Opinion ID: 3173985
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence the District Court Excluded

Text: Additional evidence that Bordelon cites on appeal was ei‐ ther excluded by or not raised in front of the district court. Because Bordelon has not argued on appeal that the district court abused its discretion in excluding the following evi‐ dence, he has waived any argument about its exclusion be‐ ing improper. Lucas, 367 F.3d at 726. Assuming arguendo that Bordelon had not waived these arguments, the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding this evidence, nor does the evidence to which he directs us give rise to an inference of discriminatory motiva‐ tion sufficient to withstand summary judgment. Sanders testified that Coates would “pick on” principals sixty years of age or older “by saying that their paperwork was wrong.” Sanders testified that Coates would “make No. 14‐3240 11 negative remarks about older principals to her team” but would not treat younger principals that way. Bordelon points to the similar testimony of Velma Cooksey, another older principal supervised by Coates. Cooksey testified that Coates “humiliated the only [sic] older principals” and “showed favoritism for the younger workers against the old‐ er workers.” In Lucas, we concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding statements that the supervi‐ sor “treated African‐Americans ‘more harshly’ … [or] that African‐Americans were asked to change rail ties more fre‐ quently, work longer sections of the track and were written up for reasons that non‐African‐Americans were not.” Lucas, 367 F.3d at 726. Cooksey’s and Sanders’s testimony is as conclusory as the testimony rejected in Lucas. Neither offers specific facts upon which to conclude Coates treated older principals in a dis‐ criminatory manner. Instead, just like the statements exclud‐ ed in Lucas, Sanders and Cooksey only offered sweeping generalizations about the way the protected class was treat‐ ed. Because this evidence is not sufficient to preclude sum‐ mary judgment, the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding it. Finally, Bordelon points to the affidavit of Clarice Berry, president of the Chicago Principals and Administrators As‐ sociation. Berry’s affidavit stated that “Coates treated older principals, including Plaintiff, in a discriminatory manner by giving schools with older principals less support than schools with younger principals. I know this from discus‐ sions I had with older principals in Area 15. Younger princi‐ 12 No. 14‐3240 pals did not mention to me that they experienced a lack of curriculum support from Coates.” Berry’s testimony is inadmissible hearsay and was properly excluded. Fed. R. Evid. 801(c), 802. Bordelon argues that Berry’s testimony is not hearsay because it falls under the exclusion from hearsay for an opposing party’s state‐ ment. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2). The opposing party in this case is the Board. Berry’s testimony comes from statements made by other principals in Area 15. Bordelon has not alleged that the Board adopted the other principals’ statements or au‐ thorized the principals to speak on its behalf. Presumably, Bordelon is arguing that these constitute statements made by Board employees “on a matter within the scope of that rela‐ tionship,” and so their statements should be admissible against the Board under Rule 801(d)(2)(D). To fall within the exclusion from hearsay, however, the statements made by the other principals must be within the scope of their employment relationship with the Board. “[N]ot everything that relates to one’s job falls within the scope of one’s agency or employment.” Williams v. Pharmacia, Inc., 137 F.3d 944, 950 (7th Cir. 1998). An employee “need not have been personally involved in that action, but her duties must encompass some responsibility related to ‘the deci‐ sionmaking process affecting the employment action.’” Ste‐ phens v. Erickson, 569 F.3d 779, 793 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Simple v. Walgreen Co., 511 F.3d 668, 672 (7th Cir. 2007)). In Williams, we held that the complaints of sex discrimi‐ nation made by five other female employees did not fall within Rule 801(d)(2)(D) because “[n]one of the women were agents of [the defendant] for the purpose of making mana‐ gerial decisions affecting the terms and conditions of their No. 14‐3240 13 own employment.” 137 F.3d at 950. The same is true in this case. The complaints of age bias made by the other princi‐ pals do not fall within the scope of their employment be‐ cause they did not have authority to make managerial deci‐ sions on behalf of the Board regarding their own employ‐ ment. Accordingly, the exclusion from hearsay under Rule 801(d)(2) is inapplicable, and the district court properly ex‐ cluded Berry’s testimony. In conclusion, Bordelon has not constructed “a convinc‐ ing mosaic of circumstantial evidence that [would] allow[] a jury to infer intentional discrimination by the decisionmak‐ er.” Makowski v. SmithAmundsen LLC, 662 F.3d 818, 824 (7th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted). Therefore, the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the Board.