Opinion ID: 3012999
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Was The Earlier Starting Time An Essential

Text: Function of Conneen’s Job? In order to establish that a plaintiff is “qualified” under the ADA, the employee must show that he/she “satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education and other jobrelated requirements of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.” Skerski v. Time Warner Cable Co., 257 F.3d 273, 278 (3rd Cir. 2001). If the plaintiff is able to make that showing, he/she must then establish that “with or without reasonable accommodation, [he/she] can perform the essential functions of the position held or sought.” Id. MBNA does not contest that Conneen possesses the requisite “skill, experience, education,” her job requires or that she has the ability to satisfactorily perform her duties. Rather, as noted above, MBNA insists that reporting for work is an essential component of Conneen’s job, and her inability to do that on a consistent basis renders her unqualified for the managerial position she claims she is entitled to. However, we disagree with that position and conclude that the district court erred in accepting it. “Essential functions” must be “fundamental” to one’s job and not simply “marginal.” Skerski, 257 F.3d at 279 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1)). The inquiry into whether a job requirement is essential to one’s job “is a factual determination that must be made on a case by case basis [based upon] all relevant evidence.” Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 148 (3rd Cir. 1998) (en banc)) (quoting 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(n)). Relevant evidence may include, but is certainly not limited to, “ ‘the employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential’ and ‘written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job.’ ” Id. However, the 12 employee’s actual experience is also relevant to the inquiry. Skerski, 257 F.3d at 281. The plaintiff in Deane was a nurse who was unable to lift heavy weights because of a work related injury. The employer/hospital claimed that lifting heavy objects was an essential function of Deane’s job as evidenced by the job description. That job description included “frequent lifting of patients” as one of the “major tasks, duties and responsibilities” of a nurse in Deane’s position. Deane, 142 F.3d at 148. Deane admitted that lifting heavy objects, including patients, was a “critical job demand[ ],” and the hospital insisted that a “nurse’s inability to lift patients” could create a dangerous situation for Deane’s patients. Id. Deane countered the hospital’s claim of job necessity with a vocational expert who asserted that heavy lifting was not one of the “four critical tasks” for nurses under the Department of Labor’s Dictionary of Occupational Titles Job Descriptions. 142 F.3d at 147. The expert drew a distinction between nurses who did not need to lift patients, and orderlies who did. The latter are classified as “heavy-duty labor.” Id. The expert criticized the hospital’s job description to the contrary for incorrectly characterizing the lifting requirements for nurses. Deane’s expert insisted that nurses are required to lift much less frequently than the hospital’s job description suggested. Id. Despite the intuitive appeal of the hospital’s argument, we concluded that the factual question remained for the jury. Id. at 148. The employer in Skerski also made an argument that had superficial appeal. There, plaintiff was employed by Time Warner to service cables, wires, and aerial cable plants Time Warner maintained as part of its cable television service. This required both climbing poles and working at heights. After approximately ten years on the job, Skerski was diagnosed with panic and anxiety disorder, and his doctor recommended that he stop climbing and working at heights. 257 F.3d at 276. Thereafter, Skerski asked his supervisor to provide him with a bucket truck so that he could continue working at heights, but the supervisor claimed that the company did not have any. Id.10 The 10. There was some discrepancy about whether the company had a bucket truck or not. Skerski claimed the company had an old one that 13 employer did offer to retrain Skerski to allow him to “reacquire the climbing skills necessary to continue his job as a technician,” but the training program abruptly stopped without explanation after Skerski’s doctor confirmed that Skerski’s incapacitating anxiety prevented him from working at heights. Id. at 277. Skerski eventually accepted another position with the company at a significantly lower salary while expressing a desire to continue doing underground repair work as he had since the onset of his anxiety disorder. Id. Skerski subsequently injured his back and began receiving workers’ compensation benefits, and thereafter filed suit under the ADA to recover money damages and reinstatement to his “ ‘modified duty status’ as an installer technician.” Id. The district court granted Time Warner’s motion for summary judgment even though it found a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Skerski was disabled and whether the alternative position he was offered constituted a reasonable accommodation under the ADA. Id. The court reasoned that “climbing was an essential function of the installer technician’s job that Skerski could not perform . . . .” Id. Accordingly, the court held that Time Warner was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Skerski was not “an otherwise qualified individual” under the ADA and therefore could not establish a prima facie case for disability discrimination. Id. We reversed. After discussing the definition of “essential functions” set forth in 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(N)(1), we stated: [t]he regulations list several factors for consideration in distinguishing the fundamental job functions from the marginal job functions, including: (1) whether the performance of the function is the reason the position exists; (2) whether there are a limited number of employees available among whom the performance of that job function can be distributed; and (3) whether could have been made available to him, but his supervisor denied that. The supervisor also insisted that Skerski had to be “100%” to continue working at heights. 257 F.3d at 277. 14 the function is highly specialized so that the incumbent in the position is hired for his or her expertise. 257 F.3d at 279 (internal quotation marks omitted). We also noted the non-exhaustive list of examples of probative evidence set forth in the regulations. Id. That evidence includes: (I) The employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential; (ii) Written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job; (iii) The amount of time spent on the job performing the function; (iv) The consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function; (v) The terms of a collective bargaining agreement; (vi) The work experience of past incumbents in the jobs; and/or (vii) The current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)). After analyzing the evidence submitted by Skerski and Time Warner in context with the aforementioned regulations, we concluded that a genuine issue of material fact remained as to whether climbing was an essential job function for a cable installer. In doing so, we did not ignore Time Warner’s claim that it was an essential function, nor the fact that the written job description identified climbing as a job requirement. However, neither did we ignore Skerski’s testimony that his own experience suggested that he had been able to satisfactorily perform as a cable installer even though he had not been able to climb for three years. We reasoned: “consideration of the seven evidentiary examples included in § 1630.2(n)(3) suggests caution against any premature determination on essential functions as at least some of them lean in Skerski’s favor.” 257 F.3d at 280. Here, of course, MBNA’s assertion that an 8:00 a.m. start time is an essential function of the job is 15 substantially weaker than Time Warner’s position in Skerski, or the hospital’s position in Deane. Here, MBNA rests its claim of the importance of punctuality largely upon the need for its officers to set an example by coming to work “on time.” It can hardly be seriously doubted that an employer has a right to expect its managerial employees to set an example for other employees. MBNA thus argues that “the responsibility of showing an example is an essential function.” Appellee’s Br. at 34. However, that argument can attach with equal force to any one of numerous aspects of a bank officer’s job that an employer might justifiably want employees to emulate. It could include a requirement that male managers wear business suits and ties. Though such examples may be justifiable from the employer’s point of view, even important to the professional atmosphere and decorum that is largely defined by the conduct of managers, that hardly elevates such preferences to fundamental functions. Absent more than appears on this record, we are not prepared to conclude that beginning work at 8:00 a.m. as opposed to 9:00 a.m. is an essential job function. That is especially true here as MBNA does not suggest that Conneen did not perform her job satisfactorily once she did arrive, or that MBNA’s business was injured by the extra hour it gave her to report for work during the period of the accommodation. MBNA cites Earl v. Mervyns Inc., 207 F.3d 1361 (11th Cir. 2000) to support its assertion that setting an example can be an essential job function. However, there the employee was charged with opening a department in a small retail store. Earl, 207 F.3d at 1366. Obviously, customers will go elsewhere and sales will be lost if a retail establishment (especially one as small as the defendant in Earl) cannot open according to its posted hours. Accordingly, an employer in those circumstances may be able to establish that punctuality is essential to the employee’s job. However, Conneen’s situation is in no way analogous to that. Nor are we persuaded that allowing flexibility in an officer’s starting times “ignores the wishes of the employer and sends a message to all employees that starting work at 16 the prescribed time does not matter, as long as you get your work done,” as MBNA argues. Appellee’s Br. at 34.11 MBNA has every right to require its employees to start work “at the prescribed time.” Id. That is not the issue here. Rather, the issue is whether MBNA can define an essential job function for an employee in a managerial position in an office setting with nothing more to substantiate the importance of that requirement than a desire that a manager set a good example. We can find nothing on this record beyond MBNA’s own ipse dixit to suggest that Conneen’s delayed starting time injured MBNA or interfered with Conneen doing her job. MBNA’s argument that it “explained to Conneen that because she was employed as an officer she was required to start work at 8:00 a.m,” is relevant to our inquiry, but not determinative. Appellee’s Br. at 35. “Describing [punctuality] as a requirement is not necessarily the same as denominating [punctuality] is an essential function.” Skerski, 257 F.3d at 280.12 Although there clearly may be some situations where an employee’s starting time cannot be altered because it is an essential function of the job, nothing on this record leads us to conclude that to be the case here. Accordingly, we hold that the district court erred in concluding that Conneen was not a “qualified individual” under the ADA because she could not perform an essential job function. 11. MBNA’s insistence that managers arrive on time to set an example also ignores the rather obvious fact that Conneen would demonstrate punctuality as long as she consistently arrived at work promptly before her designated starting time even if the starting time was 9:00. 12. Ironically, Conneen concedes that punctuality and attendance are essential functions of any position of employment. She states that she “believe[s] that attendance and punctuality are essential functions of any position.” See Appellant’s Br. at 29. However, she claims that the issues here “do not involve attendance and punctuality.” Id. In spite of this concession, Conneen goes on to argue that “changing of the work time by one hour was not an essential function for the position.” Id. at 32. We interpret this to mean that she does not concede that it was essential for her to report at 8:00 as opposed to 9:00 a.m. insofar as an analysis of “essential job functions” under the ADA is concerned. 17 She presented sufficient evidence to establish that she was a qualified individual under the ADA despite her tardiness. Nevertheless, we hold that the district court correctly entered summary judgment in favor of MBNA and against Conneen because Conneen is responsible for the breakdown of the interactive process required under the ADA.