Opinion ID: 2087744
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Discretion to Reopen the Case[3]

Text: Respondents cite a handful of cases holding that whether to reopen a case falls within the discretion of the trial court. See East Baltimore Transfer Co. v. Goeb, 140 Md. 534, 118 A. 74 (1922); Guyer v. Snyder, 133 Md. 19, 104 A. 116 (1918); Bama, Inc. v. Anne Arundel County, 53 Md.App. 14, 19-22, 451 A.2d 1261, 1264-66 (1982). Generally, these cases hold that the trial court should not be reversed for granting or denying a motion to reopen a case absent an abuse of discretion, which some of these cases have defined as improper prejudice against a party in reopening or not reopening a case. For instance, we said in Bradford v. Eutaw Savings Bank, 186 Md. 127, 131, 46 A.2d 284, 286 (1946): [A] chancellor has the power to allow defects in proof to be supplied at any time. Such action is in his discretion and is not subject to review here except where his action is arbitrary, and the rights of some of the parties are improperly affected. When, in the judgment of the chancellor, the ends of justice will be subserved, this court has said that it is his plain duty to allow further proof to come in. [Citations omitted]. See Shook v. Shook, 213 Md. 603, 612, 132 A.2d 460, 465 (1957) (noting that it is within the discretion of the trial judge whether to reopen the case, except where his action is arbitrary and the rights of some of the parties are improperly affected.); Guyer, 133 Md. at 22, 104 A. at 117 (The plaintiff had omitted to prove the judgments in the course of the trial and it was entirely within the discretion of the Court to grant the application and to permit the additional testimony to be introduced.... The nature and character of the evidence... could not have prejudiced the claimant's case, and he was not thereby injured by its admission.); Gillespie-Linton v. Miles, 58 Md.App. 484, 499-500, 473 A.2d 947, 955 (The decision to permit a party to re-open her case for the purpose of supplying additional evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial judge and will not be disturbed on appeal unless there has been an abuse of that discretion.), cert. denied, 300 Md. 794, 481 A.2d 239 (1984); Bama, 53 Md.App. at 20-21, 451 A.2d at 1265 (noting that the appellate courts seem to have amalgamated into the law side ... the more liberal rule in equity, i.e., that reversal is warranted only when the decision to reopen or not was arbitrary and some of the parties were improperly prejudiced.); cf. Brown v. Bendix Radio Div., 187 Md. 613, 621,51 A.2d 292, 295 (1947) (recognizing that courts in other jurisdictions have treated refusals by trial courts to reopen cases as an abuse of discretion). [4] Petitioner argues that it was improperly prejudicial for the District Court not to reopen the case and allow her to prove ownership of the motor vehicle and the identity of its driver, essential facts to the case, particularly when she had such evidence readily available. The cases concerning the reopening of a trial appear to distinguish between cases in which a party has made a glaring error or omission of material evidence and those in which the party seeking to reopen the case wishes to bring in trivial or supplemental evidence. This Court has rarely addressed a case in which a party moved to reopen a trial to prove an essential, but omitted, fact, and was denied the opportunity to reopen by the trial court. We have held, however, that trial judges who grant a motion to reopen in such circumstances generally act within their discretion. For instance, in East Baltimore Transfer Co., 140 Md. 534, 118 A. 74, which, as petitioner points out, is factually similar to the case sub judice, the plaintiff failed to prove who the driver of the truck that had caused the accident was, as well as who owned the truck. Noting that those facts were necessary evidence for a proper consideration of the case, the Court held that it was a proper exercise of discretion for the trial judge to reopen the case. Id. at 537, 118 A. at 75. In 1876, we noted in Trustees of the German Lutheran Evangelical St. Matthew's Congregation v. Heise, 44 Md. 453, 465 (1876), that [a]s to the power of the court to allow additional evidence to be taken, even after the cause has been submitted, that would seem to be clear, though the power is not generally exercised except in cases where, from accident or inadvertence, omissions or defects of proof have occurred, which the party could have readily supplied. (Emphasis added.) See also Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Plews, 262 Md. 442, 467-68, 278 A.2d 287, 299 (1971) (holding, inter alia, that when the plaintiff failed to lay a proper foundation for an expert's testimony, it was proper for the trial judge to reopen the case to allow counsel to lay that foundation); Bradford, 186 Md. at 131, 46 A.2d at 286 (When, in the judgment of the chancellor, the ends of justice will be subserved, this court has said that it is his plain duty to allow further proof to come in.); Guyer, 133 Md. at 22, 104 A. at 117 (In 2 Poe's Pleading and Practice, Vol. 2, it is said that cases may arise when the purposes of justice may seem to require that the application ought not to be denied, and accordingly, it is not a reversible error to permit the case to be re-opened for such purpose.). The Court of Special Appeals has held that it is an abuse of discretion not to reopen a trial when circumstances make the evidence sought to be admitted material to the party's case. In Valerino v. Little, 62 Md.App. 588, 490 A.2d 756 (1985), the trial court reversed itself on an earlier motion dismissing certain of the plaintiffs' claims, but denied the claims sub curia without hearing any evidence. The intermediate appellate court held that it was an abuse of discretion not to reopen the trial because the reversal made it necessary for the plaintiffs to prove certain evidence in support of their revived claims: We believe that, under the peculiar procedural posture of this case, the trial court abused its discretion. By reversing its initial decision [to dismiss], it became necessary to afford appellants the opportunity to present further evidence in support of their allegations of fraud, oppression or illegality.... Consequently, the court should have heard evidence on these allegations. Id. at 601, 490 A.2d at 762. Appellate courts in our sister states have also held that trial courts abuse their discretion when they refuse to allow a party to reopen a case and submit additional essential or material evidence, particularly when that evidence is omitted inadvertently. The Illinois Appellate Court has adopted four factors to aid in determining whether a case should be reopened: (1) whether the failure to introduce the evidence occurred because of inadvertence or calculated risk; (2) whether the adverse party will be surprised or unfairly prejudiced by the new evidence; (3) whether the new evidence is of the utmost importance to the movant's case; and (4) whether any cogent reason exists to justify denying the request. A-Tech Computer Services [ v. Soo Hoo ], 254 Ill.App.3d [392,] 402-03, 193 Ill.Dec. 862, 627 N.E.2d 21[, 28 (1993) ]. Polk v. Cao, 279 Ill.App.3d 101, 104, 215 Ill.Dec. 879, 664 N.E.2d 276, 279 (1996). [5] The court applied the factors to the case before it: [T]he trial court abused its discretion in denying plaintiff's request to reopen his case to introduce plaintiff's medical bills. It appears that plaintiff's counsel failed to introduce these bills ... through inadvertence.... Defendant was clearly not surprised or unfairly prejudiced by plaintiff's request to place the medical bills into evidence. Plaintiff not only testified at trial regarding his medical treatment, but also disclosed in interrogatory answers, filed more than two years before trial, that he would be seeking medical expenses at trial. Furthermore, the evidence of plaintiff's medical bills was of the utmost importance to his case since a substantial part of plaintiff's case was recovery of medical expenses. We find that no cogent reason existed to bar plaintiff from reopening his case since defendant had not yet opened his case in chief when plaintiff made his motion to reopen. Id.; see also Sugarloaf Dev. Co. v. Heber Springs Sewer Improvement Dist., 34 Ark. App. 28, 34, 805 S.W.2d 88, 92 (1991) ([E]vidence should be reopened where to do so would serve the interests of justice and cause no undue disruption of the proceedings or unfairness to the party not seeking to have it reopened.); CTB Ventures 55, Inc. v. Rubenstein, 39 Conn.App. 684, 699, 667 A.2d 1272, 1281 (1995) (In the ordinary situation where a trial court feels that, by inadvertence or mistake, there has been a failure to introduce available evidence upon a material issue in the case of such a nature that in its absence there is a serious danger of a miscarriage of justice, it may properly permit that evidence to be introduced at any time before the case has been decided. (quoting Suffield Bank v. Berman, 228 Conn. 766, 782-83, 639 A.2d 1033, 1040-41 (1994))), cert. denied, 235 Conn. 940, 669 A.2d 577 (1996); Seubert Excavators, Inc. v. Eucon Corp., 125 Idaho 409, 416-17, 871 P.2d 826, 833-34 (1994) (holding that the trial court acted within its discretion when it allowed a party to reopen the case and submit into evidence a bond, which was essential to a third-party beneficiary claim, that it had omitted before closing its case); Antley v. Brantly, 669 So.2d 685, 688-89 (La.Ct.App. 1996) (holding that the refusal of the trial judge to allow new evidence that the plaintiff would need more extensive surgery, and thus suffer more damages, was an abuse of discretion); Wakefield v. Puckett, 584 So.2d 1266, 1268 (Miss.1991) (As a general rule ... the reopening of a case for the purpose of showing facts vital to the issue involved, is liberally allowed... and a failure to do so may be considered an abuse of judicial discretion. (quoting Wells-Lamont Corp. v. Watkins, 247 Miss. 379, 387-88, 151 So.2d 600, 604 (1963))); Page v. Lewis, 902 S.W.2d 359, 361 (Mo.Ct. App.1995) ([T]here is an abuse of discretion and a new trial will be directed upon a refusal to reopen a case and permit the introduction of material evidence, that is evidence that would substantially affect the merits of the action .... (quoting Pride v. Lamberg, 366 S.W.2d 441, 445 (Mo.1963))); Metro Ins. Agency v. Mannino, 856 S.W.2d 81, 83 (Mo.Ct.App.1993) (holding that the trial court abused its discretion by denying plaintiff the chance to introduce additional evidence, then dismissing the case based on the lack of that very evidence); Ford v. Ford, 105 Nev. 672, 676, 782 P.2d 1304, 1307 (Nev.1989) (When an essential element of a party's case can be easily and readily established by reopening the case, refusal to reopen will most often constitute an abuse of discretion.); Rosen's Inc. v. Juhnke, 513 N.W.2d 575, 576 (S.D.1994) (noting that whether to reopen a case is left to the trial judge except when necessary to the due administration of justice. (quoting 75 Am. Jur.2d Trial § 379 (1991))). By contrast, most of the cases in Maryland that affirm the denial of a motion to reopen the case have dealt with motions to submit supplemental or needless evidence, or evidence that this Court, or the Court of Special Appeals, held had already been submitted through alternative means. For instance, in Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Ely, 253 Md. 254, 262-63, 252 A.2d 786, 791 (1969), an insurer sought to reopen its case and submit supplemental evidence regarding the loss deductible provision in the insurance policy. The trial judge, pointing out that the policy itself was already in evidence, denied the motion, and we held there was no abuse of discretion in that ruling. See Nicholas v. Owrutsky, 230 Md. 60, 65-66, 185 A.2d 498, 501-02 (1962) (holding that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny reopening the case to submit a contested will into evidence when the will would have cast little light on the matter at hand); Walchuck v. Harting, 224 Md. 334, 336, 167 A.2d 781, 782 (1961) (noting that no abuse of discretion occurred when the trial judge refused to allow plaintiff's counsel to submit a statement made by the plaintiff during his deposition, particularly because the counselor had an opportunity to elicit the statement during plaintiff's redirect examination and throughout the remainder of the trial). We do not interpret these latter cases to mean that a trial court must always deny a motion to reopen a case when the purpose is to submit minor or supplemental evidence. When evidence is not essential or material to the case, these cases mean that the discretion of the trial judge as to whether to reopen the case will be broader. When a party is not allowed to prove evidence that is essential to their case, generally under Rule 3-308 it would be unduly prejudicial for the trial judge not to give that party an opportunity to submit such evidence, especially if it is readily available such as apparently was so in the instant case. [6] The parties debate whether reopening the case sub judice would have unfairly prejudiced respondents. Clearly, it would have prejudiced respondents to some extent because any further evidence submitted by petitioner would have eliminated one of the defenses in their case; however, reopening the case to allow petitioner to prove who owned the motor vehicle that struck her, and who drove it, would not have unfairly prejudiced respondents. Respondents obviously knew that they were alleged to be the driver and owner of the vehicle in question. The very evidence sought to be introduced were their answers to interrogatories in which petitioner alleged respondents had admitted those very facts. More importantly, the real focus should be on petitioner's case. It was an abuse of discretion for the trial judge not to reopen the case to allow petitioner to prove facts essential to her case, particularly when the evidence was readily available to petitioner (and no trial delay would have occurred) and when respondents had made only a vague demand for strict proof that did not mention the ownership of the vehicle. In the case at bar, the trial judge's refusal to allow petitioner to prove ownership when respondents moved after the close of petitioner's evidence for judgment based on the absence of such evidence, constituted an abuse of discretion. Respondents never put petitioner on notice that they were demanding proof of ownership; thus, petitioner reasonably assumed that the ownership issue was admitted. [7] When respondents demanded proof of ownership at the close of petitioner's case, as they were entitled to do under Rule 3-308, it was an abuse of discretion not to give petitioner the opportunity to make such proof, particularly when Rule 3-308 allows for it and when petitioner apparently had the evidence readily available. See Heise, 44 Md. at 465. It was also an abuse of discretion not to allow petitioner the chance to identify the allegedly negligent driver. That evidence was omitted inadvertently by petitioner, was essential to her case, did not improperly prejudice respondents, and was readily available.