Opinion ID: 1849825
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: The Tortious Breach of Contract Claim

Text: The Hursts acknowledged in pretrial that under no circumstances could they have won the 1979 case on appeal following Burnett's failure to raise the appropriate defenses at trial. Counsel for the Hursts further stated to the court that they cannot and will not prove all the elements of negligence with respect to the 1980 appeal. The Hursts maintained nevertheless that Burnett's failure to properly pursue the appeal constituted a bad faith breach of contract. Neither Southwest's motion for summary judgment nor anything filed in connection therewith makes any reference to the Hursts' bad-faith claim. Obviously, therefore, Southwest and Burnett did not demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to the bad-faith count. The trial court apparently concluded sua sponte that the bad-faith claim was not legally supportable. Following stipulation by plaintiffs' counsel that the Hursts could not prove negligence with respect to the appeal, the transcript records the following exchange: BY THE COURT: [I]f there is no claim that there was negligence as to the appeal, well, then, I think that pretty well is going to resolve the hearing. BY MR. MILLS [COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF]: We believe it would as to the negligence part. Now, the law in the State as I understand it, and I may not be correct, is that legal malpractice cases can be brought on two bases. One is breach of contractual obligation; second is the negligence. BY THE COURT: Well, I haven't seen any contract. BY MR. MILLS: There is a contract implied by law. ..... BY THE COURT: ... I don't think that the defendant was under an obligation by any contract to do something that was vain, that had no possibility of a satisfactory solution. That is if there was no chance of success in the appeal, I don't think that the defendant was under an obligation to appeal. BY MR. MILLS: Well, Your Honor, I would agree that there was no obligation to institute the appeal. There is a very specific manner in which the Supreme Court has said you must withdraw... . We do contend that the attorney client relationship was improperly breached; that it was done intentionally, and that this is an intentional breach of contract which would entitle the Plaintiffs to recover both actual and punitive damages, much as in the bad faith insurance cases. BY THE COURT: ... I don't think that as a public policy that we ought to penalize by punitive damages an attorney who in good conscience has looked at the record and has determined that there is no chance to prevail. Assuming arguendo that Burnett did in fact abandon the appeal without ever informing her clients, it is evident that she breached an implied contractual duty. In Myers v. Mississippi State Bar, 480 So.2d 1080 (Miss. 1986), this Court stated: We take this occasion to announce ... that any time an attorney undertakes to represent a client in any court of record in this state that there attaches at that moment a legal, ethical, professional and moral obligation to continue with that representation until such time as he is properly relieved by the court of record before whom he has undertaken to represent a client. This is true regardless of the circumstances under which his representation of that client may be terminated. This withdrawal may be accomplished only by the filing of a motion with the court with proper notice to the client. Myers, 480 So.2d at 1092. As the trial judge correctly noted, Burnett was not duty bound to undertake a futile appeal. But having done so, she incurred an obligation to press ahead absent a proper withdrawal. Southwest and Burnett advance three arguments supporting the grant of summary judgment against the plaintiffs on the bad-faith breach of contract claim. First, Southwest and Burnett argue that since the Hursts allege a failure to properly withdraw, the claim would be better addressed as a bar disciplinary matter rather than as a breach of contract. Secondly, Southwest and Burnett contend that since the Hursts' first count alleges the tort of negligence, the election of remedies doctrine precludes the plaintiffs from also alleging a breach of contract. Thirdly, Southwest and Burnett assert that the breach of contract claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. None of these three arguments has merit. Abandoning representation without proper withdrawal is indeed a matter for disciplinary inquiry. Myers holds, however, that an attorney's obligation to continue representation once undertaken is both ethical and legal in nature. Myers, 480 So.2d at 1092. See also Hutchinson v. Smith, 417 So.2d 926 (Miss. 1982) (law implies promise that attorney will represent client with care, skill, and diligence). If Burnett's alleged breach of this legal obligation was attended by intentional wrong, gross negligence or breach of fiduciary duty amounting to an independent tort, then the plaintiffs' bad faith claim would be well grounded in law and fact. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Simpson, 477 So.2d 242, 249 (Miss. 1985) (punitive damages recoverable for tort of bad faith if breach of contract amounts to intentional wrong, insult, abuse or gross negligence amounting to independent tort); United States ex rel. Control Systems, Inc. v. Arundel Corp., 814 F.2d 193 (5th Cir.1987). Southwest's and Burnett's remaining two arguments are easily disposed of by noting that the Hursts' second count alleges the tort of bad faith, not a breach of contract per se. This Court has held that in legal malpractice cases, a plaintiff must elect between tort and contract remedies in certain situations. See Hutchinson, 417 So.2d at 928. [2] Since both counts in the instant action sound in tort, the election-of-remedies rule does not arise. Southwest's and Burnett's limitations argument is similarly misemployed. Southwest and Burnett correctly observe that the statute of limitations for actions based on unwritten contracts is three years. See Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-29. The Hursts' cause of action arguably accrued more than three years before the suit was filed. This is not an action, however, to enforce a contract. The Hursts alleged the independent tort of bad faith, a matter covered by the six-year general limitation found in Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49. [3] See Young v. Southern Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 592 So.2d 103 (1991). The claim is thus unaffected by the § 15-1-29 three-year limitations bar. Southwest and Burnett failed to establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, and they have not shown that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The trial court erred, therefore, in granting the motion for summary judgment with respect to the bad faith claim. C.