Opinion ID: 2646079
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: fee application

Text: Counsel for the Trust and the objectorsCthe law firms of Fleeson, Gooing, Coulson & Kitch, LLC, and Kramer, Nordling & Nordling, LLCCappeal from the district judge’s decision to deny them a portion of class counsel’s fees.7 We review fee award decisions for abuse of discretion. Anchondo v. Anderson, Crenshaw & Assocs., 616 F.3d 1098, 1101 (10th Cir. 2010). After the settlement’s preliminary approval, the law firms submitted an application for two-thirds of class counsel’s attorney fee award. The judge denied the application as untimely, improper, and without merit. On the merits, he concluded the law firms did not materially benefit the class, even though they filed an earlier class action in state court and won partial summary judgment in that case. He pointed to their lack of cooperation with class counsel and repeated efforts to derail the Hershey class, including the firms’ opposition to class certification and support for some of ExxonMobil’s defenses. These 7 The parties appear to be in disagreement over whether the law firms are members of the class and are thus bound by the settlement agreement’s appeal-bond provision. We need not resolve this debate. Even if the law firms are subject to that provision, they are not named in the district court’s appeal-bond order. Besides, their appeal is easily resolved. 13 actions, he reasoned, offset any benefit conferred by the law firms’ work in the state court class action. On appeal, the law firms first claim their fee application was in fact timely and properly filed under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(h) and 54(d). Rule 23(h) states an application for attorney’s fees “must be made by motion under Rule 54(d)(2) . . . at a time the court sets.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h)(1) (emphasis added). The judge set September 7, 2012, as the deadline for attorney fee applications, but the law firms’ application was not submitted until September 21. Their application was untimely under Rule 23(h). The firms counter that the September 7 deadline applied only to class counsel. But they do not proffer an alternative Rule 23(h) deadline and cannot have it both ways: They cannot, on the one hand, say their application was timely under Rule 23(h), but, on the other, say the district court’s only Rule 23(h) deadline did not apply to them. Granted, the judge treated their fee application as an objection to the settlement, rather than a Rule 23(h) motion. And as an objection, the fee application was timely; it was filed on the deadline for submitting objections, September 21. But as an objection, the fee application was also improperly filed. The class notice required all objections to include “[a] detailed statement of the specific legal and factual basis for each and every objection, including a list of any legal authorities, witnesses, and exhibits the objector may seek to use at the [fairness hearing].” (Appellants’ App’x Vol. II at 560.) The law firms’ initial fee application appears to contain no such statement and they do not contend 14 otherwise. Indeed, they submitted no evidentiary support until weeks later and some of their evidence was not submitted until the day before the final fairness hearing. In a complex class action such as this, where the law firms’ evidence filled thousands of pages, the judge needed time to evaluate their evidence, certainly more than one day before the fairness hearing. We do not address the untimely evidence and we agree with the trial judge: the law firms’ fee application was filed without sufficient evidentiary support. See Manual for Complex Litigation, supra, ' 21.724, at 338 (“The party seeking fees has the burden of submitting sufficient information to justify the requested fees and taxable costs.”). In sum, we decline to address the merits of the law firms’ fee application. Whether as a Rule 23(h) motion or as an objection, it was procedurally defective, and the law firmsCboth of whom are very experienced in oil and gas class actionsCoffer no excuse for their delay. On this basis, we affirm the order as to the law firms’ fee application.