Opinion ID: 2278146
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: Age as a Mitigating Factor Under the Eighth Amendment

Text: Another reason to find Missouri's sentencing scheme unconstitutional is its failure to consider age as a mitigating factor. If the jury were given the choice of whether to recommend a sentence of life with parole, in addition to the choice of life without parole, the sentencing law may be constitutional only if a jury were able to consider a defendant's age in making this determination. An offender's age is relevant to the Eighth Amendment, and criminal procedure laws that fail to take defendants' youthfulness into account at all would be flawed. Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2031. In fact, Missouri law requires the jury to consider a defendant's age at the time of the crime as a statutory mitigating factor in determining whether to recommend a death sentence or instead a sentence of life imprisonment. Section 562.032.3(7). This requirement still applies to those over 18. But for those under 18, because death has been removed as a possible punishment, the statutory admonition has no meaning. In view of the stakes involved here  stakes that invoke the protections of the Eighth Amendment  age is no less relevant as a mitigating factor in determining whether that life sentence should be with or without the possibility of parole than it was previously. Now that Missouri law requires that the guilt and punishment phases of criminal trials be separated, section 557.036.2, defendants are entitled to introduce mitigating evidence (and the prosecution to put on victim impact evidence as aggravating factors) in all cases in which punishment is tried to a jury except one involving a person found guilty of first-degree murder committed while under the age of 18, [17] for in all such cases, more than one punishment is available and the relevance of such mitigating evidence is self-evident. The evidence is even more relevant in the case of a youth, yet Missouri's mandatory life without parole sentencing scheme does not permit judge or jury to consider a juvenile offender's youth. Instead, Missouri laws demands the imposition of a life sentence without parole regardless of the characteristics of the offender. The imposition of a life sentence without parole  without consideration of Andrews' age  fails to ensure that Andrews' sentence is proportional to his crime. As such, the Missouri sentencing mandate is flawed and violates the Eighth Amendment. The principal opinion rejects this analysis, arguing that Missouri's consideration of the defendant's youth in the juvenile certification hearing is sufficient. Section 211.071.6(7). The principal opinion goes to great length to explain why it believes that the certification decision is not part of the criminal trial and, therefore, that the jury is not required under Apprendi [18] to make the findings required by that statute, including the statute's requirement that the defendant's age be considered in determining certification. [19] If this certification is to satisfy Graham 's requirement that a child's youth be considered, then it must be considered by the jury. Additionally, the certification is only to determine whether the youth can be tried as an adult. It is not intended to  and does not require the court to  determine whether the child is sufficiently culpable and his or her cognitive processes are developed sufficiently that the child can be sentenced to life without parole. The latter is a separate question that may have a different answer, as Roper recognized in stating that a child may be certified to stand trial as an adult yet not be eligible for the death penalty because of his or her youth. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578-79, 125 S.Ct. 1183. Because the jury here was not permitted to consider defendant's youth or other mitigating factors in determining punishment, the constitution requires Andrews' case be remanded for a new penalty phase trial at which a sentence including parole may be considered. It is hoped that the General Assembly will act to set out parameters for this penalty phase hearing and to dictate what considerations the jury ought to assess at that hearing, including the defendant's youth. Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2031-2032. In the interim, however, juries have long been thought capable of considering mitigating factors and determining punishment in all cases other than those involving first-degree murder by a juvenile, and they should similarly be permitted to do so in this and other similar cases. [20]