Opinion ID: 1894470
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: granting of stay

Text: The standards for granting a stay pending appeal are controlled by the Supreme Court's decision in Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission v. Process Gas Consumers, 502 Pa. 545, 467 A.2d 805 (1983). In Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, the Supreme Court expressly disapproved of the standards set forth in Allets, and held that the grant of a stay is warranted if: 1) the petitioner makes a strong showing that he is likely to prevail on the merits; 2) the petitioner has shown that he will suffer irreparable injury without the requested relief; 3) the issuance of a stay will not substantially harm other parties; and 4) the issuance of a stay will not adversely affect the public interest. However, the decision to grant or deny a stay pending appeal is vested in the trial court's discretion, and will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of that discretion. In re: Upset Sale, Tax Claim Bureau of Berks Co., 505 Pa. 327, 479 A.2d 940 (1984). Although the trial court did not specifically address the factors set forth in Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission when it granted the stay to the Rayburns, we nevertheless do not conclude that the granting of the Rayburns' petition for a stay was an abuse of the trial court's discretion. First, as the trial court noted in its order granting the stays, there was considerable confusion concerning the status of the property. The likelihood of the Rayburns succeeding on the merits on appeal could not be readily ascertained as a result of the confusion noted by the trial court. Moreover, although we found it unnecessary to reach the merits of the issues raised by the Rayburns, we cannot say that they raised insignificant issues. See Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission v. Process Gas Consumers, Id., 502 Pa. at 554, 467 A.2d at 809. Secondly, should the Rayburns have prevailed on appeal, the failure to obtain the stay would have resulted in a substantial, irreparable loss to them, i.e., the loss of the actual real estate in question. Third, while the granting of the stay would delay Insilco's obtaining satisfaction of its judgment, presuming that Insilco would prevail on appeal, Insilco would nevertheless be able to satisfy its judgment by selling the property and recovering money damages for the delay in the sale of the property. Finally, because this is a dispute between private parties, there is no substantial public interest to be affected by either the grant or denial of the stay. Considering all of these factors, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the Rayburns' petition for a stay.