Opinion ID: 152623
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Police Coercion

Text: Obviously, interrogation of a suspect will involve some pressure because its purpose is to elicit a confession. In order to obtain the desired result, interrogators use a laundry list of tactics. Numerous cases have held that questioning tactics such as a raised voice, deception, or a sympathetic attitude on the part of the interrogator will not render a confession involuntary unless the overall impact of the interrogation caused the defendant's will to be overborne. Astello, 241 F.3d at 967 (internal quotations and citations omitted). [T]here is nothing inherently wrong with efforts to create a favorable climate for confession. United States v. Santos-Garcia, 313 F.3d 1073, 1079 (8th Cir.2002) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Here, Sanchez concedes that the Eighth Circuit has said that raised voices do not necessarily render a confession involuntary. Nevertheless, he argues that the officers' use of other coercive methods led to his involuntary confession; these tactics include threatening to charge Sanchez with attempted murder, plant[ing] the idea that the assault victim's brother may retaliate, and display[ing] a graphic photo of the assault victim to Sanchez and his mother. The relevant question is whether the officers used methods so coercive as to deprive [Sanchez] of [his] ability to make an unconstrained decision to confess. Astello, 241 F.3d at 967 (internal quotations and citation omitted). The officers need not have engaged in actual violence for a court to conclude that coercion existed; instead, a credible threat is sufficient because coercion can be mental as well as physical. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 287, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991) (internal quotations and citation omitted). The district court [5] found that the [o]fficers told Sanchez he was `going to jail,' and threatened him with charges of attempted murder and assault with a deadly weapon. Sanchez I, 2009 WL 1975074, at . The court based this finding on Huffman's testimony. [6] Huffman testified that she heard the officers say that Sanchez was going to go to jail. Huffman then asked the officers why Sanchez was going to jail, and the officers replied attempted murder and assault with a deadly weapon. Crediting Huffman's account, as did the district court, we conclude, however, that the record does not support a conclusion that the officers threatened Sanchez with charges of attempted murder and assault with a deadly weapon. The officers' response to Huffman's question was not a threat to Sanchez but rather a truthful response to Huffman's question; in fact, Sanchez was later actually charged with assault with a dangerous weapon within Indian country and assault resulting in serious bodily injury. See United States v. Murdock, 491 F.3d 694, 699 (7th Cir.2007) (The record shows that, when [the defendant] asked what he would be charged with, [the officer] responded that [the defendant] would be charged with possession of drugs and a gun. This was not a threat, but rather a truthful response to [the defendant's] question based on the evidence the police found during their investigation.). Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record that the officers threatened to charge Sanchez with attempted murder or other crimes if he refused to speak with them or confess. The district court also found that the officers' suggestion of possible retaliation by the victim's brother, who was known to be dangerous, may reasonably be considered a threat to a person in Sanchez's position and that [s]uch a threat of possible violent retaliation may be considered particularly coercive in light of the fact Officer Rave knew Sanchez had younger sisters. Sanchez I, 2009 WL 1975074, at . The potential coercive nature of mentioning possible retaliation by the victim's brother is overstated given its grounding in facts known to the officers. Specifically, Officer Monroe testified that the victim's brother has been known to carry shotguns and he's been known to take care of his brothers; therefore, the officers informed Miss Huffman and [Sanchez] that. . . [the officers] wanted to avoid any type of retaliation from [the victim's brother] to coming up hurting . . . [Huffman] or [Sanchez's] family members there at the house. Neither Huffman's testimony nor any other evidence in the record refutes the officers' claim that the victim's brother had a reputation for violence; there is no evidence that the officers were not being truthful in communicating this potential threat to Huffman and Sanchez. Additionally, there is no evidence in the record that the officers promised Sanchez that if he confessed, they would protect him from the victim's brother. See Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 288, 111 S.Ct. 1246. The district court additionally cited the officers' conduct in allowing Sanchez to see a photograph of the victim's injuries as a significant factor in overbearing the will of Sanchez, given his level of immaturity, low tolerance for resisting others' influence, and seeing his mother emotionally upset after viewing the graphic [7] photograph of [the victim's] injuries. Sanchez I, 2009 WL 1975074, at . Huffman denied that the officers showed her the victim's picture in response to a question from her. When asked whether the officers showed her the picture because she asked them what had occurred, Huffman testified that she asked her son about the incident, not the officers. According to Huffman, Sanchez confessed after the officers showed the victim's picture. More specifically, she stated that Sanchez made a statement when we were hollering at him and that right before he confessed, she told Sanchez to say something and that he need[ed] to tell them. As stated supra, interrogation of a suspect will involve some pressure because its purpose is to elicit a confession. Astello, 241 F.3d at 967. Showing a . . . suspect photographs of the . . . victim is not inherently coercive police conduct. . . . Noble v. State, 319 Ark. 407, 892 S.W.2d 477, 483 (1995) (citing Derrick v. Peterson, 924 F.2d 813 (9th Cir.1990)), overruled on other grounds, Grillot v. State, 353 Ark. 294, 107 S.W.3d 136 (2003). Here, Huffman never testified that the officers combined the picture display with threats. The display of the picture does not resemble the extreme conduct found to be improper in [other] cases. People v. Anderson, Docket No. 279772, 2008 WL 5273534, at  (Mich.Ct.App. Dec. 18, 2008) (unpublished per curiam) (Defendant argues that it was coercive for the police to show him a sketch and photograph of the victim. However, the mere display of these items was not accompanied by any threats and does not resemble the extreme conduct found to be improper in the cases cited by defendant.) (citing Davis v. United States, 32 F.2d 860, 861 (9th Cir.1929) (the police took the defendant into a morgue room where the body of the victim was being drained and made him examine the wounds); Stevenson v. Boles, 221 F.Supp. 411 (N.D.W.V.1963) (the police told the defendant that he had to make a statement or they were going to take him to the scene where the decedent's bloody body was still present); State v. Cook, 47 N.J. 402, 221 A.2d 212 (1966) (the police held the low-IQ defendant's face six inches from a dead child, and then beat him with a rubber hose)). The presence and use of the victim's photograph in this particular interrogation does not rise to the level of coercive police conduct considered prohibited. Significantly, Huffman testified that Sanchez confessed not solely because of police questioning and seeing the victim's photograph but also in response to her instruction not the officers' instruction  to say something and that he need[ed] to tell them. The district court noted that Huffman posed questions and made statements to Sanchez during the officers' questioning. Sanchez I, 2009 WL 1975074, at . Accordingly, it considered whether law enforcement used Huffman to coerce Sanchez's confession and determined that Huffman's conduct does not constitute state action. Id. at . The court based this finding on Huffman's testimony, which indicated that she did not act with the intent to assist law enforcement efforts, but to further her own ends as a concerned mother. Id. at . [T]he constraints of the . . . Fifth Amendment[ ] do not apply to purely private activity. United States v. Garlock, 19 F.3d 441, 442 (8th Cir.1994). But the government can exercise such control over a private actor that a `private' action can fairly be attributed to the government for purposes of the . . . Fifth Amendment. Id. at 443. A defendant must demonstrate that, in light of all the circumstances, [the private individual] acted as an instrument or agent of the government. Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted). A defendant satisfies this test by showing that the government exercised such coercive power or such significant encouragement that it is responsible for [the private individual's] conduct, or that the exercised powers are the exclusive prerogative of the government. Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted). Sanchez has not challenged the district court's finding that Huffman did not act as an instrument or agent of the government. Because Huffman acted as a private citizen and not an agent of law enforcement, the effect of her questions on Sanchez is not attributable to police interrogation. See United States v. Erving L., 147 F.3d 1240, 1251 (10th Cir.1998) (To the extent that E.L.'s will was overborne, it was overborne by the actions of his parents rather than the actions of the officers. This type of non-government pressure does not render a confession involuntary.). The relevant question is whether the officers' actions were so coercive as to deprive [Sanchez] of [his] ability to make an unconstrained decision to confess. Astello, 241 F.3d at 967 (internal quotations and citation omitted). Huffman's own testimony demonstrates that, despite the officers' behavior, Sanchez repeatedly maintained that he didn't do it. Furthermore, she admitted that just before Sanchez confessed, Huffmannot the officerstold him to say something and that he need[ed] to tell them.