Opinion ID: 6472358
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The 2005 Amendment to Section 1-14-15(B) is an Unconstitutional Delegation of Legislative Power to the State Canvassing Board2

Text: {35} Both Petitioners and the State Canvassing Board agree that Petitioners’ claim is unaffected by the Legislature’s amendment, but the question is whether future applicants for a recount or recheck would be subject to the State Canvassing Board’s discretionary authority. On July 1, 2005, while this case was pending before this Court and before oral argument, the Legislature amended Section 1-14-15(B) as follows: The deposit or surety bond shall be security for the payment of the costs and expenses of the recount or recheck in case the results of the recount or recheck are not sufficient to change the results of the election. The state canvassing board may condition the issuance of the summons on a receipt of a portion of or the full estimated costs of the recount or recheck to ensure sufficient security. (Emphasis added.). {36} The Legislature’s intent is clear in the plain language of the amendment: the State Canvassing Board has the authority to condition a recount or recheck on the full estimated costs of the recount or recheck for future applicants. The State Canvassing Board argues that this amendment settles the question of its authority to condition the issuance of summonses on payment of the entire estimated cost of the recount, both before and after the effective date of the amendment. Petitioners note that the amendment is unconstitutional on its face, and as a result, the pre-amended version of Section 1-14-15(B) is still in effect. Petitioners make three arguments with respect to the 2005 amendment’s uneonstitutionality: (1) it is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power because the State Canvassing Board has no standards to guide its discretion in requiring advance payment of any costs; (2) it violates the Equal Protection Clause, because the amendment allows the State Canvassing Board to exercise authority to arbitrarily distinguish between similarly situated petitioners for a recount, implicating the fundamental right to vote; and (3) it violates substantive due process because petitioners are left without notice as to how much of a deposit they must provide in order for the State Canvassing Board to authorize a recount or reeheck, unfairly prejudicing minor political party candidates. In holding the 2005 amendment to Section 1-14-15(B) unconstitutional, in the interest of judicial restraint, we choose to focus only on Petitioners’ nondelegation argument: the Legislature’s unconstitutional delegation of power in giving the State Canvassing Board arbitrary and unbridled authority. {37} Preliminarily, we must address Petitioners’ ability to challenge the constitutionality of the 2005 amendment. We acknowledge that Petitioners have brought their claim under the pre-amended 2001 version of Section 1-14-15(B), which means the claim is unaffected by the Legislature’s 2005 amendment. The Uniform Statute and Rule Construction Act expressly prohibits an amended statute from having any effect on a pending action or proceeding. NMSA 1978, § 12-2A-16(A), (B) (1997). We reiterate that neither Petitioners nor the State Canvassing Board claim that the amendment affects the cause of action, but both parties address the amendment in terms of whether a claim such as Petitioners’ is capable of repetition yet evading review. The State Canvassing Board has recognized the importance of the issues in this case and has chosen to waive its standing and mootness arguments only to Petitioners’ ability to challenge the Section 1-14-15(B) 2005 amendment. {38} While we have not previously recognized a private party’s standing to invoke this Court’s power to resolve questions of the constitutionality of a statutory amendment in appellate review, this Court has recognized its discretionary authority to “grant standing to private parties to vindicate the public interest in cases presenting issues of great public importance.” Baca v. N.M. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 2002-NMSC-017, ¶ 3, 132 N.M. 282, 47 P.3d 441 (per curiam) (quoted authority omitted). In Baca, a mayor of Albuquerque petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus to prohibit the Department of Public Safety from enforcing certain provisions of the Concealed Handgun Carry Act. Id. ¶ 1. After oral argument, but while the case was still pending, the mayor was succeeded by a new mayor. Id. ¶ 2. The new mayor submitted a motion to replace the former mayor on the writ and to dismiss his predecessor’s writ. Id. This Court refused the new may- or’s motion to dismiss, granting standing to the former mayor, as a private individual, to “invoke [our] power ... to resolve constitutional questions and enforce constitutional compliance [in order] to vindicate the public interest in cases presenting [an issue] of great public importance.” Id. ¶ 3. {39} As stated, the issue of clarifying our Election Code, especially in the current political climate, make this a case of great public importance. The 2005 amendment to Section 1-14H5(B) attempts to confer the very authority the State Canvassing Board claims to have had under the 2001 version of the statute, and that the district court agreed was implicit in Section 1-14-15. Consequently, Petitioners’ argument challenging the State Canvassing Board’s discretionary authority under the 2001 version of Section 1-14-15(B) would be the same under the 2005 amended version. Even though the 2005 amendment does not affect Petitioners’ claim, because future applicants for recounts or rechecks would make an argument identical to Petitioners’ claim, common sense demands review of the amendment. We acknowledge that cases conferring standing have generally arisen in the context of our original jurisdiction in mandamus. See, e.g., Baca, 2002-NMSC-017, ¶ 3, 132 N.M. 282, 47 P.3d 441; State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 86 N.M. 359, 363, 524 P.2d 975, 979 (1974). Nonetheless, the individual facts of this case and the great public interest involved in Petitioners’ claim compel us to invoke our power to resolve the constitutionality of the 2005 amendment to Section 1-14-15(B). {40} We now turn directly to the 2005 amendment’s unconstitutionality under the nondelegation doctrine. The New Mexico Constitution provides for the separation of powers. The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct departments, the legislative, executive and judicial, and no person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this constitution otherwise expressly directed or permitted. N.M. Const, art. Ill, § 1. It is this principle of separation of powers and the limitations on the Legislature’s ability to transfer its power to other departments that is the basis of the nondelegation doctrine. See Black’s Law Dictionary 438 (7th ed.1999) (delegation doctrine). {41} The nondelegation doctrine limits, but does not completely prevent, the Legislature from vesting a large measure of discretionary authority in administrative officers and bodies. “There are many powers so far legislative that they may properly be exercised by the legislature, but which may nevertheless be delegated, since the legislature may delegate any technically nonlegislative power which it may itself lawfully exercise.” State v. Spears, 57 N.M. 400, 405, 259 P.2d 356, 360 (1953) (quoted authority omitted). The Legislature may not vest unbridled or arbitrary authority in an administrative body, however, and must provide reasonable standards to guide it. City of Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 73 N.M. 410, 417, 389 P.2d 13, 18 (1964). In the past, this Court has found proper delegation of legislative authority in eases where administrative discretion occurs within a governmental scheme, policy, or purpose, Spears, 57 N.M. at 406, 259 P.2d at 360, but “[w]hen the scope increases to immense proportions ... the standards must be correspondingly more precise.” State ex rel. Schwartz v. Johnson, 120 N.M. 820, 825, 907 P.2d 1001, 1006 (1995) (quoted authority omitted). “The essential inquiry is whether the specified guidance sufficiently marks the field within which the administrator is to act so that it may be known whether [the administrator] has kept within it in compliance with the legislative will.” Id. (quoted authority omitted). Also “the fact that [an agency acts] only under certain self-imposed restraints can in no way serve to supply what has been omitted. It is not what has been done but what can be done under a statute that determines its constitutionality.” State ex rel. Holmes v. State Bd. of Fin., 69 N.M. 430, 440, 367 P.2d 925, 932 (1961). {42} In Spears, the defendant was charged with engaging in business as a real estate broker without a license. 57 N.M. at 403, 259 P.2d at 358. The defendant challenged the constitutionality of the Legislature’s delegation to the New Mexico Real Estate Board to accept real estate licenses and to develop a qualifying examination to determine an applicant’s qualifications. Id. at 403-04, 259 P.2d at 358-59. This Court, finding the Legislature’s delegation of power to the New Mexico Real Estate Board constitutional, noted the law carried out a legislative scheme, policy, and purpose by its own terms. See id. at 406, 259 P.2d at 360. The law provide[d] for the appointment of a board, made up of persons experienced in the real estate business, ... and to which is committed the power to make and enforce any and all rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of the act and of prescribing such reasonable written examinations of such scope as to determine the qualifications of applicants. Id. at 405, 259 P.2d at 360. Because the Board’s statutorily authorized actions did not “involve the exercise of primary and independent discretion, but only determin[ations] with[in] defined limits, and subject to review, [of] some fact upon which the law by its own terms operates, such regulation or action” was constitutional. Id. at 406, 259 P.2d at 360. {43} In Schwartz, the issue was whether the Legislature, by statute, had intended to allow the governor to regulate the periodic allotment of funds to state agencies based on the recurring needs of state agencies or give the executive the discretion to base allotments on fiscal policy. Schwartz, 120 N.M. at 821, 907 P.2d at 1002. The governor argued that the Legislature had delegated allotment authority to him, based on a statute that gave the state budget division authorization to provide regulations for the periodic allotment of funds expended by any state agency. Id. at 823, 907 P.2d at 1004. The governor believed such authority allowed him to consider fiscal policy when making allotment decisions, such as the maintenance of general-fund reserves. Id. at 824, 907 P.2d at 1005. The Court, questioning whether the statute explicitly authorized the governor to consider fiscal policy, found that the statute contained few if any standards to direct the governor’s discretion in reducing allotments. Id. at 825, 907 P.2d at 1006. While the governor claimed self-restraint when determining allotments, the Court found that was insufficient to cure the unconstitutional legislative delegation of authority to the governor. Id. {44} The State Canvassing Board argues that it is an administrative agency, and consequently this Court should give great deference to its decision to require full or partial payment of a recount. However, deference is not appropriate in this case. Unlike the real estate business experts who composed the New Mexico Real Estate Board in Spears, the State Canvassing Board is composed of the governor, the secretary of state, and the chief justice of the supreme court. N.M. Const. art. Y, § 2. While all three are distinguished, high-ranking government officials, only the Secretary of State is an expert in the area of voting or elections. Also, as in Spears, while the Election Code does allow the Secretary of State to make rules and regulations to carry out the purposes of the Election Code, NMSA 1978, § 1-2-1(1979), the State Canvassing Board’s actions are explicitly statutorily provided for by the Legislature. The State Canvassing Board meets to conduct the canvass, see NMSA 1978, § 1-13-15 (1977), issue certificates of elections or nominations, see NMSA 1978, § 1-13-16 (1979), and examine election returns and certificates issued by the county canvassing boards, see NMSA 1978, § 1-13-18 (1969). It also conducts a ministerial oversight function while checking for error and fraud when approving the canvass of votes. See generally §§ 1-13-15 to 1-13-17. The State Canvassing Board, however, is not legislatively directed to develop standards for elections. {45} The Legislature’s attempted delegation of authority to the State Canvassing Board is made more explicit than the delegation claimed by the governor in Schwartz, but, as we held in that case, the Legislature in this case has failed to provide the State Canvassing Board with adequate standards to guide its discretion. The State Canvassing Board argues that the Legislature’s guiding scheme, policy, or purpose is the interest of protecting New Mexico’s taxpayers from seemingly frivolous recounts and rechecks, implicit in the use of the term “security” in the amended version of Section 1-14-15. However, nowhere in the Election Code does the Legislature explicitly state an interest to protect New Mexico taxpayers or the state fisc. Any legislative guidance given to the State Canvassing Board under this “guiding” policy is attenuated at best. Even if we were to recognize a legislative directive, much like the authority claimed by the governor in Schwartz, the Legislature has not provided the State Canvassing Board with any standards to exercise its discretion. As written, the 2005 amendment is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the State Canvassing Board. {46} The State Canvassing Board also suggests that it has inherent authority to promulgate a rule to implement the language in Section 1-14-15(B) by considering the costs of a recount or recheck mentioned in Section 1-14-15(D). However, as in Holmes and Schwartz, no self-regulation by the State Canvassing Board can cure the unconstitutional delegation. Holmes, 69 N.M. at 440, 367 P.2d at 932; Schwartz, 120 N.M. at 825, 907 P.2d at 1006. {47} As a result, we must conclude that the 2005 amendment to Section 1-14-15(B) is unconstitutional. The Legislature cannot give the State Canvassing Board unfettered discretion in determining which petitioners seeking a recount or recheck must pay for the full cost, and which must pay only a percentage of that cost. The Legislature may certainly give the State Canvassing Board some discretion in weighing the competing policy interests, such as the interest of a fair election and the protection of the treasury from allegedly frivolous requests for recounts and rechecks at issue in this case. Cf. Or.Rev.Stat. § 258.150 (2003) (giving the secretary of state the responsibility for conducting an accurate recount in the “shortest time at the least expense”). The Legislature could also explicitly increase the deposit or surety bond amount required by Section 1-14-15(A) for a recount or reeheck to reflect the entire cost of the procedures, or a set percentage thereof. See Colo.Rev.Stat. § 1-10.5-106(2) (2005) (mandating the election official who will conduct the recount to determine the entire cost and collect that amount before the recount is conducted). However, this type of discretion is so largely policy-based that it is best left to the Legislature to delineate specific standards for the State Canvassing Board to apply in exercising this discretion. The Legislature can weigh the policy concerns and determine what this standard should be.