Opinion ID: 2633651
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Erroneous instruction regarding concurrence of act and specific intent

Text: We agree with defendant that the instruction given regarding the concurrence of act and specific intent was erroneous. The trial court gave a modified concurrence instruction, CALJIC No. 3.31, stating: In each of the crimes charged in counts one and two and in the crime of voluntary manslaughter there must exist a union or joint operation of act or conduct and a certain specific intent in the mind of the perpetrator, and unless such specific intent exists the crime to which it relates is not committed. [¶] The specific intent required is included in the definitions of the crimes charged. However, the crime of murder requires the specific intent to unlawfully kill a human being, and the crime of voluntary manslaughter requires the specific intent to unlawfully kill a human being. As the Attorney General concedes, the concurrence instruction was erroneous because implied malice second degree murder, a form of murder, does not require the specific intent to kill. Defendant argues that the erroneous concurrence instruction was prejudicial in several different ways. As explained below, we find the error to be harmless.
The error in the concurrence instruction did not directly affect the jury's first degree murder verdict on the Clark count. The concurrence instruction, as it related to first degree premeditated murder, was correct, for that crime does require a specific intent to kill. Moreover, the premeditated murder instruction itself informed the jury of the concurrence requirement for that offense. (CALJIC No. 8.20; People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1142-1143, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1.) Nevertheless, defendant argues, first, that the erroneous concurrence instruction was prejudicial in relation to the Clark count because it exacerbated the erroneous absence of an instruction on express malice second degree murder (discussed above). The concurrence instruction, which stated that all murder required an intentional killing, conflicted with the implied malice second degree murder instruction. CALJIC No. 8.31 stated: When the killing is the direct result of [an act performed with implied malice], it is not necessary to establish that the defendant intended that his act would result in the death of a human being.  Defendant contends that in light of the conflict between these instructions on the mental state required for implied malice second degree murder, it is likely the jury ignored the implied malice second degree murder instructions entirely and that thus (contrary to our conclusion above) it did not view second degree implied malice murder as a viable option for an intentional, unpremeditated murder. We disagree. When reviewing ambiguous instructions, we inquire whether the jury was reasonably likely to have construed them in a manner that violates the defendant's rights. (Cf. Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385.) Applying the same standard to the conflicting instructions at issue here, we conclude it is not reasonably likely the jury determined the implied malice second degree murder instructions meant nothing at all. The jury specifically was instructed that the Benintende count could result in a conviction no greater than second degree murder, and it convicted defendant of second degree murder on that count. The jury must have applied the implied malice second degree murder instructions to reach that verdict. The jury's findings refute defendant's contention that the jury simply ignored the instructions. Rather, we believe it is reasonably likely the jury, if it confronted the conflict between the two instructions, would have concluded that one instruction prevailed over the other. If the jury concluded the specific-intent-to-kill instruction prevailed over the implied malice instruction, defendant could not have been prejudiced. Presuming, as defendant's argument does, that the jury found defendant intended to kill Clark, the instruction fit the facts as the jury found them. Likewise, if the jury concluded the language in the implied malice instruction stating that intent to kill was not necessary prevailed over the concurrence instruction, defendant still was not prejudiced. As explained above, the implied malice instruction did not preclude a second degree murder conviction based on intent to kill. [19] Second, defendant contends the conflicting instructions were prejudicial in relation to the Clark count because they could have caused the jurors to believe there was no difference between first degree premeditated murder and second degree murder, thus inviting them to impose guilt [for the Clark murder] randomly rather than on the basis of a meaningful distinction between the crimes. ( United States v. Lesina (9th Cir.1987) 833 F.2d 156, 158-159.) We disagree. Even assuming the jurors would have believed implied malice second degree murder requires the specific intent to kill, the instructions on first degree premeditated murder required more: an intent to kill formed after premeditation and deliberation and a weighing of considerations for and against killing. Nothing in the implied malice murder instructions, even with an intent-to-kill requirement superimposed upon them, required anything close to that heightened mental state. [20]
As to the Benintende count, defendant claims that because the concurrence instruction referred only to the mental state of intent to kill, the court failed to instruct the jury that the mental state required for implied malice murder  conscious disregard for life  must exist at the same time as the acts causing death. This asserted error was one of state law, subject to the Watson standard of harmless error. (See People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 219-220, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365 [applying Watson reasonable probability standard to error in failing to instruct on concurrence requirement for murder].) Any error was harmless. The instructions on implied malice and second degree murder on an implied malice theory substantially covered the concurrence of act and mental state required for implied malice murder. ( People v. Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 220, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365.) The instruction defining malice aforethought told the jury that malice is implied when the killing results from an intentional act involving a high degree of probability that it will result in death, which act is done for a base, antisocial purpose and with a wanton disregard for human life, or when the killing results from an intentional act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious disregard for life.  The implied malice murder instruction contained similar wording. The italicized language in these instructions adequately informed the jury of the concurrence requirement. [21] (See People v. Cleaves (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 367, 381, 280 Cal.Rptr. 146; see also People v. Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 1142-1143, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1.) Finally, the conflict between the implied malice instruction and the concurrence instruction was harmless as to the Benintende count. At worst, the erroneous concurrence instruction might have led the jury to believe it had to find a mental state more culpable than that required for second degree murder  that is, specific intent to kill rather than mere implied malice. Because the instruction at most could have been understood as imposing a burden on the prosecution more onerous than the law required, defendant could not have been prejudiced under any standard.