Opinion ID: 777313
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The State's Standing as Parens Patriae

Text: 29 As an alternative basis for jurisdiction, the State asserts the right to institute this action in its capacity as parens patriae. The doctrine of parens patriae allows states to bring suit on behalf of their citizens in certain circumstances by asserting a quasi-sovereign interest. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601, 102 S.Ct. 3260, 73 L.Ed.2d 995 (1982). The doctrine of parens patriae derives from the common-law principle that a sovereign, as parent of the country, may step in on behalf of its citizens to prevent injury to those who cannot protect themselves. Id. at 600, 102 S.Ct. 3260 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 30 The district court, in concluding that the State had no Article III standing to bring this litigation, reviewed various factors that the Supreme Court, this Court, and others have viewed as prerequisites for parens patriae standing. PHS, 103 F.Supp.2d at 504-09. The court concluded that the State had articulated an interest apart from the interests of the particular private parties referenced in the complaint, id. at 506 (citation omitted), and that it had met the requirement that the injury asserted be to a sufficiently substantial segment of its population, id. at 504. The court held, however, that ERISA's broad preemption clause removed from the State its quasi-sovereign interest in the specific relief sought by this lawsuit, id. at 507, and, in a very close call, id., that there were adequate alternative means of civil enforcement by which individual plaintiffs may obtain complete relief, id. at 509. Based on its last two holdings, the district court concluded that the State lacked parens patriae standing under Article III. 31 We might be inclined to disagree with the district court were it necessary to address the issue of Article III parens patriae standing. 14 We do not think, however, that it is.
32 Whether or not the State has parens patriae standing under Article III, we conclude that it lacks statutory standing under ERISA's § 1132(a)(3). When determining whether a state has parens patriae standing under a federal statute, we ask if Congress intended to allow for such standing. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 260-66, 92 S.Ct. 885, 31 L.Ed.2d 184 (1972) (parsing statutory language and examining legislative history before deciding that states cannot bring parens patriae actions for damages under § 4 of the Clayton Act because Congress did not intend to allow such suits); Illinois v. Life of Mid-Am. Ins. Co., 805 F.2d 763, 766 (7th Cir.1986) (concluding that parens patriae standing was absent because even if the complaint did sufficiently allege an injury to the state in its quasi-sovereign capacity, it [was] not clear to [the court] that Congress, in enacting the RICO statute, intended to permit such a parens patriae proceeding); see also New York ex rel Vacco v. Reebok Int'l Ltd., 96 F.3d 44, 46 (2d Cir.1996) (noting that the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act of 1976 explicitly provides for parens patriae standing). 33 Section 1132(a)(3) allows a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary of an ERISA-regulated plan to bring a civil action for injunctive and equitable relief. Other subparts of § 1132 allow the Secretary of Labor to bring specified actions. Id. §§ 1132(a)(2), (4), (5), (8), (9). Section 1132(a)(7) authorizes states to enforce compliance with a qualified medical child support order, and § 1169(b) of the same title authorizes states to acquire the rights of third parties through assignment for the limited purpose of recouping payments made under state plans for medical assistance. Nowhere else in § 1132 are states authorized to bring suit. 34 Courts have consistently read § 1132(a)(3) as strictly limiting the universe of plaintiffs who may bring certain civil actions. Harris Trust and Savs. Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 247, 120 S.Ct. 2180, 147 L.Ed.2d 187 (2000) (emphasis deleted). Absent a valid assignment of a claim, at least, non-enumerated parties lack statutory standing to bring suit under § 1132(a)(3) even if they have a direct stake in the outcome of the litigation. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 27, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983) (ERISA carefully enumerates the parties entitled to seek relief under [§ 1132]; it does not provide anyone other than participants, beneficiaries, or fiduciaries with an express cause of action....); Pressroom Unions-Printers, 700 F.2d at 892 (concluding that § 1132(e)(1), which states that pension plan participants, beneficiaries, and fiduciaries may sue for certain violations of ERISA, should be viewed as an exclusive jurisdictional grant of standing to the parties specified); see also Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 122 S.Ct. 708, 712, 151 L.Ed.2d 635 (2002) (ERISA's carefully crafted and detailed enforcement scheme provides strong evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate expressly.) (emphasis, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted). 35 Because states are not mentioned in § 1132(a)(3), Congress — which carefully drafted [the] provisions of § 1132 — did not intend for them to have the ability to bring suit pursuant to § 1132(a)(3). See Pressroom Unions-Printers, 700 F.2d at 893. Furthermore, as the district court explained, [t]he inference that Congress intentionally omitted states from section [1132(a)(3)] finds strong support in the fact that states are expressly empowered by section [1132(a)(7)] to bring only a very limited class of cases to enforce qualified medical child-support orders. PHS, 103 F.Supp.2d at 502; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1169(b) (allowing states to use assignments in certain circumstances not present in this case). 36 By holding that the State lacks parens patriae standing because § 1132(a)(3) does not expressly provide for such standing, we do not of course intend to imply that states may only sue in their parens patriae capacity when a statute specifically provides for suits by states. [S]tates have frequently been allowed to sue in parens patriae to ... enforce federal statutes that... do not specifically provide standing for state attorney generals. New York ex rel Vacco v. Mid Hudson Med. Group, P.C., 877 F.Supp. 143, 146 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (collecting cases). But cf. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. at 264, 92 S.Ct. 885 (rejecting parens patriae standing in a suit for damages in the absence of a clear expression of congressional purpose allowing such standing because of the concern of double recovery). As the district court correctly pointed out, however, the federal statutes under which states have been granted parens patriae standing all contain broad civil enforcement provisions that permit suit by any `person' that is `injured' or aggrieved.' PHS, 103 F.Supp.2d at 509-10 (collecting federal statutes with broad enforcement provisions). Section 1132 of ERISA, by contrast, carefully limits the parties who may seek relief. 37 By our holding, we reject the State's argument that Congress cannot limit states' power to sue as parens patriae. Specifically, the State argues that [t]he ability of states to act in the interest of their citizens in a parens patriae capacity is an essential attribute of the inherent sovereignty of states that may not be diminished in light of the principles of our federalism that are reflected in the Constitution and the Tenth Amendment. Pl.'s Ltr. Br. of June 12, 2001, at 14. 38 The Tenth Amendment provides that [t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people. Federal statutes validly enacted under one of Congress's enumerated powers — here, the Commerce Clause — cannot violate the Tenth Amendment unless they commandeer the states' executive officials, see Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933, 117 S.Ct. 2365, 138 L.Ed.2d 914 (1997), or legislative processes, see New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161-66, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992); see also Cellular Phone Taskforce v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 205 F.3d 82, 96 (2d Cir.2000) (holding that a federal telecommunications law preempting states' ability to regulate the health and safety issues with respect to certain personal wireless service facilities does not violate the Tenth Amendment because the statute does not commandeer local authorities to administer a federal program), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1070, 121 S.Ct. 758, 148 L.Ed.2d 661 (2001); City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 35 (2d Cir.1999) (holding that the Tenth Amendment is a shield against the federal government's using state and local governments to enact and administer federal programs not a sword allowing states and localities to engage in passive resistence that frustrates federal programs), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1115, 120 S.Ct. 932, 145 L.Ed.2d 811 (2000); United States v. Sage, 92 F.3d 101, 107 (2d Cir.1996) (concluding that the Child Support Recovery Act does not violate the Tenth Amendment because it does not compel[ ] a State to enact and enforce a federal family program), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1099, 117 S.Ct. 784, 136 L.Ed.2d 727 (1997); United States v. Bostic, 168 F.3d 718, 724 (4th Cir.) (holding that a federal gun statute does not violate the Tenth Amendment because it was validly passed under the Commerce Clause and imposes no affirmative obligation on the states), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1029, 119 S.Ct. 2383, 144 L.Ed.2d 785 (1999). Section 1132 does not commandeer any branch of state government because it imposes no affirmative duty of any kind on any of them. It therefore does not violate the Tenth Amendment.