Opinion ID: 213364
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Preclusive Effect of State Court Decision

Text: Finally, we consider whether the earlier state court litigation precludes further litigation of appellants' claims even if they get the benefit of the paycheck accrual rule. The doctrine of [res judicata or] claim preclusion is premised on the idea that, when a claim has been fully litigated and come to judgment on the merits, finality trumps. Czarniecki v. City of Chicago, 633 F.3d 545, 548 (7th Cir.2011). Because the earlier suit in this case was a state court judgment, we look to Illinois law to determine whether res judicata bars the appellants' claims. Walsh Const. Co. of Illinois v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 153 F.3d 830, 832 (7th Cir.1998). In Illinois, res judicata applies when: (1) there is a final judgment in the first suit; (2) there is identity of the causes of action (identified by a set of operative facts); and (3) there is an identity of parties (directly or through privity of interest). Id.; Czarniecki, 633 F.3d at 548-49. The district court properly decided that res judicata barred recovery for claims arising before the date of the final judgment in the state court suitNovember 10, 2003. If the appellants had been successful in the state court case, they could have recovered for damages up until November 10, 2003. The City argues that the appellants' later claims are also barred by res judicata even if the paycheck accrual rule applies. We disagree. As discussed above, following the Ledbetter Act, we recognize that each paycheck resulting from the original discriminatory act is a separate cause of action triggering its own statute of limitations. As the district court found, these independent causes of action do not share an identity of cause of action with the state court action. They are allegedly wrongful events ... separated by time and function from the allegedly discriminatory paychecks paid to the appellants before the state court case was decided. Perkins v. Board of Trustees of University of Illinois, 116 F.3d 235, 237 (7th Cir. 1997). We should not be understood as opening the door to endless re-litigation of allegedly discriminatory decisions that affect compensation for many years. A critical point here is that the state court did not rule on the merits of the discrimination issue, but ruled only on statute of limitations grounds. Therefore, there is no collateral estoppel or issue preclusion problem that would prevent these plaintiffs from receiving a first decision on the merits of their discrimination claims. See id. (holding that the university's prevailing in the first case on statute of limitations grounds did not mean that there was issue preclusion or collateral estoppel as to the plaintiff's later claims of new discrimination). The appellants may thus proceed with their discrimination claims for allegedly discriminatory compensation paid after November 10, 2003. The appellants argue that the state court decision should have no preclusive effect at all on their Title VII claims because they had not yet received their EEOC right-to-sue letter, so the Title VII claim could not have been brought in their earlier state court suit. We rejected essentially the same argument in Brzostowski v. Laidlaw Waste Sys., Inc., 49 F.3d 337, 339 (7th Cir.1995) (finding that plaintiff could have delayed the filing of his first suit or requested that the court postpone or stay the first case. What he cannot do, as he did here, is split causes of action and use different theories of recovery as separate bases for multiple suits.); see also Huon v. Johnson & Bell, Ltd., 2010 WL 3404967, at  (N.D.Ill. Aug. 26, 2010) (the Seventh Circuit has addressed that precise issue and held that a plaintiff cannot rely upon the fact that he has not yet received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC to escape the effects of res judicata). The appellants' argument that they could not bring their Title VII claims in state court is meritless, and the state court decision must be given preclusive effect for the appellants' claims before November 10, 2003. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED IN PART, with respect to the dismissal of all claims arising before November 10, 2003 and with respect to Officer Shaffer's claims for monetary damages before January 19, 2005. In all other respects the judgment is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this opinion.