Opinion ID: 2566841
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Segregating just compensation offered

Text: Under various circumstances a condemnee may recover reasonable attorney fees and expert witness fees in addition to the just compensation which is constitutionally required. E.g., RCW 8.25.070(1), .075(1). One such circumstance is when: the judgment awarded as a result of the trial [held for purpose of fixing of the amount of compensation] exceeds by ten percent or more the highest written offer in settlement submitted to those condemnees appearing in the action by condemnor in effect thirty days before the trial. RCW 8.25.070(1)(b) (emphasis added). [5] On its face RCW 8.25.070(1)(b) recognizes two factors a trial court compares to determine whether the condemnee is entitled to reasonable attorney fees and expert witness fees incurred as a result of litigating the just compensation amount: (1) the judgment awarded as a result of the trial, and (2) the highest written offer in settlement ... in effect thirty days before the trial. When the former exceeds the latter by 10 percent or more, the court is required to award reasonable attorney fees and expert witness fees. State v. Roth, 78 Wash.2d 711, 715-16, 479 P.2d 55 (1971) (holding inter alia award of fees under RCW 8.25.070 mandatory if condemnee meets all statutory prerequisites). Relying on State v. Swarva, 86 Wash.2d 29, 541 P.2d 982 (1975), the State contends the trial court and Court of Appeals erred by holding the $282,500 offer invalid because that figure exceeded the State's evidence of just compensation. Supp'l Br. of Pet'r at 9. In Swarva the State offered roughly $123,000 as compensation for the condemned property, which it deposited into the court registry upon the condemnees' rejection thereof. Swarva, 86 Wash.2d at 30, 541 P.2d 982. After the jury returned a verdict of $107,000, the trial court granted an additur, reasoning the State impermissibly introduced evidence lower than the amount it deposited as an offer of just compensation. Id. We reversed, holding: [T]he State may not offer in settlement an amount less than the fair market value established by the State's appraisal. However, nothing in the statute prohibits the State from offering an amount in excess of its lowest appraisal, in the interest of a pretrial settlement. Such practice is one purpose of a settlement  to avoid litigation and its resulting cost and delay. Id. at 33, 541 P.2d 982 (emphasis added). Because the verdict was within the jury's province to decide based on the testimony given, we reinstated the jury's verdict. Id. at 35-36, 541 P.2d 982. The State is correct Swarva expressly recognizes that no barrier exists to prevent the condemnor from offering a sum greater than the just compensation to which it believes the condemnee is entitled. Id. at 33, 541 P.2d 982. Hence the trial court ruling to the contrary was erroneous. [6] However the Court of Appeals based its affirmance on different grounds, namely RCW 8.26.180. That statute provides in relevant part: Every acquiring agency shall, to the greatest extent practicable, be guided by the following policies: (1) Every reasonable effort shall be made to acquire expeditiously real property by negotiation. .... (3) Before the initiation of negotiations for real property, the acquiring agency shall establish an amount which it believes to be just compensation therefor, and shall make a prompt offer to acquire the property for the full amount so established. In no event shall such amount be less than the agency's approved appraisal of the fair market value of such property. RCW 8.26.180(1), (3) (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals looked to RCW 8.26.180 to hold the State [was required] in this case to offer Mr. Costich $191,200 in just compensation when it received Mr. Jolicoeur's $191,200 appraisal. Costich, 117 Wash.App. at 501, 72 P.3d 190. Building on its holding the court rejected the State's reliance on Swarva, stating  Swarva cannot be read to say that the State need not disclose what its determination of the fair market value is. Id. at 502, 72 P.3d 190 (citing Swarva, 86 Wash.2d at 34, 541 P.2d 982). While it is true the quoted provisions of RCW 8.26.180 seemingly impose the mandatory obligations on the condemning authority, the legislature expressly rejected this approach. RCW 8.26.205 reads, The provisions of RCW 8.26.180, 8.26.190, and 8.26.200 create no rights or liabilities and do not affect the validity of any property acquisitions by purchase or condemnation. In addition to omitting any discussion of RCW 8.26.205, the Court of Appeals further ignored express language from Swarva, indicating RCW 8.26.180 is a guideline statute only, and its terms do not declare rights. Swarva, 86 Wash.2d at 33, 541 P.2d 982. [7] Moreover the Court of Appeals' qualms with the State's reluctance to disclose its view of just compensation are easily resolved by RCW 8.25.010, which unambiguously mandates: In all actions for the condemnation of property, or any interest therein, at least thirty days prior to the date set for trial of such action the condemnor shall serve a written statement showing the amount of total just compensation to be paid in the event of settlement on each condemnee who has made an appearance in the action. (Emphasis added.) It belies common sense to require the condemnor to inform the condemnee in the settlement offer the amount asserted as just compensation when such disclosure is already required separately as a matter of law. This record reveals the State fully complied with RCW 8.25.010 when Mr. Jolicoeur's $191,200 appraisal was received by Mr. Costich's attorney in late November 2001, well before the 30-day cutoff for such disclosure to be made. See CP at 193-94, 333. Mr. Costich makes no assertion the State violated RCW 8.25.010, thus leaving no basis for Mr. Costich to now aver he was unaware of the State's view of how much just compensation it believed Mr. Costich was due. Despite Swarva, both the Court of Appeals and trial court relied heavily on City of SeaTac v. Cassan, 93 Wash.App. 357, 967 P.2d 1274 (1998) for support. Cassan held a property owner could not use statutory attorney fees, [8] statutory expert witness fees, or deposition costs awarded to augment the condemnee's RCW 8.25.070(1)(b) comparative factor to broaden the gap between the condemnor's offer of settlement beyond the 10 percent threshold. Cassan, 93 Wash.App. at 361-62, 967 P.2d 1274. The court reasoned these items do nothing to foster settlement of just compensation disputes, which is the aim of RCW 8.25.070. Id. at 362, 967 P.2d 1274. Mr. Costich argues since Cassan held the condemnee could not use attorney fees, expert witness fees, and other factors outside of the jury's determination to broaden the gap between the offer and jury award, the condemnor may not augment its side of the comparative equation with attorney fees, expert witness fees, and other factors to narrow the gap. We reject this argument for two reasons. First, Swarva expressly allows the condemnor to offer sums above and beyond just compensation to settle the litigation. Swarva, 86 Wash.2d at 33, 541 P.2d 982. Second, we are not bound to follow Cassan. We also question whether Cassan was rightly decided. RCW 8.25.070(1)(b) references the judgment awarded as a result of the trial as the condemnee's side of the 10 percent equation, rather than the just compensation awarded as stated in Cassan. Compare RCW 8.25.070(1)(b) with Cassan, 93 Wash.App. at 361, 967 P.2d 1274. If a condemnee is entitled as a matter of law to the addition of statutory costs, prejudgment interest, and any other sum, it rationally follows those amounts will always be part of the judgment awarded as a result of the trial. RCW 8.25.070(1)(b). On the other hand, Cassan raises a good point insofar as these cost items are irrelevant toward promoting settlement. Cassan, 93 Wash.App. at 362, 967 P.2d 1274. But even including the statutory attorney and expert witness fees, costs, and prejudgment interest, the judgment awarded here would still not have exceeded the State's $282,500 settlement offer by 10 percent or greater. Mr. Costich further argues highest offer in settlement must refer to just compensation since that amount is the sole issue determined at valuation trials. See 6A WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL 150.03, at 62 (4th ed.2002). This argument lacks merit. Even in stipulated liability lawsuits, parties settle damage issues not because they agree to the amount of the damages owed, but rather to avoid the time, expense, and trouble litigation entails. The essence of Mr. Costich's objection to the State's all-inclusive January 30 offer is summarized in his Court of Appeals brief where he complains the State's refusal to itemize its settlement offer prejudiced him because it was the amount of any just compensation offer which established the bar Respondents had to `beat' by 10 [percent] at trial in order to recover their fees and expenses. Resp'ts Costichs' Resp. Br. at 6 (emphasis added). This contradicts what RCW 8.25.070(1)(b) expressly references as the comparative factor to be employed by the trial court: the highest written offer in settlement. Though other parts of Title 8 RCW reference just compensation, [9] RCW 8.25.070(1)(b) establishes the highest written offer in settlement compared to the judgment awarded as a result of the trial as the basis for determining whether attorney fees are owed. It is firmly established as a matter of statutory interpretation that where the legislature uses different language in the same statute, differing meanings are intended. State v. Beaver, 148 Wash.2d 338, 343, 60 P.3d 586 (2002) (minimum term and release date have different meanings within chapter 13.40 RCW); Haley v. Highland, 142 Wash.2d 135, 147, 12 P.3d 119 (2000) (separate property and community property in chapter 26.16 RCW have different meanings). The legislature has expressed the condemnor's highest written offer in settlement is the basis a trial court must examine to determine whether reasonable attorney fees and expert witness fees are owed, not the condemnor's opinion of just compensation owed. RCW 8.25.070(1)(b). Mr. Costich nonetheless asserts that this interpretation creates an apples-to-oranges comparison between the jury award (comprised of just compensation alone) and the settlement offer (comprised of just compensation offered in addition to other amounts). Mr. Costich contends this runs afoul of the purpose of RCW 8.25.070, which is to provide the condemnee an additional remedy when the State offers an unreasonably low amount as just compensation and forces the condemnee to litigate the just compensation amount to which he or she is constitutionally entitled. See Roth, 78 Wash.2d at 713, 479 P.2d 55; State ex rel. Wash. State Convention & Trade Ctr. v. Allerdice, 101 Wash.App. 25, 32, 1 P.3d 595 (2000). First, we do not hold that the condemnee side of the equation is measured merely by the jury award, but rather yield to RCW 8.25.070(1)(b)'s express language referencing the judgment awarded as a result of the trial. Contra Cassan, 93 Wash.App. at 361-62, 967 P.2d 1274. Second, even if we did hold the jury award alone serves as the basis for measuring the condemnee's side of the comparative equation, Mr. Costich's argument would in essence attack the wisdom behind the statute. Courts will not undertake such an inquiry absent any issue affecting constitutional rights. Davis v. State ex rel. Dep't of Lic., 137 Wash.2d 957, 976 n. 12, 977 P.2d 554 (1999). Therefore the State need not itemize its settlement offer to comply with chapter 8.25 RCW.