Opinion ID: 2443972
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Sanctions Under the Inherent Authority of the Court

Text: A court may also award a sanction in the form of an attorney's fee to a prevailing party if the opposing party acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975); Jung v. Jung, 844 A.2d 1099, 1107-08 (D.C. 2004). The Supreme Court has stated that such sanctions can be imposed by a court pursuant to its inherent power to police itself. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 46, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991). The court explained that the imposition of sanctions serv[es] the dual purpose of vindicating judicial authority without resort to the more drastic sanctions available for contempt of court and making the prevailing party whole for expenses caused by his opponent's obstinacy. Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). We held above that an attorney's fee under Super. Ct. Dom. Rel. R. 11 requires an attorney-client relationship, and expenses that have been incurred. Here, we hold that making the prevailing party whole for expenses caused by his opponent's obstinacy also requires expenses that must actually be paid to a third party attorney. Bad faith sanctions have a similar underlying rationale as that of Super. Ct. Dom. Rel. R. 11to deter misconduct in submissions to the court, and improper conduct in litigation in general. See Jung, supra, 844 A.2d at 1107-08 (bad faith sanctions serve to award . . . attorneys' fees to punish abuses of the judicial process and deter future misconduct); Schlank v. Williams, 572 A.2d 101, 108 (D.C.1990) (The intent of [bad faith sanctions] is not to compensate worthy litigants but to deter abusive litigation in the future, thereby avoiding harassment and protecting the integrity of the judicial process.) (citation and quotation marks omitted); Chambers, supra, 501 U.S. at 46 n. 10, 111 S.Ct. 2123 (stating that the court's inherent power to sanction bad faith conduct is similar to the certification requirement under FED.R.CIV.P. 11 in that it ensures that litigation is not instigated for an improper purpose, such as to harass or cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation). Thus, the rationale articulated in Kay, supra , promoting the retention of objective third party counsel applies just as forcefully in this context. Accordingly, Wallace, as an attorney and a pro se litigant in this case, cannot recover attorney's fees from Upson in the form of bad faith sanctions.