Opinion ID: 2095416
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Minimum and Maximum Sentences

Text: Before Hutchinson pled, the State informed the court of the minimum and maximum penalties for the charged offenses. The prosecutor indicated that robbery, a class B felony, has a minimum sentence of six years and a maximum sentence of twenty years. He also informed the court that the penalty range for the class D felony charged was one to four years. The court then asked appellant whether he understood the penalty for each count; appellant responded affirmatively. Appellant argues that advisement of the penalty range for the class B felony charged (robbery) does not constitute an advisement for the class B felony to which he pled guilty (confinement). He also claims that an advisement by the prosecutor is not an adequate substitute for the nondelegable judicial inquiry. The predecessor statute required that the court not accept a plea without first  addressing the defendant to inform him, among other things, of the minimum and maximum penalties for the offense charged. Ind. Code § 35-4.1-1-3 (Burns 1979 Repl.) (emphasis added). Effective September 1, 1982, the code requires that ... the court shall not accept a plea of guilty ... without first determining that the defendant ... (3) has been informed of the maximum possible sentence and minimum sentence for the crime charged... . Ind. Code § 35-35-1-2 (Burns 1985 Repl.) (emphasis added). In Williams v. State (1975), 263 Ind. 165, 325 N.E.2d 827, the petitioners argued that their guilty pleas were not entered voluntarily and intelligently when defense counsel advised them of the rights enumerated in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). Declining to set aside their pleas, this Court said: We have repeatedly stressed the desirability of the trial court advising a defendant of his federal constitutional rights as enumerated in Boykin. We affirm that position today. We believe the essence of that decision requires only that the record affirmatively show that defendant was advised of the Boykin rights prior to the entry of his plea. A defendant's guilty plea is not tainted merely because the trial court fails to repeat defendant's rights for him, so long as the record of the guilty plea proceeding contains evidence from which the trial court may validly conclude that defendant was meaningfully informed of the specific rights enumerated in Boykin. Williams, 325 N.E.2d at 833. This view was affirmed in Lockert v. State (1979), 271 Ind. 226, 391 N.E.2d 613, where Justice Prentice wrote for a unanimous Court that ... it is not material who gives the advisements, so long as the record of the guilty-plea hearing reflects that `the defendant was advised of and understood the substance of his rights. [sic] Lockert, at 615. Like Charles Lockett, Hutchinson indicated to the trial judge that he understood the charges and the penalties. This Court reviews all the evidence when determining whether the guilty plea was entered voluntarily and intelligently, including testimony given at the post-conviction trial, the transcript of the petitioner's original sentencing, and any plea agreements or other exhibits which are a part of the record. White, 497 N.E.2d at 905-906. When the record indicates that the accused was informed of the sentence range and the trial court's personal determination that the accused understood the penalties for the charged offenses, reversible error has not occurred. The recitation of the statutory advisement by the prosecutor in defendant's presence was sufficient to inform the accused of the penalty range. Cf. Burns v. State, (1986), Ind., 500 N.E.2d 201; State v. Billups, 57 Ohio St.2d 31, 385 N.E.2d 1308 (1979) (defendant who acknowledged that he heard and understood court's advisement to a previous defendant and did not desire his own recitation was adequately informed). The accused is fully informed of the minimum and maximum penal consequences when he is advised of the sentence range for the offenses charged. Cole v. State (1985), Ind., 485 N.E.2d 128. Appellant was informed of the sentence range for a class B felony. He knew, from both the terms of the plea agreement and an advisement at the guilty plea hearing, that the amended information for confinement was a class B felony. Appellant was adequately informed of the sentence range for the offense to which he pled guilty. Appellant also claims that he was not advised of the sentencing alternatives available for a class D felony. The trial court has the discretion to enter judgment of conviction and sentence for a class A misdemeanor when a person has committed a class D felony. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7 (Burns 1979 Repl.). However, the trial court is required to advise the accused only of the possible sentences for the crime charged. Ind. Code § 35-35-1-2(a)(3). We indicated earlier that the statute does not mandate the trial court to ... advise the defendant of potential sentences for offenses to which he will not be subjected if his plea is accepted (citations omitted), ... [noting that the] [d]efendant is entitled to be informed of the actual penal consequences of his plea of guilty, not the hypothetical result of a trial on a charge which the State has agreed not to prosecute in return for the plea. Brown v. State (1983), Ind., 443 N.E.2d 316, 319. Similarly, when the accused pleads guilty to a class D felony, the court is not required to advise the accused of the misdemeanant sentencing alternatives. The trial judge is bound by the terms of the plea agreement. When, as here, the agreement does not give the judge discretion to sentence the accused as a misdemeanant, then the accused need not be advised of this sentencing alternative.