Opinion ID: 183141
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: ineffective assistance of counsel (claim 1c)

Text: We next turn to Lopez's ineffective assistance claim. At his resentencing in 1990, Lopez unsuccessfully sought to establish a mitigating factor of pathological intoxication based on the evaluation of his psychiatric expert, Dr. Otto Bendheim. Lopez attributes this failure to ineffective assistance of counsel. In his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR petition), Lopez specifically complained that counsel failed to provide Dr. Bendheim with the pretrial statements and trial testimony of Pauline Rodriguez and Yodilia Sabori describing his behavior on the night of the murder. This omission constituted ineffective assistance, Lopez argued, because Rodriguez and Sabori's statements were stronger evidence of pathological intoxication than any items previously submitted to Dr. Bendheim. The trial court declined to hold an evidentiary hearing and dismissed the petition. Lopez raised the same claim in his petition for review in the Arizona Supreme Court, which also ordered dismissal. Lopez went on to broaden his ineffective assistance claim in his amended federal habeas petition. Coupled with his claim regarding the two witnesses, Lopez newly alleged that counsel failed to furnish Dr. Bendheim with a broad range of biographical data and family and social history that were necessary for a proper diagnosis. This information included the abandonment of Lopez's family by his father, his family's extreme poverty, Lopez's history of substance abuse and exposure to toxic substances, and his low education level. Lopez argued that an investigation into his personal history was necessary for Dr. Bendheim to establish a base line for his cognitive functioning, compare his functioning when intoxicated with the base line, determine if intoxication exacerbated any underlying psychiatric problems, assess him for any addictive disease, determine any neurologic deficits and the effects of intoxication on such deficits, and evaluate any other influences on his behavior or thought processes during the murder. [6] The state initially conceded that Lopez's ineffective assistance claim was properly exhausted. Nearly eight years later, however, the state sought to retract its concession, contending that Lopez's ineffective assistance claim went far beyond what was presented to the state court. The district court agreed with the state and dismissed claim 1C as procedurally defaulted. The parties strongly contest whether the state waived procedural default and whether the district court erred in reaching this issue sua sponte. We need not and do not address this issue, however, because we affirm the dismissal of Lopez's claim on an alternate ground. Even assuming that the district court should not have reached the issue of procedural default, Lopez failed to present any of the evidence in support of his expanded claim in state court. Thus, he is separately barred from seeking relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). Section 2254(e)(2) imposes a high bar on expanding the record to include evidence that was not presented in state court. The section provides: If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the applicant shows that (A) the claim relies on (i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or (ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and (B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). These same restrictions apply a fortiori when a prisoner seeks relief based on new evidence without an evidentiary hearing. Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S. 649, 653, 124 S.Ct. 2736, 159 L.Ed.2d 683 (2004) (per curiam); accord Cooper-Smith v. Palmateer, 397 F.3d 1236, 1241 (9th Cir.2005). The parties here chiefly dispute whether the statute's triggernamely, the petitioner's fail[ure] to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedingsapplies to Lopez. [7] A petitioner fail[s] to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings under the opening clause of § 2254(e)(2) where there is lack of diligence, or some greater fault, attributable to the prisoner or the prisoner's counsel. Williams, 529 U.S. at 432, 120 S.Ct. 1479. Diligence depends upon whether the prisoner made a reasonable attempt, in light of the information available at the time, to investigate and pursue claims in state court; it does not depend . . . upon whether those efforts could have been successful. Id. at 435, 120 S.Ct. 1479. Lopez was not diligent in developing his claim. In his post-conviction proceedings, Lopez did not allege that his attorney at sentencing was ineffective in failing to investigate Lopez's personal history and to furnish Dr. Bendheim with those facts, but rather complained only that counsel failed to provide the doctor with the statements and testimony of Rodriguez and Sabori. The problem, then, is not simply that Lopez failed to develop the factual underpinnings of his claimLopez failed to present this claim altogether. Although state law required Lopez to attach [a]ffidavits, records, or other evidence currently available to [him] supporting the allegations to his PCR petition, Ariz. R.Crim. P. 32.5, Lopez submitted none of the contested evidence regarding his childhood, mental health, or family and social history. Rather, consistent with his narrow ineffective assistance claim, the only evidence that Lopez attached to his PCR petition relating to claim 1C consisted of the pretrial interviews of Rodriguez and Sabori, and an affidavit of Dr. Bendheim attesting that these new materials [made his] earlier diagnosis of pathological intoxication more probable than previously expressed. Notably, Lopez does not contend that he lacked access to the information from his family members regarding family history even though he could presumably obtain it without court order and with minimal expense. See Dowthitt v. Johnson, 230 F.3d 733, 758 (5th Cir.2000) (holding that the petitioner was not diligent where he failed to present affidavits from family members and did not show that they could not be obtained absent an order for discovery or a hearing). Because Lopez was not diligent in presenting the new evidence at issue, no evidentiary hearing is required. Section 2254(e)(2) applies. [8] In addition, Lopez cannot meet the requirements of § 2254(e)(2)(A)that is, show that he makes a claim based on a new, retroactively applicable rule of constitutional law or a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence. Thus, he is barred from seeking relief. See Cooper-Smith, 397 F.3d at 1241-42.
Because Lopez cannot rely on evidence that he failed to present in state court, we will only determine whether Lopez established his original ineffective assistance claimnamely, his claim that counsel performed deficiently and prejudicially by failing to furnish Dr. Bendheim with the statements and testimony of Rodriguez and Sabori. To prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, Lopez must show that counsel's performance was objectively deficient and that the deficient performance caused him prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); see also Williams, 529 U.S. at 391, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (holding that Strickland is the clearly established federal law governing habeas claims of ineffectiveness of counsel under AEDPA). We need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies. Rather, [i]f it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice . . ., that course should be followed. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052. To prepare his evaluation for the 1987 sentencing, Dr. Bendheim interviewed Lopez and reviewed police reports regarding the murder; prior charges and arrests; a statement by Raymond Hernandez, Pauline Rodriguez's husband; and descriptions of the crime scene. On this basis, Dr. Bendheim hypothesi[zed] that Lopez suffered from pathological intoxication, which he described as a condition that causes individuals who consume small amounts of alcohol to react in an unexpected, unpredictable manner that is characterized frequently by extreme violence. In particular, Dr. Bendheim noted a statement by Hernandez that Lopez was mild and meek when sober but very mean when drunk, along with information from defense counsel that other character witnesses described similar behavior patterns on Lopez's part. Although Lopez told Dr. Bendheim that he was not intoxicated on the night of the murder, the doctor did not believe him because other evidence indicated to the contrary. At resentencing, Lopez's new counsel provided Dr. Bendheim with additional criminal records detailing other incidents in which Lopez had engaged in criminal and violent behaviorin particular, the pre-sentence investigation relating to his conviction for resisting arrest and a police report regarding an alleged sexual assault in 1986. Dr. Bendheim found that this new information corroborated his initial assessment. Based on the totality of the evidence, the doctor speculate[d] that with a great preponderance of probability[,] not certainty, but probability that but for Lopez's intoxication on the night of the crime, the murder would not have occurred. However, Dr. Bendheim underlined that he could offer only a tentative diagnosis of pathological intoxication, not a diagnosis with medical certainty, and that his diagnosis was to a very large degree . . . speculative. This uncertainty was due to the fact that he was not present at the time of the crime to observe Lopez's behavior and that Lopez himself could not confirm that he undergoes a significant personality change when intoxicated. In rebuttal, the state presented the testimony of Dr. Robert Dean, a psychiatrist and expert on alcoholism. Dr. Dean never met Lopez and had experienced only one encounter with a person presumed to suffer from pathological intoxication during his residency. However, Dr. Dean had read considerable amounts of material on the disorder and reviewed the documents on which Dr. Bendheim relied in order to assess Dr. Bendheim's evaluation. Dr. Dean rejected Dr. Bendheim's diagnosis. Dr. Dean stated that pathological intoxication was uncommon, and he was not aware of any cases in his twenty-five years of psychiatric practice. He also noted that Lopez lacked the predisposing conditions to the disorder, such as advanced age and organic pathology in the brain. Focusing on a police report describing Lopez's behavior in the alleged sexual assault of Cecilia Rodriguez, [9] Dr. Dean concluded that Lopez did not suffer a consistent, pathological response to minimal quantities of alcohol and that he did not show a pathological response to alcohol within the window of time that is typical of the disorder. Dr. Dean also specifically reviewed the pretrial statements and trial testimony of Rodriguez and Sabori and testified that those materials did not change his opinion. At the resentencing, the judge found that Lopez failed to show pathological intoxication as a mitigating factor. In the court's view, Dr. Bendheim's testimony did not rise to any level of medical certainty, but rather rested upon a `hypothesis' or `speculation.' In addition, [t]he state presented evidence to rebut the `hypothesis' and `speculation.' Lopez failed to meet his burden of proof of establishing this mitigating factor by a preponderance of the evidence, and thus the mitigating circumstance [did] not exist. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed after an independent review of the record. Lopez II, 857 P.2d at 1267-68. In his post-conviction proceedings, Lopez argued that sentencing counsel was ineffective for failing to furnish Dr. Bendheim with the eyewitness statements and testimony of Rodriguez and Sabori regarding Lopez's behavior on the night of the murder so that the doctor could make a more definitive diagnosis. Sabori attested in particular that she met Lopez in a neighborhood park on the night of the murder and talked with him from around 8 p.m. to 11:15 p.m. Sabori then went home to Rodriguez's apartment, where she was staying. About ten or fifteen minutes later, Lopez appeared at her front door drunk. Lopez asked Sabori if she got high, and she told him no. At that point, Lopez disappeared down an alley for a few minutes; when he returned he was shaking, unsteady, and belligerent. When Sabori tried to go into the house, Lopez closed the door on her hand to prevent her from leaving. Ultimately, with the help of Rodriguez, Sabori broke free and went inside. Rodriguez generally corroborated Sabori's statement. Rodriguez believe[d] [Lopez] was on something that night and observed that he wasn't[,] you know[,] hi[m]self. Rodriguez stated that Lopez came to the house around three times a week when he was drunk. When Lopez was sober, he was quiet and real nice, but he would get[] really heavy on people when drunk. The evening of the murder he was belligerent and yelled obscenities at Rodriguez. In his new affidavit submitted with the PCR petition, Dr. Bendheim stated that, in light of the statements of Rodriguez and Sabori, he could now make a more certain diagnosis of pathological intoxication. Nonetheless, the state court denied Lopez's ineffective assistance claim, finding that there was no reasonable probability that the result of the . . . sentencing procedures would have been different because of [this] alleged ineffective assistance. The state court's holding does not constitute an unreasonable application of Strickland. Lopez cannot show a reasonable probability that, absent the errors [Lopez alleges], the sentencer . . . would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Here, the statements of Rodriguez and Sabori were largely duplicative of other information provided to Dr. Bendheim. For example, one of the documents given to Dr. Bendheim for the 1987 sentencing proceeding was a police report containing Rodriguez's statements that Lopez was drunk or high several hours before the murder, and that he tried to force his way into her apartment. Lopez's counsel also provided Dr. Bendheim with the statement from Raymond Hernandez that Lopez was very mean when drunk and mild and meek when sober, and Lopez's counsel told Dr. Bendheim of other witnesses who claimed that Lopez became like another person when he drinks. Lopez's counsel at the 1990 resentencing similarly provided Dr. Bendheim with further evidence of Lopez's violent behavior when drunk, which served to corroborate Dr. Bendheim's opinion. Dr. Bendheim underlined, through his testimony at sentencing, that his assessment of Lopez was only tentative, lacked medical certainty, and was to a very large degree . . . speculative. It is true that Dr. Bendheim later testified that, had he reviewed the additional testimony of Rodriguez and Sabori, his original diagnosis would have been more probable and more certain. But we are not convinced that his more probable diagnosis would have changed the outcome of the sentencing proceeding. The new evidence would have done little to refute Dr. Dean's contrary assessment that Lopez did not suffer from pathological intoxication. As Dr. Dean pointed out, pathological intoxication is an extremely rare condition, Lopez did not exhibit any of the predisposing factors, and the evidence from his criminal file indicated that he did not react pathologically to alcohol or show reactions within the typical time-frame after drinking. After Dr. Dean examined Rodriguez and Sabori's statements, he found nothing in them to alter his opinion, and those statements were otherwise available in the record for the court's consideration. Finally, the sentencing court made a strong finding as to the especially heinous, cruel, or depraved nature of the murder, remarking that in his years on the bench he had never seen [a first-degree murder case] as bad as this one, and the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed in similarly forceful terms. See Lopez II, 857 P.2d at 1264-66. Ultimately, the absence of Rodriguez and Sabori's testimony from Dr. Bendheim's assessment did not affect the balance of the aggravating and mitigating factors. Lopez has not shown a reasonable possibility that, but for counsel's alleged errors, the sentencer would have concluded that Lopez did not deserve a death sentence. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. 2052.