Opinion ID: 157748
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The State Warrant

Text: 16 Le raises several issues with respect to the state warrant. First, he claims that it violated state standards governing admissibility, and that therefore the evidence yielded therefrom should be inadmissible. Second, he argues that sufficient probable cause was not set forth in the affidavit to satisfy either federal or state standards. Third, he argues that the warrant lacked particularity because it failed to mention the explosives that TPD officers had reason to believe were present at the residence. Finally, he argues that the executing officers exceeded the scope of the warrant. We address each of these arguments in turn.
17 As an initial matter, Le argues that state law standards, rather than federal constitutional standards, should govern the admissibility of evidence seized pursuant to the state warrant, even though his case is a federal prosecution. Often, this question is merely academic due to the fact that many state statutes and constitutional provisions are interpreted co-extensively with their federal counterparts. See, e.g., People v. Luttenberger, 50 Cal.3d 1, 265 Cal.Rptr. 690, 784 P.2d 633, 639 (1990) (stating that California appl[ies] federal standards to decide whether relevant evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant must be excluded). However, in some instances states have chosen to interpret their own constitutional guarantees more strictly than similar federal constitutional provisions. Oklahoma, for instance, has state law requirements that are, in one aspect relevant to this case, more exacting than federal standards. 18 Oklahoma courts require that search warrant affidavits state clearly the specific dates on which contraband or evidence of a crime was observed on the premises to be searched. Morris v. State, 617 P.2d 252, 252 (Okla.Crim.App.1980) (stating that [w]hen officers seek a search warrant based on information from a confidential informant, it is required that they be able to say when the informant obtained his information). Federal courts, by contrast, which apply a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, do not specifically require such information. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). 19 It is, however, well established in this circuit that in federal prosecutions the test of reasonableness in relation to the Fourth Amendment protected rights must be determined by Federal law even though the police actions are those of state police officers. 2 United States v. Miller, 452 F.2d 731, 733 (10th Cir.1971). We have reaffirmed this principle many times since Miller. See, e.g., United States v. Callwood, 66 F.3d 1110, 1112 n. 1 (10th Cir.1995); United States v. Morehead, 959 F.2d 1489, 1497 (10th Cir.1992); see also United States v. Miles, 772 F.2d 613, 615-16 (10th Cir.1985) (upholding the validity of an Oklahoma state search warrant, using the federal totality of the circumstances test, even though [t]he affidavit did not state on what date the informant claimed to have seen the transaction with the stolen guns in the appellant's home). The basis for this principle is that the exclusionary rule is only concerned with deterring [federal] Constitutional violations. United States v. Wright, 16 F.3d 1429, 1437 (6th Cir.1994). Therefore, [t]he fact that the arrest, search, or seizure may have violated state law is irrelevant as long as the standards developed under the Federal Constitution were not offended. Id. Le's argument for the applicability of state law standards simply cannot withstand scrutiny. 20 Thus, the district court was correct to apply federal constitutional principles to the issue at hand. The specific requirements of Oklahoma law, such as the requirement that the affidavit state the specific dates on which criminal activity was observed on the premises to be searched, are only parts of the totality of the circumstances which federal courts must consider in determining whether the affidavits underlying state search warrants are sufficient. See United States v. Richardson, 86 F.3d 1537, 1544 (10th Cir.1996) (stating that federal courts are to conduct an independent inquiry ... apply[ing] federal law into the reasonableness of a search, but that federal courts are not prohibited from considering state law, although such consideration may not enlarge nor diminish federal law (citation omitted)).
21 When reviewing a magistrate's finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, we must consider the totality of the circumstances and determine whether the affidavit established the probability that evidence of criminal activity would be located in the desired search area. United States v. Wittgenstein, 163 F.3d 1164, 1171 (10th Cir.1998). A magistrate's determination that probable cause exists is entitled to great deference, and we ask only whether the issuing magistrate had a 'substantial basis' for determining probable cause existed. Id. at 1172 (quoting Lawmaster v. Ward, 125 F.3d 1341, 1348 (10th Cir.1997)); see Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39, 103 S.Ct. 2317. Applying this standard, we conclude that the magistrate's decision was proper. 22 The affidavit presented to the state magistrate in this case contained the following information. The affiant, TPD Officer James Comstock, stated that he had received information from two different confidential informants, both of whom provided essentially the same information. The first informant stated that Le was selling several varieties of drugs from his residence, and that he had seen a considerable amount of [methamphetamine, cocaine, and marijuana] at [Le's] residence on numerous occasions, and had bought cocaine and methamphetamine from [Le], over one-hundred, (100), times in the past couple of years. Appellant's App. at 41. This source also stated that Le has a gun store which sells fully automatic fire arms and that Le keeps some of these weapons and ammunition at his residence. Id. The source stated that, because of Le's access to weapons, he was scared of any repercussions that might occur should [he] assist officers in any other way. Id. at 41-42. 23 The second source corroborated the first, stating that he has worked for [Le] in the past, and has bought methamphetamine and cocaine from [Le] on numerous occasions from both [Le's] residence and from [Le's] gun shop, and that he has seen [Le] to have in his possession ... a kilogram of cocaine. Id. at 42. This source also stated that he was scared of [Le] because of his access to automatic weapons. Id. 24 In an effort to corroborate the information received from the two confidential sources, Comstock ascertained that Le did indeed live at the address given by both sources; that Le did indeed have a gun shop at the address given by both sources; and that the gun shop was licensed by the federal government to sell firearms, including machine guns and silencers. 3 In addition, on June 13, 1997, Comstock collected the trash that Le left at his curb, and discovered a used ziploc baggie with a white powder residue inside of it. Id. A field test revealed that the white powder in the baggie was methamphetamine. Id. On June 27, 1997, Comstock again collected Le's trash, and found two small baggies, similar to the one found on June 13, but these two baggies had been washed clean. Id. 25 We think that the information in the affidavit, taken as a whole, supports the magistrate's finding that probable cause existed to issue the warrant. The affidavit contained information provided by two different informants whose stories were remarkably consistent. [C]onsistency between the reports of two independent informants helps to validate both accounts. United States v. Schaefer, 87 F.3d 562, 566 (1st Cir.1996); see also United States v. Fulgham, 143 F.3d 399, 401 (8th Cir.1998) (holding that the magistrate's finding of probable cause was supported by, among other things, the reciprocally corroborative consistency in the information provided by two separate informants); United States v. Pritchard, 745 F.2d 1112, 1121 (7th Cir.1984) (stating that [b]y telling consistent yet independent stories, the informants provide 'cross-corroboration,' and enhance the reliability of the application as a whole (citations omitted)). Also, it was against the penal interest of the informants to provide this type of information to the police, a factor we have considered indicative of reliability. See United States v. Sturmoski, 971 F.2d 452, 457 (10th Cir.1992). 26 In addition, Officer Comstock corroborated the informants' information, first by ascertaining that Le was involved in a business that bought and sold firearms and thus had access to heavy weapons, and second by searching Le's refuse and discovering traces of methamphetamine on June 13. Le argues that Comstock's discovery of methamphetamine in Le's trash on June 13 is stale evidence and too far removed from the July 2 search to be probative of criminal activity at the residence. Appellant's Br. at 39-40. However, the determination of whether information is stale depends on the nature of the crime and the length of criminal activity, not simply the number of days that have elapsed between the facts relied upon and the issuance of the warrant. United States v. Myers, 106 F.3d 936, 939 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1270, 117 S.Ct. 2446, 138 L.Ed.2d 205 (1997). Where the offense in question is ongoing and continuing[,] ... the passage of time is not of critical importance. Sturmoski, 971 F.2d at 457. 27 In this case, both informants stated that Le's narcotics operation was a continuing and ongoing activity. Both stated that they had purchased drugs from Le on numerous occasions, Appellant's App. at 41, 42, and the first informant stated that such purchases had been occurring over a two-year period, id. at 41. With regard to an ongoing criminal enterprise such as the one Le was involved in, a search warrant affidavit can contain information that is more than a few days old. Indeed, we have upheld a magistrate's finding of probable cause in cases involving ongoing criminal operations where the gap between the receipt of the probative information and the issuance of the warrant was two-and-one-half weeks, see Miles, 772 F.2d at 616, and even five months, see Myers, 106 F.3d at 939. In this case, we cannot conclude that a lapse of only fourteen days between Comstock's corroboration and the issuance of the warrant, and another lapse of five days between the issuance of the warrant and its execution, renders evidence of Comstock's discovery fatally stale. The issuing magistrate was entitled to consider evidence of Comstock's search of Le's trash. 28 Looking at the totality of the circumstances presented to the issuing magistrate, we think that probable cause existed for the issuance of the state warrant. The combination of the informants' reciprocal corroboration and Comstock's corroborative efforts reduced the chances of a reckless or prevaricating tale, [and] thus provid[ed] a substantial basis for crediting the informants' assertions. Gates, 462 U.S. at 244-45, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (citations omitted). Taken together, all of the facts and corroborative information contained in the affidavit were sufficient to give the magistrate a substantial basis upon which to conclude that there was a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime [would] be found at Le's residence. Id. at 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317.
29 The Fourth Amendment requires that search warrants particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. Const. amend. IV. Le argues that the state warrant failed to meet this requirement because it authorized a search only for methamphetamine and fruits [and] instrumentalities of methamphetamine transactions. Appellant's App. at 47. The warrant made no mention of the explosives, machine guns, and other assorted ordnance that TPD officers suspected might be stored at Le's residence, and which those officers in fact found at the residence. Le argues that the government's failure to include explosives and related items in the warrant turned the state warrant into an invalid general warrant. 30 Le grounds his argument in the reasoning of Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971). In that case, a plurality of the Supreme Court set forth the contours of the plain view exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. The plurality stated that an officer could seize an item for which he had no warrant when that item is found in plain view and (1) the officers are lawfully in a position to observe the item; (2) the discovery of the item is inadvertent; and (3) it is immediately apparent to the searching officers that the item is evidence of a crime or contraband. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 468-71, 91 S.Ct. 2022 (plurality opinion); Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 142, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Especially relevant here is the second requirement set forth in Coolidge: the inadvertence requirement. The Coolidge plurality made clear that the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement dictates that police obtain a warrant for items that they know about and intend to seize: If the initial intrusion is bottomed upon a warrant that fails to mention a particular object, though the police know its location and intend to seize it, then there is a violation of the express constitutional requirement of 'Warrants ... particularly describing ... [the] things to be seized.'  Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 471, 91 S.Ct. 2022 (plurality opinion) (citing U.S. Const. amend. IV). 31 However, because the inadvertence requirement to the plain view exception was announced by only a plurality of the Court, there was some question as to whether the requirement was binding precedent. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 737, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983) (plurality opinion) (stating that, even though the inadvertence requirement had generally been applied by lower courts, it has never been expressly adopted by a majority of this Court and that it was not a binding precedent). In 1990, a majority of the Court finally held that inadvertence is not a necessary condition of legitimate 'plain-view' seizures. Horton, 496 U.S. at 130, 110 S.Ct. 2301. The Court stated that [t]he fact that an officer is interested in an item of evidence and fully expects to find it in the course of a search should not invalidate its seizure if the search is confined in area and duration by the terms of a warrant or a valid exception to the warrant requirement. Id. at 138, 110 S.Ct. 2301. 4 32 In the case before us, the government concedes that TPD officers had some knowledge of the existence of explosives and heavy weapons at Le's residence prior to executing the state warrant. Tr. of Hearing on Motions, October 17, 1997, at 222 (government counsel stating that Judge, I think I can shorten this by saying we will stipulate that Officer Comstock had knowledge prior to his arresting [Le], that there ... could be explosives located in the house). Indeed, Officer Comstock stated that he had been told that there were explosives in the house, but that he did not know [that] for a fact, and that TPD officers did not seek a search warrant for explosives prior to July 2 because, until that date, they had no corroborating information to back up the claims of informants that explosives and weapons were present at Le's residence. Tr. of Hearing on Motions, September 11, 1997, at 65, 69, 79. Comstock also stated that because TPD officers suspected that there might be explosives at the residence, out of an abundance of caution for officer safety they notified a K-9 team from the TPD bomb squad and told them to be on standby. Id. at 47. 33 Upon entering Le's residence pursuant to the state warrant for drugs, TPD officers discovered drugs, weapons, and explosives. The search warrant return indicates that TPD officers seized several varieties of drugs and weapons, but did not seize the heavy weaponry and explosives. Appellant's App. at 49-51. Later that day, based on what the TPD officers and the federal agents, who had been called in when explosives were discovered, had seen at the residence, a second warrant was issued for Le's residence, authorizing federal agents to search for explosives. 34 We think the actions of law enforcement officers in waiting to seize the explosives until after the issuance of the second warrant was lawful and even commendable behavior. It likely would have been permissible in this case for the officers to have simply seized the explosives without obtaining the second warrant. Indeed, the Supreme Court has expressly endorsed such actions, stating that if [an officer] has a valid warrant to search for one item and merely a suspicion concerning the second [item], whether or not it amounts to probable cause, we fail to see why that suspicion should immunize the second item from seizure if it is found during a lawful search for the first. Horton, 496 U.S. at 139, 110 S.Ct. 2301. Here, however, the officers took the extra precautionary step of waiting to seize the explosives until after the second warrant for explosives had been issued. 35 In sum, we cannot conclude that the officers' behavior was unlawful. We think it clear that the inadvertence requirement is no longer a necessary condition for a legal plain view seizure. Under current Supreme Court precedent, a police officer may, if on the premises pursuant to a valid warrant or under an exception to the warrant requirement, seize items which immediately appear to be evidence or contraband of a crime. Here, law enforcement officials acted with due regard for both officer safety and the Fourth Amendment by calling in the K-9 team and the ATF agents only after explosives were discovered in plain view during a lawful search for drugs, and by waiting to seize those explosives until after a second warrant, this one for explosives, had been issued. In this case, we cannot conclude that the state warrant was infirm merely because it did not specifically authorize a search for explosives. The explosives were discovered because they were in the plain view of the TPD officers legally on the premises. Accordingly, the state warrant meets the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement.
36 Le next argues that the officers who executed the state warrant grossly exceeded the scope of the warrant by seizing several items not specifically mentioned in the warrant, and that the remedy for this alleged violation of his Fourth Amendment rights should be a blanket suppression of everything seized pursuant to the state warrant. 37 We begin our analysis by noting that the general rule, where executing officers exceed the scope of a warrant, is that 'only the improperly seized evidence, not all of the evidence, must be suppressed, unless there was a flagrant disregard for the terms of the warrant.'  Hargus, 128 F.3d at 1363 (quoting United States v. $149,442.43 in U.S. Currency, 965 F.2d 868, 875 (10th Cir.1992)). In the vast majority of cases, a search is not invalidated merely because some things are seized that are not stated in the warrant. Id. This is particularly true when the non-specified items are not admitted into evidence against the defendant. Id. 38 In very rare cases, however, we have applied the unusual remedy of blanket suppression. In United States v. Medlin, 842 F.2d 1194 (10th Cir.1988), for instance, we ordered a blanket suppression of all items seized pursuant to a federal warrant authorizing a search for firearms. Id. at 1195. In that case, local officers who did not possess a separate warrant entered the residence with the federal officers, and the local officers seized 667 items of property none of which were identified in the warrant authorizing the search. Id. at 1196. We held that the officers, by seizing so many items not mentioned in the warrant, exhibited a flagrant disregard for the terms of the warrant and actually transformed the otherwise valid warrant into a general warrant. Id. at 1199. In such cases, we stated, blanket suppression is appropriate. Id. 39 Similarly, in United States v. Foster, 100 F.3d 846 (10th Cir.1996), we held that blanket suppression was again the proper remedy, where state officers acting pursuant to an otherwise valid warrant seized over 60 items not mentioned in the warrant, including VCR machines and video equipment, a socket set, a pair of green coveralls, a riding lawn mower, three garden tillers, several stereo systems, two microphones, several televisions, a drill, a camera tripod, a BB gun, a camera, a metal rod, a clock radio, and a screwdriver set. Id. at 848 n. 1. One of the executing officers in that case even testified at the suppression hearing that the officers had simply taken anything of value in the house, and that this was the usual method employed by police in this particular county. Id. at 850-51 nn. 5-6. Citing Medlin, we held that these officers had also exhibited a flagrant disregard for the terms of the warrant, and we suppressed everything seized pursuant to the warrant. 40 The only other federal appellate case of which we are aware in which blanket suppression was the remedy applied is United States v. Rettig, 589 F.2d 418 (9th Cir.1978). In that case, after obtaining the search warrant through less-than-forthright means, executing officers seized some 2,288 items, including numerous U.S. government publications, credit card applications, bank brochures, medical and dental records, and many other documents. Id. at 421. The Ninth Circuit held that [a]s interpreted and executed by the agents, this warrant became an instrument for conducting a general search, and suppressed all evidence discovered in the search. Id. at 423. 41 Keeping in mind the rule that blanket suppression is an extreme remedy, almost wholly absent from the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence of other circuits, we must determine whether the officers executing the state warrant so flagrantly exceeded its scope that blanket suppression is a justifiable remedy. The state warrant, which we have already determined to be validly issued, authorized a search for the following: 42 methamphetamine, fruits, instrumentalities, monies, records, to include telephone number information on possible associates related to the sale of controlled dangerous drugs, financial records, (bank records, checking, savings and business account information), that demonstrate the above subject is deriving profit from the sale of methamphetamine or any other controlled dangerous drugs and dispersement [sic] of assets which are drug related, proof of residency, drug related notations. 43 Appellant's App. at 47. In connection with the execution of this warrant, TPD officers confiscated some 78 items, including two plastic baggies full of methamphetamine; several pill bottles containing prescription painkillers; several varieties of ammunition; various firearms and gun parts, including a pellet gun; a grenade launcher; a hunting knife; several holsters; one green armor vest; a scanner, monitor, and camera; $710 in U.S. currency; one gold chain; one brown wallet; a bank bag; a night scope; a black address book; a cellular phone; a key chain and assorted keys; and two briefcases containing assorted documents. 44 Any argument Le might make that the TPD officers exceeded the scope of the warrant by seizing the firearms and ammunition is fatally flawed. The guns and ammunition were discovered pursuant to a valid warrant-based search for methamphetamine, and were in the plain view of the searching officers. Also, Officer Comstock testified that he and the other TPD officers were aware that it was a federal offense for a user of drugs to possess a firearm. See Tr. of Hearing on Motions, September 11, 1997, at 56-57; see also 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3); United States v. Smith, 899 F.2d 116 (1st Cir.1990) (Breyer, C.J.) (upholding a plain view seizure of guns by state officers because the state officers were aware that the possession of the guns by the defendant was a violation of federal law). Thus, the guns and the ammunition were properly seized, because they were in plain view of officers legally at the residence, and it was immediately apparent to the officers that the firearms were evidence of a crime. Horton, 496 U.S. at 136-37, 110 S.Ct. 2301. 45 Le argues, however, that the seizure of the pellet gun, the gun parts, the pill bottles, the gold chain, the holsters, and several other items shows that the TPD officers flagrantly disregarded the scope of the warrant. While some of these items may arguably have been improperly seized, the officers did not exhibit a flagrant disregard for the terms of the warrant. Medlin, 842 F.2d at 1199. The remedy for any improper seizure here would be suppression of the items improperly seized, not blanket suppression of all items seized, including those lawfully taken. 46 We need not remand for a specific determination of which items were lawfully seized, because we have determined that the methamphetamine and firearms, the only items taken as a result of the execution of the state warrant for which Le was prosecuted, were lawfully seized.