Opinion ID: 2416788
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Post-conviction Hearing Denial

Text: Jones alleges that the motion court erred by denying him a hearing on most of his Rule 29.15 claims. Jones asserts that he pleaded clearly and succinctly factual allegations as to those claims that if proven would entitle him to relief and they were not refuted by the record. Further, he alleges that his pleadings contained claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, including counsel's failure: to take steps necessary to allow a second taped statement he made to be admitted in order to show his remorse; to present cumulative mitigating evidence; to represent him adequately during voir dire; to present evidence and adequately assert that jurors do not understand the MAI instructions; to question adequately defense penalty phase witnesses; and to take sufficient efforts to disqualify the trial judge and to make objections to his hostile behavior. Jones also contends that defense co-counsel should have withdrawn from the case based on her history of conflict with the trial judge. Finally, Jones alleges that the decision to seek death against him was based on arbitrary and capricious factors. Rule 29.15(h) does not require an evidentiary hearing if the motion court determines that the files and records of the case conclusively show that the movant is not entitled to relief, but the court is required to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law. Appellate review of the trial court's findings of fact is limited to a determination of whether the findings are clearly erroneous. Rule 29.15(k). In order to obtain an evidentiary hearing, in claims related to ineffective assistance of counsel, the movant must allege facts, not refuted by the record, showing that counsel's performance did not conform to the degree of skill, care, and diligence of a reasonably competent attorney and that the movant was thereby prejudiced. State v. Brooks, 960 S.W.2d 479, 497 (Mo. banc 1997). Counsel is presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and to have made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. State v. Kinder, 942 S.W.2d 313, 335 (Mo. banc 1996). Jones' motion was properly overruled without an evidentiary hearing because his allegations do not satisfy the above requirements.
Jones alleges that his counsel did not ensure that a taped statement he made was audible and understandable because it could have been played for the jury to show his deep remorse and sadness. Counsel sought to introduce the tape into evidence, the prosecutor objected on grounds that it was inaudible and hearsay, and the court sustained the objection. The trial court did not err because Jones fails to prove how he was prejudiced in that his mother and Officer Douglas testified before the jury as to Jones' remorse and sadness. The tape will only be cumulative evidence of his remorse and sadness.
Jones contends that counsel failed to develop and present evidence that he had suffered from a mental disease or defect affecting his responsibility and that his mental condition would have lessened the degree of the offense, mitigated punishment, or both. In order to support the above contention, Jones resorted to offers of proof and an affidavit not submitted to the motion court. The motion court did not err for overruling the motion because Jones did not prove that the counsel's failure to present extensive cumulative evidence about his mental status was prejudicial. See, State v. Taylor, 929 S.W.2d, 209, 225 (Mo. banc 1996).
Jones alleges that his counsel failed to ensure that an adequate voir dire was conducted, to limit the prosecutor's and court's improper voir dire, and to ensure qualified venirepersons were retained and the unqualified ones were removed. The motion court found that Jones' allegations lacked factual specificity, that he did not prove prejudice and that he could not prove that his attorney's actions during voir dire were incompetent and not matters of trial strategy. See Kinder, supra at 338. The motion court findings and conclusions are not clearly erroneous.
Jones contends that his counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the MAI instructions through presenting evidence that jurors do not understand the instructions. In support of this claim, Jones asserts that Dr. Richard Weiner, a social scientist, could have testified about a study of MAI instructions that purports to demonstrate that jurors in fact do not understand the instructions. This research does not necessarily support a conclusion that the jurors in this case were unable to understand the MAI instructions. This Court has decided that the MAI instructions are constitutional and that counsel's failure to object to possible jury misunderstanding does not support claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The constitutionality of the MAI instructions defeats the claim that counsel's performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced. Kinder, supra at 338.
Jones alleges that counsel was ineffective for failing to question defense witnesses, which was especially prejudicial in light of the prosecutor's argument that Knuckles' family was only testifying on behalf of Jones because he is a family member. These statements lack factual specificity and do not establish how Jones was prejudiced by counsel's failure to question the Knuckles' family extensively.
Jones alleges that counsel was ineffective in their efforts to disqualify the trial judge and that defense co-counsel should have withdrawn from representation due to her alleged conflict with the trial judge. This issue has already been addressed. The record, moreover, reflects that both defense attorneys functioned quite capably.
Jones alleges that the decision to seek the death penalty was based on arbitrary and capricious considerations of race, affluence and gender. The motion court found that this was a matter for direct appeal. Post-conviction motions cannot be used as a substitute for direct appeal or to obtain a second appellate review. See State v. Redman, 916 S.W.2d 787, 793 (Mo. banc 1996). Furthermore, this Court has consistently upheld Missouri's death penalty scheme as being constitutional. State v. Carter, 955 S.W.2d 548, 562 (Mo. banc 1997).