Opinion ID: 1715661
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: failure to file claim within 90 days

Text: In its initial assignment of error, Ralston argues that the district court erred in exercising jurisdiction over Crown's appeal from the city council determination because Crown did not comply with the statutory requirements for making such a claim provided for in § 16-726. Section 16-726 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: All liquidated and unliquidated claims and accounts payable against a city of the first class shall: (1) Be presented in writing; (2) state the name and address of the claimant and the amount of the claim; and (3) fully and accurately identify the items or services for which payment is claimed or the time, place, nature, and circumstances giving rise to the claim. As a condition precedent to maintaining an action for a claim, other than a tort claim as defined in section 13-903, the claimant shall file such claim within ninety days of the accrual of the claim in the office of the city clerk. Crown's claim is that Ralston breached its agreement to purchase Crown's property. Ralston states, however, that it clearly indicated its disavowal of the contract on June 10, 1992, when the mayor of Ralston sent Crown a letter indicating that the City of Ralston must withdraw its offer to purchase the Crown Products facility. Ralston argues that under § 16-726, Crown had 90 days to file its claim with Ralston for breach. Ralston claims that because Crown did not file within the statutorily prescribed time limit, Crown is time barred from filing its claim with Ralston and that the district court had no jurisdiction to review Ralston's decision. Crown argues that Ralston has waived its statute of limitations defense under § 16-726 because it failed to raise the statute of limitations issue in its answer. We find Crown's reasoning to be persuasive. In Millman v. County of Butler, 235 Neb. 915, 458 N.W.2d 207 (1990), we stated that the notice requirement of Neb.Rev.Stat. § 13-905 (Reissue 1991) of the Nebraska Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act is a procedural precedent to commencement of a negligence action, not a jurisdictional prerequisite for adjudication of a claim. Therefore, noncompliance with the notice requirement is a defense to the plaintiff's action which must be asserted. The reasoning in Millman is persuasive. The 90-day condition precedent under § 16-726 is analogous to the notice provision in Millman. It is a procedural precedent to commencement of a claim, and noncompliance is therefore a defense to Crown's action. Nonconformance with a provision requiring notice to a state agency or political subdivision is an affirmative defense which must be raised before the first tribunal or agency charged with determining the cause of action. Id. If the state agency or political subdivision fails to raise the defense of noncompliance with the notice requirement, the state agency or political subdivision waives the defense. Id. See L.J. Vontz Constr. Co. v. Department of Roads, 232 Neb. 241, 440 N.W.2d 664 (1989) (statute of limitations in contract action against state waived where not raised in defendant's answer). Therefore, because Ralston failed to raise the defense of noncompliance before the first tribunal or agency charged with determining the action, that defense was waived.