Opinion ID: 2103978
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Leon Doctrine

Text: As the arrest warrant was invalid, we must next determine whether the evidence recovered in the resulting illegal search should be excluded. Officer Podschweit testified at the suppression hearing that he had no other basis on which to stop defendant other than the arrest warrant. The State does not argue that any exception to the warrant requirement existed at the time of the search. Instead, the State argues that the evidence seized in the otherwise illegal search need not be excluded under the good-faith doctrine of United States v. Leon (1984), 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677. (See also People v. Stewart (1984), 104 Ill.2d 463, 477, 85 Ill.Dec. 422, 473 N.E.2d 1227 (adopting Leon ); 725 ILCS 5/114-12(b)(1), (b)(2) (West 1992) (codifying Leon).) We therefore analyze the principles articulated in Leon to determine whether the good-faith doctrine should apply to the present case. In Leon, the United States Supreme Court held that exclusion of evidence is not required where a police officer acts in objectively reasonable reliance on a facially valid warrant that is later found to have been invalid based on a lack of probable cause. Factually, the Leon case involved a drug investigation. The police presented evidence they had collected in the investigation to several assistant District Attorneys. Concluding that probable cause existed for a search, the assistant District Attorneys assisted in drafting affidavits which were presented to a judge who issued a search warrant. The defendants in Leon challenged the warrant, and the Court of Appeals found that the affidavits failed to establish probable cause. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the State conceded that probable cause was lacking, but argued that the officer's good-faith reliance on a facially valid search warrant should prevent exclusion of the evidence. The Supreme Court agreed. The Supreme Court first characterized the exclusion of illegally seized evidence as a prophylactic rule `designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.' ( Leon, 468 U.S. at 906, 104 S.Ct. at 3412, 82 L.Ed.2d at 687-88, quoting United States v. Calandra (1974), 414 U.S. 338, 348, 94 S.Ct. 613, 620, 38 L.Ed.2d 561, 571.) Thus, the Leon Court noted that the question of whether to exclude evidence is a separate question from whether the search or arrest was legal. In making this determination, it is necessary to analyze whether suppression of the evidence would further the purpose of the exclusionary rule to deter future police misconduct. The Leon Court determined that exclusion of evidence seized as a result of a police officer's objectively reasonable reliance on a detached and neutral magistrate's determination of probable cause would not further the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule. The Leon Court noted that the exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges or magistrates. ( Leon, 468 U.S. at 916, 104 S.Ct. at 3417, 82 L.Ed.2d at 694.) The Court reasoned that exclusion of evidence would not deter fourth amendment violations by judges because [j]udges and magistrates are not adjuncts to the law enforcement team; as neutral judicial officers, they have no stake in the outcome of particular criminal prosecutions. ( Leon, 468 U.S. at 917, 104 S.Ct. at 3417, 82 L.Ed.2d at 695.) Thus, the Court focused on whether application of the exclusionary rule would deter future constitutional violations by those who are part of the law enforcement team. The Leon Court determined that application of the exclusionary rule would not serve to deter future constitutional violations by the police where the officer acted in an objectively reasonable reliance on a technically invalid warrant. In support, the Court reasoned that [i]f exclusion of evidence obtained pursuant to a subsequently invalidated warrant is to have any deterrent effect    it must alter the behavior of individual law enforcement officers or the policies of their departments. ( Leon, 468 U.S. at 918, 104 S.Ct. at 3418, 82 L.Ed.2d at 695.) As the police cannot ordinarily be expected to question a magistrate's determination of probable cause, the suppression of evidence when the police are acting on a facially valid warrant would not alter the behavior or policies of the police. Thus, the Leon Court allowed the illegally seized evidence to be used in the State's case in chief. The Leon Court was careful to limit the contours of its ruling. The Court noted examples of instances where officers could not reasonably rely on a warrant issued by a judge or magistrate. For example, good faith on the part of the executing officer does not prevent suppression where the procuring officer knowingly or recklessly submits a false affidavit or where the affidavit does not `provide the magistrate with a substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause.' ( Leon, 468 U.S. at 915, 104 S.Ct. at 3416, 82 L.Ed.2d at 693, quoting Illinois v. Gates (1983), 462 U.S. 213, 239, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d 527, 549.) In addition, [r]eferences to `officer' throughout this opinion should not be read too narrowly. It is necessary to consider the objective reasonableness, not only of the officers who eventually executed a warrant, but also of the officers who originally obtained it or who provided information material to the probable-cause determination. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 n. 24, 104 S.Ct. at 3420 n. 24, 82 L.Ed.2d at 698 n. 24.