Opinion ID: 4525519
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Eskridge Lacks Standing to Bring a Protest

Text: The Court of Federal Claims determined that Eskridge lacked standing to bring a post-award protest because it did not have a direct economic interest since it did not have a substantial chance of receiving the Contract. See Eskridge, 142 Fed. Cl. at 422–23. Eskridge contends that the Court of Federal Claims erred in concluding that it did not have a direct economic interest as it would have had a substantial chance of winning the Contract “but for the Army’s errors in evaluating technical acceptability.” Appellant’s Br. 18. We disagree with Eskridge. Eskridge bid on the 2018 Solicitation, so we focus our inquiry on whether Eskridge possesses the requisite direct economic interest. To be an interested party, a bidder must have a “direct economic interest [that] would be affected by the award of the contract.” Myers, 275 F.3d at 1370. We conclude that Eskridge does not possess such a direct economic interest. In a post-award bid protest, the relevant inquiry is whether the bidder had a “substantial chance” of winning the award—specifically, whether a protestor “establish[ed] not only some significant error in the procurement process, but also that there was a substantial chance it would have received the contract award but for that error.” Statistica, 102 F.3d at 1582; see United States v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 892 F.2d 1006, 1010–11 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (concluding that a bid protestor had “at best, a trivial interest in the award” and therefore no economic interest where, if the protest were successful, the award would go to another party); see also Impresa Construzioni Geom. Domenico Garufi v. United States, 238 F.3d 1324, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (summarizing cases). Eskridge failed to demonstrate that it would be in line for the Contract. First, even if Ansible was removed from the running for some reason, the award would go to one of the other three lower-priced, Case: 19-1862 Document: 44 Page: 11 Filed: 04/15/2020 ESKRIDGE & ASSOCIATES v. UNITED STATES 11 technically acceptable bids that ranked before Eskridge, and Eskridge still would not have a substantial chance of winning the award. See Eskridge, 142 Fed. Cl. at 424 (explaining that there were three lower-priced, technically acceptable bids between Ansible’s and Eskridge’s bids); see also Int’l Bus. Machs., 892 F.2d at 1010–11 (finding no direct economic interest where there is a lower-priced, technically acceptable bid). 5 Second, Eskridge fails to allege prejudice sufficient to require the Contract to be rebid, which would have allowed Eskridge to compete again. A bidder has an economic interest and therefore standing to challenge a contract award where, “if the [bidder’s] bid protest were allowed because of an arbitrary and capricious responsibility determination by the contracting officer, the government would be obligated to rebid the contract, and [the bidder] could compete for the contract once again.” Impresa, 238 F.3d at 1334. Outside of its contention that the Army failed to conduct a compensation realism analysis, Eskridge does not allege alternate grounds which, if true, would require rebidding. See generally Appellant’s Br. Cf. Info. Tech., 316 F.3d at 1319 (determining that a disappointed bidder established the requisite prejudice for standing, as the party was a qualified bidder whose proposal met minimum contract requirements and “its chances of securing the contract increased if the problem [alleged] . . . was cured”). Eskridge’s counterarguments are unavailing. Eskridge contends that it would have a chance of being awarded the Contract, because its challenge encompasses 5 To the extent that Eskridge is protesting the terms of the 2018 Solicitation, such a challenge is untimely. See Blue & Gold Fleet, L.P. v. United States, 492 F.3d 1308, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that a party waives the ability to object to the terms of a solicitation if it fails to do so before the close of the bidding process). Case: 19-1862 Document: 44 Page: 12 Filed: 04/15/2020 12 ESKRIDGE & ASSOCIATES v. UNITED STATES all four lower-priced bidders due to the Army’s improper determination that they were technically acceptable when they were in fact deficient. See Appellant’s Br. 18 (“[T]he Army committed substantial errors by failing to adhere to evaluation criteria pertaining to retention and recruiting of CRNAs,” “which allowed four bidders to submit wage rates and pricing wholly inadequate to retain and recruit CRNAs in the latter option years of the contract[.]”). Specifically, Eskridge asserts—notably without providing record support—that the 2018 Solicitation required that “wage rates must increase proportionally per option year at a percentage necessary to maintain and sustain the workforce throughout the life of the contract.” Id. at 19. This argument fails, hinging on a faulty premise: For Eskridge’s argument to prevail, the 2016 Solicitation’s price realism analysis requirement—which Eskridge suggests would engender the need for proportional and annual wage increases—must have been imputed into the 2018 Solicitation. It was not incorporated. The Army specified that in the 2018 Solicitation, it had removed the 2016 Solicitation’s price realism analysis requirement and, in its place, added the minimum compensation rate requirement. See Eskridge, 142 Fed. Cl. at 414 (“[T]he Army made th[e] [minimum compensation rate] addition because the prior iteration of this procurement—unlike the current one—incorporated price realism in a best value trade-off analysis.”); see J.A. 171 (2018 Solicitation) (setting the initial “minimum acceptable provider wage rate” at $113.84 (capitalization altered)), 159–72 (2018 Solicitation) (providing for no annual wage increase in option years). All four of the lower-priced bids met the compensation rate requirement, see Eskridge, 142 Fed. Cl. at 414–15; see also J.A. 861–65, and so the Court of Federal Claims did not err in determining the bids were technically acceptable on that basis, see Int’l Bus. Machs., 892 F.2d at 1011 (explaining that, where every bidder “offers essentially the same [bid,] . . . materially differ[ing] only as to price, the Case: 19-1862 Document: 44 Page: 13 Filed: 04/15/2020 ESKRIDGE & ASSOCIATES v. UNITED STATES 13 solicitation itself is not challenged, and there is no reason to believe that the second-lowest bid is not responsive, only the second-lowest bidder has a direct economic interest”). Similarly, Eskridge’s claim that the Army erred by rating the four lower bidders as technically acceptable—despite their offering of wage rates that “fall[] below the median rate established by the IGE” for two option years— is flawed. Appellant’s Br. 21. The compensation realism analysis specified in the 2018 Solicitation requires the Army to measure each bid’s price against the minimum hourly rate provided for, which the Army did. See Eskridge, 142 Fed. Cl. at 422. In contrast, the IGE analysis is used to determine whether each bidder’s pricing was “[f]air and reasonable.” Id. at 419 (citation omitted); see J.A. 859 (2018 Solicitation Source Selection Decision Document) (“Fair and reasonable pricing can be determined by comparison to the [IGE].”). Compensation realism analysis evaluates whether a proposed compensation is too low, Eskridge, 142 Fed. Cl. at 423, while the fair and reasonable analysis determines if it is too high. See Triad Int’l Maint. Corp., B-408374, 2013 WL 4854436, at  (Comp. Gen. Sept. 5, 2013) (citing Milani Constr., LLC, B-401942, 2010 CPD ¶ 87 at 4 (Comp. Gen. Dec. 22, 2009)). For the reasons stated above, the Army did not err in its compensation realism analysis. Accordingly, because Eskridge failed to demonstrate a direct interest, it does not have standing to protest.