Opinion ID: 1608488
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: did the trial court err in reversing the decision of the board to award the hunting and fishing lease to taylor tucker?

Text: ¶ 11. The chancery court, in its role as appellate court, is limited in cases such as this to a review of the record made before the administrative agency, in this case the Board of Trustees, for the purpose of determining from such record whether the action of the Board was (1) supported by substantial evidence; (2) arbitrary or capricious; (3) beyond the agency's scope or powers; or (4) in violation of some constitutional or statutory rights of the complaining party. Board of Trustees v. Acker, 326 So.2d 799, 801 (Miss.1976). This Court defines substantial evidence as such relevant evidence as reasonable minds might accept as adequate to support a conclusion or to put it simply, more than a mere scintilla of evidence. Johnson v. Ferguson, 435 So.2d 1191, 1195 (Miss.1983). Generally, the scope of review exercised by the Supreme Court and the circuit court of an administrative agency's order is limited to the findings of the agency. Mississippi Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Pulphus, 538 So.2d 770, 772 (Miss.1989). ¶ 12. The Board's minutes reflect that it based its decision to reject Prisock's bids on its finding that the bids were not bona fide, good faith bids but were technical bids intended to preserve [Prisock's] prior rights. In making that decision, the Board apparently relied upon language found in an Attorney General's Opinion requested by the Secretary of State's senior public lands attorney [1] with regard to an interpretation of Section 29-3-41 prior to the amendment which became effective July 1, 1993. [2] This language was not included in the 1993 legislative amendment, which clearly provided stronger protection for the the most recent holder of the hunting and fishing rights on sixteenth section land. The amendment placed no restriction, limitation or requirements on the most recent holder, leaving in place the prior language that, if it shall have made an offer, [the most recent holder] shall have the final right to extend its lease for the term advertised at the annual rental equal to said highest offer received by the Board of Education. (emphasis added). ¶ 13. It is undisputed that the Board found Tucker's bid to be acceptable, as it awarded him the lease. That first statutory requirement (receiving an acceptable bid) having been met, the plain language of the statute would require the Board to allow Prisock the right to extend his lease when he tendered the annual rental of $3,600, equal to Tucker's bid. ¶ 14. The chancery court properly confined its review on appeal to the record of the Board's actions as shown by the Board's minutes and exhibits which included, inter alia, the lease contracts, bids, letters to and from the Board, and copy of check for $3,600 tendered by Prisock. The determination of what constituted the record to be considered by the chancellor on appeal was made following a hearing on Prisock's Motion to Designate Record, at which counsel for both parties presented argument and approved the chancellor's order specifying what exhibits should be a part of the record. ¶ 15. The chancellor, after reviewing the record, found that the Board's actions in rejecting Prisock's bid were not in statutory compliance nor supported by substantial evidence. He then ordered that Tucker's lease would be set aside. We find no error in the chancery court's ruling against the Board.