Opinion ID: 2066016
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Silas Gilty

Text: Gilty testified that he had a cousin who was an Oak Park police officer, but that this would not affect his ability to be fair and impartial. Gilty stated that he was 24 years old, single, worked for General Electric, lived in the Austin neighborhood and rented his home. The State advised the trial court that Gilty was challenged because he had given erroneous information on his jury card, stating on his card that he was 34, rather than 24. Also, when Gilty was asked by the court if he could be fair to both sides, he first said no. When the court repeated the question, Gilty responded that he could be fair. The court stated that it could not determine whether Gilty said that his age was 24 or 34. However, the court found that the [p]rosecutor    believed that [Gilty] said [he was] 24 and that [the prosecutor] believed a discrepancy existed between    Gilty's juror card and his voir dire answer. The court also found the State had a race-neutral reason to excuse Gilty because he had initially answered that he could not be fair in assessing the defendant's guilt. We conclude that the trial court's decision with regard to this juror was not manifestly erroneous. We need not determine whether Gilty's response regarding his age was a valid basis for the prosecution's decision to exclude him. A juror's hesitancy in responding to questions about whether he would be fair and impartial is a sound and justified reason to exercise a peremptory challenge excluding that venire member from service. The trial court's ruling was not reversible error in this case. Defendant complains that the State's reasons were pretextual because the transcript taken by the court reporter showed that Gilty correctly gave his age. However, the prosecutors stated that they thought Gilty had given an incorrect age, and the trial court accepted the prosecution's explanation. On the record before us, we find no manifest error in the court's acceptance of the State's explanation in this regard. Defendant also suggests that the State engaged in racial discrimination in its exclusion of Gilty, because this juror stated that he could, in fact, be fair and impartial in his determination of the defendant's guilt. The defendant asserts that Gilty's original response that he could not be fair and impartial was given in error and was simply a mistake. Defendant contends that Gilty corrected his response, to say that he could be fair and impartial, once he was given an opportunity to correct his mistake. The trial court did not agree with this assessment of Gilty's statements during voir dire, however. Rather, the trial court agreed with the prosecutors that Gilty had been equivocal in his representation that he could be fair and impartial. The trial court was in a better position to evaluate the testimony of this witness during voir dire. Upon review, we are not at liberty to engage in an independent assessment of the credibility of this juror's statements. The record does not support the defendant's argument that the trial court's decision with respect to Gilty was manifestly erroneous. Additionally, we reject defendant's argument that the trial court's decision was in error because there were other jurors who shared the same characteristics as those cited by the State above, and who nevertheless were not challenged by the prosecution. This circumstance does not lead to the conclusion that the trial court's disposition was manifestly erroneous. In reviewing the reasons given by the State, it is necessary to bear in mind that `in many instances there will be no single criterion that serves as the basis for the decision whether to excuse a particular venireman.' ( People v. Mitchell (1992), 152 Ill.2d 274, 295, 178 Ill.Dec. 354, 604 N.E.2d 877, quoting People v. Mack (1989), 128 Ill.2d 231, 239, 131 Ill.Dec. 551, 538 N.E.2d 1107.) The State's purposeful discrimination is not automatically established by the mere coincidence that an excluded juror shared a characteristic with a juror who was not challenged. The excluded juror may possess an additional trait that caused the State to find him unacceptable, while the juror who was not challenged may possess an additional characteristic that prompted the State to find him acceptable to serve as a juror. ( Ramey, 151 Ill.2d at 520, 177 Ill.Dec. 449, 603 N.E.2d 519.) [A] peremptory challenge is based on a combination of traits, and a juror possessing an unfavorable trait may be accepted while another juror possessing that same negative trait, but also possessing other negative traits, may be challenged. Mitchell, 152 Ill.2d at 295, 178 Ill.Dec. 354, 604 N.E.2d 877. The defendant argues, in the alternative, that this court should remand the cause for another Batson hearing. The defendant claims that the trial court erred when it refused defendant's request that the prosecutors be ordered to give their explanations under oath and subject to cross-examination. Defendant contends that the Batson Court's citation to Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine (1981), 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 implies that once a prima facie showing of discrimination has been made, the State's explanations must be made under oath and subject to cross-examination. This court has consistently rejected this argument. For example, in People v. Young (1989), 128 Ill.2d 1, 131 Ill.Dec. 78, 538 N.E.2d 453, the court noted that the Supreme Court's decision in Batson merely stated that the prosecutor must come forward with a neutral explanation for the challenge ( Young, 128 Ill.2d at 25, 131 Ill.Dec. 78, 538 N.E.2d 453), but did not require that the prosecution's explanations be given under oath and subject to cross-examination ( Young, 128 Ill.2d at 24-26, 131 Ill.Dec. 78, 538 N.E.2d 453). Also, in People v. Harris (1989), 129 Ill.2d 123, 135 Ill.Dec. 861, 544 N.E.2d 357, this court again rejected a defendant's argument that the State's explanations for peremptory challenges must be given under oath and subject to cross-examination. ( Harris, 129 Ill.2d at 174, 135 Ill.Dec. 861, 544 N.E.2d 357; see also People v. Hope (1990), 137 Ill.2d 430, 484, 148 Ill.Dec. 252, 560 N.E.2d 849, vacated on other grounds (1991), 501 U.S. 1202, 111 S.Ct. 2792, 115 L.Ed.2d 966.) The defendant has advanced no sound reason to justify this court's departure from our precedent on this question. Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court's refusal to grant defendant's request in this respect. In light of the foregoing, we find defendant's Batson arguments an inadequate basis to disturb the trial court's judgment.