Opinion ID: 2419583
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Bingo Halls as a Public Nuisance

Text: In reviewing the question whether the chancery court had subject-matter jurisdiction to enjoin a public nuisance, we cited Albright v. Karston, supra and State ex. rel. Att'y Gen. v. Karston, supra , for guidance as to the availability of equitable relief when criminal penalties are also available. In these cases, we pointed to many other cases that declared gambling houses to be public nuisances at common law. The availability of equitable relief to enjoin a gambling activity was discussed in Meyer v. Seifert , where we stated: In one of the most publicized cases that ever arose in Arkansas, Chancellor Martin enjoined the holding at Hot Springs of a world championship heavyweight prize-fight between James J. Corbett and Robert Fitzsimmons. State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Corbett, Fitzsimmons, et al., Martin's Chanc. Decisions 366. Judge Martin conceded that ordinarily equity does not enjoin the commission of crimes, but pointed out that it does issue such injunctions where property interests are involved, and emphasized the prospective property injuries threatened by the prizefight, notably the payment of money by purchases of tickets of admission to the illegal enterprise, losses by bettors.... Id. at 297, 225 S.W.2d at 6-7. This articulation of possible property losses incurred through gambling activities may reflect the rationale for decisions that a gambling house constitutes a public nuisance at common law. The protection of property rights of the public affected by illegal gambling activities meets the test for equitable relief suggested by Chief Justice Hill in State v. Vaughan , where after denying the injunction in the particular case, we added: On the other hand, if the public nuisance is one touching civil property rights or privileges of the public, or the public health is affected by a physical nuisance, or if any other ground of equity jurisdiction exists calling for an injunction, a chancery court will enjoin, notwithstanding the act enjoined may also be a crime. Id. at 126, 98 S.W. at 690. Appellants argue that because the state is taxing its bingo operations, those operations cannot be considered a nuisance. We have considered a similar argument that Act 939, (codified at Ark.Code Ann. §§ 26-52-1501 1507 (Supp.1995)), legalizes bingo in our recent decision in Billy/Dot, Inc. v. Fields, 322 Ark. 272, 908 S.W.2d 335 (1995), where we stated: Billy/Dot admits that it operates a bingo establishment where money is at risk, but it is wrong in contending that Act 939 legalizes bingo. The Act specifically does not make bingo legal, as is evidenced by its Emergency Clause: [T]hat this tax and the requirement for annual registration are not intended to address any question of legality or illegality of the conduct of playing bingo; Act 939 only provides for taxation of bingo revenues. Because there is no lawful business operation at issue here, there is no valid property right to be protected in this matter. Id. at 277, 908 S.W.2d at 337. In Billy/Dot , we also made the following determination: Here, there is no question but that playing bingo for money constitutes gambling which is a criminal offense under our statutes, and the chancery court so found. In doing so, the court correctly cited State v. Torres, 309 Ark. 422, 831 S.W.2d 903 (1992), in its order. Id. The operation of a commercial bingo hall meets the definitions of a gambling house, and is therefore a common-law public nuisance. In the case before us it was stipulated that the operation of the bingo halls has been profitable enough to make necessary the payments of taxes of $316,266.00 on gross receipts from July 1993 until June of 1996, and that appellants intend to continue the activities, thereby showing that the operation of the gambling houses have resulted in losses to the public patrons of money from their purchase of cards and pull-tabs from which the proceeds are at least sufficient to pay appellant's taxes. It was also stipulated that no prosecution has been initiated against those operations by anyone, thereby showing that the prosecuting attorney has not brought criminal charges. Whether this is because of the difficulty in gaining convictions, or a belief that other criminal violations have higher priority, or because the prosecuting attorney simply chooses not to prosecute is not relevant. The stipulation that no prosecution has occurred notwithstanding the open continuous, and lucrative operation of the public nuisance supports the chancery court's conclusion that there is no adequate remedy at law. Equity may act to suppress a public nuisance where the remedy at law is inadequate and incomplete. State ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. Karston, supra . Appellees urge that appellants' operation of commercial bingo halls should be declared to be a public nuisance because it flouts the public policy of Arkansas, as expressed in the prohibition against lotteries contained in Ark. Const. art. 19, § 14. [1] We need not address that argument because of our determination that appellants are operating gambling houses, and that such activities are public nuisances under the common law.