Opinion ID: 2377073
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: branson's appeal and marvin's cross-appeal

Text: ¶ 41 Both parties appealed from the trial court's judgment. Branson claims on appeal that the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment against him on his claim for malicious prosecution. He argues that the trial court gave undue weight to the finding of probable cause by the magistrate judge in his criminal proceedings because the existence of probable cause must be measured by reference to what Marvin knew at the time he initiated Branson's prosecution. He also argues that, given the evidence of Marvin's motives for initiating the prosecution, the trial court incorrectly concluded that Branson had failed to raise an issue of disputed fact regarding Marvin's malice. We need not resolve the issues raised by Branson because another ground for affirming the trial court's decision is apparent from the record. We hold that when Branson entered into a plea in abeyance with regard to this criminal episode, the criminal proceedings were not terminated in his favor. Because termination of the prosecution in favor of the accused is an element of a claim for malicious prosecution, the trial court did not err in granting Marvin's motion for summary judgment on this claim. ¶ 42 On cross-appeal, Marvin claims that the trial court erred in denying his request for attorney fees and in preventing him from filing a request for attorney fees related to the trust issue. He presents a number of arguments that, he claims, require remand of the attorney fee issue for further consideration. First, he argues that he had a statutory and procedural entitlement to modify his request after entry of judgment on the trust issues and that the trial court erred in not permitting him to request additional fees related to the bench trial of these family trust issues. Second, he contends that the trial court's decision is formally deficient because it contains insufficient findings to support its conclusion. Finally, he argues that the trial court erred in concluding that he was not the prevailing party for purposes of attorney fees because the trial court neglected to consider his success at the bench trial and did not adequately account for the success he enjoyed by preventing Branson from recovering on a majority of his claims. ¶ 43 We affirm the trial court's decision related to Marvin's attorney fees. Specifically, we hold that the trial court's decision is not formally deficient because we find it sufficiently detailed to support meaningful appellate review. We also conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in preventing Marvin from filing a postjudgment motion for attorney fees related to the bench trial of the family trust issues. Finally, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that neither party prevailed in this litigation. ¶ 44 Branson also appealed the trial court's grant of JNOV with regard to the jury's verdicts on his claims for slander of title and breach of fiduciary duty. He claims that the trial court incorrectly concluded that attorney fees cannot form the damages component of these claims and that this incorrect conclusion led the trial court to conclude that the verdict was internally inconsistent. He argues that the jury's answers should, instead, be interpreted to mean that the jury intended to award attorney fees as damages, with the amount of the damages to be determined by the court. [10] ¶ 45 We agree with Branson's argument as it relates to his slander of title claim because our cases acknowledge the possibility that attorney fees can form the basis of damages in a slander of title claim, so long as those fees are reasonably necessary to remove disparaging clouds from the slandered title. This is an exception to our general rule for awarding attorney fees in tort cases. And since this exception does not apply to claims for breach of fiduciary duty, we disagree with Branson's arguments with regard to that claim. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's grant of JNOV with regard to the jury's verdict on the slander of title claim, but affirm the trial court's grant of JNOV as it relates to Branson's claim for breach of fiduciary duty.