Opinion ID: 1198971
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Common Carrier Provision Of The Tramway Act

Text: The Tramway Act states that: Provisions in lieu of others. The provisions for regulation, registration, and licensing of passenger tramways and the area operators thereof under this part 7 shall be in lieu of all other regulations or registration, or licensing requirements, and passenger tramways shall not be construed to be common carriers within the meaning of the laws of this state. § 25-5-717, 8 C.R.S. (1997) (emphasis added). [6] We must read and interpret statutory language in its context. See § 2-4-101, 1 C.R.S. (1997) (Words and phrases shall be read in context.). The phrase concerning common carriers in section 25-5-717 is an integral part of a provision dealing with regulation, registration, and licensing of passenger tramways. Its evident purpose in the context of the meaning of the laws of this state is to prohibit any board or agency, other than the Tramway Board, from registering, regulating, or licensing ski lifts. For example, ski lifts are not to be considered common carriers subject to Public Utilities Commission (PUC) jurisdiction. Without this provision, ski lifts arguably would have been under the very broad statutory definition of common carriers for regulatory purposes. See § 40-1-102(3)(a)(I), 11 C.R.S. (1997). [7] We did not rely in Bagnoli on the notion that ski lift operators are common carriers when enunciating the applicable standard of care. Rather, we applied the Lewis factors to ski lift operators because of the degree of control they exercise over passengers, the relative powerlessness of a passenger to secure his or her own safety under the circumstances, and the consequent state of dependence and trust which a passenger must place in the lift operators. In Lewis, we said: It is not important whether defendants were serving as a carrier or engaged in activities for amusement. The important factors are, the plaintiffs had surrendered themselves to the care and custody of the defendants; they had given up their freedom of movement and actions; there was nothing they could do to cause or prevent the accident. Under the circumstances of this case, the defendants had exclusive possession and control of the facilities used in the conduct of their business and they should be held to the highest degree of care. Lewis, 156 Colo. at 57, 396 P.2d at 939 (emphasis added). One of the justices vigorously dissented as to the degree of care expected, on the basis that this is not a `carrier case.' Id. at 72, 396 P.2d at 947 (McWilliams, C.J., dissenting). In Bagnoli, we nevertheless adhered to the basic proposition that enunciating the degree of care to be exercised depends on the danger and degree of responsibility involved. We emphasized that the duty in negligence actions remains one of exercising due care, and due care depends upon the attendant circumstances.  166 Colo. at 38-39, 441 P.2d at 664 (emphasis added). We held that the attendant circumstances of ski lift operation, like amusement rides, demand the highest degree of care. We pointed out that other jurisdictions had imposed on ski lift operators a common carrier status in requiring the higher duty of care, but that, in Colorado, common carrier status made no difference in this regard in light of the Lewis factors. See Bagnoli, 166 Colo. at 39-40, 441 P.2d at 664. [8] Thus, in Bagnoli, we held that a Colorado jury instruction need not designate a ski lift operator as a common carrier: Because of the existence of the above described rule of Lewis, supra, and the nature and purpose of our statutes pertaining to common carriers at the time of this accident, there was no need to designate the ski lift operator as a common carrier in Instruction No. 15. Id. We said that the inclusion of the common carrier description in the actual instruction delivered to the jury in Bagnoli was: of no consequence, since the paramount purpose of Instruction No. 15 was to convey to the jury the rule of law that a chair ski lift operator must exercise the highest degree of care commensurate with the practical operation of the ski lift. Id., 441 P.2d at 664-65 (emphasis added). Thus, while common carriers may be required to exercise the highest degree of care towards their passengers, it does not follow that transport device operators who are not classified as common carriers are dispensed from exercising the highest degree of care when the attendant circumstances warrant such caution. 2.