Opinion ID: 196161
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Court's Power.

Text: 29 Since the question of whether a district court has the power to introduce an unpleaded claim on its own initiative even up to (or beyond) the close of the trial and the question of whether a district court has the power to introduce such a claim on remand are closely related, we consider them in the ensemble. 30 1. In General. The proper functioning of our adversarial system of justice depends not only on the parties' vigorous advocacy of their positions but also on the judge's adroit supervision of the litigation. The sphere of case management extends to the definition of legal issues. To mention one of many possible illustrations, a district court possesses the authority to recommend to a plaintiff how she might reshape the complaint to escape dismissal. See, e.g., Friedlander v. Nims, 755 F.2d 810, 813 (11th Cir.1985). Similarly, a district court, exercising its powers under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(b), in a proper case, may amend the pleadings merely by entering findings on the unpleaded issues, Galindo, 793 F.2d at 1513 n. 8 (collecting cases), even though neither party has essayed a formal amendment. 31 We think it follows that a district court has the power to introduce a claim (or, rather, to prompt a party to introduce a claim) at any time during the course of litigation. This power does not vanish at the tail end of a trial, even though both sides have rested. See, e.g., Campana, 755 F.2d at 215 (recognizing court's authority to permit amendment as late as during jury deliberation). This conclusion does not clash with either the letter or the spirit of Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). Although that rule plainly favors early amendments, see, e.g., id. (authorizing one revision as a matter of course if made within certain time constraints), it sets no outer time limit on amendments; the drafters chose instead to leave the matter within the discretion of the nisi prius court. See Benitez-Allende v. Alcan Aluminio do Brasil, S.A., 857 F.2d 26, 36 (1st Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1018, 109 S.Ct. 1135, 103 L.Ed.2d 196 (1989); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a) (providing that leave to amend shall be freely given when justice so requires). 32 As this discussion indicates (and as Fed.R.Civ.P. 15 and 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1367 confirm, see infra ), the court below could properly have called attention to the prospect of a new, unpleaded (but related) claim at any time as long as it adopted appropriate measures to safeguard against unfair prejudice. 33 2. On Remand. Of course, the posture of the case is now somewhat different. Doral argues that, on remand, the district court, even if it originally enjoyed the authority to introduce or entertain a new, unpleaded (but related) claim, would not still possess that power. We do not agree. Since a new, unpleaded (but related) claim could have been asserted during the trial, we see no reason to constrain a party from asserting such a claim on remand, or, correspondingly, to limit the district court's discretion in terms of entertaining such a claim. See Benitez-Allende, 857 F.2d at 36; Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 656-57 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 816, 107 S.Ct. 71, 93 L.Ed.2d 28 (1986). We hold, therefore, that, apart from incipient jurisdictional problems, a district court, on remand, retains its discretionary authority to entertain a new, unpleaded (but related) claim. 7 34