Opinion ID: 1258767
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Double Counting of Kidnapping Offense

Text: In his supplemental brief, defendant raises a related contention, namely, that the jury was improperly permitted to double count the kidnapping that formed the basis for the kidnapping-murder special circumstance. (Former § 190.2, subd. (c)(3)(ii).) The instructions permitted the jury to consider both the circumstance of the crime and the existence of any special circumstance found to be true. (Former § 190.3, factor (a).) The jury selected to retry the penalty issue was told that defendant previously had been found guilty of murder in the first degree, and that a special circumstance had been found true. But the jury was not told that the special circumstance was based on a murder during a kidnapping. Thus, defendant suggests, the jury may have counted the kidnapping-murder circumstance twice, once as a circumstance of the crime, and once as a special circumstance. We think it is not reasonably possible that the jury mistakenly assumed the applicable special circumstance involved elements additional to the circumstances of the offense itself, or gave undue weight to the kidnapping offense. (See People v. Murtishaw (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1001, 1019 [258 Cal. Rptr. 821, 773 P.2d 172].)