Opinion ID: 2638240
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: gardner iii

Text: ¶ 14 In Gardner III, our 2004 decision, we held that Gardner's claim for ineffective assistance of counsel based on the erroneous knowingly jury instruction was procedurally barred as a successive claim by the Post-Conviction Remedies Act. [17] The PCRA bars a successive post-conviction claim that could have been, but was not, raised in a previous request for post-conviction relief. [18] We noted that Gardner's successive post-conviction petition was filed nearly four years after the PCRA's effective date of July 1, 1996, and therefore the language of the statute controlled. [19] We concluded that Gardner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim for failing to challenge the knowingly jury instruction could have been brought in his first post-conviction petition. [20] Thus, Gardner's successive post-conviction claim was procedurally barred by the PCRA from receiving substantive review on its merits. [21] ¶ 15 In Gardner III, we discussed the interplay between the PCRA and our common law post-conviction procedural bar jurisprudence. Significantly, we held that Gardner's successive post-conviction claim was barred under both the PCRA and the common law. [22]
¶ 16 In 1996, the legislature enacted the PCRA to establish[ ] a substantive legal remedy for any person who challenges a conviction or sentence for a criminal offense and who has exhausted all other legal remedies. [23] The Act's plain language purports to replace our common law post-conviction procedural bar jurisprudence with a statutory restriction on successive claims. [24] The Act's statutory restriction bars a successive post-conviction claim that could have been, but was not, raised in a previous request for post-conviction relief. [25]
¶ 17 Our common law post-conviction procedural bar jurisprudence uses language similar to the statutory restriction set forth in the PCRA. As a matter of common law, we have held that courts will not review a post-conviction claim of error where the error is something which is known or should [have been] known to the party at the time the judgment was entered and therefore could have been raised at an earlier time. [26] Nevertheless, in our common law we created exceptions to this general rule, stating that the law should not be so blind and unreasoning that where an injustice has resulted the [petitioner] should be without remedy. [27] [I]t has long been our law[ ] that a procedural default is not always determinative of a collateral attack on a conviction where it is alleged that the trial was not conducted within the bounds of basic fairness or in harmony with constitutional standards. [28] Therefore, even where a claim of error could have been raised earlier, post-conviction relief may be available in those rare cases [29] or unusual circumstances where an obvious injustice or a substantial and prejudicial denial of a constitutional right has occurred that would make it unconscionable not to reexamine the issue. [30] ¶ 18 Additionally, rule 65B(i)(4) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in effect until 1991, provided that all post-conviction claims shall be raised in the post-conviction proceeding brought under this rule and may not be raised in another subsequent proceeding except for good cause shown therein. [31] Rule 65B(i)(4) did not state what constituted good cause in this context. In our 1989 Hurst v. Cook [32] decision, we established five good cause exceptions pursuant to which a successive post-conviction claim may receive review on its merits: A showing of good cause that justifies the filing of a successive [post-conviction] claim may be established by showing (1) the denial of a constitutional right pursuant to new law that is, or might be, retroactive, (2) new facts not previously known which would show the denial of a constitutional right or might change the outcome of the trial, (3) the existence of fundamental unfairness in a conviction, . . . (4) the illegality of a sentence, or (5) a claim overlooked in good faith with no intent to delay or abuse the writ. [33] We later clarified that this list of good cause exceptions is not exhaustive. [34] ¶ 19 In Gardner III, we stated that [w]ith the 1996 passage of the PCRA, only two of the five good cause factors enumerated in Hurst remain uncodified. The Act impliedly includes the first Hurst factor, the denial of a constitutional right pursuant to [retroactive] new law, since a claim predicated on fresh jurisprudence could clearly not have been raised in a prior post-conviction petition. Likewise, the Act also provides for relief on the basis of newly discovered evidence, thereby incorporating the second Hurst factor. Finally, the fourth Hurst factor is codified in Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(e), which empowers the court to correct an illegal sentence or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time. Consequently, the only Hurst . . . exceptions that have not been addressed by the legislature are the existence of fundamental unfairness in a conviction and a claim overlooked in good faith with no intent to delay or abuse the writ. [35] ¶ 20 Despite the statutory enactment of three of the Hurst factors, however, we emphasized that all five common law exceptions retain their independent constitutional significance and may be examined by this court in our review of post-conviction petitions. [36] We stated, While we do not disagree with the legislature's enactment of the PCRA  which of course, embodies the popular will  and generally afford deference to its decisions, we nevertheless will continue to exercise our constitutionally vested authority where appropriate. [37] We noted that the power to review post-conviction petitions `quintessentially . . . belongs to the judicial branch of government' pursuant to article VIII of the Utah Constitution. [38] As such, the legislature may not impose restrictions which limit [post-conviction relief] as a judicial rule of procedure, except as provided in the constitution. [39] We concluded, Our state constitution is designed to prevent the unlawful, improper incarceration or execution of innocent individuals, and for that reason, we uphold the viability of the Hurst `good cause' exceptions. [40] As a result, it is possible for a successive post-conviction claim to be procedurally barred under the PCRA and yet receive substantive review on its merits under our independent good cause common law exceptions.
¶ 21 In Gardner III, we did not review Gardner's successive post-conviction claim, the same claim at issue before us now, under the good cause common law exceptions. We declined to reach this analysis because we held that Gardner's successive post-conviction claim was facially implausible. [41] We held that [i]n order to reach analysis under the Hurst factors, a claim must be facially plausible. Gardner's [claim] is not, so we do not reach such an analysis. [42] We stated that [i]t is absurd to suggest that any reasonable juror could find that Gardner was aware that he was firing a loaded handgun into his victim's face from a short distance away, but was not reasonably certain that his action would cause death. [43] We noted explicitly that we were determining the case solely on a procedural basis and were not reaching the merits of Gardner's claim. [44] In other words, determining that Gardner's successive post-conviction claim was facially implausible was not a substantive merits review, but rather a procedural inquiry that we conducted before reaching consideration under the good cause common law exceptions. ¶ 22 In Gardner III, we left open the question of whether Gardner's successive post-conviction petition would have been procedurally barred in 1990, before the PCRA was enacted. [45] We must now determine whether, under the common law in 1990, we would have arrived at the same conclusion that we did in 2004  declining to reach analysis under the good cause common law exceptions because Gardner's claim is facially implausible. We conclude that this is exactly what we would have done. We will now discuss our common law procedural bar jurisprudence as it existed in 1990 and illustrate its application to Gardner's successive post-conviction claim.