Opinion ID: 2633881
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Asserted Inducements by Sacramento County Officers

Text: Defendant contends his confessions to the Lactawen murder, which were admitted at the penalty phase of the trial, should have been suppressed because they were the product of improper coercion by officers from the Sacramento County Sheriffs Department. We disagree. After defendant confessed to the Garcia and Sorensen murders, the Placer County officers contacted homicide investigators in the Sacramento County Sheriffs Department who were investigating a series of other murders of young women in the Interstate Highway 5 corridor in Sacramento County (the 1-5 murders). During the first interview with the Sacramento County officers, defendant denied any involvement in any murders other than the two to which he had confessed. In a second interview, defendant continued to deny involvement in the 1-5 murders but admitted having committed another murder, which turned out to be the Lactawen homicide. After defendant provided details of that incident, the officers realized the murder was under the jurisdiction of the City of Sacramento Police Department and contacted homicide officers in that agency. Those officers then conducted a third interview, during which defendant provided more details of the Lactawen murder. [11] These interviews were tape-recorded, and a redacted recording of the second interview, with references to the 1-5 murders excised, was played to the jury along with a recording of the third interview. Defendant argues these recorded statements were involuntary, and thus improperly admitted, because his will was overborne when the Sacramento County officers, during their second interview, threatened to withhold psychiatric treatment if defendant did not confess, promised him leniency and treatment if he did confess, and predicted defendant's mental difficulties would seriously worsen if he did not talk but would lessen if he did. The trial court found the officers did make inducements but their statements did not extend beyond suggestions defendant would realize some generalized benefit by speaking. More significantly, the court found the representations that were made were not the cause of defendant's decision to make the statements. Rather, the trial court concluded, defendant chose to confess because of his preexisting belief that that's what you did and his desire to unburden himself. On appeal, defendant argues primarily that the trial court erred by finding that the actions of the officers did not constitute improper coercion. We need not resolve that question. Even assumingwithout decidingthe statements made to defendant might constitute improper promises or threats under some circumstances, we conclude the trial court did not err by finding that a preponderance of the evidence in this case established defendant's decision to confess to the Lactawen murder was voluntary and was completely separate and apart from any apparent inducements that [the officers] might have given to him. (See Connelly, supra, 479 U.S. at p. 167, 107 S.Ct. 515; Maury, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 404-405, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1.) Defendant's challenge to the trial court's finding of a lack of causation centers on the circumstance that his confession to the Lactawen murder followed close in time to when the officers made their representations in attempting to convince him to talk. He argues, relying upon the Court of Appeal's decision in People v: Cahill (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 296, 316, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, that there is a rebuttable presumption, his confession resulted from the representations, because of their temporal proximity. Assuming, without deciding, defendant's reading of People v. Cahill, supra, 22 Cal.App.4th 296, 28 Cal. Rptr.2d 1, is a correct statement of the law, [12] we nonetheless conclude the totality of the circumstances in this case establishes defendant's confession was not the product of the representations made by the officers. First, the tape-recorded statements upon which defendant relies were made after defendant had admitted committing a third murder. As the officer testified at the suppression hearing, the first interview conducted by the Sacramento County officers concerning the 1-5 murders was unproductive. The officers then returned a few minutes later with their supervisor, who covered a lot of the ground [they] had already talked about ... and got the same sort of denials that [they] had earlier encountered. Approximately 27 minutes into the second interview, defendant told the officers he had not committed any of the killings about which they were questioning him, but had committed another murder. It was at this point that the tape recorder was turned on. Although this tape recording begins with the officers discussing possible benefits defendant might receive by telling the officers about the murder, defendant's initial admission obviously came before those particular statements. Indeed, defendant testified at the hearing that the first time the Sacramento County officers mentioned obtaining help for him was when an officer made a statement about another murderer who supposedly was placed in a prison psychiatric facilitya statement found more than one minute into the tape (that is, after defendant had admitted committing another murder). There was no testimony at the suppression hearing concerning any promise, threat, or other inducement having been made before the tape recorder was turned on. Thus, the record does not contain evidence suggesting the officers made any representations before defendant confessed to the Lactawen murder, although defendant, apparently, had not yet supplied them with the details. Second, as the trial court observed, it appears from statements made by defendant during the interviews that he never believed he would receive the benefits discussed by the officers. Despite their statements that defendant could receive help if he talked, he repeatedly expressed his belief that even if he spoke to them he would be sent to prison, forgotten about, and receive no help. He continued to voice this belief even after providing the details of the murder. At no point during the interview did defendant explicitly state or even imply that he had been convinced otherwise. Although defendant testified at the suppression hearing that he believed, even before speaking to the authorities, he would receive help from them, this after-the-fact, self-serving testimony is directly contradicted by the prior contemporaneous expressions of his state of mind: that he would not receive any help, but instead would be sent to prison and forgotten. [13] In fact, on cross-examination, defendant testified he told the officers during the interviews he would not be offered a beneficial deal because the way the people were cussing at me and stuff out in the booking room, I figured it was over. [14] Third, defendant's own testimony at the suppression hearing established that his decision to confess to the three murders was based upon his own preexisting personal belief that a person should cooperate with the authorities and tell them what he knows about a crime, completely separate from any representations made by the officers. On direct examination, when asked about his Miranda waivers, defendant said, I figured I had to cooperate. I always did before. When I got in trouble in Idaho, I did it then. On cross-examination and redirect examination, defendant reiterated many times his belief that confessing is what you do when you are caught by the law. Indeed, the trial court examined defendant briefly, specifically asking him: When you say you felt you had to cooperate with [the officers], that was something you felt from before this ever started and you believed that all the way through? Defendant responded, Yes, because you tell them what you know. [15] In addition, the circumstance that defendant had confessed to the Placer County officers concerning two murders, although those officers had not given any inducements, is further evidence of his state of mind concerning his willingness to admit his role in the Lactawen murder regardless of any representation made by the Sacramento County officers. In sum, there is ample evidence supporting the conclusion that defendant's decision to confess to the Lactawen murder was not the product of any coercive tactic by the officers, but rather was based upon defendant's free will and his preexisting belief that when questioned by the authorities, a person should tell what he knows. This evidence substantially outweighs any implication arising from defendant's decision to confess to the Lactawen murder a relatively short time after the officers made their representations about defendant receiving helpthe primary circumstance cited by defendant in support of his claim of error. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress these statements.