Opinion ID: 109380
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Vagueness Problems

Text: In its effort to be all-inclusive, however, the provision raises serious problems of vagueness, particularly treacherous where, as here, the violation of its terms carries criminal penalties [99] and fear of incurring these sanctions may deter those who seek to exercise protected First Amendment rights. Section 434 (e) applies to [e]very person . . . who makes contributions or expenditures. Contributions and expenditures are defined in parallel provisions in terms of the use of money or other valuable assets for the purpose of . . . influencing the nomination or election of candidates for federal office. [100] It is the ambiguity of this phrase that poses constitutional problems. Due process requires that a criminal statute provide adequate notice to a person of ordinary intelligence that his contemplated conduct is illegal, for no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed. United States v. Harriss, 347 U. S. 612, 617 (1954). See also Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156 (1972). Where First Amendment rights are involved, an even greater degree of specificity is required. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U. S., at 573. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 109 (1972); Kunz v. New York, 340 U. S. 290 (1951). There is no legislative history to guide us in determining the scope of the critical phrase for the purpose of . . . influencing. It appears to have been adopted without comment from earlier disclosure Acts. [101] Congress has voiced its wishes in [most] muted strains, leaving us to draw upon those common-sense assumptions that must be made in determining direction without a compass. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397, 412 (1970). Where the constitutional requirement of definiteness is at stake, we have the further obligation to construe the statute, if that can be done consistent with the legislature's purpose, to avoid the shoals of vagueness. United States v. Harriss, supra, at 618; United States v. Rumely, 345 U. S., at 45. In enacting the legislation under review Congress addressed broadly the problem of political campaign financing. It wished to promote full disclosure of campaign-oriented spending to insure both the reality and the appearance of the purity and openness of the federal election process. [102] Our task is to construe for the purpose of . . . influencing, incorporated in § 434 (e) through the definitions of contributions and expenditures, in a manner that precisely furthers this goal. In Part I we discussed what constituted a contribution for purposes of the contribution limitations set forth in 18 U. S. C. § 608 (b) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). [103] We construed that term to include not only contributions made directly or indirectly to a candidate, political party, or campaign committee, and contributions made to other organizations or individuals but earmarked for political purposes, but also all expenditures placed in cooperation with or with the consent of a candidate, his agents, or an authorized committee of the candidate. The definition of contribution in § 431 (e) for disclosure purposes parallels the definition in Title 18 almost word for word, and we construe the former provision as we have the latter. So defined, contributions have a sufficiently close relationship to the goals of the Act, for they are connected with a candidate or his campaign. When we attempt to define expenditure in a similarly narrow way we encounter line-drawing problems of the sort we faced in 18 U. S. C. § 608 (e) (1) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). Although the phrase, for the purpose of . . . influencing an election or nomination, differs from the language used in § 608 (e) (1), it shares the same potential for encompassing both issue discussion and advocacy of a political result. [104] The general requirement that political committees and candidates disclose their expenditures could raise similar vagueness problems, for political committee is defined only in terms of amount of annual contributions and expenditures, [105] and could be interpreted to reach groups engaged purely in issue discussion. The lower courts have construed the words political committee more narrowly. [106] To fulfill the purposes of the Act they need only encompass organizations that are under the control of a candidate or the major purpose of which is the nomination or election of a candidate. Expenditures of candidates and of political committees so construed can be assumed to fall within the core area sought to be addressed by Congress. They are, by definition, campaign related. But when the maker of the expenditure is not within these categorieswhen it is an individual other than a candidate or a group other than a political committee [107] the relation of the information sought to the purposes of the Act may be too remote. To insure that the reach of § 434 (e) is not impermissibly broad, we construe expenditure for purposes of that section in the same way we construed the terms of § 608 (e)to reach only funds used for communications that expressly advocate [108] the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate. This reading is directed precisely to that spending that is unambiguously related to the campaign of a particular federal candidate. In summary, § 434 (e), as construed, imposes independent reporting requirements on individuals and groups that are not candidates or political committees only in the following circumstances: (1) when they make contributions earmarked for political purposes or authorized or requested by a candidate or his agent, to some person other than a candidate or political committee, and (2) when they make expenditures for communications that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate. Unlike 18 U. S. C. § 608 (e) (1) (1970 ed., Supp. IV), § 434 (e), as construed, bears a sufficient relationship to a substantial governmental interest. As narrowed, § 434 (e), like § 608 (e) (1), does not reach all partisan discussion for it only requires disclosure of those expenditures that expressly advocate a particular election result. This might have been fatal if the only purpose of § 434 (e) were to stem corruption or its appearance by closing a loophole in the general disclosure requirements. But the disclosure provisions, including § 434 (e), serve another, informational interest, and even as construed § 434 (e) increases the fund of information concerning those who support the candidates. It goes beyond the general disclosure requirements to shed the light of publicity on spending that is unambiguously campaign related but would not otherwise be reported because it takes the form of independent expenditures or of contributions to an individual or group not itself required to report the names of its contributors. By the same token, it is not fatal that § 434 (e) encompasses purely independent expenditures uncoordinated with a particular candidate or his agent. The corruption potential of these expenditures may be significantly different, but the informational interest can be as strong as it is in coordinated spending, for disclosure helps voters to define more of the candidates' constituencies. Section 434 (e), as we have construed it, does not contain the infirmities of the provisions before the Court in Talley v. California, 362 U. S. 60 (1960), and Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516 (1945). The ordinance found wanting in Talley forbade all distribution of handbills that did not contain the name of the printer, author, or manufacturer, and the name of the distributor. The city urged that the ordinance was aimed at identifying those responsible for fraud, false advertising, and libel, but the Court found that it was in no manner so limited. 362 U. S., at 64. Here, as we have seen, the disclosure requirement is narrowly limited to those situations where the information sought has a substantial connection with the governmental interests sought to be advanced. Thomas held unconstitutional a prior restraint in the form of a registration requirement for labor organizers. The Court found the State's interest insufficient to justify the restrictive effect of the statute. The burden imposed by § 434 (e) is no prior restraint, but a reasonable and minimally restrictive method of furthering First Amendment values by opening the basic processes of our federal election system to public view. [109]