Opinion ID: 3166955
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: introduction

Text: ¶1 We are asked to review the court of appeals‘ retroactive application of our decision in State v. Clopten to Mr. Guard‘s case. We issued Clopten while Mr. Guard‘s case was on direct appeal. In Clopten, we held that ―in cases where eyewitnesses are identifying a STATE v. GUARD Opinion of the Court stranger and one or more established factors affecting accuracy are present, the testimony of a qualified expert is both reliable and helpful, as required by rule 702.‖1 Prior to Clopten, there was a ―de facto presumption against the admission of eyewitness expert testimony,‖ and courts generally relied on jury instructions to address this issue.2 Mr. Guard‘s motion to put on an expert on eyewitness testimony was denied because he failed to establish that such testimony was reliable, but the jury was instructed on the possible issues surrounding eyewitness testimony. The jury found Mr. Guard guilty of kidnapping, and he was subsequently sentenced to a prison term of ten years to life. Mr. Guard timely appealed his conviction, but his appeal was delayed due to his attorney‘s failure to file a docketing statement. ¶2 In deciding whether to apply Clopten retroactively, the court of appeals acknowledged our ―clear break‖ rule regarding retroactive application of new rules of criminal procedure to cases on direct review, but declined to apply it. Rather, the court concluded that the ―unusual circumstances‖ in this case required the retroactive application of our rule in Clopten.3 The court reasoned that, because the cases were very similar and were tried around the same time, if Mr. Guard‘s case had not been delayed, Guard and Clopten would ―almost inevitabl[y] . . . have been either consolidated on appeal or treated as companion cases‖ and the result in Guard ―would have been identical to the result in Clopten.‖4 Thus the court stated, ―it seems inconsistent with the administration of justice to deny Guard the benefit of the supreme court‘s approach in Clopten where, but for the happenstance that delayed Guard‘s appeal, it appears to us that the same analysis would have been applied to both cases.‖5 The court therefore applied the rule in Clopten, holding that it was harmful error for the trial court not to admit Mr. Guard‘s eyewitness expert. ¶3 The State appealed. It argues that Clopten was a ―clear break‖ from our previous caselaw on the admissibility of eyewitness expert testimony and should not have been applied retroactively. The State also argues that Mr. Guard did not preserve the issue. Mr. Guard counters that the court of appeals did not apply Clopten 1 2009 UT 84, ¶ 49, 223 P.3d 1103. 2 Id. ¶ 30. 3 State v. Guard, 2013 UT App 270, ¶ 18, 316 P.3d 444. 4 Id. 5 Id. ¶ 19. 2 Cite as: 2015 UT 96 Opinion of the Court retroactively (but merely found it persuasive), that Clopten was not a ―clear break,‖ and that Mr. Guard adequately preserved the issue. ¶4 We reverse. We conclude that Mr. Guard adequately preserved the issue. We decline to decide whether Clopten was a ―clear break‖ (and therefore should not have been given retroactive application) because we conclude that our ―clear break‖ rule is flawed and therefore abandon it. Instead, we return to our prior precedent—new rules of criminal procedure announced in judicial opinions are applicable retroactively to all cases pending on direct review at the time the new rule is announced. ¶5 After determining that Clopten applies retroactively to Mr. Guard‘s case, we then address whether the trial court abused its discretion under the Clopten standard when it failed to admit Mr. Guard‘s eyewitness expert. We conclude that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny Mr. Guard‘s motion to admit eyewitness expert testimony under Clopten, and thus we reverse the court of appeals‘ decision.