Opinion ID: 351948
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Count II: The Yva Henry Case

Text: 5 The false statements which formed the basis of this count involved a cost breakdown which had been prepared for Yva Henry, a client of Davis. Henry had written a letter dated March 12, 1974 to Paul Gross of the Florida Bar complaining about the amount she was to receive in settlement of her claim for an accident which had occurred in April 1973. 6 Gross forwarded this complaint to Davis on March 15, 1974 and requested a written response. 7 By letter dated April 1, 1974, signed for Davis by Abrams, the latter forwarded to the Florida Bar a closing statement on the Henry case, 8 containing a $231.50 charge for Costs. 6 On April 2, 1974, Gross called Davis' office to request a breakdown of the $231.50 in costs as shown by the following telephone message directed to Anita: Yva Henry 7 (cost 231.50 wants 8 breakdown?) 5564 Case No. ( 9 ) 9 That same day, Abrams signed a letter to the Florida Bar on behalf of Davis, enclosing a breakdown she prepared which listed these items: 10 10 Items (1)-(4) of this breakdown are the source of Abrams' present problems. 11 As to items (1) and (2) (the two conferences with Dr. Fox on 4/25/73 and 6/1/73), Gov't Ex. 14, which was taken from the Yva Henry file in Dr. Fox's office, is critical. That exhibit comprises undated slips of paper, one of which is a telephone call memo reading in part: 12 $75 JAD 11 Bill Conference (2) Iva Henry 50 25 13 The other critical slip of paper from Fox's Henry file forming the second part of Ex. 14 reads: 14 Fla Bar Assn. Mr. Gross Eva Henry Re: JAD 4/22/74 to verify total bill $400 - or $475 15 The bottom half of this note, beginning with 4/22/74 appears to be in a different handwriting from the top half. The third portion of Gov't Ex. 14 comprises an exact duplicate of an undated typed bill to Davis for the two office conferences in April and June 1973 which appears in the Henry file in Davis' office. 12 16 Item (3) on the breakdown, relating to $107.50 for investigation and photography, was ostensibly covered by a May 17, 1973 typed invoice in duplicate on the billhead of Worldwide Detective Agency. 13 This bill charged $100 for investigative services and $7.50 for auto. 17 With regard to item (4) covering $35 for photographs, the Henry file contained two critical documents: a photography shop invoice for film and a film developing envelope, both dated April 2, 1974, the same day on which the Florida Bar telephone inquiry and the Abrams breakdown were made. 14 The photographs of the location of the Henry accident which were placed in the Henry file could not have been taken any time before March 1974. 15 18 The most significant document in Davis' Henry file is a slip of paper comprising part of Gov't Ex. 7. 16 The first four lines of this slip, listing the four items, are in Davis' handwriting. The addition and subtraction are in Abrams' handwriting. 19 Photos 10 @ 3.50 35.00 17 A.R. 18 3 W.R. 19 6 J.M.H. 20 5 ------------- 49.0 75 ------------- 124 231.50 124.00 ------------- 107.50 20 Another slip of paper, totally in Davis' handwriting (Gov't Ex. 8), reads: 21 231.50 Invest. 150 24.90 Conf. Dr. 100 1.50 ----- Acc. Report 23 26.40 West. 6 1.50 ----- J.M.H. 5 27.90 22 A comparison of these figures and those of Ex. 7 with the figures on the breakdown (see text following note 10, supra ) reveals that the breakdown sent to the Florida Bar matched the figures of Ex. 7 containing Abrams' mathematical calculation. 21
23 The testimony which formed Count II of the indictment fills nine legal-size pages. So that we do not further lengthen this opinion, that testimony is attached as an appendix. The questions and answers are numbered for easy reference and the statements which we believe the jury could reasonably have concluded were false are italicized. 24 Abrams maintained throughout her grand jury testimony 22 that the $231.50 figure was based on bills actually in the file prior to the settlement of the Henry case, on the cost sheet she prepared as the Henry case progressed, or on cost cards which the accountant had. 23 Indeed, she effectively denied fabricating the costs. 24 We believe that the evidence overwhelmingly supported a jury conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that she gave false testimony. 25 Our view is that the jury could have reasonably concluded that actual events proceeded along the following lines and that Abrams must have known about and remembered those events when she testified before the grand jury: When the Florida Bar request for the $231.50 cost breakdown was made, Abrams or someone in Davis' office with Abrams' knowledge arranged to have the photographs taken (item (4), $35), Davis listed minor amounts to be charged for perfunctory reports made in almost every accident case (items (5)-(7), $14), and Abrams or someone in Davis' office with Abrams' knowledge arranged with someone in Dr. Fox's office to bill Davis for $75 of those costs (items (1) and (2)). And when Abrams totaled those costs and arrived at only $124, she subtracted the subtotal from $231.50, got $107.50, and she or someone in Davis' office with her knowledge fabricated an invoice on Worldwide Detective Agency billhead (item (3)) to justify the $107.50 difference. This view is based on the following. 25 First, it is clear from the documentary evidence that the Fox conferences were not billed in the ordinary course (see notes 12 and 23, supra ). Second, the Fox bill is not dated as is the other Fox invoice for $475 (see notes 8 and 12, supra ). Third, it is also clear that the Davis office requested that these conferences be billed in response to the Florida Bar inquiry. Thus, as to the Fox conferences, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Abrams violated § 1623 when she denied knowing the circumstances under which the undated Fox bill was prepared. 26 26 There was also sufficient evidence to support a conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that Abrams gave perjured testimony concerning item (3), the $107.50 invoice from Worldwide Detective Agency for investigation and photography. Weigel, owner of Worldwide, stated that a search of his records disclosed no investigation having been conducted on the Yva Henry case. Moreover, when Weigel billed clients, he never submitted the original and the copy as ostensibly was done in the Henry case. 27 Hallen, a Worldwide employee who did investigative work for Davis on Weigel's license, also found no record of investigative or photographic work done in behalf of Henry. Hallen would bill Davis by submitting to Abrams handwritten slips containing case numbers and the plaintiff's name; he never typed invoices. Abrams paid Hallen directly by check. Hallen unequivocally denied submitting the typed $107.50 invoice of Gov't Ex. 10. 28 Furthermore, sometime in 1973, Hallen, with Weigel's permission, had given blank Worldwide billheads to Joe Moore, Davis' office manager. 29 27 Based on this uncontradicted testimony, the jury was justified in finding that Abrams made false statements when she named Hallen as the source of the $107.50 figure 30 and when she said that the bill was prepared by the investigator, 31 and submitted. 32 In addition, Abrams' asserted failure to remember and denial of knowledge as to what she was doing when she performed the mathematical calculation of Gov't Ex. 7 33 could reasonably have been considered perjured. 34 28 Similarly, there was abundant evidence to support a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt conclusion that Abrams' testimony concerning the $35.00 for photographs was false. The invoice for film and the film envelope were both dated April 2, 1974, the same day on which the Florida Bar telephone inquiry was made when the Henry case was, for all intents and purposes, closed. 35 Hallen never performed any photographic work on the Henry case and did not submit the invoice for photography services. And at least one of the photographs in the Henry file establish that the pictures were not taken until at least eleven months after Mrs. Henry's April 1973 mishap. 36 No sensible explanation was forthcoming as to why photography costs need have been incurred in connection with a closed case, and the grand jury gave Abrams every opportunity to offer one. 37 29 Thus, we think a jury could justifiably find that Abrams committed perjury when she (i) told the grand jury that the bills were Dave Hallen's, 38 (ii) denied knowing the circumstances under which the photographic bills were obtained, 39 and (iii) denied that the bills were obtained the day after receiving the Florida Bar letter to justify the costs. 40 30 Lastly, based on all the evidence relating to the four items on the breakdown, we believe that a jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Abrams' statements that the $231.50 in costs came from cost sheets and cost cards, 41 and her denial of attempts to justify the costs 42 were false. 31 Appellant's sufficiency challenge is multi-pronged. Abrams argues first that she responded to questions by describing the office routine she normally would use, instead of stating what she actually did with respect to a particular item. We agree with this argument as to certain answers, 43 but believe it conveniently overlooks many others. 44 This argument also ignores the settled principle that every answer set forth in a single count does not have to be false to sustain a conviction. United States v. Bonacorsa, 2 Cir., 1976, 528 F.2d 1218, 1221-22; Stassi v. United States, 5 Cir., 1963, 401 F.2d 259, 262, vacated on other grounds sub nom. Giordano v. United States, 1968, 394 U.S. 310, 89 S.Ct. 1163, 22 L.Ed.2d 297. 32 Second, appellant contends that there was no evidence introduced to show that she willfully and knowingly lied to the grand jury, that is, that she knew the charges were not incurred and remembered that fact. In this connection we are asked to ponder the thousands of cases which passed through, and the thousands of transactions taking place in, this busy, disorganized law office, all of which made it unreasonable for Abrams to remember the details of the Henry cost breakdown. There are several answers to this contention. 33 Abrams typed and signed on Davis' behalf the letters to the Florida Bar, and she according to her grand jury testimony prepared the cost breakdown. This office work was necessary only because a very serious complaint about Davis had been lodged with the Bar. Abrams was an employee in a law office where such complaints should not have been an everyday occurrence and should not have been treated routinely or cavalierly. All the more so because Abrams was well aware in April 1974 that Davis had been the target of a recent investigation. Indeed, that investigation prompted a meeting of Davis' staff which Abrams attended and during which Davis instructed the staff to take certain actions. 45 34 In light of this background, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the Henry cost breakdown was not as forgettable as appellant contends and that Abrams knew full well that certain of her answers were false. This is especially so in light of the overwhelming evidence which could lead a jury to conclude that Abrams must have known or recalled that the $107.50 cost for investigation and photography was never incurred and that the $75 for conferences with Dr. Fox and the $35 for photographs were somehow fabricated in response to the Florida Bar inquiry. 46 35 A similar argument was raised in United States v. Chapin, 1975, 169 U.S.App.D.C. 303, 515 F.2d 1274, 1284. In rejecting the sufficiency attack, the Court stated: 36 (I)n the absence of a statement by the defendant, the falsity of an I don't recall answer must be proven by circumstantial evidence. This does not mean that proof is impossible. As another court has stated, The jury must infer the state of a man's mind from the things he says and does. Such an inference may come from proof of the objective falsity itself, from proof of a motive to lie, and from other facts tending to show that the defendant really knew the things he claimed not to know or recall. (Citations omitted.) 37 Id., 169 U.S.App.D.C. at 313, at 515 F.2d 1284. In applying these principles, there was abundant proof already detailed at length of objective falsity and other facts tending to show that Abrams really knew or recalled that which she denied knowing or recalling. As to motive, the jury knew that Abrams was employed by Davis when she appeared before the grand jury and it was at liberty to draw reasonable inferences concerning motive from the employeremployee relationship, as well as from the grant of use immunity. 47 The jury, properly instructed, resolved this issue against Abrams and we see no reason to disturb its verdict here. 38 The third prong of Abrams' sufficiency attack relates to materiality. She urges that even if we hold her answers to be perjurious, they were not capable of influencing the grand jury on the issue it was investigating; namely, whether Attorney James Davis was using the United States Mails to defraud insurance companies by 'ambulance chasing,' cooperating with doctors to increase medical bills to 'get over' Florida's Uninsured Motorist Statute threshold amounts and similar conduct. Appellant's brief at 50. 39 The test for materiality, as Abrams correctly concedes, is whether the false testimony was capable of influencing the tribunal on the issue before it. E. g., United States v. Brumley, 5 Cir., 1977, 560 F.2d 1268; United States v. Damato, 5 Cir., 1977, 554 F.2d 1371; United States v. Parr, 5 Cir., 1975, 516 F.2d 458. However, the statements need not be material to any particular issue but may be material to any proper matter of inquiry. Damato, supra; United States v. Makris, 5 Cir., 1973, 483 F.2d 1082; United States v. Gremillion, 5 Cir., 1972, 464 F.2d 901; Barnes v. United States, 5 Cir., 1967, 378 F.2d 646. 40 The grand jury was investigating various allegations stemming from insurance claims. That body has substantial leeway in conducting its investigation. This Court has approved the following language from United States v. Stone, 2 Cir., 1970, 429 F.2d 138, 140: 48 41 A grand jury's investigation is not fully carried out until every available clue has been run down and all witnesses examined in every proper way to find if a crime has been committed. 42 The questions seeking to determine whether costs deducted from Davis' clients' payments were actually incurred was a proper subject of grand jury inquiry which resulted in the indictment of Davis and Fox for use of the mails to execute a fraudulent scheme. Abrams argues that Davis' clients were not the victims or complainants, that the insurance companies were, ergo, no materiality. Appellant's brief at 51. We are totally at a loss to understand this argument. Not only were the insurance companies victimized, but so were Davis' clients and the Florida Bar as well. 49 If the fabrication and inflation of medical and other costs were part and parcel of an illegal scheme to obtain money and property by false representations, the grand jury was authorized to explore every aspect of that scheme in an effort to determine whether a federal crime had been committed. 43 A subpart of the materiality argument is that Abrams' answers in no way deterred, misled or otherwise influenced the grand jury from conducting and completing its investigation. Appellant's brief at 50. This contention misperceives the legal requirements regarding materiality. The government need not show that because of the perjured testimony, the grand jury threw in the towel. Actual impediment of the investigation is not required. E. g., United States v. Makris, supra; United States v. Gremillion, supra. Such a ridiculous rule would mean that the grand jury believed the witness and placed so much importance on his testimony that further inquiry was useless. Grand jurors are capable of judging credibility and they are free to disbelieve a witness and persevere in an investigation without immunizing a perjurer. All the law requires is that the witness' answers were capable of influencing the tribunal on the issue before it, including any matters collateral thereto. The answers analyzed above easily passed that test and the Trial Court's finding and instruction on materiality were proper. 44 Finally, Abrams complains that the government failed to place before the jury evidence of materiality. This complaint is frivolous. One way in which the government can meet its burden on this score is by introducing the transcript of the prior proceeding. See Damato, supra, 554 F.2d at 1373 and cases cited in note 3. To paraphrase what one Court stated, the best way to know what the grand jury deems material is by reading what it asked about. United States v. Sweig, S.D.N.Y., 1970, 316 F.Supp. 1148, 1164. Not only was the entire transcript of all three Abrams' grand jury appearances introduced at trial, but the jury additionally had before it the Abrams indictment which set forth the factual basis 50 for the Trial Judge's finding and instruction on materiality as required in this Circuit. See Brumley and Damato, supra.