Opinion ID: 2837800
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admissibility of Government Expert Testimony

Text: Monell next challenges the admissibility of testimony by government expert witness Detective Gary Mercurio (Detective Mercurio) that evidence found in the apartment was consistent 9 Monell also attempts to contrast the government's strike of Juror 19 with his unsuccessful attempt to challenge a white juror, Juror 12, for cause. The contrast is an illusion, however: the government also used a peremptory strike on Juror 12. - 19 - with drug dealing. Monell's primary claim is that some of Detective Mercurio's testimony did not help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, as required for expert testimony by Federal Rule of Evidence 702(a). In particular, Monell challenges the following four pieces of Detective Mercurio's testimony: (1) that drug dealers tend to have other people rent the residences that they use . . . . so that their name is not associated with that residence;(2) that drug dealers tend to have multiple cell phones to protect their identity; (3) that drug dealers want to protect their product and their money so they use firearms to do that; and (4) that a piece of wood mounted against the apartment door was a barricade, which drug dealers use[] to stop other people from taking the product from that dealer and also to slow down or stop law enforcement. Monell objected to the first three parts of Detective Mercurio's testimony, but not the fourth part about the barricade.10 Because Monell's claim fails even if he had objected 10The government argues that Monell did not preserve his objections to any of the challenged parts of Detective Mercurio's testimony because defense counsel merely stated [o]bjection without articulating specific grounds. See Fed. R. Evid. 103(a)(1)(B). We are not so sure that the grounds for the objection were not apparent from the context. Id. Monell filed a pretrial motion in limine to exclude Detective Mercurio's testimony about the modus operandi of drug distribution on the basis of the evidence seized on Rule 702(a) grounds, which the district court denied provisionally. Although the motion in limine alone did not - 20 - to the barricade testimony, we treat his challenge to all four pieces of testimony as preserved. We review preserved challenges to the admission of expert testimony for abuse of discretion. United States v. Sebaggala, 256 F.3d 59, 66 (1st Cir. 2001). The challenged testimony helped the jury decide whether Monell operated like a drug dealer, not a user, by taking steps to conceal his activities and protect a large quantity of drugs. This court has repeatedly found no abuse of discretion in the admission of similar expert testimony to explain the typical methods of drug dealers. See, e.g., United States v. Hicks, 575 F.3d 130, 144 (1st Cir. 2009) (officer's expert testimony that guns are prevalent among Brockton drug dealers and about practice of concealing or swapping firearms was admissible); United States v. Lopez-Lopez, 282 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2002) (use of GPS and cell phones to import drugs by sea). Detective Mercurio's testimony about multiple cell phone use and using the names of others to rent apartments was also directly relevant to address Monell's claim that he only lived in the apartment sporadically, and that the drugs and gun could have belonged to others residing in the apartment. Given the considerable latitude the district court enjoys in deciding whether expert testimony is helpful to the jury, preserve Monell's claimed error, it did alert the district court and prosecutor to his grounds for exclusion at trial. We need not decide this issue, however, because Monell's claim of error fails even if preserved. - 21 - Sebaggala, 256 F.3d at 65, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion here.
Monell also argues that Detective Mercurio impermissibly opined on Monell's culpable mental state, the intent to distribute. See Fed. R. Evid. 704(b) (In a criminal case, an expert witness must not state an opinion about whether the defendant did or did not have a mental state or condition that constitutes an element of the crime charged or of a defense.). Monell takes issue with the following exchange: [Prosecutor]: All right. Detective Mercurio, based on your review of all of the items in this case, have you formed an opinion if the items are more consistent with drug distribution or personal use of the items? Have you formed that opinion? [Detective Mercurio]: Yes. [Prosecutor]: What is your opinion? [Defense counsel]: Objection. [Court]: Overruled. [Detective Mercurio]: Based on, you know, the barricade on the door, the firearm being right next to the door, you know, three -- you have three digital scales, basically three different size digital scales, a small one, you know, like I said, you have the firearm, you have 37, in my opinion, 37 bags, $40 bags. No user would buy 37 $40 bags. When the prosecutor asked Detective Mercurio to explain his last comment, the detective clarified that it would not be economical - 22 - for a user to buy that amount of drugs in street-level, rather than bulk, quantities. Monell now argues that the [n]o user would buy 37 $40 bags statement, combined with the recitation of the evidence of distribution, amounted to an inadmissible expert opinion on his mental state.11 Though Monell objected, it is clear from the transcript that he objected on different grounds. Just before the exchange quoted above, the prosecutor attempted to ask the same question to elicit Detective Mercurio's opinion about drug distribution, at which point defense counsel objected on the basis that the testimony would be outside Detective Mercurio's expertise, but did not object on Rule 704(b) grounds.12 Because 11In his reply brief, Monell also challenges on Rule 704(b) grounds Detective Mercurio's testimony that certain pieces of evidence were consistent with drug distribution. Because this argument debuted in his reply brief, it is waived. Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Mowbray, 208 F.3d 288, 299 (1st Cir. 2000) (We have held, with a regularity bordering on the monotonous, that issues advanced for the first time in an appellant's reply brief are deemed waived.). 12 Defense counsel objected as follows: Beyond the objections that his testimony that that is not consistent with personal use, he may have been qualified as an expert with respect to whether this is consistent with distribution, but he has no basis in his education or training with respect to addiction, with respect to use, and so for him to offer an opinion that it's not consistent with personal use goes beyond his expertise and his training and for that reason should be excluded. - 23 - Monell did not object on the basis he now presses on appeal, our review is for plain error. See United States v. Iwuala, 789 F.3d 1, 5, 7 (1st Cir. 2015) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 103(a)(1)). It is by no means obvious that Detective Mercurio's comment that [n]o user would buy 37 $40 bags of crack cocaine was an opinion of Monell's mental state. Rather it was simply an observation that drug users do not buy large quantities in bulk in street-level units. While it is true that a jury might in turn infer something about Monell's purpose in possessing the drugs, that is precisely how one proves intent in crimes where it is relevant (and no admission is available). In short, if there was error here, then it certainly was not plain. See United States v. Duarte, 246 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2001) (plain error review requires, among other things, a clear or obvious error). In one sentence of his reply brief, Monell repeats this objection to Detective Mercurio's testimony. To the extent that Monell seeks to challenge on appeal Detective Mercurio's qualifications, he waived that challenge by waiting until his reply brief to raise it, see Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc., 208 F.3d at 299, and then doing so perfunctorily, see Rodríguez v. Municipality of San Juan, 659 F.3d 168, 175 (1st Cir. 2011). - 24 -