Opinion ID: 3165518
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Religious Abstention Doctrine

Text: As we recently reviewed at some length, “The First Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that ‘Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.’” Samuel v. Lakew, 116 A.3d 1252, 1256 (D.C. 2015) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. I.). Together, the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses operate to “severely circumscribe the role that civil courts may play in the resolution of disputes involving religious organizations.” Id. at 1256-57 (quoting Meshel v. Ohev Sholom Talmud Torah, 869 A.2d 343, 353 (D.C. 2005)). The First Amendment seeks to preserve the autonomy of religious entities “to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine.” Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 704 (2012) (citation omitted). Nonetheless, the Free Exercise Clause “does not mean . . . that churches are above the law or that there can never be a civil court review of a church action,” Heard, supra, 810 A.2d at 879. As we have recognized repeatedly, “[n]ot every civil court decision . . . jeopardizes values protected by the First Amendment.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Bible Way Church of Our Lord Jesus Christ of 28 Apostolic Faith of Wash., D.C. v. Beards, 680 A.2d 419, 427 (D.C. 1996) (recognizing that “occasions can arise when civil courts are permitted to address church activity without running afoul of the First Amendment”). “Religious organizations come before [the courts] in the same attitude as other voluntary associations for benevolent or charitable purposes, and their rights of property, or of contract, are equally under the protection of the law . . . .” Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 714 (1871). Especially when a dispute over property arises, “[t]here can be little doubt about the general authority of civil courts to resolve [the issue],” as “[t]he State has an obvious and legitimate interest in the peaceful resolution of property disputes, and in providing a civil forum where the ownership of church property can be determined conclusively.” Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979). Generally, “[c]ivil courts do not inhibit free exercise of religion merely by opening their doors to disputes involving church property.” Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969). In sum, the mere fact that the issue before the court involves a church or religious entity does not thereby bar access to our courts. On the contrary, the courts as the ultimate arbiter of disputes short of anarchy and self-help have a 29 constitutional duty to carry out their basic function to the maximum permissible extent. In determining the line where the First Amendment bars judicial resolution of disputes, this jurisdiction has consistently relied on the application of “neutral principles of law” to the parties’ contentions. “The touchstone for determining whether civil courts have jurisdiction is whether the courts may employ ‘neutral principles of law’ and ensure that their decisions are not premised on the ‘consideration of doctrinal matters, whether the ritual and liturgy of worship or the tenets of faith.’” Prioleau, supra, 49 A.3d at 816 (citing Meshel, supra, 869 A.2d at 354 (citation omitted)).