Opinion ID: 1202382
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 26

Heading: Denial of Motion to Modify Verdict Under Section 190.4, Subdivision (e)

Text: (35) Section 190.4, subdivision (e) provides that where the trier of fact has returned a verdict imposing the death penalty, the defendant is deemed to have made an application for modification of such verdict. It further provides: In ruling on the application, the judge shall review the evidence, consider, take into account, and be guided by the aggravating and mitigating circumstances referred to in Section 190.3, and shall make a determination as to whether the jury's findings and verdicts that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances are contrary to law or the evidence presented. The judge shall state on the record the reasons for his findings. We have held that these provisions require an independent consideration of whether the evidence and aggravating and mitigating circumstances support imposition of the death penalty upon defendant, and we have required that reasons for denying the modification be given with sufficient particularity so as to permit effective appellate review. (See Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 793-794; Frierson, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 179.) In the present case defendant maintains that a portion of the trial judge's findings reflects the erroneous view that the absence of mitigating factors constitutes an aggravating factor. (See Davenport, supra, 41 Cal.3d at pp. 288-290.) He quotes at length from the court's findings. [34] He draws his conclusion as to the trial court's misunderstanding of the law and inflation of aggravating factors from its factor by factor consideration of each of the circumstances in section 190.3. Defendant's argument lacks merit for several reasons. First of all, while his quote from the trial court's findings is rather lengthy, it represents only a part of the trial judge's eight pages of findings. This trial court took particular pains to spread on the record its independent review and analysis of the facts of the guilt and penalty phases. It set forth its conclusion that aggravating factors primarily involving the crime itself outweighed any minor mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, and its agreement with the jury's determination that death was the proper penalty, a finding described as supported overwhelmingly by the weight of the evidence. Second, in reviewing each of the factors of section 190.3, the trial court was apparently just trying to comply with the letter of section 190.4, subdivision (e) which it quoted at the outset of its findings and which requires that the trial judge be guided by these specified factors. We simply do not agree with defendant that from the language it chose, the trial court reflected a misunderstanding of the law regarding lack of mitigating factors constituting an aggravating factor. Third, there is clear evidence that the trial court did not hold such misunderstanding. During consideration of jury instructions for the penalty phase of the case, defendant proposed a special instruction which would inform the jury: If a factor is not found to be by you a mitigating factor, that in and of itself does not make that factor an aggravating factor unless the prosecution proves to you that factor is an aggravating factor. That instruction was given in addition to a similar instruction apparently also requested by the defense and agreed to by the prosecution which stated: The absence of a statutory mitigating factor does not necessarily constitute an aggravating factor. Neither counsel nor the court expressed any misunderstanding or disagreement with these instructions, and their ready acceptance negates the inference defendant wishes us to draw from the trial court's later comments pursuant to section 190.4, subdivision (e).