Opinion ID: 492376
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Consider Pre-Sentence Report

Text: 19 Romano also claims that Judge Carter failed adequately to consider the pre-sentence report in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(c). The report, according to Romano, contained favorable material which should not have been discredited. A fair reading of the transcript, however, reveals that Judge Carter merely disclaimed reliance on the disputed portions of the report rather than the report in its entirety, even though Romano's counsel at sentencing termed the report totally inaccurate and its reliability highly questionable. See App. at 88. 20 Prior to Romano's comments at the sentencing hearing, Judge Carter entertained comments from Paradiso regarding his own pre-sentence report. Paradiso complained that various portions of the report were inaccurate. To this Judge Carter replied, [w]ell, I'll be fair enough to say that I'm not going to consider any of the specifics that you've mentioned. App. at 82. He went on to state: I read all the material--but generally, my intent is to consider only the information that relates to the specific matter before me. Id. at 83. Judge Carter's statements leave no doubt that he disclaimed reliance on only the disputed portions of Paradiso's report, while considering all other material that was relevant to the crime for which Paradiso stood convicted. 21 Following Paradiso's objections, counsel for Romano made similar objections to his pre-sentence report. Judge Carter likewise replied [a]gain, the matter that I'm considering with Mr. Romano is what I have learned at this trial in regard to his participation in this crime. App. at 92-93. When read in context with Judge Carter's prior statements concerning Paradiso's attempt to itemize disputed portions of his report, it seems clear that Judge Carter responded in like fashion to Romano's comments, i.e., that he would not consider disputed portions but would consider all undisputed, relevant information. The record, therefore, does not support Romano's claim that his pre-sentence report was entirely discredited by Judge Carter. 22 Rule 32(c)(3)(D)(ii) provides that a district judge may disclaim reliance on disputed portions of a pre-sentence report. When a district judge determines that the disputed matter will not be taken into account at sentencing, no factual findings concerning the alleged inaccuracies are required. Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(c)(3)(D)(ii); United States v. Bradley, 812 F.2d 774, 782 (2d Cir.1987); United States v. Ursillo, 786 F.2d 66, 68-69 (2d Cir.1986); United States v. Navaro, 774 F.2d 565, 566 (2d Cir.1985) (per curiam); United States v. Charmer Industries, Inc., 711 F.2d 1164, 1172 (2d Cir.1983). In Navaro, we held that a district judge fully complied with Rule 32 by stating that he  'did not consider [the] alleged inaccuracies'  in determining sentence. 774 F.2d at 566 (quoting district court). Similarly, we deem Judge Carter's statement that he would consider only evidence of Romano's participation in the conspiracy sufficient to satisfy Rule 32. Contrary to Romano's claim, this is not a case where the district court simply ignored the pre-sentence report. Therefore, no findings regarding the disputed portions of the pre-sentence report were required and no error was committed by the district court.