Opinion ID: 2534434
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Review of the jury's aggravation and sentencing findings

Text: ¶ 132 We review de novo the jury's determination that the death penalty is warranted. A.R.S. § 13-703.04. [23] When we determine that an aggravating circumstance has been found erroneously, we must independently determine if the mitigation ... is sufficiently substantial to warrant leniency in light of the existing aggravation. A.R.S. § 13-703.04(B). See Carreon, 210 Ariz. at 73 ¶ 96, 107 P.3d at 919. [24] ¶ 133 In making this determination, we do not simply consider the number of aggravating and mitigating factors, but instead consider the quality and strength of each. Id. at ¶ 97 (quoting State v. Greene, 192 Ariz. 431, 443 ¶ 60, 967 P.2d 106, 118 (1998)). In this case, the quality and strength of the (F)(5) and (F)(8) aggravating circumstances are compelling. The evidence convincingly established that Anderson planned and carried out the murders of three victims in order to steal a pickup truck. ¶ 134 Anderson urged the following mitigation: (1) his turbulent childhood, including sexual abuse by his father and lack of stability, caused in part by frequent moves and attendance at more than fifty schools; (2) his below-average I.Q. and follower personality; (3) his relatively minor participation in the crimes compared with Poyson; (4) his acting under duress and fear of Poyson; (5) the comparatively lenient eight-year sentence that Lane received; (6) his cooperation with police by confessing to participation in the murders; (7) his good record as an inmate; and (8) his embrace of religion and Christian ministry to fellow inmates. ¶ 135 We conclude that these mitigating factors are not sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. Although there was evidence at trial that Anderson's I.Q. was below average and that he did not have a leader-type personality, he was not mentally retarded, unable to make his own decisions, or lacking the capacity to judge right from wrong. We similarly cannot give much weight to Anderson's fear of Poyson; there is simply no credible evidence that Anderson was coerced into committing these murders. ¶ 136 Moreover, Anderson's childhood troubles do not in any way explain his decision, decades later at age forty-eight, to kill three innocent people to steal a pickup. Given Anderson's substantial role in each of the murders, we reject his characterization of his participation as minor. Nor can Anderson's limited cooperation with the police be viewed as substantial mitigation. And, while Lane received a far more lenient sentence than Anderson under her plea bargain with the State, her involvement in the murders was far less substantial than Anderson's and she was but fourteen years old at the time of the murders. ¶ 137 There was evidence that Anderson has been a model inmate and has made efforts to assist fellow inmates through his Christian ministry. While laudable, these mitigating facts are not nearly substantial enough to call for leniency in light of the aggravating circumstances. Exercising independent review pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-703.04(B), we therefore affirm the death sentence for each of the three murders.