Opinion ID: 1351466
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Request a Kelly-Frye Hearing

Text: (24) Defendant also claims ineffective assistance from defense counsel's failure to request a Kelly-Frye hearing on the admissibility of evidence obtained through electrophoresis. (See ante, pt. II.H.) In his declaration defense counsel advances the following rationale for his failure to raise a Kelly-Frye objection: (1) he believed the court would probably admit the evidence at the close of such a hearing; [5] (2) he decided he would rather put Dr. Grunbaum on as a witness once, to gain some advantage of surprise over the prosecutor, instead of giving the prosecutor the opportunity to thoroughly examine him before he testified in front of the jury; and (3) Dr. Grunbaum appeared to be a somewhat reluctant witness, and defense counsel was uncertain that he would agree to testify twice. Whatever the ultimate wisdom of this strategic decision, it was not so unreasonable as to deprive defendant of his constitutional right to counsel. We cannot say that counsel did not rationally weigh the risks and benefits of his strategy, based on information presented to him and on his experience as an attorney, and conclude that the strategic advantage to be had by surprising the prosecutor with Dr. Grunbaum's testimony outweighed the perceivedly slight chance of having the evidence excluded, either by the trial court or subsequently on appeal. We conclude therefore that defense counsel's performance was not deficient. Furthermore, even if deficient performance were found, and even if it were reasonably probable that defendant would have succeeded in excluding the electrophoretic evidence, there is no reasonable probability that the outcome of the case would have been different. The evidence against defendant, though circumstantial, was very strong. First, it is undisputed that defendant was in the apartment below the victim's on the night of the murder, and left 45 minutes to an hour before the murder took place. Although Gary Eisenhauer claimed he saw defendant walk away from the apartment building after defendant had left the party, there was considerable reason to doubt Eisenhauer's credibility because of his association with defendant; in any event, such testimony is not inconsistent with placing defendant at the murder scene. It was also clear from the evidence that the murderer was someone, like defendant, who was well known to the victim. Monique would have had to unlock the deadbolt to permit the murderer access to her apartment, probably looking through the peephole first, a habit to which Lynn Celestin testified. There was no sign of forced entry, other than the force that occurred when Eisenhauer kicked open the door shortly after the murder. That the murderer was known to the victim is also apparent from the victim's calling her assailant by name  a name of probably two syllables beginning with the letter R, according to the next-door neighbor who overheard Monique plead with the murderer. Defendant was using the alias of Ron at the time, and there is conflicting testimony as to whether he was sometimes called Ronnie. Perhaps the most damaging testimony was given by Paula Struppa, defendant's friend during that period. Struppa testified that defendant went to the victim's apartment the day before the murder to obtain some telephone numbers that the victim's mother had in her possession; one of the numbers he had written down was for a Bob. Defendant left the apartment with several telephone numbers written on scraps of paper and supposedly never returned. Yet at the murder scene three notes in defendant's handwriting, including a note containing the telephone number of a Bob, were found. Joan and Lynn Celestin testified there were no notes or scraps of paper on the floor of the apartment when they left earlier that evening. The People theorized that the notes had fallen from defendant's pockets when he lowered his pants to compel the victim to orally copulate him. Other physical evidence also pointed to defendant. Bloodstains, some matching the victim's blood type but not defendant's, were found on defendant's shirt. Struppa testified she had given that shirt to defendant the previous day and that it was not bloodstained at the time. Marks on defendant's left hand were consistent with gouge marks that could have been made from the victim's fingernails as she struggled to save herself from strangulation. Abrasions on defendant's leg above and below the knee were consistent, as explained above, with the friction of defendant's pants' lining rubbing against his leg as he struggled to force the victim to orally copulate him. Defendant's case, on the other hand, was extremely weak. Defense testimony on the age of the abrasions was undermined by the defense witness's own admission that, as a dermatologist, his speculation on the cause of the injuries lay outside his field and properly belonged to the sphere of the forensic pathologist. This testimony was further discredited by the evidence of defendant's attempt to explain a fresh leg injury to police detectives shortly after the murder. Moreover, taped excerpts of defendant's response to police questions shortly after the murder strongly suggest that defendant fabricated an alibi, i.e., that he went to the house of Charles Smart and Paula Struppa after he left the party. Such a fabrication evinces a consciousness of guilt. The other part of defendant's alibi, that he slept in David Pelletier's car, was uncorroborated and, even if true, was not inconsistent with his having murdered Monique earlier that morning. Defendant also asserted, in explanation of the presence of his notes in the victim's apartment when her body was found, that they might have come from a bowl containing slips of paper with names and telephone numbers that Joan kept on the kitchen table, and that the notes had somehow fallen to the floor. But there is no evidence that such a bowl existed in the apartment; on the contrary, Joan seems to have kept her list of important names and telephone numbers on a large file card, from which defendant copied the number of Bob and others on the day before the murder. In sum, considering the totality of the evidence, we believe there is no reasonable possibility that without the electrophoretic evidence the outcome of the trial would have been affected, and defendant has therefore failed to carry his burden to prove ineffective assistance of counsel. We accordingly reject his claims of such ineffective assistance and deny his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.