Opinion ID: 2316152
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Comment on Counsel's Closing Argument on the Law.

Text: An addition to the record, inserted with the approval of the trial court, shows that one of the appellant's trial counsel, in making his argument to the jury, stated that if the jury believed the defendant's testimony that the check was not to be cashed for thirty days, and that the defendant gave a $600.00 check for $500.00 cash, that no crime had been committed. Trial counsel stated that at this point one of the judges interrupted his argument to ask Do you believe that is a defense to this cause? Counsel answered Yes and explained why. The trial judge does not recall exactly the point at which this interruption took place, but there is no reason to doubt the accuracy of the recollection of counsel. It also appears from the addition to the record, the inclusion of which was approved by the judge who asked the question, that after this question and answer, counsel for the appellant completed his argument to the jury without further comment by the court. The appellant asserts that the court invaded the province of the jury, which under Article XV, Section 5, of the Constitution of Maryland (with one exception not here involved) is the judge of the law as well as of the facts in criminal cases, and that this comment or query prejudiced the jury. There is nothing in the record to show what, if any, instructions were given to the jury in this case, and it follows, of course, that there is no exception before us to any views of the law which the court may have expressed in any instructions which may have been given. Under our almost unique constitutional provision any instructions on the law which the court may give (subject to the one exception already mentioned) are purely advisory and the court must so inform the jury. Criminal Rules of Practice and Procedure, Rule 6. There is likewise nothing in the record to indicate that during the trial any objection was made to the inquiry or comment of the court which is now complained of or that any request was made that a juror be withdrawn and a mistrial declared because of the (now) allegedly prejudicial character of the comment. (In pointing out these facts we are not to be understood as suggesting or implying any criticism of the appellant's trial counsel, neither of whom represents him on this appeal.) The right of the trial court to give advisory instructions in criminal cases was recognized long before the adoption of the present Criminal Rules of Practice and Procedure. See Klein v. State, 151 Md. 484, 135 A. 591, Vogel v. State, 163 Md. 267, 162 A. 705 and cases therein cited. The right to give such instructions is clearly recognized and expressed in Rule 6 of those Rules. If the appellant's contention is based upon the premise that the court's inquiry amounted to an instruction and was improper, it should have been objected to at the time, as provided by paragraph (g) of Rule 6. That paragraph, however, also permits this Court, of its own motion, to take cognizance of and correct any plain error even though not included in the assignment of errors. We do not regard this comment as calling for such action on our part. Under our system of jury trials in criminal cases, differences between the court and counsel with regard to the law applicable to the case not only may develop before the jury, but are to be left to the jury for determination. See, for example, paragraph (e) of Rule 6 which expressly provides that the court's giving of advisory instructions prior to the argument of the case shall not preclude counsel from arguing to the contrary. (This involves at least a reversal in part of a rule recognized long before the adoption of the Criminal Rules of Practice and Procedure. See Beard v. State, 71 Md. 275, 17 A. 1044; Bell v. State, 57 Md. 108; Franklin v. State, 12 Md. 236. Cf. Vogel v. State, supra . ) In the face of the present Rule 6(e) it cannot be successfully contended that the mere fact that the jury is informed that the court holds a different view of the law from that asserted by counsel constitutes prejudicial error. Nor can it be successfully contended that the trial judge may not express dissent from counsel's statements as to the law in the course of a criminal trial. Garlitz v. State, 71 Md. 293, 18 A. 39; Simond v. State, 127 Md. 29, 95 A. 1073; Nolan v. State, 157 Md. 332, 146 A. 268. In the Garlitz case, the question arose over counsel's statement relating to the admissibility of evidence and his statement was held to have been clearly erroneous; in the Simond case, the challenged statement pertained to the repeal of a statute and was made in the course of counsel's opening statement; and in the Nolan case the court twice interrupted counsel for the traverser in order to prevent or cut off arguments to the jury contrary to what the court had previously ruled on questions of law  on demurrer in one instance and on the admissibility of evidence in the other. This is not a case in which the defendant's counsel was precluded from arguing a question of law at all, as in Wilkerson v. State, 171 Md. 287, 188 A. 813, relied upon by the appellant. On the contrary, in the instant case, counsel for the appellant was permitted to make and did make his argument in full before the jury on his questioned theory of law, and the court made no further comment thereon after the query above mentioned. It is inferable that the court was satisfied by counsel's explanation, but there is nothing to prove whether this was or was not so. Even assuming that it was not, we cannot say that the court's inquiry followed immediately, as it was, by counsel's reply and argument in support of his view, and not followed by any further comment by the court, constituted a plain error material to the rights of the accused. We think that the appellant had his day in court and had it fairly. Cf. Dick v. State, 107 Md. 11, 68 A. 286, in which it was stated that after the court had told the jury that he had determined a question of agency in passing on the admissibility of evidence, but that the jury was not compelled to accept his opinion, the defendant was not entitled to a charge that the jury was not to pay any attention to the remarks of the court. We have now reviewed each of the appellant's contentions, and it follows from the views above expressed that the judgment should be affirmed. Judgment affirmed, with costs.