Opinion ID: 1969584
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Statements to Counselor Properly Admitted

Text: Holder's next contention is an allegation that the Superior Court erred by allowing his statements to a counselor to be used for impeachment purposes. After being arrested on August 20, 1994, Holder was committed to the Stevenson House, a State detention facility for juvenile offenders, to await a bond hearing. While at the Stevenson House, Holder was interviewed by Joseph McCorquodale (McCorquodale), a counselor on the Stevenson House staff. At trial and in this appeal, Holder submits that the statements he made to McCorquodale are privileged communications pursuant to Rule 503 of the Delaware Rules of Evidence (D.R.E. 503). D.R.E. 503(b) provides: A patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose of diagnosis or treatment of his physical, mental or emotional condition, including alcohol or drug addiction, among himself, his physician or psychotherapist, and persons who are participating in the diagnosis or treatment under the direction of the physician or psychotherapist, including members of the patient's family. D.R.E. 503(b). The Superior Court found no factual basis to support Holder's assertion of the privilege provided for in Rule 503. The Superior Court ruled: [McCorquodale], although representing himself as a counselor, has not represented himself as a psychotherapist, nor was he licensed in this state or in any other state. No basis for the privilege has been shown at the evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress. The motion is therefore denied. McCorquodale testified that he is neither a physician nor a psychotherapist. The record also reflects that McCorquodale was not participating in the diagnosis or treatment of Holder under the direction of a physician or a psychotherapist when he met with Holder at the Stevenson House. [4] Because Holder failed to establish any of the requirements set forth in Rule 503, the Superior Court properly denied the motion to suppress Holder's statements to McCorquodale on the basis of privilege. Alternatively, Holder contends that the introduction of the statements he made to McCorquodale could not be used by the State for any purpose because they were obtained in violation of the rights set forth in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Holder alleges that McCorquodale, a state agent, was required to give Miranda warnings to Holder, who was in custody, before McCorquodale spoke to Holder. This Court addressed a similar issue in Bradley v. State, Del.Supr., 559 A.2d 1234 (1989). In Bradley, an incarcerated defendant was questioned by a parole officer and the director of pre-release services. Id. at 1242-43. The questioning took place while the defendant was in prison. Id. Neither the parole officer nor the director of pre-release services advised the defendant of complete Miranda rights. Id. at 1243. This Court determined that the parole officer and director were State officials. Id. at 1244. This Court further concluded that because Bradley was in prison and the questions might elicit an incriminating response, the interview qualified as custodial interrogation. Id. at 1244-45. In the absence of Miranda warnings, this Court held in Bradley that the defendant's statements could not be used against him by the State during the prosecution's case-in-chief. Id. at 1246 (citing Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971)). Accordingly, this Court held that Bradley's statements may not be used in a new trial unless Bradley testifies. Id. at 1246-47. We explained further, however, that even if Bradley does choose to testify, his prior statements could be used only to impeach his testimony. Id. at 1247 (citing Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971)). The record reflects that the initial facts in this case are similar to the facts in Bradley. Holder was in custody at the Stevenson House and he did not receive Miranda warnings prior to speaking to a state agent, McCorquodale. Additionally, McCorquodale should have known that his questions might elicit an incriminating response from Holder. The State did not seek to introduce Holder's statements during its case-in-chief. The State only sought to use the statements Holder made to McCorquodale for impeachment purposes, after Holder testified that he did not speak to McCorquodale. It is well established law that even if an otherwise voluntary statement is obtained in violation of Miranda, the prosecution is not prohibited from introducing the statement on rebuttal for purposes of impeachment after the defendant has testified. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225-26, 91 S.Ct. 643, 645-46, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971). Holder alleged that the statements could not be used to impeach his testimony because they were not given voluntarily. The record reflects that, after an extensive inquiry, the Superior Court concluded that Holder's statements to McCorquodale had been given voluntarily. The record supports the Superior Court's factual finding that the statements were given voluntarily. Consequently, we hold that the Superior Court properly allowed the State to use Holder's statements to McCorquodale for the purpose of impeachment. See Bradley v. State, 559 A.2d at 1247.