Opinion ID: 1954318
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: the centrality of the credibility issue

Text: Since Peterson's alibi defense either stands or falls based on his credibility, the evidence which bears on his credibility is important. The nature of Peterson's defense heightens the importance of his credibility since in this case, he is one of the only witnesses who can establish his defense. The importance of his credibility to the particular facts of this case weigh in favor of the admissibility of his prior conviction, but only to the extent, if any, that his prior conviction reflects adversely on his credibility. In this context the prejudicial effect of the similarity of Peterson's prior conviction and the crime charged is so great that it outweighs the value of the conviction for impeachment purposes. Peterson also challenges the failure of the trial judge to give a limiting instruction to the jury. The State claims that this is without merit. Citing Sexton v. State, supra , and Dubose v. State, supra . In Ranier, supra, defense counsel submitted four different cautionary instructions which were refused by the judge. Ranier, at 174. Addressing the trial judge's failure to reform the instructions this Court stated, If the instructions submitted by counsel are deficient, the trial judge can and should instruct the jury on his own initiative. Ranier, at 174. See also, Guilbeau v. State, 502 So.2d 639, 643 (Miss. 1987); Harper v. State, 478 So.2d 1017, 1018 (Miss. 1985). In U.S. v. Diaz, 585 F.2d 116 (5th Cir.1978), the defendant in a drug prosecution was impeached with evidence of two prior drug convictions. Diaz, at 117. The jury was not instructed that they could consider these prior convictions only for impeachment. No limiting instruction had been requested by defense counsel and the Fifth Circuit held that the failure to grant such an instruction rose to the level of plain or fundamental error. Diaz, at 118. The court stated: ... When during a jury trial evidence is introduced that the defendant has a prior conviction for the same offense for which he is being tried, both counsel and the court have a duty to minimize the risk that the jury would infer guilt on the cocaine charges from the fact of previous convictions on cocaine charges. Thus, in this situation when no cautionary instruction is given to the jury, prejudicial error has intervened... . We cannot state with assurance that the failure to give a limiting instruction sua sponte did not influence the jury or have but a very slight effect on its deliberation. Accordingly we must set aside the conviction and order a new trial. Diaz, at 118. Because we find that the admission of Peterson's previous marijuana conviction into evidence without a determination on the record under Rule 609(a)(1), that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect was erroneous, this case must be reversed and remanded. In the future in such situations the trial judge must specifically weigh, on-the-record, those factors which make the conviction probative against those factors which make the evidence of the conviction prejudicial. Since the evidence in this case was manifestly prejudicial, the Preston procedure of remanding only for a finding under Rule 609 does not apply and a new trial must be granted. The holding of the Fifth Circuit in Diaz is a logical application of the principles which undergird Newell v. State, 308 So.2d 71 (Miss. 1975). We therefore suggest to the trial judges of this State that the better practice is that a limiting instruction be granted by the trial judge sua sponte when proper request is not made by defense counsel. This assignment is well taken and the conviction of Henry Peterson must be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.