Opinion ID: 1926660
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: These assignments of error are without merit.

Text: ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NOS. 34, 35, 39, 40, 42, 45, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55 AND 57 These assignments of error relate to alleged errors occurring during voir dire examination of prospective jurors. In Assignments of Error Nos. 48, 51, 52, 53 and 54, defendant contends the trial judge erred in excusing for cause four prospective jurors challenged by the state based on their sentiments regarding the death penalty and in denying his motion for mistrial based on this ground. The record reflects that these veniremen clearly indicated they could not return a verdict carrying the death penalty even if such verdict were supported by the evidence. Accordingly, the trial judge did not err in excusing these jurors for cause. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968); La.Code Crim.P. art. 798; State v. Williams, 343 So.2d 1026 (La.1977). In any event, in view of the decision by the United States Supreme Court in Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 96 S.Ct. 3001,49 L.Ed.2d 974 (1976) declaring Louisiana's mandatory death penalty for first degree murder unconstitutional and the subsequent decisions of this court under the mandate of Roberts, defendant is entitled to be resentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence for twenty years, which sentence represents the most severe valid penalty established by the legislature for criminal homicide at the time of this offense. State v. Jenkins, 340 So.2d 157 (La.1976); State v. Clark, 340 So.2d 208 (La.1976). We have uniformly held that a defendant insulated from the death penalty has no valid Witherspoon complaint. State v. Williams, supra ; State v. Nicolaus, 340 So.2d 296 (La.1976); State v. Hunter, 340 So.2d 226 (La.1976); State v. Miles, 339 So.2d 735 (La.1976). In Assignments of Error Nos. 34, 40, 45, 47, 49 and 50, defendant contends the trial judge erred in overruling his objections and motions for mistrial based on the state's use of its peremptory challenges to exclude black prospective jurors allegedly in violation of his rights to due process and equal protection under the law. The United States Supreme Court, in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965), has held that an accused is not denied the equal protection of the law when the state, through the use of its peremptory challenges, prevents blacks from serving on the jury unless he can prove systematic exclusion over a period of time. This court has adopted those views expressed in Swain and has refused to find a denial of equal protection unless this historical pattern of systematic exclusion is demonstrated. State v. Johnson, 343 So.2d 155 (La.1977); State v. Bennett, 341 So.2d 847 (La.1976); State v. Haynes, 339 So.2d 328 (La.1976). Defendant has not made the requisite showing in this case. Accordingly the trial judge did not err in overruling defendant's objections and motions for mistrial predicated on this ground. Defendant contends in Assignment of Error No. 35 that the trial judge erred in denying his challenge for cause of prospective juror Patricia Brockway. He argues that the prospective juror was not impartial. Defendant exercised a peremptory challenge against Mrs. Brockway and exhausted his peremptory challenges before the completion of the panel. La.Code Crim.P. art. 800. This court has repeatedly held that the trial judge is vested with broad discretion in ruling on challenges for cause, and only where it appears, upon review of the voir dire examination as a whole, that the judge's exercise of that discretion has been arbitrary or unreasonable, resulting in prejudice to the accused, will this court reverse the ruling of the trial judge. State v. Passman, 345 So.2d 874 (La.1977); State v. Weathers, 320 So.2d 895 (La.1975). During voir dire examination, Mrs. Brockway stated that she would give defendant the benefit of the doubt in a case based on circumstantial evidence, that she recognized defendant's presumption of innocence and that she would require the state to prove defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. At one time during her examination, she indicated that she would expect defendant to present some evidence in his own behalf; however, after further examination and questioning, she maintained that she would return a verdict of not guilty if the state did not prove defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and that she understood that defendant was presumed innocent and was not obligated to do anything to prove his innocence. Mrs. Brockway also expressed some concern that she might be influenced by what she had read about the crime, but on further interrogation, she indicated that she could set aside any preconceived ideas and allow her verdict to rest completely on the evidence in the courtroom and not on reports of the news media. We are satisfied that Mrs. Brockway's testimony on voir dire, taken as a whole, does not support defendant's contention that the trial judge abused his discretion in denying defendant's challenge for cause of this juror. In State v. Nix, 327 So.2d 301 (La.1975) and State v. Johnson, 324 So.2d 349 (La.1975), we ruled that similar testimony on voir dire examination did not warrant the granting of a challenge for cause. In Assignment of Error No. 39, defendant contends the trial judge improperly excused for cause prospective juror Paul Landry. La.Code Crim.P. art. 797 provides that a juror may be challenged for cause when he will not accept the law as given to him by the court. In response to questioning by the trial judge, Mr. Landry clearly indicated that he could not accept or apply the law regarding principals to a crime. Accordingly, the trial judge properly granted the state's challenge for cause of this prospective juror. In Assignment of Error No. 42, defendant contends that the trial judge erred in overruling his objection to the court's conducting its own voir dire examination in addition to that of counsel. La.Code Crim.P. art. 786 clearly provides that the court, the state and the defendant shall have the right to examine prospective jurors. During voir dire, defendant was afforded wide latitude in obtaining information sufficient to intelligently exercise his right to challenge prospective jurors for cause or peremptorily. Accordingly, this assignment of error is without substance. In Assignment of Error No. 55, defendant complains of a state question seeking to determine whether a prospective juror could return a verdict of guilty, knowing that it would carry a mandatory death penalty, if he were convinced of the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant stated no grounds for his objection to the question. It is well settled that this court will not review an objection where the grounds therefor are not made known to the trial judge. State v. Brown, 338 So.2d 686 (La.1976); State v. Powell, 325 So.2d 791 (La.1976). In any event, we find that the question complained of was entirely proper in that it elicited information necessary to a determination of whether the state had good cause to challenge the prospective juror under the provisions of La.Code Crim.P. art. 798. Accordingly, the trial judge correctly overruled defendant's objection. Finally, in Assignment of Error No. 57, defendant objected to a line of questioning wherein the prosecutor endeavored to determine whether a prospective juror could accept the law regarding co-conspirators and explained: The reason I'm asking, you haven't been sworn as a juror, yet; and you have a right as a citizen to disagree with the law or think it's a bad law and not be in a position where you're forced to do something that is uncomfortable to you . . . Defendant objected on the ground that the question presupposed a prior incorrect statement of the law of co-conspirators by the prosecutor. Whether or not the prosecutor had arguably misstated the law, the judge subsequently correctly explained the law to the juror who acknowledged that he would accept the law as stated by the judge. We are satisfied that defendant suffered no prejudice under the circumstances. These assignments of error have no merit.