Opinion ID: 783058
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Extraordinary Circumstances Beyond Rouse's Control Prevented Him From Filing On Time

Text: 34 Turning to Rouse's arguments, he first argues that his medical condition during the limitations period is an extraordinary circumstance beyond his control that prevented him from filing on time, thus warranting equitable tolling. Because Rouse simply provides no reason why his medical condition barred him from filing his habeas petition at least one day earlier, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying equitable tolling on this basis. 10 35 Second, Rouse contends that the gross negligence and unprofessional conduct of his former habeas counsel in misinterpret[ing] the statutory requirements constitutes an extraordinary circumstance beyond his control that prevented him from filing on time. (Appellant's Br. at 25, 27-28.) The errors of Rouse's former counsel, however, were neither extraordinary nor, for purposes of our inquiry, external to Rouse's own conduct. 36 We review de novo the district court's denial of equitable tolling on this basis because the district court held that, as a matter of law, a mistake of counsel does not serve as a ground for equitable tolling. (J.A. at 328.) This circuit has held that a mistake by a party's counsel in interpreting a statute of limitations does not present the extraordinary circumstance beyond the party's control where equity should step in to give the party the benefit of his erroneous understanding. Harris, 209 F.3d at 331. A majority of other circuits agree. See Merritt v. Blaine, 326 F.3d 157, 169 (3d Cir.2003) 11 (applying general rule that attorney error, miscalculation, inadequate research, or other mistakes have not been found to rise to the `extraordinary' circumstances required for equitable tolling (internal quotation marks omitted)); Beery v. Ault, 312 F.3d 948, 951 (8th Cir.2002) (Ineffective assistance of counsel generally does not warrant equitable tolling.); Fierro v. Cockrell, 294 F.3d 674, 683 (5th Cir.2002) ([C]ounsel's erroneous interpretation of the statute of limitations provision cannot, by itself, excuse the failure to file [the] habeas petition in the district court within the one-year limitations period.); Smaldone v. Senkowski, 273 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir.2001) ([A]ttorney error [is] inadequate to create the `extraordinary' circumstances equitable tolling requires.); Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir.2001) (We conclude that the miscalculation of the limitations period by Frye's counsel and his negligence in general do not constitute extraordinary circumstances sufficient to warrant equitable tolling.); Taliani v. Chrans, 189 F.3d 597, 598 (7th Cir.1999) (holding that a lawyer's miscalculation of the limitation period was not a valid basis for equitable tolling); Sandvik v. United States, 177 F.3d 1269, 1272 (11th Cir.1999) (refusing to apply equitable tolling where late filing was caused by attorney's use of ordinary mail to send petition less than a week before it was due); Gilbert by Gilbert v. Sec. of Health & Human Servs., 51 F.3d 254, 257 (Fed.Cir.1995) (The negligence of Gilbert's attorney does not justify applying equitable tolling.). As further support for the proposition that attorney error is not an extraordinary circumstance, attorney error during habeas proceedings is not itself a ground for relief in a § 2254 proceeding. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(i) (West Supp.2002) (The ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during Federal or State collateral post-conviction proceedings shall not be a ground for relief in a proceeding arising under section 2254.). 37 Moreover, the actions of Rouse's attorneys are attributable to Rouse, and thus, do not present circumstances external to the party's own conduct, Harris, 209 F.3d at 330. Rouse's argument that the errors of his former habeas counsel are external to his conduct because he did not participate in their decisions misses the mark. Former counsel's errors are attributable to Rouse not because he participated in, ratified, or condoned their decisions, but because they were his agents, and their actions were attributable to him under standard principles of agency. 12 See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753-54, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (explaining that attorney error, short of ineffective assistance of counsel, is, under standard principles of agency, attributable to the client); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) ([A] defendant [who] is represented by counsel whose performance is not constitutionally ineffective ... bear[s] the risk of attorney error....); see also Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 92, 111 S.Ct. 453, 112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990) (Under our system of representative litigation, each party is deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent and is considered to have notice of all facts, notice of which can be charged upon the attorney. (internal quotation marks omitted)). 13 38 In both Carrier and Coleman, the Supreme Court considered whether an attorney's error constituted cause for a procedural default, which like equitable tolling, requires a showing that some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639. The Court held that [a]ttorney ignorance or inadvertence is not `cause' because the attorney is the petitioner's agent when acting, or failing to act, in furtherance of the litigation, and the petitioner must `bear the risk of attorney error.' Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753, 111 S.Ct. 2546 (quoting Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639). Attorney error that constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel is not attributable to the petitioner. This is so, however, not because ... the error is so bad that `the lawyer ceases to be an agent of the petitioner,' but rather, because `the Sixth Amendment itself requires that responsibility for the default be imputed to the State.' Id. at 754, 111 S.Ct. 2546 (quoting Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488, 106 S.Ct. 2678). Thus, the Coleman Court held that attorney error during state habeas proceedings was not cause because [t]here is no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction proceedings ... [and][c]onsequently, a petitioner cannot claim constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in such proceedings. Id. at 752, 111 S.Ct. 2546. 39 Similarly, Rouse had no constitutional right to counsel in his federal habeas proceedings. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555-56, 107 S.Ct. 1990, 95 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987) (no constitutional right to counsel beyond first appeal of right), Hunt v. Nuth, 57 F.3d 1327, 1340 (4th Cir.1995) (no constitutional right to counsel during federal habeas). Rouse did have a statutory right to counsel, see 21 U.S.C.A. § 848(q)(4) (West 1999), but there can only be constitutional ineffective assistance of counsel where there is a constitutional right to counsel. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752, 111 S.Ct. 2546. In the absence of constitutional ineffective assistance of counsel, attorney error is attributable to the petitioner. Id. at 753, 111 S.Ct. 2546. Accordingly, because Rouse's former habeas counsel's error cannot be constitutionally ineffective, that error can fairly be attributable to Rouse and is not external to his own conduct. 14 See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753, 111 S.Ct. 2546. 40 Because Rouse has not shown that extraordinary circumstances beyond his control prevented him from timely filing his federal habeas petition, the district court did not err in holding that he is not entitled to equitable tolling under our existing extraordinary circumstances test applied in Harris v. Hutchinson and Spencer v. Sutton. We next consider whether we should apply a different equitable tolling test to this case.