Opinion ID: 4529168
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Communications with third parties

Text: Although managing the business was not itself barred by the Consent Order, Klopp could still violate the specific activity limitations in subparagraphs (a) and (b) by his management conduct. And so the district court also found that Klopp continued to communicate impermissibly with third-party businesses engaged in settlement services. 5 This violation of subparagraph (a) is supported by the record. See, e.g., J.A. 300 (“Q: how often in a month would you chime in on anything to do with a particular loan? A: probably less than a dozen.”); J.A. 138 (discussing repeated communications with lenders); J.A. 146–47 (requesting an interest rate concession from a lender for a particular consumer loan). So the court properly rested its contempt finding on Klopp’s communications. And, in any event, Klopp fails to explain on appeal why this contempt finding was erroneous. See United States v. Jones, 308 F.3d 425, 427 n.1 (4th Cir. 2002) (arguments not raised on appeal are waived).