Opinion ID: 2552536
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Mr. Fox's Challenge to the Prosecutor's Statements in Rebuttal

Text: Mr. Fox asserts that the trial court committed reversible error when it failed to stop and to cure the prosecutor's remarks about other police paperwork in his rebuttal argument. On cross-examination, Mr. Fox's attorney asked both Officer Green and Officer Chatmon why they had not included more specific detailssuch as the names and physical descriptions of Mr. Fox and the other suspects taken into custodyon police paperwork they had filled out on the day of the robbery. Each officer responded that he had filled out the paperwork for a limited purpose. [6] Officer Chatmon further testified that more descriptive details are usually included in paperwork generated by detectives, and that it was not his responsibility to fill out that sort of paperwork in this case. Referring to this line of questioning, defense counsel for Mr. Fox argued that the jury cannot trust and believe the testimony of Officer Green, and asserted that the government's case boils down to . . . Demetrius Washington. In his rebuttal argument, the prosecutor responded to these statements, saying: Ladies and gentlemen, you have heard testimony that there is other police paperwork that you have not seen that contains the material details of what happened that is created by the detective. After the trial court overruled defense counsel's objection, the prosecutor continued, [I]s that really a reason for a reasonable doubt in this case? When you have been shown that there is other paperwork where the details are properly put down? It is not a reasonable doubt. In reviewing a challenge to a prosecutor's argument, we first examine whether the statements were improper and whether the judge erred in failing to sustain the defense objection. Diaz v. United States, 716 A.2d 173, 179 (D.C. 1998) (quoting Coreas v. United States, 565 A.2d 594, 600 (D.C.1989)); Irick v. United States, 565 A.2d 26, 33 (D.C.1989) ([I]t is our function to review the record for legal error or abuse of discretion by the trial judge, not by counsel.). Even if we conclude that the statements were improper, we will affirm the conviction unless we findlooking at the gravity of the misconduct, [its] direct relationship to the issue of guilt, the effect of specific corrective instructions by the trial court, and the strength of the government's case, Perez v. United States, 968 A.2d 39, 80 (D.C. 2009) (quoting Diaz, 716 A.2d at 181) that the defendant suffered substantial prejudice. McGrier v. United States, 597 A.2d 36, 41 (D.C.1991) (quoting Williams v. United States, 483 A.2d 292, 297 (D.C. 1984)). There is no substantial prejudice if we can say, `with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.' McGrier, 597 A.2d at 41 (quoting Gaither v. United States, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 154, 172, 413 F.2d 1061, 1079 (1969)). It is incumbent upon the prosecutor `to take care to ensure that statements made in opening and closing arguments are supported by evidence introduced at trial.' Anthony v. United States, 935 A.2d 275, 284 (D.C.2007) (quoting United States v. Small, 316 U.S.App.D.C. 15, 19, 74 F.3d 1276, 1280 (1996)) (emphasis added in Anthony ). That degree of caution was not exercised in this case. At the very least, the prosecutor's statements were inaccurate characterizations of the testimony. At the worst, he made his case vulnerable to the claim that he was asserting personal knowledge of facts not in evidence. Cf. Daye v. United States, 733 A.2d 321, 328 n. 6 (D.C.1999) (The prosecutor's comment was . . . improper because the jury knew nothing about hypothetical evidence or lack of evidence in the government's file implicating [the defendant]; it was being asked to take the prosecutor's word for it.). Officer Chatmon had testified that more descriptive paperwork usually is (or should be) filled out by the detectives assigned to the case. But the jury had not heard testimony that there [was] other police paperwork . . . that contain[ed] the material details of what happened. . . . Nor had it been shown that there [was] other paperwork where the details are properly put down[.] Nevertheless, we are sensitive to the principle that closing arguments of counsel[] are seldom carefully constructed in toto before the event; improvisation frequently results in syntax left imperfect and meaning less than crystal clear. While these general observations in no way justify prosecutorial misconduct, they do suggest that a court should not lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an ambiguous remark to have its most damaging meaning or that a jury, sitting through lengthy exhortation, will draw that meaning from the plethora of less damaging interpretations. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 646-47, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974). The challenged remarks are not naturally understood as assertions of personal knowledge, and the jury was instructed that the statements and the arguments [of counsel] are not evidence. Although inaccurate, the prosecutor's comments referred to the evidence: you have heard testimony that . . .; you have been shown that. . . . An attentive jury, applying its common sense and the trial court's instruction, would realize that it had heard something different. When the record is considered as a whole, we are satisfied that Mr. Fox did not suffer substantial prejudice, and reversal is not warranted. See McGrier, 597 A.2d at 41; see also Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-65, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946). Contrary to Mr. Fox's assertions, the government mounted an extremely strong case against him, and the outcome of the case did not turn on the credibility of Officer Green or Officer Chatmon alone. Instead, a number of other witnesses linked Mr. Fox to the robbery: Mr. Washington testified that Mr. Fox was an active participant in the scheme; Detective Stallings identified Mr. Fox (by his clothing) as one of the robbers she saw run past her in the liquor store parking lot; and Officer Lessey testified that he watched as other officers recovered a mask, a pair of gloves, and a screwdriver from Mr. Fox at the police station. Given the strength of the government's case, we can say with fair assurance that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error, and Mr. Fox's convictions must stand.