Opinion ID: 3033188
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The City's Motion for Expert Witness Fees

Text: Where a statute allows an award of litigation fees to a prevailing party, the district court may in its discretion award [litigation] fees to a prevailing defendant 3 The City argues that the district court's retained jurisdiction ended when it ordered the case closed with the entry of its judgment following the bench trial. The closing order does not mention its effect on the court's previously retained jurisdiction. Our disposition of this argument makes it unnecessary to resolve the extent of the district court's retained jurisdiction. 8 . . . upon a finding that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. E.E.O.C., 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978) (emphasis added). There is no dispute that the City was the prevailing party on the comprehensive master planning process issue. The district court denied the City's request for expert fees, however, because it found that Sierra Club's claims on that issue were not frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation. (Add. at 39.) Because the district court applied the proper standard, we review its denial of the City's request for expert fees for an abuse of discretion. Sierra Club claimed that the City violated its permit by failing to implement a comprehensive master planning process to develop, implement, and enforce controls to reduce, to the [maximum extent practicable], the discharge of pollutants from areas of new development and significant redevelopment after construction is completed. (Appellant's App. at 32 (internal marks omitted).) In denying Sierra Club's motion for summary judgment on this issue, the district court noted that there [wa]s going to be conflicting evidence by experts as to whether the City has or has not addressed the quality of the discharge into the . . . storm sewer system. (Appellant's App. at 331.) During the bench trial, Sierra Club's expert testified that in his opinion the City had addressed only the quantity of discharge into the storm system but had failed to address whether any of the City's processes would reduce pollutants to the maximum extent practicable. Sierra Club forwarded its theory that the City, as a permittee, was required to perform a thorough review for the explicit purpose of determining whether and to what extent the City's procedures would reduce pollutants in areas of new development. It argued that a conglomeration of policies and ordinances that only tangentially affected water issues was not sufficient to meet the permit requirement. Although the district court ultimately concluded that [t]he City has done exactly what the City stated would be done in its storm water application and storm 9 water permits (Appellant's App. at 399), we cannot say that Sierra Club's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. As noted by the district court, the EPA has provided tremendous flexibility to permittees relative to the exact form the required comprehensive master planning process may take. (Id.) Nowhere does the EPA define what constitutes a comprehensive master planning process. The City's comprehensive master planning process has evolved over a period of several years and encompasses a variety of different ordinances, plans, codes, standards, and related processes. Although the permit does not require the comprehensive master planning process to be incorporated into a single document, the City's failure to do so made it difficult to determine the City's compliance when Sierra Club originally brought this suit. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the City's motion for litigation costs as the prevailing defendant.