Opinion ID: 1780829
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Aiellos' Attorney's Fees

Text: The Aiellos further claim that the court of appeals erred by reducing their attorney's fee award for fees incurred at trial. The question is whether the Aiellos could recover attorney's fees for work performed after the agreed judgment was entered, but related to issues predating the agreed judgment. The court of appeals properly characterized the agreed judgment as an accord and satisfaction intended to settle all disputed matters between the Aiellos and Stewart Title. The parties are thus barred from asserting new claims for attorney's fees for services predating the accord and satisfaction. See Dickson v. Stockman, 411 S.W.2d 610, 613 (Tex.Civ.App.Texarkana 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Though Mr. Heggen, the Aiellos' attorney, was hired after the agreed judgment was entered, Mr. Heggen testified that approximately twenty-percent of his time and fifteen-percent of his paralegal's time concerned issues predating the agreed judgment. These issues included whether there were additional misrepresentations made by Stewart Title to the Aiellos, whether Stewart Title's behavior could be considered an actionable continuing course of conduct, and whether res judicata applied to any of the issues in the current lawsuit. Relying on Dickson and Mr. Heggen's testimony, the court of appeals reformed the judgment to reflect a deduction for the percentage amounts of attorney's and paralegal fees attributable to legal work predating the agreed judgment. 911 S.W.2d at 475. Dickson, however, is not dispositive. Mr. Heggen did not perform any services prior to the entry of the agreed judgment. A party seeking attorney's fees must show that the fees were incurred on a claim that allows recovery of such fees, and thus is ordinarily required to segregate fees incurred on claims allowing recovery of fees from those that do not. Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Sterling, 822 S.W.2d 1, 10 (Tex.1991). But when the claims are dependent upon the same set of facts or circumstances and thus are `intertwined to the point of being inseparable,' the party suing for attorney's fees may recover the entire amount covering all claims. Sterling, 822 S.W.2d at 11 (citing Gill Sav. Ass'n v. Chair King, Inc., 783 S.W.2d 674, 680 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1989), modified, 797 S.W.2d 31 (Tex.1990)). Likewise, when the issues are integrally related to the claims upon which recovery of attorney's fees is based, we believe full recovery of attorney's fees should be allowed, even if some of the issues are also related to matters that predated the agreed judgment. The issues that Mr. Heggen and his paralegal worked on that predated the agreed judgment were integrally related to the claims the Aiellos pursued in the present suit. Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals's reduction of the Aiellos' award of attorney's trial fees. Given our disposition of this issue, we need not address Stewart Title's complaint that the court of appeals erred when it failed to recalculate the postjudgment interest award to reflect the reduction of the attorney's fee award. The Aiellos also contend that the court of appeals should have disregarded the amount of appellate fees awarded by the jury and instead awarded the full amount requested by counsel. The award of appellate fees is a question of fact for the jury. Trevino v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 140 Tex. 500, 168 S.W.2d 656, 660 (1943). As such, we will not disturb the jury's decision to award the Aiellos less than they requested.