Opinion ID: 513241
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Timing of Restitution

Text: 5 Angelica contends that most of the fraudulent transactions occurred prior to January 1, 1983, the effective date of 18 U.S.C. Secs. 3579-3580. He argues, therefore, that restitution could only be ordered as a condition of probation pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3651. 6 There are two distinct authorities under which a federal court may order a convicted defendant to make restitution: the Federal Probation Act (FPA), 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3651, and the Victim and Witness Protection Act (VWPA), 18 U.S.C. Secs. 3579-3580. The record on appeal fails to specify under which authority restitution was imposed. 1 The FPA provides in pertinent part: 7 Upon entering a judgment of conviction of any offense not punishable by death or life imprisonment, [the court] ... may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems best. 8 .... 9 While on probation and among the conditions thereof, the defendant ... [m]ay be required to make restitution or reparation to aggrieved parties for actual damages or loss caused by the offense for which conviction was had.... 10 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3651 (emphasis added). Because the FPA authorizes a district court to impose restitution only as a condition of the defendant's probation, by implication a district court is not authorized to order immediate restitution while the defendant is incarcerated. 11 On the other hand, the VWPA provides that a court, 12 when sentencing a defendant convicted of an offense under [Title 18], may order, in addition to or in lieu of any other penalty authorized by law, that the defendant make restitution to any victim of such offense. 13 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3579(a)(1). Effective with respect to offenses occurring after January 1, 1983, the VWPA authorizes a court, for the first time, to order payment of restitution independently of a sentence of probation. S.Rep. No. 532, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 reprinted in 1982 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 2515, 2536. The legislative history of the VWPA demonstrates that it was meant to fill the sentencing gap left by Sec. 3651, which contains no restitution provision apart from probation. United States v. Signori, 844 F.2d 635, 640 (9th Cir.1988). Because the district court ordered immediate restitution apart from Angelica's probation, we will review the order as one authorized by the VWPA. 14 The VWPA applies only with respect to offenses occurring on or after January 1, 1983. Pub.L. No. 97-291, Sec. 9(b)(2), 96 Stat. at 1258; 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1512 note; Signori, 844 F.2d at 640. In this case, the indictment alleged and Angelica was convicted of multiple counts of mail and wire fraud, emanating from a scheme that began in June 1982 and continued through July 1983. As was noted in Signori, [t]here is some question as to whether the [VWPA] may be applied to continuing offenses, such as conspiracy or scheme to defraud, commencing before January 1, 1983, and extending beyond that date. 844 F.2d at 640. In Signori, however, we declined to address that issue since we determined that the restitution order was imposed pursuant to the FPA. Id. 15 This issue which we must now confront has resulted in a division among the various circuits. Compare United States v. Corn, 836 F.2d 889, 895-96 (5th Cir.1988) (restitution only of losses resulting from criminal acts committed after January 1, 1983); and United States v. Oldaker, 823 F.2d 778, 781-82 (4th Cir.1987) (restitution only of losses resulting after January 1, 1983); and United States v. Martin, 788 F.2d 184, 188-89 (3d Cir.1986) (same); with United States v. Purther, 823 F.2d 965, 968 (6th Cir.1987) (unitary scheme continuing beyond January 1, 1983, triggers the VWPA for all losses resulting from the scheme); and United States v. Barnette, 800 F.2d 1558, 1571 (11th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 935, 107 S.Ct. 1578, 94 L.Ed.2d 769 (1987) (same). 16 The offenses of mail and wire fraud, of which Angelica was convicted, involve both the use of the mails or interstate wire or radio communications, and a fraudulent scheme similar to the ongoing offense of conspiracy. See Phillips v. United States, 679 F.2d 192, 196 (9th Cir.1982). We have held, therefore, that restitution can be based on the amount of damages caused by the entire scheme rather than only in the amount caused by a particular mailing. Id. Although Phillips applied the FPA, its rationale leads us to conclude that we should not focus on particular mailings or telephone calls to determine exactly when the victims' losses occurred. Rather, we look to the duration of the entire fraudulent scheme: [s]o long as the perpetrator is using the mails to further the scheme, he is engaged in the offense [of mail fraud]. United States v. Purther, 823 F.2d at 968. Moreover, in this ongoing scheme, the defendants continued to make fraudulent representations after the victims' diamonds were taken in order to lull the victims, and complete the scheme; in these circumstances, we do not find it appropriate to say that the victims' losses were caused by specific mailings or communications. Cf. United States v. Pomazi, 851 F.2d 244, 249-50 (9th Cir.1988) (court looks to overall scheme to defraud in determining amount of restitution). 17 Because the fraudulent scheme continued beyond January 1, 1983, we hold that all of the victims' losses are subject to a judgment of restitution under the VWPA. See Purther, 823 F.2d at 967-68; United States v. Barnette, 800 F.2d at 1571. Accordingly, the district court had discretion to order immediate restitution in conjunction with Angelica's prison sentence.