Opinion ID: 166669
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Heat of Passion

Text: 20 The clarity of the jury instructions is essential in a murder case. Lofton, 776 F.2d at 920. This is especially true where the defendant has raised a heat of passion defense. Id. As is well known, the prosecution in a criminal case is required to prove every element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). To obtain a murder conviction, the prosecution must show that the defendant acted with malice aforethought. Lofton, 776 F.2d at 920; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a). 21 The distinction between malice and heat of passion led the Supreme Court to hold that in order to obtain a murder conviction, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation when the issue is properly presented. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 704, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975); see also Lofton, 776 F.2d at 920. Indeed, the heat of passion defense is directly in opposition to malice, that is, it serve[s] to negative malice. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 207, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977); see also Serawop, 410 F.3d at 663-64. 22 Mr. Visinaiz argues that under Lofton, the district court's instructions in this case did not allow him to present his theories of defense. We find this argument less than colorable, for even assuming that Mr. Visinaiz presented evidence for a heat of passion defense, Jury Instruction 23 quite plainly reads: 23 The third element the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant acted with malice aforethought... The defendant has raised the defense that he acted in the heat of passion and not with malice. Heat of passion includes rage, resentment, anger, terror and fear. Heat of passion may be produced by fear as well as by rage. In order to satisfy this element, the government must prove the absence of heat of passion beyond a reasonable doubt, before you may find that the defendant acted with malice. 24 II R. Doc. 252, J. Instr. 23 (emphasis supplied). As such, the district court's instruction clearly required that a jury finding of second degree murder mandated that the government prove the absence of heat of passion beyond a reasonable doubt. 25 Mr. Visinaiz also takes issue with the definition of the heat of passion instruction contained in the voluntary manslaughter instructions. See II R. Doc. 252, J. Instr. 29. He contends that the instruction should have contained `cool down' language to distinguish the heat of passion felt by initial provocation, from post-provocation, renewed, angry and aggressive thought. Aplt. Br. at 57. According to Mr. Visinaiz, the absence of the cool down language precluded jury consideration of the evidence suggesting heat of passion. This must be rejected—the instruction adequately defined heat of passion as such a state of passion, or hot blood, or rage, anger, resentment, terror or fear as to indicate the absence of deliberate design to kill or as to cause one to act on impulse without reflection. II R. Doc. 252, J. Instr. 29. Suffice it to say, there is no error in Instructions 23 or 29, plain or otherwise. 26 Mr. Visinaiz also argues that the district court's instructions and verdict form constituted structural error because they precluded the jury from considering lesser included offenses until the greater offense of second degree murder was considered. This reads too much into Lofton. The problem in Lofton was that the jury was not adequately instructed that the government had to prove the absence of heat of passion in the murder instruction. Lofton, 776 F.2d at 921. Given proper instructions, it was entirely proper to have the jury consider the second degree murder charge first.