Opinion ID: 2518840
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Conducting termination trial without her

Text: Alyssa argues that the trial court violated her due process rights by conducting the termination trial in her absence and over her objection. She claims that she was unable to proceed with the termination trial due to [her] situation and that she was not given sufficient notice to appear. Whether a parent's due process rights were violated in a termination proceeding is a question of law that we review de novo. [31] We set out the test for determining the requirements of due process in CINA proceedings in D.M. v. State : [I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and, finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.[ [32] ] In this case, Alyssa's private interest affected by the official action is of great importance: parental rights are `of the highest order.' [33] As to the second factor, [t]he crux of due process is [the] opportunity to be heard and the right to adequately represent one's interests. The provision of adequate notice commonly guarantees these rights. [34] The state maintains that the superior court took ample measures to provide Alyssa with adequate notice of the upcoming termination trial. Though Alyssa claimed at the beginning of trial that she had only received notice a week before the trial date, the record shows that the court made multiple attempts to provide her with notice. At trial, Judge Smith discussed the court's efforts to notify Alyssa: I double checked the log notes, and [Alyssa] was called while the motion for me to recuse myself was pending in front of Judge Suddock and so she was called and told basically we'll be in touch. And then we had a hearing the following week [May 18] and at that hearing we had a new address for [Alyssa], Mr. Winterrowd was there, we had a new address for [Alyssa], we didn't have a phone number for her. And so we didn't call her that day, but the notice of the hearing was sent out to her right after that to her address in Oregon. She then moved, and the address was sent and July 25th we got a notice that she was in California, and staff immediately sent the notice of hearing on July 25th, so she actually had quite a bit of notice that this hearing was happening. . . . And she spoke with Cindy Holtmann at some point after that, and Ms. Holtmann told her again when the hearing was. The due process analysis in this case requires consideration of the government's interest that the termination trial proceed as scheduled. Under CINA Rule 18(e), a trial on a petition to terminate parental rights must be held within six months after the date on which the petition is filed, unless the court finds good cause is shown for a continuance. [35] When determining whether to grant a continuance for good cause, the court must consider the age of the child and the potential adverse effect that the delay may have on the child. [36] Here, the termination petition was filed on March 23, 2005, yet the trial was not held until August 9, 2006  over sixteen months later. As the state points out, the delay in trial was caused by Alyssa's numerous motions to dismiss the case and disqualify the judge, requests to change court-appointed attorneys and advisory counsel, and appeals from trial court rulings. [37] The superior court accordingly made an express finding that Alyssa's failure to appear at trial was yet another attempt to delay the proceedings: [M]y finding is that [Alyssa's] effort today to continue this yet again is just an ongoing effort to delay this trial . . . and at this point I find that it is not appropriate or in the best interests of this child that we delay it any more and that there's absolutely no good cause to continue this trial yet again. The superior court's finding that Alyssa was deliberately avoiding trial demonstrates that extraordinary circumstances existed so that it was not improper for the trial court to proceed with the trial without Alyssa's participation. Furthermore, we also call attention to the interests of Jaclyn, which are of paramount importance. Jaclyn was last removed from Alyssa's custody in May 2002, when she was one and a half months old, and apart from a brief period spent in the custody of her father, has been in foster homes for all of her life. The superior court found at trial that the child needed permanency in the worst way. The court also found that the child was in a good setting with foster parents who wanted to adopt her and it determined that denying the termination petition would put the child in an unsettled situation. The superior court thus correctly recognized that if Alyssa caused the termination trial to be delayed yet again, Jaclyn's interests would have been seriously harmed. Given the circumstances created by Alyssa herself, we do not see any additional or substitute procedural safeguards the superior court could have taken to guarantee Alyssa's presence at trial. The court kept updated records of Alyssa's address, it sent notice of the trial to her at two separate addresses with the last notice being sent more than two weeks before the trial date, and it informed her again of the trial date when she spoke with court personnel via telephone. It was Alyssa's choice to waive her right to appointed counsel, to be on vacation in Mexico, and to refuse to participate telephonically at the trial. Taking these facts into account along with the state's and the child's strong interests in expeditiously finding a permanent home, we conclude that Alyssa was not deprived of procedural due process when the trial court held the termination trial without her.