Opinion ID: 2639129
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The First AppealSmedsrud I

Text: ¶ 3 This controversy arose when Smedsrud was walking from Owner's car wash toward his convenience store along a pathway parallel to the store. A note at the car-wash change machine directed customers to go inside the store for needed coins. Smedsrud hit the top of his head on a wooden awning protruding from the side of the store. He sued Owner to recover damages for his injuries. Owner moved for summary adjudication, arguing that the danger posed by the awning was open and obvious and that Smedsrud's injuries were caused by his own negligence or inattention. He characterized the lawsuit as a relatively simple premises case.  [2] ¶ 4 Smedsrud countered that several fact questions required his cause's submission to the jury, namely, (a) whether the overhang posed an open-and-obvious danger, (b) whether Owner used ordinary care to prevent a hazardous condition on the premises after being timely warned of its presence, (c) whether Owner exercised ordinary care to correct the hazard after he knew (or should have known) of its existence, (d) whether Owner was negligent in placing and designing the overhang and (e) whether he failed to maintain his premises in a safe condition. ¶ 5 The trial court gave summary judgment to Owner, ruling that the awning was open and obvious and the accident occurred because Smedsrud failed to exercise due care and watch where he was going. In his later quest for new trial, Smedsrud argued that while the overhang was visible, it presented a deceptively innocent appearance of safety, which cloaked a reality of danger. [3] ¶ 6 COCA reversed the summary judgment and remanded the cause for further proceedings. [4] According to COCA, the record shows that reasonable minds could differ on whether the condition of the pathway sufficiently diverted . . . [Smedsrud's] attention from the alleged danger presented by the awning to prevent it from being considered `open and obvious.' COCA reasoned that the photographs in the record demonstrate (a) the awning was clearly visible and not obscured by any portion of the building and (b) the pathway was partially obstructed by a pipe coming out of the wall. In an inviting footnote that proved prophetic, COCA noted that although the evidentiary material indicates the awning may have been constructed in 1982 and remained unchanged until after the time of the accident in 1995, Owner did not interpose for his defense below that Smedsrud's claim was time-barred by the provisions of 12 O.S.2001 § 109 (a statute of repose). [5]