Opinion ID: 186018
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Complete When Filed

Text: 12 Z-Tel claims the Commission violated its own procedural rules by considering evidence that was not properly before it. The Commission's stated policy is as follows: 13 We expect that a section 271 application, as originally filed, will include all of the factual evidence on which the applicant would have the Commission rely in making its findings thereon. In the event that the applicant submits ... factual evidence that changes its application in a material respect, the Commission reserves the right to deem such submission a new application and start the 90-day review process anew. 14 Procedures for Bell Operating Company Applications Under New Section 271, Public Notice, 11 F.C.C. Rcd. 19708, 19709, 1996 WL 706006 (1996). This formulation, known as the complete when filed rule, reserves to the Commission considerable discretion to determine whether to reject late-filed evidence. Bell Atlantic New York, 15 F.C.C. Rcd. 3953, ¶ 35 (our precedent makes clear that this rule is a discretionary one). Moreover, the rule contains an exception: 15 [An applicant] may submit new factual information after the application is filed, if the sole purpose of that evidence is to rebut arguments or facts submitted by other commenters [and the new evidence] cover[s] only the period placed in dispute by commenters.... 16 SBC Communications Inc., 15 F.C.C. Rcd. 18354, ¶ 35. See Updated Filing Requirements for Bell Operating Company Applications Under Section 271 of the Communications Act, Public Notice, 16 F.C.C. Rcd. 6923, 6925-26, 2001 WL 1816730 (Common Carrier Bureau 2001) ( Updated Filing Requirements ) (restating the rule and exception). 17 Z-Tel claims the Commission violated the complete when filed rule by considering Verizon's August 17 submission as a basis for granting its application. Instead of forcing Z-Tel and other interested parties to attempt to tailor their comments to a moving target, it complains, the Commission should have required Verizon to withdraw its application and submit anew. Z-Tel also argues that Verizon's August 17 submission was objectionable because it included billing data for the month of June, which Verizon generated after it had filed its application with the Commission. 18 The Commission addressed each of these objections in the Order. With respect to the complaint that consideration of evidence in the August 17 submission violated the complete when filed rule, the Commission ruled the data were admissible because they fell within the exception described above: the evidence we rely on was submitted by Verizon to rebut competitors' assertions and pertains only to the May and June billing cycles. Order ¶ 7 n. 20. With regard to the inclusion of June data that post-dated the filing of Verizon's application, the Commission pointed out that it ha[d] previously considered performance that covered a time period slightly beyond the comment filing date, and it believe[d] it [was] appropriate to do so here. Id. ¶ 7 (citing SBC Communications Inc., 15 F.C.C. Rcd. 18354, ¶ ¶ 39-40). In fact the performance data for June did not extend beyond the date for filing comments, which was July 11, but some of it did cover a period beyond the date of the application (June 21), which no doubt explains the Commission's understanding, further discussed below, that it was departing from strict adherence to the complete when filed rule. 19 Verizon's submission of August 17 clearly comes within the exception to the complete when filed rule. Z-Tel and other commenters had challenged Verizon's billing performance for the months of May and June, e.g., Comments of Z-Tel (July 11, 2001) 8; Rubino Decl. ¶ 5; Reply Comments of Z-Tel (Aug. 6, 2001) 5, and Verizon was merely responding, defending its billing performance for those months by showing its error rate was lower than it had been before. The submission therefore met the Commission's requirements that newly-filed evidence rebut arguments or facts submitted by other commenters and cover only the period placed in dispute by commenters. 20 Z-Tel contends that even if the Commission could properly consider Verizon's August 17 submission under the exception to the complete when filed rule, the exception limits the Commission to considering data solely for the purpose of rebuttal. Therefore, Z-Tel argues, Verizon's late-filed submission could at best rebut complaints from commenters that its billing performance in May and June was inadequate; the Commission could not rely upon the late-filed data to find Verizon's billing performance was adequate. As authority for this proposition Z-Tel cites the Commission's prior statements to the effect that an applicant should include in its application all of the factual evidence on which the applicant would have the Commission rely. Procedures for Bell Operating Company Applications Under New Section 271, 11 F.C.C. Rcd. at 19709; Updated Filing Requirements, 16 F.C.C.R. at 6925; see also id. at 6926 (It generally will not be appropriate for an applicant to make any part of its initial prima facie showing for the first time in reply comments or in ex parte submissions, although there may be limited exceptions to this rule). 21 The statements Z-Tel cites all indicate the Commission might refuse to grant a § 271 application if the applicant first presents evidence of its compliance with a checklist item in its reply comments, but they also indicate the Commission retains the power to make reasoned exceptions to the rule. In this case, the Commission chose not to segregate the evidence before it into data that may permissibly be used to establish a prima facie case and data that may be used only in rebuttal. Because [n]either the June carrier-to-carrier performance data nor the data reflecting Verizon's June billing performance ... could be generated until the end of the calendar month, and because no party to [the] proceeding [was] prejudiced by its consideration of the data, Order ¶ 7, the Commission indicated that it would waive the aspect of the complete when filed rule providing that late-filed information can be used only for the purpose of rebuttal. We find this approach eminently reasonable. It is neither arbitrary nor capricious for the Commission to consider any evidence that is properly before it for any purpose as to which it is probative. See Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. ICC, 667 F.2d 151, 152-53 (D.C.Cir.1981) (the courts have long recognized that evidentiary rules used in judicial proceedings do not control the more flexible administrative process).