Opinion ID: 2517596
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Denial of Request for Sequestered Voir Dire

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court erred in failing to conduct individual death-penalty-qualification voir dire at both the guilt phase and the second penalty phase trial. In Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1, 80, 168 Cal.Rptr. 128, 616 P.2d 1301, we stated that in order to minimize the potentially prejudicial effects of voir dire conducted in open court, in future capital cases the portion of the voir dire of each prospective juror involving death qualification should be conducted individually and in sequestration. Our holding in Hovey has been abrogated by Code of Civil Procedure section 223, as added in 1990 by Proposition 115. ( People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 288, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 337, 106 P.3d 990 ( Vieira ).) That statute provides, in pertinent part: Voir dire of any prospective jurors shall, where practicable, occur in the presence of the other jurors in all criminal cases, including death penalty cases. Because defendant's trial was held after section 223 of the Code of Civil Procedure was enacted, that statute governs here. Notwithstanding Code of Civil Procedure section 223, defendant contends the trial court's failure to conduct individual voir dire as enunciated in Hovey violated her federal constitutional rights. We disagree. The rule in Hovey was not constitutionally compelled. ( People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1135, 240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306; accord, Vieira, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 287, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 337, 106 P.3d 990.) This statute was intended to overrule the conclusion in Hovey that individual sequestered voir dire is required during death penalty qualification ( Vieira, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 288, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 337, 106 P.3d 990; People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 713-714, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46), and defendant does not cite any authority in support of her argument that individual sequestered voir dire is constitutionally compelled. Defendant asserts the trial court mistakenly determined it lacked discretion to conduct Hovey voir dire following the passage of Proposition 115. This contention clearly is belied by the record. In denying without prejudice defendant's request for sequestered voir dire, the trial court observed: [O]ne of the principal reasons Proposition 115 passed was to eliminate the court overruled the requirements of the Hovey case. I recognize the court would have discretion to have individual voir dire, but counsel hasn't pointed out on the Witherspoon type of voir dire any unique aspect of the case ... that would separate this case from any other special circumstances case insofar as individual voir dire on death penalty qualification.... In your response you indicate that even though Prop. 115 might have overruled Hovey , the court still has discretion to allow it if there was some unique fact of this case that would separate it just from the ordinary, if there is such a thing, capital case.... I'm not inclined, unless there is some unusual circumstances, to allow Hovey voir dire. Although the trial court subsequently stated that Hovey voir dire is not permissible under Proposition 115, the court's earlier remarks reveal that it understood that it retained discretion to allow sequestered voir dire in an appropriate case. In the alternative, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in the manner in which it conducted group death-penalty-qualification voir dire of the prospective jurors. We disagree. A trial court has broad discretion over the number and nature of voir dire questions concerning the death penalty. ( Stitely, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 540, 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 108 P.3d 182.) Defendant contends that at both trials the court's voir dire impermissibly was slanted toward a death-oriented jury because of a series of questions regarding the circumstances under which prospective jurors might be unwilling to impose the death penalty. As we previously have recognized, a trial court should be evenhanded in questioning prospective jurors during death-penalty qualification and should inquire into the jurors' attitudes both in favor of and against the death penalty. ( People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 908-909, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 547, 891 P.2d 93.) Nonetheless, when the trial court asks jurors only whether their views on the death penalty would prevent their imposing a sentence of death, such questioning does not predispose the jury in favor of imposing the death penalty. ( Ibid. ) Indeed, we repeatedly have held that questions designed to ensure that a jury is death-penalty qualified do not result in a jury that is death-penalty oriented. ( People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 913, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 765, 824 P.2d 571; People v. Clark, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 597, 268 Cal.Rptr. 399, 789 P.2d 127; People v. Stankewitz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 104, 270 Cal.Rptr. 817, 793 P.2d 23.) [16] Defendant has not established that the trial court's questioning impermissibly prejudiced the jury at either trial or that the court abused its discretion in conducting group voir dire. The court clearly recognized its obligation to comply with section 223 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Defendant fails to convince us that the voir dire procedure followed by the trial court either at the guilt phase or the penalty phase retrial constituted an abuse of discretion or violated any provision of the federal Constitution. ( People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 133 P.3d 1076.)