Opinion ID: 2338354
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constructive Custody

Text: Nor are we persuaded that Boffen was in the constructive custody of a place of confinement when he fled from the Wicomico County courtroom. The judge presiding over the escape trial concluded that Boffen had been in the constructive custody [of the Detention Center], at least from the time of his conviction forward, and further concluded that the Detention Center is a place of confinement. The Court of Special Appeals declined to base its affirmance of Boffen's conviction for escape on this theory, instead concluding that Boffen was in the constructive custody of the DOC when the sentencing judge discussed Boffen's sentence on the first count. Similarly, the State concedes that Boffen was not in the constructive custody of the Detention Center when he fled. [7] The State does contend, however, that Boffen was in the constructive custody of the DOC. That custody, according to the State, was triggered when the original sentencing judge stated, The sentence under count number one is fifteen years to the Division of Correction. We disagree. Because escape is a statutorily prescribed crime, we shall employ canons of statutory interpretation to determine whether Boffen was in the constructive custody of a place of confinement when he fled from the courtroom. [T]he basic premise of statutory interpretation is to `ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.' State Ethics Commission v. Antonetti, 365 Md. 428, 450-51, 780 A.2d 1154, 1168 (2001)(quoting Tipton v. Partner's Management Co., 364 Md. 419, 434, 773 A.2d 488, 497 (2001)). In discerning legislative intent, we look first at the language of the relevant statutory provision or provisions. Chen v. State, 370 Md. 99, 106, 803 A.2d 518, 521-22 (2002). `If the true legislative intent cannot readily be determined from the statutory language alone, however, we may, and often must, resort to other recognized indiciaamong other things ... the legislative history, including the derivation of the statute, comments and explanations regarding it by authoritative sources during the legislative process, and amendments proposed or added to it....' Goldberg v. Miller, 371 Md. 591, 602, 810 A.2d 947, 953 (2002)(quoting Witte v. Azarian, 369 Md. 518, 525-26, 801 A.2d 160, 165 (2002)). We return to the Committee Note to Section 136, which, as previously mentioned, explains that [t]he definition of escape is intended to include the case law interpreting former Art. 27, § 139. As examples of such case law, the Note then specifically refers to our decisions in Stewart v. State, 275 Md. 258, 340 A.2d 290 (1975) and Best v. Warden, 235 Md. 633, 634, 201 A.2d 490-91 (1964), as well as the decision of the Court of Special Appeals in Beasley v. State, 17 Md.App. 7, 299 A.2d 482 (1973). A reading of those cases and others, in addition to viewing the evolution of the escape statute and its legislative history, reveals that the Legislature, in 1999, recodified Art. 27, Section 139 for the purpose, in part, of adopting the judicially defined concept of constructive custody within the law of escape. We shall begin our explanation of this process by turning to a discussion of the cases referred to in the Committee Note interpreting former Art. 27, § 139. In Best v. Warden, 235 Md. 633, 201 A.2d 490 (1964), Best was transported from the penitentiary to a hospital for medical treatment. At the hospital, while a guard that was accompanying Best went to make a telephone call to arrange for transportation back to the penitentiary, Best walked off. Id. In his petition for post conviction relief to this Court, Best alleged that he did not commit the crime of escape, as defined in Code (1957), Art. 27, Sec. 139, since he was left unguarded and the hospital was not a place of confinement. Id. 201 A.2d at 491. In rejecting Best's argument, we explained that Johnson v. Warden, 196 Md. 672, 75 A.2d 843 (1950) was applicable, where we held: [A] prisoner was legally confined in the State Reformatory within the meaning of what is now Art. 27, sec. 139, even though he was allowed to work outside, unguarded, on a private farm, and that, when he escaped from the farm, he was subject to punishment for escape from the Reformatory. Id. at 634-35, 201 A.2d at 491. The same reasoning, we declared, applies to the instant case, and thus the applicant was properly convicted of escape under Art. 27 sec. 139. Id. at 634, 201 A.2d at 491. Eleven years later, in Stewart v. State , we addressed the question of where venue may lie for the trial of the crime of escape under Maryland Code (1957, 1971 Repl.Vol. [1974 Cum.Supp.]) Art. 27, § 139. 275 Md. at 259, 340 A.2d at 290, 291 (1975). During the course of that inquiry, we surveyed a number of cases addressing the doctrine of constructive custody. One of those cases was Taylor v. State, 229 Md. 128, 130, 182 A.2d 52, 53 (1962), in which the defendant pleaded guilty and was convicted of escape for departing from a work detail at the University Hospital .... Prior to his assignment at the hospital, Taylor had served 19 months of a three year sentence in the House of Correction, after which he was transferred to the Sandy Point Correctional Camp. Id. at 129-30, 182 A.2d at 53. On appeal to this Court, Taylor argued that the facts were not sufficient to support his conviction for escape from the House of Correction under Section 139 because he was not confined at that institution when he departed. Id. at 129, 131, 182 A.2d at 53, 54. In rejecting that argument, this Court, although not using the term constructive custody, nonetheless relied on that doctrine to find that, when Taylor departed from the hospital, he continued to be under confinement [at the Sandy Point Correctional Camp]. Id. at 130, 182 A.2d at 53. Because the correctional camp was merely an adjunct of the House of Correction, we then concluded that his escape []from [the correctional camp] ... constitute[d] escape from the House of Correction. Id. Another case addressing constructive custody discussed by the Stewart court was Ford v. State, 237 Md. 266, 205 A.2d 809 (1965). There, the defendant was serving a sentence at Hagerstown for a motor vehicle offense when, under guard by a Maryland Correctional Institution Officer, he was transported to the Criminal Court of Baltimore to stand trial on burglary and larceny charges. Id. at 267-68, 205 A.2d at 810. When the officer released Ford from his handcuffs to get a drink of water, Ford broke away from his guard and ran out of the courtroom. Id. at 268, 205 A.2d at 810. He was later convicted of escape. Id. Appealing that conviction, Ford argued, among other things, that he could not be guilty of escape because he was not within the confines of the prison walls. Id. at 270, 205 A.2d at 812. We rejected the argument that Ford had to be in actual custody. Although we did not employ the term constructive custody in our opinion, we recognized its essence by declaring that Maryland draws no distinction between an escape from within the prison walls and one effected when the prisoner, while still in legal custody, was physically outside the prison area. Id. [8] In addition to those prior opinions from this Court, the Committee Note to Section 136 of Article 27 also refers to the decision of the Court of Special Appeals in Beasley v. State, 17 Md.App. 7, 299 A.2d 482 (1973). There, Beasley was convicted of a narcotics violation, sentenced to the custody of the Commissioner of Correction, and then transferred to the Maryland Correctional Camp Center at Jessup. Id. at 9-10, 299 A.2d at 483-84. While on a work release program from the Camp Center, Beasley fled, was later apprehended, and was then convicted for escape under Code, Art. 27, § 139. Id. On appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, Beasley argued that, rather than being charged under Section 139, which is a felony, he should have been charged with a misdemeanor under Section 700A of Article 27. Id. at 9, 299 A.2d at 483. That Section specifically concerned work release programs and stated in part that, `if any prisoner released from actual confinement under a work release plan shall willfully fail to return to the place of confinement so designated at the time specified in such plan, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be subject to the penalties provided in § 139 of Article 27.' Id. at 11, 299 A.2d at 484 (internal quotations omitted). Relying on Shifflett, 4 Md.App. at 230, 242 A.2d at 184, the Court of Special Appeals explained that, the escape of a prisoner while in constructive custody under a work release program constitute[s] an escape from a place of confinement in violation of § 139. Beasley, 17 Md.App. at 11, 299 A.2d at 484. In addition to the cases referred to by the Committee to Revise Article 27 as cases interpreting former Art. 27 § 139, more recently we engaged in an extensive discussion of constructive custody in Farris, a case also interpreting Section 139. The issue presented was whether the failure to report to the Allegany County Detention Center for weekend service of a prison sentence constitute[d] the crime of escape as defined by Md.Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol., 1997 Supp.) Art. 27, § 139. Farris, at 27, 716 A.2d at 239. Farris was convicted in the District Court of Maryland, sitting in Allegany County, of possession of a controlled dangerous substance. Id. He was sentenced to ninety days incarceration, all suspended, with two years probation. Id. After violating probation, Farris was sentenced to ninety days incarceration with sixty days suspended and three years probation, thirty days to be served on weekends. Id. According to the District Court's commitment record, the specific terms of his sentence were, [T]otal time to be served is 30 days, to run concurrent with any other outstanding or unserved sentence and begin on May 3, 1996. Weekend service of sentence from 11 a.m. Friday till 11 a.m. Sunday for 15 consecutive weekends. Id. Farris began serving his sentence on Friday, May 3, 1996, but on Friday, June 21, 1996, he failed to appear at the local detention center. Id. Consequently, the State charged him with escape, and after a bench trial, he was found guilty of that charge. Id. at 27-28, 716 A.2d at 239. Farris noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed. Id. at 28, 716 A.2d at 239. We granted certiorari and reversed, concluding that under the circumstances of the case, Farris's failure to report on that Friday for weekend service did not constitute the crime of escape. Id. at 28, 38, 716 A.2d at 239, 244. With respect to constructive custody, [o]ur cases have recognized, we noted, that a person, lawfully sentenced and committed to a jail or other place of confinement, may commit the physical act of escape within the meaning of Article 27, § 139 even though he or she was actually beyond the physical confines of the institution. Id. at 30, 716 A.2d at 241 (discussing our holdings in Johnson, Taylor, Best, and Ford ). In Farris, we gleaned from these cases the following conclusion regarding the concept of constructive custody within the law of escape: [W]hen a person remains in lawful custody, departure from the boundaries which restrict that person's movements may constitute an escape. 351 Md. at 32, 716 A.2d at 241-42. Stated more concretely, [a] penal institution maintains `constructive' custody when an individual is temporarily permitted to leave while still lawfully committed to that institution. Id. at 29-30, 716 A.2d at 240. Further, [p]risoners who remain in constructive custody are, at all times, we stated, lawfully under sentence, committed to a specific institution, and subject to restrictions that define the boundaries from which an unauthorized departure constitutes an escape. Id. at 34, 716 A.2d at 242. Applying these principles to the circumstances that were before us, we declared [t]he dispositive issue to be whether Farris's commitment to the Allegany Detention Center for weekend service of his sentence constitute[d] `custody' or legal detention in a place of confinement during the weekday period. Id. at 33, 716 A.2d at 242. From the following facts, we concluded that such custody did not exist during the week. During the week, [Farris] lived at his home. He received no credit against his sentence for the time spent at his home, and ... he was free from any restriction on his activity or movements during the time he was away from the detention center. Id. at 34-35, 716 A.2d at 243. In short, there were no bounds or limits on his activities. Id. at 35, 716 A.2d at 243. Thus, [b]ecause [Farris] was not in custody, he did not leave or physically depart from any place of confinement. Id. Consequently, his failure to report to the detention center ... for the weekend incarceration [did] not constitute `escape' within the meaning of the statute. Id. Our decision in Farris, in part, prompted the Legislature to amend Section 139 of Article 27 in 1999. The Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee explained in a Floor Report to Senate Bill 355 (which was identical to House Bill 463) that the 1999 revision was prompted by two events. First, the Correctional Services Article Code Revision Committee requested the Article 27 Committee to revise the laws concerning escape as they applied to the individual counties concerning temporary leave and home detention. Secondly, the Committee explained, the Court of Appeals in the case of Farris v. State, 351 Md. 24, 716 A.2d 237 (1998) held that in Allegany County the failure of an individual to report for service of a week-end sentence was not escape or any other violation of criminal law. This reasoning applies to many of the other counties as well. This bill solves these problems by making one uniform provision applicable to temporary leave and home detention in all counties. Secondly, it solves the Farris problem by making the failure to report to a correctional facility as required by a court order an escape. The Floor Report goes on to state: [House Bill 463] further codifies existing law concerning escape while on leave or otherwise not in a correctional facility. Although the current statute only refers to escape from a correctional facility, case law has adopted the concept of constructive custody to apply this statute to persons who escape while on leave or are otherwise outside of the correctional facility (e.g., in a hospital). Finally, the Floor Report declares This bill explicitly covers persons on leave. By defining escape to retain its judicially determined meaning, it also includes those taken out of a correctional facility for other reasons, such as to a hospital or court. By retaining the judicially determined meaning for escape and recognizing that individuals must have been within the confines of a facility or outside the walls of a correctional facility while on leave, the Legislature recognized that in prior cases, the individuals convicted of escape under the doctrine of constructive custody were first committed to and physically confined within a place of confinement before being allowed to depart for limited purposes, such as for work release or to receive medical attention at a hospital. We, therefore, conclude that for an individual to commit the crime of first degree escape within the concept of constructive custody, that individual must have been initially committed to and physically confined within a place of confinement. In other words, we agree with Boffen's contention that a place of confinement must first have actual custody over a person before it can have constructive custody. Because Boffen was neither committed to nor physically confined within any of the institutions of the DOC before he fled from the Wicomico County courtroom, we conclude that he did not escape from the constructive custody of a place of confinement. [9] The State, however, directs our attention to the decision of the Kansas Court of Appeals in State v. Briggs, 48 P.3d 686, 687 (2002). There, Briggs appeared for a revocation of probation hearing, after which the hearing judge revoked his probation and ordered the imposition of his original sentence. Id. at 686-87. The judge told Briggs, Have a seat in the hallway, Mr. Briggs, we'll call for an officer. Consider yourself in custody. Id. at 687. After those instructions, Briggs fled the courthouse, was recaptured, and eventually was convicted of aggravated escape under KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3810(a)(1)(2001), which provides in relevant part, that [a]ggravated escape from custody is: (a) Escaping while held in lawful custody (1) upon a charge or conviction of a felony .... Briggs appealed from that conviction, and the Court of Appeals of Kansas affirmed. In so doing, the Kansas court stated that the issue was whether the hearing judge's order to Briggs, after revoking his probation, `Have a seat in the hallway, Mr. Briggs, we'll call for an officer. Consider yourself in custody.' put Briggs in lawful custody for purposes of a conviction for aggravated escape. Id. at 688. According to Kansas case law, the court noted, `[c]ustody contemplates an intent on the part of prison officials to exercise actual or constructive control.... The key factor is that prison officials have not evidenced an intent to abandon or give up their prisoner, leaving him free to go on his way.' Id. at 688 (quoting State v. Pichon, 15 Kan.App.2d 527, 811 P.2d 517, 524 (1991)). The court then concluded that [c]ertainly, [the hearing judge's] intention was to place Briggs in custody for transportation to the county jail. Id. at 689. Further, the court observed, Briggs was in the custody of the court for probation revocation purposes, and the court had never released him from that custody. Id. Finally, the court concluded that the hearing judge exercised actual or constructive control over Briggs and restrained his liberty by ordering him to the hall to await law enforcement officials. Id. Briggs was in custody, therefore, under the applicable Kansas statutes. Id. That case is readily distinguishable because the Kansas statute includes a definition of custody not found in Maryland's statute. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3809(b)(1) defines custody broadly. It states in part that custody means arrest and detention in or commitment to various specified institutions such as a facility for holding persons charged with or convicted of crimes, a facility for holding persons adjudicated as juvenile offenders or a hospital or other facility pursuant to court order. Id. Custody also includes, according to the statute, any other detention for law enforcement purposes. Id. Custody is also defined under the Kansas statutory scheme as the restraint of a person pursuant to an arrest or the order of a court or magistrate. Id. § 22-2202(9). Under this broad statute, the trial court told the defendant that he was in custody. Therefore, the States's reliance on Briggs is misplaced; the provisions of Maryland's first degree escape statute are not so broad. [10] Another escape case, we note, dealing with a defendant who has fled from a courtroom after sentencing but before actual confinement in any penal institution is United States v. Peterson, 592 F.2d 1035 (9th Cir.1979). There, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld Peterson's conviction for escape under Title 18, United States Code, Section 751(a). Id. That statute stated in part that [w]hoever escapes or attempts to escape... from any custody under or by virtue of any process issued under the laws of the United States by any court, judge, or magistrate... shall ... be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both .... Having pled guilty and having been sentenced for a violation of a firearms law, Peterson moved for a stay of execution of the sentence. Id. at 1035-36. In denying that motion, the trial court declared, [h]e will commence his sentence now, and because no marshal was in the courtroom, the court ordered Peterson's counsel to accompany Peterson to the marshal's office immediately. Id. at 1036. While on route, Peterson fled, and was subsequently convicted of escape. Id. In affirming that conviction, the Ninth Circuit noted that custody can result from the willful failure to comply with a lawful order to custody orally given. Id. at 1037. The court also noted that in light of the trial court's announcement that Peterson would commence his sentence now, a person of ordinary intelligence and understanding would know that he was not free to leave under 18 U.S.C. § 751(a) because he was in custody under or by virtue of Any process issued under the laws of the United States by [a] court, [or] judge. Id. at 1037. Unlike the federal statute, however, Sections 136 and 137 of Article 27 do not include provisions for first degree escape when a court, judge, or magistrate issues process. [11] Indeed, as discussed above, a person does not escape under Maryland law unless he or she departs from the actual or constructive custody of a place of confinement. [12] In conclusion, we hold that Boffen's actions did not constitute the crime of first degree escape under Maryland law. This is so because Boffen, at the time he fled the courtroom, was not in the actual or constructive custody of a place of confinement. We shall therefore order that his conviction for first degree escape be reversed. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED. CASE REMANDED TO THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO REVERSE THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR WICOMICO COUNTY. COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY WICOMICO COUNTY.