Opinion ID: 1707026
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: stipulated judgments and the applicability of the guidelines

Text: The lower courts relied upon the stipulated judgment of June 29, 1994, in denying Benita a modification of child support. Therefore, we must determine if the adequacy of that stipulated judgment was properly decided and warranted the downward deviation, in assessing the correctness of the denial of the modification. [4] In assessing the modification of child support, the lower courts, focusing only on Paragraph (D) of La.R.S. 9:315.1, found that there was no duty on the part of the trial court to review the adequacy of the stipulated amount in the initial judgment. After considering Paragraph (D) in light of the entirety of La.R.S. 9:315.1 and reflecting on the legislative intent in that enactment, we find that the trial court's role in instances where child support has been stipulated is greater than that assigned in the lower courts heretofore. [5] When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the legislature. La.Civ.Code art. 9; La.R.S. 1:4. However, when a law is susceptible of different meanings, it must be interpreted as having the meaning that best conforms to the purpose of the law. La.Civ.Code art. 10. Legislative intent is the fundamental question in all cases of statutory interpretation, and rules of statutory construction are designed to ascertain and enforce the intent of the statute. State v. Piazza, 596 So.2d 817 (La.1992). It is likewise presumed that it is the intention of the legislative branch to achieve a consistent body of law. N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, Sec. 23.09 (Sands 5 th ed.1993). The meaning and intent of a law is determined by consideration of the law in its entirety and all other laws on the same subject matter, and a construction should be placed on the provision in question which is consistent with the express terms of the law and with the obvious intent of the lawmaker in enacting it. Hayden v. Richland Parish School Bd., 554 So.2d 164, 167 (La.App. 2 Cir.1989), writ denied, 559 So.2d 124 (La.1990). La.Civ.Code art. 227 provides that parents, by the very act of marrying, contract together the obligation of supporting, maintaining, and educating their children. The obligation to support their children is conjoint upon the parents and each must contribute in proportion to his or her resources. Hogan v. Hogan, 549 So.2d 267 (La.1989). As a complement to that obligation, La.R.S. 9:315-315.15 provides a detailed set of guidelines that the courts are mandated to follow in setting the amount of child support in any proceeding to establish or modify child support filed on or after October 1, 1989. La.R.S. 9:315.1(A); Hildebrand v. Hildebrand, 626 So.2d 578 (La.App. 3 Cir.1993). These child support guidelines were enacted in 1989 for a twofold purpose: to address the inconsistency in the amounts of child support awards and as an appropriate solution to the inadequacy of the amounts of these awards. Nations, Louisiana's Child Support Guideline: A Preliminary Analysis, 50 La.L.R. 1057, 1058 (1990); see also The Family Support Act of 1988, Pub.L. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (1988). Under this system of guidelines, the Legislature adopted an income shares approach which combines the adjusted monthly gross income of both parties in arriving at the amount of support owed. BLAKESLY, LOUISIANA FAMILY LAW, § 16.09.1 at 16-19 (Michie 1996). As stated in La.R.S. 9:315.1(A) the amount determined by the guideline formula is presumed to be in the child's best interest. Percle v. Noll, 93-1272 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/11/94), 634 So.2d 498. Moreover, the parental obligation to pay child support must be implemented within the body of law contained in the Louisiana Child Support Guidelines. La.Civ.Code arts. 227-231; La.R.S. 9:315, et seq.; State in Interest of Travers, 28,022 (La. App. 2 Cir.12/6/95), 665 So.2d 625; BLAKESLY, LOUISIANA FAMILY LAW, § 16.09.1 at 16-19 (Michie 1996). As such, the guidelines are intended to fairly apportion between the parents the mutual financial obligation they owe their children, in an efficient, consistent, and adequate manner. State in Interest of Travers, 665 So.2d 625. It is likewise provided in the legislation that there may be deviation from the guidelines if the application of the guidelines would not be in the best interest of the child or would be inequitable to the parties. La.R.S. 9:315.1(B). In this instance, it is incumbent upon the trial court to give specific oral or written reasons for the deviation, including a finding as to the amount of support that would have been required under a mechanical application of the guidelines and the particular facts and circumstances that warranted a deviation from the guidelines. Id. As such, the function of the guidelines to provide adequacy and consistency in child support awards is served through the establishment of a method of deviation which requires the introduction of an evidentiary basis for such departure into the record. Hildebrand, 626 So.2d at 581. Prior to the enactment of the child support guidelines, the jurisprudence had further recognized that parents may enter into a consent judgment to establish child support. See Hogan, 549 So.2d at 267; Aldredge v. Aldredge, 477 So.2d 73 (La. 1985); Williams v. Williams, 586 So.2d 658 (La.App. 2 Cir.1991); McDaniel v. McDaniel, 567 So.2d 748 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1990); Chaisson v. Chaisson, 454 So.2d 890 (La.App. 4 Cir.1984). In accordance with that jurisprudence, it is likewise envisioned in the guidelines that there will be instances where the parents will stipulate (consent) to an amount of child support. In that regard, La.R.S. 9:315.1(D) provides: The court may review and approve a stipulation between the parties entered into after the effective date of this Part as to the amount of child support to be paid. If the court does review the stipulation, the court shall consider the guidelines set forth in this Part to review the adequacy of the stipulated amount, and may require the parties to provide the court with the income statements and documentation required by R.S. 9:315.2. It is this provision on which we now focus our attention. In the present case, the lower courts read Paragraph (D) in isolation, concluding that review of the stipulated amount in light of the guidelines was discretionary. We find this a flawed reading of this statutory provision which defeats the purpose of the legislature's intent to ensure adequate and consistent child support awards. A reading of the lower courts' rulings makes it evident that the one thing not considered was the overriding provision of La.R.S. 9:315.1(A) wherein the legislature provided that the guidelines must be used in any proceeding to establish or modify child support. (Emphasis added). [6] In light of that mandate, we find that the opening sentence's use of the words court may review and approve the stipulation in La.R.S. 9:315.1(D) means that although the parents may present a stipulation for consideration, the trial court is not bound to follow it and may choose to use the guidelines instead. In this context, we find that the opening phrase of the second sentence of Paragraph (D), If the court does review the stipulation, simply means that if the trial court does not categorically reject the proposed stipulation, i.e., it chooses to entertain the stipulation, the trial court shall consider the guidelines ... to review the adequacy of the stipulated amount. To assume, as the lower courts did herein, that the reviewing role of the trial court was discretionary creates an anomaly that cannot be reconciled with the mandated application of the guidelines to the establishment or modification of child support provided in Paragraph (A) of La.R.S. 9:315.1. Moreover, such a reading would impermissibly find the guidelines inapplicable. As directed by the codal articles and jurisprudence in the interpretation of statutes, we find that consideration of the legislative impetus to enact the guidelines convinces us that the language of Paragraph (D) must yield to the mandated review requirements established in Paragraph (A). With that in mind, it is clear that the focal point of Paragraph (D) is its insistence in the second sentence that when the trial court reviews the agreement proposed by the parents, it shall consider the guidelines ... to review the adequacy of the stipulated amount. This the trial court did not do in the present case. Nor did it give any reasons warranting a deviation from the guidelines. We hasten to add that although we find that the adequacy of the stipulated amount must be evaluated in light of the guideline's considerations, the trial court is not foreclosed from approving the amount to which the parents have stipulated (consented). As authorized in La.R.S. 9:315.1(B), the trial court, after reviewing the proposed stipulation in light of the considerations enunciated in La.R.S. 9:315.1(C), may nevertheless approve a deviation from the guidelines provided it specifies for the record, either orally or in writing, the reasons for the deviation. Such an approach underscores the integral role of the trial court as gatekeeper in this area of paramount importance. If properly performed in accordance with the guidelines, this judicial review will further assure the adequacy and consistency of child support awards, foster evenhanded settlements, [7] and preserve a record for the evaluation of later proceedings to modify initially stipulated child support awards. This analysis is not to be viewed as an abrogation of that body of law which has recognized that a consent (stipulated) judgment is by its nature a bilateral agreement between the parties wherein the parties adjust their differences by mutual consent and thereby put an end to a lawsuit with each party balancing the hope of gain against the fear of loss. McLain v. McLain, 486 So.2d 1044 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1986); Williams, 586 So.2d 658 (La.App. 2 Cir.1991); McDaniel, 567 So.2d 748 (La.App. 2 Cir.1990); Chaisson, 454 So.2d 890 (La.App. 4 Cir.1984). Notwithstanding the freedom of the parties to so agree, parties must remember that their agreements may not derogate from laws enacted for the protection of the public interest. La.Civ.Code art. 7. In the present instance, it is clear that the stipulated child support recognized in the judgment must conform with the public policy codified in the child support guidelines with its concomitant best interest presumption and mandated adequacy review provisions. Accordingly, we find that pursuant to La. R.S. 9:315.1(A) and (D), the trial court should have consider[ed] the guidelines set forth [and] ... review[ed] the adequacy of the stipulated amount, .... before the stipulated judgment was presented to it for signature, and further, the trial court should have given oral or written reasons warranting the deviation from the guidelines, La.R.S. 9:315.1(B). [8] Since the stipulated judgment of June 29, 1994, was not given proper consideration by the trial court, it was error for the lower courts to rely upon this flawed judgment in denying Benita a modification of child support.