Opinion ID: 2224024
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: The rule for reviewing a jury finding is whether or not there is any credible evidence which under any reasonable view supports the verdict. Lemke v. Guse (1965), 26 Wis. (2d) 80, 131 N. W. (2d) 893, and Fields v. Creek (1963), 21 Wis. (2d) 562, 124 N. W. (2d) 599. It is undisputed that Mrs. Schafer was injured in an automobile accident on July 16, 1949, and that her attending physician, Dr. Clarence Samuelson, estimated her total-disability period to be from July 16, 1949, to August 8, 1949. Dr. John Kelly, the family physician, testified that the physical condition of the plaintiff was not in any way related to any trauma, nor was the plaintiff, except for a week while under his care, totally disabled. Dr. Henry M. Suckle, a Madison neurosurgeon, testified that plaintiff's complaints as related to him were unexplainable on the basis of objective findings and that at the time of his last examination of her, in his opinion, the plaintiff was not to a reasonable degree of medical certainty totally disabled. Dr. Robert H. Cassidy, an orthopedic surgeon, testified that in his opinion Mrs. Schafer at the time of the trial was not wholly disabled as a result of injuries. Dr. Einar R. Daniels who was called as a medical expert by the plaintiff testified that on a report prepared and submitted to the defendant insurance company on November 2, 1959, relating to the physical condition of Mrs. Schafer, he stated his findings as osteoarthritis and degenerative disc disease of the spine, obesity, varicose veins, an anxiety tension state and characterized these findings as sickness. He also testified that he filled out a report for Mrs. Schafer which contained the statement Describe restrictions on patient's activity and he replied Normal. Dr. James Booth, an osteopath who treated Mrs. Schafer regularly for several years, testified that he was contacted by an attorney for Mrs. Schafer and requested to certify on a medical form to the Time Insurance Company that a substantial part of her difficulty was due to injury rather than sickness. He testified that he did not fill out the insurance report. He further testified that a report stating that Mrs. Schafer was totally disabled as a result of the injury was not prepared by him but was sent to him ready for signature by the plaintiff's attorney. Dr. J. Howard Johnson, an orthopedic surgeon, examined the plaintiff in October of 1953, and found a healed fracture of the spinal process of the seventh cervical vertebra and also found degenerative changes in her spine associated with osteoarthritis. He indicated in his report that the healed fracture was no longer symptomatic. None of the expert medical witnesses who testified at the trial, with the single exception of Dr. Lester V. Salinsky who examined Mrs. Schafer thirteen years after the accident occurred, testified that Mrs. Schafer was totally disabled as a result of the injury. In addition to the medical testimony relating to Mrs. Schafer's physical condition, there is sufficient nonmedical evidence concerning Mrs. Schafer's activities after the date of the accident on which a jury could reasonably base a finding that Mrs. Schafer was not totally disabled. The evidence disclosed that Mrs. Schafer reported on her 1958 tax return that she used her automobile 80 percent for business use and that during 1958 she spent a total of $450 for gas, oil, grease, and antifreeze for her car. In the year 1959 she deducted $100 for stationery and supplies in connection with her business and reported $432 as automobile expense, of which 60 percent was deducted as a business expense. In addition to her travels in connection with her insurance business, the testimony disclosed that Mrs. Schafer made three trips to Florida and one trip to Washington, D. C., by car. Mrs. Schafer also, after 1960, traveled many times from her home in Ironwood, Michigan, to Milwaukee, Madison, and Waukesha in connection with court appearances, depositions and appeals. Appellant cites the case of Harker v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co. (1965), 28 Wis. (2d) 537, 137 N. W. (2d) 395, in support of her position that she was totally disabled within the meaning of the policy as a matter of law. In Harker, supra, the court did not find that it was total disability as a matter of law. The court just refused to overturn a jury finding of total disability. The appellant finds no fault with the trial court's definition of the term wholly disabled, but contends that the trial court should have pointed out that the plaintiff was entitled to make a good faith, though ineffectual, effort to perform the duties of her usual employment. The instruction was not requested and therefore deemed waived. See Blom v. Kumbier (1957), 275 Wis. 227, 81 N. W. (2d) 528. In the case at bar the court did instruct the jury that Mrs. Schafer was wholly disabled if she was unable to perform any work or follow any gainful occupation in a customary and usual manner, or if she was not able to perform a substantial portion of the work relating to any occupation for salary or profit.