Opinion ID: 1181141
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Language of Section 5(b)

Text: According to respondents, the only effect of the second sentence is to prohibit the Legislature from rejecting a nominee by failing to act on a nomination. Since the result of such inaction under this view is that the nominee is deemed to be confirmed, the Legislature has an incentive to take a vote on the nomination within 90 days. Lungren, while agreeing that the failure by the Legislature to act would result in confirmation, asserts that the second sentence has an additional effect: i.e., unless both houses actually vote to reject the nominee, he is deemed confirmed after 90 days from the time the nomination is submitted to them. Under this view, confirmation occurs if the two houses vote on the nomination but one approves and the other disapproves, as happened here, or if one votes (whether it approves or rejects) and the other fails to vote. In all these situations, according to Lungren, the nominee has been neither confirmed nor refused confirmation by both the Senate and the Assembly within 90 days, and he is therefore entitled to take office as though he had been confirmed by both. Lungren claims that the construction he advances is the only reading that gives effect to the word both in the second sentence, and that if we do not adopt his interpretation, that word would be read out of the sentence. This is plainly incorrect. The word both may be viewed as referring only to a situation in which both houses fail to vote on the nomination: in that event, the nominee would be neither confirmed nor refused confirmation by both the Senate and the Assembly, in the words of the second sentence. This is essentially the pocket veto theory of respondents. [4] Indeed, this meaning appears to flow more naturally from the language of the second sentence than the interpretation offered by Lungren, since the failure by the Legislature to confirm or refuse confirmation suggests inaction by the two houses rather than inconsistent action. [5] The issue, then, is whether the provision of the second sentence that the nominee will be deemed to have been confirmed if both houses do not refuse or approve the nomination was meant to refer only to inaction by both houses, or whether, as Lungren claims, it applies also to inconsistent action by the two houses or inaction by one house alone. It is arguable that if read literally, the second sentence will bear the more expansive interpretation offered by Lungren. In support of his position, he cites the so-called plain meaning rule. (4) Words used in a statute or constitutional provision should be given the meaning they bear in ordinary use. ( In re Rojas (1979) 23 Cal.3d 152, 155 [151 Cal. Rptr. 649, 588 P.2d 789]; Great Lakes Properties, Inc. v. City of El Segundo (1977) 19 Cal.3d 152, 155 [137 Cal. Rptr. 154, 561 P.2d 244].) If the language is clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, nor is it necessary to resort to indicia of the intent of the Legislature (in the case of a statute) or of the voters (in the case of a provision adopted by the voters). ( In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 886 [210 Cal. Rptr. 631, 694 P.2d 744]; State Board of Education v. Levit (1959) 52 Cal.2d 441, 462 [343 P.2d 8].) But the plain meaning rule does not prohibit a court from determining whether the literal meaning of a statute comports with its purpose or whether such a construction of one provision is consistent with other provisions of the statute. The meaning of a statute may not be determined from a single word or sentence; the words must be construed in context, and provisions relating to the same subject matter must be harmonized to the extent possible. ( Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1386-1387 [241 Cal. Rptr. 67, 743 P.2d 1323].) (5) Literal construction should not prevail if it is contrary to the legislative intent apparent in the statute. The intent prevails over the letter, and the letter will, if possible, be so read as to conform to the spirit of the act. ( People v. Belton (1979) 23 Cal.3d 516, 526 [153 Cal. Rptr. 195, 591 P.2d 485]; Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 245 [149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 583 P.2d 1281].) An interpretation that renders related provisions nugatory must be avoided ( People v. Craft (1986) 41 Cal.3d 554, 561 [224 Cal. Rptr. 626, 715 P.2d 585]); each sentence must be read not in isolation but in the light of the statutory scheme ( In re Catalano (1981) 29 Cal.3d 1, 10-11 [171 Cal. Rptr. 667, 623 P.2d 228]); and if a statute is amenable to two alternative interpretations, the one that leads to the more reasonable result will be followed ( Metropolitan Water Dist. v. Adams (1948) 32 Cal.2d 620, 630-631 [197 P.2d 543]). These rules apply as well to the interpretation of constitutional provisions. ( Stanton v. Panish (1980) 28 Cal.3d 107, 115 [167 Cal. Rptr. 584, 615 P.2d 1372].) (3b) It is immediately apparent from an examination of section 5(b) that the first sentence represents the main premise of the section, i.e., that both houses must confirm a nominee. This is the normal manner in which the Legislature acts. This conclusion is evident not only from the language used, but also, as we shall see, from its origin and legislative history. (6) The second sentence is a proviso, i.e., an exception to or limitation on the operation of the first. As such, it is to be strictly construed. ( People ex rel. S.F. Bay etc. Com. v. Town of Emeryville (1968) 69 Cal.2d 533, 543 [72 Cal. Rptr. 790, 446 P.2d 790]; Kirkwood v. Bank of America (1954) 43 Cal.2d 333, 341 [273 P.2d 532]; Johnson v. Board of Supervisors (1929) 208 Cal. 282, 285 [281 P. 57].) [6] In the words of one court, provisos are qualifiers, not nullifiers. ( Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Brown (E.D.Pa. 1966) 260 F. Supp. 323, 351.) One reason to reject Lungren's position is that it ascribes an unreasonably expansive meaning to the second sentence  the proviso  and concomitantly restricts the operation of the first sentence  the premise  of the section. [7] (3c) A second reason is that the construction he offers would virtually read the first sentence out of the section. Perhaps in recognition of the vulnerability of his position to such a charge, Lungren attempts to harmonize the first and second sentences in the following manner: he suggests that the two sentences offer alternative and equally valid means to confirm a nominee. Under the first sentence, both houses of the Legislature may vote to confirm within 90 days of the time the nomination is submitted to them; in that case, the nominee takes office immediately on confirmation by both houses. [8] Alternatively, if such action does not occur within 90 days and both houses have not rejected the nominee, then under the second sentence he is entitled to assume office in any event on the 91st day. In that case, the nominee is deemed confirmed (because both houses neither approved nor rejected the nomination) no matter whether, as here, one house approved the nomination and the other rejected it, or whether one house voted (either to approve or reject) and the other failed to vote. As we conclude above, however, the first and second sentences do not represent alternative and equal means of confirmation. Rather, the first provides the primary thrust of the section, while the second is a proviso limiting the operation of the first, and hence must be read narrowly. More important, under Lungren's interpretation there is a fundamental inconsistency between the first and second sentences. The first sentence would mean not that both houses must confirm, but that confirmation by either would suffice  or even that confirmation would result if one house voted to reject and the other failed to act [9]  provided only that the nominee waited 90 days. The sole function of the two-house confirmation requirement of section 5(b) would thus be reduced to possibly allowing a nominee to take office a few days or weeks earlier than he would if only one house had acted on the nomination. Even this negligible effect would disappear if, as happened in this case, both houses acted at the end of the 90-day period. After 90 days, the nominee would be deemed confirmed if only one house had voted on the confirmation within that period, whether the vote was to approve or to reject, or if the two houses had voted inconsistently with each other. It is difficult to conceive of a more distorted interpretation of the straightforward command of the first sentence that the Senate and the Assembly must confirm a nominee. Moreover, the 90-day waiting period required by the second sentence is incomprehensible if, as Lungren contends, confirmation by one house is sufficient. There would be no rational reason for a nominee to wait 90 days before assuming office following an affirmative vote on his nomination by one house if he was entitled to the office by virtue of that vote alone. Any action by the second house would ipso facto be rendered meaningless. [10] Finally, to accept Lungren's position would seriously degrade the power and dignity of one house of the Legislature in the confirmation process: an express rejection of the nominee by that house would be rendered a nullity. So far as we are aware, there is no precedent for a parliamentary procedure that calls for a legislative body to vote on a measure and then ignores its negative vote. In a bicameral Legislature such as ours, the legislative power rests in both houses. (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 1.) We are not free to depart from this basic tenet of our constitutional system unless compelled to do so by the clear command of some other provision of law. In our view, the language of section 5(b) does not authorize such a drastic departure.