Opinion ID: 2811919
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Absence of an Obvious Error

Text: The district court concluded that (1) Officer Tritschler had failed to comply with 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2012) and (2) the government had not met its burden to demonstrate another lawful reason for the arrest. Appellant’s App. at 106–07. In challenging the first conclusion, the government contends that Officer Tritschler did not need to comply with § 1357(g) because it applies only when state officers are performing “immigration officer functions.” 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2012). We agree. The federal constitution allows a state law enforcement officer to make an arrest for any crime, including federal immigration offenses. See United States v. Santana-Garcia, 264 F.3d 1188, 1193–94 (10th Cir. 2001) (in the absence of contrary state or local laws, state law enforcement officers can make arrests for violation of federal immigration laws). As a result, we must decide whether probable cause would have been obvious for an arrest on federal charges. -6- Probable cause exists when the officer has reasonably trustworthy information that would warrant a prudent person’s belief that the defendant was committing a criminal offense. United States v. Rodriguez, 739 F.3d 481, 485 n.2 (10th Cir. 2013). The parties disagree about the application of this standard to the crime of illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)). This crime is committed when  an alien,  previously removed from the United States,  is later found in the United States  without permission to reenter. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2012). We need not decide whether Officer Tritschler had probable cause. See p. 10 n.9, below. Even if he did, the district court’s error would have constituted plain error only if the existence of probable cause had been obvious. Probable cause would not have been obvious because  there was no evidence on the fourth element of illegal reentry and  we have no precedents addressing the existence of probable cause when evidence exists on some but not all of the elements of an offense. Officer Tritschler had only a report  stating that Mr. Argueta-Mejia was a felon who had previously been deported and -7-  containing an unexplained notation of “FUG.” 5 Appellant’s App. at 237. A reasonable jurist could conclude that this information did not address whether Mr. Argueta-Mejia had permission to reenter the country. The government’s insistence on probable cause is undermined by its own representations to the district court. Commenting on the routine procedure after discovery that Mr. Argueta-Mejia was a deported felon, the government stated to the district court: As I understand the process, ICE is contacted, and they pull up information on the individual that they’re contacted about. Based on that information, database checks, I believe they determine whether or not the individual is an alien, confirm the removal and determine whether or not that individual has sought or received permission to come back to the United States. If all of that information comes back, I guess affirmative, whether or not the individual is an alien or whether or not he has been previously removed from the United States, and in the negative, whether he’s received permission to return, then I believe that individual has probable cause that the violation of Title 8, United States Code, Section 1326(a) has been violated. Id. at 133–34. From this statement, the district court could have understood the government to be acknowledging the absence of probable cause until immigration officials learned whether the alien had obtained permission to reenter. Officer Tritschler did not receive this information until after the 5 Officer Tritschler acknowledged that the computer entry had not shown a warrant for Mr. Argueta-Mejia. Appellant’s App. at 176. -8- arrest. Therefore, the government’s representation to the district court would have clouded any finding that Officer Tritschler had probable cause at the time of the arrest. The government argues that one can infer the absence of permission to reenter based on the fact of a previous deportation. 6 That inference is possible, but reasonable jurists could also draw the opposite inference; the problem is that we lack any precedential decisions on probable cause without evidence addressing permission to reenter the country. 7 Even more generally, we lack precedential decisions on the necessity of probable cause for each element of a suspected crime. On that issue, the 6 In oral argument, the government argued for the first time that permission to reenter is “not that easy to come by.” Oral Arg. at 7:01-7:33. We reject this argument for two reasons. First, the argument is waived because it was raised for the first time in oral argument. See United States v. Burns, 775 F.3d 1221, 1223 n.2 (10th Cir. 2014). Second, the government has not presented any evidence, either in district court or on appeal, about the difficulties in obtaining permission to reenter or the frequency in which permission is given. In the absence of such evidence, neither our court nor the Supreme Court has ever held that a judge can rely on the infrequency of permission for reentry into the United States. Thus, we cannot base plain error on the government’s statement in oral argument that permission to reenter is “not that easy to come by.” 7 The government relies on a report (an “NCIC” alert), but has not cited any cases regarding the effect of an NCIC alert. Instead, the government relies on Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164 (2008). There the Supreme Court considered whether evidence from an arrest supported by probable cause is admissible when the arrest violated state law. Moore, 553 U.S. at 175-78. But we must determine whether the existence of probable cause was obvious, not whether an arrest supported by probable cause would have been lawful. Moore does not bear on the obviousness of probable cause from the NCIC alert. -9- circuits are divided. Compare Spiegel v. Cortese, 196 F.3d 717, 724 n.1 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that probable cause is unnecessary on each element of a crime), and Gasho v. United States, 39 F.3d 1420, 1428 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[A]n officer need not have probable cause for every element of the offense.”), with Williams v. Alexander, Ark., 772 F.3d 1307, 1312 (8th Cir. 2014) (“For probable cause to exist, there must be probable cause for all elements of the crime.”), and United States v. Joseph, 730 F.3d 336, 342 (3d Cir. 2013) (“To make an arrest based on probable cause, the arresting officer must have probable cause for each element of the offense.”). Neither our court nor the Supreme Court has weighed in on this circuit split. 8 Without precedent on the issue, we conclude that the district court did not commit a clear or obvious error in failing to find probable cause without at least some evidence on Mr. Argueta-Mejia’s permission to reenter the United States after his prior removal. 9 8 The Supreme Court has held that “[p]robable cause does not require the same type of specific evidence of each element of the offense as would be needed to support a conviction.” Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 149 (1972). But the Court has not decided whether probable cause can exist without at least some evidence on every element of a suspected crime. 9 We do not suggest how the district court should have ruled on the issue of probable cause. That issue is not before us. We hold only that under the plain-error standard, which the government asks us to apply, the existence of probable cause was not sufficiently clear and obvious to require reversal. -10-