Opinion ID: 688699
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Assessment of the Sanctions

Text: 45 The State also argues that the district court violated the State's due process rights by issuing a contempt finding without affording the State a hearing. The State contends that the fines included in the September 29 final order are in essence anticipatory contempt findings imposed without a show-cause hearing and therefore violate due process and the Eleventh Amendment. Finding that the State received all of the process it was due, we reject the State's argument. 46 The characterization of the contingent payments ordered by the court affects the procedures required for their implementation. The district court initially characterized its $50 per inmate charge as a fine. Later, on March 24, 1993, the court clarified its order, describing the $50 charge as a remedial sanction. The County and the plaintiff-prisoners argue that the district court's clarification illustrates that the penalty for violating the cap is remedial. Thus, the County and the plaintiff-prisoners conclude that the State has not been ordered to pay money because they violated a federal court order; they have simply been directed to provide funds to alleviate unconstitutional conditions caused by their failure to reduce populations to constitutionally acceptable levels. 47 To determine the character of the sanction imposed by the court, we must examine the nature of the court's actions. See United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, --- U.S. ----, ----, 114 S.Ct. 2552, 2557, 129 L.Ed.2d 642 (1994) (noting that in the contempt context, the stated purposes of the sanction ... cannot be determinative and commenting that the nature of a sanction is properly drawn, not from the subjective intent of the ... court[ ], but from an examination of the character of the relief itself. (internal quotation omitted)). 48 The Supreme Court recently noted that, the paradigmatic civil contempt sanction order ... involves confining a contemnor indefinitely until he complies with an affirmative command such as an order 'to pay alimony, or to surrender property ordered to be turned over to a receiver, or to make a conveyance.'  Bagwell, --- U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2557 (quoting Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 442, 31 S.Ct. 492, 498, 55 L.Ed. 797 (1911)). The Court then described the closest analogy to that paradigm civil contempt situation--a per diem fine imposed for each day a contemnor fails to comply with an affirmative court order. Id. That is precisely what happened in the instant case. 49 Although the court did not specifically describe its fines as contempt sanctions, the monetary penalties in the order accrue only to the extent that the court-ordered population caps are exceeded. Thus, the court order mandates a maximum inmate population and imposes a fine if that order is violated. 50 The fact that the fines are not to be paid to the court, but are remedial in nature, does not undermine the conclusion that the sanctions are for contempt. In fact, a contempt sanction is considered civil if it 'is remedial and for the benefit of the complainant....'  Id. (quoting Gompers, 221 U.S. at 498, 31 S.Ct. at 628); see also Lamar Fin. Corp. v. Adams, 918 F.2d 564, 566 (5th Cir.1990) (noting that a sanction is civil contempt [i]f the purpose of the sanction is to coerce the contemnor into compliance with a court order, or to compensate another party for the contemnor's violation); Petroleos Mexicanos v. Crawford Enters., 826 F.2d 392, 399 (5th Cir.1987) ([S]anctions for civil contempt are meant to be 'wholly remedial' and serve to benefit the party who has suffered injury or loss at the hands of the contemnor). 51 The nature of the contempt guides the proceedings which are required before a court can issue sanctions. Civil contempt sanctions are considered to be coercive and avoidable through obedience, and thus may be imposed in an ordinary civil proceeding upon notice and an opportunity to be heard. Bagwell, --- U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2557; see also id. --- U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2559 (noting that because civil contempt sanctions are viewed as nonpunitive and avoidable, fewer procedural protections for such sanctions have been required). 52 In the instant case, after reviewing the pleadings and hearing oral argument, the district court, on March 24, 1993, entered an order rejecting, inter alia, the State's motion to modify the final order and to stay the imposition of fines. Prior to entering that order, the district court heard the State's contentions that the court should stay the fine, but found the State's reasons inadequate. This hearing took place before the March 31, 1993 deadline for the reduction in prison population, and only after this hearing did the sanctions take effect. This afforded the State adequate notice and opportunity to be heard. 53 The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Mercer v. Mitchell, 908 F.2d 763 (11th Cir.1990), does not militate against this conclusion. In that case, without conducting any hearing, the district court noted that it [would] accept no excuses for not complying with its cap and directed the parties to submit a statement to the court indicating the number of prisoners held in violation of the cap. Id. at 766. The Mercer court found that this deprived the defendant county of its due process rights. Specifically, the court described the typical proceeding satisfying the requirements of due process: 54 [T]he defendant is allowed to show either that he did not violate the court order or that he was excused from complying. Typically, a defendant will argue that he should not be held in contempt because changed circumstances would make strict enforcement of the order unjust. In such a case, the defendant should move the court to modify the order, and the hearing on the show-cause order would take on the appearance of a hearing on a motion to modify an injunction. If the court determines that the order should be modified and that the defendant's conduct did not violate the order as modified, then ordinarily it would be unjust to hold the defendant in contempt. If, however, the court concludes that the order should not be modified and that the defendant did not comply with the order, then the court may hold him in contempt and impose sanctions designed to ensure compliance. 55 Mercer, 908 F.2d at 768 (second emphasis added). In the instant case, the district court conducted a hearing. The court provided the State with an opportunity to explain why it should not be required to adhere to the order and why the order should be modified. The court, however, found the State's contentions inadequate and concluded that no modification of the sanctions was in order. Even under the standard of Mercer, the district court's actions in this case met due process requirements. 10