Opinion ID: 2361847
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Anti-harassment Clause

Text: [¶ 8] Lawrence argues that the Probate Court should have struck the following anti-harassment clause from the will as against public policy and thus unenforceable as a matter of law: Provided however, that the Trustees may, in their sole and absolute discretion, suspend making any and all payments to or for the benefit of LAWRENCE LEWIS at any time when in the judgment of the Trustees, LAWRENCE LEWIS is harassing any beneficiary or any Trustee, or their agents, of any trust created hereunder. He argues that this provision is against public policy because it subjects him to an arbitrary and capricious withholding of life-sustaining funds; allows any of his brothers as beneficiaries to concoct a story that will suspend his trust payments; and gives the trustees the unfettered right to determine harassment. [¶ 9] The Probate Court found that it could not say that, on its face, the anti-harassment clause is unenforceable as a matter of law based on Lawrence's analysis. As the personal representatives and beneficiaries argue, will conditions that restrain conduct have long been upheld as not against public policy. See, e.g., In re Laning's Estate, 462 Pa. 157, 339 A.2d 520, 524-25 (1975) (upholding condition in will relating to membership in a church); Griffin v. Sturges, 131 Conn. 471, 40 A.2d 758, 762 (1944) (upholding condition in will relating to abstaining from the use of intoxicating liquor). The Restatement applicable to testamentary transfers provides that [a]n otherwise effective provision in a donative transfer which is designed to prevent the acquisition or retention of an interest in property on account of the transferee acquiring or persisting in specified personal habits is valid. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.2 (1981); id. Div. I, Pt. III Introductory Note. The use of restraints as an inducement to the elimination of existing personal habits ... or as a means of assuring the continuance of the present character of the donee ... is not against public policy. Id. § 8.2 cmt. a. Moreover, the law anticipates that a trustee may be the one to determine whether a particular restraint has been violated and provides an avenue for judicial review to avoid unreasonable exercises of power. See § 8.2 cmt. b (stating where an arbiter is designated by the testator to pass upon the question whether or not the devisee has violated the terms of the restraint[,] [t]he determination of breach of performance by such an arbiter is conclusive in the absence of a judicial finding that the determination was influenced by some consideration other than an honest endeavor to evaluate the conduct of the devisee). Thus, the Probate Court did not err in determining that the language was not unenforceable on its face. [¶ 10] The personal representatives further argued at trial and on appeal that the Probate Code specifically spells out Maine's public policy concerning restraints of conduct and that the only restraint of conduct that is unenforceable under the Probate Code is the restraint against contesting a will: A provision in a will purporting to penalize any interested person for contesting the will or instituting other proceedings relating to the estate is unenforceable if probable cause exists for instituting proceedings. 18-A M.R.S.A. § 3-905 (1998). They argue that the anti-harassment clause does not fall within this in terrorem provision because it in no way penalizes Lawrence for contesting a will. Section 3-905, however, also applies to restraints against instituting other proceedings relating to the estate. The Probate Court determined that, contrary to the personal representatives' contention, the application of the anti-harassment clause could fall within the purview of the in terrorem clause. The court found that the anti-harassment clause could conceivably be employed by the Trustees in the future to dissuade or prevent Lawrence from `instituting proceedings relating to the estate' were he to question the discretionary authority of the Trustees in the administration of his Trust. It found that to the extent it might fall within the in terrorem clause, the challenged clause could be found unenforceable at a later time depending upon circumstances which then present themselves to show that the anti-harassment clause is being improperly invoked or otherwise used to chill a legitimate legal action by Lawrence with regard to the Trust created by the Will. The Probate Court determined, nonetheless, that it did not need to determine the enforceability of the will clause with reference to the in terrorem provision at the present time because factually the clause had not been invoked or used against Lawrence. [¶ 11] The personal representatives argue on cross-appeal that the Probate Court, by speculating on future enforceability, exceeded its authority in opining on an unripe issue. The personal representatives, however, raised the issue at trial whether the anti-harassment clause fit within the in terrorem provision. The Probate Court simply responded to the personal representatives' position and demonstrated that the interpretation of this clause cannot be answered strictly as a matter of law, but is dependent on factual circumstances. In some situations harassing individuals could be analogous to using intoxicating liquors and upheld as an enforceable provision against restraint of personal behavior. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.2 (1981). In other situations, however, conduct that may be characterized as instituting proceedings relating to the estate may be deemed by the Trustees as harassing them. In this situation, it may fall within the in terrorem provision of section 3-905 and be unenforceable. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 9.2 cmt. a, b (1981) (stating there is a public interest in holding fiduciaries to a proper standard of performance and in not deterring beneficiaries from bringing to light the questionable conduct). Thus, the Probate Court properly considered the anti-harassment clause's application to the in terrorem provision and did not err in its analysis.