Opinion ID: 1172018
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the initiative conflicts with section 66484.3

Text: (1a) The Court of Appeal held that the initiative is invalid because it conflicts with state law on a matter of statewide concern. COST concedes the validity of the principle  i.e., legislation in an area of statewide concern preempts conflicting regulation by a charter city ( The Pines v. City of Santa Monica (1981) 29 Cal.3d 656, 659 [175 Cal. Rptr. 336, 630 P.2d 521])  but maintains it has no application here because the initiative neither conflicts with state law nor touches on a matter of statewide concern.
(2a) Section 66484.3 conflicts with the initiative if, as the Court of Appeal concluded, it confers authority to enact MT&BF programs exclusively on the Orange County Board of Supervisors and the city councils of the various cities within Orange County. The first point to be determined, therefore, is whether this construction of the statute is accurate. (3) Our primary aim in construing any law is to determine the legislative intent. ( Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego (1982) 32 Cal.3d 180, 187 [185 Cal. Rptr. 260, 649 P.2d 902].) In doing so we look first to the words of the statute, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning. ( Young v. Haines (1986) 41 Cal.3d 883, 897 [226 Cal. Rptr. 547, 718 P.2d 909]; People ex rel Younger v. Superior Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 30, 43 [127 Cal. Rptr. 122, 544 P.2d 1322].) (2b) As originally enacted, [7] section 66484.3 stated that [t]he board of supervisors of the County of Orange and the city council of any city in that county may, by ordinance, require the payment of a fee ... for purposes of defraying the actual or estimated cost of ... constructing major thoroughfares. (Italics added.) The Court of Appeal held that this provision constituted a specific delegation of authority to city councils in Orange County and that the initiative would conflict with this provision by reposing authority to enact such ordinances in Irvine's electorate rather than its city council. (4) Over the years this court has struggled with the question whether a statutory reference to action by a local legislative body indicates a legislative intent to preclude action on the same subject by the electorate. A review of these decisions supports the conclusion that while such references are generally not conclusive as to legislative intent, they do support an inference that the intent was to preclude action by initiative or referendum. Review of the case law further suggests that the strength of the inference varies according to the precise language used in the statute, a reference using generic language such as governing body or legislative body supporting a weaker inference than a specific reference to boards of supervisors and city councils. A third conclusion to be drawn is that an intent to exclude ballot measures is more readily inferred if the statute addresses a matter of statewide concern rather than a purely municipal affair. Our review of the decisions of this court begins with Riedman v. Brison (1933) 217 Cal. 383 [18 P.2d 947], in which we held invalid a proposed initiative which would have required a city council to call an election to determine whether a charter city should withdraw from a regional water district. Under the Metropolitan Water District Act (Stats. 1927, ch. 429, p. 694), the decision to join or withdraw from a water district was conferred on the voters but proceedings to withdraw were to be initiated by the governing body of the municipality. After concluding that district procedures were not municipal affairs, we stated that the reference to the governing body could not be properly construed to mean other than that the legislature ... has designated the `governing body' of the municipality as the agency for submitting the proposition to withdraw, and has prescribed the formalities it has deemed necessary to effectuate the withdrawal. ( Riedman, supra, 217 Cal. at p. 387.) Thus in Riedman the statutory reference to the governing body and the regional scope of the statute combined to persuade this court that action by initiative was barred. In Simpson v. Hite (1950) 36 Cal.2d 125 [222 P.2d 225], we construed legislation placing on the board of supervisors the duty of providing suitable quarters for the municipal and superior courts. We concluded that this legislation conflicted with and rendered invalid a proposed initiative that would have repealed a resolution designating a site for court buildings. In Blotter v. Farrell (1954) 42 Cal.2d 804 [270 P.2d 481], a city council refused to act on an initiative calling for a special election to change councilmanic district boundaries. At the time, section 35322 provided that after annexation of territory to a city divided into wards, the legislative body, by ordinance, shall alter the boundaries of the city wards to include the annexed territory.... We noted that under this provision the power to redistrict was given directly to the city council and indirectly to the electors under their initiative powers granted by the Constitution of California. ( Blotter, supra, at pp. 811-812) [8] Three years later, in Geiger v. Board of Supervisors (1957) 48 Cal.2d 832 [313 P.2d 545], we considered the language of Revenue and Taxation Code section 7201, providing: Any county may by action of its board of supervisors adopt a sales and use tax in accordance with the provisions of this part. Concluding that referendum was not available to challenge an ordinance enacted under this provision, we relied in part on the statutory wording: Ordinarily, a county exercises its powers through its board of supervisors [citation], and it would have been unnecessary to refer to the `board of supervisors,' in addition to the `county,' if the intent had been to treat sales tax ordinances as ordinary legislation subject to referendum. The fact that the statute not only provides that a county can adopt such a tax, but in addition specifies that this is to be done by action of the board of supervisors, plainly shows that the Legislature intended to limit to boards of supervisors the power to enact such ordinances. (See Barlotti v. Lyons, 182 Cal. 575, 577-584 [189 P. 282]; but cf. Blotter v. Farrell, 42 Cal.2d 804, 811-812 [270 P.2d 481].) ( Geiger, supra, at p. 838.) Blotter and Geiger are not irreconcilable. In Blotter the statute at issue dealt with alteration of councilmanic district boundaries, a municipal affair, and the statute used only a generic reference to the legislative body. Moreover, the legislative scheme required a vote of the electorate to establish a district system, thus reflecting a legislative determination that direct voter participation in such matters was appropriate. In Geiger, on the other hand, the Legislature had used the more specific reference to the board of supervisors. While the statute at issue in Geiger also dealt with a purely local matter, the inference that the Legislature intended to exclude voter participation was supported by the provisions of our state Constitution (former art. IV, § 1; see now, art. II, § 9) barring the referendum on tax levies or appropriations for the usual current expenses of the State. (See Hunt v. Mayor & Council of Riverside (1948) 31 Cal.2d 619, 623-624 [191 P.2d 426].) These differences in statutory language and subject matter help to explain the results reached in the respective cases. Most recently, in Building Industry Assn. v. City of Camarillo (1986) 41 Cal.3d 810 [226 Cal. Rptr. 81, 718 P.2d 68], we interpreted the provisions of Evidence Code section 669.5 shifting the burden of proof in actions challenging the validity of growth control ordinances. Subdivision (a) of the section states that it applies to ordinances enacted by the governing body of a city whereas subdivision (d) expressly exempts a voter approved ordinance adopted by referendum or initiative before the section's effective date and containing certain provisions. Concluding that Evidence Code section 669.5 applied to ordinances enacted by initiative after the effective date of that section, we noted that one of the versions considered by the Legislature before the section's enactment referred to an ordinance enacted by the governing body ... except ... an initiative measure.... As we observed, the wording of this version indicates that the Legislature must have assumed that measures enacted by a `governing body' included initiatives adopted by the electorate, since initiatives were exempted from the reach of the statute within the same sentence. ( Building Industry Assn., supra, 41 Cal.3d at pp. 819-820, original italics; see also, Lee v. City of Monterey Park (1985) 173 Cal. App.3d 798, 806-807 [219 Cal. Rptr. 309].) This specific and persuasive evidence of legislative intent was sufficient to rebut the weak inference, arising from use of the generic term governing body, that growth control measures enacted by initiative were not included. We have also reviewed Court of Appeal decisions but have found none in which statutory use of specific references to a city council or board of supervisors was considered. When construing statutes containing generic references, such as legislative body or governing body, the Courts of Appeal have generally permitted exercise of the initiative and referendum when the subject matter was of purely local concern (e.g., Atlas Hotels, Inc. v. Acker (1964) 230 Cal. App.2d 658 [41 Cal. Rptr. 231] [levy of a transient room tax]; Reagan v. City of Sausalito (1962) 210 Cal. App.2d 618 [26 Cal. Rptr. 775] [acquisition and improvement of land for use as playgrounds and parks]; Osborn v. Board of Supervisors (1915) 27 Cal. App. 85 [148 P. 970] [division of county into townships for purposes of electing justices of the peace]) but not when the statute dealt with a matter of statewide concern (e.g., Walker v. City of Salinas (1976) 56 Cal. App.3d 711 [128 Cal. Rptr. 832] [Community Redevelopment Law]; Mervynne v. Acker (1961) 189 Cal. App.2d 558 [11 Cal. Rptr. 340] [traffic regulation]). Significantly, however, no Court of Appeal decision has been found upholding an initiative or referendum seeking to exercise or annul exercise of a delegated power relating to a matter of statewide concern where the delegating statute contained even a generic reference. As COST observes, many powers conferred by statute on the legislative body of a local entity have been held to be subject to initiative and referendum. For example, ballot measures may be used to enact or amend zoning ordinances despite the language of sections 65850-65858 conferring zoning powers on the legislative body. ( Arnel Development Co. v. City of Costa Mesa (1980) 28 Cal.3d 511 [169 Cal. Rptr. 904, 620 P.2d 565] [zoning initiative in general law city]; Associated Home Builders etc., Inc. v. City of Livermore (1976) 18 Cal.3d 582 [135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 557 P.2d 473, 92 A.L.R.3d 1038] [same]; San Diego Bldg. Contractors Assn. v. City Council (1974) 13 Cal.3d 205 [118 Cal. Rptr. 146, 529 P.2d 570, 72 A.L.R.3d 973] [zoning initiative in charter city]; Johnston v. City of Claremont (1958) 49 Cal.2d 826 [323 P.2d 71] [zoning referendum in general law city].) Similarly, adoption and amendment of a general plan may be the subject of initiative or referendum although section 65356 gives these powers to the legislative body. ( Yost v. Thomas (1984) 36 Cal.3d 561 [205 Cal. Rptr. 801, 685 P.2d 1152] [referendum on general plan amendment]; O'Loane v. O'Rourke (1965) 231 Cal. App.2d 774 [42 Cal. Rptr. 283] [referendum in general law city on resolution adopting general plan]; 66 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 258 [initiative to amend general plan of general law county].) However, in all these cases the statutes dealt with purely local concerns and, as we have noted, the term legislative body is more easily read as including the electorate than the terms city council or board of supervisors. (2c) Our review of the relevant case law leads us to conclude that the Legislature's use of the terms board of supervisors and city council in section 66484.3 gives rise to a strong inference that the Legislature intended to preclude exercise of the statutory authority by the electorate.
(5a) Because, as we have seen, this is an important factor in ascertaining legislative intent, we consider next whether section 66484.3 deals with matters of statewide concern rather than strictly municipal affairs. As used in this discussion, statewide refers to all matters of more than local concern and thus includes matters the impact of which is primarily regional rather than truly statewide. (6) A charter city such as Irvine is authorized by the state Constitution to make and enforce all ordinances and regulations in respect to municipal affairs. (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 5, subd. (a).) Under this provision, ordinances enacted in a charter city relating to matters which are purely municipal affairs prevail over state laws covering the same subject. ( Baggett v. Gates (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128, 136 [185 Cal. Rptr. 232, 649 P.2d 874].) As to matters which are of statewide concern, however, home rule charter cities remain subject to and controlled by applicable general state laws regardless of the provisions of their charters.... ( Bishop v. City of San Jose (1969) 1 Cal.3d 56, 61 [81 Cal. Rptr. 465, 460 P.2d 137].) We have recognized that no exact definition of the term municipal affairs can be formulated, and that what constitutes a municipal affair or matter of statewide concern may change over time in response to changing conditions in society. ( Bishop v. City of San Jose, supra, 1 Cal.3d 56, 62-63.) In general, municipal action which affects persons outside of the municipality becomes to that extent a matter which the state is empowered to prohibit or regulate.... ( Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego (1980) 26 Cal.3d 848, 879 [164 Cal. Rptr. 510, 610 P.2d 407]. See also, Baggett v. Gates, supra, 32 Cal.3d 128, 139-140; CEEED v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Com. (1974) 43 Cal. App.3d 306, 321 [118 Cal. Rptr. 315].) (5b) The statewide importance of section 66484.3 becomes apparent upon examination of its relation to highway construction and the development of regional transportation systems. While street work has long been regarded as a matter of local concern (see City of Walnut Creek v. Silveira (1957) 47 Cal.2d 804, 812 [306 P.2d 453]; Raisch v. Myers (1946) 27 Cal.2d 773, 778 [167 P.2d 198]) it has also been recognized that construction of major highways has effects beyond municipal boundaries (see People ex rel Younger v. County of El Dorado (1971) 5 Cal.3d 480, 498, fn. 20 [96 Cal. Rptr. 553, 487 P.2d 1193]; Southern California Roads Co. v. McGuire (1934) 2 Cal.2d 115, 123 [39 P.2d 412]; Young v. Superior Court (1932) 216 Cal. 512, 516-517 [15 P.2d 163]; cf. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, supra, 26 Cal.3d 848, 879 [receipt of federal highway funds a matter of statewide concern]). Indeed, Streets and Highways Code section 250 provides: It is hereby declared to be essential to the future development of the State of California to establish and construct a statewide system of freeways and expressways and connections thereto without regard to present jurisdiction over the highways, roads, and streets that might be included.... (See also, Sts. & Hy. Code, § 300.) Section 66484.3 was designed specifically for the funding of major thoroughfares whose primary purpose is to carry through traffic and provide a network connecting to or which is part of the state highway system.... (§ 66484.3, subd. (b)(1).) In other words, the contemplated transportation facilities are to be used primarily for travel between cities rather than within cities. This intent is shown further by the provision authorizing use of the fees collected to construct facilities shown on the city's general plan whether the facilities are situated within or outside the boundaries of the city.... (§ 66484.3, subd. (i).) The construction of roads located outside a city's boundaries cannot be a strictly municipal affair. While the statute does not itself establish a regional mechanism for planning and constructing major highways, such as the formation of joint powers agencies, the use of such mechanisms is necessarily implied from the nature of the facilities themselves, since it would be practically impossible for any one or more cities acting independently to plan and build efficient additions to a regional highway system. (See City of Santa Clara v. Von Raesfeld (1970) 3 Cal.3d 239, 247 [90 Cal. Rptr. 8, 474 P.2d 976].) In short, the projects contemplated by section 66484.3 are of the kind likely to require coordination on a regional basis and to have substantial impacts on persons living outside the boundaries of the city and so are matters of statewide concern. (7) (See Wilson v. City of San Bernardino (1960) 186 Cal. App.2d 603, 611 [9 Cal. Rptr. 431] [... when a general law of the state, adopted by the state Legislature, provides for a scheme of public improvement, the scope of which intrudes upon or transcends the boundary of one or several municipalities, together with unincorporated territory, such contemplated improvement ceases to be a municipal affair and comes within the proper domain and regulation of the general laws of the state.].) (5c) COST argues that construction of the corridors cannot truly be a matter of statewide concern because the Legislature has not required but has merely enabled the local entities to impose development fees for construction of the corridors if the entities choose to do so. However, in seeking to achieve objectives of statewide concern the Legislature is not limited to means which are mandatory or coercive but can also employ means reasonably calculated to facilitate or encourage appropriate action by local entities, and the problem addressed by a statute does not cease to be of state-wide concern simply because the Legislature has authorized participation on a voluntary basis. (See Southern California Roads Co. v. McGuire, supra, 2 Cal.2d at p. 123.) Here the legislation in question was passed at the urging of local government officials to provide an innovative solution to a regional transportation problem. The Legislature correctly anticipated that many entities would voluntarily elect to use the revenue source provided by the legislation and could reasonably anticipate that permissive legislation would be most likely to engender the spirit of cooperation essential for this regional enterprise. We conclude that section 66484.3 deals with matters of statewide concern rather than strictly municipal affairs.
The construction of the statute as a delegation of authority to city councils is supported not only by the language of section 66484.3, which refers specifically to city council action, but also by a comparison with section 66484, the provision on which section 66484.3 was modeled. The parallel language of section 66484 reads: A local ordinance may require the payment of a fee... for purposes of defraying the actual or estimated cost of ... constructing major thoroughfares. Under the principle of statutory construction that a material change in the language of a legislative enactment is ordinarily viewed as showing an intent on the part of the Legislature to change the meaning of the statute ( Twin Lock, Inc. v. Superior Court (1959) 52 Cal.2d 754, 761 [344 P.2d 788]), the insertion of a specific reference to city councils in section 66484.3, not found in section 66484, is evidence of intent to confer authority specifically and exclusively on the city council. (8) (See also, City of Port Hueneme v. City of Oxnard (1959) 52 Cal.2d 385, 395 [341 P.2d 318] [`Where a statute, with reference to one subject contains a given provision, the omission of such provision from a similar statute concerning a related subject is significant to show that a different intention existed.'].) COST argues that the available legislative history rebuts the inference that the Legislature attached significance to the specific references to the board of supervisors and the city councils. These references were not present when the legislation was first introduced in the form of an amendment to section 66484. They were inserted in the fifth and final Assembly amendment of the bill when it was decided to propose a new statute limited in effect to Orange County, rather than an amendment of section 66484. [9] The geographical limitation was duly noted in reports prepared by the Assembly Local Government Committee and by the Senate Housing and Urban Affairs Committees, but no mention was made of the references to the board of supervisors and city councils. The reports listed eight ways in which section 66484.3 would change existing law but did not mention that the new legislation would have the effect of excluding action by the electorate or delegating authority specifically or exclusively to local legislative bodies. [10] The Legislative Council's Digest of the bill, while noting the geographical limitation, similarly omits any mention of this aspect of the new enactment. (9) While legislative committee reports are legitimate and valuable aids in determining legislative intent ( Curtis v. County of Los Angeles (1985) 172 Cal. App.3d 1243, 1250 [218 Cal. Rptr. 772]), they are certainly not conclusive (see San Mateo City School Dist. v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 850, 863 [191 Cal. Rptr. 800, 663 P.2d 523]), and omissions in such reports are inherently less reliable indicia of intent than positive statements. Here the weak inference which might possibly be drawn from the omission in the committee reports is insufficient to overcome the other factors previously discussed. As COST notes, the Legislature has in one instance used language which makes the intention to exclude action by the electorate unmistakably clear. Section 53541 provides that [a]ny provision of law requiring an election to the contrary notwithstanding, the legislative body without a vote of the electors may issue bonds of the local agency.... (See City of Santa Clara v. Von Raesfeld, supra, 3 Cal.3d 239.) This situation is distinguishable, however, because the city would otherwise have been required to obtain voter approval of the revenue bonds in issue. ( Id. at p. 248.) No similar preexisting requirement of voter approval applies to enactment of MT&BF programs. Finally, COST argues that we should not infer a legislative intent to exclude action by the electorate because the Legislature could have no legitimate reason for imposing this restriction. As stated, the purpose of the legislation was to facilitate action at the local level to deal with an urgent regional transportation problem. Permitting operation of the initiative and referendum powers would make enactment of the contemplated local legislation more difficult and time-consuming. (See Hunt v. Mayor & Council of Riverside, supra, 31 Cal.2d at p. 629 [recognizing the uncertainty and delay of referendum proceedings.].) Also, the county supervisors and city council members deal constantly with planning matters and regional concerns and thus should more readily and thoroughly understand the underlying issues. Being themselves elected officials, county supervisors and city council members can be expected to make decisions reflecting both their own acquired expertise and the sentiments of their constituents. (1b) Having reviewed the language, subject matter, and history of the statute, and other pertinent matters suggested by the parties, we conclude that in enacting section 66484.3 the Legislature intended to delegate authority to enact ordinances establishing MT&BF programs exclusively to the Orange County Board of Supervisors and the city councils of cities within Orange County. By requiring voter approval to enact such ordinances, the initiative conflicts with section 66484.3.