Opinion ID: 746801
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Preemption under the Hazard Communication Standard.

Text: 32 Under the Gade framework, we conclude that any portions of Proposition 65 and the OEHHA Regs. not included as part of the State Plan relate to the issue of the federal Hazard Communication Standard, and are therefore preempted. Our conclusion is based on OSHA's definition of the term issue within the Hazard Communication Standard and the preemptive reach of the phrase relating to under the Occupational Safety and Health Act and the Hazard Communication Standard. 33
34 An agency's interpretation of the preemptive effect of its regulations is entitled to deference where Congress has delegated authority to the agency, the agency's interpretation is not contrary to a statute, and agency expertise is important to determining preemption. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, ---- - ----, 116 S.Ct. 2240, 2255-56, 135 L.Ed.2d 700 (1996); Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., 471 U.S. 707, 714-15, 105 S.Ct. 2371, 2375-76, 85 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985) (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2781-82, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984)); Brannan v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 94 F.3d 1260, 1263-66 (9th Cir.1996), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 2484, 138 L.Ed.2d 992, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 2496, 138 L.Ed.2d 1003 (1997). Here, it is appropriate to defer to OSHA's interpretation of the issue of the Hazard Communication Standard. The term issue is not defined by the Occupational Safety and Health Act. Congress explicitly gave the Secretary of Labor the power to promulgate standards, like the Hazard Communication Standard, that would have preemptive effect, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651 & 667(b), and agency expertise is important in determining which state warning requirements fall within the Hazard Communication Standard's regulatory field. See Ohio Mfrs. Ass'n. v. City of Akron, 801 F.2d 824, 833 (6th Cir.1986) (courts should defer to OSHA's determination of the preemptive effect of the Hazard Communication Standard). In order to determine OSHA's intended definition of issue we may look to regulations, preambles, interpretive statements, and responses to comments. Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 718, 105 S.Ct. at 2377. 35 OSHA defines the issue of the Hazard Communication Standard in a subsection of the Purpose section of the Hazard Communication Standard. 7 The first sentence of that definition provides: 36 This occupational safety and health standard is intended to address comprehensively the issue of evaluating the potential hazards of chemicals, and communicating information concerning hazards and appropriate protective measures to employees, and to preempt any legal requirements of a state, or political subdivision of a state, pertaining to this subject. 37 29 C.F.R § 1910.1200(a)(2) (emphasis added). This broad language demonstrates that the occupational safety requirements of Proposition 65 and the OEHHA Regs. operate squarely within the issue of the Hazard Communication Standard. Proposition 65 and the OEHHA Regs. are state laws that require both evaluating the potential hazards of chemicals and communicating information concerning hazards. 38 Notably, this definition of issue contains no limitation on whom a state may require to communicate information or to eliminate chemicals. Any legal requirement of a state regarding the evaluation of hazards and the communication of those hazards to employees is preempted. The second sentence emphasizes this point. It focuses on, and expansively lists, the various methods of evaluating, and communicating about, chemical hazards. 39 Evaluating the potential hazards of chemicals, and communicating information concerning hazards and appropriate protective measures to employees, may include, for example, but is not limited to, provisions for: developing and maintaining a written hazard communication program for the workplace, including lists of hazardous chemicals present; labeling of containers of chemicals in the workplace, as well as of containers of chemicals being shipped to other workplaces; preparation and distribution of material safety data sheets to employees and downstream employers; and development and implementation of employee training programs regarding hazards of chemicals and protective measures. 40 Id. 41 OSHA's commentary in the 1987 preamble to the Hazard Communication Standard further demonstrates its intent to define the issue of the Hazard Communication Standard by prohibiting certain methods of regulation without regard to the entities employing these methods: 42 The revised § 1910.1200(a)(2) not only defines hazard communication as an issue under the terms of the Act, but also enumerates the generic areas addressed by the standard for purposes of establishing the parameters of preemption. Thus any State or local government provisions requiring the preparation of material safety data sheets, labeling of chemicals and identification of their hazards, development of written hazard communication programs including lists of hazardous chemicals present in the workplace, and development and implementation of worker chemical hazard training for the primary purpose of assuring worker safety and health, would be preempted by the HCS unless it was established under the authority of an OSHA-approved State plan. 43 Hazard Communications, 52 Fed.Reg. 31,852, 31,861 (1987) (1987 Final Rule ). 44 The second sentence of § 1910.1200(a)(2) and the quoted passage from the 1987 preamble also support the conclusion that the OEHHA Regs. operate within the issue of the Hazard Communication Standard. These statements by OSHA explicitly indicate that labeling and the distribution of data sheets about hazardous chemicals in the workplace are within the Hazard Communication Standard's issue. These same warning methods, the State informs us, are the ones that can be used to impose the warning requirements of the OEHHA Regs. on industrial truck manufacturers. 45 The State attempts, in a number of ways, to undermine the unmistakable clarity with which the Hazard Communication Standard's issue covers the nonapproved portions of the OEHHA Regs. Central to its arguments is its correct assertion that the Hazard Communication Standard's Scope and application section, 29 C.F.R. § 1920.1200(b), which follows the Purpose section, demonstrates that the Hazard Communication Standard does not impose warning requirements on industrial truck manufacturers and distributors. 8 Because the Hazard Communication Standard imposes no regulatory burden on plaintiffs, the State contends that the Hazard Communication Standard cannot preempt the state regulations that do apply to plaintiffs. It argues that Hazard Communication Standard preemption extends only to entities that the Hazard Communication Standard actually regulates. 46 This argument is unavailing. As we have pointed out, OSHA defines the issue of the Hazard Communication Standard not on the basis of who bears the regulatory burden, but on the type of regulation involved. Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, that decision was OSHA's to make, and it resulted in OSHA's total occupation of the field of that issue. When a federal scheme exclusively occupies a field, the federal scheme proscribes all state action in that field. See e.g., Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 272 U.S. 605, 613, 47 S.Ct. 207, 210, 71 L.Ed. 432 (1926) (where Congress has occupied the field of locomotive safety, allegedly nonconflicting state laws regarding automatic fire doors and cab curtains preempted even though no federal regulation on point). Instead, the test of pre-emption is whether 'the matter on which the State asserts a right to act is in any way regulated by the Federal Act.'  Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 212-13, 103 S.Ct. 1713, 1726-27, 75 L.Ed.2d 752 (1983) (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 236, 67 S.Ct. at 1154) (emphasis added); Hawaii Newspaper Agency v. Bronster, 103 F.3d 742, 749 (9th Cir.1996). Here, the state seeks to impose hazardous chemical warning requirements using methods directly and comprehensively addressed by the Hazard Communication Standard. Thus, the state regulations are preempted. 47 The State protests that its regulations do not conflict with the Hazard Communication Standard and actually furthers Congress' goal of conveying accurate warnings to employees. But that is exactly the kind of argument that was advanced, and explicitly rejected, in Gade. All supplementary regulations are preempted, whether they conflict or not. If the State truly believes that the OEHHA Regs. are at least as effective as the Hazard Communication Standard, it has a simple remedy--to submit the regulations to OSHA as part of the State Plan. OSHA can then determine whether the State's claims are accurate. 48 Finally, the state attempts to narrow the definition of the issue expressed by OSHA in 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(a)(2). It argues that the broad definition of issue stated there is limited by the language in the Scope and application section. It buttresses its argument with the doctrine of ejusdem generis, which provides that specific words govern general words similar in nature to the preceeding general words. See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384-85, 112 S.Ct. 2031, 2036-37, 119 L.Ed.2d 157 (1992) (general savings clause governed by specific provision listing preempted areas); see generally, 2A C.Sands, Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 47.17, p. 188-89 (5th ed. 1992) (Sutherland ) (ejusdem generis avoids general words rendering specific words superfluous). The flaw in the State's reasoning is that, unlike in Morales, only the general provision in the Hazard Communication Standard addresses preemption. 49 As we have shown above, s[ection] 1910.1200(a)(2) not only defines hazard communication as an 'issue' ... but also enumerates the generic areas addressed by the standard for purposes of establishing the parameters of preemption. 1987 Final Rule, 52 Fed.Reg. at 31,861 (emphasis added). In no part of the Hazard Communication Standard, nor in any of OSHA's explanatory comments, including those to the Scope and application section, however, does OSHA suggest that any other sections of the Hazard Communication Standard besides § 1910.1200(a)(2) have any bearing on preemption or the definition of issue. Indeed, the word preemption does not appear in any other section of the Hazard Communication Standard, and the word issue appears elsewhere only as a verb. As plaintiffs properly put it, the Scope and application section does not pretend to delineate which state laws are preempted. Thus, the State's reliance on this canon of construction is misplaced. Sacramento Reg'l County Sanitation Dist. v. Reilly, 905 F.2d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir.1990) (ejusdem generis does not apply where specific and general terms not akin) (citation omitted); Sutherland, § 47.17, p. 189 (same, where no inconsistency between specific and general factors). 50
51 The third, and last, sentence of the Purpose section places the previously defined issue within the context of the OSH Act's preemptive reach: 52 Under section 18 of the Act, no state [or locality] may adopt or enforce, through any court or agency, any requirement relating to the issue addressed by this Federal standard, except pursuant to a Federally-approved state plan. 53 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(a)(2) (emphasis added). This sentence emphasizes what is clear from the text of the Occupational Safety and Health Act. Federal standards, like the Hazard Communication Standard, preempt more than those state standards directly covering the same issue as the federal standard; rather, they preempt the broader category of state laws relating to the federal issue. 29 U.S.C. § 667(b); Gade, 505 U.S. at 105, 112 S.Ct. at 2386. Thus, even if the OEHHA Regs. did not fall directly within the issue of the Hazard Communication Standard, they would still be preempted if they relat[e] to that issue. 54 There are ample reasons to conclude that the Hazard Communication Standard and the OEHHA Regs. relate to the same issue or subject matter. First, it is undisputed that the occupational warning requirements of Proposition 65 and the OEHHA Regs. are, like the Hazard Communication Standard, occupational safety and health standards within the meaning of the Occupational Safety and Health Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 652(8); California Labor Fed'n, 221 Cal.App.3d at 1556-57, 271 Cal.Rptr. at 316-17. Further, as noted in part I.B, the OEHHA Regs. expressly provide that adherence to the warning requirements of the HCS satisfies its warning requirements. Cal.Code Regs., tit. 22, § 12601(c)(1)(C). We think it manifest that two sets of regulations relate to the same issue when they both directly govern occupational safety and health, and compliance with the substantive requirements of one expressly satisfies the substantive requirements of the other. 9