Opinion ID: 867611
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Admissibility and Weight

Text: ¶ 24 It is a basic maxim that judges determine admissibility of evidence and juries decide what weight to give it. As Wigmore puts it, [w]hen evidential data are once admitted by the judge and there is a sufficiency of them to entitle the case to go to the jury, their individual and total weight or probative value is for the decision of the jury. 9 John Henry Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence § 2551, at 664 (Chadbourn rev.1981). Likewise, it is standard practice not to give jurors a chance to consider issues already decided by the judge, sometimes referred to as a `second bite at the apple.' Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 104.60(2) (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed.2001). ¶ 25 The state's position assumes that because the evidence was originally presented at the Frye hearing, repeating it at trial would challenge Judge Reinstein's ruling regarding general acceptance of the protocol, thus providing a second bite at the apple. This argument fails to recognize that very often the same proof used to establish admissibility also impacts weight and credibility. ¶ 26 A Frye determination is a preliminary finding regarding the admissibility of scientific evidence and expert qualifications. It is the judge who is called upon to make this determination. Ariz. R. Evid. 104(a). Yet, according to Rule 104(e), the judge's role in determining preliminary questions does not limit the right of a party to introduce before the jury evidence relevant to weight or credibility. Ariz. R. Evid. 104(e). Implicit in this rule is an awareness that some evidence presented at the preliminary hearing will also be relevant to credibility and weight. Otherwise, Rule 104(e) would be superfluous. ¶ 27 Other jurisdictions have recognized this principle. In United States v. Velasquez, the Third Circuit reversed the trial court for not allowing a critic of handwriting analysis to testify before the jury after the judge had deemed such analysis admissible. 64 F.3d 844 (3rd Cir.1995). The panel accused the district court of ignor[ing] the fact that the same considerations that inform the court's legal decision to admit evidence under Rule 702 may also influence the factfinder's determination as to what weight such evidence, once admitted, should receive. Id. at 848. ¶ 28 The North Carolina Supreme Court has reached a similar conclusion, stating that [o]nce disputed evidence is admitted at the trial, its weight and credibility are for the jury. Therefore, if otherwise competent, to the extent that it bears upon such weight or credibility, the same testimony which failed to convince the judge to grant the motion to suppress is admissible before the jury. State v. Sanchez, 328 N.C. 247, 400 S.E.2d 421, 424 (1991) (quoting 1 Brandis on North Carolina Evidence § 19a (3d ed.1988)). ¶ 29 We agree that the jury must be allowed to hear such evidence if it is to properly perform its function as factfinder. See, e.g., Logerquist v. McVey, 196 Ariz. 470, 476, 487-88, 1 P.3d 113, 119, 130-31, ¶¶ 20, 51-55 (2000). As the North Carolina Supreme Court has noted, [a]dmissibility is for determination by the judge unassisted by the jury. Credibility and weight are for determination by the jury unassisted by the judge. Sanchez, 400 S.E.2d at 424. The trial court's blanket preclusion of evidence from the Frye hearing in this case infringed upon the role of the jury and improperly insulated the state's evidence from critique. [11] ¶ 30 Judges, in their discretion, may place reasonable limits upon the scope of cross-examination, without infringing upon the defendant's right of confrontation. State v. Fleming, 117 Ariz. 122, 125, 571 P.2d 268, 271 (1977). The test is whether the defendant has been denied the opportunity of presenting to the trier of fact information which bears either on the issues in the case or on the credibility of the witness[es]. Id. Cross-examination concerning the DPS protocol would have provided information with which the jury could weigh testimony concerning the DNA results. Because the restrictions in this case crossed the line from reasonable to excessive, they breached the defendant's right to confront adverse witnesses. 2. Right to Present Testimony ¶ 31 The defendant also argues that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated because the judge's ruling precluded him from presenting expert testimony regarding the protocol, validation studies, and match window. We agree. As noted above, the judge's application of Rule 403 was based on the erroneous assumption that evidence from the Frye hearing would play no significant role in the jury's consideration. Thus, the trial court abused its discretion when it found that the probative value of this evidence was outweighed by the risk of juror confusion. [12] 3. Reversible Error ¶ 32 Though we have determined that the trial judge erred in precluding the defendant's cross-examination and expert testimony in violation of the Sixth Amendment, we still must decide whether this error was reversible. A constitutional error is harmless if it can be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the error had no influence on the verdict of the jury. State v. Luzanilla, 179 Ariz. 391, 398, 880 P.2d 611, 618 (1994). ¶ 33 DNA analysis was a significant part of the evidence against the defendant in six of the ten cases, including two of the three homicides. In fact, DNA was the only physical evidence linking the defendant to those two murders. As the prosecutor said in closing argument, It's when you get to the DNA you know he's guilty of the murders. ¶ 34 The state argues that any error was harmless because the defendant was not totally precluded from criticizing the DNA evidence before the jury. However, the mere fact that the defense was allowed to question the reliability of the DNA evidence on a limited basis does not cure the error in this case. We have previously noted that `science' is often accepted in our society as synonymous with truth. Bible, 175 Ariz. at 578, 858 P.2d at 1181 (quoting Morris K. Udall, et al., Arizona Practice: Law of Evidence § 102, at 212 (3d ed.1991)). This is particularly so in the case of DNA evidence, which has the potential to dominate a factfinder's thinking. Accordingly, in deciding whether the error here was harmless, we must determine whether there was other substantial evidence supporting the convictions. ¶ 35 For all but three of the victims, there was credible eyewitness identification, physical evidence apart from DNA, or other corroborating facts clearly implicating the defendant. The error in precluding evidence from the Frye hearing was harmless as to them and we need not disturb the verdicts. The counts related to the attacks upon M.M., M.C. and W.C., however, are another matter.