Opinion ID: 346934
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: License Agreements

Text: 38 As noted supra, representatives of the copyright proprietors of each motion picture film listed in the indictment testified that their films had never been sold, but were only licensed in the various areas for distribution and exhibition. The license agreements for the films in each area of distribution were introduced in evidence. In analyzing these agreements, we find that they are in fact licenses and not sales. 39 Since no purpose would be served in detailing the provisions of each agreement, we find it sufficient to state that all the agreements purported to transfer only limited rights for the distribution and exhibition of the films for a limited time. All required return of the films at the end of the license period, and nearly all reserved title to the films in the copyright owner. Of those contracts which did not reserve title, none contained terms which were inconsistent with the theory of a limited license. The mere failure to expressly reserve title to the films does not require a finding that the films were sold, where the general tenor of the entire agreement is inconsistent with such a conclusion. Wise, 550 F.2d at 1191. The agreements also generally prohibited the licensee or any person from copying or duplicating any film print. Having reviewed the license agreements, we conclude that none constituted first sales. 40 The defense attempted to prove that motion pictures are generally bought and sold. Testimony was elicited, both on cross-examination of Government witnesses and from defense witnesses, that certain films had been sold in the past by copyright owners. However, none of these films were listed in the indictment. This evidence was insufficient to prove that any of the charge films had been subject to a first sale. The evidence might be relevant on the element of willfulness, which appellants do not challenge.