Opinion ID: 2545158
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Heading: Armando's Probation Search Condition

Text: Under California law, issues relating to the suppression of evidence derived from police searches and seizures must be reviewed under federal constitutional standards. ( People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 254-255, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 682; People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1291, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259.) The Fourth Amendment guarantees [t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures by police officers and other government officials. (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.) The touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is whether a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy, that is, whether he or she has manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search that society is willing to recognize as reasonable. ( California v. Ciraolo (1986) 476 U.S. 207, 211, 106 S.Ct. 1809, 90 L.Ed.2d 210; In re Tyrell J. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68, 83, 32 Cal. Rptr.2d 33, 876 P.2d 519 ( Tyrell J.), cert, den. sub nom. Tyrell J. v. California (1995) 514 U.S. 1068, 115 S.Ct. 1701, 131 L.Ed.2d 563; see People v. Ayala, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 255, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 682.) [P]rivate residences are places in which the individual normally expects privacy free of governmental intrusion not authorized by a warrant, and that expectation is plainly one that society is prepared to recognize as justifiable. ( United States v. Karo (1984) 468 U.S. 705, 714, 104 S.Ct. 3296, 82 L.Ed.2d 530; see Steagald v. United States (1981) 451 U.S. 204, 211-212, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 68 L.Ed.2d 38; Payton v. New York (1980) 445 U.S. 573, 589-590, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639.) Likewise, a garage that is attached or adjacent to a home may give rise to a legitimate expectation of privacy therein. (E.g., Taylor v. United States (1932) 286 U.S. 1, 5-6, 52 S.Ct. 466, 76 L.Ed. 951; People v. Dugan (1980) 102 Mich.App. 497, 504-506, 302 N.W.2d 209, 212.) Under the Fourth Amendment, a warrantless search of such an area is unreasonable per se unless it falls within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, for example, where consent to the search has been given. ( Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973) 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854; People v. Bravo (1987) 43 Cal.3d 600, 609, 238 Cal.Rptr. 282, 738 P.2d 336.) In California, a person may validly consent in advance to warrantless searches and seizures in exchange for the opportunity to avoid serving a state prison term. ( People v. Bravo, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 608, 238 Cal.Rptr. 282, 738 P.2d 336; People v. Mason (1971) 5 Cal.3d 759, 764-766, 97 Cal.Rptr. 302, 488 P.2d 630.) Warrantless searches are justified in the probation context because they aid in deterring further offenses by the probationer and in monitoring compliance with the terms of probation. ( People v. Mason, supra, 5 Cal.3d at pp. 763-764, 97 Cal. Rptr. 302, 488 P.2d 630; see People v. Bravo, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 610, 238 Cal.Rptr. 282, 738 P.2d 336.) By allowing close supervision of probationers, probation search conditions serve to promote rehabilitation and reduce recidivism while helping to protect the community from potential harm by probationers. (See Griffin v. Wisconsin (1987) 483 U.S. 868, 875, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 [upholding a warrantless probation search under a state regulation requiring reasonable grounds for searches].) We recently relied upon the common authority theory of consent in recognizing that if persons live with a probationer, shared areas of their residence may be searched based on the probationer's advance consent. ( People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 675-676, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 88, 981 P.2d 1019, cert. den. sub nom. Woods v. California (2000) 529 U.S. 1023, 120 S.Ct. 1429, 146 L.Ed.2d 319 [no dissenting votes noted]; see generally United States v. Matlock (1974) 415 U.S. 164,171 & fn. 7, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242.) Here it is undisputed that defendant's brother, who had agreed to warrantless searches of his property, including any residence premise] as a condition of probation, lived with defendant in apartment C on the day police entered the garage. [2] The People, relying principally on People v. Woods, supra, 21 Cal.4th 668, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 88, 981 P.2d 1019, contend that Armando's search condition furnished legal justification for the warrantless search and seizure, notwithstanding the searching officers' ignorance of the condition at the time of their actions. This argument proves too much. In People v. Woods, supra, 21 Cal.4th 668, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 88, 981 P.2d 1019, two persons who resided with a probationer challenged the constitutionality of a warrantless search of their home by a police officer who relied on the authority of a known search clause to seek incriminating evidence against another party residing in the home. (21 Cal.4th at pp. 672-673, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 88, 981 P.2d 1019.) In evaluating the legality of the search, we found it appropriate to apply an objective standard. In the context of probation searches, we explained, the question is whether the circumstances, viewed objectively, show a proper probationary justification for an officer's search; if they do, then the officer's subjective motivations with respect to a third party resident do not render the search invalid. [3] ( People v. Woods, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 678-681, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 88, 981 P.2d 1019 [relying upon Whren v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 806, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 and other Supreme Court decisions]; cf. Bond v. United States (2000) 529 U.S. 334, 338, 120 S.Ct. 1462, 1465, 146 L.Ed.2d 365 [border agent's state of mind properly disregarded in evaluating whether his physical manipulation of a bus passenger's bag violated the Fourth Amendment].) We concluded there that, regardless of the searching officer's ulterior motives, the circumstances presented ample justification for a search pursuant to the probation clause at issue because the facts known to the officer showed a possible probation violation. ( People v. Woods, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 681, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 88, 981 P.2d 1019.) Contrary to the People's argument, People v. Woods, supra, 21 Cal.4th 668, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 88, 981 P.2d 1019, does not support the proposition that police officers may lawfully enter a residential premises, without a warrant and without any awareness of a resident's probation search condition, to indiscriminately search for and seize evidence of suspected criminal wrongdoing. As our decisions indicate, searches that are undertaken pursuant to a probationer's advance consent must be reasonably related to the purposes of probation. (See People v. Bravo, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 610, 238 Cal.Rptr. 282, 738 P.2d 336; People v. Mason, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 764, 97 Cal.Rptr. 302, 488 P.2d 630.) Significantly, a search of a particular residence cannot be reasonably related to a probationary purpose when the officers involved do not even know of a probationer who is sufficiently connected to the residence. Moreover, if officers lack knowledge of a probationer's advance consent when they search the residence, their actions are wholly arbitrary in the sense that they search without legal justification and without any perceived limits to their authority. (Cf. Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 87, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 876 P.2d 519 [even though the probationer may not reasonably expect freedom from warrantless searches, officers' advance knowledge of a search condition nonetheless helps to ensure that a resulting search is not conducted for reasons unrelated to the purposes of probation]; People v. Bravo, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 606, 238 Cal.Rptr. 282, 738 P.2d 336 [the scope of a permissible probation search is determined by reference to the probation order].) People v. Woods , which concerned the legality of a home search premised upon a known probation condition, does not suggest otherwise. [4] As the People correctly note, Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th 68, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 876 P.2d 519, expressly declined to impose a strict requirement that the searching officer must always have advance knowledge of a search condition. ( Id. at pp. 86-87, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 876 P.2d 519.) That decision, however, fails to aid the People in the situation presented here. In Tyrell J., we considered a minor's efforts to suppress evidence of marijuana found on his person by a police officer who, unaware of the minor's probation search condition, detained and pat-searched the minor. Although the officer had acted without probable cause and without a warrant, we concluded, based on the circumstances surrounding the search, that the minor's expectation of privacy was not one society is prepared to recognize as reasonable and legitimate for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. [5] ( Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 86, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 876 P.2d 519; see also People v. Viers (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 990, 993, 2 Cal. Rptr.2d 667 [same conclusion in case involving an adult probationer].) In particular, we observed that the minor, being subject to a search condition, presumably was aware that any police officer, probation officer, or school official could at any time stop him on the street, at school, or even enter his home, and ask that he submit to a warrantless search. ( Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 86, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 876 P.2d 519.) Additionally, there was no indication the minor was led to believe that only police officers who were aware of the search condition would execute it; nor could he reasonably have believed the searching officer would not do so, for he did know whether the officer was aware of the condition. ( Ibid. ) The logic of Tyrell J. cannot be stretched to vitiate the illegality of the police action here. Even though a person subject to a search condition has a severely diminished expectation of privacy over his or her person and property, there is no doubt that those who reside with such a person enjoy measurably greater privacy expectations in the eyes of society. For example, those who live with a probationer maintain normal expectations of privacy over their persons. In addition, they retain valid privacy expectations in residential areas subject to their exclusive access or control, so long as there is no basis for officers to reasonably believe the probationer has authority over those areas. (See Illinois v. Rodriguez (1990) 497 U.S. 177, 188-189, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148; People v. Woods, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 682, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 88, 981 P.2d 1019.) That persons under the same roof may legitimately harbor differing expectations of privacy is consistent with the principle that one's ability to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends upon the reasonableness of his or her individual expectations. (See Minnesota v. Carter (1998) 525 U.S. 83, 88-90, 119 S.Ct. 469, 472-473, 142 L.Ed.2d 373; Steagald v. United States, supra, 451 U.S. at pp. 218-219, 101 S.Ct. 1642.) It is true that if persons live with a probationer, common or shared areas of their residence may be searched by officers aware of an applicable search condition. ( People v. Woods, supra, 21 Cal.4th 668, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 88, 981 P.2d 1019; Russi v. Superior Court (1973) 33 Cal. App.3d 160, 108 Cal.Rptr. 716. [6] ) Critically, however, cohabitants need not anticipate that officers with no knowledge of the probationer's existence or search condition may freely invade their residence in the absence of a warrant or exigent circumstances. Thus, while cohabitants have no cause to complain of searches that are reasonably and objectively related to the purposes of probationfor example, when routine monitoring occurs (see Russi v. Superior Court, supra, 33 Cal.App.3d at p. 166, 108 Cal.Rptr. 716) or when facts known to the police indicate a possible probation violation that would justify action pursuant to a known search clause ( People v. Woods, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 680-681, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 88, 981 P.2d 1019)they may legitimately challenge those searches that are not. Tyrell J., which focused specifically on the reasonableness of a probationer's privacy expectations, does not indicate otherwise. Moreover, it must be remembered that probation is an important aspect[] of the state's penal system, the optimum successful functioning of which is of compelling public interest. ( Russi v. Superior Court, supra, 33 Cal.App.3d at p. 168, 108 Cal.Rptr. 716.) With respect to the goals of probation, society would be hard pressed not to `recognize as legitimate' ( New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985) 469 U.S. 325, 338, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720) third party privacy expectations concerning the illegality of warrantless searches that bear no reasonable relation to the purposes of probation. Many law-abiding citizens might choose not to open their homes to probationers if doing so were to result in the validation of arbitrary police action. If increased numbers of probationers were not welcome in homes with supportive environments, higher recidivism rates and a corresponding decrease in public safety may be expected, both of which would detract from the optimum successful functioning of the probation system. Finally, we observe the principal purpose of the exclusionary rule `is to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures.' ( Illinois v. Krull (1987) 480 U.S. 340, 347, 107 S.Ct. 1160, 94 L.Ed.2d 364, quoting United States v. Calandra (1974) 414 U.S. 338, 347, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561.) In Tyrell J., we concluded that dispensing with a strict knowledge-first rule would not encourage law enforcement officials to engage in warrantless searches of juveniles because they would be [taking] the chance that if the target of a search is not subject to a search condition, any contraband found will be inadmissible in court. ( Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 89, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 876 P.2d 519.) Although police officers therefore have sufficient incentive to avoid an improper search of a person ( ibid. ), residential searches present an altogether different situation. Notably, residences frequently are occupied by several people living together, including immediate family members and perhaps other relatives or friends, as well as guests. Allowing the People to validate a warrantless residential search, after the fact, by means of showing a sufficient connection between the residence and any one of a number of occupants who happens to be subject to a search clause, would encourage the police to engage in facially invalid searches with increased odds that a justification could be found later. It also would create a significant potential for abuse since the police, in effect, would be conducting searches with no perceived boundaries, limitations, or justification. (See People v. Bravo, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 606, 238 Cal.Rptr. 282, 738 P.2d 336.) The potential for abuse, with its consequent impact on the citizenry, is especially heightened in high crime areas where police might suspect probationers to live. Thus, while society generally has an interest in having all probative evidence before the court, in circumstances such as these a knowledge-first requirement is appropriate to deter future police misconduct and to effectuate the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. (See Illinois v. Krull, supra, 480 U.S. at p. 347, 107 S.Ct. 1160.) For all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude the police conduct here transgressed constitutional limits. By entering apartment C's garage with no warrant and no awareness of Armando's advance consent to probation searches, the police violated defendant's reasonable expectations of privacy under the Fourth Amendment. Although the advance consent might have furnished a legitimate basis for the search and seizure had the officers known of it at the time they acted, the mere fact of its existence does not vitiate the unlawfulness of what happened here.