Opinion ID: 2750915
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Special Condition Three: Internet Ban

Text: Mr. Morrison acknowledges he did not object to this special condition of brief. The argument is therefore not properly before us, and we decline to address it. See United States v. Denogean, 79 F.3d 1010, 1012 (10th Cir. 1996) (“The general rule is that we do not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal.”); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Mhoon, 31 F.3d 979, 984 n.7 (10th Cir. 1994) (noting issues not addressed in opening brief are deemed waived). -10- supervised release at sentencing, asserting that our standard of review is therefore plain error. United States v. Rosales-Miranda, 755 F.3d 1253, 1257 (10th Cir. 2014) (noting forfeiture “triggers plain-error review”). The government contends we should not review this issue even for plain error because, it asserts, Mr. Morrison invited the alleged error by arguing that a ban on the use of a computer would justify the court giving him a lesser sentence. We are not persuaded Mr. Morrison’s argument invited the error he alleges here. “The invited-error doctrine prevents a party who induces an erroneous ruling from being able to have it set aside on appeal.” United States v. DeBerry, 430 F.3d 1294, 1302 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). In DeBerry, we explained: [T]he doctrine of invited error is based on reliance interests similar to those that support the doctrines of equitable and promissory estoppel. Having induced the court to rely on a particular erroneous proposition of law or fact, a party may not at a later state use the error to set aside the immediate consequences of the error. Id. (internal quotation marks and ellipses omitted). In support of his motion for a variance and/or a departure at the beginning of the sentencing hearing, Mr. Morrison argued that imposing a ban on computers as a special condition for supervised release would justify a reduced sentence. He asserted: There is no apparent prior conviction or behavior related to either sex crimes or child molestation at all. If you are wanting to ensure the protection of the public . . . what is the best way to do it . . . you are -11- going to impose rules when we are done with this for supervised release and you will impose rules that say no computers, no internet access, no means of photography, no cameras. Those are rules which will serve to deter . . . We have probation officers that can make sure there is no computer in that house. And if my crime is using a computer to get kiddy porn, then what better thing to do than to make sure you can’t have a computer. . . . Why is the guideline sentence not appropriate in this situation? It is because reasonable rules can be imposed for supervised release that will protect the public . . . – any more time, if it is not tied to a legitimate purpose, is just punishment for punishment sake. Rec., vol. II at 45-46 (emphasis added). But counsel for Mr. Morrison was merely recognizing that the district court was already planning to impose a ban on internet use (which counsel knew from prior experience) and contending that a lesser sentence was therefore warranted because the computer ban would serve to deter Mr. Morrison and protect the public from future child pornography crimes. Counsel’s argument thus did not induce the district court to do anything it would not otherwise have done. Accordingly, this does not appear to be a situation in which counsel invited what he now claims was error. Nonetheless, the sequence of events at sentencing shows that Mr. Morrison waived this issue. United States v. Carrasco-Salazar, 494 F.3d 1270, 1272-73 (10th Cir. 2007) (noting “an abandoned objection is waived”). At the end of the sentencing hearing, when the district court imposed the sentence and conditions of supervised release, the court stated: “I know regarding the conditions of supervised release that there are some of those that [Mr. Morrison’s counsel] will express concerns and objections to, specifically regarding the use of phones or -12- computers.” Rec., vol. II at 74 (emphasis added). Immediately thereafter, counsel objected to the special condition banning the use of a camera but he made no objection to special condition three banning the use of a computer. It is apparent that Mr. Morrison did not merely forget to object to this condition of supervised release. Rather, he deliberately thought about the argument, used it to argue in favor of a lesser sentence, and then chose not to object to it at the end of sentencing even after the court stated it believed Mr. Morrison would object. Although forfeiture, “the failure to make the timely assertion of a right,” may be reviewed on appeal for plain error, “waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have previously said that “[t]here can be no clearer intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right than when the court brings the defendant’s prior objection to his attention, asks whether it has been resolved, and the defendant affirmatively indicates that it has.” Carrasco-Salazar, 494 F.3d at 1273 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); cf. United States v. Cruz-Rodriguez, 570 F.3d 1179, 1185 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[Defendant’s] intentional litigation conduct . . . [was] tantamount to the classic waiver situation where a party actually identified the issue, deliberately considered it, and then affirmatively acted in a manner that abandoned any claim on the issue.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Similarly, we conclude that Mr. Morrison’s failure to object after the -13- district court brought the specific objection to his attention amounted to an intentional abandonment of the issue. 3