Opinion ID: 618806
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Grand Junction Robbery

Text: The court reviews the admission of evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) for abuse of discretion. United States v. Mares, 441 F.3d 1152, 1156 (10th Cir. 2006). “An abuse of discretion occurs when a judicial determination is arbitrary, capricious or whimsical.” United States v. Shumway, 112 F.3d 1413, 1419 (10th Cir. 1997) (quotation omitted). A district court does not abuse its discretion where its ruling “falls within the bounds of permissible choice in the circumstances.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Under Rule 404(b), “Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular -5- occasion the person acted in accordance with the character. . . . This evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving . . . identity . . . .” To determine whether the admission of evidence under Rule 404(b) was proper, the court applies a four-part test derived from Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691–92 (1988). The Huddleston test requires: “1) the evidence was offered for a proper purpose; 2) the evidence was relevant; 3) the trial court properly determined under Fed. R. Evid. 403 the probative value of similar-acts evidence was not substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice; and 4) the trial court gave the jury proper limiting instructions upon request.” Shumway, 112 F.3d at 1419. The fourth prong of the Huddleston test is not at issue: the trial court provided a limiting instruction at Vaughan’s request. Nor is the first prong of the Huddleston test at issue. For Rule 404(b) evidence to be offered for a proper purpose, “[t]he Government must articulate precisely the evidentiary hypothesis by which a fact of consequence may be inferred from the evidence of other acts. In addition, the trial court must specifically identify the purpose for which such evidence is offered . . . .” United States v. Kendall, 766 F.2d 1426, 1436 (10th Cir. 1985). The government articulated several 404(b) purposes for which it sought to admit evidence of the prior robberies, including knowledge, motive, intent, preparation, plan, and identity. The district court rejected the first five of these but accepted the sixth. Vaughan denied any involvement in the Salina -6- robbery and so the government sought to establish identity by showing enough similarities between that robbery and the Grand Junction robbery to demonstrate a signature quality to both crimes. The court thus specifically identified the purpose for which evidence of the Grand Junction robbery was offered. While Vaughan contests the extent of the similarities between the Grand Junction and Salina robberies, these arguments are properly considered under the second and third Huddleston prongs.
Under the second prong of the Huddleston test, Rule 404(b) evidence is relevant if it “tends to prove or disprove one of the elements necessary to the charged offense.” United States v. Mares, 441 F.3d 1152, 1156–57 (10th Cir. 2006). Uncharged prior bad acts can be used for a proper 404(b) purpose so long as they are “similar to the charged crime and sufficiently close in time.” United States v. Zamora, 222 F.3d 756, 762 (10th Cir. 2000). “Moreover, although the uncharged crime must be similar to the charged offense, it need not be identical.” Id. Where, as here, evidence is offered to show identity based on a modus operandi theory, the charged and uncharged acts must, “based on a totality of the comparison . . . share enough elements to constitute a ‘signature quality.’” Shumway, 112 F.3d at 1420 (quotations omitted). The court considers several non-exhaustive factors in considering whether the similarities between two crimes are sufficient to constitute a signature quality: -7- (1) geographic location (e.g. preference for rural or urban targets); (2) unusual quality of the crimes; (3) the skill necessary to commit the crimes; (4) use of a distinctive device; (5) geographical and temporal proximity between the crimes; (6) whether the crimes share similar physical elements; and (7) whether the crimes are part of a common scheme. See id. at 1420; Mares, 441 F.3d at 1158. Additionally, the district court has the discretion to consider these factors on a sliding scale such that “a few highly unique factors may constitute a ‘signature,’ while a number of lesser unique factors although insufficient to generate a strong inference of identity if considered separately, may be of significant probative value when considered together.” Shumway, 112 F.3d at 1420 (quotations omitted). Applying this standard, the district court determined the similarities between the Grand Junction and Salina robberies were sufficient to constitute a signature quality. The two robberies occurred in neighboring states and within thirteen days of one another. Witnesses gave a similar physical description of both robbers. Both robbers used a handgun, demanded “all the money,” and instructed the bank tellers to search particular drawers for more money. Both robbers stored the money in the front of their pants rather than a bag or container, and both robbers used a bicycle to flee the scene. Most significantly, both robbers wore a “Starter 71” baseball cap which was specially rigged with the second bill of another baseball cap that the robbers used to cover their faces. -8- Vaughan argues most of the similarities between the two robberies are generic; robbers commonly use guns and escape by means of a bicycle 1, and Starter hats are sold in chain stores around the country. Vaughan also points to the dissimilarities between the two robberies: the Salina robber wore thin plastic gloves, whereas the Grand Junction robber did not. Further, the Grand Junction robber was polite and did not fire a gun, whereas the Salina robber was rude and did fire a gun. Finally, the Salina robber was described as having reddish-blond facial hair, whereas the Salina robber was not described as having facial hair. Vaughan also argues the district court’s exclusion of the other twelve robberies he committed shows there was no signature quality to his robberies permitting an inference he committed the Salina robbery. These arguments fail to demonstrate the district court’s determination was arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical or that it fell outside the bounds of permissible choice under the circumstances. Shumway, 112 F.3d at 1419. To begin, Vaughan’s attacks on the similarities between the two robberies are piecemeal. That is, he analyzes each of the similarities cited by the district court separately in an attempt to show each, standing alone, is insufficient to establish a signature 1 In support of this contention, Vaughan cites several reported and unreported cases, as well as a plea agreement from a recent federal case in Kansas, involving robberies where the suspect used a bicycle as a means of escape. In its 404(b) order, the district court cited testimony from Special Agent Abbott indicating the use of a bicycle as a getaway vehicle in a bank robbery may occur as infrequently as five percent of all bank robberies. -9- quality. This approach is inconsistent with the course this court has taken in previous modus operandi cases, where the number and uniqueness of the factors necessary to establish a signature quality depends upon the particular circumstances of each case. See id. at 1420. Moreover, Vaughan’s attempt to minimize the significance of the distinctive, double-billed, “Starter 71” cap used in each robbery is unpersuasive. The district court was well within its discretion to conclude two robberies, committed in neighboring states only thirteen days apart, in which the suspect used a specially configured cap with a particular insignia were likely committed by the same person. While the dissimilarities Vaughan identifies—gloves, facial hair, politeness, and the discharge of a firearm—are relevant in comparing the two robberies, they are not so compelling as to demonstrate the district court abused its discretion in this case. Indeed, the case Vaughan cites as an example of where a court did abuse its discretion in admitting modus operandi evidence illustrates the type of showing he fails to make here. In United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1045–46 (5th Cir. 1977), not only were the similarities between the charged and uncharged robberies completely generic, 2 but there was a substantial 2 The prosecution in Myers described the relevant “similarities” as follows: (1) both crimes were bank robberies, (2) perpetrated by [the defendants], (3) between two and three o'clock in the afternoon. In both robberies the victimized bank was (4) located on the outskirts of a town, (5) adjacent (continued...) -10- dissimilarity between the two robberies. The charged robbery in Myers involved a lone gunman, whereas the uncharged robbery involved two armed suspects. Id. Finally, the district court’s exclusion of evidence of the other robberies to which Vaughan confessed has no bearing on whether the Grand Junction robbery was sufficiently similar to the Salina robbery to establish a signature quality.
Under the third Huddleston factor, the district court must determine whether the probative value of the prior bad acts evidence used to show identity is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Mares, 441 F.3d at 1159. “The exclusion of evidence under Rule 403 is an extraordinary remedy and should be used sparingly.” Id. (quotation omitted). Here, in light of the previously-discussed similarities and close geographical and temporal proximity between the Grand Junction and Salina robberies, the probative value of the evidence was substantial. Moreover, Vaughan fails to show that the prejudice he suffered from the admission of this evidence was unfair. See id. (“While the 2 (...continued) to a major highway. In both robberies the participants (6) used a revolver, (7) furnished their own bag for carrying off the proceeds, and wore (8) gloves and (9) masks crudely fashioned from nylon stockings. Finally, (10), in one of the banks, two women employees were present; in the other, five women employees were present. United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1046 (5th Cir. 1977). -11- evidence was ‘prejudicial’ to [the defendant] in the sense that it rebutted her theory of defense, such is the nature of evidence establishing an element of the charged crime.”). The evidence of the Grand Junction robbery was offered for a proper purpose, relevant, consistent with Rule 403, and submitted with an appropriate limiting instruction. The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence in Vaughan’s trial for the Salina robbery.