Opinion ID: 885157
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Were Appellant's Injuries Caused By An Accident?

Text: ¶ 14 Neither the uninsured motorist statute, § 33-23-201, MCA, nor the insurance contracts in question define the term accident or draw a distinction between negligent and intentional acts. In interpreting insurance contracts, we are guided by several well-established principles. This Court is bound to interpret the terms of an insurance contract according to their usual, commonsense meaning as viewed from the perspective of a reasonable consumer of insurance products. Stutzman, 284 Mont. at 376, 945 P.2d at 34. Further, this Court may not rewrite the contracts at issue, but must enforce them as written if their language is clear and explicit. Stutzman, 284 Mont. at 376, 945 P.2d at 34. Ambiguities in the language of the contracts will be construed against the insurer. Farmers Alliance Mutual Ins. Co. v. Holeman, 1998 MT 155, ¶ 25,  Mont. , ¶ 25, 961 P.2d 114, ¶ 25, 55 St.Rep. 601, ¶ 25. An ambiguity exists when the contract taken as a whole in its wording or phraseology is reasonably subject to two different interpretations. Holeman, ¶ 25. We examine the question of ambiguity in insurance contract language from the viewpoint of a consumer with average intelligence but not trained in the law or insurance business. Holeman, ¶ 25. ¶ 15 With these principles of insurance contract interpretation in mind, we turn to the UM provision at issue. Without specifically alleging ambiguity, Appellant intimates that the term accident is ambiguous. Appellant notes that while some courts view accident as simply a happening that is unexpected and unintended, McIntosh v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (Minn.1992), 488 N.W.2d 476, 478, other courts have concluded that such a simple definition is unworkable in the context of insurance contracts because it fails to resolve an important question: from whose perspective shall a court determine whether a happening is unexpected or unintended? See e.g. American Protection Ins. Co. v. Parker (1979), 150 Ga.App. 732, 258 S.E.2d 540, 542 (the fact that an injury is caused by an intentional act does not preclude it from being caused by `accident' if in that act something unforeseen, unusual and unexpected occurs which produces the result); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. McMillan (Colo.1996), 925 P.2d 785, 792-93(court determined accident to be an ambiguous term). See also Fox v. Country Mut. Ins. Co. (1998) 327 Or. 500, 964 P.2d 997, 1002 ([T]he difficulty is in the tendency to think that there is one all-encompassing definition of `accident' which accommodates all circumstances. There is no such thing) (citation omitted). In a case similar to the one at bar, the Oregon Supreme Court stated: Whether the occurrence is accidental depends entirely upon the point from which the question is viewed. If the occurrence is looked at from the point of view of the person who inflicts the harm ..., it is intentional. On the other hand, if [the occurrence] is looked at from the victim's standpoint, it is unforeseen, unintended, unexpected, and has every aspect of an accident as long as the occurrence was not provoked. Therefore, it is necessary to decide which point of view is the proper one from which to solve the present question. Davis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1973), 264 Or. 547, 507 P.2d 9, 10. ¶ 16 In light of this apparent ambiguity concerning the term accident, and the established rule that ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of the insured, Holeman, ¶ 25, Appellant urges this Court to adopt and apply to UM coverage the following definition of accident taken from Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Edition: An accident ... is an event happening without any human agency, or, if happening through such agency, an event which, under circumstances, is unusual and not expected by the person to whom it happens. (Emphasis added.) Appellant further argues that, in the context of UM coverage, viewing whether an accident has occurred from the standpoint of the insured victim is the better reasoned rule as it is in keeping with the nature and purpose of UM coverage, and the reasonable expectations of the insured. ¶ 17 Appellant distinguishes the nature and purpose of liability coverage from that of UM coverage. Appellant asserts that liability coverage is third party coverage the purpose of which is to indemnify the insured for damages which must be paid to others as a result of the insured's tortious conduct. In contrast, UM coverage is first party coverage the purpose of which is not indemnification, but rather to compensate the insured for losses produced by uninsured motorists. Appellant notes that this Court has described the compensatory purpose of UM coverage in very broad terms: The purpose of the [UM] statute is to protect completely, those willing to accept its protection, from all harm, whatever their statuspassenger, driver, pedestrianat the time of injury, produced by uninsured motorists. The only restrictions are that the plaintiff must be an insured, the defendant motorist uninsured, and that plaintiff be legally entitled to recover. Guiberson v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. (1985), 217 Mont. 279, 289, 704 P.2d 68, 74 (citation omitted). Courts in other jurisdictions have also distinguished UM coverage from liability coverage and have pursued a liberal construction of UM coverage. See e.g., Davis, 507 P.2d at 11 (this portion of the policy[UM coverage] ... resembles an accident policy for the victim of the uninsured motorist); Leatherby Ins. Co. v. Willoughby (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1975), 315 So.2d 553, 555 (uninsured motorist protection ... was designed for the protection of injured persons, not for the benefit of insurance companies or motorists who cause damage to others ...); Britt v. Phoenix Indem. Ins. Co. (1995), 120 N.M. 813, 907 P.2d 994, 998 ([T]he uninsured motorist statute was intended to expand insurance coverage and to protect individual members of the public against the hazard of culpable uninsured motorists) (citation omitted). ¶ 18 Based on the distinction between UM coverage and liability coverage, and based on this Court's liberal interpretation of UM coverage as described in Guiberson, Appellant argues that the UM statute should not be interpreted so narrowly as to preclude coverage to insured innocent victims of losses caused by uninsured motorists. Appellant argues that from his standpoint, the tortfeasors' acts and the injuries produced by those acts were unexpected and unintended and, therefore, constitute an accident. He argues that this injury-producing incident is precisely the type of accident for which UM coverage was designed. ¶ 19 Appellant notes that while there exists a split of authority among courts in other jurisdictions which have considered whether an intentional tort may be an accident for purposes of UM coverage, the majority have answered the question in the affirmative holding that accident should be viewed from the insured victim's perspective. See Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Mitchell (Ala.Civ.App.1979), 373 So.2d 1129; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. McMillan (Colo.1996), 925 P.2d 785; Leatherby Ins. Co. v. Willoughby (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1975), 315 So.2d 553; American Protection Ins. Co. v. Parker (1979) 150 Ga.App. 732, 258 S.E.2d 540; Ganiron v. Hawaii Ins. Guar. Assn. (1987), 69 Haw. 432, 744 P.2d 1210; Country Cos. v. Bourbon (1984), 122 Ill.App.3d 1061, 78 Ill.Dec. 407, 462 N.E.2d 526; Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co. v. Butler (S.D.Ind.1985), 615 F.Supp. 491; Redden v. Doe (La.Ct.App.1978), 357 So.2d 632; Harris v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. (1997), 117 Md.App. 1, 699 A.2d 447; Keeler v. Farmers and Merchants Ins. Co. (Mo.Ct.App.), 724 S.W.2d 307; Britt v. Phoenix Indem. Ins. Co. (1995), 120 N.M. 813, 907 P.2d 994; Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roberts (1964), 261 N.C. 285, 134 S.E.2d 654; Celina Mut. Ins. Co. v. Saylor (1973), 35 Ohio Misc. 81, 301 N.E.2d 721; Stucky v. Long (Okla.Ct.App.1989), 783 P.2d 500; Davis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1973), 264 Or. 547, 507 P.2d 9; Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am. v. Olivier (R.I.1990), 574 A.2d 1240; Stepp v. Hill (Tenn.Ct.App.1993), 1993 WL 181984; Whitehead v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (Tex.Ct.App.1997), 952 S.W.2d 79. But see McIntosh v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (Minn.1992), 488 N.W.2d 476, 479 (under UM coverage, accident is to be viewed from the perspective of the tortfeasor); Lindstrom v. Hanover Ins. Co. (1994), 138 N.J. 242, 649 A.2d 1272, 1276 (holding that Sciascia v. American Ins. Co. (1982), 183 N.J.Super. 352, 443 A.2d 1118, which held that for purposes of UM coverage, accident must be viewed from the insured victim's perspective, was no longer respectable authority); McCarthy v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp. (1962), 12 N.Y.2d 922, 238 N.Y.S.2d 101, 188 N.E.2d 405 (where Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation, a quasi-public institution established by the state, was exonerated from payment of liability benefits due to the intentional acts exclusion of the automobile liability policy, insurer was therefore not liable under its UM endorsement for injuries caused by intentional act); Landry v. Dairyland Ins. Co. (1997), 166 Vt. 634, 701 A.2d 1035, 1036 (same holding but under fact that insured's UM coverage contained express exclusion for injuries caused by intentional acts); Roller v. Stonewall Ins. Co. (1990), 115 Wash.2d 679, 801 P.2d 207, 210 (accident is event occurring without design, intent or obvious motivation). ¶ 20 Appellant also argues that application of the insured's viewpoint to the definition of accident comports with the reasonable expectations of the insured. Appellant asserts that a UM policyholder, having paid the premiums for UM coverage, legitimately expects coverage of injuries caused by uninsured motorists regardless of whether the injuries are intentionally or negligently caused. In support of this assertion, Appellant refers to one commentator who writes: [F]rom the perspective of the injured person, unless the tortious conduct of the uninsured or unidentified motorist was provoked by the injured person, the events and the injuries resulting from intentional acts are indistinguishable from those that result from negligent acts. In other words, when injuries are viewed from the vantage point of an injured person, the cause of the injuries is no less fortuitous than the situation in which a person is injured as a result of the negligent operation of an uninsured vehicle. .... Uninsured motorist insurance coverage terms should be structured and interpreted to implement the public's interest of fostering the public policy, manifested by the uninsured motorist statutes and financial responsibility legislation, of providing indemnification to innocent victims. Moreover, extending coverage for such occurrences almost certainly is in accord with the reasonable and, to the extent they exist for most insurance purchasers, actual expectations that the coverage will provide them with compensation in such cases. 1 Alan I. Widiss, Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Insurance § 10.2, at 512-13 (2d ed.1990) (footnote omitted). ¶ 21 Appellant acknowledges the cases cited by State Farm in its argument to the District Court where this Court upheld denials of insurance benefits to victims of intentional torts, but argues that these cases are distinguishable on two grounds. See McGehee, 219 Mont. at 306-08, 711 P.2d at 827-28 (affirming denial of general liability insurance benefits to victim of assault pursuant to the express language of the assailant's contract excluding from coverage injuries resulting from intentional acts of the insured); Burns v. Underwriters Adjusting Co. (1988), 234 Mont. 508, 510, 765 P.2d 712, 713 (affirming denial of general liability insurance benefits to victim of assault where contract contained nearly identical contract exclusion as that contained in McGehee ); New Hampshire Ins. Group v. Strecker (1990), 244 Mont. 478, 481-82, 798 P.2d 130, 132 (same result for victim of sexual molestation seeking benefits under general liability insurance contract with similar exclusion); Farmers Union Mut. Ins. v. Kienenberger (1993), 257 Mont. 107, 109, 847 P.2d 1360, 1361 (affirming denial of coverage under similar facts and policy language as Strecker ). ¶ 22 First, Appellant notes that the insurance contracts in the above cases expressly excluded from coverage intentional acts of the insured, whereas the UM provision sub judice contains no such exclusion and fails to otherwise define or clarify the term accident. Second, Appellant notes that while it was reasonable for the Court to premise its holding in the above cases on the public policy against indemnifying wrongdoers for their intentional torts, see McGehee, 219 Mont. at 308, 711 P.2d at 828, it is not reasonable to do so here. Appellant argues that in a case such as this, where the contract at issue is first party coverage and the insured is the innocent victim rather than the tortfeasor, the danger of a tortfeasor being indemnified for his wrongful act does not exist. Therefore, Appellant argues, the public policy consideration underlying the above decisions is inapplicable to the instant case. See Keeler v. Farmers and Merchants Ins. Co. (Mo.App.Ct.1987), 724 S.W.2d 307, 309-10; Redden v. Doe (La.App.Ct.1978), 357 So.2d 632, 633-34; Widiss, supra, at 513. Appellant adds that State Farm's subrogation against Morehead and his companions would defray any indirect benefit that State Farm claims would accrue to the men if Appellant recovers UM benefits. Moreover, Appellant points out that his assailants are being punished for their actions pursuant to penalties provided by the criminal code. ¶ 23 In response to Appellant's arguments, State Farm counters that we need not adopt a new or different definition for the term accident because the term is unambiguous. State Farm argues that we should reject the application of a subjective perspective to the term accident and instead apply the objective, common-sense, plain meaning to the term. State Farm views the common-sense, plain meaning of the term accident as encompassing only events that occur without intention or design, [t]hus, the perspective of the insured as opposed to the tortfeasor is not a relevant inquiry. Either an incident is an accident or it is not. Roller, 801 P.2d at 210. State Farm argues that it should be self-evident that accident does not encompass a criminal assault where, by definition, someone has acted intentionally. ¶ 24 Further, State Farm refutes Appellant's claims regarding the nature and purpose of UM coverage. Regarding the nature of UM coverage, State Farm cites McIntosh, 488 N.W.2d at 479, and argues that UM coverage is not true first party coverage, like health insurance or no-fault coverage. State Farm asserts that health insurance and no-fault coverage are true first party coverages because they are triggered solely upon the insured being harmed. State Farm argues that the focus of these coverages is on the insured. State Farm distinguishes these coverages from UM coverage, which is triggered solely upon a determination that the insured was harmed by an uninsured motorist. State Farm argues that, similar to liability coverage, the focus of UM coverage is on the uninsured motorist. ¶ 25 Regarding the purpose of UM coverage, State Farm argues that it is not to compensate innocent persons injured by uninsured motorists, but rather to provide a substitute liability policy which stands as proxy for that which the uninsured motorist chose not to carry. McIntosh, 488 N.W.2d at 478. State Farm adheres to the McIntosh view that uninsured motorist coverage more closely corresponds to security for tort liability than it does to basic reparation benefits. McIntosh, 488 N.W.2d at 479. In further support of its position, State Farm cites Sullivan v. Doe (1972), 159 Mont. 50, 60, 495 P.2d 193, 198, wherein this Court stated: The legislative purpose behind the enactment of ... uninsured motorist coverage is ... simply to place the injured policyholder in the same position he would have been if the uninsured motorist had liability insurance.... (Emphasis added.) Likewise, in Hubbel v. Western Fire Ins. Co. (1985), 218 Mont. 21, 25, 706 P.2d 111, 113, we stated: [U]ninsured motorist provisions should not be used to place the injured policyholder in a better position than he would be under the ordinary provisions of an existing insurance policy. (Emphasis added.) ¶ 26 State Farm argues that in a case such as the one at bar, where the tortfeasor was covered by legally adequate automobile liability insurance, but due to the tortfeasor's commission of an intentional tort he is deemed uninsured, recovery of damages under the injured victim's UM insurance would place the injured victim in a better position than he would be if recovery had been allowed under the tortfeasor's liability policy. State Farm notes that the Washington Supreme Court reached this same conclusion in the context of underinsured motorist coverage: [I]f McKay [the assailant] had carried automobile insurance, Roller would have received no coverage for the injuries he sustained because traditional [liability] policies do not cover intentional acts by the insured. We adopt this reasoning and conclude that to provide underinsured motorist coverage to Roller would effectively place him in a better position than he would have been in if McKay had adequate liability insurance coverage. Roller, 801 P.2d at 210. ¶ 27 State Farm also criticizes Appellant's assertion that the public policy against indemnifying tortfeasors for their wrongful acts is inapplicable to UM coverage. State Farm argues that if UM coverage is extended to victims of criminal assault, the assailants are indirectly receiving insurance coverage and are not paying for the victim's damages. State Farm argues that regardless of the type of insurance under which a victim recovers, the consequences of the assailants' acts are still muted. State Farm further argues that it is prevented from subrogating against the assailants in this case because, pursuant to Continental Ins. Co. v. Bottomly (1991), 250 Mont. 66, 70, 817 P.2d 1162, 1165, an insurer may not subrogate against its own insured. ¶ 28 Finally, State Farm refutes Appellant's claim that applying a subjective standard to the term accident comports with the reasonable expectations of the insured. State Farm quotes McIntosh, 488 N.W.2d at 479, wherein the Minnesota Supreme Court stated: Indeed, we do not think those who pay premiums into a pool for uninsured motorist coverage reasonably expect those funds to be available to pay compensation for injuries for which, if the uninsured motorist were insured, his insurance company would not have to pay. Similarly, State Farm argues that the average insured does not reasonably expect that UM coverage equates to general crime insurance. ¶ 29 Upon consideration of the parties' arguments and authorities, we conclude that the term accident is ambiguous because it is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation. See Holeman, ¶ 25. In drawing this conclusion, we find compelling the facts that neither the statute nor the UM provision at issue defines accident or excludes from coverage injuries caused by intentional, as opposed to negligent, acts of the uninsured motorist. There exists no legislative history from which to ascertain whether the Montana Legislature, in enacting the UM statute, intended to exclude from coverage injuries caused by intentional acts of the uninsured motorist. In interpreting a statute, this Court can neither insert what has been omitted or omit what has been inserted. Section 1-2-101, MCA. The fact that courts are split as to the meaning of accident further confirms our belief that the term is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation. ¶ 30 Like the majority of jurisdictions which have considered the meaning of accident, we believe that, when viewed from the standpoint of the insured victim, an injury-producing incident is no less fortuitous simply because the tortfeasor acted intentionally. Like many courts espousing the majority view, we are persuaded by the reasoning articulated in Celina Mut. Ins. Co. v. Saylor (1973), 35 Ohio Misc. 81, 301 N.E.2d 721, 723, wherein the court stated: [In this case] we deal with the subject of uninsured motorists coverage. The[insureds] have paid the insurance premiums and have consciously contracted with the [insurer] for protection. The intent in the mind of the insured at the time of injury should determine whether the acts are accidental or intentional. To look through the eyes of the uninsured rather than the insured in this factual situation would require an unconscionable twisting of the obvious purpose of purchasing insurance coverage. All reason and logic would require a construction and interpretation that intent of mind should be taken from the viewpoint of the insured. Since the insured in the instant case was clearly not acting intentionally to warn herself, since the [insured] in the instant case was the party privy to the insurance contract; since the [insured] herein is the party who paid the premium for coverage to protect herself from the risk of injury caused by an uninsured third person it is the court's belief that the provisions of the insurance policy must be construed most favorably from the insured's viewpoint. ¶ 31 We reject State Farm's argument that there exists an all-encompassing definition of accident suitable for all purposes, and that accident includes only events that occur without intention or design. On this point, we find State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. McMillan (Colo.1996), 925 P.2d 785, particularly instructive. In McMillan, the victim of a criminal assault made a claim for UM benefits with her insurer, State Farm. State Farm argued that because the tortfeasor acted intentionally, the victim's injuries were not caused by an accident within the meaning of the UM provision. In rejecting this argument, the Colorado Supreme Court noted: [A]pplication of State Farm's theory of uninsured motorist coverage would lead to absurd and unintended results. State Farm's argument is that only negligent, as opposed to intentional, acts of a tortfeasor are covered under the policy. During oral argument, State Farm conceded that in accordance with its position, if the car driven by an insured was struck by the car of an uninsured motorist who deliberately ignored a traffic signal and drove through a stop sign, the insured would not be covered under the policy because the resulting collision would not be an accident. We cannot countenance such an unreasonable result. McMillan, 925 P.2d at 794 n. 12. We agree with the Colorado Supreme Court that defining accident in such a way as to include only negligent acts, or events which occur without intention or design, would lead to absurd results and undermine the purpose of UM coverage. ¶ 32 In the course of arguing the meaning of accident, both parties engage in unyielding debate over the nature and purpose of UM coverage, the reasonable expectations of the insured, and whether the public policy against indemnifying tortfeasors for their intentional acts is applicable in the context of UM coverage. We will discuss these topics to the extent they are germane to whether the term accident is ambiguous. ¶ 33 The major premise underlying State Farm's argument that accident should not include intentional acts is that UM coverage more closely resembles liability insurance than accident or reparation insurance. State Farm argues that UM coverage was intended to be a substitute for the liability policy that the uninsured motorist chose not to carry, McIntosh, 488 N.W.2d at 478, and was designed to put the injured policyholder in the same position he would have been if the uninsured motorist had liability insurance. Sullivan, 159 Mont. at 60, 495 P.2d at 198; see also Hubbel, 218 Mont. at 25, 706 P.2d at 113. Applying these principles to the instant case, State Farm argues that allowing Appellant to recover UM coverage, when he could not recover under the tortfeasor's liability policy, effectively places him in a better position and, therefore, contravenes the purpose of UM coverage. We cannot agree with State Farm's analysis because Sullivan and Hubbel are both distinguishable from the instant case. Moreover, a closer reading of Sullivan reveals that it is inapposite to the position advanced by State Farm. ¶ 34 In Sullivan, a passenger police officer was injured when the vehicle in which he was riding collided with an unidentified motorist. The question before the Court concerned the validity of an express provision of the passenger's policy requiring any recovery of UM benefits to be offset by recovery of worker's compensation benefits. We held the provision invalid because it was at variance with the purpose of UM coverage. Sullivan, 159 Mont. at 60-61, 495 P.2d at 198-99. It is significant that in describing the purpose of UM coverage, this Court stated that it was both to provide protection for the... policyholder against the risk of inadequate compensation for injuries or death caused by the negligence of financially irresponsible motorists, and to place the injured policyholder in the same position he would have been if the uninsured motorist had liability insurance. Sullivan, 159 Mont. at 60, 495 P.2d at 198. We infer from the Court's reasoning and invalidation of the off-set provision that the Court did not believe that the passenger's recovery of UM benefits, in addition to worker's compensation benefits, placed him in a better position. We fail to see how Sullivan supports State Farm's argument. ¶ 35 In Hubbel, two co-partners of an oil business, Hubbel and Pearson, who were covered by worker's compensation insurance, were killed in an automobile collision. The issue was whether the spouse of Hubbel was entitled to UM benefits under Mr. Pearson's insurance policy in addition to worker's compensation benefits. This Court answered the question in the negative, concluding that Pearson was not an uninsured motorist within the meaning of the UM provision. Hubbel, 218 Mont. at 25-26, 706 P.2d at 113-14. The Court noted that, due to the exclusivity provision of the Worker's Compensation Act, Mrs. Hubbel's exclusive remedy was worker's compensation benefits and Mr. Pearson's estate was immune to any cause of action by Mrs. Hubbel. Hubbel, 218 Mont. at 25, 706 P.2d at 112. The Court further commented that the insurance company was placed in a catch-22 by the situation of Mr. Pearson carrying adequate auto insurance, yet being deemed uninsured simply because of the insurance company's refusal to provide coverage due to the exclusivity provision of the Worker's Compensation Act. Hubbel, 218 Mont. at 25, 706 P.2d at 113. Citing Sullivan, the Court reasoned that allowing Mrs. Hubbel recovery of both worker's compensation benefits and UM benefits would place her in a better position than if she recovered only worker's compensation benefits and, thus, would be contrary to the intent of the legislature in enacting the UM statute. Hubbel, 218 Mont. at 25-26, 706 P.2d at 113-14. Based on these considerations, the Court determined that Mr. Pearson was not an uninsured motorist within the meaning of the policy. ¶ 36 Hubbel is distinguishable from the instant case. In Hubbel, the Court was faced with two possible sources of compensation for Mrs. Hubbel, worker's compensation benefits and UM benefits, and an exclusivity provision that made one yield to the other. These factors are not present in the instant case. Here, Appellant cannot collect under the tortfeasor's liability policy and, thus, has only one source of compensation, UM benefits. We fail to see how Appellant's recovery of UM benefits would place him in a better position. Rather, he would be receiving the same compensation he would have received had he been entitled to recover under the tortfeasor's liability policy. ¶ 37 Aside from being distinguishable, we note that the reasoning of the majority opinion in Hubbel stands on shaky ground. In a dissenting opinion to Hubbel, Justice Sheehy commented that the majority was uninstructed by Sullivan, and essentially turned Sullivan on its head by ignoring the legislative policy to provide UM coverage which we have heretofore strongly supported. Hubbel, 218 Mont. at 27-29, 706 P.2d at 115. Justice Sheehy further commented: The basic fault in the reasoning of the majority ... is they have regarded the interpretation of the Worker's Compensation Act and the Uninsured Motorist Coverage Act from the viewpoint of the insurer, and not from the viewpoint of the claimant. To State Farm, Pearson is not uninsured because its policy does provide liability coverage to him. To the Hubbel claimants, however, Pearson is uninsured because, through a legal technicality, ... the Hubbel heirs cannot obtain a judgment against Pearson which could be satisfied under the liability portion of the State Farm policy. If State Farm is caught in a catch-22, then the Hubbel heirs are caught in a catch-44, a double whammy. State Farm gets to keep the money for which it collected a premium; the Hubbel heirs do not get to collect anything under the uninsured motorist coverage. Hubbel, 218 Mont. at 29, 706 P.2d at 115-16. ¶ 38 Based on the weaknesses in its arguments, we reject State Farm's position that UM coverage more closely resembles liability coverage than accident or reparation coverage, and that Appellant would be placed in a better position by recovery of UM benefits in contravention of the purpose of UM coverage. ¶ 39 Regarding the next topic, the reasonable expectations of the insured, we agree with Appellant's analysis. We believe the average insured reasonably expects that, so long as an injury-causing event is unforeseen and unprovoked by the insured, injuries caused by uninsured motorists will be covered by UM coverage regardless of whether they were caused negligently or intentionally. State Farm's argument, that the average insured does not reasonably expect UM coverage to be general crime insurance, is disingenuous in light of the limited scope of our discussion in this first section of the opinion. Here, we are only discussing whether accident should be viewed from the insured victim's perspective. It is illogical to assume that viewing accident from the standpoint of the insured victim would make UM coverage equivalent to general crime insurance. It appears State Farm's remark is more directed to the second section of this opinion which addresses the remoteness question: what degree of causal connection must exist between the accident and the tortfeasors' use of the uninsured vehicle in order for the accident to have arisen out of the operation, maintenance or use of the vehicle? We believe the arising out of the use element is the most formidable obstacle to a victim's recovery of UM coverage. Once a court has been persuaded that a victim's injuries arose out of the use of an uninsured vehicle, it should have little difficulty accepting the notion that intentional torts may be accidents and that permitting victims of intentional torts to recover UM benefits does not equate to general crime insurance. ¶ 40 Regarding the last topic, whether the public policy against indemnifying tortfeasors for their own intentional torts is applicable in the context of UM coverage, we agree with Appellant's analysis. Under UM coverage, the victim of the intentional tort is the insured and the possibility of tortfeasors being indemnified does not exist. Thus, the public policy against indemnifying tortfeasors for their intentional torts, a policy which serves the purpose of punishment and deterrence, is inapplicable in the context of UM coverage. We disagree with State Farm that Continental Ins. Co. v. Bottomly (1991), 250 Mont. 66, 817 P.2d 1162, precludes subrogation against the tortfeasors in this case. Bottomly only precludes subrogation by an insurer against its insured under a policy that the insurer has with the insured. See Bottomly, 250 Mont. at 69-70, 817 P.2d at 1164-65. Here, if Appellant recovered UM benefits, the policy under which State Farm would have a right of subrogation is the one issued to Appellant. Thus, State Farm could subrogate against the tortfeasors because they would be third parties. ¶ 41 Having determined that the term accident is ambiguous, we hold that an intentional act may be an accident for purposes of UM coverage. Absent contract language to the contrary, whether an accident has occurred must be viewed from the standpoint of the insured. Not only are we obligated to hold this way, pursuant to the rule that ambiguities in an insurance contract must be construed in favor of the insured, Holeman, ¶ 25, but we believe our holding is the better-reasoned rule as it is in keeping with the nature and purpose of UM coverage and the reasonable expectations of the insured. The facts are undisputed that Appellant neither provoked, intended, or expected the injuries inflicted by Morehead and his companions. Applying our holding today, it follows that the intentional assault on Appellant was an accident for purposes of UM coverage.