Opinion ID: 2615943
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Classification Based on Content

Text: The final objection made to the constitutionality of the zoning scheme is that it classifies theaters on the basis of the content of the films shown, and treats adult movie theaters differently from other theaters showing films protected by the First Amendment. This, appellants claim, violates both the First Amendment and equal protection guaranties. The United States Supreme Court, considering this argument in Young, departed from traditional First Amendment jurisprudence and upheld both the classification of films based on sexually explicit content and the different treatment accorded the theaters showing them. The majority in Young did not reach agreement on a rationale for this result, but two elements appear to have been dispositive. We find those elements present here, and are persuaded the Seattle scheme does not deny or infringe on the rights of free speech and equal protection. [5] The first element is that the ordinance has only a slight and neutral effect on protected speech. No real restraint or deterrent effect is evident. The ordinance regulates only the place where these films can be shown. It demonstrates a reasonable decision that the public welfare is best served by having this particular type of speech take place only in certain areas of the community. The ordinance thus remains neutral regarding the content of the films  it neither approves nor disapproves of that content, and neither promotes nor inhibits exhibition of the films. [6] The second element is the City's great interest in protecting and preserving the quality of its neighborhoods through effective land-use planning. The record demonstrates the City's sincere and sustained effort to enhance and improve the quality of life in Seattle. Zoning is an extremely important tool for achieving land-use goals in a municipality. See Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 39 L.Ed.2d 797, 94 S.Ct. 1536 (1974). Thus, the city's interest in attempting to preserve the quality of urban life is one that must be accorded high respect. Young, supra at 71. We emphasize that the purpose of the ordinance is not to regulate the content of speech. Contrary to the assertions of the appellants, the ordinance is not a disguised form of censorship. The record is replete with testimony regarding the effects of adult movie theater locations on residential neighborhoods. The evidence is more than adequate to support the finding below that the goal of the ordinance is to preserve the character and quality of residential life in the City. The choice of methods for locating adult movie theaters, that is to concentrate them in the business areas of the City rather than disperse them (as did the Detroit ordinance), is not of constitutional significance. The City's planning effort must be accorded a sufficient degree of flexibility for experimentation and innovation. Young, supra at 71, 73. We cannot substitute our judgment of what would be the most effective method of regulation in this regard. It should also be noted that the majority in Young specifically approved the concentration method. Young, supra at 62, 71. Nor do we find it significant that the Detroit ordinance upheld in Young had a provision allowing waiver of the ordinance restriction while the Seattle ordinance does not. Our conclusion that the City may regulate the location of adult movie theaters is not dependent in any way on the existence of possible waiver for existing theater locations. The Detroit waiver provision likewise played no part in the reasoning of the majority in Young. Nor is there any showing the appellants are constitutionally entitled to exemptions from the zoning restriction in this particular case. Appellants therefore fail to show any constitutional deficiency in this regard. We conclude the City's paramount interest in protecting, preserving, and improving the character and quality of its residential neighborhoods is sufficient to justify this nondiscriminatory zoning regulation of the location of adult movie theaters. [7] We find no violation of First Amendment or equal protection guaranties. We therefore turn to the final issue presented, the constitutionality of the provision for termination of nonconforming uses within 90 days.