Opinion ID: 3053954
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The “Gone in 60 Seconds” Mark

Text: [11] With respect to the “Gone in 60 Seconds” mark, the court found that Halicki lacked standing because Halicki’s registered marks for “Gone in 60 Seconds” are for toy model cars, toy model car kits, and baseball caps, whereas the Defendants only manufacture, produce, and sell restored vehicles fitted and detailed to replicate the 1960s Shelby GT-500 and GT-350 automobiles — i.e., actual cars. Halicki, 2005 WL 5253338, at  (“Because Plaintiffs are not the registered owner of ‘Gone in 60 Seconds’ for vehicles or automobiles, Plaintiffs may not claim standing in this instance as a registrant.”). This conclusion confuses an analysis of the merits of Halicki’s infringement claim with an analysis of whether she has standing to bring those claims. To establish standing under the Lanham Act, a plaintiff need only demonstrate that she is the registered owner of a mark for any class of products, even one that does not compete directly with the defendant’s products. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114. The question of whether the products on which the allegedly infringing mark appears are sufficiently related to goods sold by the plaintiff such that the defendant’s actions qualify as infringement is, by contrast, a merits question. See Perfumebay.com Inc. v. EBAY, Inc., 506 F.3d 1165, 1173 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that HALICKI FILMS v. CARROLL SHELBY INT. 15331 the degree of “relatedness” between the defendant’s and the plaintiff’s products is one factor that a district court should consider when evaluating whether the defendant has infringed on plaintiff’s mark). In this case, it is undisputed that Halicki is a registered owner of the “Gone in 60 Seconds” mark for “toy model cars and toy model car kits” and “baseball caps.” She therefore has standing under the Lanham Act to bring an infringement claim against others allegedly using the mark in a proscribed manner. [12] Although we do not reach the merits of Halicki’s “Eleanor” or “Gone in 60 Seconds” trademark infringement claims, we note that the defendants’ use of those marks on products — i.e., automobiles and automobile parts — that do not directly compete with products sold with Halicki’s mark — i.e., toy cars, toy model car kits, baseball caps, and t-shirts — is not dispositive of the merits of Halicki’s claim. See MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra, at § 24:2 (“Occasionally, a modern court will fall into the error of thinking that there must be competition between the parties for trademark infringement to occur.”); see, e.g., Hallmark Cards, Inc. v. Hallmark Dodge, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Mo. 1986) (automobile dealer’s use of the name “Hallmark Dodge” infringed on trademark owned by greeting card company); Triangle Publ’ns, Inc. v. Standard Plastic Products, Inc., 241 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1965) (producer of “MISS SEVENTEEN” luggage found to have infringed “SEVENTEEN” trademark registered to magazine publisher); see also MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra, at § 24:61 (providing extensive list of successful infringement claims brought by registered trademark owners against producers of non-competing goods). As the Tenth Circuit recently explained, [The] basic premise — that a trademark provides protection only when the defendant uses the mark on directly competing goods — is no longer good law. 15332 HALICKI FILMS v. CARROLL SHELBY INT. Although this notion survived into the early 1900s, it has long since been superceded. Team Tires Plus, Ltd. v. Tires Plus, Inc., 394 F.3d 831, 833-35 (10th Cir. 2005). The core question in non- competitive goods cases, as in most trademark infringement cases, is “whether customers are likely to be confused about the source or sponsorship of the products.” Perfumebay.com Inc., 506 F.3d at 1173 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Reno Air Racing Ass’n, Inc. v. McCord, 452 F.3d 1126, 1135 (9th Cir. 2006)); see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a). The “proximity or relatedness of the goods” is but one of eight factors for a district court to consider in its “likelihood of confusion” analysis. See Perfumebay.com, 506 F.3d at 1173. Thus we caution the District Court to take a sufficiently broad approach if and when it reaches the merits of Halicki’s infringement claims. D. Standing to Seek Declaratory Relief [13] Halicki contends that the District Court erred by finding that she did not have standing to seek a declaratory judgment cancelling the “Eleanor” trademark registration of the Defendant Carroll Hall Shelby Trust. We have explained the standing requirements for a cancellation claim brought under § 1064 of the Lanham Act: The Lanham Act requires only that the cancellation petitioner plead and prove facts showing a ‘real interest’ in the proceeding in order to establish standing. While [n]o absolute test can be laid down for what must be proved, a cancellation petitioner must show he is more than an intermeddler but rather has a personal interest, and that there is a real controversy between the parties. Thus, his allegations alone do not establish standing. The petitioner, instead, must show a real and rational basis for his belief that he would be damaged by the registration sought to HALICKI FILMS v. CARROLL SHELBY INT. 15333 be cancelled, stemming from an actual commercial or pecuniary interest in his own mark. Interest assertions will vary with the facts surrounding each cancellation dispute and therefore, a petitioner’s standing must be scrutinized case-by-case. Examples of what courts have countenanced as reasonable bases are: an assertion of a likelihood of confusion [between the petitioner’s mark and the registered mark at issue] which is not wholly without merit, . . . or . . . a rejection of an application during prosecution. Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. P.J. Rhodes & Co., 735 F.2d 346, 349 (9th Cir. 1984) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The District Court found that Halicki did not show a “real and rational basis for [her] belief that [s]he would be damaged by the registration sought to be cancelled, stemming from an actual commercial or pecuniary interest in [her] own mark,” id., because her “exclusive rights lie only with the Original Eleanor and the exploitation of that property,” Halicki, 2005 WL 5253338, at . For the reasons stated above, Halicki has made the showing required by Star-Kist. First, Halicki reserved the rights to Remake Eleanor. Moreover, an issue exists as to whether there is a real likelihood of confusion between the mark as used by the Defendants and the mark as used by Halicki. If Halicki were to sell a car based on the Original Eleanor, she may be able to show that a likelihood exists that there would be confusion in the marketplace. [14] The District Court also found that Halicki did not have Article III standing — specifically, the court found that Halicki had not shown an injury-in-fact because she provided no evidence such as lost profits from the Defendants’ merchandising of Eleanor. The District Court has conflated the Article III requirement of alleging an injury-in-fact with the burden of production required to defeat summary judgment. Halicki submitted two expert reports estimating damages in excess of $7 million. It is not clear from the District Court’s opinion if 15334 HALICKI FILMS v. CARROLL SHELBY INT. it considered this evidence and rejected it or if it did not consider it at all. In any event, the District Court erred by concluding that a lack of evidence supporting an alleged injuryin-fact deprived Halicki of Article III standing. Halicki has alleged an injury-in-fact and submitted evidence on it sufficient to preclude summary judgment for lack of standing. Moreover, Halicki has statutory standing under the Lanham Act because she retains the merchandising rights to Remake Eleanor and, as stated above, an issue exists as to whether the Defendants’ use of the mark “Eleanor” has created a likelihood of confusion in the marketplace. E. Halicki’s Other Claims [15] The District Court rejected Halicki’s claim for constructive trust based on its understanding that she did not have standing to bring suit for trademark infringement. In view of the foregoing, the District Court should revisit her constructive trust claim in the event that she establishes trademark standing and infringement. [16] To the extent the District Court granted the Defendants’ summary judgment motion as to Halicki’s remaining federal law claim for false advertising and unfair business competition and state law claims for intentional or negligent interference with prospective economic advantage, Halicki has waived any challenges to the dismissal of these claims. Halicki’s two passing references to “related state claims” in the argument section of her opening brief are insufficient to preserve those remaining state and federal claims for appellate review. See Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 525 F.3d 855, 858 n.4 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that arguments not raised in the opening brief are waived); Aramark Facility Servs. v. Serv. Employees Intern. Union, Local 1877, 530 F.3d 817, 824 n.2 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that arguments made in passing and inadequately briefed are waived). [17] Halicki also challenges the District Court’s dismissal for lack of standing of her state claim for unfair competition HALICKI FILMS v. CARROLL SHELBY INT. 15335 under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq. The District Court based its dismissal on its prior conclusion that Halicki had retained only an interest in the Original Eleanor, not Remake Eleanor. As we have now concluded otherwise, we reverse the District Court’s ruling on this issue and hold that Halicki has standing to bring her state unfair competition claim. F. Cross-appeal: Defendants are not entitled to attorneys’ fees under 17 U.S.C. § 505 of the Copyright Act or 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) of the Lanham Act The Shelby Defendants claim that the District Court erred in denying their request for attorneys’ fees, arguing that because the District Court found that the plain language of the Agreement precluded Halicki’s claims, those claims were therefore frivolous. As stated above, this Court reviews the District Court’s denial of the Shelby Defendants’ motion for attorneys’ fees for abuse of discretion. See Stephen W. Boney, Inc., 127 F.3d at 825. The Copyright Act under 17 U.S.C. § 505 provides for recovery of reasonable attorneys’ fees by the prevailing party in a civil action. In Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994), the Supreme Court eliminated the “dual standard” approach where attorneys’ fees are awarded to defendants only where claims against it were frivolous or brought in bad faith. Id. at 531-32, 534 (“Prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants are to be treated alike . . . .” ). Fogerty also rejected a rule requiring attorneys’ fees in copyright infringement cases as a matter of course, instead leaving the question of attorneys fees to the discretion of district courts. Id. at 534 (“[A]ttorneys’ fees are to be awarded to prevailing parties only as a matter of the court’s discretion.”). In deciding whether to award attorneys’ fees, courts in this Circuit consider certain factors, including (1) “the degree of success obtained; [(2)] frivolousness; [(3)] motivation; [(4)] 15336 HALICKI FILMS v. CARROLL SHELBY INT. objective unreasonableness (both in the factual and legal arguments in the case); and [(5)] the need in particular circumstances to advance considerations of compensation and deterrence.” Jackson v. Axton, 25 F.3d 884, 890 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 534 (internal citations omitted). The District Court applied the factors articulated in Jackson and denied the Shelby Defendants’ claim for attorneys’ fees pursuant to § 505, concluding that (1) the claims were not “frivolous, fanciful, or clearly baseless”; (2) Plaintiffs’ motivation in bringing the claims was to protect an interest that they believed was theirs; and (3) the Plaintiffs’ claims were not unreasonable and were decided on the basis of standing, not on the question whether the Shelby Defendants were in fact copyright infringers. The Shelby Defendants claim that the District Court abused its discretion in applying the factors. According to the Shelby Defendants, Halicki’s copyright claims were frivolous and unreasonable because: (1) “it is highly doubtful” that the Eleanor character qualifies for copyright protection; and (2) Halicki had no standing to assert any claims based on copying of Remake Eleanor. The Shelby Defendants claim that Halicki could not have thought the interests she sought to protect were hers, because she transferred those interests. As set forth above in the discussion of Halicki’s claims, that is not so, and Halicki’s causes of action must be heard on the merits. So, regardless which party prevails, the District Court correctly found that Halicki’s claims were not in any way frivolous, unreasonable, or lacking in good faith. The District Court did not abuse its discretion by denying the Defendants’ motion for attorneys’ fees under § 505. Attorneys’ fees under the Lanham Act are awarded in “exceptional cases.” 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). An exceptional case is found where “a plaintiff’s case is groundless, unreasonable, vexatious, or pursued in bad faith.” Stephen W. Boney, Inc., 127 F.3d at 827. The District Court found that this case was HALICKI FILMS v. CARROLL SHELBY INT. 15337 not exceptional under the meaning of § 1117(a), concluding that “nothing in the record demonstrates that Halicki’s lawsuit ‘is groundless, unreasonable, vexatious, or pursued in bad faith.’ ” No abuse of discretion can be found in the District Court’s conclusion that this is not an exceptional case within the meaning of § 1117(a). [18] The District Court’s denial of attorneys’ fees under 17 U.S.C. § 505 and 15 U.S.C. § 1117 is affirmed.