Opinion ID: 172520
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Cocaine-Possession Charge

Text: Mr. Cesareo-Ayala challenges the district court's denial of his motion for acquittal on the cocaine-possession charge. He contends that the evidence was insufficient to tie him to the cocaine found on Mendez upon his arrest on March 9, 2007. [I]n reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury verdict, this court must review the record de novo and ask only whether taking the evidenceboth direct and circumstantial, together with the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefromin the light most favorable to the government, a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Hanzlicek, 187 F.3d 1228, 1239 (10th Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). While the evidence supporting the conviction must be substantial and do more than raise a mere suspicion of guilt, it need not conclusively exclude every other reasonable hypothesis and it need not negate all possibilities except guilt. United States v. Burkley, 513 F.3d 1183, 1188 (10th Cir.2008) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). To establish that a defendant possessed a controlled substance with intent to distribute, the government must prove that he (1) possessed a controlled substance, (2) knew he possessed a controlled substance, and (3) intended to distribute the controlled substance. Id. at 1189. Under 18 U.S.C. § 2, anyone who aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures the commission of an offense is punishable as a principal. The government contends that the evidence was sufficient to show that Mr. Cesareo-Ayala aided and abetted the offense of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, and we agree. To begin with, the already-summarized evidence showed that on several occasions before March 9, 2007, Mr. Cesareo-Ayala had provided cocaine to Mendez for Klepac-brokered deals. It would thus be reasonable to infer that he was Mendez's supplier for the specific sale on March 9. Moreover, Mr. Cesareo-Ayala's own statements that day could readily support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. His calls to Mendezto ask what had happened and whether Mendez had his stuff, and to set up a meeting for the transfercertainly imply that he was involved in the aborted transaction with Steward; and then he confessed unequivocally to a police officer after his arrest. Mr. Cesareo-Ayala also challenges the district court's denial of his motion for a new trial on the cocaine-possession charge because of the weakness of the government's case. The district court should grant such a motion only in exceptional cases in which the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict. Evans, 42 F.3d at 593 (internal quotation marks omitted). We review for abuse of discretion the district court's denial of a motion for new trial. See id. We see no abuse of discretion here. We have already held that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict on the charge. And we doubt that we could ever find an abuse of discretion by the district court in denying a new-trial motion based on the weight of the evidence when the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict. We note that courts of appeals routinely affirm the denial of such new-trial motions once they have upheld the sufficiency of the evidence. See United States v. Rodriguez, 457 F.3d 109, 118-19 (1st Cir.2006); United States v. Bullock, 550 F.3d 247, 251 (2d Cir.2008); United States v. LeGrand, 468 F.3d 1077, 1080 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 744 n. 1 (11th Cir.2008). To be sure, the district court, which has viewed the trial evidence first-hand, may order a new trial when it perceives that the jury improperly weighed some of that evidence; but it would be a rare case in which an appellate court could make that kind of judgment. We affirm the district court's denial of a new trial on this charge.