Opinion ID: 1843539
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: ace

Text: ACE's cross appeal presents two issues not presented in the cross appeals of Harper and ADAP. First, the award to ACEunlike the awards to Harper and ADAPwas based, not on § 1988, but on the common-fund theory. The trial court concluded that a common fund ha[d] been created, which fund was comprised, it held, of $18,300,000.00 [in] reallocation of funds to the ACE Plaintiffs' school systems from the 1994-1995 education appropriations. The court then held that ACE was entitled to $1,800,000, that is, approximately 10% of the $18,300,000. Second, unlike Harper and ADAP, ACE does contend that its award was inadequate. In other words, it contends that it was due a larger percentage of a larger common fund. Specifically, it contends that a common fund was created in an amount no less than $105,000,000 and that it was entitled to no less than 15% of that amount. However, § 1988 is as applicable to the claims of ACE as it is to the claims of Harper and ADAP. The reasons why the award to ACE was not based on § 1988as were those of Harper and ADAPdo not appear to us in the Greenhaw Fee Order, or anywhere else. Indeed, the § 1983 and Fourteenth Amendment bases of the claims underlying the Liability Phase order were stated even more cogently in the pleadings of ACE than in those of the other plaintiffs-cross appellants. Because § 1988 was applicable, the fees should have been awarded under the statutory theory. Northcross v. Board of Educ. of Memphis City Schools, 611 F.2d 624 (6th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911, 100 S.Ct. 2999, 3000, 64 L.Ed.2d 862 (1980). Nevertheless, the record would fully support an award to ACE of $1,800,000 under § 1988. [2]