Opinion ID: 1662097
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Move for Judge Corrigan's Disqualification

Text: The principal claim of this appeal is that Smulls' trial counsel was ineffective for failing to discover evidence of Judge Corrigan's racial bias and move for his disqualification. This claim is based essentially on the same allegations and conduct this Court considered in disqualifying Judge Corrigan from hearing the Rule 29.15 motion: 1) that prior to the case, Judge Corrigan told a racist joke to a group of judges, that judgment had been entered against him for sexual harassment, and that he discriminated against African-American defendants in the disposition of criminal cases; and 2) that during the case, he made racially insensitive comments at the Batson hearing. Although the circumstances of the Batson hearing were reported extensively in the first Smulls opinion, they bear repeating here: The defendant noted that Ms. Sidney was the only remaining black venireperson and requested a Batson hearing. When the prosecutor stated his reasons for striking Ms. Sidney, Smulls' counsel claimed the reasons were pretextual and requested a mistrial. The court denied defendant's request. The next day, Smulls' counsel renewed the Batson challenge and stated for the record that Judge Corrigan would have been aware the victims were white and the defendant was black because he presided over the first trial. Judge Corrigan stated he did not remember who was black and who was white, but that he would accept the defendant's statement. He then reiterated his denial of the Batson claim. When the defendant again noted that Ms. Sidney was the last black venireperson, Judge Corrigan stated that he did not know what it meant to be black, that he never takes judicial notice of a person's race without direct evidence, and that it is counsel's responsibility to establish who is black and who is not. In this regard, he added: There were some dark complexioned people on this jury. I don't know if that makes them black or white. As I said, I don't know what constitutes black. Years ago they used to say one drop of blood constitutes black. I don't know what black means. Can somebody enlighten me of what black is? I don't know; I think of them as people.
Initially, Smulls assigns error to Judge O'Brien's exclusion of certain evidence regarding Judge Corrigan's racial prejudice.
During the original 29.15 proceedings, Smulls directed a request for admissions to the prosecuting attorney seeking to establish that the defendant was black, the victims were white, and the jury panel selected was all white. Following longstanding custom and practice for non-evidentiary motion hearings in civil cases, Judge Corrigan did not provide the court's official reporter. Therefore, Smulls brought a private court reporter to the hearing who recorded and transcribed the following statements from Judge Corrigan: This Court won't take the position that people are white or black. It is the Court's position that you can't look at people and determine what their race is.... If the lawyers don't want to ask the jurors whether the people are white or black or ask a witness if he's white or black, then I don't think that II can ask the parties to make that admission. At the 29.15 remand hearing before Judge O'Brien, Smulls tried to admit this transcript, arguing that the transcript demonstrates Judge Corrigan's professed inability to acknowledge a person's race. Smulls also wished to present testimony and an affidavit from his original 29.15 counsel that Judge Corrigan made statements indicating he could recognize a person's race when he so chose. On objection by the state, Judge O'Brien properly excluded the transcript on the basis that the reporter was not the official court reporter, the reporter did not appear at the hearing to attempt to authenticate the transcript, and the transcript was not self-proving. In addition, Rule 57.03(f) states that after a deposition is taken and transcribed, it must be submitted to the deponent for his reading and signature. This was not done. Subsection (g) then provides for the signature of the officer transcribing the deposition, but in the absence of the signature of the deponent, that attestation does not guarantee the accuracy of the transcript. Coffel v. Spradley, 495 S.W.2d 735, 738 (Mo.App. 1973). For all of these reasons, the transcript was inadmissible. Regardless, given the similarities between this transcript and Judge Corrigan's statements during the Batson hearing already in evidence, the transcript would have been cumulative.
Smulls' former counsel attempted to testify via affidavit that during the initial Rule 29.15 hearing, Judge Corrigan referred to the woman who years before sued him for sexual discrimination as white. The state objected to the testimony on several grounds, including relevancy, and Judge O'Brien sustained the objection. Although the testimony was offered to show Judge Corrigan's possible bias or untruthfulness about race-recognition, it is irrelevant to show counsel's ineffectiveness for failing to discover that bias or untruthfulness. For this evidence to be relevant to that claim, the evidence must have been known to counsel or discoverable during reasonable investigation. White v. State, 939 S.W.2d 887, 895-96 (Mo. banc 1997). However, Judge Corrigan's statement was not made to counsel until the initial Rule 29.15 hearing, after trial. Smulls' counsel could not have presented this evidence in a motion to disqualify before or during trial, many months before the statement was made.
A Post-Dispatch article published in 1983 reported that Judge Corrigan said during a meeting of judges that, We can't have a barbecue because we don't have a black judge to do the cooking. Smulls claims he offered this article not to establish whether there were in fact any black judges in the St. Louis County Circuit, but to establish that Judge Corrigan was biased and that his bias was public knowledge. He claims his counsel knew or should have discovered this alleged evidence of bias, and that that contributed to counsel's ineffectiveness in failing to file a motion to disqualify Judge Corrigan. Judge O'Brien ruled the article was hearsay. A hearsay statement is any out-of-court statement that is used to prove the truth of the matter asserted and that depends on the veracity of the statement for its value. Rodriguez v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 996 S.W.2d 47, 59 (Mo. banc 1999). To the extent that the article was offered to prove bias, it was inadmissible. Contrary to defendant's position, the truth of the matter asserted is not that they could not have a barbecue because there were no black judges available, but that Judge Corrigan said they could not have a barbecue because there were no black judges available. See 3 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, ET AL., FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 1466 (7th ed.1998). On the other hand, the article was admissible to show that the allegation that Judge Corrigan was biased was a matter of public knowledge, and, in fact, Judge O'Brien admitted the testimony for that limited purpose. Smulls also offered the deposition testimony of Judge Campbell, who related that he personally overheard Judge Corrigan making the joke. Judge O'Brien disallowed this evidence on hearsay grounds, but the state has made no effort in its brief to defend the ruling. Assuming the testimony should have been admitted, it is much less probative of what Smulls' counsel knew or should have discovered about the matter than the newspaper article. To the extent Judge O'Brien disallowed or discounted this evidence, Smulls was not prejudiced.
Smulls next claims the motion court erred in excluding certain evidence related to a 1982 gender discrimination suit against Judge Corrigan that resulted in a judgment against him as reported in Goodwin v. Circuit Court of St. Louis County, 729 F.2d 541 (8th Cir.1984). The evidence consisted of: 1) an affidavit from the plaintiff in that case to the effect that Judge Corrigan accurately identified her as white, and 2) docket sheets reflecting that the case was heard by an African-American judge. The purported relevancy of this evidence was that it tended to show that Judge Corrigan could identify the race of a party when he so chose, and demonstrat[ed] and prove[d] why Corrigan approximately one year later told the barbecue joke. These matters were not pled as part of the Rule 29.15 motion, and the evidence was properly excluded for that reason. Even if those matters were properly pled, the relevancy of the evidence is tenuous, especially in light of this Court's holding in the original Smulls opinion that the gender discrimination suit in question did not disqualify Judge Corrigan from hearing gender- Batson claims. State v. Smulls, 935 S.W.2d at 16-17.
Smulls called Dr. John Galliher, a professor of sociology who had reviewed Judge Corrigan's conduct during various trials in order to establish racial bias. Judge O'Brien excluded the evidence for a variety of reasons, ultimately concluding that the testimony was not credible. On appellate review, such a determination will rarely be overturned because a trial court is in the best position to assess the credibility and usefulness of expert testimony. Rousan v. State, 48 S.W.3d at 589. In an offer of proof, Dr. Galliher discussed at length the existence and effect of unconscious racial bias in our society, that people with such bias falsely claim not to be able to recognize race and will tell jokes to express their feelings, and that there is a correlation between gender bias and racial bias. He also commented on excerpts from Smulls' trial and several of Judge Corrigan's other cases. He concluded that Judge Corrigan's behaviors viewed together were inconsistent with adhering to Batson's spirit and were relevant to Smulls' ability to have Batson fairly decided. Judge O'Brien rejected this testimony in part because it did not satisfy the Frye test that an expert opinion must be based upon a valid and accepted scientific methodology and assist the trier of fact in the determination of an issue. Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hosp., 863 S.W.2d 852, 860 (Mo. banc 1993); Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C.Cir.1923). Dr. Galliher admitted that his opinions were not based upon a random sampling of Judge Corrigan's cases or any first-hand observation of any of Judge Corrigan's cases. He testified that Judge Corrigan berates black defendants in a manner not found in cases with white defendants, but admitted that he did not look beyond the nine cases selected by Smulls (out of hundreds heard), and that the defendants were black in only six of those nine cases. The circumstances of these cases prove the point: In one case, Judge Corrigan referred to the defendant as an animal, but the defendant had been convicted of the brutal beating and rape of an elderly woman; in another case, Judge Corrigan called the defendant a mad dog; but the defendant was a serial rapist; in another case, he called the defendant a flim-flam man, but the defendant had been found guilty of forgery and defrauding his employer. The other cases are comparable. This is hardly proof of a pattern of racial bias. Moreover, Dr. Galliher was not able to identify any prejudice in the actual imposition of sentences and noted Judge Corrigan consistently followed the jury's recommendation. For these reasons, Judge O'Brien did not abuse his discretion in rejecting Dr. Galliher's testimony.
Next, Smulls complains that Judge O'Brien improperly excluded evidence about an alleged policy of racial discrimination by St. Louis County prosecutors in voir dire. This evidence was offered by way of affidavits from three local criminal defense lawyers and was designed to show that Smulls' counsel should have disqualified Judge Corrigan to avoid the combination of a biased prosecutor and a biased judge. This claim fails because it was determined in the initial appeal that no error occurred in deciding the merits of the Batson challenge. State v. Smulls, 935 S.W.2d at 14-16.
Smulls subpoenaed Judge Daniel O'Toole, claiming Judge O'Toole also heard Judge Corrigan tell the barbecue joke. At the state's request, Judge O'Brien stayed the deposition until he determined Smulls was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim to which the deposition related. Judge O'Brien lifted the stay on January 5, 1998, but he denied Smulls' motion for a continuance of the evidentiary hearing until the deposition could be taken. Nonetheless, he assured Smulls that additional time would be provided as necessary. Smulls scheduled the deposition for March 9, 1998, but Judge O'Toole died on that very day after an extended bout with cancer. Smulls first claims that the state had no standing to request the stay. Smulls is mistaken. The rules of civil procedure apply to Rule 29.15 motions. Rule 29.15(a). Rule 56.01(c) permits any party to file a motion for a protective order. A request for a stay order falls within that rule. Smulls next claims that the trial court's stay of the deposition was improper because Smulls was denied access to a witness who had useful information. Trial courts have broad discretion in administering rules of discovery, which this Court will not disturb absent an abuse of discretion. State ex rel. Crowden v. Dandurand, 970 S.W.2d 340, 343 (Mo. banc 1998). As noted, the basis of the state's motion was that the deposition was premature and unduly burdensome until the motion court determined whether Smulls was entitled to an evidentiary hearing. The stay was proper under Rule 56.01(c), which permits the trial court to make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense. Smulls' citation to Rule 56.01(b)(1), which states that parties are entitled to discovery on any relevant matter, does not address the issue. Judge O'Brien's ruling was not a determination that Smulls was not entitled to the discovery. The stay was in place only until he granted an evidentiary hearing and was lifted three months prior to Judge O'Toole's death. There was no abuse of discretion. See State v. Ferguson, 20 S.W.3d 485, 504 (Mo. banc 2000). Smulls also argues that Judge O'Brien improperly refused to continue the evidentiary hearing until Judge O'Toole could be deposed. Smulls filed a motion requesting a continuance or, at minimum, that the court hold open the evidence until the deposition could be taken. In response, Judge O'Brien denied the motion, but stated he would grant a continuance at the close of Smulls' evidence if the deposition had not yet been secured. It is well settled that [t]he decision to grant or deny a request for a continuance ... rests within the trial court's discretion and will not be reversed absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion. State v. Barton, 998 S.W.2d 19, 27 (Mo. banc 1999). Because the court was willing to grant a continuance if Judge O'Toole's deposition was not taken by the time Smulls rested his case, there was no abuse of discretion.
Smulls objected to the relevancy of the state's presentation of five prominent criminal defense attorneys who know Judge Corrigan and testified to his reputation as being free of bias when judging cases involving African-Americans. Smulls concedes that character evidence is relevant when put in issue by the nature of the proceeding, and his real complaint seems to be that character evidence has no bearing on racial bias. However, an inquiry into a judge's alleged racial bias cannot be conducted without an inquiry into the judge's character because the presence or absence of racial bias is part of a judge's character. Where, as here, a party has opened the door by introducing evidence of bad character as manifested by racial bias, the other party may introduce evidence of good character as manifested by the lack of racial bias. Citing Clemmons v. State, 785 S.W.2d 524, 531 (Mo. banc 1990), Smulls also argues that the character and reputation witnesses were not competent to testify because their testimony relates solely to issues the motion court must decide. It is clear from their testimony, however, that the witnesses were testifying not as experts on a matter of law, but as persons familiar with Judge Corrigan's judicial temperament. In Clemmons , the attorneys were impermissibly testifying regarding ineffective assistance of counsel, an issue of law. Id. In contrast, the witnesses here testified regarding bias, a factual determination. See State v. Kinder, 942 S.W.2d at 334 (Mo. banc 1996); State v. Thomas, 596 S.W.2d 409, 413 (Mo. banc 1980).
To succeed on the claim that trial counsel should have disqualified Judge Corrigan on the ground of racial bias, Smulls must show that there was evidence of such disqualifying bias that his trial counsel knew of or could have discovered with a reasonable amount of investigation. White v. State, 939 S.W.2d at 895-96; State v. Twenter, 818 S.W.2d 628, 640 (Mo. banc 1991). Smulls has not done so. Most of the pre-trial, out-of-court evidence that purportedly indicated Judge Corrigan's racial bias should not be considered because it was properly excluded from evidence at the Rule 29.15 hearing before Judge O'Brien. In particular, the newspaper article about the racist joke was hearsay, and the report from Dr. Galliher on Judge Corrigan's allegedly disparate treatment of black defendants was not based on scientific study and lacked credibility otherwise. Even if that evidence had been properly admitted, it is not evidence that trial counsel knew of or could have discovered with a reasonable amount of investigation. To uncover evidence that Judge Corrigan allegedly told a single racist joke to an informal group of judges some ten years before trial, even when the joke was reported in the newspaper, is not required as part of any reasonable investigation. This is especially true considering trial counsel has only limited resources and must necessarily be given deference as to the target and scope of such investigation. See State v. Clay, 975 S.W.2d 121, 143 (Mo. banc 1998). This conclusion applies all the more to the kind of investigation conducted by Dr. Galliher. More importantly, counsel would not know the need to conduct these investigations until the allegedly racially insensitive remarks were made during the Batson hearing after the trial had commenced. Only then did the issue of Judge Corrigan's racial prejudice clearly present itself. Furthermore, even had counsel conducted the kind of pre-trial investigation that Smulls, in hindsight, now claims was required, the investigation would have likely turned up as much evidence that Judge Corrigan was not biased as evidence that he was biased. The five criminal defense lawyers who practice regularly before Judge Corrigan testified unequivocally that their African-American clients had been treated fairly, and even Judge Campbell, who testified that he overheard the racist joke years ago, qualified his statement by then testifying that during the many years he had served with Judge Corrigan, he had never heard of a claim or allegation of racial bias made against him. Under these circumstances, counsel cannot be faulted for failing to move for Judge Corrigan's disqualification before trial. Whether counsel should have moved to disqualify Judge Corrigan after his comments at the Batson hearing is perhaps another question, and ultimately, the issue to be resolved is whether counsel should have attempted to disqualify Judge Corrigan on the basis of his comments during the Batson hearing alone. Although this Court determined in the first Smulls opinion that those comments were racially insensitive, State v. Smulls, 935 S.W.2d at 26, Judge Corrigan's disqualification from the Rule 29.15 proceeding was required because those comments were coupled with the several allegations of pre-trial, out-of-court misconduct and the likelihood that Judge Corrigan, himself, would be a witness for those allegations. Id. at 27. The decision to disqualify a judge is a matter of trial strategy. State v. Ayers, 911 S.W.2d 648, 652 (Mo. banc 1995); see also Wilson v. State, 626 S.W.2d 243, 248-49 (Mo. banc 1982). As with all matters of trial strategy, appellate courts are properly deferential to trial counsel's decisions. Lyons v. State, 39 S.W.3d 32, 36 (Mo. banc 2001). In that regard, it may well be that trial counsel perceived that Judge Corrigan's Batson comments were made innocuously. Further, counsel acknowledged that there was at least one important strategic reason to keep Judge Corrigan on this case: Judge Corrigan believed that the jury instruction that permitted the judge to impose the death penalty if the jury could not agree on punishment, MAI-CR3d 313.48B, was unconstitutional, and Judge Corrigan stated that he would have an extremely difficult time imposing the death penalty if the jury did not. On this record, counsel cannot be convicted of being ineffective for failing to disqualify Judge Corrigan. Finally, hindsight shows that the decision not to disqualify Judge Corrigan did not result in prejudice. Smulls cannot point to any judicial decision that evidences Judge Corrigan's alleged bias or in which Judge Corrigan's alleged bias produced an unjust result. This Court expressed concern in its 1996 decision that Judge Corrigan's refusal to acknowledge race raises serious questions about his willingness to do what Batson requires, Smulls, 935 S.W.2d at 26, and this Court wrote: The trial court cannot add subtle burdens to the Batson process by refusing to take note of race where trial counsel properly places it at issue. Id. However, a careful review of the record shows that Smulls' Batson challenge was heard not once, but twice, and at the first hearing, Judge Corrigan did not dispute that Ms. Sidney was African-American. Indeed, the controversy did not arise until the second hearing on the second day when Judge Corrigan's memory had faded and Ms. Sidney and the other jurors who were not selected were no longer present. Ultimately, this Court determined in the original appeal that the prosecutor's preemptory strike of Ms. Sidney was not pretextual and that Judge Corrigan correctly denied the Batson challenge. Id. at 14-16. Smulls advances no evidence indicating otherwise. The simple fact is that Judge Corrigan's skepticism at Smulls' Batson hearing, whether honest or obstinate, did not prevent Smulls' claims from being heard and did not prove that the outcome of that hearing or the trial as a whole was the product of the judge's bias.