Opinion ID: 1584461
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Merits of the Plaintiff's Claim.

Text: We noted in Carr that New York Times Co. v. Sullivan significantly restricted the power of courts to grant damage awards in defamation cases brought by public officials. Carr, 546 N.W.2d at 903-04. As the Supreme Court said in New York Times: The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with actual malice  that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. 376 U.S. at 279-80, 84 S.Ct. at 726, 11 L.Ed.2d at 706. Malice must be shown with convincing clarity or clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 285-86, 84 S.Ct. at 728-29, 11 L.Ed.2d at 710. (While New York Times involved a public official, its holding has been extended to cover public-figure plaintiffs as well. Curtis Publ'g Co., 388 U.S. at 155, 87 S.Ct. at 1992, 18 L.Ed.2d at 1111). Under New York Times a plaintiff's proof that the statement in question is false is insufficient to establish defamation. In addition to showing falsity, a plaintiff must show actual malice, i.e., the statement was made with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard as to whether it was true or false. Carr, 546 N.W.2d at 904. Reckless disregard means a high degree of awareness of their probable falsity. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74, 85 S.Ct. 209, 216, 13 L.Ed.2d 125, 134 (1964). The New York Times analysis requires a plaintiff resisting a motion for summary judgment to do more than show a genuine issue of material fact; he must produce evidence from which a fact finder could reasonably find malice by clear and convincing evidence. As the Court stated in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., where the New York Times clear and convincing evidence requirement applies, the trial judge's summary judgment inquiry as to whether a genuine issue exists will be whether the evidence presented is such that a jury applying that evidentiary standard could reasonably find for either the plaintiff or the defendant. Thus, where the factual dispute concerns actual malice, clearly a material issue in a New York Times case, the appropriate summary judgment question will be whether the evidence in the record could support a reasonable jury finding either that the plaintiff has shown actual malice by clear and convincing evidence or that the plaintiff has not. 477 U.S. 242, 255-56, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2514, 91 L.Ed.2d 202, 216 (1986). It is for the court to determine whether the defendants' words were capable of a defamatory meaning and for the jury to determine whether they actually had that effect on the reader. According to the Restatement, (1) The court determines (a) whether a communication is capable of bearing a particular meaning, and (b) whether that meaning is defamatory. (2) The jury determines whether a communication, capable of a defamatory meaning, was so understood by its recipient. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 614, at 311 (1965). The burden of showing that a communication is defamatory in character is substantial. The Supreme Court has stated: A reckless disregard for the truth [under the New York Times ] requires more than a departure from reasonably prudent conduct. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication. The standard is a subjective one  there must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant actually had a high degree of awareness of . . . probable falsity. As a result, failure to investigate before publishing, even when a reasonably prudent person would have done so, is not sufficient to establish reckless disregard. Harte-Hanks Commc'ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 688, 109 S.Ct. 2678, 2696, 105 L.Ed.2d 562, 589 (1989) (citations omitted). Actual malice under the New York Times' analysis is not satisfied merely through a showing of ill will or `malice' in the ordinary sense of the term. Id. at 666, 109 S.Ct. at 2685, 105 L.Ed.2d at 576.