Opinion ID: 558994
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Unconstitutionally Obtained Prior Conviction

Text: 24 Johnson claims that the district court erred in refusing to grant him an evidentiary hearing on the alleged unconstitutionality of his prior conviction of receiving stolen property. The district court held that Johnson was not entitled to such a hearing because he had waived any objection to the use of that conviction at the December 15, 1983 hearing when his plea was accepted and he was sentenced. 25 Under Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1711, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969) a state trial court is required to determine whether a defendant has intelligently and voluntarily entered his guilty plea. Boykin further provides that a guilty plea based conviction is generally subject to attack, or is not prima facie valid, where the state court record fails to adequately reflect that the plea was knowing and voluntary. Id. 89 S.Ct. at 1712. Johnson claims that no such record exists with respect to his prior state court conviction of receiving stolen property, and he therefore contends that the district court should have granted him an evidentiary hearing on this issue under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(d). 26 The district court adopted the findings of the magistrate, who concluded that Johnson properly pleaded guilty to not only the burglary of an inhabited dwelling but also to being an habitual criminal by reason of his two prior felony convictions as specifically alleged in the indictment. In the December 1983 state court proceedings, Johnson did not offer any evidence to rebut, nor did he object to the evidence of, the two prior convictions. Furthermore, he stated prior to acceptance of his plea that he understood that he was being charged in the indictment as an habitual criminal having been twice previously convicted of a felony and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of one year or more in each case as specified in the indictment. The magistrate found that the state trial court's extensive and thorough inquiry into Johnson's decision to plead guilty in respect not only to the burglary of an inhabited dwelling charge but also the habitual criminal allegations of the same indictment satisfied Boykin 's requirements. 3 The magistrate's findings are compelled by the record. 27 In Boykin, the Supreme Court ruled that when a plea of guilty is entered in a state court criminal trial, several constitutional rights are waived. Id. at 1712. These include the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury and the right of confrontation. Id. The Court has subsequently held that 28 [w]hen a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 1608, 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973). 29 In Zales v. Henderson, 433 F.2d 20, 24 (5th Cir.1970), this Court held that a habeas corpus petitioner who pleaded guilty to enhancement charges in an habitual offender hearing waived any complaints he may have had concerning the former offenses which were set out in the enhancement charge. We deemed the guilty plea, in the context of an habitual offender trial, to be both the alpha and the omega of our determination. Id. at 22. We have often echoed this conclusion. See, e.g., Long v. McCotter, 792 F.2d 1338, 1340 (5th Cir.1986); Vail v. Procunier, 747 F.2d 277, 278 (5th Cir.1984); Scott v. Maggio, 695 F.2d 916, 922 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S.Ct. 3544, 77 L.Ed.2d 1393 (1983); Kemph v. Estelle, 621 F.2d 162, 163 (5th Cir.1980). In Long, we stated that 30 [a] plea of 'true[ ]' ... relieves the State of its burden of proof and, as such, provides the basis for the Zales waiver doctrine.... When a 'true' plea has been entered, Zales appears to prohibit subsequent collateral attacks on prior convictions in any context, whether denominated an attack on only the prior conviction, independently of the enhanced sentence, or an attack on the enhanced sentence by way of a prior conviction. Id. at 1341 (footnote omitted). 31 Johnson has alleged no facts casting doubt upon the validity of what in substance was his plea of guilty to the prior convictions and habitual criminal allegations. To be entitled to an evidentiary hearing, a habeas petitioner must allege facts which, if proven, would entitle him to relief. Taylor v. Maggio, 727 F.2d 341, 347 (5th Cir.1984). Johnson claims in general terms that he challenged one prior conviction in his December 15, 1983 proceeding and he implies that the state court denied him a hearing on the issue. He has specified no evidence, however, which would tend to support the truth of these assertions and they are clearly contradicted by the state record. We therefore hold that Johnson's Zales waiver, by what was in substance his guilty plea to both prior convictions (and to thereby being an habitual criminal) in his state court December 1983 proceeding, precludes subsequent collateral attack on the constitutionality of those prior convictions.