Opinion ID: 2517801
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Challenges to capital sentencing scheme

Text: Defendant raises numerous challenges, under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, to the California capital sentencing scheme as applied in his case. Some of the issues are presented as claims of instructional error. In other instances defendant simply suggests that the statutory sentencing scheme itself, as explicated by the standard instructions given in his case, is unconstitutional. Still other claims attack the death penalty statute, or the death penalty process in general, for reasons beyond the instructions. As will appear, no matter how these arguments are framed, we have rejected all of them. Defendant urges the trial court erred by failing to instruct that the jury must find, beyond reasonable doubt (1) the existence of each aggravating factor used to justify the death penalty, (2) that aggravation outweighed mitigation, and (3) that death was the appropriate penalty. He is mistaken. ( People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 485, 42 Cal.Rptr.3d 677, 133 P.3d 581 ( Boyer ); Jurado, supra, 38 Cal.4th 72, 143, 41 Cal. Rptr.3d 319, 131 P.3d 400; Stitely, supra, 35 Cal.4th 514, 573, 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 108 P.3d 182; Panah, supra, 35 Cal.4th 395, 499, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 672, 107 P.3d 790.) Defendant contends the trial court erred, on similar constitutional grounds, by refusing his requests to delete from the instructions those sentencing factors listed in section 190.3 that he deems inapplicable to his case, including factors (d) (offense committed under extreme mental or emotional disturbance), (f) (defendant's belief in moral justification or extenuation for his conduct), (h) (inability to appreciate criminality or conform conduct to law because of mental disease or defect, or intoxication), (i) (defendant's age at time of crime) and (j) (defendant as minor accomplice). (§ 190.3, factors (d), (f), (h), (j).) There is no such requirement where, as here, the jury was instructed to consider only applicable sentencing factors. ( Boyer, supra, 38 Cal.4th 412, 486, 42 Cal. Rptr.3d 677, 133 P.3d 581; People v. Gray (2005) 37 Cal.4th 168, 236, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 451, 118 P.3d 496 ( Gray ); Maury, supra, 30 Cal.4th 342, 439-440, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1.) In particular, we have made clear that the defendant's age is neither aggravating nor mitigating, `but is used in the statute as a metonym for any age-related matter suggested by the evidence or by common experience.' ( Mendoza, supra, 24 Cal.4th 130, 190, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 485, 6 P.3d 150.) Defendant finds constitutional error in the court's failure to designate which factors are aggravating and which are mitigating. There was no such obligation. ( Boyer, supra, 38 Cal.4th 412, 486, 42 Cal. Rptr.3d 677, 133 P.3d 581; Gray, supra, 37 Cal.4th 168, 236, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 451, 118 P.3d 496; Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th 978, 1078-1079, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 5 P.3d 68.) The sentencing statute and instructions in general, and the mitigating factors in particular, are not unconstitutionally vague. ( Young, supra, 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1226, 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 112, 105 P.3d 487; Lucero, supra, 23 Cal.4th 692, 741, 97 Cal. Rptr.2d 871, 3 P.3d 248; People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 525, 34 Cal. Rptr.2d 558, 882 P.2d 249; Webb, supra, 6 Cal.4th 494, 535, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 779, 862 P.2d 779.) The jury need not make written findings of aggravating factors. ( People v. Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 131, 154, 17 Cal. Rptr.3d 825, 96 P.3d 126; Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th 978, 1078, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 5 P.3d 68; Bemore, supra, 22 Cal.4th 809, 859, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 840, 996 P.2d 1152.) The jury need not be instructed that it does not have to find mitigating factors unanimously or beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Roldan , supra, 35 Cal.4th 646, 741, 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 360, 110 P.3d 289; Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th 381, 466, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391.) Use of descriptors such as reasonably believed and moral in sentencing factor (f) (§ 190.3, factor (f) [whether defendant reasonably believed in moral justification for his conduct]) and substantial in sentencing factor (g) ( id., factor (g) [whether defendant acted under substantial domination of another]) are not so vague as to erect impermissible barriers to the consideration of mitigating evidence. ( Panah, supra, 35 Cal.4th 395, 500, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 672, 107 P.3d 790; Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th 381, 467, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391.) The standard sentencing instructions are not constitutionally deficient insofar as they fail to define mitigation. The presumption that jurors comprehend the instructions is not rebutted by empirical assertions to the contrary based on research that is not part of the present record and has not been subject to cross-examination. ( Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th 701, 772-773, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203, 976 P.2d 754; see also Holt, supra, 15 Cal.4th 619, 702, 63 Cal. Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213.) The death penalty statute adequately narrows the class of death-eligible murderers. ( People v. Williams (2006) 40 Cal.4th 287, 339, 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 268, 148 P.3d 47; Marks, supra, 31 Cal.4th 197, 237, 2 Cal. Rptr.3d 252, 72 P.3d 1222.) Nor is the statute facially invalid insofar as it allows prosecutors discretion, within its parameters, to decide the cases in which they will and will not seek the death penalty. ( Vieira, supra, 35 Cal.4th 264, 304, 25 Cal. Rptr.3d 337, 106 P.3d 990; People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 477, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525, 907 P.2d 373; Keenan, supra, 46 Cal.3d 478, 505-507, 250 Cal.Rptr. 550, 758 P.2d 1081.) The statute is not unconstitutional insofar as it does not require comparative, or intercase, proportionality review. ( Lewis and Oliver, supra, 39 Cal.4th 970, 1067, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 467, 140 P.3d 775; Stanley, supra, 39 Cal.4th 913, 966, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 420, 140 P.3d 736; People v. Jablonski (2006) 37 Cal.4th 774, 837, 38 Cal.Rptr.3d 98, 126 P.3d 938; Panah, supra, 35 Cal.4th 395, 500, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 672, 107 P.3d 790.) Defendant claims we also deny intracase proportionality review in capital cases, but he is mistaken. Upon request, we do undertake to determine whether a particular defendant's death sentence `is so grossly disproportionate to the offenses [he committed] as to constitute cruel or unusual punishment under article I, section 17 of the California Constitution.' ( Stanley, supra, 39 Cal.4th 913, 966, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 420, 140 P.3d 736, quoting Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th 92, 193, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980.) Defendant contends his death sentence was grossly disproportionate to his individual culpability, but we reject the claim. He was a successful contractor and public official who brutally assaulted Robert and Barbara Mishell, leaving both with permanent disabilities, because he believed they had exposed his extramarital affair. After admitting this assault to his friend and fellow official, Luis Reyna, he murdered Reyna to prevent Reyna's testimony against him in the Mishell matter, then decapitated and dismembered Reyna's body and dumped it in a remote location in order to hamper the body's identification. Under these circumstances, defendant's death sentence is not so disproportionate to his offenses and to his personal culpability for those offenses as to `shock[] the conscience' or `offend[] fundamental notions of human dignity.' ( Stanley, supra, 39 Cal.4th 913, 967, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 420, 140 P.3d 736, quoting People v. Livaditis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 759, 786, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 72, 831 P.2d 297.) Defendant urges that the delay in carrying out his death sentence is cruel and/or unusual punishment in violation of the federal and state Constitutions. But we have uniformly held that reasonable delays required by the process of statutorily mandated appellate review do not violate these constitutional provisions. (E.g., Panah, supra, 35 Cal.4th 395, 500, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 672, 107 P.3d 790; Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th 353, 477-478, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442.) Finally, defendant urges that the death penalty is, per se, cruel and unusual punishment violative of the Eighth Amendment. We continue to reject such claims. (E.g., Moon, supra, 37 Cal.4th 1, 47-48, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 894, 117 P.3d 591; People v. Staten (2000) 24 Cal.4th 434, 462, 101 Cal. Rptr.2d 213, 11 P.3d 968 ( Staten ).)