Opinion ID: 1177756
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: alleged late filings

Text: Although appellant's choice of remedy was proper, it must, nonetheless, have been timely instituted. The trial court indicated that it dismissed this action because the action was not preceded by a timely claim against the estate and because it was not filed within the period authorized for such after rejection of such claim. Inasmuch as the claim was filed on November 15, 1978, which was exactly three months after August 14, 1978, the claim was timely filed. Even in the absence of specific statutory provision, the overwhelming weight of authority supports the general rule that in the computation of time prescribed by a statute of limitations, the first day or the day upon which the cause of action accrued is to be excluded. Annot., 20 A.L.R.2d 1249, 1250 (1951). (a)    In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these rules,    or by any applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default from which the designated period of time begins to run shall not be included.   (Emphasis supplied.) Rule 6(a), W.R.C.P. Action on a rejected claim must be instituted within three months after the executor or administrator mails the notice of rejection by registered mail in accordance with the provisions of § 2-6-205, W.S. 1977. The record does not reflect that such notice was mailed. It would seem, therefore, that the filings by appellant may not have been late. In any event, such filings are not material to the propriety of the dismissal of the replevin action filed by appellant. Such dismissal would have been proper only if the action was for a claim against Samuel D. Blaney which existed at the time of his death. The controversy over the guns did not occur until after his death. It was, therefore, not a claim within the meaning of §§ 2-6-201, et seq., W.S. 1977. [5] These sections concern creditors of the decedent  and claims against decedent.  Section 2-6-201.    To constitute a claim against the estate of a deceased person, an obligation must consist of a debt incurred by or for the decedent during his lifetime or such a debt as the administrator is authorized by statute to pay out of the decedent's estate.    3 Bancroft's Probate Practice, 2d ed. § 772, p. 512 (1950).    But while replevin also lies against an executor or administrator, it lies against him only in his individual capacity, his liability for wrongful possession of personalty being purely personal. Likewise, replevin does not lie without proof that possession was taken by the representative. 2 Bancroft's Probate Practice, 2d ed. § 484, pp. 612-613 (1950). `The law did not require Patterson to present any claim against the estate of Sanford to his administrator. He asked nothing against the estate. He was merely claiming his own property. The failure to present such claim was no defense to this action.' Atlas Realty Co. v. Rowray, 51 Wyo. 318, 335, 65 P.2d 1122, 1127 (1937). The statutory provisions relative to the time for filing of claims and to the time for instituting action after rejection of claims not being applicable to appellant's replevin action, it should not have been dismissed for reason of late filings.