Opinion ID: 1968741
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutional Concerns and the Confrontation Clause

Text: The Sixth Amendment grants an accused the right to confront and cross-examine the government's witnesses against him. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1435, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-316, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1109-10, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974); Elliott v. United States, 633 A.2d 27, 31 (D.C.1993); Jenkins v. United States, 617 A.2d 529, 531 (D.C.1992). An important function of this constitutionally protected right is the exposure of the witness' biases or motives for not telling the truth. Elliott, 633 A.2d at 32; See Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 678, 106 S.Ct. at 1434; Jenkins, 617 A.2d at 531. Bias, therefore, is always a proper subject of cross-examination, which takes on enhanced significance where the credibility of the key government witness is in issue. Jenkins, 617 A.2d at 531 (citations omitted). [21] Thus the Supreme Court has held: [A] criminal defendant states a violation of the Confrontation Clause by showing that he was prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness, and thereby to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors ... could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness. Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at 680, 106 S.Ct. at 1435-36 (quoting Davis v. Alaska, supra, 415 U.S. at 318, 94 S.Ct. at 1111). But the right to cross-examine is not absolute. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679, 106 S.Ct. at 1435; Jenkins, 617 A.2d at 532; Roundtree v. United States, 581 A.2d 315, 320-321 (D.C.1990). As the Court made clear in Van Arsdall: [T]rial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.... [T]he Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish. Id. at 679, 106 S.Ct. at 1435 (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20, 106 S.Ct. 292, 294-95, 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1985) (emphasis in original). [22] This court has likewise recognized the discretionary role of the trial court in controlling bias cross-examination, Ford, supra note 21, 549 A.2d at 1127, and has observed that the probative value of impeachment does not vest an examining attorney with an unbridled license. Jenkins, 617 A.2d at 532; accord, e.g., Washington v. United States, 499 A.2d 95, 101 (D.C.1985). Guided by these principles, we must first determine whether the cross-examination permitted here by the trial court was sufficient to comport with the requirements of the Sixth Amendment. Jenkins, 617 A.2d at 532. Constitutional error will be found only when the trial court's rulings prohibited all inquiry into the possibility of bias under [the] defendant's theory. Ford, 549 A.2d at 1126 (emphasis in original); see Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 678-679, 106 S.Ct. at 1434-35; Davis, 415 U.S. at 318, 94 S.Ct. at 1111. Appellants assert that the trial court committed constitutional error when it precluded [Thomas' counsel] from cross-examining the complainant to show that she fabricated her lack of consent and exaggerated her claims because she felt her friends did not believe her. They concede, however, that the court allowed [them] to ask on several occasions whether or not the complainant was indeed exaggerating her story. The record clearly shows that the defense put before the jury its theory that Ms. Smith had embellished her account of what happened in the alley. [23] Defense counsel explicitly cross-examined her on whether she was exaggerating and making the story a little bit better, accusations which she flatly denied. Despite their concession, appellants claim that this direct line of questioning was inadequate because it prohibited them from exploring why Ms. Smith was exaggerating. See Davis v. Alaska, supra, 415 U.S. at 318, 94 S.Ct. at 1111 ([w]hile counsel was permitted to ask [the witness] whether he was biased, counsel was unable to make a record from which to argue why [the witness] might have been biased or otherwise lacked that degree of impartiality expected of a witness at trial (emphasis in original)); Jenkins, supra, 617 A.2d at 533; Ford, supra note 21, 549 A.2d at 1126 n. 7. They rely heavily on Keene v. United States, 661 A.2d 1073 (D.C.1995), in which we held that it was error to exclude evidence of the victim's prior sexual acts with someone other than the defendant when the excluded evidence demonstrated the existence of a powerful motive to fabricate a charge of sexual abuse. Id. at 1079. Appellants contend that by precluding questions about Ms. Smith's perceptions of her friends' skepticism, the trial court was, in effect, excluding evidence that established her bias and motive to fabricate. We cannot agree. The cross-examination of Ms. Smith allowed the jury to hear that she told her girl friends she was raped and that, after hearing this allegation, they did not offer to help her or suggest that she call the police or go to the hospital. These facts were sufficient to enable defense counsel to argue to the jury that Smith perceived skepticism from her friends. Moreover, the court's regulation of the form of questioning in no way prohibited defense counsel from asking why Ms. Smith might have been biased. In fact, by questioning her about whether she was made at her boy friend, defense counsel had already put before the jury a possible motive for the allegedly fabricated claim of rape. Cases such as Ford, Jenkins, and Van Arsdall are therefore inapposite because the trial judge in each of those cases completely curtailed a line of questioning which would have enabled the jury to discover the witness' motive for bias. We are satisfied that the questioning permitted in this case satisfied Confrontation Clause requirements.