Opinion ID: 767881
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Burden of Proof on Establishing the Existence of a Vacancy

Text: 18 Though Jackan's request for a transfer was initially denied on the ground that civil service rules prohibited a transfer in the face of a reemployment roster, the district court also relied on the alternative ground that no vacancy existed at the time Jackan made his request. On appeal, Jackan argues that that finding was clearly erroneous. On our review of the record, we find insufficient evidence either to prove or disprove the existence of a vacancy. Resolution of this issue thus turns on which party bears the burden of proof on the question of whether a vacancy existed. We hold that, in order to recover under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act for a failure to reasonably accommodate by transfer, a plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that a vacancy existed into which he or she might have been transferred. As Jackan did not meet that burden, we affirm the district court's judgment in favor of the defendant. 19 Our explanation begins with the relevant statutory framework. An employer violates the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act when it fails to mak[e] reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless the employer can establish that the accommodations would impose an undue hardship. 42 U.S.C. 12112(b)(5)(A); see also 29 U.S.C. 794(d) (stating that ADA's standards govern determinations whether employers have violated the employment provisions of the Rehabilitation Act). According to the express terms of the ADA, [t]he term 'reasonable accommodation' may include . . . reassignment to a vacant position. 42 U.S.C. 12111(9). 20 The ADA envisions an interactive process by which employers and employees work together to assess whether an employee's disability can be reasonably accommodated. See, e.g., Beck v. University of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130, 1135 (7th Cir. 1996); 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(o)(3). Courts have struggled to define the appropriate burdens of persuasion when that process breaks down and an employee seeks relief on the ground that his employer failed to reasonably accommodate his disability. In Borkowski v. Valley Central School District, 63 F.3d 131, 137-38 (2d Cir. 1995), we laid out a two-step process to evaluate whether the failure to provide a proposed accommodation constitutes a violation of the ADA. First, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving . . . that an accommodation exists that permits her to perform the job's essential functions. Id. at 138. If the plaintiff meets that burden, the analysis shifts to the question whether the proposed accommodations is reasonable; on this question the burden of persuasion lies with the defendant. See id. 21 Our reading of Borkowski places the burden of establishing that a vacancy exists on the plaintiff-employee. When a plaintiff brings an action alleging that a defendant violated the ADA by failing to offer a reasonable accommodation, the claim fails unless the plaintiff establishes that an effective accommodation exist[ed] that would render her otherwise qualified. Id. at 139. The burden of persuasion on the existence of an effective accommodation is not satisfied by mere speculation. For example, an employee with a severe motor disorder could not successfully carry her burden of persuasion by asserting that she would have been qualified to perform the duties of her position with the assistance of a mechanical device that compensates for her disorder. She would need to demonstrate that such a device existed and was available to her employer. (The employer would then bear the burden of proving that the machine was impractical, unreasonably expensive, unsuitable, or otherwise not a reasonable accommodation.) Similarly, a plaintiff seeking to hold the employer liable for failing to transfer her to a vacant position as a reasonable accommodation must demonstrate that there was a vacant position into which she might have been transferred. Jackan has failed to meet this burden. 22 Relying upon isolated quotations drawn out of context from our opinion in Borkowski, Jackan argues that an ADA employer-defendant bears the burden of persuasion on all facets of the question whether a plaintiff's disabilities could have been reasonably accommodated. We reject this reading as inconsistent with both the letter and the spirit of Borkowski. Plaintiff points to two passages in Borkowski. At one point the Borkowski opinion stated [i]t is enough for the plaintiff to suggest the existence of a plausible accommodation, the costs of which, facially, do not clearly exceed its benefits. Id. at 138. Read out of context, that sentence arguably suggests that the plaintiff bears only a burden of production on the existence of an accommodation, rather than the burden of persuasion. But when the sentence is read in the context of the preceding sentences, it clearly refers to the reasonableness of the accommodation, not its existence: 23 As to the requirement that an accommodation be reasonable, we have held that the plaintiff bears only a burden of production. This burden, we have said, is not a heavy one. It is enough for the plaintiff to suggest the existence of a plausible accommodation, the costs of which, facially, do not clearly exceed its benefits. 24 Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Before a factfinder reaches the question of the reasonableness of the accommodation--upon which the burden of persuasion falls on the employer-defendant--it must first determine that an accommodation existed. In our view Borkowski teaches that the plaintiff bears both the burden of production and of persuasion on the prior question of the existence of the accommodation. 25 Jackan similarly relies on the statement in Borkowski that [o]n the issue of reasonable accommodation, the plaintiff bears only the burden of identifying an accommodation, the costs of which, facially, do not clearly exceed its benefits. Id. at 139. Once again, the context of the statement makes clear that the reference to the issue of reasonable accommodation was intended to focus on the reasonableness, not the existence, of the accommodation. Plaintiff's interpretation of this clause would conflict with the opinion's holding by excusing a plaintiff from the burden of establishing the existence of the accommodation. Indeed, the sentence immediately preceding reiterates that element of the opinion's holding: First, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that she is otherwise qualified; if an accommodation is needed, the plaintiff must show, as part of her burden of persuasion, that an effective accommodation exists that would render her otherwise qualified. Id. (emphases added). 26 We therefore conclude, consistent with our holding in Borkowski, that Jackan, as an ADA plaintiff complaining of his employer's failure to provide a reasonable accommodation, bears both the burden of production and the burden of persuasion on the question whether a suitable vacancy existed at the time he sought transfer. We note that our holding draws further support from the recent decisions of our sister circuits. See, e.g., Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1304 n.27 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (an ADA plaintiff ha[s] an obligation to demonstrate that there existed some vacant position to which he could have been reassigned); McCreary v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 132 F.3d 1159, 1165 (7th Cir. 1997) (The plaintiff bears the burden of showing that a vacant position exists and that the plaintiff is qualified for that position.); Stewart v. Happy Herman's Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1286 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that the burden of production and persuasion regarding the existence of a plausible accommodation both lie with the plaintiff); Mengine v. Runyon, 114 F.3d 415, 420 (3d Cir. 1997) ([T]he employee has the duty to identify a vacant, funded position whose essential functions he is capable of performing.). 4 27 For the foregoing reasons, we hold that a plaintiff seeking to recover under the ADA or Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act for his employer's failure to transfer him to a vacant position, bears the burden of establishing the existence of an appropriate vacancy. As the plaintiff in this action did not meet that burden, we affirm the district court's ruling in favor of the defendant on the ground that no vacancy has been shown to exist.