Opinion ID: 96129
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appellate.

Text: SEC. 56. Courts of first instance shall have original jurisdiction. . . . 6. In all criminal cases in which a penalty of more than six months' imprisonment or a fine exceeding one hundred dollars may be imposed.         SEC. 65. The existing courts of first instance are hereby abolished, and the courts of first instance provided by this act are substituted in place thereof. SEC. 66. There shall be courts of justice of the peace as in this section provided: 1. The existing courts of justices of the peace, established by military orders since the thirteenth day of August, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, are hereby recognized and continued, and the justices of such courts shall continue to hold office during the pleasure of the commission. 2. In every province in which there now is, or shall hereafter be established, a court of first instance, courts of justice of the peace shall be established in every municipality thereof which shall be organized under the municipal code, or which has been organized and is being conducted as a municipality when this act shall take effect, under and by virtue of the municipal code.         SEC. 68. A justice of the peace shall have original jurisdiction for the trial of all misdemeanors and offences arising within the municipality of which he is a justice, in all cases where the sentence might not by law exceed six months' imprisonment or a fine of one hundred dollars; . . . On July 1, 1902, Congress passed an act, 32 Stat. 691: An Act temporarily to provide for the administration of the affairs of civil government in the Philippine Islands, and for other purposes.  Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the action of the President of the United States in creating the Philippine Commission and authorizing said commission to exercise the powers of government to the extent and in the manner and form and subject to the regulation and control set forth in the instructions of the President to the Philippine Commission, dated April seventh, nineteen hundred, and in creating the offices of civil governor and vice-governor of the Philippine Islands, and authorizing said civil governor and vice-governor to exercise the powers of government to the extent and in the manner and form set forth in the executive order dated June twenty-first, nineteen hundred and one, and in establishing four executive departments of government in said islands as set forth in the act of the Philippine Commission, entitled `An act providing an organization for the departments of the interior, of commerce and police, of finance and justice, and of public instruction,' enacted September sixth, nineteen hundred and one, is hereby approved, ratified, and confirmed, and until otherwise provided by law the said islands shall continue to be governed as thereby and herein provided, and all laws passed hereafter by the Philippine Commission shall have an enacting clause as follows: `By authority of the United States be it enacted by the Philippine Commission.' The provisions of section eighteen hundred and ninety-one of the Revised Statutes of eighteen hundred and seventy-eight shall not apply to the Philippine Islands. Future appointments of civil governor, vice-governor, members of said commission, and heads of executive departments shall be made by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.         SEC. 5. That no law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws. That in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf. That no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offence without due process of law; and no person for the same offence shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment, nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. That all persons shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offences. That no law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be enacted. That no person shall be imprisoned for debt. That the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion, insurrection or invasion the public safety may require it, in either of which events the same may be suspended by the President, or by the governor, with the approval of the Philippine Commission, whenever during such period the necessity for such suspension shall exist. That no ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted. That no law granting a title of nobility shall be enacted, and no person holding any office of profit or trust in said islands shall, without the consent of the Congress of the United States, accept any present, emolument, office or title of any kind whatever from any king, queen, prince or foreign State. That excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted. That the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated. That neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist in said islands. That no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances. That no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and that the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. That no money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation by law. That the rule of taxation in said islands shall be uniform. That no private or local bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject, and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill. That no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized. That all money collected on any tax levied or assessed for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund in the treasury and paid out for such purpose only.         SEC. 9. That the Supreme Court and the courts of first instance of the Philippine Islands shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided, and such additional jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by the government of said islands, subject to the power of said Government to change the practice and method of procedure. The municipal courts of said islands shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided by the Philippine Commission, subject in all matters to such alteration and amendment as may be hereafter enacted by law; and the chief justice and associate justices of the Supreme Court shall hereafter be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and shall receive the compensation heretofore prescribed by the commission until otherwise provided by Congress. The judges of the court of first instance shall be appointed by the civil governor, by and with the advice and consent of the Philippine Commission: Provided, That the admiralty jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and courts of first instance shall not be changed except by act of Congress. SEC. 10. That the Supreme Court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm the final judgments and decrees of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands in all actions, cases, causes and proceedings now pending therein or hereafter determined thereby in which the Constitution or any statute, treaty, title, right or privilege of the United States is involved, or in causes in which the value in controversy exceeds twenty-five thousand dollars, or in which the title or possession of real estate exceeding in value the sum of twenty-five thousand dollars, to be ascertained by the oath of either party or of other competent witnesses, is involved or brought in question; and such final judgments or decrees may and can be reviewed, revised, reversed, modified or affirmed by said Supreme Court of the United States on appeal or writ of error by the party aggrieved, in the same manner, under the same regulations, and by the same procedure, as far as applicable, as the final judgments and decrees of the Circuit Courts of the United States. The act just quoted became a law before the final conviction of the accused in the Supreme Court of the islands. It is contended by the Government that that part of the law under immediate consideration, which provides that no person, for the same offense, shall be twice put in jeopardy, must be construed in view of the system of laws prevailing in the islands before the same were ceded to the United States, and that the purpose of Congress was to make effectual the jurisprudence of the islands as known and established before American occupation, and that the provision against double jeopardy must be read in the light of the understanding of that expression in the civil law, or rather the Spanish law as it was then in force. The citations in the brief of the learned counsel for the Government seem to establish that under the Spanish law, as theretofore administered, one who had been convicted by a judgment of the court of last resort could not again be prosecuted for the same offense. We notice some of these provisions: In Spanish law the doctrine found expression in the Fuero Real (A.D. 1255) and the Siete Partidas (A.D. 1263). After a man, accused of any crime, has been acquitted by the court, no one can afterwards accuse him of the same offence (except in certain specified cases). Fuero Real, lib. iv, tit. xxi, 1, 13. If a man is acquitted by a valid judgment of any offence of which he has been accused, no other person can afterwards accuse him of the offence (except in certain cases). Siete Partidas, Part VII, tit. i, l. xii. In the encyclopedia of Spanish law, published by Don Lorenzo Arrazola in 1848, it is said, in considering the persons who may be accused of crime: It is another of the general exceptions that a person cannot be accused who has formerly been accused and adjudged of the same crime, since the most essential effect of all judicial decisions upon which execution can issue is to constitute unalterable law. Tomo I, pag. 511. Under that system of law it seems that a person was not regarded as being in jeopardy in the legal sense until there had been a final judgment in the court of last resort. The lower courts were deemed examining courts, having preliminary jurisdiction, and the accused was not finally convicted or acquitted until the case had been passed upon in the audiencia, or Supreme Court, whose judgment was subject to review in the Supreme Court at Madrid for errors of law, with power to grant a new trial. The trial was regarded as one continuous proceeding, and the protection given was against a second conviction after this final trial had been concluded in due form of law. The change introduced under military order No. 58, as amended by act 194 of the commission, made the judgment of the court of first instance final, in cases other than capital, whether the accused be convicted or acquitted, unless an appeal was prosecuted by the Government or the accused in the manner pointed out. In order to determine what Congress meant in the language used in the act under consideration, No person for the same offence shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment, we must look to the origin and source of the expression and the judicial construction put upon it before the enactment in question was passed. A consideration of the events preceding this regulation makes evident the intention of Congress to carry some at least of the essential principles of American constitutional jurisprudence to these islands and to engraft them upon the law of this people, newly subject to our jurisdiction. That it was the intention of the President in the instructions to the Philippine Commission to adopt a well-known part of the fundamental law of the United States, and to give much of the beneficent protection of the bill of rights to the people of the Philippine Islands, is not left to inference, for in his instructions, dated April 7, 1900, (see Public Laws and Resolutions of Philippine Com. 6-9,) he says: In all the forms of government and administrative provisions which they are authorized to prescribe, the commission should bear in mind that the government which they are establishing is designed not for our satisfaction or for the expression of our theoretical views, but for the happiness, peace and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands, and the measures adopted should be made to conform to their customs, their habits, and even their prejudices, to the fullest extent consistent with the accomplishment of the indispensable requisites of just and effective government; But he was careful to add: At the same time the commission should bear in mind, and the people of the islands should be made plainly to understand, that there are certain great principles of government which have been made the basis of our governmental system, which we deem essential to the rule of law and the maintenance of individual freedom, and of which they have, unfortunately, been denied the experience possessed by us; that there are also certain practical rules of government which we have found to be essential to the preservation of these great principles of liberty and law, and that these principles and these rules of government must be established and maintained in their islands for the sake of their liberty and happiness, however much they may conflict with the customs or laws of procedure with which they are familiar. It is evident that the most enlightened thought of the Philippine Islands fully appreciates the importance of these principles and rules, and they will inevitably within a short time command universal assent. Upon every division and branch of the government of the Philippines, therefore, must be imposed these inviolable rules: That no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law; that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation; that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defence; that excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted; that no person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offence or be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself; that the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; that neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall exist except as a punishment for crime; that no bill of attainer or ex post facto law shall be passed; that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the government for a redress of grievances; that no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and that the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship without discrimination or preference shall forever be allowed. These words are not strange to the American lawyer or student of constitutional history. They are the familiar language of the Bill of Rights, slightly changed in form, but not in substance, as found in the first nine amendments to the Constitution of the United States, with the omission of the provision preserving the right to trial by jury and the right of the people to bear arms, and adding the prohibition of the Thirteenth Amendment against slavery or involuntary servitude except as a punishment for crime, and that of Art. 1, § 9, to the passage of bills of attainder and ex post facto laws. These principles were not taken from the Spanish law; they were carefully collated from our own Constitution, and embody almost verbatim the safeguards of that instrument for the protection of life and liberty. When Congress came to pass the act of July 1, 1902, it enacted, almost in the language of the President's instructions, the Bill of Rights of our Constitution. In view of the expressed declaration of the President, followed by the action of Congress, both adopting, with little alteration, the provisions of the Bill of Rights, there would seem to be no room for argument that in this form it was intended to carry to the Philippine Islands those principles of our Government which the President declared to be established as rules of law for the maintenance of individual freedom, at the same time expressing regret that the inhabitants of the islands had not theretofore enjoyed their benefit. How can it be successfully maintained that these expressions of fundamental rights, which have been the subject of frequent adjudication in the courts of this country, and the maintenance of which has been ever deemed essential to our Government, could be used by Congress in any other sense than that which has been placed upon them in construing the instrument from which they were taken? It is a well-settled rule of construction that language used in a statute which has a settled and well-known meaning, sanctioned by judicial decision, is presumed to be used in that sense by the legislative body. The Abbotsford, 98 U.S. 440. It is not necessary to determine in this case whether the jeopardy provision in the Bill of Rights would have become part of the law of the islands without Congressional legislation. The power of Congress to make rules and regulations for territory incorporated in or owned by the United States is settled by an unbroken line of decisions of this court and is no longer open to question. American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511; Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15; Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 42, 43; Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244; Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197. This case does not call for a discussion of the limitations of such power, nor require determination of the question whether the jeopardy clause became the law of the islands after the ratification of the treaty without Congressional action, as the act of Congress made it the law of these possessions when the accused was tried and convicted. It is argued that in the act of July 1, 1902, Congress recognized the jurisdiction of the Philippine courts in section 9 as follows: SEC. 9. That the Supreme Court and the courts of first instance of the Philippine Islands shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided, and such additional jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by the government of said islands, subject to the power of said government to change the practice and method of procedure. The argument is, that Congress intended to leave the right of appeal as provided by military order, No. 58, as amended by the commission, in full force. But Congress, in section 5, had already specifically provided that no person should be put twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. While section 9 recognizes the established jurisdiction of the courts of the islands, it was not intended to repeal the specific guaranty of section 5, which is direct legislation pertaining to the particular subject. It is a well-settled principle of construction that specific terms covering the given subject matter will prevail over general language of the same or another statute which might otherwise prove controlling. In re Rouse, Hazard & Co., 91 Fed. Rep. 96, 100, and cases therein cited; Townsend v. Little, 109 U.S. 504, 512. In ascertaining the meaning of the phrase taken from the Bill of Rights it must be construed with reference to the common law from which it was taken. 1 Kent, Com. 336. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, in which this court said: In this, as in other respects, it [a constitutional provision] must be interpreted in the light of the common law, the principles and history of which were familiarly known to the framers of the Constitution. Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162; Ex parte Wilson, 144 U.S. 417, 422; Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624, 625; Smith v. Alabama, 624 U.S. 465. The language of the Constitution, as has been well said, could not be understood without reference to the common law. 1 Kent's Com. 336; Bradley, J., in Moore v. United States, 91 U.S. 270, 274. At the common law, protection from second jeopardy for the same offense clearly included immunity from second prosecution where the court having jurisdiction had acquitted the accused of the offense. The rule is thus stated by Hawkins in his Pleas of the Crown, quoted by Mr. Justice Story in United States v. Gibert et al., 2 Sumner, 19, 39: The plea (says he) of autre fois acquit is grounded on this maxim, that a man shall not be brought into danger of his life for one and the same offence more than once. From whence it is generally taken by all our books, as an undoubted consequence, that where a man is once found not guilty, on an indictment or appeal, free from error, and well commenced before any court, which hath jurisdiction of the cause, he may by the common law, in all cases, plead such acquittal in bar of any subsequent indictment or appeal for the same crime.