Opinion ID: 1952329
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Motion to Reduce Sentence

Text: The defendant was sentenced to thirty years, twenty years to serve at the Adult Correctional Institutions; the state had recommended a sentence of thirty years, fifteen years to serve. The defendant's motion to reduce sentence was denied. On appeal, defendant argued that a sentence of substantially lesser time would have been more proportioned to the offense. Our function in the review of sentences is an extremely limited one. State v. Giorgi, 121 R.I. 280, 282, 397 A.2d 898, 899 (1979). Absent an abuse of discretion by the trial justice, this court will not alter a sentence on appeal. Id. Consequently we exercise our power to reduce sentences only when the record points convincingly to the conclusion that the sentencing justice has without justification imposed a sentence which is grossly disparate from sentences generally imposed for similar offenses. State v. Fortes, 114 R.I. 161, 173, 330 A.2d 404, 411 (1975). In imposing sentences, trial justices are bound only by statutory limits. State v. Gordon, 539 A.2d 528, 530 (R.I. 1988). Past arson sentences provide a norm or bench-mark for sentencing, not a mandate. Id. The sentencing justice may impose a more severe or a less severe punishment than that recommended by the state. Id. In formulating a fair sentence, the trial justice bears the affirmative duty to treat each defendant separately, focusing on the individual's unique background and character.    He should consider the gravity of the crime, the possibilities for defendant's rehabilitation, deterrence to others, and the appropriateness of the punishment for the crime. Id. Section 11-4-2 provides that persons convicted of first-degree arson shall    be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than five (5) years and may be imprisoned for life   ; provided, further, that whenever a death occurs to a person    imprisonment shall be for not less than twenty (20) years. Clearly, the sentence imposed in this case is well within the statutory limits for the offense. We note that in Gordon, we upheld a first-degree arson sentence of fifty years. 539 A.2d at 529-31. Our review of the record discloses that the trial justice rendered the requisite separate evaluation by considering defendant's presentence report and such personal factors as the rejection he suffered as a youth and the misfortune that incarceration would bring to defendant's family. The trial justice noted, however, that militating against these considerations were the interests of defendant's victims, who sustained tremendous inconvenience    [and] loss of personal property. The trial justice justified the sentence by reviewing the devastating nature of the fire at issue, by pointing out the need to deter others from committing arson, and by noting that the Legislature had established even life imprisonment as an appropriate punishment for arson. We are of the opinion, therefore, that the defendant has not sustained his burden of proving that the trial justice abused his discretion by refusing to reduce his sentence. In conclusion, for the foregoing reasons, the defendant's appeal is denied and dismissed, and the judgment appealed from is affirmed.