Opinion ID: 416443
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Incidental Infringement on Speech

Text: 140 In most of the symbolic speech cases, the activity that the government attempted to suppress was inherently expressive. Ninety-nine out of a hundred people who purposely burn their draft cards, 52 wear arm bands, 53 or superimpose a peace symbol on the flag, 54 will do so in order to express something thereby. Thus, a prohibition of that activity can have a substantial, even if incidental, impact on speech. 141 Camping as symbolic speech presents a very different case. Camping in the park has a great deal of independent significance. It is not a traditional form of speech. It has expressive First Amendment value only in a very limited set of circumstances. 55 Thus, if camping in the Memorial core area parks were permitted, the vast majority of those availing themselves of the privilege would not be intending to express anything thereby. Conversely, the incidental infringement on speech caused by an absolute ban on camping in these areas is simply not that great relative to the government's interest in preventing camping generally. 142 Appellants may well have hit upon the most expressive means of conveying their message. But they have also stated explicitly that their desire to camp in the parks is based not just on the expressive nature of those activities under the peculiar facts of this case, but also on the fact that camping would facilitate the expression both by attracting demonstrators and by capturing media attention. On the former point, appellants' original application is clear. Without the incentive of sleeping space or a hot meal, the homeless would not come to the site. 56 This statement is constantly echoed in the papers filed with this court. 57 The latter point follows from the former. Without homeless people coming to demonstrate the poignancy of their plight, the media value of the message is sadly diminished, despite the unabated poignancy of that plight. 58 143 The Supreme Court has noted time and again that although the First Amendment guarantees individuals and groups the right to deliver their message, it does not guarantee any right to deliver that message in the most effective manner possible. 59 It does not guarantee media attention. Nor does it guarantee circumstances that will attract the largest number of demonstrators. 60 Appellants' concerns in this case are not limited to a fear that their message, purely in terms of its content, will be diluted. They fear at least as much that the effect of their message, however well expressed, will be diminished. 144 Of course, we must not make the category mistake noted above in conjunction with the substantial interest test. Just as the substantiality of the government's interest must be judged by the effect of the law on all persons, so, too, the extent to which it infringes upon speech must be judged by the effect of the law on all persons, and not just by its effect on the appellant. However, the conjunction of the facilitative and expressive aspects of camping in this case is likely to be paralleled in all other First Amendment camping cases. The convenience of the demonstrators and the media value of their message will rival in importance the First Amendment aspects of the camping and thereby further diminish the claim that their First Amendment interest is substantial relative to the government's interest in preventing camping generally. 145 Judge Edwards correctly notes that a message is not less deserving of First Amendment protection merely because the manner used to express it serves other needs of the demonstrators. 61 But where there are plenty of alternative ways to express the same message--ways which, though less convenient to the demonstrators, are not fraught with the same harms to legitimate governmental interests--the First Amendment does not extend special protection to the means chosen by the demonstrators, especially where those means are chosen as much for convenience as for expressive value. To repeat, the First Amendment does not guarantee any right to deliver a message in the most effective manner possible. Nor does it guarantee any right to deliver a message in the most convenient way possible. 146 In sum, the substantiality of the government's interest in preventing camping generally in the Memorial core area parks appears to counterbalance the occasional, incidental infringement on speech caused by the regulations.