Opinion ID: 1611764
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the trial court's order was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence and the applicable law, and accordingly, was clearly and manifestly in error?

Text: ¶ 8. Within this broad assignment of error, Bruce first claims that the judgment was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence and the applicable law because Amber was an emancipated minor. Bruce cites Rennie v. Rennie, 718 So.2d 1091, 1093 (Miss.1998), as authority that the obligation to pay child support ends when a minor is emancipated. However, Bruce does not provide a specific date on which he believes Amber was emancipated and simply argues that the chancellor should have ruled that Amber was emancipated at some point prior to her reaching the age of maturity. Amber contends that the emancipation issue is irrelevant because emancipation is not a defense to past due child support. We agree. Bruce's reliance on Rennie, which is distinguishable from the instant case because it dealt with future obligations, not past due child support, is misplaced. This Court in Rennie exempted a father from future payments. The payments in the present case are past due, and now that Amber is an adult, there is no issue of future payments. ¶ 9. Emancipation was defined by this Court in Caldwell v. Caldwell, 579 So.2d 543, 549 (Miss.1991)(citing Pass v. Pass, 238 Miss. 449, 454, 118 So.2d 769, 771 (1960)), as follows: Emancipation, as employed in the law of parent and child, means the freeing of a child for all the period of its minority from the care, custody, control, and service of its parents; the relinquishment of parental control, conferring on the child the right to its own earnings and terminating the parent's legal obligation to support it. The statute governing emancipation is Miss.Code Ann. § 93-5-23 (Supp.2000) which reads in pertinent part as follows: The duty of support of a child terminates upon the emancipation of the child. The court may determine that emancipation has occurred and no other support obligation exists when the child: (a) Attains the age of twenty-one (21) years, or (b) Marries, or (c) Discontinues full-time enrollment in school and obtains full-time employment prior to attaining the age of twenty-one (21) years, or (d) Voluntarily moves from the home of the custodial parent or guardian and establishes independent living arrangements and obtains full-time employment prior to attaining the age of twenty-one (21) years. ¶ 10. The statutory requirements for emancipation are clearly permissive and not mandatory; the court may determine that the child has been emancipated if any of the four factors are satisfied. The amount of support awarded by the chancellor was clearly calculated to cease when Amber reached age twenty-one, thus the first factor is not applicable. The second factor is irrelevant because Amber did not marry. Bruce argues the full-time employment aspect of the third and fourth factors was satisfied, but the record does not validate his argument The chancellor found that Amber's employment was not full-time until after she reached age twenty-one. The difference in calculations here is not significant. In fact, the difference could at least partially be explained by the chancellor having included in her calculations vacation time or other time that Amber may not have worked. Thus the third and fourth factors were not met since full time employment is a component of both. ¶ 11. Bruce also challenges the chancellor's finding that Amber lived with her boyfriend, for a summer, claiming that the record shows they lived together for nine months. Amber testified the two lived together for four to six months. The chancellor's language may be imprecise but the finding certainly does not rise to the level of contradicting the overwhelming weight of the evidence. ¶ 12. It is significant that Bruce never petitioned the chancery court for a modification of his child support obligations. Bruce merely stopped making payments when Gloria died. The law is unequivocal on this issue. Once a child support payment becomes due, that payment vests in the child. Once the payments are vested, they cannot be modified or forgiven by the courts. Tanner v. Roland, 598 So.2d 783, 786 (Miss.1992); Thurman v. Thurman, 559 So.2d 1014, 1016-17 (Miss.1990). Each payment that becomes due and remains unpaid becomes a `judgment' against the supporting parent. Tanner, 598 So.2d at 786; Cunliffe v. Swartzfager, 437 So.2d 43, 45-46 (Miss.1983). The only defense thereto is payment. Tanner, 598 So.2d at 786; Varner, 588 So.2d at 433. The delinquent parent is liable also for the interest which has accrued on each unpaid support payment from the time it was due. Tanner, 598 So.2d at 786; Brand v. Brand, 482 So.2d 236, 238 (Miss.1986). ¶ 13. Bruce's second reason for challenging the chancellor's order as being against the overwhelming weight of the evidence was the finding that Amber's decision to leave Bruce's home was predicated on his continuous intoxication. Bruce claims the record lacked sufficient evidence for such a finding. However, this issue was addressed in the testimony of Amber, Bruce, and Tina (Bruce's ex-wife). It is perplexing that Bruce now objects to a lack of evidence to justify this finding when it was his counsel who objected to the line of questioning when Amber was queried concerning times when she was around her dad while he was drinking. Bruce's counsel objected stating we are here for child support, not custody. The objection was sustained. Based on the testimony of Amber, Bruce and his witness, Tina, there was more than sufficient evidence in the record for such a finding by the chancellor. ¶ 14. In reviewing such findings, this Court recognizes that the trial judge, sitting in a bench trial as the trier of fact, has the sole authority for determining the credibility of the witnesses. Hall v. State ex rel. Waller, 247 Miss. 896, 903, 157 So.2d 781, 784 (1963). Where there is conflicting evidence we must give great deference to the chancellor's findings. McElhaney v. City of Horn Lake, 501 So.2d 401, 403 (Miss.1987). Bruce's first assignment of error is without merit. II. WHETHER AMBER LACKS CLEAN HANDS? ¶ 15. Bruce argues an equitable maxim that He who comes into equity must come with clean hands. Cole v. Hood, 371 So.2d 861, 863 (Miss.1979). Bruce claims Amber did not have clean hands because she was unwilling to have a relationship with her father, and she was unwilling to live with him even though he was ready and willing to accept her in his home at any time. In fact, Amber had no contact with Bruce for the seven years preceding the hearing. The parties disagree over whether the lack of contact resulted from a voluntary decision by Amber to avoid her father or whether Bruce's alcohol consumption caused Amber to leave the home and caused her to be uncomfortable around her father. Although in the trial court Bruce did not label his defense the clean hands doctrine, there was ample testimony of Amber's actions and Bruce's actions before the court. ¶ 16. The chancellor was in the best position to resolve this conflict and did so in favor of Amber. Because Bruce failed to raise the unclean hands defense below, he is procedurally barred from doing so on appeal. However, procedural bar aside, we find no manifest error in the chancellor's ruling in favor of Amber.