Opinion ID: 3062784
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether Weeks’ Motion was Untimely

Text: We review de novo the district court’s determination that Weeks’ § 2255 motion was time-barred. See Jones v. United States, 304 F.3d 1035, 1037 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam). Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), a § 2255 motion must be filed within one year of the latest of the following four dates: (1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final; (2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a motion by such governmental action; (3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or (4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f) (2009). For purposes of § 2255(f)(3), the one-year limitations period begins running on the date the Supreme Court decided the case which initially recognized the right being asserted. See Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 357, 360, 125 S. Ct. 2478, 2482-83 (2005). 5 Weeks’ § 2255 motion was based on the Supreme Court’s holding in Santos, which was decided on 2 June 2008. Because Weeks filed his § 2255 motion within one year of that date, on 1 June 2009, his motion met the one-year filing deadline. Compare id. at 360, 125 S. Ct. at 2483 (concluding that § 2255 motion filed in April 2001 was untimely because it was filed more than one year after the Supreme Court decided the relevant case in June 1999). Weeks must still demonstrate that Santos retroactively applies to a case on collateral review, however. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3). In general, Supreme Court decisions that result in a new substantive rule retroactively apply to final convictions. See Schiro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 2522 (2004); see also United States v. Peter, 310 F.3d 709, 711 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (“Decisions of the Supreme Court construing substantive federal criminal statutes must be given retroactive effect.”). New substantive rules “include[] decisions that narrow the scope of a criminal statute by interpreting its terms.” Schiro, 542 U.S. at 351, 124 S. Ct. at 2522. As the Supreme Court explained in Schiro, retroactive application is warranted because such rules “necessarily carry a significant risk that a defendant stands convicted of an act that the law does not make criminal or faces a punishment that the law cannot impose upon him.” Id. at 352, 124 S. Ct. at 2522-23 (quotation marks and 6 citation omitted). The Supreme Court did not expressly state that its holding in Santos was retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review, and we have not yet decided this issue in a published opinion. In United States v. Demarest, 570 F.3d 1232, 1241-42 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 421 (2009), we addressed Santos’ application to a money laundering conviction on direct appeal. We noted that “Santos has limited precedential value” because it was a plurality opinion, and thus its holding was limited to the position that garnered five votes. Id. at 1242. “The narrow holding in Santos, at most, was that the gross receipts of an unlicensed gambling operation were not ‘proceeds’ under section 1956.” Id. Because Demarest had laundered funds from the proceeds of an illegal drug trafficking enterprise, rather than gross receipts of an illegal gambling operation, we concluded that Santos did not undermine his conviction. Id. More recently, we determined in an unpublished opinion that Santos does retroactively apply to a case on collateral review. See King v. Keller, No. 0915357, 2010 WL 1337701, at  (11th Cir. Apr. 7, 2010) (per curiam) (unpublished). The petitioner, King, had filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas corpus petition under the “savings clause” of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e), challenging his convictions for conspiracy to commit money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. 7 § 1956. See id. at . King asserted that Santos had decriminalized the conduct for which he had been convicted because the government had relied on “gross receipts,” whereas Santos limited “proceeds” to “profits.” Id. In order for King to obtain relief under the savings clause of § 2255(e), he had to first demonstrate that his claim was based on a retroactively applicable Supreme Court decision. See id. at . We concluded that he had satisfied this requirement. Citing our decision in Peter, we explained that “[t]he Santos opinion clearly construed a substantive federal criminal statute” by defining the meaning of the term “proceeds” in § 1956. Id. at . Accordingly, Santos retroactively applied to King’s case on collateral review. See id. Although King is not binding precedent, we find its reasoning persuasive. See 11th Cir. R. 36-2 (“Unpublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.”). A violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956 occurs when a person knowingly conducts or attempts to conduct a financial transaction involving “the proceeds of specified unlawful activity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) (2009). Santos narrowed the scope of the money laundering statute by interpreting the term “proceeds” to mean “profits” rather than “receipts.” Santos, 523 U.S. at ___, 128 S. Ct. at 2025.1 By construing the statute in this way, 1 Since Santos, Congress has amended § 1956 to include a definition of “proceeds” that explicitly encompasses the “gross receipts” of unlawful activity. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (2010). 8 Santos resulted in a new substantive rule that applies retroactively to cases on collateral review because it carries “a significant risk that a defendant stands convicted of an act that the law does not make criminal.” Schiro, 542 U.S. at 352, 124 S. Ct. at 2522-23. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Weeks’ § 2255 motion would be considered timely under § 2255(f)(3) and that the district court erred in failing to consider the timeliness of the motion under this subsection.