Opinion ID: 885468
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Foreseeability and the Existence of a Legal Duty

Text: ¶ 18 The existence of a legal duty is a matter of law to be determined in the first instance by the trial court. Nautilus Ins. Co. v. First Nat'l Ins., Inc. (1992), 254 Mont. 296, 299, 837 P.2d 409, 411. We review a district court's conclusion of law to determine whether it is correct. Steer, Inc. v. Department of Revenue (1990), 245 Mont. 470, 474-75, 803 P.2d 601, 603. ¶ 19 At this point, it becomes necessary to address the City's contention that absent a special relationship, it owed LaTray no duty of care. In making its claim that no special relationship existed here, the City relies on Phillips v. City of Billings (1988), 233 Mont. 249, 758 P.2d 772, in which we said: The majority rule states that [a police officer's] general duty to protect does not give rise to liability for a particular individual's injury absent a greater duty imposed by a special relationship. Under the facts of this case, we . . . refuse to find a duty based on the officers' general duty to protect the . . . public. Phillips, 233 Mont. at 253, 758 P.2d at 775 (citation omitted); see also Nelson v. Driscoll, 1999 MT 193, 295 Mont. 363, 983 P.2d 972 (discussing Phillips, the public duty doctrine governing police officers, and the special relationship exception to that doctrine). According to the City, the LaTrays have not claimed the existence of a special relationship or otherwise shown that the officers owed LaTray a greater duty of care than that owed to the general public. ¶ 20 Phillips involved a negligence claim by the occupants of a vehicle which was struck by an intoxicated motorist who ran a red light. The intoxicated motorist had been approached two hours prior to the accident and questioned by Billings police officers, who declined at that time to arrest him despite having observed the smell of alcohol on his breath and empty beer cans in his parked vehicle. The plaintiffs sued the City of Billings, claiming that the officers were under a duty to control the potentially dangerous actions of the intoxicated motorist, which duty they had allegedly breached by failing to arrest him earlier in the day. This Court, as noted above, rejected the plaintiffs' assertion that the officers were under a duty of care notwithstanding the absence of a special relationship. We reasoned that the imposition of a legal duty depended upon the officers'  ability to control the third person. Phillips, 233 Mont. at 252, 758 P.2d at 775 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 319 (1965))(emphasis added). Because the officers did not have probable cause to arrest the intoxicated motorist when they had detained him earlier in the day, we held that they had no ability to control him and, thus, that no special relationship existed giving rise to a duty to the plaintiffs. Phillips, 233 Mont. at 252, 758 P.2d at 775. ¶ 21 In Lopez, we put forth the following, relevant passage: As a general rule, there is no duty to protect others against harm from third persons. W. Page Keeton & William Prosser, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 56, at 385 (5th ed.1984). Traditionally, as we have recognized, a person is not liable for the actions of another and is under no duty to protect another from harm in the absence of a special relationship of custody or control. Krieg v. Massey (1989), 239 Mont. 469, 472, 781 P.2d 277, 279 (citing Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 56 (5th ed.1984)) (emphasis added). Such a duty may arise where, as here, the special relationship is custodial by nature, thus requiring the defendant to exercise reasonable control over his or her charge so as to prevent foreseeable harm to others. See Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 56, at 383-84 (5th ed.1984). Lopez, ¶ 24, 986 P.2d 1081. ¶ 22 Moreover, we recently addressed the Phillips decision, clarifying that a police officer does not owe a duty to protect a third person, such as LaTray, from the actions of an individual absent a custodial relationship between the officer and the individual. See Nelson, ¶ 28. Thus, a duty to protect third persons arises only when a police officer actually makes an arrest, or otherwise takes possession or custody of an individual . Nelson, ¶ 29 (emphasis added). ¶ 23 Here, in contrast to the situation presented in Phillips, the City's police officers entered into a special relationship of custody or control over Shawn, thus giving rise to a duty of care to third persons. See Krieg, 239 Mont. at 472, 781 P.2d at 279. While it is true that the officers did not actually arrest Shawn or otherwise have a basis for taking her into legal custody, they voluntarily undertook possession or custody of Shawn in transporting her to the hospital. See Nelson, ¶ 29. In so doing, they took charge of her person and, consequently, harbored the ability to control her actions to prevent an unreasonable risk of harm to third persons. See Nelson, ¶ 28; Phillips, 233 Mont. at 252, 758 P.2d at 775. ¶ 24 With respect to foreseeability in the context of duty, we have ascertained that duty is defined by the `scope of the risk which negligent conduct foreseeably entails.' Busta v. Columbus Hosp. Corp. (1996), 276 Mont. 342, 363, 916 P.2d 122, 134 (quoting Mang v. Eliasson (1969), 153 Mont. 431, 438, 458 P.2d 777, 781). [I]n analyzing foreseeability in the duty context, as we said in Lopez, we look to whether or not the injured party was within the scope of risk created by the alleged negligence of the tortfeasorthat is, was the injured party a foreseeable plaintiff? Lopez, ¶ 28, 986 P.2d 1081. ¶ 25 The special relationship that existed between the officers and Shawn gave rise to a duty of care to foreseeable plaintiffs like LaTray. If a reasonably prudent defendant has no reason to foresee `any danger of direct injury [to the plaintiff] nor any risk from an intervening cause, ' then the defendant is not negligent. Starkenburg, 282 Mont. at 17, 934 P.2d at 1027 (quoting Busta, 276 Mont. at 362, 916 P.2d at 134) (emphasis added). Based upon Shawn's combative and agitated demeanor on the day in question, a reasonably prudent defendant would have foreseen that a failure to adequately restrain or otherwise control Shawn could pose an unreasonable risk of harm to others in her vicinity. Furthermore, both of the officers testified that the standard police practice of separating reported combatants, from which they departed in this case, is designed in part for the protection and safety of bystanders who happen to be in the vicinity of the incident. We determine that by voluntarily assuming custody of Shawn and transporting her to the hospital, the officers assumed the ability to control her actions to prevent harm to bystanders, like LaTray, who fall within the scope of the risk which negligent supervision would foreseeably entail. See Phillips, 233 Mont. at 252, 758 P.2d at 775. ¶ 26 The existence of a legal duty is a matter of law. Lopez, ¶ 31, 986 P.2d 1081 (citing Nautilus, 254 Mont. at 299, 837 P.2d at 411). We hold, as a matter of law, that the City owed a duty of reasonable care to adequately supervise Shawn so as to prevent harm to any person, like LaTray, who would foreseeably be placed within the scope of risk arising from negligent supervision. Whether the City breached that legal duty, however, is an issue to be determined by the jury upon retrial. See Estate of Strever, 278 Mont. at 175, 924 P.2d at 672 (stating that breach of a legal duty is a question of fact suitable for resolution by the fact finder at trial).