Opinion ID: 844218
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Voir Dire Concerning Circumstances of the Crime

Text: Defendant contends the trial court conducted constitutionally inadequate questioning of the prospective jurors concerning possible biases arising from the circumstances of the shooting of Deputy Blair. Specifically, he claims the trial court should have asked questions regarding (1) any racial prejudices the prospective jurors may have held and (2) the legal concepts of self-defense and defense of another, particularly in the context of a gang member shooting a police officer. (3) Defendant did not ask the trial court to pose any question regarding racial biases, and therefore that portion of his appellate claim is forfeited. ( People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 539 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 802, 58 P.3d 931] [the defendant must ask for questioning concerning racial bias; the trial court need not make the inquiry on its own initiative]; Turner v. Murray (1986) 476 U.S. 28, 37 [90 L.Ed.2d 27, 106 S.Ct. 1683] [a defendant cannot complain of a judge's failure to question the venire on racial prejudice unless the defendant has specifically requested such an inquiry].) We have recognized no exception to this requirement in cases in which the potential for racial bias assertedly was obvious, and we decline defendant's invitation to do so now. Defendant's remaining claim similarly is unavailing. Prior to commencing voir dire of the venire panel, the trial court advised the parties that it intended to question the prospective jurors itself, without the participation of counsel, and also without having the panel answer written juror questionnaires. Although the prosecutor objected, defense counsel expressly agreed to the court's plan to conduct voir dire. The court invited the parties to submit suggested questions the court should pose, and defendant submitted three questions concerning self-defense and defense of others: (1) Can you accept the concept in the law that if one's life is illegally placed in peril by another, one may kill in self-defense[?]; (2) Could you accept this legal premise if the evidence shows that a uniformed police officer illegally placed the life of a street gang member in peril, and that officer is then killed in self-defense?; and (3) Can you accept the concept in the law that if the life of one's friend is illegally placed in peril by another, deadly force may be legally used in response? In response to defendant's suggestions, the trial court stated, Most jurors believe there is such a thing as self-defense. The concern is that jurors understand that if there is a self-defense issue, that they have to follow the court's instruction on the law regarding what constitutes self-defense. And will they do that and put aside their own ideas of what constitutes self-defense. Accordingly, the court agreed to give some brief comment to that effect [] that they should not necessarily adhere to their own feelings of what constitutes self-defense, that they must follow the court's instruction. Defense counsel did not object to the court's plans. Later, near the conclusion of voir dire, defense counsel asked the trial court at a sidebar conference whether it planned to ask any more followup questions of the prospective jurors. When the court stated it did not, counsel stated, Okay, I would ask that you at least touch on self-defense. The court subsequently did so, telling the jurors, [I]t is very importantI think we all have ideas of when the idea of self-defense is appropriate and when it isn't. I want to make sure that the jurors understand that if you are instructed on what the law says is appropriate for self-defense, that you follow my instructions on the law. [¶] Anybody have any question about that? . . . [¶] Let me make sure of this. The court then asked a prospective juror, do you understand what I just said? . . . [¶] You may have in your own mind when you came in here an idea of when self-defense is appropriate. [¶] But you understand that if I instruct youI am not saying I willbut if I instruct you on the law of self-defense, you must follow my instructions? The prospective juror agreed he would follow the court's instructions. The court then asked if everybody else understood, and confirmed this with two other prospective jurors. Defense counsel did not object to the trial court's questions, nor did he request that the court pose any other question concerning the subject. (4) On appeal, however, defendant contends the trial court's questioning was insufficient to ascertain whether the jurors harbored any biases that might prevent them from impartially entertaining a claim that a gang member's killing of a peace officer was justified by the need to defend one's self or a fellow gang member and from evaluating the evidence of such a defense. Defendant forfeited this claim by failing to raise this issue below, when the trial court could have remedied the alleged shortcoming. It is true defendant did initially submit proposed questions concerning the specific context of a claim of self-defense or defense of others in this case (highlighting that a gang member had killed a police officer), and the trial court did not pose those questions during voir dire. Defense counsel, however, did not object that general questioning concerning the prospective jurors' ability to follow the court's instructions on self-defense would beor subsequently wasinsufficient to uncover any biases the prospective jurors might have held. Accordingly, this claim is not preserved for appeal. ( People v. Sanchez (1995) 12 Cal.4th 1, 61-62 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 906 P.2d 1129].) Defendant's attempt to distinguish Sanchez on its facts is misplaced. The controlling principle is that a defendant may not challenge on appeal alleged shortcomings in the trial court's voir dire of the prospective jurors when the defendant, having had the opportunity to alert the trial court to the supposed problem, failed to do so. It is not sufficient, as in the present case, for a defendant merely to suggest that particular questions be asked, and then silently stand by when the trial court suggests and subsequently takes a different coursea trial court reasonably could view such silence as constituting assent to the court's approach. (5) In any event, even if defendant had not forfeited his claim, we would conclude it lacks merit. We have observed that the adequacy of voir dire is a matter ``not easily subject to appellate review. The trial judge's function at this point in the trial is not unlike that of the jurors later on in the trial. Both must reach conclusions as to impartiality and credibility by relying on their own evaluations of demeanor evidence and responses to questions.'' [Citations.] The applicable standard is a demanding one: `Unless the voir dire by a court is so inadequate that the reviewing court can say that the resulting trial was fundamentally unfair, the manner in which voir dire is conducted is not a basis for reversal. [Citation.] . . .' [Citations.] [¶] . . . `The right to voir dire, like the right to peremptorily challenge [citation], is not a constitutional right but a means to achieve the end of an impartial jury. [Citation.]' ( People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1215, 1250-1251 [32 Cal.Rptr.3d 838, 117 P.3d 544].) Defendant fails to establish any possibility that his trial was fundamentally unfair due to inadequate voir dire of the prospective jurors. To the extent our decision in People v. Williams (1981) 29 Cal.3d 392 [174 Cal.Rptr. 317, 628 P.2d 869] ( Williams ), upon which defendant relies, remains persuasive although one of its central holdings was abrogated by the passage of Proposition 115 (see People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 168, fn. 5 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 485, 6 P.3d 150] [that proposition changed the scope of legitimate inquiry on voir dire by requiring that the examination of prospective jurors be conducted only in aid of the exercise of challenges for cause, not in aid of the parties' making peremptory challenges]), Williams is distinguishable. The erroneous limitation of voir dire that led to our reversal of the judgment in Williams concerned the prospective jurors' thoughts regarding the legal concept that a person has no duty to retreat before he or she may use reasonable force to resist an attacker. As we noted, that rule was controversial, and there was a real possibility the average juror might disagree with the rule. ( Williams, supra, at p. 411.) Also implicit in Williams is an acknowledgement that the rule likely would be unknown to an average juror were it not addressed in voir dire. Moreover, there was no suggestion the prospective jurors in Williams were made aware of any facts of the case that would have indicated that the question of a duty to retreat would be at issue, and therefore that their ability to follow the law as the court would instruct might have been inhibited in that regard. We also pointed out in Williams that two of the prospective jurors had expressed doubts, even in the abstract, concerning their ability to follow self-defense principles with which they might disagree, and the trial court had foreclosed any further exploration of those responses. ( Ibid. ) The oral voir dire in the present case met constitutional standards. The trial court questioned the prospective jurors concerning their ability to follow the law of self-defense as the court ultimately would instruct them, and none expressed any doubt regarding an ability to do so. The prospective jurors were aware of the basic facts of the case, that is, that defendant was accused of shooting and killing a police officer engaged in his official duties. Questions concerning the prospective jurors' knowledge of and biases against gangs and gang members also had been posed, and the jurors were told they were required not to prejudge the case based upon any evidence of defendant's having associated with a gang. Because the prospective jurors were aware of the basic facts of the case, it was reasonable to assume they had these particulars in mind when the trial court admonished them concerning their duty and questioned them concerning their ability to follow any self-defense instructions the court might give them. Accordingly, defendant's proposed questions, although more focused than the trial court's queries, were not so significantly more likely to expose strong attitudes antithetical to defendant's cause ( Williams, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 410) that we could conclude the court's voir dire failed to aid in the exercise of challenges for cause or otherwise resulted in a fundamentally unfair trial. We also observe that defendant has not pointed to any evidence in the record suggesting that any sitting juror actually was prejudiced against his claims of self-defense and defense of another.