Opinion ID: 1323256
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claims Against the Commissioners and Kleinheksel

Text: James asserts that the Commissioners and Kleinheksel, in their individual capacities acting under color of law, deprived him of his First Amendment rights when they terminated him for reporting misconduct in the Public Works Department in his June 19, 2003 letter and for running for County Commissioner in 2004. The Defendants argue that there is no evidence establishing that the Commissioners or Kleinheksel had any role in terminating James. To state a section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must (1) allege a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Moore v. Willis Indep. Sch. Dist., 233 F.3d 871, 874 (5th Cir.2000). A plaintiff must establish that the defendant was either personally involved in the deprivation or that his wrongful actions were causally connected to the deprivation. Anderson v. Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 439, 443 (5th Cir.1999). A supervisor is not personally liable for his subordinate's actions in which he had no involvement. [2] Id. at 443-44.
In his complaint, James alleges that the Commissioners are personally liable because they are the final decision and policy makers regarding the employment decision for which the Plaintiff brings this suit, but he points to no competent summary judgment evidence to support this allegation. In his deposition, James testified that he believed the Commissioners unanimously agreed to terminate him, but when asked if he had any evidence of this he said, [n]ot at this time. In James's response to the Defendants' motion for summary judgment, he pointed to an article dated March 16, 2006 in the Dallas Morning News, which stated that Jaynes excused himself from a commissioners meeting that led to Mr. James' termination. [3] Lee Powell, Defeated Candidate Loses Job, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, March 16, 2004, at B1. Newspaper articles, however, are not proper summary judgment evidence to prove the truth of the facts that they report because they are inadmissible hearsay. Roberts v. City of Shreveport, 397 F.3d 287, 295 (5th Cir.2005). On the other hand, the Defendants point to a number of pieces of evidence to support that Bilyeu was the sole decision-maker with regard to James's termination. In his affidavit, Bilyeu states that he had the authority to terminate James and decided to do so after the March 2004 primary. He states that he was not required to receive approval of this decision by the Commissioners, but he chose to inform them of his decision because James had been a candidate for County Commissioner. Bilyeu also testified that the Commissioners did not vote on James's termination. His testimony is corroborated by Cynthia Jacobson, Director of Human Resources for Collin County, who states in her affidavit that Bilyeu alone made the decision to terminate James in March 2004. After considering the entire record, there is no evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to find that James was terminated by the Commissioners rather than by Bilyeu. [4] We therefore hold that the district court did not err by granting the Defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissing James's claim against the Commissioners in their individual capacity.
The district court concluded that Kleinheksel was sued only in his official capacity because James failed to specify in any of his responsive briefings in which capacity he was suing Kleinheksel. James argues that he did not respond to this issue because it was never raised by the Defendants. In the Defendants' Original Answer, they aver that James's allegation that Kleinheksel was `at all relevant times a Collin County employee, [and] he acted under color of law' is vague and ambiguous, and, as such, Defendants lack sufficient knowledge or information to confirm or deny it. Furthermore, in the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Brief in Support, they state that it is unclear from James's Complaint whether he was asserting a claim against Kleinheksel in his individual capacity, and that even if James was bringing a claim against Kleinheksel in his individual capacity that claim would fail because Kleinheksel was not personally involved in the decision to terminate James. They again addressed this issue in their Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. James responded to this argument in his Sur-Reply to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, so the issue was properly before the district court. Therefore, James's assertion that this argument was not properly raised below by the Defendants is incorrect. Below James stated in his sur-reply that his claim against Kleinheksel in his individual capacity was based upon the May 8, 2003 reprimand Kleinheksel issued to James. There are a number of problems with this argument. The first being that James does not seek relief related to his May 8, 2003 reprimand in his never amended or supplemented original complaint, and there is no evidence of any damages that flowed from that reprimand. Second, he fails to make this argument in his brief to this court. See Procter & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 376 F.3d 496, 499 n. 1 (5th Cir.2004) (Failure adequately to brief an issue on appeal constitutes waiver of that argument.). Since James fails to present any competent summary judgment evidence that Kleinheksel participated in the decision to terminate his employment, [5] the district court did not err by dismissing James's claims against Kleinheksel in his individual capacity.