Opinion ID: 2510351
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Implied Easement From Prior Use

Text: The Appellants argue they hold an easement over the whole of the access road by an implied easement from prior use. A party seeking to establish an implied easement from prior use must demonstrate three essential elements: (1) unity of title or ownership and subsequent separation by grant of the dominant estate; (2) apparent continuous use long enough before separation of the dominant estate to show that the use was intended to be permanent; and (3) the easement must be reasonably necessary to the proper enjoyment of the dominant estate. Davis, 133 Idaho at 642, 991 P.2d at 367. In the present case, it is undisputed that all the property in question was once in the common ownership of the Millsaps, establishing the necessary unity of title or ownership. It was separated in 1966, with the Millsaps retaining ownership over the dominant estate. That established the needed subsequent separation by grant of the dominant estate. As a result, the first element has been met. Regarding the second element, apparent continuous use, the district court wrote in its conclusions of law that there was no evidence of such use, then that there was little testimony regarding the use of the access road. However, testimony on the Millsaps' farming use of the access road at the time of separation was provided by longtime neighbor and witness for the Akers, William Reynolds as well as William A. Millsap, a witness for the Appellants and the son of W.L. and Patricia Millsaps, the common grantors. [2] This farming use was consistent with the nature of the property at the time. The testimony of the Millsaps' use of the road at the time of severance was uncontradicted and was even accepted by the district court in its findings of fact when the court stated in finding number 19 that in 1966 [t]he easement was used primarily for cultivating in May-June and haying in July-August, and in finding number 20 that the access road was used by the Millsaps about six times a year.... The district court's own findings of fact show the easement was in regular use by the Millsaps, the original grantors, at the time of severance of the dominant and servient estates. In its decision issued on reconsideration, the district court applied different reasoning, ruling that the appellants failed to show apparent continuous use of the access road because they had not proven that in 1948 the access road crossed into Parcel B. However, the time that is legally relevant to the question of apparent continuous use is the time the dominant and servient estates were severed. Davis, 133 Idaho at 642, 991 P.2d at 367. In this case, that was in 1966, not 1948. [3] Although the district court made no findings as to the location of the access road in 1948, it found that by 1966 the access road passed through Parcel B and was in regular use by the common grantors, the Millsaps. As a result, the district court's conclusion that there was no apparent continuous use by the common grantors at the time of severance is incompatible with its findings of fact and is therefore reversed. The third element requires the party claiming an implied easement from prior use to show the easement to be reasonably necessary for the proper enjoyment of the dominant estate. With respect to an implied easement from prior use, under Idaho law reasonable necessity is something less than the great present necessity required for an easement implied by necessity. Davis, 133 Idaho at 643, 991 P.2d at 368. When determining whether such reasonable necessity existed, a court does not look to the present moment, but instead determines whether reasonable necessity existed at the time the dominant and servient estates were severed. Id. at 642, 991 P.2d at 367. Once an implied easement by prior use is found to have existed at the time of severance, it is not later extinguished if the easement is no longer reasonably necessary. Id. at 643, 991 P.2d at 368. [A]n implied easement by prior use is appurtenant to the land and therefore passes with all subsequent conveyances of the dominant and servient estates. Id. In the instant case, the district court reasoned that because Vernon Mortensen testified that he recently had a back way to access his parcel A property through other property he had purchased (but since sold), the Appellants' use of the access road across the Akers' property was not reasonably necessary. The district court's finding of fact that a back way recently existed does not support its conclusion of law. The legally relevant time period for the creation of an easement implied from prior use is the time of the severance of the dominant and servient estates. Id. at 642, 991 P.2d at 367. In this case, the relevant time period would therefore be 1966, not the present day. Because the district court made no findings of fact useful to the resolution of whether in 1966 use of the access road through Parcel B was reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the dominant estate, we remand the question to the district court for additional fact finding. Because the first two elements of an easement implied from prior use have been satisfied, if such reasonable necessity is found an easement appurtenant to the dominant estate will be determined to have been established at the time of severance.