Opinion ID: 2222186
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: past age of majority

Text: Michael's first assignment of error raises two issues: (1) whether a district court has the authority to enforce the terms of an approved settlement which includes an agreement to support an adult child and (2) whether the settlement agreement or decree does in fact obligate Michael to support an adult child. Michael cites Meyers v. Meyers, 222 Neb. 370, 383 N.W.2d 784 (1986), for the proposition that a court cannot order continuing support for an adult child as part of the divorce decree. Indeed, the law does not force a parent to support his adult child. In Zetterman v. Zetterman, 245 Neb. 255, 512 N.W.2d 622 (1994), however, we held that although Neb.Rev.Stat. § 42-364 (Reissue 1988) does not permit a district court in a dissolution action to order child support beyond the age of majority, the district court has the authority to enforce the terms of an approved settlement which may include an agreement to support a child beyond the age of majority. See, Foster v. Foster, 266 Neb. 32, 662 N.W.2d 191 (2003); Groseth v. Groseth, 257 Neb. 525, 600 N.W.2d 159 (1999). This is precisely what the district court did enforce an existing agreement in context of a dissolution action. Therefore, to the extent that the settlement agreement obligates Michael to legal responsibility for his adult children, the district court has the authority to order Michael to comply with those provisions, even after the children reach the age of majority. Whether this settlement agreement does in fact require Michael to contribute to his children's education after they reach the age of majority is the question we now address. The district court interpreted paragraph B4 of the agreement to include such an obligation. It appears that the court did not find this aspect of the agreement to be ambiguous, but, rather, read the contract language to plainly include postminority schooling. We review this determination independently as a matter of law. See Spanish Oaks, supra . A contract is ambiguous when a word, phrase, or provision in the contract has, or is susceptible of, at least two reasonable but conflicting interpretations or meanings. Guerrier v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 266 Neb. 150, 663 N.W.2d 131 (2003). In our independent review, we ask whether paragraph B4 of the agreement is susceptible of a reasonable interpretation that the obligation to cover expenses of each child's education after high school, including college or vocational training, ends at the child's 19th birthday. We conclude that this phrase is not susceptible of such an interpretation. When a contract is unambiguous, the intentions of the parties must be determined from the contract itself. Spanish Oaks, supra . The plain and ordinary meaning of the terms as an ordinary or reasonable person would understand them contemplates a college education, which in virtually all cases runs past the student's age of majority. This assignment of error is without merit.