Opinion ID: 32129
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: denial of impartial jury.

Text: 24 Miniel also argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. The Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial includes the right to an impartial jury. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 727, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992). In a capital sentencing context, a defendant has the right to challenge for cause a juror whose views on capital punishment would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 852, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985). A state trial court's refusal of a petitioner's challenge for cause is a factual finding entitled to a presumption of correctness. Jones v. Butler, 864 F.2d 348, 362 (5th Cir.1988). Here, the state habeas court [found] based on a review of the trial record that the trial court did not err in failing to excuse venireperson Patrick O'Rourke for cause because he clearly demonstrated that he understood the legal definitions, was fully capable of following the law and fairly and impartially answering the punishment issues. 25 The juror in question, Patrick O'Rourke, had an MBA from the University of Houston and was a comptroller for a corporation. Miniel argues that O'Rourke expressed such an extreme bias in favor of the prosecution and the death penalty that it disqualified him from being seated as an impartial juror. In support of this argument, Miniel quotes several statements O'Rourke made while being examined during voir dire. First, Miniel asserts that O'Rourke demonstrated his bias by expressing the view that he would not worry about whether the death penalty was right or wrong in a particular case because the decision to execute a convicted defendant is more or less a mechanical process. During voir dire, in response to the prosecutor's question whether it would bother him to be limited to only two choices of punishment (life or death sentence), O'Rourke responded as follows: 26 No. I mean what it is is what it is. I don't — at that point it's not the point to be worrying about, whether or not it's right or wrong. It probably is good. Like I said, it's become more or less a mechanical process that you make these decisions. And this is the result of those decisions: more or less yes-or-no-type. 27 We do not read O'Rourke's use of the phrase more or less mechanical process as evidencing bias. Instead, we understand O'Rourke's use of the phrase more or less a mechanical process as describing the Texas procedure that determines whether a life sentence or death sentence is imposed. The prosecutor explained that, under the statutory scheme, if the issues are answered affirmatively the defendant will be sentenced to death. If there is a negative answer to either question the defendant will be sentenced to life imprisonment. We note that the prosecutor informed O'Rourke that if the jury answered the special answers yes, an automatic death verdict resulted. Webster's Dictionary provides that the word automatic is a synonym for mechanical. 2 Clearly, the jurors' answers to the special issues automatically determine the sentence imposed. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that O'Rourke's use of the phrase more or less mechanical process when describing the statutory scheme gives rise to debate regarding potential bias. 28 Miniel also points to various other statements made by O'Rourke during voir dire in support of his claim of bias, including the following: (1) he believed that the justice system is just all drawn-out and that if you speeded up the process, a few innocent might die; but society, as a whole, might be better off; (2) his personal feelings [are] that we're probably a little too lenient . . . [and] society has pretty much reined [in] its use; (3) he did not feel inclined to mitigate punishment 3 and thought that society has the obligation to remove persons who are a danger to society as a whole. 29 After reading the record, it is clear that O'Rourke held a strong personal preference for the death penalty as a punishment for those convicted of capital murder. 4 Nonetheless, O'Rourke's answers also indicated that he understood the difference between his personal feelings and what Texas law provided. 5 Under those circumstances, Miniel did not rebut with clear and convincing evidence the state court's finding that O'Rourke was fully capable of following the law and fairly and impartially answering the punishment issues. Accordingly, the district court's judgment denying this claim is not debatable or wrong. 30 Miniel further contends that O'Rourke should have been excused for cause because he could not distinguish between the term intentional, which pertains to the mental state at issue during the guilt-innocence phase and the term deliberate, which is contained in the first special issue at the punishment phase. The State does not dispute that a prospective juror should be excused if unable to distinguish between those two terms. This Court has noted that Texas law makes `a distinction between intentional and deliberate conduct; deliberate conduct is something more than intentional, but less than premeditation. [The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has] repeatedly recognized that a venireperson who cannot distinguish between intentional and deliberate conduct is impaired in his ability to consider the first special issue, and is challengeable for cause.' Green v. Johnson, 160 F.3d 1029, 1037 (5th Cir.1998) (quoting Soria v. State, 933 S.W.2d 46, 60-61 (Tex.Crim.App.1996)) (internal citation omitted). Nonetheless, Texas law does not require that venirepersons find a distinct difference between the terms intentional and deliberate. Goff v. State, 931 S.W.2d 537, 548 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). Instead, it only requires that venirepersons find a difference between the two terms and be able to base their answers on the evidence presented. Id. 31 At the beginning of O'Rourke's voir dire examination, the trial court asked him if he had any scruples against the death penalty in a proper case. O'Rourke responded negatively. The trial court then instructed O'Rourke as follows: 32 I'm going to give you a definition of intentionally and deliberately. 33 A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. 34 There's a different interpretation of the common meaning of intentionally and deliberate within the context of capital murder punishment hearing. 35 As used in the first Special Issue, the word deliberately has a meaning different and distinct from the word intentionally. 36 The word deliberately, as used in the first Special Issue, means a manner of doing an act characterized by or resulting from careful consideration, a conscious decision involving a thought process which embraces more than mere will to engage in the conduct. 37