Opinion ID: 2294182
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Denial Of The Renewed Motion To Reinstate At The Beginning Of The Third Trial

Text: Having held that the court's original disqualification of Mr. Stern in the first trial was not an abuse of discretion, we now turn to the separate issue of whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Freeman's motion to reinstate Mr. Stern in the third trial. The grant or denial of such a motion is, again, a matter within the trial court's discretion. See Pinkney, supra, 851 A.2d at 490 (citation omitted). A trial court is required to consider reinstatement when the conflict of interest no longer exists. See id. (defense counsel discovered during voir dire that the government was not intending to call the disqualified defense counsel's former client as a witness and alerted trial court to the change in circumstances). Judge Keary did not abuse her discretion by denying defense counsel's first motion to reinstate Mr. Stern before the first trial. Although the defense had obtained a written waiver from Mr. Hammond, who also asserted that he would be available for the court's examination of his waiver on the record, Judge Keary was correct in noting that the situation that [existed when Judge Abrecht] reached her decision [to disqualify wa]s not markedly changed by the addition of the provision of a written waiver. Judge Keary referenced the discretion to disqualify counsel in light of the trial court's independent interest in ensuring the trial was conducted according to the profession's ethical standards and that the proceedings appeared fair to those who observe them as another basis for her decision. See Gonzalez-Lopez, supra, 548 U.S. at 152, 126 S.Ct. 2557 (quoting Wheat, supra, 486 U.S. at 160, 108 S.Ct. 1692). Indeed, the soundness of Judge Abrecht's initial rulingand Judge Keary's decision not to reinstate Mr. Stern as defense counselis buttressed by the fact that Mr. Gilbert noted that Mr. Stern [could not] even promise that he wouldn't inadvertently mentally rely on information known to him previously through his representation of Mr. Hammond. Furthermore, Judge Keary recognized that [t]here is no telling what could develop at trial if Mr. Stern were reinstated as counsel and that the trial court was in the untenable position of choosing between not reinstating conflict-burdened counsel and having the defendant appeal the denial of his right to retained counsel of choice, or accepting Mr. Hammond's waiver of the conflict, and proceeding with conflict-burdened counsel, having the defendant challenge the effectiveness of the counsel based on his right to conflict-free counsel. See Wheat, supra, 486 U.S. at 161, 108 S.Ct. 1692 (trial courts confronted with multiple representations face the prospect of being `whip-sawed' by assertions of error no matter which way they rule, which supports the need to grant them wide latitude in deciding whether to disqualify counsel). Although Judge Keary acknowledged Mr. Freeman's preference to be represented by Mr. Stern, Judge Keary explained that the conflict of interest, the trial court's independent interest, and the lack of any change in circumstances, including the fact that Mr. Stern was not available for the first trial date, were among several factors the trial court considered. See Gonzalez-Lopez, supra, 548 U.S. at 152, 126 S.Ct. 2557 (reaffirming trial court's wide latitude in balancing the right to counsel of choice against the needs of fairness and against the demands of its calendar) (internal citations omitted). Therefore, the trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying the motion for reinstatement before the first trial. For the same reasons as discussed above, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defense counsel's renewed motion to reinstate Mr. Stern before Mr. Freeman's third trial, because the trial court properly noted that the situation has not changed and there is no more merit to the motion[] than the Court found originally to exist. Now, for the first time on appeal, Mr. Freeman asserts that the defense had abandoned Mr. Hammond as a witness before the beginning of the third trial, and thus the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to reinstate Mr. Stern. Although defense counsel may have intended to abandon Mr. Hammond as a witness, thereby eliminating the conflict of the interest that prevented Mr. Stern from serving as counsel, this change in circumstances was not brought to the attention of the trial court at the beginning of the third trial nor did defense counsel make such an argument. Instead, defense counsel's motion for reinstatement at the beginning of the third trial made a bare and vague reference to reinstatement. Defense counsel did not present the trial court with a list of defense witnesses until after the government's case-in-chief and after the defense commenced the direct examination of its own witnesses. It is significant that defense counsel did not renew its motion to reinstate Mr. Stern when it presented the trial court with its list of defense witnesses. Further, defense counsel did not address the possibility that it might call Mr. Hammond as a rebuttal witness to Mr. Thomas' testimony that Mr. Freeman informed him that Mr. Hammond, who was a client of his attorney, Mr. Stern, and another man would falsely confess to the murders to exonerate him. In sum, defense counsel's failure to renew its motion to reinstate Mr. Stern after the government's case-in-chief, its failure to apprise the trial court that it did not intend to call Mr. Hammond as either a direct or rebuttal witness, and its failure to assert any other change in circumstances distinguishes this case from Pinkney. In Pinkney, where as soon as defense counsel realized during voir dire that the government was no longer going to call the witness that presented a conflict with defendant's counsel of choice, defense counsel alerted the trial court of the change in circumstances and immediately moved for reinstatement. 851 A.2d at 490 (acknowledging defense counsel was in the best position both at the beginning of and after the government's case-in-chief in the third trial to knowand to inform the trial courtof whether Mr. Hammond would testify). Although the trial court is obliged to consider a change in circumstances warranting a reconsideration of its decision to disqualify counsel, it is not obligated to do so sua sponte. This is particularly so where the error appellant now complains of is one the appellant allowed the trial court to make by failing to apprise the Court of the changed circumstances when it had the opportunity and was in the best position to do so both before trial and during the defense's case. See id. (defense counsel promptly alerted trial court to the change in circumstances); Cowan v. United States, 629 A.2d 496, 502-03 (D.C.1993) (rejecting counsel's request for self-defense and defense of a third person jury instruction under the invited error doctrine when defense counsel failed to make clear that his initial position had changed, and thus induced the trial court to fail to give those instructions). In conclusion, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in disqualifying or refusing to reinstate Mr. Stern as Mr. Freeman's defense counsel in the first and third trials, respectively.