Opinion ID: 2292016
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Search of the Defendant's Person

Text: One of the exceptions to the warrant requirement provides that a law enforcement officer may, incident to a lawful arrest, search the person arrested and the immediate surrounding area. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969); State v. Crutcher, 989 S.W.2d 295, 300 (Tenn.1999). A search incident to a lawful arrest is justified by the need to protect the arresting officer and others from harm and the need to prevent the concealment or destruction of evidence. See Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 116, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998); Crutcher, 989 S.W.2d at 300. The validity of the search of the Defendant's person in the parking lot at the Shell station after visual and audio surveillance by police of his role in the drug transaction depends on whether the search was incident to his arrest. For a search to be valid as a search incident to a lawful arrest, there must first be a lawful arrest made contemporaneously with the search. In this case, the critical question is: was the Defendant under arrest at the time of the search of his person? In answering this question, we review the three distinct levels of interaction between citizens and law enforcement officials. The first and most limited interaction is the brief police-citizen encounter, which requires no objective justification and is limited to informal questioning of the person involved. Day, 263 S.W.3d at 901. The next level is the brief investigatory detention, which must be supported by reasonable suspicion of wrong-doing and entitles the officer to conduct a stop and frisk under the principles of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Day, 263 S.W.3d at 901. The third and most invasive level is the full-scale arrest, which must be supported by probable cause. Id.; accord Crutcher, 989 S.W.2d at 300. The investigating officers saw the Defendant commit two traffic violations, and therefore they were justified in making an initial investigatory detention. See State v. Brown, 294 S.W.3d 553, 562 (Tenn.2009) (noting that [w]hen the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred, the temporary detention of an individual during the stop of the vehicle is considered constitutionally reasonable, irrespective of the subjective motivations of the officer making the stop.). At the time the officers activated their emergency blue lights and pulled in behind the Defendant's vehicle at the Shell station, he was seized. See Day, 263 S.W.3d at 902 (The law is settled that an automobile stop by the use of flashing blue lights constitutes a `seizure.'); State v. Binette, 33 S.W.3d 215, 218 (Tenn.2000). This investigative stop entitled the officers to conduct a limited patdown search for weapons pursuant to Terry, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, and its progeny. The search of the Defendant, however, went further than a Terry patdown, and he was subjected to a full search. Therefore, the State was required to demonstrate that (1) the officers had probable cause to believe that the Defendant had committed an offense for which a full custodial arrest was permitted, State v. Richards, 286 S.W.3d 873, 878 (Tenn.2009), and (2) that the Defendant was under arrest at the time of the search. Crutcher, 989 S.W.2d at 301 (stating [i]n order to justify a full Chimel search incident to arrest, the critical question remains whether the [defendant] was, in fact, arrested at the scene.). Based on their surveillance of the drug deal and the information they received from the CI, the officers had probable cause to believe that the Defendant has committed a drug offense for which he could be arrested. The next question, and the more difficult question in this case, is whether the Defendant was under arrest at the time of the search. Whether an arrest has occurred is not always clear; it is a fact-intensive inquiry. See id. at 299. The ultimate conclusion of whether the facts establish that a person was under custodial arrest is one of law. See Daniel, 12 S.W.3d at 423-24 (stating the trial court's conclusion that a seizure did not occur is a conclusion of law derived from an application of the law to the undisputed facts of this case); State v. Nidiffer, 173 S.W.3d 62, 64 (Tenn.Crim.App. 2004) (reviewing issue of whether defendant was under arrest when he refused to consent to a blood alcohol test under de novo standard); State v. McCrary, 45 S.W.3d 36, 43 (Tenn.Crim.App.2000) (stating that [i]n contrast to the determination of when a seizure has occurred, the determination of whether a consent to a search was voluntarily given is a question of fact); see also United States v. Hernandez, 825 F.2d 846, 851 (5th Cir.1987) (It is perhaps most useful to say that the arrest determination, like the probable cause determination, presents a question of law greatly dependent upon factual findings.); Wayne A. Logan, An Exception Swallows a Rule: Police Authority to Search Incident to Arrest, 19 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 381, 426 (2001) (Despite the occasional reference to the arrest question as being factual in nature, it is more properly conceived as a legal (indeed, constitutional) question that must be resolved on the basis of factual determinations made by the court.) (footnote omitted). In Tennessee, the definition of arrest is well-established; it is `the taking, seizing, or detaining of the person of another, either by touching or putting hands on him, or by any act which indicates an intention to take him into custody and subjects the person arrested to the actual control and will of the person making the arrest.' Crutcher, 989 S.W.2d at 301 (quoting West v. State, 221 Tenn. 178, 425 S.W.2d 602, 605 (1968)). Although [a]n arrest may be affected without formal words or a station house booking ... there must be actual restraint on the arrestee's freedom of movement under legal authority of the arresting officer. Id. at 301-02 (citing 5 Am.Jur.2d Arrest § 2 (1995)). Our previous analysis in Crutcher of whether an arrest had occurred is instructive. In Crutcher, police officers apprehended the defendant after he wrecked his motorcycle following a high-speed chase. Id. at 298. The officer placed the defendant's arm behind his back and intended to arrest him, but did not handcuff the defendant when he complained of injuries from the crash. Id. While waiting for an ambulance, the officers told the defendant he would be taken to a hospital but did not mention criminal charges or arrest proceedings, nor did they advise him of his Miranda rights. Id. Before releasing the motorcycle to a friend of the defendant, one of the officers searched the defendant's backpack and found a handgun and packets of cocaine. Following the defendant's release from the hospital, he was taken to the Drug Task Force Center, but returned the following day to the hospital where he stayed for four days. Id. at 298-99. Upon his release, the defendant was arrested and charged with possession of the handgun during the commission of a felony and possession of cocaine, among other things. Id. at 299. At issue was the warrantless search of the defendant's backpack. We held that the search could not be justified as a search incident to a lawful arrest, because the defendant was not under arrest at the time of the search. Id. at 302. Significant factors supporting this conclusion included the facts that the apprehending officer did not discuss criminal charges or arrest procedures with the defendant, that it was clear that the officer did not believe he had arrested the [defendant], id. at 302 n. 11, that the officers did not take the [defendant] into custody until several hours later when he was first released from the medical center, id. at 302, and that the defendant was not formally arrested until approximately four days later. Id. at 302 n. 12. The Crutcher Court concluded: If law enforcement officers intend to justify a search as incident to an arrest, it is incumbent upon them to take some action that would indicate to a reasonable person that he or she is under arrest. Although formal words of arrest are not required, some words or actions should be used that make it clear to the arrestee that he or she is under the control and legal authority of the arresting officer, and not free to leave. Id. at 302 (footnote and internal citation omitted). Applying the Crutcher analysis to the facts in the present case, we conclude that the facts presented here more strongly support the conclusion that the Defendant was not under arrest during the search of his person than did the factual scenario in Crutcher. In this case, the police officers did not lay hands on the Defendant before the search. They asked the Defendant to step out of the car and move to the rear, but testified that this request was made for the purpose of talking with him outside of his children's presence. See Brown, 294 S.W.3d at 562 (observing that ordering a driver to get out of a vehicle and stand alongside it ... can only be described as a `de minimus' intrusion or a `mere inconvenience.' (quoting Berrios, 235 S.W.3d at 107)). Very shortly after the stop, Director Lane informed the Defendant that he was going to search him because we had been conducting a drug investigation earlier in the evening and that in my opinion, that we had enough probable cause to affect an arrest of him if we wanted to in regard to conspiracy to distribute cocaine base and distribution of cocaine base. Director Lane's testimony was candid, clear, and unequivocal that he believed he could have arrested the Defendant based on probable cause, but that he did not indicate to the Defendant that he was under arrest, did not intend to arrest him, and did not consider him under arrest. Assistant Director Miller similarly testified that he believed that after the initial stop, if he [the Defendant] wanted to leave he could have left. Assistant Director Miller also stated that based upon everything we saw and the evidence we had that night he could have been arrested. It is not sufficient that an arrest could have been made; the arrest must have been made roughly contemporaneously to the search in order for it to justify the search as incident to an arrest. In Crutcher, we decline[d] to hold that a search may be upheld as a search incident to arrest merely because a lawful custodial arrest `could have' been made, 989 S.W.2d at 301 n. 8, and emphasized that we are not prepared to hold that the police may conduct a warrantless search merely because they have probable cause to arrest the suspect. Id. at 302; see also Knowles, 525 U.S. at 115-16, 119 S.Ct. 484 (rejecting Iowa Supreme Court's reasoning that so long as the arresting officer had probable cause to make a custodial arrest, there need not in fact have been a custodial arrest); Belote v. State, 411 Md. 104, 981 A.2d 1247, 1257 n. 7 (2009) (rejecting state's position that law enforcement, in order to effect a custodial arrest, only needs probable cause and detention of the suspect); People v. Evans, 43 N.Y.2d 160, 400 N.Y.S.2d 810, 371 N.E.2d 528, 531 (1977) (concluding that [t]o adopt the proposition that the search was valid because there was probable cause to arrest puts the cart before the horse. An arrest is an essential requisite to a search incident). In Crutcher, the apprehending officer intended to place the defendant under arrest, but stopped because of the defendant's injuries. In this case, the officers never intended to place the Defendant under arrest nor did they inform the Defendant he was under arrest. See Nidiffer, 173 S.W.3d at 66 (observing that while not dispositive, an officer's telling a defendant he is under arrest is a substantive factor to consider when determining whether an arrest has occurred.). As in Crutcher, the officers did not believe they had arrested the Defendant. When Deputy Ostermann was asked at trial if they arrested the Defendant, he replied, absolutely not. He was left at his residence when we left. While the officers' subjective intentions clearly are not dispositive on the issue of whether a suspect is under arrest, cf. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 815, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996), Crutcher demonstrates that the officers' subjective intentions are not irrelevant in the context of determining whether the State may justify a warrantless search on grounds that it was made incident to a valid custodial arrest. Finally, in Crutcher, we noted that the apprehending officers did not take the defendant into custody until several hours after the search, and that the formal arrest was not made until approximately four days later. 989 S.W.2d at 302 n. 12. In the present case, the police officers did not take the Defendant into custody until his indictment more than four months after the searches. [6] In summary, we agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals' conclusion that the officers did not take such action that would indicate to a reasonable person that he or she is under arrest as required by Crutcher. Id. at 302. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying the Defendant's motion to suppress the fruits of the warrantless search of his personthe four $20 bills used by the CI to make the first controlled drug buy from Ms. Hampton. We also agree with the intermediate appellate court's conclusion that although the State provided other evidence connecting the Defendant to the first controlled buy at Ms. Hampton's house, the Defendant's possession of these twenty-dollar bills was particularly damning. Ingram, 2009 WL 3400694, at . Accordingly, we are not persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the admission of this evidence did not contribute to the jury's decision-making in finding the Defendant guilty of the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine and conspiracy to sell .5 grams or more of cocaine to the CI. See State v. Brown, 311 S.W.3d 422, 434 (Tenn. 2010); State v. Rodriguez, 254 S.W.3d 361, 371-72 (Tenn.2008). Accordingly, the erroneous admission of this evidence was not harmless. See Tenn. R.App. P. 36(b). The Defendant's convictions for the sale of.5 grams or more of cocaine and conspiracy to sell .5 grams or more of cocaine are reversed, and the case is remanded for a new trial on those charges. We concur, however, with the Court of Criminal Appeals' conclusion that the admission of this evidence was harmless as to the Defendant's other convictionsthose related to the drugs and drug paraphernalia found in his home. As a non-structural constitutional error, the erroneous admission of this evidence is only harmless when it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that its admission did not contribute to the verdict obtained. Brown, 311 S.W.3d at 434; Rodriguez, 254 S.W.3d at 371. While the erroneously admitted evidence does raise potential dangers of prejudice, under the facts of the present case, we conclude that it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the admission of this evidence did not have a substantial and injurious effect on the jury's decision-making with regard to the charges stemming from the discovery of drugs and drug paraphernalia in the Defendant's home. See Rodriguez, 254 S.W.3d at 372. Not only is the evidence of guilt overwhelming but the evidence erroneously admitted was mirrored by other admissible testimony. We conclude that it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the erroneously admitted evidence did not contribute to the convictions stemming from the discovery of drugs and drug paraphernalia in the Defendant's home.