Opinion ID: 420986
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: scope of ors 30.905

Text: 9 Philpott contends that the district court erred in holding that ORS 30.905 applied to all her claims, including her allegations that Robins intentionally and fraudulently failed to warn the public of serious side effects and, contrary to published assertions, failed to adequately test the Dalkon Shield. She argues that fraud claims are governed by ORS 12.110(1), which provides a two year statute of limitations period that begins to run from the discovery of the fraud or deceit. 10 The district court held that all Philpott's claims, including those based on intentional torts, were barred by ORS 30.905, which provides: 11 (1) Notwithstanding ORS 12.115 or 12.140 and except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, a product liability civil action shall be commenced not later than eight years after the date on which the product was first purchased for use or consumption. 12 (2) A product liability civil action shall be commenced not later than two years after the date on which the death, injury or damage complained of occurs. 13 The district court recognized that the above statute of limitations applied to all product liability civil actions, as defined by ORS 30.900: 14 As used in ORS 30.900 to 30.920, product liability civil action means a civil action brought against a manufacturer, distributor, seller or lessor of a product for damages for personal injury, death or property damage arising out of: 15 (1) Any design, inspection, testing, manufacturing or other defect in a product; 16 (2) Any failure to warn regarding a product; or 17 (3) Any failure to properly instruct in the use of a product. [Emphasis supplied]. 18 Recognizing that no Oregon court had yet construed the breadth of ORS 30.905, the district court reasoned that the broad provisions of ORS 30.900, coupled with the legislative history surrounding the products liability legislation, indicated that the legislature intended to encompass all causes of action associated with product design, inspection, testing, manufacturing, and warning within the breadth of the statute. 19 Because no Oregon courts have addressed the breadth of ORS 30.905, it is necessary to search for other indications of legislative intent. In Dortch v. A.H. Robins Co., 59 Or.App. 310, 650 P.2d 1046 (1982), the court stated:  '[i]t is clear from the discussions of House Bill 3039, which became ORS 30.905, what the legislative objective was. The legislature wanted to enact a ten-year period of ultimate repose for product liability actions....'  Id. 650 P.2d at 1049 (quoting Baird v. Electro Mart, 47 Or.App. 565, 570, 615 P.2d 335, 337 (1980) ), see Minutes, House Committee on the Judiciary, May 16, 1977, pp. 20-21. In accordance with this legislative intent to limit a manufacturer's liability exposure to ten years, the broad language of ORS 30.900 can reasonably be construed as encompassing all Philpott's product related claims. 20 Further support for this construction is found in ORS 30.925, which sets forth the standards for recovery of punitive damages in products liability actions. The statute provides in pertinent part: 21 (3) Punitive damages, if any, shall be determined and awarded based upon the following criteria: 22 (a) The likelihood at the time that serious harm would arise from the defendant's misconduct; 23 (b) The degree of the defendant's awareness of that likelihood; 24 (c) The profitability of the defendant's misconduct; 25 (d) The duration of the misconduct and any concealment of it; 26 (e) The attitude and conduct of the defendant upon discovery of the misconduct; 27 (f) The financial condition of the defendant; and 28 (g) The total deterrent effect of other punishment imposed upon the defendant as a result of the misconduct, including, but not limited to, punitive damage awards to persons in situations similar to the claimant's and the severity of criminal penalties to which the defendant has been or may be subjected. 29 The standards set forth in ORS 30.925 are particularly applicable to punitive damage awards in cases involving intentional torts and, thus, lend support to the district court's determination that the legislature intended to include all products related claims within the breadth of ORS 30.905. 30 Accordingly, we hold that the district court was correct in holding that ORS 30.905 applied to all Philpott's claims. 31