Opinion ID: 2615130
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: pleading assumpsit and punitive damages

Text: As stated, Oregon has been a code pleading state since statehood. The general rule has been that a pleading must contain factual allegations which, if proved, establish the right to the relief sought. This rule has been carried forward in the Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure. ORCP 18A. reads: A pleading which asserts a claim for relief, whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third party claim, shall contain: A. A plain and concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting a claim for relief without unnecessary repetition. The Comment to ORCP 18 states: The Council decided to retain fact pleading as opposed to notice pleading, i.e., to retain a requirement of fairly specific description of facts as opposed to adopting the less specific fact description allowable in federal courts.    The necessity of pleading ultimate facts retains the present Oregon requirements of pleading facts at a fairly specific level.   . F. Merrill, Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure: A Handbook 36 (1981). We correctly held, in 1869 and 1888, that the common counts in assumpsit are inconsistent with code pleading requirements that the complaint contain a plain and concise statement of facts constituting the claim for relief or cause of action. In Keene v. Eldriedge, supra , we erred in straying from the holdings of Bowen v. Emmerson, supra , Buchanan v. Beck, supra . Asserting damages for a tort in an assumpsit complaint does not convert the tort into a breach of contract. The efficient resolution of cases, both in the pleading stages and in the trial stages, will be furthered by holding parties to the mandate of ORCP 18 A., requiring allegations of the facts which constitute the claim for relief. [7] As regards punitive damage claims, our precedents hold that if punitive damages are sought, facts must be alleged which, if proved, will establish the right to recover punitive damages. In McGill v. Huling Buick Company, 259 Or. 413, 487 P.2d 656 (1971), the plaintiff sued an automobile dealer, and the complaint contained detailed allegations of fact concerning fraud that was practiced by the defendant upon the plaintiff. The plaintiff sought and recovered general damages and punitive damages. The defendant appealed, claiming that the allegations of the complaint were insufficient to support an award of punitive damages. Specifically, the defendant contended: nowhere in the complaint do the plaintiffs allege that the representations were willful, malicious or recklessly made, nor do they allege that they are entitled to punitive damages. 259 Or. at 418, 487 P.2d 656. In affirming the judgment for the plaintiff, we held that if the complaint alleges facts which, if true, establish that the conduct of the defendant is so reprehensible that the award of punitive damages is proper, it is not necessary to allege that the conduct complained of was malicious, wanton, or intentional. The court noted that no motion to strike or to make definite and certain had been made. 259 Or. at 421-22, 487 P.2d 656. Holden v. Pioneer Broadcasting Co. et al., 228 Or. 405, 418, 365 P.2d 845 (1961), represents the other side of the coin. It was a libel case involving publication in a newspaper, and the complaint alleged that the statements were made wilfully, maliciously and wrongfully. This court upheld an order striking the punitive damage allegation from a complaint, saying:    The allegations in the complaint do not purport to charge defendants with the intent to defame plaintiff. The recitation that the `utterances and publication were made by defendants willfully, maliciously and wrongfully' is not to be construed as an allegation that defendants knew that the charges were false or that defendants were motivated by ill will in making the alleged defamatory statement. The allegation that the statement was made `willfully, maliciously and wrongfully' is a mere conclusion of the pleader. The allegation is not sufficient to charge malice in fact. 228 Or. at 418, 365 P.2d 845. (Footnote omitted.) In Cays v. McDaniel, 204 Or. 449, 457, 283 P.2d 658 (1955), the plaintiff sought punitive damages against a car dealer for turning back the odometer mileage. We said: It is elementary that a complaint must allege facts sufficient to authorize the relief sought by a plaintiff. To be entitled to punitive damages in any case, it is necessary that plaintiff allege in his complaint the material facts justifying such allowance. If a plaintiff relies upon circumstances of aggravation as the basis of his claim for punitive damages, those circumstances must be alleged in the complaint.      . However, as we stated in Stark v. Epler, supra, [59 Or. 262, 266, 117 P. 276 (1911)] `the rules of pleading do not require that the allegations relating to exemplary damages should be set out separately from the other averments of the complaint', as is required with relation to special damages. Exemplary damages are so intimately connected with general damages that if the general allegations of the complaint are sufficient to show the wrong complained of was inflicted with malice or oppression or other like circumstances, the complaint will be deemed sufficient to authorize the infliction of punitive or exemplary damages. [8] Consistent with ORCP 18 A., we hold that whatever the theory of recovery, facts must be alleged which, if proved, will establish the right to recover. It is no longer permissible to veil the facts or theory behind a nonfactual pleading for money had and received and thereafter prove any state of facts which, historically, could support recovery on a theory of money had and received. The common counts, are no longer permissible pleadings; the complaint must set forth a plain and concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting a claim for relief. To the extent that Snow v. Tompkins, 205 Or. 60, 286 P.2d 119 (1955), and Keene v. Eldriedge, 47 Or. 179, 82 P. 803 (1905), are inconsistent with this holding, they are disapproved. We are not holding that the common count remedies are abolished. We only hold that a claim for relief must be asserted in accordance with ORCP 18 A. [9] Where punitive damages are sought, the complaint should set forth the ultimate facts which are claimed to support the recovery of punitive damages. If, as here, the punitive damage claim is based upon tortious conduct, facts must be alleged which, if true, establish the tort and the right to punitive damages.