Opinion ID: 1748991
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did the lower court err in granting Instruction S-2A for the State?

Text: The Instruction S-2A follows: The Court instructs the Jury that if you find from the evidence in this case beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, Larry Lumpkin, did on or about May 5, 1980, unlawfully, wilfully, and feloniously buy or receive a Victorian marble top coffee table, a Victorian console table with a marble top, and a Victorian wash stand with a marble top and back splash, which had a total value in excess of $100.00, when he knew that this property had been feloniously taken away from the estate of Mrs. Martha Fort, then you shall find the defendant guilty as charged. The appellant first contends that the above instruction constitutes reversible error because it assumes as true principal facts in issue, and cites Eubanks v. State, 227 Miss. 162, 85 So.2d 805 (1956), and Church v. State, 288 So.2d 855 (Miss. 1974). In Eubanks, the lower court granted a number of faulty instructions for the State. The instruction similar to the one sub judice was held to be erroneous because it assumed as true principal facts in issue. We distinguish the instructions there and in the present case because the principal part of that instruction stated ... the said Clyde Eubanks well knowing the said automobile tires to have been recently stolen and carried away as aforesaid at the time he wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously bought or obtained said automobile tires... . [227 Miss. at 169, 85 So.2d at 806]. The latter phrase peremptorily told the jury that Eubanks wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously bought or obtained the stolen property. In Church, the instruction omitted the finding that the jury must believe beyond reasonable doubt from the evidence. The instruction otherwise was virtually identical to the one condemned in Eubanks. Church was reversed on the basis of the holding in Eubanks. We are concerned with the statement in Eubanks following: We do not think that the clause, if they believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, at the beginning of this instruction, can be said to qualify all of the succeeding statements, either grammatically or in common sense. Marble v. State, 1943, 195 Miss. 386, 15 So.2d 693 is in point. [227 Miss. at 169-170, 85 So.2d at 806]. The instruction in the case sub judice tracked the indictment and required the jury to believe that appellant knew the property had been feloniously taken. All the other elements of the offense  (1) that appellant received the furniture, (2) that it was feloniously stolen, and (3) that the value of the furniture was in excess of $100.00  were uncontradicted in the record. The only real issue was whether or not appellant knew that the property had been feloniously taken. The court granted Instruction C-40 [ See Appendix I], which submitted the elements of the crime to the jury under three headings, and Instruction D-3 [ See Appendix II], which expressly related to the issue of whether or not the jury had a reasonable doubt that appellant knew or had reasonable grounds to believe the property had been stolen. If Instruction S-2A should not have been granted, the fault of it was cured by Instructions C-40 and D-3, and, reading all instructions together, no prejudice resulted to the appellant. We note that the objection by appellant to Instruction S-2A was not made on the ground that it assumed certain facts in evidence, which is now briefed and argued. Under the rules and decisions of this Court, error on that ground was waived by the appellant. Meyer v. State, 309 So.2d 161 (Miss. 1975); Entrican v. State, 309 So.2d 851 (Miss. 1975). The appellant next argues that the Instruction S-2A constitutes reversible error because it did not properly state the law, that the evidence was circumstantial as to appellant's guilt and should have contained the phrase to the exclusion of every other reasonable hypothesis than that of guilt. As stated, all the elements of the alleged crime were uncontradicted, except that of knowingly receiving stolen property. The record reflects the following: (1) Appellant and his wife testified that an unidentified male person telephoned about the property and left it on the Lumpkin porch. (2) Mrs. Lumpkin testified that an unidentified man came to the door and she paid him $75.00 for the property, but she couldn't see or describe him. (3) Appellant told Mrs. Judy Loftin that he didn't want the furniture to stay in town and she could buy it for her daughter who lived out of town. (4) Appellant told Mrs. Loftin that he did not want her to store the furniture on her carport; that when Mrs. Loftin asked him if the furniture had been stolen, appellant told her he couldn't be sure but he was afraid there was something wrong with the furniture; that if he couldn't sell it soon, he would have to get it out of his house; that, if Mrs. Loftin didn't buy it or get it out of town, he would either have to get it out of town or would have to burn it. Much of the evidence relating to knowledge by appellant that the property had been stolen was presented to the jury as direct evidence and, therefore, the circumstantial evidence rule does not apply. Further, the appellant did not request an instruction on circumstantial evidence, and the degree of proof required in such case, nor did he object to any instruction for the lack of submitting the burden of proof in a purely circumstantial evidence case. The granting of Instruction S-2A was not reversible error.