Opinion ID: 2655781
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Motion to Suppress Identification

Text: The petitioner also argues that the circuit court erred by allowing the jury to hear testimony regarding the out-of-court identification of the petitioner by the victim. This Court has held: “In determining whether an out-of-court identification of a defendant is so tainted as to require suppression of an in-court identification a court must look to the totality of the circumstances and determine whether the identification was reliable, even though the confrontation procedure was suggestive, with due regard given to such factors as the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness’ prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation.” Point 3, Syllabus, State v. Casdorph, [159] W.Va. [909], 230 S.E.2d 476 (1976). Syl. Pt. 2, State v. Foddrell, 165 W.Va. 540, 269 S.E.2d 854 (1980). The petitioner argues that when the totality of the circumstances is considered in his case, it is clear that the identification was not reliable and should have been suppressed. 11 In that regard, the petitioner notes that Mr. Granger testified at the suppression hearing that he saw the perpetrator make an obscene hand gesture at him as he drove by. He then heard a bang and looked in his rearview mirror and saw the perpetrator shooting at him. The petitioner points out that Mr. Granger did not specify how long he looked at the perpetrator or with what degree of attention; that Mr. Granger stated he had never seen the shooter before when he was questioned by the police, even though he had driven past the petitioner’s home every day on his way to and from work; and that Mr. Granger did not describe the shooter with any great detail when he called 911 as he only reported that it was “ a guy . . . wearing jeans, black hat no shirt . . . .” In addition, while acknowledging that the identification occurred within thirty minutes of the shooting, the petitioner contends that consideration must be given to the fact that he was presented to the victim exactly as the person described to 911, i.e., a man wearing jeans; the only difference was that he was sitting in a police car and handcuffed. The State contends that the petitioner is asking this Court to re-weigh the victim’s testimony and substitute its judgment for that of the jury. The State maintains that the evidence established that the identification made by Mr. Granger was reliable. While Mr. Granger testified that he did not know the petitioner, he did state that he had previously seen him feeding chickens in his yard and had encountered him face-to-face one time when he dropped off a member of the petitioner’s family at his home. Mr. Granger further testified 12 that he was certain the petitioner was the perpetrator when he identified him as he was seated in the back of the cruiser. Finally, the State points out the petitioner did not react to the identification by claiming that he was not the perpetrator, but instead he threatened Mr. Granger.8 The circuit court found that the out-of-court identification was, in fact, overly suggestive, but concluded Mr. Granger had sufficient independent knowledge of the petitioner to make the identification. In making that finding, the court noted that while Mr. Granger did not know the petitioner by name, he had seen him on multiple occasions. Further, the identification was made within twenty-five minutes of the shooting, and although the petitioner was wearing a shirt but not a hat, Mr. Granger was certain in his identification of the petitioner as the person who shot at him. Upon consideration of the totality of the circumstances and giving deference to the circuit court’s factual findings, we are unable to conclude that the circuit court erred in refusing the petitioner’s motion to suppress the out-of­ court identification made by the victim. 8 Mr. Granger testified that the petitioner was sitting in the police cruiser whistling and that after he made the identification, the petitioner said, “I’m crazy, I’ll be out. I know where you live[.]” 13