Opinion ID: 2633881
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Claims Relating to Alleged Juror Misconduct

Text: The guilt phase of the trial was completed and the jury began deliberating on Wednesday, May 17, 1989. After an evening recess, the jury reached its guilt phase verdicts the following day. On Friday, May 19, the court conducted an ex parte in camera proceeding with defense counsel, David Humphreys, who was lead counsel, and Lawrence Smith, who had been appointed as cocounsel pursuant to Keenan v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 424, 180 Cal.Rptr. 489, 640 P.2d 108. [41] Defendant was not present. Smith told the court he had learned from a fairly unimpeachable source that the jury foreman, Juror T.W., who was a medical doctor, had been overheard in a public area of the courthouse, making a statement to the effect that if he were to accept [the defense] theory of the case, ... he would be violating his Hippocratic Oath. [42] Smith explained that the person who told him of the statement did not hear the juror utter it, but rather was told of it by the person who did hear the statement. Smith provided no information concerning when the juror made the comment or when Smith learned of it. Further, Smith explained, he did not wish to reveal the source of the information at that time, because to do so would cause [him] grave personal problems to the extent that it might even give [him] a conflict of interest. The trial court and counsel recognized that if true, the circumstance that such a statement had been made might indicate serious misconduct by Juror T.W. in both discussing the merits of the case outside of jury deliberations and in relying upon improper external influences in his decisionmaking. The trial court, however, suggested that investigation of the issue might be delayed until after the penalty phase of the trial in order to avoid causing a problem for the jurors should we find out after litigation that it is [a] not-as-it-seems kind of thing. The court later reiterated its concern that immediate investigation of the report needlessly might sour the jury before it completed the case if the report ultimately proved to be incorrect. Both defense counsel agreed that prejudicing the jury was a concern. No decision concerning a course of action was reached, and the issue was put over to the next court day. On Tuesday morning, May 23, 1989, the trial court again met with defense counsel in chambers to discuss the possible juror misconduct, without defendant or the prosecutor present. Both Smith and Humphreys stated they agreed with the court's concern that questioning the jurors about the supposed statement might alienate them. The court stated it could see no detriment in postponing the investigation of the possible misconduct to avoid prejudicing the jury should it be determined that the events as reported did not happen, or that if they happened, they happened in some fashion that did not constitute misconduct. Again, no final decision was reached, and it was resolved that the issue would be further discussed with input from the prosecutor. The court thereafter reconvened in a closed session with defense counsel, defendant, the prosecutor, and court staff present. The trial court generally recounted the information Smith had disclosed, and asserted that the juror's supposed statement doesn't make a lot of sense in the form we received it, but there may be more out there. The court once again expressed its view that delaying investigation into the making of the statement would not create prejudice. The court explained that in its view, if the alleged misconduct occurred, both the guilt phase and penalty phase verdicts might be set aside. The court apparently reasoned that in light of this situation, for the time being it was preferable to defer exploring the issue of Juror T.W.'s possible misconduct. The court expressed concern that inquiring and finding that there was nothing could leave an impact on the jury that would prejudice one side or another or both. The trial court rejected the prosecutor's suggestion that an investigator interview the witnesses, because the court was concerned it will get to the jury in some fashion. The court also noted Smith might be required to become a witness in the matter, and unless and until it proved necessary to do so, the court did not want to initiate steps that might force Smith to withdraw from the case. Smith stated that in his view, if the firsthand source of the information were directly questioned concerning the statement, it was very likely that that person would claim certain privileges which would start a legal controversy and quickly become very public and blow the whole thing up. The court adjourned discussion of the matter until the afternoon in order to allow the prosecutor to consider what to recommend. That afternoon, another closed court session was held with defense counsel, defendant, the prosecutor, and court staff present. The prosecutor initially and strongly suggested that the witnesses be identified and questioned about the statement as soon as possible. He did concede, however, that it would be dangerous to start questioning the jury now. It appears the prosecutor contemplated first questioning the witnesses, and then possibly the jurors, depending on what information was gained from the witnesses. Smith stated that if he were to disclose the source of the alleged comment at this time, it would just create an impossible situation to me that I think would be a conflict of interest.... Smith then agreed to discuss the identities of the witnesses, first without the prosecutor present. Smith disclosed that the source of the information was his wife, who worked at the local newspaper, and the witness to the juror's supposed statement was a reporter for the newspaper, Angus Thomson, who was covering the trial. Smith explained that Thomson told Smith's wife about the statement in the course of a personal conversation between the two of them. Smith's difficulties arose because a condition of his wife's employment with the newspaper specified that she was not to disclose to Smith information she learned at the newspaper, and thus if Thomson were directly questioned about the supposed statement, he probably would deduce that Smith's wife had informed Smith, which in turn would jeopardize her employment and, it seemed, the Smiths' marriage. The court again stated its belief there would be no problem in proceeding with the trial of the penalty phase and deferring investigation into the statement until after that portion of the trial was completed. When Smith agreed and said this course of action was his preference, the court clarified: [M]y motivation is in the control of the integrity of these proceedings, and I don't see any damage to this Court's obligations which, quite frankly, are not to your personal situation, [but to] Mr. Rundle, the People and the law, and I don't see there is a problem with that. The court then summoned the prosecutor, summarized the new information, and again suggested that all questioning of the witnesses related to this issue be postponed until after the jury began its deliberations. Final resolution of the matter was postponed until the following morning so the prosecutor could develop any final recommendations, but the court stated its tentative plan to order that Thomson not be contacted concerning the statement, but instead to question Thomson after the jury had begun the penalty phase deliberations, and possibly to question the jurors after they reached a verdict. There is no record of any meeting the next day, May 24, 1989or for the next three weeksconcerning this matter. Consistently with the trial court's concluding remarks, however, the subject was raised again on June 15, 1989, after the jury had retired to deliberate on the penalty. The court's bailiff was called as a witness and testified he had a conversation with the reporter, Thomson, outside the courtroom after the jury had reached a guilt phase verdict, but before the verdict was announced in court. [43] The bailiff recalled mentioning to Thomson that he was surprised Juror T.W. had been chosen for this jury. The bailiff did not remember hearing a reference to the Hippocratic Oath in this conversation or at any other point during the trial, or hearing Juror T.W. or any other juror speak about the case in public. It was the bailiffs impression, in fact, that Juror T.W. was very quiet and usually hangs by himself during the whole trial. Another bailiff was called as a witness, but testified he did not recall the substance of any conversation with Thomson because he was concentrating upon monitoring the jury. Next, Thomson was called to testify. He did not remember the bailiffs comments regarding being surprised that Juror T.W. remained on the jury. He also did not remember hearing anyone speak of that juror, or hearing Juror T.W. speak of the case or the Hippocratic Oath. Thomson's answers regarding whether he heard mention of the term Hippocratic Oath were somewhat awkwardly stated, but although there was some unresolved ambiguity, a logical reading in the context of the questioning is that he had not heard anyone related to this trial employ the term. [44] Thomson was not asked whether he had spoken with Smith's wife about overhearing such a statement. Smith's wife was not called as a witness. After the questioning of Thomson concluded, the trial court stated it would question the jurors on the subject after they reached a verdict. Humphreys and the prosecutor agreed this should be done. After the jury's guilty verdict was rendered later that day, the trial court conducted another closed session during which the jurors and alternates were individually questioned concerning whether they had heard any juror talking about the case outside of the jury's deliberations. All of the jurors and alternates answered in the negative. Juror T.W. also was asked specifically whether he could recall any conversation that you may have been involved in during this trial, whether or not it involved the case, where you may have been discussing with anybody the subject of your oath as a doctor, the Hippocratic Oath. He answered, No. No, other than at which point the court interrupted and said, Not during jury deliberation. I am talking about a conversation outside the normal court proceedings. Juror T.W. then answered, Not that I can recall. Neither defense attorney accepted the trial court's invitation to approach the bench with any other questions to be posed. The issue of the supposed statement by Juror T.W. never was discussed again in the course of the trial court proceedings. On appeal, defendant contends he was denied the assistance of counsel guaranteed under the federal and state Constitutions because of a conflict of interest created by the personal difficulties faced by Smith as a result of disclosing and pursuing the issue of the alleged misconduct of Juror T.W. [45] He also contends that the trial court erred in failing to inquire into the possibility of a conflict of interest, and in conducting an inadequate investigation of the alleged juror misconduct. Finally, he contends his absence from the initial two ex parte meetings between the trial court and defense counsel violated his constitutional and statutory rights to be present during trial. As explained below, we reject each of defendant's contentions.
The Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution, made applicable to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the assistance of counsel for his defense. Similarly, article I, section 15 of our state Constitution provides that [t]he defendant in a criminal case has the right ... to have the assistance of counsel for the defendant's defense.... It has long been held that under both Constitutions, a defendant is deprived of his or her constitutional right to the assistance of counsel in certain circumstances when, despite the physical presence of a defense attorney at trial, that attorney labored under a conflict of interest that compromised his or her loyalty to the defendant. (See Glasser v. United States (1942) 315 U.S. 60, 70, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 ( Glasser); People v. Lanigan (1943) 22 Cal.2d 569, 575-576, 140 P.2d 24 [discussing former art. I, § 13 of Cal. Const., which guaranteed the defendant's right to appear and defend, in person and with counsel]; People v. Chacon (1968) 69 Cal.2d 765, 776-777, fn. 3, 73 Cal.Rptr. 10, 447 P.2d 106 ( Chacon); People v. Mroczko (1983) 35 Cal.3d 86, 104, 197 Cal.Rptr. 52, 672 P.2d 835 ( Mroczko ).) Defendant contends a conflict of interest existed in the present case and denied him his federal and state constitutional rights to counsel.
A recent decision of the United States Supreme Court, Mickens v. Taylor (2002) 535 U.S. 162, 122 S.Ct. 1237, 152 L.Ed.2d 291 ( Mickens ), clarified several aspects of the applicable law concerning the determination whether a conflict of interest acted to deny a defendant the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. In its central holding, the high court decided that in cases in which the trial court should have inquired into the possibility of a conflict of interest on the part of defense counsel but failed to do so, before reversal is warranted the defendant nonetheless must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest affected counsel's performance. ( Mickens, supra, 535 U.S. at pp. 173-174, 122 S.Ct. 1237.) As relevant to the present case, the high court also confirmed that conflict-of-interest claims are a category of ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, which, pursuant to the court's decision in Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 ( Strickland ), generally require the defendant to demonstrate (1) deficient performance by counsel, and (2) `a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.' ( Mickens, supra, 535 U.S. at p. 166, 122 S.Ct. 1237, quoting Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052.) In the context of a claim of conflict of interest, however, the deficient-performance prong of the Strickland test is satisfied by a showing that defense counsel labored under an actual conflict of interest, that is, a conflict that affected counsel's performance as opposed to a mere theoretical division of loyalties. ( Mickens, supra, 535 U.S. at p. 171, 122 S.Ct. 1237.) As to the second prongthat a defendant demonstrate prejudice in the outcome the court recognized an exception to this requirement, applicable when there exist `circumstances of [the] magnitude' of the denial of counsel entirely or during a critical stage of the proceeding. ( Id., at p. 166, 122 S.Ct. 1237.) The court acknowledged that several of its cases held that circumstances of that magnitude existed when the defendant's attorney had actively represented conflicting interests, and thus no showing of prejudice was required in such circumstances. ( Ibid.; see also United States v. Cronic (1984) 466 U.S. 648, 659, fn. 26, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657.) Those earlier cases established what has become known as a presumption of prejudice that would relieve the defendant of the otherwise applicable burden of demonstrating a reasonable probability that the conflict affected the outcome of the trial. (See Glasser, supra, 315 U.S. 60, 76, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680; Cuyler v. Sullivan (1980) 446 U.S. 335, 349-350, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 ( Sullivan ).) In determining whether a defendant has demonstrated the existence of an actual conflict of interest satisfying the first prong of the analysis, we consider whether the record shows that counsel `pulled his punches,' i.e., failed to represent defendant as vigorously as he might have had there been no conflict. ( People v. Easley (1988) 46 Cal.3d 712, 725, 250 Cal. Rptr. 855, 759 P.2d 490 ( Easley ).) And yet we must bear in mind, as we observed in People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 674, 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 360, 110 P.3d 289 ( Roldan), that when `a conflict of interest causes an attorney not to do something, the record may not reflect such an omission. We must therefore examine the record to determine (i) whether arguments or actions omitted would likely have been made by counsel who did not have a conflict of interest, and (ii) whether there may have been a tactical reason (other than the asserted conflict of interest) that might have caused any such omission.' Defendant contends that his attorneys labored under an actual conflict of interest that adversely affected their performance in two general respects: first, their decision to agree to delay investigation into the alleged statement until the end of the trial, and second, their handling of the inquiry when the witnesses and jurors ultimately were questioned. We find it unnecessary to determine whether the decision to delay the inquiry was a reasonable tactical choice by counsel or a result of divided loyalties, because we agree with defendant that counsel pulled their punches during the questioning of the witnesses. Although Smith's report was multiplelevel hearsay, some pieces of known informationthat Juror T.W., the jury foreman, was a medical doctor and possibly undertook the Hippocratic Oath at some point in his careerfit with the specifics of the statement as recounted by Smith, affording some indication of reliability. Moreover, despite the trial court's view that the statement, taken literally, did not make a lot of sense, it is reasonably possible to discern a meaning behind the words: for example, that the juror felt an obligation to society to protect it from a confessed killer such as defendant, quite apart from the juror's view of the evidence presented at the trial. [46] Indeed, the trial court repeatedly mentioned the possibility that confirmation of the report might lead it to declare a mistrial as to both the guilt and penalty phases. In light of the foregoing, there appears to be no reasonable explanation for defense counsel's ultimate failure to ask news reporter Thomson specifically whether he told Smith's wife about the alleged statement by Juror T.W., other than the desire to protect Smith's personal interest in not publicly exposing his wife as the source of the report. It seems unlikely that if Smith had learned of the alleged statement from an acquaintance who had a casual conversation with Thomson on the streetinstead of from Smith's own wife, who allegedly had a confidential conversation with Thomson in connection with her employmentThomson would not have been pointedly questioned about the conversation, even in light of the denials offered at the hearing by the other percipient witnesses. We doubt that unconflicted counsel would have ended the investigation of this potentially serious allegation of juror misconduct without asking more direct and probing questions of the witness who supposedly had heard the alleged statement. The Attorney General observes that defendant at all times was represented by two attorneys, and contends the record on appeal does not establish that defendant's other counsel, Humphreys, labored under a conflict of interest. We disagree. Even assuming we could consider separately the actions of Humphreys from those of Smith such that Smith's conflict would not automatically taint the entire defense team's handling of the juror misconduct issue, we believe Humphreys's sense of loyalty to his cocounsel was sufficient to create an actual division of loyalties on his part when viewed in light of the unreasonable failure of either counsel adequately to explore with Thomson the statement attributed to Juror T.W. Attorneys Humphreys and Smith at that time had worked together on defendant's case for more than one and a half years. Smith spoke repeatedly of the serious personal difficulties he perceived he would face if the source of his information were publicly exposed, and he and the trial court mentioned that he even might be required to withdraw from the case, depending upon how the matter was handled. (See Roldan, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 726-727, 27 Cal. Rptr.3d 360, 110 P.3d 289.) Under these circumstances, we believe the record demonstrates that Humphreys also labored under an actual conflict of interest. In sum, we conclude defense counsel's questioning of Thomson was inadequate compared to what reasonable and unconflicted counsel would have done, was a result of Smith's predicament and both attorneys' desire not to exacerbate it, and could not have been based upon a strategic choice regarding how best to protect defendant's rights. Defendant therefore has demonstrated that an actual conflict of interest affected counsels' performance. Turning to the second prong of the analysisthe question of prejudice arising from this actual conflict of interestwe conclude no presumption of prejudice should be applied in this case, and, further, the appellate record does not demonstrate a reasonable probability that, absent the conflict of interest, the result of the trial would have been different. As the Attorney General observes, dictum in Mickens expressed some uncertainty concerning the circumstances in which a presumption of prejudice should be applied. The court observed that its previous conflict of interest cases ( Glasser, supra, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680; Holloway v. Arkansas (1978) 435 U.S. 475, 489-490, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426; Sullivan, supra, 446 U.S. 335, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333), in which a showing of prejudice to the outcome was not required, all involved situations in which a single defense attorney represented jointly charged defendants. The court further observed that despite this common factual underpinning, lower courts had applied the presumption of prejudice `unblinkingly' to `all kinds of alleged attorney ethical conflicts,' even though the language of Sullivan itself does not clearly establish, or indeed even support, such expansive application. ( Mickens, supra, 535 U.S. at pp. 174, 175, 122 S.Ct. 1237.) The court stated that whether the presumption properly would be applied to other conflicts remains, as far as the jurisprudence of this Court is concerned, an open question. ( Id. at p. 175, 122 S.Ct. 1237.) In evaluating claims of Sixth Amendment violation based upon conflicts of interest, we in the past have stated that the presumption of prejudice would be applicable in a variety of factual circumstances, including matters in which, as in the present case, it was alleged that the personal interests of the attorney conflicted with those of the defendant. (See, e.g., People v. Dunkle (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861, 914, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 23, 116 P.3d 494 ( Dunkle ) [conflict based upon possibility that the attorney might be a defense witness]; Roldan, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 674, 27 Cal. Rptr.3d 360, 110 P.3d 289 [conflict based upon defense attorney having been threatened by the defendant]; Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 998, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183 [conflict based upon defense attorney's upcoming suspension from the practice of law]; May field, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 206, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 852 P.2d 331 [conflict based upon defense attorney's financial and reputational interests].) The only cases in which we have had occasion to actually apply the presumption, however, have involved, like the high court's cases, joint representation of codefendants by a single attorney. (See Easley, supra, 46 Cal.3d 712, 250 Cal.Rptr. 855, 759 P.2d 490; Mroczko, supra, 35 Cal.3d 86, 197 Cal.Rptr. 52, 672 P.2d 835; see also Chacon, supra, 69 Cal.2d at 767, 73 Cal.Rptr. 10, 447 P.2d 106.) In all other cases in which we mentioned the presumption of prejudice in the recitation of the applicable law, we concluded that the defendant failed to establish that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected counsel's performance; that is, we determined `the constitutional predicate for [the] claim of ineffective assistance' was lacking. ( Mickens, supra, 535 U.S. at p. 175, 122 S.Ct. 1237, quoting Sullivan, supra, 446 U.S. at p. 350, 100 S.Ct. 1708.) Our past decisions, therefore, do not constitute controlling authority concerning the question whether the presumption of prejudice applies to all or only some conflict of interest situations, and we are especially reluctant to interpret those holdings broadly here, in light of the skepticism expressed by the high court in Mickens concerning an expansive application of the presumption. As the high court pointed out in Mickens, the presumption of prejudice is a prophylactic measure established to address situations where Strickland itself is evidently inadequate to assure vindication of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. ( Mickens, supra, 535 U.S. at p. 176, 122 S.Ct. 1237.) Only when the court concludes that the possibility of prejudice and the corresponding difficulty in demonstrating such prejudice are sufficiently great compared to other more customary assessments of the detrimental effects of deficient performance by defense counsel, must the presumption be applied in order to safeguard the defendant's fundamental right to the effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. ( Mickens, at p. 175, 122 S.Ct. 1237.) We conclude that the Strickland standard is not inadequate in this case, and, accordingly, no presumption of prejudice is called for. Defendant does not contend that the conflict affected his counsel's performance related to their conduct of the trial itself, apart from counsel's reaction to the juror misconduct issue in question. As a result, the complained-of shortcomings of counsel in this case are fundamentally different from those found in typical conflict-of-interest situations. In most conflict cases, in which a conflict of interest affected the presentation of the defense case to the jury, the problem in assessing prejudice to the outcome of the proceeding has arisen from the reviewing court's difficulty in evaluating how extensively the conflict affected counsel's choices and, ultimately, in predicting how the presence or absence of certain evidence or arguments at trial would have affected the jury's deliberations and verdict. In the present case, we must examine how counsel's conflict affected the resolution of the allegation of juror misconduct and the possibility of defendant's moving for and receiving a mistrial on that basis. [47] This determination does not pose the same level of difficulty as attempting to gauge the effect of a conflict upon how counsel conducted the defense case at trial, and further to predict how a jury would have reacted if counsel had put forth a different defense. Rather, it essentially involves a factual determination of whether any misconduct occurred and, if so, a legal determination of whether such misconduct would have provided grounds for moving for and granting a mistrial. Accordingly, we cannot say that any difficulty in assessing the prejudice resulting from the type of conflict of interest at issue in this case is so great that the Strickland standard is inadequate. We therefore conclude we should not apply the prophylactic presumption of prejudice under these circumstances. We further conclude, based upon the appellate record, that defendant has not carried his burden of demonstrating a reasonable probability he would have received a more favorable outcome were it not for his counsel's conflict of interest that is, of demonstrating that more extensive questioning of the witnesses would have uncovered sufficient grounds to support the making and granting of a motion for a mistrial. Smith revealed to the court the reported statement and his concerns surrounding it. Other than Smith's unsworn statements and possibly Juror T.W.'s half-statement that he had spoken of the Hippocratic Oath at some point, the evidence in the appellate record, including a logical reading of Thomson's testimony, strongly contradicts the allegation that Juror T.W. made the statement in question. We also cannot determine at this time whether, even if Juror T.W. did make the statement as reported, such action constituted misconduct, or if it did, that it would warrant a mistrial. Similarly, even were we to assume that counsel's decisions to delay investigation of Smith's report and not to call Smith's wife as a witness at the hearing also were products of a conflict of interest, there is nothing in the record before us establishing that a different course of action would have exposed any more convincing evidence of misconduct. Therefore, based upon this record, we conclude there is no reasonable probability that, absent the conflict, defendant would have received a more favorable outcome specifically, a ruling by the trial court granting a mistrial based upon juror misconduct. [48]
As noted, the California Constitution provides that a defendant is guaranteed the right to have the assistance of counsel for the defendant's defense. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.) We long have recognized that under state law, [t]he right to counsel is a fundamental constitutional right, which has been carefully guarded by the courts of this state. ( In re James (1952) 38 Cal.2d 302, 310, 240 P.2d 596.) We also have characterized our state provision as calling for a somewhat more rigorous standard of review of conflict-of-interest claims compared with the analysis employed in the Sixth Amendment context. ( Mroczko, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 104, 197 Cal.Rptr. 52, 672 P.2d 835.) Although the federal Constitutionregardless of whether a presumption of prejudice appliesrequires proof of an actual conflict of interest, that is, proof that counsel's conflict adversely affected his or her performance during the proceedings ( Mickens, supra, 535 U.S. at p. 172, fn. 5, 122 S.Ct. 1237), under the state Constitution we have required only that the record support an informed speculation that a potential conflict of interest impaired the defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel. ( Mroczko, supra, 35 Cal.3d 86, 105, 197 Cal.Rptr. 52, 672 P.2d 835; see Chacon, supra, 69 Cal.2d at 767, 776-777, fn. 3, 73 Cal.Rptr. 10, 447 P.2d 106, citing Lollar v. United States (D.C.Cir.1967) 376 F.2d 243, 247 ( Lollar ).) [49] Because a conflict of interest may retard counsel's development of evidence or arguments in support of the defense and possibly even evidence of the conflict itselfwe have retained this stricter standard in order to closely guard the fundamental right to the assistance of counsel. The very failure to produce or emphasize such information ... produces a void and results in a record which shields the fact of any possible conflict and makes it difficult to demonstrate on appeal that a conflict did in fact exist. [Citation.] Accordingly, a [defendant] ... need not establish that there was an actual conflict of interest, but rather it is sufficient if the record provides an adequate basis for an `informed speculation' that there was a potential conflict of interest which prejudicially affected the defendant's right to effective counsel. [Citations.] [¶] Permissible speculation giving rise to a conflict of interest may be deemed an informed speculation but only when such is grounded on a factual basis which can be found in the record. ( People v. Cook (1975) 13 Cal.3d 663, 670-671, 119 Cal.Rptr. 500, 532 P.2d 148.) We apply a standard stricter than that applied under the federal Constitution for determining the existence of a conflict of interest, but our ultimate resolution of defendant's state constitutional claim is no different from the resolution of his federal claim. As already discussed with regard to the determination whether an actual conflict of interest exists under the federal test, the record supports an informed speculation that a potential conflict of interest impaired defendant's right to the effective assistance of counsel. Smith's desire to avoid the public disclosure of his wife as the source of the report, as well as Humphreys's desire not to cause serious personal difficulties for Smith and to avoid Smith's possible withdrawal, created the potential for divided loyalties. As also discussed above, the record additionally supports an informed speculation that counsel pulled punches because of these conflicts, as reflected in the manner in which counsel pursued the issue with news reporter Thomson during the hearing conducted at the conclusion of the trial. We conclude, however, that, as under Sixth Amendment standards, no presumption of prejudice is appropriate under state law under the circumstances of this case. We further conclude, based upon the appellate record, that defendant has not carried his burden of demonstrating he was prejudiced by the perceived conflict, including, if we assume them to be conflicted actions, counsel's decisions to delay the investigation and not to question Smith's wife. Counsel's conflicts did not affect the presentation of the defense case to the jury. Moreover, defendant has not established that Juror T.W. made the statement attributed to him by Attorney Smith, or that even if he did make some statement pertaining to the Hippocratic Oath, this constituted misconduct that would have warranted moving for, and being granted, a mistrial. [50]
Defendant contends the trial court violated its duty under Wood v. Georgia (1981) 450 U.S. 261, 272, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 67 L.Ed.2d 220 to conduct an investigation into the possibility that Attorney Smith may have been laboring under a conflict of interest, before it decided to delay its inquiry into the alleged juror misconduct and to proceed with the penalty phase of the trial. We disagree. Although, with the benefit of hindsight, we have concluded above that defendant's attorneys were affected by an actual conflict of interest in the manner in which they conducted their examination of the witnesses at the hearing, we do not believe the circumstances impose[d] upon the court a duty to inquire further into the possibility of a conflict of interest. ( Wood, supra, 450 U.S. at p. 272, 101 S.Ct. 1097.) When the allegation of juror misconduct was raised, the possibility of a conflict of interest as to Smith was openly discussed by the court and counsel, with defendant present at the later discussions. Smith, in fact, eventually revealed the source of his information and explained the particular difficulties he faced, despite his earlier reluctance to do so. Moreover, there is no evidence, and not even an allegation by defendant, that any conflict had an impact on how the defense case was presented to the jury. The conflict of interest concerned only the collateral issue of whether jury misconduct had occurred, an issue the trial court thought could be adequately explored at the conclusion of the trial, at which time Smith recused himself and Humphreys took charge of the matter for the defense. It is unclear what would have been accomplished by a further inquiry by the trial court into the possibility of a conflict of interest of counsel, and we therefore conclude that no duty to inquire was breached. Defendant also contends the trial court's investigation of the possible juror misconduct was inadequate and thereby deprived him of his right to a fair and impartial jury under the federal and state Constitutions. The existing record, however, shows neither misconduct nor bias on the part of Juror T.W. (or any other juror) and, in fact, strongly contradicts any such claim. There simply is no indication that the jury was not fair and impartial. To the extent defendant claims the trial court abused its discretion concerning how it chose to determine whether Juror T.W. engaged in misconduct or was biased, we disagree. (See People v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598, 676, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 441, 28 P.3d 175 [specific procedures to follow in investigating an allegation of juror misconduct are generally a matter for the trial court's discretion]; see also People v. Burgener (1986) 41 Cal.3d 505, 520, 224 Cal.Rptr. 112, 714 P.2d 1251 [Failure to conduct a hearing sufficient to determine whether good cause to discharge [a] juror exists is an abuse of discretion subject to appellate review.].) The record demonstrates that the court at all times properly was concerned with avoiding the possibility that the jury foreman would be erroneously accused of misconductand the jury thereby prejudiced in some manner based upon uncertain information, and the court's cautious choice of how to avoid this consequence while still adequately addressing the allegation was within the bounds of reason. (See People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 666, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 26, 919 P.2d 640.)
Defendant was not present during the first two ex parte in camera hearings concerning Smith's report of the alleged misconduct on the part of Juror T.W. He contends on appeal that his absence from these proceedings violated his federal and state constitutional rights, as well as state statutory law. As a constitutional matter, a criminal defendant accused of a felony has the right to be present at every critical stage of the trial. ( Illinois v. Allen (1970) 397 U.S. 337, 338, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353.) The right derives from the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution and the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and article I, section 15 of the California Constitution. ( Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 1010, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183.) A critical stage of the trial is one in which a defendant's `absence might frustrate the fairness of the proceedings' ( Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806, 819, fn. 15, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562) or whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge' ( Snyder v. Massachusetts (1934) 291 U.S. 97, 105-106, 54 S.Ct. 330, 78 L.Ed. 674). ( Rodriguez, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 260, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 334, 949 P.2d 31.) The ex parte meetings between the trial court and defense counsel concerning Juror T.W.'s alleged statement, at which defendant was not present, were not critical stages of the trial for constitutional purposes, because they were merely exploratory discussions concerning the potential problem of juror misconduct and possible courses of action that might be taken to resolve that issue. Defendant, in arguing to the contrary, relies primarily upon the three-judge-panel decision in Campbell v. Rice (9th Cir.2002) 302 F.3d 892. After completion of briefing in the present appeal, the Campbell opinion was vacated by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision to order an en banc rehearing of the appeal. ( Campbell v. Rice (9th Cir.2004) 386 F.3d 1258.) The court's subsequent en banc decision declined to determine whether error occurred, instead concluding that the California Court of Appeal was not unreasonable in holding that any error resulting from the defendant's absence while the trial court and counsel discussed a possible conflict of interest was harmless. ( Campbell v. Rice (9th Cir.2005) 408 F.3d 1166, 1172-1173 (en banc).) Even to the extent the three-judge opinion might carry some persuasive value, however, the Campbell case is factually distinguishable. In the present case, no final decisions were made during the meetings in question, and the information possessed by the court and defense counsel and their contemplated course of action subsequently were conveyed to defendant (and the prosecutor) in the closed court sessions before any course of action was determined. (Cf. Campbell, supra, 302 F.3d at p. 899 [the in-chambers hearing held to determine whether Campbell's right to conflict-free counsel had been violated must have been a critical stage of the criminal proceedings (italics added)].) There is no indication in the case before us that defendant's presence during the preliminary meetings held between the court and defense counsel was necessary to ensure the fairness of the proceedings or that defendant's absence in any way affected his defense. Indeed, the record reflects that defendant was present during the several discussions that subsequently took place concerning the subjects of the alleged misconduct and Smith's possible conflict of interest, and never sought to add his personal input into the decision-making process. Accordingly, defendant's constitutional right to be present was not violated by his absence at the earlier meetings. Turning to defendant's statutory claims, we have long held that the presence requirement under sections 977 and 1043 is similar to that of the constitutional provisions: under the statutes, a defendant `is not entitled to be personally present during proceedings which bear no reasonable, substantial relation to his opportunity to defend the charges against him.... [Citation.] [Citation.]' [Citations.] ( Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 855, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 141 P.3d 135; see also People v. Kelly (2007) 42 Cal.4th 763, 781-782, 68 Cal.Rptr.3d 531, 171 P.3d 548; People v. Ervin (2000) 22 Cal.4th 48, 74, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 623, 990 P.2d 506; People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1357, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259; People v. Beardslee (1991) 53 Cal.3d 68, 103, 279 Cal.Rptr. 276, 806 P.2d 1311; People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264, 309, 168 Cal.Rptr. 603, 618 P.2d 149.) Therefore, essentially for the same reasons we have articulated above in finding that defendant's constitutional right to be present was not violated, we conclude he has not established a violation of the statuteshis personal presence at the in camera hearings did not bear a reasonable, substantial relation to his opportunity to defend the charges against him. Even to the extent that defendant contends the statutory requirement is broader than the constitutional right to be personally present, there is no reasonable probability that a result more favorable to defendant would have been reached had he been personally present at the in camera discussions. Accordingly, any error would in no sense be prejudicial under Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at page 836, 299 P.2d 243. (See Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 968, 111 Cal. Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103.)