Opinion ID: 1657032
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Heading: Admission of Evidence of Prior Acts.

Text: Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion in limine to preclude the State from offering evidence of her conviction for possession of marijuana four years before she was charged with the present offense. Henderson's attorney argued the evidence was irrelevant, and even if relevant, its relevancy was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. At a hearing on this motion, the State contended the evidence was offered to establish Henderson's knowledge that the substance on top of her refrigerator was marijuana. See Bash, 670 N.W.2d at 137 (stating, in a possession case, that State must prove the defendant had knowledge that the material was a controlled substance). In response, Henderson's trial counsel said: I don't believe anyone is saying Miss Henderson doesn't know what marijuana is. She is saying the marijuana in her residence wasn't hers. The district court reserved ruling on this issue until trial. At that time the defendant's objection to the prior-acts evidence was overruled without explanation. We review rulings on the admission of evidence of prior bad acts for an abuse of discretion. State v. White, 668 N.W.2d 850, 853 (Iowa 2003). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court `exercises its discretion on grounds clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.' State v. Greene, 592 N.W.2d 24, 27 (Iowa 1999) (citation omitted). Even though an abuse of discretion may have occurred, reversal is not required if the court's erroneous admission of evidence was harmless. State v. Sullivan, 679 N.W.2d 19, 29 (Iowa 2004); Iowa R. Evid. 5.103( a ). Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. Iowa R. Evid. 5.402. Relevant evidence is evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Iowa R. Evid. 5.401. Even relevant evidence may be excluded, however, if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Iowa R. Evid. 5.403. [P]robative value gauges the strength and force of the tendency of the challenged evidence to make the consequential fact more or less probable. State v. Plaster, 424 N.W.2d 226, 231 (Iowa 1988). Evidence that appeals to the jury's sympathies, arouses its sense of horror, provokes its instinct to punish, or triggers other mainsprings of human action [that] may cause a jury to base its decision on something other than the established propositions in the case is unfairly prejudicial. Id. at 231-32 (citations omitted); see also 2 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 403.04[1][b], at 403-38 to 403-42 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2004). When the State seeks to offer evidence of prior acts, the prosecutor must articulate a valid, noncharacter theory of admissibility for admission. Sullivan, 679 N.W.2d at 28. That is because [e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. Iowa R. Evid. 5.404( b ). As noted above, the prosecutor offered the challenged evidence to show the defendant's knowledge of the nature of the substance found in her kitchen. Although the defendant contends her prior marijuana conviction does not tend to demonstrate she knew what the drug was, we disagree. We think her prior conviction makes it more probable that Henderson knew the material on top of her refrigerator was a controlled substance, namely, marijuana. See State v. Hall, 41 Wash.2d 446, 249 P.2d 769, 772 (1952) (Knowledge of what is marijuana when once acquired is not likely to be forgotten.). Thus, the State articulated a valid, noncharacter basis for admission of this evidence. Therefore, the court did not err in determining the prior-acts evidence was relevant. We turn, then, to the trial court's apparent decision that the probative value of this evidence was not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Our review of the trial court's exercise of discretion in this case is hampered by the court's failure to articulate how it balanced the probative value of this evidence against its prejudicial impact. Nonetheless, when we apply the pertinent factors, we conclude the unfair prejudice arising from the admission of this evidence substantially outweighed its minimal probative value. See Government v. Archibald, 987 F.2d 180, 186 (3d Cir.1993) (stating when trial judge fails to explain the grounds for denying a Rule 403 objection, [reviewing court] may undertake to examine the record). In weighing probative value against unfair prejudice, the court should consider the following factors: (1) the actual need for the evidence in view of the issues and other available evidence, (2) whether there is clear proof showing the other crimes were committed by the accused, (3) the strength or weakness of the prior-acts evidence in supporting the issue sought to be proven, and (4) the degree to which the jury will probably be improperly influenced by the evidence. State v. Rodriquez, 636 N.W.2d 234, 240 (Iowa 2001). The second and third factors support admission of the challenged prior-acts evidence in this case. There is clear proof Henderson committed a prior act of possessing marijuana, as evidenced by her conviction, and we think her prior possession of this illegal substance is persuasive evidence she knew the material in the bag on top of her refrigerator was marijuana. On the other hand, the actual need for this evidence was undeniably slight in view of the contested issues in the case and the other evidence available to the prosecution. Henderson's defense was not that she thought the marijuana was a household herb such as marjoram or thyme; her defense was simply that the drugs belonged to Williams, not her. Moreover, there was abundant evidence found in the apartment that marijuana had been smoked there, indicating the owner of the bag of marijuana knew what it was. Under these circumstances, the need for the prior-acts evidence was marginal at best. See United States v. Schwartz, 790 F.2d 1059, 1062 (3d Cir.1986) (holding prior acts of selling cocaine had marginal relevance to knowledge or intent elements of current charge of selling cocaine where defendant's sole defense was that he had not sold the drugs in question). Balanced against the insignificant need for the prior-acts evidence was the strong prejudicial impact of this information. As we said in State v. Castaneda, `When jurors hear that a defendant has on earlier occasions committed essentially the same crimes as that for which [the defendant] is on trial, the information unquestionably has a powerful and prejudicial impact.' 621 N.W.2d 435, 441 (Iowa 2001) (citation omitted); accord Schwartz, 790 F.2d at 1062 (holding prejudice from evidence of prior cocaine sales in prosecution for distributing cocaine was very great). Because we conclude the prejudicial effect of the prior-acts evidence outweighed its weak probative value, we hold the court abused its discretion in admitting this evidence. The next step in our analysis is to determine whether this error obligates us to reverse the defendant's conviction. Reversal is required in cases of nonconstitutional error when it appears that the rights of the complaining party have been injuriously affected by the error or that he has suffered a miscarriage of justice. Sullivan, 679 N.W.2d at 29; see also Iowa R. Evid. 5.103( a ). In applying this test, we presume prejudicethat is, a substantial right of the defendant is affectedand reverse unless the record affirmatively establishes otherwise. Sullivan, 679 N.W.2d at 30 (emphasis omitted). The trial court in the present case read a limiting instruction to the jury prior to allowing Deputy Aspleaf to testify that the defendant had a prior conviction for possession of marijuana. The jury was told this evidence was for the limited purpose of determining whether or not the defendant had knowledge, in this case, that any substance she possessed, if she did possess any, was marijuana. The court also admonished the jurors that they could not use this evidence to decide whether the defendant carried out the acts involved in the crime charged in this case and they could not convict a person simply because [they] believe[d] [the defendant had] committed a similar act in the past. Notwithstanding this instruction, we do not think the record in this case affirmatively establishes a lack of prejudice. When prior acts evidence is introduced, regardless of the stated purpose, the likelihood is very great that the jurors will use the evidence precisely for the purpose it may not be considered[:] to suggest that the defendant is a bad person, a convicted criminal, and that if he `did it before he probably did it again.' Castaneda, 621 N.W.2d at 441-42 (citation omitted). In Castaneda the trial court improperly admitted evidence of the defendant's prior sexual acts in the defendant's trial on charges of sexual abuse and indecent contact with a child. Id. at 438-39. This court held that even a proper limiting instruction would not have removed the unfair prejudice resulting from the improper testimony: The testimony was so inherently prejudicial that no amount of admonition by the court was sufficient to remove the prejudice. Id. at 442. We reach the same conclusion here with respect to admission of the defendant's prior drug conviction. While a limiting instruction can theoretically minimize the prejudice of evidence of prior acts, the effectiveness of such an instruction is greatly diminished where the prior act is the same crime at issue in the current prosecution and other evidence that would support a conviction is not overwhelming. See State v. Daly, 623 N.W.2d 799, 803 (Iowa 2001) (holding evidence that defendant had been convicted of same crime four years earlier could very likely have a substantial effect on a jury, which, although instructed not to do so, could reasonably be expected to misuse the evidence as substantive proof of guilt); cf. State v. Breitbach, 488 N.W.2d 444, 448 (Iowa 1992) (stating in a similar context, to the extent that the State's evidence on the matter in question is strong, the prejudicial effect of the challenged testimony will be correspondingly less, and, therefore, a cautionary instruction will suffice to insure the defendant receives a fair trial). That is the situation here. It would be extremely difficult for jurors to put out of their minds knowledge that the defendant had possessed marijuana in the past and not allow this information to consciously or subconsciously influence their decision. See Sullivan, 679 N.W.2d at 24 ([E]ven if the court gives a carefully crafted instruction limiting the significance of [prior-bad-acts] evidence, prejudice to the defendant is `well-nigh inescapable.' (Citation omitted.)). The very reason prior-bad-acts evidence is prejudicial is its persuasiveness that if a person possessed marijuana before, she probably possessed it again. See Sullivan, 679 N.W.2d at 24 (Empirical studies have confirmed the courts' fear that juries treat bad-acts evidence as highly probative.). In addition, the evidence of guilt in this case was not overwhelming. The State did not have the benefit of any of the traditional inferences of constructive possession to prove the marijuana and methamphetamine belonged to the defendant. Additionally, there were two persons living in the apartment when the drugs were confiscated. The primary circumstantial evidence that the drugs belonged to Henderson and not to her temporary guestthe defendant's obstructive conduct when the officer served the writ of evictionwas capable of being explained by the defendant's understandable anger at being evicted from her apartment. We conclude this record does not affirmatively establish a lack of prejudice. Therefore, we reverse the defendant's convictions for possession of marijuana and possession of methamphetamine. See id. at 30 (concluding evidence that defendant had committed same crime in the past was so inherently prejudicial that reversal was required); Daly, 623 N.W.2d at 803 (same). This case is remanded for a new trial at which evidence of the defendant's prior conviction shall not be admitted. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED AND REMANDED.