Opinion ID: 1386085
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Scope of Voluntary Manslaughter

Text: (1b) Defendant argues that the new legislation did not limit the ability of an accused to reduce an intentional killing to voluntary manslaughter as a result of mental illness or voluntary intoxication. He relies primarily on People v. Molina (1988) 202 Cal. App.3d 1168 [249 Cal. Rptr. 273]. In Molina, a psychotic mother, who was experiencing auditory hallucinations, strangled and killed her 18-month-old son and set fire to the house. The trial court refused requested instructions on the lesser offenses of voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. The defendant was convicted of second degree murder and found not guilty by reason of insanity. The Court of Appeal reversed. The Molina court reviewed sections 25, 28, and 29, noting that the statutory language provides that evidence of mental problems is inadmissible to show that a defendant lacked the capacity to form the requisite mental state, but is admissible to show that the defendant actually lacked the requisite mental state. (202 Cal. App.3d at p. 1173.) From this the court concluded: The inclusion of the language in subdivision (a) [of section 28] regarding actual formation of mental states shows that the Legislature did not foreclose the possibility of a reduction from murder to voluntary manslaughter where malice is lacking due to mental illness, or a further reduction to involuntary manslaughter where intent to kill is not present for the same reason. ( Id., at p. 1174.) We are unpersuaded by defendant's reliance on Molina, supra, 202 Cal. App.3d 1168, since the court's analysis failed to consider the effect on the definition of malice of the amendment to section 188, which was part of the same legislative package as sections 25, 28, and 29. (3) Section 188, as amended by Senate Bill No. 54 (see fn. 5, ante ), now provides: Such malice may be express or implied. It is express when there is manifested a deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature. It is implied, when no considerable provocation appears, or when the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart. [¶] When it is shown that the killing resulted from the intentional doing of an act with express or implied malice as defined above, no other mental state need be shown to establish the mental state of malice aforethought. Neither an awareness of the obligation to act within the general body of laws regulating society nor acting despite such awareness is included within the definition of malice. (Italics added.) The first sentence of the underscored passage limits malice to the definition set forth in section 188. This sentence clearly provides that once the trier of fact finds a deliberate intention unlawfully to kill, no other mental state need be shown to establish malice aforethought. Whether a defendant acted with a wanton disregard for human life or with some antisocial motivation is no longer relevant to the issue of express malice. ( People v. Stress (1988) 205 Cal. App.3d 1259, 1267-1268 [252 Cal. Rptr. 913].) No doubt about this conclusion is possible when the last sentence of section 188 is analyzed. That sentence directly repudiates the expanded definition of malice aforethought in People v. Conley, supra, 64 Cal.2d 310, and People v. Poddar, supra, 10 Cal.3d 750, that express and implied malice include an awareness of the obligation to act within the general body of laws regulating society and the capability of acting in accordance with such awareness. After this amendment of section 188, express malice and an intent unlawfully to kill are one and the same. [6] ( People v. Stress, supra, 205 Cal. App.3d at p. 1268.) Pursuant to the language of section 188, when an intentional killing is shown, malice aforethought is established. Accordingly, the concept of diminished capacity voluntary manslaughter (nonstatutory manslaughter) recognized in Conley, supra, 64 Cal.2d 310, is no longer valid as a defense. However, while retreating from the Conley/Poddar definition of malice aforethought, the Legislature left unchanged the definition of voluntary manslaughter in section 192. Indeed, that definition has not changed since section 192 was first enacted in 1872. Section 192 defines voluntary manslaughter as the unlawful killing of a human being without malice ... [¶] ... upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion. Thus, pursuant to the language of section 188, when an intentional killing is shown, malice aforethought is established. Section 192, however, negates malice when the intentional killing results from a sudden quarrel or heat of passion induced by adequate provocation. Defendant disagrees. Relying on the language in section 188 that requires for express malice a deliberate intention unlawfully to take a life, he argues that express malice requires more than mere intent to kill. We find the Court of Appeal's reasoning to the contrary in People v. Bobo [] (1990) 229 Cal. App.3d 1417, 1440-1441 [271 Cal. Rptr. 277], persuasive: From the time it was enacted in 1872, section 188 has stated that malice is express `when there is manifested a deliberate intention unlawfully' to kill. One might argue that the word `deliberate' has a significance in the distinction between murder and manslaughter. That argument would be mistaken. As noted in In re Thomas C. (1986) 183 Cal. App.3d 786, 796-797 [228 Cal. Rptr. 430]: `In People v. Valentine (1946) 28 Cal.2d 121 [169 P.2d 1], our Supreme Court pointed out that it was incorrect [to differentiate] manslaughter from murder on the basis of deliberate intent.... Deliberate intent ... is not an essential element of murder, as such. It is an essential element of one class only of first degree murder and is not at all an element of second degree murder. ( Id., at pp. 131-132; [citations].) Indeed, the standard CALJIC instruction (No. 8.11 (1983 rev.)) has been held to be a correct definition of express malice aforethought, despite the fact that it does not use the word deliberate as used in Penal Code section 188, but merely states that [m]alice is express when there is manifested an intention unlawfully to kill a human being. (CALJIC No. 8.11.) In short, deliberate intention, as stated in Penal Code section 188, merely distinguishes express from implied malice, whereas premeditation and deliberation is one class of first degree murder.' (See also People v. Van Ronk, supra, 171 Cal. App.3d at p. 824.) Moreover, as defined in cases predating Conley and Conley's foundational pillars  People v. Wells (1949) 33 Cal.2d 330, and People v. Gorshen (1959) 51 Cal.2d 716  the concept of malice aforethought was manifested by the doing of an unlawful and felonious act intentionally and without legal cause or excuse. ( People v. Balkwell (1904) 143 Cal. 259, 263 [76 P. 1017]; People v. Fallon (1906) 149 Cal. 287, 289-290 [86 P. 689]; People v. Coleman (1942) 50 Cal. App.2d 592, 596 [123 P.2d 557]; see also People v. Bender (1945) 27 Cal.2d 164, 181 [163 P.2d 8].) The adjective `deliberate' in section 188 consequently implies an intentional act and is essentially redundant to the language defining express malice. The adverb `unlawfully' in the express malice definition means simply that there is no justification, excuse, or mitigation for the killing recognized by the law. ( People v. Stress, supra, 205 Cal. App.3d at p. 1268.) (4) We still must reconcile the narrowed definition of malice aforethought in section 188 with the language of sections 22, subdivision (b) and 28, subdivision (a). These latter sections make evidence of voluntary intoxication and mental illness admissible solely on the issue of whether the accused actually formed a required specific intent, premeditated, deliberated, or harbored malice aforethought, when a specific intent crime is charged. Molina had relied on the reference to malice aforethought in section 28, subdivision (a) to conclude that the Legislature had not foreclosed the possibility of a reduction of murder to voluntary manslaughter where malice is lacking due to mental illness or intoxication. ( People v. Molina, supra, 202 Cal. App.3d at p. 1174.) As previously stated, however, the Molina analysis did not consider the effect of the Legislature's amendment of the definition of malice in section 188. As the Court of Appeal noted in People v. Bobo, supra, 229 Cal. App.3d at page 1442, section 28, subdivision (a), is a general statute covering all specific intent crimes. Leeway in the language is needed to ensure such coverage. Moreover, malice aforethought can be either express or implied. Nothing is generalized about the definition of express malice in section 188 and no leeway in the language is needed for that precise definition. Furthermore, evidence of mental disease, disorder, or defect is still admissible on the issue of whether the accused actually formed an intent unlawfully to kill  i.e., whether the accused actually formed express malice. Sections 22 and 28 state that voluntary intoxication or mental condition may be considered in deciding whether the defendant actually had the required mental state, including malice. These sections relate to any crime, and make no attempt to define what mental state is required. Section 188, on the other hand, defines malice for purposes of murder. In combination, the statutes provide that voluntary intoxication or mental condition may be considered in deciding whether there was malice as defined in section 188. Contrary to defendant's contention, we see no conflict in these provisions. (5) Defendant further argues that the Legislature's narrowing of the definition of express malice and the resulting restriction of the scope of voluntary manslaughter presents a due process problem. We disagree. The Legislature can limit the mental elements included in the statutory definition of a crime and thereby curtail use of mens rea defenses. (See Patterson v. New York (1977) 432 U.S. 197, 210-211 [53 L.Ed.2d 281, 292-293, 97 S.Ct. 2319].) If, however, a crime requires a particular mental state the Legislature may not deny a defendant the opportunity to prove he did not possess that state. ( Id., at p. 215 [53 L.Ed.2d at p. 295].) The abolition of the diminished capacity defense and limitation of admissible evidence to actual formation of various mental states has been held not to violate the due process right to present a defense. ( People v. Jackson (1984) 152 Cal. App.3d 961, 967-970 [199 Cal. Rptr. 848]; People v. Lynn (1984) 159 Cal. App.3d 715, 731-733 [206 Cal. Rptr. 181]; People v. Whitler (1985) 171 Cal. App.3d 337, 340-341 [214 Cal. Rptr. 610].) If there is no due process impediment to the deletion of malice as an element of the crime of felony murder ( People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 472-476 [194 Cal. Rptr. 390, 668 P.2d 697]), there is likewise no problem here. (1c) In amending section 188 in 1981, the Legislature equated express malice with an intent unlawfully to kill. Since two distinct concepts no longer exist, there has been some narrowing of the mental element included in the statutory definition of express malice. A defendant, however, is still free to show that because of his mental illness or voluntary intoxication, he did not in fact form the intent unlawfully to kill (i.e., did not have malice aforethought). ( People v. Jackson, supra, 152 Cal. App.3d at p. 968.) In a murder case, if this evidence is believed, the only supportable verdict would be involuntary manslaughter or an acquittal. If such a showing gives rise to a reasonable doubt, the killing (assuming there is no implied malice) can be no greater than involuntary manslaughter. (See People v. Bobo, [] supra, 229 Cal. App.3d at pp. 1442-1443.) It follows from the foregoing analysis that the trial court did not err in failing to instruct that voluntary intoxication could negate express malice so as to reduce a murder to voluntary manslaughter.