Opinion ID: 1499122
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the good faith/bad faith element

Text: As was implicit in the discussions in Yanero , good faith most often exists in the absence of bad faith, attendant upon proof that the act or function in question was discretionary and in the course and scope of the public official, or employees, public duties. Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 523 (Characteristically, the Court has defined these elements by identifying the circumstances in which qualified immunity would not be available.). Once the officer or employee has shown prima facie that the act was performed within the scope of his/her discretionary authority, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish by direct or circumstantial evidence that the discretionary act was not performed in good faith. Id. at 523. Thus, the proof required necessarily focuses on bad faith, rather than good faith. [I]f the officer or employee willfully or maliciously intended to harm the plaintiff or acted with a corrupt motive, he acted in bad faith. Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 523. See also Cottongim v. Stewart, 283 Ky. 615, 142 S.W.2d 171, 176 (1940) (Nevertheless, [they] no doubt with sinister motives in the offing, blindly ignored the law and legal advice . . . .). Cases are indeed rare where one admits an improper motive. As is most often the case, the establishment of bad faith occurs upon proof of a violation of a clearly established right of the plaintiff, which a person in the public employee's position presumptively would have known was afforded to a person in the defendant's position, i.e., objective unreasonableness. . . Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 523. For example, in Spillman v. Beauchamp, 362 S.W.2d 33, 37 (Ky.1962), it appears employees of the Kentucky Department of Agriculture killed a farmer's cow, over his protests, thinking it was diseased when it may not have been. Allegedly, before it was killed, the circuit court had found it was not diseased and thus, not to be killed. Of course, if the foregoing allegations are true they will furnish a basis for imposing personal liability upon the officer, because the allegations show a lack of good faith, an absence of reasonable grounds for the officer to believe the cow to be diseased, and the existence of a deliberate flaunting of legal rights. Id. at 37. For a violation of a right to be acceptable as evidence of bad faith, the rights violated however, must be clearly established. See Jefferson County Fiscal Court v. Peerce, 132 S.W.3d 824, 834 (Ky. 2004) (citing Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 523). Thus, the factual context of the occurrence must not exemplify a `legally uncertain environment' in which qualified official immunity is appropriate. Peerce, 132 S.W.3d at 834. The recognition of a legally uncertain environment as established in Yanero and explained in Peerce is important [b]ecause the focus is on whether the officer had fair notice that her [/his] conduct was unlawful, [the] reasonableness [of which] is judged against the backdrop of the law at the time of the conduct. If the law at that time did not clearly establish that the officer's [or employee's] conduct would violate the [law], the officer should not be subject to liability or, indeed, even the burdens of litigation. It is important to emphasis that this inquiry must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198, 125 S.Ct. 596, 599, 160 L.Ed.2d 583 (2004) (citations omitted). In this respect, Yanero adopted the objective reasonableness test of Harlow in consideration of violations as evidence of bad faith. Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 523. Thus, there is no true subjective test for this element, post Yanero , as there is for willful or corrupt motive. We make this . . . inquiry in light of the information that the defendant official possessed at the time of the incident in question. . . and cognizant of the fact that public officials generally are not hermetic, ivory-tower scribes versed in the vagaries of constitutional law. Kegler v. City of Livonia, 173 F.3d 429, 1999 WL 133110 (6th Cir.1999). Thus, the finding of a legally uncertain environment, (meaning that the right was not clearly established) not only negates the use of a statutory violation as evidence of bad faith, it may also be justification for judgment calls made outside the course and scope of the public official or employee's authority, but within what was believed to be the authority as was implicit in Peerce, supra , as discussed later. Here, in reversing the trial court's summary judgment, the Court of Appeals asserted there are genuine issues of material fact with regard to whether Sloas' statutory rights [under KRS 441.125] were violated in a manner that would tend to show `bad faith' on the part of Hall and Henderson, thereby rendering summary judgment improper. Sloas, slip op. at 10, 2003 WL 22149322. In support of its decision, the court stated: [T]he Legislature has specifically required the jailer to consider the physical and mental ability of the prisoner and it has specifically prohibited the jailer from assigning an inmate to unduly hazardous work that would endanger the life or health of the prisoner or others. Thus, an inmate participating in the [Class D] work program has been given a statutory right not to be assigned to work that is unduly hazardous. This statutory right includes the jailer not subjecting the inmate to endangerment of his life or health by the work of another prisoner. The jailer must also properly consider the physical and mental abilities of all the prisoners who are working in the program and the nature of the work assigned to each prisoner. As Yanero makes clear, a violation of one of these statutory rights could lead to a finding of bad faith on the part of the jailer, which would preclude the protection of qualified official immunity. Id. at 11, 2003 WL 22149322. Sloas has [also] alleged that both Hall and Henderson were personally negligent by assigning work to the inmates that they were not qualified to perform by failing to properly supervise the work area. In addition, Hall stated in his deposition that he had never prepared a written policy concerning [Class D] workers, nor was he aware of any written policy concerning the work program. Id. at 12, 2003 WL 22149322. Moreover, the Court of Appeals also held summary judgment was erroneously granted with respect to Sloas's claims against Hall and Henderson in their individual capacity, since there remain genuine issues of material fact as to whether Hall and Henderson breached their duty to properly assign the work to the inmates, to supervise the work of the inmates, and to provide a sufficiently safe work area. Id. at 13, 2003 WL 22149322. In support of the opinion of the Court of Appeals, Sloas asserts that the Court of Appeals correctly recognized the following triable issues existed, which precluded summary judgment pursuant to Yanero : 1. Material question of fact as to breach of duty to properly assign work to inmates; 2. Material question of fact as to breach of duty to supervise work of inmates; 3. Material question of fact as to breach of duty to provide sufficiently safe work area; and 4. Material question of fact as to whether good faith was used in carrying out discretionary acts. Sloas, slip op. at 13, 2003 WL 22149322. The Appellee also asserts that Hall and Henderson disregarded obvious evidence of lack of safety, training and general danger, when they continued with the work detail in question although at least one other inmate had been injured as a result of the tree cutting [Billy Blackford's kickback]. . . [and] another tree had been cut down on a citizen's mall box; all before the injury to the Appellee. Id. at 14-15, 2003 WL 22149322. Yet, in the context of a trial court's view of the material facts in consideration of a motion for summary judgment on the grounds of qualified official immunity, it is necessary to separate out the material issues of fact which apply only to the plaintiff's claims (should they survive summary judgment), from those that are pertinent to the determination of qualified official immunity. Thus, issues as to whether Hall and Henderson breached their duty to properly assign the work to the inmates, to supervise the work of the inmates and to provide a sufficiently safe work area, apply only to Sloas's claims  not to the considerations necessary for qualified official immunity, unless they are such as to evidence bad faith. [P]ublic officers and employees enjoy. . . qualified official immunity, which affords protection from damages liability for good faith judgment calls made in a legally uncertain environment. Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 522 (emphasis added). If this were not so, then the fact of the wrong would always obviate the immunity, as was initially suggested in Board of Trustees University of Kentucky v. Hayse, 782 S.W.2d 609, 615 (Ky.1989). And this is the very point upon which we overruled Hayse. Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 521, 523. Bad faith is [t]he opposite of `good faith,' and it is not prompted by an honest mistake as to one's rights or duties, but by some interested or sinister motive. Black's Law Dictionary 176 (rev. 4th ed.1968) (emphasis added). Thus, if the facts of the violation are not such as to demonstrate or support a finding of bad faith on the part of the officer or employee in performing a discretionary function, then the alleged violations of the right involved is irrelevant to qualified official immunity issues. Thus, where the violation of the plaintiff's right is itself one's evidence of bad faith, the right violated must be clearly established; otherwise, it would not meet the objective reasonableness test adopted from Harlow by Yanero . Thus, in the context of qualified official immunity, bad faith can be predicated on a violation of a constitutional, statutory, or other clearly established right which a person . . . presumptuously would have known was afforded to a person in the plaintiff's position. Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 523 (emphasis added).
In this case, the only decisions the Jailer made involving Sloas and the other state prisoners were (1) the decision to allow them to participate in the community service work program, (2) allowing Henderson, a nine year deputy, to supervise the work crew, and (3) to let them go back out in the afternoon after Billy Blackford had been brought in, having cut his leg when the saw kicked back on him. Each of these decisions was discretionary in that there was no mandate for him to decide them either way. Nor is there any evidence in the record that a kickback from a saw, such as occurred here, is anything other than a unexpected occurrence. Neither is there a showing in the record that the Jailer knew where the specific prisoners were working that day or the specific task assigned each of the prisoners. His primary decision, which was purely discretionary, was to use the work program at all. There is simply no bad faith shown by his involvement and actions, as [t]he power to exercise an honest discretion necessarily includes a power to make an honest mistake of judgment. Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 510. The Court of Appeals however, implied a factual issue of bad faith in that he had not promulgated the written policy specified in KRS 441.125(2), which then provided, in part: Pursuant to a written policy adopted by the fiscal court on advice of the jailer, the jailer may permit certain prisoners to work on community service related projects. (Emphasis added). KRS 441.125(2), it is noted, required the adoption of the written policy by the fiscal court, not the jailer, as he only advised them on the policy. KRS 441.125(2) however, was enacted in 1982, ten years before state prisoners were allowed to be kept in county jails for long periods. And, when KRS 532.100 was amended in 1992 to establish the Class D Program, subsection 6 thereof specifically provided: Class D felons . . . serving their time in a local jail shall be considered state prisoners. Only in 2000 was subsection 2 amended to require the jailer to write the policy, which, of course, is now submitted to the fiscal court for its approval. This event occurred in 1998. On the other hand, KRS 532.100(4) requires an agreement between the fiscal court and the department of corrections in order for the county to house state prisoners. The record here does not disclose a written policy adopted by the fiscal court pursuant to KRS 441.125(2); nor does it disclose the agreement required between Rowan County and the Kentucky Department of Corrections for Rowan County to keep Class D state prisoners. One might assume this agreement would address what the county could or could not do with state prisoners. Nor does the record reflect the Department of Corrections Policies and Procedures (CPP) for state prison work programs. Either one or the other exists, or they do not. However, we note that this was an issue that was not developed in discovery. We also note that Hall testified he relied upon the Department of Corrections' policies in his administration of the work program for the Class D prisoners. [5] Thus, assuming that the agreement between the Rowan County Fiscal Court, the jail, and the Kentucky Department of Corrections do not define the scope of the use of state prisoners in their work programs and/or that the various fiscal court members and all the jailers of Rowan County have failed to adopt an appropriate written policy since 1982, the continuation of that failure by all the fiscal courts and jailers since then, including the Appellant's, offers no proof of bad faith under these circumstances. Bad faith must be directed toward a particular individual, group of individuals, or set of circumstances. Since Sloas was not a prisoner during those intervening years (1982-1997), the failure to adopt such a policy by the previous administrations could not have evidenced their bad faith towards Sloas. There must be some implication of self-interest, or a deliberate indifference, or sinister motive, rather than an honest mistake or oversight. Under these circumstances, there were none. Moreover, 501 KAR 2:060, § 1(4), dealing with procedures for the jail housing of Class D felons, provided in 1998, [i]f the custody assigned [as determined by the Department of Corrections] is minimum or community, the Class D felon may participate in programs offered outside the jail. Effective 2001, 501 KAR 10:130, § 6(1) (now 501 KAR 7:130, § 5), titled Prisoner Programs; Services, provides [s]tate inmates who have an approved custody level shall be allowed to work on community service projects outside the jail if authorized by the jailer. Moreover, the Kentucky Department of Corrections' operations manual for CD & CC Felons Housed in County Jails (Rev. March 2005), provides in part, that: Level One (1) and Level Two (2) inmates may perform community service work outside the facility under the supervision of trained work supervisors. Level A inmates may perform work outside of the facility under the direct supervision of jail security staff . . . . Jails have the discretion of choosing which inmates they work, provided that the classification of these inmates is non-discriminatory. Operations Manual for CD & CC Felons Housed in County Jails, Rev. March 2005, Work Programs at 11. Although it is unknown from the record what was in the 1998 Corrections Operations manual, the Jailer testified he followed the polices provided to him by the Department of Corrections. At the very least, the foregoing discussion indicates the questions surrounding the interpretation of KRS 441.125(2), as it may or may not apply to state prisoners under the control of the Kentucky Department of Corrections is such as to typify a legally uncertain environment in which qualified official immunity is appropriate. Peerce, 132 S.W.3d at 834. Thus, the violation may not be used to create or impute bad faith. After all, every fiscal court of Rowan county and every jailer thereof was in violation of the written policy requirement, if it applied and assuming there has been no written policy since 1982. All the while, the county Judge/executive, the magistrates, as well as the county department heads, were employing and selecting jobs at which the state prisoners would work. Given this prior and public practice, we find no basis to conclude that the Jailer would presumptively have known that he would have violated Sloas's rights by allowing him to voluntarily work on community service projects, absent the written policy, as had all his predecessors since 1982. Thus, this violation, if any, would not support an inference or finding of bad faith. Nor would his allowing the prisoners to go back to work after Billy Blackford came in for treatment demonstrate any bad faith on his part. As to insufficient training for the staff and prisoners, one must ask  insufficient for what? There is no showing in this record that Henderson was not insufficiently trained to supervise the crew. He had done it successfully for at least three years. Allegations are made he might have been talking to a neighbor during some of the time  but that is not proof of improper training or supervision. And, how do you train someone to watch out for falling trees or anticipate they might walk into such areas? This allegation simply does not support an inference of bad faith.
As to Henderson, the Court of Appeals found material issues of fact as to whether Henderson failed to properly direct or supervise the work crew by either (1) improperly assigning the tasks of cutting the trees, (2) failing to properly supervise them at all times during their work, (3) failing to show them how to stay out of the way of falling trees, (4) failing to provide them a safe work place, and/or (5) causing them to engage in unduly hazardous work. As answers have already been given regarding training to avoid falling trees and unduly hazardous work, we will not duplicate our previous comments. As to providing a safe work place, there is no evidence that this road, where brush and trees were being cut by state prisoners, was an unsafe workplace. And we are not disposed to hold so. But, the important point is that none of these issues rise to the level of implying bad faith under the circumstances presented. Brush and trees are cut every day by everyday people. The habits and practices on how to do so safely are common knowledge and obvious to adults. It's just plain common sense that no one has ever found a sure way to teach  especially when it comes to adults avoiding falling trees. Now, the assignment and operation of chainsaws  under circumstances which did not exist here  could be a closer question. Yet, the record here discloses two important points. Henderson only gave the chainsaw to those he knew (by previous experience with them) could handle them or to those new members such as Sloas, who, when asked, indicated they knew how to handle them. Moreover, the fact that one tree hit a mailbox and that the saw kicked back on Billy Blackford is not an indication that someone is going to walk into an area where trees are being cut without paying strict attention to what is happening. It is an unforeseen and unfortunate incident  but it is not an indication of an improper assignment or supervision of the work area, such as to indicate some likelihood of the injury, and bad faith on the part of Henderson. If an officer knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took would violate a [clearly established] right of the plaintiff, bad faith may be found to exist. Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 523. Thus, any finding of bad faith on Henderson's part, from the facts in this case, would be improper. As to the allegations of improper supervision, we can find no facts which could support such a finding or belief of bad faith.