Opinion ID: 1213767
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Imminent and Substantial Endangerment Claim

Text: SAPS's next claim is that Metacon has disposed of solid waste, i.e., the lead that has been discarded on its site, 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27), that may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B). The district court granted Metacon summary judgment on the ground that SAPS provided insufficient evidence that solid waste had been discarded on the Metacon site in light of Metacon's uncontested evidence that spent casings and munitions are periodically removed. Simsbury-Avon Pres. Soc'y v. Metacon Gun Club, No. 3:04 Civ. 803(JBA), 2006 WL 2223946, at  (D.Conn. Aug.2, 2006). We need not reach the issue of whether lead on Metacon's site has been discarded within the meaning of the statutory definition of solid waste. See Conn. Coastal, 989 F.2d at 1316 (RCRA regulations apply the broader statutory definition of solid waste to imminent hazard suits.). Metacon argues that, assuming arguendo that lead is discarded on its site, the district court's grant of summary judgment should be affirmed on the alternative ground that there is insufficient evidence that the discarded lead constitutes a solid or hazardous waste which may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B). This standard cannot be met as a matter of law, says Metacon, because the AEI report on which SAPS relies concedes that the degree of risk to humans and wildlife cannot be assessed without further investigation, which SAPS has not undertaken. J.A. at 646. SAPS responds that the AEI report's findings are sufficient to raise a material issue of fact as to whether the spent ammunition on the site may present an imminent and substantial endangerment. For the reasons stated here, we conclude that the AEI report does not raise a material issue of fact and that summary judgment was properly granted.
The RCRA citizen suit provision, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B), provides a cause of action against any person ... including any past or present generator, past or present transporter, or past or present owner or operator of a treatment, storage, or disposal facility, who has contributed or who is contributing to the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste which may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B). The RCRA defines disposal as the discharge, deposit,... or placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any land or water so that such solid waste or hazardous waste or any constituent thereof may enter the environment or be ... discharged into any waters. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3). We have indicated that the imminent and substantial endangerment standard is a broad one: Significantly, congress used the word may to preface the standard of liability: present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment[.] This is expansive language, which is intended to confer upon the courts the authority to grant affirmative equitable relief to the extent necessary to eliminate any risk posed by toxic wastes. Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343, 1355 (2d Cir.1991) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), judgment rev'd in part on other grounds, 505 U.S. 557, 112 S.Ct. 2638, 120 L.Ed.2d 449 (1992); see also Me. People's Alliance v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 471 F.3d 277, 288 (1st Cir.2006) (noting that at least four of our sister circuits have construed [§ 6972(a)(1)(B) ] expansively and that all four courts have emphasized the preeminence of the word `may' in defining the degree of risk needed to support [§ 6972(a)(1)(B)'s] liability standard). No matter how broadly read, however, the text of 42 U.S.C. § 6972 requires the presence of solid or hazardous waste that may present an endangerment that is imminent and substantial. Each of these terms benefits from evaluation. In Dague, we stated that imminency requires a showing that a risk of threatened harm is present. Dague, 935 F.2d at 1356; see also Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 485-86, 116 S.Ct. 1251 (imminency requires a threat which is present now, although the impact of the threat may not be felt until later); Me. People's Alliance, 471 F.3d at 296 (imminency requires a reasonable prospect of future harm ... [that] is near-term); Chem. Weapons Working Group, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Def., 61 Fed.Appx. 556, 561 (10th Cir.2003) (A vague possibility of future harm cannot satisfy [42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B)], which applies to dangers that are both imminent and substantial.(internal quotation marks omitted)); Price v. U.S. Navy, 39 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir.1994) (A finding of `imminency' does not require a showing that actual harm will occur immediately so long as the risk of threatened harm is present.). Nonetheless, liability under 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) is not limited to emergency-type situations, and [a] finding of `imminency' does not require a showing that actual harm will occur immediately. Dague, 935 F.2d at 1356. An `imminent hazard' may be declared at any point in a chain of events which may ultimately result in harm to the public. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). As for the requirement that the endangerment at issue be substantial  a term for which the RCRA provides no definition or explanation, and that we did not specifically comment on in Dague  we agree with other Circuits that have concluded that an endangerment is substantial if it is serious. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Grant, 505 F.3d 1013, 1021 (10th Cir.2007) ([A]n endangerment is substantial under RCRA when it is serious. (internal quotation marks omitted)); Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 386 F.3d 993, 1015 (11th Cir.2004) (Because the operative word [in 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B)] is `may,'... the plaintiffs must show that there is a potential for an imminent threat of a serious harm.); Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 399 F.3d 248, 259 (3d Cir.2005) (stating that Parker 's approach ... is most faithful to the statutory language, especially as to the word `substantial'); Cox v. City of Dallas, 256 F.3d 281, 300 (5th Cir.2001) ([A]n endangerment is `substantial' if it is `serious.'); Price, 39 F.3d at 1019 ([The] endangerment must be substantial or serious.). This interpretation comports with the ordinary meaning of substantial, which includes being of moment, or important. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2281 (2002). Although the courts have agreed that the word `substantial' implies serious harm, there has been some reluctance to quantify the needed level of harm more precisely, Me. People's Alliance, 471 F.3d at 288, and we decline to do so here. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 505 F.3d at 1021 (stating that a showing of serious endangerment does not necessitate quantification of endangerment). As for endangerment, [c]ourts have consistently held that `endangerment' means a threatened or potential harm and does not require proof of actual harm. Dague, 935 F.2d at 1356. An endangerment that is imminent and substantial requires a reasonable prospect of future harm. Me. People's Alliance, 471 F.3d at 296; see also Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 505 F.3d at 1021 (stating that an endangerment is substantial where there is reasonable cause for concern that someone or something may be exposed to risk of harm (emphasis added)); Interfaith Cmty. Org., 399 F.3d at 259 (same). As the First Circuit recently summarized: [T]he combination of the word `may' with the word `endanger,' both of which are probabilistic, leads us to conclude that a reasonable prospect of future harm is adequate to engage the gears of [§ 6972(a)(1)(B)] so long as the threat is near-term and involves potentially serious harm. Me. People's Alliance, 471 F.3d at 296.
Pointing to the AEI report, SAPS argues that it has adduced sufficient evidence to create a material issue of fact as to whether lead contamination on Metacon's site may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B). We disagree for at least two reasons. Specifically, SAPS has failed to adduce sufficient evidence on either of two issues: (1) the likelihood that existing lead contamination will in fact result in harm to human health or the environment; and (2) the severity of any harm that might occur. With respect to the first issue, SAPS's expert report states that the degree of potential exposure of humans and wildlife to lead contamination on the site  with respect to impacted soils, wetland surface water and wetland sediment  was not assessed. J.A. at 644-45. The report concludes as follows: The presence of firing-range-related contaminants on the site, primarily total lead, represents a potential exposure risk to both humans and wildlife. A risk assessment utilizing the data obtained during this investigation would be necessary to evaluate the degree of risk to humans and wildlife. Id. at 646 (emphasis added). SAPS never undertook such a risk assessment. The record is thus insufficient to permit a factfinder to assess the magnitude of the possible risk identified in the AEI report  a risk, parenthetically, that was not detected at all in the analysis performed by LGB. There is thus insufficient evidence for a jury to find that the alleged contamination presents a reasonable prospect of future harm, and hence that it may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B); see also Birch Corp. v. Nev. Inv. Holding, Inc., 152 F.3d 924 (9th Cir.1998) (unpublished opinion) (letter stating the product [, i.e., gasoline,] may pose a significant threat to public health/safety was found to be insufficient to create a material issue of fact regarding imminent and substantial endangerment because the letter makes no statement about the imminence of these harms and indicates merely a possible substantial endangerment to the public health). The second concern arises from the failure of SAPS's proffered evidence to raise an issue of fact as to the seriousness of the risk it alleges. SAPS points to evidence in the AEI report that soil, wetland sediment and wetland surface water samples indicate the presence of lead at levels exceeding various Connecticut regulatory standards for residential sites. Even assuming arguendo that [p]roof of contamination in excess of state standards may support a finding of liability, and may alone suffice for liability in some cases, Interfaith Cmty. Org., 399 F.3d at 261, however, the record in this case is insufficient for a reasonable jury to find that the lead contamination at issue here involves potentially serious harm. Me. People's Alliance, 471 F.3d at 296. The AEI report compares the result of samples taken from the Metacon site to risk-based and health-based criteria developed by CTDEP. J.A. at 641. The report states: Soil sample laboratory test results for total lead and other metals are compared to Direct Exposure Criteria (DEC) of the CTDEP Remediation Standard Regulations (RSRs) and to CTDEP Significant Environmental Hazard (SEH) notification thresholds specified in Connecticut General Statutes (C.G.S.) 22a-6u. RSR DEC are health-based standards developed by CTDEP to be protective of human health and are used in this report by AEI as guidelines to assess the potential risk to human health via long-term exposure (i.e., skin contact, ingestion, inhalation, etc.) to constituents in the soil. SEH thresholds are criteria developed by CTDEP to identify potentially significant hazards to human health and the environment. Id. The report finds that various samples drawn from the Metacon site exceeded Connecticut's RSR and SEH thresholds for residential sites, and draws the conclusion that lead contamination on the site presents a potential exposure risk to both humans and wildlife. Id. at 646. The report notes specifically, however, in the section labeled Exposure Assessment, that evaluation of the degree of such risk would require a further risk assessment. See J.A. 644-45. Because it did not undertake this assessment, SAPS relies solely on the conclusion that certain samples from the Metacon site exceeded Connecticut's RSR and SEH standards to support the claim that lead on the site presents a potentially serious risk. This is plainly insufficient to raise a material issue. At the start, state environmental standards do not define a party's federal liability under RCRA. Interfaith Cmty. Org., 399 F.3d at 261 n. 6. Even the most cursory review of Connecticut law, moreover, strongly suggests that the mere fact that some samples taken from the Metacon site may exceed Connecticut's RSR standards provides an insufficient basis for a jury to find a reasonable prospect of future harm that is both near-term and ... potentially serious. Me. People's Alliance, 471 F.3d at 296. Connecticut's RSR standards define, inter alia, the threshold levels to which contaminated sites must be remediated in circumstances where the CTDEP has determined remediation is necessary. See Conn. Agencies Regs. §§ 22a-133k-1(b), 22a-133k-2(a). Notably, however, the RSRs do not create in and of themselves a requirement that remediation be undertaken, nor do they specify a time-frame for completing remediation. Conn. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., Remediation Standard Regulations: An Environmental Program Fact Sheet (updated Aug. 2007), available at http://www.ct.gov/Dep/cwp/view.asp?a= 2715&q=325014&depNav_GID=1626. With regard to hazardous waste disposal sites, for example, to which the RSRs apply, Connecticut law authorizes the CTDEP to undertake a site assessment and to order remedial action on the basis of this assessment. See Conn. Gen.Stat. §§ 22a-133d, 22a-133e. Remediation to the DEC threshold is not required merely because this threshold has been exceeded, but in light of the agency's consideration of a range of risk factors, including the characteristics of hazardous substances, such as their mobility and toxicity, the likelihood that these substances will be released, and the nature of potentially threatened populations or environments. [2] See Conn. Gen.Stat. § 22a-133d (specifying required elements in a site assessment, including a score developed by using the uncontrolled hazardous waste site ranking system found in the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 40, Section 300, Appendix A, as amended); Honeywell Int'l, Inc. v. EPA, 372 F.3d 441, 444 (D.C.Cir. 2004) (describing considerations employed in ranking hazardous waste sites). The AEI report says that it employs the DEC thresholds as guidelines to assess the potential risk to human health via long-term exposure (i.e., skin contact, ingestion, inhalation, etc.) to constituents in the soil. J.A. at 641. Yet SAPS has provided no evidence that anyone is subject to long-term exposure to lead contamination at the Metacon site, or that there are realistic pathways of exposure there. Indeed, the report found that none of the soil samples drawn from the firing line, where most people at the club would presumably be located while there, exceeded these thresholds. See J.A. at 642-43. As to the AEI report's finding that various samples exceeded the SEH notification threshold, this finding, too, provides a wholly inadequate basis, standing alone, to support a reasonable factfinder's conclusion that the lead at Metacon presents an imminent and substantial endangerment. Conn. Gen.Stat. § 22a-6u imposes a requirement that (1) if a technical environmental professional determines that there is pollution of soil within two feet of the ground surface [that] contains a substance in excess of the applicable SEH threshold, the professional must notify the owner of the contaminated parcel within seven days, Conn. Gen.Stat. § 22a-6u(d)(1); and (2) the owner of the subject parcel shall notify the commissioner [of the CTDEP] in writing within ninety days, unless, inter alia, the soil is remediated so that the contaminant does not exceed the pertinent direct exposure criterion. Id. § 22a-6u(d)(2). Standing alone, however, the fact that some Metacon samples triggered this notification requirement does not support the conclusion that the site is contaminated so as to pose a potentially serious risk of harm for the purpose of the federal standard articulated in § 6972(a)(1)(B). Indeed, CTDEP states that, when it receives notification of the presence of a contaminant above the SEH level, the DEP may ... indicate, if appropriate, that no additional action is required to abate the hazard condition identified in the notification. Conn. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., Environmental Program Fact Sheet: Reporting of Significant Environmental Hazards 3 (Nov. 2, 2004), available at http://www.ct.gov/dep/lib/dep/site_clean_ up/hazard_notification/faq_report_haz.pdf. [3] In sum, evidence that certain samples taken from the Metacon site exceeded Connecticut's RSR and SEH standards simply provides an inadequate basis for a jury to conclude that federal law, specifically, § 6972(a)(1)(B), has been violated. Absent additional evidence, the mere fact that SAPS has produced such samples does not support a reasonable inference that Metacon's site presents an imminent and substantial endangerment. We emphasize that we do not hold that exceeding Connecticut's RSR and SEH standards can never be relevant to a determination of whether a risk is potentially serious under the RCRA, but rather that the evidence in this case, standing alone, is insufficient to create a material issue of fact as to whether lead contamination on Metacon's site may present an imminent and substantial endangerment. We conclude that SAPS's evidence (1) does not indicate anything more than a speculative prospect of future harm and (2) does not include sufficient information from which a reasonable jury could find that the potential harm at issue rises to the level of a serious endangerment. Hence, SAPS has failed to raise a material issue of fact as to whether lead contamination at Metacon's site may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B). Accordingly, the district court's grant of summary judgment to Metacon on SAPS's RCRA imminent and substantial endangerment claim is affirmed.