Opinion ID: 2595540
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Postmurder burglary of Canto's house

Text: The court also excluded evidence that seven weeks after the Allen murders, police caught and prevented burglars from taking furniture from Canto's house on West Marine Avenue, and that when notified of the attempted burglary of his home, Canto, who had only briefly returned to the house since being released from the hospital, told the police he was not interested in anything in the house and would not press charges. This evidence, defendant argues, challenged the critical element of the prosecution's case for robbery: that Allen's missing jewelry was taken at the time of the murders. Several rings Allen always wore were missing when she was found dead. Some of her fingernails were broken, suggesting she engaged in a struggle in the house before she died. The prosecution argued that it was reasonable to conclude that the killer took the missing rings. Defendant points out there was no inventory taken of the contents of the house after the murders, and argues that the proffered evidence of the postmurder burglary attempt was relevant to raise the possibility that the rings were not taken at the time of the murders, but were left in the house and later taken during the burglary. The trial court properly excluded this evidence. The fact of an unsuccessful attempt to burglarize Canto's abandoned house weeks after the murders does not alone raise a reasonable inference that the missing rings were left in the house following the murders. Moreover, the court had discretion to exclude the evidence under Evidence Code section 352 even if we assume it had some marginal relevance. Even if we were to find the court abused its discretion in excluding any or all of the proffered exculpatory evidence including the statements of Walford and James and the prior burglary attempt, defendant has failed to establish a reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome in the absence of the error. At most, the additional evidence the jury would have heard was of marginal value. Indeed, for these reasons, we would find any error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705.) Defendant also argues the court impermissibly conditioned the admissibility of this proffered evidence on his testifying. Because he failed to raise this objection at trial (Evid.Code, § 354; People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 108, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 271, 82 P.3d 296), defendant forfeited this argument on appeal. Moreover, the claim is without merit. The court did not suggest that the proffered evidence would become admissible only if defendant testified. Rather, the court indicated that as offered, it was irrelevant, but if defendant offered other evidence, such as his own testimony, demonstrating Canto was a drug dealer, the court would revisit the admissibility and relevance of the proffered evidence.