Opinion ID: 1483923
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Unlawful Act Issue

Text: The Court of Appeals held that the Board had not negotiated in good faith with the SCEA because of its unilateral action in terminating payment of monthly insurance premiums and its refusal to continue deduction of professional dues from teachers' salaries during negotiations. In reaching its decision, the court adopted the rationale of the majority of cases in which this question has been considered under other state public employee labor relations acts. We affirm. An employer's unilateral change in conditions of employment which are under negotiation constitutes a refusal to bargain in good faith under the National Labor Relations Act. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 82 S.Ct. 1107, 8 L.Ed.2d 230 (1962). Courts of other states have considered whether the principles set forth in Katz apply to collective bargaining in the public sector and the majority have held that they do. In the case of Galloway Township Board of Education v. Galloway Township Education Ass'n., 78 N.J. 25, 393 A.2d 218 (1978), the Association filed an unfair practice charge against the Board of Education alleging refusal to negotiate in good faith by its unilaterally withholding payment of an annual salary increment due the teachers represented by the Association. The court cited the above stated rule in NLRB v. Katz, supra , and went on to say The basis of the rule prohibiting unilateral changes by an employer during negotiations is the recognition of the importance of maintaining the then-prevailing terms and conditions of employment during this delicate period until new terms and conditions are arrived at by agreement. Unilateral changes disruptive of this status quo are unlawful because they frustrate the `statutory objective of establishing working conditions through bargaining.' NLRB v. Katz, supra, 369 U.S. at 744, 82 S.Ct. at 1112. 393 A.2d at 230. In addressing the question of whether to apply the definition of good faith obligation to negotiate as found in cases decided under the National Labor Relations Act, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania noted that the present case does not present a situation where there exists a meaningful difference in policy between the NLRA and the [state statute], ... both acts favor the collective bargaining process. Appeal of Cumberland Valley School District, Etc., 483 Pa. 134, 394 A.2d 946, 950 (1978). The facts in that case are similar to the case at bar. During the course of negotiations for a new agreement, the old agreement expired resulting in the school district's termination of payment of health and life insurance premiums. The court held that this constituted a refusal to bargain in good faith and stated that [t]he duty to bargain in good faith means that the parties must `make a serious effort to resolve differences and reach a common ground.' Id. (citation omitted). The stated purpose of our collective bargaining statutes is the establishment and maintenance of professional working conditions and the highest possible education standards. T.C.A. § 49-5-601. Section 49-5-611 requires the boards of education and professional employee organizations to negotiate in good faith certain conditions of employment. Clearly, our statute favors the collective bargaining process as a means whereby both parties can resolve their differences through open discussion. In the present case, the Board has paid the total insurance premium for each teacher since the 1976-1977 school year. These payments had been made despite periodic increases in the premiums, and following the increase in May 1982, the full premium was paid through the months of May and June before being discontinued by the Board. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the Board is bound by the funding provided by the county government. Carter County Board of Education Commissioners v. American Federation of Teachers, 609 S.W.2d 512, 517 (Tenn. App. 1980). The court went on to say that in the event of a budgetary problem, the Board may be forced to make a prompt decision with regard to one of the conditions subject to employment; nevertheless, in such circumstances, it should be incumbent on the school board to show that it had no other choice other than to act quickly and that it did not have an opportunity to first negotiate these matters with the public employee union. Accordingly, absent a justification of its action, the Board is guilty of a refusal to bargain in good faith. As to the issue of the Board's decision to terminate the deduction of professional dues, we agree with the Court of Appeals that such action also constituted an incident of bad faith. Payroll deductions are among the mandatory subjects of negotiation, T.C.A. § 49-5-611(a)(8), and an impasse in negotiations on the subject had not been declared. At the time these violations occurred, the EPNA did not provide specific remedies. However, we agree with the judgment of the Court of Appeals, that the Board be required to pay the full insurance premiums until it justifies its actions and also to continue making payroll deductions for SCEA members during negotiations. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals is reversed as to the Open Meetings issue and the finding that the jury verdict in chancery court is advisory only. We affirm the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the Board failed to negotiate in good faith due to its unilateral actions on matters under negotiation. Costs of this appeal shall be divided equally between the parties. COOPER, C.J., and FONES, BROCK, and HARBISON, JJ., concur.