Opinion ID: 2543636
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the eyewitness identifications were constitutionally reliable

Text: ¶ 26 The Due Process Clause of the Utah Constitution bars the admission of unreliable eyewitness identifications. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 779-80 (Utah 1991) (concluding that the standard for admissibility of eyewitness identifications under Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution diverges from the standard under the federal Due Process Clause). The reliability of an eyewitness identification depends on the following five factors: (1) [T]he opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the event; (2) the witness's degree of attention to the actor at the time of the event; (3) the witness's capacity to observe the event, including his or her physical and mental acuity; (4) whether the witness's identification was made spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter, or whether it was the product of suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event being observed and the likelihood that the witness would perceive, remember and relate it correctly. Id. at 781 (internal quotation and citation omitted). ¶ 27 The trial court assessed these factors and concluded that the eyewitness identifications were sufficiently reliable to be admitted at Hollen's trial. Challenging this conclusion, Hollen claims that the eyewitness identifications were unreliable and thus their admission at trial violated his right to due process under the Utah Constitution.
¶ 28 In reviewing a trial court's decision to admit an eyewitness identification, we defer to the trial court's fact-finding role by viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the trial court's decision to admit and by reversing its factual findings only if they are against the clear weight of the evidence. Id. at 782. However, we review for correctness whether the facts are sufficient to demonstrate reliability, since this is a question of law. Id.
¶ 29 In reviewing the trial court's analysis of the identifications, we consider each Ramirez factor in turn. Where Hollen challenges one of the trial court's pertinent factual findings, we review it for clear error. Then, to guide our assessment of whether the facts are sufficient to demonstrate reliability, id., we compare the identifications in this case to the identification in Ramirez that was deemed constitutionally reliable. Id. at 784. Finally, relying on our analysis of each Ramirez factor, we assess the overall reliability of the identifications.
¶ 30 Under this factor, pertinent circumstances include the length of time the witness viewed the actor; the distance between the witness and the actor; whether the witness could view the actor's face; the lighting or lack of it; whether there were distracting noises or activity during the observation; and any other circumstances affecting the witness's opportunity to observe the actor. Id. at 782.
¶ 31 Following the testimony of Contreras, Livolsi, Channing Jones, and Pittman at the pretrial suppression hearing, the trial court found that the length of time of face to face or close contact observation [of the actor by the witnesses] ranged from one to three minutes to potentially up to ten minutes. Thus, the eyewitnesses in this case viewed the actor for a comparable or greater length of time and at a generally closer distance than the eyewitness in Ramirez, who claimed at various times to have viewed the actor for `a few seconds' or `a second' to `a minute' or longer, and whose testimony that he viewed the actor from ten feet conflicted with that of another witness who indicated the distance actually was up to thirty feet. Id.
¶ 32 Although the trial court found that the actor's face was clearly observed by each of the four witnesses, there is no dispute that the actor's disguise obscured certain details of his face. Specifically, the sunglasses covered the actor's eyes and part of the side of his face, and the fake mustache obscured his upper lip. On the other hand, the disguise did not prevent the witnesses from viewing other parts of the actor's face, such as his lower lip, nose, cheeks, and the lower portion of the forehead. ¶ 33 In Ramirez, a scarf cover[ed] most of the actor's face. Id. at 776. As a result of this disguise, the eyewitness could observe only the actor's eyes, and only well enough to note that they were small. Id. at 782. Thus, the disguise in the instant case obscured less of the actor's face than the disguise in Ramirez.
¶ 34 Additionally, the trial court noted that the witnesses viewed the disguised robber under the sunlight of a summer morning and under office lighting. The lighting conditions in Ramirez were less conducive to reliable observations: the observations occurred at nighttime in the parking lot of a fast food restaurant. Id. at 776, 783 (noting that although witnesses generally described lighting as good, on occasion[] they described it as poor and stated that the gunman was in a shadowy area).
¶ 35 Finally, in both this case and Ramirez, the presence of a second actor partially diverted the eyewitnesses' attention. ¶ 36 Overall, then, the relevant circumstances indicate that Contreras, Livolsi, Channing Jones, and Pittman had a better opportunity than the Ramirez witness to observe the actor at issue.
¶ 37 We next turn to the second Ramirez factor, the eyewitnesses' degree of attention to the actor at the time of the event. Id. at 781. In the case now before us, the trial court found that the witnesses' degree of attention, while somewhat varying, was concentrated on the identification of the two parties perpetrating the robbery, particularly after the weapon was shown and threatening comments were made, and up to and including the time when they were secured . . . . ¶ 38 Certainly, the presence of the second robber necessarily diverted some of the eyewitnesses' attention from the disguised robber. However, this diversion pales in comparison to the diversion created by the accomplice in Ramirez, who was swinging a pipe at the witness and threatening him during the witness's observations of the defendant. Id. at 783. ¶ 39 Overall, the eyewitnesses' degree of attention in this case exceeded that of the Ramirez witness.
¶ 40 We next turn to the third Ramirez factor, the witnesses' capacity to observe. Id. Here, relevant circumstances include whether the witness's capacity to observe was impaired by stress or fright at the time of the observation, by personal motivations, biases, or prejudices, by uncorrected visual defects, or by fatigue, injury, drugs, or alcohol. Id. at 783. ¶ 41 In this regard, the trial court concluded that the witnesses' capacity to observe was unimpaired. Specifically, although the trial court acknowledged that the witnesses experienced fear during the robbery, the court found that this did not interfere with their capacity to observe. In addition, the court found no evidence that the witnesses harbored any bias or prejudice against Hollen, or that fatigue or mind-altering substances affected their capacity to observe. ¶ 42 The circumstances in Ramirez, on the other hand, presented relatively greater concerns that fear, stress, or injury affected the witness's capacity to observe. In contrast to the situation here, where only a generalized threat of physical injury existed, the witness in Ramirez was physically assaulted with a pipe during a struggle with one of the assailants. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783. Furthermore, after this struggle, the witness overheard one of the assailants tell the other to shoot and kill the witness if he caused any more problems. Id. at 776, 783. ¶ 43 Thus, the circumstances indicate that Contreras, Livolsi, Channing Jones, and Pittman had a greater capacity to observe than the Ramirez witness.
¶ 44 Under the fourth Ramirez factor, relevant circumstances include the length of time that passed between the witness's observation at the time of the event and the identification of defendant; the witness's mental capacity and state of mind at the time of the identification; the witness's exposure to opinions, descriptions, identifications, or other information from other sources; instances when the witness or other eyewitnesses to the event failed to identify defendant; instances when the witness or other eyewitnesses gave a description of the actor that is inconsistent with defendant; and the circumstances under which defendant was presented to the witness for identification. Id. at 783.
¶ 45 Approximately two months lapsed between the robbery and Channing Jones's and Contreras's identifications of Hollen from the photo array; the lineup identifications occurred approximately one year and three months after the robbery. ¶ 46 In contrast, the Ramirez witness identified the actor thirty minutes to an hour after the crime at a show up, so the elapsed time was [comparatively] minimal. Id. at 783.
¶ 47 Regarding this subfactor, the trial court concluded that the mental capacity of the witnesses was impressive.... We further note that the witnesses had at least two months to recover from the stress of the robbery before their identifications. ¶ 48 In Ramirez, although we had some concerns that the witness might still be somewhat agitated when he identified the actor within an hour of the robbery, we found his state of mind did not otherwise influence his identification. Id. at 783.
¶ 49 Regarding the possibility that outside influence tainted the witnesses' identifications, the trial court found that the evidence tends to show there was not [sic] exposure to other opinions regarding the identification of the defendant at least until after the lineup. ¶ 50 In challenging this factual finding, Hollen first points out that Livolsi and Pittman saw the composite that Channing Jones and Contreras helped prepare the day of the robbery. Hollen claims, in effect, that Livolsi's and Pittman's later identifications of Hollen were unconsciously based on their exposure to the composite rather than their own independent recollection of the disguised robber. Hollen's claim is not supported by the clear weight of the evidence, however. To the contrary, the evidence shows Livolsi and Pittman had an opportunity to observe the disguised robber on the day of the robbery. In addition, the court noted that the witnesses themselves had indicated that their identifications were not based on outside influence. Thus, the trial court did not clearly err in discounting the significance of the witnesses' exposure to the composite. ¶ 51 Hollen also points out that Channing Jones told Livolsi about seeing the disguised man, whom Jones later identified as Hollen, on television. However, we see little evidence that Livolsi based his subsequent identification on this conversation. Indeed, Hollen does not claim that Livolsi ever saw the television report or otherwise gained insights about Hollen's appearance from his conversations with Channing Jones. At most, Jones's assertions may have caused Livolsi to expect that the lineup would include the disguised robber, but this possibility seems rather remote given that the lineup occurred one year after the television report. ¶ 52 Thus, the circumstances in this case are similar to the situation in Ramirez, where there also was little concern that the eyewitness identification was derivative of another witness's identification: in Ramirez, at the time of the identification, the witness knew only that police believed that the defendant matched the description of the suspect, and that another victim had not identified the suspect as one of the assailants. Id. at 783.
¶ 53 This subfactor clearly favors the eyewitness identifications in this case. The trial court found the consistency with which the[] witnesses have identified Hollen as the masked robber to be quite remarkable. Indeed, Contreras identified Hollen from the photo array, at the in-person lineup, and at trial; Livolsi and Pittman identified Hollen at the in-person lineup and at trial; and Channing Jones identified Hollen when he saw him on television, from the photo array, and at trial. Peterson and Janae Jones, for their part, picked both Hollen and another person at the lineup, although both opined the other person was the assailant. Thus, four of the six witnesses to the robbery consistently identified Hollen as the disguised robber. ¶ 54 In contrast, only one of the three eyewitnesses in Ramirez was able to identify the defendant. Id. at 783.
¶ 55 We next consider the consistency of the witnesses' descriptions of the disguised robber. Although the trial court made no specific findings in this regard, the record reveals some variation in the witnesses' descriptions of the disguised robber. For example, in contrast to the other witnesses, Pittman did not describe the disguised robber as wearing sunglasses. Moreover, unlike the other witnesseswho described the disguised robber as wearing a white t-shirt or tank top, and his accomplice as wearing a sweatshirtLivolsi remembered the disguised robber as wearing the sweatshirt. ¶ 56 In Ramirez, the descriptions [were also] somewhat confused. Id. For example, at a suppression hearing, the Ramirez witness initially stated positively that the actor wore no hat. This assertion conflicted with (1) another eyewitness's recollection that the actor wore a baseball cap, (2) the witness's later testimony at trial that he was unsure as to whether the actor wore a hat, (3) and the fact that the Ramirez defendant was wearing a baseball cap when taken into custody shortly after the robbery. Id. at 784. The inconsistencies regarding the hat were troubling because the witness claimed to have identified [the defendant] principally by his eyes, . . . [and a hat] would seem to affect a witness's view of the gunman's eyes. Id. ¶ 57 In contrast, the inconsistencies regarding the sunglasses and clothing in this case seem less consequential. Indeed, although Pittman did not describe the actor as wearing sunglasses, she did not claim to have identified Hollen based on his eyes. Similarly, Livolsi, who differed with the other witnesses regarding the actor's clothing, did not claim to have relied on what Hollen was wearing at the lineup in identifying him.
¶ 58 Concerning the suggestibility of the identification process, the trial court found that the photo array depicted six individuals with similar characteristics. Hollen disputes this conclusion, noting that Dr. Dodd opined that only three of the pictures matched the description of the disguised robber. However, Detective Dalling testified that to ensure Hollen did not stand out from anyone else, he had selected photographs where the age range, the shape of the chin, the shape of the head, the basic features of each one were similar. Under the circumstances, we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err when, after examining the photographs for itself, it resolved these conflicting opinions in the State's favor. We also note that Dalling told Contreras and Channing Jones, the two witnesses who participated in the photo array identification procedure, that the array may or may not include the disguised robber. Such a precaution further reduces concerns over suggestibility. ¶ 59 Significantly, even if we were to accept Dr. Dodd's opinion that the array presented only three meaningful choices, this case would still compare favorably to Ramirez, where the witness identified the defendant at a blatant[ly] suggestive[] show up: The identification took place on the street in the middle of the night. Ramirez, with dark complexion and long hair, was the only person at the show up who was not a police officer. He stood with his hands cuffed to a chain link fence behind his back. The headlights of several police cars were trained on him. The witnesses viewed him from the back seat of a police car. And while the remarks of the police officers prior to the show up were to the effect that they had apprehended someone who fit the description of one of the robbers may not of themselves be unnecessarily suggestive, they must be considered as part of the circumstances surrounding the identification. Id.
¶ 60 The final Ramirez factor, whether the nature of the event was such that the witness would perceive, remember, and relate it correctly, includes such considerations as whether the event was an ordinary one in the mind of the observer during the time it was observed, and whether the race of the actor was the same as the observer's. Id. at 781. ¶ 61 Regarding this factor, the trial court concluded that the nature of the event tended to focus the attention of the witnesses on what was occurring. Although not specifically mentioned by the trial court, we note that Contreras and Livolsi, like the Ramirez witness, were aware from the outset that a robbery was taking place, id.; Channing Jones and Pittman apparently did not initially recognize the situation as a robbery, however, which may have caused them to initially pay relatively less attention to the robbers. ¶ 62 Regarding the second consideration included under this factor, neither party in this case alleges that racial similarity enhanced the reliability of the identifications or that racial differences detracted from the reliability. In Ramirez, we discounted the racial difference between the witness and actor in Ramirez because the identification was not based on features where this difference was a factor. Id. ¶ 63 Thus, in terms of this factor, the identifications of Contreras and Livolsi were comparable to that of the Ramirez witness, while those of Channing Jones and Pittman were perhaps slightly inferior.
¶ 64 Considering the facts in the light most favorable to the trial court's decision [to admit the eyewitness testimony] and giving due deference to the trial judge's ability to appraise demeanor evidence, id. at 784, we conclude that the identifications were constitutionally reliable and therefore admissible. Regarding demeanor evidence, we note that the trial court found all the witnesses to be credible persons. In addition, many of the circumstances bearing on reliabilitylighting, viewing distance, consistency among the witnesses, and suggestibility of the identification procedurecompare very favorably to the eyewitness testimony deemed constitutionally reliable in Ramirez. Although considerably more time passed between the robberies and identifications in this case than in Ramirez, the passage of time was not so long as to force the conclusion that the identifications should not have been admitted into evidence. Overall, the factors bearing on reliability clearly indicate that the identifications in this case were at least as reliable as the identification in Ramirez. Accordingly, we conclude that admission of the eyewitness identifications into evidence did not violate Hollen's right to due process under Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution.