Opinion ID: 1499650
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: New Jersey News Media Privilege

Text: The appellants' claims as to the privileged nature of the subpoenaed materials are clearly cogent under N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-21. That statute provides, in pertinent part:    [A] person    connected with, or employed by news media for the purpose of gathering    or disseminating news for the general public or on whose behalf news is so gathered    or disseminated has a privilege to refuse to disclose, in any legal or quasi-legal proceeding or before any investigative body, including, but not limited to, any court, grand jury, petit jury, administrative agency, the Legislature or legislative committee, or elsewhere a. The source    from or through whom any information was procured [;]    and b. Any news or information obtained in the course of pursuing his professional activities whether or not it is disseminated. This case is the first major test of New Jersey's new Shield Law. There is no reason to accord this statute an unfriendly reception in any court of this State. There should be no eagerness to narrow or circumvent it. The Shield Law is not an irritation. It is an act of the Legislature. This law was passed in the aftermath of the Supreme Court's decision in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 33 L.Ed. 2d 626 (1972). In Branzburg, the Court held that the First Amendment will not always prevent forced disclosure of a reporter's confidential sources and information. More specifically, it ruled that the reporters there involved had no privilege under the First Amendment against being compelled, on pain of contempt, to reveal such confidential data to an investigating grand jury. In its view, the resulting infringement upon the reporters' investigating abilities was outweighed by the grand jury's need to have everyman's evidence. The Court emphasized, however, that state legislatures were not powerless to alter the result reached in Branzburg. As Justice White stated: At the federal level, Congress has freedom to determine whether a statutory newsman's privilege is necessary and desirable and to fashion standards and rules as narrow or broad as deemed necessary to deal with the evil discerned and, equally important, to refashion those rules as experience from time to time may dictate. There is also merit in leaving state legislatures free, within First Amendment limits, to fashion their own standards in light of the conditions and problems with respect to the relations between law enforcement officials and press in their own areas. It goes without saying, of course, that we are powerless to bar state courts from responding in their own way and construing their own constitutions so as to recognize a newsman's privilege, either qualified or absolute. [408 U.S. at 706, 92 S.Ct. at 2669; emphasis supplied] The News Media Privilege Act was New Jersey's response to the Court's invitation. This Act reflects our Legislature's judgment that an uninhibited news media is more important to the proper functioning of our society than is the ability of either law enforcement agencies, the courts or criminal defendants to gain access to confidential news data. It cannot be doubted that this legislative judgment rests upon a firm foundation. News media keep the public abreast of goings-on, both public and private, and thus make possible [e]nlightened choice[s] by an informed citizenry  the basic ideal upon which an open society is premised    Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 726, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 2672, 33 L.Ed. 2d 626 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting). Not only does a free press provide people with a wide range of facts and opinion, but, by exposing the actions of public officials, it serves as a check upon governmental error and abuse. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 16 L.Ed. 2d 600 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 14 L.Ed. 2d 543 (1965). As such, it is an incontestable precondition of self-government. Branzburg, supra, 408 U.S. at 726, 92 S.Ct. 2646 (Stewart, J., dissenting). In the words of James Madison:    A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps, both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance; and a people who mean to be their own Governors must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives. [ Letters and Other Writings of James Madison, Fourth President of the United States, Vol. 3, p. 276 (1865 ed.)] It was perhaps for this reason that Justice Douglas concluded that [t]here is no higher function performed under our constitutional regime than that of reporting the news. Branzburg, supra, at 722, 92 S.Ct. at 2696 (Douglas, J., dissenting). A reporter's ability to obtain sensitive information depends on his reputation for keeping confidences. Once breached  that reputation is destroyed. Potential sources of information can no longer rest secure that their identities and confidences will remain free from disclosure. Realizing that strict confidentiality is essential to the workings of a free press, our Legislature, through the News Media Privilege Act, has granted reporters an immunity from disclosure which is both absolute and comprehensive. Any person connected with any news media for the purpose of gathering or disseminating news is granted the privilege of refusing to disclose, in any legal or quasi-legal proceeding or before any investigative body, both the source of and any information acquired. Courts are thus given no discretion to determine on a case-by-case basis whether the societal importance of a free and robust press is outweighed by other assertedly compelling interests. The Legislature has done the weighing and balancing and has determined that in every case the right to non-disclosure is paramount. If a reporter falls within the ambit of the statute, he has a privilege of non-disclosure. This privilege exists not only with respect to public disclosures; it encompasses revelations to any legal or quasi-legal body, including any court. Even forced in camera disclosures are thus prohibited. Indeed, any other conclusion would subvert the policies underlying the statute. As Justice Marshall noted, denying a stay in this case: Many potential criminal informants    might well refuse to provide information to a reporter if they knew that a judge could examine the reporter's notes upon the request of a defendant. [___ U.S. ___, 99 S.Ct. 11, 58 L.Ed. 2d 38 (1978)] Further, the specter of forced in camera disclosure may, in the words of Justice Douglas, cause editors and critics to write with more restrained pens. Branzburg v. Hayes, supra 408 U.S. at 721, 92 S.Ct. at 2691 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). The majority intimates that a reporter may lose the protection of the Shield Law if he can also be deemed an investigator. See ante at 278. All good reporting must be investigative. If reporting is to be imaginative and understandable, the facts and leads must be searched out. Such resourceful, probing journalism first exposed most of the serious governmental scandals. The process helps people learn what they need to know. To hamper it is to hamper ourselves. To hold therefore that the Shield Law is not applicable to a reporter who is also an investigator is to hold that the Shield Law will never be applicable. [1] Branzburg makes clear that the Shield Law is a permissible exercise of legislative authority. As the product of a co-equal branch of government, it must be respected by our Courts. Appellants' position that the Media Privilege Act prohibits forced in camera disclosure of confidential data is thus meritorious. Since this is so, it is unnecessary to pass upon their claims that the First Amendment also protects them from such forced disclosure.