Opinion ID: 203873
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Legal Principles Concerning Overview Witnesses

Text: The problem with overview testimony is obvious if the evidence promised by the overview witness never materializes; we repeat our condemnation of the use of overview witnesses in such circumstances. However, even if all of the overview testimony is corroborated during the course of the trial, there is still the problem with such testimony that was identified in Casas: [o]verview testimony by government agents is especially problematic because juries may place greater weight on evidence perceived to have the imprimatur of the government. 356 F.3d at 120; see also United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 214 (2d Cir.2005) (noting that even if the testimony of an overview witness does prove to be a summary of later-admitted evidence, it is generally viewed as `improper ... for a party to open its case with an overview witness who summarizes evidence that has not yet been presented to the jury' and that [t]he law already provides an adequate vehicle for the government to `help' the jury gain an overview of anticipated evidence as well as a preview of its theory of each defendant's culpability: the opening statement) (quoting 6 Jack B. Weinstein, Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 1006.04[3]); Avilés-Colón, 536 F.3d at 21 n. 13 (expressing concern about the use of a government agent to endorse the testimony of other witnesses, who testify from personal knowledge about the involvement of the defendant in the conspiracy, and thereby add the imprimatur of the government to those witnesses' testimony). The overview testimony of a law enforcement official is not simply a repetition (at best) of other evidence. It is also, in effect, an endorsement of the veracity of the testimony that will follow. Garcia, 413 F.3d at 213 (noting that an overview witness did more than simply summarize the trial testimony; in addition, he told the jury that ... an experienced DEA agent[ ] had determined, based on the total investigation of the charged crimes, that [the defendant] was a culpable member of the conspiracy). We prohibit this endorsement when it takes the form of a prosecutor affirming a personal belief in the veracity of a government witness. That practice is called vouching, and it is prohibited because of its potential to shore up a witness's credibility by putting the prestige of the United States behind him and thereby inviting the jury to find guilt on some basis other than the evidence presented at trial. United States v. Vazquez-Botet, 532 F.3d 37, 53 (1st Cir.2008); see also United States v. Perez-Ruiz, 353 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir.2003) (A prosecutor improperly vouches for a witness when she places the prestige of her office behind the government's case by, say, imparting her personal belief in a witness's veracity or implying that the jury should credit the prosecution's evidence simply because the government can be trusted.). In our view, there is no meaningful difference between the endorsement of credibility offered by the government's overview witness and the endorsement offered by the vouching prosecutor. Indeed, Casas itself raised the comparison between overview testimony and vouching by citing to Perez-Ruiz after observing that overview testimony by government agents is especially problematic because of the effect on juries of evidence perceived to have the imprimatur of the government. Casas, 356 F.3d at 120. The problematic nature of overview testimony (even when the testimony accurately anticipates the testimony of subsequent witnesses) is further confirmed by the cautious approach that courts have taken to so-called summary witnesses, who testify at the end of the government's case instead of the beginning. The testimony of a summary witness must, by definition, be completely consistent with the other evidence introduced at trial. United States v. Stierhoff, 549 F.3d 19, 28 (1st Cir.2008). Still, courts have allowed such witnesses only in limited circumstances. For example, in United States v. Fullwood, 342 F.3d 409, 413 (5th Cir.2003), the Fifth Circuit endorsed the limited use of summary witnesses in complex cases, but also recognized the inherent dangers of such testimony where an agent had been allowed, without justification, to simply recap substantial portions of the Government's case-in-chief. Collecting cases, the court identified several of these potential dangers, including the fact that the practice unfairly allowed a prosecution witness merely to repeat the testimony of another, and the possibility that the credibility of the summary witness may be substituted for the credibility of the evidence summarized. Id. at 413-14. Other courts have admitted summary testimony only in the most complicated of cases, and only where the potential prejudice is minimized through the use of procedural safeguards such as limiting instructions and extensive cross-examination. See, e.g., United States v. Ray, 370 F.3d 1039, 1046-47 (10th Cir. 2004) [4] (twenty-three day drug conspiracy trial with over fifty witnesses); United States v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1150, 1161 (4th Cir.1995). The reluctance of courts to allow the government an additional opportunity to present its case in a tidy package at the end of its presentation of evidence, even when the summary evidence is, by definition, completely consistent with the rest of the trial record, confirms that the imprimatur problem with such repetitive testimony is inescapable whether that testimony comes at the beginning or end of the government's case. There is no justification for presenting an overview witness who simply anticipates the testimony of other government witnesses, even if he does so accurately. However, as we shall explain, there may still be value and legitimacy in government overview testimony that serves a different purpose.
There may be value in having a case agent describe the course of his investigation in order to set the stage for the testimony to come about the nature of the conspiracy and the defendants involved. Indeed, in considering a defendant's challenge to the testimony of an IRS agent, we have explicitly distinguished between the kind of overview testimony that we described in Casas and an agent's description of his investigation into the defendant's activities, which is based on personal knowledge. United States v. Hall, 434 F.3d 42, 57 (1st Cir.2006). The officer's testimony, if properly limited to constructing the sequence of events in the investigation, could be valuable to provide background information and to explain how and why the agents even came to be involved with th[e] particular defendant. United States v. Goosby, 523 F.3d 632, 638 (6th Cir.2008) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Absent a basis in personal knowledge, however, the overview witness may not offer substantive testimony about the nature of the conspiracy or the involvement of particular defendants. When a law enforcement witness express[es] opinions as to defendants' culpability based on the totality of information gathered in the course of their investigation[ ], Garcia, 413 F.3d at 211, these conclusory statements often involve impermissible lay opinion testimony, without any basis in personal knowledge, about the role of the defendant in the conspiracy. Id. at 211-13; Fed.R.Evid. 701. Additionally, such overview testimony may have serious Crawford /Confrontation Clause implications. In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), the Supreme Court held that a declarant's testimonial out-of-court statement is inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause unless (1) the declarant testifies ... or (2) the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross examination and the declarant is unavailable... or (3) the evidence is admitted for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted. United States v. Maher, 454 F.3d 13, 19-20 (1st Cir.2006). Therefore, [p]ost- Crawford, the admission of non-testifying informants' out-of-court testimonial statements, through the testimony of police officers, is a recurring issue in the courts of appeals. Id. at 19. Overview testimony frequently reflects reliance on the statements of non-testifying informants, who implicate the defendants in criminal activity. The problematic nature of such testimony is self-evident. Finally, and more generally, such overview testimony is almost certain to be rife with hearsay. Rodríguez, 525 F.3d at 96 (overview testimony also constituted improper hearsay testimony). While the subsequent trial testimony of the out-of-court declarant resolves the Crawford issue, which is based on the Confrontation Clause, it does not cure the hearsay problem more generally.
Delineating the boundaries of acceptable overview testimony becomes even more complicated when the overview witness is also qualified as an expert. Overview witness testimony is normally limited by the rule that lay opinion testimony is admissible only if it is 1) not grounded in scientific or specialized knowledge but rationally based on the perception of the witness, and 2) helpful to the jury in acquiring a clear understanding of the witness's testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. Fed.R.Evid. 701. In contrast, the Federal Rules permit experts to provide opinions so long as (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. Fed.R.Evid. 702. Experts, unlike lay witnesses, may base their opinions on facts or data that need not be admissible, as long as these facts are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject. Fed.R.Evid. 703. Facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible are not to be disclosed to the jury unless the court determines that their probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect. Id. The Casas court thus appropriately noted that expert witnesses have leeway other witnesses do not, although the government had never sought in Casas to qualify Stoothoff as an expert, and, [m]ore fundamentally, ... Agent Stoothoff's testimony that particular persons were members of the conspiracy was not an appropriate subject for expert testimony. It was not in any way linked to the `specialized knowledge' that Rule 702 requires. Casas, 356 F.3d at 120; see also Johnson, 54 F.3d at 1157 (Rule [703] does not afford the expert unlimited license to testify or present a chart in a manner that simply summarizes the testimony of others without first relating that testimony to some `specialized knowledge' on the expert's part as required under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.). Thus, as with any other witness, courts cannot allow an overview witness to testify as an expert as to matters that are not appropriately the subject of expert testimony. On the other hand, we have often allowed expert testimony regarding the operation of criminal schemes, [i]n particular, expert testimony regarding the description of a typical drug network. García-Morales, 382 F.3d at 18-19 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Therefore, we have held that, while portions of an overview witness's testimony were improperly admitted, other sections of the testimony were acceptable in his capacity as an expert qualified to describe the structure and operation of a typical drug conspiracy. Id. at 17-19. Nevertheless, even appropriate expert testimony under Rule 702 may be excluded under Fed.R.Evid. 403 if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice it creates. United States v. Lopez-Lopez, 282 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir.2002) (quotation marks and citation omitted). While there is no prohibition against a witness testifying as both an expert and a fact witness, courts must be mindful when the same witness provides both lay and expert testimony, United States v. Upton, 512 F.3d 394, 401 (7th Cir.2008), because of the heightened possibility of undue prejudice. The problem is especially acute where the dual roles of expert and fact witness are filled by a law enforcement official, in part because the jury may unduly credit the opinion testimony of an investigating officer based on a perception that the expert was privy to facts about the defendant not presented at trial. Id. at 401. See also United States v. Dukagjini, 326 F.3d 45, 53 (2d Cir.2003) (observing that the use of the case agent as an expert increases the likelihood that inadmissible and prejudicial testimony will be proffered, in part because when the case agent functions as an expert for the government, the government confers upon him the aura of special reliability and trustworthiness surrounding expert testimony, which ought to caution its use) (quotation marks and citation omitted); United States v. Brown, 776 F.2d 397, 401 n. 6 (2d Cir.1985) (observing that the risk of a jury conflating expert and fact testimony is increased when the opinion is given by the very officers who were in charge of the investigation) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The law enforcement/overview witness who testifies as both a fact witness and an expert thus exacerbates the imprimatur problem we have noted earlier.