Opinion ID: 379476
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Attorney-Client Relationship and the Adversary System

Text: 137 The formula suggested by the dissent for determining when a defendant has not received effective assistance of counsel presuming prejudice from scanty evidence and then shifting the normal burden of proof to the Government to disprove the existence of prejudice would have very detrimental consequences to the adversary system. The Government would be forced to attempt to produce proof entirely from the acts and privileged discussions of the accused and his counsel and to make its showing long after the trial, when memories have faded as they have here. 23 In addition to creating an almost impenetrable obstacle to sustaining convictions in many cases, such requirement would lead to highly objectional intrusions into the adversary system in most cases. Shifting the burden to the Government would force it to get very involved in a relationship that it should stay out of. 138 If the Government were required to prove that its adversary defense counsel was adequate, it would be strongly motivated and well advised during a criminal trial, in order to protect the prospect of guilty verdicts, to oversee the major decisions and activities of defense counsel and the accused that affect the trial. Performing this function would, as a practical matter, require the prosecution to probe what has heretofore been a sacrosanct area the highly confidential relationship between a criminal defendant and his lawyer. Some tension in this area unavoidably exists when the defendant makes a prima facie showing of prejudicial conduct constituting a constitutional violation, and the Government seeks to rebut that showing. Presuming prejudice from certain minimal facts that do not constitute a full prima facie case and then switching the burden of proof to the Government (which has limited access to the defendant's information) to prove that no prejudice resulted would heighten that tension inexorably. 139 To the extent that the prosecutor during trial might implore the trial judge to correct or direct the decisions or acts of defense counsel, or the accused, to prevent presumptive prejudice which would redound against the Government (though it in no way participated in such conduct or decisions), the result could well be judicial supervision of many of the tactical trial decisions of defense counsel. The hazards of creating such a rule were described by Judge Prettyman in Mitchell v. United States, supra: 140 (T)he constitutional right of an accused to the assistance of counsel might well be destroyed if counsel's selections upon tactical problems were supervised by a judge. The accused is entitled to the trial judgment of his counsel, not the tactical opinions of the judge. Surely a judge should not share the confidences shared by client and counsel. An accused bound to tactical decisions approved by a judge would not get the due process of law we have heretofore known. And how absurd it would be for a trial judge to opine that such-and-such a course was ineffective or incompetent because it persuaded him (the judge) to decide thus-and-so adversely to the accused. 141 104 U.S.App.D.C. at 63, 259 F.2d at 793. These difficulties can be avoided by leaving the burden of proof in most cases on the defendant to show substantial unfair prejudice from the acts or omissions of counsel. Such showing would constitute a prima facie case of a Sixth Amendment violation, and the burden of proceeding would then be cast on the Government to disprove the prima facie case and failing that the accused would prevail. 24