Opinion ID: 1771012
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: The respondents challenge the propriety of the referee's entry of a summary judgment in this unlicensed practice of law (UPL) case. We agree with the referee and approve the referee's findings. In Florida Bar v. Daniel, 626 So.2d 178, 182 (Fla.1993), a bar disciplinary proceeding, this Court held: Under Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-7.6(e)(1), once a formal complaint has been filed and forwarded to a referee for hearing, the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure apply except where otherwise provided in the rule. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510(c) provides for summary judgment where ... it is shown there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Thus, a referee has the authority in an UPL case to enter a summary judgment under the above-stated circumstances. In the instant case, the Bar and respondents agree that respondents prepared legal documents which were not forms approved by this Court. Both agree that Miravalle engaged in oral communications, took information from other documents, and conducted legal research for the purpose of preparing these documents. Finally, respondents do not contest that they used the word legal in their business name and advertisements; nor do they contest the authenticity of the advertisements offered into evidence by the Bar. Therefore, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the issue facing this Court is whether these acts constitute the unlicensed practice of law. The referee concluded that respondents' preparation of legal documents for their customers constitutes the unlicensed practice of law. We agree. This Court has repeatedly held that the preparation of legal documents by a nonlawyer for another person to a greater extent than typing or writing information provided by the customer on a form constitutes the unlicensed practice of law. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Davide, 702 So.2d 184 (Fla.1997); Florida Bar v. Smania, 701 So.2d 835 (Fla.1997); Florida Bar v. American Senior Citizens Alliance, Inc., 689 So.2d 255 (Fla.1997); Florida Bar v. Schramek, 616 So.2d 979 (Fla.1993). This Court has also specifically held that a nonlawyer who orally takes information from an individual to complete a form when the form has not been approved by this Court is engaged in the unlicensed practice of law. See Florida Bar v. Catarcio, 709 So.2d 96 (Fla.1998). [1] Thus, we find as a matter of law that respondents engaged in the unlicensed practice of law by engaging in oral communication, taking information from written documents, and conducting legal research for the purpose of preparing legal documents not approved by this Court. We also agree with the referee that respondents' use of their business name and the manner in which they advertise their services constitute the unlicensed practice of law. In Florida Bar v. Davide , this Court held that it constituted the unlicensed practice of law for a nonlawyer to use Florida Law Center, Inc. as a company name because the use of the name is misleading and gives the public the expectation that Florida Law Center, Inc., has expertise in the field of law. 702 So.2d at 184-85. We further held in Davide that it constitutes the unlicensed practice of law for a nonlawyer to advertise that his or her company specializes in legal areas and to use advertisements that describe legal procedures. See id. at 185. In the instant case, respondents use the business name Express Legal Services, Inc. In their advertisements, they ask the question, Are you ignoring your legal needs because you can't afford an attorney? Under this question is a list of legal fields, such as bankruptcy, adoption, eviction and divorce, in which respondents offer assistance. Thus, we conclude that respondents' use of the name Express Legal Services, Inc. and the manner in which they advertise their services constitute the unlicensed practice of law under Davide. We also conclude that respondents' challenges concerning the constitutionality of prohibiting nonattorneys from offering legal services are without merit. In the past, we have said that regulating the practice of law among nonlawyers does not violate nonlawyers' constitutional rights. In Schramek, 616 So.2d at 983, this Court found no merit to the nonlawyer's allegation that the regulation of nonlawyers unconstitutionally deprived him of his right to engage in business. In so holding, this Court stated that prohibiting the unlicensed practice of law is `not done to aid or protect the members of the legal profession either in creating or maintaining a monopoly or closed shop. It is done to protect the public from being advised and represented in legal matters by unqualified persons.' Id. (quoting State ex rel. Fla. Bar v. Sperry, 140 So.2d 587, 595 (Fla.1962)); see also Florida Bar v. Furman, 376 So.2d 378, 381 (Fla.1979) (adopting referee's report in UPL case where referee stated [t]he fact she is an expert stenographer does not give her any legal right to engage in divorce and adoption practice anymore than a nurse has the right to set up an office for performing tonsillectomy or appendectomy operations or a dental assistant to do extractions or fill teeth). Because the regulation of the unlicensed practice of law serves the critical role of protecting the public from unqualified individuals who are attempting to perform legal services, nonlawyers do not have a constitutional right to practice law by drafting legal documents or giving legal advice.