Opinion ID: 1089715
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: on petition for rehearing granted

Text: DREW, C.J. Writ of certiorari issued in this case on the basis of decisional conflict regarding the nature and standard of review of orders under F.S. Section 45.19(1), F.S.A. The decision of the district court, reversing the judgment below, was not only that the defendants' motion to dismiss should have been granted but, further, that a reinstatement would have been improper because the evidence or facts relied on by plaintiff (appellant) did not constitute sufficient cause for reinstatement; that the cause should have been finally determined for defendants for lack of such good cause; and that the attack on the decree for defendants on the merits need not, therefore, be considered. We have concluded that insofar as the decision precluded reinstatement, because in the judgment of the appellate court there was not sufficient cause, it was in direct conflict with those cases holding that appellate review on this issue is limited to a determination of abuse of discretion. The conflict of decision on this point is resolved by reaffirming the discretionary power of the trial court in the determination of good cause for reinstatement, and by emphasizing the necessity for predicating reversal upon a finding of abuse of that discretion. The opinion of the district court did not so characterize the issue decided, and in our opinion could not, upon this record, have found such an abuse. There is no necessity, in reaffirming the discretionary power of the trial court in these premises, to disregard the language of the statute and earlier decisions to the effect that dismissal is mandatory [1] when in fact there is no affirmative showing of action taken in the cause. Even if the same criteria do not control dismissal and reinstatement, we conclude from our further review of the decision in this case that the trial court's order denying the motion to dismiss should be sustained. The decisions cited for the contrary position are in each instance distinguishable and do not stand for the blanket proposition that good faith efforts to obtain trial docketing, within the statutory period, are as a matter of law insufficient to constitute action taken in the cause. The trial court's decision to proceed to a disposition of the cause on its merits should not, in the situation at bar be disturbed. Upon reconsideration we adhere to the prior determination of the cause. The judgment of the district court of appeal is quashed and the cause remanded with directions for further proceedings in accordance herewith. TERRELL and ROBERTS, JJ., concur. CALDWELL, J., concurs specially. THOMAS and O'CONNELL, JJ., dissent. THORNAL, J., dissents on jurisdiction. CALDWELL, J., concurring specially: I agree with the conclusion that, once the trial judge found that there had been some action, he could properly deny the motion to dismiss. Absent such finding, the trial judge was without discretion  dismissal was mandatory. On motion to reinstate, the trial court could exercise his discretion on the question of whether good cause was shown.