Opinion ID: 3165718
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Pattern of Heroin Transactions

Text: We turn to the district court’s conclusion that the defendants’ pattern of transactions constituted circumstantial evidence, such that “the jury could have made a reasonable, non-speculative inference that Defendants must have agreed to distribute as much heroin as they could and that the distribution would have continued in a similar fashion.” Even if some hypothetical pattern of transactions were consistent and clear enough to infer a preexisting agreement to surpass a certain quantity, such is not the pattern before us. While the testimony of Equihua-Ramirez and Burns could prove repeated transactions over a period of eight weeks, the testimony did not show any consistency in those transactions, either with respect to amount or to frequency, from which a jury could reasonably infer an agreement to distribute a kilogram of heroin. This conclusion is underscored by the vague and equivocal nature of the testimony itself. Both witnesses at points contradicted themselves, and Burns repeatedly indicated that his memory was unreliable. Even construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the purchases in this case appear to have been ad hoc, and dependent on the level of demand at any given moment. The evidence showed that Equihua-Ramirez bought his supply of heroin from Navarrette only once he had sold the amount he had previously purchased; that Burns was Equihua-Ramirez’s biggest customer; that Burns only purchased heroin when there was sufficient demand; that demand was “different all the time”; and that there was a period of approximately two weeks out of a total period of ten weeks in which the heroin “went bad,” and Burns did not purchase any heroin. UNITED STATES V. NAVARRETTE-AGUILAR 23 Moreover, the testimony given at trial revealed that the whole arrangement was temporary and unstable. During the period alleged in the indictment, Equihua-Ramirez was effectively subbing for his friend. He testified that he had no intention of continuing once his friend returned, and, in fact, that he became so frustrated with the bad heroin that he considered quitting. Similarly, Burns repeatedly testified that he intended to quit selling heroin. In sum, it would be speculative to infer that the defendants agreed to any future transactions such that they would reach the one kilogram mark. Speculation cannot constitute substantial evidence. See Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1277. Our conclusion is further supported by the Fourth Circuit’s holding in United States v. Hickman, 626 F.3d 756 (4th Cir. 2010). In that case, the court held that substantial evidence did not support a conviction for conspiracy to distribute one kilogram of heroin where the past transactions and future, expressly agreed-upon transactions amounted to a maximum of 836 grams. Id. at 766. In Hickman, as in this case, the government argued that the jury could conclude that the transactions proven were part of an “ongoing course of business.” Id. at 768. The government in that case further argued that “[it was] clear that . . . [the defendant] would have continued” to distribute heroin. Id. The Hickman court disagreed. It concluded that such a finding would come perilously close to impermissibly convicting the defendant of “hypothesized future bad acts,” and, moreover, that “[w]here no evidence exists to guide the trier of fact in determining the outer scope of a conspiracy, the trier may not simply guess at the magnitude or frequency of unknown criminal activity.” Id. at 768–69. 24 UNITED STATES V. NAVARRETTE-AGUILAR In this case, the district court attempted to distinguish Hickman. In Hickman, the defendants agreed to or actually undertook three transactions, whereas in this case the number is at least ten. Therefore, the district court concluded that, unlike in Hickman, here there was sufficient evidence to “guide” the jury “as to the total amount that was involved in the conspiracy,” because there were “multiple purchases and multiple sales and thus, there were more than a ‘limited number of actual transactions.’” But though the evidence here showed more transactions than in Hickman, Hickman is not so easily distinguishable. In Hickman, the evidence supported a finding that the defendants had distributed a maximum of 836 grams over a period of four months, which is not much different than the up to 750 grams over a period of three months (according to the district court’s calculations) in this case. And here, like in Hickman, the argument that the co-conspirators would have distributed one kilogram if it had not been interrupted potentially allows a quantity finding to stand upon what Navarrette “would have continued to do[,] which, to the extent these hypothesized future bad acts were not captured by an agreement within the charged period, is clearly improper.” Hickman, 626 F.3d at 768 (internal quotation marks omitted). Such a theory impermissibly “invites the jury to speculate as to the amount of heroin involved in the conspiracy.” Id. The government agrees that, should we conclude that substantial evidence does not support the jury’s verdict on the one kilogram quantity special finding, the error was not harmless and re-sentencing would be appropriate. While the special finding only resulted in a mandatory minimum sentence on Count One, the district court imposed an identical sentence on all counts. It is clear that the district court used this twenty-year sentence as the “starting point and the initial UNITED STATES V. NAVARRETTE-AGUILAR 25 benchmark,” Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 108 (2007) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007)), and that, had the district court sentenced Navarrette absent the special finding and mandatory minimum, “it may have arrived at a different sentence,” see United States v. Munoz-Camarena, 631 F.3d 1028, 1031 (9th Cir. 2011). Therefore, we reverse the jury’s quantity finding, vacate Navarrette’s sentence on all counts, and remand for resentencing.6