Opinion ID: 1229854
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: We review claims of insufficient evidence de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. United States v. Willis, 476 F.3d 1121, 1124 (10th Cir.2007). Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if . . . a reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. (quotation omitted). We must not weigh conflicting evidence or consider the credibility of the witnesses, but simply determine whether the evidence, if believed, would establish each element of the crime. United States v. Vallo, 238 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir.2001) (quotation and alteration omitted). Mr. Hanrahan argues his conviction must be reversed because there is insufficient evidence that he knowingly possessed the gun. [3] To establish this element, the Government must show the defendant actually or constructively possessed the firearm. United States v. Jameson, 478 F.3d 1204, 1209 (10th Cir. 2007). A person has actual possession when he has direct physical control over the firearm at a given time. Id. On the other hand, a person has constructive possession of a firearm when he knowingly holds the power and ability to exercise dominion and control over [it]. Id. In this way, constructive possession may occur when a person has exclusive possession of the premises where a firearm is found. Id. In such a case, knowledge, dominion, and control can be properly inferred because of the exclusive possession alone. Id. When two or more people occupy the space where the firearm is found, however, proximity to the firearm alone is insufficient to establish knowledge of and access to that firearm. Id. In such a joint occupancy case, proximity is probative, but it must be combined with other evidence to support an inference of knowledge of and access to the firearm. Id. The District Court instructed the jury on the law pertaining to both actual and constructive possession. Further, it instructed the jury on both sole-occupancy and joint-occupancy situations because a witness for the defense, Eddie Hartman, testified that he had borrowed Mr. Hanrahan's truck earlier in the day and left the gun there. Even under the most stringent instruction  the instruction pertaining to constructive possession in a joint-occupancy situation  there is sufficient evidence that Mr. Hanrahan knowingly possessed the firearm. The gun was in plain view on the truck's bench near the driver's seatbelt latch, where the driver's right hip would be; Mr. Hanrahan is right-handed. While Mr. Hanrahan was detained at the back of the truck, Deputy Swint asked whether the object was a gun or a lighter. Deputy Swint did not remove the gun from the seat when he asked the question, and from his position, Mr. Hanrahan could not see into the truck's cab. Nevertheless, Mr. Hanrahan responded, without hesitation, that it was a gun. He also volunteered that it was inoperable. A reasonable jury could infer from Mr. Hanrahan's admissions at the scene and his knowledge of the gun's working condition at the time of his arrest that he knew the gun was present in the car. Mr. Hanrahan points to no evidence that warrants reversal of the jury's verdict. [4]