Opinion ID: 1665038
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Newly Discovered Fact

Text: Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 requires that a motion filed pursuant to this section must be filed within two years of the date that the conviction and sentence become final. This rule provides three exceptions to the two-year time limit, the first of which is relevant to the analysis in the instant case. Rule 3.850(b)(1) provides an exception to the two-year time limitation when the facts on which the claim is predicated were unknown to the movant or the movant's attorney and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence. As noted above, the district courts are divided as to whether the change of law created by the Heggs decision is a fact as contemplated by rule 3.850(b)(1). In Regan, the First District held that the change of law announced in the Heggs decision was not a newly discovered fact under rule 3.850(b)(1) because the change in law was not a fact as contemplated by the rule. Regan, 787 So. 2d at 267. Furthermore, the court noted that if the change of law announced in Heggs is a `fact' as contemplated by rule 3.850(b)(1), then it follows that every change in the law will also necessarily become a fact as per this rule, and will remove entirely any need to perform a Witt [v. State, 387 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1980)] analysis. Regan, 787 So. 2d at 267. The court concluded that the change of law announced in Heggs did not have a tendency to prove or disprove guilt or innocence, but only affected sentencing once guilt had been established. Id. In contrast, the Fourth District has held that a defendant should have two years from the Heggs decision to file a rule 3.850 motion because the facts on which his claim is predicated could not have been known earlier. Jenkins, 771 So. 2d at 38; see also Carvello 824 So. 2d at 203 (stating defendants have two years from the issuance of Heggs to raise a claim in a 3.850 motion); Cox v. State, 805 So. 2d 1042, 1044 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (holding the two-year limitations period for defendant's motion for postconviction relief started to run when Heggs decision was issued), quashed sub nom. State v. Shiva, 894 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 2005). The Second District adopted the reasoning of Jenkins to hold that a defendant should have two years from the issuance of Heggs to file a claim. Murphy, 773 So. 2d at 1175. We conclude that the First District's observation that every decision could be viewed as a fact, which would erase the need for an analysis pursuant to Witt, has merit. In examining the effect of changes in decisional law on final judgments under rule 3.850, this Court has consistently applied the Witt analysis to determine whether the decisional change in the law requires retroactive application. [1] This Court has never examined whether a decisional change of law could constitute a newly discovered fact for purposes of rule 3.850(b)(1). See State v. Glenn, 558 So. 2d 4, 6 (Fla. 1990) (citing McCuiston v. State, 534 So. 2d 1144, 1146 (Fla. 1988)) ([A]ny determination of whether a change in the law requires retroactive application should be decided upon traditional principles pertaining to changes in decisional law as set forth in Witt.). Rather, this Court's decisions have applied the stringent Witt standard to determine whether the decisional change in law was of such constitutional and fundamental significance that it required retroactive application. Further, the term fact refers to evidence that tends to prove or disprove guilt or innocence. See Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911, 915 (Fla. 1991) (holding that in order to be entitled to relief under rule 3.850, the defendant must proffer newly discovered evidence [that is] of such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial). Therefore, we hold that that our decision in Heggs is not a newly discovered fact under rule 3.850(b)(1).