Opinion ID: 2980163
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Claim

Text: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 renders it an unlawful employment practice for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 2(a)(1).4 Title VII prohibits discrimination based on sex that creates a hostile or abusive working environment. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). “Title VII does not prohibit all 4 Similarly, Michigan’s ELCRA guarantees “[t]he opportunity to obtain employment . . . without discrimination because of religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex, height, weight, familial status, or marital status.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.2102(1). As the district court correctly noted, claims of discrimination brought under the ELCRA are analyzed under the same evidentiary framework used in Title VII cases. Humenny v. Genex Corp., 390 F.3d 901, 906 (6th Cir. 2004). 9 No. 10-1256 Galeski v. City of Dearborn verbal or physical harassment in the workplace; it is directed only at discrimination because of sex.” Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (internal quotation marks, brackets and ellipsis omitted). To establish a prima facie claim of hostile work environment samesex harassment, an employee must establish that (1) he is a member of a protected class, (2) he was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment, (3) the harassment was based on his sex, (4) the harassment created a hostile work environment, and (5) the employer failed to take reasonable steps to prevent and correct any sexually harassing behavior.5 Randolph v. Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs., 453 F.3d 724, 733 (6th Cir. 2006). To maintain a hostile work environment claim, the plaintiff must show that “under the totality of the circumstances, the alleged conduct is ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.’” Clark, 400 F.3d at 351 (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 21). The court may consider a number of factors in making this determination, including: “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it 5 Similarly, under the ELCRA, “to establish a prima facie case of hostile work environment sexual harassment, the plaintiff employee must prove (1) that she belonged to a protected group; (2) that she was subjected to communication or conduct on the basis of sex; (3) that she was subjected to unwelcome sexual conduct or communication; (4) that the unwelcome sexual conduct or communication was intended to or in fact did substantially interfere with her employment or created an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment; and (5) respondeat superior.” Elezovic v. Bennett, 731 N.W.2d 452, 457 (Mich. App. 2007) (citing Radtke v. Everett, 501 N.W.2d 155 (Mich. 1993)). “[W]hether a hostile work environment existed shall be determined by whether a reasonable person, in the totality of the circumstances, would have perceived the conduct at issue as substantially interfering with the plaintiff’s employment or having the purpose or effect of creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive employment environment.” Id. Thus, as further discussed herein, for the same reasons that Galeski’s claim fails under Title VII, it also fails under the ELCRA. 10 No. 10-1256 Galeski v. City of Dearborn is physically threatening or humiliating, or mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Harris, 510 U.S. at 23. “In same-sex (as in all) harassment cases, [our determination] requires careful consideration of the social context in which particular behavior occurs and is experienced by its target.” Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81. “[S]imple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment.” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 778 (1998) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Such a limitation “ensure[s] that courts and juries do not mistake ordinary socializing in the workplace—such as maleon-male horseplay or intersexual flirtation—for discriminatory conditions of employment.” Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81. Thus, we must “filter out complaints attacking the ordinary tribulations of the workplace, such as the sporadic use of abusive language, gender-related jokes, and occasional teasing.” Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788. Here, the parties dispute whether Galeski met the fourth element of the prima facie case. Assuming that Galeski established all the other elements of this claim, we agree with the district court that the incidents alleged are not severe or pervasive enough such that a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendants created a hostile work environment. Galeski points to Zbosnik twice complimenting him on his eyes or his hair over the course of a two year period. Galeski points to Zbosnik telling him of his pornography collection only once, in December 2006, and then telling him an admittedly crude and inappropriate story of being sexually aroused when he was robbed in Atlanta. Galeski emphasizes on appeal that Zbosnik told him, in October 2007, that he could procure a transgender/transsexual prostitute for him. However, these isolated incidents, considered 11 No. 10-1256 Galeski v. City of Dearborn together, are not severe or pervasiveness enough to establish a hostile work environment claim. See Clark, 400 F.3d at 351 (holding that incidents were not severe or pervasive enough to establish hostile work environment claim where the plaintiff alleged that her supervisor “told vulgar jokes,” “twice placed his vibrating pager on her thigh” and “pulled at her overalls after she told him she was wearing a thong”); Morris v. Oldham Cnty. Fiscal Ct., 201 F.3d 784, 787 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that incidents were not severe or pervasive enough to establish hostile work environment claim where the plaintiff alleged that her supervisor “frequently told jokes with sexual overtones, once referred to plaintiff as ‘Hot Lips,’ and several times made comments about [the plaintiff’s] state of dress”). Galeski also fails to demonstrate how the alleged incidents interfered with his work. As the Supreme Court explained in Oncale, “[t]he prohibition of harassment on the basis of sex requires neither asexuality nor androgyny in the workplace; it forbids only behavior so objectively offensive as to alter the ‘conditions’ of the victim’s employment.” 523 U.S. at 81. Though Zbosnik issued Galeski several discipline reports, Galeski concedes that he did the very things for which he was reprimanded. Additionally, the increase in disciplinary reports and Zbosnik’s alleged decision to change the hourly schedule support a retaliation claim, not a hostile work environment claim. See Morris, 201 F.3d at 790-91 (refusing to include alleged retaliatory conduct in the hostile work environment equation because the plaintiff did not suggest the conduct was committed “because of sex”). Even the revocation of his gym access, though not directly attributed to Zbosnik, would not support Galeski’s hostile work environment claim as it was a perk of the job and did not affect his performance at work. Thus, considering the totality of the circumstances, the alleged incidents 12 No. 10-1256 Galeski v. City of Dearborn amount to no more than several offhand comments and simple teasing in the workplace, outside of the reach of Title VII. We find that the facts alleged here do not satisfy Galeski’s prima facie burden and, therefore, AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the City of Dearborn.