Opinion ID: 6337433
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Search of the Trailer

Text: To lawfully search a residence, law-enforcement officers generally need a warrant supported by probable cause. See United States v. Dalton, 918 F.3d 1117, 1127 (10th Cir. 2019). Defendant concedes, as he should, that when the warrant for 9000 Zuni was issued on November 19, 2018, there was probable cause to search the trailer. He argues, however, that before the warrant was executed on November 28, officers learned that Angulo had moved from 9000 Zuni to 710 Dan. Because all the evidence in support of the warrant for 9000 Zuni was derived from Angulo’s actions, Defendant contends that the probable cause supporting the warrant for 9000 Zuni had therefore dissipated before its execution. We have held that probable cause must exist not only for the issuance of a search warrant, but also when it is executed. See United States v. Garcia, 707 F.3d 1190, 1195–96 (10th Cir. 2013). Probable cause may dissipate simply from the passage of time as evidence becomes stale. See Dalton, 918 F.3d at 1127. But new information can also undermine what had been probable cause. See id. at 1127–28; United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 95 n.2 (2006) (“[P]robable cause may cease to exist after a warrant is issued. The police may learn, for instance, that contraband is no longer located at the place to be searched.”); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 4.7(a) (6th ed. 2021) (“[E]ven 7 Appellate Case: 20-2180 Document: 010110679053 Date Filed: 05/03/2022 Page: 8 without any delay at all, new events known to the police may dissipate the recent probable cause showing to the magistrate.”). In the case before us the relevant question is whether the officers executing the 9000 Zuni warrant had determined beforehand that Angulo had moved. The district court, however, credited TFO Pelot’s testimony at the suppression hearing that officers had not determined that Angulo had moved out of 9000 Zuni before they executed the warrant. This finding is not clearly erroneous. There was no evidence that the officers had seen or received information that Angulo had moved belongings from 9000 Zuni or had moved belongings to 710 Dan. All they knew was that his phone had been used at 710 Dan during the prior two days. They also knew that Angulo had resided at 9000 Zuni for several months. The officers had no reason to infer that he had decided to change residences over the Thanksgiving holiday. A temporary (two-day) visit to 710 Dan would have been much more likely. The district court found that the evidence did no more than “suggest[] that Angulo was frequenting [710 Dan].” Order at 10. Defendant’s best support for his thesis is language in TFO Pelot’s affidavit for the 710 Dan search warrant: On November 26, 2018, Agents/TFOs conducted surveillance to determine [Angulo’s] current residence as part of the investigation, and to plan for the execution of the federal arrest warrant. Agents/TFO located [Angulo] at the SUBJECT PREMISES. [Angulo] was also observed at the SUBJECT PREMISES on November 27, 2018. On November 28, 2018, [Angulo] was taken into custody outside the SUBJECT PREMISES. Subsequent to his arrest, [Angulo] stated the SUBJECT PREMISES was his residence. The manager for the apartments where the SUBJECT PREMISES was located was interviewed 8 Appellate Case: 20-2180 Document: 010110679053 Date Filed: 05/03/2022 Page: 9 and also stated that [Angulo] had recently rented the apartment as the sole occupant. R., Vol. I at 86 (emphasis added). He argues that the emphasized language shows that the task force must have known Angulo had moved out of 9000 Zuni by November 26 because otherwise there would be no need to find his current residence. This point is not without force and might have persuaded a different factfinder. But there is no evidence that any officer had any knowledge of a move by Angulo before the cellphone-location evidence was received. And the purpose of seeking that location evidence was not to learn of a new permanent residence for Angulo but only to determine where he might best be found (what might be termed his temporary location or residence) when the time came to arrest the members of the drug organization. The author of the above-quoted paragraph, TFO Pelot, testified during the suppression hearing that he only became aware that Angulo had moved “at the time of the execution of the search warrant [for 9000 Zuni].” R., Vol. III at 29. The district court found this testimony credible. A reasonable judge could, and did, decide that the affidavit language relied on by Defendant was simply the sort of inartful expression one can expect to find when a law-enforcement officer (not an English professor) is hurrying to obtain a search warrant after discovering new important information. We affirm the district court’s ruling that the search of the trailer was lawful. 9 Appellate Case: 20-2180 Document: 010110679053 Date Filed: 05/03/2022 Page: 10