Opinion ID: 1125042
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The $1.5 Million Sanction against DuPont

Text: The Liability Defendants' only allegation of error regarding the $1.5 million discovery sanction against DuPont is their contention, raised for the first time on appeal, that the circuit court violated DuPont's constitutional rights. The Liability Defendants claim that, because the circuit court made the $1.5 million sanction against DuPont payable to the State of Hawai`i, the fine constituted a criminal contempt sanction, and, thus, the circuit court should have provided DuPont with the criminal contempt procedural protections that are guaranteed under the United States Constitution, the Hawai`i Constitution, and HRS ง 710-1077 (1993). The record indicates that the Liability Defendants failed in the circuit court to raise the issue of whether the court was complying with criminal contempt procedural protections pursuant to the United States Constitution, the Hawai`i Constitution, and/or HRS ง 710-1077. Although the Liability Defendants raised other objections to the $1.5 million sanction based on other specific grounds, the making of an objection upon a specific ground is a waiver of all other objections. State v. Matias, 57 Haw. 96, 101, 550 P.2d 900, 904 (1976) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The general rule is that an issue which was not raised in the lower court will not be considered on appeal. Kernan v. Tanaka, 75 Haw. 1, 35, 856 P.2d 1207, 1224 (1993) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1119, 114 S.Ct. 1070, 127 L.Ed.2d 389 (1994); Mauna Kea Power Co., Inc. v. Board of Land and Natural Resources, 76 Hawai`i 259, 262 n. 2, 874 P.2d 1084, 1087 n. 2 (1994); Birmingham v. Fodor's Travel Publications, Inc., 73 Haw. 359, 371, 833 P.2d 70, 77 (1992); State v. Ildefonso, 72 Haw. 573, 584, 827 P.2d 648, 655 (1992); State v. Hoglund, 71 Haw. 147, 150-51, 785 P.2d 1311, 1313 (1990). There are sound reasons for the rule. It is unfair to the trial court to reverse on a ground that no one even suggested might be error. It is unfair to the opposing party, who might have met the argument not made below. Finally, it does not comport with the concept of an orderly and efficient method of administration of justice. Ellis v. State, 36 Ark.App. 219, 821 S.W.2d 56, 57 (1991). Thus, for example, after a federal district court imposed a $125,000 contempt sanction against the City of Philadelphia (City) for the City's failure to comply with the district court's earlier order requiring the City to maintain a 90 percent occupancy rate in a residential drug treatment facility, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected the City's constitutional argument, raised for the first time on appeal, that the district court violated due process by imposing the contempt sanction without affording it adequate notice or hearing. Harris v. City of Philadelphia, 47 F.3d 1333, 1338 (3d Cir.1995). The City raised no due process arguments in the district court, either at the June 11, 1993 hearing or in its motion for reconsideration. This court generally refuses to consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. The City has put forward no reason why we should disregard our strong policy in favor of allowing district courts to decide such issues in the first instance when there was no obstacle to their review in the district court, and thus the City's waiver of its due process argument is a sufficient basis to reject its contention. Id. at 1339 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, when a party fails to raise an issue about the constitutionality of a contempt sanction before the trial court, the reviewing appellate courts may deem the constitutional issue waived. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 875 F.2d 927, 932 (1st Cir.1989) ([The appellant]'s failure to object in the district court deprived him of any right to raise these matters on appeal. (Citations omitted.)); Yarbrough v. Yarbrough, 295 Ark. 211, 748 S.W.2d 123, 124 (1988) (rejecting an appellant's contention that his sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment because he did not raise that issue before the trial court); Ellis, 821 S.W.2d at 57 (rejecting a defendant's argument that there was no notification of the contempt proceeding, because the defendant failed to present this argument to the trial court); In re Smith, 211 Ga.App. 493, 439 S.E.2d 725, 728 (1993) (holding that any defense involving the insufficiency of service of process on the appellant was clearly waived when he failed to raise this issue at the time of pleading); McCarthy v. Iowa Dist. Court for Jefferson County, 386 N.W.2d 122, 127 (1986) (holding that the issue of a plaintiff's self-incrimination could not be addressed on appeal because it was waived at the district court level); Ex Parte Bowers, 886 S.W.2d 346, 348 (Tex.Ct.App.1994) (rejecting a petitioner's contention that he never received notice of the motion for contempt, but only notice of the show of cause hearing, because this issue was never raised before the trial court, and, thus, it was waived). The record indicates that, like some of the appellants in the above cases, DuPont had ample opportunity on multiple occasions to raise the issue before the circuit court of whether the circuit court, by issuing a $1.5 million sanction against DuPont, was complying with criminal contempt procedural protections pursuant to the United States Constitution, the Hawai`i Constitution, and/or HRS ง 710-1077. However, at oral arguments and in their appellate briefs, the Liability Defendants failed to show that they raised this issue before the circuit court. Because the Liability Defendants failed to raise the issue regarding the constitutionality of the $1.5 million sanction before the circuit court, we hold that the Liability Defendants have waived this alleged error. Therefore, we affirm the $1.5 million sanction against DuPont.