Opinion ID: 109380
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: reporting and disclosure requirements

Text: Unlike the limitations on contributions and expenditures imposed by 18 U. S. C. § 608 (1970 ed., Supp. IV), the disclosure requirements of the Act, 2 U. S. C. § 431 et seq. (1970 ed., Supp. IV), [68] are not challenged by appellants as per se unconstitutional restrictions on the exercise of First Amendment freedoms of speech and association. [69] Indeed, appellants argue that narrowly drawn disclosure requirements are the proper solution to virtually all of the evils Congress sought to remedy. Brief for Appellants 171. The particular requirements embodied in the Act are attacked as overbroadboth in their application to minor-party and independent candidates and in their extension to contributions as small as $11 or $101. Appellants also challenge the provision for disclosure by those who make independent contributions and expenditures, § 434 (e). The Court of Appeals found no constitutional infirmities in the provisions challenged here. [70] We affirm the determination on overbreadth and hold that § 434 (e), if narrowly construed, also is within constitutional bounds. The first federal disclosure law was enacted in 1910. Act of June 25, 1910, c. 392, 36 Stat. 822. It required political committees, defined as national committees and national congressional campaign committees of parties, and organizations operating to influence congressional elections in two or more States, to disclose names of all contributors of $100 or more; identification of recipients of expenditures of $10 or more was also required. §§ 1, 5-6, 36 Stat. 822 824. Annual expenditures of $50 or more for the purpose of influencing or controlling, in two or more States, the result of a congressional election had to be reported independently if they were not made through a political committee. § 7, 36 Stat. 824. In 1911 the Act was revised to include prenomination transactions such as those involved in conventions and primary campaigns. Act of Aug. 19, 1911, § 2, 37 Stat. 26. See United States v. Auto. Workers, 352 U. S., at 575-576. Disclosure requirements were broadened in the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925 (Title III of the Act of Feb. 28, 1925), 43 Stat. 1070. That Act required political committees, defined as organizations that accept contributions or make expenditures for the purpose of influencing or attempting to influence the Presidential or Vice Presidential elections (a) in two or more States or (b) as a subsidiary of a national committee, § 302 (c), 43 Stat. 1070, to report total contributions and expenditures, including the names and addresses of contributors of $100 or more and recipients of $10 or more in a calendar year. § 305 (a), 43 Stat. 1071. The Act was upheld against a challenge that it infringed upon the prerogatives of the States in Burroughs v. United States, 290 U. S. 534 (1934). The Court held that it was within the power of Congress to pass appropriate legislation to safeguard [a Presidential] election from the improper use of money to influence the result. Id., at 545. Although the disclosure requirements were widely circumvented, [71] no further attempts were made to tighten them until 1960, when the Senate passed a bill that would have closed some existing loopholes. S. 2436, 106 Cong. Rec. 1193. The attempt aborted because no similar effort was made in the House. The Act presently under review replaced all prior disclosure laws. Its primary disclosure provisions impose reporting obligations on political committees and candidates. Political committee is defined in § 431 (d) as a group of persons that receives contributions or makes expenditures of over $1,000 in a calendar year. Contributions and expenditures are defined in lengthy parallel provisions similar to those in Title 18, discussed above. [72] Both definitions focus on the use of money or other objects of value for the purpose of . . . influencing the nomination or election of any person to federal office. §§ 431 (e) (1), (f) (1). Each political committee is required to register with the Commission, § 433, and to keep detailed records of both contributions and expenditures, §§ 432 (c), (d). These records must include the name and address of everyone making a contribution in excess of $10, along with the date and amount of the contribution. If a person's contributions aggregate more than $100, his occupation and principal place of business are also to be included. § 432 (c) (2). These files are subject to periodic audits and field investigations by the Commission. § 438 (a) (8). Each committee and each candidate also is required to file quarterly reports. § 434 (a). The reports are to contain detailed financial information, including the full name, mailing address, occupation, and principal place of business of each person who has contributed over $100 in a calendar year, as well as the amount and date of the contributions. § 434 (b). They are to be made available by the Commission for public inspection and copying. § 438 (a) (4). Every candidate for federal office is required to designate a principal campaign committee, which is to receive reports of contributions and expenditures made on the candidate's behalf from other political committees and to compile and file these reports, together with its own statements, with the Commission. § 432 (f). Every individual or group, other than a political committee or candidate, who makes contributions or expenditures of over $100 in a calendar year other than by contribution to a political committee or candidate is required to file a statement with the Commission. § 434 (e). Any violation of these recordkeeping and reporting provisions is punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000 or a prison term of not more than a year, or both. § 441 (a).
Unlike the overall limitations on contributions and expenditures, the disclosure requirements impose no ceiling on campaign-related activities. But we have repeatedly found that compelled disclosure, in itself, can seriously infringe on privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the First Amendment. E. g., Gibson v. Florida Legislative Comm., 372 U. S. 539 (1963); NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479 (1960); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449 (1958). We long have recognized that significant encroachments on First Amendment rights of the sort that compelled disclosure imposes cannot be justified by a mere showing of some legitimate governmental interest. Since NAACP v. Alabama we have required that the subordinating interests of the State must survive exacting scrutiny. [73] We also have insisted that there be a relevant correlation [74] or substantial relation [75] between the governmental interest and the information required to be disclosed. See Pollard v. Roberts, 283 F. Supp. 248, 257 (ED Ark.) (three-judge court), aff'd, 393 U. S. 14 (1968) ( per curiam ). This type of scrutiny is necessary even if any deterrent effect on the exercise of First Amendment rights arises, not through direct government action, but indirectly as an unintended but inevitable result of the government's conduct in requiring disclosure. NAACP v. Alabama, supra, at 461. Cf. Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U. S., at 57-58. Appellees argue that the disclosure requirements of the Act differ significantly from those at issue in NAACP v. Alabama and its progeny because the Act only requires disclosure of the names of contributors and does not compel political organizations to submit the names of their members. [76] As we have seen, group association is protected because it enhances [e]ffective advocacy. NAACP v. Alabama, supra, at 460. The right to join together for the advancement of beliefs and ideas, ibid., is diluted if it does not include the right to pool money through contributions, for funds are often essential if advocacy is to be truly or optimally effective. Moreover, the invasion of privacy of belief may be as great when the information sought concerns the giving and spending of money as when it concerns the joining of organizations, for [f]inancial transactions can reveal much about a person's activities, associations, and beliefs. California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U. S. 21, 78-79 (1974) (POWELL, J., concurring). Our past decisions have not drawn fine lines between contributors and members but have treated them interchangeably. In Bates, for example, we applied the principles of NAACP v. Alabama and reversed convictions for failure to comply with a city ordinance that required the disclosure of dues, assessments, and contributions paid, by whom and when paid. 361 U. S., at 518. See also United States v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41 (1953) (setting aside a contempt conviction of an organization official who refused to disclose names of those who made bulk purchases of books sold by the organization). The strict test established by NAACP v. Alabama is necessary because compelled disclosure has the potential for substantially infringing the exercise of First Amendment rights. But we have acknowledged that there are governmental interests sufficiently important to outweigh the possibility of infringement, particularly when the free functioning of our national institutions is involved. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U. S. 1, 97 (1961). The governmental interests sought to be vindicated by the disclosure requirements are of this magnitude. They fall into three categories. First, disclosure provides the electorate with information as to where political campaign money comes from and how it is spent by the candidate [77] in order to aid the voters in evaluating those who seek federal office. It allows voters to place each candidate in the political spectrum more precisely than is often possible solely on the basis of party labels and campaign speeches. The sources of a candidate's financial support also alert the voter to the interests to which a candidate is most likely to be responsive and thus facilitate predictions of future performance in office. Second, disclosure requirements deter actual corruption and avoid the appearance of corruption by exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light of publicity. [78] This exposure may discourage those who would use money for improper purposes either before or after the election. A public armed with information about a candidate's most generous supporters is better able to detect any post-election special favors that may be given in return. [79] And, as we recognized in Burroughs v. United States, 290 U. S., at 548, Congress could reasonably conclude that full disclosure during an election campaign tends to prevent the corrupt use of money to affect elections. In enacting these requirements it may have been mindful of Mr. Justice Brandeis' advice: Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman. [80] Third, and not least significant, recordkeeping, reporting, and disclosure requirements are an essential means of gathering the data necessary to detect violations of the contribution limitations described above. The disclosure requirements, as a general matter, directly serve substantial governmental interests. In determining whether these interests are sufficient to justify the requirements we must look to the extent of the burden that they place on individual rights. It is undoubtedly true that public disclosure of contributions to candidates and political parties will deter some individuals who otherwise might contribute. In some instances, disclosure may even expose contributors to harassment or retaliation. These are not insignificant burdens on individual rights, and they must be weighed carefully against the interests which Congress has sought to promote by this legislation. In this process, we note and agree with appellants' concession [81] that disclosure requirementscertainly in most applicationsappear to be the least restrictive means of curbing the evils of campaign ignorance and corruption that Congress found to exist. [82] Appellants argue, however, that the balance tips against disclosure when it is required of contributors to certain parties and candidates. We turn now to this contention.
Appellants contend that the Act's requirements are overbroad insofar as they apply to contributions to minor parties and independent candidates because the governmental interest in this information is minimal and the danger of significant infringement on First Amendment rights is greatly increased.
In NAACP v. Alabama the organization had made an uncontroverted showing that on past occasions revelation of the identity of its rank-and-file members [had] exposed these members to economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility, 357 U. S., at 462, and the State was unable to show that the disclosure it sought had a substantial bearing on the issues it sought to clarify, id., at 464. Under those circumstances, the Court held that whatever interest the State may have in [disclosure] has not been shown to be sufficient to overcome petitioner's constitutional objections. Id., at 465. The Court of Appeals rejected appellants' suggestion that this case fits into the NAACP v. Alabama mold. It concluded that substantial governmental interests in informing the electorate and preventing the corruption of the political process were furthered by requiring disclosure of minor parties and independent candidates, 171 U. S. App. D. C., at 218, 519 F. 2d, at 867, and therefore found no tenable rationale for assuming that the public interest in minority party disclosure of contributions above a reasonable cutoff point is uniformly outweighed by potential contributors' associational rights, id., at 219, 519 F. 2d, at 868. The court left open the question of the application of the disclosure requirements to candidates (and parties) who could demonstrate injury of the sort at stake in NAACP v. Alabama . No record of harassment on a similar scale was found in this case. [83] We agree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that NAACP v. Alabama is inapposite where, as here, any serious infringement on First Amendment rights brought about by the compelled disclosure of contributors is highly speculative. It is true that the governmental interest in disclosure is diminished when the contribution in question is made to a minor party with little chance of winning an election. As minor parties usually represent definite and publicized viewpoints, there may be less need to inform the voters of the interests that specific candidates represent. Major parties encompass candidates of greater diversity. In many situations the label Republican or Democrat tells a voter little. The candidate who bears it may be supported by funds from the far right, the far left, or any place in between on the political spectrum. It is less likely that a candidate of, say, the Socialist Labor Party will represent interests that cannot be discerned from the party's ideological position. The Government's interest in deterring the buying of elections and the undue influence of large contributors on officeholders also may be reduced where contributions to a minor party or an independent candidate are concerned, for it is less likely that the candidate will be victorious. But a minor party sometimes can play a significant role in an election. Even when a minor-party candidate has little or no chance of winning, he may be encouraged by major-party interests in order to divert votes from other major-party contenders. [84] We are not unmindful that the damage done by disclosure to the associational interests of the minor parties and their members and to supporters of independents could be significant. These movements are less likely to have a sound financial base and thus are more vulnerable to falloffs in contributions. In some instances fears of reprisal may deter contributions to the point where the movement cannot survive. The public interest also suffers if that result comes to pass, for there is a consequent reduction in the free circulation of ideas both within [85] and without [86] the political arena. There could well be a case, similar to those before the Court in NAACP v. Alabama and Bates, where the threat to the exercise of First Amendment rights is so serious and the state interest furthered by disclosure so insubstantial that the Act's requirements cannot be constitutionally applied. [87] But no appellant in this case has tendered record evidence of the sort proffered in NAACP v. Alabama . Instead, appellants primarily rely on the clearly articulated fears of individuals, well experienced in the political process. Brief for Appellants 173. At best they offer the testimony of several minor-party officials that one or two persons refused to make contributions because of the possibility of disclosure. [88] On this record, the substantial public interest in disclosure identified by the legislative history of this Act outweighs the harm generally alleged.
Appellants agree that the record here does not reflect the kind of focused and insistent harassment of contributors and members that existed in the NAACP cases. Ibid. They argue, however, that a blanket exemption for minor parties is necessary lest irreparable injury be done before the required evidence can be gathered. Those parties that would be sufficiently minor to be exempted from the requirements of § 434 could be defined, appellants suggest, along the lines used for public-financing purposes, see Part III-A, infra, as those who received less than 25% of the vote in past elections. Appellants do not argue that this line is constitutionally required. They suggest as an alternative defining minor parties as those that do not qualify for automatic ballot access under state law. Presumably, other criteria, such as current political strength (measured by polls or petition), age, or degree of organization, could also be used. [89] The difficulty with these suggestions is that they reflect only a party's past or present political strength and that is only one of the factors that must be considered. Some of the criteria are not precisely indicative of even that factor. Age, [90] or past political success, for instance, may typically be associated with parties that have a high probability of success. But not all long-established parties are winnerssome are consistent losersand a new party may garner a great deal of support if it can associate itself with an issue that has captured the public's imagination. None of the criteria suggested is precisely related to the other critical factor that must be considered, the possibility that disclosure will impinge upon protected associational activity. An opinion dissenting in part from the Court of Appeals' decision concedes that no one line is constitutionally required. [91] It argues, however, that a flat exemption for minor parties must be carved out, even along arbitrary lines, if groups that would suffer impermissibly from disclosure are to be given any real protection. An approach that requires minor parties to submit evidence that the disclosure requirements cannot constitutionally be applied to them offers only an illusory safeguard, the argument goes, because the evils of chill and harassment . . . are largely incapable of formal proof. [92] This dissent expressed its concern that a minor party, particularly a new party, may never be able to prove a substantial threat of harassment, however real that threat may be, because it would be required to come forward with witnesses who are too fearful to contribute but not too fearful to testify about their fear. A strict requirement that chill and harassment be directly attributable to the specific disclosure from which the exemption is sought would make the task even more difficult. We recognize that unduly strict requirements of proof could impose a heavy burden, but it does not follow that a blanket exemption for minor parties is necessary. Minor parties must be allowed sufficient flexibility in the proof of injury to assure a fair consideration of their claim. The evidence offered need show only a reasonable probability that the compelled disclosure of a party's contributors' names will subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials or private parties. The proof may include, for example, specific evidence of past or present harassment of members due to their associational ties, or of harassment directed against the organization itself. A pattern of threats or specific manifestations of public hostility may be sufficient. New parties that have no history upon which to draw may be able to offer evidence of reprisals and threats directed against individuals or organizations holding similar views. Where it exists the type of chill and harassment identified in NAACP v. Alabama can be shown. We cannot assume that courts will be insensitive to similar showings when made in future cases. We therefore conclude that a blanket exemption is not required.
Section 434 (e) requires [e]very person (other than a political committee or candidate) who makes contributions or expenditures aggregating over $100 in a calendar year other than by contribution to a political committee or candidate to file a statement with the Commission. [93] Unlike the other disclosure provisions, this section does not seek the contribution list of any association. Instead, it requires direct disclosure of what an individual or group contributes or spends. In considering this provision we must apply the same strict standard of scrutiny, for the right of associational privacy developed in NAACP v. Alabama derives from the rights of the organization's members to advocate their personal points of view in the most effective way. 357 U. S., at 458, 460. See also NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S., at 429-431; Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S., at 250. Appellants attack § 434 (e) as a direct intrusion on privacy of belief, in violation of Talley v. California, 362 U. S. 60 (1960), and as imposing very real, practical burdens . . . certain to deter individuals from making expenditures for their independent political speech analogous to those held to be impermissible in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516 (1945).
The Court of Appeals upheld § 434 (e) as necessary to enforce the independent-expenditure ceiling imposed by 18 U. S. C. § 608 (e) (1) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). It said: If . . . Congress has both the authority and a compelling interest to regulate independent expenditures under section 608 (e), surely it can require that there be disclosure to prevent misuse of the spending channel. 171 U. S. App. D. C., at 220 519 F. 2d, at 869. We have found that § 608 (e) (1) unconstitutionally infringes upon First Amendment rights. [94] If the sole function of § 434 (e) were to aid in the enforcement of that provision, it would no longer serve any governmental purpose. But the two provisions are not so intimately tied. The legislative history on the function of § 434 (e) is bare, but it was clearly intended to stand independently of § 608 (e) (1). It was enacted with the general disclosure provisions in 1971 as part of the original Act, [95] while § 608 (e) (1) was part of the 1974 amendments. [96] Like the other disclosure provisions, § 434 (e) could play a role in the enforcement of the expanded contribution and expenditure limitations included in the 1974 amendments, but it also has independent functions. Section 434 (e) is part of Congress' effort to achieve total disclosure by reaching every kind of political activity [97] in order to insure that the voters are fully informed and to achieve through publicity the maximum deterrence to corruption and undue influence possible. The provision is responsive to the legitimate fear that efforts would be made, as they had been in the past, [98] to avoid the disclosure requirements by routing financial support of candidates through avenues not explicitly covered by the general provisions of the Act.
In its effort to be all-inclusive, however, the provision raises serious problems of vagueness, particularly treacherous where, as here, the violation of its terms carries criminal penalties [99] and fear of incurring these sanctions may deter those who seek to exercise protected First Amendment rights. Section 434 (e) applies to [e]very person . . . who makes contributions or expenditures. Contributions and expenditures are defined in parallel provisions in terms of the use of money or other valuable assets for the purpose of . . . influencing the nomination or election of candidates for federal office. [100] It is the ambiguity of this phrase that poses constitutional problems. Due process requires that a criminal statute provide adequate notice to a person of ordinary intelligence that his contemplated conduct is illegal, for no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed. United States v. Harriss, 347 U. S. 612, 617 (1954). See also Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156 (1972). Where First Amendment rights are involved, an even greater degree of specificity is required. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U. S., at 573. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 109 (1972); Kunz v. New York, 340 U. S. 290 (1951). There is no legislative history to guide us in determining the scope of the critical phrase for the purpose of . . . influencing. It appears to have been adopted without comment from earlier disclosure Acts. [101] Congress has voiced its wishes in [most] muted strains, leaving us to draw upon those common-sense assumptions that must be made in determining direction without a compass. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397, 412 (1970). Where the constitutional requirement of definiteness is at stake, we have the further obligation to construe the statute, if that can be done consistent with the legislature's purpose, to avoid the shoals of vagueness. United States v. Harriss, supra, at 618; United States v. Rumely, 345 U. S., at 45. In enacting the legislation under review Congress addressed broadly the problem of political campaign financing. It wished to promote full disclosure of campaign-oriented spending to insure both the reality and the appearance of the purity and openness of the federal election process. [102] Our task is to construe for the purpose of . . . influencing, incorporated in § 434 (e) through the definitions of contributions and expenditures, in a manner that precisely furthers this goal. In Part I we discussed what constituted a contribution for purposes of the contribution limitations set forth in 18 U. S. C. § 608 (b) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). [103] We construed that term to include not only contributions made directly or indirectly to a candidate, political party, or campaign committee, and contributions made to other organizations or individuals but earmarked for political purposes, but also all expenditures placed in cooperation with or with the consent of a candidate, his agents, or an authorized committee of the candidate. The definition of contribution in § 431 (e) for disclosure purposes parallels the definition in Title 18 almost word for word, and we construe the former provision as we have the latter. So defined, contributions have a sufficiently close relationship to the goals of the Act, for they are connected with a candidate or his campaign. When we attempt to define expenditure in a similarly narrow way we encounter line-drawing problems of the sort we faced in 18 U. S. C. § 608 (e) (1) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). Although the phrase, for the purpose of . . . influencing an election or nomination, differs from the language used in § 608 (e) (1), it shares the same potential for encompassing both issue discussion and advocacy of a political result. [104] The general requirement that political committees and candidates disclose their expenditures could raise similar vagueness problems, for political committee is defined only in terms of amount of annual contributions and expenditures, [105] and could be interpreted to reach groups engaged purely in issue discussion. The lower courts have construed the words political committee more narrowly. [106] To fulfill the purposes of the Act they need only encompass organizations that are under the control of a candidate or the major purpose of which is the nomination or election of a candidate. Expenditures of candidates and of political committees so construed can be assumed to fall within the core area sought to be addressed by Congress. They are, by definition, campaign related. But when the maker of the expenditure is not within these categorieswhen it is an individual other than a candidate or a group other than a political committee [107] the relation of the information sought to the purposes of the Act may be too remote. To insure that the reach of § 434 (e) is not impermissibly broad, we construe expenditure for purposes of that section in the same way we construed the terms of § 608 (e)to reach only funds used for communications that expressly advocate [108] the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate. This reading is directed precisely to that spending that is unambiguously related to the campaign of a particular federal candidate. In summary, § 434 (e), as construed, imposes independent reporting requirements on individuals and groups that are not candidates or political committees only in the following circumstances: (1) when they make contributions earmarked for political purposes or authorized or requested by a candidate or his agent, to some person other than a candidate or political committee, and (2) when they make expenditures for communications that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate. Unlike 18 U. S. C. § 608 (e) (1) (1970 ed., Supp. IV), § 434 (e), as construed, bears a sufficient relationship to a substantial governmental interest. As narrowed, § 434 (e), like § 608 (e) (1), does not reach all partisan discussion for it only requires disclosure of those expenditures that expressly advocate a particular election result. This might have been fatal if the only purpose of § 434 (e) were to stem corruption or its appearance by closing a loophole in the general disclosure requirements. But the disclosure provisions, including § 434 (e), serve another, informational interest, and even as construed § 434 (e) increases the fund of information concerning those who support the candidates. It goes beyond the general disclosure requirements to shed the light of publicity on spending that is unambiguously campaign related but would not otherwise be reported because it takes the form of independent expenditures or of contributions to an individual or group not itself required to report the names of its contributors. By the same token, it is not fatal that § 434 (e) encompasses purely independent expenditures uncoordinated with a particular candidate or his agent. The corruption potential of these expenditures may be significantly different, but the informational interest can be as strong as it is in coordinated spending, for disclosure helps voters to define more of the candidates' constituencies. Section 434 (e), as we have construed it, does not contain the infirmities of the provisions before the Court in Talley v. California, 362 U. S. 60 (1960), and Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516 (1945). The ordinance found wanting in Talley forbade all distribution of handbills that did not contain the name of the printer, author, or manufacturer, and the name of the distributor. The city urged that the ordinance was aimed at identifying those responsible for fraud, false advertising, and libel, but the Court found that it was in no manner so limited. 362 U. S., at 64. Here, as we have seen, the disclosure requirement is narrowly limited to those situations where the information sought has a substantial connection with the governmental interests sought to be advanced. Thomas held unconstitutional a prior restraint in the form of a registration requirement for labor organizers. The Court found the State's interest insufficient to justify the restrictive effect of the statute. The burden imposed by § 434 (e) is no prior restraint, but a reasonable and minimally restrictive method of furthering First Amendment values by opening the basic processes of our federal election system to public view. [109]
Appellants' third contention, based on alleged overbreadth, is that the monetary thresholds in the recordkeeping and reporting provisions lack a substantial nexus with the claimed governmental interests, for the amounts involved are too low even to attract the attention of the candidate, much less have a corrupting influence. The provisions contain two thresholds. Records are to be kept by political committees of the names and addresses of those who make contributions in excess of $10, § 432 (c) (2), and these records are subject to Commission audit, § 438 (a) (8). If a person's contributions to a committee or candidate aggregate more than $100, his name and address, as well as his occupation and principal place of business, are to be included in reports filed by committees and candidates with the Commission, § 434 (b) (2), and made available for public inspection, § 438 (a) (4). The Court of Appeals rejected appellants' contention that these thresholds are unconstitutional. It found the challenge on First Amendment grounds to the $10 threshold to be premature, for it could discern no basis in the statute for authorizing disclosure outside the Commission . . . , and hence no substantial `inhibitory effect' operating upon appellants. 171 U. S. App. D. C., at 216, 519 F. 2d, at 865. The $100 threshold was found to be within the reasonable latitude given the legislature as to where to draw the line. Ibid. We agree. The $10 and $100 thresholds are indeed low. Contributors of relatively small amounts are likely to be especially sensitive to recording or disclosure of their political preferences. These strict requirements may well discourage participation by some citizens in the political process, a result that Congress hardly could have intended. Indeed, there is little in the legislative history to indicate that Congress focused carefully on the appropriate level at which to require recording and disclosure. Rather, it seems merely to have adopted the thresholds existing in similar disclosure laws since 1910. [110] But we cannot require Congress to establish that it has chosen the highest reasonable threshold. The line is necessarily a judgmental decision, best left in the context of this complex legislation to congressional discretion. We cannot say, on this bare record, that the limits designated are wholly without rationality. [111] We are mindful that disclosure serves informational functions, as well as the prevention of corruption and the enforcement of the contribution limitations. Congress is not required to set a threshold that is tailored only to the latter goals. In addition, the enforcement goal can never be well served if the threshold is so high that disclosure becomes equivalent to admitting violation of the contribution limitations. The $10 recordkeeping threshold, in a somewhat similar fashion, facilitates the enforcement of the disclosure provisions by making it relatively difficult to aggregate secret contributions in amounts that surpass the $100 limit. We agree with the Court of Appeals that there is no warrant for assuming that public disclosure of contributions between $10 and $100 is authorized by the Act. Accordingly, we do not reach the question whether information concerning gifts of this size can be made available to the public without trespassing impermissibly on First Amendment rights. Cf. California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U. S., at 56-57. [112] In summary, we find no constitutional infirmities in the recordkeeping, reporting, and disclosure provisions of the Act. [113]