Opinion ID: 1114117
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Assumption of the risk as an AEMLD affirmative defense

Text: Finally, I disagree with the majority's view of assumption of the risk under the AEMLD. This Court has held that, to establish assumption of the risk as an affirmative defense in an AEMLD action, the defendant must show that the plaintiff had knowledge of the danger at hand, and made a voluntary and deliberate choice to assume that known danger. Dennis, supra. The majority, although citing Atkins in its discussion of the assumption of the risk defense, appears to follow the assumption of the risk definition of Dennis. Under the assumption of the risk defense as defined in Dennis, there is no distinction between assumption of the risk in products liability cases and assumption of the risk in ordinary negligence cases. However, as the majority notes, the Atkins Court adopted the following language from Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A in defining assumption of the risk under the AEMLD: If the user or consumer discovers the defect and is aware of the danger, and nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make use of the product and is injured by it, he is barred from recovery. Atkins, 335 So.2d at 143 (emphasis added). The language of Atkins defining the assumption of the risk defense under the AEMLD differs from the Dennis definition of the assumption of the risk defense. A plain reading of the Atkins Court's definition indicates that an element of reasonableness should exist in the AEMLD defense of assumption of the risk. Therefore, following the language in Atkins, I believe that, for Thaxton to establish assumption of the risk in this AEMLD case, it should be required to show the following: first, that Mr. Hicks actually had knowledge of and appreciated the particular risk or danger; second, that Mr. Hicks voluntarily encountered the risk while realizing the danger; and third, that Mr. Hicks's decision to voluntarily encounter the known risk was unreasonable. An AEMLD defendant, when faced by a prima facie showing that it sent a defective product into the stream of commerce and was thus negligent as a matter of law should not be allowed to escape liability because the plaintiff exposed himself to a danger negligently created by the defendant, if that choice was reasonable under the circumstances. Under the AEMLD assumption of the risk defense, I believe that several factors should enter the inquiry as to whether the decision to voluntarily encounter the danger was reasonable. These factors include the conditions under which the plaintiff made the decision and the amount of time that he had to make the decision. The circumstances surrounding the plaintiff's interaction with the product must be taken into account. For example, as in the instant case, a worker whose job requires exposure to danger and who, while working, is injured by a dangerous, defective tool of his trade can rarely be said to have assumed the risk of danger as a matter of law. I believe that the voluntariness with which a worker who is assigned to a dangerous machine encounters that danger is often illusory. The majority does not apply the reasonableness element stated in Atkins to the facts of this case. In my opinion, the jury should not only make an inquiry into whether Mr. Hicks's encounter of the danger created by the Thaxton plug was knowledgeable and voluntary. Instead, the jury should be able to consider whether Mr. Hicks's actions were reasonable under the circumstances of his inherently dangerous work. Too often, the worker's choices in encountering danger on the job are made for him by the circumstances of his work. The Court should follow its own language of Atkins to direct the jury to consider the reasonableness of the plaintiff's action under the surrounding circumstances. As I stated above, I agree with the majority that the jury, not the trial judge, should determine whether Thaxton should be held liable for Mr. Hicks's death. However, as it stands today, products liability law in Alabama simply does not meet the needs of the consumers of Alabama, who deserve a better opportunity to receive compensation for their injuries that stem from defective products.