Opinion ID: 746887
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Daubert's

Text: Illumination and Impact 8 The trial court's oral ruling excluded Dr. Jenkins' opinion as to cause of disease under Rules 702 and 403, apparently based on the court's understanding of the Rules as interpreted and impacted by the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). Therefore, before analyzing the trial court's interpretation and application of the law to the particular proffer of expert testimony, we will set forth our reading of the essential elements of the pertinent Federal Rules of Evidence that have been illumined and impacted by Daubert.
9 Rule 702 provides that:If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 10 In admitting expert testimony, Rule 702 requires that two preliminary determinations be made by the trial court. First, the proffered witness must be qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education. Second, the proffered expert's opinion, inference or other testimony must be based on scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge that will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue. To facilitate discussion, we refer to these as the qualifications and knowledge components of Rule 702.
11 An expert must have scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge, and a witness may be qualified as an expert by reason of knowledge, skill, experience, training or education. Fed.R.Evid. 702; Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1110 (5th Cir.1991)(en banc ). Rule 702, according to the Advisory Committee Note, permits expert testimony not only by experts carrying formal credentials such as university degrees and professional memberships but also by so-called skilled witnesses, whose experiences permit them to testify with authority on a given topic. Id. The areas of inquiry that expert testimony may address are similarly broad, including scientific and technical questions as well as any other areas of specialized knowledge. Id. The question of whether the witness is sufficiently qualified as an expert is a matter to be decided by the court pursuant to Rule 104(a). United States v. Normile, 587 F.2d 784 (5th Cir.1978); Loftin & Woodard, Inc. v. United States, 577 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir.1978). In making this inquiry, the trial court has wide discretion in determining the qualifications of a witness as an expert with respect to a particular subject. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 108, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 2902, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974), reh'g denied, 419 U.S. 885, 95 S.Ct. 157, 42 L.Ed.2d 129 (1974); Robert v. Conti Carriers & Terminals, Inc. 692 F.2d 22 (5th Cir.1982). 12 In Daubert, the question of an expert's qualification under Rule 702 was not raised. The court stated that the experts were well or impressively credentialed. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 582-583, 113 S.Ct. at 2791-92. Accordingly, Daubert does not affect the foregoing principles pertaining to qualifications.
13 In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), the Supreme Court was called upon to determine the standard for admitting expert scientific testimony in a federal trial. Id. at 582, 113 S.Ct. at 2791. The court had granted certiorari in light of sharp divisions among courts applying and rejecting the test of Frye v. United States, 54 App.D.C. 46, 47, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C.Cir.1923) that expert opinion based on a scientific technique is inadmissible unless the technique is generally accepted as reliable in the relevant scientific community. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585, 113 S.Ct. at 2792. 14 The court held that the Frye general acceptance test had been displaced by the Federal Rules of Evidence, observing that: Rule 702 specifically governing expert testimony does not establish general acceptance as an absolute prerequisite to admissibility; the drafting history of the rule does not indicate an intention to incorporate such a standard; and a rigid general acceptance standard would be at odds with the liberal thrust of the Federal Rules and their general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to opinion testimony. Id. at 588-589, 113 S.Ct. at 2794-2795. 15 The Supreme Court also held that the Federal Rules require the trial judge to ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable. Id. at 589, 113 S.Ct. at 2794. Citing Rule 702 as the primary locus of this obligation, the court decided that the trial judge, when faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony, must determine pursuant to Rule 104(a) whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue. The court explained that this entails a preliminary assessment of whether the underlying reasoning of the scientific testimony is soundly grounded in scientific knowledge and methodology and can be relevantly applied to the facts in issue. Id. at 592, 113 S.Ct. at 2796. 16
17 Speaking specifically of scientific knowledge, the Court stated that the adjective  'scientific' implies a grounding in the methods and procedures of science. Id. The Court elaborated: 18  'Science is not an encyclopedic body of knowledge about the universe. Instead, it represents a process for proposing and refining theoretical explanations about the world that are subject to further testing and refinement....' But, in order to qualify as 'scientific knowledge,' an inference or assertion must be derived by the scientific method. Proposed testimony must be supported by appropriate validation--i.e., 'good grounds,' based on what is known. In short, the requirement that an expert's testimony pertain to 'scientific knowledge' establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability. Id. quoting from Brief for American Association for the Advancement of Science et al. as Amici Curiae 7-8. (Parentheses omitted; emphasis in original). 19 Thus, the Daubert Court defined scientific knowledge in terms of hard science or Newtonian science i.e., knowledge obtained and tested through the scientific method, of which Sir Issac Newton was the leading exponent. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Next Step After Daubert, Developing A Similarly Epistemological Approach To Ensuring The Reliability of Nonscientific Expert Testimony, 15 Cardozo L.Rev. 2271, 2276-2277 (1994)(citing 5 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 490-491 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967)); Jennifer Laser, Comment, Inconsistent Gatekeeping in Federal Courts: Application of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. to Nonscientific Expert Testimony, 30 Loy. L.A.L.Rev. 1379, 1404 (1997); United States v. Hall, --- F.Supp. ----, ---- (C.D.Ill.1997); United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F.Supp. 1027, 1039 (S.D.N.Y.1995). 20 The methodology of hard or Newtonian science is what distinguishes it from other fields of human inquiry. See Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 NW.U.L.REV. 643, 645 (1992). Scientific methodology today is based on generating hypotheses and testing them to see if they can be falsified....Theoretically, therefore, hypotheses are not affirmatively proved, only falsified. Of course, if a hypothesis repeatedly withstands falsification, one may tend to accept it even if conditionally true. Id. at 645-646 (citing Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1965); David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005, 1015-17(1989); Interdisciplinary Panel on Carcinogenicity, Criteria for Evidence of Chemical Carcinogenicity, 225 SCI. 682, 683 (1984)). 21
22 In Daubert the Supreme Court noted that, although Rule 702 also applies to technical, or other specialized knowledge, its discussion was limited to the scientific context because that is the nature of the expertise offered here. Id. at 590 n. 8, 113 S.Ct. at 2795 n. 8. Nevertheless, we conclude that, except where it is self-evident that the court's remarks specifically apply only to scientific knowledge, that the general principles of Rule 702 recognized by the decision are applicable to other species of expert testimony. Moreover, in Watkins v. Telsmith, 121 F.3d 984, 991 (5th Cir.1997), another panel of this court recently concluded that whether an expert's testimony is based on 'scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge,' Daubert and Rule 702 demand that the district court evaluate the methods, analysis, and principles relied upon in reaching the opinion. 23 The Daubert court began by stating that [w]e interpret the legislatively-enacted Federal Rules of Evidence as we would any statute. Id. at 587, 113 S.Ct. at 2793(citing Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 163, 109 S.Ct. 439, 446, 102 L.Ed.2d 445 (1988))(Because the Federal Rules of Evidence are a legislative enactment, courts turn to the 'traditional tools of statutory construction in order to construe their provisions.' ) Accordingly, a court must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy. United States Nat. Bank of Or. v. Independent Ins. Agents of America, 508 U.S. 439, 455, 113 S.Ct. 2173, 2182, 124 L.Ed.2d 402 (1993)(citing United States v. Heirs of Boisdore, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 113, 122, 12 L.Ed. 1009 (1849)). A statutory text consists of words living a communal existence, the meaning of each word informing the others and all taking their purport from their context. Id. at 454, 113 S.Ct. at 2182 (citing NLRB v. Federbush, Co., 121 F.2d 954, 957 (2nd Cir.1941)(L.Hand, J.)). The maxim noscitur a sociis, that a word is known by the company it keeps, is often used to avoid giving one word a scope inconsistent with its companions and thus giving  'unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress.'  Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 575, 115 S.Ct. 1061, 1069, 131 L.Ed.2d 1 (1995)(citing and quoting Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307, 81 S.Ct. 1579, 1582, 6 L.Ed.2d 859 (1961)). 24 Consequently, the requirements that Daubert found to be inherent in Rule 702, viz., that the trial judge must ensure that the expert's evidence is not only relevant, but reliable, must be applicable to technical, or other specialized knowledge, as well as to scientific testimony. Otherwise, Rule 702 would not place limits on the admissibility of non-scientific expert testimony comparable to those it imposes on purportedly scientific evidence. 25 Moreover, the Daubert opinion at several points clearly implies that it is drawing on principles of the Federal Rules that are generally applicable to all types of expert testimony. The court stated that Rule 702 ... clearly contemplates some degree of regulation of the subjects and theories about which an expert may testify. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589, 113 S.Ct. at 2794. Further, the court observed that the premise for the relaxation of the usual requirement of first-hand knowledge when any type of qualified expert testifies is an assumption that the expert's opinion will have a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of his discipline. Id. at 592, 113 S.Ct. at 2796 Thus, Daubert plainly indicates that the trial judge, when faced with the proffer of expert testimony in any field of study, must determine whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is valid under the principles of the discipline involved. Id.; See American College of Trial Lawyers, Standards And Procedures For Determining The Admissibility Of Expert Evidence After Daubert, 157 F.R.D. 571, 578 (1994). 26
27 grounded in the methodology of his discipline. 28 The Daubert court read Rule 702 to provide that  '[i]f scientific technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue'  an expert  'may testify thereto.'  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589, 113 S.Ct. at 2794 (emphasis by Court deleted). Knowledge in this context  'applies to any body of known facts or to any body of ideas inferred from such facts or accepted as truths on good grounds.'  Id. at 590, 113 S.Ct. at 2795(quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1252 (1986)). 29 In Daubert, the Court indicated that, (1) scientific knowledge within Rule 702 means principles, theories, techniques or inferences derived by the scientific method or by a body of sound scientific methods; and (2) that the proffered expert's opinion, inference, or testimony based on scientific knowledge, in order to have evidentiary reliability or trustworthiness, must be derived or inferred by the same methods. Id. at 590 n. 9, 113 S.Ct. at 2795; See also the court's general observations on principal scientific methods. Id. at 593-594, 113 S.Ct. at 2796-2797. 30 By the same token, we conclude that, under Rule 702, an opinion based on other technical or specialized knowledge, must be grounded in the principles, methods and procedures of the particular field of knowledge involved. Every discipline employs a body of methods, rules, and postulates, i.e., methodology, both in its ordinary functions and in developing and adopting new concepts, techniques, and analogues. Therefore, the knowledge of each discipline, under Rule 702, is both its principles and methodology and the theories, techniques or inferences produced through its methodology. Thus, the proffered opinion of any expert in a field of knowledge, in order to be evidentiarily reliable, must either be based soundly on the current knowledge, principles and methodology of the expert's discipline or be soundly inferred or derived therefrom. 31 As the American College of Trial Lawyers' report concludes, [W]hether the testimony concerns economic principles, accounting standards, property valuation or other non-scientific subjects, it should be evaluated by reference to the 'knowledge and experience' of that particular field. To that extent, Daubert ought to be regarded as universally applicable to expert evidence. American College of Trial Lawyers, Standards and Procedures for Determining the Admissibility of Expert Evidence after Daubert, 157 F.R.D. 571, 579 (1994). 32 For the same reasons, this court recently held in Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984 (5th Cir.1997) that the application of Daubert in determining the admissibility of expert testimony is not limited to scientific knowledge or novel scientific evidence. Id. at 989-991. Moreover, in Watkins, this court concluded that: 33 [W]hether an expert's testimony is based on scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge, Daubert and Rule 702 demand that the district court evaluate the methods, analysis, and principles relied upon in reaching the opinion. The court should ensure that the opinion comports with applicable professional standards outside the courtroom and that it will have a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of [the] discipline. 34 Id. at 991(quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592, 113 S.Ct. at 2796.) (also citing and quoting Cummins v. Lyle Indus., 93 F.3d 362, 366-371 (7th Cir.1996)(Rule 702 demands that experts adhere to the same standards of intellectual rigor that are demanded in their professional work. Id. at 369)(citing Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 316, 318 (7th Cir.1996))); See also Tyus v. Urban Search Management, 102 F.3d 256, 263 (7th Cir.1996)(Social science testimony ... must be tested to be sure that the person possesses genuine expertise in a field and that her court testimony 'adheres to the same standards of intellectual rigor that are demanded in [her] professional work.' ) (quoting Braun v. Lorillard Inc., 84 F.3d 230, 234 (7th Cir.1996)). 35
36 Rule 702 further requires that the evidence or testimony assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. This condition goes primarily to relevance. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590, 113 S.Ct. at 2795.  'Expert testimony which does not relate to any issue in the case is not relevant and, ergo, non-helpful.' 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER p 702, p. 702-18. See also United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d Cir.1985)('An additional consideration under Rule 702--and another aspect of relevancy--is whether expert testimony proffered in the case is sufficiently tied to the facts of the case that it will aid the jury in resolving a factual dispute').  Id. at 591, 113 S.Ct. at 2795. The study of the phases of the moon, for example, may provide valid scientific 'knowledge' about whether a certain night was dark, and if darkness is a fact in issue, the knowledge will assist the trier of fact. However (absent creditable grounds supporting such a link), evidence that the moon was full on a certain night will not assist the trier of fact in determining whether an individual was unusually likely to have behaved irrationally on that night. Id. 37 e. The trial judge is the gatekeeper. 38 Accordingly, when faced with a proffer of a qualified expert's testimony to scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge, the trial judge must determine at the outset, pursuant to Rule 104(a), whether the proffered opinion or inference is soundly grounded in the methodology of the expert's discipline and whether that opinion or inference is relevant to a fact in issue or to an understanding of the evidence. Cf. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589-592, 113 S.Ct. at 2794-2796. 39 The Court emphasized that the trial judge's inquiry under Rule 702 is a flexible one. Different approaches may be permissible, but the focus must be on the principles and methodology upon which the expert's opinion is based, not on the merits of the expert's conclusion. Id. at 594-595 n. 12, 113 S.Ct. at 2797-2798. Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence. Id. at 596, 113 S.Ct. at 2798 (citing Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61, 107 S.Ct. 2704, 2714, 97 L.Ed.2d 37 (1987)). Additionally, in the event the trial court concludes that the scintilla of evidence presented supporting a position is insufficient to allow a reasonable juror to conclude that the position more likely than not is true, the court remains free to direct a judgment, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 50(a), and likewise to grant summary judgment, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56. Id. (citing cf., e.g., Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 959 F.2d 1349 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 826, 113 S.Ct. 84, 121 L.Ed.2d 47 (1992); Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 874 F.2d 307 (5th Cir.1989), modified, 884 F.2d 166 (5th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1046, 110 S.Ct. 1511, 108 L.Ed.2d 646 (1990)). 40 f. The Daubert 41 factors are hard scientific methods that 42 generally are inappropriate for the 43 reliability assessment of 44 clinical medical testimony. 45 After declaring that evidentiary reliability of an expert's scientific opinion depends on whether it is soundly grounded in the the scientific method, the Daubert Court identified several individual methods or techniques within the body of hard or Newtonian scientific methodology as appropriate for trial judges' use in testing the methodology-relatedness of particular hard scientific opinion proffers. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593, 113 S.Ct. at 2796. These hard scientific methods, now sometimes called Daubert factors, are empirical testing, peer review and publication, known or potential rate of error, the existence and maintenance of operational standards, and acceptance within a relevant scientific community. Id. at 593-94, 113 S.Ct. at 2796-2797. 46 Because the objectives, functions, subject matter and methodology of hard science vary significantly from those of the discipline of clinical medicine, as distinguished from research or laboratory medicine, the hard science techniques or methods that became the Daubert factors generally are not appropriate for assessing the evidentiary reliability of a proffer of expert clinical medical testimony. 47 First, the goals of the disciplines of clinical medicine and hard or Newtonian science are different. In hard science, the usual motive is inquiring: to gain a new understanding of some mechanism of nature. Alvan R. Feinstein, Clinical Judgment 22 (1967)[hereinafter Feinstein]. In contrast, the care and treatment of the individual patient is the ultimate, specific act that characterizes a clinical physician. Id. at 27; Pellegrino and Thomasma, For The Patient's Good 71 (1988); Pellegrino and Thomasma, A Philosophical Basis of Medical Practice 120 (1981)([T]he whole process is ordained to a specific practical end--a right action for a particular patient--and ... this end must modulate each step leading to it in important ways.). The clinical physician, therefore, must take account of the immediacy of the problem confronting her for she bears an essential relationship to each patient. Additionally, she has many human values to consider--ethics, compassion, and must have a willingness to take responsibility in the face of the unknown. Edmond A. Murphy, The Logic of Medicine 6 (1976)[hereinafter Murphy]. The pursuit of these different goals of hard science and clinical medicine serves to shape the distinct objectives of the scientific experiment and the clinical treatment of a patient: 48 In clinical treatment, the main motives are remedial, or prophylactic: to change what nature has done or to prevent what it may do. In laboratory work, the premise is innovative: the goal is to test a new hypothesis or a new procedure. In ordinary clinical treatment, the premise is repetitive: the goal is to reproduce (or surpass) the best results of experiments conducted before in similar circumstances. A clinician chooses treatment in a new situation by reviewing what was done and what happened in previous situations that resembled the one at hand; he then selects whatever mode of treatment had the most successful outcome in the past. Id. at 22. 49 In ordinary clinical treatment, the purpose is not to gain new knowledge but to repeat a success of the past. Id. at 23. 50 Second, the subject matter and conditions of study are different. In laboratory work, the experimental material is an intact animal, a part of a person or of an animal, or an inanimate system; in clinical treatment, the material is an intact human being. Id. at 22. The hard scientist initiates the experiment at a time of his own convenience and chooses the material usually without regard to its desire or consent for participation. Id. In clinical medicine, the patient initiates the treatment, choosing the time, place, duration, and clinician. Id. The physician is not studying the properties of chemical compounds in a test tube; he cannot postpone dealing with cancer in a patient for fifty years because he hopes by then to have a much clearer insight into the nature of the disorder. Id. 51 Finally, clinical medicine and hard science have markedly different methodologies. A clinician observes at least three types of data for each patient who undergoes treatment: A disease in morphologic, chemical, microbiologic, physiologic, or other impersonal terms; the host in whom the disease occurs and his environmental background, including his personal properties (such as age, race, sex, and education) and external surroundings (such as geographic location, occupation, and financial and social status) before the disease began; and the illness that occurs in the interaction between the disease and its environmental host, consisting of clinical phenomena: the host's subjective sensations, or symptoms, and signs, which are findings discerned objectively during the physical examination. Feinstein, at 24-25. 52 Using these data, the clinician determines a present diagnosis (which gives the disease a name and tells what is wrong), a past etiology and pathogenesis (or how it got that way), and a future prognosis and therapy (or what to do about it). Id. at 25. Some of the data used by the clinician can often be obtained by examining the patient's fluids, cells, tissues, excreta, roentgenograms, graphic tracings, and other derivative substances. The patient's personal environmental data can often be elicited by nurses, secretaries, social workers, or other interviewers. But the history-taking, physical examination, and the determination of symptoms and signs can properly be done only by a doctor skilled in the clinical procedures described above. Id. Moreover, the [clinical physician's] capacity to make judgments in cases of a kind which he has never seen before must depend ultimately on a cultivated capacity to see equivalences between quite disparate things, that is, on analogy. Murphy, at 9. 53 In sum, hard or Newtonian scientific knowledge does not comprehend all subjects that theoretically might be subjected to its methodology. It is knowledge of a particular and limited kind, gathered or tested by a particular and characteristic method. T.H. Savory, The Language of Science (1953). Although clinical medicine utilizes parts of some hard sciences, clinical medicine and many of its subsidiary fields are not hard sciences. The purposes, criteria, values and methods of hard or Newtonian science and clinical medicine are far from identical. Fred A. Mettler, The Medical Sourcebook xxxiv (1959). Consequently, the Daubert factors, which are hard scientific methods selected from the body of hard scientific knowledge and methodology generally are not appropriate for use in assessing the relevance and reliability of clinical medical testimony. Instead, the trial court as gatekeeper should determine whether the doctor's proposed testimony as a clinical physician is soundly grounded in the principles and methodology of his field of clinical medicine. 2
Rule 703 provides that: 54 The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence. 55 Prior to Daubert, this court took the position that, before admitting expert testimony, a trial court, as part of or in addition to its preliminary inquiry under Rule 703, must apply the Frye test, i.e., the court must determine that the witness used a well-founded methodology or mode of reasoning sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs. Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1110, 1111, 1115 (5th Cir.1991). In Daubert, however, the Supreme Court held that the Frye general acceptance test was displaced by the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588-589, 113 S.Ct. at 2793-2794. The court stated that the general acceptance test is at odds with the liberal thrust of the Federal Rules of Evidence and their general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to 'opinion' testimony, and concluded that Frye is incompatible with the Federal Rules of Evidence [and] should not be applied in federal trials. Id. Therefore, any requirement that the trial court apply the Frye general acceptance test in determining the admissibility of expert testimony under the Federal Rules of Evidence is no longer tenable in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert that the test should not be applied in federal trials. Accordingly, we now read the Federal Rules of Evidence, including Rule 703, without the influence of a Frye-focal lens. 56 Under rule 703, a qualified expert may apply his relevant and reliably grounded knowledge and expertise to facts and data in the particular case in order to form and express a pertinent opinion or inference. The facts or data may be derived from (1) the first hand observation of facts, data, or opinions perceived by the witness before trial, (2) the facts, data or opinions presented at trial (as by the familiar hypothetical question or by having the expert attend the trial and hear the testimony establishing the facts, data, and opinions relied on), or (3) facts, data or opinions presented to the expert outside of court other than by his own direct perception. Fed.R.Evid. 703 advisory committee's note. If they are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field, such facts, data or opinions presented to the expert out of court need not be admitted or even admissible in evidence. United States v. Harper, 802 F.2d 115, 121 (5th Cir.1986). The rule is designed to bring the judicial practice into line with the practice of experts themselves when not in court. United States v. Williams, 447 F.2d 1285, 1290 (5th Cir.1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 954, 92 S.Ct. 1168, 31 L.Ed.2d 231 (1972), reh'g denied, 405 U.S. 1048, 92 S.Ct. 1308, 31 L.Ed.2d 591 (1972). The Advisory Committee Note accompanying Rule 703, in part, states: 57 Thus a physician in his own practice bases his diagnosis on information from numerous sources and of considerable variety, including statements by patients and relatives, reports and opinions from nurses, technicians and other doctors, hospital records, and X rays. Most of them are admissible in evidence, but only with the expenditure of substantial time in producing and examining various authenticating witnesses. The physician makes life-and-death decisions in reliance upon them. His validation, expertly performed and subject to cross-examination, ought to suffice for judicial purposes. 58 See also United States v. Burrell, 505 F.2d 904 (5th Cir.1974); United States v. Williams, 447 2d. at 1290. 59 The question of whether facts, data or opinions not admitted in evidence are of a type reasonably relied upon is a preliminary one for the court. Bauman v. Centex Corp., 611 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir.1980); United States v. Lawson, 653 F.2d 299 (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1150, 102 S.Ct. 1017, 71 L.Ed.2d 305 (1982); Michael H. Graham, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 703.1 (4th Ed.1996). Although only the terms facts or data appear in Rule 703, an opinion not in evidence, even if not admissible, may also form the basis of an expert's opinion if reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field. See Graham, at p. 109-110, n. 18 (citing the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 703). In determining the preliminary question of whether reliance by the expert is reasonable, the party calling the witness must satisfy the court, both that such facts, data or opinions are of the type customarily relied upon by experts in the field and that such reliance is reasonable. See Christophersen v. Allied-Signal, Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1113-1114 (5th Cir.1991) (en banc); Bryan v. John Bean Div. of FMC Corp. 566 F.2d 541, 544-47 (5th Cir.1978). But see Peteet v. Dow Chemical Co. 868 F.2d 1428, 1432 (5th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 935, 110 S.Ct. 328, 107 L.Ed.2d 318 (1989) (in making the 703 determination, the trial court should defer to the expert's opinion of what data they find reasonably reliable.); See also, 3 Weinstein's Evidence p 703 at 703-17(1981). 60 Daubert's description of the trial judge's duty as gatekeeper under Rule 702 sheds light on her duty in this capacity under Rule 703 and the relationship between these duties. The trial judge's duty under Rule 702 is to determine whether the expert is qualified; whether his proffered opinion is grounded in the methodology of his discipline, i.e., the body of principles, methods, rules and postulates of his field of expertise; and whether his opinion is relevant to the case. In Daubert, the Supreme Court stated that a judge assessing a proffer must also pay attention to Rule 703, which provides that expert opinions based on otherwise inadmissible hearsay are to be admitted only if the facts or data are 'of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject.'  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595, 113 S.Ct. at 2797. Accordingly, the trial judge as gatekeeper has a duty under Rule 703 to determine whether such facts and data not admitted in evidence are of the type customarily relied upon by experts in the field and whether such reliance is reasonable. 61 Therefore, it may be inferred that the duties of a judicial gatekeeper in assessing an expert opinion under Rules 702 and 703 are roughly similar to those of an appellate court in reviewing the combined legal and factual decisions of a trial judge. This is because the expert and the trial judge perform similar functions in applying specialized knowledge to facts to reach a conclusion or decision about an issue in a case. Consequently, the appellate court and the gatekeeper also perform similar functions in reviewing the work of the trial court and the expert to determine whether their conclusions are soundly grounded in the correct principles of knowledge and are based on properly and reasonably found facts and data.
Rule 403 provides that: 62 Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 63 The Supreme Court in Daubert admonished that a judge performing her gatekeeping duties under Rule 702 should also be mindful of other applicable rules, including Rule 403. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595, 113 S.Ct. at 2797. The court stated that Rule 403 permits the exclusion of relevant evidence 'if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury....'  Id. The court quoted Judge Weinstein as explaining:  'Expert evidence can be both powerful and quite misleading because of the difficulty in evaluating it. Because of this risk, the judge in weighing possible prejudice against probative force under Rule 403 of the present rules exercises more control over experts than over lay witnesses.' Weinstein, 138 F.R.D., at 632. 509 U.S. at 595, 113 S.Ct. at 2797. 64 As Rule 403 favors the admissibility of relevant evidence, such evidence is to be excluded only if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. United States v. Davis, 639 F.2d 239, 244 (5th Cir.1981); See 22 Wright & Graham, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5221. Moreover, Rule 403 is an extraordinary remedy to be used sparingly because it permits the trial court to exclude otherwise relevant evidence. E.g., United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 633, (5th Cir. Unit B), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1008, 102 S.Ct. 2300, 73 L.Ed.2d 1303 (1982). There must be a danger of unfair prejudice, not merely the danger of prejudice inherent in any relevant evidence; and its probative value must be substantially outweighed by that danger. As this court stated in United States v. McRae, 593 F.2d 700, 707 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 444 U.S. 862, 100 S.Ct. 128, 62 L.Ed.2d 83 (1979): 65 Relevant evidence is inherently prejudicial; but it is only unfair prejudice, substantially outweighing probative values, which permits exclusion of relevant matter under Rule 403. Unless trials are to be conducted on scenarios, on unreal factors tailored and sanitized for the occasion, the application of Rule 403 must be cautious and sparing. Its major function is limited to excluding matter of scant or cumulative probative force, dragged in by the heels for the sake of its prejudicial effect. As to such, Rule 403 is meant to relax the iron rule of relevance, to permit the trial judge to preserve the fairness of the proceedings by exclusion despite its relevance. It is not designed to permit the court to 'even out' the weight of the evidence, to mitigate a crime, or to make a contest where there is little or none. (emphasis in original) 66 Virtually all evidence is prejudicial or it isn't material. The prejudice must be 'unfair.'  Dollar v. Long Mfg. N.C., Inc., 561 F.2d 613, 618 (5th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996, 98 S.Ct. 1648, 56 L.Ed.2d 85 (1978). The Advisory Committee Note on Rule 403 provides that [u]nfair prejudice within this context means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one. For example, evidence may be unfairly prejudicial because it appeals to the jury's sympathies, arouses its sense of horror, provokes its instinct to punish, triggers other mainsprings of human action, or may cause a jury to base its decision on something other than the established propositions of the case. 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER p 403 403-37 to 403-40 (citing authorities including United States v. Bowers, 660 F.2d 527 (5th Cir.1981); United States v. Osum, 943 F.2d 1394, 1404 (5th Cir.1991); United States v. Kang, 934 F.2d 621, 628 (5th Cir.1991)). In addition, evidence may threaten confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury when the probability that the proof and the answering evidence that it provokes may create a side issue that will unduly distract the jury from the main issues. McCormick, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185(West 2d ed.1972); See Ford v. Sharp, 758 F.2d 1018 (5th Cir.1985).