Opinion ID: 1954490
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Motion Regarding Murder of Lawrence Bradshaw

Text: The eighth issue is whether the trial court erroneously denied Appellant's motion to preclude evidence that Appellant had been convicted of the murder of Lawrence Bradshaw. Specifically, Appellant maintains that, while it was proper to include the fact of a prior murder conviction in the PSI that was submitted to the jury for consideration, it was prejudicial error to include the victim's name. Appellant argues that the inclusion of this information allowed the jury to draw prejudicial inferences from the fact Appellant had been convicted of Bradshaw's murder. Before the sentencing hearing, Appellant filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence regarding the murder of Bradshaw, along with the fact that Appellant had been convicted of this murder. After hearing from both sides, the court ruled that the fact of the murder was admissible but not the evidence concerning it. The trial court further stated: The Court believes that [it] is appropriate to make the jury aware that the defendant has been found guilty of the first degree murder of Lawrence Bradshaw, and the Court will deny the motion in limine with respect to that. Thus, the PSI that was submitted to the jury for consideration contained Bradshaw's name, in the context that he was a homicide victim. As an initial matter, Appellant's claim of error was not preserved for review. At no time during the hearing did the State call any witness to offer evidence as to the murder of Bradshaw. Therefore, there was no testimony for the defense to object to. Near the close of the proceedings, however, the trial court provided counsel with redacted copies of the PSI report. When asked by the court to review the PSI, defense counsel maintained that it was [s]atisfactory to the defense, whereupon it was admitted without objection. Thus, Appellant's claim of error as to the PSI is not properly before this Court. In Watson v. State, we stated: In Prout v. State, 311 Md. 348, 535 A.2d 445 (1988), we concluded that when a trial judge makes a final ruling on a motion in limine to admit evidence, the party opposing the admission of the evidence must subsequently object at trial when the evidence is offered to preserve his objection for appeal. Prout, [311 Md. at 356-57,] 535 A.2d at 449. In the case sub judice, the trial judge ruled prior to trial on the motion in limine to admit Watson's prior convictions. Thus, standing alone, Watson's objection to the trial court's pretrial ruling would be insufficient to preserve his objection for our review. 311 Md. 370, 372-73 n.1, 535 A.2d 455, 457 n.1 (1988). In the instant case, not only did defense counsel fail to object when the PSI was offered into evidence for jury consideration, but he went so far as to inform the trial court that the PSI was satisfactory. If this issue were properly before us, we would find Appellant's claim of error is without merit. Section 413(c)(1) provides for the admissibility of evidence in a capital sentencing proceeding, with subsection (iv) allowing for the introduction of [a]ny presentence investigation report. A sentence recommendation and inflammatory details of unrelated crimes are to be excluded from a PSI. Appellant asserts that the inclusion of Bradshaw's name on the PSI as the victim of a prior murder conviction was an inflammatory detail of an unrelated crime that prejudiced Appellant as to the jury's final sentence. Specifically, Appellant argues that the jury's knowledge that he killed a participant in the Wanda Johnson break-in unfairly bolstered the State's position that Appellant was heavily involved in the crime, likely as a principal in the first degree. [10] In support of his contention that the identity of Bradshaw in the PSI qualified as an inflammatory detail that would lead the jury to sentence him to death for the Wanda Johnson murder because he had already been convicted for the Bradshaw murder, Appellant cites Conyers I, where we stated: In Scott, this Court interpreted § 413(c)(1)(iii) to preclude, in a death penalty case, `inflammatory detailed evidence of the underlying facts and circumstances surrounding unrelated crimes.' [11] 345 Md. at 573, 693 A.2d at 804 (quoting Scott, 297 Md. at 247, 465 A.2d at 1133). We disagree with Appellant's contention for two reasons. First, quite simply, Bradshaw's name, in and of itself, was not an inflammatory detail. As mentioned, during the hearing the State did not offer any evidence of the Bradshaw murder. Therefore, except for his name appearing in the PSI as a homicide victim, the jury did not receive any evidence during the proceeding from which to draw a prejudicial inference. Second, in contrast to Appellant's assertion otherwise, the Bradshaw murder was not entirely unrelated to the Wanda Johnson murder. In Scott, supra, we considered whether, in a capital sentencing hearing for premeditated murder, evidence that the defendant had also committed two unrelated crimes was admissible under § 413(c)(1). Essentially, we held that the admission of two unadjudicated murder charges constitutes reversible error. Scott, 297 Md. at 252, 465 A.2d at 1136. However, in the instant case, Appellant had already been convicted of the Bradshaw murder at the time of the second sentencing proceeding. See Scott, 297 Md. at 248, 465 A.2d at 1133-34 (holding that [w]hen read as a whole, § 413(c)(1) must be construed as precluding the admission of evidence relating to other crimes for which there has not been a conviction or a plea of guilty or nolo contendere). In addition, unlike the Scott case, the Bradshaw conviction was not introduced as other crimes evidence nor did the State refer to any facts surrounding the Bradshaw murder in encouraging the jury to impose the death penalty on Appellant. The jurors' knowledge of the Bradshaw murder extended only to knowledge or awareness of a related conviction, and not to a completely unrelated pending charge. Thus, for the reasons stated, we hold that Appellant's claim of error, even if preserved, is without merit and reversal is not warranted. J. Crime Scene and Victim Photographs The ninth issue is whether the trial court erroneously admitted photographs of Wanda Johnson and the crime scene. Appellant argues that the photographs were irrelevant and that the prejudice resulting from their admission outweighed their probative value. In response, the State argues that the photographs are relevant because they visually communicated the fact of the murder[] as well as the atrociousness of the crime. To be admissible, the photographs must be introduced for some legitimate purpose and their probative value must outweigh the prejudice caused by their admission. See Evans, 333 Md. at 692-93, 637 A.2d at 133. In Johnson v. State, 303 Md. 487, 495 A.2d 1 (1985), which involved a murder trial where several photographs of the victim were admitted, we explained the standard of review for admitting photographic evidence during the guilt phase of trial: We have consistently held that whether or not a photograph is of practical value in a case and admissible at trial is a matter best left to the sound discretion of the trial judge. A court's determination in this area will not be disturbed unless plainly arbitrary. Under this standard, we have permitted the reception into evidence of photographs depicting the condition of the victim and the location of injuries upon the deceased, the position of the victim's body at the murder site, and the wounds of the victim. (Citations omitted). 303 Md. at 502, 495 A.2d at 8. More recently in Evans, we observed that the application of this rule in a capital sentencing proceeding implicates issues different from those which predominate at the guilt phase of trial. 333 Md. at 693, 637 A.2d at 133. We reiterated, however, that [t]he need for caution ... in no way circumscribes the judge's evidentiary authority; the admission of photographs into evidence remains soundly committed to the discretion of the trial judge in capital sentencing proceedings. Id. In the instant case, the photographs of Wanda Johnson depicted the circumstances of her death, including the gunshot wounds and the location of her body, which are relevant considerations at the sentencing proceeding. The very purpose of photographic evidence is to clarify and communicate facts to the tribunal more accurately than by mere words. Johnson, 303 Md. at 503-04, 495 A.2d at 9. See also Evans, 333 Md. at 693, 637 A.2d at 133. Moreover, as we stated in Evans, the photographs could certainly assist the jury in visualizing the atrociousness of the crime, a circumstance which is no less important in the sentencing context than it is to a factfinder attempting to determine the degree of murder. Id. Thus, we hold that the trial court did not err in admitting the photographs, and its determination to admit them was in no way plainly arbitrary. K. Impeachment by Prior Convictions The tenth issue is whether the trial court committed plain error in permitting the State to impeach defense witness Arthur Rogers with prior convictions for first and second-degree sexual assault. Arthur Rogers testified for the defense in order to cast doubt on the testimony of Charles Johnson, who claimed that Appellant confessed to him that Appellant was the principal in the first degree. Rogers said that, one day while working in the detention center, he found Charles Johnson rifling through his legal papers for information to trade to the police. Appellant argues Rogers' testimony cast significant doubt on Charles Johnson's statement regarding Appellant's jailhouse confession, but that Rogers' credibility was improperly impaired as a result of the state's cross-examination with proof of his past convictions for sexual offenses. On cross-examination, the following occurred: [State's Attorney]: Isn't it a fact that in 1987, you were convicted of robbery in Baltimore City? [Rogers]: Yes. [State's Attorney]: All right. And isn't it a fact that in 1988, you were convicted of a second-degree sexual offense? [Rogers]: Yes. [State's Attorney]: And isn't a fact that in 1988, you were convicted of theft? [Rogers]: Yes. [State's Attorney]: And isn't it a fact that in 1995, you were convicted of a first-degree sexual offense? [Rogers]: Yes. [State's Attorney]: And you were sentenced to life without the possibility of parole? [Rogers]: Yes. Maryland Rule 5-609 governs impeachment by prior conviction. It provides in pertinent part: (a) Generally. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from the witness or established by public record during examination of the witness, but only if (1) the crime was an infamous crime or other crime relevant to the witness's credibility and (2) the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice to the witness or the objecting party. See footnote 2. See also Md.Code (1974, 1995 Repl.Vol.), Courts & Judicial Proceedings Art., § 10-905. [12] Since defense counsel made no objection to any of the questions asked by the State, Appellant's claim of error has not been properly preserved for review. See full discussion in part II., subsection A., supra. Regardless, any error in allowing the impeachment evidence was harmless. We therefore need not decide in this case whether a first or a second-degree sexual offense is an infamous crime falling within the ambit of subsection (a)(1) of Rule 5-609. [13] If the trial court had improperly admitted the impeachment evidence over a proper objection, we could not say that the defendant was substantially harmed by the impeachment so as to require reversal. The jury was well aware of Rogers' incarceration given that all his testimony related to events occurring during incarceration. Appellant does not contest the use of Rogers' theft and robbery convictions for impeachment purposes, and, upon a review of the record, we cannot say that his admission to the sexual offenses was so prejudicial as to require reversal as a matter of law. Moreover, by failing to object to the testimony at the hearing, defense counsel precluded the trial court from making a determination pursuant to subsection (a)(2) of Md. Rule 5-609, i.e., whether the probative value of admitting the evidence outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice to the witness. We have previously observed that this determination is clearly a matter of trial court discretion. State v. Giddens, 335 Md. 205, 214, 642 A.2d 870, 874 (1994). Without the benefit of an objection and a ruling on that objection from the trial court, absent extraordinary circumstances not present in the instant case, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the impeachment evidence. Therefore, even if the impeachment evidence was improper, we cannot say that the admission reached that level of magnitude of harm so as to require reversal. Thus, we hold that the trial court did not commit plain error in permitting the State to impeach Rogers with his prior convictions for first and second-degree sexual assault. L. Motion Regarding .38 Caliber Handgun The eleventh issue is whether the trial court erroneously denied Appellant's motion to prevent introduction of Appellant's statement to Monica Wilson regarding a .38 caliber handgun. We note that Appellant's motion to suppress his statement to Wilson has not been preserved for review. Appellant filed a motion in limine to prevent the admission of Appellant's statement to Wilson concerning the .38 caliber handgun, but he did not renew his objection when the evidence was introduced during the sentencing hearing. As discussed in part II., subsection I., supra, when the trial court rules against the objecting party's motion in limine, in order to preserve the objection for review, the complaining party still must object to the admission of the evidence at the time it is offered at trial. See Watson, 311 Md. at 372-73 n.1, 535 A.2d at 457 n.1; cf. Prout, 311 Md. at 356-57, 535 A.2d at 448-49. See also full discussion in part II., subsection A., supra. Even if Appellant had properly objected, however, we would find no merit to his argument that the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution compels that the statement concerning the handgun be suppressed. [14] As it has been interpreted by the courts, the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits, absent a waiver, the admission of a statement by a criminal defendant when the statement is made (1) outside the presence of legal counsel; (2) in response to interrogation by the State; and (3) after the right to counsel has attached with respect to the charge being tried. See generally Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 106 S.Ct. 477, 88 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 100 S.Ct. 2183, 65 L.Ed.2d 115 (1980); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964); Whittlesey v. State, 340 Md. 30, 665 A.2d 223 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1148, 116 S.Ct. 1021, 134 L.Ed.2d 100 (1996). As in the Whittlesey case, the State in the instant case does not contest that Wilson was acting as an agent of the State or that Appellant's statement was made outside the presence of counsel; the issue before us concerns only the third requirement, i.e., whether the right to counsel had attached. The general rule is that `a person's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel attaches only at or after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against him.' United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187, 104 S.Ct. 2292, 2297, 81 L.Ed.2d 146, 154 (1984)(quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 1881, 32 L.Ed.2d 411, 417 (1972)); see also Whittlesey, 340 Md. at 49, 665 A.2d at 232 (quoting Gouveia )). Not just any adversary proceedings invoke the constitutional protections, however, because `the Sixth Amendment right [to counsel] ... is offense-specific.' Whittlesey, 340 Md. at 50, 665 A.2d at 232-33 (quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 2207, 115 L.Ed.2d 158, 166 (1991)). Appellant does not dispute that adversarial proceedings had not commenced against Appellant concerning Wanda Johnson's murder at the time his statements were made, but he asks that we recognize what has been called the carry-over exception to the well-established rule that the Sixth Amendment right is offense-specific. Under this exception, a defendant charged with one crime may invoke the Sixth Amendment to suppress statements related to another uncharged crime that would otherwise be admissible, but only if the second crime is sufficiently related to the first crime. See Whittlesey, 340 Md. at 51-52, 665 A.2d at 233 (citing cases that have recognized the existence of such an exception). Appellant's contentions are summarized by the argument his counsel made to the trial court during pre-sentencing hearing motions: The statements regarding the .38 were made to Monica Wilson ... when Mr. Conyers was in custody. He had been charged in the Bradshaw offense. He had not been charged as yet in the Johnson homicide. She was a State agent at the time those were made. We are just going to make a brief argument on Sixth Amendment grounds that the Sixth Amendment right had attached at the time he was charged with the Bradshaw [murder], and while the Sixth Amendment is certainly offense-specific, the Supreme Court has recognized that carry-over exceptions that the right can attach to offenses that have not yet been charged if those offenses are closely related, and if there isit's even been held to say inextricably related. It's been addressed by the Court of Appeals in 1995 in a case called Whittlesey v. State where they agree that there can be a carry-over, and that that carry-over has to occur when proof for the two crimes is essentially identical, and because the .38 was used in both of those offenses, according to the ballistics expert, we would argue that that evidence is identical, and for that reason, we would ask that that statement not come in on the Sixth Amendment. The State argues in response that Appellant's Sixth Amendment rights had not attached at the time of his conversations with Wilson because at that point he had only been charged with the murder of Bradshaw, and not Wanda Johnson. Further, the State contends that the carry-over exception does not apply since the murder of Wanda Johnson and the murder of Bradshaw were not sufficiently closely related. We agree with the State that the Sixth Amendment would not prohibit the admission of Appellant's statement even if he had properly preserved his objection. Initially, we note that Appellant incorrectly cited Whittlesey at the hearing on presentencing motions to stand for our acceptance of the carry-over exception to the general rule that the Sixth Amendment is offense-specific. In Whittlesey, we explored in great detail the carry-over exception as it has developed in the wake of the Supreme Court's decisions in Moulton, supra, and Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977). We questioned whether these two cases compelled recognition of the carry-over exception. Whittlesey, 340 Md. at 52 & n. 8, 665 A.2d at 233-34 & n.8. We acknowledged that in Maryland this question was one of first impression and stated that we will not decide whether the Sixth Amendment ever requires carry-over from one offense to another, but instead will focus on whether the offenses involved in this case are closely related to each other. If they are not, then there was no Sixth Amendment violation. Whittlesey, 340 Md. at 53, 665 A.2d at 234. Thus, Appellant's contention that in Whittlesey we stated our agreement that there is a carry-over exception is misplaced. Nevertheless, as in Whittlesey, we shall assume, arguendo, that such an exception exists and determine whether it would apply in the instant case. After exploring the cases addressing the carry-over exception, we stated in Whittlesey: The unifying theme among the Sixth Amendment cases has been that the right to counsel carries over only to new charges arising from the same acts on which the [pending] charges were based. To determine whether the same acts underlie both charges, courts have looked for identity of time, place, and conduct. Some have also required identity of prosecuting sovereign. Another test employed by at least one court is whether the statements elicited by the police constituted evidence of both offenses. (Citations and internal quotations omitted). 340 Md. at 55, 665 A.2d at 235. After reviewing various cases that considered the carry-over exception, we concluded that it did not apply in that case to exclude Whittlesey's statements to an informant that implicated him in a murder. Applying the identity of time, place, and conduct test, we observed that Whittlesey's statements had been made after he had been charged with making false statements to a state official regarding the investigation of the same murder. We concluded that the false statements charge and the murder charge are not `closely related' offenses. The false statements occurred days after the murder, in another location. The conduct was also distinct; ... committing a crime is separate from an attempt to avoid responsibility for it. Whittlesey, 340 Md. at 56, 665 A.2d at 236. As in Whittlesey, in the instant case there is no identity of time, place, and conduct. The statement Appellant seeks to suppress occurred before Appellant was ever charged with the Johnson murder, which was an event distinct from the Bradshaw murder. Although Appellant had been charged with the Bradshaw murder, that murder involved separate conduct which took place at a different location more than 24 hours after the Wanda Johnson murder. Moreover, Whittlesey expressly recognized that committing a crime is separate from an attempt to avoid responsibility for it. Id. Thus, Whittlesey compels our rejection of Appellant's argument that simply because the Bradshaw murder was committed to conceal the Wanda Johnson murder the two are sufficiently closely related for the purposes of the carry-over exception. While most courts have considered the identity of time, place, and conduct test for application of the carry-over exception, Appellant looks to the same evidence test, which, as we acknowledged in Whittlesey, had been employed by a lower Pennsylvania court to determine whether the carry-over exception applied. See In re Pack, 420 Pa. Super. 347, 616 A.2d 1006 (1992). Appellant contends that since the statement regarding the .38 caliber handgun was used in both of those offenses, according to the ballistic expert, we would argue that that evidence is identical. For this reason, Appellant contends that the carry-over exception should apply. While we believe that the test of identity of time, place, and conduct more accurately reflects the Sixth Amendment considerations at issue, we need not consider which test is preferable since we believe that Appellant misinterprets the applicability of the same evidence test. In Whittlesey, after we concluded that the identity test did not apply to carry-over the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights, we also addressed the same evidence test. We acknowledged that Whittlesey's statements to the State's informant could be used to support the false statements charge as well as the murder charge, but we also observed that the State could have proved the false statements charge without proving the murder charge. Whittlesey, 340 Md. at 56-57, 665 A.2d at 236. We noted that the false statements charge could have been supported by [other] evidence.... Furthermore, the State could disprove many of appellant's statements to the police ... without having to show that appellant had killed [the victim]. Id. Similarly, in this case the State could have proved that Appellant killed Bradshaw without the statement at issue and without showing Appellant had killed Johnson. Thus, as we stated in Whittlesey, the proof for the two crimes does not necessarily require identical evidence. 340 Md. at 57, 665 A.2d at 236. In sum, Appellant failed to preserve his eleventh point of error regarding the admissibility of his statement regarding the.38 caliber handgun. Even if he had properly preserved his objection, Appellant's statement would not fall within the carry-over exception to the general rule that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches only when adversary proceedings have begun with respect to the specific offense charged. Thus, we hold that the trial court did not err when it denied Appellant's motion to prevent the introduction of Wilson's statement concerning the.38 caliber handgun. M. Constitutionality of Maryland's Death Penalty Statute The final issue that we shall address is whether Maryland's death penalty statute is unconstitutional. Specifically, Appellant argues the State's death penalty statute is unconstitutional as applied to his case and that it is facially unconstitutional. Regarding Appellant's first claim, he maintains that because the jurors found no mitigating circumstances they were compelled to impose the death penalty. Appellant asserts that such mandatory death penalty laws violate the cruel and unusual punishment prohibition of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. We hold that the fact the jurors found no mitigating circumstances did not unconstitutionally compel imposition of the death penalty. In Hunt v. State , a case in which Hunt made a similar argument as Appellant, we stated: Hunt argues that the sentencing form unconstitutionally makes the death penalty `mandatory' because it indicates that the jury should enter `death' as the sentence if it finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. We rejected a similar contention in State v. Tichnell, 306 Md. 428, 467, 509 A.2d 1179, 1199 (1986) ...; accord State v. Calhoun, 306 Md. at 739, 511 A.2d at 485. The Supreme Court addressed this issue recently in Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. [299], 110 S.Ct. 1078, 108 L.Ed.2d 255 (1990). The Court upheld the Pennsylvania death penalty statute which provided that'[t]he verdict must be a sentence of death if the jury unanimously finds at least one aggravating circumstance ... and no mitigating circumstance or if the jury unanimously finds one or more aggravating circumstances which outweigh any mitigating circumstances.' Id. at [302], 110 S.Ct. at 1081, 108 L.Ed.2d at 261 (quoting 42 Pa.Cons.Stat. § 9711(d)(6) (1988)). Addressing whether the provision unconstitutionally mandated the death sentence, the Court said: 'Death is not automatically imposed upon conviction for certain types of murder. It is imposed only after a determination that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances present in the particular crime committed by the particular defendant, or that there are no such mitigating circumstances.    ' Id. at [305], 110 S.Ct. at 1082-83, 108 L.Ed.2d at 263. The Maryland death penalty sentencing form ... is essentially identical to the Pennsylvania statute. It provides that the jury enter `death' under the same circumstances as the Pennsylvania statute. Hunt's requested instruction was not `necessary to prevent the Maryland death sentence form from unconstitutionally mandating the death penalty.' 321 Md. at 443-44, 583 A.2d at 245-46. See also Evans, 333 Md. at 696, 637 A.2d at 135 (holding that the statutory scheme... requires a jury to impose a death sentence when no mitigating circumstances are found if at least one aggravating factor has been established)(quoting Scott v. State, 310 Md. 277, 289, 529 A.2d 340, 345 (1987)). In the instant case, the trial court properly instructed the jury on how to consider the aggravating and mitigating factors in determining the appropriate sentence. Thus, because we find that the jurors were carefully and properly instructed, Maryland's death penalty statute was not unconstitutionally applied to Appellant's case. Appellant's second claim is that Maryland's death penalty statute is facially unconstitutional because (1) it requires the defendant to establish mitigating circumstances; (2) it requires the defendant to establish that non-enumerated mitigating circumstances are, in fact, mitigating; and (3) it requires the State to prove that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances by only a preponderance of the evidence rather than by some higher standard. In holding that Maryland's death penalty statute is not facially unconstitutional, we reiterate the following from Conyers I, 345 Md. at 576, 693 A.2d at 805-06 (quoting Perry v. State, 344 Md. 204, 247-48, 686 A.2d 274, 295 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1146, 117 S.Ct. 1318, 137 L.Ed.2d 480 (1997)): We have addressed these claims in prior cases and have rejected each of them. See Grandison v. State, 341 Md. 175, 231, 670 A.2d 398, 425 (stating that a similar claim, `though made time and time again over the years, has been consistently rejected by this Court'), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1027, 117 S.Ct. 581, 136 L.Ed.2d 512 (1996); Whittlesey v. State, 340 Md. 30, 82-83, 665 A.2d 223, 249 (1995)(rejecting similar constitutional challenges to Maryland death penalty statute), cert. denied, [516] U.S. [1148], 116 S.Ct. 1021, 134 L.Ed.2d 100 (1996); Wiggins v. State, 324 Md. 551, 582-83, 597 A.2d 1359, 1374 (1991)(finding no merit in challenges to defendant's burden regarding statutorily recognized and other mitigating factors and to burden of proof), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1007, 112 S.Ct. 1765, 118 L.Ed.2d 427 (1992). See also Clermont v. State, 348 Md. 419, 456, 704 A.2d 880, 898, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 1849, 140 L.Ed.2d 1098 (1998); Burch v. State, 346 Md. 253, 299, 696 A.2d 443, 466, cert. denied, ___ U.S.____, 118 S.Ct. 571, 139 L.Ed.2d 410 (1997)(rejecting arguments similar to Appellant's that the Maryland death penalty statute is facially unconstitutional). N. Other Considerations In addition to considering the arguments advanced by Appellant in this appeal, we have also considered the imposition of the death sentence from the standpoint of the factors set forth in Md.Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 414(e), and we make the following determinations: 1. The sentence of death was not imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor; 2. The evidence supports the trial court's findings of a statutory aggravating circumstance under § 413(d); and 3. The evidence supports the trial court's finding that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. Dissenting opinion by RAKER, J., in which BELL, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, J., join. RAKER, Judge, dissenting: I would reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court for Wicomico County and remand the case for a new sentencing proceeding. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. The trial court committed reversible error in several respects: (1) in permitting Detective Marll to express an opinion that key prosecution witness Charles Johnson was credible; and (2) in erroneously restricting the direct examination of defense witnesses Arthur Rogers and Ventura McLee. The Preservation Issues As a threshold matter, I disagree with the general approach taken by the majority with respect to the question of preservation of issues for appellate review. Maj. op. at 918. The majority goes to great length to emphasize that `the tried and tested rules of evidence and procedure still apply [in death penalty cases],' maj. op. at 919 ( quoting Bruce v. State, 328 Md. 594, 611, 616 A.2d 392, 400 (1992)), and that where counsel wishes to object to the admission of any evidence, he or she must do so in a timely fashion or the issue will not be preserved for review. Counsel should not rely on this Court, or any reviewing court, to do their thinking for them after the fact. Furthermore, we have stated that even in a death penalty case, with the potential finality of its outcome, litigation cannot continue ad infinitum through counsel `withholding issues or framing the questions differently each time.' Foster, 305 Md. at 316, 503 A.2d at 1331. Maj. op. at 920. Then, in apparent contradiction to the previous exhortations, the majority proceeds to exercise [its] discretion and briefly discuss all of the issues Appellant raises, including the eight unpreserved ones. Maj. op. at 920. When addressing issues that are not preserved, I suggest the following framework. First, Rules 4-325, with respect to jury instructions, 5-103, with respect to rulings on evidence, and 8-131, with respect to trial error generally, apply as much in capital cases as they do in other cases. There is no exception stated in any of those rules for capital cases. Second, each of those rules, explicitly or implicitly, permits an appellate court to address and resolve otherwise unpreserved issues. Third, ordinarily, the appellate court will not exercise that discretion. It is important that the rules retain vitality and not be regarded as merely hortatory. They have the salutary purposes of allowing all issues to be resolved in the first instance by the trial court, preventing the unfairness of allowing a party to try the case on one theory and conceal and reserve other issues for appeal in the event that theory proves unsuccessful, and averting unnecessary appeals. Finally, in a capital case, because the ultimate issue is one of life or death, this Court should more readily exercise its discretion to review an unpreserved issue when the challenged ruling, if wrong, would have been truly prejudicial and the failure to preserve was likely not a matter of trial tactics. In deciding whether or how to exercise its discretion, this Court has essentially three choices: (1) hold the matter unpreserved and not address it at all, leaving the reason for and prejudice vel non caused by the non-preservation to post-conviction; (2) hold the issue unpreserved but affirmatively exercise the discretion allowed under the rules to address and resolve the issue on the merits; or (3) hold the matter unpreserved but address the issue only by way of dicta, for the guidance of a subsequent post-conviction court. [1] With respect to jury instructions, Rule 4-325(e) states that an appellate court may take cognizance of any plain error in the instructions, material to the rights of the defendant, despite a failure to object. This suggests a three step inquiry, once a failure to object is found. First, was the instruction erroneous? If not, there is nothing to notice. Second, if it was erroneous, did it amount to plain error? Third, if it was plain error, was the error material to the rights of the defendant? Because errors in jury instructions are generally errors of law, rather than of fact, it is difficult for me to distinguish between ordinary and plain errors, so the inquiry may really be a dual one. That is, if the instruction was sufficiently erroneous that, had the proper objection been made, we would reverse, then the appellate court should examine the question of prejudice. The three basic options should be applied on a case-by-case and issue-by-issue basis. If the ruling would be that the alleged error was not error, or that in the case of a jury instruction, it was not material to the rights of the defendant, or that it was harmless under a broader harmless error analysis, we should, ordinarily, either not address the unpreserved issue or hold that it was unpreserved and address it only in dicta. That should be the general practice. It preserves the vitality of the rules, implements their salutary function, and does no practical harm to the defendant. There are two circumstances in which a different practice may be justified. One is if, for whatever reason, guidance on the issue is important in other cases; it is somewhat the same justification for addressing moot points. See Coburn v. Coburn, 342 Md. 244, 250, 674 A.2d 951, 954 (1996) (stating that the Court may address the merits of a moot case if [it] is convinced that the case presents unresolved issues in matters of important public concern that, if decided, will establish a rule for future conduct). The more frequent circumstance, especially in, but not necessarily limited to, a capital case, is when we conclude either that the error was truly prejudicial, or in the case of a jury instruction, was material to the rights of the defendant. A finding of prejudice or materiality, in that sense, necessarily precludes a determination that the error was harmless and probably would suffice to satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). From the perspective of both fairness and efficient judicial administration, therefore, we should address and resolve the issue and not leave it to future collateral proceedings. Under this approach, in this case, this Court should examine each of the unpreserved issues and determine which of the three basic options to take. If, in examining the issue, we would conclude either that there was no error, or that the error was harmless, (or in the jury instruction issue, not material to Conyers's rights), we should adopt either the first approach of holding the issue unpreserved and not addressing it at all or the third approach of holding the issue unpreserved and addressing it only in dicta. If the issue would have resulted in a reversal had it been preserved and there is no indication that the non-preservation was a matter of deliberate trial tactics, we should hold it unpreserved but affirmatively exercise and resolve it as a holding. When we make clear that we are exercising discretion, there is no inconsistency between the holding of non-preservation and resolution of the issue on the merits. Detective Marll's Testimony about Charles Johnson The majority holds that Appellant was not deprived of a fair hearing by Marll's testimony regarding prosecution witness Charles Johnson, and reversal is not warranted. Maj. op. at 921-22. I disagree. Whether Appellant was a principal in the first degree was a critical issue for this sentencing jury. See Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol.), Article 27, § 413(e)(1); Baker v. State, 332 Md. 542, 570, 632 A.2d 783, 796 (1993) (holding that under Maryland law, except in murder-for-hire cases, only those individuals found guilty of first degree murder as a principal in the first degree may be sentenced to death). Charles Johnson, an inmate at the Maryland Department of Corrections, was the State's primary witness on this issue. Thus, his credibility was central to the question of whether Conyers was eligible for the death sentence. The defense case consisted primarily of an attack upon the credibility of Charles Johnson in an attempt to convince the jury that Conyers never confessed to Johnson, the jailhouse snitch, that he shot Wanda Johnson. Although the issue was not preserved for appellate review because there was no objection to the testimony at trial, the majority holds that there was no error. The majority reasons that Marll did not offer an opinion as to Johnson's credibility as a witness but rather, that he was simply testifying as to the verified accuracy of Johnson's statements, and that he had compared each of them against the documents in the case. Maj. op. at 921. The majority believes that Marll was testifying as to whether Johnson's information, not Johnson himself, was found to be accurate and therefore truthful. I find this rationale unsound. Marll's testimony violates the well-settled principle that a witness is not permitted to express an opinion as to whether another witness is telling the truth. As we said in Bohnert v. State, 312 Md. 266, 278, 539 A.2d 657, 663 (1988), [t]estimony from a witness relating to the credibility of another witness is to be rejected as a matter of law. To me, the testimony [t]hese statements which I knew upon hearing them from Mr. Johnson to be truthful, and I was able to verify each and every statement that he gave us can be interpreted only as an expression of the witness's opinion bearing on the credibility of another witness, Johnson. Clearly, the issue was not preserved for appellate review because defense counsel lodged no objection. This evidence would fall into category two of my suggested framework for addressing preservation issues. I would hold the issue unpreserved but would affirmatively exercise the discretion allowed under the rules to address and resolve the issue on the merits. This is a capital case, the evidence is highly prejudicial, and there is no indication that the non-preservation was a matter of deliberate trial strategy. The evidence was elicited by the State in rebuttal, and the witness's response was an unanticipated, gratuitous comment on Johnson's credibility. I would hold that the admission of Marll's testimony regarding Charles Johnson deprived Appellant of a fair hearing and constitutes reversible error. Direct Examination of Arthur Rogers During direct examination of Arthur Rogers, defense counsel sought to introduce two statements: Rogers's warning to Conyers that he should not talk to Johnson because Johnson was looking at court documents of inmates, and Johnson's statement that you need to take care of number one first as his reason for looking into the court documents of other inmates. The majority concludes that the evidence was properly excluded on several grounds. First, the majority emphasizes that while the court excluded defense counsel's desired evidence, the judge permitted Rogers to testify that he warned Appellant not to talk with Johnson about his case, and that the trial judge properly exercised his discretion in limiting the testimony. Maj. op. at 921. Second, the majority concludes that the statement that Johnson was taking care of number one first was inadmissible hearsay. Maj. op. at 924. Third, the majority holds that any alleged error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Maj. op. at 925. I agree that the testimony proffered by the defense, that Johnson had told Rogers you need to take care of number one first, was hearsay. There is no evidence, proffered or otherwise, that Rogers told Conyers of Johnson's alleged statement that he was looking out for number one first. Rogers's proffered testimony that he had warned Conyers that he should not talk to Johnson because Johnson was looking through other inmates' court documents was improperly restricted. This evidence was admissible to render it less likely that Conyers spoke to Johnson at all, because the warning not to talk to Johnson, and the statement to Conyers that Johnson was looking through inmates' papers would have caused a person motivated by rational self-interest to realize that Johnson was only gathering information for his own purposes, and should therefore be avoided. The critical point Conyers wished to convey to the jury was that Conyers, if informed of activity attributed to Johnson, would not have spoken to him. While the court permitted Conyers to ask Rogers whether he advised Conyers not to talk, the court did not permit Rogers to relate that he told Conyers that Johnson was looking at other inmates' papers. Because the testimony was restricted, the defense was unsuccessful in conveying to the jury that Rogers not only warned Conyers not to speak to Johnson, but also explained to Conyers that Rogers had observed Johnson rifling the court records of others. The information contained within Rogers's warning to Conyers had bearing on Conyers' state of mind, which in turn went directly to the credibility of Johnson's testimony. Johnson testified that Conyers told him that Conyers was the shooter. The defense theory was that if Conyers was warned of Johnson's behavior, he would not have talked to Johnson. If the jury had heard this evidence, it may not have believed Johnson. Evidence that would have made it less likely that Conyers would have confessed to Johnson, and thus more likely that Johnson's testimony was false, would have been central to the critical issue of principalship. Principalship directly governs Conyers's eligibility for a death sentence. The evidence was admissible, and its exclusion cannot be considered harmless. Because of the importance of Johnson's testimony in this case, and the critical role his testimony played in the jury's determination of principalship, the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the evidence. Moreover, the error was not harmless. See Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 350 A.2d 665 (1976). For this reason, I would reverse the sentence of death and remand for a new sentencing proceeding. Direct Examination of Ventura McLee The excluded testimony of the warnings told to Conyers by McLee was admissible for the same reasons that Rogers's testimony was admissible. Counsel attempted to elicit the substance of McLee's advice to Conyers about speaking with Johnson and his warnings not to speak to Johnson. The evidence was not hearsay and was offered by the defense to show that Conyers, having been warned not to talk to Johnson, and having been told of the reasons underlying the warnings, was less likely to actually have spoken to Johnson. The trial court prevented the witness from telling the jury the substance of the advice he gave to Conyers. As discussed earlier, the jury could have found that McLee's testimony tended to make it less likely that Conyers would have spoken to Johnson, and in turn more likely that Johnson's testimony was not credible. Because Johnson's credibility was so crucial to the State's case, I cannot say that the error was harmless. As for the preservation issue, I would find that the error was preserved. Non-preservation should not be applied in such a technical fashion as to ignore the obvious, and to the reality of the dynamics in the courtroom. In my view, it was fairly obvious to the trial judge that defense counsel was seeking the same information from McLee as he sought from Rogers. When the answer to a question is obvious, counsel need not proffer the substance of an answer sought. See Mills v. State, 310 Md. 33, 46, 527 A.2d 3, 9 (1987), vacated and remanded on other grounds 486 U.S. 367, 108 S.Ct. 1860, 100 L.Ed.2d 384 (1988). Victim Impact Witness Testimony Defense counsel made no objection to the evidence Conyers now claims deprived him of a fair hearing. I would hold that this evidence falls within category one: that the matter was unpreserved and I would not address it at all. Failure to object to victim impact testimony may be a strategic decision by counsel to avoid alienating the jury. The majority holds that although the issue is not preserved for appellate review, the trial court committed no error; and that assuming error, it was harmless. The majority addresses the merits of the claim and holds that the issue has no merit. Maj. op. at 934. The majority reasons that the jury had not been made aware that Appellant had been previously sentenced to death and that the sentence had been overturned, but simply that he had been tried and convicted of murder, and that Gibson's remarks appeared to refer to this prior trial. Maj. op. at 935. Reasoning that Gibson's vague comment cannot be said to have conveyed to the jurors that Appellant received the death penalty in a prior sentencing proceeding, the majority holds that even if the claim of error was preserved, it is without merit; moreover, if error, it is harmless. Maj. op. at 935. The issue was not preserved, and I would not address it. The testimony in question included the following comments: It was two years before we went to trial, and we were trying to heal from it, and it came back. And, now, it's another two years, and we are back here again in here now. My sister was murdered, and it is just unfair to the family. Because the majority considers the issue, and holds that there was no error, I simply note that in my view, the comment was not admissible; it was not relevant to any issue before the jury; and thus, it was error. See Williams v. State, 342 Md. 724, 736, 679 A.2d 1106, 1113 (1996). Domestic Violence Testimony Appellant claims the court erred in admitting testimony in the nature of other crimes evidence. The evidence consisted of Monica Wilson's testimony that the week before the killing, Appellant became violent, mean, and threatened to shoot her; and her testimony that, when Appellant and Wilson lived together, Appellant owned a .38 caliber handgun that she had pulled ... out on him and he pulled ... out on [her]. No objection was lodged at trial to this testimony. I agree with the majority that Appellant's objection at the earlier sentencing proceeding did not preserve the issue for review. I would hold that the issue falls within category one: that it was not preserved for appellate review, and I would not address it at all, leaving the issue for consideration on post-conviction. The majority addresses the merits of the claim of error, and does so, in a manner that does violence to the rules regarding other crimes evidence in future capital sentencing proceedings. The majority states: Appellant's failure to object at the time the evidence was admitted effectively precluded the trial court from applying the evidentiary protections set forth in the capital sentencing statute, Md. Rule 5-404(b) and Md. Rule 5-403, i.e., whether the prejudice of admitting the evidence outweighs its probative value. Our case law interpreting Md. Rule 5-404(b) clearly holds that the weighing component of the test for admitting other crimes evidence implicates the exercise of the trial court's discretion. Terry v. State, 332 Md. 329, 335, 631 A.2d 424, 427 (1993) (quoting State v. Faulkner, 314 Md. 630, 635, 552 A.2d 896, 898 (1989)). Without an objection and the trial court's response in the record, we cannot say whether the trial court abused its discretion, and we will only reverse if the error caused substantial prejudice to Appellant. Maj. op. at 936. The majority apparently recognizes that a trial court, when considering whether other crimes evidence is admissible in a capital sentencing hearing, should apply Maryland Rule 5-404(b) and the case law interpreting that rule, including State v. Faulkner . Under Faulkner, a court considering other crimes evidence is required to find (a) that the acts have special relevance; (b) that there is clear and convincing evidence that the acts occurred; and (c) that the probative value is not outweighed by unfair prejudice. 314 Md. at 634-35, 552 A.2d at 898. The majority then proceeds, however, to analyze the admissibility of other crimes evidence under a different legal standard. Citing Hunt v. State, 321 Md. 387, 431-32, 583 A.2d 218, 239 (1990), it states: Section 413(c)(v), governing the admissibility of evidence in a capital sentencing proceeding, provides the trial court with the authority to admit `any ... evidence that the court deems of probative value and relevant to sentence, provided the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any statements.' Since Wanda Johnson and Lawrence Bradshaw were both shot with a .38 caliber handgun, Wilson's testimony in the sentencing proceeding that Appellant had a .38 caliber handgun and that they had pulled it out on each other helped the prosecution establish that Appellant was a principal in the first degree to Wanda Johnson's murder, which the State was required to prove under the death penalty statute. See § 413(e)(1). Moreover, in other capital sentencing proceedings we have upheld the admission of other crimes evidence after concluding that the evidence was appropriate for considering in whether to apply the death penalty. In Hunt, ... we explained why evidence of other crimes is treated differently in a capital sentencing proceeding than in the guilt/innocence phase of trial. [The Defendant] stood before the court as a convicted murderer, not as an accused defendant entitled to the presumption of innocence. While irrelevant to the guilt/innocence phase of a criminal trial, [the defendant's] `dangerousness,' as exemplified by his past conduct, was relevant in the sentencing phase of the trial. We do not suggest that any evidence of dangerousness or past violence is admissible; the trial court must evaluate the reliability of the evidence and its prejudicial impact on the defendant. Wilson's testimony in this case is not significantly prejudicial, and, as in Hunt, in this case the evidence is reliable information ... which is of probative value and relevant to sentencing[,] ... [and] the defendant [was] accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any statements. Maj. op. at 937 (citations omitted). The legal test which the majority seems to craft would require a court to find that the evidence is probative and relevant to sentence, and that the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut the evidence. In addition, the majority would have the court evaluate the reliability of the evidence and its prejudicial impact on the defendant. If the majority test does not include the clear and convincing evidence requirement of Faulkner, I disagree with this test. Section 413(c)(v) does not authorize the admission of other crimes evidence generally. Neither does Hunt. [2] The majority ignores the clear holding of Scott v. State, 297 Md. 235, 249, 465 A.2d 1126, 1134 (1983), that in a capital sentencing proceeding, the type of admissible evidence is more circumscribed than in a non-death penalty case. It strain's the reasoning of Scott to permit evidence of other crimes in death penalty sentencing proceedings based solely on a finding of relevance and fair opportunity to rebut and Rule 5-404(b) without at least applying the test set out in State v. Faulkner, 314 Md. 630, 552 A.2d 896 (1989) for admissibility of other crimes evidence. See MCCLAIN, EVIDENCE (1994 ed.), commentary, Rule 5-404(b) (This provision codifies the Maryland case law, under which evidence of prior acts will be admissible if proved by clear and convincing evidence, e.g., State v. Faulkner, 314 Md. 630, 634, 552 A.2d 896, 898 (1989), and if substantially probative of (having `special relevance' to) some contested issue in the case, other than simply to show conduct `in character.'); Scott, 297 Md. at 246-52, 465 A.2d at 1132-35 (recognizing that the type of evidence admissible pursuant to the sentencing statutory scheme in a death penalty case is generally more restricted than evidence admissible at sentencing in a non-death penalty case and holding that § 413(c)(1)(ii) precludes, in a death penalty case, any but the most reliable type of evidence of unrelated crimesa conviction); see also Conyers v. State, 345 Md. 525, 693 A.2d 781, 801 (1997) ( Conyers I ) (recognizing Scott's holding that § 413(c)(1)(i) and (iii) prohibit the admission of evidence of unrelated crimes, in a death penalty case, if the defendant had not either been convicted of those crimes or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.) [3] Under the majority's reasoning, in order to admit other crimes evidence in a non-capital case, a court must find by clear and convincing evidence that the prior act occurred; yet, in order to admit that same evidence before a capital sentencing jury deciding the issue of life or death, the court need only find reliable evidence that the prior act occurred. Nonetheless, the two standards are not inconsistent. This Court made the determination that in the context of other crimes evidence, to be admissible the trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence that the act(s) occurred. See Cross v. State, 282 Md. 468, 478-79, 386 A.2d 757, 763-64 (1978). Presumably, this standard ensures reliability. The protections of State v. Faulkner , governing the admissibility of evidence in criminal trials, in my view, are applicable in death sentencing proceedings. As to the merits of the claim, the majority reasons: [A]t least initially, the trial court may have considered the testimony favorable to Appellant. Wilson stated that only a week before the murder the couple had been fighting and that Wilson moved out of the home she shared with Appellant. The hostile break-up of the relationship could have been initially viewed as supporting a mitigating circumstance involving Appellant's emotionally disturbed state of mind at the time of the murder. Maj. op. at 937. I find it untenable to conclude that the State's introduction of evidence of the hostile break-up of the Conyers-Wilson relationship could have been considered as mitigating evidence favorable to Conyers. At the very best, the evidence is a double-edged sword. Whether to introduce the evidence in question as a mitigator was Conyers's call, not one for the State. Mitigating Circumstance of Sympathy or Mercy The majority holds that Appellant's claim of error regarding the trial court's instruction on mitigating circumstances was not preserved for review. Maj. op. at 928. I agree. The majority continues, however, and concludes that even if preserved, the instructions were thorough, and when viewed as a whole, precluded a juror from not considering a factor he or she perceived as mitigating because it was not `raised by the evidence.' Maj. op. at 932. I disagree. The jury was instructed as to non-statutory mitigating factors that [a]ny factor causing you to feel sympathy or mercy toward the defendant may be considered by you as a mitigating circumstance so long as such factor is raised by the evidence. [4] Even though the jury was instructed that allocution is evidence, the instructions nonetheless improperly restricted the juror's consideration to evidence. The non-statutory, catch-all factor does not have to be based on evidence and thus, the instructions were inherently contradictory. In assessing whether a sentencing instruction in a death penalty proceeding is invalid, the Supreme Court has stated that the test is 'what a reasonable juror could have understood the charge as meaning.' Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 315-16, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 1971-1972, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985). To determine how a reasonable juror could interpret an instruction, we `must focus initially on the specific language challenged.' Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. at 315, 105 S.Ct. at 1971. If the specific instruction fails constitutional muster, we then review the instructions as a whole to see if the entire charge delivered a correct interpretation of the law. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 541,107 S.Ct. 837, 839, 93 L.Ed.2d 934 (1987). The majority concludes that the instruction, when viewed as a whole, correctly informed the jury that in determining whether there were any mitigating factors, the jury could consider anything presented to them during the sentencing proceeding, including relevant and material conduct of the defendant up to and including this sentencing proceeding. The majority reasons that the thoroughness of the jury instructions effectively precluded a juror from not considering a factor he or she perceived as mitigating because if was not `raised by the evidence.' Maj. op. at 932. This assertion, in my view, is unfounded. It is well settled in Maryland that the jury in sentencing proceedings is not confined to the evidence in determining the existence of a non-statutory mitigator. Writing for the Court in Foster v. State, 304 Md. 439, 474-75, 499 A.2d 1236, 1254 (1985), Judge Eldridge pointed out: A sentencing authority, unconvinced that death is appropriate, may list as a mitigating circumstance whatever factor or factors may have led to this conclusion, irrespective of what the defendant produced or argued. If the sentencing authority perceives anything relating to the defendant or the crime which causes it to believe that death may not be appropriate, it may treat such factor as a mitigating circumstance and decide that it outweighs the aggravating circumstances. I believe that a rational juror could interpret the instruction given in this case as a requirement that a non-statutory mitigator must be based on evidence. The jury was presented with inconsistent instructions, creating a substantial likelihood that one or more jurors would interpret the court's instruction as a constraint upon his or her duty to consider mitigating factors. This is contrary to Maryland law, and as such, it is error. Where the jury instructions are inconsistent and partially incorrect, and a possibility of misunderstanding exists, we should conclude the instruction is invalid. Such is the case here. The majority, in footnote 6, quotes from Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982) and Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), presumably to suggest that mitigating circumstances must be based solely on evidence in the case. The cases do not support the majority's position. In Eddings, the sentencing judge found as a matter of law that he was unable to consider evidence presented during the sentencing hearing as to the mitigating evidence of defendant's family history. Id. at 113, 102 S.Ct. at 876. The issue before the Supreme Court in that case was whether the trial judge improperly failed to consider the relevant, mitigating evidence presented by the defendant, and not, as the majority states, whether mitigating factors must be based on evidence. Id., 102 S.Ct. at 876. The Supreme Court found that the limitations placed by the Oklahoma courts upon the mitigating evidence they would consider violated the rule in Lockett, and held that a sentencer may not refuse to consider, as a matter of law, any relevant mitigating evidence. Id. at 113-15, 102 S.Ct. at 876-77. That is a far cry from holding that the sentencer may only consider evidence as support for a mitigating factor. In Lockett, the Supreme Court explained that the rule the court was applying reflected the law's effort to develop a system of capital punishment at once consistent and principled but also humane and sensible to the uniqueness of the individual. Id. at 110, 102 S.Ct. at 874. The Court went on to hold that the sentencer in capital cases must be permitted to consider any relevant mitigating factor. Id. at 112, 102 S.Ct. at 875. I disagree with the majority's conclusion that once a jury is given a broad instruction as to what it should consider, that it is more likely that the jury would conclude that evidence consisted of all that they had seen and heard during the proceedings, along with their opinions and impressions. The jury had just participated in a sentencing hearing at which various documents and photographs were marked as exhibits and admitted into evidence. It is an equally, if not more plausible conclusion, that, given this experience during the sentencing hearing, the jury would have understood evidence simply to encompass the witnesses' testimony and physical exhibits. Cf. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, Evidence (6th ed. 1990), Any species of proof, or probative matter, legally presented at the trial of an issue, by the act of the parties and through the medium of witnesses, records, documents, exhibits, concrete objects, etc ... (emphasis added). The instruction given by the trial court in this case is clearly erroneous and should neither be blessed by this Court, nor considered by trial judges as legally appropriate. [5]