Opinion ID: 815387
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Indictments and Pre-Trial Motion Practice

Text: On December 16, 2009, a federal grand jury returned an indictment against Maryea and fourteen other individuals for conspiring to possess with intent to distribute and to unlawfully distribute Oxycodone, Oxycontin, Suboxone, Lorazepam, and Ativan from July 2009 to September 20, 2009, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846 (Original Indictment). Following her -5- indictment and detention, Maryea filed motions for release and for release on conditions, indicating that she suffered from bipolar disorder and that she had a significant medical history which requires medical treatment for pain. During hearings on these motions, Maryea repeatedly complained about back and neck pain that she claimed was not being addressed by jail officials, and it was also adduced that Maryea had spent time in a state psychiatric hospital for her bipolar disorder. On July 16, 2010, Woods filed a motion to continue (Woods' First MTC), and Maryea objected, providing speedy trial calculations. The district court granted Woods' motion after Maryea's counsel expressly informed the court that Maryea does not request or desire severance of her case. In August 2010, a grand jury returned a superseding indictment (Superseding Indictment) charging only defendants Maryea and Woods with the same conspiracy as in the Original Indictment, but stating that the conspiracy began in April 2009 instead of July 2009. During Maryea's arraignment on the Superseding Indictment, the government moved the district court to order a mental health evaluation at a federal medical facility to assess her competency to stand trial. Maryea objected to the government's motion as she had already procured her own mental health evaluation, and the examining physician had concluded that she was -6- competent to stand trial. The district court denied the government's motion for the reasons stated in Maryea's objection. On September 1, 2010, Woods filed his second motion to continue (Woods' Second MTC), requesting a delay in his trial date due to: (1) a companion state matter pending in the Rockingham County Superior Court with a trial scheduled for October 6, 2010, the outcome of which could affect Woods' plea negotiations in the federal criminal matter; and (2) Woods' continuing plea negotiations with the government. The district court granted the continuance on the day it was filed without obtaining Maryea's objection or consent, concluding that the ends of justice served by granting a continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv), for the reasons set forth in the motion. Trial was rescheduled for January 4, 2011. Maryea filed a series of motions in late August and early September 2010, including, inter alia, two motions to dismiss the Superseding Indictment for violations of the Speedy Trial Act, a motion to remove counsel and appoint new counsel, and a motion for bail alleging the Bureau of Prisons' failure to properly provide medical care.1 In her September 20, 2010 Reply Brief to her motion 1 Although represented by counsel, Maryea filed these motions pro se. Apparently resolving her disagreements with her defense counsel, said counsel resumed representation of Maryea throughout the pre-trial motion practice discussed infra. -7- to dismiss, Maryea objected to the granting of the continuance. Relying on the co-defendant exclusion in the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(6) (Co-Defendant Clause), Maryea argued that extending her trial date merely on the basis of co-defendant Woods' motion to continue was unreasonable: It is simply submitted that the Court cannot find the delay caused by Woods' . . . motion[] to continue to be reasonable as to Maryea. . . . This is because the Court was no longer dealing with more than two co-defendants and one of the defendants was simply looking for more time to resolve companion state cases. The district court convened a hearing to address Maryea's objection, where the district court judge stated to Maryea that the court was: fairly aggravated that you're advancing these arguments that contradict the positions you've taken already in the case, because I've asked you repeatedly every time we've talked about speedy trial if you wanted a severance, and you've stressed to me every single time you do not want a severance. Let me ask you this. Do you want to go to trial in this case next week? Is that what you want to do? Because I'm ready to try the case whenever you are. In response, Maryea's counsel stated that, [I]n terms of trial strategy, . . . I want Mr. Woods sitting on one of these chairs along with everybody else, and that's the truth. And that's a simply [sic] legal analysis, factual analysis . . . trial analysis that I do . . . I'm not looking for severance. I am objecting to the motion to continue. The district court judge then asked defense counsel, But given that the law says when you don't agree, you have to choose trial -8- strategy; right? Do you prefer to be sitting there next to Woods, or do you prefer your speedy trial? Because that's what the statute says, and defense counsel responded, I don't think the statute says that because I don't move to sever, that I've forfeited my speedy trial claim. Evaluating the strategic choices expressed by Maryea in choosing not to sever her trial from Woods alongside Woods' need for a delay, the district court denied Maryea's Speedy Trial objection, extending Woods' and Maryea's trial date. In doing so, the court stated, what's reasonable for one may not be reasonable for another, and that's what's wrong. That's what (h)(6) [the CoDefendant Clause] seems to allow for. The fact that when you have a group, you have people with different interests, different strategies, different tactics, and there's been no severance, the clock has to be the same for everyone. Maryea filed a supplemental motion to dismiss on Speedy Trial Act grounds, but that motion was denied at trial for the same reasons stated in the district court's earlier order. Before trial commenced, the district court sua sponte ordered that Maryea undergo a medical and psychological evaluation to determine her competency to stand trial, including an assessment of whether, and the extent to which her physical pain impacts that competency. On November 10, 2010, the court-appointed doctor submitted his report, concluding that Maryea was competent to stand -9- trial. The report confirmed that Maryea was able to answer all . . . questions during the doctor's evaluation and that she reported that she uses the law library [to] work on her defense. After recognizing Maryea's ongoing pain symptoms, the doctor observed that said symptoms did not impair the cognitive process during the evaluation, and that it would be a very unusual circumstance that, with an individual's mental disorder under reasonable control, the mere presence of pain would make them not competent to stand trial. The report thus concluded that Maryea's pain complaints did not affect her competency.