Opinion ID: 409069
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statutory and Constitutional Requirements for Personal Jurisdiction

Text: 36 The power of a federal court entertaining a case based on diversity of citizenship to exercise personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants turns on two independent considerations: (1) whether an applicable state rule or statute potentially confers in personam jurisdiction over the defendants and, if it does, (2) whether assertion of such jurisdiction is commensurate with due process. See, e.g., McBreen v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 543 F.2d 26, 28 (7th Cir. 1976). 37 The Illinois long-arm statute, Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 110, P 2-209(a)(2) (1981), confers personal jurisdiction over: 38 (a) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who in person or through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated, thereby submits such person ... to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State as to any cause of action arising from the doing of any such acts: 39 (2) The commission of a tortious act within this State.... 40 The Illinois Supreme Court has held that a tort is considered to be committed in the place where the injury occurs. Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill.2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). The court has also held that the statute is intended to extend jurisdiction over nonresidents to the extent permitted by due process. Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill.2d 378, 389, 143 N.E.2d 673, 679 (1957). 41 Because Kerry Adden's death occurred in Illinois, the tortious act of which the plaintiff complains occurred within that State. 3 We conclude that this case falls within the reach of the Illinois statutory provision governing the exercise of in personam jurisdiction. We turn therefore to the question whether the exercise of such personal jurisdiction comports with due process. 42 The seminal case regarding due process limitations on personal jurisdiction is International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). The International Shoe Court held that a state court may exercise in personam jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant only if the defendant has sufficient contacts or ties with the state of the forum to make it reasonable and just, according to our traditional conception of fair play and substantial justice, to permit the state to enforce the obligations which appellant has incurred there. Id. at 320, 66 S.Ct. at 160. 43 Application of the sufficient contacts test enunciated in International Shoe was recently addressed by the Supreme Court in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980). The Woodson Court applied a two-prong analysis to determine whether the constitutionally necessary contacts existed between the defendant and the forum state. Pursuant to this analysis, one must first evaluate the reasonableness and fairness of requiring a defendant to litigate in a possibly distant and inconvenient forum. The Court stated that: 44 Implicit in this emphasis on reasonableness is the understanding that the burden on the defendant, while always a primary concern, will in an appropriate case be considered in light of other relevant factors, including the forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute ...; the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief ..., at least when that interest is not adequately protected by the defendant's power to choose the forum ...; the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies .... 45 Id. at 292, 100 S.Ct. at 564 (citations omitted). Applying these factors to the instant case, we think that Adden's claim that personal jurisdiction may be constitutionally asserted in the present case is weak. As Webb v. State, 91 So.2d 156 (La.App.1956), and Geiger v. State, 242 So.2d 606 (La.App.1970), make clear, Louisiana courts recognize a cause of action against the State for injurious acts committed by escaped prisoners. The principal legal hurdle to a plaintiff's case alleging such a cause of action in the Louisiana courts is proof of proximate cause. See, e.g., Green v. State, 91 So.2d 153 (La.App.1956). 46 Although we do not decide the question of proximate cause in the instant case, Adden would have to demonstrate such a causal link if his suit were to survive a motion to dismiss. There is no sense, therefore, in which Adden's suit stood a more certain chance of success in a federal court than it would have in a Louisiana court. Second, by bringing this suit in federal court, Adden has raised the issues of the Eleventh Amendment bar and the power of the court to exercise diversity jurisdiction. These would not have been issues in the case had the suit been brought in Louisiana. We find it difficult to see therefore how Adden's choice of forum has contributed to the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies, 444 U.S. at 292, 100 S.Ct. at 564. 47 Even if we found, however, that it was reasonable to require Middlebrooks and Phelps to litigate this suit in a federal court in Illinois, the second prong of the Woodson test would prohibit the suit. This prong requires the presence of sufficient affiliating circumstances to empower the forum state to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. The circumstances that will satisfy this aspect of the Woodson test must indicate that the defendants  'purposefully avail(ed themselves) of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State,'  id. (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 1239, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958)), and be such that the defendants should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there, id. 48 Middlebrooks and Phelps did not purposefully conduct any activities within Illinois nor could they reasonably anticipate being forced to defend a negligence suit there. An escaped prisoner might flee to virtually any state and commit a tortious act there. This is especially true when six weeks have elapsed between the time of escape and the commission of the tort. The fact that apparently one of the two escapees in this case was originally from Illinois does not alter this analysis. If it did, we would be concluding that Department of Corrections officials should expect to be sued in any state which was at some point the home of a person incarcerated in Louisiana. 49 The Woodson Court interpreted the Due Process clause as giving a degree of predictability to the legal system that allows potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit. Id. We find no way in which the defendant officials could have structured their ... conduct so as to predict that they might be liable for the actions of Cook and Tucker. We necessarily conclude, therefore, that the court below could not exercise in personam jurisdiction over the individual defendants.