Opinion ID: 1230068
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Summary Judgment and the Corps' Jurisdiction under the Act

Text: Congress enacted the Clean Water Act in 1972 to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters. 33 U.S.C. § 1251. The Act prohibits the discharge of any pollutant from any point source into navigable waters of the United States without a proper permit from the Secretary of the Army (through the Corps) or from the EPA. §§ 1311, 1342, 1344. The Corps and the EPA share responsibility for implementing and enforcing the Act's permit scheme for the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters, and the extent of the Corps' jurisdiction has been hotly contested in cases around the country. Bailey concedes that the gravel and fill he placed on the site to build the road constitute pollutants and that those pollutants were discharged from a point source. Bailey also concedes that he did not obtain a permit from the Corps. Bailey challenges the Corps' assertion of jurisdiction over the site, arguing that the land onto which he discharged the pollutants did not constitute navigable waters under the Act. The Act defines navigable waters as the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas. § 1362(7). The regulations promulgated by the Corps define navigable waters as navigable-in-fact or traditionally navigable waters and the wetlands adjacent to such waters. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a).
In Rapanos v. United States , the Supreme Court addressed how the term navigable waters should be construed under the Act and the extent to which the term includes wetlands. All members of the Court agreed that navigable waters encompassed something more than traditional navigable-in-fact waters. 547 U.S. at 730-31, 126 S.Ct. 2208 (plurality opinion); 767, 126 S.Ct. 2208 (Kennedy, J., concurring); 788, 126 S.Ct. 2208 (Stevens, J., dissenting). There was no majority opinion, with five justices concluding that remand was necessary for consideration of whether the wetlands at issue in Rapanos were navigable waters covered by the Act and whether the EPA and the Corps had impermissibly extended their regulatory jurisdiction under the Act. Justice Scalia wrote the plurality opinion, joined by three other justices; Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion; and Justice Stevens wrote the dissenting opinion, joined by three other justices. The plurality opinion limits federal authority over navigable waters to those wetlands with a continuous surface connection to bodies that are `waters of the United States' in their own right, so that there is no clear demarcation between `waters' and wetlands, are `adjacent to' such waters and covered by the Act. Id. at 742, 126 S.Ct. 2208. The plurality test requires two findings: First, that the adjacent channel contains a `wate[r] of the United States,' ( i.e., a relatively permanent body of water connected to traditional interstate navigable waters); and second, that the wetland has a continuous surface connection with that water, making it difficult to determine where the `water' ends and the `wetland' begins. Id. In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy rejected these two requirements as unduly dismissive of the interests asserted by the United States in these cases and recognized that the rationale for the Act's regulation of wetlands is the functions that wetlands perform in relation to the integrity of other watersfunctions such as pollutant trapping, flood control, and runoff storage. Id. at 777, 779, 126 S.Ct. 2208. Accordingly, Justice Kennedy determined that the government's jurisdiction under the Act extends to wetlands that possess a significant nexus to waters that are or were navigable in fact or that could reasonably be so made. Id. at 759, 126 S.Ct. 2208 (internal quotations omitted). [W]etlands possess the requisite nexus, and thus come within the statutory phrase `navigable waters,' if the wetlands, either alone or in combination with similarly situated lands in the region, significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the covered waters more readily understood as `navigable.' Id. at 780, 126 S.Ct. 2208. A wetland would not satisfy Justice Kennedy's test if its effect on water quality were speculative or insubstantial. Id. Justice Kennedy also concluded that if the wetland is adjacent to navigable-in-fact waters, then the Corps may rely on adjacency to establish its jurisdiction. Id. at 782, 126 S.Ct. 2208. The dissenters determined that to the extent the Act requires a significant nexus, the requirement is categorically satisfied as to wetlands adjacent to navigable waters or their tributaries. Id. at 807, 126 S.Ct. 2208. The dissent specifically noted that all four dissenters would uphold the Corps' jurisdiction in cases that satisfy either the plurality's test or Justice Kennedy's. Id. at 810 n. 14, 126 S.Ct. 2208. [I]n these and future cases, the United States may elect to prove jurisdiction under either test. Id.
When a majority of the Supreme Court agrees only on the outcome of a case and not on the grounds for that outcome, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193, 97 S.Ct. 990, 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1977) (internal quotations omitted). The Supreme Court has recognized that applying a rule of law from its fragmented decisions is often more easily said than done. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325, 123 S.Ct. 2325, 156 L.Ed.2d 304 (2003); Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 745-46, 114 S.Ct. 1921, 128 L.Ed.2d 745 (1994). The Marks rule (the narrowest-grounds-rule) becomes problematic when one opinion supporting the judgment does not fit entirely within a broader circle drawn by the others. King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 782 (D.C.Cir. 1991) (en banc). Because there is little overlap between the plurality's and Justice Kennedy's opinions, it is difficult to determine which holding is the narrowest. Of those circuit courts that have considered Rapanos, most have concluded that Justice Kennedy's opinion constitutes the narrowest holding. United States v. Robison, 505 F.3d 1208, 1221-22 (11th Cir. 2007); N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993, 999-1000 (9th Cir.2007); United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 724-25 (7th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). Thus if a wetland meets the substantial nexus test, the federal authority has jurisdiction to regulate the wetland under the Act. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 780, 126 S.Ct. 2208 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The Seventh and the Ninth have not foreclosed the possibility that the plurality's test might apply in some cases and have limited their holdings to the facts of the cases before them. N. Cal. River Watch, 496 F.3d at 999-1000 (stating that Justice Kennedy's concurrence provided the controlling rule of law for our case and that it is the narrowest ground to which a majority of the Justices would assent if forced to choose in almost all cases); Gerke Excavating, 464 F.3d at 725 (stating that Justice Kennedy's test must govern the further stages of this litigation). The Seventh Circuit concluded that the narrowest opinion is the one least restrictive of federal authority to regulate and that as a practical matter the Kennedy concurrence is the least common denominator. Gerke Excavating, 464 F.3d at 725. Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit determined that the narrowest grounds is the less far-reaching (i.e., less-restrictive of CWA jurisdiction) and that Justice Kennedy's test, at least in wetlands cases such as Rapanos, will classify a water as `navigable' more frequently than Justice Scalia's test. Robison, 505 F.3d at 1221. The First Circuit has concluded that the Marks rule is unworkable as applied to Rapanos and has instead followed the dissent's instruction to find jurisdiction if either the plurality's test or Justice Kennedy's test is met. United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 66 (1st Cir.2006). The Sixth Circuit did not decide which test controls, concluding that jurisdiction in the case before it was proper under both the plurality's and Justice Kennedy's opinion. United States v. Cundiff, 555 F.3d 200, 210-13 (6th Cir.2009); see also United States v. Lucas, 516 F.3d 316, 327 (5th Cir.2008) (concluding that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support all three Rapanos standards and upholding guilty verdicts of defendants convicted under the Act). Bailey and amicus Pacific Legal Foundation argue that the controlling jurisdictional test is stated in the plurality opinion, and thus the wetland must have a continuous surface connection with navigable-in-fact water for the Corps to assert jurisdiction over the wetland. The United States urges us to adopt the district court's holding that the Corps has jurisdiction over the wetland if either the plurality's test or Justice Kennedy's test is satisfied. We find Judge Lipez's reasoning in Johnson to be persuasive, and thus we join the First Circuit in holding that the Corps has jurisdiction over wetlands that satisfy either the plurality or Justice Kennedy's test.