Opinion ID: 1789370
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Instruction With Respect to Hypodermic Needle.

Text: Also for the first time on this rehearing defendant complains of the following instruction included in the trial court's charge to the jury: Under the law applicable to this case, the conscious possession of a hypodermic syringe or needle is prima facie evidence of the unlawful use of narcotic drugs. This instruction is predicated upon the second sentence of sec. 161.02 (3), Stats., which reads, The unlawful possession of narcotic drugs by a person or of a hypodermic syringe or needle, except when possessed by a diabetic, shall be prima facie evidence of the unlawful use of such drugs. Since statutes, if possible, must be given a reasonable meaning and not one which accomplishes an absurd result, we hold the word unlawful does not qualify the possession of a hypodermic syringe or needle. The only unlawful possession of such an instrument would be one obtained by theft, and clearly the legislature was not here concerned with stolen property. Defendant attacks this statutory provision as being invalid on the ground that all statutory presumptions in criminal prosecutions have been held unconstitutional in Tot v. United States (1943), 319 U. S. 463, 63 Sup. Ct. 1241, 87 L. Ed. 1519, and Barrett v. United States (5th Cir. 1963), 322 Fed. (2d) 292. The state counters with the argument that only those statutory presumptions are invalid where there is no rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed. Here there clearly is a rational connection between possession of a hypodermic syringe or needle by a nondiabetic and the unlawful use of narcotic drugs. We find it unnecessary to pass on the constitutionality of this statutory provision. Even if it were error for the trial court to have given the instruction predicated upon the statute, we determine it to have been nonprejudicial. The uncontradicted testimony that there were recent hypodermic needle marks on defendant's arms; his admissions that he was taking paregoric; and the manner in which he admitted he prepared it for injection by use of heat so as to burn off the alcohol and secure a higher concentration of opium; render it highly unlikely that this instruction had any material bearing on the jury finding defendant guilty. Another reason for our determination not to reverse because of the giving of the quoted instruction is that no motion for new trial was made in this case. Error cannot be predicated upon an instruction to the jury without first moving for a new trial on this ground in the trial court. Ferry v. State (1954), 266 Wis. 508, 510, 63 N. W. (2d) 741; State v. Biller (1952), 262 Wis. 472, 482, 55 N. W. (2d) 414.