Opinion ID: 2995201
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: But he failed to sue until October

Text: 13, 1998, which means that the 300-day limitations period began on December 18, 1997, approximately a month after he knew that his work environment had become intolerable and that the Madden Center would not take any further steps to resolve the situation. Thus, Shanoff does not overcome the statute of limitations dictated by the facts of his case, and his hostile environment claim will be based only on Riperton-Lewis’s conduct that occurred on or after December 18, 1997. Title VII prohibits an employer from maintaining a workplace that is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (quoting Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson et al., 477 U.S. 57, 65-67 (1986)). To prevail on his hostile environment claim, Shanoff must show that his work environment was objectively hostile. McPhaul, 226 F.3d at 566. An objectively hostile environment is one that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive. Id. at 567 (quoting Adusumilli, 164 F.3d at 361). In determining whether a plaintiff has met this standard, courts must consider all the circumstances, including ’the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it was physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.’ Adusumilli, 164 F.3d at 361 (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 23). We can determine whether an environment is hostile or abusive only by looking at all the circumstances, as no single factor is required. Harris, 510 U.S. at 23. Regarding the frequency of the harassment, there is no ’magic number’ of incidents that give rise to a cause of action. Doe v. R.R. Donnelly & Sons Co., 42 F.3d 439, 445 (7th Cir. 1994). But repeated incidents of verbal harassment that continue despite the employee’s objections are indicative of a hostile environment. See Saxton v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 10 F.3d 526, 534 (7th Cir. 1993). In order to support his Title VII claim, Shanoff may point to Riperton- Lewis’s facially discriminatory remarks, as well as any of her remarks and behavior that may reasonably be construed as being motivated by her hostility to Shanoff’s race or religion. See Hardin v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 167 F.3d 340, 345 (7th Cir. 1999) (The complained of conduct must have either a [religious] or racial character or purpose to support a Title VII claim.) (emphasis in original). In this case, Shanoff went on medical leave on March 16, 1998, and thus he worked at the Madden Center for approximately four months during the limitations period (which extends from December 18, 1997 to October 13, 1998). During that period, on seven occasions Riperton-Lewis said things to Shanoff that he relates to his harassment claim: (1) in late December 1997, after Shanoff met with Formigoni to tell him that his health was failing because of Riperton- Lewis’s discriminatory conduct, Riperton- Lewis told Shanoff that he must be pretty stupid because [he] would never learn that she was protected, that Howard Peters [who is black] would protect her, that [Peters] was one of them and that she would see to it that [Shanoff’s] white ass--[his] white Jewish ass would be kept down; (2) during that same conversation, Shanoff told Riperton-Lewis that his health was failing, to which she responded, good; (3) in January 1998, Riperton-Lewis prohibited Shanoff from teaching medical students; (4) Riperton- Lewis had also affirmed to Shanoff that month that she was going to be able to keep [his] white Jewish ass down; (5) in late February or early March 1998, Riperton-Lewis again told Shanoff that she knew how to handle white Jewish males, and once and for all that [he] needed to leave Madden and get out of her hair; (6) when Shanoff responded that her conduct was harming his health and career, she replied by laughing and dismissing him from her office; and (7) in October of 1998, while Shanoff had been on leave for several months, Riperton-Lewis called him at home to demand that he explain his absence, and when Shanoff asked her why are you being like this, she responded, I hate everything that you are. We first note that a reasonable person may certainly conclude that, from the context of all of Riperton-Lewis’s conduct, her remarks that were not facially discriminatory (her expression of satisfaction at Shanoff’s failing health, her order not to teach medical students, her disregard of, even delight over, the effect of her harassment on Shanoff’s health and career, and her statement, I hate everything that you are) were sufficiently intertwined with her facially discriminatory remarks to be motivated by her hostility to Shanoff’s race and religion. It is [a]gainst this backdrop [that] we examine [Riperton- Lewis’s] actions committed within the limitations period. See Hardin, 167 F.3d at 345-46. Moreover, although the harassing conduct that occurred before the limitations period is time-barred and not actionable, we may consider that conduct (the haughty Jew remark, the other facially discriminatory remarks, threats, and other harassment) to illuminate the nature of the hostility involved in the actionable conduct. See United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558 (1977) (time-barred conduct may constitute relevant background evidence in a proceeding in which the status of a current practice is at issue.); Parkins v. Civil Constructors of Illinois, Inc., 163 F.3d 1027, 1036 n. 2 (7th Cir. 1998); see also Cortes v. Maxus Exploration Co., 977 F.2d 195, 199-200 (5th Cir. 1992) (time- barred conduct is relevant and may be used to illuminate current practices which, viewed in isolation, may not indicate discriminatory motives). In light of all of the conduct in this case, we conclude that Shanoff was subjected to six rather severe instances of harassment during the four months that he was working at the Madden Center during the limitations period (and one more instance of harassment while he was on leave). Riperton-Lewis made three remarks (approximately one remark each month) during the limitations period (from late December 1997 to March 1998) in which she specifically referred to Shanoff by his race and religion in an intimidating manner. Through these remarks, she emphatically expressed to Shanoff her hostility to his race and religion, and that she was motivated by that hostility to impede his career (keep his ass down). She also took steps to hinder his career (by prohibiting him from teaching medical students) and to drive him from the Madden Center (once and for all that [he] needed to leave Madden and get out of her hair). And despite Shanoff’s repeated objections to her harassment, Riperton-Lewis made further discriminatory remarks to him and expressed her approval of his failing health and diminished professional responsibilities. See Saxton, 10 F.3d at 534. She used her supervisory position to bully, intimidate and insult Shanoff because of his race and religion, which is the type of extreme harassment that is the hallmark of a hostile environment claim. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998). Riperton- Lewis’s remarks were not merely inappropriate, insulting, demeaning or annoying, and there is no indication that she was teasing Shanoff or that she simply lacked a proper sensitivity to his race and religion. In short, the summary judgment record (viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Shanoff) amply demonstrates that Riperton-Lewis’s remarks evinced her direct, unambiguous hostility to Shanoff because of his race and religion, and that she was motivated by her hostility to hinder his career at the Madden Center. Thus, Shanoff has presented sufficient facts to enable a reasonable jury to conclude that Riperton-Lewis’s harassment created an objectively hostile work environment. Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court’s decision and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.