Opinion ID: 1755829
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: MPA Always Prohibited Deceptive Practices in Sales of All Merchandise, Including Goods, Services, and Real Estate.

Text: Section 407.020 has at all times proscribed deceptive or fraudulent acts in connection with the sale of merchandise, sec. 407.020, RSMo 2000, [6] which the MPA expressly defines to include real estate. Sec. 407.010(4) (merchandise includes any objects, wares, goods, commodities, intangibles, real estate, or services). At all relevant times, both the attorney general and private parties could sue a seller for alleged use of deceptive practices in the sale of goods and services. Sec. 407.100 (authorizing attorney general to bring enforcement actions); sec. 407.025 (authorizing private suits). Before 2000, though, only the attorney general could bring enforcement actions for deceptive practices in the sale of real estate. Sec. 407.025.1, RSMo 1994; Detling v. Edelbrock, 671 S.W.2d 265, 272-73 (Mo. banc 1984) (The legislature specifically excluded real estate transactions from the scope of the private right of action provision). In 2000, the private right of action permitted under the MPA was broadened to include all transactions in merchandise. Sec. 407.025.1. The parties agree that for real estate transactions since that time, private citizens injured by MPA violations have a right to act as private attorneys general for purposes of enforcing it. See Stiffelman v. Abrams, 655 S.W.2d 522, 530 (Mo. banc 1983) (noting that the `private attorney general' concept acknowledges that government cannot do everything and that some requirements of the Act can best be enforced by those most directly involved). In this case, the alleged violations occurred during Chase's sale of the property to Hess in 1999, prior to the 2000 amendment of the MPA. The parties disagree whether the 2000 amendment applies to Hess' MPA claim in these circumstances.