Opinion ID: 223405
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Fraud on the Patent and Trademark Office

Text: FICO alleges that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's conclusion that it procured the 300-850 trademark registration by fraud. Fraud in procuring a trademark registration or renewal occurs when an applicant knowingly makes false, material representations of fact in connection with his application. In re Bose Corp., 580 F.3d 1240, 1243 (Fed.Cir.2009). [B]ecause direct evidence of deceptive intent is rarely available, such intent can be inferred from indirect and circumstantial evidence. But such evidence must still be clear and convincing, and inferences drawn from lesser evidence cannot satisfy the deceptive intent requirement. Id. at 1245. The jury found that (1) FICO made a false representation during the application process to the PTO for the registrations of the 300-850 marks, (2) FICO knew that representation to be false when it was made and intended to deceive the PTO, and (3) the PTO relied on the false representation in deciding to issue the registrations. FICO challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for each finding. We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and will not set it aside unless no reasonable jury could have reached the same verdict based on the evidence submitted. Masters v. UHS of Del., Inc., 631 F.3d 464, 469 (8th Cir.2011). At trial, Experian and VantageScore presented two statements to support their fraud on the PTO counterclaim. FICO made these statements in response to the PTO's initial denial of its application to register 300-850 on the ground that the mark was merely descriptive. FICO's employee Cheryl St. John stated that [t]o the best of [her] knowledge, only the FICO score uses the 300-850 range as a unique identifier for credit bureau risk scores. FICO asserts that the statement is true because no one else used the range as a unique identifier, and thus the jury had no basis to conclude that the statement was false. Experian and VantageScore assert that FICO did not use the mark as a unique identifier, i.e., as a trademark. FICO rejoins that it had attached a specimen to its trademark application demonstrating its use of the mark as a trademark. TransUnion's expert testified that St. John's testimony was false because FICO did not use 300-850 to identify the source of FICO's products as a unique identifier, that is, as a trademark, and that 300-850 was used only to identify a credit score range, similar to other credit-score ranges. The jury heard FICO's argument that it only used 300-850 as a trademark to identify source, and a reasonable jury could have rejected FICO's contention and determined that the statement was false. FICO's outside legal counsel also made a statement in response to the PTO's initial rejection of registration. She stated that the mark was not descriptive because 300-850 is the credit scoring scale only for [FICO's] credit bureau-based risk products and not for ... other credit bureau-based risk products that competitors develop. FICO alleges that this statement too is true when considered in the proper context of counsel's paraphrase of St. John's statement that only FICO used 300-850 as a unique identifier. FICO asserts that because TransUnion  the only other credit bureau using a 300-850 range  admitted that it was not using it as a unique identifier, the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's finding that the statement was false. A reasonable jury could conclude, however, from TransUnion's use of the 300-850 credit score range, that counsel's statement was false. FICO contends that even if the statements are considered false, there is insufficient evidence to establish that the statements were made knowingly with an intent to deceive the PTO. When drawing an inference of intent, the involved conduct, viewed in light of all the evidence ... must indicate sufficient culpability to require a finding of intent to deceive. In re Bose Corp., 580 F.3d at 1245 (internal quotation marks omitted). Experian and VantageScore presented evidence that as early as 2004, prior to St. John's statement to the PTO, (1) she was aware that FICO and others were using the same credit-score range, for the same purpose, and (2) that she knew that FICO was not using 300-850 as a trademark. Experian and VantageScore contend that St. John's attempt to deceive the PTO is confirmed by her artful use of the phrase unique identifier. See Paragon Podiatry Lab., Inc. v. KLM Labs., Inc., 984 F.2d 1182, 1191 (Fed.Cir.1993) (We conclude, as did the district court, that the inference of an intent to deceive the PTO is strongly supported by the submission of these deceptive affidavits.). Experian and VantageScore also assert that FICO's outside counsel  who had a duty to make a reasonable inquiry in support of any factual representations  knew that FICO was not using 300-850 as a trademark when she responded to the PTO's initial rejection of the registration. We conclude that a reasonable jury could have inferred that FICO had an intent to deceive the PTO. FICO contends that even if the statements about third-party use of 300-850 were false and intentionally made, they would have no bearing on whether the mark was descriptive, and that the statements thus were not material to the PTO's determination to register the mark. FICO asserts that third-party use would have been material only if another's rights were superior in the mark, which TransUnion's were not, considering its disclaimer of any use of 300-850 as a mark. FICO argues that because its registration was filed as an intent-to-use application, whether TransUnion previously used the mark could never be material. Experian and VantageScore presented a PTO expert, who testified that a reasonable examiner would consider it important in deciding whether to allow the registration to know whether others were using 300 to 850 as a score range for credit scoring services. Furthermore, the PTO had initially rejected FICO's 300-850 trademark application because it was merely descriptive and did not issue the registration until after FICO had made the two statements. Thus, there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to determine that the PTO relied on a false representation in deciding whether to issue the registration.