Opinion ID: 527868
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Cheek's Other Contentions

Text: 33 As noted above, Cheek raises a number of other challenges to his conviction. These challenges all are without merit, and hence do not require discussion. Buckner, 830 F.2d at 104. Nonetheless, we address a few of them briefly. 34 First, the district court clearly had jurisdiction of this case under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3231, which provides that the federal district courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses against the laws of the United States. Sections 7201 through 7210 of Title 26 of the United States Code, as well as 18 U.S.C. Sec. 287, are offenses against the laws of the United States. This court previously rejected any arguments to the contrary (with respect to Sections 7201-10, but this is equally applicable to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 287 as well) in United States v. Koliboski, 732 F.2d 1328, 1329-30 (7th Cir.1984). Other circuits too numerous to mention also have rejected this argument. 35 Second, Cheek argues that he was denied his right to counsel under the sixth amendment to the Constitution because he could not find trial counsel with expertise on the Constitution and the Internal Revenue Code, and because his friends were only allowed to act as helpers during certain stages of the trial. This argument is without merit. In United States v. Thibodeaux, 758 F.2d 199, 201 (7th Cir.1985), this court specifically held that [t]here is no constitutional right ... to representation by nonlawyers or laymen. Id. at 201. In this case, the district court was even more generous than it need have been, for it permitted Cheek to have his friends sit with him at counsel table. In Thibodeaux, we noted that district courts need not permit this practice. Id. 36 Moreover, the district judge only insisted on proceeding without Cheek being represented by counsel after he had granted Cheek numerous continuances in order that he could find counsel. The court also suggested that Cheek consult with friends about attorneys, and even mentioned to Cheek the name of an attorney who had tried a tax protester case before the court (Tr. March 30, 1987 at 5; Tr. May 19, 1987 at 7). This case also is similar to Thibodeaux in this respect. In that case, we held that the right to counsel may be waived if one able to afford counsel does not retain an attorney within a reasonable period of time. Id. Thus, we do not find that Cheek was denied effective assistance of counsel. 37 Third, we reject Cheek's argument that the government's evidence was insufficient as to his intent to violate the law. Cheek argues that the jury note which said that Cheek truly does not believe that he is breaking the law contradicts and negates the jury verdict of guilty. We reject this argument out of hand. Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) provides that jurors may neither testify about nor provide affidavits concerning their mental processes. This court previously has interpreted this rule to mean that counsel may not, in most instances, offer the mental processes of jurors to impeach verdicts. United States v. Sblendorio, 830 F.2d 1382, 1389-90 (7th Cir.1987), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 1034, 98 L.Ed.2d 998 (1988) and cases cited therein (A court will not inquire into the jury's deliberative process in the absence of a claim of external influence); United States v. Schwartz, 787 F.2d 257, 261-62 (7th Cir.1986) (jurors may only testify about extraneous prejudicial information or any outside influence). 5 38 Finally, we find that Cheek's numerous evidentiary objections are without merit. Even if the district court committed any error with respect to the admission of evidence, this error was harmless because of the overwhelming evidence of Cheek's guilt. Cf. United States v. Manganellis, 864 F.2d 528, 539 (7th Cir.1988) (An error is harmless if the other untainted incriminating evidence is overwhelming). Likewise, even if the district court erroneously refused to admit certain items of Cheek's proffered evidence, or improperly refused to let evidence which was admitted, but mislaid and not located until the jury began deliberating, go back to the jury, this was harmless error. This is not a case where the complained-of exclusion of evidence had a substantial effect on the jury's verdict by precluding Cheek from presenting his defense. Cf. United States v. Peak, 856 F.2d 825, 834-35 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 499, 102 L.Ed.2d 535 (1988).