Opinion ID: 2275855
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Insurance Question

Text: SLU and Dr. Bicalho next assert that the trial court erred in denying their request for a mistrial because Mr. Sgroi and Ms. Geary's counsel improperly, and in bad faith, injected insurance into the case by identifying The Doctors Company as an insurance company in a question during voir dire. SLU and Dr. Bicalho argue that the improper question caused prejudice to them and resulted in an excessive verdict in favor of Mr. Sgroi and Ms. Geary. This Court has held that the constitutional right to a trial by jury includes the right to a fair and impartial jury. Ivy v. Hawk, 878 S.W.2d 442, 444 (Mo. banc 1994). Parties have a right to know if jurors or their families have an interest in the outcome of the litigation, and the trial court has no discretion to deny a party the right to ask the preliminary `insurance question' if the proper foundation is laid. [8] Id. Counsel has laid a proper foundation when he or she requests, prior to voir dire and on the record, that he or she be permitted to ask the insurance question. Id. The accepted procedure in Missouri for asking the preliminary insurance question is as follows: 1) first getting the judge's approval of the proposed question out of the hearing of the jury panel, 2) asking only one `insurance question,' and 3) not asking it first or last in a series of questions so as to avoid unduly highlighting the question to the jury panel. Id. at 445 (Emphasis added). The accepted procedure for asking the preliminary insurance question requires counsel to specifically state to the trial judge the question that will be asked of the venire panel. Id. The form of the question is at the trial court's discretion, but it generally encompasses whether any members of the panel or their families work for or have a financial interest in the named insurance company. Id. Identifying the company in the question as an insurance company when the name of the company does not include the word insurance improperly and unnecessarily highlights the issue of insurance. Id. at 445 n. 1. Here, out of the presence of the venire panel, Mr. Sgroi and Ms. Geary's counsel advised the court that he wanted to ask the insurance question. Counsel asked only one question, and it was not the first or last question in voir dire. Counsel failed, however, to get the judge's approval of the specific question he asked. Counsel asked, Is anybody here an officer, director, or shareholder of an insurance company called The Doctor's Company? (Emphasis added). SLU and Dr. Bicalho objected that it was an improper question and requested a mistrial. The trial court sustained the objection but denied their request for a mistrial. SLU and Dr. Bicalho assert that the precise wording of the specific question was never discussed and thus [Mr. Sgroi and Ms. Geary] did not follow the proper procedure to obtain the judge's approval of the proposed `insurance question' out of the hearing of the panel. SLU and Dr. Bicalho contend that because Mr. Sgroi and Ms. Geary's question identified The Doctors Company as an insurance company, the question improperly highlighted the insurance issue and a mistrial was required. SLU and Dr. Bicalho are correct in their understanding that Ivy requires a party who wants to ask the insurance question to explicitly recite to the trial court the question to be asked. 878 S.W.2d at 445. Ivy also stands for the proposition that the word insurance should not be injected into the question when not a part of the insurance company's name. Id. However, Ivy does not require a declaration of a mistrial if the accepted procedure for asking the insurance question is not followed precisely. See id. When the proper procedure is not followed, it is within the trial court's discretion whether to grant a mistrial due to a reference to insurance, and such decisions will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of discretion. Taylor v. Republic Auto. Parts, Inc., 950 S.W.2d 318, 321 (Mo.App.1997). To establish a manifest abuse, there must be a grievous error where prejudice otherwise cannot be removed. Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hosp., 863 S.W.2d 852, 867 (Mo. banc 1993). Although the insurance question omits the word insurance where it can, mere use of the word insurance does not alone warrant reversal or a mistrial. [9] Means v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 550 S.W.2d 780, 787 (Mo.1977). When determining whether a mistrial is required, the trial court should focus on whether the question is asked in good faith. Callahan, 863 S.W.2d at 871. If an insurance question is asked not in good faith, but for the purpose of injecting insurance coverage into the minds of the jurors, the ensuing prejudicial effect deprives the defendant of his right to a fair trial. Id. If the mention of insurance was in good faith, the trial court must decide if the improper highlighting of insurance prejudiced the jury. [10] The trial court is in a superior position than an appellate court to determine if a question was motivated by good or bad faith or if there was any prejudicial effect on the jury. Taylor, 950 S.W.2d at 321. In the present case, SLU and Dr. Bicalho point to no evidence that supports their claim that the insurance question was asked in bad faith beyond the fact that counsel used the words insurance company. Other portions of the record support a finding that counsel's use of the word insurance was not done in bad faith. First, counsel attempted to follow the accepted procedure and requested permission from the trial court to ask the insurance question. Second, when SLU and Dr. Bicalho requested a mistrial, the following discussion occurred out of the hearing of the jury: [Mr. Sgroi's and Ms. Geary's counsel]: Judge, we talked about this in chambers. . . The Court: Whoa, whoa. We didn't say what question you were going to ask. I assumed that you were aware of the insurance question. [Mr. Sgroi's and Ms. Geary's counsel]: Well, I don't think that I agree you can't identify it as an insurance company. From this dialogue, the trial court could have found that counsel did not know that the word insurance should not be used, if at all possible, in the insurance question. Counsel's misunderstanding of the law supports a finding that counsel did not act in bad faith. With evidence that supports the trial court's finding of no bad faith, this Court must defer to the trial court which was in the best position to recognize bad faith or prejudice. SLU and Dr. Bicalho make two other arguments that the record shows prejudice that requires a mistrial. First, they point to venireperson Grohman's repeated references to insurance that occurred after plaintiffs' counsel asked the insurance question. However, all of these comments about insurance logically followed from questions about tort reform, medical malpractice, and putting a price on pain and suffering. SLU and Dr. Bicalho did not object to these questions, although they did renew their request for mistrial after Mr. Grohman stated that the insurance company would be paying any jury award for damages. The trial court was not compelled to believe that Mr. Grohman's references to insurance resulted from the improper insurance question. Mr. Grohman's references to insurance more likely were generated by the questions on tort reform and medical malpractice than the insurance question. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in remedying the situation by permitting Mr. Grohman to be stricken for cause rather than declaring a mistrial. Second, SLU and Dr. Bicalho contend that the jury's verdict was excessively high due to this injection of insurance into the case. They offer no support for this assertion. An award of $775,000 was not excessively high compensation to a fifty-five-year-old who suffered excruciating pain during the seven weeks between Dr. Bicalho's failure to diagnose the hip fracture and the resulting hip surgery, who undertook years of rehabilitation to recover his ability to walk, and who then lost his hip joint, which permanently deprived him of the ability to walk. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying SLU and Dr. Bicalho's request for mistrial. Because counsel did not inject insurance in bad faith and there was no grievous error where prejudice could not otherwise be removed, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying a mistrial.