Opinion ID: 4521869
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of Defendant’s Recorded Jailhouse

Text: Statement with Shawn Smith On appeal, defendant raises numerous claims based on the admission of defendant’s surreptitiously recorded jailhouse statement, asserting that its admission constituted error of constitutional dimensions. Specifically, he raises claims based on his Sixth Amendment right to counsel (see Massiah v. United States (1964) 377 U.S. 201 (Massiah)), his Fifth Amendment right to counsel and privilege against self-incrimination, his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable detention, his rights under the Sixth Amendment’s confrontation clause (see Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 (Crawford)), as well as attendant protections under Evidence Code sections 352 and 1101. We discuss each challenge in turn.
On July 29, 2008, the day after Pamela was killed, defendant was arrested for her murder. After invoking his right to remain silent, defendant refused to speak to investigators and was released two hours later. On August 1, 2008, the federal indictment was unsealed, and defendant was arrested on the federal money licensing violation. Defendant was remanded into federal custody. On September 10, 2008, while in custody, defendant made incriminating statements about Pamela’s 9 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. murder to his cellmate, Shawn Smith.4 Smith was wearing a wire and recorded his conversation with defendant. Shortly before their conversation was recorded, Smith had told authorities that he was sharing a cell with defendant and that defendant had told Smith that he was involved in murdering his wife. Detective Abdul met with Smith and determined that additional investigation was necessary. Smith was outfitted with a “wire,” a recording device placed in the inside zipper on the crotch area of Smith’s pants. Detective Abdul instructed Smith to avoid the appearance of trying to elicit information from defendant and instead to have a regular conversation with him to see if defendant would “go ahead and reveal information that [defendant] had revealed before.” Though Detective Abdul could not recall “exactly what [he] said to Mr. Smith,” he testified he did not “counsel him on what to say.” He did, however, refer to a “previous conversation” with Smith, based on which Detective Abdul determined there was “no reason” to discuss with Smith what he should say to defendant. On September 15, 2008, the same day defendant was charged with Pamela’s murder, the federal government dismissed its indictment against defendant to avoid interfering 4 At the time, Smith was in custody awaiting sentencing for a conviction of possession with intent to sell cocaine. Smith had previously been convicted of: (1) conspiracy to distribute cocaine in 1987 and served 18 months in prison; (2) transporting and possession for sale a controlled substance in 1990; (3) possession of a controlled substance with the intent to sell in 2003; (4) driving under the influence and hit and run in 2003; and (5) hit and run in 2006. These convictions were introduced into evidence to impeach Smith’s credibility. 10 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. with the state’s murder investigation of defendant. Around the same time, although Smith was “facing a fairly substantial prison term,” he was released on unsecured bond and was later released early from custody. Detective Abdul, however, later testified that Smith’s release “had nothing to do with the state crime that [defendant] was charged with.” Before and during his trial, defendant made several unsuccessful challenges to the admission of his recorded jailhouse statement. The prosecution played the entire taperecorded statement to the jury. On September 12, 2011, after the jury returned a guilty verdict, defendant filed a motion for a new trial, in which he argued that the prosecution’s decision to rely on the recorded statement and not to call Smith to testify violated defendant’s rights under Crawford. The trial court denied the motion.
Counsel; Massiah Error On appeal, defendant argues that even though he had not yet been charged for Pamela’s murder, his Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached when he was in federal custody for the money licensing violation. On that point, he asserts the federal and state prosecutions were “inextricably intertwined” and that the federal prosecution was a “sham” to hold defendant in custody while state authorities investigated the murder case against defendant. Defendant maintains that because Smith was acting as an agent for the government, any statements Smith elicited from defendant were inadmissible under Massiah. For reasons that follow, we deny this claim. The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the 11 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. assistance of counsel for his defense.” (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; see Massiah, supra, 377 U.S. at p. 206.) This constitutional protection “guarantees the accused, at least after the initiation of formal charges, the right to rely on counsel as a ‘medium’ between him and the State.” (Maine v. Moulton (1985) 474 U.S. 159, 176; see Massiah, supra, 377 U.S. at p. 206.) The “clear rule of Massiah is that once adversary proceedings have commenced against an individual, he has a right to legal representation when the government interrogates him.” (Brewer v. Williams (1977) 430 U.S. 387, 401.) The high court has “pegged commencement to ‘ “the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings—whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.” ’ ” (Rothgery v. Gillespie County (2008) 554 U.S. 191, 198 (Rothgery); see Kirby v. Illinois (1972) 406 U.S. 682, 689-690.) Likewise, we have held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel “does not exist until the state initiates adversary judicial criminal proceedings, such as by formal charge or indictment.” (People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th l, 33 (DePriest); see People v. Viray (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1186, 1194.) By its terms, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is “offense specific. It cannot be invoked once for all future prosecutions, for it does not attach until a prosecution is commenced . . . . ” (McNeil v. Wisconsin (1991) 501 U.S. 171, 175 (McNeil); see Rothgery, supra, 554 U.S. at p. 198; People v. Cunningham (2015) 61 Cal.4th 609, 648; Maine v. Moulton (1985) 474 U.S. 159, 180.) The high court has made clear that there is no exception to this offense-specific requirement for uncharged offenses that are “ ‘ “closely related” ’ ” to or “ ‘ “inextricably intertwined” ’ ” with the charged offense. (Texas v. 12 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. Cobb (2001) 532 U.S. 162, 173; see People v. Slayton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1076, 1082-1083.) That said, “when the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches, it does encompass offenses that, even if not formally charged, would be considered the same offense under the Blockburger test.”5 (Texas v. Cobb, supra, 532 U.S. at p. 173, italics added.) Here, the state prosecution for Pamela’s murder had not yet commenced when defendant, who was in federal custody for the unrelated money licensing charge, made the incriminating remarks to Smith. Contrary to defendant’s suggestion, we have expressly endorsed, in recognition of the offense specific requirement, a “bright-line precharging rule against attachment of a Sixth Amendment right.” (DePriest, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 34.) Thus, “[a] defendant’s incriminating statements about offenses for which he has not been charged may be admitted consistently with his Sixth Amendment counsel guarantee notwithstanding its attachment on other charged offenses at the time.” (Id. at p. 33.) Defendant fails to persuade why the “bright-line precharging rule against attachment of a Sixth Amendment right” (DePriest, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 34), should not apply here. 5 Under Blockburger v. United States (1932) 284 U.S. 299, “ ‘the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.’ ” (Texas v. Cobb, supra, 532 U.S. at p. 173, quoting Blockburger, supra, 284 U.S. at p. 304.) As such, the high court also described the “Sixth Amendment as ‘prosecution specific,’ insofar as it prevents discussion of charged offenses as well as offenses that, under Blockburger could not be the subject of a later prosecution.” (Texas v. Cobb, supra, 532 U.S. at p. 173, fn. 3, italics added.) 13 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. For instance, notwithstanding the Sixth Amendment’s “offense specific” requirement (McNeil, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 175), defendant insists that state and federal authorities had “worked collectively” to ensure that defendant was detained without bail in the federal case, thus making the federal licensing charge “inextricably intertwined” with the state murder charge. In support, defendant relies on principles underlying the dual sovereignty doctrine in the Fifth Amendment double jeopardy context. (See Gamble v. United States (2019) __ U.S. __, ___[139 S.Ct. 1960, 1964] (Gamble) [“Under this ‘dual-sovereignty’ doctrine, a State may prosecute a defendant under state law even if the Federal Government has prosecuted him for the same conduct under a federal statute”].) Specifically, defendant emphasizes that the high court left open the possibility that double jeopardy principles may ban a successive state prosecution that serves as a “sham and a cover” for the federal prosecution. (Bartkus v. Illinois (1959) 359 U.S. 121, 124 (Bartkus).) By analogy, defendant argues that the federal prosecution for the licensing violation was in fact a “sham” used to detain defendant while the state investigated Pamela’s murder. He maintains, therefore, that his arrest and federal detention prohibited any questioning on the state murder case. Even assuming that the dual sovereignty doctrine applies in the Sixth Amendment context (see U.S. v. Coker (1st Cir. 2005) 433 F.3d 39, 45), and further, that the sham prosecution serves as a “potential exception” to this doctrine (Gamble, supra, 139 S.Ct. at p. 1994, fn. 3 (dis. opn. of Ginsburg, J.)), we conclude defendant’s claim lacks merit. As noted, the sham prosecution theory only applies to provide defendant relief if there were successive prosecutions by 14 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. two sovereigns for the same offense. (See Gamble, supra, 139 S.Ct. at p. 1964 [affirming dual sovereignty doctrine].) Here, the offenses—Pamela’s murder and the federal licensing charge— were clearly not the same. In fact, at his federal detention proceedings, defendant argued that the federal licensing charge and the as-yet charged murder were “unrelated” and “disconnected.” Nevertheless, we agree with defendant that both federal detention hearings focused heavily on facts surrounding Pamela’s murder and defendant’s possible involvement. To the extent defendant argues that federal and state authorities “worked collectively” to have him detained in federal custody, i.e., through sharing information about the murder and providing a “detention script” prepared by the LAPD, this level of cooperation and collaboration simply represents the “conventional practice between the two sets of prosecutors throughout the country” (Bartkus, supra, 359 U.S. at p. 123). “As Bartkus makes plain, there may be very close coordination in the prosecutions, in the employment of agents of one sovereign to help the other sovereign in its prosecution, and in the timing of the court proceedings so that the maximum assistance is mutually rendered by the sovereigns. None of this close collaboration amounts to one government being the other’s ‘tool’ or providing a ‘sham’ or ‘cover.’ ” (U.S. v. Figueroa-Soto (9th Cir. 1991) 938 F.2d 1015, 1020.) Further, even if state authorities deliberately delayed arresting defendant for Pamela’s murder, which purportedly gave them more time in which to elicit defendant’s incriminatory statements in federal custody, this “conscious delay” does not violate his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. (People v. Webb (1993) 6 Cal.4th 494, 527 [no Massiah violation where investigators told wife to 15 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. “intensify her questioning” of defendant about capital crimes while defendant was incarcerated on unrelated charges].)6 Finally, defendant relies on Elkins v. United States (1960) 364 U.S. 206, to argue specifically that concepts of due process and fundamental fairness dictate that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached. Not so. Elkins’s abrogation of the “silver platter” doctrine—which previously allowed evidence obtained by a state agent’s unreasonable searches or seizures to be used in a federal trial—does not have any application here. (Elkins, supra, 364 U.S. at p. 222.) As discussed above, we reject defendant’s assertion that federal authorities acted improperly in detaining defendant; thus, the high court’s concerns of “subterfuge and evasion with respect to federal-state cooperation in criminal investigation” are not realized in this case. (Ibid.) Based on these reasons, we reject defendant’s claim that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached to the uncharged murder when he made the incriminating statements in federal custody. (See Texas v. Cobb, supra, 532 U.S. at p. 173.) 6 Because it is clear that defendant’s Sixth Amendment right had not attached when he made the incriminating statements to Smith, it is unnecessary to address, for purposes of defendant’s Massiah claim, whether Smith “(1) was acting as a government agent, i.e., under the direction of the government pursuant to a preexisting arrangement, with the expectation of some resulting benefit or advantage, and (2) deliberately elicited incriminating statements.” (In re Neely (1993) 6 Cal.4th 901, 915.) Whether Smith’s allegedly coercive actions rendered defendant’s statements involuntary, however, is an issue we discuss below. (See post, at pp. 18-20.) 16 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
Self-incrimination Defendant also claims that when authorities placed Smith in defendant’s cell to ask him pointed questions about Pamela’s murder, this violated his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. (U.S. Const., 5th Amend. [“nor shall [any person] be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself”]; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15; see Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436; Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 484-485.) Specifically, defendant maintains that he invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel when taken into federal custody for the money licensing violation and that he thereby invoked his Fifth Amendment right as to this murder case. We agree with defendant that unlike the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, his Fifth Amendment right is not offense specific. (Arizona v. Roberson (1988) 486 U.S. 675, 685.) That said, even if defendant properly invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel on July 29 when first arrested for Pamela’s murder the intervening passage of time along with defendant’s release and break in custody meant that his invocation did not remain in force on September 10 when he made the incriminating statements to Smith. Further, the high court has held that at least where no prior invocation is in effect, ’“[c]onversations between suspects and undercover agents do not implicate the concerns underlying Miranda. The essential ingredients of a ‘police-dominated atmosphere’ and compulsion are not present when an incarcerated person speaks freely to someone whom he believes is a fellow inmate. Coercion is determined from the perspective of the suspect.” (Illinois v. Perkins (1990) 496 U.S. 292, 296.) In other words, “Miranda forbids coercion, not mere strategic deception by taking 17 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. advantage of a suspect’s misplaced trust in one he supposes to be a fellow prisoner. . . . [¶] Miranda was not meant to protect suspects from boasting about their criminal activities in front of people whom they believe to be their cellmates.” (Id. at pp. 297298 [defendant showed “no hint of being intimidated by the atmosphere of the jail” and “was motivated solely by the desire to impress his fellow inmates”]; see People v. Tate (2010) 49 Cal.4th 635, 685-686.) Defendant briefly asserts that Smith was a government agent who used coercive, deceptive, and overreaching tactics to elicit defendant’s incriminating statements in violation of due process. (See Miller v. Fenton (1985) 474 U.S. 104, 110 [notwithstanding Miranda’s prophylactic protections, “the Court has continued to measure confessions against the requirements of due process”]; see also Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 288 [“fear of physical violence, absent protection from his friend (and Government agent) . . . motivated Fulminante to confess”].) “The use of deceptive statements during an investigation does not invalidate a confession as involuntary unless the deception is the type likely to procure an untrue statement.” (People v. McCurdy (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1063, 1088; see People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 649-650.) “ ‘A statement is involuntary if it is not the product of “ ‘a rational intellect and free will.’ ” [Citation.] The test for determining whether a confession is voluntary is whether the defendant’s “ will was overborne at the time he confessed.” ’ ” (People v. McWhorter (2009) 47 Cal.4th 318, 346-347.) Though the details of their conversation prior to Smith wearing a wire are unknown, it is clear that defendant and Smith had already talked about enlisting Smith’s made up hitman, “Tony,” to kill Moya. While Smith may have prodded 18 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. defendant to speak at times, the record does not support that defendant’s will was overborne when he expressed he wanted Moya killed. For instance, defendant told Smith he did not “want to be worrying about this every fuckin’ minute of the day when I’m out there” and that he did not want to “sit around here for the rest of my life and worry about whether one of them is gonna fuckin’ finally decide to fess up.” Defendant purportedly drew Smith a detailed layout of his ranch to ensure the hitman went to the right house to kill Moya. Further, when an officer passed their cell as defendant and Smith were discussing these plans, defendant remarked: “We’re planning a fucking multiple homicide bitch. Leave us alone.” Our review of the recorded conversation reveals several instances where Smith asked defendant specific, and arguably leading, questions about Pamela’s killing, including probing whether it was defendant’s idea to take the company’s rented car which was used in the killing. Smith also appeared to ingratiate himself by expressing sympathy for defendant and commiserating with defendant on how Moya and his cohorts bungled Pamela’s murder. As the conversation went on, however, defendant confessed he wanted to kill Pamela himself, but “knew I’d never fuckin’ be able to get away with it. Never.” Certainly, Smith was much more than a passive listener. That said, we cannot conclude that Smith’s questions or tactics were likely to procure an untrue statement or were otherwise improper. (See Arizona v. Fulminante, supra, 499 U.S. at p. 287 [coercion due to “credible threat of physical violence” if defendant did not confess].) Though at times Smith coaxed and prodded defendant when he hesitated to speak, it is clear from 19 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. the record as a whole that defendant was neither compelled into revealing his role in Pamela’s murder, nor was he coerced into hiring a hitman to kill Moya. If the “ ‘decision is a product of the suspect’s own balancing of competing considerations, the confession is voluntary.’ ” (U.S. v. Miller (9th Cir. 1993) 984 F.2d 1028, 1031.)
Unlawful Search and Seizure Defendant argues that pursuant to the Bail Reform Act of 1984 (18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)), he should have been released on bail after his arrest on the federal licensing charge. Instead, because he was denied bail and remained in custody, that detention was unlawful, and any statements he made to Smith during that detention should be suppressed under the Fourth Amendment. Even assuming defendant was erroneously denied bail, he fails to demonstrate that the remedy for any violation of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 is to suppress the subsequent confession of the defendant. (See United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897, 916 [“exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates”]; see also Hudson v. Michigan (2006) 547 U.S. 586, 591 [“Suppression of evidence, however, has always been our last resort, not our first impulse”].) As such, we deny this claim.
On May 11, 2011, with one remaining witness left to testify at the guilt phase, the prosecution informed the trial court that they would not be calling Smith to the stand. The trial court permitted the prosecution to lay the foundation for the recorded conversation between Smith and defendant through Detective Abdul’s testimony. Detective Abdul testified 20 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. that he placed a recording device on Smith’s person. After defense counsel recounted Smith’s criminal history, Detective Abdul replied he did not know “how extensive his criminal history was.” Detective Abdul denied offering Smith any advantage or reward for cooperating with authorities and also denied counseling Smith on what to say to defendant. However, the detective admitted he knew that at the time of the recorded conversation, Smith was awaiting sentencing and “facing a fairly substantial federal prison term” after pleading guilty to selling cocaine to an undercover agent. After Detective Abdul testified, the jury heard (and later received a transcript of) the entirety of the recorded conversation. In admitting the transcript and tape of the recorded conversation into evidence, the trial court concluded Smith’s statements were not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted and were, therefore, admissible as nonhearsay. As to defendant’s recorded statements, the trial court found that while the statements constituted hearsay, they were admissible under the exception for an admission against penal interest. Outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel raised a “standing objection”—i.e., referring to previously raised objections based on the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution—to the admission of the recorded conversation between Smith and defendant. Defense counsel also specifically raised a hearsay objection based on Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. 36 and requested that the court give a clarifying instruction on the jury’s permitted use of Smith’s statements. The trial court told defense counsel to draft an appropriate instruction, which the court said it would take up later. 21 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. On appeal, defendant focuses on Smith’s statements, the admission of which he claims violated his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation and the restrictions against testimonial statements. (Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 59; U.S. Const., 6th Amend. [“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him”]; see Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 7, 14 & 15.) Claiming prejudice, defendant asserts Smith’s statements were the “force majeure” of the prosecution’s case, without which there would be little evidence against defendant. Generally speaking, a declarant’s hearsay statement is testimonial if made “with a primary purpose of creating an outof-court substitute for trial testimony.” (Michigan v. Bryant (2011) 562 U.S. 344, 358.) Notwithstanding the lack of a comprehensive definition of “testimonial” (Ohio v. Clark (2015) __ U.S. __, __ [135 S.Ct. 2173, 2179]), the high court has nonetheless emphasized that only hearsay statements that are “testimonial” are subject to the confrontation clause. (Davis v. Washington (2006) 547 U.S. 813, 821; Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 53 [“even if the Sixth Amendment is not solely concerned with testimonial hearsay, that is its primary object”].) “It is the testimonial character of the statement that separates it from other hearsay that, while subject to traditional limitations upon hearsay evidence, is not subject to the Confrontation Clause.” (Davis v. Washington, supra, 547 U.S. at p. 821; see People v. Cage (2007) 40 Cal.4th 965, 984.) The admission of nonhearsay statements, it follows, “raises no Confrontation Clause concerns.” (Tennessee v. Street (1985) 471 U.S. 409, 414; see Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 59, fn. 9; People v. Cage, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 975, fn. 6; Evid. Code, § 1200.) 22 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. With this legal backdrop, we have set out a two-step inquiry to determine the admissibility of out-of-court statements in criminal cases: “The first step is a traditional hearsay inquiry: Is the statement one made out of court; is it offered to prove the truth of the facts it asserts; and does it fall under a hearsay exception? If a hearsay statement is being offered by the prosecution in a criminal case, and the Crawford limitations of unavailability, as well as cross-examination or forfeiture, are not satisfied, a second analytical step is required. Admission of such a statement violates the right to confrontation if the statement is testimonial hearsay, as the high court defines that term.” (People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 680; see People v. Blacksher (2011) 52 Cal.4th 769, 811 (Blacksher).) In the context of an interrogation, as used in the colloquial and not legal sense, “ ‘it is in the final analysis the declarant’s statements, not the interrogator’s questions, that the Confrontation Clause requires us to evaluate.’ . . . An interrogator’s questions, unlike a declarant’s answers, do not assert the truth of any matter.” (Michigan v. Bryant, supra, 562 U.S. at p. 367, fn. 11, quoting Davis v. Washington, supra, 547 U.S. at p. 822, fn. 1.) In that regard, the high court has also noted that statements made unknowingly to an informant or statements between fellow prisoners are “clearly nontestimonial.” (Davis v. Washington, at p. 825, citing Bourjaily v. United States (1987) 483 U.S. 171, 181-184, Dutton v. Evans (1970) 400 U.S. 74, 87-89 (plur. opn. of Stewart, J).) In this case, the prosecution maintained that statements by Smith, an undercover informant who befriended defendant in federal detention and prompted him to confess to Pamela’s murder, were not hearsay in the first place because Smith’s statements were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. 23 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. For example, in response to defense counsel’s argument that it was Smith who “leads and cons, and . . . directs” defendant to confess, the prosecution relied on Smith’s statements to show that Smith did not threaten or intimidate defendant into making incriminating statements. Smith’s statements were nonhearsay and admissible to put defendant’s “admissions on the tapes into context, making the admissions intelligible for the jury. Statements providing context for other admissible statements are not hearsay because they are not offered for their truth.” (U.S. v. Tolliver (7th Cir. 2006) 454 F.3d 660, 666, fn. omitted.) Though conceding that the statements were originally admitted for this nonhearsay purpose, defendant claims that the prosecution “repeatedly used Smith’s statements for the truth of the matter by arguing that the jury should find Smith’s taped statements to be credible.” We reject this claim. Contrary to defendant’s contention, by telling the jury, “[I]s there anything that makes you suspect that Shawn Smith is not being truthful? No because you can hear every syllable that comes out of his mouth,” the prosecution was not vouching for Smith’s credibility. Impermissible vouching “ ‘ “involves an attempt to bolster a witness by reference to facts outside the record.” ’ ” (People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 206, italics added.) Here, the prosecution urged the jury to focus on the admissible evidence: “I am not asking you to take Shawn Smith’s word for anything. I am not saying, yeah, Shawn Smith says that James Fayed said this. You can hear for yourself on the DVD, on the tape.” Moreover, the issue was not the truth or falsity of Smith’s statements—for instance, whether Smith actually knew a hitman named “Tony” who would kill Moya if defendant wanted—but whether Smith had made the 24 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. statements. Out-of-court statements are inadmissible hearsay “only when they are offered for the same purpose as testimony of a witness on the stand and therefore depend for probative value on the credibility of the declarant.” (1 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Hearsay, § 5, p. 788, italics added.) In the strictest sense, Smith’s credibility was not at issue because his out-of-court statements were not offered for their truth. It bears emphasis that both sides thoroughly discussed Smith’s credibility (or lack thereof) at trial. When crossexamining Detective Abdul, defense counsel underscored Smith’s “extensive criminal history,” and recounted each of Smith’s convictions. In closing argument, defense counsel called Smith: “Drug addict. Convicted. Felon in possession of firearms. Drunk driver. Hit and run driver.” In conclusion, defense counsel submitted: “[T]his man is no good. This man is evil. And no good comes from evil.” For its part, the prosecution was not “hiding” the fact that Smith was a convicted drug dealer. Far from vouching for Smith’s credibility, the prosecution conceded that Smith was not a trustworthy individual but was instead, in the prosecution’s words, “a crook and a criminal.” Nevertheless, as the prosecution emphasized, the recorded conversation spoke for itself: “It wouldn’t matter who was in the cell next to [defendant]. Mr. Fayed, it is his words that are being used against him.” Moreover, regarding any motive for Smith to lie, the jury heard that while Detective Abdul denied that he offered Smith any benefit in exchange for recording his conversation with defendant, Detective Abdul admitted he was aware that Smith was released early after cooperating with authorities. 25 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
In his pretrial motion in limine to exclude the entire recorded conversation with Smith, defendant alternatively requested that the trial court redact the statement if admitted. He challenged the conversation’s references to hiring a hitman to kill Moya, certain “inflammatory” remarks Smith made, and statements defendant made on other “extraneous matters,” such as defendant’s sex life, his meetings with the National Security Agency, and his admitted forgeries of Pamela’s will and counterfeit $100 bills. The trial court rejected defendant’s request, noting that the entire recorded conversation had probative value: “Now you can make your argument that it is an Oscar award-winning performance and it was not worth anything, but I think the People are entitled to bring that, in all of its glory, in front of the jury.” On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court’s ruling was erroneous and that the admitted evidence was extraneous, inflammatory, and ultimately prejudicial to him. “A trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewable for abuse of discretion.” (People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 292.) As their recorded conversation revealed, defendant and Smith spent much time talking about defendant hiring a purported hitman Smith knew named “Tony” to kill Moya. (See ante, at pp. 19-20.) Defendant argues that the evidence of the uncharged conduct about hiring a hitman to kill Moya was inadmissible because he was never charged with a postoffense crime against Moya. (See People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 404-405.) Even if admitted for a proper purpose to show defendant’s consciousness of guilt, he maintains that the evidence was unduly prejudicial under Evidence Code section 26 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 352. The evidence, defendant adds, was also “insubstantial and undependable” because it was Smith who “encouraged and prodded” defendant to hire a hitman Smith knew to kill Moya. Finally, this evidence purportedly showing defendant’s consciousness of guilt as to Pamela’s murder was cumulative because the conversation already included defendant’s statements about killing Pamela. We reject this claim on all points. Here, the prosecution’s theory was that defendant perpetrated Pamela’s murder by soliciting Moya (who in turn enlisted Marquez and Simmons) to kill Pamela. Thereafter, because of fears that Moya could turn on defendant and become a witness against him, defendant sought to hire another hitman, Smith’s fictional friend, “Tony,” to kill Moya; in that regard, Smith took care to portray Tony as dying of cancer and therefore not a risk to defendant after killing Moya. This evidence of defendant soliciting the murder of a potential witness is highly probative of defendant’s guilt of Pamela’s murder. Contrary to defendant’s contention, this evidence was not cumulative. Rather, it showed a common plan in that defendant sought to kill whoever threatened him or his livelihood. (See People v. Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 402.) Though the record does not disclose how the two first discussed the idea of defendant hiring a hitman (see ante, at p. 18) and defendant appeared reluctant at times when discussing the plans, defendant’s assertion that the evidence, therefore, was insubstantial or undependable lacks merit. Although Smith may have prodded or coaxed defendant to talk at certain points, defendant’s initial hesitation gave way to extended diatribes of how Moya and others bungled previous attempts to kill Pamela and how defendant did not want to be worried that 27 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. Moya would turn on him. Moreover, any hesitation could be attributed to defendant seeking Smith’s assurances that Tony would be more competent and effective than Moya. Defendant also admitted he would have killed Pamela himself but that he would never “get away with it. Never.” We also reject defendant’s challenge to the other admitted evidence. Smith’s pejorative references to Mexicans and women were brief and were not inflammatory; in any event, defendant fails to show how Smith’s offensive statements—to which defendant showed little reaction—would prejudice defendant. Likewise, defendant fails to show how Smith’s bravado and graphic details about hiring hitmen to commit various murders would prejudice defendant. Finally, any extraneous details, such as the forging of the will, lent credibility to defendant’s admissions because he trusted Smith enough to reveal this information. In sum, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion to redact the statement and admitting it in its entirety.