Opinion ID: 2189436
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: application of the law to the instructions

Text: In People v Aaron, 409 Mich 672, 728; 299 NW2d 304 (1980), this Court held that malice is the intention to kill, the intention to do great bodily harm, or the wanton and willful disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of defendant's behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm. We further hold that malice is an essential element of any murder ... whether the murder occurs in the course of a felony or otherwise. We therefore decided that the malice necessary for a felony-murder conviction could not be inferred merely from the intent to commit the underlying felony. However, we went on to state: The facts and circumstances involved in the perpetration of a felony may evidence an intent to kill, an intent to cause great bodily harm, or a wanton and willful disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of defendant's behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm; however, the conclusion must be left to the jury to infer from all the evidence. [Emphasis added. Id., pp 728-729.] Read in their entirety, the jury instructions at issue clearly do not require the jury to find the malice necessary for murder from the mere intention to commit the underlying felony. The felony is a factor the jury may use to find malice. The defendant objects to the felony-murder instructions because the court at one point stated: If you find that the defendant consciously intended to commit, attempted to commit or assisted another in the crime of robbery, you may infer that he knowingly created a very high risk of death with knowledge that it probably would cause death.[ [4] ] This particular instruction was preceded by explicit and correct definitions of malice. (See the italicized portions of the charge ante, pp 266-269.) The court stated: The essential element of all murder is malice.... Malice means that the defendant intended to kill or that he knowingly created a very high risk of death with knowledge that his act would probably result in death. An elaboration of this definition followed: Malice means that the defendant intended to kill or that he knowingly created a very high risk of death with knowledge that it probably would result in death, and that he did so under circumstances which did not justify, excuse or mitigate the crime. A correct definition of malice was then given for a third time in the paragraph immediately preceding the one in which the language objected to was used. More importantly, the court clarified any ambiguity in the instruction objected to by explicitly noting in the proximately following paragraphs the factors the jury had to consider in order to find malice. Specifically, the following instruction was given: [Y]ou must consider all of the facts and circumstances in determining the state of mind of the defendant at the time of the act. This may be inferred from the kind of weapon used, the nature of the wounds inflicted, the circumstances surrounding the killing, the acts, conduct and language of the accused or any other circumstances in evidence. [Emphasis added.] Our responsibility as a reviewing court is to balance the general correct, clear tenor of the instructions in their entirety against the potentially misleading effect of a single sentence isolated by the defendant. Dye, 356 Mich 279; Dupie, 395 Mich 488-489. In doing so, we find that the instructions, as a whole, correctly informed the jury of the Aaron standard governing malice in felony murder and do not require the jury to have determined such malice only on the basis of the intent to commit the underlying felony. [5] We are also aware that the trial judge was cognizant of the implications of Aaron. The court stated: Aaron says specifically that the jury may infer malice from the very thing you are objecting to [the facts of the underlying felony] and all of the facts and circumstances.... A correct understanding of the applicable standard by the trial court further supports our belief that the instructions given were accurate. Where instructions on malice in other cases were found to be incorrect, the inference of malice was made an automatic result once the intent to commit the underlying felony was found. (By contrast, the case before us raises at most a possible inference.) In People v Thompson, decided jointly with Aaron, the jury was instructed that if the said defendant was perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate said assault upon the deceased, Mary Emma Hendry, with intent to rob, then it is not necessary for the state to prove a premeditated design or intent. The judge further explained that even though there was no intent to injure anyone, the evil intent to commit the robbery carries over to make that crime murder in the first degree under the law in this state. Aaron, 409 Mich 687, n 3. In People v Wright, also decided with Aaron, the jury was instructed: For murder of the first degree there must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing occurred as a result of the crime of arson and that the defendant was at the time engaged in committing or attempting to commit, or was aiding another in the commission of that crime. [ Aaron, 409 Mich 688, n 5.] In Aaron itself, the instruction authorized the jury to convict the defendant of first-degree murder if they found that defendant killed the victim during the commission or attempted commission of an armed robbery. Aaron, 409 Mich 688. In People v Wilder, 411 Mich 328; 308 NW2d 112 (1981), the instructions were given as follows: Now I know you have heard of a premeditated killing. We are not concerned with that in this case, because the law supplies the premeditation and the deliberation if a person is killed in the perpetration of a robbery, or the attempt[ed] perpetration of a robbery. The prosecution does not have to prove premeditation and deliberation, it is automatically supplied because the law says that, if a person is killed in the perpetration or attempt[ed] perpetration of a robbery that is first-degree murder, felony. But you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a robbery or the attempt[ed] perpetration of a robbery committed by these defendants, not by somebody else. And that's important. The prosecution must prove that they committed that act or attempted to commit that act of robbery and during that Mr. Reaves was killed. [Emphasis added. Wilder, 411 Mich 340-341.] In the case now before us there is no similar mandatory language.
The aiding and abetting instructions given in this instance were not objected to at trial; therefore, the appropriate standard of review is whether manifest injustice has occurred. Woods, 416 Mich 610. While the instruction given on this issue was arguably erroneous, after a careful review of the record, we find no evidence of injustice. The defendant argues that the aiding and abetting instructions given allowed the jury to convict him of felony murder on an aiding and abetting theory without explicitly requiring the jury to make a determination of his intent to aid and abet the murder. The language under point four provides as follows: [T]hat this crime which occurred, that is the felony murder, was fairly within the criminal plan and the defendant might have expected this to happen in the course of committing the robbery. The defendant reads this as permitting the jury to apply an objective standard of foreseeability on the issue of intent. He concludes that conviction under this language violates the Aaron requirement that malice on the part of the defendant be found before any killing can be deemed murder. Before discussing the defendant's contention further, it is necessary to understand the elements of an aiding and abetting charge in Michigan. The Michigan statute, MCL 767.39; MSA 28.979, provides: Every person concerned in the commission of an offense, whether he directly commits the act constituting the offense or procures, counsels, aids, or abets in its commission may hereafter be prosecuted, indicted, tried and on conviction shall be punished as if he had directly committed such offense. The requisite intent is that necessary to be convicted of the crime as a principal. Meister v People, 31 Mich 99 (1875). In this instance, under Aaron, it therefore must be shown that the aider and abettor had the intent to kill, the intent to cause great bodily harm or wantonly and willfully disregarded the likelihood of the natural tendency of his behavior to cause death or great bodily harm. Aaron, 409 Mich 733. Further, if the aider and abettor participates in a crime with knowledge of his principal's intent to kill or to cause great bodily harm, he is acting with wanton and willful disregard sufficient to support a finding of malice under Aaron. [6] This result is in accord with numerous decisions reached by the Court of Appeals over a considerable period of time. See, e.g., People v Schaffer, 129 Mich App 287, 291; 341 NW2d 507 (1983); People v Turner, 125 Mich App 8, 11; 336 NW2d 217 (1983); People v Davenport, 122 Mich App 159, 164; 332 NW2d 443 (1982); People v Harris, 110 Mich App 636, 643; 313 NW2d 354 (1981); People v Wilbert, 105 Mich App 631, 640; 307 NW2d 388 (1981); People v Wirth, 87 Mich App 41, 46; 273 NW2d 104 (1978); People v Poplar, 20 Mich App 132, 136; 173 NW2d 732 (1969). The Aaron concerns are not implicated by this standard. In Aaron, we expressed concern for co-felons who, under the old felony-murder rule became involved in an unforeseen and unagreed-to murder. Aaron, 409 Mich 731. We stated: In the past, the felony-murder rule has been employed where unforeseen or accidental deaths occur and where the state seeks to prove vicarious liability of co-felons. In situations involving the vicarious liability of co-felons, the individual liability of each felon must be shown. It is fundamentally unfair and in violation of basic principles of individual criminal culpability to hold one felon liable for the unforeseen and unagreed-to results of another felon. This concern is not implicated by an aiding and abetting standard which requires a finding that the co-felon acted with malice. We do not address the defendant's contention that the actual instruction given does not require this level of intent to be found because the objection was not properly preserved. We review in this instance only to determine whether the defendant was subject to a manifest injustice. Because the intent necessary for an aiding and abetting conviction is so overwhelmingly evident from the record, we find that no injustice has occurred. The entire criminal enterprise, including the robbery and the killing, was cooperative in nature. Eyewitness testimony established that Kelly and Moses signaled to each other prior to entering the house, headed in the direction of the house with a rifle and a knife, and left the house with a rifle and a knife wrapped in a bloodied sheet. They were observed loading a television set into a van. There was also testimony by a witness that Kelly had told him that he (Kelly) pushed Espy down while Moses tied him up. The defendant admitted having blood on his pants. The nature of the killing itself clearly demonstrates that it was neither accidental nor done without malice. The victim's hands were tied behind his back, and his throat was slit a number of times. Even assuming the defendant did not enter the house with the intent to murder, it is clear that he either formulated such an intent once inside the house, or at the very least became aware of his codefendant's specific intent at some point during these gruesome proceedings. Defendant's testimony was contradicted by the witnesses and unsupported by the evidence. He stated that he was walking down the street when Moses threw a rifle to him and he followed with no knowledge of what was happening. He did, however, admit to agreeing to steal the television set, and, on cross-examination, to entering the victim's enclosed porch. In reviewing the record for evidence of manifest injustice to the defendant, we find none. Instead, we find the evidence of intent necessary to support an aiding and abetting conviction so overwhelming that even if the instructions are considered ambiguous no injustice is done to the defendant by allowing his conviction to stand.