Opinion ID: 441993
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: conduct of prosecutor

Text: 48 Appellants assert several instances of alleged prosecutorial misconduct during the course of trial, principally, though not exclusively, in the prosecutor's closing jury argument. We conclude that none of these instances, singly or in combination, warrant reversal. 49 1. The first complained of incident occurred during the government's cross-examination of Adriana Hinojosa (see note 6, supra ). On initial cross-examination Adriana had testified, without objection, that she taught school in Harlingen and lived there, but voted in Duval County, of which she considered herself a permanent resident. Following further cross-examination on other topics, Adriana was asked by the prosecutor how long she had lived in Harlingen, she replied eight years, and was then asked, Do you own a house in Harlingen. Before Adriana could reply, defense counsel objected to the relevancy of whether she owns a house or not. The court asked the prosecutor, What do you say about that and, receiving no answer, repeated the inquiry, to which the prosecutor then made the presently complained of response: Well, I say, Your Honor, it looks like we have an illegal voter here that votes in another county; that there could be some motive for her to go ahead and fabricate other things which shows her motive why she wants to make sure that certain candidates win. (R. 645.) Defense counsel then object[ed] to counsel's statements, stating that under the Texas election code one could legally be a permanent resident for voting in one place and nevertheless work somewhere else for years. The court, stating I don't want to get bogged down in some side issue, then asked Adriana, Do you own a home in Harlingen, to which she replied in the negative, the court then remarking Okay. The prosecutor and defense counsel thereupon each said they had no further questions. Defense counsel made no request for any instruction to the jury in respect to the matter. 50 This essentially trivial incident presents no arguable ground for reversal. In the actual trial setting, it is manifest that the illegal voter theory was premised on the witness owning a home in Harlingen; when she answered that she did not, and the court said Okay, and the whole subject was then dropped, it was the prosecution, not the defense, which suffered. The prosecution had tried to make something out of a side issue, and had fallen flat on its face in the attempt. 51 2. Complaint is also made of the portion of the prosecutor's closing argument stating: 52 You saw Jamie Garza [counsel for defendant Garcia] here, when he made his arguments, who was he talking about the whole time, he talked about Judge Uresti. We know who he's interested in. We know who he's interested in protecting. He told us who he was interested in protecting. (R. 861.) 53 There was no objection whatever to this argument. Moreover, it must be considered in light of the argument to which it responded. See United States v. Montemayor, 684 F.2d 1118, 1124 (5th Cir.1982); United States v. Hiett, 581 F.2d 1199, 1204 (5th Cir.1978). Garcia's counsel had argued: 54 The investigators went down there and they said, 'This is Duval County.' They didn't look to see if there were two sides to Duval County. They didn't look. They didn't look into this man's character, and this man is at trial, because he's been mentioned left and right. His brother came out--and this is admitted into evidence. And, ladies and gentlemen, please, please, open this up, when you're in the jury room, and look at it very carefully, and I would ask you, is there such thing as guilt by association? There's such a thing as innocent by association, but I am tendering to you people-- [R. 814.] 55 .... 56 This is in evidence, and I'm going to argue to you all that these ladies were campaigning for this man, and I want you to focus very carefully at this document. I want you to read through it. I submit to you all that the caliber of this man may be--is the caliber of his supporters. The supporters were supporting this man because he's a good man and because he's done a lot for the county, and this pamphlet, which is in evidence now, which was not objected to, look at it very carefully. 57 I think, ladies and gentlemen, that you're going to see that Duval County has progressed under his leadership, and I submit to you all that all that these people were doing was peacefully campaigning for their own preference. (R. 815.) 58 See also note 14, infra. None of this was in reply to anything raised by the prosecutor in his opening argument. Given the argument of Garcia's counsel, the lack of objection, and the factors mentioned in section 5 hereof below, no reversible error is presented in this regard. 59 3. Another area of complaint relates to references to the mother of defense counsel for Garcia. 60 (a) This initially came up in the prosecutor's cross-examination of defense witness Gonzalez, who had testified to Canales' reputation as being honest and truthful. Gonzalez testified on direct that he was the superintendent of the Benavides Independent School District. On cross-examination, he identified Zaragoza Gutierrez, Mr. Tony Villegas, Mrs. Tommy Garza, Mrs. Aida Garza, Mr. Agustin Perez, and Mr. Humberto De Los Santos as being all the members of the school district's board of trustees, and Mrs. Aida Garza as also being the mother of counsel for Garcia, all without any objection. Counsel for Canales objected when the witness was then asked if Mrs. Tommy Garza was the aunt of counsel for Garcia. The court overruled the objection, stating the question was proper cross-examination as relating to the witness' motive for testifying. No objection was made by counsel for Garcia. On further cross-examination, the witness testified, without objection, that Zaragoza Gutierrez, school board president, was the brother of defendant Canales. 61 We find no reversible error in allowing the complained of testimony. It was plainly admitted to show the witness' bias, and in this regard was essentially cumulative to the testimony that defendant Canales' brother was, in effect, the witness' boss. It is generally regarded as proper to inquire on cross-examination into any incentive the witness may have to falsify his testimony. Cloud v. Thomas, 627 F.2d 742, 744 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied sub nom. Cloud v. Byrd, 450 U.S. 1041, 101 S.Ct. 1760, 68 L.Ed.2d 239 (1981) (emphasis added). Among the commoner sorts of circumstances [admissible to show a witness' bias] are all those involving some intimate family relationship to one of the parties ... or some such relationship to a person, other than a party, who is involved on one or the other side of the litigation .... The relation of employment ... by one of the parties, is also usually relevant. 3A Wigmore on Evidence Sec. 949 (Chadbourn rev. 1970) (footnotes omitted). We have stated that the field of external circumstances from which probable bias or interest may be inferred is infinite. The rule encompasses all facts and circumstances which, when tested by human experience, tend to show that a witness may shade his testimony for the purpose of helping to establish one side of the cause only. Aetna Insurance Company v. Paddock, 301 F.2d 807, 812 (5th Cir.1962). Certainly that a witness is employed by trial counsel for a party to the case may be shown as relevant to the witness' bias. That the employment relationship is with a close relative of such counsel attenuates but does not eliminate the relevance. Here the relevance may be further attenuated because the attorney was court appointed, though this was not called to the district court's attention in connection with the objection. The trial court is given great discretion in determining the scope of cross-examination on the subject of bias .... United States v. Hodnett, 537 F.2d 828, 829 (5th Cir.1976) (per curiam). No abuse of that broad discretion is shown here. 62 (b) The matter of Aida Garza again came up in closing argument. Counsel for Garcia, in his jury argument, had gone into this area. This first occurred, just after the portion of his argument quoted in 2 above, when he said, Although I'm not on trial, and my mother is not on trial, it's easy, Mr. Jack Lamar Wolfe [the prosecutor] .... At this point the court interrupted, stating, Now, that's out of order, and: 63 We know who's on trial. Your mother is not on trial, nor is anybody else that are not the two defendants here. Duval County is not on trial, ladies and gentlemen. (R. 816.) 64 Nevertheless, counsel continued by stating, I think that what Mr. Jack Lamar Wolfe is going to try to show is, 'OK, look at all these people from Duval County involved in the conspiracy'. Later in his argument defense counsel again returned to this theme: It really hurts to come from Duval County and to see your friends, your people--and it's in evidence that I have praise for these people. And, incidentally, since my mother backed Uresti, let him talk about my mother all he wants. I'm proud of her. (R. 826.) 65 The prosecutor had not mentioned Duval County or Aida Garza in his opening argument. 66 In closing argument the prosecutor mentioned Aida Garza three times. On the initial occasion he argued: 67 And it keeps going on to the Benavides Independent School District. And who do they bring in here? They bring in here Issac Gonzalez, and he's the superintendent over there. What is Issac Gonzalez' motive for coming in here and saying these people wouldn't lie? Let's look at it. Her brother, Aurora Canales' brother, is the president of the school board. Now, if you think that the president of the school board asks the superintendent to come down here and testify for his sister, what do you think he's going to do? 68 Besides that, two other members of the school board, Tony Garza and Aida Garza, and you're going to find--and look in those campaign contributions--that Aida Garza was the head of the kind of the Good-Government League and she gave a thousand dollars to the Uresti campaign, and she was over there. See all these people? She was over there. She was at the headquarters. But they're also members of the school board. They've got three members of the school board and they're telling the superintendent, or asking the superintendent, 'You ought to come over here and testify as to the good character of my sister and our political friend.' You think he's going to come? (R. 857-58.) 69 There was no objection to any of this argument. So far as it related to the credibility of the defense witness Gonzalez, it was proper argument for the reasons previously stated. Additionally, defense counsel had already raised the matter of his mother and expressly stated that she, a member of the school board which employed Gonzalez, had backed Uresti. For the reasons stated below, while the reference to Aida Garza's financial contribution may have been improper, it does not present reversible error. 70 Next, the prosecutor mentioned that Fito Saenz, Elijio Uresti, Aida Garza, Ruperto Canales, Armando Garza, Olga Hinojosa, all the Urestis, Teresa Briones, they're all involved in this whole thing. (R. 862.) The evidence showed these individuals were involved in backing Uresti or in the Uresti political organization. There was no objection to this argument, and it does not present reversible error. 71 The prosecutor's final reference to Aida Garza occurred in the following context: 72 [Prosecutor Wolfe]: When you also look in there, you'll find out that there's another little strange thing in there. You're going to find out that this Good Government League--and I guess it's the one that Aida Garza headed up; I'm not sure--they were paid a thousand dollars, and then a couple of days later, they paid back a thousand dollars-- 73 Mr. Canales [defense counsel]: Your Honor, I object to this line of arguments, Your Honor. He's outside the record. What somebody else did or a contribution has no relevance at all regarding our client. 74 The Court: Where is this, Mr. Wolfe? 75 .... 76 Mr. Wolfe: Government's Exhibit No. 3, Your Honor. 77 .... 78 The Court: How are you tying that to this case? 79 Mr. Wolfe: It goes to the weight of this document, it goes to what is contained in this document, and it is in evidence, and everything that's in evidence is allowed to be explained to the jury. 80 The Court: Well, yes and no, gentlemen. Because it's in evidence doesn't mean it's got anything to do with this particular case. 81 I say to you ladies and gentlemen of the jury, again, we're not here to try Duval County in the abstract, we're not here to try South Texas politics, we're not here to decide if there was some wrongdoing somewhere in the campaign. We're here to decide if these two people are guilty of the precise charges. 82 So I would say to you, Mr. Wolfe, stay on that. 83 There may be other people who are guilty of something. One of the instructions I'm going to give you is not to consider or speculate about who else might be guilty of anything else, or what may or may not have happened to anybody else. What your solemn oath is to do here is to consider these two people only. 84 Now, to the extent that the attorneys are arguing about motives of people who have come here to testify, I'll allow that, but to just get off into the general structure of Duval County politics, I think that is off the mark. 85 Mr. Wolfe: Ladies and gentlemen, let me say this to you. You should not find these people guilty--find these people guilty because of Duval County, and I hope you don't think that's what I want you to do. And I know that, even if you thought that's what I wanted you to do, you wouldn't do it. That's not the reason they're on trial here. They're not on trial because of Duval County. (R. 865-67.) 86 A portion of this argument appears to have been a misinterpretation of the record. Government's Exhibit No. 3, a duly authenticated copy of the Uresti campaign report of expenditures, disbursements, and contributions which had been admitted in evidence (and as to which no complaint is made on appeal), showed in the list of disbursements on April 14, 1982 a one thousand dollar payment to Aida H. Garza (Good Government Team) for Good Government Team Campaign Work, and, in the list of contributions, appearing on other pages, receipts from the Committee for Better Government on April 14, 1982 of $1,149.50 described as Fund Raising Activity and on May 19, 1982 of $1,000 described as Loan from Bank. Apparently, the prosecutor's recollection of the exhibit merged the Good Government Team and the Committee for Better Government into the Good Government League. But this misrecollection of the exhibit, which was available to the jury in its deliberations, is not significant, given that the exhibit clearly did show a receipt by Aida Garza and it was admitted that Aida Garza was a Uresti backer. As to the question of extraneous offenses, this was inferential and attenuated and more than adequately addressed by the district court's instructions given in response to the objection, as well as by the prosecutor's last above-quoted statement. No further instruction or action by the district court was requested, and no motion for mistrial was made. We find no reversible error in this respect. 87 4. The final set of complaints generally asserts that the prosecutor's argument was in essence a request that the jury convict on the basis of guilt by association, because of the supposed reputation of Duval County, particularly, and South Texas, in general, for dirty politics. 88 Initially, the context of the arguments must be considered. We have noted that counsel for Garcia first brought up the matter of Duval County, and claimed innocent by association, because Judge Uresti was such a good man, and because of the caliber of his supporters. 14 Similarly, counsel for Canales in his argument talked about the Texas Rangers and the FBI and how they would frighten people from South Texas and poor Mexicans. 15 He questioned the motives of the prosecution (why are they trying to put it on us? (R. 834)) and took liberal common notice of how politics were conducted in South Texas. 16 Taken together, there ran through these arguments an implicit theme of South Texas, the good Judge Uresti and his high-caliber supporters against the world, particularly against those who were trying to put an end to the properly active politicking that was typical of South Texas, and against the Rangers who frightened the Spanish-speaking people there. Certainly, then, the prosecution was not barred from any mention in its closing argument of Duval County or South Texas or the Uresti organization, and was entitled to respond that a conviction was sought to stop vote buying, not legitimate politicking, and that this was for the good of the people of South Texas, rather than being a form of outside repression. 89 Turning to the specifics, we find that most of the instances complained of in this connection were references to persons shown by the evidence to be active in the campaign or organization of Uresti and his political allies. We do not find these improper, especially in a conspiracy prosecution where the defense had raised the claim of innocent by association. Moreover, there was no objection to these portions of the argument. 90 We find only two complained of references in the prosecutor's closing argument to South Texas and only one to Duval County. 91 The first South Texas reference came in the portion of the prosecutor's argument concerning Ester Espinoza, the complaining witness in count two, on which the verdict was not guilty. 17 There was no objection to any of this, and the acquittal on count two indicates it was not prejudicial. 18 92 In the portion of his argument containing the single complained of reference to Duval County, the prosecutor stated, just after the argument quoted in note 17, supra, as follows: 93 Ladies and gentlemen, there comes a time when this stuff has got to stop, and when I talk about 'this stuff,' I'm talking about vote buying. To my knowledge, I don't think anybody has ever been prosecuted in Duval County for vote buying. As a matter of fact, ladies and gentlemen-- 94 Mr. Canales: Your Honor, I'm going to object to that type of line of arguing. He's arguing outside the record and it's improper. 95 The Court: Yes, I'll sustain that. Let's don't try the history of South Texas on either side, ladies and gentlemen. The point is, are these two defendants guilty or not guilty of the specific charges against them. Let's limit that to the issue. (R. 863) (emphasis added). 96 This argument was improper, as there was no evidence of whether this was the first such Duval County prosecution (apparently it was not the first, see note 2, supra ). However, we feel that the district court's prompt instruction cured any error. We note there was no request for any other or further instruction, and no motion for mistrial. Further, the defense had already brought up Duval County several times, and had also intimated that this was an improperly motivated prosecution designed to stop legitimately active South Texas politicking. Moreover, it is not clear that the alleged fact that the prosecution was the first, as opposed to following several others, was prejudicial to the defendants. 97 The final complained of reference to South Texas occurred in this context: 98 [Prosecutor]: We've got a cancer right here, ladies and gentlemen, and it's going to hurt, and it's going to be difficult to cut it out, and you're going to agonize over it, but if you don't cut it out, ladies and gentlemen, it's going to grow and it's going to grow until it consumes us on, to where no election is free. If you want to send a message out to the people of South Texas, that vote buying is going to stop-- 99 Mr. Canales [defense counsel]: Your Honor, I object to his general law enforcement arguments, Your Honor, about sending out a message to South Texas, Your Honor. 100 The Court: Look, ladies and gentlemen, I have always understood in closing arguments, to allow a certain amount poetic license. I would simply repeat to you, and I think I've said this enough for you to understand, you are here, in the final analysis, to try these two people. You're not here to try Judge Uresti, you're not here to try Duval County, you're not here to try the cancer of vote buying. You are here to try two people, as to whether or not they are guilty of the precise charges involved. The rest of it I regard as--on both sides--as dramatic license, poetic license, and I don't think it's particularly prejudicial, but to the extent that it digresses you from your task, I remind you again that your task is simply to go in here and try these two people. Your task is not to clean up all corruption in the world from now and ever more. Your task is to try these two people on the particular charges brought against them. (R. 874-75) (emphasis added). 101 It is not entirely clear to us that the remark about send a message out to the people of South Texas did not fall into a polyphonic interlude between an improper plea for conviction ... and a permissible plea for law enforcement. Whittington v. Estelle, 704 F.2d 1418, 1423 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Whittington v. McKaskle, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 428, 78 L.Ed.2d 361 (1983). See also United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1030 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied sub nom. Meinster v. United States, 457 U.S. 1136, 102 S.Ct. 2965, 73 L.Ed.2d 1354 (1982) (may appeal to jury to act as conscience of community). Even if the argument did go beyond the proper limits of a plea for law enforcement or an appeal to the jury to act as the conscience of the community, it did not do so egregiously. Considering the court's ample and prompt curative instruction, going well beyond a perfunctory sustained or disregard that, and the fact that no other or further instruction was requested and no motion for mistrial was made, we conclude that no reversible error is presented. 102 Other complaints of the prosecutor's closing argument present no grounds for reversal. 19 103 5. We turn now to certain factors, common to most of appellants' claims of improper argument and alleged prosecutorial misconduct, which strengthen our conclusion, based on the record as a whole, that none of the complained of incidents presents reversible error. We recognize that the cumulative effect of several incidents of improper argument or misconduct may require reversal, even though no single one of the incidents, considered alone, would warrant such a result. The following factors, when considered together with our foregoing analysis, also persuade us that no such cumulative error is present here. 104 To begin with, except for one or two incidents which are either trivial or as to which appellants' complaints are clearly without any merit, each instance of which complaint is made on appeal involves a situation where appellants either made no objection whatever or where the objection they did make was sustained and an appropriate, nonperfunctory, and meaningfully curative instruction was promptly given. In none of the latter instances, moreover, did appellants request any further instruction or in any way indicate any dissatisfaction with the action of the district court. Further, and of particular significance, neither appellant at any time moved for a mistrial. Our review is therefore limited to the plain error standard .... United States v. Montemayor, 684 F.2d at 1124. As we stated in Montemayor: 105 Plain error may be recognized 'only if the error is so obvious that our failure to notice it would seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings and result in a miscarriage of justice.' United States v. Graves, 669 F.2d 964, 971 (5th Cir.1982). The defendant's burden of showing plain error is a heavy one. United States v. Pool, 660 F.2d at 559 [5th Cir.1981]. Id. 106 We stress the importance of making proper objection and, if the objection is sustained and the jury instructed accordingly, expressing to the trial court any desire for further instruction or for a mistrial. Though the reasons for this are obvious, some of them bear repeating. When we are asked to reverse in these circumstances we are, in effect, asked to go against the implicit judgment of both the trial court and the defendant's trial counsel that the trial court's corrective action was adequate and appropriate. Moreover, we are reluctant, particularly where, as here, there has been a strong curative instruction and it is obvious that the prosecution is not seeking to force a mistrial, to allow the defense to avoid making the choice, prior to verdict, between another trial and a decision by the jury which has already commenced to hear the case. We observe that defendants here were represented by vigorous, aggressive, and capable counsel, Canales' counsel having formerly served as United States Attorney for the district in which trial was held. 107 We are unable to conclude that an affirmance here works either a miscarriage of justice or tends to have a serious adverse effect on the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. 108 Next, we consider the curative instructions given by the district court. We have already adverted to several of these, and will not repeat them. There were others, however, which also effectively and concretely focused the jury's attention on its proper duties in this case, and emphasized the necessity to put aside any and all extraneous factors. 109 Just prior to final arguments, the district court instructed the jury, these statements that you're going to hear, these arguments, are not evidence. Of course, the evidence is over with ... [the arguments] are not designed to put any new evidence in the case; they are not designed to be your legal instructions.... The legal instructions that I give are the only ones that you follow .... (R. 797-98.) 110 We have noted that on at least five occasions during the final arguments the court instructed the jury that Duval County, South Texas, and the misconduct or otherwise of other persons were irrelevant, the sole and only issue being the specific defendants' guilt of the specific charges in the indictment. (R. 816, 861, 863, 866-67, 875; see also the prosecutor's above-quoted express disavowal, at R. 866-67, of any Duval County-type guilt by association theory.) 111 In its final charge to the jury, the court carefully and forcefully reemphasized these themes, as reflected by the following portions of its instructions: 112 ... It is your duty to base your verdict solely upon the testimony and the evidence without prejudice, without bias, and without sympathy to anyone. 113 The arguments were very emotional and bordered sometimes on bias, or prejudice, or sympathy. I say, 'bordered.' I don't think they overdid it, but sometimes they're talking about different people, or whether they're ... what their backgrounds are, or where they're from, and that sort of thing, whether it's the defendants or the witnesses. Some of that is relevant to decide credibility, who you believe and who you don't believe, but in the final analysis, we're not here to be sympathetic to anyone, we're not here to be prejudice[d] against anyone, we're not here to have a bias one way or the other. You're here to decide the case strictly according to the evidence, and that was the promise you made and that was the oath you took before being accepted by the parties, and they have the right to expect nothing less. [R. 878-79.] 20 114 .... 115 Now you must consider only the evidence.... [T]he sworn testimony given at this trial by the witnesses, plus the exhibits. That's what we mean by 'evidence.' Remember again that any statements, objections, or arguments by the attorneys are not evidence.... [I]t is your own recollection of the evidence, and it is your own interpretation of the evidence that is controlling. [R. 882.] 116 .... 117 The point I want to make to you is that it's not a question of ... are they guilty or not guilty in general, in some kind of abstraction. It's a question of ... is Aurora Canales guilty or not guilty of count one? Next question: Is she guilty or not guilty of count three? 118 And, in a separate analysis, Elia Garcia. Is she guilty or not guilty of count one? Then the next one, count two and count three. And your findings of any one of those does not necessarily control the other. 119 I caution you and I stress to you that you are here to decide the guilt or innocence of these two ladies from the evidence in this case. They are not on trial for any act or conduct or offense that is not alleged in the indictment. You are not here called upon to return a verdict as to the guilt or innocence of any other person or persons that are not on trial. You should not speculate as to the status or disposition of the case as to anybody else. I want to stress that in view of some of the closing arguments on each side. While they were enlightening, interesting in the final analysis, I want to repeat to you again, it's simply a question of ... are these two ladies guilty or not guilty, from the evidence, on the precise count they're charged with. You're not here to decide whether the Texas Rangers are a good idea or a bad idea. We're not here to talk about the F.B.I.'s investigating techniques. We're not here to decide if Duval County has good people or bad people. We're not here to ... [right] all the wrong history. We're not here to generally clean up corruption or send messages or anything of that sort, one way or the other. We're not here to be sympathetic to people who are nice and have families and children, or anything of that sort. We're simply here to decide whether the government has proved that these two ladies are guilty of the particular charges against them. 120 So the rest of that stuff should be disregarded by you except and only except insofar as you find it relevant in some of the instances, as far as just evaluating the credibility or motives or that sort of thing as to people who actually appeared here in this case. 121 But other than that, this is not a court of inquiry. We're not here generally to wonder if these two people--and I stress to you again to disregard and not even try to speculate what other people might've done, or what other involvements they might've had, or anything of that sort. [R. 906-07.] 122 .... 123 ... [Y]ou're here to only decide whether the government has proved the case beyond a reasonable doubt. [R. 908.] 124 .... 125 Remember that you are not partisans. You are judges of the facts and your interest is to seek the truth. (R. 909.) 21 126 We believe these instructions, coupled with those previously referenced, were more than sufficient to render it most unlikely that appellants were materially prejudiced by the matters complained of. 127 Partial confirmation of this conclusion is found in the jury verdict, returning an acquittal on count two, where the government's evidence was weaker, and a conviction on counts one and three, where the proof of guilt was stronger. This tends to indicate that the jury based its verdict on the evidence, and was not swayed by the fact that this was a Duval County case or by a desire to send a message to the people of South Texas, which considerations, of course, applied as much to count two as to the other counts. Indeed, much of the complained of argument was particularly related to count two (see, e.g., note 17, supra ). 128 Finally, we have considered the record as a whole, the proof of guilt and the overall manner in which the trial was conducted. While the proof of guilt was not overwhelming it was, on count three at least, substantially above the level of minimal sufficiency. In our opinion, the trial was fair. The record does not reflect that the case was prosecuted on a guilt by association theory. The trial judge handled the case in an outstanding manner, giving the attorneys proper latitude to present their respective cases but always retaining ultimate control and, in a fully evenhanded and fair manner, seeing to it that the trial moved along and remained focused only on the real issues, whether the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the named defendants individually were guilty of the precise matters with which they were charged. 129 Accordingly, we find no reversible error in the appellants' complaints of the prosecutor's jury argument and related instances of claimed misconduct.