Opinion ID: 1579381
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Insufficiency of Evidence & Free Speech Claim

Text: Evans claims the district court erred in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal, because there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions for stalking and harassment. In tandem with this argument, Evans contends he could not have committed harassment because his actions were protected by his right to free speech. See U.S. Const. amend. I. We recently considered and rejected a similar claim in another case involving Evans. See State v. Evans, 672 N.W.2d 328, 331 (Iowa 2003). As a threshold matter, in this case we refuse to consider Evans' constitutional claim, because Evans did not preserve error. Reviewing the record, we find Evans did not raise this issue in the district court. Issues not raised before the district court, including constitutional issues, cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. State v. McCright, 569 N.W.2d 605, 607 (Iowa 1997). We now consider Evans' claim there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to support his convictions for harassment and stalking. We review insufficiency claims for errors at law. State v. Sanborn, 564 N.W.2d 813, 816 (Iowa 1997) (quoting State v. Bayles, 551 N.W.2d 600, 608 (Iowa 1996)). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, and will not disturb a jury verdict unless we find the evidence supporting the conviction was not substantial. Id. Evidence is substantial if it could convince a rational fact finder that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
Evans was convicted of two counts of first-degree harassment in violation of Iowa Code sections 708.7(2) and 708.7(1)( b ). In order to address Evans' sufficiency challenge, we review Iowa Code section 708.7(1)( b ), which states, in relevant part: A person commits harassment when the person, purposefully and without legitimate purpose, has personal contact with another person, with the intent to threaten, intimidate, or alarm that other person.... Iowa Code § 708.7(1)( b ). Evans claims that, as a published photographer, his sole purpose in contacting Arnold was to take her picture. Moreover, the defendant maintains he never threatened Arnold; he points out we have yet to sustain a conviction for harassment in the absence of a showing of a threat on the part of the defendant, and therefore ought not to do so here. We are satisfied a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty on the charges of harassment beyond a reasonable doubt. Threatening the victim is not a necessary element of our harassment statute. To conclude otherwise would ignore the disjunctive language of section 708.7(1)( b ), which forbids a person from personally and without legitimate purpose... [having] personal contact with another person, with the intent to threaten, intimidate, or alarm that other person. Iowa Code § 708.7(1)( b ) (emphasis added); see State v. Anderson, 636 N.W.2d 26, 37 (Iowa 2001) (We avoid interpreting a statute to render any part of it superfluous.). There is substantial evidence in the record Evans intended to alarm, if not intimidate, Arnold. Our court has not previously had occasion to define alarm for the purposes of Iowa Code section 708.7(1)( b ). In the absence of a legislative definition of a term or a particular meaning in the law, we give words their ordinary meaning. State v. White, 563 N.W.2d 615, 617 (Iowa 1997). To ascertain the ordinary meaning of a word, we may consult the dictionary. Id. The dictionary defines alarm as to cause (someone) to feel frightened, disturbed, or in danger.... The New Oxford American Dictionary 36 (2001). Evans correctly points out harassment is a specific intent crime. State v. Button, 622 N.W.2d 480, 483 (Iowa 2001). Intent is seldom capable of direct proof, however, and a trier of fact may infer intent from the normal consequences of one's actions. Evans, 672 N.W.2d at 331 (citing State v. Chang, 587 N.W.2d 459, 462 (Iowa 1998); State v. Farnum, 554 N.W.2d 716, 720 (Iowa Ct.App.1996)). Given the prior history between the two parties, we believe the evidence was sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to find the defendant acted with the intent to alarm or intimidate Arnold in the two incidents for which he was convicted of harassment. By August 31, when Evans showed up at Arnold's home uninvited and asked Arnold if she would be willing to play a dominant female role in a new pictorial he was producing about Dred Scott, Arnold had repeatedly rebuffed Evans' offers. By September 25, Evans had made several more unsuccessful attempts to persuade Arnold to pose for him, including the incident at the car wash where Arnold hurriedly ran away from Evans without washing her car or picking up her change. It should not have been unexpected on Evans' part that his conduct would alarm Arnold. In the context of the history between these two parties, we think a reasonable jury could find, at the very least, Evans intended to alarm Arnold when he showed up at her front door asking to take her picture on August 31. This behavior would easily cause Arnold to feel frightened, disturbed, or in danger; such is the natural consequence of Evans' acts, from which the requisite intent for harassment may be inferred. See Evans, 672 N.W.2d at 331 (citing Chang, 587 N.W.2d at 462; Farnum, 554 N.W.2d at 720). This inference becomes even stronger by the September 25 incident, in light of the additional unsuccessful attempts which occurred in the interim and the fact Evans appeared wearing red, strappy high heels with matching toenails. There is ample evidence here of a ratcheting up of bizarre and alarming behavior. For both incidents, a rational jury could conclude Evans intended to alarm Arnold.
Evans also claims there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to sustain his conviction for stalking Arnold. Evans contends Arnold never explicitly told him to leave her alone before October 12; rather, he alleges, Arnold only told him she wasn't interested, which, according to Evans, means something entirely different. Moreover, Evans points out there is no evidence the police told Evans to leave Arnold alone nor any allegation Evans violated a protective order. And lastly, absent any threats on his part, Evans maintains there is no evidence a reasonable person would fear bodily injury or death because of his behavior. Again, we must reject Evans' claims. Iowa's stalking statute states: A person commits stalking when all of the following occur: a. The person purposefully engages in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that would cause a reasonable person to fear bodily injury to, or the death of, that specific person or a member of the specific person's immediate family. b. The person has knowledge or should have knowledge that the specific person will be placed in reasonable fear of bodily injury to, or the death of, that specific person or a member of that specific person's immediate family by the course of conduct. c. The person's course of conduct induces fear in the specific person of bodily injury to, or the death of, the specific person or a member of the specific person's immediate family. Iowa Code § 708.11(2). Proof of all three elements, beyond a reasonable doubt, is necessary to sustain a conviction under Iowa's stalking statute. Id.; see State v. Limbrecht, 600 N.W.2d 316, 318 (Iowa 1999). We think a reasonable jury could find the prosecution met its burden on all three elements of Iowa Code section 708.11(2) in the present case. Although the defendant never threatened Arnold, making a threat is not an element of our stalking statute. See Limbrecht, 600 N.W.2d at 319 (Instead of targeting a `credible threat,' the statute criminalizes a `course of conduct' that may or may not include threats.). Nor is it necessary the defendant receive official notice from the police his behavior is causing the victim fear. Given the persistent, repeated, and sexual nature of Evans' questioning, including his unexpected arrivals at Arnold's home, we think a rational jury could find Evans guilty of stalking Arnold. We think the record clearly shows Evans purposefully engaged in a course of conduct directed at Arnold which would cause a reasonable person to fear bodily injury, and Evans knew Arnold would be placed in such fear. The record discloses a course of conduct in which Arnold repeatedly said she was not interested in Evans' disturbing offers. On two occasions, she fled from Evans. Importantly, Evans' behavior escalated over time, culminating in two uninvited visits to Arnold's home, even though Arnold did not tell Evans where she lived. On the first visit, Evans wore red strappy heels with painted toenails to match; on the second, he hid in front of his companion and jumped out when Arnold answered the door. Given Evans' repeated and ever-escalating attempts to photograph Arnold, her steadfast refusals, and the bizarre sexual nature of Evans' proposals, a rational jury could find a reasonable person would fear injury. Moreover, there is sufficient evidence Evans knew Arnold would have such fears. Nor is there any question Arnold, in fact, feared Evans would injure her. Arnold testified at trial she now takes a different route to work, parks her car in a secure lot, and is afraid to answer the door or even the telephone.