Opinion ID: 2121874
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Plaintiffs' 1983 Claim Against Calumet City

Text: Our last task is to determine whether plaintiffs have stated a cause of action under section 1983 against Calumet City. The Supreme Court set forth the elements for municipal liability under section 1983 in Monell v. Department of Social Services (1978), 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611. Under Monell, section 1983 plaintiffs must establish (1) that they have suffered the deprivation of a constitutionally protected interest, and (2) that the deprivation was caused by an official policy, custom, or usage of the municipality. ( Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. at 2037-38, 56 L.Ed.2d at 638.) As we have already determined that plaintiffs' complaint alleges sufficient facts to support a charge of gender discrimination, our sole remaining inquiry is whether that deprivation was caused by an official policy, custom or usage of Calumet City. Plaintiffs have alleged the following facts to support the existence of a culpable municipal policy or custom of gender discrimination. First, plaintiffs allege that the conduct of Officer Horka during the incident is evidence of a municipal custom of gender discrimination. Second, plaintiffs point to Calumet City's past policy of strip-searching females, but not males, for nonfelony offenses. This policy was found unconstitutional by the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. ( Doe v. Calumet City (N.D.Ill. 1990), 754 F.Supp. 1211.) Plaintiffs allege that this policy institutionalized the disparate treatment of women. Third, plaintiffs argue that the municipality ratified the disparate treatment of women by failing to institute policies to counteract the discriminatory effects of the strip searches. Fourth, plaintiffs argue that Calumet City ratified Officer Horka's conduct by not bringing Officer Horka up on charges specifically related to gender discrimination. Last, plaintiffs point out sexist comments, such as Isn't this just like a woman, allegedly made by unidentified officers at the scene. As a matter of analytical clarity, it is important to determine the manner in which plaintiffs have attempted to demonstrate the municipal custom or policy. One way to establish official policy is to show that the deprivation results from the execution of a policy put in place by high level officials such as lawmakers or    those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy. ( Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. at 2037-38, 56 L.Ed.2d at 638.) Where the conduct of high level officials responsible for establishing policy causes the deprivation, municipal policy is conclusively established without a showing of repeated instances of similar conduct. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati (1986), 475 U.S. 469, 480-81, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 1299, 89 L.Ed.2d 452, 463. Where the conduct of high level officials is not implicated, plaintiffs must establish municipal fault through custom or inadequate training. In order to establish a particular custom, a plaintiff must show a practice is so settled and widespread that policymaking officials can be said to have either actual or constructive notice of the practice. (See Bordanaro v. McLeod (1st Cir. 1989), 871 F.2d 1151, 1156-58.) Therefore, it is necessary to show that the conduct has been repeated with the apparent acquiescence of policy makers. Where the plaintiff attempts to establish that the deprivation was caused by a policy of inadequate training, the deficiency must be the moving force behind the deprivation and amount to deliberate indifference to the rights of the persons that the police come into contact with. City of Canton v. Harris (1989), 489 U.S. 378, 389, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 1205, 103 L.Ed.2d 412, 427. Plaintiffs cannot establish that Officer Horka's gender discrimination was caused by any policy put in place by high ranking policymakers. Officer Horka is not a high ranking policymaker whose edicts represent municipal policy. Moreover, the policy of strip searching only women, even if meeting the requirements of an official policy, was not the cause of Officer Horka's conduct. In order for a policy to be the cause of the deprivation, there must be an affirmative link between the policy and the particular constitutional violation involved. ( City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle (1985), 471 U.S. 808, 823, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 2436, 85 L.Ed.2d 791, 804.) While we acknowledge that the strip-search policy and the alleged conduct of Officer Horka were both forms of gender discrimination, Officer Horka was not attempting to strip search Jane when the alleged constitutional deprivation took place. Therefore, plaintiff cannot show a municipal policy put in place by a high ranking official caused the deprivation of her rights. Similarly, plaintiffs' allegations are insufficient to impose municipal liability based on a failure to train. The only allegation relating to failure to train is that Calumet City failed to institute a policy to counteract the strip-search policy. Even if this deficiency amounted to deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of those who came into contact with the police, it was not the moving force behind the gender discrimination suffered by Jane. Failure to implement a policy to counteract discriminatory strip searches is simply not closely enough related to be the proximate cause of the gender discrimination suffered by Jane. As the conduct of policymakers is not implicated and the allegations regarding failure to train are insufficient, plaintiffs must rely on a showing of custom. Plaintiffs have pleaded facts from which a reasonable trier of fact could determine that gender discrimination in general was so settled and widespread that the policymakers had either constructive or actual notice of such conduct. The plaintiffs did not allege one isolated instance of discrimination by one rogue officer. Against the backdrop of the strip-search policy, the alleged discriminatory actions of both Officer Horka and the other officers at the scene provide sufficient allegations that gender discrimination was widespread. Moreover, the complaint charges that Calumet City acquiesced in the discriminatory conduct by failing to either establish an effective policy to counteract the strip-search policy or investigate the charges of discrimination in this case. These allegations were sufficient to prevent the dismissal of the action against Calumet City based on the pleadings.