Opinion ID: 7314255
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Banfield Matter

Text: Edwin Banfield (“Grievant”) was the owner of the Banfield Moving and Storage Company. On September 27, 1982, one of his trucks was struck by a vehicle operated by Food Haulers, Inc. An initial police report was made at the time of the accident. Two weeks later, a contradictory report was filed, indicating that grievant’s driver was at fault. Grievant then retained respondent to investigate the contradictory reports and to sue Food Haulers for damages. On December 21, 1982, respondent instituted an action on behalf of grievant in the Monmouth County District Court. The complaint was initially dismissed in April 1983 because it was served on the wrong party, Shop Rite, rather than Food Haulers. The complaint was reinstated after proper service. In July 1983, Food Haulers filed an answer and counterclaim. On July 22, 1983, respondent sent grievant a letter requesting answers to enclosed interrogatories by Food Haulers. Grievant unsuccessfully attempted to answer the interrogatories. His requests for assistance from respondent were ignored. Respondent subsequently received notice from the Superior Court that grievant’s case would be called for trial on November 14, 1983. When respondent appeared at the District Court calendar call, however, he discovered that grievant’s case was not on the District Court trial list. It was the practice, in Monmouth County, that District Court matters for jury trial be sent over to Superior Court, as the District Court had no facilities for juries. Consequently, a District Court case for jury trial would be called for trial in Superior Court. On November 15, 1983, grievant’s complaint was dismissed for failure to respond to the trial call in the Superior Court. Respondent was under the impression that grievant’s complaint had been dismissed, prior to the trial call, for failure to answer interrogatories. On November 21, 1983, respondent sent a letter to the presiding judge of the District Court asking why the case had been dismissed for failure to respond to the trial call, when it had already been dismissed on other grounds. The Judge’s clerk subsequently told him that “there had been some sort of mix-up” and that he should get his “client’s answers to the interrogatories and then move to vacate the dismissal and not worry about the other dismissal” [2T.69]. 2 Between November 1983 and May 1984, respondent told grievant that he needed answers to the interrogatories before he “could do anything” [2T.79]. On November 15, 1983, opposing counsel filed a certification claiming that the Food Haulers truck had sustained damages in the amount of $85.10 plus replacement rental expenses of $254, for an erroneously calculated total damage of $934.10. Respondent received a copy of this certification and noticed the error in calculation. He did nothing, however, to remedy the error and relied on the Judge’s law clerk, who told him that a judgment on the counterclaim would not be entered until he could obtain answers to the interrogatories. On February 14, 1984, a default judgment was entered against grievant, based on the counterclaim. Respondent did not notify grievant of the default judgment against him. Grievant first became aware of the default judgment in May 1984, when he received a letter from opposing counsel. Finally, grievant received a letter from respondent dated May 29, 1984, requesting him to answer interrogatories. Once again, grievant’s subsequent requests for guidance went unanswered. On September 1, 1984, grievant sent a letter to the Monmouth County Prosecutor expressing his dissatisfaction with respondent’s representation. On April 80, 1985, a formal hearing was held before the ethics committee. Respondent, his attorney and grievant appeared. The hearing panel report found that respondent’s conduct “in neglecting the legal matter entrusted to him [had] clearly [arisen] to a violation of DR 6-101.” It recommended that respondent be given a private reprimand. A dissenting member of the hearing panel did not find respondent’s negligence to have risen to “gross negligence” or a “pattern of negligence or neglect”, in violation of DR 6-101 and, therefore, recommended that the matter be dismissed.