Opinion ID: 1934689
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Exclusion of a Witness

Text: Scott Ward pled guilty to aggravated promotion of prostitution, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 852 (1983), and conspiracy to commit gross sexual assault, id. § 151. At the trial of Begin and LaMarche, he testified for the State, essentially corroborating the testimony of the victims. Late in the presentation of the State's case, a woman approached defense counsel. She offered to testify about a conversation with Ward during which he told her that he had falsely implicated Begin and LaMarche because he was angry with them. Because the witness was not on the defense witness list, the State objected to her proffered testimony. She is a well-known local figure, involved in a highly publicized case in which she accused members of the Sanford Police Department of extorting sexual favors in return for favorable probation treatment. The State argued that the jurors' potential knowledge of that case presented a real risk of a mistrial. Prior to ruling, the trial court asked defense counsel whether other witnesses would offer similar testimony. Defense counsel acknowledged that the woman's testimony was similar to that of other defense witnesses. Without questioning the jurors to determine whether any of them would be unable fairly to evaluate the witness's testimony, the court refused to allow her to testify. Begin and LaMarche have a constitutional right to present exculpatory evidence. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Me. Const. art. I, § 6. In recognition of that principle, we have held that any practice that effectively deters a material witness from testifying is invalid unless necessary to accomplish a legitimate interest. State v. Fagone, 462 A.2d 493, 496 (Me.1983). Although the defendant's right must sometimes give way to the legitimate demands of the adversarial system, Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 413, 108 S.Ct. 646, 655, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988), other jurisdictions have allowed exclusion of a defense witness only as a sanction for willful violation of discovery rules in order to gain a tactical advantage. 2 Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 19.4 (1984 & Supp.1991). No such violation has occurred in this case. In fact, the trial court specifically found that the late appearance of the witness was not due to any fault of the defense. In the instant case, the court excluded the testimony because the court hypothesized that the jurors might recognize the very well-known witness after she had begun to testify, representing a very real risk of a mistrial. The court weighed the perceived risk of a mistrial against the essentially cumulative nature of the proffered testimony and determined that exclusion of the testimony was justified. Given the importance, however of the defendants' right to present exculpatory evidence, it was error for the court to reach that conclusion without conducting a voir dire of the jury to determine whether in fact any risk of a mistrial existed. The question remains whether the trial court's error was harmless. The duty of a reviewing court is to consider the trial record as a whole and to ignore errors that are harmless, including most constitutional violations. State v. Hassapelis, 620 A.2d 288, 293 (Me.1993) (quoting United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 509, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 1980, 76 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983)). We will not set aside an otherwise valid conviction if we may confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1438, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986)). The harmless error inquiry focuses on the importance to the defense of the evidence excluded and the prejudicial effect of the exclusion. United States v. Yefsky, 994 F.2d 885, 897 (1st Cir.1993). The witness's testimony in this case was not central to the defense because it went only to the collateral issue of the credibility of Ward who was not the principal accuser. Moreover, the exclusion of her testimony did not greatly prejudice the defense because it was similar to that of two other witnesses. There is no reason to believe that the excluded witness would have been more credible than the others. On this record, we are convinced that the trial court's error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.