Opinion ID: 1172674
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: Opening Statement (Guilt Phase)

Text: Appellant first complains of two statements made by the prosecuting attorney during the State's opening statement in the guilt phase of the trial. In suggesting the jury could come to know the deceased Ms. Holly C. Washa only through the testimony of witnesses, the prosecutor stated: I've sort of lived with Holly [Washa] over the last two years or so preparing for this case, and perhaps I've personalized her a little bit. Maybe by the time this trial is over, you will know enough about her that maybe you'll personalize her a little bit. The one thing I do hope though is that justice can be done by the end of this trial and we can put Holly [Washa] to rest. The defense did not object to this statement. Near conclusion of the State's opening statement, the prosecutor stated: I want to assure you at the end of this case you're not going to look at me and say, Did he do it? I suggest you're going to look at me and you're going to say, How could he have done it? And, you know, that's one question that I won't be able to answer for you. I don't have to answer it for you. I can't imagine how any person could have done this to Holly Washa or to any other living human being. How could he have done it? The defense did not object to this comment. Upon conclusion of its opening statement, the defense moved for a mistrial based upon the prosecuting attorney's personalized and emotional appeal to the jury in his opening statement. The defense in the alternative requested a remedial instruction to the jury. The trial court denied the motion for mistrial, but did instruct the jury that counsels' opinions, statements, whatever else they say in openings are certainly not evidence. Denial of a motion for mistrial for alleged prosecutorial misconduct lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. [76] This court will not disturb that decision absent an abuse of discretion. [77] Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion because the prosecutor's statements were not improper. Even assuming they might have been improper, there was no prejudice to Appellant. Besides, the court timely instructed the jury it was not to consider counsel's opinions or statements as evidence. Appellant has not sustained his burden of establishing that either of the statements were improper. The first statement was introductory in nature and focused on the prosecutor's preparation for trial. The second statement merely informed the jury what the state's evidence was expected to show. There is no indication either statement was made to elicit an emotional response from the jury. Neither was improper. Assuming the two statements might have been improper, Appellant has not established he was prejudiced by either of them. The context in which they were made demonstrates that Appellant suffered no prejudice which would have affected the jury's verdict. The trial court properly instructed the jury that remarks by counsel in opening statements were not evidence. In fact, the defense made similar remarks in its opening statement. Defense counsel told the jury that like the [prosecution] has personalized this case for a couple of years with Holly Washa, we have done so with Mr. Brown.... Defense counsel also stated in the jury's presence that Appellant's killing of Ms. Washa was incredibly horrible, brutal and bizarre and asked the jury how any person could be so twisted, so full of bottled up rage to commit this type of crime. Appellant now claims error by the State for less provocative statements than those made by his own counsel in opening statement. This weakens the claim the remarks of the prosecutor were prejudicial and resulted in denial of a fair trial for Appellant. [78]