Opinion ID: 2315948
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: adequacy of voir dire

Text: Defendant contends that the voir dire for the resentencing proceeding was inadequate in several respects. First, he argues that the trial court erred by failing to define murder for the jury panel and by refusing defense counsel's requests that potential jurors be asked in which types of cases they would be willing to impose the death penalty. According to defendant, those errors combined to deny him his constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury. Second, defendant argues that the court erred by refusing to inform potential jurors that defendant had prior murder convictions and by failing to probe whether knowledge of those convictions would impair their ability to determine punishment in accordance with the law. Essentially, defendant claims that the voir dire failed to identify jurors who would automatically sentence a triple murderer to death without considering evidence of mitigating factors. Because such jurors would have been excludable for cause, defendant contends that the trial court's ruling denied him his constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury. Finally, defendant contends that the exclusion for cause of Stephen Ficsor because he acknowledged that imposing the death penalty would be very difficult denied him his constitutional right to due process and a fair and impartial jury. Underlying those contentions, and the venue challenge discussed supra at 20-27, 594 A. 2d at 181-185, is the argument that the voir dire as a whole was insufficient in scope and depth to ensure sentencing by a fair and impartial jury. The contention relating to Ficsor is meritless. The questioning of that juror demonstrates that there was ample reason to doubt his ability to follow the law or to abide by his oath. He indicated dissatisfaction with the limited sentencing options available. He also could not say that he could sentence a person to death even in the case of a gruesome killing. The record indicates a sufficient basis for the trial court's decision that Ficsor's ability to act as a juror was substantially impaired within the meaning of Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed. 2d 841 (1985), and Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 65 L.Ed. 2d 581 (1980). See State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 256, 524 A. 2d 188. Although we do not rely on it, we also note that counsel did not object to the exclusion of Ficsor, nor did he request further questioning. We reject defendant's contention that the trial court abused its discretion by excusing Ficsor on the basis of such a sterile record. See State v. Hunt, supra, 115 N.J. at 357, 558 A. 2d 1259 (sound measure of discretion in trial court to determine whether potential juror's views would prevent or substantially impair his or her ability to decide sentence). Defendant's remaining arguments, however, present more difficult problems. Taken together, the alleged errors and omissions raise serious doubts about the efficacy of the jury-selection process. The similarities between this voir dire and the one addressed in Williams II, supra, 113 N.J. 393, 550 A. 2d 1172, are plentiful, obvious, and disturbing. That neither defendant nor the State exhausted its complement of peremptory challenges is of no consequence if the voir dire failed to produce sufficient information to allow counsel or the court to challenge prospective jurors intelligently, either for cause or peremptorily. As this Court stated in Williams II, counsel must be afforded the opportunity for a thorough voir dire to evaluate and assess jurors' attitudes in order to effectively participate in jury selection. If counsel is unable to screen out prejudice and bias, that inevitably leads to unfair juries. This result  or the possibility of this result  cannot be tolerated. [ Id. at 409, 550 A. 2d 1172 (emphasis added).] The right to a fair and impartial jury is guaranteed under both the federal and the state constitutions. U.S. Const. amends. VI & XIV; N.J. Const. art. I, para. 10. The protection afforded that fundamental right is heightened in capital cases. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 324 n. 84, 524 A. 2d 188. In Williams II, we were faced with the issue of whether the trial court had abused its discretion when it refused to ask jurors who favored the death penalty in some cases whether they would automatically favor the death penalty if the defendant had committed murder and rape, as alleged in the indictment. We held that the refusal to pursue that line of inquiry was serious error and a significant component of the deficiencies that necessitated reversal of both the sentence and the conviction of that defendant. 113 N.J. at 417, 550 A. 2d 1172. [I]t follows that a juror who will not, or cannot, consider relevant mitigating evidence pertaining to the defendant because the crime involves rape and murder is substantially impaired under the Adams- Witt test. Therefore, the failure to inquire into whether any juror could consider the mitigation evidence if it was established that defendant was guilty of rape and murder denies counsel and the trial court the tools with which to insure that the jury panel could fairly undertake its role in this case. [ Ibid. ] With the mere interchange of another murder for rape, that reasoning is equally applicable to the present circumstances. The State now argues that Williams II is somehow distinguishable on this issue. We disagree. In both cases, the line of questioning disallowed by the trial court related to a statutory aggravating factor the existence of which jurors are expected  indeed, if established, obligated  to consider in their sentencing deliberations. That the rape in Williams II was intertwined with the circumstances of the murder for which that defendant was being prosecuted, while the other murders to be considered in this case arose out of separate occurrences, is of no moment. Any distinction stems merely from the wording of the provisions enumerating the aggravating factors. Compare N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(g) (offense was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of    [a] sexual assault) with N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(a) (defendant has been convicted, at any time, of another murder). The inquiry in both cases goes beyond the level of precluding intrusion into the sentencing determination of non-specific-statutory aggravating factors. In Williams II, we recognized that the brutality of a rape and murder could blind venirepersons in the performance of their duties as jurors. Similarly, we are convinced that knowing a defendant had killed before could cause an otherwise fair-minded person to disregard evidence offered in support of mitigating factors. Cf. D. Baldus, G. Woodworth & C. Pulaski, Equal Justice and the Death Penalty 318-20 (1990) (reporting probability that sentence of death will be imposed increased by 520 percent for each prior murder conviction). The reasoning of Williams II is not limited to circumstances surrounding the murder for which a defendant is being prosecuted. Under the United States Constitution and our system of capital punishment, the sentencer must consider not only the circumstances of the particular offense but also the character and record of the individual offender. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2991, 49 L.Ed. 2d 944, 961 (1976); accord Williams II, supra, 113 N.J. at 417, 550 A. 2d 1172. Hence, the voir dire should include questioning about evidence of aggravating factors that will be presented during the sentencing proceeding and that may with reasonable likelihood have such an effect on a prospective juror as to render him or her substantially impaired under the Adams-Witt standard. The State also argues that Williams II is distinguishable because there  unlike this case  defendant exhausted his allotment of peremptory challenges. That contention misperceives the problem created by the refusal to permit voir dire about the impact of other murder convictions on prospective jurors. By prohibiting that inquiry, the court denied counsel and the trial court the tools with which to insure that the jury panel could fairly undertake its role. Williams II, supra, 113 N.J. at 417, 550 A. 2d 1172. Whether defendant exhausted his allotment of peremptory challenges is not dispositive. The refusal to inquire about the effect of other murder convictions denied defendant the information necessary to exercise those challenges intelligently and effectively. Furthermore, the inquiry might have identified jurors who were unable to consider relevant evidence in support of mitigating factors when faced with a recurrent murderer. Such jurors would have been excusable for cause under our capital-punishment system. Ibid. In ruling that questioning concerning the impact of other murders is not required, the trial court concluded that such an inquiry would amount to shopping with the jurors to find out when their tendencies will be overborne to a point where they go for death. Although the court may have been correct in its characterization, it erred in its implicit conclusion that shopping is not permissible or appropriate. In fact, it is necessary. We return again to Williams II: Once the trial court has elicited from each juror sufficient information concerning that person's predilections    then counsel's ability to formulate and argue for excusal for cause is enhanced. More importantly, the trial court will have a more complete record on which to apply the Adams- Witt standard in granting or denying excusals for cause. This enhanced record is imperative to preserve society's interest in a fair trial. Greater disclosure will also undoubtedly aid both the defense and prosecution in the exercise of their respective peremptory challenges. [113 N.J. at 413, 550 A. 2d 1172.] As we recently stated in State v. Moore, 122 N.J. 420, 446, 585 A. 2d 864 (1991),  voir dire acts as a discovery tool. It is not enough just to ask jurors in a capital case whether the nature of the crimes would affect their ability to be fair in deliberating on a death sentence versus a term of years. The question is correct so far as it goes, but it really invites only one answer. [ Id. at 449, 585 A. 2d 864.] In Moore we explained that State v. Manley, 54 N.J. 259, 255 A. 2d 193 (1969), does not compel such a limited voir dire. In Manley the Court revised the procedures for conducting voir dire in response to abuse of such procedures by counsel: The impression is inescapable that the aim of counsel is no longer exclusion of unfit or partial or biased jurors. It has become the selection of a jury as favorable to the party's point of view as indoctrination through the medium of questions on assumed facts and rules of law can accomplish. [ Id. at 281, 255 A. 2d 193.] The new procedures returned to the trial court the primary responsibility for conducting voir dire. We held in Biegenwald II, supra, 106 N.J. at 29, 524 A. 2d 130, that those revised procedures applied to capital-murder cases. Regrettably, we perceive from the records in many of the cases coming before us that trial courts have read Manley, in conjunction with Adams and Witt, to limit voir dire to the bare minimum necessary to qualify a juror. See State v. Dixon, 125 N.J. 223, 593 A. 2d 266 (1991); State v. Moore, supra, 122 N.J. at 445, 585 A. 2d 864 (One of the problems that we have in capital cases is that the constitutionally-limited Adams-Witt standard for disqualification of jurors in capital cases    gets confused with the more general inquiry into juror predispositions or preferences that should mark the general jury-selection process.). The procedures set forth in Manley and those approved by Adams and Witt are minimum requirements. Blind adherence to those standards and procedures does not necessarily produce a thorough and searching voir dire. An adequate voir dire should incorporate the suggestions of Williams II and Moore with an eye toward providing counsel and the court with the tools necessary to perform their respective tasks comprehensively and intelligently. We note in this case that the State, to its credit, acknowledged the need for inquiry about other murder convictions during voir dire. It brought the opinion in Williams II to the trial court's attention and even went so far as to submit a proposed question for the court to use: As I previously advised you, the decision as to what is the appropriate penalty in connection with this matter will depend upon the existence of aggravating factors and mitigating factors and you will then weigh these as I will instruct you at the end of this case. The legislature has listed a number of aggravating factors and has also listed a number of mitigating factors. One of the aggravating factors the legislature has listed and the State contends exists is that the defendant    had been previously convicted of murder. Could you consider the mitigating evidence even if the State proved that the defendant had previously been convicted of murder? Without endorsing the exact question proffered by the prosecution or suggesting that a single question can accomplish the task, we are impressed with the obvious merit of the State's proposal. In light of Williams II  and particularly in light of the positions of the parties  the trial court's refusal to inquire about the impact that knowledge of other murder convictions would have on the ability of prospective jurors to credit or consider the evidence in mitigation is mystifying. The refusal to permit questioning on the impact of other murder convictions during voir dire constitutes serious error. Such error, however, is not irremediable. Defendant's sentence may be upheld if the voir dire was otherwise so thorough and probing as to ensure that the jurors empaneled had the capacity to credit the evidence in mitigation, State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 123, 154, 548 A. 2d 887 (1988) ( Bey II), and the ability to perform their duties in accordance with the court's instructions and their oaths, see Adams v. Texas, supra, 448 U.S. at 45, 100 S.Ct. at 2526, 65 L.Ed. 2d at 589. On reviewing the jury-selection process as a whole, we conclude that it was constitutionally flawed. Notwithstanding the broad discretionary powers vested in the trial court regarding the jury-selection process, Biegenwald II, supra, 106 N.J. at 37, 524 A. 2d 130; State v. Jackson, 43 N.J. 148, 160, 203 A. 2d 1 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 982, 85 S.Ct. 690, 13 L.Ed. 2d 572 (1965), we have suggested several ways of ensuring an efficacious voir dire, particularly in capital cases. The near-total absence here of use of methods recommended for conducting voir dire leaves us unable to conclude that defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury was not abridged. In Williams II, supra, 113 N.J. 393, 550 A. 2d 1172, and Williams I, supra, 93 N.J. 39, 459 A. 2d 641, we suggested several approaches to conducting an adequate voir dire in capital cases. We identified the use of open-ended questions as an important ingredient in the death-qualification inquiry. Williams II, supra, 113 N.J. at 413, 550 A. 2d 1172. We also endorsed the practice of providing prospective jurors with an outline of this state's death penalty statute and questioning them regarding their opinions of the statute. Id. at 412-13 n. 5, 550 A. 2d 1172. We indicated that posing hypothetical examples to probe how various factors might affect a person's decisionmaking process is proper. Ibid. Particularly revealing in relation to defendant's contentions about the failure to define murder is the following: Knowledge about what constitutes capital murder    and the use of the aggravating and mitigating factors scheme during sentencing will enable all potential jurors to answer questions concerning the death penalty free of misconceptions and faulty assumptions concerning how the law is administered in this state. [ Ibid. ] In Williams I, we were presented with the conflict between a defendant's right to a fair trial and the media's right of access to newsworthy occurrences. We suggested as an alternative to closure of the proceedings that the trial court should consider the efficacy of more exhaustive and searching voir dire examinations. The Court in conducting the voir dire should be particularly responsive to the requests of counsel regarding the examination of prospective jurors [concerning] potential bias. 93 N.J. at 68, 459 A. 2d 641. Indeed, we have noted that in capital cases trial courts should be especially sensitive to permitting attorneys to conduct some voir dire. Biegenwald II, supra, 106 N.J. at 30, 524 A. 2d 130. Finally, we have indicated that the court should consider whether there should be a greater willingness to resolve doubts in favor of the defendant in excusing jurors for cause. Williams I, supra, 93 N.J. at 68, 459 A. 2d 641. The voir dire in this case, as in many other cases, proceeded in a consistent, if not monotonous, pattern. After the prospective jurors had completed the questionnaire, the court conducted individual examinations beginning with review of the answers on the questionnaire. Most potential jurors were questioned concerning their prior knowledge of Biegenwald or cases involving him. Each person was asked for his or her views on the death penalty. The court then followed up with questions concerning the potential juror's ability to follow the law as instructed. The court also questioned prospective jurors concerning their willingness to credit psychiatric testimony. Questioning by counsel was minimal and proceeded almost entirely through the court. On at least eight occasions, the court rejected defense counsel's request, based on the potential juror's response to the individualized questioning, for additional inquiry about a venireperson's views on the death penalty. That is in addition to rejecting defense counsel's request for such questioning as a matter of course. A review of the voir dire of juror Mitchell provides a sense of the court's approach to death qualification: Q All right. The obligation of the jurors here in this trial is a limited one as I explained, has to do with which penalty is appropriate to this situation based upon aggravating factors that are presented and mitigating factors that are presented unless those words throw you, I don't think they should, but aggravating factors would be those things which would tend to lean you towards the death penalty, mitigating factors would tend to lean you away from the death penalty and toward life imprisonment with no parole for 30 years, those are the two options? A Yes. Q Since death is a possible option, what do you think generally about the death penalty? A It applies in certain cases and sometimes it doesn't, it's not something that I have taken a position on definitely, that it goes or doesn't go in cases. Q There are some people conscientiously think the death penalty should never be imposed and they are entitled to that view. That's not your view? A No. Q There are also some folks who are more, if you will, hard-nosed and they would say if there is a murder involved whoever is convicted of that murder should get the same penalties, death penalty. Are you of that persuasion? A No, I think you have to weigh each case by its merits. Q Okay, part of the evidence that will be presented to you is that of Dr. Eshkenazi, I mentioned his name yesterday, he's a psychiatrist. Anything about psychiatric testimony which you think is less worthy of acceptance than maybe other kind of medical testimony? A No, sometimes, in some cases it's very valid. Q At the end of the case after you have heard all the evidence on the aggravating and mitigating factors, I'll be explaining to all the jurors who sit how they should handle those and what principals [sic] of law apply to the decision. I tell you that your obligation under your oath is to accept the law as I explain it and not to substitute for it your own views as to what you think the law is or what it ought to be, you think you can do that? A Yes, sir, I do. Q Sitting there now and knowing it's important to all of us, you think that if you are selected as a juror on this case you would be able to sit, listen in that open minded way that I have described before, make your evaluation and then decide what is the appropriate penalty and do that fairly, objectively and conscientiously? A I believe so. THE COURT: Any additional questions of the prospective juror?         MR. DIAMOND: Judge, before the next witness is called, I seem to have a problem, not with you, your Honor, but the answer, the nature of the answer that a lot of them are giving is always the same answer. It would depend upon the facts and it just seems to me there is a coachment in there like I believe it's Mr. Sacchi who said before that, you know, he wouldn't want somebody who has come out of jail and he heard [sic: hurt] somebody else again, I have the terrible feeling in my mind, it depends upon the facts, depends upon the facts that he murdered more than one person. THE COURT: Depends upon the murder, depends upon the circumstances, but their answer is their answer, you know, you may not like that answer but it's absolutely the correct answer. MR. DIAMOND: I agree, I realize it's the correct answer for the person and if it's all of them who believe anybody who kills more than once, then there's no question in my mind, it's a tough thing, I know it's a tough thing. I wonder if there's something we could ask them what they mean by that. If they could elaborate on that aspect a little bit more. THE COURT: You come up with a question, give it to me sometime. MR. DIAMOND: The question is simply, Judge, depending on the circumstances, what are the circumstances? THE COURT: No, because then I'm shopping with them. They will say gee, if he stabbed him in the back 16 times or  MR. DIAMOND: It's not a question of shopping, you are asking them already the simple question that can you sit on a murder case and do you feel you would always vote for the death penalty or you would never vote for it? Once you asked that question you are in the market place. This question of shopping only applies if we're going to go up and down the scale. It's not like it's a mark-down today and it's going to be four murders tomorrow. Always going to be three murders, no shopping involved at all. We know there are three murders, they should be allowed to know there are three. At least ask them if under certain circumstances, they may have some outlandish reason, if they all seem to say if a person killed somebody more than once and not put to death, then we're going to do it this time. That's not shopping. We know the specific amount, we're not haggling over the price, there's three murders. If you are not going to do that, at least ask them what they mean when they say special circumstances on their mind already, it's not a shopping expedition. THE COURT: Okay, you speak in colorful language, I'm satisfied the questioning so far is in accordance with constitutional mandates and I'm not going to go beyond that as you suggest unless there's something in the specific answer, not that general answer which is, you know, God knows the right answer, we assume most people are that way, that they are willing to weigh and it will depend upon the circumstances, that's the right answer. I'm not going to ask them what kind of circumstances would cause you to go one way or another. No, I'm not going to do that. MR. DIAMOND: Well, would you ask  THE COURT: No more, I have ruled. MR. DIAMOND: Stop you from weighing  THE COURT: Don't keep coming back at me with another if. I have ruled. The suggestion in the colloquy that there is a correct answer to the open-ended question what are your views on the death penalty? is most troubling. Although such an open-ended question is undeniably a proper jumping-off point for death qualification, the vapid response it depends on the circumstances in no way reduces the need for additional probing of a venireperson's views on the appropriateness of the sentence of death. The purpose of voir dire is not to elicit from a potential juror the correct answer; it is to draw out the potential juror's views, biases, and inclinations and to provide both counsel and the court the opportunity to assess the venireperson's demeanor. We reiterate that voir dire should proceed with the conscious object of providing court and counsel alike with sufficient information with which to challenge potential jurors intelligently  whether for cause or peremptorily. The court's initial open-ended question and variations on the it depends response were too often followed by closed-ended, suggestive questions that, not surprisingly, elicited the obvious correct response. For example, venireperson Black responded to the question what do you think about the death penalty? in this way: A Personally it's really more up to how the state of the victim was, the person was with the defendant, at the time was he mentally out of control, but I have no views, really, I don't go either way, never sat down and thought about killing somebody because of a crime. Q Well, are you saying that your judgment will depend upon what proofs are presented to you? A Yes. Q Depending upon the proofs, you could go either towards the death penalty or towards life imprisonment one way or the other? A Yes. Q All right. As I said to the jurors, what will be presented will be evidence on what are called aggravating factors and mitigating factors, those are big words, really come down to pluses and minuses as to the individual, Mr. Biegenwald. Do you think you could listen to all the pluses and minuses and then under the law as I'll explain it decide what the right penalty should be? A Yes. [Emphasis added.] The court invited additional questions from counsel, but defense counsel declined. Ms. Black was later excused peremptorily by the State. In one instance, when the response of the venireperson raised the issue of the impact of another murder conviction, the court did assure itself that the potential juror would remain open to the option of life imprisonment. Venireperson Russo answered the general query concerning his views on the death penalty this way: A I think it's good in some ways, if a person is  I mean has committed a murder, I mean if it's so strict they have committed more than one murder, I do believe in the death penalty, I think that's the right way. Q If they have committed more than one murder? A Yes. Q So that you would be inclined towards the death penalty if that were presented to you? A Yes. Q If it were presented to you, would that mean that you wouldn't pay any attention to what the mitigating evidence was? A No, I mean, the factors are there that it was to a certain degree more brutal than another murder per se, I wouldn't lean more towards the death penalty. Q But even with another murder in your words, would you still be willing to listen and open to the possibility that the mitigating factors might still outweigh even that? A Oh, yes, I'd listen, yes. Q So even with another murder, it's possible, I think from what you said, you still could vote for life imprisonment with no parole for at least 30 years? A Yes. Q Depending upon what you hear? A Yes. Q Understand I'm not trying to lead this perspective [sic] juror but that's the way I hear him saying his responses to me. At the end of the case I'll be explaining what the law is, how the jury is to approach their decision, that's really what the law comes down to. Do you believe you'd be willing to accept that law as I explain it without tinkering with it in your own mind to suit your own views? A Yes. Defense counsel excused Russo peremptorily. Were that method of questioning employed throughout the voir dire process, our result might well be different. Unfortunately, we find that the death-qualification questioning of Mr. Russo was the exception and the interrogation of Ms. Black is representative of the normal course. The error of refusing to probe more thoroughly the death-penalty views of the jurors was compounded by the absence of indoctrination on the applicability of the death penalty and the crime of murder. The court identified the basis for Biegenwald's murder conviction during the general voir dire: To assist you in answering some of the questions it will be necessary that you have some understanding of the charge that was contained in the Indictment upon which Richard Biegenwald has been found guilty of murder. The Indictment in that regard reads that Richard Biegenwald, on or about the 28th or 29th day of August, 1982, in the City of Asbury Park, did commit the crime of murder of a girl by the name of Anna Olesiewicz. Her name will come up and that's the charge and he's been found guilty of that. He did that. When the response of a venireperson indicated a possible misunderstanding of the law, the court attempted to clarify by disclosing that a death sentence could be imposed only on a defendant convicted of murder. Although we agree with the observation of the State that murder is not such an uncommon occurrence in our society, we do not accept the proposition that the average juror should be expected to be capable of drawing the legal distinction between capital murder and other killings. In fact, the responses of more gregarious venirepersons suggest that without instruction, they are not so capable. One prospective juror indicated that the death penalty would be appropriate in some cases but not for accidental killings. Another indicated that her decision would depend on whether the defendant was mentally out of control. The death-qualification questioning of venireperson Luzzati demonstrates the potential prejudice that could arise from the failure to educate potential jurors: [Q] What are your own views of the death penalty if we might ask? A It's how serious the crime was, if it was cold blooded murder, I feel that his life should be taken, too. If it was an accident, that's something totally different. Q If it's an accident it's not murder. A I don't know what the circumstances were. Q There's no such thing as accidental murder. A That's the way I feel about it. Q All right. Are you saying then that if it's a real murder, the death penalty ought to be imposed? A From what I can understand, just from what you had told us. Q No, what I told you was there were two options, that's what I told you. A I feel if it was intentional, then his life should be taken, too. Q You can't have a murder without it being intentional? A Then his life should be taken. Mr. Luzzati was excused; however, the exchange evinces the danger inherent in a procedure wherein equivocal answers to the initial open-ended question were followed by lengthy questions that suggested the correct response. To admonish a potential juror that we're talking only about murder here is ineffective in the absence of an explanation of the meaning of murder under New Jersey law. In common parlance, murder and killing are interchangeable. Murder as used in the criminal-law system has a precise meaning, and capital murder is even more narrowly circumscribed. With the notable exception of the court's initial question concerning a venireperson's views on the death penalty, the routine examination consisted of a series of leading, closed-ended questions. Although the court invited follow up from counsel, it refused to allow such inquiry at critical points. The court failed to educate the potential jurors concerning the laws of New Jersey relating to murder and capital punishment except in the most general terms. It rejected hypothetical questions designed to draw out bias and predisposition. We acknowledge the paucity of objection by defense counsel. However, whatever lack of zealousness and vigor one might ascribe to defense counsel in no way diminishes our duty to ensure that defendant is sentenced by a fair and impartial jury, each member of which is capable of considering evidence in support of aggravating and mitigating factors before reaching a conclusion on the appropriate punishment. The lapses in the voir dire employed here foreclose a conclusion that jury members were properly death-qualified. The right to a fair trial must be diligently protected to insure that all defendants, regardless of the crime charged or the weight of the evidence produced, are tried by a fair and impartial jury. Williams II, supra, 113 N.J. at 409, 550 A. 2d 1172; accord Williams I, supra, 93 N.J. at 61, 459 A. 2d 641 (The death penalty is a categorical imperative for trial fairness.). No matter how convinced we may be of defendant's guilt, unless we are similarly convinced of the jury's impartiality, we cannot allow the death penalty to be imposed. When the basic procedure designed to assure that impartiality  challenges for cause, peremptory challenges, and a searching voir dire  are improperly applied so as to seriously weaken their combined effectiveness, a new trial is necessary. [ Williams II, supra, 113 N.J. at 445, 550 A. 2d 1172.] We are unable to conclude that the inadequacy of the death-qualification process was harmless error. Nor can we attribute that inadequacy to a strategic decision by defense counsel. See State v. Marshall, supra, 123 N.J. at 93, 586 A. 2d 85. Because the jury may have included members who were substantially impaired, the sentence must be set aside. Mu'Min v. Virginia, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 1899, 114 L.Ed. 2d 493 (1991), confirms that the subject of possible bias from pretrial publicity must be covered  which it was  but that questions specifically dealing with the content of what each juror has read [need not] be asked. Id. at ___, 111 S.Ct. at 1908. Here, not only was the specific question about the prior murder convictions rejected, but the subject was not covered sufficiently or almost at all. Justice Stein ignores the deficiencies that compound the error of not asking about the impact of the prior-murder-conviction factor  i.e., the lack of open-ended questions, hypothetical questions, prior-murder-conviction questions based on individual responses, and instruction on what constitutes capital murder in New Jersey. See post at 105, 594 A. 2d at 229 (Stein J., dissenting). The subject of possible blinding bias from that known factor  bias that would render a potential juror excludable for cause  simply was not covered. Hence, we do not read Mu'Min to compel a result different from ours. Finally, we recognize that our finding that defendant is entitled to voir dire potential jurors on the possible blinding impact of the c(4)(a) factor most likely will require a two-jury system for all capital cases in which the State seeks to prove that factor. That is because aggravating factor c(4)(a), unlike all other aggravating factors, is proved by evidence not generally admissible during the determination of guilt or non-guilt. See Evid.R. 55. One of the purposes of the bifurcated-trial system established by the New Jersey Death Penalty Act is to prevent the jury's determination of death-eligibility from being influenced by evidence relevant only to adjudgement of the appropriate sentence. See State v. Pinnell, 311 Or. 98, 121, 806 P. 2d 110, 116 (1991) (One of the purposes of the bifurcated trial is    to prevent the jury's verdict on [non-guilt] or guilt from becoming tainted by evidence of defendant's bad character that is admissible only in the penalty phase.). Although a single jury is preferable, the Legislature has explicitly provided for empaneling a separate jury for the sentencing proceeding on a showing of good cause. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(1); cf. State v. Long, 119 N.J. 439, 475, 575 A. 2d 435 (1990) (recognizing that other-crimes evidence admissible during guilt phase may be too prejudicial during penalty phase and be irremediable by a limiting instruction); State v. Moore, supra, 113 N.J. at 277, 550 A. 2d 117 (recognizing that when limiting instructions are insufficient to protect a defendant from prejudice from other-crimes evidence, court may have to impanel a new jury for the penalty phase). Prior-murder convictions are relevant to the determination of the appropriate sentence because the sentencing phase focuses in part on the character of the defendant. The guilt phase, however, is limited to a determination of what the defendant did. See United States v. Myers, 550 F. 2d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir.1977) (A concomitant of the presumption of innocence is that a defendant must be tried for what he did, not who he is.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 847, 99 S.Ct. 147, 58 L.Ed. 2d 149 (1978). Because of the prejudice that could be engendered by voir dire prior to the guilt phase about a defendant's other murder convictions that are not otherwise admissible as evidence during that portion of the case, see Evid.R. 55, that questioning should almost invariably come only after a jury has found a defendant death eligible. See Pinnell, supra, 311 Or. at 121, 806 P. 2d at 116 (finding that objective of a bifurcated trial was thwarted by voir dire before guilt phase that implied that defendant had previously been convicted of other crimes).