Opinion ID: 3135205
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Identical Elements

Text: During this same period, a different type of proportionate penalties analysis emerged. What would later be designated the “identical elements” proportionate penalties analysis was first used in People v. Christy , 139 Ill. 2d 172 (1990). In Christy , the defendant was convicted of armed violence predicated on kidnapping with a Category I weapon (a knife with a blade of at least three inches in length). This offense was classified as a Class X felony, punishable by 6 to 30 years in prison. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 33A–3(a); Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 1005–8–1(a)(3). The defendant pointed out that the elements of this offense were exactly the same as aggravated kidnapping, but that offense was classified as a Class 1 felony, punishable by 4 to 15 years in prison (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 10–2(a)(5); Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 1005–8–1(a)(4)). This court held that “common sense and sound logic” would dictate identical penalties for these offenses. Because the identical offenses did not yield identical penalties, this court held that the penalties were unconstitutionally disproportionate and the greater penalty could not stand. Christy , 139 Ill. 2d at 181. Justices Miller and Ryan dissented, arguing that different penalties for different offenses simply gave prosecutors the discretion of which offense to charge, and this was not meaningfully different from allowing prosecutors to choose between offenses with different elements. The dissenters pointed out that the Supreme Court held in United States v. Batchelder , 442 U.S. 114, 60 L. Ed. 2d 755, 99 S. Ct. 2198 (1979), that it did not violate the constitutional guarantees of equal protection or due process to allow prosecutors the discretion to choose between two statutes with different elements or even two statutes with identical elements. Christy , 139 Ill. 2d at 185-86 (Miller, J., dissenting, joined by Ryan, J.), citing Batchelder , 442 U.S. at 125, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 765, 99 S. Ct. at 2205). This court again used the identical elements analysis in People v. Lewis , 175 Ill. 2d 412 (1996). In that case, the defendant was charged with armed violence predicated on robbery with a Category I weapon 720 ILCS 5/18–1, 33A–1 (West 1994)). The defendant argued that the penalty for that offense violated the proportionate penalties clause because it was more severe than the penalty for armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/18–2 (West 1994)), and the two offenses shared identical elements. This court concluded that Christy controlled, and thus invalidated the greater penalty. The court rejected the State’s invitation to overrule Christy . This court also rejected the State’s contention that the proportionate penalties clause only allows courts to compare the gravity of a particular offense with the severity of its assigned penalty. Rather, we held that comparing different offenses and their penalties was an accepted part of our proportionate penalties jurisprudence. Lewis , 175 Ill. 2d at 420-21. Further, this court stated that comparing offenses with identical elements was less troublesome than comparing offense with different elements because it did not require a subjective determination by this court as to which offense was more serious. The court merely considers two different penalties given to two identical offenses by the same legislative body. Thus, there is no risk of the court acting as a “superlegislature” or substituting its judgment for that of the legislature. Lewis , 175 Ill. 2d at 421-22. Justices Miller and Nickels dissented, arguing that Christy was wrongly decided and that the only legitimate type of proportionate penalty review is determining whether the sentence for a particular offense is cruel or degrading or so wholly disproportionate to the offense so as to shock the moral sense of the community. Lewis , 175 Ill. 2d at 424-26 (Miller, J., dissenting, joined by Nickels, J.).