Opinion ID: 527007
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Subject Matter Jurisdiction: Is This a Case for the

Text: 9 NLRB? 10 Congress vested exclusive jurisdiction in the NLRB over conduct that is arguably protected or arguably prohibited by sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA. See International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Davis, 476 U.S. 380, 394, 106 S.Ct. 1904, 1914, 90 L.Ed.2d 389 (1986). 2 These sections protect the right of the employees to engage in collective bargaining and prohibit both management and labor from engaging in the enumerated unfair labor practices. 29 U.S.C. Secs. 157, 158. GM bears the burden of showing that the challenged conduct is arguably protected or prohibited by the NLRA. See Davis, 476 U.S. at 395, 106 S.Ct. at 1914. It presents three arguments designed to meet this burden and invoke NLRB jurisdiction. We deal with each argument in turn, reviewing them as did the district court; that is, after examining the record de novo we resolve all reasonable doubts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant, and then determine whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Schuster v. Martin, 861 F.2d 1369, 1371 (5th Cir.1988). 11
12 First, GM contends that future employment eligibility is a mandatory subject of bargaining under 29 U.S.C. Sec. 158(d); hence, plaintiffs' claims about GM's representations necessarily implicate GM's good faith in bargaining, or in failing to bargain, 3 over the future-employment issue. GM also asserts that its conduct was arguably prohibited or protected by the NLRA because section 8(a)(5) requires employers to bargain with union representatives before modifying policies that affect mandatory subjects of bargaining. See Armour & Co., 280 NLRB 824, 826 (1986). 4 13 The district court assumed arguendo that the VTEP was a mandatory subject of bargaining, such that GM had a duty to bargain with union representatives over the VTEP. 5 But the court concluded that the issue of future eligibility for rehire was not, in itself, a mandatory subject of bargaining so as to require GM to engage in bargaining over that issue as well: The fact that the matter at issue here, eligibility for future employment, in retrospect could have been and perhaps should have been included within [the VTEP] does not render that topic a fortiori a mandatory subject of bargaining. 14 We agree. As plaintiffs observe, the company's evaluation and consideration of individual applicants for employment lies at the very core of entrepreneurial control. The Supreme Court has held that these types of managerial decisions are not mandatory subjects of bargaining. See Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 498, 99 S.Ct. 1842, 1849, 60 L.Ed.2d 420 (1979) (quoting Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 222, 85 S.Ct. 398, 409, 13 L.Ed.2d 233 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)). An employer's failure or refusal to bargain over a non-mandatory subject does not violate section 8(a)(5). 6 See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349, 78 S.Ct. 718, 722, 2 L.Ed.2d 823 (1958). 15 Thus, the fact that future eligibility for rehire might, in the context of the VTEP, have an economic value for those workers who accepted the plan, or that GM raised the issue during collective bargaining (a claim which plaintiffs contest), does not transmogrify a management prerogative into a mandatory subject of bargaining. The status of the issue of future eligibility does not change by virtue of its relation to, or even its purported inclusion in, a union-management agreement concerning other mandatory subjects of bargaining. See Wooster, id. As plaintiffs note, to hold otherwise would provide both management and labor with a bootstrap with which to make any bargaining subject a mandatory one. 16
17 Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA requires employers to bargain in good faith with employee representatives. We have read that section to preclude employers from circumventing those representatives by bargaining directly with employees. See Standard Fittings Co. v. NLRB, 845 F.2d 1311, 1317 (5th Cir.1988). GM asserts that in making its representations to the group of employees who attended the VTEP meetings, it engaged in conduct arguably prohibited by the NLRA. Thus, GM maintains that the NLRB is the appropriate forum to hear even the claims of those whose conduct the Act arguably prohibits; in even more basic terms, the implication of GM's argument is that if its conduct indeed was wrong, it is the Board that should declare it so. We hold, however, that Davis defeats GM's attempt to invoke the NLRB's exclusive jurisdiction in this fashion. 18 In Davis, the Court gave the following construction to the phrase arguably protected or prohibited: 19 If the word 'arguably' is to mean anything, it must mean that the party claiming pre-emption is required to demonstrate that his case is one that the Board could legally decide in his favor. That is, a party asserting pre-emption must advance an interpretation of the Act that is not plainly contrary to its language and that has not been 'authoritatively rejected' by the courts or the Board. The party must then put forth enough evidence to enable the court to find that the Board reasonably could uphold a claim based on such an interpretation. 20 476 U.S. at 395, 106 S.Ct. at 1914 (citations omitted). GM contends throughout its brief that its positions on the status of future employment eligibility as a bargaining subject and on the propriety (or impropriety) of its representations to the employees were not ones which the Board or courts have rejected authoritatively. But that contention, even if accepted, does not bring us to a resolution, for as the Court explains in the passage quoted above, the party attempting to invoke the Board's jurisdiction must then demonstrate that the Board could reasonably uphold that party's claim. The reason for this requirement is simple and instructive here: The exclusivity of the Board's administrative province, made necessary by the need for uniform treatment in labor disputes, may not serve as a shelter for those whose claims have no realistic chance of acceptance and no import for national labor policy. Cf. Gray v. Local 714, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 778 F.2d 1087, 1090 (5th Cir.1985) (employee's claim for fraudulent inducement not preempted by NLRA because alleged conduct was of only peripheral concern regarding federal law). 21 By its own cast, GM's argument concerning its circumvention of union representatives goes only to show that its conduct was arguably prohibited by the Board; hence, its claim could not reasonably be upheld by the Board. 7 Nor does GM convincingly demonstrate the import of its claim for national labor policy: As plaintiffs observe, the challenged conduct here was not an attempt on the part of GM to interfere with the collective bargaining process or to diminish the union's representative role; instead, it was a post-bargaining effort to induce individual employees to accept VTEP benefits. While not dispositive, 8 it is relevant that the parties had completed collective bargaining over the VTEP; GM's alleged inducements had no direct bearing upon the collective bargaining process in that they were not offered in order to obtain ratification of an agreement. 9 For better or worse, the bargaining process had served its function, and the union representatives had fulfilled their role. It was then left to the individual employees to choose whether they would opt for the plan, and it is upon that choice that GM's alleged inducements operated. 22
23 Finally, GM would have us hold that its representations at the VTEP meetings were protected expression under section 8(c) of the NLRA, which provides, 24 The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice ... if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit. 25 29 U.S.C. Sec. 158(c). Here, GM's contention is that its representations at the meetings amounted only to a statement of fact about the VTEP: Employees who opted for the plan were not eligible for rehire. 26 We cannot accept this characterization of the facts in the current procedural posture of the case. As we explain below, we find no provision in the VTEP that reasonably might be construed as governing the dispute over future eligibility. Making all reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiffs, we must conclude that GM's representations went beyond a recitation of what was contained in the VTEP. Hence, we can only construe GM's statements as a promise of benefit over and above what the VTEP offered. As such, GM's statements were not protected expression under section 158(c). 27