Opinion ID: 1532996
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Interpretation of the Insurance Contracts

Text: Dingwell's company had a primary general liability insurance contract with Travelers from April, 1971 to April, 1978, and excess general liability policies, first with API from July, 1972 to July, 1976, and then with Chicago from July, 1977 to April, 1978, and with a third company, not a party to this action, between July, 1976 and July, 1977. The insurers contend that pollution exclusion provisions [2] in their respective policies free them from any duty to defend the class action. All three of the insurance policies cover liability for personal injury or property damage arising out of an occurrence. The API policy defines occurrence as an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which results in personal injury, property damage or advertising liability neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured. The Chicago policy defines occurrence in similar terms. Both definitions would cover the events described in Count I of the class action if the events were neither expected nor intended, unless the events fall within the pollution exclusion clauses. Travelers has so stipulated in respect to its policies. All three of the policies obligate the insurer to defend the insured against any suit within the coverage of the policy. There are two different pollution exclusion clauses. The relevant part of the Travelers' clause reads: It is agreed that this policy does not apply (a) to bodily injury or property damage arising out of any emission, discharge, seepage, release or escape of any liquid, solid gaseous or thermal waste or pollutant (1) if such emission, discharge, seepage, release or escape is either expected or intended from the standpoint of any insured or any person or organization for whose acts or omissions any insured is liable, or (2) resulting from or contributed to by any condition in violation of or noncompliance with any governmental rule, regulation or law applicable thereto. . .. (Emphasis added.) Both API and Chicago used the following: This policy does not apply . . . (i) to personal injury or property damage arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalies, toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, waste materials or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or upon land, the atmosphere or any water course or body of water; but this exclusion does not apply if such discharge or dispersal release or escape is sudden and accidental. (Emphasis added.) The Superior Court justice held that these two clauses have the same meaning. He found in particular that the exception to the exclusion is limited in both clauses to a release of pollutants which is sudden and accidental, the words used in the Chicago and API policies. We find that it was error to read sudden and accidental into the Travelers policy. Unambiguous language in a contract must be given its plain meaning, Soper v. St. Regis Paper Co., Me., 411 A.2d 1004, 1006 (1980). The plain meaning of the Travelers exclusion is that it applies only to expected or intended releases of pollutants. A release may be unexpected and unintended, without being sudden and accidental. However, as discussed below, we find that a duty to defend arises from all three contracts.