Opinion ID: 2150860
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Was it error to have refused plaintiffs' request to call the city's special investigator adversely

Text: The plaintiffs called Sergeant Traver of the Madison police department as its first witness and asked to call him as an adverse witness under sec. 885.14 (1), Stats., which provides: Any party ... or his or its ... employe ... may be examined upon the trial as if under cross-examination, at the instance of any adverse party. It is clear that, under the plain meaning of the statute, Sergeant Traver was an employee of the city, a party-defendant adverse to the plaintiffs. The trial judge ruled, however, that the statute was not applicable. He stated that the negligence claimed against the city referred to that of the department of traffic engineering, a function with which the police officer had nothing to do. He said the fact that another branch of the city was involved would not affect the testimony of the officerthat he is clearly not an adverse witness insofar as how the accident happened. Later he referred to the officer as an independent witness. In the trial judge's opinion following motions after verdict, he stated, Sergeant Traver offered no testimony which had any bearing on the city's liability in this lawsuit. We cannot agree with this rationale. It appears that, at the point of the trial when this decision was made, the judge attempted to separate the liability of the city from that of the bus company. He reasoned that, because the testimony of the officer was ostensibly relevant only to the collision of the bus and the pedestrian, no interest of the city adverse to the plaintiffs was thereby involved. However, where two defendants are sued in a single tort action, the amount of negligence attributed to the plaintiff is inseparably of concern to each of the defendants. We do not agree with the trial judge's reasoning, for the testimony of Sergeant Traver tended to show that the plaintiff was negligent as to lookout, and, though the negligence thus revealed was initially significant in regard to the liability of the bus company, it was equally significant in regard to the liability of the city. Under our comparative negligence law, any negligence attributable to the plaintiff redounds to the benefit of all the defendants, since a plaintiff cannot recover from any defendant unless he is less negligent than that defendant. Any negligence that Sergeant Traver could attribute to Donna Schueler was of direct benefit to his employer, the city of Madison. The statute is one relating to testimonial bias. It is a legislative public-policy declaration that a witness can be expected to have some loyalty to his employer and, hence, to have interests contrary to his employer's legal adversaries. There is no room in the terminology of the statute for the conclusion that expertise of the witness should permit a court to ignore its plain and unequivocal meaning. We also conclude that the trial court compounded its error by stating in the presence of the jury that the police officer was an independent witness. This tended to give the same credence to the police officer that we would expect to be afforded a traffic officer in the ordinary case where the city was not a party. That the officer was not a witness unconnected with any concern for the city's liability is evinced by the clear implication of the record that photographs and statements of witnesses in possession of the officer had been withheld from the plaintiffs and were sprung on trial, While the trial judge correctly pointed out that he would have ordered the city to produce the pictures if a proper pretrial request were made, the significance of the point is that the police witness withheld information that would most likely not have been withheld if the city were a stranger to the lawsuit. In addition, the refusal to let plaintiffs' counsel call the officer as an adverse witness resulted in disrupting any orderly procedure in the presentation of the plaintiffs' case. Ordinarily, when a party is called adversely, the examination permitted following the adverse examination is limited to matters tending to explain or qualify testimony of witnesses given on cross-examination (sec. 885.14, Stats.). O'Day v. Meyers (1911), 147 Wis. 549, 133 N. W. 605; Guse v. Power & Mining Machinery Co. (1912), 151 Wis. 400, 139 N. W. 195. In the instant case, however, the judge's erroneous ruling opened the door for the full weight of the defense position to be brought in at the very beginning of the trialbefore the plaintiffs' case had really commenced. A full reading of the transcript leads to the conclusion that, from the time Sergeant Traver, who was really the principal witness for the defense, was permitted the unlimited right to testify, the defense had the initiative in the lawsuit, and all opportunity of an orderly presentation of the plaintiffs' case was gone. What should have been an affirmative presentation of the plaintiffs' case degenerated into a rebuttal. The right of the plaintiffs to open their case was violated. A trial judge in the exercise of properly expressed discretion may, of course, permit the alteration of the usual order of proof. But the record must clearly show that the judge was conscious of the implications of his action and show he exercised discretion on a legally recognized basis. In the instant case defendants were given a substantial advantage when the questioning of Sergeant Traver permitted the opening of the defendants' case at the beginning of the trial. McCormick, Evidence (hornbook series), p. 6, fn. 1, sec. 4, points out that the right to open and close is a right that is related to the plaintiff's burden of proof. In the instant case, the defendants were, in effect, given the right to present a major portion of their case at the commencement of testimony, but the plaintiffs remained saddled with the burden of affirmative proof. See also: 6 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed.), pp. 494-498, sec. 1866. Plaintiffs' attorney questioned Sergeant Traver only in regard to physical facts that were apparent at the scene of the accident. However, the attorney for the Madison Bus Company immediately began questioning the officer about information secured from witnesses during the course of his investigation. Upon plaintiffs' attorney's objection to questions substantially beyond the scope of plaintiffs' questions, the trial judge made the surprising statement that the officer was an independent witness and ruled that the defendant bus company could treat the witness as its own. The bus company's attorney then proceeded to develop the defense case. It is little wonder that defense counsel twice in the space of a single page of transcript stated that he was delighted with this procedure. Plaintiffs' attorney had a full and unlimited opportunity to re-examine this police witness, but the record read as a whole indicates that the prejudice that arose from the disruption of the orderly presentation of plaintiffs' case was beyond rectification. We do not consider this special statutory procedure under sec. 885.14, Stats., the equivalent of the usual testimonial proceedings, in respect to which we have recently adopted the wide-open rule of cross -examination, which permits the cross-examining lawyer to bring out points relevant to his own case. We did, however, in Boller v. Cofrances (1969), 42 Wis. 2d 170, 166 N. W. 2d 129, make it clear that one of the criteria to be examined in permitting wide-open cross-examination was the degree to which it disrupted the orderly presentation of the evidence. Boller, supra, page 181. Here, it is apparent that no such criterion was applied or considered when the judge suddenly ruled that the officer was available for full direct examination by the defendants, and as an independent witness. The refusal to permit plaintiffs to call Sergeant Traver adversely is inextricably linked with an additional error in regard to the testimony of the same witness. When the bus company's attorney examined the police officer, he asked what questions were asked the plaintiff Donna Schueler in the emergency room of the hospital and what answers were given. The officer stated that she said: She had been crossing University Avenue, from the north side to the south side, and that she had forgotten about the bus lane and that she had not stopped for the median strip ... and was in the process of stepping into the bus lane when she struck the left side of the bus. This statement of Donna Schueler, as recounted by the officer, is the sole evidence of any admission by Donna Schueler that she had any knowledge of the movement of the buses contrary to the flow of ordinary vehicular traffic in the opposite direction. Its admission was highly significant, for it established, arguably at least, that she knew of the hazard of the buses and was aware of her duty to keep a lookout for buses coming from the west. The statement of Donna Schueler recited by Sergeant Traver was almost the whole of the defendants' case. Under the provisions of the statutes, the statement was prima facie inadmissible. Sec. 885.28 (1), Stats., provides: In actions for damages caused by personal injury, no statement made or writing signed by the injured person within 72 hours of the time the injury happened or accident occurred, shall be received in evidence unless such evidence would be admissible as part of the res gestae. This testimony was not objected to. However, counsel has no duty to object when, from the course of the proceedings, the point at issue is one on which the judge has just ruled adversely. The law does not require counsel to perform a useless act or to make a futile objection. Trial counsel stated on motions after verdict that he made no objection because the court had just ruled, over counsel's objection, that the officer was impartial and was an independent investigator. He asserted that his objection to the judge's refusal to permit him to call the officer adversely sufficiently raises the question of the police officer's right as an impartial witness to take a statement within seventy-two hours. The trial judge said on motions after verdict: Counsel now say that it would have been pointless to object to such testimony after the Court had ruled that Officer Traver was not an adverse witness insofar as how the accident happened. Perhaps this is correct, and undoubtedly we would have permitted Officer Traver to testify as to what the plaintiff had told him about the accident even though there had been a specific objection at the time. Since the issue was almost precisely that involved in the question whether the officer was to be called adversely, we are satisfied that the earlier objection sufficed to raise the seventy-two-hour statute on this appeal. This statute (sec. 885.28 (1)), was directed at curing the evils resulting from the practice of obtaining statements from an injured person which might later be used in defending against a lawsuit brought by the injured person. It was believed that use of such statements was unfair because the physical and mental condition of the injured person might prevent him from properly safeguarding his rights. Zastrow v. Schaumburger (1932), 210 Wis. 116, 245 N. W. 202, and Musha v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (1960), 10 Wis. 2d 176, 102 N. W. 2d 243. This court has held, however, that this statute does not apply in cases where the statement was procured by a police officer who was investigating the accident in the course of his official duties. Hack v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. (1967), 37 Wis. 2d 1, 154 N. W. 2d 320; Keplin v. Hardware Mut. Casualty Co. (1964), 24 Wis. 2d 319, 129 N. W. 2d 321, 130 N. W. 2d 3. The reason for the exception is that the police officer ordinarily has no interest in the outcome of any lawsuit commenced, and therefore, in the light of such indifference of the officer, there is no necessity to protect the injured party. Musha v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., supra . There is no question that sec. 885.28 (1), Stats., covers this case unless the police officer exception is applicable. It is not because Sergeant Traver was the employee of one of the defendants to the lawsuit. Sergeant Traver was asked by the attorney for the bus company, ... what are the duties generally of a special investigator to distinguish you from a police officer? He answered, Specialized training in serious accidents, injury accidents, any time city property is involved ... categories that a patrolman does not handle. (Emphasis supplied.) It is clear that in the ordinary case who prevails in a civil lawsuit is of no concern to a police officer. As between the parties, he is completely neutral. This is not true in the instant case where the city, the officer's employer, is a party and the officer is a specialist in making investigations when the city's liability is at issue. While we reaffirm the police-officer exception to the seventy-two-hour statute, in the instant case it is not applicable. For reasons set forth above, the status of Sergeant Traver in this case was little different than that of the ordinary insurance investigator. In view of our conclusion that the statement taken by the special investigator is not admissible, we need not explore the close question of whether Donna Schueler was in such condition at the time of the statement that she would not be expected to make intelligent and voluntary responses to the questions. We note that the statement of Sergeant Traver that Donna Schueler was coherent and responsive is at odds with the testimony of Edith Schueler, Donna's mother, to the effect that when she first saw Donna immediately after the officer left, Donna was incoherent and was tossing her head from side to side with pain.