Opinion ID: 161081
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Substantial Impairment of Major Life Activities

Text: 30 The ADA protects employees from discrimination on the basis of a disability. See 42 U.S.C. 12112(a) (stating that [n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment). It defines a disability as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of [an individual's] major life activities; a record of such impairment; or being regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. 12102(2). 3 31 In light of this definition, the determination of whether an individual is protected by the ADA generally involves three inquiries: (1) determining whether the individual has an impairment or a record of impairment or is regarded as having such impairment; (2) identifying the activities the individual alleges to be affected by the impairment and determining whether they constitute major life activities under the ADA; and (3) determining whether the impairment substantially limits the major life activity. Doyal v. Oklahoma Heart, Inc., 213 F.3d 492, 495-96 (10th Cir. 2000). [A] plaintiff must specifically plead or prove at trial the impairments and the major life activities he or she asserts are at issue. Poindexter v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 168 F.3d 1228, 1230 (l0th Cir. 1999). 32 In this case, Ms. Selenke asserted that she was impaired in the major life activities of working and breathing. MIC does not dispute that Ms. Selenke has sinusitus or that working and breathing are major life activities under the ADA. See Doyal, 271 F.3d at 495 (stating that '[m]ajor life activities' include such functions as . . . breathing . . . and working). Thus, the parties' dispute involves the third part of the inquiry--whether Ms. Selenke's sinusitis substantially impaired her working and breathing.
33 With regard to working, we agree with the district court's analysis. [T]o demonstrate that an impairment 'substantially limits' the major life activity of working, an individual must show significant[ ] restrict[ion] in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities. Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc., 36 F.3d 939, 942-43 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (emphasis added)). '[T]he inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.' Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 904 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(j)(3)(i)), aff'd, 527 U.S. 471 (1999). Here, Ms. Selenke acknowledged that, at the time she was employed by MIC, she was able to perform all the duties that her job required. See Aplt's App. at 208. Although her physician eventually concluded that she could no longer work as a mammographer, that determination was based on her condition after the termination of her employment. Similarly, the testimony of her expert physician--that she should be provided with an environment free of exposure to perfumes, colognes, cleaning products, photocopier fumes, and other sources of chemical exposure in her work environment, see id. vol. III at 653--was based on an August 10, 1998 evaluation, more than fifteen months after she left MIC. Thus, there is no evidence in the record from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that, at the time of her employment with MIC, Ms. Selenke was unable to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person. See 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(j)(3)(i)). 4
34 Whether Ms. Selenke presented evidence that she had a substantial impairment in the major life activity of breathing presents a much closer question. She alleged in her first amended complaint that, while employed at MIC, she suffered physical problems such as headaches, dizziness, fatigue, breathing difficulties, burning eyes and related symptoms of sinusitus and chemical exposure as a result of the chemicals and lack of proper ventilation. Aplts App. vol. I, at 13 (emphasis added). After giving her deposition and in response to MIC's motion for summary judgment, Ms. Selenke submitted an affidavit describing breathing problems that she had suffered since 1995. 5 35 Unlike the district court, we are not convinced that Ms. Selenke's failure to mention these problems at her deposition precludes consideration of her affidavit. Although an affidavit that contradicts earlier sworn testimony should be disregarded if it constitutes an attempt to create a sham fact issue, Franks v. Nimmo, 796 F.2d 1230, 1237 (10th Cir. 1986), that principle is not applicable when the deposition testimony is ambiguous and the affidavit assists in clarifying it. See id. (stating that the court should consider whether the earlier testimony reflects confusion which the affidavit attempts to explain); Videon Chevrolet, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 992 F.2d 482, 487 (3d Cir. 1993) (concluding that, in light of ambiguous deposition testimony, it was proper to consider an affidavit and noting that[t]o hold that such a semantic misstep from a witness untrained in the law effectively ends his case would only bring back the sporting theory of justice and open the door to sharp practices by counsel); Slowiak v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 987 F.2d 1293, 1297 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that [a] subsequent affidavit may be used to clarify ambiguous or confusing deposition testimony). 36 On the issue of her breathing difficulties, Ms. Selenke's deposition testimony is somewhat unclear. At the deposition, MIC's attorneys asked her what activities in your life have been affected by your disability? Aplt's App. vol. III, at 586. When Ms. Selenke asked him if he was referring to social activities, the lawyer replied, It's your call, what kind of activities in your life. Id. Even though court decisions and administrative regulations group together as major life activities such disparate acts as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, sleeping, sitting, standing, lifting, reaching, and working, see Doyal, 213 F.3d at 495, it does not necessarily follow that a deponent such as Ms. Selenke would understand that the word activity included a basic physiological function such a breathing--particularly when she asked for clarification of the term and the attorney refused to provide it. Thus, in light of the ambiguity of her deposition testimony, it is questionable whether her affidavit should have been disregarded. 37 Moreover, as Ms. Selenke observes, several courts have concluded that breathing difficulties may constitute an impairment of a major life activity. See, e.g., Homeyer v. Stanley Tulchin Assocs., Inc., 91 F.3d 959, 962 (7th Cir. 1996) (concluding that there were factual questions as to whether the plaintiff's chronic allergic rhinitis and sinusitus substantially limited her ability to breath and work); Treadwell v. Dow-United Tech., 970 F. Supp. 962, 972 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (finding evidence sufficient to create a jury question as to whether her major life activity of breathing has been substantially impaired . . . by her alleged sensitivity to chemicals); Whillock v. Delta Air Lines, 926 F. Supp. 1555, 1561-63 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (concluding that evidence of plaintiff's hypersensitivity to certain chemicals created a factual question as to whether her breathing was substantially impaired). Ms. Selenke's contention that her breathing difficulties constitute a protected disability also finds some support in the Supreme Court's decision in Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998). There, the court held that an individual's HIV infection constituted a substantial impairment of the major life activity of reproduction, even though [c]onception and childbirth are not impossible for an HIV victim. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 641. That holding followed from the significant health risks associated with such reproduction. See id. (stating that the ADA addresses substantial limitations on major life activities, not utter inabilities). Here, the record contains evidence that Ms. Selenke's sinusitus affected her breathing by causing her increased health risks upon exposure to certain conditions in the darkroom. 38 For all these reasons, we will assume, without deciding, that Ms. Selenke presented sufficient evidence that she suffered from a substantial impairment of the major life activity of breathing while employed by MIC. We now turn to the other elements of Ms. Selenke's claim for discriminatory discharge under the ADA.