Opinion ID: 38607
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Maintaining Employment

Text: 25 Finally, Perez argues that under the Fifth Circuit's decision in Watson v. Barnhart, 288 F.3d 212 (5th Cir.2002), the ALJ was required to find not only that the claimant's ailments do not prevent him from obtaining employment, but also that the claimant will be able to maintain employment. The Commissioner takes the position that Watson 's conclusion has been undermined by the more recent Fifth Circuit case of Frank v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 618 (5th Cir.2003). We agree with the Commissioner. 26 This court made clear in Frank that nothing in Watson suggests that the ALJ must make a specific finding regarding the claimant's ability to maintain employment in every case. Id. Rather,  Watson requires a situation in which, by its nature, the claimant's physical ailment waxes and wanes in its manifestation of disabling symptoms. Id. Without such a showing, the claimant's ability to maintain employment is subsumed in the RFC determination. See id. Perez has not made the requisite showing. 27 The Frank court gave an example of evidence that might necessitate a separate finding of a claimant's ability to maintain employment: For example, if Frank had alleged that her degenerative disc disease prevented her from maintaining employment because every number of weeks she lost movement in her legs, this would be relevant to the disability determination. Id. The evidence urged upon the court by Perez does not rise to this level of impairment. 28 First, Perez points to his 1995 testimony that he has good days and bad days. 8 As the Commissioner correctly points out, Perez's testimony, if credible, simply do[es] not rise to the level of impairment anticipated by the Court in Frank.  Cf. Dix v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 135, 136 (8th Cir.1990) (describing the intermittently recurring symptoms of the claimant who was suffering from Crohn's disease); Singletary, 798 F.2d at 821 (The nature of the mental impairment is such ... that the claimant is unable to remain employed for any significant period of time.). 29 Second, Perez states that in 1992 he was being given epidural injections for his pain and [b]ecause the injections [were] given over time, the pain would vary in intensity or `wax and wane' between injections. Such an assertion is simply not sufficient to bring Perez's case within the realm of disablement envisioned by the Frank court. It is axiomatic that the pain from any type of ailment will vary in intensity, especially the farther one gets from treatment that alleviates pain. 9 Moreover, Dr. Heinze, who administered the injections, reported that the injections were effective. 30 Third, Perez points to testimony by Dr. Heinze in December 1999 that Perez had been unable to work for the previous five years. The Commissioner points out that Dr. Heinze never conducted any form of clinical examination on Perez, for example, an MRI, X-ray, blood test, or CT scan. [O]rdinarily, the opinions, diagnoses, and medical evidence of a treating physician who is familiar with the claimant's injuries, treatments, and responses should be accorded considerable weight in determining disability. Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 237 (5th Cir.1994) (quoting Scott v. Heckler, 770 F.2d 482, 485 (5th Cir.1985)). But the treating physician's opinions are not conclusive. Id. [W]hen good cause is shown, less weight, little weight, or even no weight may be given to the physician's testimony. Id. Recognized good cause exceptions include disregarding statements that are brief and conclusory, not supported by medically acceptable clinical laboratory diagnostic techniques, or otherwise unsupported by the evidence. Id. (citing Scott, 770 F.2d at 485) (emphasis added). The ALJ was therefore justified in giving little weight to Dr. Heinze's testimony because he did not perform any clinical examinations on Perez. 31 Finally, Perez points to the 1999 testimony by his expert witness, an environmental safety and health manager, that he knew Mr. Perez and it was his professional opinion that Mr. Perez would not be able to work a 30 hour week `on a reliable basis.' This evidence does not come close to meeting the standard required by Frank. Perez has not offered any evidence that his condition waxes and wanes in intensity such that his ability to maintain employment was not adequately taken into account in his RFC determination. In short, Perez's Watson argument is wholly without merit. It is rejected.