Opinion ID: 1192612
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Defendant is Entitled to Eleventh Amendment Immunity on the RLUIPA Claim.

Text: Plaintiff seeks monetary damages, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief, asserting that the defendant violated RLUIPA by not providing him with kosher meals while he was incarcerated at the Kinross facility. RLUIPA provides: [n]o government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution . . . even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person  (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-1(a). RLUIPA defines government as including States and their agencies and departments, as well as persons acting under color of State law. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(4)(A). Plaintiff's RLUIPA claim against the defendant, a State official, in her official capacity is considered a claim against the State of Michigan. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991). Accordingly, any immunity available to the State is available to the defendant in her official capacity. Id. The plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against the defendant for the alleged RLUIPA violation. The plaintiff, however, has been transferred from the Kinross facility to a facility that offers kosher meals. In addition, the Hiawatha facility has since changed its policy to preclude transferring participants in the kosher meal program to the Kinross facility. Therefore, we find that the plaintiff's request for declaratory and injunctive relief is rendered moot. Kensu v. Haigh, 87 F.3d 172, 175 (6th Cir.1996) (holding prisoner's claim for injunctive and declaratory relief mooted by his transfer to new facility). The district court found that the plaintiff's claim for monetary damages against the defendant in her official capacity should be dismissed because the State of Michigan has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity to claims for damages under RLUIPA. The plaintiff argues that, by accepting federal funds for its prisons, the State waived its immunity for RLUIPA claims. By accepting federal prison funds, States consent to provide appropriate relief to prisoners who suffer a RLUIPA violation. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-2(a), 2000cc-1(b)(1) (requiring all states that receive federal prison funds to comply with RLUIPA). RLUIPA provides that [a] person may assert a violation of this chapter as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a). The issue before us is whether monetary damages are appropriate relief for violations of RLUIPA. Neither the United States Supreme Court nor this court has ruled on the issue. There is also no consensus among the other Circuits as to whether a State's acceptance of federal prison funds constitutes a waiver of its sovereign immunity as to RLUIPA claims for damages. The Courts of Appeals for the Third, Fourth and Fifth Circuits, along with a district court from this Circuit, have concluded that the States are immune from claims for monetary damages under RLUIPA. See Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Texas, 560 F.3d 316, 330-332 (5th Cir.2009) (designated for publication); Scott v. Beard, 252 Fed.Appx. 491, 492-93 (3d Cir.2007); Madison v. Virginia, 474 F.3d 118, 122-23 (4th Cir.2006); Porter v. Caruso, No. 1:05-cv-562, 2008 WL 3978972, at -7 (W.D.Mich. Aug.22, 2008), appeal docketed, No. 08-2314 (6th Cir. Oct. 14, 2008). See also Webman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 441 F.3d 1022, 1026 (D.C.Cir.2006) (holding language in Religious Freedom Restoration Act, similar to that in RLUIPA, permitting suit for appropriate relief, did not waive federal government's immunity to suits for damages). The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, however, takes the opposite view and ruled that a State's receipt of federal prison funds constitutes a waiver of its sovereign immunity for suits seeking monetary damages under RLUIPA. Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255, 1271 (11th Cir.2007). In Madison v. Virginia , the plaintiff sued the Commonwealth of Virginia, alleging it violated RLUIPA by denying him kosher meals. Madison, 474 F.3d at 122-23. The district court held that by accepting federal prison funds, the Commonwealth of Virginia had waived its sovereign immunity for RLUIPA claims, including those for monetary damages. Id. at 123. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit disagreed, stating that, although Virginia consented, by accepting federal prison funds, to be subject to the substantive requirements of RLUIPA, the language of RLUIPA did not expressly and unequivocally extend its waiver of sovereign immunity to suits seeking monetary damages. Id. at 129-33. The court explained: State sovereign immunity is among the Constitution's most foundational principles, see, e.g., Brown v. N.C. Div. of Motor Vehicles, 166 F.3d 698, 704 (4th Cir.1999), and we may not infer that a State's immunity from suit in the federal courts has been negated, Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984). [T]here can be no consent by implication or by use of ambiguous language. Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 318, 106 S.Ct. 2957, 92 L.Ed.2d 250 (1986) (quoting United States v. N.Y. Rayon Importing Co., 329 U.S. 654, 659, 67 S.Ct. 601, 91 L.Ed. 577 (1947)). A waiver must be unequivocally expressed in statutory text. See Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192, 116 S.Ct. 2092, 135 L.Ed.2d 486 (1996). For this reason, general participation in a federal program or the receipt of federal funds is insufficient to waive sovereign immunity. See Atascadero [State Hosp.v. Scanlon], 473 U.S. [234,] 246-47, 105 S.Ct. 3142, 87 L.Ed.2d 171 [(1985)]. Rather, Congress must make its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute. Hoffman v. Conn. Dep't of Income Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96, 101, 109 S.Ct. 2818, 106 L.Ed.2d 76 (1989) (plurality) (internal quotation omitted). Id. at 129-30. The Fourth Circuit concluded that a waiver of sovereign immunity for some type of remedy does not necessarily extend to suits for damages. Id. at 131 (quoting Webman, 441 F.3d at 1025). For a waiver of sovereign immunity to extend to claims for monetary damages, the waiver must unambiguously extend to such claims. Id. (quoting Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192, 116 S.Ct. 2092, 135 L.Ed.2d 486 (1996)). Any purported waiver of sovereign immunity will be strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in favor of the sovereign. Lane, 518 U.S. at 192, 116 S.Ct. 2092. See also Gomez-Perez v. Potter, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 1931, 170 L.Ed.2d 887 (2008) (considering waiver of federal government's sovereign immunity). Thus, the Fourth Circuit held that RLUIPA's appropriate relief language did not unequivocally waive the State's immunity from suit for monetary damages. RLUIPA makes no reference to monetary relief  or even to sovereign immunity generally. Madison, 474 F.3d at 131. Thus, the court concluded that acceptance of federal prison funds under RLUIPA does not waive a State's immunity from suits for monetary damages. Id. Similarly, the Fifth Circuit, finding the Fourth's Circuit's reasoning in Madison persuasive, recently held that the appropriate relief language contained in RLUIPA was not sufficiently clear in light of the [Supreme] Court's sovereign-immunity jurisprudence. Sossamon, 560 F.3d 316, 330. Accordingly, the court held that any claim under RLUIPA for monetary damages against the defendants in their official capacity was barred by the State's sovereign immunity. Id. at 331-32. The plaintiff argues that the Sixth Circuit should adopt the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit found in Smith v. Allen . In Smith, the court held that RLUIPA created a private cause of action for appropriate relief against a State that accepted federal prison funds. Smith, 502 F.3d at 1269. The Eleventh Circuit, relying on Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 112 S.Ct. 1028, 117 L.Ed.2d 208 (1992), stated that where Congress ha[s] not given any guidance or clear indication of its purpose with respect to remedies, federal courts should presume the availability of all appropriate remedies. Smith, 502 F.3d at 1270. Thus, the Smith court concluded that the phrase appropriate relief as used in RLUIPA is broad enough to encompass the right to monetary damages. Smith, 502 F.3d at 1270. We disagree with the Eleventh Circuit's holding that Franklin is applicable to a claim against a State for money damages under RLUIPA. Franklin did not involve a claim of sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court has recognized that Franklin is not per se applicable to all claims against a State, but only to claims in which a State has expressly waived its sovereign immunity. Lane, 518 U.S. at 196-97, 116 S.Ct. 2092 (finding Congress did not waive federal government's sovereign immunity for monetary damages for claims against it for violations of § 504(a) of Rehabilitation Act of 1973). In Lane, the Supreme Court explained: Petitioner's reliance on Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60, 112 S.Ct. 1028, 117 L.Ed.2d 208 (1992), . . . is misplaced. In Franklin, we held only that the implied private right of action under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 supports a claim for monetary damages. [A]bsent clear direction to the contrary by Congress, we stated, the federal courts have the power to award any appropriate relief in a cognizable cause of action brought pursuant to a federal statute. Id., at 70-71, 112 S.Ct., at 1035. Franklin, however, involved an action against nonfederal defendants under Title IX. Although the Government does not contest the propriety of the injunctive relief Lane obtained, the Federal Government's sovereign immunity prohibits wholesale application of Franklin to actions against the Government to enforce § 504(a). As the Government puts it, [w]here a cause of action is authorized against the federal government, the available remedies are not those that are `appropriate,' but only those for which sovereign immunity has been expressly waived. Id. As discussed above, a finding that a State has waived its sovereign immunity by accepting federal funds must be based on unequivocal language in the statute that makes the waiver unambiguous. Here, RLUIPA does not contain a clear indication that Congress unambiguously conditioned receipt of federal prison funds on a State's consent to suit for monetary damages. We find the reasoning of the Fourth and Fifth Circuits consistent with the current Supreme Court case law requiring waivers of sovereign immunity to be unequivocally expressed. See, e.g., Gomez-Perez, 128 S.Ct. at 1942-43; Lane, 518 U.S. at 192, 116 S.Ct. 2092; United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33-34, 37, 112 S.Ct. 1011, 117 L.Ed.2d 181 (1992). We hold that, because RLUIPA's appropriate relief language does not clearly and unequivocally indicate that the waiver extends to monetary damages, the Eleventh Amendment bars plaintiff's claim for monetary relief under RLUIPA.