Opinion ID: 222717
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 21

Heading: Adequacy of ClearOne's evidence of recoverable costs

Text: Biamp argues that ClearOne's evidence inadequately substantiated the amount of common attorneys' fees and nontaxable expenses imposed against the defendants. Biamp contends that ClearOne's evidence consisted of block bill[s] that included after-the-fact handwritten notations to allocate fees, ma[king] it impossible to determine which tasks were related to [ClearOne's] misappropriation claim against Biamp as opposed to unrecoverable fees or fees allocated only to the Wide[B]and Defendants. Aplt. Br. at 62. Further, Biamp asserts that, because the district court should have conducted an evidentiary hearing, this court should remand the case to the district court for a hearing to determine the appropriate award. Under Utah law, the party requesting attorneys' fees has the burden of presenting sufficient evidence to support the award. Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266, 268 (Utah 1992). [T]he evidence should include the hours spent on the case, the hourly rate or rates charged for those hours, and usual and customary rates for such work. Id. While only fees related to compensable claims are recoverable, Utah courts have recognized that a party need not allocate fees between compensable and non-compensable claims when the claims involve related legal theories and common sets of facts. Wilde v. Wilde, 35 P.3d 341, 349 (Utah Ct.App. 2001). We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in relying on the documentation ClearOne provided to determine the amount recoverable. See Cadena v. Pacesetter Corp., 224 F.3d 1203, 1215 (10th Cir.2000) (reviewing a party's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the district court's award of attorneys' fees for abuse of discretion). In support of its request for attorneys' fees, ClearOne submitted a declaration from its lead attorney, James Magleby, asserting that each and every invoice for attorneys' fees incurred in th[e] matter had been filed with the court. JA at D18137. ClearOne asserted that it ha[d] carefully gone through each and every invoice to ensure that only recoverable fees were included in the requested amount, eliminat[ing] fees for issues related to the Biamp-ClearOne license agreement, which were resolved prior to trial, deduct[ing] the fees already awarded to ClearOne, and eliminat[ing] fees related to [the `spin-off' cases]. Id. at D18137-38. ClearOne further explained that it allocated the legal fees documented on the invoices into three categories: (1) common fees applicable to all defendants; (2) WideBand [d]efendants only fees; and (3) Biamp only fees. Id. at D18138. The magistrate judge, in conducting the initial review of ClearOne's motion, extensively analyzed the amount of attorneys' fees ClearOne requested and considered Biamp's objections. The magistrate judge explained that ClearOne's records [we]re not block bills as Biamp claim[ed], but [instead] contain[ed] separate time entries on separate days on separate tasks for separate timekeepers. Id. at D22495. Reasoning that the claims in this case involved a core set of facts, the magistrate judge concluded that the records were very sufficient to measure the amount of fees to be awarded. Id. Similarly, the district court, in reviewing the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, concluded that ClearOne satisfied its burden to present sufficient evidence to support the attorneys' fees award through the Declaration of James Magleby and the accompanying exhibits. Id. at D22721. The district court noted that [it] [wa]s not convinced that ClearOne engaged in block billing, noting [ClearOne's] detailed invoices (a very voluminous stack of documents), along with Mr. Magleby's sworn declaration that he and his colleagues reviewed all of the invoices and related documents, and allocated the fees and expenses incurred by ClearOne into different categories. Id. at D22721-22 (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted). Further, the district court explained that ClearOne's allocations were sufficient because the claims involved a core set of facts common to the claims and the defendants. Id. at D22723. Having concluded that the district court did not err in relying on Biamp's documentation, we in turn conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing attorneys' fees without conducting an evidentiary hearing. See Robinson v. City of Edmond, 160 F.3d 1275, 1286 (10th Cir. 1998) (reviewing the district court's decision to deny an evidentiary hearing on the attorneys' fees issue for abuse of discretion). We have previously explained that [a] district court does not abuse its discretion when it fails to hold a hearing at which the parties will simply reiterate arguments they already have made in their briefs. Id. In this case, Biamp requested a hearing merely to further demonstrate its position regarding what it asserted were ClearOne's improper allocations of attorneys' fees. Id. at D22626 n. 1. Biamp asserted this argument both in its objection to ClearOne's motion for attorneys' fees and in its objection to the magistrate judge's report. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the evidentiary hearing.