Opinion ID: 2633670
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The prosecuting attorney had the discretion to add charges after Korum withdrew his plea agreement

Text: ś 12 Prosecuting attorneys are vested with great discretion in determining how and when to file criminal charges. See State v. Lewis, 115 Wash.2d 294, 299, 797 P.2d 1141 (1990); see also Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 134 n. 2, 113 S.Ct. 1993, 124 L.Ed.2d 44 (1993) (recognizing prosecutors have universally available and unvoidable power to charge or not to charge an offense.). The Sentencing Reform Act of 1981(SRA), chapter 9.94A RCW, recognizes this discretion and provides standards, not mandates, to guide prosecutors: These standards are intended solely for the guidance of prosecutors in the state of Washington. They are not intended to, do not and may not be relied upon to create a right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by a party in litigation with the state. RCW 9.94A.401. See also DAVID BOERNER, SENTENCING IN WASHINGTON: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE SENTENCING REFORM ACT OF 1981 § 12.24, at 12-47 (1985) (It is clear the Sentencing Guidelines Commission and the Legislature intended to prevent judicial review of [the prosecutor's charging] decisions.). ś 13 Despite this express language, the Court of Appeals held that prosecutorial discretion is statutorily limited. See Korum, 120 Wash.App. at 701-02, 86 P.3d 166. Specifically, the court relied on former RCW 9.94A.440(2)(2) and (b) (1996), recodified as RCW 9.94A.411(2)(a)(ii) and (B), which provide that [t]he prosecutor should not overcharge to obtain a guilty plea, and notes that overcharging includes [c]harging additional counts. See Korum, 120 Wash.App. at 701-02, 86 P.3d 166. ś 14 However, the Court of Appeals failed to reference relevant portions of the SRA's guidelines that support the State's decision to charge Korum with the additional counts. Whereas the language cited by the Court of Appeals is precatory, earlier language in former RCW 9.94A.440(2) provides that [c]rimes against persons will be filed if sufficient admissible evidence exists. [3] (emphasis added). All of the charges filed against Korum, with the exception of unlawful possession of a firearm in the second degree, fall under the category of crimes against persons. [4] See former RCW 9.94A.440(2). ś 15 Additionally, former RCW 9.94A.440(2)(1)(a) provides that other charges should be filed if they are necessary to strengthen the State's case at trial. Here, the additional charges related to crimes where Korum personally entered the invaded homes and hence was identifiable by nonparticipants in the crime. In the incident related to the original charges, Korum did not enter the homes. Thus, the State would have depended almost entirely on the testimony of Korum's accomplices. As a result, the decision to add charges after Korum withdrew his plea agreement was not only within the prosecuting attorney's discretion, it was also supported by the SRA guidelines and strengthened the State's case.