Opinion ID: 2031928
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Improper Arguments by Prosecutor at Second Stage of Capital Sentencing Hearing

Text: Defendant contends that the prosecutor in closing argument at the second stage of the sentencing hearing made repeated emotional appeals to impose the death penalty that were calculated to inflame the emotions of the jury and to diminish the jury's responsibility to make a life or death decision. Defendant maintains that he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing.
The prosecutor argued to the jury that [c]apital punishment is society's only form of self defense against the Ed Moores of this world. Defense counsel objected to this comment, stating, It's not supported by the evidence, not supported by the argument. The court is going to instruct the jury as to the law   . The trial judge then stated that he would instruct the jury as to the law. The prosecutor also stated to the jury that [c]apital punishment is the law of this State and you have to follow the law. Defense counsel did not object to this comment. Defendant first contends that these comments implied to the jury that imprisonment was not an alternative punishment for first degree murder in Illinois. We do not agree that the jury was misled. The trial judge correctly instructed the jury that the defendant would be sentenced to a sentence other than death if the jury was unable to unanimously find that there were no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death penalty. (See People v. Tenner (1993), 157 Ill.2d 341, 384, 193 Ill.Dec. 105, 626 N.E.2d 138.) The trial judge also instructed the jury that closing arguments are not evidence and that statements not based on the evidence should be disregarded. We therefore do not believe that the comments denied the defendant a fair capital sentencing hearing. Defendant next argues that the prosecutor's comments improperly implied that a penalty other than death would allow the defendant to commit future crimes against society. (See People v. Johnson (1991), 146 Ill.2d 109, 148, 165 Ill.Dec. 682, 585 N.E.2d 78; People v. Szabo (1983), 94 Ill.2d 327, 367, 68 Ill.Dec. 935, 447 N.E.2d 193 (prosecutor in sentencing hearing may not prey on fears of jurors that a defendant may walk the streets again and harm another).) Here, however, the comments were brief, the State introduced substantial evidence in aggravation, and the defendant introduced minimal evidence in mitigation. We therefore do not believe that the brief comments were so prejudicial that they denied the defendant a fair sentencing hearing.
The prosecutor further told the jurors that they were the only barrier between good and evil and the only barrier between justice and injustice. The prosecutor also asked the jurors to [s]how the world that good can triumph over evil. Defendant argues that these comments mischaracterized the jury's role, diverted its attention from its proper consideration of mitigating and aggravating factors, and shifted its attention away from giving consideration to the offense and the offender. In addition, the defendant argues that these comments improperly implied to the jury that it would be siding with evil and injustice if it did not impose the death penalty. Defendant did not object to these comments at the sentencing hearing, but requests that this court review these comments under the plain error rule. We believe that these comments, considered in context, were made to emphasize the defendant's extensive criminal history. Furthermore, we do not believe that the defendant was denied a fair sentencing hearing. The trial judge defined both aggravating and mitigating factors in the jury instructions, and the jury was instructed to consider all of those factors. In addition, both the jury instructions and the verdict forms informed the jurors that if they were unable to unanimously find that there were no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death penalty, the court would impose a sentence other than death. We find that the jury was fully informed of its role in imposing the death penalty and that the jury's attention was not diverted from consideration of the offense, the offender or the relevant aggravating and mitigating evidence.
Defendant next argues that the prosecutor improperly argued to the jury that the defendant was trying to avoid responsibility for the murder by presenting mitigating evidence. Specifically, the prosecutor argued as follows: He [defendant] just wants to get away with this. Don't let him get away with it. Hold him accountable for what he did to that woman on July 7th, 1991. He is accountable. Don't let him escape responsibility for the rape and murder of Judy Zeman. Enforce our law. Defendant further objects to the prosecutor's comment that: It appears that he [defendant's father] was a    rotten father   . But Ed [defendant] wants to use that as an excuse   . Don't blame me for setting Judy on fire, because I had a rotten father. The excuse doesn't wash. It doesn't excuse what he did. Defendant asserts that consideration of a tumultuous family background as a mitigating factor is proper, and that its consideration does not suggest an absence of responsibility for the crime of murder. ( Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982), 455 U.S. 104, 116, 102 S.Ct. 869, 877, 71 L.Ed.2d 1, 12.) Defendant did not object to these comments at the sentencing hearing, and he thus waived the issues. ( Enoch, 122 Ill.2d at 188-90, 119 Ill.Dec. 265, 522 N.E.2d 1124.) He urges this court to review the issues under the plain error doctrine. We do not believe that the prosecutor's comments rose to the level of plain error. This court has noted that a heinous murderer is not necessarily excused by his having had an abusive father. ( People v. Gacy (1984), 103 Ill.2d 1, 102-03, 82 Ill.Dec. 391, 468 N.E.2d 1171 ([a] disapproving father does not excuse 33 homosexually related murders and numerous other incidents of sexual torture and physical abuse).) Furthermore, the trial court properly instructed the jury to consider all mitigating factors supported by the evidence. We do not find that the prosecutor's remarks were erroneous or were likely to have affected the jury's determination.
Defendant next contends that the prosecutor in closing argument improperly shifted the jury's sense of responsibility for imposing the death penalty, in violation of Caldwell v. Mississippi (1985), 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231. In Caldwell, the Court vacated a death sentence when the prosecutor led the jury to believe that responsibility for determining the propriety of the death penalty rested with an appellate court rather than the jury. ( Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 328-29, 105 S.Ct. at 2639, 86 L.Ed.2d at 239.) In so holding, the Court noted that an uncorrected attempt to shift responsibility for the ultimate determination of death from the jury to others creates an intolerable danger that the jury will in fact choose to minimize the importance of its role. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 333, 105 S.Ct. at 2642, 86 L.Ed.2d at 242. In this case, defendant contends that, if the jury believed certain comments made by the prosecutor in closing argument, the jury would have believed that a decision to impose death had already been made by the legislature, minimizing the importance of the jury's role. While defendant failed to object to the challenged comments discussed below, he urges this court to review under the plain error rule. Defendant first objects to the prosecutor's comment to the jury that [c]apital punishment is the law of this State and you [the jury] have to follow the law. Considered in context, we believe that this comment was an invited response to defense counsel's argument in closing regarding the merits of capital punishment. As such, defendant may not now claim prejudicial error. ( Nevitt, 135 Ill.2d at 454, 142 Ill.Dec. 854, 553 N.E.2d 368.) Furthermore, the prosecutor stated at least four times in closing argument that the death penalty shall be imposed only if the jurors find no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death penalty. The instructions and the verdict forms also informed the jurors of the standard for imposing the death penalty. We do not believe that the comments were improper or would have affected the jury's determination. Defendant next asserts that the prosecutor said that the law requires the death penalty, and objects to this comment. The prosecutor stated in part: If you walk into that jury room and you find that the mitigating factors are not sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death penalty, the law says that you have to do it [impose the death penalty]. The facts in this case compel it. The law requires it. Justice absolutely demands it. There are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude capital punishment. We believe that, considered in context, the prosecutor was simply arguing that no mitigating factors in this case should have precluded the imposition of the death penalty. Furthermore, the jurors were instructed as to the alternatives to the imposition of the death penalty. As stated, the prosecutor also repeatedly informed the jury of the correct standard for imposing the death penalty. Defendant next points to the prosecutor's assertions that Edward Moore sentenced himself to death, and argues that these comments improperly led the jury to believe that ultimate responsibility for a death sentence rested with the defendant's conduct and not with the jury. (See Buttrum v. Black (N.D.Ga.1989), 721 F.Supp. 1268, aff'd per curiam (11th Cir.1990), 908 F.2d 695.) In Buttrum, the court found a Caldwell violation when the prosecutor argued that a defendant had `signed her own death warrant' and that the jury was merely a cog in the criminal process. ( Buttrum, 721 F.Supp. at 1316.) The court believed that the comments suggested to the jury that ultimate responsibility rested with the defendant, and believed that the argument may have affected the sentencing decision. Buttrum, 721 F.Supp. at 1317. Unlike the court in Buttrum, we do not believe that the comments here would have affected the jury's sentencing decision. The prosecutor repeatedly informed the jurors of their responsibility for weighing the factors and then determining whether the death penalty should be imposed. The jurors were also instructed as to their responsibility to determine whether the death penalty should be imposed. The comments may also have been interpreted as merely emphasizing the strength of the aggravating evidence. See People v. Page (1993), 155 Ill.2d 232, 282, 185 Ill.Dec. 475, 614 N.E.2d 1160. Furthermore, in People v. Hudson (1993), 157 Ill.2d 401, 460-61, 193 Ill.Dec. 128, 626 N.E.2d 161, this court found that comments similar to those made by the prosecutor in this case were invited by defense counsel's closing argument in which he suggested that the jury should feel guilty for imposing a death sentence. ( Hudson, 157 Ill.2d at 460-61, 193 Ill.Dec. 128, 626 N.E.2d 161.) We believe that the comments here, considered in context, were also invited by defense counsel's emotional pleas in closing argument. Finally, defendant argues that the trial judge violated Caldwell by failing to sustain his objection to the prosecutor's suggestion that the jury did not have ultimate responsibility for determining the death penalty. While the trial judge did not state that he was sustaining the objection, he did respond that he would instruct the jury as to the law in this case. Indeed, the trial judge twice instructed the jury that it was responsible for imposing the death sentence. We do not find that the trial judge's failure to specifically sustain the objection denied the defendant of a fair capital sentencing hearing.