Opinion ID: 194964
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: an officer and a gentleman

Text: 7 Appellant, who remains a colonel in the ANG, argues strenuously that, for purposes of this case, his civilian status may be disentangled from his military status, and that he should be free to sue for discrimination implicating the former. But this balkanization of technicians' work is belied by Congress's description of the functions that ANG technicians serve, by the unmistakable intendment of the Technician Act (the statute that Congress enacted in 1968 to regulate such personnel), and by the resulting ties that bind technicians' civilian and military roles. 8 The Technician Act makes technicians eligible for military employment benefits and, in so doing, seeks to improve national security by facilitating the recruitment of qualified individuals. SeeAmerican Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. FLRA, 730 F.2d 1534, 1542-47 (D.C.Cir.1984) (analyzing legislative history). The Act provides in relevant part that persons may be employed as technicians only [u]nder regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the [relevant military branch].... 32 U.S.C. Sec. 709(a). Each such technician shall, while so employed, be a member of the National Guard and hold the military grade specified by the Secretary concerned for that position. 32 U.S.C. Sec. 709(b). In substance, then, the Technician Act evidences Congress's intention that technicians, while retaining their positions as civil employees outside the competitive civil service, will serve simultaneously as employees of the appropriate military department, subject to its regulation. 9 It is axiomatic that the National Guard is military in character. See H.R.Rep. No. 1823, 90th Cong.2d Sess., reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3318, 3319 (recognizing the military characteristics of the National Guard). We think it follows that technicians are martial in character. Indeed, under the Technician Act's composite regime, technicians are considerably more than nominal members of the military establishment. In referring to the National Guard's mission, Congress termed it essential as a matter of military policy that the strength and organization of the [National Guard] as an integral part of the first line defenses of the United States be maintained and assured at all times. 32 U.S.C. Sec. 102. Because National Guard technicians serve as the Guard's support staff and are, in fact, those whose job it is to maintain and assure the Guard's strength and organization, they are indispensable to this nation's defense. See, e.g., 32 U.S.C. Sec. 709(a) (assigning to technicians such distinctively military tasks as (1) the administration and training of the National Guard; and (2) the maintenance and repair of supplies issued to the National Guard or the armed forces). Nor do technicians merely perform tasks that have a military ring to them; the record reflects that fully one-half of appellant's outfit, the 101st Air Refueling Wing, served in Operation Desert Storm or Desert Shield. 10 Given this mise-en-scene, it is unsurprising that, no matter the context, every court having occasion closely to consider the capacity of National Guard technicians has determined that capacity to be irreducibly military in nature. See, e.g.,Stauber v. Cline, 837 F.2d 395, 399 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 817, 109 S.Ct. 55, 102 L.Ed.2d 33 (1988); Illinois Nat'l Guard v. FLRA, 854 F.2d 1396, 1398 (D.C.Cir.1988); American Fed'n, 730 F.2d at 1545-46; New Jersey Air Nat'l Guard v. FLRA, 677 F.2d 276, 279 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988, 103 S.Ct. 343, 74 L.Ed.2d 384 (1982); Nesmith v. Fulton, 615 F.2d 196, 200-01 (5th Cir.1980). We, too, conclude that, since National Guard technicians' positions are encompassed within a military organization and require the performance of work directly related to national defense, such positions are themselves military in nature. 11 Appellant strives valiantly to elude the grasp of this logic. He says that his situation is different; it falls outside the mine run of previous cases because he was ousted from his civilian employment without being terminated from his military post. This asseveration cannot withstand scrutiny. 12 For one thing, appellant mischaracterizes his own situation: though he retains his commission as a colonel in the ANG, the injury of which he complains has had repercussions beyond the loss of his civilian mantle. He also has been dismissed from the post of deputy commander for maintenance--a post which he admits is military in nature. For another thing, appellant's self-portrait, even as he has painted it, is not an original. In Nesmith, for example, the plaintiff lost his civilian post prior to the eventual loss of his military post. Nesmith, 615 F.2d at 197. The court took care to analyze the initial dismissal independently, yet reached the same conclusion as other courts that have considered the question: an ANG technician's two identities are not scissile. Seeid. at 201; see alsoStauber, 837 F.2d at 399 (holding that an injury occurring in the course of plaintiff's civilian employment as an ANG technician arose incident to military service); cf. New Jersey Air Nat'l Guard, 677 F.2d at 279 (holding that the Technician Act grants adjutants general final discretion relating to discipline and discharge of ANG technicians). 13 We rule, therefore, that while a technician's job is a composite, containing both civilian and military pieces, the job's dual aspects are inseparable; they are, like Chang and Eng, joined at the chest. And from the fact that the technician's several roles are inextricably intertwined, it follows that the adverse employment action against which appellant inveighs necessarily implicates his military as well as his civilian status. In other words, Colonel Wright, for present purposes, is both an officer and a gentleman.