Opinion ID: 4319313
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Kia contingency fee: $21,171.00

Text: TOTAL: $54,510.47 JA 61-62 (emphasis in original). Seitz supported these contentions with findings from the Zubras proceeding. In her response to Seitz’s motion for summary judgment, Miller did not contest any of the facts averred by Seitz. Instead, she argued that he did not provide sufficient evidentiary support for his assertions and that collateral estoppel was inappropriate. Because Seitz established all three elements of a turnover action and Miller failed to raise a genuine issue as to any material fact, we agree with the Bankruptcy Court that Seitz was entitled to summary judgment and turnover of the fees.5 Miller’s second argument attacks the grant of summary judgment on the grounds that it was based on obiter dicta. Specifically, she claims that the findings of the Bankruptcy Court in the Zubras proceeding were unsupported by evidence and therefore cannot be relied upon in this proceeding. But this argument is essentially another attempt to attack the Zubras judgment, and, as the District Court correctly noted, “[t]he time for 5 To the extent that Miller argues that collateral estoppel cannot apply to this case because the cause of action in this proceeding differs from that of the Zubras proceeding, we find that argument meritless because collateral estoppel does not require that the causes of action be identical. See Howard Hess Dental Labs. Inc. v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 237, 247-48 (3d Cir. 2010) (stating the elements of collateral estoppel). 6 [Miller] to challenge the Zubras judgment . . . passed when she failed to appeal or move for reconsideration.” JA 15. Miller’s final argument with regards to collateral estoppel—that it cannot apply because the Bankruptcy Court in the Zubras proceeding did not have jurisdiction—is rejected for the reasons stated above. Accordingly, we will affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of Seitz. b. Relief from Judgment Miller argues that the District Court erred by denying her motion for relief from the Zubras judgment. First, she restates her argument that the Bankruptcy Court in the Zubras proceeding lacked jurisdiction. For the reasons stated above, we disagree. Second, Miller contends that she is entitled to relief from the Zubras judgment “because the revocation of discharge occurred after the statute of limitations/statute of repose had expired,” citing to Section 727(e) of the Bankruptcy Code. Br. for Appellant at 46. Although Miller had ample opportunity to raise this argument in her original bankruptcy proceeding when Zubras moved to reopen her case, in the Zubras proceeding, and in the Bankruptcy Court in this proceeding, she failed to do so. Instead, she raised it for the first time in the District Court in a supplemental brief. To circumvent this failure, she argues that Section 727 is a statute of repose, citing to In re Taylor, 449 B.R. 686 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2011), and therefore “non-waivable.” Br. for Appellant at 47. We disagree that Section 727 is jurisdictional and find that Miller waived this argument here. The Supreme Court has “repeatedly held that procedural rules, including time bars, cabin a court’s power only if Congress has ‘clearly state[d]’ as much.” United 7 States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 135 S. Ct. 1625, 1632 (2015) (alterations in original) (quoting Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. 145, 153 (2013)). “[A]bsent such a clear statement, . . . courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional.” Id. (quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original) (quoting Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. at 153). Congress did not clearly state that Section 727(e)’s deadline is jurisdictional. Instead, the language of the statute simply provides when “[t]he trustee, a creditor, or the United States trustee may request a revocation of discharge,” and does not speak to a court’s power. 11 U.S.C. § 727(e). Therefore, we regard Section 727(e) as a “quintessential claim-processing rule[]” that “do[es] not deprive a court of authority to hear a case.” Kwai Fun Wong, 135 S. Ct. at 1632 (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 270 n.9 (2010) (finding that the time limit to request revocation of a Chapter 13 confirmation that was “procured by fraud” is non-jurisdictional and waivable); Weil v. Elliott, 859 F.3d 812, 814-15 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that § 727(e)(1) is “a non-jurisdictional claim-processing rule” that can be waived). Because Miller failed to raise this argument in any of the prior proceedings or in this proceeding until her appeal to the District Court, she cannot do so now. Therefore, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Miller’s motion for relief from judgment. c. Seitz’s Alleged Violations of Due Process and Ethical and Fiduciary Duties In both her appeal from the Bankruptcy Court’s summary judgment ruling and her motion for relief from judgment, Miller contends that Seitz “violated [her] Due Process 8 rights, his grant of authority and [his] fiduciary duties when he ignored controlling state law and instituted proceedings to recoup funds that are not derived from assets of the Bankruptcy Estate.” Br. for Appellant at 6. In support of this argument, Miller cites to Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3(2), which mandates that lawyers disclose known adverse legal authority to a tribunal. The only violation of this rule alleged by Miller is Seitz’s “failure to present any countervailing authority to [Miller’s] Pennsylvania state law cases and other authorities.”6 Br. for Appellant at 50. However, whether the fees were part of the bankruptcy estate was not at issue in either Seitz’s motion for summary judgment or Miller’s motion for relief from judgment because that issue had been resolved by the Bankruptcy Court in the Zubras proceeding. Therefore, Seitz was not obligated to present any authority on that issue and did not violate any of his duties in this respect.