Opinion ID: 2630721
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: extent of the conflict

Text: ś 42 First, a conflict over strategy is not the same thing as a conflict of interest. Restraint of Stenson, 142 Wash.2d at 722, 16 P.3d 1. In Stenson, counsel made the strategic decision, after the jury had convicted his client of murder, to concede his client's guilt while arguing to that same jury that his client deserved mercy. Stenson, however, wished to continue to assert his innocence through the sentencing phase of his capital trial. We held that this was a strategy decision in the hands of counsel and no right of Stensen had been compromised. Id. at 732, 16 P.3d 1. ś 43 Here, similarly, the conflict was only about trial strategy. Counsel clearly believed that given the overwhelming evidence that Cross had killed his family, the best or only defense available was to plead (in the guilt phase) that Cross was not guilty by reason of insanity, or lacked the ability to premeditate, or suffered from diminished capacity. Counsel also clearly believed that the best or only chance to persuade the jury to show mercy was on the basis of Cross's poor mental health. Cross did not want to move forward on this strategy, but, as trial judge noted, Cross frequently changed his mind. CP at 2149. The trial court conducted an extensive in camera hearing during a break from voir dire to determine whether the very real dispute between Cross and his counsel justified intervention. RP (Jan. 31, 2001) at 537-59; cf. Restraint of Stenson, 142 Wash.2d at 730-37, 16 P.3d 1 (during similar hearing during voir dire, judge observed that aside from the conflict over strategy, defendant worked well with counsel). ś 44 While not determinative, the relationship between attorney and client does bear on whether representation has been irrevocably poisoned. Cf. Restraint of Stenson, 142 Wash.2d at 728-29, 16 P.3d 1. Judge DuBuque, who had been involved in the case for 18 months and had ample opportunity to observe the relationship between counsel and Cross develop, noted that every time you have been in court, I have observed a very good, positive attorney/client relationship. RP (Jan. 31, 2001) at 538-39; see also RP (Apr. 18, 2001) at 7-8 (judge noted for the record that there has been . . . nothing but cordial calm conversation between counsel and their client.). Counsel concurred that their relationship with Cross was generally good. RP (Jan. 31, 2001) at 538; RP (Apr. 18, 2001) at 8. Cross acknowledged that he was able to communicate with his counsel, that [t]hey are pretty easy going, and that he could work with them. RP (Jan. 31, 2001) at 540, 547. But he explained that he did not want the expert testimony on his mental health because: I have never cared for the psychiatrists.. . . There is too much stuff pulled over them. I felt there was too much crap to believe the psychiatrists. . . . . I will live with this trial for the rest of my life. And I don't want a lie or communications like this that everyone wants to mount a defense, and it's a bunch of bull shit. From the beginning, all I wanted to do is plead guilty and get it over with. . . . . I think everybody suffers from depression at some time and that's no excuse for crime. Id. at 540-41. [7] ś 45 This is not the type of conflict with counsel that raises Sixth Amendment concerns. Cf. Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 172 n. 5, 122 S.Ct. 1237, 152 L.Ed.2d 291 (2002) (actual conflict of interest could include attorney representation of a witness); Frazer v. United States, 18 F.3d 778, 785 (9th Cir.1994) (conflict existed when attorney verbally assaulted client with racially derogatory term); Brown v. Craven, 424 F.2d 1166, 1169-70 (9th Cir.1970) (perfunctory work can rise to cognizable conflict); accord Restraint of Stenson, 142 Wash.2d at 729, 16 P.3d 1 (fact that attorney and client disagreed over trial strategy not sufficient to find a cognizable conflict even after counsel testified that he can't stand the sight of his client). Instead, this is the type of conflict that courts generally leave to the attorney and client to work out, absent actual ineffective assistance of counsel. Cf. Kaczynski, 239 F.3d at 1118 (refusing to find plea involuntary even if it were motivated by defendant's desire not to have mental health evidence submitted to the jury). ś 46 Cross has not demonstrated a legally cognizable conflict giving rise to error.