Opinion ID: 1343563
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Continuous Representation Doctrine

Text: More central to our final analysis, however, is the issue of continued representation by the Appellee's law firm and the effect of that representation upon the running of the statute of limitations. The Appellant proposes the adoption of the continuous representation doctrine designed to toll the statute of limitations during the continuation of the attorney/client relationship. This doctrine tolls the running of the statute in an attorney malpractice action until the professional relationship terminates with respect to the matter underlying the malpractice action. It is an adaptation of the continuous treatment rule applied in the medical malpractice [8] forum and is designed, in part, to protect the integrity of the professional relationship by permitting the allegedly negligent attorney to attempt to remedy the effects of the malpractice and providing uninterrupted service to the client. See Cuccolo v. Lipsky, Goodkin & Co., 826 F.Supp. 763, 769-70 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (outlining policy considerations underlying the doctrine). In Glamm v. Allen, 57 N.Y.2d 87, 453 N.Y.S.2d 674, 439 N.E.2d 390 (1982), the court indicated that since it would be impossible to envision a situation where commencing a malpractice suit would not affect the professional relationship, the rule of continuous representation tolls the running of the Statute of Limitations on the malpractice claim until the ongoing representation is completed. Id. 453 N.Y.S.2d at 677, 439 N.E.2d at 393.
In Muller v. Sturman, 79 A.D.2d 482, 437 N.Y.S.2d 205 (N.Y.App.Div.1981), the court explained that the continuous representation doctrine applies only where there are clear indicia of an ongoing, continuous, developing and dependent relationship between the client and the attorney.... Id. 437 N.Y.S.2d at 208. The doctrine should be applied only where the professional's involvement after the alleged malpractice is for the performance of the same or related services and is not merely continuity of a general professional relationship. Id. at 207. The doctrine envisions a relationship between the parties that is marked with trust and confidence ... [and] involves a continuity of the professional services from which the alleged malpractice stems. Id. at 208. Based upon these principles, we hold that the limitations period for a legal malpractice claim is not tolled by the continuous representation rule where an attorney's subsequent role is only tangentially related to legal representation the attorney provided in the matter in which he was allegedly negligent. Therefore, [t]he inquiry is not whether an attorney-client relationship still exists on any matter or even generally, but when the representation of the specific matter concluded. Ronald E. Mallen and Jeffrey M. Smith, Legal Malpractice § 21.12, at 822 (4th ed.1996). North Dakota has also adopted this rule, reasoning that it has the dual purpose of protecting the relationship as well as protecting the client from the possibility of barring his cause of action by delay. In Wall v. Lewis, 393 N.W.2d 758 (N.D.1986), the court held: We believe that the continuous representation rule appropriately protects the integrity of the attorney-client relationship and affords the attorney an opportunity to remedy his error (or to establish that there has been no error), while simultaneously preventing the attorney from defeating the client's cause of action through delay. 393 N.W.2d at 763. The Wall court also specified that the doctrine was applicable only where the representation relates to the same transaction or subject matter as the allegedly negligent acts. Id. at 762. In Bosse v. Quam, 537 N.W.2d 8 (S.D. 1995), the Supreme Court of South Dakota addressed the continuous representation rule and noted that the rule, as applied to legal malpractice, has its roots in the medical malpractice exception to the statute of limitations. The statute is tolled for torts arising from a physician's continued treatment until the doctor-patient relationship has ended; likewise, the continuous representation rule in the legal malpractice arena halts the commencement of the limitations period until the attorney-client relationship has ended. 537 N.W.2d at 10-11. In Keegan v. First Bank of Sioux Falls, 519 N.W.2d 607 (S.D.1994), the court specifically placed the burden upon the client to establish the applicability of the continuous representation doctrine as a defense to the statute of limitations claims potentially asserted by the attorney. Id. at 615. In Morrison v. Watkins, 20 Kan.App.2d 411, 889 P.2d 140 (1995), the court emphasized that the applicability of the continuous representation rule ceases when the attorney/client relationship terminates. Where the client does hire another attorney, and assumes an adversarial stance to her first attorney, the continuous representation terminates, even if the client does not formally fire the first attorney. Id. 889 P.2d at 148. The Supreme Court of Kentucky justifies application of the rule by reference to the underlying discovery rule, reasoning that the continuous representation rule is simply a branch of the discovery rule, which holds that by virtue of the attorney-client relationship, there can be no effective discovery of the negligence so long as the relationship prevails. Alagia, Day, Trautwein & Smith v. Broadbent, 882 S.W.2d 121, 125 (Ky.1994). The rule recognizes the attorney's superior knowledge of the law and the dependence of the client, and protects the client from an unscrupulous attorney. Id. The practical advantage of the rule is to enable a negligent attorney to correct or mitigate the harm if there is time and opportunity and if the parties choose such a course. Without it, the client has no alternative but to terminate the relationship, perhaps prematurely, and institute litigation. Id.; see also Northern Mont. Hosp. v. Knight, 248 Mont. 310, 811 P.2d 1276 (1991) (applying the continuous representation rule to architects); Zwecker v. Kulberg, 209 A.D.2d 514, 618 N.Y.S.2d 840 (1994) (applying the rule to accountants). The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, in Tolliver v. United States, 831 F.Supp. 558 (S.D.W.Va.1993), has adopted the continuous treatment rule in the medical malpractice context, reasoning that in order to avoid depriving a medical patient of the right to place trust and confidence in the physician, the solution is to excuse the patient from challenging the quality of care until the confidential relationship terminates, to toll the statute's running during this period. Id. at 560. The doctrine of continuous treatment in the medical malpractice arena was also adopted by the Fourth Circuit in Miller v. United States, 932 F.2d 301 (4th Cir.1991), and Otto v. National Institute of Health, 815 F.2d 985 (4th Cir.1987). Similar reasoning was employed in another context by this Court in Clark v. Milam, 192 W.Va. 398, 452 S.E.2d 714 (1994). We addressed the tolling of the statute of limitations for corporate claims against lawyers who previously represented the corporation adversely controlled by officers and directors who had retained the lawyers. We stated the following in syllabus point one: In West Virginia, the doctrine of adverse domination tolls statutes of limitation for tort claims against officers and directors who acted adversely to the interests of the company and against lawyers and accountants, owing fiduciary duties to the company, who took action contributing to the adverse domination of the company. Id. at 399, 452 S.E.2d at 715. In discussing the implications of the rule, the following observations were made by Mallen and Smith: The purpose of the continuous representation rule is to avoid unnecessarily disrupting the attorney-client relationship. Adoption of the rule was a direct reaction to the illogical requirement of the occurrence rule, which compels clients to sue their attorneys although the relationship continues and there has not been and may never be any injury. The rule, limited to the context of continuous representation, also is consistent with the purpose of the statute of limitations, which is to prevent stale claims and enable the defendant to preserve evidence. When the attorney continues to represent the client in the subject matter in which the error has occurred, all such objectives are achieved and preserved. The attorney-client relationship is maintained and speculative malpractice litigation is avoided. The rule of continuous representation is available and appropriate in those jurisdictions adopting the damage and discovery rules. The policy reasons are as compelling for allowing an attorney to continue efforts to remedy a bad result, even if some damages have occurred and even if the client is fully aware of the attorney's error. The doctrine is fair to all concerned parties. The attorney has the opportunity to remedy, avoid or establish that there was no error or attempt to mitigate the damages. The client is not forced to end the relationship, although the option exists. This result is consistent with any expressed policy basis for the statute of limitations. Mallen and Smith, supra, § 21.12, at 817 (footnotes omitted).
As recognized by Mallen and Smith, quoted above, the rationale underlying the continuous representation doctrine supports application of the doctrine even where the client has actual knowledge of the allegedly negligent act. Quite obviously, nothing about the continuous representation doctrine limits the client's ability to terminate the attorney/client relationship upon learning of the attorney's allegedly inappropriate endeavor or to immediately institute a cause of action against the attorney. Thus, applying the doctrine, even where the client has knowledge of the act, will not prejudice the rights of the client to obtain redress. The continuous representation doctrine was expressly approved and codified in California in 1977 at section 340.6, subdivision (a) of the Code of Civil Procedure. In its statutory form, the limitations period will not begin to run during the continuous representation regarding the specific subject matter in which the alleged wrongful act or omission occurred even when the client is fully aware of both the attorney's negligence and the resulting harm. Cal. Civil Procedure § 340.6 (West 1982). In Laird v. Blacker, 2 Cal.4th 606, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 550, 828 P.2d 691, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1021, 113 S.Ct. 658, 121 L.Ed.2d 584 (1992), the Supreme Court of California relied upon the language of the statute and reasoned as follows: Section 340.6 and its legislative history make clear that once a client has been injured by an adverse judgment, the limitations period commences and is not tolled by filing an appeal absent continuous representation by the trial attorney. This continuous representation rule was adopted in order to avoid the disruption of an attorney-client relationship by a lawsuit while enabling the attorney to correct or minimize an apparent error, and to prevent an attorney from defeating a malpractice cause of action by continuing to represent the client until the statutory period has expired. (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, 2d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 298 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 17, 1977.) 7 Cal.Rptr.2d at 557, 828 P.2d at 698 (citations omitted). In Morrison, the Kansas court recognized that [a]t least one court has held that the continuous representation rule is not applicable when the client learns of the attorney's negligence before the termination of the relationship. 889 P.2d at 147; see Economy Housing Co., Inc. v. Rosenberg, 239 Neb. 267, 475 N.W.2d 899 (1991). [9] As the Morrison court recognized, however, this runs counter to the rationale for the rule ... designed to permit a client to work with the attorney to correct the error even though the client knows the error exists. 889 P.2d at 147. The court also noted as follows: A synthesis of cases dealing with the continuous representation rule reveals that its purpose is to benefit both the client and attorney by allowing the attorney to attempt to correct or mitigate damages caused by the attorney's error and allowing the client to refrain from discharging the attorney upon discovery of the error. Id. at 148. In O'Neill v. Tichy, 19 Cal.App.4th 114, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 162 (1993), the court held that, under California's statutory codification of the continuous representation rule, a client's awareness of the attorney's negligence does not interrupt the tolling of the limitations period so long as the client permits the attorney to continue representing the client regarding the specific subject matter in which the alleged negligence occurred. 25 Cal.Rptr. at 165. Likewise, we hold that the client's actual or constructive knowledge of the attorney's allegedly negligent act does not prevent application of the continuous representation doctrine.
We conclude that the continuous representation doctrine is an appropriate mechanism for altering the effect of the statute of limitations where the attorney and client continue their relationship, with respect to the specific matter underlying the alleged malpractice, beyond the time of that alleged malpractice. As in Muller and courts of other jurisdictions, we specify that the doctrine is to be utilized only where the attorney's involvement after the alleged malpractice is for the performance of the same or related services and is not merely continuity of a general professional relationship. Muller, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 207. We strongly emphasize the necessity of examining the nature of the continuing representation. The continuous representation doctrine applies only to malpractice actions in which there is clear indicia of an ongoing, continuous, developing, and dependent relationship between the client and the attorney. The doctrine should only be utilized only where the attorney's involvement after the alleged malpractice is for the performance of the same or related services and is not merely continuity of a general professional relationship. We further impose the restriction that the burden of establishing the elements necessary for the application of the doctrine is upon the client. Based upon the foregoing, we reverse the decision of the lower court granting summary judgment to the Appellee, and we remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Reversed and Remanded.