Opinion ID: 1436386
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: All Other Persons, Firms, or Corporations

Text: Jolly Roger argues that the Release expressly provides for its complete discharge from liability to Saranillio because in addition to specifically releasing the Silvas and GEICO, the Release expressly covers all other persons, firms or corporations[.] Not unexpectedly, there is no consensus among the courts that have considered the effect of all-inclusive all other persons language under the UCATA. Generally, courts take one of three approaches. See Sims v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 225 Conn. 401, 408, 623 A.2d 995, 999 (1993). Some have adopted a flat bar rule, giving all other persons language broad, literal effect and holding that it releases all potential joint tortfeasors even if they are not specifically named or identified in the release. See, e.g., Douglas v. United States Tobacco Co., 670 F.2d 791, 794-95 (8th Cir.1982) (applying Arkansas law); Ralkey v. Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co., 63 Md.App. 515, 530, 492 A.2d 1358, 1366 (1985). The `flat bar' rule yields a broad construction of both the `so provides' language of [section 4 of the UCATA] and the `any and all' language of the release. Sims, 225 Conn. at 409, 623 A.2d at 999. Other courts give all other persons provisions no effect, holding that a release covers only those parties specifically named or identified in the release. See, e.g., Moore v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 299 Ark. 232, 239-40, 773 S.W.2d 78, 81-82 (1989); Alsup v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 101 Ill.2d 196, 201, 77 Ill.Dec. 738, 741, 461 N.E.2d 361, 364 (1984); Beck v. Cianchetti, 1 Ohio St.3d 231, 234-35, 439 N.E.2d 417, 420 (1982); Alaska Airlines, Inc., 568 P.2d at 929. Courts adopting this rule generally hold that naming the released parties is not necessary if those parties are sufficiently described with terms such as `employees' or `the driver of the car.' Sims, 225 Conn. at 410, 623 A.2d at 1000 (citations omitted). Still other courts hold that a release discharges only those tortfeasors that the parties who bargained for the release intended to release. Under this view, parties not specifically named in the release are discharged only if extrinsic evidence establishes that the parties to the release intended to discharge them. See, e.g., id. at 412, 623 A.2d at 1001; Cram v. Town of Northbridge, 410 Mass. 800, 803, 575 N.E.2d 747, 749 (1991); Hurt v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 380 So.2d 432, 433-34 (Fla.1980). We believe that the second approachthat only those parties specifically named or otherwise clearly identified on the face of the release are discharged  is the most sensible approach and consistent with the purposes of the UCATA. In enacting the UCATA, particularly HRS § 663-14, the legislature clearly intended to abrogate the common law release rule, which often resulted in the unintended discharge of all joint tortfeasors, including those who were strangers to the release. Construing releases to discharge joint tortfeasors not specifically designated on the face of the release would, in many cases, effectively perpetuate the common law rule and therefore frustrate the purpose of the statute. Alsup, 101 Ill.2d at 201, 461 N.E.2d at 364; Beck, 1 Ohio St.3d at 234-35, 439 N.E.2d at 420. In contrast, a construction of HRS § 663-14 requiring specific identification of joint tortfeasors as a condition precedent to their discharge will insure that the intention of the parties to a release is given effect and will significantly minimize the possibility that unwary parties will be misled as to the effect of a release. Moreover, this rule lends itself to fair play and easy application. Moore, 299 Ark. at 240, 773 S.W.2d at 82 (citing Young v. State, 455 P.2d 889 (Alaska 1969)). Accordingly, we hold that the so provides language of HRS § 663-14 means that a release discharges only those parties designated by name or otherwise specifically identified or described on the face of the release. In No. 17036, the Release does not name or otherwise specifically identify Jolly Roger. It therefore does not extend to Jolly Roger. Because neither the common law release rule nor the Release itself bars Saranillio from pursuing any claim against Jolly Roger, we vacate the circuit court's summary judgment in favor of Jolly Roger entered on March 29, 1993.