Opinion ID: 2143910
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Use of Parol Evidence

Text: In ruling on the adequacy of the disclaimer and on Mende's motion for summary judgment on the express warranty, the trial court barred all parol evidence. It treated the written warranty, drafted by Travel Craft and executed by Mende, as a complete and exclusive statement of all of the terms of the agreement. Travel Craft says that this treatment was error; it argues that the trial court should have admitted parol evidence. Mende claims that the the series of communications and final writing between the parties was only a final expression of their agreement as to warranties.  It says parol evidence could not be admitted with respect to that agreement on warranties. Section 202 of the U.C.C. sales article governs the use of parol evidence. It does not allow the terms of a final agreement to be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement. Ind. Code § 26-1-2-202 (West 1980), amended by Ind. Code § 26-1-2-202 (West Supp. 1989). The section allows the terms of an agreement to be explained or supplemented by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court finds the writing to have been intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement. Ind. Code § 26-1-2-202(b). We conclude that the written warranty was a final expression of the parties' agreement on warranties, but we believe that the trial court erred in treating the agreement as a final expression on all terms and thus barring all parol evidence. We read U.C.C. § 2-202 to provide that when parties create a complete and exclusive agreement on limited terms, parol evidence is still admissible if it is explanatory or supplemental. Ind. Code § 26-1-2-202 comment 3 (West 1980). We hold that parol evidence was admissible to explain and supplement the warranty words normal use and defects.