Opinion ID: 844204
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence of witness dissuasion

Text: Defendant claims that reversal is required because he was prejudiced by the admission of evidence that a prosecution witness at trial of the restaurant crimes had received a telephone call “from someone” that may have made her afraid to testify. Although defendant is correct that the evidence could not be used by the jury to infer his consciousness of guilt, there was a proper, albeit limited, purpose for introducing the evidence and there is no merit to defendant‟s assertion that he was incurably prejudiced by its admission, as we explain, post.
Prosecution witness Karen King testified that for a two-week period in February 1996, prior to the restaurant crimes, defendant stayed with her and her boyfriend in the same Highland apartment complex where codefendant Rogers resided. She told the jury that she recalled seeing a handgun in the apartment at the time, although she could not confirm that it belonged to defendant. During direct examination, the prosecutor asked the witness whether she was afraid to be in court. She answered, “No.” The prosecutor then followed up by asking, “Did you receive a phone call from someone?” The court sustained defense counsel‟s hearsay and discovery objections. The prosecutor continued to question the witness, eliciting from her that although she was initially fearful of testifying, she 35 was no longer afraid. At defense counsel‟s request, the court then conducted a sidebar conference to discuss the objected-to evidence. Outside the jury‟s presence, the prosecutor explained that the brother of King‟s boyfriend had called to tell her “that it would be better for her if she did not come to court and if she did not testify.” The court agreed with defense counsel that the prosecutor should have disclosed this information to the defense before the witness‟s testimony. When defendant‟s counsel further complained that the prosecutor‟s line of questioning implied that defendant made a threatening telephone call, the court suggested that defense counsel attempt to elicit from the witness during cross-examination that the call was not from defendant or codefendant Rogers. The court also indicated that, on request, it would instruct the jury with CALJIC Nos. 2.05 and 2.06, regarding the requirements for considering the suppression of evidence as tending to show a consciousness of guilt. Defense counsel moved for mistrial, arguing that the admission of the telephone call evidence denied defendant his federal constitutional guarantees, including his rights to due process and to cross-examine the witnesses against him. The court denied the motion, finding that any prejudice would be diffused by cross-examination and a cautionary instruction expressly directing the jury not to infer defendant‟s guilt from evidence of an effort to suppress evidence. The prosecutor added that he attempted to present the telephone call evidence solely for purposes of testing the witness‟s credibility. Defense counsel introduced the telephone call evidence during crossexamination, and elicited from King that neither defendant nor Rogers had called her or had asked someone to call her. In response to defense counsel‟s question whether she had been threatened, she replied, “Not threaten. Just told me it would be best if I didn‟t testify.” King also indicated that she was as reluctant to be on 36 the witness stand as she had been to speak with investigating officers five years earlier. Immediately following King‟s testimony on this point, the court instructed the jurors that “the phone call was not made” by either defendant or the codefendant, and informed them that “unless there was evidence to indicate they told someone to do that, which at this point there is not, it cannot be considered against either [of them].” The court also explained to the jury, however, that the telephone call evidence could be considered in evaluating the credibility of the witness. The court instructed on the issue again before closing arguments, this time affirmatively directing the jury not to consider evidence of an attempt to suppress evidence “as tending to show any consciousness of guilt on the defendant‟s part.”
We agree with the trial court that there was a proper, albeit limited, purpose for the introduction of the evidence that someone called King attempting to dissuade her from testifying, which was its effect on King‟s credibility as a witness. The fact that King came to court and took the witness stand notwithstanding the caller‟s advice tended to bolster her credibility. (See People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1142 [evidence that the defendant‟s sister offered the witness money to refrain from testifying was relevant to evaluating the witness‟s credibility]; cf. People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 870 [“[i]t is not necessarily the source of the threat — but its existence — that is relevant to the witness‟s credibility”].) Defendant argues that King‟s testimony was incurably prejudicial, and deprived him of a fundamentally fair trial, because the very fact the threatening call was made raised the inference that he had authorized it. His contention is 37 unpersuasive. As the record reflects, defense counsel affirmatively elicited from King that the caller did not threaten her or state that he was speaking on defendant‟s behalf, and the court instructed the jury that the telephone call evidence could not be considered against either him or his codefendant. Under these circumstances, “[w]e think it highly unlikely the jurors understood they could infer defendant authorized or orchestrated [a] threat . . . .” (People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 670 [relying on similar grounds to reject the argument that evidence regarding the defendant‟s sister‟s attack on a prosecution witness posed a danger that the jury would speculate that the defendant authorized it].) Defendant suggests that the trial court “left the door open” for the jury to infer that he was responsible for the threatening call when it instructed subsequent to King‟s testimony that “at this point” there was no evidence connecting defendant to the call. The record shows, however, that at the close of evidence the trial court made clear to the jurors that they were not permitted to consider the telephone call evidence as tending to show defendant‟s consciousness of guilt. We presume jurors “generally understand and follow instructions.” (People v. McKinnon, supra, at p. 670.) Defendant complains nonetheless that the court‟s instruction directing the jurors not to consider against him the evidence of the telephone call to King did nothing to dispel the inference of consciousness of guilt. He urges this court to adopt the reasoning and result of a 1974 decision by the Indiana intermediate appellate court, which concluded that a new trial should have been granted in that case because testimony by a prosecution witness about having received threats and bribes was “so prejudicial to [the] defendant that no jury could be expected to apply it solely to the question of the credibility of the witness.” (Keyser v. State (Ind.Ct.App. 1974) 312 N.E.2d 922, 924.) Even were we to agree with the Keyser decision that the prejudice to the defendant in that matter could not be cured by an 38 instruction to disregard the improper evidence, the case is readily distinguishable from the present one in important respects. In Keyser, the prosecution‟s entire case depended on the testimony of the witness who had been threatened. (Id. at p. 924.) Here, by contrast, King‟s testimony played but a minor role in establishing defendant‟s guilt of the restaurant crimes; at best, her testimony showed only that two months before the crimes defendant was associating with codefendant Rogers and carrying a firearm. In Keyser, furthermore, the reviewing court intimated that the prosecutor‟s introduction of the improper testimony was calculated to prejudice the defendant. (Ibid.) The telephone call evidence at issue here, however, was admissible for the proper, limited purpose of assessing the witness‟s credibility. Finally, in Keyser there was no evidence or instruction advising the jury that the defendant was not involved in the attempted bribe and threat. In this case, the court expressly instructed the jury that defendant had no connection to the telephone call King received. Given the slight significance of King‟s testimony and the absence of any evidence from which the jury could infer that the telephone call was made at defendant‟s behest, we reject defendant‟s assertion that the court‟s instructions were insufficient to overcome the assertedly prejudicial effect of King‟s testimony on this point. The court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant‟s motion for mistrial, and its ruling allowing the testimony for a limited purpose did not render defendant‟s trial fundamentally unfair. 2. Courtroom presence of the restaurant murder victim’s wife Defendant claims that the court abused its discretion and deprived him of his various constitutional rights when it allowed Donna, the restaurant murder victim‟s wife, to remain in the courtroom after testifying for the prosecution. There was no error. 39 a. Background Prior to jury selection in the case, the court conducted a brief hearing on a defense motion to exclude witnesses during the course of trial, and the court agreed that witnesses should not hear the testimony of other witnesses prior to testifying. The discussion, however, focused primarily on whether Donna Malouf Lawrence, the homicide victim‟s wife and a percipient witness to the incident at the restaurant, would be permitted to remain in the courtroom following her testimony. After being informed that the prosecutor had advised Donna regarding appropriate courtroom demeanor, the court indicated that it would exercise its discretion to exclude from the courtroom any witness or spectator whose conduct would prevent either side from receiving a fair trial. Nonetheless, defense counsel expressed his concern that Donna‟s presence during the guilt phase would affect the fairness of the possible penalty phase, at which Donna would be called to the witness stand to give victim impact testimony. The court pointed out, however, that the same concern was present in any death penalty case in which victim impact witnesses were present during the guilt phase. In the court‟s view, once Donna had testified, the rationale for excluding her from the courtroom no longer existed. Although the court ruled that it would allow Donna to remain in the courtroom following her testimony, it reiterated that if it came to the court‟s attention that anyone in the courtroom engaged in inappropriate conduct, it would not hesitate to exclude such person from the proceedings. Without defense objection, Donna testified at the guilt phase of trial with the assistance of a victim-witness advocate. At the prosecutor‟s request, the court instructed the jury regarding the support person‟s presence and role.11 11 The court instructed, “Ladies and gentlemen, the law provides that an alleged victim in a crime is allowed to have a support person with them in court (footnote continued on next page) 40 Consistent with the court‟s earlier ruling, Donna remained in the courtroom after completing her testimony, sitting in the front row. When the next prosecution witness had answered several questions on direct examination, defense counsel complained to the court outside the jury‟s presence that Donna had been nodding her head in agreement with the witness‟s answers. The court indicated that it had not observed Donna nodding her head, but suggested that she be told to be more mindful of her gestures. The prosecutor informed the court that he had done so. Although the court overruled defense counsel‟s objection to Donna‟s presence, it stated it would monitor the situation and, if a problem arose, it would recommend that Donna sit in the back of the courtroom. Defense counsel renewed the objection to Donna‟s presence during the testimony of a prosecution witness who was describing the shooting of the victim, Fred Malouf. As counsel pointed out, Donna was crying and being held by her support people, and he saw one of the jurors looking over at her and staring. The court noted that it had been paying attention to Donna and agreed that she appeared upset. It observed, however, that she was not making any disturbance. In the court‟s view, her conduct was no different from that in any other case in which family members of the victim exhibit some type of emotional reaction, and she had a right to be in the courtroom. b. Discussion Defendant argues that the presence of a support person to assist Donna during her guilt phase testimony, coupled with Donna‟s nodding her head in (footnote continued from previous page) during testimony. The support person is entitled to sit with them but is, obviously, not the witness and is not going to participate in any manner.” 41 agreement with prosecution testimony and “emotional outbursts” during trial, interfered with the jury‟s ability to deliberate and reach an unbiased verdict in violation of his right to a fair trial, an impartial jury, and other constitutional guarantees. Because defendant did not object when a victim-witness advocate accompanied Donna to the witness stand, he has forfeited that portion of his claim. (People v. Stevens (2009) 47 Cal.4th 625, 641.) We find no merit to his contention in any event. Defendant insists that he was prejudiced by the support person‟s presence on the witness stand while Donna testified because it created a false and distorted view of Donna‟s demeanor and tacitly vouched for the truth of her testimony. We are not persuaded. Section 868.5 permits prosecution witnesses in cases involving murder and other enumerated offenses to be attended in court by two support persons, one of whom may accompany the witness to the stand. Absent improper interference by the support person, however, no decision supports the proposition that defendant advances here, that the support person‟s mere presence infringes his due process and confrontation clause rights. “ „The presence of a second person at the stand does not require the jury to infer that the support person believes and endorses the witness‟s testimony, so it does not necessarily bolster the witness‟s testimony.‟ [Citation.]” (People v. Stevens, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 641; see People v. Ybarra (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1069, 1076-1079; People v. Patten (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1718, 1725-1733.) Here, the record does not disclose any circumstances indicating that Donna‟s support person improperly influenced the jury‟s assessment of her testimony. (See People v. Patten, supra, at pp. 17311732.) For instance, there is no description as to where the support person sat in proximity to Donna and whether she had physical contact with Donna during her testimony. Nor is there any indication that the support person displayed emotion or gestures suggesting to the jury that she believed Donna‟s account of the 42 incident. (Patten, supra, at pp. 1732-1733.) Notably, the court informed the jurors that Donna was entitled by law to be attended by a support person during her testimony, and admonished them that the support person was “not the witness.” This admonition, coupled with the court‟s instruction directing the jury to base its decision in the case solely on the evidence received at trial and not to be swayed by sympathy or prejudice, further undermines any suggestion of improper interference by the support person. (People v. Ybarra, supra, at p. 1078.) Defendant fails to show that he was prejudiced by the presence of a support person during Donna‟s testimony. Nor are we persuaded by defendant‟s argument that he was prejudiced further by Donna‟s nodding in agreement with prosecution witnesses and crying in court while being comforted by support persons. Defendant posits that such conduct would have instilled in the jury powerful feelings of sympathy and revenge, leading to verdicts on guilt and penalty that were based, not on the evidence adduced at trial, but on emotion. His claim of prejudice is unsupported by the record. A spectator‟s conduct is grounds for reversal if it is “of such a character as to prejudice the defendant or influence the verdict.” (People v. Lucero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1006, 1022; accord, People v. Chatman, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 369; see also Holbrook v. Flynn (1986) 475 U.S. 560, 572 [spectator conduct violates the federal Constitution if it is “so inherently prejudicial as to pose an unacceptable threat to defendant‟s right to a fair trial”].) The trial court has broad discretion to ascertain whether a spectator‟s actions were prejudicial. (People v. Chatman, supra, at p. 369.) There is no showing that Donna‟s presence in the courtroom following her testimony prejudiced defendant. During the hearing on Donna‟s continued courtroom presence, the court made clear its intention to exercise its discretion to 43 exclude any spectator whose conduct threatened the fair trial rights of either side. When later informed by defense counsel that he had seen Donna nodding her head in agreement with a prosecution witness, the court indicated that it would monitor her demeanor. After defense counsel subsequently complained that one or more jurors were watching Donna being comforted by support persons during another witness‟s description of the shooting, the court stated that it had observed no impropriety. The court acknowledged that Donna was upset but noted that she was not making a disturbance. On this record, the court properly exercised its discretion in overruling defense counsel‟s repeated objections to Donna‟s presence in the courtroom. Having observed the courtroom proceedings firsthand, the trial judge was in the best position to evaluate the impact of Donna‟s conduct in front of the jury. (People v. Cornwell (2005) 37 Cal.4th 50, 87.) Defendant cites a number of out-of-state decisions reversing the judgments for spectator misconduct in support of his argument that the same result is warranted here. We examined these identical cases in People v. Lucero, supra, 44 Cal.3d 1006. In rejecting the defendant‟s invitation to adopt the reasoning and result from those decisions, we concluded that none involved the “single isolated outburst” at issue there. (Id. at p. 1023.) We easily reach the same conclusion in this case, in which the conduct in question is even farther afield from the unrelenting, prejudicial disruptions at issue in the cited cases. 3. Circumstantial evidence instructions Defendant contends he was denied due process because the court‟s instructions explaining to the jury how to consider circumstantial evidence were contrary to the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree. The court instructed at the two guilt phases with CALJIC Nos. 2.01 and 8.83: the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to prove guilt and the special 44 circumstance allegations, respectively. In relevant part, both instructions informed the jury that if one interpretation of the circumstantial evidence “appears to you to be reasonable and the other interpretation to be unreasonable, you must accept the reasonable interpretation and reject the unreasonable.” Defendant faults the instructions in two respects. First, he argues that telling the jurors they must accept a guilt interpretation of the evidence “that appears to be reasonable” allows a finding of guilt based on proof less than beyond a reasonable doubt. (Cage v. Louisiana (1990) 498 U.S. 39.) We have repeatedly rejected the identical contention. “When the questioned phrase is read in context, not only with the remaining language within each instruction but also together with related instructions, including the reasonable doubt instruction, it is clear that the jury was required only to reject unreasonable interpretations of the evidence and to accept a reasonable interpretation that was consistent with the evidence.” (People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 144; accord, People v. Brasure (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1037, 1058; People v. Romero (2008) 44 Cal.4th 386, 415.) Defendant acknowledges our prior decisions and urges us to reconsider them. He offers no persuasive reason to do so. Defendant further criticizes CALJIC Nos. 2.01 and 8.83 for requiring the jury to draw an incriminatory inference when such an inference merely appears to be reasonable. Specifically, he argues that imposing on the jurors a duty to accept an interpretation of evidence pointing to his guilt creates an impermissible mandatory, conclusive presumption. (Carella v. California (1989) 491 U.S. 263, 265-266.) We repeatedly have rejected the same contention. (People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 144; People v. Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 926, 942943.) We do so again here for the reasons stated in those decisions. 45 4. Failure to instruct on voluntary intoxication Defendant contends he was denied his state and federal rights to due process, fair trial, and a reliable determination of guilt and penalty by the absence of instructions explaining to the jury how voluntary intoxication may have affected his ability to form the specific intent necessary for conviction of the restaurant crimes. Defendant acknowledges that, absent a defense request, the trial court had no duty to instruct on voluntary intoxication. (People v. Verdugo (2010) 50 Cal.4th 263, 295; People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1120.) Even had defense counsel asked the court to give a voluntary intoxication instruction, however, none was required because there was no substantial evidence either that defendant was intoxicated or that intoxication affected his ability to “actually form[] a required specific intent.” (§ 22, subd. (b); see People v. Roldan, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 715; accord, People v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 677.) Lateshia Winkler testified that defendant was high when he returned to her apartment around 10:00 p.m., after the incident at the restaurant. She further explained on cross-examination that defendant was stumbling around and “shermed out,” meaning that he was under the influence of PCP. During the same line of questioning, however, Winkler also indicated that defendant was “acting normal” before he left her apartment Saturday evening. Defendant points to no evidence suggesting that he was intoxicated at the time of the crimes.