Opinion ID: 782695
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Woods' Sentence Enhancements

Text: 36 Woods contests two sentencing enhancements applied by the district court that had the effect of lengthening her sentence. We review the district court's factual findings at sentencing for clear error. United States v. Collins, 109 F.3d 1413, 1420 (9th Cir.1997). Those factual findings must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.
37 The district court increased Woods' offense level by three levels for having been a manager or supervisor at MTI. The enhancement applied if Woods was a manager or supervisor ... and the criminal activity involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b) (2002). Woods must have managed or supervised one or more other participants. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n. 2. A `participant' is a person who is criminally responsible for the commission of the offense, but need not have been convicted. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n. 1. The enhancement was improper because the record fails to show that Woods managed or supervised at least one other participant. 38 At sentencing, the government identified only four participants besides Woods: Flarida, Garcia, Rachel Bennett, and William Maloney. 5 The government does not contend that Woods managed or supervised Flarida. Thus, the enhancement was proper only if Woods managed or supervised Garcia, Bennett, or Maloney, all of whom were closers. But the record does not indicate that Woods managed or supervised any closer. The only activity the government identified in specific relation to closers was that Woods referred customers back to closers for reprepping. This activity was not managerial or supervisory in nature, however. It was simply part of Woods' role as a verifier. 39 Because all of the other participants identified (besides Flarida) were closers, and because the record fails to show that Woods managed or supervised any closer, a preponderance of the evidence does not establish that Woods managed or supervised any other participant. Application of the enhancement was thus clearly erroneous. 40
41 On October 20, 1997, a judicial injunction was entered prohibiting Flarida from selling any magazine, engaging in any prize promotion, or owning any business entity that sold a magazine or engaged in a prize promotion. It also prohibited Flarida and his agents, employees, officers, servants, and attorneys, and those persons in active concert or participation with him, who receive actual notice of [the injunction] by personal service or otherwise, from making material false representations or violating the Telemarketing Sales Rule. (Emphasis added.) In sentencing Woods, the district court applied a two-level enhancement on the ground that her offense violated the injunction. At the time of sentencing, such an enhancement was appropriate for offenses involving the violation of any judicial ... injunction. U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(3)(B) (1997). 42 Woods contends that the injunction did not apply to her because she lacked actual notice of it. We agree with Woods that the record fails to demonstrate actual notice. Circumstantial evidence established that Flarida and Woods had known each other for many years and had worked together at MTI and North Star. There was also evidence that Woods had falsely claimed to have received money from NSP that had actually been paid to Flarida. Considered together, this evidence supported an inference that Woods knew that Flarida had been under investigation and possibly that Flarida was hiding something, but that does not mean that Woods was told of or knew about the court's injunction. Because a preponderance of the evidence does not establish that Woods knew of the injunction, application of the enhancement was clearly erroneous.