Opinion ID: 2570148
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Consideration of Professional Expertise

Text: In her original declaration, Juror S.B. said, Based upon my professional experience, I explained to the other jurors that the Defendant's family was not seriously dysfunctional. I related to the jury members that based upon my professional experience (who I explained `whored' their own children for profit) the Defendant was not raised in such a dysfunctional family. [30] In her amended declaration, S.B. disavowed much of the initial declaration: The words `seriously dysfunctional' were not used by me or anyone else. Also, I cannot imagine myself saying that `the Defendant was not raised in such a dysfunctional family.' I did not voice or claim any `professional experience.' I have none. I am a student only. I did mention that I knew of a kid who was whored out as a toddler, but who came out all right; he now works as a janitor in Loma Linda. Juror J.G.'s original declaration read in part: As a teacher with experience in Special Education I explained to the other jurors that it was my professional opinion that Defendant ... was not seriously learning handicapped. I gave the other jurors examples from my professional background to prove that Defendant Loker was not seriously learning disabled. Additionally, I explained from my professional background that the Defendant was not so dysfunctional as to be excusable. In his amended declaration, J.G. stated, I did say to other jurors that the defendant did not appear to me to be handicapped as a slow learner, but I did not express my beliefs as an expert. I never used the term `professional expertise' or anything like that, and did not try to convey any `professional' background to other jurors. In his original declaration, Juror G.C. stated that jurors discussed their professional experience regarding special education, learning disabilities, and dysfunctional families to show that the defendant was not seriously learning disabled, and that his family was not seriously dysfunctional. In his amended declaration, Juror G.C. said, I made it very clear and specifically told [the defense investigator] a number of times that the things in my declaration were only briefly mentioned, and not part of our deliberations. None of these things were discussed at any length.... In her amended declaration, Juror D.B. stated, No one mentioned having any professional or expert experience. Our discussions were based on personal experience and opinions only. The amended declarations of Jurors S.Y., L.M., C.L., and C.B. were consistent with D.B.'s amended declaration. [31] In addition, Juror L.M., echoed by Juror C.B., stated, None of us felt Loker was handicapped or abused. This was from the evidence in court. At a hearing regarding the declarations, the court observed that the one area that there does appear to be some dispute in the declarations is whether or not jurors expressed their own professional experience, training, or education, or offered their own experience as a basis for evaluating any of the issues or evidence that was presented. Some of the declarations supplied by the defense indicates that some of the jurors did do that. The declarations filed by the prosecution indicate that there was no such discussion. Defense counsel replied, I'm satisfied with the state of the court's factfinding in terms of the issues discussed. Counsel affirmed that there was no need for the jurors to be called to testify at an evidentiary hearing, and that the court could decide the issue based on the declarations. At the subsequent new trial hearing, defense counsel noted that the court had originally indicated that it was in dispute as to whether jurors used their professional experience and training and education in terms of guiding the jury ... in the deliberations. He argued that Juror G.C.'s declaration provided a third somewhat independent person on that issue who may guide the court in that regard. The trial court found that while Juror G.C. heard something that he at least took as a reference to ... something that he might have perceived as an area of expertise of a juror, ... clearly the weight from all of the affidavits indicates that if there was any such discussion it was not an ongoing discussion. And, indeed, most of the jurors were not even aware of it and don't recall even hearing it. So there's nothing to suggest that it was a topic of conversation or deliberations, if there was any such mention. And from the affidavits I can't even find that there was such mention. But if there was it was clearly something that was very brief and was ... not even to the point where the other jurors even heard it. So there's nothing there to suggest that there indeed was improper expert opinion or other improper evidence brought into the jury room that was used by any juror to evaluate the evidence. The court also found that there was no prejudice from any juror exposure to this subject. (19) Even assuming the jurors made the statements attributed to them in the original declarations, we conclude there was no misconduct. [J]urors may rely on their own experiences in evaluating the testimony of the witnesses. `Jurors do not enter deliberations with their personal histories erased, in essence retaining only the experience of the trial itself. Jurors are expected to be fully functioning human beings, bringing diverse backgrounds and experiences to the matter before them.' ( People v. Leonard, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1414.) The views the jurors allegedly asserted here were not contrary to, but came within the range of, permissible interpretations of th[e] evidence. All the jurors, including those with relevant personal backgrounds, were entitled to consider this evidence and express opinions regarding it.... A juror may not express opinions based on asserted personal expertise that is different from or contrary to the law as the trial court stated it or to the evidence, but if we allow jurors with specialized knowledge to sit on a jury, and we do, we must allow those jurors to use their experience in evaluating and interpreting that evidence. Moreover, during the give and take of deliberations, it is virtually impossible to divorce completely one's background from one's analysis of the evidence. We cannot demand that jurors, especially lay jurors not versed in the subtle distinctions that attorneys draw, never refer to their background during deliberations. ( People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1266 [120 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 47 P.3d 225]; accord, People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 650 [21 Cal.Rptr.3d 612, 101 P.3d 509].) A fine line exists between using one's background in analyzing the evidence, which is appropriate, even inevitable, and injecting `an opinion explicitly based on specialized information obtained from outside sources,' which we have described as misconduct. ( People v. Steele, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1266.) The declarations in this case do not show that the jurors crossed the line into misconduct. Whether defendant's family was dysfunctional or whether he had a learning disability are not areas foreign to the experience of most jurors.