Opinion ID: 182006
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Significant Limits on Personal Care

Text: The ADA defines disability as (a) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of an individual; (b) a record of such an impairment; or (c) being regarded as having such an impairment. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2006). The EEOC relies on subsection (a), a physical impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, to argue that Shepherd was disabled from March 2003 to September 12, 2003, because his condition substantially limited his ability to engage in the major life activity of caring for himself. Our role is not to decide whether Shepherd was actually disabled under the ADA. Rather, we need decide only whether a rational jury, viewing any conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to the EEOC, could so decide. We believe it could do so easily. We focus on the two parts of the statute's definition of disability: First, the EEOC must demonstrate that Shepherd's impairment limited a major life activity, for which we examine the law and the evidence regarding Shepherd's ability to care for himself. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2006). Second, the EEOC must further show that his limitation on a major life activity was substantial. See id. We identify disputed issues of material fact with respect to both parts.
Self-care has long been recognized as a major life activity under the ADA. The federal regulations adopted in the year following the passage of the Act listed caring for oneself as a major life activity. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). Courts followed suit. See Holt v. Grand Lake Mental Health Center, Inc., 443 F.3d 762, 767 (10th Cir.2006) (recognizing self-care as a major life activity under the ADA); Regional Economic Community Action Program, Inc. v. City of Middletown, 294 F.3d 35, 47 (2d Cir.2002) (providing examples of limitations on self-care); Cehrs v. Northeast Ohio Alzheimer's Research Center, 155 F.3d 775, 780-81 (6th Cir.1998) (identifying caring for oneself as a recognized major life activity under the Act); Dutcher v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 53 F.3d 723, 726 (5th Cir.1995) (caring for oneself encompasses a broad range of normal activities related to daily living, including feeding oneself, driving, grooming, and cleaning home). We ruled in Nawrot v. CPC International, 277 F.3d 896, 904-05 (7th Cir.2002), that an employee's inability to administer his own diabetes medication also amounted to a limitation on the major life activity of self-care. Likewise in Brunker v. Schwan's Home Service, 583 F.3d 1004, 1008-09 (7th Cir.2009), we found that not being able to dress oneself appropriately constituted evidence of a limitation on the major life activity of self-care. Our application is consistent with the purpose of the ADA to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate to combat disability discrimination. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub.L. No. 101-336, § 2, 104 Stat. 327, 329; see also ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 1(b), 122 Stat. at 3554 (elaborating on a broad scope of protection intended by Congress to be available under the original Act); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 495, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the ADA was meant to serve a remedial purpose). The specific inclusion of caring for oneself in the 2008 Amendments' list of major life activities further supports this interpretation. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 4(a), 122 Stat. at 3555, amending 42 U.S.C. § 12102. Shepherd testified at his deposition that he needed assistance with dressing himself, brushing his hair, and bathing four or five days each week while he was working at AutoZone prior to September 13, 2003. He also recalled experiencing other difficulties since 2003, including an inability to tie his shoes and the development of oral hygiene problems that resulted from his inability to care for his teeth properly. Shepherd's wife, Susan Shepherd, also testified that she had to assist him with personal care while he was working at AutoZone. According to her deposition testimony, she had to help Shepherd with showering, putting on his pants and shoes, and brushing his hair and teeth before he stopped working for AutoZone. There is some ambiguity in Susan's testimony regarding exactly when Shepherd began having difficulty with certain personal tasks. Though Susan said she assisted him with his personal tasks before he stopped working for AutoZone, at other times in her May 2008 deposition, she testified that Shepherd's difficulties with these tasks began three or four years ago. For purposes of summary judgment, however, AutoZone removed much of the ambiguity in its own statement of undisputed facts filed to support its summary judgment motion. There, AutoZone stated: Shepherd has needed assistance with dressing himself, brushing his hair and bathing on a daily basis from approximately the year 2003 or 2004 to the present time; [s]ince 2003, Shepherd's wife has assisted him with washing his back; [s]ince 2003, Shepherd has had difficulty brushing his teeth; during [his flare-ups]... he would not be able to put on his own pants, his own shoes, brush his hair, or brush his teeth; and, Shepherd would not be able to wash his own hair, back or feet when having these flare-ups. These statements by AutoZone as well as the Shepherds' testimony could be understood to mean that Shepherd's limitations on his ability to care for himself began at any point during or immediately after 2003. At the summary judgment stage, any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the non-moving party. It was the responsibility of the questioning attorney at the deposition to clarify the facts if the attorney intended to move for summary judgment on the basis of these answers. Particularly here, where one of the key issues was the time period during which Shepherd was affected by his condition March through September 12, 2003AutoZone could have asked follow-up questions to try to get more specific answers from the Shepherds. For the purposes of summary judgment, the testimony by Susan Shepherd was consistent with her husband's testimony to the effect that Shepherd was limited in caring for himself between March and September 2003.
We turn now to examine whether the facts support a conclusion that Shepherd was substantially limited in caring for himself. We follow the Supreme Court's reasoning in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 196, 122 S.Ct. 681, 151 L.Ed.2d 615 (2002), such that our consideration of this term is guided first and foremost by the words of the disability definition itself. [3] Looking to Webster's Dictionary and the Oxford English Dictionary, the Court determined that substantially in the phrase substantially limits means considerable or to a large degree. 534 U.S. at 196-97, 122 S.Ct. 681. This less-than-precise meaning of the term indicates that the ADA precludes impairments that interfere in only a minor way with the performance of manual tasks from qualifying as disabilities. Id. at 197, 122 S.Ct. 681. The implementing federal regulation states a little more clearly that substantially limits means that an individual is: (i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform; or (ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1). The regulation provides that when determining whether a limitation is substantial, we consider [t]he nature and severity of the impairment; [t]he duration or expected duration; and [t]he permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact of ... the impairment. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2); see also Williams, 534 U.S. at 196, 122 S.Ct. 681 (looking to the regulation for guidance on the meaning of substantially limited); Hamm v. Runyon, 51 F.3d 721, 725 (7th Cir.1995) (same). We have already addressed the nature and severity of Shepherd's impairment in our description of the limitations he faced. The Shepherds testified, and AutoZone did not dispute (for purposes of summary judgment), that before Shepherd went on leave in 2003, he needed assistance with the most basic personal care tasks when a flare-up occurred. With respect to the duration and impact of his impairment, Susan testified that Shepherd experienced flare-ups [a]t least four to five times a week while he was still working at AutoZone. Shepherd also testified that he needed assistance with his personal care maybe four or five days each week prior to September 13, 2003. As noted above, there were portions of the Shepherds' testimony that were less specific or that superficially appeared to contradict other portions, but for the purposes of our review, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. And again, AutoZone provided its own clarification in its list of undisputed facts accompanying its summary judgment motion. In addition to its statement that Shepherd needed assistance on a daily basis, AutoZone wrote that Shepherd was experiencing these [flare-ups] four to five times a week before he went on leave of absence from AutoZone. On the basis of the significant limits on his personal care almost every day during the relevant period, a reasonable jury could easily find Shepherd's limitations to be substantial. AutoZone contends that even if Shepherd's condition was limiting, it was not substantially limiting because it was only episodic or sporadic. Relying on our discussion in Brunker, AutoZone asserts that because a broken leg, appendicitis, or isolated bouts of depression did not qualify as disabilities, Shepherd's episodic flare-ups should not qualify either. We do not agree. [4] Shepherd's impairment in this case, a permanent condition that affected his personal care almost daily, is not comparable to the temporary or sporadic examples we listed in Brunker. The limitations Shepherd faced in his self-care every day or almost every day are not commensurate with the temporary limitations posed by a broken leg or appendicitis, nor were they isolated. AutoZone's additional reliance on Moore v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., 221 F.3d 944 (7th Cir.2000) is also misplaced. Moore suffered from rheumatoid arthritis, an inflammatory disease of the joints that causes the joints to swell and stiffen and that is prone to intermittent flare-ups. AutoZone points to our statement that Moore's infrequent flare-ups... [did not] render his condition a disability, but Moore's flare-ups occurred only one or two [times] per year. 221 F.3d at 952. Even with generous math, the occurrence of Shepherd's flare-ups four or five times a week was still greater than the frequency experienced by the plaintiff in Moore by a factor of over one hundred. We find more apposite guidance in EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 233 F.3d 432, where we noted that an episodic condition should not detract from the substantiality analysis. The plaintiff in Sears suffered from a permanent neuropathy that substantially limited her ability to walk. We found that a predictable yet intermittent pattern of impairment was sufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment. 233 F.3d at 440 n. 4 (the fact that [the] condition was episodic is not dispositive in the disability inquiry). Likewise, in Haschmann v. Time Warner Entertainment Co., 151 F.3d 591 (7th Cir.1998), we treated episodic flares, characteristic of lupus, as a disability under the ADA. 151 F.3d at 599-600. The Haschmann plaintiff's episodic flares of lupus are more similar to Shepherd's flare-ups of myofascial tenderness than the broken leg or isolated episodes of depression we addressed in Brunker. In its order granting summary judgment for AutoZone, the district court distinguished Shepherd's situation from Sears and Haschmann, as well as from our similar holding in Vande Zande v. State of Wisconsin Department of Administration, 44 F.3d 538 (7th Cir.1995), that pressure ulcers resulting from paralysis were intermittent impairments characteristic of an admitted disability. The court differentiated them on the basis that the progressive diseases in our prior cases were different from a soft tissue neck or back injury like Shepherd's which, the court stated, could not be diagnosed in the absence of flare-ups. Even if that were medically correct, we do not see a sound legal difference in the court's application of the statute to the facts of this case. The assessment of an impairment under the ADA is a highly individualized examination that considers the facts of each case independently in light of the statutory and regulatory language. See Kampmier v. Emeritus Corp., 472 F.3d 930, 938 (7th Cir.2007) (noting that whether or not a medical condition rises to the level of a disability is to be made on an individualized case-by-case basis). A reasonable jury could readily determine from the totality of the evidence in this record that Shepherd was substantially limited in his ability to care for himself from March 2003 to September 2003.