Opinion ID: 808245
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: GBAPP’s Motion to Dismiss

Text: We “review de novo [a] [d]istrict [c]ourt’s dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, accepting all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Lopez v. Jet Blue Airways, 662 F.3d 593, 596 (2d Cir. 2011). To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Although pro se complaints must contain sufficient factual allegations to meet the plausibility standard, see Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), we look for such allegations by reading the complaint with “special solicitude” and interpreting it to raise the strongest claims it suggests, Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Ruotolo v. I.R.S., 28 F.3d 6, 8 (2d Cir. 1994)). We have conducted a de novo review of the record in light of these principles and now affirm the district court’s dismissal of McAllister’s claims against GBAPP. Both Title VII and the ADA require some allegedly discriminatory action on the part of the employer defendant. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (Title VII); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (ADA). Even when read with the special solicitude we show pro se pleadings, however, the Complaint is devoid of any allegation suggesting that 1 We note that McAllister does not challenge the district court’s dismissal of his claims against the individual defendants. 3 GBAPP was McAllister’s employer, much less that it played a role in any of the discriminatory conduct he alleges. Because McAllister’s claims against GBAPP therefore lack facial plausibility, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of those claims.