Opinion ID: 515792
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Whether the Subsequent Detention and Frisk of Thomas

Text: Were Justified 27 It is clear that Officer Siegel effected a temporary stop for investigatory purposes. Based on the objective and articulable facts given by Officer Siegel for the stop, we have determined that the stop was based on founded suspicion. But a so-called Terry stop is by its very nature of temporary duration and limited in its intrusiveness on the liberty of the suspect being investigated. A lawful frisk does not always flow from a justified stop. Each element, the stop and the frisk, must be analyzed separately; the reasonableness of each must be independently determined. The standard for justifying a frisk is whether a reasonably prudent person in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his or her safety or that of others was in danger. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. at 1883. If the stop is based on founded suspicion and the officer has reason to believe that the suspect is armed and dangerous, the officer may conduct a limited weapons search. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1923, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972). 28 In defining the scope of the stop and inquiry of the suspects, courts have tried to balance the need to conduct an investigation on less than probable cause with the constitutional rights of the individual detained on less than probable cause. A valid stop can include the momentary restriction on a person's freedom of movement in order to maintain the status quo while making an initial inquiry. United States v. Patterson, 648 F.2d 625, 633 (9th Cir.1981). Otherwise, an officer could not perform a preliminary investigation of an alleged wrongdoing. The scope of the inquiry following a stop and the detention is a fact-specific determination. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1325, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). The facts of this case indicate that the initial investigatory stop provided no basis for the subsequent detention and frisk. The events that transpired after the stop unreasonably interfered with Thomas' personal liberty and were violative of the Fourth Amendment. 29 There is nothing inherently suspicious in the fact that Thomas got out [of his car] without being asked to do so. Appellant's opening brief, at 4. Officer Siegel pulled his patrol car in front of Thomas' car, making it impossible for Thomas to freely leave. In United States v. Kerr, 817 F.2d 1384 (9th Cir.1987), an officer effected a stop in exactly the same way that Officer Siegel did. We stated that the suspect stopped and exited his car primarily in response to Deputy Hedrick's official appearance and conduct, rather than of his own volition. Id. at 1386. The government cannot suggest that this initial act by Thomas was a reason for Officer Siegel to fear for his safety. 30 Once Thomas got out of his car, Officer Siegel had a clear view of him and could see that Thomas did not match the description of either of the suspects, in that he was not wearing a plaid suit or a tan jacket. Although the arrest report indicates that the passenger in Thomas' car was wearing a camel-colored jacket, Officer Siegel apparently did not make that observation before making the stop, and there is nothing in the record to suggest that he observed the tan jacket during the detention and frisk of Thomas. Officer Siegel asked Thomas why he was in the bank parking lot and asked Thomas to identify himself. Both questions were permissible in the context of an investigatory stop. Thomas responded to the first question with a plausible explanation and properly identified himself. 31 Nothing that occurred up to this point justified Officer Siegel's subsequent actions. The officer kept Thomas' driver's license as he positioned himself behind Thomas, so that both Thomas and the passenger in the car were within Officer Siegel's line of vision. The officer then asked Thomas whether he had any weapons. The record is silent on how long Officer Siegel waited for a response before he proceeded to pat Thomas down for weapons. In answer to the defense counsel's questions at the suppression hearing, Officer Siegel described in detail the factual circumstances surrounding the frisk of Thomas. Officer Siegel's attitude towards frisking Thomas is evident in the answer he gave to a question from the government at the suppression hearing: 32 Q. Officer Siegel, why did you pat Mr. Thomas down? 33 A. Basically for my own safety. I was by myself. I was investigating a felony. There were two of them, one of me. I didn't want any surprises. So I patted down just about everything under that kind of circumstance. 34 Q. Did the size or appearance of Mr. Thomas in any way contribute to your decision to patting him down? 35 A. Well, he is a pretty big guy. I patted him down because I didn't want to get in any trouble. I wanted to see what was in front of me, make sure they didn't have a weapon on them. 36 Officer Siegel had no reason to continue the detention after he had asked his initial investigatory questions, and yet he asked Thomas whether he had any weapons. Under the circumstances of this case, the question concerning weapons was not prompted by Officer Siegel's reasonable belief that Thomas might be armed and presently dangerous, and therefore, the question was not justified. 8 Cf. United States v. Kennedy, 573 F.2d 657, 659 (9th Cir.1978). Nothing in the police dispatch suggested that either of the counterfeiting suspects was armed or dangerous. Nor were there any other circumstances that would lead to such a belief. 37 The physical appearance of a suspect may be significant if it contributes to the officer's reasonable belief that the suspect is armed, for example if the officer sees a suspicious bulge on the suspect's body or the clothes worn by the suspect could easily hide a weapon. United States v. Hill, 545 F.2d 1191, 1193 (9th Cir.1976) (a bulge in a suspect's clothing that was consistent with the presence of a weapon was a relevant factor in determining the validity of a frisk). There is no indication that Officer Siegel based his frisk of Thomas on such an observation. Finally, there is nothing to suggest that Thomas made any abrupt movements or engaged in suspicious, furtive behavior during the course of the investigation that would have justifiably prompted Officer Siegel to fear for his safety. See United States v. Ullrich, 580 F.2d 765, 769 (5th Cir.1978). Officer Siegel only suggests that he frisked Thomas because he was a pretty big. An officer cannot simply frisk all pretty big guys without more specific objective reasons why the suspect posed a risk to the safety of the officer. The justification given by Officer Siegel for the frisk is not indicative of the reasoned approach to a frisk, based on an articulable fear for one's own safety, that was contemplated by Terry and Adams. It indicates a perfunctory attitude towards frisking a suspect once a justified stop has occurred. 38 The government argues that once Officer Siegel made the stop, he could do nothing else but continue his investigation: He surely couldn't turn his back and walk away. If it was reasonable for him to investigate further by asking questions, it was reasonable for him to pat-down the exterior of [Thomas'] clothing. The way that Officer Siegel conducted his investigation, however, cannot be used to bootstrap a justification for the detention and frisk of Thomas. The 'narrow scope' of the Terry exception does not permit a frisk for weapons on less than reasonable belief or suspicion directed at the person to be frisked. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 94, 100 S.Ct. 338, 343 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979). If we followed the government's logic, all investigatory stops would necessarily include a frisk. Without any reason whatsoever, a police officer could routinely ask about weapons and frisk the individual under suspicion. Such a result would not only destroy the necessary distinction between the stop and frisk, but would indiscriminately subject countless individuals to the humiliation and invasiveness of a bodily frisk. We cannot allow the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment to be tampered with so carelessly.