Opinion ID: 2225360
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Legislature's Intent

Text: The legislature has, in section 14(c)(11)(C), expressly delegated to the Department authority to determine what standards an applicant must satisfy to qualify for a license (when the applicant does not satisfy the experience requirements specifically delineated in section 14(c)(11)(B) of the Act). Where the legislature expressly or implicitly delegates to an agency the authority to clarify and define a specific statutory provision, administrative interpretations of such statutory provisions should be given substantial weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. (See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (1984), 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694; Granite City Division of National Steel Co. v. Illinois Pollution Control Board (1993), 155 Ill.2d 149, 184 Ill.Dec. 402, 613 N.E.2d 719; Abrahamson v. Illinois Department of Professional Regulation (1992), 153 Ill.2d 76, 97-98, 180 Ill.Dec. 34, 606 N.E.2d 1111.) A court will not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation adopted by the agency charged with the statute's administration. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (1984), 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694. The trial court determined that the Department's interpretation of section 14(c)(11)(C) was inconsistent with the legislature's intent, because the Department considered an applicant eligible for a license under section 14(c)(11)(C) only if the applicant had worked in a private alarm contractor agency. The trial court found that the Department's interpretation contradicted the express language of section 14(c)(11)(C), which authorizes the Department to issue a license if the applicant has satisfied standards of competence and experience for persons not having experience with a private alarm contractor agency. (Emphasis added.) 225 ILCS 445/14(c)(11)(C) (West 1992). The Department points out, however, that the trial court improperly interpreted the scope of its decision. Under the Department's interpretation of subsection (C), a person who has never worked in a licensed private alarm contractor agency may nevertheless obtain a license if that person has worked within the private alarm contracting field. The Department notes, by way of example, that many large store chains have in-house personnel who implement, service and monitor the store's alarm systems. Although such stores are not licensed private alarm contractor agencies within the meaning of the Act, applicants for licensure who have worked full-time for three years in a supervisory capacity in the alarm department of such stores may be considered eligible for a license under section 14(c)(11)(C) of the Act. The Department also suggests that the experience the plaintiff gained operating his own unlicensed alarm business may have satisfied the experience requirements of section 14(c)(11)(C), if the plaintiff had worked fulltime, rather than part-time, in that capacity. We find that the Department's conclusion that applicants for licensure satisfy the experience requirements of section 14(c)(11)(C) only if they have worked fulltime for three years in a supervisory capacity within the private alarm contracting field is a permissible construction of that section. The Department's construction is therefore entitled to deference. Our conclusion that the Department's construction of section 14(c)(11)(C) is reasonable is influenced in part by the fact that the legislature expressly adopted the Department's interpretation when it drafted the current version of the Act. The Private Detective, Private Alarm, and Private Security Act of 1993 (225 ILCS 446/1 et seq. (West Supp.1993)) specifies that a person applying for a private alarm contractor license must have a minimum of 3 years out of the 5 years immediately preceding application as a full time manager or administrator for an agency licensed as a private alarm contractor agency or for an entity that designs, sells, installs, services or monitors alarm systems which in the judgment of the Board satisfies standards of alarm industry competence. (Emphasis added.) (225 ILCS 446/75(c)(8) (West Supp.1993).) Where, as here, the legislature amends a statute soon after a controversy arose as to the interpretation of the original act, it is logical to regard the amendment as a legislative interpretation of the original statute. ( Granite City Division of National Steel Co. v. Illinois Pollution Control Board (1993), 155 Ill.2d 149, 176-77, 184 Ill.Dec. 402, 613 N.E.2d 719; 1A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 22.31, at 279 (5th ed. 1993).) Accordingly, we conclude that the Department's interpretation of section 14(c)(11)(C) is consistent with and reflects the legislature's intent.