Opinion ID: 2761209
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: standard of review

Text: The test for establishing an Eighth Amendment claim of inadequate medical care encompasses a multitude of questions that present elements both factual and legal. Review of such mixed questions is of a variable exactitude; the more law-based a question, the less deferentially we assess the district court's conclusion. In Re Extradition of Howard, 996 F.2d 1320, 1328 (1st Cir. 1993) (The standard of review applicable to mixed questions usually depends upon where they fall along the degree-of-deference continuum . . . .). The ultimate legal conclusion of whether prison administrators have violated the Eighth Amendment is reviewed de novo. See, e.g., Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288, 1307 (11th Cir. 2010) (Whether the record demonstrates that [the prisoner] was sprayed with chemical agents . . . and that he suffered -41- psychological injuries from such sprayings are questions of fact. Whether these deprivations are objectively 'sufficiently serious' to satisfy the objective prong, is a question of law . . . . (internal citations omitted)); Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002) (The district court's factual findings regarding conditions at the Prison are reviewed for clear error. However, its conclusion that the facts do not demonstrate an Eighth Amendment violation is a question of law that we review de novo. (citing Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 681 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc))); Hickey v. Reeder, 12 F.3d 754, 756 (8th Cir. 1993) (Whether conduct, if done with the required culpability, is sufficiently harmful to establish an Eighth Amendment violation is an objective or legal determination which we decide de novo.); Alberti v. Klevenhagen, 790 F.2d 1220, 1225 (5th Cir. 1986) ([O]nce the facts are established, the issue of whether these facts constitute a violation of constitutional rights is a question of law that may be assayed anew upon appeal.). Subsidiary legal questions, such as whether an actor's conduct amounted to deliberate indifference for purposes of the Eighth Amendment, are likewise reviewed de novo. Cf. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996) (holding that, for Fourth Amendment purposes, reasonable suspicion and probable cause determinations should receive de novo appellate review); United States v. Camacho, 661 F.3d 718, 724 (1st Cir. 2011) (we review de novo a district court's -42- subsidiary reasonable suspicion and probable cause determinations in evaluating a motion to suppress); United States v. Bucci, 582 F.3d 108, 115-17 (1st Cir. 2009). Our court awards deference to the district court's resolution of questions of pure fact and issues of credibility. See, e.g., DesRosiers v. Moran, 949 F.2d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 1991) (reviewing factual findings regarding the adequacy of care deferentially); Torraco, 923 F.2d at 234 (finding that issues of culpability in a deliberate indifference inquiry are usually questions for a jury). We will reverse the district court's findings on such factual questions only for clear error. DesRosiers, 949 F.2d at 19 ([W]e assay findings of fact in a bench trial only for clear error.). We find clear error when we are left with 'a strong, unyielding belief, based on the whole of the record,' that the judge made a mistake. In re O'Donnell, 728 F.3d 41, 45 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Islamic Inv. Co. of the Gulf (Bah.) Ltd. v. Harper (In re Grand Jury Investigation), 545 F.3d 21, 24 (1st Cir. 2008)). We may also find clear error when the district court commits an error of law that affects its fact-finding analysis. See Uno v. City of Holyoke, 72 F.3d 973, 978 (1st Cir. 1995) ([T]he jurisprudence of clear error 'does not inhibit an appellate court's power to correct errors of law, including those that may infect a so-called mixed finding of law and fact, or a finding of fact that is predicated on a misunderstanding of the -43- governing rule of law.' (quoting Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 106 (1986))). This standard of review tracks the Supreme Court's framework for appellate review of claims of excessive punishment or fines under the Eighth Amendment. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 336-37 & n.10 (1998). In Bajakajian, the Supreme Court concluded that the excessiveness of a fine was a question properly considered de novo by appellate courts, applying the standard of gross disproportionality articulated in [its] Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause precedents. Id. at 336. [T]he application of a constitutional standard to the facts of a particular case, the Supreme Court reasoned, may appropriately require de novo appellate review to ensure consistency in the law's development. Id. at 336 n.10; see also Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 435-36 (2001) (extending de novo review of the excessiveness inquiry associated with the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment to punitive damages awards); Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699 (holding that as a general matter determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be reviewed de novo on appeal). The considerations set forth in Ornelas, and applied in Bajakajian and Leatherman Tool, are equally relevant here. Medical 'need' in real life is an elastic term, Battista, 645 F.3d at 454, that take[s its] substantive content from the -44- particular context[] in which the standards are being assessed. Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696. Similarly, the legal rules for what constitutes care in violation of the Eighth Amendment acquire content only through application -- a fact which favors de novo appellate review to maintain control of, and to clarify, the legal principles. See id. at 697.