Opinion ID: 6534454
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Gwin v. Lynn

Text: Arguably, Stevens did not determine whether an expert who also participated in some of the events at issue in the case could be questioned in a discovery deposition about the substance of his or her expert opinions. In Gwin , four years after deciding Stevens , this court clarified that a witness who is an expert as to some matters and a fact witness as to other matters may be deposed as to the historical facts of his or her direct involvement in or observation of relevant events. Gwin , 344 Or. at 67 , 176 P.3d 1249 . However, the basic bar on expert discovery in Oregon-that a witness's opinions as an expert are not subject to discovery-was not modified in Gwin and remains untouched, as members of the bar have correctly understood to be the case. See, e.g. , II Oregon Civil Pleading and Practice § 27.5-7 (2012) (observing that Stevens resolved any ambiguity in Oregon about the disclosure of an expert's identity or opinions). Gwin , a legal malpractice action, involved an expert who was both an Oregon certified public accountant and a lawyer. The plaintiff had hired the expert to mitigate damages  from the defendant's alleged legal malpractice, 344 Or. at 68 , 176 P.3d 1249 , and then sought to present the expert's testimony at trial, including her opinion that the plaintiff would have to incur further expenses to mitigate her damages and that the Oregon State Bar's Professional Liability Fund could have reduced the damages by appointing repair counsel to help the plaintiff at an earlier point. Id. at 69 , 176 P.3d 1249 .  The defendant sought to depose the expert about her personal involvement in efforts to mitigate the damage that the defendant's alleged malpractice had caused. Id. at 68-69 , 176 P.3d 1249 . At a hearing on the defendant's motion to compel the lawyer's participation, the defendant clarified that he did not wish to inquire into the lawyer's expert opinions but only into the facts of which she had personal knowledge because of her involvement in mitigating the plaintiffs' damages. Id . at 70, 176 P.3d 1249 . After the trial court denied the motion to compel, the defendant sought a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate its order, arguing that, even if the lawyer would provide an expert opinion about, for example, the applicable standard of care, her knowledge of factual matters at issue in the case ought to be discoverable. Id . at 71, 176 P.3d 1249 . This court agreed with the defendant and issued a peremptory writ. This court first noted that, as the court had held in Stevens , the right under ORCP 36 B(1) to obtain discovery from all potential witnesses does not extend to expert witnesses. Id. at 72 , 176 P.3d 1249 ([L]egislative context and history establish ineluctably that the scope of the rule was not intended to extend to expert witnesses.). The Gwin court then stated: Still, nothing in the wording of [ ORCP 36 B], the decision in Stevens , or in any other case of which we are aware, suggests that a witness who has been personally or directly involved in events relevant to a case may not be deposed as to facts of which the witness has personal knowledge, simply because that person will be, as to other matters, an expert witness at trial. Id . at 72, 176 P.3d 1249 . As that passage suggests, the extent of the discovery allowed in Gwin turned on the distinction between historical facts, which the expert knew due to her participation in relevant events, and the opinions that she might express at trial based on her expertise. Emphasizing that distinction, the court thereafter considered and rejected various arguments that the plaintiffs had raised in opposition to the notion that their expert might be deposed as to her personal involvement in the underlying events. To an argument that the defendant's real  intent was to cross-examine the lawyer about her opinions as an expert, the court responded that it was persuaded that the defendant only sought to examine the lawyer concerning her personal involvement in those events and facts that are within her personal knowledge as a result of that involvement. Id . As for the plaintiff's contention that the evidence rules relating to expert opinions suggested that experts might have to disclose facts underpinning their opinions in voir dire but not in discovery, this court responded that the cited rules could not be read to prohibit deposing the witness concerning events that pertain to the witness's direct involvement in or observation of the relevant facts that are personally known by the witness and that were not gathered primarily for the purpose of rendering an expert opinion. Id. at 74 , 176 P.3d 1249 . And on a point directly relevant to this case, the court in Gwin rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the defendant would attempt to test the expert lawyer's expertise by taking apart the facts on which the expert bases her opinion. The court explained that the 'facts' that [the] defendant want[ed] from [the expert] pertain[ed] to her direct involvement in or her observation of and derivative knowledge of the relevant events. Id . at 73, 176 P.3d 1249 . In the end, the court issued a peremptory writ directing the trial court to allow the defendant to depose the lawyer, but it specified that [a]ny such deposition must  be limited to evidence that [the lawyer] can provide as a fact witness, and must observe the prohibition against pretrial deposition of expert witnesses with  respect to their anticipated expert testimony. Id . at 75, 176 P.3d 1249 . Ultimately, the court in Gwin held that the general prohibition on expert discovery recognized in Stevens stands, but that a party may depose an expert as to (and only as to) factual matters within the expert's personal knowledge. To the extent that that is not evident from the opinion's use of the term fact witness, it is made clear by the court's descriptions of the material sought by the defendants as, not opinions, but the facts that [the witness] has personal knowledge of, Gwin, 344 Or. at 70 , 176 P.3d 1249 ; factual  matters at issue, id. at 71 , 176 P.3d 1249 ; facts of which the witness has personal knowledge, id. at 72 , 176 P.3d 1249 ; facts  pertain[ing] to her direct involvement in or her observation of and derivative knowledge of the relevant events, id. at 73 , 176 P.3d 1249 ; and facts that pertain to the witness's direct involvement in or observation of the relevant events, id . at 74, 176 P.3d 1249 . The point is also made by the facts in Gwin . There, the evidence that the defendant sought from the plaintiff's expert, and to which the court concluded that the defendant was entitled, was factual-rather than opinion-evidence. It is described in the opinion as the actual amounts [that the witness] has collected from [the plaintiff], the percentage of work that she has done for [the plaintiff] that she can fairly say was directed at mitigation of damages, whether or not [the plaintiff's] house was ever refinanced, and which state employees she contacted on behalf of [the plaintiff] in order to get additional patients for [the plaintiff's] home care business. Id. at 71 , 176 P.3d 1249 . Moreover, this court drew a distinction between fact questions and opinion questions. In responding to the plaintiff's argument that, by deposing her expert concerning the historical facts concerning her work to mitigate damages, the defendant would inevitably stray into the prohibited area of expert opinion, this court explained that it was possible to distinguish between questions about facts and questions that sought expert opinions: Indeed, it seems clear to us that one can distinguish questions that, for example, call for answers about [the witness's] actions as a factual participant in the effort to mitigate damages, including her legal work for [the plaintiff], from those that call for answers about her expert opinions . And it also is true that, in any instance in which the lawyer defending the deposition believes that a question trespasses on [the witness's] expertise or otherwise is impermissible, the lawyer specifically is authorized by ORCP 39 D(3) to prevent the deponent from answering. Gwin , 344 Or. at 73 , 176 P.3d 1249 (emphasis added). As permitted and encouraged in Gwin , defendant's lawyer in this case drew the line between questions calling for historical facts (including expert opinions that the doctors had formed in 2013) and  questions directed at obtaining newly formed expert opinions from the doctors during their depositions. Thus, I disagree with the majority's conclusion that it is not the current application of expertise that is dispositive. Ransom , 363 Or. at 566, 425 P.3d at 420. In reaching that conclusion, the majority relies on Gwin for the propositions that (1) an expert who acquires or develops facts or opinions as a participant in the events at issue may be questioned about those events as an ordinary witness; (2) under ORCP 36 B, a participating expert can be asked any questions relevant to his or her direct involvement in the events at issue; and (3) whether a participating expert also has expert qualifications does not alter or restrict the scope of the questions that he or she may be asked about his or her participation. Ransom , 363 Or. at 566-67, 425 P.3d at 420 (emphasis in original). The majority's reading of Gwin , however, is in some respects wrong and in other respects merely imprecise in a way that obfuscates the opinion's actual point. First, Gwin does not support the distinction the majority draws between participating and nonparticipating expert witnesses, based on the sources of their evidence. Although the Gwin opinion does contain a statement to the effect that, for purposes of  the opinion, a fact witness is a person who has obtained relevant facts through their own senses, 344 Or. at 67 n. 1, 176 P.3d 1249 (as opposed to obtaining facts principally for the purpose of rendering an expert opinion in the trial, id . at 75, 176 P.3d 1249 ), that description refers to historical facts, and this court would permit the opponent to ask the witness deposition questions only about those historical facts. Neither does Gwin focus, as the majority appears to suggest, on whether the facts being sought were directly perceived by the witness or else presented to him or her for the purposes of rendering an opinion. Instead, discoverability turns not on the source of the facts underpinning the evidence sought from the expert, but on the content of the testimony that is sought, i.e. , whether it would impart the witness's current scientific, technical, or otherwise specialized knowledge or opinion to assist the trier of fact or whether the witness would relate historical facts given the witness's direct involvement in or observation of the relevant events  that are personally known by the witness. Id. at 74 , 176 P.3d 1249 . But the most significant problem with the majority's explanation of Gwin is that it obscures what should be an obvious point of the opinion-that a party may only depose an expert as to factual matters within the expert's personal knowledge. To the extent that the doctors were involved in events that are relevant to plaintiff's case, plaintiff is entitled to question them about matters within their personal knowledge concerning how or why they proceeded in the manner that they did-including their own observations, findings, diagnoses, and opinions at the time. Those matters are historical facts in this context, and they are proper subjects for deposition under Gwin . In this case, plaintiff did inquire, and the doctors answered questions regarding, those matters. But the doctors' current observations and opinions of radiological scans that will be presented to them, even if they are the same scans that they allegedly misread in 2013, are (or would be) the very epitome of expert opinion testimony-the expert's application of his specialized knowledge to diagnostic images that are presented for the purpose of eliciting an opinion as to what they portray. And because that is so, the relevant rule is the one that this court acknowledged in Stevens as a policy choice that the legislature had made in 1979: discovery of experts is not authorized in civil actions in this state. 336 Or. at 404 , 84 P.3d 140 . The majority also relies on case law from other jurisdictions. Ransom , 363 Or. at 568-69, 425 P.3d at 421-22. But it is notable that the cases the majority cites rely on civil procedure rules that have not been interpreted as categorically barring discovery of experts, except as to factual matters within their personal knowledge based on involvement in the relevant events. If Oregon is an outlier in this matter, it is because that is what Oregon practice and Oregon's discovery rule-as interpreted by this court in two opinions that plaintiff does not seek to overturn-demand. 3  I recognize that, in a world that generally permits liberal discovery of the opposing party's case, it appears anomalous to place any limits on plaintiff's discovery of the doctors when she alleges that they were responsible for her injury. In federal practice, for example, FRCP 26(a)(2) now requires a party to disclose the identity of any witness it may use at trial to present evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 703, or 705 and, unless a written report under FRCP 26(a)(2)(B) is required, to provide the subject matter on which the witness is expected to present evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 703, 705 and a summary of the facts and opinions to which the witness is expected to testify. FRCP 26(a)(2)(C). And, a party may depose any person who has been identified as an expert whose opinions  may be presented at trial, FRCP 26(b)(4)(A), meaning any testifying expert, retained or not. It is especially difficult when, in similar circumstances, other jurisdictions have concluded that a percipient expert's current opinions are fair game for discovery, as noted by the majority. But the drift of judicial decisions made under entirely different statutes should not impel this court to set aside settled notions of Oregon's bar on expert discovery.