Opinion ID: 774738
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Rittenhouse's Certified Claims

Text: 21 When reviewing an appeal from a district court's ruling on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, we review that court's factual findings for clear error and its rulings on issues of law de novo. See Ellsworth v. Levenhagen, 248 F.3d 634, 638 (7th Cir. 2001). Because Rittenhouse's habeas petition was filed after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), we review his claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sec. 2254 as amended by that Act. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 322-23, 117 S. Ct. 2059, 138 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1997); Ouska v. Cahill-Masching, 246 F.3d 1036, 1044 (7th Cir. 2001). Thus, we are permitted to grant his petition for a writ of habeas corpus only if the claims he now presents were adjudicated by the Illinois courts on the merits in such a manner that resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. sec. 2254(d)(1). 22 The Supreme Court has explained that a state court decision is contrary to clearly established precedent if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Court's] cases or if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the Court's] precedent. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 146 L. Ed. 2d 389 (2000). The Court has likewise explained that a state court decision is an unreasonable application of its precedent if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Court's] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case. Id. at 413. While a federal court reviews de novo whether a state court ruling was contrary to clearly established law, see Ouska, 246 F.3d at 1044, under the 'unreasonable application' clause, 'a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.' Morgan v. Krenke, 232 F.3d 562, 565-66 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 409). 23 Before reviewing the merits of Rittenhouse's claims, we must determine whether he properly presented these claims to the Illinois courts. If he failed to exhaust all available state remedies or raise all claims before the state courts, his petition must be denied without considering its merits. Dressler v. McCaughtry, 238 F.3d 908, 912 (7th Cir. 2001). We have explained that the requirement that state courts have the first opportunity to cure a claim of continued confinement in an unconstitutional fashion stems from the understanding that state courts are equally obliged to follow federal law and from the desire for comity between state and federal court systems. Spreitzer v. Schomig, 219 F.3d 639, 645 (7th Cir. 2000). To satisfy this requirement, a petitioner must present both the operative facts and the legal principles that control each claim to the state judiciary; otherwise, he will forfeit federal review of the claim. Wilson v. Briley, 243 F.3d 325, 327 (7th Cir. 2001). Additionally, our cases have articulated four factors to consider in determining whether a habeas petitioner has fairly presented his claims in state court: 24 (1) whether the petitioner relied on federal cases that engage in constitutional analysis; (2) whether the petitioner relied on state cases which apply a constitutional analysis to similar facts; (3) whether the petitioner framed the claim in terms so particular as to call to mind a specific constitutional right; and (4) whether the petitioner alleged a pattern of facts that is well within the mainstream of constitutional litigation. 25 Id. at 327. In applying these factors, [t]he bottom line is that the task of the habeas court in adjudicating any issue of fair presentment is assessing, in concrete, practical terms, whether the state court was sufficiently alerted to the federal constitutional nature of the issue to permit it to resolve that issue on a federal basis. Ellsworth v. Levenhagen, 248 F.3d 634, 639 (7th Cir. 2001) (quotations omitted). 26 The district court concluded that Rittenhouse's claim that the trial court's instructions denied him of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights was procedurally defaulted because Rittenhouse did not fairly present this claim to the Illinois courts. See Rittenhouse v. O'Sullivan, No. 98-3286, slip op. at 14-15 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 22, 2000). Rittenhouse's briefs to the Illinois courts only discussed the problems with the challenged instructions within the context of his argument that he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel for his attorney's failure to object to these instructions. Additionally, Rittenhouse's brief to the Illinois Appellate Court did not refer to a single federal or state case addressing a criminal defendant's federal due process rights. In fact, the only reference to due process in Rittenhouse's ten page argument alleging ineffective assistance of counsel appears in the very last sentence, where he asserts that the trial court's instructional errors denied him of his right to due process. 27 A close review reveals, however, that although Rittenhouse's only discussion of the jury instructions was within the context of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, he did in fact present the Illinois Appellate Court with a very substantial analysis of alleged problems with the jury instructions. Additionally, his argument that the instructions created a mandatory presumption of legal responsibility clearly implicates the Due Process Clause as explained by the Supreme Court in Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 521, 99 S. Ct. 2450, 61 L. Ed. 2d 39 (1979) (finding that a presumption in a jury instruction that relieves the government of its burden to prove each element of a crime violates the Due Process Clause). Likewise, although the appellate court did not say this outright, its analysis concluding that the instructions did not create an improper presumption squarely addresses and rejects Rittenhouse's argument that is essentially a due process argument. Thus, although it is a close call, we will err on the side of evaluating the merits of Rittenhouse's claim. 28 As we explained in Part II.A., however, these instructions, taken as a whole, did not create a presumption that Rittenhouse was legally responsible for the actions of Whitehead and Chaszar. Thus, the instructions did not relieve the State of its burden to prove Rittenhouse's culpability for each of the crimes with which he was charged. Therefore, we conclude that the Illinois Appellate Court's conclusion that these instructions were proper was not an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. Consequently, we will deny Rittenhouse's petition on this claim. 29 With regard to Rittenhouse's second claim--that the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on his mere presence theory of defense was a denial of his fundamental right to due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment--the district court dismissed it on the merits, finding that the Illinois Appellate Court's decision rejecting Rittenhouse's claim was neither an incorrect statement of Supreme Court precedent nor an unreasonable application of the law to the facts. Rittenhouse v. O'Sullivan, No. 98-3286, slip op. at 16 (C.D. Ill. August 22, 2000). The court reached the merits notwithstanding the appellant's assertion that Rittenhouse's claim was procedurally defaulted pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 119 S. Ct. 1728, 144 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1999), because he failed to include this claim in the petition for leave to appeal that he filed with the Illinois Supreme Court. In rejecting the respondent's argument, the district court explained that, because Rittenhouse filed his petition when the decisions of this court held that he did not default issues if he left them out of this petition for leave to appeal, it would not default Rittenhouse for following the then existing procedural law of the [Seventh] Circuit. Rittenhouse, No. 98- 3286, slip op. at 15-16. We cannot agree. 30 In Boerckel, the Supreme Court ruled that several of the claims raised in the defendant's federal habeas petition were procedurally defaulted because he had not properly presented those claims to the Illinois courts. 526 U.S. at 848. Although he had presented the claims to the Illinois Appellate Court, Boerckel did not include them in his petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, and, therefore, he had not satisfied the federal exhaustion requirement. See id. While Boerckel's case involved a matter on direct appeal, we have since held that [t]he procedural default rule announced in Boerckel applies with equal force in a case . . . on collateral review. White v. Godinez, 192 F.3d 607, 608 (7th Cir. 1999). Additionally, consistent with the Supreme Court's retroactive application of its holding in Boerckel, we have procedurally defaulted a habeas petitioner's claims where he sought relief through the state court system prior to the Boerckel decision and failed to present certain claims in his petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court. See Rodriguez v. Scillia, 193 F.3d 913, 917 (7th Cir. 1999). Therefore, we must disagree with the district court's determination that the Boerckel decision does not affect Rittenhouse's petition and instead conclude that this claim has been procedurally defaulted because Rittenhouse did not include it in his petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court. 31 Because we find this claim to be procedurally defaulted, we may grant Rittenhouse's petition for habeas relief on this claim only if he is able to 'demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claim[ ] will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.' Anderson v. Cowan, 227 F.3d 893, 899-900 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 115 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1991)). Rittenhouse has made no attempt to offer such a demonstration, other than his attorney's comment at oral argument that if this court were to find that both of his claims were procedurally defaulted, and therefore declined to review them on the merits, the errors alleged in these claims, taken together, would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. We do not accept this argument. We have already denied Rittenhouse's first claim on the merits, and we find no aspect of the trial court's decision to refuse to instruct the jury on his mere presence theory of defense that requires us to review this claim on the merits in order to avoid a miscarriage of justice. Therefore, we will deny his petition for a writ of habeas corpus on this claim.