Opinion ID: 518184
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Pre-termination Hearing Requirement

Text: 25 Plaintiff asserts that he was entitled to a pre-termination hearing under the due process clause because he had a property interest in continued employment by the University. In response, defendants contend that plaintiff had no property interest in continued employment and that even if he did, he waived his right to a pre-termination hearing. The district court decided to hold a bifurcated trial on those two issues in reverse order. The first portion of the trial was dedicated to the question of whether plaintiff waived any right that he might have had to a pre-termination hearing. If plaintiff were successful at the first portion of the trial, then the second portion was to concern whether plaintiff had a property interest entitling him to a pre-termination hearing. 26 At the conclusion of the first portion of the trial, the district court held that plaintiff, by refusing to initiate the grievance procedures outlined in the University's policy manuals, waived any right to a pre-termination hearing. Consequently, the district court directed the jury to enter a verdict in favor of defendants. 5 27 We do not agree with the district court that plaintiff waived his right to a pre-termination hearing by refusing to initiate the University's grievance procedures because, in our opinion, the grievance rules effectively were post-termination procedures. However, we are persuaded that the judgment for defendants on plaintiff's due process claim should be sustained on the alternative ground that the undisputed evidence in the record establishes that plaintiff in fact was accorded all of the pre-termination hearing opportunities required by the Constitution. An appellate court may affirm the judgment of a district court on any grounds that find support in the record, provided the litigants have had a fair opportunity to develop the record. See, e.g., Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132, 137 n. 5, 102 S.Ct. 2355, 2359 n. 5, 72 L.Ed.2d 728 (1982) (It is well accepted ... that without filing a cross-appeal or cross petition, an appellee may rely upon any matter appearing in the record in support of the judgment below); Colorado Flying Academy, Inc. v. United States, 724 F.2d 871, 880 (10th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1182, 106 S.Ct. 2915, 91 L.Ed.2d 544 (1986). 28 It is settled that the  'root requirement' of the Due Process Clause [is] 'that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property interest.'  Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1493, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985) (emphasis in original), quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379, 91 S.Ct. 780, 786, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971). The Supreme Court in Loudermill held that [t]his principle requires 'some kind of a hearing' prior to the discharge of an employee who has a constitutionally protected property interest in his employment. 470 U.S. at 542, 105 S.Ct. at 1493. A pre-termination hearing is necessary in order to balance the competing interests at stake: the private interest in retaining employment, the governmental interest in the expeditious removal of unsatisfactory employees and the avoidance of administrative burdens, and the risk of an erroneous termination. Id. at 542-43, 105 S.Ct. at 1493-94. 29 The Supreme Court in Loudermill held that a security guard employed by a school district should have been given some opportunity to explain an apparent misstatement found in his job application before being fired. The Court stated that the pretermination 'hearing,' though necessary, need not be elaborate. Id. at 545, 105 S.Ct. at 1495. Indeed, [t]he formality and procedural requisites for the hearing can vary, depending upon the importance of the interests involved and the nature of the subsequent proceedings. Id. 30 The purpose of the pre-termination hearing is to be an initial check against mistaken decisions--essentially, a determination of whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the charges against the employee are true and support the proposed action. Id. at 545-46, 105 S.Ct. at 1495-96. In an employment context, the essential requirements of due process ... are notice and an opportunity to respond.... To require more than this prior to termination would intrude to an unwarranted extent on the government's interest in quickly removing an unsatisfactory employee. Id. at 546, 105 S.Ct. at 1495. 31 Here, the district court essentially held that the University's elaborate grievance procedures were pre-termination procedures which plaintiff knowingly waived. The district court apparently focused on the fact that under the University's procedures, a termination is not final until ten working days after the University gives the employee what the University calls a notice of termination. The University's rules provide that the employee can begin the grievance procedures at any time during the ten-day period. The rules further provide that if the employee initiates the procedures, then the termination is suspended temporarily and no termination papers will be processed ... until the grievance has been resolved. (Staff Handbook at 14 (R. 82 Exh. 9); March 2, 1987 Tr. at 44, 56.) 32 Although a termination technically is not final for ten days, in our view the University's policies demonstrate that as a practical matter, termination occurs as soon as the employee is given notice of termination. During the ten-day period and during the pendency of the grievance procedure (assuming that the employee invokes the procedures), the employee is not allowed to work. (March 2, 1987 Tr. at 53.) More to the point, the employee receives no pay during that time. (Staff Handbook at 14 (R. 82 Exh. 9).) In addition, if the employee's grievance is not successful and the termination ultimately is upheld, then the effective date of the termination relates back to the date of the initial notice. (March 2, 1987 Tr. at 49.) 33 Indeed, the University's conduct in this case indicates that plaintiff's termination effectively occurred on the date of his final meeting with his supervisors and not ten days later. Although the University's witnesses testified that plaintiff's foreman gave plaintiff a notice of termination at their final meeting, the foreman's statement to the plaintiff at the time was more direct: [A]s of now, you are terminated. (Id. at 38.) 6 34 Therefore, we conclude that the University's grievance mechanism, at least in the context of the facts of this case, was effectively a post-termination procedure. Thus, contrary to the district court's reasoning, the fact that plaintiff knowingly waived his grievance rights is not relevant to the issue of whether plaintiff received proper pre-termination procedures. 35 Notwithstanding that conclusion, we find more than sufficient evidence in the record to establish that the pre-termination procedures which the University accorded plaintiff fully satisfied plaintiff's constitutional right to notice and an opportunity to be heard before discharge. The Constitution does not require an elaborate or formal pre-termination hearing. All that is required is an initial check against mistaken decisions. The employee needs only notice and an opportunity to respond to the basis of the firing. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545-46, 105 S.Ct. at 1495-96. 36 Here, there was an extensive history of warnings, including probation, whereby the University notified plaintiff that his conduct constituted insubordination and jeopardized his continued employment. The University gave plaintiff numerous opportunities, including face-to-face meetings, to justify and explain his position, but he continued to persist in his disruptive attitude and conduct. There is no dispute that plaintiff's supervisors ultimately fired plaintiff because, in their opinion, he was guilty of insubordination. (Paris Dep. at 42.) Plaintiff disagrees that he was, in fact, guilty of insubordination, given the alleged legitimacy of his safety concerns. But plaintiff does not dispute that he was warned that further conduct of the type which his supervisors deemed to be insubordination could lead to his discharge. 37 We conclude that plaintiff's supervisors gave plaintiff sufficient warnings and ample opportunities to present his side of the story. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542, 105 S.Ct. at 1493. 38 First, plaintiff's foreman repeatedly told plaintiff that he was disrupting the department and that he could not keep rehashing his same complaints after his superiors had made final decisions. (E.g., Paris Dep. at 45-46.) During those discussions, plaintiff was given the opportunity to explain his position. 39 Second, in late 1981, another of plaintiff's supervisors met with plaintiff's wife, who also worked for the University. The supervisor told her about plaintiff's unacceptable behavior and sought her help in convincing plaintiff to cooperate with his supervisors. The supervisor told her that if Mr. Seibert could not accept the opinion of two registered professional engineers he should not be working at the Health Sciences Center, especially if he had no facts to show the engineers were wrong. (Starin Interrogatories at 4, R. 82 Exh. 8; March 2, 1987 Tr. (first session) at 21-22.) On the next day, plaintiff's wife told the supervisor that she had talked with plaintiff and that he told her that he would see if he could work things out with his foreman. Plaintiff's wife also told the supervisor that, according to plaintiff, if the situation was not resolved, plaintiff would not quit, but would have to be fired. (Starin Interrogatories at 5.) 40 Third, on December 2, 1981, less than three months before the termination, plaintiff's foreman held a formal meeting with plaintiff to discuss the problems created by his persistent complaints. The foreman gave plaintiff an oral reprimand, telling him that he was on probation for six months and that unless his disruptive actions ceased, he would be subject to termination. (March 2, 1987 Tr. at 21-22, 25-26.) Plaintiff again was given the opportunity to explain his position at that time. 41 Fourth, on the same day that he gave plaintiff the oral reprimand, plaintiff's foreman gave plaintiff a written reprimand conveying the same message. The written reprimand was entitled Disciplinary Action and stated that [c]ontinuation of past attitudes, lack of communication or arguments when the job is assigned, will result in immediate termination. (Dec. 2, 1981 letter, R. 82 Exh. 10; March 2, 1987 Tr. at 57-58.) The written reprimand further stated that if plaintiff's conduct improved over the six-month probation period, then the reprimand would be removed from [plaintiff's] personnel file and destroyed. Plaintiff signed a copy of the reprimand, indicating that he had read the above. 7 42 Fifth, on the day that the foreman discovered plaintiff's absence from work (when plaintiff was away conducting an inspection tour of his various concerns with a supervisor from another department), the foreman held another meeting with plaintiff. (March 2, 1987 Tr. at 22-23.) Plaintiff was given the opportunity to explain where he had been and why. 43 Sixth, on the next day, the foreman and another supervisor held what was to become the final meeting with plaintiff. Although the foreman testified that he did not invite plaintiff to explain his position again, the foreman purportedly had an open mind and would have discussed it with him, but he didn't so choose. (Id. at 33.) After plaintiff rejected the foreman's suggestion that he resign, the foreman told him that he was terminated. The other supervisor present at the meeting then handed plaintiff a copy of the University's grievance procedures. 44 We believe that the totality of the procedures and opportunities which the University afforded plaintiff were sufficient to satisfy constitutional requirements. Plaintiff was not fired out of the blue. Plaintiff was not fired for reasons that he did not know. Plaintiff was not fired without being given the opportunity to present his side of the story. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542, 105 S.Ct. at 1493. The University's procedures equaled or exceeded those sanctioned by the Supreme Court in Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 65, 99 S.Ct. 2642, 2649, 61 L.Ed.2d 365 (1979). The Court in Barry held that no due process violation had occurred where a horse trainer whose license was suspended for allegedly drugging a horse was given more than one opportunity to present his side of the story before the suspension. Id. at 65, 99 S.Ct. at 2649. 45 Therefore, assuming for the sake of argument that plaintiff had a property interest in continued employment at the University, plaintiff had available all of the pre-termination due process protections that the Constitution requires.