Opinion ID: 2598298
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: [¶ 25] Mr. Vlahos' sufficiency of the evidence claim is twofold. First, he claims the state relied exclusively on testimony from accomplices or coconspirators and such testimony was not sufficient by itself to support a conviction for conspiracy under Wyoming law. Second, he contends, even if all the witnesses were not accomplices or coconspirators, the only witness whose testimony connected him with acts in furtherance of the conspiracyMr. Buckleywas unquestionably an accomplice or coconspirator. Without corroboration of Mr. Buckley's testimony by other witnesses, Mr. Vlahos argues, there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction. The state contends Mr. Vlahos' underlying premise is incorrect. It asserts a conviction may be upheld under Wyoming law upon the uncorroborated testimony of accomplices. According to the state, no testimony corroborating the testimony of Mr. Buckley or the other witnesses was necessary. [¶ 26] In presenting his arguments, Mr. Vlahos blurs the terms accomplice and coconspirator but argues law applicable to coconspirators. The state for its part ignores the law relating to coconspirators, focusing instead on the law applicable to accomplices. Because these are two distinct concepts involving two distinct rules of law, we provide the following discussion for purposes of clarification. [¶ 27] An accomplice, or accessory before the fact, is a person who knowingly aids or abets in the commission of a felony or who counsels, encourages, hires, commands, or procures a felony to be committed. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-201(a) (LexisNexis 2003); Wheeler v. State, 691 P.2d 599, 601 (Wyo. 1984). To fall within this definition of accomplice, a person must actively participate in or encourage the crime and have the intent to accomplish the same criminal end as the principal. Wheeler, 691 P.2d at 601. For a defendant to be convicted as an accomplice, it must be proven that someone committed the substantive criminal offense and the defendant associated himself with and participated in the accomplishment and success of the criminal venture. Virgilio v. State, 834 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Wyo.1992). [¶ 28] Wyoming law is that a conviction may be had upon the unsupported testimony of an alleged accomplice. Vigil v. State, 926 P.2d 351, 360 (Wyo.1996). Thus, in Wyoming as well as in other states that follow the common law, no corroboration of accomplice testimony is required, and a conviction can be sustained on such testimony alone if it is convincing and credible. Ostrowski v. State, 665 P.2d 471, 487 (Wyo. 1983); Filbert v. State, 436 P.2d 959, 960 (Wyo.1968). Application of this principle to the present facts leads to the conclusion that no corroborating evidence was required if the witnesses Mr. Vlahos refers to could be properly characterized as accomplices. [¶ 29] Turning to the question of coconspirators, conspiracy is defined in Wyoming as follows: (a) A person is guilty of conspiracy to commit a crime if he agrees with one (1) or more persons that they or one (1) or more of them will commit a crime and one (1) or more of them does an overt act to effect the objective of the agreement. (b) A person is not liable under this section if after conspiring he withdraws from the conspiracy and thwarts its success under circumstances manifesting voluntary and complete renunciation of his criminal intention. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-303(a), (b) (LexisNexis 2003). In numerous cases decided in this jurisdiction and elsewhere, the rule has evolved that a coconspirator's out-of-court statement is not sufficient to support a conspiracy conviction; corroborating evidence is required. Jasch v. State, 563 P.2d 1327, 1334 (Wyo.1977). This rule developed because, although such statements are not considered hearsay under W.R.E. 801(d)(2)(E), their use at trial raises concerns about reliability since the declarant is not subject to cross-examination or juror scrutiny. Under the rule, the trial court, prior to admitting the coconspirator statement, must determine independent evidence exists showing (1) a conspiracy existed, (2) the declarant and the defendant were involved in the conspiracy, and (3) the statement was made during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Jandro v. State, 781 P.2d 512, 521 (Wyo.1989). Mr. Vlahos argues this rule extends not only to a coconspirator's out-of-court statement but to a coconspirator's in-court testimony, such as Mr. Buckley's testimony at his trial. In support of this assertion, he cites Grable v. State, 649 P.2d 663 (Wyo.1982), a case involving use at the defendant's retrial of coconspirator testimony given at his first trial. [¶ 30] In considering whether sufficient evidence supported the conspiracy conviction in Grable, this Court cited the rule that evidence independent of the coconspirator's statement must be presented. We then examined the evidence other than the coconspirator's prior testimony and upheld the conviction on the basis of that evidence. Grable, 649 P.2d at 677. While this Court did not expressly hold that evidence independent of a coconspirator's in-court testimony must be presented, the approach taken might be read to suggest that is so. Courts that have expressly addressed the question, however, have reached a contrary result. [¶ 31] In United States v. Smith, 692 F.2d 693, 697 (10th Cir.1982), the defendant challenged the trial court's admission of a coconspirator's in-court testimony contending that such testimony was proper only after independent evidence showed a conspiracy existed. The court of appeals stated: The flaw in Smith's argument is simply that Rule 801(d)(2)(E) and the cases construing it are irrelevant to the direct testimony of a coconspirator. By definition, hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Fed.R.Evid. 801(c) (emphasis added). There is absolutely no need to fit [the coconspirator's] in-court statements into the coconspirator provision of Rule 801(d)(2)(E). [The coconspirator's] testimony constituted sufficient independent evidence of a conspiracy and Smith's participation therein. 692 F.2d at 697-98 (citation omitted). [¶ 32] Faced with the same argument in Laughlin v. United States, 385 F.2d 287, 292 (D.C.Cir.1967), the court said the argument was based on a misunderstanding of the rule requiring evidence independent of a coconspirator's statement to establish a conspiracy existed. That rule, the court said, applies only to out-of-court (i.e., hearsay) statements of a coconspirator. It does not exclude proof of a conspiracy by the direct testimony under oath of a party to it. 385 F.2d at 292 (citation omitted). [¶ 33] Similarly, in United States v. Szabo, 789 F.2d 1484, 1487 (10th Cir.1986), the court upheld a conspiracy conviction over the defendant's objection that it was based upon coconspirator testimony. The court quoted Smith, 692 F.2d at 697-98, for the principle that the requirement of evidence independent of a coconspirator's out-of-court statement does not apply to a coconspirator's in-court testimony and then said: There is no constitutional requirement that such testimony be examined for trustworthiness before being placed before the jury. Rather, the Confrontation Clause, in its optimum application, envisions: [A] personal examination and cross-examination of the witness in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43, 15 S.Ct. 337, 39 L.Ed. 409 (1895).... 789 F.2d at 1487. [¶ 34] These cases are persuasive. Jasch, 563 P.2d 1327, to which the Grable Court cited, involved a coconspirator's out-of-court statement. All the other Wyoming cases requiring independent evidence of conspiracy, except Grable, likewise involved a coconspirator's out-of-court statement where there was no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant or for the jury to assess his reliability. Under those circumstances, evidence independent of the coconspirator's statement corroborating the conspiracy is necessary. For the reasons quoted from Szabo, 789 F.2d at 1487, above, the same concerns do not arise when the coconspirator provides direct testimony at trial. [¶ 35] We hold that independent evidence corroborating a conspiracy is not necessary when a coconspirator appears at trial and presents direct testimony of the conspiracy and the defendant's involvement therein. A coconspirator's in-court testimony is sufficient independent evidence to support a conspiracy conviction. We overrule Grable to the extent it can be read to say such evidence is not sufficient and independent evidence is required even when the coconspirator testifies at trial. [¶ 36] Having attempted to clarify Wyoming law on accomplice statements and coconspirator testimony, we turn to the specific question of whether sufficient evidence supported Mr. Vlahos' conviction for conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery. The standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence issues is well established: When reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim in a criminal case, we must determine whether a rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. We do not consider conflicting evidence presented by the unsuccessful party, and afford every favorable inference which may be reasonably and fairly drawn from the successful party's evidence. We have consistently held that it is the jury's responsibility to resolve conflicts in the evidence. We will not substitute our judgment for that of the jury, ... our only duty is to determine whether a quorum of reasonable and rational individuals would, or even could, have come to the same result as the jury actually did. [ Bloomquist v. State, 914 P.2d 812, 824 (Wyo. 1996)]. Williams v. State, 986 P.2d 855, 857 (Wyo. 1999) (some citations omitted); see also Urbigkit v. State, 2003 WY 57, ¶ 44, 67 P.3d 1207, ¶ 44 (Wyo.2003). [¶ 37] Mr. Vlahos identifies five witnesses as accomplices/coconspirators whose testimony against him, he claims, was insufficient to support the conviction absent independent evidence: Mr. Buckley, Mr. Munoz, Mr. Hoskins, Mr. Walters, and Ms. Ross. All these witnesses appeared and testified at trial and were subjected to defense counsel's cross-examination. Because we concluded that coconspirators' in-court testimony as well as accomplices' statements can support a conviction without independent corroborating evidence, it is not necessary for us to consider whether the five witnesses identified by Mr. Vlahos were accomplices or coconspirators. Even if we assume they properly fell into either category, corroborating evidence of their testimony was not required under Wyoming law. [¶ 38] We look first to Mr. Buckley's testimony. He provided direct testimony that he and Mr. Vlahos planned and carried out the bank robbery. He described details of the planning discussions, the robbery itself, and what occurred in its aftermath. The jurors had the opportunity to observe Mr. Buckley, scrutinize his demeanor, and determine for themselves whether he was credible. Apparently, they found his testimony that Mr. Vlahos was involved in planning the robbery credible but were not convinced Mr. Vlahos actually participated in the robbery. Under our rules of law concerning accomplice statements and coconspirator testimony, Mr. Buckley's testimony was sufficient independent of the other evidence presented to support the conviction on the conspiracy charge. [¶ 39] Mr. Haskins, Mr. Walters, and Mr. Munoz each testified that Mr. Vlahos was very much involved in planning the robbery. Mr. Walters testified that Mr. Vlahos was the leader of the plan to rob the bank. Mr. Munoz similarly testified that Mr. Vlahos did most of the talking during the planning discussions. The testimony of these three witnesses, considered in light of the other evidence presented, was sufficient to support the conviction. [¶ 40] Ms. Ross testified that she overheard discussions between Mr. Vlahos and the others concerning robbing a bank. She further testified that, on the day of the robbery, Mr. Vlahos and Mr. Buckley came to her house with a large amount of money which they distributed among themselves and others. Her testimony describing the clothes they were wearing matched the photographs taken by the bank security camera. [¶ 41] We assume the jury duly considered all the testimony and gave it the weight to which it was entitled. Vargas v. State, 963 P.2d 984, 991 (Wyo.1998). Given the substantial evidence from a variety of witnesses of Mr. Vlahos' involvement in an agreement to commit bank robbery, we uphold his conspiracy conviction.