Opinion ID: 48833
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Title VII Retaliation Framework

Text: Under Title VII, it is “an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees . . . because [the employee] has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice” by the statute or “because [the employee] has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing” under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). To establish a claim of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) he engaged in a protected activity; (2) an adverse employment action occurred; and (3) a causal link exists between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Fabela v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 329 F.3d 409, 414 (5th Cir. 2003). The parties agree that Thomas, by filing an EEOC complaint in 2000, had engaged in an activity protected by Title VII, thus satisfying the first element. Thomas argues that his alleged constructive discharge 12 constitutes an adverse employment action for purposes of his retaliation claim. A constructive discharge does qualify as an adverse employment action. See Harvill v. Westward Communs., L.L.C., 433 F.3d 428, 439 (5th Cir. 2005); Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 968 F.2d 427, 431 (5th Cir. 1992).2 While Thomas’s argument is convoluted, it is possible to isolate two sets of actions as the basis for his allegation of constructive discharge. First, Thomas claims he was ordered by Boone to perform menial or degrading tasks such as “cleaning filthy equipment operated by other employees,” “wiping down the walls inside the building,” “us[ing] malfunctioning equipment,” and “involuntary reassignment to the galvanized pipe change out crew,” which was very physically intensive. Second, Thomas cites the alleged harassing conduct by Straughter and Atmos’s handling of the matter as a basis for his claim. 3. Allegations Not Included in 2004 EEOC Complaint The filing of an administrative complaint is a prerequisite 2 Because Thomas specifies constructive discharge as satisfying the adverse employment action element of his retaliation claim, our analysis of his claim is unaffected by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006). Constructive discharge qualified as an adverse employment action under this circuit’s old “ultimate employment action” test, which the Supreme Court disapproved of in Burlington Northern, and it qualifies as such under the “material adversity” standard established in that case. Id. at 2415. While Burlington Northern set a lower threshold for finding an adverse employment action, Thomas is still required to satisfy the stringent test for constructive discharge. 13 to a Title VII suit. Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 781 (5th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, we may consider as the basis for Thomas’s suit only the specific allegations made in his 2004 EEOC complaint, as well as “any kind of discrimination like or related to the charge’s allegations, limited only by the scope of the EEOC investigation that could reasonably be expected to grow out of the initial charges of discrimination.” Fine v. GAF Chem. Corp., 995 F.2d 576, 578 (5th Cir. 1993). Thomas’s 2004 EEOC charge listed only Straughter’s “sexual [sic] explicit conduct” and Atmos’s subsequent investigation as the basis for his complaint. Thomas’s allegations that Boone assigned him menial and degrading tasks are not “like or related to” his accusations regarding Straughter’s conduct, and an EEOC investigation into Straughter’s conduct could not reasonably be expected to encompass Boone’s work assignment practices. We therefore may not consider these practices as a basis for Thomas’s retaliation claim. 4. Allegations Included in 2004 EEOC Complaint We now consider the allegations within the scope of Thomas’s 2004 EEOC complaint––those concerning Straughter’s 2004 conduct and the subsequent investigation by Atmos. We agree with the district court that Thomas cannot make out a prima facie case either that he suffered a constructive discharge based on the Straughter incidents and subsequent investigation or that there 14 was a causal link between these events and Thomas’s 2000 EEOC complaint. For either reason, Thomas’s retaliation claim must fail.
A constructive discharge has occurred when an employee resigns after “the employer made the employee’s working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign.” Barrow v. New Orleans S.S. Ass’n, 10 F.3d 292, 297 (5th Cir. 1994). “[T]o succeed on a constructive discharge claim, the plaintiff must show a greater degree of harassment than is required for a hostile work environment claim.” Hockman v. Westward Communs., LLC, 407 F.3d 317, 332 (5th Cir. 2004). As explained above, we are limited to considering the two instances of alleged harassment by Straughter, but this does not necessarily doom Thomas’s claim. In the context of hostile work environment claims, the Supreme Court has indicated that “extremely serious” isolated incidents can “amount to discriminatory changes in the ‘terms and conditions of employment.’” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 (1998) (citation omitted). Similarly, we have held that “isolated incidents, if egregious, can alter the terms and conditions of employment.” Harvill, 433 F.3d at 435. We need not decide, however, whether Straughter’s alleged harassment reached the necessary level of seriousness, because Thomas’s precipitous resignation upon being informed of the results of 15 Atmos’s investigation was not the action of a reasonable employee. The record indicates that Atmos’s response to Thomas’s allegation was appropriate. Thomas and Straughter were both placed on paid leave while Atmos investigated Thomas’s claims. Atmos interviewed several of Thomas’s coworkers, including those that Thomas requested be interviewed. When none of these coworkers supported Thomas’s accusations, Atmos still attempted to respond to Thomas’s concerns. Human resources personnel pledged to counsel Straughter to refrain from inappropriate behavior and to conduct training for supervisors and managers on harassment. Thomas did not remain at Atmos to see if these efforts ended the objectionable behavior; rather, he resigned immediately. This was not the act of a reasonable employee in his position. See Thompson v. Naphcare, Inc., 117 F. App’x 317, 325 (5th Cir. 2004) (unpublished) (stating that “an employee who resigns without affording the employer a reasonable opportunity to address her concerns has not been constructively discharged”); see also Boze v. Branstetter, 912 F.2d 801, 805 (5th Cir. 1990). Even if Thomas had demonstrated that he was constructively discharged, however, he has made no prima facie case of a causal link.
A plaintiff alleging Title VII retaliation may establish a causal link in two ways: either by presenting direct evidence of retaliatory motive or by providing circumstantial evidence that creates a rebuttable presumption of retaliatory motive. Fabela, 329 16 F.3d at 414-15. By producing direct evidence, the plaintiff avoids the McDonnell Douglas framework and shifts the burden of persuasion to the employer. Brown v. E. Miss. Elec. Power Ass’n, 989 F.2d 858, 861 (5th Cir. 1993). Thomas alleges that he has direct evidence of retaliatory motive. He states that in conversations with Thomas, Boone continued to bring up the Mighty Joe Young incident, complained that Thomas’s EEOC complaint had brought him under tremendous pressure, and declared “if something like this ever comes up again, I will drag you through the mud.” We have defined “direct evidence” as evidence which, “if believed, proves the fact without inference or presumption.” Brown, 989 F.3d at 861. In a Title VII context, direct evidence includes any statement or document which shows on its face that an improper criterion was a basis for the adverse employment action. Fabela, 329 F.3d at 415. The evidence provided by Thomas does not satisfy this standard. While Boone’s statements to Thomas tend to show that Boone resented Thomas for his 2000 EEOC complaint, they do not, on their face, demonstrate that Boone’s subsequent actions were motivated by this resentment. Moreover, as stated below, Thomas has not shown that Boone influenced either Straughter’s alleged actions or Atmos’s investigation of them. We therefore examine whether Thomas’s circumstantial evidence demonstrates a retaliatory motive. Where the plaintiff provides only circumstantial evidence of causation, the McDonnell Douglas burdenshifting framework applies. Sandstad v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 309 17 F.3d 893, 896 (5th Cir. 2002). Thus, if the employee makes a prima facie case of retaliation, the burden of production shifts to the employer to state a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the employment action. Baker v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 430 F.3d 750, 75455 (5th Cir. 2005). If the defendant meets its burden, the presumption of discrimination created by the prima facie case disappears, and the plaintiff is left with the ultimate burden of proving that the protected activity was the but-for cause of the adverse employment action. See Montemayor v. City of San Antonio, 276 F.3d 687, 692 (5th Cir. 2001). Certainly, there can be no inference of causation from temporal proximity in this case. The incidents of alleged harassment by Straughter and Atmos’s investigation occurred in the spring of 2004, a full 3.5 years after Thomas’s initial EEOC complaint. We have noted that district courts in this circuit have allowed an inference of causation for summary judgment purposes where up to four months has elapsed. Evans v. Houston, 246 F.3d 344, 354 (5th Cir. 2001). The Supreme Court, however, has cited approvingly other circuit court cases that found three and four month periods too long to allow an inference of causation. Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 27374 (2001). Clearly, a lapse of 3.5 years does not permit an inference of causation. Thomas, however, argues that a causal connection is evident because the “exact same decision-makers” were involved in the 18 2000 and 2004 incidents. The record indicates that Thomas was fired in 2000 after Boone reported his “blowing up” comment to Operations Manager Robert Griffin (“Griffin”), who discussed the situation with unnamed members of the human resources department. The 2004 investigation was initiated after Boone reported Thomas’s new accusations to Griffin, and the investigation was carried out by Griffin, Atmos Human Resources Manager Debbie Redell (“Redell”) and Vice President of Human Resources David Hebert (“Hebert”). Boone, the individual for whom there is some evidence of residual anger at Thomas, played only a minor role in the proceedings. Thomas has put forward no evidence indicating that Griffin, Redell or Hebert harbored resentment against him for his 2000 complaint, and there is substantial evidence that the 2004 investigation was carried out with fairness and diligence. Thomas has failed to present sufficient evidence to create a rebuttable presumption of retaliatory motive.