Opinion ID: 1163237
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Affirming the ICA's Result on Different Grounds

Text: Based on our review, we agree with the result reached by the ICA; however, we specifically disapprove Kahoonei I to the extent that it misconstrues the correct test to be employed when determining whether a private individual who conducts a search and seizure of evidence is a government agent. To that extent, we agree with the rationale of the concurring opinion that the motivation of a private individual is not relevant when determining whether such individual is a government agent. [5]
In State v. Meyer, 78 Hawai`i 308, 893 P.2d 159 (1995), we stated that [b]oth the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution [6] and article I, section 7 of the Hawai`i Constitution [7] ensure that an individual's legitimate expectations of privacy will not be subjected to unreasonable governmental intrusions.... The basic purpose of these constitutional provisions is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by government officials. Id. at 311-12, 893 P.2d at 162-63 (citations, internal quotation marks, internal brackets, and some ellipses omitted) (emphases added). As illustrated by the aforementioned language, the purpose of the fourth amendment and article I, section 7 is to protect individuals against intrusions by the government. See also Furuyama, 64 Haw. at 120, 637 P.2d at 1102 (The Fourth Amendment['s] protection applies to governmental action. (Citation omitted.)). Thus, if Mrs. Kahoonei was acting as a private individual, any evidence she obtained may be properly admitted. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2048-49, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) (holding that, if private persons act wholly on their own initiative, evidence turned over to police is admissible), reh'g denied, 404 U.S. 874, 92 S.Ct. 26, 30 L.Ed.2d 120 (1971); People v. Horman, 22 N.Y.2d 378, 292 N.Y.S.2d 874, 239 N.E.2d 625, 628 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1057, 89 S.Ct. 698, 21 L.Ed.2d 699 (1969) ([S]ince the evidence in this case was seized without the participation or knowledge of any governmental official, it is admissible in a criminal prosecution.). However, if Mrs. Kahoonei was acting as an agent of the government, the proscriptions of the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Hawai`i Constitution would apply. See Furuyama, 64 Haw. at 120, 637 P.2d at 1102; see also Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 614, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 1411-12, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989) ([The Fourth] Amendment protects against [searches and seizures] if [a] private party acted as an instrument or agent of the Government.). In deciding Mrs. Kahoonei's role, the ICA, as previously stated, relied on Boynton and enumerated four factors that it believed required examination in determining whether a symbiotic relationship existed between the police and Mrs. Kahoonei. The Boynton court, however, specifically stated that, [i]n defining a private search, the Supreme Court has stated that the fourth amendment applies only if the private party, in light of all circumstances of the case, must be regarded as having acted as an instrument or agent of the state. Application of this definition will frequently require a careful factual analysis. Boynton, 58 Haw. at 536, 574 P.2d at 1334 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). By limiting its analysis to the four Boynton factors and relying heavily on the motivation of the private individual, the ICA misinterpreted the correct test to be applied in determining whether Mrs. Kahoonei acted as a private individual or as a government agent. We recognize that, when determining whether a private individual is a government agent under article I, section 7 or the fourth amendment, there is no bright-line rule of application. Instead, we must examine the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the governmental involvement is significant or extensive enough to objectively render an otherwise private individual a mere arm, tool, or instrumentality of the state. In so doing, we focus on the actions of the government, because, as discussed infra, the subjective motivation of a private individual is irrelevant. Our decision in Boynton remains good law to the extent that it enumerates some of the relevant factors that may be considered in a totality of the circumstances inquiry. However, because Kahoonei I may potentially mislead other courts and because we recognize that in retrospect our pronouncements are sometimes more enigmatic than we would wish, State v. Schroeder, 76 Hawai`i 517, 524, 880 P.2d 192, 199 (1994), we now explicitly hold that the correct test for determining whether a private individual is a government agent is the totality of the circumstances test. Requiring a private individual's search and seizure of evidentiary items to be subject to a totality of the circumstances inquiry calls for an examination of all relevant government actions. State courts in other jurisdictions have also determined that an examination of all attendant circumstances is the most accurate method of determining whether a private individual acted as a government agent. For example, in State v. Knudsen, 500 N.W.2d 84 (Iowa.Ct.App.1993), the Iowa Court of Appeals observed that the Iowa Supreme Court [has] set out some guidelines for determining whether a private citizen should be considered an agent of the state: Whether a private citizen has become an agent or instrument of the state depends on the total circumstances surrounding the challenged conduct. Id. at 86 (emphasis added). In Knudsen, there was testimony that, inter alia, the police officer was unaware of the private citizens' conduct at issue, did not anticipate their actions, and was completely removed from the area. The court held that, [c]onsidering the totality of the circumstances, the trial court did not err in finding [that the private citizens] had not acted as an instrument. . . of the state[.] Id. (emphasis added). See also People v. Aguilar, 897 P.2d 84, 85 (Colo.1995) (The resolution of whether an individual becomes such an `agent' of the police is determined by the totality of the circumstances. (Citations omitted.)); Burk v. State, 848 P.2d 225, 234 (Wyo.1993) (holding that a private individual's actions were voluntary in light of all of the circumstances); State v. Sanders, 327 N.C. 319, 395 S.E.2d 412, 422 (1990) ([W]e conclude that determining whether a private citizen's search or seizure is attributable to the State and therefore subject to constitutional scrutiny demands a totality of the circumstances inquiry.).
As previously stated, we agree with the concurring opinion that Mrs. Kahoonei's motivation for retrieving the evidence at issue is irrelevant to an analysis of whether she was acting as a government agent at the time she seized the handgun and ammunition from Kahoonei's bedroom. As aptly stated by Judge Acoba, such an examination is at best a speculative venture which may leave the mistaken impression that under these or similar facts a private person's implied motivation may somehow vitiate the precipitating conduct of the police. Kahoonei I, concurring op. at 223, 925 P.2d at 393. In our view, a private individual's subjective motivation would not address the fundamental concern of either the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution or article I, section 7 of the Hawai`i Constitution, that is, to curb unconstitutional activity by government agents. These constitutional provisions are not concerned with the subjective motivation of private individuals such as Mrs. Kahoonei. In other words, the focus of the inquiry is necessarily on the actions of the police officers; Mrs. Kahoonei's subjective reasons for participating in the search and seizure is irrelevant. A private individual may be a government agent, even if he or she is acting for personal reasons. Likewise, private individuals may be acting on their own, even if they erroneously believe they are acting as an agent of the police. For example, even if Mrs. Kahoonei's motivation in retrieving the gun was out of concern that the firearm might injure a member of her household, under the totality of the circumstances in this case, such concern would not excuse the action of the police if their conduct was significant or extensive enough to objectively render Mrs. Kahoonei a mere arm, tool, or instrumentality of the state. We note that the federal courts continue to consider the motivation of the private person when determining if an individual is a government agent. [8] However, [a]s the ultimate judicial tribunal in the state, this court possesses the final and unreviewable authority to interpret and enforce the Hawai`i Constitution. State v. Lopez, 78 Hawai`i 433, 445, 896 P.2d 889, 901 (1995) (citations omitted). In Lopez, we observed that, [i]n the area of searches and seizures under article I, section 7, we have often exercised this freedom. Id. Unlike the exclusionary rule on the federal level, Hawai`i's exclusionary rule serves not only to deter illegal police conduct, but to protect the privacy rights of our citizens. Id. Eliminating consideration of the subjective motivation of a private individual will serve to guard the privacy rights of Hawai`i's citizens against illegal government conduct  regardless of what a potential agent believes his or her role may be in conducting a search and seizure of evidentiary items. We therefore hold that, when determining whether, under the totality of the circumstances, governmental involvement in a particular instance is significant or extensive enough to render an otherwise private individual a mere arm, tool, or instrumentality of the state, the subjective motivation of the private actor is not a relevant concern under article I, section 7 of the Hawai`i Constitution.
Under the totality of the circumstances of this case, we hold that Mrs. Kahoonei was acting as a government agent when she retrieved the handgun and ammunition from Kahoonei's bedroom. It is clear, under the facts of this case, that the idea of retrieving the evidentiary items did not originate with Mrs. Kahoonei. It is undisputed that Sergeant Lenchanko told Mrs. Kahoonei and Tamanaha that a search warrant could be gotten to search the house and that a search would be done anyway. We agree with Judge Acoba that [i]t is obvious the purpose of the police statements was to convince the two women to retrieve the gun for the police without the aid of a warrant, thus absolving the police of any possible illegality in the recovery of the gun. Kahoonei I, concurring op. at ___, 925 P.2d at 393. Most importantly, when officer Akina accompanied Mrs. Kahoonei to Kahoonei's bedroom and stood in the doorway watching her retrieve the handgun and ammunition, officer Akina knew that Mrs. Kahoonei was engaging in an activity that a police officer could not effect without a search warrant. See Alston v. United States, 518 A.2d 439, 442 (D.C.App.1986) (A private individual may become an agent or instrumentality of the state ... if the government is involved in the development of a plan which is later carried out by private persons, or stands by while a private citizen seizes the desired evidence.  (Citations, internal quotation marks, and internal brackets omitted.) (Emphasis added.)); People v. North, 29 Cal.3d 509, 174 Cal.Rptr. 511, 514, 629 P.2d 19, 22 (1981) ([T]he police need not have requested or directed the search in order to be guilty of standing idly by; knowledge of the illegal search coupled with a failure to protect [a defendant's] rights against such a search suffices. (Citation and internal quotation marks omitted.) (Emphasis in original.)). In this case, the police were standing by while a private individual engaged in a search that the police would otherwise need a warrant to effectuate. In our view, under the totality of the circumstances, the governmental involvement was significant and extensive enough to render Mrs. Kahoonei an instrumentality of the state. Thus, regardless of her subjective motivation, Mrs. Kahoonei was acting as an agent of the police. See People in Interest of P.E.A., 754 P.2d 382, 385 (Colo.1988) (The agency rule prevents police from circumventing the fourth amendment by having a private individual conduct a search or make a seizure that would be unlawful if performed by the police themselves. (Citation omitted.)). Under the circumstances of this case, we believe it was incumbent upon the police to obtain a search warrant rather than utilize a private citizen. See Moody v. United States, 163 A.2d 337, 340 (D.C.Mun.App.1960) (The officer certainly recognized the evidentiary value of the goods themselves. He could not therefore escape the necessity of obtaining a search warrant[.]). To hold otherwise would needlessly erode one of the fundamental objectives of the fourth amendment and article I, section 7 of the Hawai`i Constitution, that is, to deter government agents from bypassing the warrant requirement.