Opinion ID: 2176374
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standard for Granting Preliminary Injunctive Relief

Text: The decision to grant or deny preliminary injunctive relief is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Stamenich v. Markovic, 462 A.2d 452, 456 (D.C.1983). In exercising its discretion, however, the trial court must consider the following criteria: A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy, and the trial court's power to issue it should be exercised only after careful deliberation has persuaded it of the necessity for the relief. A proper exercise of discretion requires the trial court to consider whether the moving party has clearly demonstrated (1) that there is a substantial likelihood he [or she] will prevail on the merits; (2) that he [or she] is in danger of suffering irreparable harm during the pendency of the action; (3) that more harm will result to him [or her] from the denial of the injunction than will result to the defendant from its grant; and, in appropriate cases, (4) that the public interest will not be disserved by the issuance of the requested order. Wieck, 350 A.2d at 387. The trial court must be especially careful where, as here, the requested relief would enjoin agency action pending the outcome of administrative review. The circumstances that will justify ... interference with nonfinal agency action must be truly extraordinary.... Public Util. Comm'r of Or. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 767 F.2d 622, 630 (9th Cir.1985). In such a case the trial court must bear in mind that it is acting in a field that is normally confided to the agency's expertise and must give serious weight to the obviously disruptive effect which the grant of the temporary relief ... [is] likely to have on the administrative process. Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 83, 94 S.Ct. 937, 949, 39 L.Ed.2d 166 (1974). Moreover, as the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has observed, In the field of government procurement the courts must be sedulous to heed the admonition that their authority to vacate and enjoin action that is illegal must be exercised with restraint les[t] the courts fall into the error of supposing that they may revise action simply because [they] happen to think it ill-considered, or to represent the less appealing alternative solution available. M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 147 U.S.App. D.C. 221, 230-31, 455 F.2d 1289, 1298-99 (1971) (quoting Calcutta E. Coast of India & E. Pakistan/U.S.A. Conference v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 130 U.S.App.D.C. 261, 264, 399 F.2d 994, 997 (1968)); see Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Brown, 600 F.2d 429, 434-35 (3d Cir.1979).