Opinion ID: 2607251
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: the trial court is vested with post-vacation cognizance to entertain an ancillary restitutionary claim

Text: Stites asserts that by his September 26, 1992 voluntary dismissal of the water loss claim the trial court came to be divested of jurisdiction. It was hence without cognizance to compel Stites' repayment of money. The provisions of 12 O.S. 1991 §§ 1031 et seq. clearly authorize the district court to vacate or modify its judgments within the prescribed time intervals after due notice is given to all affected parties. [24] The court's continuing jurisdiction over ancillary post-vacation proceedings is explicitly (if not also implicitly) conferred by the clear terms of the statutory scheme. As a condition of vacation, the nisi prius court may (a) preserve the liens of judgment (§ 1035) [25] , (b) postpone execution on the judgment (§ 1037) [26] or (c) require the defendant to post a bond that would stand as security for the payment of damages (§ 1036) [27] . The latter section contemplates proceedings to enforce bonds posted in the course of vacation process. The terms of 12 O.S. 1991 §§ 1031 et seq. (particularly §§ 1035, 1036 and 1037), when read together, clearly confer upon the court ancillary cognizance to implement its vacation orders by administering full and complete remedial process. The vacation of an involuntarily satisfied judgment generally leaves in its wake questions about restitution [28] of satisfaction. [29] These are legitimate ancillary issues in the context of vacation relief prescribed by §§ 1031 et seq. In short, the trial court's continuing jurisdiction in post-vacation proceedings extends to issues raised by a plea for restitution to the same extent and in a like manner as it applies to enforcement of a § 1036 bond. A restitutionary remedy, which avails to one upon a judgment's vacation, may be prosecuted in the same case or by a separate action. At the time of the judgment's vacation in this case no separate action stood commenced in another case. [30] There was hence no hindrance to the trial court's exercise of power over DUIT's plea for post-vacation restitutionary relief.