Opinion ID: 164228
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Strict Scrutiny Post-Graham

Text: 175 As the majority notes, since Graham, the Court has experienced no noticeable discomfort in applying strict scrutiny to alienage classifications. Toll, 458 U.S. at 22, 102 S.Ct. 2977 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see Maj. op. at 1250; see, e.g., Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 601-02, 96 S.Ct. 2264, 49 L.Ed.2d 65 (1976) (applying strict scrutiny for limitations on state civil engineering licenses and noting that the Court had establish[ed] that state classifications based on alienage are subject to strict judicial scrutiny) (internal quotation marks omitted); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642, 93 S.Ct. 2842, 37 L.Ed.2d 853 (1973) (holding that the exclusion of aliens from civil service jobs denied them equal protection and that a flat ban on the employment of aliens in positions that have little, if any relation to a State's legitimate interest, cannot withstand scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. at 721, 93 S.Ct. 2851 (applying strict scrutiny to a state law that excluded aliens from being licensed as attorneys); see also Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 438, 102 S.Ct. 735, 70 L.Ed.2d 677 (1982) ([C]itizenship is not a relevant ground for the distribution of economic benefits.). 176 In Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 96 S.Ct. 1883, 48 L.Ed.2d 478 (1976), the Supreme Court upheld as constitutional the amendments to the Social Security Act that conditioned an alien's eligibility for Medicare benefits on the alien's continuous residence in the United States for five years and admission for permanent residence. In doing so, the Supreme Court recognized that 177 the relationship between the United States and our alien visitors has been committed to the political branches of the Federal Government. Since decisions in these matters may implicate our relations with foreign powers, and since a wide variety of classifications must be defined in the light of changing political and economic circumstances, such decisions are frequently of a character more appropriate to either the Legislature or the Executive than to the Judiciary. 178 426 U.S. at 81, 96 S.Ct. 1883. Mathews also distinguished Graham, recognizing that its equal protection analysis ... involves significantly different considerations because it concerns the relationship between aliens and the States rather than between aliens and the Federal Government. Id. at 84-85, 96 S.Ct. 1883. The Court explained that 179 [i]nsofar as state welfare policy is concerned, there is little, if any, basis for treating persons who are citizens of another State differently from persons who are citizens of another country. Both groups are noncitizens as far as the State's interests in administering its welfare programs are concerned. Thus, a division by a State of the category of persons who are not citizens of that State into subcategories of United States citizens and aliens has no apparent justification, whereas, a comparable classification by the Federal Government is a routine and normally legitimate part of its business. 180 Id. at 85, 96 S.Ct. 1883 (emphasis supplied). The Court thus articulated the distinction between alienage classifications imposed by the federal government and those created by state and local governments. Chemerinsky, supra, § 9.5.4. The federal government, rather than the states or the judiciary, regulates the condition of entry and residence of aliens. Mathews, 426 U.S. at 85, 96 S.Ct. 1883. Thus, whereas the federal government might routine[ly] and normally create divisions between citizens and aliens as a legitimate part of its business, a similar division a by a state has no apparent justification. Id. Because the responsibility for regulating the relationship between the United States and our alien visitors has been committed to the political branches of the Federal Government, id. at 81, 96 S.Ct. 1883, the Supreme Court afforded the statute a deferential standard of review. Id. at 82, 96 S.Ct. 1883. The Court thus upheld the federal program because it was not wholly irrational and served the legitimate purpose of securing the fiscal integrity of the Medicaid program at issue. Id. at 83, 85, 96 S.Ct. 1883. 181 Particularly relevant here, as the majority notes, is that in the following year, the Court applied Graham's strict scrutiny analysis to invalidate a New York law that limited financial aid for higher education to citizens, those who had applied for citizenship, and those who declared an intent to apply when they became eligible. Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2120, 53 L.Ed.2d 63 (1977). In explaining the rationale of Mathews, the Court also noted that,  classifications by a State that are based on alienage are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny. Id. at 7, 97 S.Ct. 2120 (emphasis supplied) (internal quotation marks omitted). Congress, as an aspect of its broad power over immigration and naturalization, enjoys rights to distinguish among aliens that are not shared by the States. Id. at 7 n. 8, 97 S.Ct. 2120. The Court also emphasized the inherent discriminatory intent of the statute, noting that the law is directed at aliens and ... only aliens are harmed by it. Id. at 9, 97 S.Ct. 2120.