Opinion ID: 1386415
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: renunciation

Text: The trial court found that the plaintiff and her husband each had an undivided one-half interest in the notes, as tenants in common, and that the plaintiff's husband had forgiven his one-half interest by Article Eight of his October 20, 1966, will. The plaintiff concedes, in her cross-appeal from the dismissal of part of her claim, that the notes were held by the Fehlings as tenants in common  and we need not, therefore, discuss that point in this opinion. We are left, then, with the plaintiff's contentions on appeal that, as a matter of law: (1) any interest in the notes could only be discharged by both of the Fehlings, as co-payees; or (2) if plaintiff's husband could discharge his one-half interest, he did not do so because he failed to deliver the will or surrender the notes to the defendants; or (3) the will did not effect a discharge of these notes. In asserting that any interest in the notes could only be discharged by the joint action of both payees, the plaintiff relies on § 34-3-116(b), W.S. 1957, 1975 Cum.Supp. [§ 34-21-316(a)(ii), W.S. 1977]. [3] The application of this provision must be considered in conjunction with other relevant U.C.C. provisions  which, in this case, would be § 34-3-605, W.S. 1957, 1975 Cum. Supp. [§ 34-21-372, W.S. 1977]. Gillespie v. Riley Management Corp., 59 Ill.2d 211, 319 N.E.2d 753. Section 34-3-605, supra, provides in relevant part: (1) The holder of an instrument may even without consideration discharge any party       (b) by renouncing his rights by a writing signed and delivered or by surrender of the instrument to the party to be discharged. [Emphasis supplied] On its face, § 34-3-605(1)(b), supra, allows a holder to at least discharge a party to the instrument to the extent of the holder's interest therein. He could not, however, discharge all interests under an instrument payable to himself and another party. Section 34-3-116(b), supra. This construction is consistent with general legal principles applicable to tenancies in common. 20 Am.Jur.2d, Cotenancy and Joint Ownership, § 26. Cf. Hill v. Breeden, 53 Wyo. 125, 79 P.2d 482; and Wambeke v. Hopkin, Wyo., 372 P.2d 470. We see no basis on which to conclude that these particular principles were changed by enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code and, therefore, hold that the plaintiff's husband could renounce his undivided one-half interest in the promissory notes. Finally, we must determine whether plaintiff's husband made an effective renunciation of his interest in the notes. In this regard, plaintiff contends that her husband failed to comply with the renunciation requirements of § 34-3-605(1)(b), supra, because he failed to deliver his Last Will and Testament to the defendants. The plaintiff cites no case authority for her contention, and we have been unable to discover any which provides a definitive answer to the issue raised. It is beyond question, however, that a testator may discharge debts due to him by express provisions in his will. 6 Bowe-Parker: Page on Wills, § 57.1 (1962); 96 C.J.S. Wills § 792; 80 Am.Jur.2d, Wills, § 1593. In addition, a tenant in common may dispose of his undivided interest in property by devise or bequest. 20 Am.Jur.2d, Cotenancy and Joint Ownership, § 99. We find no language in § 34-3-605(1)(b), supra, which would prohibit the ability of a person to discharge his interest in an instrument by a renunciation contained in a will which meets the requisite formalities of execution. See, Ricks v. Brown, 15 Or. App. 160, 515 P.2d 206; and Greene v. Cotton, Ky., 457 S.W.2d 493. The term deliver  as contained in § 34-3-605(1)(b), supra,  is defined by the U.C.C. as a voluntary transfer of possession. Section 1-201(14), W.S. 1957, 1975 Cum.Supp. [§ 34-21-120(a)(xiv), W.S. 1977]. There is no indication that this delivery must occur contemporaneously with the written renunciation, or that it must occur during the payee's lifetime  as would be true for an effective gift inter vivos or gift causa mortis ( Begovich v. Kruljac, 38 Wyo. 365, 267 P. 426). We hold that all the requirements of an effective renunciation were met when Mr. Fehling's will was admitted to probate. [4] Furthermore, we hold that the language of Article Eight of Mr. Fehling's will was effective in discharging his interest in these particular notes. The intent of the testator in this case is clearly discernible from the will itself, and the plaintiff has supplied no cogent reasoning or authority to the contrary. Affirmed.