Opinion ID: 1342405
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Juror John Doe [3] and Wainwright v. Witt

Text: Mercer claims the disqualification of Juror John Doe violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. We disagree. In Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985), the Supreme Court stated that the critical issue regarding the disqualification of a capital juror is whether the juror's views would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' Id. at 424, 105 S.Ct. 844 (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980)). The Wainwright Court observed that a juror's bias need not be proved with `unmistakable clarity'... [because] bias cannot be reduced to question-and-answer sessions which obtain results in the manner of a catechism. Id. at 424, 105 S.Ct. 844. Finally, the Wainwright Court noted that there will be situations where the trial judge is left with the definite impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law ... [and that] is why deference must be paid to the trial judge who sees and hears the juror. Id. at 425-26, 105 S.Ct. 844. It is with this standard in mind that we address whether the trial court abused its discretion in disqualifying Juror John Doe. We have carefully reviewed the lengthy colloquy involving Juror Doe. While it is possible to cherry-pick certain responses and perhaps conclude that Juror Doe is qualified, a review of the totality of the responses reveals a potential juror vacillating and struggling with his strong convictions against the death penalty. Juror Doe, without hesitation, expressed an ability to impose a life sentence. Conversely, when the trial court asked if the juror could vote for a sentence of death, Juror Doe responded, I'm not sure, sir. The State followed the court's questioning by pursuing the same line of inquiry, to which Juror Doe responded that it's just hard to judge, you know, someone else ... for something that they've done. Following up, the State zeroed in on Juror Doe's reservations, asking whether Juror Doe could sign his name to a death penalty verdict, to which Doe responded, I don't think so, sir. Defense counsel attempted to rehabilitate Juror Doe, but without much success. Doe stated he would try to consider both options. The trial court permitted both sides to vet Juror Doe thoroughly. Doe answered, probably so, when asked if his feelings would interfere with serving on the jury. And when Doe was asked, if you were convinced that a death sentence was appropriate that you could sign that form along with the other jurors, he answered, [t]hat goes back to like having to put my name on the line you said whenfor a death sentence. I'd still have to think about that. The trial court concluded that Juror John Doe was not qualified under Wainwright: I think the juror is not qualified.... There's several things that I think need to be mentioned, and the first is the juror's demeanor.... I believe that ... this juror's views on capital punishment would substantially impair his ability to perform his duties as a juror in accordance with the instructions that I would give him. ... A lot of times I think we see jurors who hesitate ... [and] I feel as though I can get a sense as to whether the juror is hesitating because they are trying to think deeply and be completely open and honest with us or are they hesitating because they are troubled by the ... issue that they're about to discuss. I did not get the impression, as I do sometimes, that this juror hesitated because he was trying to be clear about his feelings. I got the impression that he hesitated because he was troubled by ... what he thought would be the question of whether or not he would be able to impose the death penalty.... And in the end I am left ... with the impression that ... this juror's views on the death penalty would substantially impair his performance of his duty to ... follow the instructions that I would give him. And so I find that he is disqualified. We find the trial court acted well within its broad discretion in finding Juror Doe's views would substantially impair his ability to follow his oath and the court's instructions on the law. See Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1, 9, 127 S.Ct. 2218, 167 L.Ed.2d 1014 (2007) (Deference to the trial court is appropriate [which necessarily involves granting the trial court broad discretion] because it is in a position to assess the demeanor of the venire, and of the individuals who compose it, a factor of critical importance in assessing the attitude and qualifications of potential jurors.); State v. Wood, 362 S.C. 135, 141, 607 S.E.2d 57, 60 (2004) (adhering to the rule that a trial court's disqualification of a prospective juror will not be disturbed where there is a reasonable basis ... [to] conclude[] that the juror would not have been able to faithfully discharge his responsibilities as a juror); State v. Council, 335 S.C. 1, 10, 515 S.E.2d 508, 512 (1999) (following the rule that unless unsupported by the evidence, determination of whether a juror is qualified to serve on a death penalty case is within the sole discretion of the trial judge). Even the cold record before us reflects Juror Doe's hesitancy and profound unease with the prospect of performing his duties as a juror in accordance with his oath and the court's instructions. State v. George, 323 S.C. 496, 503, 476 S.E.2d 903, 908 (1996) (finding that the trial court acted correctly by disqualifying a juror that declared that she did not think she could sign a form recommending the death penalty); State v. Longworth, 313 S.C. 360, 366, 438 S.E.2d 219, 222 (1993) (disqualifying a juror who initially stated he `probably could' consider the death penalty but later stated he did not think so). We affirm the disqualification of Juror John Doe.