Opinion ID: 160520
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claims Against the Tribal Defendants

Text: 4 Plaintiffs' amended complaint asserts the same three claims against various subsets of tribal defendants, all of whom were sued in their official and individual capacities. Plaintiffs' first two claims are constitutional; the third invokes the FTCA. The first claim alleges that certain named tribal defendants violated the plaintiffs' First and Fifth Amendment rights to freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, due process, and equal protection. 1 Aplt. App. 95, 57 (Dry); id. at 109, 104 (McConnell); id. at 119, 134 (Burlison). The second claim asserts that certain tribal defendants deprived Plaintiffs of their liberty without due process of law and deprived [them] of equal protection of the laws, in violation of the 4th and 5th Amendments of the Constitution of the United States. Id. at 96-97, 63-64 (Dry); see also id. at 111, 110-11 (McConnell) (also alleging a violation of Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment rights); id. at 120-21, 140-41 (Burlison) (same). Third, the complaint alleges that certain tribal defendants deliberately, intentionally and maliciously committed several intentional torts against Plaintiffs, and seeks compensation under the FTCA. Id. at 101, 74-75 (Dry); id. at 116, 121-22 (McConnell); id. at 125, 151-52 (Burlison). 5 Upon a notice of substitution filed by the United States, the district court dismissed the FTCA claims against all but two tribal defendants and substituted the United States as party defendant. Fed. Aplee. Supp. App. at 5; see 28 U.S.C. 2679(d)(1). Appellants' all-inclusive Notice of Appeal designates not only the district court's orders dated August 16, 1999, and September 30, 1998, but also all other orders of dismissal, prior orders and rulings. 3 Aplt. App. 658. Plaintiffs, however, have failed to brief the propriety of the substitution, and we therefore deem their appeal of this issue to have been abandoned. See Coleman v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 108 F.3d 1199, 1205 (10th Cir. 1997). 6 In seven orders issued on September 30, 1998, the district court dismissed all remaining claims against the tribal defendants for failure to state a claim or for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), (b)(1). We review such dismissals de novo, applying the same standard used by the district court. Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for Deaf & Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir. 1999) (failure to state a claim); Sac & Fox Nation of Okla. v. Cuomo, 193 F.3d 1162, 1165 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 2657 (2000) (lack of jurisdiction). We will affirm a 12(b)(6) dismissal when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). In conducting our analysis, we are obligated to accept as true all the factual allegations in the complaint, construe them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor. Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1231-32 (10th Cir. 1996). 7 Our review of a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) depends on whether the motion was granted on factual or legal grounds. See Holt v. United States, 46 F.3d 1000, 1002-03 (10th Cir. 1995). In the first category, the movant challenges the facts upon which subject matter jurisdiction depends. Id. at 1003. To resolve such a dispute, [a] court has wide discretion to allow affidavits, other documents, and a limited evidentiary hearing . . . . Id. In the present case, the district court considered legal arguments not contained in the complaint, but did not rely on any evidentiary materials. We therefore review the 12(b)(1) dismissals under the same standard applicable to the dismissals under 12(b)(6), see Seamons, 84 F.3d at 1231-32, accepting all factual allegations as true and according the plaintiffs the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. Holt, 46 F.3d at 1002-03. 8 On appeal, Plaintiffs urge us to accept the following five contentions. First, that the Choctaw Nation is exercising contracted federal criminal jurisdiction because the Choctaw citizens did not grant criminal jurisdiction to the tribal government under the 1983 Choctaw Constitution. Aplt. Br. at 6. Second, that officers acting under federal contracted criminal jurisdiction are federal [and not] tribal officers. Id. at 7. Third, that the Bureau of Indian [A]ffairs contracting and overseeing federal criminal jurisdiction contracted to the tribe is liable for arrests performed in furtherance of the contract. Id. Fourth, that Choctaw citizens may seek compensation for injury pursuant to a treaty in federal district court. Id. And Fifth, that state municipal officers and municipalities are liable for holding prisoners for an entity that did not have jurisdiction to arrest the individuals. Id. On the facts of this case, we find each argument to be without merit.
9 Indian tribes exercise inherent sovereign authority over their members and territories. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 509 (1991). Due to their sovereign status, suits against tribes or tribal officials in their official capacity are barred in the absence of an unequivocally expressed waiver by the tribe or abrogation by Congress. Fletcher v. United States, 116 F.3d 1315, 1324 (10th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). Plaintiffs have not argued that the tribal defendants have waived their immunity, nor have they pointed to any congressional abrogation thereof. The tribal officials are therefore immune from suit in their official capacities. The individual capacity claims against the tribal defendants are addressed below. 10
11 Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in dismissing their claims against the tribal defendants because the tribal defendants are actually not tribal defendants at all, but rather, agents of the federal government. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971), the Supreme Court held that individuals who suffer violations of the United States Constitution by agents of the federal government may sue for damages in federal court. Despite Plaintiffs' failure to cite Bivens at any point in their brief, we construe their constitutional claims against the tribal defendants alleged to be agents of the federal government as Bivens claims. 12 Plaintiffs' first contention on appeal is that the Choctaw Nation is exercising contracted federal criminal jurisdiction because the Choctaw citizens did not grant criminal jurisdiction to the tribal government under the 1983 Choctaw Constitution. Aplt. Br. at 6. We read this as a two-part argument. First, Plaintiffs claim that the Choctaw Nation has no criminal jurisdiction over its members. Implicitly acknowledging that such jurisdiction is inherent in tribal sovereignty, Plaintiffs argue that the Choctaw Nation has waived that aspect of its sovereignty. Id. at 9-10. Second, Plaintiffs contend that the federal government delegated the power to exercise federal criminal jurisdiction to the Tribe by establishing the Choctaw Court of Indian Offenses, which functions as an instrumentality of the federal government. Id. at 10-11. 13 It is undisputed that Indian tribes have power to enforce their criminal laws against tribe members. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978); accord Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 563 (1981). The Supreme Court has squarely rejected the argument that this power derives from a delegation by the federal government, holding instead that the power is inherent in tribal sovereignty. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 322-23; see also 25 U.S.C. 1301(2) (defining powers of self-government to include the inherent power of Indian tribes, hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians). Indian tribes continue to possess all aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of their dependent status. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323. 14 Plaintiffs do not argue that the inherent criminal jurisdiction of the Choctaw Nation was withdrawn by treaty or statute. Nor do they -- or could they -- contend that such jurisdiction is inconsistent with the Tribe's dependent status. See id. at 326 ([T]he sovereign power of a tribe to prosecute its members for tribal offenses clearly does not fall within that part of sovereignty which the Indians implicitly lost by virtue of their dependent status.). Instead, Plaintiffs argue that the Choctaw Nation waived its jurisdiction in 1983 when it adopted a constitution that did not explicitly declare the Tribe's power to make and enforce criminal laws. Aplt. Br. at 9-10. 15 The question of whether an Indian tribe may waive a sovereign power by failing to enumerate it in a tribal constitution is a legal question, which we review de novo. Cf., e.g., Fletcher, 116 F.3d at 1323-24 (We review de novo the legal question of when a party can assert sovereign immunity.). The Supreme Court has held that a tribal constitution's silence regarding a particular sovereign power does not constitute a waiver of that power. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 148 & n.14 (1982) (rejecting silence as waiver argument in context of sovereign power to tax). To explain its holding, the Court noted that neither the Tribe's Constitution nor the Federal Constitution is the font of any sovereign power of the Indian tribes. Because the Tribe retains all inherent attributes of sovereignty that have not been divested by the Federal Government, the proper inference from silence on this point is that the [unenumerated] sovereign power remains intact. Id. at 148 n.14 (citations omitted). 16 The Supreme Court's holding in Merrion is controlling in this case. The Choctaw Nation's failure to explicitly describe the Nation's inherent criminal jurisdiction in its constitution did not (and, per Merrion, could not) effect a waiver of that power. Therefore, there is no set of facts that could have been alleged in support of this claim that would entitle the plaintiffs to relief, and dismissal for failure to state a claim and for lack of jurisdiction was proper. Seamons, 84 F.3d at 1231. In light of our holding that the Choctaw Nation has inherent criminal jurisdiction over its members and that such jurisdiction has been neither waived by the Tribe nor abrogated by Congress, we need not reach Plaintiffs' argument that the Choctaw Court of Indian Offenses, established pursuant to a Choctaw/BIA contract under the Indian Law Enforcement Act (ILEA), is a federal instrumentality exercising federal jurisdiction. In sum, we hold as a matter of law that at all times relevant to this action, the tribal defendants acted as agents of the Tribe pursuant to their inherent sovereign power to exercise criminal jurisdiction over intratribal offenses. Accordingly, we reject Plaintiffs' first and second contentions on appeal.
17 The district court's dismissal of the individual capacity Bivens claims against the tribal defendants was also proper, as was the dismissal of the FTCA claims against tribal security officers Kenneth Johnson and Blake Johnico in their individual capacities. 1 Under Bivens, an individual has a cause of action against a federal official in his individual capacity for damages arising out of the official's violation of the United States Constitution under color of federal law or authority. See Applewhite v. United States Air Force, 995 F.2d 997, 999 n.8 (10th Cir. 1993). Similarly, the FTCA allows injured persons to sue for torts committed by federal employees while acting within the scope of their office or employment. 28 U.S.C. 1346(b)(1). Although the plaintiffs have alleged that the tribal defendants acted as federal agents, our standard of review does not require that we accept conclusory allegations, unwarranted inferences, or legal conclusions in a complaint. Hackford v. Babbitt, 14 F.3d 1457, 1465 (10th Cir. 1994). As explained, the tribal defendants did not act as federal employees or agents, nor did they act under color of federal law. In addition, the tribal defendants are not bound by the United States Constitution. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 382-85 (1896) (holding that the U.S. Constitution only restricts the federal and state governments, but not tribal governments); Wheeler v. Swimmer, 835 F.2d 259, 262 (10th Cir. 1987) ([T]he safeguards of the federal Constitution were not extended wholesale to individual members of Indian tribes.). Therefore, Plaintiffs' constitutional and FTCA claims against the tribal defendants in their individual capacities were properly dismissed for failure to state a claim.