Opinion ID: 2166474
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Did the plaintiff's injuries arise out of her employment?

Text: Even though the plaintiff's injuries occurred in the course of her employment, we nevertheless hold that they did not arise out of her job duties with the ACS. The phrase arising out of requires that a causal connection exist between the employment conditions and the resulting injury. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Googe, 217 Tenn. 272, 397 S.W.2d 368, 370 (1965). With respect to whether an assault arises out of employment, we have previously delineated assaults into three general classifications: (1) assaults with an inherent connection to employment such as disputes over performance, pay or termination; (2) assaults stemming from inherently private disputes imported into the employment setting from the claimant's domestic or private life and not exacerbated by the employment; and (3) assaults resulting from a neutral force such as random assaults on employees by individuals outside the employment relationship. Woods v. Harry B. Woods Plumbing Co., 967 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tenn.1998). When an assault has an inherent connection to the employment it is compensable. See W.S. Dickey Mfg. Co. v. Moore, 208 Tenn. 576, 347 S.W.2d 493 (1961) (finding injuries stemming from a job performance dispute arose out of the employment). On the other hand, assaults originating from inherently private disputes and imported into the work place are not compensable. See White v. Whiteway Pharm., Inc., 210 Tenn. 449, 360 S.W.2d 12 (1962) (denying compensation where a third party murdered an employee on employer's premises over a domestic dispute). However, whether neutral assaults are compensable turns on the facts and circumstances of the employment. Woods, 967 S.W.2d at 771; see also Beck v. State, 779 S.W.2d 367 (Tenn.1989) (finding a random assault by a third party arose out of employment where the employment exposed the claimant to public risks). The assault in this case is best described as a neutral assault. In granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the chancery court commented: [T]here's certainly not any evidence that this person who committed the assault was part of the working employment relationship and was not there on any kind of business related to the [ACS] or really any business with the employee. We agree with the chancery court's conclusions. A neutral force assault is one that is neither personal to the claimant nor distinctly associated with the employment. 1 Arthur Larson, Workers' Compensation Law, § 3.05 (2007); Arthur Larson, The PositionalRisk Doctrine in Workers' Compensation, 1973 Duke L.J. 761, 781 (noting that a neutral force is associated with neither the work environment nor the claimant's personal life). The Woods categories focus on what catalyst spurred the assault, i.e., was it a dispute arising from a work-related duty, was it a dispute arising from a personal matter, or was it unexplained or irrational? An assault that is spurred by neither a catalyst inherently connected to the employment nor stemming from an inherently private dispute is most aptly labeled as a neutral force assault. Here, the undisputed facts clearly show that the assault had neither an inherent connection with the employment, nor did it stem from a personal dispute between Sawyers and the plaintiff. Therefore, we must focus our attention on the facts and circumstances of the plaintiff's employment and its relationship to the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. Generally, for an injury to arise out of employment, it must emanate from a peculiar danger or risk inherent to the nature of the employment. Blankenship, 164 S.W.3d at 354. Thus, an injury purely coincidental, or contemporaneous, or collateral, with the employment . . . will not cause the injury . . . to be considered as arising out of the employment. Jackson v. Clark & Fay, Inc., 197 Tenn. 135, 270 S.W.2d 389, 390 (1954). However, in limited circumstances, where the employment involves indiscriminate exposure to the general public, the street risk doctrine may supply the required causal connection between the employment and the injury. Jesse v. Savings Prods., 772 S.W.2d 425, 427 (Tenn.1989); see also Hudson, 583 S.W.2d at 602 (adopting the street risk doctrine). In Hudson, this Court adopted the street risk doctrine, which provides that if the employment exposes the employee to the hazards of the street that it is a risk or danger incident to and inherent in the employment and provides the necessary causal connection between the employment and the injury. Hudson, 583 S.W.2d at 602. In that seminal case, unknown assailants assaulted the claimant as he entered the cab of his employer's tractor trailer after purchasing lunch at a fast food restaurant. Id. at 599. The assailants did not steal the claimant's money or anything from the vehicle, and their motives were never discovered. Id. In holding that the street risk doctrine supplied the causal connection, we emphasized that the claimant wore a uniform identifying him with his employer, the nature of the claimant's employment exposed him to the general public, and the claimant was charged with safeguarding his employer's property while on duty, even on his lunch break. Id. at 603. In more recent cases, this Court has applied the street risk doctrine in situations that do not actually involve streets and highways. For example, in Jesse, 772 S.W.2d at 427, we applied the street risk doctrine to supply the causal connection where an employee was raped by a customer on her employer's premises while she was performing her work duties as a convenience store clerk. In that case, we rejected the employer's argument that an employee so injured must show an employment-related motive on the part of the assailant and that a rape, standing alone, suggests a personal motive. Id. Rather, we held that an assailant's motive is but one factor to consider in deciding whether an assault arises out of the employment. Id. The Jesse Court relied on the following rationale of Hudson: the employee's visible identification with his employment and his responsibility as custodian of his employer's valuable property provided a sufficient nexus between the assault and the employment. Id. (citing Hudson, 583 S.W.2d at 603). The Jesse Court further stated that the street risk doctrine applies where an employee's indiscriminate exposure to the general public is one of the conditions under which her work [is] required to be performed, and the actions of those persons on the premises are reasonably considered hazards of the employment. Jesse, 772 S.W.2d at 427. Similarly, in Beck v. State, 779 S.W.2d 367 (Tenn.1989), we applied the substance of the doctrine to hold that a random assault upon a driver's license examiner, which occurred in her employer's parking lot, arose out of her employment, although we did not use the term street risk. Id. at 371 (citing Jesse, 772 S.W.2d at 427). The assailant in Beck came to the claimant's place of employment and inquired: Where is that mean old [claimant]? Id. at 368. The assailant waited for the claimant who was administering a driving test. Id. at 368-69. When the claimant returned, she informed her co-workers of an improperly parked car. Id. at 369. The assailant admitted the car was his, but as the claimant turned away, he grabbed her tightly around the waist and whispered, I want sex, sex, sex. Id. The claimant quickly pulled away from the assailant, but sought workers' compensation benefits based on the incident. Id. at 371. The Beck Court found that the claimant's emotional injuries were compensable and that they arose out of her employment, reasoning that the assailant had access to the claimant because her workplace was open to the public and because her job duties required her to ask the assailant to move his improperly parked vehicle. Id. Likewise, in Braden v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 833 S.W.2d 496 (Tenn.1992), this Court held that the street risk doctrine satisfied the causal connection requirement where the employee was assaulted by unknown assailants as he removed paperwork from his employer's van while it was parked at his residence. Id. at 497-98. We carefully limited application of the street risk doctrine to workers whose employment exposes them to the hazards of the street, or who are assaulted under circumstances that fairly suggest they were singled out for attack because of their association with their employer. . . . Id. at 499. Unlike our previous cases in which the facts supported application of the street risk doctrine to provide the necessary causal connection, the facts here do not establish that the plaintiff's employment exposed her to a street hazard or that she was singled out for her association with her employer. There is nothing to indicate that she was targeted because of her association with her employer or that she was charged with safeguarding her employer's property. Additionally, the plaintiff was not advancing the interests of the ACS when she allowed Sawyers into her kitchen, and her employment with the ACS did not impose any duty upon the plaintiff to admit Sawyers to her home. The plaintiff argues that had it not been for her employment arrangement, she would not have been at home to suffer these attacks. However, we have never held that any and every assault which occurs at the work site arises out of employment. Additionally, although Sawyers knew from a previous visit that the plaintiff was home during the day, there is nothing in the record which indicates that there was a causal connection between the plaintiff's employment and the assault. Unlike our prior decisions, the facts do not show that Sawyers attacked the plaintiff because she was identifiable as an ACS employee, or because she was performing a job duty, or because she was safeguarding the ACS's property. The street risk doctrine is not a limitless means of allowing recovery for every situation. As such, this case presents us with an opportunity to outline the boundaries of the doctrine. When an employee suffers a neutral assault within the confines of her employer's premises  whether the premises be a home office or a corporate office-the street risk doctrine will not provide the required causal connection between the injury and the employment unless the proof fairly suggests either that the attacker singled out the employee because of his or her association with the employer or that the employment indiscriminately exposed the employee to dangers from the public. The facts of this case clearly illustrate that the street risk doctrine does not apply. There is nothing in the record to fairly suggest or provide any weight to the assertion that the plaintiff's injuries were causally connected with the nature of her employment. Therefore, the chancery court's holding that the plaintiff's injuries did not arise out of her employment is affirmed.