Opinion ID: 356040
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Propriety of Judgment N. O. V.

Text: 20 As stated above, the parties essentially agree on the important facts of the case. Officers Moats and Rockwell conceded at trial that they had no reason to believe that the decedent, a burglary suspect, had used violence in the commission of the burglary or that he posed a threat to anyone's safety. 7 Both testified that they shot at the decedent to prevent his escape from arrest. For her part, Leslie Landrum does not dispute the existence of probable cause to arrest her son for a felony. 21 Given the above facts, Landrum proceeded under two alternative theories in prosecuting her section 1983 claim: (1) the shooting death of her son was a per se unreasonable taking of her son's life; or (2) even if not per se unreasonable, it was unreasonable given the circumstances. In addition, she argues here that the good faith defense normally provided police officers in section 1983 actions against them 8 was unavailable to these defendants because it had been expressly preempted by Nebraska law. We consider each of these points separately below.
22 In support of her conclusion that the use of deadly force 9 against a fleeing, nonviolent felon is per se unreasonable, Leslie Landrum relies on this court's interpretation of the fourteenth amendment due process clause in Mattis II, 10 and section 28-839 of the Reissue of Revised Statutes of Nebraska, 1943. 23 We consider the statutory claim first. Section 28-839 provides, in relevant part, that: 24 28-839. Use of force in law enforcement. (1) Subject to the provisions of this section and of section 28-841, the use of force upon or toward the person of another is justifiable when the actor is making or assisting in making an arrest and the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary to effect a lawful arrest. 25 (2) The use of force is not justifiable under this section unless: 26 (a) The actor makes known the purpose of the arrest or believes that it is otherwise known by or cannot reasonably be made known to the person to be arrested; and 27 (b) When the arrest is made under a warrant, the warrant is valid or believed by the actor to be valid. 28 (3) The use of deadly force is not justifiable under this section unless: 29 (a) The arrest is for a felony; 30 (b) Such person effecting the arrest is authorized to act as a peace officer or is assisting a person whom he believes to be authorized to act as a peace officer; 31 (c) The actor believes that the force employed creates no substantial risk of injury to innocent persons; and 32 (d) The actor believes that: 33 (i) The crime for which the arrest is made involved conduct including the use or threatened use of deadly force; or 34 (ii) There is a substantial risk that the person to be arrested will cause death or serious bodily harm if his apprehension is delayed. 35 Plainly, one of the prerequisites to the use of deadly force was not met in this case. Neither officer Moats nor Rockwell believed, as required by subsection 3(d), that the crime for which the arrest was made involved the use or threatened use of deadly force or that a substantial risk existed that the decedent would cause death or serious bodily harm if his apprehension were delayed. 11 Thus it appears that Nebraska has made the use of deadly force against fleeing nonviolent felons unreasonable per se. 36 In response, however, officers Moats and Rockwell contend that the provisions of section 28-839 do not apply to law enforcement officers. They rely on section 28-833 of the Nebraska Code, which defines the terms used in sections 28-833 to 28-843, including the term actor. That term, used in the section 28-839 provision concerning use of force in law enforcement, apparently excludes Nebraska law enforcement officers from the requirements of the subsequent provisions: 37 28-833. Terms, defined. As used in sections 28-833 to 28-843, unless the context otherwise requires: 38 (4) Actor shall mean any person who uses force in such a manner as to attempt to invoke the privileges and immunities afforded him by sections 28-833 to 28-843, except any duly authorized law enforcement officer of the State of Nebraska or its political subdivisions    . (Emphasis added.) 39 As is evident, a direct contradiction exists between the definition of actor, which excludes law enforcement officers, and section 28-839, which seems to apply to law enforcement officers although it refers only to actors. The district judge considered that issue and ruled that section 28-839 does apply to police officers, relying on the legislative history and terms of section 28-833 through 28-843, which were intended to adopt the Model Penal Code provisions on the use of force. 12 Based on our review of the same sources, 13 we agree with the district court. 40 Under these circumstances plaintiff Leslie Landrum established that the police officers had exercised unreasonable force as a matter of law. 41 Because we have determined that appellant established the use of excessive force as a matter of law, we need not consider her second theory of recovery under section 1983: that if not unreasonable per se, the force used by officers Rockwell and Moats was unreasonable under the circumstances.
42 Our ruling that officers Rockwell and Moats used excessive force as a matter of law does not necessarily mean that appellant was entitled to a directed verdict at the close of all evidence, thus authorizing judgment n. o. v. In section 1983 actions for damages, defendants are entitled to a qualified immunity from liability based on good faith belief in the propriety of their actions and reasonable grounds 14 for that belief. Procunier v. Navarette, --- U.S. ----, 98 S.Ct. 855, 55 L.Ed.2d 24 (1978); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). 43 Thus, for example, (w)hen a court evaluates police conduct relating to an arrest its guideline is 'good faith and probable cause.'  Scheuer v. Rhodes, supra, 416 U.S. at 245, 94 S.Ct. at 1691, quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967). A similar guideline must be applied in assessing the propriety of force used by the police to effectuate an arrest. If police officers (1) believe that a certain amount of force is necessary to make an arrest, (2) believe that use of that amount of force is lawful under the circumstances, and (3) have reasonable grounds for each of the foregoing beliefs, then they are entitled to the defense of good faith even if the use of force turns out, ex post, to have been illegal or excessive. See Procunier v. Navarette, supra ; Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 95 S.Ct. 992, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, supra ; Pierson v. Ray, supra. 44 The defense of good faith is not, as plaintiff-appellant asserts, inapplicable to an action based on excessive force and assault and battery. 15 Nor is it preempted by Nebraska law. 16 45 Therefore, in defense of this action for damages, police officers Moats and Rockwell were entitled to rely upon provisions of their manual, even though those provisions conflicted with the post-incident interpretations of state law as pronounced by the district court. Thus, their good faith was an issue in the lawsuit. 46 Because good faith is dependent on motivation and conduct of the defendant as established at trial, the validity of the defense is ordinarily a question for the jury. Pierson v. Ray, supra, 386 U.S. at 557-58, 87 S.Ct. 1213; Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 Harv.L.Rev. 1133, 1209 n. 119 (1977). Moreover, like other affirmative defenses originally predicated on the common law, 17 the burden is on the defendant to prove each element of the defense to the jury's satisfaction. 18 Cf. Pierson v. Ray, supra, 386 U.S. at 555-58, 87 S.Ct. 1213. The existence of a good faith issue stands as a bar to appellant's claim to be entitled to a judgment n. o. v. on liability. Accordingly, the trial judge correctly overruled plaintiff's motions for a directed verdict and judgment n. o. v. 47