Opinion ID: 1318702
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Tort Law Analysis

Text: The majority's overturning Dunbar and Chandler is not sufficient to prevent dismissal of plaintiff's action in the present case. Without more, plaintiff's complaint is still subject to dismissal for failure to state a cause of action. It is not enough to prove that the state has consented to be sued, i.e., waived its immunity to suit. In waiving immunity, the ITCA does nothing more than waive the state's immunity to action; it does not create a cause of action where none previously existed. I.C. § 6-903(f) states in part, Nothing in this act shall enlarge or otherwise adversely affect the liability of an employee or a governmental entity. Any immunity or other bar to a civil lawsuit under Idaho or federal law shall remain in effect. The majority chooses to ignore this directive of the Idaho legislature, stating, It has been argued that the 1971 Idaho act was not intended to create new causes of action against the government in its business of governing. Ante at 223, 723 P.2d at 766. Responding to that argument, the majority opinion, quoting from the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 319, 77 S.Ct. 374, 377, 1 L.Ed.2d 354 (1957), then states, But the very purpose of the Tort Claims Act was to waive the government's traditional all-encompassing immunity from tort actions and to establish novel and unprecedented government liability. Ante at 222, 723 P.2d at 766. However, I.C. § 6-903(a) specifically rejects this Rayonier novel and unprecedented liability doctrine. There is no comparable provision in the Federal Tort Claims Act to I.C. § 6-903(f), which rejects Rayonier's novel and unprecedented liability doctrine, and therefore the majority's reliance upon the Rayonier decision of the United States Supreme Court to the effect that the very purpose of the Tort Claims Act was to ... establish novel and unprecedent governmental liability is contrary to the express directive of the Idaho legislature in I.C. § 6-903(f). The basic premise motivating the majority in this case having been expressly rejected by the Idaho legislature in I.C. § 6-903(f), the entire tort analysis of the majority opinion is thus flawed. Because the majority erroneously approaches the tort law aspect of this case from the doctrine borrowed from the Rayonier case that the purpose of the Tort Claims Act was to establish novel and unprecedented governmental liability, when in fact the Idaho legislature stated that [n]othing in this act shall enlarge ... the liability of an employee or a governmental entity, the whole basic approach of the majority opinion is wrong. If the majority opinion were true to the directive of I.C. § 6-903(f), and it followed the doctrine of our existing tort law cases of Worden v. Witt, 4 Idaho 404, 39 P. 1114 (1895), and Jacobson v. McMillan, 64 Idaho 351, 132 P.2d 773 (1943), the Court would be compelled today to affirm the district court and dismiss plaintiff's complaint. Once the shield of immunity to suit is removed, a plaintiff must still affirmatively establish that the governmental entity, if a private person or entity, would be liable ... under the laws of the State of Idaho prior to a finding of liability as to the State of Idaho and the Board of Corrections. The majority's analysis regarding this aspect of plaintiff's case ignores our prior case law. Since the plaintiff seeks to hold the board liable for the negligence of its agent/employee (probation officer Housley), the doctrine of imputed negligence or respondeat superior is clearly implicated. To succeed under this doctrine, plaintiff must establish: (1) that the agent/employee's conduct constituted actionable negligence, i.e., for all practical purposes plaintiff must make out a cause of action for negligence against Housley; and (2) that the agent/employee's negligent acts were within the course and scope of employment. I.C. § 6-903(a); Restatement (Second) Agency § 243.
Turning first to the cause of action for negligence against the agent/employee, it is by now axiomatic that the allegation of plaintiff's complaint, in order to state a cause of action for negligence, must set forth the following concepts fundamental to any negligence action: duty, breach, proximate cause and damages. Blake v. Cruz, 108 Idaho 253, 257, 698 P.2d 315, 319 (1985). Careful analysis of plaintiff's complaint reveals that it is deficient as to two of the four fundamental elements, namely, duty and proximate cause. Thus, plaintiff has not stated a cause of action for negligence against employee Housley and, therefore, states no cause of action against defendant State Board of Corrections.
The primary element in a cause of action for negligence is the existence of a duty owed by defendant to the particular plaintiff. Prosser & Keeton, Torts, § 30 (1984). Thus, while it may be said that the defendant was negligent ... [he may not be] liable because he was under no duty to the plaintiff not to be. Id. The question of existence of a duty under the particular facts of the case is a question of law for the courts. Prosser & Keeton, Torts, § 37 (1984). As stated by the Supreme Court of California in a tort claims act against the State of California: The existence of `duty' is a question of law. (Citations omitted.) `[L]egal duties are not discoverable facts of nature, but merely conclusory expressions that, in cases of a particular type, liability should be imposed for damage.' Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, [17 Cal.3d 425, 131 Cal.Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334 (1976).] Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal.3d 741, 167 Cal.Rptr. 70, 74, 614 P.2d 728, 732 (1980). Essentially the question of the existence of a duty involves a legal determination that some relationship exists between the defendant and the plaintiff which gives rise to an obligation of conduct toward a particular person in the first instance. [D]uty is a question of whether the defendant is under any obligation for the benefit of the particular plaintiff. Prosser & Keeton, supra at § 53. Furthermore, a determination of the existence of a duty in a particular case involves consideration of several factors, including the following: [T]he extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved .... When public agencies are involved additional elements include the extent of the agency's powers, the role imposed upon it by law and the limitations imposed upon it by budget. Davidson v. City of Westminster, 32 Cal.3d 197, 185 Cal.Rptr. 252, 649 P.2d 894, 897 (1982), quoting with approval Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal.2d 108, 70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561 (1968), and Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal.3d 741, 167 Cal.Rptr. 70, 614 P.2d 728 (1980). In the present case, even when construing the facts and allegations contained in plaintiff's complaint and all reasonable inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to plaintiff, it is clear that she has failed to establish the existence of any legal duty owed her by defendant State of Idaho Board of Corrections (through its agent Housley). Indeed, on its face, plaintiff's complaint fails entirely to specifically allege the existence of any duty. Plaintiff's complaint does contain allegations of negligence, but as stated earlier, liability will not flow from allegations of negligence absent allegations that show that defendant was under a duty not to be negligent toward plaintiff. Drawing reasonable inferences from the allegations in plaintiff's complaint, it is possible to glean therefrom the existence of three possible sources of duty imposed on defendant board (and therefore its agent Housley): (1) the court order of probation; (2) the probation agreement between the board and defendant Bloom; and (3) the statutory duty to supervise, investigate, and report violations of the probation. However, it is beyond question that under the statutes and prior decisions of this Court any duty arising from any of these three sources may not form the basis of an action in tort. The second category, the probation agreement violation, is quickly answered by a long line of Idaho cases, culminating with our most recent decision in Carroll v. United Steelworkers of America, 107 Idaho 717, 629 P.2d 361 (1984), wherein we stated: Under Idaho law it is settled that an alleged failure to perform a contractual obligation is not actionable in tort.... In Taylor v. Herbold, 94 Idaho 133, 483 P.2d 664 (1971), we stated, `To found an action in tort, there must be a breach of duty apart from the non-performance of a contract.' ... Mere nonfeasance, even if it amounts to willful neglect to perform the contract, is insufficient to establish a duty in tort. Carroll v. United Steelworkers of America, 107 Idaho 717, 719, 692 P.2d 361, 363 (1984). Assuming, without deciding, that a probation agreement is an enforceable contract, under the Carroll case and Taylor v. Herbold, supra , failure of the Board of Corrections to perform the contract would not support an action in tort. As to the other two categories, the court's order of probation and the board's statutory duty contained in I.C. § 20-219, [9] contrary to the majority's assertion, any duty arising from these two sources is owed to the public at large and not in favor of an individual member thereof. [10] The established law in Idaho is that such duties imposed on public officials and running in favor of the general public do not inure to the benefit of individual or particular members of the general public. Worden v. Witt, 4 Idaho 404, 39 P. 1114 (1895) ([I]f the duty which the official authority imposes upon an officer is a duty to the public, a failure to perform it, or an inadequate or erroneous performance, must be a public, not an individual, injury, and must be redressed, if at all, in some form of public prosecution. 4 Idaho at 406-07); Jacobson v. McMillan, 64 Idaho 351, 132 P.2d 773 (1943). In Jacobson v. McMillan, 64 Idaho 351, 132 P.2d 773 (1943), this Court was faced with facts substantially the same as those in the present case. In the Jacobson case, one Dan O'Connor had been arrested and charged with assault with a deadly weapon as the result of an attempt to shoot his wife. After being bound over on the assault charge, O'Connor was committed to the custody of the Kootenai County sheriff. The court's order of commitment specifically required that the individual involved be retained in custody in the Kootenai County jail pending trial on charges of assault with a deadly weapon. The court's order was never rescinded. The parallel between the facts in the Jacobson case and the facts in this case to this point are obvious. In the present case the defendant was convicted of felony DUI, and his legal custody was committed to the probation officer Housley, although released nevertheless on probation, under the strict terms as outlined in the majority opinion. Officer Housley is accused of failing to enforce the court's order of probation, thus violating it. Similar to the present case, the sheriff in the Jacobson case, was accused of acting in direct contravention of the order and the statutory duty imposed by then I.C. § 20-604, [11] by removing the committed individual from the county jail prior to trial and releasing him to the custody of the hospital superintendent at the state hospital in Blackfoot. Through the alleged negligence of the hospital superintendent in failing to supervise the committed individual, he was permitted to wander freely around the hospital grounds without guard and as a result escaped from the state hospital. Subsequent to his escape, neither the hospital superintendent nor the county sheriff attempted to apprehend the escaped individual. Several months later O'Connor again attempted to kill his wife and in the process assaulted two men who were trying to protect her, killing one and wounding the other. Suit was brought against both the sheriff and the hospital superintendent by Jacobson, the individual wounded in the assault. In his complaint, Jacobson alleged, similar to the plaintiff in this case, that his injuries were the proximate result of the negligence of the sheriff and the superintendent whose acts were in direct violation of the court order committing the individual to the county jail. [12] Defendants Sheriff McMillan and the superintendent of the hospital moved to dismiss the complaint on grounds that the alleged facts of the complaint did not state a cause of action. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff appealed. This Court affirmed the trial court on two alternative bases: (1) lack of duty owed to plaintiff by defendants, and (2) lack of proximate cause. [13] Writing for the Court, Justice Ailshie, in affirming the dismissal, applied traditional tort law analysis and held that there existed no duty between defendants and plaintiff. The duties of a peace officer, who has custody of a prisoner, are two-fold, (1) to the public and (2) to the prisoner.... [H]e owes no more duty to one member of the public than to another. Any violation on the part of the sheriff, of his duty to keep a prisoner charged with a crime, is answerable to the public; and he is subject to ... removal from office, for wilful, negligent violation of such duty. That right, however, does not inure to individuals. It rests with the public and must be exercised by the prosecutor or a proper party on behalf of the state. 64 Idaho at 358, 132 P.2d at 777 (citations omitted). In reaching this holding, Justice Ailshie relied specifically on the language from Worden v. Witt, supra . Jacobson v. McMillan, 64 Idaho at 358-89, 132 P.2d 773. The rationale of Jacobson that no liability accrues in favor of an individual member of the public, based on an alleged breach of a general duty to the public, is in accord with the majority of jurisdictions which have addressed the issue. See, e.g., Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal.3d 741, 167 Cal.Rptr. 70, 80, 614 P.2d 728, 738 (Cal.1980) (absent a special relationship between the probation authorities and victim, no duty is owed by the probation authorities to a victim who is otherwise a single member of a large amorphous public group of potential targets); Everton v. Willard, 468 So.2d 936 (Fla.1985) (The victim of a criminal offense, which might have been prevented through reasonable law enforcement action, does not establish a common law duty of care the individual citizen and resulting tort liability, absent a special duty to the victim.); Dauffenbach v. City of Wichita, 233 Kan. 1028, 667 P.2d 380 (1983) (failure to perform duty owned to general public does not give rise to tort liability); Sorichetti v. City of New York, 65 N.Y.2d 461, 492 N.Y.S.2d 591, 595, 482 N.E.2d 70, 74 (1985) (absent special relationship, a municipality does not owe a duty to its citizens in the performance of governmental functions); Chambers-Castanes v. King County, 100 Wash.2d 275, 669 P.2d 451, 457 (1983) (duty of law enforcement agencies to protect public is a duty owed to the public at large and [is] unenforceable as to individual members of the public). See generally, Annot., 38 A.L.R.4th 1194 (1985). The Thompson case, supra, presents facts substantially similar to the present case. In Thompson, plaintiffs sought to hold defendant Alameda County liable for the death of their son following the release of a dangerous juvenile offender, James. In their complaint plaintiffs alleged that the juvenile offender had been in the custody and under the control of county and had been confined in a county institution under court order. County knew that James had `latent, extremely dangerous and violent propensities regarding young children and that sexual assaults upon young children and violence connected therewith were a likely result of releasing him into the community.' County also knew that James had `indicated that he would, if released, take the life of a young child residing in the neighborhood.' ... County released James on temporary leave into his mother's custody at her home.... Thompson v. County of Alameda, 167 Cal.Rptr. at 72, 614 P.2d at 730 (emphasis added). As in the present case, the plaintiffs in Thompson had alleged the existence of a special relationship between the county and the juvenile offender. The juvenile offender was committed to a county institution pursuant to court order just as defendant Bloom in the present case was committed to probation under a court order. The juvenile offender in Thompson was on parole at the time of the incident. There existed a relationship between the county and the juvenile offender of parolor and parolee. Nevertheless, the California Supreme Court held that, absent a special relationship between the county and the plaintiff-victim, i.e., a showing by the plaintiff that the state by its conduct placed the specific plaintiff in a position of clearly foreseeable danger, no liability could be imposed on the county. Contrasting the facts in Thompson with its earlier holding in Johnson v. State, 69 Cal.2d 782, 73 Cal.Rptr. 240, 447 P.2d 352 (1968), where the risk of danger focused precisely on a specific plaintiff, the court held in Thompson that Alameda County bore no special and continuous relationship with the specific plaintiffs nor did the county knowingly place the specific plaintiffs' decedent into a foreseeably dangerous position. The court in Thompson likewise distinguished its prior decision in Tarasoff v. Regents Univ. of California, 551 P.2d 334 (1976), where again the victim was the known and specifically foreseeable and identifiable victim of the [mental] patient's threats. 167 Cal.Rptr. at 76, 614 P.2d at 734. Applying the rationale and holding of Thompson to the present case, the majority should likewise hold that defendant Board of Corrections may not be held liable for injuries sustained by plaintiff since no duty is owed to a single member of an otherwise large amorphous public group of potential targets. 167 Cal.Rptr. at 80, 614 P.2d at 738. The plaintiff's allegation of inadequate or negligent supervision is nothing but a thinly veiled claim of failure of a law enforcement agency to protect her from harm. Such claims have uniformly been rejected by the courts. Sorichetti, supra ; Chambers-Castanes, supra ; Shore v. Stonington, 187 Conn. 147, 444 A.2d 1379 (1982) (lack of showing of imminent harm to identifiable victim failed to turn officer's legal duty to public generally into special duty to individual; therefore, town was not liable to plaintiffs whose decedent was killed by intoxicated driver who, approximately one hour prior to accident, was stopped and warned but not arrested by officer); see generally Annot. 46 A.L.R.3d 1084, §§ 3, 4, 6 (1972 & Supp.1985). The only exception to the general rule of non-liability for failure to protect is where a special relationship has been established between the governmental entity and the victim. No such special relationship has been alleged or shown in the present case. Indeed, defendant Board of Corrections was completely unaware of the particular plaintiff in this case prior to the accident in question. The majority opinion makes no mention of the Jacobson case and its general rules of non-liability for failure to perform general duties owed to the public at large, and instead creates a duty in the present case by adopting the Restatement (Second) Torts, § 319. However, the so-called Restatement is not restating the law of Idaho and is, indeed, a complete reversal of the prior decisional law in this state. Not a single case is cited by the majority in support of its assertion that Section 319 is the law in Idaho. As it did in overturning Dunbar and Chandler, the majority again creates law (indeed, a new tort of negligent supervision) where none existed before and legislates Section 319 of the Restatement (Second) into the law of the State of Idaho. [14]
In most instances the question of proximate cause is an issue of fact for the trier of fact. Annau v. Schutte, 96 Idaho 704, 535 P.2d 1095 (1975). However, as with any issue of fact, if reasonable minds could not differ as to the existence or non-existence of an issue, then the issue becomes one of law and is for the court to decide. Palsgraf v. Long Island RR. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y.1928); Annau v. Schutte, supra . In the context of this case in its present posture (motion on the pleadings), if under any conceivable set of facts plaintiff fails to establish proximate cause, then the complaint and suit may properly be dismissed. Proximate cause is defined as a cause which, in natural and continuous sequence unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the result (injuries) and without which the result would not have occurred. Smith v. Sharp, 82 Idaho 420, 354 P.2d 172 (1960); Chatterton v. Pocatello Post, 70 Idaho 480, 223 P.2d 389 (1950); accord Challis Irrig. Co. v. State, 107 Idaho 338, 689 P.2d 230 (Ct.App.1984). Even if a cause is alleged to be a concurring cause of the injury, it still must be a proximate cause in its own right. Challis Irrig. Co. v. State, supra ; Miller v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 24 Idaho 567, 135 P. 845 (1913); 57 Am.Jur.2d Negligence, §§ 176-182 (1971). Careful examination of the allegations of plaintiff's complaint reveals that nothing short of failing to physically restrain Bloom, i.e., physically preventing him from drinking and subsequently driving a vehicle, can be said to constitute conduct on the part of the Board of Corrections (and its agent/employee) which proximately caused plaintiff's injuries. That is, only such conduct on the part of the board is that without which the result would not have occurred. The allegations of plaintiff's complaint which constitute the sine qua non of plaintiff's cause of action are as follows: (a) Allowing ... Bloom to drive a motor vehicle for non-employment purposes ... contrary to . . . the Order of Probation ...; (b) Allowing ... Bloom to operate a motor vehicle without written permission from the court or probation department ... contrary to the Agreement of Probation ...; .... (i) Failing to initiate proceedings to revoke ... Bloom's probation despite the fact that ... Bloom had failed and/or refused to comply with the order of probation ... and the agreement of probation ... on numerous occasions prior to [the date of the accident in question]; (j) Failing to act reasonably and prudently under the circumstances despite its knowledge that ... Bloom had been convicted twice of [driving while intoxicated] prior to [the date of the accident in question] and that ... Bloom was likely to cause great bodily harm to members of the public at large if not adequately supervised. Allegation (j), lack of adequate supervision, is the essence of plaintiff's complaint. [15] However, as is apparent, lack of adequate supervision is far too broad a characterization to support a finding of proximate cause. Instead, the only aspect of supervision which does lend itself to a finding of proximate cause is physically preventing Bloom from operating a motor vehicle in contravention of his order of probation or probation agreement. [16] In my estimation, the only two ways authorized for accomplishing such a task are either: (1) arresting Bloom for violation of his probation agreement pursuant to I.C. § 20-227 (and in this case such action only acquires meaning from a claim that probation officer Housley had actual knowledge that prior violations had occurred); or (2) initiate proceedings to revoke his probation (this is the essence of allegation (i)). I.C. § 20-227 does give a probation officer the authority to arrest a parolee for violation of the terms and conditions of his parole or probation, but the statute gives the officer discretion in determining whether or not to make such an arrest. Thus, the statute states, Any parole or probation officer may arrest a parolee or probationer without a warrant, or may deputize any other officer with power of arrest to do so, by giving him a written statement setting forth that the parolee or probationer has, in the judgment of said parole or probation officer, violated the conditions of his parole or probation. Whether or not to arrest a person who is alleged to have violated the law has always been a discretionary decision at common law. Everton v. Willard, 468 So.2d 936 (Fla.1985) (no distinction between discretionary decision of police officer whether to arrest individual for an offense and the discretionary decision of a prosecutor of whether to prosecute an individual; both are judgmental decisions which are inherent in enforcing the laws of the state); Watson v. Quarles, 381 N.W.2d 811 (Mich.App.1985) (the determination of what type of action to take in face of unlawful conduct, e.g., make an immediate arrest, is a discretionary decisional act entitled to immunity); Hildenbrand v. Cox, 369 N.W.2d 411 (Iowa 1985) (decision by police whether to take an intoxicated person into custody is permissive rather than mandatory). Under I.C. § 20-227 it is expressly made discretionary. The effect of the majority opinion today is that every probationer who violates any term of his probation must be arrested, or the state will be subject to a claim of liability in tort for any subsequent violations which that probationer may commit. The same is true with the second allegation that the State Board of Corrections should have initiated proceedings to revoke Bloom's probation. Of course, only the court can revoke his probation, and even under the majority opinion such a revocation decision by the court falls under the discretionary function exception of I.C. § 6-904(1). However, the decision of whether or not to initiate proceedings to revoke a probation, just as a decision on whether or not to prosecute in the first instance, involves just as much judgment and discretion as does the court's decision in deciding whether or not finally to revoke probation. As a result of today's decision, the courts and the probation officers will never be able to cope with the monumental task of arresting and initiating proceedings to revoke probation for every probationer who fails to comply with some term or condition of his probation. The tort law system was never intended to supervise the management of the probation and parole system. However, that is what will result from the majority's opinion. Today's decision will jeopardize rehabilitative efforts both by eliminating any discretion which probation officers have in dealing with released offenders and their partial failure to live up to the conditions of their probations, and by the fact that parole or probation authorities [will] be far less likely to authorize release [on probation] given the substantial drain on their resources which [today's decision] might require. A stated public policy favoring innovative release programs [will] be thwarted. Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal.3d 741, 167 Cal.Rptr. 70, 79, 614 P.2d 728, 737 (1980). The prisons in the State of Idaho are unable to cope with the huge numbers of prisoners matriculating through the criminal justice system, and many who otherwise would be incarcerated have been forced into the already over-taxed probation and parole system. Probation and parole officers are forced to work with caseloads which are extremely difficult to manage. These caseloads are the result of policy decisions made by the Idaho legislatureplanning decisions, if you willconcerning the allocation of limited state resources to the criminal justice system, and particularly the funds available for incarceration and the funds available for probation and parole. Today's decision substitutes the tort law system for the planning and policy decisions made by the Idaho legislature. At the present level of funding, or at any level of funding which is reasonably foreseeable in the future given the state of the economy in Idaho, the parole and probation system will be unable to meet the supervision standards which today's opinion imposes upon it through the tort law system. The result, I predict, will be chaos. Either there will be a major reduction in the number of individuals placed on probation and parole, and a stated public policy favoring innovative release programs [will] be thwarted, Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal.3d 741, 167 Cal.Rptr. 70, 79, 614 P.2d 728, 737 (1980), or the state will be subjected to a flood of tort claims which will place impossible fiscal burdens upon future legislatures. Only by the legislature's immediate attention to the problems which today's decision creates can the chaos which will undoubtedly result from it be averted.
Since the majority is sustaining the plaintiff's cause of action, it becomes necessary to address the scope of employment issue. Even if the plaintiff has established negligence on the part of the board's agent/employee, Housley, the plaintiff's claim that Housley was within the scope of his employment is inconsistent with those allegations concerning his alleged acts which are claimed to form the basis of her cause of action. Plaintiff's allegation in her complaint, that the board's agent/employee Housley was at all times acting within the scope of his employment, is in direct contravention with plaintiff's allegation that this very agent/employee was also without authority to disobey or, in effect, ignore the terms of the order of probation and probation agreement. If, as alleged by plaintiff, the probation officer was without authority to engage in the very conduct alleged to be the basis of plaintiff's right to recovery, then plaintiff's cause of action must be dismissed against the State of Idaho for failing to establish or allege that the agent/employee's acts were committed within the scope of employment. Absent additional allegations by plaintiff that the Board of Corrections was aware of its agent/employee's conduct in this regard and thereby acquiesced in such, it is a general rule of law that an agent/employee's unauthorized conduct constitutes ultra vires action for which the principal/employer may not be held liable. Texas Co. v. Peacock, 77 Idaho 408, 293 P.2d 949 (1956) (no apparent authority of agent exists if it is known to person asserting authority of agent that, in fact, he is without authority of principal to do the complained of act); Manion v. Waybright, 59 Idaho 643, 86 P.2d 181 (1938) (presumption that acts committed during time of employment are within the servant's scope of employment may be rebutted upon a showing that such acts were unauthorized); Axtell v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 9 Idaho 392, 74 P. 1075 (1903) (acts by servants which are expressly forbidden may not serve as basis for imposition of liability on master); accord Orbit Stations, Inc. v. Curtis, 100 Nev. 205, 678 P.2d 1153 (Nev.1984) (acts of unauthorized agent not imputable to principal absent consent or acquiescence by principal); Kidd v. Maldonado, 688 P.2d 461 (Utah 1984) (absent ratification by principal, unauthorized act of agent does not impose liability on principal); National Cash Register Co. v. Lightner, 154 Colo. 98, 388 P.2d 781 (1964) (principal not liable for unauthorized acts of agent absent consent of principal or other allegations of apparent authority of agent).