Opinion ID: 541744
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: N.Y. Penal Law Sec. 240.35(1)

Text: 72 We now turn our attention to the district court's conclusion that N.Y. Penal Law Sec. 240.35(1) violates the due process clause of the New York State Constitution. The district court reached the conclusion solely on the basis of its interpretation of several New York State cases, relying in particular on a recent opinion of the New York Court of Appeals, People v. Bright, supra. Our primary concern is whether consideration of this issue was properly within the district court's jurisdiction. The question of whether the court properly exercised jurisdiction may be raised by this Court, itself, at any stage of the proceedings. Manway Construction Co. v. Housing Authority of Hartford, 711 F.2d 501, 503 (2d Cir.1983). 73 First, we are doubtful that plaintiffs have alleged an actual case or controversy, as required by Article III of the United States Constitution. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 1664, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983); Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat. Union, 442 U.S. 289, 297-98, 99 S.Ct. 2301, 2308-09, 60 L.Ed.2d 895 (1979). To satisfy this constitutionally-mandated jurisdictional requirement, 74 [p]laintiffs must demonstrate a personal stake in the outcome in order to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues necessary for the proper resolution of constitutional questions.... Abstract injury is not enough. The plaintiff must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of the challenged official conduct and the injury or threat of injury must be both real and immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical. 75 Lyons, 461 U.S. at 101-02, 103 S.Ct. at 1664-65 (citations omitted). As it relates to the issue of whether Sec. 240.35(1) comports with the New York State Constitution, we do not think that this fundamental prerequisite of jurisdiction has been satisfied. 76 Initially, the New York Penal Law was simply not at issue in this case. In the original complaint, the plaintiffs alleged violations of their rights as a result of the TA's enforcement of 21 N.Y.C.R.R. Sec. 1050.6(b) in the subway system. They never maintained that any of the defendants, in fact, stopped them from begging and panhandling pursuant to the N.Y. Penal Law Sec. 240.35(1). By instructing the plaintiffs to challenge Sec. 240.35(1), the district court designed a much different case than the controversy that originally came before the court. From the outset, the role of Metro-North, an original defendant in the case, had been dubious since the commuter railroad was not empowered to enforce the TA ban on begging and panhandling pursuant to Sec. 1050.6. The challenge to Sec. 240.35(1) enabled the district court to exercise jurisdiction over Metro-North, as well as the LIRR, the Port Authority and conceivably any other defendant empowered to enforce this provision of the New York Penal Law. At a minimum, the scope of the case was expanded beyond the subway to include facilities such as Grand Central Station, Pennsylvania Station, the Port Authority Bus Terminal and the World Trade Center. 77 In its Opinion and Order dated January 25, 1990, the district court indicated that its sua sponte action was prompted by defendants' assertion that transit police, as duly authorized peace officers, were doing no more than enforcing that provision [Sec. 240.35(1) ] of the state penal law. The court was apparently referring to a statement made by the TA in a memorandum filed November 30, 1989 submitted in opposition to the motion for a preliminary injunction. The memorandum observed that the TA regulation at issue was comparable to a New York State Penal provision prohibiting loitering, remaining or wandering about in a public place 'for the purpose of begging' N.Y. Penal Law Sec. 240.35. Based on this observation, the district court raised and discussed the issue at length during the first oral argument, subsequently attempted to join the Attorney General so as to call the state statute into question, and finally, at the second oral argument, instructed the plaintiffs to amend the complaint accordingly. 78 Subject matter jurisdiction may not be created either by the parties, or by the court. The record is devoid of any allegation that the plaintiffs have been prohibited from begging or panhandling on the basis of Sec. 240.35(1). The TA prohibition of begging is based on its own regulations, not on the New York Penal Law. The Port Authority represented during this litigation that, on the basis of Sec. 240.35(1), it would not issue a permit to beg pursuant to 21 N.Y.C.R.R. Secs. 1220.16, 1220.25 and 1290.3. However, the plaintiffs have never requested, nor have they been denied, a permit to beg by the Port Authority. Indeed, while plaintiffs admit to begging in the Port Authority facilities, they do not allege that they have ever been requested to desist or to leave by any Port Authority official. Nor do the plaintiffs suggest that anyone has ever been arrested or prosecuted for begging or panhandling in the Port Authority pursuant to Sec. 240.35(1). At most, the plaintiffs have alleged an abstract and hypothetical, rather than a real and immediate, possibility of injury. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 101-02. When one cuts through the procedural labyrinth of this case, it becomes clear that the district court, and not the plaintiffs, raised the New York Penal Law as an issue. As we have noted previously, [p]rocedural irregularities almost always breed confusion, the great enemy of justice. United States v. Town of North Hempstead, 610 F.2d 1025, 1031 (2d Cir.1979). 79 Based on the plaintiffs' failure to apply to the Port Authority for a permit to beg prior to challenging its reliance on Sec. 240.35(1), we must conclude that they have failed to allege either a direct injury or an imminent danger of injury resulting from the challenged provision of the New York Penal Law. See Berrigan v. Norton, 451 F.2d 790 (2d Cir.1971) (Where two prisoners failed to request, and the warden never denied, permission to engage in First Amendment activity outside the prison, the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the prisoners' claims of constitutional violations as they did not present a justiciable case or controversy.). Accordingly, this aspect of their complaint must be dismissed. 80 Even if the plaintiffs had alleged a justiciable case or controversy, the district court would have lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this issue. The jurisdiction of the district courts is limited not only by the Constitution, but also by Congress. See Town of North Hempstead, 610 F.2d at 1029. It seems clear that the district court properly exercised its jurisdiction over plaintiffs' First Amendment claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331. However, the constitutionality under the New York State Constitution of a New York Penal Law provision presents no federal questions. Consequently, the district court's adjudication of this issue would only be permissible if the issue properly fell within the court's pendent jurisdiction. See Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 108 S.Ct. 614, 618, 98 L.Ed.2d 720 (1988); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1138, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966); Town of North Hempstead, 610 F.2d at 1029. 81 An exercise of pendent jurisdiction is appropriate when the federal and state claims are sufficiently related so as to be considered to 'comprise but one constitutional case ', the test of relatedness being whether the claims 'derive from a common nucleus of operative fact.'  Town of North Hempstead, 610 F.2d at 1030 (citation omitted). Although the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction is one of flexibility and discretion, it is fundamental that [n]eedless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726, 86 S.Ct. at 1139 (footnote omitted). A district court ought not reach out for ... issues, thereby depriving state courts of opportunities to develop and apply state law. Mayer v. Oil Field Systems Corp., 803 F.2d 749, 757 (2d Cir.1986). These same principles underlie our 11th Amendment jurisprudence: 82 A federal court's grant of relief against state officials on the basis of state law ... does not vindicate the supreme authority of federal law. On the contrary, it is difficult to think of a greater intrusion on state sovereignty than when a federal court instructs state officials on how to conform their conduct to state law. Such a result conflicts directly with the principles of federalism.... 83 Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106, 104 S.Ct. 900, 911, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984). Thus, pendent jurisdiction should not be exercised merely because the exercise of such judicial power is desirable or expedient. Town of North Hempstead, 610 F.2d at 1029. 84 Applying these principles to the case at bar, we fail to see a sufficient relationship between the First Amendment challenge to the TA's prohibition against begging and the challenge, based on the due process clause of the New York State Constitution, to N.Y. Penal Law Sec. 240.35(1). The federal constitutional claim raises legal issues completely unrelated to those presented by the state constitutional claim. The fact that the TA's prohibition on begging is unconnected to the New York Penal Law deprives the claims of the requisite common nucleus of operative fact for the exercise of pendent jurisdiction. See Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725, 86 S.Ct. at 1138; Town of North Hempstead, 610 F.2d at 1029-30. Moreover, exercising pendent jurisdiction in this case would violate fundamental principles of federalism and comity. New York State has a definite interest in determining whether its own laws comport with the New York Constitution. A proper determination may well involve ascertaining the state legislature's intention in passing Sec. 240.35(1), as well as interpreting prior decisions of the New York courts. We think the federal district court was ill-disposed to undertake such a task.