Opinion ID: 13413
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: References To Adams' Prior Convictions

Text: Adams contends that the prosecutors acted improperly by intentionally eliciting testimony concerning and commenting upon his prior criminal record, despite the fact that the judge had granted a motion in limine prohibiting such references.8 Appellant does not provide a record reference for either the motion or an order granting it, and we found none in reviewing the record. Nevertheless, assuming arguendo that such a motion was granted, under Rule 103 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the plain error standard of review applies if at trial the defendant failed to timely renew the objection raised by motion in limine. United 8 Johnston adopted this portion of Adams' brief. Because the challenged testimony and comment do not pertain to Johnston, he could not have experienced any prejudice. Accordingly, we limit our discussion to Adams. 22 States v. Graves, 5 F.3d 1546, 1551 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub. nom., 511 U.S. 1081, 114 S.Ct. 1829, 128 L.Ed.2d.459 (1994). Three separate incidents form the foundation for Adams' challenge. Kimela Lomax testified that a vehicle in which she and Adams were riding was stopped by law enforcement officials, and that there were guns in the vehicle. She testified, without objection, that she and Adams were charged with the offense of carrying a weapon. On cross-examination, Lomax testified that she pleaded no contest to the charge and received probation. Thereafter, on redirect examination, a prosecutor asked Lomax [w]e know what happened to you. What happened to Darrell? Lomax answered, [h]e got probation. (27 R. 5086). There was no objection to the question at that time, although counsel later filed a motion for mistrial based in part on the question concerning Adams' prior conviction. The failure of counsel to object to the admission of the evidence at the first available opportunity waived any ground of complaint against its admission, absent plain error. United States v. Vesich, 724 F.2d 451, 462 (5th Cir. 1984). When a defendant has forfeited an error by failing to object, the error is remedied only in the most exceptional cases. United States v. Calverley, 37 F.3d 160, 162 (5th Cir. 1994)(en banc), cert. denied, U.S. , 115 S.Ct. 1266, 131 L.Ed.2d 145 (1995). Plain error is error so obvious and substantial that failure to notice it would affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings and would result in manifest injustice. United States 23 v. Reyes, 102 F.3d 1361, 1364 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, U.S. , 117 S.Ct. 180, 136 L.Ed.2d 166 (1996). The prosecutor well knew that the question would elicit evidence that the defendant had a prior conviction; evidence that was irrelevant and prejudicial, and in violation of Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The prosecutor acted improperly in asking the question; however, we conclude that the misconduct does not satisfy the high standard required to qualify as plain error. The second incident occurred when, after Lomax's testimony that Adams was sentenced to probation, the prosecutor asked Lomax [d]id you ever have conversations with Darrell Adams about his concern (previous questions made it clear that the prosecutor was referring to concern about going to the penitentiary). Defense counsel's objection was overruled. Lomax answered, [h]e said he wasn't worried about going back, thus telling the jury that Adams had once before been to the penitentiary. No objection was stated at that time. Because Adams did not object to the comment at the first opportunity available, we review for plain error. Although Lomax's response to the question of Adams' concern about going to the penitentiary was not responsive to the question in the strictest sense, that does not factor into our analysis because we can safely assume that the prosecutor was indeed soliciting the answer which the witness gave. The government's introduction of evidence that the defendant had previously served a penitentiary term was clearly improper, but the following court instruction alleviated the 24 resulting prejudice: First, I want to instruct you that I am striking one of the responses of Ms. Lomax that she gave in reply to a question yesterday. There was a question asked whether Ms. Lomax had conversations with Darrell Adams about his concern. Ms. Lomax, instead of answering yes or no, which would have been all that the answer called for, answered with a statement that I'm going to instruct you to disregard entirely. You are not to speculate upon it at all. The answer was said he wasn't worried about going back. That answer is stricken from the record. It was an improper response. You are instructed to disregard it completely and to pay no attention to it or speculate upon it at all in any of your considerations about this case. (28 R. 5117) The instruction was thorough, and juries are presumed to follow their instructions. United States v.Castillo, 77 F.3d 1480, 1491 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, U.S. , 117 S.Ct. 180 (1996). The prejudice is also mitigated by the fact that the jury later learned from Adams himself that he had previously been in the penitentiary. See United States v. Davis, 831 F.2d 63, 65 (5th Cir. 1987). In a taped conversation between Adams and Robert Mansaw, Adams stated I done been down that road . . . penitentiary . . . and I got [sic] going back. Finally, Adams objects to the following portion of the government's closing argument: [Roosevelt Gatterson's] been to prison for dope. He kind of felt that he and Darrell had a lot in common, that they had a lot to talk about, they were kind of kindred spirits, had common background. (39 R. 7805). Adams did not object to the comment. Accordingly we review the statement for plain error. United States v. Bermea, 30 F.3d 1539 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied sub. nom., 513 U.S. 1156, 25 115 S.Ct. 1113, 131 L.Ed.2d 746 (1995). We disagree with appellants' contention that the statement is a direct comment on Adams' prior conviction; the common background referred to could reasonably be construed as a background in narcotics trafficking. D. Improper Questioning of Law Enforcement Agents Appellants characterize numerous questions by prosecutors to law enforcement agents as objectionable to such an extent that, considered together, they constitute prosecutorial misconduct. We therefore review them as such, rather than as claimed error by the trial court with respect to evidentiary rulings. Appellants contend that the prosecutors intentionally and repeatedly questioned law enforcement agents in a manner calculated to violate the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. By asking law enforcement officials what steps they took during their investigation and why they took those steps, appellants assert that the prosecutors were able to indirectly introduce damaging hearsay testimony of informants and law enforcement officials. They also contend that the prosecution asked improper questions designed to elicit irrelevant testimony which was prejudicial. Rule 803 of the Federal Rules of Evidence defines hearsay as a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Out-of-court statements offered for another purpose, e.g., providing background information to explain the actions of investigators, are not hearsay. United States v. 26 Carrillo, 20 F.3d 617, 620 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, U.S. , 115 S.Ct. 261. 130 L.Ed.2d 18 (1994), citing United States v. Gonzalez, 967 F.2d 1032, 1035 (5th Cir. 1992). Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . .. Fed. R. Evid. 403. The more directly an out of court declaration implicates the defendant, the greater the danger of prejudice. United States v. Carillo, 20 F.2d at 620. If an outof-court statement does not directly implicate the defendant, then the probative value outweighs the prejudice. Id. Appellants Johnston, Lowery, Hill and Adams point to numerous instances of alleged improper questioning9; we address only those instances where an appellant is directly implicated. Michael Hembree, a DEA agent, testified that he and Agent Margaret Brice, a deputy narcotics investigator with the Caddo Parish Sheriff's Office, interviewed Tracy Boston, who was in custody at the Shreveport jail. The AUSA then asked Hembree: [c]an you tell the members of the jury what you did after you spoke with Tracy Boston. (20 R. 2761). Defendants' objection was overruled and Hembree answered: We refocused [our] investigation more narrowly to certain individuals and activities that were being conducted specifically by certain individuals and their part as partners in a drug organization, other specific parts in that organization. Id. When the prosecutor later asked if [he] went any other place 9 Lowery alone cites more than one hundred fifty examples of questions or portions of testimony which he contends are improper. 27 or examined any other records or did anything other thing after that, Hembree stated that he had a conversation with Agent Brice. Id. The prosecutor then asked Hembree the nature of the conversation, and Hembree replied Eric Lowery, Felicia Metcalf Lowery, the conversation was regarding Eric Lowery, Felicia Metcalf Lowery and a residence located at 9469 Pitch Pine Road in Shreveport. (20 R. 2762). The prosecutor's questions succeeded in demonstrating to the jury that information conveyed to Hembree by Boston and Brice incriminated Lowery; the information was probably inadmissible per se, and the sources were not subject to cross examination. An earlier effort by the prosecutor to reveal to the jury the topic of Hembree's conversation with Boston had already been thwarted. When the prosecutor asked Hembree about the topic of his conversation with Tracy Boston defense counsel objected, and the objection was sustained. The challenged question, i.e., the nature of the conversation between Hembree and Brice (clearly a rehash of the Boston interview) came almost immediately after the objection to the prosecutor's question concerning the topic of Hembree's discussion was sustained. The prosecutor's later question, which was objected to by defendants, put before the jury in an indirect manner the same irrelevant hearsay testimony which the district court had prohibited the prosecutor from eliciting. To the discredit of the prosecutors, this was not an isolated situation. A similar instance involved the testimony of Deputy Robert Davidson of the DeSoto Parish Sheriff's Office. Davidson 28 testified that he talked to Don Johnson of the Shreveport Police Department. He was then asked [w]hat did you do after talking to Don Johnson with the Shreveport Police Department. (17 R. 1772). Following defendants' objection to the question which was overruled, Davidson answered that he continued surveillance and focused investigation on more than Renee Smith. Id. Davidson was then asked [w]ho did you focus the investigation on? (17 R. 1772). Defendants objected to the question; however, the district judge overruled the objection and instructed the jury that this is being offered not for the truth of the matter, that may have been said to him, but rather to show simply a basis for action here at this point. Id. There was, of course, a basis for this ruling, just as the judge instructed the jury. Nevertheless, Davidson's answer: Darrell Adams and George Robinson demonstrated that the evidence should have been excluded. (17 R. 1773). The identity of the focus of the investigation had limited, if any, probative value. It was entirely unnecessary to explain the basis for further activity by the witness. By any account the probative value was insufficient to offset the prejudice to Adams resulting from the direct implication that a Shreveport policeman, not subject to cross-examination, had given information, itself probably not admissible, which caused defendants to become the focus of a narcotics investigation. See United States v. Gomez, 529 F.2d 412, 416 (5th Cir. 1976). The prejudice to Adams was compounded when Davidson was allowed to answer the prosecutor's inquiry as to what else did you 29 focus your investigation on?. (17 R. 1774). Davidson replied ProCare Engine Exchange in Houston. Id. Because the jury had before it evidence that Adams owned ProCare at the time of Davidson's investigation, this response (surely anticipated by the prosecutor) further implicated Adams. There are several additional examples which, although they do not involve opinion evidence as to defendant's unlawful activities directly, do so implicitly. In those instances, the jury would reasonably infer that information obtained in an out of court conversation between a testifying police officer and an informant or other law enforcement officer implicated a defendant in narcotics activity. For example, a prosecutor asked Mike Kellum: [d]uring the course of your narcotics investigation have you become familiar with the names Eric Lowery and Larry Hill as focuses of any narcotics investigation in Shreveport? (17 R. 1727). Defendants objected to the question, and the objection was sustained. The prosecutor then explained to the district judge that she was attempting to ask Agent Kellum if he had personal knowledge of that information. The judge told Kellum that he could answer if he had personal knowledge. Kellum replied [y]es, I do. Id. On motion of defendants the judge ordered the answer stricken and instructed the jury to disregard the answer. Nevertheless, the irrelevant question was highly prejudicial to Hill and Lowery; the personal knowledge of information regarding a defendant's narcotics activity is never admissible. No prosecutor should ever ask such a question. The 30 judge's instruction to the witness regarding personal knowledge obviously was not meant to refer to information from others; however, that is what the answer reflected. This was not an isolated instance of such questioning. Michael Hembree testified that he checked certain records relating to Lowery, Hill and other individuals. Despite the ruling just described, Hembree was asked [w]ere any of these names already familiar to you as a result of your personal investigation? (20 R. 2690). Once again defendants' objection was sustained, but the question carried its own damaging garbage. Based upon the large number of instances of similar improper questioning we conclude that the prosecutors intentionally used such questioning as part of their trial strategy. Our conclusion is strengthened by the fact that both prosecutors used the same improper method of questioning. The questions were clearly improper and highly prejudicial to the defendants. Prosecutors have an obligation to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction. . .. United States v. Murrah, 888 F.2d 24, 28 (5th Cir. 1989). A breach of that obligation constitutes serious prosecutorial misconduct, the effect of which we discuss later. E. Comments on Defendants' Failure to Testify Various appellants challenge five statements by prosecutors,10 contending that the statements were improper comments upon 10 The challenged comments were made by two different assistant United States Attorneys. 31 defendants' failure to testify. We conclude that in two instances prosecutors did violate appellants' Fifth Amendment rights. Prosecutors are prohibited from commenting directly or indirectly on a defendant's failure to testify in a criminal case. United States v. Montoya-Ortiz, 7 F.3d 1171, 1178 (5th Cir. 1993). A prosecutor's remarks constitute impermissible comment on a defendant's right not to testify, if the prosecutor's manifest intent was to comment on the defendant's silence or if the character of the remark was such that the jury would naturally and necessarily construe it as a comment on the defendant's silence. United States v. Collins, 972 F.2d 1385, 1406 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1017, 113 S.Ct. 1812, 123 L.Ed.2d 444 (1993). A prosecutor's intent is not manifest if there is an equally plausible explanation of the prosecutor's remark. United States v. Collins, 972 F.2d at 1406. The challenged remarks must be considered in the context of the case in which they are made. United States v. Montoya-Ortiz, 7 F.3d at 1179. Some factual background is necessary in order to consider the prosecutors' comments in context. During closing argument, a defense counsel placed a photograph of a witness for the prosecution in the witness stand and discussed the witness's testimony. During the rebuttal argument the prosecutor removed the photograph from the witness stand, placed it on an easel at the end of the jury box, and surrounded the photograph with pictures of Alvarado, Adams, Felicia Lowery, and Angela Tubbs. Thereafter he stated: 32 But I submit from the testimony you've heard that was, that was, a man chosen by Darrell Adams, mind you, the first relationship. That was a man chosen by Darrell Adams to take care of and take charge of the most precious things in Darrell Adam's everyday life, drugs and money. That was the first choice made. That was the first relationship made. And to take this Houston Police Department glamour shot of fat addict Roy. Come on. Is that not to some extent misleading? Judging by his appearance. But to set that photograph in that stand without including the other players-- (40 R. 8074). Defendants' objected, and the jury was excused. The district judge ruled that the statement was not a comment on the defendant's failure to testify, but he offered to instruct the jury to disregard the remark. Defendants declined the offer. The prosecutor then continued his rebuttal argument stating: You cannot be permitted to conclude from this Houston Police Department glamour shot of Roy Patterson -- You cannot, you cannot, be permitted to conclude that he acted alone, that he was not involved in some combination, some confederation, some conspiracy, to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and the reasonably foreseeable consequence of cocaine, crack cocaine, and marijuana. You cannot. (40 R. 8082-83). The prosecutor was attempting to persuade the jury that the witness was not acting alone, that he was acting as part of a conspiracy. The prosecutor's argument, although unartful, does not demonstrate manifest intent to comment on the defendants' silence, nor would a jury necessarily construe it as a comment on their failure to testify. The statement was not an improper comment on defendants' failure to testify. The second comment made during the rebuttal argument is the following: 33 [Counsel for Lowery] also submitted to you that his client has led an open life. If it's so open, why don't you put your automobiles in your name? If it is so open, why don't you tell us what you do to make in this cash business that you moved to after you've worked at Cantonese Grocery. . .. (40 R. 8099). Lowery moved for a mistrial. The motion was denied based on the prosecutor's explanation, outside the presence of the jury, that his comment was directed to Lowery's failure to file income tax returns. The judge then instructed the jury to disregard the statement. No manifest intent to comment on the defendant's failure to testify is demonstrated in the cited statement. The prosecutor's explanation, i.e., that he was commenting on the lack of income tax returns, is a plausible explanation for the statement. Moreover, the jury would not necessarily and naturally view the statement as a comment on Lowery's failure to testify. The statement did not violate appellants' Fifth Amendment rights. Appellants also attack a question posed by the prosecutor to IRS Special Agent Jackson. Agent Jackson was asked: [a]t any time did A.D. Ernest invoke his right to remain silent? The agent stated [h]e did later. (31 R. 6044). At this point in the trial Ernest was a defendant; later he entered a guilty plea. The inquiry was restricted to Ernest and did not implicate any appellant. The jury would not necessarily construe a statement that one defendant invoked his right to remain silent as a comment on the remaining defendants' failure to testify. Moreover, defendants' failure to contemporaneously object to the question deprived the court of the opportunity to give a curative 34 instruction to eliminate or lessen any prejudice to appellants. The question does not constitute error as to any appellant. One troublesome comment occurred during the redirect examination of Roosevelt Gatterson. Again, background is essential to place the comment in the proper context. During direct examination Gatterson testified about a number of activities in which he engaged in furtherance of the conspiracy. During crossexamination he was asked three times if anyone could corroborate his testimony concerning three such activities, e.g., cocaine deliveries. Gatterson responded no to each of the three questions. On redirect the prosecutor inquired [a]ren't there some people in this courtroom that can back up what you say? (15 R. 1165). Simultaneously the prosecutor made a sweeping arm gesture indicating the individuals seated at counsel tables. The judge immediately told the jurors to disregard the impermissible question and instructed them as follows: no defendant is required to present any evidence in this case nor to testify in this case. You may not, if any one of them choose not to do so, consider that against them or in your consideration of the evidence at all or in any respect whatsoever. You've been instructed on that before. You're instructed again. Mr. Dies has asked an improper question in turning as he did toward the defendants in this respect. They are under no burden to make a response on any of that. Therefore, you're instructed to disregard entirely that question. (15 R. 1166). The prosecutor demonstrated manifest intent to comment on the defendants' failure to testify. In responding to the crossexamination to the effect that there were no witnesses who could 35 corroborate Gatterson's testimony, the prosecutor implied that there were such people in the courtroom, obviously referring to the defendants. No one else in the court room could have witnessed the events; only the defendants could reasonably be thought to be capable of providing corroboration. The question was bad enough, but the prosecutor made it worse by use of the arm gesture emphasizing that he was referring to the defendants' failure to testify. The prosecutor's question and gesture clearly constituted an impermissible comment on the defendants' silence, serious prosecutorial misconduct. There is more: during the first portion of the government's closing argument, in highlighting some of the court's instructions on the law that the jury was likely to hear following closing arguments, a prosecutor stated: This also says that in an impeachment of prior inconsistencies instruction something that I want to remind you of and the instruction actually reminds you of. It reminds you that a defendant has the right not to testify. That is constitutional right. It is yours. It is mine. It is theirs. Please value it. I do. Don't take into consideration the fact that whether or not anyone testified in this case is inappropriate. But what you also can't do in a situation like this is go back into that jury room and make up a story for them. That is impermissible by law. You can't play what if. You can't say, Well, if they testified, well, maybe they would have explained this. Maybe they would have said that. That's not allowed and that's fair. (39 R. 7779-80). Defendants objected to the argument as an impermissible comment on their failure to testify and requested a mistrial. The judge overruled the objection stating [t]he jury is going to follow the instructions of the court on that. Id. 36 The government urges that there was no manifest intent to comment on the failure to testify, because it is equally plausible that the comment was a plea for the jury to base its verdict solely on the evidence and not on speculation and conjecture, and that the jury would not necessarily have considered the remark as a comment on the defendants' failure to testify. Mindful that wide latitude is accorded counsel during closing argument, we nevertheless deem the prosecutor's statement to be error. The fact that the prosecutor was not attempting to have the jury infer guilt due to the defendant's failure to testify does not render the statement permissible. The statement was a direct comment on the failure to testify. Even though the prosecutor cautioned the jury not to consider whether the defendants testified at trial, his comment focused the jury's attention on the fact that the defendants did not testify. It matters not that the prosecutor was paraphrasing the court's instruction. A statement by the court referring to the defendant's right not to testify is far different from a similar reference by the prosecutor in closing argument; indeed, a defendant who has chosen not to testify probably has the right to request the court to delete such a reference from the court's charge. In any event, the last portion of the prosecutor's statement had no basis in the court's charge and was arguably an incorrect statement of the law. Nothing precludes jurors from theorizing in their own minds as to a defendant's version of the facts in the absence of testimony from the defendant. Our system of justice rigorously guards the right of an accused to remain 37 silent and not to testify. Prosecutors are obligated never to attempt to sway a jury in any way because of the exercise of an accused of that right. To suggest that a defendant's decision not to testify somehow limits jurors' mental processes, e.g., with respect to inferences to be drawn from direct evidence, violates that obligation. The prosecutor's statement constitutes error. EFFECT OF PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT Having concluded that the prosecutor's references to the defendants' failure to testify and their improper questioning of various law enforcement officials constitute serious misconduct, we must now determine whether those tactics cast serious doubt upon the correctness of the jury's verdict. Otherwise, the errors are harmless and do not justify reversal. United States v. Palmer, 37 F.3d 1080, 1085 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, U.S. , 115 S.Ct. 1804, 132 L.Ed.2d 265 (1995). In examining the effect of the prosecutors' impermissible comments, we consider three factors: the magnitude of the prejudicial effect of the remark, the efficacy of any cautionary instruction, and the strength of the evidence of the defendant's guilt. United States v. Bermea, 30 F.3d 1539, 1563 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied sub. nom., 513 U.S. 1156, 115 S.Ct. 1113 (1995). The prejudicial effect of the comment and gesture during Gatterson's testimony was slight. The question was asked during the second week of a trial that lasted twenty-nine (29) days extending over a period of approximately eight weeks. The prejudice 38 was also lessened because the question was asked during the government's case-in-chief. At that time the jury did not know that the defendants would not testify and would therefore be less inclined to construe the question as a comment on the defendants' silence. The judge's timely and thorough jury instruction further mitigated the effect of that improper comment. The prosecutor's comment during closing argument was more prejudicial. It was a direct comment on defendants' failure to testify, and it occurred only one day before the jury began deliberations. The prejudice was mitigated somewhat by the trial judge's instruction prior to the commencement of jury deliberations that: The law does not require a defendant to prove his innocence or to produce any evidence at all and no inference whatever may be drawn from the election of a defendant not to testify. Yesterday morning when [the prosecutor] was giving -- going over some of the instructions, she expected that I would give and remarked on one of these passages and [defense counsel] moved for a mistrial and I denied that and said the jury would follow my instructions. My instructions are these. Again, no inference whatever may be drawn from the election of a defendant not to testify. (40 R. 8174). While the harm was mitigated by this jury instruction, the prejudice remained. The constitutional right of a defendant to choose not to testify is a fundamental tenet of our system of justice. The prejudice resulting from a direct reference by a prosecutor to the exercise of that right, coupled with an attempt to use the failure to testify to limit the jurors personal 39 deliberative process cannot be completely cured by a court instruction. The remaining prejudice, especially if cumulated with prejudice resulting from other misconduct, may be sufficient, absent substantial evidence of a defendant's guilt, to cast doubt upon the correctness of the jury's verdict. As previously stated, the prosecutors' improper questioning of law enforcement officials was highly prejudicial to those appellants directly implicated. There are no factors mitigating that prejudice. To complete the analysis as to whether the prosecutors' errors justify reversal of convictions, we must measure the prejudice resulting from the misconduct against the strength of the evidence as to each appellant's guilt. A. Darrell Adams There is no need to repeat the extensive evidence already recounted in detail. Suffice it to say that the evidence against Adams is overwhelming. Bosia Cash, Roosevelt Gatterson, Officer Henry King, Kimela Lomax, Stevenson McClendon, Bruce Embrey, and Roy Patterson all identified Adams as the supplier of narcotics being transported to Shreveport for distribution over a lengthy period. There was a great deal of evidence that Adams directed the activities of his co-conspirators in Houston, arranged for the narcotics to be transported to Shreveport, identified the person to whom the drugs were to be delivered, and collected and counted the vast profits derived from these illegal activities. There is also considerable circumstantial evidence against 40 Adams. Documents seized from Adams' office at ProCare were identified by FBI Agent Harold Clouse as drug ledgers. Additionally, Adams engaged in various practices common among those involved in narcotics trafficking, including listing pager and telephone service in the name of another. Over a two year period, thirty three (33) different pagers were billed to ProCare. There is also strong financial evidence of Adams' guilt. Receipts for wire transfers of money were retrieved from his garbage, two for transfers of $4,000 and one for $3,000. Adams frequently had large amounts of cash in his possession; he made cash payments of $5,000 and $5,341.82 on a Lexus automobile and kept $10,000 in cash in a shoe box in his closet. The search of Adams' house at the time of his arrest yielded $32,000: $3,000 in a bag in a closet in the master bedroom, $13,000 in a shed, and $19,000 in a bag behind the washing machine. The financial condition of ProCare also provides evidence of Adams' guilt. Based on records from the State Comptroller's Office, in 1993 ProCare's reported sales were approximately the same as those established by the records of sales seized at ProCare. However, bank deposits for the business in 1993 were significantly higher. That surplus is not accounted for by transfers of money from Adams' personal back account to the corporation's account. After deducting Adams' expenditures from his personal bank account, insufficient funds remained to account for the funds deposited into ProCare's account. Although Adams purchased Procare in 1991, his income tax return for that year does 41 not record any income from ProCare. Adams did not file income tax returns in 1992 and 1993. On a credit application for the purchase of a car executed in October 1993, Adams stated that his yearly salary from ProCare was $75,000. Considering the overwhelming evidence against him, the prosecutorial misconduct does not rise to the level of reversible error as to Adams. B. Gonzalo Alvarado As with Adams, the evidence against Alvarado is overwhelming. Several witnesses named Alvarado as Adams' source of drugs. Stevenson McClendon testified that he purchased cocaine from Alvarado on behalf of Adams. Gatterson testified that he picked up cocaine destined for Shreveport from Alvarado. Roy Patterson testified that Alvarado personally delivered five kilograms of cocaine to him at the stable used by Adams. Witnesses saw Adams deliver money to Alvarado, and there was evidence of frequent communication between Adams and Alvarado, including testimony that Alvarado called ProCare daily. When Bosia Cash was arrested and the cocaine he was transporting was seized, Adams sent Gatterson to inform Alvarado of the loss. During the search of Alvarado's house twelve (12) pounds of marijuana and a five pound scale were seized. A document seized from Adams' office at ProCare, identified as a drug ledger, indicated a payment to Alvarado for cocaine. Alvarado challenges his convictions based solely on the two comments by prosecutors on the defendants' failure to testify. 42 Considering the overwhelming evidence of Alvarado's guilt we find that the prosecutors' improper comments do not constitute reversible error, and we affirm his convictions. C. Eric Lowery Considering the strength of the evidence against Lowery we conclude that the prosecutors' misconduct did not have an effect on the outcome of his trial. Thus, the misconduct was harmless error as to Lowery. Roy Patterson testified that in approximately May 1993, Lowery and Johnston came to ProCare and Lowery arranged with Patterson to deliver a shipment of marijuana to Shreveport. Roosevelt Gatterson testified that he saw Lowery at ProCare on two occasions; both times Lowery met with Adams. On the second occasion Lowery was accompanied by Johnston. Gatterson testified that he was told that Lowery and Johnston were at Procare for some type of narcotics deal. Roy Patterson also testified that large amounts of cocaine and marijuana were delivered directly to Lowery. Patterson testified that Lowery participated in the weighing of one marijuana delivery to Shreveport, and Derrick Patterson corroborated Lowery's involvement in that delivery of marijuana. Roy Patterson testified that he received large amounts of cash from Lowery and delivered that money to Adams. Kimela Lomax testified that Johnston delivered a large amount of cash to Adams' house. Lomax further testified that when Adams confronted Johnston with an accusation that the money Johnston delivered was short, 43 Johnston called Lowery, who discussed the situation with Adams. There is also strong circumstantial evidence of Lowery's guilt. Lowery phoned and visited Adams at ProCare, and Lowery and Adams met in Shreveport a number of times so that Adams could take care of business. Murray Franks, a salesman with EconoPage, testified that he sold several pagers to Lowery during the period covered by the conspiracy. During the period covered by the conspiracy Lowery purchased a Grand Prix automobile; he told the car salesman that he did not want to pay more than $10,000 cash for the car. Lowery paid for the Grand Prix in cash, primarily in denominations of $50 or less. He registered the vehicle in Jennifer Gerard's name. The vehicle Lowery traded in at the time he purchased the Grand Prix was also registered in Jennifer Gerard's name. In December 1993, Lowery's brother Walter Gerard used $5,000 cash received from Lowery to pay part of the purchase price of an automobile. Although the vehicle was registered in Walter Gerard's name and Gerard had a set of keys, it was clear that the car was Lowery's. Lowery failed to file income tax returns for the years 1991-1993.