Opinion ID: 3030694
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Germany

Text: Nahrvani requested asylum from both Iran and Germany, and the IJ addressed the issue of asylum from both countries.1 [3] “[T]o be eligible for asylum, an applicant must establish either past persecution or a well-founded fear of present persecution on account of a protected ground.”2 Singh v. INS, 362 F.3d 1164, 1170 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation, alteration, and internal quotation marks omitted). To establish a well-founded fear of persecution, an applicant must show that his fear is “both subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable.” Gormley v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1172, 1180 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). “The subjective component may be satisfied by credible testimony that the applicant genuinely fears persecution.” Id. (citation omitted). “The objective component of this test requires showing, by credible, direct, and specific evidence in the record, that persecution is a reasonable possibility.” Agbuya v. INS, 241 F.3d 1224, 1228 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “This showing may be made by the production of specific documentary evidence or by the credible and persuasive testimony of the applicant.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). [4] We have characterized “persecution as an extreme concept, marked by the infliction of suffering or harm in a way regarded as offensive.” Li v. Ashcroft, 356 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (citation, alteration, and internal 1 Neither the IJ or BIA addressed the issue of whether an alien may request asylum from a country of which he is not a citizen. At least one court has ruled that an alien may seek asylum from the country of resettlement. See Rife v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 606 (8th Cir. 2004). We need not resolve this issue to decide this case. 2 Nahrvani appeals the denial of asylum from Germany on the basis that he had a well-founded fear of future persecution. 2892 NAHRVANI v. GONZALES quotation marks omitted). Physical violence inflicted against an individual often “meets the requirement of severity that characterizes persecution[.]” Hoxha v. Ashcroft, 319 F.3d 1179, 1182 n.5 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted); see also Duarte de Guinac v. INS, 179 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 1999) (“we have consistently found persecution where, as here, the petitioner was physically harmed . . .”) (citations omitted). Although death threats against an individual may be sufficient to constitute persecution, see Khup v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 898, 903 (9th Cir. 2004), most threats do not rise to the level of persecution. See Hoxha, 319 F.3d at 1182 (characterizing unfulfilled threats as harassment rather than persecution); see also Lim v. I.N.S, 224 F.3d 929, 936 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Threats themselves are sometimes hollow and, while uniformly unpleasant, often do not effect significant actual suffering or harm.”). [5] The pivotal issue in this case is whether the incidents described in Nahrvani’s testimony and asylum application meet the high standard required to prove persecution. Although Nahrvani described several incidents in Germany of harassment, threats, and property damage, the record reflects that he suffered only de minimis property damage and anonymous, ambiguous threats. Nahrvani suffered no physical harm nor was he ever detained. Nahrvani did receive a couple of serious threats. One phone call stated: “It is Halal to shed your blood[,]” and one note threatened that people who abandoned Islam would “have to die.” [6] While “especially menacing death threats” may constitute persecution in “certain extreme cases,” Lim, 224 F.3d at 936, this is not such an extreme case. Nahrvani received only telephone or written threats, and never had a personal confrontation with any of the people threatening him.3 See id. 3 Although Nahrvani testified that he was chased by officials from the Iranian Consulate, he did not provide any details regarding the incident. NAHRVANI v. GONZALES 2893 (“Neither [petitioner] nor his family was ever touched, robbed, imprisoned, forcibly recruited, detained, interrogated, trespassed upon, or even closely confronted.”); compare Ruano v. Ashcroft, 301 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding persecution where petitioner was threatened by men who had “closely confronted” him and drawn their pistols in his presence). In contrast, the threats Nahrvani received were anonymous, vague, and did not create a sense of immediate physical violence. See Lim, 224 F.3d at 936-37. Additionally, while we have acknowledged that threats of death are enough to constitute persecution, we typically rely on all of the surrounding events, including the death threat, in deciding whether persecution exists. See Salazar-Paucar v. INS, 281 F.3d 1069, 1075 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that death threats “combined with” multiple events, including harm to the applicant’s family and murders of the applicant’s political counterparts, constituted persecution); see also Reyes-Guerrero v. INS, 192 F.3d 1241, 1243-44 (9th Cir. 1999) (describing repeated bribe attempts, personal confrontations, and death threats); Sangha v. INS, 103 F.3d 1482, 1486-87 (9th Cir. 1997) (involving an attack on the petitioner’s family, personal confrontation, and death threats). Other than the two specific threats described above, the incidents Nahrvani related do not significantly bolster his persecution claim. “Because reasonable minds could differ” as to whether the threats received by Nahrvani constituted persecution, the record does not compel us to make a finding that the threats did constitute persecution. Khup, 376 F.3d at 903. [7] Nahrvani has also failed to demonstrate that the acts of which he complains were “committed by the government or forces the government is either ‘unable or unwilling’ to control.” Ernesto Navas, 217 F.3d at 655-56. Nahrvani contends that the German police continually failed to investigate his reports of mistreatment. However, the record regarding these assertions is far from compelling. The German police took reports documenting Nahrvani’s various complaints. Nahrvani admitted that he did not give the police the names of any sus2894 NAHRVANI v. GONZALES pects because he did not know any specific names. In addition, Nahrvani’s assertion is directly contradicted by the testimony of his wife, who stated that the police investigated the complaints, but were ultimately unable to solve the crimes. She also testified that racial issues in no way affected the police’s willingness to help Nahrvani. The evidence simply does not compel the conclusion that the German government was unable or unwilling to control those individuals harassing Nahrvani. Although Nahrvani’s fear of returning to Germany is sufficiently credible, to satisfy the subjective component of the future persecution inquiry, the evidence must also compel a finding that future persecution is an objectively reasonable possibility.4 See Hoxha, 319 F.3d at 1182. [8] For many of the same reasons discussed above, Nahrvani’s fear of future persecution in Germany is too speculative to support an asylum claim. See Nagoulko v. INS, 333 F.3d 1012, 1018 (9th Cir. 2003) (declining to credit a speculative future persecution claim). Nahrvani did not substantiate his claim regarding the German government’s inability or unwillingness to control the asserted persecution from which he suffered. Thus, the evidence does not compel a finding that future persecution is an objectively reasonable possibility. See id. [9] Because Nahrvani failed to establish eligibility for asylum from Germany, he necessarily failed to demonstrate eligibility for withholding of removal. See Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003). Finally, substantial evidence supports the IJ’s denial for relief under the CAT, as Nahrvani has presented no evidence to demonstrate that it is more likely 4 Because Nahrvani cannot establish past persecution, he does not receive the benefit of a rebuttable presumption that his fear of future persecution was well-founded. See Molina-Estrada v. INS, 293 F.3d 1089, 1096 (9th Cir. 2002). NAHRVANI v. GONZALES 2895 than not that he will be tortured if returned to Germany. See Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186, 1193-94 (9th Cir. 2003). IV. THE BIA’s SUMMARY AFFIRMANCE We need not address Nahrvani’s argument that the BIA improperly streamlined his case pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(7)(ii). Because we reached the merits of the IJ’s decision, it is “unnecessary and duplicative” for us to review the BIA’s decision to streamline. Falcon Carriche, 350 F.3d at 855. V.