Opinion ID: 2614001
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admissibility of defendant's postarrest statements

Text: Defendant contends that his question, postarrest, Did you say I could have a lawyer? constituted an invocation of his right to counsel, and that the trial court erred in ruling that subsequent statements made by him in the course of police interrogation were not obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 10 A.L.R.3d 974]. At the preliminary hearing, defendant moved to exclude evidence of his statements based upon this alleged violation of Miranda ; after the motion was denied, he renewed it prior to trial, again relying upon the evidence received at the preliminary hearing. In support of his motion, defendant presented the following evidence: at approximately 3 p.m. on January 21, 1987, three police officers went to defendant's apartment for the purpose of serving a search warrant as to the premises and an arrest warrant on defendant. Not finding defendant at home, they proceeded to search the residence. Defendant arrived and entered the apartment, but upon discovering one of the officers, and being informed he was under arrest, defendant began backing out of the apartment. The other two officers, summoned by the third, grabbed defendant's arms, held him against the outer wall of the apartment, and handcuffed him, informing him he was under arrest for murder. Defendant, who struggled during the arrest, was placed stomach down on the floor of the apartment. One of the officers began reciting the Miranda warnings, but was interrupted several times by defendant, who was agitated and loud. At one point, the officer told defendant to shut up so the officer could read him his rights. Defendant repeatedly asked why he was being arrested. Defendant was informed several times that he was being arrested for the murder of the Chiapellas, and at one point the officer referred to the occurrence of the murders on Tuesday of the previous week. Defendant responded he had an alibi for that date, because he and his girlfriend had been at a party all day. The officer cautioned defendant that the police would check it out. The officer read the advisements concerning defendant's right to remain silent, that anything he said could and would be used against him in a court of law, of his right to an attorney before any questioning, if he wished, and to have an attorney appointed if he could not afford to hire one, and that if you decide at any time to exercise your rights and not answer any of the questions or make any statements  and I gave up at that point. Defendant then said, Did you say I could have a lawyer? The officer told him, yes, if he wanted one. Defendant did not respond and remained silent. The police did not ask defendant any questions at that time. Defendant was transported to the Chico Police Department and, on the same day (January 21), at approximately 8 p.m., the police read to defendant the full Miranda advisements, including his right to have counsel present during questioning and to have counsel appointed in the event defendant could not afford an attorney. Defendant also was asked whether he understood and wished to waive his rights, and proceeded to waive them. Near the conclusion of that interview, at approximately 8:40 p.m., defendant asked to use the telephone. An officer told him he could do so, but forgot to comply with defendant's request. A second interview was conducted from 9:10 p.m. to 10:08 p.m. At the end of the second interview, when asked whether he had any questions, defendant asked when a lawyer would be appointed for him, and an officer told him that would occur during arraignment. Both interviews were tape-recorded in total. [5] The statements that defendant sought to exclude were in the nature of admissions. In addition to making exculpatory statements denying he had committed the murders or ever had been to the Chiapellas' residence, defendant attempted to explain his cashing of a check made out to him by Katherine in the amount of $3,000 on the day following the murders. He asserted that on January 9, 1987, as on a number of prior occasions during the fall of 1986 and the early part of 1987, he had been paid by Katherine Chiapella to perform sexual acts. Defendant claimed he and Katherine had gone to a particular room at the Thunderbird Lodge. Defendant reported that on this occasion, as well as on others, sexual devices were employed, which Katherine transported in the trunk of her vehicle. Defendant also claimed that he had borrowed his roommate's knife in order to fix his own stereo antenna, and insisted that for a number of months he had not worn the bloodstained shoes found at his apartment. The trial court determined beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant's statements were voluntarily made.
(10a) As an initial matter, the Attorney General contends that, by failing to renew the Miranda motion in Placer County, defendant waived the issue. Defendant unsuccessfully moved, during his preliminary hearing in 1987, to exclude his statements on the ground they were obtained in violation of Miranda. In March 1988, prior to the commencement of trial in Butte County, defendant renewed his motion to exclude the statements on Miranda grounds. The court denied the motion. In March 1989, following the change of venue to Placer County, defendant again moved to suppress these statements, this time on the ground that the probability that their admission would prejudice defendant substantially outweighed their probative value. (Evid. Code, § 352.) Although at that time defendant did not renew his objection expressly on the basis of Miranda, the Placer County judge observed, after the prosecutor advised him that the judge in Butte County already had ruled upon the admissibility of the statements, that the Butte County court expressly had ruled that Miranda did not bar admission of the statements. The Placer County judge then stated that the only remaining questions were whether the statements were relevant and whether they should be sanitized, and defense counsel agreed with this assessment. [6] Defendant did not specifically renew his objection at the time the statements were admitted into evidence. We conclude that, under the circumstances described above, defendant did not waive the Miranda issue. (11) It is true that a judgment will not be reversed on the ground that evidence has been admitted erroneously, unless `there appears of record an objection to or a motion to exclude or to strike the evidence that was timely made and so stated as to make clear the specific ground of the objection or motion. ...' ( People v. Mattson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 826, 853-854 [268 Cal. Rptr. 802, 789 P.2d 983], italics in Mattson, quoting Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a).) Specificity is required both to enable the court to make an informed ruling on the motion or objection and to enable the party proffering the evidence to cure the defect in the evidence. [Citations.] ( People v. Mattson, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 854.)  Miranda -based claims are governed by this rule. `The general rule is that a defendant must make a specific objection on Miranda grounds at the trial level in order to raise a Miranda claim on appeal.' ( Ibid., quoting People v. Milner (1988) 45 Cal.3d 227, 236 [246 Cal. Rptr. 713, 753 P.2d 669] [pretrial motion was not pursued to obtain a ruling]; People v. Rogers (1978) 21 Cal.3d 542, 548 [146 Cal. Rptr. 732, 579 P.2d 1048]; see also People v. Visciotti (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 54 [5 Cal. Rptr.2d 495, 825 P.2d 388]; People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 519 [3 Cal. Rptr.2d 677, 822 P.2d 385].) (12) In addition, we have held that a pretrial ruling on a claimed violation of a defendant's Fifth Amendment rights is subject to reconsideration by the trial court, and an objection on Fifth Amendment grounds to the admissibility of the evidence is waived if not made at trial when the evidence is offered. ( People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1005 [254 Cal. Rptr. 586, 766 P.2d 1]; cf. People v. Jennings (1988) 46 Cal.3d 963, 975-976 [251 Cal. Rptr. 278, 760 P.2d 475] [issue preserved through stipulation that earlier ruling would be binding at new trial]; People v. Boyer (1989) 48 Cal.3d 247, 270-271, fn. 13 [256 Cal. Rptr. 96, 768 P.2d 610] [issue preserved because Miranda claim tied to binding ruling, pursuant to § 1538.5, that no detention occurred, so that objection at trial would have been futile].) (10b) Nonetheless, in People v. Morris, supra, 53 Cal.3d 152, 189-190, we concluded that if a motion to exclude evidence is made raising a specific objection, directed to a particular, identifiable body of evidence, at the beginning of or during trial at a time when the trial judge can determine the evidentiary question in its appropriate context, the issue is preserved for appeal without the need for a further objection at the time the evidence is sought to be introduced. In the present case, all three criteria are met, although the motion was made prior to trial. Moreover, as was the case in Morris, no event occurred after the in limine ruling and before the evidence was received at trial that so changed the context as to constitute a basis for reconsideration of the ruling. ( Id. at p. 189.) In addition, in People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 549-550 [280 Cal. Rptr. 631, 809 P.2d 290], we relied upon Morris to conclude that, because the three criteria outlined in Morris were met, the defendant had not waived the issue in question for purposes of appeal where, in a pretrial motion, the defendant had moved to exclude evidence based upon the psychotherapist-patient privilege and did not object at trial to admission of the evidence on that ground. Further, in People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41 [10 Cal. Rptr.2d 554, 833 P.2d 561], we considered whether the defendant, having made a motion and having obtained a hearing pretrial on the issue whether to exclude his statements pursuant to Miranda, was entitled to another hearing on the Miranda issue during the trial. We concluded the defendant was not entitled to a second hearing, based in part upon the reasoning of Morris that such in limine hearings concerning the admissibility of evidence should be conducted separately, prior to the introduction of evidence at trial. ( Id. at p. 119.) In the present case, the comments of the Placer County judge suggest he considered the ruling of the earlier judge to be binding. Moreover, it would appear inconsistent to require that defendant renew his objection to such evidence at trial or lose his right to raise the issue on appeal, while concluding, nevertheless, that he is not entitled to any further hearing on the objection. (See People v. Clark, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 119.) Because we have held a defendant is not obligated to renew a pretrial motion that is based upon a statutory privilege, it would be anomalous to subject a defendant raising a claim arising under the Constitution to a different rule. Accordingly, we conclude defendant preserved this issue for appeal.
(13) We recently have observed that `[t]he scope of our review of constitutional claims of this nature is well established. We must accept the trial court's resolution of disputed facts and inferences, and its evaluations of credibility, if they are substantially supported. [Citations.] However, we must independently determine from the undisputed facts, and those properly found by the trial court, whether the challenged statement was illegally obtained. [Citation.]' ( People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 25 [23 Cal. Rptr.2d 593, 859 P.2d 673]; People v. Boyer, supra, 48 Cal.3d 247, 263.) (14) As we stated in People v. Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th 405, 440 [20 Cal. Rptr.2d 537, 853 P.2d 992], [u]nder the familiar requirements of Miranda, designed to assure protection of the federal Constitution's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination under `inherently coercive' circumstances, a suspect may not be subjected to custodial interrogation unless he or she knowingly and intelligently has waived the right to remain silent, to the presence of an attorney, and to appointed counsel in the event the suspect is indigent. (Citing Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 444-445, 473-474 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 706-707, 722-723].) Once having invoked these rights, the accused `is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.' (5 Cal.4th at p. 440, citing Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 484-485 [68 L.Ed.2d 378, 385-386, 101 S.Ct. 1880]; see also McNeil v. Wisconsin (1990) 501 U.S. 171, 176-177 [115 L.Ed.2d 158, 167-168, 111 S.Ct. 2204]; Arizona v. Roberson (1988) 486 U.S. 675, 680-682 [100 L.Ed.2d 704, 712-714, 108 S.Ct. 2093]; Michigan v. Mosley (1975) 423 U.S. 96, 104, fn. 10 [46 L.Ed.2d 313, 321, 96 S.Ct. 321].) If, subsequently, assuming there is no break in custody, the police initiate a meeting in the absence of counsel, the suspect's statements are presumed involuntary and are inadmissible as substantive evidence at trial, even if the suspect executes a waiver and the statements would be considered voluntary under traditional standards. ( McNeil v. Wisconsin, supra, 501 U.S. 171, 176-177 [115 L.Ed.2d 158, 167-168]; see Michigan v. Harvey (1990) 494 U.S. 344, 350 [108 L.Ed.2d 293, 302, 110 S.Ct. 1176].) If a suspect indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process, prior to or during questioning, that he or she wishes to consult with an attorney, the defendant may not be interrogated. ( Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 444-445 [16 L.Ed.2d at pp. 706-707], italics added; id. at pp. 470, 472-474, 477-479 [16 L.Ed.2d at pp. 721, 722-724, 725-727]; People v. Burton (1971) 6 Cal.3d 375, 383-384 [99 Cal. Rptr. 1, 491 P.2d 793]; see People v. Johnson, supra, 6 Cal.4th 1, 27; People v. Boyer, supra, 48 Cal.3d 247, 271.) We have observed previously that no particular form of words or conduct is necessary on the part of a suspect in order to invoke his or her right to remain silent ( People v. Randall (1970) 1 Cal.3d 948, 955 [83 Cal. Rptr. 658, 464 P.2d 114]), and the suspect may invoke this right by any words or conduct reasonably inconsistent with a present willingness to discuss the case freely and completely. ( People v. Burton, supra, 6 Cal.3d 375, 382.) Earlier decisions of this court and the Courts of Appeal have indicated that a request for counsel need not be unequivocal in order to preclude questioning by the police. (See People v. Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 950, 990 [22 Cal. Rptr.2d 689, 857 P.2d 1099]; People v. Thompson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 134, 165 [266 Cal. Rptr. 309, 785 P.2d 857]; People v. Randall, supra, 1 Cal.3d 948, 955.) As we stated in People v. Johnson, supra, 6 Cal.4th 1, 27-28, California decisions have concluded that a defendant may invoke the constitutional right to counsel by such diverse statements or questions as: `Do you think we need an attorney?' and `I guess we need a lawyer' ( People v. Superior Court ( Zolnay ) (1975) 15 Cal.3d 729, 735-736 [125 Cal. Rptr. 798, 542 P.2d 1390]); `Tell me the truth, wouldn't it be best if I had an attorney with me?' ( People v. Hinds (1984) 154 Cal. App.3d 222, 234 [201 Cal. Rptr. 104]); `I don't know if I should have a lawyer here or what....' ( People v. Russo (1983) 148 Cal. App.3d 1172, 1176-1177 [196 Cal. Rptr. 466]); and `Well, maybe I should talk to my attorney, Mr. Corbin' ( People v. Munoz (1978) 83 Cal. App.3d 993, 995-996 [148 Cal. Rptr. 165]). (15a) Defendant relies upon these and similar California decisions in contending that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his statements to the police. (16) Nonetheless, as we previously have recognized, subsequent to the adoption of article I, section 28, subdivision (d) of the California Constitution, we apply federal standards in reviewing a defendant's claim that his or her statements were elicited in violation of Miranda. ( People v. Sims, supra, 5 Cal.4th 405, 440; People v. Markham (1989) 49 Cal.3d 63, 67-71 [260 Cal. Rptr. 273, 775 P.2d 1042].) Subsequent to its decision in Edwards, the United States Supreme Court observed that [t]he rule of [ Edwards ] applies only when the suspect `ha[s] expressed' his wish for the particular sort of lawyerly assistance that is the subject of Miranda. [Citation.] It requires, at a minimum, some statement that can reasonably be construed to be expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney in dealing with custodial interrogation by the police. ( McNeil v. Wisconsin, supra, 501 U.S. 171, 178 [115 L.Ed.2d 158, 168-169], italics omitted.) Most recently, in Davis v. United States (1994) 512 U.S. ___, ___ [129 L.Ed.2d 362, 368, 114 S.Ct. 2350], in determining that a suspect's remark to Naval Investigative Service agents  Maybe I should talk to a lawyer  was not a request for counsel, the United States Supreme Court has held further that a suspect must unambiguously request counsel. (512 U.S. at p. ___ [129 L.Ed.2d at p. 371].) The court in that case stated: As we have observed, `a statement either is such an assertion of the right to counsel or it is not.' Smith v. Illinois [(1984)] 469 U.S. 91, 97-98.... Although a suspect need not `speak with the discrimination of an Oxford don[]' ... (Souter, J., concurring in judgment), he must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney. If the statement fails to meet the requisite level of clarity, Edwards does not require that the officers stop questioning the suspect. See Moran v. Burbine 475 U.S. 412, 43, n. 4, 89 L.Ed.2d 410, 106 S.Ct. 1135 (1986) (`the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present only [i]f the individual states that he wants an attorney').... [¶] We decline petitioner's invitation to extend Edwards and require law enforcement officers to cease questioning immediately upon the making of an ambiguous or equivocal reference to an attorney. See Arizona v. Roberson, [486 U.S. 675,] 688 ... (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (`the rule of Edwards is our rule, not a constitutional command; and it is our obligation to justify its expansion'). ( Davis v. United States, supra, 512 U.S. ___, ___ [129 L.Ed.2d 362, 371-372].) [W]e are unwilling to create a third layer of prophylaxis to prevent police questioning when the suspect might want a lawyer. Unless the suspect actually requests an attorney, questioning may continue. (512 U.S. at p. ___ [129 L.Ed.2d at p. 373].) (15b) In the present case, defendant did not unequivocally state that he wanted an attorney, but simply asked a question. Moreover, he declined to respond when the police repeated the advisement that he was entitled to an attorney. (See People v. Johnson, supra, 6 Cal.4th 1, 29; People v. Clark, supra, 3 Cal.4th 41, 121.) [7] Viewed in context, defendant's statement simply indicated defendant wished to ascertain whether he had heard the officer correctly. Upon being informed that he had heard correctly, defendant did not make a statement that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney in dealing with custodial interrogation by the police ( McNeil v. Wisconsin, supra, 501 U.S. 171, 178 [115 L.Ed.2d 158, 169], italics omitted; see Davis v. United States, supra, 512 U.S. ___, ___ [129 L.Ed.2d 362, 371-372]), but merely remained silent. We conclude that, in view of the entire record  including defendant's statements and his disruptive conduct as a whole during and immediately following the arrest (which apparently contributed to his failure to hear completely the officer's initial advisements), the interrogatory nature of defendant's reference to an attorney, the officer's immediate repetition of the advice that had been given, and defendant's failure to respond thereto  there was substantial evidence to support the trial court's determination that defendant's statement did not constitute an invocation of his right to counsel. Therefore, it is unnecessary for us to determine whether the evidence obtained in asserted violation of Miranda was prejudicial to the defense. [8]