Opinion ID: 1058852
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: assignments of error waived, defaulted, or abandoned

Text: Juniper contends [t]he trial court erred in failing to entertain and rule upon Juniper's filed Motion for a Forensic Expert. The record contains no such motion, although Juniper filed a document styled Memorandum in Support of Motion for Appointment of Forensic Expert. Juniper cites only the Memorandum in his argument on this assignment of error. The trial court never ruled on Juniper's request for a forensics expert, but the record reflects no request for a ruling or that the trial court was ever alerted to the existence of the Memorandum. Therefore, Juniper has waived any claim under this assignment of error because he was required to request a ruling from the trial court and he failed to do so. Lenz v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 451, 463, 544 S.E.2d 299, 306, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1003, 122 S.Ct. 481, 151 L.Ed.2d 395 (2001) (failure to request ruling on pretrial motion waived issue on appeal); Riner v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 296, 323-25, 601 S.E.2d 555, 571-72 (2004) (failure to alert trial court to fact that it had ruled only on admissibility of primary hearsay in statement waived defendant's argument on appeal that the statement was inadmissible as second level hearsay).
Juniper assigns error to the trial court's denying his motion for a change of venue and argues the trial court abused its discretion in doing so. The Commonwealth responds that Juniper waived this argument on appeal because he failed to renew the motion prior to trial. In a pretrial motion for a change of venue Juniper's counsel stated, We make [the motion] at this time anticipating that the Court is going to take it under advisement. We will continue to make it as we ... believe that the potential juror pool is tainted by [media] coverage. The trial court took the motion under advisement, but Juniper never renewed the motion before the jury was empanelled. [W]hen a change of venue motion is taken under advisement or continued until the jury is empaneled, it is incumbent on the party seeking a change of venue to renew the motion or otherwise bring it to the court's attention. Failure to do so implies acquiescence in the jury panel and is tantamount to waiver of the motion for change of venue. Jackson v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 423, 430-31, 587 S.E.2d 532, 539 (2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 842, 125 S.Ct. 281, 160 L.Ed.2d 68 (2004) (citation omitted). Accordingly, Juniper has waived any claim under this assignment of error because he was required to timely renew the motion or bring the matter to the attention of the trial court, which he failed to do. See id.; Green v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 81, 94-95, 580 S.E.2d 834, 842 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1194, 124 S.Ct. 1448, 158 L.Ed.2d 107 (2004).
In separate assignments of error, Juniper argues the trial court erred in refusing to compel the Commonwealth to produce its files from his prior criminal convictions and of unadjudicated bad acts that would be referenced in the penalty phase. He also claims an entitlement to the files related to a prior prosecution of Rueben for rape. On appeal, Juniper argues the prior criminal conviction and unadjudicated bad acts files should have been produced because to thoroughly investigate and to essentially reconstruct those 35 ... events was unduly burdensome, if not impossible. As to Rueben's files, Juniper's appellate argument is the files cannot be reasonably recreated ... and ... his constitutional rights were violated by the failure to compel the file. Neither argument was made to the trial court. At trial, Juniper made the same argument as the basis to grant both motions: Although the Defendant has an investigator available to him, the time to interview all the witnesses that would be essential to reconstructing the information contained in those files cannot [be] reasonably ascertained by the Defendant without extensive costs to the Commonwealth in the form of attorneys fees and/or investigator fees. This ground was reemphasized by defense counsel's oral argument that it would be more economical for the Commonwealth if they would provide us with the files rather than having [defense counsel or the court-appointed investigator] have to try to reconstruct each of those separate 35 events. In other words, Juniper's sole contention at trial for both motions is that granting the motions would save the Commonwealth money. [9] This is obviously not the argument Juniper makes on appeal; therefore, consideration of either assignment of error is barred under Rule 5:25. See Buck v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 449, 452-53, 443 S.E.2d 414, 416 (1994). Furthermore, Juniper proffered no evidence or explanation as to any nexus between Rueben's rape conviction and any matter at issue in this case.
Juniper also claims the trial court erred by changing the standard death penalty voir dire partially through jury selection by using the phrase `exceedingly difficult' instead of `substantially impair.' Part of the way through voir dire of the potential venire, the trial judge stated, When I ask these questions[,] instead of using [`substantially impair,'] I'm going to start [using the term] [`exceedingly difficult.'] I think substantially impairedI think it's a legal term [and] I'm not sure the jurors understand what I'm talking about when I say that. Juniper's counsel responded, We don't quarrel with that but the case law does use substantially impair. The trial judge then noted, If you-all want to use it in your questions that's fine, but I've just noticed when I'm asking the question their eyes seem to glaze over when I start saying things like that. Juniper's counsel replied, That's fine. This exchange clearly shows that Juniper's counsel not only did not object to the trial court's decision to alter the voir dire language, but acquiesced to it. Consequently, Juniper has waived any right to appeal on this issue under Rule 5:25.
Juniper argues the trial court erred in allowing the Commonwealth to grant immunity to witness Keon Murray with no notice, contrary to the law, and due process rights of [Juniper]. Keon Murray testified for the Commonwealth. At the beginning of his testimony, he agreed that no promises [had] been made to [him] by the Commonwealth in exchange for [his testimony]. Murray testified that he was close to Juniper and his family and knew Keshia. When questioned about the events on the day of the murders, Murray answered, Your Honor, I plead the Fifth. The trial court called a recess and outside of the presence of the jury, the Commonwealth stated its intention to offer Murray immunity. [10] Defense counsel stated his objection as follows: I object to the procedure ... on behalf of defendant, Mr. Juniper. . . . . . The question is whether or not this procedure denies the defendant due process of the law. . . . . . [T]hreatening [Murray] about his testimony is a denial of due process to Mr. Juniper. That's the best argument I can make. On appeal, Juniper argues the grant of immunity was an abuse of discretion because it prevented effective cross-examination of Murray in violation of Juniper's due process rights under the Sixth Amendment. Specifically, Juniper contends that since the grant of immunity was contemporaneous with the witness's testimony, the defense lacked [t]he pre-trial preparation and reflection required to allow a full and fair examination of Murray. In response, the Commonwealth essentially argues that Juniper has waived this due process argument because he failed to assert a violation of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause in the trial court. We agree with the Commonwealth because the record reflects Juniper never argued to the trial court the Confrontation Clause claims he now makes on appeal as the basis of his due process argument. As he acknowledges on appeal, Juniper's argument that the trial court's decision undermined his ability to cross-examine Murray, is actually a claim under the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause. As such, a general assertion of a due process violation in the trial court is insufficient to preserve this argument for appeal. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994). Therefore, Juniper has waived this assignment of error under Rule 5:25.
Juniper assigns error to the trial court allowing instructions and verdict forms in the penalty phase regarding future dangerousness when the predicates were not proven and that unanimity is required to prove an aggravating factor for death. On brief, Juniper argues only that the trial court was wrong in refusing Instruction D-P8. [11] The Commonwealth contends that Juniper waived the argument regarding instruction D-P8 because the record does not indicate that Juniper ever submitted the instruction to the trial court, nor does Juniper mention the instruction during his arguments and objections regarding other refused jury instructions. The record supports the Commonwealth's claims. The only mention of instruction D-P8 in the record appears in the text of the instruction and Juniper's Memorandum in Support of Instruction No. D-P8, which is dated January 13, 2005. Because the record does not show that the trial court ruled on Instruction D-P8 or that Juniper requested a ruling or objected to a ruling made, even if the assignment of error had corresponded to Juniper's arguments regarding Instruction No. D-P8, this Court would not consider the merits of the claim. See Lenz, 261 Va. at 463, 544 S.E.2d at 306.