Opinion ID: 442149
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Interpretation of p 15.1

Text: 20 As we recounted above, our prior opinion interpreted p 15.1 as impos[ing] a substantial obligation on the government to provide available funds to the Board. United States v. Board of Education of Chicago, 717 F.2d at 383. Since the United States had misinterpreted p 15.1 as merely requiring that the government assist the Board in filing applications for federal aid, and since it had failed to provide available funds to the Board, we remanded the case to the district court to give the government an opportunity to show that it intended to comply with p 15.1 in the future. 2 On November 10, 1983, the government submitted the Plan of the United States for Supporting the Desegregation Plan of the Board of Education of the City of Chicago (November 10 Plan), in which it outlined its position, later rejected by the district court, that the Weicker Amendment had rendered unavailable to the Board any 1984 funds beyond the $20 million allocated by the Yates Bill. 3 However, in the November 10 Plan, the government also stated for the first time that it was prepared to give the Board priority in the distribution of desegregation funds under existing federal programs. 4 The district court gave little weight to the November 10 Plan. In its 1984 Opinion, the court stated that the plan contained no adequate suggestions at all for remedying the United States' past Consent Decree violations or for providing further funding for the [desegregation] [p]lan. 1984 Conclusion of Law No. 123. 5 21 During the most recent oral arguments before this court, counsel for the government answered questions regarding the government's system of priority and explained that, under this system, the Department of Education will put the Board at the top of the list for any program grants that can be applied to desegregation assistance and for which the Board is eligible. According to the government's counsel, top of the list priority for Title IV funds not only is a guarantee that the Board will receive its equitable fair share of funding under Title IV criteria, but also requires that this funding be earmarked for Chicago and be set apart from the usual block grant funding that is allocated to the regional desegregation centers serving the Midwest. Furthermore, the government's counsel explained that, with regard to the Discretionary Fund, top of the list priority means that if the Board were to submit a research or development project that would aid its desegregation efforts, the Board would have priority to get what the project called for. 6 22 After considering the government's oral explanation of this priority system, especially the government counsel's assurance that this priority is not available to any other school district in the country, we conclude that by guaranteeing that the Board will be funded on a priority basis under existing school desegregation programs, the amount of which funding is determined by program criteria and is subject to the review of the district court, 7 the government would comply with our interpretation of p 15.1 and would fulfill its substantial obligation to provide available funds. 23 By so ruling, we reject the district court's conclusion that p 15.1 mandates that the government attempt to make funds available through legislative activity so as to provide the portion of necessary funding that the Board cannot supply. The district court had reached this conclusion in its 1983 Order and had relied upon it in conducting the March 1984 hearings, which established the level of funding needed to implement the Board's desegregation plan. In its 1984 Opinion, the district court noted that since we had not rejected its 1983 conclusion regarding the government's obligation, 8 that conclusion became the law of the case. 1984 Conclusions of Law Nos. 6-8. However, the district court also observed that it was not barred from reconsidering its 1983 conclusions, and it explained that the refusal to reconsider previously decided principles on remand is a self-imposed (hence non-binding) prudential limitation. 1984 Conclusion of Law No. 1(a). In light of the strong indication in our prior opinion that a government's attempts to remedy its noncompliance with a consent decree are to be preferred over judicially-imposed remedies, the district court would have acted with optimal prudence if it had not inferred that our silence regarding its 1983 conclusions indicated validation, see 1984 Conclusion of Law No. 6, and if it had freshly reassessed, prior to the submission of the November 10 Plan, its interpretation that p 15.1 requires the government to engage in legislative activities to make available the necessary desegregation funding that the Board cannot supply. Such a reassessment was appropriate despite the exhaustive work already undertaken by the district court and the understandable frustration that attended the judicial monitoring of the Decree. 24 After closely examining the extrinsic evidence surrounding the adoption of p 15.1 into the Decree, we must conclude that there is inadequate support for the district court's interpretation. In the parties' stipulation regarding the negotiations leading to the adoption of p 15.1, we find no indication that the parties had any federal funding sources in mind other than programs that could be used, consistent with the intent of Congress, to fund school desegregation efforts. To the extent that the district court reads the June 19, 1980, letter from Assistant Attorney General Drew Days to the Board as indicating that the parties contemplated legislative initiatives on the part of the Executive Branch to make funds available, see 1984 Conclusion of Law No. 139, we find this reading to be clearly erroneous. The applicable wording in this letter tracks the language in p 15.1 and does not amplify or further explain the parties' intent. 25 We thus remand this case for a determination of whether the Board is receiving the maximum level of funding that is available under the criteria of programs through which funds for desegregation can be disbursed. In the likely event that the Board has financial needs that are still unmet, we note that the government has admitted that it has a duty to search among funds that Congress had indeed made ... available. Transcript of April 5, 1984, at 1416. The best proof that the government is fulfilling this duty would be the assignment of personnel to the task of periodically reviewing federal funding programs, in the Department of Education and in other federal agencies, for unencumbered funds that may be used to advance the Board's desegregation plan.