Opinion ID: 2633509
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 27

Heading: Lack of a Jury Unanimity Requirement

Text: For essentially the same reasons we rejected the previous claim, we also disagree with defendant that our statute is unconstitutional because it does not require jurors to agree unanimously on the existence of particular factors in aggravation. (Accord, e.g., People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 466, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391; People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 214, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 825 P.2d 781.) While all the jurors must agree death is the appropriate penalty, the guided discretion through which jurors reach their penalty decision must permit each juror individually to assess such potentially aggravating factors as the circumstances of the capital crime (§ 190.3, factor (a)), prior felony convictions ( id., factor (c)), and other violent criminal activity ( id., factor (b)), and decide for him- or herself what weight that activity should be given in deciding the penalty. ( People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 774, 239 Cal.Rptr. 82, 739 P.2d 1250.) The series of normative judgments involved in deciding whether a particular circumstance is indeed aggravating and, if so, what weight it should be given, cannot be fitted into a scheme of unanimous jury fact finding. Defendant's contention is premised on a misunderstand[ing] [of] the penalty determination process. ( People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 99, 241 Cal.Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127.)