Opinion ID: 183984
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: A.1. Search of Stabile's House

Text: Stabile first argues that the Government's July 24, 2006 warrantless search of his house violated the Fourth Amendment. This argument fails because Deetz consented to the search. The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990); United States v. Price, 558 F.3d 270, 277 (3d Cir.2009); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). In general, a warrantless entry into a person's house is unreasonable per se.  See Payton, 445 U.S. at 586, 100 S.Ct. 1371. However, there are exceptions to this rule. See Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499, 78 S.Ct. 1253, 2 L.Ed.2d 1514 (1958). Consent is an exception to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); see Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250-51, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) (approving consent searches because a search permitted by consent is reasonable). Consent must be given voluntarily, Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968), and voluntariness may be gleaned from considering a range of factors. See Price, 558 F.3d at 279; United States v. Kim, 27 F.3d 947, 955 (3d Cir.1994). The individual giving consent must also possess the authority to do so, see Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 181, 110 S.Ct. 2793, and the consent of one who possesses common authority over premises or effects is valid as against the absent, nonconsenting person with whom that authority is shared, United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974). Common authority rests not on property rights but rather on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control . . . so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the cohabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched. Id. at 172 n. 7, 94 S.Ct. 988. Finally, a warrantless search of a shared dwelling for evidence over the express refusal of consent by a physically present resident cannot be justified as reasonable as to him on the basis of consent given to the police by another resident. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 120, 126 S.Ct. 1515, 164 L.Ed.2d 208 (2006). Here, Deetz had authority to consent and voluntarily consented. Deetz had common authority to consent to a search of the house because, as a cohabitant, she mutually used the property along with Stabile and exercised joint access and control over the house. See Matlock, 415 U.S. at 172 n. 7, 94 S.Ct. 988. Deetz's mistaken belief that she was married to Stabile does not alter the analysis because an unmarried cohabitant has authority to consent to a search of shared premises. See id. at 176, 94 S.Ct. 988. Finally, we note that at the time Deetz granted consent, Stabile was not present. Stabile's absence distinguishes this case from Georgia v. Randolph , which applies only when a physically present resident refuses consent. 547 U.S. at 120, 126 S.Ct. 1515. Therefore, because Deetz exercised her access and control over the premises absent any contemporaneous refusal by a co-resident, she had authority to consent at the time of the search. We also conclude that Deetz's consent was voluntary. [W]e determine the voluntariness of a consent by examining the totality of the circumstances. Price, 558 F.3d at 278; Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227, 93 S.Ct. 2041. We consider such factors as age, education, and intelligence of the subject; whether the subject was advised of his or her constitutional rights; the length of the encounter, the repetition or duration of the questioning; and the use of physical punishment. Price, 558 F.3d at 278; see Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226, 93 S.Ct. 2041. The `setting in which the consent was obtained [and] the parties' verbal and non-verbal actions' are also relevant. Price, 558 F.3d at 278 (quoting United States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 459 (3d Cir.2003)). Finally, even though Deetz was told she could refuse, the Government need not inform the subject of his right to refuse consent. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227, 93 S.Ct. 2041 (not essential for prosecution to show that the consenter knew of the right to refuse consent in order to establish that the consent was voluntary); Kim, 27 F.3d at 955. Here, Deetz, an educated person, invited the officers into her house. She asked the officers to sit and offered them drinks. The officers asked Deetz to sign a written consent form, and Deetz thought about whether to sign it for thirty minutes before she did, in fact, sign it. Deetz also orally consented to the search. After signing the form, Deetz assisted the officers in their search of the house by leading them to several computers and, later, providing one officer with a screwdriver to help remove a hard drive. Considering the totality of the circumstances, there is no indication that Deetz's consent was involuntary. Therefore, because Deetz had the authority to consent to a search of the house and because Deetz voluntarily consented to the search, the initial warrantless search of the house did not violate the Fourth Amendment.