Opinion ID: 1998202
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Low and Moderate Income Housing Act

Text: We first determine the applicable law under which this Court shall review the town's appeal from SHAB. Although this issue is not in dispute, [6] we find it fitting to underscore the statutory language that applies to the disposition of this case in light of amendments to the act in 2004 and 2005. See JCM, LLC v. Cumberland Zoning Board of Review, 889 A.2d 169, 172-73 (R.I.2005) (determining the applicable law even though neither party contested SHAB's application of the pre-amendment act). For this Court to interpret a statute as retroactive, the General Assembly must make a clear expression of retroactive application. Pion v. Bess Eaton Donuts Flour Co., 637 A.2d 367, 371 (R.I.1994). In Kaveny v. Cumberland Zoning Board of Review, 875 A.2d 1, 4-5 (R.I.2005), we declined to retroactively apply various amendments to the act in our analysis of the matter then before us because the amendments lacked the requisite clear expression of retroactive application. We therefore applied the law in effect at the time when the applicant-developer submitted its application for a permit to the zoning board. Id. ; see also JCM, LLC, 889 A.2d at 172-73 (applying Kaveny to ascertain the applicable version of the statute). In the instant case, all 2004 and 2005 amendments to the act became effective after East Bay submitted its application to the zoning board, on August 27, 2003. Accordingly, we shall review the town's appeal under the pre-amendment act. [7]
The General Assembly passed the Low and Moderate Income Housing Act in 1991 as a measure to address the acute shortage of affordable, accessible, safe, and sanitary housing for its citizens of low and moderate income. Section 45-53-2. The aspirational language of the act continues by declaring that it is imperative that action is taken immediately to assure the availability of affordable    housing for these persons as a measure necessary to assure the health, safety, and welfare of all citizens of this state. Id. The General Assembly placed the burden of achieving this urgent goal upon the cities and towns of the state to provide opportunities for the establishment of low and moderate income housing. Id. Recently, this Court has addressed thoroughly the operational components of the act in Omni Development Corp. There, construing the clear and unambiguous language of § 45-53-4, we wrote that the act provides for a streamlined and expedited application procedure whereby `a single application for a [comprehensive permit] to build [low and moderate income] housing in lieu of separate applications to the applicable local [municipal] boards' may be submitted to the zoning board of review of a city or town. [8] Omni Development Corp., 814 A.2d at 894 (quoting § 45-53-4). Section 45-53-4 requires the zoning board to notify each applicable local board immediately upon receipt of an application, and thereafter hold a public hearing on the application within thirty days. The zoning board then must render a decision, based upon a majority vote of the board, within forty (40) days after the termination of the public hearing. Section 45-53-4. Applications for which the zoning board has held no public hearing or has failed to make a decision within forty days are deemed to have been allowed and the approval shall issue immediately. Id. The provisions of the act confer upon the zoning board considerable powers in granting an application for a permit. In Omni Development Corp., we noted that a zoning board, when passing upon an application    is not merely performing its limited statutory duties, but rather is vested with significant discretion and responsibility to act in the best interest of the community. Omni Development Corp., 814 A.2d at 897. Indeed, § 45-53-4 provides that the zoning board: has the same power to issue permits or approvals that any local board or official who would otherwise act with respect to the application, including, but not limited to, the power to attach to the permit or approval, conditions, and requirements with respect to height, site plan, size, or shape, or building materials, as are consistent with the terms of this section. [9] Those aggrieved by a zoning board's decision to issue an approval may appeal directly to this Court. Section 45-53-4; see, e.g., Kaveny, 875 A.2d at 1 n. 1 (appeal of abutting landowners). A party aggrieved by the issuance of a permit with conditions also may appeal, but the avenue of the appeal depends upon the status of the aggrieved party. Compare Kaveny, 875 A.2d at 1 n. 1 (direct appeal of remonstrants to this Court by virtue of § 45-53-4), with Omni Development Corp., 814 A.2d at 893-94 (procedural posture involving a town's appeal to this Court after an applicant's appeal to SHAB by virtue of § 45-53-5). The act is more circumscribed with respect to the zoning board's ability to deny an application. Section 45-53-4 provides that a zoning board may deny an application only if based on one or more of the following four grounds: [1] if the proposal is inconsistent with local needs   ; [2] if the proposal is not in conformance with the comprehensive plan; [3] if the community has met or has plans to meet the standard of ten percent (10%) of the units   ; or [4] if concerns for the environment and the health and safety of current residents have not been adequately addressed. [10] Moreover, a zoning board that denies an application based on one or more of these grounds must support its decision with sufficient findings of fact and reasons for the actions taken. JCM, LLC, 889 A.2d at 176 (quoting Kaveny, 875 A.2d at 8). [11] If a zoning board denies an application, or grants a permit with conditions that make the development of affordable housing infeasible, the applicant may appeal to SHAB pursuant to § 45-53-5. SHAB must then, under the dictates of § 45-53-5, notify the zoning board of the appeal immediately, hold a hearing within twenty days after receipt of the applicant's statement, and render a written decision and order, based upon a majority vote within thirty days after the termination of said hearing. See also Union Village Development Associates v. North Smithfield Zoning Board of Review, 738 A.2d 1084, 1085-86 (R.I.1999) (holding that § 45-53-5 requires a majority vote of the full membership of SHAB). SHAB's written decision must state its findings of fact, and its conclusions and the reasons for those conclusions. Section 45-53-5. This Court previously has articulated the statutory standard of review SHAB must apply in passing upon an applicant's appeal from an adverse decision of a zoning board. In Omni Development Corp., we read § 45-53-6(a) to provide expressly that: [i]n hearing the appeal, [SHAB] shall determine whether, in the case of the denial of an application, the decision of the zoning board of review was reasonable and consistent with local needs   . Omni Development Corp., 814 A.2d at 898 (quoting § 45-53-6(a)). (Emphasis added.) As we recently explained in JCM, LLC, a case that examined and applied this Court's ruling in Omni Development Corp., the threshold inquiry into whether a zoning board's decision to deny an application based on a zoning or land use regulation is consistent with local needs essentially depends upon whether the municipality meets the statutory quota for low and moderate income housing units. JCM, LLC, 889 A.2d at 174 (quoting Omni Development Corp., 814 A.2d at 899). We held in JCM, LLC that the zoning or land use ordinance, requirement, or regulation underlying a zoning board's decision to deny an application is: [12] conclusively deemed consistent with local needs when `imposed by a city or town council after a comprehensive hearing, and that community has met or exceeded its statutory minimum for low and moderate income housing units; and has adopted a comprehensive plan that includes a housing element that addresses the need for low and moderate income housing for that community.' JCM, LLC, 889 A.2d at 174 (quoting Omni Development Corp., 814 A.2d at 898-99) (construing § 45-53-3(2)). In municipalities for which this conclusive presumption applies, SHAB has no statutory authority to vacate, modify, reverse, or otherwise manipulate the decision of the zoning board. Id. ; Omni Development Corp., 814 A.2d at 899. SHAB must apply a higher level of scrutiny, however, to the decisions of municipalities that have failed to meet the statutory requirement, imposed upon them by negative implication in § 45-53-3(2)(i), to have affordable housing that is in excess of ten percent of the municipality's total housing units. [13] See JCM, LLC, 889 A.2d at 174; Omni Development Corp., 814 A.2d at 899. Without the benefit of the conclusive presumption, SHAB must apply the analysis housed in the statutory definition of [c]onsistent with local needs: local zoning or land use ordinances, requirements, and regulations are considered consistent with local needs if they are reasonable in view of the state need for low and moderate income housing, considered with the number of low income persons in the city or town affected and the need to protect the health and safety of the occupants of the proposed housing or of the residen[ts] of the city or town, to promote better site and building design in relation to the surroundings, or to preserve open spaces, and if the local zoning or land use ordinances, requirements, and regulations are applied as equally as possible to both subsidized and unsubsidized housing. Section 45-53-3(2). We elaborated in our Omni Development Corp. opinion that it is incumbent upon SHAB to examine the decision and the [local requirement] on which it rests and determine whether the [local requirement] is reasonable in light of the state's need for low income housing. Omni Development Corp., 814 A.2d at 899. A local requirement is reasonable, this Court continued, if it is not designed or intended to exclude low and moderate income residents from the community or to discourage or frustrate the likelihood of success of a project. Id. Coming full circle, SHAB must examine the illustrative standards set forth in § 45-53-6(b). JCM, LLC, 889 A.2d at 174-75; Omni Development Corp., 814 A.2d at 901. These factors include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) The consistency of the decision to deny or condition the permit with the approved comprehensive plan; (2) The extent to which the community meets or plans to meet the ten percent (10%) standard for existing low and moderate income housing units; (3) The consideration of the health and safety of existing residents; (4) The consideration of environmental protection; and (5) The extent to which the community applies local zoning ordinances and special exception procedures evenly on subsidized and unsubsidized housing applications alike. Section 45-53-6(b). [14] As this Court pronounced in Omni Development Corp., and reiterated in JCM, LLC, the above factors are in addition to the reasonableness analysis contained in § 45-53-3(2)'s definition of [c]onsistent with local needs. JCM, LLC, 889 A.2d at 174; Omni Development Corp., 814 A.2d at 901. We were mindful in Omni Development Corp., and are still, of the degree of overlap between the reasonableness analysis of § 45-53-3(2) and the illustrative factors of § 45-53-6(b), noting that the latter largely mirror the former. Omni Development Corp., 814 A.2d at 901. For municipalities lacking the statutory quota, however, the act calls upon SHAB to conduct an analysis under both subsections. JCM, LLC, 889 A.2d at 174; Omni Development Corp., 814 A.2d at 901.
The town argued vigorously at the SHAB hearing, and before us at oral argument, that SHAB's statutorily required standard of review violates the guarantees of equal protection and due process of both section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 2, of the Rhode Island Constitution. [15] The town points to the deferential standard with which this Court reviews decisions of zoning boards granting permit applications with or without conditions when an appeal is brought by aggrieved parties pursuant to § 45-53-4. The standard of review SHAB must employ under §§ 45-53-6 and 45-53-3(2), on the other hand, is much less deferential to the zoning board of a municipality that has not reached its statutory quota under the act, such as the town in the present case. Thus, the town argues that the differential appellate treatment of opposing parties within the same dispute violates the above-indicated constitutional provisions. The town's argument essentially decries the different standards of review a zoning board receives from appellate bodies under the act that, as we summarized in Part II.B of this opinion, is a function of the divergent avenues of appeal available to aggrieved parties based on their particular status in the case. Section 45-53-4, as we have stated, provides a mechanism by which an aggrieved party may file a direct appeal to this Court. Although the act does not set forth a standard by which this Court must review such direct appeals, our case law applies an especially deferential review analogous to that applied by the Superior Court in passing upon appeals from local zoning boards pursuant to G.L.1956 § 45-24-69. Kaveny, 875 A.2d at 7-8; Curran, 672 A.2d at 454-55. Our review does not give this Court license to substitute its judgment for that of the zoning board of review as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. Curran, 672 A.2d at 454 (quoting § 45-24-69(d)). Further, this Court may reverse the decision of the zoning board only in the event that the decision violated constitutional or statutory provisions, that it was made in excess of statutory authority or made upon an unlawful procedure or error of law, was clearly erroneous in view of the evidence, or was [otherwise] arbitrary or capricious. Id. at 454-55 (quoting United Cerebral Palsy of Rhode Island v. Town of Johnston, No. 95-116-A. (mem., R.I. filed Mar. 23, 1995)). As this Court explained in Omni Development Corp., 814 A.2d at 898, our manner of review in such cases is distinct from SHAB's standard of review in passing upon a zoning board's denial or conditional approval of an application, brought by an applicant pursuant to § 45-53-6. In Omni Development Corp., the town argued that, under our holding in Curran, 672 A.2d at 454-55, SHAB must apply the same deferential review that this Court employs when reviewing a direct appeal from a zoning board. Omni Development Corp., 814 A.2d at 898. We rejected the town's argument, holding that the act expressly requires SHAB to conduct specific inquiries under §§ 45-53-6 and 45-53-3(2), and that the degree of scrutiny under these sections depends upon whether the town has met its statutory quota. The deferential review annunciated in Curran, we continued, applied to our review of SHAB's decisions as well as the decisions of a zoning board before us on direct appeal, but not to SHAB's review of the same. [16] Omni Development Corp., 814 A.2d at 898. The town's contention in the present case is that these admittedly dissimilar standards embody differential appellate treatment that rises to the level of a constitutional deprivation. We disagree. Faced with a challenge to the constitutional validity of an act of the General Assembly, we begin our analysis with the presumption that the legislative enactment is constitutional. Gem Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Rossi, 867 A.2d 796, 808 (R.I.2005). The General Assembly possesses the broad and plenary power to make and enact law, save for the textual limitations    that are specified in the Federal or State Constitutions. Cherenzia v. Lynch, 847 A.2d 818, 822 (R.I.2004) (quoting City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 44 (R.I.1995)). As such, this Court will not invalidate a statute on constitutional grounds unless the challenging party can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute at issue is repugnant to a provision of the Rhode Island Constitution. Ruggiero v. City of Providence, 889 A.2d 691, 697 (R.I.2005). Further, this [C]ourt will make every reasonable intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a legislative act, and so far as any presumption exists it is in favor of so holding. State v. Garnetto, 75 R.I. 86, 94, 63 A.2d 777, 781 (1949). The town calls upon this Court to calibrate the applicable sections of the act, as written by the General Assembly and applied in the case at hand, against the due-process and equal-protection guarantees of both the federal and state constitutions. Because article 1, section 2, of the Rhode Island Constitution is parallel to section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, we conduct a hybrid analysis that nevertheless reflects the autonomous character of each constitution's inviolable guarantees. Providence Teachers' Union Local 958, AFL-CIO, AFT v. City Council of Providence, 888 A.2d 948, 956 (R.I.2005) (noting that the drafters of the 1986 Rhode Island Constitution created an independent state foundation for individual rights presumably in case the federal judiciary should adopt a more narrow interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment). The substantive component of due process guards against arbitrary and capricious government action. Brunelle v. Town of South Kingstown, 700 A.2d 1075, 1084 (R.I.1997). To prevail on such a claim, a successful litigant must show that the statute in question violates a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest or that the General Assembly's implementation of the statute was clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. Cherenzia, 847 A.2d at 826 (quoting Brunelle, 700 A.2d at 1084); accord Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926). Concerning equal protection, [i]t is well established that where it has not been shown that a `fundamental right' has been affected or that the legislation sets up a `suspect classification,' a statute will be invalidated    only if the classification established bears no reasonable relationship to the public health, safety, or welfare. Kaveny, 875 A.2d at 11 (quoting Sweetman v. Town of Cumberland, 117 R.I. 134, 151, 364 A.2d 1277, 1288 (1976)). The town has failed, in the present case, to provide any rationale to support its assertion that the act's provisions for appellate review violate either of the constitutional protections of either constitution, much less a rationale that establishes that point beyond a reasonable doubt. Beyond positing the mere observation that the procedure is differential, which this Court already recognized in Omni Development Corp., 814 A.2d at 898, the town directs our attention to four opinions of other states. [17] These cases, however, are distinguishable and do not address a statute in any way similar to the act at issue here. [18] In crafting the Low and Moderate Income Housing Act, the General Assembly designed a unique and sometimes intrusive standard that SHAB must apply in reviewing a zoning board's decision to deny an application. This standard, provided in §§ 45-53-6 and 45-53-3(2) as a carveout to the customary review of zoning board appeals, requires SHAB to scrutinize a zoning board's denial of an application when the municipality in question has failed to reach its statutory quota of affordable housing, as in the case before us. When the municipality has satisfied that quota, however, and thus has met the purposes behind the act as set forth in § 45-53-2, SHAB's standard decidedly is less harsh. We cannot say that the act, a fundamental component of which is SHAB's suspicious eye vis-à-vis recalcitrant municipalities, violates the constitutional provisions invoked by the town in light of the imperative considerations involved at the act's birth. The state unquestionably has a legitimate interest, if not a substantial one, in addressing the housing needs of its impecunious citizenry. See Kaveny, 875 A.2d at 10-11 (holding similarly, but in answer to less focused constitutional challenges). Nor can we say that the act is unrelated to the health, safety, or welfare of the individuals and families that the General Assembly sought to affect through its enactment. See id. Consequently, the town's due-process and equal-protection challenges must fail.