Opinion ID: 769263
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Walton's Challenge to the Restitution Portion of her Sentence

Text: 28 Lastly, the government concedes, as Walton has asserted, that the district court committed plain error because according to the transcript of the proceedings, the court was under the mistaken impression that it was required to order her jointly and severally liable for the entire amount of the restitution of $90,500.00. 2 At the conclusion of Walton's sentencing hearing, the court ordered: 29 THE COURT: A condition of the supervised release is that she make restitution. I think I am required to impose the full amount these days; is that correct? 30 [Marsalis' Attorney]: Yes, your Honor. 31 [The Government]: You are Judge. 32 THE COURT: 90,000 and how many dollars? 33 [The Government]: 500. 34 THE COURT: $90,500 within the period of supervised release. . . . 35 (Emphasis added). Walton contends that under the law, the court was not required to impose the full amount, but instead, had the option of apportioning the restitution amount among the defendants and weighing factors into the fixed restitution figure, such as her contribution to the victim's loss and her economic circumstances. 36 Under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (MVRA), enacted in 1996, a court must award the full amount of restitution to each victim of a property crime. See 18 U.S.C. sec. 3663A(a)(1), (c)(1)(A)(ii); sec. 3664(f)(1)(A). The MVRA does not permit a district court to exercise discretion as to whether it imposes restitution upon a defendant; the statutory language clearly states that it must. See United States v. McIntosh, 198 F.3d 995, 1004 (7th Cir. 2000). The statute also provides that where more than one defendant has contributed to the victim's loss, the court may make each defendant liable in full or apportion liability among the defendants to reflect the level of contribution to the victim's loss and economic circumstances of each defendant. 18 U.S.C. sec. 3664(h). 3 37 Because the MVRA affords the sentencing court discretion in apportioning liability where multiple defendants are involved, our previous holdings interpreting the Victim Restitution Act remain instructive here. In McIntosh, we stated that because the Victim Restitution Act provides district courts with discretion when ordering restitution, when a court chooses to impose an order [of restitution] and simultaneously waives a fine because of the defendant's economic circumstances, an explanation of its reasoning is necessary. McIntosh, 198 F.3d at 1004. 38 Thus, when a court orders restitution under 18 U.S.C. sec. 3664(h) but the record fails to sufficiently support [the court's] conclusions or clarify its reasoning, then we ask that the court provide us with that information, including its specific findings of fact, to facilitate our review. United States v. Menza, 137 F.3d 533, 538 (7th Cir. 1998); cf. United States v. Boula, 997 F.2d 263, 269 (7th Cir. 1993). 39 Upon review of the judge's statements in the record, we are not convinced that the court was aware that it had the option of either ordering Walton liable for the full amount of the restitution or apportioning her liability to reflect the level of Walton's contribution to the victim's loss and her economic circumstances. 4 We also are left in limbo and can only speculate as to why the court waived Walton's fine and the interest due to [her] financial inability to pay and ordered her restitution payments to be made in monthly installments equal to 10% of her monthly cash flow, but for reasons unexplained, chose not to apportion her liability based upon her economic circumstances as it had the authority to do so under 18 U.S.C. sec. 3664(h). 40 Thus, we vacate and remand the restitution portion of Walton's sentence and ask the court to make clear that it has considered whether Walton should be liable for payment of the full amount of restitution or for an apportioned amount reflect[ing] [her] level of contribution to the victim's loss and economic circumstances. 18 U.S.C. sec. 3664(h). We leave to the judgment of the court to determine whether our aforementioned conclusions warrant a reevaluation of the restitution portions of Marsalis' and Golliday's sentences as well. 41 In conclusion, we agree that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he found that the government struck the African-American juror for race-neutral reasons, precluded evidence of the unsolved February 1996 ATM theft and denied Marsalis' motion for a new trial. We vacate the restitution portion of Walton's sentence and remand the case to the trial court to make specific its findings in support of its order of restitution, while also considering whether or not she should be held liable for the full amount of restitution or for an amount reflecting her contribution to the victim's loss and her economic circumstances, and whether the restitution portion of Marsalis' and Golliday's sentences should also be reevaluated. Accordingly, we AFFIRM Marsalis' conviction and sentence, AFFIRM Walton's conviction, and REVERSE only with respect to Walton's restitution order and REMAND the sole issue of restitution to the district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 42 AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.