Opinion ID: 1763774
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Doyle analysis

Text: Once a Doyle violation has been found, this Court has discretion to review the violation or violations in the context of the entire record. Dexter, 954 S.W.2d at 340. The proper standard for review, when the error is preserved, is the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. Id. at 340 n. 1. Under this standard, the State bears the burden of proving that a federal constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Harmless beyond a reasonable doubt means that no reasonable doubt exists that the admitted evidence failed to contribute to the jury's verdict. State v. March, 216 S.W.3d 663, 667 (Mo. banc 2007). To determine the effect of a Doyle violation on the jury's verdict, this Court examines these factors: (1) whether the government made repeated Doyle violations; (2) whether the trial court made any curative effort; (3) whether the defendant's exculpatory evidence is transparently frivolous; and (4) whether the other evidence of the defendant's guilt is otherwise overwhelming. Dexter, 954 S.W.2d at 340 n. 1.
There can be no doubt the State made repeated Doyle violations. Like Dexter, the State, whether purposefully or not, developed a theme that carried throughout all phases of trial. Id. at 340-41. As noted above, the theme was that if Brooks was innocent, he would have made an exculpatory statement during the police interview. This theme was repeated through all stages of trial.
The trial court undertook some action to cure the effect of each of the preserved errors. As noted, the State commented about Brooks' silence during opening arguments. The trial court told the jury to disregard the State's comment: Ladies and gentlemen, the objection of defense counsel has been sustained. The jury will be instructed to disregard the prosecuting attorney's comments regarding the defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent. Those comments will be stricken from the record and should play no part in your consideration of this case. When Lieutenant Thomas commented about Brooks' right to remain silent, the trial court ordered the State to rephrase the question but erroneously did not instruct the jury to disregard the comment about Brooks' right to remain silent. In Dexter, similar curative efforts were made to the jury. Id. at 341. This Court found those efforts to be minimal and determined that because the issue had been raised to the jury, it created an inference of guilt by directing the jury to be suspicious of appellant's lack of response.... Id. The same is true concerning the facts of this case; the curative efforts here were minimal. Although the court instructed the jury to disregard the comment in the State's opening statement, it failed to give a similar instruction in response to Lieutenant Thomas' testimony. The court's efforts had little effect as the trial progressed because the jury had already entertained the State's suggestion that if Brooks was innocent he would have explained his struggle with Cates and his self-defense theory. Moreover, notwithstanding the trial court's rulings, the State continued to call attention to Brooks' post- Miranda silence.
Brooks' defense that he was struggling with Cates when the gun discharged was not transparently frivolous; in fact, the trial court gave the offered self-defense instruction, which is an implicit finding that the trial court believed there was substantial evidence to support the instruction. The defense was plausible and supported by Dr. Case's testimony that Cates was shot during a struggle over the gun. Brooks also testified about a prior occasion in which Cates had pointed a gun at him during an argument.
Evidence of Brooks' guilt is substantial but not overwhelming. In Dexter, this Court acknowledged the difficulty in determining what establishes overwhelming evidence but concluded that it means, at a minimum that there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction without consideration of the inadmissible evidence ... [t]here must be no reasonable doubt that appellant committed the crime, and the degree of prejudice that occurred by use of the inadmissible references to appellant's post- Miranda warnings silence must be insubstantial. Id. at 342. The State's use of Brooks' silence was not insubstantial. A review of the record suggests some of the more persuasive evidence of Brooks' guilt were the inconsistent pre- Miranda statements he made, but the State for the most part chose not to cross-examine him concerning those statements. In lieu of that permissible strategy, the State chose the impermissible strategy of using of Brooks' post- Miranda silence. The success of Brooks' self-defense instruction depended on his credibility, and the State's impermissible use of his post- Miranda silence undermined his credibility. Therefore, in light of the result in this case, it cannot be said that the cumulative effect of the multiple references to his post- Miranda silence were insubstantial.