Opinion ID: 1447881
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Mistrial Motion Based on People v. Anderson

Text: (8) Defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial based on this court's decision in People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104 [240 Cal. Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306] ( Anderson ). This court held in Carlos v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 131, 140 [197 Cal. Rptr. 79, 672 P.2d 862] ( Carlos ) that the felony-murder special circumstance of section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17) required the prosecution to prove that the defendant intended to kill the victim, irrespective of whether the defendant was the actual killer or an aider or abettor. In Anderson, supra, 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1147, we overruled Carlos and held that a felony-murder special circumstance may be found and the death penalty imposed without proof that the defendant intended to kill, unless the defendant was not the actual killer. We later clarified that the holding of Anderson did not apply to crimes committed while Carlos was in effect. ( People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 973, fn. 4 [281 Cal. Rptr. 273, 810 P.2d 131]; accord, People v. Fauber (1992) 2 Cal.4th 792, 835 [9 Cal. Rptr.2d 24, 831 P.2d 249].) The crimes in this case occurred in November 1984, when this court's decision in Carlos was in effect. When the trial began, Carlos was still the law. This court filed its opinion in Anderson on October 13, 1987. On October 14, 1987, the prosecution in this case rested its case-in-chief. The next day, defendant moved for a mistrial. Defendant's motion for a mistrial was based on the theory that his defense was structured around the central contention that, although he kidnapped, robbed and fatally shot the victim, he lacked the intent to kill her. On appeal, defendant contends that had he known that, under Anderson, the prosecution would not have to prove intent to kill, he would have structured his defense differently. But in arguing the motion at trial, the only material choice that defense counsel indicated might have been different was the use of peremptory challenges; defense counsel suggested that, had the defense known intent to kill would not be an issue, it would have tried to select a jury with only the penalty phase in mind. The primary defect in defendant's argument is that, as this court has subsequently made clear, for crimes committed when Carlos was in effect the jury was required to find that the defendant had the intent to kill before a felony-murder special circumstance could be found true. ( People v. Duncan, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 973, fn. 4; People v. Fauber, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 835.) In this case, the trial court's charge to the jury anticipated our later ruling that Anderson was not to be applied retroactively to crimes committed while Carlos was in effect. The trial court required the jury to find whether or not defendant intended to kill a human being at the time of the murder. The jury expressly found that defendant had the intent to kill the victim. Accordingly, defense counsel's strategy of basing the defense on defendant's asserted lack of intent to kill was in no way compromised by Anderson, because Anderson did not apply to defendant's trial. We therefore conclude that the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion for a mistrial. Our conclusion is not affected by the trial court's refusal to specifically instruct the jury that it must find intent to kill in order to find the robbery-murder special circumstance. As noted above, the trial court did require the jury to determine whether or not defendant had the intent to kill. Thus, the jury necessarily found the requisite intent to kill as a result of other properly given instructions.... ( People v. Leach (1985) 41 Cal.3d 92, 108 [221 Cal. Rptr. 826, 710 P.2d 893]; see also People v. Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 438.) We note that defense counsel in closing argument stressed to the jurors that they had to make a finding whether defendant had the intent to kill. Nor does consideration of Coleman v. McCormick (9th Cir.1989) 874 F.2d 1280 alter our conclusion. As we have elsewhere explained,  Coleman considered whether a trial held under one set of rules can later be used to reach a sentencing verdict under a quite different set of rules, and concluded it cannot. ( People v. Beardslee (1991) 53 Cal.3d 68, 110 [279 Cal. Rptr. 276, 806 P.2d 1311].) Here, the rules governing the critical issue โ whether the jury had to conclude that defendant had the intent to kill as a prerequisite to the felony-murder special circumstance finding โ did not change during trial in any way that affected this case. Thus, Coleman, which this court is not bound to follow in any event, has no application here.