Opinion ID: 1637617
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ring Entitles a Capital Defendant to a Jury Determination of the Facts on Which Eligibility for a Death Sentence is Predicated.

Text: In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), decided three years after this Court affirmed Mr. Whitfield's conviction and sentence, the United States Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment does not permit a defendant to be expose[d]... to a penalty exceeding the maximum he would receive if punished according to the facts reflected in the jury verdict alone. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 483, 120 S.Ct. 2348. Numerous courts and commentators thereafter suggested that the principles underlying Apprendi were inconsistent with the principles underlying the Supreme Court's decision in Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990), that a judge could determine the aggravating facts necessary to impose the death penalty once a jury convicted defendant of first-degree murder. They were correct. Two years later, the Supreme Court applied the principles underlying Apprendi to the capital sentencing setting. The Court reasoned that, [c]apital defendants, no less than non-capital defendants, ... are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment. Ring, 536 U.S. at 589, 122 S.Ct. 2428. [4] Further, it found that Arizona's practice of labeling aggravating circumstances as sentencing factors rather than as elements of the offense of capital murder was a matter of form over substance and that, under Arizona's statutory scheme, Arizona's enumerated aggravating factors operate as `the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense.' Id. at 609, 122 S.Ct. 2428, quoting, Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494, n. 19, 120 S.Ct. 2348. Applying these principles, the Supreme Court invalidated Arizona's capital sentencing scheme because it permitted a judge, rather than a jury, to determine the presence of aggravating factors required by Arizona law for imposition of the death penalty following a jury adjudication of a defendant's guilt of first-degree murder. In so holding, it extended to the capital sentencing setting Apprendi 's holding that the Sixth Amendment does not permit a defendant to be `expose[d] ... to a penalty exceeding the maximum he would receive if punished according to the facts reflected in the jury verdict alone.' Id. at 588-89, 120 S.Ct. 2348, quoting, Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 483, 120 S.Ct. 2348. The Supreme Court held that not just a statutory aggravator, but every fact that the legislature requires be found before death may be imposed must be found by the jury. And, in determining which factors fall within this rule, Ring cautioned that, the dispositive question ... `is one not of form, but of effect.' Id. at 602, 122 S.Ct. 2428, quoting, Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494, 120 S.Ct. 2348. If a State makes an increase in a defendant's authorized punishment contingent on the finding of a fact, that factno matter how the State labels it must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 602, 122 S.Ct. 2428. Because Mr. Ring did not argue that Arizona's sentencing scheme required the jury to make a factual finding as to mitigating factors, the Supreme Court declined to specifically address whether a jury was also required to determine whether mitigating factors were present that called for leniency. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 597, n. 4, 122 S.Ct. 2428. Instead, it set out the general principle that courts must use in applying Ring to determine whether a particular issue must be determined by the jury or can be determined by a judge, stating, [c]apital defendants ... are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment. Id. at 589, 122 S.Ct. 2428. On remand, applying these principles, the Supreme Court of Arizona rejected the contention that the requirements that mitigating circumstances be considered and weighed against aggravators were not factual predicates for imposition of the death penalty. See State v. Ring, 204 Ariz. 534, 65 P.3d 915, 942-43 (2003) ( Ring II ). It held, therefore, that, even if the presence of a statutory aggravator was conceded or not contested, resentencing would be required unless the court found that the failure of the jury to make these factual findings was harmless on the particular facts of the case. Id.