Opinion ID: 1230314
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Patterson Deliberate Intent Claim

Text: The Appellants premised their civil action against Patterson upon the deliberate intent statute, West Virginia Code § 23-4-2(c)(2)(ii)(A-E). The pertinent portions of West Virginia Code § 23-4-2(c)(2) provide as follows: (2) The immunity from suit provided under this section and under section six-a, article two of this chapter, may be lost only if the employer or person against whom liability is asserted acted with deliberate intention. This requirement may be satisfied only if ... (ii) The trier of fact determines, either through specific findings of fact made by the court in a trial without a jury, or through special interrogatories to the jury in a jury trial, that all of the following facts are proven: (A) That a specific unsafe working condition existed in the workplace which presented a high degree of risk and a strong probability of serious injury or death; (B) That the employer had a subjective realization and an appreciation of the existence of such specific unsafe working condition and of the high degree of risk and the strong probability of serious injury or death presented by such specific unsafe working condition; (C) That such specific unsafe working condition was a violation of a state or federal safety statute, rule or regulation, whether cited or not, or of a commonly accepted and well-known safety standard within the industry or business of such employer, which statute, rule, regulation or standard was specifically applicable to the particular work and working condition involved, as contrasted with a statute, rule, regulation or standard generally requiring safe workplaces, equipment or working conditions; (D) That notwithstanding the existence of the facts set forth in subparagraphs (A) through (C) hereof, such employer nevertheless thereafter exposed an employee to such specific unsafe working condition intentionally; and (E) That such employee so exposed suffered serious injury or death as a direct and proximate result of such specific unsafe working condition. The Appellants claimed that Patterson failed to properly train Mr. Jones regarding safe chute cleaning methods, alleging that Patterson knew its employees inserted their bodies into the chute to clean the materials lodged inside the chute. [6] Thus, the Appellants argued that they proved all five statutory requirements for recovery under the deliberate intent statute. Patterson contended that it had instructed its employees to stand above the chute while cleaning it and had no knowledge of the methods being utilized by Mr. Jones. Patterson had sent Mr. Jones to a training course offered by the West Virginia Office of Safety, Health & Training providing safety training for operators of machinery with chutes. This training course specified that placing one's body in the chute was dangerous and could result in serious injury. [7] The lower court found no evidence to support (1) a specific unsafe working condition; [8] (2) a subjective realization by Patterson of a specific unsafe working condition; or (3) an intentional exposure of Mr. Jones to an unsafe condition. As we stated in syllabus point two of Mayles v. Shoney's, Inc., 185 W.Va. 88, 405 S.E.2d 15 (1990): A plaintiff may establish `deliberate intention' in a civil action against an employer for a work-related injury by offering evidence to prove the five specific requirements provided in W.Va.Code Sec. 23-4-2(c)(2)(ii) (1983). Accord, Syl. Pt. 4, Blake v. John Skidmore Truck Stop, Inc., 201 W.Va. 126, 493 S.E.2d 887 (1997). West Virginia Code § 23-4-2(c)(2)(iii)(B) provides the following guidance to courts reviewing allegations of deliberate intent: A court shall dismiss an action when, after considering all the evidence and every inference legitimately and reasonably raised thereby most favorably to the plaintiff, the court shall determine that there is not sufficient evidence to find each and every one of the facts required to be proven in the deliberate intent statute. In Sias v. W-P Coal Co., 185 W.Va. 569, 408 S.E.2d 321 (1991), this Court held that such motions are to be granted when, pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, one or more of the five elements of W.Va.Code § 23-4-2(c)(2)(ii)(A)-(E) [1994] do not exist (motion for summary judgment) or when, after considering all of the evidence and every reasonable inference in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, there is insufficient evidence to find each and every one of the aforestated five elements (motion for a directed verdict). 185 W.Va. at 576, 408 S.E.2d at 328. Syllabus point three of Sias explained: The portion of the statute which authorizes prompt judicial resolution of deliberate intention actions against employers, specifically, W.Va.Code § 23-4-2(c)(2)(iii)(B) [1994], relates to plaintiffs' more specific substantive law burden under the five-element test of W.Va.Code § 23-4-2(c)(2)(ii)(A)-(E) [1994], but the preexisting procedural law still applies for granting employers' motions for summary judgment, directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The lower court examined that evidence presented by the Appellants regarding the specific unsafe working condition, Patterson's subjective realization thereof, and the allegation of intentional exposure of Mr. Jones to an unsafe condition. Indulging in every favorable consideration toward the Appellants, the lower court concluded that the directed verdict should be granted in favor of Patterson. In our de novo review of the directed verdict question, we have reviewed the testimony presented on the deliberate intent issue, and we agree with the lower court's conclusions. We therefore affirm in that respect.