Opinion ID: 2301253
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Bail Bond Agents

Text: In Maryland, the bail bond system is governed by statute and Rule. See Md. Code (2001), Title 5 Release, Subtitle 2 Pretrial Release of the Criminal Procedure Article; Md. Rules 4-216 and 4-217. Further, bail bond agents are subject to strict regulations and licensing requirements by various other provisions of the Maryland Code. [4] In Shifflett v. State, 319 Md. 275, 572 A.2d 167 (1990), we affirmed the Court of Special Appeals and held that bail bond agents have broad common law powers to arrest principals, much greater than the powers normally possessed by private citizens. We stated: The jury convicted the petitioner, and she was sentenced to three years' imprisonment on the resisting arrest and battery convictions. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgments. Shifflett v. State, 80 Md.App. 151, 560 A.2d 587 (1989). It held that the bail bondsmen's authority under the common law to arrest the principal was broader than that of a private citizen to arrest. It quoted at length from Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 366, 371-72, 21 L.Ed. 287 (1872), as follows: When bail is given, the principal is regarded as delivered to the custody of his sureties. Their dominion is a continuance of the original imprisonment. Whenever they choose to do so, they may seize him and deliver him up in their discharge, and if that cannot be done at once, they may imprison him until it can be done. They may exercise their rights in person or by agent. They may pursue him into another State, may arrest him on the Sabbath, and if necessary, may break and enter his house for that purpose. The seizure is not made by virtue of new process. None is needed. It is likened to the rearrest by the sheriff of an escaping prisoner.... In [Anonymous,] 6 Modern [231], it is said: The bail have their principal on a string, and may pull the string whenever they please and render him in their discharge.`  Shifflett v. State, 319 Md. 275, 277, 572 A.2d 167, 168 (1990) (alteration in original). [5] We have held that the fact that a private person must be licensed by the State to engage in their employment does not make that person a State agent for Fourth Amendment search and seizure purposes. In Waters v. State, 320 Md. 52, 575 A.2d 1244 (1990), Waters argued that the cocaine taken out of his pocket by a security guard, Paul Madden, was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable search and seizures because the security guard was acting as a State agent. Specifically, Waters contended that because private detective agencies were regulated and licensed by the State, private security guards that work for private detective agencies are similar to special police officers who are commissioned by the Governor and exercise general police powers in the protection of their employer's property. Id. at 55, 575 A.2d at 1245. Therefore, Waters alleged that Madden's seizure of the cocaine from his pocket involved state action and should not be admissible at trial because it was unreasonable. We held that the mere licensing and regulation of the security guards, without being vested with arrest or other police powers, was not enough to qualify the security guards as State agents. We stated: As employees of detective agencies engaged to guard the property of their employer's clients, security guards have not been granted police powers by statute and therefore are not state agents in any traditional sense for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Without governmental powers, security guards are acting as private citizens when protecting property, and their private status is not altered because their interest in protecting property coincides with the public's interest in preventing crime generally.... Moreover, mere state licensing of a private individual's occupation, without more, does not constitute sufficient state control to make the individual a state agent. Nor does extensive state regulation of itself convert the actions of those regulated into state action. ... The only evidence in the case was that Madden was a licensed security guard at the time he seized the plastic bags, and the trial judge so held. Water's argument that Madden was a state agent is wholly unconvincing. Consequently, Judge Goudy correctly determined that the seized cocaine was admissible in evidence, there being no showing (or even an allegation) that Madden was working in collusion with the police at the time of the search, or otherwise acted as an instrument of the State in the performance of his duties. Id. at 59-60, 575 A.2d at 1247-48 (citations omitted). Bail bond agents, who are licensed and regulated by the State, do not have police powers by statute and are not, generally, State agents. Therefore, bail bond agents are generally not State actors for Fourth Amendment suppression purposes. In the case sub judice, however, the facts demonstrate that due to the extensive participation by the officer in leading the attempt to effect entry into the apartment, the bail bond agents were working in substantial collusion with the police.