Opinion ID: 1042298
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Jackson Is Distinguishable

Text: Jackson is distinguishable from the instant case. Unlike the plaintiff in Jackson, Ion does not rely solely on his own statements denying Chevron’s allegations. Ion has presented significantly more evidence that Chevron was motivated by discriminatory reasons—and not merely reliance on other employees’ reports of Ion’s misbehavior—than the plaintiff in Jackson. Here, Ion has offered an e-mail written by General Manager Melcher, in which Melcher references Ion’s attempt to exercise his FMLA rights and asks Ion’s supervisor, Ogborn, for “options.” The temporal proximity between when the e-mail was sent, when Peel came forward with Ion’s alleged statements, when Ion was asked to come to the clinic to sign a medical records release, and when Ion was terminated is noteworthy and raises serious questions about Chevron’s motives for terminating Ion. 5. Chevron Has Not Established as a Matter of Law that It Would Have Terminated Ion Despite Its Retaliatory Motive Pursuant to the mixed-motive framework, it is Chevron’s burden to prove that it would have terminated Ion despite any retaliatory motive. In arguing that it would have terminated Ion despite any retaliatory motive, Chevron first offers evidence that Ion told his coworker, Peel, that he should fake an illness so that he could take a paid leave of absence pursuant to the FMLA. Ion denies this allegation. In addition, Ion presents the e-mail from Melcher that shows 23 Case: 12-60682 Document: 00512388400 Page: 24 Date Filed: 09/26/2013 No. 12-60682 that Chevron was motivated to retaliate against him for taking FMLA leave. Ion suggests that the timing of Peel’s revelation to Ogborn, in light of Melcher’s e- mail, is suspicious. Moreover, Chevron concluded that Ion was faking a medical condition after taking Peel’s account of the matter at face value without any sort of investigation—despite Chevron’s own counselor in its Employee Assistance Program referring Ion to a licensed professional counselor of Chevron’s choosing, and that counselor certifying that Ion suffered from a serious health condition as defined by the FMLA. Chevron’s failure to conduct even the most cursory investigation, confront Ion about Peel’s statements, or seek a second opinion under the FMLA15 calls into doubt Chevron’s reasonable reliance and good faith on Peel’s statements, and, at the very least, creates a fact issue as to whether it would have terminated Ion despite its retaliatory motive. Chevron next offers evidence that Ion was verbally abusive toward clinic employees on March 25, 2009, when asked to sign a GO-153 form. In support, Chevron provides an affidavit by Revere Christophe, a Facility Security Officer, in which Cristophe testifies that he conducted interviews with the clinic employees and concluded that Ion had engaged in “belligerent and abusive conduct toward the nursing staff in the clinic.” In addition, Chevron offers a note written by Ogborn in which he describes Ion’s demeanor toward the clinic employees as “passive/aggressive harassment” and reports that Ion made the employees feel uncomfortable. Ion again denies this allegation and once more points to Melcher’s e-mail as proof of Chevron’s retaliatory motive. Ion argues that he was merely asking questions about the GO-153 form, including whether 15 See 29 U.S.C. § 2613(c)(1) (2006) (“In any case in which the employer has reason to doubt the validity of the certification provided . . . for leave . . . , the employer may require, at the expense of the employer, that the eligible employee obtain the opinion of a second health care provider designated or approved by the employer concerning any information certified . . . for such leave.”). 24 Case: 12-60682 Document: 00512388400 Page: 25 Date Filed: 09/26/2013 No. 12-60682 he was required to sign it. When the clinic staff could not answer his questions, Ion claims that he sought answers from Ogborn, Human Resources Manager Johnette Watson, and finally the head nurse, Angela Fortney—none of whom could answer Ion’s questions. Ion argues that using his refusal to sign the GO153 form as a basis for terminating him is a violation of the FMLA and that Chevron’s allegations about his behavior are disingenuous.16 On the other hand, Chevron argues that it did not fire him because of his refusal to sign the form, but for his behavior when asked to sign the form. We find this argument to be without merit. First, the fact that the termination letter is devoid of any reference to the clinic incident is significant. It is curious that the termination letter would include reference to Ion taking Chevron company equipment home, an act that Watson testified was not wrongful, but include no reference to the clinic incident, which allegedly included concerns of workplace violence. Moreover, when asked during her deposition whether the letter was an accurate statement of the reasons Ion was terminated, Watson, who drafted the termination letter, answered affirmatively. The omission of the clinic incident from the termination letter calls into question whether Chevron truly relied on the clinic incident as a reason for terminating Ion. Second, all accounts of the clinic incident offered by Chevron are vague and include no specific or objective description of Ion’s behavior. The accounts do not describe foul language, physical manifestations of anger, or any other description of Ion’s behavior outside of Ion asking questions about having to sign the GO-153 form. The failure to bring forth any evidence about Ion’s actual behavior calls into doubt Chevron’s reasonable belief 16 “If an employee submits a complete and sufficient certification signed by the health care provider, the employer may not request additional information from the health care provider.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.307(a) (2013). 25 Case: 12-60682 Document: 00512388400 Page: 26 Date Filed: 09/26/2013 No. 12-60682 and good-faith reliance on the clinic employees’ report. Third, because Chevron fails to specify what was abusive about Ion’s behavior, it is unclear how related Chevron’s concerns about Ion’s behavior were to Ion’s refusal to sign the GO-153 form. It would be unreasonable, and would undercut the FMLA’s protection, to permit an employer to draw any arbitrary distinction between firing an employee for exercising his FMLA rights and for firing an employee for how he exercised his FMLA rights. Pursuant to Chevron’s view, an employer would be able to fire an employee for raising his voice when opposing an employer’s unlawful attempt to violate the FMLA. But see Burnett v. LFW Inc., 472 F.3d 471, 482 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that a question of material fact existed where an employer’s classification of an employee’s conduct as insubordinate stemmed in large measure from its mistaken belief that the employee was not entitled to FMLA leave). In summation, Chevron has failed to meet its burden and establish as a matter of law that it would have fired Ion despite its retaliatory motive. Chevron’s evidence of Ion’s history of attendance and performance-related deficiencies is insufficient to establish that it would have fired Ion because Chevron chose to address those deficiencies with a suspension and a PIP/AIP, and Ogborn testified that Ion would have been reinstated had he come back to work. Chevron’s evidence that Ion was faking FMLA leave is also insufficient because of the doubts raised by Chevron’s failure to investigate and Melcher’s e-mail. Finally, Chevron’s evidence that Ion had been abusive during the clinic incident is insufficient because it was not mentioned in Ion’s termination letter, the accounts of the clinic incident are vague and nondescript, and Chevron has 26 Case: 12-60682 Document: 00512388400 Page: 27 Date Filed: 09/26/2013 No. 12-60682 failed to establish as a matter of law that its concerns about the clinic incident were not related to Ion’s refusal to sign the GO-153 form.17