Opinion ID: 215224
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Timely Registration and Attorneys' Fees

Text: LAMCO's lead argument on appeal is that attorneys' fees are barred because the copyright claim to the disputed song, Caballo Viejo, was not timely registered. [2] See 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2006). We disagree for two reasons: one of fact and the other of law. As a matter of fact, the copyright was timely registered. As a matter of law, the statute does not apply to a defendant who is successful in defending claims that it infringed. Section 412 bars recovery of statutory damages under section 504 and attorneys' fees under section 505 by copyright owners who failed to register the work before the alleged infringement began. Id. § 412(2) (prohibiting certain remedies for any infringement of copyright commenced after first publication of the work and before the effective date of its registration, unless such registration is made within three months after the first publication of the work); see also Johnson v. Gordon, 409 F.3d 12, 20 (1st Cir.2005) (recognizing that registration is a condition precedent for obtaining certain remedies, such as statutory damages and attorneys' fees). By its plain language, section 412 does not apply in this case. According to LAMCO's complaint, the alleged infringement began in 1994. Caballo Viejo, however, was registered with the Copyright Office in 1983, more than a decade earlier. Besides, there is nothing in the statute that prohibits fee awards in cases, like this one, of non infringement. The reason is obvious: only copyright owners may register their copyright claims, the conduct incentivized by section 412. A defendant accused of infringing someone else's copyright could not possibly comply with the statute's registration criterion. Section 412 thus does not, logically, apply to alleged infringers. See O'Well Novelty Co. v. Offenbacher, Inc., 225 F.3d 655, 2000 WL 1055108, at  (4th Cir. Aug.1, 2000) (unpublished table decision) (holding that section 412 only applies to plaintiffs who assert copyright infringement claims and not to defendants who successfully defend against such claims); Domingo Cambeiro Prof'l Corp. v. Advent, 211 F.3d 1273, 2000 WL 262597, at  (9th Cir. Mar.7, 2000) (unpublished table decision) (affirming fee award to prevailing defendant; explaining that section 412 does not apply to this case because there has been no finding of infringement). See generally 4 Melville B. Nimmer and David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 14.10[B][2] (rev. ed.2010) ([Section 412] does not speak to a finding of noninfringement. Accordingly, if [the alleged infringer] prevails, nothing on the face of the statute bars awarding fees to it. In this way, the registration requirement is nonsymmetrical.); 6 William F. Patry, Patry on Copyright § 22:204 (2010) (similar). [3]