Opinion ID: 1708023
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Existence of Excusable Neglect

Text: In Clarke, supra, this Court held: A party moving for relief from judgment must show excusable neglect. Excusable neglect must be neglect of a nature that would cause a reasonable, prudent person to act similarly under similar circumstances. The term `excusable neglect' has no fixed meaning and is to be interpreted liberally to insure that cases are heard and tried on the merits. Excusable neglect is illusive and difficult to define: `I could never succeed [in defining it intelligibly]. But I know it when I see it.' Jacobellis v. State of Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197, 84 S.Ct. 1676, 1683, 12 L.Ed.2d 793, 804 (1964) ([Stewart], J. concurring, describing obscenity). Clarke, 423 N.W.2d at 821 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). In Clarke, supra, this Court found excusable neglect in the defaulting defendant's emotional state of mind, her drinking problems and the disarray of her marriage. Similar factors are present in the instant case. Alicia was served a summons and complaint for divorce the day she left a hospital she had entered for severe emotional problems. Compounding her emotional problems, was Alicia's strained comprehension of the English language and her lack of familiarity with the American legal system. Although the circuit court found that Alicia can read and speak English and that her linguistic abilities were sufficient to present her claim in court, a review of Alicia's hearing testimony makes it readily apparent that she has limited communicative and comprehensive skills. Questions had to be repeated and Alicia's answers were frequently rambling, vague or indefinite. This Court has previously found a default defendant's foreign birth and lack of experience with court proceedings sufficient to establish excusable neglect warranting relief from a default judgment. See, Johnson v. Johnson, 50 S.D. 341, 210 N.W. 155 (1926). See also, Rosebud Lumber Co. v. Serr, 22 S.D. 389, 117 N.W. 1042 (1908). Despite her language difficulties and emotional problems, Alicia did seek help from a legal aid office almost immediately after service of the summons and complaint. However, instead of affording Alicia the assistance she needed in defense of the divorce litigation, Alicia was caught in a bureaucratic quagmire as three separate legal aid offices attempted to determine which one of them should handle Alicia's case. Military legal aid in Denver referred Alicia to a Denver legal aid office. Alicia contacted Denver legal aid the day after service of the summons and complaint. Yet, nearly two months apparently passed before that office was able to conduct an interview on May 20, 1991, only eight days before the divorce hearing. Another bureaucratic shuffle ensued between Denver legal aid and East River Legal Services in Sioux Falls. Phone calls and correspondence were apparently exchanged and it was not until June 4, 1991, that East River Legal Services issued any formal notice that it intended to provide services to Alicia. This was already seven days after entry of the default divorce judgment against Alicia. Even the notice that was issued merely advised that Alicia would be sent a list of South Dakota attorneys and that Alicia would then have to choose an attorney and contact that person for assistance. Thus, yet another referral was involved before Alicia could finally obtain the assistance of South Dakota legal counsel. Presumably after that point, Alicia needed additional time to confer with South Dakota counsel, allow counsel time to review and evaluate the case, and permit counsel time to determine the appropriate course of action and file appropriate motions. See, Clarke, supra . Given this bureaucratic shuffle, we find that the legal aid offices involved were more at fault in Alicia's default than Alicia. It is the settled rule, relief under SDCL 15-6-60(b) is available in attorney negligence situations only if the client can affirmatively show either (1) that the attorney's negligence was excusable or (2) that the client herself was not negligent. Gold Pan Partners, Inc. v. Madsen, 469 N.W.2d 387, 392 (S.D.1991). Although it is true that clients have responsibility for inquiring into their affairs and must be diligent in contacting counsel to inquire about the progress of legal proceedings ( First Federal Sav. & Loan, supra ), given Alicia's foreign birth and lack of familiarity with the American legal system, it was not unreasonable for her to have stood by waiting for assistance she doubtlessly believed had been promised and would be forthcoming. The circuit court's finding of fact # 13 did determine that Alicia made a decision [to] not take action despite, the legal advice provided her by three separate legal representatives. This finding was appropriately objected to as clearly erroneous. We have searched the record in vain for information concerning what legal advice was given to Alicia by the three separate legal aid agencies she contacted. Alicia's rambling and vague hearing testimony renders it impossible to know exactly what she was told or what she understood concerning the necessity of filing an answer and making a timely response to Charles' divorce complaint. Although Alicia contacted military legal aid a day or so after receiving the summons and complaint, when asked if she knew she had 60 days to do something, Alicia testified, Yes sir. Well, I didn't know exactly. But when I went to the legal service on base, they told me. I didn't know. But then after they told me, I find that out. When asked if military legal aid offered her legal representation, Alicia responded, Just he told me to call the legal aid [at Denver]. When asked if she did that, Alicia stated, Yes, I did that right away. They keep me on hold and they asked me how much income I make and everything. They told me they are going to send me a paper. Although Alicia conceded she was told there were 60 days from her signature on the admission of service until the divorce could be final, she also testified that she thought she was supposed to get further notice before anything would happen. Additionally, Alicia testified that Denver legal aid: said that they were going to put the they're going to help me. Then they let me waited and waited. I kept calling them. Then they said, oh, one of this person, you know, say that where did your husband file this? I said, `In South Dakota.' He should havewell, he should have filed the divorce in here. In a similar vein, Alicia testified on cross-examination that Denver legal aid: They give me hope. They said they're going to send me the paper. Then I kept waiting. Then where's the papers? Then I called him. I bugged him again. I called him again. I said, hey, I really need a lawyer beforeI don't understand what I'm losing in here. Based upon this testimony, it is clear that Alicia did not sit idly by awaiting entry of the default divorce decree but, rather, took the only actions she knew how to take. The day after service of the divorce papers, she made contact with legal aid in the undoubted expectation that professionals would take the necessary action to assist her. While the clock ticked, the professionals filed no answer, took no steps we can see to assure the filing of a timely answer and, insofar as the record reflects, did nothing but attempt to hand off Alicia's case. Accordingly, we hold finding of fact # 13 concerning Alicia's decision to not take action to be clearly erroneous. See, Johnson v. Johnson, 451 N.W.2d 293 (S.D.1990) (findings of fact not disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous). See also, Selle v. Pierce, 494 N.W.2d 634 (S.D. 1993) (finding clearly erroneous when after reviewing all evidence we are left with definite and firm conviction that mistake was made). A decision involves making an informed choice from among the available alternatives. Here, we find nothing to establish that the available alternatives in response to the divorce action were ever comprehended by Alicia or that, from among those alternatives, she made a conscientious choice not to respond. Based upon the foregoing analysis, a liberal review of these exceptional circumstances clearly discloses the existence of excusable neglect warranting Alicia's relief from the default judgment. Certainly the facts in this case are just as compelling as those involved in Clarke, supra .