Opinion ID: 1162526
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: respondent's first trial

Text: As noted, on December 8, 1983, a Reno, Nevada federal grand jury indicted respondent on seven felony counts. Four of the seven counts of the indictment, the so-called Conforte counts, involved Conforte's assertions that respondent had solicited and accepted bribes from Conforte. Two of the remaining counts involved respondent's income tax returns for the years 1979 and 1980. The final count charged that respondent had filed in 1979 a false financial disclosure statement to the Judicial Ethics Committee for the year 1978. [109] On September 9, 1983, Chief Justice Warren Burger designated Judge Walter E. Hoffman, a senior judge from the Eastern District of Virginia, to preside over Judge Claiborne's trial. [110] Previously, Judge Hoffman had been specially designated by Chief Justice Burger to preside over the grand jury investigations of respondent in Portland, Oregon, and in Reno, Nevada. All of the district judges for the District of Nevada eventually recused themselves from any participation in respondent's case, and Judge Hoffman was designated after Chief Judge Browning of the Ninth Circuit requested the appointment of an out-of-circuit district judge to preside over the trial. [111] See United States v. Claiborne, 781 F.2d 1327, 1330 (9th Cir.1986) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). Prior to the commencement of the trial, respondent's counsel filed in excess of thirty pre-trial motions. [112] Judge Hoffman denied many of these motions without conducting evidentiary hearings respecting the factual allegations set forth therein. In the matters in which evidentiary hearings were allowed, Judge Hoffman severely limited the scope of the inquiries. [113] We are hesitant to question the propriety of many of Judge Hoffman's xrulings in this regard prior to and during respondent's trials. In particular, we do not deem it appropriate to comment upon whether, as a matter of federal law, respondent had set forth sufficient allegations supported by affidavits or other evidence to establish a prima facie case entitling him to pretrial evidentiary hearings in all the matters raised. We observe, however, that from our prespective and in fulfilling our responsibility to review all the circumstances underlying respondent's conviction, it is indeed unfortunate that a more comprehensive factual record was not developed respecting respondent's claims of investigative and prosecutorial abuse. Others, as well, have voiced similar concerns regarding respondent's allegations and have suggested that investigative and prosecutorial abuses violated respondent's right to due process of law, thereby rendering respondent's conviction the fruit of the poisoned tree. [114] For example, shortly after the United States Senate voted to remove respondent from office, Senator David H. Pryor addressed the Senate in part as follows: After sitting for days as a member of the impeachment committee, I have attempted to the best of my ability to fairly judge and determine the case of Harry Claiborne. I must admit to my colleagues that a month ago, I, like most Americans, wondered why we were giving him even the benefit of the doubt. As the weeks passed, after reading transcripts and listening to and observing witness after witness, I must say at this time, and during this day, that at least in my mind there was a reasonable doubt about his willfulness or his deliberate intent to defraud the Government. But, Mr. President, there is no reasonable doubt in my mind about another aspect of this case, and that is the long arm of the U.S. Government and the abuse of power that ultimately led to Judge Claiborne's conviction. I have concluded that he was targeted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in a very arbitrary and capricious manner. If we have any doubts about Judge Claiborne having been a target, then I ask these questions: Why did our Government forgive $16 million in back income taxes to a criminal fugitive named Conforte to come back from Brazil and help make a case against Judge Claiborne? Why did Harry Claiborne, unlike most other citizens, not have the opportunity to face an IRS audit in the civil division before criminal prosecution charges occurred? Why did one IRS agent assigned to this sting operation of Harry Claiborne become so incensed and rebelled to the degree that he refused to participate, and ultimately was demoted and sent to another State? Why was it that after administering a polygraph test to Harry Claiborne, a test which he passed, the polygraph operator, himself, became a target of intimidation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation? What is going on in this country when we allow this sort of practice to occur? In the Article of Impeachment No. III, we were asked by the managers to impeach from office Harry Claiborne. Why? Because, simply, he was convicted by a lower court and a jury. My question concerning Article III this afternoon was, how was that conviction actually obtained? Once again, I have concluded in my own mind that had Harry Claiborne not been a target of the Federal Government, had Harry Claiborne's accountant not been intimidated by the U.S. Government, had Harry Claiborne had the opportunity to submit all evidence into the lower court decision and trial, had an appeal en banc to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals been granted, I believe the case of Harry Claiborne might not have been before the U.S. Senate today. See 132 Cong.Rec. S15778 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1986) (statement of Senator Pryor); see also 132 Cong.Rec. S15779 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1986) (remarks of Senator Heflin expressing the view that there is no question that most of the Members of the Senate feel that there should be an investigation by an appropriate committee pertaining to the possible overreaching by the executive branch into the judicial branch and an investigation into the procedure which has been called targeting); 132 Cong.Rec. S16824 (daily ed. October 16, 1986) (remarks of Senator Levin indicating that the evidence clearly suggests that the Government engaged in a pattern of selective prosecution, prosecutorial overreaching, and perhaps intimidation of witnesses and other improprieties). Such concerns ultimately prompted the United States Senate to adopt a resolution on October 18, 1986, calling for hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee on procedures for protecting citizens against improper investigations and prosecutorial practices. See S.Res. 514 (99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 Cong.Rec. S17058 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1986)). One of the most troubling allegations in this regard concerns the possibility that prior to Conforte's grand jury appearance and respondent's first trial, some federal agents involved in respondent's investigation and prosecution may have known or had substantial cause to suspect that Conforte's bribery allegations were false. The possibility that this occurred has significant implications. It is arguable, for example, that Conforte's grand jury testimony may have had a contaminating effect upon the only grand jury to hear his testimony and to return an indictment against respondent. Arguably, the entire indictment may have been tainted by Conforte's testimony, including the counts seemingly unconnected with Conforte's allegations. Moreover, if indeed all the counts of the indictment returned by the grand jury were infected by the testimony of Conforte, and the government had reasonable cause to suspect that Conforte's testimony was perjurious, then it may be appropriate to depreciate the substantial respect and weight normally accorded a judgment of conviction for the purposes of disciplinary action. See SCR 114; Selling v. Radford 243 U.S. 46, 51, 37 S.Ct. 377, 379, 61 L.Ed. 585 (1917). Although respondent was eventually convicted on the tax counts alone and those counts were seemingly unrelated to Conforte's allegations, we must question whether an indictment on any of the counts would have been returned, or whether any prosecution whatsoever would have gone forward in the absence of an investigative and prosecutorial mind-set bent on prosecuting respondent at all costs, and in the absence of Conforte's contaminating and infectious allegations disparaging respondent's integrity. See, e.g., Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1, 14, 77 S.Ct. 1, 8, 1 L.Ed.2d 1 (1956) (where government informant had given false testimony, Court concluded that informant had poisoned the water in this reservoir, and the reservoir cannot be cleansed without first draining it of all impurity). Conforte's allegations and testimony underlying the first count of the indictment, and the manner in which the prosecution proceeded on that count, are particularly troublesome in this regard. Specifically, Count I of the indictment alleged: Between on or about December 14, 1978 and December 15, 1978, in the District of Nevada, the Defendant, HARRY EUGENE CLAIBORNE, being a public official, that is a United States District Court Judge for the District of Nevada, directly and indirectly, corruptly asked, demanded, exacted, solicited, sought, accepted, received and agreed to receive for himself a thing of value, that is United States currency in the amount of $30,000, from Joseph Conforte, in return for being influenced in his performance of an official act, that is the decisions and rulings ... with regard to two consolidated motions to quash grand jury subpoenas then pending before him, said motions captioned, In the Matter of Application of Olga Irene Karaway For an Order to Show Cause, Misc. R-78-36, and In Re Grand Jury Subpoena Served on Sessina Lowe, Misc. R-78-35; in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 201(c). [115] (Emphasis added.) Prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (1982) (bribery of public officials) are governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1982), which provides: Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, no person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offense, not capital, unless the indictment is found or the information is instituted within five years next after such offense shall have been committed. In general, the period of limitations imposed by this statute begins to run at the moment the crime is complete. See United States v. Coia, 719 F.2d 1120 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 973, 104 S.Ct. 2349, 80 L.Ed.2d 822 (1984). Because the grand jury did not indict respondent on Count I until December 8, 1983, and because of the five-year limitation provision established by 18 U.S.C. § 3282, the government was necessarily restricted to proof that the alleged bribery occurred after December 8, 1978. In this respect, respondent has observed: In one of the first interviews with FBI agents, CONFORTE related that the bribery scenario in Count I occurred in late November, 1978. At the trial, CONFORTE testified as to whether he had told the FBI the event occurred in late November, 1978: Could be. CONFORTE testified he is not sure he did not state late November, he just didn't recall... . The time of this scenario would not have been acceptable to the prosecution because the asserted offense would have been barred from prosecution by the applicable statute of limitations. [116] At the trial, however, Conforte testified that on the evening of Monday, December 11, 1978, he was at his home watching football when he received a telephone call from Judge Claiborne. According to Conforte, Judge Claiborne requested him to come up to my place tomorrow night. [117] Conforte further testified that on Tuesday, December 12, 1983, he made arrangements to drive a ladyfriend's car to respondent's Reno apartment where he met with Judge Claiborne later that evening at approximately 8:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. [118] Conforte further testified at trial that the following events then transpired: 1. Respondent escorted Conforte into a kitchen-dining room area and Conforte sat down and faced respondent across a table, or a counter separating the dining area from the kitchen. [119] 2. Judge Claiborne gestured or indicated that his apartment might be bugged and wrote a message on a yellow pad of paper and passed it to Conforte stating, I need $30,000 and don't worry about your case. Conforte read the message and wrote in reply Which case? The judge replied, again in writing, The subpoenas. [120] 3. Conforte then wrote back I don't have it with me, I will bring it tomorrow. According to Conforte, the judge then shook his head meaning it was okay, burned the paper upon which these communications were written, and washed the ashes down the kitchen sink. [121] 4. The following day, on Wednesday, December 13, 1978, Conforte claimed he got together $30,000 in cash partly from the receipts of the brothel and, to the best of [his] memory, from cash he had available in a safe deposit box at the Nevada National Bank in Sparks, Nevada. [122] 5. Later, on the night of Wednesday, December 13, 1978, Conforte claimed that he went back to Judge Claiborne's Reno apartment and personally delivered the $30,000 to the judge. [123] Thereafter, at respondent's trial, the defense elicited testimony and presented evidence conclusively establishing that the events described in Conforte's above-referenced testimony simply could not have occurred on two successive days during the week in question. First, it was established at trial that the Conforte story described above could not have occurred because Conforte was not even in Reno, Nevada, on December 12, 1978, the night that Conforte claimed he first visited respondent's apartment and respondent had allegedly solicited a $30,000 bribe. Specifically, an employee of the United States Department of State testified that a review of official passport records revealed that Conforte personally applied for and picked up a passport on an emergency basis in New York City on December 12, 1978. The passport official further testified that if another person had picked up the passport for Conforte there would have been a letter of authorization. Apparently, the official records revealed no such letter. [124] Additionally, Conforte's passport records indicated that he entered Brazil sometime between and including December 13 and 18, 1978. [125] It should be noted that, at one point in his testimony, Conforte himself acknowledged that he personally had obtained a passport in New York City, on an emergency basis. [126] Second, an operations manager at Nevada National Bank testified that firm and solid procedures of the bank required customers wishing to gain access to their safe deposit boxes to sign an entry ticket before they would be allowed such access. [127] The operations manager further testified that she personally conducted a search of the bank's records of the entry tickets of Conforte's safe deposit box and found that the records indicated that Conforte had not accessed his safe deposit box between December 5, 1978 and December 15, 1978. [128] As respondent noted in a motion to dismiss the indictment against him filed shortly before the second trial, the government had knowledge of these bank records prior to the first trial. [129] Third, FBI Special Agent Wick testified at trial that his investigation of the apartment complex where respondent resided in 1978 revealed that some studio apartments in the complex contained a long counter at which a person could sit and which divided the open areas of the apartments from the kitchen areas. Such an arrangement would have been consistent with Conforte's description of respondent's apartment. Wick testified, however, that he did not find such an arrangement in the apartment in which respondent resided. [130] Further, the manager of the apartment complex testified that respondent's apartment did not have a bar, or a counter of any kind where persons could sit on either side and look at one another. [131] Thus, the defense established that the floorplan of respondent's apartment was simply not as Conforte had described it in his sworn testimony. It is apparent from the foregoing evidence that it was quite conclusively established at respondent's first trial that the bribery scenario alleged by Conforte could not possibly have occurred on the dates in question. [132] Moreover, because Conforte's passport revealed that he was clearly not in the United States after December 18, 1978, and because the statute of limitations required the government to prove that the bribery occurred after December 8, 1978, the prosecution was necessarily restricted to proof that the alleged bribery occurred between December 8, 1978 and December 18, 1978. In addition, it was established at the trial that Judge Claiborne ultimately ruled in favor of the government and against Conforte's interests in the matter involving the subpoenas which Conforte claimed was the basis of the alleged $30,000 bribe. Specifically, in April of 1979, Judge Claiborne denied the motions filed on behalf of the two Conforte employees seeking to quash the service of the grand jury subpoenas. [133] Further, Leland Lutfy, the assistant United States Attorney who handled these subpoena matters for the government, testified that he observed nothing irregular on the part of Judge Claiborne in his handling of [the] case. [134] Thus, Judge Claiborne's actual rulings in that matter were not favorable to Conforte's best interests. As we previously indicated, the untruthful nature of Conforte's allegations underlying Count I of the indictment posed inherent difficulties of proof for the prosecution, which suggest, at the very least, that the prosecutors had reasonable cause to question the veracity of Conforte's scenario prior to trial. Interestingly, respondent's counsel has observed that during Conforte's grand jury testimony not once ... was [Conforte] ever asked ... to state the day, the day of the month, or even the year, when the scenario of Count I was supposed to have occurred. [135] Moreover, the record reveals that the prosecution had considerable difficulties in pinpointing the exact dates that the offense in Count I allegedly occurred. In particular, the record reveals that the government prosecutors served three successive amended demands for notice of alibi upon respondent prior to trial. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 12.1(a) (upon written demand of attorney for the government, the defendant shall within ten days serve upon the government's attorney a written notice of the defendant's intention to offer a defense of alibi stating the specific place at which the defendant claims to have been at the time of the alleged offense and the names and addresses of the witnesses upon which the defendant intends to rely). On January 23, 1984, for example, the government notified respondent's counsel that it believe[d] the evidence [would] establish that the offense alleged in Count I occurred at respondent's Reno apartment,  [b]etween approximately 6:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m. on December 14, 1978; and between approximately 6:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m. on December 15, 1978. ... [136] In response, respondent submitted a notice of intention to offer the testimony of Mary Hilt, the official court reporter in 1978 for the federal court in Reno, Nevada. Respondent indicated that Ms. Hilt would testify that she was with respondent from approximately 7:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. on December 14, 1978. [137] Later, at the trial, Ms. Hilt did in fact testify that on December 14, 1978, she drove respondent to his apartment at the end of the workday, and later, at approximately 7:00 p.m. to 7:30 p.m., she picked up respondent at his apartment and drove him to a car lot in Reno. Further, Ms. Hilt testified that she and respondent later dined together at a Reno restaurant, and that she returned respondent to his apartment that evening at approximately 10:00 p.m. [138] Similarly, respondent's counsel submitted a notice of intention to offer the testimony of numerous witnesses as well as evidence obtained from airline records establishing that respondent was in Las Vegas, Nevada, at the time in question on the night of December 15, 1978. [139] Thereafter, after investigating the evidence revealed in respondent's notice of alibi, on March 9, 1984, two days after respondent filed his notice of alibi, the prosecution filed a Second Amended Demand For Notification of Intention to Offer Alibi Defense. [140] In this demand, the prosecution asserted that recently conducted government interviews and investigation [had] revealed that the crime alleged in Count I ... may have occurred on days immediately preceding the December 14-15 cited dates cited in the indictment. Accordingly, the prosecution amended its demand for notice of intention to offer an alibi to the offense charged in Count I, to include the hours of 6:00 p.m. through 11:00 p.m. on the dates between and including December 12, 1978, and December 15, 1978. [141] On March 12, 1984, the date that the jury selection for the trial was set to commence, the prosecution filed a third amended demand, once again enlarging the time frame to encompass the period between and including December 11 and December 15, 1978. [142] These events suggest that Conforte's position was sufficiently flexible to shift with the strength of respondent's alibi evidence. A hearing before Judge Hoffman was conducted just prior to the start of the jury selection on the morning of March 12, 1984, relating to the propriety of the government's second and third amended demands. At this hearing, respondent's counsel represented to the court that substantial time and resources over a period of six weeks had been expended in an attempt to piece together respondent's whereabouts on the particular dates of December 14 and 15, 1978, in reliance upon the government's indication that it would attempt to prove the facts alleged in Count I specifically occurred on those dates. [143] Further, counsel represented that the defense team had expended substantial time preparing the opening argument to the jury which would stress the fact that respondent could effectively refute the government's allegations that the alleged offense occurred on December 14 and 15, 1978. [144] Counsel also articulated the substantial time and difficulties involved in trying to refresh the recollections of potential witnesses who might have been able to assist respondent in reconstructing and establishing his exact whereabouts during an entire week over five years before. Finally, counsel argued that severe prejudice to respondent's defense would occur if the prosecution was allowed to expand the time frame of the alleged offenses in accordance with its lastminute demands. Accordingly, defense counsel urged the court to hold the government to proof that the offense alleged in Count I took place as originally represented by the prosecution. Alternatively, defense counsel requested a two-week continuance of the trial so that respondent could effectively investigate and discover respondent's whereabouts between and including December 11 and December 15, 1978. Counsel observed that [i]t's not just a question of responding [to the government's amended demands], ... it's a question of being properly prepared to defend the case. [145] Judge Hoffman ultimately ruled, however, that although respondent should not be required to respond to the government's new demands within the time frame provided in Fed.R.Crim.P. 12.1, the prosecution would not be limited to proof that the alleged offense took place on December 14 and 15, 1978. The judge also denied respondent's motion for a continuance. [146] Prior to the ruling, the prosecutor objected to the continuance, noting that the actual presentation of respondent's case would not even start for a period of three weeks and that respondent would have a full week to conduct any investigation he needs. [147] Judge Hoffman, in refusing the two-week delay, stated, All right. It's your responsibility. I'm not going to worry about it. [148] Thus, the issues of fundamental fairness and due process of law were left to another time and another court. However, the issue relating to Judge Hoffman's refusal to grant a continuance was ultimately rendered moot when the jury at the first trial could not agree upon a verdict as to any of the seven counts upon which respondent was indicted, and when the prosecution elected to proceed only on the counts unrelated to Conforte's allegations in the second trial. [149] Although prosecutor Shaw specifically represented to Judge Hoffman that no prosecution witnesses had changed their stories in light of the notice of alibi provided by respondent, it strains credulity to suppose that at some point, in the course of these events and prior to the commencement of the first trial, the prosecution did not begin to suspect that the difficulties it was encountering in terms of proof might well have stemmed from a senario that was simply not verifiable in truth. Nonetheless, in spite of these obstacles the government prosecutors insisted upon sending to the jury the counts based upon the obviously suspect accusations volunteered by Conforte. [150] See United States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781, 785-86 (9th Cir.1974) (prosecutor who discovers perjury by a grand jury witness after indictment must inform the defendant, the trial court and the grand jury so that the indictment can be cured); see also United States v. Bracy, 566 F.2d 649, 655 (9th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 818, 99 S.Ct. 79, 58 L.Ed.2d 109 (1978). The defense did not discover the evidence establishing that Conforte was absent from the Reno area on December 12, 1978, until well after the first trial had begun. [151] Prior to the discovery of that information, however, the defense had subpoenaed a member of this court to testify as to his personal knowledge of certain facts at respondent's first trial. [152] Pursuant to that subpoena, on March 30, 1984, this court's present Chief Justice, E.M. Gunderson, testified that he and Judge Claiborne had dinner together at a hotel in downtown Reno, Nevada, on December 12, 1978, and that he was with Judge Claiborne from approximately 7:30 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. on that particular night. [153] Quite apart from Chief Justice Gunderson's testimony, however, it was conclusively established that respondent could not possibly have solicited a bribe from Conforte on the night of December 12, 1978, because, as the United States State Department official unequivocally confirmed, on December 12, 1978, Conforte was in fact in New York City picking up his passport. On April 13, 1984, after a lengthy trial and prolonged deliberations, the jury announced that it was hopelessly deadlocked and was unable to come to a unanimous verdict on any of the seven counts charged in the indictment. Accordingly, Judge Hoffman declared a mistrial and ordered that the case be retried. [154] Judge Hoffman further directed that the retrial would commence on July 31, 1984. [155] On June 27, 1984, the prosecution filed a motion seeking to dismiss the Conforte counts of the indictment. [156] The prosecution expressed the belief that the evidence presented in the first trial relating to the Conforte counts may have distracted the jury in its consideration of [the remaining counts] and contributed to its inability to reach a verdict.... [157] Thus, after subjecting respondent to prolonged grand jury investigations and a lengthy, sensational trial based on Conforte's accusations of bribery and corruption, all accompanied by extensive media coverage, the prosecution finally, impliedly admitted that Conforte's allegations lacked substance. [158] Nonetheless, in light of the intense publicity surrounding the allegations of bribery and corruption of a federal judge by a brothel owner, respondent's reputation and integrity were sullied notwithstanding the jury's failure to convict on any of the counts at the first trial. The allegations of corruption reported in the media were given added credence by the prosecution's refusal to recognize explicitly the questionable veracity of Conforte's accusations, by its continued adherence to the terms of the Conforte bargain, and by the failure to seek the criminal prosecution of Conforte on charges of perjury. In our view, given the conduct of the prosecution and the intense media scrutiny of the evidently false bribery accusations, there can be little doubt that the public's perception of respondent's character and integrity was severely diminished within the Reno community. This publicity may well have affected respondent's ability to obtain a fair second trial from a jury untainted by the spurious allegations linking him with a notorious brothel owner and attacking his honesty and integrity. See, e.g., United States v. Claiborne, 765 F.2d 784, 800 (9th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1120, 106 S.Ct. 1636, 90 L.Ed.2d 182 (1986) (discussing trial judge's refusal to excuse two trial jurors for cause thus requiring defendant's use of peremptory challenges); see also Rec.Pt. IV, Vol. I, Pleading No. 3 at 34-39 (Claiborne's opening brief on appeal citing voir dire testimony of the two prospective jurors in question). Although the prosecution's decision no longer to pursue the Conforte counts in the second trial prompted media criticism of the prosecution's tactics, the damage to respondent's public image undoubtedly had already been done. [159] The costs of defending against the false Conforte accusations must be calculated not only monetarily but also in human terms taking into account the substantial opprobrium and obloquy to which respondent has been exposed. As we discuss in more detail below, these factors are relevant to our deliberations in the instant matter and are appropriately considered in mitigation of any conduct warranting discipline. See In re Ross, 99 Nev. 657, 660, 668 P.2d 1089, 1092 (1983); Carter v. Cianci, 482 A.2d 1201 (R.I. 1984). Further, we may appropriately consider whether respondent obtained an impartial evaluation in the second trial from a jury untainted by the Conforte allegations of corruption and dishonesty in assessing the weight to be accorded respondent's conviction for disciplinary purposes. SCR 114; Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46, 51, 37 S.Ct. 377, 379, 61 L.Ed. 585 (1917). One of the most compelling reasons for focusing at length on the Conforte aspects of the Claiborne prosecution is because it is cogently arguable that in spite of an unrelenting prosecutorial commitment, no criminal indictment would have issued without the facile foundation supplied by Conforte. [160] Although our record does not include transcripts of any of the grand jury proceedings, it is strongly inferable that government allegations of Claiborne's failure to report the Conforte bribe money on his tax returns infected the grand jury proceedings in both Oregon and Reno. In fact, it appears from our overall survey of the record available to us, that the tax counts evolved from the Conforte nexus to the ultimate case that was unmoored from its initial Conforte foundation. This evolution of the tax counts has great significance, it seems, for it fairly implicates an entirely different scenario for Claiborne that would have altogether obviated the criminal indictment and conviction. Although we will hereafter examine in some detail the 1979 and 1980 tax returns relevant to Claiborne's criminal conviction, suffice it to observe here that absent the patently criminal nature of the alleged Conforte involvement in Claiborne's generation of taxable income, other, more reasonable circumstances and inferences likely would have prevailed. For example, the record reflects, as we will hereafter specify, that Claiborne's 1979 and 1980 tax returns were legitimate prospects for a civil audit by the Internal Revenue Service. In the context of a civil audit, it appears beyond speculation to suggest that Claiborne's former tax accountant and C.P.A., Joseph C. Wright, would have approached the subject of his former client's taxes much differently than he did in the criminal arena. [161] As will be seen hereafter, there is substantial evidence to support Claiborne's contention that he never concealed income from his accountants or otherwise sought to evade payment of his tax obligations. The Conforte connection simply cannot be ignored in any fair analysis of respondent's predicament, including his entitlement to further discipline by this court.