Opinion ID: 1135493
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: conditions imposed on points of diversion above the sculpin pool

Text: The Director conditioned the amount of water Hardy could divert from his points of diversion above the sculpin pool to the extent that such diversion can occur without increasing or decreasing the water levels, temperature, quality, and/or flow velocity within the natural sculpin pool located downstream. Hardy argues that it was error for the Director to place a condition on these points of diversion because they are a part of a previously approved water permit which constitutes a vested right or a contractual right to divert water which cannot be interfered with by a retroactive application of the local public interest standard. [2] As support for his argument, Hardy cites to I.C. § 42-204 which reads in part as follows: The department of water resources shall issue a permit for any approved application, make a record of the approval and provide a copy of the permit to the applicant, who shall be authorized, on receipt thereof, to proceed with the construction of the necessary works for the diversion of such water, and to take all steps required to apply the water to a beneficial use and perfect the proposed appropriation. The district court disagreed with Hardy, finding that any application to amend a permit offers the entire permit to the IDWR for review, and since the rights are inchoate at this time, the entire permit is subject to scrutiny under the public interest considerations added to the statutes after the original permits were issued. We agree with the rationale of the district court. In Big Wood Canal Co. v. Chapman, 45 Idaho 380, 263 P. 45 (1927), the Court held that there was no retroactive application of a statute which extended the time for making proof of application of water to a beneficial use because the affected permittee in that case had only an inchoate or contingent right which was vulnerable to being abridged or modified by law. In describing the type of right a water permittee has, the Court stated: By application for permit ... the permittee secures an inchoate right which will ripen into a legal and complete appropriation by compliance with the statutory steps. Such right is merely a contingent right, which may ripen into a complete appropriation, or may be defeated by a failure of the holder to meet the statutory requirements. The permit, therefore, is not an appropriation of the public waters of the state. It is not real property. It is merely a consent given by the state to construct and acquire real property. 45 Idaho at 402, 263 P. 45. Likewise, in Hidden Springs Trout Ranch, Inc. v. Allred, 102 Idaho 623, 636 P.2d 745 (1981), the Court held that an applicant for a water permit did not possess the type of vested rights which were immune to subsequent legislation. Although the Court specifically noted that it was not addressing the situation where a water permit is involved, the Court defined an applicant's rights as inchoate rights which may ripen into a vested interest following proper statutory adherence. 102 Idaho at 625, 636 P.2d 745. Because Hardy's water permits only give him an inchoate or contingent right to put the water to a beneficial use, it was not improper for the Director to impose conditions upon his whole permit based on the local public interest. However, this is not to say that a permittee requesting an amendment to a water permit must accept the conditions imposed by the Director at the risk of losing any previously approved points of diversion. If a permittee finds the conditions to be unsatisfactory, the permittee should be allowed to withdraw the application for amendment and be left with what the permittee had before submitting the application to the IDWR. Similarly, a permittee should be allowed to appeal any conditions imposed by a Director, to ensure that such conditions were not imposed unreasonably or arbitrarily, without fear of losing the State's consent to put the water to a beneficial use under the terms of the original permit. Given that the Director was entitled to place the condition on Hardy's points of diversion above the sculpin pool, Hardy next argues that the condition itself is not supported by the evidence contained in the record and therefore is clearly erroneous under I.C. § 67-5215(g)(5). The determination of what elements of the public interest are impacted, and what the public interest requires, is committed to the sound discretion of the Director. Shokal v. Dunn, 109 Idaho 330, 707 P.2d 441 (1985). It is apparent in this case that the Director considered the protection of the natural sculpin pool to be in the public's interest. Accordingly, the Director conditioned the amount of water Hardy could divert so as not to affect the water levels, temperature, quality and/or flow velocity of the sculpin pool. Although we find no abuse of discretion in the Director's attempt to protect the sculpin pool, we fail to find any evidence in the record which requires a condition which in effect prohibits Hardy from diverting any water above the sculpin pool. In granting Hardy's right-of-way, the BLM required that Hardy take no actions which will increase or decrease water levels, temperature, quality, and/or flow velocity within the natural sculpin pool upstream of the authorized impoundment pool. However, the BLM condition, by its terms, did not apply to Hardy's points of diversion above the sculpin pool. The Director's condition appears to be an attempt to extend greater protection to the sculpin pool than that provided by the BLM right-of-way. The IDWR argues that because the Director's condition is based on the BLM condition, and because Mr. Cordell testified that BLM anticipated that there would be no diversion by Hardy above the sculpin pool, the factors taken into consideration for the BLM right-of-way, as set forth in the Right-of-Way/Temporary Use Permit and the environmental assessment, provide sufficient support for the Director's condition. We disagree. We find nothing in the Right-of-Way/Temporary Use Permit or the environmental assessment which addresses the effect that any diversion above the sculpin pool might have on the sculpin. Nor was there evidence submitted by Hardy, the IDWR or the protestants regarding the consequences of any diversion. As noted by the district court, there was no evidence submitted, outside a general conclusion that the sculpin are sensitive to water changes, as to what might be required to protect the sculpin pool. There was no quantifiable measure of variance stated within the condition, and without a variance, any diversion of water above the sculpin pool would affect the elements listed in the condition, making the condition difficult if not impossible to measure and satisfy. Mr. Cordell testified that the purpose of the BLM conditions was to keep Hardy's right-of-way in compliance with the BLM's stated management goals regarding its ACEC classification of the Box Canyon Area. Although the Director may well conclude that those elements of the public interest affected by Hardy's actions and the BLM's goals are consistent, any conditions imposed by the Director must be supported by the evidence. The Director cannot rely on the conditions imposed by the BLM. While it is true that Hardy will have to comply with the BLM condition in order to maintain his right-of-way, the Director as the agent of the State of Idaho, has no interest in the agreement made between BLM and Hardy. As noted earlier, if the record is insufficient to support the agency's decision, we can reverse the decision or remand the case for further proceedings. Dovel v. Dobson, supra ; Idaho County Nursing Home v. Department of Health and Welfare, 120 Idaho 933, 821 P.2d 988 (1991); Love v. Board of County Commr's, 105 Idaho 558, 671 P.2d 471 (1983). In this case, we feel the better approach is to remand the matter to the Director for further proceedings to determine what effect and to what degree Hardy's diversion above the sculpin pool might have on the sculpin, and in light of such findings, to determine what conditions are necessary to protect the sculpin pool and the public's interest.