Opinion ID: 1144069
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the Trial Judge's Modification of Instruction D-6 Constituted a Reversible Error?

Text: Before reaching the merits of Davis' contention, this Court considers whether Davis' failure to object to Instruction D-6 resulted in a waiver of his right to present the issue on appeal. The State explains that the prosecutor objected to the instruction offered by Davis. In response to the prosecutor's objection, the trial judge amended the instruction by striking a portion of it and then granted it without any objection from Davis. The State contends that Davis' failure to object to the amended version constituted a waiver. Bieller v. State, 275 So.2d 97 (Miss. 1973). Davis did not address this point. This Court has repeatedly held that failure to object to a jury instruction constitutes a waiver. See, e.g., Barnett v. State, 563 So.2d 1377, 1380 (Miss. 1990); Watson v. State, 483 So.2d 1326, 1329 (Miss. 1989).
Procedural bar aside, this Court rejects Davis' contention on substantive grounds. Instruction D-6, as originally proposed by Davis, provides: The Court instructs the Jury that in reaching your verdict you are to consider all of the evidence concerning the entire case and the circumstances surrounding the crime. One of the issues in this case is the identification of George Lee Davis as the perpetrator of the crime. As with each element of the crime charged, the State has the burden of proving identity beyond a reasonable doubt, and before you may convict George Lee Davis you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the accuracy of the identification of George Lee Davis. If, after considering all of the evidence concerning the crime and the witness' identification of George Lee Davis as the person who committed the crime, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that he is the person who committed the crime, then you must find him not guilty. Identification testimony is an expression of belief or impression by the witness. You must judge its value and reliability from the totality of the circumstances surrounding the crime and the subsequent identification. In appraising the identification testimony of a witness, you should consider the following: 1) Did the witness have an adequate opportunity to observe the offender? 2) Did the witness observe the offender with an adequate degree of attention? 3) Did the witness provide an accurate description of the offender after the crime? 4) How certain is the witness of the identification? 5) How much time passed between the crime and the identification? If, after examining all of the testimony and the evidence, you have a reasonable doubt that George Lee Davis was the person who committed the crime, then you must find George Lee Davis not guilty. Vol. I, at 18 & 20 (italicization added). The italicized portion of the instruction represents that to which the prosecutor objected and which the trial judge struck. The objection was made because in one place it tells them to consider all the evidence, and then in the second part of it, it instructs them to consider these certain items as far as identification[; i]t's confusing on those grounds. Vol. II, at 73-74. Davis of course disagrees  albeit he failed to object to the judge's decision to strike the italicized portion. Davis contends that D-6 instructs the jury about identification and, at the same time, instructs the jury that its verdict should be based on all of the evidence concerning the entire case and the circumstances surrounding the crime. Appellant's Brief at 10 (citing Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972); United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir.1972); Clubb v. State, 350 So.2d 693 (Miss. 1977); Fells v. State, 345 So.2d 618 (Miss. 1977)). Davis adds that D-6 was an objective and fair attempt to have the jury instructed about the factors which this Court has deemed important in reviewing identification testimony. Appellant's Brief at 10 (citing Turner v. State, 478 So.2d 300, 302 (Miss. 1985); Robinson v. State, 473 So.2d 957, 962 (Miss. 1985)). Davis concludes that the judge's decision violated his constitutional right to a fair trial. The italicized portion is simply a clarification of the portion which was granted, and the prosecutor's complaint that it made the instruction confusing is untenable. The italicized portion was modeled (virtually verbatim) after model instructions composed by the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in Telfaire, 469 F.2d at 558. In short, the italicized portion correctly states our case law and could have been granted. This notwithstanding, this Court finds that the judge's decision was not erroneous. As noted, the italicized portion merely clarified the portion which was granted, and trial judges are not required to grant repetitious instructions. See, e.g., Ragan v. State, 318 So.2d 879, 882 (Miss. 1975) (The trial court is not required to grant several instructions on the same question in a different verbiage.) (citing numerous supportive cases). The deletion was harmless simply because Davis was not prejudiced. Contrary to Davis' unsubstantiated contention, the judge's decision to strike the italicized portion did not adversely affect his right to receive a fair trial. Moreover, Davis' guilt was proved beyond a reasonable doubt by the overwhelming weight of evidence  which leads to the third and final issue. Richardson v. State, 402 So.2d 848 (Miss. 1981) (holding that judge's erroneous refusal to grant instruction was harmless since identification of appellant as the burglar and his guilt of the crime were proved beyond reasonable doubt by overwhelming weight of evidence).