Opinion ID: 1266773
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Historical Analysis of Right of A Child Born Out of Wedlock to Inherit From Father

Text: An examination of the evolution of the right of a child born out of wedlock to inherit from his or her parents reveals a determinative fact: such right derives not from the paternity statutes, but rather from relevant court decisions and the inheritance statutes. At common law, a child born out of wedlock had no right to inherit from either parent. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 768, 97 S.Ct. 1459, 52 L.Ed.2d 31 (1977); Stone v. Gulf American Fire and Casualty Co., 554 So.2d 346, 363 (Ala.1989), cert. denied sub nom., Williams v. Stone, 496 U.S. 943, 110 S.Ct. 3229, 110 L.Ed.2d 676 (1990). Statutes were gradually enacted throughout the country, as in the case of West Virginia Code § 42-1-5 (1923) (Repl.Vol.1997), recognizing the right of a child born out of wedlock to inherit from its mother. West Virginia Code § 42-1-5 provided as follows: Bastards shall be capable of inheriting and transmitting inheritance on the part of their mother, as if lawfully begotten. In Simpson v. State Compensation Commissioner, 114 W.Va. 814, 174 S.E. 329 (1934), this Court explained that such statute had come to West Virginia through Virginia law and established beyond question that the statute conferred upon an illegitimate the same legal kinship to his mother, uterine brothers and sisters, and other blood kindred through the mother, as if he were legitimate. Id. at 816-17, 174 S.E. at 330. On April 26, 1977, the United States Supreme Court concluded that an Illinois statute, similar to the West Virginia statute, violated the principle of equal protection by denying children born out of wedlock the intestacy rights in their fathers' estates otherwise provided to legitimate offspring. Trimble, 430 U.S. at 776, 97 S.Ct. 1459. Four years later, in Adkins v. McEldowney, 167 W.Va. 469, 280 S.E.2d 231 (1981), this Court observed: Our Code, 42-1-5, restricts illegitimates' rights to a greater extent than the Illinois statute declared unconstitutional in Trimble, and so certainly the Supreme Court's rule forbids application of our statute. Id. at 471, 280 S.E.2d at 232-33. The Adkins Court then applied the doctrine of neutral extension, to permit children born out of wedlock to inherit from both mother and father. Id. at 469, 280 S.E.2d at 232, syl. pt. 2. Illegitimacy is a suspect classification entitled to strict scrutiny by our Constitution, art. III, § 17, and thus W.Va.Code, 42-1-5, as written, restricting inheritance by an illegitimate child to inheritance from his or her mother, is unconstitutionally discriminatory. Id. at 469, 280 S.E.2d 231, 280 S.E.2d at 231, syl. pt. 1. In syllabus point three of Adkins, this Court explained: Our legislature has manifested its intent to abrogate common law prohibitions against inheritance by ... [children born out of wedlock], and has given them rights of inheritance from and through their mothers. This, however, creates an impermissible discrimination that we, applying the doctrine of neutral extension, must remedy by requiring that Code, 42-1-5 be applied to permit ... [children born out of wedlock] to inherit from both mother and father. 167 W.Va. at 470, 280 S.E.2d at 232, syl. pt. 3. Recognizing the absence of any statutory guidelines for the determination of rights of a child born out of wedlock to inherit from his father, the Adkins Court suggested that [o]ur legislature may want to provide a statutory scheme compatible with our holding today, outlining how illegitimate children may prove entitlement to inherit from their fathers. Until such time as it does, trial courts must evaluate each cause on a caseby-case basis. 167 W.Va. at 473, 280 S.E.2d at 233. Our legislature did not respond to this Court's invitation in Adkins until it enacted an amended version of West Virginia Code § 42-1-5 in 1999. [4] While that statute has no applicability to the present case since the decedent died prior to its enactment, its integration into the inheritance schemes of the state is important to our analysis. [5] Prior to that 1999 statute, providing specific methodology and time limits for determining entitlement of a child born out of wedlock to inherit from the father, the applicable law was that provided by the Adkins Court:  [T]rial courts must evaluate each cause on a caseby-case basis. 167 W.Va. at 473, 280 S.E.2d at 233 (emphasis supplied). We have additional guidance from a case decided by this Court after Adkins. In Moore v. Goode, 180 W.Va. 78, 375 S.E.2d 549 (1988), this Court had further opportunity to address the right of a child born out of wedlock to inherit from the father. In discussing the distinctions among paternity, divorce, and support statutes, this Court rejected an argument that the determined father definition contained in the adoption statute would apply to assist in the resolution of the inheritance issue. We decline to hold that the legislature intended the determined father language in the adoption statute to be the means by which paternity is established for purpose of intestate succession. Id. at 84, 375 S.E.2d at 555. The Court further observed that the statutory distinctions between a determined father and an unknown father may have evolved in order to meet the due process and equal protection problems that can occur in adoption cases. Id. [6] In characterizing the nature of the civil action designed to enable inheritance from the father of a child born out of wedlock, the Court stated: We recognize that this suit is not a paternity action because Isaac N. Morris [the putative father] is deceased. [7] Id. [8] Finally, we are aided by a case heard by a Pennsylvania Superior Court. In re Estate of Greenwood, 402 Pa.Super. 536, 587 A.2d 749 (1991), appeal denied, 529 Pa. 634, 600 A.2d 953 (1991), addressed the rights of children born out of wedlock to establish paternity for inheritance purposes from one who has died prior to the institution of the proceeding, and the effect of statutes of limitation contained within a separate paternity establishment statute. The Greenwood court explained that the `right to inherit' in the case of intestacy is reserved exclusively to Chapter 21 of the Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries Code.... 587 A.2d at 752. The Pennsylvania statutes did provide somewhat more distinct guidance, in the form of a statute explicitly permitting children born out of wedlock to inherit from their fathers [9] and a general assertion that [e]xcept as herein otherwise provided, a person born out of wedlock shall have the same rights in an estate and shall be subject to such time limitations and to such procedures as are applied to any other heir or claimant against an estate. 20 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. 3538 (1978) (Supp.1990-91). However, the critical component of the Greenwood court's reasoning was its recognition that the eighteenyear statute of limitations under Section 4343(b) [the Pennsylvania paternity statute in question] is inapposite to the case at bar and cannot be made applicable to Chapter 21 of the intestate succession statute. 587 A.2d at 752. As in the case of the West Virginia paternity regimen, the Pennsylvania paternity statutes were incorporated within the Support Matters Generally section of the Pennsylvania statutory structure. Id. The Greenwood court found this fact persuasive and explained that when the chapter in which the paternity statutes appear is reviewed in its entirety, giving it a common sense interpretation, the thrust of the language is geared toward resolving the question attendant to `a duty of support.' Id. The court affirmed the lower court's holding subjecting a child born out of wedlock to the same time restraints as applied to other heirs or claimants of an estate and found as follows: From our scrutiny of the statute in question, there is no indication in the Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries Code, save for the time restraints for filing a claim with an estate before a final decree of distribution is issued, that the Legislature intended to establish a barrier to an illegitimate's right to prove paternity beyond the purported father's lifetime so as to inherit by, from and through the decedent. Id. at 752 n. 3; see also Ellis v. Ellis, 752 S.W.2d 781 (Ky.1988) (refusing to apply time limitation for support actions to inheritance determination).