Opinion ID: 1850321
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Virgie Dycus Failed to Identify Lattimore as Her Husband's Attacker.

Text: ¶ 50. I cannot join the opinion of the majority because it does not acknowledge the failure of Virgie Dycus to identify Terry Lattimore as the murderer of James Dycus. In addition, I must respectfully dissent in deference to precedent of this Court and the United States Supreme Court, which forbids allowing the flawed pretrial identification of Lattimore into evidence.
¶ 51. On July 16, 2000, Virgie Dycus frantically dialed 911. She told the operator that two n____s are killing my husband. When asked for a description, she said simply that the men were black, both tall, and that one was shirtless. ¶ 52. The investigating police officer testified that her initial description was similarly vague. She told him what she had relayed to the 911 operator, that one man was tall, black, and shirtless, but was unable to give a description of the other man as she was quite understandably very upset. Mrs. Dycus also failed to identify the weapon used to attack her husband. During her 911 call she described the weapon as a stick. Speaking to the police later, she admitted that it could have been a pipe, or a baseball bat. ¶ 53. While these facts most certainly call into question the State's ability to meet the Biggers factors, it is the in-court identification by Mrs. Dycus that slams the lid shut on any argument that she could independently identify Terry Lattimore. ¶ 54. The prosecutor conceded that the in-court identification of Lattimore by Mrs. Dycus failed utterly. [W]e all made a big joke about it, he admitted to the trial court. In an order, the trial judge set the scene: It took Mrs. Virgie Dycus approximately two (2) minutes to make an in-court identification of the defendant. When asked by the Assistant District Attorney, Tucker Gore, whether the man that she had identified in earlier testimony as the person she saw beating her husband was in the courtroom, Mrs. Dycus slowly scanned the entire courtroom from right to left, beginning with jurors in the jury box (to her immediate right). She initially pointed over the Defendant's head at a person in the audience wearing a blue shirt. After a pause, she changed her response by pointing at the Defendant who was wearing a white shirt and tie. Two (2) minutes elapsed from the time of the initial question through the designation of Defendant in response. ¶ 55. Mitchell Creel was an attorney sitting in the audience who, at one point during the two minutes, Mrs. Dycus pointed out as her husband's attacker. However, there is at least one important difference between attorney Creel and Mr. Lattimore: Creel happens to be white. ¶ 56. As he testified: Q: Would you simply, and to the best of your recollection, tell the Court what transpired during the identification process. A: When Mr. Gore asked the witness to identify, Is the defendant in the courtroom today, I believe she responded, Yes. Would you point out the defendant? And at that point, for whatever reason, I don't know if it was age or whatever, she slowly began to look across the courtroom, starting with the jury box first, which really caught my attention because it just seemed unusual, from my profession. Usually those identifications are done immediately. But anyway, she goes around carefully and looks at everybody, a bunch of people in the courtroom. And without quoting the specific language she used, she pointed in my direction, or in that direction. And it's been awhile. I truly can't remember the specifics. I know she pointed in my direction. . . . . Q: And did you feel at any point she was pointing actually at you? A: I mean, she pointed in my direction. But, I mean, it's kind of hard for me to feel or take it serious when clearly myself knew that I had nothing to do with this crime. Q: You and Mr. Lattimore are not of the same race, is that correct? A: No. Q: Would you describe Mr. Lattimore as somewhat light-skinned? A: Mr. Lattimore is a light-skinned African-American. I'm a white Caucasian. A difference in height and size. Certainly a difference. Creel admitted that he thought it was kind of comical almost. ¶ 57. Four other witnesses gave similar testimony. The other man Mrs. Dycus identified as her husband's murderer was a dark-complexioned black man. Again, Lattimore has a light complexion. ¶ 58. If the charade had ended at this point it would have been troubling enough. Yet the trial judge had to be informed of one last fact: Mrs. Dycus only identified Lattimore after her family began pointing at him. Three witnesses testified that Mrs. Dycus looked to her family for help after failing to identify the correct defendant. ¶ 59. Even after settling upon Lattimorewhom she clearly did not recognizeMrs. Dycus was unsure. Q: I see you're pointing. Could you describe who you are pointing at? A: I believe it's the one that's in the blue shirt back there. He's not sitting here. Waitwait a minute. That's him right there I do believe. No. As I say, I've been having trouble. Q: Take your time. A: I still say I believe that that's him best as I can recall. Q: And you're pointing at whom? A: That one. Q: Describe what he has on? A: Pardon? Q: Describe what he has on? A: A white shirt and a tie. Q: And where is he seated? A: Pardon? Q: Wherewhere is he in the courtroom? A: Right there at the end of the table. Q: Are you sure? A: I think I'm sure. Q: Are you sure? A: He looks more like him than anybody else in here that I can see. Let's put it that way. Lattimore's attorney objected to the identification to no avail. ¶ 60. It is undeniably clear that, from the moment Mrs. Dycus dialed 911 to the day of trial, she had no grasp of who attacked her husband other than that it was a shirtless black man. We cannot blame Mrs. Dycus for not being able to identify her husband's attacker; the moment was horrific, and even if she were not under enormous stress, eyewitness identifications are notoriously shaky. The vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken identification. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1933, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149, 1158 (1967). However, we cannot condemn a man to life in prison when we are not extremely sure that he is the one with blood on his hands. The trial court should not have allowed the in-court identification to be entered into evidence.
¶ 61. The opinion incorrectly concludes that a totality of the circumstances test should be applied to in-court identifications which follow an improper pretrial lineup. This is neither the law of Mississippi nor the United States of America. Rather, A participant in a lineup has a right to have a lawyer present only if criminal proceedings have been instituted against him. If the right is violated, the prosecution will be permitted an in-court identification by the eyewitnesses who viewed the proscribed lineup only upon a showing by clear and convincing evidence that the in-court identifications are based upon observations of the suspect other than the lineup identification. York v. State, 413 So.2d 1372, 1383 (Miss. 1982) (citing United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967)). See also Frisco v. Blackburn, 782 F.2d 1353, 1355 (5th Cir.1986) (reiterating that the burden is on the prosecution to establish basis of in-court identification by clear and convincing evidence); Green v. State, 377 So.2d 618, 620 (Miss.1979) (holding that the State must meet a heavy burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence the independence of [the witness's] proposed in-court identification). ¶ 62. For its position, the majority relies upon Nicholson v. State, 523 So.2d 68, 71 (Miss.1988), a case which deals with the question of whether the pretrial identification was impermissibly suggestive. That is not the claim made by Lattimore in this case. The majority also claims that Outerbridge v. State, 947 So.2d 279 (Miss.2006), stands for the proposition that we will support a trial court's finding that an in-court identification was not tainted unless there is no substantial credible evidence supporting such a conclusion. Yet both Outerbridge and the case it cites, Roche v. State, 913 So.2d 306, 310 (Miss.2005), concern pretrial identifications. Accordingly, the substantial credible evidence standard is not applicable to the in-court identification issue. ¶ 63. When a criminal defendant is completely denied counsel at a pretrial lineup, the state must meet a higher burden of proof than when the lineup is simply alleged to be suggestive. Compare Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (holding that denial of counsel at lineup requires state to prove independence of in-court identification with clear and convincing evidence) with Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977) (holding that a totality of the circumstances test must be applied to in-court identifications following suggestive pretrial lineups). The reason for this distinction is because, without counsel, there is grave potential for prejudice, intentional or not, in the pretrial lineup, which may not be capable of reconstruction at trial and . . . presence of counsel itself can often avert prejudice and assure a meaningful confrontation at trial. Brooks, 903 So.2d at 695 (quoting Wade, 388 U.S. at 236, 87 S.Ct. at 1937, 18 L.Ed.2d at 1162). ¶ 64. As discussed supra, the trial record does not reflect that the prosecution was able to establish the basis of Mrs. Dycus's questionable in-court identification by clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, the trial court committed reversible error by allowing the identification.
¶ 65. The majority never concludes whether admission of the pretrial identification was error. Instead, the opinion quotes the trial court's ruling allowing Mrs. Dycus to make an in-court identification. Assuming that the majority finds the admission of the pretrial identification harmless error, I must respectfully dissent on this issue. ¶ 66. The majority correctly finds that Lattimore's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated when his attorney was absent from the pretrial lineup. Yet, I cannot agree that this constitutional violation was not fatal to this case. ¶ 67. In Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 273, 87 S.Ct. 1951, 1957, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178, 1186 (1967), the United States Supreme Court held that when a criminal defendant is denied the right to counsel at a pretrial lineup, [t]he State is therefore not entitled to an opportunity to show that that testimony had an independent source. Only a per se exclusionary rule as to such testimony can be an effective sanction to assure that law enforcement authorities will respect the accused's constitutional right to the presence of his counsel at the critical lineup. (emphasis supplied); see also Brooks v. State, 903 So.2d 691, 694-697 (Miss.2005) (quoting Gilbert ). Accordingly, it was clear error for the trial court to admit evidence of the pretrial identification, and the majority's reliance that Dycus's in-court identification was based upon her view of the defendant at the scene of the crime and not based upon the lineup, has no relevance to whether the pretrial identification was admissible. ¶ 68. Second, the error cannot be harmless where this was the only evidence tending to show it was Lattimore, and not the suspect Brown, who committed the murder. Harmless error requires that we declare a belief that [admission of the pretrial identification] was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 274, 87 S.Ct. 1951 (emphasis supplied) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 711 (1967)). In other words, [t]he question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction. Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87, 84 S.Ct. 229, 230, 11 L.Ed.2d 171, 173 (1963). ¶ 69. Because Mrs. Dycus was the only eyewitness to the attack, her testimony was crucial to the State's case. This is especially true because Brown was subsequently acquitted for the crime of which Lattimore was found guilty. As discussed at length supra, Mrs. Dycus had extreme difficulty in identifying Lattimore; indeed, she de facto failed to identify him. The pretrial identification she offered played a substantial role in his eventual conviction. For as the United States Supreme Court recognized in Gilbert, the witness' testimony of [her] lineup identification will enhance the impact of [her] in-court identification on the jury and seriously aggravate whatever derogation exists of the accused's right to a fair trial. 388 U.S. at 273-74, 87 S.Ct. 1951. Accordingly, the majority's comparison to Jimpson v. State, 532 So.2d 985, 989 (Miss.1988), where the amount of other evidence was overwhelming, is completely unfounded. ¶ 70. I am also mindful that, as Justice Dickinson recently warned, [t]he phrase harmless beyond a reasonable doubt has now become synonymous with harmless error analysis, but this Court's current usage of that phrase has set it loose from its original moorings. Haynes v. State, 934 So.2d 983, 994 (Miss.2006) (Dickinson, J., dissenting, joined by Waller and Cobb, P.JJ., and Graves, J.). We cannot continue to allow this misuse of the phrase harmless. ¶ 71. Because admission of the pre-trial identification substantially contributed to Lattimore's conviction, it was not harmless error, and I would reverse.