Opinion ID: 2150049
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did the Trial Court Err in Denying Dale's T.R. 60(B)(8) Motion?

Text: Dale alleges the trial court erred in finding his Trial Rule 60(B)(8) motion was timebarred; he asserts it was filed within a reasonable period of time. We disagree. When a Trial Rule 60(B)(8) motion is filed, the burden is on the movant to demonstrate that relief is both necessary and just. Fairrow v. Fairrow (1990), Ind., 559 N.E.2d 597. The decision of whether to grant or deny the motion is left to the equitable discretion of the trial court, and is reviewable only for abuse of discretion. See Shotwell v. Cliff Hagan Ribeye Franchise (1991), Ind., 572 N.E.2d 487. We will not reweigh the evidence in conducting this review. Id. Trial Rule 60(B)(8) provides for relief from judgment for any reason other than those set forth in Rules 60(B)(1) (mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect), 60(B)(2) (any grounds that could be raised on motion to correct error), 60(B)(3) (fraud), or 60(B)(4) (default without proper notice). [2] Any claim filed under T.R. 60(B)(8) must be filed within a reasonable period of time after the judgment is entered. Fairrow, 559 N.E.2d at 599. The determination of what constitutes reasonableness, however, varies with the circumstances of each case. See, e.g., Graham v. Schreifer (1984), Ind. App., 467 N.E.2d 800. Relevant to the question of timeliness is prejudice to the party opposing the motion and the basis for the moving party's delay. In re Whitney-Forbes, Inc. (7th Cir.1985), 770 F.2d 692, 697-98. Dale filed his motion for relief in 1992, nine years after the trial court entered its first dissolution decree and six years after the second decree. He did not contest paternity during the dissolutions and chose not to appeal either support order. The Court of Appeals correctly found that Dale brought his T.R. 60(B)(8) motion as a substitute for a direct appeal, which we will not permit. Gipson, 629 N.E.2d at 954; see also Fairrow, 559 N.E.2d at 598. Because Dale failed to demonstrate the extraordinary circumstances required by subdivision (8), we conclude that the trial court's denial of relief was appropriate.