Opinion ID: 481712
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Difficulties

Text: 10 First. The opinion contradicts Rule 11. Rule 11 requires that a lawyer certify that what he files with the court is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law. In this case what Kirkland, Ellis had filed was a brief arguing for summary judgment because of the law of California, applicable under Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). The opinion assumes that the California cases which Kirkland, Ellis failed to cite were directly contrary to the argument it was making. P. 1536. But the opinion concludes that Kirkland, Ellis' failure was not a violation of Rule 11. Id., p. 1542. 11 How can a brief be warranted by existing law if its argument goes in the face of directly contrary authority from the highest court of the jurisdiction whose law is being argued? How can a brief be warranted to be a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law when there is not the slightest indication that the brief is arguing for extension, modification or reversal? 12 To ask these questions is to answer them. An argument in the teeth of uncited and undistinguished contrary authority is not warranted by existing law. An argument that does not mention directly-contrary authority is not a good faith argument for its modification or reversal. The opinion contradicts the Rule. The opinion repeals the Rule's requirement that a brief be warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the law's amendment or reversal. 13 The opinion puts the question as one of argument identification, treating Kirkland, Ellis' failure as a failure to identify correctly its argument as one for extension of existing law. Id., pp. 1539-40. But Kirkland, Ellis' failure was far greater. Kirkland, Ellis made no argument at all for extending existing law. It simply misrepresented the law it cited. 14 Second. The opinion eliminates significant language from Rule 11. Not only does the opinion appear to exempt a whole class of legal papers from the operation of the Rule, it excises a key phrase from the Rule. The Rule requires that the lawyer certify that the pleading is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. The opinion restricts the Rule to a prohibition of frivolous pleadings. Id., p. 1540. Doing so the opinion uses a term--frivolous--not to be found in the Rule. 15 In its history of the Rule, the opinion treats as exhaustive what the Rule introduces with the words such as as merely exemplary--the purposes of harassment, delay, or needless expense. See Id., p. 1537. Obviously the Rule means to punish these improper purposes. But there would be no point to the Rule listing them by way of example if the Rule were restricted to punishing only them. The Rule mandates sanctions for any legal papers filed in federal court with any improper purpose. The opinion reads any out of the Rule. 16 The opinion fails to recognize that untruthful briefs are subject to sanctions under Rule 11. Eliminating from the Rule its condemnation of any improper purpose, the opinion treats as mere salutary admonitions Judge Schwarzer's requirement that a brief be, to the best of a lawyer's ability, truthful. Doing so, the opinion fails to acknowledge that to mislead the court is an improper purpose. An untruthful brief is, objectively, a brief whose purpose is to mislead the court. It is subject to sanctions under Rule 11. 17 A lawyer's signature on a paper filed in court is described by Rule 11 as a certificate. What is a certificate? It is a signed, written, or printed testimony to the truth of something. Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Meaning 1. Without focusing on the term certificate, the opinion itself appears to agree with this definition. The opinion says that the signatory attorney warrants. Id., p. 1536. Warrants is a verb meaning to assure a person of the truth of what is said. Webster's, Meaning 2b. 18 How can a lawyer offer testimony to the truth of what he has filed, how can he assure a person of its truth, if it is a misrepresentation? 19 Third. The opinion is one-sided in its use of authority on the purpose of Rule 11. The opinion ignores these statements by Arthur Miller, the principal draftsman of Rule 11: 20 We have lived so long with the emphasis on duty to client that redirecting the responsibilities of lawyers to the system is easier said than done. Yet once it is understood that the court system is a societal resource, not merely the private playpen of the litigants, the difficult task of discouraging hyperactivity must be undertaken. 21 The 1983 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure represent a modest step in that direction. They attempt to check abuses by requiring an attorney's signature on all litigation papers--pleadings, motions, and discovery requests and responses--certifying that, based on reasonable inquiry, there is good ground to support the document and the signer's motivation is not improper. The message is clear. An attorney must stop and think before acting--that is the litigator's duty to the system--or be subjected to sanctions.... 22 Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 Minn.L.Rev. 1, 19 and 21 (1984). 23 The opinion ignores this summary of Rule 11 applications by an authoritative treatise: 24 Conversely, sanctions have been deemed appropriate in a wide range of circumstances because the pleadings or motions filed have been deemed frivolous or made without sufficient inquiry. Wright-Miller-Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure (1986 Supp.) sec. 1333 (emphasis supplied). 25 The opinion ignores relevant portions of the statement of the purpose of the 1983 amendment made by the Advisory Committee on Rules: 26 The new language is intended to reduce the reluctance of courts to impose sanctions, see Moore, Federal Practice p 7.05 at 1547, by emphasizing the responsibilities of the attorney and reenforcing those obligations by the imposition of sanctions ... (emphasis supplied). 27 The expanded nature of the lawyer's certification in the fifth sentence of amended Rule 11 recognizes that the litigation process may be abused for purposes other than delay (emphasis supplied). 28 The new language stresses the need for some prefiling inquiry into both the facts and the law to satisfy the affirmative duty imposed by the rule.... This standard is more stringent than the original good-faith formula and thus it is expected that a greater range of circumstances will trigger its violation (emphasis supplied.) 29 Contrary to Miller, the court continues the emphasis on duty to client. Contrary to Wright, Miller, and Kane, the opinion restricts Rule 11 to a single circumstance, frivolousness. Contrary to the Advisory Committee, the opinion imposes only a negative duty not to be frivolous. 30 Fourth. Instead of acknowledging the violation of Rule 11 when a lawyer attempts by brief to mislead the court, the opinion specifically rejects the district court's statement that under Rule 11 a lawyer must not misstate the law. P. 1539. The opinion goes on to cite with apparent approval the view of the American Bar Association's Litigation Section that the practicing bar sees vigorous advocacy seemingly without regard to its possible misrepresentations to the court as the mark of justified representation of the client. Id., p. 1540, n. 4. 31 This vision of vigorous advocacy seemingly indifferent to misrepresentations is cited by the opinion as understandable concern by the bar that vigorous advocacy not be chilled. Identification of vigorous advocacy with indifference to misrepresentation reflects a one-sided view. It is a view that has been repudiated by modern legal ethics. There is no reason to revive the old, discredited view, much less to incorporate the old view into an interpretation of Rule 11. Vigorous advocacy is, necessarily, truthful advocacy. 32 A distinct shift from the old view was made in a report by the Joint Conference on Professional Responsibility established by the American Bar Association and the Association of American Law Schools. Confronted by the layman's charge that the lawyer is nothing but a hired brain and voice, this committee undertook to set out the duties of lawyers in terms of social functions that made the lawyer's role understandable, acceptable, and even necessary. See Introductory Statement of Cochairmen Lon L. Fuller and John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 ABA Journal 1159 (1958). The report, in large measure, reflected the jurisprudence, the insights, and the wisdom of Professor Fuller. The report stressed that the integrity of the adjudicative process itself depends upon the participation of the advocate in order to hold in suspense the mind of the judge, prevent premature closure of the judge's mind, and make a wise decision possible. The function of the advocate defined his responsibilities and the limits of advocacy. The report concluded that a lawyer whose desire to win leads him to muddy the headwaters of decision and who distorts and obscures the true nature of a case trespasses against the obligations of professional responsibility. Id. at 1161. 33 Modern codes of ethics have followed this line of thought. The American Bar Association's Model Code of Professional Responsibility invoked the report of the Joint Conference in stating that a lawyer today stands in special need of a clear understanding of his obligations and of the vital connection between these obligations and the role his profession plays in society. Preamble, fn. 3, ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility (1974). The first disciplinary rule of the Code is that a lawyer shall not ... engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. DR 1-102(A)(4). The Disciplinary Rule does not distinguish misrepresentation of fact and misrepresentation of law. 34 More specifically, under the general heading, Representing a Client Zealously, the Model Code provides that a lawyer shall not ... knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law, except that he may advance such claim or defense if it can be supported by good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. DR 7-102(A)(2). Ethical Consideration 7-23 in the same Code declares, Where a lawyer knows of legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction directly adverse to the position of his client, he should inform the tribunal of its existence unless his adversary has done so ... EC 7-23. 35 The standards of the Model Code are substantially followed in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct of the American Bar Association. Rule 3.3 under the heading, Candor Toward the Tribunal makes it a black letter rule that a lawyer should not knowingly fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly diverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel. Model Rules 3.3(a)(3). The note on this Rule goes on to say, Legal argument based on a knowingly false representation of law constitutes dishonesty toward the tribunal ... The underlying concept is that legal argument is a discussion seeking to determine the legal premises properly applicable to the case. 36 In black letters the Model Rules also provide, A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. Model Rule 3.1. Commentary on this Rule explicitly links it to DR 7-102(A)(2) of the Model Code. 37 Amazingly, the opinion of the court fails to acknowledge the source for the language of Rule 11 that a paper should be warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law. Both the ABA's Model Rules, adopted on August 2, 1983, and Rule 11, which became effective August 1, 1983, are properly seen as based on DR 7-102(A)(2) of the Model Code in their treatment of what a lawyer should not do. If the objective standard of Rule 11 is higher than the subjective standard of Model Rule 3.3, that is no reason for the court to ignore the link between Rule 11 and the ethical standards of the bar. 38 It is equally surprising that the opinion of the court does not acknowledge that in the ABA's Model Rules, frivolousness is specifically defined by the absence of a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law. Frivolousness does not only consist, as the court appears to assume, in making a baseless claim. Frivolousness also consists in making a legal argument without a good faith foundation. 39 Fifth. Not only does the opinion suggest a view of unrestrained advocacy repudiated by modern authorities, it favors a type of analysis sponsored by the Eighth Circuit and overruled by the Supreme Court. The opinion takes the position that a requirement of truthful argumentation tends to create a conflict between the lawyer's duty zealously to represent his client and the lawyer's own interest in avoiding rebuke. P. 1540. 40 Precisely such an analysis was offered by the Eighth Circuit in relieving the lawyer of an obligation not to present perjury. That court found a conflict of interest between the lawyer's duty to represent his client zealously and the lawyer's ethical duty not to present perjury. Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir.1984); rehearing en banc denied, 750 F.2d 713 (8th Cir.1984). Reversing the Eighth Circuit, the Supreme Court noted that there was no conflict of duties when the lawyer was asked by his client to assist in the presentation of false testimony. Nix v. Whiteside, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 988, 998, 89 L.Ed.2d 123 (1986). 41 A client has as little right to the presentation of false arguments as he has to the presentation of false testimony. No conflict exists when a lawyer confines his advocacy by his duty to the court. The opinion is insensitive and unresponsive to the teaching of the Supreme Court that a restraint on the freedom of a lawyer to present falsity as truth does not create any true conflict. The lawyer has a duty to work within the boundaries of professional responsibility. He is not free to suborn testimony, to perjure himself, to offer perjured testimony, or to misrepresent facts or law. No conflict exists between his duty to work within these restraints and his duty to his client. The opinion suggests that there is the possibility of conflict over a duty to serve a client and a duty not to misrepresent the law. Fidelity to the relevant opinion of the Supreme Court and to the modern standards of the profession lead to a different conclusion.