Opinion ID: 390286
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Impact of Vermont Yankee

Text: 44 DOL concludes its brief with the claim that (e)specially in light of the Supreme Court's recent admonition in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (435 U.S. 519, 98 S.Ct. 1197, 55 L.Ed.2d 460 (1978)), Maryland's attempt to engraft additional procedures beyond what Congress intended, must therefore fail. 82 Because similar claims recently have been made before this court, 83 we briefly address the bearing of Vermont Yankee on this case. 45 DOL apparently relies on the Supreme Court's reiteration in Vermont Yankee of statutory and decisional law cautioning reviewing courts against engrafting their own notions of proper procedures upon agencies entrusted with substantive functions by Congress. 84 Based on this concern, 85 the Supreme Court reversed this court's invalidation of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's rule that specifies numerical values for the anticipated environmental effects associated with the uranium fuel cycle in light water cooled nuclear power reactors. The Court rejected what it deemed the ineluctable mandate of the court of appeals decision, that is, to require procedures beyond those prescribed in § 553 of the APA. 86 The essence of the Court's decision, and the point that distinguishes Vermont Yankee from this case, was the conclusion that 46 nothing in the APA, NEPA, 87 the circumstances of this case, the nature of the issues being considered, past agency practice, or the statutory mandate under which the Commission operates permitted the court to review and overturn the rulemaking proceeding on the basis of the procedural devices employed (or not employed) by the Commission so long as the Commission employed at least the statutory minima, a matter about which there is no doubt in this case. 88 47 In the instant case, however, the sole question is whether DOL employed the minimal procedural requirements established by statute for modifying the statistical methodology. 89 We conclude that the agency erroneously omitted the minimal requirements prescribed by § 553 of the APA. 90 48 DOL argues that this result will produce a parade of horribles and will require the use of § 553 procedures for virtually any routine correction or refinement of technique. 91 This claim lacks merit. First, as this opinion makes clear, § 553 procedures apply only to rules not exempt by statute. Second, as DOL's own statement before the district court demonstrates, 92 the modification of the statistical methodology here was hardly a routine correction or refinement. It was instead the agency's considered response to over a decade of serious criticism of its prior methodology. 93 Even the Balance of State corrective factor 94 applied to Maryland with the new methodology was selected (u)pon examination by the agency. 95 The methodology bears all the earmarks of conclusive agency action, governing the rights and interests of the public. 96 Future changes to the methodology that are truly routine corrections or refinements may easily be exempted from § 553 procedures as interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice. 97 But where, as here, the agency action satisfies the APA's definition of a rule and eludes exemptions to § 553, it is procedurally defective unless promulgated with the procedures required by law. 98 IV. DISPOSITION 49 Normally, a judicial determination of procedural defect requires invalidation of the challenged rule. 99 The posture of this appeal, however, calls for different treatment. We found justiciable only Maryland's claim that future modifications of the statistical methodology must be subject to notice and publication. 100 Therefore, our disposition will govern only such future modifications. We hold that any substantial change in the method of calculating unemployment statistics must be promulgated with advance publication by notice, opportunity for public comment, and final publication at least 30 days prior to effective date. 101 50 In its amended complaint, Maryland also claimed that DOL's adoption of the new methodology is arbitrary and capricious. 102 Maryland requested that the district court defer ruling on this claim until after rulemaking procedures produce a record susceptible to judicial review. Applying this approach prospectively only, we agree. If Maryland or other interested parties wish to challenge future modifications of the methodology for gathering unemployment statistics, they may do so after DOL has promulgated such modifications according to requisite procedures.