Opinion ID: 1621755
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 30

Heading: whether the trial court properly instructed the jury regarding reasonable doubt.

Text: The appellant contends that he was denied his rights under Article I, Sections 6, 7, 8, 16, 17, and 18 of the Tennessee Constitution, and the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution because the jury was unconstitutionally instructed concerning the meaning of reasonable doubt at the guilt and sentencing phase of the trial. At the guilt phase of the trial, the jury received the following instruction concerning the meaning of reasonable doubt. Reasonable doubt is that doubt engendered by an investigation of all the proof in the case and an inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easily as to the certainty of guilt. Reasonable doubt does not mean a captious, possible, or imaginary doubt. Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict of any criminal charge, but moral certainty is required, and this certainty is required as to every element of proof necessary to constitute the offense. (charge of the court, transcript of the evidence, vol. five, § III, p. 681). [9a] The appellant argues that this instruction equating beyond a reasonable doubt with a moral certainty violated his due process rights under the new standard set forth in Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 114 S.Ct. 1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994). In Victor, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the phrase moral certainty may have lost its historical meaning, and that a jury might understand it to allow conviction on proof that does not meet the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. Victor, 511 U.S. at 13, 114 S.Ct. at 1247. It reasoned that `moral certainty,' standing alone, might not be recognized by modern jurors as a synonym for `proof beyond a reasonable doubt,' but something less than the very high level of probability required by the Constitution in criminal cases. Id. While the Court stated that it did not condone the use of the moral certainty phrase, the Court held that the phrase could pass constitutional muster if used in conjunction with a modifying instruction that lent meaning to the phrase. Victor, 511 U.S. at 15, 114 S.Ct. at 1248. [10a] In order to meet the requirements of due process, the jury instructions must be examined as a whole, without considering particular phrases out of context. Victor, 511 U.S. 5, 114 S.Ct. at 1243, 127 L.Ed.2d at 590. The instruction provided to the jury in the present case used the term moral certainty in conjunction with let the mind rest easily and arise from possibility. Though neither of these phrases have been before the United States Supreme Court, [11a] the courts of this state have consistently upheld the constitutionality of this instruction. See State v. Nichols, 877 S.W.2d 722 (Tenn. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1114, 115 S.Ct. 909, 130 L.Ed.2d 791 (1995); Pettyjohn v. State, 885 S.W.2d 364 (Tenn. Crim. App.), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. 1994); State v. Beckham, No. 02C01-9405-CR-00107, 1995 WL 568471 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, Sept. 27, 1995); Caldwell v. State, No. 02C01-9405-CR-00107, 1994 WL 716266 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, Dec. 28, 1994), perm. to appeal granted in part, denied in part, (Tenn. May 30, 1995); State v. Voaden, No. 01C01-9305-CC-00151, 1994 WL 714223 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Dec. 22, 1994), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. May 1, 1995); Smith v. State, No. 03C01-9312-CR-00393, 1994 WL 330132 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, July 1, 1994). Specifically, the Tennessee Supreme Court noted in State v. Nichols, 877 S.W.2d at 734, that the use of the phrase `moral certainty' by itself is insufficient to invalidate an instruction on the meaning of reasonable doubt. The court distinguished the Tennessee instruction from the one invalidated in Cage v. Louisiana because the Tennessee instruction does not require grave uncertainty to support acquittal. Moreover, the court concluded that: [w]hen considered in conjunction with an instruction that [r]easonable doubt is that doubt engendered by an investigation of all the proof in the case and an inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easily upon the certainty of your verdict, we find that the instruction properly reflects the evidentiary certainty required by the due process clause of the federal constitution and the law of the land provision in our state constitution. Nichols, 877 S.W.2d at 734. We, therefore, conclude that the charge given by the trial court, although containing the phrase moral certainty, did not violate the appellant's rights under the United States or the Tennessee Constitutions.