Opinion ID: 2680038
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Requirement for a Cognizable Injury

Text: [¶17] Each smoking-ban-related count of the amended complaint recites that America “sustained harm.” In dismissing the smoking-ban counts, the court 11 found that “[a] crucial aspect of the Amended Complaint is that it does not allege that the asserted failure to enforce the smoking ban has caused harm—at least legally cognizable injury—to [America] individually.” [¶18] The specific factual assertion of harm made in the amended complaint is that “America cannot enter or leave his unit without passing the exhaust of a unit in which tobacco is being smoked in violation of the Smoking Ban.” America argues that “[c]igarette smoke is universally understood to be a toxic and carcinogenic substance,” and therefore his “allegations that he has been exposed to secondhand smoke . . . describe a legally cognizable injury sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” The court found America’s allegation that he “sustained harm” as a result of walking past another unit’s exhaust to be insufficient absent some particularized physical injury or illness. [¶19] The MCA provides: “If . . . any . . . person subject to this Act fails to comply with . . . any provision of the declaration or bylaws, any person or class of persons adversely affected by that failure has a claim for appropriate relief.” 33 M.R.S. § 1604-116 (emphasis added). The Sunspray Declaration provides: “An aggrieved unit owner shall have a right of action against the Association for failure to comply with or to enforce . . . any rules and regulations duly adopted . . . .” (Emphasis added). In reaching its conclusion that the amended complaint was insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss, the trial court found that 12 the reference to “aggrieved unit owner,” like the reference to “persons adversely affected” in the MCA, has to be construed to require particularized injury, meaning that the aggrieved owner must allege and if necessary, establish, that he or she has suffered particularized injury as a result of the acts or omissions at issue. [¶20] We agree with the Superior Court. A complaint “must . . . allege facts sufficient to demonstrate that the complaining party has been injured in a way that entitles him or her to relief.” Burns v. Architectural Doors & Windows, 2011 ME 61, ¶ 17, 19 A.3d 823. In a different context, we said that “[a] person is aggrieved . . . if that person has suffered particularized injury—that is, if . . . [an] action operated prejudicially and directly upon the party’s property, pecuniary or personal rights.” Nelson v. Bayroot, LLC, 2008 ME 91, ¶ 10, 953 A.2d 378. [¶21] Here, accepting the factual allegation in the complaint as true, America was exposed to secondhand smoke when outside his unit. The complaint does not allege how much, how often, or to what effect. Simply stating in his brief that the harm to him is “universally understood” under those vague circumstances is not sufficient to establish an actionable injury. Without any specifics concerning his exposure and the results of that exposure, the court could not find that America “allege[d] facts sufficient to demonstrate that [he] has been injured in a way that entitles him . . . to relief.” Burns, 2011 ME 61, ¶ 17, 19 A.3d 823. 13 3. The Sufficiency of the Complaint’s Smoking-Ban Counts [¶22] We now examine the legal sufficiency of the five smoking-ban-related counts in America’s amended complaint. In Counts I (breach of fiduciary duty), III (violation of the MCA), and V (violation of the MNCA), America alleged that the defendants acted in bad faith. As discussed above, the complaint’s factual assertions do not make out a claim of bad faith due to a flat refusal to enforce the smoking ban, but rather demonstrate a disagreement over how to enforce it. In that circumstance, the defendants’ discretionary decisions are protected by the business judgment rule. [¶23] Count VII alleges breach of contract based on the defendants’ failure to enforce a Sunspray rule, namely the smoking ban. An element of that claim is that America show “actual injury or damage.” In re Hannaford Bros., Co. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 2010 ME 93, ¶ 8, 4 A.3d 492. As discussed above, the facts alleged in the complaint do not make out a cognizable injury to America. [¶24] Finally, Count X alleges negligence in that “[d]efendants breached their duty to exercise reasonable care in enforcing the Smoking Ban.” “A claim of negligence requires proof of a duty owed, breach of that duty, and an injury proximately caused by the breach.” Gray v. TD Bank, N.A., 2012 ME 83, ¶ 16, 45 A.3d 735; see In re Hannaford Bros., Co., 2010 ME 93, ¶¶ 8-9, 4 A.3d 492 14 (stating that “actual injury” is an element of a negligence claim, and that because “[t]he tort of negligence does not compensate individuals for the typical annoyances or inconveniences that are a part of everyday life. . . . [l]iability . . . ordinarily requires proof of personal injury or property damage.” (citation omitted)). Because the complaint did not allege a cognizable injury, this count was properly dismissed. The entry is: Judgment affirmed. On the briefs: Neal F. Pratt, Esq., and Jonathan G. Mermin, Esq., Preti Flaherty, LLP, Portland, for appellant Vitorino America Catherine R. Connors, Esq., Geraldine G. Sanchez, Esq., Nolan L. Reichl, Esq., and Joshua D. Dunlap, Esq., Pierce Atwood LLP, Portland, for appellees Sunspray Condominium Association et al. At oral argument: Neal F. Pratt, Esq., for appellant Vitorino America Catherine R. Connors, Esq., for appellees Sunspray Condominium Association et al. Business and Consumer Docket docket number CV-2011-41 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY