Opinion ID: 2320924
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Riley's Fifth Amendment Rights

Text: Riley argues that he invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel at 9:00 a.m. on September 9, during the initial interrogation by Detectives Sauls and Garvey, when he checked no in the box next to the question Do you want to make a statement at this time without a lawyer? on the Prince George's County rights waiver form. The trial court found, however, that he did not invoke his Fifth Amendment rights at that time, and there is evidentiary support for its finding. Under case law interpreting the Fifth Amendment, custodial interrogation must cease if, at any time during the questioning, the suspect clearly and explicitly requests an attorney. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-485, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). If the suspect clearly requests an attorney, interrogation may lawfully resume only if the suspect initiates further communication, exchanges or conversations with the police. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485, 101 S.Ct. 1880. However, the Supreme Court has stated that if a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel, our precedents do not require the cessation of questioning. Davis, 512 U.S. at 459, 114 S.Ct. 2350 (emphasis in original; citations omitted). [13] Police officers have no duty to clarify ambiguous statements that might arguably contain a request for an attorney. Id. at 461-462, 114 S.Ct. 2350; see United States v. Cooper, 85 F.Supp.2d 1, 20 (D.D.C.2000). A court, moreover, must consider the totality of the circumstances to ascertain whether the accused in fact knowingly and voluntarily decided to forgo his rights to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979). The trial court found, as a fact, that Riley did not explicitly invoke this right when he answered no to the question Are you willing to make a statement at this time without a lawyer? The court interpreted this no answer as clearly invoking his right to remain silent, but not his right to an attorney under the Fifth Amendment. In explaining its finding, the court said that when a person answers no to the [question of whether he is willing to make a statement without a lawyer], it is impossible to know whether the person . . . is not willing to make a statement without a lawyer but is willing to make a statement with a lawyer or whether the person is not willing to make a statement. The Prince George's County waiver form, the court said, was inherently ambiguous. [14] The court noted that Riley did not explicitly ask for a lawyer at any time on September 9, and when he was specifically asked late in the day on September 9 whether he had ever requested a lawyer that day, he responded no. Riley further demonstrated that he did not ask for a lawyer when, at 1:43 p.m. on September 9, he again answered no upon being asked whether he was willing to make a statement without a lawyer, but clarified that statement by saying to Detective DeLoatch, I don't want to make a written statement, but I'm willing to talk to you. Taking all of these facts into consideration, we hold that Riley failed to invoke his right to counsel under the Fifth Amendment. See Gresham v. United States, 654 A.2d 871 (D.C.1995) (holding that defendant's confession to the police need not be suppressed because defendant did not clearly assert his right to counsel during interrogation when he asked his girl friend, in the presence of the police, to call his mother and tell her to get him a lawyer). [15]
There is no doubt that Riley invoked his right to remain silent at 9:00 a.m. on September 9. The issue before us here, however, is whether he waived that right a few hours later, at 1:43 p.m. on September 9. The admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends under Miranda on whether his right to cut off questioning was scrupulously honored. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975). In Stewart v. United States, 668 A.2d 857 (D.C. 1995), this court listed four factors, originally set forth in Mosley, that must be considered in determining whether a suspect's rights have been scrupulously honored: (1) was the suspect orally advised of his rights and did he orally acknowledge them; (2) did the police immediately cease questioning and make no attempts to resume or ask him to reconsider; (3) was there a sufficient break (in Mosley, two hours) between the first and second interrogations and was the second performed at a different location by a different officer about a different crime and (4) were Miranda warnings given before the second questioning session. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104, 96 S.Ct. 321; see Stewart, 668 A.2d at 863. The Mosley Court envisioned a case-by-case approach involving an inquiry into all of the relevant facts to determine whether the suspect's rights have been respected. United States v. Dell'Aria, 811 F.Supp. 837, 842 (E.D.N.Y.1993) (cited in Stewart, 668 A.2d at 863). In reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress evidence, this court may not disturb the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by substantial evidence. E.g., Stewart, 668 A.2d at 863; see D.C.Code § 17-305(a) (2001). However, we review de novo whether the defendant's rights were scrupulously honored and whether the police conduct constituted interrogation because these are questions of law. Jones v. United States, 779 A.2d 277, 281 (D.C. 2001) (en banc), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 906, 122 S.Ct. 1207, 152 L.Ed.2d 145 (2002); Stewart, 668 A.2d at 863. The trial court ruled that with one failing, which I find to be inadvertent, the police did scrupulously honor [Riley's] right to remain silent . . . having invoked his right to remain silent at 9:00 a.m. that morning and having decided to waive his rights at 1:30 or 1:43 that same afternoon. In coming to this decision, the court reviewed the events of September 9 following Riley's arrest. The court first noted that the police properly terminated their questioning when Riley invoked his right to remain silent at 9:00 a.m. However, Detective DeLoatch then improperly entered Riley's interview room at 10:45 a.m. with the express purpose of eliciting a statement from Riley and interrogating him. Though this was not a proper reinitiation of questioning under Michigan v. Mosley , the trial court concluded, and we agree, that under the totality of the circumstances this isolated act did not invalidate Riley's subsequent waiver of rights or make his confession inadmissible. In Peoples v. United States, 395 A.2d 41 (D.C.1978), the defendant was arrested in Maryland at 9:00 a.m. and thereafter invoked his rights. Despite this invocation, improper questioning ensued, and the defendant admitted to past criminal involvement in the District of Columbia and gave a written confession. Six hours after making this confession, the defendant was again informed of his rights by a magistrate, and he indicated that he understood them. He was then taken back to the police station, where he asked to speak to a District of Columbia police officer. This officer again read the defendant his rights, and the defendant waived them, giving a four-page written statement on the crimes he had committed, signing each page, and initialing a further waiver of his Miranda rights. Though the defendant's initial confessions early in the day were inadmissible, this court held that the trial court did not err in finding appellant's subsequent confession to be voluntary and untainted. 395 A.2d at 44. Although the defendant in Peoples was interviewed about the same crime after invoking his right to remain silent, we held that under the totality of the circumstances the Mosley requirements were satisfied, and thus the statements were admissible. In the case at bar, we are satisfied that, under the totality of the circumstances, the Mosley requirements, as applied in Peoples, were met. [16] Riley invoked his right to remain silent at 9:00 a.m., and the questioning was immediately terminated. Riley was then left alone for a substantial period of time, more than four hours, except for the brief improper remarks that Detective DeLoatch directed at Riley at 10:45 a.m. Later, while Riley was being escorted to the bathroom at around 1:30 p.m., he initiated a conversation on the subject of the murders by making statements to Detective DeLoatch about his innocence which the detective described as unsolicited outbursts. [17] After returning from the bathroom with Riley and hearing his outbursts continue, DeLoatch correctly understood that Riley wished to speak further on the subject. Detective DeLoatch then read Riley his Miranda rights and gave him a waiver form listing these rights, asking if he waived them. After checking the no box next to the question, Are you willing to make a statement at this time without a lawyer?, Riley, without prompting, orally clarified that he was willing to talk but did not want to make a written statement. [18] After Detective DeLoatch explained to Riley that answering yes would not result in a written statement but would simply allow him to talk about the murders, Riley changed his answer from no to yes and waived his rights. [19] During the ensuing conversation Riley told Detective DeLoatch that he had nothing to do with the murders for which he had been arrested. After leaving Riley alone for another long stretch, Detective DeLoatch returned to complete the processing of Riley's arrest. While this was going on, Riley initiated a conversation with Detective DeLoatch by asking if he could speak with Muhammad. Detective DeLoatch arranged a meeting between the two of them at about 7:30 p.m., and during that meeting Riley learned from Muhammad that he had confessed. Riley then decided that he too wanted to confess, and told Detective DeLoatch that he wanted to tell his side of the story. Riley then gave a written statement, in the course of which he admitted his involvement in the murders. Although he was not read his Miranda rights again before writing that statement, which was completed at around 9:40 p.m., the evidence established that he had already heard his rights read several times that day. In addition, he testified at the suppression hearing that he understood his rights because of his prior arrest on August 22, only two and a half weeks earlier. Finally, Riley signed an addendum at the end of his written statement, indicating that he waived his rights and that at no time that day had he requested the aid of counsel. The timing of Riley's confession persuades us that the key factor in prompting him to confess was his 7:30 p.m. meeting with Muhammad, which was arranged at Riley's behest. We hold that Riley's waiver of his Miranda rights shortly after 1:30 p.m. was not tainted by Detective DeLoatch's serious, but ultimately inconsequential, misstep at 10:45 a.m., and that his written confession several hours later  which he gave after his meeting with Muhammad  was not subject to exclusion under Mosley and its progeny.