Opinion ID: 2674677
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: mr. carlton lacks standing to assert

Text: THE CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS BECAUSE HIS INJURY IS NOT REDRESSABLE BY THIS COURT DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF THE CHILD’S ADOPTIVE PARENTS ¶28 In his Amended Petition, Mr. Carlton raised a number of arguments aimed at proving the unconstitutionality of the Act, including both facial and as applied arguments based on violations of procedural and substantive due process, equal protection, the “open courts” provision of Utah’s constitution, and vagueness. But Mr. Carlton lacks standing to assert these claims because his injury cannot be redressed by this court unless the Adoptive Parents are parties to this case. This is so because Mr. Carlton’s constitutional arguments and proposed remedies do not implicate the rights of either Ms. Brown or Adoption Center— they implicate the rights of the Adoptive Parents. So despite the fact that Mr. Carlton’s constitutional claims may have merit,15 he lacks standing to bring them because they are not redressable by this court until the Adoptive Parents are added to this action. ¶29 Although we recognize that we are not bound by the federal constitution’s “case or controversy” requirement, we have repeatedly recognized that a “justiciable controversy” is the 15 Of particular potential merit is Mr. Carlton’s contention, which he clarified at oral argument, that the Act’s imposition of a deadline on out-of-state fathers whose home states impose no such deadline is a violation of due process. 11 CARLTON v. BROWN Opinion of the Court “keystone” of our judicial framework.16 Indeed, we have stated that the constitutional term ‘judicial power of courts’ is generally understood to be the power to hear and determine controversies between adverse parties and questions in litigation. Such core judicial powers include ‘the authority to hear and determine justiciable controversies’ as well as ‘the authority to enforce any valid judgment, decree or order.’17 But “[i]n the absence of any justiciable controversy between adverse parties, the courts are without jurisdiction.”18 ¶30 Thus, in order for us to retain jurisdiction over this appeal, Mr. Carlton is required to show that there is a justiciable controversy before us. The concept of “justiciability” implicates various categories of cases and doctrines that impose limits on our jurisdiction, including advisory opinions, feigned and collusive cases, standing, ripeness, mootness, political questions, and administrative questions.19 For example, with respect to ripeness we have recently observed that “[i]n order to constitute a justiciable controversy, a conflict over the application of a legal provision must have sharpened into an actual or imminent clash of legal rights and obligations between the parties thereto.”20 ¶31 In this case, we agree with the district court’s ultimate conclusion that Mr. Carlton lacked standing to bring his constitutional claims, although we reach that conclusion by a 16 Shipman v. Evans, 2004 UT 44, ¶¶ 32–33, 100 P.3d 1151, abrogated on other grounds by Utahns For Better Dental HealthDavis, Inc. v. Davis Cnty. Clerk, 2007 UT 97, 175 P.3d 1036. 17 Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 849 (Utah 1994) (emphasis omitted) (internal citation omitted); see also Timpanogos Planning & Water Mgmt. Agency v. Cent. Utah Water Conservancy Dist., 690 P.2d 562, 569 (Utah 1984). 18 Williams v. Univ. of Utah, 626 P.2d 500, 503 (Utah 1981). 19 See Wylie v. Idaho Transp. Bd., 253 P.3d 700, 705 (Idaho 2011). 20Carter v. Lehi City, 2012 UT 2, ¶ 93, 269 P.3d 141 (internal quotation marks omitted). 12 Cite as: 2014 UT 6 Opinion of the Court different road. As noted above, “standing” comprises three components: injury, causation, and redressability.21 Although Mr. Carlton has adequately shown the former two, he cannot show the latter because “redressability” requires that the injury be “redressable by a favorable ruling.”22 ¶32 Unfortunately, the district court prevented Mr. Carlton from joining the Adoptive Parents in this case when it denied his Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Petition. Consequently, Mr. Carlton lacks standing to bring these claims because his injury—the termination of his parental rights—is not redressable by a favorable ruling from this court. This is so because even if we were to agree with Mr. Carlton’s arguments against the constitutionality of the Act, we simply could not grant the relief he requests, which is that his parental rights to the child be reinstated and the adoption overturned. Neither Adoption Center nor Ms. Brown has any rights to relinquish,23 and we certainly do not have the authority to infringe upon the Adoptive Parents’ rights to the child since they are not parties to this proceeding.24 Because of the Adoptive Parents’ absence, we cannot grant the relief Mr. Carlton seeks. Therefore, his injury is not redressable, and consequently he lacks standing to assert the constitutional challenges set forth in his Amended Petition. ¶33 But despite the fact that we agree with the district court’s conclusion that Mr. Carlton lacks standing to assert the constitutional claims as they are presently pled, we nevertheless reverse its decision to dismiss those claims because we conclude that the district court erroneously denied Mr. Carlton’s Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Petition. The district court denied this motion on the basis of futility, but it is clear from the face of 21 Brown v. Dep’t. of Natural Res., 2010 UT 14, ¶ 17, 228 P.3d 747. 22 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013). 23 See State v. Sims, 881 P.2d 840, 841 (Utah 1994) (dismissing a case for lack of jurisdiction because even if the court granted the relief requested “it would have no legal effect on the parties”). 24 Fink v. Miller, 896 P.2d 649, 654 n.6 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (observing that the “trial court exceeded the bounds of its authority by directing the actions of a nonparty”). 13 CARLTON v. BROWN Opinion of the Court his proposed Second Amended Petition that Mr. Carlton was attempting to add the Adoptive Parents, which, as we just noted, would have granted him standing to bring the constitutional claims. Hence, we conclude that the district court erred when it determined that the motion to amend was futile. ¶34 Mr. Carlton correctly notes that, under rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, “leave [to amend] shall be freely given when justice so requires.” And in his Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Petition, Mr. Carlton argued, among other things, that no prejudice would result from the amendment because a trial had not yet been scheduled and no formal discovery had been conducted. This argument was not refuted by Adoption Center in its opposition to Mr. Carlton’s motion. We conclude that pursuant to rule 15(a), the district court should have granted Mr. Carlton leave to amend. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s denial of this motion and remand the case with the instruction that the district court grant Mr. Carlton leave to amend his petition. And because it is clear that Mr. Carlton’s Second Amended Petition would have cured the standing issue discussed above, we also reverse the district court’s dismissal of the constitutional claims and remand this case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.