Opinion ID: 2638020
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Psychosexual Evaluation

Text: [¶ 24] After accepting the guilty plea, the district court ordered Hirsch to obtain a psychosexual evaluation by April 30, 2004. Pursuant to a request from the State, the time for filing the evaluation was extended to June 30, 2004. On June 8, 2004, Hirsch filed a motion seeking a continuance of sentencing scheduled for June 10 as the evaluation had not yet been completed. The motion was granted. At sentencing, defense counsel indicated that the evaluation was not completed because Hirsch was indigent and requested that he be sent to the State Hospital for evaluation. The court concluded that the evaluation was not required and proceeded to sentence Hirsch. On appeal, Hirsch contends that the district court abused its discretion when it sentenced him without an evaluation. [¶ 25] W.R.Cr.P. 32(a)(2) provides, in pertinent part: (2) Report.The report of the presentence investigation shall contain: (A) Information about the history and characteristics of the defendant, including prior criminal record, if any, financial condition, and any circumstances affecting the defendant's behavior that may be helpful in imposing sentence or in the correctional treatment of the defendant; . . . . (D) Such other information as may be required by the court. The plain language of the rule gives the district court judge discretion to include any information which may aid him in his task of imposing a fair sentence in light of all the available facts without limitation. Hornecker v. State, 977 P.2d 1289, 1292 (Wyo.1999). A sentence will not be disturbed because of sentencing procedures unless the defendant can show an abuse of discretion, procedural conduct prejudicial to him, circumstances which manifest inherent unfairness and injustice, or conduct which offends the public sense of fair play. Brower v. State, 1 P.3d 1210, 1216 (Wyo. 2000) (citing Smith v. State, 941 P.2d 749, 750 (Wyo.1997) and Wayt v. State, 912 P.2d 1106, 1109 (Wyo.1996)). [¶ 26] In 1987, the Wyoming Legislature repealed a series of statutes that provided for, among other things, compulsory mental health evaluations of defendants convicted of certain sex offenses prior to sentencing. 1987 Wyo. Sess. Laws, Ch. 41, at 69-70. In Hornecker, we addressed the effect of that repeal in the context of a claim by a defendant that the district court had abused its discretion by considering a psychosexual evaluation. Hornecker asks us to view the repeal of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-13-601 through 7-13-605 as withdrawing judicial authority to order such mental evaluations. Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-13-601 through 7-13-605, repealed in 1987, provided for compulsory mental health evaluations for certain enumerated sex offenses prior to sentencing. [Emphasis in original.] Hornecker argues that under the current statutory scheme, mental evaluations can only be ordered pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 12 (where the defendant pleads not guilty by reason [of] mental illness [or] deficiency) or Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-11-301 through 7-11-307 (Michie 1997) (where it appears that the defendant is unfit to proceed due to mental illness or deficiency). We decline to draw such an inference from the repeal. The only reasonable inference that can be drawn from the repeal of mandatory mental evaluation statutes, where the legislature has not specifically withdrawn the power of the court to order the evaluation s, is that the legislature intended to make the decision to order an evaluation discretionary. Therefore, we hold that the repeal of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-13-601 through 7-13-605 did not deprive the courts of their power to order mental health evaluations for sentencing purposes pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 32(a)(2). [Emphasis added.] Hornecker, 977 P.2d at 1292. In a subsequent decision, we held that a district court did not abuse its discretion when it proceeded to sentencing without an evaluation: Brower did not request the evaluation in his motion for continuance, to the probation officer during preparation of the presentence investigation report, or at sentencing. He did not claim or specify what prejudice would occur in either his continuance motion or during the sentencing hearing should the court determine sentence without benefit of this information. On appeal, he does not specify or explain the benefit that he would have derived from a sexual offender evaluation and what impact it potentially held for the ultimate sentencing determination. Under these circumstances, we find no procedural violation of W.R.Cr.P. 32 occurred because these showings were not made. We further find that these circumstances establish that Brower suffered no prejudice when the district court proceeded with sentencing without the evaluation. Brower v. State, 1 P.3d 1210, 1216 (Wyo. 2000). [¶ 27] Hirsch argues that the district court committed a procedural error when it proceeded to sentencing without the evaluation that it had previously ordered. Hirsch differentiates his situation from Brower by pointing out that he did request the evaluation prior to sentencing. Furthermore, he claims prejudice because there was a significant probability that a psychosexual evaluation would have mitigated any concerns that Hirsch posed a continuing threat to the community given that he had no prior sexual offense convictions. [¶ 28] Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion and that Hirsch has failed to demonstrate prejudice. The order requiring a psychosexual evaluation was issued by the district court on February 27, 2004. The deadline for obtaining the evaluation was set for April 30, which was later extended to June 30 at the request of the State. On June 8, 2004, Hirsch sought and obtained a continuance of sentencing because the evaluation had not been completed. Sentencing took place on October 13, 2004. At the outset of the hearing, Hirsch informed the court that he had been examined by two evaluators but they had refused to release any report because he could not pay them. Hirsch then suggested that sentencing be postponed and he be sent to the State Hospital to obtain an evaluation. The problem with Hirsch's argument is that the court ordered the evaluation in February; two deadlines passed and sentencing was continued in June at Hirsch's request so that an evaluation could be completed. Yet, it was not until sentencing was finally held later in October that Hirsch claims for the first time that he could not obtain an evaluation because of financial reasons. Hirsch never filed any objection to the requirement that he pay for the evaluation. Eight months elapsed from the date the evaluation was ordered until the sentencing hearing and not once, even in the motion seeking to delay sentencing in June filed by Hirsch for the express purpose of additional time to obtain the evaluation, was the question of his ability to pay for the evaluation brought to the court's attention. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion when it decided to proceed with sentencing without an evaluation. [¶ 29] Additionally, Hirsch has failed to establish any prejudice arising from the district court's decision. His claim that there was a significant probability that an evaluation would have shown little risk of re-offending is an inference he derives from his interpretation of selected facts in the record. Similarly, the State points to other facts in the record that would support a reasonable inference that there is a significant risk of re-offense. In short, the views of both parties as to what a psychosexual evaluation would reveal are simply speculation. The burden, however, is on Hirsch to demonstrate prejudice. Without any evidence as to what the findings of an evaluation would be in the record, he has failed to carry that burden and, under these circumstances, we find no procedural violation in sentencing.