Opinion ID: 1869289
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Grant Mistrial after Prosecutor's Voir Dire Bolstering of Commonwealth's Witness

Text: Appellant first claims that the trial court erred when it failed to grant a mistrial during voir dire when the Commonwealth described its witness as having no motive and being neutral. The Commonwealth first told the jury that the co-defendant, Smith, had already had his day in court, [1] but that they may or may not find out what happened in his case. The Commonwealth then told the jury that it was their job to determine credibility. In reference to Smith's testimony, the Commonwealth asked the jury if it could think of a reason someone might lie for someone else, take the blame for someone else, cover up for someone else. The Commonwealth then said, Well, there's such an individual today, and then there is an individual who is neutral. And that neutral individual is Mr. Ronald Estill. The defense objected and moved for a mistrial. At a bench conference, the Commonwealth agreed to correct any error. The court sustained the objection, but overruled the motion for a mistrial. No admonition or further relief was requested. However, the Commonwealth then offered to clarify by instructing the jury that it was their job to determine credibility and who had the motivation to lie. The defense responded, Okay, as long as he clarifies, and the Commonwealth informed the jury accordingly. A mistrial is an extreme remedy and should be resorted to only when there appears in the record a manifest necessity for such an action or an urgent or real necessity. Bray v. Commonwealth, 177 S.W.3d 741, 752 (Ky.2005). A manifest necessity is an `urgent or real necessity' that is determined on a case by case basis. Commonwealth v. Scott, 12 S.W.3d 682, 684 (Ky.2000) (quoting Miller v. Commonwealth, 925 S.W.2d 449, 453 (Ky. 1996)). A hung jury is a classic example of a manifest necessity requiring a mistrial. Id. However, `[i]n some cases the declaration of a mistrial by a presiding judge when there was no manifest necessity to do so will prevent retrial.' Radford v. Lovelace, 212 S.W.3d 72, 79 (Ky.2006) (quoting Nichols v. Commonwealth, 657 S.W.2d 932, 933 (Ky.1983)). When deciding whether there is manifest necessity to declare a mistrial, we must look to see if either parties' right to a fair trial has been infringed upon. Radford, 212 S.W.3d at 80. To do this, the court must always assess if the parties' `interest in seeing the first trial through to a verdict [is] outweighed by competing and equally legitimate demand for [protection of the parties' rights and] public justice.' Id. (quoting Scott, 12 S.W.3d at 685). Specifically, the decision should be based on whether the complained of `event ... prevented the [party] from receiving a fundamentally fair trial.' Id. (quoting Scott, 12 S.W.3d at 685). The standard for reviewing the denial of a mistrial is abuse of discretion. Bray v. Commonwealth, 68 S.W.3d 375 (Ky.2002). Here, defense counsel agreed that the Commonwealth could clarify any potential bolstering issue by telling the jury that they would determine credibility and motivation. Additionally, the Commonwealth's bolstering was not during its case in chief while Estill was on the stand; it was during voir dire. No admonition was requested. Even though it was improper bolstering, it was not an error `of such character and magnitude that a litigant will be denied a fair and impartial trial and the prejudicial effect can be removed in no other way [except by grant of a mistrial].' Bray, 177 S.W.3d at 752 (quoting Gould v. Charlton Co., Inc., 929 S.W.2d 734, 738 (Ky.1996)). Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to declare a mistrial.