Opinion ID: 200973
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Johnson's Cross-Appeal Regarding Damages

Text: 41 Johnson cross-appeals the district court's summary judgment and post-trial determinations that, as a matter of law, he is not entitled to any back pay or front pay for any period beyond December 8, 2000. Spencer Press raises no questions about Johnson's preservation of these issues for appeal. 42 The availability of back pay and front pay is not affected by the cap on compensatory and punitive damages. Both federal and Maine law clearly exclude awards of back pay from the statutory cap on the sum of compensatory and punitive damages. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(2); Me.Rev.Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 4613(2)(B)(8)(d). And the Supreme Court has recently clarified that the same rule applies to awards of front pay. Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 848, 121 S.Ct. 1946, 150 L.Ed.2d 62 (2001). 43 An award of back pay compensates plaintiffs for lost wages and benefits between the time of the discharge and the trial court judgment. See Lindemann & Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law 635-37 (Cane, Jr. et al. eds., 3d ed.1996). Front pay, by contrast, is money awarded for lost compensation during the period between judgment and reinstatement or in lieu of reinstatement. Pollard, 532 U.S. at 846, 121 S.Ct. 1946; see Lindemann & Grossman, at 639-42. Front pay thus compensates plaintiffs for lost wages that may accrue after the conclusion of the trial. Both back pay and front pay are authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1), which provides: 44 If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court may ... order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay (payable by the employer, employment agency, or labor organization, as the case may be, responsible for the unlawful employment practice), or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate. Back pay liability shall not accrue from a date more than two years prior to the filing of a charge with the Commission. Interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable. 45 During the back pay period, individuals have an obligation to exercise reasonable diligence in finding alternative suitable employment. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1); Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 231-32, 102 S.Ct. 3057, 73 L.Ed.2d 721 (1982) (an unemployed or underemployed claimant, like all other Title VII claimants, is subject to the statutory duty to minimize damages set out in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1)); Carey v. Mt. Desert Island Hosp., 156 F.3d 31, 41 (1st Cir.1998). Thus, awards of back pay are offset by any wages that could have been earned with reasonable diligence after the illegal discharge, regardless of whether they were actually earned. See § 2000e-5(g)(1); Quinones Candelario v. Postmaster Gen. of United States, 906 F.2d 798, 799-802 (1st Cir.1990). Failures to mitigate damages can take a variety of forms, including not looking for new employment, see, e.g., Hansard v. Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co., 865 F.2d 1461, 1468 (5th Cir.1989), finding new employment but voluntarily quitting, see, e.g., EEOC v. Delight Wholesale Co., 973 F.2d 664, 670 (8th Cir.1992), or, as in this case, finding new employment and getting discharged for misconduct, see, e.g., Brady v. Thurston Motor Lines, Inc., 753 F.2d 1269, 1277 (4th Cir.1985). 46 The Supreme Court laid out the basic standards for awarding back pay in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975). That opinion clarified that in cases of unlawful discrimination, back pay should be denied only for reasons which, if applied generally, would not frustrate the central statutory purposes of eradicating discrimination throughout the economy and making persons whole for injuries suffered through past discrimination. Id. at 421, 95 S.Ct. 2362. Despite its equitable nature, back pay is therefore a presumptive entitlement of a plaintiff who successfully prosecutes an employment discrimination case. Thurman v. Yellow Freight Systs., Inc., 90 F.3d 1160, 1171 (6th Cir.1996). In this circuit, juries are generally entrusted with decisions on back pay when the jurors are already resolving issues of liability and compensatory damages. 7 See Santiago-Negron v. Castro-Davila, 865 F.2d 431, 441 (1st Cir.1989). 47 Awards of front pay, by contrast, are generally entrusted to the district judge's discretion 8 and are available in a more limited set of circumstances than back pay. See Lussier v. Runyon, 50 F.3d 1103, 1108-09 (1st Cir.1995). Front pay should not be awarded unless reinstatement is impracticable or impossible. Wildman v. Lerner Stores Corp., 771 F.2d 605, 616 (1st Cir.1985). Even then, awards of front pay are discretionary, in part because they necessarily involve predictions of events yet to come. See id.; Lussier, 50 F.3d at 1109. For these reasons, district court decisions as to front pay are generally afforded more deference than decisions as to back pay. 48 The district court ruled that Johnson stopped mitigating his damages about seven months after he left Spencer Press, when he was fired on December 8, 2000 from his subsequent job at Hannaford Brothers, a major supermarket chain in Maine. Johnson had started that job only a few days after leaving Spencer Press. Johnson was found eating food for which he had not paid, in violation of Hannaford company rules. This failure to mitigate damages, held the district court, eliminated the availability of either back pay or front pay for any time period after December 8. 9 Moreover, the district court found that there was insufficient evidence that the mistreatment Johnson endured at Spencer Press was causally responsible for his being fired from Hannaford. The court concluded that Johnson's own lay testimony to this effect did not create an issue of fact and that Johnson's expert was not specific enough on the link between Johnson's disability and his misbehavior at Hannaford. 10 49 Johnson's cross-appeal does not dispute the conclusion that Spencer Press was not responsible for his termination from Hannaford. Instead, Johnson's basic argument is that the district court misunderstood the implications of his being fired from Hannaford for the availability of both front and back pay. Johnson argues that his termination from Hannaford only tolled the availability of back pay until he was able to find another job, and that the district court erroneously held that the availability of back pay was permanently cut off at that point. Johnson makes a similar argument as to front pay, claiming that the district court still had discretion to award front pay even after he was fired from Hannaford. Furthermore, Johnson says that he was unable to find a job after he was fired from Hannaford because he was psychologically completely disabled and Spencer Press is responsible for this disability. As a result, Johnson argues, Spencer Press is liable for back pay after he was fired from Hannaford because it was responsible for his inability to end the tolling period. Similarly, Johnson says that the district court could also have awarded front pay on this rationale. The analytical issues as to back pay and front pay are similar.
50 Review of the legal principles used by the district court in determining the availability of back pay is de novo. Reich v. Cambridgeport Air Sys., 26 F.3d 1187, 1190 (1st Cir.1994). Johnson's appeal raises a number of difficult issues. As Johnson notes, the district court's final holding was that once Johnson was fired from Hannaford, he was no longer eligible for any back pay. 11 51 The district court was correct that once Johnson was fired from Hannaford for misconduct, he was no longer mitigating his damages, as was required. But that did not mean that the possibility of back pay was permanently cut off. Although the district court did not explicitly endorse, or even give reasons for, such a rule, its holding necessarily relied on this supposition of law. 12 We hold that this was error. 52 In fact, at least two circuit courts have found that back pay awards can accrue for periods after an employee is terminated from an employer B when the job at employer B was serving to mitigate damages arising from discriminatory conduct by employer A. See Delight Wholesale, 973 F.2d at 670 (back pay period was temporarily tolled after plaintiff voluntarily quit for personal reasons and began to run once she found a new job); Brady, 753 F.2d at 1278-80 (back pay is temporarily tolled after an employee is fired for misconduct in the course of mitigating damages from a previous illegal discharge and begins again once the employee finds another job). These holdings stem, at least in part, from the NLRB's rule on the issue, first articulated in Knickerbocker Plastic Co., 132 N.L.R.B. 1209, 1215, 1961 WL 15694 (1961): 53 We further find that, as a result of such quitting, each of these claimants shall be deemed to have earned for the remainder of the period for which each is awarded back pay the hourly wage being earned at the time such quitting occurred. Therefore, an offset computed on the appropriate rate per hour will be deducted as interim earnings from the gross back pay of each of these claimants. This offset shall be made applicable from the date of the unjustified quitting throughout the remainder of the back pay period for each particular claimant. 54 (emphasis added). Because Title VII's back pay language was  `expressly modeled' on the analogous remedial provision of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) the principles developed under the NLRA generally guide, but do not bind, courts in tailoring remedies under Title VII. Ford Motor Co., 458 U.S. at 226 n. 8, 102 S.Ct. 3057 (internal citations omitted). 55 We hold that back pay is not permanently terminated when an employee is fired for misconduct or voluntarily quits interim employment. 13 This view comports with the purpose of the back pay remedy as articulated in Albemarle. Albemarle taught that back pay is a presumptive entitlement of a victim of discrimination and that the discriminating employer is responsible for all wage losses that result from its unlawful discrimination, at least until the time of judgment. 14 422 U.S. at 419-21, 95 S.Ct. 2362. Had there been no discrimination at employer A, the employee would never have come to work (or have been fired) from employer B. 15 The discriminating employer (employer A) should not benefit from the windfall of not paying the salary differential when the employee is re-employed by employer C. 16 Further, the use of per se rules is contrary to the general principle that the necessary balancing of the equities requires a case-by-case approach. Rosario-Torres v. Hernandez-Colon, 889 F.2d 314, 321 (1st Cir.1989) (en banc) ([T]he hallmark of equity is the ability to assess all relevant facts and circumstances and tailor appropriate relief on a case by case basis.); Medlock v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 164 F.3d 545, 555 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 813, 120 S.Ct. 48, 145 L.Ed.2d 42 (1999). 56 Ultimately, we need not craft general principles for how back pay should be calculated when an employee who has been discriminated against is fired from intervening employment. But our holding does require us to reach a second issue. Here, once Johnson was fired from Hannaford, he never sought out employment before trial in a further attempt to mitigate damages. Johnson explains that he did not seek further employment because he was unable to work as he suffered from a total psychological disability; indeed, Johnson received a 100 percent non-service connected disability rating from the Veteran's Administration. Some courts have adopted a rule that if a plaintiff is unable to mitigate damages due to a disability not caused by the discriminatory employer, that disability cuts off back pay liability. 17 Lathem v. Dep't of Children & Youth Servs., 172 F.3d 786, 794 (11th Cir.1999) ([C]ourts exclude periods where a plaintiff is unavailable to work, such as periods of disability, from the back pay award.); Starceski v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 54 F.3d 1089, 1101 (3rd Cir.1995) ([A]s a general rule ... an employer who has discriminated need not reimburse the plaintiffs for salary loss attributable to the plaintiffs and unrelated to the employment discrimination. (internal quotation marks omitted)). Here, Johnson does not argue that a disability arising independently of the discriminatory employer does not cut off back pay, so we do not rule on the issue. Johnson does, however, argue that there was evidence that his disability was caused by the harassment he endured at Spencer Press. If it was, he says, then both back pay and front pay should have been available even after he was fired from Hannaford for misconduct. 57 Johnson is correct that several courts have held that an employee who is unable to work due to a disability is not precluded from receiving back pay when the employer caused the disability. This court has, applying Massachusetts law, endorsed that rule. See Blockel v. J.C. Penney Co., 337 F.3d 17, 27-28 (1st Cir.2003). We now extend that holding to Title VII; an employee who cannot mitigate damages because of the unlawful actions of the employer can still receive back pay. See Lathem, 172 F.3d at 794 ([A] Title VII claimant is entitled to an award of back pay where the defendant's discriminatory conduct caused the disability.); Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139, 157 (3d Cir.1999) (Because [the employer's] conduct affirmatively impaired [the employee's] ability to mitigate her damages, it would be inequitable to reduce her back pay award in this case.). This rule is merely a logical corollary of the principle that the victims of discrimination should be restored, so far as possible ... to a position where they would have been were it not for the unlawful discrimination. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 421, 95 S.Ct. 2362. If the employer's unlawful conduct caused the employee's inability to mitigate damages, then the employer should be liable for the resulting consequences. 58 Nonetheless, the evidence provided by Johnson does not allow him to take advantage of this rule. That evidence does no more than create an issue regarding whether the harassment at Spencer Press was one among numerous other independent and significant contributing factors to Johnson's psychological disability. Besides his own testimony, the only evidence that Johnson offered was the testimony of one expert, Dr. Ananis. Dr. Ananis stated in a deposition that Johnson 59 had been able to maintain a certain degree of functioning and employment until the events which took place during his employment at Spencer Press, including the harassment he stated he received while he worked there. I am aware that Mr. Johnson had other issues in his life, including family deaths, divorce, and problems with his sons, and I did not make a determination as to what event or events, if any, caused his depression and panic and anxiety disorders. Nevertheless, it is clear to me that the events at Spencer Press relating to the harassment he stated he received from his supervisor exacerbated his depression and panic and anxiety disorders. 60 Although this testimony may have created a genuine question of fact about whether there was some relationship between the harassment at Spencer Press and Johnson's disability, it was not sufficient for Johnson to escape summary judgment on the issue. Given that Johnson was able to find a new job at Hannaford immediately after leaving Spencer Press and then to keep the job for the next seven months and given that Johnson has had numerous other significant problems in his life that may have been causally related to his disability, the evidence was insufficient. 61 Johnson's own testimony does not bridge the gap. Johnson confirmed that he had suffered from depression and anxiety since 1993, and that he had family problems as well as the problems he suffered at Spencer Press. But he did not, and could not (owing to his lack of expertise), testify that his inability to get a job after Hannaford was caused by the harassment at Spencer Press.
62 For the same reasons that we affirm the denial of back pay after December 8, 2000, we conclude that there was no abuse of discretion in the district court's refusal to grant front pay.