Opinion ID: 2060424
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Order refusing to vacate a prior order of dismissal.

Text: September 30, 1971, the trial court, upon plaintiffs' ex parte motion, dismissed the above-entitled actions upon their merits with prejudice as to the defendants, Wisconsin Tobacco and Scotten, Dillon. Plaintiffs' affidavit in support of their motions to dismiss averred that they believed there was no merit to their claims against the defendants, Wisconsin Tobacco and Scotten, Dillon. Plaintiffs contend that the trial court committed error in refusing to exercise its discretion to relieve the plaintiffs from the order of September 30, 1971. Sec. 269.46, Stats., insofar as it is relevant to the instant appeals, provides: ... The court may, upon notice and just terms, at any time within one year after notice thereof, relieve a party from a judgment, order, stipulation, or other proceeding against him obtained, through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect and may supply an omission in any proceeding.... The relief sought under the statute is addressed to the discretion of the trial court, and upon appeal from its order, this court will only reverse where there has been a clear abuse of discretion. Ochiltree v. Kaiser (1963), 20 Wis. 2d 191, 121 N. W. 2d 890; Padek v. Thornton (1958), 3 Wis. 2d 334, 88 N. W. 2d 316; Gowran v. Lennon (1913), 154 Wis. 566, 143 N. W. 678. This court in Gowran, supra, at page 569, stated: ... The statutory authority ... extends to granting relief where, under all the circumstances, there has been some excusable omission through inadvertence or otherwise, and justice seems to require that opportunity for a judicial hearing should be had notwithstanding such omission. An appeal in such a case is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Hence when such discretion shall have been exercised the result cannot be disturbed unless it appears so clearly wrong as to evince an abuse of judicial power. That, manifestly, takes a pretty strong case. In support of their motion to vacate the order of September 30, 1971, plaintiffs contend that they, in reliance upon the advice of counsel, and upon the express representation of Power, that he was the president of Wisconsin Tobacco and had the power and authority to enter into a binding and effective settlement agreement with the plaintiffs, entered into the settlement agreement, dated September 29, 1971. Plaintiffs assert that they were mistaken as to the facts, circumstances and law; that apparently Power did not have the authority to enter into the settlement agreement; and that they have not received any consideration for said settlement agreement or for settling their claims in these actions against Wisconsin Tobacco. The record reveals that plaintiff, Buchen, and Power, fully cognizant of their purported dismissals on December 10, 1970, met on September 29, 1971, and conducted what was denominated a special meeting of the directors of Wisconsin Tobacco Company, Inc. At that meeting they resolved that they were the only lawful directors of Wisconsin Tobacco and had the power and authority to conduct its business. Thereupon, they proceeded to take action on behalf of the corporation. This included such acts as the appointment of new directors and officers; changing of the names of those authorized to draw upon the corporate bank account; the settlement of the plaintiffs' actions against the defendant, Wisconsin Tobacco, including the corporate payment of compensatory damages and the fees, costs and disbursements of plaintiffs' counsel; the execution of a new employment contract between Wisconsin Tobacco and the plaintiff, Buchen; a retroactive corporate payment to plaintiffs, Buchen and Tryggestad, of wages between December 10, 1970, and September 29, 1971; and filing by the corporation, with the office of the secretary of state, the annual report of the corporation under the signature of Power, reflecting the officers and directors as reconstituted. The so-called settlements were effected without consultation with or approval of counsel of record for Wisconsin Tobacco and Scotten, Dillon. The following day, September 30, 1971, the plaintiffs appeared in court and moved for the dismissal of their actions against Wisconsin Tobacco and Scotten, Dillon. The settlement agreements purportedly reached the day before were not brought to the attention of the trial court, and the order dismissing the defendants, Wisconsin Tobacco and Scotten, Dillon, was not contingent thereon. The trial court, in refusing to vacate its prior order of September 30, 1971, stated: ... plaintiffs ask to be relieved of the actions which they took prior to September 30, 1971. It appears from the affidavits and documents which are a part of these motions that plaintiffs proceeded on the assumption that they were in a position to in effect take control of Wisconsin Tobacco Company and that apparently they were dealing with someone who was in authoritative position in Scotten Dillon Company so they could enter into certain agreements, take certain actions, enter into certain stipulations, and settle these lawsuits. Now the facts such as they existed at that time certainly were within the knowledge and province of the plaintiffs. It was they who proceeded on the basis that they could deal with these corporations and reach their settlements and then proceeded to stipulate for the dismissal of these lawsuits on the merits as to the corporate defendants. The dismissals which were secured by the plaintiffs did not contain any reservations whatsoever. The court reaches the conclusion that the plaintiffs embarked upon a course of action with their eyes wide open, and upon advice of counsel, and this court is not of the opinion that any case has been made for excusing them from their judgments. These were judgments which they obtained themselves, they were not obtained against them. Under the facts of this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs' motion.