Opinion ID: 528191
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The 1987 Authorization Act

Text: 37 Although Sec. 1223(a) does state that the Secretary of Defense shall procure services and supplies from a private contractor when doing so is less costly than in-house provision, that section does not apply to functions which the Secretary of Defense determines must be performed by military or government personnel. Thus, the statute does not provide an objective standard by which a court can assess which functions must be performed by government employees; instead, it expressly leaves that decision to the Secretary's determination. See generally Kreis v. Secretary of the Air Force, 866 F.2d 1508, 1513 (D.C.Cir.1989) (distinguishing between existence of a condition as an objective fact and an administrator's determination of the existence of that condition). 38 Section 1223(a) is linguistically similar to the statutory provision authorizing the Director of Central Intelligence to terminate a CIA employee whenever he shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States. 50 U.S.C. Sec. 403(c) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court found that that provision grants the Director an unreviewable discretion. Webster v. Doe, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 2047, 2052, 100 L.Ed.2d 632 (1988). The Court examined the context within which the Director makes such a determination, noting that a decision to terminate a CIA employee will typically involve considerations of national security that simply are not amenable to judicial review. Id. The question of whether private contractors or military personnel should be responsible for making pricing and delivery decisions with respect to materials needed for the operations of the Air Force also implicates national security concerns. Although we recognize that such concerns may be less central in the procurement context than in the area of intelligence operations, we conclude that the principles set forth in Webster are sufficiently broad to encompass the present situation. Accordingly, we hold that Sec. 1223 of the 1987 Authorization Act does not provide us with a meaningful standard against which to judge the agency's exercise of discretion.