Opinion ID: 2543852
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 20

Heading: Motion to Disqualify/Judicial Bias

Text: We next address Ault's claim that he was denied a fair hearing due to judicial bias. See Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-78, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986). Ault argues that Judge Marc Gold revealed his bias by (1) failing to reappoint the defense attorney from Ault's first penalty phase; (2) discussing the case with defense counsel outside of Ault's presence; and (3) refusing to order a PSI. In his Supplemental Initial Brief, Ault also argues that the trial court erred in rejecting his pro se motion to disqualify the judge. In that motion, Ault asserted that Judge Gold (1) made an open threat against him; (2) expressed a predisposition against him by stating that Ault would spend the rest of his life locked up; and (3) was forgetful or ill or both. Addressing the motion to disqualify first, the trial court was correct as a matter of law in rejecting the motion. In Logan v. State, 846 So.2d 472 (Fla. 2003), a criminal defendant challenged the trial court's decision to deny both a pro se motion to dismiss the charges and a pro se motion for bond reduction after the defendant's counsel refused to adopt the motions. We explained that the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee that the accused can make his own defense personally and have the assistance of counsel. Id. at 474 (quoting State v. Tait, 387 So.2d 338, 339-40 (Fla.1980)). We also cited with approval a statement by the Fifth District Court of Appeal that [t]he defendant, under appropriate circumstances, has the constitutional right to waive counsel and represent himself. The defendant has no right, however, to partially represent himself and, at the same time, be partially represented by counsel. Id. at 475 (quoting Sheppard v. State, 391 So.2d 346, 347 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)). With the exception of a defendant's pro se motion to discharge his or her court-appointed attorney, any pro se pleading that is not adopted by the defendant's counsel is unauthorized and a nullity. See id. at 475-76; but see Knarich v. State 866 So.2d 165, 167 (Fla.2d DCA 2004) (noting that where counsel refused to endorse a pro se motion to disqualify the judge, the trial court permitted defendant to act as co-counsel for purposes of the motion); Turner v. State, 598 So.2d 186, 186 (Fla.1st DCA 1992) (Although the appellant had appointed counsel, his motion to disqualify the trial judge was filed pro se. In the motion, he requested permission to serve as his own co-counsel for purposes of the motion. By entertaining the motion on the merits, the judge implicitly granted this request.). [14] In this case, the trial court asked defense counsel whether he was adopting Ault's pro se motion to disqualify. Counsel responded in the negative and the court struck the motion as a nullity. Under Logan, this ruling was correct as a matter of law, and we find no abuse of discretion in failing to consider the motion. Regarding Ault's general claim of judicial bias, we find that this claim is unpreserved for appellate review. Under Steinhorst v. State, 412 So.2d 332, 338 (Fla.1982), in order for an argument to be cognizable on appeal, it must be the specific contention asserted as legal ground for the objection, exception, or motion below. In Overton v. State, 976 So.2d 536, 547 (Fla.2007), for example, we rejected an appellant's claim that he was denied a full and fair evidentiary hearing due to improper conduct by the trial judge where there was no indication in the record that Overton ever objected or attempted to disqualify Judge Jones due to his alleged improper conduct. In the present case, Ault never filed a valid motion to disqualify the judge. The only motion to disqualify was correctly treated as a nullity. See Logan, 846 So.2d at 475-76. Further, none of the present grounds for disqualification were asserted in that motion. Accordingly, the specific contentions supporting disqualification were not asserted in the court below. Ault is therefore barred from raising these claims on appeal. See Steinhorst, 412 So.2d at 338. Finally, we note that, even if Ault's claim were not procedurally barred, the grounds asserted here are insufficient to establish a valid claim of judicial bias. In order to present a facially sufficient basis for disqualification, a party must demonstrate a well-grounded fear that he will not receive a fair trial. See Mansfield v. State, 911 So.2d 1160, 1170 (Fla.2005). A mere subjective fear of bias is legally insufficient. [R]ather, the fear must be objectively reasonable. Id. at 1171 (quoting Arbelaez v. State, 898 So.2d 25, 41 (Fla.2005)). As we explained in Rivera v. State, 717 So.2d 477 (Fla.1998): The fact that the judge has made adverse rulings in the past against the defendant, or that the judge has previously heard the evidence, or allegations that the trial judge had formed a fixed opinion of the defendant's guilt, even where it is alleged that the judge discussed his opinion with others, are generally considered legally insufficient reasons to warrant the judge's disqualification. Id. at 481 (quoting Jackson v. State, 599 So.2d 103, 107 (Fla.1992)). Here, Ault asserts that judicial bias was demonstrated through two adverse rulings and because the judge had discussed potentially negative information with defense counsel. Ault has not presented factual grounds establishing a reasonable fear of judicial bias.