Opinion ID: 1533780
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claims based upon misrepresentation, nuisance, restrictive covenants, and the defense of laches or waiver.

Text: The Smiths are engaged in radio communication services and lease their land for towers for communication services. The first tower was erected on their property in 1965. That tower, a triangular metal lattice structure, was originally 140 feet tall but is presently seventy feet tall. It has a width of eighteen inches on each side. A second tower was erected in 1988, and was 190 feet in height. All of the appellants either built or purchased their homes after the first tower was erected. A lease was entered into between the Smiths and Bell in 1997 that allowed Bell to construct a telecommunications tower on the property. The proposed tower would be 170 feet tall and supported by a three-legged base measuring seventeen feet between the legs. The construction costs for the tower was an estimated $630,000. Appellants were notified of the proposed tower in February of 1997. Appellants objected to the construction of the tower, and, following the trial court's ruling excluding evidence of the environmental effects of radio frequency emissions, a trial was held to consider whether the tower constituted a nuisance or a violation of a restrictive covenant and whether Michael Smith had misrepresented certain facts to the Wrights regarding his intended land use. After the close of the testimony and submission of briefs and suggested findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court entered a decree that dismissed appellants' complaint with prejudice. On appeal, we consider chancery cases de novo on the record, but we do not reverse a finding of fact by the chancellor unless it is clearly erroneous. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Campbell v. Campbell, 336 Ark. 379, 985 S.W.2d 724 (1999). For appellants' second point on appeal they contend that the trial court erred when it dismissed appellants Janet and Doyle Wright's misrepresentation claim against appellee Michael Smith. Appellant Janet Wright alleged that Michael Smith represented to her that he did not intend to build additional towers on his property. Mrs. Wright testified at trial that he [Michael Smith] said if he did anything he might put one other small tower there, but that this property was his grandfather's and that he and his wife would build their home there. Mrs. Wright further testified that I did not know there would be another tower built on that property. I did not definitely know that. I was told in terms of maybes. That he might put another tower up. I was given notice at the time I bought my property and started building my house that there would likely be another tower built on the Smith property. Finally, Mrs. Wright, discussing an easement granted to her by the Smiths, testified that in the easement it states that Michael Smith, Darcy Smith, and Judith Smith may place a guy wire in said easement if they deem it necessary for a radio transmission tower. That was something that when he and I had the initial discussion about it he said, `I might put another small tower someday.' And he said, `I don't know where it would be.' He said, `If it needs to be on your easement, is that okay?' I said, `As long as it doesn't block us going in and out, that's fine.' Michael Smith testified that he was asked the following question during a deposition prior to trial `Did you ever discuss with either of the Wrights any future plans you might have for the property?' My answer was: `I told her that someday I might build another tower up there.' At the close of the trial, the chancellor, relying on P.A.M. Transp. v. Ark. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 315 Ark. 234, 868 S.W.2d 33 (1993), dismissed appellants' claim finding that the representation pertained to future events and as such could not constitute a misrepresentation. The essential elements of an action for deceit are as follows: (1) a false representation of a material fact; (2) knowledge that the representation is false or that there is insufficient evidence upon which to make the representation; (3) intent to induce action or inaction in reliance upon the representation; (4) justifiable reliance on the representation; and (5) damage suffered as a result of the reliance. Golden Tee, Inc. v. Venture Golf Schools, Inc., 333 Ark. 253, 969 S.W.2d 625 (1998). An action for fraud or deceit may not be predicated on representations relating solely to future events. Delta School of Commerce, Inc. v. Wood, 298 Ark. 195, 766 S.W.2d 424 (1989) However, this rule is inapplicable if the person making the representation or prediction knows it to be false at the time it is made. Id. The trial court's dismissal was not clearly erroneous. Appellants failed to establish the elements necessary for a misrepresentation claim. Mrs. Wright admitted in her testimony that Mr. Smith never definitively told her that he would not put additional towers on his land. Moreover, Mrs. Wright's testimony regarding the use of her easement by Mr. Smith for the erection of an additional smaller tower demonstrates that Mr. Smith was not trying to mislead the Wrights about his possible future plans. Additionally, whether Mr. Smith planned to erect more towers on his property is an assertion as to future events. Thus, we hold that the trial court did not err when it dismissed the Wrights' cause of action. In their third point on appeal, appellants claim that the trial court erred when it applied the doctrines of waiver and laches to their case. Waiver is the voluntary abandonment or surrender by a capable person of a right known to him to exist, with the intent that he shall forever be deprived of its benefits, and it may occur when one, with full knowledge of the material facts, does something which is inconsistent with the right or his intention to rely upon it. Smith v. Walt Bennett Ford, Inc., 314 Ark. 591, 864 S.W.2d 817 (1993). The right to enforce a restrictive agreement may be lost by laches or acquiescence, especially when one incurs expenditures. Baldischwiler v. Atkins, 315 Ark. 32, 864 S.W.2d 853 (1993). The doctrine of laches is based on a number of equitable principles that are premised on some detrimental change in position made in reliance upon the action or inaction of the other party. Anadarko Petroleum v. Venable, 312 Ark. 330, 850 S.W.2d 302 (1993). It is based on the assumption that the party to whom laches is imputed has knowledge of his rights and the opportunity to assert them, that by reason of his delay some adverse party has good reason to believe those rights are worthless or have been abandoned, and that because of a change of conditions during this delay it would be unjust to the latter to permit him to assert them. Self v. Self, 319 Ark. 632, 893 S.W.2d 775 (1995). Laches requires a demonstration of prejudice to the party alleging it as a defense resulting from a plaintiff's delay in pursuing a claim. Swink v. Giffin, 333 Ark. 400, 970 S.W.2d 207 (1998). The chancellor did not err by applying the defenses of waiver and laches to appellants' case. All of the appellants purchased their homes after the erection of the first tower on the Smiths's property. The two towers on the property were built in 1965 and 1988. The placement of these two towers have never been challenged. Moreover, appellants have not challenged the placement of these towers in the current case. The Smiths have used their property in the same manner, as the location of communication towers, for thirty years without protest. Relying on the acquiescence of the landowners during the thirty previous years, appellees entered into a contract for the construction of an additional tower valued at $630,000. Appellees would have been prejudiced if the chancellor had granted appellants' injunction. Thus, because appellants sat on their rights and because appellees relied on this acquiescence, the trial court properly applied the doctrines of waiver and laches to appellants' claims. In their final point on appeal, appellants contend that the trial court's findings that the proposed tower were neither a violation of the neighborhood restrictive covenants nor a nuisance was clearly erroneous. Restrictive covenants are to be strictly construed against limitations upon the free use of property, and all doubts resolved in favor of the unfettered use of the land. Casebeer v. Beacon Realty, Inc., 248 Ark. 22, 449 S.W.2d 701 (1970). In other words, if there are any doubts, they are to be construed strictly against those seeking to enforce them and liberally in favor of freedom in use of the land. Id. This rule of construction is based upon the repugnance of restrictions on the use of land to trade, commerce, recognized business policy, and common-law rights to use lands for all lawful purposes. Where there is uncertainty in the language by which a grantor in a deed attempts to restrict the use of realty, freedom from restraint should be decreed. Id. We have also held that when the language of the restrictive covenant is clear and unambiguous, the parties will be confined to the meaning of the language employed and that it is improper to inquire into the surrounding circumstances or the objects and purposes of the restriction for aid in its construction. Casebeer v. Beacon Realty, Inc., 248 Ark. 22, 449 S.W.2d 701 (1970). Nuisance is defined as conduct by one landowner that unreasonably interferes with the use and enjoyment of the lands of another and includes conduct on property that disturbs the peaceful, quiet, and undisturbed use and enjoyment of nearby property. Southeast Ark. Landfill, Inc. v. State, 313 Ark. 669, 858 S.W.2d 665 (1993). Equity clearly will enjoin conduct that culminates in a private or public nuisance where the resulting injury to the nearby property and residents is certain, substantial, and beyond speculation and conjecture. See Arkansas Release Guidance Foundation v. Needler, 252 Ark. 194, 477 S.W.2d 821 (1972). The general rule is that in order to constitute a nuisance, the intrusion must result in physical harm, as distinguished from unfounded fear of harm, which must be proven to be certain, substantial, and beyond speculation and conjecture. It is well settled that a landowner may make such use of his property as he chooses so long as he does not unlawfully or unreasonably interfere with or harm his neighbor. Miller v. Jasinski, 17 Ark.App. 131, 705 S.W.2d 442 (1986). It is only the unreasonable use or conduct by one landowner which results in unwarranted interference with his neighbor which constitutes a nuisance. Id. The chancellor correctly found that the proposed tower did not violate the restrictive covenant nor was it a nuisance. The pertinent language from the restrictive covenant is set forth in the deeds of the property owners in the neighborhood. The language in the covenant states: No noxious, odorous, or offensive trade or activity shall be permitted. Appellants contend that the placement of the communications tower in their neighborhood would violate this restrictive covenant. The chancellor found that since a telecommunication tower has operated in the area in question without objection for more than 30 years and another for 10 years, the drafters of the restrictive covenant did not consider communications towers to be noxious, odorous, or offensive; that those living in the neighborhood have not considered such towers to be noxious, odorous, or offensive; and that those moving to the neighborhood knowing that such towers were in operation did not consider towers to be noxious, odorous, or offensive. These findings were not clearly erroneous. Because the proposed tower did not constitute a noxious, odorous, or offensive activity, the chancellor did not err in his finding that the proposed tower did not violate any restrictive covenants. The chancellor was correct when he found that the proposed tower did not amount to a nuisance. Appellants failed to show any certain, substantial harm that is beyond speculation or conjecture. They alleged that if the proposed tower were erected the following harms would be suffered by the residents of the neighborhood: (1) the tower would be aesthetically unpleasing; (2) an attractive nuisance would result; (3) the tower would bring additional workmen to the community and cause the safety of the residents to be compromised; and (4) the erection of the tower would cause a proliferation of towers in the community. The chancellor found, and the record supports the finding, that all of the harms alleged by appellants are speculative and are not supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, we hold that because appellants failed to provide proof of actual substantial harm that they would suffer as a result of the proposed tower, the trial court did not err when it found that the tower was not a nuisance. Affirmed.