Opinion ID: 900615
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Inability to Locate Employment

Text: [¶ 19.] Belhassen's alternative argument for recovery is that he has been unable to locate employment and should be entitled to recover odd-lot benefits. Department rejected Belhassen's argument and concluded that Belhassen had not established unavailability of suitable employment by showing that he has made `reasonable efforts' to find work. Department noted that Belhassen completed and submitted an application to Carlisle Plastics, but [t]here is no evidence that Carlisle Plastics requested any further information or testing from Belhassen. Further, Department noted that there was no evidence in the record that Belhassen applied for any other employment. [¶ 20.] A review of the record supports the ALJ's conclusion that Belhassen's efforts to find suitable employment were not reasonable. We have previously stated that a claimant must make reasonable efforts. See Wagaman, 1998 SD 27, ¶ 35, 576 N.W.2d at 243. Despite his initial registration with Job Service, no evidence exists that Belhassen made any further contacts with Job Service or applied for any other employment. Further, the evidence shows that after six months with Job Service, Belhassen was placed on the inactive status. Belhassen failed to make any further efforts to find employment during this time whether it was through Job Service or by his own efforts. It is clear that Belhassen's efforts were far from reasonable. Based upon our review of the record, Belhassen has failed to show that the ALJ erred in not awarding him permanent total disability benefits. [¶ 21.] 2. Whether Belhassen is entitled to Cozine benefits. [¶ 22.]  Cozine benefits are those which are paid to a claimant for the loss of a part of the body or its loss of use. Kurtenbach v. Frito-Lay, 1997 SD 66, ¶ 29, 563 N.W.2d 869, 876 (citing Cozine v. Midwest Coast Transp., Inc., 454 N.W.2d 548, 551-52 (S.D.1990); SDCL 62-4-6). In Cozine, we held that a medical impairment rating will not always measure loss of use and [a]lthough the medical impairment rating given by a doctor is an important factor, the extent of loss of use does not necessarily equal the extent of medical impairment. 454 N.W.2d at 552. The South Dakota Legislature thereafter enacted SDCL 62-1-1(8), which provided at the time of Belhassen's injury: Permanent partial disability, a loss of use of the body or member of the body which is partial and permanent and shall be determined by a medical impairment rating, expressed as a percentage to the affected body part, using the guide to evaluation of permanent impairment established by the American medical association, third edition, November 1988. In addition to the medical impairment rating as set forth above, the employee is entitled to receive up to an additional fifty percent of the affected body part if the medical impairment rating given does not adequately reflect his loss of use as measured by the ability of the employee to perform work in the open labor market and to earn comparable wages taking into consideration the employee's education, training, experience and capacity for rehabilitation. There is a presumption that the employee has no loss of use beyond the medical impairment rating if the employee is able to return to his usual and customary line of employment[.] SDCL 62-1-1(8) (1993). [5] In determining whether Belhassen is entitled to Cozine benefits, [i]t is for Department to determine `if, and to what extent, a claimant has suffered the loss of use of a part of the body.' [citation omitted]. Factors such as a medical impairment rating, testimony of vocational experts, and other testimony must be considered to determine loss of use. Wagaman, 1998 SD 27, ¶ 41, 576 N.W.2d at 244 (citing Tischler v. UPS, 1996 SD 98, ¶ 49, 552 N.W.2d 597, 605) (emphasis added). [¶ 23.] In the present case, Belhassen presented expert testimony only from Ostrander. The ALJ heard Ostrander's testimony and found it lacked credibility because it was based on erroneous information regarding Belhassen's prior work history. The ALJ concluded, [a]s a matter of simple logic it seems that Belhassen has suffered a loss beyond his impairment rating. For example, a person who suffers from the same physical limitations as Belhassen, but has basic English skills, would be more employable than Belhassen. Recognizing the existence of a loss beyond the impairment rating is not enough. A specific percentage of loss must be determined. Making such a determination requires a valid and reliable expert assessment. After carefully considering all the evidence, I must reject Mr. Ostrander's opinion. I cannot accept his casual, almost flippant, disregard of [Belhassen's] 17 years of experience as a driver in Libya. After acknowledging that he did not know for certain what employment Belhassen had held in Libya, Ostrander opined that Belhassen had no transferable skills when he came to the United States. I cannot accept that opinion, based as it is on the admitted lack of information regarding [Belhassen's] employment history in Libya. The oft-quoted maxim that an expert's opinion is entitled to no more weight than the facts upon which it is based is certainly well applied to this situation. Finally, the ALJ opined that Belhassen failed to meet his burden of proof in establishing any loss of use beyond his impairment rating. [¶ 24.] John Morrell argues that it was not clearly erroneous for ALJ to reject Ostrander's expert testimony. In support of its argument, John Morrell cites Loewen v. Hyman Freightways, Inc., 1997 SD 2, 557 N.W.2d 764. Belhassen once again argues that Department's decision to reject Ostrander's opinion was clearly erroneous. Belhassen contends that it is common sense that the ability to drive in Libya does not transfer to the ability to drive for employment in the local job market. Belhassen also argues that based on his inability to read, speak or understand English, combined with his other physical and education limitations, would make obtaining a commercial driver's license difficult. Finally, Belhassen claims that [s]eventeen years of experience at the low end of the semi-skilled job range does not miraculously transform that semi-skilled job into a transferable job skill. [¶ 25.] In Loewen, we noted: [T]he Department is in the best position to assess the credibility of the witness and the weight to be accorded their testimony, and we give due regard to its opportunity to observe the witnesses and the evidence first hand. [ Petersen, 515 N.W.2d at 235]; Wendel v. Domestic Seed & Supply, 446 N.W.2d 265, 271 (S.D.1989). We will not substitute our judgment for the agency's on an issue of credibility unless we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Lien v. Miracle Span Corp., 456 N.W.2d 563, 565 (S.D.1990). 1997 SD 2, ¶ 11, 557 N.W.2d at 767. Ostrander admitted that he did not know if or how long Belhassen was a driver in the Libyan military or how long he had done cleaning work in Libya. It was within the ALJ's discretion to assess the credibility of Ostrander and determine whether to accept it. The ALJ did not accept it because it was entitled to no more weight than the facts upon which it is based. Belhassen had no credible expert testimony to support his claims; therefore, ALJ did not believe that Belhassen's claims entitled him to Cozine benefits. Reviewing the record, we cannot say that a mistake was made by the ALJ. [¶ 26.] Based upon our disposition of the first two issues, we need not discuss John Morrell's issues. [¶ 27.] We affirm. [¶ 28.] MILLER, Chief Justice, and KONENKAMP and GILBERTSON, Justices, concur.