Opinion ID: 889962
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: background and overview

Text: ¶57 Plaintiffs here are twelve lesbian, gay, or bisexual individuals who are in six committed, intimate, same-sex relationships. As of the filing of their affidavits in the District Court on December 10, 2010, plaintiffs Donaldson and Guggenheim had been in a relationship for 27 years; Leslie and Haugland for 12 years; Stallings and Wagner for 21 years; Gibson and Boettcher for 11 years; Long and Parker for 8 years; and Owens and Williams for 18 years. With their life partners, Plaintiffs have established families 30 which provide them with long-term mutual emotional and economic support and a stable environment for raising children. Plaintiffs are employed in, or have retired from, a variety of professions including teaching, coaching, counseling, engineering, music, art, and medicine. They are active in their children’s schools, in their churches, in their professions, and in their communities. One has served in the Montana Legislature. It is undisputed that Plaintiffs are productive members of society and have, in fact, successfully raised a number of children. Some Plaintiffs are now grandparents. ¶58 Plaintiffs desire to protect their family relationships in the same way their heterosexual neighbors, coworkers, and fellow community members are able to do under Montana law. Plaintiffs have taken some steps in this regard. For example, they have entered into joint tenancy arrangements on their houses and bank accounts and have executed powers of attorney, healthcare directives, and wills in favor of their partners. Plaintiffs point out, however, that such private legal arrangements can be expensive and, thus, are not available to many couples. Plaintiffs also express concerns about whether these arrangements will be honored—especially in the event of a medical emergency. Some Plaintiffs describe (in their affidavits) past incidents when healthcare personnel refused to speak with them about their partner’s condition. Another Plaintiff (Leslie) describes how she and her former partner, Erika, took many of the legally available steps to protect their relationship. Yet, after Erika died in a work-related accident on Christmas Day 1996, which was their eighth anniversary, Leslie found herself “powerless and degraded” and treated like a “legal stranger” when she attempted to exercise the responsibilities of a partner. She was denied access to Erika’s remains; she was denied a 31 copy of the death certificate by the sheriff because she was a “stranger in blood”; she was refused paid bereavement leave by her employer (the same employer for whom Erika had been working when she was killed) and thus had to go back to work only a week after Erika’s death; she had no rights under the intestacy laws with regard to Erika’s property; she had no legal means to prevent Erika’s family from entering their home, going through their belongings, and taking Erika’s possessions, many of which the two had shared as domestic partners; and, to add insult to injury, she was required to pay inheritance taxes on the proceeds from Erika’s half of their condominium, which Leslie was forced to sell. ¶59 The underlying issue, as the District Court stated in its Order, is that “individuals such as Plaintiffs are denied a variety of benefits and protections that are statutorily available to heterosexual spouses.” The District Court identified some of these statutes and noted some of the “real life scenarios” in which these laws have affected Plaintiffs. For example, Montana’s intestacy laws and workers’ compensation laws provide certain protections to the surviving spouse of a different-sex relationship, but not to the surviving partner of a same-sex relationship. Likewise, bereavement leave is made available to a different-sex spouse but not to a same-sex partner. Furthermore, Plaintiffs are unable under Montana’s tax laws to file joint returns or to take the spousal exemption for nonworking spouses if filing separately. Montana law permits the different-sex spouse of a terminally ill person to withhold life-sustaining treatment, but does not afford this right to the same-sex partner of a terminally ill person. Similarly, the different-sex spouse of a person who has become mentally incompetent has priority to become guardian, but a same-sex partner does not have this same right. 32 ¶60 If not for the fact that each couple consists of two members of the same sex, Plaintiffs’ relationships could qualify as “marriage” under Montana law. Title 40, chapter 1, MCA. As noted, however, Plaintiffs do not ask to be granted the status of “married.” For purposes of this case, Plaintiffs only seek a determination that they are entitled, as a matter of constitutional law, to obtain the same rights and benefits—along with the same mutual responsibilities and obligations—which the State of Montana has chosen to grant to different-sex married couples. The premise underlying this claim is that “marriage” does not include an exclusive right to any particular rights and benefits conferred by the government, and that “marriage” connotes something other than just the receipt of such rights and benefits. See e.g. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 426-27, 434-35, 444-46 (Cal. 2008) (“the constitutional right to marry clearly does not obligate the state to afford specific tax or other governmental benefits on the basis of a couple’s family relationship”; even if all of the personal and dignity interests which have traditionally informed the right to marry have been given to same-sex couples through the Domestic Partner Act, there is still “a considerable and undeniable symbolic importance” to the designation of “marriage”); Kerrigan v. Commr. of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 417-18 (Conn. 2008) (“[m]arriage . . . is not merely shorthand for a discrete set of legal rights and responsibilities”; “[a]lthough marriage and civil unions do embody the same legal rights under our law, they are by no means ‘equal’[;] . . . the former is an institution of transcendent historical, cultural and social significance, whereas the latter most surely is not”); Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1077-79 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing “the extraordinary significance of the official designation of ‘marriage’ ” apart from the rights, 33 protections, and benefits conferred by the government). Therefore, Plaintiffs argue, when the State chooses to make benefits and protections available to persons in committed intimate relationships, the State must do so evenhandedly, without discriminating on the basis of the sexual orientation of the persons in those relationships. In a sense, Plaintiffs are merely demanding “separate but equal” treatment by the State—the minimal floor of equal protection rights under Plessy. ¶61 The Attorney General does not deny that the State could provide such protections to committed intimate same-sex couples. As a matter of fact, the Attorney General acknowledges in his appellate brief that “the Legislature could choose to provide benefits similar to spousal benefits to unmarried couples” and that “the Legislature could create a different status conferring similar benefits outside of marriage for civil unions or domestic partners.” The Attorney General, speaking through an Assistant Attorney General, made similar statements during oral argument. ¶62 One may wonder, then, why we do not simply grant Plaintiffs the declaratory relief they seek. While I certainly do not condone the “separate but equal” doctrine of Plessy—which the Supreme Court overruled in Brown v. Board of Ed., 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686 (1954)—Plaintiffs have made clear that, for purposes of this lawsuit, they do not seek the status of marriage. They merely seek “equal opportunity” to obtain the same benefits and protections which the State, in its discretion, has chosen to make available to different-sex couples. It is surely beyond cavil that Plaintiffs are entitled, at the very least, to the equal protection of these laws—even if that protection is effected through a regime that does not include marriage, as the Attorney General suggests. See Alaska Civ. 34 Liberties Union v. State, 122 P.3d 781, 793-94 (Alaska 2005) (restricting public benefits programs to different-sex married couples violates the rights of employees with same-sex partners to “equal rights, opportunities, and protection under the law”); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 220-21 (N.J. 2006) (as a matter of equal protection, “committed same-sex couples must be afforded on equal terms the same rights and benefits enjoyed by married opposite-sex couples”); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999) (the State has “a constitutional obligation to extend to [same-sex couples] the common benefit, protection, and security that Vermont law provides opposite-sex married couples”). ¶63 It appears from the District Court record, the arguments on appeal, and the Court’s Opinion that the hindrance in recognizing and declaring these rights boils down to a simple refusal by those in power to make the constitutionally sound—albeit politically unpopular—decision. For starters, rather than concede the elementary premise of this lawsuit—that it is a denial of equal protection to make statutory protections available to different-sex couples, who may obtain them by getting married, but to categorically deny them to same-sex couples, who are not able to get married—the Attorney General instead attempts to justify and prolong this institutionalized discrimination being perpetrated by the State of Montana against a discrete minority of its citizens. 3 Frankly, the State’s 3 In contrast, see e.g. Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1008 (Cal. 2011): “The answer filed by the [California] Attorney General also declined to defend the initiative, but went further and affirmatively took the position that Proposition 8 [which amended the California Constitution to prohibit same-sex marriage] is unconstitutional.” See also e.g. Ltr. from Eric H. Holder Jr., U.S. Atty. Gen., to John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. H.R., at 2 (Feb. 23, 2011) (Dkt. 42 in the District Court record): “[T]he President [of the United States] and I have concluded that classifications based on sexual orientation 35 arguments in this regard are inconsistent and difficult to follow. On one hand, the State concedes that the Legislature could provide committed intimate same-sex couples with similar benefits as are afforded to different-sex married couples. Yet, on the other hand, the State suggests that any benefits provided to different-sex married couples cannot also be provided to same-sex couples due to the Marriage Amendment. This reasoning is clearly a non sequitur for reasons discussed in greater detail in the Marriage Amendment section below. See ¶¶ 174-179, infra. For the time being, it suffices to point out that the Marriage Amendment merely states: “Only a marriage between one man and one woman shall be valid or recognized as a marriage in this state.” And, as noted, Plaintiffs are not asking that their relationships be recognized as “marriage.” Furthermore, the Marriage Amendment does not require the State to grant married couples tax benefits, or the right to make medical decisions for a spouse, or the right to death benefits under the workers’ compensation laws, etc. Nor does it say that these sorts of benefits and protections, if the State chooses to grant them, may not also be offered to unmarried persons. The State concedes that the Legislature could enact a civil-union or domestic-partnership scheme. ¶64 Perhaps for these reasons, the State ultimately takes the position that Plaintiffs’ constitutional claim should not be decided at all. The reason: a ruling in Plaintiffs’ favor could result in the invalidation of “innumerable” unspecified statutes. Yet, surely the fact that Plaintiffs are being discriminated against in “innumerable” ways is reason to hasten a decision on the merits of their claim, not delay it. Regrettably, however, a majority of warrant heightened scrutiny and that, as applied to same-sex couples legally married under state law, Section 3 of [the Defense of Marriage Act] is unconstitutional.” 36 this Court defers to the Attorney General’s approach. Instead of requiring the State to demonstrate the constitutionality of its practices, the Court punts. The Court implies that Plaintiffs are to blame—that their failure to “specifically identify” and “specifically analyze” the “specific statutes” that are discriminatory somehow precludes us from declaring Plaintiffs’ rights. Opinion, ¶¶ 9, 11, 13. How the Court expects Plaintiffs to present their claim is not entirely clear from the Court’s opaque analysis. But a careful inspection reveals the Court’s rationale to be entirely disingenuous in any event. ¶65 First of all, Plaintiffs have identified numerous statutes which grant benefits and protections to different-sex spouses but not to same-sex partners. Indeed, after observing in its Order that “Plaintiffs are denied a variety of benefits and protections that are statutorily available to heterosexual spouses,” the District Court lists a slew of those statutes. Furthermore, Plaintiffs attached a laundry list of the discriminatory statutes to their motion to alter or amend the judgment. That list is attached as Appendix 1 to this Dissent. If what the Court needs is a specific statute to analyze, the Court can simply pick one of the numerous statutes identified in the District Court’s Order or in Plaintiffs’ list, and assess its validity in light of the parties’ arguments. The constitutional principles of the Court’s analysis could then be extrapolated and applied to other statutes. ¶66 Secondly, if the Court is suggesting that Plaintiffs may not obtain a declaratory ruling until they have specifically identified every single discriminatory statute, it appears entirely likely that the extensive list of statutes attached to Plaintiffs’ motion to alter or amend the judgment is, in fact, a listing of every single discriminatory statute. If that is what the Court needs, then the Court need look no further than Plaintiffs’ motion, which 37 is contained in the District Court record. More importantly, however, the Court has cited no authority whatsoever for requiring Plaintiffs to identify all of the discriminatory statutes. In fact, as I discuss in further detail below, the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act enables Plaintiffs to obtain a declaration of their rights in a single lawsuit, without necessarily identifying each and every discriminatory statute. ¶67 Thirdly, if the Court is suggesting that Plaintiffs must challenge each statute on an individual basis, the Court has cited no authority for this approach either. Indeed, one purpose of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act is to avoid such seriatim litigation. As Plaintiffs reminded the District Court in their motion to alter or amend the judgment, they sought declaratory relief “in part to avoid this type of expensive and protracted litigation that would drain judicial resources while prolonging the harm experienced by Plaintiffs and their families.” Cf. McGillivray v. State, 1999 MT 3, ¶¶ 9-11, 293 Mont. 19, 972 P.2d 804 (concluding that declaratory relief was the only “reasonable remedy” where, absent such relief, only those plaintiffs who had “the financial resources and personal fortitude to endure four different court proceedings” would be able to exercise their claimed constitutional right, while those plaintiffs “who will not or cannot afford this extensive litigation would be denied their right”). Indeed, forcing Plaintiffs to challenge each of the “innumerable” statutes in piecemeal fashion is not only manifestly unfair to them, it is an enormous waste of resources, given that the underlying legal question is the same with respect to each statute at issue. Montana taxpayers, who will have to foot the State’s legal bills for defending each of these “innumerable” lawsuits, should be appalled by the Court’s and the Attorney General’s approach here. 38 ¶68 I think it is worth noting that the Court’s and the Attorney General’s approach is completely out of step with other courts around the country—federal and state. For example, Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), 1 U.S.C. § 7, defines “marriage” as a legal union between one man and one woman, and defines “spouse” as a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife. Although these definitions have “varying impact on more than a thousand federal laws,” the Second Circuit Court of Appeals did not require the plaintiff to specifically identify those laws. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 180 (2d Cir. 2012). To the contrary, the court proceeded to analyze her equal protection claim and concluded that “homosexuals compose a class that is subject to heightened scrutiny,” that the class is “quasi-suspect” and thus subject to “intermediate scrutiny,” and that “DOMA’s classification of same-sex spouses was not substantially related to an important government interest.” Windsor, 699 F.3d at 185, 188. Similarly, despite DOMA’s “ramifying application throughout the U.S. Code” and its “effects on the numerous federal programs at issue,” the First Circuit Court of Appeals did not require the plaintiffs to identify the “economic and other benefits” impacted by DOMA. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 5, 13 (1st Cir. 2012). The court simply analyzed the constitutionality of excluding same-sex couples and concluded that “Congress’ denial of federal benefits to same-sex couples lawfully married in Massachusetts has not been adequately supported by any permissible federal interest.” Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 16. ¶69 In New Jersey, different-sex married couples are entitled to “a vast array of economic and social benefits and privileges.” Lewis, 908 A.2d at 206. While same-sex 39 couples enjoyed various rights under New Jersey’s Domestic Partnership Act, they were still denied “many benefits and privileges” accorded to married couples. Lewis, 908 A.2d at 215. In other words, the Domestic Partnership Act “failed to bridge the inequality gap between committed same-sex couples and married opposite-sex couples.” Lewis, 908 A.2d at 215. The New Jersey Supreme Court noted a number of the rights afforded to married couples but denied to same-sex couples. The court did not require the plaintiffs, however, to go back to the trial court and re-file their constitutional challenge to this scheme—like this Court does in the present case—as “specific” challenges to “specific” statutes. Rather, the court quite sensibly and logically explained that the constitutional question is “whether there is a public need to deny committed same-sex partners the benefits and privileges available to heterosexual couples.” Lewis, 908 A.2d at 217. Ultimately, the court held that “denying to committed same-sex couples the financial and social benefits and privileges given to their married heterosexual counterparts bears no substantial relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose.” Lewis, 908 A.2d at 220. ¶70 The fact that there were “hundreds” of statutes relating to marriage and to marital benefits did not prevent the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts from ascertaining whether the exclusion of same-sex couples from those benefits violated the state constitution. Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 955 (Mass. 2003). The court noted some of the statutory benefits in its opinion, but saw no need “to be comprehensive.” Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 955. The Hawaii Supreme Court also saw no such need. In considering the same-sex couples’ constitutional challenge, the court observed that “a multiplicity of rights and benefits” are contingent upon the status of 40 marriage, but the court found it “unnecessary . . . to engage in an encyclopedic recitation of all of them.” Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 59 (Haw. 1993). ¶71 The Vermont Supreme Court likewise had no difficulty analyzing the legality of excluding same-sex couples from the “broad array of legal benefits and protections incident to the marital relation, including access to a spouse’s medical, life, and disability insurance, hospital visitation and other medical decisionmaking privileges, spousal support, intestate succession, homestead protections, and many other statutory protections.” Baker, 744 A.2d at 870. The court did not require the plaintiffs to specifically identify and specifically analyze the specific statutes. Rather, the court addressed the question common to each: “whether the exclusion of same-sex couples from the benefits and protections incident to marriage under Vermont law” is unconstitutional. Baker, 744 A.2d at 880. The court ultimately found “a constitutional obligation to extend to plaintiffs the common benefit, protection, and security that Vermont law provides opposite-sex married couples.” Baker, 744 A.2d at 886. ¶72 I could continue, but I think the point is clear. In refusing to issue a declaratory ruling as to Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, and in forcing them to instead litigate each statutory protection individually, this Court sets itself up as the only court in the country to follow such an approach. In so doing, the Court commits grievous error. ¶73 The instant case is no different than the cases cited above. “Marriage” in Montana is presently defined as “a personal relationship between a man and a woman arising out of a civil contract.” Section 40-1-103, MCA. Marriage between two persons of the same sex is prohibited. Section 40-1-401(1)(d), MCA; Mont. Const. art. XIII, § 7. Hence, by 41 definition, a person cannot be the “spouse” of someone who is the same sex. Black’s Law Dictionary 1533 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 9th ed., Thomson Reuters 2009) (spouse: “a married person”). The State grants a broad array of legal benefits and protections to “spouses.” As but one example, § 37-19-904(2)(c), MCA, grants the surviving “spouse” the right to control the disposition of the remains of a deceased person. Same-sex couples are excluded from the operation of these statutes because, by definition, they cannot be “spouses” and because they are not encompassed within the scope of the statutes in some other way. See e.g. § 45-5-206, MCA (for purposes of partner or family member assault, “partners” means “spouses, former spouses, persons who have a child in common, and persons who have been or are currently in a dating or ongoing intimate relationship with a person of the opposite sex” (emphasis added)). Plaintiffs’ claim here is the same as the challengers’ claims in the above cases: excluding same-sex couples from the opportunity to obtain the protections of these laws is unconstitutional. ¶74 As detailed in the Declaratory Judgment section below, there is simply no basis in law or in reason for requiring Plaintiffs to present their constitutional claim within the context of a challenge to a specific spousal benefit, or for requiring them to pursue independent challenges to each benefit, or for requiring them to identify all of the discriminatory laws. The notion that they must “specifically identify” and “specifically analyze” each of the “innumerable” statutes is, in reality, nothing more than a straw-man argument that the Attorney General has invented, and this Court has adopted, to avoid a socially divisive issue. I cannot believe that if the statutes discriminated on the basis of race, national origin, or religious affiliation, rather than sexual orientation, the Court 42 would concoct such an implausible procedural technicality as the Court does here to evade a legitimately presented constitutional question and deny the plaintiffs relief. ¶75 For all of these reasons, the Court’s contention that it cannot issue a ruling on Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights is devoid of any genuine or well-grounded underpinning. And so is the Court’s suggestion that Plaintiffs still need “to develop an argument as to . . . the level of constitutional scrutiny that should be applied to [the discriminatory] laws by the courts.” Opinion, ¶ 13. Plaintiffs devote entire sections of their briefs to this exact question, arguing that sexual orientation is a suspect class and that the denial of statutory benefits and obligations based on sexual orientation should be subject to heightened scrutiny. It is not clear whether the Court has overlooked these sections of Plaintiffs’ briefs, or simply chosen to ignore them, but the argument is there. Perhaps the Court’s view is that the level of scrutiny varies from statute to statute depending on “the nature of the State’s interest.” Opinion, ¶ 13. That, however, would be quite the novel approach to constitutional law. Indeed, I am aware of no precedent, from any court in this country, holding that the level of scrutiny—rational basis, middle tier, or strict—is determined not by the classification or the constitutional right at issue, but by “the nature of the State’s interest” in discriminating against the class or infringing the right. Such an approach turns equal protection and due process analysis on its head. ¶76 If the reader is baffled by what the Court is requiring of Plaintiffs, he or she is not alone. As a purely factual matter, there is no dispute that the State, by statute, makes certain benefits and obligations available to different-sex couples but denies same-sex couples access to those same benefits and obligations. The legal question common to 43 every challenge Plaintiffs might lodge against these statutes is whether, under our Constitution, the State may categorically exclude homosexuals and bisexuals in committed intimate same-sex relationships from the opportunity to obtain the same statutory protections made available to heterosexuals and bisexuals in committed intimate different-sex relationships. There is no persuasive, let alone legitimate, reason why we cannot issue a ruling on this question. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that “the nature of the State’s interest” in excluding same-sex couples varies from statute to statute, this does not preclude us from declaring what Plaintiffs’ rights are under traditional constitutional principles. We can rule—and I would rule—that sexual orientation is a suspect class and, therefore, that the State’s interest in denying same-sex couples the opportunity to obtain the statutory protections offered to different-sex couples must be “compelling.” Such a ruling is permitted by the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, and it would adequately resolve this dispute. At that point, the legislative and executive branches could take whatever steps are necessary to honor Plaintiffs’ civil rights—as legislative and executive officers are constitutionally sworn to do (Mont. Const. art. III, § 3)—in accordance with our decision. ¶77 The Court tells Plaintiffs that they may amend their complaint and pursue further proceedings in the District Court. Opinion, ¶ 13. While this at least has the virtue of rescuing their claims from the District Court’s outright dismissal, I cannot agree that this remedy is adequate. To the contrary, refusing to declare Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights forthwith, and sending them back to the District Court for unnecessary re-litigation of a constitutional question they have squarely presented to us in the instant appeal, is itself an 44 infringement of those rights. It must not be forgotten that “[t]he rights here asserted are, like all such rights, present rights; they are not merely hopes to some future enjoyment of some formalistic constitutional promise. The basic guarantees of our Constitution are warrants for the here and now and, unless there is an overwhelmingly compelling reason, they are to be promptly fulfilled.” Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 533, 83 S. Ct. 1314, 1318 (1963) (rejecting the City’s request for further delay in meeting its constitutional obligation under the Fourteenth Amendment to desegregate its public parks and other municipal recreational facilities). Likewise, under Montana law, the courts of this State (including the Montana Supreme Court) are courts of justice. Section 3-1-101, MCA. “Courts of justice shall be open to every person, and speedy remedy afforded for every injury of person[.] . . . Right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial, or delay.” Mont. Const. art. II, § 16. This fundamental constitutional right is not simply access to courts. It is access to justice—defined in Montana’s organic law to mean a speedy remedy, to every person, for every injury of person, without delay. ¶78 Thus, as a matter of federal constitutional law and Montana constitutional law, Plaintiffs are entitled to a prompt determination of their constitutional rights vis-à-vis the State of Montana’s admitted practice of making benefits and protections available to different-sex couples while categorically denying them to same-sex couples. Plaintiffs are also entitled to prompt rectification for any violations of these rights. Watson, 373 U.S. at 533, 83 S. Ct. at 1318 (“any deprivation of constitutional rights calls for prompt rectification”); Mont. Const. art. II, § 16 (“speedy remedy” shall be afforded for every injury). “It is axiomatic that ‘justice delayed is justice denied.’ ” State ex rel. Carlin v. 45 Fifth Jud. Dist. Ct., 118 Mont. 127, 135, 164 P.2d 155, 159 (1945); cf. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 816, 108 S. Ct. 2166, 2178 (1988) (“Perpetual litigation of any issue . . . delays, and therefore threatens to deny, justice.”); Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 2002 MT 129, ¶ 58, 310 Mont. 123, 54 P.3d 1 (Nelson, Trieweiler, Leaphart, & Cotter, JJ., specially concurring) (“Constitutional rights that cannot be enforced are illusory. It is as if those rights cease to exist as legal rights.”). Evading and delaying a decision on the merits of Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims, and requiring them to file seriatim challenges to “innumerable” statutes—each with the same, common legal issue—denies Plaintiffs access to justice just as clearly and as surely as if we had simply padlocked the courthouse doors. No class of litigants should be burdened with the emotional, financial, and time-related costs of this approach. No class of litigants should be treated in this draconian fashion. Our decision today makes a mockery of this Court’s supposed commitment to access-to-justice principles. See In re the Estab. of an Access to Just. Commn., No. AF 11-0765 (Mont. May 22, 2012). ¶79 In light of the foregoing, I believe that rather than affirmatively protect Plaintiffs’ civil rights as they are sworn to do, the Attorney General, the Legislature, and now, sadly, a majority of this Court have instead denied these persons justice and wrongly prolonged the State’s discriminatory practices. In requiring Plaintiffs to jump through procedural hoops that we have never imposed on any other minority group, and in thus delaying the vindication of their constitutional rights, the Court conveys that gay, lesbian, and bisexual Montanans cannot expect to receive fairness, justice, respect, and equal treatment from Montana’s courts. As I said at the outset, this is a black day for civil rights in Montana. 46 ¶80 I now turn to a detailed discussion of the law supporting my conclusion that declaratory relief is appropriate here.