Opinion ID: 1433861
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Refusal to Excuse Jurors for Cause

Text: The trial court granted only some of defendant's numerous challenges for cause. He now contends the court erroneously failed to excuse five prospective jurors who eventually heard the case. As noted, the defense had exercised only four of its twenty peremptory challenges when it indicated no further objection to the jury as constituted. `It has long been the rule in California that exhaustion of peremptory challenges is a condition precedent to an appeal based on the composition of the jury. [Citation.]' ( People v. Coleman (1988) 46 Cal.3d 749, 770, 251 Cal.Rptr. 83, 759 P.2d 1260.) Defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury is not compromised as long [as] he could have secured the juror's removal through the exercise of a peremptory challenge. ( People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 480, 48 Cal. Rptr.2d 525, 907 P.2d 373; cf. Ross v. Oklahoma (1988) 487 U.S. 81, 85-88, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 2276-2278, 101 L.Ed.2d 80.) Accordingly, California courts hold that the defendant must exercise his peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors who should have been excluded for cause, and that to complain on appeal of the composition of the jury, the defendant must have exhausted those challenges. [Citation.] ( People v. Coleman, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 770, 251 Cal.Rptr. 83, 759 P.2d 1260; People v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 904-905, 8 Cal. Rptr.2d 678, 830 P.2d 712.) Defendant did not do so; he may not now claim error. Acknowledging these principles, but citing dictum in People v. Lucas, supra, 12 Cal.4th at page 481, footnote 13, 48 Cal. Rptr.2d 525, 907 P.2d 373, defendant argues alternatively that the trial court had a sua sponte duty to excuse biased jurors when counsel failed to do so. Whatever the language in Lucas may imply, this court has never imposed on the trial court an independent, affirmative obligation to excuse a prospective juror notwithstanding counsel's failure to exercise a peremptory challenge for that purpose. The decisional and statutory authorities cited do not support that proposition. (See former Code Civ. Proc., ง 223, enacted by Stats.1988, ch. 1245, ง 2, p. 4148 and repealed by initiative measure, Prop. 115 ง 6, passed by voters at Primary Elec. (June 5, 1990); former Pen.Code, ง 1078, enacted 1872 and repealed by Stats.1988, ch. 1245, ง 36, p. 4155; People v. Mattson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 826, 845, 268 Cal.Rptr. 802, 789 P.2d 983; Morgan v. Illinois (1992) 504 U.S. 719, 729-730, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 2229-2230, 119 L.Ed.2d 492.) [2] While the authority to control voir dire includes the power to excuse prospective jurors for cause (see People v. Jiminez (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1611, 1621, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 268, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Kobrin (1995) 11 Cal.4th 416, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 895, 903 P.2d 1027), it does not impose a sua sponte duty to do so. We thus decline to excuse defendant's failure to preserve this issue for review. (See People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 413, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 301,916 P.2d 1000.) We also reject defendant's passing suggestion that defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to utilize all available peremptory challenges. [T]he decision whether to accept a jury as constituted is obviously tactical, and nothing on the appellate record demonstrates counsel's tactical choice here was either unreasonable or prejudicial. ( People v. Lucas, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 480, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525, 907 P.2d 373.) We have reviewed the voir dire of the jurors in question. Whether or not they had been exposed to any pretrial publicity, including viewing America's Most Wanted, each gave credible assurances he or she would decide the case based only on what transpired in the courtroom.