Opinion ID: 2453992
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Burden on exercise of constitutional rights

Text: Relying primarily on United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968), Aguilar-Raygoza argues that NRS 484C.340 penalizes defendants who exercise their constitutional right to a jury trial by withholding eligibility for a treatment program. The State argues that the statutory scheme provides a benefit for a guilty or nolo contendere plea that does not unconstitutionally burden a defendant's constitutional rights, similar to the statute upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 99 S.Ct. 492, 58 L.Ed.2d 466 (1978). We agree with the State. In Jackson, the Court was asked to decide whether the United States Constitution permits the establishment of a death penalty that is applicable only to those defendants who assert the right to contest their guilt before a jury, given that such a scheme discourages defendants from exercising their right to a trial. 390 U.S. at 581, 88 S.Ct. 1209. Under the federal statute challenged in Jackson, a death sentence could be imposed for kidnapping only upon a jury recommendation, whereas the maximum penalty for defendants who pleaded guilty or executed a jury waiver was life imprisonment. Id. at 572-81, 88 S.Ct. 1209. The Court explained that [i]f the provision had no other purpose or effect than to chill the assertion of constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose to exercise them, then it would be patently unconstitutional. Id. at 581, 88 S.Ct. 1209. In evaluating the provision's purpose, the Court acknowledged that it could be viewed as ameliorating the severity of the more extreme punishment by limiting the death penalty to cases in which a jury recommends that penalty and that such a goal is an entirely legitimate one. Id. at 582, 88 S.Ct. 1209. But the Court explained that Congress could not achieve that goal by means that needlessly chill the exercise of basic constitutional rights and therefore the question is whether that [chilling] effect is unnecessary and therefore excessive. Id. The Court then concluded that the challenged provision achieved its goal in a manner that needlessly penalized the assertion of the constitutional right to a jury trial. Id. at 582-83, 88 S.Ct. 1209. The Court thus invalidated the death-penalty provision in the statute. Id. at 583, 591, 88 S.Ct. 1209. The Supreme Court later went on to distinguish Jackson in Corbitt. There, the Court rejected a claim that a New Jersey statute placed an unconstitutional burden on the exercise of the rights to a trial and against self-incrimination by allowing a judge to choose between a mandatory life sentence and a lesser sentence for a defendant who pleaded non vult ( i.e., nolo contendere) to a murder indictment, whereas a defendant who proceeded to trial would be sentenced based on the degree of murder found by the jury, with a first-degree murder verdict carrying a mandatory life sentence. 439 U.S. at 214-15, 218, 99 S.Ct. 492. Relying on Jackson, the defendant complained that the statute burdened his constitutional rights by providing more flexibility in the sentencing of a defendant who chose to forgo a trial. Id. at 218, 99 S.Ct. 492. In distinguishing Jackson, the Court noted that the pressures to forgo trial and to plead to the charge in this case are not what they were in Jackson  for two reasons. Id. at 217, 99 S.Ct. 492. First, unlike in Jackson, the death penalty was not involved, and second, unlike in Jackson, pleading non vult would not avoid any risk of suffering the maximum penalty because the judge accepting the non vult plea still had authority to impose a life sentence. Id. The Court further explained that based on the tolerance for and encouragement of plea negotiations that offer substantial benefits in exchange for a plea, id. at 218-21, 99 S.Ct. 492, its cases since Jackson clearly established that not every burden on the exercise of a constitutional right, and not every pressure or encouragement to waive such a right, is invalid. Id. at 218, 99 S.Ct. 492. The Court also noted that there was no element of retaliation or vindictiveness against Corbitt for going to trial and that withholding the possibility of leniency from [those who choose to go to trial] cannot be equated with impermissible punishment as long as our cases sustaining plea bargaining remain undisturbed. Id. at 223-24, 99 S.Ct. 492. The Court in Corbitt thus recognized that defendants are often put to difficult choices because the criminal justice system offers opportunities to minimize risks by waiving constitutional rights but that those difficult choices are permissible so long as the encouragement does not unnecessarily burden the exercise of the right. In summarizing Corbitt and the other relevant cases in this line of authority in the context of an alleged violation of the right against self-incrimination, we have noted that many courts distinguish between an act of leniency and a penaltya distinction that is based on the accepted use of plea bargaining and the practice of granting leniency in sentencing to those defendants who accept responsibility: Several courts have distinguished between a denied benefit (an act of leniency) and a penalty (a harsher sentence) and have concluded that denial of a sentencing reduction based on a defendant's refusal to accept responsibility for his actions does not constitute a penalty nor a sentence enhancement and thus does not violate the [United States Constitution]. These decisions rely on a line of United States Supreme Court cases upholding plea bargains and rejecting claims that offers of lower sentences in exchange for guilty pleas impermissibly compel defendants to incriminate themselves as well as on the longstanding practice of sentencing more leniently those defendants who evidence contrition. Dzul v. State, 118 Nev. 681, 692, 56 P.3d 875, 882-83 (2002). We conclude that the possibility of entering an alcohol treatment program provided in NRS 484C.340 is a form of leniency that is available in exchange for a plea of guilty or nolo contendere and is not an unconstitutional penalty for refusing to enter such a plea or a burden on the exercise of constitutional rights. Here, as in Corbitt, the pressures on Aguilar-Raygoza to forgo trial and to plead to the charge are not what they were in Jackson for two reasons. First, the death penalty is not a possibility. Second, the maximum punishment for felony DUI is not reserved only for those who insist on a jury trial; the defendant who abandons the right to a jury trial is not assured that he will not be sentenced to imprisonment under NRS 484C.400(1)(c). The defendant who pleads guilty or nolo contendere still must qualify for a treatment program and, even if the defendant qualifies for a treatment program, the judge accepting the plea has the authority to deny the application for treatment and sentence the defendant to imprisonment for the same term as a defendant who has been convicted upon a jury verdict. NRS 484C.340; NRS 484C.400(1)(c); see also Picetti v. State, 124 Nev. 782, 794, 192 P.3d 704, 712 (2008) ([T]he provisions set forth in NRS [484C.340] . . . merely give the district court discretion to allow a defendant to complete a treatment program in order to obtain a conviction and sentence for a lesser offense.). And we see no reason to believe that NRS 484C.340 exerts such a powerful influence to coerce inaccurate pleas [of guilty or nolo contendere] that it should be deemed constitutionally suspect, Corbitt, 439 U.S. at 225, 99 S.Ct. 492; rather, the choice confronting a defendant charged with felony DUI gives rise to no more compulsion than that present in a typical plea bargain. Nor is there any reason to conclude that NRS 484C.340 was intended to punish defendants who insist on going to trial. Like the possibility of probation at issue in Dzul, the availability of a treatment program for defendants who accept responsibility is consistent with the historical practice and understanding that a sentence imposed upon a defendant may be shorter if rehabilitation looks more certain and that confession and contrition are the first steps along the road to rehabilitation. 118 Nev. at 693, 56 P.3d at 883. While Aguilar-Raygoza was not given a benefit that may be extended to defendants who accept responsibility for their wrongs, id., we conclude that the deprivation of that benefit does not place an unconstitutional burden on his constitutional rights. [3]