Opinion ID: 2099317
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dissolution and Wind Up of Spa GP

Text: Della Ratta concedes that any court can order the dissolution of a partnership. CA Section 9A-801 provides in pertinent part: A partnership is dissolved, and its business must be wound up, only upon the occurrence of any of the following events: ... (5) On application by a partner, a judicial determination that: ... [it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business of the partnership]. (emphasis added). Here, there is no question that the General Assembly did not restrict which court could make the judicial determination of whether dissolution of a partnership is appropriate and render an order accordingly. Thus, the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County possessed the subject matter jurisdiction to hear the dissolution count for Spa GP and would have been able to issue the final order of dissolution rather than transfer the matter to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. Della Ratta instead challenges the validity of the order for the wind up of Spa GP on grounds that the application requesting wind up was made in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County when it should have been made in Montgomery County. There is no dispute that the Circuit Court for Montgomery County supervised the wind up of Spa GP, but Della Ratta asserts that the language of CA Section 9A-803 (on application of any partner, ... the circuit court for the county in which the principal office of the partnership is located ... may order judicial supervision of the winding up) required Dyas to file his application for wind up in Montgomery County. Judge Rodowsky, writing for the CSA, rejected this argument, stating that the use of application in the statute was meant to refer to the class of persons who can request judicial supervision of the winding up process, rather than to limit the filing of an application to a specific court. Della Ratta v. Dyas, 183 Md.App. 344, 363, 961 A.2d 629, 640 (2008). We agree. The statute permits an order for judicial supervision of winding up of a partnership on application of any partner, partner's legal representative, or transferee.... CA § 9A-803 (emphasis added). The General Assembly could have, but did not, describe the petition for judicial supervision as an application to the circuit court for the county in which the principal office of the partnership is located. Instead, the General Assembly coupled the word application with of a partner, [etc.], indicating its intention to regulate who would have standing to make such an application, not the place where persons with standing could file such an application. The CSA also rejected Della Ratta's challenge to the order for wind up of Spa GP on the grounds that requiring severance of Dyas's dissolution actions from his other twelve claims would not be a commonsense application of the statute. Della Ratta, 183 Md.App. at 364, 961 A.2d at 641. It noted that actions for involuntary dissolution are often linked to claims of breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and possibly fraud. Id. As Dyas did not seek dissolution of Spa GP until after he had filed his other claims in Anne Arundel County, Della Ratta's theory would require Dyas to file a separate claim for dissolution in Montgomery County rather than attaching the count onto his third amended complaint in Anne Arundel County. Id. at 364, 961 A.2d at 640 (Ordinarily, Dyas would have been entitled to a stay of the dissolution action, pending resolution of his claims in Anne Arundel County.). If Dyas had been successful on his other claims (as he was here), collateral estoppel would lead to an order of dissolution in Montgomery County. By trying the issues in Anne Arundel County, and transferring the entire action to Montgomery County prior to the order of dissolution, Dyas has achieved the same result. Id. at 364, 961 A.2d at 641. Again, we agree with the CSA.