Opinion ID: 13423
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Solomon's Status

Text: 14 The district court found that Solomon was an independent contractor and not a federal employee and therefore denied his motion for certification under the Westfall Act. We agree.
15 The FTCA only applies to an employee of the government, which is defined to include officers or employees of any federal agency ... and persons acting on behalf of a federal agency in an official capacity, temporarily or permanently in the service of the United States, whether with or without compensation. 28 U.S.C. § 2671. Neither the FTCA nor the Westfall Act applies to the actions of an independent contractor. See United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 813-14, 96 S.Ct. 1971, 1975-76, 48 L.Ed.2d 390 (1976); Broussard v. United States, 989 F.2d 171, 174 (5th Cir.1993). Whether Solomon was an employee of the ATF or an independent contractor is a question of federal law. Cavazos ex rel. Cavazos v. United States, 776 F.2d 1263, 1264 (5th Cir.1985). The ultimate determination of his status is a conclusion of law to be reviewed de novo. Cf. Donovan v. Tehco, Inc., 642 F.2d 141, 143 n. 4 (5th Cir.1981) (considering whether individuals were employees or independent contractors under the Federal Labor Standards Act).
16 The critical factor in distinguishing an independent contractor from an employee  'is the power of the Federal Government to control the detailed physical performance of the contractor. '  Broussard, 989 F.2d at 174 (quoting Orleans, 425 U.S. at 814, 96 S.Ct. at 1976 (quoting Logue v. United States, 412 U.S. 521, 528, 93 S.Ct. 2215, 2219, 37 L.Ed.2d 121 (1973))). In Broussard, this circuit recognized that, while this may be the most critical factor, it is not the only factor. 989 F.2d at 175. If this were the only factor considered, then no professional who exercises professional judgment could be considered a federal employee under the FTCA. Id. In Logue, the Supreme Court relied upon the Restatement (Second) of Agency which lists other factors besides control in determining whether a person is an employee or independent contractor. 412 U.S. at 527 & n. 5, 93 S.Ct. at 2219 & n. 5 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2 (1957)); see also Broussard, 989 F.2d at 175. In addition to control, § 220 of the Restatement lists the following factors which may evidence the existence of an employee relationship: (1) the work does not require one who is highly educated or skilled; (2) the work is typically done by an employee in the locale, rather than an independent contractor; (3) the employer supplies the tools, instrumentalities, or place of work; (4) the employment is for a considerable period of time with regular hours; (5) the method of payment is by the hour or month; (6) the work is full-time employment by one employer; (7) the work is part of the employer's regular business; and (8) the parties believe they have created an employment relationship. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, supra, § 220(2) & cmt. h, referenced in id. § 2 cmt. a.
17 Considering the above factors in relation to Solomon, who is a professional, we agree with the district court that he is an independent contractor. The value of Solomon's work derives from his education and skill. The evidence does not suggest that the services of the type supplied by Solomon are typically supplied by an employee in the relevant locale. Solomon supplies the materials upon which his seminars are based. His affiliation with the ATF has been for a period of years, but other than the seminars, it has been on an as-needed basis with no regular or set hours. He is a full-time employee of the Washington State Patrol, not the federal government. Although Solomon was paid by the hour, his professional services are a type that is commonly measured by the hour, rather than by the job; this factor therefore has little weight in determining whether he is an employee. Additionally, the Blanket Purchase Agreement does not set any price for Solomon's services; it only requires that the government get at least the best price he offers to anyone. His services are not part of the ATF's regular business, and the ATF, according to the stipulated facts, did not consider him an employee. All of these factors taken together demonstrate that Solomon is an independent contractor and not an employee of the United States. 18 In Broussard, this court held that a doctor employed by an independent contractor to the federal government is not an employee of the federal government. 989 F.2d at 176. Solomon argues that because he is not like the doctor in Broussard (i.e., he is paid directly by the government, the government selected him, and his contract does not explicitly deny the government supervisory control), he is an employee. However, the government selects its independent contractors and would be expected to pay them directly. To accept his argument would suggest that individuals are rarely independent contractors. Additionally, the Restatement describes the extent of control as determined by agreement. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, supra, § 220(2)(a) (the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise over the details of the work); id. cmt. h (an agreement for close supervision or de facto close supervision of the servant's work). In Solomon's case, his contract is silent on control, which suggests an independent contractor relationship under the Restatement.
19 Solomon also argues that the persons acting on behalf of the federal government in an official capacity language of § 2671 includes him. The Supreme Court considered and rejected a similar argument in Logue. 412 U.S. at 531-32, 93 S.Ct. at 2221-22. The acting on behalf of language was meant to cover the dollar-a-year man who is in government service without pay or an individual who is directly supervised by a federal agency pursuant to an agreement. Id. Solomon fits neither of the above descriptions. Additionally, to apply the acting on behalf of language to an independent contractor because he was asked to provide a service for the government, as urged by Solomon, would make the distinction between employees and independent contractors virtually meaningless. Cf. id. at 532, 93 S.Ct. at 2221-22. Under such an expansive construction of the language, all independent contractors would be acting on behalf of the United States and would make the explicit exclusion of independent contractors from the FTCA in § 2671 meaningless. See 28 U.S.C. § 2671. 20 Because we affirm the district court's denial of Solomon's motion for certification on the grounds that he is not a federal employee, we need not consider whether he was acting in the scope of his employment. 21