Opinion ID: 3000767
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Indiana Common Law Restraint of Trade Claims

Text: The plaintiffs also assert Indiana common law restraint of trade claims against RBC and Bank One. Before enacting its antitrust statutes, Indiana recognized a common law private right of action in those individuals injured by acts in restraint of competition. See Knight & Jillson Co. v. Miller, 87 N.E. 823, 827-28 (Ind. 1909). The Indiana courts have held that the Indiana antitrust statute was intended to be declarative of the common law prohibition against restraint of trade. See id. at 827. Indiana has no modern cases involving the common law tort of restraint of trade distinct from the elements of an action under Indiana’s antitrust statutes.2 Because the Indiana antitrust statutes are considered to be declarative of the common law, see id., there is no reason to believe that the elements of a common law action for restraint of trade differ from those of a statutory cause of action. Therefore, because the plaintiffs cannot establish a claim under Indiana’s antitrust statute, their common law restraint of trade claims also fail. D. Plaintiffs’ ERISA Discriminatory Discharge Claims Lastly, The plaintiffs allege that Bank One discharged them in order to prevent or otherwise discriminate against them from exercising their rights under the Plan in violation of ERISA § 510.3 They assert two distinct theories in support 2 The plaintiffs cite Fort Wayne Cleaners & Dryers Ass’n v. Price, 137 N.E.2d 738 (Ind. Ct. App. 1956) (en banc), for the proposition that a party may pursue both common law and statutory actions for restraint of trade. Although Fort Wayne Cleaners involved both common law and statutory claims, nothing in the decision suggests that the common law claims were for the tort of restraint of trade. A close reading of the case suggests that the common law claims in that case were for tortious interference with business relations, a separate tort that remains actionable in Indiana. See id. at 741-42 (“There can be no doubt in [Indiana] that it is an actionable wrong to interfere, either directly or indirectly, with the business of another without cause or justification . . . .”). 3 Section 510 provides, in pertinent part: (continued...) No. 06-3802 Page 7 of this claim. The plaintiffs first contend that the sale of the Division itself violated ERISA § 510 because the sale was motivated by a desire to prevent all of the Division’s employees from exercising their rights under the Plan. We have not addressed the issue of whether the sale of a division may constitute a violation of § 510. However, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has held that a party may establish a violation of § 510 under such circumstances, but “only by showing that some ERISA-related characteristic special to the unit . . . was essential to the firm’s selecting the unit for closure or sale.” Andes v. Ford Motor Co., 70 F.3d 1332, 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Bank One met its initial burden on summary judgment by pointing to the absence of evidence that denial of the plaintiffs’ benefits under the plan was essential to Bank One’s decision to sell the Division. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. In short, to survive summary judgment, the plaintiffs were required to come forward with evidence of specific facts to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether Bank One intended to discriminate against this particular division because of some characteristic of the benefit plan. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The plaintiffs have not provided such evidence. Therefore, Bank One was entitled to summary judgment in its favor on this theory. The plaintiffs also advance a theory of disparate treatment in support of their claim that Bank One discharged them in violation of ERISA § 510. They contend that Bank One either awarded benefits or allowed other employees of the Division who did not request benefits under the Plan to remain at Bank One. The plaintiffs attempt to establish their theory of disparate treatment under the indirect method of proof using the burden-shifting analysis of McDonnellDouglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), which we have applied to ERISA § 510 claims. See Salus v. GTE Directories Serv. Corp., 104 F.3d 131, 135 (7th Cir. 1997). To proceed under this approach, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination “by demonstrating that he (1) belongs to the protected class; (2) was qualified for his job position; and (3) was discharged or denied employment under circumstances that provide some basis for believing that the prohibited intent to retaliate was present.” Id. If the plaintiff makes this prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the employer to present a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for 3 (...continued) It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline, or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary for exercising any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of an employee benefit plan . . . or for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which such participant may become entitled under the plan . . . . 29 U.S.C. § 1140. No. 06-3802 Page 8 its action. Id. The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the proffered explanation is pretext. The plaintiffs have not made a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation. The record demonstrates that the plaintiffs were notified that they would be terminated before any request for benefits was made. Further, there is no indication in the record that Bank One was aware that the plaintiffs intended to request benefits under the Plan at the time it discharged them. Such circumstances do not provide a “basis for believing that the prohibited intent to retaliate was present.” Id. Assuming that the plaintiffs have met their initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, Bank One has come forward with a legitimate, non-pretextual explanation. Bank One explains that its decision to terminate the plaintiffs was the result of selling the Division. To meet their burden on summary judgment to demonstrate that Bank One’s proffered reason was pretext, the plaintiffs must come forward with “evidence of specific facts that call into question the veracity” of Bank One’s proffered reasons. Hague v. Thompson Distribution Co., 436 F.3d 816, 827 (7th Cir. 2006) (applying the McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting analysis in the context of racial discrimination). The plaintiffs attempt to meet this burden by pointing to three comparison employees. The first comparison employee, Chris Shrader, also was terminated by Bank One as a result of the sale to RBC, but allegedly received benefits under the Plan. The fact that Shrader also was terminated supports Bank One’s proffered reason that the plaintiffs were terminated because of the sale. The plaintiffs submit no evidence regarding second comparison employee, Leo Liberio. Rather, the plaintiffs simply assert their belief that Liberio either still works for Bank One or received benefits under the Plan. Such unsupported beliefs do not constitute evidence of specific facts for purposes of summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The third comparison employee, Jerry Bevers, formerly worked in the Division but now works for Chase Home Finance, a successor corporation to Bank One. The plaintiffs provide no specific facts with respect to how Bevers came to work there. In short, these comparisons provide no evidence of specific facts that would call into question the veracity of Bank One’s proffered non-discriminatory explanation. Therefore, Bank One is entitled to summary judgment in its favor on the plaintiffs’ disparate treatment theory of ERISA discrimination.