Opinion ID: 2174543
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Right to Effective Advocacy.

Text: Defendant claims that restrictions imposed on him by the court's regulation of the proceedings abridged his right to effective advocacy in violation of due process. He points to the following examples. Defendant cites approximately 70 occasions when he and his advisory counsel were prohibited from making offers of proof. On three of these occasions, defendant requested a bench conference and did not ask to make an offer of proof. Once he asked to be allowed to cite authority in support of his cross-examination rather than to make an offer of proof. On two of the cited occasions, the defense was permitted to make an offer of proof. Finally, 43 of the cited examples occurred during the omnibus hearing at which defendant asked a number of questions unrelated to the evidentiary issues at hand. Defendant complains that the physical restrictions placed on him at trial diminished his ability to represent himself effectively. On several occasions, defendant asked the court for permission to move freely about the courtroom during the presentation of his case. These requests were denied for security reasons [5] and defendant was required to remain seated at the counsel table. For the safety of the witnesses, jury, judge, counsel and court personnel, defendant also was not permitted to participate personally in any conferences held at the bench or in chambers, a number of which were conducted off the record. Defendant's objection to this treatment stemmed from his perception that any apparent inequality between him as a self-representor and the prosecutor would place him in an unfavorable light in the minds of the jurors. However, [i]t is not the trial court's duty to remove all obstacles from the path of the party who has elected to represent himself. People v. Rice, 40 Colo.App. 357, 579 P.2d 647, 650 (1978). Because defendant chose to manage his own defense, he relinquishe[d], as a purely factual matter, many of the traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2541, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). Furthermore, security measures more obvious than those employed in this case have been found not to deny due process. [6] The court's insistence on these measures did not deny defendant due process of law. Defendant next argues that his exclusion from bench and chambers conferences violated his right to be present at all stages of the trial. See Minn.R.Crim.P. 26.03. Standby counsel had been appointed as required to ensure defendant a fair trial. Defendant at the outset indicated his desire to have his standby counsel argue motions for him. He makes no claim that his advisory counsel were ill-equipped to handle the bench and chambers conferences or that their participation was unsolicited. Cf. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984). Defendant's additional presence at the conferences would not have contribute[d] to the fairness of the procedure. Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2658, 2667, 96 L.Ed.2d 631 (1987). Furthermore, defendant's right to be present at all stages of the trial is not so absolute as to require jeopardizing the safety of those present in the courtroom. The trial court did not allow defendant to consult with his standby counsel at length after every question but regulated consultation. As the state has noted, defendant consulted with standby counsel over 175 times during the course of his jury trial. On the record before us, we find no abuse of the discretion given the trial court by Minn.R.Evid. 611(a) to control the proceedings so as to ascertain the truth and avoid needless consumption of time nor do we find any unreasonable restriction of defendant's consultation right. Defendant argues that his right to prepare an effective opening statement was violated. Although he demanded that the trial start on February 25, defendant complained that he was unprepared when the trial later began on May 14, 1991. The judge told defendant that he was free to wait until after the state rested to give his opening statement; defendant chose not to wait. Without any citations to the record, defendant asserts that throughout the trial, the judge made prejudicial comments and exhibited hostility and impatience toward the defense in the presence of the jury. Generally, the judge conducted himself admirably under circumstances which were, at times, trying. Moreover, the trial court has broad discretion in dealing with disruptive, contumacious, stubbornly defiant defendants    . No one formula for maintaining the appropriate courtroom atmosphere will be best in all situations. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1061, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970). The trial court properly exercised that discretion. Finally, defendant objects to the trial court's handling of the closing arguments. First, he challenges the three hour time limit placed on each side. However, [t]he limitation of time for arguments of counsel is within the sound discretion of the trial judge. United States v. Bednar, 728 F.2d 1043, 1049 (8th Cir.1984) (limitation of twenty minutes not abuse of discretion); see also Capriola v. United States, 61 F.2d 5 (7th Cir.1932) (two hour limit not abuse of discretion). Second, defendant claims that he and his advisory counsel were improperly castigated and threatened by the court during the state's final argument. When defendant began interrupting the prosecutor's argument with objections, the judge overruled them and instructed defendant to make legal objections. [I]t is undoubtedly within the province of the trial judge to admonish and rebuke counsel when guilty of misconduct    . Hansen v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 231 Minn. 354, 360, 43 N.W.2d 260, 264 (1950). Defendant's behavior was disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful. Allen, 397 U.S. at 343, 90 S.Ct. at 1060. The trial court was well within the bounds of the constitution in handling defendant as it did. We have considered and find no merit in defendant's arguments that he was denied a speedy trial when the trial did not begin on February 25, 1991; that he was denied a public trial because one day the omnibus hearing went beyond normal business hours; and that he was denied his right to disqualify the presiding judge. Defendant is constitutionally guaranteed a fair trial, not a perfect one. The trial was long and difficult. The trial court properly controlled the presentation of evidence and maintained the decorum and security of the courtroom without depriving defendant of his constitutional right to a fair trial. See Batsell v. United States, 403 F.2d at 401; Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970).