Opinion ID: 7089211
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Other Evidence Issues

Text: {¶ 206} In his sixth proposition of law, Tench challenges the testimony of Rachel Keaton, a forensic scientist in the latent-print  section of BCI. Keaton testified that she examined four exhibits that had been processed by another latent-print examiner, who did not testify. Tench contends that Keaton's testimony violated the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause because it was not limited to her own observations and conclusions but also communicated the substance of the nontestifying examiner's out-of-court statements. We agree. However, while Keaton's testimony did violate the Confrontation Clause, the defense did not object at trial and the error was not plain error. {¶ 207} Keaton testified that the four exhibits 7 were originally processed and examined by Dawn Limpert, a BCI latent fingerprint examiner who had since retired. Keaton had Limpert's notes with her while testifying and said that she was familiar with her findings. Keaton testified that there was no conflict between Limpert's findings and her own. {¶ 208} Keaton explained that processing latent fingerprints involves the application of chemicals to make the fingerprints visible. Keaton testified that Limpert had applied particular chemicals to the surface of each exhibit. Keaton did not testify that she had seen Limpert apply these chemicals or that she was able to identify the chemicals she had used when she examined the exhibits.  {¶ 209} Based on her own visual examination of the exhibits, Keaton testified that she had found no fingerprint ridges on three of the exhibits and that the ridges she had found on the fourth exhibit were insufficient to allow identification. {¶ 210} The Confrontation Clause provides: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right    to be confronted with the witnesses against him   . This means that admission of an out-of-court statement of a witness who does not appear at trial is prohibited    if the statement is testimonial unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness. State v. Maxwell , 139 Ohio St.3d 12 , 2014-Ohio-1019 , 9 N.E.3d 930 , ¶ 34, citing Crawford v. Washington , 541 U.S. 36 , 53-54, 124 S.Ct. 1354 , 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004) ; see also Bullcoming v. New Mexico , 564 U.S. 647 , 657, 131 S.Ct. 2705 , 180 L.Ed.2d 610 (2011). {¶ 211} To begin with, we agree with Tench that Keaton's testimony effectively communicated to the jury the substance of Limpert's out-of-court statements. Keaton testified that Limpert applied certain chemicals to the exhibits, a process she did not claim to have personally observed. Keaton further testified that her own conclusions as to the absence of identifiable fingerprints did not conflict with Limpert's. Thus we must determine whether Limpert's out-of-court statements were testimonial as that term is used in Crawford and its progeny. {¶ 212} Crawford defined testimony as a solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact and held that the Confrontation Clause applies to those who bear testimony. Crawford at 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354 . Although Crawford did not define testimonial, it stated that the core class of statements implicated by the Confrontation Clause includes statements made under circumstances that would lead an objective witness to reasonably believe  that the statement would be available for use at a later trial. Maxwell at ¶ 35. Later decisions applying Crawford have explained that testimonial statements are those made for 'a primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.'  Maxwell at ¶ 40, quoting Michigan v. Bryant , 562 U.S. 344 , 358, 131 S.Ct. 1143 , 179 L.Ed.2d 93 (2011). {¶ 213} We conclude that Limpert's out-of-court statements were testimonial. In this case, a law-enforcement officer provided evidence to a state laboratory set up for the purpose of assisting police investigations. See R.C. 109.52 (BCI may operate a criminal-analysis laboratory and engage in such other activities as will aid law enforcement officers in solving crimes and controlling criminal activity); compare Bullcoming , 564 U.S. at 665 , 131 S.Ct. 2705 , 180 L.Ed.2d 610 (police sent evidence to a state laboratory required by law to assist in police investigations).  {¶ 214} Citing Maxwell and Williams v. Illinois , 567 U.S. 50 , 84, 132 S.Ct. 2221 , 183 L.Ed.2d 89 (2012) (plurality opinion), the state argues that Limpert's findings were not testimonial, because they were not prepared for the primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual. But the state's proposed targeted-individual test comes from the plurality opinion in Williams. It was specifically rejected by five justices and is not the law. Id. at 114-116 , 132 S.Ct. 2221 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 135-136 , 132 S.Ct. 2221 (Kagan, J., dissenting). Williams is also distinguishable because the defendant there was neither in custody nor under suspicion when the DNA sample was sent to the laboratory. Id. at 84 , 132 S.Ct. 2221 . Tench was both under suspicion and in custody when Limpert examined the exhibits for fingerprints. {¶ 215} As for Maxwell , we did not endorse the targeted-individual test in that case. Far from it; we described Williams as not helpful to our resolution of the Confrontation Clause issue decided there. Maxwell , 139 Ohio St.3d 12 , 2014-Ohio-1019 , 9 N.E.3d 930 , at ¶ 55. {¶ 216} Clearly, Limpert's examination of the exhibits was conducted to establish past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution: whether Tench left fingerprints on items of evidence connected to the victim's body, her house, or the vehicle in which the body was found. Hence, Limpert's statements about that examination were testimonial. {¶ 217} As Tench concedes, he did not object at trial when Keaton testified about Limpert's statements. He cannot, therefore, prevail on this issue unless he establishes plain error. To show plain error, he must show that (1) there was an error, (2) the error was plain, i.e., obvious, and (3) the error affected substantial rights. State v. Barnes , 94 Ohio St.3d 21 , 27, 759 N.E.2d 1240 (2002). {¶ 218} Tench's claim founders on the third requirement. To show that an error affected his substantial rights, Tench must show a reasonable probability that the error resulted in prejudice-the same deferential standard for reviewing ineffective assistance of counsel claims. (Emphasis sic.) State v. Rogers , 143 Ohio St.3d 385 , 2015-Ohio-2459 , 38 N.E.3d 860 , ¶ 22. Thus, he must show that the probability of a different result is 'sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome' of the proceeding. United States v. Dominguez Benitez , 542 U.S. 74 , 83, 124 S.Ct. 2333 , 159 L.Ed.2d 157 (2004), quoting Strickland , 466 U.S. at 694 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 . {¶ 219} Keaton testified that there was no conflict between her findings and Limpert's. And Keaton's finding was that there were no identifiable fingerprints on  the items she examined. Even if the jury inferred that Limpert reached the same conclusion, that conclusion did not inculpate Tench in the charged offenses. Thus, the erroneous admission of Limpert's conclusion via Keaton's testimony  does not undermine confidence in the trial's outcome. There is no reasonable probability that Tench was prejudiced by the error, which ultimately contributed nothing to the guilty verdict. We therefore overrule Tench's sixth proposition of law.
{¶ 220} Tench repeatedly claimed that he had searched for his mother during the morning of November 12 by driving the route she would have taken to get home from her workplace. At trial, Detective Schmitt testified that he checked this claim by reviewing traffic-camera video taken at the intersection of State Route 303 and I-71 from 11:00 p.m., November 11, to 4:00 or 5:00 a.m., November 12, 2013. Schmitt did not see Tench's Ford F-150 at that intersection in the video footage he reviewed. The video itself was not introduced or played at trial (presumably due to its length). Tench did not object at trial to Schmitt's testimony. {¶ 221} In his seventh proposition of law, Tench contends that Schmitt's testimony about the video was inadmissible for three reasons. First, he contends that Schmitt's testimony was improper lay-opinion testimony, violating Evid.R. 701, which permits lay opinions that are rationally based on the perception of the witness and    helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. He contends that only an expert [could] make a determination of the accuracy of the video. This claim fails because Schmitt did not offer any opinion regarding the video; he testified merely to what he saw when he viewed it. {¶ 222} Second, Tench contends that Schmitt should not have been permitted to testify regarding the content of the video, because the video itself was not authenticated pursuant to Evid.R. 901(A). Tench has not raised an argument under Evid.R. 1002, which governs the admissibility of evidence offered to prove the content of a recording. {¶ 223} Evid.R. 901(A) states: The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. See generally Midland Steel Prods. Co. v. Internatl. Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of Am. , 61 Ohio St.3d 121 , 130, 573 N.E.2d 98 (1991) (discussing methods of authenticating video recordings); State v. Pickens , 141 Ohio St.3d 462 , 2014-Ohio-5445 , 25 N.E.3d 1023 , ¶ 150-151. {¶ 224} The video was neither introduced into evidence nor authenticated, and no foundation was laid for the admissibility of Schmitt's testimony. But even if it was error for the detective to testify as to the content of an unauthenticated video, it did not constitute plain error. As detailed above in our discussion of  Tench's fifth proposition, there was overwhelming evidence of guilt; thus, the testimony about the traffic-camera video does not undermine confidence in the jury's finding of guilt. {¶ 225} Finally, Tench contends that the video was never provided to or reviewed by defense counsel and that defense counsel was unable to adequately cross examine the witness[ ] without viewing the video or having it analyzed by an expert. He contends that [i]t was error  for defense counsel not to object to that testimony let alone failing to demand the video for analysis. {¶ 226} This appears to be a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel-although Tench does not cite or discuss the standard governing ineffective-assistance claims-and also a claim that discovery was improperly withheld. Neither claim is factually supported: Tench cites nothing in the record to show that defense counsel was not provided with the video. {¶ 227} We overrule Tench's seventh proposition of law.