Opinion ID: 1111580
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence to sustain conviction for aiding and abetting first-degree, depraved-mind murder.

Text: {13} The State must offer sufficient evidence to prove each element of the crime charged, beyond a reasonable doubt. See generally State v. Garcia, 1992 NMSC 046, 114 N.M. 269, 274, 837 P.2d 862, 867 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 317-19, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2788-89, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). The State's obligation to do so arises from the constitutional requirement of due process. Id. The evidentiary burden imposed on the State as a matter of due process is the production of evidence into the record, from which a rational fact-finder could find the facts necessary to support each element of the crime charged. This does not involve substituting the appellate court's judgment for that of the jury in deciding the reasonable-doubt question, but it does require appellate court scrutiny of the evidence and supervision of the jury's fact-finding function to ensure that, indeed, a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the essential facts required for a conviction. Garcia, 1992 NMSC 046, 114 N.M. at 274, 837 P.2d at 867. {14} In reviewing for sufficient evidence to support a conviction, we apply a time-honored, three-part test: 1) that substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion; 2) that on appeal, all disputed facts are resolved in favor of the successful party, with all reasonable inferences indulged in support of the verdict, and all evidence and inferences to the contrary discarded; and 3) that although contrary evidence is presented which may have supported a different verdict, the appellate court will not weigh the evidence or foreclose a finding of substantial evidence. State v. Lujan, 103 N.M. 667, 669, 712 P.2d 13, 15 (Ct.App.1985). The first part of this test paraphrases the evidentiary burden imposed on the State as a matter of constitutional due process. The second and third parts of the test reflect a traditional view of the role of an appellate court in reviewing the results achieved at trial, whether the matters tried were civil or criminal. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Homestake Min. Co., 102 N.M. 473, 476, 697 P.2d 156, 159 (Ct.App. 1985). It is then through this small aperture called appellate review that we examine the evidence. Id.
{15} Baca's guilt as an accessory arises not only from his own actions but also from those actions that he helped, encouraged or caused. See UJI 14-2822(3) NMRA 1997 (Aiding or abetting; accessory to crime other than attempt and felony murder.). The State must produce evidence that would satisfy a rational fact-finder that Baca shared Eccleston's purpose and design. See State v. Ortega, 77 N.M. 7, 17, 419 P.2d 219, 227 (1966) (holding there must be a community of purpose and partnership in the unlawful undertaking); State v. Luna, 92 N.M. 680, 683, 594 P.2d 340, 343 (Ct.App.1979). In this case, the State was required to show, either through direct or circumstantial evidence, that Eccleston committed an act greatly dangerous to the lives of others indicating a depraved mind without regard for human life, see UJI 14-203 NMRA 1997, and also that Baca helped, encouraged or caused Eccleston's act, intending that the crime occur. See UJI 14-2822(3). {16} In Brown, 1996 NMSC 073, ¶ 14, 122 N.M. at 727, 931 P.2d at 72, we indicated that one factor in identifying depraved-mind murder is the number of persons subjected to the risk of death. We also said that [b]ecause the legislature has deemed that a killing performed with a depraved mind is an especially serious homicide, deserving of punishment equal to that imposed for other forms of first-degree murder, we conclude that the legislature intended the offense of depraved mind murder to encompass an intensified malice or evil intent. Id. ¶ 15, 122 N.M. at 727, 931 P.2d at 72. There must be proof that the defendant had `subjective knowledge' that his or her act was extremely dangerous to the lives of others. Id. ¶ 16, 122 N.M. at 728, 931 P.2d at 73 (quoting Omar-Muhammad, 102 N.M. at 278, 694 P.2d at 926). The required mens rea element of `subjective knowledge' serves as proof that the defendant acted with a `depraved mind' or `wicked or malignant heart' and with utter disregard for human life. Id. (quoting Omar-Muhammad, 102 N.M. at 278, 694 P.2d at 926, and Hernandez, 1994 NMSC 043, 117 N.M. at 499, 873 P.2d at 245). {17} Based on the evidence summarized below, we conclude that the State carried its evidentiary burden. There is sufficient evidence to support findings that (1) Eccleston committed an act greatly dangerous to the lives of others, (2) knowing that the act created a risk of death or great bodily harm, which indicated a depraved mind, regardless of the lives of others, and (3) that Baca helped him commit that act. We also conclude that the State carried its burden of showing that (4) Baca shared Eccleston's purpose or design.
{18} Baca argues that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, shows at most that he shared an intent to shoot at the tires and that shooting at the tires was not an act greatly dangerous to the lives of others, indicating a depraved mind heedless of the lives of others. He reasons that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to support his conviction for depraved-mind murder and, thus, also was insufficient to support his conviction of conspiracy to commit depraved-mind murder. We disagree with Baca's analysis of the evidence and, therefore, need not reach Baca's analysis of the law. {19} This Court must ensure that a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the essential facts required for a conviction. Garcia, 1992 NMSC 046, 114 N.M. at 274, 837 P.2d at 867. Here, the State had the burden to prove that Baca and Eccleston intended to shoot at Comingo's car, thereby sharing the general purpose to commit an act greatly dangerous to the lives of others. Larry Betancourt testified that the car driven by Baca veered to the left as if the driver attempted to line up the passenger side of his car with Comingo's driver's side. Baca testified that he did not do this. Additionally, John Bacon testified that after Eccleston fired the shots, Baca laughed and said, I thought you were shooting for the tires. The jury might have believed Baca's testimony and rejected Betancourt's testimony. A jury therefore might have found that Baca realized only after the shots were fired that Eccleston intended to shoot at the driver. However, a reasonable jury also might have rejected Baca's testimony. {20} Baca testified that earlier in the evening he had seen Eccleston playing with his forty-five-caliber handgun, showing it off like he always does, and saying he loved his gun. Baca testified further that, although he did not actually see the gun inside the pool hall, he was aware Eccleston had it with him, around his waist on an elastic strap. Similarly, he testified that he did not actually see Eccleston holding the gun as he got into Baca's car to leave the pool hall, but he was aware that Eccleston still had it strapped around like his [waist] where he had that strap. While they were driving around after leaving the pool hall, and at the intersection, as Baca started chasing Comingo's car, Baca knew Eccleston had the gun with him. Baca testified, however, that he did not know Eccleston was going to shoot the gun. {21} If the jury rejected Baca's testimony, the jury was entitled to infer that Baca positioned the car because he knew that Eccleston was aiming his gun at the driver. If the jury was willing to draw that inference, then the jury was entitled to find that Baca shared Eccleston's purpose in firing into the interior of the car. See Brown, 1996 NMSC 073, ¶ 31, 122 N.M. at 731, 931 P.2d at 76 ([I]t is for the jury to weigh the credibility of the witnesses....). Such a finding would justify a conclusion that Eccleston committed an act greatly dangerous to the lives of others, indicating a depraved mind regardless of the lives of others, that Baca helped him commit that act, and that Baca shared Eccleston's purpose. In addition, the court instructed the jury that in order to convict Baca of depraved-mind murder, it would need to find that he knew that the acts were greatly dangerous to the lives of others. Eccleston was the shooter; the jury might have viewed Baca, in effect, as providing necessary equipment. {22} We hold that sufficient evidence exists to affirm Baca's conviction of aiding and abetting first-degree, depraved-mind murder. In view of our holding, we do not reach Baca's argument that shooting at the tires of Comingo's car was not a sufficient basis for a conviction of depraved-mind murder. We also do not reach Baca's argument that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of conspiracy to commit depraved-mind murder. We subsequently address Baca's other argument about his conviction of conspiracy. We next address his argument that he was denied effective assistance of counsel.