Opinion ID: 75958
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: State Courts Deny 3.850 Relief

Text: 86 After the three-day hearing, the court entered an order denying Robinson's 3.850 motion. The 3.850 court determined that [e]ven if the affidavits are all true the aggravating circumstances overwhelm the mitigating circumstances. Applying Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the court concluded that Robinson's trial counsel exercised reasonable professional judgment and that, in any event, there was not a reasonable probability that Defendant would have received a life sentence if the background evidence would have been presented in the manner [3.850 counsel] argue it should have been. 87 Under Strickland 's prejudice prong, the 3.850 court noted that Pearl's decision not to present character witnesses who would testify that Robinson was a good, non-violent person effectively kept out evidence of a very similar, very violent sexual assault which [Robinson] committed subsequent to St. George's murder. The 3.850 court determined that had this evidence come in, there would be no chance the jury would have recommended life. The 3.850 court also noted that much of the new mitigation evidence was cumulative of what had been presented to the resentencing jury and cumulative of those nonstatutory mitigating factors found by the state trial court. 33 88 The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Robinson's 3.850 motion and subsequent request for rehearing. Robinson III, 707 So.2d at 688. The Florida Supreme Court concluded that, although counsel's performance may have been deficient in some respects, Robinson cannot demonstrate that he was so prejudiced as to merit a new penalty phase proceeding. Id. at 695. That court pointed out that, despite the new information provided by postconviction counsel, Krop still believes that Robinson has some type of personality disorder and still has some type of sexual disorder. Id. at 697. It also reasoned that much of the new mitigation evidence was cumulative. As for the noncumulative evidence about Robinson's loving relationships with women and other character evidence, the Florida Supreme Court concluded this would have opened the door to evidence that less than one week after the St. George murder, Robinson allegedly committed an armed robbery and rape with Fields after coming upon a woman with a disabled car on the interstate. Id. at 696. It emphasized that these alleged crimes were an almost exact replay of what happened with Ms. St. George, minus the murder. Id. 89 For these reasons, the Florida Supreme Court determined that no reasonable probability existed that the mitigating evidence subsequently gathered and presented to the 3.850 court would have altered the balance of aggravating and mitigating factors in this case. Thus, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the 3.850 court's determination that no prejudice resulted from Pearl's representation, concluding as follows: Considering the five valid aggravators, the cumulative nature of the proffered lay testimony, and the modification of Krop's testimony, we find no error in the trial court's finding that Robinson has not demonstrated the prejudice necessary to mandate relief. Id. at 697. 90 Although deciding this case on the prejudice prong of Strickland, the Florida Supreme Court did comment on Pearl's performance. It opined that Pearl should have been more proactive and more directly involved with Krop's investigation and, [i]n that sense, his performance was probably deficient. Id. In large part, however, the Florida Supreme Court indicated that Pearl had performed effectively. It noted that Krop's decision to rely solely on Krop's testimony, while questionable, was defensible. Id. And, pointing to the subsequent armed robbery and rape, the Florida Supreme Court stated that [t]he trial court could have concluded that Pearl was not ineffective in not opening the door to this potentially devastating rebuttal evidence. Id.