Opinion ID: 1920961
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Injunctive Relief and Exceptions

Text: There were no penal provisions in the open meeting law at the time this case was decided in the lower court. However, Minn.St. 645.241 makes it a misdemeanor to perform any act prohibited by statute where no penalty for that violation is imposed in any statute. The defendant contended in the court below that plaintiffs failed to pursue the remedy afforded by § 645.241 and were therefore not entitled to any equitable relief. [4] The open meeting law did not authorize the courts to issue injunctions or writs of mandamus as some states do. See, e. g., Iowa Code Ann. § 28A.7 (1967). No question was directly raised on this appeal as to the adequacy of the remedy provided by Minn.St. 645.241. The trial court did point out that it might have dismissed this action in its discretion on the grounds propounded by the defendant but did not because using its equitable powers to resolve the dispute was in the public interest. The court's rationale is contained in its memorandum: The problem here is not a weighing of interests between the School Board and the news media as to the extent of disclosure to the public of the business of the School Board, but rather it is an attempt to determine fairly where the public interest lies between these conflicting positions. The news media wants full and complete access to all meetings of the Board, while the School Board feels that in certain areas, it is in the public interest that certain deliberations and information be kept confidential. In view thereof, it may be presumed that absent a selfish or profit motive on the part of the news media, that both parties are in agreement as to their desires to serve the public interest. The Court could well have, in its discretion, dismissed this lawsuit on the grounds propounded by defendant, but cognizant of the fact that this action is of an equitable nature and that it is in the public interest that the dispute be resolved as far as possible, the Court has attempted to look at the real issues involved and arrive at some equitable and fair guide lines that hopefully will direct the parties intelligently and practically in the future. It is obvious that the Duluth School Board perform an unselfish and time-consuming service to the citizens of Duluth. They act without pay and devote hours each month to time-consuming Board of Education business. It can, therefore, be presumed that they have and will continue to act in good faith and in a manner that they sincerely believe is in the public interest. Therefore, the actions which this Court seeks to enjoin of the School Board are not to infer a denunciation or an accusation of bad faith on the part of the School Board but rather instruction to them of the course to pursue in order that the law and the public interest may be fulfilled. The Court necessarily must recognize that the statute involved is specific to some degree as to its intent and purpose but is general as to the means of enforcing or carrying out its provisions. Consequently, it must be enforced practically and realistically to best serve the public interest. Similarly, although the law did not require any notice of meetings called by the Board, the court again used its equity power by requiring that the Board give notice to the local news media of any meeting open to the public. The trial court appropriately commented in its memorandum on this item: M.S. 471.705 is silent as to any requirement of notice to the public or news media. The Court, however, agrees with the language of the Minnesota Attorney General addressed to the Faribault City Attorney, dated January 11, 1972, to the effect that an open meeting called in secrecy or suddenly without notice is in effect a closed meeting, and without such notice, the letter but not the spirit of the law would be observed. The trial court, having decided to use an equitable remedy not directed nor even authorized by the open meeting law, could also decide that it was within its discretion to determine the extent of the injunctive relief to be granted, provided such limitation was not contrary to the plain policy and purpose of that law. The open meeting law did not provide that certain meetings could be closed if it was in the public interest to do so. The court nonetheless looked to the public interest as an equitable and fair guideline in fashioning the relief granted, explaining: In conclusion, a few words concerning the bases of the Court's Order to restrict some of the Board's meetings from the public may be helpful. Committee meetings of less than a quorum, hearings on discharge of tenure teachers, and consideration of communications confidential by law are self-evident and require no explanation as to their being closed meetings. Inasmuch as the Board of Education in certain respects are adversaries to other interests in some of their considerations, it must be obvious that the Board should have the advantage afforded their adversaries in the matter of confidential discussion with their attorneys over litigation, conversations and discussions with the negotiators in labor disputes. Plaintiffs complain that the trial court after enjoining secret meetings engrafted exceptions upon the open meeting law to protect what it considered the public interest. The open meeting law was devoid of any authorization or directions for injunctive relief, and the court engrafted an equitable remedy thereon, to which it in turn engrafted exceptions based on what it considered to be equitable principles. The court also engrafted a requirement that notice of certain meetings be given to the local news media. We think engraftments per se are not inappropriate in this case, but also recognize that where the courts attempt to aid in enforcing legislative enactments, they should do so without changing the policy and purposes expressed by the legislature. Thus, the trial court should not have used the public interest as a factor in determining what acts should be enjoined since that determination should be a policy decision for the legislature. The wisdom of the open meeting law may be debated in the public arena but our role is to enforce the statute according to its terms. If it doesn't work in the public interest, the legislature is the branch of government that should change it. Whether or not injunctive relief should have been granted at all in this case may be open to some question. We assume that the open meeting law was intended to be something more than a mere statement of policy and that at a minimum the legislative branch would intend that the salient and clear-cut features of the law be enforced. At least one case from another state court suggests that closed meetings in violation of an open meeting law can be enjoined without an enabling provision in the statute. State ex rel. Adams v. Rockwell, 167 Ohio St. 15, 145 N.E.2d 665 (1957). We hold that injunctive relief is an appropriate remedy in this case but have misgivings about the extent of the relief and some of the exceptions. Plaintiffs in effect assert that the trial court should have issued its broad order enjoining the defendants from violating the open meeting law without adding the exceptions it did. [5] They further object to some of the exceptions on the ground that they concern issues which were not appropriately raised and litigated. Defendants counter with the argument that if injunctive relief is to be granted, its agents, officers, and board members are entitled to be specifically advised by the court's order with certainty, definiteness, and clarity what conduct is prohibited. Defendants also point out that plaintiffs asked the court to issue a broad order enjoining defendants from violating the open meeting law while presenting evidence only on specific violations but not requesting that only these practices be ceased. We generally concur with the trial court's decision to enjoin the board from holding secret or closed meetings but are troubled by the exceptions and will discuss them separately.