Opinion ID: 2993608
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The District Court Properly Ordered Discovery

Text: Regarding the Trust Contents ¶ 18 Donald’s challenge to the default judgment centers on the argument that it was error for the district court to permit discovery on remand following Rawlings I. He argues that once a constructive trust was imposed, “there was no need for any additional discovery” because “the parties have already had their day in court on the merits.” ¶ 19 We determine that additional discovery was appropriate and, indeed, necessary. The trial in this case was bifurcated, a fact that Donald disregards: the district court chose to first address whether it was proper to impose a constructive trust before deciding the issue of what property such a trust would contain. Therefore, after the district court imposed a constructive trust, the issue of what would make up the corpus of the trust remained. Discovery was thus necessary to allow the court to make a determination on that issue. Furthermore, Donald stipulated to a post—Rawlings I scheduling order that provided that “[d]iscovery shall be allowed in this case on all remaining material issues in this bifurcated action.”5 He cannot now claim that he should be released from that agreement. Therefore, after this court upheld the imposition of a constructive trust, it was proper for the district court to permit further discovery to determine what properties the trust comprised and to identify any benefits or profits derived from Donald’s use or transfer of those properties. B. Given Donald’s Conduct During Discovery, Entry of Default Judgment Was Not an Abuse of Discretion ¶ 20 Donald also contends that it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to enter default judgment against him. But the district court made extensive findings that Donald was not 5 Though Donald’s counsel did not sign the order, he orally agreed to it at a July 10, 2012 hearing. 8 Cite as: 2015 UT 85 Opinion of the Court responsive to requests, ignored earlier discovery sanctions, and disregarded an explicit court order. Given these facts, we hold that it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to strike Donald’s pleadings and defenses and enter default judgment against him. ¶ 21 During the post—Rawlings I discovery, Donald failed to produce additional documents requested by the siblings, but instead contended that he had previously supplied all requested documentation. The siblings moved to compel, and the district court found that, “in fact . . . such documents had not been supplied” and that Donald’s responses to the document requests “were inadequate and nonresponsive.” As a result, the court ordered Donald “to respond anew” to the siblings’ request for documents by either providing the requested documents or personally certifying that after a diligent search no responsive documents existed. The court also sanctioned Donald, awarding the siblings their costs, expenses, and attorney fees associated with the motion to compel. ¶ 22 Despite the district court’s clear directives and the imposition of sanctions, Donald still did not comply with the court’s order. The siblings brought a motion for an order to show cause, arguing that Donald did not comply with court orders and that the court should hold Donald in contempt, strike his pleadings, and enter default judgment. In response, Donald claimed that he had “now complied with all document requests.” Ruling on the matter, the district court stated that Donald “inappropriately delayed this case’s progress” and that “[m]ost troubling is [his] refusal to act in accordance with the express and stringent terms” of the court’s order. Moreover, the court continued, “[i]n light of the fact that [Donald] previously [had] been found in contempt, had attorney fees awarded against [him], and now [has] ignored the new Order imposed against” him, the court was “convinced that [he] will only continue to ignore the Court’s orders in the future.” Under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e)(2)(D) (2011), the court found that Donald’s failure to comply “was not substantially justified” and there was “no adequate excuse or explanation.” As a result, the court granted the siblings’ request to strike Donald’s pleadings and defenses and entered default judgment against him. 9 RAWLINGS v. RAWLINGS Opinion of the Court ¶ 23 Donald defends his actions by again arguing that he had previously produced all requested documents. He contends that, even though the district court ordered him to “respond anew,” this court should consider the documents that he did produce. In other words, Donald acknowledges that he did not comply with the district court’s explicit order but nonetheless argues that sanctions against him were an abuse of discretion. ¶ 24 The rules do not permit parties to comply with court orders only when they see fit, and we will not countenance Donald’s open disregard for the district court’s directives. Under rule 37, if a party fails to comply with a court order, the court may “dismiss all or part of the action, strike all or part of the pleadings, or render judgment by default on all or part of the action.” UTAH R. CIV. P. 37(e)(2)(D) (2011). The district court made extensive findings that Donald did not comply with its orders, provided no adequate justification or excuse, ignored previous sanctions, and acted in a willful and intentional manner. These findings support the district court’s decision to strike Donald’s pleadings and defenses and enter default judgment in favor of the siblings. We therefore find no abuse of discretion and affirm the district court’s order of default judgment.