Opinion ID: 4023577
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claimed Ambiguity

Text: ¶28. Linde also claims the contract is ambiguous as to its client—the Hospital or Patient’s Choice. What Linde appears to be arguing is that, if the contract is ambiguous, then the Hospital cannot meet its burden to affirmatively show it was not the contracting party. But we fail to follow this logic. When a contract is ambiguous, we employ canons of construction—which include looking to extrinsic evidence, if necessary. See, e.g., Dalton v. Cellular South, Inc., 20 So. 3d 1227, 1232-33 (Miss. 2009). And here, the extrinsic 2006); Ward v. Hawkins, 418 S.W.3d 815, 822 (Tex. Ct. App. 2013). But even if we were to follow those jurisdictions who impose a clear-and-convincing standard, our conclusion would be the same—the Hospital met its burden to affirmatively show the invalidity of the arbitration award and resulting judgment. 12 evidence—namely the lease—supports the interpretation that the contract was with Patient’s Choice, not the Hospital. So Linde’s ambiguity argument actually strengthens the Hospital’s position. ¶29. But having reviewed all of Linde’s assertions, the fact remains the contract coupled with the lease affirmatively show it was Patient’s Choice, not the Hospital, that entered the contract containing the arbitration award. We thus affirm both trial courts’ orders setting aside the Missouri judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction.