Opinion ID: 223677
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Majority's Factual Errors

Text: Pursuant to AEDPA, we presume that the state court's factual findings are correct absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. See Lundgren, 440 F.3d at 763; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e). Our deference to the state court's factual findings notwithstanding, a habeas court must, to some extent, grapple with a case's relevant facts as found by the state court. See Cullen, 131 S.Ct. at 1407. Specifically, we must review the factual record before the state court in order to evaluate whether the state court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law to the facts. See id. This prerequisite is never more significant than in a Brady case where we consider [the suppressed evidence] in light of the evidence available for trial that supports the petitioner's conviction. Jells, 538 F.3d at 502. The majority implicitly acknowledges this requirement, and uses some of the facts in analyzing the report's materiality. ( See Maj. Op. at 680-81, 682-84.) But, the majority's cursory examination of the relevant facts cannot provide an adequate basis for assessing the reasonableness of the state court's application of Brady to the facts before it. Even considering the substantial deference that AEDPA mandates, the majority's perfunctory review is inadequate. See Harris v. Haeberlin, 526 F.3d 903, 910 (6th Cir.2008) ([E]ven in the context of federal habeas, deference does not imply abandonment or abdication of judicial review.) (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 324, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003)). Had the majority thoroughly analyzed the factual record before the state court, it would have apprehended the egregious mistakes that the state court made in denying Petitioner's Brady claim. Instead, the majority finds that the report is not material under Brady by glossing over the veracity and credibility problems affecting several pieces of inculpatory evidence, and ignoring the Supreme Court's directives to look at the entire case from all perspectives. See Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 789-91. Therefore, prior to discussing the state court's unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent, and the majority's equally deplorable misapplication of Brady in denying Petitioner a writ of habeas corpus, it is necessary to identify the majority's factual missteps which handicap its ability to perform a proper AEDPA analysis of Petitioner's Brady claim. As an initial matter, there are several problems with the majority's recitation of the facts. The majority recounts that [Petitioner] had purchased a .380 caliber semi-automatic pistol and ammunition just weeks before the murders and was wearing a dark hooded jacket with the hood tied tight around his face when he entered the gun shop to purchase the pistol. ( Id. at 671-72.) Although the majority represents its description of Petitioner's apparel as established fact, this detail is not as certain as the majority implies. In her testimony during Petitioner's trial, Trisha M. Blackburn, the salesperson working at Cleland's Gun Shop when Petitioner purchased the gun, affirmed that Petitioner had on a windbreaker tied closely around his face when he came to the gun shop. (J.A. at 6114.) However, Blackburn admitted at trial that when she initially spoke with police officers she was unable to give[] them a description of how [Petitioner] was dressed on that particular day. ( Id. at 6113-14.) Moreover, when pressed, Blackburn stated that she did not remember either what the other customer[s] ha[d] on that day, ( id. at 6114-15), or what she was wearing that day. ( See id. at 6115.) Nor did Blackburn recall how [any Cleland customers between March and July 1986] were dressed when they came in. ( Id. at 6118-19.) Nevertheless, Blackburn maintained that she specifically recall[ed] what [Petitioner] was wearing on that particular day. ( Id. at 6115.) Far from being the ironclad fact represented by the majority, Blackburn's memory of Petitioner's dress on that date is dubious at best. Next, the majority notes that [Petitioner] and Tincher and Ogle were acquaintances. (Maj. Op. at 671-72.) However, Albert Earl, Jr. testified at Petitioner's trial that Heard was also acquainted with both victims. ( See J.A. at 5886-87.) Thus, contrary to the majority's intimation, because both Petitioner and Heard were acquainted with the victims, this fact is not probative of the culprit's identity. Moreover, in repeating the pertinent facts for its analysis, the majority lists the evidence implicating Petitioner as follows: First, both victims were shot with a .380 pistol that [Petitioner] bought approximately two weeks before [Ogle's and Tincher's] deaths. Second, [Petitioner's] uncle saw [Petitioner] drunk and in possession of the murder weapon only a few hours before Tincher was found shot dead approximately one-half of a mile from [Petitioner's] home on March 8. Third, [Petitioner] admitted to being at Ogle['s] and Tincher's apartment on March 8, and it is undisputed that Ogle was reported missing sometime shortly after [Petitioner's] acknowledged visit. Fourth, [Petitioner] was wearing a dark blue pin-striped suit jacket during the night in question, and a few hours after Tincher was found dead and Ogle disappeared, [Petitioner] took a dark blue pin-stripped suit to the dry cleaners that was soaking wet and that made a brownish dripping mess on the floor as it dried. Fifth, Heard testified that he was with [Petitioner] and witnessed [Petitioner] shoot Ogle. Sixth, on the evening of March 12, [Petitioner's] mother delivered the murder weapon to [a police officer] at a nearby Way-Lo station. Finally, [Petitioner] showed police officers where Ogle's body was on March 12. (Maj. Op. at 680.) Although the majority lists several of these facts to demonstrate Petitioner's opportunity to commit the crimes, because Petitioner and Heard were admittedly together much of the evening, these facts are equally if not more demonstrative of Heard's opportunity to commit the crimes. The majority states that [Petitioner] admitted to being at Ogle['s] and Tincher's apartment on March 8. ( Id. at 680) However, in his testimony at Petitioner's trial, Heard admitted that he was also present at Ogle's and Tincher's apartment on the night of March 8, 1986. ( See J.A. at 6460-62.) Therefore, Petitioner's presence at the victims' apartment does not indicate that he, rather than Heard, committed the crimes. The majority further states that Petitioner's uncle saw [Petitioner] drunk and in possession of the murder weapon only a few hours before Tincher was found shot dead. (Maj. Op. at 680.) First, it is noteworthy that Petitioner's uncle, Randolph Randleman, testified that when Petitioner and Heard arrived drunk and rowdy at Randleman's house in the early morning of March 8, Petitioner was carrying a .380 caliber semi-automatic pistol. ( See J.A. at 6155-56.) However, Randleman took [the gun] from [Petitioner, and] threw it on top of the refrigerator. ( Id. at 6156-57.) Randleman further testified that both Heard and [Petitioner] left [Randleman's house] out of the kitchen.... So, either one could have taken [the gun]. ( Id. at 6179.) Therefore, contrary to the majority's suggestion, Randleman's testimony indicates that both Petitioner and Heard had the opportunity to take the gun off of the top of Randleman's refrigerator on their way out of his house that night. However, as Randleman himself admitted, he d[idn't] know who took [the gun] ... [he] never s[aw] anybody take the gun.... So, either [Petitioner or Heard] could have taken it. ( Id. ) Furthermore, in its factual recitation, the majority lists the following facts that were introduced at trial through Heard's testimony: [Petitioner] was armed with a .380 caliber pistol the morning of March 8; [a] cab took [Petitioner] and Heard to Ogle['s] and Tincher's apartment on Hill Avenue at [Petitioner's] direction, where both [Petitioner] and Heard entered the apartment; Ogle was getting ready to go to work and Tincher, although she popped out to say hello, was still in bed; Ogle agreed to give [Petitioner] and Heard a ride to [Petitioner's] mom's apartment on Airport Road; [Petitioner,] sitting in the front seat, gave Ogle the directions and eventually told her to stop on the side of the road on Hill Avenue; Ogle and [Petitioner] got out of her car and walked roughly forty yards into a field or wooded area off Hill Avenue; Heard heard two gunshots and saw Ogle's body laying on the ground; [Petitioner] rushed back to Ogle's car and motioned for Heard to get in the front passenger's seat as [Petitioner] got into the driver's seat and drove Ogle's car back to the victims' apartment complex; [Petitioner] picked a gun up off the floor of the car, exited the vehicle, and told Heard to take the car; Heard then left the car and took Ogle's wallet as he abandoned the car roughly one block from his home. (Maj. Op. at 671-73 (internal modifications omitted).) There are several reasons to question the credibility of Heard's testimony. [1] Foremost, Heard had a significant motive to implicate Petitioner. Initially Heard, like Petitioner, was indicted and charged with two counts of aggravated murder that carried three death penalty specifications. However, by agreeing to testify at Petitioner's trial, Heard was able to plead guilty to one count of complicity to murder, exposing Heard to a term of imprisonment ranging between fifteen years to life, with the possibility of parole after serving twelve and a half years of incarceration. ( See J.A. at 6488-89.) Additionally, at least two pieces of physical evidence tend to implicate Heard: it is undisputed that Ogle's car was found on the same block as Heard's house ( see id. at 6419-20); and officers testified at Petitioner's trial that in the course of a search conducted pursuant to a valid search warrant, police officers found Ogle's wallet in Heard's bedroom. ( Id. at 6431-32.) There were also several discrepancies between Heard's testimony and other evidence presented at Petitioner's trial. Whereas Earl testified earlier in Petitioner's trial that Heard was acquainted with both Tincher and Ogle ( see id. at 5887), Heard denied having any relationship with either victim. ( See id. at 6460.) Moreover, in recounting his version of Ogle's murder on the witness stand, Heard stated that he heard two gunshots, after which he look[ed] back in [Petitioner's] direction... and [Ogle] was lying on the ground. ( Id. at 6465.) However, in his report of Ogle's autopsy, the coroner, Dr. Christopher Reed Desley, testified that the main external findings of the autopsy were the presence of three gunshot wounds. ( Id. at 6311.) Finally, Detective Arthur M. Marx testified that Heard's story was incredible because from Heard's alleged vantage point, it was physically impossible to see what [Heard] said he saw, namely that Petitioner shot Ogle in the field. ( Id. at 6556.) The veracity of Heard's testimony is further called into question by his concession on cross-examination that he told police several different stories relating to the crimes. ( See id. at 6472-76.) [T]he first thing he told [police was that he] didn't know anything about it. ( Id. at 6473.) The second thing [Heard] told [police] was that he had seen two white girls get killed. ( Id. ) The third thing [Heard] told police was that he has seen a black male... that he knew as a dope dealer ... driving the [victim's] car ... [d]own [an] alleyway ... [a]nd [that Heard] didn't know who he was ... [or] what he had done with the car. ( Id. at 6474.) The fourth story Heard told police was that he had gone to a carwash and there an unknown black male told [him] about two white girls being killed. ( Id. at 6475.) Thus, the version of the crimes that Heard recounted on the witness stand at Petitioner's trial, and that the majority apparently credits, was his fifth story. Heard's testimony is therefore weak in several respects: (1) Heard had a strong motive to implicate Petitioner in order to exculpate himself; (2) it is inconsistent with several other pieces of trial evidence; and (3) Heard was proven untrustworthy, having told the authorities five versions of the facts. In its recitation of the facts, the majority does mention the credibility problems plaguing Heard's testimony. ( See Maj. Op. at 673.) However, although in analyzing the materiality of the report in conjunction with the facts presented at trial, the majority acknowledges the aspersions cast on Heard's testimony, ( see id. at 682), it ignores the probative value of this evidence. Instead, in its discussion, the majority accords significant weight to facts introduced through Heard's testimony. This seemingly willful blindness to the weaknesses of Heard's testimony unduly tips the scales against a finding of materiality in contravention of AEDPA's requirement that a habeas court give comprehensive consideration to all potential factual scenarios. See Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 789-91. The majority makes further factual errors in its materiality analysis by surmising what may have happened had Petitioner been aware of the report at the time of his trial, and finding, based on these conjectures, that the report would not have helped Petitioner's case. The majority states that [Petitioner] ignores the likely damaging evidence flowing from the report. Most significantly, the report ... undermines the defense theory that Heard... was the triggerman. (Maj. Op. at 682.) The majority also contends that the time line of events suggested by the report entirely subverts [Petitioner's] defense theory that Heard was the killer. ( Id. at 683.) Thus, the majority finds that the report would not have assisted Petitioner because it was not directly in line with Petitioner's defense theory at trial. However, in unreasonably narrowing its analysis to the precise factual arguments actually presented at trial, the majority ignores the equally plausible likelihood that the report could have led Petitioner to additional information, witnesses and defense theories. Such one-sided conjecture by the majority is not a persuasive basis for finding that the report is not material. Similarly, the majority states that [Petitioner] also ignores the fact that any witnesses who testified on his behalf regarding the alleged March 12 sighting of Ogle would have been subject to cross-examination, during which the State could have raised factual contradictions.... [T]he State quite likely could have successfully obtained the witnesses' admissions that they had in fact been mistaken about the sighting of Ogle and had instead seen her sister. ( Id. at 683.) However, the fact that individuals retracted their statements six years after Petitioner's trial does not indicate that they would have done so six years earlier on the eve of Petitioner's trial. [2] Moreover, whereas the individuals only retracted their statements six years after Petitioner's trial concluded, they initially made the statements on March 12, 1986, just a month prior to Petitioner's trial. Thus, if temporal proximity is any indication, it is possible that the individuals who claimed that they saw Ogle on March 12, 1986 would have stood by their account throughout Petitioner's trial. The majority's contention that the State quite likely could have successfully obtained the witnesses' admissions that they had in fact been mistaken in stating that they saw Ogle after she was allegedly murdered, ( id. ), is nothing more than pure speculation. There is simply no way to evaluate whether the statements would have been retracted or undermined at Petitioner's trial. The majority's analysis in this case is riddled with factual problems, which in their own right represent a failure to attempt a thorough reconstruction of the broad range of potential factual scenarios at play in the case, and thus constitutes a misapplication of AEDPA deference. See Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 789-91. The majority also glosses over several reliability issues affecting the evidence presented at Petitioner's trial, and makes numerous faulty factual suppositions. It is only based on this faulty factual foundation that the majority arrives at its conclusion that the report is not material.