Opinion ID: 1747431
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Other Crimes Evidence During the Penalty Phase

Text: On August 14, 1990, the State served upon the defense notice of evidence of other offenses that it intended to present during the penalty phase. These other offenses included evidence of the four murders of which Brooks had been found guilty in his first trial, i.e., adjudicated offenses. [14] In addition, the State offered the testimony of Ernest Owens and Jimmy Milsap, both of whom were among the victims of Brooks' crime spree who survived. The State's notice concluded by declaring that it also intended to introduce evidence of [c]rimes more particularly described by John Brooks in the oral statements made to Det. John Reynolds on December 30 and 31, 1986, as evidenced in the attached description of such statements. [15] The trial judge held no formal hearing on the admissibility of the unadjudicated offenses contained in the confession, including those yet to be verified by the New Orleans Police Department, but after a brief in camera conference held just prior to the opening of the penalty phase ruled that the confession was admissible in toto. [16] In its oral reasons for admitting the confession in the penalty phase, the trial court found that the confession met the threepronged standard formulated by this Court pursuant to its pretrial review of this case. Brooks (I), 541 So.2d at 841. The trial court found specifically that the uncorroborated confession of Brooks was clear and convincing evidence of the commission of the unrelated crimes mentioned therein, that this evidence was otherwise competent and reliable, and that these crimes had relevance and substantial probative value as to the defendant's character and propensities. See LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 905.2. Pursuant to the trial court's ruling, the jury during the penalty phase listened while Detective Reynolds read to them Brooks' confession, a confession containing descriptions of the four murders for which Brooks stood already convicted, the two murders for which he was being prosecuted, the two murders for which he remains under indictment, and some nineteen (19) separate incidents involving twenty-seven (27) other unadjudicated offenses. However, the State failed to present any evidence corroborating even just the existence of twenty-three (23) of the unadjudicated offenses referred to in the confession. [17] In presenting these unsubstantiated claims to the jury the State called no victims or eyewitnesses to testify, offered no indictments or bills of information to verify that these offenses were being prosecuted, and failed even to present any evidence that the New Orleans Police Department had managed to match the alleged incidents to any unsolved cases or item numbers, i.e., reported incidents. [18] These are the facts to which we must now apply the standards this Court has declared should control the admission of such evidence. Under the circumstances of this case, the trial court simply erred in finding that the aforementioned portions of Brooks' confession introduced during the penalty phase were reliable enough to meet the Brooks (I) standard. Brooks (I) requires that the evidence of unadjudicated unrelated offenses introduced in the penalty phase of a capital trial be proven by clear and convincing evidence and be otherwise competent and reliable. Although uncontroverted defense admissions alone might under other circumstances be sufficient to establish the facts by clear and convincing evidence, Brooks' admissions must be considered along with the inability of the police to verify even the occurrence of many of the purported offenses contained in the confession. This circumstance raises the possibility that many of the crimes Brooks claimed he committed may never have occurred. While we note that we find in this opinion that Brooks was competent to stand trial and capable of understanding and waiving his Miranda rights, these determinations do not lessen the prospect that Brooks voluntarily inflated the scope of his crime spree at the time of his confession. Detective Reynolds testified that Brooks made it clear that he was confessing to tell his side of the story; under such circumstances, given that Brooks knew retribution was nigh, the possibility of at least some exaggeration on his part is a valid concern. Certainly Brooks' mental retardation and erratic and unpredictable behavior should have raised a warning flag, and the failure of the police to verify a number of the alleged crimes should serve to heighten this concern. While we are unprepared to say that extrinsic corroboration of unadjudicated other crimes contained in a defendant's confession is a necessary predicate to the admission of that confession in the penalty phase of a capital trial, we do note that such corroboration is a traditional and time-honored method of demonstrating the trustworthiness of such statements. [19] Such guarantees of trustworthiness are particularly necessary in capital cases where the risk of fabrication or inaccuracy must be viewed with an eye towards the question to be determined by the trier of fact. In this case, such corroboration, if available and produced, would likely have cured the defects that we conclude cause the confession's admissions of unadjudicated crimes to fail the first two prongs of the Brooks (I) test. In this case, the State did not even attempt to demonstrate that Brooks' confession contained any guarantees of trustworthiness as to the alleged crimes whose existence the police were unable to verify. Such a showing, under the facts of this case, simply falls below the standard enunciated by this Court in Brooks (I). For the reasons set out above, we find that the trial court erred in admitting at the penalty phase that part of Brooks' confession which contained references to multiple unadjudicated offenses not shown by clear and convincing evidence and not supported by competent and reliable evidence offenses which in fact may not have occurred. Furthermore, given the sheer volume of such inadmissible other crimes evidence which was presented to the jury during the penalty phase, [20] we find that this error incurably tainted the sentencing process and that the error therefore cannot be considered harmless. Thus, we reverse the jury's recommendation of death and order that a new sentencing hearing be held in accordance with the views expressed herein, and in particular in strict conformity with the Brooks (I) standards.