Opinion ID: 1767064
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Denial of Strong's Motion In Limine to Exclude Reference to Sexual Acts Perpetrated Against Others

Text: Strong filed a motion in limine to exclude any testimony about sexual acts or statements done or made by him other than the incidents charged. Specifically, this included statements by people, [other] than the alleged victim in this case, that Richard Strong has touched them in a sexual manner, attempted to do so, or made statements to them of a sexual nature. The circuit court granted the motion with respect to statements made by Strong but denied the motion with respect to acts perpetrated by Strong, pursuant to Ark. R. Evid. 404(b) (2007) and the pedophile exception articulated and recognized by this court. Shavonia Strong, one of Strong's biological daughters, testified that, on two occasions when she was approximately eight or nine years old, her father attempted inappropriate sexual behavior with her. The admission or rejection of evidence under Ark. R. Evid. 404(b) is left to the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of discretion. Flanery v. State, 362 Ark. 311, 208 S.W.3d 187 (2005). According to Ark. R. Evid. 404(b), [e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. Such evidence is permissible for various other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Ark. R. Evid. 404(b). This court has recognized a pedophile exception to this rule, whereby we have approved allowing evidence of similar acts with the same or other children when it is helpful in showing a proclivity for a specific act with a person or class of persons with whom the defendant has an intimate relationship. Flanery v. State, supra . The rationale for recognizing this exception is that such evidence helps to prove the depraved sexual instinct of the accused. Id. For the pedophile exception to apply, we require that there be a sufficient degree of similarity between the evidence to be introduced and the sexual conduct of the defendant. White v. State, 367 Ark. 595, 242 S.W.3d 240 (2006). We also require that there be an intimate relationship between the perpetrator and the victim of the prior act. Id. Shavonia Strong's testimony falls squarely under the pedophile exception to Rule 404(b). The relationship between her and her father was clearly an intimate one. See id. The conduct about which she testified was sufficiently similar to the charged conduct to warrant application of the exception. Shavonia testified that her father tried to rub against her with his penis and that he did this while on top of her on a bed in his room. While this conduct is not identical to that alleged by K.M., we also note that both Shavonia and K.M. were under Strong's care at the time of the abuse. K.M. viewed Strong as her father. Furthermore, both girls were between the ages of six and nine at the time of the start of the abuse. In Flanery v. State, supra , we upheld the use of the pedophile exception despite the fact that the prior conduct was not identical to the charged conduct. We pointed out that the victim and the witness were similar in age when the abuse happened and that both were living in the appellant's home and viewed him as a father figure. Id. In light of such precedent, we cannot say that the degree of similarity between the prior conduct and the charged conduct was insufficient. Clearly, this evidence was helpful in showing a proclivity toward a specific act with a person or class of persons with whom Strong had an intimate relationship. See id. Shavonia's testimony helped to prove Strong's depraved sexual instinct. See id. Therefore, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Strong's motion and permitting this testimony, and an appeal of this ruling would be without merit. Likewise, Ark. R. Evid. 403 (2007) provides no ground for reversal. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the probative value of Shavonia's testimony outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice, because the evidence involved a similar crime against a child of an age similar to that of K.M., and both were in Strong's care at the time of the abuse. See Hernandez v. State, 331 Ark. 301, 962 S.W.2d 756 (1998).