Opinion ID: 891707
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Wills and Trusts Can Be Revoked Only Through Strict Compliance with the Statutory Formalities Established By New Mexico Law.

Text: {15} Revocation of wills and trusts is governed by mandatory statutes. We must honor legislative intent that wills and trusts be revoked in strict accordance with the statutory methods and formalities established by the UPC and UTC. See Gushwa v. Hunt (In re Estate of Gushwa), 2008-NMSC-064, ¶ 15, 145 N.M. 286, 197 P.3d 1 (explaining that the legislature has intentionally and specifically limited the available means of revocation); see also Albuquerque Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 74 N.M. 69, 71, 390 P.2d 657, 658 (1964) ([W]here the subject of revocation is regulated by statute a will may be revoked only in the manner described by the statute.). When construing the UPC and UTC provisions governing revocation, we take an approach that promotes the statutes' underlying purposes and policies. See §§ 45-1-102(A), 46A-1-112. A primary purpose of both the UPC and the UTC is to discover and make effective the intent of a decedent in distribution of his property. Section 45-1-102(B)(2); see also Cable v. Wells Fargo Bank N.M., N.A. (In re Cable Family Trust), 2010-NMSC-017, ¶ 12, 148 N.M. 127, 231 P.3d 108 (explaining that the UTC regards the terms of the trust as the manifestation of the settlor's intent). {16} At early common law, before the advent of statutes governing the revocation of wills, attempts to defeat valid wills were common. 2 Page on the Law of Wills § 21.3, at 352 (2003) (The recognition of informal revocation by oral declarations ... natural[ly] result[ed] in bold attempts to defeat wills by fabricating evidence of the declarations of [the] testator.). These abuses led to the enactment of revocation statutes in England and, subsequently, most states, including New Mexico. Albuquerque Nat'l Bank, 74 N.M. at 71, 390 P.2d at 658-59. Requiring strict adherence to the formalities established by revocation statutes protects decedents, who are unavailable to defend their estate plans against fraud. See Gushwa, 2008-NMSC-064, ¶¶ 29-30, 145 N.M. 286, 197 P.3d 1. {17} The UPC provides the exclusive means by which a will can be revoked. See Sanchez v. Martinez (In re Estate of Jose C. Martinez), 1999-NMCA-093, ¶ 9, 127 N.M. 650, 985 P.2d 1230. The power of a testator to revoke is of equal stature and importance as the power to make a will in the first place, and one of the inherent characteristics of a will is its revocability. 2 Page on the Law of Wills, supra, § 21.1, at 345-46. A testator can revoke a will or any part thereof by executing a subsequent will. Section 45-2-507(A)(1). A will can also be revoked by performing a revocatory act on the will, including burning, tearing, canceling, obliterating or destroying the will or any part of it with the intent to revoke the will. Section 45-2-507(A)(2). In this case, it is undisputed that Husband neither executed a subsequent will nor performed a revocatory act on his existing Will. {18} Trust revocation is governed by the UTC. The terms of the trust instrument determine whether a trust is revocable. See § 46A-6-602. A settlor can revoke or amend a revocable trust by complying with a method of revocation provided in the terms of the trust. Section 46A-6-602(C)(1). Additionally, if a trust does not expressly establish the exclusive means by which it can be revoked, the settlor can revoke that trust by executing a later will or codicil that expressly refers to the trust or specifically devises property that would otherwise have passed according to the terms of the trust, or by any other method manifesting clear and convincing evidence of the settlor's intent. Section 46A-6-602(C)(2). The Trust in this case provided a method of revocation. Husband and Wife each reserved the power to revoke their shares of the Trust by simply signing a duly executed instrument and delivering that instrument to the trustee. Husband did not execute either an instrument revoking the Trust, pursuant to the language of the Trust, or a later will that would have revoked the Trust, pursuant to Section 46A-6-602(C)(2)(a). {19} Son argues that Husband's filing and service of a divorce petition constitutes clear and convincing evidence of his intent to revoke his trust and that the Trust was therefore revoked pursuant to Section 46A-6-602(C)(2)(b). It is doubtful that the mere filing and service of a divorce petition could constitute clear and convincing evidence of a settlor's intent to revoke a trust. Less formal methods of trust revocation are usually insufficient means to revoke a trust, because they provide less reliable indicia of intent than those methods outlined in either the terms of the trust or in the statutory language of the UTC. See Unif. Trust Code § 602 cmt. (amended 2003), 7C U.L.A. 549 (2006). {20} We need not reach this issue, however, because it was not preserved below. Son does not indicate in his brief, and in our review of the record we have not located, where Son argued to the district court that filing and service of a divorce petition was clear and convincing evidence of Husband's intent to revoke the Trust. Son neither established that he preserved this argument nor presented any legal authority supporting his claim. [T]his Court will not review issues raised in appellate briefs that are unsupported by cited authority. State v. Clifford, 117 N.M. 508, 513, 873 P.2d 254, 259 (1994). Mere reference in a conclusory statement will not suffice and is in violation of our rules of appellate procedure. Id.; see Rule 12-213(A)(4) NMRA (providing that briefs shall contain ... a statement explaining how the issue was preserved in the court below, with citations to authorities, record proper, transcript of proceedings or exhibits relied on). Accordingly, we decline to review whether Husband's filing of a divorce petition manifested clear and convincing evidence of his intent to revoke the Trust in satisfaction of Section 46A-6-602(C)(2)(b).