Opinion ID: 179337
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Suppression of Evidence Recovered from a Vehicle Search

Text: We review the district court's determination of probable cause de novo and its factual findings for clear error. United States v. Washburn, 383 F.3d 638, 642 (7th Cir.2004). A warrantless search is per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, subject to a few well-established exceptions. Arizona v. Gant, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 1716, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009). Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, a law enforcement officer may conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle when, based on the totality of the circumstances, he has probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime. United States v. Zahursky, 580 F.3d 515, 521 (7th Cir.2009). Probable cause requires only a probability, rather than an absolute certainty, that contraband or evidence will be found. Id. When making the probable cause determination, law enforcement officers are permitted to draw reasonable inferences from their training and experience. Id. However, when a finding of probable cause is supported by information from a confidential informant, the sufficiency of the probable cause determination hinges on the confidential informant's reliability, veracity, and basis of knowledge. United States v. Olson, 408 F.3d 366, 370 (7th Cir.2005). In assessing the credibility of an informant, we consider whether the informant (1) possessed firsthand knowledge; (2) provided sufficient details to law enforcement; (3) relayed information that was later corroborated; and (4) testified at a probable cause hearing. Id. No single factor is dispositive, and a deficiency in one factor may be compensated for by a strong showing in another or by some other indication of reliability. United States v. Brack, 188 F.3d 748, 756 (7th Cir.1999). Additionally, we consider the informant's admission of culpability as an indication of veracity. United States v. Mitten, 592 F.3d 767, 774 (7th Cir.2010), quoting United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 29 L.Ed.2d 723, (1971) (Admissions of crime... carry their own indicia of credibility sufficient at least to support a finding of probable cause to search.). Trooper Bowles pulled over the Ford Focus after noticing that it did not have the required license plate light. The parties do not dispute that Trooper Bowles possessed sufficient reasonable suspicion under Terry to stop the vehicle. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). The parties only dispute whether Trooper Bowles had probable cause to search the vehicle after the original Terry stop had concluded. Appellants argue that the informant's information did not support probable cause because the informant was a drug addict and convicted felon who had never provided information to law enforcement before. To support their argument, Appellants highlight a number of details that the informant could not provide. However, instead of focusing on the details that the informant failed to disclose, we focus on the information that the informant actually provided. Immediately after his arrest, the informant admitted his own culpability and told police that Cruz-Rea was going to use a Ford Focus to transport a shipment of cocaine from Utah to Indianapolis. Although the informant could not confirm that the cocaine would be concealed inside gift-wrapped packages, he stated that Cruz-Rea had previously shipped cocaine under that disguise. And despite being unable to confirm the exact date the Ford Focus would depart for Indianapolis, the informant revealed that the vehicle would leave within one or two days. The informant also told police that Cruz-Rea used a post office box that was listed under the informant's name. Prior to stopping the Ford Focus, authorities corroborated all of the informant's information. Upon pulling over the Ford Focus, Trooper Bowles immediately noticed the gift-wrapped packages in the backseat. His suspicions were further aroused when the passenger and driver of the Ford Focus told conflicting stories about where they were headed. We find that the informant's admission of culpability, the corroboration of the informant's story, and the driver's and passenger's conflicting stories provided Trooper Bowles with probable cause to search the vehicle. We therefore affirm the district court's determination of probable cause, finding the automobile exception to the warrant requirement satisfied.