Opinion ID: 2022261
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Defendant's Invocation of Constitutional Rights

Text: Allen asserts that his Miranda rights were violated by police officers who ignored his invocation of the right to remain silent and his demand for counsel. Specifically, he claims that he invoked his right to remain silent when he exclaimed, Wait a minute, hold it, hold it, (R. at 338), and that he invoked his right to counsel when he asked to speak to his mother. In Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975), the Court held that a confession obtained in an interrogation initiated some time after a suspect cut off earlier questioning did not violate Miranda. Evidence obtained in this way may be admissible even though a subsequent interview was initiated by an officer, so long as the police scrupulously honor the defendant's right. Id. The Court reasoned that Miranda does not forever prohibit law enforcement officials from speaking to a suspect once she decides not to speak; room is left for the officer to inquire whether the suspect has changed her mind and decided to speak. When an officer ceases questioning at the time a suspect indicates she is not willing to answer and, prior to any subsequent questioning, the suspect is again advised of her rights, the suspect's rights have been respected if she then decides to speak. Id. Allen's exclamation, hold it, was simply not an invocation of the right to remain silent. In context, it is readily apparent that Allen's exclamation was nothing more than an instantaneous reaction to learning that the polygraph indicated a lack of truthfulness when he was questioned about the murder weapon. (R. at 334-38.) Allen did not communicate by words or conduct a desire to cease answering questions. We conclude that Allen did not invoke his right to cut off questioning. A similar outcome befalls Allen's claim that the police denied his right to counsel. The right to counsel during custodial interrogation is more profound than the right not to speak and, once invoked, it cannot be waived except upon the initiation of the accused. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85, 101 S.Ct. at 1884-85. The Edwards Court emphasized the inconsistency with Miranda that would attend a rule permitting law enforcement authorities, at their insistence, to reinterrogate an accused in custody if he has clearly asserted his right to counsel. Id. at 485, 86 S.Ct. at 1633 (emphasis added). Allen argues that he did not understand the meaning of the word counsel because Logsdon misled him. He points to Logsdon's improper remark that counsel doesn't mean lawyer, it could be pretty much anybody, (R. at 307), followed by Allen's requests to speak to his mother. Still, the totality of circumstances does not show that Allen clearly asserted a desire for the advice or presence of counsel. Examination of Logsdon's dialogue with Allen shows that Allen was aware of his right to an attorney but showed no interest in speaking to one. It is readily apparent that Logsdon wanted Allen not to change his mind about doing the polygraph interrogation, but Logsdon did in fact talk to him about lawyers and the appointment of an attorney in addition to making the pretty much anybody remark. Allen responded each time. Logsdon then presented Allen with a Miranda waiver form, suggested he read it, told him [t]hat don't mean you have [to] do anything, and referred to the advisement of rights. (R. at 308.) Allen signed it. He never demonstrated confusion about the meaning of counsel and did not show interest in the advice of counsel. Some fifteen to thirty minutes later, Allen first requested to speak to his mother. He said he had wanted to talk to her since early in the evening to let her know what's happenin[g]. (R. at 323.) Logsdon responded that he would ask other officers to contact her and then he left the room. When he returned, he told Allen he had spoken with an officer who had gone to his mother's home and talked to her. Allen would not mention his mother again for half an hour. On the basis of this exchange, we conclude that Allen did not clearly assert his right to counsel when he asked to speak with his mother. We reach the same conclusion with respect to Allen's second and third requests to speak to his mother. No reason exists for this Court to find that Allen was actually invoking his constitutional rights because there is no evidence of him conceptually linking mother with counsel, attorney, lawyer, or rights. Allen asked to speak to his mother only when his story began collapsing under the weight of negative polygraph results.