Opinion ID: 1314272
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Evidence of Implied Consent

Text: Beatrice argues that it never consented, impliedly or otherwise, to trial of the issue raised by the Court of Appeals. The key inquiry of rule 15(b) for express or implied consent is whether the parties recognized that an issue not presented by the pleadings entered the case at trial. Missouri Housing Development Com'n v. Brice, 919 F.2d 1306 (8th Cir.1990). See 3 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 15.18[1] at 15-76 (3d ed. 2005). In determining whether to allow amendments to conform to the evidence, a court initially should consider whether the opposing party expressly or impliedly consented to the introduction of the evidence. Express consent may be found when a party has stipulated to an issue or the issue is set forth in a pretrial order. Implied consent may arise in two situations. First, the claim may be introduced outside of the complaintin another pleading or documentand then treated by the opposing party as if pleaded. Second, consent may be implied if during the trial the party acquiesces or fails to object to the introduction of evidence that relates only to that issue. Implied consent may not be found if the opposing party did not recognize that new matters were at issue during the trial. The pleader must demonstrate that the opposing party understood that the evidence in question was introduced to prove new issues. (Emphasis supplied.) Id., § 15.18[1] at 15-75 to 15-76. Here, the Court of Appeals found that the issue of Beatrice's offer of employment until retirement was tried by implied consent, because evidence was presented on the issue and Beatrice did not object to such evidence. Blinn v. Beatrice Community Hosp. & Health Ctr., 13 Neb.App. 459, 696 N.W.2d 149 (2005). This is the situation in which courts most often find that parties implicitly consented to the trial of an issue. See 3 James Wm. Moore et al., supra, § 15.18[1]. But an opposing party's recognition of a new issue would not be shown, for example, if the new issue was merely raised inferentially by evidence that was relevant to the issues that were pleaded, and that the opposing party directly addressed only the pleaded issues at trial. A court may not find consent when evidence supporting an issue allegedly tried by implied consent is also relevant to other issues actually pleaded and tried. Id., § 15.18[1] at 15-76 to 15-77. If the evidence overlaps in this fashion, it does not equate to implied consent absent a clear indication that the party who introduced the evidence was attempting to raise a new issue. Portis v. First Nat. Bank of New Albany, Ms., 34 F.3d 325 (5th Cir.1994). A court will not imply consent to try a claim merely because evidence relevant to a properly pleaded issue incidentally tends to establish an unpleaded claim. Elmore v. Corcoran, 913 F.2d 170 (4th Cir.1990). In general, a finding of implied consent depends on whether the parties recognized that an issue not presented by the pleadings entered the case at trial. ... Where a party does not recognize the significance of evidence and so fails to contest it, he cannot realistically be said to have given his implied consent to the trial of unpled issues suggested by it, always assuming that his failure to grasp its significance was reasonable.... When evidence is introduced that is relevant to a pleaded issue and the party against whom the amendment is urged has no reason to believe a new issue is being injected into the case, that party cannot be said to have impliedly consented to trial of that issue. (Citations omitted.) Domar Ocean Transp. v. Independent Refining Co., 783 F.2d 1185, 1188 (5th Cir.1986). Accord, e.g., Prieto v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 354 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir.2004); Rodriguez v. Doral Mortg. Corp., 57 F.3d 1168 (1st Cir.1995); Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375 (7th Cir.1992). See, e.g., Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 108 S.Ct. 2166, 100 L.Ed.2d 811 (1988). In this case, Beatrice argues, persuasively, that the evidence relied upon by the Court of Appeals was not objected to because it was pertinent to the issues that were properly pleaded in the case, such as Blinn's alleged reliance on Beatrice's representations and Blinn's performance at the hospital. In particular, Blinn's testimony that the chairman of the board said Blinn could stay [at Beatrice] until [he] retired was relevant to Blinn's promissory estoppel claim, and such testimony cannot be said to have notified Beatrice that Blinn's claim of breach of an oral contract had been expanded to include a claim that Blinn's employment-at-will relationship with Beatrice had been modified to a contract of employment until retirement. To satisfy rule 15(b), evidence to which no objection is raised must be directed solely at the unpleaded issue, in order to provide a clear indication that the opposing party would or should have recognized that a new issue was being injected into the case. The record here simply fails to satisfy that standard. The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the pleadings in this case had been constructively amended by implied consent pursuant to rule 15(b).