Opinion ID: 1446534
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Laurel's Proffer Statement Contained Sufficient Indicia of Reliability to be Admissible

Text: Defendant's first argument on appeal is that Laurel's proffer statement was inadmissible at sentencing because it was hearsay that did not possess sufficient indicia of reliability. We review the district court's determination of reliability for abuse of discretion, United States v. Bowker, 372 F.3d 365, 392 (6th Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, 543 U.S. 1182, 125 S.Ct. 1420, 161 L.Ed.2d 181 (2005); United States v. Luciano, 414 F.3d 174, 180 (1st Cir.2005), and we review the district court's factual findings for clear error. See United States v. Herrera, 928 F.2d 769, 774 (6th Cir.1991). The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment also imposes a minimum standard of reliability for evidence admitted at sentencing. See United States v. Silverman, 976 F.2d 1502, 1504 (6th Cir.1992) (en banc) (citing United States v. Baylin, 696 F.2d 1030, 1040 (3d Cir.1982)). To the extent that Defendant's claims sound in due process, we review them de novo. See United States v. Sanders, 452 F.3d 572, 576 (6th Cir.2006) (A due process claim raising a mixed question of law and fact is reviewed de novo.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 2130, 167 L.Ed.2d 867 (2007). Generally, the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply to sentencing proceedings, Fed.R.Evid. 1101(d)(3), and hearsay evidence is admissible at sentencing. United States v. Davis, 170 F.3d 617, 622 (6th Cir.1999). However, U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a) does establish a minimum indicia-of-reliability standard that evidence must meet in order to be admissible in Guidelines sentencing proceedings. Section 6A1.3(a) states: When any factor important to the sentencing determination is reasonably in dispute, the parties shall be given an adequate opportunity to present information to the court regarding that factor. In resolving any dispute concerning a factor important to the sentencing determination, the court may consider relevant information without regard to its admissibility under the rules of evidence applicable at trial, provided that the information has sufficient indicia of reliabiltiy to support its probable accuracy. U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3 (emphasis added). In Silverman, this Court, sitting en banc, concluded that this standard was also required as a matter of due process. 976 F.2d at 1504 (This due process limit on the evidence a sentencing court may properly consider is recognized in the commentary to § 6A1.3.). We have characterized Silverman as setting a relatively low hurdle, United States v. Greene, 71 F.3d 232, 235 (6th Cir.1995), that asks only that  some evidentiary basis beyond mere allegation in an indictment be presented to support consideration of such conduct as relevant to sentencing. Silverman, 976 F.2d at 1504. The evidence in this case, under the Guidelines and as a matter of due process, is clearly above the minimum standard of reliability required for the evidence to be admissible at sentencing. The district court found that Laurel's statement was richly detailed, and was both internally and externally consistent. J.A. at 406. The district court also noted that the statement could conceivably be used to impeach Laurel if he subsequently testified to the contrary, and so even though it was offered under the promise of immunity, the possibility of the statement being used against Laurel's penal interests bolstered its reliability. These factual findings establish that Laurel's proffer statement was sufficiently reliable to be admitted at sentencing. Compare United States v. Hunt, 487 F.3d 347, 352-53 (6th Cir.2007) (holding that two co-conspirators' hearsay statements were admissible when corroborated by each other and by circumstantial evidence) with United States v. Lowenstein, 108 F.3d 80, 83-84 (6th Cir.1997) (concluding that the evidence did not contain sufficient indicia of reliability where the district court relied solely upon a hearsay statement that did not mention the factual basis for the belief of the [declarant]). Defendant contends that Laurel's statement was inadmissible because statements from a co-defendant that shift blame onto the defendant are presumptively unreliable. See, e.g., Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 544, 106 S.Ct. 2056, 90 L.Ed.2d 514 (1986) (noting that there exists a time-honored teaching that a codefendant's confession inculpating the accused is inherently unreliable). The cases upon which Defendant relies are distinguishable, however, because they do not concern sentencing. [3] This flaw is fatal. We have held that co-conspirators' hearsay statements are admissible at sentencing, notwithstanding the fact that such statements may be suspect on account of the co-conspirators' explicit or implicit desire to secure favorable treatment from the police. Hunt, 487 F.3d at 352-53 (citing United States v. Huckins, 53 F.3d 276, 279 (9th Cir.1995)). Importantly, Defendant points to nothing about Laurel's proffer statement that suggests that it is unreliable, beyond its character as hearsay and the fact that Laurel was involved in the same conspiracy as Defendant. We have recently rejected an invitation to craft a rule that would consider co-conspirator hearsay inherently unreliable, and would thus render such evidence presumptively inadmissible at sentencing. Id. Here, the district court made detailed and extensive findings as to the reliability of Laurel's proffer statement, and we accordingly hold that the district court did not err by admitting such evidence at sentencing. II. The District Court did not Err by Concluding that Defendant was an Organizer or Leader Next, Defendant argues that his sentence should be vacated because the district court enhanced his advisory Guidelines range by four points under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1. We have not settled the question of what standard governs review of a sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1. Traditionally . . . we reviewed the district court's factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v. McDaniel, 398 F.3d 540, 551 n. 10 (6th Cir.2005) (citing United States v. Henley, 360 F.3d 509, 516 (6th Cir.2004)). However, after the Supreme Court in Buford v. United States held that review under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 should be conducted deferentially rather than de novo, 532 U.S. 59, 64, 121 S.Ct. 1276, 149 L.Ed.2d 197 (2001), this Court has found it unnecessary to determine whether Buford requires us to alter the standard of review we apply in reviewing § 3B1.1 enhancements. McDaniel, 398 F.3d at 551 n. 10. Likewise, the instant case provides no occasion for resolving this uncertainty, because we would affirm the enhancement of Defendant's Guidelines range under any standard of review. Defendant makes two arguments as to why the district court erred in applying a § 3B1.1 enhancement when calculating his advisory Guidelines range. First, Defendant contends that the substance of his participation in the conspiracy did not establish that he was an organizer or leader. Second, Defendant argues that the relevant criminal activity involved an insufficient number of persons to support the enhancement. These arguments will be addressed below. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a), an enhancement of four levels is appropriate if the defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive. In making this determination, a court should consider: the exercise of decision making authority, the nature of participation in the commission of the offense, the recruitment of accomplices, the claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of the crime, the degree of participation in planning or organizing the offense, the nature and scope of the illegal activity, and the degree of control and authority exercised over others. United States v. Hernandez, 227 F.3d 686, 699-700 (6th Cir.2000) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n. 4). Here, the facts found by the district court support the conclusion that Defendant was an organizer or leader. The district court found that Defendant had demonstrated that he had held a leadership role by his conversation with Laurel on April 8, 2001. In that conversation, Defendant figuratively looked Laurel in the eye and said, you know what you have to do, and this was a pretty powerful indicat[or] of a supervisory relationship. He was giving orders. J.A. at 415. This fact demonstrates a significant degree of control and authority exercised over others. Hernandez, 227 F.3d at 700. The district court also found that Defendant was the man to whom Laurel was turning, and he was the man who was supplying Laurel with the drugs. J.A. at 415-16. The fact that Defendant was supplying Laurel with drugs demonstrates a significant degree of planning, organizing, and participation on the part of Defendant. The district court also noted that the amount of cocaine was worth $2 million, which it characterized as massive, and it found that Defendant was somebody with a large stake in the profitability. J.A. at 417-18. These facts go to Defendant's claimed right to the fruits of the crime and the nature and scope of Defendant's decision-making authority. In light of these facts, we conclude that the district court properly held that Defendant was an organizer or leader pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1. [4] Defendant also argues that his advisory Guidelines range could not be enhanced under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a) because the criminal activity in which he participated did not involve five or more persons. We note that the district court correctly concluded that it need not find that Defendant was an organizer or leader of five people in order to apply the enhancement. In addressing the analogous inquiry under § 3B1.1(b), which provides a three-level enhancement if the defendant was a manager or supervisor (but not an organizer or leader), this Court stated that there need only be evidence to support a finding that the defendant was a manager or supervisor of at least one other participant in the criminal activity, and that the criminal activity involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive. Henley, 360 F.3d at 517. For the purpose of § 3B1.1(a), a participant is a person who is criminally responsible for the commission of the offense, but need not have been convicted. Id. at 518 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n. 1). Defendant argues that the facts of this case do not disclose the involvement of four other persons, because there is no evidence that Defendant controlled subsequent buyers, and therefore the Davis brothers and the persons to whom they sold cannot be counted for the purpose of § 3B1.1. Defendant relies on United States v. Belletiere, where the Third Circuit held that [b]efore a supplier or customer may be deemed to have been a `controlled' participant under § 3B1.1(a), the government must prove at least an interdependence between the defendant and the supplier or customer that would support an inference that the supplier or customer for personal use is answerable to the defendant. 971 F.2d 961, 970 (3d Cir.1992). We need not decide, however, whether the reasoning of Belletiere should be adopted by this Court. [5] Even ignoring the persons who lacked contact with Defendant, the criminal activity in this case included five persons. The district court found that there were four individuals that were nothing other than drivers of loads of cocaine or transporters of money back from Memphis to [Defendant]. J.A. at 413. Although it is not precisely clear to whom the district court is referring, the record supports the fact that Canoso, Louis Pacheco, Laurel, and Joe Villanueva were all involved in transporting cocaine and money for Defendant. The district court's implicit finding that these individuals were participants under § 3B1.1 is not erroneous. Consequently, we hold that the district court properly imposed an upwards adjustment under § 3B1.1(a).