Opinion ID: 2633459
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sufficiency of the evidence in this case

Text: When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial, we have repeatedly stated that evidence adduced in the trial court must be considered in the strongest light for the prosecution when the appellate court passes on the legal sufficiency of such evidence to support a conviction; the same standard applies whether the case was before a judge or jury. The test on appeal is not whether guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether there was substantial evidence to support the conclusion of the trier of fact. State v. Quitog, 85 Hawai`i 128, 145, 938 P.2d 559, 576 (1997) (quoting State v. Eastman, 81 Hawai`i 131, 135, 913 P.2d 57, 61 (1996)) (emphasis omitted). `Substantial evidence' as to every material element of the offense charged is credible evidence which is of sufficient quality and probative value to enable a person of reasonable caution to support a conclusion. Eastman, 81 Hawai`i at 135, 913 P.2d at 61. State v. Birdsall, 88 Hawai`i 1, 8, 960 P.2d 729, 736, reconsideration denied, 88 Hawai`i 1, 960 P.2d 729 (1998). Here, the jury was presented with the following alternative means of establishing a lack of consent: (1) the absence of consent; or (2) ineffective consent, based on any of four grounds. It is undisputed that there was legally sufficient evidence to support the jury's consideration of the absence of consent alternative. As to the jury instruction regarding the ineffective consent alternative, the prosecution concedes that the evidence presented at trial simply [did] not support an ineffective consent instruction in this case[,] but argues that the instruction was so inapplicable that there is no real possibility that the erroneous instruction contributed to the verdict. Our review of the record reveals that, although there was no argument presented or evidence adduced in support of grounds one and three of the ineffective consent statute, [27] the prosecution presented considerable argument and adduced some evidence in support of the theory that, even if Complainant gave apparent consent, it was ineffective based on either ground two or ground four. Under ground two, consent is ineffective if [i]t was given by a person who by reason of youth, mental disease, disorder or defect . . . is manifestly unable or known by the defendant to be unable to make a reasonable judgment as to the nature of harmfulness of the conduct alleged [.] (Emphasis added.) Proof of the complainant's youth alone does not satisfy the elements of Ground two. Ground two of the ineffective consent statute is thus distinguishable from the strict liability offense described in HRS § 707-732(1)(b), wherein the offense is described as sexual contact with a person less than fourteen years old. See supra note 5; cf. State v. Buch, 83 Hawai`i 308, 316 n. 5, 926 P.2d 599, 607 n. 5 (1996) (noting that [t]he Commentary to HRS § 702-235, . . . to the extent that it suggests that the Code eliminates absolute liability with respect to the victim's age in a sex offense, is directly contrary to the unequivocally expressed legislative intent [in imposing strict liability under 707-732(1)(b)]). In order to prove Ground two, the prosecution must prove that Defendant knew or should have known, i.e., that it was manifest, that Complainant was unable to exercise reasonable judgment as to the nature of the harmfulness of the conduct alleged. HRS § 702-235(2). During trial, the prosecution spent considerable time focusing on Complainant's youth to explain why she did not ask to go home and chose to stay in the hotel room with Defendant, even after the earlier assaults, distinguishing Complainant's actions from an adult response. The prosecution's arguments also repeatedly referred to the effect of Defendant's mental manipulation and mental coercion upon Complainant as a young girl who was easily influenced. [28] There was evidence that Complainant was fourteen-years-old. She also testified that nothing like this had happened to her before, that she was embarrassed by Defendant's sexual advances, and that, when Defendant made these advances, she tried to avoid him or push him away. However, even if Complainant was inexperienced or embarrassed, there was no evidence adduced that Defendant knew or should have known that Complainant was unable to make a reasonable judgment as to the nature or the harmfulness of the conduct alleged. Thus, although there was considerable argument regarding Complainant's youth and some evidence of her inexperience, there was legally insufficient evidence to establish ineffective consent under Ground two. Under Ground four, consent is ineffective if, inter alia, [i]t is induced by . . . deception. (Emphasis added.) The prosecution repeatedly referred to Defendant's use of deception and manipulation to lure this young girl to spend time with him and come to his hotel, referring to Defendant as a pied piper and a con artist. [29] The record contains evidence that Defendant talked about his connection to rock groups and modeling agencies. However, there is no evidence that Defendant was untruthful about his connections. Defendant began his relationship with the Complainant, her family, and her friends by procuring concert tickets for them. At best, the evidence supports an inference that Defendant used his connections and procured concert tickets in order to attract Complainant to spend time with him. If the jury believed that she consented to the sexual conduct, was induced by deception that would render such consent meaningless. Thus, although there was significant prosecutorial effort expended on Defendant's use of deception and a trace of evidence that he tried to impress the Complainant with his connections, such evidence was legally insufficient to establish ineffective consent based on Ground four. Based on the foregoing, if the jury believed that Complainant consented to the sexual conduct, Defendant should have been acquitted because there was no legally sufficient evidence in support of any of the four grounds of ineffective consent. However, the jury was instructed that they could find Defendant guilty, even if they believed Complainant consented, based upon ineffective consent. Because there was considerable argument and some evidence presented to the jury regarding the Complainant's youth and Defendant's mental manipulation and deception, it is possible that some or all of the jurors believed they could find guilt based on ineffective consent, despite the lack of legally sufficient evidence as to any of the ineffective consent grounds. See Ice, 997 P.2d at 741 (stating that, [w]ith so much testimony and prosecutorial effort invested into [legally insufficient] theory, we cannot say there is no real possibility that the verdict here was based only on the [legally sufficient] theory.). Further, as recognized by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, [i]f the judge tells a jury that they may find the defendant guilty on a theory that is factually unsupported (in effect committing an error of law), the jurors understandably might believe that there must be some evidence to support that theory. Plunkett, 664 N.E.2d at 837. We cannot assume that the jurors rejected the ineffective consent theories presented to them. Therefore, we hold that the instruction as to ineffective consent prejudicially affected Defendant's right to due process because (1) the jury was instructed that it could convict Defendant based on the absence of consent or any of the four grounds of ineffective consent, (2) there was a reasonable possibility that the verdict was based upon at least one of the four grounds of ineffective consent, and (3) there was legally insufficient evidence to support any of the four grounds of ineffective consent presented to the jury. In other words, the erroneous jury instruction regarding ineffective consent was not harmless because there was a reasonable possibility that the verdict was based on an alternative that was unsupported by legally sufficient evidence.