Opinion ID: 3058194
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Probable Cause to Search the Tractor-Trailer

Text: Alternatively, Rendon argues that, even if Cox had reasonable suspicion to detain him, his consent to search was coerced and the initial entry into and search of his tractor-trailer by Cox and Faulk and then by Anderson was illegal. We agree with the magistrate judge’s conclusion that the interior search of the 3 Rendon argues that we should not credit any of these facts because Cox’s testimony is not credible because of allegations of misconduct unrelated to this case. The record contains no evidence of any connection between Cox’s alleged misconduct and credibility issues and we see no reversible error in the magistrate’s credibility determination. 7 tractor-trailer by the officers was unlawful because, as the government concedes, Rendon’s consent was coerced and not voluntarily given. C. Probable Cause to Search Based on the Canine Alert Finally, we turn to the question of whether the unlawful search tainted the canine alert. The Supreme Court has held that the use of a canine to sniff the exterior of a vehicle for purposes of drug detection does not implicate the Fourth Amendment if it is conducted during the course of a lawful traffic stop. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005). Moreover, our circuit has held that the alert of a drug-trained canine to the presence of drugs in a vehicle gives rise to probable cause to search that vehicle. United States v. Tamari, 454 F.3d 1259, 1265 (11th Cir. 2006). Rendon argues that, in this case, the canine sniff which alerted the officers to the presence of illegal drugs was tainted by the officers’ prior unlawful detention and searches which occurred during the 20 minutes between the detention and the canine alert.4 Our circuit has stated that “[t]he exclusionary rule serves to deter police misconduct by preventing the introduction of evidence obtained through police 4 The initial stop in this case occurred at 4:07 pm and the parties agree that the lawful detention for the routine vehicle inspection lasted until 4:34 pm. Luca arrived at 4:52 pm and alerted to the drugs shortly thereafter. 8 illegality.” United States v. Virden, 488 F.3d 1317, 1322 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442–43 (1984)). In explaining whether police illegality will support the suppression of evidence, the Supreme Court has stated that the appropriate question to ask is “whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963). We have identified three circumstances in which the evidence can be said to have been obtained by means “sufficiently distinguishable” from the initial illegality such that suppression is not necessary. First, the challenged evidence will be admissible under the “inevitable discovery” doctrine if it inevitably or ultimately would have been discovered by lawful means without reference to the police misconduct. Second, under the “independent source” doctrine, the challenged evidence will be admissible if it derived from a lawful source independent of the illegal conduct. Third, the challenged evidence will be admissible under the “attenuation” doctrine if the causal connection between the constitutional violation and the discovery of the evidence has become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint. United States v. Terzado-Madruga, 897 F.2d 1099, 1113 (11th Cir. 1990) (internal citations omitted). Here, we have held that the detention by Cox was not illegal as it was 9 supported by reasonable suspicion. Thus, there is no taint attributable to Cox’s continued detention. With reference to the illegal entry into the trailer by Cox, Faulk and Anderson, we see no basis to conclude that Luca’s search was tainted. First, nothing was uncovered during any of the interior inspections. The evidence that Rendon is seeking to have suppressed was not discovered by any of the three officers during their illegal searches of his tractor-trailer and we can find no connection between the interior searches and the ultimate alert by Luca. Rendon argues that the officers noticed new bolts on the refrigeration unit while they were inside the trailer. However, the evidence reflects that the refrigeration unit protruded on the outside of the trailer and it was during their exterior observation of the trailer that they noticed the new bolts. Anderson’s deployment of Luca around the exterior of the tractor-trailer was conducted in a routine manner and Luca alerted to the exterior portion of the refrigeration unit. Accordingly, because the ongoing traffic stop was lawful, and the use of a canine to perform an exterior sniff for drugs during that traffic stop was not tainted, the search for drugs in the location of the alert was permissible. See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409. It was not error to admit this evidence under either the “inevitable discovery” or “independent source” doctrine. AFFIRMED. 10