Opinion ID: 3027974
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: restriction on associating with children

Text: The District Court prohibited Voelker from associating with minors without the prior approval of the Probation Officer and mandated that any such contact be in the presence of an adult who is familiar with Voelker’s criminal background. Voelker argues that this condition prevents him from having unsupervised contact with his two children or any children he may have in the future. He claims that it therefore interferes with his constitutional right of procreation, as well as his fundamental liberty and his freedom of association under the 37 First Amendment. Since Voelker did not object to this condition at sentencing, we review for plain error. See Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 389 (1999). In order for us to find plain error: There must be an “error” that is “plain” and that “affects substantial rights.” The deviation from a legal rule is “error,” and an error is “plain” if it is “clear” or “obvious.” In most cases, an error affects substantial rights if it is prejudicial, i.e., “affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.” . . . We will exercise our discretion and vacate the sentence if the plan error affecting substantial rights also “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Evans, 155 F.3d 245, 251 (3d. Cir.1998) (internal citations omitted). “A plainly erroneous condition of supervised release will inevitably affect substantial rights, as a defendant who fails to meet that condition will be subject to further incarceration.” United States v. Pruden, 398 F.3d 241, 251 (3d Cir. 2005). Similarly, “imposing a sentence not authorized by law seriously 38 affects the fairness, integrity, and reputation of the proceedings.” Evans, 155 F.3d at 252. We have held that a sentence is “imposed in violation of law,” and therefore plainly erroneous, when it is imposed without proper consideration for the statutory factors that govern sentencing. United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 328 (3d Cir. 2006). “The court need not discuss every argument made by a litigant . . . . Nor must the court discuss and make findings as to each of the §3553(a) factors . . . .” Id. at 329. However, the record must contain sufficient reference to those factors to allow us to review for reasonableness. We need not engage in an in-depth discussion of this claim. There is evidence on this record that Voelker exposed his daughter’s buttocks over the internet using his webcam. There is also evidence that he jeopardized his minor daughter’s welfare by offering her for sex during an online communication. Although Voelker claims that he never intended to follow through with that offer and that he was merely “role-playing,” 39 the record nevertheless clearly support restricting his association with minors. However, the court delegated absolute authority to the Probation Office to allow any such contacts while providing no guidance whatsoever for the exercise of that discretion. Thus, Voelker’s Probation Officer becomes the sole authority for deciding if Voelker will ever have unsupervised contact with any minor, including his own children, for the rest of his life. This is the very kind of unbridled delegation of authority that we struck down in Loy II. See 237 F. 3d at 266. There, we stated: “[T]he sentencing court may not wholesaledly ‘abdicate[] its juridical responsibility’ for setting the conditions of release.” Id. (quoting United States v. Mohammad, 53 F.3d 1426, 1438 (7th Cir. 1995)).18 Even though the record contains evidence that supports a conclusion that Voelker may be capable of exploiting his own children, it is not clear to us that the District Court intended this 18 In Mohammad, the court vacated an order of restitution because the sentencing court allowed the probation officer to decide the method of payment. 53 F.3d at 1429. 40 lifetime ban on association with minors to extend to his own children. In Loy II, we resolved the profound legal issues that arose from a three year ban on association with minors by assuming that the court did not intend it to apply to the defendant’s own family. We explained: “Given the severe intrusion on Loy’s family life that would otherwise result, we believe that, absent a clearer sign from the District Court, the condition should be construed to apply only to other people’s children, and not to Loy’s own.” Loy II, 237 F. 3d at 270. Although we resolved the ambiguity in Loy by supplying a presumption that ameliorated the problems that would have arisen had the ban included the defendant’s own family, we cannot do that here. Given this record, the court may have intended the condition to extend to Voelker’s own family. On remand, the court will have yet another opportunity to clarify the intended scope of this restriction and to provide sufficient guidance for the exercise of the Probation Officer’s discretion if a ban on associating with minors is reimposed. 41 We do not now express any opinion about the legality of a condition that so drastically interferes with one’s right to associate with one’s own children. We do, however, caution that any lifetime ban on association with minors should be supported by sufficient evidence to resolve the dispute over whether Voelker was simply role-playing. On remand, the court may wish to supplement this record with expert testimony from persons knowledgeable in this area in order to better resolve the dispute about Voelker’s potential threat to children, particularly his own children, rather than merely adopting the findings of the Presentence Report without further explanation. This is particularly true since the record does not set forth the expertise of the person(s) who prepared the Presentence Report, in addressing this sensitive and difficult area. We need not reiterate that a sentencing court has broad discretion in fashioning an appropriate sentence and in resolving any factual dispute relevant to that difficult task. It is equally clear that the court should proceed cautiously in imposing any 42 condition that could impact Voelker’s parental rights absent sufficiently reliable supporting evidence. We realize, of course, that parental rights are not absolute and that they are subject to the state’s interest in the welfare of the defendant’s children. Parents can “lose custody of their children or have restrictions placed on their parental rights” when there is sufficient evidence “to support a finding that children are potentially in danger from their parents.” Loy II, 237 F.3d at 269. However, there must be sufficient “evidence to support a finding that children are potentially in danger from their parents, [otherwise] the states’ interest cannot be said to be ‘compelling,’ and thus interference in the family relationship is unconstitutional.” Id. at 269-70.19 19 Voelker is now receiving psychological evaluation and treatment. Those actively involved in his treatment are well placed to assist the District Court in determining whether Voelker poses a sufficient threat to children to justify this restriction. On remand, the court will have access to the professionals treating Voelker as well as other professionals who can assist in determining the propriety of any condition restricting his contact with minors and whether any such restriction should extend to his own children. That testimony can assist the court’s analysis under § 3553(a). 43