Opinion ID: 3046716
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Amendment Request

Text: Leave to amend under Rule 15(a) should be “freely given when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). The Supreme Court interpreted this rule in the venerable case of Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962): Rule 15(a) declares that leave to amend ‘shall be freely given when justice so requires’; this mandate is to be heeded. See generally, 3 Moore, Federal Practice (2d ed. 1948), ¶¶ 15.08, 15.10. If the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the merits. In the absence of any apparent or declared reason-such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure 6 deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.-the leave sought should, as the rules require, be ‘freely given.’ Of course, the grant or denial of an opportunity to amend is within the discretion of the District Court, but outright refusal to grant the leave without any justifying reason appearing for the denial is not an exercise of discretion; it is merely abuse of that discretion and inconsistent with the spirit of the Federal Rules. By this standard, the District Court abused its discretion in failing to grant Bivings’ request to amend. There is no apparent or declared reason such as bad faith, dilatory motive, or prejudice to the other party that would justify a denial of the request to amend. Nor was Bivings’ request to amend untimely. The statute of limitations had begun to run on July 25, 2005,3 and was tolled as of August 29, 2005, when the Bivings filed a petition for post-conviction relief in state court. The limitations period began to run again on January 5, 2007, when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied his petition for permission to appeal. Bivings filed his objections to the Magistrate’s recommendations on June 7, 2007, well within the one-year limitation period.4 Finally “[t]hough we cannot say [Bivings] will prevail on any of [the claims he seeks to add], we are equally unable to say the amendments he proposes are so likely to affect the outcome that they would be futile.” 3 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Bivings’ direct appeal on April 26, 2005, and he would have had 90 days to petition the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, so the statute began to run on July 25, 2005. 4 Given the timeliness of the motion to amend, there is no need for the claims in petitioner’s amended petition to “relate back” to those of his original petition. C.f. United States v. Pittman, 209 F.3d 314, 317 (4th Cir. 2000) (discussing and applying relation back rule). 7 Riley v. Taylor, 62 F.3d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 1995). Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court erred by denying the petition with prejudice without affording Bivings an opportunity to amend. Appellees assert that this result will effectively give petitioners “two bites at the apple,” allowing them to delay bringing all of their claims until after a report and recommendation a magistrate has issued. We are unpersuaded. First, Foman itself involved a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment. Given Foman, it follows a fortiori that a request to amend a complaint following a magistrate’s report and recommendation should not be denied on the basis of unreasonable delay. Second, any concern in regard to delay is outweighed by our interest in rendering decisions on the merits, rather than on the basis of “mere technicalities.” Foman, 371 U.S. at 181. The policy behind Rule 15 and the principles of Foman require that a timely request to amend be granted, even if that request could have been brought at an earlier date. See Riley, 62 F.3d at 91. The fact that Bivings did not present the District Court with a document labeled “Motion to Amend” does not defeat his claim. We construe pro se filings liberally, and hold them “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). See also United States v. Miller, 197 F.3d 644 (3d Cir. 1999) (discussing the “time-honored practice of construing pro se plaintiffs’ pleadings liberally.”) Bivings’ objections to the Magistrate’s report and recommendation 8 made clear his desire to amend his petition to include the claims he had previously exhausted in state court, and he there specifically identified those claims. We are convinced that this was sufficient to put the court and all parties on notice of his request to amend his petition. See Calderon v. Kansas Dept. of Soc. and Rehab. Serv., 181 F.3d 1180 (10th Cir. 1999) (failure to file a formal motion is not always fatal, particularly where there is readily apparent notice to opposing parties and to the court of the desire to amend and the particular basis for amendment); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1990) (the fact that request to amend was not presented in a separate formal motion is not a bar).