Opinion ID: 2629325
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Prosecutorial and Judicial Bias

Text: [¶ 29] Mr. Reichert also claims manifest injustice requiring reversal of the denial of his motion occurred when the district court judge and prosecutor remained on the case despite alleged personal biases. In the case of the judge, Mr. Reichert also claims manifest injustice occurred because the judge was improperly influenced by political and social pressure. [¶ 30] Concerning the prosecutor's personal bias, Mr. Reichert testified three members of the prosecutor's family were victims of his offenses. He testified the prosecutor's father also was a leading member of a victim growers group made up of eight to twelve victims who acted as liaison between the prosecution and the victims. Additionally, the prosecutor was listed as the registered agent for the victim growers group. [¶ 31] At the arraignment, the prosecutor disclosed his relationship with three of the victims. [The state]: The state would offerand as you have probably observed in reading through the amended information, I have a family member, and a family member by marriage, and an extended family member, who are victims in this matter. I have reviewed the ethical rules which apply to conflicts and cannot find any conflict, nor do I think I have a personal conflict. I do not receive any pecuniary interest in the outcome of this case, directly or indirectly. I have disclosed that to [defense counsel] and Mr. Reichert from the very beginning. It's my understanding that they do not have any objection from a prosecution standpoint or defense standpoint with the prosecution for me to continue with the case; and I would like to certainly present that to the court on the record, and you know if we have a response from [defense counsel] or Mr. Reichert. THE COURT: [Counsel], the prosecutor has indicated that he doesn't feel he has a conflict of interest under the rules of professional responsibility, but I would call for your response to his disclosure that some of the alleged victims are related to him. [Defense counsel]: Your Honor, [the state] and I have discussed this, and I agree with the representation he has made to the court, and we will agree with him that there is no conflict. If he had concerns about the prosecutor's relationship with the three victims, Mr. Reichert did not inform the court at that time or any other time prior to raising the issue in his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Once he raised the issue, the prosecutor removed himself from the case and a special prosecutor stepped in to represent the State. The special prosecutor represented the State at the hearing on Mr. Reichert's motion to withdraw his plea. [¶ 32] Rule 1.7 of the Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct addresses conflicts of interest in pertinent part as follows: (b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to . . . a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless: (1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected; and (2) the client consents after consultation. The comment to Rule 3.8, which addresses special responsibilities of prosecutors, states: [1] A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence. Precisely how far the prosecutor is required to go in this direction is a matter of debate and varies in different jurisdictions. The comment references the ABA Standards of Criminal Justice Relating to Prosecution Function, which in Standard 3-1.3 provides: (f) A prosecutor should not permit his or her professional judgment or obligations to be affected by his or her own political, financial, business, property, or personal interests. In addition to these provisions, the preamble to the Rules of Professional Conduct states: In the nature of law practice . . . conflicting responsibilities are encountered.    The Rules of Professional Conduct prescribe terms for resolving such conflicts. Within the framework of these Rules many difficult issues of professional discretion can arise. Such issues must be resolved through the exercise of sensitive professional and moral judgment guided by the basic principles underlying the rules. [¶ 33] None of these provisions expressly prohibits a prosecutor from representing the State in a case where family members are victims of the offense charged. However ill-considered it might appear on the surface, we conclude no manifest injustice resulted from the prosecutor's representation of the State despite his familial relationship with three of the victims. We are satisfied the prosecutor promptly and fully disclosed the relationship. Nothing in the record suggests his relationship with the victims affected him in carrying out his responsibility to minister justice, influenced the outcome of the case or prejudiced Mr. Reichert in any way. In addition, Mr. Reichert waived any objection to the prosecutor's participation in the case. We hold the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plea withdrawal motion on the basis of prosecutorial bias. [3] [¶ 34] We turn to the claim of the judge's personal bias. Mr. Reichert testified he accepted delivery of the judge's brother's beans for storage, sold the bean crop without the brother's knowledge and when the brother later decided to sell, generated the appropriate paperwork and presented a check for payment. Knowing there were not sufficient funds in the account to cover the check, Mr. Reichert asked the brother to wait to cash the check. A few days later, the brother asked Mr. Reichert's wife who worked at the bank to deposit the check. She did so and the check bounced. Mr. Reichert made good on the check and the judge's brother was not one of the victims of Mr. Reichert's crimes. Still, Mr. Reichert asserts, the fact that the judge's brother was a customer likely prejudiced the judge. [¶ 35] Mr. Reichert also claims the district court judge was biased and prejudiced because he was influenced by the involvement of political officials and the public. In his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, Mr. Reichert stated: The political presence of the governor and some of his comments and the testimony of Senator Meier may have influenced Judge Kautz into imposing an excessive sentence. . . . Mr. Reichert testified: [A]fter the arraignment, after the plea was entered, that's really when things started to really stir within the community. That's when [the judge] started to receive political pressure. He received a tremendous amount of social pressure, as well as the personal pressure that he had from his relationship with his brother being involved. Mr. Reichert further testified a newspaper reported the governor attended a meeting with the grower victims. When asked whether the department of agriculture could extend Mr. Reichert a loan to pay back the victims, leaving the victims whole and Mr. Reichert owing the department of agriculture, the newspaper reported the governor as saying Mr. Reichert's not going to be making much money where he's going in the near future. Mr. Reichert pointed to that statement from the newspaper, as the political influence that might have affected the outcome of this sentence. [¶ 36] Mr. Reichert also cited the testimony of a state senator at the sentencing hearing as improperly influencing the judge. The senator, one of fifteen victims who testified or presented a statement at the hearing, asked the judge to sentence Mr. Reichert to four to eight years imprisonment for check fraud to be served consecutively to ten to fourteen years for conversion, and a suspended sentence of ten to fourteen on the second conversion count. [¶ 37] We have defined bias and prejudice as follows: prejudice involves a prejudgment or forming of an opinion without sufficient knowledge or examination; bias is a leaning of the mind or an inclination toward one person over another. Cline v. Sawyer, 600 P.2d 725, 729 (Wyo.1979). A mere allegation of judicial bias is insufficient to form a basis for disqualification; sufficient facts showing bias must be presented in the affidavit supporting the motion. Pearson v. State, 866 P.2d 1297, 1300 (Wyo.1994). Pursuant to W.R.C.P. 40.1(b)(2), Mr. Reichert was required to submit an affidavit stating sufficient facts to show the existence of judicial bias or prejudice against him. [4] Pursuant to W.R.C.P. 40.1(b)(2), the judge should have been recused if a reasonable person, assuming the facts in the affidavit were true, could infer that he had a bias or prejudice preventing him from dealing fairly with Mr. Reichert. [¶ 38] Mr. Reichert submitted an affidavit stating in pertinent part:    2. I owned and operated Mountain States Commodities. 3. Lowell Kautz, Wayne Korell, Beth Korell, and Alan Korell were all customers of Mountain States Commodities. 4. As a long time resident of Torrington, Wyoming, I know that Lowell Kautz is the brother of Judge Keith Kautz. 5. During court Pat Korell [the prosecutor] admitted that his father, step-mother and uncle were all victims in this matter. 6. Pat Korell's father was appointed to the board of the victim-grower's committee which helped to establish how they would receive restitution. We conclude these facts were not sufficient to cause a reasonable person to infer the judge was biased or prejudiced against Mr. Reichert. We agree with the conclusion reached by the district judge assigned to decide the recusal motiona judge may not be removed for cause simply on the basis that his brother was, at one time, a customer of the defendant. [¶ 39] We likewise find nothing in the testimony presented at the plea withdrawal hearing from which a reasonable person could infer the judge was biased or prejudiced. Some of Mr. Reichert's testimony concerning the judge's bias, such as the governor's statement at the victim growers' meeting as reported in the newspaper, was hearsay. Evidence presented in support of a motion to disqualify a judge is generally insufficient when it is supported merely by hearsay. In re Claim of Farman, 841 P.2d 99, 101 (Wyo.1992). Much of the rest of Mr. Reichert's testimony was speculation, which we also find insufficient to support a motion to disqualify. Simply stated, there was no evidence showing the district court judge prejudged the case or formed an opinion without sufficient knowledge or examination. There likewise was no showing the judge had a leaning of the mind or an inclination toward one person over another. We hold the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plea withdrawal motion.