Opinion ID: 2090001
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standing Under the DCHRA

Text: We first consider ESS's argument that the trial court erred by dismissing Counts III and IV for lack of standing under the DCHRA. Because a motion to dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) presents questions of law, our standard of review for dismissal for failure to state a claim is de novo. Johnson-El v. District of Columbia, 579 A.2d 163, 166 (D.C.1990) (citations omitted). The DCHRA makes it unlawful to interrupt or terminate, or refuse or fail to initiate or conduct any transaction in real property; or to require different terms for such transaction, D.C.Code § 1-2515(a)(1) (1999), on the basis of the race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, marital status, personal appearance, sexual orientation, familial status, family responsibilities, disability, matriculation, political affiliation, source of income, or place of residence or business of any individual, § 1-2515(a). `Transaction in real property' means the exhibiting, listing, advertising, negotiating, agreeing to transfer or transferring, whether by sale, lease, sublease, rent, assignment or other agreement, any interest in real property or improvements thereon, including, but not limited to, leaseholds and other real chattels. D.C.Code § 1-2502(30). Count III of ESS's complaint alleges that Carr Realty, Carr Realty L.P. and 1747 Pennsylvania Avenue Associates interrupted, terminated, refused and failed to initiate and conduct, and required different terms for, a transaction ... based on the race, national origin and personal appearance of Mrs. Chung and Mr. Hong, in violation of D.C.Code § 1-2515(a) and (b). Count IV alleges that the same actions were taken by Asadoorian and Goodwin in their individual capacities. ESS alleges that as a result of appellees' discriminatory actions in refusing assignment of the lease to ESS's prospective assignees, the sale of ESS failed to take place and ESS continued to suffer business losses. The trial court dismissed ESS's claims under the DCHRA based on appellees' argument that the prospective assignees, who were not parties to the action, were the actual targets of discrimination, and therefore ESS had no standing to pursue claims based on discrimination against third parties under the DCHRA. As one court has noted, [w]hether a party is asserting its own rights, as opposed to seeking to vindicate the rights of a third party, is often a difficult question. Benjamin v. Aroostook Med. Ctr., Inc., 57 F.3d 101, 105 (1st Cir.1995). Although the trial court decided the motion to dismiss as a question of third-party standing, and each party has argued the standing issue to this court as one of third-party standing, we do not understand ESS to state a derivative claim. ESS's complaint alleges a direct harm to its pecuniary interests as a result of appellees' alleged discriminatory animus toward the proposed assignees. ESS neither seeks to stand in the place nor assert the rights of the rejected assignees. With the understanding that ESS has alleged direct harm to its interests, it is still necessary to consider whether such a claim may be maintained under the DCHRA by a litigant who was not the intended victim of discrimination. [6] In essence the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide on the merits of the dispute or of particular issues, Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-51, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975)), or, put another way, the determination of whether a specific person is the proper party to bring a matter to the Court for adjudication. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.3, at 56 (3d ed.1999). Constitutional standing under Article III requires the plaintiff to allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief. Wright, 468 U.S. at 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315. Out of prudential concerns, [s]tanding doctrine embraces several judicially selfimposed limits on the exercise ... of jurisdiction, such as the general prohibition on a litigant's raising another person's legal rights ... and the requirement that a plaintiff's complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked. Id. However, when Congress intends to extend standing to the full limit of Article III, the sole requirement for standing... [is a] minima of injury in fact. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372, 102 S.Ct. 1114, 71 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982). Thus, when standing is permissible to the limit of Article III, courts lack the authority to create prudential barriers to standing. Id. With these principles in mind, we turn to standing under the DCHRA. Section 1-2556 of the District of Columbia Code recognizes a private cause of action under the DCHRA, providing in pertinent part: (a) Any person claiming to be aggrieved by an unlawful discriminatory practice shall have a cause of action in any court of competent jurisdiction for damages and such other remedies as may be appropriate. ... As a textual matter, the statute does not purport to limit the availability of an action under the DCHRA to only those persons who are the targets of discrimination. There is no statutory requirement that the litigant be a member of a protected class. Rather, the broad textual grant of standing in section 1-2556 extends to [a]ny person claiming to be aggrieved by an unlawful discriminatory practice. (Emphasis added.) The DCHRA broadly defines a person as any individual, firm, partnership, mutual company, joint-stock company, corporation, association, organization, unincorporated organization, labor union, government agency, incorporated society, statutory or common-law trust, estate, executor, administrator, receiver, trustee, conservator, liquidator, trustee in bankruptcy, committee, assignee, officer, employee, principal or agent, legal or personal representative, real estate broker or salesman or any agent or representative of any of the foregoing. D.C.Code § 1-2502(21). [7] Accordingly, appellees' argument that the DCHRA confers standing only to the targets of discrimination finds no support in the language of the statute. We have specifically stated on several occasions that the DCHRA is a remedial civil rights statute that must be generously construed. See Wallace v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, 715 A.2d 873, 889 (D.C.1998); Simpson v. District of Columbia Office of Human Rights, 597 A.2d 392, 398 (D.C.1991). Nevertheless, notwithstanding the plain language of the statute and our exhortations that it be generously construed, appellees argue that any person should not include anyone other than the direct target of discrimination, and urge that we recognize prudential limitations on standing under the DCHRA because a failure to do so would bring in so many potential plaintiffs that the purpose of the statute would be eviscerated. [8] Appellees' proffered interpretation is narrower than the statutory language and the opposite of generous construction. Moreover, we are not free to impose prudential limitations on standing even assuming that we were to agree, which we do not, that it would be wise to do so. The DCHRA was passed to underscore the Council's intent that the elimination of discrimination within the District of Columbia should have the highest priority. Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 319 (D.C.1995) (citing COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SERVICES AND CONSUMER AFFAIRS, COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, COMMITTEE REPORT OF BILL 2-179, THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT OF 1977, at 3 (1977)). The Council undoubtedly intended the Human Rights Act to be a powerful, flexible, and far-reaching prohibition against discrimination of many kinds. Id. Although we have noted that the Council did not intend the DCHRA to prohibit every discriminatory practice, see, e.g., Evans v. United States, 682 A.2d 644, 648 (D.C.1996); Dean, 653 A.2d at 319, it nevertheless follows that standing under the DCHRA should be accorded a broad enough construction to make a remedy available from those forms of discrimination which the statute does reach. We traverse no new epistemological territory when we recognize that discrimination not only inflicts an injury on the individual who is targeted for discrimination but also exacts a social and economic toll from others. See, e.g., Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211, 93 S.Ct. 364, 34 L.Ed.2d 415 (1972) (recognizing that discrimination causes injury to the whole community); Cf. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 300, 85 S.Ct. 377, 13 L.Ed.2d 290 (1964) (noting that local discrimination affects national commerce). Limiting standing under the DCHRA to only the direct targets of discrimination would limit the flexibility of the DCHRA as a tool to eliminate discrimination and hamstring efforts to effect the statute's broad purpose. That a plaintiff's alleged injury is predicated upon discrimination against a person other than him or herself presents a jury question as to whether an unlawful discriminatory practice occurred and whether the plaintiff was thereby aggrieved; it is not, however, a question of justiciability. Moreover, appellees' arguments for prudential limitations on standing were foreclosed by Molovinsky v. Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington, 683 A.2d 142, 146 (D.C.1996), in which we held that standing under the DCHRA is coextensive with standing under Article III. [9] Therefore, for standing under the DCHRA, the plaintiff needs to allege a minima of injury in fact, Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 372, 102 S.Ct. 1114, and this court lack[s] the authority to create prudential barriers to standing under the DCHRA. Id. This case is similar to cases granting standing under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3601-3631 (1994 & Supp.1999). For example, in Trafficante the Supreme Court noted that complaints by private persons are the primary method of obtaining compliance with the Act, and held that under the Act standing is as broad as is permitted under Article III. 409 U.S. at 209, 93 S.Ct. 364. In Trafficante, two tenants of an apartment complex sued the apartment owner alleging discriminatory housing practices. The lower courts held that the plaintiffs had no standing to bring the suit because only individuals who are the objects of the discriminatory practices could sue under the Act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that given the broad statutory grant of standing, the plaintiffs had alleged a particular injury in fact, the loss of important benefits from interracial associations. Id. at 210, 93 S.Ct. 364. Here, ESS has alleged a more tangible and quantifiable pecuniary loss as a result of appellees' alleged discrimination. [10]