Opinion ID: 2633413
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Nickels and the Napolillis had an employee-employer relationship.

Text: An express or implied contract or agreement of employment must exist for there to be an employee-employer relationship. [47] The trial court found that Nickels and the Napolillis entered into an agreement by which Nickels provided at least eighty hours of work per month for the Napolillis. In exchange, the Napolillis compensated Nickels by providing a log home for her to live in and a place for her to keep her animals. [48] The Napolillis characterize this agreement as a rental agreement, while Nickels characterizes it as a employment relationship. Substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that the agreement between Nickels and the Napolillis constitutes an employment relationship. The application filled out by Nickels and Johnson refers to the position as a job and includes questions about relevant job experience. The agreement between Nickels and the Napolillis specifies the number of hours of labor required per month and a compensation rate for hours worked beyond that amount. The agreement also lists sixteen tasks for Nickels to perform, and reserves the Napolillis' right to terminate the agreement if labor is not performed as indicated ... or if said labor is not performed in a conscientious manner to [the] Napolilli[s'] expectations. That the document also contains terms commonly found in a residential rental agreement [49] does not diminish the legal significance of the agreement as an employment agreement. Although the trial court found that Nickels and the Napolillis had an employment contract defining the terms of their relationship, the existence of a contract does not end the inquiry. The legal determination of whether an employee-employer relationship exists relies, in part, on consideration of the character of the employee's work and the relationship of work to the employer's business. [50] We have explained elements of this relative nature of the work test in Searfus v. Northern Gas Company : In evaluating the character of the claimant's work, the trier of fact is to consider the degree of skill involved, the degree to which it is a separate calling or business, and the extent to which it can be expected to carry its own accident burden. Concerning the relationship of the claimant's work to the purported employer's business, the trier of fact is to consider how much it is a regular part of the employer's regular work, whether it is continuous or intermittent, and whether the duration is sufficient to amount to the hiring of continuing services as distinguished from contracting for the completion of a particular job. [51] The trial court made the following findings relevant to whether Nickels was the Napolillis' employee: (a) Noel and Nancy Napolilli exercised control and direction over the manner and means that [Nickels] performed work by their verbal and written instructions, (b) [Nickels] could have terminated her work status, (c) there was extensive supervision by Noel Napolilli, (d) the Napolillis[ ] provided tools and equipment of substantial value for [R]uth Nickels to accomplish farm work, (e) the work payment was based on 80 hours per month, with records documenting work time, and (f) the contract was initially written and subsequently oral. Ample evidence supports these factual findings, and they are not clearly erroneous. The Napolillis suggest that the relationship of Nickels's work to the Napolillis' business weighs in favor of not considering Nickels an employee. They urge us to consider that because the farm was a lifestyle choice and not a primary income source, it ought not bear the costs of injuries incurred in furtherance of the Napolillis' and Nickels's farming activities. We have recognized Professor Larson's distinction between consumptive activities which should not bear the burden of workers' compensation insurance, and productive business activities, which should. [52] A homeowner who hires someone to perform an odd job for his own benefit is not appropriately considered an employer under the workers' compensation statute. [53] A business, unlike a homeowner, can pass the cost of workers' compensation insurance on to the consumers of the business's service or product. The superior court found that [t]he `business' of Isabella Creek Farm was not the primary source of income for the Napolillis[;] however, the work that Ruth Nickels performed was a regular part of the regular work of Isabella Creek Farm business. Because Nickels's work for Isabella Creek Farm and the Napolillis furthered the business, it is therefore within the scope of the workers' compensation system.