Opinion ID: 1830839
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 27

Heading: Whether the Trial Court erred in denying the Appellant's motion for introduction into evidence of instances of past sexual conduct by Ashley Galloway, and in granting the Appellee's motion in limine to exclude evidence of past sexual behavior of the victim, Ashley Galloway.

Text: ¶ 152. In his 13th assignment of error, Hughes contends that it was error to prohibit Hughes from putting on evidence concerning Galloway's past sexual behavior. ¶ 153. Throughout the trial, Hughes attempted to create the impression that the State had failed to explore the possibility that someone other than Hughes had committed the murder. Hughes contends, in keeping with this theory of defense, that he should have been allowed to put on evidence of Galloway's past sexual conduct because it reasonably could create the inference that someone other than Hughes was the source of the semen found in Galloway's body. M.R.E. 412 is designed to prevent the introduction of irrelevant evidence of the victim's past sexual behavior to confuse and inflame the jury into trying the victim rather than the defendant. ¶ 154. The critical question is whether the evidence goes to demonstrating that another person is the actual source of the injury, or whether the evidence is simply offered to show the promiscuity or character of the victim. As such, the inquiry under Rule 412 devolves to a specific requirement of relevancy of the proffered evidence. ¶ 155. Under Rule 412: If the court determines on the basis of the hearing ... that the evidence which the accused seeks to offer is relevant and that the probative value of such evidence outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice, such evidence shall be admissible in the trial to the extent an order made by the court specifies evidence which may be offered and areas with respect to which the alleged victim may be examined or cross-examined. M.R.E. 412(c)(3)(emphasis added); see Herrington v. State, 690 So.2d 1132, 1136 (Miss.1997). ¶ 156. Hughes proffered some hearsay and some direct evidence of Galloway's past sexual contacts. Even assuming such contacts are true, the closest was approximately two weeks before her disappearance. This contrasts sharply with Herrington, Amacker v. State, 676 So.2d 909, 912 (Miss.1996), and Heflin v. State, 643 So.2d 512 (Miss.1994), in which the proffered testimony exhibited a nexus between the time, place or the other possible perpetrator of the crime. In Heflin there was evidence that the victim may have had intercourse possibly two days before the rape with someone other than the defendant in the same clothes on which the incriminating evidence was found. Heflin v. State, 643 So.2d at 516. Also, in Amacker, the proffered testimony was that on the night in question, a person other than the defendant had been sleeping with the victim. Amacker, 676 So.2d at 910. Likewise, in Herrington, the proffer demonstrated highly probative evidence linking an alternate possible perpetrator with the victim, the time and nature of the injury. Herrington, 690 So.2d at 1136. ¶ 157. The trial court judge in the instant case examined the proffer under Rule 412 and found: [E]ven assuming here for the sake of argument that all these statements are true regarding the past sexual activity, some of these persons who are claimed to have had sexual relations with Galloway had these relations months before she disappeared, and as pointed out, possibly the closest would be .... approximately two weeks prior to the Galloway's disappearance.... [T]he Court could allow the evidence only if the Court is able under Rule 412 to find that, number one, that the evidence which the accused seeks to offer is relevant, and that the probative value of such evidence outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice.... There's nothing to indicate to the Court that any of this would be relevant, even in any stretch of the imagination, to show any possible source of the semen by trying to show that one of these individuals, even assuming here for the sake of argument that they did have sexual relations with Miss. Galloway, that somehow two weeks or three weeks or four months or six months before here [sic] disappearance that she may have had sexual relations would in no way have any relevance concerning source of semen as being one of these individuals as opposed to the defendant. ¶ 158. The trial judge correctly applied Rule 412 and did not abuse his discretion in determining the evidence to be irrelevant.