Opinion ID: 1469024
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Burden of Proof As to Mealtime Compensation

Text: Plaintiffs also appeal the district court's instruction that assigned Plaintiffs the burden of proof to show that they were engaged in conduct primarily for the benefit of the employer and that their mealtimes were thus compensable. See Henson v. Pulaski County Sheriff Dept., 6 F.3d 531, 534 (8th Cir.1993) (indicating that whether an employee is entitled to mealtime compensation depends on whether that time was spent predominantly for the benefit of the employer or whether the employee was able to use that time effectively for his or her own purposes). Plaintiffs argue that because mealtimes amount to an exemption from compensation under the Act, it was the County's burden to show that Plaintiffs had a bona fide mealtime and engaged in no work. We find Plaintiffs' argument unavailing. The Supreme Court has indicated that the general rule [is] that the application of an exemption under the Fair Labor Standards Act is a matter of affirmative defense on which the employer has the burden of proof. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196-97, 94 S.Ct. 2223, 41 L.Ed.2d 1 (1974). While we have never before determined who bears the burden in cases of disputed mealtime compensation, we are not persuaded that this case implicates an exemption within the meaning of the FLSA. A claim for non-payment of work during an established mealtime is analytically similar to an unpaid overtime claim, not an exemption claim. See id. (citing various exemption claims). The gravamen of Plaintiffs' complaint is that they performed work during mealtimes, that the work amounted to overtime because it was in addition to their already-scheduled, eight-hour shift, and the work during these mealtimes went uncompensated. By requiring Plaintiffs to show that their actions were primarily for the benefit of the employer, the jury instruction simply commanded that Plaintiffs show that they actually preformed work for a time that exceeded the hours of their compensable workday. In essence, a claim for unpaid mealtime work is no different than other overtime claims where it is the plaintiff's burden to show (1) that the plaintiff has performed compensable work and (2) the number of hours for which the plaintiff has not been properly paid. Cf. Goldberg v. Kickapoo Prairie Broad. Co., 288 F.2d 778, 784 (8th Cir.1961); Anderson, 328 U.S. at 687-88, 66 S.Ct. 1187 (stating that each employee must prove that he has in fact performed work for which he was improperly compensated... and produce[ ] sufficient evidence to show the amount and extent of that work as a matter of just and reasonable inference.); see also Aamold v. United States, 39 Fed.Cl. 735, 741 (Fed.Cl. 1997) (indicating that the burden is on the employee to show that his or her mealtime was compensable); Hill v. United States, 751 F.2d 810, 814-15 (6th Cir.1984) (discussing how mealtime compensation was not warranted where the employee failed to show that the employee spent mealtimes predominantly for the employer's benefit, was not able to enjoy the mealtime adequately or comfortably, or was engaged in the performance of substantial duties). Plaintiffs cite Fourth and Fifth Circuit case law as support for the proposition that the County bears the burden because mealtimes qualify as an exemption within the meaning of the FLSA. See Roy v. County of Lexington, 141 F.3d 533, 544 (4th Cir.1998); Bernard v. IBP, Inc. of Neb., 154 F.3d 259, 265 (5th Cir.1998) (citing Roy, 141 F.3d at 544). We are not persuaded, however, by those courts' classifications of mealtime as an exemption from compensation. The statutory default for mealtimes is that they are non-compensable because they do not constitute work under the FLSA. See 29 C.F.R. § 785.19. Mealtimes, then, are not exempt from compensation, but rather they are not compensable in the first instance. Furthermore, requiring the County to show that Plaintiffs' established mealtimes were not, in fact, non-compensable would be entirely inefficient. It is Plaintiffs who are in the best positions to prove that their actions during their scheduled mealtimes were for the benefit of the employer and thus not part of a bona fide meal period. To require that the County prove a negative that an employee was not performing work during a time reserved for mealswould perversely incentivize employers to keep closer tabs on employees during their off-duty time. In conclusion, we believe that under the FLSA, the employee bears the burden to show that his or her mealtimes were compensable work. The district court thus did not err in its jury instruction.