Opinion ID: 2639238
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Failure to Instruct on Lesser Offense of Second-degree Murder

Text: Davis contends the trial court erred in instructing the jury that it must first consider whether Davis was guilty of first-degree premeditated murder before considering any lesser included offenses. The State disagrees, arguing that the instruction was not erroneous. The jury was instructed as follows on the lesser included offense of second-degree murder: If you do not agree that the defendant is guilty of murder in the first degree, you should then consider the lesser included offense of murder in the second degree. To establish this charge, each of the following claims must be proved: 1. That the defendant intentionally killed Davion Johnson; 2. That this act occurred on or about the 25th day of January, 2000, in Sedgwick County, Kansas. Davis' trial counsel did not object to this instruction. Thus, on appeal, this court is limited to considering whether the instruction was clearly erroneous. K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 22-3414(3); Saenz, 271 Kan. at 346. In support of his assertion that the instruction was erroneous, Davis relies upon K.S.A. 21-3109, which states: A defendant is presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved. When there is a reasonable doubt as to his guilt, he must be acquitted. When there is a reasonable doubt as to which of two or more degrees of an offense he is guilty, he may be convicted of the lowest degree only. Davis asserts that K.S.A. 21-3109 requires that a jury consider all instructions, i.e., both of the charged crime and its lesser included offenses, at the same time. He argues that the instruction in this case violated K.S.A. 21-3109 because it allowed the jury to sign the verdict form without first considering the lesser included offense of second-degree murder. This court addressed the same argument in State v. Roberson, 272 Kan. 1143, 38 P.3d 715 (2002), cert. denied 537 U.S. 829 (2002). In Roberson, the defendant contended that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that it should consider the lesser included offenses to premeditated murder only if the jurors did not agree the defendant was guilty of the charged offense. The Roberson court rejected the defendant's argument, reasoning as follows: The pattern instructions offer an orderly method of considering possible verdicts. The pattern instructions offer a transitional statement that can be inserted at the beginning of the elements instructions of lesser offenses. For example, in this case the trial court used the pattern instruction transitional statement between the charged offense and the next less serious of the lesser offenses: `If you do not agree that the defendant is guilty of murder in the first degree, you should then consider the lesser included offense of murder in the second degree-intentional.' Then the trial court instructed on the elements of the lesser offense of second-degree intentional murder. Roberson's complaint about the approved pattern method of considering possible verdicts is that the jury supposedly cannot consider the lesser offense until after rejecting conviction on the greater offense. In State v. Korbel, 231 Kan. 657, 661, 647 P.2d 1301 (1982), the court rejected a similar challenge to the words `if you cannot agree' when used to preface an instruction on a lesser charge. The court stated that the words `are not coercive and do not require the members of a jury to unanimously find the accused innocent of the greater charge before proceeding to consider a lesser charge. The words `if you cannot agree' presuppose less than a unanimous decision and no inference arises that an acquittal of the greater charge is required before considering the lesser.' 231 Kan. at 661. The jury is instructed that the charged offense, in this case first-degree murder, includes lesser offenses. Here the jury was instructed, according to PIK Crim. 3d 68.09, that the charged offense includes lesser offenses and that defendant may be found guilty of the charged offense, a lesser offense, or may be found not guilty. The court instructed the jury: `You may find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree, murder in the second degree-intentional, murder in the second degree-unintentional, voluntary manslaughter, involuntary manslaughter or not guilty.' The trial court further instructed the jury that `[w]hen there is a reasonable doubt as to which of two or more offenses defendant is guilty, he may be convicted of the lesser offense only.' See K.S.A. 21-3109. Taking these instructions together with the elements instructions, the jury was fully and accurately informed that it could consider the lesser offenses, and the jury had an orderly method for doing so. 272 Kan. at 1154-55. Davis asserts that Roberson was erroneously decided because K.S.A. 21-3109 requires all instructions to be considered as a whole. It is unknown what language within K.S.A. 21-3109 Davis is referring to as establishing the requirement that all instructions be considered together and at the same time. Such a requirement does not exist. As in Roberson, the jury members in this case were instructed in accordance with PIK Crim. 3d 68.09: The offense of first degree murder with which the defendant is charged includes the lesser offense of second degree murder. You may find the defendant guilty of first degree murder, second degree murder or not guilty. When there is a reasonable doubt as to which of two or more offenses defendant is guilty, he may be convicted of the lesser offense only. Your Presiding Juror should sign the appropriate verdict form. This instruction parallels the language of K.S.A. 21-3109, which Davis erroneously contends was violated in this case. In addition to the two instructions previously discussed, the jury members were also instructed that they had a duty to consider and follow all of the instructions. They were instructed that each crime charged against the defendant was a separate and distinct offense and that each offense must be decided separately on the evidence and law applicable to it, uninfluenced by a decision on any other charge. They were also instructed that if they had reasonable doubt as to the truth of any of the claims required to be proved by the State, the defendant must be found not guilty; however, if they had no reasonable doubt as to the truth of any of the claims required to be proved by the State, the defendant should be found guilty. As this court has repeatedly recognized, the propriety of jury instructions is to be gauged by the consideration of the whole, each instruction being considered in conjunction with all other instructions in the case. State v. McNaught, 238 Kan. 567, 584, 713 P.2d 457 (1986); State v. Price, 233 Kan. 706, 711, 664 P.2d 869 (1983); State v. Korbel, 231 Kan. 657, Syl. ¶ 6, 647 P.2d 1301 (1982). After reviewing all the instructions, the jury was informed that it could consider the lesser included offense of second-degree murder. Therefore, the trial court's instruction was not clearly erroneous. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for resentencing.