Opinion ID: 1704594
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Right to Use a Special Verdict Form.

Text: General verdicts and special verdicts have been in existence in this jurisdiction since 1877. However, the original use of a special verdict limited the jury to find the facts only, leaving the judgment to the court. Revised Codes of the Territory of Dakota, Code of Civil Procedure, Art. V, § 260 at 557 (1877). A review of our reported decisions since that time establishes a use of general verdicts predominating over the use of special verdicts. The use of special verdicts is now governed by SDCL 15-6-49(a) [1] and the use of special interrogatories with a general verdict is now governed by SDCL 15-6-49(b). [2] The issue of the interpretation of the current rule is a case of first impression in South Dakota. There are three general views as to the use of special verdicts or their companions, special interrogatories with a general verdict. Some states, such as Texas, use them in many jury cases. 9 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2503 (1971). Most states which use this approach have done so by statute. [3] On the other hand, critics of this system have attacked it as unwarranted judicial meddling with the jury system. [4] The middle ground, which is in accord with the literal wording of 15-6-49(a), makes the use of special verdict forms a matter of judicial discretion. When Rule 49 was adopted by this Court in 1966, we assume that this Court at that time meant what it said and said what it meant. Cf. Appeal of AT & T Information Systems, 405 N.W.2d 24, 27 (S.D.1987). SDCL 15-6-49(a) and (b) are the equivalent to Rule 49(a) and (b) Fed.R.Civ.P. Mielitz v. Schmieg, 461 N.W.2d 763, 765 (S.D.1990). Rule 49 is used in the Federal Courts and in many state courts. Thus, decisions by the Federal Courts and other states with the Federal Rules provide analytical assistance in interpretation of our state rule. Mielitz, supra . The Federal Rules have become similar to a uniform law. SDCL 2-14-13 states that a uniform law is to be interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it. In Orrison v. City of Rapid City, 76 S.D. 145, 74 N.W.2d 489 (1956), we were called upon to interpret the method of use of special verdicts under SDC 33.1330, the Court may direct the jury to find a special verdict..., the predecessor to SDCL 15-6-49(a) the court may require a jury to return only a special verdict.... (emphasis added). In Orrison, we held that the decision of the trial court on whether to use a special verdict form was subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review. Id. 74 N.W.2d at 495. Subsequently, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Bartak v. Bell-Galyardt & Wells, Inc., 629 F.2d 523, 531 (8th Cir.1980), determined that both the current South Dakota rule, SDCL 15-6-49, and the identical Federal Rule 49, were based on an abuse of discretion standard. The issue of the use of special verdicts and interrogatories is not analyzed in isolation. It has been held that when jury instructions comprehensively cover all material issues in a case, the trial court does not abuse its discretion by denying the request for use of Rule 49. Wheeler v. John Deere, 935 F.2d 1090, 1101 (10th Cir.1991). For the above reasons, we interpret SDCL 15-6-49(a) to allow the determination to use a special verdict form and its contents, if used, to be within the sound discretion of the circuit court. Abuse of discretion refers to a discretion exercised to an end or purpose not justified by, and clearly against, reason and evidence. Kanta v. Kanta, 479 N.W.2d 505, 507 (S.D.1991). An abuse of discretion will be measured by an objective reasonableness standard... `We are not to determine whether the judges of this court would have made an original like ruling, but rather whether we think a judicial mind, in view of the law and the circumstances of the particular case, could reasonably have reached such a conclusion.' Stated another way, a trial court's findings of fact and the subsequent application of discretion shall not be disturbed unless there is clearly no basis in reason or evidence to support that finding. Matter of Estate of Donahue, 464 N.W.2d 393, 394-95 (S.D.1990) (citations omitted.) [5] Wright and Miller state that there is little specific criteria as to how a trial court should exercise its discretion in using or not using Rule 49. Supra, at § 2505. However, a review of case law and other recognized authorities establishes some helpful guidelines in this area. Special verdicts are not favored in single issue or single party cases. Conversely, they can be helpful in cases concerning complex causes of action or multiple parties. Wright and Miller, supra; Bartak, 629 F.2d at 531. [6] Special verdicts are also of assistance in cases where the law is unsettled or is evolving. A special verdict makes it clear that the novel theory may have had no effect, or what effect it had on the jury's ultimate determination. This possibly allows corrective action by the trial court or an appellate court without the time and expense of another trial. Wright and Miller, supra. Special verdicts are not justified for the mere purpose of cross-examination of the jury to create error for the record. Wright and Miller, supra. If used, it should be for ultimate issues and not something akin to a Court's findings of fact in a court trial. Wright and Miller, supra. The text of Rule 49(a) states that questions should be drafted to be answered by the jury in a numerical figure or short answer rather than lengthy dissertations which may confuse the jury and unduly lengthen its deliberations. This Court has struggled with the issue of interpretation of inconsistent answers by a jury. Mielitz, 461 N.W.2d 763. Special verdicts may also be helpful if it is necessary for the jury to determine if an award is tied to a date certain such as a statute of limitations, Schoenrock v. Tappe, 419 N.W.2d 197, 205 (S.D.1988) (Henderson, J., dissenting) (citing McCarthy Bros. Co. v. Hanskutt, 29 S.D. 535, 137 N.W. 286 (1912)), or the identity of the actual tortfeasor. Martinez v. Union Pacific R. Co., 714 F.2d 1028, 1032 (10th Cir.1983). Lastly, special verdicts are appropriate where suggested or mandated by statute. An example is the matter of prejudgment interest where it is allowed on some types of damages and not allowed on others. Cert. of Question from U.S. Dist. Court ( Meyer v. Dixon Bros. ), 369 N.W.2d 658, 659 (S.D.1985). Since Dixon, this distinction has been codified with the adoption of SDCL 21-1-13.1 which specifically points to such a procedure in the determination of prejudgment interest. [7] This case is an auto accident resulting in personal injuries to the Plaintiff. There is a single defendant and a single plaintiff. The issue of liability was taken from the jury by the circuit court leaving only the issue of damages. The jury was properly instructed on the Plaintiff's theories of liability. Such a case would ordinarily justify the circuit court in exercising its discretion in refusing to use a special verdict form such as was proposed by the Plaintiff. Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck and Company, 512 F.2d 276, 294-95 (5th Cir.1975). See also Beachel v. Long, 420 N.W.2d 482 (Iowa App. 1988); Sabasko v. Fletcher, 359 N.W.2d 339 (Minn.App.1984). While we do not wish to belittle the unfortunate injuries suffered by the Plaintiff in this matter, neither can we allow the use of a general verdict to be precluded in the future merely by creative counsel artfully dressing up pleadings, even in a simple dog bite case, to allege multiple theories of recovery. Cf. Boland v. City of Rapid City, 315 N.W.2d 496, 503 (S.D.1982). Were we to adopt the argument of the Plaintiff, then the only shred of discretion left to a circuit court would be those unusual cases where there is one plaintiff, one defendant and one cause of action. We can find no case interpreting Rule 49 which even comes close to this restrictive view of the authority of a trial court. Plaintiff mentions in passing that, as this case was filed after July 1, 1990, under SDCL 21-1-13.2, prejudgment interest is governed by SDCL 21-1-13.1. Honomichl v. Modlin, 477 N.W.2d 599, 600 (S.D.1991). Plaintiff would be entitled to prejudgment interest for economic losses such as medical care and lost wages prior to trial. On the other hand, the future medical costs, past and present pain and suffering, future lost earnings, past and future loss of enjoyment of life and consortium and future disability are not subject to prejudgment interest. The general verdict form used by the circuit court does not allow this Court to determine what, if any, damages were awarded by the jury on each type of damage claimed which may or may not be subject to prejudgment interest. Early on in discussing jury instructions, the circuit court and counsel talked about the effect of SDCL 21-1-13.1 on this case. After Plaintiff's original request for a special verdict form was denied, counsel and the circuit court agreed to use a 49(b) special interrogatory to settle the interest matter. Unfortunately this was not done. The Plaintiff failed to call this oversight to the attention of the trial court during jury deliberations or when the verdict was received and the jury still impaneled. Instead, Plaintiff merely requested that the jury be polled concerning the amount of the verdict. Plaintiff failed to raise the interest issue in post-trial motions to the circuit court. Plaintiff further failed to specifically assign this as a legal issue in its brief to this Court. We find Plaintiff has waived the issue of prejudgment interest both by her failure to timely point out this problem to the circuit court while the jury was still impanelled, Platt v. Rapid City, 67 S.D. 245, 291 N.W. 600, 604 (1940), and by her failure to properly raise the issue before this Court. See SDCL 15-26A-60(4) and (5); and Graham v. State, 328 N.W.2d 254, 255 n. 2 (S.D.1982).