Opinion ID: 2800623
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Miscellaneous Shots At The Warrant

Text: Burgos lobs a number of other arguments at the substance of the affidavit, none of which give us significant pause. He argues that the affidavit was not full and complete because some statements were too vague, and because it includes a one-sentence disclaimer that the affidavit included only information relevant to the wiretap application and not all of the information from the -16- entire investigation. These arguments fail on the grounds that an affidavit need not include the minutiae of an investigation. See Cartagena, 593 F.3d at 110; see also United States v. Yeje-Cabrera, 430 F.3d 1, 9-10 (1st Cir. 2005). Burgos also complains that the affidavit's authorization to include individuals yet unknown violates the requirement that the application include the identity of the person, if known, committing the offense and whose communications are to be intercepted. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b)(iv). He argues that the government knew the names of certain other individuals that would eventually be recorded and failed to include them. In United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413 (1977), the Court held that this requirement to identify individuals extends to those whose conversations the government has probable cause to believe would be intercepted. Although it is typically the unnamed individuals who challenge a wiretap under such circumstances, see id. at 428; see also United States v. Chiarizio, 525 F.2d 289, 291-93 (2d Cir. 1975), we will assume without deciding that a named individual can also bring such a challenge because it does not affect the outcome here.8 Nevertheless, Burgos offers no facts establishing that the 8 While this would make little sense in the Fourth Amendment context, where the named individual would be asserting the unnamed individual's rights, in this context the named individual is claiming that his conversations were recorded pursuant to a statutorily deficient wiretap, even though it is difficult to see how the deficiency could be prejudicial. -17- government had probable cause to believe that the other individuals would be intercepted on the targeted telephone, so this argument also fails. B. Motion To Suppress Evidence From Burgos' Car And Farm Burgos next challenges on a number of grounds the denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized from his car and farm pursuant to a search warrant. As with the wiretap warrant, Burgos argues that the application for the warrant was deficient because of omissions and inaccuracies in the application. In considering such a challenge, our approach is similar to the one we used with regard to the wiretap: we excise the offending inaccuracies and insert the facts recklessly omitted, and then determine whether or not the 'corrected' warrant affidavit would establish probable cause. Burke v. Town of Walpole, 405 F.3d 66, 82 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 789 (3d Cir. 2000)).9 Burgos also argues that the application did not satisfy the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment. In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress based on such a claim, we review the district court's fact-finding for clear error, and conclusions of law de novo. United States v. Kuc, 737 F.3d 129, 132 (1st Cir. 2013). 9 While the rule applies to omissions made with intentional or reckless disregard for the truth, see Burke, 405 F.3d at 81-82, we need not decide whether or not the omissions here were reckless or intentional, because either way, they do not undermine probable cause. -18- 1. Omitted Information About Corales and Semidey A warrant application must include sufficient information to establish probable cause both that a crime has been committed, and that evidence of the crime will be found in the place to be searched. United States v. Hicks, 575 F.3d 130, 136 (1st Cir. 2009). Burgos argues that the application for the warrant was deficient because it omitted material information undermining the credibility of Semidey and Corales, whose statements comprised much of the information in the affidavit. Burgos again argues that the affidavit did not explain the nature of Semidey's relationship with Burgos or her potential motivations for serving as an informant, nor the fact that Corales was a disgraced former cop with a history of perjury and multiple felony convictions. The affidavit provided the following as a basis for probable cause: • Semidey's statements to a DEA agent that Burgos had confronted her with a rumor that she was an informant, and had threatened to kill her; • Semidey's statements that if she ever disappeared, law enforcement should look for her on Burgos' farm; • Observations of Burgos having an employee rigorously wash the interior of his car in the rain two days after Semidey disappeared and shortly after the police contacted him with questions about Semidey; -19- • High call volume from Burgos' phone to Semidey's that stopped the night of her disappearance, followed by a single call to her number after the police contacted him about her disappearance; • Visual observations by Iglesias of what appeared to be a newly turned area of earth in the approximate dimensions of a grave on the farm; • A recording of a call between Burgos and co-conspirator Radamés Castillo-Martinez (Castillo) in which Castillo said he was concerned that something might have happened to Burgos because of this girl; • Statements by Corales and Castillo that Burgos knew Semidey was an informant; • Several statements by Corales, identified in the affidavit as CS #2, recounting conversations in which Burgos said he was not concerned to hear that co- conspirator Castillo had been arrested because he was confident that the police were not going to find Semidey; that the DEA would have arrested him by then if it could; and that he didn't understand how Semidey could have cause[d] damage to him after he had paid her bills and her children's living expenses;10 10 Corales volunteered to serve as an informant in December 2005, after he learned that co-conspirator Castillo had been arrested on charges related to their preparations to import cocaine -20- • A conversation between Corales and Burgos in which Burgos said that Semidey's body won't appear and that [t]hey can look for her in Yauco, Ponce, and Mayaguez and they're not going to find her. In the conversation, Burgos and Corales also made plans to bury a stolen boat on the farm. (This conversation was recorded, although the affidavit does not make that clear.); • Corales' statement that he believed Semidey may be buried on the farm. This evidence clearly suffices to establish probable cause, even considering the affidavit in light of the omitted information about Semidey and Corales. In particular, the credibility of Semidey's statements that Burgos had threatened her are not undercut by the kind of information that might cast doubt on her credibility with regard to Burgos' drug activities. When informant Jane reports that target John threatened to kill her because John learned that Jane is an informant, and Jane then disappears after last being seen getting into John's car, after which John is seen washing the car in a rainstorm, it almost goes without saying that there exists probable cause to conduct further investigations into John no matter what one thinks about Jane's motives for serving as an informant. See United States v. Hibbard, 963 F.2d 1100, 1101-02 (8th Cir. 1992) (upholding a warrant from the Dominican Republic. -21- authorizing the search of defendant's residence for the whereabouts of a missing person based entirely on the fact that the defendant had threatened the victim and that the victim was last seen in the defendant's presence). Whatever additional corroboration such statements might need is amply provided for by the recorded conversation between Burgos and Corales in which Burgos stated that Semidey was not going to appear. In short, nothing in the omitted evidence cast any material doubt on Semidey's statements relevant to the warrant application. As for Corales, the corroborating information not dependent on his credibility is sufficient to establish a nexus to the car and the farm. The search of the car was based primarily on agents' observations of Burgos having the car's interior washed in the rain two days after Semidey disappeared, and shortly after law enforcement went to Burgos house to attempt to question him. As for the farm, the affidavit established a nexus based on Semidey's statements that law enforcement should look for her body on the farm if she disappeared, as well as the recorded conversation in which Burgos and Corales agreed to bury a boat on the farm. Thus, even considering the affidavit in light of Corales' potential unreliability, there is a sufficient basis for probable cause. 2. Other Probable Cause Arguments Burgos makes several other arguments for why the warrant failed to establish probable cause. First, he points to certain -22- inaccuracies in the warrant's description of events. In particular, he argues that Iglesias' trial testimony regarding his observations of disturbed earth on the farm appear to vary from his description in the affidavit. As discussed above, however, probable cause existed even without the observation of the disturbed earth, so we need not delve into this argument. As for the car, Burgos attempts to build a probable cause challenge based on the fact that the affidavit described Burgos washing the inside of his vehicle with an employee, while testimony in the suppression hearing made clear that Burgos was actually supervising the employee and did not participate in the washing himself. Burgos argues that having a third party wash the car is inconsistent with an attempt to remove evidence of a crime, where one would expect great secrecy. However, the description of the car-washing in the affidavit does indicate that a third party, who seemed to be Burgos' employee, was involved, so this minor difference in how Iglesias described the event is not material. Finally, Burgos makes a staleness argument based on the passage of time between Semidey's disappearance in July 2005 and the government's application for a search warrant in December, after Corales agreed to cooperate. Burgos argues that even if there was probable cause to believe that there had once been evidence in the car, the affidavit did not include any reason to believe that it would have still remained six months later. An -23- allegation of staleness is evaluated not merely on how old the information is, but circumstances including the nature of the suspected crime, the character of the items to be seized, the habits of the suspect, and the nature of the premises to be searched. United States v. Bucuvalas, 970 F.2d 937, 940 (1st Cir. 1992), abrogated on other grounds by Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 18 (2000). Burgos cites no case where evidence was suppressed on the basis of a failure to state the common-sense notions that bodies often stay where they are disposed of, and that DNA evidence can last longer than six months, and we decline to announce such a rule here--particularly given that the passage of time without Semidey's reappearance made foul play appear increasingly more likely. 3. Particularity Burgos next argues that the search warrant violates the Constitutional requirement that a warrant must particularly describ[e] . . . [the] things to be seized. U.S. Const. amend. IV. The warrant authorizes a search for [e]vidence and trace evidence relevant to the homicide of Madelin Semidey-Morales in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1513. See also the attached affidavit, which is hereby incorporated and made part hereof. Burgos argues that evidence and trace evidence is insufficiently particular, and that the failure to define the kind of trace evidence sought was particularly egregious because -24- Iglesias admitted that he used the broad term precisely to avoid limiting the forensic analysis. Although federal courts do not generally uphold warrants authorizing the search for evidence of crime X unless that statement follows a list of illustrative examples, see United States v. Bithoney, 631 F.2d 1, 2-3 & n.1 (1st Cir. 1980), Burgos' argument fails because the warrant incorporates by reference the affidavit, which describes the target of the search as the person, or remains, of Madelin Semidey-Morales, evidence of the manner of her death and her personal effects. Affidavit language expressly incorporated by the warrant can satisfy the particularity requirement. See Rivera Rodríguez v. Beninato, 469 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2006); cf. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557-58 (2004) (collecting circuit cases allowing incorporation by reference and leaving open the possibility of incorporation). While there still exists some generality in terms like evidence of the manner of her death and her personal effects, this is a situation in which the circumstances of the crime make an exact description of the fruits and instrumentalities a virtual impossibility. United States v. Timpani, 665 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1981) (quoting Spinelli v. United States, 382 F.2d 871, 886 (8th Cir. 1967)). In such cases, the searching officer can only be expected to describe the generic class of items he is seeking. Id. (quoting Spinelli, 382 F.2d at 886). -25- 4. Compliance With Rule 41(e) Burgos next attacks the warrant on the grounds that the issuing magistrate failed to fill in two of the spaces on the preprinted warrant form: one for the date by which the warrant was to be executed, and one for the judge to whom the warrant should be returned. (The space on the form for the return date is followed by the parenthetical not to exceed 10 days.) Burgos argues that these omissions violate Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(e)(2)(A) (2009), which required the warrant to command the officer . . . to execute the warrant within a specified time not longer than 10 days and to return the warrant to the magistrate judge designated in the warrant, and that such violation mandates suppression.11 In United States v. Bonner, 808 F.2d 864 (1st Cir. 1986), we considered a different subdivision of Rule 41, one providing that officers must leave a copy of the warrant at the place to be searched. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(f)(1)(c).12 We held that because the subdivision is ministerial, a violation does not require suppression unless the defendant can demonstrate prejudice. Bonner, 808 F.2d at 869. Prejudice means being subjected to a search that might not have occurred or would not have been so 11 In 2009, Congress amended Rule 41(e), increasing to 14 days the time to execute the warrant. 12 At the time Bonner was decided, the subdivision was numbered 41(d). -26- abrasive had the rules been followed. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Other circuits have held the same applies to all the prerequisites of Rule 41. See United States v. Schoenheit, 856 F.2d 74, 76-77 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v. Burke, 517 F.2d 377, 386-87 (2d Cir. 1975). We have little trouble concluding that the prejudicial error rule of Bonner should extend to the failure by the issuing magistrate to define the time period of the search when the form itself provides that the search is to be completed within the time frame specified by the rule, and to the failure to designate a magistrate to whom the form should be returned. The exclusionary rule should be limited to those situations where its remedial objectives are best served, i.e., to deter illegal police conduct, not mistakes by judges and magistrates. Bonner, 808 F.2d at 867 (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 908, 916 (1984)). Burgos does not suggest why he was prejudiced by the warrant's technical failings. Absent a showing of prejudice, there is no basis for suppressing the evidence.13