Opinion ID: 197423
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 20 In our sufficiency of the evidence review, we determine whether, drawing all reasonable inferences in the government's favor, a rational jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Andrade, 94 F.3d at 12. 21 Montilla argues that the jury was faced with two equally likely scenarios, one of which was that he was innocent. He asserts that under United States v. Andujar, 49 F.3d 16 (1st Cir.1995), this is insufficient to meet the government's burden of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Montilla's statement of the law is correct. Id. at 22 (When a jury is confronted ... with equally persuasive theories of guilt and innocence, it cannot rationally find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.). However, Montilla understates the case against him. 22 The guilt of Zorrilla and Caldern is admitted. When Caldern and Zorrilla were negotiating the deal at the shop, Montilla was constantly present. Criminal conspirators do not often welcome innocent nonparticipants as witnesses to their crimes. United States v. Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d 14, 18 (1st Cir.1991); see also United States v. Cuevas-Esquivel, 905 F.2d 510, 515 (1st Cir.1990). No effort was made to keep the illicit deal from Montilla's ears. Indeed, Zorrilla loudly bragged about the purity of the cocaine in front of Montilla. 23 Still, mere association with a principal or mere presence while criminal activity is going on around one is not enough to establish aiding and abetting, even when combined with knowledge that a crime will be committed. See United States v. Luciano-Mosquera, 63 F.3d 1142, 1150 (1st Cir.1995), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 1879, 135 L.Ed.2d 174 (1996). As Montilla points out, this was a crime-ridden neighborhood and knowledge by Montilla that those around him were committing crimes does not necessarily mean that he was aiding and abetting those crimes. 24 While knowledge is certainly an element of the offense, id., (and the facts here abundantly show knowledge), something more, some action to assist the crimes, is needed. See id. To convict Montilla of aiding and abetting, the government had to prove that his codefendants committed the crime, and that Montilla associated himself with, and participated in the drug transaction as something he wished to bring about, and sought by his actions to make it succeed. United States v. Ruiz, 105 F.3d 1492, 1499 (1st Cir.1997). 25 The government says that the something more is that Montilla acted as a lookout. Several inferences from the evidence support the government's position. The first is that Montilla was at the entrance to the small room where he could act as a lookout while the drug deal negotiations were being conducted and was not in the shop repairing cars. The second is that, when the informant told the men it was time to deliver the drugs to his partner, all three men, including Montilla, left the small room to go out toward the car. The third is that Montilla, who did not have the drugs, stopped just outside the shop, and from that vantage watched. He was well-situated to act as a lookout, and an arresting agent thought that was exactly what Montilla was doing. 26 The evidence is thin, but not so thin as to invalidate the jury's reasonable assessment that Montilla is guilty. New Trial Motion 27 The district court's denial of the motion for a new trial is reviewable only for a manifest abuse of discretion. Andrade, 94 F.3d at 14. A district court's power to order a new trial is greater than its power to grant a motion for acquittal. Ruiz, 105 F.3d at 1500. 28 Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure authorizes a district court to grant a new trial if required in the interest of justice. 1 Where, as here, the motion is based on new or previously unavailable evidence, the defendant has to establish that the evidence was: (i) unknown or unavailable at the time of trial, (ii) despite due diligence, (iii) material, and (iv) likely to result in an acquittal upon retrial. Tibolt, 72 F.3d at 971. 29 Although the new statements by the two principals of the drug transaction that Montilla is innocent appear facially to satisfy the third and fourth elements of the test, 2 our focus is on the first element of the test. The district court denied the motion on the ground that the evidence was both known and available. Similarly, the government, apparently conceding the third and fourth elements, argues that the testimony was neither unknown, nor unavailable. It also asserts that Montilla did not exercise due diligence. 30 In this lies the problem. Both the government's arguments and the district court's ruling assume that Zorrilla and Caldern were available to testify at Montilla's trial. But Montilla, who, it facially appears, had diligently attempted to secure their testimony, 3 did not have the power to compel them to testify at his trial in light of their Fifth Amendment privileges once they changed their minds about testifying. 31 Montilla's trial commenced on June 27, 1995. On that same day, Caldern and Zorrilla entered pleas of guilty and the court accepted their pleas. Their sentencing was deferred until September, 1995. Caldern's and Zorrilla's counsel each advised his client not to testify for Montilla because the testimony might incriminate them with regard to other transactions and because the men still had to face sentencing proceedings. Exercising their privilege against self-incrimination, Caldern and Zorrilla informed the court that they would not testify, and they were excused. 32 We have recognized that an unsentenced defendant who has pled guilty retains a legitimate protectable Fifth Amendment interest as to matters that could affect his sentence. United States v. De La Cruz, 996 F.2d 1307, 1312 (1st Cir.1993); see United States v. Zirpolo, 704 F.2d 23, 25 & n. 2 (1st Cir.1983); see also Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 461-63, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 1872-73, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981) (state's efforts to compel criminal defendant to testify at sentencing phase of capital trial would contravene Fifth Amendment). Further, the potential importance of the presentence phase of criminal proceedings to a defendant is highlighted by Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(e) which expressly permits a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea before a sentence is imposed by showing any fair and just reason. It was an error of law for the district court to hold that the testimony of these witnesses was available per se. 33 This then poses a legal question, not explicitly addressed by the government. Rule 33 permits new trial motions to be filed within two years only if the evidence is newly discovered. If the evidence is not newly discovered, and the motion was not filed within the seven days otherwise required, then the district court lacks jurisdiction to hear the motion. United States v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238, 1250 n. 12 (1st Cir.1996), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 1109, 137 L.Ed.2d 310 (1997). 34 The legal question is whether exculpatory affidavits from codefendants who did not testify at trial because they exercised their Fifth Amendment privileges may ever qualify as newly discovered evidence within the meaning of Rule 33. Most other circuits have expressed hostility to this notion, usually on the ground that the defendant was aware of the potential testimony at trial, even if that testimony was unavailable due to assertions of privilege. These courts have held that such testimony is not newly discovered. See, e.g., United States v. Theodosopoulos, 48 F.3d 1438, 1448-50 (7th Cir.1995), United States v. Muldrow, 19 F.3d 1332, 1339 (10th Cir.1994); United States v. Dale, 991 F.2d 819, 838-39 (D.C.Cir.1993); United States v. DiBernardo, 880 F.2d 1216, 1224-25 (11th Cir.1989); United States v. Metz, 652 F.2d 478, 480-81 (5th Cir.1981), United States v. Diggs, 649 F.2d 731, 739-40 (9th Cir.1981). 35 We believe the question is resolved affirmatively by our precedent. This circuit has, for almost twenty years, held that the newly discovered language of Rule 33 encompasses evidence that was unavailable. See Vega Pelegrina v. United States, 601 F.2d 18, 21 (1st Cir.1979). In this, our test has differed from that of other circuits, as the cases cited above demonstrate. Indeed, in Vega Pelegrina, the newly discovered evidence was the testimony of a codefendant who had refused to testify for defendant at trial, or to recant a prior inculpatory statement until the statute of limitations had run. Id. 36 This court has adhered to the four part test outlined in United States v. Wright, 625 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir.1980), for almost two decades, saying that the first question is whether the evidence was unknown or unavailable to the defendant at time of trial. Id. at 1019 (emphasis added); see, e.g., United States v. Ortiz, 23 F.3d 21, 27 (1st Cir.1994); United States v. Benavente Gomez, 921 F.2d 378, 382 (1st Cir.1990); United States v. Glantz, 884 F.2d 1483, 1486 (1st Cir.1989); United States v. Martin, 815 F.2d 818, 824 (1st Cir.1987). This panel is not free, on its own, to alter circuit precedent absent some intervening reason such as a Supreme Court decision or new legislation. 37 Furthermore, given the [i]n the interests of justice standard of Fed.R.Crim.P. 33, there seems little distinction between evidence which a defendant could not present because he did not know of it and evidence which he could not present because the witness was unavailable despite exercising due diligence. At least in the context of newly available evidence from one not a codefendant, at least two circuits appear to agree. See United States v. Garland, 991 F.2d 328, 335 (6th Cir.1993) (ordering new trial where although the defense knew of [witness's] existence before and during the trial, [the witness] was not located until after the trial.); United States v. Ouimette, 798 F.2d 47, 51-52 (2d Cir.1986) (ordering hearing on new trial where witness, while known of at trial, was unavailable after police allegedly pressured him not to testify). 38 We believe the better rule is not to categorically exclude the testimony of a codefendant who asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege at trial under the first prong but to consider it, albeit with great skepticism, in the context of all prongs of our four part test. It is true that there is a greater need for caution in considering Rule 33 motions where the new evidence comes from a codefendant who was unavailable at trial because he chose to exercise his privilege. See DiBernardo, 880 F.2d at 1224; United States v. Jacobs, 475 F.2d 270, 286 n. 33 (2d Cir.1973). It is not unusual for the obviously guilty codefendant to try to assume the entire guilt. United States v. Alejandro, 527 F.2d 423, 428 (5th Cir.1976). A convicted, sentenced codefendant has little to lose (and perhaps something to gain) by such testimony. United States v. Freeman, 77 F.3d 812, 817 (5th Cir.1996). Such testimony [by sentenced codefendants] would be untrustworthy and should not be encouraged. United States v. Reyes-Alvarado, 963 F.2d 1184, 1188 (9th Cir.1992). 39 Nonetheless, there is, here, at least a facial showing of compliance with the other prongs sufficient to warrant further inquiry. On its face, the proffered testimony in the affidavits is material, and the testimony, if believed, could lead to a different outcome, especially in light of the government's sufficient, but underwhelming, case against Montilla. See Benavente Gomez, 921 F.2d at 383 (It is true that where the trial evidence was noticeably thin, new exculpatory evidence may be of increased importance.). The new testimony, while it may not be true, is not inherently implausible. And we note that Montilla has steadfastly maintained his innocence, even through sentencing, at some cost. Because he refused to acknowledge that he had committed a crime, Montilla was ineligible for sentence reductions for acceptance of responsibility under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. 40 The term on its face is used deliberately here and with no suggestion that the codefendants' newly available testimony is true. That the codefendants waited a year to come forward hardly supports the strength of their assertions. But there is enough to commit the matter back to the district court, which is itself, under the law, responsible for weighing the factors under Rule 33: 41 Motions for new trial are directed to the discretion of the trial court. In considering such a motion, the court has broad power to weigh the evidence and assess the credibility of both the witnesses who testified at trial and those whose testimony constitutes new evidence. 42 Wright, 625 F.2d at 1019. The judge may, of course, use the knowledge he gained from presiding at the trial, as well as the showing made in the motion. 3 Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 557, at 337 (2d ed.1982). 43 We follow our precedent in United States v. Abou-Saada, 785 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.1986), and remand to the district court to reconsider the motion for a new trial and to hear evidence. There is no suggestion that such hearings are required in the usual course; they are not. Cf. United States v. Kearney, 682 F.2d 214, 218 (D.C.Cir.1982). Had the district court itself ruled otherwise on the issue of unavailability, it might have chosen to have a hearing. We think it wiser here for the district court to hold such a hearing given the unusual combination of circumstances here. Montilla's conviction rests almost entirely on the testimony of the DEA informant. Neither the videotape nor the audiotape directly incriminate Montilla. The reference on the audiotape to the mechanic could equally well be understood to refer to the location of the deal, and not to the role of the mechanic. Only the informant places him in the small room; Montilla's other witnesses say he was repairing a car. A hearing will be helpful 4 where the matters presented by the proffer are not conclusively refuted as to the alleged facts by the files and records of the case. United States v. Carbone, 880 F.2d 1500, 1502 (1st Cir.1989) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The credibility of the witnesses is important. Neither Caldern nor Zorrilla testified before--this is not a recantation of testimony situation where the court has had an opportunity to assess credibility. 5 44 We believe the district court should, after a hearing, reconsider whether, as Rule 33 provides, the interests of justice require a new trial. See Ouimette, 753 F.2d at 192-93 (remanding to the district court for hearing on new trial motion where affidavit presented new testimony going to issue of defendant's guilt); Lyles v. United States, 272 F.2d 910, 913 (5th Cir.1959) (on new trial motion, district court will be in a better position to exercise its functions after holding hearing). 45 As already observed, we disagree with the decisions treating the belated statements of codefendants aimed at exculpating the moving defendant as per se insufficient under Rule 33. But we share the general skepticism concerning those statements, and the present opinion by no means confers any automatic right in such a case to a new trial or even to a hearing. Our judgment here turns on unusual circumstances including the weakness of the government's case against the defendant, significant efforts to procure the codefendants' testimony before his own conviction, and the plausible explanation as to why the evidence was not available earlier. 46 The case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.