Opinion ID: 2575864
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Defendant contends that the evidence presented at the guilt phase was insufficient to establish the premeditation element of first degree murder, the lying-in-wait special circumstance, and the conspiracy conviction, and he asserts that basing a conviction or special circumstance finding on insufficient evidence violates his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution to due process of law, a fair trial, and reliable verdicts in a capital case. To determine the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, an appellate court reviews the entire record in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether it contains evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value, from which a rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1128, 113 Cal. Rptr.2d 27, 33 P.3d 450; accord, People v. Silva, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 368, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 93, 21 P.3d 769.) A murder that is premeditated and deliberate is murder of the first degree. (§ 189.) In this context, `premeditated' means `considered beforehand,' and `deliberate' means `formed or arrived at or determined upon as a result of careful thought and weighing of considerations for and against the proposed course of action.' ( People v. Mayfield, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 767, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 928 P.2d 485.) An intentional killing is premeditated and deliberate if it occurred as the result of preexisting thought and reflection rather than unconsidered or rash impulse. ( People v. Stitely, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 543, 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 108 P.3d 182.) A reviewing court normally considers three kinds of evidence to determine whether a finding of premeditation and deliberation is adequately supported preexisting motive, planning activity, and manner of killingbut [t]hese factors need not be present in any particular combination to find substantial evidence of premeditation and deliberation. ( Ibid. ; see also People v. Combs, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 850, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 61, 101 P.3d 1007; People v. Silva, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 368, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 93, 21 P.3d 769.) The evidence of preexisting motive was ample. During the days before Holloway's murder, defendant had talked to Brian Johnsen and Denise Shigemura about whether they should kill Doug Mynatt, but they had decided not to tell Teresa Holloway about this because of concern that she would reveal it to the police. On the night of the murder, defendant told Johnsen that he had decided to proceed with the plan to kill Mynatt and that it could not wait until Johnsen was released from jail. Teresa Holloway then got on the phone and asked Johnsen whether there was a plan to kill Mynatt. From this evidence, a rational juror could infer that defendant had a motive to kill Holloway, to prevent her from revealing his planned killing of Mynatt. The evidence of planning activity was ample as well. Shortly before the murder, defendant asked Mark Schmidt for a chain. When Schmidt offered defendant an 18-inch length of plastic weed-eater cord, defendant wrapped the cord around his own neck, with one end in each fist clenched at shoulder height, and said: It will do. From these actions, a rational juror could infer that defendant had already decided to use the cord to strangle Holloway. Defendant then asked Schmidt to tell Teresa Holloway to get off the phone because he (Schmidt) needed to leave the apartment. A rational juror could infer that defendant made this request so that Holloway would be forced to leave Schmidt's apartment and then could be lured into Anna Humiston's car, where the fatal attack would take place. In the car, defendant positioned himself directly behind Holloway. A rational juror could infer that defendant did so to facilitate his planned strangulation of Holloway. Because this evidence of preexisting motive and planning activity was by itself sufficient to support the first degree murder conviction on a theory of premeditation and deliberation, we need not review the evidence concerning the manner of killing. The lying-in-wait special circumstance requires proof of an intentional murder, committed under circumstances which include (1) a concealment of purpose, (2) a substantial period of watching and waiting for an opportune time to act, and (3) immediately thereafter, a surprise attack on an unsuspecting victim from a position of advantage. ( People v. Morales (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 557, 257 Cal.Rptr. 64, 770 P.2d 244; accord, People v. Combs, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 853, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 61, 101 P.3d 1007; People v. Michaels, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 516, 122 Cal. Rptr.2d 285, 49 P.3d 1032.) There is sufficient evidence that defendant concealed from Holloway his purpose to kill her. As explained earlier, there is substantial evidence from which a rational juror could infer that defendant had already formed this purpose when he obtained a cord from Mark Schmidt that could be used to strangle Holloway. He did not reveal that purpose to Holloway immediately by attacking her, but instead lured her into Humiston's car. There is sufficient evidence of a substantial period of watching and waiting for an opportune time to act. The place where Teresa Holloway's body was found was two to three miles from Mark Schmidt's apartment. A rational juror could infer that defendant did not attack Holloway immediately after luring her into Humiston's car, but instead waited for a substantial period while the car was driven to a location where there was little risk that the attack would be observed by other motorists or by pedestrians. Finally, there is substantial evidence that once the car reached a suitable location, defendant immediately launched a surprise attack on an unsuspecting victim from a position of advantage. Defendant ensured a position of advantage by occupying the back seat of Humiston's car, directly behind Teresa Holloway. From the blood evidence found in the car, the very nature of the planned attack, and the lack of injury to defendant, Humiston, or Shigemura, a rational juror could infer that Holloway was taken by surprise, with little or no opportunity to escape or fight back. In concluding that the evidence is sufficient to support the lying-in-wait special circumstance, we are guided by this court's decisions in People v. Combs, supra, 34 Cal.4th 821, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 61, 101 P.3d 1007, and People v. Morales, supra, 48 Cal.3d 527, 257 Cal.Rptr. 64, 770 P.2d 244, which involved nearly identical facts. In Combs and Morales, as here, the defendant armed himself with a weapon suitable for use in strangulation, lured an unsuspecting victim into the front seat of an automobile, positioned himself directly behind the victim, waited until the car reached a suitable location, and then launched a surprise attack on the unsuspecting victim. ( People v. Combs, supra, at p. 853, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 61, 101 P.3d 1007; People v. Morales, supra, at p. 554, 257 Cal.Rptr. 64, 770 P.2d 244.) In Morales, as here, the defendant bludgeoned the victim to death after an initial attempt at strangulation was unsuccessful. ( People v. Morales, supra, at p. 554, 257 Cal.Rptr. 64, 770 P.2d 244.) We consider next defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conspiracy conviction. A conviction of conspiracy requires proof that the defendant and another person had the specific intent to agree or conspire to commit an offense, as well as the specific intent to commit the elements of that offense, together with proof of the commission of an overt act `by one or more of the parties to such agreement' in furtherance of the conspiracy. ( People v. Morante (1999) 20 Cal.4th 403, 416, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 665, 975 P.2d 1071; accord, People v. Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1131, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 436, 25 P.3d 641.) Disagreement as to who the coconspirators were or who did an overt act, or exactly what that act was, does not invalidate a conspiracy conviction, as long as a unanimous jury is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that a conspirator did commit some overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. ( People v. Russo, supra, at p. 1135, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 436, 25 P.3d 641.) Here, defendant's plan to attack and kill Teresa Holloway in Anna Humiston's car required the cooperation of Humiston and Denise Shigemura. There is ample evidence that one or both of them did agree or conspire to commit the murder. Shigemura shared defendant's motive to kill Holloway, because she also had been part of the plot to kill Doug Mynatt and, like defendant, would be put at risk if Holloway revealed that plot. Although there is no direct evidence that defendant and Shigemura discussed in advance the killing of Holloway, there was evidence that they were alone together at Mark Schmidt's residence shortly before the killing, during which a discussion and agreement could have taken place. Shigemura's later conduct provided additional evidence that she agreed to the murder. She was driving Humiston's car at the time of the fatal attack, she did not separate herself from defendant or report the killing afterward, and with defendant's help she concocted a false story to explain why, on the night of Holloway's murder, she failed to return to the halfway house where she was then required to live. As for Humiston, there was evidence that defendant engaged in an intense conversation with her at Schmidt's residence, that she allowed Shigemura to drive her car, and that she did not report the murder afterward and continued to associate with defendant. From this evidence, a rational juror could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant and either Shigemura or Humiston (or both) had the specific intent to agree or conspire to murder Holloway, as well as the specific intent to commit the elements of murder. The overt act requirement was also satisfied. The prosecution alleged five overt acts in support of the conspiracy charge. Two alleged overt acts occurred before Holloway's murder (defendant, Denise Shigemura, and Anna Humiston met with Teresa Holloway at Mark Schmidt's residence and defendant, Shigemura, Humiston, and Holloway left Schmidt's residence in Humiston's car); two alleged acts occurred after the murder (defendant, Shigemura, and Humiston placed Holloway's body in the culvert and walked to a nearby phone from which defendant called to request a ride); and one alleged act was the murder itself. The jury returned not true findings on the preoffense overt acts allegations, but it found each of the other overt act allegations to be true. Commission of the target offense in furtherance of the conspiracy satisfies the overt act requirement. ( People v. Padilla (1995) 11 Cal.4th 891, 966, 47 Cal. Rptr.2d 426, 906 P.2d 388.) Because the jury found that defendant committed the murder itself in furtherance of the conspiracy, and because substantial evidence supports that finding, the overt act requirement is satisfied. Although defendant is correct that the overt act requirement may not be satisfied by conduct occurring after the target offense is complete ( People v. Zamora (1976) 18 Cal.3d 538, 560, 134 Cal.Rptr. 784, 557 P.2d 75), defendant was not prejudiced by the jury's consideration of the invalid postoffense overt act allegations, and the valid finding of a single overt act is sufficient to support the conspiracy verdict. ( People v. Padilla, supra, at pp. 965-966, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 426, 906 P.2d 388.) Defendant argues that the jury's not true findings on the preoffense overt act allegations conclusively demonstrate the jury's rejection of the prosecution's theory that defendant had agreed with Shigemura or Humiston (or both) to kill Holloway before Holloway was lured into Humiston's car, and that this inconsistency fatally undermines the conspiracy verdict. We disagree. An inconsistency between a not true finding on an overt act and a verdict or another finding is not a ground for overturning the inconsistent verdict or finding. ( People v. Hernandez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 835, 862, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 602, 69 P.3d 446; see People v. Santamaria (1994) 8 Cal.4th 903, 911, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 624, 884 P.2d 81 [recognizing that an apparently inconsistent not true finding may be the result of mistake, compromise, or lenity].)