Opinion ID: 4453948
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Adel, 136 Wn.2d 629, 635, 965 P.2d 1072(1998)).

Text: We begin our analysis with the plain language ofthe statutes—where we look to see if the legislature expressly told us that both punishments are permissible. Calle, 125 Wn.2d at 116-11. For example, our legislature has expressly authorized multiple punishments for crimes committed during a burglary: Every person who, in the commission of a burglary shall commit any other crime, may be punished therefor as well as for the burglary, and may be prosecuted for each crime separately. RCW 9A.52.050. Our legislature has not, however, similarly authorized multiple punishments under either the felony murder statute or the rape statute at issue here. See RCW 9A.32.030(l)(c)(felony murder); RCW 9A.44.040 (rape). We turn next to the Blockburger test. Jackman, 156 Wn.2d at 746-47. Under this test, we compare the elements of the two offenses at issue to determine whether they are the same—^the assumption being that the legislature ordinarily does not intend to punish the same offense under two different statutes. Whalen, 445 U.S. at 691-92. For double jeopardy purposes, a lesser included offense is the 'same offense' as the greater offense. State v. Fuller, 185 Wn.2d 30, 37-38, 367 P.3d 1057(2016)(citing Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 168-69, 97 S. Ct. 2221, 53 L. Ed. 2d 187(1977)). A lesser included offense is [a] crime that is composed ofsome, 9 State V. Muhammad (Bisir Bilal), No. 96090-9 but not all, ofthe elements of a more serious crime and that is necessarily committed in carrying out the greater crime. Black's Law Dictionary 1301(11th ed. 2019). The merger doctrine is closely related. Under that doctrine, a lesser included offense merges into a more serious offense when a person is charged with both crimes, so that the person is not subject to double jeopardy. Black's Law Dictionary at 1184; see also Freeman, 153 Wn.2d at 773 ([W]e presume the legislature intended to punish both offenses through a greater sentence for the greater crime.(citing Vladovic, 99 Wn.2d at 419)). [T]he merger doctrine is a rule of statutory construction which only applies where the Legislature has clearly indicated that in order to prove a particular degree ofcrime (e.g., first degree rape)the State must prove not only that a defendant committed that crime (e.g., rape) but that the crime was accompanied by an act which is defined as a crime elsewhere in the criminal statutes (e.g., assault or kidnapping). Vladovic, 99 Wn.2d at 420-21. First degree rape is unquestionably a lesser included offense offelony murder based on first degree rape. First degree rape is composed ofsome, but not all, ofthe elements of felony murder—in fact, the felony murder statute incorporates the elements of first degree rape by reference. RCW 9A.32.030(l)(c). In other words, the legislature has clearly indicated that in order to prove first degree felony murder, the State must prove not only that the defendant caused someone's death but also that the killing was accompanied by rape, which is defined as a crime elsewhere in 10 State V. Muhammad (Bisir Bilal), No. 96090-9 the criminal statutes. Thus, the two offenses are the same offense under Blockburger, and they must merge to avoid subjecting Muhammad to double jeopardy. Cf. Whalen, 445 U.S. at 693-94 (construing analogous statutes and concluding that felony murder based on rape and the underlying rape were the same offense under Blockburger). Indeed, we have previously treated felony murder and the felony on which it is based as greater and lesser offenses that must merge. In Francis, the defendant attacked two people, Lucas and Jacobson, with a baseball bat, intending to steal $2,000. 170 Wn.2d at 521. Lucas died in the course of the robbery. Id. The defendant pleaded guilty to first degree felony murder of Lucas and attempted first degree robbery of Jacobson. Id. We held that these two offenses did not merge— but only because there were two victims. Id. at 527-28. We explained that the outcome would have been different with only one victim: If Francis had pleaded to the attempted robbery ofLucas and felony murder ofLucas, double jeopardy would preclude conviction of the attempted robbery count. Id. at 527; see also id. at 530 ([T]he prosecutor dropped the attempted robbery count against Lucas from the second amended complaint because it would have merged into the felony murder upon conviction.). Just last year, a unanimous court cited this portion of Francis approvingly. In re Pers. Restraint ofSchorr, 191 Wn.2d 315, 325, 422 P.3d 451 (2018)(holding that first degree robbery conviction did not merge with first degree 11 State V. Muhammad (Bisir Bilal), No. 96090-9 murder conviction but only because defendant pleaded guilty to premeditated murder in addition to felony murder). The State argues that the two offenses are not the same under Blockburger, noting that the felony murder statute, unlike the first degree rape statute, does not require a completed rape. Suppl. Br. of Resp't at 20. We recognize that because felony murder may be predicated on a felony other than rape, or on an attempted rape, a person could be convicted offelony murder without committing a completed first degree rape. RCW 9A.32.030(l)(c). But [w]e consider the elements of the crimes as charged and proved, not merely as the level of an abstract articulation of the elements. Freeman, 153 Wn.2d at 777(emphasis added); see also Whalen, 445 U.S. at 694 (In the present case, however, proof of rape is a necessary element of proof of the felony murder, and we are unpersuaded that this case should be treated differently from other cases in which one criminal offense requires proof of every element of another offense.);In re Pers. Restraint ofOrange, 152 Wn.2d 795, 81719, 100 P.3d 291 (2004). Here, although the State charged Muhammad with felony murder based on either attempted or completed rape, CP at 22, the jury convicted Muhammad of completed rape, id. at 395. In fact, the State never even requested a jury instruction on attempt. See id. at 287-311. Because we consider the elements as charged and proved. Freeman, 153 Wn.2d at 111, we reject the State's abstract argument. 12 State V. Muhammad (Bisir Bilal), No. 96090-9 Although our analysis does not end here, the result of the Blockhurger test creates a strong presumption of the legislature's intent, and [t]his presumption can 'be overcome only by clear evidence of contrary [legislative] intent.' Louis, 155 Wn.2d at 570(second alteration in original)(quoting Calle, 125 Wn.2d at 780). Requiring clear evidence of legislative intent is in accord with the rule of lenity, which we apply in double jeopardy cases. Jackman, 156 Wn.2d at 751; Adel, 136 Wn.2d at 634-35; see also Whalen, 445 U.S. at 695 n.lO.^ In this case, the Court of Appeals relied on our decision in Calle to overcome the Blockhurger presumption. Muhammad,4 Wn. App. 2d at 60-61 (discussing Calle, 125 Wn.2d 769). But Calle is distinguishable. In Calle, a case involving the rape and incest statutes, we said that clear evidence of contrary [legislative] intent may overcome the Blockhurger presumption. Calle, 125 Wn.2d at 780. Unlike the offenses at issue in the case at ^ In Ladner v. United States, the United States Supreme Court considered whether a federal statute permitted two convictions rather than one a for single shotgun discharge that affected two federal officers. 358 U.S. 169, 171, 79 S. Ct. 209,3 L. Ed. 2d 199(1958). The Court held that the rule of lenity means that the Court will not interpret a federal criminal statute so as to increase the penalty that it places on an individual when such an interpretation can be based on no more than a guess as to what Congress intended. Id. at 177-78. In Bell v. United States, the United States Supreme Court considered whether the Mann Act(former 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1949)) permitted two convictions rather than one for a single trip transporting two women across state lines. 349 U.S. 81, 82, 75 S. Ct. 620, 99 L. Ed. 905 (1955). The Court held that if Congress does not fix the punishment for a federal offense clearly and without ambiguity, doubt will be resolved against turning a single transaction into multiple offenses. Id. at 84. 13 State V. Muhammad (Bisir Bilal), No. 96090-9 bar, the offenses at issue in Calle were not the same under Blockburger. Id. at 778. Thus, the presumption in Calle was that the two offenses did not merge and that the defendant could be punished for both. We then turned to other indicators of legislative intent to determine whether any clear evidence could overcome the Blockburger presumption and bar the courts from imposing separate punishments. Id. at 780. We found none. Instead, we found only support for our conclusion that the Legislature intended to punish incest and rape as separate offenses. Id. We reasoned that the differing purposes served by the incest and rape statutes, as well as their location in different chapters of the criminal code, are evidence of the Legislature's intent to punish them as separate offenses. Id. Here, we are looking for clear evidence that the two offenses are not the same, despite the Blockburger presumption to the contrary. As in Calle, we find no clear evidence sufficient to overcome the Blockburger presumption. Although the felony murder and rape statutes are located in different chapters of the criminal code, the felony murder statute explicitly cross-references the rape statutes. In contrast, the rape statute at issue in Calle did not cross-reference the incest statute, nor did the incest statute cross-reference the rape statute. Id. at 776 n.l (quoting relevant statutes). When the legislature uses cross-references in statutes, the cross-referenced material is not truly located somewhere else; it is as if the legislature set out the cross-referenced material in full. Cf. State v. Eckblad, 152 Wn.2d 515, 519-22, 98 14 State V. Muhammad (Bisir Bilal), No. 96090-9 P.3d 1184 (2004) (denying vagueness challenge to statute that cross-referenced federal regulations). The legislature is merely saving trees, not revealing a clear intent to punish the same offense twice. And although the felony murder and rape statutes may serve different purposes when examined in isolation, this fact alone falls well short of the clear evidence of contrary legislative intent necessary to overcome the strong presumption that the two offenses at issue here are the same and must merge. In sum, we hold that the legislature did not intend for the sentencing court to punish Muhammad for both felony murder based on first degree rape and the underlying first degree rape. At best, the legislative intent is unclear, and we apply the rule of lenity. The two offenses must merge (absent an exception to the merger doctrine) so that Muhammad is not subject to double jeopardy. B. The exception to the merger doctrine does not apply here The State argues that an exception to the merger doctrine applies and therefore the offenses should not merge. Suppl. Br. of Resp't at 21-24. Under this exception, a lesser conviction will not merge with the greater ifit involves some injury to the person or property of the victim or others, which is separate and distinct from and not merely incidental to the crime of which it forms an element. State v. Johnson, 92 Wn.2d 671, 680, 600 P.2d 1249 (1979). If the lesser crime was not incidental but rather had an independent purpose, it falls within the described exception and 15 State V. Muhammad (Bisir Bilal), No. 96090-9 courts may impose separate punishment. State v. Berg, 181 Wn.2d 857, 866, 337 P.3d 310 (2014). For example, the felony murder and attempted robbery that did not merge in Francis, discussed above, could be said to have caused separate and distinct injuries: one victim was killed, and the other, separate victim was nearly robbed. If the same victim had been killed and robbed, however, the injuries would not have been separate and distinct, and the two offenses would have merged into one. Francis, 170 Wn.2d. at 527. We detailed this exception to the merger doctrine in Johnson. There, the defendant was convicted of first degree rape, first degree kidnapping, and first degree assault. Johnson,92 Wn.2d at 672. To convict the defendant of first degree rape,the State had to prove not only that the defendant committed rape, but that the rape was accompanied by an act which is defined as a separate crime elsewhere in the criminal statutes—such as kidnapping or assault. Id. at 675. This court explained that the kidnapping and assault were intertwined with the rape, rather than separate and distinct from it. Id. at 680-81. We therefore held that the assault and kidna[p]ping convictions merged into the rape conviction, id., explaining that the legislature intended to treat the underlying crimes as aggravating factors, elevating a lesser degree of rape to first degree rape. Id. at 676, 678. We subsequently explained that our analysis in Johnson squared perfectly with the United States Supreme Court's analysis in Whalen. Vladovic, 99 Wn.2d at 16 State V. Muhammad (Bisir Bilal), No. 96090-9 419 (citing Whalen, 445 U.S. 684). The defendant in Whalen was convicted of the same crimes that Muhammad was convicted of here: rape and of murdering the same victim in the perpetration of the rape. Id. We explained the United States Supreme Court's Whalen holding as follows: [t]he Court held that since proof of rape was necessary to prove first degree murder under the statutory seheme, Congress had not authorized cumulative punishment for the rape and the killing committed in the course ofthe rape. Id. Then, in State v. Fagundes, Division One of the Court of Appeals applied Johnson to an array of convictions similar to those pending before us: first degree felony murder predicated on first degree rape and first degree kidnapping. 26 Wn. App. 477, 485-86, 614 P.2d 198, 625 P.2d 179 (1980). The court noted that the underlying offenses, like those in Johnson,operate[d] to enhance the degree ofthe murder. Id. at 485. The court also explained that proofofthe underlying felonies makes unnecessary the proof of premeditation otherwise required to support a firstdegree murder conviction. Id. at 485-86. In accord with Johnson, a unanimous court held that the underlying felonies of first-degree rape and first-degree kidnap[p]ing merged into the murder. Id. at 486. More recently, and also unanimously. Division Three ofthe Court of Appeals held that attempted first degree robbery merges with first degree felony murder based on that attempted robbery. State v. Williams, 131 Wn. App. 488,497-99, 128 17 State V. Muhammad (Bisir Bilal), No. 96090-9 P.3d 98 (2006), adhered to on remand, 147 Wn. App. 479, 195 P.3d 578 (2008). The court explained that [t]he shooting had no purpose or intent outside of accomplishing the robbery or facilitating [the defendant's] departure from the scene. Id. at 499. The court noted felony murder's unique dependence on its predicate offense: if the predicate offense (e.g., attempted first degree robbery) is truly independent from the killing for purposes of the exception to the merger doctrine, then the fact finder cannot find that the killing was in furtherance of or in flight from that predicate offense. Id. And without that finding, a first degree felony murder conviction cannot stand. Id.\ see also RCW 9A.32.030(l)(c)(felony murder statute). Although Johnson, Vladovic, Fagundes, and Williams clearly and persuasively point us in one direction—the two convictions before us must merge— Division Two of the Court of Appeals has twice come out the other way. See State V. Saunders, 120 Wn. App. 800, 86 P.3d 232(2004); State v. Peyton, 29 Wn. App. 701, 630 P.2d 1362 (1981). In the earlier of those two opinions, Peyton, the court held that the defendant's convictions for first degree robbery and first degree felony murder based on that robbery did not merge. Peyton, 29 Wn. App at 720. In that case, the State alleged that the defendant had robbed a bank and, while fleeing the scene, had shot and killed a pursuing officer. Id. at 704-05. With limited explanation, the court stated that the robbery was a separate and distinct act 18 State V. Muhammad (Bisir Bilal), No. 96090-9 independent of the killing and thus did not merge with the felony murder conviction. Id. at 720. The court did not explain how the killing could be separate and distinct from the robbery while simultaneously occurring in the course of and in furtherance of [the robbery] or in immediate flight therefrom the robbery, a necessary finding under the felony murder statute. See id. at 715 n.2(quoting former RCW 9A.32.030(l)(c)(1975)). In the latter ofthose two opinions, Saunders, a divided panel provided a more thorough analysis than the one found in Peyton. See 120 Wn. App. at 820-24. In that case, the defendant was convicted of first degree felony murder based on first degree rape, first degree robbery, and first degree kidnapping, along with all three ofthose underlying felonies. M at 808. The majority held that the predicate crimes and the murder [were] not sufficiently intertwined for application of the merger doctrine but were separate and distinct from the murder. Id. at 822-24. But the majority failed to reconcile its analysis of the merger exception with the felony murder statute. We have explained that the merger exception is reserved for offenses that are truly separate and distinct; it does not apply when the lesser offense is merely incidental to or intertwined with the greater. Johnson, 92 Wn.2d at 680-81; see also Berg, 181 Wn.2d at 866 (explaining that the lesser crime must have had an independent purpose). Meanwhile, the felony murder statute demands that a jury find that the death occurred in the course of, in furtherance 19 State V. Muhammad (Bisir Bilal), No. 96090-9 of, or in immediate flight []from the underlying felony. RCW 9A.32.030(l)(c). The underlying felony 'must at least have intimate relation and close connection with the killing, and must not be separate, distinct, and independentfrom it.' State V. Diebold, 152 Wash. 68, 73, 277 P. 394 (1929)(emphasis added) (quoting 63 L.R.A. 368 (1904) and citing Pliemling v. State, 46 Wis. 516, 1 N.W. 278, 281 (1879)). So the exception to the merger rule applies only to separate, distinct, and independent offenses, while felony murder demands the exact opposite. The exception to the merger rule and felony murder are irreconcilable and cannot coexist. The majority in Saunders avoided this result by reasoning that all three underlying felonies had a purpose other than facilitating murder. 120 Wn. App. at 820-24. For example,the majority explained that the purpose ofthe kidnapping was to humiliate [the victim] and to retaliate for her refusal to comply with [the defendant's] sexual demands. Id. at 823. But when would the purpose of the underlying offense to felony murder ever be to facilitate murder? Id. at 822-24. The purpose of the felony murder rule is to deter felons from killing negligently or accidentally by holding them strictly responsible for killings they commit. State v. Leech, 114 Wn.2d 700, 708, 790 P.2d 160 (1990)(emphasis added)(citing People V. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 781, 402 P.2d 130, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1965); 2 Wayne R.LaFave & Austin W.Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 7.5, at 210 (1986)). When a person negligently or accidentally kills somebody in the course of, 20 State V. Muhammad (Bisir Bilal), No. 96090-9 in furtherance of, or in flight from a robbery, rape, burglary, arson, or kidnapping, that person by definition did not commit the underlying crime to facilitate murder. It was an accident, albeit a criminal one. When it comes to felony murder, the lesser offense does not—and cannot—^have a purpose independent from the greater; the purpose ofthe entire criminal endeavor is to commit the underlying felony. On a related note, if the State believes that the defendant also intended to kill, then it may charge the defendant with a different form of murder. In fact, the State did just this in Saunders. There, the State charged the defendant with intentional murder in the first degree or, in the alternative, felony murder based on rape,robbery, and kidnapping. Saunders, 120 Wn. App. at 808. Felony murder is generally easier to prove because proof of the underlying felonies makes unnecessary the proof of premeditation otherwise required to support a first-degree murder conviction. Fagundes,26 Wn. App. at 485-86. The jury found Saunders guilty offelony murder, not intentional murder. Saunders, 120 Wn. App. at 808. Based on this finding, the State failed to prove that the killing had any purpose independent from the underlying felonies, and the crimes should have merged. The majority also reasoned that all three underlying felonies caused the victim injuries independent from the murder. Id. at 822-24. For example, the majority described injuries suffered by the victim during the course of the rape that were distinguishable from the subsequent murder. Id. at 823. But when it comes to 21 State V. Muhammad (Bisir Bilal), No. 96090-9 felony murder, the injuries stemming from the underlying felonies are not distinguishable from the murder. Rather, the State must establish those injuries in order to prove the underlying felonies and, in turn, the felony murder based on those underlying felonies. The injuries are crucial to the entire prosecution; without them, the State cannot prove anything. The dissent in Saunders, meanwhile, explained that the Court of Appeals is bound by Johnson, which is directly on point and requires that one or more of the underlying convictions merge with the felony murder conviction. Id. at 827 (Morgan, J., dissenting in part)(citing Johnson, 92 Wn.2d 671). We agree with the Saunders dissent. In the case before us, the degree of killing was raised to first degree murder by conduct separately criminalized by the legislature: rape. Thus, the legislature presumably intended to treat the underlying felony as an element that elevated the killing to first degree murder, and the two offenses must merge. And this presumption is not overcome by the exception to the merger doctrine. The underlying rape was intertwined with the killing—^the jury necessarily found that the killing occurred in the course of, in furtherance of, or in immediate flight from that rape and all its horrible effects.^ And the rape did not The Court of Appeals in this case claimed that the rape was not integral to the murder and that the murder did not effectuate or coincide with the rape. Muhammad,4 Wn. App. 2d at 66. This is entirely inconsistent with the jury's finding that Muhammad caused Richardson's death in the course of, in furtherance of, or in immediate flight 22 State V. Muhammad (Bisir Bilal), No. 96090-9 have a purpose independent from the killing—the jury convicted Muhammad of felony murder, meaning it found no purpose other than that which was required to prove the underlying felony. The exception to the merger doctrine does not apply, and the superior court must vacate the first degree rape conviction. C. Article I, Section 7 I concur with the lead opinion that under both the state and federal constitutions, absent a carefully drawn and jealously guarded exception, an officer needs a valid warrant to obtain both historical and real-time cell site location information (CSLI). As the lead opinion explains in persuasive detail, [hjistorical and real-time CSLI. . . reveal an intensely intimate picture into our personal lives, lead opinion at 12, and thus the State generally must have a warrant to obtain it. However,I write separately because I believe that the lead opinion applies much too broad of an exception to the warrant requirement in the name of exigent circumstances. Our constitution demands that officers obtain a warrant before they disturb a person's private affairs. Wash. Const, art. I, § 7; State v. Hinton, 179 Wn.2d 862, fromthe rape. CP at 383,395;see State v. Hacheney, 160 Wn.2d 503,506, 158 P.3d 1152 (2007)([F]or a death to have occurred in the course of a felony, there must be a causal connection such that the death was a probable consequence of that felony.(citing State v. Golladay, 78 Wn.2d 121, 131, 470 P.2d 191 (1970), overruled on other grounds by State V. Arndt, 87 Wn.2d 374, 378, 553 P.2d 1328 (1976); Diebold, 152 Wash, at 72)). 23 State V. Muhammad (Bisir Bilal), No. 96090-9 868-69, 319 P.3d 9(2014). An officer may avoid this constitutional demand only if the search falls within one ofthe jealously guarded and carefully drawn exceptions to the warrant requirement. Hinton, 179 Wn.2d at 868-69. The State bears a heavy burden to show the search falls within one of the 'narrowly drawn' exceptions. State V. Garvin, 166 Wn.2d 242, 250, 207 P.3d 1266(2009)(quoting State v. Jones, 146 Wn.2d 328, 335, 45 P.3d 1062(2002)). One jealously guarded and carefully drawn exception is for exigent circumstances. State v. Cuevas Cardenas, 146 Wn.2d 400, 405, 47 P.3d 127, 57 P.3d 1156 (2002). Under this exception, the warrant requirement must yield if exigent circumstances demand that police act immediately. Id. (citing Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hoyden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99, 87 S. Ct. 1642, 18 L. Ed. 2d 782 (1967); State v. Terrovona, 105 Wn.2d 632, 644, 716 P.2d 295 (1986)). Exigent circumstances arise when 'obtaining a warrant is not practical because the delay inherent in securing a warrant would compromise officer safety, facilitate escape or permit the destruction of evidence.' State v. Smith, 165 Wn.2d 511,517, 199 P.2d 386(2009)(quoting v. Audley, 11 Wn. App. 897, 907, 894 P.2d 1359(1995)). Courts should keep in mind that law enforcement may promptly gain a search warrant through telephone calls to a judge at nearly any time of day. Muhammad, 4 Wn. App. 2d at 52. 24 State V. Muhammad (Bisir Bilal), No. 96090-9 The lead opinion correctly recites five circumstances that could be deemed exigent and the six factors that might be useful to determine whether an exigency exists. Lead opinion at 22. But at the end of the day, we look[] to the totality of the circumstances. Id. (citing Smith, 165 Wn.2d at 518). The State must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the officers had no choice but to act immediately and without a warrant. Garvin, 166 Wn.2d at 250 (citing State v. Smith, 115 Wn.2d 775, 789, 801 P.2d 975 (1990)). To satisfy its heavy burden, the State must'point to specific, articulable facts and the reasonable inferences therefrom which justify the intrusion.' State v. Coyle, 95 Wn.2d 1, 9, 621 P.2d 1256(1980)(quoting State V. Diana, 24 Wn. App. 908, 911, 604 P.2d 1312(1979)). Generally, this means that the State must show either that the police had specific prior infonnation that the suspect had planned to flee or destroy evidence, or that the police were 'confronted with some sort of contemporaneous sound or activity alerting them' to the possible presence of an exigent circumstance. Id. at 10 (quoting State v. Mueller, 15 Wn. App. 667, 670, 552 P.2d 1089 (1976)). But the facts must be specific and the inferences reasonable—^mere suspicion is insufficient. Id. at 9-10. I agree with the lead opinion that in general, the circumstance at issue here is one that might be deemed exigent: Muhammad's vehicle was mobile and potentially 25 State V. Muhammad (Bisir Bilal), No. 96090-9 contained evidence of a serious crime.^ Lead opinion at 23. I also agree with the lead opinion that the nature of the offense at issue was grave and violent, satisfying one ofthe six factors. Id. But that is the extent of my agreement. The State claims that Muhammad would likely destroy evidence and escape unless the officers acted quickly. Suppl. Br. of Resp't at 9. This claim is unsupported by specific, articulable facts. First of all, the police were clearly not concerned with Muhammad escaping. Indeed, after finding Muhammad in the field, based on the ping, and then questioning him at the station,the police did not arrest or even detain him: they drove Muhammad home. 1 VTP at 82-83. That doesn't sound very exigent. Second, the police had no prior information that Muhammad planned to destroy evidence or flee. Coyle, 95 Wn.2d at 10. Nor were they confronted with any contemporaneous activity alerting them that Muhammad was carrying out plans to destroy evidence or to flee. Id. Instead, the police lost sight of a suspect in the midst of an ongoing investigation. A generalized fear that an out-of-sight suspect ^ The lead opinion also says that Muhammad was in flight. Lead opinion at 23. But he wasn't—^he was working on a fence in a neighboring community. CP at 95. And although the police may have worried that he was in flight, mere suspicion is insufficient to prove exigency. Coyle, 95 Wn.2d at 9-10. The lead opinion also notes that Muhammad's vehicle disappeared only after police discontinued surveillance, suggesting that he was on the mn. Lead opinion at 24. But the fact that Muhammad did not leave until after Officer Boyd had left his surveillance post means nothing absent something in the record suggesting that Muhammad knew that he was being surveilled in the first place. 26 State V. Muhammad (Bisir Bilal), No. 96090-9 might be on the run or out destroying evidence is insufficient to prove by clear and convincing evidence that exigent circumstances made it impractical to obtain a warrant. Our jealously guarded and carefully drawn exigency exception to the warrant requirement demands more. The State also claims that Muhammad posed a danger to the public. Suppl. Br. of Resp't at 9. Of course, public safety is always the paramount concern of the police. But this concern carmot override constitutional protections of privacy, effectively swallowing the warrant requirement. The police cannot ignore the constitutional rights of a suspect, no matter how heinous the crime being investigated, and rationalize away the constitutional violation as one that kept the public safe. Instead, the State must provide specific, articulable facts that exigent circumstances made obtaining a warrant impractical at the time of the privacy violation.^ Generic references to public safety do not meet that standard. Under our nearly categorical exclusionary rule. State v. Winterstein, 167 Wn.2d 620, 636, 220 P.3d 1226 (2009), we require the suppression of evidence obtained in violation of article I, section 7, with no exceptions that rely on speculation, the likelihood of deterrence, or the reasonableness of official misconduct. State v. Mayfield, 192 Wn.2d 871, 888,434 P.3d 58(2019). Thus,the ® Relatedly, the court must focus its analysis on the facts as they existed at the time of the violation. 27 State V. Muhammad (Bisir Bilal), No. 96090-9 next questions are what evidence was obtained in violation of that constitutional privacy protection, and whether the error offailing to suppress that evidence and its fruits was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals answered those questions because they concluded that the warrantless ping was lawful. CP at 218-26; Muhammad,4 Wn. App. 2d at 50. I would remand this case to the Court of Appeals with instructions to determine what evidence should have been suppressed as a direct result or fruit of the unconstitutional ping (i.e., the poisonous tree) and whether any error in failing to suppress that evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See RAP 13.7(b)(If the Supreme Court reverses a decision ofthe Court of Appeals that did not consider all of the issues raised which might support that decision, the Supreme Court will either consider and decide those issues or remand the case to the Court of Appeals to decide those issues.). I believe that this is the proper route, particularly in light of Mayfield, 192 Wn.2d 871, an opinion published after the Court of Appeals ruled in this case.