Opinion ID: 2101388
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Propriety of Appellee's Action Under Chapter 663A.

Text: At the outset we consider the state's contention that because the sanctions imposed on Davis did not involve a situation wherein reduction of sentence pursuant to section 246.39 or section 246.43 had been unlawfully forfeited, the remedies of chapter 663A are not available to him. This contention was advanced in the trial court and rejected in that court. The state's position on this issue is that subsection (6) of Iowa Code section 663A.2 (1983) is the only provision which allows the bringing of an action for postconviction relief in order to challenge the actions of a prison disciplinary committee. This subsection was added to the statute by an amendment in 1981 (Iowa Acts 1981 ch. 198, §§ 1, 2). The 1981 amendment to section 663A.2 provides: Any person who has been convicted of, or sentenced for, a public offense and who claims that: .... 6. The person's reduction of sentence pursuant to section 246.39 or section 246.43 has been unlawfully forfeited; .... may institute, without paying a filing fee, a proceeding under this chapter to secure relief. The State urges that there is no basis for enlarging this provision to include imposition of prison discipline not involving forfeiture of sentence reductions under sections 246.39 and 246.43. It contends that express enumeration in the amendment of the subjects to which the provisions of the act are directed implies the exclusion of additional subjects. In meeting this argument, petitioner relies on the language in subsection (5) of section 663A.2 which provides for postconviction review if the convicted person is otherwise unlawfully held in custody or other restraint. It is claimed that this language permits a challenge to the imposition of administrative segregation without due process or in violation of a prison rule. The language in subsection (5) upon which petitioner relies was contained in the postconviction act when we said in Allen v. State, 217 N.W.2d 528, 531 (Iowa 1974) that challenges to prison disciplinary procedures were not reviewable by an action for postconviction relief. We now conclude, however, that substantial reasons exist for departing from the position taken in Allen with respect to postconviction review of the actions of prison officials which involve a substantial deprivation of liberty or property rights. Surely, state courts must stand ready to adjudicate such claims in some manner. Speaking of related problems, the special committee on habeas corpus of the Conference of Chief Justices stated: If any proposition can be stated dogmatically in this field it is this: the state courts must provide post-conviction corrective process which is at least as broad as the requirements which will be enforced by the federal courts .... a state can call this remedy whatever it wants, but it must provide some corrective process. Report of the Special Committee on Habeas Corpus of the Conference of Chief Justices (1953). In Fichtner v. Iowa State Penitentiary, 285 N.W.2d 751 (Iowa 1979), we permitted deprivations of this type to be reviewed by means of writ of habeas corpus. We have recognized that our postconviction act supplements to some extent the common law writ of habeas corpus to the extent that it provides an equivalent substitute. See Emery v. Fenton, 266 N.W.2d 6, 10 (Iowa 1978); McElhaney v. Auger, 238 N.W.2d 797, 799 (Iowa 1976). Those conclusions were reached with respect to attacks on the validity of a criminal conviction. We believe that we should now also permit claims of the type which are presented in the present action to be reviewed according to the procedures provided under chapter 663A. It would be unwieldly to require separate actions and different procedures to review prison disciplinary proceedings depending on the type of punishment imposed. In many of the prison disciplinary proceedings in which judicial review will be sought, forfeiture of good and honor time will be involved but will be coupled with other means of discipline which can be characterized as a substantial deprivation of liberty or property but which are not expressly mentioned as a subject for review under chapter 663A. We therefore approve litigating all such claims involving substantial deprivation of liberty or property interests pursuant to the procedures of chapter 663A in the county in which the applicant is being confined. The state separately argues in the present case that the sanctions imposed upon petitioner are not a proper subject for judicial interference because administrative segregation is within the discretion of prison authorities in regard to carrying out their responsibilities for housing the prison population. In support of this contention, it relies on Hewitt v. Helms, ___ U.S. ___, 103 S.Ct. 864, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983). We find no merit in this argument where, as here, the order for administrative segregation was expressly imposed as punishment for a violation of prison rules. Hewitt involved nonpunitive administrative segregation and does not support the state's contentions.