Opinion ID: 3032627
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mixed Motive Instruction

Text: Galdamez contends that the district court failed to give a mixed motive instruction despite sufficient evidence.4 The district court’s formulation of jury instructions is reviewed for abuse of discretion, as is the sufficiency of the evidence to support a mixed motive instruction. See Costa v. Desert Pal- 4 Galdamez requested a mixed motive instruction based on Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), aff’d, 539 U.S. 90 (2003). In pertinent part, her requested instruction read: If you find that the plaintiff’s national origin and/or color was a motivating factor in the defendant’s treatment of the plaintiff, the plaintiff is entitled to your verdict, even if you find that the defendant’s conduct was also motivated by a lawful reason. . . . The plaintiff is entitled to damages unless the defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant would have treated plaintiff similarly even if the plaintiff’s national origin and/or color had play [sic] no role in the employment decision. The district court instead instructed the jury that Galdamez had to establish two elements by a preponderance of the evidence: 1) That [Galdamez’s] supervisors at the United States Postal Service subjected [Galdamez] to adverse employment action that affected the terms and conditions of [her] employment while she was the Postmaster in Willamina, and 2) That [Galdamez’s] national origin was a motivating factor in the supervisors’ decision to subject [her] to that adverse employment action. GALDAMEZ v. POTTER 8263 ace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 858 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), aff’d, 539 U.S. 90 (2003). Whether an instruction misstates the law, however, is a legal issue reviewed de novo. Id. [4] The evidence in the record was sufficient to support a mixed motive instruction. See Stegall v. Citadel Broad. Co., 350 F.3d 1061, 1072 (9th Cir. 2004) (as amended); Costa, 299 F.3d at 858-59. The instruction given was a mixed motive instruction: It asked the jury whether Galdamez’s national origin was “a motivating factor,” not the motivating factor, in the Postal Service’s decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (emphasis added). The district court declined to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense that the Postal Service would have taken the same action in the absence of an impermissible motivating factor, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B), because the Postal Service never raised it. This was neither an abuse of discretion, nor a misstatement of the law, because it preserved the portion of the mixed motive instruction required by the evidence, and because omission of the affirmative defense, if anything, favored Galdamez. [5] In any event, any instructional error here was more likely than not harmless. See Swinton v. Potomac Corp., 270 F.3d 794, 805-06 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining civil harmless error standard). The jury was instructed that it could find for Galdamez if her national origin was “a motivating factor” for her adverse treatment. When presented with a note from jurors during deliberations, expressing some confusion as to whether discriminatory animus had to be “the” motivating factor as opposed to “a” motivating factor, the district court clarified that “[a] ‘motivating factor’ means that it has to be at least one of the reasons for any adverse employment action.” Finally, when asked in the special verdict form whether Galdamez had proven that her national origin was “a motivating factor in any adverse employment action on the part of her supervisors,” the jury answered “No,” but took pains to include a separate note stating its unanimous conclusion that Galdamez’s supervisors “subjected Ms. [Galdamez] 8264 GALDAMEZ v. POTTER to adverse employment action.” There was thus a clear finding that discriminatory animus was not “a motivating factor” in the Postal Service’s decision. In other words, the jury received a fair approximation of a mixed motive instruction as it pertained most clearly to Galdamez’s disparate treatment claim, but resolved the facts against her. Therefore, any error stemming from the district court’s truncated version of the mixed motive instruction was more likely than not harmless.