Opinion ID: 170677
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Did the venue transfer constitute fundamental error?

Text: Mr. House next contends that the State's use of the facially neutral venue transfer statute for the unconstitutional purpose of discriminating against him is a fundamental error. Thus, he argues that the state court violated clearly established federal law and unreasonably determined the facts in light of the evidence presented in requiring him to demonstrate that he suffered prejudice by being tried in Doña Ana County. As with Mr. House's prior claims, he cannot obtain habeas relief on this ground. Mr. House observes that both the New Mexico Supreme Court and the federal district court misapprehended the thrust of his claim. Rather than arguing that he is entitled to a jury trial in Taos County, Mr. House contends that regardless of the venue to which his case was transferred, the Constitution guarantees him freedom from the State's use of facially neutral venue transfer statutes for unconstitutional purposes  to promote racial discrimination and to obtain biased factfinders. Mr. House's contentions rest on a faulty premise  that the law is clearly established that the alleged Fourteenth Amendment violations at issue constitute fundamental errors. A fundamental error is a structural defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991). The United States Supreme Court has never held that the alleged Fourteenth Amendment violations Mr. House raises constitute structural (i.e., fundamental) errors. Similarly, no Supreme Court case holds that a transfer of venue over a defendant's objection, even to a venue in which virtually no person of the defendant's race resides, constitutes a structural defect or fundamental error. Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that the Sixth Amendment requires only that a defendant be provided a jury composed of a fair cross section of the venire pool, meaning an impartial jury, not a representative jury. See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 480, 110 S.Ct. 803, 107 L.Ed.2d 905 (1990). Further, our own review of the evidence confirms the state court did not base its decision on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The record includes evidence that Doña Ana County residents were not particularly biased against Mr. House. For instance, the trial court heard testimony that, of the persons willing to participate, thirty-six percent of those surveyed in Doña Ana County had an opinion, while sixty percent of the Taos County participants had one. The trial court could thus validly determine that more Taos County residents had formed opinions regarding Mr. House's guilt (one way or the other) than potential jurors in Doña Ana County. Approximately 111 of the 300 persons surveyed in Taos County responded that they thought Mr. House was guilty in comparison to sixty-five of 300 residents of Doña Ana County who expressed the same view. To be sure, the record also shows that Taos County has a greater percentage of Native Americans than does Doña Ana County. House I, 978 P.2d at 991 (The trial court and all the participants ... were well aware that Taos County has a 6.5% Native American adult population while Doña Ana County has only about 0.8%.). Nonetheless, a disparity in the number of potential Native American jurors is not presumptively discriminatory. Therefore, Mr. House has failed to rebut, by clear and convincing evidence, the presumptive correctness of the state court's factual findings. The New Mexico Supreme Court's decision, therefore, was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent. Nor was it based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. Accordingly, we deny habeas relief on this ground.