Opinion ID: 1733568
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: analyzing the challenged argument in this case

Text: At the outset, we note that Plaintiffs' counsel failed to raise any objections during closing argument made by counsel for UTC/UTOS, nor did Plaintiffs' counsel request a curative instruction or a mistrial during or at the close of such argument. As noted above, however, Plaintiffs' counsel did challenge various portions of opposing counsel's closing argument by way of a motion for new trial, [26] which was summarily denied by the trial court. Accordingly, we must determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the Plaintiffs' motion for new trial on the basis of allegedly improper, but unobjected-to, closing argument made by counsel for UTC/UTOS. After reviewing the closing argument being challenged, as well as the entire record in this case, we find that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the Plaintiffs' motion for new trial. We agree with the Plaintiffs that portions of the closing argument now being challenged were indeed improper, especially (1) counsel's repeated use of the term B.S. detector; (2) counsel's comment that if the jury found for the Plaintiffs on the consultancy agreement claim, the jury would be accessories, after the fact, to tax fraud; and (3) counsel's characterization of the Plaintiffs' case as cashing in on a lottery ticket. However, we do not find improper counsel's comments regarding Murphy's credibility, as there was sufficient record evidence to support counsel's questioning of Murphy's credibility. More importantly, it is clear that a reasonable jurist could conclude that the improper closing argument made by counsel for UTC/UTOS was not harmful, incurable, or of a character to so damage the fairness of the trial that the public's interest in our system of justice requires a new trial. Accordingly, based on the foregoing, we approve the Fourth District's affirmance of the trial court's denial of the Plaintiffs' motion for new trial. It is so ordered. WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING and QUINCE, JJ., concur. PARIENTE, J., concurs specially in result only with an opinion, in which ANSTEAD, J., concurs. PARIENTE, J., concurring specially in result only. I concur in the result reached by the majority and commend Justice Lewis's scholarly analysis. I agree with the majority's rejection of the Fourth District's bright-line rule in Murphy that would preclude reversal if no objection to the improper argument was registered at trial. See majority op. at 1026. Further, even under our prior case law, the unobjected-to arguments in this case do not constitute fundamental error. I am concerned, however, that the majority's newly formulated four-prong test [27] for fundamental error might unnecessarily restrict the authority of trial courts to grant new trials. Further, although I generally agree with the majority's requirement that the trial court first evaluate the unobjected-to improper argument in a motion for new trial, I would still retain the right of appellate courts to reverse for fundamental error where the conduct so damaged the fairness of the trial that the public's interest in our system of justice requires a new trial. Majority op. at 1030. The appellate courts should exercise this right, however, only in those rare cases where the public's confidence in the judicial process would be seriously undermined if the improper argument went uncorrected. I reach this conclusion because the primary reason to continue to embrace the fundamental error doctrine based on unobjected-to closing argument in civil cases, or the plain error doctrine as the term is used by many other state and federal jurisdictions, [28] is to ensure the fundamental fairness of the judicial process and the public trust and confidence in what transpires in our halls of justice. Accordingly, I regard the conflict represented by the competing viewpoints in this case as more than simply a dispute between whether it is more important to correct reprehensible attorney misconduct during closing argument or whether it is more important to promote the principle of proper preservation of trial error and appellate predictability. Majority op. at 1025 (quoting Fravel v. Haughey, 727 So.2d 1033, 1038-39 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (Cobb, J., concurring specially)). In addition, I agree that the fundamental error principle should not be used by courts to enforce compliance with ethical standards or to sanction lawyer misconduct. Other methods are available when those issues require redress. [29] The fundamental or plain error doctrine recognizes the public responsibility of the appellate court to reverse when the improper misconduct during closing argument seriously affects the basic fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial process, thereby challenging the legitimacy of the underlying judicial process itself. Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79 Ohio St.3d 116, 679 N.E.2d 1099, 1104 (1997). In recognizing this important interest in Seaboard Air Line R.R. Co. v. Strickland, 88 So.2d 519, 524 (Fla.1956), we quoted with approval the following statement from the United States Supreme Court: [A] trial in court is never, as respondents in their brief argue this one was, purely a private controversy ... of no importance to the public. The state, whose interest it is the duty of court and counsel alike to uphold, is concerned that every litigation be fairly and impartially conducted and that verdicts of juries be rendered only on the issues made by the pleadings and the evidence. The public interest requires that the court of its own motion, as is its power and duty, protect suitors in their right to a verdict, uninfluenced by the appeals of counsel to passion or prejudice. Where such paramount considerations are involved, the failure of counsel to particularize an exception will not preclude this court from correcting the error. New York Cent. R.R. v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 310, 318-19, 49 S.Ct. 300, 73 L.Ed. 706 (1929). As Judge Altenbernd has explained: Although fundamental error is extraordinarily difficult to define, the doctrine functions to preserve the public's confidence in the judicial system. Relief is granted for a fundamental error not because the party has preserved a right to relief from a harmful error, but because the public's confidence in our system of justice would be seriously weakened if the courts failed to give relief as a matter of grace for certain, very limited and serious mistakes. Hagan v. Sun Bank of Mid-Florida, 666 So.2d 580, 584 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). In this case, the majority has rejected the Fourth District's bright-line rule abolishing fundamental error in civil cases and instead has recognized an escape valve with a very narrowly defined parameter and of extremely limited application. Majority op. at 1026. At the same time, the majority has also included an additional requirement that the trial court should first evaluate the impact of the objectionable, but not objected-to, closing argument. I generally agree with the requirement that the objectionable closing argument remarks should first be addressed by the trial court through a post-trial motion. This requirement is a sound one because of the trial court's unique ability to evaluate the impact of the allegedly improper argument along with other conduct that the litigant claims forms the basis for a new trial. Because appellate courts have only the written record by which to evaluate the impact of the argument, undue emphasis may be placed on a comment that was innocuous at the time it was uttered. This is especially true with arguments involving words such as you or I, that often may be misconstrued and that rarely constitute the type of highly prejudicial or inflammatory argument precluding dispassionate consideration of the evidence. See majority op. at 1029. In addition, review by the trial court would provide the appellate court with the benefit of the trial court's assessment of the allegedly improper remarks and their impact, or lack of, on the trial. Long ago, we acknowledged that it is the trial judge's responsibility, as the impartial judicial officer in charge of the proceeding, to protect litigants against such interference by counsel with the orderly administration of justice and the protection of the right of the litigant to a verdict `uninfluenced by the appeals of counsel to passion or prejudice.' Strickland, 88 So.2d at 524. Recently, we reiterated the trial court's broad discretionary power to grant a new trial when a verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence and we explained that this discretionary power emanates from the common law principle that it is the duty of the trial judge to prevent what he or she considers to be a miscarriage of justice. Brown v. Estate of Stuckey, 749 So.2d 490, 495 (Fla. 1999). Despite my general agreement with the requirement that the trial court first evaluate the effect of the unobjected-to closing argument, I disagree with the majority as to the standard the trial court should follow when evaluating the effect of the unobjected-to closing argument. In my opinion, the trial court should have the power to grant a new trial based on pervasive, improper closing argument when necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice. In other words, I would enunciate a two-part test that would allow trial courts to grant a new trial based on unobjected-to closing argument where the trial court finds that: (1) the improper remarks are incurable; that is, the trial court finds the remarks to be of such character that neither rebuke nor retraction may entirely destroy their sinister influence, Baggett v. Davis, 124 Fla. 701, 717, 169 So. 372, 379 (1936); and (2) the prejudicial conduct in its collective import is so extensive that its influence pervades the trial, gravely impairing a calm and dispassionate consideration of the evidence and the merits by the jury. Tyus v. Apalachicola N. R.R., 130 So.2d 580, 587 (Fla.1961); see also Strickland, 88 So.2d at 523. A standard that would allow trial courts to evaluate cases under this two-part analysis would blend our prior case law on fundamental error as set forth in Baggett, Strickland and Tyus and would be more consistent with the approach taken by those states that require evaluation by a trial court. See Austin v. Shampine, 948 S.W.2d 900, 906 (Tex.Ct.App.1997) (reversing only where issue preserved through motion for mistrial and where the argument is so inflammatory that its harmful or prejudicial nature cannot be cured by an instruction to disregard); Dial v. Niggel Assocs., Inc., 333 S.C. 253, 509 S.E.2d 269, 271 (1998) (even where there has not been a contemporaneous objection, a new trial motion should be granted in flagrant cases where a vicious inflammatory argument results in clear prejudice). In contrast, the stringent four-part test set forth by the majority risks undermining the major tenet of both Tyus and Strickland, that the judge in the milieu of the trial courtroom is in the best position to gauge the actual effect of prejudicial remarks and deal with them accordingly. Fravel, 727 So.2d at 1039 (Cobb, J. concurring specially). [30] I also write to emphasize that the majority opinion should not be read to condone arguments that permit the noble art of trial practice to at times degenerate into a free-for-all. Nelson v. Reliance Ins., 368 So.2d 361, 361 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). As Judge Schwartz observed long ago, it is unacceptable for the judiciary to act simply as a fight promoter, who supplies an arena in which parties may fight it out on unseemly terms of their own choosing. Borden, Inc. v. Young, 479 So.2d 850, 851 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). Thus, it remains the duty of trial judges to admonish lawyers to refrain from improper closing argument. See Fravel, 727 So.2d at 1036 ([W]e find it troubling that trial judges are reluctant to curb the abuse perpetrated by trial counsel in the area of improper comments made during closing arguments.). I have no doubt that many trial judges take this responsibility seriously. Even those judges who may be reluctant to step in during closing argument do not hesitate to issue instructions to lawyers before closing argument reminding the litigants what is and what is not proper argument based on the plethora of appellate decisions that have previously identified the limits of proper advocacy. For these reasons, and to provide further guidance for the trial courts and trial lawyers as to the permissible bounds of advocacy, I urge appellate courts to continue to report the actual substance of the remarks that they deem objectionable, and to explain why they are objectionable. The type of closing arguments to which I refer are not simply those advanced by lawyers engaged in zealous advocacy or ones that contain words such as ridiculous [31] or other colorful adjectives. Instead, I am referring to those clear instances of a lawyer's attempt to appeal to juries' passions and prejudices by drawing attention to impermissible considerations outside of the record. Arguments about [w]hat other lawyers have done, what has occurred in other law suits, and what other corporations have done, are examples of arguments that are clearly outside the bounds of vigorous but acceptable advocacy. Bellsouth Human Resources Admin., Inc. v. Colatarci, 641 So.2d 427, 430 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). As much as it is the primary responsibility of trial lawyers to lodge proper, specific and timely objections and the responsibility of the trial court to maintain a fair and orderly trial, we, at the appellate level, cannot abdicate all responsibility. Although there are many sound reasons why a litigant should not be rewarded because his or her attorney strategically decides not to object, it is important that appellate courts nonetheless retain the right to address fundamental error. As Judge Dauksch explained in his specially concurring opinion in Fravel : It is not a matter of who is at faultthe offending lawyer who misbehaves, or the negligent or crafty lawyer on the other side who does not object, or the trial judge who shirks his duty to intercede. It is a matter of fundamental fairness and this court's duty to see to it that all litigants are given their due in court. That is the primary reason for having courts of appeal. 727 So.2d at 1038 (Dauksch, J., concurring specially). If we simply preclude consideration of fundamental error in civil cases, the danger, as Judge Sharp observes, is that we ourselves, as appellate judges, have all but disappeared from this equation, like the Chesire Cat, fading behind a smile in search of a `bright line,' leaving only the trial judges to fight the battle. Id. at 1040 (Sharp, J., dissenting). [32] ANSTEAD, J., concurs.