Opinion ID: 853007
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appealability of Order Enforcing Settlement Agreement

Text: The Court of Appeals concluded that the grant of the Defendant's Motion to Enforce Mediation Settlement Agreement was appealable as a final judgment and also under Trial Rule 54(B). For the reasons given below, we conclude it was neither. Succinctly stated, a final judgment disposes of all issues as to all parties thereby ending the particular case. Doperalski v. City of Michigan City, 619 N.E.2d 584, 585 (Ind.Ct.App.1993). It leaves nothing for future determination. Thompson v. Thompson, 259 Ind. 266, 269, 286 N.E.2d 657, 659 (1972). This doctrine is now formalized in Indiana Rule of Appellate Procedure 2(H), which provides that a judgment is final if, (1) it disposes of all claims as to all parties .... Ind. Appellate Rule 2(H). The order did not call itself a judgment, and did not enter judgment for $94,500. Rather, it merely ruled on a motion and directed the parties to take all measures to consummate the settlement ... within (30) thirty days.... Both the parties and the trial court treated Jackson's motion for relief from judgment as properly filed under Trial Rule 60(B)(8). The Court of Appeals concluded that because the parties and the trial court treated the trial court's August 2 order as a final judgment, whatever defects existed in the ruling as a final judgment were cured. We do not agree that the views of the parties or the trial court resolve this issue. Whether the order was a final judgment governs the appellate courts' subject matter jurisdiction, and unlike most contentions, lack of jurisdiction is not waived by the parties. Neither the parties nor the trial court can confer appellate jurisdiction over an order that is not appealable either as a final judgment or under Trial Rule 54(B). To the contrary, the lack of appellate jurisdiction can be raised at any time, and if the parties do not question subject matter jurisdiction, the appellate court may consider the issue sua sponte. Albright v. Pyle, 637 N.E.2d 1360, 1363 (Ind.Ct.App.1994). The trial court's grant of the Motion to Enforce was not a final judgment because it did not end the case. The relief requested by the Defendants was that the trial court uphold the validity of the settlement, and order Jackson to enter into a joint stipulation of dismissal. By its terms, the motion asked the trial court to order Jackson to sign the settlement agreement, which had already been signed by his attorney, and asked that the trial court order the Defendants to pay Jackson the agreed amount. In granting the Defendant's motion, the trial court order directed Jackson, to take all measures necessary to consummate the settlement ... within 30 days. This did not dismiss the case, and left open what would happen if, as in fact turned out to be the case, Jackson did not comply with the directive to consummate the settlement. A disposition of all claims requires more than the entry of a ruling on a motion without entry of judgment. See Constantine v. City-County Council of Marion County, 267 Ind. 279, 280, 369 N.E.2d 636, 637 (1977) (entry granting a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(B)(6) for failure to state a claim was not a final judgment, given the right under Trial Rule 12(B)(8) to replead); compare Parrett v. Lebamoff, 179 Ind.App. 25, 26-27, 383 N.E.2d 1107, 1108-09 (1979) (entry stating grounds for dismissal, dismissing claim, and awarding costs to plaintiff was a final judgment). A judgment that fails to determine damages is not final. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Stone, 467 N.E.2d 1226, 1231 (Ind.Ct.App.1984). The Court of Appeals concluded that even if the August 2 order was not a final judgment it met the requirements of an order appealable under Trial Rule 54(B) because had it been carried out, [it] would have led to the entry of an ultimate determination ... between Jackson and the Appellants. Georgos v. Jackson, 762 N.E.2d 202, 206 (Ind.Ct.App.2002). We disagree that this is sufficient. Many orders, if carried out, will ultimately lead to a final judgment. Under this phrasing of the issue many orders would be at least arguably appealable even though they are plainly not final judgments and are subject to various contingencies, including whether the parties do in fact carry the order out. But even if it were the case that this order ended all disputes between Jackson and the Defendants, it would not be appealable under Rule 54(B). Trial Rule 54(B) certification of an order that disposes of less than the entire case must contain the magic language of the rule. This is intended to provide a bright line so there is no mistaking whether an interim order is or is not appealable. As we recently held in Martin v. Amoco Oil Co., 696 N.E.2d 383 (Ind.1998), an order becomes final and appealable under Rule 54(B) only by meeting the requirements of T.R. 54(B). These requirements are that the trial court, in writing, expressly determine that there is no just reason for delay and, in writing, expressly direct entry of judgment. Id. at 385. The trial court made no Rule 54(B) finding here. As a result the August 2 order was not final under Trial Rule 54. Even though the trial court's August 2, 1999, ruling granting the Defendants' Motion to Enforce was an interlocutory order, it was arguably appealable as of right under Appellate Rule 14(A)(2) because it required the execution of a document. However, there is no requirement that an interlocutory appeal be taken, and Jackson may elect to wait until the end of litigation to raise the issue on appeal from a final judgment. In re Newman, 174 Ind.App. 537, 545-46, 369 N.E.2d 427, 432 (1977) (though party may have had an interlocutory appeal of right for payment of money, it was not waived and could be raised in appeal from final judgment). For all of these reasons, the August 2, 1999, order was not required to be appealed and the issues Jackson raises are properly before us in this appeal from the final judgment entered after the jury trial.