Opinion ID: 858503
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Fourteenth Amendment Suppression Analysis

Text: [¶20] A prosecutor’s suppression of evidence that is favorable to a defendant and material to his guilt violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Lawson, ¶ 20, 242 P.3d at 1000 (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196–97, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963)). To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must show “that the prosecution suppressed evidence, the evidence was favorable to the defendant, and the evidence was material.” Lawson, ¶ 21, 242 P.3d at 1000 (citing Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196–97)). “It is well-established that ‘[f]avorable evidence includes impeachment evidence.’” Chauncey v. State, 2006 WY 18, ¶ 13, 127 P.3d 18, 21 (Wyo. 2006) (quoting Davis v. State, 2002 WY 88, ¶ 18, 47 P.3d 981, 985– 86 (Wyo. 2002)). [¶21] With regard to suppression, this Court has recognized that “[t]he essence of Brady is the discovery of information after the trial, which was known to the prosecution but unknown to the defense during the trial.” Thomas v. State, 2006 WY 34, ¶ 16, 131 P.3d 348, 353 (Wyo. 2006) (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976) (italics in original)). With regard to materiality, we have said evidence that is cumulative is not material. Chauncey, ¶ 21, 127 P.3d at 23 (citing Relish v. State, 860 P.2d 455, 460 (Wyo. 1993)). We have further explained: Evidence is material under Brady only when a reasonable probability exists that the result of the proceeding would have been different had the evidence been disclosed. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. at 3383; Thomas v. State, 2006 WY 34, ¶ 15, 131 P.3d 348, 353 (Wyo. 2006). A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. Id. When the defense makes a specific request and the prosecution fails to respond fully, the reviewing court may consider directly any adverse effect the failure to respond might have had on the preparation or presentation of the defendant’s case. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 683, 105 S.Ct. at 3384. “The reviewing court should assess the possibility that such effect might have occurred in light of the totality of the circumstances and with 6 an awareness of the difficulty of reconstructing in a post-trial proceeding the course that the defense and the trial would have taken had the defense not been misled by the prosecutor’s incomplete response.” Id. In judging materiality, the focus is on the cumulative effect of the withheld evidence, rather than on the impact of each piece of evidence in isolation. Id.; United States v. Nichols, 2000 WL 1846225, 2000 U.S.App. Lexis 33183, 2000 Colo. J. C.A.R. 6735 (10th Cir. 2000). Lawson, ¶ 22-23, 242 P.3d at 1000-01. [¶22] Using this framework, we turn to the evidence Kovach contends the prosecutor suppressed in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The State concedes that none of the evidence at issue was provided to Kovach. Our inquiry therefore is whether the evidence was suppressed; that is to say, available to the prosecutor during the trial but not to Kovach and, if so, whether the evidence was favorable and material.
[¶23] The first allegedly suppressed evidence we address is a December 8, 2010, e-mail the prosecutor sent to Isaac Zimmerman’s attorney. The prosecutor attached to the e-mail a criminal warrant for Mr. Zimmerman’s arrest and a draft criminal information charging Mr. Zimmerman with reckless endangering and with accessory before the fact to kidnapping and felonious restraint. The e-mail included the following message: Against the wishes of the Sublette County Sheriff’s Office, I chose not to prosecute Mr. Zimmerman due to Mr. Zimmerman’s cooperation with the State, and my belief Mr. Zimmerman would make a favorable witness at trial against Mr. Kovach. It now appears I was wrong about Mr. Zimmerman’s willingness to assist in this matter. Mr. Zimmerman was a clear accessory before the fact to kidnapping and felonious restraint, as well as committing an act of reckless endangerment by knowingly transporting a victim for Mr. Kovach’s continued physical abuse and terrorization. I chose not to charge Mr. Zimmerman based on a totality of circumstances, and those circumstances have now changed. Now that Mr. Zimmerman has changed his mind about 7 lending assistance to the State, I have changed mine about charging him with the crimes he committed. Will you accept service on behalf of your client? [¶24] By a post-trial affidavit dated January 17, 2012, Isaac Zimmerman stated, “After receiving this information from the Sublette County Attorney, I decided to meet with the Sublette County Attorney without counsel and cooperate with the Sublette County [Attorney] as he wanted.” [¶25] Kovach contends that this e-mail was material impeachment evidence because it could have been used to impeach Isaac Zimmerman’s testimony by showing that he was pressured to cooperate with the prosecutor and testify favorably for the State. Although the e-mail certainly shows that Mr. Zimmerman was under pressure to testify favorably for the State, we do not agree with Kovach that the prosecutor’s failure to turn the e-mail over to Kovach resulted in a Brady violation. The record shows that Kovach knew before trial that Mr. Zimmerman had been threatened with prosecution, and the record further shows that the e-mail would have been nothing more than cumulative evidence of those threats. [¶26] We note at the outset that, whatever pressure may have initially been brought to bear on Isaac Zimmerman for his cooperation, the State did not follow through on its efforts to compel Mr. Zimmerman to testify as a prosecution witness. During the trial, Mr. Zimmerman was called as a defense witness, not as a State witness, and as indicated above, Mr. Zimmerman’s testimony matched Kovach’s version of events in many respects. [¶27] As to the prosecution’s efforts to secure Isaac Zimmerman’s favorable testimony, the record is far from silent. Mr. Zimmerman testified on direct examination by defense counsel: Q. Okay. Now Mr. Zimmerman, you and I have spoken. Have you spoken to anybody else about this matter? A. I spoke to the officers and the county attorney and the investigator. Q. And how many times did you speak to them? A. Five times total I believe. Q. Okay. Have you been promised anything for your testimony here today? A. No. Q. Have you been threatened about your testimony? A. Yes, I have. 8 Q. And how so? A. I was threatened with charges against me as well. Q. Okay. And how did that happen? A. I guess I wasn’t giving them what they wanted to hear. Q. And who made those threats to you? A. I believe it was [the prosecutor’s investigator]. Q. Anybody else? A. I believe [the prosecutor] also said that, you know – I don’t believe he – I take that back. I don’t think [the prosecutor] actually made any threats, he just said there was some pressure for me to be charged. [¶28] On cross-examination by the prosecutor, Isaac Zimmerman again testified to the threatened prosecution against him: Q. Okay. You and I have spoke several times; is that correct? A. Yes. Q. And that’s what you just testified to? A. Yes. Q. Now [defense counsel] has indicated that you were threatened with prosecution; is that correct? A. Correct. Q. And was that ever explained to you what charges you would be facing if you were not cooperative? A. Yes. Q. And what charges were those? A. Accessory. Q. Okay. Now do you recall driving a beaten man to Travis Kovach’s camp at Travis Kovach’s direction? A. Yes. Q. And do you recall what I told you as to why I was not going to prosecute you? A. Yes. Q. And what was that? A. Because you didn’t think I had anything to do with it. Q. Does it refresh your recollection that I told you I didn’t want to ruin a young man’s life because he didn’t do the right thing? A. Yes. 9 Q. Now you were scared during this whole ordeal, weren’t you? A. Yes. Q. And in hindsight you probably would have done things differently, wouldn’t you? A. Yes. Q. You would have tried to help those old men, wouldn’t you? A. Yes. Q. But you didn’t do those things? A. No. Q. And why? A. I didn’t know what to do. Q. It was out of control, wasn’t it? A. Yes. Q. Mr. Kovach was out of control, wasn’t he? A. Yes. [¶29] On further cross-examination by the prosecutor, Isaac Zimmerman adhered to his testimony that Kovach did not fire his weapon and it was only because of pressure by the prosecutor’s investigator that he ever said otherwise: Q. And so what did you tell [the prosecutor’s investigator] on November 10th? A. I was pretty angry at that point because we had been talking on for quite awhile and I just told him what he wanted to hear. Q. Oh, okay. And what was it that he wanted to hear? A. He wanted to hear that there had been a gun fired. Q. And you told him he probably fired a shot, correct? A. Correct. Q. And you told him he probably had the gun out, correct? A. Correct. Q. But you’re now saying that was only because you were telling [the prosecutor’s investigator] what he wanted to hear? A. I was getting a lot of pressure from [the prosecutor’s investigator]. 10 Q. You got a lot of pressure from [defense counsel]? A. No. Q. Or Mr. Kovach? A. No. [¶30] Finally, on re-direct examination by defense counsel, Isaac Zimmerman again insisted that Kovach had not fired his weapon and that any statements to the contrary were the result of pressure by the prosecution. Q. Now [the prosecutor] had asked you about this gun issue and he had you read a statement. Prior to that time had you already given two statements to law enforcement? A. Yes. Q. You had already given a statement to my investigator? A. Yes. Q. In all of those statements did you say you did not hear the gun? A. I did. Q. Okay. And actually in the statement that [the prosecutor] read to you earlier on, in that statement you told [the prosecutor’s investigator] that you didn’t hear the gun either; isn’t that right? A. Correct. Q. A n d i t w a s n’t u n t i l [ t h e p r o s e c u tor’s investigator] threatened you that you told him what he wanted to hear? [PROSECUTOR]: Objection, leading. COURT: Sustained. Q. Why did you eventually say to [the prosecutor’s investigator] that, you know, “I think that’s what happened”? A. Because of the pressure that they were putting on me. [¶31] Isaac Zimmerman’s trial testimony clearly informed the jury that he was threatened with prosecution and that he felt pressured to cooperate with the prosecutor and testify favorably for the State. The prosecutor’s e-mail to Mr. Zimmerman’s attorney would have been cumulative evidence to the same effect. See Chauncey, ¶ 21, 127 P.3d at 24 (“Where, as in the instant case, a witness for the State has been exhaustively impeached, both generally and as to the specific issue addressed by the suppressed evidence, we do not believe that one additional piece of cumulative information makes the verdict unworthy of confidence.”). Additionally, defense counsel’s examination of 11 Mr. Zimmerman shows that Kovach knew of the threats in time to use them during the trial. Any doubt concerning Kovach’s access to that information was further resolved by the testimony of both Mr. Zimmerman and defense counsel during the evidentiary hearing on Kovach’s new trial motion. Mr. Zimmerman testified: Q. You were very cooperative with [defense counsel] through the entire trial; is that correct? A. Yes. Q. And very cooperative with [defense counsel] prior to trial; is that correct? A. Correct. .... Q. Now did you ever tell [defense counsel] that you had seen or heard of an e-mail with a criminal information from my office? A. Yes, I believe I did. Q. When did you tell him that? A. I don’t know. Q. Did you bring that to his attention after the trial was over? A. I think it was before, but I’m not sure. Q. Now he actually brought that to your attention; is that correct? After the trial he contacted you and said, “Mr. Zimmerman, I know that there is an affidavit” – or, excuse me, “an e-mail and some charging information,” he brought that to your attention; isn’t that correct? A. Yes, yes. Q. Okay. You didn’t bring that to his attention? A. No. Q. How many days after trial was it that he brought that to your attention? A. I don’t know, I don’t recall. Maybe a week, maybe two weeks. Q. But you didn’t contact him out of the blue and tell him about it; is that correct? A. No. [¶32] Kovach’s counsel testified: Your Honor, I mean – let me put it in the form of testimony. Mr. Zimmerman had approached me after being interviewed several times and said that he was feeling threatened and was there anything that I could do for him and 12 I said no, I said I couldn’t, but I said I could give him some names of some lawyers in Pinedale. [¶33] We are satisfied that the prosecutor’s failure to provide the Isaac Zimmerman e- mail to defense counsel did not result in a Brady violation. The evidence was cumulative, and defense counsel had information relating to the threats against Zimmerman before trial. See Thomas, ¶ 18, 131 P.3d at 353 (defendant failed to show a Brady violation where evidence was available and used during trial).
[¶34] We turn then to the next evidence Kovach contends that the prosecutor impermissibly suppressed—an alleged promise the prosecutor made to MW to reopen her sexual assault case in exchange for her favorable testimony. Kovach argues that this impeachment evidence was important because the prosecution attempted to portray MW as a reluctant witness against Kovach, when according to Kovach, the prosecution had in fact made a deal to procure MW’s favorable testimony. We reject this alleged suppression as a Brady violation because the record does not support Kovach’s characterization of the conversation between the prosecutor and MW. See Chauncey, ¶ 17, 127 P.3d at 22 (rejecting Brady argument as to an interview because the argument mischaracterized the evidence). [¶35] Kovach offered the following affidavit statements from MW in support of his new trial motion. 5. I was interviewed on several occasions by the Sublette County Sheriff, Sublette County Investigator … and the Sublette County Prosecuting Attorney. 6. At one time during these interviews I was informed by Sublette County officials that I was the State’s most important witness and that I was going to help them put Mr. Kovach away. 7. Weeks before trial I met with the Prosecuting Attorney and him and I discussed my rape that occurred some years prior to this incident. The Prosecuting Attorney expressed to me that he felt the prosecution of the case was not handled properly. He said that after the Kovach case was over, he would look into the case and see if there was anything missed and might be able to reopen it. 13 8. The night before I was to testify I met with the Prosecuting Attorney at his office. We sat in his office for about an hour and a half and talked about among other things my testimony. 9. During this conversation the Prosecuting Attorney told me that Jess Ribelin was hit with the pliers at camp. I told the Prosecuting Attorney that I was certain that Jess Ribelin was not hit with the pliers as I was standing right next to him. We argued about this point and the Prosecuting Attorney said he believed Mr. Ribelin and it was dropped. 10. I also [asked] the Prosecuting Attorney during this conversation what would happen if I ever came across the man that attacked me. I told the Prosecuting Attorney that I would beat the crap out of him and asked what would happen to me. The Prosecuting Attorney told me they would have to arrest me, but would not charge me. [¶36] During the evidentiary hearing on Kovach’s new trial motion, MW testified that the prosecuting attorney made no promise to reopen her sexual assault case and there was no quid pro quo exchange for her favorable testimony. On direct examination by defense counsel, MW testified: Q. Was there at some point any discussion about reopening the case or restarting the [sexual assault] case or something of that nature? A. Right, [the prosecutor] had said that after this was done and over with, Kovach’s trial, that he would have his investigator -- that he might have his investigator look into it. Q. Was there any explanation as to why it needed to wait until after the Kovach trial was done? A. Just because he was busy with this trial. [¶37] On cross-examination by the prosecutor, MW testified: Q. Did [defense counsel] approach you about signing a different affidavit than this one? A. He had e-mailed me one prior to this one to look over, yes. Q. And was it the same as this one? A. No. 14 Q. And what were the differences in the affidavit that you didn’t sign versus the one that’s presented here today? A. On number 7 on the list about that once the case was over that you had promised me you would look into my case. Q. And why did you not sign that affidavit? A. Because that’s not what was said, it was that you – after this was all done and over with that you might look into it, you and your investigator or your investigator. Q. Have I ever promised you anything – A. No. Q. -- for your testimony? A. No. Q. Have I ever given you any representations of incentives if you testified? A. No. Q. When you and I met, we talked about your role as a witness in Mr. Kovach’s case; is that correct? A. Yes. Q. And we also would talk about your role as a victim in a different case; is that correct? A. Yes. Q. Did you ever believe that those conversations were in any way intertwined between your prior case and Mr. Kovach’s case? A. No, I felt when we were talking about Travis’ case that I was the witness and then when you and I were talking that it was simply you and I talking, not the prosecuting attorney and the witness talking, just that we were having a conversation. Q. And did you feel like I was listening to your concerns and the concerns you expressed-- A. Yes. Q. --in your role as a witness? A. Yes. Q. Now [defense counsel] has asked you about the night before the trial – A. Uh-huh. Q. --when we discussed what would happen if you saw your alleged perpetrator in the grocery store? A. Yes. 15 Q. We had some pretty serious conversations about your rape incident that night, did we not? A. Yes. Q. When you brought up seeing him in the grocery store and what you would do, did you present that question to me in a serious – A. No. Q. --question? A. No. Q. If I recall correctly you were actually laughing or smiling a bit when you asked that question? A. Correct. Q. And in many ways it was a way to lighten the mood from what had been a very serious conversation; is that correct? A. Yes, yeah. Q. And when I responded, “Well, you would have to be arrested, but I’m not sure you’d be charged” and I smiled when I said that, did you feel like that I was making a promise of any kind? A. No, no. [¶38] MW’s testimony is clear that the prosecutor made no promises to her in exchange for her favorable testimony. And, her testimony during Kovach’s trial was consistent with the lack of any such promise. MW testified that she at no time saw Kovach hit Jess Ribelin with a pair of fencing pliers, which was contrary to the testimony the prosecution wanted from her. She also openly disagreed with the prosecutor at another point in her testimony, when the prosecutor asked her to confirm her belief that Jess Ribelin’s ear was injured in the manner Mr. Ribelin had reported, that is, when Kovach shoved the fencing pliers into his ear canal: Q. Just as a – your common, every-day experience and your common sense, did what you see inside his ear, did that match the description as to how he got it? A. Being hit with a fist could have caused the same thing too, but my concern – Q. [MW], that’s not what you said yesterday evening, was it? A. Yes, it was. Q. Do you recall having a conversation with me yesterday evening? A. Yes, I do. 16 Q. Do you recall telling me that it was unlikely that that could have been caused by a fist because it was inside the ear canal? A. That is not what I said, …. [¶39] Kovach bears the burden of proving that exculpatory evidence existed but was suppressed. Wilkening v. State, 2007 WY 187, ¶ 12, 172 P.3d 385, 388 (Wyo. 2007). We find that Kovach did not meet his burden of showing that a promise was exchanged between the prosecutor and MW, and we therefore reject the claimed Brady violation.
[¶40] On July 26, 2011, the prosecutor’s investigator interviewed Dave Huber, a member of Kovach’s hunting camp who was present when Kovach returned to the camp with the Ribelin brothers. This interview was recorded and transcribed, but it was not provided to defense counsel. [¶41] As noted above, the burden is on Kovach to prove that material exculpatory evidence was suppressed. See Wilkening, ¶ 12, 172 P.3d at 388. On appeal, however, Kovach has made no argument as to what portion of the Huber interview was exculpatory or how the evidence was material to the outcome of the trial. Kovach does no more than identify the interview as evidence the prosecution failed to turn over, and he thus has not met his burden of proving a Brady violation. [¶42] Additionally, the record shows that defense counsel had the same information the prosecution had as to any evidence Mr. Huber could provide. See Thomas, ¶ 16, 131 P.3d at 353 (“The essence of Brady is the discovery of information after the trial, which was known to the prosecution but unknown to the defense during the trial.”). Specifically, the record contains an affidavit signed by Mr. Huber in which he attested: 5. I was interviewed by an investigator from the [defense counsel’s] office. 6. I w a s a l s o i n t e r v i e w e d b y [ t h e p r o s e c u tor’s investigator], an investigator from Sublette County, in late July of 2011 about this matter. 7. A f t e r b e i n g i n t e r v i e w e d b y [ t h e p r o s e c u tor’s investigator], the investigator from Sublette County, I was also interviewed by [defense counsel] about this matter. My interview with [defense counsel] occurred before December, 2011. During this interview, I told [defense counsel] I had 17 given a tape recorded interview to [the prosecutor’s investigator] at my home in Wyoming. 8. During each interview with both investigators and [defense counsel], I told the same story about what I recalled from the confrontation at the Kovach hunting camp on October 15, 2010. 9. During each interview, I stated that I heard Travis Kovach and one of the other men arguing with each other. Although I don’t recall what was said, I do recall telling each interviewer that both men were using loud voices. 10. During each interview, I stated that I did not see Travis Kovach hit anyone. 11. During each interview, I state[d] that I never heard anyone mention at camp that Travis Kovach had fired his gun or used his gun to hit the other gentlemen. [¶43] Based on our reasoning above, we are unable to find a Brady violation in the prosecution’s failure to disclose the Huber transcript to defense counsel. Nonetheless, we do not condone the failure to disclose the evidence, and we remind prosecutors that when they “fail … to disclose exculpatory evidence they not only fail in their duty and risk otherwise justifiable convictions, but expose themselves to the charge that they have violated Rule of Professional Conduct 3.8.” Lawson, ¶ 53, 242 P.3d at 1009.