Opinion ID: 389939
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: liability under title vi

Text: 79 The City has made essentially a threefold challenge to the district court's finding of liability under Title VI. It contends that it never had notice of, or an opportunity to litigate, the Title VI issues in the district court, that such claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations or by laches, and that in any event, plaintiffs failed to prove a violation of that Title. Since we find merit in the last of these contentions we need not deal with the issue of timeliness, and we touch on the notice contention only in order to place in perspective the failure of proof. 80 The complaint filed by plaintiffs clearly raised issues under Title VI. Paragraph 6(b) stated as follows: 81 Bridgeport has received in the past and will receive in the future federal financial assistance including revenue sharing funds. It has spent a portion of these funds and intends to continue to spend a portion of such funds received in the future in the area of public safety, including the Fire Department. And paragraph 17 alleged: 82 Defendants (sic ) discriminatory practices violate the plaintiffs' rights not to be excluded from participation in, denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance, on account of race, color, or national origin, guaranteed by Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000d. 83 The City admitted the allegations of paragraph 6(b), and denied paragraph 17. 84 Much of the evidence presented by plaintiffs at trial related to the City's discriminatory practices between 1964, when Title VI took effect, and 1972 when Title VII became applicable to municipalities. For example, the record included the firefighters examinations given in 1965, 1968 and 1971, with data as to the numbers of minority and nonminority applicants who took and who passed those exams. This evidence was relevant not only as background for the Title VII claim, but also as proof of the Title VI claim. The latter relevance does not seem to have been entirely lost on the defendants; the City's post-trial memorandum began with the statement that the plaintiffs asserted claims under both Title VII and Title VI. We conclude that the defendants had more than adequate notice and opportunity to contest the Title VI claims at the initial trial in this case, and that the district court was entitled toconsider these claims after the remand from this Court. 18 85 As the record stands, however, we do not find that plaintiffs proved all of the elements of their Title VI claim. 19 Title VI, § 601 of the Civil Rights Act, states: 86 No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. 87 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976). Section 602 of the Act imposes on agencies empowered to extend Federal financial assistance to any program or activity a duty to effectuate the provisions of the Title by issuing appropriate rules and regulations. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1. The enforcement power of the agencies under § 602, however, is limited by § 604 as follows: 88 Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed to authorize action under this subchapter by any department or agency with respect to any employment practice of any employer, employment agency, or labor organization except where a primary objective of the Federal financial assistance is to provide employment. 89 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-3. This section in effect requires a logical nexus between the use of federal funds and the practice toward which agency action is directed. Although on its face § 604 limits the circumstances under which action can be taken by an agency, plaintiffs have not argued that the provision is applicable only to agencies and not to private actions. Both plaintiffs' brief and the amicus brief of the government appear to assume that the primary objective to provide employment limitation applies to private rights of action as well. We agree. We see no indication that Congress would not have intended that the logical nexus requirement exist with respect to private actions as well as agency action. Thus, for a claimant to recover under Title VI against an employer for discriminatory employment practices, a threshold requirement is that the employer be the recipient of federal funds aimed primarily at providing employment. See Carmi v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 620 F.2d 672, 674-75 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, -- U.S. --, 101 S.Ct. 249, 66 L.Ed.2d 117 (1980); Trageser v. Libbie Rehabilitation Center, Inc., 590 F.2d 87, 88-89 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 947, 99 S.Ct. 2895, 61 L.Ed.2d 318 (1979). 90 The district court's findings with respect to Title VI did not touch on this requirement. The court stated simply as follows: 91 Defendants, in their answer, have admitted that federal funds have been received by the City and expended in the Fire Department. Plaintiffs have proven that such funds were received and expended in the Fire Department in each year between 1971 and 1977. 92 479 F.Supp. at 111. There was no finding that the funds were aimed primarily at providing employment. Thus, the findings do not adequately support the ruling on liability. 93 Nor would a finding as to the primary purpose of the federal funds have been supported by the properly received evidence of record. The complaint contained no express allegation as to the primary purpose of such funds, and hence there was no pleaded admission as to this element. Further, it appears that no evidence as to the purpose of the federal funds was introduced at the earlier stages of this case. Prior to the evidentiary hearing on remand, plaintiffs apparently recognized that the record was deficient in this respect, stating as follows: 94 The record is not clear with respect to the relevance of Title VI to this case, in that there is no evidence relating to receipt of federal funds by the City other than Revenue Sharing funds. 95 Plaintiffs therefore requested that the court accept evidence relating to Title VI at the hearing on remand. The district court, however, denied plaintiff's request. Its prehearing order limited the permissible evidence to other issues, and when plaintiffs nevertheless sought at the hearing to elicit testimony from the City's Comptroller on the subject of the City's use of federal funds, the court sustained the City's objection and dismissed the witness. The plaintiffs do not challenge this exclusion by the district court; to the contrary, they properly concede that the scope of additional evidence, if any, was within the trial judge's discretion, which he did not abuse. (Appellees' Brief on Appeal at 21.) 96 Plaintiffs contend, however, that the record adequately reflects the use of federal funds under the Emergency Employment Act 20 for the purpose of employment in the City's fire department, because the district court stated that it would take judicial notice of the City's budget. While we reject the City's contention that the district court could not properly take judicial notice of the budget, we cannot see that any materials properly the subject of judicial notice provided the information that was required. Rule 201(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence allows a court to take judicial notice of a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it is either 97 (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. 98 A municipality's published budget could qualify as a source of information whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. What was presented to the court here, however, was a few photocopied pages of the City's Public Employment Employee Roster, which did not readily reveal the primary purpose of federal funds received by the City. 99 These pages merely listed names and addresses of individuals, together, apparently, with various City departments, and dates, and an assortment of other numbers that we find altogether cryptic. Nowhere on any of the photocopied pages is there any mention of the Emergency Employment Act, or any other indication that what is there reflected is federal funding primarily for employment. 100 The characterization of these pages as reflecting the receipt of federal funds for employment purposes comes strictly from the affidavit to which they were attached. This affidavit, submitted by a paralegal employed by plaintiffs' counsel, stated in pertinent part as follows: 101 IV. My examination revealed that indeed, at least during the years 1971 and 1972, some federal money was used by the City to hire personnel for the Fire Department. This money was provided to the City through the Emergency Employment Act of 1971. 102 V. The hiring of Fire Department personnel with Emergency Employment Act money was recorded in the Public Employment Employee Roster for the years 1971 and 1972. Photocopies of relevant pages of this roster along with my own added notations are attached. 103 Such an affidavit, of course, is not a source whose accuracy is beyond reasonable question, and the facts recited therein could not properly have been judicially noticed. 21 104 We conclude that the affidavit could not, and the photocopies did not, supply the evidence required to support plaintiffs' Title VI claim. We therefore vacate the court's ruling that the City violated Title VI.