Opinion ID: 721360
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Cross-Examination of Co-Defendant Jones

Text: 8 Gary Jones, Caldwell's first cousin, was indicted with Caldwell in Count I. Jones made a deal with the government whereby he pleaded guilty to a reduced misdemeanor charge in exchange for his testimony against Caldwell. 9 On cross-examination, Jones acknowledged that he had used marijuana daily over a period of approximately fifteen years. He also admitted his involvement in the conspiracy to manufacture over 1,000 marijuana plants. Caldwell's lawyer attempted to establish that Jones would have faced a minimum ten-year sentence had he not been permitted to plead to the lesser offense in exchange for his testimony. The court, however, disallowed any such inquiry beyond establishing that the penalty cap for a misdemeanor offense is one year and that a felony charge could call for time in the penitentiary. The court's rationale for limiting the evidence was that Jones' potential sentence before becoming a cooperating witness was a collateral matter and could not be determined with precision. 10 The district court's limitation constitutes an abuse of discretion. Because the bias of a witness is always relevant, the penalty to which Jones would have been subject had he not testified against Caldwell cannot be characterized as collateral. Moreover, the minimum sentence that Jones originally faced was clear: the conspiracy charge against Jones carried a statutory minimum sentence of ten-years imprisonment regardless of the application of any sentencing guideline provision. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(vii) (1993). A district court is given wide latitude to limit cross-examination to avoid witness harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, or unnecessary repetition. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679, 106 S.Ct. at 1435. No such concerns, however, warranted the court's ruling in this case. The evidence Caldwell sought on cross-examination was relevant and accurate. Therefore, we hold that the district court's exclusion of the evidence violated Caldwell's right to confront the prosecution witness. 11 We must next decide whether, assuming that the damaging potential of the cross-examination were fully realized, [we can] nonetheless say that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684, 106 S.Ct. at 1438. We consider multiple factors, including the importance of Jones' testimony to the overall case against Caldwell; whether it was cumulative, the presence of corroborating or contradicting evidence, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and the overall strength of the government's case. Id. Although the jury did not learn the extent of the break Jones received for cooperating, Jones testified that his sole reason for testifying was to obtain the reduced misdemeanor charge. In addition, even if we entirely disregard Jones' testimony, the government's case against Caldwell--which included the defendant's own inculpatory statements--was strong. After reviewing the record in light of all the foregoing factors, we conclude that the district court's error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.