Opinion ID: 2108163
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Battery in Rhode Island

Text: The defendant next invites this Court to abandon our common-law definition of criminal battery and replace it with the Model Penal Code's rule, [5] which requires bodily injury to support a criminal conviction for battery. [6] In Rhode Island, [a]side from the obvious higher standard of proof required to establish criminal battery, the law recognizes no distinction between criminal and civil battery. Fenwick v. Oberman, 847 A.2d 852, 855 (R.I. 2004). Battery refers to an act that was intended to cause, and does cause, an offensive contact with or unconsented touching of or trauma upon the body of another, thereby generally resulting in the consummation of the assault. State v. Messa, 594 A.2d 882, 884 (R.I.1991) (quoting Proffitt v. Ricci, 463 A.2d 514, 517 (R.I.1983)). In Fenwick, we indicated that the opportunity may one day present itself, given the proper factual scenario, for this Court to address whether criminal battery should require an element of harm. Fenwick, 847 A.2d at 855 n. 4. However, we do not believe that this issue is properly before us in this case because the argument was not raised during trial. Rule 33 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure does not authorize a trial justice following a jury-waived criminal trial to grant a new trial. Rule 33 permits only that a trial justice on motion by the defendant may vacate the judgment, take additional testimony, and direct the entry of a new judgment. The rule now permits alleged errors of law to be addressed in the context of a motion for a new trial. However, it does not allow a defendant to raise an entirely new issue at the Rule 33 stage. See Rule 33, Committee Notes for 2002 Amendment (It is not intended nor anticipated that the ability to raise an error of law on a motion for a new trial will change the    harmless error, plain error, and contemporaneous objection rules generally applicable to trials.). The rule allows defense counsel to present to the trial justice a legal argument that previously had been made during trial before the verdict was entered. We recognize that defendant repeatedly argued during trial that Arrico never was harmed by the contact with Albanese, but defense counsel never argued that such harm was a required element of battery, and instead agreed with the trial justice's definition of battery that did not require proof of injury. During the first motion to dismiss, the trial justice said we all know that battery is an unlawful touching of one person's body with another person's body. Do you accept that? Defense counsel responded, An unpermitted, unyes, I do, your Honor. Although defendant contended that Arrico was not harmed by the contact, this argumentthat criminal battery should require an element of harm as opposed to a mere uncontested touching or offensive contactwas not made to the trial justice until the hearing on defendant's motion for a new trial. Because such an argument was not made during trial, it cannot belatedly be asserted during the motion for a new trial. As we have said on innumerable occasions, this Court's familiar `raise-or-waive' rule precludes our consideration of an issue that has not been raised and articulated at trial. State v. Bido, 941 A.2d 822, 828 (R.I.2008). Therefore, because the issue was not properly preserved, we decline to address it at this time.