Opinion ID: 793602
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Clearly Established Federal Law on Constitutionally Defective Counsel

Text: 82 The Supreme Court first articulated the now-familiar two-part test for determining whether counsel is ineffective in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and [i]t is past question that the rule set forth in Strickland qualifies as clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 390, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Under Strickland, to show that his counsel's assistance was ineffective, Petitioner bears the burden in showing 1) that his counsel's performance was deficient, in other words, that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and 2) that Petitioner was prejudiced by the attorney's deficient performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 83 The Supreme Court has established an objective test for the deficiency prong: When a convicted defendant complains of the ineffectiveness of counsel's assistance, the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, as judged by prevailing professional norms. Id. at 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Indicia of objective unreasonableness include the violation of `certain basic duties' inherent in the representation of a criminal defendant, among them a `duty of loyalty' to the client, from which derive `the overarching duty to advocate the defendant's cause and the more particular duties to consult with the defendant on important decisions and to keep the defendant informed of important developments in the course of the prosecution.' Rickman v. Bell, 131 F.3d 1150, 1154 (6th Cir.1997) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052). In assessing deficient performance, reviewing courts must take care to avoid second-guessing strategic decisions that failed to bear fruit. Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 84 If Petitioner is successful in proving deficient performance, Petitioner must then show that counsel's constitutionally deficient performance prejudiced Petitioner. Petitioner need not show that counsel's deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in the case, rather, only that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Ohio is a weighing state, which means that the aggravating circumstances must outweigh the mitigating factors in order to impose the death penalty. Under federal law, one juror may prevent the death penalty by finding that mitigating factors outweigh aggravating factors. As the Supreme Court recently said in Wiggins, the prejudice prong is satisfied if there is a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have struck a different balance. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 523-28, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003). 85 In determining whether prejudice has resulted from counsel's errors, a court must consider the totality of the evidence before the jury.... [A] verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by the record is more likely to have been affected by errors than one with overwhelming record support. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. 2052. In making this determination as to prejudice, this Court examines the combined effect of all acts of counsel found to be constitutionally deficient, in light of the totality of the evidence in the case. See, e.g., Blackburn v. Foltz, 828 F.2d 1177, 1186 (6th Cir.1987). If Petitioner fails to prove either deficiency or prejudice, then Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claims must fail. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ([A] court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies.... If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice ... that course should be followed.) 86 Capital defense counsel has an affirmative duty to pursue mitigation evidence and to conduct an appropriate investigation into potential mitigating factors: 87 Counsel's constitutional duty to investigate a defendant's background in preparation for the sentencing phase of a capital trial is well-established. Coleman v. Mitchell, 268 F.3d 417, 449 (6th Cir.2001); see also Austin v. Bell, 126 F.3d 843, 848 (6th Cir.1997). The prospect of being put to death unless counsel obtains and presents something in mitigation magnifies counsel's responsibility to investigate. Mapes v. Coyle, 171 F.3d 408, 426 (6th Cir.1999). And notwithstanding the deference Strickland requires, neither this court nor the Supreme Court has hesitated to deem deficient counsel's failure to fulfill this obligation. See, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 523-28, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 ... (2003) (concluding that counsel's failure to expand their investigation of the defendant's personal background, which included physical and sexual abuse, beyond the presentence investigation and Department of Social Services reports constituted constitutionally deficient performance); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 395, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 ... (2000) (finding counsel's failure to conduct an investigation that would have uncovered extensive records graphically describing Williams' nightmarish childhood deficient); Carter v. Bell, 218 F.3d 581, 596-97 (6th Cir.2000) (concluding that defense counsel's failure to investigate the defendant's family, social, or psychological background constituted representation at a level below an objective standard of reasonableness). Accordingly, our principal concern in deciding whether [counsel] exercised reasonable professional judgment is ... whether the investigation supporting counsel's decision not to introduce mitigating evidence of [Harries's] background was itself reasonable. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 522-23, 123 S.Ct. 2527 (internal quotations and citations omitted). In assessing counsel's investigation, we must conduct an objective review of their performance, measured for `reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.' Id. at 523, 123 S.Ct. 2527 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052). ... More recent ABA Guidelines, which the United States Supreme Court has recognized as reflecting prevailing professional norms, emphasize that investigations into mitigating evidence `should comprise efforts to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence and evidence to rebut any aggravating evidence that may be introduced by the prosecutor.' Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524, 123 S.Ct. 2527 (quoting ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases § 11.4.1(C), p. 93 (1989) and adding emphasis). 88 Harries v. Bell, 417 F.3d 631, 637-638 (6th Cir.2005). 89 3. Defense Counsel Was Not Deficient in Failing to Assert a Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity Defense 90 Petitioner alleges that his trial counsel's failure to assert a not guilty by reason of insanity defense was constitutionally defective performance. Petitioner states in his brief to this Court that his trial counsel failed to obtain an appropriate expert to offer testimony about [Petitioner's] state of mind at the time at which these offenses occurred. (Pet'r Br. 46.) Petitioner then puts forth legal argument that criminal defendants are entitled to mental health experts and cites case law in support of this contention. (Pet'r Br. 47-49, citing Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 71, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985) (The State must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination ....).) Petitioner argues that Petitioner's trial counsel failed to ask for and secure an expert [as] contemplated by Ake.  (Pet'r Br. 48.) 91 Petitioner is correct in that a counsel's failure to explore the possibility of a not guilty by reason of insanity defense through reasonable investigation, including the use of a qualified mental health expert, can rise to the level of constitutionally defective counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ([S]trategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation. In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.); see also Powell v. Collins, 332 F.3d 376 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that capital defendant is entitled to mental health expert during guilt and penalty phases); Sims v. Livesay, 970 F.2d 1575, 1580 (6th Cir.1992). Here, however, the only conclusion supported by the record before this Court is that defense counsel did secure appropriate mental health experts and did make an adequate investigation into Petitioner's mental state and background well before the criminal trial. 92 Petitioner's trial counsel requested and received funding for two clinical psychologists, Dr. Newton Jackson and Dr. Nancy Schmidtgoessling. Petitioner has a constitutional right to only one mental health expert. See Ake, 470 U.S. at 71, 105 S.Ct. 1087. Records submitted to the court indicate that these psychologists each evaluated Petitioner well before Petitioner's August 1990 guilt-phase trial. These same records show that the psychologists met with Petitioner's defense counsel in advance of trial and after each had evaluated Petitioner. Moreover, both mental health experts interviewed people from Petitioner's background, including immediate family members. 93 Counsel's diligence in obtaining not just the constitutionally mandated single mental health expert, but two mental health experts, shows that counsel engaged in a reasonable investigation into Petitioner's mental state at the time of the crimes. Counsel's decision not to pursue an insanity defense must be understood as a strategic one, absent any compelling evidence to the contrary. Given that defense counsel did call Dr. Schmidtgoessling during the penalty phase to testify to Petitioner's mental condition, but that Dr. Schmidtgoessling admitted, on cross-examination, that she should could not reach a conclusion that Petitioner was not sane at the time of his crimes, Petitioner has no substantive grounds on which to claim that trial counsel's strategic choice was unreasonable. 5 94 To the extent that Petitioner's argument can be framed as one impugning the competency of the psychologists retained to assist trial counsel, Petitioner's argument has little merit. The Constitution does not require that an indigent criminal defendant be able to retain the expert of his choosing, only that a competent expert be made available. See Ake, 470 U.S. at 83, 105 S.Ct. 1087. A licensed practitioner is generally held to be competent, unless counsel has good reason to believe to the contrary. Cf. Skaggs v. Parker, 235 F.3d 261, 268 (6th Cir.2000) (finding defense counsel's reliance on expert during penalty phase unreasonable in light of expert's highly unusual and eccentric behavior during guilt phase). Here, Petitioner presents no evidence that Dr. Jackson and Dr. Schmidtgoessling were incompetent. Instead, Petitioner submits an affidavit of Ph.D. psychologist Jeffrey Smalldon who opines that Petitioner should have been seen as eligible ... for a defense of not guilty by reason of insanity. (J.A. at 121.) The question before this Court, however, is not whether all mental health experts would agree on whether the defense was viable, but whether counsel's decision not to pursue the defense was a reasonable strategic choice. [R]easonably diligent counsel may draw a line when they have good reason to think further investigation would be a waste. Rompilla v. Beard, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 2463, 162 L.Ed.2d 360 (2005). 6 95 Given counsel's information at the time of trial, there is no evidence to support the conclusion that counsel's decision was unreasonable. 96 As to the penalty phase of Petitioner's trial, Petitioner's claim for ineffective assistance with respect to the use of mental health experts must similarly fail. Contrary to Petitioner's contention, defense counsel did submit mitigating psychological evidence to the extent possible. Defense counsel placed Dr. Schmidtgoessling on the stand. Dr. Schmidtgoessling testified to Petitioner's difficult family background, the unusual forms of discipline Petitioner had been subjected to as a child, and the emotional abuse Petitioner had been subjected to by his parents. Dr. Schmidtgoessling testified that Petitioner's religious beliefs affected his perception of reality, and that she diagnosed Petitioner with mixed personality disorder with the dominant features being narcissism, paranoia, and anti-social tendencies. Dr. Schmidtgoessling further testified that, in her opinion as a psychologist, Petitioner really believed ... that it was right to kill these folks because he believed that God commanded him to do so. (J.A. at 10836.) It may be inferred, however, from Dr. Schmidtgoessling's conclusion that Petitioner was not insane, that in her view Petitioner's delusional thinking did not rise to the legal definition of insanity under Ohio law. 97 Given the absence of a factual basis for Petitioner's claim, the state court's conclusion that defense counsel was not ineffective for its failure to present an insanity defense cannot be said to be contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. 98 4. Defense Counsel Was Not Ineffective in Failing to Object to Particular Pieces of Evidence 99 In his fourteenth claim for relief, Petitioner alleged ineffective assistance of counsel due to counsel's failure to raise a series of nine objections at trial. The objects of the nonobjections are as follows: 100 (a) Evidence of the character of the victims, even though their character was not at issue. 101 (b) Evidence as to what the prosecutor told the police to do as it related to the search and recovery of the victims' bodies, which had the effect of bolstering the witness' testimony and establishing the appearance of conducting a search in conformity with the law. 102 (c) A witness' mentioning of Jonestown. (J.A. at 9579.) 103 (d) Expert opinions that were not stated in terms of probability. 104 (e) Demonstrative use and admission of numerous firearms and other materials unconnected to the death of the Averys. 105 (f) Use of the victims' decayed clothing with attached body parts, resulting in the prejudicial introduction of offensive odors, and testimony as to the Averys' stomach contents. (J.A. at 10106-27.) 106 (g) Testimony concerning other acts evidence not related to or similar to the offenses at bar. 107 (h) Prosecutorial recitation of facts not in evidence during closing argument. 108
109 (Pet'r Br. 55.) 110 As analyzed supra, subclaims (a), (b), (c), (d), (h), and (i) are procedurally defaulted, and Petitioner has failed to overcome his default. Only subclaims (e), (f), and (g) are preserved for our review. 111
112 As a threshold matter, in a trial of any size, numerous potentially objectionable events occur. [T]he Constitution does not insure that defense counsel will recognize and raise every conceivable constitutional claim. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982). Moreover, experienced trial counsel learn that objections to each potentially objectionable event could actually act to their party's detriment. Learned counsel therefore use objections in a tactical manner. In light of this, any single failure to object usually cannot be said to have been error unless the evidence sought is so prejudicial to a client that failure to object essentially defaults the case to the state. Otherwise, defense counsel must so consistently fail to use objections, despite numerous and clear reasons for doing so, that counsel's failure cannot reasonably have been said to have been part of a trial strategy or tactical choice. See Hodge v. Hurley, 426 F.3d 368, 376 (6th Cir.2005) ([C]ounsel's failure to object to any of the numerous improper statements in the prosecution's closing argument is well outside [professional norms].) (emphasis in original). 7 113
114 Even assuming, arguendo, that Petitioner is able to prove that it was error for counsel to fail to object to the above-referenced evidence, Petitioner has failed to show how 1) the failure to object to any of the enumerated instances amounts to a constitutional deprivation of counsel, and 2) how Petitioner was prejudiced by the admission— i.e., why this Court should find that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Petitioner is not entitled to a presumption of prejudice unless it can be said that his counsel fail[ed] meaningfully to oppose the prosecution's case. Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 179, 125 S.Ct. 551, 160 L.Ed.2d 565 (2004). 115 Petitioner presents no argument in support of the prejudice prong beyond Petitioner's conclusory assertions that the cumulative effect of the errors denied Petitioner his right to effective assistance of counsel. The evidence of Petitioner's guilt was overwhelming. Petitioner admitted to shooting the Averys. Accomplices testified against Petitioner and provided details of the crimes. Coroner's evidence corroborated the accomplices' testimony. Forensic evidence further corroborated the accomplices' accounts. In the penalty phase, Petitioner himself did not disclaim the acts, but merely asserted that his actions were not wrong because God's will directed them. In light of this overwhelming evidence, it is difficult to conclude that there exists a reasonable probability that but for the alleged errors, the result of either the guilt or penalty phases would have been different. 116 c. The Supreme Court of Ohio's decision was not an unreasonable application of federal law 117 Petitioner has preserved for review his allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel due to counsel's failure to object to the firearms evidence (subclaim (e)), the victims' clothing (subclaim (f)), and other acts evidence (subclaim (g)). 118 Petitioner argues that his trial counsel should have objected to the state's introduction of firearms evidence which was unconnected to the death of the Averys. Petitioner further contends that his trial counsel should have objected to the presentation of the Averys' putrified clothing in the courtroom. Finally, Petitioner argues that defense counsel should have objected to the testimony of an Officer Alvord that revealed that Petitioner had been under investigation for plans to assault the Kirtland Temple. 119 On direct review, the Ohio Court of Appeals found that the court did not commit plain error by allowing the firearms and ostensible other acts evidence into the trial, concluding that while the firearms (and presumably the testimony going to the planned assault) were of questionable relevance, Petitioner had failed to establish that but for the disputed evidence, the results of the guilt or penalty phases would have been otherwise. Lundgren, No. 90-L-15-140, 1993 WL 346444, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS, at -20. The Ohio Supreme Court agreed, summarily finding that Petitioner was not prejudiced by the admission of the evidence under the plain error standard. See Lundgren, 653 N.E.2d at 318. 120 Petitioner argues that his trial counsel should have objected to the prosecution's use, in court, of the Averys' clothing as visual exhibits of where bullets penetrated. The clothing, recovered from the buried bodies of the Averys, was accompanied by a pungently acrid smell. 121 Both the Ohio Court of Appeals and the Ohio Supreme Court failed to treat separately each evidentiary subclaim under Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel assignment of error. Instead, the courts concluded generally that even were Petitioner able to prove counsel erred in failing to proffer objections, Petitioner had failed to prove prejudice. See Lundgren, No. 90-L-15-140, 1998 WL 964592, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 4394, at -92; Lundgren, 653 N.E.2d at 324. In addition, the Ohio Supreme Court observed: 122 Lundgren's counsel vigorously and professionally defended his client in an unpopular cause. As a part of that strenuous defense, counsel could make tactical choices. Lundgren's trial strategy was to concede that he shot the Averys, but argue he did not deserve the death penalty, given his sincere religious motives. Under the facts, the decision not to object to issues raised in propositions of law five, six, seven, eight, nine, eleven, thirteen, fourteen, twenty-one, twenty-two, and twenty-three did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. 123 Lundgren, 653 N.E.2d at 324 (internal quotation and citation omitted). 124 The district court found the firearms evidence admissible as relevant to a finding of prior calculation and design and therefore concluded that counsel did not err in failing to object to their admission. In addition, the district court found that Agent Alvord's testimony revealing suspicion of Petitioner's plans to assault the Temple was admissible because it was admitted in the context of the agent's testimony tending to reveal that Petitioner was packed and ready to move and therefore had prior calculation and design to kill the Averys and then quit the area. Finally, the district court concluded that the clothes were properly admitted to show that their defects were consistent with the testimony as to the victims' gunshot wounds. 125 The Ohio Supreme Court's conclusion cannot be said to be either contrary to nor an unreasonable application of the Strickland test. The evidence against Petitioner going to guilt was undisputed, and the basic elements of the crime—the planning and execution of a family of five—are strong aggravating factors in and of themselves. Petitioner does not support in briefs to this Court how, without the above evidence, there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Petitioner's argument under these subclaims must fail. 5. Summary 126 Petitioner has procedurally defaulted his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel as premised on victim character evidence, the mention of Jonestown, the use of certainty language, the warrantless barn search, the wiretap, and prosecutorial misconduct. Without argument as to cause for his failure to bring these issues up on direct appeal, Petitioner cannot overcome this procedural default. 127 Petitioner's non-defaulted claims show no grounds for habeas relief premised on ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner's trial counsel had ample reason for not bringing an insanity defense and had performed a reasonable investigation into Petitioner's mental state and background. Moreover, the state court's determination that Petitioner failed to prove prejudice from the introduction of the victims' clothing, the firearms evidence, and Petitioner's Temple assault plans was not contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law.