Opinion ID: 201450
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Corps jurisdiction

Text: 5 The reach of the Corps's Section 10 permitting authority on the OCS turns on a question of statutory interpretation. Congress passed OCSLA in 1953 to assert federal jurisdiction over the OCS and to establish a regulatory framework for the extraction of minerals therefrom. See 43 U.S.C. § 1332; see also Ten Taxpayer Citizens Group v. Cape Wind Assocs., 373 F.3d 183, 188 (1st Cir.2004) (A major purpose of the OCSLA was to specify that federal law governs on the [OCS]....) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, OCSLA extended the Corps's Section 10 regulatory authority to prevent obstruction to navigation in the navigable waters of the United States ... to artificial islands and fixed structures located on the [OCS]. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(f) (1953). In 1978, this grant of authority was amended to apply instead to the artificial islands, installations, and other devices referred to in subsection (a) of this section. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(e) (2004). Subsection (a), in turn, extends federal jurisdiction to: 6 all artificial islands, and all installations and other devices permanently or temporarily attached to the seabed, which may be erected thereon for the purpose of exploring for, developing, or producing resources therefrom, or any such installation or other device (other than a ship or vessel) for the purpose of transporting such resources. 7 Id. at § 1333(a)(1) (emphasis supplied). Appellants argue that the clause which may be erected thereon for the purpose of exploring for, developing, or producing resources therefrom, is restrictive, and limits the Corps's permitting authority on the OCS to structures related to the extraction of mineral resources. 2 Thus, they argue, the Corps lacked authority to grant a Section 10 permit for construction of Cape Wind's data tower. The Corps, on the other hand, has determined that its Section 10 authority was extended to artificial islands, installations, and other devices located on the seabed, to the seaward limit of the [OCS], by section 4(f) of [OCSLA] as amended. 33 C.F.R. § 320.2(b) (internal citation omitted). 8 The district court determined that the which may be clause of Subsection (a) was not restrictive. See Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. United States Dep't of the Army, 288 F.Supp.2d 64, 75 (D.Mass.2003) (finding that OCSLA's text supports the Corps's position that Section 10 jurisdiction extends to all OCS structures including, but not limited to, those that ` may be ' used to explore for, develop, or produce resources (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1)) (emphasis supplied by district court)). Thus, the district court held, the Corps has authority to grant a Section 10 permit for all structures on the OCS, regardless of their function. 9 We find the statutory text in question ambiguous. It is not apparent whether the reference to Subsection (a) inserted into Subsection (e) in 1978 refers to all artificial islands, and all installations and other devices permanently or temporarily attached to the seabed, 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1), or only to all such installations used to explore, develop or produce resources. In light of this ambiguity, the Corps and Cape Wind invite us to defer to the Corps's interpretation of its authority, see 33 C.F.R. § 320.2(b), under the Chevron doctrine. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). In this case, however, we find it unnecessary to reach the question of Chevron deference because legislative history reveals, with exceptional clarity, Congress's intent that Section 10 authority under OCSLA not be restricted to structures related to mineral extraction. 3 See id. at 843 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 2778 (If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect.); Strickland v. Comm'r, ME. Dept. of Human Servs., 48 F.3d 12, 19-20 (1st Cir.1995) (evaluating legislative history to determine whether Congressional intent was unambiguously expressed). 10 In the conference report for the 1978 OSCLA amendments, Congress explained that the changes to Subsection (e) 11 were technical only and there was no intent to change present law. The existing authority of the Corps of Engineers ... applies to all artificial islands and fixed structures on the [OCS], whether or not they are erected for the purpose of exploring for, developing, removing and transporting resources therefrom. The amendment ... is not intended to change the scope of this authority, but merely to conform the description of the types of structures, no matter what their purpose, to the types of structures listed in subsection (a), namely all installations and other devices permanently or temporarily attached to the seabed. It is not the intention of the conferees to limit the authority of the Corps [ ] as to structures used for the exploration, development, removal, and transportation of resources. 12 H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1474 (Conference Report) at 82 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1674, 1681 (emphasis supplied). 4 Appellants suggest that the intent expressed in the above-quoted language was not that Corps authority be unlimited with regard to the purpose of the structure in question, but rather with regard to different types of structures within the subset of structures related to exploring for, developing, removing or transporting minerals. This interpretation strains the Conference Report language well beyond the meaning it can bear, especially in light of Congress's awareness when it amended OCSLA that the Corps had issued Section 10 permits for OCS structures unrelated to mineral extraction on several occasions between 1953 and 1978, implying its approval of the exercise of such jurisdiction. See Conference Report at 81 ([The Corps's existing] authority has been used... to regulate the construction and location of ... artificial fishing reefs, radio towers, and a proposed gambling casino which was to be constructed on reefs. It also applies to structures erected for the purpose of exploring for and transporting resources.... (emphasis supplied)). Appellants' efforts to counter this legislative history with language from the Senate Report from the original 1953 OCSLA that could be read to imply a limitation of Corps permitting authority to structures intended for mineral resource development is unavailing. The Corps's current authority is determined by OCSLA as amended in 1978, and the Conference Report addresses Congress's intent at that time. See also United States v. Commonwealth Energy Sys. & Subsidiary Cos., 235 F.3d 11, 16 (1st Cir.2000) (The most dispositive indicator of congressional intent is the conference report.). 13 Congress made clear that [t]he existing authority of the Corps ... applies to all artificial islands and fixed structures on the [OCS], whether or not they are erected for the purpose of exploring for, developing, removing, and transporting resources therefrom. Conference Report at 82. This express legislative intent is determinative of the scope of the Corps's authority. Accordingly, we hold that the Corps had jurisdiction to issue a Section 10 permit for Cape Wind's data tower.