Opinion ID: 886659
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Montana’s Constitution

Text: ¶54 When the Declaration of Rights of Montana’s Constitution was drafted, the Bill of Rights Committee (the Committee) clearly intended that the rights set out in Article II stand on their own footing and provide individuals with fundamental rights and protections far broader than those available through the federal system. The Committee’s February 22, 1972 transmittal letter to the Convention delegates states that “new safeguards” had been added to the Declaration [Bill] of Rights “to meet the changing circumstances of contemporary life” and: In presenting this proposed Declaration of Rights, the committee notes that the guidelines and protections for the exercise of liberty in a free society come not from government but from the people who create that government. It is that spirit which has motivated this committee to insure for Montana’s future, through this bill of rights, a more responsible government that is Constitutionally commanded never to forget that government is created solely for the welfare of the people so that the people can more fully enjoy the heritage of American liberty within the structure of that government. Montana Constitutional Convention, Bill of Rights Committee Proposal, February 22, 1972, p. 619 (hereinafter Proposal). ¶55 Taking these admonitions to heart, this Court has, for example, applied the broader protections of Montana’s Constitution in a number of contexts involving individual privacy (Gryczan v. State (1997), 283 Mont. 433, 942 P.2d 112); personal autonomy (Armstrong v. State, 1999 MT 261, 296 Mont. 361, 989 P.2d 364); search and seizure (State v. Bullock (1995), 272 Mont. 361, 901 P.2d 61; State v. Siegal (1997), 281 Mont. 250, 934 P.2d 176, overruled in part by State v. Kuneff, 1998 MT 287, 291 Mont. 474, 970 P.2d 556; State v. Elison, 2000 MT 288, 302 Mont. 228, 14 P.3d 456); the right to counsel (State v. Johnson (1986), 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248); the environment (MEIC v. Dept. of Environmental 26 Quality, 1999 MT 248, 296 Mont. 207, 988 P.2d 1236); and the right of participation and the right to know (Common Cause v. Statutory Committee (1994), 263 Mont. 324, 868 P.2d 604; Great Falls Tribune v. Public Schools (1992), 255 Mont. 125, 841 P.2d 502; Associated Press v. Bd. of Public Educ. (1991), 246 Mont. 386, 804 P.2d 376; Jarussi v. Board of Trustees (1983), 204 Mont. 131, 664 P.2d 316). ¶56 Furthermore, and acknowledging the Committee’s statement that no part of the Constitution is more important, Proposal, p. 619, we have repeatedly recognized the rights found in Montana’s Declaration of Rights as being “fundamental,” meaning that these rights are significant components of liberty, any infringement of which will trigger the highest level of scrutiny, and thus, the highest level of protection by the courts. Walker v. State, 2003 MT 134, ¶ 74, 316 Mont. 103, ¶ 74, 68 P.3d 872, ¶ 74 (citing Dorwart v. Caraway, 2002 MT 240, ¶ 96, 312 Mont. 1, ¶ 96, 58 P.3d 128, ¶ 96 (Nelson, J., concurring); Butte Community Union v. Lewis (1986), 219 Mont. 426, 430, 712 P.2d 1309, 1311; Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 2002 MT 129, ¶ 52, 310 Mont. 123, ¶ 52, 54 P.3d 1, ¶ 52 (Nelson, J., concurring), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 956, 123 S.Ct. 1633, 155 L.Ed.2d 506 (2003)). ¶57 It follows, therefore, that Montana’s Constitution should, likewise, provide more protection against discrimination based on sexual orientation than the Court’s Opinion in this case reflects. ¶58 The case at bar is one involving the fundamental guarantee of individual dignity and equal protection protected under Article II, Section 4 of the Montana Constitution. For more than a decade and a half we have recognized that Montana’s equal protection clause “provides for even more individual protection” than does the federal equal protection clause in section 27 one of the Fourteenth Amendment. Cottrill v. Cottrill Sodding Service (1987), 229 Mont 40, 42, 744 P.2d 895, 897. ¶59 Montana’s equal protection clause, Article II, Section 4, provides: Individual dignity. The dignity of the human being is inviolable. No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. Neither the state nor any person, firm, corporation, or institution shall discriminate against any person in the exercise of his civil or political rights on account of race, color, sex, culture, social origin or condition, or political or religious ideas. As Professors Larry Elison and Fritz Snyder observe: As a practical matter, the vagaries of life coupled with the allure of power and privilege deny equality among persons, and make difficult the application and enforcement of equal protection before the law. Perhaps that is why “in recent years the equal protection guarantee has become the single most important concept in the Constitution for the protection of individual rights.” Larry M. Elison and Fritz Snyder, The Montana Constitution: A Reference Guide 34 (2001) (hereinafter Elison) (quoting John E. Nowwak & Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law 595 (5th ed. 1995)). ¶60 Historically, the mantle of equal protection law has expanded steadily to protect different groups of persons who were prosecuted and abused for simply being who they were born to be--racial and religious minorities and women, are examples. Prior to passage of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (and perhaps the French Revolution), the idea of equality was limited to persons of power, usually free, white male property owners. . . . Over time, the notion of equality under law has expanded [to include Blacks and women], and theoretically most persons are now included. The 1972 Montana Constitution provides the most inclusive scheme of “equal rights” of any known constitution. Elison, at 35. And, “[a]t the heart of the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection lies the simple command that the Government must treat citizens as individuals, not as simply 28 components of a racial [or] sexual . . . class.” J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B. (1994), 511 U.S. 127, 152-53, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 1434, 128 L.Ed.2d. 89. ¶61 However much equal protection jurisprudence has enlarged the scope of persons guaranteed this right, unfortunately gays and lesbians have been left behind. Sexual and gender orientation is not considered a “suspect class” and discrimination so based does not merit strict scrutiny/compelling interest analysis under federal law. See Lofton v. Kearney (S.D. Fla. 2001), 157 F.Supp.2d 1372, 1382 (collecting cases at n.14), affirmed by Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children and Family Services (11th Cir. 2004), 358 F.3d 804; Baker v. State (Vt. 1999), 744 A.2d 864, 878 n.10; Lawrence v. Texas (2003), 539 U.S. 558, 579-88, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 2484-85, 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (O’Connor, J., concurring). In fact, as this separate Opinion earlier points out, gays and lesbians continue to suffer the effects of unequal treatment, often with the blessing, express or implied, of the government, its institutions, and its elected officials. Indeed, as already noted, laws and policies have been adopted which specifically target gays and lesbians for unequal treatment. ¶62 As with federal case law, this Court’s jurisprudence has never acknowledged gender orientation as a suspect class. Although we have stated that Article II, Section 4 provides more individual protection than does its federal counterpart, Cottrill, 299 Mont. at 42, 744 P.2d at 897, in practice, Montana’s equal protection jurisprudence--as the Court’s Opinion demonstrates--largely follows federal law. See Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Dialogue 29 and Human Dignity: States and Transnational Constitutional Discourse, 65 Mont. L. Rev. 15, 28-29 n.45 (Winter 2004) (hereinafter Jackson); Elison, at 36-38. 7 ¶63 This approach, however, is antithetical to the plain language of Montana’s equal protection clause and, in particular, to one of its components--the guarantee of inviolable human dignity--a textual protection unique among the fifty states. Jackson, at 21. ¶64 Montana’s human dignity clause was drawn from the Puerto Rican Constitution, Article II, Section 1. Jackson, at 22. This clause follows a history of international and foreign constitution-making and human rights declarations at the end of World War II and reflects the international community’s focus on human dignity as a fundamental value. Jackson, at 26. Puerto Rican courts and constitutional scholars have characterized the concept of the dignity of the human being as “the moral basis for democratic government,” and implies the “essential equality” of all people before the law. In other words, the inviolable dignity of human beings must be reflected in both the governance structures of a democracy and the way in which individual members are treated. Jackson, at 23 (quoting Juan M. Garcia-Passalacqua, Puerto Rican Constitutional Law 41 (1974)). ¶65 Notwithstanding these venerable roots, however, this Court’s jurisprudence has, for the most part, treated the human dignity clause, not as a fundamental value to be recognized 7 But see Dorwart, ¶ 84 (federal constitutional decisions may neither bound nor weaken similar, but greater guarantees of individual rights afforded by Montana’s Constitution). 30 in its own right,8 but rather, as reinforcing other values such as the protection against unlawful searches and seizures, government discrimination, and privacy. Jackson, at 27-32. ¶66 The dimensions of the individual dignity clause included within Article II, Section 4, have not been well developed by this Court. See Elison, at 34, 36; Matthew O. Clifford and Thomas P. Huff, Some Thoughts on the Meaning and Scope of the Montana Constitution’s “Dignity” Clause With Possible Applications, 61 Mont. L. Rev. 301 (hereinafter Clifford). Nor have we discussed the various clauses within Article II, Section 4 in relation to each other and with a view to interpreting this section as a coherent whole. ¶67 For example, in Walker, we held that, read together with Article II, Section 22, the individual dignity clause provides Montanans with greater protections from cruel and unusual punishments than does the federal constitution. We also noted that the federal constitution does not expressly provide for the right to human dignity. Walker, ¶ 73. And, in In re Mental Health of K.G.F., 2001 MT 140, ¶¶ 45-60, 306 Mont. 1, ¶¶ 45-60, 29 P.3d 485, ¶¶ 45-60, we stated that the dignity of those persons subject to involuntary mental health commitments required effective assistance of counsel and appropriate due process and that groups of people should not be singled out and “devalued as members of society” or treated as “an inferior second-class of citizens.” We have also invoked the dignity clause in other contexts: Armstrong, ¶¶ 71-73 (bodily integrity); Oberg v. Billings (1983), 207 Mont. 277, 280, 674 P.2d 494, 495 (right not to be subjected to a polygraph exam as a condition of employment); Girard v. Williams, 1998 MT 231, ¶¶ 77-80, 291 Mont. 49, ¶¶ 77-80, 966 P.2d 1155, ¶¶ 77- 8 But see Walker, ¶ 82, where we recognized the right of inviolable human dignity as a separate, stand-alone right. 31 80 (Nelson, J., concurring) (child custody); and In re C.R.O., 2002 MT 50, ¶¶ 45-54, 309 Mont. 48, ¶¶ 45-54, 43 P.3d 913, ¶¶ 45-54 (Nelson, J., Cotter, J., Leaphart, J., dissenting) (termination of parental rights). ¶68 Our approach, however, has failed to give full effect to the language and unique constituent parts of Montana’s equal protection clause and to the textual protection of inviolable human dignity in cases involving fundamental human rights. Article II, section 4 reaches beyond the boundaries of traditional equal protection. The language is unique to the extent it recognizes human dignity as a dimension of, or corollary to, the concept of equal protection of the law. The language also portends to create a right to equality within the realm of private activity, eliminating the “state action” requirement attached to the comparable provision of the U.S. Constitution. Elison, at 35. ¶69 In my view, this Court’s equal protection jurisprudence has been too long bounded by federal equal protection case law where fundamental human rights are at issue. There is no good reason why we should not begin to afford all Montanans the full protections intended by the framers when they adopted Article II, Section 4. As one commentator has suggested, “Montana lawyers should jettison federal discrimination analysis in favor of a Montana analysis free of gender-based standards.” Elison, at 36 (quoting Wendy A. Fitzgerald, Toward Dignity in the Workplace: Miller-Wohl and Beyond, 49 Mont. L. Rev. 147 (1988)). ¶70 I agree and I believe that this is the appropriate case in which we should begin to develop the law of equal protection based on Montana’s unique Constitutional guarantee of the inviolability of human dignity coupled with the right to equal protection of the law and the prohibition against private and State discrimination. It is to that approach that I now turn.