Opinion ID: 2602094
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: [¶7] Mr. Smith was convicted of second degree murder. Second degree murder is statutorily defined as: Whoever purposely and maliciously, but without premeditation, kills any human being is guilty of murder in the second degree[.] Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-104 (LexisNexis 2007). The jury in this case was instructed: The elements of the crime of Second Degree Murder are: 1. On or about April 28, 1986; 2. In Natrona County, Wyoming; 3. The Defendant, Jeffery Lynn Smith; 4. Purposely and; 5. Maliciously; 6. Killed Tammy Dively. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these elements has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the Defendant guilty of Second Degree Murder. If, on the other hand, you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of these elements has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the Defendant not guilty of Second Degree Murder. [¶8] In determining whether there was sufficient trial evidence to sustain a conviction, we apply the following standard of review: In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence . . ., we examine and accept as true the State's evidence and all reasonable inferences which can be drawn from it. We do not consider conflicting evidence presented by the defendant. We do not substitute our judgment for that of the jury; rather, we determine whether a jury could have reasonably concluded each of the elements of the crime was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. This standard applies whether the supporting evidence is direct or circumstantial. Martin v. State, 2007 WY 2, ¶ 32, 149 P.3d 707, 715 (Wyo. 2007), citing Butcher v. State, 2005 WY 146, ¶ 16, 123 P.3d 543, 549 (Wyo. 2005). [¶9] Mr. Smith maintains that there was insufficient evidence that he committed the homicide. The day after the murder, April 29, 1986, officers interviewed Ms. Dively's young daughter. She identified a house in the neighborhood where she said one of her mother's friends lived. She told the investigators that she thought her mother had gone to the house the previous evening to purchase marijuana. [¶10] Mr. Smith was one of the men who lived in the house the daughter identified, and the officers interviewed him shortly after the murder. A transcript of the interview was admitted into evidence at trial. Mr. Smith told officers that Ms. Dively had come to his house the night she died, asking for his roommate. He said she left after he told her his roommate was not home. Mr. Smith stated that he did not know Ms. Dively very well. [¶11] In 2006, investigators located Mr. Smith, who was in jail in Nebraska, and again interviewed him. During that interview, he contradicted his earlier statements by saying that he did not know Ms. Dively at all. Pursuant to a warrant, the investigators obtained a sample of Mr. Smith's DNA. [¶12] Contrary to Mr. Smith's statement that he did not know Ms. Dively, DNA testing established that they had engaged in sexual contact prior to her death. The Natrona County Coroner, James Thorpen, M.D., testified that spermatozoa and prostatic acid phospatase, which are components of seminal fluid, were found on the vaginal swab taken during the autopsy. Kevin Noppinger, the State's DNA expert, testified that the DNA test results excluded everyone on earth except Mr. Smith as the donor of the semen discovered in Ms. Dively's body. The medical experts also testified that, while spermatozoa may be discovered in the vaginal pool for several days after sexual activity, prostatic acid phospatase will generally dissipate within 24 to 30 hours after sexual contact. The vaginal swabs were taken 19½ hours after Ms. Dively's death was reported. Dr. Thorpen testified that the fact that prostatic acid phospatase was found in Ms. Dively's vaginal pool was consistent with sexual activity between the victim and Mr. Smith shortly before her death. [¶13] Lawrence Larry Malone, a friend of Ms. Dively's, testified that between 6:15 and 6:30 p.m. on the evening of her death, he witnessed her get into a blue truck with a white cab. He believed the truck was a GMC or Chevrolet, model year somewhere between 1967 and 1972. Consistent with Mr. Malone's testimony, Ms. Dively's daughter testified that she had looked out the window and saw her mother walking toward a blue pickup. She stated that was the last time she saw her mother alive. Ms. Dively's lifeless body was discovered by a passerby around 7:45 p.m. that same night. [¶14] In 1986, Mr. Smith owned a truck consistent with Mr. Malone's description. Mr. Malone testified that a photograph of Mr. Smith's truck looked like the truck he saw the victim getting into. He also stated that the man driving the truck had brown hair and part of it flipped over one eye. A photograph of Mr. Smith from 1989 introduced into evidence at trial resembled the man Mr. Malone described as the driver of the truck. [¶15] Mr. Smith argues that the evidence that he committed the murder was circumstantial and, in order to conclude he murdered Ms. Dively, the jury had to improperly add inference to inference. Our law is clear that, in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not distinguish between direct and circumstantial evidence. Rawle v. State, 2007 WY 59 ¶ 28, 155 P.3d 1024, 1031 (Wyo. 2007). Furthermore, as our standard of review states, reasonable inferences are allowed. A permissible inference has been described as follows: An inference is a process of reasoning by which a fact or proposition is deduced fairly and logically from other facts proven or admitted. An inference is truly evidence. The weight to which it is entitled depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case   . Story v. State, 721 P.2d 1020, 1025 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 962, 107 S.Ct. 459, 93 L.Ed.2d 405 (1986). Seeley v. State, 959 P.2d 170, 176 (Wyo. 1998). [¶16] The trial evidence showed that Mr. Smith was not truthful with officers about his relationship with Ms. Dively. He clearly knew her better than he admitted, as the DNA evidence established he had engaged in sexual contact with her. Mr. Smith argues that the evidence of sexual contact does not prove that he killed Ms. Dively because the medical evidence established that they could have had sex many hours before her death. It is true that one of the inferences which could have been drawn from the medical evidence was that Mr. Smith and the victim engaged in consensual sex several hours before her murder. However, it was also reasonable for the jury to infer from the medical evidence that the time of the sexual activity between Ms. Dively and Mr. Smith was just prior to her death, strongly suggesting that he murdered her. That inference is also supported by the trial evidence that Ms. Dively got into a pickup, like one Mr. Smith owned, with a man that resembled him shortly before her death. [¶17] When evidence is presented that is capable of producing conflicting inferences, the determination of which inference is proper should be left to the jury. See, e.g., Michaelis v. State, 2005 WY 80, ¶ 3, 115 P.3d 1098, 1100 (Wyo. 2005). This is not a case where the jury had to engage in speculation or conjecture to conclude that Mr. Smith murdered Ms. Dively. Instead, the evidence, although circumstantial, together with the reasonable inferences emanating from it was sufficient to support the jury's verdict. On this record, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the State proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, Mr. Smith was Ms. Dively's murderer. [¶18] Cases from other jurisdictions support our decision that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude Mr. Smith murdered Ms. Dively. Walker v. State, 651 S.E.2d 12 (Ga. 2007) had facts remarkably similar to those presented here. The victim was killed in 1989 and the medical examiner collected samples of sperm from the victim's vagina during the autopsy. Twelve years later, the swabs were sent for testing. The test revealed that the DNA on the swab matched Mr. Walker's profile, which was already in a DNA database. The trial evidence also revealed that, at the time of the victim's death, Mr. Walker frequently stayed at his grandmother's home, just a block away from the park near where the victim's body was discovered. Mr. Walker had also been observed in the park a few days after the murder. Id. at 14. [¶19] Mr. Walker submitted that the evidence against him was insufficient because it was completely circumstantial and did not exclude other reasonable hypotheses which would have supported his innocence. Id. Like Mr. Smith, he maintained that the evidence could have supported the inference that he had consensual sex with the victim and then, later, someone else killed her. The court ruled that the role of interpreting the evidence belonged to the jury and the jury's decision would be reversed only if it was unsupportable as a matter of law. The court said that the jury was entitled to reject as unreasonable the theoretical possibilities that Walker had a consensual encounter with the victim and find, from the evidence presented, that the defendant murdered the victim. Id. at 14-15. See also, People v. Saxon, 871 N.E.2d 244, 251-52 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (concluding it was appropriate for the fact finder to infer the defendant was the perpetrator from evidence that he had sexual intercourse with the victim and other contradicted circumstantial evidence). [¶20] Mr. Smith also argues there was insufficient evidence that he acted purposely. The judge instructed the jury: Purposely means intentionally. Malice means that the act constituting the offense charged was done intentionally, without legal justification or excuse or that the act was done in such a manner as to indicate hatred, ill-will, or hostility towards another. To prove Second Degree Murder the State must prove that the Defendant acted Purposely and Maliciously. However, the State is not required to prove that the Defendant intended to kill. [¶21] Ms. Dively's body was found approximately 50 feet off the road. Dr. Thorpen testified that Ms. Dively had been hit on the head more than once, resulting in severe head trauma. She was subsequently run over by a vehicle at least twice. Deborah Lougee, a forensic scientist with the Montana Department of Justice, studied the tire track evidence and confirmed that Ms. Dively could have been run over more than once. [¶22] Dr. Thorpen testified the [m]anner of death was multiple severe traumatic injuries with collapse and herniation of both lungs, ruptured liver with massive abdominal hemorrhage, and blow to the right head with basilar skull fracture. He stated that the head injury could have been lethal, if she did not receive medical treatment, but the compression injuries from being run over were definitely lethal. Dr. Thorpen stated that the medical evidence did not indicate that Ms. Dively's death was accidental. [¶23] There is no question that this evidence was sufficient to support the jury's conclusion that the homicide was committed purposely and with malice. As the jury was instructed, purposely means that the act was intentional. In the context of second degree murder purposely simply means the act was not committed carelessly, inadvertently, accidentally, negligently, heedlessly or thoughtlessly. Butcher, ¶ 20, 123 P.3d at 550, quoting Lopez v. State, 2004 WY 28, ¶ 18, 86 P.3d 851, 857 (Wyo. 2004), which quoted State v. Keffer, 860 P.2d 1118, 1138 (Wyo. 1993). Similarly, malice means that the act was done intentionally, without legal justification or excuse or was accomplished in such a manner as to indicate hatred, ill-will or hostility towards another. The jury reasonably could have concluded that when Mr. Smith hit Ms. Dively on the head multiple times, ran over her at least twice and left her on the side of the road to die, he acted purposely and with malice. Mr. Smith's argument to the contrary is not plausible.