Opinion ID: 2720490
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Wheeler Avenue

Text: In order to challenge a search or seizure, a defendant must allege not only that the police action was unreasonable, but also that the defendant‘s personal interests were violated. ―The ‗capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends . . . upon whether the person . . . has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.‘ (Rakas v. Illinois (1978) 439 U.S. 128, 143.) A defendant has the burden to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place searched. [Citations.]‖ (People v. Rivera (2007) 41 Cal.4th 304, 308, fn. 1.) In considering this question, courts look to the totality of the circumstances. Appropriate factors include ― ‗ ― ‗whether the defendant has a [property or] possessory interest in the thing seized or the place searched; whether he has the right to exclude others from that place; whether he has exhibited a subjective expectation that it would remain free from governmental invasion, whether he took normal precautions to maintain his privacy and whether he was legitimately on the premises.‘ ‖ ‘ [Citation.]‖ (People v. Roybal (1998) 19 Cal.4th 481, 507.) Essentially, a legitimate expectation of privacy is one ―society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.‖ (Minnesota v. Olson (1990) 495 U.S. 91, 97.) Initially, Bryant points out that the prosecution presented evidence in the preliminary hearings to establish that he was a leader of the Bryant Family drug 18 organization that operated Wheeler Avenue. Thus, he urges, the prosecution conceded he had a legitimate expectation of privacy there. Accordingly, he contends, the trial court‘s contrary finding was erroneous and the Attorney General is estopped from challenging the issue on appeal. Bryant provides no authority for this novel assertion. The circumstance that Bryant ran the organization using Wheeler Avenue as a base of operations does not mean he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the house when it was searched. As the high court observed in analogous circumstances, its precedents ―clearly establish that a prosecutor may simultaneously maintain that a defendant criminally possessed [a seized item], but was not subject to a Fourth Amendment deprivation, without legal contradiction.‖ (United States v. Salvucci (1980) 448 U.S. 83, 90.) At the suppression hearing, Bryant tried to establish his expectation of privacy in Wheeler Avenue without testifying on the subject himself. He sought to call Williams as a witness and to introduce the ―expert testimony‖ of Detective Vojtecky. He also suggested testimony by the prosecutor. The court denied the request to compel Williams, who was in a witness protection program, to appear. The prosecutor did suggest the possibility of stipulating to certain facts that Williams had testified to at the preliminary hearings. The parties, however, never actually entered into a stipulation. In fact, Bryant‘s counsel explicitly rejected the idea of preparing a stipulation. As to the testimony of Detective Vojtecky, the court excluded most of it, ruling the testimony was irrelevant hearsay. It also rejected the suggestion that the prosecutor testify for essentially the same reason. The prosecutor could offer no relevant testimony about Bryant‘s privacy expectations. Bryant did not present any evidence, such as legal documents, to show he personally held some property interest in Wheeler Avenue. He chose to testify at the hearing, but limited his testimony to facts about his residence on Judd Street. Accordingly, the court denied the motion to suppress, finding that Bryant had established no reasonable expectation of privacy in Wheeler Avenue. 19 On appeal, Bryant does not assert that the evidence actually before the trial court compelled a different result regarding his expectation of privacy. As noted, no evidence on the subject was admitted. His recitation of the preliminary hearing and subsequent trial testimony regarding Bryant‘s connections to and the search of Wheeler Avenue is irrelevant. That evidence was not before the trial court when it ruled on the pretrial motion. (People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 132 (Rundle).) Bryant does not challenge the exclusion of Vojtecky‘s testimony, except by way of conclusory assertions in his reply brief that the court‘s ruling was erroneous and unconstitutional. He makes absolutely no assertion that the ruling excluding the prosecutor‘s testimony was erroneous. He has therefore waived these issues. (Stanley, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 793.) In any event, there is no support for the conclusion that either of these witnesses could have provided admissible testimony. Clearly, neither witness had personal knowledge of Bryant‘s expectations of privacy. Bryant suggested at the hearing that they might testify as expert witnesses about the Bryant Family. It is true that experts may permissibly base an opinion on hearsay or other evidence that might not be directly admissible, but a trial court nonetheless has discretion to ― ‗ ― exclude from an expert‘s testimony any hearsay matter whose irrelevance, unreliability, or potential for prejudice outweighs its proper probative value.‖ ‘ ‖ (People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 137.) ― ‗[P]rejudice may arise if, ― ‗under the guise of reasons,‘ ‖ the expert‘s detailed explanation ― ‗[brings] before [the trier of fact] incompetent hearsay evidence,‖ ‘ ‖ and ― ‗disputes in this area must generally be left to the trial court‘s sound judgment.‘ ‖ (Ibid.) Moreover, Bryant never clearly articulated how any proper opinion testimony could have assisted his cause. There is no reason to disturb the court‘s exercise of its judgment that these witnesses could offer no competent evidence on Bryant‘s expectations of privacy in Wheeler Avenue. 20 Thus, the remaining focus of Bryant‘s claim is that the court erroneously declined to compel Williams to appear. He urges the ruling violated his constitutional right to ―compulsory process‖ preventing him from carrying his burden. The argument fails. The Sixth Amendment provides that ―[i]n all criminal prosecutions,‖ the defendant has the right ―to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.‖ (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.) This right is applicable to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment‘s due process clause. (Washington v. Texas (1967) 388 U.S. 14, 19.) Our state Constitution has a similar provision. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 15 [a criminal defendant has the right ―to compel attendance of witnesses in the defendant‘s behalf‖].) We will assume without deciding that the compulsory process right applies to a request to compel a witness to appear at a suppression hearing. The procedural context of Bryant‘s clam is relevant to determine whether his rights were violated. A defendant claiming a denial of compulsory process must plausibly show that the missing testimony ―would have been both material and favorable to his defense.‖ (United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal (1982) 458 U.S. 858, 867; see also In re Martin (1987) 44 Cal.3d 1, 32.) Moreover, the constitutional right to compulsory process is not ―an unfettered right to offer testimony‖ that ―automatically and invariably outweigh[s] countervailing public interests.‖ (Taylor v. Illinois (1988) 484 U.S. 400, 410, 414.) A defendant claiming a violation of this right must establish both that he was deprived of the opportunity to present material and favorable evidence and that the deprivation was arbitrary or disproportionate to any legitimate purpose. (See Holmes v. South Carolina (2006) 547 U.S. 319, 324–325.) At bottom, ― ‗[i]n order to declare a denial of [due process based on the denial of compulsory process] we must find that the absence of . . . fairness fatally infected the trial; the acts complained of must be of such quality as necessarily prevents a fair trial.‘ ‖ (Valenzuela-Bernal, p. 872.) As Bryant acknowledges in his brief, Williams was not the only witness who could have testified on this subject. Bryant himself could have done so. A defendant‘s 21 testimony at a suppression hearing cannot ―be admitted against him at trial on the issue of guilt unless he makes no objection . . .‖ (Simmons v. United States (1968) 390 U.S. 377, 394), and, as explained in People v. Lightsey (2012) 54 Cal.4th 668, 717, the due process right to present a defense does not obligate a trial court to admit proffered evidence with the effect of allowing the defendant to testify without subjecting himself to crossexamination. Bryant was, of course, free to decline to testify at the suppression hearing, but his decision against doing so did not render the hearing fundamentally unfair. Although ― ‗ ―[t]he criminal process . . . is replete with situations requiring the ‗making of difficult judgments‘ as to which course to follow . . . [and] . . . a defendant may have a right, even of constitutional dimensions, to follow whichever course he chooses, the Constitution does not by that token always forbid requiring him to choose.‖ ‘ ‖ (Letner, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 153, citation omitted.) Further, there was no suggestion that Williams could have provided important information that Bryant could not have. Indeed, as the court here mentioned and some other courts have recognized, given the subjective portion of the expectation of privacy analysis, it is questionable whether a defendant could carry his burden without presenting his own testimony. (See, e.g., U.S. v. Mendoza (7th Cir. 2006) 438 F.3d 792, 795 [― ‗without an affidavit or testimony from the defendant, it is almost impossible to find a privacy interest‘ ‖].) Williams‘s testimony, therefore was an arguably inferior substitute for Bryant‘s. The trial court reasonably ruled that Bryant had not established a need for Williams‘s testimony outweighing the administrative burden and potential safety concern in removing Williams from the safe location where he was housed. In the past the Bryant Family had taken steps to kill and influence witnesses against it. The weighing of Bryant‘s interests against these concerns was neither arbitrary nor disproportionate. In sum, the denial of Bryant‘s request to compel Williams‘s testimony did not prevent a fundamentally fair hearing. 22 Bryant ultimately presented no competent evidence showing he had an expectation of privacy in Wheeler Avenue. On this deficient record the trial court clearly did not err in denying the suppression motion.