Opinion ID: 2625366
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Response to Jury Inquiry Regarding Commutation

Text: Defendant asserts the court erred in responding to a jury inquiry regarding the finality of a life without parole sentence. We find no error. The jury was instructed, pursuant to CALJIC Nos. 8.84 and 8.88, that the penalty for defendant shall be death or life imprisonment without possibility of parole. During its penalty deliberations, the jury sent a note inquiring whether defendant could be exchanged with Mexico like last time and whether there is any way he can get out, if life without parole. Outside the jury's presence, counsel agreed the jury could be told that an exchange with Mexico was impossible, that the commutation power applies to both life without parole and death sentences, and that the jury should not consider commutation in determining the appropriate sentence. The court indicated to counsel it would tell the jury that in its experience commutation of a life without parole sentence would not occur. Thereafter, the court advised the jury that no exchange with Mexico would be possible, that the Governor could commute either sentence, but that the jury should not consider such speculative matters in deciding penalty. The court also commented that in its experience commutation has never happened, nor do I, as a trial judge expect it to ever happen. A juror then asked if that is the only circumstance that would permit that? and the court replied that barring a cataclysmic earthquake destroying all prisons, commutation was the only legal way and with the Governor a politically elected official, it would not happen in the near future. The court repeated that the jurors should approach their deliberations as if the choice were between death and life without possibility of parole for sure, and without considering the possibility of commutation in deciding penalty. Defendant made no objection to the court's explanatory response to the jury's questions and, accordingly waived his present argument. (See, e.g., People v. Hart (1999) 20 Cal.4th 546, 656, 85 Cal. Rptr .2d 132, 976 P.2d 683; People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 360, 63 Cal. Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708.) In any event, his points lack merit. Defendant first argues that the court misadvised the jurors regarding the case with which a Governor could commute a life without parole sentence, failing to tell them that, by reason of defendant's prior record, no commutation would be possible without the agreement of four Supreme Court justices. (Cal. Const., art. V, § 8.) Yet our cases require no such detailed advice regarding judicial limitations on the Governor's commutation power. ( Hart, supra, at pp. 655-656, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 132, 976 P.2d 683, and cases cited; but see Coleman v. Calderon (9th Cir.2000) 210 F.3d 1047,1051.) Our review of the court's comments indicates it adequately explained the theoretical possibility of the commutation of a death or life without parole sentence, and cautioned the jurors not to consider the matter. (See People v. Hovey (1988) 44 Cal.3d 543, 584, 244 Cal.Rptr. 121, 749 P.2d 776; People v. Ramos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 136, 159, fn. 12, 207 Cal.Rptr. 800, 689 P.2d 430.) As we recently explained, and contrary to defendant's assertion, nothing in Kelly v. South Carolina (2002) 534 U.S. 246, 122 S.Ct. 726, 151 L.Ed.2d 670, or Shafer v. South Carolina (2001) 532 U.S. 36, 121 S.Ct. 1263, 149 L.Ed.2d 178, suggests the court's instructions and explanations were inadequate. In those cases, unlike here, the court failed to tell jurors that the defendant would be ineligible for parole. (See People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 636, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 68 P.3d 302; People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 270, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 18, 66 P.3d 1123; People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 123, 124, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 271, 65 P.3d 749.) Our cases hold that CALJIC Nos. 8.84 and 8.88, unlike the instructions given in Shafer or Kelly, adequately inform the jury of the defendant's ineligibility for parole. ( Prieto, supra, at pp. 270-271, 133 Cal.Rptr .2d 18, 66 P.3d 1123; People v. Smithey, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 1009, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243, 978 P.2d 1171.) Defendant also faults the court for suggesting the present Governor, or a successor, might be swayed politically to release a prisoner. Of course, nothing in the court's remarks did any such thing. In context, the court was proposing the opposite thesis, namely, that political considerations made it highly unlikely a commutation would ever occur. (See People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1198, 99 Cal. Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130.) In any event, as noted, defense counsel acceded to the court's explanatory statement and thus waived any objection for appeal. Defendant argues the court's explanatory statement, by inaccurately suggesting the Governor could unilaterally commute a death sentence and might do so for political reasons, thus degraded the jury's relative importance in the sentencing process and diminished the jurors' sense of responsibility. (See Caldwell v. Mississippi (1985) 472 U.S. 320, 328-329, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231.) After reading the court's entire statement in context, we find no reasonable possibility that any such degrading or diminishing occurred here. (See People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1072-1074, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388; People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 244-248, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 426, 821 P.2d 1302.) As previously noted, the court's explanation did not posit the possibility of a politically engendered commutation. Instead, the court made it clear that commutation was an unlikely event, and carefully and repeatedly told the jury not to consider the possibility of commutation in determining the appropriate penalty. Defendant's reliance on Shafer v. South Carolina, supra, 532 U.S. 36, 121 S.Ct. 1263, 149 L.Ed.2d 178, is misplaced. In Shafer, the trial court had merely instructed that life imprisonment means until the death of the defendant, and failed to clarify that parole was unavailable to the defendant. The Shafer court therefore deemed inadequate the trial court's subsequent admonishment not to consider[ ] the availability of parole. ( Id. at p. 38,121 S.Ct. 1263.) Finally, defendant argues the court's statement improperly told the jurors defendant could be released from prison by an earthquake if he were sentenced to life without parole. In defendant's view, the court's remarks invited the jury to speculate about the possibility of an earthquake big enough to free him from confinement. Although the court may have erred in mentioning the speculative possibility of an earthquake causing defendant's release, the error was harmless and could not possibly have affected the verdict. (See People v. Hill (1992) 3 Cal.4th 959, 1009-1011, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 475, 839 P.2d 984 [prosecutor's reference to an earthquake or other miracles deemed harmless error].) Despite defendant's present concern, it is highly unlikely any juror chose death for him because of a concern that a cataclysmic earthquake might some day set him free. In any event, as noted, defense counsel acceded to the court's explanatory statement, including the earthquake reference, and thus waived any objection for appeal.