Opinion ID: 2232885
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Jury Instructions on Lesser Included Offenses of Murder

Text: Champlain asserts that the trial court committed reversible error when it refused to instruct the jury on reckless homicide, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter. As explained below, we agree as to reckless homicide and grant Champlain's request for a new trial. A. Test applied by the trial court When asked to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense, trial courts are to apply the test set forth in Wright v. State, 658 N.E.2d 563 (Ind.1995). First, the trial court must determine whether the lesser offense is either inherently or factually included in the crime charged. Id. at 566-67. If either of these prerequisites is met, the question whether to give the instruction hinges on the evidence presented by both parties. More precisely, as we explained in Wright: If there is a serious evidentiary dispute about the element or elements distinguishing the greater from the lesser offense and if, in view of this dispute, a jury could conclude that the lesser offense was committed but not the greater, then it is reversible error for a trial court not to give an instruction, when requested, on the inherently or factually included lesser offense. If the evidence does not so support the giving of a requested instruction on an inherently or factually included lesser offense, then a trial court should not give the requested instruction. Id. at 567 (citations and footnote omitted). We will review a trial court's factual findingwhere one is madeon the existence or lack of a serious evidentiary dispute for an abuse of discretion. This deference reflects and recognizes the trial court's proximity to the evidence. Nonetheless, Wright clearly dictates that reversal is required if the trial court wrongly concludes that no serious evidentiary dispute exists and refuses to give an instruction on a lesser included offense. If the trial court makes no ruling as to whether a serious evidentiary dispute exists, Wright implicitly requires the reviewing court to make this determination de novo based on its own review of the evidence. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 659 N.E.2d 652, 656-57 (Ind.Ct.App. 1995) (applying Wright in reversing conviction for failure to instruct the jury on reckless homicide and involuntary manslaughter), trans. denied. We now examine the evidence in this case with these guidelines in mind. B. Champlain's reckless homicide instruction The first part of the Wright test is satisfied here because reckless homicide is an inherently included lesser offense of murder. Wright, 658 N.E.2d at 567. The only difference between reckless homicide and murder is the mens rea the State must prove to obtain a conviction. Murder occurs when the defendant knowingly or intentionally kills another human being. IND.CODE § 35-42-1-1 (1993). A person engages in conduct knowingly if the actor is aware of a high probability that he or she is doing so. IND. CODE § 35-41-2-2(b) (1993). Reckless homicide, by contrast, requires proof that the defendant recklessly killed another human being. IND.CODE § 35-42-1-5 (1993). A person engages in conduct recklessly if he or she engages in the conduct in plain, conscious, and unjustifiable disregard of harm that might result and the disregard involves a substantial deviation from acceptable standards of conduct. IND.CODE § 35-41-2-2(c) (1993). Accordingly, the issue becomes whether there was a serious evidentiary dispute over whether Champlain knowingly killed Vanlue, i.e., with an awareness of a high probability that he was doing so. [5] Wright, 658 N.E.2d at 567. Rather than making findings on this point, the trial court refused to give Champlain's reckless homicide instruction on the ground that Champlain's theory of the case was inconsistent with a conviction for a lesser offense. In a colloquy with the court, defense counsel conceded that Champlain's strategy was to pin the murder on Jamison. The trial court reasoned that this theory was inconsistent with offering an alternative defense implicitly conceding Champlain's involvement in a criminal act, but with a lower degree of mental culpability. The trial court analogized the situation to rape cases in which an instruction on the victim's consent is properly refused if the defendant denies being the perpetrator. Similarly, some of our cases have suggested that an instruction for reckless homicide is appropriately refused where the accused asserts a claim of self-defense. See, e.g., Bolin v. State, 544 N.E.2d 1372, 1374 (Ind.1989). Assuming without deciding that it is within the trial court's discretion to refuse to instruct on affirmative defenses if they are inconsistent with the defense's contentions, the issue in this case is whether an instruction is required when there is a serious evidentiary dispute as to an element of the State's case in chief. Here the evidence as to Champlain's mens rea is murky. The evidence showed that Champlain banged on the door of Vanlue's trailer and said: Do you want to die? I am going to blow the ... lock off the door. I am going to kill you. Soon thereafter, Champlain fired two shots into the trailer at close range. According to Jamison, the first shot struck Vanlue. Certainly the jury could have found based on this testimony that Champlain formed the requisite intent for murder before he got to the trailer, and maintained that intent after he arrived. However, the evidence could have supported a finding that Champlain acted recklessly rather than knowingly when he fired the fatal shot. Champlain disclaimed an intent to kill after he was arrested later that night, asserted that he was unaware Vanlue was on the other side of the door, and claimed to be firing at the lock. [6] Because Champlain stated just before the shooting that he was going to blow the lock off the door, the jury could have found that the shot that killed Vanlue was fired for this purpose and not to hit her. The physical evidence would not have precluded this finding. A firearms expert who examined the gun, the door, and the lock estimated that Champlain fired the weapon directly against the door knob assembly or, at most, three feet from the door; and that, based on the results of a lead test, a gunshot appeared to have struck the lock itself. Record at 1037-38. Based on the dispersion pattern of the shot that struck Vanlue, the expert also estimated that Vanlue was three to nine feet from the gun at the time it was fired. Record at 1039-40. Depending on how the jury weighed and credited all of this evidence, the jury could have returned with a conviction for reckless homicide. Firing only to blow open the lock or mindlessly through a closed door is surely in plain, conscious, and unjustifiable disregard of the harm that might result to Vanlue and a substantial deviation from acceptable standards of conduct, but may not be viewed by the jury as knowing or intentional killing. IND.CODE § 35-41-2-2(c) (1993); see Nordstrom v. State, 627 N.E.2d 1380, 1383 (Ind.Ct.App.1994) (defendant shot wife at close range allegedly believing gun would not discharge; reckless homicide proved beyond a reasonable doubt), trans. denied. Under these facts it was for the jury to decide whether, if he fired the shot that killed Vanlue, Champlain was reckless or was actually aware of a high probability that he was firing at Vanlue, or intentionally shot her. This ambivalence raises a serious evidentiary dispute over whether Champlain knowingly killed Sherri Vanlue even if the jury concludes, as it did, that he was the shooter. Accordingly, his conviction must be reversed and a new trial held. Wright, 658 N.E.2d at 567. One lesson to take from this case is that when the question to instruct on a lesser included offense is a close one, it is prudent for the trial court to give the instruction and avoid the risk of the expense and delay involved in a retrial. Griffin v. State, 644 N.E.2d 561, 563 (Ind.1994) (murder conviction reversed for failure to instruct jury on voluntary manslaughter). C. Voluntary manslaughter Champlain also contends the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. Voluntary manslaughter is an inherently included lesser offense of murder because it requires proof of the same material elements of murder. Id. at 562; compare IND.CODE § 35-42-1-1 (1993) with IND.CODE § 35-42-1-3 (1993). Voluntary manslaughter is a knowing or intentional killing committed while acting under sudden heat, which is a mitigating factor and not an element of the crime. Isom v. State, 651 N.E.2d 1151, 1152 (Ind.1995), reh'g denied. Sudden heat has been defined as sufficient provocation to excite in the mind of the defendant such emotions as anger, rage, sudden resentment, or terror, and that such excited emotions may be sufficient to obscure the reason of an ordinary man. Fox v. State, 506 N.E.2d 1090, 1093 (Ind.1987). The jury should be instructed on voluntary manslaughter if there is any appreciable evidence of sudden heat. Griffin, 644 N.E.2d at 562 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, evidence merely of anger or words alone cannot support a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter. Matheney v. State, 583 N.E.2d 1202, 1205 (Ind.1992), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 962, 112 S.Ct. 2320, 119 L.Ed.2d 238. Here the trial court specifically found that there was insufficient evidence of provocation to warrant an instruction on voluntary manslaughter. This finding is not an abuse of discretion. If anything, the evidence in this case suggests that Champlain acted with some premeditation. Champlain called Vanlue's brother and expressed an intent to kill Vanlue, drove to Vanlue's trailer with a loaded gun, and verbally repeated his intent to kill while standing outside her door. In telling Champlain to leave after he threatened her, Vanlue was not provocative and certainly was not threatening. Indeed, all Champlain can point to on this issue is evidence of his unprovoked anger. There is no serious evidentiary dispute as to the existence or lack of sudden heat in this case. Wright, 658 N.E.2d at 567. Accordingly, the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter. D. Involuntary manslaughter Involuntary manslaughter is not an inherently included lesser offense of murder. Id. at 569; compare IND.CODE § 35-42-1-1 (1993) with IND.CODE § 35-42-1-4 (1993). It is a factually included lesser offense only if the charging instrument alleges that the killing was accomplished by a battery. Wright, 658 N.E.2d at 569-70. Battery is a knowing or intentional touching of another person in a rude, insolent, or angry manner. IND.CODE § 35-42-2-1 (1993 & Supp.1995). Although a shooting can in some situations be classified as a battery, Lynch v. State, 571 N.E.2d 537, 538-39 (Ind.1991), here the information alleged only that Keith D. Champlain did knowingly kill another human being, to-wit: Sherri Reeves Vanlue[.] Record at 17. Because the information did not assert a battery, involuntary manslaughter in this case was not a factually included lesser offense of murder. The trial court therefore did not err in refusing to give the instruction. Wright, 658 N.E.2d at 567.