Opinion ID: 1879629
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: crossing a crossing

Text: Neb.Rev.Stat. § 39-655(1) (Reissue 1984) provides in pertinent part: Whenever any person driving a vehicle approaches a railroad grade crossing under any of the circumstances set forth in this section, the driver of such vehicle shall stop within fifty feet but not less than fifteen feet from the nearest rail of such railroad and shall not proceed until he can do so safely. The requirements of this subsection shall apply when: (a) A clearly visible electric or mechanical signal device gives warning of the immediate approach of a railroad train; .... (c) A railroad train approaching within approximately one quarter mile of the highway crossing emits a signal audible from such distance and such railroad train, by reason of its speed or nearness to such crossing, is an immediate hazard; or (d) An approaching railroad train is plainly visible and is in hazardous proximity to such crossing. Regarding the rules generally applicable to motorists approaching a railroad grade crossing, this court has consistently stated: `It is a well-established rule in Nebraska that a traveler on a highway, when approaching a railroad crossing, has a duty to look and listen for the approach of trains. He must look, where by looking he could see, and listen, where by listening he could hear, and if he fails without a reasonable excuse to exercise such precautions, then he is guilty of contributory negligence more than slight, as a matter of law, and no recovery can be had for damages resulting from a collision with a passing train....' Whitaker v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 218 Neb. 90, 94-95, 352 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1984). See, also, Wyatt v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 209 Neb. 212, 306 N.W.2d 902 (1981); Hegarty v. Campbell Soup Co., 214 Neb. 716, 335 N.W.2d 758 (1983); Thomas v. Burlington Northern R.R., Inc., 203 Neb. 507, 279 N.W.2d 369 (1979); Starlin v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 193 Neb. 619, 228 N.W.2d 597 (1975). When a motorist approaches a railroad crossing, with which the motorist is acquainted or conversant but for which the motorist's view is restricted or obstructed, the motorist has the duty to look and listen at a time and place where looking and listening will be effective to prevent an accident, and failure to observe this rule, without reasonable excuse for noncompliance, may be negligence. See, Neusbaum v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 162 Neb. 754, 77 N.W.2d 299 (1956); McQuin v. Missouri P.R. Corporation, 122 Neb. 423, 240 N.W. 515 (1932). In Bertrand v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, 160 So.2d 19, 21-22 (La. App.1964), the court characterized the dangerous trap doctrine applicable to railroad grade crossings: [I]f a crossing is unusually dangerous because the view of the motorist is so obstructed as to require that he place himself in a position of peril dangerously near the tracks, before he has a view of the oncoming train, the railroad company will be held liable, unless it can show that it took unusual precautions, such as reducing the speed of the train, or increasing its warnings and providing signaling devices, etc. The theory of this doctrine is that the railroad may not rely upon the duty of the motorist to stop and look, if the physical circumstances are such that stopping and looking will do the motorist no good. At a railroad crossing obstructed to an approaching motorist's view, the approaching motorist has no absolute duty to stop before traveling on the crossing, but such duty to stop exists where a reasonably prudent person in the exercise of ordinary care would have considered a stop necessary under the circumstances. See Pennington v. Southern Pac. Co., 146 Cal. App.2d 605, 304 P.2d 22 (1956). A rule similar to the immediately preceding was applied in Crabtree v. Missouri P.R. Co., 86 Neb. 33, 124 N.W. 932 (1910), a wrongful death action for a decedent who was run over and killed by Missouri Pacific's steam engine moving on a track obstructed by freight cars near the crossing on which the plaintiff's decedent, a 9-year-old girl, was walking. Background noise drowned the noise from defendant's engine, including the sound of the ringing bell and blowing whistle, and other traffic in the vicinity distracted the little girl on the crossing. 86 Neb. at 39, 124 N.W. at 934. A plaintiff's verdict was upheld against the railroad's appeal, and this court stated: The rule in this state is not that there is an absolute obligation upon a person crossing a railway track to stop, look and listen before attempting to cross, but, as laid down in Omaha & R.V.R. Co. v. Talbot, 48 Neb. 627 [67 N.W. 599], the duty of the traveler upon a public highway approaching a railroad crossing is to exercise ordinary care. If he goes upon a railroad crossing without first listening and looking for the approach of a train, without a reasonable excuse therefor ... and if such failure to look and listen contributes to the party's injury, he cannot recover. The qualifying words,  without a reasonable excuse therefor , are of great significance in this connection. If, as in this case, the view of approaching trains is obstructed by freight cars standing near the crossing, if the traveler's attention is distracted by moving trains upon other tracks, or by other sounds or sights, if no warning signals are given or lookouts stationed, it is a question for the jury as to whether or not the traveler exercised ordinary care. 86 Neb. at 44, 124 N.W. at 936. We do appreciate the predicament of the crew, who were charged with the responsibility of moving a mile-long freight train with dispatch and who were confronted with the stationary screen of railroad cars near the crossing, a trap set not by the train crew but by their employer. By the same token, we appreciate the problem facing a northbound motorist using the crossing, who might have to consider stopped in advance of the westbound main line, leave his vehicle on the crossing and perhaps blocking the eastbound main line, move to a point where the motorist could peer around the screen of cars parked on the center siding, and, on ascertaining there was no approaching westbound railroad traffic, return to his vehicle to continue the trek across the tracks, if his vehicle had not been hit by an eastbound train. Under the circumstances, the only absolute rule to prevent a train-vehicle accident on the crossing in question would be: When a train and a vehicle simultaneously approach an obstructed crossing, both shall come to a complete stop, and neither shall depart until the other has gone. That rule, however, is somewhat impractical. Union Pacific chides McCully's conduct, states that McCully violated § 39-655(1), asserts that unreliability of the crossing signals and presence of railroad cars on the center siding track required Mr. McCully to exercise greater care (brief for appellant at 25), and concludes that, as a matter of law, McCully was contributorily negligent, barring Andersons' recovery, because McCully was aware of the presence of the cars on the center siding track east of the crossing as he approached the crossing. Mr. McCully testified that while he was proceeding across the crossing his attention was focused on a truck approaching the crossing from the south [sic]. Neither the approaching truck nor the cars on the center siding track excused Mr. McCully from his duty to look, listen and stop for an approaching train. Brief for appellant at 33. As in the case of any other statute, applicability of § 39-655(1) depends on the particular factual setting. McCully did look twice to assure himself that no train was approaching and concurrently saw the southbound truck as it prepared to use the crossing. The parked railroad cars on the center siding may have caused a twofold effect in production of the accident. First, the stationary cars caused an optical distortion of approaching westbound trains. Second, the cars on the siding muted the sound of the engine's ringing bell and blowing whistle as well as prevented a northbound motorist's seeing the engine's lights. Acuity of a northbound motorist's hearing may have been dulled by the industrial din at the crossing. Of no small import is the continually malfunctioning flasher-signal with its false warning, a lighted Lorelei luring motorists onto the crossing where they had to make a necessarily belated determination whether train traffic was approaching. To obtain the continuous panoramic view of the crossing, as Union Pacific would requie, a motorist must look to the east for an approaching westbound train, then ahead for oncoming vehicular traffic at or on the crossing, and, finally, to the west for an eastbound train. Upon completion of that sequence, the motorist would have to immediately reverse the cycle or repeat the sequence, all within a millisecond or less for oscillation of the motorist's head, to assure observation of any possible or probable danger in every sector of the crossing. The more realistic approach to a situation such as that in the present case is the rule applied in Crabtree v. Missouri P.R. Co., 86 Neb. 33, 124 N.W. 932 (1910), namely, if there is a reasonable excuse for not seeing the approaching train, such as an obstruction preventing one from seeing the train or a distraction diverting the attention, the question whether conduct in traversing a railroad crossing is reasonable is a matter for the jury. In view of the variables and conditions inherent in the setting for the crossing accident in this case, we cannot conclude that McCully's conduct was unreasonable and, as a matter of law, was contributory negligence as a bar to Andersons' recovery. Under the circumstances, whether McCully's conduct was reasonable, that is, whether he exercised ordinary care and prudence in operating Andersons' semi, was a jury question. Since McCully's conduct presented a jury question, Union Pacific's claims of error regarding the district court's denying a summary judgment, directed verdict, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and new trial are without merit.