Opinion ID: 169974
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jones’s Sentence

Text: Prior to Jones’s sentencing hearing, the probation department prepared a pre-sentence report (PSR) using the 2002 version of the sentencing guidelines. For Count I, the assault on Eichers resulting in physical contact, the PSR recommended applying the offense guideline for aggravated assault. See USSG -27- §2A2.2. “‘Aggravated assault’ means a felonious assault that involved (A) a dangerous weapon with intent to cause bodily injury (i.e., not merely to frighten) with that weapon; (B) serious bodily injury; or (C) an intent to commit another felony.” Id., comment. (n.1). The PSR suggested Jones’s attempt to get Stevens’s baton during the struggle was an attempt to use a dangerous weapon to cause bodily injury. Under the aggravated assault provision, the base offense level was 15. See USSG §2A2.2(a). Three levels were added for brandishing or threatening to use a dangerous weapon. See USSG §2A2.2(b)(2)(c). Another three-point increase was included because Eichers was a prison official and Jones was in his custody at the time of the assault. See USSG §3A1.2(b). The PSR also recommended a two-level upward adjustment for obstruction of justice, explaining Jones’s testimony at trial appeared to falsify material facts. See USSG §3C1.1. Thus, for Count I the adjusted base offense level was 23. For Count II, the assault on Stevens resulting in bodily injury, the PSR recommended the same base offense level, adjustments and enhancements recommended for Count I, but also included a two-level increase because Stevens sustained bodily injury. See USSG §2A2.2(b)(3)(A). After applying a two-level multiple-count adjustment, the combined total offense level was 27. See USSG §3D1.4. The PSR calculated Jones’s Criminal History as Category III. The government requested it be increased to Category IV based on Jones’s -28- disciplinary history while in custody. The PSR rejected the government’s suggestion but stated, “the court may want to consider the defendant’s inmate disciplinary record and his prior offenses that were not assessed criminal history points . . . when selecting a point within the guideline range or as aggravating factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” (R. Vol. XVIII at 17.) Based on an offense level of 27 and a Criminal History Category of III, the guideline range for imprisonment was 87 to 108 months. The PSR also offered alternate guideline computations in the event the court did not agree the aggravated assault guideline applied. Applying USSG §2A2.4 (Obstructing or Impeding Officers), the base offense level was 6. Adding three levels because the conduct involved physical contact and two levels for obstruction of justice, the total combined offense level was 13. Based on a total offense level of 13 and a Criminal History Category of III, the alternate guideline range for imprisonment was 18 to 24 months. Addressing the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the PSR suggested “the court may consider that the defendant was involved in an assault on two correctional officers, which by its nature is a serious offense,” his history of violence before and during his imprisonment, and his poor adjustment to the prison environment making it highly likely there will be further disciplinary problems while he is incarcerated. (R. Vol. XVIII at 24.) The PSR also stressed “the need for the court to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct.” (Id. at -29- R-2). Jones objected to the PSR’s statement of the offense conduct, its use of the aggravated assault guideline, the obstruction of justice adjustment and his prison disciplinary record as a sentencing factor. He argued the total offense level should be 11 resulting in a guideline range of 8 to 14 months imprisonment. The court held two sentencing hearings. The first took place on May 2, 2005, and was primarily the presentation of the government’s evidence to support its guideline range arguments. The government introduced the videotape of the struggle as evidence of an aggravated assault. To support its request for an increased Criminal History Category, the government introduced, over Jones’s objection, his prison disciplinary records. Although the court allowed the exhibits, it stated it would give the disciplinary records little, if any, weight in determining the guideline range because the administrative findings were not based on a full factual hearing. The government then introduced a transcript of Jones’s trial testimony to support an obstruction of justice adjustment, claiming Jones’s testimony was generally a series of material falsehoods. The government also called a former inmate at Florence who was an orderly (cleaning person) at the location where Jones was housed for several months after the assault on Eichers and Stevens. The former inmate testified Jones approached him the day after the altercation, asking him to sign an affidavit falsely stating he had witnessed Jones having problems with the same guards in -30- the past. He also said Jones had given him a letter to pass on to another inmate requesting that inmate’s sister to perform a background check on Stevens and Eichers, as well as others who helped subdue Jones. In addition, Jones allegedly stated in the letter “he wasn’t beyond killing these people that had harmed him.” (R. Vol. XVI at 34.) The second hearing took place on July 1, 2005. After hearing counsels’ final arguments on the guideline calculations, the court ruled the government failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that Jones intended to use the baton as a deadly weapon and therefore, the court would apply USSG §2A2.4, not the aggravated assault guideline. The court also concluded the government failed to identify specific instances of material falsehoods in Jones’s testimony and consequently, it would not apply an obstruction of justice adjustment. 7 Based on the court’s rulings, it effectively determined the appropriate guideline range was 12 to 18 months imprisonment. The court then allowed counsel to present argument under the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. Jones argued a lenient sentence was warranted due to Jones’s mental condition as a result of his lengthy incarceration, his lack of family support including the recent death of his mother, and ended by urging the court to “treat this as a . . . rather modest assault as criminal assaults go.” (R. Vol. XVII 7 The court did not address the inmate’s testimony in its oral rulings but found no credibility in his rendition of events in its written order. -31- at 33.) Following the government’s response seeking a sentence above the guidelines based on the § 3553(a) factors, the court stated: [The guideline recommendation] is one factor of several to be considered pursuant to Section 3553(a). And I do consider the guidelines since they are a product of a lot of experience and study and it does provide us with some handholds in determining a rational range of sentence applicable to individuals. The factors under the statute in addition to the guidelines, of course, . . . the history and characteristics of the defendant, that’s well stated. And he does have a violent history and a history that conflicts with an ordered society. And the nature and the circumstances of the offense . . . have been belabored by both sides through trial and now through sentencing. I do conclude . . . that it could be that the defendant’s view of what happened is more accurate than that of the officers. We just simply – the evidence doesn’t make it obvious. But what is obvious is that the jury decided and that is the law as far as we are concerned that this defendant forcibly assaulted the officers in a voluntary and intentional manner. That’s the jury determination. And particularly in ADX, but in prisons generally, that determination requires punishment. The punishment as we know is to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for law, should include adequate deterrence, protect the public from further crimes of the defendant, provide him with education, training and so forth, and avoid particular unwarranted sentencing disparities. When I look at this, I certainly feel that the defendant must be punished for deterrence, for protection and hopefully to promote respect for the law. I agree with the Government that it is a very serious circumstance, what happened, and given the jury’s determination, I believe that a reasonable and just punishment would necessarily be something more than the guideline calculations as stated . . . . The circumstances of this individual, and keep in mind that the struggle is certainly serious, but the injury and so forth comparatively minor, I think an appropriate sentence . . . and by appropriate I mean reasonable and just – would be three years consecutive [to the time currently being served] and I will impose -32- that sentence. (Id. at 41-43.) a) Standard of Review After United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), we review a sentence for reasonableness, “encompass[ing] both the reasonableness of the length of the sentence, as well as the method by which the sentence was calculated.” United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1055 (10th Cir. 2006) (emphasis omitted). In United States v. Lopez-Flores, we determined an objection to the adequacy of the court’s explanation for its sentence is an objection to the method by which the sentence was calculated. 444 F.3d 1218 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 127 S.Ct. 3043 (2006). An adequate explanation is required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) which states, in relevant part: The court, at the time of sentencing, shall state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence, and, if the sentence . . . is outside the [guideline] range, . . . the specific reason for the imposition of a sentence different from that described, which reasons must also be stated with specificity in the written order of judgment and commitment . . . . We concluded if the defendant does not object to the district court’s lack of explanation after it announced his sentence, “plain-error review is appropriate.” Lopez-Flores, 444 F.3d at 1221. Relying on Lopez-Flores, the government claims Jones is attacking only the adequacy of the explanation given by the trial court for his sentence, i.e., the -33- method used to calculate the sentence. Because Jones did not object below, the government asserts our standard of review is for plain error. In his reply brief, Jones claims his appeal attacks both the method by which the sentence was reached and its length. He argues the government’s reliance on Lopez-Flores is misplaced because its holding is limited to objections relating to guideline sentences. We recently clarified the confusion regarding the standard of review in the absence of an objection to the trial court’s failure to fully articulate its reasons for imposing a specific sentence. United States v. Romero, 491 F.3d 1173 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, __ S.Ct.__, 2007 WL 2300385 (2007). In Romero, we reviewed a sentence imposed for illegal reentry into the United States. We recognized Lopez-Flores had created some confusion because, in that case, the defendant failed to raise any substantive argument that the § 3553(a) factors merited a below-guidelines sentence. Id. at 1176. This fact “raise[d] some question as to whether this omission affected our determination that his procedural objection went unpreserved.” Id. We clarified our approach in Romero, and applied a plain error standard despite Romero’s argument requesting the court to lower his sentence from the guideline range. Id. at 1176-78. We took the opportunity to reassert “[o]ur conviction that the requirement of contemporaneous objection to procedural errors is consistent with our precedent and represents a reasonable burden on defendants . . . .” Id. at 1177. Romero -34- contains no indication the plain error standard of review is inapplicable when a general argument as to the length of the sentence is presented nor did we limit the holding only to within-guidelines sentences. Id. at 1176-78. We reiterated the purpose of an objection is to alert the court to error that can be immediately corrected. Id. at 1177. It is even more incumbent on a defendant to object when the court imposes an above-guidelines sentence which the defendant believes is not adequately explained. Consequently, we apply a plain error standard to Jones’s claim the district court did not articulate the factors supporting a sentence exceeding the guideline range. “Plain error occurs when there is (1) error, (2) that is plain, which (3) affects substantial rights, and which (4) seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Lopez-Flores, 444 F.3d at 1222 (quotation omitted). On the other hand, “it is unnecessary to argue to the district court after imposition of the sentence that the sentence is unreasonably long.” Id. at 1221. Thus, we review the ultimate sentence imposed for reasonableness. United States v. Mares, 441 F.3d 1152, 1159 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S.Ct. 3048 (2007). b) Adequate Exposition “[W]hen a district court imposes a sentence outside the Guidelines, the level of scrutiny we apply in reviewing the sentence depends on the ‘comparative difference’ between the applicable range under the advisory Guidelines and the -35- actual sentence imposed.” United States v. Hildreth, 485 F.3d 1120, 1127 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Cage, 451 F.3d 585, 594 (10th Cir. 2006)). We look to the percentage of divergence as well as the “absolute number of months above or below the Guidelines range.” United States v. Valtierra-Rojas, 468 F.3d 1235, 1240 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S.Ct. 2935 (2007). The detail with which the court must explain its decision to vary from the guideline range is relative to the degree of the discrepancy between the sentence and the advisory range. Cage, 451 F.3d at 594 (“Had the comparative difference been smaller but still outside the guidelines range, the district court’s decision would not have been presumptively reasonable but an appropriate justification would suffice for this court to determine that it is reasonable.”). 8 Here, Jones received a sentence of twice the 2002 guidelines maximum or in other words, an additional eighteen months. This is certainly not extreme when viewed in light of our cases. See United States v. Mateo, 1170 (10th Cir. 2006), (471% or eight years upward variance is an “extreme” divergence), cert. denied, 127 S.Ct. 2890 (2007); Valtierra-Rojas, 468 F.3d 1235, 1237 (122% or thirtythree month variance is “substantial,” rather than extreme); United States v. Bishop, 469 F.3d 896, 908 (10th Cir. 2006) (37% or twenty-one month variance a 8 The Supreme Court has recognized “a number of circuits adhere to the proposition that the strength of the justification needed to sustain an outside-Guidelines sentence varies in proportion to the degree of the variance.” Rita v. United States, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2467 (2007). The Court will consider this approach this term in United States v. Gall, No. 06-7949. Id. -36- “significant” increase). Rather, the variance in Jones’s sentence is substantial but not extreme. We therefore require the court to express sufficiently compelling reasons but “they need not be as ‘dramatic’” as the reasons supporting an extreme divergence. Valtierra-Rojas, 468 F.3d at 1240. The district court’s explanation was sufficient. The PSR, incorporated in part in the sentencing record, stated, “the need for the court to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct is great in this case. The 36-year-old defendant has been incarcerated for the last 15 years . . . . The defendant has a history of poor institutional adjustment in the BOP, and his behavior problems in prison have escalated during his period of imprisonment.” 9 (R. Vol. XVIII at R-2.) At sentencing, the court reiterated its concerns regarding Jones’s violent history and the seriousness of the offense. It noted the special considerations given to the location of the offense and the identity of the victims. Thus, an exceptional need for deterrence, protection and the promotion of respect for the law was sufficiently explained. In addition, Jones does not allege any error by the district court that affected his substantial rights or that the court’s failure to give a satisfactory explanation would change “‘the outcome of the district court proceedings.’” 9 Jones’s disciplinary history included numerous incidents of insolence or refusing to obey orders, one incident of threatening a staff member, one incident of indecent exposure to a corrections officer, four incidents of fighting or assaulting other inmates, and five incidents of possessing a weapon or sharpened tool. -37- United States v. Trujillo-Terrazas, 405 F.3d 814, 819 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993)). “[W]e will not supply such an argument for him.” Romero, 491 F.3d at 1179. For these reasons, Jones has failed to demonstrate the trial court’s explanation for imposing an aboveguidelines sentence was error, let alone plain error. c) Reasonableness of Sentence Reasonableness is guided by the statutory factors delineated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Hildreth, 485 F.3d at 1127. [Section] 3553(a) . . . tells the sentencing judge to consider (1) offense and offender characteristics; (2) the need for a sentence to reflect the basic aims of sentencing, namely (a) ‘just punishment’ (retribution), (b) deterrence, (c) incapacitation, (d) rehabilitation; (3) the sentences legally available; (4) the Sentencing Guidelines; (5) Sentencing Commission policy statements; (6) the need to avoid unwarranted disparities; and (7) the need for restitution. The provision also tells the sentencing judge to ‘impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with’ the basic aims of sentencing as set out above. Rita, 127 S.Ct. at 2463 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)). Jones complains the court’s sentence of twice the upper limit of the advisory guideline range is presumptively unreasonable. This argument is foreclosed by our recent holding in Valtierra-Rojas, 468 F.3d at 1239. (“We join these circuits in holding that a sentence outside of the properly calculated Guidelines range is not presumptively unreasonable.”); see also Rita, 127 S.Ct. at 2467 (“The fact that we permit courts of appeals to adopt a presumption of -38- reasonableness does not mean that courts may adopt a presumption of unreasonableness.”). Consequently, Jones is afforded no presumption his aboveguidelines sentence is unreasonable. “A substantively reasonable sentence ultimately reflects the gravity of the crime and the § 3553(a) factors as applied to the case.” Hildreth, 485 F.3d at 1127 (quotations omitted); see also Cage, 451 F.3d at 594. “[T]here is no formula into which we input the degree of divergence in order to generate precisely how compelling the district court’s reasons need be,” although “comparison with other cases is a useful tool.” Valtierra-Rojas, 468 F.3d at 1240. As discussed above, a comparison of Jones’s sentence with other cases reveals the divergence from the guidelines here was not extreme. Jones does not argue that the sentencing court’s reasons were not proper under § 3553(a). Nor do we have a situation where the district court abandoned the guidance afforded by the guidelines. Cf. Hildreth, 485 F.3d at 1129 (“[T]he District Court essentially ignored the recommendation of the sentencing Guidelines.”). As we have stated: Although the sentencing Guidelines are now advisory, district courts must consider them in reaching sentencing decisions. As we have previously explained, the Guidelines are an expression of Congress’s intentions in passing the sentencing laws. Consequently, a district court may not determine reasonableness under § 3553(a) without reference to the fact that the Guidelines represent a critical advisory aspect of the § 3553(a) factors. Moreover, a properly calculated Guidelines sentence will typically reflect an accurate application of the factors listed in § 3553(a), including the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities under § 3553(a)(6), which we -39- have noted is the purpose of the Guidelines. Id. at 1128-29 (citations and quotations omitted). Due to ex post facto concerns, Jones was sentenced under the 2002 Guidelines manual rather than the manual in effect at the time of sentencing, the 2004 Guidelines manual. While we offer no opinion as to whether the nowadvisory guidelines require an ex post facto analysis, the current guidelines at the time of sentencing are instructive when reviewing a sentence for unreasonableness. 10 See United States v. Tisdale, 7 F.3d 957, 967 (10th Cir. 1993). The base offense level for Jones’s offense was increased from 6 in 2002 10 Compare United States v. Demaree, 459 F.3d 791, 794-95 (7th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S.Ct. 3055 (2007) (“We conclude that the ex post facto clause should apply only to laws and regulations that bind rather than advise, a principle well established with reference to parole guidelines whose retroactive application is challenged under the ex post facto clause.”); United States v. Barton, 455 F.3d 649, 655 n.4 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 127 S.Ct. 748 (2006) (same); and United States v. Rodarte-Vasquez, 488 F.3d 316, 325 (5th Cir. 2007) (Jones, J., concurring) (“A purely advisory regulation does not present an ex post facto problem solely because it is traceable to Congress and will possibly disadvantage a defendant.”); with United States v. Carter, 490 F.3d 641, 643 (8th Cir. 2007) (“[A]t least one of our sister circuits has held that the ex post facto clause does not apply to the now-advisory guidelines. But in a case decided after Booker, we recognize[d] that retrospective application of the Guidelines implicates the ex post facto clause, though we took into account post-offense amendments to the guidelines when determining the overall reasonableness of the defendant’s sentence.”) (quotation and citation omitted) and United States v. Gilman, 478 F.3d 440, 449 (1st Cir. 2007) (“Although we note that the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has concluded that Booker’s ruling that the guidelines are advisory rather than mandatory carries with it the elimination of ex post facto concerns, the issue is doubtful in this circuit.”) (citation and quotation omitted). -40- to 10 in 2004. 11 If the offense involved physical contact, the 2004 Guidelines require an increase of three levels and if bodily injury was sustained, an additional increase of two levels. See USSG §2A2.4(a),(b)(1)&(2). Consequently, Jones’s base offense level under the 2004 Guidelines would have been 30 to 37 months imprisonment. 12 We also are mindful that “[t]he sentencing judge has access to, and greater familiarity with, the individual case and the individual defendant before him than the Commission or the appeals court.” Rita, 127 S.Ct. at 2469. Here, the statutory maximum for these offenses was eight years for an assault resulting in physical contact and twenty years for an assault resulting in bodily injury. See 18 U.S.C. § 11(a)&(b). The guideline range did not account for Jones’s extensive prison disciplinary history or the fact he was an inmate who attacked prison officials. “To affirm, we must simply be satisfied that the chosen sentence, standing alone, is reasonable.” United States v. Jarrillo-Luna, 478 F.3d 1226, 1230 (10th Cir. 2007). Given the above considerations, we do not find the imposition of a thirty-six month sentence unreasonable. 11 The 2002 Guidelines were used pursuant to USSG §1B1.11(b)(1) which provides: “If the court determines that use of the Guidelines Manual in effect on the date that the defendant is sentenced would violate the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution, the court shall use the Guidelines Manual in effect on the date that the offense of conviction was committed.” 12 The imposition of another two levels, one for each conviction on two counts, remained the same under both the 2002 and 2004 Guidelines. See USSG §3D1.4(2002) and USSG §3D1.4 (2004). -41- B. Motion for a New Trial Jones’s second motion for a new trial was based on his conversation with another inmate while waiting for his second sentencing hearing. The inmate, alleged he, too, suffered an unprovoked attack by Eichers while at Florence during the summer of 2003. Jones complains that had he known of this incident, he “could have used this information to effectively cross-examine Officer Eichers and undermined the credibility of the guards,” which “could have changed the jury verdict.” (R. Vol. I, Doc. 197 at 2.) In his reply brief to the trial court, Jones claimed: “This evidence was admissible, not only as [] impeachment after Officer Eichers took the stand, but as independent evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).” (Id., Doc. 204 at 4.) Jones did not elaborate on this claim. The court denied Jones’s motion concluding the new evidence was merely impeachment evidence. The court also observed: “In his reply, Jones argues for the first time that evidence of the [inmate’s] incident would have been admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) as independent evidence relevant to the affirmative defense of self-defense. Jones fails to provide any information from which I could determine that the . . . incident was similar enough to the facts of this case to be relevant for 404(b) purposes.” (R. Vol. I, Doc. 242 at 3.) Jones argues he “made a prima facie showing that the evidence was more than merely impeaching evidence” which “should be enough to obtain a ruling on the merits.” (Appellant’s Supp. Opening Br. at 4.) He asserts: “If the court -42- believed it needed more information, it should have asked the parties for it or set the motion for a hearing.” (Id.) We disagree. Rule 33(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure authorizes district courts to grant new trials “if the interest of justice so requires.” “A motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence is generally disfavored and should be granted only with great caution.” United States v. Gwathney, 465 F.3d 1133, 1143 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotations omitted), cert. denied, 127 S.Ct. 2151 (2007). “To procure a new trial based on newly discovered evidence . . . the defendant must show: (1) the evidence was discovered after trial; (2) the failure to learn of the evidence was not caused by his own lack of diligence; (3) the new evidence is not merely impeaching; (4) the new evidence is material to the principal issues involved; and (5) the new evidence is of such a nature that in a new trial it would probably produce an acquittal. Id. at 1144 (quotations omitted). We review the denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion. United States v. Quintanilla, 193 F.3d 1139, 1146 (10th Cir. 1999). We find no abuse of discretion here. The court carefully and thoroughly reviewed the proffered evidence (even though it was unaccompanied by an affidavit) and reached a reasonable conclusion. Jones did not explain his Rule 404(b) theory to the court nor does he do so on appeal. 13 We also note his 13 Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rule of Evidence provides in relevant part: Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove -43- argument on appeal fails to contain any citation to supporting legal precedent. We require more than bare conclusions. See United States v. Hall, 473 F.3d 1295, 1313 n.5 (10th Cir. 2007) (stating failure to meaningfully develop arguments will forfeit them on appeal); see also Barkell v. Crouse, 468 F.3d 684, 696 (10th Cir. 2006) (“We have consistently held that we will not consider claims unsupported by cogent argument and authority.”). AFFIRMED. ENTERED FOR THE COURT Terrence L. O’Brien