Opinion ID: 71999
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Closing Argument at the Sentencing Phase

Text: 71
72 Cargill's most vehement objection is to the following remarks of the prosecutor: 73 His salvation and what Almighty God does to him for what he's done does not concern us, for society has a right to demand that he pay a price for the events that he has done. Is the appropriate price life imprisonment, and 10 years or 15 years or ever how long it is, seven years or five years, when a bunch of little boys are sitting around the Christmas table thinking, Is that all that jury thought of my mama and daddy because that man is sitting off somewhere eating Christmas turkey dinner? 74 Cargill argues that [t]he clear insinuation of these comments was that the jury could not count upon a life sentence resulting in imprisonment for life. According to Cargill, the prosecutor intentionally and pointedly argued to the jury that its choice was not between life imprisonment and death, but rather between perhaps as few as five years' imprisonment and death. Thus, Cargill believes, the prosecutor improperly commented on the possibility of parole, and this comment was misleading because under O.C.G.A. § 42-9-39(c) consecutive life sentences for each of his four felonies would have rendered him ineligible for parole for at least thirty years. 22 75 We reject Cargill's interpretation of these remarks for several reasons. 23 First, the prosecutor's remarks were not an inaccurate comment on the applicable state law. As the state habeas corpus court found, Cargill had been charged with two counts of murder and two counts of armed robbery. The minimum sentence allowed by law for armed robbery in Georgia is five years imprisonment. O.C.G.A. Sec. 16-8-41(b). Therefore, as the court further determined, a life sentence for murder and from 15 to five years in prison would not be an inaccurate statement of the law. 24 That is, of course, exactly what the prosecutor said--Is the appropriate price life imprisonment, and 10 years or 15 years or ever how long it is, seven years or five years ... ? We are not at liberty to challenge this state court determination of state law. McBride v. Sharpe, 25 F.3d 962, 972 (11th Cir.) (en banc ), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 990, 115 S.Ct. 489, 130 L.Ed.2d 401 (1994). 76 Moreover, a fair reading of the challenged remarks reveals that the prosecutor was attempting to convey the gravity of the crime and its consequences--the murder of the Williamses left four young boys without parents--to convince the jury that life imprisonment, i.e., allowing Cargill to continue to live, would be too lenient a sentence. The proportionality argument was a consistent theme throughout the prosecutor's closing. Later in his speech, for example, he stated: 77 If you have to show some compassion, show some compassion for a family that has lost two members for absolutely no reason. If your heart has to go out to somebody, let it go out to a society that you represent that demands that this defendant receive that appropriate punishment and not that he be given, compared to the crime he committed, what amounts to more than a judicial slap on the wrist, a sentence of life imprisonment. A sentence of life is a sentence of life. There's no difference between this one and one that's done an armed robbery that has not taken life, to a rapist, to any--to a murderer who has not shown a mind so depraved as this one. 78 Here the prosecutor made an argument comparable to the remarks Cargill challenges--that the gravity of the offense warrants a death sentence; a sentence of life imprisonment, i.e., letting Cargill live, is too light. We also note that the prosecutor made another remark in his closing--I'm not telling you that a life sentence in a Georgia penitentiary is any piece of cake--that appears to contravene Cargill's thesis. We remain mindful of the guideline adopted in Brooks that ambiguous prosecutorial remarks must be viewed with lenity. 762 F.2d at 1400. 25 79 In addition, we note that Cargill's counsel did not make a contemporaneous objection to the challenged remarks. Instead, defense counsel waited to object and move for a mistrial until after the prosecutor had finished his closing argument, defense counsel had given his closing argument, the court had rendered its jury instructions and the jury had retired to deliberate. Furthermore, the closing argument of Cargill's counsel was ameliorative: 80 The district attorney, as you heard, stated that David Cargill showed no mercy; so no mercy on him. And I submit to you that a sentence of life imprisonment is not showing mercy. It is a sentence of imprisonment for the rest of his life. When he first was arrested, he was tan and robust. You have heard from the testimony that he has changed dramatically. As you can see now, he's a bleached and worn shadow of what he previously was, even being here in the county jail. Being sentenced to the penitentiary, as even the district attorney in the way he characterized it, is no bed of roses. It's a very harsh and severe penalty; and if such a sentence is voted by you, that does accomplish what the district attorney is asking, and that is that he has forfeited his right to be among us. That is, he will be, by your verdict of life imprisonment, placed in prison for the remainder of his natural life. You would accomplish that goal which the district attorney has asked you to. 81 See Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1509 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc ), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986) (prosecutor's improper argument that parole board would release defendant prematurely was effectively countered by defense counsel's argument that [the defendant] would probably never be released again). Finally, the court instructed the jury concerning life imprisonment as follows: 82 Now, members of the jury, you may return any one of two verdicts as to penalty in this case. Life imprisonment, you may return a verdict which reads, We, the jury, fix the penalty at life imprisonment, in which event the defendant would be sentenced to serve the remainder of his life in the penitentiary. 83 Accordingly, we do not agree with Cargill's assertion that none of the factors that minimize prejudice exists here. Indeed, after a thorough review of the full context of the sentencing proceeding, we conclude that the prosecutorial remarks at issue were not prejudicial. 26 84
85 Cargill next argues that the prosecutor improperly invoked his prosecutorial expertise in asking the jury to believe that this case was appropriate for the death penalty. 86
87 The first improper instance here was, as Cargill describes it, that [t]he prosecutor told the jury that based, inter alia, on 'experience ... we feel [death] to be the appropriate punishment.'  Cargill pulls the prosecutor's assertion out of its setting. The actual context of this statement was as follows: 88 You will have to elect or select between the death penalty and the life sentence. We are obviously encouraging the death penalty. That is no revelation. We are going to make some remarks to you and show you, based on experience, based on the circumstances of this crime, based on the circumstances of this defendant why we feel this to be the appropriate punishment. 89 Viewed in their totality, these remarks were not improper. We agree with the appellee that the prosecutor was merely prefacing the underlying bas[e]s on which a death sentence should be imposed and clearly let the jury [know] that it was a decision for the jury to make. Consequently, these remarks cannot contribute to Cargill's constitutional claim. See Brooks, 762 F.2d at 1403 (comments that are not improper can never be unconstitutional). 90
91 Cargill's argument as to two other comments, however, has more force. Cargill accurately asserts that the prosecutor had no record support for his statement that [s]o seldom do we see crimes so cold-blooded and not one but two bullets fired into the heads. This remark, invoking the expertise of the prosecutor to suggest the special seriousness of the crime, was improper. Tucker, 762 F.2d at 1505; see also Brooks, 762 F.2d at 1413 (The argument improperly suggested that the prosecutor had canvassed all murder cases and selected this one as particularly deserving of the death penalty....). We note, however, that although Cargill's counsel objected (not contemporaneously, but after the jury had retired to deliberate) to several alleged instances of the prosecutor's comment[ing] upon ... evidence he did not introduce, this was not one of them. This, as well as other factors discussed below, indicates to us that the remark--considered in the context of the prosecutor's entire closing argument--did not have much, if any, prejudicial effect. 92 Cargill also argues that the prosecutor improperly invoked his expertise when making the following commentary: 93 [A]nd then we came to the preacher. This is not the first time I've stood in front of a jury for a heinous crime, and there's always a judge; there's always a court reporter; there's always a defendant; there's always defense attorneys; there's always prosecutors; and there's always a preacher. I don't know why we always have to have a preacher, and everybody who gets in jail and gets into trouble has got to find the Lord. And I am not disparaging a true and fundamental belief in God or Jesus Christ, or whatever god you believe in. I will express some reservations. I will disparage acute onset religion, where people try to use Almighty God just like a monkey wrench, when you're in trouble, you've got to have it, you go get it; and when the pipe's fixed or when the trouble's over, you put it right back and forget until the next time you need it. 94 Defense counsel objected to these comments, though in a non-contemporaneous fashion. Assuming arguendo that this commentary was improper, but see Bowen v. Kemp, 769 F.2d 672, 680 (11th Cir.1985), reinstated in relevant part, 832 F.2d 546, 547 n. 2 (11th Cir.1987) (en banc ), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 970, 108 S.Ct. 1247, 99 L.Ed.2d 445 (1988), its prejudicial effect is far from clear. Although the prosecutor should not have referenced his experience and other cases not in evidence, we agree with the appellee that the thrust of his statements was to focus the jury's attention on whether [Cargill's] invocation of religion was genuine. This, of course, was a legitimate subject for the prosecutor to address. 95 On the whole, we are convinced, after reviewing the totality of the prosecutor's closing argument, defense counsel's closing and the court's instructions to the jury, that the jury labored under no misperception as to its role; the jury clearly understood that it alone bore the responsibility for deciding whether [Cargill] should live or die. Brooks, 762 F.2d at 1414. 96
97 Cargill also contends that the prosecutor falsely and improperly told the jury that the information Mr. Cargill offered during the sentencing phase did not constitute mitigating evidence. Cargill cites three allegedly violative instances, two of which we emphasize in the following excerpt: 98 We brought on Sheriff John Adams who told you about the defendant's reputation, and that reputation was bad, for turbul[e]nce and violence. That's what we have to call fighting and stabbing and cutting and that kind of thing. It's a bad reputation. We--he also testified as to the defendant's reputation on things like larceny and so forth. We did get the one sister to come out and say finally, tell you about his drug abuse. Now, that's what you're passing on. This is the good old boy that you're going to be passing on. His mother loves him. That is not evidence. She begged for him. If you wanted begging, we could've given you some begging; but that's not the way it ought to be done. 99 ... The defendant's sister said she knew of that fine he was to pay in January in Harris County. His mother testified. She told us he was a good little boy. She didn't tell us anything about once he grew up. But we had emphasized some things that we already knew, that he was a dog-fighter, a compassionate sport.... And she further testified that he only cut his brother one time. That's because he was coming at him with a tire tool, just one time. 100 He had his sister up there. He helped her move out. He gave her money. Look, this is blood. And there's not a crime in this world that blood is going to overlook, is not going to mitigate, is not going to say does not deserve some special treatment, no matter what anybody does. So the mere fact that that happens proves nothing. 101 We also put forth the third statement to which Cargill objects in its broader context: 102 Mitigation--and notice the things that we're talking about don't affect the crime. They just either heighten the severity of it because of what the person is or lighten the impact of it. The Judge is going to charge you about this. Mitigation, and you're to consider mitigating factors. Now, what mitigating factors you have in this case, I don't know. [Defense counsel] is going to tell you. But you're to consider the aggravation, the evidence in aggravation, the evidence in mitigation.... 103 We are not surprised that Cargill's counsel never objected to these statements. These comments conveyed no prejudicial message to the jury--only that the mitigating evidence Cargill presented was of little force. We also note that the prosecutor went on to say, in discussing aggravating and mitigating factors, that 104 [t]here is not a question, there is not a doubt but that [Cargill] was engaged in an armed robbery while he committed the two murders, and that he was engaged in a murder when he committed the murder. 105 Well, if that's the case, does that end it? No, because for any reason or no reason, mitigating factors, if you can find them from this evidence, from the crime that was committed, from what was presented to you by the defense in this case, mitigating factors can wipe out these statutory aggravating circumstances and you are not bound, even though they are there to give the death penalty. You can say, This crime appropriately merits a life sentence in spite of all that has gone on since Monday morning at 9 o'clock [the time the trial commenced]. You are a jury. 106 Finally, the trial court clearly instructed the jury members that the responsibility of finding any mitigating or extenuating facts and circumstances rested with them. We conclude that Cargill's contentions lack merit. 107
108 Cargill's final argument under this claim is similarly meritless. He asserts that the prosecutor made an improper reference in asking the jury, How would you like to be a correctional officer in an institution with that man in there with a life sentence and knowing he wanted to leave? In Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1480, 1486 (11th Cir.) (en banc ), vacated on other grounds, 474 U.S. 1001, 106 S.Ct. 517, 88 L.Ed.2d 452 (1985), reinstated, 802 F.2d 1293 (11th Cir.1986) (en banc ), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 911, 107 S.Ct. 1359, 94 L.Ed.2d 529 (1987), this court held that a prosecutor's similar remarks to the jury--Now what about the guards who would be guarding him down there? The guards would be, of course, exposed to him[ ]--constituted an appropriate means of pointing out the possibility of Tucker's future dangerousness and did not call for a speculative inquiry into prison conditions.