Opinion ID: 2576153
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Judge Nelson's failure during pretrial proceedings to declare a doubt concerning defendant's competence and to conduct a competency hearing

Text: As mentioned above, defendant premises his first claim that the court erred in failing to declare a doubt about his competence to waive his right to counsel solely on knowledge concerning defendant that Judge Henry P. Nelson, who briefly presided over pretrial proceedings in this case long after defendant had been granted the right to represent himself, had gained during defendant's earlier trial on the attempted murder charges. [8] Judge Nelson presided over defendant's 1985 trial for the attempted murders of Green and Miller. After the jury found defendant guilty on both counts in that case, but before defendant's sentencing, Judge Nelson received and reviewed a probation report. [9] The report discussed defendant's employment history (none) and military service (he was discharged for being absent without leave (AWOL) on an excessive number of occasions), and noted that in 1972 in Riverside County defendant was arrested by the sheriff's office in regards to a `sanity hearing.' The probation report also stated: During that same year defendant was a patient at Atascadero State Hospital from March until July for 1026 Penal Code  Forgery  Steal car. [10] At the sentencing hearing on August 16, 1985, Judge Nelson remarked that he believed the maximum available sentence of 14 years and four months was too lenient for defendant's crimes. Judge Nelson explained: Apparently you are what is called in the trade a psychopath, Mr. Blair. In other words, you just don't have any kind of human feelings for anybody else. That's apparently your situation now. There's some indication that you've had some previous bouts with psychiatric disability, and that's not surprising. You're 45 years old, and by your own statement you've never held a permanent job in your life, and apparently you were fooling around doing some studying on student loans. Apparently did some flitting around at some school. Apparently the military, the Marine Corps discharged you, and according to you, for too many [AWOL's]. So maximum sentence in this case is not enough. [¶] . . . [¶] You, who ruined one woman's life, put her in a vegetative state, ruined another woman, the most you can get is 14 years and 4 months . . . . But all this is just a joke to you, and I can see that's true. Because, as I say, that's your problem. Judge Nelson then imposed the maximum sentence. Nearly two years later, as a result of defendant's statutory peremptory challenge (see Code Civ. Proc., § 170.6) to the judge then presiding, Judge Roger W. Boren, the present capital case was assigned to Judge Nelson for a brief period beginning on May 1, 1987. As described in the previous part, defendant had been representing himself since October 1986, having been questioned and admonished by various judges regarding his self-representation. In an answer to a challenge for cause filed against him by defendant, Judge Nelson acknowledged having expressed regret during the attempted murder sentencing that the sentence could not have been longer, since the evidence indicated a cold, calculated attempt to kill one woman, and almost causing the death of another woman through that attempt. The Defendant's actions, as well as his demeanor before me (he secreted an exhibit into the holding tank and flushed it down the drain), indicate a dangerous psychopath, and I did say so. Some time later that summer, Judge Nelson was reassigned to another department. During the brief period Judge Nelson presided over this case, the issue of defendant's competence to waive counsel or to represent himself never arose. Judge Nelson did not preside over any further proceedings in this case. Defendant contends that because Judge Nelson had presided over defendant's attempted murder trial in 1985, he was aware in 1987  when he was assigned to this capital case  of facts that should have raised a bona fide doubt in his mind whether defendant was competent to waive counsel and represent himself in the capital trial. Therefore, defendant claims, Judge Nelson erred in failing to declare a doubt concerning defendant's competence and to conduct a competency hearing in 1987. Defendant observes that Judge Nelson was aware, from the probation report in the attempted murder case, that defendant had been: (1) found insane in a criminal proceeding in 1972 and confined to Atascadero State Hospital for several months; (2) unable to hold a job during his adult life; and (3) discharged from the military for being AWOL on an excessive number of occasions. We disagree that the foregoing amounted to substantial evidence that defendant was incompetent to waive counsel at the time of the capital trial. Nothing about defendant's discharge from the military or his inability to hold a job indicated that he did not have the mental `capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him.' (See Godinez v. Moran, supra, 509 U.S. at p. 401, fn. 12, 113 S.Ct. 2680; see also People v. Koontz, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1068, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 859, 46 P.3d 335 [evidence of defendant's inability to `function socially' was not substantial evidence of defendant's incompetence to stand trial, to waive counsel, or to represent himself].) Similarly, the evidence of defendant's possible mental instability did not amount to substantial evidence of incompetence to waive counsel at the time of the capital trial. Defendant's confinement at Atascadero State Hospital in 1972 suggested that he might have been suffering from a mental illness at that time, and Judge Nelson noted that defendant appeared to have had previous bouts with psychiatric disability. The Atascadero confinement was in 1972, however, 12 years before the present crimes took place, and there was nothing in the record of this case pertaining to the period between 1972 and 1987 to indicate that defendant might be mentally ill at the time of the capital trial. (See People v. Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 516-517, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 656, 93 P.3d 271.) Moreover, even a history of serious mental illness does not necessarily constitute substantial evidence of incompetence that would require a court to declare a doubt concerning a defendant's competence and to conduct a hearing on that issue. (See, e.g., People v. Ramos (2004) 34 Cal.4th 494, 508, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 575, 101 P.3d 478 [defendant must exhibit more than a preexisting psychiatric condition to be entitled to a competency hearing].) We have found that evidence of more serious mental disturbances than defendant displayed did not amount to substantial evidence of incompetence requiring a competency hearing. (See, e.g., People v. Ramos, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 508-511, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 575, 101 P.3d 478 [defendant's death wish, history of psychiatric treatment, planned suicide attempt, propensity for violence, and psychiatric testimony that defendant was physically abused as a child and suffered from a paranoid personality disorder did not constitute substantial evidence of incompetence requiring court to conduct a competency hearing].) Here, the circumstance that defendant had been found insane in a criminal proceeding and had been confined to a mental hospital for an unspecified period approximately 15 years prior to the present trial, without more, was insufficient to compel a doubt whether defendant had the mental capacity to understand the proceedings against him in the current prosecution. Nor did Judge Nelson's 1985 statement that defendant was a psychopath indicate that Judge Nelson entertained or should have entertained a doubt concerning defendant's competence in 1987. Defendant notes that one definition of psychopath is a mentally ill or unstable person. Thus, he contends, Judge Nelson must have recognized that defendant was mentally ill. We disagree. The term psychopath (or sociopath) commonly is used to describe individuals with antisocial personality disorder, defined as a pervasive pattern of disregard for, and violation of, the rights of others. (See Am. Psychiatric Assn., Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, (2000 4th rev. ed.) pp. 701-702.) It appears that Judge Nelson intended this meaning when he used the term psychopath, for he immediately explained: In other words, you just don't have any kind of human feelings for anybody else. He further explained that it was defendant's cold and calculated crime and his destruction of evidence in the attempted murder trial that had prompted him to label defendant a dangerous psychopath. Thus, Judge Nelson's use of the term psychopath in describing defendant apparently did not indicate a belief, even in 1985, that defendant was psychotic, out of touch with reality, or otherwise unable to understand the proceedings against him. [11] Defendant also contends that the following additional evidence should have raised a doubt in Judge Nelson's mind regarding defendant's competence: (1) at a time when Judge Stromwall was presiding over the attempted murder case, the Court of Appeal had issued a pretrial ruling finding good cause for a continuance to allow defendant's counsel to investigate the possibility of an insanity defense; (2) in the capital case, Judge Blackwell found that defendant could not read and understand simple English, and Judge Munoz assertedly found he could not understand the saying, a lawyer who tries his own case has a fool for a client; and (3) defendant told Judge Munoz that he was unable to get along with the attorneys appointed to represent him. Nothing in the record, however, indicates that Judge Nelson was or should have been aware of these facts at the time he presided over pretrial proceedings in the capital case in 1987. They therefore have no bearing on whether Judge Nelson should have declared a doubt regarding defendant's competence. (See People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1152, 282 Cal.Rptr. 465, 811 P.2d 757 [due process requires a competency hearing if defendant presents substantial evidence of incompetence]; People v. Castro (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1402, 1415, 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 770 [due process requires competency hearing when trial court becomes aware of substantial evidence of incompetence].) We also note that defendant overstates what is reflected in the record. After fully exploring a possible insanity defense in the attempted murder case, defendant's counsel informed Judge Stromwall that the insanity issue is no longer involved in this matter and stated his belief that there was nothing that would impair defendant from representing himself. Further, although Judge Blackwell denied defendant's request for self-representation on the ground that defendant could not read or write simple English (because he did not follow all the instructions in filling out the pro. per. advisement form), that finding appears to be incorrect, in view of defendant's demonstrated ability, which we already have noted, in the preparation of numerous pro se filings. Moreover, Judge Munoz did not find that defendant could not understand the saying about a lawyer trying his own case being a fool. Accordingly, none of these asserted facts compelled the expression of a doubt concerning defendant's competence to waive counsel. Finally, we note that defendant's advisory counsel did not advise Judge Nelson that defendant's competence might be in issue. In sum, there was no substantial evidence of incompetence requiring Judge Nelson to declare a doubt concerning defendant's competence and to conduct a competency hearing at his capital trial. (See §§ 1367, 1368.)