Opinion ID: 166033
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: taylor's appeal waiver

Text: 10 In cases such as this where a defendant waived his appellate rights pursuant to a plea agreement, we must first determine whether the defendant can appeal his sentence notwithstanding the appellate waiver. See United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1321-25 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc). To do this, we examine (1) whether the disputed appeal falls within the scope of the waiver of appellate rights; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his appellate rights; and (3) whether enforcing the waiver would result in a miscarriage of justice as we define herein. Id. at 1325. When construing an appellate waiver, we apply well-established contract principles and examine the plain language of the plea agreement. United States v. Porter, 405 F.3d 1136, 1142 (10th Cir. May 3, 2005). In addition, we strictly construe the scope of [the] appellate waiver[ ] and [interpret] any ambiguities ... against the Government and in favor of a defendant's appellate rights. Id. (quotations and citation omitted). 11 In the present case, we need look only at the language of the appellate waiver itself to satisfy ourselves that Taylor can appeal his sentence. 1 The appellate waiver contained an explicit exception that provides: 12 [Taylor's] waiver of rights to appeal and bring collateral challenges shall not apply to appeals or challenges based on changes in the law reflected in Tenth Circuit or Supreme Court cases decided after the date of this agreement that are held by the Tenth Circuit or Supreme Court to have retroactive effect. 13 Thus, the question in this case is whether Blakely and Booker changed the law in this circuit regarding sentencing. We think they did. 14 To begin with, Blakely and Booker extended Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), to sentencing matters by finding that a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights are violated if any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum is not admitted or proved beyond a reasonable doubt. See generally Blakely, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004); Booker, 543 U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). The statutory maximum is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant. Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at 2537 (emphasis deleted); see also Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 749; United States v. Price, 400 F.3d 844, 847 (10th Cir.2005). The Court in Booker consequently found the Guidelines unconstitutional but remedied their infirmity by making them advisory rather than mandatory. See Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 750. 15 As a result of these Supreme Court rulings, the law in this circuit has been changed with regard to sentencing. Before Blakely and Booker, the sentencing judge was required to enhance Taylor's sentence under the Guidelines for possessing a firearm in connection with another offense. Now, however, the sentencing judge is not required to mandatorily apply the Guidelines, although they will be important to the overall reasonableness of any sentence imposed by a court post- Booker. See United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 738 (10th Cir.2005). 16 Having concluded the law of this circuit has been changed as a result of Supreme Court rulings and our subsequent application of them, see, e.g., id. at 729, the more subtle question in this case then is whether these cases have retroactive effect for purposes of Taylor's appeal waiver. To begin with, no one would argue these cases do not apply on direct review. See, e.g., United States v. Labastida-Segura, 396 F.3d 1140, 1142 (10th Cir. 2005) (applying Booker on direct review). It is less obvious, however, whether the plea agreement's retroactivity language referred to a direct appeal, since the parties likely assumed there would be no direct appeal, given the state of the law when the plea agreement was executed. Moreover, the customary usage of the term retroactive is in the collateral review context, where habeas petitioners are foreclosed from relief except in those rare cases that the Supreme Court deems to be retroactively applicable to collateral attack. See Price, 400 F.3d at 848 (applying Supreme Court's retroactivity analysis and adding,  Blakely did not announce a watershed rule of criminal procedure that would apply retroactively to initial § 2255 motions). 17 The plain language of Taylor's plea agreement is not so narrowly confined. The agreement itself states that the appellate waiver bars Taylor from pursuing both appeals and collateral challenges. The exception in Taylor's waiver, however, allows him to pursue both appeals and collateral challenges, so long as they are based on retroactive changes in the law. Indeed, if the term retroactive only referred to subsequent collateral challenges, the agreement's language regarding direct appeal would be superfluous. Because we construe a plea agreement so as to give effect to all of its words and phrases, see Porter, 405 F.3d at 1142, we read the term retroactive on direct appeal as referring to changes in the law made after the execution of the plea agreement and including those decided while the direct appeal is pending. 2 The plea agreement by its terms, of course, will not allow a subsequent collateral attack to the sentence unless the Supreme Court expressly finds that a decision will be applied retroactively on habeas review. See Johnson v. McKune, 288 F.3d 1187, 1194 (10th Cir. 2002). 18 In sum, based on the language of his agreement, Taylor can appeal his sentence. 19