Opinion ID: 1952580
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Superintendent's Authority

Text: On this appeal, we review the agency's decision directly for abuse of discretion, errors of law, or findings not supported by the evidence. International Paper Co. v. Board of Envtl. Protection, 629 A.2d 597, 599 (Me.1993). When interpreting statutes, we seek to discern from the plain language the real purpose of the legislation, avoiding results that are absurd, inconsistent, unreasonable, or illogical. Id. at 599-600 (quoting Mahaney v. State, 610 A.2d 738, 741 (Me. 1992)). When the dispute involves an agency's interpretation of a statute administered by it, the agency's interpretation, although not conclusive, is entitled to great deference and will be upheld unless the statute plainly compels a contrary result. Abbott v. Commissioner of Inland Fisheries & Wildlife, 623 A.2d 1273, 1275 (Me.1993). Wood argues that the Superintendent lacked jurisdiction to impose sanctions because Wood surrendered his license before the Staff initiated the disciplinary action. Wood relies on 24-A M.R.S.A. § 1539(1) (1990), which provides that the Superintendent may revoke a license if he finds that, as to the applicant or licensee, a violation of the Code has occurred. Wood concludes that the Superintendent's disciplinary authority is limited to current applicants or licensees. The Superintendent contends that section 1539(1) does not limit his disciplinary authority to current applicants or licensees. According to the Superintendent, the Code prohibits persons or entities from committing certain acts while an applicant or licensee. If Wood were to prevail, the Superintendent maintains that any licensee could evade disciplinary action by simply surrendering his license. Such a result would frustrate the overall purpose of the Code by diminishing the Superintendent's authority to regulate the licensing and conduct of insurance agents. See 24-A M.R.S.A. § 1673 (Supp. 1993) (For the protection of the people of this State, the superintendent may not issue, continue or permit to exist any agent . . . license except in compliance with this chapter.. . .). The Superintendent's argument has support in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Senise v. Corcoran, 146 Misc.2d 598, 552 N.Y.S.2d 483, 484-85 (1989) (State Superintendent of Insurance is not divested of jurisdiction when license is surrendered or expires). Cf. Golz v. Maine Real Estate Comm'n, 634 A.2d 1288, 1289 (Me.1993) (Generally speaking, the disciplinary authority of occupational and professional licensing boards is limited to enforcement against licensees or former licensees.). We need not decide this issue, however, because we find that Wood was still a licensee under the Code when the Staff brought its action. Wood's license was to expire on April 1, 1992. Perhaps coincidentally, the Staff filed its petition on March 31, 1992, one day before the expiration date. Although Wood's license had terminated pursuant to 24-A M.R.S.A. § 1532-A(7) (1990), it could have been reinstated if Wood obtained a new appointment and filed a new application. See 24-A M.R.S.A. §§ 1518, 1532-A(7) (1990 & Supp.1993). Unlike a first-time applicant (or an applicant whose license had indeed expired), Wood would not have been required to take the examination. 24-A M.R.S.A. § 1521 (1990). In effect, his terminated license had not yet expired, but was, as the Superintendent asserted at oral argument, in a state of hibernation. Wood also argues that the Staff's petition to revoke his license was rendered moot by his earlier surrender. We disagree. Under the statutory scheme, there is clearly a difference between a license that has been terminated and a license that has been revoked. After a termination, which is essentially a ministerial act carried out pursuant to 24-A M.R.S.A. § 1532-A(7), Wood could reinstate his license by obtaining a new appointment and submitting a new application. After a revocation, however, the Superintendent can refuse to issue a new license unless the former licensee shows good cause why the prior revocation should not be deemed a bar to the issuance of a new license. 24-A M.R.S.A. § 1542(1). Moreover, a person whose license has been revoked twice is not eligible for relicensing. 24-A M.R.S.A. § 1542(2). Therefore, the termination of Wood's license did not render the issue of revocation moot. See State v. Gleason, 404 A.2d 573, 578 (Me.1979) (an issue is not moot if there remain sufficient practical effects flowing from the resolution of [the] litigation to justify the application of limited judicial resources). Wood further argues that because 24-A M.R.S.A. § 1512-A (1990) refers to a person whose license as an insurance agent. . . has been . . . voluntarily surrendered to avoid prosecution, the Legislature clearly recognized that an agent may voluntarily surrender his license to avoid prosecution. The Superintendent maintains that although section 1512-A allows him to negotiate the surrender of a license as an alternative to revocation, a voluntary surrender outside the context of a disciplinary proceeding does not immunize a licensee from a subsequent disciplinary action. Because the Code does not plainly [compel] a contrary result, Abbott, 623 A.2d at 1275, we uphold the Superintendent's interpretation. Finally, Wood argues that the $2,000 fine was improper because (1) he was not a licensee when it was imposed and (2) the Superintendent did not prove that he had received the Attorney General's notice of election. [2] Because we conclude that Wood was in fact a licensee, we hold that the Superintendent had the authority to impose a fine against him. Since Wood did not raise the issue of the Attorney General's election during the initial administrative proceeding, he has failed to preserve it for appellate review. See New England Whitewater Ctr., Inc. v. Department of Inland Fisheries & Wildlife, 550 A.2d 56, 58 (Me.1988).