Opinion ID: 2182224
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: respondent's failure to withdraw from the first case

Text: When Jefferson terminated the Respondent's employment, the Respondent failed to withdraw from the case as he was required to do. See AGC v. Kerpelman, 288 Md. 341 [420 A.2d 940] (1980). His reasons for not doing so have been set out infra. These reasons are totally unconvincing. Respondent advances another reason for his failure to withdraw, that is, that he wanted to be paid a $200 balance allegedly owed him when he represented Jefferson previously in a criminal case. Aside from the fact that he had previously sworn under oath that it was a civil case, his reason is totally unconvincing because I find as a fact and by clear and convincing evidence that the $200 was paid to the Respondent. Jefferson so testified and he said it was done before two witnesses (Clarence Bowman and Mr. Spell). What is more is that Jefferson testified that the Respondent would not represent him with respect to the two accidents unless he was paid in advance. Respondent testified that he and Jefferson agreed that the $200 would be taken out of any recovery made in the First Case. Yet this agreement is nowhere recorded. In fact, the Respondent had Jefferson sign two powers of attorney in connection with both the First Case and the Second Case but these documents do not mention any such agreement. I find by clear and convincing evidence that the $200 was paid to the Respondent by Jefferson before the Respondent undertook to represent Jefferson in the First Case. Hence, the Respondent's testimony to the effect that he would not withdraw until paid this $200 is not believed. The Respondent's demand that he be paid $750 before he would withdraw from the cases is found to be unreasonable and extortionate. I find that it was not based upon any substance or rationality. I find that he did not and would not account to either Jefferson or his later attorney (Simons) for this $750. His attempt to use his Exhibit 7 (for identification) is totally unpersuasive. His in-court accounting (work done, money spent, money owed) is suspect because he demanded the very same amount ($750) from Spell when Spell wanted him to withdraw from Spell's case. I find by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent violated Disciplinary Rule 2-110(B)(4) D. RESPONDENT ENGAGED IN CONDUCT WHICH WAS PREJUDICIAL TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, WHICH ADVERSELY REFLECTED ON HIS FITNESS TO PRACTICE LAW, AND INVOLVED DISHONESTY I find by clear and convincing evidence that while the Respondent knew that he was being investigated by the AGC, he got Jefferson to write a letter to be presented to the AGC, which letter was intended to fend off and block the investigation. I find further that this letter was induced by Respondent's representation to Jefferson that in exchange for the letter the Respondent would settle the First Case swiftly. However, I find that said representation was false. Jefferson testified that the Respondent more or less told him what to say in the letter and that it was to be sent to the AGC. He further testified that the Respondent told him that he had been having trouble with the AGC and that Jefferson had to get them off his back. As to why he wrote the letter, he testified that the Respondent told him that he (Respondent) could hurry up and settle the (First Case) if I wanted to get it settled. It is significant at this precise time, Jefferson needed money because he had lost his job. I find that the Respondent told Jefferson to say that he (Jefferson) was satisfied and that he (Jefferson) didn't want to press anymore further charges on him and I further find that as the result of the Respondent's direction, Jefferson wrote that he will take no further actions against (Respondent) involving either case. I also find that Jefferson really did not want to write such a letter  in fact, he testified that his wife said that she would not sign and so Jefferson did not sign the letter. But he did write the letter, I find, as the result of the Respondent's representation that in this way the First Case would be swiftly settled. I find that the Respondent never intended to settle the First Case swiftly. In fact the Respondent did nothing to settle the case and next to nothing to bring it to trial. Hence the Respondent made a false representation to a person whom the Respondent knew to be vulnerable in order to obtain an exculpatory letter  a letter designed to thwart a legitimate investigation of the Respondent. Hence he has violated: Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(4), (5) and (6) Disciplinary Rule 6-102(A) /s/ Marshall A. Levin Marshall A. Levin, Judge September 13, 1983 COLE, Judge, dissenting: The record in this case makes two conclusions indelibly clear: (1) this is basically a dispute between a single client and his attorney and (2) the evidence may have been cast in a more favorable light for respondent had he not elected to be his sole witness as well as well as his own counsel. In any event, I do not believe that respondent's misconduct calls for the ultimate sanction of disbarment. While the Court cannot overlook the fact of respondent's prior disciplinary experience before this Court, Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Howard, 282 Md. 515, 385 A.2d 1191 (1978), a suspension for a lengthy period would be sufficient to protect the public interest as well as to impress the bar that respondent's conduct fell below the professional standards of this State. I, therefore, dissent from the Court's order of disbarment. Judge ELDRIDGE has authorized me to say that he concurs in the views expressed herein.