Opinion ID: 430578
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: unconstitutional restriction of jury's consideration of

Text: MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES 106 In Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), the Supreme Court held that the sentencer [must] not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death. Id. at 604, 98 S.Ct. at 2964 (emphasis in original). Alvord contends that the jury instructions at the sentencing hearing violated the Lockett rule by limiting the jury to considering only statutory mitigating circumstances. See Washington v. Watkins, 655 F.2d 1346, 1377 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981) (invalidating sentence on basis of faulty instructions), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 949, 102 S.Ct. 2021, 72 L.Ed.2d 474 (1982). The district court correctly analyzed and resolved this issue. 107 The judge instructed the jury in this case that the aggravating circumstances which you may consider are limited to such of the following as may be established by the evidence ... and then listed the statutory aggravating circumstances. The judge then instructed the jury that the mitigating circumstances which you may consider if established by the evidence are these ... and then listed the statutory mitigating circumstances. In Ford v. Strickland, 696 F.2d 804 (11th Cir.1983) (en banc), 108 Instructing the jury on aggravating circumstances, the trial judge stated, [y]ou shall consider only the following ..., and read the statutory language. With regard to mitigating circumstances, he said, [y]ou shall consider the following ..., omitting the word only and again reading the appropriate statutory language. 109 Id. at 811-12. We see no distinction of importance between the language used in Ford and that used in the present case. In neither situation did the trial judge commit the error present in Washington v. Watkins, in which the charge operated affirmatively to preclude jury consideration of nonstatutory mitigating factors. 655 F.2d at 1377 (footnote omitted). Also, in both this case and Ford the judge permitted the defendant freely to introduce evidence without regard to its statutory relevance. 21 Thus, the sentence is not invalid under Lockett.VII. PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW 110 Alvord's final claim is that the Florida Supreme Court failed to conduct an adequate proportionality review in this case because the Court's comparison makes absolutely no reference to the characteristics of the offender in each prior case, comparing instead, only the facts of the crime .... In addition, [the opinion does not review] all cases of a similar nature in imposing the sentence of death. We have read the opinion of the Florida Court and we find the review beyond challenge. The Court stated: 111 It is our responsibility to review the sentence in the light of the facts presented in the evidence, as well as other decisions, and determine whether or not the punishment is too great. See State v. Dixon [283 So.2d 1 (Fla.1973) ], supra. Three murders were committed while the perpetrator was engaged in the commission of the felony offense of burglary. Each of the murders was especially heinous, atrocious and cruel in that the homicides were committed through strangulation by use of a rope. This could only be accomplished through a cold, calculated design to kill, as distinguished by a single shot from a firearm during an outburst of anger. The great risk of serious bodily harm by death to other persons is apparent, in that defendant obviously murdered two of the victims in order to avoid a surviving witness to the murder of the other victim. The murders were not committed under circumstances which defendant believed to provide a moral justification or extenuation for his conduct and his capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was not impaired. His age, 26 years, had no particular significance. These aggravating circumstances outweigh any circumstances which would mitigate the sentence in this case. 112 There is no way that the Legislature could program a judicial computer with all of the possible aggravating factors and all of the possible mitigating factors in each case. See State v. Dixon, supra. The law does not require that capital punishment be imposed in every conviction in which a particular state of facts occur. The statute properly allows some discretion, but requires that this discretion be reasonable and controlled. No defendant can be sentenced to capital punishment unless the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors. However, this does not mean that in every instance under a set state of facts the defendant must suffer capital punishment. 113 The statute contemplates that the trial jury, the trial judge and this Court will exercise reasoned judgment as to what factual situations require the imposition of death and which factual situations can be satisfied by life imprisonment in light of the totality of the circumstances present in the evidence. Certain factual situations may warrant the infliction of capital punishment, but, nevertheless, would not prevent either the trial jury, the trial judge, or this Court from exercising reasoned judgment in reducing the sentence to life imprisonment. Such an exercise of mercy on behalf of the defendant in one case does not prevent the imposition of death by capital punishment in the other case. 114 Sullivan v. State [303 So.2d 632 (Fla.1974) ], supra, involved a death sentence which was held to be appropriate by this Court. During the course of a robbery defendant abducted the victim, struck him with a tire iron, and shot him with both barrels of a shotgun in the back of the head. The defendant reloaded and discharged both barrels again into the victim's head. Just as in Sullivan, this case involves the commission of a burglary and the murder of the victim. The deliberate actions of Sullivan in repeatedly shooting the victim is no less heinous and atrocious than the actions of defendant Alvord in deliberately strangling three women with a rope. 115 Gardner v. State, 313 So.2d 675 (Fla.1975), was an appeal from a death sentence for the murder of a female. The murder was accomplished by the use of a blunt instrument, the victim's body containing at least 100 bruises, abrasions and contusions. There was a massive hemorrhage of the pubic area. The victim was beaten so badly that the murder was looked upon as being especially heinous, atrocious and cruel. These aggravating circumstances outweighed any mitigating circumstances and the death penalty was upheld. Certainly, the atrocious manner in which Gardner murdered his victim is no more atrocious or heinous than the atrocious manner in which Alvord coldly strangled three females while committing his burglary. 116 A female victim was involved in Hallman v. State, 305 So.2d 180 (Fla.1974). The defendant committed the crime of robbery, cut the victim about the throat and neck with broken glass, slitting her throat and causing her death. Hallman had been convicted of two previous crimes involving an assault upon a young woman with a dangerous weapon. Alvord had been involved with the rape of a young girl in Michigan, and the evidence indicated that an assault was made upon the deceased Lynn, who was 18 years of age. The act of Hallman in cutting the victim with broken glass is no more heinous than the strangulation of three women by Alvord. Comparing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances with those shown in other capital cases and weighing the evidence in the case sub judice, our judgment is that death is the proper sentence. 117 Pursuant to Rule 6.16(b), Florida Appellate Rules, we have reviewed the evidence to determine whether the interest of justice requires a new trial. No reversible error is made to appear and the evidence does not reveal that the ends of justice require that a new trial be awarded. We find that the judgment and sentence of the trial court in this cause is in accordance with the justice of the cause. 118 Alvord v. State, 322 So.2d 533, 540-41 (Fla.1975). 119 Since the briefs were submitted in this case, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Pulley v. Harris, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 871, 78 L.Ed.2d ---- (1984). In Pulley, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution does not require a state to conduct proportionality reviews, provided that its capital sentencing system [is not] so lacking in other checks on arbitrariness that it would not pass constitutional muster without comparative proportionality review .... Id. at ----, 104 S.Ct. at 873. Like the California system, the Florida system requires that special circumstances, id. must be found before the sentence of death may be imposed in a given case. See generally Barclay v. Florida, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 3418, 77 L.Ed.2d 1134 (1983); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976). The Florida system also contains other checks on the discretion of the sentencing authority so often discussed that we need not repeat them here. See id. Thus, in light of Pulley, Florida is not required to conduct a proportionality review. Alvord does not contend that he was the victim of an unequally applied proportionality review, and the review he received was as extensive as is given by the State of Florida. Thus, his attack on his death sentence on this ground is without merit. The opinion of the district court is 120 REVERSED in part and AFFIRMED in part.