Opinion ID: 848701
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: an excessive verdict

Text: In order to grant relief under MCR 2.611(A)(1)(c), it is first necessary to determine whether the verdict is excessive. Because subsection c does not define this term, it must be given its plain and ordinary meaning [ ]. [13] Excessive is defined as going beyond the usual, necessary, or proper limit or degree; characterized by excess. [14] In the context of compensatory damages, the determination whether damages exceed the necessary or proper limit is no simple task. [T]he authority to measure damages, as we stated in Kelly v. Builders Square , inheres in the jury's role as trier of fact. [15] Because the amount required to compensate a party for pain and suffering is imprecise, that calculation typically belongs to the jury. [16] The difficulty of reviewing damage awards, however, does not undermine the judicial obligation to do so under MCR 2.611. A reviewing court is therefore faced with the task of ensuring that a verdict is not excessive without concomitantly usurping the jury's authority to determine the amount necessary to compensate an injured party. Given the impossibility of using a simple algorithm for this task, judicial review of compensatory awards must rely on the fundamental principle behind compensatory damages  that of recompensing the injured party for losses proven in the record. This, in effect, is the rationale behind three of the four factors that a majority of this Court endorsed in Palenkas v. Beaumont. [17] The Palenkas majority stressed that appellate review of jury verdicts must be based on objective factors and firmly grounded in the record. [18] Accordingly, judicial review of purportedly excessive jury verdicts should focus on the following objective factors: [1] whether the verdict was the result of improper methods, prejudice, passion, partiality, sympathy, corruption, or mistake of law or fact; [2] whether the verdict was within the limits of what reasonable minds would deem just compensation for the injury sustained; [and 3] whether the amount actually awarded is comparable to awards in similar cases within the state and in other jurisdictions.[ [19] ] When a verdict is procured through improper methods of advocacy, misleading argument, or other factors that confound the jury's quantification of a party's injuries, that amount is inherently unreliable and unlikely to be a fair estimate of the injured party's losses. Likewise, when a verdict is unsupported by the record or entirely inconsistent with verdicts rendered in similar cases, a reviewing court may fairly conclude that the verdict exceeds the amount required to compensate the injured party. When analyzing a verdict according to the Palenkas factors, courts must be mindful of the fact that punitive damages are available in Michigan only when expressly authorized by the Legislature. [20] Here, the Civil Rights Act does not authorize punitive damages  and, moreover, permits compensation only for injury or loss caused by each violation of this act, including reasonable attorney's fees. [21] Thus, the court has a statutory obligation under the CRA to ensure, through consideration of the objective factors described by Palenkas, that this damage award serves the ends articulated by the Legislature. [22] We turn first to the question whether the verdict was the result of improper methods, prejudice, passion, partiality, sympathy, corruption, or mistake of law or fact ... [23] As shown in greater detail in Part II(B)(2), we have concluded that this verdict was the product of misleading argument, inflammatory rhetoric, and the improper admission of expert opinion testimony utterly lacking in scientific support. [24] The first Palenkas factor listed above therefore provides strong support for the conclusion that this verdict is excessive, as that term is used in MCR 2.611(A)(1)(c). The second Palenkas factor addresses whether the verdict was within the limits of what reasonable minds would deem just compensation for the injury sustained ... [25] This inquiry into the reasonableness of the verdict concerns, in essence, whether the verdict is supported by the record. Here, it is apparent that the jury verdict is unsupported by the evidence in one sense. The jury awarded plaintiff $1 million in trust for future medical expenses and loss of future earning capacity, despite the fact that plaintiff failed to demonstrate any economic harm in the present, much less a loss of future earning capacity. In fact, according to her counsel, plaintiff continues to earn almost $100,000 a year with overtime pay as an employee of defendant. Similarly, there was no evidence regarding the nature of medical treatment that plaintiff may have to undergo in the future or the likely cost of that treatment. The jury's estimation of plaintiff's future economic loss was without support in the record. The remainder of the verdict  $20 million  was intended to compensate plaintiff for emotional distress, physical pain and suffering, and the aggravation of her substance abuse. There may be some cases in which it is possible to determine objectively that a compensatory award is or is not supported by the record. But this determination is extremely problematic where damages for emotional distress are at issue. In such cases, comparison with damage awards in comparable cases in this jurisdiction and beyond  the final Palenkas factor  becomes most relevant. While the resultant analysis is certainly imperfect, other damage awards may provide a range of what constitutes reasonable compensation for the type of injury suffered by a plaintiff. With this range in mind, the reviewing court may determine whether the verdict appears to be within the limits of what reasonable minds would deem just compensation for the injury sustained... [26] Turning finally to the third Palenkas factor, the $21 million verdict awarded in this case is far beyond the range of what other juries have determined to be reasonable compensation for injuries similar to  and much worse than  those suffered by plaintiff. To our knowledge, plaintiff's $21 million verdict is the largest amount ever awarded for a single-plaintiff sexual harassment claim in the United States. It is seventy times larger than the maximum award permitted under title VII, the federal civil rights act. [27] Indeed, plaintiff has not cited a single compensatory verdict in an employment discrimination action from any court within the United States that arguably rivals the amount awarded to plaintiff. In responding to defendant's argument that the $21 million verdict is the largest single-plaintiff sexual harassment award upheld on appeal anywhere in the entire country, plaintiff has argued to this Court: Defendant's other sexual harassment case analysis is far from honest. Looking only at automobile companies, and ignoring every other case of sexual harassment in any other field of employment in the Country, the largest recovery is a $34,000,000 settlement by Mitsubishi in June of 1998.... While Daimler Chrysler may believe that sexual harassment of women is acceptable and insignificant, other automobile manufacturers recognize their responsibilities and the gravity of injury by agreeing to high seven and eight figure settlements to avoid the higher measure of full redress available to a victim like Linda Gilbert who recovers for all losses at trial. Plaintiff's attack on defendant's dishonesty here omits a crucial fact: Mitsubishi's $34 million settlement was in a class action. [28] We are unaware, therefore, of any single-plaintiff employment discrimination verdict involving a nonpunitive award that even arguably approaches the amount awarded to plaintiff, and plaintiff has identified none. Plaintiff argues that this discrepancy between her verdict and every other sexual harassment verdict in United States simply reflects the jury's recognition that defendant's conduct was much, much worse than that of any other defendant in a sexual harassment case. While we have no doubt that plaintiff encountered truly ugly conduct at Chrysler given the evidence and testimony adduced at trial, we cannot accept the argument that plaintiff's was the worst case of sexual harassment in the history of the country that has resulted in a verdict. A survey of verdicts rendered in other sexual harassment suits reveals that plaintiffs who endure sexual harassment in its most aggressive form  unwanted touching and persistent, predatory sexual advances  uniformly have received far less in compensatory damages than the amount awarded to plaintiff. For example, in Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d 1295, a party who alleged that she was sexually harassed during a four-month period and was raped by her manager was awarded $2 million. [29] And in Grow v. W.A. Thomas Co., 236 Mich.App. 696, 601 N.W.2d 426, the plaintiff alleged that she was subjected to sexually explicit comments and unwanted kissing and groping over several years and recovered $192,684. [30] Indeed, the only plaintiffs who have recovered sexual harassment verdicts that are even arguably comparable to that rendered in this case are those who recovered punitive damages. [31] Even among cases in which a plaintiff recovered punitive damages for sexual harassment, our research discloses no case in which a party recovered a punitive award that approached or exceeded $21 million that was upheld on appeal. [32] On the basis of three of the factors articulated by this Court in Palenkas, we conclude that the verdict in this case is excessive as that term is used in MCR 2.611. Not only does the verdict exceed verdicts in similar cases by leaps and bounds, but, as shown in this opinion, it was awarded by a jury inflamed by hyperbolic rhetoric, prejudice-baiting argument, and unscientific expert testimony.