Opinion ID: 2609843
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The K-Mart manual.

Text: K-Mart contends that it is entitled to a new trial based on the district court's admission of a K-Mart loss prevention manual into evidence. K-Mart argues that the manual created a higher standard of care than that imposed by applicable Nevada law pertaining to a shopkeeper's retention of a suspected shoplifter, and therefore it was improper for the jury to consider. The decision to admit or exclude relevant evidence, after balancing the prejudicial effect against the probative value, is within the sound discretion of the trial judge. See NRS 48.035. [4] The trial court's determination will not be overturned absent manifest error or abuse of discretion. See Jeep Corporation v. Murray, 101 Nev. 640, 646, 708 P.2d 297, 301 (1985). Discussing appellate review of such determinations, this court has stated, `[i]f the evidence is relevant, reversal is appropriate only where its prejudicial effect so outweighs its probative value that admission constitutes a clear abuse of discretion.' Land Resources Dev. v. Kaiser Aetna, 100 Nev. 29, 34, 676 P.2d 235, 238 (1984) (quoting F/V American Eagle v. State, 620 P.2d 657, 672 (Alaska 1980)). Evidence is relevant where it has some tendency to make the existence of any material fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. See NRS 48.015. [5] At trial, K-Mart argued that its actions were shielded from liability under NRS 598.030, which codifies the common law shopkeeper's privilege. NRS 598.030 provides, in pertinent part: 2. Any merchant may request any person on his premises to place or keep in full view any merchandise the person may have removed, or which the merchant has reason to believe he may have removed, from its place of display or elsewhere, whether for examination, purchase or for any other purpose. No merchant is criminally or civilly liable on account of having made such a request. 3. Any merchant who has reason to believe that merchandise has been wrongfully taken by a person and that he can recover the merchandise by taking the person into custody and detaining him may, for the purpose of attempting to effect such recovery or for the purpose of informing a peace officer of the circumstances of such detention, take the person into custody and detain him, on the premises, in a reasonable manner and for a reasonable length of time. Such taking into custody and detention by a merchant does not render the merchant criminally or civilly liable for false arrest, false imprisonment, slander or unlawful detention unless the taking into custody and detention are unreasonable under all the circumstances. (Emphasis added.) NRS 598.030 grants a merchant a qualified privilege against defamatory remarks made while detaining a person who is reasonably believed to have committed theft of the store's merchandise. The statute also shields a merchant from liability for false arrest, false imprisonment, and unlawful detention. However, this immunity only applies where the merchant's actions are reasonable. Even where a merchant has probable cause to detain a customer, he or she may still be denied protection of the statute if it is shown the detention was unreasonable. See, e.g., Silvia v. Zayre Corp., 233 So.2d 856 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1970) (store lost its statutory privilege by detaining suspect for too long); Altman v. Knox Lumber Co., 381 N.W.2d 858 (Minn.Ct.App.1986) (store owner not entitled to statutory immunity where store employee acted unreasonably in detaining suspected shoplifter); Ayscue v. Mullen, 78 N.C.App. 145, 336 S.E.2d 863 (1985) (store owner not immune from liability where detention not conducted in a reasonable manner); see also Wilde v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Supermarkets, Inc., 160 So.2d 839 (La.Ct.App.1964). Under similar statutes, the detention has been found unreasonable where the merchant has been unnecessarily rude or used excessive force. See, e.g., Gortarez v. Smitty's Super Valu, Inc., 140 Ariz. 97, 680 P.2d 807 (1984) (jury question as to whether detention was reasonable where plaintiffs were physically subdued yet held without questioning); J.C. Penney v. Cox, 246 Miss. 1, 148 So.2d 679 (1963) (even assuming detention was carried out with probable cause, qualified privilege did not apply as detention was unreasonable where store manager grabbed customer and demanded payment for item in front of many customers and salespeople); Lukas v. J.C. Penney Co., 233 Or. 345, 378 P.2d 717 (1963) (detention must be carried out in a reasonable manner for statute to apply). Consequently, one of the material issues in dispute was whether K-Mart's actions in investigating the suspected shoplifting was reasonable. The K-Mart manual provides guidelines for employee encounters with a suspected shoplifter. The manual instructs employees to: (1) approach the subject in a calm manner, (2) ask the subject to return to the store, (3) suggest calling the police if the subject refuses, (4) obtain a license number if the subject leaves, and (5) notify the police. The manual further provides that the suspect should not be touched and force should never be used. [6] The jurisdictions are split as to whether a merchant's manual is relevant to a determination of whether the merchant's behavior is reasonable. Some courts hold that merchants' manuals are inadmissible in false imprisonment and false arrest actions arising out of suspected shoplifting. For example, in Alvarado v. City of Dodge City, 238 Kan. 48, 708 P.2d 174 (1985), the court held that a merchant's liability for false arrest should depend on the minimum legal standards established by statute rather than on the merchant's own standards. Id. 708 P.2d at 185. The court stated public policy dictated that a merchant should not be penalized for establishing higher standards for its employees than the applicable statutory standards. Therefore, the court found the trial court had properly excluded the manual. Id. Similarly, nonreversible error was found where a trial court admitted a store's rules instructing its employees on how to deal with shoplifters where statements from the employee manual might have created doubt in the jurors' minds as to whether the applicable standard was that provided in the statute or the manual. Jones v. Montgomery Ward, 49 Or.App. 231, 235, 619 P.2d 907, 910 (1980). Conversely, in Luckie v. Piggly-Wiggly Southern, Inc., 173 Ga.App. 177, 325 S.E.2d 844 (1984), the court held it was reversible error to exclude a manual instructing employees on how to deal with shoplifters in a false imprisonment case. Id. 325 S.E.2d at 846. The court held the manual was relevant as to what constituted: (1) reasonable grounds to suspect shoplifting, (2) a reasonable manner of detention or arrest, and (3) a reasonable length of detention under the shopkeeper's defense statute. Id. K-Mart's own loss prevention manual was previously found relevant and admissible to determine the reasonableness of K-Mart's actions in detaining a suspected shoplifter in Caldwell v. K-Mart, 306 S.C. 27, 410 S.E.2d 21 (S.C.Ct.App.1991). Other courts have found the manuals admissible to show whether an agent was acting within the scope of authority in causing an arrest, and for the purpose of showing grounds for the award of punitive damages. See D.A. Johns, Annotation, Admissibility of Defendant's Rules or Instructions for Dealing with Shoplifters, in Action for False Imprisonment or Malicious Prosecution, 31 A.L.R.3d 705 (1970 & Supp.1993). We conclude that the better rule allows a merchant's manual to be admitted to determine the reasonableness of the merchant's behavior. In negligence cases, self-imposed guidelines and internal policies are often admissible as relevant on the issue of failure to exercise due care. See, e.g., K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 103 Nev. 39, 732 P.2d 1364 (1987). Although all of Washington's claims involved intentional torts, the crucial inquiry was nonetheless whether K-Mart's actions in detaining Washington were reasonable. What is reasonable is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury. Since NRS 598.030 imposes a standard of reasonableness, but does not define it, the excerpts from the loss prevention manual would be relevant to aid the jurors in determining what was reasonable behavior on the part of K-Mart when detaining Washington. The jurors were not instructed to hold K-Mart to the standards enunciated in its own manual. The jurors were free to assign whatever weight they wished to the manual. K-Mart introduced evidence that the custom in the industry was to use reasonable force. The jurors also had NRS 598.030 before them. The reasonableness of K-Mart's actions was a factual determination that the jurors could make based upon all the evidence presented at trial. Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the K-Mart manual as it was relevant to the material issue of the reasonableness of K-Mart's actions. Whether the district court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that the standard of care set by statute, rather than the standard set by the K-Mart manual, was controlling. K-Mart's counsel requested a jury instruction stating that NRS 598.030 is controlling in cases where the plaintiff has been accused of shoplifting. The district judge refused, explaining that it was the custom in his courtroom to introduce statutory authority without any additional explanatory material. The court invited counsel for K-Mart to argue that the statute should be controlling to the jury. K-Mart contends that the district court's refusal to instruct the jury that the statute was controlling allowed the jury to believe that any use of force by K-Mart was unreasonable, since NRS 598.030 allows a merchant to use reasonable force to detain a suspected shoplifter, but the K-Mart rules do not allow any use of force. The record reveals that extensive in camera discussions pertaining to jury instructions took place. K-Mart attempted to introduce several instructions which would, in effect, state that NRS 598.030 trumps the K-Mart manual. K-Mart relies on Lerner Shops of Nevada, Inc. v. Marin, 83 Nev. 75, 423 P.2d 398 (1967), wherein this court held it was reversible error for the trial court to refuse to give instructions on NRS 598.030 in a false imprisonment trial. The facts of the instant case are readily distinguishable. Here, the court gave instructions on NRS 598.030; it merely refused to allow further elaboration on the statute as requested by K-Mart. A party is entitled to have the jury instructed on all of its theories of the case that are supported by evidence and consistent with existing law. Beattie v. Thomas, 99 Nev. 579, 583, 668 P.2d 268, 271 (1983). However, where the instructions given adequately cover the applicable law, it is not error to refuse to give additional instructions on the same subject. Id. at 585, 668 P.2d at 271; see also Crown Controls Corp. v. Corella, 98 Nev. 35, 639 P.2d 555 (1982). Had K-Mart offered an instruction explaining that the manual was not law, but could be considered in determining whether K-Mart's actions were reasonable, the district court may well have been obligated to give said instruction. Such an instruction would assist this jury in understanding the interplay between NRS 598.030 and the K-Mart manual. However, no such instruction was requested. We conclude that the jury instructions given adequately covered the applicable law; therefore, it was not error for the district court to refuse to give further instructions on the same subject. Whether sufficient evidence supports the jury's finding of defamation. Washington claimed that K-Mart defamed him on three separate occasions. First, Washington claimed that K-Mart falsely told Officers Berni and Guthrie that he had used the hair product without paying for it. Next, Washington alleged that K-Mart made a defamatory statement about him to his girl-friend, Deborah Donaldson, that he seemed to be a bad guy. Finally, Washington asserted that the act of being handcuffed and marched through the store to the security office constitutes slander per se. To prevail on a defamation claim, a party must show publication of a false statement of fact. Wellman v. Fox, 108 Nev. 83, 86, 825 P.2d 208, 210 (1992). Whether or not a statement is capable of defamatory construction is a question of law for the court. In Branda v. Sanford, 97 Nev. 643, 637 P.2d 1223 (1981), this court stated: It is generally accepted that for both libel and slander it is a question of law and, therefore, within the province of the court, to determine if a statement is capable of a defamatory construction. If susceptible of different constructions, one of which is defamatory, resolution of the ambiguity is a question of fact for the jury. Id. at 646, 637 P.2d at 1225-26 (citations omitted). A statement is defamatory when it would tend to lower the subject in the estimation of the community, excite derogatory opinions about the subject, and hold the subject up to contempt. Las Vegas Sun v. Franklin, 74 Nev. 282, 287, 329 P.2d 867, 869 (1958); see Posadas v. City of Reno, 109 Nev. 448, 851 P.2d 438 (1993). We agree with K-Mart that the statements made by Weiss to the police and the statement made to Deborah Donaldson are not actionable. Although the trial court made no findings in this regard, it is likely the statements made to the police would be subject to a qualified privilege under NRS 598.030. Alternatively, the statements could be deemed communications preliminary to a judicial proceeding under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 587 and would therefore be absolutely privileged if made in good faith. [7] Similarly, the statement that Washington seemed like a bad guy is likely nonactionable opinion. Ultimately, a claim for ordinary slander would fail because Washington did not prove special damages at trial. To prevail on a defamation claim, a party must show publication of a false statement of fact that causes damage. Wellman v. Fox, 108 Nev. 83, 86, 825 P.2d 208, 210 (1992), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 68, 121 L.Ed.2d 34 (1992). As a general rule, only assertions of fact, not opinion, can be defamatory. Id. However, expressions of opinion may suggest that the speaker knows certain facts to be true or may imply that facts exist which will be sufficient to render the message defamatory if false. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 13, 110 S.Ct. 2695, 2703, 111 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990). However, even if the statements were defamatory, a plaintiff must also show special damage as a part of a prima facie case of ordinary slander. See Branda v. Sanford, 97 Nev. 643, 637 P.2d 1223 (1981). Washington did not present any evidence of damage to his reputation nor of special damages arising from any of the three alleged instances of defamation. Therefore, a claim for ordinary slander would fail due to a lack of evidence of special damages. On the other hand, we agree with Washington that the act of being handcuffed and marched through the store to the K-Mart security office and the statements made by K-Mart constitute slander per se. Words or conduct or the combination of words and conduct can communicate defamation. See Mains v. K-Mart Corp., 297 S.C. 142, 375 S.E.2d 311 (S.C.Ct.App.1988). A statement is defamatory when it would tend to lower the subject in the estimation of the community, excite derogatory opinions about the subject, and hold the subject up to contempt. Las Vegas Sun v. Franklin, 74 Nev. 282, 287, 329 P.2d 867, 869 (1958). Certain classes of defamatory statements are considered so likely to cause serious injury to reputation and pecuniary loss that these statements are actionable without proof of damages. The four types of slander historically designated as defamatory per se are false statements made involving: (1) the imputation of a crime; (2) the imputation of having a loathsome disease; (3) imputing the person's lack of fitness for trade, business, or profession; and (4) imputing serious sexual misconduct. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 262 n. 18, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 1052 n. 18, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978); Branda v. Sanford, 97 Nev. 643, 646, 637 P.2d 1223, 1225 (1981). No proof of any actual harm to reputation or any other damage is required for the recovery of damages for these four kinds of slander. W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts § 112, at 788 (5th ed. 1984). Otherwise stated, proof of the defamation itself is considered to establish the existence of some damages, and the jury is permitted, without other evidence, to estimate their amount. Id. The record reflects that the district court considered the statements made by Weiss and Officer Berni and the act of leading Washington through the store in handcuffs to be capable of defamatory construction, in fact, that it was slander per se: THE COURT: If we, in fact, take the allegation made by Mr. Weissif we take his version of the story, and Officer Berni's version of the story now, where they state that they not only asked him to stop, but identified themselves and stated that, You used part of this product without paying for it, and we want you to come back into the store, that is the allegation of a commission of a crime, is it not? .... [T]here are cases that say when you cause one to be marched through a populated area in handcuffs, nothing needs to be said. That alone is the same as the allegation of the commission of a crime. .... We've already discussed that defamation per se requires no proof of damages. Damages are presumed. And this is an allegation of a crime, which is one of the four instances, based on the hornbook, of defamation per se.... We agree with the analysis of the district court. The imputation of shoplifting, by words or by pantomime, if communicated to a third party, is unquestionably slander per se. See Safeway Stores v. Rogers, 186 Ark. 826, 56 S.W.2d 429 (1933); American Stores Co. v. Byrd, 229 Md. 5, 181 A.2d 333 (1962); Tumbarella v. Kroger Co. 85 Mich.App. 482, 271 N.W.2d 284 (1978); Southwest Drug Stores v. Garner, 195 So.2d 837 (Miss.1967); Hall v. Heavey, 195 N.J.Super. 590, 481 A.2d 294 (1984); Mains v. K-Mart Corp., 297 S.C. 142, 375 S.E.2d 311 (S.C.Ct.App.1988); see also, G.H. Genzel, Annotation, Defamation: Actionability of Accusation of Imputation of Shoplifting, 29 A.L.R.3d 961 (1970 & Supp. 1993). We conclude, as a matter of law, that the words and conduct of K-Mart were capable of defamatory construction in that the pantomime imputes criminal conduct to Washington. [T]he truth or falsity of an allegedly defamatory statement is an issue of fact properly left to the jury for resolution. Posadas v. City of Reno, 109 Nev. 448, 453, 851 P.2d 438, 442 (1993). Washington testified that Weiss and Officer Berni grabbed him, chased him, tackled him, handcuffed him, and then led him back into the store in front of a crowd of people. Weiss testified that he approached Washington with a bottle of hair spray in his hand and stated, Excuse me, sir, I'm from K-Mart security. I need you to come back in the store about using this product. Officer Berni testified that he questioned Washington in a similar fashion and handcuffed him in front of a crowd of people. The language alone that Weiss used to address Washington was arguably susceptible of innocent construction. However, the combination of words and actions together constitutes slander per se as it would impute, to a reasonable person, that Washington was a thief. There is sufficient evidence in the record to indicate that the language and actions were published, by communication to other shoppers, including witness Joyce Gantz, and the crowd in the parking lot. See M & R Investment Co. v. Mandarino, 103 Nev. 711, 715, 748 P.2d 488, 491 (1987) (publication may be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence of communication to a third person). We conclude, therefore, that there was substantial evidence to support the jury's finding of defamation.