Opinion ID: 1950123
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Plain Error and the Laumer Test

Text: Even if we decided to exercise our discretion and to review Mr. Gilchrist's constitutional claim despite his failure to raise the issue in the trial court, he would not be entitled to a reversal of his convictions under the applicable plain error standard of review. [19] Under the first two prongs of the plain error test and Mr. Gilchrist's analysis, he would have to demonstrate that the trial court committed constitutional error in determining the credibility of Mr. Hamilton, rather than leaving that assessment to the jury, and he would have to establish that the error was plain. Mr. Gilchrist maintains that the trial court committed error because [t]he last three decades of controlling decisional law [in the Supreme Court and in this court] have undermined substantially the philosophical basis underlying the first prong of the Laumer test and, as a result, Laumer does not bind this court. However, he cites no decision from the Supreme Court or this court explicitly declaring that a trial court which determines the credibility of a witness, offered to repeat a declarant's statement against penal interest, violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution. And, not one of the cited cases overrules the Laumer test. Indeed, this panel would be bound by Laumer since only the en banc court may overrule a decision of a prior panel or division, or the en banc court. M.A.P. v. Ryan. [20] Moreover, the Supreme Court cases cited by Mr. Gilchrist are quite different from the one before us, both factually and with respect to the issues presented. [21] Hence, even if Mr. Gilchrist had preserved his constitutional claim, we would not conclude that the trial court erred, or that any such error was plain or obvious. Furthermore, even if we determined that the trial court erred or plainly erred with respect to the posited constitutional claim, we would not agree that Mr. Gilchrist would be able to demonstrate prejudice under the third or fourth prongs of the plain error standard. This is so because he would not be able to satisfy the third prong of the Laumer test, whether there exist corroborating circumstances that clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statements. The alleged statement of Mr. Ross, which Mr. Gilchrist sought to introduce through the testimony of Mr. Hamilton, falls into the second category of statements against penal interest which the Court discussed in Lilly v. Virginia  those offered as exculpatory evidence by a defendant who claims that it was the maker of the statement, rather than he, who committed (or was involved in) the crime in question. [22] These second category statements are not viewed as inherently unreliable, as are third category statements. [23] Nevertheless, the circumstances surrounding [these types of statements must] provide considerable assurance of their reliability. [24] Laumer distilled from Chambers v. Mississippi, supra , general considerations relevant to the issue of reliability and trustworthiness of a statement against penal interest; the first two are pertinent here: (1) the time of the declaration and the party to whom the declaration was made; [and] (2) the existence of corroborating evidence in the case. [25] Contrary to Mr. Gilchrist's argument, we are satisfied that the trial court properly applied the considerations pertaining to the third Laumer prong, and did not confound the first and third prongs. The trial court's analysis of the third prong of the test is consistent with Chambers and Laumer. The trial court looked at the timing of Mr. Ross's declaration. Unlike the declarant's statement in Chambers, Mr. Ross' statement was made five years after Mr. Davis' murder, rather than shortly after the murder had occurred. [26] As we said in Laumer, the court in United States v. Guillette, found that the declarant's inculpatory statement which was made some four months after the crime was too attenuated and remote to provide assurance of reliability. [27] Clearly, Mr. Ross' alleged statement was made long after the murder of Mr. Davis; the reasons for the delay are not clear on this record; and, as the trial court noted, there is no evidence that Mr. Ross told anyone else about his alleged role as Mr. Davis' murderer. Moreover, although the existence of a close relationship between the declarant and the witness also may provide indications of trustworthiness, [28] the closeness of the relationship between Mr. Ross and Mr. Hamilton is not crystal clear. True, they were childhood friends and attended the same elementary and junior high schools, but there is no independent evidence showing that the friendship and closeness continued to the time of Mr. Ross' alleged statement. With respect to the existence of corroborating evidence  another consideration identified in Chambers and Laumer  the trial court emphasized that Mr. Ross' statement incorrectly specified the place of the shooting as the alley, rather than Ms. Butler's apartment. And, the trial court properly took into consideration the strong evidence that Mr. Gilchrist murdered Mr. Davis; the evidence included the eyewitness testimony of Ms. Butler, who lived with Mr. Gilchrist at the time of the crime, and the testimony of Mr. Love, who saw Mr. Gilchrist stomp Mr. Davis in the alley until he expired, and who helped Mr. Gilchrist dispose of the body. In light of our review of the record and Mr. Ross' alleged statement, we would be constrained to conclude that the trial court correctly found that Mr. Ross' statement was not reliable or trustworthy under the third Laumer prong. [29] Under these circumstances, and in light of the government's strong and compelling evidence of Mr. Gilchrist's guilt, as well as the great care that the trial judge took to ensure the fairness of the trial proceedings, Mr. Gilchrist would not be able to establish the third prong of the plain error standard  that the error (assuming error in the trial court's denial of the defense request to present the testimony of Mr. Hamilton) affected his substantial rights  or the fourth prong. Even assuming that there would be a reasonable probability that the error[] had a prejudicial effect on the outcome of the trial, under the fourth prong of the plain error standard, for the reasons stated, Mr. Gilchrist would not be able to show a miscarriage of justice, or that the error could have seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the trial proceeding. [30] Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. So ordered.