Opinion ID: 529771
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Violations of the FDCPA.

Text: 12 On appeal, Pipiles argues that four subsections of 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1692e were violated by the Notice. Section 1692e is violated when a debt collector uses any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. The sixteen subsections of section 1692e detail nonexclusive specifications of this general prohibition. 13 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1692k(c) provides a general defense to any violation of Sec. 1692e, however, stating:A debt collector may not be held liable in any action brought under this subchapter if the debt collector shows by a preponderance of evidence that the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error. 14 Further, section 1692k(b)(1) provides that in determining the amount of liability in any individual action for violation of the FDCPA, the court shall consider, among other relevant factors ..., the frequency and persistence of noncompliance by the debt collector, the nature of such noncompliance, and the extent to which such noncompliance was intentional.... 15 Against this background, we turn to consideration of the specific statutory violations asserted by Pipiles. 16
17 No violation of this subsection was pleaded, and no application to amend the pleadings to conform to the proof, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(b), was made here or below. Under these circumstances, we ordinarily refuse to consider a claim for the first time on appeal. Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 556, 61 S.Ct. 719, 721, 85 L.Ed. 1037 (1941); Davis v. Musler, 713 F.2d 907, 917 (2d Cir.1983) (Van Graafeiland, J., concurring); Adato v. Kagan, 599 F.2d 1111, 1116 (2d Cir.1979); Terkildsen v. Waters, 481 F.2d 201, 204-05 (2d Cir.1973). 18 This is an appropriate case to invoke this rule. Because this issue was not brought into focus below, the state of the record is quite murky concerning the Bureau's responsibility for the erroneous information transmitted in the Notice concerning the $35.00 indebtedness to Cardiology Associates for treatment of Patricia Julius. Furthermore, we determine hereinafter that (1) the Notice violated three other subdivisions of section 1692e, (2) no damages should be awarded to Pipiles, but (3) she is entitled to costs and a reasonable attorney's fee unless the Bureau is allowed to tender, and establishes, a section 1692k(c) defense on remand. None of these rulings would be changed in any respect by any determination we might make on Pipiles' section 1692e(2)(A) claim. In view of all the foregoing, we decline to consider it. 19
20 Section 1692e(5) proscribes the threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken, while section 1692e(10) forbids, in relevant part, the use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. Pipiles contends that the following language in the Notice constituted both threats of action that the Bureau did not intend to take and false representations: Notice Is Hereby Given That This Item Has Already Been Referred for Collection Action; We Will At Any Time After 48 Hours Take Action As Necessary And Appropriate To Secure Payment In Full; and Pay This Amount Now If Action Is To Be Stopped. Pipiles testified that she thought they'd take me to court, sue me and wreck my credit. She relies, with respect to the falsity of these statements and the lack of any intention to consummate the threatened action, upon Emerick's testimony that the Bureau routinely would take no further action on debts under $150.00, other than to try to contact by phone. 21 The district court concluded that there was no violation because there is nothing said here that he is going to refer this further to an attorney and there is no violation of either the letter or the spirit of the law. Cf. Kleczy v. First Fed. Credit Control, Inc., 21 Ohio App.3d 56, 58, 486 N.E.2d 204, 206-07 (1984) (words avoid further action not sufficiently threatening to constitute statutory violation; additional letters constituted further action in any event). 22 Although it is a close question, given the vagueness of the language in the Notice, we conclude that a violation of section 1692e(5) and (10) has been established. The clear import of the language, taken as a whole, is that some type of legal action has already been or is about to be initiated and can be averted from running its course only by payment. The only action underway was the dispatching of the Notice itself, and the only prospective future action for this indebtedness was an attempt at telephone contact (which in fact occurred). See Baker v. G.C. Servs. Corp., 677 F.2d 775, 778-79 (9th Cir.1982) (further telephone and mail solicitation not equivalent to threatened legal action). Pipiles is accordingly entitled to prevail on this issue. 23
24 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1692e(11) (1982) prohibits, with an exception not here relevant, the failure to disclose clearly in all communications made to collect a debt or to obtain information about a consumer, that the debt collector is attempting to collect a debt and that any information obtained will be used for that purpose (emphasis added). It is uncontested that the first communication to Pipiles, which the district court found was sent although Pipiles denied receiving it, did meet these requirements. The question we must consider is whether the Notice nonetheless violated section 1692e(11). 25 We reject at the outset Pipiles' contention that the Notice violated the statute because it failed to state in so many words that the Bureau was attempting to collect a debt. As we said in Emanuel v. American Credit Exch., 870 F.2d 805, 808 (2d Cir.1989), it is clear from the face of the [Notice] that it was intended to obtain payment of a debt, and there simply is no requirement that the [Notice] quote verbatim the language of the statute. The Notice, however, did not state that any information obtained would be used for the purpose of collecting the debt in question. 26 In Emanuel we [thought] it clear from the plain language of section 1692e(11) that the debt collector must comply with both disclosure requirements, regardless of whether any information is sought. Id. We noted that Congress employed the disjunctive 'or' when it described the types of communications covered by section 1692e(11), and the conjunctive 'and' when it described the contents required for inclusion in the communications. Id. 27 Emanuel, however, does not control our decision here. In Emanuel, the initial communication to the debtor failed to include the required information. We therefore decided, in accord with Hulshizer v. Global Credit Servs., Inc., 728 F.2d 1037 (8th Cir.1984) (per curiam), another case involving an initial communication, that the statute had been violated. We distinguished Pressley v. Capital Credit & Collection Serv., Inc., 760 F.2d 922 (9th Cir.1985) (per curiam), where it was held that strict compliance with the statute was not required in the case of a follow-up communication, but stated that we d[id] not necessarily agree that a distinction should be made between initial and follow-up letters, see 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1692e(11) ('all communications' must make the required disclosures). 870 F.2d at 808. 28 Since the district court in this case found that an initial communication was sent to Pipiles which complied with section 1692e(11), we must now address the question left open in Emanuel and determine whether the Notice, a follow-up communication, was also required to comply. We hold that it was, and therefore rule that Pipiles has established a violation of section 1692e(11). 29  'The starting point for our interpretation of a statute is always its language.'  Mobil Oil Corp. v. Karbowski, 879 F.2d 1052, 1054 (2d Cir.1989) (quoting Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 2166, 2172, 104 L.Ed.2d 811 (1989)). Thus, '[a]bsent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, [the language used] must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.'  Id. (quoting Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 2056, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980)). 30 The Pressley court avoided the conclusion that the required disclosures must be present in all communications by finding that such a result would ignore the balancing mandated by Congress between the interests of consumers in freedom from harassment and the interests of ethical debt collectors in freedom from unnecessary restrictions, 760 F.2d at 925, that [n]o useful purpose would be served by repetition of a formal warning in such a follow up notice to a debtor, id. at 926, and that this requirement was not intended by Congress, id. We disagree. 31 First, in providing that all communications contain the required disclosures, Congress appears to have precluded the balancing suggested in Pressley. Were balancing undertaken, allowing certain communications to omit the disclosures, the clear and unambiguous language all communications would effectively be changed to some communications. Second, it is apparent that the prescribed requirement can further the Congressional purpose in enacting the FDCPA in 1977, which was to prevent abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices. 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1692 (1982). In fact, this case illustrates the utility of the statute. By requiring disclosure in all communications, Congress has ensured that even if the first notice is not received by the consumer, as Pipiles claims occurred here, subsequent notices will nonetheless provide the consumer with the requisite disclosures. Third, even if there were little discernible purpose in repetition, Congress could exercise its legislative judgment to adopt a reasonable margin of safety to insure its remedial goal. We are not at liberty to substitute a view different from that expressed by Congress in the legislative enactment. 32 We accordingly conclude that the Notice violated section 1692e(11). 33