Opinion ID: 2567349
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Asserted Faretta error

Text: Defendant contends that on June 17, 1988, a superior court judge (not the judge who presided at trial) erred in denying his motion to represent himself under Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 ( Faretta ). The Attorney General asserts that defendant's waiver of self-representation later cured any error. We agree with the Attorney General. Analysis of this contention requires a recitation at some length of the pertinent factual background. As mentioned above (see 32 Cal.Rptr.3d p. 58, 116 P.3d pp. 523-524, ante ), on June 15, 1988, defendant moved to dismiss his attorneys, Barnett and O'Malley, and have the district attorney represent him. (See People v. Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d 118, 84 Cal.Rptr. 156, 465 P.2d 44 ( Marsden ).) When told that representation by the prosecutor was impossible, defendant renewed his motion to dismiss his attorneys and asked to represent himself. Defense counsel raised a doubt as to defendant's competency, and argued that if the court did not agree that defendant was incompetent, then there was a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship. The court disagreed. O'Malley noted that defendant's Faretta motion remained pending, and both defense attorneys moved to withdraw as counsel, citing a deterioration in the attorney-client relationship. The court then asked defendant a number of questions to determine whether his request for self-representation was voluntary. Defendant responded that he understood the court's admonitions, was aware of the dangers of self-representation, and knew he potentially faced the death penalty. He also expressed a desire to plead guilty, but the court said it would not allow him to do so even if he represented himself. In response to the court's inquiry about his education, defendant said he had graduated from high school and had one year of college. The court asked whether defendant had any problem understanding English; defendant answered in the negative, although he acknowledged he needed some words explained to him. The court told defendant he might not understand much of the language to be used in the trial. The court denied the Faretta motion, stating: I think the record adequately reflects the reason for the court's denial, but the court does not feel that [defendant] is competent to represent himself in this particular action based upon his education and his language. The court also stated it was granting the Marsden motion, apparently referring to Barnett's and O'Malley's motion to withdraw. The court ordered the transcript of the hearing sealed. More than a year later, on July 27, 1989, the judge then presiding over defendant's competency trial ordered the transcript of the June 17, 1988, hearing unsealed at the parties' joint request. Defense Counsel Gray argued the transcript revealed error in the denial of defendant's Faretta motion. The prosecutor and the judge agreed. In an effort to cure the error in denying his Faretta motion, the judge offered to examine defendant immediately concerning his current thoughts on self-representation, and to do so again after the verdict in the competency trial. The judge explained to defendant that the transcript of the June 17, 1988, hearing revealed that incorrect procedure had been followed and that the court and counsel were discussing how to remedy the problem. The judge then declared a recess to allow defendant to confer with his attorneys. When the court reconvened, competency Trial Counsel Rockhill stated that defendant did not then wish to represent himself. At the prosecutor's request, the court examined defendant on the issue. Defendant stated that he understood what they had been discussing and that, with respect to his attorneys, I personally don't like either one of them as far as their attitudes toward me, but I do agree with what you just said, I do not want to represent myself. I need some lawyers. During the afternoon session that day, Trial Counsel Gray moved to dismiss the case based on Faretta error. The court denied the motion, stating it believed any error had been cured because defendant was given and declined the opportunity to represent himself, and would be given the same opportunity after the determination of his competency. On October 10, 1989, after the jury found defendant competent to stand trial, and before the start of voir dire in the criminal trial, the trial court again asked defendant if he wished to represent himself. Defendant answered: I don't want to represent myself. I want the lawyer  the lawyer to take full responsibility of the case for shipping me to San Francisco for the federal jury. The court commended defendant on his decision, and defendant replied: I don't really appreciate his work but we will see how it goes. If you are willing to take the responsibility, Mr. Gray. Mr. Dunkle cannot sign anything because it is the responsibility of the government and they are responsible for the murders for controlling Mr. Dunkle on the headwave without the permission of Jon Dunkle. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his Faretta motion on June 17, 1988, and that later proceedings failed to remedy the error. As defendant observes, Faretta holds that the Sixth Amendment grants an accused personally the right to present a defense and thus to represent himself upon a timely and unequivocal request. ( People v. Marshall, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 20-21, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 84, 931 P.2d 262.) The right to self-representation obtains in capital cases as in other criminal cases ( People v. Clark (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583, 617, 268 Cal.Rptr. 399, 789 P.2d 127), and may be asserted by any defendant competent to stand trial  one's technical legal knowledge, as such, being irrelevant to the question whether he knowingly and voluntarily exercises the right ( Godinez v. Moran (1993) 509 U.S. 389, 399-400, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321; People v. Joseph (1983) 34 Cal.3d 936, 943-944, 196 Cal. Rptr. 339, 671 P.2d 843). The right to representation by counsel persists until a defendant affirmatively waives it, and courts indulge every reasonable inference against such waiver. ( People v. Marshall, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 20, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 84, 931 P.2d 262.) Applying these standards, we conclude defendant's June 17, 1988, request to represent himself, made over a year before the commencement of his criminal trial, was timely, and the Attorney General does not argue it was either involuntary or other than knowing. Notably, when he made the request, defendant had just been found competent to stand trial. Thus, the superior court erred in denying the request. Defendant acknowledges that the Faretta right, once asserted, may be waived or abandoned. In McKaskle v. Wiggins (1984) 465 U.S. 168, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122, in which the trial court appointed standby counsel for a self-represented defendant, the United States Supreme Court concluded that the defendant, who had acquiesced in standby counsel's participation at various points during the trial, could not complain on appeal that he was denied his right to represent himself at those points. ( Id. at pp. 182-183, 104 S.Ct. 944.) In Brown v. Wainwright (5th Cir.1982) 665 F.2d 607, the federal court of appeals concluded that a defendant who, expressing dissatisfaction with his attorney, first asserted his right of self-representation and later made no objection when his counsel told the court that he and the defendant had resolved their difficulties and that the defendant wanted him to continue his representation, had waived his Faretta request. ( Id. at p. 611; see also People v. Rudd (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 620, 628-631, 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 807; id. at p. 631, 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 807 [a defendant who failed to object to revocation of his self-represented status for `serious and obstructionist conduct' in failing to be ready for trial on the date he had agreed could not complain on appeal]; People v. Skaggs (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1, 7-9, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 376 [even if the defendant's equivocal comment were construed as a Faretta request, he abandoned it by failing to seek a definitive ruling on it]; People v. Kenner (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 56, 62, 272 Cal.Rptr. 551 [a defendant may, by his or her conduct, indicate abandonment or withdrawal of a request for self-representation].) We agree with defendant that the proceedings of July 27, 1989, although resulting in defendant's clear disclaimer of his Faretta rights, failed to remedy the error in the denial of his Faretta request because criminal proceedings were then suspended due to the pendency of the competency hearing. (See § 1368, subd. (c) [[W]hen an order for a hearing into the present mental competence of the defendant has been issued, all proceedings in the criminal prosecution shall be suspended until the question of the present mental competence of the defendant has been determined.]; People v. Horton (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1068, 1108, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 516, 906 P.2d 478; People v. Marks (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1335, 1340, 248 Cal.Rptr. 874, 756 P.2d 260.) We disagree, however, with defendant's further contention that the proceedings of October 10, 1989, after the resumption of criminal proceedings, failed to correct the error because the record reflects he was talking gibberish and thus did not intentionally and voluntarily waive a constitutional right. Defendant does not now appear to assert he was incompetent on that date, and any such assertion must fail. As the Attorney General notes, defendant had already had two competency hearings, most recently some two months earlier, and no substantial change of circumstances, warranting yet another competency inquiry, had occurred. ( People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 136, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 614, 38 P.3d 461.) In any event, the record contains no suggestion that defendant did not understand what he was giving up in confirming that he wished to be represented by counsel, or that he might in fact have wished to represent himself notwithstanding his statements to the contrary during the October 10, 1989, proceedings as well as the earlier hearing. For this reason, too, the circumstance that the court informed defendant that the trial would start the following week, or that in 1988 it had declined to permit defendant to plead guilty, did not render his waiver of Faretta rights involuntary. Because the proceedings of October 10, 1989, cured the error in denying defendant his Faretta rights, any error in the court's denial of the defense motion for mistrial based on the Faretta error was nonprejudicial. Defendant further asserts that, in any event, reversal of the judgment is required because the trial court's error in denying his Faretta motion resulted in his being forced to accept unwanted representation by counsel for an entire year, during which period resolution of the case was delayed, against his wish to plead guilty. But he cites no authority for the proposition that a defendant who, following an erroneous denial of his assertion of Faretta rights, validly waives the right to self-representation and proceeds to trial represented by counsel is entitled to relief on appeal. Indeed, such decisions as McKaskle v. Wiggins, supra, 465 U.S. 168, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122, and Brown v. Wainwright, supra, 665 F.2d 607, are to the contrary, and we therefore reject the contention.