Opinion ID: 335045
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Board's Interests

Text: 43 The Parole Board primarily has argued in these cases that a prisoner-parolee does not have a substantial interest in a prompt revocation hearing, rather than asserting an affirmative interest in delay. The Board has, however, emphasized its punishment interest in delaying execution of a warrant to lengthen total imprisonment, an administrative interest in avoiding travel to distant places of incarceration and duplicative hearings, and an oversight interest in consideration of prison conduct during the intervening sentence. 44 Appellees have not challenged the ability of the Board to delay the implementation of a revocation decision so as to have the intervening and (the unserved portion of) the original sentence run consecutively. Their asserted interest is in the prompt decision alone; the Board's punishment interest in delaying execution therefore is not material. 35 As a result, we must consider the Board's administrative and oversight interests in delay.
45 The Board might assert two administrative interests in delaying revocation hearings until the completion of intervening sentences: (1) the difficulty and expense of conducting hearings in distant state prisons where parole violators may be incarcerated on their intervening sentences; 36 and (2) the cost of additional hearings when the Board decides to re-evaluate a decision made at the commencement of an intervening sentence on the basis of prison behavior. 46 The transportation problem is not unique to the parolee imprisoned for a new sentence. The Supreme Court in Morrissey v. Brewer also faced the problem of parolees under supervision in a distant state, yet due process was held to require a preliminary hearing reasonably near the place of the alleged parole violation before removal to the original place of imprisonment for a final revocation hearing. 408 U.S. at 485, 92 S.Ct. at 2602, 33 L.Ed.2d at 496. The Court had occasion in Gagnon v. Scarpelli to respond to assertions of practical difficulties caused by the Morrissey decision: 47 Petitioner argues, in addition, that the Morrissey hearing requirements impose serious practical problems in cases such as the present one in which a probationer or parolee is allowed to leave the convicting State for supervision in another State. Such arrangements are made pursuant to an interstate compact adopted by all of the States . . . . 48 Some amount of disruption inevitably attends any new constitutional ruling. We are confident, however, that modification of the interstate compact can remove without undue strain the more serious technical hurdles to compliance with Morrissey. An additional comment is warranted with respect to the rights to present witnesses and to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. Petitioner's greatest concern is with the difficulty and expense of procuring witnesses from perhaps thousands of miles away. While in some cases there is simply no adequate alternative to live testimony, we emphasize that we did not in Morrissey intend to prohibit use where appropriate of the conventional substitutes for live testimony, including affidavits, depositions, and documentary evidence. Nor did we intend to foreclose the States from holding both the preliminary and the final hearings at the place of violation or from developing other creative solutions to the practical difficulties of the Morrissey requirements. 49 411 U.S. at 782 n.5, 93 S.Ct. at 1760, 36 L.Ed.2d at 662. Given the procedural flexibility of the hearing required by Morrissey, we are unpersuaded that the transportation interest is a substantial objection to a requirement of prompt revocation hearings. 37 In fact, the Board's own regulations reflect the need for a certain degree of procedural flexibility despite the additional expense; as we noted earlier, the regulations authorize holding a revocation hearing reasonably near the place of an alleged violation if the local hearing would facilitate production of witnesses or retention of counsel and if the parolee denies that any violation was committed. 28 C.F.R. § 2.55(a); see note 20 supra. 50 Present practice is for the Board to hold annual dispositional reviews of outstanding unexecuted warrants lodged as detainers. 38 It therefore would not appear to be a substantial additional burden to require a prompt revocation hearing, nor does it appear that an end-of-sentence re-evaluation hearing would require greater expense than the current system. Indeed, we note that the expense of such a re-evaluation hearing applies only to those parolee-prisoners who have received adverse revocation decisions. Moreover, the Government is spared the expense of dispositional reviews for those parolee-prisoners who have received favorable parole revocation decisions. 51 Perhaps most to the point, however, is the fact that the transportation burden would have to be assumed in any event. For, as we noted above, it seems plain that a hearing has to be held sufficiently before the expiration of the intervening sentence to eliminate the risk of unjustified incarceration. See pp. ---- - ---- of --- U.S.App.D.C., 359 of 534 F.2d supra. The question is merely one of the timing of a hearing that must to some degree precede the expiration of that sentence, and the Board has no interest whatsoever in postponing the burden of transportation whose assumption is ultimately inevitable. 39
52 Appellants argue that the Parole Board should have discretion to delay the final hearing to enable it to consider the record of the parolee's interim institutional performance in determining whether to revoke the parole at the end of the intervening sentence or to continue or modify the parole status. (Appellants' Br. at 28). In essence, the Board seeks to condense two determinations into one. The first determination is whether, on the basis of the facts underlying the violator warrant, parole should be revoked; the second is whether events during the intervening incarceration warrant a different disposition. Many parolees may wish that the Board make this combined decision, believing that they may avoid revocation through good behavior in prison. We do not, however, deny them the ability to leave that course open to the Board. We hold only that when a parolee requests a prompt hearing and decision, he is entitled to one. 53 We have noted that a parolee may have a substantial interest in focusing the revocation hearing on the conduct surrounding the violator warrant. When the violation is relatively minor, and he has exceptional references from his community, he may fear that delay in presenting the references will prejudice his case. If the parolee believes that incorrect adverse information has been lodged with the Board, he may conclude that a delay will prejudice his ability to challenge the information or to confront witnesses. Or, when the parolee has a strong case to avoid revocation, he may decide to try for an immediate decision in his favor so as to reduce the risk that prison behavior will prejudice his case. 54 We repeat that an early decision adverse to the parolee-prisoner will not prevent the Board from later reconsideration in light of the record of the parolee-prisoner's interim institutional performance. If, however, the prisoner's interests are served by an early decision and whatever inertial force it carries, the reason for the Board's desire to avoid any decision prior to completion of the intervening sentence escapes us.