Opinion ID: 2056781
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appellants' Points as Newly Discovered or Newly Revealed Facts or Law

Text: [¶ 35] Much of the support for the various Rule 60(b) motions is based on the premise that the significant information now offered was not available during the child protective proceeding and could not, with due diligence, have been discovered and presented or argued at the termination hearing. See M.R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2). That claim does not hold up to even superficial analysis.
[¶ 36] The mother's mental health issues were disclosed and addressed throughout the child protective proceeding, including the termination hearing. Nothing in the record suggested that the mother was incompetent to participate in those proceedings. In those proceedings the mother argued that she was addressing her mental health issues, that she was and would be a competent parent, and that she was, with assistance of counsel, competently participating in the proceedings. The mother did not change her position about her mental health issues or attempt to recant her testimony about abuse until more than a year after the final judgment when her appeal had been denied. Then, the new spin on her condition, incompetence, became convenient to support the effort to collaterally attack the termination judgment. [7] [¶ 37] The record reflects that the mother was beset by conflicting emotions and, sometimes, acted in ways contrary to her own and her child's best interests. Although subject to physical and mental abuse over a long period of time, and although her child was subject to physical and mental abuse by the father, the mother: (1) continued to expose her child to domestic violence; (2) regularly allowed the perpetrator access to the child despite court orders prohibiting such access; (3) continues to have contact with her abuser; and now, (4) in concert with her abuser, seeks to recant her prior testimony and statements that the father is an abuser, claiming that these statements were fabricated as a result of her mental illness. [¶ 38] This is a tragic pattern often seen in domestic violence cases. [8] It shows that the mother, the victim of domestic violence, faced emotional conflicts in her relationship with her abuser. But, contrary to the position argued by the mother and the father, the trial court could find that these conflicts did not render the mother mentally incompetent to participate in the proceedings and testify about the abuse. These conflicts did not require that the trial court accept the mother's efforts to recant her prior statements detailing the abuse of her and her son. The trial court properly rejected the mother's and the father's efforts to paint her as an incompetent in order to overturn the termination order.
[¶ 39] The trust fund resources potentially available to the child and the possible availability of kin for a kinship placement were certainly known and could have been disclosed in the child protective proceeding had the parties chosen to do so. [9] [¶ 40] In sum, the trial court could reasonably determine that the major points of new information or argument offered in support of the 60(b) motions were known to the parties during the child protective proceeding but not disclosed for strategic reasons. Rule 60(b) provides no opportunity to advance a new litigation strategy after-the-fact when an original trial strategy proved unsuccessful. See State v. Cleaves, 2005 ME 67, ¶ 13, 874 A.2d 872, 874; Teel v. Colson, 396 A.2d 529, 534 (Me.1979) (explaining that a party cannot shift ground on appeal and create new theories after being unsuccessful on a theory presented to the trial court).