Opinion ID: 220052
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Method for Determining a Reasonable Award

Text: The district court determined that the most rational method of calculating the appropriate fee award in this case was to compare the amount of damages that Hometown sought and the amount of damages that it recovered. S & B Wilson argues that Hometown should not recover any of its attorneys' fees because it failed to meet its burden of proving which expenses arose out of or resulted from litigating the breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. Hometown argues that the district court failed to consider all the relevant factors in fashioning an award. S & B Wilson's argument that Hometown should not recover any attorneys' fees fails. Hometown had the burden to prove what a reasonable fee would be in this case. See Wilson, 745 S.W.2d at 873 (Obviously, the burden of proof on the question of what is a reasonable fee in any case is upon the plaintiff and plaintiff should be in a position to tender such proof.). However, Hometown did submit some evidence of the fees that it incurred to litigate S & B Wilson's breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing in the form of an affidavit from John P. Konvalinka, an attorney who represented Hometown in the litigation. Furthermore, the jury found that S & B Wilson violated its duty of good faith and fair dealing, and according to the plain language of the contract, Hometown is entitled to recover its fees and expenses that arose out of or resulted from this breach. Thus, the district court correctly found that Hometown could recover the attorneys' fees that arose out of or resulted from this breach. Hometown argues that the district court failed to consider all the relevant factors in fashioning an award. The Supreme Court of Tennessee has held that the appropriate factors to be used as guides in fixing a reasonable attorney's fee include: (1) the time devoted to performing the legal services; (2) the time limitations imposed by the circumstances; (3) the novelty and difficulty of the legal issues and the skill required to perform the service; (4) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar services; (5) the amount involved and the results obtained; and (6) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney. Connors v. Connors, 594 S.W.2d 672, 676 (Tenn.1980); see also Tenn. Sup.Ct. R. 8 (setting forth substantially similar guidelines). The United States Supreme Court has held that the most critical factor is the degree of success obtained. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436, 103 S.Ct. 1933. Tennessee courts have rejected a methodology based solely on the ratio of the fees requested to the amounts eventually awarded to the plaintiff. See Keith v. Howerton, 165 S.W.3d 248, 252-53 (Tenn. Ct.App.2004). However, the district court in this case relied on Connors and acknowledged that it was aware of the variety of factors that should be considered in fixing a reasonable attorney's fee. The main factor that the district court relied on was the amount involved and the results obtained. Depending on the case, certain Connors factors may be more relevant than others. Here, S & B Wilson did not dispute the reasonableness of Hometown's claimed attorneys' fees, and the district court's only duty was to apportion these fees among Hometown's claims. Thus, certain factors such as the time limitations imposed by the circumstances, the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar services, and the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney would have little relevance. In addition to the amount involved and the results obtained, the district court appeared to consider the time devoted to performing the legal services: Having presided over a twelve day jury trial and ruled on significant pre-trial and post-trial motions, the Court is intimately familiar with this case, and it is obvious to the Court that what this case was really about was Plaintiff obtaining ownership of the Burger King franchises. At trial, Plaintiff was primarily concerned with proving breach of contract in hopes that the Court would award specific performance and order Defendants to sell the franchises to Plaintiff. In addition, the district court carefully considered and rejected the option of awarding Hometown a portion of its expenses based on the number of claims on which it was successful compared to the number of claims brought in this case. Typically, the district court is entitled to wide discretion because of its superior understanding of the litigation. See Imwalle, 515 F.3d at 551. Thus, the district court did not err in placing primary reliance on the ratio of Hometown's success to what it claimed in calculating an attorneys' fee award. However, because we grant S & B Wilson judgment as a matter of law as to damages, the amount that Hometown recovered in damages is now zero. [1] Although Hometown has not proven damages, it has proven that S & B Wilson breached the duty of good faith and fair dealing. Thus, under the terms of the Agreement, Hometown may still be entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees arising out of or resulting from the breach, determined by the factors outlined in Connors. Thus, we REVERSE the district court's award of attorneys' fees and REMAND for recalculation.