Opinion ID: 2977989
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: conti’s equal pay act claim

Text: The Equal Pay Act prohibits employers from paying an employee at a rate less than that paid to employees of the opposite sex for equal work. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). Thus, to establish a prima facie case of wage discrimination, Conti must show that “an employer pays different wages to employees of opposite sexes ‘for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions.’” - 24 - No. 08-1301 Conti v. American Axle Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)); Balmer v. HCA, 423 F.3d 606, 612 (6th Cir. 2005). “‘Equal work’ does not require that the jobs be identical, but only that there exist ‘substantial equality of skill, effort, responsibility and working conditions.’” Buntin v. Breathitt County Bd. of Educ., 134 F.3d 796, 799 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting Odomes v. Nucare, Inc., 653 F.2d 246, 250 (6th Cir. 1981)). Whether the work of two employees is substantially equal “must be resolved by an overall comparison of the work, not its individual segments.” Id. An EPA plaintiff may meet her prima facie burden by demonstrating a wage differential between herself and her predecessor. See Gandy v. Sullivan County, Tenn., 24 F.3d 861 (6th Cir. 1994) (presuming that there was “substantial similarity” between plaintiff and her immediate male predecessor’s job). If Conti carries her burden, “the burden shifts to the employer to show that the differential is justified under one of the Act’s four exceptions.” Corning Glass, 417 U.S. at 196; Kovacevich v. Kent State Univ., 224 F.3d 806, 826 (6th Cir. 2000). One of the Act’s four exceptions is a “general catchall provision,” Corning Glass, 417 U.S. at 196, which precludes liability where the employer can show that the different payment to employees of opposite sexes “is made pursuant to . . . a differential based on any other factor other than sex,” 29 U.S.C. 206(d)(1)(iv). Consequently, AAM is not liable under the EPA if it is able to demonstrate that the alleged wage differential is predicated on a factor other than sex. See Timmer v. Michigan Dept. of Commerce, 104 F.3d 833, 843 (6th Cir. 1997). In moving for summary judgment, AAM argued that, at least in most instances, Conti earned a higher annual salary than her male counterparts. In those instances where Conti earned less, AAM - 25 - No. 08-1301 Conti v. American Axle argues that the difference in pay and/or title was based on factors other than her sex, pointing to the purportedly greater experience, education, and other qualifications of her male counterparts. In many respects, AAM’s argument is well taken. For instance, the record shows that Conti did earn more money than most of her male counterparts when she was hired into AAM as an SEIT in 1997. And the record also shows that Conti earned more money than Earhart when the two were co-Directors of Indirect Material Purchasing for the first half of 2003. Although Conti alleges that Earhart was promoted to salary band 15 in that position, AAM responds that Earhart was demoted to band 13 when Conti was made a co-director. AAM also points out that Conti earned significantly more money as the manager of New Model Launch than Satish Raheja, the prior male employee who held that position less than a year before Conti. Upon closer scrutiny, however, AAM’s argument fails in one critical instance. When Conti was promoted to manager of the New Model Launch department, she received a significantly lower salary than her immediate male predecessor, Pannucci. If the positions held by Conti and Pannucci were “substantially similar,” this difference alone is sufficient to establish a prima facie case under the EPA. See Buntin, 134 F.3d at 799 (“The plaintiff may meet her prima facie burden by demonstrating a wage differential between herself and her predecessor.”). At that point, the burden would fall on AAM to “prove” its claim that the difference in pay and title was based on legitimate factors other than sex. Id. Primarily, AAM contends that Conti received less pay than Pannucci because, although she was promoted ostensibly to the position left vacant by Pannucci, she was given the title and responsibilities of a manager rather than a director. According to AAM, the difference in title - 26 - No. 08-1301 Conti v. American Axle reflects a critical distinction in the duties performed by Pannucci and Conti. But this Court consistently has recognized that the plaintiff is not required to demonstrate that the duties performed are “identical,” but only “that there exist ‘substantial equality of skill, effort, responsibility and working conditions.’” Buntin, 134 F.3d at 799 (quoting Odomes, 653 F.2d at 250). “Whether the work of two employees is substantially equal ‘must be resolved by an overall comparison of the work, not its individual segments.’” Id. (quoting Odomes, 653 F.3d at 250). Applying that standard, we find that Conti has raised a material issue as to whether she performed substantially equal work for less pay. Conti testified that she was required to perform all of the duties previously assigned to her predecessor, as well as some additional responsibilities.7 Nevertheless, Conti received significantly less pay, and again was not eligible for the same executive bonuses. Although AAM argues that there is a significant difference in the responsibilities assigned to Pannucci and Conti in their respective positions, the only evidence to that effect comes from the 7 As the dissent points out, in support of her claim that she assumed additional responsibilities over and above those performed by Pannucci, Conti “highlights that she handled Sarbanes-Oxley audits and IT system administration—duties Pannucci did not have—without the benefit of Pannucci’s two direct reports.” Dissenting Op. at 12. The dissent criticizes this claim on the ground that “Conti gives us no reason why audits and IT system administration should warrant a different pay scale.” Id. This criticism entirely misunderstands Conti’s argument. Conti obviously is not arguing that her work performing Sarbanes-Oxley audits and IT administration warrants a different pay scale, but rather that these additional tasks support her overarching claim that she performed “substantially similar” duties as Pannucci, and thus shows that she deserved to be paid at the same pay scale. It is revealing that the dissent refuses to accept Conti’s “bald allegations” that she performed these additional tasks—despite the fact that nothing in the record is to the contrary, and notwithstanding our obligation to make all inferences in Conti’s favor—and yet, at the same time, is more than willing to accept Dauch’s completely unsubstantiated claim that being deposed would impose a substantial hardship on him, when we owe no such deference to Dauch’s claims. - 27 - No. 08-1301 Conti v. American Axle self-serving testimony offered by Pannucci himself. AAM offers no other evidence to rebut Conti’s claim that she performed “substantially” the same functions as Pannucci. Because the court was required to construe the record in the light most favorable to Conti at this stage, it was improper for the district court to credit Pannucci’s testimony over Conti’s without any other supporting evidence.8 In light of the competing claims as to this particular issue, we find that it was improper to grant summary judgment as to Conti’s retaliation claim. See Timmer, 104 F.3d at 844 (“[A]s with all affirmative defenses under the Act, the employer must prove that ‘sex provides no part of the basis for the wage differential [in order to prevail on summary judgment].’” (quoting Brennan v. Owensboro-Daviess County Hosp., 523 F.2d 1013, 1031 (6th Cir. 1975) (emphasis in Timmer)). In our view, Conti has raised a prima facie case under the EPA with respect to her claim of unequal pay in this context, and the disputed issues of fact regarding the difference in responsibilities between her and Pannucci cannot be resolved on summary judgment.