Opinion ID: 857425
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Marlowes Sought Interlocutory Relief

Text: ¶13 To ascertain whether the Marlowes improperly pursued interlocutory relief, we must, as a threshold matter, determine whether they pursued interlocutory relief at all. Applying basic principles of appellate procedure, we have no difficulty in answering that they did. ¶14 The Marlowes' argument for why their filing in circuit court did not represent an interlocutory appeal hinges on their belief that the arbitration panel was not empowered to order Wis. Stat. ch. 804 discovery. As the Marlowes see it, since the panel had no authority to issue that order, its order was null and void ab initio, that is, from the beginning, and the circuit court was not reviewing the order at all, let alone on an interlocutory basis. The Marlowes' position is founded on 9 No. 2011AP2067 several fundamental misunderstandings of the law, and we cannot accept it. ¶15 First, the Marlowes' premise flows from an untenably theoretical and impractical characterization of judicial mechanics. Even if we suspend disbelief and assume with the Marlowes that an order exceeding an arbitration panel's power vanishes when the order is questioned in court, that does not change the fact that the filing in circuit court interrupts an ongoing proceeding before the panel. That is, regardless of whether the panel's discovery order was null or not, there was nevertheless an arbitration in progress at the time it was issued. It is this fact——not the correctness or validity of the order——that renders the action interlocutory. See, e.g., Brown v. Argosy Gaming Co., L.P., 360 F.3d 703, 706 (7th Cir. 2004) (defining an interlocutory action as one that merely gives pause to the ongoing proceedings to resolve one issue in a larger, ongoing dispute . . . .) (Emphasis added.) ¶16 In any event, the arbitration panel indisputably had the authority to issue an order relating to discovery, the only complaint the Marlowes raise is whether it issued the correct discovery order. Throughout the course of this controversy, it has never been suggested by any party or decision-maker that the arbitration panel was forbidden from determining the boundaries of discovery. Rather, the Marlowes simply assert that the panel erroneously set those boundaries in accordance with one chapter of the statutes instead of another. It follows, then, as amicus Wisconsin Insurance Alliance helpfully points out, that from the 10 No. 2011AP2067 Marlowes' perspective, the panel would have acted within its jurisdiction if it had ordered discovery in line with Wis. Stat. § 788.07 but exceeded its jurisdiction by ordering discovery in line with Wis. Stat. ch. 804. If that were true, a panel would have jurisdiction only if the outcome happened to turn out to be right in the judgment of the courts. That is not how jurisdiction works. See, e.g., Gen. Comm. of Adjustment v. Mo.- Kan.-Tex. R.R Co., 320 U.S. 323, 337 (1943) (When a court has jurisdiction it has of course authority to decide the case either way.) (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). For the foregoing reasons, there can be no doubt that the circuit court's declaration of the Marlowes' rights granted them interlocutory relief. 2. Interlocutory Relief Was Not Available to the Marlowes ¶17 Having shown why the Marlowes' action in circuit court was interlocutory, we must now confront the question of whether they were permitted to seek such relief. In view of the important and well-established purposes of arbitration, they were not so permitted. ¶18 We start, as the court of appeals before us did, with the recognition that this issue is one of first impression in Wisconsin. Fortunately, though, it is far from that elsewhere. In the absence of binding authority construing the Wisconsin Arbitration Act, we look for guidance to decisions from other jurisdictions interpreting similar provisions of their own arbitration acts. Borst, 291 Wis. 2d 361, ¶30. Wisconsin Stat. §§ 788.10 and 788.11 set forth the circumstances in which a 11 No. 2011AP2067 court can take action on an arbitrator's decision, and thus form the bases for our inquiry into the availability of interlocutory relief on an arbitration ruling. The same role is performed in the Federal Arbitration Act by 9 U.S.C. §§ 10 and 11, which contain nearly identical language to the corresponding Wisconsin provisions. We therefore consult the non-binding cases addressing the issue as persuasive authority, and in this instance we find them especially persuasive. ¶19 A number of other jurisdictions have held that intermediate relief from arbitrators' decisions is not typically available. See Kristen M. Blankley, Did the Arbitrator Sneeze?--Do Federal Courts have Jurisdiction over Interlocutory Awards in Class Action Arbitrations?, 34 Vt. L. Rev. 493, 506 (2010) (The courts, when usually confronted with non-final awards, claim that they should generally refrain from intervention and allow arbitration to run its course.). These decisions are based on the sound theory that the courts must facilitate as much as possible the primary aims of arbitration: providing a forum to resolve disputes more quickly, efficiently, and cheaply than courts can. See Compania Panemena Maritima San Gerassimo, S.A. v. J.E. Hurley Lumber Co., 244 F.2d 286, 289 (2d Cir. 1957)(noting that challenges to intermediate arbitration decisions result only in a waste of time, the interruption of the arbitration proceeding, and encourage delaying tactics in a proceeding that is supposed to produce a speedy decision.); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Davis, 490 F.2d 536, 544 (3d Cir. 1974) (declining to allow an interlocutory appeal of an interim 12 No. 2011AP2067 arbitration decision because [p]iecemeal litigation would result). In Wisconsin, as much as in the federal system, arbitration is designed to facilitate the speedy, efficient resolution of disputes without encumbering parties with all of the expenses and formalities associated with civil litigation in the courts. See, e.g., Franke v. Franke, 2004 WI 8, ¶24, 268 Wis. 2d 360, 674 N.W.2d 832 ([P]ublic policy favors arbitration as promoting the efficient resolution of disputes, and as giving the parties what they bargained for, that is, an arbitrator's, not a court's decision.). Those advantages accrue not only to parties but to the circuit courts, which experience a lightening of their substantial dockets, saving the taxpayers money and litigants both money and time. See, e.g., Balt. & Ohio Chi. Terminal R.R. Co. v. Wis. Cent. Ltd., 154 F.3d 404, 409 (7th Cir. 1998) (Posner, J.) (remarking that one purpose of arbitration is to lighten the pressure on the courts) (citation omitted). It is self-evident that any rule encouraging parties to shuttle their cases to and from court in the midst of an arbitration proceeding would substantially slow down the arbitration process and impose significant costs on the parties, thereby defeating the most central objectives of arbitration. We therefore adopt the sensible rule followed by the authorities cited above, and hold that in Wisconsin a party involved in an arbitration proceeding must ordinarily wait until the arbitrators have reached a final decision on the award to be given, if any, before turning to the circuit courts. 13 No. 2011AP2067 ¶20 Those courts that have permitted interlocutory review during an arbitration proceeding have done so only in rare circumstances that present a compelling reason to depart from the normal practice. For instance, interlocutory appeals have been entertained when the intermediate ruling could subject the aggrieved party to irreparable harm, Aerojet-General Corp. v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 478 F.2d 248, 251 (9th Cir. 1973) (regarding the fixing of venue), or when such review is necessary to preserve assets pending a final ruling from the arbitrator on the award. Yasuda Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 37 F.3d 345, 347-48 (7th Cir. 1994). Again, we embrace the unassailable logic underlying these cases, as they properly balance the need for efficient and orderly arbitration proceedings with the need for an occasional exception to accommodate especially urgent or potentially irreparably prejudicial matters that demand the immediate attention of the courts. ¶21 The Marlowes do not suggest that the discovery dispute at arbitration was unusual in such a way as to justify intermediate intervention by the circuit court, and we see no evidence to that effect. On the contrary, there has been no showing that the request for limited discovery was either especially urgent or that it posed the threat of irreparable injury. Tellingly, in the only Wisconsin case involving a similar discovery dispute, we remanded the cause back to the arbitration panel after it had allowed overbroad discovery and issued an award, Borst, 291 Wis. 2d 361, ¶4, thus indicating 14 No. 2011AP2067 that such disputes can be effectively resolved within the course of the ordinary appellate process, without resorting to inefficient, time-consuming practices which defeat the very purpose of arbitration. While certainly not dispositive of the matter, this precedent underscores why the arbitration panel here was entitled to fully discharge its duties before being second-guessed on an intermediate matter by the circuit court.7 As a result, we affirm the court of appeals decision insofar as it correctly held that the Marlowes' action for declaratory relief constituted an improper interlocutory appeal.