Opinion ID: 765404
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Heard Affidavit

Text: 13 At trial Amerson requested that Heard's affidavit be admitted as a declaration against penal interest under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3). 5 The trial court refused to admit the statement, ruling that Amerson had failed to demonstrate that there existed corroborating circumstances which clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. I can not in good conscience find that that . . . element has been met. 14 We begin by noting that out-of-court statements are generally inadmissible because they are presumed to be unreliable. United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1110 (7th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Hooks, 848 F.2d 785, 796 (7th Cir. 1988)). We review the district court's decision that a particular hearsay statement is admissible under Rule 804 only for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Doerr, 886 F.2d 944, 954 (7th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). Under the three part test we set forth in United States v. Garcia, 897 F.2d 1413, 1420 (7th Cir. 1990), for determining the admissibility of a statement under Rule 804(b)(3), a court must find that, (1) the declarant's statement was against the penal interest of the declarant, (2) corroborating circumstances exist indicating the trustworthiness of the statement, and (3) the declarant must be unavailable. United States v. Moore, 936 F.2d 1508, 1516 (7th Cir. 1991) (internal quotations omitted). Further, we have previously held that we will not 15 second-guess the sentencing judge['s determinations] because he or she has had the best opportunity to observe the verbal and non- verbal behavior of the witnesses focusing on the subject's reactions and responses to the interrogatories, their facial expressions, attitudes, tone of voice, eye contact, posture and body movements, as well as confused or nervous speech patterns in contrast with merely looking at the cold pages of an appellate record. 16 United States v. Garcia, 66 F.3d 851, 856 (7th Cir. 1995) (citation, internal quotations, and emphasis omitted). 17 Heard's affidavit states: Being in possession of two packages of cocaine. I ran to the back bedroom and attempted to dispose of them. One landed inside. Later one was found outside. (emphasis added). Heard's affidavit is untruthful for several reasons. Initially, Heard contends that he was in possession of two packages of cocaine and that one landed inside while the other was found outside. Though Heard refers to two packages of cocaine in his affidavit, he never affirmatively states that the second package of cocaine found outside just below the front porch and not in the vicinity of the bedroom window was the same package he attempted to dispose of outside the bedroom window. Through the mechanism of a carefully drafted affidavit, Heard attempts to deceive this Court into believing that the second package, found far and away from the bedroom window in question (thirty to forty feet to the east) and just below the front porch, belonged to him (Heard), not Amerson, and thus was not the bag of cocaine thrown by Amerson over his head and off the front porch and found immediately by Officer Moore. All this despite the fact that Officer Mumaw testified that Heard was prevented from propelling anything out of the window, for [t]here was a large curtain in the way where this gentleman was trying to punch and the canister found on the floor, containing seven individually wrapped packages of crack, didn't make it because the curtain didn't go out the window. As Officer Patterson testified, he, along with Officers Moore and Kirwan, was standing directly and immediately below the broken bedroom window and heard glass breaking from above [him]. At that time [he] looked up and saw pieces of glass falling down just in front of [him]. The three officers immediately searched the surrounding area with their flashlights and found nothing but broken glass. An hour later, Amerson appeared on the scene (at the front porch). Three officers (Officers Moore, Mitchell, and Mumaw) arrested him after observing a bag of cocaine in his hands and observing him (Amerson) throw the plastic bag of rock-like crack cocaine over his head, off the landing and onto the ground behind him. At this time, Officer Moore immediately descended the front steps and retrieved Amerson's plastic bag containing crack cocaine. The affidavit states that Heard attempted to dispose of both packages. Again, Heard, through craftily framed phrases, does not affirmatively state that he disposed of the second package, only that he attempted to dispose of the package. 18 In addition, the location where the police officers discovered the crack cocaine (immediately below the porch where Amerson was standing) makes that part of Heard's affidavit wherein he states that he attempted to dispose of the two packages of cocaine and [l]ater one was found outside implausible. According to the evidence at trial, the bag of cocaine found outside the building immediately below the porch where Amerson was standing was found to be at least thirty to forty feet east and slightly to the south of the broken window and eight to ten feet south and west of the porch (which, like the bedroom window, was on the south side of the building). It is impossible to comprehend how Heard, who dropped his one canister of cocaine in the bedroom at the time he was tackled by Officer Mumaw, would have been able to project the second package out the window and in a direction east and slightly to the south of the broken window and parallel to the building through a heavy curtain a distance of thirty to forty feet while he was in the process of falling down as he was being tackled and restrained by two officers. We are of the opinion that the trial court's exclusion of the affidavit was proper, for the information contained therein, that Heard attempted to dispose of a second package of crack through a scenario of action physically untenable without the guidance system of the latest smart bomb, was not only less than credible, but comes within the realm of impossibility. 19 In response, Amerson contends that the fact that Heard broke the window corroborates that particular aspect of the affidavit's truthfulness. Granted both parties do agree that Heard broke the window, but they disagree as to whether Heard was able to dispose of the second package of cocaine out the bedroom window, for the Government contends that Heard never had possession of another container of crack cocaine. Thus, the Government argues that Heard could not dispose of something he never had possession of. We fail to understand how Amerson's contention that Heard broke the window corroborates Amerson's version of events, for it merely corroborates that he broke the window, as the Government concludes. Furthermore, Amerson argues that the testimony of Sharon Parker, also arrested with Heard at the time of the police search, corroborates Heard's affidavit. Without being specific, Parker merely testified that Heard told her some time after he was in custody that he had several packages of cocaine 6 in his possession at the time of the search warrant entry. 7 Though it is true that Heard had a single canister which contained seven individually wrapped rocks of cocaine, Heard's affidavit is not corroborated by Parker's testimony because his affidavit stated that he had but two packages of cocaine, not several as Parker stated under oath. 8 Additionally, Parker's testimony fails to even address the question of whether Amerson was carrying crack when he arrived on the porch at the apartment and was confronted by the three police officers. 20 Because both Parker's testimony and Amerson's contention that Heard disposed of the second package of cocaine are inconclusive, there is no evidence in the record to corroborate Heard's ambiguous and untruthful affidavit. Thus, the trial judge did not err in exercising his considerable discretion, United States v. Nagib, 56 F.3d 798, 805 (7th Cir. 1995), when he refused to receive the affidavit into evidence. See United States v. Bradley, 145 F.3d 889, 892 (7th Cir. 1998) (A court abuse[s] its discretion in admitting evidence 'only when no reasonable person could agree' with its rulings.) (quoting United States v. Sinclair, 74 F.3d 753, 756 (7th Cir. 1996)). 21 The dissent disagrees with the trial judge's decision to exclude the affidavit. Initially, the dissent, according to the majority's interpretation, gives somewhat of an inaccurate accounting of the events that transpired prior to Amerson's arrest for possession of crack cocaine. The dissenting judge notes that after Amerson was warned that the police were inside the apartment, Amerson tossed a plastic bag over his shoulder. The police testified that they found the [plastic] bag, containing small 'rocks' of crack cocaine, on the ground in front of the building but that they found nothing but shards of glass on the ground below the window that Heard had broken. On the contrary, the police did not testify that the plastic bag was found beneath the bedroom window as the dissent seems to imply, but rather, the testimony of Officer Moore revealed that Amerson's plastic bag was discovered by Moore directly below the front porch where Amerson was standing and taken into custody by the officers, some thirty to forty feet east and slightly to the south of the broken window. 22 The dissent also comments: [a]lthough one officer testified that the crack allegedly thrown by Amerson was found at the front of the apartment, another officer, the evidence custodian [Officer Patterson], 9 placed it only about 19 feet in a straight line from the window in the back bedroom. Initially, we disagree with the dissent, for we do not believe it is possible for a person to throw a plastic bag nineteen feet in a straight line through a second floor window covered by a heavy curtain. Furthermore, the dissent fails to point out that the testimony the majority relied upon dealing with the location of the crack was that of Officer Moore, the police officer who discovered the plastic bag containing the crack on the ground below the porch. Isn't it interesting to note that exhibit 4E received in evidence is a photograph of the bag of crack as it was located at the time of its discovery in the light of Officer Moore's flashlight on the ground immediately below the porch? In response to the dissent's contention that the evidence custodian located the bag nineteen feet from the window, we point out that the evidence custodian was not responsible for locating the cocaine, Officer Moore was, so the evidence custodian's observations are thus of no import. 23 We also disagree with the dissent's contention that the district judge failed to give reasons for his ruling that the affidavit was not trustworthy and that his ruling therefore deserves no deference. Specifically, the dissent provides: 24 On the present, incomplete record, Heard's affidavit seems about as trustworthy as other forms of hearsay . . . . The district judge thought otherwise, but as he did not explain his thinking process, and specifically did not point to anything in the record that might support his conclusion, we should not give it controlling weight. . . . [D]eference is never properly given to rulings the grounds of which are not explained, unless the grounds are obvious. 25 The judge specifically stated his reason for finding that the affidavit was not trustworthy-- he found that the affidavit was not trustworthy because it lacked sufficient corroborating circumstances. The judge went on to state: The third element [of Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3)] is that there must have been corroborating circumstances which clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. I can not in good conscience find that third element has been met. (emphasis added). Since the judge, with this very language, did in fact make a specific finding dealing with the lack of trustworthiness of the affidavit, we are obligated to extend considerable deference to his ruling and overturn it only if the ruling was clearly erroneous. Hall, 165 F.3d at 1112 (quoting Garcia, 897 F.2d at 1420) (emphasis added). The trial judge may exclude statements where 'the corroborating evidence does not clearly indicate the trustworthiness' of the statements. . . . A district court's 'determination of the trustworthiness of an out-of-court statement should be upheld unless the finding is clearly erroneous.' Id. Furthermore, Heard's affidavit is of little value, for Heard never affirmatively stated that he disposed of the crack, only that he attempted to do so. Additionally, based on the testimony of Officer Mumaw, Heard was unable to throw anything out the window since there was a large curtain in the way. It is interesting to note that the bag of crack was discovered some thirty to forty feet east of the window in question by police after the officers had witnessed Amerson throw it over his head. We query the dissent: how could Heard throw a plastic bag of crack cocaine out of a second floor window some thirty to forty feet east parallel to the apartment through a heavy curtain unless he was somehow hanging out the window? 26 The dissent goes on to comment that no reason has been given why Heard . . . would admit to that possession if it were untrue. We believe that this statement is inaccurate because the dissent apparently overlooks the information contained in Amerson's presentence investigation report, which provides that Amerson had a criminal record. The jury had been apprised by defense counsel that Amerson had previously been convicted of committing three felonies. As such, Amerson's credibility might very well have been questioned by the jury, and the court provided jurors with an instruction concerning the jurors' consideration of Amerson's prior criminal convictions--Evidence that a witness has been convicted of a crime is to be considered by you only insofar as it may affect the witness' credibility. Armed with this instruction, jurors were prepared to properly assess Amerson's credibility. Furthermore, Amerson had in the past been accused of using physical force to coerce an associate to sign an affidavit stating that [the associate] was the owner of . . . drugs found in [Amerson's] vehicle, thus, a false affidavit which exculpated Amerson and inculpated his associate. Considering the surrounding circumstances that clearly demonstrate that the affidavit was untruthful, it would not be improper for us to believe that Amerson coerced Heard to sign the affidavit. 27 The dissent comments: It is apparent from the majority opinion that my colleagues credit the police testimony over that of the criminals; but that is not our job; the issue is the admissibility, not the weight, of Heard's affidavit. In so arguing, the dissent confuses our determination of the issue. By rejecting Amerson's testimony, we do not give greater weight to the testimony of a single police officer or even two police officers; the fact is that all six officers who testified repeated the same set of circumstances. Does the dissent really believe that all six officers were untruthful? The presiding judge made a credibility judgment based on the testimony of the defendant and his witnesses following the testimony of the law enforcement officers. Further, let us not ignore the fact that Amerson has repeatedly been involved in criminal activity and has previously been accused of coercing an associate to sign a false affidavit. As such, we cannot credit Amerson's testimony over that of the police. Furthermore, we note that one who has previously been convicted of a criminal offense is not as trustworthy as one who has never been convicted of a crime. 28 Also, the dissent is inaccurate in contending that the quantity of cocaine which Heard claimed belonged to him, which we concluded that Amerson threw away, would ice the case against Heard. Since Heard had already been caught red-handed with a canister of cocaine in the apartment, the Government's case against him was already on ice. 29 The dissent goes on to state: [b]efore ruling Heard's affidavit inadmissible, the district judge should have explored the circumstances surrounding its creation. To the contrary, the burden to demonstrate the existence of corroborating circumstances is on Amerson. See Am. Auto. Accessories v. Fishman, 175 F.3d 534, 541-42 (7th Cir. Apr. 23, 1999). Shifting the responsibility of demonstrating corroborating circumstances to the district judge is improper since the judge should not become an advocate of one party or another.