Opinion ID: 2845376
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dr. Wheelis

Text: ¶17. In response to interrogatory requests, Jennifer designated Dr. David Wiggins as an expert and informed the defendants that he was expected to testify: to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that . . . [Dr.] Michael Wheelis . . . breached the applicable standard of care regarding [his] treatment of Plaintiff’s decedent, and that the breach of said standard of care caused or contributed to the death of Plaintiff’s decedent. As to Dr. Wheelis,6 Dr. Wiggins opined four breaches: (1) failure to perform an adequate history; (2) failure to perform an adequate physical exam; (3) failure to order the appropriate tests; and (4) failure to make the proper diagnosis. Dr. Wiggins further opined that a head 6 In the discovery phase, Dr. Wiggins also was designated to offer testimony against Dr. Russ. However, at trial, Jennifer’s replacement expert, Dr. Truly, offered testimony only against Dr. Wheelis. 7 CT, which would have been “indicated in a severely ill child with a history of subarachnoid hemorrhage, . . . might have revealed the presence of a subarachnoid hemorrhage.” Dr. Wiggins opined that, had Dr. Wheelis made the proper diagnosis, Hunter would have been treated earlier, would not have undergone an unnecessary exploratory laparotomy, and would have been admitted to the ICU where he could have been closely monitored. Dr. Wiggins concluded that the “delay in recognizing the patient’s deteriorating status delayed treatment, thus prolonging the pathological conditions and almost certainly worsening the outcome.” ¶18. Approximately six weeks before trial, Jennifer moved to designate an expert out of time, stating that Dr. Wiggins was unavailable to testify at trial. Following a motion hearing, the trial judge ruled that: What the Court is going to do is to allow partially what plaintiff is requesting. But this Court – as I said, it’s always a matter of fairness within the rules. Now, you will be allowed to designate a new expert, but this expert cannot go outside what has already been disclosed by this prior expert. In other words, there’s no new surprises or anything like that. That’s a matter of fairness, and with the aging of this case – in other words, the new expert will not be allowed to give any opinions which are outside of what has already been designated. In other words, I’m giving you an opportunity, because of the time from this prior designation, to get a replacement expert, not a new expert. . . . But it won’t be like we’re starting off with a new expert where you find out what he’s going to say, because the expert will be limited to the opinions and the facts and basis for it that’s already been disclosed. The court memorialized his finding in an order granting Jennifer’s motion to designate an expert out of time, “provided . . . that the opinions of the newly designated expert shall not differ from the opinions disclosed previously for Dr. Wiggins in scope, substance, basis, or in any other material respect. . . .” 8 ¶19. Dr. William Truly, a physician in family and emergency medicine, testified at trial. Dr. Truly was accepted as an expert in emergency-room medicine without objection by defendants. Dr. Truly testified that his testimony was based on a reasonable degree of medical certainty and that, based on his knowledge, education, training, and experience, he was aware of what was required of a minimally competent emergency-room physician. ¶20. Dr. Truly testified that he disagreed with Dr. Wheelis’s impression of gastroenteritis because Hunter had no evidence of diarrhea. Dr. Truly also testified that, with a child who has a history of an intracranial bleed and who presents with vomiting, the standard of care would have been to perform a C.T. scan of the head. Dr. Truly testified that Dr. Wheelis did not perform a C.T. scan of the head and further testified, over objection by the defendants, that Wheelis’s failure was a deviation from the standard of care, and such deviation contributed to Hunter’s death. Dr. Truly further testified that there was a failure to properly diagnose on the part of Dr. Wheelis and his failure to diagnose was a breach of the standard of care. ¶21. Dr. Wheelis’s brief offers a side-by-side comparison of Dr. Wiggins’s designated testimony vis-a-vis what Dr. Truly testified to at trial. The wording used by each doctor is not an exact replication. However, the issue to be determined is whether Dr. Wheelis was prejudiced by Dr. Truly’s C.T. testimony. There can be no doubt that Dr. Wheelis was on notice that Dr. Wiggins would testify as to breach and causation, specifically that the failure to order a timely C.T. scan was a breach of the standard of care, and that a C.T. scan should have been ordered by Dr. Wheelis, given Hunter’s history. 9 ¶22. Dr. Truly’s testimony discussed above was within the parameters of the designation in offering an opinion that Dr. Wheelis’s failure to order a C.T. scan on a child with a history of an intracranial bleed resulted in the initial misdiagnosis. While parts of Dr. Truly’s testimony did not recite verbatim Dr. Wiggins’s designation, the parameters of Dr. Truly’s testimony are markedly similar, ultimately opining, as did Dr. Wiggins, that Dr. Wheelis’s breach of the standard of care contributed to or caused Hunter’s death. Therefore, we find that the trial court erred in granting a JNOV in favor of Dr. Wheelis. ¶23. In his order granting the motions for JNOV, the trial judge specifically stated “that as to the issue of causation, the Plaintiff failed to establish its burden of proof as required by law.” The trial judge made no other finding or explanation. This Court is troubled by the trial court granting JNOV instead of granting a new trial. Trial courts have three options when motions for JNOV are made: (1) deny the motion and try the case to a verdict; (2) grant the motion and enter a judgment for the moving party; or (3) grant a new trial. White v. Stewman, 932 So. 2d 27, 32 (Miss. 2006) (internal citation omitted). “[A] new trial becomes appropriate when a trial court determines that error within the trial mechanism itself has caused a legally incorrect or unjust verdict to be rendered.” White, 932 So. 2d at 33. Courts have granted new trials “whenever convinced, from the evidence, that the jury has been partial or prejudiced, or has not responded to reason upon the evidence produced.” Beard v. Williams, 172 Miss. 880, 884 161 So. 750, 751 (1935). A new trial may be necessary if mistakes were made in conducting the trial or in applying the law. White, 932 So. 2d at 33. 10 ¶24. Because we find that the trial court erred by granting Dr. Wheelis’s motion for JNOV, we reverse the judgment of the trial court in part and remand for a new trial as to Dr. Wheelis. A new trial provides a clean slate. The issues must be retried, and the parties may thus present evidence differently. As such, a new trial requires its own law, and the judge is once again empowered to make judgments concerning Mississippi law as required by the evidence. White, 932 So. 2d at 33-34.