Opinion ID: 1773017
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: improper comment by the prosecutor while addressing the venire

Text: During voir dire, the Commonwealth told the potential jurors that Hayes only stipulated to having had sexual intercourse with Williams after blood samples and DNA test results were returned that disclosed sexual contact. Hayes's counsel objected. At sidebar, defense counsel reiterated that, from the outset, Hayes admitted to the sexual contact but claimed that it was consensual. Hayes's counsel stated that she did not want the implication made to the jury that her client had something to hide. Still at sidebar, the trial judge inquired as to how the situation could be cured. Defense counsel requested only that the Commonwealth not finish the question. The issue was not brought up again by the Commonwealth, nor was the prosecutor's comment mentioned at any further stage of the trial. Hayes now argues that the comments of the prosecutor during voir dire so prejudiced the jury pool that a fair trial was impossible. We disagree. At the time of the Commonwealth's misstatement to the potential jurors, Hayes could have requested that the judge admonish the jury to disregard the prosecutor's statement. Because Hayes did not request an admonition or any other curative action by the court, the Commonwealth argues that it was not incumbent upon the trial judge to provide relief. We agree. Hayes points out that lack of consent was the only issue in the case and that his contention that the sexual intercourse was consensual was his only defense. Due to these factors, Hayes argues that the Commonwealth's statement, which implied that he had initially denied sexual contact with Williams but then changed his story when the laboratory results demonstrated that sexual intercourse had occurred, was so prejudicial that no admonition of the trial court would have cured it. Hayes cites Mason v. Stengell, Ky., 441 S.W.2d 412, 416 (1969), and Risen v. Pierce, Ky., 807 S.W.2d 945, 950 (1991), to support his position that a new trial is required regardless of his failure to request an admonition or other forms of relief. We first note that both Mason and Risen deal with statements made during closing argument, not voir dire questions. Moreover, in each case an admonition was requested. In Mason , our predecessor court held that, as [a] general rule, if the attention of the court is called to an improper argument and if the jury is admonished in regard to it, a reversal will not be had unless it appears that the argument was so prejudicial under the circumstances that the admonition of the trial court would not cure it. Mason, 441, S.W.2d at 416. In the case before us, the trial judge asked defense counsel what relief she wanted. She received the relief requested and never asked for an admonition. The trial court did not err by allowing the trial to proceed.