Opinion ID: 198329
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ramos' Cross Appeal

Text: 18 The district court declined to award Ramos any front pay, which compensates the plaintiff for the loss of future earnings. The Puerto Rico Supreme Court has held that when reinstatement of the employee cannot be ordered ... [f]ront pay up to retirement is an indispensable part of the just compensation afforded to the employee discriminated against by reason of age. Odriozola v. Cosmetic Dist. Corp., 116 D.P.R. 485, 16 Offic. Trans. 595, 624, 1985 WL 301222 (1985). In denying front pay damages, the district court held that the jury verdict made Ramos whole and, in the alternative, that Ramos had not proven that the impossibility of reinstatement was caused by the discrimination of Davis & Geck. Because front pay is considered an equitable remedy, the decision to award or withhold front pay is, at the outset, within the equitable discretion of the trial court. Lussier v. Runyon, 50 F.3d 1103, 1108 (1st Cir.1995). We therefore review the front pay determination for an abuse of discretion. 19 To collect front pay in the absence of a request for reinstatement, Ramos had to prove that he could not return to work at Davis & Geck because of the discriminatory acts of the defendant. See Odriozola, 16 P.R. Offic. Trans. at 619 (allowing front pay where the plaintiff could not work because he was ill, and said illness was due to [the employer's] discriminatory action against him); see also Lopez-Vicil v. ITT Intermedia, Inc. (Lopez I ), 97 J.T.S. 42 at 833, 838 (1997) (concluding that the preferred remedy in cases involving discriminatory dismissals is reinstatement, provided that this is possible) (citing Selgas v. American Airlines, Inc., 104 F.3d 9 (1st Cir.1997)). The district court found that Ramos is capable of returning to his former position but the stresses of his personal life, not the Defendant's prior discriminatory conduct, pose the greatest obstacle for him. Ramos, 968 F.Supp. at 773. After a careful examination of the record, including a review of the testimony of two experts who testified contradictorily about Ramos' mental health history, 5 we cannot say that this finding is clearly erroneous: [w]here there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous. Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 862 F.2d 910, 916 (1st Cir.1988) (citing Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985)). Consequently, we will not disturb the district court's denial of front pay.
20 The district court initially awarded Ramos $37,695 in attorney's fees. Just six days after that ruling, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico issued a decision establishing that ordinarily, the amount that the attorney of a prevailing worker may receive under an Act No. 100 claim shall be twenty-five percent (25%) of the base compensation awarded to the worker. See Lopez-Vicil v. ITT Intermedia, Inc. (Lopez II), 97 J.T.S. 104 at 1250, 1254 (1997). The district court then revised the attorney's fees award to $37,500 in keeping with the Lopez II decision, finding that this fee award was adequate to fairly compensate plaintiff's counsel. We find no abuse of discretion in this determination. See Coutin v. Young & Rubicam Puerto Rico, Inc., 124 F.3d 331, 336 (1st Cir.1997) (We review fee awards deferentially, according substantial respect to the trial court's informed discretion.); Lopez II, 97 J.T.S 104 at 1254 (Appellate courts, in turn, shall not disturb the trial court's fee award except in cases involving abuse of discretion.). 21 Ramos offers a second, more novel challenge to the attorney's fees award. Despite the jury's verdict to the contrary, Ramos claims to be a prevailing party under the ADEA, entitled to a consideration of his fee request pursuant to ADEA jurisprudence. This is so, he says, because the jury's finding that he had been the victim of employment discrimination on the basis of age pursuant to Law 100 is in effect a victory under the ADEA as well. 22 Ramos' proposition is clearly incorrect. As the district court noted, the significant differences in the burden of proof requirements under the ADEA and Law 100 explain the jury's award under Law 100 and its denial under the ADEA. Under the ADEA, the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proving that 'he would not have been fired but for his age.'  Serrano-Cruz, 109 F.3d at 25 (quoting Freeman v. Package Mach. Co., 865 F.2d 1331, 1335 (1st Cir.1988)). In employment discrimination claims proceeding under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the establishment of plaintiff's prima facie case shifts only a burden of production to the defendant (to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action); once the employer meets that burden of production the presumption of discrimination vanishes and the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer's stated reason is in fact a pretext, and that the real reason was discriminatory animus. Greenberg v. Union Camp Corp., 48 F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir.1995) (discussing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973)); see also Wildman v. Lerner Stores Corp., 771 F.2d 605, 609 (1st Cir.1985) (Under the ADEA, the burden of proof is at all times on the plaintiff.). 23 Under Law 100, however, once the employee triggers the act's protections by showing that his discharge, constructive or otherwise, was not justified, the employee enjoys a presumption that he or she has been the victim of discrimination and the burdens of both production and persuasion shift to the employer. See Alvarez-Fonseca v. Pepsi Cola of Puerto Rico Bottling Co., 152 F.3d 17, 27 (1st Cir.1998) (citing Ibanez Benitez v. Molinos de Puerto Rico, Inc., 114 P.R. Dec. 42, 52, 1983 WL 204221 (1983) (concluding that Law 100 is more favorable to plaintiff than its federal counterpart)); see also Sanchez v. Puerto Rico Oil Co., 37 F.3d 712, 723 (1st Cir.1994) (comparing burdens of proof under the ADEA and Puerto Rico Law 100 and noting that under Law 100, in contrast [to the ADEA], the burden of proof shifts to the defendant once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case). Thus, in order to rebut the Law 100 presumption, the employer must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the challenged action was not motivated by discriminatory age animus. Alvarez-Fonseca, 152 F.3d at 27-28. These different burden of proof allocations explain the divergent liability determinations on Ramos' ADEA and Law 100 claims. Ramos is not a prevailing party under the ADEA and has no claim to attorney's fees under that statute.
24 Plaintiff also assigns error to the district court's refusal to grant pre-judgment interest. Pursuant to Puerto Rico Rule of Civil Procedure 44.3(b), the plaintiff is entitled to pre-judgment interest if the defendant acted in an obstinate manner during the litigation. See Dopp v. Pritzker, 38 F.3d 1239, 1252 (1st Cir.1994) (noting that, while Rule 44.3(b) speaks in terms of parties who act rashly, the case law makes it transpicuously clear that the legally operative conduct under [Rule 44.3(b) ] is that of obstinacy) (citing De Leon Lopez v. Corporacion Insular de Seguros, 931 F.2d 116, 126-27 (1st Cir.1991)). The district court found that Davis & Geck had not been obstinate and declined to award pre-judgment interest. Such a finding is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Id. at 1253. At the close of the trial, the district court commended the attorneys on both sides for their competence and diligence. Furthermore, in refusing Ramos' request for pre-judgment interest, the court noted that the defendant's success in defeating several of the claims justified a robust defense. After a review of the record, and in deference to the vastly different relationship between the district court and the events of an actual trial, on the one hand, and the court of appeals and those same events, on the other hand, id., we affirm the denial of pre-judgment interest. 25 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.