Opinion ID: 1477474
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Discussion with a Witness

Text: Appellant's primary claim of misconduct involves the prosecutor's conversation with Detective Sauls during a recess in his cross-examination at the suppression hearing. Despite an admonition from the court to Detective Sauls that he should not discuss his testimony with anyone, the prosecutor spoke with him about a mistake he had made in answering a question on direct examination about when he advised appellant of his Miranda rights. After the conversation was revealed, the court orally admonished the prosecutor but did not impose any sanctions. Appellant now contends that it was error for the court not to do so and claims that his counsel's subsequent cross-examination of Detective Sauls was prejudiced as a result. He also moved to strike Detective Sauls' redirect testimony in its entirety, which the court denied. In general, the trial court has broad discretion to determine the appropriate remedy for violations of the so-called rule on witnesses. See Benn v. United States, 801 A.2d 132, 141 (D.C. 2002); Brown v. United States, 388 A.2d 451, 456 (D.C.1978). [20] When reviewing a decision on whether or not to permit testimony after there has been a violation of the rule, this court will reverse only for an abuse of discretion. Bourn v. United States, 567 A.2d 1312, 1317 (D.C.1989). Testimony should normally be excluded only under extreme circumstances. Brown, 388 A.2d at 456 (Generally, the violation of the court order must be so egregious that it `has somehow so discredited the witness as to render his testimony incredible as a matter of law' (citation omitted)); see Holder v. United States, 150 U.S. 91, 92, 14 S.Ct. 10, 37 L.Ed. 1010 (1893). As the government correctly points out, the traditional remedy for a violation of a court order prohibiting witnesses from discussing their testimony with anyone else is cross-examination. See Geders, supra note 20, 425 U.S. at 89-90, 96 S.Ct. 1330; Brown, 388 A.2d at 457. In this case, Detective Sauls was specifically cross-examined about the discussion he had with the prosecutor during the break in his testimony. Appellant's present claim that his ability to cross-examine Detective Sauls was impaired because of the detective's conversation with the prosecutor is thus refuted by the record. In addition, appellant suggests a multitude of sanctions which the court could have imposed on the prosecutor for violating its order to refrain from speaking to the witness. Trial judges, however, have broad discretion in deciding what sanctions, if any, should be imposed on those who violate their orders. The draconian measures proposed by appellant, such as the declaration of a mistrial and striking the detective's testimony in its entirety, are not often used; more importantly, they do not fit the circumstances of this case. See Benn, 801 A.2d at 140-141 (a witness who has violated a sequestration order may be excluded from the witness stand only under extreme and exceptional circumstances). The need to sanction the government in this instance is especially doubtful. Appellant claims that Detective Sauls' testimony was tainted by his talking with the prosecutor during the break in the hearing. When the proceedings were reconvened, the prosecutor admitted that he had violated the court's order and had spoken to the witness during his cross-examination. However, on redirect the prosecutor elicited only information about a mistake in the detective's testimony on direct that he made before the break concerning when he advised appellant of his Miranda rights. Because no new information was introduced after the prosecutor spoke to the witness, there is no basis for concluding that all of his testimony was tainted or should be stricken. As the trial court stated, sanctioning the prosecutor or striking Detective Sauls' testimony was unnecessary [b]ecause his testimony did not change on redirect from that which had already been elicited. Appellant also refers to a violation of the purported rule in Thacker v. United States, 599 A.2d 52 (D.C.1991), to support his claim that the prosecutor's misconduct in talking to Detective Sauls should have resulted in severe sanctions. In Thacker this court held that the trial court did not commit plain error by failing to order, sua sponte, sequestration of the government witnesses. Id. at 60. We also went on to hold that, in light of the record, there was nothing improper about the prosecutor's contact with a government witness during the trial. Id. Appellant tries to expand this holding with the assertion that because the prosecutor in this case spoke with Detective Sauls in violation of the court's order, automatic sanctions should follow. Not only is this argument without support in Thacker, but we have found no case which holds that once an attorney violates a court order, such as one prohibiting witness contact, sanctions must follow automatically. See Benn, 801 A.2d at 141. Neither Thacker nor any other case that we have found limits the trial court's discretion in the manner suggested by appellant. We therefore find no abuse of discretion or other legal error in the court's failure to impose a sanction for the prosecutor's violation of its directive not to speak to the witness.