Opinion ID: 3058127
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Calculation of Loss Attributable

Text: Thompson argues that the district court erred in calculating the total loss attributable to his criminal conduct at sentencing. Under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1), a defendant’s total offense level is increased by 14 levels if the offense involved a loss between $400,000 and $1,000,000. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(H). The district court in this case calculated the applicable guideline range of 70 to 87 months based on a total loss amount attributable of $434,597.54, after finding that BOA lost $319,800 and investors Justin Jay and Bruce Lyons lost $71,597.54 and 3 Although we typically look to the outcome of the trial in determining whether an attorney’s error at trial was prejudicial, we have recognized a narrow exception for cases in which “the only effect of trial counsel’s negligence was on [the defendant’s] appeal.” Davis v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 341 F.3d 1310, 1315 (11th Cir. 2003) (emphasis omitted). Thompson does not argue that this case falls under this exception. We note, however, that even if the exception applied, Thompson’s argument would fail because he does not make the necessary showing of a “reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome on appeal” had the mistake not occurred. Id. at 1316. 6 $43,200, respectively. Although the district court imposed a below-range sentence of 66 months, Thompson challenges the factual findings underlying the calculation of BOA’s and Jay’s losses. The district court’s factual findings for purposes of sentencing may be based on, among other things, evidence heard during trial, undisputed statements in the Presentence Investigation Reports (PSIs), or evidence presented during the sentencing hearing. United States v. Hamaker, 455 F.3d 1316, 1338 (11th Cir. 2006). The government bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence any disputed fact necessary to support a sentence enhancement. United States v. Bernardine, 73 F.3d 1078, 1080 (11th Cir. 1996). The government meets this burden “by presenting reliable and specific evidence.” Id. Thompson first argues that the district court erred in failing to reduce BOA’s loss–here, the amount of the loan–by the correct fair market value of 54 Spivey Lane, the collateral on the loan that BOA recovered.4 According to the PSI, the fair market value of 54 Spivey Lane was $132,900. At sentencing, 4 Where a victimized lender, like BOA in this case, recovers collateral from the defendant, the loss must be reduced by “the amount the victim has recovered at the time of sentencing from disposition of the collateral, or if the collateral has not been disposed of by that time, the fair market value of the collateral at the time of sentencing.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, comment. (n.3(E)(ii)). 7 however, the Government argued that the actual fair market value was $81,800 because BOA had reached an agreement with a buyer to sell the property for that price. While we have recognized that the sentencing court “is in the best position to assess the evidence and estimate the loss based upon that evidence,” the estimate “may not be mere speculation and the government bears the burden of supporting its loss calculation with reliable and specific evidence.” United States v. Gupta, 463 F.3d 1182, 1200 (11th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Here, the Government provided no evidence, much less reliable and specific evidence, in support of its assertion that 54 Spivey Lane’s fair market value was $81,800. When the district court asked if a copy of the purported sales contract was available, the Government responded that it did not have a copy of the contract but would supplement the record with one. The Government’s brief on appeal, however, does not reference any supplemental evidence. Moreover, our review of the district court docket indicates that the sales contract did not become part of the record. As a result, we are aware of no evidence that could have provided a factual basis for the district court’s determination of 54 Spivey Lane’s fair market value. 8 Thompson also argues that the district court erred in counting Jay’s losses as part of the loss attributable calculation. He contends that even though he objected to the portion of the PSI detailing Jay’s losses, the Government failed to present evidence at sentencing establishing that Jay was a victim and confirming that Jay’s loss amount is $71,597.54. Thompson is only partially correct. The district court did not err in finding that Jay was a victim, despite the lack of evidence at sentencing, because there was sufficient supporting evidence presented at trial, including Jay’s own testimony. Hamaker, 455 F.3d at 1338. The district court did err, however, in adopting the disputed statements in the PSI regarding the amount of Jay’s loss without having received any supporting evidence at trial or sentencing from the government.5 Because the district court calculated the total loss amount attributable to Thompson’s conduct without proper factual bases, we remand to allow the district court to receive evidence of 54 Spivey Lane’s fair market value, as well as Jay’s loss amount.6 5 In its brief, the government responds to Thompson by merely summarizing the procedures it used to compile the PSI’s disputed facts. It does not identify any evidence supporting Jay’s loss amount. 6 Where a district court misapplies the sentencing guidelines, we need not remand if the district court’s errors are harmless. Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 203 (1992). Here, although the district court imposed a sentence falling below the guideline range to give Thompson “some credit” for the low valuation of 54 Spivey Lane, we cannot conclude, and the 9