Opinion ID: 174351
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Lechoslaw's Claims Against Bank Handlowy

Text: Lechoslaw appeals the dismissal of Bank Handlowy from the case for lack of personal jurisdiction claiming that the trial court had both general and specific jurisdiction over Bank Handlowy, and in the alternative, that Bank Handlowy waived objections to any lack of personal jurisdiction over it.
We begin with Lechoslaw's argument that Bank Handlowy's contacts with Massachusetts are sufficient for personal jurisdiction under its long arm statute. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 223A, § 3(a) and (d). When a court's personal jurisdiction over a defendant is contested, the plaintiff has the ultimate burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that jurisdiction exists. Adams v. Adams, 601 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.2010); Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Hoover Treated Wood Prods., Inc., 37 Mass. App.Ct. 231, 638 N.E.2d 942, 944 (1994). As there was no hearing on the jurisdictional question, we normally assume that the court used the prima facie method in deciding the jurisdictional question. Adams, 601 F.3d at 4. This inquiry asks whether the plaintiff has proffered evidence which, if credited, is sufficient to support findings of all facts essential to personal jurisdiction. Phillips v. Prairie Eye Ctr., 530 F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir.2008). We proceed directly to the constitutional analysis, because the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has interpreted the state's long-arm statute as an assertion of jurisdiction over the person to the limits allowed by the Constitution of the United States. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). We review the court's factual findings for clear error, but our review of the court's legal conclusions as to whether its findings support the existence of personal jurisdiction is always non-deferential and plenary. Adams, 601 F.3d at 4-5. The due process clause imposes several requirements on the exercise of personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants. First, the defendant must have sufficient minimum contacts with the state. For specific jurisdiction, the plaintiff's claim must be related to the defendant's contacts. For general jurisdiction, in which the cause of action may be unrelated to the defendant's contacts, the defendant must have continuous and systematic contacts with the state. Second, for either type of jurisdiction, the defendant's contacts with the state must be purposeful. And third, the exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable under the circumstances. Harlow v. Children's Hosp., 432 F.3d 50, 57 (1st Cir.2005). Bank Handlowy is a Polish bank with all of its branches in Poland. All customers of Bank Handlowy are required to open their accounts at a bank branch in Poland. Bank Handlowy does not allow bank accounts to be opened by mail or online. It is undisputed that Bank Handlowy does not advertise its financial services in Massachusetts nor own any real property or pay taxes in Massachusetts. The only fact that Lechoslaw asserts to support general jurisdiction is that fourteen individual customers and twenty-five corporate customers have provided Bank Handlowy with their Massachusetts addresses. But Lechoslaw has failed to adduce evidence that Bank Handlowy purposely sought out these customers, such that the bank could reasonably foresee the need to invoke the protections and benefits of the forum, or that these constitute continuous or systematic contacts. Haddad v. Taylor, 32 Mass. App.Ct. 332, 588 N.E.2d 1375, 1377 (Mass. App.Ct.1992). [8] More specifically, the transaction at issue took place in Poland and the check, assuming it was mailed, was mailed to a New Jersey address and not one in Massachusetts. Even if we assume that these contacts were minimally sufficient for either specific or general jurisdiction, Harlow, 432 F.3d at 66, there is no evidence that these contacts were purposeful. Finally, it would be unreasonable in this case to subject Bank Handlowy to the jurisdiction of the Massachusetts courts as it is a foreign bank with no agents in Massachusetts and which does not conduct any business in Massachusetts. Lechoslaw has failed to meet his burden of proving that Bank Handlowy met the requirements for the exercise of personal jurisdiction.
Because the requirement of personal jurisdiction represents first of all an individual right, it can, like other such rights, be waived. Insurance Corp. of Ireland Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703, 102 S.Ct. 2099, 72 L.Ed.2d 492 (1982). It is clear that a defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person is waived if not timely raised in the answer or a responsive pleading. Id. (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)) (internal quotations and marks omitted); see also Mass. R. Civ. P. 12(h) (same). However, even if the issue of personal jurisdiction is raised in its answer or other responsive pleading, a party may nevertheless waive jurisdiction if it makes voluntary appearances and contests the case at all stages until judgment is rendered. Ingersoll v. Ingersoll, 348 Mass. 209, 202 N.E.2d 820, 821 (1964). Those are the two extremes; in between lies a wide gray gulf. Lechoslaw argues that in this case we should find that Bank Handlowy's conduct lies on the side of waiver. Lechoslaw contends that even though Bank Handlowy included lack of personal jurisdiction as a defense in its answer, it nevertheless consented to jurisdiction and admitted to doing so when it filed its motion for leave to file a Rule 12 motion late in the Superior Court. In that motion, Bank Handlowy stated: Based on the small dollar value of this case and the expense involved in researching, preparing, filing and arguing complex Motions such as a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, Bank Handlowy decided to have an Answer filed on its behalf instead of challenging this court's ability to exercise jurisdiction over it. Lechoslaw also argues that Bank Handlowy is anyway precluded by its actions and by laches from raising the issue of personal jurisdiction because it propounded discovery requests, negotiated extensions to the time required to respond to the discovery requests, solicited a confidentiality agreement, and because it filed an assented-to motion to expand the tracking order before filing its Rule 12 motion. Like both trial courts that had occasion to rule on this issue, we find these arguments to be without merit. We begin with the issue of the standard of review. A determination as to waiver [of personal jurisdiction is] within the discretion of the trial court, consistent with its broad duties in managing the conduct of cases pending before it. United States v. Ziegler Bolt & Parts Co., 111 F.3d 878, 882 (Fed.Cir.1997). Thus, [o]n appeal, this court defers to the judgment of the trial court on such matters closely associated with the standard functions of the adjudicative process, so long as that judgment is not an abuse of the trial court's discretion. Accordingly, [we review] the trial court's decision on the waiver issue for an abuse of discretion. Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Hamilton v. Atlas Turner, Inc., 197 F.3d 58, 60 (2d Cir.1999). Both trial courts held that these actions did not constitute waiver and we do not find that they abused their discretion in doing so. Bank Handlowy's answer to Lechoslaw's complaint included the affirmative defense of lack of personal jurisdiction. The language quoted above, from Bank Handlowy's motion, does not imply that Bank Handlowy had assented to jurisdiction. The quote makes clear that Bank Handlowy contested personal jurisdiction in its answer. It only clarifies the reason why Bank Handlowy chose to file an answer, its first responsive pleading in this case, before it filed a Rule 12 motion. There is nothing the matter with Bank Handlowy's chosen order of filings given that its answer included the personal jurisdiction defense. In addition, the fact that Bank Handlowy assented to a motion to extend the tracking order before it filed its Rule 12 motion is also not reason to find waiver, and the cases Lechoslaw cites are not to the contrary. [9] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Bank Handlowy did not waive its defense of lack of personal jurisdiction.