Opinion ID: 2411780
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: magnitude of asserted injury

Text: The first factor to consider when applying the Anderson balancing test is the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. In this analytical section we focus solely on injuries alleged under the First Amendment. The alleged injury to Virginia Chapman and Ron Peace, appellants who are school board members, does not involve a fundamental right because no such status is given to candidacy. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143, 92 S.Ct. 849, 855, 31 L.Ed.2d 92 (1972); Yonts v. Commonwealth, Ky., 700 S.W.2d 407 (1985). See also, J. Nowak, R. Rotunda, and J.N. Young, Constitutional Law, Chap. 16, § VIII, p. 776, (2d ed. 1983); L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, § 13-19 (2d ed. 1988). The federal circuit courts of appeal, under Equal Protection Clause analysis, sometimes within the context of First Amendment challenges, as the trial court observed, have adhered to Bullock v. Carter, supra , in holding that there is no fundamental right to candidacy. See, Stiles v. Blunt, 912 F.2d 260, 265 (8th Cir. 1990); Zielasko v. State of Ohio, supra ; Hatten v. Rains, 854 F.2d 687, 693 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106, 109 S.Ct. 3156, 104 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1989); Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1126 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied 439 U.S. 1129, 99 S.Ct. 1047, 59 L.Ed.2d 90 (1979). Appellants, Virginia Chapman and Ron Peace, are only deprived of becoming candidates for re-election to the school board in the district where their relatives were hired as employees, after appellants initially took office as members on the Board. Appellants' candidacies thus, are not forever barred. If their relatives transfer to work in another school district, or change jobs entirely, appellants will no longer be foreclosed from seeking re-election to their posts. Moreover, appellants at present are only denied the opportunity to seek reelection to the school board as long as they fit within the disqualifying parameters of the statutes. Appellants remain free to seek every other office in the Commonwealth.
We must similarly determine whether the asserted injury to voters' rights of association, and to express themselves under the First Amendment, are in fact implicated in this case, applying the Anderson test. Not all restrictions placed on a candidate's eligibility impose suspect burdens on fundamental rights of voters to associate and to choose among candidates. Anderson v. Celebreeze, 460 U.S. at 788, 103 S.Ct. at 1569; Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-31, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968). Generally, evenhanded restrictions on candidate eligibility that serve legitimate state goals, unrelated to First Amendment values, are upheld. See, Anderson v. Celebreeze, 460 U.S. at 788, 103 S.Ct. at 1570, fn. 9, citing Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 102 S.Ct. 2836, 73 L.Ed.2d 508 (1952). First, we must note that we are not persuaded that appellants have standing to raise voters' claims under First Amendment challenges of the statutes. In cases assessing the impact of candidate eligibility requirements on the rights of voters, one or more voters supporting the candidate are typically parties to the action. In Anderson, 460 U.S. at 783, 103 S.Ct. at 1566, suit was brought by independent presidential candidate, John Anderson, and three registered voters; in Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. at 136, 92 S.Ct. at 852, voters supporting candidates intervened in the action; and in Zielasko, supra, at 958, a registered voter supporting the candidacy of Zielasko joined the action challenging the constitutional validity of age requirements to any judicial office under the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause. Assuming that appellants, indeed, have standing to raise claims that voters' rights have been infringed, we find no basis to substantiate their assertion of injury. The fundamental right of voting, speech, and association does not grant voters an absolute right to vote for a specific individual, regardless of whether that candidate meets reasonable eligibility requirements. Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. at 967, 102 S.Ct. at 2845, Zielasko v. State of Ohio, at 961. Furthermore, the anti-nepotism provisions in these statutes neither favor or disfavor particular viewpoints or political parties. Voting for candidates for the school board is only limited by excluding those persons who fall within the parameters of the challenged statutes. While the opportunity of voters to select particular candidates may be obstructed by these statutes, surely most candidates are not precluded from the voters' consideration. No substantial segment of the community is therefore barred from the ballot by these provisions. See Wellford v. Battaglia, 343 F.Supp. 143 (D.Del.1972), aff'd, 485 F.2d 1151 (3d Cir.1973). Neither do the challenged statutes inhibit the free exchange of ideas. See Anderson v. Celebreeze, supra, 460 U.S. at 792, 103 S.Ct. at 1572; see also L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 13-20, p. 1109 (2d ed. 1988). The instant case therefore does not involve any significant injury to voters' First Amendment rights.