Opinion ID: 2783488
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Anthony Forfeited his Right to Testify

Text: ¶65 Having established that a criminal defendant may forfeit his or her right to testify through conduct incompatible with the assertion of the right, we proceed to consider whether Anthony forfeited his right to testify in his own defense. ¶66 Anthony argues that the circuit court erred in its forfeiture determination. He submits that the circuit court went where no court has gone before: denying a criminal defendant the right to testify where his conduct did not first warrant removal from the courtroom. Painting this case exclusively as a disruption case under Allen, Anthony contends that there is no precedent for stripping a defendant of his right to testify based on 'disruptive' behavior when he was never so disruptive as to render it impossible to carry on the trial in his presence. In his view, the circuit court's decision in this case amounted to nothing more than a protective measure based on the circuit court's fear that Anthony may become disruptive. Anthony maintains that there is no basis in existing law for such a preemptive application of Allen. ¶67 Anthony recognizes that Rock permits reasonable limitations on the right to testify where legitimate interests in the criminal trial process are concerned. However, he argues that the Rock balancing test weighs in his favor. In asserting 26 No. 2013AP467-CR that the circuit court's forfeiture determination was arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes it was designed to serve, Anthony questions whether legitimate interests in the criminal trial process were really at issue. As to the preservation of courtroom decorum, Anthony contends that there is no authority to support the proposition that [the right to testify] can be circumscribed by principles of decorum. Regarding the interest in maintaining order in the courtroom, Anthony argues that the circuit court's concern for the jury's safety may have arisen post hoc.17 As for the circuit court's interest in controlling the presentation of evidence, Anthony submits that he never indicated that he would testify in anything but a truthful and relevant manner. ¶68 In sum, according to Anthony, the complete denial of his right to testify was a far too severe punishment for [his] minor disruption and dissent, particularly in light of the fact that he planned to serve as the sole eyewitness in support of his self-defense theory. ¶69 The State contends that Anthony forfeited his right to testify by refusing to comply with the circuit court's evidentiary ruling and posing a threat to the preservation of dignity, order, and decorum in the courtroom. The State disagrees with Anthony's assertion that a circuit court can only bar a defendant from testifying where his or her conduct 17 Post hoc is defined as [a]fter this; consequently. Black's Law Dictionary 4 (7th ed. 1999). 27 No. 2013AP467-CR warrants removal from the courtroom. According to the State, a denial of the right to be present at trial is a more extreme sanction than denial of the right to testify because removal from the courtroom infringes upon several rights: the right to confrontation, the right to conduct a defense, and the right to appear before a jury. Thus, per the State's reasoning, it is illogical to require the same level of misconduct to justify the denial of both rights. ¶70 The State acknowledges an absence of case law directly addressing the issue before the court; however, it contends that cases dealing with forfeiture of a defendant's right to counsel through conduct inconsistent with the assertion of the right are more persuasive than the disruption type cases that Anthony offers. See, e.g., Cummings, 199 Wis. 2d at 752-56; United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1100 (3d Cir. 1995) (recognizing that a defendant can forfeit or waive by conduct his or her right to counsel through dilatory tactics). Specifically, the State argues [i]f a defendant can be found to have forfeited or 'waived by conduct' the right to counsel without an explicit waiver and absent any violent behavior, it logically follows that a defendant can also be found to have forfeited his right to testify without engaging in behavior that merits removal from the courtroom. ¶71 Recognizing that Rock sets forth the appropriate test for determining the propriety of a circuit court's decision concerning forfeiture of the right to testify, the State asserts that the circuit court's interests in controlling the 28 No. 2013AP467-CR presentation of the evidence and preserving dignity, order, and decorum in the courtroom justified the complete denial of Anthony's right to testify. ¶72 We agree with the State and hold that Anthony forfeited his right to testify by displaying stubborn and defiant conduct that presented a serious threat to both the fairness and reliability of the criminal trial process as well as the preservation of dignity, order, and decorum in the courtroom. ¶73 As a preliminary matter, we concur with the State that a circuit court need not remove a defendant from the courtroom in order to justify a denial of the right to testify. The cases that we have cited for the proposition that a defendant may forfeit a constitutional right through conduct do not exclusively involve the type of violent and disruptive behavior that may necessitate removal from the courtroom. See, e.g., Cummings, 199 Wis. 2d at 752-56; See also Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 20 (1973) (holding that the defendant waived or forfeited his constitutional right to be present through his voluntary absence). Therefore, when determining whether a defendant forfeited his or her right to testify through conduct, we believe the appropriate inquiry is to consider the totality of the circumstances in order to assess whether the defendant interfered with the circuit court's ability to protect that right. We reiterate that such an inquiry must be guided by Rock's balancing test——the forfeiture determination must not be arbitrary or disproportionate to the 29 No. 2013AP467-CR purposes it is designed to serve. In other words, a complete denial of the right to testify must be reasonable under the circumstances of the case. ¶74 In this case, we recognize two distinct interests that formed the basis of the circuit court's complete denial of Anthony's right to testify. Both constitute legitimate interests in the criminal trial process. ¶75 The first involves the circuit court's ability to control the presentation of evidence so as to ensure the fairness and reliability of the criminal trial process. The primary purpose of a criminal trial is to develop relevant facts on which a determination of guilt or innocence can be made. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 230 (1975); See also State v. McClaren, 2009 WI 69, ¶5, 318 Wis. 2d 739, 767 N.W.2d 550 (Ascertainment of the truth is the primary objective of a trial. . . .). Efficiency is a secondary objective of a trial, but where it can be attained with constitutionally permitted measures, it is highly desirable. McClaren, 318 Wis. 2d 739, ¶5. ¶76 Under Wis. Stat. § 906.11, circuit courts are charged with serving these two purposes. The statute provides, in relevant part: (1) Control by judge. The judge shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to do all of the following: (a) Make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth. 30 No. 2013AP467-CR (b) Avoid needless consumption of time. (c) Protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment. Wis. Stat. § 906.11(1). We have held that Wis. Stat. § 906.11 enables a circuit court to try to be certain that a jury is presented with admissible, reliable evidence and to make pretrial rulings so that the trial runs smoothly. McClaren, 318 Wis. 2d 739, ¶3. Indeed, the trial process requires as much: The adversary process could not function effectively without adherence to rules of procedure that govern the orderly presentation of facts and arguments to provide each party with a fair opportunity to assemble and submit evidence to contradict or explain the opponent's case. The trial process would be a shambles if either party had an absolute right to control the time and content of his witnesses' testimony. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410-411 (1988). ¶77 It is clear from our review of the record that Anthony's proposed testimony likely would have confused or misled the jury, thereby presenting an obstacle to the ascertainment of truth. As the circuit court acknowledged, the jury had a difficult decision to make, and irrelevant matters such as Anthony's alleged wrongful conviction; Anthony's status as an African-American male; Anthony's religious beliefs; and Anthony's memories all the way back to when [he] was five years old would not have helped the jury make its decision. ¶78 To take but one example, if Anthony had been allowed to testify about his alleged wrongful conviction, it is possible that the State would have felt compelled to prove that Anthony's 31 No. 2013AP467-CR conviction was never overturned and may have been completely legitimate. In other words, the issue of Anthony's purported wrongful conviction had the obvious potential to develop into a trial within a trial, thereby confusing the jury as to the issues it was required to decide, or worse, misleading the jury into thinking that it could determine Anthony's guilt or innocence in this case based on the likelihood that he was wrongfully convicted of armed robbery in 1966. To further complicate matters, the trial within a trial likely would have constituted a needless consumption of time. ¶79 Where, as here, a defendant repeatedly promises to disobey a circuit court's evidentiary ruling, the effect of which would seriously threaten the fairness and reliability of the criminal trial process, we think it fair to say that a circuit court has a legitimate interest in placing reasonable limitations on a defendant's right to testify. See Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302 (In the exercise of this right, the accused, as is required of the State, must comply with established rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence.); See also Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 327 (2006) (While the Constitution thus prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence under rules that serve no legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to promote, well-established rules of evidence permit trial judges to exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by 32 No. 2013AP467-CR certain other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the jury.). ¶80 The second distinct interest underlying the circuit court's forfeiture determination concerned the preservation of dignity, order, and decorum in the courtroom. In our view, the record is clear that Anthony posed a serious threat to that legitimate interest in the criminal trial process as well. ¶81 The circuit court made findings of fact with respect to Anthony's demeanor at trial, both in its oral decision and its written decision post-conviction, and we defer to them unless they are clearly erroneous. Ndina, 315 Wis. 2d 653, ¶45. The circuit court observed that Anthony was quite animated when insisting to testify to irrelevant matters, i.e., he was speaking very forcefully with a good deal of anger in his voice. The circuit court noted how enraged and tensely coiled Anthony became and how close he seemed to a breaking point.18 Based on Anthony's demeanor, the circuit court expressed concern that Anthony would cause a ruckus on the stand and pose a threat to the security of the jury. 18 Anthony suggests that these findings of fact, described in the circuit court's written decision post-conviction, were the product of a post hoc rationalization for the circuit court's forfeiture determination. However, we recently explained that taking judges at their word is a fundamental assumption built into our legal system. State v. Robinson, 2014 WI 35, ¶48, 354 Wis. 2d 351, 847 N.W.2d 352. In the absence of clear evidence to contrary, we decline to assign improper motive on the part of the circuit court. Id. 33 No. 2013AP467-CR ¶82 The circuit court's observations are supported by other portions of the record. For example, the record shows that Anthony threatened that he would need to be carried out of the courtroom if he could not testify freely. At some point, additional sheriff's deputies were called into the courtroom, bringing the total present to eight. Toward the end of the circuit court's discussion with Anthony, the sheriff's office requested that Anthony wear a stun belt for the remainder of the trial. Also, at Anthony's sentencing, the circuit court noted the presence of additional sheriff's deputies because of that [one] incident in my court where you couldn't contain your rage, and that's what I'm concerned about. ¶83 Where, as here, a defendant displays such disruptive conduct, we find it rational to conclude that a circuit court has a legitimate interest in placing reasonable limitations on the right to testify.19 ¶84 Having identified two legitimate interests that warranted the imposition of reasonable limitations on Anthony's right to testify, the question remains whether the circuit court's complete denial of that right was in fact reasonable under the circumstances. Stated differently, we consider 19 Contrary to Anthony's assertion, there is case law supporting the proposition that the right to testify can be circumscribed by principles of decorum. See, e.g., United States v. Ives, 504 F.2d 935, 941-46 (9th Cir. 1974), vacated on other grounds, 421 U.S. 944 (1975), opinion reinstated in relevant part, 547 F.2d 1100 (9th Cir. 1976). 34 No. 2013AP467-CR whether the circuit court's forfeiture determination was arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes it was designed to serve. ¶85 The circuit court's complete denial of Anthony's right to testify was reasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances in this case. Though we do not wish to diminish the importance of Anthony's self-defense testimony, which was certainly relevant to the charged offense, we cannot condone Anthony's blatant disrespect for the criminal trial process. To do so would seriously jeopardize a circuit court's ability to fulfill its constitutionally or legislatively mandated obligations, including those imposed by Wis. Stat. § 906.11. ¶86 The United States Supreme Court has stated countless times that adherence to rules of evidence and procedure is essential to the proper functioning of our criminal trial process. See, e.g., Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302; Rock, 483 U.S. at 55 n.11; Taylor, 484 U.S. at 410-411. That numerous rules controlling the presentation of evidence do not offend the defendant's right to testify20 is a sure indication that a circuit court's interest in effectuating the ascertainment of truth is tantamount to the constitutional right to testify.21 By 20 Rock, 483 U.S. at 55 n.11. 21 Indeed, the United States Supreme Court in Rock appeared most concerned with the fact that the evidentiary rule at issue stripped the circuit court of its ability to control the presentation of evidence so as to facilitate the truth-seeking process. See id., 483 U.S. at 56-62. 35 No. 2013AP467-CR repeatedly refusing to comply with the circuit court's instruction not to discuss irrelevant matters before the jury, Anthony gave the circuit court little choice but to completely deny his right to testify for fear of compromising the primary purpose of the criminal trial process. ¶87 In light of this conduct alone, we would be hard pressed not to conclude that Anthony forfeited his right to testify. But Anthony's conduct did not stop there. The more Anthony insisted on disregarding the circuit court's evidentiary ruling, the more disruptive and enraged he became, to the point where the circuit court legitimately believed that Anthony posed a threat to the orderliness of the courtroom, including the security of the jurors.22 We think the United States Supreme Court was clear when it stated that such a flagrant disregard in the courtroom of elementary standards of proper conduct should not and cannot be tolerated. Allen, 397 U.S. at 343. ¶88 We are mindful, as was the circuit court, that courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against the loss of constitutional rights. . . . Id. In its post-conviction written decision, the circuit court explained that it considered less restrictive alternatives to forfeiture. For example, it considered permitting Anthony to provide irrelevant testimony and later instructing the jury to ignore it. However, it noted 22 The circuit court pointed out in its post-conviction written decision that the nearest juror sat eight feet away from the witness stand. 36 No. 2013AP467-CR that such an approach would condone disrespect for the court's rulings. In addition, it might have provoked a disturbance once Anthony witnessed the circuit court nullifying his attempt to sway the jury. ¶89 That Anthony was likely to erupt at the provision of a limiting instruction is clear from the record; thus, we find it reasonable to conclude that a limiting instruction would not have minimized a significant risk presented by Anthony's testimony. Moreover, while we presume that juries follow properly given jury instructions, State v. Marinez, 2011 WI 12, ¶41, 331 Wis. 2d 568, 797 N.W.2d 399, we note that a jury instruction in this case would not have solved a separate problem created by Anthony's unfettered testimony: a needless consumption of time. ¶90 The circuit court considered at least one other alternative to forfeiture. It explained that it could have put Anthony on the stand and directed his attorney not to broach the subject of Anthony's prior convictions. However, the circuit court identified the obvious flaw in that approach. Given Anthony's determination to testify freely, he likely would have found a way to raise irrelevant matters on his own, thereby creating the potential for a substantial disturbance once the circuit court intervened. ¶91 As the United States Supreme Court explained in Allen, [n]o one formula for maintaining the appropriate courtroom atmosphere will be best in all situations. Id. Indeed, the Court stressed that trial judges confronted with disruptive, 37 No. 2013AP467-CR contumacious, stubbornly defiant defendants must be given sufficient discretion to meet the circumstances of each case. Id. We read this statement as a caution against the type of Monday-morning quarterbacking that may arise on appellate review of these situations. ¶92 Importantly, the Court in Allen upheld the circuit court's forfeiture determination despite the fact that there were other coercive measures that could have been used with the defendant. Id. at 344-46. The Court found significance in the fact that the defendant was both warned of the potential consequences of his actions and given the opportunity to participate at trial if he reformed his conduct. Id. at 346. ¶93 Of course, that is exactly what happened in this case. The circuit court warned Anthony on several occasions that he would not be allowed to testify if he continued his misbehavior. The circuit court also provided Anthony with multiple opportunities to reform his conduct. ¶94 Under these circumstances, the circuit court was not required to put Anthony on the stand and wait for the fireworks. The criminal trial process deserves better. ¶95 Therefore, we conclude that Anthony forfeited his right to testify by exhibiting stubborn and defiant conduct that posed a serious threat to the both the fairness and reliability of the criminal trial process and the preservation of dignity, order, and decorum in the courtroom.