Opinion ID: 1057624
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sentence Reduction Credits

Text: In addition to the possibility of early release on parole, most felony offenders sentenced to serve their sentences incarcerated in the TDOC have the opportunity to obtain sentence reductions based on sentence credits earned for, e.g., “good institutional behavior.” See generally Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-236 (2006 & Supp. 2009). Sentence reduction credits operate distinctly from eligibility for parole. Sentence reduction credits actually reduce a defendant’s sentence such that his or her term of imprisonment expires earlier than it would without the credits. Sentence reduction credits may also hasten a defendant’s RED. See id. at (b) (“The allowances which can be awarded pursuant to this section shall be referred to as inmate sentence reduction credits and shall affect release eligibility and sentence expiration dates in the same manner as time credits affected parole eligibility and sentence expiration dates prior to September 1, 1980.”). Parole, on the other hand, allows a defendant to continue serving his sentence outside the walls of the prison; parole does not actually reduce the parolee’s sentence. Defendants serving sentences for most of the statutorily-enumerated violent offenses listed above are eligible to earn sentence reduction credits, although they are limited to thereby reducing their sentence by no more than 15%. Id. § 40-35-501(i)(1). However, our General Assembly has designated a few offenses for which neither parole nor sentence reduction credits are available. Persons meeting the definition of “child sexual predator,” “multiple rapist,” or “child rapist” are not eligible for early release on the basis of either parole or sentence reduction credits. Id. § 39-13-523(b), (c) (Supp. 2009); see also id. § 4035-501(i)(3). These defendants must serve their entire sentences. The uniform judgment document designates these sentences by boxes labeled “Child Rapist 100%” and “Multiple Rapist 100%,” respectively. Our legislature has also provided that a defendant determined to be a “repeat violent offender” shall, upon conviction of any of certain enumerated offenses, be sentenced “to imprisonment for life without possibility of parole.” Id. § 40-35120(g). The uniform judgment document designates these sentences by a box labeled 6 “Repeat Violent 100%.”10 Repeat violent offenders sentenced to life without the possibility of parole are, obviously, not entitled to a RED or early sentence expiration on the basis of sentence reduction credits.11 B. Sentencing and Habeas Corpus Article I, section 15 of the Tennessee Constitution guarantees that “the privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in case of rebellion or invasion, the General Assembly shall declare the public safety requires it.” While arising from the constitution, the writ has nevertheless been regulated by statute for more than 150 years. Ussery v. Avery, 432 S.W.2d 656, 657 (Tenn. 1968). The statute applicable at the time Defendant filed his habeas corpus petition provides that “[a]ny person imprisoned or restrained of liberty, under any pretense whatsoever, except in cases [in which federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction], may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus, to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment and restraint.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-21-101 (2000). In spite of the statute’s broad language, “the grounds upon which habeas corpus relief will be granted are narrow.” Hickman v. State, 153 S.W.3d 16, 20 (Tenn. 2004) (citing Dixon v. Holland, 70 S.W.3d 33, 36 (Tenn. 2002)). Specifically, this Court has held that the writ may be granted “only when it appears upon the face of the judgment or the record of the proceedings upon which the judgment is rendered that a court lacked jurisdiction or authority to sentence a defendant12 or that the sentence has expired.” Stephenson v. Carlton, 28 S.W.3d 910, 911 (Tenn. 2000) (citing Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 164 (Tenn. 1993)) (emphasis and footnote added); see also State v. Galloway, 45 Tenn. (5 Cold.) 326, 336-37 (1868). It is well-settled “that a petition for writ of habeas corpus may not be used to review or correct errors of law or fact committed by a court in the exercise of its jurisdiction.” State ex rel. Holbrook v. Bomar, 364 S.W.2d 887, 888 (Tenn. 1963). Furthermore, “the writ of habeas corpus cannot be used to serve the purpose of an appeal or writ of error.” Id. With respect to sentencing, we have recognized that “[s]entencing is jurisdictional and must be executed in compliance with the [applicable Sentencing] Act.” McConnell, 12 10 The designation “100%” for violent offenders, child rapists, multiple rapists, and repeat violent offenders refers to the defendant’s RED. A “100%” RED indicates that the defendant is not eligible for early release on parole. 11 Defendants with no previous criminal history who are convicted of first degree murder may also be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(a) (2006 & Supp. 2009), for which there is no release eligibility, id. § 40-35-501(h)(2). 12 In habeas corpus proceedings, we construe the term “jurisdiction” as synonymous with the term “authority.” See Lynch v. State ex rel. Killebrew, 166 S.W.2d 397, 398-99 (Tenn. 1942). 7 S.W.3d at 798. Thus, a trial court lacks the jurisdiction or authority to impose on a defendant a sentence that (1) is not authorized by the applicable statutes, see, e.g., May v. Carlton, 245 S.W.3d 340, 348-49 (Tenn. 2008) (granting habeas corpus relief to convicted felon declared infamous for a crime not listed as infamous under the statute); Stephenson, 28 S.W.3d at 912 (holding habeas corpus attack proper where defendant’s sentence of life without parole was not statutorily authorized and was therefore illegal), or (2) directly contravenes an applicable statute, see, e.g., Smith v. Lewis, 202 S.W.3d 124, 127-28 (Tenn. 2006) (holding sentence illegal because it provided for a RED where the applicable statute expressly prohibited early release eligibility); State v. Burkhart, 566 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tenn. 1978) (holding sentence imposed in direct contravention of express statutory provisions “a nullity”). This Court considers unauthorized sentences, including those that are in direct contravention of an applicable statute, to be illegal as opposed to merely erroneous. See Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251, 256 (Tenn. 2007) (recognizing that a judgment rendered without statutory authority is void and that “[a] sentence imposed in direct contravention of a statute is void and illegal”). Habeas corpus relief may be granted on illegal sentences but not on those that are merely erroneous. Archer, 851 S.W.2d at 161. Examples of illegal sentences include (1) a sentence imposed pursuant to an inapplicable statutory scheme, see McConnell, 12 S.W.3d at 796, 799-800; (2) a sentence designating a RED where a RED is specifically prohibited by statute, see Lewis, 202 S.W.3d at 127-28; (3) a sentence ordered to be served concurrently where statutorily required to be served consecutively, see Burkhart, 566 S.W.2d at 873; and (4) a sentence not authorized for the offense by any statute, see Stephenson, 28 S.W.3d at 912. In each of these cases, relief was appropriate because the trial court did not have the statutory authority (or jurisdiction) to impose the challenged sentence. With regard to allegedly improper sentences arising from plea bargains, we have stated repeatedly that offender range classification and release eligibility are “nonjurisdictional.” See, e.g., Hoover v. State, 215 S.W.3d 776, 780 (Tenn. 2007). Thus, “a knowing and voluntary guilty plea waives any irregularity as to offender classification or release eligibility.” Id.; Hicks, 945 S.W.2d at 709; see also State v. Mahler, 735 S.W.2d 226, 228 (Tenn. 1987). Accordingly, the parties may agree to a “hybrid” sentence that “mixes and matches” range assignment, term of years, and release eligibility without regard to what our sentencing scheme might call for absent a plea bargain so long as (1) the term of years is within the overall range of years specified for the offense, see Hoover, 215 S.W.3d at 779, and (2) the RED is not less than the minimum allowable for the offense, see Lewis, 202 S.W.3d at 128. See also McConnell, 12 S.W.3d at 799 (“The 1989 [Sentencing] Act establishes the outer limits within which the State and a defendant are free to negotiate, and the courts are bound to respect those limits.”). 8 Examples of sentences which might contain “errors” but would not entitle the defendant to habeas corpus relief include (1) a plea-bargained sentence including a range classification that is greater than would be assigned on the basis of the defendant’s prior convictions, see Mahler, 735 S.W.2d at 227-28; (2) a plea-bargained sentence including a term of years that was incompatible with the range designation, see Hoover, 215 S.W.3d at 780-81; and (3) a plea-bargained sentence including a RED that was incompatible with the range designation, see Hicks, 945 S.W.2d at 706. In each of these cases, this Court held that the challenged sentence was not illegal.13 Relief from legal sentences that contain alleged errors must be sought through an appeal as of right or through a petition for post-conviction relief.