Opinion ID: 269176
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the prosecutor's misstatement.

Text: 70 Appellant argues that the prosecutor in his closing statement was permitted to misrepresent the crucial testimony of the witness Allgire. Appellant points out that on the issue of Bernes' awareness of the speculations being conducted for Federal in various names, the only testimony from a completely disinterested witness was that of Mr. Allgire; and, appellant further says that while the jury might have failed to perceive from other evidence that Bernes must have known of the speculations, the jury could hardly have rejected Allgire's testimony that, on November 30 or December 1, 1960, before the collapse of Federal he heard Bernes and appellant discuss the losses which Federal Grain had incurred in the commodities future market through the accounts of Mrs. L. V. Butler and Best Gin & Land Company. 71 It appears that the Allgire testimony was first referred to in the closing argument of the defense when counsel accurately summarized the testimony, and the prosecutor interrupted, saying, I am going to object to that, Your Honor. That was not the question that was asked, nor was that the answer given. The trial court then stated, Well, the jury will remember what the testimony is. This is argument, this is not the evidence, this is merely the lawyer's statement about what happened. You will remember the evidence. 72 Later, during the closing statement for the Government, the prosecutor incorrectly summarized the testimony of Allgire to the effect that Allgire heard a conversation between Bernes and Butler about trading in futures but nothing was said in the conversation about trading in Mrs. Butler's name, or in other names or anything of that type. When counsel for appellant objected to this inaccurate summation, the trial court said: Now, gentlemen, let's let everybody make their own argument. The jury is going to remember this conversation. I have refrained from doing anything and let you attorneys say whatever you want to say. Both of you for the defendants did the same thing. Let the jury remember. Go on with your argument. The prosecutor further commented on the Allgire testimony, questioning why the defense did not proceed to ask Allgire the details of the conversation. In its general charge to the jury after the closing arguments were concluded, the trial court instructed the jury that what counsel stated was not evidence, but rather the evidence was as they, the jury, remembered it to be. 73 Appellant contends that prejudicial error resulted from the prosecutor's misrepresentation and the error was compounded by the trial court's comment about the misrepresentation. Appellant argues that taking the most generous view of the matter, the prosecutor chose to leave an ambiguity, and, by a less generous view, he chose to persist in his misrepresentation, no longer an honest one, relying on the trial court's apparent indisposition to interfere with him. The Government concedes that the prosecutor made a misstatement but contends that it was an honest misrepresentation, and, therefore, under the language of this court in Nicholson v. United States, 221 F.2d 281 (8th Cir. 1955), the error committed was not prejudicial. 74 In Nicholson v. United States, supra at 283, this court stated: 75    Our examination of that part of the testimony which is contained in the record indicates that defendant is probably correct in his interpretation of the import of the testimony. Each time the dispute arose between counsel the Court informed the jury that the jury was the sole judge of what the testimony was. Misconduct of counsel in argument to the jury is ground for reversal under some circumstances. But an honest misinterpretation of testimony, such as this apparently was, without some indication of resulting prejudice does not constitute reversible error. (Emphasis added) 76 See also Keeble v. United States, 347 F.2d 951 (8th Cir. 1965). 77 It should be pointed out that while appellant disputed the prosecutor's summation, no request for a mistrial was made and the trial court was not requested to instruct the jury to disregard the statement. There is nothing in the record which indicates that the misstatement was other than an honest misrepresentation and nothing more. Prefacing his summarization of the witness' testimony, the prosecutor said: This is the way I understood    — and when he concluded he said: I think that was all that was said. 78 We cannot say that the misstatement was so palpably improper as to have been clearly prejudicial, United States v. Cohen, 177 F.2d 523, 527 (2d Cir. 1949), and there is absent any clear and convincing proof of prejudice resulting from the misstatement; hence, it was not prejudicial error, and the error committed was cured by the trial court's instruction to the jury. United States v. Barrett, 280 F.2d 889 (2d Cir. 1960). 79