Opinion ID: 151633
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Does Amendment 706 have the effect of lowering

Text: Flemming’s “applicable guideline range”? What initially appears to be a question with a “seemingly commonsense” answer, McGee, 553 F.3d at 229—i.e., whether Flemming’s technical status as a career offender, which played 10 With an offense level of 22 and a criminal history category of V, the advisory sentencing range for Flemming would have been 77 to 96 months’ imprisonment (instead of 92 to 115 months). 17 no role in the sentence the District Court ultimately imposed, nonetheless makes him ineligible for a sentence reduction—is made far more complicated by the second requirement of § 3582(c)(2), which provides that any sentence reduction must be “consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 11 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2); see also Doe, 564 F.3d at 310. The policy statement in § 1B1.10 provides that a sentence reduction based on a retroactive amendment is not consistent with that policy statement if the amendment “does not have the effect of lowering the defendant’s applicable guideline range.” 12 U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B) (emphasis added). Thus, under the policy statement, Flemming is not eligible for a sentence reduction if his “applicable guideline range” is the sentencing range calculated under the Career Offender Guidelines, as that range is not affected by Amendment 706. However, if Flemming’s “applicable guideline range” is the Crack Cocaine 11 As the Supreme Court recently confirmed, the Sentencing Commission’s policy statement in § 1B1.10 is binding on courts. See Dillon v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2683 (2010). 12 We have explained that while the policy statement and the first requirement of § 3582(c)(2) are “complementary,” the policy statement is “narrower.” Doe, 564 F.3d at 310–11 (rejecting the argument that the policy statement in § 1B1.10 “implicitly redefines the § 3582(c)(2) term ‘based on’”). 18 Guidelines range—which is affected by Amendment 706—he is eligible for a sentence reduction. The Government contends that the Guidelines specify that all departures, including the departure authorized under § 4A1.3, result in a sentence outside the “applicable guideline range.” Under the Government’s theory, it is irrelevant that the District Court rejected the propriety of the career offender enhancement and sentenced Flemming within the Crack Cocaine Guidelines range, because his “applicable guideline range” for purposes of § 1B1.10 remained the Career Offender Guidelines range. As we explain below, the Government’s view, though plausible, is far from compelled by the Guidelines. Rather, after “seiz[ing] every thing from which aid can be derived” to answer this question, Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 463 (1991) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)—i.e., the Guidelines’ text, the Sentencing Commission’s instructions for applying the Guidelines, and the Commission’s applicable Commentary to the Guidelines—we conclude that the edition of the Guidelines used at Flemming’s sentencing is ambiguous as to whether the “applicable guideline range” is his pre-§ 4A1.3 departure range (the Career Offender Guidelines range) or his post-§ 4A1.3 departure range (the Crack Cocaine Guidelines range). Under the rule of lenity, we resolve that ambiguity in Flemming’s favor. 19
The Sentencing Guidelines contain no global definition of the phrase “applicable guideline range,” which our Court and other circuit courts have treated as a term of art. As a result, we previously have looked to the Application Instructions for the Guidelines contained in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 for guidance in determining the point at which a defendant’s “applicable guideline range” is determined. Those Instructions (though they do not use the term “applicable guideline range”) instruct sentencing courts to apply the various provisions and chapters of the Guidelines “in a specific order.” Doe, 564 F.3d at 311; see also United States v. Johnson, 155 F.3d 682, 684 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting that the Application Instructions provide “a sequence of steps for the court to follow in the order in which they appear”) (emphasis in original).13 The theory is that, by 13 To be clear, these “steps” are not the same as those we have required district courts to follow in the wake of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). See United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006); accord United States v. Grier, 585 F.3d 138, 141–42 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc). Under that procedure, district courts must (1) “continue to calculate a defendant’s Guidelines sentence precisely as they would have before Booker”; (2) rule on any departure motions, and determine how any departure “affects the Guidelines calculation”; and (3) impose a sentence after considering the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Gunter, 585 F.3d at 247. By contrast, we deal in this case solely with a question of 20 determining the step of the Application Instructions at which a defendant’s “applicable guideline range” has been set, we can identify the adjustments that come after that point (and thus do not affect the “applicable guideline range”). We relied on the Application Instructions in United States v. Doe to determine the “applicable guideline range[s]” for two defendants subject to mandatory minimum sentences of life imprisonment, which exceeded their initial Guidelines ranges of 151–188 and 121–151 months’ imprisonment, respectively, calculated under the Crack Cocaine Guidelines. 564 F.3d at 308. The mandatory minimum sentence was not applied to either defendant because each received a downward departure from such a sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) and U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 in exchange for their substantial assistance to the Government. Id. After departing by several levels, the District Court sentenced Jane Doe to 41 months’ imprisonment, and John Doe to 84 months’ imprisonment. Id. After Amendment 706 was made retroactive, both defendants filed motions for a reduction of sentence. Id. The Does contended that their “applicable guideline ranges” for Guidelines interpretation (i.e., at what point a defendant’s “applicable guideline range” has been set), and whether the Application Instructions provide a clear answer to that question. Moreover, as the Supreme Court has now ruled, Booker does not apply in the § 3582(c)(2) context. See Dillon, 130 S. Ct. at 2692. 21 purposes of § 1B1.10 were the ranges calculated under the Crack Cocaine Guidelines, as the District Court had relied on those ranges to determine the extent of its departure under § 5K1.1.14 We rejected their argument, concluding that the Does’ “applicable guideline range[s]” were the mandatory minimum sentences, rather than their “initial” Guidelines ranges under the Crack Cocaine Guidelines. Id. at 311. In so holding, we looked to the Application Instructions in § 1B1.1, which culminate in the following four steps: (f) Determine the defendant’s criminal history category as specified in Part A of Chapter Four. Determine from Part B of Chapter Four any other applicable adjustments. (g) Determine the guideline range in Part A of 14