Opinion ID: 1494221
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Investigation of Allegations of Juror Misconduct

Text: Capano raises two issues on appeal concerning the trial court's resolution of allegations of juror misconduct. First, he contends that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to investigate a dismissed juror's allegations that the remaining jurors had conspired to have the complaining juror removed because his view of the case differed from their view. [324] Second, he contends that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to dismiss a juror who participated in a conversation about the case with a juror from another trial and who initiated a conversation with Fahey's sister before the penalty phase of this trial began. A trial court's determinations on the mode and depth of investigative hearings into allegations of juror misconduct and on the remedy for such misconduct are reviewed on appeal to determine whether the court abused its discretion. [325]
During the trial, the court received two letters from the jury foreperson alleging (1) that Juror No. 5 had expressed his opinions on the case to at least two other jurors and (2) that Juror No. 5 indicated that he had already reached a decision in the case. [326] In response to these allegations, the court interviewed Juror No. 5 in the presence of counsel. [327] The trial judge informed the juror of the allegations and identified the complaining jurors. [328] The juror asserted that he had not expressed any opinions to other jurors and that he did not know why the jurors had made the allegations. [329] Nevertheless, with the agreement of all counsel, the court dismissed the juror. After the trial was completed, Juror No. 5 approached two of Capano's lawyers and suggested that the other jurors had conspired to remove him from the jury because he was inclined to acquit Capano. [330] Based in part on these allegations, Capano moved for a new trial. The trial court again interviewed Juror No. 5 and concluded that the juror's testimony was not credible. [331] The trial judge declined to investigate the matter further and denied Capano's motion for a new trial. [332] The trial court has broad discretion to determine the extent to which allegations of juror misconduct warrant further investigation. [333] This policy has particular force where the defendant wishes to impeach the jury's verdict with evidence of misconduct. [334] In the present case, the trial court elected not to investigate further the allegation that members of the jury conspired to have Juror No. 5 removed because he was inclined to acquit Capano. In reaching this decision, the trial judge acted within his broad discretion because he found no credible evidence to suggest that the allegations warranted further investigation. The post-trial testimony of Juror No. 5 was the only evidence of misconduct by other jurors. [335] Moreover, the trial court had a sufficient basis on which to conclude that this testimony was not credible: (1) The juror did not mention the alleged conspiracy during his initial interview with the court or in his 1999 letter to the court and (2) the juror misrepresented the content of his first interview with the trial judge. [336] Although allegations of improper pressure by other jurors are undoubtedly serious, [337] the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to conduct a further investigation into the post-trial allegations of Juror No. 5. [338]
Juror No. 4 was involved in two separate incidents that raise some questions about her impartiality. First, this juror had a conversation concerning the Capano case with a juror serving on another trial. During an interview with the trial judge, Juror No. 4 revealed the general tenor, if not the precise contents, of the conversation. [339] Based on this interview, the trial judge concluded that the conversation was innocent and did not prejudice Capano. [340] Second, Juror No. 4 initiated a conversation with Fahey's sister, Kathleen Fahey-Hosey, at a local gym after the guilt phase and just before the penalty phase of the trial began. Juror No. 4 told Fahey-Hosey that she was really sorry about all this and that the jury had prayed for her family after it came to a decision in the guilt phase. [341] There is no evidence that Fahey's sister made any statement to the juror on the merits of the case. When the court interviewed her, the juror also suggested that she may have already reached a decision on sentencing. [342] As an initial matter, it would appear that Capano did not object to the retention of Juror No. 4 after the disclosure of her conversations with the other juror or after her contact with Fahey's sister. Although it is unclear from the record when the trial judge revealed that Juror No. 4 discussed Capano's trial with the other juror, Capano waived his objection to the retention of Juror No. 4 by failing to present the issue to the trial court. [343] In any event, Capano's claims with respect to Juror No. 4 fail because Capano does not present any evidence that the juror's conversations actually prejudiced his case. To impeach a jury verdict because of juror misconduct, a defendant must establish actual prejudice unless defendant can show that the circumstances surrounding the misconduct were so egregious and inherently prejudicial as to support a presumption of prejudice to defendant. [344] Moreover, indications that a juror has made up her mind on an issue before the end of the trial  despite repeated admonitions from the trial judge not to do so  do not generally require dismissal of the juror. [345] In the present case, there is no evidence that Juror No. 4's conversation with the other juror was prejudicial to Capano. Based on the testimony of Juror No. 4 and on the disclosure by the other juror, the trial court could properly conclude that Juror No. 4 did not overhear information about the Capano case during her conversation with the other juror. [346] The trial court could therefore properly retain Juror No. 4 after her contact with the other juror because there was no risk that the juror would base her deliberations on facts outside the evidence adduced in court. [347] Similarly, although Juror No. 4's conversation with Fahey's sister was completely inappropriate during the course of the Capano trial, it did not indicate an improper bias in favor of Fahey's family. The conversation was relatively brief and did not concern the facts of the case or the jury's verdict. [348] Evidently, the trial court and defense counsel were satisfied with the account, and they agreed to permit Juror No. 4 to remain on the jury for the penalty phase, thus waiving the claim now presented. [349] Finally, Juror No. 4's comment that I feel like I've already come to my decision on [sentencing] was not sufficiently prejudicial to warrant dismissal because she merely indicated an inclination in one (unspecified) direction. Although jurors are consistently admonished not to reach a decision on any issue before the parties have presented all of the evidence, the trial court has discretion to permit a juror to remain as long as the juror does not express[] a firm conclusion that the man was guilty regardless of anything. [350] Juror No. 4, by contrast, agreed that she could still discuss the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and be open to being convinced by other people who are on the jury. [351] Because Juror No. 4 did not express a firm conclusion with respect to Capano's sentence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by permitting the juror to participate in the penalty phase of Capano's trial. The trial court could properly find that the incidents described above did not actually prejudice Capano and that they did not taint the jury's verdict. As a result, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to pursue further investigations or by refusing to grant Capano's motion for a new trial on the basis of this misconduct. The courts of this State, and the courts of many other states, go to great pains to insulate jurors from any contact even remotely related to a pending case. Indeed, it is customary practice in Delaware for jurors to wear juror identification badges during a case. It is regrettable from an institutional perspective that these juror mishaps occurred in this case. Although contact between a juror and the victim's family is improper and should not be permitted, there is no indication that the conversation was prejudicial to Capano in this case. We trust, however, that the Superior Court has instituted adequate measures and instructions to ensure that such problems will not occur in other cases in the future.