Opinion ID: 2823809
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Double Jeopardy Law

Text: Â¶9Â Â Â Â Â Under the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and Colorado Constitutions, the State cannot punish a person for the same offense twice. U.S. Const. amend. V (â[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .â); 3 Colo. Const. art. 2, Â§ 18 (âNo person shall . . . be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.â). This constitutional guarantee prevents both a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal or conviction and multiple punishments for the same offense. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977). For a defendant to show a violation of his constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy, jeopardy must have attached at the first proceeding, that proceeding must have concluded, and the defendant must have been exposed to a second, or double, jeopardy. See, e.g., People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d 128, 141â42 (Colo. 1992); People v.Â Paulsen, 601 P.2d 634, 636 (Colo. 1979). Jeopardy attaches when the jury is sworn during a jury trial, when the first prosecution witness is sworn during a bench trial, or when the court has accepted a guilty plea. See Â§ 18-1-301(1), C.R.S. (2014); Jeffrey v.Â Dist. Court, 626 P.2d 631, 636 (Colo. 1981). Â¶10Â Â Â Â Â Historically, the United States Supreme Court has âresisted attemptsâ to extend double jeopardy protections to sentencing proceedings. Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 438 (1981). The Court has reasoned that â[t]he imposition of a particular sentence usually is not regarded as an âacquittalâ of any more severe sentence that could have been imposed.â Id.; see also Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 747 (1994) (explaining that repeat-offender laws âpenaliz[e] only the last offense committed by the defendantâ (internal quotation marks omitted)). Rather than viewing an enhanced penalty for recidivism âas either a new jeopardy or additional penalty for the earlier crimes,â the Court has explained that it is only âa stiffened penalty for the latest crime, which is considered to be an aggravated offense because a repetitive one.â Gryger v.Â Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 732 (1948). Â¶11Â Â Â Â Â Despite this, the Court held in Bullington that double jeopardy prohibited the trial court from sentencing a defendant to death when the defendant had originally been sentenced to life imprisonment under a stateâs bifurcated guilt and penalty proceedings. Bullington, 451 U.S. at 446. It reasoned that â[t]he presentence hearingresembled and, indeed, in all relevant respects was like the immediately preceding trial on the issue of guilt or innocence.â Id. at 438. âIt was itself a trial on the issue of punishment so precisely defined by the [stateâs sentencing] statutes.â Id. Unlike the previous cases the Court had considered where the sentence was subject to great discretion, this had âthe hallmarks of the trial on guilt or innocence.â Id. at 439.