Opinion ID: 2498805
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Donna Griffin Matter

Text: In April 2006, Donna Griffin (Griffin) hired Respondent to represent her in a medical malpractice action against her chiropractor, Kenneth Ray (Ray). Griffin believed Ray had injured her back and neck during treatment. Respondent waited until August 15, 2007, to request Griffin's medical records from Ray. He received the records on September 1, 2007. Even though the medical records indicate that Ray last treated Griffin on March 20, 2006, Respondent did not file a civil complaint until more than two years later, on March 26, 2008. [15] Ray raised a statute of limitations defense in his June 19, 2008, answer to Griffin's complaint. On November 10, 2008, Respondent sent Griffin a letter advising her that there was no real chance of [her] matter settling and that her case must be clearly winnable ... to continue to justify the investment [she] would make in costs and [Respondent would] make in fees. [16] He indicated that they would need to reevaluate their chances of success before proceeding. Between April and September 2009 discovery continued, and Griffin was deposed on August 11, 2009. She testified that her last treatment with Ray was on March 16, 2006. On June 15, 2009, Respondent was suspended from the practice of law for one year and one day, with the condition of reinstatement, effective August 15, 2009. Pursuant to C.R.C.P. 251.28(b) and (c), Respondent was required to promptly notify Griffin and opposing counsel by certified mail of his suspension and advise Griffin that she could seek legal services elsewhere. However, Respondent never notified Griffin or opposing counsel of his suspension. On August 25, 2009, Respondent filed an affidavit with the People indicating that he had filed a substitution of counsel in Griffin's case. This statement was not true. Notwithstanding his suspension, on September 3, 2009, Respondent and his associate, John McBride (McBride), met with Griffin to discuss her case. At this meeting, Respondent informed Griffin that he had filed her case after the statute of limitations had run. Griffin terminated Respondent's representation that day. On October 6, 2009, McBride filed on Respondent's behalf a motion to withdraw, which was granted that day. Ray filed a motion for summary judgment on October 30, 2009, based on the statute of limitations. On November 6, 2009, the parties filed a confession of the motion for summary judgment and a stipulation to dismiss Griffin's case with prejudice, which the court granted. Respondent's failure to communicate with Griffin about the nature of her injury, to timely review her medical records to determine the date of her injury, and to file her case within the statute of limitations period violated Colo. RPC 1.3, which mandates a lawyer act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client. Respondent's conduct also violated Colo. RPC 1.4(a)(3), which provides that a lawyer shall keep the client reasonably informed about the status of his or her matter. Respondent neglected this duty when he failed to notify Griffin that he had filed the complaint outside the limitations period and, later, when he failed to promptly inform Griffin that his license to practice law had been suspended and he could no longer continue to represent her. Further, Respondent neglected to notify Griffin in writing that his law license had been suspended, that he could no longer represent her, and that she could seek new representation pursuant to C.R.C.P. 251.28(b). He also did not obtain Griffin's consent to continue working on her case during the winding up period as required by C.R.C.P. 251.28(a). By disregarding these rules, Respondent violated Colo. RPC 3.4(c), which provides that a lawyer shall not knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists. Finally, Respondent violated Colo. RPC 8.4(c), which prohibits an attorney from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. Respondent acted dishonestly by neglecting to notify Griffin that he had been suspended; by leading her to believe that he was a licensed attorney during his period of suspension; by failing to inform her that the statute of limitations had run on her malpractice claim yet continuing to pursue the claim and incurring further costs; and by misrepresenting in his affidavit to the Colorado Supreme Court that he had complied with C.R.C.P. 251.28.