Opinion ID: 407601
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Search of the Jeep.

Text: 52 After the search of the house had produced no personal identification documents, DEA Agent Don Fox searched a Jeep belonging to Boese, which was parked off the street on the premises of the residence. Inside a storage compartment Fox found two briefcases. He laid the briefcases on the back seat of the Jeep, and then informed Agent Fiorentino that two briefcases were lying in the Jeep in plain view. Boese was asked for permission to search the briefcases and he refused. At that point the briefcases were seized and taken to San Francisco where a warrant was obtained to search them. 53 In his affidavit in support of the application for the warrant Fiorentino stated that he had seen the briefcases in plain view on the back seat of the Jeep. At the suppression hearing Agent Fox testified that he never told Fiorentino that he had previously moved the briefcases from the storage container to the back seat. 54 Fiorentino's affidavit listed several of the items which had been seized at the house and requested permission to search for the same items which had been sought by the first warrant. The second warrant was issued and a search of the briefcases produced various identification documents in the names David Lyle Boese, David Lyle Boyce, and Virgil Lee Pinney, ownership papers for a sailing yacht and a 1959 Jaguar in the name of David Sterling, ownership papers for a 1978 Porsche registered to David Tristen Spencer, various corporate papers for Sterling Enterprises, Ltd., a repair bill for a Ferrari made out to David Spencer, various car insurance premium notices made out to Dennis Stevens, and a State of California registration for a 1966 Ferrari in the name of David Spencer. Most important was a sealed envelope from Sterling Enterprises, Ltd., P.O. Box 1043 in the Cayman Islands, to Sound Genesis, 2001 Bryant Street, San Francisco. Inside the envelope was a typed letter from David Sterling, President, Sterling Enterprises, dated November 14, 1980. This letter eventually led authorities to the warehouse which was the subject of the third warrant and search. 55 Boese attacks the search of the Jeep and the briefcases on several grounds, namely that (1) there was insufficient probable cause to search the Jeep; (2) even if probable cause existed, no exigent circumstances justified the search without a warrant; (3) even if exigent circumstances existed probable cause did not exist to issue a warrant for the briefcases; and (4) the warrant for the briefcases was tainted by the false statement of Fiorentino that the briefcases were found in plain view. 56 We think the numerous issues raised by Boese are easily disposed of by noting that no additional warrant was necessary to search the Jeep in addition to the first warrant. In United States v. Napoli, 530 F.2d 1198 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920, 97 S.Ct. 316, 50 L.Ed.2d 287 (1976), we held that a warrant authorizing a search on the premises known as 3027 Napoleon Avenue permitted the search of a camper parked off the street and close to the building on a driveway on the premises. See also United States v. Cole, 628 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1043, 101 S.Ct. 1763, 68 L.Ed.2d 241 (1981). Here we think that the warrant for a search on the premises known as 256 Seadrift Road was sufficiently particular to permit a search of Boese's Jeep similarly parked on the premises off the street and close to the house. 57 Since the search of the Jeep was authorized by the first warrant, the search of the storage container by Agent Fox was also authorized. That search produced the two briefcases. Although the DEA agents would have been perfectly justified in opening the briefcases and searching them there for identification documents, the agents, in a commendable exercise of caution, took the briefcases back to San Francisco and obtained a new warrant to search them. 8 58 As stated earlier, the warrant for the briefcases sought the same items as the first warrant. Our earlier analysis has assumed without deciding that there was not probable cause at the time the first warrant was issued to search the house for business records and correspondence relating to the distribution of cocaine. We may also assume arguendo that had the briefcases been searched under only the authority of the first warrant, the business records and correspondence found there (in particular, the letter to Sound Genesis from Sterling Enterprises, Ltd.) would have to be suppressed, although the seizure of the identification papers and other items would be proper. However, the application for the second warrant stated additional facts not known at the time the first warrant was issued. Thus we must look at the second warrant afresh in light of these additional facts and determine if at the time of its issuance probable cause existed to search for all of the items sought by the warrant. 59 The affidavit to the second warrant incorporated the facts stated in the first warrant by reference, but in addition listed some of the items which had been found by DEA agents searching the house. These included the business records and a scuba diving tank with a false bottom of the same type which had been found in the Nigerian shipment. Assuming as we have that the business records were improperly seized, they could not be used to justify the issuance of a warrant. Thus we must exclude from the determination of probable cause any information obtained as a consequence of the illegal ... seizure. United States v. Hunt, 496 F.2d 888, 894 (5th Cir. 1974). The affidavit must be read with all mention of the illegal seizure excised. Id. at 895; see United States v. Schiffman, 572 F.2d 1137, 1139 (5th Cir. 1978). Even if mention of the business records seized at the house is deleted, 9 however, the discovery of the scuba tank with the false bottom remains in the affidavit. We think that the presence of this item now gave the magistrate enough evidence reasonably to conclude that criminal activities were occurring within the house itself, and that the Seadrift residence was one of Boese's bases of operations for his drug smuggling business. Moreover, discovery of a modified scuba tank in Boese's residence some six months after the discovery of cocaine in similarly modified scuba tanks in the Nigerian shipment gave reason to believe that Boese was engaged in an ongoing smuggling operation. For these reasons, we think that the second warrant did state facts which gave the magistrate probable cause to believe that business records and correspondence relating to the smuggling operation might be found on the premises in general and in the briefcases found there in particular. 60 Fiorentino's statements regarding the location of the briefcases do not militate against this conclusion. First, at the suppression hearing, the district court found that the officers involved acted in good faith, and this holding is not clearly erroneous. 10 The affidavit is thus good on this ground alone. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 2684, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978) (deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth required to invalidate warrant; negligence or innocent mistake insufficient). Second, even if Fiorentino's statement was an intentional falsehood and the statement that the briefcases were in plain view were deleted, there would be no difference in result. The search of the Jeep and the storage container was justified by the first warrant, so that in any case the briefcases would not have been illegally seized. Further, probable cause to search the briefcases for business records due to the discovery of the scuba tank would still exist. See id. (If material which is the subject of the alleged falsity is set aside, and there remains sufficient content in the warrant affidavit to support a finding of probable cause, suppression hearing is not required.). 61