Opinion ID: 409481
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Order to State Officials

Text: 5 As the district court recognized, appellees are entitled to attorney's fees as the prevailing parties under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. In Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978), the Supreme Court held that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar an attorney's fee award against a state under that statute. In particular, the Court concluded that in enacting section 1988, Congress intended to invoke its enforcement power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to remove the states' protection under the Eleventh Amendment. 437 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. at 2575; see also Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 132, 100 S.Ct. 2570, 2576, 65 L.Ed.2d 653 (1980). The Court also concluded that such an award was appropriately directed against the State even though the State or one of its departments was not named as a party, since the plaintiffs' suit was for all practical purposes, (brought) against the State itself. 437 U.S. at 700, 98 S.Ct. at 2578. 6 The Attorney General of California, who has represented appellant Cory throughout this proceeding, generally recognizes the impact of Hutto v. Finney. 2 However, he argues that appellees' exclusive means of enforcing the award is through a writ of execution pursuant to Rule 69 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore he concludes that the court acted improperly in invoking its equitable authority under Rule 70 to attempt to enforce the judgment. 7 Ordinarily, the equitable remedies provided under Rule 70 are not appropriate in enforcing a monetary judgment. See Gabovitch v. Lundy, 584 F.2d 559, 560 n.1 (1st Cir. 1978); 7 J. Moore, Federal Practice P 69.03(2) (2d ed. 1978). However, under the extraordinary circumstances here where the judgment is against a state, which refuses to appropriate funds through the normal process provided by state law, the district court should not necessarily be reduced to satisfying a judgment through the cumbersome procedure of attempting to execute against state property or bank accounts. 3 It may, instead, pursue any remedy provided in Rule 69 or Rule 70 to enforce the award, including ordering state officials to pay the claim. 8 The legislative history of section 1988 supports this conclusion. The Senate Report on section 1988 states that the award should be collected either directly from the official, from funds of his agency or under his control, or from the state or local government. S.Rep.No.1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 reprinted in 1976 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 5908, 5913. There is no suggestion in the report that a writ of execution is the only means of enforcing the award. Accordingly, those courts which have addressed this issue under circumstances similar to those involved here have specifically held that a district court may invoke its equitable authority under Rule 70 to enforce an attorney's fee award under section 1988 against the state. See Gary W. v. Louisana, 622 F.2d 804, 806-07 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 994, 101 S.Ct. 1695, 68 L.Ed.2d 193 (1981); Gates v. Collier, 616 F.2d 1268, 1271 (5th Cir. 1980); see also Gilbert v. Johnson, 490 F.2d 827, 829 (5th Cir. 1970) (approving use of Rule 70 to enforce back pay award against the Veterans Administration.) 9 The Attorney General contends also that the order here is improper because it compels the Controller to act in violation of State law. The California Constitution provides that money may be drawn from the Treasury only through an appropriation made by law. Cal.Const. Art. XVI, § 7 (West 1982). Section 4.5 of the 1980-81 California State Budget Act states that no funds appropriated by the Act may be used to pay an attorney's fee award unless the award is specifically authorized and set forth in an item or section of this act or ... expressly authorized by a statutory provision other than Section 1021.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 1980 Cal.Stat. ch. 510, § 4.5. Finally, section 12440 of the California Government Code (West 1980) prohibits the Controller from drawing warrants on the treasury unless authorized by law, and unless unexhausted specific appropriations provided by law are available to meet it. The Attorney General therefore concludes that since the legislature here specifically refused to pass the appropriation for the attorney's fees award, as required by the 1980 Budget Act, section 12440 prohibits the Controller from complying with the district court's order by issuing a warrant without violating State law. 10 The Attorney General's argument represents a delicately wrought chain of apparent logic that leads to an ineluctably wrong conclusion. Gary W. v. Louisiana, 441 F.Supp. 1121, 1125 (E.D.La.1977), aff'd., 622 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1980). Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, a court, in enforcing federal law, may order state officials to take actions despite contravening state laws. Thus in Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Association, 443 U.S. 658, 99 S.Ct. 3055, 61 L.Ed.2d 823 (1979), this court had affirmed a district court order directing the Washington State Department of Fisheries to adopt regulations protecting Indian fishing rights. In a parallel State proceeding, the Washington Supreme Court had held that the Fisheries Department had no authority under State law to take the steps directed by the district court. Therefore the Washington Court concluded that the order was void since the federal court did not have the power to order state officials to do any act which they were not authorized to do by laws of the state from which they derive their power. Puget Sound Gillnetters Association v. Moos, 88 Wash.2d 677, 684, 565 P.2d 1151, 1155 (1977). 11 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in both the State and federal court proceedings, affirming this court's decision and vacating the decision of the Washington Supreme Court. The Court specifically rejected the State court's conclusion regarding the State officials' capacity to act under State law: 12 State-law prohibition against compliance with the District Court's decree cannot survive the command of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (78 S.Ct. 1401, 3 L.Ed.2d 5); Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506 (16 L.Ed. 169). It is also clear that Game and Fisheries, as parties to this litigation, may be ordered to prepare a set of rules that will implement the Court's interpretation of the rights of the parties even if State law withholds from them the power to do so. E.g. North Carolina Board of Education v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (91 S.Ct. 1284, 28 L.Ed.2d 586); Griffin v. County School Board, 377 U.S. 218 (84 S.Ct. 1226, 12 L.Ed.2d 256); Tacoma v. Taxpayers, 357 U.S. 320 (78 S.Ct. 1209, 2 L.Ed.2d 1345). 13 443 U.S. at 695, 99 S.Ct. at 3079. 14 In Gates v. Collier, 616 F.2d 1268 (5th Cir. 1978), the Fifth Circuit, faced with nearly identical objections to those raised here affirmed an order very similar to that now challenged. The district court, in attempting to enforce an attorney's fees award under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 against the State of Mississippi, ordered the State Auditor to issue a warrant upon the State Treasurer and ordered the State Treasurer to honor the warrant and pay the attorney's fees. The court of appeals rejected the state's argument that Mississippi law prevented the officials from honoring the order since the legislature had not appropriated any funds for the award: 15 Congress has declared that states and their officials who violate federal civil rights laws must reimburse the successful plaintiff for costs incurred in seeking redress. To strike down the order in this case because it conflicts with the laws of Mississippi would be no different than reversing a bare judgment for attorney's fees. In either case, we would be allowing the state, by legislative action, to recloak itself with the Eleventh Amendment immunity which Congress has chosen to remove. Such a result would be contrary to the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. 16 616 F.2d at 1272. 17 We agree with the Fifth Circuit that a state cannot frustrate the intent of section 1988 by setting up state law barriers to block enforcement of an attorney's fees award. Thus we conclude that the district court acted within its authority in issuing the order to the Controller and other State officials. 18 In affirming the district court's order, we do not mean to suggest that the district court must proceed under Rule 70 rather than Rule 69. The alternative of issuing a writ of execution still remains open to the court. 4 Nor do we express any opinion how the district court should implement its order should it choose to proceed under the order appealed from. That task remains open for the court below which has plenary power to enforce its commands. We simply conclude that the district court did not act improperly in issuing its order directed to state officials named therein.