Opinion ID: 1834173
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Blood Tests.

Text: Douglas argues that testimony relating to the second blood test was improperly admitted into evidence by the court. He claims that the blood tests were ordered pursuant to what is now Iowa Code section 600B.41 (1993) (formerly section 675.41). This section allows a trial judge to order parties to a paternity action to submit to blood testing for paternity and provides for admission of the test results into evidence. This statute states in part: 600B.41 Blood and Genetic Tests. 1. In a proceeding to establish paternity in law or in equity the court may on its own motion, and upon request of a party shall, require the child, mother, and alleged father to submit to blood or genetic tests. 2. If a blood or genetic test is required, the court shall direct that inherited characteristics, including but not limited to blood types, be determined by appropriate testing procedures, and shall appoint an expert qualified as an examiner of genetic markers to analyze and interpret the results and to report to the court. 3. Verified documentation of the chain of custody of the blood specimen is competent evidence to establish the chain of custody. The testimony of the court-appointed expert at trial is not required. 4. A verified expert's report shall be admitted at trial. Douglas argues that the testimony relating to the blood test is inadmissible because the results of the blood tests were not sent to the court or properly verified. He contends that the chain of custody of the blood samples was not properly demonstrated. Section 600B.41 was intended by the legislature as an aid to permit parties in a paternity suit to admit reports of blood test results into evidence without requiring the testimony of the court-appointed expert. State ex rel. Buechler v. Vinsand, 318 N.W.2d 208, 210 (Iowa 1982) (The provision for pretrial objections to the test procedures and validity is intended to allow the trustworthiness of the evidence to be determined before trial to obviate the necessity of personal testimony by the blood analyst. ) (emphasis added). Douglas cites State ex rel. Hodges v. Fitzpatrick, 342 N.W.2d 870 (Iowa App.1983), in support of his proposition that the results of the blood test are not admissible unless the test results are reported to the court and documentation of the chain of custody is verified. In Hodges, the court found the expert's report was inadmissible because the statute requires the expert to report to the court the results of the examination. Id. at 873. Because section 600B.41 was intended as a vehicle for admitting blood tests without testimony of the expert, the reporting and verification requirements must be satisfied if the blood test report is to be admitted at trial. Id. However, section 600B.41 does not impose additional foundational requirements for the admission of expert testimony at trial. Dr. Polesky, director of the Memorial Blood Center of Minneapolis (previously Minneapolis War Memorial Blood Bank), an undisputed expert in paternity testing, testified at trial via telephone. When testimony of an expert is offered at trial, the statutory reporting and verification requirements are not applicable. When a proper foundation is established, the court may admit expert testimony and reports of the blood test results. We find sufficient foundation for the admission of the expert's opinion and reports offered at trial. The blood tested was that of Ayla, Elizabeth and Douglas. The procedures for collection, transportation and testing of the blood were reliable. The failure of the paternity clerk to certify one of the forms when the blood was drawn was satisfactorily explained by her testimony at trial. The testimony at trial sufficiently established the chain of custody of the blood specimens. Elizabeth argues that the blood test results constituted conclusive evidence of Douglas' nonpaternity. Dr. Polesky testified the blood test results are conclusive proof that Douglas is not the biological father of Ayla. Other states have recognized that blood tests showing a zero probability of paternity are conclusive evidence of nonpaternity as a matter of law. See, e.g., Krokstrom v. VanDolah, 826 S.W.2d 402, 403 (Mo. Ct.App.1992); Symonds v. Symonds, 385 Mass. 540, 546, 432 N.E.2d 700, 704 (1982); V.L.P. v. J.S.S., 407 A.2d 244, 248 (Del.Fam. Ct.1978). See also John P. Ludington, Annotation, Admissability and Weight of Blood-Grouping Tests in Disputed Paternity Cases, 43 A.L.R.4th 579, § 8 (1986). Other states have adopted statutes that provide the blood test is conclusive evidence of nonpaternity. See, e.g., Del.Code Ann. tit. 13, § 810(h) (1993); Idaho Code § 7-1116(5) (Supp.1994); Ind.Code Ann. § 31-6-6.1-8(c) (Burns Supp. 1994); Mont.Code Ann. § 40-5-234(3)(a) (1993); Tenn.Code Ann. § 24-7-112(b)(1) (Supp.1994); Wis.Stat.Ann. § 767.48(4) (West 1993). Iowa has not adopted a statute that provides that blood and genetic tests are conclusive evidence of nonpaternity. This court has twice declined to hold blood tests are conclusive evidence of nonpaternity as a matter of law. In re Estate of Hawk v. Lain, 329 N.W.2d 660 (Iowa 1983); In re Marriage of Schneckloth, 320 N.W.2d 535 (Iowa 1982). In Schneckloth, this court recognized the highly persuasive nature of blood tests on the issue of nonpaternity. Schneckloth, 320 N.W.2d at 538. We cited with approval Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct. 2202, 68 L.Ed.2d 627 (1981), which noted [t]he powerful if not conclusive nature of blood grouping tests that exclude paternity. Schneckloth, 320 N.W.2d at 538. Here, the blood tests show no possibility that Douglas could be the father of Ayla. Although this fact is highly persuasive, we again find that it is unnecessary to hold that the tests are conclusive. In addition to the blood test results, Elizabeth testified she was in another relationship with an undisclosed man during the period of conception. Elizabeth told Douglas she was unsure who the father was when she became pregnant. Douglas' name was not listed on Ayla's birth certificate. Also, there is no legal presumption of paternity arising from the circumstances in this case.