Opinion ID: 1337405
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: I. West Virginia Guidance

Text: West Virginia Code § 55-7-12 (1931) (Repl.Vol.2000) [1] provides direction regarding releases of tortfeasors, as follows: A release to, or an accord and satisfaction with, one or more joint trespassers, or tort-feasors, shall not inure to the benefit of another such trespasser, or tort-feasor, and shall be no bar to an action or suit against such other joint trespasser, or tortfeasor, for the same cause of action to which the release or accord and satisfaction relates. Prior to the 1931 amendment, that statute did not contain the term tort-feasor. The statute provided only as follows: A release to, or an accord and satisfaction with one joint trespasser, hereafter executed or had, shall not inure to the benefit of another such trespasser, and shall be no bar to an action or suit against such other joint trespasser for the same cause of action to which the release or accord and satisfaction relates. W.Va.Code Ann., c. 136 § 7 (Barnes' Code 1923). The 1931 addition of the term tortfeasor was explained in the Revisers' Note [2] as follows: The words `or tort feasor,' wherever occurring, are new, and are added to indicate that this section applies to all joint wrongdoers, as is held in Leisure v. Monongahela Valley Traction Co., 85 W.Va. 346, [101 S.E. 737 (1920) ]. (emphasis supplied.). [3] Thus, while the statute [4] clarifies that a release of one tortfeasor does not release another tortfeasor, the issue of whether the release of the tortfeasor functions as a release of a nonwrongdoer such as a vicariously liable employer is not resolved thereby. The statute applies strictly and exclusively to joint wrongdoers, as elucidated in the Revisers' Note. [5] Vicarious liability is a doctrine imposed as a matter of public policy, allowing inclusion of a non-wrongdoer as a party. Vicarious liability is not premised upon the commission of a tort, and there is no joint wrongdoing of the employer/principal and employee/agent. [6] Where a principal is liable only through vicarious liability, such principal did not commit a negligent act and would consequently not constitute a tortfeasor under West Virginia Code § 55-7-12. Consequently, that statute does not provide a foundation for a conclusion that release of an agent cannot function as a release of the principal. West Virginia case law similarly fails to provide a definitive answer to the certified question posed. We tangentially addressed issues of the doctrine of respondeat superior in conjunction with a determination of the moral obligation of the State in State ex rel. Bumgarner v. Sims, 139 W.Va. 92, 79 S.E.2d 277 (1953), [7] and acknowledged that a joint action may be maintained against a master and servant in a case in which the plaintiff's injuries were occasioned solely by the negligence of the servant. [8] Id. at 111, 79 S.E.2d at 289. We explained as follows: Subject to the rule set forth in points 3 and 4 of the syllabus of the Humphrey[ v. Virginian Ry. Co., 132 W.Va. 250, 54 S.E.2d 204 (1949)] case that where the master's duty is absolute and nondelegable, or where the liability of the master is not predicated solely upon the negligence of the employee impleaded, but upon the negligence of another employee, or that of the master himself, an acquittal by a jury of the servant in an action instituted against the master and servant to establish liability based solely on the servant's negligence will not release the master. The relation of master and servant in those cases, in which the doctrine of respondeat superior applies, is joint, and the parties should be regarded as though they were joint tort-feasors. Wills v. Montfair Gas Coal Co., 97 W.Va. 476, 125 S.E. 367. In some respects, however, the relation may be regarded as joint and several. Id. at 111, 79 S.E.2d at 289. [9] Syllabus point eight of Bumgarner provided: Subject to the rule that an acquittal by a jury of the servant in an action instituted against the master and servant to establish liability based solely on the servant's negligence, will release the master, the relation between the master and servant, the latter acting within the scope of his employment, is joint and several in the sense that both master and servant are liable for injuries caused by the negligent wrongdoing of the servant, acting within the scope of his employment, and liability for such injuries may be asserted in an action at law against the master and servant jointly or against each of them in a separate action at law. Id. at 94, 79 S.E.2d at 280-81. The statements in Bumgarner regarding the manner in which the principal/agent relationship may resemble the joint tortfeasor relationship were made only in the sense that both master and servant are liable for injuries caused by the negligent wrongdoing of the servant as clearly articulated in syllabus point eight of Bumgarner. Id. Indeed, they are both liable, as joint tortfeasors would both be liable. 139 W.Va. at 94, 79 S.E.2d at 280-81. However, they are not liable as joint wrongdoers; one is culpable and one is not. Thus, while the principal/agent or master/servant relationship does resemble the joint tortfeasor relationship in limited degree, the parallels are not boundless, and the Bumgarner court neither encountered nor resolved the question presently before this Court. The Bumgarner court also stated that the common law rule that a valid release of the servant releases the master from liability was abrogated, in part, [10] by West Virginia Code § 55-7-12. 139 W.Va. at 112, 79 S.E.2d at 290. In reviewing the Bumgarner opinion in its entirety, it appears that this statement was pure dictum. There was neither an actual release nor a covenant not to sue [11] executed by the plaintiff in Bumgarner. The civil action against the wrongdoer, Mr. Coiner, had proceeded to trial, and a jury verdict had been rendered. It was simply not satisfied due to Mr. Coiner's bankruptcy. Any statements regarding the effect of a release of the wrongdoing agent upon the principal must therefore be considered dicta. Such statements were not necessary to the conclusion reached and were not restricted to the facts before the Bumgarner Court. This Court has clearly stated as follows in In re Assessment of Kanawha Valley Bank, 144 W.Va. 346, 109 S.E.2d 649 (1959): The rule of stare decisis does not apply where the former decisions have misunderstood or misapplied the law or are contrary to reason. Simpkins v. White, 43 W.Va. 125, 27 S.E. 361. . . . no legal principle is ever settled until it is settled right. Weston v. Ralston, 48 W.Va. 170, 36 S.E. 446, 450. . . . it is better to be right, than to be consistent with the errors of a hundred years. Lovings v. Norfolk & W.R. Co., 47 W.Va. 582, 35 S.E. 962, 965. Id. at 382, 109 S.E.2d at 669. [12] This Court has also repeatedly cautioned against establishing precedent based upon dicta. As explained in Kanawha Valley Bank, [o]biter dicta or strong expressions in an opinion, where such language was not necessary to a decision of the case, will not establish a precedent. 144 W.Va. at 382-83, 109 S.E.2d at 669. Regarding the rationales of prior holdings and their inclusion within the doctrine of stare decisis, we distinctly stated as follows in Banker v. Banker, 196 W.Va. 535, 474 S.E.2d 465 (1996): This doctrine concerns the holdings of previous cases, not the rationales[.] Id. at 546 n. 13, 474 S.E.2d at 476 n. 13. Stare decisis is the policy of the court to stand by precedent. It is different from the doctrine of stare rationibus decidendi- to keep to the rationes decidendi of past cases. Rather under the doctrine of stare decisis, a case is important only for what it decidesfor the what not for why and not for how. Id. A judicial precedent attaches to a specific legal consequence to a detailed set of facts in an adjudged case or judicial decision, which is then considered as furnishing the rule for the determination of a subsequent case involving identical or similar material facts and arising in the same court or a lower court in the judicial hierarchy. Allegheny Gen., Hosp. v. N.L.R.B., 608 F.2d 965, 969-70 (3rd Cir.1979) (footnote omitted). An engaging commentary upon the value of dicta was provided by Justice Neely in his dissent to Pittsburgh Elevator Co. v. West Virginia Board of Regents, 172 W.Va. 743, 310 S.E.2d 675 (1983). Justice Neely surmised that a dissent to dicta is like the sound of one hand clapping. [L]aw must be written with care. It is meant to be an exercise of the mind, not a venting of the spleen. Id. at 758, 310 S.E.2d at 690 (Neely, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The references in Bumgarner to the effect of a plaintiff's release of a wrongdoing agent upon a principal were sheer dicta and were confined to a unique set of facts not present in the case sub judice. In its exuberance to provide the victim with recompense and ensure that the moral obligation of the State was satisfied, the majority was overly generous in its comments on the effect of the statute. It is therefore inaccurate to presume that Bumgarner provides the answer to this certified question.