Opinion ID: 2630840
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Competency Procedures

Text: [¶ 7] Mr. Follett argues his right to due process was violated because the district court did not follow the statutorily mandated procedures for determining whether he was competent to proceed with the trial court proceedings. In particular, he claims the district court should not have accepted his guilty plea without ordering a competency hearing. [¶ 8] A criminal defendant may not be tried unless he is competent, and he may not waive his right to counsel or plead guilty unless he does so competently and intelligently. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993), quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). The same standard of competency applies whether a defendant goes to trial or pleads guilty. Godinez, 509 U.S. at 398, 113 S.Ct. 2680. The United States Supreme Court has ruled that a defendant is competent, under the standards of due process, if he has `sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding' and has `a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.' Godinez, 509 U.S. at 396, 113 S.Ct. 2680, quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960) (per curiam). The determination of whether a defendant is mentally fit to proceed must be made by the trial court. Hayes v. State, 599 P.2d 558, 563 (Wyo.1979). It is not in the nature of a defense to the charge. It is a threshold issue, necessary to be resolved to prevent a violation of due process through conviction of a person incompetent to stand trial. Id. Moreover, the competency requirement continues from the time of arraignment through sentencing. See Godinez, 509 U.S. at 403, 113 S.Ct. 2680 (Kennedy, J., concurring); deShazer v. State, 2003 WY 98, ¶ 20, 74 P.3d 1240, 1248 (Wyo. 2003). [¶ 9] Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-301 et. seq. sets forth the requirements for determining whether a criminal defendant is competent to stand trial. The statutes are designed to protect criminal defendants' due process rights. deShazer, 2003 WY 98, ¶ 26, 74 P.3d at 1251. Under the principles articulated in Godinez and the clear language of the statutes, the statutory requirements pertain to all trial court proceedings, including change of plea proceedings. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-303 (LexisNexis 2005) provides, in pertinent part: (a) If it appears at any stage of a criminal proceeding, by motion or upon the court's own motion, that there is reasonable cause to believe that the accused has a mental illness or deficiency making him unfit to proceed, all further proceedings shall be suspended. (b) The court shall order an examination of the accused by a designated examiner. The order may include, but is not limited to, an examination of the accused at the Wyoming state hospital on an inpatient or outpatient basis, at a local mental health center on an inpatient or outpatient basis, or at his place of detention.    (d) The clerk of court shall deliver copies of the report to the district attorney and to the accused or his counsel. The report is not a public record or open to the public. After receiving a copy of the report, both the accused and the state may, upon written request and for good cause shown, obtain an order granting them an examination of the accused by a designated examiner of their own choosing. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-304 (LexisNexis 2005) provides specific protections when a defendant pleads not guilty or not triable on the basis of mental illness or defect. That statute provides, in relevant part:    (d) In all cases where a plea of not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency is made, the judge shall order the defendant examined as provided in W.S. 7-11-303(b). If an examination provided in W.S. 7-11-303(b) was made, the report may be received in evidence and no new examination shall be required unless, in the discretion of the court, another examination is necessary. Within five (5) days after receiving a copy of the report, both the accused and the state, upon written request, may obtain an order granting them an examination of the accused by a designated examiner of their own choosing. The clerk of court shall deliver copies of the report or reports to the district attorney and to the accused or his counsel. All reports required by this subsection shall conform to the requirements of W.S. 7-11-303(c). These reports are not public records or open to the public. [¶ 10] In deShazer, 2003 WY 98, ¶ 12, 74 P.3d at 1244-45, we adopted the standards articulated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit to review competency issues. Although competence is a factual issue, that term ... is not self-defining. Because competency to stand trial is an aspect of substantive due process, ... the legal standard by which competency is to be evaluated is constitutionally mandated. Accordingly, the components of that standard, required as they are by the Constitution, do not vary according to the views of a particular court. The Constitution can require but one gauge against which to determine whether, because of his mental condition, a defendant's due process rights are violated by requiring him to stand trial. The content of the standard of competency is therefore a question of law which we review de novo. Id. (citations omitted). We look to the following standard in evaluating the sufficiency of the processes used by the trial court in determining whether a defendant is competent to continue with legal proceedings: Once the trial court has evaluated a defendant's competency by the correct standard, the second inquiry on review is whether the trial court's determination of a defendant's competency is fairly supported by the record of the proceeding at which the determination [is] made.... In other words, the substantial evidence standard of review governs the second inquiry. [ State v. ] Soares, 81 Hawai`i 332, 916 P.2d [1233], 1251 [(Haw.Ct.App.1996)]. deShazer, 2003 WY 98, ¶ 13, 74 P.3d at 1244-45. [¶ 11] Prior to being bound over to the district court for a trial, Mr. Follett filed a motion to suspend the proceedings and for a mental evaluation. The circuit court granted the defense motion, and the resulting evaluation concluded: It can be stated with a reasonable degree of psychological certainty that Mr. Follett has the basic capacity to comprehend his position, understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, conduct his defense in a rational manner, and the ability to cooperate with his counsel to the end that a defense may be interposed on his behalf. Neither Mr. Follett nor the State objected to the report or requested a second evaluation in accordance with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-303(d) or § 7-11-304(d). Mr. Follett subsequently waived his preliminary hearing and the circuit court bound him over to the district court for trial. The district court arraigned Mr. Follett on November 13, 2003, and he entered pleas of not guilty, not guilty by reason of mental illness and not triable by reason of mental deficiency. [¶ 12] On appeal, Mr. Follett argues the district court should have sua sponte ordered a second evaluation after he pleaded not guilty by reason of mental illness. He claims a second evaluation following his plea was mandated by the language in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-304(d) which states: [i]n all cases where a plea of not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency is made, the judge shall order the defendant examined as provided in W.S. 7-11-303(b). He also complains the district court violated the statutory requirements by failing to make an express finding on the record that he was competent. [¶ 13] Mr. Follett did not object to the results of the first evaluation or request another evaluation as he was entitled to by the statutes. Thus, the results of the first evaluation did not trigger additional obligations. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-304(d) sets out the requirement for an examination when a defendant enters a mental illness plea; however, it also specifically states that if an evaluation has already been performed, then the report may be received in evidence and no new examination shall be required unless, in the discretion of the court, another examination is necessary. The clear language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-304(d) allowed the court to rely on the initial examination, so long as it did not deem another examination was necessary. Moreover, although it is good practice for the district court to make an express finding of competency after a mental health evaluation, the district court's failure to do so in this case was not erroneous. In Hayes, we held the district court did not err by failing to enter a specific order regarding the defendant's competency to stand trial. Hayes, 599 P.2d at 568. As in this case, there was no conflicting evidence about the defendant's competency resulting from the mental health evaluation and there was but one ruling which the record would support. Id. [¶ 14] Other cases have followed procedural paths similar to Mr. Follett's case. In Smith v. State, 871 P.2d 186 (Wyo.1994), Mr. Smith was charged with two counts of first degree murder. Prior to his arraignment, the trial court ordered the procedures suspended for an evaluation of Mr. Smith's competency to stand trial. Id. at 187. After the trial court determined he was fit to proceed, Mr. Smith was arraigned and pled not guilty and not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency. Id. Mr. Smith subsequently changed his plea to guilty. Id. On appeal, this Court concluded his guilty plea was unconditional and, consequently, he waived all non-jurisdictional defenses. Id. at 190. There was no contention that the trial court was required to order Mr. Smith to undergo another competency evaluation simply because he pled not guilty by reason of mental illness after the competency evaluation was completed. Id. [¶ 15] Mr. Follett maintains the competency requirement is continuing and the evaluation in circuit court was insufficient to comply with the statutory requirements. We agree the district court has a continuing duty to monitor whether a defendant's competency should be evaluated. This continuing duty is recognized by both our statutes and our case law. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-11-303 and 7-11-304; deShazer, 2003 WY 98, ¶ 26, 74 P.3d at 1251. However, unless the parties avail themselves of the procedures for contesting an evaluation pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-303(d), there must be some basis for the district court to conclude additional evaluations are warranted. In other words, there must be reasonable cause to believe the accused has a mental illness or deficiency making him unfit to proceed before other evaluations are mandated. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-303(a). [¶ 16] Mr. Follett points to statements made in association with his sentencing as evidence his competence was questionable. His wife and son both testified he had not been the same since he suffered a heart attack and underwent heart bypass surgery several years before, and they testified Mr. Follett needed mental help. This evidence did not, however, trigger the need for a second evaluation because those same circumstances existed when the initial evaluation was conducted. Furthermore, the district court acknowledged it was cognizant of Mr. Follett's potential mental health issues and paid particular attention to those matters during all court proceedings. Mr. Follett points to nothing in the record to indicate his mental health situation changed between the time of the evaluation and the change of plea hearing. [¶ 17] Because Mr. Follett did undergo a mental evaluation and there was no indication his mental health changed after the evaluation, this case is substantively different from deShazer. The status of deShazer's mental health was in question from the very outset of this case, and, yet, no evaluation was ordered prior to his trial. deShazer, 2003 WY 98, ¶ 14, 74 P.3d at 1245. The evidence of his diminished capacity included taperecorded `rantings' and typewritten and handwritten letters and notes, most of which might have raised the specter of mental illness or incompetency even in the mind of a lay observer. deShazer, 2003 WY 98, ¶ 15, 74 P.3d at 1245. In addition, the prosecution called the district court's attention to the fact deShazer's father had attempted to have his son involuntarily committed to a mental hospital shortly before the crimes were committed because he believed his son to be obsessed with the victim, severely depressed, and suicidal. deShazer, 2003 WY 98, ¶ 16, 74 P.3d at 1249. Similarly, defense counsel indicated, on several occasions, he was concerned about deShazer's state of mind. deShazer, 2003 WY 98, ¶¶ 16-18, 74 P.3d at 1249. The district court did not, however, order deShazer to undergo a mental evaluation. On appeal, we concluded the district court erred by failing to sua sponte order the proceedings suspended and a mental health evaluation to determine whether deShazer was competent to proceed. deShazer, 2003 WY 98, ¶ 28, 74 P.3d at 1252. We [held] that the circumstances presented at trial were sufficient to trigger the requirement that the district court conduct a competency hearing in order to determine if deShazer was fit to proceed. Id. [¶ 18] In contrast, Mr. Follett's rights were protected in this case. He underwent a mental evaluation which concluded he was competent, and he did not contest the results of the evaluation or request an additional evaluation. After the evaluation was completed, there was no new evidence suggesting Mr. Follett's capacity had diminished. We conclude the district court complied with the mental examination requirements set out in the statutes and Mr. Follett's due process rights were not violated.