Opinion ID: 4521882
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Orders to Hold a Settlement Conference

Text: [¶22] The Bank argues that the court abused its discretion by extending the July 16, 2015, stay on Manning’s motion for reconsideration and “forcing” the Bank to participate in the judicial settlement conference. We review court orders supervising and managing proceedings for an abuse of discretion. See Geary v. Stanley, 2007 ME 133, ¶ 12, 931 A.2d 1064; see also M.R. Civ. P. 16(a)-(b). “The touchstone of determining whether the court has properly exercised its discretion is whether in a given case that discretion is exercised in furtherance of justice.” Unifund CCR Partners v. Demers, 2009 ME 19, ¶ 8, 966 A.2d 400 (alterations omitted) (quotation marks omitted). [¶23] Here, upon remand in 2014, the court ordered the parties to attend a settlement conference. See M.R. Civ. P. 16(b). A settlement conference was not held because, in part, the Bank filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss its complaint without prejudice, which was granted by the court. Manning then filed a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal and, at the parties’ request, 11 the court stayed Manning’s motion in anticipation of our decision in Greenleaf II.6 [¶24] During this stay, the court again ordered the parties to attend a settlement conference and extended the stay until after that conference was held. A settlement conference eventually took place on September 23, 2016; however, it was unsuccessful and, on November 18, 2016, Manning filed a motion for contempt based on the Bank’s alleged conduct at the settlement conference. This was followed by a hearing on Manning’s motion for contempt and a second unsuccessful settlement conference. [¶25] In the circumstances of this case, where Manning filed a motion for reconsideration and the parties then both agreed to stay further proceedings on that motion, the court’s decision to require the parties to attend a settlement conference was “exercised in furtherance of justice,” Unifund CCR Partners, 2009 ME 19, ¶ 8, 966 A.2d 400, and, thus, was not an abuse of discretion.7 6 Manning’s motion for reconsideration, which we treat as a motion to alter or amend a judgment, see Arsenault v. Arsenault, 2008 ME 75, ¶ 5, 946 A.2d 412; M.R. Civ. P. 59(e), “suspend[ed] the finality of the initial judgment and defer[red] the running of the appeal period,” Most v. Most, 477 A.2d 250, 258 n.12 (Me. 1984). 7 Although we do not take issue with the court’s decision to require a settlement conference during the stay, the court’s management of this case, in general, did not comport with “the overall purpose of the [Maine] Rules of Civil Procedure, which is to ensure the speedy and inexpensive resolution of a case.” Merrifield v. Hadlock, 2009 ME 1, ¶ 6, 961 A.2d 1107 (discussing a pretrial scheduling order); see M.R. Civ. P. 1. 12