Opinion ID: 1275303
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: issue iappointment of a special master

Text: {7} Jason contends that the children's court erred in appointing a special master to preside over the January 27, 1995, adjudicatory hearing. The State responds that Jason waived his objection to the appointment of a special master because Jason's counsel failed to argue to the children's court that the criteria of Rule 10-111(A) NMRA 1995 (prior to Sept. 1, 1995 amendment) were met. Rule 10-111(A) has since been amended, but at the time of these proceedings Rule 10-111(A) provided that a special master may be appointed to assist a children's court judge upon the showing that: 1) the children's court judge is unable to expeditiously dispose of pending children's court cases; or 2) some exceptional condition requires the appointment of a special master. [1] {8} Jason's counsel objected generally to the appointment of a special master on constitutional grounds; however, his counsel failed to object on the grounds that the two criteria of Rule 10-111(A) were not met. The children's court appointed the special master without making a finding of dispositional necessity or exceptional condition for a special master. However, we agree with the State that Jason did not preserve this issue for appeal. {9} It is well-settled that objections must be raised below to preserve an issue for appellate review. State v. Lucero, 104 N.M. 587, 590, 725 P.2d 266, 269 (Ct.App.1986). The New Mexico Rules of Appellate Procedure require a ruling or decision by the district court to be fairly invoked in order to preserve a question for review. Rule 12-216(A) NMRA 1998. Jason did not invoke a ruling on the application of Rule 10-111(A). Consequently, neither the children's court nor the State had the opportunity to address the criteria of Rule 10-111(A), and no factual record on this issue exists for review. {10} Moreover, Jason did not argue at trial, nor did he argue on appeal that this objection involves a fundamental right, general public interest, or fundamental error. See Rule 12-216(B) NMRA 1998 (stating that an appellate court may consider in its discretion, questions involving: (1) general public interest; or (2) fundamental error or fundamental rights of a party.). Therefore, none of the exceptions to the preservation rule outlined in Rule 12-216 are at issue. Jason thus waived his objection that the children's court did not meet the two criteria set forth in the former Rule 10-111(A), and we do not consider this argument on appeal. {11} Jason also argues that the special master's refusal to rule on his motion to suppress his confession violated due process and denied him the same basic rights as an adult. See NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-14(A) (1993) (providing that [a] child subject to the provisions of the Delinquency Act ... is entitled to the same basic rights as an adult, except as otherwise provided in the Children's Code ...). We agree with the Court of Appeals that neither due process nor Section 32A-2-14(A) was violated by the failure of the special master to rule on the motion to suppress because the children's court reviewed the matter both before and after the adjudicatory hearing. {12} We also agree with the Court of Appeals that the special master in this case was not a judge pro tempore appointed in violation of New Mexico Constitution art. VI, § 15 (as amended 1978). Under Rule 10-111(F) NMRA 1998, the children's court may adopt the [special master's] report or proposed order, modify it or reject it in whole or in part. Thus, the special master's report to the children's court was only a recommendation, and the children's court retained the final decision-making authority.