Opinion ID: 1821869
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Second Degree Kidnapping:

Text: We fail to see that the state established that the murder was committed during a second degree kidnapping. The state argued that this offense was committed while defendant was armed, R.S. 14:44.1(A)(5), when he forcibly moved the victim from one room to another in his home or when he enticed Domengeaux and Fort with drugs to accompany him from the scene in the victim's car. R.S. 14:44.1(B)(1), (2). Whether the women left unwillingly is debatable, given the ample opportunity before and after the murder to quit the defendant's presence. It is more than debatable that the murder of Smith occurred during commission of a second degree kidnapping under the facts here. There is no debate, however, that the state failed to establish a forcible seizing and carrying from one place to another with respect to movement of the victim from room to room. While no particular distance need be traveled, this Court has interpreted the phrase to require evidence that the offender relocated the victim from one physical setting or environment to another. State v. Davillier, 99 1204, (La.12/10/99), 752 So.2d 149, 150 (relocating a victim from one side of a truck to the other does not satisfy the substantial coerced movement from the immediate physical environment in which the assault occurs and does not constitute second degree kidnapping); State v. Arnold, 548 So.2d 920, 926, (La.1989) ([a] robber's moving a victim at knife point from one room to another for the purpose of opening a safe arguably should not be punished as a kidnapping.). The state's evidence produced at trial does not establish the substantial movement required for a carrying from one place to another. R.S. 14:44.1(B)(1), (2); Davillier, 752 So.2d at 150; State v. Arnold, 548 So.2d at 927. Accordingly, this aggravating circumstance defined in Art. 905.4(A)(1) is not established and cannot support imposition of the death penalty.