Opinion ID: 1417964
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: People v. Feland

Text: A police officer stopped Kenneth Ray Feland for driving a motor vehicle at an excessive speed. The officer administered roadside sobriety tests, and Feland was then taken to the Arvada police department for a blood alcohol test. Feland agreed to take a breath test, and that test was performed with a Luckey Alco-Analyzer gas chromatograph. No evidence was offered which creates an issue as to either the accuracy of that particular machine or the manner in which the test was administered. The gas chromatograph measures the percent of alcohol in the blood. It first mixes the suspect's breath with any one of several inert gases. The resulting mixture is then burned in a hydrogen flame which is surrounded by an electrical field. The ions formed by combustion contribute to the existing electrical field, and variations in that field are measured by an electrometer. Those measurements are recorded on a card, and the various readings obtained are then compared with a standardized form to obtain a measurement of the suspect's blood alcohol level. [2] See R. Erwin, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases § 23.01 (3d ed. 1978). Before the test is administered, the machine is calibrated by passing a standard solution containing .10 percent alcohol through it. The gas chromatograph destroys the sample of the suspect's breath which it analyzes. Thus, unlike the breathalyzer machine, the gas chromatograph does not preserve any substance, such as the test ampoule, which could be made available for independent testing by a defendant. Prior to trial, Feland asked that he be provided with a sample of his breath taken at the time of the blood alcohol test and a sample of the standard solution used to calibrate the machine at that time. He was informed that, in accordance with the standard policy of the police department, no separate sample of his breath had been preserved, and that the standard solution was no longer available. Feland then moved to suppress his blood alcohol test as evidence. At the suppression hearing, Feland's expert witness testified that at the time of the test several inexpensive and practical methods existed to preserve a separate sample of Feland's breath. The district attorney in Feland's case has conceded that it is possible to preserve such a sample. Feland's expert witness further testified that, had a separate sample of Feland's breath been preserved, it would have been possible to retest his blood alcohol level with greater precision at a later date and under laboratory conditions. He also expressed the opinion that if a sample of the standard solution had been retained, that solution could have been tested to determine whether it had been properly prepared. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The trial courts in both of these cases justified their denial of the defendants' motions to suppress on the basis of our decision in People v. Hedrick, supra . People v. Hedrick , however, was not grounded on this court's conclusion that the state could never be required to preserve a sample of a defendant's breath for independent testing. Rather, People v. Hedrick was predicated on a record that demonstrated a complete lack of evidence . . . regarding the type of machine used in the test on the defendant, and the fact that a breath sample could be preserved. Id. at 381. In People v. Hedrick , we said: Neither defendant nor the prosecution presented any evidence of the type of machine used in administering the test. The only testimony was from the defendant, who stated he had freely chosen the breath test and testified, inter alia : `Well, I don't feel 1.28 [sic] was under the influence. I don't feel like I was under the influence, so I don't think the test was right.' Id. at 379. In summary, where there is a failure, as here, to prove that the evidence is preservable or that there was any prejudice to defendant by failure to have available to him a breath sample, we must hold that the wider interests of society favor the admissibility of the test results at trial. Id. at 382. In both cases which are now before us, the record is replete with evidence that a sample of the defendant's breath could have been preserved inexpensively and expediently. At defendant Garcia's trial, the evidence was uncontradicted. In defendant Feland's case, the district attorney has conceded that methods exist to preserve a defendant's breath. [3] Moreover, the defendant in each case presented competent evidence that a separate breath sample could have been independently tested and the results of that test used to impeach the testimony of the machine which tested his breath. Lauderdale v. State, supra, at 381; see also, Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316, 318, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974); Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 692, 51 S.Ct. 218, 75 L.Ed. 624 (1931); U.S.Const., amend. VI; Colo.Const., Art. II, Sec. 16. Thus, the vacuum in the record which dictated our decision in People v. Hedrick, supra , has been filled by the evidence produced by the defendants in these cases. In People v. Hedrick, supra , we set forth three tests to determine whether a denial of discovery infringed upon the due process right of a defendant to have the state make available to him potentially exculpatory information: (1) whether the evidence was suppressed or destroyed by the prosecution; (2) whether the evidence is exculpatory; and (3) whether the evidence is material to the defendant's case. Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 794-5, 92 S.Ct. 2562, 33 L.Ed.2d 706 (1972); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). The breath samples requested by the defendants are obviously material to the proof of the drunk driving charges. Section 42-4-1202(2)(c), C.R.S.1973 (1976 Supp.) provides that a blood alcohol level of .10 percent gives rise to a presumption that the defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol. A defendant's ability to attack the validity of that presumption is, thus, dependent upon his ability to attack the accuracy of the machine which tested his blood alcohol level. State v. Lauderdale, supra. It is, of course, impossible for us to determine whether the breath samples requested by the defendants would have exculpated them. It is not necessary for a defendant to demonstrate that the evidence he seeks to discover, but which is no longer available for examination by the court, would have been favorable to him, People v. Harmes, 38 Colo.App. 378, 560 P.2d 470 (1976), so long as that evidence is not merely incidental to the prosecution's case or to the defendant's affirmative defense. People v. Bynum, 192 Colo. 60, 556 P.2d 469 (1976). It is sufficient that the material requested `might' be `favorable' to the accused. United States v. Bryant, 142 U.S. App.D.C. 132, 142 n. 21, 439 F.2d 642, 652 n. 21 (D.C.Cir.1971). The final question to be answered is whether the evidence requested by the defendant has been suppressed or destroyed by the prosecution. In these cases, the separate samples of the defendant's breath have been neither suppressed nor destroyed they were never collected and preserved. But this fact does not mean that the defendants' case must fall. The failure of the state to collect and preserve evidence, when those acts can be accomplished as a mere incident to a procedure routinely performed by state agents, is tantamount to suppression of that evidence. It is incumbent upon the state to employ regular procedures to preserve evidence which a state agent, in the regular performance of his duties, could reasonably foresee `might' be `favorable' to the accused. People v. Bryant, supra; People v. Poole, 192 Colo. 56, 555 P.2d 980 (1976); State v. Maloney, 105 Ariz. 348, 352, 464 P.2d 793, cert. denied, sub nom. Maloney v. Arizona, 400 U.S. 841, 91 S.Ct. 82, 27 L.Ed.2d 75 (1970); Comment, Judicial Response to Governmental Loss or Destruction of Evidence, 39 U.Chi. L.Rev. 542 (1972). The fact that a .10 percent blood alcohol reading from the devices used in the present cases is sufficient to bring about a defendant's conviction militates against a conclusion that independent testing of the accuracy of those machines is unnecessary. The prosecution has the duty to prevent the loss or destruction of evidence that is favorable to the accused. . . . Trial by ambush is no longer acceptable as a means for ascertaining the truth. In the past, we have endorsed liberal discovery procedures in criminal cases.. . . People v. Roblas, 193 Colo. 496, 568 P.2d 57, 60 (1977). The trial of a criminal case is not a game of fox and hounds in which the state attempts to outwit and trap a quarry. Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 87 S.Ct. 793, 17 L.Ed.2d 737 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring). It is, instead, a sober search for truth, in which not only the resources of the defendant, but those readily available to the state must be put to work in aid of that search. We hold, therefore, that in all cases where a defendant elects to submit to a breath test to determine his blood alcohol level, he must be given a separate sample of his breath at the time of the test or the alcoholic content of his breath in a manner which will permit scientifically reliable independent testing by the defendant, if that test is to be used as evidence. United States v. Bryant, supra, 439 F.2d at 652; People v. Hitch, 11 Cal.3d 159, 113 Cal.Rptr. 158, 520 P.2d 974 (1974); 12 Cal.3d 641, 117 Cal.Rptr. 9, 527 P.2d 361 (1974). Accordingly, the evidence relating to the breath tests and any derivative evidence is suppressed in both cases, a new trial is ordered for both defendants, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with the directives contained in this opinion.