Opinion ID: 168346
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Search of the B edroom

Text: M r. Cruz-M endez claims that M s. Armenta’s consent for the officers to search the bedroom was coerced. The district court found that M s. Armenta had verbally consented to the search of her bedroom and that her consent was made “unequivocally, specifically, freely, and intelligently,” without coercion by the officers. R. Doc. 48 at 12 (District Court Decision). As we have already -13- discussed, we review only whether the factual findings regarding consent were clearly erroneous. See Sawyer, 441 F.3d at 894. W e cannot say that the district court’s findings were clearly erroneous. Although M s. Armenta testified that she never consented to a search of the apartment, Agent Gamarra testified to the contrary and the district court credited his testimony. W e see no reason not to defer to the court’s credibility determination. As for coercion, M r. Cruz-M endez contends that the officers’ questioning of M s. Armenta w ithout reasonable suspicion and the fact that M s. Armenta is “presumptively uneducated,” Aplt. Br. at 24, render her consent involuntary. There is no merit to these arguments. Because we have already held that M s. Armenta consented to the officers’ presence in the living room, the officers were not required to have reasonable suspicion for their questioning. And there is nothing in the record to indicate that M s. Armenta was uneducated. M r. Cruz-M endez also points, however, to several additional, more significant circumstances: the presence of several armed officers, the length of time the officers were in the apartment, and the officers’ statement that they would get a search warrant if M s. Armenta did not consent. His argument is hardly frivolous and could have persuaded a rational fact-finder that the consent was involuntary. But it does not require setting aside the district court’s finding. -14- First, the district court explicitly found that the officers w ere not overly threatening or forceful. Second, although the officers’ encounter with M s. Armenta w as more than momentary, the length did not necessarily make it overbearing. The district court found that the officers’ second visit to M s. Armenta’s apartment lasted approximately 30 minutes before M r. Cruz- M endez was arrested. (The court’s time frame is consistent with the Provo Police Department Call for Service report, which indicates that M s. Armenta’s license was verified at 8:35 a.m. and that the arrest was completed by 9:00 a.m.) During that period M s. Armenta had left to retrieve her license from the car, Agent Derewonko had searched the bathroom, M s. Armenta had retrieved her green card, she had her conversation with Agent Gamarra outside, and the officers secured the apartment, searched the bedroom closet, and arrested M r. Cruz- M endez. This was not the equivalent of a lengthy interrogation in a bare room while the subject sits on a stool until her w ill is overborne. Cf. Benally, 146 F.3d at 1240 (statement following one-and-a-half-hour interview after M iranda warning was not coerced); United States v. Strache, 202 F.3d 980, 986 (7th Cir. 2000) (defendant who was handcuffed for 20 minutes before consenting nonetheless did so voluntarily); United States v. French, 974 F.2d 687, 693 (6th Cir. 1992) (45 minutes between stop and consent did not amount to coercion); United States v. Tyson, 360 F. Supp. 2d 798, 806 (E.D. Va. 2005) (consent given -15- 30 minutes after officers arrived; finding of voluntariness supported by initial refusal to permit w arrantless search). M ost helpful to M r. Cruz-M endez is A gent Gamarra’s assertion to M s. Armenta that he would get a search warrant if she did not consent. But such statements are not per se coercive. See U nited States v. Severe, 29 F.3d 444, 446 (8th Cir. 1994) (officers’ statement that they would obtain a search warrant “only one factor in the totality of the circumstances”); United States v. White, 979 F.2d 539, 542 (7th Cir. 1992) (although baseless threats to obtain a warrant may render consent involuntary, an expression of a genuine intent to obtain one does not); United States v. Hummer, 916 F.2d 186, 190 (4th Cir. 1990) (“The fact that a search warrant was mentioned does not necessarily constitute a coercive factor negating consent.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Agosto, 502 F.2d 612, 614 (9th Cir. 1974) (officer’s statement that he would obtain a warrant if consent not given is “not conclusive as a matter of law ”); cf. United States v. Culp, 472 F.2d 459, 462 (8th Cir. 1973) (defendant’s consent valid even though it followed officer’s statement that a search warrant was being procured, because defendant consented for an independent, voluntary reason). One must still examine the particulars of the case. The district court had two weighty reasons for not finding that Agent Gamarra’s assertion improperly overpowered M s. Armenta’s will. First, the -16- assertion did not in itself cause M s. Armenta to consent. W hen told how the officers could procure a warrant, she said, “[F]ine, go get a search warrant.” R. Vol. II at 122. She changed her mind only when the officers discovered the cellular phone w ith “CRUZ” etched on it. At that point she knew that the officers had caught her in a lie. The district court could have reasonably inferred that the psychological impact of this realization was more pow erful than the officers’ assertion that they would get a w arrant. It stated that M s. Armenta “readily consented” only after she realized that the phone had been discovered. R. Doc. 48 at 12 (District Court Decision). Second, even if Agent Gamarra’s original assertion that they would get a warrant was improperly coercive because the officers clearly lacked the requisite probable cause, that assertion was likely true by the time the assertion bore any fruit (namely, M s. Armenta’s consent). W hen the officers found a man’s coat in the apartment with a cellular phone labeled “CRUZ” in the pocket, after M s. Armenta and her brother had denied knowing a M r. Cruz-M endez, they probably had sufficient additional information to procure a warrant. See White, 979 F.2d at 542 (expression of genuine intent to obtain warrant “does not vitiate consent”). W e hold that the district court did not clearly err when it found that M s. Armenta voluntarily consented to the search of the bedroom.