Opinion ID: 2602047
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of Application to Modify the Penalty Verdict

Text: Once the jury returned a death verdict, the trial court considered an automatic motion for a modification of the sentence (§ 190.4, subd. (e)), which the trial court denied. Defendant contends the trial court's decision constituted error. Specifically, defendant asserts the trial court's failure to take into account the proportionality aspect of the death penalty requires reversal. We disagree. (18) A trial court's duty under section 190.4, subdivision (e), is to independently reweigh the evidence of aggravating and mitigating factors presented at trial and determine whether, in its independent judgment, the evidence supports the death verdict. ( People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1267 [120 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 47 P.3d 225].) The record demonstrates that the trial court did so here. In aggravation, the trial court discussed the calculated nature of the crimes, the fact that defendant likely chose the women he attacked because he was aware they lived alone, and the brutality of the attacks. The court next identified numerous mitigating factors including, among other things, defendant's lack of criminal history, his addiction to drugs, his childhood, and his devotion to his children. The trial court then independently reweighed the evidence and ultimately concluded that the circumstances of the crime were so compelling that [their] weight alone substantially outweighed the totality of the mitigating factors. The trial court carefully performed its duty under section 190.4, subdivision (e). Defendant also argues that the circumstances of this crime were not so bad as to place defendant among the worst of the worst. To the extent defendant is claiming the trial court erred by failing to compare the crimes in this case with other death penalty cases, we have held such intercase proportionality review is not required by either the state or federal Constitution. ( People v. Lenart (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1107, 1130 [12 Cal.Rptr.3d 592, 88 P.3d 498]; People v. Sapp (2003) 31 Cal.4th 240, 317 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 554, 73 P.3d 433].) To the extent he is arguing that his sentence was disproportionate to his personal culpability, we disagree. ( People v. Steele, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1269.) As the trial court explained, [defendant] did not randomly select his victims but rather used his special knowledge as a workman or as a neighbor to assess their vulnerability before he preyed upon [them] . . . . [¶] There was unusual emotional brutality in the rape and forced oral copulation of the first victim. And there was unusual physical brutality in the killing of [Evans]. Defendant's sentence is not disproportionate to [his] personal culpability. It does not shock the conscience. ( People v. Steele, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1269.) The trial court did not err when it declined to modify the sentence.