Opinion ID: 2590571
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Third-party retaliation

Text: An action for retaliatory discharge is founded on the proposition that because an employee filed a complaint for some type of discrimination against the employer, she was discharged. [11] Juanita's retaliation claim is actually a third-party retaliation claim because she alleged that Motel 6 retaliated against her due to Robert's activities, rather than her own. [12] We have not previously decided whether Nevada's anti-retaliation statute, NRS 613.340, supports a retaliation claim when the complaining party has not engaged in protected activity. NRS 613.340(1) states: It is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment... because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by NRS 613.310 to 613.435, inclusive, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding or hearing under NRS 613.310 to 613.435, inclusive. Similarly, Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII], or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII]. [13] Federal appellate courts have concluded that Title VII's plain language precludes a third-party retaliation claim because of the pronoun he, which applies only to parties personally engaged in protected activity. [14] Additionally, in Smith v. Riceland Foods, Inc., [15] the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals opined that third-party retaliation claims are not necessary to protect spouses or significant others because Title VII also prohibits employers from retaliating against employees for `assist[ing] or participat[ing] in any manner' in a proceeding under Title VII. [16] The Riceland court reasoned that in most situations, a third party will fall within Title VII's protection because she will have participated in some manner in the Title VII proceeding. [17] The Riceland court also acknowledged that following anything other than Title VII's plain meaning would create problems in deciding who qualifies for protection under the statute. [18] Unlike the federal appellate courts, some federal district courts have held that third-party retaliation claims are actionable even when the party did not explicitly engage in protected activity. [19] These courts have based their conclusion on the primary purpose of Title VII's anti-retaliation provision  to ensure unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms  and have necessarily ignored the statute's plain language. [20] This policy approach was soundly rejected by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Fogleman v. Mercy Hospital, Inc. [21] Although the Fogleman court recognized the conflict between Title VII's plain meaning and its general policy objectives, the court concluded that the statute had to be read according to its plain meaning. To do otherwise would implicate the separation of powers: The preference for plain meaning is based on the constitutional separation of powers  Congress makes the law and the judiciary interprets it. In doing so we generally assume that the best evidence of Congress's intent is what it says in the texts of the statutes. [22] Although we recognize that, as with Title VII, a conflict exists between NRS 613.340(1)'s plain language and the statute's policy objectives, we are bound to follow a statute's plain meaning when the language is unambiguous. [23] NRS 613.340(1), like Title VII, limits the initiation of a retaliatory discrimination action to those individuals that have opposed an unlawful employment practice or participated in any manner in a proceeding brought under NRS 613.310 to 613.435. To ignore the plain meaning of NRS 613.340(1) would be an impermissible judicial excursion into the legislature's domain. Therefore, to sustain a retaliation action under NRS 613.340(1), the party bringing the action must have personally engaged in activity protected by NRS 613.340(1). Here, the record does not demonstrate that Juanita participated in Robert's NERC claim, nor does it reveal any instance of Juanita opposing Motel 6's employment practices. Accordingly, Juanita did not engage in activity protected by NRS 613.340(1), and the district court properly granted summary judgment to Motel 6 on Juanita's third-party retaliation claim.