Opinion ID: 1938908
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Requested Manslaughter Instruction

Text: At a bench conference called at the conclusion of all the evidence, the trial judge discussed with counsel the jury instructions to be given. Defendant's attorney asked for an instruction on manslaughter. He said: I think that the State in its evidence may have triggered the issue of manslaughter. And I would ask the court to instruct the jury and allow them to return a verdict of manslaughter if they feel that the killing of Mr. Bucino was done by my client but may have been done with mitigation. The prosecutor assumed that the defense request was based on one of two theories: hot-blooded response to a legally adequate provocation, or imperfect self-defense. He addressed both theories, and opined that the evidence was insufficient to generate an instruction on either. Defense counsel clarified his position: What I'm saying, judge, I don't think this is an imperfect self-defense case at all. I think this is a case where the jury may find that because of the man's size and because of his condition as to sobriety, or lack of same, that his  he's been described as massive. He was described as intimidating.... That the jury may feel, and they are the trier of the fact, that the person responded to these gestures. And that this coming back after he had left, came back in an aggressive-type manner, to be adequate provocation. And I think it's a question for the trier of fact to determine. I think  I don't think it's necessary for my client to substantially put himself at the scene. If the State's evidence, and they're trying to show that he was a criminal agent, and if the State's evidence fairly generates the issue I think that it's up to the trier of fact to determine. The trial judge denied the request, finding the defendant's testimony to be inconsistent with a theory of mitigation. He said: It may have been had he remained silent, but once he takes the stand and denies it I'm not going to allow him to walk both sides of the street which is what you want to do. The appellate court's going to have to permit that. The court will deny the motion. The trial judge instructed the jury concerning murder in the first and second degrees but, consistent with his ruling, did not give an instruction concerning manslaughter. Although the defendant noted certain exceptions at the conclusion of the charge, he did not include an exception to the court's failure to instruct on manslaughter. The defendant was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to 25 years imprisonment. [2] He appealed, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed his conviction in an unreported opinion. The intermediate appellate court, relying upon its earlier decision in Brown v. State, 29 Md. App. 1, 349 A.2d 359 (1975), held that where the defendant denied involvement in the shooting, the trial judge properly refused to instruct on manslaughter. We granted the defendant's petition for certiorari, and we affirm the conviction. We do so, however, on the ground that the evidence adduced at trial was not sufficient to generate the issue of manslaughter, and not on the ground that the defendant was precluded from advancing alternative or inconsistent theories of defense. Preliminary to our discussion of the substantive issues, we note a potential problem with respect to adequate preservation of this point for appellate review. Maryland Rule 4-325(e) provides, in part: No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless the party objects on the record promptly after the court instructs the jury, stating distinctly the matter to which the party objects and the grounds of the objection. (Emphasis added.) We have said that under certain well-defined circumstances, when the objection is clearly made before instructions are given, and restating the objection after the instructions would obviously be a futile or useless act, we will excuse the absence of literal compliance with the requirements of the Rule. Gore v. State, 309 Md. 203, 208-09, 522 A.2d 1338 (1987); Bennett v. State, 230 Md. 562, 188 A.2d 142 (1963). We make clear, however, that these occasions represent the rare exceptions, and that the requirements of the Rule should be followed closely. Many issues and possible instructions are discussed in the usual conference that takes place between counsel and the trial judge before instructions are given. Often, after discussion, defense counsel will be persuaded that the instruction under consideration is not warranted, and will abandon the request. Unless the attorney preserves the point by proper objection after the charge, or has somehow made it crystal clear that there is an ongoing objection to the failure of the court to give the requested instruction, the objection may be lost. See Johnson v. State, 310 Md. 681, 685-89, 531 A.2d 675 (1987). In reading the transcript of these proceedings, for example, it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether defense counsel acquiesced in the judge's determination that the defendant could not walk both sides of the street or, whether having considered the apparent inconsistency of the two positions, counsel decided to abandon the request for a manslaughter instruction as a matter of sound trial tactics or, whether he intended to persist in his request. We shall consider the issue notwithstanding the defendant's failure to follow the precise dictates of Rule 4-325(e) because, as the State concedes, the Court of Special Appeals apparently considered the substantive question under the plain error exception built into the Rule, and that Court did not abuse its discretion in doing so. See Dawkins v. State, 313 Md. 638, 643, 547 A.2d 1041 (1988). The trial judge was of the opinion that the defendant could not walk both sides of the street  that is, that the defendant could not simultaneously advance inconsistent theories of defense. We do not agree. We hold that a defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on any theory of defense that is fairly supported by the evidence, even if several theories offered are inconsistent. This is the position taken by the federal courts, and by the vast majority of state courts. See, e.g., Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 108 S.Ct. 883, 99 L.Ed.2d 54 (1988); People v. Perez, 62 Cal.2d 769, 44 Cal. Rptr. 326, 401 P.2d 934 (1965); State v. Harris, 189 Conn. 268, 455 A.2d 342 (1983); State v. Shehan, 242 Kan. 127, 744 P.2d 824, 827-28 (1987); State v. Knowles, 495 A.2d 335 (1985), appeal after remand, 517 A.2d 1075 (Me. 1986); Love v. State, 441 So.2d 1353 (Miss. 1983); State v. Baker, 277 S.W.2d 627 (Mo. 1955); State v. Kills Small, 269 N.W.2d 771 (S.D. 1978); People v. Fugua, 146 Mich. App. 133, 379 N.W.2d 396 (1985); Booth v. State, 679 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. App. 1984). This holding is consistent with the requirement of Maryland Rule 4-325(c) that [t]he court may, and at the request of any party shall, instruct the jury as to the applicable law.... It is also consistent with the general proposition that a defendant is entitled to an instruction on every essential question or point of law supported by evidence. Smith v. State, 302 Md. 175, 179, 486 A.2d 196 (1985); Blackwell v. State, 278 Md. 466, 477, 365 A.2d 545 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 918, 97 S.Ct. 2183, 53 L.Ed.2d 229 (1977). See also Hook v. State, 315 Md. 25, 41, 553 A.2d 233 (1989) (defendant entitled to an instruction on lesser included offense when that offense is fairly supported by the evidence). To the extent that language of the Court of Special Appeals in Brown v. State, supra, 29 Md. App. at 20, 349 A.2d 359, is inconsistent with our holding today, that language is disapproved. Although as a legal matter there is no bar to putting forth different or inconsistent theories of defense, there will often be practical problems of proof, particularly where different theories involve proof of different mental states on the part of the defendant. Where, for example, a particular subjective belief is required, a defendant who testifies that he was not present may find it difficult or impossible to adduce evidence that will fairly support the required finding. Indeed, that is the crux of the problem facing the defendant in this case. Sims argues that he was entitled to a manslaughter instruction on either of two theories  hot-blooded response to provocation, or imperfect self-defense. Concerning the first, he argues that the jury could have found he acted in hot blood either as a result of a mutual affray, or in direct response to provocation evidenced by Bucino's words coupled with his conduct. In Cox v. State, 311 Md. 326, 331, 534 A.2d 1333 (1988), we defined voluntary manslaughter to include intentional homicide, done in a sudden heat of passion, caused by adequate provocation, before there has been a reasonable opportunity for the passion to cool. In Whitehead v. State, 9 Md. App. 7, 11, 262 A.2d 316 (1970), Judge Orth for the Court of Special Appeals set forth the four elements of the rule of provocation described by Professor Rollin M. Perkins: [3] (1) There must have been adequate provocation; (2) The killing must have been in the heat of passion; (3) It must have been a sudden heat of passion  that is, the killing must have followed the provocation before there had been a reasonable opportunity for the passion to cool; (4) There must have been a causal connection between the provocation, the passion, and the fatal act. Mutual combat has been recognized as a possible source of adequate provocation. Carter v. State, 66 Md. App. 567, 572, 505 A.2d 545 (1986); Shuck v. State, 29 Md. App. 33, 38-40, 349 A.2d 378 (1975), cert. denied, 278 Md. 733 (1976); Whitehead v. State, supra, 9 Md. App. at 11, 262 A.2d 316; R. Perkins and R. Boyce, Criminal Law 88-91 (3d ed. 1982); 2 C. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 159 (14th ed. 1979). The rule of provocation will apply when persons enter into angry and unlawful combat with a mutual intent to fight and, as a result of the effect of the combat, the passion of one of the participants is suddenly elevated to the point where he resorts to the use of deadly force to kill the other solely because of an impulsive response to the passion and without time to consider the consequences of his actions. In the case before us, there was no evidence of a mutual affray. Insulting words or gestures, no matter how opprobrious, do not amount to an affray, and standing alone, do not constitute adequate provocation. See 2 C. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law, supra, § 156; R. Perkins and R. Boyce, Criminal Law, supra, 93-94; Lang v. State, 6 Md. App. 128, 250 A.2d 276 (1969). Although there was evidence from which the jury could have found that Bucino had directed racial and derogatory comments toward Sims in the bar, this conduct did not constitute adequate provocation. Moreover, Sims testified that he was not upset by the comments. He said: I didn't pay him no attention. I don't  you know, I didn't want to argue about it, right. So I just looked at him, you know, and that was it.... Me and him never really had any words, you know, about anything. As the Court of Special Appeals noted in Lang v. State, supra, 6 Md. App. at 132, 250 A.2d 276, there is authority for the proposition that sufficient provocation may consist of words accompanied by conduct indicating a present intention and ability to cause the defendant bodily harm. See 1 Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure § 177 (Anderson ed. 1957). Assuming, without deciding, that a combination of words and conduct may give rise to sufficient provocation, we find the evidence here insufficient to support that theory. Even if we were to find the evidence sufficient to objectively show adequate provocation, there is not a shred of evidence showing the state of mind of the defendant at the moment of the shooting. Sims' testimony sheds no light on this because he testified that he was not there. No one else saw his facial expressions or heard his speech at the time critical to this determination. Assuming that there might be a case where evidence of that type could demonstrate the sudden onset of hot-blooded passion that produced the mortal blow or shot, this is not such a case. The blood must indeed be hot, and under some circumstances only the hot-blooded killer can attest to that. See Price v. State, 82 Md. App. 210, 217, 570 A.2d 887 (1990); Cunningham v. State, 58 Md. App. 249, 259, 473 A.2d 40 (1984); Tripp v. State, 36 Md. App. 459, 469, 374 A.2d 384, cert. denied, 281 Md. 745 (1977); Bartram v. State, 33 Md. App. 115, 175, 364 A.2d 1119 (1976), aff'd, 280 Md. 616, 374 A.2d 1144 (1977). Although the ultimate burden of proving the absence of mitigation rests upon the State when that issue is properly in the case, the burden of initially producing some evidence on that issue (or of relying upon evidence produced by the State or adduced from witnesses called by the State) sufficient to give rise to a jury issue with respect to mitigation, is properly cast upon the defendant. Dykes v. State, 319 Md. 206, 215-17, 571 A.2d 1251 (1990); Simmons v. State, 313 Md. 33, 39-40, 542 A.2d 1258 (1988); State v. Evans, 278 Md. 197, 207-08, 362 A.2d 629 (1976). Sims was singularly unsuccessful in placing before the jury evidence sufficient to fairly generate the issue of mitigation by hot-blooded response to adequate provocation. Sims fares no better with his second argument, concerning the doctrine of imperfect self-defense. He did not preserve this point for appellate review. Indeed, he expressly disavowed any reliance upon the theory of imperfect self-defense when he requested an instruction on manslaughter. We add that had the point been preserved, we would have found it to be without merit. We recognized the doctrine of imperfect self-defense in State v. Faulkner, 301 Md. 482, 483 A.2d 759 (1984), and we have more recently discussed it in Simmons v. State, supra , and Dykes v. State, supra . Imperfect self-defense may be available to mitigate murder to manslaughter when the defendant is able to show that he honestly held certain subjective beliefs even though those beliefs may be objectively unreasonable, and all other requirements of perfect self-defense are present. Judge Moylan, writing for the Court of Special Appeals in Watkins v. State, 79 Md. App. 136, 138, 555 A.2d 1087 (1989), noted: Where ... the defender unreasonably (though honestly) perceives the danger or unreasonably (though honestly) responds with more than necessary force, it is a case of imperfect self-defense, which mitigates the level of blameworthiness down to the manslaughter level even though it does not totally exculpate. (Emphasis in original.) Sims has never contended that he was entitled to an instruction on perfect self-defense. He does not contend that there was evidence from which the trier of fact could conclude that the person who shot Bucino had reasonable grounds to believe himself in immediate danger of death or serious bodily harm, and that resort to the use of fatal force was justified. Rather, he contends that even in the absence of proof of an objectively reasonable belief concerning the level of danger he faced or the need to resort to fatal force, he was entitled to have the jury consider his subjective state of mind. The difficulty with that argument is that there is not a scintilla of evidence concerning the beliefs actually entertained by the person who shot Bucino. As we pointed out above, the defendant has the burden of presenting some evidence sufficient to reasonably generate the issue. The issue in this instance involved the honestly held subjective feelings of the perpetrator at the moment of the shooting. When the defendant maintains that he was not the perpetrator, this becomes a very difficult, though probably not impossible, [4] burden to meet. In this case, the defendant did not meet that burden.