Opinion ID: 2614563
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Interests Underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause

Text: The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment, guarantees that no person shall be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb[.] Similarly, article I, section 10 of the Hawai`i Constitution provides in relevant part that nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy[.] Based upon these provisions, we have long recognized that there are three separate and distinct aspects to the protections offered by the double jeopardy clause. `Double jeopardy protects individuals against: (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense.' Whiting, 88 Hawai`i at 359, 966 P.2d at 1085 (quoting Quitog, 85 Hawai`i at 141, 938 P.2d at 572 (quoting Higa, 79 Hawai`i at 5, 897 P.2d at 932, and citing State v. Lessary, 75 Haw. 446, 454, 865 P.2d 150, 154 (1994), and United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989))). These protections seek to balance two primary and sometimes countervailing interests underlying double jeopardy defendants' interests and societal interests.
Traditionally, the double jeopardy clause has been viewed as safeguarding three interests of defendants: (1) the interest in being free from successive prosecutions; (2) the interest in the finality of judgments; and (3) the interest in having the trial completed in front of the first tribunal. See Rick A. Bierschbach, Note, One Bite at the Apple: Reversals of Convictions Tainted by Prosecutorial Misconduct and the Ban of Double Jeopardy, 94 Mich. L.Rev. 1346, 1348-49 (1996). With regard to a defendant's interest in restricting the prosecution to a single attempt to prove his or her guilt at trial, the United States Supreme Court has offered two fundamental bases. First, multiple prosecutions seriously disrupt a defendant's personal life during trial and create a potential for governmental harassment of the defendant. See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503-04, 98 S.Ct. 824, 54 L.Ed.2d 717 (1978) (noting that a second prosecution increases the financial and emotional burden on the accused and prolongs the period in which he or she is stigmatized by an unresolved accusation of wrongdoing). Second, repeated prosecutions enhance the likelihood that an innocent defendant may be convicted. See id.; see also United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 128, 101 S.Ct. 426, 66 L.Ed.2d 328 (1980) (noting that reprosecution allows the government to gain advantage from what it learns at the first trial about the strengths of the defense and its own weaknesses); Lessary, 75 Haw. at 455-56, 865 P.2d at 155 (quoting Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 518-19, 110 S.Ct. 2084, 109 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990)). Similarly, the interest in the finality of judgments contemplates the importance to the defendant of being able, once and for all, to conclude his confrontation with society. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 486, 91 S.Ct. 547, 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971); see also Quitog, 85 Hawai`i at 148-49, 938 P.2d at 579-80 (noting the constitutional policy of finality for the defendant's benefit (quoting United States v. Cavanaugh, 948 F.2d 405, 413-17 (8th Cir.1991))). Related to but separate from this interest is the defendant's interest in having the trial completed by the first tribunal. See Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 36, 98 S.Ct. 2156, 57 L.Ed.2d 24 (1978) (recognizing right to have trial completed by a particular tribunal). In doing so, the defendant is afforded the protection against manipulation designed to prevent the initial fact-finder from reaching a verdict in the defendant's case. Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 25.1(b) (2d ed.1992).
Balanced against the defendant's interests is society's need for effective enforcement of its criminal laws. See, e.g., Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 38, 109 S.Ct. 285, 102 L.Ed.2d 265 (1988) (noting that a defendant's interest in a fair trial must be balanced against society's interest in punishing one whose guilt is clear (quoting United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466, 84 S.Ct. 1587, 12 L.Ed.2d 448 (1964))). To that end, the Court has recognized that society must be afforded the right to one full and fair opportunity to prove a defendant's guilt. See, e.g., Washington, 434 U.S. at 505, 98 S.Ct. 824. When trial error deprives society of its right to attempt to prove the defendant's guilt in a single prosecution, the interests of society in vindicating its laws generally outweigh the double jeopardy interests of a defendant. See, e.g., Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 685, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982); see also, e.g., State v. Lincoln, 72 Haw. 480, 490-91, 825 P.2d 64, 70 (1992) (noting the necessity for trial court to recognize and weigh the State's interest in prosecuting crime against fundamental fairness to the defendant) (citing State v. Moriwake, 65 Haw. 47, 647 P.2d 705 (1982), and State v. Alvey, 67 Haw. 49, 678 P.2d 5 (1984)).
Having set forth the competing interests underlying double jeopardy, we now consider the effect of the double jeopardy clause on prosecutorial power. We have repeatedly recognized the following purpose of the double jeopardy clause: the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him [or her] to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him [or her] to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he [or she] may be found guilty. Whiting, 88 Hawai`i at 359, 966 P.2d at 1085 (quoting Quitog, 85 Hawai`i at 140, 938 P.2d at 571) (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957)) (brackets added). In doing so, we have implicitly acknowledged the enormous imbalance of power between the prosecution and the criminal defendant. Indeed, the prosecution wields great discretion in the decision to charge and what to charge; in the control of vast governmental resources in investigating and preparing a case; in the plea bargaining process for the majority of cases that are resolved without trial; and in the deference and authority the prosecution commands before juries in those cases that are tried to a conclusion. Kenneth Rosenthal, Prosecutor Misconduct, Convictions, and Double Jeopardy: Case Studies in an Emerging Jurisprudence, 71 Temp. L.Rev. 887 (1998) (footnote omitted). [6] The double jeopardy clause addresses this reality by imposing a potential constitutional bar to reprosecution where there is egregious misconduct on the part of the prosecution. In this connection, we have held that retrial is barred where `the defendant's mistrial motion is the necessary response to ... prosecutorial misconduct designed to avoid an acquittal, or is necessitated by deliberate misconduct which has for its intended purpose the denial of the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial[.]' State v. Baranco, 77 Hawai`i 351, 355, 884 P.2d 729, 733 (1994) (quoting State v. Pulawa, 58 Haw. 377, 382, 569 P.2d 900, 905 (1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 925, 98 S.Ct. 2818, 56 L.Ed.2d 768 (1978)) (brackets in original). The juxtaposition of the prosecution's great discretion and the substantial interests of the defendant, who bears the brunt of the prosecution's exercise of its power, gives rise to the special standards of conduct discussed fully in Section III.A.1. above. As discussed, the prosecution's primary duty is not merely to seek a conviction. See Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 648-49, 94 S.Ct. 1868 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (noting that the prosecution's function is not to tack as many skins of victims as possible to the wall). Rather, as stated, the prosecution's primary duty is to seek justice, to exercise the highest good faith in the interest of the public and to avoid even the appearance of unfair advantage over the accused. Quitog, 85 Hawai`i at 136 n. 19, 938 P.2d at 567 n. 19 (citations omitted). To this end, the prosecution must serve the truth-seeking and fairness functions of trial and to pursue and present relevant evidence, regardless of which side it benefits. Therefore, unlike any other advocate, the prosecutor must always be mindful of his or her primary obligation to seek justice while at the same time fulfilling his or her obligation to seek convictions.