Opinion ID: 1599368
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Presumption from a Firearm's Presence.

Text: The first paragraph of instruction No. 6 informed the jury that [t]he presence in a motor vehicle of any firearm shall be prima facie evidence that it is in the possession of, and is carried by, all persons occupying such motor vehicle at the time such firearm is found.... In prosecutions for violation of statutes pertaining to controlled substances, `[a] defendant possesses a controlled substance when the defendant knows of the nature or character of the substance and its presence and has dominion or control over the substance.'  State v. Harney, 237 Neb. 512, 515, 466 N.W.2d 540, 543 (1991). Accord State v. Lonnecker, 237 Neb. 207, 465 N.W.2d 737 (1991). The preceding possessory standard or test is equally applicable to a defendant's prohibited possession of a firearm in violation of § 28-1203(1). Hence, under § 28-1203(1), proof of possession is essential for a conviction. Yet, instruction No. 6 is unclear concerning the effect of a firearm's presence within a vehicle. Did the shotgun's presence within the vehicle completely establish Jasper's commission of the possessory crime, so that no other proof was required for a conviction? Or was the shotgun's presence sufficient proof of Jasper's knowledge about the presence of a prohibited firearm, an element of the possessory crime? The mandatory language in instruction No. 6, that is, the firearm's presence within the vehicle shall be evidence of possession, might lead a reasonable juror to conclude that the trial court was directing that an illegal firearm's presence, in and of itself, established Jasper's commission of the firearms crime. Also, a reasonable juror might conclude that the court was directing that from the shotgun's presence, the jury must infer that Jasper's knowledge, as a component of possessing an illegal firearm, had been established, so that no other proof of Jasper's knowledge was necessary. In either of the foregoing situations, the instruction and its conclusive or mandatory result relieved the State of its burden to produce evidence on each element of the crime charged against Jasper and was tantamount to a directed verdict against Jasper, namely, presence of a firearm established Jasper's commission of the possessory crime or at least some of the elements of the crime. However, the crime charged was not presence in a vehicle containing a short shotgun, but was possessing a short shotgun. Based on mere presence of the firearm, there could be no constitutionally permissible instruction that the jury must infer Jasper's commission of the crime charged or any element of the crime charged. An instruction which directs a verdict against a defendant, either on the issue of guilt for a crime charged or on an element of the crime, violates the defendant's due process right to a fair trial in a criminal case. State v. Harney, supra ; State v. Kipf, 234 Neb. 227, 450 N.W.2d 397 (1990). See, also, Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979). An instruction which requires that a jury draw an inference adverse to a defendant in a trial of a criminal case deprives a defendant of, or denies a defendant, the due process right to a fair trial. State v. Kipf, supra ; Sandstrom v. Montana, supra . On the other hand, if a firearm's presence in a vehicle driven by a defendant may be a circumstance for consideration in determining whether the defendant was in... possession of the weapon, then instruction No. 6 simply informs the jury concerning correct use of circumstantial evidence, that is, a firearm's presence in a vehicle driven by a defendant may be a circumstance tending to prove the defendant's knowledge concerning presence of the weapon and dominion or control over the weapon. Cf., State v. Oldfield, 236 Neb. 433, 461 N.W.2d 554 (1990) (presence of a controlled substance within a vehicle; circumstantial evidence regarding defendant's possession of the substance); State v. Harney, supra . Circumstantial evidence means facts or circumstances, proved or known, from which existence or nonexistence of another fact may be logically inferred or deduced through a rational process. State v. Loveless, 234 Neb. 463, 451 N.W.2d 692 (1990); State v. Lewis, 177 Neb. 173, 128 N.W.2d 610 (1964). True, the court, by instruction No. 5, set out the elements of the crime of possession of a short shotgun, including (1) Jasper's possession of a short shotgun and (2) Jasper's willful, intentional, and knowing possession of the firearm. Nevertheless, instruction No. 6, in reference to the shotgun's presence within the vehicle and Jasper's possession of the firearm, was ambiguous and misleading. All instructions, read conjunctively, must correctly state the law, adequately state the issues, and not mislead the jury. State v. Pierce, 231 Neb. 966, 975, 439 N.W.2d 435, 443 (1989). Accord State v. Harney, 237 Neb. 512, 466 N.W.2d 540 (1991). The ambiguity in and from instruction No. 6 prevented Jasper's fair trial on the crime of possessing a short shotgun. Unless Rebutted. The second paragraph of instruction No. 6 states that [p]rima facie evidence is evidence sufficient in law to raise a presumption of fact or establish the fact in question unless rebutted. In the preceding Presumption from a Firearm's Presence, we discussed the effect of a court's constitutionally impermissible instruction which directs a mandatory inference by a jury in a criminal case. Additionally, the second paragraph of instruction No. 6, in substance, informed the jury that the shotgun's presence in the car driven by Jasper resulted in a presumption that Jasper was in possession of the firearm, a presumption which persisted unless rebutted. As previously noted, [d]ue process in a criminal case requires that the prosecution prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, every factual element necessary to constitute the crime charged against a defendant. State v. Harney, supra at 514, 466 N.W.2d at 543. However, the unless rebutted provision in instruction No. 6 shifted the burden of persuasion to Jasper, that is, possession, a presumed fact derived from the shotgun's presence in the car driven by Jasper, remained an established fact unless Jasper could persuade the jury otherwise. To meet the shifted burden of persuasion, Jasper might even find it necessary to produce evidence on the issue of possession, a necessity which would shift to Jasper the burden to disprove an element of the crime. As pointed out in Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 313, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 1970, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985), the State is prohibited from using evidentiary presumptions in a jury charge that have the effect of relieving the State of its burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt of every essential element of a crime. While presence of a firearm in a vehicle driven by a defendant may be a relevant circumstance tending to prove the defendant's knowledge about a firearm's nature and presence, and dominion or control over the weapon, absence of the defendant's rebuttal concerning possession does not, and constitutionally cannot, establish the defendant's criminal possession of the firearm. See, State v. Harney, supra ; State v. Oldfield, 236 Neb. 433, 461 N.W.2d 554 (1990). Thus, instruction No. 6 presented a presumption which shifted to Jasper the burden of persuasion regarding possession as an element of the firearms charge against Jasper. In view of the State's twofold burden for conviction, namely, the burden of producing sufficient evidence to avoid a directed verdict of acquittal and the burden of persuading the fact finder that Jasper was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the presumption of possession, expressed in instruction No. 6, came in direct conflict with the presumption of Jasper's innocence. The constitutionally required presumption of innocence must prevail; hence, the unless rebutted provision in instruction No. 6 must fail. Due process in a trial of a criminal case prohibits an instruction which contradicts the presumption of a defendant's innocence or shifts to a defendant the burden of persuasion on an element of the crime charged against the defendant. State v. Harney, 237 Neb. 512, 466 N.W.2d 540 (1991). Consequently, the second paragraph of instruction No. 6 deprived Jasper of his constitutionally guaranteed due process right to a fair trial on a criminal charge. Nebraska Evidence Rule 303(3). The State tries to salvage instruction No. 6 by referring to Neb.Evid.R. 303(3), Neb. Rev.Stat. § 27-303(3) (Reissue 1989), which states: Whenever the existence of a presumed fact against the accused is submitted to the jury, the judge shall give an instruction that the law declares that the jury may regard the basic facts as sufficient evidence of the presumed fact but does not require it to do so. In addition, if the presumed fact establishes guilt or is an element of the offense or negatives a defense, the judge shall instruct the jury that its existence must, on all the evidence, be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Even if there had been a recognizable and constitutionally acceptable presumption available in Jasper's case, the trial court failed to specifically instruct the jury that possession, which was the presumed fact, must, on all the evidence, be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, as expressly required by Neb.Evid.R. 303(3). Although we have previously referred to Francis v. Franklin, supra , concerning application of a presumption in a criminal trial, repetition of the Supreme Court's observation in Francis only emphasizes the pitfalls in presumptions: The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. ... This bedrock, `axiomatic and elementary' [constitutional] principle, ... prohibits the State from using evidentiary presumptions in a jury charge that have the effect of relieving the State of its burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt of every essential element of a crime.... Francis v. Franklin, supra at 471 U.S. at 313, 105 S.Ct. at 1970. See, also, State v. Kipf, 234 Neb. 227, 450 N.W.2d 397 (1990).