Opinion ID: 859212
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evaluation methods used by State’s expert

Text: ¶20 Boyston next argues the superior court erred in admitting Dr. Seward’s testimony because he failed to use currently accepted intellectual testing procedures. We disagree. 4 We express no opinion on what procedural or substantive effect, if any, current Evidence Rule 702, as amended effective January 1, 2012, might have had on Dr. Seward’s qualifications or permissible testimony. 9 ¶21 Section 13-753(B) requires a prescreening expert “to determine the defendant’s intelligence quotient using current community, nationally and culturally accepted intelligence testing procedures.” See State ex rel. Thomas v. Duncan, 222 Ariz. 448, 451 ¶ 17, 216 P.3d 1194, 1197 (App. 2009) (holding that § 13-753(B) requires a prescreening expert to personally conduct an IQ test and not solely rely on one previously administered). In contrast, later-appointed experts such as Dr. Seward must “examine the defendant using current community, nationally and culturally accepted physical, developmental, psychological and intelligence testing procedures, for the purpose of determining whether the defendant has an intellectual disability,” and then submit to the trial court a written report “that includes the expert’s opinion as to whether the defendant has an intellectual disability.” A.R.S. § 13-753(E). ¶22 Boyston concedes that no statute expressly required Dr. Seward to administer an IQ test, but argues that currently accepted testing procedures required Dr. Seward to either personally conduct a valid IQ test or, at a minimum, rely on a valid IQ test. He asserts that the only IQ test Dr. Seward relied on was the discredited Culture Fair test that Boyston took in 2000. ¶23 Dr. Seward acknowledged that the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM-IV) 10 states that individualized testing is always required “to make the diagnosis of mental retardation.” But he testified that he did not need to personally administer additional IQ testing because Boyston had recently been given three individualized IQ tests. Dr. Seward further opined that “interpret[ing] the tests that others had given . . . [was] satisfactory with respect to the requirement of individualized testing.” Boyston did not introduce any evidence to rebut Dr. Seward’s testimony that he had followed currently accepted testing procedures related to IQ testing. ¶24 Regarding the results of the various IQ tests administered by others, Dr. Seward gave the most credence to the Culture Fair test, which Boyston argues is not a valid IQ test. On that test, Boyston obtained a weighted IQ score of 85, “a level of functioning” described in the testing notes as “dull normal intelligence.” Dr. Seward considered the results of the Culture Fair test “noteworthy” because Boyston “did not have the same incentive to appear impaired” when that test was administered in 2000, before he committed the crimes at issue here. ¶25 Dr. Seward acknowledged that he did not know the details of the Culture Fair testing and that he was unable to review any raw data from that test. But Boyston did not introduce any evidence below to show that the Culture Fair test 11 deviated from currently accepted tests or that Dr. Seward inappropriately relied on it. On appeal, Boyston cites several cases in which courts gave minimal weight to that test and other similar tests, but those cases do not hold that an expert falls below currently accepted standards by relying on such tests.5 Moreover, the records in those cases, unlike this one, contained expert testimony that generally explained the limitations of such tests. ¶26 Although Dr. Seward relied on the Culture Fair test, he also referred to and analyzed the underlying data from the IQ tests administered by Dr. Young and Dr. Gaughan, with whose opinions he disagreed. Given his conclusions that Boyston was malingering on those IQ tests and that no other information 5 Boyston quotes from Goetsch v. State, 172 N.W.2d 688, 692 (Wis. 1969), which recites an expert’s description of the Culture Fair test. Boyston also inappropriately quotes an unreported federal district court case in which the experts who testified had agreed that the Culture Fair test was not a reliable measure of intellectual function. But Boyston cannot establish through case law matters on which no expert testimony was offered below. Boyston also quotes from Rivera v. Quarterman, 505 F.3d 349, 362 (5th Cir. 2007), which explained that the lower court had rejected screening tests used in the prison system. But the weighing of evidence by the trial court in that case is irrelevant to our review of whether the trial court in this case abused its discretion, as “[t]he trial judge has broad discretion in determining the weight and credibility given to mental health evidence.” Grell II, 212 Ariz. at 528 ¶ 58, 135 P.3d at 708 (quoting State v. Doerr, 193 Ariz. 56, 69 ¶ 64, 969 P.2d 1168, 1181 (1998)). 12 revealed that Boyston had subaverage intellectual functioning, Dr. Seward determined that no additional IQ testing was necessary. Boyston failed to show that Dr. Seward’s determination was invalid or suspect because he did not adhere to currently accepted testing procedures. Accordingly, the superior court did not abuse its discretion by admitting and relying on Dr. Seward’s testimony that Boyston did not demonstrate significantly subaverage intellectual functioning. See A.R.S. § 13-753(K)(5). ¶27 Boyston also argues that Dr. Seward failed to follow currently accepted testing procedures by not performing formal evaluations of Boyston’s adaptive functioning and by focusing on his strengths rather than his deficits. As with intellectual functioning, however, Boyston introduced no evidence to rebut Dr. Seward’s testimony that he followed currently accepted testing procedures related to adaptive behavior. Although Boyston’s mental retardation expert, Dr. Keyes, administered the Adaptive Behavior Assessment System, Second Edition (ABAS-II) test to Boyston, Dr. Seward explained that it is difficult to measure adaptive functioning when the individual is incarcerated, and pointed to the testing criteria in the ABAS-II manual, which requires that the examiner have frequent, longterm contact with the individual. Dr. Seward instead relied on school and criminal records, interviews with those who knew 13 Boyston, and recorded jail telephone conversations. ¶28 In challenging Dr. Seward’s opinion on adaptive behavior, Boyston relies heavily on information in the DSM-IV and the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD, formerly AAMR) manual. Both manuals suggest the examiner should investigate numerous sources over an extended time frame, and the DSM-IV also recommends consideration of adaptive functioning measures. But Boyston did not present this evidence below or argue that it established currently accepted procedures for assessing adaptive functioning; and Dr. Seward considered information from a wide variety of sources. ¶29 Boyston also points to various authorities, including the DSM-IV, the AAIDD manual, and medical journal articles, that indicate that those with mental disabilities have both strengths and deficits, and that an evaluating expert should focus on the presence of deficits. He takes issue with the weight Dr. Seward gave to Boyston’s jail conversations and on his own interviews with Alexandria and her father, arguing that Dr. Seward violated current standards by focusing on strengths while ignoring Boyston’s deficits. As with adaptive behavior testing, however, Boyston did not introduce below the information to which he now points as evidence of current standards; and again, Dr. Seward analyzed Boyston’s adaptive behavior in many areas and from many 14 sources. ¶30 In sum, although Dr. Seward did not personally administer an IQ test or an adaptive functioning assessment, he testified without contradiction that he followed current standards. No evidence showed that his evaluation methods violated “current community, nationally and culturally accepted physical, developmental, psychological and intelligence testing procedures.” A.R.S. § 13-753(E). The superior court did not abuse its discretion in admitting and relying on Dr. Seward’s testimony.