Opinion ID: 77358
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: April 1, 2005, Conference

Text: 42 At the April 1, 2005, status conference, Wilk stated that he was prepared to go to trial on April 18 if the district court granted his motion to strike the Death Notice. If the district court denied the motion to strike, Wilk would file an interlocutory appeal to this Court and move the district court to stay the proceedings. Wilk conceded that the time during his interlocutory appeal would be excludable under the Speedy Trial Act. 43 The government believed that Wilk was extorting the district court and pointed out that the district court could find time excludable under the Speedy Trial Act in light of Wilk's refusal to take a firm position on the proposed continuance of the trial date to August 29. The government believed that Wilk's new statement that he was prepared for a non-capital trial on April 18 was inconsistent with his repeated requests for continuances and the outstanding discovery matters. 44 Wilk responded that different trial strategies would be employed depending on whether the Death Notice was in effect. Wilk asserted that he was not trying to exploit the district court, but wanted a ruling on the Death Notice before he was asked to waive his right to a speedy trial. The district court did not want to rule on Wilk's motion to strike the amended Death Notice until the government had responded. 45 Ultimately, the district court concluded that both sides needed additional time to prepare for trial, stating: 46 It's apparent to the Court based on the argument made by [the government], and based on the numerous submissions by Counsel for the Defense that both sides need additional time to properly prepare this case for trial. I am very stingy, as you know, about granting a continuance but the bottom line is justice. 47 I am thoroughly convinced that the interest of justice served by a continuance far outweighs any interest of the public and the Defendant in a speedy trial. So as much as I hate to continue this case because, I can tell you it's wrecking [sic] havoc with my schedule, I am going to continue this case until August the 29th. 48 J. Order Denying Wilk's Motion to Strike the Death Notice 49 On April 27, 2005, the district court entered a twenty-one page order denying Wilk's motion to strike the Death Notice. The district court analyzed the timeliness of the Death Notice under the factors listed in United States v. Ferebe, 332 F.3d 722, 737 (4th Cir.2003). 15 See United States v. Wilk, 366 F.Supp.2d 1178, 1182-83 (S.D.Fla.2005). First, the district court concluded that the August 29th trial date should be used in its timeliness analysis because the trial date was continued for reasons unrelated to the filing of the Death Notice. Id. at 1183. As reasons for using the August 29 trial date, the district court pointed to the issues raised at the March 30 and April 1 status conferences, including the numerous unresolved motions; the fact that Wilk had not yet disclosed his experts; and the potential for a Daubert hearing on the government's experts on April 11, one week before the April 18 trial date. Id. at 1183-84. 50 Second, the district court found that the Death Notice was filed a reasonable amount of time before trial because over six months existed between the filing of the Death Notice and the August 29th trial date. Id. at 1185. The district court further determined that even if it were to use the April 18th trial date, the Death Notice was filed a reasonable time before the trial because the district court had given the government until February 18 to file the Death Notice and the district court set this deadline because it found it would provide Defendant notice of the government's intent to seek the death penalty a reasonable amount of time before trial. Id. 51 Third, as to the nature of the charges, the district court found that [t]he homicide charges are rather basic; only the obstruction of justice and pornography allegations, which form part of Defendant's intent, involve any degree of intricacy. Thus, two months, let alone six months, would be sufficient time to prepare a defense. Id. at 1186. The district court also determined that the government did not intentionally delay in filing the Death Notice. Id. 52 Fourth, the district court found that the aggravating factors merely track the [death penalty] statute's language and are reflective of the same facts that are in the homicide charges themselves. Id. at 1187. The district court determined that the defendant could have adequately prepared his death defense in two months, let alone six, given the nature of the aggravating charges and the prior notice provided in the first Superseding Indictment . . . . Id. The district court further concluded that there was nothing to suggest that the government should have filed the Death Notice sooner. Id. 53 Fifth, as to the status of discovery, the district court found that discovery will undoubtedly be completed long before the August 29 trial date. Id. Even with the April 18 trial date, the district court determined that this factor did not weigh in Wilk's favor enough as to outweigh the other factors. It noted that Wilk had yet to disclose any defense experts or produce any mental health evidence even though [Wilk] had consulted at least a dozen experts. Id. 54 Finally, the district court also relied on the fact that the government included a list of statutory aggravating factors in the first superseding indictment in October 2004, even though it was not required to do so. Id. at 1187-88. Because the timeliness of a Death Notice is an issue of first impression in this Court, the district court decided it was also necessary to engage in a prejudice analysis. Id. at 1189. The district court found that Wilk did not suffer any prejudice from the timing of the February 2005 Death Notice because: (1) the Death Notice was filed within the deadline imposed by the district court; (2) defense counsel had already received the district court's permission for eleven experts, some of which related solely to penalty phase issues; (3) the death penalty was addressed at each of the status conferences; (4) the magistrate judge initially informed appointed counsel to treat this as a death penalty case; (5) the district court and the parties had already discussed written juror questionnaires that included questions addressing the death penalty; and (6) the Death Notice merely parroted information that was already known. Id. Based on these factors, the district court further found that for defense counsel to now suggest surprise strikes this Court as being opportunistic and disingenuous. Id. The district court denied Wilk's motion to strike the Death Notice. Id. at 1190. Wilk timely appealed.