Opinion ID: 2582377
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Davis v. Washington

Text: Having left several foundational questions unresolved in Crawford, the United States Supreme Court revisited the analysis in its consolidated opinion in Davis. [8] Therein, the Court clarified that the federal confrontation clause applies only to testimonial hearsay: It is the testimonial character of the statement that separates it from other hearsay that, while subject to traditional limitations upon hearsay evidence, is not subject to the Confrontation Clause. Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2273 (emphasis added). Thereafter, the Court continued where Crawford left off: Without attempting to produce an exhaustive classification of all conceivable statements  or even all conceivable statements in response to police interrogation  as either testimonial or nontestimonial, it suffices to decide the present cases as follows: Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution. Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2273-74 (footnote omitted). The Court subsequently applied its new-fashioned distinction between testimonial and nontestimonial hearsay to the specific facts presented by Davis and Hammon.
Davis involved out-of-court statements made by Michelle McCottry (McCottry) while speaking with a 911 emergency operator on the telephone. Id. at 2270-71. McCottry reported an ongoing domestic disturbance with her former boyfriend, Adrian Davis (Davis). McCottry informed the operator that Davis was jumpin' on [her] again[,] and that he was usin' his fists. Id. at 2271. During the conversation, Davis struck McCottry and ran out the door. Id. The operator informed McCottry that the police were on their way, and that, They're gonna check the area for him first[.] Id. The police arrived four minutes later and observed that McCottry appeared distressed, that she recently sustained injuries to her face and forearm, and that she had frantically collected her children and her belongings in her preparation to leave the residence. Id. Davis was charged with violating a domestic no-contact order. Id. McCottry did not testify, and, over Davis' objection, the trial court permitted a recording of McCottry's conversation with the emergency operator. Id. The jury thereafter returned a verdict of guilt, and Davis' conviction was affirmed by both the Washington Court of Appeals and the Washington Supreme Court. Id. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Id. at 2272. The Court ultimately concluded that McCottry's statements made to the 911 emergency operator were nontestimonial. Id. at 2277. The Court reasoned that (1) McCottry was speaking about events as they were actually happening, rather than `describ[ing] past events,' id. at 2276 (emphasis in original) (brackets in original) (citation omitted), (2) any reasonable listener would recognize that McCottry . . . was facing an ongoing emergency[,] id., and (3) the nature of what was asked and answered . . ., again viewed objectively, was such that the elicited statements were necessary to be able to resolve the present emergency, rather than simply to learn . . . what had happened in the past. Id. The Court pointed out that even the emergency operator's attempt to establish the identity of McCottry's attacker produced nontestimonial hearsay insofar as the information was elicited so that the dispatched officers might know whether they would be encountering a violent felon. Id. Accordingly, the Court held that McCottry's statements were properly admitted and affirmed the Washington Supreme Court's judgment. Id. at 2280.
In Hammon, the police responded to a reported domestic disturbance at the residence of Hershel and Amy Hammon (hereinafter individually referred to as Hershel and Amy). Id. at 2272. Upon arrival, the police discovered Amy sitting alone on the front porch. Id. Amy gave the police permission to enter the dwelling, and the police further observed broken glass in front of a gas heating unit from which flames were being emitted. Id. Hershel was also on the premises, and he informed the police that he and Amy were arguing, but that the dispute had been resolved without becoming physical. Id. Amy's account differed. Id. After reporting the incident to the police, she filled out a battery affidavit as follows: Broke our Furnace & shoved me down on the floor into the broken glass. Hit me in the chest and threw me down. Broke our lamps & phone. Tore up my van where I couldn't leave the house. Attacked my daughter. Id. Hershel was charged with domestic battery and violating his probation. Id. At trial, Amy did not testify. Id. The trial court nevertheless admitted Amy's affidavit under the present sense impression exception to the hearsay exclusionary rule. Id. The trial court also permitted the introduction of Amy's oral account, via the testimony of one of the responding police officers, under the excited utterances exception. Id. The trial judge found Hershel guilty as charged, and Hershel's convictions were affirmed by both the Indiana Court of Appeals and the Indiana Supreme Court. Id. at 2273. The United States Supreme Court granted Hershel's application for certiorari. Id. The Court thereafter perceived a clear factual distinction between Hammon and Davis, and concluded that Amy's statements were testimonial: It is entirely clear from the circumstances that the interrogation was part of an investigation into possibly criminal past conduct  as, indeed, the testifying officer expressly acknowledged. . . . There was no emergency in progress; the interrogating officer testified that he had heard no arguments or crashing and saw no one throw or break anything. . . . When the officers first arrived, Amy told them that things were fine . . . and there was no immediate threat to her person. When the officer questioned Amy for the second time, and elicited the challenged statements, he was not seeking to determine (as in Davis ) `what is happening,' but rather `what happened.' Objectively viewed, the primary, if not indeed the sole, purpose of the interrogation was to investigate a possible crime  which is, of course, precisely what the officer should have done. Id. at 2278 (emphasis in original). The Court continued: The statements in Davis were taken when McCottry was alone, not only unprotected by police (as Amy Hammon was protected), but apparently in immediate danger from Davis. She was seeking aid, not telling a story about the past. McCottry's present-tense statements showed immediacy; Amy's narrative of past events was delivered at some remove in time from the danger she described. And after Amy answered the officer's questions, he had her execute an affidavit, in order, he testified, [t]o establish events that have occurred previously. Id. at 2279 (brackets in original). The Court reversed the judgment of the Indiana Supreme Court and remanded the matter for further consistent proceedings. Id. at 2280.