Opinion ID: 884505
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: issues

Text: ¶ 11 Did the District Court err in concluding that the nonowned automobile exclusion in Henninger's policy applies? ¶ 12 The Livengoods first assert that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to American Family because a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether Henninger and Frehse were residents of the same household for purposes of applying the nonowned automobile exception. We disagree. ¶ 13 American Family alleged in its complaint that, at the time of the accident, Henninger and Frehse were residents of the same household. The Livengoods denied that allegation in their answer. Thereafter, however, Henninger and Frehse answered the complaint and admitted that they were residents of the same household on the date of the accident. That admission was sufficient to meet American Family's burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact regarding residency in the same household. Thus, the burden shifted to the Livengoods to come forward with substantial evidence, not mere denial or speculation, that a genuine issue of fact existed as to whether Henninger and Frehse were residents of the same household. See Bruner, 272 Mont. at 264, 900 P.2d at 903. ¶ 14 The Livengoods did not come forward with any evidence whatsoever, much less substantial evidence, to controvert Henninger and Frehse's admission that they were residents of the same household and, thereby, to raise a genuine issue of fact in that regard. Instead, the Livengoods advanced cases from other jurisdictions setting forth factors tending to indicate whether two persons are residents of the same household. They advance those cases again on appeal, arguing therefrom that questions remain as to those factors in the present case. The problem with the Livengoods' argument, however, is that none of the cases on which they rely involve an admission by the persons involved that they were, in fact, residents of the same household. As a result, the questions the Livengoods raise about the duration and nature of Henninger and Frehse's relationship, their intentions regarding the future and the like, are merely speculative and are insufficient to meet their burden of raising a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Henninger and Frehse were residents of the same household at the time of the accident. We conclude, therefore, that the District Court did not err in determining that no genuine issue of material fact exists regarding Henninger and Frehse being residents of the same household at the time of the accident. ¶ 15 The Livengoods also contend that the District Court erred in interpreting the nonowned automobile exclusion to require only that the vehicle driven by Henninger at the time of the accident be owned by Frehse, a resident of her household, and in determining, on that basis, that the exclusion applies. They posit that, in order for the exclusion to apply, Frehse also must have either furnished his vehicleor made it availablefor Henninger's regular use. Again, we disagree. ¶ 16 As set forth above, the policy language at issue excludes coverage for injury arising out of the insured's use of a vehicle owned by or furnished or available for regular use by you or any resident of your household. In its common usage, or connotes the disjunctive, and it is used to express an alternative or give a choice of one among two or more things. See Black's Law Dictionary 1095 (6th ed.1990). When a provision is written in the disjunctive, it is clear that only one of the separately stated factors must exist. See Baldridge v. Board of Trustees (1997), 287 Mont. 53, 62, 951 P.2d 1343, 1349. Indeed, in Stutzman, we implicitly interpreted a similarly worded exclusion of a vehicle owned by or furnished for the regular use of the named insured or any relative disjunctively, requiring the insurer to establish only that the vehicle was owned by a relative of the named insured. Stutzman, 284 Mont. at 378, 945 P.2d at 35. ¶ 17 Here, the disjunctive or separates each alternative in the nonowned automobile exclusion at issue. As a result, coverage clearly is excluded for injuries arising from Henninger's use of a vehicleother than her insured carwhich is either owned by or furnished or available for regular use by either Henninger or any resident of her household. American Family established that Henninger was using a vehicle owned by Frehse, a resident of her household, at the time of the accident. It was not required to show that the separately stated alternative regarding a vehicle furnished or made available for her regular use by a resident of her household also was satisfied. ¶ 18 We hold that the District Court did not err in interpreting the policy language or in concluding that the nonowned automobile exclusion in Henninger's policy applies.