Opinion ID: 1936899
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: [3,4] We first address whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over Rupari. Personal jurisdiction is the power of a tribunal to subject and bind a particular entity to its decisions. Hunt v. Trackwell, 262 Neb. 688, 635 N.W.2d 106 (2001). Before filing any other pleading or motion, one may file a special appearance for the sole purpose of objecting to a court's assertion or exercise of personal jurisdiction over the objector. In re Interest of Rondell B., 249 Neb. 928, 546 N.W.2d 801 (1996). [5,6] Confronted with a special appearance, a plaintiff has the burden to establish facts which demonstrate the court's personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Williams v. Gould, Inc., 232 Neb. 862, 443 N.W.2d 577 (1989). In a hearing on a special appearance, an affidavit may be used to prove or disprove the factual basis for a court's assertion or exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant. Id. When a jurisdictional question does not involve a factual dispute, determination of a jurisdictional issue is a matter of law which requires an appellate court to reach a conclusion independent from the trial court's. Kugler Co. v. Growth Products Ltd., 265 Neb. 505, 658 N.W.2d 40 (2003). Nebraska's long-arm statute, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-536 (Reissue 1995), provides in relevant part: A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person: (1) Who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from the person: (a) Transacting any business in this state; . . . . (2) Who has any other contact with or maintains any other relation to this state to afford a basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction consistent with the Constitution of the United States. [7,8] Section 25-536 suggests a broad application of the exercise of personal jurisdiction by the courts of this state, an application which is supported by case law. It was the intention of the Legislature to provide for the broadest allowable jurisdiction over nonresidents. State on behalf of Yankton v. Cummings, 2 Neb. App. 820, 515 N.W.2d 680 (1994). Nebraska's long-arm statute is to be interpreted broadly in view of the rationale and philosophy underlying its adoption. General Leisure Products Corp. v. Gleason Corporation, 331 F. Supp. 278 (D. Neb. 1971). Section 25-536 expressly extends Nebraska's jurisdiction over nonresidents having any contact with or maintaining any relation with Nebraska as far as the U.S. Constitution permits. Castle Rose v. Philadelphia Bar & Grill, 254 Neb. 299, 576 N.W.2d 192 (1998). [9,10] In Williams, we discussed the procedure that must be followed in determining whether a court can exercise jurisdiction under Nebraska's long-arm statute. Before a court can exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, the court must first determine whether a statutory standard of the long-arm statute is satisfied. Id. If the long-arm statute has been satisfied, the court must then determine whether minimum contacts exist between the defendant and the forum state for personal jurisdiction over the defendant without offending due process. Id. ; Dunham v. Hunt Midwest Entertainment, 2 Neb. App. 969, 520 N.W.2d 216 (1994). We conclude that the requirements of the long-arm statute were satisfied in this case because Rupari was transacting business in Nebraska. Lubeck's affidavit stated that in November 1999, Midwest arranged an oral contract between Quality Pork and Rupari whereby Rupari agreed to pay for all pork products ordered from Quality Pork by Star. Under the agreement, orders placed by Midwest were delivered to Star and Rupari was sent the invoices. With regard to the orders at issue, payments in the amounts of $43,736.84 and $47,467.80 were made by Rupari. Rupari did not pay for the third order, in the amount of $44,051.98, and it is the subject of this action. This evidence establishes that Rupari, through Midwest, was transacting business in Nebraska. See § 25-536(1)(a). [11] We next consider whether minimum contacts exist between Rupari and the State of Nebraska such that personal jurisdiction may be exercised without offending due process. Due process for personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant requires that the defendant's minimum contacts with the forum state be such that maintenance of the suit does not offend `traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' See Internat. Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945). See, also, Williams v. Gould, Inc., 232 Neb. 862, 443 N.W.2d 577 (1989); McGowan Grain v. Sanburg, 225 Neb. 129, 403 N.W.2d 340 (1987). In Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-72, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1985), the Court explained the protection afforded by due process as it relates to personal jurisdiction: The Due Process Clause protects an individual's liberty interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which he has established no meaningful contacts, ties, or relations. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S., at 319. By requiring that individuals have fair warning that a particular activity may subject [them] to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign, [citation omitted] the Due Process Clause gives a degree of predictability to the legal system that allows potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U. S. 286, 297 (1980). The Court held that this fair warning requirement is satisfied if the defendant has purposefully directed his activities at residents of the forum, Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U. S. 770, 774 (1984), and the litigation results from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities, Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U. S. 408, 414 (1984). Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 472-73. Parties who reach out beyond one state and create continuing relationships and obligations with citizens of another state are subject to regulation and sanctions in the other state for the consequences of their activities. See Travelers Health Assn. v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 647, 70 S. Ct. 927, 94 L. Ed. 1154 (1950). Burger King Corp. stated several considerations that enter into the determination of whether a forum may legitimately exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who has purposefully directed his activities toward residents of the forum. A state has a `manifest interest' in providing its residents with a convenient forum for redress. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 473. It would be unfair to allow a nonresident to escape having to account for consequences that arise proximately from such activities. Id. [T]he Due Process Clause may not readily be wielded as a territorial shield to avoid interstate obligations that have been voluntarily assumed. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 474. In addition, modern transportation and communication have made it much less burdensome for a party to defend himself in a state where he engages in economic activity. Id. [12] The constitutional touchstone is whether the defendant purposefully established minimum contacts in the forum state. Id. `[I]t is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.' Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1985), quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 78 S. Ct. 1228, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1283 (1958). This `purposeful availment' requirement ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of `random,' `fortuitous,' or `attenuated' contacts . . . . Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 475. The benchmark for determining if the exercise of personal jurisdiction satisfies due process is whether the defendant's minimum contacts with the forum state are such that the defendant should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there. Castle Rose v. Philadelphia Bar & Grill, 254 Neb. 299, 576 N.W.2d 192 (1998). Two types of personal jurisdiction may be exercised depending upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case: general personal jurisdiction or specific personal jurisdiction. These concepts were discussed in Dunham v. Hunt Midwest Entertainment, 2 Neb. App. 969, 520 N.W.2d 216 (1994). There, the Court of Appeals pointed out that a state may exercise either general or specific personal jurisdiction, so long as the defendant has sufficient contact with the forum state, citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 104 S. Ct. 1868, 80 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1984). In the exercise of general personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff's claim does not have to arise directly out of the defendant's contacts with the forum state, provided that the defendant has engaged in continuous and systematic general business contacts with the forum state. See Hall, 466 U.S. at 416. If the defendant's contacts are neither substantial nor continuous and systematic, but the cause of action arises out of or is related to the defendant's contact with the forum, a court may assert `specific jurisdiction' over the defendant depending on the quality and nature of such contact. Hall, 466 U.S. at 414 n.8. Accord Dunham, supra . [13] Once it has been decided that a defendant purposefully established minimum contacts within the forum state, these contacts may be considered in light of other factors to determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with `fair play and substantial justice.' Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 476. These considerations include `the burden on the defendant,' `the forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute,' `the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief,' `the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies,' and the `shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.' Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 477, quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S. Ct. 559, 62 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1980). Such considerations sometimes serve to establish the reasonableness of jurisdiction upon a lesser showing of minimum contacts than would otherwise be required. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 477. In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals was presented with the question of whether there were sufficient minimum contacts between Rupari and the State of Nebraska to assert either general personal jurisdiction or specific personal jurisdiction over Rupari. As to the exercise of general personal jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals found that Rupari's activities did not qualify as substantial or continuous and systematic. The court stated that [t]he most that can be said is that Rupari allegedly engaged in business with Quality Pork by having Quality Pork ship products to Texas and that Rupari sent two payments to Quality Pork in Nebraska. See Quality Pork Intern. v. Rupari Food Services, Inc., No. A-01-1203, 2003 WL 21057297 at  (Neb. App. May 13, 2003) (not designated for permanent publication). The court also concluded that the record did not indicate that Rupari's activities qualified as a purposeful availment that would satisfy the requirements of specific personal jurisdiction. [14,15] We disagree with the Court of Appeals' determination as to purposeful availment. To determine whether a defendant's contract supplies the contacts necessary for personal jurisdiction in a forum state, a court is to consider the parties' prior negotiations and future contemplated consequences, along with the terms of the contract and the parties' actual course of dealing. Castle Rose v. Philadelphia Bar & Grill, 254 Neb. 299, 576 N.W.2d 192 (1998), citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1985); Williams v. Gould, Inc., 232 Neb. 862, 443 N.W.2d 577 (1989). Whether a forum state court has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant depends on whether the defendant's contacts with the forum state are the result of unilateral acts performed by someone other than the defendant, or whether the defendant himself has acted in a manner which creates substantial connections with the forum state, resulting in the defendant's purposeful availment of the benefits and protections of the law of the forum state. See, Burger King Corp., supra ; Williams, supra . In this case, Rupari induced Quality Pork to ship products to Star. Quality Pork had previously ceased doing business with Star because of its poor credit. Based upon Rupari's promise to pay for products shipped to Star, Quality Pork filled orders valued at $43,736.84, $47,467.80, and $44,051.98 respectively. Quality Pork's claim arose out of Rupari's contacts with a company located in Nebraska. Therefore, in evaluating whether the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction is reasonable, we conclude that it would not be unduly burdensome for Rupari to defend an action in Nebraska. Quality Pork had a valid interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief which supported the bringing of its action in this state. By purposefully conducting business with Quality Pork, Rupari could reasonably anticipate that it might be sued in Nebraska if it failed to pay for products ordered from Quality Pork. [16] Where a defendant who has purposefully directed his activities at forum residents seeks to defeat jurisdiction, he must present a compelling case that the presence of some other consideration would render jurisdiction unreasonable. Burger King Corp., supra . Rupari has failed to present such a case. The affidavit of Rupari's president merely set forth that it is a food servicing company which sells and resells food products such as pork and that it does not have employees, offices, or property in the State of Nebraska. Under the facts of this case, the lack of physical presence in Nebraska is not a compelling reason that would cause the assertion of jurisdiction to be unreasonable. We conclude that Rupari had sufficient minimum contacts with Nebraska to satisfy the due process requirements for the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction. The district court had specific personal jurisdiction over Rupari, and the Court of Appeals erred in holding that it did not.