Opinion ID: 39526
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Fourteenth Amendment Motion to Suppress

Text: In addition to his Fourth Amendment suppression argument, Lopez-Moreno also argues that the evidence against him should have been suppressed based on Officer Parker’s alleged violation of his rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Lopez-Moreno asserts that both his initial stop and continued detention were instances of ethnic profiling. LopezMoreno argues that such treatment violated his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and that the proper remedy is suppression. We review this claim under the same standard of review as LopezMoreno’s Fourth Amendment-based suppression claim. In considering Lopez-Moreno’s claim, we note our prior decision in United States v. Chavez, 281 F.3d 479 (5th Cir. 2002). In Chavez, we considered the defendant’s argument that evidence against him should be suppressed because he was a victim of ethnic profiling. We stated: Neither the Supreme Court nor our Court has ruled that there is a suppression remedy for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, and we do not find it necessary to reach that issue here. For even if we assume arguendo that the Fourteenth Amendment does provide such an exclusionary remedy, it is plain that [the Defendant-Appellant] has failed to offer proof of discriminatory purpose, a necessary predicate of an equal protection violation. Chavez, 281 F.3d at 486-87. Our earlier statement applies equally well to Lopez-Moreno’s claim. He has offered no evidence showing that Officer Parker’s actions were driven by a discriminatory purpose. Accordingly, Lopez-Moreno’s Equal - 23 - Protection-based suppression argument fails. C. The Admissibility of Evidence of the Passengers’ Legal Status Lopez-Moreno next argues that the district court erred by denying his motion in limine of February 23, 2004, and by admitting at trial documents from the passengers’ A-files. In his motion in limine, Lopez-Moreno argued that documents contained in the passengers’ A-files were not admissible to prove that the passengers were in the United States illegally because their admission would violate the rule against hearsay found in FED. R. EVID. 802 and his Confrontation Clause rights under the Sixth Amendment. As Lopez-Moreno notes, to convict a defendant of transporting an undocumented alien, the Government must prove that: (1) the defendant transported or moved an alien within the United States; (2) the alien came to, entered, or remained in the United States in violation of the law; (3) the defendant was aware, or in reckless disregard, of the alien’s illegal status; and (4) the defendant acted willfully in furtherance of the alien’s violation of the law. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) (2000); United States v. Diaz, 936 F.2d 786, 788 (5th Cir. 1991). According to Lopez-Moreno, documents from the passengers’ A-files were inadmissible to prove that the passengers came to, entered, or remained in the United States in violation of the law. We review the district court’s evidentiary decisions for an abuse of discretion. General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, - 24 - 141 (1997); United States v. Wilson, 322 F.3d 353, 359 (5th Cir. 2003). We note at the outset that the section of Lopez-Moreno’s appellate brief dedicated to his evidentiary arguments is essentially a copy of his motion in limine filed on February 23, 2004.6 Because virtually all of this section of his appellate brief was drafted before the trial occurred, it raises issues that are now moot. Specifically, in his motion in limine, and thus in his appellate brief, Lopez-Moreno argues that documents from the passengers’ A-files were inadmissible because they contain personal statements made by the passengers that are hearsay, the admission of which would violate his Sixth Amendment right to confront the passengers at trial. However, no documents containing the passengers’ hearsay statements were introduced at trial. The record indicates that documents found in the A-files did contain statements made by the passengers about their legal status. For instance, each of the nine passengers signed affidavits concerning his or her illegal entry into the United States. While the government initially may have intended to introduce these documents to prove the passengers’ legal status, it ultimately chose not to do so. Accordingly, because these documents were never introduced at trial, Lopez-Moreno’s 6 With a few minor exceptions (e.g., the inclusion of a standard of review), Section II of Lopez-Moreno’s appellate brief--the section pertaining to his evidentiary arguments--is a verbatim copy of the motion in limine. - 25 - objection to their introduction is moot.7 At trial, the Government only introduced three items from the passengers’ A-files: (1) the passengers’ booking photographs; (2) a photocopy of a Mexican voter identification card that one of the passengers had in his possession; and (3) a computer printout from BICE’s computer system for each of the seven passengers who had been deported that showed the date on which he or she was deported to Mexico. Lopez-Moreno’s appellate brief does not specifically refer to any of these documents, although he does generally assert that documents contained in the A-files should have been excluded because their introduction would violate the rule against hearsay and his Confrontation Clause rights. After considering this argument as applied to the items from the A-files that were admitted at trial, we conclude that 7 Although no documents containing the passengers’ statements were introduced at trial, Agent Griffin did testify at trial that, as part of his investigation, he asked each of the passengers: (1) his name; (2) his date and place of birth; (3) his height and weight; (4) whether he had any scars or marks; (5) whether he was married or single; (6) whether he was from Mexico; (7) the date and place of his entry into the United States; (8) the status of his entry; (9) his nationality; and (10) where he currently resided. While Agent Griffin did not testify as to the passengers’ answers, he subsequently testified that, based on his investigation, he believed they were in the United States illegally. Lopez-Moreno does not argue here, and did not argue below, that by listing these questions and then offering this opinion, Agent Griffin effectively introduced the passengers’ responses through the back door, possibly in violation of the Confrontation Clause. Counsel’s delphic objection referred to her motion in limine, which pertained only to the admissibility of documents from the A-files. A proper objection would have required considerably more development. In any event, we need not decide this issue, which would be res nova in this circuit. - 26 - these documents were properly admitted. First, we need not address the admissibility of the passengers’ booking photographs because Lopez-Moreno did not object at trial to their introduction and does not challenge their introduction on appeal.8 United States v. Bigler, 817 F.2d 1139, 1140 (5th Cir. 1987) (noting that we generally will not consider issues that are not raised by the litigants on appeal). Second, the admission of the photocopy of the Mexican voter identification card did not violate the rule against hearsay or the Confrontation Clause. The photocopy of the voter identification card cannot be characterized as hearsay because it is not, and does not contain, an assertion, or nonverbal conduct intended to be an assertion, offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c) (defining “hearsay” as “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at a trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted”).9 Likewise, admission of the photocopy of the Mexican voter identification card did not violate the Confrontation Clause. The Confrontation Clause 8 At trial, Lopez-Moreno initially objected to the introduction of the photographs on the ground that they had not properly been authenticated. The Government responded by eliciting testimony designed to authenticate them. After the Government authenticated the photographs, Lopez-Moreno withdrew his objection to their introduction. 9 FED. R. EVID. 801(a) defines a “statement” as “(1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person if it is intended by the person as an assertion.” - 27 - states that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The applicability of this provision is limited “to ‘witnesses’ against the accused--in other words, those who ‘bear testimony.’” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004). As such, the Confrontation Clause applies only to testimonial statements. Id. While the Supreme Court chose in Crawford not to define precisely what is and is not a testimonial statement, it is clear that the photocopy of the identification card does not qualify as such because it in no way involves a witness bearing testimony. See id. at 51, 56. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the photocopy of the Mexican voter identification card. The admission of the computer printouts was also proper. While the computer printouts conceivably could be viewed as containing hearsay statements (statements regarding the passengers’ deportations from the United States), they are nevertheless admissible under FED. R. EVID. 803(8), which permits the introduction of public records and reports containing hearsay statements. FED. R. EVID. 803(8) covers: Public records and reports. Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions and proceedings and against the Government in criminal cases, - 28 - factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness. Under Rule 803(8), records, including computer records, made by a public agency are admissible, regardless of whether they would otherwise be excluded as hearsay. See United States v. Puente, 826 F.2d 1415, 1417-18 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that under Rule 803(8), computer records maintained by the Customs Service that showed when the appellant’s vehicle entered the United States were properly admitted); United States v. Quezada, 754 F.2d 1190, 1193 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that under Rule 803(8), a record of deportation contained in an INS file was properly admitted); United States v. Koontz, 143 F.3d 408, 412 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that booking records were properly admitted under Rule 803(8)); United States v. Smith, 973 F.2d 603, 605 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that computer records of reported robberies in a specified locality were properly admitted under Rule 803(8)). In Quezada, we rejected the claim that the law enforcement exception in Rule 803(8)(B) applied to exclude a document showing that the appellant had been deported from the United States, stating that Rule 803(8)(B) was directed at observations by law enforcement officers at the scene of a crime or in the course of investigating a crime and did not apply to “recording routine, objective observations, made as part of the everyday function of the preparing official or agency . . . .” Quezada, 754 F.2d at 1194. We further stated that because the official preparing the - 29 - form at issue in Quezada had no motivation to do anything other than “mechanically register an unambiguous factual matter,” the document was reliable and not excluded by the law enforcement provision of Rule 803(8)(B). Id. The same reasoning applies in the present case. BICE’s computer records of the passengers’ deportations are the type of public records that are admissible under Rule 803(8), and they are not the sort of investigative reports (i.e., police reports) that would be excluded under Rule 803(8)(B). See FED. R. EVID. 803(8); Quezada, 754 F.2d at 1194; Puente, 826 F.2d at 1417-18. Accordingly, these computer records were properly admitted under Rule 803(8). Additionally, the admission of these computer records presents no Confrontation Clause problems. In Crawford, the Supreme Court stated that business records, which are analogous to public records, are “by their nature . . . not testimonial” and not subject to the requirements of the Confrontation Clause. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51, 56; see also id. at 76 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in judgment) (noting that “the Court’s analysis of ‘testimony’ excludes at least some hearsay exceptions, such as business records and official records”). Furthermore, this court has found that items in an alien’s immigration file akin to business records were non-testimonial in nature and held that the Confrontation Clause did not bar their admission. See United States v. Rueda-Rivera, 396 F.3d 678, 680 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam); United States v. Gutierrez-Gonzales, No. 03-51253, 111 - 30 - Fed. Appx. 732, 734 (5th Cir. Oct. 8, 2004) (per curiam) (unpublished). The computer records at issue in the present case are public records of this sort, and, as such, the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting them into evidence. Accordingly, Lopez-Moreno’s argument that inadmissible documents from the A-files were admitted at trial fails. D. The Sufficiency of the Evidence Finally, Lopez-Moreno claims that insufficient evidence existed to prove that the passengers were in the United States illegally, and he argues that, as a result, the district court improperly denied his motion for acquittal based on the insufficiency of the evidence. He does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence proving that he was aware of, or in reckless disregard of, the aliens’ illegal status. When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider whether the evidence presented, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, would allow any rational finder of fact to conclude that the prosecution proved the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Valentine, 401 F.3d 609, 615 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Brugman, 364 F.3d 613, 615 (5th Cir. 2004). We review the district court’s denial of Lopez-Moreno’s motion for acquittal de novo, applying the same standard as did the district court, i.e., whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Valentine, 401 F.3d at 615. - 31 - In the present case, there was compelling evidence that the passengers were in the United States illegally. For instance, the evidence showed, inter alia, that: (1) the passengers were being transported in a camioneta van of the sort often used to transport illegal aliens from Mexico to the United States and from point to point within the United States; (2) none of the passengers spoke English; (3) the passengers’ personal hygiene reflected that they had been unable to bathe for quite some time, which (in the opinion of the BICE agent) is typical of illegal aliens in transit for extended periods; (4) none of the passengers in the van had any luggage; (5) one passenger was carrying a Mexican voter identification card; (6) other than the passenger carrying the Mexican voter identification card, none of the nine passengers had any identification; (7) according to Officer Parker, when he stated to Lopez-Moreno that “some of them probably ain’t legal,” Lopez-Moreno responded by saying either “might” or “might be”; (8) when asked the same question later, Lopez-Moreno’s body language indicated to Officer Parker that he either agreed or was being evasive; (9) BICE records introduced at trial showed that seven of the nine passengers subsequently were deported from the United States;10 and (10) Agent Griffin testified that, based on his investigation, the passengers were 10 We note that the computer record applicable to each alien shows only the fact of deportation and does not, by itself, evidence the different fact that such alien “has come to, entered, or remains in the United States in violation of law,” as required by 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A). - 32 - in the country illegally. While none of these factors alone is definitive proof that the passengers were in the United States illegally, when viewed together in the light most favorable to the prosecution, they would allow a rational finder of fact to conclude that the prosecution proved this element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Valentine, 401 F.3d at 615; Brugman, 364 F.3d at 615. Thus, Lopez-Moreno’s sufficiency argument fails, and the district court properly denied his motion for acquittal.