Opinion ID: 2633374
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether filing fees are jurisdictional

Text: ¶ 9 We first address McPhie's argument that the court of appeals erred in its determination that payment of the required filing fee is not a jurisdictional requirement for commencement of an action at the trial level. ¶ 10 Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint be filed in order to commence a civil action. The rule provides: (a) How commenced. A civil action is commenced ... by filing a complaint with the court.... (b) Time of jurisdiction. The court shall have jurisdiction from the time of filing of the complaint.... Utah R. Civ. P. 3(a)-(b). Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure defines filing. It states, in pertinent part, that [t]he filing of pleadings and other papers with the court as required by these rules shall be made by filing them with the clerk of the court. Utah R. Civ. P. 5(e). However, despite the above, McPhie argues that filing requires not only depositing papers with the court, but also payment of the required filing fee. In doing so, McPhie acknowledges that rule 3 is silent as to whether payment of filing fees is required before a complaint can be considered filed. Nevertheless, McPhie argues that rule 3's filing requirement incorporates sections 21-1-1, [4] 21-1-5, [5] and 21-7-2 [6] of the Utah Code, which set forth the court clerk's duty to collect filing fees. Because these sections require the court clerk to collect filing fees in advance of the performance of service, McPhie argues that payment of the filing fee must be a jurisdictional requirement. Dipoma argues, in response, that rule 3 contains no language requiring filing fees, nor expressly incorporates sections 21-1-1, 21-1-5, or 21-7-2 of the Utah Code, and therefore, the court of appeals correctly determined that payment of filing fees is not a jurisdictional requirement for the commencement of an action. ¶ 11 This court has not addressed the issue of whether the payment of filing fees is a jurisdictional requirement for commencing an action at the trial level. However, this court has addressed whether filing fees are jurisdictional on appeal. In doing so, this court has consistently looked to the plain language of the applicable rule when construing it, thereby declining to read additional language into the rule. For example, in Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 676 P.2d 952 (Utah 1984), this court addressed the question of whether payment of docketing fees is a jurisdictional requirement under rule 73 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which governed the filing of appeals prior to 1985. Rule 73 stated in pertinent part: `A party may appeal from a judgment by filing with the district court a notice of appeal, together with sufficient copies thereof ..., and depositing therewith the fee required for docketing the appeal in the Supreme Court.' Id. at 954-55 (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 73(a)). In determining whether rule 73's docketing fee requirement was jurisdictional, the Prowswood court distinguished rule 73 from rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, which set forth only the requirement that an appellant must file a notice of appeal, and then stated: `Failure of an appellant to take any step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such action as the court of appeals deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal.' Id. at 958 (emphasis added) (quoting Fed. R.App. P. 3(a)). The Prowswood court concluded that the plain language of rule 73, unlike rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, expressly made both the notice of appeal and the docketing fee requirement jurisdictional. See id. at 959. ¶ 12 However, on January 1, 1985, rule 73 was superseded by rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 3, like rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, contained no express reference to payment of the docketing fee at the time of filing as a jurisdictional requirement. Accordingly, because the language making payment of filing fees a jurisdictional requirement had been removed, this court, in State v. Johnson, held that [u]nder Rule 3, the timely payment of fees on an appeal from the district court to this Court is no longer jurisdictional. 700 P.2d 1125, 1129 n. 1 (Utah 1985) (emphasis added). ¶ 13 Consistent with the above cases, in determining whether the payment of filing fees is a jurisdictional requirement for commencement of an action at the trial level, we must look to the plain language of rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Like rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, which was construed in Johnson, rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure contains no express reference to filing fees as a jurisdictional requirement, nor does the rule expressly incorporate, as McPhie argues, sections 21-1-1, 21-1-5, and 21-7-2 of the Utah Code as jurisdictional requirements. Rather, as the court of appeals correctly noted, the plain language of rule 3 requires merely that a plaintiff file a complaint with the court clerk, and any reference to filing fees as a jurisdictional requirement is notably absent. Certainly, if it had been intended that payment of filing fees be a jurisdictional requirement for commencing an action, a provision expressly requiring that fees be paid in advance would have been included. See Hausknect v. Indus. Comm'n, 882 P.2d 683, 684-85 (Utah Ct.App.1994) (holding payment of required fees jurisdictional under Utah Rule Appellate Procedure 14, where rule stated that `[a]t the time of filing any petition for review, the party obtaining the review shall pay to the clerk of the appellate court such filing fees as are established by law, and also the fee for docketing the appeal' (emphasis added) (quoting Utah R.App. P. 14(b))). ¶ 14 Moreover, in addition to the fact that rule 3 contains no express reference to filing fees as a jurisdictional requirement, we note that a majority of courts in other jurisdictions, construing nearly identical rules governing the commencement of an action, have concluded that the filing fee requirement is not jurisdictional at the trial level. See, e.g., Burnett v. Perry Mfg., Inc., 151 F.R.D. 398, 401 (D.Kan.1993) ([T]he greater weight of authority [among federal courts] indicates that the filing fee requirement is not jurisdictional.); see also Cintron v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 813 F.2d 917, 920 (9th Cir.1987) (holding filing fee requirement not jurisdictional under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Rodgers v. Bowen, 790 F.2d 1550, 1551-52 (11th Cir.1986) (same); Wrenn v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 575 F.2d 544, 547 (5th Cir.1978) (same); Johnson v. Brown, 803 F.Supp. 1414, 1418-19 (N.D.Ind.1992) (same); Bolduc v. United States, 189 F.Supp. 640, 641-42 (D.Me.1960) (same); Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Auth. v. DiAntonio, 152 Pa.Cmwlth. 237, 618 A.2d 1182, 1183-84 (1992) (holding filing fee requirement not jurisdictional under Pennsylvania law); Foley v. Foley, 147 Cal.App.2d 76, 304 P.2d 719, 719-20 (1956) (same under California law); 4 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1052, at 165 (2d ed.1987) (stating that [f]iling a complaint requires nothing more than delivery to a court officer authorized to receive it). But see Broker House Int'l, Ltd. v. Bendelow, 952 P.2d 860, 863 (Colo.Ct.App. 1998) (holding payment of filing fees jurisdictional prerequisite for commencement of action under Colorado law). ¶ 15 In determining that filing fees are not a jurisdictional requirement for the commencement of an action at the trial level, the above courts have noted that [t]o decide otherwise would eliminate reasonable reliance by parties on a [court clerk's] acceptance of a pleading, DiAntonio, 618 A.2d at 1184, and that `[t]he loss of a potentially valid cause of action is a rather harsh penalty for an oversight of this type.' Burnett, 151 F.R.D. at 402 (quoting 4 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1055 (2d ed.1987)). Moreover, as the court of appeals noted, and as Dipoma argues on appeal, making the payment of filing fees a jurisdictional requirement in the absence of plain language could potentially lead to harsh, unintended results, especially in the case of a check returned for insufficient funds. Indeed, a check may be returned for many reasons, some of which are beyond the ability of the payor to controlsuch as bank errorand a plaintiff should not have his or her action dismissed due to problems beyond their control. ¶ 16 In view of the above, we hold that the court of appeals correctly applied the analogous statutory and case law in determining that payment of filing fees is not a jurisdictional prerequisite for the commencement of an action under rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.