Opinion ID: 1058798
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: facts

Text: The material facts are undisputed. During the relevant time period, Augusta Health Care for Women, P.L.C. (Augusta Health Care) was a professional limited liability company that provided obstetric and gynecological medical services to patients. Augusta Health Care was owned and operated by two licensed physicians, one of whom was Mark P. Brooks, M.D. On April 8, 2003, Shana J. Shutler filed a motion for judgment, jointly and severally, against Dr. Brooks and Augusta Health Care. Shutler alleged therein that Dr. Brooks administered medical treatment to Shutler in a negligent manner, causing her serious and permanent injury. Shutler further alleged that Dr. Brooks was acting as an agent and employee of Augusta Health Care and within the scope of his employment during his treatment of her. Accordingly, Shutler asserted a vicarious liability claim against Augusta Health Care for Dr. Brooks' negligence. Dr. Brooks and Augusta Health Care filed a joint grounds of defense, denying any negligent conduct. On the day before the matter was scheduled for trial, Shutler filed a motion to dismiss Dr. Brooks as a party defendant with prejudice to the refiling of any action against [Dr. Brooks] individually. The motion also stated that the matter will proceed forward against the co-defendant, [Augusta Health Care], who is vicariously liable for any negligence of [Dr. Brooks]. [1] The trial court granted Shutler's motion the following day and immediately entered an order dismissing Dr. Brooks as a defendant. The order provided that the dismissal was with prejudice to [Shutler] to refile any actions against [Dr. Brooks] based upon the allegations pending herein. Regarding Shutler's claims against Augusta Health Care, the order further provided that [t]his matter shall proceed forward against the defendant [Augusta Health Care] based upon the allegations pending herein. Counsel for the defendants endorsed the order without objection. [2] On the same day the trial court entered the order dismissing Dr. Brooks as a defendant, Augusta Health Care filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to what is now Rule 3:20. In the motion, Augusta Health Care asserted that the dismissal with prejudice operated as a determination on the merits that Dr. Brooks was not liable to Shutler for the negligent conduct alleged in her motion for judgment. Relying principally upon Roughton Pontiac Corp. v. Alston, 236 Va. 152, 156, 372 S.E.2d 147, 149 (1988), Augusta Health Care maintained that a verdict for an employee exonerates the employer as a matter of law when the two are sued together and the employer's liability is solely dependent on the employee's conduct. Augusta Health Care further maintained that the rule stated in Roughton applies with equal force when a claim against an employee is dismissed with prejudice as when the employee is exonerated by a verdict. Additionally, Augusta Health Care asserted that since there was an adjudication on the merits of Dr. Brooks' liability, res judicata applied to bar Shutler's claim against Augusta Health Care. Shutler responded to the motion for summary judgment by asserting that the order dismissing Dr. Brooks by its plain terms clearly intends and directs that the matter would proceed towards trial against Augusta [Health Care]. Shutler contended that when Augusta Health Care signed the order without objection, it waived any challenge, including any res judicata -based challenge, that the Order of dismissal somehow precludes the plaintiff from proceeding to trial against Augusta [Health Care]. Shutler further contended that the order dismissing Dr. Brooks was not res judicata because it was not a judgment on the merits. Finally, Shutler maintained that the rule stated in Roughton did not apply because no verdict had been rendered in Dr. Brooks' favor. In a letter opinion dated April 11, 2005, the trial court concluded that Augusta Health Care was entitled to summary judgment. The trial court reasoned, among other things, that [w]hile Roughton was decided upon a jury verdict, this [c]ourt can perceive no reason why Roughton should be limited to situations solely in which a jury has returned a verdict exonerating the [servant]. Noting that the parties did not dispute that Augusta Health Care's liability was solely derivative of Dr. Brooks' conduct under the circumstances of this case, the trial court determined that the dismissal of Dr. Brooks with prejudice rendered Augusta Health Care not liable as a matter of law. [3] By order entered on June 2, 2005, incorporating the prior opinion letter, the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment and entered final judgment in favor of Augusta Health Care. This appeal followed.