Opinion ID: 2265144
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: The Jury Charge On the Inference Created by the Use of a Gun

Text: Defendant argues that a portion of the jury instructions on the murder charge were erroneous and warrant a reversal of his conviction. Specifically, defendant challenges the instruction that permitted the jury to draw an inference from defendant's use of a deadly weapon that he purposely intended to kill Flax. After providing the jurors with detailed instructions on the burden of proof, the reasonable-doubt standard, and the presumption of innocence, the court defined the elements of murder, including purpose and/or knowledge. In defining purposely and knowingly the court explained: Purpose and knowledge are conditions of the mind which cannot be seen and can only be determined by inferences from conduct, words or acts. The court then told the jurors that they could find that proof of purpose or proof of knowledge had been furnished beyond a reasonable doubt by inferences which may arise from the nature of the acts and circumstances surrounding the conduct under investigation. Such things as the place where the acts occurred, the weapon used, the location, the number and nature of the wounds inflicted, and all that was done or said by the defendant preceding, connected with and immediately succeeding the events leading to the death of the decedent are among the circumstances to be considered. The essential determination for you to make in regard to the charge of murder in this case is whether the defendant committed the killing purposely or knowingly as I've defined these terms for you.         In order for you to find the defendant guilty of murder the State must first establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing of the decedent was committed by the defendant and that it was done purposely or knowingly as I've defined those terms for you.         A homicide or a killing with a deadly weapon such as a .32 caliber handgun in itself would permit you to draw an inference that the defendant's purpose was to take life or to cause serious bodily injury resulting in death. A deadly weapon is defined as any firearm or other weapon, device, instrument, material or substance which, in the manner it is used or intended to be used, is known to be capable of producing death or serious bodily injury. In your deliberations you may consider the weapons used, the manner and circumstances of the killing. And if you were satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant shot and killed the decedent with a handgun, you may draw an inference from the weapon used and from the manner and circumstances of the killing as to the defendant's purpose or knowledge. The court also provided the jurors with an accurate and complete instruction on the defense of mental disease or defect. Defendant made no objection to those instructions. Defendant now contends, however, that the instructions were erroneous because they failed to inform the jurors that any inference from defendant's use of a handgun was permissive, not mandatory. In addition, defendant asserts that the instruction failed to inform the jurors that the inference was rebuttable. Finally, defendant argues that those factors shifted the burden of proof because it foreclosed the defenses of diminished capacity and voluntary intoxication by not informing jurors that for the inference to be applicable, they first must have found defendant's use of the weapon to have been purposeful and/or knowing. As a threshold matter, the State submits that by failing to object to the instructions, defendant waived appellate review. More, significantly, the State contends that the instructions properly informed the jurors that the inference was permissible and in no way suggested that it was mandatory; that there was no need for the trial court to inform the jury specifically that the inference was rebuttable; and that the instructions did not shift the burden of proof. We find that the instructions did not mislead the jurors. After reviewing the charge as a whole, we are confident that the jury was properly informed that the inference was not mandatory, nor did the instructions shift the burden of proof to defendant or foreclose his defenses. The purpose of a trial court's instruction is to explain the law to the jury in the context of the material facts of the case. State v. Concepcion, 111 N.J. 373, 379, 545 A. 2d 119 (1988). An appropriate charge is essential for a fair trial. State v. Collier, 90 N.J. 117, 122, 447 A. 2d 168 (1982). When reviewing instructions on appeal, `portions of a charge alleged to be erroneous cannot be dealt with in isolation but the charge should be examined as a whole to determine its overall effect.' Marshall I, supra, 123 N.J. at 135, 586 A. 2d 85 (quoting State v. Wilbely, 63 N.J. 420, 422, 307 A. 2d 608 (1973)). The instructions also must be considered in light of the arguments of counsel. Id. 123 N.J. at 145, 586 A. 2d 85. We have long accepted that the use of a deadly weapon raises an inference that there was an intent to kill   . State v. Thomas, 76 N.J. 344, 357, 387 A. 2d 1187 (1978). However, a jury may reject such an inference. Ibid. Inferences are constitutionally sound so long as the jury is not compelled to accept them and the trier of fact can rationally make the connection between the facts and the inference. County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157-63, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 2224-27, 60 L.Ed. 2d 777 (1979). We are satisfied that both conditions are met with respect to the permissive inference that one who uses a deadly weapon may have the requisite purpose or knowledge to commit murder. In State v. McClain, 248 N.J. Super. 409, 422, 591 A. 2d 652 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 126 N.J. 341, 598 A. 2d 897 (1991), the court considered an instruction similar to the one in question: In your deliberations, you may consider the weapon used and the manner and circumstances of the killing, and if you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant shot and killed the decedent with a gun, you may draw an inference from the weapon used, that is the gun, and from the manner and circumstances of the killing, as to the defendant's purpose or knowledge. The Appellate Division found that the instruction was such as to convey to the jury that the inference was a permissible one   . Ibid. Like the charge in McClain, the disputed instructions made clear that the jurors could infer defendant's knowledge or purpose from the use of a gun but did not require that they do so. Use of the term may was sufficient to inform the jurors that the inference was permissive and not mandatory. That is particularly true because the accompanying instructions treated the inference like other evidence the jury should consider. The jury was told that it may draw an inference from the weapon used and the manner and circumstances of the killing as to defendant's purpose or knowledge. Furthermore, there is no need to inform a jury that a presumption is rebuttable if the court has already informed that jury that the presumption itself is permissive. Clearly, the jurors were aware that they were free to reject the presumption. An additional charge might have clarified in the jurors' minds that defendant could rebut the presumption, but such a clarification was unnecessary. With respect to defendant's diminished-capacity defense, the court instructed the jurors that the State had the burden of showing beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had not suffered from a mental disease or defect that had rendered him incapable of forming the particular state of mind that is an element of the charged offense. That instruction was certainly sufficient to confirm in the jurors' minds that they had to find that defendant had knowingly or purposely possessed the handgun before they could apply the inference. Moreover, the jurors were instructed that they could consider the manner and circumstances of the killing as to the defendant's purpose or knowledge. Contrary to defendant's assertions, that instruction could not be read as an obstacle to his evidence of diminished capacity. Indeed, it would have the opposite effect. In this regard, the court clearly informed the jurors of the law relating to defendant's theory of the case: If you find the defendant, because of his mental disease or defect or disorder could not have acted purposely or knowingly or recklessly, then he is relieved of criminal responsibility because he is incapable of acting knowingly, purposely or recklessly as the law may require with respect to each material element of the offense charged as we've already gone over. And, therefore, you should then find defendant not guilty of the charges set forth in the indictment and the lesser included charges I've defined for you. The burden of proving defendant's guilt of the offense charged here beyond a reasonable doubt, as I've said, is always on the State and that burden never shifts. You should consider all the relevant and material evidence having a bearing on the defendant's mental condition including his conduct at the time of the alleged act, his conduct since, any mental history, and any medical testimony which you've heard from witnesses who have testified for the defense and for the State, and such other evidence by the testimony of witnesses or exhibits in this case that may have a bearing upon and assist you in your determination of the issue of his mental condition. We find that the jurors were adequately instructed on the burden of proof with respect to defendant's mens rea. Indeed, the court repeatedly informed the jurors that the State bore the burden of proof on each element of the crime, including mental state, and that the burden never shifted to defendant. The instructions did not permit the jurors to conclude that the burden of proof had somehow shifted to defendant. Defendant's failure to object to the instructions supports our conclusion that the disputed inference instruction in the total context of the court's instructions was not erroneous.