Opinion ID: 198294
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jury Orientation

Text: 26 Of eighty prospective jurors in the panel for this case, only sixty-two appeared for jury orientation on the morning of September 13, 1995. At the orientation, conducted on the record but outside the presence of counsel, the district court gave preliminary instructions regarding jury service and distributed the juror questionnaires. He told the jurors nothing specific about the case except the docket number. The judge then instructed the jurors not to discuss the case with anyone, spoke to them about the importance of jury service, and described the questionnaire. The judge left the courtroom while the jurors viewed the video Justice by the People and completed the questionnaires. Upon their completion of the questionnaires, the judge returned and excused the jurors for the day. Because only fifty prospective jurors remained after the morning orientation session on September 13, the court summoned thirteen additional randomly selected prospective jurors from two other panels. These prospective jurors, and one late-arriving member of the original panel, then received substantially the same information and instructions from the judge and completed the questionnaires. 27 During jury selection the next day, it became clear to Ortiz-Miranda's counsel that some of the juror questionnaires were missing. Upon raising the matter with the district court, the judge explained to counsel that the clerk had highlighted certain questionnaires as problematic, and he had dealt with those obvious cases. 9/14/95 Tr. at 126. Ortiz-Miranda's counsel objected to the district court's actions on the ground that it involv[ed] and invok[ed] Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. Id. The court overruled counsel's objections, but agreed to provide counsel with the questionnaire forms and invited counsel to further object after reviewing them if counsel found that the court had exercised the [sic] improper discretion, id., in excusing fourteen prospective jurors brought to his attention by the jury clerk. 28
29 In order to be deemed qualified to serve as a juror on a petit jury in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, an individual must be a citizen of the United States, eighteen years of age or older, have resided for a period of one year within the judicial district, and be able to read, write, speak, and understand the English language with a degree of proficiency sufficient to fill out satisfactorily the Juror Qualification Form and to render satisfactory jury service in this Court. District Plan at 3. 30 The district court dismissed six of the prospective jurors based on a lack of proficiency in English. Juror 16 stated that she had difficulty reading or understanding English and answered the question asking her to describe her work in general terms in Spanish. Juror 17 completed almost all of the questionnaire in Spanish. Juror 18 indicated that she had difficulty with English and also wrote in Spanish that she did not hear well. Juror 45 completed the forms entirely in Spanish. Juror 61 indicated that he had trouble with English and did not give more than a one word response in English to any of the questions requiring more than a yes or no answer. Finally, Juror 93 indicated that he had trouble reading or understanding English, but otherwise completed the questionnaire in English. After examining these questionnaires, we hold that Judge Fuste did not err by dismissing these prospective jurors. 31 The District Plan also mandates that [n]o person shall be qualified to serve ... if he is incapable, by reason of mental or physical infirmity, to render satisfactory jury service. Id. The district court excused two jurors for medical reasons. Juror 13 answered No to the question, Do you have any physical problem (for example, sight, hearing or other medical condition) that would interfere with your ability to serve? but a note at the bottom of the form states Eye ongoing medical [illegible]. The government contends that this note was made by the district court, but the author's identity is unclear. The district court did write on the beginning of the form: See note [page] 3 claimed ongoing eye impediment. Juror 89 stated that he had Fibrilosis Atrial and that he was currently taking daily medication. The district court excused him on account of his health and because of his answer to question # 9. Question # 9 asked the degree of education the prospective juror had achieved. Juror 89 had a law degree, but was retired. 2 Although the district court's actions, with respect to these two jurors, were questionable in that Juror 13 did not state that his medical condition would interfere with his serving as a juror and Juror 89 was dismissed in part because he holds a law degree, there was at least some medical reason why both jurors could have been excused. Accordingly, these excusals were not an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Contreras, 108 F.3d 1255, 1269 (10th Cir.1997) (applying abuse of discretion standard to pre voir dire excusals). 32
33 Both § 1866 and the District Plan permit the district court to excuse prospective jurors prior to voir dire on the ground of undue hardship. Here, the district court excused six jurors on that basis. 34 According to the district court's notes, Juror 3 was excused because he was the only person at his office. Juror 3 stated that he was the only representative of the company in Puerto Rico. I sell generic medicine to Drug [sic] stores and Hospitals [sic] in P.R[.] My Job [sic] is mostly done by telemarketing for which I can not be away from my work for too long. I m[sic] training a part time employee to assist me due the [sic] increase in sales. The district court excused Juror 32 because she was taking care of her mother, who was in the hospital, and her grandmother, who was at home. Although she was the only one who could help them, she stated that she would be very proud to participate as a juror ... and to let [her] know what [she] should do. According to his notes, Judge Fuste excused Juror 70 because he was a night shift medical technician at Fajardo Hospital. 35 Jurors 35, 63, and 72 indicated that they had various business and personal travel plans that would conflict with the trial. Juror 35 stated that she would be traveling during the trial to a Consumers Affairs annual meeting and then intend[ed] to take my vacations. Juror 63 was excused by the district court on account of a pre-arranged vacation. During the trial, she was scheduled to attend a training session and to leave with her family on a previously planned vacation. Finally, Juror 72 was excused because he had a reservation to go to Nevada and California for a month during the trial. 36 The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Jurors 3 and 32, but did impermissibly excuse Jurors 70, 35, 63, and 72. With regard to Jurors 3 and 32, their questionnaires document that acting as Jurors would work an undue hardship. However, the same cannot be said for the others. 37 With regard to Juror 70, we note that under the District Plan, he could have requested to be excused from jury duty. The District Plan states that jury service by medical laboratory technicians would entail undue hardship or extreme inconvenience, and such an individual shall be excused from jury service upon individual request. District Plan at 5 (emphasis added). However, Juror 70 did not request to be excused or object to being a juror. The choice not to serve on the jury at this stage was his and not the court's. The district court acted improperly in unilaterally excusing him from jury service. We cannot be sure whether Juror 70 desired to serve or was unaware of the District Plan's provision. Regardless of his desire or knowledge, however, there was no prima facie reason for him to have been dismissed from the pool at this point. 38 We begin by noting with respect to Jurors 35, 63, and 72 that the district court incorrectly described their situation to counsel the next morning at jury selection. The district court stated: What else was there? And people with paid vacations, which they so said in a note, Judge, I'm leaving on such and such a date. How can I detain those people? 9/14/95 Tr. at 127. After a very close and careful reading of the questionnaires, we did not find any notes on them stating that any of these jurors had paid vacations. If such a statement was made by any of the jurors to the district court, it was not recorded by the Judge on the questionnaires in the record. Jurors 35 intend[ed] to take vacations. For Juror 63, everything was set. Finally, Juror 72 had a reservation. It appears that the district court interpreted those phrases to mean paid non-refundable, non-changeable tickets although those phrases may well not have meant that at all. 39 Jury duty works a burden on all called to serve. There are instances in which previously-made travel plans would cause jury service to become an undue hardship. However, the district court all too willingly accepted the proposed excuses of these jurors without allowing the parties to examine the prospective jurors in voir dire. Exclusions at this stage approach a ministerial function, which is why § 1866 authorizes the clerk of the court under the supervision of the district court--if the District Plan so authorizes--to excuse such jurors. See § 1866(c). If jurors are excused as a result of a non-ministerial exercise of discretion better left to voir dire itself, as occurred here, the prospects for the defendant obtaining a fair cross-section of the community could be improperly diminished. 40 In general, we think it unwise for district judges to engage in ex parte voir dire beyond purely ministerial functions. Ministerial functions permitted by the Plan and Act are usually performed by the clerk, under supervision of the court. If a judge does no more than what a jury clerk is authorized to do in excusing jurors, that may raise an issue of allocation of court resources but does not raise an issue of impropriety. See United States v. Calaway, 524 F.2d 609, 616 (9th Cir.1975). When the court, in the absence of counsel, starts questioning jurors and excusing them based on responses which go beyond basic information about qualifications, obvious bias, or hardship, it is all too easy to slip over the line, as happened here. Whether slipping over the line deprives a defendant of statutory or constitutional rights is another question.