Opinion ID: 1405837
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Joint trials.

Text: Defendant's principal guilt phase contention is that his trial should have been severed from that of his codefendant, Kelly. Prior to trial, defendant twice moved for severance. He cited the codefendants' possible antagonistic defenses and also urged that he would be improperly prejudiced by introduction against Kelly of Kelly's taped confession implicating defendant. (See People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518, 530-531 [47 Cal. Rptr. 353, 407 P.2d 265].) To the second of his pretrial motions, defendant attached the entire text of the Kelly statement. The prosecution ultimately stated it would not use the Kelly tape. However, Kelly's counsel indicated he intended to introduce it as state of mind evidence to corroborate Kelly's defense of duress and menace. In this posture, the pretrial motions were denied without prejudice. During jury selection, Kelly's counsel advised that he wished to introduce evidence (1) of defendant's shooting of Stevenson on July 7, 1979, and (2) that Kelly was aware of the Stevenson incident when he agreed to participate in the July 8 gallery robbery. Defendant renewed his severance motion, noting that Kelly's testimony about the Stevenson matter was enormously prejudicial to defendant and would not be admissible against him if he were tried separately. Defendant's counsel also pointed out that Kelly could presumably call Stevenson himself, as well as any other witness to the shooting. The trial court denied the renewed motion. As promised, the prosecution did not introduce the Kelly tape in its case in chief. Kelly testified in his own behalf, describing his involvement in the Stevenson episode, and he introduced the tape. [4] Stevenson was called by Kelly and testified, as noted, that defendant shot him and left him for dead on July 7, 1979. (1a) Defendant renews his contention that the Stevenson incident was manifestly harmful to his defense but could not have been admitted against him in a separate trial. He therefore contends the trial court prejudicially abused its discretion in denying severance. We disagree. The Penal Code states a general preference for joint trial of jointly charged defendants. (§ 1098.) A classic case for joint trial is presented when defendants are charged with common crimes involving common events and victims. ( People v. Turner (1984) 37 Cal.3d 302, 312-313 [208 Cal. Rptr. 196, 690 P.2d 669].) Severance remains largely within the discretion of the trial court. (§ 1098; Turner, supra, at p. 312.) This court has said that severance should generally be granted in the face of an incriminating confession [by a codefendant], prejudicial association with codefendants, likely confusion resulting from evidence on multiple counts, conflicting defenses, or the possibility that at a separate trial a codefendant would give exonerating testimony. ( Turner, supra, at p. 312; People v. Massie (1967) 66 Cal.2d 899, 917 [59 Cal. Rptr. 733, 428 P.2d 869] [fns. omitted].) However, we recently cautioned that a joint trial is not unfair simply because the codefendants have antagonistic defenses and one defendant gives testimony that is damaging to the other and thus helpful to the prosecution. [Citations.] ( Turner, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 313.) If the likelihood of antagonistic testimony alone required separate trials, they would appear to be mandatory in almost every case. ( Id., at pp. 312-313.) [5] Defendant urges, however, that Kelly did not simply seek to exculpate himself by laying blame on defendant. Rather, his antagonistic defense of duress or menace allowed him to present prejudicial evidence and argument of uncharged conduct by defendant, which would not have been admissible against defendant in a separate trial. Assuming this is a valid ground for distinguishing the reasoning of Turner, supra, we nonetheless conclude the trial court acted within its discretion in denying the severance motion. Recent decisions addressing the analogous problem of severance of counts (see § 954) are instructive. (2) When ruling on a motion to sever counts for which the statute allows joint trial, the court must decide whether the realistic benefits from a consolidated trial are outweighed by the likelihood of substantial prejudice to defendant. In determining the degree of potential prejudice, the court should evaluate whether (1) consolidation may cause introduction of damaging evidence not admissible in a separate trial, (2) any such otherwise-inadmissible evidence is unduly inflammatory, and (3) the otherwise-inadmissible evidence would have the effect of bolstering an otherwise weak case or cases. Severance motions in capital cases should receive heightened scrutiny for potential prejudice. ( People v. Smallwood (1986) 42 Cal.3d 415, 426-429 [228 Cal. Rptr. 913, 722 P.2d 197]; Williams v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 441, 448-454 [204 Cal. Rptr. 700, 683 P.2d 699].) The balancing process is a highly individualized exercise ( Williams v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 452), and the propriety of a trial court ruling depends on the facts as they appeared when the motion was decided. ( Turner, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 312.) (1b) Here, such a balance hardly required severance. Defendant insists that the prosecutor never asserted any benefits from a joint trial. However, judicial economy was obviously paramount in this case, since separate trials would have required selection of two juries, one death-qualified, and presentation of much the same evidence and witnesses to each. [6] Defendant demonstrated no potential prejudice sufficiently substantial to justify this duplication of resources even in the context of a capital case. We assume arguendo, as defendant suggests, that the Stevenson shooting, and certain other evidence presented by Kelly which suggested defendant's violent nature, would have been inadmissible in his separate guilt trial for the Opel murder. Defendant urges that, apart from its usefulness to Kelly, such evidence merely suggested defendant's criminal propensity and did not go directly to such issues as identity or intent. (See Evid. Code, §§ 1101, 1102; see also, e.g., People v. Thompson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 303, 314-321 [165 Cal. Rptr. 289, 611 P.2d 883].) Other crimes evidence which would not be admissible against an accused in his separate trial holds a well-understood potential for prejudice. However, the likelihood of its admission in an otherwise proper joint trial does not alone justify severance. ( Smallwood, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 429.) Further, we are persuaded, severance was not required in this case on grounds that such evidence was potentially inflammatory. [7] Here, we conclude, any potential prejudice from the disputed evidence was minimal, since it was unlikely to alter the verdict by unfairly bolstering an otherwise weak case. At the time the motions to sever were decided, the clearly admissible evidence that defendant was guilty of all the charges against him was already very strong. At the preliminary hearing, eyewitnesses Rogers and O'Grady positively identified defendant as a coparticipant in the gallery incident. While both witnesses conceded at the hearing that Kelly and defendant were obscured from their view at the moment Opel was shot, they made clear that defendant was the robber brandishing a handgun of the kind which killed Opel. They also suggested that defendant had been confronting Opel directly, while Kelly, at defendant's direction, took responsibility for the two surviving victims. As at trial, the witnesses said that shortly before Opel was shot, they saw defendant fire the handgun at the ceiling during an argument with Opel. After a subsequent shot which sounded like it came from the same gun, they heard Opel's body fall. Rogers identified as similar to the robbers' weapons a handgun and shotgun found in luggage carried by defendant, Holt, and Kelly at the time of their airport arrest two days after the killing. Under these circumstances, the trial court could properly conclude that the benefits of joinder outweighed any potential prejudice to defendant arising from Kelly's duress defense. The court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for severance. Even if we concluded the contrary, however, reversal would not be warranted. Hindsight reveals that defendant suffered no actual prejudice from admission of the Stevenson evidence. (See Turner, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 312.) In his opening argument at trial, defense counsel conceded that defendant had personally shot and killed Opel. The prosecutor did not introduce Kelly's taped statement. Rogers and O'Grady described the gallery incident essentially as they had at the preliminary hearing. Though they noted intervening changes in appearance, the witnesses again named defendant and Kelly as the participants and implicated defendant as Opel's killer. They acknowledged they had easily picked defendant from a photo lineup in which he was depicted as he appeared at the gallery. Ballistics evidence not presented at the preliminary hearing linked the handgun found in the suspects' luggage with the bullet removed from Opel's head. Rogers and O'Grady again identified weapons taken from the suspects at the airport, and O'Grady recognized defendant's distinctive leather jacket. The trial included evidence of defendant's multiple escapes from custody, implying his consciousness of guilt. Defendant presented no evidence whatever in his own behalf. [8] Under the circumstances, there is no reasonable probability that the verdict as to defendant was affected by Kelly's defense in their joint trial. Hence, there is no basis for reversal. ( Massie, supra, 66 Cal.2d at pp. 922-923; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836-837 [299 P.2d 243].)