Opinion ID: 1269966
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: negligence claim against the state

Text: Ashby alleges that the district court erred in finding that the State owed no duty to Ashby. To recover in a negligence action brought under the State Tort Claims Act, [14] a plaintiff must show a legal duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, a breach of such duty, causation, and damages. [15] The threshold issue in any negligence action is whether the defendant owes a legal duty to the plaintiff. [16] The law defines a duty as an obligation, to which the law will give recognition and effect, to conform to a particular standard of conduct toward another. [17] The question whether a legal duty exists for actionable negligence is a question of law dependent on the facts in a particular situation. [18] The alleged duty Ashby places on the State does not come from a single source. Instead, we understand Ashby's argument to be that based upon a combination of constitutional and statutory law, the State had a duty to confirm whether he had consented to the adoption, or that the Blacks did not need his consent, before the State approved M.A.'s removal from Nebraska. Ashby contends that the State is a `sending agency' under the ICPC in effect at the time of M.A.'s removal. [19] (The ICPC was amended in 2009.) [20] Ashby alleges that as a sending agency, the State must comply with every requirement in the ICPC and with Nebraska's adoption statutes. Ashby also asserts that as a sending agency under the ICPC, the State `retain[s] jurisdiction over the child sufficient to determine all matters in relation to the custody, supervision, care, treatment and disposition of the child which it would have had if the child had remained in the sending agency's state....' [21] Ashby argues that these statutes require the State to satisfy the consent laws for in-state adoptions before permitting a child to be placed with out-of-state adoptive parents. He also argues that the State must comply with Nebraska adoption law to protect his constitutional parental right to care for and have custody of his child. [22] Ashby, however, does not challenge the constitutionality of any statute. We agree with Ashby that in a private adoption, Nebraska is a sending agency under the ICPC. The ICPC defines a sending agency as a party state, officer or employee thereof; a subdivision of a party state, or officer or employee thereof; a court of a party state; a person, corporation, association, charitable agency or other entity which sends, brings, or causes to be sent or brought any child to another party state. [23] The State argues that in a private adoption, the sending agency under the ICPC is the birth mother, not the State. We agree that the birth mother is a sending agency. [24] But we also believe that in a given placement, more than one individual or entity could be a sending agency. Here, Kilmer was a sending agency because she initiated and consented to placing M.A. with the Blacks. But the State, through Dyer, was also a sending agency. Dyer facilitated and approved the removal of M.A. from Nebraska, causing M.A.'s placement in Alabama. According to her own testimony, Dyer had the power to refuse to authorize removal of M.A. from Nebraska. So we do not agree with the State's argument that Kilmer was the sole person responsible for allowing the removal of M.A. The definition of a sending agency appears broad enough to include any individual or entity that causes a child to be moved interstate, even if that means there are multiple sending agencies in a single adoption. We conclude that the State is a sending agency under the ICPC. But even if the State is a sending agency, for it to be negligent, it must have breached a duty owed to Ashby. Ashby asserts that the statutes require the State to determine whether he had consented to the adoption or whether his consent was not required before allowing M.A. to leave Nebraska. To address this argument, we look to Nebraska's paternity statutes. When a child is born out of wedlock and the biological mother desires to relinquish her rights to the child, the biological mother's attorney or the adoption agency facilitating the adoption must attempt to notify the biological father or possible biological fathers. As outlined in Neb.Rev.Stat. § 43-104.08 (Reissue 2004): Whenever a child is claimed to be born out of wedlock and the biological mother contacts an adoption agency or attorney to relinquish her rights to the child ... the agency or attorney contacted shall attempt to establish the identity of the biological father and further attempt to inform the biological father of his right to execute a relinquishment and consent to adoption, or a denial of paternity and waiver of rights.... The notice must be served in advance of the child's birth, whenever possible, to allow the biological father to comply with the registration requirements. And the notice must inform the putative father that he may have the right to file a notice of objection and intent to obtain custody. [25] The biological father can be notified by registered or certified mail, restricted delivery, return receipt requested. [26] Or, [i]f the agency or attorney representing the biological mother is unable through reasonable efforts to locate and serve notice on the biological father or possible biological fathers as contemplated in sections 43-104.12 and 43-104.13, the agency or attorney shall notify the biological father or possible biological fathers by publication. [27] So, in a private adoption, regardless of how the attorney or adoption agency attempts to notify a biological father, the attorney or agency must exercise diligence to identify and give actual or constructive notice to the biological father. [28] But Nebraska's statutes do not prohibit placement with adoptive parents before notice is perfected. Instead, [i]f the biological father [is] not given actual or constructive notice prior to the time of placement, the prospective adoptive parents are required to sign an at-risk placement form. [29] The form give[s] the adoptive parents a statement of legal risk indicating the legal status of the biological father's parental rights as of the time of placement. [30] In signing the form, the adoptive parents are acknowledging their acceptance of the placement, notwithstanding the legal risk. [31] Here, Washburn attempted to, and eventually did, notify Ashby of the proposed adoption. But the notification took place after M.A.'s birth. As required by statute, Dyer approved placement of M.A. with the Blacks only after they signed an at-risk placement form. The form explicitly stated that in the event the birth father comes forward, or asse[r]ts his interest in the subject child, even after the time of placement, the State of Alabama may require the undersigned to return the child to the State of Nebraska for further determination on the rights of the putative father. Nebraska's statutes require the birth mother's attorney or adoption agency, not the State, to notify the biological father of a proposed adoption. More important, these statutes specifically permit the State to approve out-of-state placement with prospective adoptive parents without the biological father's consent or notification if the prospective adoptive parents have signed an at-risk placement form. Contrary to Ashby's claims, the State had no obligation under any of the paternity statutes or the ICPC to confirm that Ashby consented to the adoption before allowing M.A. to leave the state. We agree that the State, as a sending agency, was required to ensure ICPC compliance before allowing M.A. to leave Nebraska. [32] But nothing in the ICPC requires the State to ensure that a possible biological father has consented to an adoption or has not claimed paternity before approving a child's placement in a prospective adoptive home. Ashby contends that an at-risk placement form provides an inadequate substitute for Ashby's notice of, or consent to, the adoption. To reach that conclusion, Ashby would have us read into § 43-104.15 a different requirement for out-of-state at-risk placements than for in-state at-risk placements. But in the absence of ambiguity or constitutional defect, courts must give effect to statutes as they are written. [33] And Ashby has not challenged the constitutionality of § 43-104.15 or claimed that it is ambiguous. Section 43-104.15 permitted the at-risk placement with the Blacks, and we find nothing in either the ICPC or Nebraska law that placed a duty on the State to confirm that Ashby had first consented to the adoption. Ashby also argues, however, that when reading Nebraska's adoption laws in pari materia with the paternity statutes, the statutes require consent for the adoption before making an out-of-state placement. He points to Neb.Rev.Stat. § 43-104(1) (Reissue 2004), which states no adoption shall be decreed unless written consents are executed by both the mother and father of a child born out of wedlock. Here, however, the issue focuses on the placement of a child in another state. Ashby's argument confuses adoption with placement. Placements occur before an adoption, and Nebraska's statutes permit both in-state and out-of-state placements without prior consent. In assisting this out-of-state private adoption, the State fulfilled its obligations. Despite Ashby's arguments to the contrary, the State did not have a duty to confirm that Ashby consented to the adoption before allowing the Blacks to remove M.A. from Nebraska. Absent a duty, a negligence claim fails. [34] The district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the State.