Opinion ID: 1350305
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: criminal procedure and judgment n.o.v.

Text: Neb.Rev.Stat. § 29-2201 et seq. (Reissue 1989), a segment of the statutes expressing rules for procedure in the trial of criminal cases, contain some of the postverdict procedure concerning a judgment of conviction. In that regard, State v. Morley, 239 Neb. 141, 151, 474 N.W.2d 660, 668 (1991), states, [A] motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, provided for by Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-1315.02 (Reissue 1989), is limited to civil proceedings, there being no mention of such a remedy in Neb.Rev.Stat. §§ 29-2101 to 29-2106 (Reissue 1989), which detail remedies dealing with criminal procedure after a guilty verdict is entered in a criminal action. See, also, State v. Torrence, 192 Neb. 720, 224 N.W.2d 177 (1974) (judgment n.o.v. is limited to civil proceedings). Thus, Nebraska criminal procedure does not include judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Because a judgment n.o.v. is unauthorized and, therefore, unavailable under Nebraska criminal procedure, the county court's order, as an adjudication of the merits of Miller's motion for judgment n.o.v., was judicial action outside the subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court. For that reason, Miller's motion for judgment n.o.v. may be characterized as a procedural and legal nullity. Since Miller's motion and the county court's action, or decision on the motion, lack legal effect in the determination of any question relative to Miller's trial, nothing is presented for review in this court. Nothing comes from nothing. In the absence of a legally cognizable final order as a subject for appellate review, see Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-1902 (Reissue 1989) (final order defined), this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to evaluate the merits of Miller's assertion concerning her conviction, that is, Miller's contention that a judgment of acquittal should have been entered by the trial court, notwithstanding the verdict by which Miller had been convicted. Whether a question is raised by the parties concerning jurisdiction of the lower court or tribunal, it is not only within the power but the duty of an appellate court to determine whether such appellate court has jurisdiction over the subject matter.... Where lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the original tribunal is apparent on the face of the record, yet the parties fail to raise that issue, it is the duty of the reviewing court to raise and determine the issue of jurisdiction sua sponte. Glup v. City of Omaha, 222 Neb. 355, 359, 383 N.W.2d 773, 777 (1986). Accord, Clark v. Cornwell, 223 Neb. 282, 388 N.W.2d 848 (1986); In re Interest of L.D. et al., 224 Neb. 249, 398 N.W.2d 91 (1986). Litigants cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction on a judicial tribunal by either acquiescence or consent. Coffelt v. City of Omaha, 223 Neb. 108, 110, 388 N.W.2d 467, 469 (1986). Accord, In re Interest of Adams, 230 Neb. 109, 430 N.W.2d 295 (1988); In re Interest of L.D. et al., supra . When a trial court lacks the power, that is, jurisdiction, to adjudicate the merits of a claim, issue, or question, an appellate court also lacks the power to determine the merits of the claim, issue, or question presented to the trial court. See, Andrews v. City of Lincoln, 224 Neb. 748, 401 N.W.2d 467 (1987); In re Interest of L.D. et al., supra . We point out that Miller's motion at the conclusion of her trial was very definitely expressed in terms of a request for a judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the guilty verdict. Although Miller, in her appeal, refers to her postverdict request as a motion for directed verdict, that is, a procedural vehicle to test sufficiency of evidence for submission of Miller's case to the jury, we cannot overlook the fact that Miller made no motion for a directed verdict, but did make a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, nonexistent relief in the trial of a criminal case in Nebraska. Our viewing Miller's postverdict request as a motion for a directed verdict would require our considering a motion which was never made before submission of Miller's case to the jury. Since a judgment n.o.v. is not a part of criminal procedure in Nebraska, we dismiss Miller's appeal on the question concerning her motion for judgment n.o.v.