (N.D.N.Y. 1996); Wright v. Mason City Community Sch. Dist., 940 F. Supp. 1412, 1419-1420 (N.D. Iowa 1996); Bosley v. Kearney R-1 Sch. Dist., 904 F. Supp. 1006, 1023 (W.D. Mo. 1995). The district court in the present case, ruling without consideration of any court of appeals decisions on the issue,/7 held that the University could be liable for failing to take action to address Doe’s harassment, but only if Doe alleged (as the court believed she had not done) that school and University officials’ failure to respond resulted from the University’s sexual discrimination against her. In other words, the court held that the University’s allegedly intentional failure to act in the face of knowledge of the sexual harassment was not sufficient to sustain Title IX liability; in the court’s view, Doe needed to allege that the failure arose out of an intent by the University to discriminate on the basis of sex. For reasons set forth below, this Court holds that a Title IX fund recipient may be held liable for its failure to take prompt, appropriate action in response to student-on-student sexual harassment that takes place while the students are involved in school activities or otherwise under the supervision of school employees, provided the recipient’s responsible officials actually knew that the harassment was taking place. We reject the district court’s further requirement that plaintiffs in such cases plead or prove that the recipient, or any of its officials, failed to respond as a result of sexually discriminatory intent. The failure promptly to take appropriate steps in response to known sexual harassment is itself intentional discrimination on the basis of sex, and so, once a plaintiff has alleged such failure, she has alleged the sort of intentional discrimination against which Title IX protects.