Opinion ID: 2318299
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Satisfied Sentence Renders Alleged Invalidity of Conviction Moot

Text: The issue remains whether the hearing court properly declined to consider appellant's petition on the ground that it presents a moot question. The Supreme Court of Delaware, in Gural v. State, 251 A. 2d 344 (1969), has recently stated that there are three prevalent views relating to the doctrine of mootness as applied to sentences already served: (1) the traditional view that satisfaction of the contested sentence, per se, renders the case moot; (2) the liberal view that the petitioner's interest in clearing his name, per se, permits review of or attack upon the conviction; and (3) the modified traditional view that the satisfaction of the sentence renders a case moot unless, in consequence of the conviction and sentence, the petitioner suffers collateral legal disabilities or burdens, surviving the satisfaction of the sentence, sufficient to give petitioner standing to attack his conviction. See Annot., 9 A.L.R. 3d 462. See generally Postrelease Remedies for Wrongful Conviction, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 1615 (1961); Mootness and Collateral Consequences in Criminal Appeals, 28 U. Chi. L. Rev. 363 (1960-1). Prior to this Court's decision in Commonwealth ex rel. Ulmer v. Rundle, 421 Pa. 40, 218 A. 2d 233 (1966), Pennsylvania followed the so-called traditional rule. Commonwealth v. Garner, 204 Pa. Superior Ct. 227, 203 A. 2d 333 (1964). The Ulmer decision, however, introduced what we shall here refer to as a collateral criminal consequences rule, which might well be deemed a restricted version of viewpoint (3) in the Delaware formulation described above. The doctrine of mootness was there held not to apply where one could suffer the consequence of having sentences begin and end later than they normally would, had the sentencing court been aware that a previously imposed, but unexpired, sentence was invalid. Although the Superior Court would limit Ulmer to its specific factual setting, i.e., where petitioner is serving a sentence illegally lengthened by and immediately following (thus with no hiatus) an invalid sentence, we think the decision is properly read as allowing an attack on a satisfied sentence which is shown to affect directly any subsequent criminal prosecution or conviction. Although the present case does not involve a recidivist statute, [8] the announced policy of the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County is the equivalent. It is clear that should appellant be found guilty of the charge presently pending against him in that county, he will be classed as a second offender and will suffer a harsher penalty, including imprisonment, than would be imposed absent the prior (allegedly invalid) drunken driving conviction. [9] Such a result presents the possible collateral criminal consequences which preclude application of the general rule of mootness to the collateral attack on appellant's initial conviction.