Opinion ID: 600354
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was Defendant's Alleged Mental State Commonplace?

Text: 55 The district court did not believe that expert psychiatric testimony was necessary because the defendant's experience was relatively commonplace and one of a host of attitudes and syndromes that are a part of daily living. J.App. at 46. That view has been adopted by the panel majority of this Court, which writes that Dr. Grove's expert testimony addressed a subject matter within the experience of the jury. 56 The medical evaluation prepared by Dr. Grove paints a very different picture. He concludes that the defendant suffers from a severe Dependent Personality Disorder with severe narcissistic features and that this is 57 a bonafide [sic] mental disorder as defined in the most respected, standard text on the subject, i.e. [DSM-III-R]. That text makes a clear distinction between personality traits and a personality disorder as follows: Personality traits are enduring patterns of perceiving, relating to, or thinking about the environment and oneself, and are exhibited in a wide range of important social and personal contexts. It is only when personality traits are inflexible and maladaptive and cause either significant impairment ... in social or occupational functioning ... or subjective distress that they constitute Personality Disorders.... Some psychiatrists have asserted that all human beings can be classified as suffering from a mental disorder. All human beings possess personality traits; indeed, it is the complex of personality traits that make us unique. Not all human beings, however, suffer from a mental disorder.... With regard to this case now before the court, it is my professional opinion that had evidence been available to Ms. DiDomenico to the effect that the computers had been stolen, her capacity to recognize that evidence would have been seriously impaired as the direct result of [her] mental disorder. 58 Psychiatric Report Prepared by C. Scott Grove, M.D., J.App. at 235-36 (emphasis added). 59 The panel majority correctly points out that the jury had an opportunity to hear testimony from DiDomenico about her background and relationship with Parsons, as well as testimony from another defense witness, Valentovish, who described the effect Parsons had on women. However, Dr. Grove would have done more than simply elaborate on these facts. Rule 702 provides a dual rationale for the admission of expert testimony: to help the trier of fact (1) to determine a fact in issue, but also (2) to understand the evidence. Thus, Rule 702 anticipates that an expert witness will do something more than merely supply facts to the jury. An expert may also assist a jury in understanding the evidence before it. That is precisely what Dr. Grove's testimony would have accomplished. 60 In making a Rule 702 determination, a district court must be guided by the principle that 61 [t]here is no more certain test for determining when experts may be used than the common sense inquiry whether the untrained layman would be qualified to determine intelligently and to the best possible degree the particular issue without enlightenment from those having a specialized understanding of the subject involved in the dispute. 62 Advisory Committee Note to Rule 702, Fed.R.Evid. (emphasis added) (quoting Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 Vand.L.Rev. 414, 418 (1952)), quoted in United States v. Onumonu, 967 F.2d 782, 788 (2d Cir.1992). To hear DiDomenico's self-description of her emotional state at the time of her crime, without more, is not to understand to the best possible degree how this emotional state might affect her ability to have guilty knowledge. A psychiatrist can provide this specialized understanding. 63 Courts now routinely allow psychiatrists and psychologists to enlighten the jury on the effects of mental illness. In Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985), for example, the Supreme Court wrote, 64 [P]sychiatrists gather facts, through professional examination, interviews, and elsewhere, that they will share with the judge or jury; they analyze the information gathered and from it draw plausible conclusions about the defendant's mental condition, and about the effects of any disorder on behavior; and they offer opinions about how the defendant's mental condition might have affected his behavior at the time in question.... Unlike lay witnesses, who can merely describe symptoms they believe might be relevant to the defendant's mental state, psychiatrists can identify the elusive and often deceptive symptoms of insanity, and tell the jury why their observations are relevant. Further, where permitted by evidentiary rules, psychiatrists can translate a medical diagnosis into language that will assist the trier of fact, and therefore offer evidence in a form that has meaning for the task at hand. Through this process of investigation, interpretation, and testimony, psychiatrists ideally assist lay jurors, who generally have no training in psychiatric matters, to make a sensible and educated determination about the mental condition of the defendant at the time of the offense. 7 65 Id. at 80-81, 105 S.Ct. at 1095 (citation omitted) (emphasis added); see also Arcoren v. United States, 929 F.2d 1235, 1239-40 (8th Cir.) ( 'The concept expressed by the Rules is sufficiently broad to embrace psychiatric and psychological testimony from those who possess specialized knowledge concerning mental aberrations in human behavior, when such knowledge will help the jury to understand relevant issues in the case.'  (quoting United States v. Barta, 888 F.2d 1220, 1223 (8th Cir.1989)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 312, 116 L.Ed.2d 255 (1991)). 66 Indeed, as one court has noted, in a case dealing with battered woman syndrome evidence: 67 The difficulty with the expert's testimony is that it sounds as if an expert is giving knowledge to a jury about something that the jury knows as well as anyone else, namely, the reasonableness of a person's fear of imminent serious danger. That is not at all, however, what this testimony is directly aimed at. It is aimed at an area where the purported common knowledge of the jury may be very much mistaken, an area where jurors' logic, drawn from their own experience, may lead to a wholly incorrect conclusion, an area where expert knowledge would enable the jurors to disregard their prior conclusions as being common myths rather than common knowledge. 68 State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 478 A.2d 364, 378 (1984); see also State v. Koss, 49 Ohio St.3d 213, 551 N.E.2d 970, 972 (1990) (noting that most jurisdictions confronted with the issue have allowed expert testimony concerning battered woman syndrome); State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793, 798 (Minn.1989) (same); Susan Murphy, Assisting the Jury in Understanding Victimization: Expert Psychological Testimony on Battered Woman Syndrome and Rape Trauma Syndrome, 25 Colum.J.L. & Soc.Probs. 277, 297-98 (1992). 69 For the reasons given above, I believe that Dr. Grove could have assisted the jury in deciding whether defendant's background and mental disorder affected her ability to have guilty knowledge. Without his testimony to establish this alleged causal link, the jury could not determine intelligently and to the best possible degree  the disputed issue in this case, because, as Dr. Grove's written report makes clear, DiDomenico's mental condition was not so commonplace that a layperson would understand it.