Opinion ID: 393976
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sex-inciting Devices or Contrivances

Text: 15 Appellees argue that even if the restrictions on the sale of contraceptives and prophylactics are invalid, nevertheless they are severable from the restriction on the sale of sex-inciting devices or contrivances. Appellees therefore contend chapter 772 is valid insofar as it prohibits the sale of sex-inciting devices or contrivances except by duly registered and licensed physicians and pharmacists. 16 Appellant argues that the single sentence prohibition in section 772.010 first restricting the sale of contraceptives, then sex-inciting devices or contrivances, and finally prophylactic rubber goods or membranes so closely ties together the items that chapter 772 is not severable and therefore unconstitutional in its entirety. Clearly if the phrase refers only to contraceptives or prophylactics which have sex-inciting characteristics, 4 this restriction is invalid for the reasons set forth in Part II B supra. 17 A federal court is without power to remedy defects in an ordinance by giving it constitutionally precise content. Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 622, 96 S.Ct. 1755, 1761, 48 L.Ed.2d 243 (1976). However, we are obliged to favor an interpretation which renders the statute constitutional, The Casbah, Inc. v. Thone, 651 F.2d 551 at 558 (8th Cir. 1981); Turchick v. United States, 561 F.2d 719, 723-24 (8th Cir. 1977). We therefore assume the phrase sex-inciting device or contrivance includes items which have no contraceptive or prophylactic characteristics. As so interpreted, an issue raised is whether the entire chapter is defeated because of the invalidity of the provisions restricting the sale of contraceptives and prophylactics. 18 We do not reach the close question of severability. 5 To the extent that the restriction in chapter 772 on the sale of sex-inciting devices or contrivances can stand alone, the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague. 19 The doctrine of vagueness is embodied in the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Due process incorporates notions of fair notice or warning. 6 Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572, 94 S.Ct. 1242, 1246, 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974). We have recently discussed the standards applied in deciding whether an ordinance is unconstitutionally vague on its face. We stated in Geiger v. City of Eagan, 618 F.2d 26, 28 (8th Cir. 1980): 20 Due process has two requirements: that laws provide notice to the ordinary person of what is prohibited and that they provide standards to law enforcement officials to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. 21 Vague laws offend several important values. First, because we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application. 22 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-109, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972) (footnotes omitted). 23 There is concern that lawmaking will be entrusted to the moment-to-moment judgment of the policeman on his beat. Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 120, 89 S.Ct. 946, 951, 22 L.Ed.2d 134 (1969) (Black, J., concurring). 24 In determining whether an ordinance is impermissibly vague, courts traditionally have relied on the common usage of statutory language, judicial explanations of its meaning, and previous applications of the statute to the same or similar conduct. Balthazar v. Superior Court, 573 F.2d 698, 700 (1st Cir. 1978). 25 No legislative or administrative definitions have been made of the phrase sex-inciting device or contrivance. A search of reported decisions of prosecutions under chapter 772 7 does not reveal any interpretation of the phrase by Missouri state courts. 8 26 It is our view that a restriction on the sale of any sex-inciting device or contrivance does not provide appellant with a sufficiently definite standard by which to judge whether a customer is buying a device for a legitimate use or a sex-inciting use. For example, appellant states some vibrators it offered for sale were seized by police, while others were not. Assuming that genital vibrators might be sex-inciting devices or contrivances, a problem arises because these items also have non-sex-inciting purposes which have been set forth in FDA regulations at 21 C.F.R. § 884.5960(a) (1980): A genital vibrator for therapeutic use is an electrically operated device intended and labeled for therapeutic use in the treatment of sexual dysfunction or as an adjunct to Kegel's exercise (tightening of the muscles of the pelvic floor to increase muscle tone). Thus a purchaser may want to purchase a genital vibrator to increase muscle tone. Appellant has no way to determine from the ordinance whether an item it wishes to offer for sale for this purpose will be considered by the police, judge, or jury to be sex-inciting. 27 The ordinance further lacks arrest and search standards for enforcement officials.    Where definite guidelines for enforcement officials are not present, use of the ordinance to expand arrest opportunities and justify searches magnifies the potential harm from enforcement of the ordinance. Geiger v. City of Eagan, supra, 618 F.2d at 29. 28 We also note the Supreme Court has struck down on vagueness grounds a licensing scheme for films when the standard in the ordinance for classifying a film was whether it was likely to incite or encourage delinquency or sexual promiscuity. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 88 S.Ct. 1298, 20 L.Ed.2d 225 (1968). 29 We conclude a restriction on the sale of sex-inciting devices or contrivances forbids    an act in terms so vague that (persons) of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. Conally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 127, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926). Nor does the phrase provide standards to law enforcement officials to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Geiger v. City of Eagan, supra, 618 F.2d at 28. The restriction on the sale of any sex-inciting device or contrivance is unconstitutionally vague. 30 We therefore conclude the ordinance is invalid in its entirety. 31 Reversed.