Opinion ID: 2980457
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Qualified immunity was correctly denied

Text: According to Plaintiff Haley’s version of the facts, he told officers that he had consumed only two beers, and when Officers saw him crouching down by his car, he was trying to cough up some phlegm. Haley acknowledges that he had a cup of liquor with him, but says that the officers never saw him drink from it because he did not in fact do so. Haley testified that he was not intoxicated at the time of his arrest, R.61 (Haley Dep. 1) at 47, and that he asked to take a breathalyzer or field sobriety test, but the officers refused his request, id. at 46. Ellis testified that nothing about Haley’s manner of speech, demeanor, or how he walked and carried himself indicated that he was under the influence of drugs or alcohol. R.58 (Ellis Dep. 1) at 46–47.2 Ellis testified that Haley never became 2 Ellis’s testimony at first seemed to indicate that her observations about Haley’s appearance of sobriety were based on her belief that it would be uncharacteristic of him to be intoxicated because he had a good job that he would not want to jeopardize. But on redirect examination, counsel clarified this by asking, “Do you recall anything about -6- No. 10-6176, Haley v. Elsmere belligerent or angry with officers, and never cursed at them. Id. at 20. Officer Markesbery testified that he was patrolling the area, in part because neighbors had previously, but not on that night, complained of loud noise and drug use on the American Legion property. R.59 (Markesbery Dep.) at 187–88. Officer Markesbery offers as undisputed his and Officer Robinson’s testimony that Haley smelled of alcohol, his eyes appeared bloodshot, and he appeared unsteady on his feet. But we may ignore this testimony because it is not part of Haley’s version of the facts, and it clearly is not “undisputed.” Ellis’s testimony, while not particularly detailed in describing Haley’s appearance of sobriety, contradicts the officers’ claim that Haley appeared intoxicated and we—unlike Markesbery—will not ignore it. K.R.S. § 222.202(1), the statute of arrest, states: A person is guilty of alcohol intoxication when he appears in a public place manifestly under the influence of alcohol to the degree that he may endanger himself or other persons or property, or unreasonably annoy persons in his vicinity. Under Haley’s version of the facts as they were known to Officer Markesbery, it was objectively unreasonable for an officer to believe he had probable cause to arrest Haley for alcohol intoxication. Though Haley stated that he had consumed two beers, and the officers saw him crouching down (perhaps appearing to be trying to vomit—though no one testified that he ever did vomit), nothing else about his conduct would have made a reasonable officer conclude he was “manifestly” intoxicated. Nor, under Haley’s version of the facts, was there any indication that he was Ron’s demeanor, how he carried himself, how he walked, how he talked, how he did anything that would have led you to believe that he was under the influence of any alcohol or drugs or anything else?” Ellis responded, “No, sir.” -7- No. 10-6176, Haley v. Elsmere unreasonably annoying anyone. A reasonable officer might have concluded that, had Haley been manifestly under the influence, he could have posed a danger to himself or others because he was in the parking lot, perhaps intending to get in his car. But since a reasonable officer could not have concluded he was manifestly intoxicated in the first place, that is irrelevant. And at any rate, Haley’s offer to submit to a breathalyzer undercuts any potential danger he might have posed by driving under the influence. Accepting Haley’s version of the facts, a reasonable officer could not have found the elements of the statutory offense of alcohol intoxication. The district court did not commit a purely legal error in denying summary judgment to Markesbery on the basis of qualified immunity. Markesbery also argues for the first time on appeal that he could have had probable cause to arrest Haley under yet another statute, K.R.S. § 222.202(2), which reads: A person is guilty of drinking alcoholic beverages in a public place when he drinks an alcoholic beverage in a public place, or in or upon any passenger coach, or other vehicle commonly used for the transportation of passengers, or in or about any depot, platform, or waiting room. At no time in the proceedings before the district court did Markesbery ever cite this statute or make this argument. “Our function is to review the case presented to the district court, rather than a better case fashioned after a district court’s unfavorable order.” DaimlerChrysler Corp. Healthcare Benefits Plan v. Durden, 448 F.3d 918, 922 (6th Cir. 2006). Accordingly, we will not consider this new argument. See Post v. Bradshaw, 621 F.3d 406, 415 (6th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2902 (2011) (mem.). Finally, Markesbery correctly points out that the district court did not explicitly address the “clearly established” prong of the qualified immunity test. The court stated: “Given the totality of -8- No. 10-6176, Haley v. Elsmere these circumstances, the court concludes that a jury question exists as to whether [Markesbery] had probable cause to arrest plaintiff . . . , and that issues of fact as outlined above prevent a grant of qualified immunity on the false arrest claim.” Since Pearson, a court need not approach the qualified immunity analysis in the order previously mandated by Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001). Generally, that procedure allows courts to address the “clearly established” prong first, which often obviates the need to determine whether there was an actual violation of a constitutional right. Here, the court found that issues of material fact prevented a determination of whether Markesbery violated Haley’s constitutional right; it said nothing specifically about whether that right was clearly established. Markesbery wisely advances no argument that the right was not clearly established. “Plainly, the federal right to be subject only to arrest upon probable cause was clearly established.” Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 500 (6th Cir. 2009).3 Markesbery argues only that, accepting the facts as Haley claims Markesbery knew them to be, an officer could have reasonably (though erroneously) believed that there was probable cause to arrest Haley. But as we have explained, that claim must fail.