Opinion ID: 2031928
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Denial of a Fair Capital Sentencing Hearing

Text: Defendant contends that he was denied a fair capital sentencing hearing because the trial court denied his request to argue jury nullification, the State introduced hearsay evidence, and the prosecution made improper arguments to the jury.
At the eligibility stage of the sentencing hearing, defense counsel requested permission to argue to the jury the theory of jury nullification. Defense counsel stated to the trial judge that he would like to suggest to this jury that they can stop at this point    and not impose the death penalty based upon their ability as jurors to find this statute [the Illinois death penalty statute] unconstitutional. The trial judge denied defense counsel's request to argue jury nullification. Defendant argues before this court that it was reversible error for the trial court to deny defense counsel the opportunity to argue jury nullification. The defendant concedes that a criminal defendant has no right to instruct the jury that it may nullify a verdict of guilt. He asserts, however, that a jury has the power to engage in nullification and a defendant has a right to argue nullification to the jury. The defendant relies on language in United States v. Anderson (7th Cir.1983), 716 F.2d 446, and People v. Ganus (1992), 148 Ill.2d 466, 171 Ill.Dec. 359, 594 N.E.2d 211. In United States v. Anderson (7th Cir. 1983), 716 F.2d 446, 449-50, the court stated that the necessary historical tension between jury nullification and a jury's adherence to instructions should not be collapsed by explicit nullification instructions. The Anderson court added that `[t]he jury system provides flexibility for the interests of justice outside the formal rules of law. This embraces whatever extra the defendant conveys by personal representation, whether through demeanor or sincerity of justification.' ( Anderson, 716 F.2d at 450, quoting United States v. Dougherty (D.C.Cir.1972), 473 F.2d 1113, 1137.) The defendant argues that the Anderson court thus clearly set forth an accused's right to argue jury nullification. Similarly, defendant cites People v. Ganus (1992), 148 Ill.2d 466, 473, 171 Ill.Dec. 359, 594 N.E.2d 211, in support of his argument that a defendant has a right to argue jury nullification. In Ganus, the defendant argued that he was denied effective assistance of counsel when trial counsel elicited prejudicial testimony about defendant's gang activity to try to prove a compulsion defense which was not a defense available to the defendant. In finding that the defendant failed to prove his claim under Strickland, this court stated in part, His counsel conceived a compulsion defense which, though not a legal defense, could or might have persuaded a jury not to convict. Jury nullification is always a possibility. ( Ganus, 148 Ill.2d at 473-74, 171 Ill.Dec. 359, 594 N.E.2d 211.) The defendant argues that this court recognized a right to request jury nullification by stating that it is always a possibility. Neither Anderson nor Ganus, however, holds that a defendant has a right to argue jury nullification. Both cases simply discuss a jury's power to acquit a defendant on the basis of extraneous factors. We believe that this power does not translate into a defendant's right to argue nullification. (See United States v. Kerley (7th Cir.1988), 838 F.2d 932, 938 ([J]ury nullification is just a power, not also a right).) Other courts that have considered the issue raised here have similarly held that an accused in a criminal case is not entitled to argue or instruct a jury on nullification. (See, e.g., United States v. Brown (7th Cir.1977), 548 F.2d 204, 210; United States v. Berrigan (4th Cir.1969), 417 F.2d 1002, 1006; United States v. Sloan (N.D.Ind.1989), 704 F.Supp. 880, 884; Annas v. State (Alaska App.1986), 726 P.2d 552, 560 n. 8; Reale v. United States (D.C.1990), 573 A.2d 13, 15; Davis v. State (Miss.1988), 520 So.2d 493, 494-95 (and cases collected); State v. Pease (1987), 227 Mont. 424, 740 P.2d 659, 663; State v. Bjerkaas (1991), 163 Wis.2d 949, 960-61, 472 N.W.2d 615, 619-20.) A defendant does not have the right to have the jury ignore the law or the undisputed evidence in a case. (See People v. Rollins (1982), 108 Ill.App.3d 480, 487, 64 Ill.Dec. 3, 438 N.E.2d 1322 (defendant has no right to have the jury defy the law or ignore the undisputed evidence).) In the instant case, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defense counsel's request to argue jury nullification. In support of his contention, defendant cites two additional cases. ( People v. Waisvisz (1991), 221 Ill.App.3d 667, 675, 164 Ill. Dec. 439, 582 N.E.2d 1383; People v. Austin (1982), 111 Ill.App.3d 213, 215, 66 Ill.Dec. 944, 443 N.E.2d 1107.) In neither case, however, was the propriety of the jury nullification argument at issue on appeal.
Defendant further argues that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to introduce in aggravation double hearsay evidence and, separately, hearsay evidence relating to an alleged rape and attempted rape.
Defendant argues that he was denied his right under the eighth amendment and State law to a fair and reliable capital sentencing hearing because the State introduced double hearsay in aggravation. Specifically, the defendant objects to admission of testimony that the defendant attacked two correctional officers, threatened another, and threatened to take a gun and run. The defendant, however, failed to object to the alleged errors at the sentencing hearing, and he has thus waived the issues for review. ( Enoch, 122 Ill.2d at 188-90, 119 Ill.Dec. 265, 522 N.E.2d 1124.) Nevertheless, defendant urges this court to apply the plain error rule, which may be invoked if evidence at a sentencing hearing was closely balanced or if the error was so egregious as to deprive the defendant of a fair sentencing hearing. People v. Fields (1990), 135 Ill.2d 18, 60, 142 Ill.Dec. 200, 552 N.E.2d 791; People v. Young (1989), 128 Ill.2d 1, 57, 131 Ill.Dec. 78, 86, 538 N.E.2d 463, 461; 134 Ill.2d R. 615(a). At a capital sentencing hearing, a trial court, in its discretion, has wide latitude in admitting relevant and reliable evidence in aggravation and mitigation. ( People v. Tenner (1993), 157 Ill.2d 341, 380-81, 193 Ill.Dec. 105, 626 N.E.2d 138.) Evidence in the nature of hearsay may be introduced at sentencing if it is otherwise reliable. ( Tenner, 157 Ill.2d at 380-81, 193 Ill.Dec. 105, 626 N.E.2d 138.) This court has noted, however, that when double hearsay testimony has been found to be admissible, at least some parts of that testimony have been corroborated. People v. Erickson (1987), 117 Ill.2d 271, 300, 111 Ill.Dec. 924, 513 N.E.2d 367; People v. Foster (1987), 119 Ill.2d 69, 98, 115 Ill.Dec. 557, 518 N.E.2d 82. Defendant objects to the testimony of Grundy County Chief Deputy Terry Marketti. In the first instance, Marketti testified that at least one New York correctional officer told him that the defendant had attacked two New York correctional officers. The defendant argues that the testimony was prejudicial because the prosecutor used it in closing argument as a reason for the jury to impose the death penalty and was unreliable because Marketti could not identify how the defendant allegedly assaulted the officers. Marketti next testified that a Grundy County inmate told him that the defendant said he would kill a correctional officer for shutting off the phone. The defendant argues that this testimony was prejudicial because it was elicited to show future dangerousness. He also contends that the prosecutor in closing argument referred to the phone incident by arguing that the defendant lives to threaten and to hurt. Last, Marketti testified that an escort deputy told him that while the escort deputy was placing a firearm in a lockup when entering the courthouse, the defendant said to the escort deputy that he ought to grab the gun and run. The escort deputy did not testify. The defendant concludes that Marketti's testimony was improper double hearsay and that, as a result, his death sentence should be vacated and a new sentencing hearing should be held. We disagree. The information to which Marketti testified was compiled for security precautions so that those guarding the defendant would, as Marketti testified, [b]e on their guard for him, if this is what he does to correctional officers. Given the underlying reason for compiling the information, we believe that the testimony was sufficiently reliable. That Marketti was unable to identify the source of information about the alleged attacks or to specify how the officers were attacked does not, as the defendant argues, render the testimony unreliable, but rather goes to the weight to be given the evidence. We reject defendant's argument that admission of the challenged testimony was error.
Defendant further argues that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to introduce hearsay evidence relating to an alleged rape and attempted rape by the defendant. At the sentencing hearing, Hinsdale Police Officer James Eccardt testified that he investigated a complaint against the defendant based on an incident in 1976 in which the defendant allegedly forced a 15-year-old girl into a car, demanded sex, and struck her before she was able to escape. Eccardt testified that the victim reported the incident to police immediately after her escape. Defendant was charged with unlawful restraint, battery, contributing to the sexual delinquency of a child, and contributing to the delinquency of a minor, and was convicted of battery. Illinois State Police Officer Kevin Shaughnessy testified at the sentencing hearing that he investigated an incident in 1989 in which the defendant allegedly forced a 15-year-old girl to have sexual intercourse with him before she was able to escape. Shaughnessy testified that the girl reported the incident to police immediately after her escape, and was taken to a hospital for treatment. He testified, however, that the results of the sexual assault kit were not disclosed because the girl decided that she did not want to go through the ordeal of a trial. The defendant was not prosecuted. Defense counsel did not make proper objections to the admission of these officers' testimony at the sentencing hearing. No objection was made to Shaughnessy's testimony. Defense counsel objected to Eccardt's testimony, but based the objection on remoteness rather than hearsay. A specific objection to the admission of evidence waives all grounds not specified. ( People v. Lewis (1995), 165 Ill.2d 305, 335, 209 Ill.Dec. 144, 651 N.E.2d 72; People v. Curry (1973), 56 Ill.2d 162, 170, 306 N.E.2d 292.) Defendant urges this court to reach the merits of this claim under the plain error rule. Defendant cites People v. Edwards (1991), 144 Ill.2d 108, 161 Ill.Dec. 788, 579 N.E.2d 336, in support of his contention that the evidence of the alleged rape and attempted rape incidents was unreliable. In Edwards, this court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the admission of videotaped statements made by the defendant's two children, aged 8 and 11, in mitigation at his capital sentencing hearing. ( Edwards, 144 Ill.2d at 174, 161 Ill.Dec. 788, 579 N.E.2d 336.) In finding that the evidence was unreliable, this court noted that neither child had sworn an oath promising to tell the truth, that the State had no opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses or view the unedited versions, and that the children were young. ( Edwards, 144 Ill.2d at 175, 161 Ill. Dec. 788, 579 N.E.2d 336.) These concerns were aggravated by the fact that the State was unable to establish what the children had been told about their father before being interviewed. Edwards, 144 Ill.2d at 175, 161 Ill.Dec. 788, 579 N.E.2d 336. Defendant argues that, as in Edwards, the testimony here stems from minors and that such testimony is unreliable. He contends that the testimony here is even more unreliable than in Edwards because here the officers relied on the characterizations of others while in Edwards the children would have been seen and would have given their own account. Defendant adds that neither complaining witness was available for cross-examination, that he was only convicted of battery for the 1976 incident, and that he was not prosecuted for the 1989 incident. Defendant concludes that the testimony substantially prejudiced him. We believe that the instant case is distinguishable from Edwards. In Edwards, the defendant sought to introduce edited versions of videotaped interviews with his young children. The State would have been unable to explore the circumstances surrounding the interviews or to establish what the children had been told about their father's circumstances. In contrast, here, we believe that the testimony was sufficiently reliable. Both officers had personally investigated the incidents and had interviewed the complaining witnesses. (See People v. Tenner (1993), 157 Ill.2d 341, 381, 193 Ill.Dec. 105, 626 N.E.2d 138 (in determining if a trial court abused its discretion in introducing testimony of officers, court considered whether they had interviewed complaining witnesses).) Both police reports were based on information compiled before the offenses charged here. (See People v. Morgan (1986), 112 Ill.2d 111, 144, 97 Ill.Dec. 430, 492 N.E.2d 1303.) The two complaining witnesses reported the incidents immediately after their escape. One incident was corroborated by a certified copy of a battery conviction. We also note that both investigating officers were subjected to full cross-examination by defense counsel at trial. We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting testimony concerning these incidents.
Defendant contends that the prosecutor in closing argument at the second stage of the sentencing hearing made repeated emotional appeals to impose the death penalty that were calculated to inflame the emotions of the jury and to diminish the jury's responsibility to make a life or death decision. Defendant maintains that he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing.
The prosecutor argued to the jury that [c]apital punishment is society's only form of self defense against the Ed Moores of this world. Defense counsel objected to this comment, stating, It's not supported by the evidence, not supported by the argument. The court is going to instruct the jury as to the law   . The trial judge then stated that he would instruct the jury as to the law. The prosecutor also stated to the jury that [c]apital punishment is the law of this State and you have to follow the law. Defense counsel did not object to this comment. Defendant first contends that these comments implied to the jury that imprisonment was not an alternative punishment for first degree murder in Illinois. We do not agree that the jury was misled. The trial judge correctly instructed the jury that the defendant would be sentenced to a sentence other than death if the jury was unable to unanimously find that there were no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death penalty. (See People v. Tenner (1993), 157 Ill.2d 341, 384, 193 Ill.Dec. 105, 626 N.E.2d 138.) The trial judge also instructed the jury that closing arguments are not evidence and that statements not based on the evidence should be disregarded. We therefore do not believe that the comments denied the defendant a fair capital sentencing hearing. Defendant next argues that the prosecutor's comments improperly implied that a penalty other than death would allow the defendant to commit future crimes against society. (See People v. Johnson (1991), 146 Ill.2d 109, 148, 165 Ill.Dec. 682, 585 N.E.2d 78; People v. Szabo (1983), 94 Ill.2d 327, 367, 68 Ill.Dec. 935, 447 N.E.2d 193 (prosecutor in sentencing hearing may not prey on fears of jurors that a defendant may walk the streets again and harm another).) Here, however, the comments were brief, the State introduced substantial evidence in aggravation, and the defendant introduced minimal evidence in mitigation. We therefore do not believe that the brief comments were so prejudicial that they denied the defendant a fair sentencing hearing.
The prosecutor further told the jurors that they were the only barrier between good and evil and the only barrier between justice and injustice. The prosecutor also asked the jurors to [s]how the world that good can triumph over evil. Defendant argues that these comments mischaracterized the jury's role, diverted its attention from its proper consideration of mitigating and aggravating factors, and shifted its attention away from giving consideration to the offense and the offender. In addition, the defendant argues that these comments improperly implied to the jury that it would be siding with evil and injustice if it did not impose the death penalty. Defendant did not object to these comments at the sentencing hearing, but requests that this court review these comments under the plain error rule. We believe that these comments, considered in context, were made to emphasize the defendant's extensive criminal history. Furthermore, we do not believe that the defendant was denied a fair sentencing hearing. The trial judge defined both aggravating and mitigating factors in the jury instructions, and the jury was instructed to consider all of those factors. In addition, both the jury instructions and the verdict forms informed the jurors that if they were unable to unanimously find that there were no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death penalty, the court would impose a sentence other than death. We find that the jury was fully informed of its role in imposing the death penalty and that the jury's attention was not diverted from consideration of the offense, the offender or the relevant aggravating and mitigating evidence.
Defendant next argues that the prosecutor improperly argued to the jury that the defendant was trying to avoid responsibility for the murder by presenting mitigating evidence. Specifically, the prosecutor argued as follows: He [defendant] just wants to get away with this. Don't let him get away with it. Hold him accountable for what he did to that woman on July 7th, 1991. He is accountable. Don't let him escape responsibility for the rape and murder of Judy Zeman. Enforce our law. Defendant further objects to the prosecutor's comment that: It appears that he [defendant's father] was a    rotten father   . But Ed [defendant] wants to use that as an excuse   . Don't blame me for setting Judy on fire, because I had a rotten father. The excuse doesn't wash. It doesn't excuse what he did. Defendant asserts that consideration of a tumultuous family background as a mitigating factor is proper, and that its consideration does not suggest an absence of responsibility for the crime of murder. ( Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982), 455 U.S. 104, 116, 102 S.Ct. 869, 877, 71 L.Ed.2d 1, 12.) Defendant did not object to these comments at the sentencing hearing, and he thus waived the issues. ( Enoch, 122 Ill.2d at 188-90, 119 Ill.Dec. 265, 522 N.E.2d 1124.) He urges this court to review the issues under the plain error doctrine. We do not believe that the prosecutor's comments rose to the level of plain error. This court has noted that a heinous murderer is not necessarily excused by his having had an abusive father. ( People v. Gacy (1984), 103 Ill.2d 1, 102-03, 82 Ill.Dec. 391, 468 N.E.2d 1171 ([a] disapproving father does not excuse 33 homosexually related murders and numerous other incidents of sexual torture and physical abuse).) Furthermore, the trial court properly instructed the jury to consider all mitigating factors supported by the evidence. We do not find that the prosecutor's remarks were erroneous or were likely to have affected the jury's determination.
Defendant next contends that the prosecutor in closing argument improperly shifted the jury's sense of responsibility for imposing the death penalty, in violation of Caldwell v. Mississippi (1985), 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231. In Caldwell, the Court vacated a death sentence when the prosecutor led the jury to believe that responsibility for determining the propriety of the death penalty rested with an appellate court rather than the jury. ( Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 328-29, 105 S.Ct. at 2639, 86 L.Ed.2d at 239.) In so holding, the Court noted that an uncorrected attempt to shift responsibility for the ultimate determination of death from the jury to others creates an intolerable danger that the jury will in fact choose to minimize the importance of its role. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 333, 105 S.Ct. at 2642, 86 L.Ed.2d at 242. In this case, defendant contends that, if the jury believed certain comments made by the prosecutor in closing argument, the jury would have believed that a decision to impose death had already been made by the legislature, minimizing the importance of the jury's role. While defendant failed to object to the challenged comments discussed below, he urges this court to review under the plain error rule. Defendant first objects to the prosecutor's comment to the jury that [c]apital punishment is the law of this State and you [the jury] have to follow the law. Considered in context, we believe that this comment was an invited response to defense counsel's argument in closing regarding the merits of capital punishment. As such, defendant may not now claim prejudicial error. ( Nevitt, 135 Ill.2d at 454, 142 Ill.Dec. 854, 553 N.E.2d 368.) Furthermore, the prosecutor stated at least four times in closing argument that the death penalty shall be imposed only if the jurors find no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death penalty. The instructions and the verdict forms also informed the jurors of the standard for imposing the death penalty. We do not believe that the comments were improper or would have affected the jury's determination. Defendant next asserts that the prosecutor said that the law requires the death penalty, and objects to this comment. The prosecutor stated in part: If you walk into that jury room and you find that the mitigating factors are not sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death penalty, the law says that you have to do it [impose the death penalty]. The facts in this case compel it. The law requires it. Justice absolutely demands it. There are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude capital punishment. We believe that, considered in context, the prosecutor was simply arguing that no mitigating factors in this case should have precluded the imposition of the death penalty. Furthermore, the jurors were instructed as to the alternatives to the imposition of the death penalty. As stated, the prosecutor also repeatedly informed the jury of the correct standard for imposing the death penalty. Defendant next points to the prosecutor's assertions that Edward Moore sentenced himself to death, and argues that these comments improperly led the jury to believe that ultimate responsibility for a death sentence rested with the defendant's conduct and not with the jury. (See Buttrum v. Black (N.D.Ga.1989), 721 F.Supp. 1268, aff'd per curiam (11th Cir.1990), 908 F.2d 695.) In Buttrum, the court found a Caldwell violation when the prosecutor argued that a defendant had `signed her own death warrant' and that the jury was merely a cog in the criminal process. ( Buttrum, 721 F.Supp. at 1316.) The court believed that the comments suggested to the jury that ultimate responsibility rested with the defendant, and believed that the argument may have affected the sentencing decision. Buttrum, 721 F.Supp. at 1317. Unlike the court in Buttrum, we do not believe that the comments here would have affected the jury's sentencing decision. The prosecutor repeatedly informed the jurors of their responsibility for weighing the factors and then determining whether the death penalty should be imposed. The jurors were also instructed as to their responsibility to determine whether the death penalty should be imposed. The comments may also have been interpreted as merely emphasizing the strength of the aggravating evidence. See People v. Page (1993), 155 Ill.2d 232, 282, 185 Ill.Dec. 475, 614 N.E.2d 1160. Furthermore, in People v. Hudson (1993), 157 Ill.2d 401, 460-61, 193 Ill.Dec. 128, 626 N.E.2d 161, this court found that comments similar to those made by the prosecutor in this case were invited by defense counsel's closing argument in which he suggested that the jury should feel guilty for imposing a death sentence. ( Hudson, 157 Ill.2d at 460-61, 193 Ill.Dec. 128, 626 N.E.2d 161.) We believe that the comments here, considered in context, were also invited by defense counsel's emotional pleas in closing argument. Finally, defendant argues that the trial judge violated Caldwell by failing to sustain his objection to the prosecutor's suggestion that the jury did not have ultimate responsibility for determining the death penalty. While the trial judge did not state that he was sustaining the objection, he did respond that he would instruct the jury as to the law in this case. Indeed, the trial judge twice instructed the jury that it was responsible for imposing the death sentence. We do not find that the trial judge's failure to specifically sustain the objection denied the defendant of a fair capital sentencing hearing.