Opinion ID: 1988800
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Bolstering of Detective's Fingerprint Assessment

Text: The defendant next argues that the trial justice erroneously permitted the state to bolster Det. Firth's fingerprint assessment when he allowed the state to ask whether Det. Firth's conversation with two other fingerprint examiners made him change his own opinion, thereby avoiding a hearsay challenge. The defendant submits that the trial justice further erred in permitting the state to bolster its case through the presentation of retired Major John Power, who testified to thirty-eight years of experience in fingerprint identification. The defendant further contends that Major Power's testimony on that issue was prejudicially cumulative. The state counters that defendant has waived the issue of bolstering with respect to the reference to the two other fingerprint examiners because defendant failed to object when the prosecutor asked whether Det. Firth had changed his opinion after consulting with them. Therefore, the state contends that defendant's claim of error regarding bolstering through the use of the other examiners' findings has been waived. The state also argues that the findings of Major Power were admissible and did not constitute improper bolstering because defense counsel, during cross-examination, had questioned Det. Firth's qualifications and ability to render an expert opinion. Impermissible bolstering or vouching typically occurs when one witness offer[s] an opinion regarding the truthfulness or accuracy of another witness' testimony. State v. Lassiter, 836 A.2d 1096, 1107 (R.I.2003) (quoting State v. Webber, 716 A.2d 738, 742 (R.I.1998)). Bolstering is forbidden because [t]he determination of the truthfulness or credibility of a witness lies within the exclusive province of the jury. Id. (quoting Webber, 716 A.2d at 742). Impermissible bolstering may occur even if the witness does not literally state an opinion concerning the credibility of another witness's testimony. Id. (citing Webber, 716 A.2d at 742). If one witness's testimony has the same `substantive import' as if it addressed another witness's credibility, it is inadmissible. Id. (quoting Webber, 716 A.2d at 742). We conclude that neither Det. Firth's testimony concerning his consultation with the two detectives nor Major Power's testimony constitute improper bolstering. First, with respect to the state's raise or waive argument, we note that the trial justice overruled defendant's objection to a question directed at Det. Firth intended to elicit testimony as to whether the latent fingerprints taken from the crime scene matched the inked fingerprints of defendant. In doing so, the trial justice, noting that the record was preserved, stated at sidebar that the defendant has a continuing objection to any opinion being offered by this witness as to the fact of his examination, his opinion that the examination shows that the prints found at the scene match those of the defendant. The question at issue here, posed by the state on redirect, was whether Det. Firth had change[d][his] opinion as to whether those five latent prints belonged to the defendant after he consulted with two other detectives. Clearly, the elicited opinion was still that of Det. Firth and not the other two detectives. The record was preserved and the continuing objection ran to this opinion testimony on redirect examination. Therefore, the state's raise or waive argument fails. Nonetheless, the trial justice did not err by allowing the state to question Det. Firth about his consultation with the two detectives. These detectives did not testify and therefore could not speak to Det. Firth's credibility or to his opinion. By asking the detectives to review the fingerprint evidence, Det. Firth was following a BCI practice, about which he testified, of double-checking one's own work. With respect to Major Power's testimony, Major Power neither testified as to Det. Firth's credibility nor offer[ed] an opinion concerning the truthfulness of [his] testimony. State v. Marr, 731 A.2d 690, 695 (R.I.1999) (quoting State v. Lyons, 725 A.2d 271, 276 (R.I.1999)). Furthermore, Major Power testified about his own extensive qualifications as a retired police officer with thirty-eight years experience, twenty-five of which were served as a BCI detective, including being qualified as an expert in courts [w]ell over a hundred times. Major Power's opinion, that the latent fingerprints taken from the crime scene matched the inked prints of defendant, did not bolster Det. Firth's opinion. Although Major Power was not at the crime scene, he conducted an independent examination and found that the latent prints were identical to the inked fingerprints of defendant. Major Power's testimony neither directly nor indirectly touched on the credibility of Det. Firth. He merely offered an opinion after an independent evaluation of the fingerprint evidence. Major Power's testimony was likely sought, as the trial justice noted during a sidebar conference, because Det. Firth's qualifications and experience were called into question during cross-examination. The trial justice, therefore, did not err in permitting Major Power to offer his expert opinion.