Opinion ID: 2570640
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: initial city council vote

Text: The core question in this case is whether the City had the authority to grant the special use permit with a simple majority vote, after the planning commission had reconsidered the proposal and reaffirmed its recommendation to deny the permit. The answer is found in the applicable statutes. Therefore, our review is unlimited, and we need not afford any deference to the district court's interpretation. See LSF Franchise REO I v. Emporia Restaurants, Inc., 283 Kan. 13, 19, 152 P.3d 34 (2007). The controlling statutory provision is found in K.S.A. 12-757(d), which provides, in relevant part: Unless otherwise provided by this act, the procedure for the consideration and adoption of any such proposed amendment shall be in the same manner as that required for the consideration and adoption of the original zoning regulations.... When the planning commission submits a recommendation of approval or disapproval of such amendment and the reasons therefor, the governing body may: (1) Adopt such recommendation by ordinance in a city or by resolution in a county; (2) override the planning commission's recommendation by a 2/3 majority vote of the membership of the governing body; or (3) return such recommendation to the planning commission with a statement specifying the basis for the governing body's failure to approve or disapprove. If the governing body returns the planning commission's recommendation, the planning commission, after considering the same, may resubmit its original recommendation giving the reasons therefor or submit new and amended recommendation. Upon the receipt of such recommendation, the governing body, by a simple majority thereof, may adopt or may revise or amend and adopt such recommendation by the respective ordinance or resolution, or it need take no further action thereon. If the planning commission fails to deliver its recommendation to the governing body following the planning commission's next regular meeting after receipt of the governing body's report, the governing body shall consider such course of inaction on the part of the planning commission as a resubmission of the original recommendation and proceed accordingly. (Emphasis added.) The well-settled starting point for interpreting a statute is to look at what the legislature actually said by reading the words of the statute and ascribing ordinary meanings to ordinary words. See State v. McElroy, 281 Kan. 256, 262, 130 P.3d 100 (2006). We have explained: When we are called upon to interpret a statute, we first attempt to give effect to the intent of the legislature as expressed through the language enacted. When a statute is plain and unambiguous, we do not speculate as to the legislative intent behind it and will not read the statute to add something not readily found in it. We need not resort to statutory construction. It is only if the statute's language or text is unclear or ambiguous that we move to the next analytical step, applying canons of construction or relying on legislative history construing the statute to effect the legislature's intent. See State v. Robinson, 281 Kan. 538, 539-40, 132 P.3d 934 (2006); CPI Qualified Plan Consultants, Inc. v. Kansas Dept. of Human Resources, 272 Kan. 1288, 1296, 38 P.3d 666 (2002). In re K.M.H., 285 Kan. 53, 79-80, 169 P.3d 1025 (2007). Beginning that process, we first discover that the statute clearly establishes that, if the governing body (hereafter city) wants to take action upon a proposed zoning amendment when it first receives a planning commission recommendation, it has three options. The city can: (1) take the recommended action by a simple majority vote; (2) take action contrary to the recommendation by a two-thirds majority vote; or (3) return the proposal to the planning commission with a statement specifying the basis for the city's failure to follow the recommendation, i.e., remand the proposal to the planning commission for reconsideration. If, as here, the city chooses the third option of remanding the proposal, the planning commission, after a reconsideration, may: (1) resubmit its original recommendation with reasons for its action; (2) submit a new and amended recommendation; or (3) fail to deliver a recommendation to the city after the planning commission's next regular meeting following the remand. If the planning commission follows the third course of action, i.e., doing nothing, the original recommendation is deemed to have been resubmitted. Upon receipt of the post-remand, reconsidered planning commission recommendation, the city is given three options: (1) adopt the planning commission's recommendation, i.e., take the action which the planning commission recommends; (2) adopt a revised or amended recommendation; or (3) take no further action. The statute specifically provides that the city's adoption of either the planning commission recommendation or a revised or amended recommendation may be accomplished by a simple majority thereof. K.S.A. 12-757(d). The district court interpreted the statute as requiring a two-thirds majority vote for the City to grant the special use permit in contravention of a recommended denial, both before and after the remand to the planning commission. The court opined that, by granting the permit, the City did not revise or amend and adopt the planning commission recommendation, but rather it overrode the ... recommendation. Therefore, the district court apparently imported the override language applicable to the City's first consideration of the original recommendation and grafted it onto the post-remand, reconsideration procedure. Of course, the statute plainly does not say anything about a two-thirds vote after a proposal has been returned to the planning commission and resubmitted to the City, but rather it explicitly prescribes that post-remand action will be taken by a simple majority. In effect, then, the district court both added something that is not in the statute, i.e., a two-thirds vote requirement following remand, and eliminated something that is explicitly stated in the statute, i.e., the simple majority directive. See McElroy, 281 Kan. at 262, 130 P.3d 100 (courts should not add something that is not readily found in the statute or eliminate that which is readily found therein). The district court was persuaded to reconstruct the statute because of its belief that to do otherwise would create an absurd loophole allowing the City Council to return a recommendation by a simple majority when it does not have the required two-thirds majority to override it, and then override the recommendation with only a simple majority when it is returned. As will be discussed later, the plain statutory language does not create an absurd loophole, but rather makes perfect sense. Nevertheless, with respect to our statutory interpretation discussion, the district court was not imbued with the discretion or authority to ignore the legislature's words in its quest to divine what the law should or should not be. See Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v. Kline, 283 Kan. 64, 77, 150 P.3d 892 (2007). Interestingly, the Manlys acknowledge that the district court did not read the statute as it is written. They contend that the clear language of the statute permits the City only to adopt or revise or amend and adopt the recommendation upon the second submission following remand, and there is no provision for an override of the resubmitted recommendation. Therefore, the Manlys read the statute as manifesting an apparent legislative intent to preclude the City from ever granting the special use permit once the planning commission has resubmitted a recommendation to deny it. However, the Manlys do not urge that construction upon us because they acknowledge that such a preclusion would usurp the governing body's authority. We wholeheartedly agree with the Manlys' assessment of the separation of powers. A planning commission is created to fulfill an advisory function. See, e.g., K.S.A. 12-757(b) (All such proposed [zoning regulation] amendments first shall be submitted to the planning commission for recommendation.  [Emphasis added.]); see also Houston v. Board of City Commissioners, 218 Kan. 323, 330, 543 P.2d 1010 (1975) (function of planning commission is advisory only). If the legislature intended to allocate the ultimate authority to grant or deny a zoning amendment to the planning commission, it would be impermissibly shifting the City's governance from the elected City Council to an appointed advisory commission. See K.S.A. 12-104 (in acts granting or limiting powers to city governments or prescribing procedure, governing body is defined as mayor and council, mayor and commissioners, or board of commissioners, based on the status of the cities affected). To the contrary, we have previously declared that [t]he final authority in zoning matters rests with the governing body possessing legislative power. Houston, 218 Kan. 323, Syl. ¶ 3, 543 P.2d 1010. While the Houston case was decided prior to the current version of K.S.A. 12-757, it remains good law with respect to the basic allocation of governing power. Where we begin to part company with the Manlys is with their assessment that the district court's phantom two-thirds super-majority requirement does not likewise usurp the City Council's governing authority. As illustrated in this case, that requirement would permit a simple majority of the planning commission to govern over a simple majority of the City Council. We do not believe the legislature intended for the tail to wag the dog, i.e., an advisory body should not have the authority to trump the decision of the governing body that appointed it. Nevertheless, we need not rely on public policy considerations. As noted, 12-757(d) plainly gives the City the authority to revise or amend and adopt a planning commission recommendation by a simple majority vote. To circumvent that plain language, the Manlys attempt to convince us that the City's authority to revise or amend a recommendation does not include the right to reject or overrule the recommendation. However, that contention defies logic. Obviously, when the City revises or amends a recommendation before taking action, it has implicitly rejected or overruled that part of the recommended action which was not followed. Moreover, where the recommendation is to completely deny a special use permit, i.e., to tell the applicant no, it is difficult to imagine how one revises or amends that recommendation without overriding it to some extent, i.e., the only way to revise or amend no is to say yes to something. Viewing the current statute in a historical perspective corroborates our view of its meaning. Although the Manlys suggest that the statute's language is plain and unambiguous, so as to preclude a consideration of the legislative history, their arguments in support of rewriting the statute belie that suggestion. When there is ambiguity the court `is not limited to the mere consideration of the language employed, but may also look to the historical background of the enactment, the circumstances accompanying its passage, the purposes to be accomplished, and the effect the statute may have under the various suggested constructions.' City of Lenexa v. City of Olathe, 228 Kan. 773, 776, 620 P.2d 1153 (1980) (determining legislative intent in amending annexation statutes), modified on other grounds on rehearing 229 Kan. 391, 625 P.2d 423 [1981]). Dillon Real Estate v. City of Topeka, 284 Kan. 662, 679, 163 P.3d 298 (2007). Prior to K.S.A. 12-757(d), the City would have had no option upon initially receiving a planning commission recommendation with which it did not agree. It had to return the proposal to the planning commission. The specific statutory language was: Upon receipt of a recommendation of the planning commission which the governing body disapproves, the governing body shall return such recommendation to the planning commission with a statement specifying the basis for disapproval and such recommendation shall be considered in like manner as that required for the original zoning recommendations returned to the planning commission. K.S.A. 12-708 (Weeks 1975). The procedures upon remand to the planning commission and upon its return to the City were the same as in the current statute. Indeed, the language over which the parties squabble in this case, revise or amend and adopt, was identical: The planning commission, after reconsidering the same, may resubmit its original recommendations giving the reasons therefor or submit new and amended recommendations. Upon the receipt of such recommendations, the governing body may adopt or may revise or amend and adopt such recommendations by ordinance, or it need take no further action thereon. (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 12-708 (Weeks 1975). In K.S.A. 12-757(d), the legislature gave the City another option upon receiving an initial recommendation with which it did not agree. Rather than remanding to the planning commission for reconsideration, a City could move forward with taking action in contravention of the recommendation if two-thirds of the governing body did not feel the need for further input from its advisory commission. That option eliminates the need for a pointless remand. However, the legislature clarified that the two-thirds super-majority vote is only applicable to the streamlined, no remand initial option by specifying that the post-remand action is to be effected by a simple majority. The legislative history of our current statute is enlightening as well. K.S.A. 12-741 et seq. was enacted in 1991. L.1991, ch. 56, sec. 1. The statute was introduced by Senate Bill 23 (SB 23) and was the result of a study and report completed by the interim Local Government Committee. Minutes of the Senate Local Government Committee, Jan. 23, 1991. The report was submitted to the Senate Committee; it recommended recodification of planning and zoning laws contained in SB 23, and also recognized that despite the solid foundation of SB 23, further changes may be needed. The recodification project had begun over 10 years before the bill was introduced. Of note, the report stated approval authority for zoning regulations remained with the governing body. Minutes of the Senate Local Government Committee, Jan. 23, 1991, attachment 3-6. During the January 24, 1991, meeting of the Senate Local Government Committee, the Director of Planning for the City of Overland Park raised the following issue: The question we have is what percentage or number of votes is needed by the governing body to approve an application [for subdivision regulations] that has been returned to the governing body by the planning commission for a second consideration. We assume that a simple majority vote is sufficient to approve, however, the legislation is not clear. We are concerned that with the present wording a 2/3rds majority vote may be argued as being necessary when the item returns from the planning commission. This same concern holds true for Page 12, Line 9-23 and Page 15, Line 11-23. These two sections deal with the adoption of zoning regulations and rezoning ordinances, respectively. Minutes of the Senate Local Government Committee, January 24, 1991, attachment 3-2. Apparently in response to this concern, the bill was amended to add the simple majority language found in the current statute. Minutes of the Senate Local Government Committee, February 6, 1991. The legislative intent is crystal clear. In conclusion, we hold that under K.S.A. 12-757(d), the City was permitted to issue the special use permit by a simple majority vote notwithstanding the resubmitted planning commission recommendation to deny the permit. Accordingly, we find that the district court erred in ruling that the special use permit was unlawfully approved.