Opinion ID: 2979014
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Second Gun Statement

Text: -9- Thomas also argues that his incriminating statement to Sanders while en route to the Maury County jail should have been suppressed because he made it in response to a question posed by Sanders and before Sanders Mirandized him. The Government responds that Thomas’s argument is “both a factual and legal nullity” because Sanders’s question was not designed to elicit any kind of incriminating response and had nothing to do with a firearm. Furthermore, Thomas’s answer was non-responsive to the question and was therefore a volunteered confession. Finally, the Government claims that Sanders Mirandized Thomas as soon as he realized that Thomas would continue to incriminate himself. Thomas testified at the suppression hearing that, during the arrest and transport to jail, Sanders asked Thomas what he was doing with the gun, why he had tattoos on his face, and why he had the gun. The video shows that, while being transported, Thomas asked Sanders how long it would take for Thomas to be bonded out of jail. Sanders explained that “it’s a simple possession charge,” but that “the only thing that might mess things up is your parole.” Thomas then asked: “What about the gun?” Sanders responded: “The gun. I mean you’re a convicted felon. You’re not supposed to have gun. I’m not exactly sure what penalty that carries. My advice to you is basically, if you don’t have a lawyer you need to get one.” Thomas asked again: “So what’s it take someone to make bond?” Sanders replied that “it depended on how busy the jail was, whether a magistrate was present.” Sanders added that “it depends on whether you’ve got cash for bond.” There was silence approximately thirty seconds. Then Sanders asked Thomas: “You got somewhere . . . talking about time, you got somewhere you need to be?” In response, Thomas explained: “Yeah. You’re not gonna believe this. I have a meeting with the feds, a gang awareness, a gang prevention program. That’s why I got the gun. I knew I couldn’t buy it in a store so I bought it off the streets.” Sanders -10- said “Right.” Thomas reiterated that was why he bought the gun. At this point, Sanders stopped Thomas, and told him that he needed to advise Thomas of his rights. Sanders then administered the Miranda warnings. Miranda warnings are necessary only during “interrogation.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. “Custodial interrogation” is “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers.” Id. “Interrogation” in the Miranda context has a special meaning: “Interrogation,” as conceptualized in the Miranda opinion, must reflect a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself. We conclude that the Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent. That is to say, the term “interrogation” under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. . . . But, since the police surely cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable results of their words or actions, the definition of interrogation can extend only to words or actions on the part of police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-02 (1980) (footnotes omitted). In determining whether a defendant has been interrogated, a court should “carefully scrutinize the factual setting of each encounter.” United States v. Avery, 717 F.2d 1020, 1025 (6th Cir. 1983). “Even a relatively innocuous series of questions may, in light of the factual circumstances and the susceptibility of a particular suspect, be reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.” Id. On the other hand, “[a]ny statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence.” Innis, 446 U.S. at 299-300 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478). That is, “[v]olunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478. -11- In Innis, the defendant was arrested for robbery. Innis, 446 U.S. at 293-94. The police were unable to locate the gun used to commit the crime. Id. at 294-95. One of the officers mentioned to another officer while in the defendant’s presence that there were a lot of handicapped children in the area who might hurt themselves if they found a weapon. Id. The defendant then offered to show the officers where he had hidden the gun. Id. at 295. The Supreme Court held that the officers’ conversation was not “interrogation” because there was “no express questioning,” the “entire conversation appear[ed] to have consisted of no more than a few off hand remarks,” rather than a “lengthy harangue in the presence of the suspect,” and the record “in no way suggest[ed] that the officers’ remarks were designed to elicit a response.” Id. at 302-03 & n.9. Similarly, in this case, there was “no express questioning” but a simple off-topic question following up on Thomas’s conversation about timing issues, and nothing in the record shows that Sanders was trying to elicit an incriminating response. Instead, the video reflects that Sanders was not interrogating Thomas, but rather that the two were engaged in casual conversation. The district court did not err in concluding that Sanders did not “initiate” questioning because the question he asked was not designed to elicit an incriminating response. Although the defendant in Innis had been Mirandized, and the conversation in that case occurred between the two police officers and was not directed at the suspect, these factual differences are not so significant as to require a different result in this case. See United States v. Hurst, 228 F.3d 751, 760 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that an officer’s comment that “we’ve got good information on you,” did not contain “any compulsive element suggesting a Fifth Amendment violation under the circumstances”); see also Fleming v. Metrish, 556 F.3d 520, 527 (6th Cir.) (holding that officer’s “brief remarks” to defendant that he “needed to do the right thing” and asking -12- whether he “now wished to talk to the lead investigating officer” were not a “lengthy harangue” amounting to a constitutional violation and thus analogous to facts of both Innis and Hurst), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 103 (2009). Because Sanders was not attempting to elicit information from Thomas, his question was not the “functional equivalent” of express questioning within the meaning of Innis. See Tolliver v. Sheets, 594 F.3d 900, 919 (6th Cir. 2010). Nor was Sanders required to stop Thomas midstream. “Police may listen to volunteered statements, and need not interrupt a suspect who is volunteering information in order to deliver a Miranda warning.” Id. at 920. Sanders simply asked a follow-up question. Cf. id. (holding that officer’s question whether there was “more than one gun in the place” was a permissible follow-up question because it was in response to the suspect’s volunteered statement that he “was getting the other gun out”). And “[p]olice may even interrupt a volunteered statement to ask clarifying or follow-up questions.” Id. In sum, as the district court held, there was no Miranda violation, so the statement was properly admitted. Even if the statement was obtained in violation of Miranda, its admission in this case is harmless, given Thomas’s first statement and his responses on the gun questionnaire.2 See, e.g., Kyger v. Carlton, 146 F.3d 374, 382-83 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that the admission of a statement obtained in violation of Miranda resulted in harmless error because the defendant repeated the substance of the statement in a later admissible statement).