Opinion ID: 1113311
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Justification for Delayed and/or Successive Petitions.

Text: (13) Before considering the merits of a second or successive petition, a California court will first ask whether the failure to present the claims underlying the new petition in a prior petition has been adequately explained, and whether that explanation justifies the piecemeal presentation of the petitioner's claims. This requirement is reasonable in view of the interest of the state in carrying out its judgments, the interest of the respondent in having the ability to respond to the petition and to retry the case should the judgment be invalidated, and the burden on the judicial system. In assessing a petitioner's explanation and justification for delayed presentations of claims in the future, the court will also consider whether the facts on which the claim is based, although only recently discovered, could and should have been discovered earlier. A petitioner will be expected to demonstrate due diligence in pursuing potential claims. If a petitioner had reason to suspect that a basis for habeas corpus relief was available, but did nothing to promptly confirm those suspicions, that failure must be justified. However, where the factual basis for a claim was unknown to the petitioner and he had no reason to believe that the claim might be made, or where the petitioner was unable to present his claim, the court will continue to consider the merits of the claim if asserted as promptly as reasonably possible. And, as in the past, claims which are based on a change in the law which is retroactively applicable to final judgments will be considered if promptly asserted and if application of the former rule is shown to have been prejudicial. With the exception of petitions which allege facts demonstrating that a fundamental miscarriage of justice has occurred, an exception to be addressed below, unjustified successive petitions will not be entertained on their merits. This petitioner, in common with others who have filed multiple petitions attacking the same judgment of conviction since McCleskey v. Zant, supra, 499 U.S. 467 (hereafter McCleskey ), was decided, states that his new claims were developed in response to McCleskey, which was decided after his earlier petition was filed. This petitioner does not allege that the factual and/or legal bases for these claims were unknown at the time the earlier petition was filed. Attempts to justify a failure to make all of a petitioner's claims in the first petition by relying on the Supreme Court's McCleskey decision are unpersuasive. McCleskey construes and implements a federal statute governing successive petitions to federal courts by state prisoners. (Rules Governing [28 U.S.C.] ง 2254 Cases in the U.S. Dist. Cts., rule 9(b) [Rule 9(b)].) The decision does not control the availability of relief in the courts of this state. ( In re Shipp, supra, 62 Cal.2d 547, 553-554.) McCleskey is instructive, however, since the high court recognized there that abusive writ practice has a serious impact on the states' administration of criminal justice. In McCleskey, the Supreme Court reviewed the statutory and common law efforts to control abuse of the writ of habeas corpus in the federal courts. The high court concluded that abuse in the form of successive petitions exists when a claim has been deliberately abandoned earlier and is also found when a claim presented in a subsequent petition could have been presented in an earlier petition. (499 U.S. at p. 488 [113 L.Ed.2d at pp. 541-542.].) Recognizing that the federal courts have equitable discretion to excuse the failure to include all claims in the first habeas corpus petition, the Supreme Court attempted to resolve the question which often faces this court โ how to determine whether a petitioner has a legitimate excuse for failure to raise claims at the appropriate time, i.e., in a prior petition. The high court clearly recognized the interests which California decisions governing successive and delayed petitions have long reflected: [T]he writ strikes at finality. One of the law's very objects is the finality of its judgments. Neither innocence nor just punishment can be vindicated until the final judgment is known. `Without finality, the criminal law is deprived of much of its deterrent effect.' Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 [103 L.Ed.2d 334, 354-355, 109 S.Ct. 1060] (1989). And when a habeas petitioner succeeds in obtaining a new trial, the `erosion of memory and dispersion of witnesses that occur with the passage of time,' Kuhlmann v. Wilson [(1986) 477 U.S. 436] at 453 [91 L.Ed.2d 364, 106 S.Ct. 2616], prejudice the government and diminish the chances of a reliable criminal adjudication.... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... Far more severe are the disruptions when a claim is presented for the first time in a second or subsequent ... habeas petition. If `[c]ollateral review of a conviction extends the ordeal of trial for both society and the accused,' Engle v. Isaac [(1982) 456 U.S. 107] at 126-127 [71 L.Ed.2d at pp. 799-800], the ordeal worsens during subsequent collateral proceedings. Perpetual disrespect for the finality of convictions disparages the entire criminal justice system. (499 U.S. at pp. 491-492 [113 L.Ed.2d at pp. 542-543].) The court then adopted for purposes of federal habeas corpus review of state criminal convictions the cause and prejudice standard analogous to that used in determining if a state procedural default bars federal review (see Wainwright v. Sykes (1977) 433 U.S. 72, 88 [53 L.Ed.2d 594, 608-609, 97 S.Ct. 2497]: In procedural default cases, the cause standard requires the petitioner to show that `some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts' to raise the claim in state court. Murray v. Carrier, [ supra , ] 477 U.S. [478] at 488 [91 L.Ed.2d at pp. 408-409]. Objective factors that constitute cause include `interference by officials' that makes compliance with the state's procedural rules impracticable, and `a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available to counsel.' Ibid. In addition, constitutionally `ineffective assistance of counsel ... is cause.' Ibid. Attorney error short of ineffective assistance of counsel, however, does not constitute cause and will not excuse a procedural default. Id., at 486-488 [91 L.Ed.2d at pp. 407-409]. Once the petitioner has established cause, he must show `actual prejudice resulting from the errors of which he complains.' United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 168 [71 L.Ed.2d 816, 102 S.Ct. 1584] (1982). Federal courts retain the authority to issue the writ of habeas corpus in a further, narrow class of cases despite a petitioner's failure to show cause for a procedural default. These are extraordinary instances when a constitutional violation probably has caused the conviction of one innocent of the crime. We have described this class of cases as implicating a fundamental miscarriage of justice. (499 U.S. at p. 494 [113 L.Ed.2d at pp. 544-545].) Under the rule for federal practice announced in McCleskey, the petitioner will bear the burden, once the government pleads abuse of the writ, to disprove abuse by showing cause for the failure to raise his claims in an earlier petition and prejudice therefrom. That decision is irrelevant to petitioner's burden in this court, however. The suggestion that the decision of McCleskey justifies piecemeal presentation of claims to this court implies both that there was no prior federal authority identifying piecemeal presentation of claims as an abuse of the writ, and that there has been no comparable state requirement governing habeas corpus claims. Neither proposition is supportable. As we have shown, piecemeal presentation of known claims and repetitious presentation of previously denied claims have not been condoned in this state. The federal courts have also disapproved piecemeal presentation of claims. Considering a series of repetitious federal habeas corpus petitions, stays of execution of judgment, and appeals by a state prisoner in Barefoot v. Estelle (1983) 463 U.S. 880 [77 L.Ed.2d 1090, 103 S.Ct. 3383], the Supreme Court recognized the interest of the state and the potential for abuse of the writ. `To the extent that [second and successive habeas corpus petitions] involve the danger that a condemned inmate might attempt to use repeated petitions and appeals as a mere delaying tactic, the State has a quite legitimate interest in preventing such abuses of the writ.'... Rule 9(b) states that `a second or successive petition may be dismissed if the judge finds that it fails to allege new or different grounds for relief... [or if] the failure of the petitioner to assert those grounds in a prior petition constituted an abuse of the writ.' See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 18 [10 L.Ed.2d 148, 162-163, 83 S.Ct. 1068] (1963); Advisory Committee Note to Rule 9(b), 28 U.S.C., p. 273. (463 U.S. at p. 895 [77 L.Ed.2d at pp. 1105-1106].) Thereafter, in Woodard v. Hutchins (1984) 464 U.S. 377 [78 L.Ed.2d 541, 104 S.Ct. 752], the Supreme Court, in a per curiam order, vacated a stay of execution granted by a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Justice Powell, joined by four other justices, concurred, observing that the underlying petition for writ of habeas corpus was a successive petition filed without explanation for failure to raise the claims earlier or to include them in an earlier petition (464 U.S. at pp. 377-378 [78 L.Ed.2d at p. 543] (conc. opn. of Powell, J.)), and characterizing the filing as an abuse of the writ. This case is a clear example of the abuse of the writ that ง 2244(b) was intended to eliminate. All three ... claims could and should have been raised in his first petition for federal habeas corpus. ( Id., at p. 379 [78 L.Ed.2d at p. 544].) The opinion notes that there was no evidence that the claims had been deliberately withheld, but no explanation was offered for the failure to raise the claims earlier. ( Id., at p. 379, fn. 3 [78 L.Ed.2d at p. 544].) [14] While a major concern of the court was that the second habeas corpus petition in Woodward v. Hutchins, supra , had been filed on the eve of execution, the court's statement that failure to include all claims in the original petition was an abuse of the writ was not so limited. A petitioner cannot reasonably claim that McCleskey constituted a change in federal habeas corpus procedure that somehow justified a failure to include all known claims in the initial state petition. [15] (14) Petitioner argues that a prisoner's own knowledge of the basis for a claim should be irrelevant if there has been no previous development of the claim combining all the relevant historical facts and a legal theory. This is not the rule. A prisoner who has knowledge of the facts upon which he believes that he is entitled to relief must explain any delay in seeking relief. ( In re Shipp, supra, 62 Cal.2d 547, 553.) He may rely on counsel who then represents him to include the claim in a petition to be filed by counsel if he has alerted counsel to the issue. If he is not represented by counsel, he need not develop the legal theory on which the claim is based, but must fully and fairly state the facts which underlie the claim for relief. ( In re Swain, supra, 34 Cal.2d 300, 304.) Petitioner concedes that whether there has been a change of counsel is irrelevant to whether the merits of claims raised for the first time in a successive petition should be entertained. The rule has been that the court will look to what petitioner and/or his counsel knew at the time of the appeal or the filing of the first habeas corpus petition, and demand that the failure to raise all issues in a single, timely petition be justified. Any other rule would put a premium on repeated changes of counsel, and would wholly undermine the policy underlying the court's refusal to consider the merits of successive petitions offering piecemeal presentation of claims. And, as we have indicated above, in the future a habeas corpus petitioner, like a petitioner who mounts a collateral attack by petition for writ of coram nobis, `must show that the facts upon which he relies were not known to him and could not in the exercise of due diligence have been discovered by him at any time substantially earlier than the time of his motion for the writ.' ( People v. Shipman, supra, 62 Cal.2d 226, 230.) In limited circumstances, consideration may be given to a claim that prior habeas corpus counsel did not competently represent a petitioner. (15) An imprisoned defendant is entitled by due process to reasonable access to the courts, and to the assistance of counsel if counsel is necessary to ensure that access, but neither the Eighth Amendment nor the due process clause of the United States Constitution gives the prisoner, even in a capital case, the right to counsel to mount a collateral attack on the judgment. ( Murray v. Giarratano (1989) 492 U.S. 1 [106 L.Ed.2d 1, 109 S.Ct. 2765].) This court has held, however, that if a petition attacking the validity of a judgment states a prima facie case leading to issuance of an order to show cause, the appointment of counsel is demanded by due process concerns. ( People v. Shipman, supra, 62 Cal.2d 226, 231-232. Cf. Coleman v. Thompson (1991) 501 U.S. ___ [115 L.Ed.2d 640, 111 S.Ct. 2546].) Regardless of whether a constitutional right to counsel exists, a petitioner who is represented by counsel when a petition for writ of habeas corpus is filed has a right to assume that counsel is competent and is presenting all potentially meritorious claims. (But see, Coleman v. Thompson, supra, 501 U.S. ___ [115 L.Ed.2d 640] [where no right to counsel exists there can be no constitutionally ineffective counsel]; Antone v. Dugger (1984) 465 U.S. 200 [79 L.Ed.2d 147, 104 S.Ct. 962] [failure to raise claims in first petition not excused on ground that counsel was rushed].) (16) If, therefore, counsel failed to afford adequate representation in a prior habeas corpus application, that failure may be offered in explanation and justification of the need to file another petition. The petitioner must, however, allege with specificity the facts underlying the claim that the inadequate presentation of an issue or omission of any issue reflects incompetence of counsel, i.e., that the issue is one which would have entitled the petitioner to relief had it been raised and adequately presented in the initial petition, and that counsel's failure to do so reflects a standard of representation falling below that to be expected from an attorney engaged in the representation of criminal defendants. However, if the petitioner is aware of facts that may be a basis for collateral attack, and of their potential significance, he may not fault counsel for failing to pursue that theory of relief if the petitioner failed to advise counsel of those facts. (17) Moreover, mere omission of a claim developed by new counsel does not raise a presumption that prior habeas corpus counsel was incompetent, or warrant consideration of the merits of a successive petition. Nor will the court consider on the merits successive petitions attacking the competence of trial or prior habeas corpus counsel which reflect nothing more than the ability of present counsel with the benefit of hindsight, additional time and investigative services, and newly retained experts, to demonstrate that a different or better defense could have been mounted had trial counsel or prior habeas corpus counsel had similar advantages. Petitioner states that the new claims made here would have been included in the prior petition had this court not summarily and preemptively denied that petition and that the additional claims had not been developed sufficiently to enable him to include them in that petition at the time it was filed. (18) The court must and will assume, however, that a petition for writ of habeas corpus includes all claims then known to the petitioner. Summary disposition of a petition which does not state a prima facie case for relief is the rule. ( People v. Gonzalez, supra, 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1258-1259; see also, 6 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (2d ed. 1989) Extraordinary Writs, ง 3361, p. 4170.) This practice is too well established (see Ex parte Walpole (1890) 84 Cal. 584 [24 P. 308]) to warrant any inference that petitioners are justified in believing that the court will routinely delay action on a filed petition to permit amendment and supplementation of the petition. [16] A petitioner who is aware of facts adequate to state a prima facie case for habeas corpus relief should include the claim based on those facts in the petition even if the claim is not fully developed. If the petition is delayed because the petitioner is not able to state a prima facie case for relief on all of the bases believed to exist, the delay in seeking habeas corpus relief may be justified when the petition is ultimately filed if the petitioner can demonstrate that (1) he had good reason to believe other meritorious claims existed, and (2) the existence of facts supporting those claims could not with due diligence have been confirmed at an earlier time. [17] Petitioner's assertion that he would have added additional claims to his prior petition had it not been denied neither explains nor justifies the failure to include the claims in the prior petition. (Cf. In re Haygood (1975) 14 Cal.3d 802 [122 Cal. Rptr. 760, 537 P.2d 880] [counsel, appointed after issuance of an order to show cause on petition prepared in propria persona by prison inmate, reviewed record and discovered additional ground for relief of which the petitioner had been unaware].) The court may grant leave to file a supplemental petition (see, e.g., In re Haygood, supra, 14 Cal.3d 802, 805), but has no obligation either to do so or to delay action on a petition in the expectation that a supplement to the petition will be forthcoming. The law mandates prompt disposition of habeas corpus petitions (ง 1476), and the interest of the state in the finality of judgment weighs heavily against delayed disposition of pending petitions. (See In re Eli (1969) 71 Cal.2d 214, 218 [77 Cal. Rptr. 665, 454 P.2d 337]; In re Arguello, supra, 71 Cal.2d 13, 17; In re Anderson (1968) 69 Cal.2d 613, 621 [73 Cal. Rptr. 21, 447 P.2d 117].) (19a) Although, as we have noted, petitioner has not adequately explained his failure to include all of his present claims in his prior petition, our disposition of the present petition does not rest on that omission. Instead, we turn to his delay in making the new claims and in supplementing the evidentiary basis for claims previously made.