Opinion ID: 2570573
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: State's failure to preserve pager message

Text: Leonard challenges the State's failure to preserve the recording of the message left on Jesus Cintron's pager. He claims that the district court erred by failing to dismiss the charges or, alternatively, preclude testimony about the message. He argues that it was fundamentally unfair for the State to present testimony about the pager message when the State did not afford him the means to directly challenge the source of the evidence. The State's loss or destruction of evidence constitutes a due process violation only if the defendant shows either that the State acted in bad faith or that the defendant suffered undue prejudice and the exculpatory value of the evidence was apparent before it was lost or destroyed. Sheriff v. Warner, 112 Nev. 1234, 1239-40, 926 P.2d 775, 778 (1996); see also Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 109 S.Ct. 333, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988). Where there is no bad faith, the defendant has the burden of showing prejudice. See Warner, 112 Nev. at 1240, 926 P.2d at 778. The defendant must show that `it could be reasonably anticipated that the evidence sought would be exculpatory and material to [the] defense.' Id. (quoting Boggs v. State, 95 Nev. 911, 913, 604 P.2d 107, 108 (1979)). It is not sufficient to show `merely a hoped-for conclusion' or `that examination of the evidence would be helpful in preparing [a] defense.' Id. Here, Leonard filed a motion to dismiss the case or, in the alternative, to suppress evidence of the message. The district court held a hearing on the motion. At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court denied Leonard's motion, stating that bad faith of the State was not an issue and holding that Leonard had not shown that the evidence had exculpatory value that was apparent before it was destroyed. We conclude that the district court did not err. First, there is no evidence that the State acted in bad faith. Second, Leonard did not demonstrate that it could reasonably be anticipated that the message was exculpatory. Although Leonard denied leaving the message, other credible evidence contradicted his contention. Leonard also argues that the district court should have excluded evidence of the pager message as hearsay. We note, however, that there was credible testimony of the message's content and that Leonard was the source of the message. Thus, the message was not hearsay because it was admitted against Leonard as his own incriminating statement. NRS 51.035(3). For the same reason, Leonard was not denied his constitutional confrontation rights. Alternatively, Leonard asserts that the court should have instructed the jury that due to the failure to preserve the message it should presume the evidence was adverse to the State. [10] Leonard has failed to specifically cite to any portion of the record where he requested special instruction on such a presumption. Moreover, we conclude that such instruction was not warranted given the facts of this case.