Opinion ID: 71643
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Franklin’s Testimony

Text: Senegal argues that any discussion among Franklin, Senegal, and York regarding the Mason shooting occurred after the conspiracy to murder Mason ended, and therefore does not fall under Rule 801(d)(2)(E). Any statements made by Senegal to Franklin implicating himself in Mason’s shooting are, however, admissible as an admission of a party opponent under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(A), which provides that “[a] statement is not hearsay if . . . [it] is offered against a party and is . . . the party’s own statement, in either an individual or a representative capacity.” Additionally, Senegal misstates the record. Although Franklin testified that Winn informed him after Mason’s shooting that Senegal and York had committed the attack, Franklin also testified to a conversation between himself, Senegal, and York before the shooting, in which Senegal and York discussed their desire to kill Mason, and in which Franklin advised them against doing so. Because the Government has shown that (1) a conspiracy between Senegal and York to kill Mason existed; (2) Senegal and York, as the coconspirators, made the 13 Case: 08-40406 Document: 00511059611 Page: 14 Date Filed: 03/23/2010 No. 08-40406 challenged statements; (3) Senegal and York made many of the statements during the course of the conspiracy; and (4) Senegal and York made the statements in furtherance of the conspiracy, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting most of Franklin’s testimony. See Delgado, 401 F.3d at 298. We also find that admission of any of Franklin’s statements that reported conversations that occurred after the Mason shooting was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 3. Winn’s Testimony Concerning his Jailhouse Conversation with York Senegal argues that the district court erred by allowing the Government to introduce Winn’s testimony regarding York’s jailhouse conversations with Winn because these conversations occurred well after the conspiracies to rob the UFCU and to silence Mason ended, and therefore do not meet the strictures of Rule 801(d)(2)(E). Senegal’s argument is not without merit, as we have noted that “[t]here can be no furtherance of a conspiracy that has ended.” United States v. Nall, 437 F.2d 1177, 1182 n.5 (5th Cir. 1971). Because these conversations occurred after the conclusion of all the relevant conspiracies, the district court abused its discretion by admitting them. The Government has, however, proved that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Even without Winn’s testimony, the Government produced overwhelming evidence of Senegal’s involvement in Mason’s shooting. This evidence included (1) Mason’s identification of Senegal as one of the attackers, (2) Franklin’s testimony, (3) Joseph’s testimony, and (4) the evidence tying the bullet extracted from Mason to the gun York left in DeVault’s car, combined with Senegal’s signature on the pawn slips for the items stolen from DeVault. We cannot say that the district court’s error had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Franklin, 561 F.3d at 404. 14 Case: 08-40406 Document: 00511059611 Page: 15 Date Filed: 03/23/2010 No. 08-40406 4. Joseph’s Testimony Senegal does not clearly state which part of Joseph’s testimony he finds objectionable. The only questionable testimony involved Joseph’s conversation with York in which York implicated Senegal in Mason’s shooting after it had taken place. Although this particular part of Joseph’s testimony does not satisfy the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule, most of his testimony does, as it either reported the substance of conversations with Senegal, thereby satisfying Rule 801(d)(2)(E) as an admission by a party opponent; or reported conversations occurring before Mason’s shooting where York and Senegal discussed killing Mason, thereby satisfying Rule 801(d)(2)(E) as a statement by a coconspirator. Based on the abundance of admissible evidence, we find that any error in admitting portions of Joseph’s testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. C. Evidentiary Challenges to the District Court’s Admission of Evidence Relating to the DeVault Robbery and the Texas City Arrest Senegal and York argue that the district court violated Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) by allowing various witnesses to testify about Senegal and York’s involvement in two unindicted crimes: the DeVault robbery and the Texas City arrest. We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion, subject to harmless error review. United States v. Crawley, 533 F.3d 349, 353 (5th Cir. 2008). Rule 404(b) provides that “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith,” but “[i]t may . . . be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident . . . .” In order to satisfy Rule 404(b), the Government must, “upon request by the accused . . . provide reasonable notice 15 Case: 08-40406 Document: 00511059611 Page: 16 Date Filed: 03/23/2010 No. 08-40406 in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.” F ED. R. E VID. 404(b). In United States v. Beechum, we established a two-part test for the admission of an “extrinsic offense” under Rule 404(b). 582 F.2d 898, 911 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc). “First, it must be determined that the extrinsic offense evidence is relevant to an issue other than the defendant’s character.” Id. Upon satisfaction of the first prong, “the evidence must possess probative value that is not substantially outweighed by its undue prejudice and must meet the other requirements of [R]ule 403.” Id. We have also held that “Rule 404(b) is only implicated when the offered evidence is extrinsic; evidence intrinsic to the charged offense does not implicate the rule.” Crawley, 533 F.3d at 353–54. If we conclude that the additional crimes are intrinsic to any of the charged offenses, then “‘consideration of [their] admissibility pursuant to Rule 404(b) [is] unnecessary.’” United States v. Powers, 168 F.3d 741, 749 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Garcia, 27 F.3d 1009, 1014 (5th Cir. 1994)) (some alteration in original). “‘Other acts’ evidence is intrinsic when it is inextricably intertwined with the charged offense, when both acts are part of the same criminal episode, or when the ‘other act’ was a necessary preliminary step toward the completion of the charged crime.” Crawley, 533 F.3d at 354 (citing United States v. Sumlin, 489 F.3d 683, 689 (5th Cir. 2007)). 1. The DeVault Robbery The district court did not err when it allowed the Government to introduce testimony about the DeVault robbery. Rule 404(b) allows the Government to admit evidence of prior bad acts to prove identity, and the evidence recovered from the DeVault robbery tends to prove the identity of Senegal and York as 16 Case: 08-40406 Document: 00511059611 Page: 17 Date Filed: 03/23/2010 No. 08-40406 Mason’s attackers. The Government informed Senegal and York of their plan to introduce evidence of the DeVault robbery, in compliance with Rule 404(b). The Government has also satisfied Beechum’s two-pronged test. The DeVault robbery and the evidence surrounding it were “relevant to an issue other than the defendant’s character”; namely, the identity of Mason’s assailants. Beechum, 582 F.2d at 911. Additionally, the probative value of the evidence gathered from the DeVault robbery far surpassed the prejudice alleged by Senegal and York, who argue that the evidence concerning the DeVault robbery implies that they habitually commit armed robberies, which could lead a jury to believe that they possessed firearms and committed other armed crimes habitually. The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting testimony about the DeVault robbery. 2. The Texas City Arrest In contrast, we find that the district court abused its discretion by allowing the Government to introduce evidence of Senegal and York’s Texas City arrest. The Government argues that the Texas City arrest is intrinsic because the police recovered a .45 caliber firearm that Joseph testified was the same one that Senegal misfired while attempting to kill Mason. This connection, however, is too attenuated for us to conclude that the offenses were inextricably intertwined. See Crawley, 533 F.3d at 354 (citing Sumlin, 489 F.3d at 689). Likewise, the Government cannot justify admitting this evidence as extrinsic under Rule 404(b) because it did not give Senegal and York any “reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial” about its intent to introduce the evidence. F ED. R. E VID. 404(b). The district court’s error in admitting this testimony, however, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. As discussed above, the Government introduced abundant admissible evidence of Senegal and York’s guilt on all counts. In addition to this overwhelming evidence, the district court gave the 17 Case: 08-40406 Document: 00511059611 Page: 18 Date Filed: 03/23/2010 No. 08-40406 jury a cautionary instruction before admitting evidence of both the DeVault robbery and the Texas City arrest. See Crawley, 533 F.3d at 355 (“Even assuming, therefore, that admission of the extrinsic evidence posed a risk of undue prejudice, that risk was greatly minimized by the court’s limiting instruction.”). We find that Senegal and York have not demonstrated reversible error. D. Sufficiency of the Evidence Challenge as to York’s Conviction for Aiding and Abetting Senegal’s Possession of a Lorcin Pistol York, but not Senegal, appeals his conviction under Count 4, which charged him with aiding and abetting Senegal’s possession of a Lorcin pistol while Senegal was a convicted felon. York argues that because Rolland, Senegal’s girlfriend, recanted her grand jury testimony and refused to testify at trial that York brought the Lorcin pistol to her house, the Government has not produced sufficient evidence to convict York of aiding and abetting Senegal’s possession of the weapon. Although the Government impeached Rolland with her grand jury testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 607, Rolland never adopted those statements at trial, and the district court limited the jury’s consideration of Rolland’s grand jury testimony to use for impeachment purposes only.7 The jury found York guilty of the charge in Count 4, and our “review of the sufficiency of the evidence is ‘highly deferential to the verdict.’” Elashyi, 554 F.3d at 491–92 (quoting United States v. Gulley, 526 F.3d 809, 816 (5th Cir. 2008)). We ask “‘whether the evidence, when reviewed in the light most favorable to the [g]overnment with all reasonable inferences and credibility 7 See Gower v. Cohn, 643 F.2d 1146, 1153 n.11 (5th Cir. 1981) (“Where a limiting instruction is given, the jury may consider the prior inconsistent statement only as impeachment, and not as substantive evidence.”); see generally United States v. Dennis, 625 F.2d 782, 795–96 (8th Cir. 1980) (“Whether to admit [prior inconsistent statements] as substantive evidence or to limit their use to impeachment is within the broad discretion of the trial court.”). 18 Case: 08-40406 Document: 00511059611 Page: 19 Date Filed: 03/23/2010 No. 08-40406 choices made in support of a conviction, allows a rational fact finder to find every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. at 492 (quoting Gulley, 526 F.3d at 816) (alteration in original). Although the jury could not consider Rolland’s grand jury testimony as evidence of York’s guilt, the Government produced other evidence as to York’s participation in Senegal’s possession of the Lorcin pistol. Specifically, Winn identified the Lorcin pistol as the weapon Senegal used and brandished during the UFCU robbery, and security photographs taken during the UFCU robbery showed York near Senegal while Senegal brandished the weapon. Considering this evidence “in the light most favorable to the [g]overnment with all reasonable inferences and credibility choices made in support of a conviction,” we cannot say that no rational fact finder could find York guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aiding and abetting Senegal’s possession of the Lorcin pistol. Id. (quoting Gulley, 526 F.3d at 816) (alteration in original). We thus affirm York’s conviction on Count 4. E. Challenge to the District Court’s Statements Senegal and York argue that the district court judge exhibited “manifest partiality” that deprived them of their constitutional right to a fair trial. After the officer who responded to the Mason shooting testified that Mason could not identify his assailants immediately after the attack, the district court judge asked the officer whether gunshot wound victims suffer from shock that affects “their judgment, their perception, [and] their ability to communicate.” The officer responded “I’m assuming it can, yes sir.” Senegal and York argue that the district court asked this question in an attempt to undermine the defense. Senegal and York also allege bias in the district court judge’s statement that “I’ve never had a hung jury in 17 years and you ain’t going to be the first.” They argue that this statement implied that the jury need not partake in any true, good faith deliberation over Senegal and York’s guilt. 19 Case: 08-40406 Document: 00511059611 Page: 20 Date Filed: 03/23/2010 No. 08-40406 When faced with a complaint that a judge’s misconduct gives the appearance of partiality, we must “determine whether the judge’s behavior was so prejudicial that it denied the defendant a fair, as opposed to a perfect, trial.” United States v. Bermea, 30 F.3d 1539, 1569 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. Williams, 809 F.2d 1072, 1086 (5th Cir. 1987)). “To rise to the level of constitutional error, the district judge’s actions, viewed as a whole, must amount to an intervention that could have led the jury to a predisposition of guilt by improperly confusing the functions of judge and prosecutor.” Id. (citing United States v. Samak, 7 F.3d 1196, 1197–98 (5th Cir. 1993)). When considering the challenged remarks, we must also place them in the “proper context by viewing the totality of the circumstances, considering factors such as the context of the remark, the person to whom it is directed, and the presence of curative instructions,” and before we may reverse, “[t]he totality of the circumstances must show that the trial judge’s intervention was quantitatively and qualitatively substantial.” United States v. Saenz, 134 F.3d 697, 702 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting Bermea, 30 F.3d at 1569) (internal quotation marks omitted). We find that the district court’s limited questioning of the officer was not inappropriate. Federal Rule of Evidence 614(b) allows the district court to “interrogate witnesses, whether called by itself or by a party,” and we have held that “[a] federal district judge may comment on the evidence, question witnesses, bring out facts not yet adduced, and maintain the pace of the trial by interrupting or setting time limits on counsel.” United States v. Wallace, 32 F.3d 921, 928 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. Hawkins, 661 F.2d 436, 450 (5th Cir. 1981)). We find that the district court’s de minimus examination of the officer did not prejudice either Senegal or York. Viewing the entirety of the district court’s comments to the jury is illustrative. The district court’s statement reads: 20 Case: 08-40406 Document: 00511059611 Page: 21 Date Filed: 03/23/2010 No. 08-40406 Look, my expectation is that we’re going to finish the record tomorrow and that we will very likely argue the case and submit it to you for deliberations. Whether you reach a verdict tomorrow or spend the rest of your lives doing it is your business. I’ve never had a hung jury in 17 years and you ain’t going to be the first. So get some rest, be refreshed. Be ready to go. This is hard work. And when it comes to your turn to be judges of the facts, you’re gong [sic] to see what I’m talking about. It is hard work. So be ready to go. Thank you for your attention. Senegal and York’s argument that the district court implied that the jury need not seriously deliberate their guilt or innocence is entirely baseless. In context, the district court’s statement implored the jury to prepare to take their job very seriously, and suggested that they should take as much time as necessary to reach the correct result. The record does not suggest that this comment prejudiced Senegal or York in the least. Even when combined, the district court’s actions do not rise to the level of reversible error. F. Challenge to the District Court’s Sentence On appeal, Senegal, but not York, argues that the district court erred in several ways when it imposed his sentence. He did not, however, make any objections to his sentence before the district court, and we thus review for plain error. To prove plain error, Senegal “must show (1) there was error, (2) the error was plain, (3) the error affected his substantial rights, and (4) the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Clark, 582 F.3d 607, 616 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Jackson, 549 F.3d 963, 975 (5th Cir. 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Even if Senegal satisfies all the elements of plain error review, “the decision to grant relief is entirely discretionary.” Id. (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 735–36 (1993)). 21 Case: 08-40406 Document: 00511059611 Page: 22 Date Filed: 03/23/2010 No. 08-40406 1. Consecutive Sentences under 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A) and 924(e) Senegal argues that the district court erred by imposing consecutive sentences for his convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), which prohibits being a felon in possession of a firearm and carries a fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence, and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), which imposes an additional, yet shorter, mandatory minimum punishment for possessing a firearm while committing a crime of violence. Senegal cites the Second Circuit’s decision in United States v. Whitley, which held that the text of § 924(c)(1)(A) “exempt[ed the defendant] from the consecutive ten-year minimum sentence for discharging a firearm because he is subject to the higher fifteen-year minimum sentence provided by section 924(e).” 529 F.3d 150, 158 (2d Cir. 2008). He acknowledges that we have allowed a district court to impose consecutive sentences for violations of § 924(c)(1)(A) and a statute with a longer minimum mandatory sentence, see United States v. Kyles, 304 F. App’x 268, 269–70 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (unpublished); United States v. Collins, 205 F. App’x 196, 197–98 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (unpublished), but contends that Whitley proves that the district court imposed a sentence that is “plainly excessive.” Although the Second Circuit’s reasoning applies to Senegal’s situation, he cannot demonstrate plain error. After Senegal filed his brief in this case, we adopted, in a published opinion, the reasoning and holding set forth in Collins. See United States v. London, 568 F.3d 553, 564 (5th Cir. 2009). London binds our analysis, and precludes Senegal’s claim that the district court plainly erred when making this sentencing determination. 2. Double Jeopardy Senegal also argues that because the jury found him guilty of violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) for being a felon in possession of a firearm, and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) for possessing a firearm while committing a crime of violence, and 22 Case: 08-40406 Document: 00511059611 Page: 23 Date Filed: 03/23/2010 No. 08-40406 both offenses involved the same firearm, his convictions violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. Senegal cites United States v. Medellin-Torres for the proposition that “convictions and sentences, which were based on possession of the same weapon, are multiplicitous and violate double jeopardy.” 293 F. App’x 354, 354–55 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (unpublished). Both Medellin-Torres and the case it relies on, United States v. Munoz-Romo, 989 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1993), addressed defendants convicted for multiple violations of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), which prohibits certain classes of individuals from possessing firearms and whose subsections “differ[] only in [their] requirement that the offender have a certain ‘status’ under the law.” Munoz-Romo, 989 F.2d at 759 (internal quotation marks omitted). Senegal’s argument is without merit. In Munoz-Romo, we held that “the language and structure of Section 922(g) disclose Congress’s clear intent not to impose cumulative punishments when the same incident violates two subdivisions of subsection (g),” in part, because “[t]he two subdivisions at issue here are found in a single subsection of a statute that prescribes a single penalty for all of those subdivisions.” Id. (emphases added). We also noted that “the statute’s structure indicates that Congress sought ‘only to bar the possession of firearms by certain types of persons that it considered dangerous,’ and not to punish persons ‘solely for having a certain status under the law.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Winchester, 916 F.2d 601, 605–06 (11th Cir. 1990). We held that Congress did not intend that “a convicted felon who is also a fugitive from justice, a drug addict, a mental defective, and an illegal alien, could be sentenced to five consecutive terms of imprisonment for the same incident, namely, the possession of a firearm.” Id. (quoting Winchester, 916 F.2d at 607) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). We do not have any of the same concerns in this case. Senegal received separate sentences for being a felon in possession of a firearm and for possessing 23 Case: 08-40406 Document: 00511059611 Page: 24 Date Filed: 03/23/2010 No. 08-40406 a firearm while committing a crime of violence. The two offenses punish different incidents, and both sections enumerate distinct penalties. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), with 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). That Senegal used the same weapon during the course of committing both offenses is irrelevant; while his conviction under § 924(e) imposed a punishment for possessing a firearm while having the status of a felon, his conviction under § 924(c)(1)(A) punished his use of a firearm. We hold that Senegal’s convictions for violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(e) and 924(c)(1)(A) do not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.