Opinion ID: 160186
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Propriety of Written Summation and Delivery of the Verdict

Text: 20 Edward next requests a new trial, arguing that [b]y conducting the closing argument and verdict stage of the trial in writing, the trial court prejudicially deprived Edward of his right to be present under the Due Process Clause and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43. 4 In support of this argument, Edward cites cases establishing and applying the well-settled constitutional right of a criminal defendant to be present during critical stages of trial. We find Edward's argument unpersuasive. 21 We begin with a discussion of the right to be present generally afforded to criminal defendants and the unique character of juvenile proceedings in contrast thereto. In previously examining a criminal defendant's due process right to be present at trial, we quoted the Supreme Court in holding the right arises 22 whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fulness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.... [T]he presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only. ... [D]ue process does not require the defendant's presence when [his] presence would be useless, or the benefit but a shadow. 23 Larson, 911 F.2d at 394 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-108 (1934)). Employing this standard, we held a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to be present for summations delivered at a jury trial. See id.; Burrell v. Aaron, 560 F.2d 988, 989 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1018 (1978). 24 However, unlike the situation in Larson, this is not a criminal proceeding, but a juvenile matter. As Edward's counsel pointed out at the dispositional hearing, [a] successful prosecution under the [Federal Juvenile Delinquency] Act results in a civil determination of status rather than a felony or misdemeanor conviction. United States v. Sealed Appellant, 123 F.3d 232, 233 (5th Cir. 1997). Accord United States v. Brian N., 900 F.2d 218, 220 (10th Cir. 1990). The Supreme Court has taken a slightly different approach, recognizing [l]ittle, indeed, is to be gained by any attempt simplistically to call the juvenile court proceeding either civil or criminal, because while the proceeding has not yet been held to be a criminal prosecution[] within the meaning and reach of the Sixth Amendment, it is not devoid of criminal aspects merely because it usually has been given the civil label. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 541 (1971) (quotation marks omitted). Precisely because of the unique nature of the juvenile court proceeding, the Supreme Court has specifically refused to hold all rights constitutionally assured to an adult accused of crime also are to be enforced or made available to the juvenile in his delinquency proceeding. Id. at 533. [T]he Due Process Clause has a role to play, see In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967), in juvenile trial proceedings, and the standard we use to measure the extent of that role is one of fundamental fairness. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 543. Bearing this in mind, we carefully examine Edward's two-part argument.
25 Edward first argues he had a right to present oral summation. 5 In support of his position, he cites several unrelated cases and attempts to tie them together. Edward first cites Larson for the proposition stated above: a criminal defendant has a right to be present for summations in a jury trial in order to provide assistance to counsel and exert psychological influence on the jury. See Larson, 911 F.2d at 396. He then cites Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975), where the Supreme Court held a criminal defendant cannot be completely denied the right to present a closing summation in the context of a bench trial. Id. at 863, 865. Finally, Edward points to a case from the Second Circuit that held the psychological impact a defendant has on the jury is equally applicable when the fact finder is the court itself. See United States v. Canady, 126 F.3d 352, 362 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1134 (1998). Therefore, Edward reasons, he had a constitutional right to offer an oral summation at trial. 26 Edward's reasoning is unavailing for several reasons. First, we do not accept the Second Circuit's reasoning in Canady as applied to juvenile proceedings. While the presence of the defendant during closing arguments may exert a psychological influence on a jury, we find the likelihood of such an impact on a district judge in a juvenile proceeding to be minimal. Second, Herring is distinguishable. The Herring Court confronted a situation where the trial court completely foreclosed the defendant from presenting a summation, and the Court's decision was grounded in the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, not the Due Process Clause right to be present. Herring, 422 U.S. at 856-57. We find nothing in Herring which requires the summations be presented orally to the court. 6 See United States v. Stenzel, 49 F.3d 658, 662 n.2 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 840 (1995) (noting written summation might have precluded appeal on issue of whether district court had duty to inquire if counsel desired to make closing arguments). Proper adjudication of a case often demands careful reflection on the facts presented, and the application of those facts to the law. Written summations are a helpful tool for the trial court in accomplishing what can be a complicated task of sorting through evidence presented at trial. We would perform a disservice to the interests of fairness and justice if we completely precluded the use of written summations at the close of a criminal bench trial, and instead insisted on oral summations. 7 Third, even if we required oral summations in criminal bench trials, we would need to determine if such a requirement was necessary in a juvenile trial proceeding. However, we do not need to make that determination here because Edward invited any perceived error. 27 As recounted earlier, at the close of trial Edward's counsel asked the trial court for the opportunity to present a closing argument and actually suggested the argument be in written form: May we also file written closing arguments, Your Honor, ... I don't mind if you set a page limit, but I would like an opportunity to ... either orally or written[], do a summation to the Court. Two weeks later, when the deadline for the written summations and post-trial motions arrived, Edward's counsel filed a request for oral summation instead. 8 However, at this point the trial court had mulled the case over for days. The government prepared its written summation and filed it with the trial court the same day Edward filed his request. The trial court was ready to review the summations and make its rulings. The invited error doctrine prevents a party from inducing action by a court and later seeking reversal on the ground that the requested action was error. United States v. Johnson, 183 F.3d 1175, 1178 n.2 (10th Cir. 1999). We hold the district court was under no obligation to rearrange its schedule to accommodate Edward's belated motion, having already granted his original request for written argument.
28 Whether Edward was entitled to be present at the trial court's rendering of the verdict is a more difficult question. Edward again cites Larson and Canady as supporting his position. In Larson, we held a criminal defendant has a due process right to be present for the rendition of a jury verdict, citing the same opportunity to assist counsel and influence the jury as mentioned in the closing argument context discussed above. See Larson, 911 F.2d at 395-96. The Second Circuit extended our logic one step further to require physical presence of a criminal defendant for the rendering of a verdict following a bench trial. See Canady, 126 F.3d at 361-62. Edward invites us to extend the logic further yet, and require the presence of juvenile defendants. We decline to do so. 29 In addition to our earlier-stated reluctance to adopt the Second Circuit's reasoning as applied to juvenile proceedings, we have a further reason for not extending Canady. The Second Circuit in Canady relied in part on the criminal defendant's right to an open public trial in holding the district court erred by issuing its verdict in written form. Id. at 362-63. As support for its position, the panel stated [t]here is a distinctly useful purpose in ensuring that the pronouncement of the defendant's guilt or innocence by the court is both face-to-face and public. It assures that the trial court is 'keenly alive to a sense of its responsibility and to the importance of its functions.' Id. at 361 (quoting Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984)) (alterations omitted). Waller is a case devoted to the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. Waller, 467 U.S. at 43-44. In relying on Walker, Edward fails to appreciate the difference between a criminal trial and a juvenile proceeding. 30 We have not extended the public trial right to juvenile defendants. In McKeiver, the Supreme Court seemed to express disdain for the idea when it held the right to a jury trial did not apply to juvenile proceedings. The Court clearly insinuated the public trial right would be incompatible with the traditional nature of the juvenile proceeding when it stated: [I]f the jury trial were to be injected into the juvenile court system as a matter of right, it would bring with it into that system the traditional delay, the formality, and the clamor of the adversary system and, possibly, the public trial. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 550. Indeed, in Edward's case, the district court meticulously guarded the privacy of the proceedings, presumably to protect Edward's interests. When deciding whether due process requires application of certain constitutional rights to juvenile proceedings, the Supreme Court has focused on fundamental fairness with an emphasis on fact-finding procedures. See McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 543 (stating emphasis on fact-finding led to applying [t]he requirements of notice, counsel, confrontation, cross-examination, and standard of proof to the juvenile setting, but rejecting right to jury trial because one cannot say that in our legal system the jury is a necessary component of accurate fact-finding). Given our view of Canady and the Supreme Court's emphasis on applying those rights related to fact-finding to juvenile proceedings, we see no justification for adopting a constitutional rule requiring the presence of juvenile defendants for the rendering of the verdict at the close of a bench trial. 31 Again, however, we point out we would affirm the district court regardless of our determination of the constitutional question because any perceived error in not reading the verdict in open court was harmless. In so holding, we note all but a limited class of fundamental constitutional errors are subject to harmless error analysis. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1999). That limited class includes a complete denial of counsel, biased trial judge, racial discrimination in selection of grand juries, denial of self-representation at trial, denial of public trial, and a defective reasonable doubt instruction. See id. at 8. These errors affect the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply ... the trial process itself. Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). Failing to announce the verdict in a juvenile court proceeding hardly rises to the level of the structural errors listed above because it does not necessarily render the proceeding fundamentally unfair or an unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or innocence. Id. at 9. In addition, we have previously applied harmless error analysis to the deprivation of a criminal defendant's right to be present at rendition of the verdict. See Larson, 911 F.2d at 396. 32 When we apply harmless error analysis, we require the beneficiary of a constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967), quoted in Neder, 527 U.S. at 15. We are confident the district court's verdict was not impacted by the fact it was issued in written form, and not read in open court in Edward's presence. First, the district court explicitly concluded oral summation would not assist him in his decision. Second, the district court carefully reviewed the testimony, made supportable credibility determinations, and found Edward guilty. The court's own conclusion and thorough analysis convinces us the verdict would not have changed with a theoretical change in method of delivery. Therefore, we find any perceived error harmless. 9 33 Having reviewed the issues raised on appeal, we doubt the sagacity of Edward's constitutional and Rule 43 arguments as outlined in our discussion. However, we dispose of these issues on alternative grounds because any potential errors were either invited or harmless. In addition, we hold the district court did not error by admitting the testimony of Dr. Hoffman under Fed. R. Evid. 803(4). Accordingly, we AFFIRM.