Opinion ID: 2051995
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Defendant's Statement To Officer Edge

Text: [7] The circuit court and the court of appeals in this case found that the defendant's statement to Officer Edge was volunteered. On review, we are bound by the circuit court's findings of historical facts unless they are contrary to the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. State v. Turner, 136 Wis. 2d 333, 343, 401 N.W.2d 827 (1987). This court is not bound, however, by the lower courts' determination of the ultimate issue of whether the police violated the defendant's Miranda rights, which is a constitutional fact which this court determines independently. Id. at 344. We agree with the lower courts' determination that the defendant's statement to Officer Edge was volunteered and that the defendant's Miranda rights were not violated. [8, 9] In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 479, the United States Supreme Court determined that the fifth and fourteenth amendments' prohibition against compelled self-incrimination [4] required that custodial interrogation be preceded by advice to an individual that he has a right to remain silent and that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law and that he has the right to the presence of an attorney and if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning. The Court in Miranda also indicated the procedures to be followed subsequent to the warnings. If the accused indicates that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. Id. at 474. The right of an accused to cut off questioning must be scrupulously honored. Id. at 479; Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975). If the accused requests counsel, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474. Furthermore, a valid waiver of that right to counsel cannot be established by showing only that the accused responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if the accused has been advised of his rights. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981). Rather, an accused, having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by authorities until counsel has been made available to the accused, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. Id. at 484-85. Consequently, in deciding whether the defendant's Miranda rights were violated, we must first determine when and if the defendant invoked either his right to remain silent or his right to counsel. The defendant submits that he initially invoked his right to counsel at his house when his mother told the police they should contact the defendant's attorney. The defendant's position is without merit. As this court has recently held: Since the right to counsel and the right to remain silent are given by the constitution to the defendant, he alone can exercise those rights. Neither his family nor his attorney are threatened with accusations, nor do they have the defendant's knowledge of the case, including the defendants' knowledge of his own guilt or innocence, nor are they subject to the pain of the defendant's possibly guilty conscience. Therefore, no one but the accused can make the decision to make a statement to the police or to ask for the assistance of counsel in making his decision. State v. Hanson, 136 Wis. 2d 195, 213, 401 N.W.2d 771 (1987). The defendant next argues that he personally requested counsel at his house, when he asked his mother, on his way up the stairs from the basement, to contact his attorney. The defendant maintains that two officers were nearby when he made this statement, and, under State v. Middleton, 135 Wis. 2d 297, 309, 399 N.W.2d 917 (Ct. App. 1986), a communication of a desire for counsel to a third person that is understood as a request for counsel by a police bystander is sufficient to constitute an invocation of the right to counsel. [10] Because invoking the right to counsel is an expression of the accused's desire to deal with the police only through counsel, that desire must be communicated to the police. Neuenfeldt v. State, 29 Wis. 2d 20, 24, 138 N.W.2d 252 (1965), cert. denied 384 U.S. 1025 (1966); Middleton, 135 Wis. 2d at 308. Consequently, in Middleton, 135 Wis. 2d at 309, the court of appeals held that: Although the suspect will usually communicate the desire for counsel directly to the police, we see no reason why indirect communication, such as to a police bystander, should be ineffective so long as the suspect has reason to believe the communication is effective. That is, the suspect must have some basis for believing that the bystander, as well as the person directly addressed, will understand that the suspect wants counsel. A suspect cannot expect the police to honor his or her desire for counsel unless the suspect has a reasonable basis for believing that the police realize that he or she has the desire. [11] In the case before this court, the defendant never testified that he had reason to believe that the communication with his mother was effective to impart to the officers an understanding that he wanted counsel. Furthermore, the police bystanders in this case expressly disclaimed any recollection of hearing the defendant ask his mother to contact his attorney. Consequently, we find that the defendant's statement to his mother asking her to contact the defendant's attorney was not an effective invocation of the defendant's right to counsel because, on the basis of the record before us, the defendant could not have had a reasonable basis for believing that the officers realized that the defendant had the desire for counsel. [12] The defendant next contends that he invoked his right to silence when he refused to admit knowledge of the incident to Detective Markley. A defendant's disclaimer of any knowledge of the death of a victim does not constitute an invocation of the defendant's right to silence. See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 727 (1979). Detective Markley testified that after he had administered the Miranda warnings to the defendant and had obtained an assurance from the defendant that he understood them, the defendant gave an express, affirmative response to the question whether he wished to speak to Detective Markley. Detective Markley then told the defendant he thought that the defendant knew something about the homicide of Scott Alf, to which the defendant replied, No, I don't. We find that the defendant did not invoke his right to remain silent by merely responding to Detective Markley's statement in the negative. The defendant also contends that he invoked his right to counsel when Officer Edge attempted to question him. We agree that the defendant invoked his right to counsel when Officer Edge attempted to question him. However, we also find that Officer Edge did not continue to question the defendant about the incident after the defendant requested his attorney. Rather, Officer Edge immediately attempted to contact the defendant's attorney. Although the initial attempt to contact the defendant's attorney was unsuccessful, telephonic communication between the defendant and his attorney was established shortly thereafter. After the defendant told Officer Edge that his attorney told him not to talk, Officer Edge telephoned a juvenile intake worker to arrange for the defendant's processing. The defendant does not dispute this sequence of events, but argues that during the time Officer Edge was making the arrangements to process the defendant, Officer Edge continued to make small talk with the defendant regarding school and his parents, thereby warranting suppression of the defendant's statement to Officer Edge under Edwards. We disagree. The United States Supreme Court in Edwards held that an accused ... having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85 (emphasis added). The Court has defined the term interrogation under Miranda as referring not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police, other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody, that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980). [13] We find that Officer Edge's small talk with the defendant about school and his family was not interrogation within the meaning of Miranda because Officer Edge's conversation with the defendant was not reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect and, in fact, did not. Therefore, we hold that the defendant's statement to Officer Edge was not the product of any interrogation conducted after the defendant had invoked his right to counsel, but rather was the product of an unsolicited, wholly spontaneous, volunteered action on the defendant's part. Consequently, we find that the defendant's Miranda rights were not violated and that the defendant's statement to Officer Edge was properly admitted.