Opinion ID: 776854
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Legality of the Protective Order

Text: 20 The State argues that the district court's denial of the motion to reconsider conflicts with Ninth Circuit authority. We disagree. In declining to reconsider the magistrate's protective order, the district court properly applied the law of this circuit as set forth in our en banc decision in McDowell II. 21 The protective order in McDowell I and II was virtually identical to the protective order in this case. The order stat[ed] that the Attorney General could use any documents produced from the trial counsel's file only for purposes of the pending habeas litigation. McDowell II, 197 F.3d at 1254. By the terms of the order, this restriction was to continue in effect after the conclusion of the habeas proceedings and would apply `in the event of a retrial of all or any portion of [the petitioner's] criminal case.' Id. After the district court granted the writ of habeas corpus and reaffirmed that the order was to remain in effect, the State filed a motion for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), arguing that the order was improper. On appeal from the denial of that motion, a three-judge panel of this court agreed with the State that the protective order misapprehended the law regarding the scope of the attorney-client privilege and was thus an unintentional abuse of discretion. McDowell I, 173 F.3d at 1191. In the panel's view, the district court's order constituted an unwarranted anticipatory interference with the prerogatives of the state courts because it effectively enjoins California courts from adjudicating a state law issue concerning [the petitioner's] waiver of the attorney-client privilege and attempts to retain continuing supervisory jurisdiction over the conduct of the retrial in state court. Id. at 1191. Such an order, the panel wrote, contravenes basic principles of comity and federalism. Id. 22 On rehearing en banc, we disagreed, holding that the district court did not commit clear error when it limited access to the file pursuant to the terms of the protective order. McDowell II, 197 F.3d at 1256. In support of our holding, we emphasized that district courts have very broad discretion in fashioning discovery orders under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c), and the protective order did not fall clearly outside the bounds of that authority. Id. Therefore, we held that the district court did not commit clear error in denying the motion to reconsider the protective order. 23 Applying McDowell II, we hold in this case that the district court did not commit clear error in denying the motion to reconsider the protective order. While a petitioner in a habeas corpus action who raises a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of counsel waives the attorney-client privilege as to the matters challenged, see Wharton, 127 F.3d at 1203, McDowell II makes clear that it is within the discretion of the district court to issue an order limiting that waiver to the habeas proceeding in which the ineffective assistance question is raised. 24 The State argues that the protective order may unduly limit its ability to use the attorney-client-privileged materials in the event of a retrial in state court, and that the state rather than the federal court should determine the scope of the waiver on retrial. It is true that the order is designed to ensure that the prosecution on retrial will not use the discovery permitted in the habeas proceeding to circumvent the more limited discovery available in criminal prosecutions. See McSurely v. McClellan, 426 F.2d 664, 671-672 (D.C.Cir. 1970) ([C]ivil discovery may not be used to subvert limitations on discovery in criminal cases, either by the government or by private parties.); Campbell v. Eastland, 307 F.2d 478, 487 (5th Cir.1962) (A litigant should not be allowed to make use of the liberal discovery procedures applicable to a civil suit as a dodge to avoid the restrictions on criminal discovery and thereby obtain documents he would not otherwise be entitled to for use in his criminal suit.). It is also true that if Osband is granted a new trial because of the ineffectiveness of his trial counsel, the order will limit the ability of the State to use against him material that would have remained undisclosed but for the violation of his constitutional rights by his earlier counsel. 25 In the posture of this case, however, the question is not whether the federal district court on habeas was correct in entering a protective order limiting the use of attorney-client material on retrial. The question before us is narrower. We are asked only to decide whether it was clear error for the district court to deny the motion for reconsideration of such a protective order. The en banc panel in McDowell II provided the answer when presented with a virtually identical order: The question being a debatable one, the district court did not commit clear error when it limited access ... pursuant to the terms of the protective order. 197 F.3d at 1256. 26 The State finds support for its argument in Anderson v. Calderon, 232 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir.2000). Anderson, decided by a three-judge panel after our en banc decision in McDowell II, wrote that a district court correctly denied a capital habeas petitioner's request for a protective order comparable to the orders entered in McDowell and in this case. Id. at 1099-1100. The Anderson panel set forth, in language that tracks verbatim the language of the vacated panel opinion in McDowell I, its disapproval of the protective order sought by Anderson as an unwarranted anticipatory interference of the state courts that would contravene basic principles of comity and federalism. Compare id. at 1099-1100 with McDowell I, 173 F.3d at 1191. 27 For three reasons, we refuse to accord to Anderson the weight the State would give it. First, in Anderson the district court had refused to grant a protective order comparable to the order in this case. But the district court's refusal had been dictated by the three-judge panel decision in McDowell I. We now know that the three-judge panel decision in McDowell I was vacated, and that the governing opinion is McDowell II. Thus, the three-judge panel in Anderson approved an action taken by the district court under compulsion of a decision that was later vacated. 28 Second, the statement by the Anderson panel is dictum. Anderson upheld the district court's denial of the writ of habeas corpus on the merits. Given the denial of the writ, there was going to be no retrial. (Indeed, Anderson has since been executed.) It is therefore clear that everything the Anderson panel said about the use of the discovered materials at retrial had no operational meaning in that case, and it was clear to the Anderson panel at the time it wrote that this was so. 29 Third, to the extent Anderson is inconsistent with the statement of Ninth Circuit law set forth in McDowell II, we, of course, are bound by the en banc decision. A panel of the Court of Appeals cannot revisit a prior decision made by the court sitting en banc. Payton v. Woodford, 258 F.3d 905, 914 (9th Cir.2001); see also Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 964 (9th Cir.1998) (en banc) (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (After all, overruling precedent is an important function that is expressly reserved to the en banc court, and a panel is ordinarily not free to do so.). McDowell II plainly holds that protective orders like the one issued in this case do not fall outside the bounds of the very broad discretion of the district courts, and that it is not clear error to deny a motion to reconsider such an order. 30 We therefore AFFIRM the ruling of the district court.