Opinion ID: 6500749
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Kuchel Act

Text: TID argues that the Kuchel Act does not authorize the Service to regulate agricultural uses of lease land in the refuges to ensure consistency with “proper waterfowl management.” TID relies on § 695n of the Act to support its argument. We quoted § 695n above. For the convenience of the reader, here it is again in relevant part: The Secretary shall, consistent with proper waterfowl management, continue the present pattern of leasing [specified] reserved lands . . . within the Executive order boundaries of the Lower Klamath and Tule Lake National Wildlife Refuges . . . . 14 TULELAKE IRRIGATION DISTRICT V. USFWS 16 U.S.C. § 695n (emphasis added). TID argues that because the phrase “consistent with proper waterfowl management” is set off by commas it is a “nonrestrictive” clause. TID writes in its brief to us: “‘Consistent with proper waterfowl management’ is not an operative phrase in the sentence. It is a nonrestrictive clause that, by definition, is not essential to the meaning of the sentence.” TID argues that the clause simply clarifies that “the present pattern of leasing is consistent with proper waterfowl management.” (Emphasis in original.) Even if we were to consider the language of § 695n in isolation from the rest of the Kuchel Act, we would disagree. When construing a statute, courts should “avoid any statutory interpretation that renders any section superfluous.” Cent. Mont. Elec. Power Co-op, Inc. v. Adm’r of Bonneville Power Admin., 840 F.2d 1472, 1478 (9th Cir. 1988). This canon holds true, as well, for interpretations of language within a single section. See Lockhart v. United States, 577 U.S. 347, 354–57 (2016). TID admits that its proposed interpretation of § 695n would render superfluous the phrase “consistent with proper waterfowl management.” In contrast, the Service’s interpretation gives the phrase a distinct meaning and function within the section. Under the Service’s interpretation, the phrase requires the Service to ensure that the agricultural uses of lease land are consistent with proper waterfowl management. However, we do not consider the language of § 695n in isolation. Rather, as TID itself recognizes, we must construe it in light of the rest of the Kuchel Act. Even if the meaning of § 695n were unclear, “[i]t is necessary and required that an interpretation of a phrase of uncertain reach is not confined to a single sentence when the text of the whole statute gives TULELAKE IRRIGATION DISTRICT V. USFWS 15 instruction as to its meaning.” Maracich v. Spears, 570 U.S. 48, 65 (2013). Unlike TID’s interpretation of § 695n, the Service’s interpretation comports with the entirety of the Kuchel Act. Other parts of the Act unambiguously prioritize wildlife management objectives over agricultural uses on leased land. Section 695k of the Act specifies that the “policy” of Congress in the Klamath Refuge Complex is “to preserve intact the necessary existing habitat for migratory waterfowl.” 16 U.S.C. § 695k. Section 695l, quoted above, requires the Secretary to administer “all lands” in the Klamath Refuge Complex “for the major purpose of waterfowl management, but with full consideration to optimum agricultural use that is consistent therewith.” Id. § 695l (emphasis added). We therefore reject TID’s interpretation of § 695n. With respect to the textual argument made by TID, the language of § 695n, whether considered in isolation or in the context of the rest of the Kuchel Act, is unambiguous. We therefore do not need to proceed to step two of the Chevron analysis. We hold that the Kuchel Act requires the Service to regulate the pattern of lease land agriculture in the refuges to ensure consistency with proper waterfowl management.