Opinion ID: 2508037
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Disclosure of the Recovery and Release of $31,600 to Lourdes

Text: At the penalty phase of trial, the defense was permitted to call Detective Marks and Detective Simmons to testify at a hearing pursuant to Evidence Code section 402. (See post, pt. II.C.1.) Marks testified that on the day after the instant crimes, they received information from a confidential citizen informant that Alex Cardenas had left an estimated $75,000 in cash in a red suitcase at a residence on R Street in Wilmington. Marks went to that residence and found $31,000 plus in a burgundy-colored nylon athletic bag in the living room. Marks believed the burgundy bag to be the same one he had observed at the Cardenas home following the crimes. Simmons testified to the same effect. Additionally, when Simmons asked Lourdes Cardenas if she knew where the money came from, she said she did not know about the money. The police could not tie the money to any narcotic activity or to Alex Cardenas in any type of narcotic activity. But because it was determined that the money was in the Cardenas home at the time of the subject crimes, Simmons released it to Lourdes. Based on the above hearing testimony, defendant contends the prosecution violated its disclosure obligations under section 1054.1. In particular, he argues the prosecution was not in statutory compliance because it waited until the penalty phase to disclose the reason the police released the money found at the R Street residence to Lourdes, i.e., because the money was determined to have been in the Cardenas home. This information, he argues, was relevant to the issues of motive, lack of forced entry, and intent to kill, and to challenge Lourdes's credibility. Defendant further claims this statutory violation infringed on his federal constitutional rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments and Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 ( Brady ) to due process of law and a fair trial. Under section 1054.1, prosecutors are required to disclose any exculpatory evidence and any relevant written or recorded statements of witnesses or reports of the statements of witnesses whom they intend to call at trial. (§ 1054.1, subds.(e), (f).) Under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause, prosecutors must disclose evidence to a criminal defendant when it is `both favorable to the defendant and material on either guilt or punishment.' [Citations.] Evidence is `favorable' if it hurts the prosecution or helps the defense. [Citation.] `Evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had [it] been disclosed to the defense, the result... would have been different.' ( People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 866, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 857, 978 P.2d 15; see also Brady, supra, 373 U.S. at p. 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194.) Evidence probative of a testifying witness's credibility, including the potential for bias, is evidence favorable to the accused. (See United States v. Bagley (1985) 473 U.S. 667, 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481.) As we explain below, defendant's contentions are based on information that was known or available to him at trial. Consequently, his failure to make proper objections, request appropriate sanctions, or seek any continuance on the matter is fatal to his contentions on appeal. (See People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 411, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708 ( Carpenter ) [ Brady claim found not cognizable on appeal]; cf. People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 830-831, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 919 P.2d 1280 [claim that conviction was based on false testimony found waived]; People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 151, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980 [failure to seek sanctions or a continuance found fatal to claim that prosecutor had misled the defense concerning the content of a witness's testimony].) In any event, the claims lack merit. Regardless whether the reason for the release of the $31,600 to Lourdes was material or even favorable to defendant, the record shows that references to all of the police activity relating to that money were contained in a murder book that had been made available to the defense as part of discovery. Defendant's counsel claimed to have reviewed the entire murder book page by page well before the trial began, and indeed, subsequently reported to the trial court, at the penalty phase, that through all of the discovery that we've had in this case... there seems to have been a large amount of cash in the residence at the time of the crime and most probably, for sure, $31,600 in cash was recovered on the 12th of May, 1989, which was the very next day, of course, and was then later returned to Ms. Cardenas. (See post, pt. II.C.1.) Although the murder book evidently did not set forth a reason why Detective Simmons released the money to Lourdes, that single omission did not constitute a failure to disclose or a suppression under either statutory or constitutional standards. First, the critical facts pertaining to the money's existence, Alex Cardenas's reported drug involvement and actions, the recovery of $31,600 from the R Street residence, and the money's later release to Lourdes, had been fully disclosed during discovery. Detective Simmons's testimony merely confirmed what defendant's counsel informed the court they already had gleaned from discovery, i.e., that the police concluded the recovered money had been in the Cardenas home at the time of the crimes. No violation of section 1054.1 appears. Second, the prosecutor had no constitutional duty to conduct defendant's investigation for him. Because Brady and its progeny serve to restrict the prosecution's ability to suppress evidence rather than to provide the accused a right to criminal discovery, the Brady rule does not displace the adversary system as the primary means by which truth is uncovered. ( United States v. Martinez-Mercado (5th Cir.1989) 888 F.2d 1484, 1488.) Consequently, when information is fully available to a defendant at the time of trial and his only reason for not obtaining and presenting the evidence to the Court is his lack of reasonable diligence, the defendant has no Brady claim. ( United States v. Brown (5th Cir.1980) 628 F.2d 471, 473; see also United States v. Stuart (8th Cir.1998) 150 F.3d 935, 937 [Evidence is not suppressed if the defendant has access to the evidence prior to trial by the exercise of reasonable diligence.]; United States v. Slocum (11th Cir.1983) 708 F.2d 587, 599.) In any event, evidence that is presented at trial is not considered suppressed, regardless of whether or not it had previously been disclosed during discovery. ( United States v. Martinez-Mercado, supra, 888 F.2d at p. 1488; see United States v. Slocum, supra, 708 F.2d at p. 600 [newly-discovered evidence does not warrant a new trial unless, inter alia, the evidence is discovered following trial and the movant demonstrates due diligence to discover the evidence prior to trial].) Once again, the record confirms the prosecutor's pretrial disclosure of the detectives' murder book entries regarding Alex Cardenas's reported transportation of a large sum of money from the Cardenas house to a residence on R Street the day after the crimes, the police recovery of $31,600 from the R Street residence, and the subsequent release of the $31,600 to Lourdes. Evidence of the reason for the release of the $31,600 to Lourdes was in fact presented at trial, albeit at the Evidence Code section 402 hearing, through the testimony of Detective Simmons. Trial counsel did not dispute the prosecutor's assertions in court that counsel had known Simmons's telephone number and that Simmons had been available for a year and a half to interview. Thus, the record demonstrates defendant had ample time and opportunity to investigate the matter in question and to discover the reason for the release of the money to Lourdes, but simply failed to do so. These circumstances do not amount to a suppression under Brady, supra, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194. In sum, the contentions complaining of the prosecution's belated disclosure and suppression provide no statutory or constitutional basis for a reversal.