Opinion ID: 1936088
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: validity of aggravating factors

Text: Taylor's challenge to each of the aggravating circumstances is addressed individually. (1) Under Sentence of Imprisonment. Taylor contends that the evidence that he was under a sentence of imprisonment was insufficient to support a finding of the aggravating circumstance that he was under a sentence of imprisonment. Having found that the evidence was sufficient to prove the element of the crime that Taylor was under a sentence of life, we hold that it was legally sufficient to support the finding of an aggravating circumstance. (2) Previously Convicted of a Felony Involving the Use or Threat of Violence. Taylor claims the prior murder conviction was insufficient to support this aggravating factor and claims that the conviction of aggravated assault (dated April 14, 1989) was insufficient because it occurred after the crime for which he was being sentenced. This Court has held that convictions subsequent to the crime for which a person is being sentenced may be used as proof of aggravating circumstances. Turner, 573 So.2d at 670; Leatherwood v. State, 435 So.2d 645, 651-52 (Miss. 1983), cert. denied 465 U.S. 1084, 104 S.Ct. 1455, 79 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984); Jones v. State, 381 So.2d 983, 994 (Miss. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1003, 101 S.Ct. 543, 66 L.Ed.2d 300 (1980); Reddix v. State 381 So.2d 999 (Miss. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 986, 101 S.Ct. 408, 66 L.Ed.2d 251 (1980). The jury did not err in finding this aggravating factor. (3) While Engaged in the Commission of Kidnapping or Flight after Committing Kidnapping. Taylor contends that there was no evidence that the murder was committed intentionally while the defendant was engaged in the commission of a kidnapping or flight after committing a kidnapping, and that therefore, no rational trier of fact could have been convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of this aggravating factor. The State maintains that the prosecution adduced evidence from which the jury could have found that Taylor murdered Mildred Spires while engaged in the commission of a kidnapping. The State says in its brief: That she did not want to be in the car with Taylor is evidenced by the signs of violence in the car: a torn brassiere, half of which was found in the front seat of the car and half of which was found on her body; a broken ash tray; and, a stuffed heart pillow torn from the [rearview] mirror. That Taylor prevented her from leaving is also evidenced by the car: her car keys and the gold chain she wore around her neck were found underneath the back seat. The above evidence is sufficient to support a finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that through trickery and deceit Taylor caused Mildred Spires to meet him and that he then confined her in her own car and, when she wanted to leave, used violence to prevent her from leaving a place she did not want to be. This is ample proof to support the jury's finding of this aggravating circumstance. Because the car in which Mildred's body was found was not located for some months after her disappearance and because the windows were open when the car was found, it is not possible to say with certainty that the conditions existing in the car were caused, as the State contends, by Taylor's actions in holding Mildred against her will. Because we do not think the State's evidence was sufficient for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Taylor kidnaped Mildred, the presentation of this factor to the jury was error. (4) Avoiding or Preventing a Lawful Arrest. Taylor claims that the State adduced no evidence to support the proposition that the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing the detection and lawful arrest of the defendant. The Court has said that the avoiding arrest aggravating circumstance is justified where: there is evidence from which it may be reasonably inferred that a substantial reason for the killing was to conceal the identity of the killer or killers or to `cover their tracks' so as to avoid apprehension and eventual arrest by authorities. There is absolutely no evidence that a desire to avoid apprehension and arrest was a substantial reason for the killing of Mildred Spires. This instruction was improperly given to the jury as an aggravating circumstance. (5) Especially Heinous, Atrocious or Cruel. Taylor maintains that the State adduced no evidence that the capital murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel. The State contends that there was sufficient evidence that Mildred Spires died of strangulation and that strangulation is unnecessarily torturous to the victim. The State bases its contention on the testimony of Dr. Galvez who testified that strangulation ... is a slow way to kill anybody. Galvez said of strangulation: There is pain in the neck. I am sure that at least once in a while, you hit your Adam's apple, and you feel pain, physical pain. The legislative language of this aggravating factor has been found to be unconstitutionally vague. Clemons v. State, 535 So.2d 1354, 1361 (Miss. 1988) (citing Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988)) vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S. 738, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 108 L.Ed.2d 725 (1989). The aggravating circumstance may be used only when the jury is instructed as to its meaning in a manner which will channel the jury's discretion in sentencing. This Court has held that this language refers to those situations where the actual commission of the capital felony was accomplished by such additional acts to set the crime apart from the norm of capital felonies by the consciencelessness or pitilessness of the crime which is unnecessarily tortuous to the victim. Hansen v. State, 592 So.2d 114, 151 (Miss. 1991) cert. denied, 504 U.S. 921, 112 S.Ct. 1970, 118 L.Ed.2d 570 (1992) (emphasis added). There was no evidence before the jury as to how the crime was actually committed. Even if Dr. Galvez's opinion as to strangulation is accepted as true, there is no evidence of how the strangulation was carried out and no evidence of any additional acts to set the crime apart from the norm of capital felonies as conscienceless, pitiless or unnecessarily torturous. This aggravating circumstance was improperly submitted to the jury. This Court has said that it will not re-weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances on appeal; such weighing is a matter solely for the jury. Clemons v. State, 593 So.2d 1004, 1006 (Miss. 1992). The present case, however, is distinguished from our prior cases in which we have refused to re-weigh aggravating and mitigating factors. It is also distinguished from any supposed vagueness under the United States Supreme Court holdings or definitions. This case simply lacks the requisite proof or evidence to support the jury's finding of three aggravating factors. The State showed only conjecture, not evidence, that a kidnapping had occurred. Likewise, there was no evidence other than the prosecution's argument which would support a finding that the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing the detection and lawful arrest of the defendant. Finally, we are left solely with speculation that the victim's death was especially heinous, atrocious and cruel. These important distinguishing characteristics are not based on semantic subtleties, but on an absence of proof and evidence which could substantiate the jury's finding of three aggravating factors. We cannot re-weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors not because of our past precedent, but more importantly, because there is a lack of proof and evidence to support a re-weighing. Therefore, the judge committed reversible error when he instructed the jury as to the aggravating factors.