Opinion ID: 2296081
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Ko's statutory contentions.

Text: Section 13 (b) of the Interpreter Act provides as follows: The salaries, fees, expenses and costs incident to providing the services of interpreters under this chapter shall be paid for by the Office [of Interpreter Services]. D.C.Code § 31-2712(b); see also the virtually identical language in Section 31-2711(b)(6). These provisions, read literally, appear to proscribe the payment by the United States Attorney's office of the salaries, fees, expenses and costs of interpreters who have been appointed pursuant to the provisions of the Act. Judge Learned Hand warned years ago, however, that we should not make a fortress out of the dictionary. See Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 326 U.S. 404, 66 S.Ct. 193, 90 L.Ed. 165 (1945). It is not at all obvious to me [19] that the provisions on which Ko relies were designed to deal with the situation here presented. There is nothing in the legislative history of the Interpreter Act to suggest that the payment of interpreters' salaries and fees by the prosecutive arm of the government was any part of the mischief which the Interpreter Act was designed to correct. Rather, Sections 31-2712(b) and 31-2711(b)(6) may simply have been designed to provide by legislation for a source of payment. Rule 28 (b) of the Superior Court's Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: Interpreters. The Court may appoint an interpreter of its own selection and may fix the reasonable compensation of such interpreter. Such compensation shall be paid out of [the] funds provided by law or by the government, as the Court may direct. (Emphasis added.) Rule 28(b) has been in effect since 1971, when the then newly-created Superior Court first adopted Rules of Criminal Procedure. It is substantially identical to what is now Rule 28 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which has been in effect since 1966. Both federal and District of Columbia law have thus authorized payment of interpreters' salaries by the government for many years. If the members of the Council intended to overrule or repeal a long-standing practice which has been codified in the rules of the Superior Court, one might reasonably expect them to do so expressly, rather than sub silentio without even mentioning the problem. Indeed, there is no indication from any source that payment by any branch of the government of the salaries and fees of interpreters was perceived to be a problem at all. [20] The government also relies on Section 31-2711(d), which authorizes the Office of Interpreter Services to contract for and compensate qualified interpreters. That section provides, inter alia, that the Office may employ interpreters on a full-time or part-time basis, use qualified volunteer services, or procure the services in any other method consistent with the District of Columbia law. Id. (Emphasis added.) According to the government, [c]ertainly, one lawful  and fiscally prudent  means of paying for interpreter services was to allow the U.S. Attorney's Office to provide the funds for the services of those interpreters required for the government's witnesses in criminal prosecutions. This interpretation of § 31-2711(d) is consistent with Rule 28, which allows a trial court to pay for appointed interpreters out of the funds provided by law or by the government, as the Court may direct. I do not suggest that the government's contentions summarized above are necessarily compelling. The words of a statute should be construed according to their ordinary sense, and with the meaning commonly attributed to them. J. Parreco & Son v. District of Columbia Rental Hous. Comm'n, 567 A.2d 43, 46 (D.C.1989). The intent of the legislature is ordinarily to be found in the language which it has used. Id. At least to the extent that the government asks us to treat the phrase any other method consistent with District of Columbia law as trumping ostensibly clear statutory language requiring payment by the Office of Interpreting Services, it may be treating on treacherous ground. Taking the case as it comes to us, however, the question on appeal is not whether an interpreter paid by the United States Attorney's office may properly be designated to interpret for the defendant over the defendant's objection. Rather, the court must decide whether the assignment to Ko of interpreters retained and paid by the prosecution was so obviously erroneous and so manifestly unjust that the judge committed plain error in taking the actions that he did. If Ko had expressed any dissatisfaction with the rotation to him of these interpreters, the judge might well have reconsidered his decision and found some alternative resolution. Courts require a contemporaneous objection in order to enable the judge to deal with problems of this kind at the trial court level without jettisoning the trial. See Hunter, supra, 606 A.2d at 144. If, as in this case, a party fails to object, then he is faced on appeal with the formidable task of demonstrating plain error. In relation to his claims of bias, Ko has satisfied neither prong of the plain error standard. Especially in light of the provisions of Rule 28(b), the use of the government-paid interpreters, while questionable, was not plainly or obviously impermissible. Moreover, there was no clear miscarriage of justice in this case. Ko has made no showing whatever of actual bias in translation, or of any prejudice to him resulting from the prosecutor's payment of the interpreters' salaries. [21]