Opinion ID: 2974596
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Negligence of Home-Mart

Text: The district court construed the Smiths’ complaint against Home-Mart as alleging two theories of negligence: (1) that Home-Mart was negligent in advising Franks Trucking to drive into the wet field; and (2) that Home-Mart was negligent in failing to hire a third party to pull the truck and mobile home out of the field. The district court held that both theories failed as a matter of law for lack of evidence of duty and proximate causation. There is no dispute regarding the essential elements of a negligence claim under Tennessee law. The district court correctly summarized the relevant standards as follows: 2 Jeannie Smith’s claim is for loss of consortium stemming from her husband’s injury. -4- No. 06-5024 Smith v. Frank A claim based on negligence requires proof of the following elements: (1) a duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff; (2) conduct by the defendant falling below the standard of care amounting to a breach of that duty; (3) an injury or loss; (4) causation in fact; and (5) proximate or legal cause. Turner v. Jordan, 957 S.W.2d 815, 818 (Tenn. 1997). Duty is the legal obligation a defendant owes to a plaintiff to exercise reasonable care in order to protect against unreasonable risks of harm. See McCall v. Wilder, 913 S.W.2d 150, 153 (Tenn. 1995). The duty of reasonable care must be considered in relation to all the relevant circumstances, and the degree of foreseeability needed to establish a duty of care decreases in proportion to increases in the magnitude of the foreseeable harm. See Pittman v. Upjohn Co., 890 S.W.2d 425, 433 (Tenn. 1994); Doe v. Linder Constr. Co., Inc., 845 S.W.2d 173, 178 (Tenn. 1992). An act or omission will not be considered a proximate cause of an injury if a reasonable person could not have foreseen or anticipated the injury. McClenahan v. Cooley, 806 S.W.2d 767 (Tenn. 1991). Dist. ct. order pp. 5-6, JA 42-43. Under the sales agreement, Home-Mart assumed responsibility for delivery and set-up of the mobile home. In discharging this responsibility, Home-Mart hired Franks Trucking to perform the delivery and set-up. No representative or agent of Home-Mart was present at the home site on the date of delivery. The district court found, and it is undisputed, that Franks Trucking was an independent contractor. The district court correctly noted that one who hires an independent contractor is ordinarily not liable under Tennessee law, as principal, for damages caused by the contractor’s negligence. See Givens v. Mullikin ex rel. Estate of McElwaney, 75 S.W.3d 383, 394 (Tenn. 2002). The district court thus held that, since Home-Mart did not retain any right to control the methods of Franks Trucking’s performance, it owed the Smiths no duty of care in connection with the delivery – either in regard to advising Franks how to place the home on the lot or in regard to whether the aid of a third party should have been enlisted to pull the truck and mobile home out of the field. -5- No. 06-5024 Smith v. Frank The Smiths have not challenged this holding on the duty element. They focus solely on the district court’s proximate cause determination, addressed below. Yet, duty remains an essential element of the Smiths’ negligence claim, irrespective of causation. Absent evidence that Home-Mart owed them a duty that was breached, the claim must fail. We find no error in the district court’s assessment that Home-Mart owed the Smiths no duty in relation to the manner of delivery.3 Entry of summary judgment in favor of Home-Mart was therefore proper on this basis alone. The district court also concluded that, even if Home-Mart breached a duty owed to the Smiths – either by erroneously advising Franks Trucking to drive into the field or by failing to hire a third party to provide the pull which Franks had anticipated needing – neither misfeasance proximately caused the Smiths’ injuries. The Smiths object, arguing that, but for such acts of negligence, their injuries would not have occurred. To carry their burden of establishing proximate causation, the Smiths must prove that “(1) the tortfeasor’s conduct [was] a ‘substantial factor’ in bringing about the harm being complained of; and (2) there is no rule or policy that should relieve the wrongdoer from liability because of the manner in which the negligence had resulted in harm; and (3) the harm giving rise to the action could have reasonably been foreseen or anticipated by a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence.” 3 A principal can be held liable for harm caused by its independent contractor if the contractor acted pursuant to an order or directions negligently given by the principal. Givens, 75 S.W .3d at 394-95. W hile the present record does arguably support a finding that W illiam M ark Franks, in guiding the truck onto the wet field, acted in accordance with Steve Richardson’s directions, there is no evidence that Home-Mart controlled Franks Trucking’s performance or that Franks Trucking lacked discretion to depart from Richardson’s directions if conditions warranted it. Rather, the record indicates that Richardson’s directions were not an “order” at all, but more in the nature of a “suggestion,” and that Franks retained the prerogative to deliver and install the mobile home as he saw fit in light of the conditions he faced on the day of delivery. Home-Mart’s minimal involvement in the delivery of the mobile home was clearly insufficient to warrant a finding that it owed the Smiths a duty of reasonable care. -6- No. 06-5024 Smith v. Frank Kellner v. Budget Car and Truck Rental, Inc., 359 F.3d 399, 406 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting McClenahan v. Cooley, 806 S.W.2d 767, 775 (Tenn. 1991)). “[P]roximate causation is a jury question unless the uncontroverted facts and inferences to be drawn from them make it so clear that all reasonable persons must agree on the proper outcome.” Id. (quoting McClenahan, 806 S.W.2d at 775). Under the facts of this case, no reasonable juror could conclude that Richardson’s directions to Franks a day or more before the actual delivery, even if erroneous, were a substantial factor in bringing about the Smiths’ injuries or that such injuries should have been anticipated as a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the erroneous directions. As the district court concluded, the link is too tenuous. Nor could any reasonable juror conclude that Home-Mart should have reasonably foreseen that its failure to prohibit Kevin Smith from offering equipment and assistance to the delivery effort was a substantial contributing factor in the causation of the Smiths’ injuries. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the Smiths, it appears to have been arguably foreseeable to Home-Mart (1) that Franks would follow Richardson’s suggestion; (2) that driving the truck into the wet field would cause it to become stuck; (3) that Kevin Smith would offer the use of his equipment, if needed, to extricate the truck; and (4) that Smith, being familiar with the equipment offered, would volunteer to operate it. Still, the record is devoid of evidence to support a finding that Smith’s voluntary participation, though foreseeable, posed any probability of personal injury. The record includes no evidence that Home-Mart had reason to know the equipment likely to be used by Smith to pull the truck was inadequate or that heavy equipment towing is inherently -7- No. 06-5024 Smith v. Frank dangerous. The only evidence relevant to the point suggests that the breaking of the chain and resultant injury to Smith was an unusual occurrence. William Mark Franks, who had been delivering and installing mobile homes for nearly ten years, had never seen a “3/8's log chain” break. Nor had his brother Jimmy Franks. The Smiths maintain that the risk of harm was manifest by virtue of the sheer combined weight of the vehicles that had to be pulled – estimated to be approximately 28,000 to 32,000 pounds. Yet, they do not explain why this fact should have reasonably been deemed to portend risk of personal injury, rather than simply difficulty or even failure. Further, the argument fails to recognize that despite the weight of the vehicles involved, Smith did, over the course of three to four hours, achieve some measure of success. He and Cummings, with the use of two tractors and chains, were able to move the truck away from the mobile home and move the mobile home to within twenty feet of the home site before the accident occurred. There is no evidence that any risk of personal injury had become manifest during the course of the effort. No representative of Home-Mart was present at the time of delivery or even aware of the difficulties that ensued. Both William Mark Franks and Kevin Smith were present and better positioned, during three to four hours of effort, to assess the ground conditions and the capabilities and safety of the equipment available. Each of them had discretion to continue or discontinue the effort in the face of any apparent dangers. Home-Mart’s role in the delivery of the mobile home was minimal and did not, as a matter of law, constitute a substantial contributing factor in the causation of the Smiths’ injuries. -8- No. 06-5024 Smith v. Frank Accordingly, the district court’s ruling that the Smiths failed to adduce evidence establishing that any negligence by Home-Mart was a proximate cause of the Smiths’ injuries must be upheld.