Opinion ID: 162486
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Discriminatory Referrals as a Violation of SPI's Contract Rights

Text: 60 The district court concluded that Allstate was entitled to summary judgment on SPI's claim that the insurer violated SPI's contract rights in a discriminatory manner by giving it fewer referrals than it gave to non-minority participants in the QVP program. The court found that SPI has failed to produce sufficient evidence of a contractual obligation between SPI and Allstate for Allstate to refer SPI a specific number or proportionate share of Allstate's mitigation claims each year. We agree. 61 SPI co-owner Orlando Harris gave the following deposition testimony: 62 Q This vendor agreement that you — that you say that you signed with Allstate, did it promise you a certain number of referrals per year? 63 A No, sir. 64 Q Did it promise you to do any specific type of work? 65 A No, sir. 66 Q Did it promise you any specific dollar volume of business? 67 A No, sir. 68 Q Okay. In fact, did it promise you any business at all? 69 A I would say it did. 70 Q All right. What business did it promise you? 71 A It promised me that when they have a — way I'm taking it and reading it, when I have a fire, flood, or water, or smoke in one our insureds, you will be one of the vendors that we would recommend — that we would not recommend, but we would dispatch to the customer's home. So me, thinking that — hey, if I'm — I don't care if I was the tenth one. I'm thinking every tenth claim, I'm getting a claim from Allstate. 72 Q Did they promise you that you would get every other — promise you that it would be an equal rotation? 73 A The word promise — they told me that it was on a rotating basis. 74 Q Did anyone ever promise you — they said — you know there was three vendors at that time; right? 75 A (Witness nods head up and down). 76 Q Did anyone ever say you will get every third call? 77 A No. 78 Q Okay. 79 A That's my stupidity of what I expected, when you say a rotating basis. 80 SPI argues that, if evidence of an equalreferral contractual term is required, this testimony was sufficient to foreclose summary judgment. It argues that, viewed in the light in the most favorable to SPI, [a] jury may fairly infer, as did Mr. Harris, that a promise of referrals on a rotating basis, is a promise of even referrals. 81 Assuming, without deciding, that the QVP program amounted to a contract, the parol evidence rule renders Harris's testimony ineffective to contradict the QVP form's written language. Because this is a federal question case, federal law governs the applicability of the parol evidence rule. United States v. Jacobs, 304 F.Supp. 613, 619 (S.D.N.Y.1969). Under the federal common law's version of the parol evidence rule, [e]vidence of a collateral agreement may be admitted if (1) it does not contradict a clear and unambiguous provision of a written agreement, and (2) the parties did not intend the written agreement to be the complete and exclusive statement of their agreement. United States v. Triple A Mach. Shop, Inc., 857 F.2d 579, 585 (9th Cir.1988); see also United States v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 397 F.2d 577, 579 (5th Cir.1968) (Where the terms of the contract are unambiguous[,] the determination of its meaning is a question of law and should be decided without resort to extrinsic evidence.). 82 As noted above, the QVP form signed by SPI stated, We [Allstate] have no obligation to refer customers to this particular vendor. SPI may not negate this unambiguous provision with Harris's testimony that someone at Allstate promised him that referrals would be rotated among the vendors. Because the terms of the QVP form govern, SPI's claim based on a contractual right to referrals fails. 3 83