Opinion ID: 2449383
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: is the newspaper liable for publication of the defamatory statements?

Text: In the present case, the newspaper did not specifically accuse McCall of offering to fix the case or to bribe a judge. It simply repeated numerous times the allegations made to this effect. The newspaper argues that it is not liable to McCall because there has been no showing of fault in its actions in printing these statements of another, and that it is not strictly liable for what appears on its pages, even if the stories are defamatory. The Federal courts, led by the United States Supreme Court, have been developing a body of law in recent years which defines the protection the First and Fourteenth Amendments give the press for libelous publications. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), the Court ruled that damages could not be recovered for defamation of a public official without clear and convincing evidence of actual malice on the part of the publisher. Actual malice requires a showing of knowledge of falsity of the defamatory statement or reckless disregard of its truth or falsity. Id. In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S.Ct. 1975, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1967), the court applied the Sullivan standard of defamation to  public figures.  In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 91 S.Ct. 1811, 29 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971), the court, in a plurality opinion, applied Sullivan to a publication concerning private individuals where the matter was of concern to the public. If the Supreme Court had left Rosenbloom untouched, respondent here clearly would have had the right to publish the defamatory statements made by Frazier about McCall (who concededly is a private individual) with relative impunity because they dealt with a matter of public interest, viz., possible bribery of a judge or fixing a case. The Court modified the Rosenbloom case and retreated from it in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974). This case sounded the death knell of the doctrine of liability without fault in libel cases by private individuals against media defendants. The Court ruled that each state may allow private individuals to recover compensatory damages, even if the defendant publisher or broadcaster disseminated the defamatory statement without actual malice. [S]o long as they do not impose liability without fault, the states may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual. Id. at 347, 94 S.Ct. at 3010, 41 L.Ed.2d at 809. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 96 S.Ct. 958, 47 L.Ed.2d 154 (1976), where the court characterized Gertz as a repudiation of Rosenbloom with respect to defamation of private individuals. While it is not our function to approve or disapprove the ruling or reasoning of the Supreme Court, we concur in the rationale that the court used in balancing the interests of the press with those of private individuals. Private individuals and their reputations were declared to be more deserving of protection from defamation than those of public figures or public officials. Private individuals do not have the easy access to the self-help remedy of response to defamatory falsehoods via the news media that public persons have. Moreover, they neither voluntarily nor involuntarily expose themselves to public scrutiny by seeking or holding public office or assuming a prominent or influential role in society. In the parlance of the horse industry, part of the turf of being a public official or public person is to be subject to public scrutiny. This is not necessarily so in the case of private citizens. Following the decision in Gertz , many states adopted standards of liability. [3] This court has not. [4] We have given considerable thought to an appropriate standard, recognizing the far-reaching effects of this ruling on the rights and duties of the press in this state. We are also aware of the fundamental right of private individuals to be free from being defamed. The Kentucky Constitution guarantees freedom of the press, but holds newspapers accountable for abusing that liberty. Section 8 of the Constitution reads: Freedom of speech and of the press  Printing presses shall be free to every person who undertakes to examine the proceedings of the General Assembly or any branch of government, and no law shall ever be made to restrain the right thereof. Every person may freely speak, write and print on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty.  (emphasis added). We believe that while it is our option under Gertz to adopt a standard of fault, Kentucky Const., Sec. 8, mandates that we adopt a standard which adequately protects the private individual from defamation. We choose simple negligence. The standard used by Tennessee is a reasonable one. In Memphis Publishing Co. v. Nichols, Tenn., 569 S.W.2d 412, 418 (1978), the Tennessee Supreme Court said: [T]he appropriate question to be determined from a preponderance of the evidence is whether the defendant exercised reasonable care and caution in checking on the truth or falsity and the defamatory character of the communication before publishing it. Another way of stating the standard is that a private plaintiff may recover on a showing of simple negligence, measured by what a reasonably prudent person would or would not have done under the same or similar circumstances. The adoption of this standard does not imply any change in the basic common law and statutory rules of libel and slander as expressed and interpreted by this court in the past. See Wilson v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 642 F.2d 371 (6th Cir. 1981). One further point remains on the question of liability. We are urged by the respondents to adopt the doctrine of neutral reportage. In Edwards v. National Audubon Society, Inc., 556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1002, 98 S.Ct. 647, 54 L.Ed.2d 498 (1977), the Court of Appeals granted the press absolute immunity from liability for accurately reporting newsworthy statements, regardless of the press' belief about the truth of the statements. This doctrine has not been approved by the Supreme Court of the United States and has not received approval in other jurisdictions. [5] We reject the doctrine. Accordingly, respondents' argument that they simply repeated allegations is without merit. Having determined that the article which is the subject of this lawsuit is defamatory, having adopted a standard of fault pursuant to Gertz and Ky. Const. Sec. 8, and having rejected the doctrine of neutral reportage, we conclude that the Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment. [6]