Opinion ID: 1191667
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Our Abuse of Discretion Test

Text: We adopt a two-part test to determine objectively whether a district court has abused its discretion in denying a motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court has held that a district court abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law. Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 405, 110 S.Ct. 2447 (A district court would necessarily abuse its discretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law....). Thus, the first step of our abuse of discretion test is to determine de novo whether the trial court identified the correct legal rule to apply to the relief requested. [18] If the trial court failed to do so, we must conclude it abused its discretion. If the trial court identified the correct legal rule, we move to the second step of our abuse of discretion test. This step deals with the tension between the Supreme Court's holding that we may reverse a discretionary trial court factual finding [19] if we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. at 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, and its holding that we may not simply substitute our view for that of the district court, but rather must give the district court's findings deference, see Nat'l Hockey League, 427 U.S. at 642, 96 S.Ct. 2778. Resolving that tension by reference to Anderson, we hold that the second step of our abuse of discretion test is to determine whether the trial court's application of the correct legal standard was (1) illogical, (2) implausible, or (3) without support in inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the record. [20] Anderson, 470 U.S. at 577, 105 S.Ct. 1504. If any of these three apply, only then are we able to have a definite and firm conviction that the district court reached a conclusion that was a mistake or was not among its permissible options, and thus that it abused its discretion by making a clearly erroneous finding of fact. [21] A significantly deferential test that looks to whether the district court reaches a result that is illogical, implausible, or without support in inferences that may be drawn from the record makes particularly good sense in the context of a motion for new trial. See United States v. Heath, 260 F.2d 623, 626 (9th Cir.1958) (To prevent possible prejudice on trial beyond the general atmosphere of impartiality which traditionally pervades the courtroom, trial judges have wide discretion to methods of control. Among these are ... grant of new trial.); Freund v. Nycomed Amersham, 347 F.3d 752, 765 (9th Cir.2003) (The district court is most familiar with the context of the trial, and enjoys broad discretion with regard to a new trial motion.); see also Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 36, 101 S.Ct. 188, 66 L.Ed.2d 193 (1980) (The authority to grant a new trial ... is confided almost entirely to the exercise of discretion on the part of the trial court.). Accordingly, we hold that when we review for abuse of discretion a district court's denial of a motion for a new trial, we first look to whether the trial court identified and applied the correct legal rule to the relief requested. Second, we look to whether the trial court's resolution of the motion resulted from a factual finding that was illogical, implausible, or without support in inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the record. In other words, our abuse of discretion test means that we do not automatically affirm a district court's factual finding if we decide it is permissible, and we do not automatically reverse a district court's factual finding if we decide a mistake has been committed. Rather, in either case, we will affirm a district court's factual finding [22] unless that finding is illogical, implausible, or without support in inferences that may be drawn from the record. [23]