Opinion ID: 2972829
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Statements While Detained

Text: -5- United States v. Ronnie Thomas No. 04-5872 Finally, Thomas asserts that the district court erred by failing to suppress the statements made while he was detained by the police. These statements include: (1) Thomas’ assertion that “the gun is not mine” and that he was “being set up”, (2) his statement that he was trying to get “the gun” out of the house and away from his girlfriend, and (3) his response that he did not have a permit for the weapon. The first two responses were volunteered by Thomas. Thus, any argument that these statements were obtained in violation of Miranda is clearly misplaced. The magistrate judge properly concluded that statements volunteered by Thomas were not the result of the “functional equivalent of [police] questioning.” And, because the Terry stop, frisking, and brief questioning were permissible, that evidence cannot be considered the “fruit of an unlawful seizure.” A different analysis is required regarding the third statement which was in direct response to a question by Officer Dyson. During a Terry stop, officers are permitted to ask a detainee a moderate number of questions to determine the person’s identity and to try to obtain information confirming or dispelling their suspicions. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984). Thomas maintains that the question presented regarding the gun permit occurred in circumstances tantamount to a formal arrest and, therefore, required a recitation of Miranda rights. This Court has instructed that: [t]he very nature of a Terry stop means that a detainee is not free to leave during the investigation, yet is not entitled to Miranda rights. Therefore, the pertinent question is whether [the suspect] was “in custody” during the investigatory -6- United States v. Ronnie Thomas No. 04-5872 detention for the purposes of determining whether his Fifth Amendment rights were violated. In determining whether a defendant was subject to custodial interrogation we look to the totality of the circumstances “to determine ‘how a reasonable man in the suspect’s position would have understood the situation.’” The “ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” United States v. Swanson, 341 F.3d 524, 528-29 (6th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). Relevant considerations include: (1) the purpose of the questioning; (2) whether the place of the questioning was hostile or coercive; (3) the length of the questioning; and (4) other indicia of custody such as whether the suspect was informed at the time that the questioning was voluntary or that the suspect was free to leave or to request the officers to do so; whether the suspect possessed unrestrained freedom of movement during questioning; and whether the suspect initiated contact with the police or acquiesced to their requests to answer some questions. Id. at 529. Here, the purpose of the police questioning, i.e., to determine whether Thomas had a gun permit, was benign and unintrusive. Regarding the second factor, Thomas was questioned in a police car, on a public street, and without handcuffs. The Supreme Court has not required Miranda warnings in similar settings. See California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125-26 (1983) (detainee not “in custody” although questioning took place in a police station); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495-96 (1977) (questioning at state police offices behind closed doors not a custodial interrogation where defendant was informed he was not under arrest and was -7- United States v. Ronnie Thomas No. 04-5872 allowed to leave at the conclusion of the interview). In addition, the police questioning was extremely brief. Finally, the magistrate judge did not find any other factors impacting the voluntariness of Thomas’ answers. Considering all of the above factors, we conclude that the district court was correct in determining that the police officers’ brief questioning did not rise to the level of “custodial interrogation” and did not require Miranda warnings. While Thomas may not have been free to leave the squad car, “the very nature of a Terry stop means that a detainee is not free to leave during the investigation, yet is not entitled to Miranda rights.” Swanson, 341 F.3d at 528.