Opinion ID: 1199598
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the first sanctions order for attorney fees

Text: ¶ 19 Defendants requested that the interference with contract claim be dismissed with prejudice. When the motion was heard and granted the trial court did not expressly state whether the dismissal was with prejudice or without leave to amend. Martin then sought leave to amend her petition. ¶ 20 Defendants argue that Martin violated 12 O.S. § 2011 by reasserting a claim previously dismissed with prejudice when she sought leave to amend her petition. Martin argues that in these circumstances she possessed a statutory right to amend and was asserting that right. ¶ 21 Her attempt to file the Fifth Amended Petition was what got Martin in trouble. The allegations against Johnson in the Fourth Amended Petition are identical to those in the Fifth Amended Petition, with one exception. She first alleged that Johnson interfered with her contract in certain particulars, but in the latter petition she added the allegation that he was acting in bad faith when he did those things. The allegations against Hoover are also similar in both petitions. But in the Fifth Amended Petition Martin adds the allegation that Hoover was acted in bad faith and with malice against Martin. ¶ 22 Defendants rely upon language in Voiles v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc., 1996 OK 13, 911 P.2d 1205, stating that an action for interference with contract would not lie against an agent of a principal to the contract. Id. at ¶ 18, 911 P.2d at 1210. Johnson and Hoover argued that they were agents of the school district for the purpose of an action based upon Martin's teaching contract. Martin countered with the argument that the rule did not apply when an agent was acting in bad faith and with malice. ¶ 23 Defendants countered with several arguments, one of which was that Martin's allegations of bad faith occurred in those portions of the petition alleging sexual harassment and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and not in the specific portions of the petition alleging interference with contract. Upon the conclusion of the oral argument the trial court asked Defendants if they had anything further to add, and they stated that: Yes, Your Honor. Again, just to repeat that sexual harassment claim does, indeed, say that it was in bad faith; but it's not in the tortious interference with  intentional infliction of emotional distress clearly alleges acts outside the scope of employment. Again, that's not in the tortious interference with contract count. In sum, Defendants argued at the hearing that Martin's petition had a defect in pleading, in that while in some portions thereof she included allegations of bad faith and malice, in the tortious interference with contract portion of her petition she had not done so. ¶ 24 When Martin then requested leave to amend her petition by adding language of bad faith and malice to her interference with contract claim the Defendants sought sanctions, which the Court imposed. When reviewing a § 2011 sanction we look at whether the offending counsel could reasonably have argued in support of the legal theory advanced at the time of the offending conduct. Hammonds v. Osteopathic Hospital Founders Ass'n, 1996 OK 100, ¶ 7, 934 P.2d 319, 322. Martin claims that she sought leave to amend pursuant to statute, and as provided for the circumstances that existed at the time she made her motion. Our Pleading Code states that: G. FINAL DISMISSAL ON FAILURE TO AMEND. On granting a motion to dismiss a claim for relief, the court shall grant leave to amend if the defect can be remedied and shall specify the time within which an amended pleading shall be filed. If the amended pleading is not filed within the time allowed, final judgment of dismissal with prejudice shall be entered on motion except in cases of excusable neglect. In such cases amendment shall be made by the party in default within a time specified by the court for filing an amended pleading. Within the time allowed by the court for filing an amended pleading, a plaintiff may voluntarily dismiss the action without prejudice. 12 O.S.1991 § 2012(G), (emphasis added). The Pleading Code states that in granting a motion to dismiss a claim the court shall grant leave to amend if the defect can be remedied. ¶ 25 Here the trial court did not state if it was granting the motion to dismiss based upon a pleading defect, or for some other reason advanced by Defendants. Defendants did argue at the hearing that the claim had a pleading defect. The transcript of the hearing on the motion to dismiss shows that neither of the parties nor the court used the language with prejudice during the hearing. The record shows that no mention was made during the hearing whether leave to amend was either granted or denied. ¶ 26 The record also shows that the motion to dismiss was the first challenge to the legal sufficiency of the petition's interference with contract claim. Thus, we are not presented with the situation where a trial court has unequivocally dismissed a claim for a non-curable pleading defect, and then a plaintiff seeks to re-file the dismissed claim in the guise of an amended petition. Finally, if Martin could reasonably have believed that the claim was dismissed because of a pleading defect she could reasonably have believed that she was allowed to request leave to amend her pleading. In the trial court she cited Kelly v. Abbott, 1989 OK 124, 781 P.2d 1188, an opinion stating that a trial court has a mandatory duty pursuant to § 2012(G) to grant leave to amend when a defect in pleading may be remedied. Id. 1989 OK 124, at ¶ 6, 781 P.2d at 1190. We conclude that Martin could reasonably have believed that the trial court dismissed her claim because of a pleading defect, and she could reasonably have argued that her amendment was allowed pursuant to § 2012. The order awarding sanctions based upon her motion seeking leave to amend is thus vacated.