Opinion ID: 751096
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The January 18 Vote

Text: 44 Finally, Coogan argues that the district court erred by confining its Mt. Healthy analysis to the February 1 vote, thereby failing to determine whether a majority of the defendants had proven nonpolitical reasons for their votes on January 18. We agree that the district court should have analyzed the January 18 vote under the Mt. Healthy standard. 45 Coogan was first denied reappointment at the January 18 meeting. If the Council cannot prove that they would have denied Coogan's reappointment on January 18 irrespective of his political activities, then Mr. Coogan's First Amendment rights were violated by that vote. See Rutan, 497 U.S. at 76, 110 S.Ct. at 2737-38. 46 The district court explained that it did not address the January 18 vote because [a]t that point, ... the entire selection process was jumbled and confused. It is unclear to us why such atmospherics are relevant. While the Council members may have been uncertain of their obligations and the latitude the law afforded them, as the district court found, they still proceeded with the resolution and voted not to reappoint Coogan. The Council members had been advised by counsel on both January 11 and January 17 that they could not vote against Coogan simply because of his politics, and they received no different legal advice thereafter. 47 The district court also pointed to the abstentions by Pilozzi, Smyers, and Christy in the January 18 vote as evidence of the alleged confusion. However, an abstention is no less a legislative act than a yes or no vote. See Affrunti v. Zwirn, 892 F.Supp. 451, 460 (E.D.N.Y.1995) (town board members clearly acted in their legislative capacities ... when they ... abstained from voting upon ... resolutions); Rabkin v. Dean, 856 F.Supp. 543, 546-47 (N.D.Cal.1994) (votes and abstentions were legislative acts). Moreover, under the voting rules of the Council, which require an affirmative vote by a majority of the full Council, an abstention is the functional equivalent of a negative vote. See Wrzeski v. City of Madison, 558 F.Supp. 664, 668 (W.D.Wis.1983)([w]hen enough members abstain from voting on an issue, the measure will fail for lack of an affirmative vote by the majority). We see no reason, therefore, why the motives for abstaining should not be analyzed in the same manner as the motives for voting yes or no. 3 See, e.g., Jeffries v. Harleston, 52 F.3d 9, 14 (2d Cir.1995)(jury found, inter alia, that defendant who abstained acted for retaliatory motives); Cooper v. Town of E. Hampton, 888 F.Supp. 376, 379-80 (E.D.N.Y.1995) (allowing claim for retaliatory conduct against defendants who voted no or abstained). Indeed, to hold otherwise would create a convenient means of engaging in impermissible conduct while avoiding liability. Cf. Federal Express Pilots v. National Mediation Bd., No. 93-2145, 1994 WL 761052, at  8 (D.D.C. Oct. 21, 1994) (noting ability to skew or manipulate voting by abstaining). 48 We do not mean to disparage the right of any person to abstain on an official vote. Indeed, the First Amendment protects such a right. See Wrzeski, 558 F.Supp. at 667-69; Bundren v. Peters, 732 F.Supp. 1486, 1499-1500 (E.D.Tenn.1989). Moreover, we realize that there exist legitimate, nonpolitical reasons for abstaining, such as where the voter lacks sufficient information to vote yes or no. Our point here is that the district court failed to make such a finding for any of the individual abstainers. 49 The defendants counter that it is irrelevant whether the district court addressed the January 18 vote because the same result occurred on February 1. While the January 18 vote is irrelevant with respect to the ultimate outcome of the vote, it is hardly irrelevant to this case. Ryan, Zeisz, and Horn all voted in favor of Coogan's reappointment on January 18. Coogan only needed one more vote. Given the evidence that Christy, Pilozzi, Smyers, and Priano were opposed to Coogan's reappointment at least in part for political reasons, for the Council to escape liability all four must individually demonstrate legitimate motives for either abstaining or voting against the reappointment.