Opinion ID: 1605156
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: liability of boteler and corey and its agent, charles t. kyles

Text: Nichols charged in his declaration that the defendant, Charles T. Kyles, driver of the sausage truck, was negligently following too closely, did not maintain a proper lookout, did not maintain control of his vehicle and negligently struck the disabled van occupied by Nichols after the initial collision between the United Parcel van and the Nova automobile. Kyles, the driver of the sausage truck, and his employer, Boteler & Corey, will be collectively referred to hereinafter as Kyles. As to Kyles' involvement in the accident, the record reveals that the plaintiff Nichols, operating a United Parcel van with a fiber glass cab, passed Kyles' sausage truck as it proceeded north, approximately one-fourth of a mile south of the accident. Kyles was driving at a steady 55 miles per hour rate of speed when Nichols passed and pulled in front of him as both vehicles continued northward. Kyles continued to maintain a 55 miles per hour rate of speed as Nichols gradually pulled away creating a three to four car lengths distance between the two vehicles just before the accident occurred. The elapsed time from the time that Nichols passed Kyles to the point of collision was approximately 16.5 seconds. As stated earlier, prior to reaching the first bridge, which was approximately one-fourth of a mile from the accident scene, Nichols and Kyles saw the tractor-trailer rig parked facing south on the west side of the highway opposite their northbound lane. Nichols had also seen the truck in the same position the day before the accident. Nichols was aware of the approaching southbound Nova vehicle driven by Brooks. Defendant Kyles was unaware of the approaching Nova, evidently because of the large United Parcel van in front of him. Plaintiff Nichols testified as follows: Q. All right. When did you first observe a car [the Nova driven by Brooks] approaching from the north? A. After I had completed my pass around the grain [sic  sausage] truck. Q. All right now, where was that car with respect to the center of the highway when you first observed it? A. He was on his side of the road. Q. All right. What if anything was that car doing that appeared unusual or that called your attention to it in any special way? A. Nothing. Q. All right. And as you were approaching the grain truck, at what speed were you traveling? A. Around fifty, between fifty and fifty-five. Q. All right. Now, what, if anything, did you do as you came nearer to the grain truck? A. I let off my accelerator a little bit. Q. And why did you do this? A. To slow down a little bit because of the coming situation. The grain truck was out a little bit. Q. All right now, at that time, had the oncoming vehicle done anything unusual? A. No sir. Q. All right. Then tell the jury if you will, Ron, what next occurred. A. Well, just all of a sudden the Nova just came over in my lane, and I slammed on brakes and tried to turn to the right, and that's all I remember. Q. All right. And when the Nova  and this is the vehicle driven by Larry Brooks? A. Yes sir. Q. All right. When it came over in your lane, how did it come over there? A. Quickly, suddenly. Just all of a sudden he just zipped over. Q. All right. And you did what? A. I just slammed on brakes and tried to turn to the right to get out of his way. (Emphasis added). Q. All right now, at the time he came over in your lane, do you know where you were with respect to the disabled trailer on the shoulder of the road? A. I imagine I was about seventy-five feet this side, south side of the trailer. Q. You had not gotten to the trailer? A. No sir. Q. Had he gotten to the trailer? A. No sir. Q. Could you estimate how far north of the trailer he was when he zipped over in your lane, as you call it? A. Probably around a hundred feet. Q. All right. So then how far apart would you say ya'll were when he zipped over in your lane? A. Around two-hundred feet. Q. All right. And after you saw him zip over in your lane and applied your brakes and pulled to your right, then what happened? A. That's all I remember. Q. That's all you remember? A. Yes, sir. Q. All right. What is the next thing you remember after putting on your brakes and pulling to your right? A. I came to and I was laying on the highway. They had already gotten me out of the truck. When I came to, I saw a lot of people standing around, and then I guess I blacked back out. Q. All right. The last time you remember seeing the Chevy Nova, how was it coming at you? A. Straight at me, just bearing down at me. The defendant Kyles was called by plaintiff as an adverse witness and testified as follows with respect to the collision: Q. As you were following along behind this UPS van, maintaining your fifty-five mile an hour speed, three, four car lengths behind him, and approaching this disabled van on the shoulder of the road, what is the first thing you noticed that made you know something wasn't right? A. The first thing I noticed that made me know something wasn't right was when I seen this UPS van going in the air and all the debris flew from it and the door flew off of it and it turned over. ... . Q. All right. Now, what did you do when you finally determined that something had gone wrong up there? A. Tried to dodge it, tried to stop, tried to dodge it. Q. All right now, did you apply your brakes? A. Yes sir. Q. And how far away from him were you when you applied your brakes? A. I don't know, sir. Nichols was unable to avoid the Nova driven by defendant Brooks, which had crossed into Nichols' lane of traffic. The resulting collision virtually destroyed the United Parcel van's cab and the Nova automobile. Kyles veered to the left to avoid hitting the United Parcel van but was unsuccessful and struck some part of the van. Was appellant Kyles entitled to a peremptory instruction and, failing that, a judgment N.O.V.? The general law with respect to following vehicles is summed up in Blashfield, Automobile Law and Practice (3d ed.) section 113.15, (1979) which states, in part, as follows: Duties  following vehicle  maintain reasonable distance. Under the provisions of some statutes the express duty of the driver of a following vehicle is to not follow more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard to the speed of such vehicles and the traffic upon and condition of, the highway. [Same as our statute, Miss. Code Ann. § 63-3-619(1)(1972)].[1] ... . Statutes or rules of the road which require the maintenance of distance by one vehicle following another are not rendered inapplicable by the mere fact that the following vehicle is not directly in the rear of the leading vehicle, but do not apply where the following vehicle is overtaking and passing the leading vehicle, or is in another lane. ... . Hard-and-fast or general rules do not exist as to how close a motorist, in the exercise of ordinary care, should follow another vehicle, and the only rule that can govern the interval to be maintained is that of reasonable care under the circumstances. The mere fact that a vehicle travels in close proximity to a moving vehicle ahead does not necessarily constitute negligence. The driver of a following vehicle is not to be charged with anticipating an emergency created by the negligence of another under circumstances that could not have been reasonably anticipated. Exonerating circumstances may be when the vehicle immediately ahead collides with another vehicle or object... . (Emphasis added). [1] (1) The driver of a motor vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of such vehicles and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway. Appellee Nichols does not contend that subsection 2 is applicable to the facts in this passing situation. It provides as follows: The driver of any motor truck or motor truck drawing another vehicle when traveling upon a roadway outside of a business or residence district shall not follow within three hundred feet of another motor truck or motor truck drawing another vehicle. The provisions of this subsection shall not be construed to prevent overtaking and passing nor shall the same apply upon any lane specially designated for use by motor trucks. That fact that plaintiff Nichols passed Kyles and thereby placed Kyles in a close following position presents two questions: (1) After being passed by Nichols, was Kyles under a duty to immediately decrease his speed? We think not. For a vehicle to immediately slow down after being passed could, in itself, create a hazardous condition to traffic to the rear. From common practice and experience we can safely say that a driver who is passed on the highway, under ordinary circumstances, maintains his speed while the passing vehicle moves on ahead creating a distance between them. This of necessity takes time, the amount of time depending on the speed of the two vehicles. We would add, however, that at some point, if the passing vehicle does not create a distance between the two vehicles that would be reasonable, the passed vehicle must either slow until a reasonable distance is created or elect to repass the original passing vehicle. (2) The next question is whether the tractor-trailer rig which was disabled and parked on the west shoulder of the highway with approximately eighteen inches extending onto the paved portion of the highway, created a special hazard which required Kyles, in the exercise of reasonable care, to immediately slow his vehicle after being passed by the United Parcel van? Again, we think not. All of the testimony is to the effect that there was ample room for a southbound vehicle such as the Nova to pass the parked disabled truck without crossing the center line, while meeting oncoming traffic in the northbound lane. In fact, Nichols had traveled this highway the day before the accident and had seen the disabled truck and testified that although the rear dual wheels of the truck protruded onto the highway, there was ample room for vehicles meeting one another to pass without any problem. The defendant Brooks also testified that there was ample room for him to have passed between the truck and oncoming traffic without crossing the center line and was unable to explain why he suddenly veered into the path of Nichols' United Parcel van. Brooks' relevant testimony is as follows: Q. So that's the last thing you remember? A. That's the last thing I remember, with the exception of, as I said, this silver streak, I said in the deposition given in October, came across my right hand. I don't know what this silver streak was. Q. When you were last conscious, you were approaching then the grain truck and you were moving to the left. A. No, I was not moving to the left. I was at the position at which I was reasonably safe. I was no longer moving. Q. Well, where were you? A. I was going straight ahead. Q. In whose lane? A. My lane. We are of the opinion that under the circumstances presented, no special hazard existed on the highway which would require a person in the exercise of reasonable care to immediately decrease the speed of his vehicle after being passed by another vehicle. Therefore, since the defendant, Kyles, was under no duty to immediately decrease the speed of his vehicle after being passed by Nichols' United Parcel van, in order to allow an interval to be created between them, and, since Nichols, by passing Kyles, created the short distance between himself and Kyles and 16.4 seconds later collided with the Brooks' vehicle (Nova) which suddenly and without cause or reason veered into Nichols' lane of traffic, creating a situation that was not reasonably anticipated, Kyles was not guilty of any negligence which proximately caused or contributed to Nichols' damages and injuries. As to whether Kyles reacted to the situation in a reasonable manner under the circumstances, we need only look to the undisputed facts. At the time the United Parcel van collided with the Nova, Kyles was three to four car lengths behind the United Parcel van traveling at 55 miles per hour. Nichols slammed on brakes and collided with the Nova. Kyles saw the van going in the air and all the debris flew from it and the door flew off of it and it turned over. Kyles put on brakes, skidded and veered to the left in an attempt to miss the van but was unsuccessful. One could hardly do more under the circumstances. For the above reasons, we are of the opinion that the trial court should have sustained Kyles' motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. REVERSED AND RENDERED AS TO THE LIABILITY OF BOTELER AND COREY AND ITS AGENT, CHARLES T. KYLES. PATTERSON, C.J., SMITH and SUGG, P. JJ., and BROOM and ROY NOBLE LEE, JJ., concur. BOWLING, HAWKINS and DAN M. LEE, JJ., dissent.