Opinion ID: 2637325
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Willard's Wrongful Discharge and Breach-of-Contract Claims

Text: Willard's amended complaint asserts that Khotol is liable for wrongful discharge and breach of his employment contract. Both claims rely on a theory that Willard could only be fired for just cause and was entitled to certain job protections, including an opportunity to dispute his termination through company grievance procedures. In support of this theory, Willard relies primarily on our decision in Jones v. Central Peninsula General Hospital [20] and language in Khotol's employee manual to argue that the manual fostered a reasonable expectation that he could only be legally discharged for cause. In granting Khotol summary judgment on these claims, the superior court compared the facts of this case to Jones and concluded that, unlike the provisions of the manual at issue in Jones, certain disclaimers in Khotol's manual and Khotol's employment application made it clear that, as a matter of law, Willard remained an at-will employee. The superior court thus concluded that the manual did not affect Willard's at-will status, so he could be legally discharged with or without just cause. On appeal, Willard contends that the superior court improperly distinguished Jones and renews his argument that the manual, taken as a whole, fostered a reasonable expectation that he could only be fired for cause and was entitled to certain procedural job protections. While Jones recognized that personnel manuals can sometimes modify at-will employment agreements by creating expectations of specific job protections, we conclude that Jones has no bearing on Willard's case because uncontroverted evidence establishes that Willard was still a probationary employee. Khotol's employee manual unambiguously provided that, as such, he could be fired at any time during his first three months of employment if his attitude, habits, attendance or job performance did not measure up to Khotol's standards. Willard was on the job for only six weeks before being fired. The Khotol manual defines the probation period as extending for 90 days, commencing on the date of hire, during which time the employee must demonstrate the ability to perform the job. The manual further describes probation as a try-out time for both employee and employer, during which the company may dismiss the employer for reasons related to work habits, attitude, attendance or performance. The manual's only guarantee to probationary employees is that they will receive several evaluations of their job performance during the ninety-day period, followed by a final review at the end of probation. Willard contends that, even though he fell within the manual's description of a probationary employee, Khotol did not regard him as having probationary status. He disputes his probationary status on three specific grounds: he notes that company officials never told him he was on probation; he asserts that he never received probationary evaluations; and he points out that he received holiday pay for July 4, contrary to the manual's statement that probationary employees are not eligible for such pay. Willard's arguments are unpersuasive. Nothing in the manual suggests that new employees must be told that they are on probationary status before they fall into that category; instead, the manual classifies all new employees as probationary workers. Moreover, Khotol's alleged failure to give Willard an evaluation during his six weeks on the job does not support a reasonable inference that he was not on probation. While the manual promises several evaluations during the ninety-day probation period, it does not specify when the evaluations must occur within the ninety-day period. Likewise Willard's unexplained receipt of holiday pay for July 4th does not support a reasonable expectation of non-probationary status. Courts in other jurisdictions have generally recognized that, absent specific contractual protections, probationary employees may be dismissed for any non-discriminatory reason or no reason at all. [21] Similarly, we have consistently recognized that in the absence of statutory or contractual provisions to the contrary, probationary employees traditionally are accorded minimal procedural and substantive job protections. [22] In sum, Willard's attempt to raise claims under Jones for wrongful discharge and breach of contract fails as a matter of law because Khotol's employee manual unequivocally made him a probationary employee and gave him no right or reasonable expectation of a right to pursue these claims. We thus affirm the superior court's decision on these claims.