Opinion ID: 2087167
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: Whether the Election Code Authorized McDunn to be Placed on the 1992 Ballot

Text: Having determined that McDunn won the 1990 primary to fill Kiley's vacancy, we must now consider whether the Election Code authorized the trial court to place her on the 1992 general election ballot to fill that vacancy when she had won the 1990 primary election. We conclude that the Election Code provides for the specific relief the trial court granted McDunn. Section 2A1.2 of the Election Code specifies the consolidated schedule of elections. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 46, par. 2A 1.2.) Section 2A1.2(b)(1) provides: (b) At the general primary election: (1) in each even-numbered year candidates of political parties shall be nominated for those offices to be filled at the general election in that year   . (Emphasis added.) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 46, par. 2A1.2(b)(1).) Moreover, section 2A9 of the Election Code provides: Judges of the Supreme, Appellate and Circuit Courts shall be elected in their respective districts or circuits at the general election of each even-numbered year immediately preceding the expiration of the term of each incumbent judge, not retained, whose term expires before the next general election, and shall enter upon the duties of their offices on the first Monday of December after their election. Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 46, par. 2A9. A reading of these two sections seems to provide that McDunn could not have been placed on the 1992 general election ballot to fill Kiley's vacancy because she was nominated at the 1990 primary election, and could thus have only run in the 1990 general election. However, a reading of the entire Election Code reveals otherwise. Section 759(a) of the Election Code provides: The person receiving the highest number of votes at a primary as a candidate of a party for the nomination for an office shall be the candidate of that party for such office, and his name as such candidate shall be placed on the official ballot at the election then next ensuing   . Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 46, par. 7-59(a). Section 7-63 of the Election Code, which provides for, and details the procedure of, primary election contests, states: If the grounds alleged are sufficient in law, the court shall proceed in a summary manner and may hear evidence, examine the returns, recount the ballots and make such orders and enter such judgment as justice may require. (Ill. Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 46, par. 763.) Moreover, and more importantly, section 2A1(e) provides: (e) In the event any court of competent jurisdiction declares an election void, the court may order another election without regard to the schedule of elections set forth in this Article. (Emphasis added.) Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 46, par. 2A1(e). The trial court here weighed the evidence, and correctly determined that McDunn had received the highest number of votes in the 1990 primary election. After this, the trial court found the 1990 general election to fill Kiley's position had no effect because McDunn was not on the ballot as required by section 759, and because the trial court had suppressed the 1990 general election results to fill Kiley's vacancy. The trial court then rescheduled the election to fill Kiley's vacancy for November 3, 1992, with McDunn as the Democratic candidate. What the trial court did, although relying on the general authority found in section 763 of the Election Code, was to declare the 1990 general election to fill Kiley's vacancy void, and order another election without regard to the schedule of elections set forth in [Article II]. (Ill.Rev. Stat.1989, ch. 46, par. 2A-1(e).) Thus, the Election Code specifically provided that the trial court could place McDunn on the 1992 general election ballot to run for Kiley's vacancy, even though she had won the 1990 primary election to run for that vacancy.