Opinion ID: 417702
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The August Order

Text: 11 The August Order approved a stipulation between Berkman and the City agreeing on an interim physical test to be used to determine which members of the plaintiff class were adequately qualified to be firefighters and hence could be appointed to the reserved positions. The events leading to the August Order began in the wake of the March Order. Berkman and the City had different ideas as to the most appropriate procedure for determining which members of the plaintiff class were adequately qualified to become firefighters. The City favored development of a new physical exam, whereas Berkman sought a training program in which interested class members would participate and have their fitness to be firefighters evaluated solely on the basis of their performance in that program. Each side proceeded to develop its own proposal. 12 The City's Department of Personnel undertook a review of the literature regarding firefighter testing, existing analyses of the New York City firefighter's job, and the district court's opinion in the present case. Eventually, after consultation with members of the Fire Department, UFA, and outside consultants, the City devised a two-part physical exam, as described in the margin. 5 This exam was itself tested on a group composed of 37 incumbent firefighters, selected to be representative of members of the Fire Department with respect to assignment, age, and years on the force. The testing was supervised by 20 superior officers, who were instructed as to what constituted acceptable and unacceptable performance on each subtest. A score of 4:09 minutes for performance of all the tests was eventually set as the cutoff passing score. 6 This was derived from the distribution of the test scores of the incumbent test-testers, the recommendations of the Fire Department officers who had supervised the incumbents in the test, and the recommendations of a psychometrician retained as a consultant by the Personnel Department. 13 In the meantime, Berkman, who knew the City was working on an interim test but did not know its contents, continued to press for a physical training program. The City met with Berkman's counsel several times to discuss the nature and cost of Berkman's proposal, but did not disclose any information regarding its interim test prior to May 21, when the test was finalized. It did not invite Berkman to participate in the test development. 14 On May 21, in an effort to have interim hiring qualification procedures commenced without further delay, Berkman moved to have the district court approve her proposed physical training program. The City quickly cross-moved to have its proposed interim test approved. On May 26, the district court held a hearing on the applications, at which Berkman, the City, and UFA were represented. 15 The City urged approval of its proposed interim test, arguing that it was job-related and would permit the City to select persons who would be able to perform firefighting duties in New York City. Berkman adhered to her preference for a training program, citing her lack of participation in the development of the City's proposed test, her consequent uncertainty as to the validity of the test, and her desire to end delay in gaining the interim relief granted by the March Order. 16 The court expressed concern over the secrecy with which the City's test had been prepared, stated its preference for a qualifying procedure based on observations over a substantial training period (May 26, 1982 Tr. at 32), and questioned the fairness of asking class members to take a physical test on short notice and without training procedures. The court reserved decision as to each side's proposal and encouraged the parties to attempt a compromise. 17 At the end of this hearing, UFA, which had offered no proposal of its own and had submitted no papers, testimony, or argument either for or against either proposed qualifying procedure, appeared to favor the City's proposed test. When the court indicated that it would reserve decision and asked counsel to return the next day, counsel for UFA suggested that perhaps a decision by the court could be obviated if Berkman's experts were to review the City's proposed exam and find it acceptable: 18 MR. TEITLER [counsel for UFA]: Your Honor, before a determination is made by the bench, the plaintiffs have indicated that they haven't had their experts have time to go over the exam broached by the City. 19 Wouldn't it be more advantageous to see if between us, if their experts review the exam proposed by the City and find it acceptable that it might give a little more leeway as to what the result might be? 20 THE COURT: I don't have any problem at all with you discussing it amongst yourselves and coming up with any resolution you can, I would encourage it .... 21 ... If you can take the problem out of my hands, I would be happy to have you do it. 22 (Id. at 60-61.) 23 Compromise was not quickly forthcoming, however, and the parties so notified the court. Accordingly, on June 3, 1982, the court ruled orally, in essence, that it would approve the City's proposed interim test if it could be validated. 7 It ordered the City (1) to prepare to administer the proposed exam to interested members of the plaintiff class in September, (2) to appear in court in early August for a hearing on the validity of the proposed exam, (3) to disclose to the plaintiff class all information on the validity, fairness, and adverse impact of the exam, and (4) to conduct, beginning on June 7, familiarization and training programs for members of the plaintiff class who wished to take the interim exam. 8 Berkman and the City were directed to cooperate in developing the familiarization and training programs. This order was embodied in a written order filed on June 9 (June 9 Order). UFA immediately appealed. 9 24 Berkman and the City nevertheless continued to negotiate, and eventually they agreed upon a qualifying physical test that differed only in minor respects from the interim test proposed by the City in May. The agreement was embodied in a stipulation dated July 12, 1982, which described the physical test as set forth in the margin. 10 25 UFA refused to join in the stipulation, however, and the City moved to have the district court compel UFA to sign. At a hearing on August 3, the district court stated that it had no authority to order a party to sign a stipulation but that it would construe the City's application as a request that UFA show cause why, if there is any reason, why this qualifying test shouldn't be approved. (Aug. 3, 1982 Tr. at 3.) The court then put that question to UFA's counsel: 26 THE COURT: ... 27 .... 28 Mr. Teitler[,] [p]erhaps you could tell me what your position is? 29 MR. TEITLER: My position is very simple, your Honor. 30 We are in the midst of appealing Court Order dated June 9th, and we feel if we sign any stipulation, it would prejudice our rights under the appeal. 31 THE COURT: All right. Well, I'll note your opposition, your note that you don't consent to the relief that's being requested and otherwise approve the qualifying test .... 32 (Id. (emphasis added).) UFA's counsel proffered no other objection and made no other statements. 33 After further discussion of minor details, the court so-ordered the stipulation signed by Berkman and the City. This was the August Order that is one of the subjects of this appeal. 11 34 After filing its notice of appeal from the August Order, UFA applied to the district court for a stay of the holding of the interim physical test pending the outcome of its appeal. In support of its application, UFA submitted affidavits by its counsel and its president asserting, inter alia, that the interim physical test approved by the court on August 3 was inadequate to establish whether candidates were qualified to be firefighters. 12 At a hearing on September 2, the court denied UFA's application, stating as follows: 35 THE COURT: You are raising questions about [this] qualifying examination, which I asked someone from your office whether they intended to raise back, as I recall, in the beginning of this month [sic: last month?], at a time when I said I wanted to hear those, so that these people who are preparing to take this test would not spend a month o[r] more preparing to take the test which was subject to complaints, and the only answer I got from your representative there was that simply because they felt it would be inconsistent with the position that they were taking on the [appeal] that they were not going to consent to the test, test form. I didn't get a pray [sic] of an explanation of any deficiencies that you found in this test. As a result people have gone out and literally, I assume, sweated through a month in preparation, and I really wonder, that you come in on the eve of the time when these people are going to go out and match their physical capacities with a test of this sort, and start to raise questions about the adequacy of the exam.... 36 .... 37 ... I'm going to deny the request for a stay pending the appeal. I find I can only conclude that it's being brought for the purposes of delay. 38 (Sept. 2, 1982 Tr. at 11, 13 (emphasis added).) A similar motion to this Court was likewise denied.