Opinion ID: 1450226
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: violation of civil rights under section 1983

Text: J.H.'s first claim is that his civil rights were violated by Lyday's conduct against him. He brings suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which states: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. [4] The United States Supreme Court has ruled that under certain circumstances, a municipality may be sued as a person for violating a citizen's rights. In Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, [5] the Court held that to establish a claim for violation of civil rights against a municipality under section 1983, the violation complained of must arise out of the official acts of the municipality or under a governmental custom or policy, even though such custom may not have received formal approval through the body's decision-making channels. [6] Liability against a municipality will not lie merely on the basis of respondent superior or on the unofficial acts of the municipality's employees. [7] Subsequent cases have clarified the requirements for establishing section 1983 liability against a municipality for the acts of its employees. First, the injury to rights must have been committed under color of state law. [8] There is no constitutional right to protection from the actions of private citizens. [9] To show that an injury was committed under color of state law, a plaintiff must show that the actor was either a public official who can be said to act for the municipality or an employee of the municipality who acted according to a law, custom, or usage known to and acquiesced in or condoned by the municipality. [10] In Canton v. Harris, [11] the Court held that a custom or usage may result from failure to train city police officers if that failure amounts to deliberate indifference to a known constitutional right of a plaintiff or the citizens of the municipality. [12] Further clarifying the meaning of the term deliberate indifference, the Court stated: Only where a municipality's failure to train its employees in a relevant respect evidences a deliberate indifference to the rights of its inhabitants can such a shortcoming be properly thought of as a city policy or custom that is actionable under § 1983. As Justice Brennan's opinion in Pembaur v. Cincinnati put it: [M]unicipal liability under § 1983 attaches where  and only where  a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives by city policymakers. Only where a failure to train reflects a deliberate or conscious choice by a municipality  a policy as defined by our prior cases  can a city be liable for such a failure under § 1983. [13] Although Canton involved a custom or policy of inadequate training of police officers, the deliberate indifference standard articulated in Canton is also readily applicable to a municipal policy or custom of failing to adequately screen and hire applicants. [14] Although it seems unlikely that a municipality would have a policy of inadequate hiring practices, in light of the duties assigned to police officers and to specific officers on a police force, a need for additional testing and screening of applicants for positions as officers may be facially obvious. If so, the violation of rights resulting from inadequate screening may be so inevitable that the officials who ignored or failed to identify the need may be said to have been deliberately indifferent to it. [15] However, an isolated incident involving failure to screen an applicant will not be sufficient to show that the city's policy violated a plaintiff's rights. [16] Thus, to show that a city was deliberately indifferent in its hiring practices, actual knowledge of the applicant's problems and their relationship to the damage caused or a widespread pattern of hiring police officers with violent or deviant tendencies must be established. [17] In articulating the parameters of municipal liability for failure to train police officers under section 1983, the Court in Canton required that a close relationship exist between the deficiency in city policy and the resulting injury. In defining this close nexus for causation purposes, the Court stated: Moreover, for liability to attach in this circumstance the identified deficiency in a city's training program must be closely related to the ultimate injury.... To adopt lesser standards of fault and causation would open municipalities to unprecedented liability under § 1983. In virtually every instance where a person has had his or her constitutional rights violated by a city employee, a § 1983 plaintiff will be able to point to something that the city could have done to prevent the unfortunate incident. Thus, permitting cases against cities for their failure to train employees to go forward under § 1983 on a lesser standard of fault would result in de facto respondeat superior liability on municipalities  a result we rejected in Monell. [18] Thus, a plaintiff has a higher burden to show that the policy of the municipality was the moving force, or active cause, of the deprivation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. This proof of causation, which is more than but for causation, must be an active, proximate cause of the harm. [19] Applying the above standards to the present case, we first examine whether Lyday's molestation of J.H. provides a legal basis for liability against West Valley. It cannot be said that the City is automatically liable for Lyday's actions in molesting J.H. merely because Lyday was a West Valley employee. [20] It is not contended, nor do the facts demonstrate, that in committing the molestation, Lyday was acting as a policy maker of the City or according to a West Valley custom. Therefore, his acts are not fairly attributable to West Valley, and the City should not be held liable for them. [21] However, plaintiff's section 1983 claim is based not only on the actions of Lyday, but also on the actions of Lyday's superiors in the police department. Plaintiff has asserted that Campbell and Maughan violated his rights through their custom and practice of hiring police officers without adequately checking into applicants' backgrounds and psychological fitness. Plaintiff has shown that Campbell and Maughan were officials of West Valley with policy-making authority with regard to its police department and any hiring practices or decisions there. Therefore, policies regarding hiring made by these individuals may be fairly attributable to West Valley. When the record is viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiff, it also shows that the procedures used by Campbell and Maughan in evaluating Lyday's application for employment with West Valley were in accordance with the normal policies, customs, and procedures used to evaluate police applications at the time Lyday was hired. Although West Valley has denied that it was negligent in hiring Lyday, it has not specifically denied that the procedures used to evaluate Lyday's application were the customary procedures used for all police applications. However, the affidavits of Campbell and Maughan detailing the procedures used in hiring Lyday indicate that the procedures followed the normal routine of the department. [22] However, plaintiff has failed to establish that the remaining requirements for making a claim under section 1983 have been met. Under Canton, plaintiff must also show that the custom or practice used in hiring police officers for West Valley was deliberately indifferent to his rights and that this indifference actually caused his injury. Plaintiff has failed to establish either of these elements. First, he has failed to establish that West Valley's custom or practice for hiring police officers was a violation of section 1983 as defined by Canton and Wassum. The record, taken in a light most favorable to plaintiff, does not show an indifference on the part of West Valley that could be equated with a conscious choice not to act. The record shows no evidence of knowledge on the part of West Valley that Lyday had a sexually deviant character or was likely to behave violently or to molest plaintiff. Further, there is no evidence of a pattern of hiring police officers with violent or deviant behaviors or characteristics. At most, plaintiff has demonstrated that further screening procedures for prospective employees existed that West Valley did not use. The decision not to use such procedures, whether conscious or not, does not alone rise to the level of deliberate indifference necessary to establish liability under section 1983. [23] Second, plaintiff has not made a legally sufficient showing of causation to establish liability under section 1983. The relationship between West Valley's hiring practices in 1980 and the alleged violation of plaintiff's rights in 1986 is tenuous at best. [24] J.H. has not established the close nexus between city policy and his damages as required by Canton. Therefore, his claim under that section must fail.