Opinion ID: 2631838
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Scope of immunity for emergency management activities under NRS 414.110

Text: On appeal, the Nylunds contend that the district court misapplied the emergency management immunity statute by failing to distinguish between the Nylunds' allegations regarding the city's negligence in handling the flood, and their allegations regarding the city's negligence in its pre-flood activities. In particular, they argue that the city's pre-flood activities, such as its design, operation, and maintenance of the storm drains, are not activities related to emergency management, and therefore are not covered by the immunity created in NRS 414.110. In reviewing the district court's grant of summary judgment, we must decide whether the district court has properly read and applied the law, a question we review de novo. [1] Summary judgment is only appropriate in the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. [2] NRS 414.110, the statute upon which the district court granted summary judgment, immunizes government entities from liability arising out of emergency management activities: 1. All functions under this chapter and all other activities relating to emergency management are hereby declared to be governmental functions. Neither the state nor any political subdivision thereof nor other agencies of the state or political subdivision thereof ... is liable for the death of or injury to persons, or for damage to property, as a result of any such activity. To resolve the issue the Nylunds present, we must construe NRS 414.110. When construing statutes, we seek to give effect to the legislature's intent. [3] To do so, we first look to the plain language of the statute. [4] But if the statutory language is ambiguous or otherwise does not speak to the issue before us, we construe it according to that which reason and public policy would indicate the legislature intended. [5] Also, we may infer legislative intent by reading a particular statutory provision in the context of the entire statutory scheme. [6] Turning first to the plain language of NRS 414.110, we note that it does not specifically address the issue at handwhether a government entity can claim immunity under the statute for its pre-emergency negligence that contributed to damage caused by later emergency management activities. But we can infer the legislative intent from the other sections of the same statutory chapter. The express purpose of NRS Chapter 414 is to empower the State and local governments to prepare for and swiftly respond to emergencies and disasters that imperil life and property, such as fire, flood, earthquake, and enemy attack. [7] To this end, the legislature granted immunity for death of or injury to persons, or for damage to property that result from negligence in managing an emergency. [8] The sound public-policy reasons behind this language are apparent. An emergency is a sudden and unforeseen crisis, [9] and the damage it causes can spread quickly. When facing an emergency, the government entity leading the response operation does not have time to deliberate and chart a course calculated to provide the customary degree of due care. Thus, the legislature gave the response authority substantial decision-making latitude, allowing it to make quick decisions to avert disaster, decisions that criticswith the benefit of hindsightmight later call negligent. In light of the policy behind NRS 414.110, we disagree with the Nylunds' contention that it does not immunize the city for its alleged pre-flood negligence. We read the immunity statute to cover not only negligent emergency management, but also any previous negligence that contributed to the damage caused by the emergency management activities. This is a natural extension of the policy underlying NRS 414.110. Because emergencies are sudden and unexpected, the response authority does not have time to assess whether unknown or unforeseen obstacles created by past negligence will hinder its course of action. For instance, in this case, even if we accept the Nylunds' argument that their residence would not have been flooded but for the city's pre-flood negligence in designing, operating, and maintaining the drainage system, we cannot imagine that the city had time to fully assess the drainage system's actual capacity before channeling the floodwaters down Fifth Street. We conclude that NRS 414.110 prevents the Nylunds from attacking the city's emergency management activities and its negligent pre-flood design, operation, or maintenance activities that are causally related to damage caused by the emergency management activities. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court correctly read NRS 414.110 as immunizing Carson City from the Nylunds' action and properly granted summary judgment in Carson City's favor. [10]