Opinion ID: 2571467
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: SCR 99(1) provides, in pertinent part, Every attorney . . . practicing law here, whether specially admitted or not, is subject to the exclusive disciplinary jurisdiction of the supreme court and the disciplinary boards and hearing panels created by these rules. Other jurisdictions with similar rules have uniformly held that a lawyer not admitted in the jurisdiction, but who nevertheless practiced law in that jurisdiction, is properly subject to discipline where he or she practiced. [4] We recognize that NRS 7.285 prescribes criminal penalties for the unauthorized practice of law. But as a practical matter, such a complaint to law enforcement, which is also responsible for investigating matters such as violent crimes and drug offenses, would almost certainly be accorded a lower priority. Given this lower priority, by the time law enforcement could devote resources to an unauthorized practice of law complaint, several more clients could be harmed. Also, while NRS 7.285(3) permits the state bar to file a civil action and seek an injunction against a person engaging in the unauthorized practice of law, this court, as the ultimate authority over attorneys as officers of the court, has a special interest in enforcing its rules governing the legal profession. [5] And although an injunction as provided in NRS 7.285(3) may prevent future harm, it cannot punish past misconduct. Moreover, Droz's actions clearly illustrate why this court should exercise jurisdiction over his conduct: Droz is already disbarred in Utah and so very little more disciplinary action could be imposed upon him there, and his misconduct affected several Nevada citizens, a Nevada lawyer, and the Nevada court system. Droz has apparently fled the jurisdiction, and so an injunction at this point would be ineffective. Criminal penalties against Droz are likewise of questionable effect, at least unless and until he is located and subject to arrest. Accordingly, while the sanctions to be imposed must be tailored to Droz's lack of a Nevada law license, this court has jurisdiction to impose professional discipline upon him and should exercise that jurisdiction. Panel's recommendation As we recognized in In re Stuhff, [t]hough persuasive, the [panel's] findings and recommendations are not binding on this court. This court must review the record de novo and exercise its independent judgment to determine whether and what type of discipline is warranted. [6] The panel's misconduct findings must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. [7] Having thoroughly reviewed the record, we conclude that clear and convincing evidence supports the panel's findings. [8] We turn to the panel's recommended discipline. The Indiana Supreme Court has noted that, while a law license issued by California was not subject to sanction by the Indiana court, the Indiana court may impose penalties appropriate to punish or prevent misconduct that occurs in Indiana. [9] Examples of penalties considered or imposed by other courts in situations similar to this case include public reprimands, a temporary or permanent prohibition on future admission, including pro hac vice admission, injunctive relief, contempt sanctions, fines, and payment of costs. [10] Here, the hearing panel recognized the limitations on the discipline it could impose, since Droz does not have a Nevada law license. Thus, it tailored its recommendations to the specific facts. First, the panel recommended that this court enjoin Droz from practicing law in Nevada or appearing in any Nevada court. This recommendation is appropriate. Second, the panel recommended a fine of $500 per count, for a total of $3,000. In light of the harm caused by Droz to this state's justice system and to several Nevada citizens, a $3,000 fine is warranted. Third, in view of the apparently criminal nature of Droz's fraudulent arbitration scheme, the panel recommended that the matter be referred to the appropriate law enforcement authorities. We agree that a referral to law enforcement is appropriate. While the panel specifically mentioned only state and county authorities, however, we conclude that bar counsel should provide the information to federal authorities as well, since credit card issuers and banks are both subject to federal regulation, and thus, Droz's actions may come within federal jurisdiction. Accordingly, this recommendation, with one slight modification, is proper. Finally, the panel recommended that bar counsel be directed to provide a copy of this court's opinion directly to the Utah and Arizona bars. Again, the panel's recommendation is warranted. If Droz has in fact relocated to Scottsdale, he may very well be perpetrating similar misconduct there, and so expedited notice to Arizona is proper. Also, since Droz was licensed in Utah, that state also has a particular interest in this matter. In sum, we conclude that the panel's recommended discipline is appropriate to punish or prevent misconduct that occurs in Nevada, and that it should be approved, with the one slight modification noted above. Accordingly, Paul Droz is prohibited from practicing law in Nevada and from appearing in any Nevada court. Additionally, Droz shall pay the costs of this disciplinary proceeding and a fine of $3,000. Further, we direct the state bar to refer this matter to any appropriate federal, state, or county law enforcement authorities for possible criminal investigation. We also direct the state bar to serve a copy of this opinion upon the Utah and Arizona bars. Finally, the state bar shall serve a copy of this opinion upon Droz at his last-known address. [11]