Opinion ID: 2788749
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: At Chevron Step One, the Statute is Ambiguous.

Text: When construing a congressional enactment, “our inquiry begins with the statutory text.” BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004). In addition, in the present context we must apply the background rule that “[t]he FLSA is to be construed liberally in favor of employees; exemptions are narrowly construed against employers.” Haro v. City of Los 8 NAVARRO V. ENCINO MOTORCARS Angeles, 745 F.3d 1249, 1256 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 138 (2014). “FLSA exemptions . . . are to be withheld except as to persons plainly and unmistakably within their terms and spirit.”3 Solis v. Washington, 656 F.3d 1079, 1083 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). “An employer who claims an exemption from the FLSA bears the burden of demonstrating that such an exemption applies.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). As noted, the statute exempts “any salesman, partsman, or mechanic primarily engaged in selling or servicing automobiles.” 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(10)(A). The statute does not define the terms “salesman, partsman, or mechanic.” Examining the statutory text and applying canons of statutory interpretation, we cannot conclude that service advisors such as Plaintiffs are “persons plainly and unmistakably within [the FLSA’s] terms and spirit,” Solis, 656 F.3d at 1083 (internal quotation marks omitted). It is plausible to read the term “salesman” broadly and to connect the term to “servicing automobiles”; that is, one could consider a service advisor to be a “salesman . . . primarily engaged in . . . servicing automobiles.” But, as explained in more detail below, in Part C, it is at least as plausible to read the nouns in a more cabined way: a salesman is an employee who sells cars; a partsman is an employee who requisitions, stocks, and dispenses parts; and 3 The rule that courts should construe the FLSA’s exemptions narrowly originated in Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392 (1960). In recent years, the Supreme Court has clarified that the presumption applies only to the exemptions in § 213 and not more generally. Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 134 S. Ct. 870, 879 n.7 (2014); Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2172 n.21 (2012). NAVARRO V. ENCINO MOTORCARS 9 a mechanic is an employee who performs mechanical work on cars. Service advisors do none of those things; they sell services for cars. They do not sell cars; they do not stock parts; and they do not perform mechanical work on cars. It is not clear from the text of the statute whether Congress intended broadly to exempt any salesman who is involved in the servicing of cars or, more narrowly, only those salesmen who are selling the cars themselves. Certainly Congress did not exempt all employees of a car dealership; for example, a bookkeeper who tracks invoices for car sales and servicing is plainly not exempt, nor is a secretarial employee who routes calls to the salesmen, partsmen, and mechanics. Nor do canons of statutory interpretation aid Defendant. To the contrary, the § 213 “exemptions are narrowly construed against employers.” Haro, 745 F.3d at 1256. In sum, the statutory text and canons of statutory interpretation yield no clear answer to whether Congress intended to include service advisors within the exemption. Because Congress has not “directly spoken to the precise question at issue,” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842, the statute is ambiguous.