Opinion ID: 171694
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mr. Taylor's Claim to an Adequate Lesser-Included Instruction

Text: In Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 627, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980), the Supreme Court held that a death sentence cannot constitutionally be imposed unless the jury is permitted to consider a verdict of guilt as to a lesser-included non-capital offense, provided that the evidence would support such a verdict. Id. at 627, 100 S.Ct. 2382. Without such an instruction, the Court reasoned, defendants would be subject to a heightened risk of erroneous conviction if juries were presented only with the stark choice either to convict a defendant of a capital offense or set him free. [W]hen the evidence unquestionably establishes that the defendant is guilty of a serious, violent offensebut leaves some doubt with respect to an element that would justify conviction of a capital offensethe failure to give the jury the third option of convicting on a lesser included offense would seem inevitably to enhance the risk of an unwarranted conviction. Such a risk cannot be tolerated in a case in which the defendant's life is at stake. Id. at 637, 100 S.Ct. 2382. Accordingly, the denial of a proper lesser-included non-capital instruction, when warranted by the evidence, violates due process by diminish[ing] the reliability of the guilt determination. Id. at 638, 100 S.Ct. 2382. In this case, Mr. Taylor received a second-degree murder instruction. As the OCCA acknowledged, however, the instruction given was erroneous under Oklahoma law. See Taylor II, 998 P.2d at 1231. The jury was instructed that to establish second-degree murder, the state must prove five elements: 1) the death of a human; 2) caused by conduct which was imminently dangerous to the other person(s); 3) the conduct was that of the defendant; 4) the conduct evinced a depraved mind in extreme disregard of human life; 5) the conduct is not done with the intention of taking the life of or harming any particular individual. Jury Instruction 17 (emphasis added). The words or harming should not have been included. Taylor II, 998 P.2d at 1231. Under Oklahoma law, the existence of an intent to harm a particular individual should not preclude a conviction for second degree depraved mind murder. Willingham v. State, 947 P.2d 1074, 1081 (Okla.Crim.App. 1997) (overruled on other grounds by Shrum v. State, 991 P.2d 1032, 1036 n. 8 (Okla.Crim.App.1999)). [] Nevertheless, the OCCA found this error harmless because it determined that Mr. Taylor was not entitled to a correct second-degree murder instruction in the first place. See Taylor II, 998 P.2d at 1231. Similarly, the district court concluded that Mr. Taylor was not entitled to a second-degree murder instruction, albeit for different reasons. Taylor v. Sirmons, No. CIV-01-252-JHP-KEW, 2007 WL 778043, at -27 (E.D.Okla. Mar.12, 2007). Our analysis will proceed as follows. First we will address the OCCA's harmless error analysis, concluding that it was contrary to clearly established federal law. Then we will turn to the district court's alternative arguments for why the error was harmless, rejecting these on de novo review. Finally, we will analyze the evidence in this case de novo, apply the test for harmless error set forth in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 629-31, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993), and conclude that the defective instruction had a substantial and injurious effect . . . in determining the jury's verdict. Id. at 631, 113 S.Ct. 1710
The OCCA concluded that Mr. Taylor's errant instruction was harmless on the ground that a second degree murder instruction was unnecessary under the facts of this case. It reasoned as follows: Appellant testified that as he ran through the living room, he saw movement out of the corner of his eyes and fired in that direction twice, killing Sauer. These facts suggest a design to effect the death of Sauer and therefore do not support a second degree murder instruction. Taylor II, 998 P.2d at 1231 (emphasis added). Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1-2). A state court decision is contrary to clearly established law if the state court applies a rule different from the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases, or if it decides a case differently than [the Supreme Court has] done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002). A state court decision is an unreasonable application of clearly established law when the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme Court's] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of petitioner's case. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000)). The OCCA reached the merits of Mr. Taylor's objection to the defective lesser-included offense instruction, but its analysis of harmlessness was contrary to clearly established federal law, as set forth by the Supreme Court in Beck. We therefore do not defer to the OCCA's ruling. The OCCA erred by assuming that if the evidence suggested a finding of first degree murder, it therefore did not support a second degree murder instruction. Taylor II, 998 P.2d at 1231. This is inconsistent with the inquiry demanded by Beck. Under Beck, courts are not directed to evaluate the evidence to determine whether it would support a first degree murder conviction, or even whether a conviction for first degree murder or a lesser-included offense is better supported. As the Supreme Court noted in Hopper v. Evans, the jury must be permitted to consider a verdict of guilt of a noncapital offense `in every case' in which `the evidence would have supported such a verdict,' 456 U.S. 605, 610, 102 S.Ct. 2049, 72 L.Ed.2d 367 (1982) (citation omitted), not just in those cases where the court believes the lesser verdict would be most consistent with the evidence. If the evidence would support a verdict of either first degree murder or second degree murder, the jury must be allowed to make the choice. The effect of the OCCA's contrary approach is to deny the defendant the benefit of the second-degree murder instruction in precisely the circumstance where it is most important: where the evidence would support conviction for first degree murder but would also support conviction on the lesser-included offense. In Hogan v. Gibson, 197 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999), this court reviewed a capital conviction in which the state appellate court had upheld denial of a lesser-included offense instruction on the ground that the evidence was consistent with conviction for first degree murder. We found this approach squarely contrary to the holding of Beck,  id. at 1305, and therefore found that the state court ruling was not entitled to deference under AEDPA. See id. at 1306. Indeed, the error made by the OCCA in that case was essentially the same as that made here. Compare Hogan v. State, 877 P.2d 1157, 1160 (Okla.Crim. App.1994) (OCCA concluded that lesser-included instruction was unwarranted because the facts show a clear design to effect the victim's death in a cold and calculated manner) with Taylor II, 998 P.2d at 1231 (OCCA reached same conclusion because the[ ] facts suggest a design to effect the death of Sauer). The proper inquiry is whether the defendant presented sufficient evidence to allow a jury to rationally conclude that the defendant was guilty of the lesser-included offense. Hogan, 197 F.3d at 1308. In Mr. Taylor's case, the court should have determined whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to allow the jury to find that the defendant shot at Mr. Sauer without intending to kill him. Because the OCCA's analysis here, as in Hogan, was contrary to clearly established federal law, as set forth by the Supreme Court, we cannot defer to its conclusion that no lesser-included offense instruction was required.
The district court also concluded that Mr. Taylor was not entitled to an instruction on second-degree murder, but for different reasons. We review the district court's independent legal conclusions de novo. See Rogers v. Gibson, 173 F.3d 1278, 1282 (10th Cir.1999). First, the district court found that due process did not compel a second degree murder instruction in this case because it believed that under Oklahoma law, second degree depraved mind murder is not a lesser included offense of first degree murder. Taylor v. Sirmons, 2007 WL 778043 at . This may have been an understandable interpretation of a confusing line of Oklahoma cases, but it was error. To be sure, Beck requires state trial courts to instruct juries only on offenses that are considered lesser-included offenses of the charged crime as a matter of state law. Hopkins v. Reeves, 524 U.S. 88, 90-91, 118 S.Ct. 1895, 141 L.Ed.2d 76 (1998); see Turrentine v. Mullin, 390 F.3d 1181, 1194 n. 1 (10th Cir.2004). Moreover, we have recognized that there existed a short window between 1997 and 1999 where Oklahoma did not recognize second degree depraved heart murder to be a lesser-included offense of first degree murder. See Willingham v. Mullin, 296 F.3d 917, 923 (10th Cir.2002). As a result, had the OCCA denied Mr. Taylor's Beck claim during this period of time, relying on the ground that second degree murder was not a lesser-included offense of first degree murder, his petition for relief would fail even though second degree murder was a lesser included offense at the time of his trial. See Willingham v. Mullin, 296 F.3d at 922-26. By the time the OCCA decided Mr. Taylor's Beck claim on direct appeal in 2000, however, second degree murder was again considered a lesser-included offense of first degree murder in Oklahoma. See Shrum v. State, 991 P.2d 1032, 1036 n. 8 (Okla.Crim.App.1999). Thus, both at the time of Mr. Taylor's trial and at the time of his direct appeal, second degree murder constituted a lesser-included offense of first degree murder in Oklahoma. In comparison, Mr. Willingham's Beck claim failed because his direct appeal occurred during the window in which second degree murder was not a lesser-included offense. See Willingham v. Mullin, 296 F.3d at 923. Because second degree murder was a lesser-included offense of first degree murder at each critical point in Mr. Taylor's case history, he was entitled to a second degree murder instruction if it was warranted by the facts. The district court's second reason for concluding that Mr. Taylor was not entitled to a second-degree murder instruction was based on a confusion between two different types of instruction. In addition to requesting a second-degree murder instruction based on his claimed lack of intent to kill Mr. Sauer, Mr. Taylor asked for and received a voluntary intoxication instruction based on his ingestion of methamphetamine and other substances shortly before the shootings. The district court seems to have understood this theory as an alternative basis on which Mr. Taylor was asserting a right to a lesser-included instruction. See Taylor v. Sirmons, No. CIV-01-252-JHP-KEW, 2007 WL 778043 at  (E.D.Okla. Mar.12, 2007). Voluntary intoxication, however, is not a lesser-included offense of homicide; rather it is a perfect defense to first degree murder. [] The jury instruction on voluntary intoxication reflects this: If you find that the state has failed to sustain [the burden of proving that the defendant formed the specific criminal intent required to commit first degree murder], by reason of the defendant's intoxication, then the defendant must be found not guilty of those crimes. Jury Instruction 27 (emphasis added). There is some confusion over whether Oklahoma law properly permitted a voluntary intoxication instruction in this case. See, e.g., Aplt. R. Br. 20 n. 8; Aple. Br. 40-41. The district court found that Mr. Taylor was not entitled to a voluntary intoxication instruction, because some Oklahoma cases have indicated that where a criminal defendant is able to give a detailed lucid account of his criminal activity he is not [ ] entitled to a voluntary intoxication instruction. Taylor v. Sirmons, No. CIV-01-252-JHP-KEW, 2007 WL 778043 at  (E.D.Okla. Mar.12, 2007). Nevertheless, even recognizing that an individual's state of intoxication might prove relevant to whether he acted with a depraved mind in extreme disregard of human life, the question is academic in this case because Mr. Taylor does not rely on a voluntary intoxication theory as the sole rationale justifying a second degree murder instruction. See Aplt. R. Br. 20 (The defense scenario [second degree murder] is viable even without an intoxication defense.). Both sides consistently agreed before the Oklahoma courts that defense counsel's strategy at trial did not focus on voluntary intoxication. See Ev. Hear. Tr. IV at 72-73 (Feb. 23, 1999) (counsel for state arguing that if the Court examines. . . the actual trial transcript, the defense of voluntary intoxication was not what Mr. Elliot [defense trial counsel] was using.); id. at 13 (defense trial counsel testifies that he did not intend to raise the defense of voluntary intoxication as a defense). It is therefore immaterial for purposes of our Beck inquiry whether Mr. Taylor was entitled to an instruction based on a voluntary intoxication theory.
We next turn to the question Beck instructs us to ask: whether the evidence supported a second degree murder instruction, such that a jury could have rationally concluded that Mr. Taylor did not intend to kill Mr. Sauer. We find that there was sufficient evidence introduced at trial from which a jury could have rationally acquitted Mr. Taylor of first degree murder and convicted him of second degree murder. In Oklahoma, homicide is second degree murder [w]hen perpetrated by an act imminently dangerous to another person and evincing a depraved mind, regardless of human life, although without any premeditated design to effect the death of any particular individual. 21 Okl. St. Ann. § 701.8. A design to effect death is inferred from the fact of killing, unless the circumstances raise a reasonable doubt whether such design existed. 21 Okl. St. Ann. § 702. In addition, a design to effect death sufficient to constitute murder may be formed instantly before committing the act by which it is carried into execution. 21 Okl. St. Ann. § 703. The most direct evidence regarding Mr. Taylor's state of mind involved Steven and Lindsay Verner. The prosecution introduced evidence that Mr. Taylor told his friend Steve Armstrong shortly before the incident that if Mr. Verner did not pay his drug debt he would need to cap Mr. Verner. Moreover, the fact that Mr. Taylor's girlfriend was sitting in her car with the engine running while Mr. Taylor was inside supported the inference that Mr. Taylor had made plans for a speedy getaway. There also was evidence that, prior to shooting Lindsay Verner Mr. Taylor said: I hope you die, bitch. There was no direct evidence regarding Mr. Taylor's state of mind toward Michael Sauer, the only person who died as a result of Mr. Taylor's shooting spree. It is undisputed that Mr. Taylor did not know Mr. Sauer. The prosecution's theory of the case was that after his premeditated shooting of Mr. Verner, Mr. Taylor shot the other three victims, including Mr. Sauer, in order to eliminate witnesses. If believed by the jury, this would be sufficient to support a conviction for first degree murder of Mr. Sauer. The focus of the defense to the first degree murder charge was the absence of any evidence that Mr. Taylor had a premeditated design to effect the death of Mr. Sauer. Defense counsel articulated the theory in this passage from his closing argument to the jury: Most if not all of the evidence that has come from [the state] about Charles Taylor's intent to kill anybody is about his intent as it affects Steve Verner. The only problem with that is the only murder now filed is not about Steve Verner; it's about Michael Sauer. He doesn't even know Michael Sauer. There is no evidencenot a shred that he knew him; that he had any motive[;] that he had any reason to kill Michael Sauer[.] Tr. III 692-93. The only witness for the defense was Mr. Taylor himself. He testified that he shot Mr. Verner because for some reason I don't know it scared me when Mr. Verner reached out to put his arm around him. Tr. III 600. When he saw Mr. Verner fall to the floor and grab his face after being shot, Mr. Taylor testified that it scared me. I didn't realize what had really happened at that point and-uh-flipped out and started to run out the door. . . . Id. As to shooting Michael Sauer, he claimed that he seen somebody out of the corner of [his] eye, didn't know who it was, but fired shots in that direction. Tr. III 601. Mr. Taylor maintained this story on cross-examination. When the prosecutor asked Mr. Taylor whether he shot Michael Sauer, Adrienne Smith, and Lindsay Verner because he had thought that they might be able to report him, he responded I don't think I was thinking at all. Tr. III 620. In response to Mr. Taylor's account of the incident, the State notes that Mr. Sauer was shot twice in his back and argues that [t]he fact that both bullets traveled a similar path through the victim's back suggests that Petitioner had not traveled between the shots and therefore may have stood and shot the victim twice in a row. Aple. Br. 41. The State argues that if Mr. Taylor had paused, taken aim, and shot Michael Sauer twice in a row, this would cast doubt on Mr. Taylor's explanation of the shooting. Accepting the factual findings of the state court and of the district court but reviewing their legal conclusions de novo, we conclude that the evidence would have allowed a jury to reasonably find that Mr. Taylor did not entertain a premeditated design to kill Michael Sauer. In reaching this conclusion, we begin with the fact that the trial judge, who was most intimately familiar with the evidence in the case and observed the demeanor of the witnesses, concluded that Mr. Taylor was entitled to a second-degree murder instruction (although unfortunately, the court delivered one that was not correct). This casts serious doubt on the State's argument that a reasonable jury, hearing the same evidence heard by the trial judge, could not have found Mr. Taylor guilty of second degree murder. For reasons already explained, the contrary conclusion reached by the OCCA is not entitled to deference. It is also significant that the prosecutor, who had every incentive to sniff out an implausible defense, made no objection at trial to the court's decision to give the second degree murder instruction. See Tr. III 644. This, too, casts doubt on the State's later argument, offered for the first time on appeal in the OCCA, that the evidence of intent at trial was so clear that a second degree murder instruction was unsupportable. Turning now to the facts, we cannot agree with the State that the evidence regarding intent was so one-sided that a reasonable jury had no alternative but to conclude that Mr. Sauer's death was a product of premeditated design. If Mr. Taylor did not aim as he shot, but the gun was just flailing around, as the OCCA summarized the defendant's testimony, Taylor II, 998 P.2d at 1229, it is hard to see why a second degree murder instruction would not be appropriate. Such behavior would be imminently dangerous to another person, and it would evinc[e] a depraved mind, regardless of human life, but it would not indicate any premeditated design, 21 Okl. St. Ann. § 701.8, to kill Michael Sauer. Even if the jury believed that Mr. Taylor intentionally shot at Mr. Sauerindeed, even if the jury believed that Mr. Taylor was intentionally seeking to harm himit could have believed his testimony and concluded that Mr. Taylor had no intent to kill him. See Quilliams v. State, 779 P.2d 990 (Okla.Crim.App.1989) (affirming second degree murder conviction where defendant testified his gunshots were intended to wound, but not to kill). The OCCA has upheld second degree depraved mind murder convictions in a variety of cases in which the facts were similar to these, or arguably even more suggestive of an intent to kill. In Dorsey v. State, the OCCA upheld a second degree murder conviction where the defendant intentionally armed himself with a knife and entered the store where he started a fight with the victim and intentionally stabbed him. 739 P.2d 528, 529 (Okla. Crim.App.1987). In Quilliams v. State , the OCCA upheld a second degree murder conviction where the defendant admitted intentionally shooting [the victim], but denied an intent to do more than wound [the victim]. 779 P.2d 990, 991 (Okla. Crim.App.1989). In both cases, the OCCA concluded that a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of [second degree murder] beyond a reasonable doubt. Dorsey, 739 P.2d at 529; Quilliams, 779 P.2d at 991. See also Hall v. State, 698 P.2d 33 (Okla.Crim.App.1985) (affirming second degree depraved mind murder conviction where victim was stabbed thirteen times in the chest and neck areas and sustained a large skull fracture); Tucker v. State, 675 P.2d 459 (Okla.Crim.App.1984) (determining evidence supported second degree depraved mind murder conviction where five-month-old infant was battered by defendant with his fists and hands over two-day period and deliberately dropped to the floor). We recognize the force of the State's argument that the similar paths of the two bullets through Mr. Sauer's back makes it less likely that Mr. Taylor shot him while running wildly through the apartment. While this may have been a legitimate argument for the prosecutor to make to the jury, however, it is not so self-evident a proposition as to compel the jury to disbelieve Mr. Taylor's testimony. Although the prosecution called numerous medical and law enforcement personnel to discuss the shootings, it never elicited any testimony on whether the bullet path evidence suggested, let alone conclusively established, that Mr. Taylor stopped, took aim, and shot Mr. Sauer in the manner the State now hypothesizes. None of the state courts, nor the district court below, made any factual finding regarding the probabilities that the two shots could have been fired in rapid succession by someone running towards the front door of the house. A forensics investigation might well be able to draw a confident conclusion from this evidence, but as an appellate court we cannot. The evidence regarding the paths of the bullets does not provide us, therefore, with an unequivocal basis to conclude that Mr. Taylor intended to kill Mr. Sauer. One additional consideration contributes to persuade us that a rational jury could have convicted Mr. Taylor of second degree murder. When Mr. Taylor argued at his evidentiary hearing on direct appeal that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to pursue a voluntary intoxication defense more vigorously, the State responded by claiming that defense counsel's strategy to focus on showing a lack of intent to kill Michael Sauer was ingenious. Evid. Hr. IV 73. After describing the defense's theory that there was a lack of specific intent, not because [Mr. Taylor was] intoxicated, but because [he] didn't know [Michael Sauer;] . . . had never met [him], the State argued that this factual avoidance [strategy] was a fairly good attack. Id. If this theory was sufficiently plausible to constitute sound trial strategy, it can scarcely be so flawed that a second degree murder instruction was unwarranted. For all these reasons, we are persuaded that the evidence would have allow[ed] a jury to rationally conclude that the defendant did not intend to kill Michael Sauer. Whether a jury was more likely to convict on first or second degree grounds is not the question. Due process demands that a jury be permitted to consider a lesser-included offense of first degree murder before imposing death so long as the evidence would have supported such a verdict. Beck, 447 U.S. at 627, 100 S.Ct. 2382; see Hogan, 197 F.3d at 1312. Here, if the jury accepted Mr. Taylor's account that he shot in the direction of Michael Sauer in a panicked withdrawal from Mr. Verner's home, without intent to kill, it could have validly convicted him of second degree murder. Thus, we conclude that a second degree depraved mind murder instruction was warranted based on the facts of Mr. Taylor's case.
If the defense had requested a second degree murder instruction and the trial court had denied it outright, it would be unnecessary to engage in harmless error analysis. A Beck error can never be harmless. Hogan, 197 F.3d at 1312 n. 13. Where, however, the trial court gives a lesser-included offense instruction but the instruction is flawed, the reviewing court must determine whether the error in the instruction had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993). See Turrentine v. Mullin, 390 F.3d 1181, 1194 (10th Cir. 2004) (applying harmless error analysis to a flawed lesser-included offense instruction). The error in the instruction might be trivial or irrelevant to the particular case, such that the error could not have affected the jury's deliberations. The question in such cases, however, is not whether a properly instructed jury would have been more likely to sentence the defendant to first degree murder or second degree murder. Beck makes clear that due process requires that a lesser-included instruction must be given where the evidence supports it, regardless of how powerfully the state presents the case for first degree murder. The question, instead, is whether the errant instruction had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury's opportunity to consider a proper lesser-included instruction. In this case, we are persuaded that the error in Mr. Taylor's second degree murder instruction was sufficiently material that it had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623, 113 S.Ct. 1710. The errant instruction directed the jury that it could not convict Mr. Taylor of second degree murder if it concluded that he intended to kill or harm Michael Sauer. This was prejudicial to Mr. Taylor because his defense centered on the argument that he did not have the specific criminal intent to kill for Murder in the First Degree. Tr. III 696 (emphasis added). The defense did not deny that Mr. Taylor fired the gunshots that killed Michael Sauer or that he understood that firing a gun at someone would hurt him. In fact, Mr. Taylor responded in the affirmative when the state asked him on cross-examination whether he kn[e]w that a gun [was] dangerous and whether he kn[e]w that when you shoot somebody it's going to hurt them. Tr. III 606 (emphasis added). Thus, the defense attempted to draw precisely the line that was effaced by the erroneous instruction: that Mr. Taylor may have intended to harm Michael Sauer but did not intend to kill him. Jurors are presumed to follow their instructions. Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 540-41, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993). If the jurors in Mr. Taylor's case followed the instruction given on second degree depraved mind murder, they could quite logically have rejected a second degree murder verdict even if they fully accepted the defendant's theory of the caseconcluding that even if Mr. Taylor did not mean to kill Michael Sauer, he nevertheless admitted shooting at him during his panicked withdrawal from Steven Verner's home, knowing this would inflict harm. Therefore, as in Turrentine: if the jury followed [its instructions], it would conclude that the defendant could not be convicted of second degree murder even if all the legal prerequisites for such a conviction were present. This is the equivalent of instructing the jury that no second degree murder alternative was availablethat it was first degree murder or nothing. Turrentine, 390 F.3d at 1193. This is precisely what the rule set out in Beck was designed to avoid. As the Supreme Court noted, [w]hen the evidence unquestionably establishes that the defendant is guilty of a serious, violent offensebut leaves some doubt with respect to an element that would justify conviction of a capital offensethe failure to give the jury the `third option' of convicting on a lesser included offense would seem inevitably to enhance the risk of an unwarranted conviction. Beck, 447 U.S. at 637, 100 S.Ct. 2382. In this case, defense counsel explicitly told the jury that the defendant was guilty of second degree murder. See Tr. III 697 (defense counsel in summation: [Y]ou can't turn [Mr. Taylor] loose; [he has committed] murder in the second degree, no question about it.). If the jury was effectively made to choose between a capital conviction and acquitting a defendant whose counsel admitted that he committed homicide, the defendant surely faced the substantial risk that . . . the jury [was] likely to resolve its doubts in favor of conviction. Beck, 447 U.S. at 634, 100 S.Ct. 2382 (quoting Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 212-13, 93 S.Ct. 1993, 36 L.Ed.2d 844 (1973)). Accordingly, [w]e cannot say that the availability of a third optionhere, a proper second degree depraved mind murder instructioncould not have resulted in a different verdict. Id. As the Supreme Court concluded in Beck, [s]uch a risk cannot be tolerated in a case in which the defendant's life is at stake. Beck, 447 U.S. at 637, 100 S.Ct. 2382.