Opinion ID: 217410
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: IWCA Retaliation

Text: Though it had dismissed all of Moore's federal claims, the district court exercised supplemental jurisdiction over his IWCA termination claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). The district court then granted summary judgment as to that claim. The court relied on its conclusions that Moore had not presented evidence of his discharge and that any purported discharge occurred before Vital knew of Moore's intent to file a workers' compensation claim. The parties spent much time and energy disputing whether Moore thought he had been discharged, but the only relevant question is whether Moore actually was discharged. Vital seems to have taken inconsistent positions toward Moore's employment status. The district court concluded that Moore wasand perhaps isan employee of Vital on inactive status. On appeal, Vital argues that Moore abandoned his job by not showing up for work. These positions may or may not be consistent; regardless, Moore has put forth evidence that creates a genuine dispute about whether he was discharged: his September 2, 2005, letter to Vital; Buzogany's response and the attached COBRA notice; and Buzogany's 2006 letter offering Moore a job. Vital purports to have sent Moore a COBRA notice on February 21, 2005. The language of the notice suggests that Moore's employment relationship with Vital ended on or before that date. The notice reports that Moore's medical coverage provided through Vital Products, Ltd. Terminated on 02/15/05. It also reports that, to continue health benefits, Moore was obligated to pay COBRA premiums for each month after [his] termination of employment. The words termination of employment contradict Vital's apparent contention that Moore was on inactive status. The purported mailing date of the COBRA notice is evidence that Moore did not abandon his job. Vital offers no standard by which we can determine whether Moore abandoned his job, but certainly a jury could conclude that Moorewho injured his back working at Vital on February 16had not abandoned his job before February 21. [1] Because the COBRA notice suggests that Moore's employment at Vital ended and that he did not end the relationship by abandoning his position, a jury could reasonably conclude that Vital discharged Moore. The letters exchanged between Buzogany and Moore further muddy the issue of Moore's employment status. On September 2, 2005, Moore wrote to Vital inquiring about the status of his company health insurance. In the letter, Moore represented that he was a current Vital employee. Buzogany's response explained that Moore was no longer automatically covered by the company's plan, but that Moore was eligible for COBRA coverage. What Buzogany did not address is the reason Moore had lost his previous coverage. Vital may have thought Moore had abandoned his position, but Buzogany did not point this out to Moore. The next communication between Vital and Moore was a June 2006 letter Buzogany wrote, offering Moore a position within his health restrictions. Like Buzogany's September 2005 letter, this one shed no light on Moore's employment status. This evidence taken togetherparticularly the language and purported mailing date of the COBRA noticewould allow a jury to conclude Vital had discharged Moore. But the timing and circumstances of any discharge are uncertain. Thus, supposing Vital did discharge Moore, there are genuine questions of fact regarding when it did so and whether Vital's actions were motivated by Moore's intention to file an IWCA claim. Accordingly, summary judgment was inappropriate for this claim.