Opinion ID: 1403970
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the duty of the tavern owner

Text: Next is the question of whether a tavern owner has a common law duty to an intoxicated adult customer who injures himself. Because we find that the duty of the tavern owner does not extend to an adult customer who voluntarily consumes intoxicants and is injured, we need not address the question of proximate cause. [2] Traditionally, no duty to the inebriated customer could be enforced for want of a recognized causal link. Great Central Ins. Co. v. Tobias, 37 Ohio St.3d 127, 524 N.E.2d 168, 171 (1988). In Brigance, however, we recognized that the concept of duty is one of public policy and is subject to the changing attitudes and needs of society. Id. at 303. Because accidents involving drunk drivers have become commonplace, we held: [W]e find the commercial vendor for on the premises consumption is under a duty, imposed both by statute and common law principles, to exercise reasonable care in selling or furnishing liquor to persons who by previous intoxication may lack full capacity of self-control to operate a motor vehicle and who may subsequently injure a third party. We must now decide whether public concerns and changing attitudes require this duty to be extended to the inebriated customer. Several states have considered the question. See Annot., 98 A.L.R.3d 1230 (1980). A majority of them have refused to create a cause of action for an adult who voluntarily drinks to the point of intoxication and is thereby injured. [3] These jurisdictions have generally concluded that as a matter of public policy drunken persons who harm themselves are responsible for their condition, and should not prevail either under a common law or statutory basis. Bertelmann, 735 P.2d at 933; see also Wright v. Moffitt, 437 A.2d 554, 557 (Del. 1981). Focusing on the duty concept, these courts hold the view that no duty should be imposed upon the tavernkeeper, and protection should not be extended, because the adult voluntarily created the vulnerability that is the problem. Trujillo v. Trujillo, 104 N.M. 379, 721 P.2d 1310, 1313 (Ct.App. 1986). To allow recovery in favor of one who has voluntarily procured a quantity of liquor for his or her own consumption with full knowledge of its possible or probable results `would savor too much of allowing ... [the] person to benefit by his or her own wrongful act.' [ Allen v. County of Westchester, 109 A.D.2d 475, 492 N.Y.S.2d 772, 776 (N.Y. 1985)] ... We cannot allow such a result. Id. If this Court were to create a cause of action against the tavern owner, the inebriate could be rewarded for his own immoderation. Such was not the intent of Brigance, nor will we allow such a reward. Rather, we concur in the view enunciated in Kindt v. Kauffman, 57 Cal. App.3d 845, 129 Cal. Rptr. 603, 610 (1976): The inestimable gift of reason and self-control cries out for preservation in every person, and the duty of its preservation devolves upon each member of the public. When the restraint of reason and the ability to care for one's self are perverted by a conscious, self-indulgent act of voluntary intoxication which temporarily casts off those powers, no societal or personal wrong, nor violation of public or social policy is accomplished or violated if the actor is alone held answerable for his injury... . Governmental pateralism protecting people from their own conscious folly fosters individual irresponsibility and is normally to be discouraged.... To go yet another step and allow monetary recovery to one who knowingly becomes intoxicated and thereby injures himself is in our view morally indefensible. The opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part argues that the creation of a new cause of action would be consistent with Brigance. In so urging, it is claimed that no logical reason exists for distinguishing between the intoxicated passenger and the intoxicated driver. We disagree. The difference is obvious and dispositive. One individual got behind the steering wheel of an automobile and drove it in a drunken condition; the other one didn't. Societal considerations aimed at deterring drunken driving forbid the driver's recovery of damages; no such policy need preclude a non-driver's claim. In no other situation called to our attention does the law so excuse one's failure to act responsibly. A defendant in a criminal trial, for example, is held accountable for his criminal behavior committed while in a state of voluntary intoxication. Grayson v. State, 687 P.2d 747 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984); 21 O.S. 1981 § 153. A worker's injury resulting directly from the intoxication of the injured employee while on duty is not compensable under Workers' Compensation law. 22 O.S. 1981 § 11. Then there are the practical consequences of recognizing such suits. Pause, if you will and contemplate the vast number of claims that may be urged by drunks, if they were entitled to every expense and injury that are natural concomitants of their intoxication. Sager v. McClenden, 296 Or. 33, 672 P.2d 697, 701 (1983). In a world where alcohol is readily available for consumption by adults the ultimate accountability should rest on the adult consumer, absent unusual circumstances or injury to an innocent third party. A court that creates, as in Brigance, a cause of action based on public policy has a burden to responsibly chart the boundaries beyond which the new cause of action does not serve the public, and should not be the law. By that standard we see no public policy that would demand extension of the traditional tort law. Here, the question is simply whether the intoxicated adult must bear the responsibility for his own injury which occurred due to his voluntary consumption of an excessive amount of alcohol. In the absence of harm to a third party, the act of serving an alcoholic beverage to an intoxicated adult customer and allowing the customer to exit the establishment does not constitute a breach of duty which is actionable in common law negligence. The public policy of protecting the innocent from the intoxicated would not be furthered by such an extension of Brigance. This holding does not ignore the conduct of the tavern owner, as the opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part fears. If a third party is injured, the rule of Brigance provides a cause of action against the tavern owner as well as the driver. Furthermore, the tavern owner who disregards the condition of his customers does so at the risk of criminal prosecution as well as forfeiture of his liquor license. Accordingly, under the facts as presented to us we find that the tavern owner has no liability to the intoxicated adult who voluntarily consumes alcoholic beverages to excess and sustains injuries as a result of his intoxication. The question certified to us by Judge Daugherty must be answered in the negative. CERTIFIED QUESTION ANSWERED. OPALA, C.J., HODGES, V.C.J., and SIMMS, DOOLIN and HARGRAVE, JJ., concur. LAVENDER and KAUGER, JJ., concur in part, dissent in part. ALMA WILSON, J., dissents.