Opinion ID: 2117213
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: qualified electors

Text: Month, Name of Post-Office Address Day, Qualified Residential Address City, Year Elector or P.O. Box No. State 1. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 6. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 8. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The number of signature lines on each page of a printed petition may vary if necessary to accommodate other required textual matter. In this section for referral petitions `full text of the measure' means the bill as passed by the legislative assembly excluding the session and sponsor identification. In this section for initiative petitions `full text of the measure' means an enacting clause which must be: `BE IT ENACTED BY THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA' and the body of the bill. If the measure amends the law, all new statutory material must be underscored and all statutory material to be deleted must be overstruck by dashes. When repealing portions of the law, the measure must contain a repealer clause and, in brackets, the text of the law being repealed. Each copy of any petition provided for in this section, before being filed, must have attached thereto an affidavit executed by the circulator in substantially the following form: State of North Dakota ) ) ss. County of ------------------- ) (county where signed) I, ----------, being duly sworn, depose and say (circulator) that I am a qualified elector; that I reside at ---------------; (address) that each signature contained on the attached petition was executed in my presence; and that to the best of my knowledge and belief each person whose signature appears on the attached petition is a qualified elector; and that each signature contained on the attached petition is the genuine signature of the person whose name it purports to be. ------------------------- (signature of circulator) Subscribed and sworn to before me this ------------ day of -----------------------------,,19 ---, at -----, North Dakota. (city) (Notary Seal) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- (signature of notary) Notary Public, North Dakota My commission expires ----------- The applicants did not argue that the approved petition did not comply with the statutory requirements for form. Instead, their objections went to the heart of the substance and meaning of the text of the proposed measure. In defining the term form, Black's Law Dictionary, 651 (6th ed. 1990) explains that it is the antithesis of substance: In contradistinction to `substance,' `form' means the legal or technical manner or order to be observed in legal instruments or juridical proceedings, or in the construction of legal documents or processes. Antithesis of `substance.'... Form is to be distinguished from substance. Art. III, § 2, N.D. Const., limits the Secretary's review to whether the petition is in proper form and contains the names and addresses of the sponsors and the full text of the measure. It does not authorize a review of the substance or merits of the text of the measure. When a petition is challenged, neither the Secretary nor this court should be concerned with the substance or merit of the proposed measure, because under our system of government, the resolution of a proposal's merit rests with the electorate. See Matter of Increase of Taxes on Tobacco Products, supra, 756 P.2d at 998. The applicants mistakenly relied upon State ex rel. Askew v. Meier, 231 N.W.2d 821 (N.D.1975), as precedent for allowing or requiring the Secretary to examine the substance of an initiated measure in deciding whether the matter should be placed on the ballot. In Askew, the state Legislature passed a resolution ratifying a proposed amendment to the United States Constitution, commonly known as the Equal Rights Amendment. Petitions were filed to refer the resolution. We concluded that the act of ratification by the Legislature was authorized by the federal constitution, and, therefore, the resolution was not subject to referral under state law. We enjoined the Secretary from placing the referendum on the ballot. Askew involved a unique procedural question not present in the case before us, whether the matter was referable at all. The Askew decision did not involve the scope of the Secretary's review under Art. III, § 2, N.D. Const., for approving the form of an initiated petition. Consequently, the Askew decision is not authority for the proposition that the Secretary may examine the substance of an initiated measure. Neither do our more recent cases support the applicants' contention that the Secretary must examine the substance and merit of a proposed initiated measure. In Haugland v. Meier, 335 N.W.2d 809, 811 (N.D.1983), we held that the Secretary should not have approved a referendum petition that contained in its Statement of Intent an extraneous statement, arguably constituting improper editorial comment ... misleading and incorrect. Concluding that extraneous statements must be eliminated prior to approval of a referral petition, we noted, however, that [n]either the secretary of state nor this court should be in the position of exercising a subjective judgment in considering the form of the petition. Haugland v. Meier, supra, 335 N.W.2d at 810, n. 1. Similarly, in Lips v. Meier, 336 N.W.2d 346 (N.D.1983), we concluded that a referral petition's Statement of Intent contained impermissible extraneous statements that should have been deleted by the Secretary. Again, in Haugland v. Meier, 339 N.W.2d 100, 106 (N.D.1983), we determined that introductory language in a referral petition that was inaccurate and misleading, and serve[d] no useful purpose should have been deleted by the Secretary. In each of these cases, our review of the Secretary's approval of a referral petition focused upon whether prefatory language, inserted by the sponsors, contained improper, extraneous statements. Those extraneous statements consisted of the sponsors' editorial comments about the legislative enactment being referred. These cases stand for the proposition that the Secretary is obliged to strike extraneous editorial comment from referral petitions, not that he must examine the substance or merit of a proposed initiated measure in approving the petition as to its form. There is no allegation that the petition in this case contains improper, extraneous statements. We hold that the Secretary's constitutional responsibility under Art. III, § 2, N.D. Const., to approve the form of a petition, is limited to ascertaining whether the petition complies with the statutory requirements for form and whether the petition contains impermissible, extraneous statements. In reviewing a petition for form, the Secretary must not be concerned with the merits of the petition or with the substance of its text. As to the constitutional attacks on the proposed measure, we believe they are premature. In effect, the applicants have asked for an advisory opinion on a proposed measure that is not yet law about questions that are not ripe for review. But, we do not give advisory opinions on questions that are not ripe for review. Mullins v. N.D. Dept. of Human Services, 483 N.W.2d 160 (N.D.1992). This court will not entertain a request to test the validity or constitutionality of a proposed statute on the ground that if it is enacted, it would impinge on the litigant's rights. Anderson v. Byrne, 62 N.D. 218, 242 N.W. 687 (1932). Until the issue of constitutionality arises in an actual, litigated controversy, a determination of the constitutional question would be an advisory opinion. Boedecker v. St. Alexius Hospital, 298 N.W.2d 372 (N.D.1980). For the reasons expressed in this opinion, we issued an order on September 4, 1992, vacating the August 20, 1992, temporary injunction and denying the request for permanent injunctive relief. ERICKSTAD, C.J., VANDE WALLE and JOHNSON, JJ., and VERNON R. PEDERSON, Surrogate Judge, concur. VERNON R. PEDERSON, Surrogate Judge, sitting in place of MESCHKE, J., disqualified.