Opinion ID: 1890541
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: The Trial Court Abused its Discretion by Permitting Cross-Examination Concerning Brown's Tattoos, But With Respect to Brown's Convictions the Error Was Harmless.

Text: Bland's body was discovered on January 12, 2001, and later that same day a Kentucky State Police detective opened the investigation. During the late night or early morning hours between January 13 and 14, a Columbia City police officer stopped Brown for an outstanding traffic violation, and in the course of his interview noticed that the inside of Brown's left wrist bore cuts and scratches. He passed that information on to the detective investigating Bland's murder. On January 15, the detective interviewed Brown and photographed the cut and scratches on Brown's wrist. At trial the Commonwealth moved to introduce the photograph on the ground that the scratches on Brown's wrist were consistent with the Commonwealth's theory that Brown had lifted and carried Bland's bulky, 27-inch television. The photograph also depicted a tattoo on the inside of Brown's left forearm. The tattoo shows a demonic hand with its fingers clutching the earth and its middle finger raised in a familiar gesture of contempt. Arguing that the tattoo was unduly prejudicial, Brown objected to the photo, but the trial court overruled the objection. The Commonwealth introduced the photo without referring to the tattoo. The tattoo again became an issue during Brown's testimony. The Commonwealth's forensic examiners had testified that none of the several hairs collected from Bland's residence matched Brown's. At the time of trial, Brown's head was shaved. To counter the impression that his shaved head might account for the absence of his hair from the crime scene, Brown's counsel during direct examination introduced a photo of Brown from near the time of the offense, when his head was not shaved, obviously to advance the defense theory that he had hair which could have been shed had he been at the crime scene. The photo had been cropped so as not to show Brown's arms, which bear several tattoos. When counsel asked Brown if the photo accurately represented his appearance in January 2001, he testified that it did but volunteered that it failed to show his tattoos. On cross-examination, the Commonwealth asked Brown to confirm that he had tattoos, and when he did, the prosecutor asked him what the tattoos said and represented. Defense counsel's objection was overruled, on the ground that Brown's direct testimony had opened the door, and the prosecutor proceeded to elicit descriptions of several of Brown's tattoos, [14] including the demonic hand from the Commonwealth's prior exhibit. Asked what that tattoo meant, Brown replied, F__k the world. Under further questioning, Brown described eleven more tattoos on his arms. They included his son's name, a cross with his father's name, a dog, a six-point star, the word untouchable, the phrase only God knows why, his grandmother's name, a rose, the name of his neighborhood, a skull and the word respect. During closing argument, the Commonwealth reminded the jury of three specific tattoosthe hand, untouchable, and the phrase only God knows why and suggested that the phrase referred to Bland's murder and that together the three tattoos conveyed the attitude of one capable of such an apparently senseless crime. Brown contends that all of the tattoo evidencethe Commonwealth's photograph showing the hand tattoo and all of the cross-examination concerning that and his other tattooswas mere character evidence inadmissible under KRE 404(b) and further that the tattoo evidence was unfairly prejudicial and so much so as to be inadmissible under KRE 403. Although we disagree with Brown's contention concerning the Commonwealth's photograph, which was introduced without any mention of the tattoo and served a proper evidentiary purpose, we agree that he was improperly cross-examined. With respect to Brown's conviction, we are convinced that the error was harmless. The error was not harmless with respect to Brown's sentence, however, and would require resentencing even were resentencing not required on double jeopardy grounds. Contrary to Brown's assertion, the photograph of his cut and scratched wrist was relevant evidence tending to show that not long before the photo ( i.e. right at the time of the murder) Brown had carried a heavy, bulky object such as a large television. Brown's own account that he had scratched himself moving large stereo speakers out of a friend's car gave credence to this theory of relevancy. As Brown notes, under KRE 403 relevant evidence may be excluded if it is unfairly prejudicial and if the prejudicial effect substantially outweighs the evidence's probative value. Ware v. Commonwealth, 537 S.W.2d 174, 176 (Ky.1976) (Generally under our rules, `[p]rejudiced' means unfairly prejudiced.). Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it will induce the jury to decide the case on an improper basis, commonly an emotional one, rather than on the evidence presented. United States v. Thomas, 321 F.3d 627, 630 (7th Cir.2003) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). When Brown objected to the photograph depicting his scratched wrist on the ground that the hand tattoo, also visible in the photo, would unfairly prejudice him, the trial court noted that tattoos are common in our current society and thus that Brown's tattoo, if introduced without comment, was not apt to have a prejudicial effect substantially in excess of the photo's probative value. We agree with the trial court, and so conclude that its admission of the wrist photo was not an abuse of discretion. As Brown also notes, however, several courts have held that where tattoos are not relevant to a material issue in the case, such as the identity of the perpetrator or the defendant's membership in a conspiracy, they are inadmissible as evidence of the defendant's character or for the purpose of showing that the defendant is the sort of person apt to commit the alleged crime. See, e.g., United States v. Newsom, 452 F.3d 593 (6th Cir.2006); Brooks v. State, 903 So.2d 691 (Miss.2005); United States v. Thomas, supra ; State v. Steele, 510 N.W.2d 661 (S.D.1994). Our rules, too, prohibit mere character or propensity evidence, KRE 404(b), and, as just discussed, evidence calculated to do nothing but rouse the jury's emotions against the defendant. We agree with Brown that the cross-examination concerning his various tattoos and what they meant violated these rules. The tattoo evidence was not relevant to any material issue, but merely tended to suggest, in the case of the three negative tattoos singled out by the Commonwealth, that Brown was the sort of angry, disaffected person capable of murdering Sherry Bland. The Commonwealth's contention that Brown opened the door to this evidence by referring to his tattoos during his direct examination is of no avail. As we recently explained in Commonwealth v. Stone, 291 S.W.3d 696 (Ky.2009), `opening the door' to otherwise inadmissible evidence is a form of waiver that happens when one party's use of inadmissible evidence justifies the opposing party's rebuttal of that evidence with equally inadmissible proof. Stone , at 701-02 (citing Purcell v. Commonwealth, 149 S.W.3d 382 (Ky.2004)). However, [t]he open door doctrine does not pave the way for responsive evidence just because it fits in the same general category as evidence already admitted. For example, admitting hearsay from one side does not mean the other side can offer hearsay.... The question in each case is not whether initial proof shares some common quality with proof offered in response. Rather, it is whether the latter answers the former, and whether it does so in a reasonable way without sacrifice of other important values. Stone at 702 (quoting from 1 Mueller & Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence, § 1:12, 75-76 (3d ed.2007)). The Commonwealth's tattoo questioning cannot be deemed a reasonable answer to an assertion by Brown, because Brown had made no pertinent assertion. His reference to the fact that the photograph of himself did not show his tattoos asserted nothing, and certainly nothing remotely exculpatory, about either the tattoos or his character, which might then have been subject to rebuttal by the Commonwealth. Cf. Metcalfv. Commonwealth, 158 S.W.3d 740, 745 (Ky.2005) (The prosecutor may introduce evidence of the accused's bad character only to rebut evidence of the accused's good character.... And character evidence is admissible only in the form of reputation or opinion, not specific instances of conduct.) Nor did introduction of the cropped photograph open the door because, again, it did not amount to an assertion by Brown of good character which might have invited a response. This case is thus distinguishable from Urbanski v. Commonwealth, 526 S.W.2d 7 (Ky.1975), on which the Commonwealth relies, a case pre-dating the current rules of evidence. In that case a defendant accused of drug crimes was deemed to have made a rebuttable assertion of good character, or at least of anti-drug character, by appearing in court well-dressed and well-groomed. By flying under such false colors, our predecessor Court opined, the defendant invited evidencea photograph and verbal descriptionsof his hippy-like appearance at other times. Id. at 8. Even assuming that on its narrow facts Urbanski remains good law, it does not aid the Commonwealth here because neither the photograph Brown introduced nor his testimony volunteering that the photo did not show his tattoos amounted to an assertion of character to which the Commonwealth could respond at all, much less with tattoo evidence violative of KRE 403 and 404(b). The trial court abused its discretion by ruling otherwise. Although the trial court should not have permitted the Commonwealth to cross-exam Brown regarding his tattoos, we agree with the Commonwealth that with respect to Brown's conviction the error was harmless. The Commonwealth used the tattoo evidence to argue that Brown regarded himself as an outsider to society and the law and that with the only God knows why tattoo he may have been admitting Bland's murder. On these points, however, the tattoo evidence added very little to what the jury had already learned. The jury knew, for example, that Brown was a convicted felon, that many of his friends were convicted felons and drug users, that he had not been steadily employed, and that he did not maintain his own residence but lived a semi-nomadic existence by staying for brief periods at the homes of his grandmother, his sister, and various friends. That Brown had tattoos reflective of a rebellious, even crime-tinged, life would have come as no surprise to the jury and would not have substantially swayed its guilt or innocence determination. Similarly, the jury had already heard from several of Brown's friends that he had admitted committing the crimes against Bland. The Commonwealth's unsupported speculation about the only God knows why tattoo added little, if anything, to that evidence. Moreover, the jury heard about Brown's numerous tattoos, several bearing family members' names, and thus to the extent those were more humanizing, the jury was not given a totally skewed impression of the messages on his body. Ultimately, the tattoo evidence, although improper, was harmless error. See Winstead, 283 S.W.3d at 689 (the court can say with fair assurance that the judgment was not substantively swayed by the error). With respect to Brown's death sentence, however, we cannot with confidence say that the jury was not swayed by the improper tattoo evidence. The Commonwealth used that evidence to paint the picture of a particularly remorseless crime and that picture may well have contributed to this second jury's conclusion that death was the appropriate sentence. Even had Brown been properly subject to the death penalty in his second trial, therefore, we would have been compelled to vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing.