Opinion ID: 2369367
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Rape and lewd act by force

Text: Notwithstanding the sufficiency of the evidence to support his first degree murder conviction for murdering Corina on a theory of premeditation and deliberation, defendant contends the evidence at trial did not prove that he raped Corina, committed a lewd act on her by force, or attempted to do either for purposes of a felony-murder theory. As noted, in addition to the first degree murder convictions, the jury further found true that Corina's murder was committed during the commission or attempted commission of a rape [16] (§ 190.2, former subd. (a)(17)(iii), now (a)(17)(C)) or a lewd act by force on a child under 14 [17] (§ 190.2, former subd. (a)(17)(v), now (a)(17)(E)). Corina was 12 years old when defendant committed these crimes. In addition to instructing the jury that a verdict of first degree murder required the jury find that defendant acted with premeditation and deliberation, the trial court instructed it in the alternative that a murder is committed in the first degree if the killing occurred during the commission or attempted commission of the crime of rape or lewd act by force with a child. (See § 189.) (11) For felony murder, the required mental state is the specific intent to commit the underlying felony. ( People v. Friend (2009) 47 Cal.4th 1, 49 [97 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 211 P.3d 520] ( Friend ).) The killing is considered to be committed in the perpetration of the underlying felony if the acts were part of a continuous transaction. (E.g., People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1259 [57 Cal.Rptr.3d 543, 156 P.3d 1015] ( Prince ).) No strict causal or temporal relationship between the murder and underlying felony is required. (E.g., ibid. ) The jury found true the special circumstance that Corina's murder was committed while defendant was engaged in ... the commission of, attempted commission of, or the immediate flight after committing, or attempted to commit rape or a lewd act by force. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17).) As with felony murder, there need not be a strict temporal relationship between the murder and the target felony for purposes of the special circumstance finding. (E.g., People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 271-272 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 841 P.2d 897].) (12) An attempt to commit a crime requires the specific intent to commit the target crime (in this case, rape or a lewd act by force) and a direct but ineffectual act, beyond mere preparation, done towards its commission. ( People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 138 [74 Cal.Rptr.3d 454, 180 P.3d 224], disapproved on another ground in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22 [87 Cal.Rptr.3d 209, 198 P.3d 11].) (13) Intercourse after death does not necessarily negate the felony-murder rule or the rape-murder special-circumstance finding, as postmortem intercourse could constitute an attempt to commit rape, provided it was part of a continuous transaction and the intent to commit rape was formed prior to the murder. (See, e.g., People v. Lewis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1255, 1299-1301 [96 Cal.Rptr.3d 512, 210 P.3d 1119] ( Lewis ).) The same is true for a postmortem lewd act. (See, e.g., People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 660-661 [21 Cal.Rptr.3d 612, 101 P.3d 509] ( San Nicolas ).) Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence to support the inference that he intended to commit a sexual act on Corina. Defendant correctly notes Corina did not exhibit any signs of genital trauma, and no semen was found on her body or clothing. As noted, however, Corina was discovered with her shorts and panties around her left knee, her legs spread open, and with bloodstains on her thighs that were consistent with handprints. Citing People v. Anderson, supra, 70 Cal.2d 15, People v. Granados (1957) 49 Cal.2d 490 [319 P.2d 346], and People v. Craig (1957) 49 Cal.2d 313 [316 P.2d 947], defendant contends the physical evidence was insufficient to support a finding that he intended to commit a sexual act. Anderson, Granados, and Craig are dependent on their particular facts. Defendant, notably unlike the defendants in those three cases, at one point admitted to the police that he kind of helped Corina take off her shorts and might of touched her down there; he also admitted that he touched her during the course of removing her shorts and the bloodstains on her thighs were consistent with handprints. Thus, the case against defendant rested on more than simply Corina's nudity. (See, e.g., Lewis, supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 1290-1291, fn. 24.) Thus, a reasonable trier of fact could have relied upon the physical evidence, coupled with defendant's (albeit somewhat equivocal) admission, and concluded that he took direct action toward the commission of a lewd act. Moreover, Powalka, like Corina, had her shorts and panties rolled around her left knee; this similarity supports the inference that he harbored the lustful intent required by section 288. In People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 138-139 [14 Cal.Rptr.3d 212, 91 P.3d 164], we affirmed a burglary conviction (and related special circumstance finding) where a conclusion that the defendant possessed the requisite felonious intent to commit rape reasonably could have been drawn from the fact that he entered the victim's residence after attempting to sexually assault another victim outside the residence. In this case, Corina's and Powalka's nearly identical states of undress similarly support the inference that Corina's murder occurred during an attempt to commit a lewd act with her. [18] Defendant finally contends there was insufficient evidence Corina was alive when he sexually assaulted her, or at least attempted to do so. A trier of fact, however, reasonably could have concluded Corina was alive during the sexual assault (or attempt), as defendant specifically told the police he instructed her to remove her shorts and then kind of helped her in doing so. For defendant to have so instructed Corina and then assisted in removing her shorts, she necessarily still must have been alive at the time. Regardless, even if Corina's death preceded defendant's sexual assault on her, a trier of fact reasonably could have found the assault and murder to be a continuous course of conduct, and that defendant formed the intent to sexually assault Corina while she was still alive. (See Lewis, supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 1299-1301; San Nicolas, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 660-661.)