Opinion ID: 2970947
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Comments on Bowling’s Silence

Text: Bowling’s first claim is that the prosecutor negated the presumption of innocence during general voir dire by drawing Bowling also argues that the prosecution made the following analogy: constitutionally improper comments about his failure to testify. Bowling has two comments in mind. First, in the Okay; most of us know how to drive a standard prosecution’s closing argument in the guilt phase, the transmission. That means that you are not going forward prosecutor argued that the defendant did have a motive: in this case or you are not going in reverse in this case, but you are sitting in neutral waiting to determine, based But, see, we have proven a motive. There is no doubt he on the evidence you hear here, whether you go forward had one. See, something made him buy that gun from No. 01-5832 Bowling v. Parker 39 40 Bowling v. Parker No. 01-5832 Mr. Brackett before this killing. Something caused him necessarily’ take them as such; 2) were the remarks isolated to go out and sit by that fence row by that empty slat. or extensive; 3) was the evidence of guilt otherwise Something made him do that. Something made him say overwhelming; 4) what curative instructions were given and that morning, “Today is the day.” Something motivated when.” Lent v. Wells, 861 F.2d 972, 975 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. him to plan it so that he caught Eddie and Tina Early denied, 489 U.S. 1100 (1989). there the every morning [sic] — or, at the very moment of their arrival at the cleaners. And, something The prosecution’s comments do not create constitutional motivated him to ram his car into theirs, and to empty error. Analyzing the above factors, we conclude that both of that .357 into their bodies. We have proven to you that the comments are singular, inadvertent statements that only he had a motive. We can’t tell you what it is, because upon reflection marginally touch on Bowling’s silence. They only the man that pulled the trigger knows. But, we were not manifestly intended to reflect on Bowling’s silence know that there is one. and likely would not have been taken as such. The prosecution’s first comment, which was not objected to, that J.A. at 4860-61. Bowling argues that the statement “only the “only the man that pulled the trigger knows” was probably man that pulled the trigger knows,” was effectively a intended to show the jury that the prosecution had done comment on the fact that Bowling did not testify at trial. everything it could to show motive; the comment was likely Bowling did not, however, object to this statement at the time. not intended to highlight the defendant’s silence. The second Bowling also points to the prosecution’s argument in the statement seems even less appropriately construed as a penalty phase where the prosecutor remarked, “What the comment on the defendant’s silence — the prosecution was defendant cannot get away from here is the planning, the merely emphasizing its view that the defendant’s actions at premeditation, the physical evidence, his actions, the the time of the crime (rather than his silence at trial) callousness of it, and his lack of seeming remorse.” J.A. at demonstrated no remorse. See Lent, 861 F.2d at 975 (stating 5116. Bowling objected to this statement at trial and argues that there can be no constitutional error if “some other here that it also was a comment on Bowling’s silence. explanation for the prosecutor’s remarks is equally plausible”). We therefore conclude that such comments do The law is clear that the prosecution cannot comment on a not constitute constitutional error. defendant’s decision not to testify at trial. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965); Rachel v. 3. Diminished Jury Responsibility Bordenkircher, 590 F.2d 200, 202 (6th Cir. 1978) (granting writ of habeas corpus and requiring a new trial when the Bowling argues that the prosecutor diminished the jury’s prosecutor remarked that he could not say what happened responsibility for deciding whether to apply the death penalty. because the defendant “won’t tell us”). Yet, prosecutors can Bowling points to several comments made at the penalty “summarize the evidence and comment on its quantitative and phase that he alleges took the responsibility for the death qualitative significance.” United States v. Bond, 22 F.3d 662, sentence away from the jury and placed it on the prosecution, 669 (6th Cir. 1994). When a statement indirectly comments the legislature, and society. on the defendant’s decision not to testify, this court uses four factors to evaluate such a statement: “1) Were the comments The Supreme Court has established that “it is ‘manifestly intended’ to reflect on the accused's silence or of constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a such a character that the jury would ‘naturally and determination made by a sentencer who has been led to No. 01-5832 Bowling v. Parker 41 42 Bowling v. Parker No. 01-5832 believe that the responsibility for determining the (holding that, under Dugger, the use of the word appropriateness of the defendant’s death rests elsewhere.” “recommend” under Kentucky law did not misstate the jury’s Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 328-29. In Caldwell, the Supreme role and therefore could not amount to a Caldwell Court reversed the defendant’s conviction after the prosecutor violation).10 As a result, this statement was not made in explicitly argued that the responsibility for the death penalty violation of Caldwell. was not with the jury, by telling the jurors “your decision is not the final decision.” Id. at 325. In Dugger v. Adams, 489 The second potentially problematic statement was also U.S. 401 (1989), the Court held that “to establish a Caldwell made by the prosecution in its closing: violation, a defendant necessarily must show that the remarks to the jury improperly described the role assigned to the jury That is an extraordinary case, you see. Multiple by local law.” Id. at 407. Bowling cites several statements homicides, intentional killings; you kill one person. made in closing argument that allegedly violate Caldwell, but Don’t kill everybody else, the other witnesses. none of these claims have merit. Extraordinary cases. In Kentucky, the death penalty applies. And, our Legislature has said in those A number of the statements Bowling puts forward clearly aggravated murder cases that the death penalty may be do not constitute Caldwell violations. Bowling claims that imposed by a jury. Potter Stewart, a former Justice of the the prosecutor improperly told the jury to find the death United States Supreme Court, said while dealing with penalty because Bowling was not ill but mean, because the death penalty cases. “The expression of society’s moral legislature had deemed the death penalty appropriate when it outrage is essential in an ordered society that asks its devised the legislative scheme, and because Bowling might be released on parole otherwise. We note initially that Bowling’s characterizations of the prosecution’s remarks are 10 There is a violation of state law here, how ever, beca use during the somewhat inaccurate and exaggerated. In any event, period between Caldwe ll and Dugger (and before the trial in this case), however, Bowling has not shown how the prosecution’s the Kentucky Suprem e Co urt held that the wo rd “recom mend,” wh ile remarks improperly described the role assigned to the jury by technically accurate, improperly suggested to the jury that they were local law as required by Caldwell. “mere ly one step in a long process.” Tamme v. Commonwea lth, 759 S.W.2d 51, 5 3 (K y. 198 8); cf. Kordenbrock, 919 F.2d at 1101 (holding Only two of the prosecutor’s statements are potentially that there was no violation of state law because the trial and appeal in the case at bar happened before the decision in Tamme and the dec ision in serious violations of Caldwell. The first statement was made Tamme was not retroactive). by the prosecutor who, when addressing the jury, stated that W e do not believe this violation of state law is so egregious as to the jurors could not “recommend the death penalty unless make the prosecutor’s misconduct a violation of due process. Although [they] first decide that an aggravating factor exists.” J.A. at the prosecutor erroneously used the word “recommend,” it was an isolated 5113-14 (italics added). Bowling alleges that the jury’s remark and clearly not intended to prejudice the jury — the prosecutor routine ly used other m ore approp riate words, such as “fix[]” and responsibility for the death penalty was unconstitutionally “impose” throughout his closing argument. J.A. at 511 0, 51 13. In fact, lessened by the use of the word “recommend.” We have held, his closing argument ended with the stateme nt, “I am asking you to however, that this statement does not misstate local law sentence T.C. Bo wling to death.” J.A. at 5120. In this context, it is clear because Kentucky statutes also use the word “recommend.” that the jury was well aware that it had responsibility of deciding whether See KY . REV . CODE ANN . § 532.025(1)(b); Kordenbrock v. the death penalty should apply. We therefore hold that any potential violation of state law under Tamme did not violate B owling’s due-pro cess Scroggy, 919 F.2d 1091, 1101 (6th Cir. 1990) (en banc) rights. No. 01-5832 Bowling v. Parker 43 44 Bowling v. Parker No. 01-5832 citizens to rely on legal processes rather than self-help to 113. The Solivan court distinguished Alloway by noting that vindicate their wrongs.” He continued — and this is the comments in Alloway “constituted a general plea which critical — “because,” he said, “when people begin to did not even specifically refer to the crime of armed robbery,” believe that organized society is unwilling or unable to and that “armed robbery was not and is not the specific focus impose on criminal offenders the punishment they of national attention as is the drug problem.” Solivan, 937 deserve, then the seeds of anarchy will soon be sewn.” F.2d at 1155. In contrast, in Solivan, “the prosecutor went beyond . . . a mere innocuous reference to the community or J.A. at 5111-12. Bowling argues that this quotation, which societal need to convict guilty people . . . and went so far as comes from Justice Stewart’s concurrence in Furman v. to urge the jury to send a message to the community, to Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308 (1972), and was repeated in defendant and ‘all of the drug dealers like her’ by convicting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976), violates the defendant.” Id. In Solivan, the prosecutor suggested that principles announced in Caldwell. However, it is clear that through a conviction “the jury . . . would help keep its there is nothing in this statement that explicitly misinforms community in northern Kentucky free of the drug trade.” the jury of its role. Bowling’s argument here is better conceptualized as a claim under Viereck v. United States, 318 In Buell v. Mitchell, 274 F.3d 337 (6th Cir. 2001), we again U.S. 236 (1943), which held that the incendiary nature of a addressed the distinction between Alloway and Solivan, prosecutor’s patriotic remarks which were “wholly irrelevant denying a writ of habeas corpus to a defendant on the basis of to any facts or issues in the case, the purpose and effect of a prosecutor’s remark that “the jury should ‘send a message which could only have been to arouse passion and prejudice” to the Robert Buells of the world’ that ‘if you're going to jeopardized the defendant’s right to a fair trial. Id. at 247. commit this kind of a crime then you better be expecting to This court, however, has stated that unless the remarks were pay the ultimate price, yourself.” Id. at 365. We noted that “calculated to incite the passions and prejudices of the jurors, the prosecutor in Buell “was not making a statement regarding appeals to the jury to act as the community conscience are not the jury’s ability to address a specific societal problem,” but per se impermissible,” United States v. Solivan, 937 F.2d was merely making “a general statement regarding the need 1146, 1151 (6th Cir. 1991), and so a case-by-case analysis is to convict people who commit sexual molestation and required. murder.” Id. In Solivan, we held that a prosecutor violated the Under our binding precedents, we hold that the prosecutor’s defendant’s right to a fair trial when he urged the jury to “tell statement in this case is not so improper as to violate her and all of the other drug dealers like her . . . that we don’t Bowling’s due-process rights. The statement that Bowling want that stuff in Northern Kentucky and that anybody who complains of is a general reference to the societal need to brings that stuff in Northern Kentucky . . . [interrupted by the punish guilty people; the prosecutor in this case did not court]” Id. at 1148. An earlier case, United States v. Alloway, “attempt to compare or to associate the defendant with a 397 F.2d 105 (6th Cir. 1968), had held not improper a feared and highly publicized group, such as drug dealers,” prosecutor’s statement that “You the jurors, are called upon Solivan, 937 F.2d at 1154, but was attempting only to make in this case to be the world conscience of the community. “a general statement regarding the need to convict people who And I'm calling on this jury to speak out for the community commit . . . murder,” Buell, 274 F.3d at 365. Moreover, the and let the John Alloways know that this type of conduct will prosecutor did not state that the jurors’ individual not be tolerated, that we're not going to tolerate . . .” Id. at communities would be safer if the defendant were convicted, No. 01-5832 Bowling v. Parker 45 46 Bowling v. Parker No. 01-5832 as was the case in Solivan. Although we will not say that the 399, 409 (6th Cir. 2000) (upholding the statement, “Ask giving of this statement was proper, see State v. Byrd, 512 yourself if you had a loved one, or had a relative, or a friend, N.E.2d 611, 615-16 (Ohio 1987) (calling the same argument who was in a situation like that”). Given the Simpson “not proper” and “caution[ing] prosecutors to avoid such precedent, by which this panel is bound, we must conclude arguments”), we do not find it, under the circumstances of that the statement that Bowling complains of is not so this case, so improper as to render Bowling’s trial fundamentally unfair as to constitute a denial of due process. fundamentally unfair, see Macias, 291 F.3d at 453-54 (noting that the normally deferential review of prosecutorial 5. Finding of Statutory Aggravator misconduct is even more deferential under AEDPA). Bowling next claims prosecutorial misconduct amounting 4. The Golden Rule to a denial of due process in the fact that the prosecutor told the jury, during the eligibility section of the penalty phase, Bowling claims that the prosecutor also committed that because it had already found the aggravating misconduct when, after discussing the testimony of Bowling’s circumstance in the guilt phase of the trial (by finding family, he remarked in the penalty phase: Bowling guilty of intentional double homicide), it need not again consider whether there was an aggravating It is always difficult when a family member testifies on circumstance in the penalty phase, because under Kentucky behalf of someone charged with a crime. They are his law, the aggravating circumstance was already shown. See family. And, what do you expect? Don’t you know that KY . REV . CODE ANN . § 532.025(2)(a)(6) (making an offender Mr. and Mrs. Early and Ms. Morgan would give anything eligible for the death penalty when “[t]he offender's act or in the world to have had the opportunity to beg for their acts of killing were intentional and resulted in multiple children’s life on April 9, 1990. Please don’t hurt our deaths”). The prosecutor remarked as follows: children. And, don’t you know, Chris [the injured child], if he could, would love to have plead for the life of his You cannot recommend the death penalty unless you first mother and father. decide that an aggravating factor exists. Did the Defendant, Thomas Clyde Bowling, Jr. intentionally J.A. at 5115-16. Bowling argues that the prosecutor’s cause the death of more than one person. I don’t have to comments here are similar to the forbidden Golden Rule, remind you that you found that last Friday. which “tends to pressure the jury to decide the issue of guilt or innocence on considerations apart from the evidence of the J.A. at 5113-14. defendant’s culpability.” Dean v. Commonwealth, 777 S.W.2d 900, 904 (Ky. 1989) (finding error in an extended This instruction does not appear to violate Bowling’s statement glorifying the victim of a homicide). constitutional rights. First, an aggravating circumstance may be found at either the guilt or penalty phase. See Tuilaepa v. This comment, however, was an isolated remark that did California, 512 U.S. 967, 971-72 (1994). Second, Tuilaepa not suggest to the jury that they should decide the case on a notwithstanding, the jury instructions in this case did in fact basis other than Bowling’s culpability. This court has require the jury to find the aggravating circumstance beyond recently held a more dangerous comment not to be improper, a reasonable doubt in the penalty phase as well as in the guilt let alone a denial of due process. Simpson v. Jones, 238 F.3d No. 01-5832 Bowling v. Parker 47 48 Bowling v. Parker No. 01-5832 phase, J.A. at 5106, which the jury found, J.A. at 5138. There In summary, we find none of Bowling’s allegations of is therefore no error. prosecutorial misconduct, individually or together, violate due process. 6. Denigration of Bowling’s Mitigation Evidence G. Denial of Fair Jury Finally, Bowling argues that the prosecution improperly told the jury that it did not have to consider Bowling’s Bowling’s next set of claims is that the jury empaneled to mitigation evidence. Bowling cites to the part of argument hear his case was unfairly selected. Bowling has two where the prosecutor remarked: independent claims for relief. His first argument is that one of the jurors actually seated was an “automatic death penalty” It is a strong, strong, strong case against this Defendant. juror who should have been excluded. Bowling’s second And, what about mitigating circumstances that you are argument is that three jurors, whom Bowling eventually instructed to consider, if you wish; Mitigating struck with his peremptory challenges, should have been circumstances, whether there are any mitigating dismissed for cause. These claims do not have merit. circumstances that would make this entire event less serious, the brutal murder of two young lives. Are there Bowling’s first claim of improper jury selection is that any such circumstances? Are there? Charles Livingston, Juror # 650, should have been excluded for cause as an “automatic death penalty” juror. See Morgan J.A. at 5116 (italics added). Bowling argues that the v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 728 (1992) (noting that “a capital italicized phrase makes it seem that the jury does not need to defendant may challenge for cause any prospective juror . . . consider the mitigating evidence, which it is constitutionally who will automatically vote for the death penalty in every required to do under Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380 case”); see also Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985) (1990). This could be an improper attempt to suggest to the (“[T]he proper standard for determining when a prospective jury they may decide not to consider mitigating evidence, but juror may be excluded for cause because of his or her views it seems more likely to be interpreted as a simple argument on capital punishment . . . is whether the juror’s views would that there is no mitigating evidence. See Lent, 861 F.2d at prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties 975 (noting that there can be no constitutional error if “some as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.”) other explanation for the prosecutor’s remarks is equally (internal quotation omitted). In determining whether a juror plausible”). Even if this is error, however, it is an isolated, is biased, “deference must be paid to the trial judge who sees unintentional error with no effect on the jury. The jury was and hears the juror.” Witt, 469 U.S. at 426. Even before repeatedly told in the instructions that they had to consider AEDPA, the trial court’s finding that a juror was impartial mitigating evidence; for example, an instruction states that the was entitled to a presumption of correctness, rebuttable only jury “shall consider such mitigating or extenuating facts and upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence. See 28 circumstances as have been presented to you.” J.A. at 5106. U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1036 Bowling has therefore not made out a violation of due process (1984) (noting that juror partiality is a question of historical here. fact). The question is not whether the trial judge was wrong or right in his determination of impartiality, but merely whether his decision was “fairly supported by the record.” See Witt, 469 U.S. at 433 (internal quotations omitted). No. 01-5832 Bowling v. Parker 49 50 Bowling v. Parker No. 01-5832 The colloquy between Livingston, the trial court, and the Q [(Court)]: Would you consider if mitigating two sets of counsel was extensive: circumstances were proven to you along with the rest of the case? Q [(Pros.)]: If you were selected as a jury — juror, and A: I would try. along with your eleven jurors in a Q: Would you consider all of the facts in the case, particular case concluded that the not just the fact that he had committed a defendant was guilty of intentional murder, multiple killing, but circumstances of how, then could you in the sentencing phase or why, when, and under what mental condition the penalty phase consider the entire range and all that sort of thing? of penalties, twenty years to life, life A: Uh-huh. without parole, or death? Q: Would you consider all of those factors? A: One? A: Yes, (inaudible). Q [(Court)]: And, decide on one of them; but, could you Q: Then, let me know whether you believe that in consider all three penalties? every case where a defendant is convicted of an A: I could consider them all. intentional killing that the death penalty would automatically be given or should automatically J.A. at 3534-35. The court then asked whether Livingston be given? Do you believe that? Are you sure could vote for the death penalty, and he answered you understand what I am saying now? affirmatively. The court then asked: [Some clarification.]