Opinion ID: 181375
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Considerations Prompting Congress's Adoption of the Significant Purpose Amendment

Text: In considering Congress's decision to allow FISA standards to be triggered by a showing of a significant rather than primary purpose of obtaining foreign intelligence information, we may properly consider the practical considerations informing that choice. See Keith, 407 U.S. at 322, 92 S.Ct. 2125 (observing that different standards may be compatible with the Fourth Amendment in light of the different policy and practical considerations at issue); see also United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d at 72. The relevant background is discussed in detail in In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 722-29. We summarize it here only as necessary to highlight two considerations that emerged from years of Justice Department experience trying to satisfy the primary purpose requirement and that informed Congress's amendment of FISA's purpose certification provision: (1) if intelligence and law enforcement officials coordinate efforts in pursuing national security inquiries, it can be difficult, if not impossible, to identify whether their primary purpose is to obtain foreign intelligence information or evidence of a crime; and (2) the segregation of intelligence and law enforcement officials to ensure the executive's ability to certify a primary foreign-intelligence-gathering purpose can compromise national security. FISA's original purpose certification requirement was not uniformly construed by the courts. Although we thought it clear that the statute's original reference to the purpose to obtain foreign intelligence information referenced the primary purpose, United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d at 77, the First Circuit construed the requirement in the negative, holding that the investigation of criminal activity cannot be the primary purpose of a surveillance order under FISA, United States v. Johnson, 952 F.2d at 572. Meanwhile, the Ninth Circuit hesitated to define FISA's purpose requirement to draw too fine a distinction between criminal and intelligence investigations, noting that `[i]nternational terrorism,' by definition, requires the investigation of activities that constitute crimes. United States v. Sarkissian, 841 F.2d 959, 965 (9th Cir.1988). The FISA Review Court echoed this concern in In re Sealed Case, questioning the soundness of any purpose certification standard that assumed that the government seeks foreign intelligence information (counterintelligence) for its own saketo expand its pool of knowledge. 310 F.3d at 727. It concluded that FISA as passed by Congress in 1978 clearly did not preclude or limit the government's use or proposed use of foreign intelligence information, which included evidence of certain kinds of criminal activity, in a criminal prosecution. Id. In United States v. Duggan , we had emphasize[d] this same point, even though we construed the purpose requirement of FISA to mean primary purpose: [O]therwise valid FISA surveillance is not tainted simply because the government can anticipate that the fruits of such surveillance may later be used, as allowed by § 1806(b), as evidence in a criminal trial. Congress recognized that in many cases the concerns of the government with respect to foreign intelligence will overlap those with respect to law enforcement. 743 F.2d at 78. We concluded that where information sought through FISA surveillance involved international terrorism[,]. . . the fact that domestic law enforcement concerns may also have been implicated did not eliminate the government's ability to obtain a valid FISA order. Id. In the years after our decision in Duggan, this important point became muddled, if not lost. In 1995, the Justice Department not only committed itself to satisfying the primary purpose test but, [a]pparently to avoid running afoul of that test, it adopted procedures limiting contacts between intelligence and law enforcement officials. See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 727-28 (noting that procedures eventually came to be narrowly interpreted within the Department of Justice so as to erect a wall to prevent the FBI intelligence officials from communicating with the Criminal Division regarding ongoing [intelligence] investigations); see also The Nat'l Comm'n on Terrorist Attacks Upon the U.S., The 9/11 Commission Report 78-80 (2004) (discussing constraints imposed by primary purpose requirement on sharing of intelligence information between prosecutors and intelligence agents). Moreover, as the FISA Court became aware of these Justice Department procedures for segregating intelligence and criminal investigative officials, it adopted elements of them into certain of its orders. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 728. [26] The net result was to shift the focus of FISA surveillance applications from the purpose of the surveillance to the nature of the underlying investigation. Id. As the FISA Review Court observed, these practices imposed a cost on national security. See id. at 744 & n. 29 (citing congressional hearings indicating that practices implemented to segregate intelligence from law enforcement officials to avoid running afoul of primary purpose test may well have contributed, whether correctly understood or not, to the FBI missing opportunities to anticipate the September 11, 2001 attacks). In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the executive asked Congress to substitute a purpose for the purpose requirement of FISA so as to allow it to dismantle the wall between intelligence and law enforcement personnel erected to ensure that the primary purpose of any FISA surveillance or search was to obtain foreign intelligence information and not evidence of crime. Id. at 732. Congress did not accept the executive's proposed language, but it did agree that certification of a primary purpose to obtain foreign intelligence information should not be required to secure a FISA warrant. Although no committee reports accompanied the PATRIOT Act, Senator Feinstein, one of the act's strong supporters, provided a cogent floor statement as to the reasons for recasting FISA's purpose certification requirement: Under current law, authorities can proceed with surveillance under FISA only if the primary purpose of the investigation is to collect foreign intelligence. But in today's world things are not so simple. In many cases, surveillance will have two key goalsthe gathering of foreign intelligence, and the gathering of evidence for a criminal prosecution. Determining which purpose is the primary purpose of the investigation can be difficult, and will only become more so as we coordinate our intelligence and law enforcement efforts in the war against terror. Rather than forcing law enforcement to decide which purpose is primarylaw enforcement or foreign intelligence gathering, this bill strikes a new balance. It will now require that a significant purpose of the investigation must be foreign intelligence gathering to proceed with surveillance under FISA. The effect of this provision will be to make it easier for law enforcement to obtain a FISA search or surveillance warrant for those cases where the subject of the surveillance is both a potential source of valuable intelligence and the potential target of a criminal investigation. Many of the individuals involved in supporting the September 11 attacks may well fall into both of these categories. 147 Cong. Rec. S10591 (Oct 11, 2001) (quoted in In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 732-33). To address these practical considerations i.e., the difficulty in identifying the primary purpose when surveillance is pursued jointly by intelligence and law enforcement officials, and the importance of such joint efforts to protect national securityCongress in the PATRIOT Act amended FISA to provide that, upon satisfaction of all other statutory requirements, FISA warrants could be issued on certification that a significant purpose of the surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence information. See Pub.L. No. 107-56, § 218, 115 Stat. at 291 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(6)(B)). In a separate amendment, Congress expressly authorized federal officers conducting surveillance with the aim of obtaining foreign intelligence information to coordinate their activities with law enforcement officers. See id. § 504, 115 Stat. at 364 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1806(k)(1)) (Federal officers who conduct electronic surveillance to acquire foreign intelligence information under this title may consult with Federal law enforcement officers or law enforcement personnel of a State or political subdivision of a State . . . to coordinate efforts to investigate or protect against [, inter alia, actual or potential attack by a foreign power or agent of a foreign power, sabotage, international terrorism, or other clandestine intelligence activities by a foreign power or agent of a foreign power].). In so doing, Congress made clear that such coordination would preclude neither a finding that FISA's significant purpose certification requirement was met, nor the entry of an order of approval under § 1805. See 50 U.S.C. § 1806(k)(2). [27]