Opinion ID: 622978
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The sufficiency of the Music Companies' evidence of infringement.

Text: The Music Companies' evidence of copyright infringement consisted primarily of Scott Greene's investigative report and deposition testimony. East Coast and Hudson argue that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the Music Companies for two reasons: first, because Greene's identification of copyrighted compositions performed at the Long Beach Roscoe's was expert testimony by a lay witness that should have been excluded from evidence; and second, because the Music Companies failed to prove substantial similarity between the publicly performed compositions and the copyrighted works. The district court did not abuse its discretion by relying on Greene's report and declaration. Green's report and declaration contained his competent percipient witness testimony as a visitor to the Long Beach Roscoe's. Fed.R.Evid. 701. Identifying popular songs does not require scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge. Fed.R.Evid. 702. On the contrary, identifying music is a reflexive daily process for millions of radio listeners, amateur karaoke singers, and fans of Name That Tune reruns. See Fed. R.Evid. 701 advisory committee's note ([T]he distinction between lay and expert witness testimony is that lay testimony results from a process of reasoning familiar in everyday life, while expert testimony results from a process of reasoning which can be mastered only by specialists in the field.) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Moreover, many of Greene's identifications did not even require him to tax his memory: the live band announced the titles of several of the compositions they covered, and Greene transcribed other titles directly from a CD jewel case. Clearly, the district court correctly determined that Greene's evidence was admissible. East Coast and Hudson next argue that the Music Companies' evidence of copyright infringement was inadequate because neither Greene nor any other witness proved substantial similarity between the compositions performed at Roscoe's and the copyrighted works. To establish a prima facie case of copyright infringement, a plaintiff must demonstrate `(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are original.' Funky Films, Inc. v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 462 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir.2006) (quoting Feist Pubs., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361, 111 S.Ct. 1282, 113 L.Ed.2d 358 (1991)). The word `copying' is shorthand for the infringing of any of the copyright owner's [six] exclusive rights, one of which is the right to perform the copyrighted work publicly. S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1085 n. 3 (9th Cir.1989); see also 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (reserving to owners of copyrights in musical works the exclusive right to perform the copyrighted work publicly). Substantial similarity is not an element of a claim of copyright infringement. Rather, it is a doctrine that helps courts adjudicate whether copying of the constituent elements of the work that are original actually occurred when an allegedly infringing work appropriates elements of an original without reproducing it in toto. See Funky Films, 462 F.3d at 1076. A showing of substantial similarity is irrelevant in a case like this one, in which the Music Companies produced evidence that the public performances [2] entailed direct copying of copyrighted works. See id. (noting that a demonstration of substantial similarity is only necessary to prove infringement [a]bsent evidence of direct copying); see also Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907, 910 (9th Cir.1989) (noting that [a] finding that a defendant copied a plaintiff's work, without application of a substantial similarity analysis will be made when the defendant has engaged in virtual duplication of a plaintiff's entire work); 2 Howard B. Abrams, The Law of Copyright § 14:10 (2011) (Direct proof [of copying] can consist of ... testimony of direct observation of the infringing act....). Substantial similarity is thus a red herring: the proper question is whether infringing performances occurred vel non. And on that question, East Coast and Hudson cannot raise a genuine issue of material fact. Greene's declaration, detailed investigative report, and deposition testimony were sufficient to establish that the works were publicly performed. He declared that the live band he saw perform at the Long Beach Roscoe's introduced the songs they were playing as Coltrane standards and proceeded to play them. He further declared that he saw a disc jockey play four tracks from a CD of Hiroshima songs, the titles of which he obtained from the jewel case lying next to the CD player. All of this evidence was completely uncontradicted by East Coast and Hudson, who proffered no evidence tending to contradict Greene's testimony that the eight copyrighted compositions at issue were publicly performed at the Long Beach Roscoe's on the night he visited the venue. The district court was correct to conclude that Greene's uncontested declaration was sufficient to establish that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether copyright infringement occurred at the Long Beach Roscoe's.