Opinion ID: 761499
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: 19 In a case like the instant one, in which the District Court reviewed an agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), we review the administrative action directly. See Troy Corp. v. Browner, 120 F.3d 277, 281 (D.C.Cir.1997); Gas Appliance Mfrs. v. Department of Energy, 998 F.2d 1041, 1045 (D.C.Cir.1993). In other words, we accord no particular deference to the judgment of the District Court. See Gas Appliance Mfrs., 998 F.2d at 1045. Rather, on an independent review of the record, we will uphold BAT's ad hoc decision unless we find it to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994). In determining whether the action is in accordance with law, we must give an agency's interpretation of its own regulation 'controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.'  Military Toxics Project v. EPA, 146 F.3d 948, 954 (D.C.Cir.1998) (quoting Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 45, 113 S.Ct. 1913, 123 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993)). 20
21 BAT has conceded throughout this litigation that it has directed other employers with already approved apprenticeship programs not to enroll Grinnell employees in those programs. See, e.g., ABC II, 978 F.Supp. at 342. We agree with the District Court that BAT had no statutory or regulatory authority to block Grinnell employees from participating in existing apprenticeship programs at other companies. 22 The ad hoc decision itself cites only § 29.3(h) for authority, but acknowledges, as it must, that [s] 29.3(h) is only applicable to the situation where an employer seeks to register a new apprenticeship program with BAT. Ad Hoc Decision at 2, reprinted in Grinnell App. 82J. Section 29.3 is entitled, Eligibility and procedure for Bureau registration of a program. 29 C.F.R. § 29.3 (emphasis added). Nothing in § 29.3--indeed, nothing in Part 29 of the applicable regulations--grants BAT the authority to block one company's employees from enrolling in already registered apprenticeship programs of another company. Thus, to the extent that BAT was relying upon its interpretation of § 29.3(h) for its authority to block such enrollments, that interpretation was plainly erroneous. 23 DOL's brief to this court cited no authority--other than § 29.3(h)--in support of BAT's position, and counsel gave no basis for the authority when questioned at oral argument. The only justification even mentioned at oral argument--that BAT might have been motivated by a desire to give the Union an advantage in the ongoing labor dispute--is certainly not a valid one, as counsel for DOL had to concede. See Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1337-38 (D.C.Cir.1996). 24 Therefore, we affirm the District Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Grinnell on this point, although we do so for slightly different reasons than those articulated by the District Court. The District Court held that BAT's refusal to allow Grinnell employees to enroll in existing programs violated the NAA because it effectively punish[es] innocent workers. ABC II, 978 F.Supp. at 342. However, we see no need to interpret the NAA here. Instead, we affirm the District Court's decision and order on this point because BAT simply had no lawful authority to do what it did. See University of the Dist. of Columbia Faculty Ass'n/NEA v. District of Columbia Fin. Responsibility and Management Auth., 163 F.3d 616, 621 (D.C.Cir.1998); Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. National Mediation Bd., 29 F.3d 655, 659 (D.C.Cir.1994) (en banc). 25
26 Grinnell's request to register a new, unilateral apprenticeship program, separate and distinct from the program previously established pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement, does implicate § 29.3(h), because Grinnell is seeking to register a program with BAT. BAT deferred ruling on Grinnell's request, on the assumption that there is an issue under § 29.3(h), namely, whether the Union's consent was required before BAT could approve the request. If the Union's consent was not required, BAT agreed that Grinnell's request for registration should be approved. See Brief for Appellees/Cross-Appellants at 20. However, BAT's interpretation of § 29.3(h) apparently led it to believe that it could not determine whether the Union's consent was required until after the NLRB decided whether the parties' agreement was still in effect. Therefore, BAT chose to stay its hand, pending the outcome of the case before the NLRB. 27 Grinnell, however, contends that it must be permitted to train striker replacements under apprenticeship programs, and that § 29.3(h) should not be read to provide the Union with veto power over any attempt on Grinnell's part to offer apprenticeship training. In support of its position, Grinnell raises an issue that BAT, in the decisions at issue here, and DOL, in its arguments to the District Court and this court, mostly ignore. 28 As Grinnell points out, § 29.3(h) requires a union's consent to registration of a new program only where the collective bargaining agreement or other instrument, provides for participation by [the] union in any manner in the operation of the substantive matters of the apprenticeship program, and such participation is exercised. (emphasis added). Grinnell argues that since the Union is not currently participating in the operation of the JATC (because it is on strike), its consent is not required before BAT may approve Grinnell's unilateral program--regardless of whether the agreement is still in effect. Grinnell claims that § 29.3(h) was drafted to account for precisely this situation; it points out that the provision goes on to state that [w]here no such participation is evidenced and practiced,--i.e., for example, when the union is on strike--the union's consent is not required. Such an interpretation comports with common sense, according to Grinnell, because a contrary reading of the section would mean that a union is able to block an employer's effort to obtain certified training for replacement apprentices during a strike, even as the Union refuses to participate in a joint program. Brief of Appellants at 27-28. 29 BAT never addressed the meaning of the phrases and such participation is exercised and where no such participation is evidenced and practiced in its ad hoc decision, and DOL inexplicably failed to respond to Grinnell's interpretation in its brief to this court. What little is offered by the agency is blatantly disingenuous. Throughout this litigation, BAT and counsel for DOL have consistently misrepresented the language of § 29.3(h). In Swoope's affidavit submitted to the District Court, he summarized § 29.3(h) as requiring union consent where the collective bargaining agreement provides for union participation in the apprenticeship program, and that participation has been exercised. Declaration of Anthony Swoope, Director, BAT, at 3 (Dec. 18, 1996), reprinted in Grinnell App. 123 (emphasis added). In other words, Swoope substituted has been exercised for is exercised. BAT made precisely the same misrepresentation in its ad hoc decision. See Ad Hoc Decision at 2, reprinted in Grinnell App. 82J. To complete the circle, counsel for DOL also used the has been exercised language in its brief to this court. See Brief for Appellees/Cross-Appellants at 17. These misstatements hardly can be viewed as simple oversights. 30 Obviously, is exercised does not mean the same thing as has been exercised. There is no doubt that the Union's participation in the JATC program has been exercised. If that were the language of § 29.3(h), it would clearly support BAT's position, because the Union and Grinnell both actively participated in the JATC program prior to the commencement of the strike in April 1994. But that is not the language of the regulation. We do not see how BAT can require the Union's consent to the establishment of a new apprenticeship program under § 29.3(h) in the face of the and such participation is exercised and where no such participation is evidenced and practiced language in the regulation. BAT may have an answer, but it has failed to provide it. 31 Because the agreement has expired, the JATC program may or may not exist, depending upon whether Grinnell had bargained in good faith to impasse before implementing the terms of its final offer. There is no question, however, that the Union is not currently participating in the JATC program. The Union represented at oral argument that it will certainly participate in the JATC program if the NLRB finds that Grinnell did not bargain in good faith to impasse, in which case the agreement is still in effect. Section 29.3(h), however, requires that the Union participation is exercised, not that it might be exercised pending the outcome of a case before the NLRB, nor, as BAT and DOL would have it, that it has been exercised at some point in the past. Section 29.3(h) is quite clear that [w]here no such participation is evidenced and practiced, union consent is not required. 32 It is true that this court must defer to a reasonable agency interpretation of its own regulation, even if that interpretation is not the one that the court would have adopted in the first instance. Belco Petroleum Corp. v. FERC, 589 F.2d 680, 685 (D.C.Cir.1978). However, BAT's path from is exercised to has been exercised has yet to be explained and is, at best, incomprehensible. Accordingly, we vacate this portion of BAT's ad hoc decision with instructions to the District Court to remand to the agency for prompt disposition of Grinnell's request for registration of a new, unilateral program. If the agency cannot articulate a legitimate basis for denying registration--and BAT's desire to give one side an advantage in an ongoing labor dispute is not a legitimate basis--Grinnell's request should be granted. There is no reason to defer a decision until the NLRB has ruled. Even assuming that the agreement is still in effect, there is no doubt that under § 29.3(h), it provides for participation by [the] union ... in the operation of the substantive matters of the apprenticeship program. The only issue is whether that participation is exercised. Nothing that the NLRB decides will be dispositive with respect to that issue. Moreover, insofar as the NLRA is concerned--that is, insofar as Grinnell has committed an unfair labor practice--the NLRB will provide the appropriate remedy if one is warranted. 33
34 The Union did not move to intervene in the District Court until October 3, 1997, several weeks after the District Court issued its decision in ABC II. The District Court ruled that it was constrained to deny the Union's motion for want of jurisdiction, because both Grinnell and DOL had already appealed to this court. We decline to decide whether the District Court had jurisdiction to grant the Union's motion. Compare Nicol v. Gulf Fleet Supply Vessels, Inc., 743 F.2d 298, 299 (5th Cir.1984) (holding that district court was without jurisdiction to grant motion to intervene once appeal had been filed), with Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 612 F.2d 131, 134 (3d Cir.1979) (en banc) (holding that filing of appeal did not divest district court of jurisdiction to grant motion to intervene). Instead, we affirm the denial of the Union's motion on the ground that the motion was untimely. 35 Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that any motion for intervention must be timely. FED R. CIV. P. 24(a). The Supreme Court has said that [t]imeliness is to be determined from all the circumstances. And it is to be determined by the court in the exercise of its sound discretion; unless that discretion is abused, the court's ruling will not be disturbed on review. NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 366, 93 S.Ct. 2591, 37 L.Ed.2d 648 (1973) (footnote omitted). If the motion was not timely, there is no need for the court to address the other factors that enter into an intervention analysis. See id. at 369, 93 S.Ct. 2591. Where, as here, the District Court has not made any factual findings with respect to the timeliness issue (because it denied the motion on jurisdictional grounds), we must make our own determination. Cook v. Boorstin, 763 F.2d 1462, 1468 (D.C.Cir.1985). 36 A motion for intervention after judgment will usually be denied where a clear opportunity for pre-judgment intervention was not taken. Dimond v. District of Columbia, 792 F.2d 179, 193 (D.C.Cir.1986); see also Massachusetts Sch. of Law v. United States, 118 F.3d 776, 783 n. 5. (D.C.Cir.1997) ([S]ome would-be intervenors may inexcusably neglect to try to enter the proceedings before judgment, at a time when notice of their arguments would have enabled the district court to avert the alleged errors. Then, post-judgment intervention for the purpose of challenging those supposed defects on appeal would rightly be denied as untimely.). Here, the Union offers no reason whatsoever for its failure to intervene prior to judgment. 37 The Union cites two cases that reversed denials of motions to intervene, United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 97 S.Ct. 2464, 53 L.Ed.2d 423 (1977), and Dimond. In those cases, however, the necessity of intervention did not arise until after judgment had been entered. In United Airlines, the would-be intervenor found out only after final judgment that the plaintiffs did not plan to appeal the denial of class certification. See United Airlines, 432 U.S. at 393-94, 97 S.Ct. 2464. In Dimond, the potential inadequacy of [the existing parties'] representation came into existence only at the appellate stage. Dimond, 792 F.2d at 193. In this case, the Union sought to intervene simply because it wished to advance a particular argument on appeal that DOL had not explicitly advanced in the District Court. The Union has offered no reason, and no reason is apparent from the record, why it could not have sought intervention prior to judgment. Accordingly, given the presumption that post-judgment motions to intervene will be denied, we affirm the District Court's denial of the Union's motion. If the Union wishes to intervene in further proceedings, i.e., on remand, it may raise the issue at the appropriate time.