Opinion ID: 895218
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Probate Code

Text: The court of appeals believed that [t]he real jurisdictional problem plaguing the summary judgment is that it was rendered by a district court that did not have control over the heirship issues that are central to Fernandez's petition. 267 S.W.3d at 81. The court held that whether Fernandez had an interest in Kenedy's and East's estates is undoubtedly a probate question that must be resolved by the probate court and, in this case, cannot be resolved in the district court. Id. at 82. But the only given authority for this conclusion was a footnote in Palmer v. The Coble Wall Trust Co., Inc., 851 S.W.2d 178, 180 n. 3 (Tex.1992), which does not mention exclusive jurisdiction and does not hold that only a county court acting in probate has jurisdiction over heirship claims in the circumstances presented here. The cited footnote primarily addresses counties in which there is a statutory county court or a statutory probate court, id., which is not the case in Kenedy County. However, the footnote does go on to explain: To further complicate matters, the district courts exercise some probate jurisdiction. The Probate Code provides that [t]he district court shall have original control and jurisdiction over executors, administrators, guardians and wards under such regulations as may be prescribed by law. TEX. PROB.CODE § 5(a) (Supp.1992). In those counties where there is no statutory court exercising probate jurisdiction, most probate matters must be filed in the constitutional county court, id. § 5(b); however, the county judge may transfer contested matters to the district court, which may then hear them as if originally filed in district court. Id. In this situation the county court retains jurisdiction over the uncontested portions of the case. Id. The county judge may also request the assignment of a statutory probate judge to hear contested matters. Id. Palmer, 851 S.W.2d at 180 n. 3. Neither section 5(b) of the Probate Code nor the footnote in Palmer addresses the situation at hand, which involves attacks on district court judgments in cases where the estates were fully administered and closed decades ago. In fact, the Probate Code does not authorize probate courts to exercise jurisdiction in these circumstances, where a decedent died testate and his or her estate was fully administered and closed. In counties such as Kenedy with no statutory probate court, county court at law, or other statutory court exercising probate jurisdiction, all applications, petitions, and motions regarding probate and administrations shall be filed and heard in the county court, except that in contested probate matters, the contested portion can be assigned to a statutory probate court judge or transferred to district court. TEX. PROB. CODE § 5(b). [22] All courts exercising original probate jurisdiction shall have the power to hear all matters incident to an estate. Id. § 5(f). `[I]ncident to an estate'. . . include[s] the probate of wills, the issuance of letters testamentary and of administration, and the determination of heirship, and also include[s], but [is] not limited to, all claims by or against an estate, . . . all actions to construe wills, . . . and generally all matters relating to the settlement, partition, and distribution of estates of deceased persons. Id. § 5A(a). But we have said that a court empowered with probate jurisdiction may only exercise its probate jurisdiction over matters incident to an estate when a probate proceeding related to such matters is already pending in that court. Bailey v. Cherokee County Appraisal Dist., 862 S.W.2d 581, 585 (Tex.1993); see TEX. PROB.CODE § 5A(a), (b). Therefore, the probate court in this case could exercise jurisdiction over Fernandez's heirship claim only if, before Fernandez brought that claim, a probate proceeding was already pending in that court. In this case, there is no open or pending estate in the probate court to which an heirship proceeding would be incident and, thus, the Probate Code does not authorize the probate court's exercise of jurisdiction to determine heirship. See Schwartz v. Jefferson, 520 S.W.2d 881, 889 (Tex.1975) (The mere filing of a bill of review does not affect the finality of the judgment which is sought to be set aside.); In re Kenedy Mem'l Found., 159 S.W.3d at 145 (acknowledging that the estates of Kenedy, his wife, and East were closed long ago and not reopened by the mere filing of the bills of review, so none of the estates were pending). Indeed, if the mere filing of a bill of review or an application for declaration of heirship were to reopen a closed estate and render it pending within the meaning of the Probate Code, no estate or probate judgment would ever truly be final because such judgments would always be subject to additional litigation in courts other than those that issued the judgments. Moreover, section 48 of the Probate Code provides that a proceeding to declare heirship may be filed in the probate court only when a person died intestate as to some or all of his or her property, when a will has been probated or estate administered but real or personal property was omitted, or when there has not been a final disposition. TEX. PROB.CODE § 48(a) (permitting suit for declaration of heirship [w]hen a person dies intestate and there shall have been no administration in this State upon his estate or when a will has been probated or an estate administered but property was omitted from such will or from such administration); see id. § 3(o) (defining heirs as those persons. . . who are entitled under the statutes of descent and distribution to the estate of a decedent who dies intestate). That is not the case here. Because Kenedy left a will that disposed of all his property, as determined by the district court in the Humble Oil suit, and because his estate was fully administered and closed, the Probate Code does not authorize the probate court to determine heirship. [23] See Cogley v. Welch, 34 S.W.2d 849, 853 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1931, judgm't adopted) (holding that court has absolutely no authority . . . to exercise jurisdiction to declare heirship when decedent died testate); McMahan v. Naylor, 855 S.W.2d 193, 194-95 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied) (recognizing that issue of intestacy should be determined before heirship); Guajardo v. Chavana, 762 S.W.2d 683, 684-85 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1988, writ denied) (holding that heirship is not justiciable before intestacy is established); Buckner Orphans Home v. Berry, 332 S.W.2d 771, 775-76 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that putative heirs would first have to annul the wills left by deceased before they had such interest as would entitle them to come into the probate court asking for a declaration of heirship, or claiming rights in the estate as heirs). Authority to decide Fernandez's heirship claims rests solely with the district court as part of its exclusive jurisdiction over the bills of review. [24]