Opinion ID: 1561583
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Failure to Call Independent Medical Examiner as Defense Expert

Text: In his final postconviction claim, Smithers argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for not retaining an independent medical examiner to refute testimony and argument about whether victim Cowan was alive and conscious when she was placed in the pond. The postconviction court found that counsel was not ineffective. We agree. At trial, Dr. Laura Hair, Associate Medical Examiner in District Six, testified that based on the foam cone found around Cowan's mouth, the body being recovered from water, and the possibility that someone heard the victim calling from the pond, drowning was a possibility. Dr. Hair explained: At the time of the autopsy I did not consider the possibility of drowning. I really believed her to have been dead from her injuries in the pond. I got information later on that she may well have been making noise and that foam cone is probably indicative of drowning. When asked if the congestion found in Cowan's lungs was consistent with drowning, Dr. Hair answered: It's possible. It's consistent with a lot of things actually. Ultimately, Dr. Hair opined that the cause of death was the combined effects of the manual strangulation and chop wounds of the head. She did not testify about whether the chop wounds were inflicted before or after Cowan was strangled, and she did not testify about at what point during the attack Cowan likely lost consciousness. On cross-examination, the following exchange occurred between defense counsel and Dr. Hair: Q. So you are testifying that foaming could be indicative of drowning. That's simply a possibility? A. Yes. Q. You are not able to make any conclusion correct? A. No. Q. In fact I believe you testified that you did not even think about drowning until you were told that somebody had said they heard voices, correct? A. That's correct, yes, sir. Q. And in fact you did not list it as a cause of death in preparing the Certificate of Death? A. That's correct. On re-cross-examination, defense counsel questioned Dr. Hair about whether the foam cone could have been caused by air escaping the body after death. Q. That [foam if caused by last breaths or trapped air] is not an indication of breathing, correct? A. No. Q. And the person could be for that matter be unconscious when this is occurring? A. You can breathe when you are unconscious, yes. Q. And the person could be dead and there could be you said air that was trapped in the lungs that was escaping, is that correct? A. That's correct. At the postconviction evidentiary hearing, Dr. Ronald Keith Wright, M.D., testified as an expert in forensic pathology on behalf of Smithers. Dr. Wright opined that Cowan's cause of death was manual strangulation and that it was highly unlikely that she died of drowning. He testified about the specific physiological factors that caused him to believe she did not drown in freshwater, including the relatively light weight of her lungs, the lack of hemorrhaging to the mastoid air sinuses, and the lack of right-heart fibrillation. [4] Trial counsel Scott Lyon Robbins testified that the defense strategy had been to argue that Cowan died of blunt trauma, not strangulation, before she was in the water. Attorney Robbins explained that he made a strategic decision that Dr. Hair's testimony supported the defense's arguments. Attorney Robbins stated: My decision at the time was that we had what we needed to make the arguments we were trying to make from Dr. Hair's testimony. At that time that was what we proceeded with, that she wasn't given [sic] a definitive strangulation over the blunt trauma. She really wasn't saying which it was. There wasn't any statement as to whether the witness was conscious at any point. And to show that there was, you know, there was a particular painful or drawn out or cruel death was something that she really didn't nail down very well. And so that was the point we were trying to make was that that wasn't proven. Because Smithers did not demonstrate that this decision to rely on Dr. Hair's testimony was unreasonable, the postconviction court did not err in denying this claim. In Belcher v. State, 961 So.2d 239 (Fla.2007), this Court rejected a similar argument that defense counsel should have presented its own expert gynecologist, rather than relying on cross-examination of the State's expert. In that case, trial counsel testified that the defense felt that the State expert could give them what they wanted. Id. at 250. This Court affirmed the denial of relief, finding that counsel made a reasonable strategic decision. The Court explained that it is not necessary for defense counsel to retain a defense expert where defense counsel cross-examined the State's experts to establish the facts necessary for the defense. Id. In this case, Dr. Hair's testimony was silent as to whether Cowan was conscious during the strangulation and agreed that the evidence did not exclude the possibility that she was unconscious when placed in the pond. Thus, Dr. Hair's testimony was consistent with the defense's argument that Cowan lost consciousness quickly due to blows to the head. Accordingly, trial counsel was not deficient. Moreover, Smithers failed to prove deficiency because much of Dr. Wright's testimony would have been harmful to the defense. Dr. Wright's testimony contradicted the argument that Cowan lost consciousness quickly due to blows to the head. He testified that based on the lack of internal bleeding, Cowan's head injuries were inflicted postmortem or perimortem after she was strangled to unconsciousness. See Rose v. State, 985 So.2d 500, 505-06 (Fla.2008) (finding counsel made reasonable tactical decision not to call expert to discuss photographs due to concern that evidence could have harmed defense); Provenzano v. State, 616 So.2d 428, 432 (Fla.1993) (finding counsel not deficient for failing to introduce records that contradicted defense's theory). We also conclude that Smithers did not establish that he was prejudiced by the alleged deficient performance. While it is true that the State argued to the jury that Cowan may have drowned, Smithers has not shown a reasonable probability that the sentence imposed would have been different had the defense presented an expert witness. The evidence does not undermine confidence in the sentencing court's finding that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC). In discussing HAC, the sentencing court stated that the evidence established that the death of Cristy Cowan was caused by or involved blunt impact to her face and head, manual strangulation, and possible drowning. However, the focus of the sentencing court's analysis was that the strangulation death of a conscious victim is in and of itself a crime which is heinous, atrocious, or cruel. The testimony presented at the postconviction hearing supported, rather than contradicted, the finding that Cowan was strangled to death while conscious. The evidence also does not undermine confidence in the sentencing court's finding that the CCP aggravating factor was applicable. In analyzing CCP, the sentencing court relied on the evidence that Smithers deliberately sought out Cowan and took her to the secluded property after he had already killed Roach. On appeal, this Court likewise relied on the events leading up to Cowan's murder in finding CCP applicable. The postconviction evidence did not refute the evidence that Smithers picked up Cowan, took her to the property, and locked the gate behind them, after having recently killed Denise Roach. Because trial counsel made a reasonable strategic decision not to call a defense expert and the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing does not undermine confidence in the sentences, the postconviction court did not err in denying relief.