Opinion ID: 763642
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Role as Compared to Other Participants in the Relevant Conduct

Text: 32 The second principle we derive from the text of the Guidelines is that the district court may also measure the defendant's culpability in comparison to that of other participants in the relevant conduct. We draw this principle from two application notes. Application note one states that minimal participants are those who are plainly among the least culpable of those involved in the conduct of a group. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, comment. (n.1). Application note three says that a minor participant means any participant who is less culpable than most other participants, but whose role could not be described as minimal. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, comment. (n.3). These definitions clearly contemplate some assessment of relative culpability. However, not all participants may be relevant to this inquiry. First, the district court should look to other participants only to the extent that they are identifiable or discernable from the evidence. This is a fact-intensive inquiry. Second, the district court may consider only those participants who were involved in the relevant conduct attributed to the defendant. The conduct of participants in any larger criminal conspiracy is irrelevant. 33 Relative culpability does not end the inquiry, however. The fact that a defendant's role may be less than that of other participants engaged in the relevant conduct may not be dispositive of role in the offense, since it is possible that none are minor or minimal participants. In United States v. Daughtrey, 874 F.2d 213 (4th Cir.1989), Judge Wilkins gave the following example to illustrate this principle: 34 [I]f three individuals had entered a bank with the intent to commit robbery and one stood guard at the door, another sprayed paint on the camera, and the third gathered the money from a teller's cage, no adjustment for Role in the Offense would be warranted. Even if one of the participants deserved an aggravating adjustment because of other acts he committed, the other participants would not be entitled to minimal or minor Role in the Offense adjustments. 35 Id. at 216. We recognized this position in Zaccardi, 924 F.2d 201. Zaccardi claimed that he was entitled to a minor role adjustment because the PSI characterized him as the least culpable participant in the conspiracy. See id. at 202. We rejected that argument on the ground that it would require sentencing courts to regard the least culpable member of any conspiracy as a minor participant, regardless of the extent of that member's participation. Id. at 203; see also United States v. Miller, 159 F.3d 1106, 1111 (7th Cir.1998) (Though comparative roles are important to determining whether to grant an offense level reduction, they are not determinative.); United States v. Rotolo, 950 F.2d 70, 71 (1st Cir.1991) (Breyer, C.J.) (recognizing that one who, say, points a gun at a bank teller and seizes the money is not entitled to a downward adjustment simply because someone else in the gang supervised his activities). Simply put, a defendant is not automatically entitled to a minor role adjustment merely because she was somewhat less culpable than the other discernable participants. Rather, the district court must determine that the defendant was less culpable than most other participants in her relevant conduct. 7 36 In sum, we believe that a district court's determination of a defendant's mitigating role in the offense should be informed by two modes of analysis: First, and most importantly, the district court must measure the defendant's role against the relevant conduct for which she was held accountable at sentencing; we recognize that in many cases this method of analysis will be dispositive. Second, the district court may also measure the defendant's role against the other participants, to the extent that they are discernable, in that relevant conduct. 37 In making the ultimate finding as to role in the offense, the district court should look to each of these principles and measure the discernable facts against them. In the drug courier context, examples of some relevant factual considerations include: amount of drugs, fair market value of drugs, amount of money to be paid to the courier, equity interest in the drugs, role in planning the criminal scheme, and role in the distribution. This is not an exhaustive list, nor does it suggest that any one factor is more important than another. In the final analysis, this decision falls within the sound discretion of the trial court. Indeed, we acknowledge that a similar fact pattern may on occasion give rise to two reasonable and different constructions. This is inherent in the fact-intensive inquiry specifically contemplated by the Guidelines. As the Supreme Court has recognized, a trial court's choice between two permissible views of the evidence is the very essence of the clear error standard of review. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574, 105 S.Ct. 1504. So long as the basis of the trial court's decision is supported by the record and does not involve a misapplication of a rule of law, we believe that it will be rare for an appellate court to conclude that the sentencing court's determination is clearly erroneous. 8