Opinion ID: 2257538
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the Probative Value of Brown's Proffer was Substantially Outweighed by the Danger of Unfair Prejudice.

Text: The logical relevance of Brown's guilty plea and proffer does not conclude the analysis. A trial judge may exclude otherwise relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. [28] As discussed above, we review for an abuse of discretion a trial judge's ruling under D.R.E. 403 for an abuse of discretion. [29] Here, the trial judge found that any probative value of Brown's proffer was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, or wasting time. [30] The trial judge stated: Brown's plea agreement would likely poison the well for Linda Charbonneau as a jury would view the case as closed. The jury's focus must be solely on the evidence, and there would be a great deal of time wasted to explore matters. [31] In so holding, the trial judge abused his discretion. Brown's proffered statements were highly probative. Mellisa was the State's primary witness who provided the testimony that enabled the jury to find her mother guilty of two intentional murders. Any evidence that would operate to impeach Mellisa's credibility had probative value. If the jury found Mellisa's testimony generally incredible, then Linda would have had an opportunity to create a reasonable doubt in the jurors' minds about the extent of her own involvement in the crimes charged. The trial judge held, however, that the jury would have viewed the case as closed if Brown's plea and proffered statements were admitted. We interpret that view to mean that if the jury was told that Brown had pleaded guilty to two counts of First Degree Murder and if the jury had accepted the facts underlying Brown's proffer, the jurors would have concluded that Linda was guilty of two intentional murders. We do not agree. The State's theory, which the jury understood, was that Linda, Mellisa, and Brown all committed the murders. Both Brown and Mellisa's statements implicated themselves, each other, and Linda to some degree. Admitting Brown's proffered statements, certainly would not give the jury any indication that the case (against Linda) was closed. The trial judge should have admitted the proffered statements. Thus, we hold that the trial judge abused his discretion by holding that the probative value of the Brown statement was outweighed by the prejudice that evidence would occasion to Linda (on the theory it would close the case against her) or that it would be a waste of time to explore the inconsistency in the testimony of two eyewitnesses to two intentional murders. There certainly, on the other hand, was no cognizable prejudice to the State in admitting statements that the State itself had procured as part of its plea bargain and that, by not rescinding its plea bargain with Brown, continued impliedly to endorse.