Opinion ID: 718736
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: July Fourth Weekend Transfer

Text: 81 The district court outlined in some detail OMH's precipitate actions in the abortive transfer of nine individuals from the Devereux Institute over the July Fourth weekend. See 908 F.Supp. at 1148-49 & n. 13. Boiled down, the district court's findings demonstrate that some or all of these individuals were incapable of giving their consent to being moved from the institute, and that the OMH attempted to transfer them involuntarily to another institution, without the consent of their guardians. 82 An attempt by the State to force involuntary commitment to an institution or to otherwise involuntarily restrain an individual implicates at least an individual's right to procedural due process. See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361, 103 S.Ct. 3043, 3048, 77 L.Ed.2d 694 (1983) (It is clear that commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.) (internal quotation omitted). By attempting to seize and transport plaintiffs to in-state institutions without the consent of their guardians and without providing adequate procedural due process guarantees, the State Defendants threatened a violation of plaintiffs' due process rights. The question is, what remedy is appropriate for this wrong? 83 The injunction has two remedial elements: (i) resumption of full funding of plaintiffs' out-of-state care; and, (ii) when or if plaintiffs are transferred to in-state facilities, compliance with an orderly transfer process that includes procedural due process guarantees. 84 (i) Funding. The due process right against deprivation of liberty, implicated by the attempted July Fourth weekend transfer, is distinct from an asserted right to receive voluntary institutional care from the State, implicated by the termination of funding. As we have already discussed, under DeShaney, plaintiffs have no independent due process right to funded care from the State Defendants. The district court addressed this issue by engrafting the involuntary character of the attempted transfer onto the overall institutional status of the plaintiffs. It therefore concluded that the due process obligation restricting involuntary transfers automatically created a due process obligation to fund the plaintiffs' current institutional placements. 908 F.Supp. at 1153. But the loss of funding for voluntary private institutional care does not restrict plaintiffs' liberty (and does not implicate the Due Process Clause) as would an involuntary transfer. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196-97, 109 S.Ct. at 1003-04. A due process violation was threatened during the July Fourth weekend, but that wrong cannot support an injunction that imposes an expansive duty for the State Defendants to provide immediate full funding. The district court lacked the power to deploy the State's resources in this way. Injunctive relief should be narrowly tailored to address specific harms and not impose unnecessary burdens on lawful activity. Waldman Publishing Corp. v. Landoll, Inc., 43 F.3d 775, 785 (2d Cir.1994) (citing Society for Good Will, 737 F.2d at 1251). 85 (ii) Transfer Process. The injunctive requirement that the transfer process must be orderly and constitutionally appropriate could be supported only to the extent that a transfer is involuntary, as was the transfer attempted over the July Fourth weekend. We do not doubt that, if the district court had found an actual and imminent likelihood of future abuses similar to the July Fourth weekend episode, the district court could remedy it by injunction. Tom Doherty Assocs., Inc. v. Saban Entertainment, Inc., 60 F.3d 27, 37 (2d Cir.1995). But the district court made no such finding. At most, the district court found that cessation of TCF will inevitably  force the State to make a hasty transfer of plaintiffs, 908 F.Supp. at 1155 (emphasis added); but this conclusory statement is unsupported. There is no finding whatsoever of any actual and imminent threat that the State will renew its attempt to effect an involuntary transfer. The extraordinary remedy of an injunction is unavailable absent such a finding. Nor does the cessation of transitional care inevitably mean hasty transfer[s] by the State, because the State's disclaimer of any funding obligation until 1999 does not require the relocation of any of its clients. We therefore conclude that this injunction is not needed to prevent irreparable harm that may result from the threatened violation of plaintiffs' rights over the July Fourth weekend, or that might flow from any similar incident in the future.