Opinion ID: 2162170
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the hostile environment claim

Text: Daka contends first that the trial court erred in denying its motion for judgment n.o.v. on the age-related hostile environment claim because there was insufficient evidence that an abusive atmosphere existed. Specifically, Daka argues that Breiner was not subjected to unwelcome harassment, that remarks about his age were neither severely nor pervasively abusive, and that these remarks did not alter the conditions of his employment. In our view, this line of argument is based on an overly selective reading of the record. Having reviewed the record as a whole, as we must, we are satisfied that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's findings.
The DCHRA provides in part: It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice to do any of the following acts, wholly or partially for a discriminatory reason based upon the ... age ... of any individual: (1) By an employer. To fail or refuse to hire, or to discharge, any individual; or otherwise to discriminate against any individual, with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, including promotion; or to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities, or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee. . . . D.C.Code § 1-2512(a)(1) (1997 Supp.). [13] Relying significantly on federal cases interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1994), [14] this court in Howard University v. Best, 484 A.2d 958, 981 (D.C.1984), held that a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of sexual harassment [under the DCHRA] upon demonstrating that unwelcome verbal and/or physical advances of a sexual nature were directed at him/her in the workplace, resulting in a hostile or abusive working environment. See also, e.g., Estate of Underwood v. National Credit Union Administration, 665 A.2d 621, 640 (D.C.1995) (citing Best ); Norman v. Gannett Co., 852 F.Supp. 46, 49 (D.D.C.1994). We conclude that the same test should apply, mutatis mutandis, in any DCHRA case in which a plaintiff alleges unlawful discrimination that takes the form of a hostile or abusive working environment. In other words, applying the Best standard more generically, a plaintiff such as Mr. Breiner has a viable hostile environment claim if he can demonstrate (1) that he is a member of a protected class, (2) that he has been subjected to unwelcome harassment, (3) that the harassment was based on membership in the protected class, and (4) that the harassment is severe and pervasive enough to affect a term, condition, or privilege of employment. Best, 484 A.2d at 978. [15] More than a few isolated incidents must have occurred, and genuinely trivial occurrences will not establish a prima facie case. Id. at 980 (citations and footnote omitted). However, [n]o specific number of incidents, and no specific level of egregiousness need be proved. Id. Whether the plaintiff has met his burden depends on the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 980-981. This means that in determining whether the DCHRA has been violated, the trier of fact should consider... the amount and nature of the conduct, the plaintiff's response to such conduct, and the relationship between the harassing party and the plaintiff. Id. at 981. Before applying the Best standard to this case, we must address two threshold issues: whether recent Supreme Court decisions modifying the elements of a hostile work environment claim under Title VII should be applied similarly to cases arising under the DCHRA, and whether a hostile environment theory is even appropriate for age-based claims. We shall consider each in turn. As to the first issue, the parties disagree on whether actual emotional damage must be shown by a plaintiff when proving a hostile work environment claim under the DCHRA. Daka, relying on Howard University v. Best, supra , argues that Breiner not only must prove that a reasonable person would have found the work environment hostile and abusive, but also must present objective evidence of actual emotional damage. See Estate of Underwood, supra, 665 A.2d at 640. In Daka's opinion, a requirement of a showing of psychological harm is particularly important with age-based claims because age remarks, by their nature, are less invidious than remarks about other protected groups. Breiner maintains, to the contrary, that two post- Best decisions of the Supreme Court, Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993), and Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986), have superseded Best in this respect. Harris and Meritor hold that a plaintiff in a Title VII action need not prove a tangible psychological injury in order to prove the existence of a hostile work environment. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21, 114 S.Ct. at 370 (citing Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64, 106 S.Ct. at 2404). [16] The rationale for this holding is that abusive work environments, even those that do not seriously affect an employee's emotional well-being, can and often will detract from employees' job performance, discourage employees from remaining on the job, or keep them from advancing in their careers. Harris, 510 U.S. at 22, 114 S.Ct. at 371. Thus a plaintiff has an actionable hostile work environment claim under Title VII [w]hen the workplace is permeated with `discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult'. . . that is `sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment'.... Id. at 21, 114 S.Ct. at 370 (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65, 67, 106 S.Ct. at 2405). Under this standard, a plaintiff must demonstrate both an objectively hostile or abusive environment, i.e., one that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive, and a subjective perception by the plaintiff that the environment is abusive. But the plaintiff need not prove, in addition, that he or she suffered an actual psychological injury. Certainly Title VII bars conduct that would seriously affect a reasonable person's psychological well-being, but the statute is not limited to such conduct. So long as the environment would reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abusive . . . there is no need for it also to be psychologically injurious. Harris, 510 U.S. at 22, 114 S.Ct. at 371 (citation omitted). A quite persuasive argument can be made that Harris has put a significant gloss on Best, or even that Harris has superseded Best to the extent that the two cases are inconsistent. We note first that this court, in deciding issues arising under the DCHRA, consistently relies upon decisions of the federal courts in Title VII cases as particularly persuasive authority. See, e.g., Benefits Communication Corp. v. Klieforth, 642 A.2d 1299, 1301-1302 (D.C.1994); Arthur Young & Co. v. Sutherland, 631 A.2d 354, 361 n. 17, 367-368 (D.C.1993); American University v. District of Columbia Commission on Human Rights, 598 A.2d 416, 422 (D.C.1991). Even in Best itself we applied Title VII principles in resolving the plaintiff's discrimination claim. See 484 A.2d at 977-982. Second, the primary purpose of the DCHRA, to eradicate all employment discrimination, [17] would be furthered by our following Harris and Meritor because the burden upon a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case would be a little less heavy than it was under Best, in that the plaintiff would no longer have to prove actual psychological injury. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 22, 114 S.Ct. at 370. Third, such a holding would be compatible with recent hostile environment cases brought in the District of Columbia under Title VII. See Park v. Howard University, 315 U.S.App. D.C. 196, 198, 71 F.3d 904, 906 (1995) (citing Harris ), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 57, 136 L.Ed.2d 20 (1996); Gary v. Long, 313 U.S.App. D.C. 403, 408-409, 59 F.3d 1391, 1396-1397 (1995) (citing Harris and Meritor ), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1011, 116 S.Ct. 569, 133 L.Ed.2d 493 (1995); Stoeckel v. Environmental Management Systems, Inc., 882 F.Supp. 1106, 1114 (D.D.C. 1995) (citing Harris ). Moreover, in the only reported Superior Court decision since Harris, the court followed Harris after assuming that this court would apply a similar standard and approach to the interpretation of the reach of the [DCHRA]. Drake v. Henkels & McKoy, Inc., 123 Daily Wash. L. Rptr. 2217, 2223 (D.C.Super.Ct.1995). Having said all this, however, we conclude that we need not decide the point here. We note instead that the trial court's instructions in this case, which were based on Harris and not Best (and therefore said nothing about actual psychological injury), elicited no complaint from either side. We therefore hold that Daka waived any objection it might have had to any arguable omission from the instructions. See Super. Ct. Civ. R. 31 (requiring specific objection to instructions before the jury retires). Turning to the other preliminary question whether an age-related hostile environment claim is viable under discrimination statutes such as the DCHRAwe find that only a few courts have considered this issue or anything close to it. Federal courts have done so under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. (1994), and have unanimously held that hostile work environment claims are equally cognizable in an ADEA case as they are under Title VII. See, e.g., Sischo-Nownejad v. Merced Community College District, 934 F.2d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir.1991); Young v. Will County Dep't of Public Aid, 882 F.2d 290, 294 (7th Cir.1989); Eggleston v. South Bend Community School Corp., 858 F.Supp. 841, 845-852 (N.D.Ind. 1994); Spence v. Maryland Casualty Co., 803 F.Supp. 649, 671 (W.D.N.Y.1992), aff'd, 995 F.2d 1147 (2d Cir.1993); Drez v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 674 F.Supp. 1432, 1436-1437 (D.Kan.1987). These courts have concluded that, with no material difference between the ADEA and Title VII, [18] there is no reason to differentiate between age discrimination claimants and members of other protected groups when considering a hostile environment claim. An ADEA plaintiff's rights are simply protected by a different statute, but any claim that those rights have been violated is comparable in substance to a civil rights claim under Title VII. See, e.g., Drez, supra, 674 F.Supp. at 1436-1437. The only state court decision we have found that addresses this issue under a state discrimination statute, Kelly v. Bally's Grand, Inc., 285 N.J.Super. 422, 667 A.2d 355 (1995), reached a similar conclusion by adapting New Jersey's sexual harassment hostile environment analysis to fit an age animus claim.... Id. at 434, 667 A.2d at 362. [19] Thus, under New Jersey's equivalent of the DCHRA, a plaintiff claiming age discrimination would have to establish that: (1) the complained-of conduct would not have occurred but for her age; (2) the conduct was severe or pervasive; (3) enough to make a reasonable older-aged person . . . believe that; (4) the conditions of employment have been altered and the working environment is hostile or abusive. Id. (citation omitted). Like New Jersey's anti-discrimination statute, the DCHRA was enacted to eliminate all discrimination in the workplace, not just sexual or racial discrimination. See D.C.Code § 1-2501 (statute is intended to secure an end in the District of Columbia to discrimination for any reason  (emphasis added)). Since the elements of a prima facie discrimination claim may be reformulated according to the facts of each particular case, see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 n. 13, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824 n. 13, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), we see no reason why age-based hostile environment claims should be treated differently from any other harassment claims under the DCHRA. Daka argues that Breiner's hostile environment claim based on age-related harassment is novel and unprecedented, and should not be considered on the same footing as claims based on racial or sexual harassment because spoken remarks about age are less invidious than racial epithets or sexual slurs. Daka maintains that age-based harassment is less objectionable because everyone progresses into the protected groupin other words, we will all grow old sooner or later. On this point, Daka states in its brief: Unlike a hostile environment sexual harassment claim that typically involves conduct, photographs, and even sexual advances, Breiner's age-related hostile environment claim is based solely on verbal remarks. In this regard, it is more akin to claims arising from remarks or slurs denigrating a person's race or national origin. But even so, age-related claims still stand apart, because membership in the protected age group is not membership in a minority group. To the contrary, everyone fortunate enough to enjoy a modicum of longevity will become a member of the protected age group. Thus, Daka says, even if references to Breiner as `old man' or `old fart' may have been impolite, they simply cannot be given the same legal significance as calling a woman a `bitch' ... or using ... derogatory or hateful slurs and epithets against members of another race. We reject this argument, mainly because it is made in the wrong forum. The DCHRA prohibits all discrimination based on thirteen listed factors, including race, sex, and age. D.C.Code § 1-2512(a). It does not draw any distinction among these thirteen factors, nor does it even hint that certain types of discrimination are deemed more serious than others. On the contrary, it makes unlawful all discrimination in the workplace in any of the thirteen categories. Since the Council of the District of Columbia has not seen fit to classify different types of discrimination in the manner suggested by Daka, this court is not free to declare that some kinds of discrimination are more or less unlawful than other kinds. If Daka (or anyone else) believes the statute should so provide, the place to seek recourse is the legislature, not the courts.
Daka contends that its motion for judgment n.o.v. should have been granted. Because [a] judgment notwithstanding the verdict is proper only in `extreme' cases, Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 506 A.2d 1100, 1103 (D.C.1986), we review the denial of such a motion deferentially. Reversal is warranted only if `no reasonable person, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, could reach a verdict in favor of that party.' Arthur Young & Co. v. Sutherland, supra, 631 A.2d at 363 (citations omitted); accord, e.g., Clement v. Peoples Drug Store, Inc., 634 A.2d 425, 427 (D.C.1993) (citing cases). In this case Breiner had to prove that he was subjected to unwelcome harassment based on his age, and that this harassment was so severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of his employment by creating a hostile or abusive working environment. We hold that the evidence was sufficient to meet this burden of proof.
Daka's strongest argument is that the evidence at trial showed that Breiner welcomed comments about his age. Unwelcome conduct is conduct which the employee did not solicit or invite and which the employee regarded as undesirable or offensive. Howard University v. Best, supra, 484 A.2d at 978. It is true, as Daka says, that much of the evidence on this issue was controverted. The record reveals that Breiner sometimes referred to himself in relatively mild agerelated terms such as old man or old school, but it is less clear who initiated these remarks. Breiner and Neff both testified that Sakell uttered disparaging remarks first; [20] Sakell and Leyseth testified to the contrary. What is obvious, however, is that even if Breiner did invite innocuous epithets such as old man or old school, the subsequent ridicule he received was much more egregious and offensive. It is also evident that Breiner sought to discourage this behavior by making it well known, especially to Mr. Sakell, that he found these insults inappropriate. On three separate occasions Breiner approached Sakell and told him his comments were against the law or illegal. But Sakell was undeterred by these complaints and, if anything, became more abusive toward Breiner. Not only did he insult Breiner in front of, and directly to, Breiner's subordinates, but he also condoned Reeves' improper conduct. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Breiner, as we must, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence that the age-related comments were unwelcome, notwithstanding Daka's evidence to the contrary. On this point there was clearly an issue for the jury to resolve.
There is no dispute that the conduct of Sakell and others was based on Breiner's age. Daka maintains, however, that it was not sufficiently severe to warrant damages under the DCHRA. We find this argument wanting. Although the Harris and Best standards are not mathematically precise, Harris, supra, 510 U.S. at 22, 114 S.Ct. at 371, whether an environment is hostile or abusive can be determined by considering several factors, none of which in itself is dispositive. According to the Supreme Court, these may include: the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance. The effect on the employee's psychological well-being is, of course, relevant to determining whether the plaintiff actually found the environment abusive. But while psychological harm, like any other relevant factor, may be taken into account, no single factor is required. Id. at 23, 114 S.Ct. at 371. [21] Reduced to essentials, the test is not whether work has been impaired, but whether working conditions have been discriminatorily altered. Id. at 25, 114 S.Ct. at 372 (Scalia, J., concurring); accord, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, ___, 118 S.Ct. 998, 1001, 140 L.Ed.2d 201 (1998) (citing Harris ); Meritor, supra, 477 U.S. at 67, 106 S.Ct. at 2405. In this case the evidence was sufficient to show that they were. Breiner described a series of events which occurred with significant frequency. The repetitive age-based slurs directed toward him were sufficiently pervasive to alter Breiner's working conditions. They were demeaning from both an objective and a subjective point of view. Concededly, some of the remarks, such as old timer or old fogey, were rather innocuous. But other comments, especially those uttered by Sakell and Reeves, could reasonably be found to have been intentionally malicious. To question Breiner's sexual prowess and his ability to perform his job in front of both customers and subordinates was intolerable. The evidence also showed that Sakell's persistent ridicule seriously undermined Breiner's ability to manage the cafeteria staff. Junior employees, such as Reeves and McKenna, began to emulate Sakell, treating Breiner in a similarly abusive fashion. The combined effect of these insults was a serious decline in Breiner's morale and job performance. He testified that he felt inadequate and incompetent, and that the insults about his age started to bother, irritate and really hurt him. It was clear from Breiner's numerous protests to Sakell and Reeves that he did not appreciate or welcome their age-based harassment. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Breiner, as we must, we hold that it was sufficient to go to the jury on the question of whether this harassment altered the conditions of Breiner's working environment. The Supreme Court held in Meritor that Title VII affords employees the right to work in an environment free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult. 477 U.S. at 65, 106 S.Ct. at 2405 (citations omitted). We see no reason not to recognize this same right under the DCHRA. Indeed, this court has stated, in a DCHRA case, that an employee has the right to work in a decent environment and to earn a fair livelihood based on merit.... Arthur Young & Co. v. Sutherland, supra, 631 A.2d at 373. From the record before us, a jury could reasonably find that Breiner's workplace was permeated with the kind of intimidation, ridicule, and insult which Meritor forbids, and that it was sufficiently severe or pervasive `to alter the conditions of [his] employment and create an abusive working environment.' Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67, 106 S.Ct. at 2405 (citations omitted). We therefore hold that the trial court did not err in denying Daka's motion for judgment n.o.v.