Opinion ID: 748851
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Continuance from June 6 to October 3, 1995.

Text: 24 Following an informal status conference on May 22, 1995, the court granted a continuance of the trial which had been set to commence on June 6. On June 12, 1995, the parties filed a Stipulation and Order Re[:] Excludable Time Under the Speedy Trial Act, and pursuant to that stipulation, the court subsequently entered an order on June 13, 1995, which continued the trial to October 3. Also by stipulation of the parties, the order entered by the court expressly found: 25 [T]he ends of justice served by granting the requested continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial, in that the failure to grant the continuance would deny the government continuity of counsel, and would deny newly associated defense counsel a reasonable period of time to adequately prepare for trial. 26 Order Re[:] Excludable Time Under the Speedy Trial Act, filed June 13, 1995, p 4 at 2. Shetty makes a variety of arguments related to this continuance, but we discuss only the two primary arguments emphasized on appeal. 1 27 First, to substantiate his position that the trial was delayed due to court congestion, Shetty emphasizes that the district court's order expressly states that [t]he court's next available trial date is October 3, 1995. Id. p 3, at 1. 28 This argument does not establish a violation of the Speedy Trial Act. We note that the order entered by the district court was drafted and proposed by the parties themselves and submitted with their stipulation. And, while it is true that court congestion cannot serve as a basis for a continuance, United States v. Engstrom, 7 F.3d 1423, 1427 (9th Cir.1993), where a trial date is set and later changed at the request of the parties, district courts certainly cannot be required to reset cases in unworkable or unavailable time slots. Moreover, there is no indication in the record that the defense ever requested an earlier trial date or that it withdrew its stipulation to continue the trial to October 3, 1995. Absent notice that the defendant was withdrawing from the stipulation or requesting an earlier trial date, the district court had no reason to reset the trial on an earlier date. 29 In his second major argument related to this continuance, Shetty points out that on September 11, 1995, a status conference was held during which the district court ruled upon discovery motions filed by the defense. Contending that the time between September 11 and October 3, 1995, should not be excludable, Shetty essentially maintains that once the discovery motions were ruled upon, it was incumbent on the trial court to disregard the earlier stipulation of the parties, as well as its own order, and reset the trial on a date earlier than October 3, 1995. More specifically, in his opening brief, Shetty states that [t]here is no indication that counsel, who were both available for the conference, were unable to proceed on September 11th. The trial could have been scheduled for that date. (Brief of Appellant at 30.) 30 In hindsight and for purposes of arguing that the Speedy Trial Act was violated, the defense contends it was ready to try the case on September 11. This argument, if successful, might earn Shetty extra days of nonexcludable time under the Speedy Trial Act, but it completely discounts the realities associated with prosecuting, defending and conducting a criminal trial. Until September 11, 1995, the defense did not know the outcome of its discovery motions. Moreover, to call a jury, let alone witnesses, takes time. Had the court unexpectedly moved the trial date up from October 3 to September 11, 1995, counsel for both sides would likely have argued that they were being prejudiced and needed more time to prepare. 31 Under the circumstances, the ends of justice served by the continuance [to the scheduled trial date of October 3, 1995] outweigh[ed] the best interest of the public and the defendant in [an earlier trial date]. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A). In addition, there is no indication in the record that the defense withdrew its earlier stipulation to continue the trial until October 3, 1995, and/or requested an earlier trial date at any time following the outcome of the September 11 hearing and before the scheduled trial date of October 3, 1995. Absent notice that the defense was withdrawing from the stipulation or wanted an earlier trial date, the district court had no reason to reschedule Shetty's trial on an earlier date. 32