Opinion ID: 1107735
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Was quo warranto the proper form of action given Reed's pardon?

Text: Reed's first argument on appeal is that quo warranto was an improper form of action in this case because, he says, his pardon in Georgia cured any statutory impediments to his holding elective state office. Alternatively, Reed argues that the proper method to test the right to hold an elective state office is under Alabama's election-contest statute, Ala.Code 1975, § 17-15-1 et seq. Alabama's quo warranto statute, Ala. Code 1975, § 6-6-591, provides, in pertinent part: (a) An action may be commenced in the name of the state against the party offending in the following cases: (1) When any person usurps, intrudes into or unlawfully holds or exercises any public office, civil or military, any franchise, any profession requiring a license, certificate, or other legal authorization within this state of any office in a corporation created by the authority of this state; (2) When any public officer, civil or military, has done or suffered any act by which, under the law, he forfeits his office; . . . . (b) The judge of the circuit court may direct the action to be commenced when he believes that any of the acts specified in subsection (a) of this section can be proved and it is necessary for the public good, or it may be commenced without the direction of such judge on the information of any person giving security for the costs of the action, to be approved by the clerk of the court in which the action is brought. (c) An action under this section must be commenced in the circuit court of the county in which the acts are done or suffered. . . .  The foregoing provisions must be read in conjunction with Ala.Code 1975, § 36-2-1(a), which provides, in part: (a) The following persons shall be ineligible to and disqualified from holding office under the authority of this state: (1) Those who are not qualified electors, except as otherwise expressly provided; . . . . (3) Those who shall have been convicted of treason, embezzlement of public funds, malfeasance in office, larceny, bribery or any other crime punishable by imprisonment in the state or federal penitentiary and those who are idiots or insane. . . .  The plain reading of § 36-2-1(a)(3) is that a person convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment in the state penitentiary is ineligible to hold state office. In interpreting a predecessor statute to § 36-2-1(a)(3), this Court held that `ineligible'. . . . means inelectable  that is, not capable of being chosen  and hence the qualifications enumerated relate to the date of election, and not merely to the date of actual induction into office.  Finklea v. Farish, 160 Ala. 230, 237, 49 So. 366[, 368 (1909) ]. Shepherd v. Sartain, 185 Ala. 439, 446, 64 So. 57, 61 (1913). In State ex rel. Sokira v. Burr, 580 So.2d 1340 (Ala.1991), this Court held that a convicted felon who has been pardoned before being elected to and assuming public office was eligible to hold elected office in Alabama. However, that is not the issue presented in this case. In this case Reed had not been pardoned, when elected, of the felony he had been convicted of. Reed remained unpardoned when he assumed office, and under § 36-2-1(a)(3) he was ineligible to seek or assume that office. This finding that Reed was ineligible to seek or to hold office leads to an examination of the quo warranto statute to determine whether that statute provides the proper procedural method by which to remove Reed from office. Section 6-6-591(a)(1) provides that an action may be brought on behalf of the State [w]hen any person usurps, intrudes into or unlawfully holds or exercises any public office. . . . To usurp is to seize unlawfully and assume another's position, office, or authority. See, e.g., Black's Law Dictionary 1580 (8th ed.2004). Although Reed argues that the quo warranto statute should be used in snapshot fashion, focusing on a particular instant in time when the facts were most favorably disposed toward him, usurp clearly indicates that the disqualifying circumstance attaches when it arises and that it is continuing in nature. See, e.g., Shepherd, supra. Reed's usurpation of office occurred when he assumed an office he was ineligible to hold. By assuming that office he usurped the right of a legally qualified candidate to do so. Reed did not reveal his felony conviction and thereby Reed denied the electors of Russell County the right to make a choice from among a slate of legally qualified candidates. Having usurped his office initially, Reed's usurpation continued for the entire one-and-one-half year term he served before he was removed from office, because during that entire term he deprived someone else who was lawfully entitled to the office at the time of the election from holding it. Reed argues, however, that when this action was filed he had been pardoned and that he was therefore qualified to continue to hold the office of county commissioner. Reed contends that Reed v. Board of Trustees for Alabama State University, 778 So.2d 791 (Ala.2000), supports his contention that his pardon cured his ineligibility to hold office. Reed involved a dispute relating to the eligibility to hold office of someone appointed by the governor to the Board of Trustees for Alabama State University. The governing statute, § 16-50-20(a), provided that `[n]o member of the governing board or employee or student of any public post-secondary institution . . . shall be eligible to serve on the board [of trustees for Alabama State University].' Reed, 778 So.2d at 793 (emphasis omitted). Parker, who served on the Board, had during part of her service on the Board been employed at another postsecondary educational institution, but had resigned that position before the challenge to her service on the Board of Trustees for Alabama State was filed. This Court recognized that Parker had sometime served on the Board in violation of § 16-50-20(a) but found that her resignation from the other postsecondary institution had cured her disqualification. The Court found that under the specific language of the statute, Parker may have been ineligible to serve while she was employed at the other institution, but she was not ineligible for appointment to the Board. The Court stated that the disability . . . does not attach to the appointment, but merely follows the Board member's service. 778 So.2d at 794. As we have discussed above, our cases hold that a person disqualified from holding public office pursuant to § 36-2-1(a)(3) is ineligible to seek as well as to hold that office; thus, the disability created by § 36-2-1(a)(3) attaches at the inception of holding that office and cannot, with reference to that term of office, be cured thereafter. Reed did not involve elected public office under § 36-2-1(a)(3), and it is not controlling here. [2] It is the settled law of this State that a quo warranto proceeding is the proper remedy to determine whether a party is usurping a public office. See, e.g., Talton v. Dickinson, 261 Ala. 11, 72 So.2d 723 (1954). This Court has also stated that [i]t is well established that the remedy [of quo warranto] lies to challenge a person's right to hold office based on grounds of ineligibility. State ex rel. James v. Reed, 364 So.2d 303, 305 (Ala. 1978). We find that quo warranto was the proper form of action on the facts of this case. [3]