Opinion ID: 2638406
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The court has a duty to construe statutes constitutionally.

Text: We have oft stated and long repeated the maxim of statutory construction that statutes where possible should be afforded a constitutional, rather than an unconstitutional application. [7] See, e.g., State v. Furman, 122 Wash.2d 440, 458, 858 P.2d 1092 (1993); Grant v. Spellman, 99 Wash.2d 815, 827, 664 P.2d 1227 (1983); State v. Collins, 55 Wash.2d 469, 470, 348 P.2d 214 (1960); State v. Clausen, 160 Wash. 618, 632, 295 P. 751 (1931). Water rights in Washington have long been understood to be usufructuary in nature they only constitute a right to use water, not a possessory right in the actual water itself. See, e.g., Rigney v. Tacoma Light & Water Co., 9 Wash. 576, 583, 38 P. 147 (1894); see Office of the Attorney General, An Introduction to Washington Water Law 1:2 (Jan.2000). That said, water rights are nonetheless property, and are thus protected in this state against unlawful deprivation absent due process and governmental takings or damagings absent just compensation first made. See Wash. Const. art. I, §§ 3, 16; Dep't of Ecology v. Grimes, 121 Wash.2d 459, 478, 852 P.2d 1044 (1993); Dep't of Ecology v. Adsit, 103 Wash.2d 698, 705-06, 694 P.2d 1065 (1985); Bach v. Sarich, 74 Wash.2d 575, 579, 445 P.2d 648 (1968); In re Clinton Water Dist. of Island County, 36 Wash.2d 284, 287, 218 P.2d 309 (1950); Washington Water Law, supra, at VII:13; 9 Julius L. Sackman, Nichols on Eminent Domain § 34.05[4], at 34-77 (rev.3d ed.1999); 2 Sackman, supra, § 5.05[1], at 5-309 (rev.3d ed.1999); David C. Hallford, Environmental Regulations as Water Rights Takings, 6 Nat. Resources & Env't 13, 13 (1991); Jan G. Laitos, Water Rights, Clean Water Act Section 404 Permitting, and the Takings Clause, 60 U. Colo. L.Rev. 901, 905 (1989). A governmental abrogation of a preexisting, vested water right is an appropriation of that enhanced minimum flow to a public use and therefore is a taking encompassed in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments no matter how minimal the intrusion may be. See Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. CI. 313, 319-20 (2001) (discussing United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 66 S.Ct. 1062, 90 L.Ed. 1206 (1946); Int'l Paper Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 399, 51 S.Ct. 176, 75 L.Ed. 410 (1931); Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 83 S.Ct. 999, 10 L.Ed.2d 15 (1963)). Commentators also agree if the application of water quality regulations conditions an existing water right to maintain minimum instream flows, and the required minimum flows de facto deny the right holder the ability to accomplish the purpose of the right in an economically feasible manner, then application of the regulation constitutes a taking requiring compensation sufficient to acquire an alternative supply means. See, e.g., Laitos, supra, at 919; Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr. & Bennett W. Raley, Water Rights Protection in Water Quality Law, 60 U. Colo. L.Rev. 841, 896-99 (1989). The District [8] has maintained the purpose for which it obtained water rightsthe construction and operation of a hydroelectric facilitywill be entirely frustrated by the imposition of the minimum instream flows required by Ecology. See, e.g., Answer to Mot. for Discretionary Review at 6 (stating Ecology's requirements would make project substantially worthless); id. at 12 (infeasible); Br. of Resp't/Cross-Pet'r at 9 (uneconomic and would not be built); District's Reply Br. to Ecology's Arguments on Cross-Appeal at 9 n. 10 (prohibit[s] the District's use of its water rights). Additionally, Ecology concedes there will be certain times of the year when the natural flow of Sullivan Creek will be insufficient to maintain the bypass flows while still permitting the full exercise of the water rights claimed by the District. Corrected Pet'r Reply Br. at 15. These statements are corroborated in the record. [9] Here Ecology uses the water quality certification process to impose additional minimum instream flow conditions which significantly impair the District's existing permit rights. The District's preexisting right to 550 cfs total water rights was previously vested by permit subject only to a 10 cfs minimum flow condition before the Ecology order at issue here. See PCHB Hr'g Ex. of Ecology-231, CP at 164. The new enhanced minimum flow imposed by the water quality certification order however multiplies by 20 times the original minimum flow requirement. Were the applicable statutes construed to allow this, existing rights in property would be taken in arguable conflict with the federal takings clause as well as the state eminent domain requirement that no property be taken without just compensation having first been made. [10] This presents a problem of constitutional magnitude which could easily be avoided by an appropriate constitutional construction as urged in sections A and B.