Opinion ID: 522032
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Exclusiveness of LHWCA Remedy

Text: 5 Under 5 U.S.C.A. Sec. 8171(a), employees of nonappropriated fund instrumentalities as described by 5 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2105(c) (1977) are entitled to compensation for death or disability under the rubric of the LHWCA. 3 Section 8173 purports to make the liability incurred under section 8171 exclusive. The section reads: 6 The liability of the United States or of a nonappropriated fund instrumentality described by section 2105(c) of this title, with respect to the disability or death resulting from injury, as defined by section 902(2) of title 33, of an employee referred to by sections 8171 and 8172 of this title, shall be determined as provided by this subchapter. This liability is exclusive and instead of all other liability of the United States or the instrumentality to the employee, his legal representative, spouse, dependents, next of kin, and any other person otherwise entitled to recover damages from the United States or the instrumentality because of the disability or death in a direct judicial proceeding, in a civil action, or in admiralty, or by an administrative or judicial proceeding under a workmen's compensation statute or under a Federal tort liability statute. 7 5 U.S.C.A. Sec. 8173. 8 The language of section 8173 is identical in all material respects to the language of its sister provision, 5 U.S.C.A. Sec. 8116(c) (1980), which purports to make exclusive the liability of the United States and its instrumentalities under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA), 5 U.S.C.A. Secs. 8101-93 (1980). 4 This court has previously held that liability under FECA is exclusive when a substantial question exists as to whether an employees' injuries are covered under FECA. See Avasthi v. United States, 608 F.2d 1059, 1060 (5th Cir.1979); Bailey v. United States, 451 F.2d 963, 965 (5th Cir.1971). We hold today that the same test should be applied to determine whether the liability of the United States under the LHWCA via the Nonappropriated Fund Instrumentalities Act, 5 U.S.C.A. Sec. 8171-73, excludes the availability of other remedies, including the recovery sought by Wilder under the FTCA. If it is determined that a substantial question of coverage exists, then the employee must first seek and be denied relief [under the LHWCA].... Avasthi, 608 F.2d at 1060. 9 The government does not challenge the assumption of the district court that Wilder's initial injury was compensable, and we have no reason to challenge that assumption. The discrete issue presented is whether the subsequent aggravation of that injury by the alleged malpractice of the hospital's medical personnel presents a substantial question of coverage under the LHWCA. The parties do not cite, and our research has not discovered, any case in this circuit addressing the issue under either section 8116(c) or section 8173. Several cases, however, suggest that if a work-related injury compensable under FECA is aggravated through medical treatment, the aggravation is also compensable. See Baker v. Barber, 673 F.2d 147, 150 (6th Cir.1982); Balancio v. United States, 267 F.2d 135, 137 (2d Cir.1959); Mohr v. United States, 184 F.Supp. 80, 81 (N.D.Calif.1960) (citing Matter of Dombach, 8 E.C.A.B. 389 (1955)) (In the opinion of the Court, death or disability is compensable under the Compensation Act if it is the ultimate consequence of an injury sustained by a Federal employee in the performance of his duties even though it may have been directly caused by intervening medical treatment given for the original injury); Frieouf v. United States, 183 F.Supp. 439, 440 (N.D.Calif.1960). See generally, A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law Secs. 13.21 and 72.61(c) (1985). The reasoning of the Second Circuit in Balancio is persuasive: 10 It is not necessary, we think, to hold that it was part of the plaintiff's duty to go to the hospital, because the aggravation of his initial injuries, suffered while he was indubitably in performance of his duty, should be regarded as resulting from the initial injuries themselves. As we have just said, that is the rule at common-law when the claim is for negligence; the initial wrong is the cause of all that follows, even when there has intervened a succeeding negligent act that produced the aggravation. We interpret the Compensation Act as a substitute for the whole of the claim that, but for it, would have arisen under the Tort Claims Act. 11 Wilder does not argue that the Secretary of Labor would deny an application for benefits were she formally to apply for them, and we need not speculate on the outcome of such an application. We are satisfied, and so hold, that the aggravation of her work-related injuries through the alleged malpractice of treating medical personnel presents a substantial question of coverage under the LHWCA, and a more conclusive determination is unnecessary. The district court erred in finally determining that the aggravation of Wilder's work-related injury was compensable under the LHWCA; in our opinion, that determination should be made in the first instance by the Secretary. Until Wilder has made an application for benefits and had it denied, she cannot pursue her remedy under the FTCA. 5