Opinion ID: 2359281
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Did the trial court err in admitting evidence of oral promises preceding the written agreement?

Text: The Corporation points out that Stern testified that Contino guaranteed him, prior to the signing of the agreement, that he would be employed for three years. The Corporation contends such contradicted the written intention of the parties that the employment would be for two, maybe three years, subject to the satisfaction clause. It argues that the testimony violated the integration clause of paragraph fifteen [3] and the parol evidence rule. Stern argues that the first time Contino's promise that the contract would be upheld came up at trial no objection was raised. (N.T. 35) Later, when he stated he believed Mr. Contino's assurance that he, Stern, would be with the company for three years, the Corporation objected. (N.T. 56-57). Stern further contends that while the Corporation raised this matter in a motion in limine, it did not preserve it in post trial motions. Contrary to appellee's claim, this contention was raised in post-trial motions. When, as in the instant case, an agreement or provision thereof is clear on its face and is not reasonably capable of differing interpretation, the intent of the parties must be ascertained from the writing itself. Berger v. Ackerman, 293 Pa.Superior Ct. 457, 439 A.2d 200 (1981); Potts Mfg. v. Loffredo, 235 Pa.Superior Ct. 294, 340 A.2d 468 (1975). However, while the proffered testimony may have been a violation of the parol evidence rule, not every violation of the rules of evidence requires a new trial. Where the error has worked no harm to the appellant, a new trial will not be in order. Whistler Sportswear, Inc. v. Rullo, 289 Pa.Superior Ct. 230, 433 A.2d 40 (1981). The harmless error rule has been applied to the improper admission of parole evidence. See Tate v. Moran, 264 Pa.Superior Ct. 540, 400 A.2d 217 (1979). Here, reading the challenged testimony as a whole, and not select excerpts, it merely reflected the clear intent of the parties as provided in the agreement. Any error was harmless. Compare, Capan v. Divine Providence Hospital, 270 Pa.Superior Ct. 127, 410 A.2d 1282 (1979) (counsel was able to elicit similar testimony by other questioning).