Opinion ID: 546189
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Object of Commerce

Text: 12 All objects of interstate trade merit Commerce Clause protection; none is excluded by definition at the outset. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 622, 98 S.Ct. 2531, 2534, 57 L.Ed.2d 475 (1978). But when the dangers inhering in an object's movement far outweigh[ ] its worth in interstate commerce, a state can prohibit transportation of the object across state lines. Id. For example, the Supreme Court has said that a state may restrict interstate movement of an object when, on account of the object's existing condition, [it] would bring in and spread disease, pestilence, and death. Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern R. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 489, 8 S.Ct. 689, 700, 31 L.Ed. 700 (1888) (striking down state prohibition on interstate movement of liquor); see also Clason v. State of Indiana, 306 U.S. 439, 442, 59 S.Ct. 609, 611, 83 L.Ed. 858 (1939) (upholding Indiana's prohibition against interstate transportation of large dead animals because obvious purpose of the enactment [was] to prevent the spread of disease and the development of nuisances). 13 The Supreme Court in City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey expressly concluded that the interstate movement of solid and liquid wastes is commerce. 437 U.S. at 621-23, 98 S.Ct. at 2534-35. In that case, the Court rejected the lower court's conclusion that the waste was not an object of commerce because it was valueless and could not be put to effective use. The Court held that the innate danger of the solid and liquid waste did not outweigh its worth in interstate commerce. 14 Although the hazardous waste involved in this case may be innately more dangerous than the solid and liquid waste involved in City of Philadelphia, 9 we cannot say that the dangers of hazardous waste outweigh its worth in interstate commerce. Congress has defined hazardous waste as a solid waste ... which ... may ... cause, or significantly contribute to a significant increase in mortality or an increase in serious ... illness, or ... pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or the environment when improperly treated, stored, transported, or disposed of, or otherwise managed. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 6903(5) (emphasis added). The legislative and executive branches of the federal government together with the separate states have developed a comprehensive scheme for regulating the management of hazardous waste. Waste generators, transporters, and managers must comply with highly technical and rigid rules designed to ensure that the movement of hazardous waste is accomplished with a minimum of danger to the public and to the environment. To the extent these rules can and do provide for the safe transportation of hazardous waste, the dangers associated with hazardous waste movement do not outweigh the value of moving hazardous waste across state lines. 15 In concluding that hazardous waste is an object of commerce, we follow precedent of this circuit. See State of Alabama v. United States EPA, 871 F.2d 1548, 1555 n. 3 (11th Cir.1989) (To the extent plaintiffs also seem to assert injury based on the out-of-state nature of these wastes [PCBs and other toxic wastes], the Supreme Court has already held that the commerce clause bars such a distinction. (citing City of Philadelphia )), cert. denied sub nom. Alabama ex rel Siegelman v. United States EPA, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 538, 107 L.Ed.2d 535 (1989). Accord Hardage v. Atkins, 582 F.2d 1264, 1266 (10th Cir.1978) (controlled industrial waste, defined in Oklahoma statute as refuse products that are toxic to human, animal, aquatic, or plant life, is within purview of commerce clause). In addition, this conclusion comports with the Holley Bill, which banned the transport of hazardous wastes into Alabama only from certain states, not from all states, thereby suggesting hazardous waste is not inherently too dangerous to be a product in commerce.