Opinion ID: 2060361
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Failure to Provide Adequate Compensation ( Chief Judge )

Text: The Chief Judge plaintiffs make a separation of powers claim not raised by the Maron petitioners or Larabe e plaintiffs: the Separation of Powers Doctrine requires that the State defendants provide the Judiciary with adequate judicial compensation and, because judicial salaries are constitutionally inadequate, the State defendants have breached their constitutional duty. The constitutional inadequacy of judicial salaries, the Chief Judge plaintiffs posit, threatens to impair the Judiciary's ability to function as a coequal branch. The Compensation Clause was enacted to preserve judicial independence, and we agree with the conclusion of high courts in other jurisdictions that this is dependent, in part, on judges receiving adequate compensation ( see Glancey v Casey, 447 Pa 77, 86, 288 A2d 812, 816 [1972] [it is the constitutional duty and the obligation of the legislature, in order to insure the independence of the judicial . . . branch of government, to provide compensation adequate in amount and commensurate with the duties and responsibilities of the judges involved]). Moreover, adequate judicial compensation is necessary to ensure that the public will have its matters heard by competent judges ( see Judiciary Constitutional Convention of 1921: Report of the Legislature, at 29, supra ) and that judges will be free to issue decisions in accordance with the law without fear of retribution by the other two branches of government. Therefore, we reject the State defendants' claim that the Compensation Clause's language that compensation shall not be diminished is the opposite of an adequate compensation guarantee. Even counsel for the State defendants in Larabee concede that judicial compensation could be so low that it could be constitutionally objected to. The Chief Judge plaintiffs posit that the current salaries of Judiciary Law article 7-B judges and justices are inadequate when compared to other legal positions in the public and private sectors. This argument is one that is best addressed in the first instance by the Legislature. All of the State defendants have conceded, at one point or another, that judicial compensation must be increased. We anticipate that our holding today will permit them to consider, in good faith, judicial salary increases on the merits. The Legislature might find the record compiled in the Chief Judge case to be helpful. There, plaintiffs demonstratewithout rebuttal from the Statethat, in real value, New York judges' salaries now rank below judicial salaries in other states and the Federal Judiciary, despite the complexity of legal issues presented in New Yorka world economic centerand the burgeoning case load faced by New York judges. The argument for a cost-of-living increase is not that, in some objective sense, New York judges do not earn a living wage. Judges made no such argument when this litigation commenced in much better economic times and certainly do not press such a contention now. The claim is that, due to the lack of a cost-of-living increase for more than 11 years, judges no longer earn salaries that are appropriate given the significance of their position in our tripartite form of government and the role they play in ensuring the rights of all members of society. That role has increased substantially since the last compensation adjustment. For instance, the Judiciary's workload has increased by 10% over the past four years alone. Since 2005, Family Court's workload has increased 16%, civil filings in Supreme Court have increased more than 14%, and the caseloads in the New York City Civil Courts and those city courts outside of New York City have risen by 13% and 17%, respectively. Moreover, state courts handle over 90% of the filings as compared to the less than 10% handled by our federal courts. Judicial salaries need not be exorbitant, but they must be sufficient to attract well-qualified individuals to serve. Otherwise, only those with means will be financially able to assume a judicial post, negatively impacting the diversity of the Judiciary and discriminating against those who are well qualified and interested in serving, but nonetheless unable to aspire to a career in the Judiciary because of the financial hardship that results from stagnant compensation over the years.