Opinion ID: 1451277
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether the Smiths' Emotional Distress Claims Are Separate, Independent Common-Law Torts Existing Separate And Apart From the Host Tort Plaintiff And Thus Entitle Them To Separate Each Person Liability Coverage

Text: In enacting Hawai`i's no-fault law, the legislature abolished tort liability for accidental harm arising from motor vehicle accidents wherein an accident victim was no longer able to maintain a traditional negligence tort action against an alleged wrongdoer except in specific circumstances as delineated under HRS § 294-6. Parker v. Nakaoka, 68 Haw. 557, 560, 722 P.2d 1028, 1030 (1986) (citing 1983 Haw.Sess.L., Act 245, § 1 at 518-19; Sen.Stand.Comm.Rep. No. 402, in 1973 Senate Journal at 817, 818); see also Barcena v. Hawaiian Ins. & Guar. Co., 67 Haw. 97, 102, 678 P.2d 1082, 1086 (1984). HRS § 294-6 provides in relevant part: Abolition of tort liability. (a) Tort liability of the owner, operator, or user of an insured motor vehicle, or the operator or user of an uninsured motor vehicle, or the operator or user of an uninsured motor vehicle who operates or uses such vehicle without reason to believe it to be an uninsured motor vehicle, with respect to accidental harm arising from motor vehicle accidents occurring in this State, is abolished, except as to the following persons or their personal representatives, or legal guardians, and in the following circumstances: (1) Death occurs to such person in such a motor vehicle accident; or injury occurs to such person which consists, in whole or in part, in a significant permanent loss of use of a part or function of the body; or injury occurs to such person which consists of a permanent and serious disfigurement which results in subjection of the injured person to mental or emotional suffering; (2) Injury occurs to such person in a motor vehicle accident in which the amount paid or accrued exceeds the medical-rehabilitative limit established in section 294-1(10)(b) for expenses provided in section 294-1(10)(A) and (B); provided that the expenses paid shall be presumed to be reasonable and necessary in establishing the medical-rehabilitative limit; or (3) Injury occurs to such person in such an accident and as a result of such injury the aggregate limit of no-fault benefits outlined in section 294-2(10) payable to such person are exhausted. HRS § 294-6(a) (emphasis added). Pursuant to the plain and unambiguous language of HRS § 294-6(a), persons or their personal representatives or legal guardians may assert a claim for accidental harm as long as the threshold requirements are met  the first being that death or injury occurs to such person in a motor vehicle accident. The phrase such person in subsections (1), (2), and (3) above refers to the phrase persons, or their personal representatives or legal guardians; they are the sole individuals who may maintain claims for accidental harm against a wrongdoer, and such person must have been in the accident. Here, Christopher was the only person who died in the motor vehicle accident. Although the Smiths claim that their emotional distress claims arose out of a motor vehicle accident in which Christopher was killed, none of the Smiths sustained their accidental harm in the accident. Thus, the plain language of HRS § 294-6(a) appears to mandate that the Smiths are unable to bring a separate, independent suit for their alleged emotional distress. However, because the provisions of HRS § 294-6 are in derogation of principles of common law tort liability, they must be strictly construed and, where it does not appear that there was a legislative purpose in the statute to supersede the common law, the common law applies. Doi v. Hawaiian Ins. & Guar. Co., Ltd., 6 Haw.App. 456, 465, 727 P.2d 884, 890 (1986); see Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc. v. Department of Transp., 66 Haw. 607, 611, 671 P.2d 446, 449 (1983); Fonseca v. Pacific Constr. Co., Ltd., 54 Haw. 578, 585, 513 P.2d 156, 160 (1973). The legislative purpose in enacting HRS chapter 294 is clear; it was to reform the existing system of reparations for damages arising from motor vehicle accidents in order to provide motor vehicle accident victims assured, adequate and prompt reparation for certain economic losses without regard to fault. The clear objectives of the law are to: (1) institute insurance reform in order to (a) expedite the settling of all claims, (b) create a system of reparations for injuries and loss arising from motor vehicle accidents, (c) compensate these damages without regard to fault, and (d) modify tort liability for these accidents; and (2) to reduce the cost of motor vehicle insurance by establishing a uniform system of motor vehicle insurance. Doi, 6 Haw.App. at 465-66, 727 P.2d at 890 (citations omitted). We acknowledge that within the tort context, there exists independent legal protection for NIED claims in this jurisdiction. Such claims were first recognized in Rodrigues, wherein this court determined that the interest in freedom from negligent infliction of serious mental distress is entitled to independent legal protection. Rodrigues, 52 Haw. at 174, 472 P.2d at 520 (emphasis added). Thus, the Rodrigues court held that there is a duty to refrain from the negligent infliction of serious mental distress. Id. The duty, however, is only to those foreseeably endangered by the conduct and only with respect to those risks or hazards whose likelihood made the conduct unreasonably dangerous. Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, 63 Haw. 557, 560, 632 P.2d 1066, 1068 (1981) (citing Rodrigues, 52 Haw. at 174, 472 P.2d at 521). The absence of resulting physical injury is not a bar to recovery, but rather evidence of the degree of emotional distress suffered. Leong, 55 Haw. at 403, 520 P.2d at 762. Moreover, there is no requirement that plaintiffs must actually witness the tortious event in order to recover. Campbell, 63 Haw. at 557, 632 P.2d at 1066; see also Masaki v. General Motors Corp., 71 Haw. 1, 18, 780 P.2d 566, 576, recon. denied, 71 Haw. 664, 833 P.2d 899 (1989). The non-witnessing of the accident is also a factor to be considered in determining the degree of emotional distress suffered. Masaki, 71 Haw. at 18, 780 P.2d at 576. The Smiths maintain that, like the claimants in Rodrigues and Campbell, they should be able to assert independent claims of emotional distress separate and apart from the claim being made on behalf of Christopher by his estate. Additionally, the Smiths contend that they should be entitled to separate each person limits of liability coverage. However, the crucial distinction overlooked by the appellees is that the Smiths' NIED claims are not being reviewed within a pure tort context. Moreover, the appellees have apparently overlooked the fact that Rodrigues and Campbell were not considered within the context of automobile insurance coverage. In this case, the Smiths claims are based on their emotional distress due to Christopher's death in the accident. Common sense dictates that but for Christopher's death, they would not have any claims of severe emotional distress to assert in the first instance. In Hoke v. Paul, 65 Haw. 478, 653 P.2d 1155 (1982), the spouse of an allegedly defamed police officer claimed that she suffered loss of consortium and emotional distress as a result of the alleged defamation. This court held that such claims were not independent, stating: If, on trial, she proves damage by reason of loss of consortium arising out of [defendant's] alleged tortious actions with respect to [her husband] and/or she establishes, according to the standard laid down in Rodrigues, supra, that she has suffered damages by way of emotional distress arising out of [defendant's] alleged tortious conduct with respect to [her husband], she should be entitled to recover therefore on any count on which [her husband] recovers damages. Her claim for relief, however, is not independent. If the jury, on trial, finds against [her husband] and for [the defendant] on either Counts I or II or both, then judgment should also be rendered against [her] on such count or counts. Id. at 485, 653 P.2d at 1160-61 (emphasis added); see also Masaki, 71 Haw. at 4-5, 780 P.2d at 569-70 (trial court reduced damages for emotional distress suffered by parents by proportion of contributory negligence on the part of injured son); Bertlemann v. Taas Associates, 69 Haw. 95, 735 P.2d 930 (1987) (where decedent's recovery was barred, so were his survivors' derivative wrongful death claims). Because the Smiths' claims clearly originates from the primary claim  the death of Christopher  we conclude that such claims are derivative. [10] In fact, the Lawrences agree that the Smiths' claims are derivative of the main claim in the sense that their viability is dependent on the viability of the main claim. We believe that HRS § 294-6(a) codifies the treatment of derivative claims consistent with the great majority of jurisdictions that do not allow separate each person limits for derivative claims, including NIED. These courts have held that recovery of insurance proceeds for derivative claims are limited to a single each person limit applicable to the host plaintiff. A noted commentator has stated that: In uninsured motorists coverage cases the great majority of the courts have held that consequential and derivative loss claimants who were not themselves ... injured in the accident did not sustain separate bodily injury [accidental harm] within the contemplation of the policy language. Thus, where only a single injury was involved, claims for loss of consortium, mental anguish, and medical expenses arising out of injury to the injured person have been held ineffective to activate the policy's multiple injury limits. Liability policies contain a virtually identical Limits of Liability provision governing the insurer's obligation to pay damages sustained by third parties. The legal concepts and considerations pertaining to liability coverage limits are essentially the same as those pertaining to uninsured motorists coverage limits, and the majority of courts have similarly held that claims for loss of consortium, mental anguish, and derivative medical expense do not activate the policy's per accident limits where only one person sustained injury or death in the accident.