Opinion ID: 2569599
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the Trial Court Committed Error in the Entry of Partial Summary Judgment

Text: [¶ 8] Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue as to any material fact exists and the prevailing party is entitled to have a judgment as a matter of law. Eklund v. PRI Environmental, Inc., 2001 WY 55, ¶ 10, 25 P.3d 511, ¶ 10 (Wyo. 2001); see also W.R.C.P. 56(c). A genuine issue of material fact exists when a disputed fact, if it were proven, would have the effect of establishing or refuting an essential element of the cause of action or defense which has been asserted by the parties. Williams Gas ProcessingWamsutter Company v. Union Pacific Resources Company, 2001 WY 57, ¶ 11, 25 P.3d 1064, ¶ 11 (Wyo.2001). We examine the record from the vantage point most favorable to the party who opposed the motion, and we give that party the benefit of all favorable inferences which may fairly be drawn from the record. Id. We evaluate the propriety of a summary judgment by employing the same standards and by using the same materials as were employed and used by the lower court. Scherer Construction, LLC v. Hedquist Construction, Inc., 2001 WY 23, ¶ 15, 18 P.3d 645, ¶ 15 (Wyo.2001). We do not accord any deference to the district court's decisions on issues of law. Id. [¶ 9] For purposes of efficiency, we will conjunctively examine the propriety of the grant of partial summary judgment to the agent and the sellers. The same facts are alleged to support the claims for both intentional misrepresentation and negligent misrepresentation, although we reiterate the claim against the agent is only for negligent misrepresentation. [2] The buyers based the alleged misrepresentations upon statements contained in the information sheet provided to them and several alleged oral statements made while they inspected the property with the agent. The trial court based its decision on the parties' depositions, affidavits, and briefs. We note, because the parties designated only a limited portion of the record, our review is necessarily constrained.
[¶ 10] Intentional misrepresentation and negligent misrepresentation share common elements. Intentional misrepresentation (fraud) is established when the following elements are proven: (1) the defendant made a false representation intended to induce action by the plaintiff; (2) the plaintiff reasonably believed the representation to be true; and (3) the plaintiff relied on the false representation and suffered damages. Sundown, Inc. v. Pearson Real Estate Company, Inc., 8 P.3d 324, 330 (Wyo.2000). Intentional misrepresentation must be established by clear and convincing evidence. Id. Quite similarly, a plaintiff in a claim for negligent misrepresentation must show: One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information. Hulse v. First American Title Company of Crook County, 2001 WY 95, ¶ 52, 33 P.3d 122, ¶ 52 (Wyo.2001) (quoting Richey v. Patrick, 904 P.2d 798, 802 (Wyo.1995)). A fundamental difference between the two causes of action is, a plaintiff need only prove negligent misrepresentation by a preponderance of the evidence, not unlike any other plaintiff in any other action sounding in negligence, while a plaintiff must prove intentional misrepresentation by clear and convincing evidence. Verschoor v. Mountain West Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company, 907 P.2d 1293, 1299 (Wyo.1995). [¶ 11] The trial court found the buyers failed to provide evidence sufficient to demonstrate material issues of fact concerning the various misrepresentations they claimed occurred. First, the buyers alleged statements in the information sheet provided by the sellers and the agent to interested potential purchasers misrepresented the amount of water rights attributable to the property as follows: Water rights for 1075 acres plus reservoir water from Lake Adelaide. Several small reservoirs on the property, and WATER COSTS: Shell Canal Rehab$4,251.97; Shell Canal Adelaide$5,994.02; 1994 Shell Canal @ $8.50/acre$8,604.96. The buyers argued the testimony of J.R. Kvenild, a Wyoming real estate broker, demonstrated a misrepresentation when he testified that, according to his research and information from the State Engineer's office, there isn't a full 1,075 acres of water rights. However, the designated record provides no evidence submitted by the buyers to establish the amount of water rights they contended was accurate. [¶ 12] An affidavit from Dorothy Balo, an employee with the Shell Canal Company, was presented to the trial court and provided in part: (4) According to the books, records and accounts of Shell Canal Company, there are water rights for 1,075.62 acres. These are the same water rights available to [the sellers] from and after September of 1994, according to our books and records. (5) In addition to those water rights, there is water available from Lake Adelaide to service the [sellers'] property. [¶ 13] The trial court granted summary judgment concluding that no false statement was intentionally or negligently made because the Shell Canal Company records were used to compile the information sheet and, while the sellers occupied the property, they paid for water rights on 1,075 acres. Testimony that the water rights were not on a full 1,075 acres without any evidence as to the amount the buyers contended was accurate is insufficient to create a material issue of fact that a false statement was made. [¶ 14] Second, the buyers contend the statement that the property consisted of approximately 1,956 acres plus seven acres for the home place was a misrepresentation of the acreage. The buyers' claim is either they were not provided with land descriptions or it was not possible to accurately determine the total amount of acreage included in the sellers' property from the land descriptions. Regardless of which contention is applied, both arguments fail to establish the essential element of a misrepresentation; i.e., that a false representation was made. The designated record does not reflect any evidence provided to the trial court which would establish a material issue of fact. [¶ 15] Third, the buyers allege the number of acres which were capable of being put into production was misrepresented. The information sheet provided there were [a]pproximately 600 acres in production now with another 200 acres that could be put in. (Emphasis added.) The agent testified the sellers had told him there was about 450 acres of alfalfa, about 100 acres of oats, and I believe 60 to 80 acres of irrigated pasture. This statement is consistent with the estimated production set out in the information sheet. Furthermore, the Farm Service Agency (the Agency) supervisor's affidavit reflected the buyers had filed three separate reports with the Agency indicating they had 745 acres of crop land. [¶ 16] In granting summary judgment on this issue, the trial court relied upon the following factors: Considering the use of the word, approximately, in the Property Condition Statement, the caveat found at the bottom of the Property Condition Statement, the fact that John Dewey did not know the dates the photographs he used were taken and did not know whether all of the property depicted was part of the [sellers'] place or not, the fact that there was no survey done and there was no engineer's report available, and the fact that John Dewey, himself, after drilling his grain, represented a significantly larger number to the Department of Agriculture, there is clearly no material issue of fact regarding the point in questionthat is, whether there was a misrepresentation .... Upon a thorough review of the evidence and materials presented to the trial court, we agree with the court's reasoning and assessment of the evidence. [3] The buyers did not provide any evidence that there was less than the approximated acreage as identified in the information sheet. [¶ 17] Finally, the buyers assert the number of cattle located on the property was misrepresented by the statement on the information sheet that the sellers were [p]resently running 175 cows and calves on the place. The buyers assert 175 cows and calves implies there were 175 cow/calf pairs, for a total of 350 animals on the property. Specifically, the buyers maintain, It would only stand to reason tha[t] any court in Wyoming, a state rich in the heritage of the livestock industry, ... would take judicial notice that when speaking of a cow and a calf, you are speaking of a pair. The buyers admitted that, on their three property inspections, they saw only a total of approximately 160 animals, an amount significantly less than what they maintained was represented in the information sheet. [¶ 18] In White v. Ogburn, 528 P.2d 1167, 1171 (Wyo.1974), we addressed a fraudulent misrepresentation claim regarding the number of cattle being run on the property at the time of sale. In that case, we dismissed the claim for fraudulent misrepresentation with the following language: We do not say that [defendants] could not rely upon representations made to them by the [plaintiffs], but they could not blind themselves to observe the readily available facts and place reliance upon such alleged misrepresentations without making a diligent inquiry of these facts. 528 P.2d at 1171. We have previously stated that [r]eliance is reasonable when false representations have occurred prior to the execution of the contract which is sought to be avoided or for which damages are sought to be recovered. Sundown, Inc., 8 P.3d at 331. Just as the purchasers in White were able to observe the cattle on the premises, so too were these buyers. Even if the buyers could have initially proven a misrepresentation, once they inspected the property and had the ability to observe the number of cattle on the premises, they could no longer rely upon their belief that the property supported 350 animals. The buyers failed to provide evidence to establish a material issue of fact existed as to the essential element of reliance. [¶ 19] Summary judgment was properly granted on each of the claimed intentional and negligent misrepresentations contained within the information sheet.
[¶ 20] The buyers also complain the trial court erred by granting summary judgment on several oral misrepresentations allegedly made to them by the agent during the property inspections. On appeal, the buyers provided no evidentiary support for these claims. Instead, they argued the questions of whether all the oral representations were even made and whether they were false were factual questions appropriate for consideration by a jury. This argument disregards the buyers' duty to come forward with competent evidence of specific facts to counter the motion for summary judgment. The alleged oral misrepresentations are as follows: 1. The agent stated the alfalfa was killed by heat broiling; 2. The buyers were not told about the existence of the weeds; 3. The agent misrepresented that he helped harvest sixty bushels of barley from the sellers' place; 4. The agent misrepresented that the Letellier house was about six years old; 5. The agent was not aware of the condition of the irrigation pipes and head gates and should have been; 6. Misrepresentation of the condition of the septic system at the Hallsted place; 7. Misrepresentation that a new septic system had been put in at the Letellier place; 8. Misrepresentation on the number of places alkali had leaked to the surface of the ground; 9. Cistern was represented to have been cleaned but was neither cleaned nor disinfected; 10. House at the Hallsted place had not been cleaned as represented; and 11. The agent misrepresented the alfalfa production capability. Summary judgment was granted on five of the alleged oral misrepresentations due to a lack of admissible evidence that the representations were false. These include: 1. Alfalfa was killed by heat broiling; 2. The agent misrepresented that he helped harvest sixty bushel/acres of barley from the sellers' place; 3. Misrepresentation on the septic system at the Letellier place; 4. Cistern at the Hallsted place was represented to have been cleaned but was neither cleaned nor disinfected; and 5. The agent misrepresented the alfalfa production capability. The trial court commented: [T]his Court has scoured every detail of the record for some admissible evidence that the representations referred to therein were false. [The buyers] have offered zero evidence on any of those allegations, and simply rely upon the proposition that whether they were false or not is a question of fact; however, [the sellers] have come forward with admissible evidence that they are, in fact, true. One of the basic elements of fraud is the falsity of the representation of a material fact. White, 528 P.2d at 1171. Our review of the same material considered by the trial court likewise leads us to the same conclusionthe buyers presented no evidence to support the allegation the representations were in fact false. [¶ 21] The trial court granted summary judgment on three of the alleged oral misrepresentations stating, [the buyers] have neither argued nor submitted evidence that there were misrepresentations with respect to any of these items. The allegations concerned (1) the existence of the weeds, (2) the condition of the irrigation pipes and head gates, and (3) misrepresentations about the alkali leaking to the surface. These claims reflect the buyers' propensity throughout this litigation to make bald assertions without evidentiary support. In fact, the buyers did not come forward with any evidence to show these representations were even made to them. [¶ 22] Next, the buyers claim the agent represented the Letellier home was about six years old. The agent testified in his deposition that, if the buyers had asked about the Letellier home, he would have told them it was probably built in the '50s. Notably, the buyers admitted they inspected the home, both inside and out, before they submitted their offer. It is not reasonable for the buyers to rely upon a representation, if in fact one was made, that the home was only six years old when it would be evident upon inspection that the home was much older. In terms of the intentional misrepresentation claim, the buyers are not justified in relying upon the truth of a representation if its falsity is obvious to them. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 541 (1977). Stated another way, one cannot recover if he blindly relies upon a representation, the falsity of which would be obvious to him upon a cursory examination or investigation. Id. at cmt. a. In this instance, the buyers were required to use their own senses, and, because they had the opportunity to inspect the property, no reasonable jury could conclude they relied on the statement. As there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding justifiable reliance or evidence that the representation was made, we affirm. [¶ 23] The buyers also maintain the Hallsted place had not been cleaned as represented. The trial court remarked that this claim demonstrate[d] the frivolous nature of the vast majority of the [buyers'] claims. Again, the buyers admitted they inspected the Hallsted place before they submitted their offer and, therefore, were not relying on its cleanliness as an inducement to enter into an agreement. [¶ 24] Finally, the buyers allege the condition of the Hallsted place septic system was misrepresented. They claim a septic problem occurred subsequent to their possession of the premises. However, no evidence was offered that either the sellers or the agent knew of any problem or problems which had existed prior to closing. The buyers do not direct this court to any evidentiary basis to prove a false representation was made. [¶ 25] The various misrepresentations must fail for a lack of proof that representations were made, relied upon, or false. In order to succeed on summary judgment, the movant must establish a prima facie case, and then the burden shifts to the opposing party who must show a genuine issue of material fact or come forward with competent evidence of specific facts countering the facts presented by the movant. Bender v. Phillips, 8 P.3d 1074, 1077 (Wyo.2000). At the trial court level and again on appeal, the buyers failed in their burden to establish material issues of fact on both the intentional misrepresentation and the negligent misrepresentation claims. Consequently, we affirm all aspects of the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment in favor of the sellers and the agent.
[¶ 26] The buyers also assert claims based on negligent nondisclosure. Their brief sets out a single argument in support of their contention that partial summary judgment was improperly granted on this issue: The lower court in its ruling on the issue of failure to disclose held that the authority in Richey, supra, was dispositive and therefore granted summary judgment in favor of [the sellers] and [the agent]. The elements necessary to establish a cause of action for non-disclosure are founded in factual determinations. The Court committed error in not allowing these factual determinations to be made by the jury. We summarily affirm cases or issues that have not been presented with cogent argument or supported by pertinent authority. Small v. Convenience Plus Partners, Ltd., 6 P.3d 1254, 1256 (Wyo.2000). Thus, we decline to consider the claims for negligent nondisclosure.