Opinion ID: 778298
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: AEDPA Analysis

Text: 53 The standard of review applicable to the Appellate Division's decision on Cox's privilege claim depends on whether that court disposed of the claim on the merits rather than on a procedural, or other, ground. Sellan v. Kuhlman, 261 F.3d 303, 311 (2d Cir.2001). If the Appellate Division adjudicated Cox's claim on the merits, then we may not grant the writ under AEDPA unless that adjudication resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) (explaining the contrary to and unreasonable application clauses). If the Appellate Division did not adjudicate Cox's claim on the merits, we review it de novo. See Washington v. Schriver, 255 F.3d 45, 55 (2d Cir.2001). 54 The Appellate Division held that Cox's remaining claims, including his cleric-congregant privilege claim, were either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit. Cox I, 264 A.D.2d at 854, 696 N.Y.S.2d at 178. The district court evidently assumed that the Appellate Division rejected Cox's federal claims on the merits because it applied AEDPA deference to some of them. See Cox II, 154 F.Supp.2d at 792-93. While we conclusively presume that a claim is not procedurally barred absent a clear statement to the contrary, Jones, 229 F.3d at 118, to determine whether a state court adjudicated a claim on the merits, we would ordinarily apply the distinct analysis adopted by our decision in Sellan, see 261 F.3d at 314 (adopting the adjudicated on the merits analysis set forth in Mercadel v. Cain, 179 F.3d 271, 274 (5th Cir.1999)). Here, however, we find it unnecessary to perform that analysis. As in Washington, 255 F.3d at 55, our disposition of this appeal would be the same whether we were to review the petitioner's claim de novo or with AEDPA deference. 55 The appellant, assuming AEDPA deference applies, observes that the Supreme Court has never addressed the relationship between the clergy privilege and the First Amendment or between [A.A.] and the First Amendment. Appellant's Br. at 32-33. It therefore argues that we cannot find the Appellate Division's decision either contrary to, or involv[ing] an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (emphasis added). This argument misconceives the potential constitutional question presented here. The issue is not whether the First Amendment mandates a cleric-congregant privilege. Cox does not make that argument. The issue is whether, assuming that A.A. must be treated as a religion in this context and in light of the New York legislature's choice to enact a cleric-congregant privilege, courts may, under the Establishment Clause, interpret the privilege to extend to some religions but not to A.A. Cox claims, in other words, that New York's privilege officially discriminates against the religion of A.A. We need not and do not reach that issue to resolve this appeal. But we note that the prohibition of official discrimination against religions is undoubtedly clearly established. See, e.g., Larson, 456 U.S. at 244, 102 S.Ct. 1673 (The clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.); Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 703, 114 S.Ct. 2481, 129 L.Ed.2d 546 (1994) ([G]overnment should not prefer one religion to another or religion to irreligion.).