Opinion ID: 610906
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Legal Accuracy of the Modified Supplemental Instruction

Text: 23 James next argues that the court's modified supplemental instruction telling the jury that he could be convicted of aiding and abetting the robbery even if he did not know of its occurrence until Mackey exited the bank was erroneous as a matter of law. He claims that it is axiomatic that a defendant cannot be found guilty of aiding and abetting a crime under 18 U.S.C. § 2 if the crime was committed before the defendant provided any aid. James contends that a defendant who did not know about a robbery prior to driving the robber from the bank may be properly convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 3 as an accessory after the fact but not as an aider and abettor. This distinction is important because in cases where the principal would not be subject to life imprisonment or the death penalty, 18 U.S.C. § 3 provides that, [e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by any Act of Congress, an accessory after the fact shall be imprisoned not more than one-half the maximum term of imprisonment or fined not more than one-half the maximum fine prescribed for the punishment of the principal, or both. Under 18 U.S.C. § 2, on the other hand, an aider and abettor is punishable as a principal. 24 There is ample authority from other circuits for the proposition that one who assists in the escape phase of a bank robbery is an aider and abettor of that robbery, and not an accessory after the fact. See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 749 F.2d 1514, 1518 (11th Cir.1985) (stating that the crime of bank robbery continues throughout the escape for purposes of characterizing the involvement of additional parties who knowingly and willfully join in the escape phase only (quotation omitted)); United States v. McCaskill, 676 F.2d 995, 1000 (4th Cir.) (stating that the escape phase of a bank robbery is part of the robbery), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1018, 103 S.Ct. 381, 74 L.Ed.2d 513 (1982); United States v. Wilkins, 659 F.2d 769, 773 (7th Cir.) (stating that [t]he getaway is part of the robbery; therefore, the driver of the getaway car is a principal in the crime of robbery and not a mere accomplice after the fact), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1102, 102 S.Ct. 681, 70 L.Ed.2d 646 (1981); United States v. Willis, 559 F.2d 443, 444 (5th Cir.1977) (per curiam) (stating that escape immediately following the taking is a necessary phase of most violent bank robberies ... [, and] the robbery is not a consummate transaction until the immediate removal phase comes to a halt); United States v. Jarboe, 513 F.2d 33, 37 (8th Cir.) (stating that the offense described in 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) extends to period of hot pursuit), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 849, 96 S.Ct. 90, 46 L.Ed.2d 71 (1975); United States v. Von Roeder, 435 F.2d 1004, 1010 (10th Cir.1970) (stating that [o]ne who participates in and assists in the escape of the parties who were in the bank aids and abets the bank robbery, and is properly charged as a principal), cert. denied sub nom. Gonzales v. United States, 403 U.S. 934, 91 S.Ct. 2264, 29 L.Ed.2d 713, and vacated on other grounds sub nom. Schreiner v. United States, 404 U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct. 326, 30 L.Ed.2d 222 (1971) (per curiam). 25 In United States v. Grubczak, 793 F.2d 458 (2d Cir.1986), during our discussion concerning whether the evidence was sufficient in that case to support the defendant's conviction for aiding and abetting an armed robbery, we stated: Since the robbery itself was continuing through this escape phase, ... defendant's knowledge of a weapon at this point was sufficient to support a conviction for aiding and abetting an armed robbery. Id. at 464. We cited the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Martin and the Fifth Circuit's decision in Willis in support of this proposition. Id. When the government brought our statement in Grubczak to the attention of the district judge in the case at hand, the judge expressed concern that it was only dictum in view of the other bases for our holding in that case. We now make our reasoning explicit: The escape phase of the crime of bank robbery is part of the ongoing robbery, not an event occurring after the robbery, for purposes of characterizing the involvement of a party who knowingly and willfully joins in the escape phase only. Such a party is properly liable as a principal in the crime of bank robbery, rather than as an accessory after the fact. Therefore, the district court properly instructed the jury that James could be guilty of aiding and abetting even if he only participated in the escape phase of the robbery. 26