Opinion ID: 768474
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Ceremonial Deism11

Text: 166 Practices closer to home which now require discussion are our national motto, In God We Trust, the inclusion of God into the pledge of allegiance, and again, prayer in conjunction with legislative sessions.These practices have come to be discussed under the rubric ceremonial deisms, a term first found in the literature in a reference to the 1962 Meiklejohn Lecture at Brown University given by Dean Eugene Rostow of Yale University Law School 12 . Regrettably, the reference is in a book review by Professor Arthur E. Sutherland of Harvard University Law School and then only in a footnote. See Sutherland Book Review, 40 Ind. L.J. 83, 86 n. 7 (1965). Professor Sutherland said: 167 . . . constitutional tolerance of the opening prayers in the Congress would require some other theory - possibly the idea that another class of public activity, which the Dean of the Yale Law School recently called ceremonial deism, can be accepted as so conventional and uncontroversial as to be constitutional. 168 Id. at 86 (quoting Dean Rostow from memory). 169 Justice Brennan, in his dissenting opinion in Lynch, supra, brought the phrase into Supreme Court jurisprudence when he said: 170 Finally, we have noted that government cannot be completely prohibited from recognizing in its public actions the religious beliefs and practices of the American people as an aspect of our national history and culture. While I remain uncertain about these questions, I would suggest that such practices as the designation of In God We Trust as our national motto, or the references to God contained in the Pledge of Allegiance to the flag can best be understood, in Dean Rostow's apt phrase, as a form of ceremonial deism, protected from Establishment Clause scrutiny chiefly because they have lost through rote repetition any significant religious content. 171 465 U.S. at 716 (internal citations and footnote omitted). 172 In Allegheny, supra, Justice Blackmun, in a footnote to his majority opinion, in explaining legislative prayer as constitutional in Marsh, said: 173 The function and history of this form of ceremonial deism suggest that those practices are not understood as conveying government approval of particular religious beliefs. 174 492 U.S. at 595-96 n. 46 (quoting Lynch at 717) (emphasis added). 175 Justice Blackmun again used the term in distinguishing creche displays, references to God in the motto, and in the pledge of allegiance. See 492 U.S. at 603. 176 Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opinion in Allegheny, explained ceremonial deism as follows: 177 Justice Kennedy submits that the endorsement test is inconsistent with our precedents and traditions because, in his words, if it were applied without artificial exceptions for historical practice, it would invalidate many traditional practices recognizing the role of religion in our society. This criticism shortchanges both the endorsement test itself and my explanation of the reason why certain long standing government acknowledgments of religion do not, under that test, convey a message of endorsement. Practices such as legislative prayers or opening Court sessions with God save the United States and this honorable Court serve the secular purposes of solemnizing public occasions and expressing confidence in the future These examples of ceremonial deism do not survive Establishment Clause scrutiny simply by virtue of their historical longevity alone. Historical acceptance of a practice does not in itself validate that practice under the Establishment Clause if the practice violates the values protected by that Clause, just as historical acceptance of racial or gender baseddiscrimination does not immunize such practices from scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment. 492 U.S. at 630 (internal citations omitted and emphasis added). 178
179 The Supreme Court, while justifying inclusion of God in the Pledge of Allegiance and In God We Trust, an adaptation of text found in Psalms, as our national motto, has not yet decided a direct challenge to these practices. However, the courts of appeals have dealt with both the national motto and the pledge of allegiance. Legislative prayer as constitutional has already been discussed. See supra Part III.D.2.
180 The national motto, In God We Trust, was enacted into law in 1956. See 70 Stat. 732, P.L. 851, 1956. After describing the history of its use in coinage, beginning with the Act of March 3, 1865 (13 Stat. 518), and the adoption of the Star Spangled Banner 13 as our national anthem (and particularly its fourth stanza), 14 the legislative history regarding our national motto reads: 181 It will be of great spiritual and psychological value to our country to have a clearly designated national motto of inspirational quality in plain, popularly accepted English. 182 H.R. No. 84-1959, 1956 U.S.C.C.A. 3720. 183 In Aronow v. United States, 432 F.2d 242 (9th Cir. 1970), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit declined to order a three-judge court, convened under 28 U.S.C. § 2286, to consider a challenge to the national motto on the grounds that: 184 It is quite obvious that the national motto and the slogan on coinage and currency In God We Trust has nothing whatsoever to do with the establishment of religion. Its use is of a patriotic or ceremonial character and bears no true resemblance to a governmental sponsorship of a religious exercise. 185 432 F.2d at 243. The Ninth Circuit went on to say: 186 While ceremonial and patriotic may not be particularly apt words to describe the category of the national motto, it is excluded from First Amendment significance because the motto has no theological or ritualistic impact. As stated by the Congressional report, it has spiritual and psychological value and inspirational quality. 187 432 F.2d at 243-44 (internal footnotes omitted). 188 In Gaylor v. United States, 74 F.3d 214 (10th Cir. 1996), the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found a challenge to the national motto under the Establishment Clause without merit, stating: 189 The reasonable observer, much like the reasonable person of tort law, is the embodiment of a collective standard and is thus deemed aware of the history and context of the community and forum in which the religious display appears. 190 . . . . We need not engage in such empirical investigation because we do not ask whether there is any person who could find an endorsement of religion, whethersome people may be offended by the display, or whether some reasonable person might think [the State] endorses religion. [T]he endorsement inquiry is not about the perceptions of particular individuals or saving isolated non-adherents from the discomfort of viewing symbols of faith to which they do not subscribe. It is instead an objective inquiry that this court is fully equipped to conduct with the facts at hand. After making that inquiry, we find that a reasonable observer, aware of the purpose, context, and history of the phrase In God we trust, would not consider its use or its reproduction on U.S. currency to be an endorsement of religion. 191 74 F.3d at 217 (internal citations omitted).
192 The Pledge of Allegiance was initially given official recognition in June 1942 by a joint resolution of Congress. It was amended to include the words one nation under God by a joint resolution approved June 14, 1954. 68 Stat. 249. The legislative history of the joint resolution, while skirting close to giving an impermissible religious cast to the inclusion, states: 193 At this moment of our history the principles underlying our American Government and the American way of life are under attack by a system whose philosophy is at direct odds with our own. Our American Government is founded on the concept of the individuality and the dignity of the human being. Underlying this concept is the belief that the human person is important because he was created by God and endowed by him with certain inalienable rights which no civil authority may usurp. The inclusion of God in our pledge therefore would further acknowledge the dependence of our people and our Government upon the moral directions of the Creator. At the same time it would serve to deny the atheistic and materialistic concepts of communism with its attendant subservience of the individual. It goes on to say: 194 It should be pointed out that the adoption of this legislation in no way runs contrary to the provisions of the first amendment to the Constitution. This is not an act establishing a religion or one interfering with the free exercise of religion. A distinction must be made between the existence of a religion as an institution and a belief in the sovereignty of God. The phrase under God recognizes only the guidance of God in our national affairs. The Supreme Court has clearly indicated that the references to the Almighty which run through our laws, our public rituals, and our ceremonies in no way flout the provisions of the first amendment. 195 H.R. No. 83-1693, 1954 U.S.C.C.A. 2339. 196 In Sherman v. Community Consolidated School District 21 of Wheeling Township, 980 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1992), the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, setting aside the voluntary nature of the exercise, turned back a challenge to the pledge of allegiance by the father of a minor child that the inclusion of the reference to God was a violation of the Establishment Clause. The essence of the Seventh Circuit decision is best expressed in the concurring opinion which says: 197 The Pledge of Allegiance with all of its intended meaning does not effectuate an establishment of religion. If legislative prayer based upon the Judeo-Christian tradition is permissible . . ., and a Christmas nativity scene erected by a city government is permissible . . ., then certainly the less specific reference to God in the Pledge of Allegiance cannot amount to an establishment of religion. We need not drain the meaning from the reference to reach this conclusion. 198 980 F.2d at 448 (internal citations omitted).