Opinion ID: 315386
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Chapter 119 of Title 18.

Text: 11 Whether the challenged interception should be suppressed demands close scrutiny of the statutory requirements concerning wire and oral communications added by Title III of the Crime Control Act. See Chapter 119, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2510 et seq. If the interception in question falls within the parameters of Chapter 119, the warrantless surveillance must be suppressed. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2515. 12 The threshold question is whether these radio-telephone conversations constitute an oral communication or a wire communication. The answer is critical because the definition of oral communication includes the expectation of privacy language derived from Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). In order for an oral communication to be protected by the Act, the speaker must have an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation . . . . 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2510(2). A wire communication has no such restriction in its definition. It is defined as any communication made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection between the point of origin and the point of reception . . . . 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2510(1). 13 Obviously, there is a reason for the more restrictive definition of oral communications. When a person talks by telephone, he can reasonably assume privacy. That assumption may often be invalid for non-wire communications. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the participants in an oral communication to make a reasonable estimate of the privacy afforded them by their particular circumstances. 14 The definition of wire communication is not free from ambiguity. [C]ommunication made in whole or in part . . . through the use of facilities . . . by the aid of wire . . . between the point of origin and the point of reception . . . . could be interpreted in several ways. For example, it could be argued that if any wire is used to aid the communication, it must be deemed a wire communication. If this were followed to its conclusion, the use of a radio would be included in the definition because some wires are contained in the radio transmitter and receiver-thus the communication would be aided in part by the use of wire. However, such an interpretation would be inconsistent with the language of the immediately succeeding section which permits an agent of the FCC, in certain circumstances, to intercept a wire communication, or oral communication transmitted by radio . . . . 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2511(2)(b). 5 15 Broadcasting communications into the air by radio waves is more analogous to carrying on an oral communication in a loud voice or with a megaphone than it is to the privacy afforded by a wire. As with any broadcast into the air, the invitation to listen is afforded to all those who can hear. In the instant case, the eavesdroppers merely tuned their radio receivers to the proper station. It is obvious that conversations initiated from a radio-telephone more logically fall within the category of oral communication. 16 By reading the sections together, we can only conclude that the Congress did not mean that every conversation aided in any part by any wire would be a wire communication. As a radio broadcast must be deemed an oral conversation, we believe it would strain the legislative intent to hold that conversations emanating from a radio telephone would not be treated similarly. 17 However, that does not end our inquiry. Although the record is not clear, it appears that some conversations were between two radio telephones while others were between a radio telephone and a regular land-line telephone. While the former are within the definition of oral communications, the use of a land-line telephone at one end of the conversation raises a serious question as to the defined category in which such a communication belongs. While logic may dictate that the same rule should apply when a conversation crosses the airways but initiates or terminates on a land line, we are not free to reach that result if the legislative intent is to the contrary. The legislative history states: 18 Paragraph (1) defines wire communication to include all communications carried by a common carrier, in whole or in part, through our Nation's communications network. The coverage is intended to be comprehensive. 19 S.Rep.No.1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 1968 U.S.Code Cong. and Admin.News 2178. Based upon this indication of Congressional intent, we are forced to conclude that, when part of a communication is carried to or from a land-line telephone, the entire conversation is a wire communication and a search warrant is required. 20 We realize that our classification of a conversation between a mobile and a land-line telephone as a wire communication produces what appears to be an absurd result. These conversations were intercepted by an ordinary radio receiver and not by a phone tap. Logically they should be afforded no more protection than those occurring between two radio transceivers. They should be oral communications. However, Congress's definition of a wire communication necessitates this conclusion. 21 This is especially ironic since Title III of the Crime Control Act contains stringent civil and criminal penalties for those who violate its provisions. 6 In other words, any citizen who listens to a mobile telephone band does so at its own risk, and scores of mariners who listen to the ship-to-shore frequency, commonly used to call to a land-line telephone, commit criminal acts. 22 However we have closely examined the legislative history of Title III and have found no indication of how Congress intended to treat a radio-telephone conversation. 7 In the absence of such an indication, we must conclude that, if the conversation involves a land-line telephone, it is a wire communication. 23 We have the option to use the surely Congress did not intend rubric and amend the statute. But usurpation of the legislative function by the courts is a basic violation of the separation of powers doctrine. We reject that alternative. Any change must therefore be made by the Congress. 24 The trial court should now determine whether the arrests resulted from interceptions of oral or wire communications. If from wire communications, the warrantless interception should be suppressed as to those with standing to object. If not from wire communications, the critical question then becomes whether appellants had a reasonable expectation that the communications were not subject to interception. This too is an issue of fact to be determined by the trial court at the time of the motion to suppress. The district judge made a specific finding that Hall and Nichols knew they could be heard by other people and had no right of privacy. The record substantiates this finding and it is not clearly erroneous. United States v. Gunn, 428 F.2d 1057, 1060 (5th Cir. 1970); 3 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 675, at 130 (1969). The judge stated he could not, from the evidence, make such a finding as to Dever. 25 Therefore, as to any conversations not involving a land-line telephone by Hall and Nichols, the interceptions were not oral communications as defined because they lacked the requisite expectation of privacy. Thus, no search warrant was required by the statute. As to Dever, the result may be different. 26