Opinion ID: 1101055
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: whether certain witnesses for the state gave inadmissible hearsay testimony.

Text: ¶ 40. Hennington argues that the testimony of Dr. Whittington, the examining physician, M.H., the mother of the child, and Mangold, the social worker, should have been excluded as inadmissible hearsay which did not come within an enumerated exception. We find that the record shows the trial court followed the proper procedures, had the necessary hearings and made the necessary findings of reliability prior to accepting the testimony of each of the witnesses. ¶ 41. Miss. R. Evid. 801 defines hearsay as a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Miss. R. Evid. 803 delineates certain exceptions to the hearsay rule. Pertinent to the present case are the exceptions found in subsections (4) and (25). ¶ 42. Rule 803(4) provides: [s]tatements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment, regardless of to whom the statements are made, or when the statements are made, if the court, in its discretion, affirmatively finds that the proffered statements were made under circumstances substantially indicating their trustworthiness. ¶ 43. Rule 803(25) provides: [a] statement made by a child of tender years describing any act of sexual contact performed with or on the child by another is admissible in evidence if: (a) the court finds, in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury, that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide substantial indicia of reliability; and (b) the child either (1) testifies at the proceedings; or (2) is unavailable as a witness: provided, that when the child is unavailable as a witness, such statement may be admitted only if there is corroborative evidence of the act. Miss. R. Evid. 803(25) allows statements of causation and fault [and] has been expanded to include the identity of the perpetrator in child abuse cases. Young v. State, 679 So.2d 198, 203 (Miss. 1996) ( quoting Jones v. State, 606 So.2d 1051, 1056 (Miss. 1992)). ¶ 44. This Court has contradicted itself in its past decisions regarding its interpretation of Miss. R. Evid. 803(4). In Eakes v. State, 665 So.2d 852 (Miss. 1995), the Court wrote: This Rule allows statements identifying the perpetrator in child abuse cases. Doe, 644 So.2d at 1205 ( citing Jones v. State, 606 So.2d 1051, 1056 (Miss. 1992) and Mitchell v. State, 539 So.2d 1366 (Miss. 1989)). A dual-pronged test must be met prior to admission of evidence pursuant to M.R.E. 803(4): `the declarant's motive in making the statement must be consistent with the purposes of promoting treatment; and ... the content of the statement must be such as is reasonably relied on by a physician in treatment.' Doe, 644 So.2d at 1206 ( quoting Jones v. State, 606 So.2d 1051, 1056 (Miss. 1992) ( citing U.S. v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430, 436 (8th Cir.1985))). A statement identifying the perpetrator as a member of the victim's household is reasonably pertinent to treatment and, consequently, reasonably relied upon by physicians in diagnosis and treatment. Doe, 644 So.2d at 1206 ( citing Jones, 606 So.2d at 1056-57). Applying, the two-part test which must be met prior to a finding of admissibility, it is first noted that the motive behind informing a treating physician that one has been sexually abused is consistent with the purposes of promoting treatment. The doctor cannot begin to treat the patient without knowing the patient's complaint. Surely prevention of further abuse is part of the treatment of sexual abuse; therefore, the motive behind identifying the perpetrator is also consistent with the purposes of promoting treatment. Given the premise underlying the medical history/diagnosis exception to the hearsay rule, i.e., that patients do not lie to their doctors when requesting treatment, a statement that one has been sexually abused, as well as any identification of the perpetrator, is reasonably pertinent to treatment and, therefore, reasonably relied upon by a treating physician. In Doe, this Court expanded Jones, supra, to allow a finding that the identity of the child's sexual abuser was pertinent to treatment, therefore reasonably relied upon by the treating physician, although the perpetrator was not a member of the child's household. Since the alleged perpetrator in Doe was the child's father, whose visitation rights were at issue, this Court reasoned that prevention of further abuse was an immediate concern. Doe, 644 So.2d at 1206. It follows that prevention of further abuse will always be an immediate concern, whether the perpetrator has daily, weekly, or only sporadic opportunity to abuse a child. There is no logical reason to find that a statement identifying the perpetrator is sufficiently pertinent to treatment and reliable if the perpetrator is someone who has regularly scheduled contact with the child but not if the perpetrator is, instead, a family friend, an acquaintance, or a stranger. The statement regarding April's identification of Eakes as her abuser, although he was not a member of April's household or someone who had regular contact with the child, was properly admitted pursuant to M.R.E. 803(4). Eakes, 665 So.2d at 866-67. ¶ 45. Less than two months after Eakes was decided, this Court issued its opinion in Johnson v. State, 666 So.2d 784 (Miss. 1995). In Johnson, the Court contradicted its earlier holding in Eakes. Under [Miss. R. Evid.] 803(4), statements by a child victim relied upon by a treating physician identifying the perpetrator as a member of the child's household are admissible in child abuse cases. Doe v. Doe, 644 So.2d 1199, 1206 (Miss. 1994). Where the child is sexually assaulted by a member of the child's immediate household, an important part of treatment is the prevention of further sexual abuse as well as the treatment of emotional and psychological injuries. Jones v. State, 606 So.2d 1051, 1056-57 (Miss. 1992). Where the perpetrator is not a member of the child's immediate household, it is error to admit statements identifying the perpetrator made by the child to a treating physician. However, such admission will be harmless if the testimony is merely cumulative. Jones, 606 So.2d at 1057. To be admissible under 803(4), `the declarant's motive in making the statement must be consistent with the purposes of promoting treatment; and ... the content of the statement must be such as is reasonably relied on by a physician in treatment.' Doe, 644 So.2d at 1205-06 ( quoting Jones, 606 So.2d at 1056). Johnson, 666 So.2d at 795. ¶ 46. This Court expanded its reading of the Miss. R. Evid. 803(4) exception to include the identity of the perpetrator in child abuse cases in Mitchell v. State, 539 So.2d 1366 (Miss. 1989). See Jones v. State, 606 So.2d 1051, 1056 (Miss. 1992). In Mitchell, the Court stated: many courts, State and Federal, with evidence rules similar to ours, admit statements by child sexual abuse victims to physicians and psychologists while being examined, diagnosed, and treated following an incident of sexual abuse under exceptions analogous to M.R.E. 803(4). However, for the most part, physicians and psychologists have been allowed to testify only about the incident, as related by the child, and not about the identity of the assailant, [unless the identity of the assailant] [2] is reasonably pertinent to treatment, such as in cases where the child has been sexually assaulted by a member of the family. In such cases, the need to remove the child from the situation becomes a pertinent part of the treatment. See, e.g, Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941 (4th Cir.1988); United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430 (8th Cir.1985); U.S. v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir.1980); U.S. v. Nick, 604 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir.1979); State v. Robinson, 153 Ariz. 191, 735 P.2d 801 (1987). See also, Hall v. State, 539 So.2d 1338 (Miss. 1989). Jones, 606 So.2d at 1056 ( quoting Mitchell, 539 So.2d at 1370) (emphasis added). ¶ 47. The Court takes this opportunity to set forth definite guidelines regarding the admission of hearsay testimony under Miss. R. Evid. 803(4) as to the identification of the perpetrator in a sexual abuse case. Justice Prather, writing for the Court, stated that prevention of further abuse will always be an immediate concern, whether the perpetrator has daily, weekly, or only sporadic opportunity to abuse a child. Eakes, 665 So.2d at 867. The Court reasoned that it was illogical to find that a statement identifying the perpetrator is sufficiently pertinent to treatment and reliable if the perpetrator is someone who has regularly scheduled contact with the child but not if the perpetrator is, instead, a family friend, an acquaintance, or a stranger. Id. We find this to be the more reasoned and logical approach. ¶ 48. When the Court expanded the exception of Miss. R. Evid. 803(4) to include the identity of the perpetrator of the sexual abuse, it reasoned that the need to remove the child from the situation becomes a pertinent part of the treatment. Jones, 606 So.2d at 1056 ( quoting Mitchell, 539 So.2d at 1370). Clearly, the paramount concern in treatment of sexual abuse is to ensure that a child is not returned to the environment that fostered, allowed, or permitted the abuse. Although the perpetrator was not an immediate family member living in the same home as the child, the record shows that Hennington frequented the home of the child. ¶ 49. Today, the Court firmly states its position as a reaffirmation of the holding in Eakes. Therefore, we hold that hearsay testimony identifying the perpetrator is admissible under Miss. R. Evid. 803(4) regardless of whether he or she is a member of the child's immediate household. The overriding question making the inquiry necessary is, Will the perpetrator have access to the child in the future that would allow the sexual abuse to continue? Because the inquiry is necessary for treatment, the answer is admissible under the Rule.
¶ 50. Whittington testified that A.R. was brought to his medical clinic for an examination as a result of an alleged sexual abuse. The State inquired as to whether a history of A.R. was taken during the examination. The Defense then objected as to the hearsay, which prompted hearings on the record and outside the presence of the jury. A proffer was made as to what Whittington's testimony would be. When asked by the State what the child related to him as to the history of his injury, Whittington responded that the child told him his uncle had placed his mouth on his penis and went up and down and that his uncle had also licked his rectum. Whittington then asked the child if he experienced burning while urinating, any discharge from his penis, any type of anal discharge, or any nightmares. ¶ 51. Whittington was then asked by the State if he examined the child to determine if there were signs of any sexual abuse. He stated that upon examining the child's penis he noticed several small abrasions accompanied with some scabbing. Whittington testified that he determined the abrasions were bite marks, which was consistent with the history the child had given him. ¶ 52. Whittington was cross-examined by the Defense and further examined on redirect by the State. The court then made the following findings: THE COURT: The Court hereby finds, as I have previously done, that the witness relating to the alleged victim who is the subject of Dr. Whittington's examination is obviously unavailable as a witness. The Court finds that this examination which was performed two or three days after the alleged incident, the content of that examination and the circumstances of the alleged victim receiving medical attention obviously provide a substantial indicia of reliability, and I will admit Dr. Whittington's testimony under 803(4) and 803(25). Whittington then testified as to these same matters in front of the jury. ¶ 53. The `substantial indicia of reliability' required by M.R.E. 803(25) are necessary to prevent confrontation clause problems. Eakes, 665 So.2d at 865 ( quoting Doe v. Doe, 644 So.2d 1199, 1206 (Miss. 1994)). The reliability of the statement must be judged independently of any corroborating evidence; otherwise, the confrontation clause may be violated. Id. (citing Doe, 644 So.2d at 1204). While no mechanical test is available, factors which should be considered in judging reliability are: spontaneity and consistent repetition; mental state of declarant; use of terminology unexpected of a child of similar age; and lack of motive to fabricate. Id. When the correct legal standard is used by the trial court, this Court will not reverse a finding of admissibility unless there is a finding of an abuse of discretion. Id. ¶ 54. Whittington stated that he walked into the room and asked, [A.R.], tell me what happened. A.R. replied that his uncle had placed his private parts in his mouth and went up and down. The statement was spontaneous and made in response to a very broad and general question asked by the doctor. Some factors that the court should examine to determine if there is sufficient indicia of reliability are ... whether the statements were made spontaneously [or] whether suggestive techniques were used in eliciting the statement. Miss. R. Evid. 803 cmt. 25. These factors are not, however, exclusive, and the court must make an overall determination of whether the child declarant was particularly likely to be telling the truth when the statement was made. Griffith v. State, 584 So.2d 383, 388 (Miss. 1991) ( quoting Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 822, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 3150, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990)). ¶ 55. This Court finds that the trial judge found sufficient indicia of reliability as required by Miss. R. Evid. 803(25) and did not abuse his discretion by admitting the testimony of Whittington. Therefore, his testimony was properly admitted after the appropriate hearings were had on the record finding that under the two-part test there was substantial indicia of reliability.
¶ 56. Hennington complains that the testimony of M.H. was improperly ruled admissible by the trial judge. He claims there was no on the record finding, as required by Miss. R. Evid. 803(25). The record clearly shows that there was a hearing on the record to determine if there were sufficient indicia of reliability in the proffered testimony of M.H. ¶ 57. M.H. described the relationship prior to the sexual abuse between A.R. and Hennington as wonderful. They did things together, such as uncle type things. M.H. testified that she inquired why A.R. was having problems with his schoolwork. A.R. stated that he thought he maybe was being abused. M.H. and A.R. had done a study in Boy Scouts on the different types of abuse, such as emotional, physical, mental, and sexual. M.H. began to tell the court what A.R. said to her about sexual abuse when the Defense objected to this as hearsay. A hearing outside the presence of the jury took place, where M.H. testified as follows: STATE: What did he tell you, M.H.? M.H.: That he thought that that was what had been happening when I was talking about the  definition of sexual abuse? STATE: And did you ask him how this was happening? Tell me how the conversation proceeded. M.H.: I didn't think it was my child. I thought that some other child had told A.R. these things, and then A.R. told me no, that it was him. STATE: Did he indicate who, if anyone, had been doing this? M.H.: After a long pause he did. STATE: And who did he say? M.H.: Uncle Matt. STATE: Let me ask you something, M.H. Tell me, again, your child's relationship with his Uncle Matt. M.H.: It was a very close relationship with Uncle Matt. STATE: To further my understanding of that, he still has feelings for his uncle; is that correct? M.H.: Sure, he does? STATE: He loves his uncle. M.H.: Uh-huh. STATE: Do you have any reason to believe that your child would tell a lie on his uncle? M.H.: No. ¶ 58. M.H. was then cross-examined by the Defense as to what A.R. had related to her. The court then made the following findings on the record: THE COURT: Again, the time of the conversation between this witness and alleged victim being two days, the statements made by the child and the circumstances of the statement with his mother, I find it very difficult to understand the lack of reliability of that particular discourse and find that that is obviously under circumstances that would provide an indicia of reliability, and that the fact that the content of the statement is obviously corroborated by medical testimony, I'll admit the evidence. ¶ 59. It is true that the trial judge erred by considering the medical testimony of Whittington as a factor in finding sufficient indicia of reliability. The reliability of the statement must be judged independently of any corroborating evidence; otherwise the confrontation clause may be violated. Doe, 644 So.2d at 1206. To be admissible under the Confrontation Clause, hearsay evidence used to convict a defendant must possess indicia of reliability by virtue of its inherent trustworthiness, not by reference to other evidence at trial. Griffith, 584 So.2d at 388 ( quoting Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. at 822, 110 S.Ct. at 3150). However, there were other factors the judge considered. He considered the relationship between the mother and child. He considered the relationship between the child and the perpetrator and determined that there was not an apparent motive on the declarant's part to lie. ¶ 60. This Court finds there were sufficient indicia of reliability to allow the testimony of M.H. The lower court did not commit error by allowing the hearsay testimony of M.H., where she stated that A.R. told her that Hennington was the perpetrator who had sexually abused him.
¶ 61. Hennington argues that the testimony of Mangold was inadmissible hearsay that did not meet the requirements of the exception to hearsay in Miss. R. Evid. 803(25). He complains that there was no on the record finding of factors considered by the judge prior to ruling the testimony admissible. ¶ 62. The trial judge conducted a hearing outside the presence of the jury as required by Miss. R. Evid. 803(25). Although the trial judge did not specifically mention the Wright factors he considered, he admitted the testimony of Mangold under Miss. R. Evid. 803(25). The record before this Court contains sufficient evidence of the Wright factors presented to the judge prior to his admission of Mangold's testimony. ¶ 63. Mangold was questioned by the State regarding his interview of A.R. and his findings as a result of that interview. Q. And how did you conduct the interview after you said you had some small talk. How did you get to the point of asking him regarding the sexual abuse? A. Basically I told him that I had talked with his parent, and his parents had talked with me and told me he had something that we needed to talk about, and if he would, just wherever he wanted to start, start and tell me about what happened. Q. And did he immediately begin to tell you? A. Yes, ma'am, he did. Q. What did he tell you? A. He told me that his Uncle Matt Hennington had taken his private parts in his hands and moved it up and down. He also told me that his uncle Matt would take his hands and place them on Mr. Matt Hennington until white stuff came out. He told me that Mr. Matt Hennington put his mouth on his penis, he referred to it as private part, and moved it up and down.       Q. At that time did you believe him? A. Yes, ma'am, I did. Q. Why? A. Basically because he's very consistent with his information. His demeanor was such that he had a difficult time talking about it, he was very concerned, he was a little ashamed to talk about it, and he basically fit the pattern of numerous other children that we've talked with and dealt with on sexual abuse matters, and he was very believable in his statements. ¶ 64. After this proffered testimony was given outside the hearing of the jury, the trial judge found there were sufficient indicia of reliability as required by M.R.E. 803(25) so as to allow the testimony of Mangold. The judge made the following ruling: THE COURT: As we've discussed in the past, since the Court has previously ruled that the alleged victim in this case obviously is unavailable, the Court hereby finds that the statements given is [sic] immediately after the day of alleged  what was the date, Mr. Mangold? A. The date after the alleged abuse took place is the date I interviewed the child, yes, sir. THE COURT: Three days or so after the alleged incident, obviously, the child at the Department of Human Services, was preparing import of what he was doing there, and I find that there are particularized guarantees of trustworthiness in this particular case which provides substantial indicia of reliability, and I'll admit the testimony. ¶ 65. Again, this Court has previously held that no mechanical test is available to find substantial indicia of reliability. Eakes, 665 So.2d at 865. Although not an exhaustive list, some factors to consider are spontaneity and consistent repetition, mental state of the declarant, use of terminology unexpected of a child of similar age, and lack of motive to fabricate. Doe, 644 So.2d at 1206. Other factors to consider are whether there is an apparent motive on the part of the declarant to lie and the timing of the declarations. Miss. R. Evid. 803 cmt. 25. The record supplies this Court on review sufficient indicia of reliability to find that Mangold's testimony was properly admitted under Miss. R. Evid. 803(25). When the correct legal standard is employed by the trial court, this Court will reverse a finding of admissibility only when there has been an abuse of discretion. Eakes, 665 So.2d at 865; Doe, 644 So.2d at 1207. This Court does not find that the trial court abused its discretion as to the testimony admitted under Miss. R. Evid. 803(25). Therefore, Hennington's argument must fail, and the trial court is affirmed.