Opinion ID: 2276741
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: First Class of Writ Cases: Trial Court Had Jurisdiction.

Text: To determine if this is one of the first type of cases for which a writ could properly be granted, we must determine whether the trial court was proceeding outside its jurisdiction. Originally, we rendered an opinion in this case granting the writ. We did so in part because we found that the trial court lacked jurisdiction [b]ecause CR 60.02(f) does not apply to the facts of this case.... [12] We posited that a change in the law is not a sufficiently extraordinary circumstance to grant any relief under CR 60.02, except where the direst injustice would result otherwise. [13] And we concluded that Sergent faces no such injustice. [14]
We granted rehearing, and we now state clearly that any attempt on our part in our original opinion to suggest that a trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule on an otherwise properly filed CR 60.02(f) motiona motion filed in a court having subject-matter jurisdiction and exercising personal jurisdiction over the parties to the actionwas in error. Generally speaking, a trial court would not lack jurisdiction to rule on an otherwise properly filed CR 60.02(f) motion. But we recognize that there are two circumstances in which the trial court would lack jurisdiction to grant relief upon a CR 60.02 motion. First, as to subsections (a) through (c) of CR 60.02, some authority would suggest that a trial court lacks jurisdiction to reopen a judgment under these subsections if a year or more has passed since entry of judgment. [15] Second, our opinion in Asset Acceptance suggests that the trial court would lack jurisdiction to reopen a judgment essentially on CR 60.02(a)-(c) grounds if the CR 60.02 motion was not filed within one year of the judgment even if the CR 60.02 motion were filed under the guise of a CR 60.02(f). [16] In Asset Acceptance, the untimely CR 60.02 motion, filed two years after entry of default judgment, was purportedly based on CR 60.02(f). But the party opposing reopening argued that the motion was actually grounded on excusable neglect under CR 60.02(a). The party seeking reopening alleged that she was unaware of the default judgment, despite receiving notice, and was incapable of managing her own affairs for some time because of substance abuse rehabilitation. [17] Leaving unresolved the issue of whether the CR 60.02 motion had actually been filed on the basis of CR 60.02(a) grounds of excusable neglect, we vacated the Court of Appeals' dismissal of the appeal of the reopening and remanded for consideration of Asset's contention that Moberly's 60.02 motion was barred by limitations and therefore outside the trial court's authority to grant. [18] We instructed the Court of Appeals that: If the Court determines that Moberly's motion stated a reason of an extraordinary nature rather than mistake, excusable neglect or one of the more common grounds for relief, the availability of which was barred by the one-year limitation period in CR 60.02, then the appropriate course would be again to dismiss the appeal. [19] Toyota contends that it is entitled to a writ because Asset Acceptance shows that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to grant reopening under CR 60.02(f). Sergent distinguishes Asset Acceptance by asserting that his CR 60.02(f) motion was not a disguised CR 60.02(a)-(c) motion because his motion was not premised on any grounds covered by subsections (a), (b), or (c) of CR 60.02, such as perjury, fraud, newly discovered evidence, excusable neglect, or mistake. Toyota contends that Sergent's purported CR 60.02(f) motion is a disguised CR 60.02(a) motion premised on mistake, noting that the trial court itself had found that the law had not really changed but instead had been misinterpreted. Sergent argues that he did not seek reopening nor did the trial court grant it on the basis of mistakeof law or otherwise. Sergent asserts that he sought reopening and the trial court properly granted it because the change of law constituted extraordinary circumstances. We agree with Sergent. Although we have frequently held that a change in the law, by itself, was not sufficient to create extraordinary circumstances warranting relief under CR 60.02(f), [20] we are not aware of any reported cases holding that such a motion seeking CR 60.02(f) relief was in essence actually a motion seeking relief for mistake under CR 60.02(a). In fact, we recently rejected a criminal appellant's attempt to argue that a change in law necessitated the grant of CR 60.02 relief to correct a mistake of law, instead noting that the common-law writ of coram nobis, which CR 60.02 essentially replaced, existed in the law for the purpose of correcting mistakes of fact, not mistakes of law. [21] The trial court's dismissal of Sergent's wage-and-hour dispute could not reasonably be termed a mistake because at the time of entry the trial court's ruling comported with the prevailing construction of the law that wage-and-hour claims had to be brought first in administrative proceedings. And the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal; we denied discretionary review. Sergent neither directly nor ostensibly alleged a mistake when seeking reopening under CR 60.02(f). In fact, by stating in the order granting this motion that the law had not really changed but had been misinterpreted, the trial court echoed our conclusion in Parts Depot that Early had misconstrued the governing statutes. [22] And some Kentucky cases generally state that it is inappropriate to grant relief under CR 60.02(a) on the basis of judicial mistake. [23] Because Sergent's CR 60.02 motion could not reasonably be construed as premised on a mistake by the trial court in originally dismissing the action, the trial court did not lose jurisdiction to rule on the motion solely by reason that the CR 60.02 motion was filed more than a year after the original judgment of dismissal. In short, since Sergent's motion was properly brought under CR 60.02(f), the strict one-year time limitation set forth for actions brought under CR 60.02(a)-(c) was inapplicable. So the trial court had the jurisdiction to rule upon the merits of Sergent's motion. Having determined that, in the present case, the trial court did not lack jurisdiction to consider the CR 60.02 motion, we note that, in the future, the availability of an immediate appeal under Asset Acceptance will mean that a remedy exists by application to an appellate court when a trial court improperly reopens a case under CR 60.02(f) when the case actually involves an untimely CR 60.02(a)-(c) motion and, thus, will preclude the availability of writs in such cases.
Toyota raised in the Court of Appeals an argument that the law of the case doctrine prevented the trial court from exercising jurisdiction to rule on or grant CR 60.02 relief. [24] Toyota asserted that the original decision of the trial court dismissing Sergent's action for lack of jurisdiction to hear the disputea decision that was not disturbed by the appellate courtsoperated to block jurisdiction to consider CR 60.02(f) relief by operation of the law of the case. We disagree. We believe that a trial court's jurisdiction to determine whether extraordinary circumstances merit relief from a judgment includes jurisdiction to determine whether extraordinary circumstances also merit application of one of the exceptions to the law of the case doctrine. Toyota cites Kentucky Board of Medical Licensure v. Ryan, [25] as suggesting that the trial court would lack jurisdiction to rule on a CR 60.02 motion under the law of the case doctrine. The holding in that case is inapt. Although the Medical Licensure Board argued that the trial court erroneously ignored the law of the case and lacked jurisdiction to order it to conduct a CR 60.02 hearing, [26] we simply held that a trial court did not have jurisdiction to order the Board to hear a CR 60.02 motion because such motions could only properly be filed in courts and not before an administrative agency such as the Board. Our opinion did not suggest that application of the law of the case doctrine would preclude a court from having jurisdiction to hear a CR 60.02 motion. [27] Furthermore, to the extent that the Court of Appeals' unpublished opinion in Davis-Johnson ex rel. Davis v. Parmelee [28] holds that law of the case would deprive a trial court of jurisdiction to rule on a CR 60.02(f) motion, including the question of whether extraordinary circumstances merit an exception from the law of the case doctrine, it is hereby overruled. In short, we conclude that the law of the case doctrine does not invariably deprive a trial court of jurisdiction to reconsider under CR 60.02(f) an issue already decided if the law upon which the original decision was basedincluding a controlling appellate opinionhas materially changed.