Opinion ID: 720717
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Plaintiff Pratt's Wrongful Termination Claim

Text: 54 Plaintiffs' fourth cause of action alleges that Southwest wrongfully terminated the employment of plaintiff Pratt because of the filing of the original Complaint, in violation of the Railway Labor Act and public policy. See Complaint at p. 13. Southwest has filed for summary judgment on this claim, contending that: (1) the RLA does not create a private cause of action, (2) neither Arizona nor Texas public policy exceptions to at-will employment apply in this situation, and (3) the undisputed facts show that the Southwest management personnel who terminated Pratt's employment were unaware that this lawsuit had been filed. Plaintiffs counter that: (1) the RLA and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, allow this claim, (2) the Utah public policy exception to at-will employment allows this claim, and (3) the factual posture of this claim makes it inappropriate for summary judgment. 55 Regarding the federal prong of Plaintiffs' claim, the court agrees with Southwest's argument that the All Writs Act does not provide an independent basis for jurisdiction over this claim. See, e.g., Commercial Sec. Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 456 F.2d 1352, 1355 (10th Cir.1972); Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr. v. F.C.C., 750 F.2d 70, 77 (D.C. Cir.1984). Nor does a private cause of action exist under the RLA for those who assert retaliatory conduct based upon employee activities which bear no relationship to establishing a union, or to employer activities that bear no relationship to undermining a union. Herring v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 894 F.2d 1020, 1023 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1016, 110 S.Ct. 1319, 108 L.Ed.2d 495 (1990). 56 Regarding the state-law public policy prong of the claim, the parties appear uncertain as to which state law should apply. 32 This issue need not be decided here, however, due to the court's disposition of this final claim in Plaintiffs' Complaint. 57 It is well-settled that pendent [supplemental] jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff's right. United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1139, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966). Moreover, the justification for the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction: 58 lies in considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants; if these are not present a federal court should hesitate to exercise jurisdiction over state claims even though bound to apply state law to them. Needless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law. Certainly, if the federal claims are dismissed before trial ... the state claims should be dismissed as well. 59 Id.; see also, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (stating that district court may decline exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over state claims if it has dismissed claims over which it had original jurisdiction). 60 In this case, litigation has not proceeded to the point that Plaintiffs would be prejudiced if this claim was dismissed. Therefore, in the exercise of its discretion, the court declines jurisdiction over plaintiff Pratt's wrongful termination claim, which is grounded in a state-law-based public policy exception to the at-will doctrine.