Opinion ID: 1355714
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: dowling indicates a clear defensible result

Text: The main reason the majority gives for overruling Dowling is that it requires after-the-fact analysis of subtle distinctions preserved in the record of the proceedings. Majority, at 308. Just as a preliminary point, the same is true of almost every decision we make. If the need for meticulous evaluation of the record is a defect in standards of appellate review, then much of this court's work is suspect. More to the point, it is clear the majority grossly overstates the difficulties involved in applying the Dowling standard. Dowling defines when a criminal defendant has been acquitted and may not be placed in jeopardy again: A finding by the court as the trier of fact, without a jury,[ [1] ] when read conclusively into the record in such a manner as to indicate that it is neither tentative nor made with reservation or advisement nor subject to further consideration or proceedings in the same case, will support a judgment of acquittal or dismissal. 98 Wn.2d at 547 (quoting State v. Bastinelli, 81 Wn.2d 947, 950, 956, 506 P.2d 854 (1973) (Hale, C.J., concurring)). We derived this rule from the well established principle that, when an appellate court reverses a conviction based on insufficient evidence, a retrial is not permissible. 98 Wn.2d at 544. See Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40, 67 L.Ed.2d 30, 101 S.Ct. 970 (1981); Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 57 L.Ed.2d 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141 (1978). A trial court cannot grant, by way of a motion to reconsider, what the State cannot obtain from this court on appeal. 98 Wn.2d at 545. Whatever speculative difficulties the majority may have in mind in its appraisal of Dowling, they are not present in this case. The application of the rule to this record is simple and straightforward. Contrary to the majority's representation, the trial judge did not merely state a position in language that reflected a ruling. He ruled. [The Court]: Counsel, I can't see anything else but she prevented her own restraint, physical restraint within the drunk tank, per se. In her activity of striking out at one time, outside the attorney's room, it would appear to be, again, hostile assault, but not in the sense of prevention of detention; it was just an assault per se. Looking at all of the evidence most favorable to the State, I don't think the requirements of State versus Green [94 Wn.2d 216, 616 P.2d 628 (1980)] are met, and I will dismiss regarding 3rd degree assault. Do you want some time to consult with each other regarding the other two matters? Report of Proceedings, at 100. The judge summarized the relevant evidence, stated the applicable legal standard, applied that standard to the facts, stated a conclusion and moved on to the next issue. No subtle analysis or guesswork is needed to identify such a statement as a clear, unambiguous ruling. Furthermore, not only did the trial court make an unequivocal ruling, the State recognized it as such. In making the motion to reconsider, counsel for the State began by saying: [Counsel]: Your Honor, I realize you have ruled, but I would like to draw your attention to State v. Jury, [19 Wn. App. 256, 576 P.2d 1302, review denied, 90 Wn.2d 1006 (1978)] ... Report of Proceedings, at 101. In short, the trial court's ruling that the State had not met its burden was neither tentative nor made with reservation or advisement nor subject to further consideration ... 98 Wn.2d at 547. Under Dowling, Collins was acquitted at the moment the decision was announced, and the State's motion for reconsideration simply could not be granted without running afoul of the prohibition on double jeopardy. There is no guesswork involved in reaching this conclusion. The majority overstates the difficulties associated with applying the Dowling rule because it is bent on overruling it.