Opinion ID: 1194845
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: An Adequate Remedy Was Present

Text: First, at common law, the constitutional writ of certiorari issued only when there was no other adequate remedy at law. Here, the statute in question does provide a remedy for persons in Saldin's circumstances. In this case, Saldin objects to the requirement the Snohomish County Council (Council) imposed that it complete an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) before proceeding with its project. Saldin does not want to complete an EIS because of the expense and delay involved in doing so. Saldin complains the County Council's decision was arbitrary, capricious, and illegal, and invoked the constitutional writ of certiorari in an attempt to gain judicial review of the Council's decision. Saldin claims it has no statutory means to appeal the Council's decision, and, as a result, is entitled to issuance of the constitutional writ of certiorari. But this is not precisely true, as RCW 43.21C.075(6)(c) provides: Judicial review under this chapter shall without exception be of the governmental action together with its accompanying environmental determinations. [4] Saldin argues such judicial review would come too late to prevent the financial burdens it will incur in completing the EIS, and the judicial review provided by RCW 43.21C.075(6)(c) would therefore not provide an adequate remedy. Thus, Saldin claims, a writ of certiorari lies. The majority agrees with Saldin, stating, For the developer who has been ordered illegally by an administrative agency to prepare an EIS and who incurs the requisite costs and delays, review of that decision by the agency after the permitting decision has been made is `too little, too late.' Majority op. at 374. The majority goes on to say, Additionally, without the opportunity for judicial review, public officials have a powerful tool to delay potential projects. Majority op. at 374. The majority evidently thinks the Legislature made a big mistake by enacting RCW 43.21C.075(6)(c) and creating this powerful tool. [5] The majority's decision in this case is plainly an effort to correct this perceived legislative faux pas. Correcting what we think is poor legislation is not a legitimate function of the judicial branch. It is not our role to substitute our judgment for that of duly elected officials.... In addition, the appropriate remedy when legislative action is considered unjust is political. Raynes v. City of Leavenworth, 118 Wash.2d 237, 243, 821 P.2d 1204 (1992). Saldin's situation is reminiscent of the pretermitted heir rule, but here, the statute does not omit to mention those in Saldin's position; it simply specifically provides they may not have judicial review until the process is complete. As a result, Saldin is not pretermitted. Because Saldin has an appeal, it is not entitled to a writ of certiorari: The general rule is, that when an appeal lies, a certiorari will not be granted, for the obvious reason that the appeal is the remedy where it is given by statute, and the certiorari is an extraordinary legal remedy; and its aid can be invoked only in the absence of the ordinary remedy by appeal or writ of error. GEORGE E. HARRIS, CERTIORARI § 44, at 37 (1893). That Saldin believes the procedural remedy offered by the statute is not adequate for its purposes does not mean a remedy is altogether absent. [6] A statutory remedy exists; Saldin just does not like it. It is not for this Court to interfere with the Legislature's determination of the adequacy of statutory remedies. Statutory remedies are entirely the purview of the Legislature. [7] Serious concerns about separation of powers and the proper role of courts in our tripartite form of government arise if this Court is willing to question legislative policy decisions and intrude into questions purely legislative in nature. In addition to the statute's procedural remedy affording judicial review to Saldin, Saldin has an adequate remedy at law. The majority opinion makes no mention whatsoever of the availability of damages to Saldin under RCW 64.40. Saldin's complaint about the County Council's decision boils down to the costs it will incur preparing the EIS and the attendant delay in proceeding with the project. If Saldin can prove the Snohomish County Council's action in requiring an EIS was truly arbitrary and capricious, and there was in fact no justification for an EIS, it can recover the costs of preparation and delay, as well as attorney's fees, under RCW 64.40.