Opinion ID: 1677477
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Trial court erred in restricting Mueller's choice of remedies.

Text: Tucek is entitled to sue for damages for fraud and deceit. Appellees argue that she must rescind under SDCL chap. 53-11. By virtue of our decisions in O'Connor v. King, 479 N.W.2d 162 (S.D.1991), Holmes v. Couturier, 452 N.W.2d 135 (S.D.1990), and Kerr v. Staufer, 59 S.D. 83, 238 N.W. 156 (1931), she has the right to the remedy of her choice. With the trial court's ultimatum rescind or go homeTucek was deprived of a choice. Other jurisdictions have held: One who has executed a release or compromise of a cause of action sometimes feels that he was unduly pushed or fraudulently induced into making the agreement. In this situation there are several courses open to him. He may sue on the original cause of action and, when the release is tendered as a defense, assert its invalidity. He may begin an equity action to set aside or reform the release or compromise agreement. Or he may affirm the agreement and bring an action of deceit to recover the damages he suffered by reason of executing the same. W.R. Habeeb, Annotation, Release Induced by Third Person, 58 A.L.R.2d 500 (1958) (emphasis added). Appellees insist she must return the money to now sue for damages. Let us review the justice of that remark in light of these facts: (a) Of the $70,000.00 paid, over $30,000.00 was spent on medical bills; (b) Bank obtained money from her father who stole it from herto pay off her father's delinquent loan on his bowling alley; (c) Mueller, using the settlement money he alone negotiated, purchased a new van, and with those same stolen funds, took a grand vacation to Florida; (d) Insurer, Adjusting Company and Kinonen settled for $30,000.00 less than the policy limits or the reserves established to settle the claim. And during all of this time, Tucek was in a neurology ward, physically and mentally incapacitated, and did not know what was actually transpiring. Apparently, those who either practiced fraud upon her or participated therein or knowingly received the fruits therefrom, would have Tucek return the proceeds of the settlement. Under this set of facts, such a tenet of thought is outrageous. Consider the following: [W]e believe no good reason can be suggested for placing upon the injured or defrauded party the burden of undoing or attempting to undo the wrong practiced upon him before he may have the right to sue for the damages resulting therefrom. 58 A.L.R.2d at 504 (citing Bailey v. London Guarantee & Accident Co., 72 Ind.App. 84, 121 N.E. 128 (1918)). Although Tucek did endorse two checks, such does not prove that she accepted the settlement. Recall, she did not sign the release, therefore it cannot be assumed that the two checks constituted final settlement. Appellees, however, had an opportunity to undo this fraud; yet, they camped down on their favorable settlement and thereby ratified the fraud. See Malakul v. Altech Arkansas, Inc., 298 Ark. 246, 766 S.W.2d 433 (1989). Tucek has every right to affirm the contract and seek monetary damages. Garrett, 459 N.W.2d at 847.