Opinion ID: 2050786
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Untimely Jury Demand

Text: We now consider Pickett's appeal of the Circuit Court for Howard County's decision which sanctioned the striking of his jury demand by the District Court. The record shows that on July 14, 1997, the District Court denied Pickett's motion to quash service. At that time, Sears agreed to a fifteen day extension of time for Picket to file his notice of intent to defend in accordance with Rule 3-307, [11] such that Pickett would have needed to file his notice of intention to defend no later than July 29, 1997, and any demand for a jury trial no later than August 8, 1997. Instead, on July 29, 1997, Pickett filed a motion asking the District Court to reconsider its denial of his motion to quash service of process. The District Court denied the motion for reconsideration on July 30, 1997. Pickett filed both his notice of intention to defend and his demand for a jury trial on August 21, 1997. In response, Sears filed a motion to strike the jury demand as untimely filed and failing to meet the amount in controversy threshold for a jury trial. On August 28, 1997, the trial court struck Pickett's jury trial demand with a notation stating Strickenamount in controversy does not exceed $5,000. Pickett asserts that, according to Maryland Rule 3-325(c), the District Court did not have authority to strike a jury demand for failure to meet the amount in controversy requirement. The District Court has exclusive original civil jurisdiction over contract actions where the debt or damages at issue does not exceed $25,000, exclusive of interest, costs and attorney's fees if applicable. See Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 4-401(1) (1973, 1998 Repl.Vol.). All actions tried in the District Court of Maryland are tried without a jury. In order to secure a jury trial, Pickett, like any other litigant, would have to file a timely jury trial demand. The right to a trial by jury in Maryland is established in Articles 5 and 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The origins of the jury trial right in Maryland are as follows: That the Inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the Common Law of England, and the trial by Jury, according to the course of that Law, and to the benefit of such of the English statutes as existed on the Fourth day of July, seventeen hundred and seventy-six; and which, by experience, have been found applicable to their local and other circumstances, and have been introduced, used and practiced by the Courts of Law or Equity ... Article 5 of the Declaration of Rights. At the time Sears commenced this litigation against Pickett, Article 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provided in relevant part as follows: The right of trial by Jury of all issues of fact in civil proceedings in the several Courts of Law in this State, where the amount in controversy exceeds the sum of five thousand dollars, shall be inviolably preserved. [12] This Court historically anticipated the need for the development of rules and statutory provisions which would preserve the constitutional right to a jury trial while sustaining all reasonable regulations of the exercise of that right made in the interest of the general public. Knee v. Baltimore Passenger Ry. Co., 87 Md. 623, 627, 40 A. 890, 892 (1898). The framework for the invocation of a jury trial is found in § 4-402(e) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article and Maryland Rule 3-325. At the time Sears commenced its action against Pickett, § 4-402(e) provided in relevant part as follows: Jury trial. (1) In a civil action in which the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000, exclusive of attorney's fees if attorney's fees are recoverable by law or contract, a party may demand a jury trial pursuant to the Maryland Rules. (2) Except in a replevin action, if a party is entitled to and files a timely demand, in accordance with the Maryland Rules, for a jury trial, jurisdiction is transferred forthwith and the record of the proceeding shall be transmitted to the appropriate court ... Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 4-402(e) (1973, 1998 Repl.Vol.). [13] Maryland Rule 3-325(1999), which sets forth the requirements and procedures for demanding a jury trial under the provisions of § 4-402(e), provides as follows: (a) Demand Timefor Filing. (1) By Plaintiff. A plaintiff whose claim is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the District Court may elect a trial by jury of any action triable of right by a jury by filing with the complaint a separate written demand therefor. (2) By Defendant. A defendant, counter-defendant, cross-defendant, or third-party defendant may elect a trial by jury of any action triable of right by a jury by filing a separate written demand therefor within ten days after the time for filing a notice of intention to defend. (b) Waiver. The failure of a party to file the demand as provided in section (a) of this Rule constitutes a waiver of trial by jury of the action for all purposes, including trial on appeal. (c) Transmittal of Record to Circuit Court. When a timely demand for jury trial is filed, the clerk shall transmit the record to the circuit court within 15 days. At any time before the record is transmitted pursuant to this section, the District Court may determine, on its own initiative or on motion of a party, that the demand for jury trial was not timely filed. A party demanding the jury trial need not file a second demand in the Circuit Court after filing a timely demand in the District Court. See Paul V. Niemeyer & Linda M. Schuett, Maryland Rules Commentary 75 (2nd ed.1992, 2000 Supp.). This Court has previously held that where a party is entitled to a jury trial under the terms of § 4-402(e), and a demand for a jury trial has been made, the demand itself divests the District Court of jurisdiction as a matter of law and immediately vests jurisdiction in the circuit court. Vogel v. Grant, 300 Md. 690, 696, 481 A.2d 186, 189 (1984). The Vogel case involved the timely filing of a jury demand in a contract action brought under the original jurisdiction of the District Court. Id. at 692, 481 A.2d at 187. Upon receipt and entry in the docket of defendant's timely jury demand, the District Court transferred the case to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. Id. at 693, 481 A.2d at 187. After the record had been transmitted to the Circuit Court, the plaintiff attempted to challenge the jury demand on the basis that it was not a separate writing as required by former Maryland District Rule 343, and did not bear a certificate of service pursuant to former Maryland District Rule 306. Id. We explained the process for evaluating the validity of jury trial demands as follows: [A]s the statute and cases make clear, when a party has a right to a jury trial and files a demand, jurisdiction over the case is immediately vested in the circuit court. If another party believes that there was a procedural defect, which results in a waiver of the jury trial right, or which otherwise should deprive the demandant of a jury trial, his recourse is to file a motion in the circuit court. If the movant's procedural objection to the jury trial is well-taken, the circuit court will then remand the case to the District Court for a nonjury trial. Nevertheless, as long as it is the type of case to which the jury trial right attaches and a jury trial is demanded, it is normally the circuit courts, and not the District Court, which have jurisdiction over a motion opposing a jury trial because of an alleged procedural defect. Id. at 697-98, 481 A.2d at 189-90. As a result, the Vogel Court held that a violation of one of the procedural requirements, such as the requirement that the jury demand be filed in a separate writing, does not give the District Court the ability to retain jurisdiction over a case where the litigants were entitled to a jury trial and filed a timely demand. Id. at 699-700, 481 A.2d at 190-91. When this Court decided Vogel the language of § 4-402(e)(2) regarding jury trials for non-replevin actions simply read, if a party is entitled to and demands a jury trial, jurisdiction is transferred forthwith and the record of the proceeding shall be transmitted to the appropriate court. Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 4-402(e)(2) (1974, 1984 Repl.Vol.). Recognizing the need for clarity in defining the jurisdiction of the trial courts when considering demands for jury trials, the General Assembly amended and reenacted § 4-402(e)(2) in 1985 to read, as it does today, if a party is entitled to and files a timely demand, in accordance with the Maryland Rules, for a jury trial, jurisdiction is transferred forthwith and the record of the proceeding shall be transmitted to the appropriate court. 1985 Md. Laws, ch. 3. The General Assembly specifically found it necessary to take this emergency measure in order to make it clear that in a civil action, a demand for a jury trial must be filed in a timely manner in order to divest the District Court of its jurisdiction to hear a case for which it has original jurisdiction. Id. There can be no doubt that the essential language of § 4-402(e) which triggers the divestment of the District Court's jurisdiction to hear the case, is if a party is entitled to and files a timely demand, in accordance with the Maryland Rules.... § 4-402(e)(2)(emphasis added). The language of Maryland Rule 3-325(c) gives the District Court a fifteen-day window of opportunity to examine the timeliness of the jury trial demand sua sponte or as requested by motion of a party prior to transmitting the record to the Circuit Court. Thus, while Rule 3-325(c) makes no provision for the District Court to evaluate the amount in controversy prong of the jury trial demand, the District Court maintains the ability to strike the demand as untimely filed until the record has been transmitted to the Circuit Court. See Dallas v. Envtl. Health Assoc., Ltd., 77 Md. App. 350, 356, 550 A.2d 422, 425 (1988)(finding that subsection (c) of Rule 3-325 provides an exception to the general rule that the circuit courts evaluate the validity of jury demands and allows the District Court to consider the validity of the demand in the circumstance where the claimed procedural defect in the jury trial demand is the untimeliness of the demand). In District Court practice, the timing for a defendant to file a jury demand is inextricably linked to the defendant's filing of the notice of intention to defend. Maryland Rule 3-307 sets forth the requirement that defendants must file a notice of intention to defend an action within fifteen days after service of the original pleading or else risk having a default judgment entered against them on the basis of ex parte proof of liability and damages as presented to the court by the plaintiff. A jury trial demand must be filed within ten days after the time for filing the notice of intention to defend. Md. Rule 3-325(a)(2). A defendant may challenge the sufficiency of service of process afforded him under the facts of the case by including any explanation or ground of defense within the notice of intention to defend. Md. Rule 3-307(a). Therefore, Pickett, unlike the Hobbesean choice he portrays, could have challenged the sufficiency of service of process in his notice of intention to defend. Under the facts of this case, where the District Court determined that service of process was effective to convey personal jurisdiction over Pickett as of April 3, 1997, Pickett would have had to file his jury demand by April 28, 1997. Pickett's first appearance in the matter, however, did not take place until May 16, 1997, when he filed his motion to quash service of process. While the entry of an appearance does not waive the litigant's right to assert any available defenses under the Maryland Rules, it also does not toll the period for filing a notice of intention to defend or jury trial demand. See Md. Rule 3-131(c)(1999). [14] Despite the untimely nature of its filing, the District Court elected to hear Pickett's Motion to Quash Service of Process on July 14, 1997. At that time, the District Court denied Pickett's motion and provided Pickett with a fifteen-day grace period in which to file a notice of intention to defend and/or a motion to transfer venue. The District Court did not extend to Pickett the option of filing a motion for reconsideration, nor did the court express that the filing of any pleadings other than a notice of intention to defend or motion to transfer venue would toll the fifteen-day extension period. Thus, under the extension provided by the District Court, Pickett should have filed his notice of intention to defend no later than July 29, 1997, and his demand for a trial by jury no later than August 8, 1997. The District Court did not have authority to strike Pickett's demand for a jury trial on the basis that the amount in controversy did not exceed $5,000. Notwithstanding that fact, the District Court should have stricken the demand as untimely filed. We agree with the Circuit Court of Howard County that under the facts of this case, Pickett's demand for a jury trial was both untimely filed and failed to meet the amount in controversy requirement. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Circuit Court's decision denying Pickett's demand for a jury trial as untimely when filed with the District Court on August 21, 1997. JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR HOWARD COUNTY AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.