Opinion ID: 2197709
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Severance of the PDWPP Charge

Text: The third issue is whether the Superior Court erred in denying Massey's motion for relief from the allegedly prejudicial joinder of the PDWPP charge. This Court reviews a decision on severance for abuse of discretion. [17] The denial of a motion to sever will not be disturbed unless the defendant demonstrates a reasonable probability that the joint trial caused substantial prejudice. [18] To promote judicial economy and efficiency, Superior Court Criminal Rule 8(a) permits the joinder of two or more offenses in the same indictment where the offenses are based upon the same act or transaction. [19] Here, the joinder of the seven pending charges against Massey, including the charge of PDWPP, related to the same act or transactionthe May 21, 2006 incident outside the Dover nightclub. But, because any joinder must be consistent with the rights of the accused, Superior Court Criminal Rule 14 also permits the court to sever offenses and hold separate trials if it appears that a defendant will be prejudiced by the joinder. [20] Massey argues that the joinder was prejudicial because the jury [might] use the evidence of one of the crimes to infer a general criminal disposition of the defendant in order to find guilt of the other ... crimes. [21] More specifically, Massey contends that the joinder of the PDWPP charge with the remaining six charges was prejudicial because, to establish an element of the PDWPP charge (that Massey was a person prohibited), the State would be entitled to introduce evidence of Massey's prior crimes, that included two very similar, and recent, convictions of possession of a firearm and of ammunition. We disagree. First, had the jury believed that Massey had a general criminal disposition, it likely would have found him guilty as charged on all counts. Instead, the jury convicted Massey of four lesser-included offenses (second and third degree assault), and of only three of the original charges. Second, the State was entitled to introduce evidence of Massey's prior convictions not only as an element of the pending PDWPP offense, but also, once Massey elected to take the stand, to impeach his credibility as a witness under D.R.E. 609. [22] Massey correctly argues that, where the witness is the defendant who testifies about his prior convictions, D.R.E. 609, read together with D.R.E. 105, requires a cautionary jury instruction. [23] Here, as later discussed, sufficient limiting instructions were given. Third, Massey argues that the Superior Court has specifically and repeatedly held in other cases that PDWPP charges should be severed, because the jury may be unable to compartmentalize their judgment of guilt or innocence with regard to each of the separate counts of the indictment, and may infer a general criminal disposition. [24] Although this argument is not without force, the cases cited by Massey are distinguishable. This case involves an atypical situationthe fact that the defense was going to, and did, voluntarily disclose to the jury in the opening statement that Massey was on probation, thus enabling the jury to infer that Massey had a criminal record of some kind. [25] Massey claims that the potential for prejudice is greater when the jury knows specifically the nature of the prior crimes than when it only knows generally that the defendant is on probation because of a prior criminal record. Although we agree with this contention, nevertheless, the choice made by the defense to disclose Massey's status as a probationer reduced any potential prejudice below the required level (substantial prejudice), especially given that (by stipulation) the jury was informed about the specific nature of Massey's two prior similar convictions. [26] Because of that stipulation, the only other reference to Massey's prior crimes was during the following brief exchange on cross-examination, for purposes of impeachment: Q: Mr. Massey, you've been convicted of felonies on two occasions, haven't you? A: Yes. Q: In fact, those are the ones we read in into the record, 2003 and 2005? A: Correct. Q: And you've been convicted of a crime of dishonesty. Isn't that correct? A: Yes. Q: And what was that? A: Criminal impersonation. Q: And when was that? A: I think 2003. [Prosecutor]: Nothing further of this witness, Your Honor. These atypical circumstances significantly reduced, if not eliminated, any potential prejudice deriving from the trial judge's refusal to sever the PDWPP charge from the other charges. We therefore uphold the Superior Court's ruling.