Opinion ID: 1743598
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: the trial court erred in allowing the state to amend the indictment.

Text: ¶ 41. Count Two of the original indictment returned against Spann states that Spann [d]id unlawfully, wilfully and feloniously, with or without design to effect death, did kill a human being, to wit: Myong Cheon Son, while engaged in the commission of the crime of Robbery upon said Myong Cheon Son and Myong Ja Son, in violation of Section 97-3-73 of the Miss. Code of 1972, as amended, and all in violation of Section 97-3-19(2)(e), of the Miss. Code of 1972, as amended, against the peace and dignity of the State of Mississippi. Section 97-3-19(2), the capital murder statute, states: The killing of a human being without the authority of law by any means or in any manner shall be capital murder in the following cases: . . . . (e) When done with or without any design to effect death, by any person engaged in the commission of the crime of rape, burglary, kidnapping, arson, robbery, sexual battery, unnatural intercourse with any child under the age of twelve (12), or nonconsensual unnatural intercourse with mankind, or in any attempt to commit such felonies. (emphasis added). Section 97-3-73 provides: Every person who shall feloniously take the personal property of another, in his presence or from his person and against his will, by violence to his person or by putting such person in fear of some immediate injury to his person, shall be guilty of robbery. (emphasis added). ¶ 42. On November 19, 1998, the State filed its motion to amend the indictment, stating that the original indictment contained a scrivener's error and that it should be amended to read that the crime of robbery was committed in violation of Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-79 rather than § 97-3-73. Section 97-3-79 provides: Every person who shall feloniously take or attempt to take from the person or from the presence the personal property of another and against his will by violence to his person or by putting such person in fear of immediate injury to his person by the exhibition of a deadly weapon shall be guilty of robbery.... (emphasis added). ¶ 43. The trial court granted the State's motion to amend, finding that the change in the indictment was one of form and not substance. Spann argues that the trial court erred in finding the change in the indictment was not a substantive change. ¶ 44. An indictment may not be amended to change the nature of the charge, except by action of the grand jury which returned the indictment. Miller v. State, 740 So.2d 858, 862 (Miss.1999)(citing Greenlee v. State, 725 So.2d 816, 819 (Miss. 1998)). To amend an indictment without action of the grand jury, the amendment must be of form and not of substance. Id. (citing Greenlee, 725 So.2d at 821). It is well settled in this state ... that a change in the indictment is permissible if it does not materially alter facts which are the essence of the offense on the face of the indictment as it originally stood or materially alter a defense to the indictment as it originally stood so as to prejudice the defendant's case. Miller, 740 So.2d at 862 (quoting Shelby v. State, 246 So.2d 543, 545 (Miss.1971)). The test for whether an amendment to the indictment will prejudice the defense is whether the defense as it originally stood would be equally available after the amendment is made. Greenlee at 822 (citing Griffin v. State, 584 So.2d 1274, 1276 (Miss.1991)). ¶ 45. Spann contends that the amendment to the indictment was an attempt to cut off a defense available to Spann under § 97-3-73, but not so readily available to Spann under § 97-3-79that is, that Spann did not take nor attempt to take the personal property of another. Spann's argument is misplaced. In order to convict Spann of capital murder under Count II of the original indictment, the State was required to prove that Spann either took the personal property of another, pursuant to § 97-3-73, or that he attempted to take the personal property of another, pursuant to § 97-3-19(2), which encompasses the killing of a human being during the commission of robbery or any attempt to commit robbery. Thus, under the original indictment, Spann had at least two defenses available to him under Count IIthat is, that he did not take the personal property of another and that he did not attempt to take the personal property of another. The amendment to the indictment did not alter Spann's available defenses. Under Count II of the amended indictment, the State was required to prove that, in violation of § 97-3-79, Spann took or attempted to take the personal property of another by exhibition of a deadly weapon. Spann thus had available under the amended indictment at least two possible defenses to Count II that is, that he did not take the personal property of another and that he did not attempt to take the personal property of another. ¶ 46. Spann relies upon this Court's decision in Quick v. State, 569 So.2d 1197, 1199 (Miss.1990), in arguing that the amendment to the indictment was one of substance rather than form. In Quick, the defendant was charged with aggravated assault in violation of Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-7-(2)(b) in that he did willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, purposely an knowingly commit an aggravated assault upon [the victim] with a deadly weapon.... The morning of trial, the State moved to amend the indictment to charge, after the word knowingly, the following: intentionally or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life contrary to § 97-3-7(2)(a) and (b).... The indictment was never formally amended, but the jury instructions reflected the additional language. This Court found that the additional language impermissibly constituted an amendment of substance to the indictment. Id. at 1200. Quick is clearly distinguishable from the amendment at hand. The amendment in Quick allowed the defendant to be convicted of aggravated assault under a lesser burden of production than that required by the initial indictment. That is, recklessness became an element of the crime charged, and though the defendant may have defended against the elements of purposely and knowingly, he was caught off guard by not having been put on notice that he must also defend against the element of recklessness. Such is not the case in the issue at hand. The amendment to the indictment added no additional elements to the crime charged, other than the additional requirement that the State prove that the robbery, or attempt thereto, was made with a deadly weapon. Such did not alter the defenses available to Spann. ¶ 47. The State, more appropriately, relies upon this Court's decision in Davis v. State, 684 So.2d 643 (Miss.1996). In Davis, the original indictment charged the defendant with capital murder, with an underlying felony of robbery in violation of § 97-3-73. The jury was instructed, however, as to the elements of armed robbery. On appeal, Davis alleged that the inconsistency allowed the State to broaden the charges of the indictment or to constructively amend the indictment. This Court rejected Davis's argument that the alteration was one of substance, stating: Because the indictment cited the robbery statute, Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-73 (1972), Davis received adequate notice of the charges against him. Instruction S-3 defined robbery in terms of armed robbery which required the State to prove an element not required for a person to be charged with capital murder. Of import is the fact that any robbery occurred. All defenses and proof available to Davis remained equally applicable. Therefore, the amendment is one of form and not substance. Id. at 660. Spann attempts to distinguish his case from Davis by stating that his defense that he did not take or attempt to take the personal property of another is not so readily available under § 97-3-79 as it is under § 97-3-73. As discussed above, however, and as noted in Davis, all defenses and proof available to Spann remained equally applicable. This assignment of error is without merit.