Opinion ID: 653261
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Tangs' Arguments

Text: 17 The thrust of the Tangs' argument is that they have been denied their due process rights because they are now bound by a judgment based on the full credit bid issue without having had the opportunity to fully and fairly litigate the issue. We reject this argument. 18
19 The Tangs argue that the finding of the bankruptcy court on the full credit bid issue was clearly erroneous because that finding, and resulting judgment, were based on an issue outside the scope of the remand order. This argument fails because the Tangs' failure to object to the introduction of the evidence regarding the full credit bid at the second bankruptcy trial precluded them from raising the issue in a Rule 60(b)(6) motion. As stated in Blinder, Robinson & Co. v. SEC, 748 F.2d 1415 (10th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1125 (1985): 20 A Rule 60(b) motion is an extraordinary procedure which may be granted in [sic] a showing of due cause. [citation omitted]. 21 Even assuming that Blinder, Robinson's attorney's failure to object to the allegedly improper evidence was due solely to the negligence of their counsel rather than to deliberate litigation strategy, this would not constitute a sufficient showing to warrant the extraordinary relief sought. 22 Id. at 1420; see also In re Braen, 900 F.2d 621, 629 (3d Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1066 (1991), stating [c]ases abound in which petitions for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b) on this ground have been denied. [citations omitted]. 23 2. The doctrine of law of the case bars reconsideration of the Tangs' challenge to the full credit bid evidence. 24 Under the doctrine of law of the case, a decision of the court in a prior appeal must be followed in all subsequent proceedings in the same case. Eichman v. Fotomat Corp., 880 F.2d 149, 157 (9th Cir.1989), citing Waggoner v. Dallaire, 767 F.2d 589, 593 (9th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1064 (1986). Once the court of appeals has affirmed a judgment, the district court may subsequently modify that judgment pursuant to a Rule 60(b) motion 1 in three situations:  the first decision is clearly erroneous and would result in manifest injustice, an intervening change in the law has occurred, or the evidence on remand is substantially different. Id. 25 The Tangs assert that the bankruptcy court's use of the full credit bid evidence and resulting judgment were clearly erroneous and manifestly unjust. The bankruptcy court expressly stated its view to the contrary at the hearing on the Tangs' Rule 60(b) motion: [T]he matter has been presented to the United States Court of Appeals, which included a request for rehearing.... The Court of Appeals has ruled in favor of the McInerney position. I am satisfied that the result that has been obtained is a fair and just result. Excerpt of Record, Ex. 6, p. A-47. 26 The Tangs also assert that the evidence presented to the court in support of their Rule 60(b)(6) motion differed substantially from the record of their earlier appeal. To the contrary, it was identical to the evidence on which the Tangs' relied to challenge the evidence of the full credit bid in their prior appeal and petition for rehearing. Because we rejected that challenge by denying the petition for rehearing, the bankruptcy court had no power to reconsider the issue. Gould v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 790 F.2d 769 (9th Cir.1986).