Opinion ID: 1248260
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Suspension Clause

Text: Finally, Skurtu argues that if equitable tolling is unavailable, a denial of habeas relief to Skurtu based on the provisions of the REAL ID Act would violate the Suspension Clause of Article I of the United States Constitution. According to Skurtu, a question remains as to whether the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals to hear petitions for review of removal orders under the REAL ID Act qualifies as an adequate substitute for habeas review. As noted by the government, this court has expressly held that § 106 of the REAL ID Act is an adequate substitute to habeas jurisdiction. Mohamed v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 522, 526 (8th Cir.2007). In Mohamed, we recognized that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) vests in us the power to review all constitutional claims and questions of law in the removal order and that Congress created a remedy as broad in scope as a habeas petition. Id. As a result, the REAL ID Act is an adequate and effective substitute to test the legality of a person's detention. Id. In accordance with Mohamed, we hold that Skurtu's inability to seek habeas review of his removal order does not violate the Suspension Clause, as the REAL ID Act is an adequate substitute for habeas review.