Opinion ID: 2038653
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Guidelines for Transfer Hearings.

Text: Since we remand this case for a new transfer hearing to be conducted in accordance with G.L.c. 119, § 61, as appearing in St. 1975, c. 840, § 1, it serves no useful purpose for us to address specifically the plaintiff's argument that the judge's decision to transfer him to adult court was not warranted by the evidence. [11] Rather, as guidance for future proceedings in this case and similar cases, we offer several observations. First, we emphasize the statutory requirement that a judge, before dismissing a juvenile complaint, must enter a written finding based on clear and convincing evidence showing that the minor is not suitable for treatment as a juvenile. See G.L.c. 119, § 61, as amended in 1975. Further, the judge should make subsidiary findings in accordance with statutory criteria (see note 6 supra ), Rule 85A (see note 12 infra ) and the considerations that we outline below. We turn now to a discussion of the relevant considerations for determining whether to transfer a juvenile to adult court. In deciding this question, it is essential to keep sight of the important consequences that result from a transfer decision and the legislative policy underlying our statutes relating to delinquent children. As noted by the Supreme Court in Kent v. United States, supra at 556, the waiver of jurisdiction is a `critically important' action determining vitally important statutory rights of the juvenile. If treated as a juvenile, the plaintiff in this case, for instance, will have no criminal record (G.L.c. 119, § 53), will not be disqualified from public service (G.L.c. 119, § 60), will be eligible for rehabilitation under the care and guidance of the Youth Service Board (G.L.c. 119, § 58, and c. 120), and will be discharged at the age of eighteen unless there is a finding that his discharge would be physically dangerous to the public (G.L.c. 120, §§ 16 and 17). See D'Urbano v. Commonwealth, 345 Mass. 466 (1963). If treated as an adult, the plaintiff, who was fifteen and one-half years old at the time of the hearing, will be deprived of these substantial statutory protections and will be imprisoned for life if convicted of first degree murder. In view of the important consequences attaching to a transfer decision, it is not surprising that G.L.c. 119, § 53, mandates that the statutory sections dealing with delinquent children, including G.L.c. 119, § 61, should be construed liberally in order that children, as far as practicable, shall be treated not as criminals, but as children in need of aid, encouragement and guidance. See Metcalf v. Commonwealth, 338 Mass. 648, 651-652 (1959). From this statutory requirement, we may infer that the Legislature intended that noncriminal treatment is to be favored and that transfer should be ordered only when warranted by exceptional circumstances. Cf. Kent v. United States, supra at 560. Nevertheless, a judge has considerable discretion, within this statutory framework, to determine whether a child should be treated as an adult. In exercising this discretion, a judge is to be guided by Rule 85A, which sets forth factors relevant to a transfer decision, [12] and G.L.c. 119, § 61, as amended in 1975. [13] There is no specific requirement that a judge weigh these factors in a certain manner or achieve some predesigned balance. Any factor which bears on the protection of the public and the amenability of the child to treatment as a juvenile may be considered. However, we do not believe that a decision to transfer is proper when supported by findings which deal only with the seriousness of the charge and the inadequacy of existing juvenile facilities in terms of safeguarding the public. Despite the importance of these two factors and the weight that they may have in support of a conclusion that there should be a transfer to adult court, there must also be a finding that the juvenile cannot be rehabilitated within the present juvenile structure, or that, in the absence of long-term supervision and security, he poses a serious threat to the public, with subsidiary findings indicating the basis for this conclusion. [14] It cannot be assumed that the nature of the offense demonstrates the need for treatment beyond available juvenile facilities, for this assumption would imply that juvenile facilities will be adequate only if a child is charged with a minor offense and that, by definition, serious offenders must be denied the statutory protections afforded juveniles. Such a conclusion ignores the rehabilitative purposes of our statutes relating to delinquent children and, in effect, restricts without legislative sanction our juvenile system to the treatment of minor offenders. While we emphasize the need to focus on the minor's potential for successful treatment before the age of majority within existing juvenile facilities, we do not mean to suggest that there will not be instances where transfer is appropriate. It is clear that a judge, having considered all relevant factors in light of the legislative intent and having made supportive findings, may legitimately conclude that transfer is warranted. Accordingly, we vacate the judge's order dismissing the juvenile complaint and remand for a rehearing on the issue whether the plaintiff is to be tried as an adult, including a determination whether probable cause exists and a reconsideration of the plaintiff's amenability to treatment as a juvenile, to be held in accordance with G.L.c. 119, § 61, as appearing in St. 1975, c. 840, § 1. So ordered.