Opinion ID: 1190386
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appellate Review of Denial of the Motion For New Trial

Text: Our review of the denial of a motion for new trial is governed by the long-standing abuse of discretion standard. The defendant bears a significant burden to overcome this standard. United States v. Endicott, 869 F.2d 452, 454 (9th Cir.1989). According to our precedent, reversal under this standard is permissible only when we are firmly convinced that the district court committed a clear error in judgment. Put another way, reversal is justified only when the appellate court is convinced firmly that the reviewed decision lies beyond the pale of reasonable justification under the circumstances. Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1175 (9th Cir.2000). To give texture to this standard, it is critical that we not only give deference to the district court but engage in some degree of self-reflection that we are true to our role as a reviewing court rather than as a trial court. In assessing the exercise of discretion, the district court's denial of a new trial is benchmarked against the standards in United States v. Harrington, 410 F.3d 598, 601 (9th Cir.2005). Harrington sets out five criteria that the moving party must satisfy to warrant a new trial on the basis of new or newly discovered evidence: (1) the evidence is newly discovered; (2) the failure to discover the evidence sooner is not attributable to lack of diligence by the defendant; (3) the evidence is material to the issues at trial; (4) the evidence is neither cumulative nor merely impeaching; and (5) the evidence indicates that a new trial will probably result in an acquittal. Id. (citing United States v. Kulczyk, 931 F.2d 542, 548 (9th Cir.1991)). The majority's de novo conclusions that the district court was wrong in evaluating every Harrington factor is more than a stretch. As a general matter, evidence that is merely cumulative or impeaching is not ordinarily an adequate basis for the grant of a new trial. Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1, 5, 77 S.Ct. 1, 1 L.Ed.2d 1 (1956). It is no leap to conclude that the prospect of impeachment on a collateral issue also does not warrant a new trial. Hinkson does not satisfy even the first two factorsnewly discovered evidence and diligencenor does he meet the remaining criteria. Finally, it bears noting that the majority hints at government impropriety with respect to the production of evidence regarding Swisher's military record. Op. at 1271-72. Speculation on this point ignores the district court's explicit findings: [2] [T]he Government did not fail in its disclosure obligations. Furthermore, there is no factual link whatsoever between the government's conduct here and any alleged wrongful conduct on the part of witness Swisher. There is no indication that the Government had any awareness that any of Swisher's testimony regarding his military background could be false prior to defense counsel's mid-trial receipt of the surprise letter from the National Personnel Records Center. I object to the majority's effort to override the district court record. If the district court's findings are clearly erroneous, then reversal on that point would be in order. Alternatively, if there remains a substantial question as to the timing and receipt of evidence regarding Swisher's military record, then the case should be remanded to the district court for further hearing and findings on that issue. But the worst of all worlds is to sprinkle the opinion with innuendo and then simply let it hang there as a backdrop to the remainder of the opinion.