Opinion ID: 2176137
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: admission of co-defendants' statements

Text: Ms. Sellers testified at trial that while she was with Dunstrom, Bruce, Eddie, Michelle Nelson and Henry, at a motel in Virginia they turned on the television, which flashed the Landover murders. At that time, Sellers observed Henry and the other men dancing or jumping up and down, pretending that they were like firing shots. Bruce and Dunstrom just kept basically talking about Landover, and how Chief, you know, was crying for his life.... Henry was laughing along with them, cheering them on. When the news indicated there was one survivor, Henry became angry with Dunstrom for not killing the girl, or not finishing up the work. On appeal Henry contends that the court erred in admitting that portion of Sellers' testimony wherein she related the statements of Bruce and Dunstrom in the Virginia hotel when they heard the news about the murders. He alleges these statements constituted hearsay and did not qualify for admission under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule. Henry claims the event took place after the fulfillment of the object of the conspiracy and that the events Sellers described were not made in connection with the acts of concealment or disposing of the fruits of the crime. We agree that the statements could not be admitted under the co-conspirator exceptions to the hearsay rule, but Sellers' testimony was, however, properly admitted. The statements of Bruce and Dunstrom may be considered Henry's tacit admissions, and as such, an exception to the hearsay exclusion. We recently discussed tacit admissions in Briggeman v. Albert, 322 Md. 133, 586 A.2d 15 (1991), wherein we stated, [a]n admission may be implied through the affirmative conduct or, in the case of `tacit admissions,' the silence or inaction of a party.... A tacit admission occurs when one remains silent in the face of accusations that, if untrue, would naturally rouse the accused to speak in his or her defense. Ewell v. State, 228 Md. 615, 618, 180 A.2d 857, 859 (1962); McCormick on Evidence [§ 270 at 799 (E. Cleary, 3d ed. 1984)]; 6 L. McLain, [ Maryland Evidence § 801(4).3 at 312-13 (1987)]. Id. 322 Md. at 137-38, 586 A.2d at 17. Professor McLain identified several prerequisites to classifying a statement as a tacit admission: A party ... may make a `tacit admission,' adopting, by his or her silence, another person's statement. In order for the other's statement to be considered the party's tacit admission, the following prerequisites must be satisfied: (1) the party heard and understood the other person's statement; (2) at the time, the party had an opportunity to respond; (3) under the circumstances, a reasonable person in the party's position, who disagreed with the statement, would have voiced that disagreement. The party must have had first-hand knowledge of the matter addressed in the statement. 6 L. McLain, Maryland Evidence § 801(4).3 at 312-13 (1987) (footnotes omitted). Ms. Sellers testified that while Bruce and Dunstrom talked about the murders and Chief, Henry was laughing along with them, cheering them on. Thus Henry even went beyond a tacit admission and by his obvious approval, adopted the statements as his own. We find that the trial judge did not commit reversible error by allowing Ms. Sellers' testimony of Henry's adoptive admissions to be admitted into evidence.