Opinion ID: 1990662
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Sims' Successive Motion for Postconviction Relief Is Procedurally Barred.

Text: [3] The first aspect of the appeal before us pertains to the denial of Sims' motion to alter or amend the judgment denying postconviction relief. We have previously determined that a motion to alter or amend a postconviction judgment is an appropriate motion, that the filing of the motion terminates the time for filing a notice of appeal under Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-1912(3) (Reissue 2008), and that a new period of 30 days for filing a notice of appeal commences when the motion is ordered dismissed. State v. Bao, 269 Neb. 127, 690 N.W.2d 618 (2005). [4-6] The Nebraska Postconviction Act, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 29-3001 et seq. (Reissue 2008), is available to a defendant to show that his or her conviction was obtained in violation of his or her constitutional rights. State v. Marshall, supra . However, the need for finality in the criminal process requires that a defendant bring all claims for relief at the first opportunity. Id. Therefore, an appellate court will not entertain a successive motion for postconviction relief unless the motion affirmatively shows on its face that the basis relied upon for relief was not available at the time the movant filed the prior motion. Id. In the instant case, the allegations in Sims' second motion for postconviction relief involve ineffective assistance of counsel claims against his trial and appellate counsel as well as Sims' claim that there was insufficient evidence to convict him. Sims previously raised, and this court rejected on direct appeal, Sims' claim that there was insufficient evidence to convict him. Further, Sims' claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were known or knowable to Sims at the time of his direct appeal and his first motion for postconviction relief. Sims attempts to excuse his failure to raise his ineffective assistance of counsel claims in his prior postconviction motion by arguing that his postconviction counsel was ineffective for failing to raise these claims. However, we have held that there is no constitutional guarantee to effective assistance of counsel in a postconviction action, and therefore, Sims' claim of ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel is unavailing. State v. Deckard, 272 Neb. 410, 722 N.W.2d 55 (2006). Sims further attempts to excuse his failure to raise the ineffective assistance of counsel claims in his first postconviction motion by arguing that he could not raise the claims in his first motion because he is not trained in the law. We have addressed a similar claim in State v. Parmar, 263 Neb. 213, 221-22, 639 N.W.2d 105, 112 (2002), stating: Although [the movant] argues that he appeared pro se in the [first] postconviction proceeding, this is of no avail because ... there is no absolute requirement of appointment of counsel in postconviction cases, and the defendant has the right of self-representation. A pro se party is held to the same standards as one who is represented by counsel. Therefore, Sims' attempts to excuse his failure to raise his ineffective assistance of counsel claims in his previous motion are without merit. These claims were known or knowable to Sims in the previous proceedings, and he had an opportunity to raise them and failed to do so. Because Sims has not affirmatively shown on the face of his motion that the grounds for relief raised in his second motion for postconviction relief could not have been asserted at the time he filed his prior motion, his claims were properly rejected by the district court and the denial of his motion to alter or amend the judgment on this basis is affirmed.