Opinion ID: 1692113
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Various Other Claims

Text: The first error likely to recur upon retrial is the introduction of the testimony of Mary Weedman about individuals coming and attempting to coerce her into talking with them. The Commonwealth inquired whether anyone at the defense table ever tried to coerce her to give a taped statement or to interview her. She responded that no one at that table had, but that a blond headed lady and a man pulled up to her house and flashed a badge and told her that if she did not talk they would get the sheriff to make her talk. St. Clair objected on hearsay grounds and the trial court sustained the objection. The Commonwealth continued questioning attempting to show a connection between the people who questioned Weedmen and St. Clair. At trial, St. Clair moved for a mistrial on the ground this testimony was irrelevant and prejudicial. Although the admission of this testimony would not warrant reversal, it was error and should not be admitted upon retrial. [42] The second error concerned the admission of the transcript of Vernon Stephens preliminary hearing testimony in Oklahoma in March of 1992. The Commonwealth moved to admit the transcript under KRE 804(b)(1). In St. Clair I, [43] we held that as the offense occurred before the 1992 adoption and effective date of KRE 804(b)(1), it would be governed by the previous rule prohibiting introduction of prior testimony at a criminal trial unless the testimony was given at a previous trial of the same offense ... on the same charge. [44] Although we held the admission of such evidence harmless because it was cumulative of St. Clair's testimony, it was nonetheless error in this case and should be excluded. Finally, we will address St. Clair's last valid assertion of error. He claims that when the Commonwealth asked Reese was there any conversation that went on between St. Clair and Mr. Brady as you all drove that thirty minutes to an hour up to old Boston Road? Defense immediately objected on hearsay grounds. A bench conference was held and the trial judge allowed Reese to testify on the grounds that Brady's declaration was subject to the dying declaration exception in KRE 804(b)(2). Reese testified that Brady said he had a daughter in college and that she was home for the weekend. Brady also talked about his wife. The Commonwealth asked what Brady had said about his wife and Reese answered, He was wanting to go back home. Upon this appeal, the Commonwealth responds by noting that Reese testified that Brady told St. Clair that he wanted to go home to his family. The Commonwealth claims that this testimony was being used to show that Brady was being held against his will. The Commonwealth posits that this was admitted to show the topic of conversation not what Brady actually said. In support, the Commonwealth cites Wilson v. Commonwealth [45] for the proposition that evidence showing that a victim had begged for his life is always admissible. However, in Wilson , we neither addressed hearsay nor discussed the dying declaration exception. We note that this argument is novel to this appeal and was not argued at trial. This testimony was not admissible as a dying declaration because the statements did not concern the impending causes of the victim's death, and it is not clear that the victim was aware of his impending death. [46] It is well settled that statements may be admitted to show the declarant's state of mind, and testimony showing a declarant's state of mind, e.g., fear, is admissible. However, the testimony concerning Brady's daughter and his desire to go home was inadmissible hearsay and should have been excluded from trial. For the forgoing reasons, we reverse and remand. As to part I, COOPER and JOHNSTONE, JJ., concur. ROACH, J., concurs by separate opinion; and WINTERSHEIMER, J., dissents by separate opinion in which GRAVES and SCOTT, JJ., join. As to part II, all concur except COOPER, J., who dissents by separate opinion. As to part III, all concur.