Opinion ID: 392657
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Anti-Injunction Act Objections

Text: 22 Appellant's second contention is that the district court's order of June 27 violates the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, which provides: 23 A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a state court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments. 24 The Supreme Court has noted that the purpose of the Act, which rests on the fundamental constitutional independence of the states and their courts, 12 is to prevent needless friction between state and federal courts. 13 The Court has applied the Act strictly, 14 stating that it is an absolute prohibition against any injunction of any state court proceedings that does not fall within one of the three specifically defined exceptions in the Act. 15 The issue for decision, then, is whether the June 27 order falls within one of the three exceptions. 25 The district court relied primarily, as do appellees before this court, on the last of the three exceptions, which permits a federal court to enjoin a state proceeding in order to protect or effectuate its judgments. 16 Known as the relitigation exception, the protect or effectuate language was intended to affirm the power of federal courts to enjoin the relitigation of cases and controversies fully adjudicated by such courts. 17 The Supreme Court has construed the exception to mean that a state court may be prevented from so interfering with a federal court's consideration or disposition of a case as to seriously impair the federal court's flexibility and authority to decide that case. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 398 U.S. 281, 295, 90 S.Ct. 1739, 1747, 26 L.Ed.2d 234 (1970). 26 Appellant argues that this exception should be read narrowly to permit an injunction only where the state proceeding involves the same cause of action as did the federal proceeding. Appellant contrasts the cause of action in the federal suit, to ensure compliance with the Clean Water Act by providing for sludge disposal, with the causes of action in the enjoined state proceedings, which involve issues such as compensability of restrictive covenants under Maryland property law. Appellant concludes that the state suits are collateral to, rather than duplicative of, the federal suit and that therefore the relitigation exception does not apply. 27 We believe, however, that Atlantic Coast Line mandates an examination of the effect a state proceeding would have on a prior federal judgment, rather than a comparison of formal causes of action. Where a state court enjoins a course of conduct which is necessary to comply with a prior federal court order, the federal court has authority to effectuate its order by enjoining the state proceeding. In Doe v. Ceci, 517 F.2d 1203 (7th Cir. 1975), a federal district court had enjoined a county hospital from refusing to permit its medical personnel to perform elective abortions within the hospital. Subsequently a state court entered an order restraining county officials from disbursing any county funds for elective abortions. The district court enjoined enforcement of the state court order and the Seventh Circuit affirmed on grounds that such action was necessary to effectuate the earlier order of the federal court and thus not in contravention of 28 U.S.C. § 2283. Id. at 1204. See also Henry v. First National Bank of Clarksdale, 595 F.2d 291, 306-07 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub nom. Claiborne Hardware Co. v. Henry, 444 U.S. 1074, 100 S.Ct. 1020, 62 L.Ed.2d 756 (1980); Thomason v. Cooper, 254 F.2d 808 (8th Cir. 1958); Baker v. Gotz, 415 F.Supp. 1243 (D.Del.), aff'd mem., 546 F.2d 415 (3d Cir. 1976). Thus the district court plainly acted within its authority in enjoining the WSSC from complying with the June 17 order of the Circuit Court for Prince George's County. 28 The State of Maryland, while acknowledging the power of the district court to stay the Prince George's Circuit Court injunction, joins appellant in arguing that the June 27 order was overly broad in enjoining both pending state proceedings which had not progressed to final judgment and prospective state litigation concerning Site 2. The law is clear, however, that a federal court is not required to await a final judgment by a state court before acting to protect its own decrees. 18 29 Where proceedings in a federal court have been ongoing for several years, as they have here, state proceedings which would frustrate the federal court's effective disposition of the case have frequently been enjoined even where the state proceedings have not yet progressed to final judgment. Many of these cases have involved school desegregation orders. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 501 F.2d 383 (4th Cir. 1974); Grenchik v. Mandel, 373 F.Supp. 1298 (D.Md.1973). 19 In New York State Association for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 456 F.Supp. 85 (E.D.N.Y.1978), the district court enjoined a state proceeding which would have interfered with its disposition of a civil rights case over which it had acquired jurisdiction five years earlier, noting that the state court plaintiffs' claims would properly have been brought before the federal court. Id. at 97. In this case, too, we believe that if P. G. County believed changed circumstances required modification of the 1978 order, it was obligated to seek such modification in the district court, which ordered the implementation of Site 2 in 1978. 30 Thus we conclude that it was within the district court's discretion to enjoin P. G. County's participation in the three pending proceedings in Maryland state courts in which the relief sought would have frustrated the district court's flexibility and authority to enforce its 1978 order. The injunction against prospective state court litigation concerning Site 2, being outside the scope of § 2283, 20 is likewise valid. In sum, we find no violation of the Anti-Injunction Act or of equitable principles in the June 27 injunction order.