Opinion ID: 2103431
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the fraternity and sorority exemption is constitutional

Text: Section 19.1 of the Revenue Act of 1939 provides an exemption for property used exclusively for school purposes: All    property of schools    used by such schools exclusively for school purposes,    including, but not limited to, student residence halls, dormitories and other housing facilities for students and their spouses and children, and staff housing facilities   . The Occupancy, in whole or in part, of a school-owned and operated dormitory or residence hall by students who belong to one or more fraternities, sororities, or other campus organizations shall not defeat the exemption for such property under the terms of this Section. (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 120, par. 500.1.) The last sentence was added by a 1967 amendment to section 19.1. (1967 Ill. Laws 1977.) McKenzie contends that the language referring to fraternities in section 19.1 is unconstitutional under article IX, section 6, of the Constitution because it authorizes an exemption for property that is not used exclusively for school purposes. This court rejected a similar argument in MacMurray College v. Wright (1967), 38 Ill.2d 272, 276-77. That case required consideration of an amendment which added the language in section 19.1 describing property used exclusively for school purposes as including, but not limited to, student residence halls, dormitories and other housing facilities for students and their spouses and children, and staff housing facilities   . (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, ch. 120, par. 500.1.) The court held that this amendment did not attempt to expand the availability of the exemption for school property beyond the limits of article IX, section 3, of the 1870 Constitution: We deem that the legislature did not intend to alter the requirement that school property, including staff housing facilities, in order to be exempted from tax must in fact be used exclusively for school purposes. The legislature when it said `including, but not limited to, student residence halls, dormitories and other housing facilities for students and their spouses and children, and staff housing facilities' was speaking descriptively and illustratively and not with a declaratory intendment. The statute does not seek to enlarge the area of constitutionally allowable exemption. 38 Ill.2d 272, 277. Although this is, perhaps, a closer case than MacMurray College, we believe that the legislature's addition of the sentence referring to fraternities was merely a description or illustration of another type of property that might qualify, under appropriate circumstances, as property used exclusively for school purposes. Like the statute in MacMurray College this statute is not unconstitutional on its face. McKenzie relies on Knox College v. Board of Review (1923), 308 Ill. 160, for the proposition that fraternities and sororities are exclusive social organizations which can never be used exclusively for school purposes. In that case, however, a property tax exemption was denied only for a specific fraternity house: The fraternity houses here in question, however, are not shown by the evidence to be buildings created for the indiscriminate use of all the students, but are, as we understand the record, open only to the members of the respective fraternities, not by virtue of their college attendance but only upon election to membership in such fraternities under rules established by the societies themselves. (Emphasis added.) 308 Ill. 160, 166.) Given that in appropriate circumstances this court has upheld property tax exemptions for a campus union (see, e.g., People ex rel. Goodman v. University of Illinois Foundation (1944), 388 Ill. 363, 373; cf. City of Chicago v. University of Chicago (1907), 228 Ill. 605, 608-09 (remission of water rates allowed where held that union used for educational purposes)) and for campus dormitories (see, e.g., People ex rel. Hesterman v. North Central College (1929), 336 Ill. 263, 266), we cannot say that school-owned fraternity houses per se may never qualify for a property tax exemption as property used exclusively for school purposes. The availability of the exemption depends on questions of fact such as how students become eligible to use the facility, and no such evidence has been presented in this facial challenge to the statute. For that reason, we hold that the language in section 19.1 referring to fraternities and sororities is not unconstitutional on its face.