Opinion ID: 362303
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: effect of taking the wrong route

Text: 25 Unfortunately, appellants did not complain to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Appearing as Amicus curiae, however, that agency itself proposes that the omission be excused in these cases because the functioning of Title VII depends in such large part upon the personal initiative and effort of lay charging parties, 60 and because, as we have just seen, the statutory procedural path for District policemen is greatly confusing even for lawyers 61 and judges. 62 26 We agree. In enacting the 1972 amendments, Congress expressed its displeasure with strict adherence to exhaustion requirements when the employee is forced to act with no certainty of the steps required to exhaust such remedies. 63 And while this litigation is the first we have uncovered in which a court has construed the statutory provisions under scrutiny in any analogous situation, we have striven to abide this congressional concern in other contexts. We have held that Section 706's requirement that a complainant approach a designated agency within a set period of time after the employer has discriminated is not jurisdictional in the strict sense. 64 We have also declared that although we will require close observance of similar time limits under Title VII, 65 equitable principles can be used to extend the time period in deserving cases. 66 The reasoning underlying these pronouncements was that, because Title VII is remedial legislation dependent for its enforcement on laymen, 67 we must seek in every case an interpretation animated by the broad humanitarian and remedial purposes underlying the federal proscription of employment discrimination, 68 and resultantly that resort to technicalities to foreclose recourse to administrative or judicial processes is particularly inappropriate. 69 27 Appellee argues, however, that since the 1972 amendments clearly indicate that Some District Government employees are covered by § 706 and Others by § 717, it was incumbent upon appellants to make the necessary inquiries, or do the required research, or take other steps to preserve their federal rights. . . . 70 But surely it would be hypertechnical, if not downright unrealistic, to require nonlawyers to study the statute, its legislative history and its administrative interpretations and predict accurately which of two quite reasonable constructions of the unclear language a court will adopt. And, just as surely, appellee's suggestion would inflict the harsh penalty of suit-dismissal for an easily understandable interpretive error and frustrate congressional intent as well. The Senate author of the 1972 amendments admonished that because aggrieved individuals . . . frequently are untrained laymen . . . acts of discrimination should not escape the effect of the law through a procedural oversight. 71 Moreover, we ourselves have noted that courts confronted with procedural ambiguities in the statutory framework have, with virtual unanimity, resolved them in favor of the complaining party. 72 28 We do likewise in these cases. In our view, if appellants adequately complied with the requirements of Section 717, the time limit for complaining to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission under Section 706 was tolled until the date of this opinion when the route they should have taken was first made clear. 73 Our final task, therefore, is to gauge appellants' administrative performance by the standards of Section 717.