Opinion ID: 1668593
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Defense counsel should have objected to hearsay statements which identified Freeman as the thief.

Text: State trooper Evanson testified at trial that when I was cuffing David Primeaux, he had mentioned that Ben Freeman was the driver of the vehicle. Freeman's defense counsel did not object. Another example of unchallenged testimony which may have constituted hearsay was when Primeaux was allowed to testify that Freeman stated, I am going to try to steal a car somewhere. State contends these statements were admissible as exceptions to the hearsay rule. State also argues the statements were offered to explain why police officers searched Freeman, not to prove that Freeman stole the car. State's arguments merely highlight the problem with counsel's failure to object. Whether either statement was hearsay requires an analysis of the hearsay rule and the exceptions thereto. Defense counsel did not object to the statements and consequently the trial court was never called upon to rule on the admissibility of the statements. Even if the statements were admissible as exceptions to the hearsay rule, defense counsel should have asked that the jury be instructed that the statements were being offered for that limited purpose. On the other hand, one may argue that Freeman's defense counsel realized the statements were admissible as exceptions to the hearsay rule. Defense counsel may have concluded that objecting to the statements, only to be overruled by the trial court, would accomplish nothing except to draw undue attention to the damaging statements. If defense counsel was guided by such motives, her failure to object could be seen as a reasonable tactical decision. Laprath did not testify at the habeas corpus hearing. As a result, this Court has not had the opportunity to consider defense counsel's explanation of her actual motives.