Opinion ID: 2995520
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Verdict Forms and Interrogatories

Text: in Qualified Immunity Cases Before reviewing the evidence, however, I must pause and comment upon how defense counsel’s unorthodox strategy prejudiced Officer Coffey and complicated our review of this case on appeal. In cases of this nature, defense counsel is responsible for timely preparing and presenting proper interrogatories for the trial judge to submit to the jury. Sadly, defense counsel failed to supply the trial judge with instructions and specific factual interrogatories related to the material contested facts presented at trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 49(b). Instead, both parties took the easy but fatal way out (to the detriment of the jury’s deliberative process) and presented the trial judge with only a general verdict form containing the following question: Did Defendant Sean Coffey use excessive force during the course of the December 20, 1997 traffic stop of Plaintiff Victor McNair [and Plaintiff Tre McNair], which deprived [them] of [their] Fourth Amendment right[s] to be free from unreasonable seizure? Counsel neglected to object to the verdict form’s amorphous question, which improperly invited the jury to usurp the role of the court and resolve constitutional issues in the form of a legal conclusion devoid of reference to specific facts, i.e., what constitutes the precise amount of force that may be displayed in response to the circumstances surrounding the safety risk Coffey reasonablybelieved to have been posed by the McNairs to the police and the public at large. See McGee, 956 F.2d at 735. It is a basic premise of our legal system that juries are the triers of fact only; it is for the judge, not the jury, to interpret the law and to draw the line in the sand separating conduct that is protected and unprotected under the Constitution. In other words, the plaintiff must convince the court that the facts found by the jury are sufficient to trigger the protections of the Fourth Amendment as a matter of law. See id. at 735-36. This case presents an issue similar to that in McGee, which involved the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff McGee alleged a due process violation when a building inspector posted a sign declaring McGee’s house uninhabitable without having previously offered him the right to participate in a hearing. We found error with the trial court’s limited jury instruction that McGee was entitled to damages if the jury was convinced that he was deprived of his property without due process of law. See id. at 735 ([t]he jury was instructed that McGee should prevail . . . if he proved . . . [t]hat the alleged deprivation occurred without due process of law.) We held that this instruction was impermissible because it essentially asked the jury to decide what process McGee was due in regards to the alleged deprivation. Id. Jurors without the benefit of legal education, training and experience are not expected to be qualified to interpret a constitutional question dealing with the precise substantive guarantees of the Due Process Clause. We stated that [w]hat process is due under the Constitution is a legal question that the judge should resolve. The judge then should put to the jury any factual questions relating to the application of that standard. The jury’s conclusion that McGee did not receive ’due process of law’ does not inform our analysis of what process was due. Id. Certainly, the reasoning of McGee applies to the facts in the case before us. During the trial, the McNairs raised a constitutional issue, alleging an excessive display of force. At the close of the McNairs’ case, upon proper motion and with the aid of respective counsel, the trial judge was obligated to initially inquire whether the plaintiffs produced any facts sufficient to allow a jury to determine whether Patrolman Coffey violated their Fourth Amendment rights. Before sending the case to the jury, and after taking into consideration the facts and the law applicable thereto, the attorneys were obligated to submit, and the court was likewise obligated to present the jury with special interrogatories that would have then allowed the court to: (1) understand what precisely occurred on December 20, 1997; and (2) determine, in light of those particular findings and the applicable law, whether such a violation in fact occurred. See Rakovich v. Wade, 850 F.2d 1180, 1202 n.15 (7th Cir. 1987) (en banc); Gros v. Port Washington Police Dist., 944 F. Supp. 1072, 1084 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) ([u]nresolved factual questions bearing on qualified immunity should be decided . . . on special interrogatories.) Here, the issue is whether the McNairs proved at trial that Officer Coffey displayed excessive force. As previously discussed, after resting their cases, the parties should have provided the trial judge with special interrogatories and requests that the jurors be instructed, prior to their deliberations, that the parties agreed that Officer Coffey was the sole patrolman on duty, seated in his car in the dark of winter around 5:30 p.m., in an area stipulated to as having a high crime rate, including drug trafficking; and that Officer Coffey encountered the McNairs among a group of three other individuals standing on a street corner near an apartment known to be the site of illegal drug activity. (Appellants’ Br. at 6-7; Appellee’s Br. at 1-3.) See 9A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure sec. 2506 at 174-76 (1995) (discussing jury instructions related to undisputed facts). Then, the specific questions asked of the jury should have included, but not necessarily been limited to: According to the evidence presented, would a patrolman in Officer Coffey’s position have reasonably believed that: (1) the McNairs and this crowd dispersed shortly after seeing Officer Coffey’s police vehicle, with some members of the group retreating towards the apartment?; (2) a third suspect may have been present in the McNair vehicle outside Coffey’s field of vision?; (3) the McNairs should have seen and heard Coffey’s emergency lights and sirens, yet disregarded these observations and continued driving for one mile or more?; (4) the McNairs pulled into a gas station lot, where customers were present, which was within walking distance of a residential neighborhood?; and (5) furthermore, as a result of their seizure, did the McNairs suffer any physical injuries while they were detained for approximately one hour for questioning? The jury’s responses then should have served as the basis for the district judge’s determination of whether Officer Coffey’s actions were reasonable as a matter of constitutional law. See Rakovich, 850 F.2d at 1202 n.15; 9A Wright & Miller, supra sec.sec. 2511-13 at 217-35. Because of defense counsel’s failure to request, much less tender any proposed special interrogatories to the trial judge, the jury was improperly instructed and ill-informed. Nevertheless, I cannot agree with the wild-eyed speculation and supposition offered by plaintiffs’ counsel that the McNairs must prevail because the jury necessarily determined that a reasonable officer would never have believed the McNairs were drug dealers or posed any sort of threat. (Appellants’ Rule 54 Stmt. at 5 n.5.) Counsel’s argument is misdirected in at least two respects. First, although counsel sets up a strawman, i.e., his drug dealer argument, and proceeds to flail away at it, the dispositive issue is not whether the McNairs were drug dealers. Rather, the controlling question is whether Officer Coffey acted reasonably at the time, in light of his knowledge, information,experience, and perceptions of the seriousness of the totality of the circumstances confronting him. Saucier, 121 S.Ct. at 2155-56; Smith v. City of Chicago, 242 F.3d 737, 743-44 (7th Cir. 2001). In addition, as I stated earlier, the jury’s conclusion that Coffey used excessive force must be supported with specific evidence offered at trial. To the extent that undisputed and unimpeached evidence established material facts showing, as a matter of law, that Officer Coffey was justified in his belief that the McNairs posed a risk to himself and to the community, the uninformed jury’s finding that Coffey violated the Fourth Amendment, in response to the inane, sweeping question, Did Defendant Sean Coffey use excessive force during the course of the December 20, 1997 traffic stop of Plaintiff Victor McNair [and Plaintiff Tre McNair], which deprived [them] of [their] Fourth Amendment right[s] to be free from unreasonable seizure?, is useless and highly prejudicial to Officer Coffey. See McGee, 956 F.2d at 735-36; Dual Mfg. & Eng’g v. Burris Indus., 619 F.2d 660, 667 (7th Cir. 1980) (en banc).