Opinion ID: 689999
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Aiding and Abetting versus Pinkerton Co-Conspirator Liability

Text: 26 We agree with the district court that criminal liability for aiding and abetting under 18 U.S.C Sec. 2 is not the same as co-conspirator liability under Pinkerton. The Defendant argues that because aiding and abetting and Pinkerton co-conspirator liability are founded on the same principle of vicarious liability, 9 they are the same. However, in Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 69 S.Ct. 766, 93 L.Ed. 919, the Supreme Court distinguished between these two principles of criminal liability: 27 The rule of ... [Pinkerton ] does service where the conspiracy was one to commit offenses of the character described in the substantive counts. Aiding and abetting has a broader application. It makes a defendant a principal when he consciously shares in any criminal act whether or not there is a conspiracy ... Pinkerton v. United States is narrow in its scope. Aiding and abetting rests on a broader base; it states a rule of criminal responsibility for acts which one assists another in performing. The fact that a particular case might conceivably be submitted to the jury on either theory is irrelevant. 28 Id. at 620, 69 S.Ct. at 770. 29 Clearly, Pinkerton liability, which requires the defendant's participation in a conspiracy, is much narrower in scope than aiding and abetting. Although we agree that the extradition papers prohibited the use of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2 in trying the Defendant, we find unpersuasive the Defendant's argument that the Pinkerton doctrine is ... a variant of 18 United States Code Section 2. Appellant's Br. at 12. 30 We now turn to the Defendant's argument that the doctrine of dual criminality prohibits trying the Defendant under any theory of vicarious criminal liability, including the Pinkerton theory.