Opinion ID: 204386
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Vagueness Challenge to Code 203

Text: Mr. Jordan first argues that the district court erred in concluding that BOP Code 203 was not impermissibly vague as applied to him in light of the BOP’s past and present interpretations of the Code. Code 203, which is set forth in 28 C.F.R. § 541.13, Table 13, prohibits inmates from “[t]hreatening another with bodily harm or any other offense.” Mr. Jordan contends that the BOP’s practice was to limit the Code’s application to credible threats directed toward an individual. Specifically, he argues that the BOP did not apply Code 203 more broadly to threatening statements. Mr. Jordan argues that the statement at issue was not a credible threat directed toward an individual. Although “Mr. Jordan denies making the statement, he . . . concede[s] that for purposes of the vagueness analysis the court assumes [that] he uttered it.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 21. However, Mr. Jordan contends that the district court erred in determining that a prison official was standing directly outside of his cell door. Mr. Jordan urges us to find that the BOP officers were exiting the area when the statement was made 4 (...continued) the merits of his claims. -8- and, consequently, to conclude that the statement was not directed toward the officers and could not have been interpreted as a credible threat. To the extent that the dispute over the location of the officers is material, Mr. Jordan argues that “it was improper for the district court to resolve the dispute without [a] hearing.” Id. A BOP regulation may be impermissibly vague if it either “fails to provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits” or “if it authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Jordan v. Pugh, 425 F.3d 820, 824–25 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Vagueness challenges that are not based on the First Amendment, such as the instant challenge, 5 are evaluated in light of the particular 5 Mr. Jordan brings this vagueness challenge under the Fifth Amendment’s due process guarantee. Although Mr. Jordan attempts to argue on appeal that his claim implicates the First Amendment, Aplt. Opening Br. at 23 n.5, he failed to raise this issue before the district court. Consequently, Mr. Jordan has waived any First Amendment argument. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976); Turner v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 563 F.3d 1136, 1143 (10th Cir. 2009). Moreover, not only did Mr. Jordan fail to raise a First Amendment claim before the district court, he explicitly rejected such a claim. In his Traverse, Mr. Jordan stated that “he does not in this case allege that his First Amendment free speech rights have been violated.” R., Vol. II, at 21 n.10 (Traverse, filed Jan. 30, 2007). We therefore will not address that argument. As we have previously held, a prisoner’s pro se status does not excuse him from failing to present an argument to the district court. See Velasquez v. Astrue, 301 F. App’x 778, 779 (10th Cir. 2008); see also Lewis v. Booker, No. 99-3092, 1999 WL 638239, at  n.1 (10th Cir. Aug. 23, 1999); Gross v. United States, No. 961351, 1997 WL 157387, at  (10th Cir. Apr. 4, 1997). Thus, Mr. Jordan has (continued...) -9- circumstances of the case on an as-applied basis. United States v. CardenasAlatorre, 485 F.3d 1111, 1114 n.7 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361 (1988)). The district court focused on whether Code 203 provided “fair warning” of the prohibited conduct. It determined that “Code 203 clearly sets forth the conduct prohibited by the regulation. By its plain terms, it prohibits threatening another person with either bodily harm or any other offense.” R., Vol. II, at 139. Accordingly, the court held that Mr. Jordan had sufficient notice that his statement that “[t]his [was] the kind of stuff that made [him] want to stab someone” might violate Code 203. Id. We agree with the district court’s analysis. We also conclude that it was not clear error for the district court to find that Officer Quenelle was standing directly outside of Mr. Jordan’s cell door based on the officer’s own statements. Moreover, we agree with the district court’s legal conclusion regardless of Officer Quenelle’s exact location. Whether Officer Quenelle was in the process of leaving the cell area, standing in the open door to Mr. Jordan’s cell, or standing in the sally port (fortified entryway) of Mr. Jordan’s cell, the evidence clearly establishes that he was close enough to Mr. Jordan to hear the threatening statement; thus, an evidentiary hearing to determine Officer Quenelle’s precise 5 (...continued) waived any First Amendment vagueness claim. -10- location was unnecessary. Accordingly, for substantially the same reasons articulated by the district court, we hold that Code 203 is not impermissibly vague as applied to Mr. Jordan.