Opinion ID: 901494
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: [¶ 8.] Krukow does not dispute that he violated the conditions of his supervision agreement. Instead, he contends that he was not under the Board's jurisdiction at the time the violations occurred. According to Krukow, his November 1998 judgment does not explicitly state how long he was to remain on supervised release, and thus the Board did not have the power to revoke his suspended sentence nearly six years after he was sentenced. The Board, on the other hand, claims that a plain reading of Krukow's sentence demonstrates that the sentencing court expected the suspended sentence to last nine years and six months. [¶ 9.] At his revocation hearing, Krukow did not challenge the Board's jurisdiction to impose the remainder of his suspended sentence. However, we will consider the issue because questions of jurisdiction can be raised and considered at any time. Wells v. Wells, 2005 SD 67, ¶ 11, 698 N.W.2d 504, 507 (citing Reaser v. Reaser, 2004 SD 116, ¶ 27, 688 N.W.2d 429, 437 (citations omitted)). While Krukow is correct that the trial court's sentence does not explicitly state the time Krukow will be subject to the Board's supervision, he cites no authority for the conclusion that absent such a provision the Board has no jurisdiction. Nevertheless, he insists that this Court cannot assume that the sentencing court meant to place Krukow on supervision for the entire time of his suspended sentence. [¶ 10.] Once a defendant is released on a suspended sentence, the Board has the responsibility for enforcing the conditions imposed by the sentencing judge, and the [B]oard retains jurisdiction to revoke the suspended portion of the sentence for violation of the terms of suspension. SDCL 23A-27-19. Krukow was sentenced to ten years. Then, on the condition that he adhere to certain terms, the court suspended the execution of nine years and six months of his sentence. While the court could have stated in its sentence that Krukow was to remain under the Board's supervision for less than the suspended nine years and six months, the court was not required to do so. See State v. Macy, 403 N.W.2d 743, 744-46 (S.D.1987). Unless otherwise provided, the length of supervision and the suspended sentence were coterminous. Despite the fact that Krukow had been on supervised release for over five years, he was still under the supervision of the Board at the time he violated the conditions of his suspended sentence. Therefore, the Board had jurisdiction to revoke the suspended portion of his sentence.