Opinion ID: 1590328
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Plaintiff's Theory

Text: According to Horn, the feature that made it easy to disable the interlock by simpl[y] unplugging the J-13 circuit render[ed] the [machine] defective and thus unreasonably dangerous. Horn's brief, at 49. Horn's expert witness, B.J. Stephens, testified that it was foreseeable that the interlock [would] be defeated, and that it was too easy to defeat the interlock. Horn's theory of the case is that Mitchell was killed while operating the machine in automatic mode, and that the machine was operational in that mode with the doors open and the cutting area unprotected because the interlock could be disabled by simply unplugging one wire in the circuit box on the back of the machine. Her theory, in other words, is that the machine as designed and marketed virtually invited removal of the interlock so as to permit open-door operation in the automatic mode. Thus, Horn does not fault the design for failing to inhibit open-door operation of the machine in manual mode. In that connection, Cardinal contends that Horn has failed to present substantial evidence indicating that the machine was in fact being operated in automatic mode.  Cardinal's brief, at 27 (emphasis added). We disagree. It is undisputed that Mitchell's machine was set to operate at 4,000 rpm at the time of the accident. Roy Procter, [2] who is the machine shop supervisor for SDS and was, therefore, Mitchell's supervisor at the time of the accident, testified that 4,000 rpm was a more appropriate speed for automatic mode. That fact is also supported by findings contained in the OSHA report. According to the OSHA report, Mitchell's machine had  finished [its] X axis,  and she was preparing [to make] her second cut  when the cutting tool broke. (Emphasis added.) Based on these findings, Horn's expert witness, B.J. Stephens, opined that the machine must have been operating in automatic mode. Procter agreed with Stephens that the OSHA findings suggest that Mitchell was operating the machine in automatic mode. In particular, he stated that if Mitchell was in the process of making a second cut when the accident occurred, she must have been operating the machine in automatic mode. He also testified that one could infer from the finding that the machine had finished the X axis that Mitchell was in the middle of a job and in the automatic mode. Thus, the evidence indicating that Mitchell was operating the machine in automatic mode at the time of the accident was substantial. Cardinal also contends that because of the deliberate circumvention of the interlockostensibly by employees of SDS after the installation of the machine by Cardinal  the machine was not in substantially the same condition at the time of the accident as when it was marketed and sold. Therefore, it argues, the action of individuals not affiliated with Cardinal was an intervening cause of the accident, relieving Cardinal of liability. Horn, however, contends that alteration does not relieve Cardinal of liability as a matter of law. This is so, because, she argues, where an alteration or modification is reasonably foreseeable to a manufacturer or seller, the manufacturer or seller is not relieved of liability under a design defect claim under the AEMLD. Horn's brief, at 55-56. This argument is in accord with Alabama law. `An essential element of an AEMLD claim is proof that the product reached the consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it was sold. . . . However, the mere fact that a product has been altered or modified does not necessarily relieve the manufacturer or seller of liability.' Hicks v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 652 So.2d 211, 218 (Ala. 1994) (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Harris, 630 So.2d 1018, 1027 (Ala.1993)). `A manufacturer or seller remains liable if . . . the alteration or modification was reasonably foreseeable to the manufacturer or seller. . . .' Id. (emphasis added). Harris involved, among other things, an AEMLD action against a manufacturer and a retailer arising out of the improper installation of a water heater, resulting in the severe carbon-monoxide poisoning of the occupants of a mobile home. The heater was improperly installed without a pipe to vent carbon monoxide and other exhaust gases outside the mobile home. 630 So.2d at 1023. The heater was previously owned, and no draft hood accompanied the heater when it left the original purchaser's possession. At trial, [the installer for the occupants] testified that when he installed the water heater he did not know that gas water heaters required venting. 630 So.2d at 1023. After a jury returned a verdict against the manufacturer and seller, the manufacturer and seller moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, [3] arguing, among other things, that the plaintiffs had failed to carry their burden of establishing that the water heater had not been substantially altered between its [sale] and the time of the accident. 630 So.2d at 1027. Indeed, the undisputed evidence was that when the water heater was installed in the mobile home its draft hood and vent pipe and the plastic pouch containing the instruction manual were missing. 630 So.2d at 1023. However, the trial court denied their motion, and they raised that issue on appeal. The plaintiffs argued that [i]t was foreseeable . . . that the pouch containing the instruction manual, as well as the draft hood and vent pipe, would be removed from the water heater. 630 So.2d at 1027. This Court agreed with the plaintiffs and held that the trial court did not err in denying the motions for a [judgment notwithstanding the verdict] on the basis of a substantial alteration of the product. 630 So.2d at 1028. The Court stated: [W]e hold that the changes in the water heater either were not substantial alterations or, if they were substantial alterations, were foreseeable. First, the evidence shows that the vent pipe was not sold with the water heater. The instruction manual states that the customer must provide his own vent pipe. Therefore, the absence of a vent pipe cannot be a substantial alteration of the product. Second, substantial evidence shows that the instruction manual [and] the draft hood . . . were detachable and easily removed. When the water heater was originally sold, the instruction manual was contained in a plastic pouch affixed to the water heater by adhesive tape. The draft hood was attached by slipping tabs located on the legs of the draft hood into holes placed in the jacket top covering the top of the water heater. . . . Thus, the removal of the manual [and] the draft hood . . . was a foreseeable alteration of the water heater.  630 So.2d at 1028 (emphasis added). Horn's expert testified that it was foreseeable that the interlock [would] be defeated and that it was too easy to defeat it. Gary Wooster, a computer engineer employed by Fadal, testified that Fadal know[s] that users attempt to defeat the interlock. Wooster also stated that users of the machines Fadal markets and sells in Europe expect to be able to defeat it. Because there is substantial evidence indicating that attempts to disable the interlock were foreseeable, there is substantial evidence indicating that the machine reached the consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it was sold. 652 So.2d at 218. In that respect, Fenley v. Rouselle Corp., 531 So.2d 304 (Ala.1988), cited by Cardinal, is distinguishable. That case involved post-sale modifications of a machine press manufactured by Rouselle Corporation and purchased by the employer of the plaintiff, Virgil Fenley. 531 So.2d at 304. The trial court found that, before the accident that injured Fenley, his employer had modified the machine in a number of important ways: `The press was acquired by the employer of the Plaintiff and as manufactured was operated by a foot treadle. Prior to the day of this accident, the foot treadle had been removed. The employer was in the process of altering the press at the time of the accident by converting it to operate off of four palm buttons. Once the alterations were completed, the operation of the press would require two employees, each with both hands fully engaged on the buttons, before the press would operate. `Before the modification process had been completed, the employer elected to run some parts and had installed one unguarded palm button at approximately waist high in order to do so. The plaintiff, Virgil Wallace Fenley, apparently leaned against the one unguarded palm button, thus activating the press and injuring his hands. `In short, the Plaintiff and his employer were making temporary use of the press by putting the press in operation before the modification procedure had been completed.' 531 So.2d at 304-05. To those findings, this Court added the following comments: The rigging of the press to operate with one palm button was not the only change that decreased the safety of the press. James Brooks, the electrician who modified the press for Fenley's employer, testified regarding the changes made. He had been installing new electrical equipment and controls supplied by Rockford Safety Equipment. The press in question was the last to have its controls changed, and Fenley's employer instructed him to get this press running the best way he could, so that it could be used temporarily. He did not install the controls specified by Rockford Safety Equipment. For one operator, the press should have had two palm buttons wired in series so that the machine could operate only when the operator had both hands on the buttons. The buttons required guards so that they could not be pressed accidentally, but the guard was not in place on the button that caused the accident. The control box had interlocks to require the use of both buttons, but Brooks had bypassed the interlocks. He also testified that an anti-tie-down circuit was not wired, but did not specify how that made the machine less safe. The motor start circuit was also bypassed. Brooks was asked, `When the motor had been turned to the off position, and if the motor start circuit had been wired properly, could the press have been actuated?' He answered, `No.' There is evidence in the record that Fenley may have turned the motor off before attempting to change dies, but did not wait for the motor to stop completely, and that the press could operate as long as the motor was still turning. Thus, it can be seen that Fenley's employer had caused numerous safety devices on the machine to be deactivated and had made the machine operate in a very different manner than it had when it left the control of Rouselle. . . .  531 So.2d at 306 (emphasis added). Significantly, the trial court held that, [a]t the time [Fenley] was injured, the machine was being operated in a manner or fashion and in a rigged condition that could not have been foreseen by the manufacturer.  531 So.2d at 305. On the basis of those findings and that holding, this Court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the manufacturer. Similarly, Burkett v. Loma Machine Manufacturing, Inc., 552 So.2d 134 (Ala. 1989), involved post-sale modifications of a saw blade guard, increasing the exposed part of the blade from 15 to 30 inches, and resulting in injury to a user. 552 So.2d at 135-36. This Court affirmed a summary judgment in favor of the manufacturer, because the manufacturer had presented uncontroverted evidence that the alteration was substantial. 552 So.2d at 136. In this case, we cannot say that, as a matter of law, the machine was substantially altered within the meaning of the AEMLD. In short, Horn has presented substantial evidence as to the elements of her AEMLD claim. Her expert opined that the machine was defectively designed due to the foreseeability of the industrial customer to bypass the interlock circuit in the elementary method employed in the instant case and that the accident could have been prevented had the machine been equipped with technology that was readily available when it was manufactured. Indeed, Cardinal concedes that the broken cutting tool was allowed to escape the confines of the machine because the front door shields were open. Cardinal's brief, at 3. Thus, we turn to Cardinal's affirmative defenses.