Opinion ID: 2185743
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether the Earlier Court of Appeals' Decision is the Law of the Case in the Instant Proceedings.

Text: In Feller I, the court of appeals began its opinion by noting that Feller appealed from a district court ruling denying his statutory and constitutional claims. The court then characterized Feller's claims this way: Plaintiff claims that the district court erred in (1) finding there had been no violation of the open meetings law when the civil service commission denied his request for a closed hearing; and (2) finding that the defendants did not violate his constitutional rights. Feller I, 435 N.W.2d at 388. In section I of its opinion, the court of appeals addressed the issue of whether the district court improperly granted the commission's motion for summary judgment on Feller's claim that the open meetings law had been violated. The opinion took issue with the district court's legal conclusion that the open meetings law affords Feller no remedy for refusing to go into closed session. Id. at 389. The court of appeals concluded that the open meetings law did indeed afford Feller such a remedy. It reached that conclusion by holding that the enforcement provisions of Iowa Code section 21.6 applied to the provisions of Iowa Code section 21.5(1). Id. at 389-90. The court of appeals did not specify what that remedy was but merely said this: We hold that a remedy was available to Feller upon his statutory claim, and that the trial court was obligated under law to consider whether the commission in fact violated section 21.5. We accordingly reverse the court's grant of summary judgment. Id. at 390. We think that holding meant this: the district court should have determined whether the commission abused its discretion in refusing to apply the exception in section 21.5(1)(i). If the district court determined the commission did abuse its discretion, the court should have voided the commission's decision denying a closed hearing and should have ordered the commission to hold such a hearing. We reach this conclusion from the following language in Iowa Code section 21.5(1)(i) and 21.6(3), both of which the court of appeals cited and relied on. Feller I, 435 N.W.2d at 389-90. Iowa Code section 21.5(1)(i) provides: 21.5 Closed session. 1. A governmental body may hold a closed session only to the extent a closed session is necessary for any of the following reasons: .... i. To evaluate the professional competency of an individual whose appointment, hiring, performance or discharge is being considered when necessary to prevent needless and irreparable injury to that individual's reputation and that individual requests a closed session. .... Feller, of course, relied on this exception before the commission and in the district court. Iowa Code section 21.6 contains the enforcement provisions for the open meetings law. The part the court of appeals relied on is in subsection 3, which pertinently provides: 3. Upon a finding by a preponderance of the evidence that a governmental body has violated any provision of this chapter, a court: .... b. Shall order the payment of all costs and reasonable attorney fees to any party successfully establishing a violation of this chapter.... c. Shall void any action taken in violation of this chapter, if ... the court finds under the facts of the particular case that the public interest in the enforcement of the policy of this chapter outweighs the public interest in sustaining the validity of the action taken in the closed session. (Emphasis added.) We doubt whether the open meetings law provides a remedy when a governmental body refuses to close a hearing. Perhaps, as the commission suggests, the only way to test the propriety of a governmental body's refusal to close a meeting is through certiorari proceedings. For these reasons we probably should have granted the commission's application for further review on this issue in the prior appeal. We mention this for cautionary purposes in future cases. However, on this question of law involving statutory interpretation, the court of appeals decision became the law of the case. As such, this decision was binding on remand and in any subsequent appeal. See Wolfe v. Graether, 389 N.W.2d 643, 651 (Iowa 1986) (when Iowa court of appeals has determined issue of law necessary to decision of a prior appeal and this determination is not vacated by the Iowa supreme court, the decision of the Iowa court of appeals is controlling as to issue for purpose of further proceedings in district court and subsequent appeals notwithstanding fact that subsequent appeal may be considered by Iowa supreme court). This is so even though the court of appeals may have been incorrect in its interpretation of the open meetings law. See Lawson v. Fordyce, 237 Iowa 28, 33-37, 21 N.W.2d 69, 74-76 (1945). These principles announced in Wolfe and Lawson are part of the law of the case doctrine. In Feller I, the court of appeals did not end its decision when it reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment. In section II of the opinion the court went on to say this: As presented in section I, Iowa Code section 21.5 indicates that the commission may close a public session upon a proper showing. The use of the word may in the statute confers a power and places discretion within the one who holds the power. Discretion is abused when it is exercised on clearly untenable grounds or to a clearly unreasonable extent. .... Upon our review of the transcripts of the hearings held before the Scott county civil service commission, we believe the commission abused its discretion in denying Feller's request for a closed hearing. Balancing the relative interests involved, we think it clear that the exposure of the allegations against Feller to the public would cause needless and irreparable injury to Feller's reputation within the community, particularly in light of the fact that there is no evidence that such allegations had anything to do with his job performance. If the closed meeting provision in the open meetings law means anything, it is for the protection of the employee and not for the protection of the commission. We believe that to deny a closed meeting in a case where such needless damage would be done to the employee is an arbitrary and capricious exercise of discretion. The court's grant of summary judgment is reversed and we remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and Iowa Code section 21.6. Feller I, 435 N.W.2d at 390 (citations omitted). It is this language that lies at the heart of the present controversy. Feller argues that, by this language, the court of appeals decided the abuse of discretion issue and this decision was binding on remand. According to Feller, all the district court needed to do on remand was to order a closed hearing and determine what attorney fees and costs Feller was entitled to. In contrast, the commission argues that the law of the case doctrine did not make this language binding on remand because the language was nothing but dictum. According to the commission, the language was not necessary to decide the only issue before the court of appeals on count I: whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment. Under the commission's reasoning, the district court on remand properly ignored this language when it permitted a trial on the abuse of discretion issue. We have recognized that [t]he general understanding of the doctrine of the law of the case is that it applies only to so much of an opinion by an appellate court in a former decision in the same case as was essential to the determination required of the court. Wolfe, 389 N.W.2d at 651 (citations omitted); accord 5 Am.Jur.2d Appeal and Error § 753, at 196-97 (1962). In short, the doctrine does not apply to dictum. Id. at 197. But, for reasons that follow, we do not view the abuse of discretion language in Feller I as dictum. There were two issues before the court of appeals in Feller I: the statutory claim issue in count I and the constitutional issue in count II. Both counts sought reversal of the commission's decision refusing to close the hearing. Both counts also depended on a showing that the commission abused its discretion in refusing to close the hearing because Feller would suffer needless and irreparable injury in an open hearing. Count I was decided adversely to Feller on summary judgment. But count II was tried on the merits. In that trial Feller relied on the transcripts of the hearings before the commission to establish his claim of abuse of discretion. The commission likewise relied on these transcripts to show no abuse of discretion. In addition, the commission relied on an affidavit of one of the commissioners. The district court decided the abuse of discretion issue against Feller. On appeal in Feller I, Feller argued that the commission failed to exercise its discretion in this case in good faith. Feller asked that the court send the matter back to the agency with directions to hold a closed meeting. The abuse of discretion issue was squarely before the court of appeals. The court had all the record it needed to determine the issue. We think the court of appeals intended toand didreach the merits on the abuse of discretion issue. Otherwise, it would not have ignored the constitutional issue in count II. It did not address count II because the court was awarding Feller all the relief he was asking for under both counts. To that extent the court of appeals language on the abuse of discretion issue was necessary to its decision. In any event, we think the court of appeals had to address the issue of abuse of discretion. Otherwise, there could have been an issue preclusion problem on remand regarding count I. See Bascom v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 395 N.W.2d 879, 881 (Iowa 1986) (according to doctrine of issue preclusion, when parties have litigated a particular issue in a prior proceeding, they are barred from further litigating that issue in a subsequent proceeding). As we said, the district court sustained the commission's motion for summary judgment on count I solely for the reason that the open meetings law afforded Feller no remedy. In doing so, the district court did not reach the abuse of discretion issue. On count II the district court overruled the motion for summary judgment, concluding there was a material fact question on the abuse of discretion issue. In the trial on count II, the district court found that the commission had not abused its discretion. If the court of appeals had not addressed the abuse of discretion issue, on remand the commission could have argued that Feller was barred from contesting this issue under count I because it had been decided against him on appeal under count II. We think the court of appeals realized this too and decided it had to address the abuse of discretion issue either under count I or under count II. The court did not reach the merits in count II, so for this additional reason we think its language on the abuse of discretion issue was necessary to its decision. The commission's application for further review in Feller I shows that it too believed the court of appeals had decided the abuse of discretion issue on the merits. In its application the commission said this: The Iowa appellate court held that [the commission and its members] had violated section 21.5(1)(i) and abused their discretion by failing to close the hearing on the civil service appeal, and reversed and remanded. .... Moreover, the appellate court held that [the] mere statement of applicant that his reputation may be damaged was a sufficient showing, and the failure to honor such request constitutes an abuse of discretion. [The commission and its members] have problems with such concept, especially since no authority has been cited in support of such ruling and the dictates of the legislature would appear to be contrary. (Emphasis added.)