Opinion ID: 4553999
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Rehaif Issue.

Text: The district court accepted Caudle’s guilty plea to unlawful possession of the assault rifle on May 16, 2019. On June 21, the Supreme Court held in Rehaif that, to convict a defendant of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the government “must show that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and also that he knew he had the relevant status when he possessed it.” 139 S. Ct. at 2194. Caudle argues the district court committed plain error by accepting his guilty plea without informing him of the nature of the charge to which he was pleading and determining that there was a factual basis for the plea, thereby violating Rules 11(b)(3) and 11(b)(1)(G) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See United States v. Coleman, 961 F.3d 1024, 1027-28 (8th Cir. 2020).2 Though the district court accepted Caudle’s plea before the Supreme Court’s decision in Rehaif, “we measure whether an error is plain based on the law at the time of appeal.” Coleman, 961 F.3d at 1028. Accordingly, we held in Jawher that this Rule 11(b) violation is “(1) an error, (2) that is plain.” 950 F.3d at 579. These are the first two elements of the plain error standard established in United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993). However, to obtain plain error relief, Caudle must also establish that the error affected his substantial rights. To make this showing, he must “demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have 2 Caudle also argues it was error to accept his guilty plea because the indictment failed to allege the element of the offense established in Rehaif. This contention is without merit. “An indictment is normally sufficient if its language tracks the statutory language.” United States v. Jawher, 950 F.3d 576, 579 n.2 (8th Cir. 2020) (quotation omitted). There was no error, much less plain error. -6- entered the plea.” Coleman, 961 F.3d at 1030 (quotation omitted); see United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83 (2004). The relevant status for Caudle’s felon-in-possession offense is that he “has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Caudle argues that, because he had never been sentenced to prison for more than one year when he was indicted, he would not have pleaded guilty had he understood the government’s burden to prove the Rehaif element. This contention will not withstand close scrutiny. Paragraph 28 of his Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) recited that, while Caudle’s initial sentence for a 1992 California grand theft offense was one year imprisonment and sixty days probation, his probation was revoked in 1994 and he was sentenced to three years imprisonment. Paragraph 35 recited that, in 2005, he was convicted of the Arkansas offense of possession of a firearm by a felon. This criminal history would undoubtedly have provided sufficient evidence to prove that Caudle knew his status as a § 922(g)(1) felon at the time he committed this offense. See United States v. Welch, 951 F.3d 901, 907 (8th Cir. 2020); United States v. Hollingshed, 940 F.3d 410, 415-16 (8th Cir. 2019). The “lack of a plausible ignorance defense means that any § 922(g) defendant who served more than a year in prison on a single count of conviction will face an uphill battle to show that a Rehaif error in a guilty plea affected his substantial rights.” United States v. Williams, 946 F.3d 968, 974 (7th Cir. 2020). Here, unlike the defendants in Coleman and Williams, Caudle does assert on appeal that he would not have pleaded guilty if he had known of Rehaif. But the conclusory assertion is not plausible. At the start of the sentencing hearing -- more than three months after the Rehaif decision -- the district court asked Caudle, “Do you think there’s any reason you should be permitted [to] withdraw the plea of guilty that you entered back in May?” Caudle replied, “No, sir.” The PSR criminal history paragraphs, to which Caudle did not object, recited that he had twelve adult criminal convictions spanning -7- more than thirty years. As in Coleman, given these circumstances, Caudle “has not shown a reasonable probability that he would not have pleaded guilty had he known of Rehaif. 961 F.3d at 1030. Thus, there was no plain Rehaif error that warrants giving Caudle another opportunity to withdraw the guilty plea that he did not seek to withdraw at sentencing. The judgment of the district court is affirmed. ______________________________ -8-