Opinion ID: 2324489
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: standard for conditional release and burden of proof

Text: Finally (and this is the basis for my partial dissent) I am troubled by my inability to discern from the majority opinion what standard the Court would require a patient to meet in order to establish his eligibility for conditional release, and I am equally disturbed by the burden of proof  clear and convincing  which the majority decides Carter will have to sustain at his conditional release hearing. As to the first, the majority says at one point that [d]angerousness is not    the sole criterion for release. If the patient is in a state of remission and there are sufficient medical assurances that he will pose no threat to society, there may be no danger to be feared from his conditional release. There may, however, be a rehabilitative purpose in retaining the patient in the hospital if further progress can be made in curing his underlying condition. Public protection may demand prolonged confinement in hopes of eventual recovery and release. If this statement is intended to suggest that the state can take it upon itself to act in loco parentis to rehabilitate an involuntary civilly committed patient, I think the notion is nothing short of reprehensible. It is big brotherism at its worst. It amounts to the state taking someone never convicted of a crime and, lacking the dangerousness element, saying we think it is for your own benefit to be locked up for a lifetime. Seemingly consistent with this first statement of a criterion is the observation later in the majority opinion that [c]learly, dangerousness by itself is not a sufficiently specific guide to the formulation of conditional release standards. However, later it is said that [r]elease is to occur only `if a combination of conditions may be found that would reduce the likelihood of dangerous behavior below the standard required for commitment   .' The latter is adopted from Judge Bazelon's concurring opinion in United States v. McNeil, 140 U.S. App. D.C. 228, 434 F. 2d 502 (D.C. Cir.1970) and to me is plainly incompatible with the majority's earlier efforts to articulate a standard, quoted above. I think the trial judge is entitled to clearer guidance than these irreconcilable statements furnish him. For myself, it is apparent from what I have said elsewhere in this opinion that I would permit the conditional release to occur upon a showing that defendant has reached a stage where he is no longer dangerous to himself or others as long as he complies with the terms and conditions imposed on him by his conditional release. But to require him to meet that standard by any more than the mere preponderance of the evidence revokes to a great extent the benefits of conditional release which is, by definition, something of a gamble. The standard of clear and convincing proof lies somewhere between the ordinary civil requirement of preponderance of the evidence and the criminal rule of beyond a reasonable doubt. New Jersey Rules of Evidence, § 1(4)-4. However, at least two New Jersey cases have stated that the line of demarcation between what is `clear, satisfactory and convincing' and that which removes `all reasonable doubt' is more fanciful than real, In re Calef, 109 N.J. Eq. 181 (Prerog. 1931), aff'd 111 N.J. Eq. 355 (E. & A. 1932), cert. denied sub nom. Neely v. Stacy, 288 U.S. 606, 53 S.Ct. 397, 77 L.Ed. 981 (1933); State v. Cale, 19 N.J. Super. 397 (App. Div. 1952). Regardless of whether the clear and convincing test is viewed as being this strict or slightly less so, it is a difficult standard to meet  probably so difficult that as a practical matter Carter, or others in his position, are unlikely to be conditionally released if they must sustain this burden. Application of the clear and convincing standard in the context of release of mental patients is novel in New Jersey. As Mc Cormick, Evidence 679 (1954) indicates, clear and convincing is commonly utilized only where there are special dangers of deception by the party on whom this burden is imposed. Therefore, that text tells us, this burden has been imposed where the undue influence of a mental incompetent is at issue, where an oral contract to make a will is sought to be proved, in suits for specific performance of an oral contract, where the terms of a lost will are being established, or where fraud is in question. New Jersey's use of the clear and convincing standard has been even more limited. It has been adopted judicially to preserve the strong policy of the Statute of Wills, N.J.S.A. 25:1-1 et seq., which requires all wills to be in writing, and of the Statute of Frauds, N.J.S.A. 3A:3-2, requiring certain types of contracts to be in writing. Where the courts have felt that equity dictated enforcement of such instruments, although not in writing, they have instituted the stricter standard of proof to forestall trumped-up prayers for relief. Aiello v. Knoll Golf Club, 64 N.J. Super. 156 (App. Div. 1960). See also In re Calef, supra ; State v. Cale, supra ; Coddington v. Jenner, 57 N.J. Eq. 528 (Ch. 1898), aff'd 60 N.J. Eq. 447 (E. & A. 1900). Additionally, this test has been adopted statutorily to relieve the harshness of the dead man's rule that no oral evidence may be introduced against a dead man's estate or his representatives. Under this statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:81-2, such evidence can be introduced, but proof of a claim against a dead man, relying upon such evidence, must be by clear and convincing proof, to guard against fraudulent claims in an area peculiarly open to trickery. For examples of cases applying this standard under the same statute, see Moran v. Estate of Pellegrino, 90 N.J. Super. 122 (App. Div. 1966); Buska v. Aquinaldo, 84 N.J. Super. 577 (Law Div. 1964). No such mitigating factor presents itself in a conditional release decision. Such a proceeding is a simple civil determination and the standard normally utilized  preponderance of evidence  is the proper burden of proof for the committed patient to bear. Hough v. United States, 106 U.S. App. D.C. 192, 271 F. 2d 458 (D.C. Cir.1959); Bolton v. Harris, supra ; In re Franklin, 7 Cal.3d 126, 101 Cal. Rptr. 553, 496 P. 2d 465 (Cal. S.Ct. 1972); Newton v. Brooks, 246 Or. 484, 426 P. 2d 446 (Or. Sup. Ct. 1967); (en banc); contra, State v. Blubaugh, 80 Wash. 2d 28, 491 P. 2d 646 (Wash. Sup. Ct. 1971). At the risk of being repetitious, I also observe that the clear and convincing standard seems open to constitutional challenge since it is a higher standard than that which all other civilly committed mental patients must meet; thus, it violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As I have already pointed out, Jackson v. Indiana, supra , addressed itself specifically to the problem of more stringent commitment and release standards in the case of an unconvicted mental patient, and struck down a statute which imposed them. Additionally, as a policy matter, I would strike down a standard which seems to ignore the high value which has always been placed on human liberty by the American system of justice. In a day when some courts are requiring states to prove dangerousness beyond a reasonable doubt before they can involuntarily civilly commit someone, e.g., In re Ballay, 482 F. 2d 648 (D.C. Cir.1973); Lessard v. Schmidt, supra , I do not agree that New Jersey's policy should be to create such a difficult route for conditional release as is imposed here. [7] The Court has today extended the application of a creative principle of law. It would be a bitter irony were the conditional release concept, both noble in principle and practical in its effect, permitted to founder on the shoals of an indefinite standard and an entirely inappropriate burden of proof. I fear that may be its fate. Therefore, as to those portions of the majority opinion which require meeting a standard greater than dangerous to self or others by a burden of more than preponderance of the evidence, I dissent. CLIFFORD, J., concurs in result. For reversal and remandment  Justices JACOBS, HALL, SULLIVAN, PASHMAN and CLIFFORD  5. For affirmance  None.