Opinion ID: 4529502
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: rehaif challenge

Text: In a supplemental brief, Johnson argues that his conviction for the § 922(g)(1) firearm offense must be vacated in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Rehaif v. United States, 588 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), because his indictment did not charge, the jury was not instructed, and the government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Johnson knew he was a felon at the time he possessed the firearm. 10 As Johnson concedes, this challenge—raised for the 10 The district court instructed the jury that Johnson could be found guilty of the § 922(g)(1) firearm offense only if the following facts were proved beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) “[Johnson] knowingly possessed a firearm or ammunition in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce”; and (2) “before possessing the firearm or ammunition, [Johnson] had been convicted of a felony, a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year.” 21 Case: 19-10200 Date Filed: 04/28/2020 Page: 22 of 24 first time on appeal—is reviewable for plain error only. See Hernandez, 906 F.3d at 1370. In Rehaif, the Supreme Court held that in prosecutions under §§ 922(g) and 924(a)(2), the government must prove—as an element of the crime—that when the defendant possessed the firearm, “he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm,” such as his status as a convicted felon. See 588 U.S. at __, 139 S. Ct. at 2194-97, 2200. Here, Rehaif makes plain that the district court erred when it did not require the indictment to charge, the jury to be instructed, and the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Johnson knew he was a felon at the time he possessed the firearm. See id. at __, 139 S. Ct. at 2194-97, 2200. Therefore, as the government concedes in this direct appeal case, Johnson has shown error that is plain. However, Johnson’s Rehaif challenge fails because he cannot show that the district court’s error affected his substantial rights. To show that the Rehaif error affected Johnson’s substantial rights, he must establish “a reasonable probability that, but for the error, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.” Molina-Martinez v. United States, 578 U.S. __, __, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1343 (2016) (quotation marks omitted). In making this determination, we consider the whole record. United States v. Reed, 941 F.3d 1018, 1021 (11th Cir. 2019). 22 Case: 19-10200 Date Filed: 04/28/2020 Page: 23 of 24 Here, the record as a whole demonstrates that Johnson knew of his status as a convicted felon when he possessed the firearm in the instant 2018 offense. First, at trial, Johnson stipulated to the fact that he “had been previously convicted of a felony, a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year.” Then, at sentencing, while Johnson objected to the PSI’s factual narratives surrounding some of his convictions, he did not object to the convictions themselves. Namely, the unobjected-to facts in the PSI showed that he had three convictions for possession of cocaine, which Johnson concedes is a felony under Florida law. See Fla. Stat. §§ 893.13(1)(a)(1), 893.03(2)(a)(4). Nor did Johnson object to the PSI’s indication that he ultimately served a total of 366 days’ imprisonment on his 2008 conviction. In fact, he admitted at the sentencing hearing that his longest sentence had been one year and one day. Johnson did not object to the PSI fact that, on the date of his 2009 cocaine-possession arrest, he reported to the sheriff’s office “to register as a felon.” Under these circumstances, a reasonable jury could “have inferred that [Johnson] knew he was a felon” when he possessed the firearm in the instant § 922(g)(1) firearm offense. See Reed, 941 F.3d at 1022. While Johnson points out that his stipulation to being a convicted felon was not a stipulation that he had knowledge of his felon status at the time of the firearm possession, it was still a fact for the jury to consider in determining the knowledge 23 Case: 19-10200 Date Filed: 04/28/2020 Page: 24 of 24 element of the offense. See id. Johnson also argues that the record “might support an inference that”—given his background, intelligence level, and mental health issues—“[he] may not appreciate nor fully understand the collateral consequences of his prior criminal history[.]” Even if this is the case, Rehaif only requires the government to prove that Johnson had knowledge of his status as a convicted felon, not that he knew that his firearm possession, as a convicted felon, was in fact unlawful. See Rehaif, 588 U.S. at __, 139 S. Ct. at 2194-97, 2200. Because Johnson cannot show a reasonable probability that, but for the Rehaif error, the outcome of his trial would have been different, he cannot show that the error affected his substantial rights. See Molina-Martinez, 578 U.S. at __, 126 S. Ct. at 1343; Reed, 941 F.3d at 1021-22. Johnson has failed to meet the plain error standard.