Opinion ID: 1875449
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Trial Court Properly Denied Campbell's Motion for Directed Verdict on Firearm Enhancement.

Text: The Commonwealth sought to have Campbell's sentences for drug offenses enhanced under KRS 218A.992 (possession of firearm at time of and in furtherance of drug offenses). Campbell moved for a directed verdict on the firearm enhancement, based on lack of proof of the firearm's operability, and argues that the trial court committed reversible error in denying this motion. The jury found Campbell guilty of all three drug offenses (methamphetamine manufacture, marijuana possession, and drug paraphernalia possession) and further found beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell had possessed a firearm in furtherance of all three drug offenses. The jury recommended the maximum enhanced sentences available for these three offenses (fifty years' imprisonment on the enhanced methamphetamine manufacture, and five years' imprisonment each on the enhanced possession of marijuana and enhanced possession of drug paraphernalia convictions). Police had found a rusty or corroded sawed-off shotgun behind the headboard of a bed in Campbell's home when searching the home for evidence of suspected methamphetamine manufacture. The gun was not subjected to any ballistics testing before trial, and neither party presented proof as to whether the gun was actually capable of firing. The Commonwealth had announced its intention at an in-chambers conference during trial to offer a police officer's testimony that the gun would actually fire bullets, but the trial court sustained Campbell's objection that this evidence should be excluded due to lack of prior notice. [29] So this case squarely presents the question of whether the prosecution has the burden of proving the operability of a firearm in order to enhance sentences for drug offenses under KRS 218A.992 or whether the inoperability of the firearm is an affirmative defense that the defense has the burden of proving. The firearm enhancement is set forth in KRS 218A.992, which states, in pertinent part, that: 1) Other provisions of law notwithstanding, any person who is convicted of any violation of this chapter who, at the time of the commission of the offense and in furtherance of the offense, was in possession of a firearm, shall: (a) Be penalized one (1) class more severely than provided in the penalty provision pertaining to that offense if it is a felony; or (b) Be penalized as a Class D felon if the offense would otherwise be a misdemeanor. A firearm is defined in KRS 237.060(2) as any weapon which will expel a projectile by the action of an explosive. By the plain language of this definition, a gun must be able to shoot bullets or other projectiles to qualify as a firearm. [30] This is in contrast to federal firearm enhancement for drug offenses where the relevant statutory definition of firearm explicitly includes weapons designed to eject projectiles by explosive action or weapons that can be converted to eject projectiles by explosive action, as well as those that actually will eject projectiles by explosive action. [31] In Arnold v. Commonwealth, [32] the Court of Appeals recently held that in carrying concealed deadly weapons cases, the inoperability of the weapon is an affirmative defense that the defense had the burden of proving. This holding conforms to our precedent. [33] And we find no reason to treat the alleged inoperability of a weapon differently in the context of firearm enhancement of drug convictions. Although firearm definitions for carrying concealed deadly weapons and for firearm enhancement purposes are provided in different sections of the Kentucky Revised Statutes, the language in these sections is identical. Both KRS 527.010(4) (applicable to carrying concealed deadly weapons cases under KRS 527.020) and KRS 237.060(2) (applicable to firearm enhancement of drug offenses under KRS 218A.992) define a firearm as any weapon which will expel a projectile by the action of an explosive. But this definition is not an element of either offense. Rather, the basic elements of the offense of carrying a concealed deadly weapon are set forth, subject to certain specified exceptions, in KRS 527.020(1): A person is guilty of carrying a concealed weapon when he or she carries concealed a firearm or other deadly weapon on or about his or her person. [34] Required elements for firearm enhancement of drug offenses are found in KRS 218A.992(1): Other provisions of law notwithstanding, any person who is convicted of any violation of this chapter who, at the time of the commission of the offense and in furtherance of the offense, was in possession of a firearm[.] Because the operability of the firearm is not an element of the firearm enhancement, the inoperability of a firearm is an affirmative defense for which the defense has the burden of proof. So the total lack of proof as to operability does not entitle Campbell to a directed verdict on the firearm enhancement. Furthermore, the proof was sufficient to create a jury issue as to the elements of the firearm enhancement: possession of a firearm at the time the drug offenses were committed and possession of a firearm in furtherance of the drug offenses. Whether or not the gun was covered by bedding, it was found in Campbell's home and, thus, in his constructive possession. [35] Furthermore, given its proximity to the marijuana, drug paraphernalia, and methamphetamine manufacturing equipment found, the jury could reasonably infer that it was used in furtherance of the drug offenses. Thus, the trial court properly denied the directed verdict motion pursuant to the directed verdict standard in Commonwealth v. Benham: [36] On motion for directed verdict, the trial court must draw all fair and reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the Commonwealth. If the evidence is sufficient to induce a reasonable juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, a directed verdict should not be given. For the purpose of ruling on the motion, the trial court must assume that the evidence for the Commonwealth is true, but reserving to the jury questions as to the credibility and weight to be given to such testimony. On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if under the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only then the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal. [37] We also note that the jury was properly instructed that it must find the elements of the firearm enhancement provision beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury instructions explicitly asked whether the jury found Campbell guilty of each drug offense and, in regard to each offense, whether the jury believe[d] from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant was in possession of a firearm when he committed the offense and in furtherance of the offense. [38] This in furtherance language properly tracks the statute and, certainly, is more than adequate to fulfill the requirement that a nexus between the firearm possession and the drug offense be shown. [39] Furthermore, the jury was also instructed on the definition of a firearm with the exact language of KRS 237.060(2). So we find no fault with the jury instructions as to the firearm enhancement. Because the jury was properly instructed on the firearm enhancement issue and the evidence was sufficient to withstand the directed verdict motion, we find no reversible error in the trial court's handling of this matter. So we affirm the enhancement of Campbell's drug offenses for possession of a firearm at the time of and in furtherance of the commission of the offenses.