Opinion ID: 71507
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: directed verdict or motion to dismiss?

Text: Before determining the applicable standard the Magistrate Judge should have employed, we must decide the basis upon which the Magistrate Judge ruled; i.e., did he treat the notices as motions to dismiss under 12(b)(1), after hearing the evidence, or did he grant a motion for directed verdict. On appeal, Garcia contends the Magistrate Judge granted a directed verdict. From the record before us and after reading the Magistrate Judge's order disposing of the notices, it appears that the procedural posture set forth in the Magistrate Judge's order is more accurately described as a ruling on a motion to dismiss, instead of on a motion for directed verdict. It seems the Magistrate Judge, during the course of the jury trial, simultaneously conducted an evidentiary hearing on the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. After hearing both sides present evidence on the issue, the Magistrate Judge concluded it was without jurisdiction to hear the case. In addition, Copenhaver/Bell's motion for directed verdict was based on Garcia's absence of establishing pretext, and not on the district court's lack of jurisdiction. Neither in his ruling from the bench nor in his written order disposing of the notices does the Magistrate Judge mention pretext. Rather, the substance of his two related rulings was subject matter jurisdiction. The language contained in the written order is clear. The Magistrate Judge dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, in essence, the Magistrate Judge treated Copenhaver/Bell's notices as motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As such, we will evaluate the case in light of the standards governing Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) motions.