Opinion ID: 166962
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Government’s Peremptory Strike of Jurors

Text: During the jury selection process, one of the prospective jurors, who was a member of the Northern Arapaho Indian Tribe, stated she was a witness for her uncle during his federal trial for criminal sexual abuse, for which he was acquitted, and that one of the prosecutors in the instant case participated in her uncle’s case “against us.” When asked if being a witness for her uncle prejudiced her, she replied, “Kind of. I don’t know.” Although she stated she “could be fair,” she also admitted her previous testimony may have prejudiced her “at that time,” and when asked if she had any particular feelings about the federal government or the Federal Bureau of Investigation investigating cases on the reservation, she stated: No, except just during the time when it happened ... it was like a real bad experience and stuff. But [I] kind of got over it. ... You know, it was just like our family went through a lot and it was wrong, you know. I don’t know. Kind of hard to talk about. -6- Finally, when asked if it would be hard for her knowing other families would go through the same thing, she stated, “Uh-huh, kind of, but I can try.” The government challenged the juror for cause, asking that she be excused, which the trial court denied, stating, “I feel that even though she did have [a] situation in the family, that [she] has said that she would be fair, and I think she regards this as a separate case.” The government then used one of its peremptory challenges to strike the juror, to which Mr. Hebah’s counsel raised a Batson challenge, stating the government could not strike the juror based on race. At a bench discussion with the judge, the government's counsel explained he participated in adjudicating the juror’s uncle’s case and that after the “not guilty” verdict, federal marshals broke up a “big fight” which erupted in the federal courtroom between the victim’s and juror’s families. He also explained officials escorted the victim and her family out the back door of the courthouse because the juror’s family was waiting for her, and that it was an “extremely ugly and emotional thing.” The trial court then overruled Mr. Hebah’s Batson objection and dismissed the juror. The next prospective juror, who was also a female member of the Northern Arapaho Indian Tribe, stated she experienced prejudice when her nephew “went -7- through some court stuff, too” and also admitted prior knowledge of the instant case, stating, “I kind of heard what happened to what is going on with this case. ... I work with [Mr. Hebah’s] girlfriend’s mother and she told me everything, so I don’t know. I’m kind of like sitting on a balance.” When the judge told her she could not consider anything she heard other than the evidence presented by the witnesses, she stated, “I don’t know. It would be kind of hard, I would think, for me because I’m really close friends to her and then, I don’t know, I just didn’t agree with some of the stuff that they had told me about.” When questioned on whether she could consider the government’s proof, if it was beyond a reasonable doubt, over Mr. Hebah’s presumption of innocence, she said she would “try,” and when asked if her mind was made up, she noted she was close to Mr. Hebah’s girlfriend’s mother and “she did tell me a lot of what happened.” She also stated she had a bad experience with the court system when her nephew was beaten, even though some of the perpetrators were found guilty and served time, and explained he was not treated fairly by the system and that she did not trust law enforcement or lawyers. The government then asked the court to strike the juror for cause, given her statements on how she would evaluate evidence connected to law enforcement officials. The trial court explained to the juror that, as a juror, she would be -8- instructed the testimony of law enforcement officers would be considered the same as any other person, to which she stated, “I understand that.” When the court asked her to promise she would not discount testimony merely because it was from law enforcement, she answered, “Yeah, yeah,” turning her head away from the court and addressing the floor and finally stating, “I promise.” After the court denied the government’s request for removal for cause, the government exercised a peremptory challenge to strike the juror, to which Mr. Hebah’s counsel again raised a Batson challenge based on race. During the bench discussion, the court volunteered that the juror vacillated on her answers, and then agreed with government counsel that it had a reasonable basis for challenging her because she begrudgingly agreed she would try to treat law enforcement testimony the same as other testimony. While Mr. Hebah’s counsel argued the juror said she would fairly assess the evidence, the court countered, “Yeah, but ... I had to drag it out of her.” The court then concluded by stating the challenge was reasonable and denying Mr. Hebah’s second Batson objection. On appeal, Mr. Hebah argues the district court violated his constitutional rights, under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), when it allowed the government to use its peremptory challenges to strike two Native Americans from -9- the jury. In rather summary fashion, Mr. Hebah suggests the government’s claim the jurors were biased against the prosecution was “disingenuous” in light of the district court’s earlier rulings not to remove the jurors for cause and the two jurors' statements they would be fair and impartial. Mr. Hebah then concludes the only basis for the jurors “to be excused by the United States was that they are Native American women.” We begin with our standard of review and the law applicable to Batson jury claims. “It is clear that defendant has the constitutional right to be tried by a jury whose members are selected by nondiscriminatory criteria,” United States v. Hartsfield, 976 F.2d 1349, 1356 (10th Cir. 1992) (quotation marks and citation omitted), and that “[a] party’s use of a peremptory challenge to exclude a juror based on the juror’s race violates the United States Constitution,” United States v. Castorena-Jaime, 285 F.3d 916, 927 (10th Cir. 2002) (relying on Batson, 476 U.S. at 89). In order to resolve objections to peremptory challenges, a three-step procedure is followed in which: (1) “the objector must make a prima facie showing that the peremptory challenge is based on race”; (2) if this burden is met, “the party striking the juror must articulate a race-neutral explanation for striking the juror”; and (3) “[i]f the court finds the striking party’s reason is race neutral, the court must determine whether the objecting party has shown purposeful -10- discrimination.” Id. at 927-28 (relying on Batson, 476 U.S. at 94-98). “The party objecting to the use of the peremptory challenge carries the ultimate burden of persuasion.” Id. at 928. In addition, we have held that “‘[o]nce a prosecutor has offered a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenges and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant had made a prima facie showing becomes moot.’” United States v. Sneed, 34 F.3d 1570, 1579 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359 (1991)). In reviewing Batson-type claims, we review de novo whether the striking party’s explanation is race neutral, Castorena-Jaime, 285 F.3d at 927; Sneed, 34 F.3d at 1580, and “unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.” Sneed, 34 F.3d at 1579 (quotation marks and citation omitted). We review the district court’s finding of whether the striking party had discriminatory intent for clear error, affording great deference to its decision on discriminatory intent, which represents a finding of fact. Castorena-Jaime, 285 F.3d at 927; Sneed, 34 F.3d at 1579-80. We recognize that in making its determination, “the district court can consider whether the prosecutor’s explanation is a mere pretext for race-based peremptory challenges,” and its “findings on the issue of discriminatory intent -11- largely turn on an evaluation of the prosecutor’s credibility.” Sneed, 34 F.3d at 1579. In this case, the issue of whether Mr. Hebah established a prima facie case of discrimination is moot, given the government gave a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenges of the two jurors, after which the district court ruled on Mr. Hebah’s Batson objections concerning the question of intentional discrimination. Applying the applicable de novo standard of review, we conclude the government's counsel offered plausible race-neutral explanations for striking the jurors based on their apparent predisposed prejudice against the prosecution arising from past negative trial experiences. Even though Mr. Hebah contends both jurors stated they would be fair and impartial, it is clear neither juror would readily commit to objectively considering the government’s evidence. We further reject Mr. Hebah’s argument against the peremptory strikes of those jurors based on his contention the district court previously denied the government’s request to excuse the same jurors for cause. Clearly, explanations for a peremptory strike do not need to rise to the same level of challenges for cause. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 362-63. Having determined the government provided a legitimate, race-neutral -12- reason for exercising its peremptory strikes, we consider the district court’s finding the government also had no discriminatory intent, as reflected by its decision to overrule Mr. Hebah’s Batson objections. 1 Applying our clear error standard of review and affording deference to the district court’s credibility and discriminatory intent determinations, Mr. Hebah has not met his burden of persuasion in showing any error occurred. Our decision on this issue is bolstered by the fact the government did not impose a peremptory strike against another Native American who served on the jury in this case, thereby helping to dispel an inferred pattern of discriminatory challenges by the government to strike Native American jurors based solely on race. See United States v. Willie, 941 F.2d 1384, 1399 (10th Cir. 1991). While peremptory strikes might result in a disproportionate removal of Native American jurors, that impact does not, per se, turn the prosecution’s actions into a violation of the Constitution. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 361. Moreover, as the government points out, any inferred argument by Mr. Hebah that the low number of Native Americans serving on the jury prejudiced him is countered, in part, by the fact he himself used a peremptory strike to remove another Native American juror. 1 Despite our affirmation of the district court’s summary rulings in this case, we continue to encourage district courts to make explicit factual findings on the record when ruling on Batson challenges, including statements on whether the proffered reason for the challenged strike is facially race neutral or inherently discriminatory, and why it chose to credit or discredit the given explanation. See Castorena-Jaime, 285 F.3d at 929. -13-