Opinion ID: 221985
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Effective Date Section of the CSPA

Text: Nino primarily argues that the Board's reading of the effective date section is at odds with the text, purpose, and legislative history of that section. For its part, the government responds that Nino clearly falls outside of the plain text of the effective date section. In the alternative, the government submits that, even if the text of the effective date section is ambiguous, the Board's interpretation of it was a reasonable one to which we should defer. The CSPA's effective date section provides: The amendments made by this Act shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and shall apply to any alien who is a derivative beneficiary or any other beneficiary of  (1) a petition for classification under section 204 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1154) approved before such date but only if a final determination has not been made on the beneficiary's application for an immigrant visa or adjustment of status to lawful permanent residence pursuant to such approved petition; (2) a petition for classification under section 204 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1154) pending on or after such date; or (3) an application pending before the Department of Justice or the Department of State on or after such date. Child Status Protection Act of 2006, Pub.L. No. 107-208, § 8, 116 Stat. 930 (2006). The single member of the Board who heard the case viewed subsection (1) as imposing two requirements: a visa petition must have been approved prior to the CSPA's enactment, and there must not have been a final determination on a beneficiary's application at any time afterwards. Dr. Kotaria's petition was approved on June 27, 2002, almost a year before the CSPA was enacted, so Nino cleared the first hurdle. But because Nino had a final determination on one application for adjustment of status, the Board concluded that she tripped over the second requirement. The Board determined that neither of the other subsections applied to Nino, and thus Nino was not covered under the CSPA. We review issues of law  including challenges to the Board's interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)  de novo. Kiorkis v. Holder, 634 F.3d 924, 928 (7th Cir.2011). Our analysis begins with the statute's language. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450, 122 S.Ct. 941, 151 L.Ed.2d 908 (2002). Where Congress's intent is clear from that language, it must be given effect  neither the agency nor this court may deviate from it. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). Where the statute is ambiguous, however, we owe some deference to the interpretation advanced by the agency assigned to administer the statute. White v. Scibana, 390 F.3d 997, 1000 (7th Cir.2004). Each party begins by arguing that the text of the effective date section is unambiguous and militates in its favor. We disagree. The Board has already determined, in a previous opinion, that the language of subsection (1) is unclear, see In re Avila-Perez, 24 I. & N. Dec. 78, 83 (BIA 2007), and we are similarly perplexed by it. The before such date language might be reasonably understood as applying only to the text preceding it  a reading the Board adopted and the government argues for today. Under that reading, subsection (1) would not apply to beneficiaries of petitions approved prior to the effective date if they had a final decision on an application at any time after that point  including any time after the statute was enacted. That reading is consistent with the text of subsection (1), but it infringes on the overall structure of the effective date section, whose other subsections expressly deal with conduct occurring after the CSPA's enactment. On the other hand, the before such date language could be rationally read to apply to the entirety of subsection (1)  a reading advanced by Nino. Under that reading, subsection (1) would cover all beneficiaries of petitions approved before the statute was enacted, removing from the CSPA's coverage only those beneficiaries who had a final adjudication on an application prior to the CSPA's enactment. That reading would better serve the overall structure of the effective date section, but it is not, on its face, a more natural reading of subsections (1)'s text. When, as here, there are two plausible but different interpretations of statutory language, there is ambiguity. Khan v. United States, 548 F.3d 549, 556 (7th Cir.2008). [1] Anticipating this ambiguity, the government urges us to apply Chevron deference to the Board's nonprecedential interpretation of the effective date section. If Chevron deference applied, it would require us to adopt the Board's interpretation of the statute unless its construction was unreasonable. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43, 845, 104 S.Ct. 2778. We note, however, that Chevron deference is not triggered in all cases. Even when we are talking about interpretations of statutes [like the INA], not everything that an agency produces is entitled to the strongest form of deference. Joseph v. Holder, 579 F.3d 827, 831 (7th Cir.2009). The Supreme Court clarified Chevron 's reach in United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001). In Mead, the Court was tasked with determining the level of deference owed to letters issued by the United States Customs Service. The letters  which instructed parties on their tariff classifications  were binding only on the party at issue, were not subject to notice and comment, and could be modified largely without notice. Id. at 223, 121 S.Ct. 2164. The Court held that administrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority. Id. at 226-27, 121 S.Ct. 2164. Because the letters did not have the force of law, Chevron deference did not apply. Id. at 231-32, 121 S.Ct. 2164. Our task, in light of Mead, is to determine what proclamations by the Board carry the force of law, as only those proclamations are entitled to Chevron deference. Decisions by a three-member panel of the Board obviously carry the force of law, as the Board's regulations make clear that those decisions have precedential value and are binding on the Board when it decides future cases. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(6); Joseph, 579 F.3d at 832. Similarly, non-precedential Board decisions that themselves rely on applicable Board precedent would also carry the force of law, as the non-precedential disposition is merely applying reasoning that already carries precedential weight. See Lagunas-Salgado v. Holder, 584 F.3d 707, 711 (7th Cir.2009); Ali v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 737, 739 (7th Cir.2008). The question remains whether nonprecedential Board opinions that do not rely on binding Board precedent are deserving of Chevron deference. Relying on Mead, all of our sister circuits to address the issue have concluded these non-precedential opinions  which by the Board's regulations do not carry the force of law  are not analyzed under Chevron. Rotimi v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 55, 57-58 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam); Garcia-Quintero v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 1006, 1013-14 (9th Cir. 2006); Carpio v. Holder, 592 F.3d 1091, 1097 (10th Cir.2010); Quinchia v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 552 F.3d 1255, 1258 (11th Cir. 2008). Another circuit dodged the question but gave us a peek at its hand, a peek that similarly swings against Chevron deference for non-precedential opinions. De Leon-Ochoa v. Att'y Gen. of U.S., 622 F.3d 341, 350-51 (3d Cir.2010). The remaining circuits have ducked the question entirely. Vasquez v. Holder, 635 F.3d 563, 567 n. 6 (1st Cir.2011); Cervantes v. Holder, 597 F.3d 229, 233 n. 5 (4th Cir.2010); Mushtaq v. Holder, 583 F.3d 875, 877 (5th Cir.2009); Japarkulova v. Holder, 615 F.3d 696, 700-01 (6th Cir.2010); Godinez-Arroyo v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 848, 850-51 (8th Cir.2008). Out of all of the circuits to address the question, we are the only one to go the other way. In Gutnik, we determined that these streamlined, non-precedential opinions are given Chevron deference so long as the Board provides us with some reasoning to review. Gutnik v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 683, 690 (7th Cir.2006). In doing so, we relied on the Supreme Court's general statement in Aguirre-Aguirre that `[j]udicial deference to the Executive Branch is especially appropriate in the immigration context.' Id. ( quoting INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 416, 119 S.Ct. 1439, 143 L.Ed.2d 590 (1999)). But Mead came after Aguirre-Aguirre, and it made clear that the sine qua non of Chevron deference is an agency statement carrying the force of law. Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27, 121 S.Ct. 2164. It is for that reason that we have expressed doubts about Gutnik 's vitality. See, e.g., Chen v. Holder, 607 F.3d 511, 514 (7th Cir.2010); Ghani v. Holder, 557 F.3d 836, 840 (7th Cir.2009); Joseph, 579 F.3d at 833. Today we hold that non-precedential Board decisions that do not rely on binding Board precedent are not afforded Chevron deference. To the extent that Gutnik is inconsistent with this, it is overruled. [2] Just because Chevron deference does not apply does not mean that we owe no deference to the Board's interpretation. Skidmore deference still applies to less formal statements by an agency, see Mead, 533 U.S. at 234-35, 121 S.Ct. 2164, and non-precedential opinions by the Board certainly fall within that group, see Carpio, 592 F.3d at 1098. Under Skidmore deference, the Board's interpretation is `entitled to respect'  but only to the extent that [it has the] `power to persuade.' Bailey v. Pregis Innovative Packaging, Inc., 600 F.3d 748, 751 (7th Cir.2010) ( quoting Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587, 120 S.Ct. 1655, 146 L.Ed.2d 621 (2000)). To assess the persuasive power of the Board's decision, we examine the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944). We cannot say that the Board's interpretation of subsection (1), which led it to hold that Nino fell outside of the CSPA's coverage, is persuasive. For one, the Board's consideration is far from thorough  its effective date analysis occupied all of a paragraph of thought. The Board made no effort to consider how its interpretation of subsection (1) harmonized (or failed to harmonize) with the other effective date subsections. Moreover, the Board did not address the legislative history of subsection (1) or the tension between the Board's reading and the fact that the CSPA was meant to be an ameliorative statute, applying to as many parties as practicable. These are proper inquiries that the Board ignored. The Board's analysis also fails to address reasoning it employed in a prior, precedential opinion. In Avila-Perez, the Board was tasked with determining whether the CSPA applied to a petitioner who had been the derivative beneficiary of a petition for classification, but had not filed an application for adjustment of status before the statute was enacted. In re Avila-Perez, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 80. That question required the Board to explore subsection (1), a subsection it deemed ambiguous. In analyzing the effective date section's legislative history, the Board determined that subsection (1) was intended to expand the coverage of the statute beyond those individuals whose visa petitions and applications were pending on the date of the CSPA to also protect those individuals whose visa petitions were approved before the effective date, but only if their applications had not already been finally adjudicated.  Id. at 85 (emphasis added). This observation clashes with the Board's conclusion here, and the Board made no effort to address the inconsistency. The Board's opinion suffers from another, related problem: it ignores directly relevant legislative history. Because subsection (1) is ambiguous, its legislative history serves as a valid interpretive tool. See Khan, 548 F.3d at 556-57. That history recounts the purpose of what is now subsection (1), and it cuts against the Board's reasoning. Originally, the CSPA was to apply to all beneficiaries of visa petitions, whether the petitions were filed before or after the CSPA's enactment. See Padash v. INS, 358 F.3d 1161, 1171-72 (9th Cir.2004) (recounting the history of subsection (1)). The Department of Justice expressed discomfort with such wide-reaching retroactivity. It noted that unlimited retroactivity would force it to reopen cases as old as 1952, imposing records problems and creating administrative backlog. H.R.Rep. No. 107-45, 6-7 (2001), reprinted in 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. 640, 644, 2001 WL 406244. The end result was subsection (1), which was seemingly designed to solve the Department's concerns over reviving cases long disposed of. See Padash, 358 F.3d at 1172; Avila-Perez, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 85. Nino's reading of the subsection satisfies the Department's concern without removing a large segment of intended beneficiaries from the Act's coverage. The Board's reading, however, would go too far  there should be no records headache for matters still pending before the Department when the CSPA became effective. It is for all of these reasons that we find the Board's reading of subsection (1) unpersuasive. More to the point, we are convinced that Nino's reading is correct: subsection (1) includes all beneficiaries of previously approved visa petitions except those with applications adjudicated prior to the CSPA's enactment. This reading is more consistent with the legislative history of the CSPA, harmonizes with the longstanding principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of the alien, INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987), and meshes with the Board's earlier interpretation of subsection (1), see Avila-Perez, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 85. Finally, this reading satisfies the Department of Justice's concerns over administrative backlog. (We are confident that the Department will be thrilled that it got what it asked of Congress.) Applying subsection (1), we conclude that the CSPA applies to Nino: her mother's classification petition was approved prior to the CSPA's enactment, and neither of Nino's adjustment applications were decided prior to the CSPA's enactment. Whether the CSPA will help Nino to attain permanent residency is another question, one that will depend on the actual text of the Act's substantive sections. That issue has not yet been fully addressed, and we accordingly leave it to the proper administrative body on remand.