Opinion ID: 2506328
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: procedural posture of and standards applicable to the ica motion

Text: To be clear, this is not a decision on an expedited appeal from the order (s) and judgment of the Circuit Court. The appeal from the Circuit Court has not been briefed. The deadline for a cross-appeal has not expired. The matter before this court is a motion for an injunction pending an appeal, which is governed by HRAP Rule 8(a), which provides in relevant part: (a) Motions for Stay, Supersedeas Bond or Injunction in the Appellate Courts. A motion for stay of the judgment or order in a civil appeal, or for approval of a supersedeas bond, or for an order suspending, modifying, restoring, or granting an injunction during the pendency of an appeal shall ordinarily be made in the first instance to the court or agency appealed from. A motion for such relief on an appeal may be made to the appellate court before which the appeal is pending or to a judge thereof, but, if the appeal is from a court, the motion shall show that application to the court appealed from for the relief sought is not practicable, or that the court appealed from has denied an application, or has failed to afford the relief the applicant requested, with the reasons given by the court appealed from for its action. The motion shall also show the reasons for the relief requested and the facts relied upon, and, if the facts are subject to dispute, the motion shall be supported by affidavits, declarations, or other sworn statements or copies thereof. With the motion shall be filed such copies of parts of the record as are relevant. Generally, the standard for a preliminary injunction is: (1) whether the moving party has shown that it is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the balance of irreparable harms favors the issuance of an injunction; and (3) whether the public interest supports granting such an injunction. See, e.g., Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. Hous. and Cmty. Dev. Corp. of Haw., 117 Hawai`i 174, 212, 177 P.3d 884, 922 (2008). This standard has been most frequently applied to a trial court's consideration of a motion for preliminary injunction or an appellate court's review of a trial court's decision on such motion. It appears, however, that a stronger showing on the merits may be required when a party seeks an injunction pending appeal. See, e.g., Life of the Land, Inc. v. City Council of the City and County of Honolulu, 60 Haw. 446, 447, 592 P.2d 26, 27 (1979) (In order for an appellant to obtain an injunction pending appeal, there must be a showing that he is threatened with irreparable injury and that there is substantial likelihood that he will prevail on the merits of his appeal.) (emphasis added); Life of the Land v. Ariyoshi, 59 Haw. 156, 165, 577 P.2d 1116, 1122 (1978) (holding that appellant had failed to establish a prima facie case on the merits, much less a showing of substantial likelihood of success); MDG Supply, Inc. v. Diversified Inv., Inc., 51 Haw. 480, 482, 463 P.2d 530, 532 (1969) ([T]here must be a showing that appellant is threatened with irreparable injury and that there is great likelihood, approaching near certainty, that he will prevail.) (citations omitted). While the rule permitting an appellate court to grant injunctive relief pending an appeal has shifted from the rules of civil procedure to the rules of appellate procedure, we are aware of no cases interpreting HRAP Rule 8(a), and the aforementioned cases continue to be cited favorably (particularly the Life of the Land cases) and have not been overruled. We recognize, too, that, if a court is able to conclude that a prima facie case has been made in support of the movant's position on the merits of a case, the weight attached to the various elements may vary, and a strong showing of irreparable harm may reduce the weight given to any lack of likelihood of success on the merits. See, e.g., Office of Hawaiian Affairs, 117 Hawai`i at 211-12, 177 P.3d at 921-22 ([T]he more the balance of irreparable damage favors issuance of the injunction, the less the party seeking the injunction has to show the likelihood of his success on the merits.) (citation omitted); Life of the Land v. Ariyoshi, 59 Haw. at 165, 577 P.2d at 1122 (We recognize that the weight to be attached to the various elements of the test may vary, and that a strong showing of irreparable harm may reduce the weight given to any lack of likelihood of success on the merits.) (citation omitted). The opposite proposition is, of course, true as well. A strong showing on the merits may reduce, but not eliminate, the moving party's burden on the issues of irreparable harm and public interest. See Penn v. Transp. Lease Haw., Ltd., 2 Haw.App. 272, 276, 630 P.2d 646, 650 (1981) ([T]he greater the probability that the party seeking the injunction is likely to prevail on the merits, the less he has to show that the balance of irreparable damage favors issuance of the injunction.) Finally, we recognize that the relief sought by Stop Rail is in the nature of a mandatory injunction. A mandatory injunction compels one to perform an affirmative act in order to do or undo a previous act. Wahba, LLC v. USRP (Don), LLC, 106 Hawai`i 466, 472, 106 P.3d 1109, 1115 (2005). The purpose of an injunction, in general, is to protect property or other rights from irreparable injury by prohibiting or commanding certain acts. Morgan v. Planning Dept., County of Kauai, 104 Hawai`i 173, 188, 86 P.3d 982, 997 (2004) (citations omitted). Most injunctions are prohibitory, meaning that the matter complained of is a consequence of present conduct and the injunction simply orders a defendant to refrain from engaging in the designated acts. Wahba, 106 Hawai`i at 472, 106 P.3d at 1115 (citation omitted). A mandatory injunction is distinguishable from a prohibitory injunction in that a mandatory injunction commands performance of certain acts whereas a prohibitory injunction prohibits the performance of certain acts. Legal Aid Soc'y of Haw. v. Legal Serv. Corp., 961 F.Supp. 1402, 1408 n. 3 (D.Haw.1997). The Hawai`i Supreme Court has cautioned that [m]andatory preliminary relief which goes well beyond the status quo is particularly disfavored, and should not be issued unless the facts and law clearly favor the moving party. Wahba, 106 Hawai`i at 472, 106 P.3d at 1115 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). That court further stated that [t]he severity of a mandatory injunction makes it a disfavored option which courts should deny unless the facts and law clearly favor the injured party. Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).