Opinion ID: 1239990
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: chapter 975 committed persons

Text: [41] Finally, Post and Oldakowski argue that the governor's partial veto of Special Session Assembly Bill 3 resulted in a gap in the newly created chapter 980 which makes it inapplicable to those committed pursuant to chapter 975, the Sex Crimes Act. [25] An objective test is applied following a partial veto requiring what remains to be a complete, entire, and workable law. State ex rel. Kleczka v. Conta, 82 Wis. 2d 679, 706, 264 N.W.2d 539 (1978). Post and Oldakowski assert that the law following the veto is unworkable in that it: (1) did not repeal § 975.12 that specifies chapter 51 civil commitments as the exclusive means of extending a chapter 975 commitment; (2) does not abrogate the privileged nature of treatment records; and (3) provides no mechanism for notification of pending release of chapter 975 committed persons nor for transmission of otherwise confidential information to the appropriate authorities. [42,43] We find Post and Oldakowski's claim that chapter 51 proceedings provide the exclusive method to extend civil commitment of chapter 975 committed persons unpersuasive. This argument centers on the language of § 975.12(1) which states that persons shall be discharged at the end of one year or the maximum term for the underlying offense for which they were convicted unless DHSS has petitioned for civil commitment under § 51.20. We acknowledge that the veto did not repeal this section, but we find that point irrelevant. A chapter 980 commitment is not an extension of any other type of commitment and § 975.12 does not limit the state's ability to seek a separate civil commitment under chapter 980. [44] Post and Oldakowski originally argued that the veto failed to abrogate the physician-patient privilege of § 905.04(2) which prevents the use in court of confidential communications by a patient to any treatment provider. At oral argument, Post and Oldakowski conceded that the general rule of physician-patient privilege is subject to exception once the mental state of the committed person becomes an issue at a hearing. This concession was appropriate as this court has previously ruled that chapter 975 continuation of control hearings fall within the statutory exception to privilege as proceedings for hospitalization. Wis. Stat. § 905.04(4)(a). See State v. Cramer, 98 Wis. 2d 416, 425, 296 N.W.2d 921 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 924 (1981). We conclude that both initial commitment and discharge hearings under chapter 980 are similarly proceedings for hospitalization which fall within the established exception to the privilege found in § 905.04(4)(a). Post and Oldakowski's final claim, that the post-veto law does not provide mechanisms for notice or release of confidential information, rests on the following language in § 980.015: (2) If an agency with jurisdiction has control or custody over a person who may meet the criteria for commitment as a sexually violent person, the agency with jurisdiction shall inform each appropriate district attorney and the department of justice regarding the person as soon as possible beginning 3 months prior to the applicable date of the following: (a) The anticipated discharge from a sentence, anticipated release on parole or anticipated release from imprisonment of a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense. (b) The anticipated release from a secured correctional facility, as defined in s. 48.02(15m), of a person adjudicated delinquent under s. 48.34 on the basis of a sexually violent offense. (c) The termination or discharge of a person who has been found not guilty of a sexually violent offense by reason of mental disease or defect under s. 971.17. Post and Oldakowski read this to cover only persons imprisoned, adjudicated delinquent and placed in a secure correctional facility, or found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. They reason that persons under chapter 975, committed in lieu of imprisonment, do not fit into any of the categories and therefore DHSS can neither supply notification of their pending release nor transmit their records. Post and Oldakowski acknowledge that the legislature created a new exception to the confidentiality of treatment records that specifically allows access: To the department of justice or a district attorney under s. 980.015(3)(b), if the treatment records are maintained by an agency with jurisdiction, as defined in s. 980.015(1), that has control or custody over a person who may meet the criteria for commitment as a sexually violent person under ch. 980. Wis. Stat. § 51.30(4)(b)10m. However, they assert that because persons committed under chapter 975 do not fit into the challenged language in § 980.015, the exception to confidentiality cannot be triggered. If an agency with jurisdiction (defined as the agency with the authority or duty to release or discharge) has control or custody over a person who may meet the criteria for commitment as a sexually violent person it shall inform the DOJ or district attorney within 90 days of the anticipated discharge from sentence or release on parole of the status of such person. Wis. Stat. § 980.015. [45] Under chapter 975, a person convicted of certain sexual offenses and found to be in need of specialized treatment could be committed to the custody of DHSS rather than sentenced to prison. Wis. Stat. §§ 975.001, and 975.06(2). DHSS remains the agency with the authority to release on parole persons committed under chapter 975. Wis. Stat. § 975.10. Thus, chapter 975 committed persons clearly do fit within the category of persons described in § 980.015(2)(a) in that they may be released on parole following a conviction for a sexually violent offense. [46] We hold that the above language does not preclude but rather requires DHSS to provide notification of pending release and to transmit relevant treatment records concerning persons committed under chapter 975 whom DHSS deems may be candidates for commitment as sexually violent persons. Wis. Stat. § 980.015(3)(b). DHSS, as the agency with jurisdiction, has the obligation to provide DOJ or the district attorney with such information concerning all persons who might meet the statutory commitment criteria, i.e., those who: (1) have been convicted of a sexually violent offense (§ 980.02(2)(a)); (2) are within 90 days of discharge or release from a commitment order entered as a result of a sexually violent offense (§ 980.02(2)(ag)); (3) have a mental disorder (§ 980.02(2)(b)); and (4) are dangerous because that disorder creates a substantial probability that he or she will engage in acts of sexual violence (§ 980.02(2)(e)). This description potentially encompasses persons committed under chapter 975 and the post-veto law in no way excludes them from coverage. [47] We conclude that the governor's veto resulted in a complete and workable law that properly encompasses persons originally committed under chapter 975. By the Court. The order of the circuit court is reversed and the cause is remanded. SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J. (dissenting). No one denies that the crimes precipitating the passage of chapter 980 are among the most heinous afflicting our society. One can readily understand why the legislature, faced with such wrongs, sought redress through the enactment of chapter 980. But much as I might empathize with the legislature and much as I might share the concerns which led to the passage of chapter 980, it is beyond reasonable doubt that chapter 980 is unconstitutional. I join the many judges from Wisconsin [1] and other jurisdictions [2] who have found that similar statutes create unconstitutional preventive detention based primarily on predictions of dangerousness. In authorizing the incarceration of individuals on the basis of past crimes for which they have already served their sentences, chapter 980 violates constitutional provisions against double jeopardy and ex post facto laws. In creating a circularly defined class of sexually violent persons who can be committed without evidence of mental illness and who could not be committed under Wisconsin's civil commitment law, chapter 980 violates constitutional guarantees of substantive due process and equal protection. The state cannot violate individual rights inscribed in the constitutions by creating special classes of individuals whose constitutional rights are diminished. Although the end result may seem attractive, under our constitutions the state cannot simply lock people up on the supposition that they will be dangerous in the future when they have already served their sentences for crimes committed in the past. The legislative, executive and judicial branches have available other, constitutionally valid methods of addressing the dangers posed by violent criminals. These methods include tougher and more stringent supervision of those on parole or conditional release, chapter 51 commitment, more intensive prison treatment programs, longer legislatively enacted sentences for crimes of sexual violence, and prosecutors' advocacy for and judges' imposition of lengthier or consecutive sentences at the time of sentencing. Such responses to the dangers posed by sex offenders can protect the community without eroding the constitutional guarantees that protect all of us. For the reasons set forth, I dissent. [3]