Opinion ID: 20121
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Part A

Text: 22 Act 83, Part A, requires every railroad company or person owning and operating a railroad in [Louisiana to] equip each locomotive engine 17 with a bell and a whistle or horn which, under normal conditions, can be heard at a distance of not less than one quarter mile. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 32:168 (West 1999). Because the LBIA completely preempts the field of locomotive equipment, Part A is clearly invalid. See Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 272 U.S. 605, 613, 71 L. Ed. 432, 47 S. Ct. 207 (1926); Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n of Tex., 833 F.2d 570, 576 n.7 (5th Cir. 1987) (State attempts to prescribe any locomotive safety equipment must necessarily fail.). Moreover, because the Secretary of Transportation has promulgated regulations covering the sound capacity of locomotive audible signaling devices, we find that the FRSA also preempts Act 83. Like the district court, we are not persuaded that Act 83 fits within the FRSA's exception for state regulations which address local safety hazards. 18 Thus, we affirm the district court's ruling that both the LBIA and FRSA preempt Act 83, Part A. We must next determine whether Part B of Act 83 survives this finding. 23 Under Louisiana law, when a portion of a statute is found to be invalid, a severability analysis is an essential element of judicial review. See Love v. Foster, 147 F.3d 383, 385 (5th Cir. 1998). Louisiana Revised Statute 24:175, which contains the state's general rule on severability, provides: 24 Unless otherwise specifically provided therein, the provisions of each act of the legislature are severable, whether or not a provision to that effect is included in the act. If any provision or item of an act, or an application thereof, is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect other provisions, items, or applications of the act which can be given effect without the invalid provision, item, or application. 25 Id. The Louisiana Supreme Court has determined that the test for severability is whether the unconstitutional portions of the law are so interrelated and connected with the constitutional portions that they cannot be separated without destroying the intention of the legislative body enacting the law. Police Ass'n of New Orleans v. City of New Orleans, 649 So. 2d 951, 965 (La. 1995). Stated simply, the first question is whether the legislature would have passed the statute without the invalid features. 26 We believe that the Louisiana legislature would have passed Part B without Part A's equipment requirements. Part B is a safety measure designed to signal the presence of an oncoming train so that collisions can be avoided. The Louisiana legislature would obviously want Part B to stand alone if Part A was found to be invalid. Simply put, the Louisiana legislature would have presumably wanted pedestrians or drivers alerted to the presence of an oncoming train, regardless of whether this was accomplished through the sounding of a horn, the ringing of a bell, or the firing of a rifle. Thus, having found Parts A and B severable under Louisiana law, we next determine whether the FRSA preempts Louisiana's signaling requirements. 27 As previously mentioned, regulations promulgated pursuant to the FRSA require all lead locomotives to be equippedwith audible warning devices with a specified minimum decibel level. 19 See 49 C.F.R. 229.129. From this regulation and the fact that the High-Speed Rail Development Act directs the Secretary of Transportation to promulgate regulations governing the sounding of audible warning devices, 20 the Appellees argue that federal law preempts Act 83, Part B. In short, the Appellees invite us to hold that by issuing regulations covering audible warning equipment, the Secretary intended to bar states from regulating the manner in which such signals are sounded. We respectfully decline this invitation. 28 The FRSA speaks clearly to a state's authority to regulate railroad safety: 29 A State may adopt or continue in force a law, regulation, or order related to railroad safety until the Secretary of Transportation prescribes a regulation or issues an order covering the subject matter of the state requirement. 30 49 U.S.C. 20106. Although the Secretary has issued regulations covering the sound capacity of audible signaling devices, we find that these regulations neither cover nor substantially subsume regulations governing when such devices are sounded. 21 See Rushing v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 185 F.3d 496, 515 (5th Cir. 1999). Although our decision in Rushing addressed whether the FRSA preempts state common law nuisance claims, we find the reasoning equally applicable to the instant case: 31 A sound capacity safety regulation does not subsume regulations on when whistles are sounded. Although the state likely could not ban the sounding of whistles by banning them altogether, because it would defeat the purpose of the whistle capacity provision, it can impose restrictions on when they are sounded. 32 Id. at 516 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted); see also Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of Or., 9 F.3d 807 (9th Cir. 1993) (distinguishing between whistle capacity and whistle use, and holding that federal regulations governing the former do not preempt the latter). Thus, we find that Act 83, Part B, is not preempted by federal law.