Opinion ID: 867277
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutionality of (F)(6) especially cruel aggravating circumstance

Text: ¶ 42 Hargrave argues that the A.R.S. § 13-751(F)(6) aggravating factormurder committed in an especially cruel manneris unconstitutionally vague, incapable of principled application, and arbitrary and capricious as applied. We review alleged constitutional violations de novo, State v. McGill, 213 Ariz. 147, 159 ¶ 53, 140 P.3d 930, 942 (2006), and when possible, construe statutes to uphold their constitutionality, State v. Cromwell, 211 Ariz. 181, 188 ¶ 38, 119 P.3d 448, 455 (2005). ¶ 43 The United States Supreme Court has found Arizona's (F)(6) aggravating circumstance facially vague, but held that it may be remedied with appropriate narrowing judicial constructions. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 654-56, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990), overruled in part by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002); see also Ellison, 213 Ariz. at 138 ¶ 96, 140 P.3d at 921. We have approved of jury instructions defining especially cruel as requiring evidence that the victim was conscious during the violence and that the defendant knew or should have known that the victim would suffer mental anguish or physical pain. Ellison, 213 Ariz. at 139 ¶¶ 98-99, 140 P.3d at 922; Cromwell, 211 Ariz. at 189 ¶ 42, 119 P.3d at 456; Anderson II, 210 Ariz. at 352-53 n. 19, ¶ 111, 111 P.3d at 394-95 n. 19. We have also upheld instructions requiring that the victim experience significant uncertainty about his or her fate. Cromwell, 211 Ariz. at 189 ¶ 42, 119 P.3d at 456; Anderson II, 210 Ariz. at 352-53 n. 19, ¶ 111, 111 P.3d at 394-95 n. 19. ¶ 44 Hargrave argues that these limiting interpretations no longer save the (F)(6) aggravator from unconstitutional vagueness because juries, rather than judges, now find the existence of aggravating factors. See A.R.S. § 13-751(E). We rejected this argument in Cromwell, 211 Ariz. at 189-90 ¶¶ 41-42, 44, 119 P.3d at 456-57, and Anderson II, 210 Ariz. at 353 ¶¶ 112-14, 111 P.3d at 395. ¶ 45 The instruction here contained the essential narrowing factor that the defendant either knew or should have known that his actions would cause the victims mental anguish or physical pain before death. We upheld a nearly identical instruction in State v. Tucker, 215 Ariz. 298, 310-11 ¶¶ 30-31, 160 P.3d 177, 189-90 (2007), and find no reason to depart from that decision now. The only difference between the Tucker instruction and the one here is that in Tucker, the instruction stated that a crime is especially cruel if the Defendant either intended or knew. Here, the instruction used the phrase the defendant either knew or should have known that the crime would cause the victims to experience physical pain or mental anguish. This slight alteration does not deprive the instruction of the essential narrowing factor that maintains its constitutionality. ¶ 46 Hargrave also argues that the (F)(6) instruction is facially vague because it failed to properly channel the jurors' discretion by providing clear, objective standards. We have previously rejected this argument. [8] E.g., id.