Opinion ID: 2570810
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Community Residential Center Appropriation

Text: The legislature appropriated funds to the Department of Corrections for new community residential centers (CRCs). [93] This appropriation included the following passage: This appropriation is for new CRC beds, not owned or controlled by municipalities, to provide space in institutions for violent felons. All beds will meet department standards for Community Residential Centers. Contracts will be competitively bid. The governor vetoed all three sentences in this passage.
Having decided that the veto of this passage was invalid because the governor's veto explanation was inadequate, the superior court did not decide whether the struck passage was an item. The council only tangentially suggests that it was not an item. The governor does not appear to address the issue on appeal. Our discussion of the item veto in Part III.C.1, in context of the ASMI appropriations, clearly indicates that the language struck from the CRC appropriation was not an item.
The governor's veto message for chapter 98 stated: In taking final action on the FY98 operating budget, I followed a longstanding gubernatorial tradition of vetoing intent language because it is not appropriate in an appropriations bill. [94] Does this objection adequately explain this veto? The superior court held that it did not. The court reasoned that the governor's general intent objection could not be said to cover the vetoed CRC language because the vetoed passage clearly was not intent language, and no other explanation arguably applied. For reasons discussed above in Part III. C.2, this is the type of interpretation that courts should avoid when considering the constitutional sufficiency of a statement of objections. The reviewing court should simply determine whether the objection makes comprehensible reference to the provision being vetoed, and should not attempt to evaluate the reasoning underlying the objection. [95] The governor's intent objection meets this minimum-of-coherence standard. The struck language can permissibly be characterized as merely expressing the legislature's intent. The governor's explanation for vetoing the CRC language is therefore constitutionally adequate.
Applying the Hammond factors and the presumption of constitutionality discussed in Part III.C.3, we next determine whether including the struck passage violated the confinement clause. Some of the factors seem to be in relative balance. The qualifying language in the first sentence is the minimum necessary to explain the Legislature's intent about how the money is to be spent. The second sentence also describes how the money is to be spent, but can be read to specify standards; the third specifies procedures and does not describe what the money is for. These two sentences can be read to administer the program or to impose substantive requirements better addressed in a substantive bill. Likewise, the first sentence is clearly germane and appropriate to an appropriation bill, the second may be, and the third is not. None of the vetoed language seems to extend beyond the life of the appropriation. Therefore, the first, second, and fifth Hammond factors are in balance and the fourth favors finding no violation. Further, the struck language does not clearly offend the third Hammond factor (no enactment of new law or amendment of existing law). The governor argues that because the words not owned or controlled by municipalities [96] prevented the department from using this appropriation to contract with municipalities to provide CRC space, they substantively changed existing law, which allowed the commissioner to contract with municipalities. [97] The council responds that AS 33.30.031(a) allows for use of public or private facilities, [98] and that a decision to fund one type of facility over the other does not enact new law. We agree with the council. Alaska Statute 33.30.031 authorizes the commissioner to contract with municipalities. But it does not require the commissioner to put municipalities on footing equal with private enterprise as potential providers of new CRC bed space. The appropriation therefore does not preclude the commissioner from fulfilling the department's statutory mandate. Instead, it specifies the type of CRC space the money covers. [99] We conclude that the CRC appropriation does not violate the confinement clause.
The Alaska Constitution provides that [t]he executive power of the State is vested in the governor. [100] The governor argues that the vetoed language violates this provision and thus the principle of governmental separation of powers because it eliminates the department's discretion to contract with public agencies to provide CRC space. The council argues that the policy decision to fund privately owned CRCs rather than publicly owned CRCs was a legitimate exercise of legislative power. We agree with the council. We held above that this language does not preclude the department from fulfilling its statutory mandate. Instead, this language embodies a permissible policy decision on how to spend the CRC money. It therefore does not violate the separation-of-powers principle.