Opinion ID: 1723507
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: whether the summary affidavit procedure comports with due process.

Text: Finally, Dwight complains that he was denied due process because the chancellor made his decision based upon two unrebutted, un-cross examined affidavits. Dwight claims that to allow such a procedure in a divorce case in which the chancellor must make inherent judgments about the character and contributions of individuals in the marriage does not comport with notions of fair play and substantial justice inherent in a due process system. Dwight admits that the right to cross examine and confront witnesses can be waived. But in essence he does not think that this is a fair process because it denies a full hearing on all the facts. Both parties waived their right to cross examine and confront witnesses against them in open court at the August 18, 1994 hearing. At that time, Dwight and Nancy both stipulated to the process. The chancellor stated that if one party wanted to rebut something in the other's affidavit, that party could do so in a counter affidavit. Dwight had the benefit of seeing Nancy's affidavit before filing his own, so he could rebut her assertions in his original affidavit. Nancy did not take advantage of the counter affidavit process. Trial by affidavit is a process that is allowed in several states. See Overman v. Overman, 102 Idaho 235, 629 P.2d 127 (1980); Eberly v. Eberly, 489 A.2d 433 (Del. 1985); Sieber v. Sieber, 258 N.W.2d 754 (Minn. 1977), (but if facts or affidavits render cross-examination essential, formal hearing must be held). Saturnini v. Saturnini, 260 Minn. 494, 497, 110 N.W.2d 480, 483(1961); Carvalho v. Carvalho, 838 P.2d 259, 262 (Ak. 1992). This Court however, has eschewed the use of affidavits as a substitute for a legitimate trial, except when used in the context of summary judgment under MRCP 56. Sullivan v. Trustmark National Bank, 653 So.2d 930, 932 (Miss. 1995); Brown v. Credit Center, Inc., 444 So.2d 358, 362 (Miss. 1983); Donald v. Reeves Transport Co., 538 So.2d 1191, 1195-96 (Miss. 1989). In the case at bar, because both parties made a knowing and intelligent waiver of their respective rights to cross examination, allowing the chancellor to rely upon their affidavits in reaching his decision, we find that this issue is without merit.