Opinion ID: 1343569
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Change of Venue/Continuance

Text: Appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for a change of venue or, in the alternative, a continuance. We disagree. A motion to change venue is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Caldwell, 300 S.C. 494, 388 S.E.2d 816 (1990). The trial judge's refusal of a motion for continuance will also not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Tanner, 299 S.C. 459, 385 S.E.2d 832 (1989). Appellant contends venue should have been changed because there is widespread racial prejudice in Lexington County shown by the fact that the solicitor has not sought the death penalty against any defendant accused of murdering a black person. Appellant also contends jurors in Lexington County are death prone because when the death penalty was sought, only one defendant did not receive the death penalty. These arguments are similar to the one raised in State v. Green, 301 S.C. 347, 392 S.E.2d 157 (1990). In Green, we affirmed the trial judge's denial of a motion for a change of venue made on the ground that jurors in Charleston are more likely to impose the death penalty on black defendants. We noted the statistical evidence presented did not contain details of the nature of the crimes involved or the composition of the juries. Likewise, here, appellant has not presented any evidence about the details of the crimes in these cases, the juries, or the aggravating and mitigating circumstances involved. [3] Appellant also contends prejudicial pretrial publicity required a change of venue or a continuance. We disagree. At trial, appellant specifically complained about an article which appeared in The State newspaper on the morning jury selection began. The article discussed appellant's two prior trials and their costs. When jurors have been exposed to pretrial publicity, a denial of a change of venue is not error when the jurors are found to have the ability to set aside any impressions or opinions and render a verdict based on the evidence presented at trial. Caldwell, supra . The defendant bears the burden of showing actual prejudice. Id. When the trial judge bases his ruling upon an adequate voir dire examination of the jurors, his conclusion that the objectivity of the jury panel has not been polluted by outside influence will not be disturbed absent extraordinary circumstances. State v. Copeland, 278 S.C. 572, 300 S.E.2d 63 (1982). In Caldwell, we held there was no abuse of discretion where eleven of the seated jurors and two alternates acknowledged awareness of media coverage but stated they could be impartial and decide the case based on evidence presented. Here, only seven jurors who actually sat on the jury stated they knew something about the case. [4] Here, the trial judge questioned every juror about his/her knowledge of the case. He disqualified six jurors who stated they could not be impartial knowing facts about the case. The remaining jurors stated they could be objective and put aside any knowledge they had about the case. The trial judge concluded the jurors could be objective. We find no abuse of discretion. Appellant then claims there was inherent prejudice. In Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961), the United States Supreme Court found actual prejudice when two-thirds of the seated jurors stated they had formed an opinion that the defendant was guilty even though they also stated they could be fair and impartial. Here, however, none of the seated jurors stated that they had formed an opinion about appellant's guilt. Further, the voir dire testimony and record do not reveal the kind of 'wave of public passion' that would have made a fair trial unlikely by the jury that was empaneled. Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984). The trial judge stated he did not believe public passion was so strong so as to not be able to believe the jurors' responses to voir dire. We agree. We hold the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying appellant's motions for a change of venue or continuance.