Opinion ID: 2777576
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Estrella Decision

Text: 1 The application of the 8-level enhancement in lieu of the 16-level enhancement would have resulted in a total offense level of 13. Based on a total offense level of 13 and a criminal history score of VI, Defendant’s guideline range would have been 33-41 months’ imprisonment. 4 Case: 14-10230 Date Filed: 02/06/2015 Page: 5 of 12 We review de novo whether a defendant’s prior conviction qualifies as a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines. Estrella, 758 F.3d at 1244. Pursuant to Florida Statute § 790.19: Whoever, wantonly or maliciously, shoots at, within, or into, or throws any missile or hurls or projects a stone or other hard substance which would produce death or great bodily harm, at, within, or in any public or private building, occupied or unoccupied, or public or private bus or any train, locomotive, railway car, caboose, cable railway car, street railway car, monorail car, or vehicle of any kind which is being used or occupied by any person, or any boat, vessel, ship, or barge lying in or plying the waters of this state, or aircraft flying through the airspace of this state shall be guilty of a felony of the second degree. Fla. Stat. § 790.19. Estrella was also an illegal reentry case, in which Estrella’s prior § 790.19 conviction was based on an assault that he directed at an occupied vehicle. Likewise in this case, the PSR indicates that defendant Estrada’s assault was also targeted at an occupied automobile. In Estrella, we first examined whether § 790.19 had as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, which is required before a statute can be deemed a crime of violence for purposes of § 2L1.2. We noted that, as a categorical matter, it did not, because some prongs of the statute did not contain an element requiring that the physical force threatened, attempted, or used be directed against a person, as opposed to property. This meant that the statute punished 5 Case: 14-10230 Date Filed: 02/06/2015 Page: 6 of 12 some conduct that would fit the Guidelines’ definition of a crime of violence, but it also punished some conduct that would not satisfy that definition. Estrella, 758 F.3d at 1248. Stated more simply, some parts of the statute would permit conviction even when the defendant had not directed physical force against a person, as opposed to physical property. Our analysis did not stop there, however. We looked further to see whether the statute could be considered to be a divisible statute, as set out in Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013). If the statute were considered to be divisible, we could then proceed to analyze whether, under a modified categorical test, the particular conviction meshed with those elements required for an offense to constitute a crime of violence. If the statute were deemed, indivisible, however, the inquiry was over and the particular conviction could not be considered a crime of violence for purposes of enhancing the defendant’s sentence. Estrella, 758 F.3d at 1245-47. In examining § 790.19, we concluded that it was a divisible statute; that is, it “effectively create[s] several different crimes.” Id. at 1249 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). Given that conclusion, we then applied the modified categorical test to determine whether defendant Estrella had been effectively convicted of an offense with elements equivalent to those elements found in an offense for a crime of violence. We concluded that Estrella could be deemed to have been convicted 6 Case: 14-10230 Date Filed: 02/06/2015 Page: 7 of 12 of a crime of violence if his conviction was for wanton conduct, because Florida law defines “wanton” to mean that one has acted intentionally or with reckless indifference to the consequences and with knowledge that damage is likely to be done to some person. Id. at 1253. But if instead Estrella had been convicted of only malicious conduct, the latter was satisfied by knowledge that injury or damage would be done to a person or to property and, in that case, Estrella would not be deemed to have been convicted of a crime of violence. Having set up the analytical model, we then looked to Shepard-approved2 documents to see if we could determine on which of the above two mental elements the defendant had been convicted. That review revealed only a charging document which showed that Estrella had been charged in the disjunctive with “‘wantonly or maliciously’ targeting ‘a vehicle being used or occupied by a person.’” Id. at 1254. Accordingly, as the only document before us did not clarify which of the two alternative mental states formed the basis for the defendant’s conviction and as one of those mental states would preclude the offense from being deemed a crime of violence, we concluded that Estrella’s prior conviction was not a qualifying conviction for purposes of the § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) enhancement. Id.