Opinion ID: 885630
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Five Years or Thirty Days?

Text: ¶7 Jones asserts that a five-year statute of limitation should apply to writs of review of contempt proceedings. He bases his argument on § 27-2-231, MCA, the section providing for a default statute of limitation. Section 27-2-231, MCA, reads: An action for relief not otherwise provided for must be commenced within 5 years after the cause of action accrues. Further, in the definitions section of Title 27, § 27-2-101, MCA, requires that the word action is to be construed, whenever necessary to do so, as including a special proceeding of a civil nature. See also § 25-1-102(2), MCA. ¶8 In support of his argument, Jones cites Shaffroth v. Lamere (1937), 104 Mont. 175, 17980, 65 P.2d 610, 611-12. This case involved a petition for a writ of review submitted to a district court requesting review of a justice court's default judgment. Shaffroth addressed the question of the statute of limitation involved under the statutory predecessor of § 2725-102, MCA, which specifies the authority to grant a writ of review. This statute, which is substantively the same as its predecessor as it relates to this case, now reads: file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/01-594%20Opinion.htm (3 of 12)3/23/2007 4:08:23 PM file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/01-594%20Opinion.htm A writ of review may be granted by: (1) the supreme court and any justice of the supreme court, in proceedings for contempt in the district court; or (2) the supreme court or the district court or any judge of those courts, when a lower tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions has exceeded the jurisdiction of the tribunal, board, or officer and there is no appeal or, in the judgment of the court, any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. Shaffroth held that the default statute of limitation of five years applied to the situation in which one of the parties waited six years to seek a writ of review of the justice court's default judgment. Shaffroth, 104 Mont. at 179-80, 65 P.2d at 611-12. Jones argues that Shaffroth requires that the default five-year statute of limitation applies to all writs of review under § 27-25-102, MCA, including review of a contempt proceeding by way of a writ of certiorari. ¶9 In the alternative, Jones cites Rule 17(d), M.R.App.P., for the proposition that original proceedings before this Court, which could include writs of certiorari to review contempt proceedings, may be filed at any time. ¶10 In contrast, the District Court asserts that a 30 day deadline should apply to petitions for writs of review of contempt proceedings. The District Court bases its argument on the procedures designated by Chapter 25 of Title 27, the chapter which authorizes writs of review, and on the Montana Rules of Appellate Procedure. Section 27-25-103, MCA, which immediately follows the statute authorizing writs of review, reads: Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the provisions of Title 25 are applicable to and constitute the rules of practice in the proceedings mentioned in this chapter. The provisions of Title 25 relative to new trials and appeals, except insofar as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter, apply to the proceedings mentioned in this chapter. The District Court argues that according to this section of Title 25, specifically Chapter 21 which comprises the Montana Rules of Appellate Procedure, applies, inasmuch as Jones's Petition is filed before the Supreme Court. file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/01-594%20Opinion.htm (4 of 12)3/23/2007 4:08:23 PM file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/01-594%20Opinion.htm ¶11 Turning to Chapter 21 of Title 25, the District Court cites Rule 1, M.R.App.P., which states that the Rules of Appellate Procedure govern appeals and original proceedings in the Supreme Court. Further, Rule 17, M.R.App.P., requires that original writs, including writs of review, be commenced and conducted as prescribed by the applicable sections of the Montana Code Annotated for the conduct of such or analogous proceedings . . . . The District Court asserts that petitions for writs of review of contempt are analogous to appeals and that therefore, the Montana Rules of Appellate Procedure apply to reviews of contempt orders. Following this rationale, the court maintains that Rule 5, M.R.App.P., requires that appeals must be filed within 30 days (or 60 days if the State is a party) of the entry of the judgment or the order appealed from. The District Court points out that the current Montana Rules of Appellate Procedure were significantly rewritten and enacted in 1966, after Shaffroth was decided. This includes Rule 17, M.R.App.P, mentioned above, which governs the procedure for original writs. ¶12 In response to this argument, Jones asserts that, according to choice of law holdings, statutes of limitation are substantive law rather than procedural law. He argues that the statute cited in support of the District Court's position, § 27-25-103, MCA, which applies Title 25 relative to new trials and appeals, only applies to procedural matters. ¶13 In the alternative, the District Court also cites Rule 72, M.R.Civ.P., which reads: When an appeal is permitted by law from a district court to the supreme court of Montana, or in any case where original proceedings are commenced in the supreme court, such appeal or original proceeding shall be taken, perfected, and prosecuted pursuant to the provisions of the Montana Rules of Appellate Procedure and controlling statutes to the extent that they are not superseded by the Montana Rules of Appellate Procedure. The District Court asserts that even if Shaffroth controlled statutory interpretation at one point, Rule 72, M.R.Civ.P., superseded that case when it was enacted in 1966, with the result that the Montana Rules of Appellate Procedure now prescribe the time frames within which petitions for writs of review or certiorari involving contempt proceedings may be filed.