Opinion ID: 3009718
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Right of Access Doctrine

Text: Although the district court denied intervention by the Newspapers, it made an alternative holding. Assuming that intervention was proper, the district court considered the merits of the Newspapers' challenge to the Order of Confidentiality and their attempt to obtain access to the Settlement Agreement. The district court determined that the Settlement Agreement was not a judicial record, and it therefore denied the Newspapers' motion to obtain access to the Settlement Agreement under the right of access doctrine. We have previously recognized a right of access to judicial proceedings and judicial records, and this right of access is beyond dispute. Littlejohn v. Bic Corp., 851 F.2d 673, 677-78 (3d Cir. 1988) (quoting Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1066 (3d Cir. 1984)). The balancing of factors for and against access is a decision committed to the 0 We also note that the Record sent the Borough a request for information pursuant to the Pennsylvania Right to Know Act on October 22, 1992, just over four months from the date of settlement. Only after the Borough refused to provide the Record with the Settlement Agreement did the Record realize that court action would be necessary. These facts indicate that the Record was diligent in seeking the Settlement Agreement, and that its motion for intervention therefore cannot be deemed untimely. 0 We need not address whether in some circumstances a trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, may rightly conclude that untimeliness or other factors relating to the particular claimant justify refusal of intervention where the intervenors seek to contest an ancillary issue. 16 discretion of the district court, although it is not generally accorded the narrow review reserved for discretionary decisions based on first-hand observations. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust and Sav. Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., 800 F.2d 339, 344 (3d Cir. 1986) (citations omitted). In this case, however, the district court reached its conclusion through a legal determination that the Settlement Agreement was not a judicial record accessible under the right of access doctrine. We will therefore exercise plenary review over the district court's legal determination. See 1st Westco Corp. v. School Dist. of Phila., 6 F.3d 108, 112 (3d Cir. 1993). The Newspapers argue that the Settlement Agreement which Pansy and the Borough entered into is a judicial record, accessible under the right of access doctrine. If the Settlement Agreement is a judicial record, then Rittenhouse would be binding and the Agreement should be released by the district court. In Rittenhouse, this court held that a settlement agreement deemed a judicial record is accessible under the right of access doctrine. 800 F.2d at 344-45. We specifically held that the strong presumption of access outweighed the interest in promoting settlements, which in the matter before us is the only interest which the Borough has argued in favor of maintaining the Order of Confidentiality. Id. Therefore, if the Settlement Agreement is a judicial record, it should be released by the district court itself under the right of access doctrine, and there would be no need for the Newspapers to demonstrate that the Settlement 17 Agreement is a public record under the Pennsylvania Right to Know Act. However, our prior decisions preclude a finding that the Settlement Agreement is a judicial record accessible under the right of access doctrine. See Internal Operating Procedures of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 9.1 (July 1990) (It is the tradition of this court that the holding of a panel in a reported opinion is binding on subsequent panels.). In Enprotech Corp. v. Renda, 983 F.2d 17 (3d Cir. 1993), we indicated that when a settlement agreement is not filed with the court, it is not a judicial record for purposes of the right of access doctrine. Id. at 20-21. In Enprotech, we held that since the Settlement Agreement ha[d] not been filed with, placed under seal, interpreted or enforced by the district court, it was not a judicial record. Id. at 20. The Enprotech court went on to hold: Moreover, the Agreement will not become a part of the public record unless and until the district court may order the parties to comply with its terms. Id. at 21. The Enprotech Court so held even though the district court in that case specifically retained jurisdiction over the settlement agreement until its expiration so that it could enforce its terms. Id. In the instant case, the Settlement Agreement which is subject to the Order of Confidentiality was never filed with, interpreted or enforced by the district court. The district court has not ordered any of the terms of the Settlement Agreement to be complied with. Accordingly, Enprotech controls 18 the instant case and leads us to conclude that the Settlement Agreement is not a judicial record, and the right of access doctrine cannot be a basis for the Newspapers to obtain access to the Agreement. In contrast, in Rittenhouse we found that the settlement agreement was a judicial record because it had been filed with and enforced by the district court. 800 F.2d at 34445. Another decision by this court indicates that the Settlement Agreement is not a judicial record accessible under the right of access doctrine. In Littlejohn v. Bic Corp., 851 F.2d 673 (3d Cir. 1988), we addressed the question of whether documents which were admitted into evidence and had become judicial records were accessible under the right of access doctrine after the underlying litigation had been settled and the documents had been returned to the party resisting disclosure. We stated: We . . . hold that, absent allegations of fraud or other extraordinary circumstances, trial exhibits that were restored to their owner after a case has been completely terminated and which were properly subject to destruction by the clerk of court are no longer judicial records within the supervisory power of the district court. Id. at 683. Under Littlejohn, even where there is no dispute that documents were at one time judicial records, once such documents are no longer part of the court file they lose their status as judicial records.0 Thus, in Littlejohn, as in 0 But see Littlejohn, 851 F.2d at 688 (Scirica, J., dissenting).