Opinion ID: 1937444
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: parental termination

Text: On appeal, B.L.R. argued that hearsay testimony about her past experience with children had been erroneously admitted and that the evidence did not clearly and convincingly support termination of her parental rights. During direct examination, Nancy Schaefer, a social worker, was asked about her conversation with A.B., a former foster parent of B.L.R. Over objections of B.L. R.'s counsel, Schaefer testified that A.B. said that B.L.R. had a long history of mental illness, that B.L.R. had abandoned an earlier child, and that B.L.R. was incapable of caring for a child. Later, Schaefer testified, again over objection, about statements made by hospital personnel about B.L.R.'s inability to cope with the infant. The juvenile court overruled both objections and received the testimony as bearing on why Social Services acted, not on B.L.R.'s ability as a parent. Since the hearing dealt only with B.L. R.'s ability as a parent, B.L.R. argued that hearsay about her ability should not have been admitted for any purpose. The Rules cannot be circumvented by categorizing hearsay evidence that directly reflects upon the issue at question as evidence for another purpose, B.L.R. argued. Social Services argued that the testimony was not offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted, the definition of hearsay in NDREv 801(c), but it was offered to show why Social Services acted so swiftly after the birth. Therefore, Social Services argued, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the testimony. Moreover, even if the testimony was erroneously admitted, Social Services argued that it was harmless because other evidence overwhelmingly proved the need for terminating B.L.R.'s parental rights. In a nonjury trial, a judge should ordinarily receive all evidence which is not clearly inadmissible. Healy v. Healy, 397 N.W.2d 71, 74 (N.D.1986). A trial judge, who is qualified to rule on admission of evidence, is also qualified to differentiate between sound evidence and unsound evidence in deciding the case. Brodersen v. Brodersen, 374 N.W.2d 76, 78 (N.D.1985). Therefore, in a trial without a jury, it is generally not reversible error to admit incompetent evidence unless there is insufficient competent evidence to support an essential finding or unless the incompetent evidence induced an improper finding. Schock v. Ronderos, 394 N.W.2d 697, 699 (N.D.1986). Receipt of incompetent evidence in a nonjury trial is not error unless it adversely affects the decision. This juvenile court understood the limited function of this hearsay evidence, ruling that I am only going to receive this information, not for the truth but for what [the social worker] ultimately didthe basis upon which she acted. The Explanatory Note to NDREv 801 says that it is only when a statement is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted that there is a lack of the safeguards used to insure credibility of the declarant. This hearsay evidence was not offered for its truth and was not reflected in the juvenile court's findings. We conclude that there was no abuse of discretion in receiving hearsay evidence for a restricted purpose other than the truth of the matter asserted. To terminate a parent's rights to a child, there must be clear and convincing evidence that: (1) the child is deprived; (2) the conditions and causes of deprivation are likely to continue or will not be remedied; and (3) by reason thereof, the child is suffering or will probably suffer serious harm. NDCC 27-20-44(1)(b). We examine the evidence in a manner similar to a trial de novo. In Interest of J.A.L., 432 N.W.2d 876, 878 (N.D.1988). We recognize the juvenile court's opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, and we give appreciable weight to the juvenile court's findings, but we are not bound by those findings. In Interest of A.M.A., 439 N.W.2d 535, 537 (N.D.1989). Termination of a parent's rights must rest upon the attitude, conduct, ability, and such other matters relating to the parent's duties, responsibilities, and care for the child which... are ... collectively referred to as `fitness.'  McGurren v. S.T., 241 N.W.2d 690, 697 (N.D.1976). A child should be taken from a parent at birth only when it is clear that the infant will probably suffer serious harm if left in the parent's care. Psychiatric testimony showed that B.L.R. was chronically mentally ill, suffering from paranoid schizophrenia, with a history of alcohol and drug abuse. This testimony also reported that medication was essential to control her mental illness but that B.L.R. had repeatedly failed to take prescribed medicines and repeatedly failed to follow medical recommendations. The psychiatrist testified that when she discontinued her prescribed medication she became very erratic, disorganized, confused and even basic things that she has to do she can not....  In her testimony, B.L.R. acknowledged that she had been institutionalized for her mental illness in 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, and on two different occasions in 1987. She confirmed that her diagnosis was chronic paranoid schizophrenia and that she refused medication necessary to control her condition. She admitted that she had lost legal custody of three other children. The inadequacy of B.L.R.'s behavior towards her infant was shown by her aberrant responses to social workers, by her erratic attitude during the few visitations she made, and by her departure shortly after the birth to get her affairs straightened out in her native Maryland where she was incarcerated for offenses that occurred prior to the birth. The psychiatrist testified that B.L.R.'s illness affected her ability to care for a child to the point that she had no understanding of the needs of an infant. The psychiatrist described B.L. R.'s prognosis as poor. The juvenile court was absolutely satisfied that she is unable to properly care for a child and is satisfied, in addition, that she is, on many occasions, unable to cope with her own needs. So are we. We conclude that there was clear and convincing evidence that M.M.S. was deprived, that the causes of the deprivation were likely to continue, and that M.M.S. would probably suffer serious harm in B.L. R.'s care. Therefore, we affirm the juvenile court's decision to terminate B.L.R.'s parental rights to M.M.S. ERICKSTAD, C.J., and GIERKE, J., concur. VANDE WALLE and LEVINE, JJ., concur in the result.