Opinion ID: 2602166
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Structural Differences Between State and Federal Governments

Text: The fifth [ Gunwall ] factor, the differences in structure between state and federal governments, `always favors an independent state interpretation.' Malyon, 131 Wash.2d at 797, 935 P.2d 1272 (quoting Richmond v. Thompson, 130 Wash.2d 368, 382, 922 P.2d 1343 (1996)). We noted, [t]his factor is most valuable when the differences ... are relevant and can be articulated. Certainly factors of federalism are indicative of different considerations served by the First Amendment than by article I, section 11. Malyon, 131 Wash.2d at 797, 935 P.2d 1272. We have stated many times the United States Constitution is a grant of limited power authorizing the federal government to exercise only those constitutionally enumerated powers expressly delegated to it by the states, whereas our state constitution imposes limitations on the otherwise plenary power of the state to do anything not expressly forbidden by the state constitution or federal law. Gunwall, 106 Wash.2d at 66, 720 P.2d 808. The Missouri Supreme Court expressed the effect of this structural difference best, noting that state courts should recognize and enforce legislative enactments as embodying the will of the people unless they are plainly and palpably a violation of the fundamental law of the [state] constitution. Ams. United v. Rogers, 538 S.W.2d 711, 716 (Mo.1976). However, this difference does not mean the First Amendment principles recognized by the United States Supreme Court cannot guide our interpretation of similar state provisions. Rather, federally recognized First Amendment protections provide a floor below which the states may not go. That is, state provisions cannot be interpreted to provide lesser protections than the federal constitution. We know already the EOG Program does not violate principles of separation between church and state under the First Amendment. This conclusion is evident from the United States Supreme Court's holding in Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 106 S.Ct. 748, 88 L.Ed.2d 846 (1986). In her concurrence to that opinion, Justice O'Connor clarified the appropriate federal analysis of such programs: Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, [103 S.Ct. 3062, 77 L.Ed.2d 721] (1983), makes clear that state programs that are wholly neutral in offering educational assistance to a class defined without reference to religion do not violate the second part of the Lemon v. Kurtzman [403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2135, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971)] test, because any aid to religion results from the private decisions of beneficiaries. Ante, at 754 (Powell, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). The aid to religion at issue here is the result of petitioner's private choice. No reasonable observer is likely to draw from the facts before us an inference that the State itself is endorsing a religious practice or belief. Witters, 474 U.S. at 493, 106 S.Ct. 748 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). While the structural differences in federal and state constitutions mean the federal analysis is not binding upon our state constitutional analysis, it can still guide us because both recognize similar constitutional principles. The structural differences in state and federal constitutions may require a different analytical approach. That does not mean, however, that our result will always be inconsistent with the United States Supreme Court. The state constitutional decisions of other state courts may also be helpful under the fifth Gunwall factor. These cases provide useful guidance when interpreting our state constitutional provisions because other states often face the same constitutional concerns. These cases may also clarify our analysis because they occur in a state constitutional setting. In Americans United v. Rogers, [4] the Missouri Supreme Court was faced with a constitutional challenge to a financial assistance program providing tuition grants to college students at certain approved public and private colleges. The trial court had declared the program unconstitutional under both the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and the establishment clauses of the Missouri Constitution. In its review, the Missouri Supreme Court noted that provisions of the state constitution had previously been construed as more `restrictive' than the First Amendment ... in prohibiting expenditures of public funds in a manner tending to erode an absolute separation of church and state. Ams. United, 538 S.W.2d at 720. The court located this heightened restriction in two provisions of the Missouri state constitution. The first, article I, section 7 of the Missouri Constitution, states: That no money shall ever be taken from the public treasury, directory or indirectly, in aid of any church, sect or denomination of religion, or in aid of any priest, preacher, minister or teacher thereof, as such; and that no preference shall be given to nor any discrimination made against any church, sect or creed of religion, or any form of religious faith or worship. The second, article IX, section 8 of the Missouri Constitution, provides: Neither the general assembly, nor any county, city, town, township, school district or other municipal corporation, shall ever make an appropriation or pay from any public fund whatever, anything in aid of any religious creed, church or sectarian purpose, or to help to support or sustain any private or public school, academy, seminary, college, university, or other institution of learning controlled by any religious creed, church or sectarian denomination whatever.... Proponents of the state program for tuition assistance argued the language of the program was clear and explicit in providing that the program was designed and implemented for the benefit of the students, not of the institutions, and that the awards were made to the students, not the institutions. Ams. United, 538 S.W.2d at 720 (quoting oral argument transcript). The Missouri Supreme Court agreed, holding those schools statutorily qualified would not be subjected to that `control' prohibited by Article IX, § 8, of the Missouri Constitution. Furthermore, the qualifications include approval by accrediting groups which condition approval on academic freedom. Ams. United, 538 S.W.2d at 721. Although the Missouri Constitution was more restrictive than the First Amendment, the court nevertheless held the program had a primary effect other than the advancement of religion and, therefore, did not violate federal or state constitutional requirements of separation of church and state. Ams. United, 538 S.W.2d at 721. The EOG Program at issue in this case contains the same important limiting factors. Any grants awarded are based upon individual student eligibility. The students must meet the qualifying criteria before receiving grant moneys. The prohibitions of Washington State Constitution article I, section 11 that [n]o public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or the support of any religious establishment are not violated by the EOG Program, which confers a public benefit to eligible students to pursue a college education. The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed a similar challenge to a scholarship award program in Lenstrom v. Thone, 209 Neb. 783, 311 N.W.2d 884 (1981). In that case, the trial court had declared a program, similar to the EOG Program at issue here, violated the state constitution. The Nebraska program provided financial assistance to eligible college students and allowed grant moneys to be applied to educational services at private colleges. The Nebraska Supreme Court held the program did not violate the Nebraska Constitution, article VII, section 11, providing, [n]otwithstanding any other provision in the Constitution, appropriation of public funds shall not be made to any school or institution of learning not owned or exclusively controlled by the state or a political subdivision thereof The critical factor, the Nebraska Supreme Court held, was that the purpose of the program, and therefore the purpose of the appropriation of public funds, was to benefit eligible students to attend the colleges of their choice. Lenstrom, 209 Neb. at 791, 311 N.W.2d 884. Similar to Nebraska's constitution, our state constitution contains no specific prohibition against a program designed to benefit eligible students in pursuing college educations. Article I, section 11 of the Washington Constitution prohibits public money or property appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or the support of any religious establishment. This prohibition is not violated by the EOG Program, which confers a public benefit to eligible students to pursue a college education. Where an appropriation has not been made for a religious purpose, it does not conflict with the Washington constitutional prohibition. Lastly, the Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld a challenge to a post secondary enrollment options program providing tuition aid to eligible students enrolled in participating private colleges in Federation of Teachers v. Mammenga, 500 N.W.2d 136 (Minn.Ct. App.1993). Under the program, a college or university could be reimbursed only for nonsectarian courses attended by eligible students. The trial court found the program constitutional. The Minnesota Court of Appeals agreed and held the program did not violate the establishment clauses to the Minnesota Constitution. Fed'n of Teachers, 500 N.W.2d at 138-39. The establishment clauses of the Minnesota Constitution, article I, section 16 and article XIII, section 2, contain provisions prohibiting both benefits and support to schools teaching distinctive religious doctrines. Article XIII, section 2 specifically states: In no case shall any public money or property be appropriated or used for the support of schools wherein the distinctive doctrines, creeds or tenets of any particular Christian or other religious sect are promulgated or taught. The Minnesota Court of Appeals determined state benefits under the program were limited to nonsectarian purposes because the program was designed to benefit students, not private colleges; eligible students could attend either public or private universities and colleges; and the state could only reimburse these institutions for nonsectarian classes. Fed'n of Teachers, 500 N.W.2d at 139. Our state EOG Program has restrictions similar to Minnesota's, as thoroughly discussed by Justice Madsen in the majority opinion. These restrictions include: (1) students must adhere to the EOG Program's religious exclusion; (2) students must sign an agreement containing a statement of understanding that the college may not require the student to be enrolled in any program including religious worship, exercise, or instruction; (3) colleges must agree to the same prohibition against requiring religious worship, exercise, or instruction; and (4) aid is distributed to the student not to the college. The restrictions the EOG Program places on aid to students prevent the aid from being applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or the support of any religious establishment. Other states, when interpreting their more restrictive state constitutions, have looked to the principles underlying their state constitutional provisions. [5] The distinctions these states have drawn are similar to those we have recognized in Malyon and our other decisions. That is, where the legislature establishes a program providing benefits to eligible students for a college education, the state constitution is not violated when the student chooses to receive his or her education at a private college or university, particularly when specific conditions and restrictions have been imposed on the program and the student's course of study to prevent sectarian influence. Under the analysis applied in other state decisions, the EOG Program would not violate the more specific separation of the church and state provisions in those state's constitutions. Nor does the EOG Program violate article I, section 11 of the Washington Constitution. Our state constitution contains no express prohibition against the Legislature's establishment of a program designed to assist eligible students pursuing college educations by providing tuition reimbursement. In fact, given the importance of this education, such programs should be applauded and not condemned. Justice Madsen correctly analyzes the principles our cases have recognized and rightly concludes no state constitutional violation exists. That an independent state constitutional analysis is consistent with the result we would have reached under the First amendment is not remarkable or unexpected. Parallel provisions often result in consistent results because the principle that church and state must remain separate is deeply ingrained in our constitutional jurisprudence. This principle animates both the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 11 of the Washington Constitution. The restrictions guarding against an establishment of state sponsored religion have been created to protect religion's free exercise, not to prevent it. JOHNSON and SANDERS, JJ., concur. CHAMBERS, J. (dissenting). I respectfully dissent. No issue is more fundamental to American liberty than freedom of religion. This freedom requires separation of church and state. Our nation's founders cherished religious independence. A core pragmatism underlies our Constitutions' safeguards of religious liberties: our founders were wise enough to know if they imposed their religious beliefs onto others, one day, religious beliefs of others could be imposed upon them. Freedom from government interference, an essential component of the protection of religious liberty, can be guaranteed only by imposing absolute neutrality in religious matters upon the State. As Thomas Jefferson eloquently insisted, to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves ... is sinful and tyrannical. [1] In 1789, the founders of the United States were content with the establishment and free exercise clauses of the First Amendment, which command that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. They left to the several states to answer vital questions about established churches and religious freedom. One hundred years later, the drafters of the Washington State Constitution met. They were not content with simply mirroring the First Amendment. Specifically, the events of the intervening century caused them deep concern about religion in public schools. [2] The result is that our state constitution strictly prohibits both sectarian [3] influence on state schools and state funds going to support religious schools. They crafted this language: All schools maintained or supported wholly or in part by the public funds shall be forever free from sectarian control or influence. Wash. Const. art. IX, § 4. This constitutional provision goes beyond the Enabling Act for statehood, which merely required us to establish and maintain `a system of public schools, which shall be open to all children... and free from sectarian control.' [4] We also went beyond the Enabling Act and the First Amendment by prohibiting influence on any school supported wholly or in part by state funds. Wash. Const. art. IX, § 4. Our State has, from our very beginning, been far more careful than our nation to keep the spheres of religion and state separate. [5] This overriding protectiveness of the separation of church and state was and is not limited to education. Our state constitution also goes further than the federal establishment clause, by providing: No public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or the support of any religious establishment.... Wash. Const. art. I, § 11. We are not merely prohibited from establishing a state church; we are also prohibited from using public money or property to support worship, exercise, instruction, or religious establishments. The majority finds comfort in a finding below that none of the institutions in question teach the tenets of any particular denomination or sect as part of their regular curriculum. Our inquiry should not end there. We must look beyond the regular curriculum to determine if public money is being applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or the support of any religious establishment. Wash. Const. art. I, § 11. The findings below, and the trial court's determination that the program violated the state constitution, should cause us great concern. A survey of the findings below with respect to five of the colleges and universities eligible for the Educational Opportunity Grant (EOG) Program, chapter 28B.101 RCW, illustrate the need for constitutional diligence. All five of these institutions provide a valuable contribution to our society; it is not the merit as institutions that we examine, but whether our state constitution permits the application of public money to these institutions. Northwest College. Northwest College is an institution of the Assemblies of God. Northwest College requires students to take the following courses in order to graduate: Exploring the Bible, Foundations of the Christian Life, Evangelism in the Christian Life, and Christian Doctrine. The college's mission statement includes, Help to fulfill the Great Commission and to propagate the historic faith of the sponsoring church. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 1126. Chapel at Northwest College is held daily and attendance by all students is required. Walla Walla College. Walla Walla College is governed by a board of trustees, all of whom must be members in good standing of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church. Students are required to take 16 hours in religion and theology to graduate. Approximately 90 percent of the full-time faculty members of Walla Walla College are members in good and regular standing of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church. The Walla Walla College student handbook provides: Observing the seventh day of the week as a day of rest from daily activities is a practice of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church and a distinctive part of life at Walla Walla College. All students are expected to respect that observance by refraining from ordinary activities, attending Friday evening and Sabbath services, and treating the day with special respect in keeping with the ethos of this academic community. CP at 1220. Faculty and students are encouraged to offer Christian prayer in classes. CP at 1221. Students at Walla Walla College are not allowed to ... undermine the religious ideals of the College. CP at 1221. Pacific Lutheran University. Pacific Lutheran University is controlled by the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America. Graduating students must have taken eight hours of religious courses. Faculty shall set a worthy example of Christian life and seek to inculcate in the students the highest ideals of Christian manhood and womanhood. CP at 1143. Seattle Pacific University. Seattle Pacific University is a Free Methodist Church institution. All members of the [governing] Board are to be in sympathy and accord with the doctrinal position and standards of the University as a Free Methodist school. CP at 1170. Students are required to take 15 credit hours of religion to graduate, and among those credit hours a student must take Christian Formation, Christian Scriptures, and Christian Theology. The faculty handbook describes effective teaching to include [k]nowledge of and ability to communicate the relationship between one's discipline and Christian faith and life and willingness to guide and mentor in matters of spiritual formation. CP at 1175-76. The faculty handbook also sets forth that service to the church is a significant factor in evaluating a faculty member's application for tenure. Whitworth College. Two-thirds of the governing board of Whitworth College must be members of the Synod of Alaska-Northwest of the Presbyterian Church and between one-sixth and one-third of the members are to be ordained Presbyterian ministers. There are three core religious courses all students must take to satisfy graduation requirements. The Whitworth College mission statement states, [i]t is policy or at least a `cultural expectation' at Whitworth to encourage the integration of faith and learning in the classroom.... Whitworth also engages in efforts to use the transforming power of Jesus Christ to transform lives of students in response to student requests. CP at 1240. Ministry coordinators appear to be hired by the school and are directed to motivate and empower students to minister to one another. CP at 1241. In the residence halls, students are paid to act as ministry coordinators. Our founders sought to guarantee each of us the right to choose our own religious path. They understood that, once having chosen, many of us would believe that our path should be the path for others. Indeed, many religious faiths encourage believers to win over converts. Education, by its essential nature, affords those who teach access to minds that are often eager and willing to learn and accept what is taught. The State cannot constitutionally induce principles, beliefs and thoughts of a devotional nature, and cannot pay others to do so. The institutions before us provide a great public and humanitarian service. But once public funds are provided to an educational institution controlled by a religious organization with a religious mission, functionally, do those funds advance religious doctrine? Our founders chose not to take a chance that they might. The founders did not intend, nor has this Court ever permitted, public educational funds be entrusted to those who teach or those who receive religious instruction. The EOG Program relies solely upon statements signed by the schools and students, including the five institutions surveyed above, to meet the constitutional requirements. Those statements merely assert the grant recipient is not enrolled in a program that includes religious worship, exercise, or instruction or pursuing a religious, seminarian or theological degree; there is no other enforcement mechanism. Given that each of the institutions surveyed above is controlled or significantly influenced by a religious organization and requires courses in religion as a prerequisite for graduation, it is likely that the students, colleges, and universities are interpreting religious instruction as meaning religious instruction in preparation for the ministry. That is not all that our state constitution forbids. Recognizing our state constitution's unique treatment of education and religion, this Court has developed two different analytical approaches to resolve challenges of alleged support of religion by the State. Compare State Higher Educ. Assistance Auth. v. Graham, 84 Wash.2d 813, 529 P.2d 1051 (1974) (prohibiting loans to students attending sectarian institutes for violating state constitution), with Malyon v. Pierce County, 131 Wash.2d 779, 935 P.2d 1272 (1997) (permitting expenditure of county funds on local law enforcement chaplaincy program). If the challenge involves some element of public education, we have applied a broad construction of article I, section 11 and article IX, section 4. See, e.g., Graham, 84 Wash.2d 813, 529 P.2d 1051; Weiss v. Bruno, 82 Wash.2d 199, 509 P.2d 973 (1973) (forbidding expenditure of state funds to support students at sectarian institutions); Calvary Bible Presbyterian Church v. Bd. of Regents, 72 Wash.2d 912, 436 P.2d 189 (1967) (secular study of the Bible as Literature constitutional); Perry v. Sch. Dist. 81, 54 Wash.2d 886, 344 P.2d 1036 (1959) (invitation of students to attend outside religious instruction unconstitutional); Visser v. Nooksack Valley Sch. Dist. 506, 33 Wash.2d 699, 207 P.2d 198 (1949) (same); Mitchell v. Consol. Sch. Dist. 201, 17 Wash.2d 61, 135 P.2d 79 (1943) (publicly subsidized transportation to religious school unconstitutional); State ex rel. Dearle v. Frazier, 102 Wash. 369, 173 P. 35 (1918) (high school credit for outside Bible study unconstitutional). [6] In summary, we have applied a broad construction of the provisions of article I, section 11 and article IX, section 4 in the context of education, whether or not the institutions were schools as otherwise intended by article IX. If, however, the challenge does not involve education, we merely determine whether the State's objective was support of religious worship, exercise, or religious establishment. Malyon, 131 Wash.2d at 799-800, 935 P.2d 1272. Structurally and analytically, this Court has frequently analyzed constitutional challenges involving education through both article IX and article I, section 11. We have developed a rich body of law applying article I, section 11 to education, both at the common school level and at the university level. Concluding that article IX generally does not apply to higher education does not permit us, as Justice Johnson proposes, to ignore the specific protections of article IX, section 4. Article IX, section 4 goes beyond the practical command to the Legislature to establish general and uniform common schools, but instead embodies a deep principle of Washington law: that we jealously honor and protect the separation of church and state. Even indirect support of a religious school can violate article I, section 11 and article IX, section 4. See generally Weiss, 82 Wash.2d 199, 509 P.2d 973. Unfortunately, the majority has nearly abandoned article IX, section 4 and consequently has nearly abandoned our jurisprudence demanding strict separation in matters of religion and education. In its place, the majority has substituted the antiestablishment jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court. I fear that abandonment of article I, section 11 of the Washington Constitution in favor of the Lemon test ( Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971)) has not taken merely two small steps but two giant leaps in constitutional law, first Malyon and now Gallwey. I disagree with my learned colleague that Litchman v. Shannon, 90 Wash. 186, 155 P. 783 (1916), foredooms the majority's result here. Litchman established that the University of Washington was not a common school for the purposes of article IX, sections 1-2, and therefore could charge tuition. I have no quarrel with this conclusion. Article IX, section 4, and the deep principle it articulates, was simply not implicated. Historically, this Court has never shied away from finding unconstitutional state support for religious worship, exercise or instruction in public schools. See, e.g., Dearle, 102 Wash. 369, 173 P. 35. In Dearle, this Court considered high school credit given for outside Bible study. Dearle, 102 Wash. 369, 173 P. 35. We found the required examination was public support for religious instruction, and thus unconstitutional. Dearle, 102 Wash. at 370, 380-85, 173 P. 35. Cogently, one Justice observed of article I, section 11: That is plain, simple and mandatory, and by it the legislature, school authorities and courts are bound. The school authorities are forbidden to apply any of the public money or property to any religious exercise or instruction. The curricula of the public educational institutions cannot be made to include any kind of religious worship, exercise, or instruction. The language is most comprehensive and argues itself. Dearle, 102 Wash. at 386, 173 P. 35 (Holcomb, J., concurring). This program presents parallel constitutional concerns. The EOG Program functions to give public money to schools controlled by religious organizations that require or make available to the students religious worship, exercise, and instruction. This is unconstitutional in public schools, and it is unconstitutional in private schools supported by state funds, no matter how de minimis the support. We rearticulated these principles in Mitchell. There, we considered a program similar in form to the EOG Program. Washington State provided transportation to all students, regardless of whether they attended a public, private, or religious school. Mitchell, 17 Wash.2d at 63, 135 P.2d 79. This was couched by the statute as an individual entitlement of the pupil, rather than as direct support for a sectarian school. Id. We concluded the program was public support for a religious institution and, in effect, created sectarian schools partially supported by public funds, and thus violated both article I, section 11 and article IX, section 4. Mitchell, 17 Wash.2d at 66-67, 135 P.2d 79; accord Visser, 33 Wash.2d 699, 207 P.2d 198 (transportation a benefit to religious school and violative of both article I, section 11 and article IX, section 4). We rejected the fig leaf there that the support was merely a benefit to individuals, and we should reject it here. In Perry, this Court again made clear even de minimis use of school facilities to further religious education was forbidden by our state constitution. A school district in Spokane allowed students to spend an hour a week during the school day in off campus religious instruction sponsored by local churches. Perry, 54 Wash.2d at 889, 344 P.2d 1036. The school involvement was limited to collecting permission cards from parents and brief announcements or explanations of the program. Perry, 54 Wash.2d at 888, 344 P.2d 1036. The distribution of the cards was found to be  use of school facilities supported by public funds for the promotion of a religious program, which contravenes Art. I, § 11 of our state constitution. Perry, 54 Wash.2d at 896, 344 P.2d 1036. This practice has the further effect of influencing the pupils, while assembled in the classrooms, as a `captive audience' to participate in a religious program, contrary to the express provisions of Art. IX, 4 of our state constitution. Perry, 54 Wash.2d at 896, 344 P.2d 1036. We refined our analysis in Calvary Bible. There, we considered whether an undergraduate course, English 390: The Bible as Literature, taught in a state controlled university, constituted religious instruction. Calvary Bible, 72 Wash.2d at 913, 436 P.2d 189. We concluded it did not. The trial court issued extensive findings of fact establishing, English 390 is taught as a study of the Bible for its literary and historic qualities and is presented objectively as a part of a secular program of education and did not promote a particular theology or indoctrinate a particular religious belief. Calvary Bible, 72 Wash.2d at 916, 436 P.2d 189. We took a hard look at the meaning of religious instruction as used in article I, section 11 and concluded: [T]he framers of our constitution did not intend the word instruction to be construed without limit, but that the proscribed field be confined to that category of instruction that resembles worship and manifests a devotion to religion and religious principles in thought, feeling, belief, and conduct, i.e., instruction that is devotional in nature and designed to induce faith and belief in the student. Calvary Bible, 72 Wash.2d at 919, 436 P.2d 189. Calvary Bible was rightly decided. Rightly understood, its holding is limited to establishing a particular University of Washington Bible as Literature class is not religious instruction as prohibited by our state constitution. The majority attempts to squeeze the EOG Program within this Court's holding in Calvary Bible that the prohibition on instruction did not extend to every course involving religion. They give insufficient weight to the fact the University of Washington was not alleged to be controlled by any religious establishment, and do not address the remaining prohibitions against worship, exercise or support of any religious establishment of article I, section 11. Not long after Calvary Bible, this Court was faced with a funding plan not entirely dissimilar to the EOG Program. State Higher Educ. Assistance Auth., 84 Wash.2d 813, 529 P.2d 1051. The State had established a program where loans from educational institutions to students attending college would be purchased by the State, whether the school was religious or secular. Graham, 84 Wash.2d at 815, 529 P.2d 1051. The money to support this came from a combination of general funds and a tax exempt bond. Graham, 84 Wash.2d at 815-16, 529 P.2d 1051. We found the program was support to religious institutions and therefore violated Washington Constitution article IX, section 4 and article I, section 11. We relied heavily on Weiss, which established: Any use of public funds that benefits schools under sectarian control or influenceregardless of whether that benefit is characterized as indirect or incidentalviolates this provision. Graham, 84 Wash.2d at 817, 529 P.2d 1051 (quoting Weiss, 82 Wash.2d at 211, 509 P.2d 973). Accord Witters v. Comm. for the Blind, 112 Wash.2d 363, 771 P.2d 1119 (1989) (grant to visually handicapped student to enable him to attend a religious college in preparation for the ministry unconstitutional). Clearly, if merely purchasing a loan made to a college student is fatal support of a religious educational institution, giving a grant to a student at a sectarian educational institution is also fatal support. Our broad construction of our constitutional prohibition of the use of public funds for any religious purpose was clear by the time we announced Perry. In recognition of the special place public education holds in our system of government, this standard remains. However, we do not apply such a strict standard in other cases. See generally Malyon 131 Wash.2d at 801, 935 P.2d 1272. Admittedly, Malyon does not fit within the doctrine laid out by our prior article I, section 11 and article IX, section 4 cases. However, critically, Malyon was not an education case, and our jurisprudence treats public schools and education different from the way it treats chaplaincy programs. Because Malyon does not implicate education, it does not provide us with guidance here. The majority suggests that my approach would necessitate barring the State from providing medical coupons redeemable at religious hospitals. I respectfully disagree. Article I, section 11 and article IX, section 4, read together do not reach the State's police power to protect the health of state residents; such programs would be analyzed solely under article I, section 11. Under Malyon, such programs would almost certainly be upheld as constitutional. The founders of our nation and our state cherished religious independence. The founders were not hostile to religion; instead, I am of the firm conviction they believed the best way to encourage authentic religious devotion was to keep government out of religion. The drafters of our state constitution declared that schools supported by public funds shall forever be free from sectarian influence. Wash. Const. art. IX, § 4. They also declared that no public money should be applied to any religious institution or support of any religious establishment. Wash. Const. art. I, § 11. This Court has steadfastly struck down as unconstitutional direct and indirect support, on campus and off campus support, and even de minimis use of public funds which could be used by an educational program to advance a religious purpose. The EOG Program cannot withstand the restrictions imposed by our state constitution. I would affirm the trial court, and therefore I respectfully dissent. CHAMBERS, BRIDGE and IRELAND, JJ., dissents.