Opinion ID: 1325116
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Comment on Responsibility for Sentence of Death.

Text: Defense counsel engaged in an emotional closing argument, repeatedly telling the jury that it was being asked to kill this boy. In an effort to diminish the impact of these remarks, the assistant Commonwealth's attorney informed the jury: Well, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, that load is not on your shoulders, that responsibility is not yours. The Judge will be the person that fixes sentence if you find the defendant guilty as charged and fix his punishment at death. The Court will pronounce sentence. Upon objection by defense counsel, the court ruled, in the jury's presence, [I]t is clearly the law. The jury verdict is a recommendation. Frye contends the prosecutor's argument and the court's comment constituted clear error requiring reversal under Caldwell v. Mississippi, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985), decided June 11, 1985, three days after the conclusion of Frye's trial but before entry of the final judgment order on July 3, 1985. Caldwell also involved allegedly improper argument by a prosecutor in a capital sentencing proceeding. In that case, the prosecutor sought to dilute the effect of defense argument that the prosecutor said would have the jurors believe that they would kill this man. He told the jury, Your job is reviewable. Overruling a defense objection, the trial court said, I think it proper that the jury realizes that it is reviewable automatically as the death penalty commands. Accordingly, the prosecutor reiterated to the jury, as Judge Baker has told you, ... the decision you render is automatically reviewable by the Supreme Court. Id. ___ U.S. at ___, 105 S.Ct. at 2638. The United States Supreme Court held that this effort to minimize the jury's sense of responsibility for imposing a sentence of death violated the Eighth Amendment's heightened `need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.' Id. at ___, 105 S.Ct. at 2645 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2991, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976) (plurality opinion)). Casting its holding in broad language, the court stated that it is constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant's death rests elsewhere. Id. at ___, 105 S.Ct. 2639. Justice Marshall, writing for a majority of five, [5] found that unreliability and bias inhere in death sentences following state-induced suggestions that the sentencing jury may shift its sense of responsibility to an appellate court. This bias stems from several sources. First, there are institutional limits on appellate review that may not be understood by jurors. Second, a jury, understanding a sentence of death will receive automatic review, may impose this penalty to `send a message' of extreme disapproval for the defendant's acts where it otherwise might not have found the death sentence appropriate. Third, correctly assuming that the lesser sentence does not receive mandatory review, a jury may impose the death sentence to trigger automatic review and delegate the sentencing responsibility to another tribunal. And, finally, realizing that review would be conducted by others, the jury might minimize the significance of its own role and accept the invitation to shift the sentencing responsibility to another body, particularly where it is told such review is by judges who the jury may believe, because they are legal authorities, are more entitled to make the penalty determination. Id. at ___, 105 S.Ct. at 2642. We believe the ruling of Caldwell applies to the present case. The Commonwealth urges that application of Caldwell should be narrowly limited to comments about appellate review. This argument, however, ignores the sweeping language of the Court, prohibiting any argument which leads a jury to believe the sentencing responsibility lies elsewhere. [6] Under Virginia's statutory capital sentencing scheme, it is the jury's responsibility to fix the punishment of a defendant who has been convicted of a capital offense and it is the court's responsibility to impose sentence. See Code §§ 19.2-264.3, -264.4, -264.5. Although the sentencing statute twice refers to the jury's verdict as a recommendation, see Code §§ 19.2-264.2(2), -264.4(A), the court must either impose sentence in accordance with the verdict fixing punishment at death or set aside the sentence of death and impose the lesser penalty of imprisonment for life. See Code § 19.2-264.5. The court may not arbitrarily take this latter action, being authorized to set aside the death sentence only after consideration of a probation officer's report and upon good cause shown. Id. Therefore, the jury's verdict is not merely a recommendation to be followed or rejected by the trial court at its discretion. In view of the statutory language, it is understandable that the prosecutor and the trial court inadvertently stated the law in a manner that could have misled the jury. In criminal actions in the Commonwealth, the power to determine punishment of one convicted of a criminal offense rests in the jury (or the court in cases tried without a jury). Code § 19.2-295. The jury's role has long been construed to be more than advisory, resulting in more than just a recommendation of punishment. See Ballard v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 213, 215, 321 S.E.2d 284, 285 (1984) (sentence in criminal prosecution of an adult is fixed by jury); Smyth v. Bunch, 202 Va. 126, 130-31, 116 S.E.2d 33, 37 (1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 935, 81 S.Ct. 382, 5 L.Ed.2d 366 (1961) (use of word recommend by a jury in its verdict was merely an irregularity since jury is authorized to fix punishment in criminal cases); cf. Code § 8.01-430 (trial judge's discretion is limited in setting aside jury verdict in civil action); Dutton v. Locker, 224 Va. 535, 543-44, 297 S.E.2d 814, 819 (1982) (the trial judge may not substitute own conclusion for that of jury in civil action where jury verdict is based on credible evidence); Lane v. Scott, 220 Va. 578, 581-82, 260 S.E.2d 238, 240 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 986, 100 S.Ct. 2969, 64 L.Ed.2d 843 (1980) (same). Furthermore, we have held that it is improper for a prosecutor to tell the jury that, if it makes a mistake, the court can correct it. See Lyons v. Commonwealth, 204 Va. 375, 379, 131 S.E.2d 407, 409-10 (1963). Thus, under Virginia law or under the rule announced in Caldwell, it is improper for the jury to be told that the trial judge shares the responsibility for the death sentence. Like the reference to appellate review in Caldwell, such a comment is misleading because it fails to place before the jury accurate information explaining the limits on the court's power to set aside the jury's verdict. While it is true that the trial court in a proper case may set aside a sentence of death, the court does not have unlimited discretion to do so in any case. The Commonwealth asserts that, when viewed in the context of the prosecutor's entire argument and the proceedings throughout the trial, the challenged remarks could not have had an appreciable effect in minimizing the jury's sense of responsibility. But the Caldwell decision squarely rejects the same argument raised by the dissenters in that case, holding that other remarks to the effect that the jury was responsible for sentencing did not cure the prejudicial effect of the prosecutor's improper argument. See ___ U.S. at ___ n. 7, 105 S.Ct. at 2645 n. 7 (majority opinion); id. at ___, 105 S.Ct. at 2646 (concurring opinion). Here, as in Caldwell, in spite of other argument emphasizing the importance of the jury's function, the prosecutor did not retract the questionable argument. Here, as in Caldwell, the trial court failed to correct the prosecutor's comments, approving the misleading statement of the law and reinforcing its potentially damaging effect. Because we cannot say that the assistant Commonwealth's attorney's remarks had no effect on the jury's sentencing decision, id. at ___, 105 S.Ct. at 2646, we hold that the sentence of death must be vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings only on the issue of penalty. See Code § 19.2-264.3(C).