Opinion ID: 6500514
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Conviction for Conspiracy to

Text: Unlawfully Transfer or Possess a Firearm56 William Maxwell disputes the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for conspiracy to unlawfully transfer a firearm.57 That count was brought under the general conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371, which requires the government to prove “(1) an agreement between two or more persons to achieve an unlawful goal; (2) the defendant intentionally joined the agreement, with knowledge of its objective; and (3) an overt act taken in furtherance of the conspiracy by a co-conspirator.” United States v. Whiteford, 676 F.3d 348, 357 (3d Cir. 2012). Insofar as William was concerned, the object of the alleged conspiracy was to get guns 56 William Maxwell moved before the District Court for judgment of acquittal on this count. We exercise plenary review over the denial of the motion, although “we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, mindful that it is the jury’s province (and not ours) to make credibility determinations and to assign weight to the evidence.” United States v. Richardson, 658 F.3d 333, 337 (3d Cir. 2011). 57 The same count also charged a conspiracy to unlawfully possess a firearm, but, as in the previous section, it is sufficient for us to concern ourselves with William’s efforts to transfer a firearm. See supra Section V.D. 95 into the hands of Scarfo and Pelullo, both of whom were convicted felons. The evidence supporting that count involved William’s brother John delivering a firearm from Dallas, Texas, to Scarfo’s home in Egg Harbor Township, New Jersey. The FBI recorded multiple wiretapped phone conversations between John and Pelullo as John made his way to New Jersey. In one call on September 6, 2007, John expressed his suspicion that he was being followed by “a chopper over-head” and “a black and white Suburban [that was] right behind [him] too.” (JAD at 6156.) They agreed that John should stop for lunch, presumably to avoid leading the suspected surveillance vehicles to Scarfo’s house. Later that day, John and Pelullo spoke again; John said he “talked to Bill [i.e., William Maxwell] and he[, William,] said it could be everything and it could be nothing. He said there’s no way of knowing. He said … just take whatever precautions that you [Pelullo] thought were best.” (JAD at 6168.) Months later, FBI agents executed a search warrant at Scarfo’s house in Egg Harbor Township and uncovered a gun that, according to an ATF report, John Maxwell purchased from a pawn and gun shop in Dallas on September 4, 2007. William Maxwell claims that the only evidence tying him to the firearm delivery – the call in which John told Pelullo about his conversation with William – was insufficient to bring William within the conspiracy to have the firearm transferred to or possessed by Pelullo or Scarfo. We take that as an argument that the government failed to furnish sufficient evidence of the second element of a conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371: that William intentionally joined an agreement with knowledge of its objective. Whiteford, 676 F.3d at 357. 96 But considering that phone call, as we must, in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, it is enough. United States v. Richardson, 658 F.3d 333, 337 (3d Cir. 2011). From John’s statement on the phone that he “talked to Bill” about the suspected surveillance vehicles (JAD at 6168), a rational trier of fact could have found that William had knowledge of John’s illicit objective to deliver the firearm. See United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418, 431 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc) (“[A]lthough the prosecution must prove the defendant’s knowledge of the conspiracy’s specific objective, that knowledge need not be proven by direct evidence.”). And a rational jury could also have found, from John’s statement noting William’s shared concern about the possibility of surveillance and the advice he gave about the precautions to take (or at least whose precautions to follow), that William was in on the agreement. See United States v. McKee, 506 F.3d 225, 241 (3d Cir. 2007) (“A defendant’s knowledge and intent may be inferred from conduct that furthered the purpose of the conspiracy.”). Although thin, there was thus sufficient evidence as to the second element of the charge – that William intentionally joined the conspiracy, knowing of its objective.58 58 The evidence of the first and third elements of a conspiracy was also sufficient, and William does not meaningfully contest those elements. As to the first, the multiple wiretapped phone calls between John and Pelullo as John made his way to New Jersey, plus John’s call with William, supported a finding that an agreement existed for John to deliver a firearm to Scarfo’s home, where it would be possessed unlawfully by Scarfo or Pelullo. See United States v. McKee, 506 F.3d 225, 238 (3d Cir. 2007) (permitting circumstantial proof of agreement “based upon reasonable 97