Opinion ID: 15662
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Sufficiency as to the Effects on Interstate Commerce

Text: 37 The Hobbs Act criminalizes efforts by defendants to obstruct, delay, or affect commerce or the movement of any article in commerce, by robbery or extortion. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). The Government presented evidence at trial that all of the victimized businesses either purchased products out-of-state or transferred their profits to out-of-state national headquarters. Appellants Hickman, Chopane and Limbrick all contend, however, that the amounts stolen from the businesses were fairly trivial or that the businesses themselves only had a minor role in interstate commerce. Accordingly, they argue, their crimes fell outside the ambit of the Hobbs Act. 38 In support of their position, the appellants cite United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995), for the proposition that the Government is required to show that each robbery had a substantial effect on interstate commerce in order to support convictions under the Hobbs Act. This circuit has rejected that argument, instead employing the aggregation principle to allow Hobbs Act convictions where the impact of individual robberies on interstate commerce is minimal. In United States v. Robinson, 119 F.3d 1205 (5th Cir.1997), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 1104, 140 L.Ed.2d 158 (1998), this court held: 39 [I]n Hobbs Act prosecutions based on local activities that affect interstate commerce, the government need not prove that the effect of an individual defendant's conduct was substantial. It suffices to show a slight effect in each case, provided that the defendant's conduct is of a general type which, viewed in the aggregate, affects interstate commerce substantially. 40 Id. at 1208. 41 A review of Supreme Court authority raises serious questions regarding whether aggregation principles can be used as the commerce clause jurisdictional hook under the Hobbs Act when the underlying crimes arise from a purely local crime spree. Without question, these robberies standing alone, or viewed cumulatively, do not substantially affect commerce. They may not even minimally affect commerce. These local robberies are not the sort of economic activity that can legitimately be viewed in the aggregate for traditional economic impact analysis purposes. The conceptual difference between the consumption of home-grown wheat that might otherwise have been sold on the open market, see Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 63 S.Ct. 82, 87 L.Ed. 122 (1942), or denying service in a restaurant to a particular race of interstate travelers, see Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 85 S.Ct. 377, 13 L.Ed.2d 290 (1964), and a string of local robberies is apparent. We, however, are bound by circuit law. See United States v. Robinson, 119 F.3d at 1208. Robinson constitutes clear circuit precedent for the application of aggregation to this local non-economic activity, thereby setting the commerce clause jurisdictional hook. Unless and until the en banc court intervenes, our choice is clear. Under existing circuit precedent, the jury in this case heard sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that the victims engaged in interstate commerce. 42 Additionally, Limbrick argues that the Government failed to prove that the Catfish Cabin heist resulted in even a minimal impact on interstate commerce. The record is clear that no money was taken in that robbery. However, § 1951 also covers attempts to obstruct interstate commerce, and the appellants were so indicted. Moreover, the district court explicitly charged the jury that Limbrick and Hickman could be convicted on this count if, had their attempts at robbery been successful, the Catfish Cabin's assets would have been at least minimally depleted. The evidence is sufficient to sustain the jury's affirmative answer to this question. 43