Opinion ID: 1833463
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: order on review

Text: Vice President Gore claims that the trial court erred in the following three ways: (1) The trial court held that an election contest proceeding was essentially an appellate proceeding where the County Canvassing Board's decision must be reviewed with an abuse of discretion, rather than de novo, standard of review; (2) The court held that in a contest proceeding in a statewide election a court must review all the ballots cast throughout the state, not just the contested ballots; (3) The court failed to apply the legal standard for relief expressly set forth in section 102.168(3)(c).
The Florida Election Code sets forth a two-pronged system for challenging vote returns and election procedures. The protest and contest provisions are distinct proceedings. A protest proceeding is filed with the County Canvassing Board and addresses the validity of the vote returns. The relief that may be granted includes a manual recount. The Canvassing Board is a neutral ministerial body. See Morse v. Dade County Canvassing Board, 456 So.2d 1314 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). A contest proceeding, on the other hand, is filed in circuit court and addresses the validity of the election itself. Relief that may be granted is varied and can be extensive. No appellate relationship exists between a protest and a contest; a protest is not a prerequisite for a contest. Cf. Flack v. Carter, 392 So.2d 37 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980) (holding that an election protest under section 102.166 was not a condition precedent to an election contest under section 102.168). Moreover, the trial court in the contest action does not sit as an appellate court over the decisions of the Canvassing Board. Accordingly, while the Board's actions concerning the elections process may constitute evidence in a contest proceeding, the Board's decisions are not to be accorded the highly deferential abuse of discretion standard of review during a contest proceeding. In the present case, the trial court erroneously applied an appellate abuse of discretion standard to the Boards' decisions. The trial court's oral order reads in relevant part: The local boards have been given broad discretion which no Court may overrule, absent a clear abuse of discretion. Gore v. Harris, No. 00-2808, 2000 WL 1770257 (Fla.2d Cir.Ct. Dec. 4, 2000) (Proceedings at 10). The trial court further noted: The court further finds that the Dade Canvassing Board did not abuse its discretion.... The Palm Beach County Board did not abuse its discretion in its review and recounting process. [10] In applying the abuse of discretion standard of review to the Boards' actions, the trial court relinquished an improper degree of its own authority to the Boards. This was error.
Appellees contend that even if a count of the undervotes in Miami-Dade were appropriate, section 102.168, Florida Statutes (2000), requires a count of all votes in Miami-Dade County and the entire state as opposed to a selected number of votes challenged. However, the plain language of section 102.168 refutes appellees' argument. Section 102.168(2) sets forth the procedures that must be followed in a contest proceeding, providing that the contestant file a complaint in the circuit court within ten days after certification of the election returns or five days after certification following a protest pursuant to section 102.166(1), whichever occurs later. Section 102.168(3) outlines the grounds for contesting an election, and includes: Receipt of a number of illegal votes or rejection of a number of legal votes sufficient to change or place in doubt the result of the election.  § 102.168(3)(c) (emphasis added). Finally, section 102.168(8) authorizes the circuit court judge to fashion such orders as he or she deems necessary to ensure that each allegation in the complaint is investigated, examined, or checked, to prevent or correct any alleged wrong, and to provide any relief appropriate under the circumstances. As explained above, section 102.168(3)(c) explicitly contemplates contests based upon a rejection of a number of legal votes sufficient to change the outcome of an election. Logic dictates that to bring a challenge based upon the rejection of a specific number of legal votes under section 102.168(3)(c), the contestant must establish the number of legal votes which the county canvassing board failed to count. This number, therefore, under the plain language of the statute, is limited to the votes identified and challenged under section 102.168(3)(c), rather than the entire county. Moreover, counting uncontested votes in a contest would be irrelevant to a determination of whether certain uncounted votes constitute legal votes that have been rejected. On the other hand, a consideration of legal votes contained in the category of undervotes identified statewide may be properly considered as evidence in the contest proceedings and, more importantly, in fashioning any relief. We do agree, however, that it is absolutely essential in this proceeding and to any final decision, that a manual recount be conducted for all legal votes in this State, not only in Miami-Dade County, but in all Florida counties where there was an undervote and, hence, a concern that not every citizen's vote was counted. This election should be determined by a careful examination of the votes of Florida's citizens and not by strategies extraneous to the voting process. This essential principle, that the outcome of elections be determined by the will of the voters, forms the foundation of the election code enacted by the Florida Legislature and has been consistently applied by this Court in resolving elections disputes. We are dealing with the essence of the structure of our democratic society; with the interrelationship, within that framework, between the United States Constitution and the statutory scheme established pursuant to that authority by the Florida Legislature. Pursuant to the authority extended by the United States Constitution, in section 103.011, Florida Statutes (2000), the Legislature has expressly vested in the citizens of the State of Florida the right to select the electors for President and Vice President of the United States: Electors of President and Vice President, known as presidential electors, shall be elected on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November of each year the number of which is a multiple of 4. Votes cast for the actual candidates for President and Vice President shall be counted as votes cast for the presidential electors supporting such candidates. The Department of State shall certify as elected the presidential electors of the candidates for President and Vice President who receive the highest number of votes. Id. In so doing, the Legislature has placed the election of presidential electors squarely in the hands of Florida's voters under the general election laws of Florida. [11] Hence, the Legislature has expressly recognized the will of the people of Florida as the guiding principle for the selection of all elected officials in the State of Florida, whether they be county commissioners or presidential electors. When an election contest is filed under section 102.168, Florida Statutes (2000), the contest statute charges the trial judge to: fashion such orders as he or she deems necessary to ensure that each allegation in the complaint is investigated, examined, or checked, to prevent or correct any alleged wrong, and to provide any relief appropriate under such circumstances. Id. (emphasis added). Through this statute, the Legislature has granted trial courts broad authority to resolve election disputes and fashion appropriate relief. In turn, this Court, consistent with legislative policy, has pointed to the will of the voters as the primary guiding principle to be utilized by trial courts in resolving election contests: [T]he real parties in interest here, not in the legal sense but in realistic terms, are the voters. They are possessed of the ultimate interest and it is they whom we must give primary consideration. The contestants have direct interests certainly, but the office they seek is one of high public service and of utmost importance to the people, thus subordinating their interests to that of the people. Ours is a government of, by and for the people. Our federal and state constitutions guarantee the right of the people to take an active part in the process of that government, which for most of our citizens means participation via the election process. The right to vote is the right to participate; it is also the right to speak, but more importantly the right to be heard. Boardman v. Esteva, 323 So.2d 259, 263 (Fla.1975) (emphasis added). For example, the Legislature has mandated that no vote shall be ignored if there is a clear indication of the intent of the voter on the ballot, unless it is impossible to determine the elector's choice. § 101.5614(5)-(6) Fla. Stat. (2000). Section 102.166(7), Florida Statutes (2000), also provides that the focus of any manual examination of a ballot shall be to determine the voter's intent. The clear message from this legislative policy is that every citizen's vote be counted whenever possible, whether in an election for a local commissioner or an election for President of the United States. [12] The demonstrated problem of not counting legal votes inures to any county utilizing a counting system which results in undervotes and no registered vote ballots. In a countywide election, one would not simply examine such categories of ballots from a single precinct to ensure the reliability and integrity of the countywide vote. Similarly, in this statewide election, review should not be limited to less than all counties whose tabulation has resulted in such categories of ballots. Relief would not be appropriate under [the] circumstances if it failed to address the otherwise valid exercise of the right of a citizen to vote of all those citizens of this State who, being similarly situated, have had their legal votes rejected. This is particularly important in a presidential election, which implicates both state and uniquely important national interests. The contestant here satisfied the threshold requirement by demonstrating that, upon consideration of the thousands of undervote or no registered vote ballots presented, the number of legal votes therein were sufficient to at least place in doubt the result of the election. However, a final decision as to the result of the statewide election should only be determined upon consideration of the legal votes contained within the undervote or no registered vote ballots of all Florida counties, as well as the legal votes already tabulated.
It is immediately apparent, in reviewing the trial court's ruling here, that the trial court failed to apply the statutory standard and instead applied an improper standard in determining the contestant's burden under the contest statute. The trial court began its analysis by stating: [I]t is well established and reflected in the opinion of Judge Joanos and Smith v. Tine[ [13] ][sic], that in order to contest election results under Section 102.168 of the Florida Statutes, the Plaintiff must show that, but for the irregularity, or inaccuracy claimed, the result of the election would have been different, and he or she would have been the winner. It is not enough to show a reasonable possibility that election results could have been altered by such irregularities, or inaccuracies, rather, a reasonable probability that the results of the election would have been changed must be shown. In this case, there is no credible statistical evidence, and no other competent substantial evidence to establish by a preponderance of a reasonable probability that the results of the statewide election in the State of Florida would be different from the result which has been certified by the State Elections Canvassing Commission. This analysis overlooks and fails to recognize the specific and material changes to the statute which the Legislature made in 1999 that control these proceedings. While the earlier version, like the current version, provided that a contestant shall file a complaint setting forth the grounds on which the contestant intends to establish his or her right to such office or set aside the result of the election, the prior version did not specifically enumerate the grounds for contesting an election under this section. Those grounds, as contained in the 1999 statute, now explicitly include, in subsection (c), the [r]eceipt of a number of illegal votes or rejection of a number of legal votes sufficient to change or place in doubt the result of the election. (Emphasis supplied.) Assuming that reasonableness is an implied component of such a doubt standard, [14] the determination of whether the plaintiff has met his or her burden of proof to establish that the result of an election is in doubt is a far different standard than the reasonable probability standard, which was applicable to contests under the old version of the statute, and erroneously applied and articulated as a preponderance of a reasonable probability standard by the trial court here. A person authorized to contest an election is required to demonstrate that there have been legal votes cast in the election that have not been counted (here characterized as undervotes or no vote registered ballots) and that available data [15] shows that a number of legal votes would be recovered from the entire pool of the subject ballots which, if cast for the unsuccessful candidate, would change or place in doubt the result of the election. Here, there has been an undisputed showing of the existence of some 9000 undervotes in an election contest decided by a margin measured in the hundreds. Thus, a threshold contest showing that the result of an election has been placed in doubt, warranting a manual count of all undervotes or no vote registered ballots, has been made.