Opinion ID: 1980207
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: record title ownership

Text: II. Noticeably the 1848 plat clearly established Water Street as the eastern boundary of block 96. In 1905, however, another or second plat was made pursuant to a survey by Charles Schecker. Plaintiffs insist the latter shows (1) the city abandoned Water Street along block 96, and (2) the eastern boundary of that block became the water's edge. As a preface to our consideration of this contention, a more detailed map of block 96 is set forth, infra [see p. 524]. Based upon the 1905 Schecker plat, this diagram shows block 96 is bordered on the east by two irregular wavy lines, labeled High Bank of Mississippi along the upper (northern) part of the drawing. An ancillary dispute as to the effect of such label is later resolved. The thatched area represents plaintiffs' property as determined by trial court. To the right (east) thereof is the disputed tract, measuring about 68 feet, north to south. For reasons later disclosed land located between the 1848 plat boundary line and the heavier wavy line is denoted upland tract. The remainder of the disputed strip, represented by space between the two irregular lines, is labeled lowland tract. III. The 1905 Schecker plat is the sine qua non of plaintiffs' claimed record title ownership. All deeds comprising their chain of title describe the property conveyed as designated in the recorded plat thereof, or by similar words of incorporation. Millhams contend the recorded plat thereof, referred to in all such title instruments since 1905, relate to the Schecker plat. But defendant maintains such references in all of plaintiffs' chain of title instruments are to the 1848 plat, including those executed after filing of the Schecker plat. It is attendantly urged by defendant the latter plat is invalid because of noncompliance with certain statutory procedures governing its recordation. Resolution of this issue requires a sequential determination of the various defects to which defendant alludes. A. First, defendant offered evidence tending to show the Schecker plat was never actually recorded. Plaintiffs' testimony, including Guttenberg Town Council Minute Book entries from 1903 to 1905 and numerous notations on the first page of the Schecker plat itself, strongly suggest the contrary. Indeed, the recorder's certificate endorsed thereupon is prima facie evidence the document was in fact properly recorded. See Thompson v. Anderson, 94 Iowa 554, 557, 63 N.W. 355 (1895). Despite the fact the county assessor never officially used the 1905 plat and same was not officially indexed in the county recorder's office we assume, arguendo, it was recorded in September 1905. As later demonstrated, however, this alone does not per se aid plaintiffs' cause. B. Defendant next assails validity of the 1905 plat because it contains no certification of approval by the Guttenberg Town Council. By virtue of § 916, The Code 1897 (in effect when said plat was filed for recordation in 1905), such attestation was a condition precedent to recording. In material part, it provided: All plats    before being recorded, shall be filed with the clerk of such city or town, and when so filed the council, within a reasonable time, shall consider the same, and, if it is found that such plat conforms to the provisions hereof, the council shall direct the mayor and clerk to certify its resolution of approval, which shall be affixed to the said plat before it shall be received for record by the county recorder. Moreover, § 917 stated, in relevant part: When the statement and plat are accompanied with the certificates   , they shall be admitted to record, and not otherwise, and shall be of no validity until so filed for record in the office of the recorder   . (emphasis supplied). Plaintiffs concede the Schecker plat bears no such certificate of approval, but insist it was actually, if not formally, approved by the town council. Some council minute entries support this view, including a September 5, 1905 resolution that Chas. Schecker be authorized to have the new town plats recorded. We are told there was thus substantial compliance with the statutes. Admittedly substantial compliance with statutory requirements is generally held sufficient. See 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations § 83b. Although plaintiffs contend there was certainly a substantial compliance, this assertion is open to question. See e.g., Metropolitan Plan Com'n. of Marion County v. State, 243 Ind. 46, 182 N.E.2d 786 (1962). In any event, standard of compliance is not here determinative because the irregularities cited by defendant were statutorily cured by § 592.3, The Code 1971: In all cases where, prior to January 1, 1950, any person, persons, or corporations have laid out any parcel of land into town or city lots and the plat or plats thereof have been recorded and the same appears to be insufficient because of    a failure to fully comply with all of the provisions of chapter 409 of the Code, 1950, or corresponding statutes of earlier Codes,    and, subsequent to such platting, lots or subdivisions thereof have been sold and conveyed, all such said plats which have not been vacated and have been of record for a period of twenty years or more, are hereby legalized and made of full force and effect as of the date of the making thereof the same as though all certificates had been attached and all the other necessary steps taken as provided by law   . See also § 592.2; 32 Iowa L.Rev. 746, 748, n. 26 (1947). In light of this legalizing act, it is evident the recorded Schecker plat was accorded validity notwithstanding irregularities which attended the filing and recordation thereof. Consequently, we are confronted with two inconsistent plats, both valid in law and neither specifically vacated. C. So the question now to be resolved is whether plaintiffs acquired their residential property with reference to the 1848 recorded plat thereof or, as they contend, the 1905 recorded plat thereof. It is to be initially understood the validity or invalidity of a plat does not affect the efficacy of a deed which describes property conveyed by reference to such plat. In Young v. Cosgrove, 83 Iowa 682, 684, 49 N.W. 1040 (1891), this court said: Surely, when an instrument is referred to to designate land or give description thereof, we are not required to hold such an instrument valid and regular in order to accept the description it gives. A void deed or a void plat could well describe lands which could be properly and conveniently referred to for such description in deeds conveying them. (emphasis supplied). And, as explained in 1 Patton, Land Titles, § 120 (2d ed. 1957), quoted in Marshall, Iowa Title Opinions and Standards (Annotated), 14.1(P), at 342 (1963): A conveyance by reference to a recorded plat, is not affected by the plat being invalid. This is because the plat, whether valid or invalid, if conclusively identified, is as much a part of the description as would be the case if it were copied into the instrument, or if the data furnished by it were set out in full. See also 23 Am.Jur.2d, Deeds, §§ 232-233; 26 C.J.S., Deeds, § 100h at 874. By reason of the fact plaintiffs' chain of title instruments refer only to the recorded plat thereof in describing the property conveyed, we must next determine which plat is so incorporated by reference. The standard to be applied is well stated in 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations § 83a, at 199: In case of discrepancy between plats, the one with respect to which lots have been sold will be deemed to be the true and correct one as far as the rights of the owners of those lots are concerned. The entire problem here presented may be thus reduced to a single question of fact: Is the plat with respect to which lots have been sold the 1848 John M. Gay plat, or the 1905 Charles Schecker plat? We find no indication the latter was ever employed as a deed-related reference prior to involvement in the instant litigation. Plaintiffs' abstract of title makes no mention whatsoever of the Schecker plat. Furthermore, the city surveyor found no such signification in municipal or county files. Although the 1905 plat was kept in the county recorder's office, it was used for reference purposes only. Finally, the county assessor stated, by affidavit, the 1848 plat alone is used for the purposes of assessing the properties as covered thereby. While plaintiffs insist the assessor's nonuse of the Schecker plat is irrelevant, we must disagree. See Edwards v. City of Santa Paula, 138 Cal.App.2d 375, 292 P.2d 31, 35 (1956). The narrow issue at hand is apparently one of first impression in Iowa, but our factual determination finds ample support in Pavela v. Fliesz, 26 Wis.2d 710, 133 N.W.2d 244 (1965). There the plaintiffs' (grantees') deed described their lot as 40 feet in width, adding said premises to be known as lot eighteen (18) in block twelve (12) of First Addition to Kenosha Center, when same is placed on record. Plaintiffs there introduced an area plat showing their lot was 42 feet wide, two feet more than the width appearing in the metes and bounds description of the [plaintiffs'] property in all the deeds involving that parcel since 1917. 133 N.W.2d at 247. The plat, however, contained no indication of its date of origin, had not been recorded, and significantly, [t]here was no evidence that any of the grantors or grantees in the various deeds had actual knowledge of plaintiffs' [plat]. Id., at 246. The question before the court was, as here, whether plaintiffs took their property according to the disputed plat  i.e., was it incorporated into the deeds under which the [plaintiffs] claim   . Answering in the negative, the Wisconsin Supreme Court said: An unrecorded plat or other map referred to in a deed and identified by parol evidence will be treated, at least between the grantor and grantee, as effectively incorporated into the deed. The reference, however, must be definite and certain. In the case before us, the deed references to the First Addition do not give any particulars by which a plat or map existing at the time the particular deed was given could be identified as the one referred to, other than the name of a proposed subdivision. Although there is evidence that plaintiffs [plat] was in existence at the assessor's office during the time that many of the relevant deeds were delivered, we consider the evidence insufficient to establish that the various grantors and grantees had it in mind. 133 N.W.2d at 247 (emphasis supplied). Similarly, in the case at bar, plaintiffs' chain of title deeds refer to the 1848 plat alone, the only recorded plat thereof in existence prior to September 1905. Various deeds thereafter executed impart no indication a different plat was contemplated by reference to the recorded plat thereof. Briefly stated, any alleged reference to the Schecker plat is hardly definite and certain. It further appears plaintiffs were unaware of the Schecker plat until shortly before commencement of this action. Compare Raines v. Village of Alden, 252 Minn. 530, 90 N.W.2d 906 (1958). In light of the fact plaintiffs offered no evidence substantiating any claim to the effect their property was purchased in contemplation of the 1905 rather than the 1848 plat, we must reject the theory of ownership by record title advanced by them. This conclusion also comports with the general rule that lines of a senior plat survey will prevail over conflicting lines in a junior survey. See 11 C.J.S. Boundaries § 61. IV. Parenthetically, if plaintiffs had proved the various post-1905 deeds incorporated the Schecker plat description by reference, they would still not be riparian owners. Even though plaintiffs claim said plat shows the Mississippi River as the eastern boundary of block 96, we agree with trial court's findings to the contrary. As disclosed by the diagram in Division II, supra, the Schecker plat contains two irregular parallel lines between block 96 and the river. Although the plat page on which block 96 is detailed does not so indicate, the same bilinear symbol is labeled High Bank of Mississippi along block G (immediately north of block 96) on another page of Schecker's map. For clarification, our diagram indicates this designation adjacent to block G. In an effort to resolve an apparent labeling inconsistency, defendant introduced testimony by a realty specialist for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. He opined the heavier wavy line represents the top of the high bank. This witness also stated the lighter parallel line to the right (east) thereof denotes the water line of the river or even the bottom of the bank. Upon a careful examination of the entire plat, he concluded Schecker closed these tracts [i. e., lots 1-8 in block 96] on the easterly side at the top of the high bank of the Mississippi River. Trial court found, and we agree, the foregoing interpretation of the 1905 plat conforms to all other surveys in evidence at this trial. Resultantly, plaintiffs' assertion that the Schecker plat established the easterly boundary of [their property] to be the high water mark of the Mississippi River must be rejected. In other words, evidence adduced at trial, including the Schecker plat upon which plaintiffs lean so heavily, clearly demonstrates there is a strip of land between the rim of the high bank and the water's edge which is not part of block 96. From this it follows plaintiffs' claim of riparian ownership status is unfounded because, as later disclosed, their property does not abut upon a river. See Peck v. Olsen Constr. Co., 216 Iowa 519, 522-523, 245 N.W. 131, 89 A.L.R. 1147 (1931). See also McCauley v. Salmon, 234 Iowa 1020, 1022, 14 N.W.2d 715 (1944); Shortell v. Des Moines Electric Co., 186 Iowa 469, 480, 172 N.W. 649 (1919). Actually, the east-west lot dimensions shown on the Schecker plat extend only to the rim of the high bank, rather than to the river itselfa fact which supports trial court's interpretation of said plat. On the other hand, plaintiffs insist the river is the relevant boundary monument, therefore it should negate and take precedence over inconsistent distance calls. See generally Park Commissioners v. Taylor, 133 Iowa 453, 459-460, 108 N.W. 927 (1906); 11 C.J.S. Boundaries § 50c. If the Schecker plat did show the river, rather than the top or rim of the high bank, as the eastern boundary of block 96, plaintiffs' reliance upon Taylor, supra, would be justifiable. But the fact remains the 1905 plat does not establish the Mississippi River as a boundary monument. Consequently, Taylor is inapposite. Rather, the circumstances here involved are virtually indistinguishable from those presented in Turner Subdiv. Property Owner Assoc. v. Schneider, 4 Mich.App. 388, 144 N.W.2d 848, 850 (1966), where the court said: An examination of defendants' chain of title makes it clear that defendants' premises ran on a metes-and-bounds description `to the bank of Lake Michigan' and not `to the lake shore at high water' or any other point on the water's edge. The surveys introduced as exhibits clearly indicate that the water is and was a substantial distance from the bluff or bank upon which defendants' home is located. Whoever owns property in actual contact with the water is considered the true riparian owner because the `basis of the riparian doctrine, and an indispensable requisite to it, is actual contact of the land with the water.' [Citation]. Defendants, therefore, cannot be considered riparian owners. Further discussion is unnecessary. Plaintiffs' claim of ownership by record title is without merit.