Opinion ID: 2829186
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was the Trial Court’s Definition of Producing Cause Harmful?

Text: Having decided that the trial court’s definition of producing cause was erroneous, we now consider whether this error requires reversal. Transcontinental asserts that the trial court’s omission of the but -for component of the producing cause definition was reversible error. We agree. “A judgment will not be reversed for charge error unless the error was harmful because it probably caused the rendition of an improper verdict . . . .” Columbia Rio Grande Healthcare, L.P. v. Hawley , 284 S.W.3d 851, 856 (Tex. 2009) (citing Tex. R. App. P. 61.1). “Charge error is generally considered harmful if it relates to a contested, critical issue.” Id. (citing Bel -Ton Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pickle , 915 S.W.2d 480, 481 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam ), and Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. John Carlo Tex., Inc. , 843 S.W.2d 470, 472 (Tex. 1992)). “To determine whether the instruction probably caused an improper judgment, we examine the entire record.” Quantum Chem. Corp. v. Toennies , 47 S.W.3d 473, 480 (Tex. 2001). Daller , one of Crump’s treating physicians and Crump’s sole expert, testified: Mr. Crump had had [sic] a renal transplant approximately 25 years prior, I believe. He also had what is known as compensated cirrhosis from hepatitis C. At the time that he experienced the injury, that injury caused a progression of his hepatic insufficiency, and because of his inability to fight off infections and also because of his overall medical condition, it caused a series of events that led to his death. According to Daller , the site of the injury became infected, the infection caused Crump’s already-weakened organs to fail, and his organ failure in turn caused his death. Further, on cross-examination he testified: Q: It’s your opinion that the cause of the infection was histoplasmosis but that but for the bruise the histoplasmosis would not have developed into a full-stage infection, right? A: That is correct. On the other hand, Transcontinental’s expert, Hunt, testified that Crump died from the natural complications of being immunosuppressed for twenty-five years rather than from the May 9, 2000 injury: Q. In your opinion, would the death have occurred without the May 9, 2000 injury ever taking place? A. Yes. Hunt testified on cross-examination, “Had [Crump] not had that contusion to his knee, he still would have had those other problems.” Q. So, you’re saying that Mr. Crump would have been in there in Polly Ryon [Memorial Hospital] on January 23rd of 2001, dying of liver failure, kidney failure, aspiration of the stomach, his heart was giving out—I mean , his whole body was shutting down. You said yourself he was critically ill. A: Yes, sir. Transcontinental bore the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, the negative proposition that the May 2000 injury was not a producing cause of Crump’s death. See Tex. Lab. Code § 410.303; Morales v. Liberty Mut . Ins. Co. , 241 S.W.3d 514, 516 (Tex. 2007) (“[T]he appealing party bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. The factfinder may consider, but is not bound by, the appeals panel’s decision. The method of review that [the Labor Code] provides is known as modified de novo review.”) ( citations omitted). The but -for aspect of causation was squarely at issue in this case, and the sole question before the jury was whether the May 2000 injury was a producing cause of Crump’s death. Here, the charge error “relate[d] to a contested, critical issue”—indeed, the sole issue—that of causation. See Hawley , 284 S.W.3d at 856; see also Toennies , 47 S.W.3d at 480 (“An improper instruction is especially likely to cause an unfair trial when the trial is contested and the evidence sharply conflicting, as it was in the present case [when the trial court gave an incorrect causation standard].”); Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs . v. Hinds , 904 S.W.2d 629, 637 (Tex. 1995) (finding harmful error where a jury instruction stated the standard of causation incorrectly and the evidence was “vigorously and convincingly disputed”); John Carlo Tex., Inc. , 843 S.W.2d at 472 (“Virtually the entire factual dispute between the parties has been over whether Bell’s conduct was justified. To ask the jury to resolve this dispute without a proper legal definition [of justification,] the essential legal issue[ ,] was reversible error.”). Including the but -for component in the definition would have assisted the jury in resolving the disputed expert testimony at the crux of the case and, more importantly, would have stated the law accurately. See Williams , 85 S.W.3d at 166 . In these circumstances, the absence of a proper definition of producing cause probably resulted in an improper judgment and, as such, was reversible error. See Hinds , 904 S.W.2d at 637 . Prior to trial, Transcontinental objected to Crump’s definition, the one ultimately accepted by the trial court, asserting it was not a correct statement under Texas law. Transcontinental tendered its own definition in writing, including a but -for component: “that cause, which in a natural and continuous sequence, produces death and without which, the death would not have occurred.” See Tex. R. Civ. P. 278 (“Failure to submit a definition or instruction shall not be deemed a ground for reversal of the judgment unless a substantially correct definition or instruction has been requested in writing and tendered by the party complaining of the judgment.”). Because Transcontinental’s definition included the critical but-for component, and was otherwise a correct statement of law, it was “substantially correct” and sufficed to preserve its complaint of charge error on appeal. See Hinds , 904 S.W.2d at 637–38 (“There should be but one test for determining if a party has preserved error in the jury charge, and that is whether the party made the trial court aware of the complaint, timely and plainly, and obtained a ruling.”) ( quoting State Dep’t of Highways v. Payne , 838 S.W.2d 235, 241 (Tex. 1992)). We hold that the definition of producing cause approved in Ledesma —a substantial factor in bringing about the injury or death and without which the injury or death would not have occurred—applies in workers’ compensation cases. Because the definition submitted here lacked the but -for component, and because its omission in this case constitutes harmful error, we remand the case for new trial.