Opinion ID: 2634089
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Did the prosecutor commit misconduct by making improper remarks about defense counsel and the defense theory of the case?

Text: [¶13] The appellant's second allegation of prosecutorial misconduct is directed at the following highlighted statements made in the State's rebuttal closing argument, which statements we will set forth in context: We had some real assertions as to  I wrote it down as the truth according to [ defense counsel ]. But let's look at what he says is in dispute. None of the victims were in uniform. Well, even Mr. Bustos testified that he wasn't going to balk at paying the cover charge or showing his ID to the bouncers because they weren't in uniform. It is not required under Wyoming law that bouncers wear uniforms, and rarely will any of you have any memories of bouncers at any kind of event like this wearing uniforms. That's not a justification for stabbing somebody in the leg. I stabbed him because he wasn't wearing a uniform. That's pretty thin, when you really boil it down to what he's saying. He says no one but the bouncers believe that the  that they identified themselves. Actually, what you heard was that it was a crowded bar. There were 50 to 60 people in there  unless you believe the defendant and his friend's testimony that maybe there were a hundred or 200 in there, but at least 50 to 60 people. The bouncer said they were running at capacity; they had to make sure there weren't too many people there. But it's a crowded bar. It's loud, and a fight has broken out. Now, all of the other witnesses said they didn't hear it. They didn't say it didn't happen. And really, it doesn't even matter. Does it matter if they ran over there and said they were law enforcement officers? What do we really know happened? Well, again, let's look at the truth according to [ defense counsel ]. He says that his client was the victim of a big guy holding him over the stairs. He was looking down that landing and just knew he was going to be thrown down those stairs. The same photograph that shows you the green table Mr. Campbell was thrown onto also lets you see that even if you're standing in the very doorway, you have a landing in front of you that's at least as wide as the door. He wasn't standing on the brink of the stairs. He was simply looking out the door. He was being held by Mr. Statton in an attempt to restrain him. He was not being thrown anywhere. He was not  nobody testified he was picked up off the floor, except maybe Mr. Bustos. I didn't hear that, but picked up off the floor and thrown  held over the stairs? I don't know where that came from. It's hard to refute. (Emphasis added.) [¶14] Our standard for the review of this issue differs from the standard of review we applied to the first issue: Because no objection to the prosecutor's closing argument was made at trial, we review the claim under our plain error standard. Plain error exists when 1) the record is clear about the incident alleged as error; 2) there was a transgression of a clear and unequivocal rule of law; and 3) the party claiming the error was denied a substantial right which materially prejudiced him. Prejudice results if [the appellant] can show that he was not allowed a trial on its own merits. Where the plain error elements are met, we may correct the error if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Dysthe v. State, 2003 WY 20, ¶ 23, 63 P.3d 875, 884 (Wyo. 2003) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). [¶15] The first prong of the plain error test has been met in that the questioned remarks clearly appear in the trial transcript. As to the second prong, the appellant characterizes the prosecutor's remarks, first, as implying that the appellant's self-defense defense was a lie, and second, as being a personal attack upon defense counsel. In support of the first contention, he cites Doherty v. State, 2006 WY 39, ¶ 22, 131 P.3d 963, 970 (Wyo. 2006) and Barnes v. State, 642 P.2d 1263, 1265-66 (Wyo. 1982), for the proposition that the prosecutor can only suggest that the appellant is a liar if that suggestion is supported by the evidence. In support of the contention that disparaging remarks about defense counsel are improper, he cites Johnson v. Gibson, 169 F.3d 1239, 1250 (10th Cir. 1999), overruled in part on other grounds by Green v. State, 1993 OK CR 30, 862 P.2d 1271 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993). The authority stated does, indeed, support the stated propositions. [¶16] In its brief, the State argues that the prosecutor's remarks did not violate a clearly established rule of law because it is the role of the jury in a credibility contest to determine who is telling the truth, and the prosecutor was merely emphasizing for the jury the two different versions of the event presented by the evidence. See Miller v. State, 2003 WY 55, ¶ 22, 67 P.3d 1191, 1197 (Wyo. 2003) (as fact finder, jury weighs credibility of witnesses). We agree. While we are not enamored of the prosecutor's phraseology, and we do not condone the personalization of closing argument, we do not find that these words, in this context, violated a specific and clear rule of law. We condoned much more direct and more egregious statements that a defendant was lying in both Doherty, 2006 WY 39, ¶¶ 19, 22, 131 P.3d at 969, 970-71 (There is no tale that is too tall to tell. There is no person too sacred to lie to . . . . [E]ven if it means taking the stand and lying to 12 jurors of your peers); and Barnes, 642 P.2d at 1265-66 (While calling a defendant a thief and a liar may not be in good taste, the evidence discloses a reasonable inference that he was not truthful in his testimony and he was in fact a thief). Further, an implication of disparagement, unchallenged below, simply does not rise to the level of professional misconduct that violates the rules of professional conduct for Wyoming lawyers, the ABA standards for prosecutors, or the right to due process of law. See Wyo. R. Prof. Conduct 3.4(e); and Trujillo, 2002 WY 51, ¶ 5, 44 P.3d at 24. [¶17] Even if the statements at issue could be seen as violating a clear rule of law, the appellant has not met his burden of proving that he was prejudiced thereby. See Butz, 2007 WY 152, ¶ 28, 167 P.3d at 657. At most, the two statements were disparagement by innuendo, they were brief, and they were said within the context of a comparison of the two versions of the incident. It just cannot be said that they prevented a trial on the merits or seriously affected the fairness of the trial. Finally, we note that the jury was instructed that statements of counsel were not to be considered as evidence, and we assume that juries follow the court's instructions. Doherty, 2006 WY 39, ¶ 28, 131 P.3d at 972; DeJulio v. Foster, 715 P.2d 182, 187 (Wyo. 1986); Eckert v. State, 680 P.2d 478, 485 (Wyo. 1984); Slaughter v. State, 630 P.2d 517, 519 (Wyo. 1981). [¶18] In his brief, the appellant opines that: The disparaging remarks and relying on facts not in evidence could have affected the jury's deliberations. This was not a case of overwhelming evidence and boiled down to whose version was believable. The prosecutor's misconduct could have affected that decision to Mr. Bustos' detriment. [¶19] The problem with this argument, of course, is that could have affected is not the test for prejudice under plain error analysis. Rather, the test is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the appellant would have received a more favorable verdict in the absence of the error. Miller v. State, 2006 WY 17, ¶ 15, 127 P.3d 793, 798 (Wyo. 2006). That standard has not been met in this case.