Opinion ID: 1236812
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Exclusion of Shedrick Evans's preliminary hearing testimony.

Text: On cross-examination of Shedrick Evans, the defense inquired regarding statements made by the police in presenting the photographic lineup from which Evans identified defendant as the assailant, in an attempt to demonstrate that overly suggestive procedures had tainted Evans's selection. (1)(See fn. 4.) When Evans professed a partial loss of memory as to some of these statements, the defense sought to impeach him with his preliminary hearing testimony either as a prior inconsistent statement (Evid. Code, § 1235) [4] or as prior recorded testimony (Evid. Code, § 1291). [5] After observing Evans testify, the court found his memory loss genuine, not evasive; hence, his trial testimony did not give rise to any inconsistency within the meaning of Evidence Code section 1235. (See, e.g., People v. Green (1971) 3 Cal.3d 981, 987-989 [92 Cal. Rptr. 494, 479 P.2d 998].) The court also impliedly determined he was not unavailable as required for the admission of prior recorded testimony pursuant to Evidence Code section 1291. (See Evid. Code, § 240 [defining unavailable as a witness]; People v. Stritzinger (1983) 34 Cal.3d 505, 518-519 [194 Cal. Rptr. 431, 668 P.2d 738].) It therefore refused the proffered impeachment. (2a) On appeal, defendant does not contest the court's rulings under Evidence Code section 1235 or 1291 as currently construed. Nor does he question the fundamental precepts underlying the exclusion of hearsay. (See Chambers v. Mississippi (1973) 410 U.S. 284, 298 [35 L.Ed.2d 297, 310-311, 93 S.Ct. 1038].) Rather, he broadly contends that statutory restrictions on the admission of prior recorded testimony may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice ( id., at p. 302 [35 L.Ed.2d at pp. 312-313]) and deprive him of his due process right to present a defense. According to defendant, the trustworthiness and reliability of this form of hearsay, given under oath and subject to cross-examination, suffice to establish its admissibility, at least when critical to exonerating the accused. (See ibid. ; see also Green v. Georgia (1979) 442 U.S. 95, 97 [60 L.Ed.2d 738, 741, 99 S.Ct. 2150].) We do not read Chambers v. Mississippi, supra, 410 U.S. 284, as expansively as defendant urges; nor do the facts of this case come within its rationale. The defendant there was charged with the killing of a police officer. Prior to trial, one McDonald signed a confession to the murder and made similar inculpatory statements to others. When called by the defense at trial, however, he denied any involvement and repudiated his confession. As a result of the strict application of certain Mississippi rules of evidence ( id., at p. 289 [35 L.Ed.2d at p. 305]), Chambers was foreclosed from the opportunity either to cross-examine McDonald [under the `voucher' rule limiting the right to confrontation unless the witness is `adverse' to the accused] or to present witnesses in his own behalf who would have discredited McDonald's repudiation and demonstrated his complicity [due to the limitation on admission of hearsay statements against penal interests]. ( Id., at p. 294 [35 L.Ed.2d at p. 308].) The Supreme Court found a denial of due process not because the trial court precluded hearsay bearing persuasive assurances of trustworthiness ( Chambers v. Mississippi, supra, 410 U.S. at p. 302 [35 L.Ed.2d at pp. 312-313]) but because the combined effect of the two procedural constraints excluded potentially exculpatory evidence crucial to the defense. ( Id., at pp. 294, 297-298, 302 [35 L.Ed.2d at p. 308, 310-311, 312-313].) Indeed, the court concluded only that under the facts and circumstances of this case the rulings of the trial court deprived Chambers of a fair trial. ( Id., at p. 303 [35 L.Ed.2d at pp. 313-314], italics added; see also Green v. Georgia, supra, 442 U.S. at p. 97 [60 L.Ed.2d at p. 941] [In these unique circumstances, `the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice.'].) As the high court made equally clear, however, In reaching this judgment, we establish no new principles of constitutional law. Nor does our holding signal any diminution in the respect traditionally accorded to the States in the establishment and implementation of their own criminal trial rules and procedures. ( Chambers v. Mississippi, supra, 410 U.S. at pp. 302-303 [35 L.Ed.2d at pp. 312-313].) The court expressly declined to decide whether Mississippi's preclusion of hearsay statements against penal interest might serve some valid state purpose by excluding untrustworthy testimony. ( Id., at p. 300 [35 L.Ed.2d at pp. 311-312].) It sufficed that implementation of the rule against Chambers debarred evidence critical to his defense notwithstanding overwhelming indicia of its reliability. ( Id., at p. 302 [35 L.Ed.2d at pp. 312-313].) Defendant has failed to present a similarly compelling case. (3) To begin with, foundational prerequisites are fundamental to any exception to the hearsay rule. ( Chambers v. Mississippi, supra, 410 U.S. at p. 302 [35 L.Ed.2d at pp. 312-313]; California v. Green (1970) 399 U.S. 149, 154 [26 L.Ed.2d 489, 494-495, 90 S.Ct. 1930]; cf. Washington v. Texas (1967) 388 U.S. 14, 23, fn. 21 [18 L.Ed.2d 1019, 1025-1026, 87 S.Ct. 1920] [state may provide for testimonial privileges and nonarbitrary rules disqualifying certain witnesses].) As a general proposition, criminal defendants are not entitled to any deference in the application of these constraints but, like the prosecution, must comply with established rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence. ( Chambers v. Mississippi, supra, 410 U.S. at p. 302 [35 L.Ed.2d at pp. 312-313].) (2b) Furthermore, the restrictions imposed under Evidence Code sections 1235 and 1291 are neither archaic, irrational, and potentially destructive of the truth-gathering process ( Chambers v. Mississippi, supra, 410 U.S. at p. 296, fn. 8 [35 L.Ed.2d at pp. 309-310]) nor the subject of considerable scholarly criticism ( id., at p. 300, fn. omitted [35 L.Ed.2d at pp. 311-312]; see California v. Green, supra, 399 U.S. at pp. 154-155 [26 L.Ed.2d at pp. 494-495]; cf. People v. Spriggs (1964) 60 Cal.2d 868, 870 [36 Cal. Rptr. 841, 389 P.2d 377] [prior rule foreclosing admission of declarations against penal interest vigorously criticized by the scholars and based on historical accident]). Nor do they arbitrarily exclude[] material portions of [a witness's] testimony. ( Rock v. Arkansas (1987) 483 U.S. 44, 55 [97 L.Ed.2d 37, 48-49, 107 S.Ct. 2704].) On the contrary, they reasonably and rationally relate to the particular hearsay exception concerned. (Compare People v. Sam (1969) 71 Cal.2d 194, 209-210 [77 Cal. Rptr. 804, 454 P.2d 700] [hearsay not admissible under Evid. Code, § 1235, when witness testifies to lack of memory: no inconsistency and therefore no impeachment value] with People v. Green, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 988 [inconsistency in effect, rather than contradiction in express terms, determines admissibility of witness's prior statement]; see People v. Rojas (1975) 15 Cal.3d 540, 549 [125 Cal. Rptr. 357, 542 P.2d 229, 92 A.L.R.3d 1127] [hearsay admitted under Evid. Code, § 1291, based on `simple principle of necessity,  i.e., the absence of any other means of utilizing the witness' knowledge']; see generally, People v. Enriquez (1977) 19 Cal.3d 221, 235 [137 Cal. Rptr. 171, 561 P.2d 261, 3 A.L.R.4th 73].) In addition, trial courts do not mechanistically apply these exceptions, but exercise broad discretion in determining compliance with foundational requirements in light of countervailing constitutional considerations. ( People v. Enriquez, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 235; People v. Rios (1985) 163 Cal. App.3d 852, 863 [210 Cal. Rptr. 271]; see People v. Green, supra, 3 Cal.3d at pp. 987-989.) As a general matter, the ordinary rules of evidence do not impermissibly infringe on the accused's right to present a defense. ( People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, 834 [226 Cal. Rptr. 112, 718 P.2d 99].) Nor do we discern any fundamental unfairness or denial of due process in their particular operation here. The exculpatory value of the excluded evidence was tangential at best, relating as it did to possible impeachment of the witness's recollection of police identification procedures. It would not have directly impugned Evans's identification either at the photographic lineup or during court proceedings at the preliminary hearing or at trial. (See Dutton v. Evans (1970) 400 U.S. 74, 87 [27 L.Ed.2d 213, 226, 91 S.Ct. 210].) The prosecution also presented other eyewitness testimony the defense made no serious attempt to undermine as well as strong physical evidence connecting defendant to the crimes, including the murder weapon and similar clothing found at his residence. Hence, the exclusion of Evans's preliminary hearing testimony on this minor point could not have impaired the right to present a defense. Federal authorities cited by defendant do not alter our conclusion. [6] In Rock v. Arkansas, supra, 483 U.S. 44, the United States Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional the state's per se exclusion of the defendant's posthypnotic testimony because of the significant adverse effect on her ability to testify, which virtually prevented her from presenting any exculpatory evidence. ( Id., at p. 57 [97 L.Ed.2d at pp. 49-50]; cf. People v. Shirley (1983) 31 Cal.3d 18, 67 [181 Cal.Rptr 243, 723 P.2d 1354] [rule excluding posthypnotic testimony of witnesses subject to a necessary exception [for defendant] to avoid impairing the fundamental right of an accused to testify in his own behalf].) Similarly, in Washington v. Texas, supra, 388 U.S. 14, a Texas statute conclusively barred a convicted accomplice from testifying for the defendant even though the testimony was relevant and material to the defense. The disqualification derived from common law rules predating the Judiciary Act of 1789 and was, in the court's analysis, irrational in its premise and absurd in its application. ( Id., at pp. 22-23 [18 L.Ed.2d at pp. 1024-1026].) The court found the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to present a defense thus violated by arbitrary rules that prevent whole categories of defense witnesses from testifying on the basis of a priori categories that presume them unworthy of belief. ( Id., at p. 22 [18 L.Ed.2d at pp. 1024-1025]; see also People v. Spriggs, supra, 60 Cal.2d at pp. 870-875.) [7] Evidence Code sections 1235 and 1291 do not create categorical or conclusive limitations on the admission of relevant evidence or impose unreasonable foundational prerequisites. More significantly, in this case neither operated to foreclose the right to present a defense or otherwise deprive defendant of due process.