Opinion ID: 213531
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of Prior Felony

Text: Roberts argues the district court erred in admitting evidence of his 1999 conviction under Rule 404(b). That rule provides: Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). “We review the district court's decision to admit evidence under 404(b) for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Commanche, 577 F.3d 1261, 1266 (10th Cir. 2009). We “will not disturb an evidentiary ruling absent a distinct showing that it was based on a clearly erroneous finding of fact, or an erroneous conclusion of law or - 10 - manifests a clear error in judgment.” United States v. Contreras, 536 F.3d 1167, 1170 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotations omitted). The admission of “other acts” evidence under Rule 404(b) requires a four-factor inquiry: “(1) whether the evidence is offered for a proper purpose, (2) its relevancy, (3) that the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect, and (4) a limiting instruction is given if the defendant so requests.” United States v. Cardenas Garcia, 596 F.3d 788, 797 (10th Cir.) (quotations omitted), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3299 (2010). “Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion, and . . . accordingly 404(b) evidence, like other relevant evidence, should not lightly be excluded when it is central to the prosecution’s case.” United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1280 (10th Cir. 2003) (quotations omitted). “The threshold inquiry . . . is whether that evidence is probative of a material issue other than character.” Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 686 (1988)). a) Purpose “To obtain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for possession by a felon of a firearm or ammunition, the government had to prove (1) [Roberts] was convicted of a felony; (2) he thereafter knowingly possessed a firearm and/or ammunition; and (3) the possession was in or affecting interstate commerce. United States v. Wilson, 107 F.3d 774, 779 (10th Cir. 1997). The government maintains the evidence of Roberts’ 1999 possession of a firearm was admissible to show he knowingly possessed the gun tossed into the dumpster. Roberts counters the prosecutor’s use of the evidence in crossexamination to show his propensity to carry a firearm belies this contention. - 11 - The only contested element was Roberts’ knowing possession of the gun. Roberts “placed his knowledge of the firearm’s presence at the scene on his person at issue by pleading not guilty to the crime and requiring the government to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Oaks, 606 F.3d 530, 539 (8th Cir. 2010.) “Rule 404(b) explicitly contemplates the admission of evidence of prior convictions to establish intent.” United States v. Cherry, 433 F.3d 698, 701 (10th Cir. 2005). Roberts’ prior conviction for possession of a firearm “addresses the material issue of his knowledge of the presence of the firearm and his intent to possess it.” Oaks, 606 F.3d at 539. Thus, Roberts’ 1999 conviction, if it meets the other 404(b) requirements, is admissible. b) Relevancy Roberts argues his prior conviction is too remote in time to be relevant. “[T]here is no absolute rule regarding the number of years that can separate offenses. Rather, the court applies a reasonableness standard and examines the facts and circumstances of each case.” United States v. Franklin, 704 F.2d 1183, 1189 (10th Cir. 1983); see United States v. Cuch, 842 F.2d 1173, 1178 (10th Cir. 1988) (previous assault eight years ago not too remote); United States v. Walker, 470 F.3d 1271, 1275 (8th Cir. 2006) (“[T]here is no specific number of years beyond which prior bad acts are no longer relevant to the issue of intent.”) (quotations omitted). In calculating the time span between Roberts’ offense and the instant crimes, we do not count any periods of incarceration. See Cherry, 433 F.3d at 702 n. 4. Roberts’ prior gun possession occurred on May 10, 1999, and his current offense occurred on April 6, 2008. As far as we can tell from the appellate record, Roberts was incarcerated - 12 - for at least six years during that period. Consequently, the applicable time between Roberts’ 1999 conviction and the instant crime is approximately three years. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Roberts’ 1999 conviction because it was too remote in time. Roberts also argues his 1999 conviction was irrelevant because the factual circumstances surrounding that conviction are distinct from the circumstances in this case. Apparently, Roberts’ possession of the gun in 1999 was linked to his involvement in a burglary. He argues the situation here, his possession of a gun at a social event, is so unlike the 1999 incident that the two have no bearing on each other. Relevant evidence is “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. The fact Roberts previously possessed a gun in his right front pants pocket is certainly relevant to whether he knowingly possessed a weapon in his right front pants pocket on the night of his arrest. The circumstances were sufficiently similar to establish relevance. c) Prejudicial effect Roberts argues the probative value of the 1999 conviction was substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice.9 “[T]his determination . . . calls for a common sense 9 Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides: Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. - 13 - assessment of all the circumstances surrounding the extrinsic offense, including prosecutorial need, overall similarity between the extrinsic act and the charged offense, as well as temporal remoteness.” Jernigan, 341 F.3d at 1283 (quotations omitted). As discussed above, the 1999 conviction carried sufficient similarity and was not too remote in time. In addition, its probative value to the government was substantial. There was no physical evidence connecting Roberts to the gun and Roberts’ defense was that Pena and Thatcher were lying about seeing him throw the gun into the dumpster. Only the unembellished relevant facts of Roberts’ prior conviction were revealed. Shea testified Roberts denied he had a weapon but, when searched, Shea discovered a gun in the right front pocket of Roberts’ pants. The court did not allow any further details of the prior conviction and immediately provided a limiting instruction. See United States v. Trogdon, 575 F.3d 762, 766 (8th Cir. 2009) (danger of unfair prejudice negated when facts of prior conviction limited and court gave a limiting instruction), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1116 (2010). Upon review of the requisite balancing under rule 403, “we give the evidence its maximum reasonable probative force and its minimum reasonable prejudicial value. ”United States v. Cerno, 529 F.3d 926, 935 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotations omitted). “Because district court judges have front-row seats during trial and extensive experience ruling on evidentiary issues, our review affords the district court considerable discretion in performing the Rule 403 balancing test.” Id. at 935-36 (quotations omitted). We cannot say the district court’s decision to admit this evidence manifests a clear error in judgment. - 14 - d) Limiting Instruction The district court gave the jury an appropriate limiting instruction immediately following Officer Shea’s testimony. It informed the jury that the parties had agreed to stipulate to the fact that the Roberts had a prior felony conviction and admonished the jury: The evidence that you just heard . . . relates to the nature of [Roberts’] prior felony conviction. The nature of the conviction being that he previously had a weapon, a firearm, in 1999 . . . relative to the prior conviction. You may consider that evidence . . . only for the purpose of judging whether he knowingly possessed a weapon in this case . . . . That’s a limiting instruction. You can’t consider the fact that his previous conviction was for a felon in possession of a firearm for any other purpose than judging whether he knowingly possessed a firearm in this case. (R. Vol. 3 at 273.) This instruction appropriately constrained the jury’s consideration of the evidence and “[w]e presume jurors will remain true to their oath and conscientiously follow the trial court's instructions.” United States v. Carter, 973 F.2d 1509, 1513 (10th Cir. 1992). Moreover, in addition to the instruction following Shea’s testimony, the jury received instruction explaining how it must limit its consideration of evidence at several points before it began its deliberations. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Roberts’ prior conviction.