Opinion ID: 2626902
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Intent of the Legal Parent

Text: ¶ 71 A party claiming de facto parent status must first show that the legal parent intended the third party and the child to form a permanent parent-child relationship. For this step to be satisfied, the court must find that the legal parent's own actions led to the creation of [a] parental bond between the third party and the child, J.C. v. C.T., 184 Misc.2d 935, 711 N.Y.S.2d 295, 299 (Fam.Ct.2000), and that at the time the bond formed, the legal parent intended it to be permanent, as opposed to temporary, however long. [8] In other words, the legal parent must have consented to and fostered the petitioner's formation and establishment of a parental relationship with the child. [9] See V.C., 163 N.J. 200, 748 A.2d 539, 552 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 926, 121 S.Ct. 302, 148 L.Ed.2d 243 (2000). A third party can prove this by showing that the legal parent ceded over to the third party a measure of parental authority and autonomy and granted to that third party rights and duties vis-a-vis the child that the third party's status would not otherwise warrant. Id. ¶ 72 The focus of this part of the test is on the legal parent's intent at the formation and during the pendency of the parent-child relationship, not at the termination of the relationship between the legal parent and a third party. Id.; see also T.B. v. L.R.M., 567 Pa. 222, 786 A.2d 913, 919 (2001) (noting that what is relevant to an in loco parentis determination is the method by which a third party gained authority to assume parental status, and holding that where the biological parent encouraged the partner to assume the status of parent and acquiesced as the partner carried out day-to-day care of the child, she could not erase the relationship created with the child after the parties separated). Once the legal parent intentionally creates a de facto parent for his or her child, the legal parent cannot later change his or her mind and unilaterally sever or alter the nature of that relationship. However, this does not mandate that a legal parent form this intent at the conception or birth of the child. The de facto parent's participation in the actual decision to have a child and the process of conception, while highly probative of intent where present, is not required. See V.C., 748 A.2d at 552-53 (recognizing that the situation in which the partner does not participate in the decision to conceive parallel[s] the situation in which a woman, already pregnant or a mother, becomes involved with or marries a man who is not the biological or adoptive father of the child, but thereafter fully functions in every respect as a father). A parent can intend to create a de facto parent-child relationship with a third party anytime during the child's life. ¶ 73 The intent requirement is critical because it ensures that the legal parent has the absolute ability to maintain a zone of autonomous privacy for herself and her child. Id. at 552. If the legal parent wishes to maintain that zone of privacy, he or she need only choose not to delegate parental authority or encourage the formation of a permanent, parent-like relationship between his or her child and another party, and avoid any overt acts in furtherance of such a relationship. Moreover, the intent requirement limits the people who can qualify as de facto parents. For example, under this standard, a nanny or other caretaker will not qualify as a de facto parent because a parent does not intend these relationships to be parental or permanent. Additionally, this part of the test prevents roommates, live-in boyfriends or girlfriends, or significant others from automatically qualifying as de facto parents. While a party that lives with a legal parent and his or her children will likely participate in parental responsibilities to some degree, that participation, by itself, is not enough. A claimant in this position would have to show by clear and convincing evidence that the legal parent intended to create a parent-child relationship and intentionally ceded over a sufficiently significant amount of parental responsibility to create a permanent parental relationship between the claimant and the child. I believe the intent requirement gives due consideration to a parent's right to maintain an autonomous zone of privacy. However, if the legal parent wishes to keep intact this zone of privacy, he or she cannot give a third party parental authority the exercise of which may create a profound bond with the child. Id. ¶ 74 A party claiming de facto parent status must do more than merely allege intent; the party must also point to specific behavior of the legal parent that clearly manifests that intent. This is a case-specific requirement that can be satisfied by a variety of behavioral evidence. There is not, therefore, any specific factor that is required or that will, on its own, be conclusive. Rather, a court must carefully examine all of the evidence to determine whether proof of the requisite intent is clear and convincing. ¶ 75 In the case before us, Barlow's behavior amply demonstrates that, even before the child's birth, Barlow intended Jones to be an equal, permanent parent. Shortly after becoming engaged, Barlow and Jones mutually decided to have children together and formulated a plan whereby Barlow would bear the first child and Jones would bear the second. Pursuant to this plan, Barlow allowed Jones to participate in the selection of a sperm donor, and together the parties selected a donor that shared both of their traits. Jones attended all prenatal matters relating to the artificial insemination and, following conception, participated in prenatal care with Barlow and the physician. During the pregnancy, Jones and Barlow entered into a civil union which, at least in Vermont, conferred rights on each of them respecting children born during the union. Barlow allowed Jones to be present at the delivery and participate to the extent possible. After the child was born, Barlow and Jones chose a name that would reflect both of their surnames and listed that name on the birth certificate. ¶ 76 Barlow continued to openly exhibit her intent that Jones function in a parental role after the child's birth. Barlow, Jones, and the child lived together and held themselves out as the Jones-Barlow family. Barlow and Jones both held themselves out as the child's parents. The child and Barlow both called Jones Mommy, while Barlow was called Momma. Jones provided financial support for the child, attended pediatric appointments with her, and participated in her daily care through such activities as dressing her, feeding her, and taking her to child care. Jones would not have been able to participate in these activities, at least to the extent she did, without Barlow's consent. ¶ 77 Perhaps the most convincing fact is that Barlow designated Jones as the child's legal co-guardian. In fact, the Verified Petition for Appointment of Co-Guardians for a Minor stated that [Jones] is the only other parent that [the child] knows or will know and the Supporting Memorandum stated that [s]ince [the child's] birth, [Jones] has served as her other parent in all regards. Jones and Barlow took further steps to ensure that Jones could protect the child as she would if she were a legal parent, including preparing estate planning documents and naming each other as beneficiaries on life insurance policies to ensure that the child would be cared for in an emergency. ¶ 78 I do not mean to suggest that designating another party as a co-guardian, standing alone, is determinative. To the contrary, I do not believe that a co-guardianship, on its own, would be enough to satisfy this part of the test given that co-guardianships are established for a number of reasons, many of which do not involve the intent to create a permanent parent-child relationship. However, combined with Jones' participation in bringing the child into the world and her daily support thereafter, I find the language and content of the co-guardianship petition in this case particularly persuasive. ¶ 79 Other jurisdictions have relied on actions similar to Barlow's in determining whether a third party is a de facto parent. For example, in V.C., the mother and her partner jointly decided to have children, chose a sperm donor, and participated in prenatal care together. 748 A.2d at 542-43. The children called the partner Meema, and the biological mother referred to her partner as the mother of her children. Id. at 543. The parties and the children lived together as a family, and the partner assumed many day-to-day obligations of parenthood and provided financial support. Id. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the record supported the conclusion that the mother had fostered and cultivated, in every way, the development of a parent-child bond between [her partner] and [her children]. Id. at 555. ¶ 80 Likewise, in E.N.O. v. L.M.M ., the court held that the mother's partner was a de facto parent. 429 Mass. 824, 711 N.E.2d 886, 892-93 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1005, 120 S.Ct. 500, 145 L.Ed.2d 386 (1999). There, the parties jointly decided to have a child, the partner cared for the mother during pregnancy, the child was given both parties' surnames, the parties sent out birth announcements listing them both as parents, and the partner assumed most of the financial responsibility for the family and assisted in caring for the child. Id. at 888-89; see also Carvin v. Britain (In re Parentage of L.B.), 155 Wash.2d 679, 122 P.3d 161, 163-65 (2005), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ____, 126 S.Ct. 2021, 164 L.Ed.2d 806 (2006) (looking to factors such as the parties' mutual decision to have a child and selection of a sperm donor, the partner's participation in prenatal care and delivery, the parties' choice to give the child a name that reflected both surnames, the parties' decision to live together as a family unit and hold themselves out as a family, the fact that the child called her mother mommy and the partner momma, and the parties' decision to share parenting responsibilities); T.B., 786 A.2d at 914-15 (holding that the partner was a de facto parent where the parties jointly decided to have a child and thereafter lived together, the mother named her partner as a guardian over the child in her will, they engaged in financial planning to provide for the child, and the partner participated in day-to-day child rearing responsibilities, such as taking the child to child care); H.S.H-K., 533 N.W.2d at 421-22 (holding that the partner was a de facto parent where the parties jointly decided to have a child, the partner was present during prenatal appointments and delivery, the parties gave the child a name that reflected both surnames, the partner provided primary financial support, and both women shared child care responsibilities). ¶ 81 Like the above courts, I find a significant amount of evidence manifesting Barlow's intent to give parental rights to Jones. Barlow's actions clearly and convincingly establish that, up until she and Jones separated, she intended Jones to be her child's other parent. I therefore would hold that in this case the intent requirement has been satisfied.