Opinion ID: 1356988
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Public intent.

Text: (2a) It is urged that the judgments cannot stand because they are unsupported by a specific finding that the public's use of the subject property was accompanied by a belief on its part that it had a right to such use. The trial court specifically found, however, that the uses made of the subject property by the public were made as if said parcels were part of a public recreational area. This, under the specific terms of our Gion-Dietz decision, was a sufficient finding of that kind of adversity which is requisite to implied in law dedication. (2 Cal.3d at p. 39.) Defendant also argues that the evidence before the court cannot be read to support such a finding of public interest. Without detailing the evidence upon which she relies, we can adequately characterize it as indicating that during the periods of time in which public dedication was held to have occurred no reasonable member of the public could have concluded that the subject property was publicly owned. Even if we ignore all contrary evidence, however  including that of public maintenance of the property  the fact remains that knowledge of private ownership is not inconsistent with a belief in a right to public use. No case has ever suggested that the public, in order to bring about the implication of public rights upon private land, must act in the belief that the land is in public ownership. It is enough that the public demonstrate through its actions that its members believed that they had a right to use the property as they did. We do not here suggest  nor have we ever in the past suggested  that the requisite belief on the part of the public, as manifested by its actions with respect to the property, is not subject to the requirement of reasonableness in all of the circumstances. Thus if the owner can show that his efforts to exclude the public or otherwise discourage public use were such that the public was effectively put on notice that its use of the property was not authorized, he may thereby preclude the accrual of public rights. This question, however, is ordinarily one of fact, to be determined in light of all of the circumstances. (See Gion- Dietz, supra, at p. 41.) In the instant case the trial court found on the basis of substantial evidence that no effective effort was made by any owner or anyone else to interfere with or halt such use by said members of the general public at any time.