Opinion ID: 1404850
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Voluntary Submission to Jurisdiction

Text: Although we have concluded that the Utah long-arm statute does not provide a basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over ASC I, Corcoran, and Danielak by Utah courts, SII nevertheless argues that the state district court erred in dismissing the action against these defendants. In particular, it asserts that these defendants waived their objection to personal jurisdiction by submitting to the federal court's personal jurisdiction without objection. When a federal court acquires subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of diversity, the federal court must apply the law of the forum state, see Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938), to determine if a state court would exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant. [4] And [i]f the state court lacks jurisdiction of the ... parties, the federal court acquires none.... Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 258 U.S. at 382, 42 S.Ct. 349. A federal court sitting in diversity can render a valid judgment only if the state in which it sits would have had personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Thus, there is only one source of personal jurisdiction law in diversity cases  state law. A federal court sitting in diversity is really an extension of the forum state court. When a defendant consents to personal jurisdiction in a federal court sitting in diversity, that defendant necessarily consents to the forum state's exercise of personal jurisdiction. Allowing a defendant to waive personal jurisdiction in the federal court but later contest the exercise of jurisdiction in a state court is tantamount to allowing a defendant to waive jurisdiction in one district court in Utah but contest it in another district court. The requirement of personal jurisdiction operates to protect defendants from the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum and acts to ensure that the States, through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-292, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980); see also Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702-03, 102 S.Ct. 2099, 72 L.Ed.2d 492 (1982) (providing that because [t]he personal jurisdictional requirement recognizes and protects... an individual right, it can, like other such rights, be waived). ASC, Corcoran, and Danielak did not try to avoid litigating in a Utah forum; they only wanted to avoid litigating in a Utah state court. They had this option through removal but lost it because of their own untimeliness. Therefore, we hold that they waived any objection to personal jurisdiction of Utah courts over them.