Opinion ID: 2824295
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Character Impeachment Evidence

Text: Lastly, Mr. Taylor contends that the trial court erred by excluding Ms. Little’s testimony about her interactions with the officers because it would impeach the officers’ credibility by testifying about allegedly “specific acts of dishonesty.” Impeachment evidence can challenge “a witness’s perception, credibility, and truthfulness.” Mitchell, 313 S.W.3d at 675. Missouri rules of evidence generally do not permit a witness to impeach the character of a different witness in the case by testifying about specific instances of the other witness’s conduct during direct examination. Id. at 678; see also Leavell v. Leavell, 89 S.W. 55, 57 (Mo. App. 1905). Additionally, extrinsic evidence of a witness’s character for truth and veracity may only be introduced if it is “very probative of and relevant to credibility.” Mitchell, 313 S.W.3d at 680. 14 Mr. Taylor suggests that Ms. Little wanted to use her cell phone to videotape the officers to capture misconduct. As noted previously, the offer of proof did not include any testimony by Ms. Little that the officers prevented her from videotaping to hide exculpatory events that would have aided Mr. Taylor’s defense or that, had Ms. Little’s cell phone not been seized, she would have recorded misconduct by the officers. Instead, Mr. Taylor seeks to use Ms. Little’s statements that the officers temporarily seized her cell phone to impeach the officers’ character to aid in Mr. Taylor’s defense that the officers had, at an earlier time, planted the cocaine on Mr. Taylor. The officers preventing Ms. Little from recording the events after Mr. Taylor’s arrest is of little probative value to whether the officers previously had planted drugs on Mr. Taylor. As such, the trial court did not abuse its discretion because it could have reasonably found that any minimal probative value in Ms. Little’s testimony that the officers told her to stop recording and temporarily seized her cell was outweighed by its collateral nature and the potential to confuse or mislead the jury. Mr. Taylor next contends, for the first time on appeal, that an officer taking Ms. Little’s cell phone and telling Ms. Little not to videotape is relevant impeachment evidence because it demonstrates the officer’s “consciousness of guilt.” While the “[c]onduct and declarations of a defendant that are relevant to show a consciousness of guilt or a desire to conceal the offense are admissible because they tend to establish the defendant’s guilt of the charged crime,” State v. Barton, 998 S.W.2d 19, 28 (Mo. banc 1999), Mr. Taylor has provided no authority for admitting evidence of consciousness of guilt to impeach the credibility of a testifying witness who has not been charged with a crime. By taking the stand, a witness places his 15 or her credibility at issue, and that credibility may be impeached by various methods. Mitchell, 313 S.W.3d at 676. Acts showing a “consciousness of guilt” of a testifying witness, however, is not a recognized form of impeachment. The offer of proof does not show that Ms. Little’s testimony would have been relevant as direct evidence, to contradict the officers’ testimony, or to impeach the officers’ character. Mr. Taylor has not shown that the trial court’s decision to exclude the evidence is clearly against the logic of the circumstances of the case or so unreasonable as to indicate a lack of careful consideration. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding Ms. Little’s testimony at trial. No Plain Error in Sentencing Mr. Taylor contends that the trial court plainly erred by depriving him of his right to due process when it declared his sentence before Mr. Taylor and his counsel had an opportunity to present mitigating evidence at his sentencing hearing. The state counters that the trial court did not plainly err because the court only told Mr. Taylor what sentence “it was leaning toward” after it had heard evidence at trial and reviewed the sentencing assessment report. Moreover, the state argues the trial court allowed Mr. Taylor and his counsel an opportunity to present mitigating evidence, considered a reverend’s letter as mitigating evidence, and did not “state that it would not be swayed by any mitigating evidence.” Because this error was not preserved, Mr. Taylor requests plain error review. Claims that are not preserved may be reviewed in the discretion of this Court for plain error. Rule 30.20. “Plain error is found when the alleged error ‘facially 16 establish[es] substantial grounds for believing a manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice occurred.” State v. Driskill, 459 S.W.3d 412, 426 (Mo. banc 2015) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Such errors must be “evident, obvious, and clear.” State v. Hunt, 451 S.W.3d 251, 260 (Mo. banc 2014). Mr. Taylor asserts the trial court’s announcement in open court that it is the court’s practice to advise trial counsel of the sentence the trial court has decided to impose prior to a sentencing proceeding violates his constitutional rights to due process, assistance of counsel, and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment. In support, Mr. Taylor cites Green v. United States , 365 U.S. 301 (1961), and State v. Wise, 879 S.W.2d 494 (Mo. banc 1994), overruled on other grounds by Joy v. Morrison, 254 S.W.3d 885 (Mo. banc 2008), for the principle that a defendant has a right to meaningful allocution, including the right to present mitigating evidence before the trial court determines the defendant’s sentence. “As early as 1689, it was recognized that the court’s failure to ask the defendant if he had anything to say before sentence was imposed required reversal.” Green, 365 U.S. at 304. Eight members of the Supreme Court of the United States, in Green, agreed that Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure “requires a district judge before imposing sentence to afford every convicted defendant an opportunity personally to speak in his own behalf.” 3 Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 425-26 (1962). The Supreme Court held in Hill, however, that “[t]he failure of a trial court to ask a criminal 3 The Supreme Court in Green and Hill relied on Rule 32(a). Rule 32 has since been revised, and the requirement that the defendant be given an opportunity to speak or present mitigating evidence is now contained in Rule 32(i)(4)(A). 17 defendant represented by an attorney whether he has anything to say before sentence is imposed . . . is an error which is neither jurisdictional nor constitutional.” 4 Id. at 428. Rule 29.07(b)(1) provides the procedure for allocution and sentencing in Missouri courts. In contrast to the federal rule, Rule 29.07(b)(1) expressly states that the requirement for allocution is directory rather than mandatory when a defendant has been heard on a motion for a new trial and in misdemeanor cases. Rule 29.07(b)(1) reads: When the defendant appears for judgment and sentence, he must be informed by the court of the verdict or finding and asked whether he has any legal cause to show why judgment and sentence should not be pronounced against him[.] . . . If the defendant has been heard on a motion for new trial, and in all cases of misdemeanor, the requirements of this subparagraph are directory and the omission to comply with them shall not invalidate the judgment or sentence. On June 17, 2013, Mr. Taylor filed a motion for judgment of acquittal or, in the alternative, for a new trial. The court heard and adjudicated this motion at the beginning of a hearing on July 23, 2013. Mr. Taylor, Mr. Taylor’s counsel, and the prosecuting attorney were present. Before ruling on the motion, the court asked Mr. Taylor’s counsel if he wished to make any additional arguments. Mr. Taylor’s counsel proceeded to argue the motion, including submitting an exhibit into evidence. After the prosecuting attorney replied, the court stated: “All right. The Court has permitted both counsel to make argument. The motion for new trial is hereby overruled and denied in its entirety.” 4 This Court, in Wise, notes that several federal district courts have held the right of allocution is constitutionally protected when a criminal defendant affirmatively requests to speak to the court before sentencing. 879 S.W.2d at 516. 18 Rule 29.07(b)(1) expressly states that the requirement that the court ask whether the defendant has any legal cause to show why judgment and sentence should not be pronounced is merely directory when the defendant is heard on a motion for a new trial. The rule further provides that, in those circumstances, the failure of the court to provide allocution does not invalidate the sentence. Because Mr. Taylor was heard on his motion for a new trial, the trial court was not mandated by Rule 29.07(b)(1) to allow Mr. Taylor and his counsel an opportunity to present mitigating evidence. See State v. Scott, 621 S.W.2d 915, 918 (Mo. 1981); State v. Meller, 387 S.W.2d 515, 518 (Mo. 1965); State v. Kukovich, 380 S.W.2d 324, 327 (Mo. 1964); State v. Drake, 298 S.W.2d 374, 378 (Mo. 1957). While Rule 29.07(b)(1) may not have mandated the trial court to give Mr. Taylor allocution, the routine practice of the trial court in announcing its decision prior to a scheduled hearing on the matter is at odds with the long-standing right that a criminal defendant personally be given the opportunity to speak and to present mitigating evidence prior to sentencing. The trial court’s announced purpose in adopting its practice is to avoid surprising a criminal defendant in open court with the pronounced sentence, possibly because the judge wishes to avoid the emotional trauma to a defendant that may occur when a defendant hears a severe sentence for the first time. That purpose would not outweigh the importance of a trial court allowing a criminal defendant to be heard. Nevertheless, this case does not compel resolution of the issue of whether a criminal defendant has a right to present mitigating evidence despite the express statement in Rule 29.07(b)(1) that the requirement of allocution is merely directory and 19 this Court’s prior decisions holding that there is no reversible error in failing to give allocation, which would include a meaningful opportunity to present mitigating evidence. Mr. Taylor does not cite authority directly addressing whether Rule 29.07(b)(1) and this Court’s decisions are at odds with a criminal defendant’s due process rights. Therefore, he fails to make a persuasive argument that this Court should reexamine existing law and overrule its precedent. Finally, Mr. Taylor does not show that he did not receive allocution or a meaningful opportunity to present mitigating evidence. Specifically, he does not show that the trial court did not consider all of the evidence relevant to sentencing, both mitigating and aggravating, before informing Mr. Taylor’s counsel that he intended to impose a sentence of 16 years. Before sentencing, the court asked Mr. Taylor’s counsel if Mr. Taylor had an opportunity to review the sentencing assessment report. His counsel answered he had. This inquiry shows that the sentencing assessment report was made available to the trial court, Mr. Taylor, and the state prior to the hearing on July 23, 2013. The court then asked Mr. Taylor’s counsel and the prosecuting attorney: “Do you have any legal reason why judgment, order and sentence not be entered at this time?” Both answered no. In response to the trial court’s invitation to Mr. Taylor’s counsel to make statements on behalf of his client, Mr. Taylor’s counsel referenced information in the sentencing assessment report, arguing to the court that Mr. Taylor was asking for a sentence of 13 years in prison on a crime that carried a maximum of life in prison. The trial court then stated that it had received a letter from Reverend Shields on behalf of Mr. Taylor. The trial court stated that Reverend Shields knew Mr. Taylor’s mother and 20 family, which demonstrates that the trial court had read the letter sent on Mr. Taylor’s behalf. Only after this exchange did the court address Mr. Taylor individually and proceed to sentence him. In doing so, the trial court asked Mr. Taylor if there was anything he wished to say, and Mr. Taylor responded that there was not. On this record, Mr. Taylor fails to show the trial court plainly erred. Any mitigating evidence was in the sentencing assessment report and Reverend Shields’ letter, and both were filed prior to the sentencing hearing and available for the trial court’s review. Mr. Taylor did not prove, much less argue, that the trial court did not review and consider that evidence prior to advising Mr. Taylor’s counsel of the court’s intention to impose a sentence of 16 years in prison. Equally important, Mr. Taylor did not present any additional mitigating evidence at the sentencing hearing that he claims the trial court did not consider. Because Mr. Taylor did not object to the trial court’s announced practice of advising a criminal defendant of a sentence prior to allocution, he asks for plain error review, which would require him to prove manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice. Rule 30.20. Mr. Taylor has not demonstrated manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice because he has not proved that the trial court did not consider all the mitigating evidence, albeit prior to the hearing, before determining the sentence the trial court intended to impose.