Opinion ID: 1674404
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: facts

Text: On November 29, 1971, Alvin Culberson (Culberson), indicted for assault and battery with intent to kill and represented by counsel, entered a plea of guilty to the charge and was sentenced by the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Harrison County to serve five (5) years in a Mississippi state penitentiary. After serving his time and completing his sentence without objection, he resumed his criminal habits. In 1977, Culberson was tried and convicted of capital murder while engaged in the commission of a robbery or an attempt to commit such a felony. During the sentencing phase of Culberson's 1977 trial, two prior convictions were submitted as aggravating circumstances. One of the two prior convictions was the 1971 felony of assault and battery with intent to kill. In 1979, the capital murder conviction was affirmed by this court. Culberson v. State, 379 So.2d 499 (Miss. 1979). On March 14, 1989, more than seventeen (17) years after entry of his guilty plea to the assault and battery with intent to kill charge, Culberson filed a motion pursuant to the provisions of our UPCCRA to set aside the plea and conviction alleging: At the plea hearing, the judge asked Mr. Culberson if he knew what he was charged with, but did not tell him the maximum sentence possible for assault and battery with intent to kill. Neither the judge nor Mr. Harris [1] explained to Mr. Culberson the elements of assault and battery with intent to kill. Mr. Culberson entered his plea of guilty because his attorney had told him he should, and without an understanding of the nature and consequences of that plea. On May 11, 1990, the Circuit Court denied Culberson's motion on the ground that it was procedurally barred under § 99-39-5 of our UPCCRA. Culberson appeals contending that: (a) Johnson II is an intervening decision excepted from the limitations period of the act; and (b) the limitations period of our UPCCRA violates Article 3, Section 21 of the Mississippi Constitution (1890) by suspending the writ of habeas corpus and also violates the due process clause of the United States Constitution.
Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2) (Supp. 1991) provides: A motion for relief under this chapter shall be made within three (3) years after the time in which the prisoner's direct appeal is ruled upon by the supreme court of Mississippi or, in case no appeal is taken, within three (3) years after the time for taking an appeal from the judgment of conviction or sentence has expired, or in case of a guilty plea, within three (3) years after entry of the judgment of conviction. Excepted from this three-year statute of limitations are those cases in which the prisoner can demonstrate either that there has been an intervening decision of the supreme court of either the state of Mississippi or the United States which would have actually adversely affected the outcome of his conviction or sentence or that he has evidence, not reasonably discoverable at the time of trial, which is of such nature that it would be practically conclusive that had such been introduced at trial it would have caused a different result in the conviction or sentence. Likewise excepted are those cases in which the prisoner claims that his sentence has expired or his probation, parole or conditional release has been unlawfully revoked. In Phillips v. State, 421 So.2d 476 (Miss. 1982), we held that an assault upon the constitutionality of a prior conviction used for sentence enhancement should be conducted in a proceeding in the court in which such conviction occurred and should be solely concerned with attacking that conviction. We further held that if the challenge to the prior conviction was successful, then relief from the subsequent conviction should be sought in the Mississippi court which used the prior conviction for enhancement purposes. Culberson's complaint confirms that the alleged constitutional infirmities of his prior conviction submitted to and considered by the court as an aggravated circumstance do not appear on the face of the conviction and have not been vacated via collateral attack. The significance is magnified by our following articulation in Phillips: An examination of the basic nature of such a constitutionally defective decision is somewhat helpful in determining the role that such a conviction may play in the application of an habitual offender statute. In Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971), (Douglas, J. concurring), Justice Douglas noted: [A] guilty plea is rendered voidable by threatening physical harm, Waley v. Johnston [316 U.S. 101, 62 S.Ct. 964, 86 L.Ed. 1302 (1942)], supra, threatening to use false testimony, ibid., threatening to bring additional prosecutions, Machibroda v. United States [368 U.S. 487, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962)], supra, or by failing to inform a defendant of his right of counsel, Walker v. Johnston [312 U.S. 275, 61 S.Ct. 574, 85 L.Ed. 830 (1941)], supra. Id. [404 U.S.] at 266, 92 S.Ct. at 500, 30 L.Ed.2d at 435 (emphasis added). The nature of constitutionally defective prior convictions as being voidable as opposed to void highlights two different aspects of their application in the instant case. First, unless such constitutional infirmity appears on the face of the conviction, or unless the conviction has been vacated via a collateral attack, the conviction may be used for the enhancement of sentence under an habitual offender statute. Secondly, the nature of a constitutionally defective conviction as being voidable highlights the fact that the proper challenge to such a defective conviction lies in a separate action brought expressly for that purpose.       The mere fact that the defendant has chosen to collaterally attack a prior conviction has no effect upon the status of that conviction until such time as the conviction is vacated. This is in line with the language previously cited from Justice William O. Douglas indicating that constitutionally defective convictions are voidable. Until such time as they are actually voided, they may be used for habitual offender statute purposes. (emphasis ours) Perusal of Phillips assures us that the trial court properly permitted the 1977 prior conviction of Culberson to be used as an aggravated circumstance. The time limitations clock prescribed by § 99-39-5(2) began running in October 1977. It is true that in Johnson v. State, 511 So.2d 1333 (Miss. 1987) ( Johnson I ), we denied a petition for post conviction collateral relief and held that the reversal by the New York court of appeals of a conviction twenty-three (23) years after its rendition did not invalidate it as an aggravating circumstance to be considered during the sentencing phase of Johnson's trial. Following our denial of the petition in Johnson I, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that in view of the New York court's action in vacating and dismissing his prior conviction, Johnson's death sentence should be re-examined because it was based partially on a reversed conviction which provided no legitimate support for the imposed sentence. See ( Johnson II ) Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 108 S.Ct. 1981, 100 L.Ed.2d 575 (1988). Johnson II quoted with approval our decision in Phillips. Although Phillips was not a death penalty case, the same principle applies in the capital context. In Nixon v. State, 533 So.2d 1078 (Miss. 1987), we applied the reasoning of Phillips when a defendant in a capital case sought to attack the validity of a prior conviction introduced to support the finding of aggravating circumstances at sentencing. In approving the Phillips procedure, we stated: Here the Court is asked to render guidelines for determining the admissibility of prior felony records to establish aggravating circumstances under Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-101(5)(b) (Supp. 1986). This Court has announced the following procedure in Phillips v. State, 421 So.2d 476 (Miss. 1982). In Phillips, the prosecution sought to use a prior Kentucky conviction to enhance the defendant's punishment under Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-81, as amended. The defendant objected to the use of the Kentucky conviction alleging that the conviction was invalid because he had not knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty. In response to Phillips' argument, this Court held that the trial judge is not required to go beyond the face of the prior convictions sought to be used in establishing a defendant's status as an habitual offender. If on its face, the conviction makes a proper showing that a defendant's prior plea of guilty was both knowing and voluntary, that conviction may be used for the enhancement of the defendant's punishment under the Mississippi Habitual Offender Act. Phillips, 421 So.2d at 481. See also, Moore v. State, 508 So.2d 666 (Miss. 1987). Nixon, 533 So.2d at 1099. Nixon extended the Phillips procedure and reasoning to capital cases in which prior convictions are used to support aggravated circumstances. Justice Banks, in his dissenting opinion, tells us that in death penalty cases, a prior conviction is only one of several statutory aggravating factors, and, it was thought, prior to Johnson v. Mississippi that a successful attack on such conviction, even when used as an aggravating factor, would be unavailing. We do not agree and cannot comprehend why prior to Johnson II it was thought that a successful attack on a prior conviction used as one of two aggravating circumstances in a capital conviction would not redound beneficially to a prisoner's subsequent collateral challenge to the later capital sentence. This was precisely our position in Phillips where we stated: Should such proceeding ... succeed in overturning the conviction, then relief should be sought in Mississippi. Phillips, 421 So.2d at 482. If prior to Johnson II relief was unavailing as suggested by the dissenting opinion, why did we state in Phillips that it should be sought? But suppose this was the thinking, does this make Johnson II an intervening decision which actually adversely affects the outcome of Culberson's conviction or sentence? We think not. An examination of the facts shows that Culberson is attacking his seventeen-year-old guilty plea because he was not advised concerning the maximum sentence or the elements of his crime, and, therefore, was without understanding of the nature and consequences of his plea. In the trial court, he relied primarily on Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969) as his basis for relief. What he considered the law to be prior to Johnson II should have no bearing on the outcome of his case. Surely, he was presumed to know the statutory limitations of our UPCCRA. In Johnson II, the United States Supreme Court reversed the conviction and death penalty imposed by Johnson I after the New York court's invalidation of his prior New York voidable conviction properly challenged in a proceeding conceded by the State to raise appealable issues with possible merit. People v. Johnson, 69 N.Y.2d 339, 514 N.Y.S.2d 324, 506 N.E.2d 1177 (1977). The New York court's opinion states, in part: [D]efendant ... seeks reversal of a 1963 New York assault conviction which was used as an aggravating factor at the sentencing phase of the Mississippi trial... . The defendant argues and the People concede the passage of time does not bar appeal.       [T]he People concede that ... defendant has raised appealable issues with possible merit. Johnson, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 324-25, 506 N.E.2d at 1177-78. It is crystal clear from the record that Johnson did not think that a successful attack on his prior conviction was unavailing. In any event, each case of an alleged voidable conviction must stand or fall on applicable circumstances. In People v. Johnson , the New York prosecutorial authorities conceded appealable issues with possible merit. Such concession is not present in this case. Moreover, the majority's ruling permits anyone having a prior conviction used as an aggravating factor at the sentencing phase or for enhanced punishment to use a Rip Van Winkle approach to circumvent plain statutory prescription of our post-conviction collateral relief act. It has been suggested that the post-conviction collateral relief statute may be read to include a decision adversely affecting the relationship between the sentence under attack and the sentence presently served or given effect. We could arrive at such a construction, however, only by adding words and meaning to the statute contrary to its intent and purpose. The statute plainly states that an exception to its limitations period is restricted to an intervening decision which would actually adversely affect the outcome of the conviction or sentence. To adopt Culberson's argument would require us to rewrite the statute. We are unwilling to engage in such blatant judicial legislation. Culberson's capital murder conviction or sentence cannot be actually adversely affected unless and until his prior conviction used as an aggravating factor is properly and successfully challenged. In Baugh v. Lane, 722 F. Supp. 525 (C.D.Ill. 1989), the petitioner plead guilty to murder and was sentenced on July 6, 1977. Baugh never appealed this conviction nor sought any post-conviction remedy. He subsequently plead guilty and was sentenced on seven (7) federal charges involving the illegal use of weapons. After successfully challenging the federal convictions and serving his federal time, Baugh was transferred to Illinois prison officials to serve his state time. Almost eleven (11) years after the state guilty plea and sentence, Baugh sought review of his case. He claimed that the guilty plea was involuntary due, among other related grounds, to his lack of understanding of the charge against him and the required mental state for a murder conviction. The District Court first found that the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act would preclude state review of Baugh's claims in that Baugh failed to comply with the act's statute of limitations. 722 F. Supp. at 529. Baugh's sole excuse for not filing a timely petition was [p]etitioner is a lay person and not knowledgeable to the law. The Court found the excuse wholly insufficient. The opinion stated: Petitioner's pro se status and ignorance of the law alone are wholly insufficient to establish cause. These grounds did not succeed in United States ex rel. Stewart v. Ragen, 231 F.2d 312, 314 (7th Cir.1956), where petitioner [sought] to excuse his failure to exhaust his State Court remedies by reference to his lack of education, his failure to understand legal proceedings, and a prison rule prohibiting one inmate from assisting another in preparing legal proceedings. Assuming the truth of such allegations, we do not think they enlarge his right to a federal habeas corpus. See also Vasquez v. Lockhart, 867 F.2d 1056, 1058 (8th Cir.1988), cert. denied, [490] U.S. [1100], 109 S.Ct. 2453, 104 L.Ed.2d 1007 (1989) (holding that pro se status and unfamiliarity with the English language and the United States court system do not establish cause); Smittie v. Lockhart, 843 F.2d 295, 298 (8th Cir. 1988); (petitioner's pro se status and ninth grade education do not establish cause); Hughes v. Idaho State Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 908-09 (9th Cir.1986) (petitioner's pro se status, illiteracy and lack of assistance in writing and filing court papers do not constitute cause); Bennett v. Fortner, 863 F.2d 804, 808 n. 5 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, [490] U.S. [1071], 109 S.Ct. 2077, 104 L.Ed.2d 641 (1989) (similar); and Alexander v. Dugger, 841 F.2d 371, 374 n. 3 (11th Cir.1988) (similar); compare Strickland v. Marshall, 632 F. Supp. 590, 598-99 (S.D.Ohio), app. dismissed, 803 F.2d 721 (6th Cir.1986). Baugh at 531-32. Logic, reason, our UPCCRA, and judicial authority tell us that Johnson II is not an intervening decision.
The appellant seeks to bring heavy constitutional armament into action in its attempt to convince us that the legislature has provided the State with a statute which fails to meet constitutional muster. We are afforded a bountiful legal feast with an entree merging our coram nobis procedure with constitutional habeas corpus, flavored with newly expanded theories of inherent judicial power, and garnished with due process constraints. We decline the treat because this issue has been decided against the appellant and is controlled by our recent pronouncements in Cole v. State, 608 So.2d 1313 (Miss. 1992). Having found that Culberson's claim does not fall within an exception to the three-year limitation period prescribed in § 99-39-5(2), we affirm. LOWER COURT'S DENIAL OF MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF AFFIRMED. ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., and HAWKINS and DAN M. LEE, P.JJ., concur. BANKS, J., dissents with separate written opinion joined by PRATHER and SULLIVAN, JJ. PITTMAN, J., not participating. ROBERTS, J., not participating according to Supreme Court Internal Rules.