Opinion ID: 1199648
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Bennett's declaration

Text: Bennett argues that the superior court improperly disregarded the declaration she submitted in response to Weimar's summary judgment motion. Weimar responds that the superior court correctly refused to consider the declaration because it was not notarized, did not state that a notary was unavailable, and, therefore, did not meet the statutory requirements of an affidavit. Weimar also argues that, even if the declaration had been admitted, it would not have prevented summary judgment because it contains no admissible evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact. The superior court reasoned that Alaska Civil Rule 56 does not allow a court to consider a non-notarized written statement such as the Declaration of Connie S. Bennett. Rule 56(c) emphasizes the importance of affidavits, as opposed to unsworn allegations, with regard to summary judgment. It provides that a summary judgment motion may be supported by affidavits setting forth concise statements of material facts made upon personal knowledge. [5] The party opposing summary judgment may serve opposing affidavits, a concise 'statement of genuine issues' setting forth all material facts as to which it is contended there exists a genuine issue necessary to be litigated, and any other memorandum in opposition to the motion. [6] When a party has made and properly supported a summary judgment motion, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. [7] Therefore, assertions of fact in unverified pleadings and memoranda cannot be relied on in denying a motion for summary judgment. [8] Alaska Statute 09.63.010 lists persons who may witness an affidavit. [9] Alaska Statute 09.63.020(a) specifies how an equivalent document may be created when a notary public is unavailable. [10] Bennett's declaration does not meet the requirements of that statute because it does not assert that a notary or other authorized official was unavailable. We conclude that Bennett's declaration does not satisfy the requirements of Rule 56 or AS 09.63.020(a). Bennett argues that, when deciding whether to grant summary judgment, courts may treat a nonmoving party's papers more leniently than the moving party's papers. Bennett asserts, [c]ourts have even accepted verified pleadings as well as declarations as being the functional equivalent of an affidavit in opposition to a motion for summary judgment. Federal courts may treat verified pleadings as equivalent to affidavits, if the verified complaint is based on personal knowledge and sets forth facts admissible in evidence and to which the affiant is competent to testify. [11] We have also allowed parties to rely on verified pleadings in opposing summary judgment. [12] Verified documents, however, are prepared under oath and are sworn and signed before a person authorized by law to take the person's oath or affirmation. [13] Therefore, verified and notarized documents satisfy the same basic requirements. [14] Bennett also urges us to consider her declaration because she made it under penalty of perjury. She reasons, It seems incongruous for the rules to be such that a person could be convicted of perjury for making a statement in the manner Bennett did in this case, and yet that same statement is not sufficient evidence to support a civil action. Federal courts permit unsworn declarations in lieu of affidavits if the declarations are signed under penalty of perjury. [15] Congress passed 28 U.S.C. § 1746, allowing such declarations, after finding that [t]he requirement that the person who signs an affidavit must appear before a notary and be sworn can be inconvenient. [16] Congress found that documents might have to be executed outside normal business hours when a notary is unavailable. [17] And, for documents executed outside the United States, it found that notarization might pose additional problems regarding the authority of the officer administering the oath and the authenticity of the officer's seal. Our statutes, however, contain no analogous provision permitting unsworn declarations in lieu of affidavits. In AS 09.63.020(a), our legislature has provided an exception to the notarization requirement when a notary is unavailable. If a notary is available, sworn affidavits are required. If a notary is unavailable, a document satisfying AS 09.63.020(a) is required. The requirement that the party appear before a notary public or other person authorized by AS 09.63.010 to administer an oath (assuming one is available) to swear the truth of a document's contents is potentially more effective at producing truth during motion practice than the threat of discretionary prosecution for perjury. A notary also requires the affiant to produce identification before the notary signs and seals the document. [18] Absent legislative requirement that we do so, we are not willing to equate an unsworn declaration with an affidavit for purposes of summary judgment proceedings. This is an additional safeguard which we wish to retain. Finally, we must decide whether Weimar timely objected to the form of Bennett's declaration. Weimar first challenged the procedural sufficiency of the declaration at oral argument on the summary judgment motion. Weimar had previously treated the declaration as an affidavit. Because Weimar first raised this issue at oral argument, the superior court was not compelled to hold that the unsworn declaration was insufficient. But Bennett never submitted a corrected document. Any possible error on the part of the superior court in failing to give Bennett an opportunity to supply an adequate document is made harmless by Bennett's failure to tender a document that conformed to the requirements of AS 09.63.010 or AS 09.63.020(a) when she moved for reconsideration, and by her failure to request additional time in which to supply a conforming document. We conclude that Bennett's declaration is inadmissible, and that any error in rejecting it is harmless.