Opinion ID: 1668397
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: did the trial court err in denying koester's motion for a judgment of acquittal?

Text: Koester moved for a judgment of acquittal at the close of state's case and, again, at the close of all the evidence. Both motions were denied. After trial, Koester filed another motion for a judgment of acquittal or, in the alternative, a motion for a new trial. A motions hearing was conducted on March 26, 1993 and, on April 13, 1993, the trial court entered its order denying the motions. As his first issue, Koester contends that the trial court erred in denying his acquittal motions because state failed to offer sufficient evidence to establish he had the specific intent necessary to aid and abet the commission of an aggravated assault. In that regard, Koester argues there was no showing that he had the specific intent to promote or facilitate the commission of an aggravated assault. [3] `[The] standard of review on a denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal is whether the state set forth sufficient evidence from which the jury could reasonably find the defendant guilty of the crime charged. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict. A guilty verdict will not be set aside if the state's evidence and all favorable inferences that can be drawn therefrom support a rational theory of guilt.' State v. Ganrude, 499 N.W.2d 608, 610 (S.D.1993) (quoting State v. Blalack, 434 N.W.2d 55, 59-60 (S.D.1988) (citations omitted). Koester rests his contention of failure of proof of intent on this court's previous holdings that mere presence at the scene of the crime is insufficient, in and of itself, to establish that one is an aider and abettor in the commission of an offense. See, e.g., State v. Bradley, 431 N.W.2d 317 (S.D.1988). Here, Koester asserts that state offered no direct evidence of his specific intent to aid, abet or advise in the commission of an aggravated assault on the occupants of the Dell Rapids car. In essence, he contends the proof at trial merely showed he was present in his vehicle on the interstate during the incident, but, there was no showing that he did anything to promote or facilitate the commission of the aggravated assault. We disagree. SDCL 22-18-1.1(5) provides: Any person who: