Opinion ID: 6111527
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Email as a Potential Meeting

Text: The City first argues that (1) neither the General Assembly nor this court has ever equated email with FOIA meetings, and (2) the constitutional infirmities created by the circuit court's declarations should be avoided by reversing the circuit court's order. Essentially, the City argues that because FOIA does not include language that a public meeting can be constituted by electronic communication, this court should establish a bright-line rule that FOIA's reach does not extend to email. We disagree. In relevant part, Arkansas Code Annotated § 25-19-106 provides as follows: (a) Except as otherwise specifically provided by law, all meetings, formal or informal, special or regular, of the governing bodies of all municipalities, counties, townships, and school districts and all boards, bureaus, commissions, or organizations of the State of Arkansas, except grand juries, supported wholly or in part by public funds or expending public funds, shall be public meetings. (b)(1) The time and place of each regular meeting shall be furnished to anyone who requests the information. (2) In the event of emergency or special meetings, the person calling the meeting shall notify the representatives of the newspapers, radio stations, and television stations, if any, located in the county in which the meeting is to be held and any news media located elsewhere that cover regular meetings of the governing body and that have requested to be so notified of emergency or special meetings of the time, place, and date of the meeting. Notification shall be made at least two (2) hours before the meeting takes place in order that the public shall have representatives at the meeting. Ark. Code Ann. § 25-19-106 (a) - (b)(1)(2) (Supp. 2017). The City acknowledges that we have said that a FOIA meeting may occur even in the absence of an actual gathering of members in the case of a telephone poll or when serial third-party contact is made to obtain approval of action. See Harris v. City of Fort Smith , 359 Ark. 355 , 197 S.W.3d 461 (2004) (holding that one on one meetings, including telephone conversations, between the administrator and city directors to obtain a decision on a property purchase were informal meetings subject to FOIA); Rehab. Hosp. Servs. Corp. v. Delta-Hills Health Sys. Agency, Inc. , 285 Ark. 397 , 687 S.W.2d 840 (1985) (holding  that a telephone poll with proper notice may be an acceptable type of open meeting). The City argues that emails cannot constitute a meeting because the General Assembly amended FOIA by Act 1653 of 2001 to include electronic or computer-based information as public records pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated § 25-19-103 but expressed no intention at that time that electronic communications can constitute a public meeting. However, we decided Harris after that amendment, and in the fifteen years since the General Assembly has not enacted legislation to change our interpretation that telephone conversations can, in some cases, constitute a meeting. The General Assembly is presumed to be familiar with this court's interpretations of its statutes, and if it disagrees, it can amend these statutes. Air Evac EMS, Inc. v. USAble Mut. Ins. Co. , 2017 Ark. 368 , 533 S.W.3d 572 . FOIA does not include telephone communications in its definition of a public meeting, but the General Assembly has not amended the statute post- Harris . We do not see any material difference between the use of email exchanges to conduct public business and telephone conversations to conduct public business. For the same reasons, the application of FOIA's public meeting provisions to emails does not present either a separation of power issue or constitutional issue any more than the telephone calls at issue in Harris . We liberally construe FOIA to accomplish its broad and laudable purpose that public business be performed in an open and public manner. McCutchen v. City of Fort Smith , 2012 Ark. 452 , 425 S.W.3d 671 . We therefore have no difficulty in concluding that FOIA's open-meeting provisions apply to email and other forms of electronic communication between governmental officials just as surely as they apply to in-person or telephonic conversations. It is unrealistic to believe that public business that may be accomplished via telephone could not also be performed via email or any other modern means of electronic communication. Neither this court nor the General Assembly can be expected to list all such communication methods or anticipate others yet to emerge. Exempting electronic communication would allow governmental officials who are so inclined to make decisions in secret, leave the public in the dark, and subvert the purpose of FOIA's open-meeting provisions.