Opinion ID: 853049
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Was this a Final Determination?

Text: A final determination of the State Board for purposes of Tax Court jurisdiction is an order that determines the rights of, or imposes obligations on, the parties as a consummation of the administrative process. Mills v. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, 639 N.E.2d 698, 701 (Ind.Tax Ct.1994). Pursuant to the State Board's procedural rules, a final determination is any action of the Board of Tax Commissioners or the appeals division that is (1) designed as such by the Board of Tax Commissioners or appeals division, (2) the final step in the administrative process before resort may be made to the judiciary, or (3) deemed final under I.C. § 6-1.1-15-4 [6] and I.C. § 6-1.1-15-5 [7] . We conclude that a final determination in this setting is akin to a final judgment issued by a court, which Ind. Appellate Rule 2(H)(1) defines as one that disposes of all claims as to all parties. The Tax Court used a very liberal interpretation, concluding that the Board issued a final determination because no other administrative proceeding occurred, the decision was signed by three of the Board's commissioners, and the decision determined the rights of and imposed obligations on the parties. Ispat, 757 N.E.2d at 1083-84. It said that a final determination is an order that determines the rights of or imposes obligations on the parties as a consummation of the administrative process. Ispat, 757 N.E.2d at 1083. Ispat contends that the Board's decision was a final determination as opposed to, say, an advisory opinion, because the dispute involved a real situation instead of a hypothetical one. (Pet'r Ispat Inland Br. at 10-13.) The State Board is regularly engaged in providing guidance to local officials at varying levels of formality from oral advice to published manuals. While an advisory opinion may often be generated by less than hypothetical situations, we have not found specific language that states an advisory opinion may only address hypothetical situations. Nor have we found any language that automatically transforms an advisory opinion into a final determination. On the other hand, Ispat argues that there are alternative methods to reach a final determination and the Tax Court has used nontraditional paths to reach a final determination in the past. [8] While there have been said instances, we see no need to apply a nontraditional standard in the present case, as the facts do not support a need for deviation. In effect, Ispat argues that the Indiana Code should provide for interlocutory appeals. It is not the law at the moment. A final determination requires the completion of a two-part test, and Ispat has not satisfied the requirements. This is not to say that the taxpayer was without an alternative means to obtain a final determination. Theoretically, Ispat had the option of refusing the demand for an audit, in which case the machinery of the tax system would produce appealable final determinations. [9] The legislature's declaration that the Tax Court may not hear an appeal if the taxpayer fails to comply with any statutory requirement for the initiation of an original tax appeal, Ind.Code § 33-3-5-11(a), expresses a standard tenet of administrative law. Under Indiana law, if a party is required by the Administrative Orders and Procedures Act to exhaust its administrative remedies before an agency prior to obtaining judicial review of the agency decision, courts are completely ousted of subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case at all. Austin Lakes Joint Venture v. Avon Utilities, Inc., 648 N.E.2d 641, 644 (Ind.1995). A party is not entitled to judicial relief for an alleged or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted. Id. (citing Wilson v. Board of Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 270 Ind. 302, 305, 385 N.E.2d 438, 441 (Ind.1979)). In Sproles, 672 N.E.2d at 1358, we observed that the exhaustion doctrine serves multiple objectives: Premature litigation may be avoided, an adequate record for judicial review may be compiled, and agencies retain the opportunity and autonomy to correct their own errors. Even if the ground of complaint is the unconstitutionality of the statute, which may be beyond the agency's power to resolve, exhaustion may still be required because administrative action may resolve the case on other grounds without confronting broader legal issues. In a few exceptional instances, however, a party may gain judicial review without satisfying the prerequisite. The leap is sometimes justified where pursuit of administrative remedies would be futile, where strict compliance would cause irreparable harm, and where the applicable statute is alleged to be void on its face. Bellamy v. Gillis, 722 N.E.2d 905 (Ind.Ct. App.2000). We are not persuaded that any of these exceptions apply here.