Opinion ID: 677795
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Retrospective Operation of the 1991 Amendment

Text: 78 Since Lundy conceded that the old Rule 15(c), which was in effect at the time he filed his complaint, would have barred his action against Dr. Carlino and Dr. Carlino, P.A. (collectively the Carlinos), the first question I must consider is whether the amendment applies retrospectively to cases pending in the district court at the time the amendment became effective. 79 Most courts of appeals have held that the amendment should normally operate retrospectively. See Woods v. Indiana University-Purdue University at Indianapolis, 996 F.2d 880, 886 (7th Cir.1993); Garvey v. Vaughn, 993 F.2d 776, 778, 783 n. 17 (11th Cir.1993); Skoczylas v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 961 F.2d 543, 545-46 (5th Cir.1992); Hill v. United States Postal Serv., 961 F.2d 153, 155-56 (11th Cir.1992); Bayer v. United States Dep't of Treasury, 956 F.2d 330, 334-35 (D.C.Cir.1992). The Supreme Court, as authorized by the Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2074 (Supp.1993), ordered the amended rule to be applied to all pending cases if just and practicable. 6 There certainly is no practicability objection to its retrospective operation. Thus the only remaining question is whether it would be just to apply the rule retrospectively. 80 Without oversimplifying, the justice of retrospective operation has already largely been accounted for in the context of Rule 15(c)(3) by the very terms of the Rule. That is, insofar as the Rule demands an inquiry into prejudice to and knowledge of the party to be added, it is safe to dispense with the justness inquiry at the retrospectivity stage of the analysis. See Woods, 996 F.2d at 886. Simply put, if the party to be added had notice and is not prejudiced, and knew or should have known that it was an intended party, it would not be unjust to apply the new rule retrospectively to that party. These considerations lead me to conclude that Rule 15(c) retrospectively applies to this case. 7