Opinion ID: 701770
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Tackett's Issues

Text: 48
49 Tackett contends that the district court erred by failing to grant his motion to be tried separately from Pierce. We find his argument unpersuasive. The decision to grant or deny severance is entrusted to the sound discretion of the district court. United States v. Moreno, 933 F.2d 362, 369 (6th Cir.1991). The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Tackett's motion for severance. 50 Tackett argues that he was prejudiced by being tried with Pierce, because they had mutually antagonistic defenses. 6 Without a showing of compelling prejudice, a motion for severance should not be granted. Id. Furthermore, as a general rule, persons jointly indicted should be tried together. Id. But, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14 provides:If it appears that a defendant or the government is prejudiced by joinder of ... defendants ... for trial together, the court may order an election or separate trials of counts, grant a severance of defendants or provide whatever other relief justice requires. 51 Fed.R.Crim.P. 14 (emphasis added). 52 The Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of severance in Zafiro v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993). In Zafiro, the government accused the defendants of distributing illegal drugs. Two of the defendants, Garcia and Soto, were carrying a box containing fifty-five pounds of cocaine up a staircase, when the police arrested them. At trial, Soto testified that he knew nothing about the drug conspiracy and was just helping Garcia carry the box. Garcia, on the other hand, argued that he was innocent and that the box belonged to Soto. 7 Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 936. The district court denied the motions for severance, and the jury convicted all four Defendants. 53 The Supreme Court affirmed and held that mutually antagonistic defenses do not mandate severance. Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 937. Rule 14 does not require severance even if prejudice is shown; rather, it leaves the tailoring of the relief to be granted, if any, to the district court's sound discretion. Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 938. The Supreme Court went on to say that when the defendants are properly joined under Rule 8(b), 8 [a] district court should grant a severance under Rule 14 if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence. Id. Such a risk would occur when evidence that is inadmissible against one defendant if tried alone is admitted against a codefendant. Id. This would allow the prosecution to circumvent the rules by trying such individuals together. When the risk of such prejudice is high, a district court may order separate trials if necessary, but less drastic measures, such as limiting instructions, often will suffice to cure any risk of prejudice. Id. Finally, defendants are not entitled to separate trials merely because they may have a better chance of acquittal in separate trials. Id. 54 Tackett claims the district court should have granted severance for two reasons. First, he argues that the government would not have been able to introduce his prior criminal record if he was tried alone. Second, he claims that Pierce was trying to convict Tackett in order to get himself off. 55 As discussed above, the government introduced Tackett's prior criminal acts to show motive. The acts would have come in even if he had been tried alone. Severance would not have precluded the government from introducing motive evidence under Rule 404(b). Furthermore, Tackett himself brought in some of his prior acts on cross-examination. Finally, the Judge issued limiting instructions several times and told the jury to consider these acts only as evidence of motive and not as evidence of guilt. 56 Second, Tackett claims that Pierce's counsel was trying to convict Tackett, by showing that Tackett acted alone. This is similar to Zafiro, where the two defendants both claim they are innocent and each accuses the other of the crime. Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 938. In Zafiro, the Supreme Court held that cautionary instructions and proper jury instructions could cure this problem. Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 939. In this case, the District Judge made several cautionary instructions, and properly instructed the jury that [y]ou must decide, for each defendant, whether the United States has presented proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the particular defendant is guilty of a particular charge. District Court's Jury Instructions at 27; see also Zafiro, --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 939 (holding similar jury instructions cure prejudice). Therefore, Zafiro controls and the District Judge did not abuse his discretion in denying severance. 57
58 Tackett contends that the district court erred by denying his motion for a new trial based upon government intimidation of the witnesses. Tackett never raised the issue of governmental intimidation during trial, and therefore, according to Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b), we review for plain error. 9 United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15-16, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 1046, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985). Under the plain error doctrine, we determine if any errors below  'seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.'  Id. at 15, 105 S.Ct. at 1046 (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160, 56 S.Ct. 391, 392, 80 L.Ed. 555 (1936)). To review for plain error, we look to the entire record and determine if the alleged act resulted in a miscarriage of justice. Id. at 16, 105 S.Ct. at 1046-47. 59 After reviewing the record as a whole, we find that the alleged government intimidation did not result in a miscarriage of justice. Tackett's conviction rested, at least in part, on the jury's rejection of Tackett's claim that he had been in Ohio on the weekend of the fire. Tackett presented witnesses who said he was at his brother's football game in Findlay, Ohio. Tackett claims that the jury would have accepted his alibi if he had been able to present all of the witnesses and evidence that confirmed his story. He contends that the government deprived him of two alibi witnesses, Tucker Ballinger and Joseph Spalding, by intimidating them during special court-ordered interviews before they were to testify. 60 Review of the procedural circumstances that lay behind Tackett's alibi defense reveals why the government was interviewing witnesses during trial. The government originally asked Tackett to declare his alibi defense in a pretrial motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12.1. Tackett eventually responded and revealed his planned alibi defense. The government reciprocated and revealed its list of rebuttal witnesses. Immediately before trial, however, Tackett officially abandoned his alibi defense. The United States quickly changed its strategy, in order to avoid prejudicing Tackett by mentioning his alleged alibi. Tackett once again renounced his alibi midway through trial. 61 At trial it became clear that Linda Tackett would produce an alibi defense. 10 She revealed that her alibi was identical to Brian Tackett's alibi. Brian Tackett reversed directions one more time. Tackett's indecisiveness placed the district court in a very difficult situation, and the district court could have barred Tackett from using his alibi defense altogether. See United States v. Tinker, 985 F.2d 241, 243 (6th Cir.1992) (the district court has substantial discretion in determining whether to hold parties to their pre-trial agreement). The district court chose not to follow this strict course, because the United States had prior knowledge of Tackett's alibi and the witnesses he might use. (J.A. at 321.) In order to be fair, the district court allowed the government an opportunity to prepare, and allowed the prosecution to interview Tackett's alibi witnesses before they took the stand. 62 Ballinger and Spalding both testified at post-trial proceedings that the interviewing officials had treated them roughly. 11 Two representatives of the United States interviewed each witness separately in the government's office. 12 63 The officials interviewed Ballinger first. At the post-trial hearing, Ballinger revealed that the government officials accused him of lying when he recounted that he remembered seeing Tackett on the night of the football game. The officials apparently suggested that Ballinger would face perjury charges if they found out his testimony was false. The encounter was loud enough for Spalding, who was in the next room, to hear. Ballinger said the officials had not physically intimidated him, but left him kind of scared. Ballinger's willingness to testify on Tackett's behalf, however, was unshaken. One of the defense attorneys, however, told him his testimony was not needed and sent him home. 64 Spalding claims a similar encounter with the officials. He alleges that one of the officials terminated the interview by snapping, Just get ... the hell out of here, and the next time we see you we don't want to see any bitching from you. Spalding says he was very frightened. Despite this treatment, Spalding claims he still would have testified on Tackett's behalf. The defense attorneys, however, also sent him home without using him as a witness. 65 Linda Tackett's attorney verified this, stating that he had sent them home because he felt their testimony was not essential. Furthermore, both witnesses admitted they were not sure whether Brian Tackett attended the football game. We find it peculiar that the defendants did not bring this intimidation to the Court's attention during the trial. Instead, defense counsel just dismissed both witnesses, once he apparently heard what happened. 13 66 The right of a defendant to establish a defense by presenting his own witnesses is a fundamental element of due process. Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 93 S.Ct. 351, 34 L.Ed.2d 330 (1972) (per curiam). Courts have held that a variety of prosecutorial and judicial actions aimed at discouraging defense witnesses from testifying deprive the criminal defendant of his right to due process. Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 93 S.Ct. 351, 34 L.Ed.2d 330 (1972) (per curiam) (The judge admonished the defense witness, telling him that if he lied the judge would personally see to it that his case went to the grand jury and he would be indicted for perjury. The witness chose not to testify and the Supreme Court found reversible error.); United States v. Thomas, 488 F.2d 334, 335 (6th Cir.1973) (per curiam) (Secret Service agent approached witness before he was to testify and told him that if he testified he would be prosecuted for misprision of a felony. The Sixth Circuit held this was reversible error, where unnecessary ex parte communications between agent of prosecutor and witness appear to intimidate witness.). Webb, however, does not stand for the proposition that merely warning a witness of the consequences of perjury demands reversal. United States v. Smith, 997 F.2d 674, 679 (10th Cir.1993). Judges and prosecutors do not necessarily commit a Webb type violation merely by advising a witness of the possibility that he or she could face prosecution for perjury if his or her testimony differs from that he or she has given previously. Id. at 680. In fact, the government has an obligation to warn unrepresented witnesses of the risk that the testimony they are going to give can be used against them. United States v. Jackson, 935 F.2d 832, 847 (7th Cir.1991). Where, however, the substance of what the prosecutor communicates to the witness is a threat over and above what the record indicates is necessary, and appropriate, the inference that the prosecutor sought to coerce a witness into silence is strong. Id. 67 In the present case, it does not appear that the official's interrogation, while inappropriate, mandates reversal. The fact that the prosecutor's agents became belligerent and hostile towards the defense witness is not dispositive. The defense must show that the contact substantially interfered with any free and unhampered determination the witness might have had as to whether to testify. Smith, 997 F.2d at 680. 68 In this case, both witnesses were willing to testify after the interrogation. The interviews were not completely unnecessary or without purpose. Moreover, the district court allowed the interviews, and the defense counsel never objected to them. Although the interviews left Ballinger and Spalding understandably agitated, the interrogations did not affect their ability to testify or alter the probable outcome of the trial. Therefore, the government's actions did not result in error in this case.
69 Tackett next contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the trial. Traditionally, ineffective assistance of counsel claims are not cognizable on direct appeal. United States v. Gonzales, 929 F.2d 213, 215 (6th Cir.1991). The proper avenue for raising such claims is through a collateral attack on the conviction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2255. United States v. Goodlett, 3 F.3d 976, 980 (6th Cir.1993). If the parties have adequately developed the record, however, the court can elect to hear the issue on direct appeal. Id.; United States v. Wunder, 919 F.2d 34, 37 (6th Cir.1990). In this case, we find that the record is adequately developed for us to consider this issue. 70 Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are mixed questions of law and fact. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 698, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2070, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). We review ineffective assistance of counsel issues de novo on appeal. Sims v. Livesay, 970 F.2d 1575, 1579 (6th Cir.1992). 71 In this case, we find that Tackett received effective assistance of counsel. 72 A convicted defendant's charge that he was denied effective assistance of counsel, to be successful, requires that the defendant prove: (1) that counsel's performance was deficient; and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense so as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. 73 Meeks v. Bergen, 749 F.2d 322, 327 (6th Cir.1984). Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. Id. We presume from the outset that a lawyer is competent, and therefore, the burden rests on the accused to demonstrate a constitutional violation. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 2046, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984). 74 The first part of the analysis requires that a defendant show that the attorney's efforts fell below an objective standard of reasonableness ... under prevailing professional norms. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. Tackett has failed to do this. Tackett claims that he received ineffective assistance because his trial counsel did not (1) properly investigate his alibi, (2) present all of the witnesses that could have been presented, or (3) reveal the government intimidation. First, Tackett could not expect counsel to properly investigate an alleged alibi, when Tackett changed his mind as to whether or not to use it at every turn in the case. In fact, Tackett did not finally make up his mind until the government had rested. This put everyone, most notably Tackett's attorney, in a precarious position. Second, Tackett's counsel did not present every witness because many were cumulative or unreliable. (J.A. at 370.) Third, both Ballinger and Spalding would probably have been impeached if they testified. At the post-trial hearing, Ballinger and Spalding revealed that they were not positive whether they saw Tackett at the game. Finally, it is not clear that Tackett's counsel ever knew of the intimidation. (J.A. at 371 n. 1.) Therefore, Tackett has failed to show his counsel's performance was deficient.
75 Tackett also moves for a new trial on the grounds that the government presented perjured testimony. A district court's denial of a new trial should not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. United States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954, 966 (6th Cir.1982). 76 To prevail on a claim that the government presented perjured testimony, Tackett must show (1) that the statements were actually false; (2) the statements made were material; and (3)[the] prosecution knew they were false. United States v. Farley, 2 F.3d 645, 655 (6th Cir.1993). Tackett has failed to meet the first prong. 77 Two witnesses, Lewis Jenkins, Sr. and Lewis Jenkins, Jr., each said that Linda Tackett paid them on December 7, 1991, at the Tackett's farm in Bowling Green, Kentucky. Both said they saw Brian Tackett. Tackett, however, claimed he was in Findlay, Ohio. 78 After trial, Tackett called Neton Allen Sisk, who worked on the Tackett farm with the Jenkinses. Sisk stated that the Tacketts paid them on December 8. This does not establish that the Jenkins's statements were false, but only that someone was mistaken about the date. The jury had a chance to observe the witnesses' credibility, and Tackett could have called Sisk at trial. Additionally, the government presented other evidence to establish that Tackett was in Bowling Green on the day of the fire. Finally, even if the statements were false, Tackett fails to meet the third prong because he has not even hinted that the government knew they were false. 79 Tackett also claims that the government threatened Kim Patton and forced her to lie in order to convict him. Patton, however, stated at trial that no one threatened her or promised her anything as compensation for testifying. Tackett presents no evidence that Kim Patton perjured herself, except his own testimony. 14 The jury chose to believe Kim Patton over him. Therefore, we fail to find any evidence of perjured testimony. 80 The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Tackett's motion for a new trial based on perjured testimony.
81 Tackett argues that the district court improperly questioned witnesses. At trial, the defense failed to object to the district court's questions, and therefore, the proper standard of review is plain error. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15-16, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 1046, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985); Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). 82 The trial judge's duty is to conduct a trial in an orderly fashion and obtain truth and justice. United States v. Slone, 833 F.2d 595, 597 (6th Cir.1987). He must see to it that the issues are not obscured and the testimony is not misunderstood. The trial court has the right to interrogate witnesses for this purpose. Id. The District Judge asked a few follow-up questions to two witnesses. The first witness was Thurmon Tackett. He asked Thurmon Tackett questions because Mr. Tackett was attempting to evade the government's questions. The District Judge posed the questions in an even-handed, non-inflammatory manner. He also asked three questions of Morgan White. This was solely to clarify that no one had answered White's phone calls to the Tackett residence on December 6. The District Judge's questions were both warranted and necessary, and do not mandate reversal.
83 Tackett claims the trial was fundamentally unfair, and thus, he should be granted a new trial. The standard of review is abuse of discretion. Barlow, 693 F.2d at 966. 84 In his brief, Tackett simply asserts the trial was fundamentally unfair. He gives no reasons for this. Errors that might not be so prejudicial as to amount to a deprivation for due process when considered alone, may cumulatively produce a trial setting that is fundamentally unfair. Walker v. Engle, 703 F.2d 959, 963 (6th Cir.1983). Tackett fails to explain how his trial was fundamentally unfair and fails to point to an accumulation or even one error upon which to base this claim. We find no evidence of the trial being fundamentally unfair.