Opinion ID: 2295666
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Nature of the Evidence to Counter the Plaintiff's Prima Facie Case

Text: For each of the three types of prima facie cases, there is a particular kind of evidence that will counter it. Evidence of only a particular subject matter is appropriate to match the factual proof underlying the particular prima facie case. Thus, in a McDonnell Douglas disparate treatment case, the subject matter will be some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for defendant's conduct. See Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, supra 439 U.S. at 24-25, 99 S.Ct. 295; King v. New Hampshire Dept. of Resources, Etc., 420 F.Supp. 1317, 1326-27 (D.N.H.1976), aff'd, 562 F.2d 80 (1st Cir. 1977). In a Teamsters pattern-or-practice case, the appropriate countering subject matter is a nondiscriminatory explanation for the apparently discriminatory pattern or practice constituting the prima facie case of unlawful discrimination. Teamsters v. United States, supra 431 U.S. at 360 n. 46, 97 S.Ct. 1843. In an Albemarle disparate impact case, the countering subject matter is a job-related justification for the hiring practices having a disparate sex impact. For example, if employment tests, oral or written, are at issue, there must be evidence indicating by professionally acceptable methods that the employer's discriminatory tests are . . . `predictive of or significantly correlated with important elements of work behavior which comprise or are relevant to the job or jobs for which candidates are being evaluated'. [18] Or, if other hiring requirements or criteria, such as prior experience or strength, are at issue, there must be credible evidence that they are necessary to safe and efficient job performance. [19] The touchstone is business necessity . . ., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., supra 401 U.S. at 431, 91 S.Ct. 849, not mere business convenience. See United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418, 451 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906, 92 S.Ct. 1607, 31 L.Ed.2d 815 (1972). It must be emphasized that in all of these contexts the ultimate burden of persuasion is never shifted from the plaintiff. Yet, if a judgment in favor of the plaintiff on the basis of his or her prima facie case alone is to be avoided, there must exist evidence having probative force as to the particular subject matter appropriate to counter the particular prima facie case. In the case at bar plaintiffs have asserted that a requirement of prior police experience, even though facially neutral, is sex-discriminatory in its impact because until recently few women have been employed as police officers anywhere. See Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 583, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring and dissenting); Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348, 358 (5th Cir. 1972); Freeman v. Motor Convoy, Inc., 409 F.Supp. 1100, 1116 (N.D.Ga. 1976). The Superior Court, however, ruled that prior police experience is a bona fide job qualification. We do not understand that the Superior Court was using the term in a technical sense to refer to the bona-fide-occupational-qualification (bfoq) exception expressly carved out by both the Maine and the federal laws prohibiting employment discrimination. Under federal law the bfoq exception applies only where sex (or other prohibited basis for discrimination) is itself a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise. [20] The United States Supreme Court has held that the federal bfoq exception was in fact meant to be an extremely narrow exception to the general prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex. Dothard v. Rawlinson, supra 433 U.S. at 334, 97 S.Ct. at 2729 (Alabama policy of not hiring women guards for contact positions in all-male penitentiaries held valid). Although the Maine bfoq exception is not as clearly stated as the federal exception, [21] no reason appears for the Maine legislature to use the technical term bona fide occupational qualification otherwise than in its technical meaning established in the federal statutory and case law. Thus, the bfoq exception is not available to defendants to justify their requiring, or giving a hiring advantage to, prior police experience. However, any prima facie case of disparate impact from that practice is countered by credible evidence that prior police experience is necessary to safe and efficient job performance; that is, such experience is a business necessity. E. E. O. C. v. N. Y. Times Broadcasting Service, Inc., supra at 361. This evidence must relate to the business necessity of prior police experience as distinguished from the mere advantage that prior experience offers in many hiring situations. Also, on rehearing, the practicality of training on the job and at the Maine Police Academy during the one-year probationary period will be relevant in applying the business necessity test. The CSC's heavy reliance upon physical strength is another example of a facially neutral practice that may have a disproportionately harsh impact upon women. The conception of a police officer as necessarily aggressive, big, strong, and intimidating is a sex stereotype. The CSC chairman gave a low score to plaintiff Bernard because she was not the rough-tough type, and flatly stated that he gave all female applicants low scores because he assumed they could not handle a physical situation. However, once there is evidence constituting a prima facie case of disparate impact, to counter it there must be credible evidence, rather than the mere assumption, that all or substantially all women would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of a police officer. See Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969); Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 462 F.Supp. 952, 956 (D.Iowa 1979). [22] The criterion or requirement of strength is justified only if job-related, and a test must be adopted and professionally validated to measure it directly. [23] It is improper to evaluate the individual applicant in the stereotypical abstract. Dothard v. Rawlinson, supra 433 U.S. at 331-33, 97 S.Ct. 2720. Similarly, if the evidence constituting a prima facie case relates to oral interviews that have a disparate impact on women, the countering evidence must be professional testimony that the interview criteria are significantly related to or predictive of important elements of police work. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, supra, 422 U.S. at 431, 95 S.Ct. 2362; Allen v. City of Mobile, 464 F.Supp. 433, 438-40 (S.D. Ala.1978); Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 43 Fed.Reg. 38,295 (1978). Here, defendants have conceded that the oral interview was never validated to be job related. Additionally, federal courts have held criteria similar to those used by the CSC commissioners in evaluating applicants during the oral interviews (such as appearance, personality) to be subjective and very susceptible to partiality. E. g., Ste. Marie v. Eastern R. Ass'n, 458 F.Supp. 1147, 1154-56, 1162 (S.D. N.Y.1978); Wade v. Mississippi Coop. Extension Serv., 372 F.Supp. 126, 142 (N.D. Miss.1974), aff'd in pert. part, 528 F.2d 508, 518 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Local 357, 356 F.Supp. 104, 114-17 (D.Nev.1973). See generally Newman, Remedies for Discrimination in Supervisorial and Managerial Jobs, 13 Harv.C.R.-C.L.L.Rev. 633, 636-46 (1978).