Opinion ID: 2156072
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Interest was established by the trial court in favor of plaintiff from the date of the judgment. Appellant contends it should have been established from March 1957.

Text: We have established in many decisions that as to unliquidated claims interest is to be computed from the date of the judgment, when the claim becomes liquidated. This refers particularly to tort actions. Under certain conditions we have somewhat relaxed this rule. Collins v. Gleason Coal Co., 140 Iowa 114, 115 N.W. 497, 118 N.W. 36, 18 L.R.A.,N.S., 736; Moore v. Fryman, 154 Iowa 534, 134 N.W. 534; Bridenstine v. Iowa City Electric R. Co., 181 Iowa 1124, 165 N.W. 435. In the case at bar plaintiff's claim has reference to the balance due under a contract. Even though the counterclaim for defects or omissions is in the nature of an unliquidated claim, this does not convert the claim of plaintiff into an unliquidated claim. Knutson v. Lasher, 219 Minn. 594, 18 N.W.2d 688; Banks v. Carrell, 241 Iowa 786, 43 N.W.2d 142; Maslow Cooperage Corp. v. Weeks Pickle Co., 270 Wis. 179, 70 N.W.2d 577; 47 C.J.S. Interest § 19(b). The rule which has been approved in Minnesota, Wisconsin and Iowa is stated in 47 C.J.S. Interest § 19(b) as follows: Ordinarily, where the amount of a demand is sufficiently certain to justify the allowance of interest thereon, the existence of a set-off, counterclaim, or cross claim which is unliquidated will not prevent the recovery of interest on the balance of the demand found due from the time it became due. Plaintiff testified he finished the house in August 1957, and at that time defendants acquired full possession of the home. The written contract between the parties provides a schedule of payments, and the following as to any unpaid balance: Final payment shall be due 10 days after completion of the work and the contract fully performed. Since we have held plaintiff substantially performed the contract, in accordance with provisions of many previous decisions, the contract was performed by August 31, 1957. The final payment was therefore due September 10, 1957. Since it was not paid, plaintiff is entitled to interest from that date on the amount established in this decision. The Minnesota Court has made a succinct statement of the interest situation in Knutson v. Lasher, supra [219 Minn. 594, 18 N.W.2d 696], as follows: The rule is that, where the amount due under a contract is certain and liquidated or capable of ascertainment, but is reduced by an unliquidated setoff, interest is allowable on the balance found to be due from the time it became due or suit was commenced. In the instant case, by written agreement between the parties it became due on September 10, 1957. This court made the following observation in Banks v. Carrell, supra, where interest was computed from the date of the completion of the work. The court said: There is no dispute but that the work was completed by plaintiff on September 14, 1946.    More than three years had elapsed between the filing of the mechanic's lien and the judgment. A large part of the amount sued for was for wages paid employees and for materials furnished. To deny interest on such items for a period of over three years does not appeal to us as being equitable. [241 Iowa 786, 43 N. W.2d 148.] III. We hold there was substantial performance of the contract by plaintiff. There are only two items for which defendants should be given credit, as outlined in Division I; $60 which plaintiff admitted, and $136 which is obvious because of the contract provision and plaintiff's testimony. The trial court does not specify the items allowed on the counterclaim in the amount it fixed of $843. This amount is modified and established at $196. Judgment should, therefore, be entered and foreclosure of mechanics lien decreed in the amount of $3,258.13, together with statutory interest from September 10, 1957. Counsel for appellant raised the question in oral argument that the court had wrongfully, as he contended, divided the costs in the District Court equally between the two parties. However, appellant did not raise this alleged error in his brief and argument and under the rules of this court we cannot give the question consideration. R.C.P. 344(a) (4) (3), 58 I.C. A. Costs of appeal shall be taxed 20% to appellant and 80% to appellee. The judgment and decree of the trial court is modified as heretofore stated, and subject to such modification is affirmed. Modified, affirmed and remanded.