Opinion ID: 772948
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Plaintiff's Excessive Force Claim

Text: 12
13 Plaintiff brings a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 alleging that OfficersKocenda and Jenkins used excessive force when arresting him, taking him to the police station, and transporting him to and from the hospital following his request for medical attention. The Supreme Court has held that excessive force claims are best analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable seizures. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). In determining whether excessive force was used, courts must ask whether the officer's actions, in light of the totality of the circumstances, were objectively reasonable. Id. at 396-97. Because this is a test of objective reasonableness, the underlying motivations of the officer in making the arrest should not be examined. Id. at 397. 14 In determining whether an officer's actions were reasonable, the specific facts of each case are key. Id. at 396. Courts should pay particular attention to the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. Id. While courts must look to the totality of the circumstances in determining whether a seizure was reasonable, they must be sure to view those facts from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.Id. 15 When making an arrest or investigatory stop, the government has the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it. Id. Law enforcement officers are inevitably required to make difficult, split-second decisions regarding the amount of force needed in a particular situation, and [n]ot every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge's chambers, violates the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 396-97 (quotation omitted). 16 In looking to the facts of this case as stated in the complaint, it appears clear that none of the specific factors mentioned by the Supreme Court weigh in favor of a greater use of force. Plaintiff was stopped by police because he made an illegal left-hand turn, and was arrested following a routine traffic check when it was discovered that his license was suspended and that there was an outstanding civil warrant for his failure to pay child support. These crimes are not particularly severe, nor do they indicate that the plaintiff had a tendency toward violence. There is also no evidence that the plaintiff attempted to flee from the officers, or that he resisted arrest in any way. 17 The district court stated in its opinion dismissing plaintiff's excessive force claim that, even for individuals like Kostrzewa who are arrested for non-violent misdemeanors, an officer's decision to apply handcuffs when arresting an individual is objectively reasonable. While this circuit has noted that excessive force claims can be maintained for cuffing an individual's wrists too tightly, see Martin v. Heideman, 106 F.3d 1308, 1312-13 (6th Cir. 1997); Walton v. City of Southfield, 995 F.2d 1331, 1342 (6th Cir. 1993), the district court noted that, in this instance, the officers cuffed the plaintiff on the loosest setting possible. 18 Essentially, the district court held that even if a person's wrists are too large to fit safely in an officer's handcuffs, the officer still acts in an objectively reasonable manner when he decides to fit the handcuffs onto the arrestee's wrists. The district court stated, [p]olice officers are entitled to take reasonable precautions to ensure their safety and the safety of others, which includes the handcuffing of arrestees who will be with them from the arrest untiltheir subsequent incarceration in a jail. J.A. at 84 (D. Ct. Order, Aug. 27, 1999). 19 While the Supreme Court stated in Graham that the right to use, or threaten to use, some degree of physical coercion is encompassed within the government's right to make an arrest, Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, in this case the plaintiff has alleged in his complaint more than the mere application of handcuffs that were tight. In his complaint, Kostrzewa stated that, while in the squad car, he repeatedly complained to the officers that the handcuffs were too tight and were causing him pain. Despite his complaints, the officers allegedly amused themselves by speeding unnecessarily, braking abruptly, and driving recklessly along a winding road, so as to toss Kostrzewa around the back seat of the car and place additional pressure on his wrists. Kostrzewa claims that, as a result of the officers' driving, his head and shoulders were knocked against the plastic partition between the back seat and the officers, making it necessary for him to wedge himself in the footrest portion of the back seat to keep from further injury. J.A. at 9-10 (Compl.). 20 Plaintiff further alleged in his complaint that, when he demanded medical attention after being booked at the police station, the officers, having searched through several pairs of handcuffs to find a larger set, again decided to cuff him to transport him to the hospital, despite the fact that his wrists were swollen. By the time a doctor at Troy-Beaumont Hospital examined Kostrzewa, his wrists were extremely swollen, red and painful. J.A. at 11 (Compl.). Nevertheless, Officer Kocenda agreed to remove only one of the handcuffs so that the doctor could examine the plaintiff. After a brief examination, the doctor recommended that Kostrzewa's wrists be elevated and that ice be applied, so as to reduce swelling. Officer Kocenda put the cuffs back on plaintiff's wrists after the examination. As a result of the cuffing on the day in question, plaintiff alleged severe, debilitating and permanent injuries to both wrists. 3 J.A. at 13 (Compl.). 21 Taking these factual allegations as true, as this court must on review of the dismissal of a complaint, it does not appear beyond doubt that the plaintiff cannot prove that the officers' conduct was unreasonable. Performance Contracting, 163 F.3d at 369. Even if we ignore the officers' refusal to remove the handcuffs, despite plaintiff's original complaints that they were causing him pain, and even if we do not consider the officers' decision to place handcuffs on Kostrzewa when traveling to and from the hospital, despite the fact that his wrists were already red and swollen, if the defendants drove recklessly with the plaintiff handcuffed in the back seat so as to cause him further pain and injury, this, by itself, is enough to state a claim upon which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the officers used excessive force. 22 This circuit's decision in Martin illustrates that, even without the allegations of the officers' reckless driving, there are sufficient facts alleged in the complaint to overcome defendants' motion to dismiss. In Martin, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant officer used excessive force by handcuffing him so tightly that his hands were becoming numb. Martin, 106 F.3d at 1310. Martin complained that the cuffs were hurting him while being driven to the jail as well. Id. Following a twenty minute ride to the jail and a fifteen-minute wait in a holding cell, the officer finally loosenedthe handcuffs. On appeal, we reversed the district court's decision granting the defendant officer a directed verdict on Martin's excessive force claim, stating that a genuine issue of material fact exist[ed] as to whether [the officer] used excessive force under the circumstances[.] Id. at 1313. 23 That the plaintiff's claim in Martin created a genuine issue of material fact for jury determination is telling in this case, where the only question is whether Kostrzewa's complaint, assuming all the facts alleged therein are true, states a claim for which relief can be granted. When the Martin court decided that the plaintiff's excessive force claim, based on an overly-tight application of handcuffs, created a genuine issue of material fact which the jury must decide, it necessarily acknowledged within its holding that plaintiff's claims were legally redressable. Thus, because facts similar to those in theMartin case are alleged here, it follows that we cannot resolve Kostrzewa's excessive force claim at the 12(b)(6) stage. 4 24 Assuming all the facts alleged in Kostrzewa's complaint are true, as we must, there is no question that he has stated a legally sufficient claim for which relief can be granted. 25
26 Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, governmental officials, including police officers, will not be held liable on a plaintiff's claim for civil damages so long as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights which the reasonable officer in the defendants' position would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). This circuit has held that the right to be free from excessive force, including excessively forceful handcuffing, is a clearly established right for purposes of the qualified immunity analysis. Martin, 106 F.3d at 1313; Walton, 995 F.2d at 1342. 27 When making a qualified immunity analysis, it is important to remember that the defendant is, in essence, saying: 'If the plaintiff's version is credited, what I did, judged today, arguendo would be wrongful, but at the time I acted, no reasonable officer would have known he was acting wrongfully.' Kain v. Nesbitt, 156 F.3d 669, 671 (6th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). As this circuit has analyzed the qualified immunity issue in excessive force cases, the question of whether the reasonable officer would have known his conduct violated clearly established constitutional rights can be answered by the initial inquiry of whether the officer's use of force was objectively reasonable. See Martin, 106 F.3d 1312-13; Walton, 995 F.2d at 1342. It is clear from this circuit's analyses in various excessive force decisions that, havingconcluded that the right to be free from excessive force is clearly established, whether we grant qualified immunity in a particular case depends upon whether the officer did, in fact, use excessive force (i.e., force that was not objectively reasonable). Martin, 106 F.3d 1312-13; Walton, 995 F.2d at 1342; Kain, 156 F.3d at 672-73. To put it another way, if there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether an officer's use of force was objectively reasonable, then there naturally is a genuine issue of fact with respect to whether a reasonable officer would have known such conduct was wrongful. 28 Kostrzewa has alleged facts indicating that Officers Kocenda and Jenkins may have acted unreasonably in their use of force against him. Thus, this court cannot grant defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion on the basis of qualified immunity because it is not clear that a reasonable officer in the defendants' situation would not have known that engaging in the conduct alleged by plaintiff was violative of plaintiff's clearly established right to be free from excessive force. Accordingly, the district court's decision dismissing plaintiff's excessive force claim against Officers Kocenda and Jenkins is REVERSED. 5