Opinion ID: 1203061
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: THE MEANING OF PENAL CODE SECTION 1538.5, SUBDIVISION (i)

Text: (2a) On its face, section 1538.5, subdivision (i) is clear and unambiguous. In pertinent part, the section provides: If the motion [to suppress] was made at the preliminary hearing, unless otherwise agreed to by all parties, evidence presented at the special hearing shall be limited to the transcript of the preliminary hearing and to evidence which could not reasonably have been presented at the preliminary hearing, except that the people may recall witnesses who testified at the preliminary hearing. (Italics added.) The People contend that this language gives the prosecution an unequivocal right to recall witnesses at the special hearing. We agree. The Court of Appeal, following dictum in People v. Anderson (1989) 210 Cal. App.3d 24, 28 [258 Cal. Rptr. 125], disagreed with this contention and construed the language of the section narrowly to permit the People to recall witnesses only in opposition to evidence which a defendant presents in the superior court. The court concluded that the Legislature's purpose in adopting the language in question was to allow the prosecution to rebut new evidence presented by the defense. (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Rep. on the 1987 Amends., Assem. Bill No. 2328 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.) Jan. 27, 1986, p. 3.) The section does not on its face contain the limitation adopted by the Court of Appeal. Defendants [6] argue that such a limitation can be found if one reads the exception (except that the people may recall witnesses who testified at the preliminary hearing) to apply only to the words evidence which could not reasonably have been presented at the preliminary hearing, and not to modify the words limited to the transcript of the preliminary hearing as well. Under such an interpretation, the People's right to recall witnesses would be limited to those circumstances in which the defendant had presented new evidence at the superior court hearing. However, we believe defendants' argument lacks merit. The exception simply does not impose any limitations on the People's right to recall witnesses at the special hearing. In our view, nothing in the language of section 1538.5, subdivision (i), is reasonably susceptible to the Court of Appeal's interpretation. (3) Standard rules of construction require us to give the words in a statute the meaning they bear in ordinary use. [Citations.] If the language is clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, nor is it necessary to resort to indicia of the intent of the legislature.... [Citations.] ( Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735 [248 Cal. Rptr. 115, 755 P.2d 299]. See also Delaney v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 785, 798 [268 Cal. Rptr. 753, 789 P.2d 934]; Committee of Seven Thousand v. Superior Court (1988) 45 Cal.3d 491, 501 [247 Cal. Rptr. 362, 754 P.2d 708]; Solberg v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 182, 198 [137 Cal. Rptr. 460, 561 P.2d 1148].) (2b) The words of the section do not qualify the right of the People to recall witnesses at the special hearing. Instead, that right is clear and unambiguous. ( Lungren v. Deukmejian, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 735.) Therefore, we believe there is no need to construe the section or to look to external evidence of the intent of the Legislature. However, even if it were necessary for us to look to the legislative intent, our conclusion would be the same. The legislative history supports our conclusion that the Legislature intended the People to be able to recall witnesses at the renewed suppression motion without limitation. In disagreeing with this conclusion, the Court of Appeal relied on a report prepared for the Assembly Committee on Public Safety (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Rep. on the 1987 Amends., Assem. Bill No. 2328 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.) Jan. 27, 1986, p. 3), which states that the purpose of allowing the prosecution to recall witnesses at the special hearing would be to allow the prosecution to rebut new evidence presented by the defense. While this statement indicates one possible purpose for recalling a witness, it does not clearly indicate an intent to limit the right of the prosecution to recall witnesses. Moreover, any support this statement might give to defendants' interpretation is considerably weakened by a report from the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, which states that [t]he prosecution ... has the right to recall witnesses who testified at the preliminary hearing. The bill would not limit the testimony of the recalled prosecution witnesses to newly presented evidence. (Sen. Com. on the Judiciary, Rep. on Assembly Bill No. 2325 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.) p. 4, italics added.) There is no suggestion in the Senate report that the testimony of the recalled witnesses would be limited to responding to newly presented defense evidence. On the basis of this legislative history, it is difficult to conclude that the Legislature intended to permit the People to recall witnesses at the special hearing in the superior court only when the defense has presented new evidence. Finally, defendants contend that a literal interpretation of section 1538.5, subdivision (i) would result in absurd consequences which the Legislature did not intend, and that we should construe the statute to avoid this result. ( People v. Pieters (1991) 52 Cal.3d 894, 898 [276 Cal. Rptr. 918, 802 P.2d 420], quoting Younger v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 102, 113 [145 Cal. Rptr. 674, 577 P.2d 1014].) In amending the statute, the Legislature intended to limit the number of hearings a defendant may receive on motions to suppress evidence. (Sen. Com. on the Judiciary, Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 2328 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.) p. 3.) Defendants assert that acceptance of a literal reading would defeat the purpose of eliminating repeat testimony at the special hearing, and hence would contravene the purpose of the Legislature. We again disagree. As written, the section serves the legislative purpose by substantially reducing the total amount of time spent litigating suppression motions. Under our interpretation, a full de novo hearing is avoided, thus advancing the legislative goal behind section 1538.5, subdivision (i). We therefore conclude that there is no justification or supportable basis for adopting the limitation suggested by the Court of Appeal. We understand the words of section 1538.5, subdivision (i), to mean what they say and say what they mean: the People have an unqualified right to recall witnesses at the special hearing.