Opinion ID: 3009935
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Was Westinghouse's ADEA Violation Willful?

Text: Westinghouse next contends that the district court erred in upholding the jury's finding of willfulness. Willfulness is significant because the ADEA provides double damages when the employer's discriminatory conduct is willful. 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(b). The double recovery is punitive and is intended to deter willful conduct. Trans-World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 125 (1985). An ADEA violation is willful if the employer either knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the ADEA. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 113 S. Ct. 1701, 1710 (1993). In Hazen Paper, the Supreme Court rejected any requirement of direct evidence of discrimination, outrageous conduct by the employer10 or proof that age was the 9 . We have considered Westinghouse's argument that certain time sheets, identifying work that Starceski could have performed when it terminated him, were improperly admitted into evidence under the business records exception to the hearsay rule but conclude this argument lacks merit. A proper foundation was laid for the admission of these documents and they were properly admitted under Rule 803(6) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which permits the admission of documents prepared in the ordinary course of business, even if the individual who prepared them does not testify about their contents. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). 10 . This rejection of the outrageous standard effectively overrules our decisions in Lockhart v. Westinghouse Credit Corp., 879 F.2d 43, 57-58 (3d Cir. 1989) and Dreyer v. Arco Chemical predominant rather than a determinative factor in the employment decision. Id.; Sanchez v. Puerto Rico Oil Co., 37 F.3d 712, 722 n.9 (1st Cir. 1994). In addressing willfulness after Hazen Paper, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reasoned that the question is not whether the evidence used to establish willfulness is different from and additional to the evidence used to establish a violation of the ADEA, but whether the evidenceadditional or otherwisesatisfies the distinct standard used for establishing willfulness. Brown v. Stites Concrete, Inc., 994 F.2d 553, 560 (8th Cir. 1993). In the instant case, the district court reasoned: [T]he evidence was undisputed that Mr. Ali Jaafar was defendant's management personnel with final decisionmaking authority over plaintiff's layoff. Plaintiff's evidence, through his then supervisor, Mr. Dick Saul, was that several months prior to the planned layoff, Mr. Jaafar told Mr. Saul to set up the senior engineers in plaintiff's department for permanent layoff. Mr. Saul testified that the clear meaning of Mr. Jaafar's instructions was that the older engineers in plaintiff's department were to be specifically targeted for permanent layoff. Mr. Saul further testified that thereafter, Mr. Jaafar directed him to artificially lower plaintiff's performance evaluation. Starceski v. Westinghouse, No. 91-0454, slip op. at 5 (W.D. Pa. March 14, 1994).11 We again acknowledge the conflicting (..continued) Co., 801 F.2d 651, 658 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 906 (1987). 11 . The record also shows that five of the six individuals selected for layoff were in the protected age group, and testimony on whether Jaafar gave these orders, but state again that we are obliged to view the evidence in the light most favorable to Starceski, the verdict winner. See Radabaugh, 997 F.2d at 450. Looking at the record in this way, Westinghouse's position that the violation resulted from no more than accident, inadvertence or ordinary negligence is factually incorrect. See Sanchez, 37 F.3d at 721-22.12 On this record, a jury acting reasonably could find that Westinghouse either knew or showed reckless disregard for its statutory duty to avoid discriminating against Starceski because of his age.13 (..continued) Starceski was the oldest. The average age of those laid off was fifty-one. The average age of those retained was thirty-nine. 12 . We reject Westinghouse's argument that Jaafar's intent cannot be imputed to it. Jaafar was a second level manager and was the final decision maker on the selection of people for termination. Therefore, his intent is imputed to the company both for the purpose of determining whether the Act was violated and for the purpose of determining whether that violation was willful. See Crawford v. West Jersey Health Systems, 847 F. Supp. 1232, 1236 (D.N.J. 1994) (test for determining agency is whether the alleged agent has 'participated in the decisionmaking process that forms the basis of the discrimination') (quoting Hamilton v. Rodgers, 791 F.2d 439, 443 (5th Cir. 1986)). We also reject Westinghouse's contention that the district court erred in admitting a list of employees in Starceski's department, which was prepared at the request of the EEOC and contained the employees' ages and indicated who had been selected for layoff, but then excluding the EEOC determination that Starceski's administrative charge lacked probable cause. Admission of the EEOC decision on probable cause and its file is entrusted to the discretion of the district court. Walton v. Eaton Corp., 563 F.2d 66, 75 (3d Cir. 1977) (upholding the trial court's refusal to admit portions of the EEOC file). We cannot say that the district court abused its discretion here. 13 . The dissenting opinion contends that Jaafar's statements were insufficient to show that Westinghouse acted willfully. In doing so, the dissenting opinion in footnote 2 disclaims any need to consider whether Jaafar's conduct could be attributed to Accordingly, we will affirm the district court's denial of Westinghouse's motion for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial on willfulness. (..continued) Westinghouse. It concludes that a jury finding that Jaafar may have discriminated is not proof that Westinghouse knew or approved Jaafar's act. In this respect, the dissenting opinion fails to give Starceski, as the verdict winner, the benefit of all inferences that reasonably can be drawn from the evidence. One such inference from Saul's testimony about Jaafar's remarks is that Westinghouse knew of or showed reckless disregard for its duties under the ADEA. Under the usual standards governing the interpretation of a verdict speaking generally to any issue, we should assume the jury so found. Thus, our analysis does not disturb the two-tier rule as the dissenting opinion suggests.