Opinion ID: 1057886
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Nature of the Tort

Text: The Court is now left to determine what elements are essential to the tort as it exists today, consistent with the original writ, but in line with equal protection and modern law. Kessel succinctly lays out the elements of this cause of action, consistent with Virginia law: (1) the complaining parent has a right to establish or maintain a parental or custodial relationship with his/her minor child; (2) a party outside of the relationship between the complaining parent and his/her child intentionally interfered with the complaining parent's parental or custodial relationship with his/her child by removing or detaining the child from returning to the complaining parent, without that parent's consent, or by otherwise preventing the complaining parent from exercising his/her parental or custodial rights; (3) the outside party's intentional interference caused harm to the complaining parent's parental or custodial relationship with his/her child; and (4) damages resulted from such interference. 511 S.E.2d at 765-66. Given the nature of the original English common law writ, we must consider whether the harm and recoverable damages must be limited solely to tangible loss of service. We join the high court of Maryland in concluding that a focused analysis reveals that loss of services has never been an element of the tort itself, but rather, arose from common law pleading requirements in force in England, which contained artificial divisions between tangible loss of services and intangible losses such as comfort and society. [4] Khalifa, 945 A.2d at 1256, 1262. The evolution from form- to fact-based pleading in Maryland, as in Virginia, dictates that the ancient pleading requirements of English writs no longer serve to define the elements of the tort. Id. at 1262. We therefore conclude that the modern iteration of this common law tort encompasses both tangible and intangible damages, including compensatory damages for the expenses incurred in seeking the recovery of the child, lost services, lost companionship, and mental anguish. Equitable remedies such as injunctions or custody orders may not be awarded under this cause of action. Finally, as we have previously stated, [I]f a tortfeasor's tort was intentional rather than negligent, i.e., deliberately committed with intent to harm the victim ... and if the evidence is sufficient to support an award of compensatory damages, the victim's right to punitive damages and the quantum thereof are jury questions. Smith v. Litten, 256 Va. 573, 579, 507 S.E.2d 77, 80 (1998); see also Giant of Virginia, Inc. v. Pigg, 207 Va. 679, 685-86, 152 S.E.2d 271, 277 (1967).
We adhere to the ordinary burden in civil actions of preponderance of the evidence. Fudge v. Payne, 86 Va. 303, 308, 10 S.E. 7, 8 (1889). We find no precedent to indicate that this writ required any heightened standard of proof. We require a heightened standard of clear and convincing evidence for intentional infliction of emotional distress, for instance, because it is an action not favored by this Court due to the inherent ambiguity in proving harm to one's emotions or mind. Russo v. White, 241 Va. 23, 26, 400 S.E.2d 160, 162 (1991). Although, as with many torts, juries may award some compensation for mental anguish in intentional interference cases, the harm lies in the physical interruption of the parent-child relationship, a concrete factor. Thus, we conclude that the ordinary burden of preponderance of the evidence is appropriate for a claim of intentional interference with parental rights.
The minority of states that have resisted recognition of tortious interference with parental or custodial rights have done so based on policy grounds, citing concern for the best interest of the child. In Larson v. Dunn, 460 N.W.2d 39 (Minn.1990), the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that it was not in the best interest of children to permit such a tort, because the law should not provide a means of escalating intrafamily warfare. Id. at 46. The court concluded that a tort possessing the potential for such significant impact on children should be properly evaluated as a matter of public policy by the legislature rather than created by the courts. Id. at 47. The Minnesota Supreme Court's emphasis on the best interest of the child was followed two years later by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Zaharias v. Gammill, 844 P.2d 137, 140 (Okla.1992) (We are convinced that the tort of interference with custodial relations would not enhance the scheme of family law in Oklahoma, and we expressly disapprove of it.). We share these courts' concern for the well-being of children caught in intra-familial disputes, a concern that was not as prominent an issue in 1607, when only a male parent could bring this cause of action. The fear that this cause of action would be used as a means of escalating intra-familial warfare can be largely disposed of by barring the use of this tort between parents, as other state courts have done. The West Virginia high court put this well in Kessel: [W]e hold that a parent cannot charge his/her child's other parent with tortious interference with parental or custodial relationship if both parents have equal rights, or substantially equal rights (as in the case of a nonmarital child where the putative biological father seeks to establish a meaningful parent-child relationship with his child and, until such a relationship has been commenced, does not have rights identical to those of the child's biological mother), to establish or maintain a parental or custodial relationship with their child. In other words, when no judicial award of custody has been made to either parent, thereby causing the parents' parental and custodial rights to be equal, no cause of action for tortious interference can be maintained by one parent against the other parent. Likewise, where no judicial decree has been entered awarding custody of a nonmarital child to one or the other of the child's biological parents, the complaining biological parent cannot assert a claim of tortious interference with parental or custodial relationship against the other biological parent. 511 S.E.2d at 766. A similar bar is articulated in Comment (c) to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 700, excerpted in footnote 3, supra. Thus, we conclude that a defendant may raise an affirmative defense of substantially equal rights, as explained above in Kessel, as it is to the advantage of all parties that such a determination be made early in the proceedings. Additionally, in the interest of the child, we note with approval the affirmative defense of justification as set forth in Kessel, wherein the court held that a party should not be held liable if he or she possessed a reasonable, good faith belief that interference with the parent's parental or custodial relationship was necessary to protect the child from physical, mental, or emotional harm[; or] possessed a reasonable, good faith belief that the interference was proper ( i.e., no notice or knowledge of an original or superseding judicial decree awarding parental or custodial rights to complaining parent); or reasonably and in good faith believed that the complaining parent did not have a right to establish or maintain a parental or custodial relationship with the minor child ( i.e., mistake as to identity of child's biological parents where paternity has not yet been formally established). 511 S.E.2d at 766. We do not cite these as an exhaustive list of available defenses, but rather note them due to their particular importance, so that our explicit recognition of this tort does not promote unnecessary intra-familial litigation or deter an individual from acting when he or she holds a good-faith belief that a child is in danger.