Opinion ID: 2295347
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whalem and Later Cases

Text: In Whalem, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, sitting en banc, held that when there is sufficient question as to a defendant's mental responsibility at the time of the crime, that issue must become part of the case. . . . [I]n the pursuit of justice, a trial judge must have the discretion to impose an unwanted defense on a defendant. . .. [ Id. 120 U.S.App.D.C. at 337-38, 346 F.2d at 818-19.] [11] The court declined to establish specific standards to guide trial judges in exercising their discretion. [12] The court stated, ambiguously, that it would conclude a judge had abused his or her discretion if he or she failed to raise the defense despite the existence of a combination of factors which required the trial judge to inject the insanity issue. Id. 120 U.S.App.D.C. at 338, 346 F.2d at 819. In the case before it, the court concluded that the trial judge had not erred in refusing to interpose the defense because both psychiatric reports negated an insanity defense. Id. 120 U.S.App.D.C. at 338, 346 F.2d at 819. [13] Although the circuit court has reaffirmed Whalem on several occasions, [14] the only additional guidance it has given to trial judges has been to mention several factors that would support a court's decision to interpose the defense. Among these are the bizarre nature of the crime, the desire of defense counsel to raise the defense, the differing views of experts as to insanity at the time of the offense, and the defendant's behavior at trial (as it indicates his or her mental condition). See United States v. Robertson, 165 U.S.App.D.C. 325, 335, 507 F.2d 1148, 1158 (1974). Although the court has recognized that the decision of a competent defendant is highly relevant, Cross v. United States, 128 U.S.App.D.C. 416, 419, 389 F.2d 957, 960 (1968); accord, United States v. Robertson, 430 F.Supp. 444, 447 (D.D.C.1977), the court has emphasized that a defendant's reasons must be weighed as part of a full presentation of evidence relevant to the issue of criminal responsibility. Robertson, supra 165 U.S.App.D.C. at 337, 507 F.2d at 1160; accord, United States v. Snyder, 174 U.S.App.D.C. 117, 121-22, 529 F.2d 871, 875-76 (1976). [15] The circuit court has stated explicitly, moreover, that the defendant's decision to reject the defense could not be controlling. Robertson, supra 165 U.S.App.D.C. at 337, 507 F.2d at 1160. It is fair to say, in summary, that in decisions following Whalem, the circuit court, in effect, has encouraged trial judges to focus their principal attention on those factors (especially expert testimony) related to the strength of the evidence supporting a potential insanity defense, rather than on the defendant's present desire not to raise the defense and on the current ability to make an intelligent choice. The circuit court's deemphasis of the defendant's choice is generally consistent with the stated aim of the Whalem rule. In explaining its rationale, the court declared that the trial judge has a responsibility to prevent the conviction of one who was insane at the time of committing an offense, because such an individual lacks criminal responsibility and, accordingly, must not be punished. [16] Whalem, supra 120 U.S.App. D.C. at 337, 346 F.2d at 818; see Overholser v. Lynch, 109 U.S.App.D.C. 404, 409, 288 F.2d 388, 393 (1961) (en banc), rev'd on other grounds, 369 U.S. 705, 82 S.Ct. 1063, 8 L.Ed.2d 211 (1962). Were this the only purpose of the rule, [17] however, it would be difficult to justify giving the trial court any discretion to refuse the defense once the judge became aware of evidence that could support a jury finding of not guilty by reason of insanity. The fact that Whalem granted trial courts discretion, therefore, suggests that the court may have been acknowledging other interests. At least one member of the circuit court has suggested that the flexibility of the Whalem rule permits trial judges to recognize the decision of the defendant who chooses not to raise the defense. See Robertson, supra 165 U.S. App.D.C. at 338, 507 F.2d at 1161 (separate statement of Bazelon, C. J.); accord, People v. Redmond, 16 Cal.App.3d 931, 936, 94 Cal. Rptr. 543, 547 (1971). All the parties to this appeal assert, nonetheless, that the Whalem rule does not accord sufficient respect to the intelligent choice of a competent defendant. They argue that the rule leaves the trial judge too much discretion to force an unwanted insanity defense on a competent defendant if the evidence supporting such a defense is sufficiently compelling. Such a result, they maintain, is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Faretta, supra, and Alford, supra, which emphasize that defendants must have the right to make decisions central to their defense, since they must bear the consequences of these decisions. We turn, therefore, to these Supreme Court cases, in order to assess their impact on Whalem.