Opinion ID: 2808513
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Prove Prior Convictions

Text: Mr. Shields contends that, in accordance with recent Supreme Court precedent, his three prior convictions had to be proved to the jury. He also maintains that the criminal process against him was flawed from the beginning because the indictment recited not only the substantive crime of felon in possession of a firearm, under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), but also the statutory sentencing enhancement for three prior felony convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). In his view, the recitation of this latter provision obligated the Government to prove before the jury not only the 10A court may not consider a conviction for purposes of the ACCA if the defendant’s civil rights have been restored. See 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20). 11 Although Mr. Shields styled his brief as raising seven distinct arguments, we address together his contentions that the Government offered insufficient evidence to prove his three prior convictions and that his prior convictions needed to be proved to the jury. No. 13-3726 9 substantive offense of conviction (possession of a firearm by a felon) but also the existence of each conviction. Alternatively, he submits that the Government constructively amended the indictment by proving only the § 922 offense. We cannot accept the view that § 924(e)(1), on its own, provides a substantive element of the offense that must be submitted to the jury. In Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), the Supreme Court held that prior convictions are sentencing factors that could be determined by the court and that need not be proved to a jury. See id. at 246–47. More recently, the Court held that any fact that increases the mandatory minimum sentence is an element of the offense that must be submitted to a jury. See Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2155. But, in crafting that rule, the Court explicitly declined to revisit Almendarez-Torres. See id. at 2160 n.1. Mr. Shields nevertheless argues that Almendarez-Torres now conflicts with the Court’s more recent decision in Alleyne. Although we have said that “Almendarez-Torres is vulnerable to being overruled,” we also have noted that only the Supreme Court can overrule its prior decisions. United States v. Elliott, 703 F.3d 378, 381 n.2 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Browning, 436 F.3d 780, 782 (7th Cir. 2006)). Accordingly, unless the Court acts, we are bound to follow Almendarez-Torres. See United States v. Boswell, 772 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Zuniga, 767 F.3d 712, 718 (7th Cir. 2014). Mr. Shields’s prior felony convictions therefore were not substantive elements of his offense and did not need to be proved to the jury in order to support his fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence. 10 No. 13-3726 The fact that the indictment recited § 924(e)(1) does not alter this conclusion. Including a sentencing provision, such as § 924(e)(1), in an indictment does not transform a sentencing factor into a substantive element. “Under Rule 7(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a miscitation such as the reference to § 924(e) is harmless error and cannot be grounds for dismissing the indictment or reversing the conviction unless the defendant is misled by the erroneous reference and prejudiced thereby.” United States v. Lowe, 860 F.2d 1370, 1381 (7th Cir. 1988). 12 Mr. Shields does not contend that he was misled or otherwise prejudiced by the reference to the sentencing provision. Indeed, Mr. Shields’s pretrial motions indicate that he was fully aware of the substance of the pending charges. 13 Finally, Mr. Shields submits that, by including the § 924(e)(1) enhancement in the indictment, the Government constructively amended the indictment by only offering evidence to prove one felony. “A constructive amendment of an indictment occurs when the evidence at trial ‘goes beyond the parameters of the indictment in that it establishes offenses different from or in addition to those 12 See also United States v. Quintero, 872 F.2d 107, 111 (5th Cir. 1989) (rejecting the defendant’s argument after noting that the defendant did “not even allege that he was misled or that he did not receive adequate notice of the charges against him” and finding that there was “no evidence in the record that [the defendant] was misled by the surplusage”). 13 See United States v. Lowe, 860 F.2d 1370, 1381 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting that it was “apparent from the content of Lowe’s numerous pretrial motions that the indictment created no such notice problem for him or his counsel”). No. 13-3726 11 charged by the grand jury.’” United States v. Phillips, 745 F.3d 829, 832 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Pigee, 197 F.3d 879, 886 (7th Cir. 1999)). The alleged amendment must be sufficiently different such that it would be impossible to know whether the grand jury would have indicted for the crime actually proved. See id. Here, because the inclusion of the sentencing provision in the indictment did not create a separate offense, there can be no constructive amendment. Simply stated, the Government presented evidence to prove that Mr. Shields committed the offense set forth in the indictment: it proved that he previously was convicted of a felony and that he possessed a firearm that had travelled in interstate commerce.