Opinion ID: 1966812
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: A. The Vacancy Rent Increase

Text: In its second reconsideration decision, the Rental Housing Commission determined that the statutory term housing accommodations in § 208 of the Rental Accommodations Act of 1975 could encompass integrated, multi-building complexes for the purpose of vacancy rent increases. An agency's interpretation of the statute and regulations it administers will be sustained unless shown to be unreasonable. Becker v. District of Columbia Department of Consumer & Regulatory Affairs, 518 A.2d 93, 94 (D.C.1986); Grayson v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services, 516 A.2d 909, 912 (D.C. 1986); 1880 Columbia Road Tenants' Association v. District of Columbia Rental Accommodations Commission, 400 A.2d 333, 337 (D.C.1979). We defer to the RHC's reasonable construction of the statute at issue here. Section 208 of the Rental Accommodations Act of 1975 permits a landlord to take a rent ceiling increase when a rental unit is vacant, up to the rent ceiling of substantially comparable units in the same housing accommodation. Housing accommodation is defined by § 201(e) of the 1975 Act, as any structure or building in the District of Columbia containing one or more rental units and the land appurtenant thereto. In its first two decisions the Commission found that the plain language of the definition permitted only one meaning, namely that only building was intended by the words building or structure. Ultimately, however, (in its second reconsideration decision) the Commission concluded that the definition of housing accommodation was ambiguous. In construing a statute, we must first look at the language of the statute by itself to see if the language is plain and admits of no more than one meaning. Davis v. United States, 397 A.2d 951, 956 (D.C. 1979). But [w]hether or not the words of a statute are clear is not always clear. Id. (citing Sanker v. United States, 374 A.2d 304, 307 (D.C.1977) (quoting Barbee v. United States, 392 F.2d 532, 535 n. 4 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 935, 88 S.Ct. 1849, 20 L.Ed.2d 855 (1968)). At first impression, the definition of the term housing accommodation seems clear enough. But as the Commission points out, its clarity is superficial. The definition of housing accommodation cannot be simply building, since the plain language is building or structure. Unless structure were to have no meaning, it would have to refer to something in addition to building. To read the statute so as to render the term structure superfluous would be contrary to the well-established rule of statutory construction that effect must be given, if possible, to every word of a statute so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, unless the provision is the result of obvious mistake or error. Tenants Council of Tiber Island-Carrollsburg Square v. District of Columbia Rental Accommodations Commission, 426 A.2d 868, 874 (D.C.1981) (citing SANDS, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.06 (4th ed. 1973)). The Commission reasons that since the Council intended that housing accommodation was to include more than just what was contained in a buildingbecause otherwise the reference to structure would be meaninglessit is reasonable to infer that the Council intended to include integrated, multi-building complexes. The Commission's reconsideration decision also identifies another way in which the definition renders the term ambiguous. Observing that the words structure and building in the definition of housing accommodation are connected by the disjunctive term or, the Commission concluded that the two terms are mutually exclusive. Previous decisions of the RHC have construed structure and building as alternative terms for the same entities, however. Because the terms structure and building cannot be both mutually exclusive and one and the same, the statutory definition of housing accommodation is ambiguous. A legislative provision warrants closer scrutiny when its language has only superficial clarity, fails to embody legislative intent or yields absurd or unjust results. Auger v. D.C. Board of Appeals and Review, 477 A.2d 196, 211-12 (D.C.1984); Peoples Drug Stores, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 470 A.2d 751, 753-54 (1983) (limits of plain meaning principle). We agree that the definition of the term housing accommodation renders it ambiguous. Having rejected the superficial clarity of a literal reading of the term, we need examine only whether the construction chosen by the Commission to resolve the ambiguity is a reasonable one. Lee v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services, 509 A.2d 100, 104 (D.C.1986) (citing Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2782, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984)). We find the Commission's construction of the statute reasonable based on several grounds. First, the District of Columbia Council reenacted virtually identical statutory language after the Commission's decision in Pyne v. Northbrook, supra, which permitted a multi-building housing complex to be considered a housing accommodation for the purpose of vacancy rent increases. Second, such an interpretation is in harmony with the legislative purpose in enacting the vacancy rent increase provision. Finally, the interpretation is consistent with the construction of the term in other contexts.