Opinion ID: 1865781
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: assignments of error number three, sixteen, seventeen, eighteen, nineteen, twenty, twenty-one, twenty-two, twenty-three, twenty-four, twenty-five, twenty-six, and twenty-seven

Text: The misinformation and misrepresentations set forth in the prosecution Response to Defendant's Motion for Discovery and in the prosecution Supplementary Response to Defendant's Motion for Discovery. (No. 3) The prosecution failure to furnish the defense with any notice of intent to utilize extraneous offense evidence at trial. (No. 16) The improper and prejudicial prosecution utilization of extraneous offense evidence at trial. (No. 17) The prosecution failure to furnish the defense with any notice of intent to utilize at trial alleged inculpatory statements purportedly made by the accused. (No. 18) The improper and prejudicial prosecution utilization at trial of alleged inculpatory statements purportedly made by the accused which were not legally admissible as evidence. (No. 19) The prosecutor, in asserting facts by way of questions propounded to witnesses in the presence of the jury, made himself a witness without being subject to crossexamination, in violation of the fundamental principle of the hearsay rule and of the constitutional right to confrontation. (No. 20) The prosecutor, through improper displays and by making factual statements in the form of questions propounded to witnesses in the presence of the jury, improperly utilized an inculpatory statement allegedly obtained from the defendant by police in connection with the defendant's 1972 Maryland homicide charge, neither the existence nor the free and voluntary character of which statement was ever established by any evidence whatsoever, either before or after its misuse by the prosecutor, who was wellaware that the defendant's Maryland conviction had been reversed because of the use at trial of that same statement, the character of which the Maryland Court of Criminal Appeals held had not been shown to be free and voluntary. (No. 21) The denial by the trial court of the Defense Motion to Expunge Portion of Sanity Commission Report. (No. 22) The sanity commission appointed by the Court on motion of the prosecutor, in addition to the authorized disclosure of objective psychiatric findings, improperly disclosed to the prosecutor inculpatory statements allegedly made by the defendant, which information was improperly utilized at trial through the use of assertive questions propounded to witnesses by the prosecutor in the presence of the jury. (No. 23) The prosecutor, in order to subvert the insanity defense, asserted in questions propounded in the presence of the trial jurors, facts which he was prohibited from proving, thereby improperly commenting, by way of question, on inadmissible evidence, to wit, inculpatory excerpts from statements made to the sanity commission in 1979, and to Maryland police in 1972. (No. 24) Prosecution display and utilization at trial of inculpatory statements allegedly made by the defendant to the sanity commission appointed by the court on motion of the prosecutor, which statements were neither freely or voluntarily made as they were legally compelled and also because, at the time they were allegedly obtained from the defendant, he was under such extreme conditions of custodial mistreatment and stress that any such statements were the direct result of, and totally attributable to, the exertion of improper influence, fear, intimidation, menace, coercion and duress upon the mind and person of the defendant. (No. 25) The prejudicial failure of the trial court to immediately order the trial jury removed from the courtroom when specifically requested to do so by defense counsel. (No. 26) A prosecution rebuttal expert witness, who was a member of the sanity commission appointed by the court on motion of the prosecution to examine the accused, intentionally answered a defense question on cross-examination in an unresponsive manner for the sole purpose of prejudicing the defendant through disclosure to the jury of legally inadmissible and erroneous information allegedly obtained from the defendant, by the prosecution expert witness during his court-ordered psychiatric examination of defendant, which information had been disclosed to, and discussed with, the prosecutor by the witness prior to his being called to testify for the prosecution on rebuttal. (No. 27) The prosecution represented, in answers to discovery, that it had no statements by the defendant and that it did not intend to introduce in evidence any oral statements made by defendant. It did not do so. However, statements made by Felde to Dr. Marceau and to Maryland authorities were used in cross-examination. Mrs. Maria Krebsbach, Felde's sister, was asked by the state to read from a document the following: We were wrestling over my rifle and I told him to leave my home and he got shot. He would not leave so he got shot. (Tr. 1554) An objection to this line of questioning was sustained. Defense counsel did not ask that the jury be admonished to disregard the testimony and no admonishment was given. The state was told to lay a foundation for introduction of the Maryland confession, S-83, before using it for cross-examination. It was never introduced into evidence. [10] Later, Ms. Krebsback was asked if Felde said, You don't have to worry about him, I blew his head off, he's in my bedroom closet (Tr. 1558). She responded that she did not recall those words. All she remembered was Felde saying, I killed a man, I think. (Tr. 1558) There was no evidence that the prior statement had been made. Mrs. Krebsbach had testified on direct examination about her knowledge of the homicide, and the state was entitled to cross-examine her on the details of the event. [11] Defendant contends that the information given to Dr. Marceau during his sanity examination was privileged and should not have been used in his cross-examination. However, the doctor-patient privilege does not apply to a physician who is court appointed. LSA-R.S. 15:476. Further, the privilege was waived when defendant pleaded insanity. State v. Berry, 324 So.2d 822 (La., 1975); State v. Aucoin, 362 So.2d 503 (La., 1978). Defendant also argues that the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution [12] prevented cross-examination on statements purportedly made by Felde to Dr. Marceau. When a defendant fails to plead not guilty by reason of insanity, the information furnished to the sanity commission cannot be used in his cross-examination. State v. Jones, 359 So.2d 95 (La., 1978). Involuntary, uncounselled disclosures at a pretrial sanity examination cannot be used at trial, without violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981). In Estelle v. Smith, supra , a psychiatrist who examined defendant under court order to determine his competency to stand trial testified at the penalty phase on the basis of that examination that Smith was a severe sociopath and Smith was sentenced to death. The court in Estelle distinguished that situation from one in which there was a sanity examination occasioned by a defendant's plea of not guilty by reason of insanity at the time of his offense. A criminal defendant, who neither initiates a psychiatric evaluation nor attempts to introduce any psychiatric evidence, may not be compelled to respond to a psychiatrist if his statements can be used against him at a capital sentencing proceeding. Estelle v. Smith, supra, 451 U.S. at 468, 101 S.Ct. at 1876, 68 L.Ed.2d at 372. However, Felde placed his sanity at issue. Compare United States v. Madrid, 673 F.2d 1114 (1982). Felde's counsel had no objection to the sanity commission's appointment. [Caddo Proceedings, Tr. 8] Thus, his attorney participated in the significant decision to submit to the examination. Estelle v. Smith, supra, 451 U.S. at 471, 101 S.Ct. at 1877, 68 L.Ed.2d at 374. Wayne Felde said that, to him, the members of the sanity commission amounted to policemen; he did not trust them when he went in to talk to them. He was guarded and polite, but said he was not cooperative. Therefore, any statements made to Dr. Marceau were free and voluntary. The statements were not introduced into evidence; they were used by the prosecution only in questioning Felde. Miranda [13] does not preclude cross-examination on the basis of voluntary, uncoerced, prior statements which are inconsistent. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971). The question of whether Felde was in a disassociated state and unable to remember what happened at the time of the crime was a key issue at trial. Felde was asked, Do you recall telling Dr. Marceau that you vaguely remembered pointing the gun at the police officer and telling him to stop and let you out, and when your instructions were not followed, the officer started wrestling with you for the gun, the car hit a guard rail and the gun went off? (Tr. 2150) Felde said he did not recall the statement and did not admit making other statements to Dr. Marceau. Dr. Marceau was not called in rebuttal. On direct examination, Dr. Marceau was not allowed to testify about the substance of what Felde told him. Since there was never any affirmative evidence that the statements were actually made, any error was relatively harmless. LSA-C. Cr.P. art. 921. [14] Compare Esquivel v. State, 96 Nev. 777, 617 P.2d 587 (1980) where the conviction was reversed because defendant was impeached with statements made to a psychiatrist in a court ordered mental examination. The prosecution claimed in rebuttal argument to the jury that what defendant told Dr. Marceau was the truth: And either the doctor made it up or someone made it up and it does not fit in any way as an incriminating piece of evidence in this case that he pulled the gun and told the policeman to pull over, back in January of 1979, when Dr. Marceau spoke with the Defendant. It doesn't fit in any way at that time as incriminating evidence. In fact, it would have been more incriminating for somebody to tell him he pulled the gun and started executing the policeman. But, see, the truth is, obviously, the Defendant told Dr. Marceau what he recalled at the time, four months after the incident. (Tr. 2344) The prosecutor was to some extent replying to an argument made by defense counsel, as follows: He's got a lot of opportunity to lie in this case, a lot. He had a lot of opportunity to lie in Maryland, and I submit that he didn't. My recollection of what Dr. Marceau said was that he seemed to be perfectly truthful. He didn't know exactly how much he remembered and how much was told to him. And why would he say the car hit a guardrail and went off at that time? That is what the paper said and that is what he was told, no doubt, by the people who were guarding him, or from the police reports. (Tr. 2295) What defendant told Dr. Marceau was not in evidence. Felde did not admit the statements. Therefore, these facts bearing on his credibility were not of record. State v. Sayles, 395 So.2d 695, (La., 1981). Although the prosecution's rebuttal argument was improper, defense counsel did not object. In view of the ample independent evidence that Felde was sane at the time of the offense, it is unlikely this argument carried great weight with the jury. See State v. Moore, 414 So.2d 340 (La., 1982); State v. Hayes, 364 So.2d 923 (La., 1978). Compare State v. Carthan, 377 So.2d 308 (La., 1979). It was only after learning that he was wanted by the police that Felde bought the pistol and shells. It was Thompkins, not Felde, who was shot and Felde reloaded his gun before he was apprehended. Even one of the expert witnesses supporting defendant's insanity defense admitted that it was possible he shot officer Thompkins to avoid going back to jail. These assignments lack merit. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NUMBER FOUR AND FIVE The denial by the trial court of the Defense Motion for Court Order Commanding State Production and Disclosure of Statements and Addresses of Witnesses Favorable to the Defense; (No. 4) and The prosecutorial nondisclosure and suppression of exculpatory evidence of the intoxication of the accused at the time of the offense charged which exculpatory evidence was material to the question of guilt. (No. 5) As to Assignment No. 4, the state denied having any addresses for the witnesses in question more current than those in possession of defense counsel. There is no indication that there were exculpatory statements by these witnesses. Their addresses and statements were subject to discovery only if they were favorable to the defendant and material and relevant to the issue of guilt or punishment. LSA-C.Cr.P. arts. 718, 723. [15] As to Assignment No. 5, these witnesses could allegedly have testified on the question of defendant's intoxication, but there was abundant other evidence that defendant was intoxicated at the time of the crime. The prosecution denied having any information that defendant was intoxicated to the point of not knowing what he was doing, but was willing to stipulate that defendant was intoxicated. Although defense counsel argued that the prosecutor had the addresses he wanted and also exculpatory material regarding intoxication, he did not ask for an in camera examination by the trial court to settle the argument. Absent some showing that the state was suppressing exculpatory material, the trial court did not err in refusing to give defendant's counsel the prosecution's files on these witnesses. These assignments lack merit. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NUMBER SIX, SEVEN, AND EIGHT The denial by the trial court of the Defense Motion for Court Order Commanding Prosecution Production of Photographs Favorable to the Defense. (No. 6) The granting by the trial court of the prosecution Motion to Quash Subpoena Duces Tecum. (No. 7) The prosecutorial nondisclosure and suppression of photographic evidence which was favorable to the accused and material to the issues of credibility and culpability. (No. 8) Defense counsel admits that any error as to Assignment No. Seven was harmless. Defendant contends in assignments six and eight that the state had photographs of Felde which were not given to the defense, specifically shots showing Felde on the ground after being shot. It was not conclusively established that any additional photographs existed, but defense counsel argued that he had seen one in the prosecutor's office which he did not receive. [16] The state offered to let the court conduct an inspection of all the photographic negatives in its records. (Tr. 246) Thus, the defense could have had an in camera examination of the negatives to determine if there were any photographs which had been withheld but did not avail itself of the opportunity. It is argued in connection with these assignments that the police intended to shoot Felde in cold blood. This argument is irrelevant to the real issue, the circumstances under which Felde shot officer Thompkins. Further, the evidence does not support defendant's contention that the police attempted to execute Felde. Mr. Elzie A. Sandifer, who lives adjacent to the scene of Felde's shooting, was a defense witness who said he heard a voice say, throw the gun down, before he heard two shots. (Tr. 1306) Mrs. Eloise Sandifer, heard a yell, [T]hrow the gun down, before the first shot. (Tr. 1328) After the first shot, she heard drop it. (Tr. 1330) According to her testimony, there was a warning before the first shot and an additional warning before the second shot. The uncontradicted evidence is that Felde's hands were handcuffed in front of him when he was shot. The pattern of his injuries does not prove that they must have been behind him. See Footnote 4, supra. These assignments lack merit. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER NINE The continuous utilization by the prosecutor of improper leading questions on direct examination of prosecution lay witnesses. When defense counsel objected to leading questions, his objections were sustained. In other instances, when defense counsel failed to object, he cannot raise the issue on appeal. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 841. Leading questions are not the type of prosecutorial error which diminish the reliability of a jury's verdict. Beck v. Alabama, supra, is inapplicable. Only when there is a clear abuse of discretion which prejudices defendant's rights will a conviction be reversed because of leading questions. State v. Swift, 363 So.2d 499 (La., 1978); State v. Vanderhoff, 415 So.2d 190 (La., 1982). This assignment lacks merit. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER TEN The improper cross-examination of the defendant by the prosecutor in the presence of the jury regarding the fact that the deceased father of the defendant had been convicted of a federal criminal offense. It is contended that asking defendant's sister, Maria Krebsbach, if her father was on probation from a federal offense when he died, together with other questions about her father's drinking problem and violence, implied that Felde was, like his father, a bad man. Defense counsel did not object to this line of questioning. Similar information was brought out by the defense during Felde's direct testimony. This assignment lacks merit. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ELEVEN The improper admission into evidence by the trial court of State Exhibits 56 A and 56 b. It is contended that the trial court should not have allowed a copy of the permanent driver's license of Felde's sister, Florence McDonald, and an enlargement of the photograph on that license into evidence. It is argued that the state's only purpose was to utilize Florence McDonald's personal unattractiveness against her defendant brother. Mr. Mustin of Lorant's testified that Florence McDonald cashed a fifty dollar check when Felde bought his gun, using a driver's license number for identification. Mustin identified the license number as the one on the check and the photograph as a depiction of the woman who cashed it. Both were relevant to the circumstances in which defendant purchased the murder weapon. The evidence was properly admitted. See State v. Gordy, 380 So.2d 1347 (La., 1980); State v. Paster, 373 So.2d 170 (La., 1979). This assignment lacks merit. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER TWELVE The improper exclusion from evidence by the trial court of Defense Exhibit 133. It is argued that a 1975 letter written by Felde's brother-in-law, David Krebsbach, documented the changes produced in Felde from his combat in Vietnam. Thus, it corroborated the insanity defense, showed that Felde's mental condition was not a recent concoction by the defense, and should have been admitted. The letter states: He served in combat over in Vietnam. Upon his return from Vietnam, he was stationed nearby and resided with us. He was a changed person upon returning from Vietnam. He was very quiet and not as fun loving. Had nightmares, talking in his sleep, was nervous and twitchy, and started drinking. He was discharged honorably from the army. The letter was properly excluded as hearsay offered to show the truth of its substance. LSA-R.S. 15:434. The information in the letter was brought out during Krebsbach's testimony. This was the better evidence. Since Krebsbach testified about the letter, his 1975 opinion was given to the jury. There was no error. This assignment lacks merit. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER THIRTEEN The improper exclusion from evidence by the trial court of Defense Exhibit 173. The trial court refused to admit in evidence a questionaire distributed by a group called Citizen Soldier, which was intended to identify Vietnam veterans who had suffered from exposure to Agent Orange (Dioxin). It is argued that inability to question Michael Uhl, the founder of Citizen Soldier, about results of the questionaire prejudiced the defense. The questionaire revealed unauthenticated complaints by other veterans. There was ample testimony that defendant's combat experience and exposure to Agent Orange could have created a post-traumatic stress syndrome. The questionaire results were hearsay and essentially irrelevant to the question of whether defendant was insane at the time of the crime. The exhibit was properly excluded. This assignment of error lacks merit. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER FOURTEEN The trial court improperly restricted the scope of defense inquiry into the issue of insanity and improperly limited the evidence to be utilized by the defense in establishing the insanity of the accused at the time of the offense by the required preponderance of evidence. Defendant contends that the trial court improperly prevented him from questioning Maria Krebsbach about the effects of World War II on her father. The desired testimony was irrelevant. LSA-R.S. 15:275. [17] Defendant also alleges that defense witness Michael Uhl should have been qualified as an expert concerning the effect of Agent Orange on Vietnam veterans. Mr. Uhl had researched complaints from Vietnam veterans, but this did not qualify him as an expert on the effect of Agent Orange. Uhl was not allowed to testify about his own ability to cope with Vietnam combat because the subject was irrelevant. Defense counsel argues that the trial court erred in sustaining an objection to testimony of Linda Vandevanter, an operating room nurse in Vietnam, regarding the type of combat wounds received by Vietnam veterans and her personal feelings about the war. Both were irrelevant. There was extensive expert testimony by Dr. Wilson and Dr. Figley about the effects of the Vietnam war on many of its veterans. This assignment of error lacks merit.