Opinion ID: 2543555
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: search incident to a lawful arrest and to suppress

Text: The first issue for our review is whether the trial court erred when it found that the search of Payne's person by Leavenworth police officers was a lawful search incident to arrest and, thus, denied Payne's motion to suppress. When a motion to suppress evidence is filed, the State bears the burden of proving to the trial court the lawfulness of the search and seizure. State v. Damm, 246 Kan. 220, 222, 787 P.2d 1185 (1990) (citing Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390-91, 57 L. Ed.2d 290, 98 S. Ct. 2408 [1978]). If the findings of the trial court on a motion to suppress evidence are based on substantial evidence, the appellate court must not substitute its view of the evidence for that of the trial court. [Citation omitted.] State v. Wonders, 263 Kan. 582, 588-89, 952 P.2d 1351 (1998). According to Payne, he was without a doubt seized, but was not arrested because two of the police officers involved testified they did not believe this was an arrest. Payne contends that since the officers were not armed with a search warrant, since he was not under arrest, and since the officer had no probable cause to believe what he felt in Payne's pocket was a weapon, the act of reaching into his pocket was an intrusive, unwarranted, and illegal search. Payne argues that under Terry, officers could permissibly conduct a brief search for weapons, but could not justify their search and subsequent discovery of the crack pipe. In addition, Payne asserts that the rock of crack cocaine discovered in his shirt pocket at the police station should also be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree, since it was obtained as a result of finding the crack pipe. Therefore, Payne requests this court to reverse the trial court's decision and remand, with orders to suppress both the crack pipe and the rock of cocaine. Payne's possession of the car belonging to Harris provided sufficient probable cause for an arrest. The trial court correctly decided that officers discovered the crack pipe and rock of cocaine only after, based on probable cause, they had placed Payne under arrest. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution only prohibits unreasonable searches; thus, the officer's search of Payne was a reasonable search incident to his lawful arrest. 1. Arrest v. detention. The first matter for our determination is whether the actions of the Leavenworth police officers constituted an arrest or a detention. K.S.A. 22-2202(4) defines arrest as the taking of a person into custody in order that the person may be forthcoming to answer for the commission of a crime. The United States Supreme Court has equated custody with whether there is a `formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a formal arrest. California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 77 L. Ed.2d 1275, 103 S. Ct. 3517 (1983). This court has previously stated: `Arrest as defined in the Kansas Code of Criminal Procedure contemplates more than the temporary restraint of a person by a law enforcement officer. It is the restraint of a person in order that he or she may be forthcoming to answer for the commission of a crime. State v. Boone, 220 Kan. 758, Syl. ¶ 7, 556 P.2d 864 (1976). Moreover, [a]n arrest is made by an actual restraint of the person arrested.... K.S.A. 22-2405. Further, in Alvarado v. City of Dodge City, 238 Kan. 48, 708 P.2d 174 (1985), this court distinguished a detention from an arrest. `[D]etention' is defined to mean the temporary restraint of a person by a law enforcement officer. `Arrest' is defined as the taking of a person into custody in order that the person may be forthcoming to answer for the commission of a crime. 238 Kan. at 61. Here, the Leavenworth police officers did more than temporarily restrain or detain Payne. When Payne entered the vehicle and started the engine, Officer Tavano pulled Payne out of Harris' car and placed him on his chest in the roadway while another officer handcuffed him. Police had their guns drawn and pointed at Payne as he was pulled from the car. Nothing in the record indicates that officers would allow Payne to proceed to the station for further investigation on his own accord. As one officer noted, when you are taken out of a car at gunpoint, you are under arrest and you are not free to go. Payne admits that at that point, he was no longer free to leave. Reviewing the totality of the circumstances, Payne's freedom of movement was restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest. Therefore, the trial court was correct in ruling that Payne was arrested, not detained. Payne's assertion that he was not arrested fails. 2. Lawfulness of the arrest. Next, we must determine whether the arrest was lawful. Here, an arrest warrant had not been issued because law enforcement officials did not know the identity of the person or persons who had taken Harris' car. If a warrantless arrest is challenged by a defendant, the burden is on the State to justify the arrest was not only authorized by the statute, but that it was permissible under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The constitutional validity of a warrantless arrest depends upon whether the arresting officer had probable cause to believe that the person arrested had committed a felony. State v. Aikins, 261 Kan. 346, Syl. ¶ 2, 932 P.2d 408 (1997). At the suppression hearing and at the hearing on posttrial motions, the trial court found that this was a lawful arrest. Judge Stewart explained his reasoning by stating: It appears from the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing and the evidence presented today that Mr. Payne was in possession of a vehicle which was the property of Eddie Harris, who just had been found dead and apparently murdered, and Mr. Payne was in possession of that property without any apparent authority. The officers had probable cause to arrest him at that point, and based upon the fact that they knew the crime of murder had been committed, and it appeared that there was at least probable cause to believe Mr. Payne was involved in the commission of that offense and at least possession of the stolen property at that point. The United States Supreme Court has written: [T]he judgment of the Nation and Congress has ... long been to authorize warrantless public arrests on probable cause rather than to encumber criminal prosecutions with endless litigation with respect to the existence of exigent circumstances, whether it was practicable to get a warrant, whether the suspect was about to flee, and the like. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423-24, 46 L. Ed.2d 598, 96 S. Ct. 820 (1976). Our court stated in Aikins, 261 Kan. 346: Probable cause for arrest without a warrant depends upon the probabilities arising from known facts and circumstances. Probable cause exists when the practical considerations of everyday life would lead a reasonable and prudent officer to believe a felony has been or is being committed. Syl. ¶ 3. In determining whether probable cause to arrest exists, all the information in the officer's possession, fair inferences therefrom, and facts may be taken into consideration that might not be admissible on the issue of guilt. Syl. ¶ 6. Here, the Leavenworth police officers were instructed to set up surveillance of Harris' vehicle in connection with the investigation of Harris' murder. Police knew Harris lived alone, had been murdered, and that his car and keys were missing from his residence. Officers were directed to watch the vehicle and to stop anyone trying to operate or enter it and hold him or her in custody for questioning. Officer Slusher watched Payne as he cautiously approached the vehicle, walking away from it once, then turning around and kind of looking like is anybody watching me.... When officers apprehended Payne he was in Harris' vehicle and had started the engine. Two officers immediately parked their vehicles to the front and rear of Harris' car to prevent Payne from fleeing the scene. Although Payne was not advised that he was under arrest, Officer Slusher testified that he felt he had enough probable cause to arrest the person in the car without a warrant. The information known by the officers at the time of Payne's arrest could cause a reasonable and prudent officer to believe a felony had been or was being committed. At the very least, the officers knew Payne was in possession of a vehicle that belonged to a murder victim and saw Payne glancing furtively before approaching and entering the vehicle. The trial court did not err in finding that probable cause existed for Payne's arrest; thus, that the arrest was lawful. 3. Seizure of the crack pipe. Next, we consider the reasonableness of the search leading to the seizure of the crack cocaine pipe from Payne's shirt pocket. An officer's search of an arrested person incident to an arrest is a well-established exception to the requirement of a search warrant. Police may conduct a warrantless search of an arrested person, and in addition the immediate surrounding area may be searched contemporaneously with the arrest. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 457, 69 L. Ed.2d 768, 101 S. Ct. 2860, reh. denied 453 U.S. 950 (1981). The Kansas Legislature has codified this exception in K.S.A. 22-2501, which states: When a lawful arrest is effected a law enforcement officer may reasonably search the person arrested and the area within such person's immediate presence for the purpose of (a) Protecting the officer from attack; (b) Preventing the person from escaping; or (c) Discovering the fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of the crime. Payne argues on appeal that the crack cocaine pipe should have been suppressed by the trial court because it was evidence obtained as the result of an illegal search. Following the arrest, officers assisted Payne in standing up, and then conducted a pat-down search. Officer Tavano testified that he felt a pipe in Payne's shirt pocket as he patted him down for weapons as soon as they picked Payne up off the ground. Officer O'Brien testified that Tavano pulled some cards out of one of Payne's pockets and, after they put Payne in the back of a police vehicle, Tavano struggled to put the two cards back in Payne's left shirt pocket. According to O'Brien, at that time Tavano looked at what was in Payne's pocket and found the crack pipe. At the preliminary hearing, Tavano stated: I felt the pipe, it was short, I am familiar with it, what a Crack pipe is. I knew it to be nothing else but a pipe and removed it. Under the plain view doctrine, if police are lawfully in a position from which they view an object, if its incriminating character is immediately apparent, and if the officers have a lawful right of access to the object, they may seize it without a warrant. Wonders, 263 Kan. 582, Syl. ¶ 3. The plain feel exception ... is applicable to lawful searches in Kansas. 263 Kan. 582, Syl. ¶ 7. The legality of a law enforcement officer's seizure of property in plain view or on plain feel is immediately apparent if there is reasonable or probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity. 263 Kan. 583, Syl. ¶ 11. Here, officers conducted a search of Payne's person following his arrest in an attempt to locate any weapons he might be carrying. Their actions can be characterized as a search for the purpose of protecting the officers from an attack or to keep Payne from escaping. Further justification for the search can be found in the plain feel exception. The trial court correctly denied Payne's motion to suppress the crack pipe. Payne's argument that the search was not legal is without merit. 4. Seizure of the crack cocaine. Payne also argues that the rock of cocaine discovered in his shirt pocket at the police station should be suppressed. In State v. Copridge, 260 Kan. 19, 918 P.2d 1247 (1996), the defendant argued that the district court erred in failing to suppress evidence collected during a search of his personal effects and clothes conducted while officers booked him into jail. This court found that the defendant's effects were lawfully seized, and, therefore, officers could search them without a warrant or probable cause. There, we stated: [W]here a defendant has been taken into custody and his or her personal effects have been lawfully seized and retained for safekeeping, the defendant has no expectation of privacy and officers may thereafter take a `second look' at the inventoried personal effects without a search warrant and remove any evidence. 260 Kan. at 23. `While the legal arrest of a person should not destroy the privacy of his premises, it doesfor at least a reasonable time and to a reasonable extenttake his own privacy out of the realm of protection from police interest in weapons, means of escape, and evidence.' [Citation omitted.] 260 Kan. at 24 (quoting United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 808-09, 39 L. Ed.2d 771, 94 S. Ct. 1234 [1974]). The search of Payne's person at the jail was a reasonable custodial search for weapons, means of escape, and evidence. Payne's assertion of error fails.