Opinion ID: 1483399
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Law..Did the Court Commit Reversible Error by Excluding Johnson from the Courtroom?

Text: The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that no person shall be deprived of liberty without due process of law and the Sixth Amendment guarantees a speedy and public trial with the right of confrontation [2] to every defendant in the courts of the United States. The leading criminal case on what constitutes due process under the Fourteenth Amendment is Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 54 S.Ct. 330, 78 L.Ed. 674, 90 A.L.R. 575. We think that this decision must guide us to our conclusion in the case at bar since the Supreme Court held in Hurtado v. People of California, 110 U.S. 516, 535, 4 S.Ct. 292, 28 L.Ed. 232, that the phrase due process of law used in the Fourteenth Amendment to restrain action by the states means substantially the same as that phrase of the Fifth Amendment, restraining action by the federal government. See, also, Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 101, 29 S.Ct. 14, 53 L.Ed. 97; Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 66, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158, 84 A.L.R. 527; Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 235, 236, 60 S.Ct. 472, 84 L.Ed. 716, and compare Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 245, 56 S.Ct. 444, 80 L.Ed. 660. In view of the exhaustive citation of authorities in both the majority opinion of the Supreme Court by Mr. Justice Cardozo and in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Roberts in the Snyder case, there is no point in this court embarking upon a lengthy reiteration of the authorities. In Snyder v. Massachusetts, Snyder, who had been found guilty of a murder growing out of an attempted robbery, contended that he had been deprived of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment because when the jury had viewed the scene of the crime pursuant to the provisions of Section 35 of Chapter 234 of the General Laws of Massachusetts he had not been present. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the conviction, 282 Mass. 401, 185 N.E. 376, and the Supreme Court of the United States refused to reverse the judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. After referring to Twining v. New Jersey, supra, 211 U.S. at pages 106, 111, 112, 29 S.Ct. 14, 53 L.Ed. 97, in which the privilege against self-incrimination was withdrawn, and Hurtado v. People of California, supra, where a defendant was tried for a capital offense upon an information rather than an indictment, Mr. Justice Cardozo stated the essence of due process of law as follows, 291 U.S. at page 105, 54 S.Ct. at page 332, 78 L.Ed. 674, 90 A.L.R. 575, What may not be taken away is notice of the charge and an adequate opportunity to be heard in defense of it. Mr. Justice Cardozo then went on to say that a defendant's privilege to confront his accusers and cross-examine them face to face is guaranteed to him by the Sixth Amendment in prosecutions in the federal courts, citing Gaines v. Washington, 277 U.S. 81, 85, 48 S.Ct. 468, 72 L.Ed. 793, and that his defense may be made easier if he is permitted to be present while jurors are being examined or counsel are summing up to the jury. His presence will enable him to advise his counsel or if he wishes, to supersede his counsel and to conduct the trial himself. Mr. Justice Cardozo then went on to say, In all the cases thus assumed the presence of the defendant satisfies the test that was put forward a moment ago as basic and decisive. It bears, or may fairly be assumed to bear, a relation, reasonably substantial, to his opportunity to defend. The test thus laid down by the Supreme Court is a very plain one. In the opinion in the Snyder case Mr. Justice Cardozo also stated, 291 U.S. at pages 107, 108, 54 S.Ct. at page 333, 78 L.Ed. 674, 90 A.L.R. 575, So far as the Fourteenth Amendment is concerned, the presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only. The Supreme Court points out that motions before trial are heard in the defendant's absence, as are many motions made after trial or in the prosecution of appeals. The question which we have before us in the instant case is one which is extremely difficult to answer. Obviously it is not necessary for a defendant to be present at every stage of the proceedings against him. Due process does not require him to be in court when a true bill is returned against him by a grand jury or when his appeal is argued in the appellate court. See Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325, 331, 31 S.Ct. 590, 55 L.Ed. 753. The defendant must be in court when jurors are challenged. Hopt v. People of Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 579, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L.Ed. 262. Certainly the defendant must be present when the jury is in the box and the trial is in progress. The defendant must be deemed to have the absolute right to hear everything which the jury hears if he is to protect himself. Under such circumstances his presence bears a relation reasonably substantial, to his opportunity to defend. To exclude him from the court room upon such occasions would be to hazard his constitutional rights upon the theory an appellate tribunal might save him from jeopardy. He must be present when the jury is present and is receiving evidence. If he is, then the trial meets the substance of the stringent test laid down by Mr. Justice Roberts in his dissenting opinion in the Snyder case, 291 U.S. at page 129, 54 S.Ct. at page 341, 78 L.Ed. 674, 90 A.L.R. 575. Mr. Justice Roberts stated that the prisoner's constitutional right of presence    comprehend[s] the inquiry by the ordained trier of fact from beginning to end, citing Hopt v. Utah, supra; Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 13 S.Ct. 136, 36 L.Ed. 1011, and Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 32 S.Ct. 250, 56 L.Ed. 500, Ann.Cas. 1913C, 1138. In the instant case it appears that the defendant was present at all times that the jury was present and his absolute constitutional right of presence was not infringed. Johnson's exclusion took place when the jury was absent and a point of law raised by his counsel was argued. We can find no federal decision precisely in point. The case which supplies the nearest parallel to the case at bar is that of Adams v. State of Florida, 28 Fla. 511, 10 So. 106, 117, where the jury had been sent from the courtroom during argument and Adams was returned to jail. In that case it was flatly held that the defendant had,    the right to be present and to hear questions of law as well as questions of fact discussed, and in fact no steps can be taken in the case in his absence. A somewhat similar decision was reached in Tiller v. State, 96 Ga. 430, 23 S.E. 825, 826. In this case Mr. Justice Lumpkin stated, It cannot be doubted that the argument of counsel is a stage of the proceedings, for the trial is not concluded until after the verdict has been received and recorded. The importance of this particular stage, as affecting the accused, is obvious; it being a matter of vital concern to him to see and hear everything done and said, both for and against him, as the trial progresses. The decisions just cited seem to us to go too far. If followed to their logical end great difficulties would be encountered in the practical conduct of a trial. The rule was stated by Mr. Justice Cardozo in the Snyder case, 291 U.S. at page 114, 54 S.Ct. at page 335, 78 L.Ed. 674, 90 A.L.R. 575, as follows, A defendant in a criminal case must be present at a trial when evidence is offered, for the opportunity must be his to advise with his counsel    and cross-examine his accusers, citing Powell v. Alabama, supra; Dowdell v. United States, supra; Commonwealth v. Slavski, 245 Mass. 405, 140 N.E. 465, 29 A.L.R. 281. In other words, applying another test stated by Mr. Justice Cardozo, the presence of a defendant is a condition of due process only to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence   . The test, therefore, the jury, the triers of fact being absent from the courtroom, must be whether or not the appellant was damaged by not being present. An examination of the record convinces us that he was not. The question which was argued was purely one of law. We think that the trial court correctly resolved it for the reasons which will appear more particularly hereafter. Upon the return of the appellant to the courtroom he was warned of his constitutional immunity and claimed it immediately. As we have previously indicated, the right of a defendant to be present when the triers of fact are absent is not an absolute right, but one qualified by a condition that nothing occurs when he is not present which could put him in jeopardy. Only thus would his presence bear a relation reasonably substantial, to his opportunity to defend. Counsel for the United States makes much of the fact that when the appellant went on the stand he acquired another capacity; he remained a defendant but he became a witness. A defendant who becomes a witness waives his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination as to the crime with which he is charged. Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494, 46 S.Ct. 566, 70 L.Ed. 1054. Waiver of privilege by a defendant is discussed at length in 8 Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd Ed., §§ 2276 et seq. and we do not need to repeat here what is said there. The government contends that when Johnson offered himself as a witness he waived any constitutional privilege which conflicted with that role. We cannot agree with this contention. There is ample authority for the proposition that a defendant when he goes on the witness stand waives constitutional rights otherwise retained. For example, he waives his privilege as to self-incrimination. He must answer questions as to facts according to the rules which are imposed on him in the jurisdiction in which he is being tried. There are half a dozen different rules which may govern the giving of his testimony. They need not be stated here. See Wigmore on Evidence, supra. But in the case at bar we are not concerned with what testimony a defendant who takes the stand must give but with the fact that the defendant was absent from the court room at a stage of his trial. We cannot justify the exclusion of the defendant from the courtroom in the case at bar on the ground that he was a witness. For whatever additional capacity or capacities a defendant may acquire during the course of his trial he remains a defendant throughout the entire course of his trial until, the jury returning a verdict of not guilty, the court has entered judgment upon that verdict. The argument of the prosecuting officer based upon the appellant's capacity as a witness is an ingenious one, but we cannot accept it. Its acceptance would open the door wide to abuse and the abrogation of rights guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. We prefer to base our conclusions on what we deem to be safer ground. We lay down the rule for this circuit that a defendant must be present in the courtroom at every stage of the proceeding which requires the presence of the jury. This is an absolute right. He should also be present at every other stage of his trial, from the time the first venireman is called to the box until judgment is rendered by the court upon the verdict of the jury. If he is not present when the triers of the facts are not present but argument is being had before the court during the course of his trial, he must be deemed to be entitled to a new trial if it be found that any of his rights have been endamaged by his absence. In the case at bar it should be noted that neither the defendant nor his counsel made objection to the direction of the trial judge that he leave the courtroom during the argument upon the propriety of the question which had been put to him as a witness. The record is full of other instances of vigorous objection by the defendant's counsel. We think that the defendant acquiesced in the trial judge's direction to him to withdraw from the courtroom. No objection was made at the time the trial judge gave the direction. It was not made the basis for any motion following the judgment of conviction. It was not advanced to this court as a ground for the enlargement of Johnson upon bail. It was asserted first in the argument upon appeal. We state these facts despite our conviction that in the application of constitutional rights technicalities have no place, for we think the facts tend to confirm our conclusion that the defendant took no harm from his exclusion from the courtroom during the argument.