Opinion ID: 3030965
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Persecution Determination

Text: As stated above, the IJ found Xiao had demonstrated neither past persecution nor a well-founded fear of future persecution because there is no evidence of a pattern or practice of persecution of Christians by the Chinese government, Xiao’s single arrest cannot pass as persecution nor can the mandatory gynecological exams, and there is no evidence to support Xiao’s testimony that she will suffer negative repercussions upon her return to China as a result of having left the country “illegally.”10 But even if there is substantial evidence to support the IJ’s conclusions that Xiao 10 Regarding Xiao’s claim that persecution was more likely in light of her illegal exit from China, the IJ questioned the “illegal” nature of her exit and noted that this is not a protected ground relevant to asylum. Even if we assume that Xiao’s exit from China was “illegal,” we need not decide here whether it alone is sufficient to support an asylum claim. As a remand is warranted on other grounds, we do not consider Xiao’s manner of exit. 22 did not (a) suffer past persecution on account of religion, (b) have a well-founded fear of future religious persecution, or (c) suffer past persecution on account of her resistance to birth control policies, we conclude that a remand is required on the question of whether Xiao has a well-founded fear of future persecution because of her resistance to China’s family planning policies. The IJ failed to discuss this issue; however, it was considered and rejected by the BIA in connection with Xiao’s motion to remand. We accordingly analyze the question of Xiao’s fear of future persecution on political grounds in the context of the BIA’s denial of the motion to remand. “We treat the motion styled as a ‘motion to remand’ as a motion to reopen since it requires reopening the proceedings.” Shardar, 382 F.3d at 325 n.4. “We review the BIA’s denial of the motion to reopen [or remand] for abuse of discretion.” Id. at 324 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Under this standard, “the [BIA’s] decision must be reversed if it is . . . contrary to law,” and “we must also ask whether the [BIA] followed proper procedures and considered and appraised the material evidence before it.” Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 174, 177 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks, citations and modifications omitted). “A motion to reopen must establish prima facie eligibility for asylum.” Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 563 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Sevoian, 290 F.3d at 173). This standard requires a petitioner to “produce objective evidence showing a reasonable likelihood that he can establish that he is entitled to relief. Id. (internal quotation marks, 23 modifications, and citations omitted). At the motion to reopen stage, “[a] ‘reasonable likelihood’ means merely showing a realistic chance that the petitioner can at a later time establish that asylum should be granted.” Id. at 564 (emphasis added).11 This does not mean that an applicant gets a second chance to establish what was unsuccessful initially, but rather that s/he will have an opportunity to show additional evidence that was unavailable at the first hearing. Here, the BIA denied Xiao’s motion to remand because it could simply not conclude based on the evidence of record that the respondent has a wellfounded fear of persecution because she may now be considered in violation of the population control law. It is unclear whether the United States citizen children will actually return to China with the respondent. There is also insufficient documentary evidence of record to convince the Board that there is any likelihood that the respondent will be sterilized. This language implies that the BIA was requiring that Xiao establish a wellfounded fear, rather than a “realistic chance” that she could establish such a fear at a later time. See id. at 564. “The distinction may at first appear to be subtle shading, but without it ‘prima facie’ (meaning at first sight) would lack meaning.” Id. Furthermore, the BIA’s comment regarding the possibility that Xiao’s children might not return to China with her was an inappropriate and insufficient ground for 11 Guo’s use of “realistic chance” was not intended to cut back on Sevoian’s “reasonable likelihood” test, but simply to explain that the latter does not require one seeking reopening to show at the time of the motion to reopen that “the evidence for asylum outweighs the evidence against.” Id.; see also Poradisova v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 70, 78 (2d Cir. 2005).] 24 denial. First, “the break-up of a family. . . [is] a result that is at odds . . . . with significant parts of our overall immigration policy.” Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 561 (9th Cir. 2004). Second, the BIA’s suggestion that Xiao might abandon her children implies that any asylum applicant who has been persecuted, but can abandon the opinion or association giving rise to the persecution, should do so – an outcome that is also at odds with the objectives of United States asylum law. Finally, there is no support in the record for the contention that Xiao might abandon her children to return to China. It is not clear how much of the BIA’s holding rested on this wayward comment and thus unclear how much the BIA’s overall conclusions are undermined by our rejection of this rationale. Because the BIA failed to apply the proper evidentiary standard, and denied the motion at least in part on an impermissible conclusion about Xiao’s ability to return to China without her children, we remand this case to allow it to determine whether Xiao has established a prima facie case of a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of her political opinion, namely her resistance to China’s population control policies. The BIA’s analysis should be conducted in light of our caselaw and any additional evidence Xiao can produce on remand, and without reference to the prior adverse credibility finding. We also encourage it to consider the 2005 Country Report on remand. Caushi, 436 F.3d at 231 n.6 (noting that our Court has described country reports as “the most appropriate and perhaps best resource on country conditions”) (internal quotation 25 marks and citation omitted). If the BIA, applying the proper evidentiary standard, determines that Xiao states a prima facie case, it may then remand the matter to an IJ for a hearing. B. CAT relief The CAT has been implemented by regulations codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16 and 208.18, which require withholding of removal for an alien who can show that it is more likely than not that she, upon removal to a particular country, will be tortured by, or with the acquiescence of, its government. Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 591 n.2 (3d Cir. 2003). “The standard for relief has no subjective component, but instead requires the alien to establish . . . by objective evidence that [s]he is entitled to relief.” Sevoian, 290 F.3d at 175 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). A claim for relief under the CAT is “analytically separate” from both asylum and withholding of removal under the INA. Zubeda, 333 F.3d at 476. As such, an adverse credibility finding for purposes of denying asylum and withholding of removal claims does not preclude a petitioner from establishing a claim for relief under the CAT. Id. Similarly, “a decision-maker must review claims for relief under the Convention and consider relevant country conditions even where adverse credibility determinations have precluded relief under the INA.” Tarrawally, 338 F.3d at 188. Here the IJ issued an order that, among other things, denied Xiao’s application for protection under the CAT. Yet he did not mention the Convention or torture at any point 26 in his oral opinion. Likewise, the BIA did not mention the CAT claim in its affirmance of the IJ’s opinion. It is true that “[t]he Board is not required to write an exegesis on every contention, but only to show that it has reviewed the record and grasped the movant’s claims.” Sevoian, 290 F.3d at 178 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). As stated above, however, IJs and the BIA are required to review claims for relief under the CAT “even where adverse credibility determinations have precluded relief under the INA.” Tarrawally, 338 F.3d at 188. It was therefore error for the IJ to dismiss Xiao’s CAT claim on the basis of the adverse credibility finding made in relation to her application for asylum. Yet notwithstanding such an error, remand is unnecessary if the record does not support a petitioner’s claim for relief under the CAT. Mahmood, 427 F.3d at 253; Zubeda, 333 F.3d at 465 n.1. A CAT claim requires a both a likelihood and severity of harm that is simply not implicated by the record before us. We accordingly deny Xiao’s claim for relief under the CAT.