Opinion ID: 778494
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Consideration of the Wells Factors

Text: 41 In assessing the City's claimed adoption of the speech of the Ten Commandments Monument, we turn first to our own precedent regarding such proposed `adoptions.' In Wells v. City and County of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1140-42 (10th Cir.2001), — a case not available at the time of the district court's decision and, disappointingly, neither cited nor discussed by either party during briefing or oral argument before our court — we considered whether a sign listing the sponsors of a holiday display constituted the speech of the government or of the sponsors themselves. In deciding that the sign constituted government speech, we adopted and considered four factors: (1) whether the central purpose of the sign was to promote the views of the municipality; (2) whether the municipality exercised editorial control over the content of the sign; (3) whether the literal speaker was an employee of the municipality; and (4) whether ultimate responsibility for the content of the sign rested with the municipality. See also Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085, 1093-94 (8th Cir.2000) (developing the factors we borrowed in Wells ). 42 We consider the Wells factors in turn. First, the central purpose of the Ten Commandments Monument is to advance the views of the Eagles rather than those of the City of Ogden. The Eagles designed, produced, and donated the Ten Commandments Monument, all with the avowed purpose of providing a moral code for youth to emulate. Indeed, the Eagles presented similar monuments to municipalities across the country, all toward the same aim. That the Monument's central purpose is to promote the views and agenda of the Eagles rather than the City of Ogden is further evidenced by the City attorney's concession, at oral argument, that the City has no idea as to the meaning of parts of the Monument, particularly the Phoenician letters. Cf. Wells, 257 F.3d at 1141 (noting, in considering the central purpose factor, that the City exercised complete control over the construction, message, and placement of the disputed sign). 43 Second, certainly the City of Ogden maintained no editorial control over the design and creation of the Monument. Rather, the Eagles exercised complete control over the content of the Monument, turning over to the City of Ogden a completed product. Cf. id. at 1142 (noting, in concluding that the government exercised editorial control over the sign at issue, that there is no indication that any of the [private speakers] even knew about the [disputed sign], much less exercised any editorial control over its design or content and further relying on the fact that the municipality built, paid for, and erected the sign at issue). 44 The third and fourth factors are, admittedly, somewhat less clear in our context. After the Eagles donated the Monument to the City of Ogden, we might think that the City became the literal speaker, every day proclaiming the contents of the Monument. We conclude, however, that the Eagles are properly considered the literal speaker of the speech contained on the Monument. We so conclude based upon recognition of the fact that the Eagles, free from any City control, composed the speech contained on the Monument — a fact underlined by the Monument's explicit acknowledgment of the Eagles as the Monument's creators. Cf. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 203 F.3d at 1094 & n. 10 (relying on the degree to which a government employee substantial[ly] edit[ed] the speech at issue to conclude that the government became the literal speaker). 5 45 Finally, we consider whether the municipality maintained ultimate responsibility for the content of the Monument. Certainly the City did not initially maintain such responsibility since the Eagles independently constructed the Monument. After the City acquired title to the Monument, however, presumably the City could have sold, re-gifted, modified, or even destroyed the Monument at will. Arguably, then, the City may be charged with ultimate responsibility for the content of the Monument. Cf. Wells, 257 F.3d at 1142 (considering, as to the ultimate responsibility factor, which entity provided security for the disputed sign). 46 b. Consideration of the Post Hoc Nature of the City of Ogden's Effort to Claim Adoption of the Speech of the Ten Commandments Monument 47 Three of the four Wells factors thus suggest that the City of Ogden did not effectively adopt the speech of the Ten Commandments Monument. Any doubt regarding this conclusion is removed through consideration of the after-the-fact nature of the City of Ogden's effort to claim adoption of that speech. 48 The Supreme Court has expressed considerable concern that post hoc rationalizations may obscure viewpoint discrimination. In City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 108 S.Ct. 2138, 100 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988), the Court required municipalities to employ clear and objective standards in licensing particular newspapers to place newsracks on public property. Without the use of such standards, the Court explained,  post hoc rationalizations by the [municipality] and the use of shifting or illegitimate criteria ... [will] mak[e] it difficult for courts to determine in any particular case whether the [municipality] is permitting favorable, and suppressing unfavorable, expression. City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 758, 108 S.Ct. 2138. Similarly, in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 811-13, 105 S.Ct. 3439, 87 L.Ed.2d 567 (1985), the Court noted: The existence of reasonable grounds for limiting access to a nonpublic forum ... will not save a regulation that is in reality a facade for viewpoint-based discrimination. The Cornelius Court, despite recognizing the validity and reasonableness of the justifications [now] offered by [the government] proceeded to remand for consideration of whether the government's exclusion of a speaker from a nonpublic forum was impermissibly motivated by a desire to suppress a particular point of view. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 812-13, 105 S.Ct. 3439; cf. American Jewish Congress v. City of Beverly Hills, 90 F.3d 379, 385-86 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (holding that a municipality's ad hoc, standardless policy for permitting private religious unattended displays in a public park violated the Establishment Clause because of the policy's potential for impermissibly favoring one religion over another). 49 Here, the City of Ogden is unable to point to any pre-litigation evidence of the City's explicit adoption of the speech of the Ten Commandments Monument. Summum filed the Complaint in this case on March 11, 1999. Four months later, the City of Ogden's City Council issued a statement explicitly noting that the City has adopted the inscriptions [of each Monument on the grounds of the Ogden City municipal building] as expressions of the City. Aples' App. at 80, 84 (Second Aff. of Norman L. Ashton, dated July 28, 1999, incorporating Mr. Ashton's July 26, 1999 letter to Summum, in which Mr. Ashton explains the City Council's rejection of Summum's proposed gift). This statement, drafted by Mr. Ashton in his role as the City's attorney, constitutes the first written expression of the City's alleged adoption of the speech contained on the Ten Commandments Monument. 50 In his deposition for this case, then-Ogden City mayor Glenn J. Mecham does claim a City practice, pre-dating the rejection of the Seven Principles Monument, of only accepting those proposed gifts that constitute a legitimate public expression of [the City's] official view. Aplts' App. vol. I, at 271 (Dep. of Glenn J. Mecham, dated June 2, 1999, at 10). The City, however, fails to point to any particular pre-litigation occasion on which the City had actually applied this alleged practice. Indeed, in the one circumstance cited by the City, the successful 1985-1991 effort to install a particular historical marker, the City confesses that, in response to the City Council's query as to whether the [proposed marker] conformed `to the adopted Goals and Policies for the [development of the grounds of the municipal building],'.... [t]he Staff Report of the Planning Commission explained [that] the ` [p]olicies are silent on the addition of monuments and the lack of a master site development plan makes decisions on additions, such as this, a best guess on what works ....' Aples' Br. at 10 (quoting Aplts' App. vol. II, at 508, 551, 553-54 (Aff. of Gloria J. Berrett, dated Apr. 9, 1999, incorporating the Ogden City Planning Commission's Report of Action, dated July 25, 1991)) (emphasis added). 51 In light of the Wells factors and the caselaw's particular concern for post hoc rationalizations in the Free Speech Clause context, we must conclude that the speech represented by the Ten Commandments Monument represents the speech of the Eagles rather than that of the City of Ogden. 6 2. The Historical Relevance Justification 52 We must also reject the City of Ogden's contention that the City's discrimination, in favor of the Eagles and against Summum, is reasonable based upon the comparative historical relevance, to the Ogden City community, of the Ten Commandments and the Seven Principles. We do not conclude that a municipality may never maintain a nonpublic forum to which access is controlled based upon `historical relevance' to the given community. Rather, we conclude only that, here, the City of Ogden failed to employ adequate safeguards to ensure that the `historical relevance' criterion did not devolve into a mere post hoc facade for viewpoint discrimination. 53 In Summum v. Callaghan, 130 F.3d 906, 920 (10th Cir.1997), we observed: Allowing government officials to make decisions as to who may speak on [municipal] property, without any criteria or guidelines to circumscribe their power, strongly suggests the potential for unconstitutional conduct, namely favoring one viewpoint over another. Our concern in Callaghan stems from the Supreme Court's same concern, as expressed in cases such as City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 758, 108 S.Ct. 2138, 100 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988), and Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 811-13, 105 S.Ct. 3439, 87 L.Ed.2d 567 (1985), as noted immediately above in section II(B)(1)(b). In Callaghan, we quoted City of Lakewood at length: 54 `[A] law or policy permitting communication in a certain manner for some but not for others raises the specter of content and viewpoint censorship. This danger is at its zenith when the determination of who may speak and who may not is left to the unbridled discretion of a government official.... [W]ithout standards governing the exercise of discretion, a government official may decide who may speak and who may not based upon the content of the speech or viewpoint of the speaker.' 55 130 F.3d at 920 (quoting City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 763-64, 108 S.Ct. 2138). See also Board of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235-36, 120 S.Ct. 1346, 146 L.Ed.2d 193 (2000) (remanding out of concern that the use of student-body elections to disperse money collected via student activity fees would not adequately safeguard against viewpoint discrimination in the disbursement of those funds). 56 In order to prevent viewpoint discrimination, and thereby remain in compliance with the Free Speech Clause, a municipality need not necessarily employ written guidelines. See Wells v. City and County of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1150 (10th Cir.2001) ([T]he fact that [a municipality's] policy is unwritten is not fatal, but merely a factor to be considered.) (internal quotation marks omitted). In such a case, a municipality might instead rely upon a well-established practice as to its selection amongst speakers. City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 770, 108 S.Ct. 2138. We consider, then, in turn, whether the City of Ogden can here rely on either (1) a written policy or (2) a well-established practice as a means of adequately safeguarding against viewpoint discrimination in the City's administration of the asserted `historical relevance' criterion. 57 a. Consideration of Whether the City of Ogden can Ground the Asserted `Historical Relevance' Criterion in Any Written Policy 58 Here, the City of Ogden cannot ground the City's `historical relevance' justification in any written policy. As we have noted, Summum filed the Complaint that initiated this lawsuit on March 11, 1999. Only in late July of 1999 did the City of Ogden's City Council, through the City Attorney, issue a statement explaining that the Seven Principles Monument failed to fall within the purposes for which the City has reserved the forum, those purposes including memorializ[ing] historical and cultural events and ideas associated with the area, its settlement and development. Aples' App. at 80, 84 (Second Aff. of Norman L. Ashton, dated July 28, 1999, incorporating Mr. Ashton's July 26, 1999 letter to Summum, in which Mr. Ashton explains the City Council's rejection of Summum's proposed gift). 59 While the City also notes a Municipal Gardens Master Plan, dated February 24, 1984 [and thus pre-dating the City's rejection of the Seven Principles Monument], this plan does not develop the `historical relevance' criterion. Aplts' App. vol. II, at 508, 528-34 (Aff. of Gloria J. Berrett, dated Apr. 9, 1999, incorporating the Municipal Gardens Master Plan). Rather, the Master Plan merely observes, in passing, that the Plan  does not preclude the concept of making history visible by means of [an] information center, statues, etc. Id. at 531 (emphasis added). This is a slender reed, indeed, upon which to find a policy requiring that monuments be selected based upon historical relevance to the Ogden City community. We conclude, particularly in light of the City's subsequent admission that  [the City's p]olicies are silent on the addition of monuments,  id. at 508, 551, 553-54 (incorporating the Ogden City Planning Commission's Report of Action, dated July 25, 1991) (emphasis added), that the City of Ogden has failed to establish a written policy of monument selection based upon historical relevance to the Ogden City community. 60 b. Consideration of Whether the City of Ogden can Ground the Asserted `Historical Relevance' Criterion in Any `Well-Established Practice' 61 Absent evidence of written guidelines to safeguard against viewpoint discrimination, we consider whether the City of Ogden has demonstrated the existence of a `well-established practice' of resort to the `historical relevance' criterion. The City claims such a practice; in support of this claim, the City cites the deposition testimony of then-Ogden City mayor Glenn J. Mecham. Mayor Mecham testified that, in deciding whether to accept a proposed monument, one factor that he would consider was whether the monument represents a statement that is based upon the history and traditions of Ogden City, as has been manifest in various modes and media since Ogden's inception in 1851. Aplts' App. vol. I, at 278 (Dep. of Glenn J. Mecham, dated June 2, 1999, at 26). Other than that statement, however, Mayor Mecham and the City of Ogden provide no further evidence of the existence of such a practice. 62 Other testimony, including that of Mayor Mecham himself, suggests that the historical significance criterion is not well-established. Mayor Mecham carefully testified that while historical relevance to the Ogden City community may represent one factor upon which he would base a decision to accept a proposed monument, individual members of the City Council may not utilize the same standard. See id. at 277-78 (Dep. of Glenn J. Mecham, dated June 2, 1999, at 25-26). The City of Ogden does not provide any evidence suggesting that those council members, prior to the date on which Summum filed the instant action, ever themselves considered the `historical relevance' criterion. 63 Consideration of the monuments adjacent to the Ten Commandments Monument further suggests that the `historical relevance to the Ogden City community' standard is not well-established. The adjacent monuments are (1) a monument commemorating police officers who have given their lives in service to Ogden City and (2) a tree and plaque commemorating Ogden City's sister city. That these monuments suggest a theme of `historical relevance' is not self-evident; the City makes no effort to explain the presence of these monuments in terms of historical relevance to the Ogden City community. 64 Thus, the City of Ogden has provided no evidence of a written policy directing that monuments be accepted for placement on the lawn of the municipal building based upon historical relevance to the Ogden City community. Instead, the City has provided only the relatively scant and conclusory deposition testimony of one individual in order to demonstrate resort to such a criterion. We conclude, based on this evidence, that the City has failed to demonstrate the existence of a well-established practice of accepting monuments based upon the monuments' historical relevance to the Ogden City community. Cf. Wells, 257 F.3d at 1150-51 (finding, in a section of the court's opinion different than that discussed above at Section II(B)(1)(a), the existence of a `well-established practice' governing selection amongst competing speakers where the municipality demonstrated the existence of an absolute ban on speech in the given forum — a ban that left the municipality with very little, if any, room for discretion). In the absence, then, of any apparent policy governing the City's simultaneous (1) rejection of the Seven Principles Monument and (2) display of the Ten Commandments Monument, we must conclude that the City of Ogden has unreasonably, and in violation of the Free Speech Clause, risked viewpoint discrimination in the relevant forum. 65 C. The Establishment Clause `Defense' 66 Finally, the City of Ogden endeavors to enlist the Establishment Clause in defense of the City's rejection of the Seven Principles Monument. According to the City, displaying the Seven Principles Monument would place the City in violation of the Establishment Clause; the prospect of such a violation, the City argues, justifies any infringement upon Free Speech Clause rights otherwise attributable to the City's rejection of the Seven Principles Monument. 67 The Supreme Court has yet to resolve whether a municipality's interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation justifies viewpoint discrimination. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 113, 121 S.Ct. 2093, 150 L.Ed.2d 151 (2001) ([I]t is not clear whether a State's interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation would justify viewpoint discrimination. We need not, however, confront the issue in this case, because we conclude that the school has no valid Establishment Clause interest.) (internal citation omitted). Like the Supreme Court in Good News (and also in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 837-46, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (1995), Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394-96, 113 S.Ct. 2141, 124 L.Ed.2d 352 (1993), and Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 271, 102 S.Ct. 269, 70 L.Ed.2d 440 (1981)), we need not resolve this issue because we conclude that the City of Ogden has not established that the display of the Seven Principles Monument would have constituted an Establishment Clause violation. See Summum v. Callaghan, 130 F.3d 906, 920-21 (10th Cir.1997) (reaching the same conclusion on essentially identical facts). 68 While the health of the standard of Establishment Clause analysis developed in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971), may be the subject of some debate, see, e.g., MICHAEL W. McCONNELL, STUCK WITH A LEMON: A NEW TEST FOR ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CASES WOULD HELP EASE CURRENT CONFUSION, 83 A.B.A. J. 46 (Feb. 1997), Lemon has not been overruled and thus remains the starting point for our Establishment Clause analysis. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395 n. 7, 113 S.Ct. 2141; see also Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 314-17, 120 S.Ct. 2266, 147 L.Ed.2d 295 (2000) (applying at least the first prong of the Lemon test, that concerning the governmental purpose animating the challenged policy). Under Lemon, we consider the purposes animating the challenged policy, the likely effects of that policy, and whether the policy fosters an excessive entanglement between government and religion. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13, 91 S.Ct. 2105 (First, the [given municipal action] must have a secular legislative purpose; second, [the action's] principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; [and,] finally, the [action] must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 69 Particularly informing our consideration of the Lemon factors is consideration of whether the challenged policy ensures government neutrality towards religion. Good News, 533 U.S. at 114, 121 S.Ct. 2093 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis deleted). Our neutrality inquiry must consider not only whether the government is actually acting neutrally but also whether a reasonable observer, reasonably informed as to the relevant circumstances, would perceive the government to be acting neutrally. 7 Finally, our consideration of the Lemon factors demands sensitivity to any coercive pressure imposed upon the relevant community on account of the challenged policy. Id. at 115, 121 S.Ct. 2093; Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 310-13, 120 S.Ct. 2266 (relying on the coercive nature of prayer at public high school football games to find such prayer to constitute a violation of the Establishment Clause). 70 Applying these factors to the City of Ogden's hypothetical acceptance of the Seven Principles Monument, we are not persuaded that such acceptance would constitute a violation of the Establishment Clause. The City of Ogden advances arguments as to both the purpose and the effect prongs of Lemon. We consider these arguments in turn. 71 First, as to the purpose of the City's hypothetical display of the Seven Principles Monument, the City points only to Summum's purpose in making the donation, a purpose the City characterizes, with a cite only to a deposition not included in the appellate record, as to use [the Seven Principles Monument] as a proselyt[iz]ing tool, to get out the word concerning Summum's religious beliefs, to attract greater attention to Summum as a viable and alternative religious organization. Aples' Br. at 38. The purpose inquiry, however, centers not on the purpose animating the speech of a particular private actor (e.g., Summum) but, rather, on the purpose for which the government allows such speech on government property. See, e.g., Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 314-16, 120 S.Ct. 2266 (examining the intent animating the decision of the government to institute a particular policy regarding speech at public high school football games: [T]he ... policy fails a facial challenge because the attempt by the District to encourage prayer is also at issue.) (emphasis added). 72 If the City of Ogden's City Council displayed the Seven Principles Monument with the purposes that the City attributes to Summum, our concern regarding the Establishment Clause would be great indeed. Here, however, the City presents no evidence suggesting that the City would have maintained an improper purpose in accepting the proposed monument. Based upon the record before us, we cannot conclude that the City of Ogden's acceptance of the Seven Principles Monument would have been motivated by anything other than a concern for equal access. 73 Second, the City argues that a reasonable observer would perceive the City of Ogden's display of the Seven Principles Monument as an endorsement of the tenets of the Summum religion. The City (somewhat ironically in light of the City's simultaneous insistence that the display of the Ten Commandments Monument alone does not violate the Establishment Clause) notes that the presence of the Seven Principles Monument on the Municipal Grounds, coupled with the fact that Summum would be the only church to have contributed a monument to the relevant forum, would leave an observer to conclude that the City of Ogden endorses Summum. 74 Again, we must disagree; we are persuaded that a reasonable observer would, instead, note the fact that the lawn of the municipal building contains a diverse array of monuments, some from a secular and some from a sectarian perspective. The secular monuments would include the police officer memorial, the sister city tree, and certain historical monuments. The sectarian monuments would include one from a Judeo-Christian perspective (the Ten Commandments Monument), see Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41, 101 S.Ct. 192, 66 L.Ed.2d 199 (1980) (The Ten Commandments are undeniably a sacred text in the Jewish and Christian faiths, and no legislative recitation of a supposed secular purpose can blind us to that fact.) (footnote omitted), and one from the perspective of Summum. As the City of Ogden itself recognizes: The trend of the [United States Supreme] Court appears to be that greater and more equal accommodation of all ideas (pluralism and diversity), including religious discourse, in public fora does not threaten the private religious freedom the Establishment Clause was meant to protect. Aples' Br. at 26 n. 14. To the extent to which the City of Ogden remains genuinely concerned regarding the likely misapprehensions of passersby, the City might also post a disclaimer, explaining clearly that private entities are responsible for at least some of the Municipal Grounds' monuments, including the Ten Commandments Monument and the Seven Principles Monument. Cf. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 769, 115 S.Ct. 2440, 132 L.Ed.2d 650 (1995) (If [a particular governmental unit] is concerned about misperceptions, nothing prevents [that governmental unit] from requiring all private displays in the [forum] to be identified as such.). Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the City's display of the Seven Principles Monument would have had the effect of conveying, to a reasonable and reasonably well-informed observer, that the City of Ogden was endorsing a particular religion.