Opinion ID: 780172
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Taylor's Standing to Request an Independent Educational Evaluation

Text: 24 It is uncontested that one of the primary purposes of the IDEA is to to ensure that the rights of children with disabilities and parents of such children are protected, 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(B), including a parent's right to demand an IEE, see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1); 34 C.F.R. § 300.502. Yet the invocation of this general statutory purpose is of little assistance in helping us determine whether Taylor is entitled to exercise parental rights under the statute. Whether Taylor may avail herself of the IDEA's procedural protections in this case depends upon whether Taylor is considered a parent within the meaning of the Act. Unfortunately, neither the IDEA nor its federal regulatory scheme are models of clarity. 25 The IDEA was enacted to assist states in providing special education and related services to children with disabilities, see 20 U.S.C. § 1411(a)(1), by adopting an approach that has been termed cooperative federalism. See, e.g., Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Mauney, 183 F.3d 816, 830 (8th Cir.1999); Bernardsville Bd. of Educ. v. J.H., 42 F.3d 149, 151 (3d Cir.1994). Under the IDEA, a participating state is entitled to receive federal funding if it has in effect policies and procedures designed to ensure, among other things, that children with disabilities are identified and evaluated, that a free, appropriate public education is available to all children with disabilities, that the state is working towards providing full educational opportunity to all children with disabilities, and that children with disabilities and their parents are afforded the procedural safeguards provided under the Act. 20 U.S.C. § 1412. 26 The Act does not usurp the state's traditional role in setting educational policy, however. Rather, it is left to the individual states to determine how to implement the statute's goals. Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 736 F.2d 773, 784 (1st Cir.1984) (`Cooperative federalism' in this context, then, allows some substantive differentiation among the states in the determination of which educational theories, practices, and approaches will be utilized for educating disabled children with a given impairment.), aff'd sub nom. Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 105 S.Ct. 1996, 85 L.Ed.2d 385 (1985). The statute incorporates state substantive standards as the governing federal rule if they are consistent with the federal scheme and meet the minimum requirements set forth by the IDEA. Mrs. C. v. Wheaton, 916 F.2d 69, 73 (2d Cir.1990); see also Antkowiak v. Ambach, 838 F.2d 635, 641 (2d Cir.1988) (same). It seems plain that the Congress drew the procedural and substantive contours of education for disabled children, but left the shading and tinting of the details largely to the states. States are responsible for filling in the numerous interstices within the federal Act through their own statutes and regulations. Burlington, 736 F.2d at 785. 27 Consistent with this broad-outline approach, prior to 1997 the IDEA did not contain any definition of the term parent. The statute was amended by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments for 1997, Pub.L. No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37, to include the following provision: 28 The term parent — 29 (A) includes a legal guardian; and 30 (B) except as used in sections 1415(b)(2) and 1439(a)(5) of this title, includes an individual assigned under either of those sections to be a surrogate parent. 31 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19). By its terms, this statutory provision is not exhaustive. Clearly, legal guardians and educational surrogates are not the only persons entitled to the IDEA's procedural protections. Even if the use of the expansive term includes did not carry with it the strong implication that the statute's definition of parent encompassed more than the two categories specifically referenced, we would find it difficult to credit a reading that excluded natural parents from the list of persons who could exercise parental rights under the statute. 3 Indeed, the legislative history indicates that this definition was added merely so that most references to `guardian' [could be] deleted throughout the act when accompanied by the term `parent.' S. Rep. 104-275, at 32 (1996) (explaining a proposal to enact an identical amendment in S. 1578). 4 Thus, the statutory language provides us with little assistance. 32 The Department of Education's current set of regulations implementing the IDEA, effective since 1999, contains a more comprehensive definition of parent: 33 (a) General. As used in this part, the term parent means — 34 (1) A natural or adoptive parent of a child; 35 (2) A guardian but not the State if the child is a ward of the State; 36 (3) A person acting in the place of a parent (such as a grandparent or stepparent with whom the child lives, or a person who is legally responsible for the child's welfare); or 37 (4) A surrogate parent who has been appointed in accordance with § 300.515. 38 (b) Foster parent. Unless State law prohibits a foster parent from acting as a parent, a State may allow a foster parent to act as a parent under Part B of the Act if — 39 (1) The natural parents' authority to make educational decisions on the child's behalf has been extinguished under State law; and 40 (2) The foster parent — 41 (i) Has an ongoing, long-term parental relationship with the child; 42 (ii) Is willing to make the educational decisions required of parents under the Act; and 43 (iii) Has no interest that would conflict with the interests of the child. 34 C.F.R. § 300.20 (emphasis added). 5 44 The regulation does not purport to list all those who are granted rights under the statute. In fact, by using the disjunctive, it indicates exactly the opposite — that the listed persons may or may not be entitled to exercise parental rights under the statute. Hence, the natural reading is that the federal regulation establishes a range of persons who may be considered a parent for purposes of the IDEA, but does not require that any and all such persons must be granted statutory rights. 45 Plaintiff nonetheless claims that, under § 300.20, natural parents retain their IDEA rights unless the state brings a proceeding to terminate their parental status. 6 We cannot accept such a reading of the regulation. Section 300.20 does not state, for example, that all the persons listed as possible parents possess standing to bring a claim under the IDEA until their parental rights are permanently revoked. Indeed, such a construction of the regulation would lead to the absurd result that natural parents, guardians, and persons acting in the place of a parent may all exercise the same rights under the IDEA simultaneously. Cf. Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575, 102 S.Ct. 3245, 73 L.Ed.2d 973 (1982) ([I]nterpretations... which would produce absurd results are to be avoided if alternative interpretations consistent with the legislative purpose are available.). The Department of Education could not have intended that there would be a superfluity of parties able to exercise authority over the child under the regulation simultaneously, each of whom may have conflicting ideas with respect to the child's education, with no means of choosing among them. 46 Nor is this problem solved if we assume that the regulation sets up a hierarchy, so that natural parents presumptively enjoy privileges under the statute while the other persons listed in § 300.20(a) may exercise IDEA rights only when there has been a complete termination of a natural parent's status or when the natural parents are deceased. Not only is such a reading contrary to a literal reading of the regulation, this interpretation would also create internal inconsistencies. Cf. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Muszynski, 268 F.3d 91, 98 (2d Cir.2001) ([W]hen determining which reasonable meaning [of ambiguous text] should prevail... absurd results are to be avoided and internal inconsistencies ... must be dealt with.) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Section 300.20(b), for example, imposes additional conditions that must be met before foster parents may exercise parental rights. Among them is the requirement that [t]he natural parents' authority to make educational decisions on the child's behalf has been extinguished under State law. 34 C.F.R. § 300.20(b)(1). The regulation therefore allows a foster parent to exercise parental rights under the IDEA when both parents have lost rights over educational decision-making, even if this has been accomplished by something less than an irrevocable termination of the parent-child relationship. We find it improbable that the regulation would permit foster parents to exercise rights over children in the absence of a complete termination of parental rights, yet mandate that guardians, grandparents, stepparents or other persons could act in a parent's stead only when the parent-child relationship has been annulled. 47 The only way to read the regulation so that it is intelligible is with reference to state law. The regulation does not establish a method for choosing which of the possible parents is entitled to exercise rights under the statute. Given the nature of the statutory scheme, we look to state law to fill this gap and to establish which potential parent has authority to make special education decisions for the child. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the regulation refers to adoptive parents, legal guardians, and other persons legally responsible for the child's welfare. None of these concepts is given content in federal law; rather, state domestic law assigns these rights. Thus, the regulation explicitly relies upon the state to assign parental rights. 48 We acknowledge that the federal regulations are inartfully drafted. To the extent that there is ambiguity, we may look to how the federal Department of Education has construed its own regulation. An agency's consistent interpretation of its regulations is to be given controlling weight unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation. See, e.g., Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461, 117 S.Ct. 905, 137 L.Ed.2d 79 (1997); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 413-14, 65 S.Ct. 1215, 89 L.Ed. 1700 (1945); Levy v. Southbrook Int'l Inv., Ltd., 263 F.3d 10, 14 (2d Cir.2001), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 1911, 152 L.Ed.2d 821 (2002); Esden v. Bank of Boston, 229 F.3d 154, 168 (2d Cir.2000). 7 In a 1987 policy letter, the Department of Education's Office of Special Education Programs (OSEP) stated: 49 The question of which divorced parent should be allowed to perform parental functions under the [IDEA] is not properly a matter for OSEP to decide. Rather, this is a matter for State or local divorce courts. Just as these courts deal with matters of custody, they can appropriately deal with matters related to the responsibility for making educational decisions on behalf of the child. OSEP would not seek to create a rule intruding on the jurisdiction of the courts and State family law in this area. 50 As OSEP's interpretation is perfectly consistent with both the gap left in the regulations and the strong presumption that issues of domestic relations fall within the traditional sphere of state authority, cf. Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 625, 107 S.Ct. 2029, 95 L.Ed.2d 599 (1987), we accord deference to the Department of Education's decision that the allocation of parental rights under the IDEA is best left to local domestic law. 8 51 Our conclusion is further reinforced by caselaw. The only other circuit court decision to have addressed this precise issue has likewise held that the extent of a natural parent's rights under the IDEA must be determined with reference to state law. See Navin v. Park Ridge Sch. Dist. 64, 270 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir.2001). In Navin, the natural father of a child with a disability sought to bring a due process challenge to the school district's IEP. In analyzing whether the non-custodial father had standing to bring an action under the IDEA, the Seventh Circuit looked to the rights that the father retained under a state custody decree. Id. (If the divorce decree had given [the mother] not only custody but also every instrument of influence over [the child's] education, then [the father would have no claim under the IDEA]. Although the IDEA grants rights to `parents,' ... nothing in the IDEA overrides states' allocation of authority as part of a custody determination.). Finding that, although the mother had authority to make final educational decisions, the father nonetheless retained the right under the custody decree to be involved in and to influence his son's education, the Navin court remanded for the district court to determine whether the father's wishes were incompatible with the mother's. 9 52 Having determined that state law will inform our resolution of the standing issue, we now look to Taylor's parental rights under Vermont law. Vermont's implementing regulations comport with the requirements set forth in the IDEA, and in fact substantially mirror the federal regulations: 53 Whenever the words parent or parents appear in these rules, the words shall mean, as appropriate: 54 (a) A biological or adoptive parent; 55 (b) A legal guardian, but not the state if the student is in the custody of the Commissioner of Social and Rehabilitative Services; 56 (c) A person who is acting as a parent, such as a grandparent or stepparent with whom the child lives and who is legally responsible for the child; 57 (d) A foster parent who has been appointed the educational surrogate parent by the Vermont Educational Surrogate Parent Program; or 58 (e) Educational surrogate parent. 59 Vermont Board of Education Rule 2360.3 (emphasis added). In applying this regulation, Vermont looks to its domestic law in deciding when it would be appropriate to allow a natural parent to exercise rights granted by the IDEA. Vermont therefore does not allow natural parents whose legal authority to make educational decisions on behalf of a child has been terminated by operation of local domestic law to challenge an IEP determination. See, e.g., In re T.C., 25 I.D.E.L.R. 1245 (Vt. SEA 1997); In re Randolph Sch. Dist., E.H.L.R. 509:183 (Vt. SEA 1987). This potion is consistent with the implementation of 34 C.F.R. § 300.20 by other states. See, e.g., In re N. Allegheny Sch. Dist., 26 I.D.E.L.R. 774 (Pa. SEA 1997); In re Andalusia City Bd. of Educ., 22 I.D.E.L.R. 666 (Ala. SEA 1995). 60 In contrast to the facts of the Navin case, here Taylor's parental right to participate in her daughter's education has been revoked by a Vermont family court. Moreover, the father, upon whom Vermont has bestowed this legal authority, has opposed the due process hearing requested by Taylor as against the child's best interests. As Taylor does not have the authority to make educational decisions on behalf of L.D., we agree that she lacks standing to demand a hearing under the IDEA on the appropriateness of defendants' IEP evaluation. 10