Opinion ID: 778366
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of the PLRA to Plaintiffs' Motion to Extend Jurisdiction

Text: 40 The district court's construction of the PLRA is a question of law, which we review de novo. Gilmore v. California, 220 F.3d 987, 997 (9th Cir.2000). 41 The district court held that the prospective-relief provisions of the PLRA applied to Plaintiffs' motion to extend jurisdiction. The court then denied the motion on the ground that Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a current and ongoing violation of their constitutional rights. Plaintiffs argue that the court should not have applied the PLRA because extension of the Judgment is not prospective relief subject to the strict limitations of that statute. In the alternative, they argue that, even if the PLRA does constrain the district court's power to extend the Judgment, the court applied the wrong legal standard. We will examine each of these two arguments in turn. 42
43 The PLRA limits the power of federal courts to grant or approve certain remedies in actions challenging prison conditions: 44 Prospective relief in any civil action with respect to prison conditions shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs. The court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right. 45 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A). As defined by Congress, the term `prospective relief' means all relief other than compensatory monetary damages. Id. § 3626(g)(7). [T]he term `relief' means all relief in any form that may be granted or approved by the court, and includes consent decrees.... Id. § 3626(g)(9). 46 Defendants contend that Plaintiffs' motion for extension of jurisdiction was a request for prospective relief within the meaning of the PLRA. They note that Plaintiffs asked the district court to craft an order that would have governed health services at the Prison for two years after January 12, 1999, making the request both nonmonetary and future oriented. That being so, Defendants argue that § 3626(a)(1)(A) of the PLRA constrained the district court's power to extend jurisdiction over the Judgment. 47 Plaintiffs counter that their motion did not call for prospective relief because it did not require the court to devise any new remedy. They assert that the motion was nothing more than an attempt to enforce the existing terms of a court order by following the procedures laid out in that order. Because the district court retained continuing jurisdiction over the Judgment, Plaintiffs claim that the PLRA cannot limit the district court's power to extend its jurisdiction. 48 Plaintiffs' position is rebutted by Ninth Circuit precedents interpreting the meaning of prospective relief under the PLRA. We have explained that [t]he PLRA restricts the power of the court to grant prospective relief regarding any civil action respecting prison conditions. Oluwa v. Gomez, 133 F.3d 1237, 1239 (9th Cir.1998) (emphasis added). The fact that the Judgment was approved before the enactment of the PLRA does not change the status of future remedial requirements as prospective relief. Id. at 1240. To the contrary, we have held that § 3626 applies to all relief other than monetary damages `whether such relief was originally granted or approved before, on, or after' the PLRA's enactment. Gilmore, 220 F.3d at 999 n. 15 (quoting Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-134, § 101, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-70). Thus, the Judgment and any extension thereof constitute prospective relief under the PLRA. 49 In support of their view, Plaintiffs cite Essex County Jail Annex Inmates v. Treffinger, 18 F.Supp.2d 445 (D.N.J.1998), and Inmates of Occoquan v. Barry, C.A. No. 86-2128 (D.D.C. July 23, 1996) (unpublished disposition). Of course, neither case binds us. Further, both cases are readily distinguishable. 50 In each of those cases, the plaintiffs filed motions for contempt in order to enforce substantive provisions of their respective consent decrees. Neither decision addressed a situation in which the plaintiffs were seeking to extend the life of an expiring decree or in which the defendants were seeking to terminate a decree pursuant to the PLRA. See, e.g., Essex County, 18 F.Supp.2d at 462 (The enforcement of a valid consent decree is not the kind of `prospective relief' considered by § 3626(a). As long as the underlying consent order remains valid—neither party has made a 3626(b) motion to terminate—the court must be able to enforce it.). 51 In short, the district court properly concluded that the prospective-relief provisions of the PLRA apply to Plaintiffs' motion to extend jurisdiction. 2
52 Plaintiffs argue in the alternative that, even if § 3626 limited the district court's ability to extend jurisdiction, the court applied the wrong legal standard. Plaintiffs assert that the district court erred by requiring them to prove a current and ongoing violation of their constitutional rights. The quoted standard appears in § 3626(b)(3), which pertains to termination proceedings and which states in part: Prospective relief shall not terminate if the court makes written findings based on the record that prospective relief remains necessary to correct a current and ongoing violation of the Federal right.... (Emphasis added.) We are not persuaded by Plaintiffs' argument. 53 The quoted standard for termination does not differ materially from the standard to be applied in deciding whether prospective relief is proper. To prevail on their motion to extend jurisdiction, Plaintiffs must establish that the prospective relief extend[s] no further than necessary to correct the violation of their Eighth Amendment rights. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). This standard, too, requires the existence of a constitutional violation in need of correction. The text of § 3626(a)(1)(A) suggests that, in the absence of a current and ongoing violation, there is no occasion to fashion prospective relief to cure the violation. In other words, if a violation no longer exists, the statute does not permit the court to order prospective relief. As we have declared: 54 [T]he general standard for granting prospective relief differs little from the standard set forth in § 3626(b)(2) for terminating prospective relief, or from the standard set forth in § 3626(b)(3) for preserving relief to correct a current and ongoing violation. The limits on federal court jurisdiction are essentially the same — no more than necessary to correct the underlying constitutional violation. 55 Gilmore, 220 F.3d at 1006. 56 To summarize, the district court properly applied the PLRA's prospective-relief provisions to Plaintiffs' motion to extend jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Judgment expired by its own terms unless Plaintiffs proved that the Prison's mental health and dental services violated the Eighth Amendment, an issue to which we now turn. 3