Opinion ID: 2330401
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Prosecutorial Work Product Doctrine

Text: ¶ 14 This case presents the question of whether Crim. P. 16(I)(e)(1) protects only the prosecution's work product in connection with the criminal proceeding before the court or if the exception extends to all other prosecutorial work product prepared in anticipation of other criminal prosecutions. ¶ 15 Crim. P. 16(I)(a), 16(I)(b), and 16(I)(c) explicitly set forth a litany of materials that the prosecution must disclose to the defense, including all materials in its possession related to its investigation of the accused in the case at hand, all exculpatory evidence, and, upon the defense's request, all related material that is held by another government agency that can be recovered by the prosecution through diligent good faith efforts. Additionally, Crim. P. 16(I)(d) states that a trial court may, in its discretion, compel the prosecution to disclose other materials that are not explicitly enumerated in Crim. P. 16, provided that the trial court finds that the other materials are relevant to the defendant's case and that the defense's request is reasonable. ¶ 16 This broad prosecutorial obligation to disclose materials to the defense, however, is not without limit. One such limitationrelevant hereis Crim. P. 16(I)(e)(1), which provides that the People are excused from disclosing materials that contain its legal strategies or opinions created in anticipation of a criminal prosecution: Disclosure shall not be required of legal research or of records, correspondence, reports, or memoranda to the extent that they contain the opinions, theories, or conclusions of the prosecuting attorney or members of his legal staff. See People v. Dist. Court, 790 P.2d 332, 335-36 (Colo.1990) (reasoning that the prosecutorial work product protection found in Crim P. 16(I)(e)(1) mirrors the common law rule and thus applies to opinion work product created in anticipation of litigation). ¶ 17 In construing the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure, we employ the same interpretive rules applicable to statutory construction. People v. Fuqua, 764 P.2d 56, 58 (Colo.1988). We first read the language of a rule consistent with its plain and ordinary meaning, and, if it is unambiguous, we apply the rule as written. Id. at 59. If, however, the rule is unclear on its face, then we must attempt to resolve any ambiguity so as to make our application of the rule consistent with the intent of the rule and the fundamental purposes of the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure to provide for the just determination of criminal proceedings and to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration, and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay. Peterson, 113 P.3d at 708 (quoting Crim. P. 2 (Purpose and Construction)). ¶ 18 Our jurisprudence distinguishes between factual and opinion work product. Gall ex rel. Gall v. Jamison, 44 P.3d 233, 238-39 (Colo.2002); see also Barbara E. Bergman & Nancy Hollander, 3 Wharton's Criminal Evidence § 11:29 (15th ed. 2011). Generally, [o]pinion work product includes the attorney's mental impressions, opinions or legal theories and is afforded a high level of protection. Bergman & Hollander, supra, § 11:29. In contrast, factual work product encompasses the factual observations memorialized by an attorney while conducting an investigation and generally receives a lower level of protection. Bergman & Hollander, supra, § 11:29. ¶ 19 Under the plain meaning of Crim. P. 16(I)(e)(1), the prosecutorial work product protection only applies to so-called opinion work product, and does not extend to fact work product. The commentary to ABA Criminal Justice Discovery Standard 11-6.1(a), which contains language that is nearly identical to Crim. P. 16(I)(e)(1), [4] explains that the prosecutorial work product doctrine protects attorney work product that is judgmental rather than factual. ABA Criminal Justice Discovery Standard 11-6.1(a), Commentary (3d ed. 1995) [hereinafter ABA Standard 11-6.1(a)]. By way of example, the commentary provides a list of materials that are typically considered opinion work product, including notes relating to trial strategy, to theoretical arguments and supporting authority, and to direct and cross-examination; office memoranda on legal questions, evidence, prospective jurors, and other aspects of the case . . .; and summaries and analyses of the case file, of anticipated witnesses or their testimony, and of the probability of obtaining certain evidence. Id. Accordingly, Crim. P. 16(I)(e)(1) protects against the disclosure of any prosecutorial work product containing the prosecution's strategy, legal research, impressions, or professional judgments. Conversely, the rule does not protect against the disclosure of relevant factual work product, which the trial court may, in its discretion after a showing by the defense that the materials sought are relevant and that the request is reasonable, order the prosecution to disclose under Crim. P. 16(I)(d)(1). [5] ¶ 20 In contrast, the plain meaning of Crim. P. 16(I)(e)(1) does not resolve the present controversy regarding the so-called temporal scope [6] of the protection because the rule does not specify whether it covers all prosecutorial opinion work product or merely the opinion work product prepared in anticipation of prosecuting the case before the court. Unlike the federal prosecutorial work product protection contained in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16, which provides for the protection of reports, memoranda, or other internal government documents made by an attorney for the government . . . in connection with investigating or prosecuting the case,  on its face, Colorado's rule does not define the temporal scope of our state's prosecutorial work product protection. Cf. Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(a)(2) (emphasis added). Accordingly, we must determine the underlying intent and purpose of the rule. ¶ 21 In Colorado, [t]he work product doctrine, although most frequently asserted as a bar to discovery in civil litigation, applies with equal, if not greater, force in criminal prosecutions.  Dist. Court, 790 P.2d at 335 (Colo.1990) (citing U.S. v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 236, 238, 95 S.Ct. 2160, 45 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975)) (emphasis added). The purpose of the work product doctrine is to protect the mental impressions and legal analysis of the attorney, so that she may properly analyze the merits of and prepare for the disposition of her client's case. People v. Martinez, 970 P.2d 469, 475 (Colo. 1998). Accordingly, the doctrine is designed to protect an attorney's mental processes reflected in `interviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental impressions, personal beliefs, and countless other tangible . . . materials.' Id. (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511, 67 S.Ct. 385, 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947)). ¶ 22 Thus, the doctrine is an intensely practical one, grounded in the realities of litigation in our adversary system. Nobles, 422 U.S. at 238, 95 S.Ct. 2160. Further, the doctrine is firmly rooted in a pragmatic understanding that a rule allowing for the discovery of work product would have a chilling effect on an attorney's incentive to analyze a case thoroughly and to memorialize that analysis in writing for later inspection and review. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511, 67 S.Ct. 385 (Were [work product] open to opposing counsel on mere demand, much of what is now put down in writing would remain unwritten. An attorney's thoughts, heretofore inviolate, would not be his own. Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices would inevitably develop in the giving of legal advice and in the preparation of cases for trial. The effect on the legal profession would be demoralizing. And the interests of the clients and the cause of justice would be poorly served.); see also Martinez, 970 P.2d at 474 n. 12 (citing Hickman 's reasoning as the basis of the work product doctrine in Colorado). ¶ 23 While our research reveals no Colorado case on this issue, in light of the rationale behind Colorado's work product doctrine, we resolve the present case in accordance with the reasoning employed by the U.S. Supreme Court in addressing a similar issue under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in F.T.C. v. Grolier, 462 U.S. at 27, 103 S.Ct. 2209. In Grolier, the Supreme Court held that the federal civil work product protection, as set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3), survives the expiration of the litigation for which the work product was prepared because, consistent with its purpose, the rule applies the work product protection to any litigation. Id. at 25, 103 S.Ct. 2209. This reasoning was expounded upon by Justice Brennan, who concurred in this portion of the majority's holding. In his concurrence, Justice Brennan explained that the survivability of the work product protection to apply in other, subsequent litigation was essential to the work of parties that are involved in recurring litigation, including government agencies: It would be of a substantial benefit to an opposing party (and of corresponding detriment to an agency) if the party could obtain work product generated by the agency in connection with earlier, similar litigation against other persons. He would get the benefit of the agency's legal . . . research and reasoning, enabling him to litigate `on wits borrowed from the adversary.' Worse yet, he could gain insight into the agency's general strategic and tactical approach to deciding when suits are brought, how they are conducted, and on what terms they may be settled. Id. at 30-31, 103 S.Ct. 2209 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (citations omitted). Accordingly, Justice Brennan concluded, the federal civil work product doctrine protects work product from discovery in subsequent litigation because to hold otherwise would risk the same potential for `inefficiency, unfairness, . . . sharp practices' and demoralization that Hickman warned against. Id. at 31, 103 S.Ct. 2209 (quoting Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511, 67 S.Ct. 385); see also Frontier Ref., Inc. v. Gorman-Rupp Co., Inc., 136 F.3d 695, 703 (10th Cir.1998) ([W]e conclude that the work product doctrine extends to subsequent litigation.); 2 Discovery Proceedings in Federal Court § 26:4 (3d ed. 2012) (collecting federal civil cases that generally hold that materials prepared in anticipation of other litigation are subject to the work product doctrine in subsequent cases). ¶ 24 In the criminal context, this rationale was echoed by the Michigan Court of Appeals in People v. Gilmore, 222 Mich.App. 442, 564 N.W.2d 158 (1997). On facts similar to the controversy presently before us, the Gilmore court held that Michigan's prosecutorial work product doctrine protected opinion work product that a defendant sought that was prepared by the prosecution in its investigation of the park ranger that ultimately cited and arrested the defendant. Id. at 166. In Gilmore, the prosecution initially investigated both the defendant and the arresting park ranger, but ultimately cleared the park ranger of any wrongdoing and only filed charges against the defendant. Id. at 161-62. While preparing his defense, the defendant sought to discover any documents held by the prosecution that related to its decision to not charge the park ranger. Id. After the prosecution refused to release its disposition report for the park ranger, the trial court granted the defendant's motion to compel disclosure. Id. ¶ 25 On appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the order compelling disclosure because the requested document was protected work product and disclosure would violate the private sphere within which a prosecutor's office may validly exercise its constitutionally mandated prosecutorial discretion. Id. at 166. The Gilmore court reasoned that if it compelled disclosure of this work product, [s]uch access [would] dilute the extent to which such documents candidly and thoroughly review the full range of considerations that must be evaluated by the prosecutor before deciding whether to charge a person with a crime. Id. at 166-67. Thus, the Gilmore court reasoned that if it released the disposition report in this case, in the future, a prosecutor would be less likely to memorialize her legal analysis and impressions of a case for fear that it might be discoverable in a different prosecution. See id. ¶ 26 We find the reasoning employed in both Grolier and Gilmore to be consistent with the purpose of Crim. P. 16(I)(e)(1), which is to provide prosecutors with a degree of privacy in which they may candidly and thoroughly evaluate legal claims and strategies. See Martinez, 970 P.2d at 474-75. If we were to hold that Crim. P. 16(I)(e)(1) applies only to protect opinion work product created in anticipation of the case before the court, then a prosecutor, when investigating a criminal episode in the future, would have a substantial incentive to refrain from candidly and thoroughly evaluating a case for fear that her mental impressions, legal analysis, and trial strategies would be discoverable by defendants in future cases. Accord Grolier, 462 U.S. at 31, 103 S.Ct. 2209 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) ([Agencies] have an acute interest in keeping private the manner in which they conduct and settle their recurring legal disputes.). The result of such a rule would guarantee that much of what is now put down in writing would remain unwritten and the cause of justice would be poorly served. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511, 67 S.Ct. 385. Finally, such a rule would violate the spirit of the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration, and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay. Crim. P. 2. Accordingly, we refuse to reach such a conclusion. ¶ 27 In light of the vital purposes underlying Colorado's prosecutorial opinion work product protection, we reverse the order of the trial court below and hold that, pursuant to Crim. P. 16(I)(e)(1), all prosecutorial opinion work product prepared in anticipation of any potential prosecution is protected from discovery. [7]