Opinion ID: 333214
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: submission of the insanity issue to the jury

Text: 10 Appellant's second contention on appeal is that the district court committed reversible error in allowing the insanity issue to go to the jury. Specifically, he argues that the government failed to produce any evidence to contest one of the necessary elements of an insanity defense as defined in this Circuit, and that hence the district court should have directed a verdict of acquittal at the close of appellant's case. 11 There is no doubt that appellant raised the issue of his sanity at the time of the offense; consequently, the government had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that he was sane at the time of the alleged crime. Brock v. United States, 387 F.2d 254, 257 (5th Cir. 1967). This Court, however, has never empirically defined the amount of evidence necessary to constitute 'sufficiency' for purposes of submitting the issue of sanity to the jury, but instead has stated that each case must be decided on its own facts, and that the quantum and nature of proof the government must offer depends upon the quantum and nature of proof the defendant offers. Nagell v. United States, 392 F.2d 934, 937 (5th Cir. 1968). 12 The test for insanity in this Circuit is substantially the one proposed by the ALI in the Model Penal Code, and which has also been adopted by the Second, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits: 2 13 '(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. 14 (2) As used in this Article, the terms 'mental disease or defect' do not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct.' 15 Blake v. United States, 407 F.2d 908, 916 (5th Cir. 1969) (En Banc). Thus, under Blake, once it has been established that the defendant is indeed suffering from a mental disease or defect, the remainder of the test is a disjunctive one--the defense must then prove either that the disease rendered the defendant incapable of appreciating the wrongfulness of his conduct, or that it rendered him incapable of conforming his conduct to the requirements of the law. The defense may choose to put only one of these latter 'capacity' elements into issue, or it may elect to proceed on both of them, as was the case here. 16 At trial, appellant's attorney offered the testimony of two court-appointed psychiatrists, both of whom stated that appellant was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia. This diagnosis was not contested by the government's psychiatrist, Dr. Clary. The two psychiatrists offered by the defense also testified that appellant's mental illnes rendered him incapable of appreciating the wrongfulness of his acts, and one of them, Dr. appellant's mental illness rendered him appellant was incapable of conforming his conduct to the requirements of the law. In response to this testimony, the government psychiatrist, Dr. Clary, stated that in his opinion appellant 'did know right from wrong' and 'could have conformed his conduct to the law.' 17 Appellant has contended that Dr. Clary's statement that appellant 'did know right from wrong' did not constitute a refutation of the first element of the Blake test since Dr. Clary phrased his answer in terms of the old McNaghten standard 3 of 'knowing' right from wrong, rather than 'having the capacity' to comprehend the wrongfulness of one's actions. This argument, however, does not hold up under scrutiny since a person who, although suffering from a mental disease or defect such as paranoid schizophrenia, knows the difference between right and wrong is, a fortiori, capable of appreciating such a legal distinction. Cf. United States v. Parks, 460 F.2d 736, 743 (5th Cir. 1972). 4 Thus, contrary to appellant's assertion, the government did present evidence to controvert that offered by the defense on both elements of the Blake test, and this Court finds that that evidence was of sufficient quality and weight to justify submitting the issue of appellant's sanity to the jury. 18