Opinion ID: 2513908
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Trial Court's Decision To Award Enhanced Partial Fees to Concerned Citizens Was Proper.

Text: The Cizeks argue that because they were subject to suit based on their reliance on the municipality's determination that the airstrip was a legal nonconforming use, they should not be held liable for attorney's fees. The Cizeks' argument rests primarily on their substantive appealthey argue that the superior court erred in holding that they could not reasonably rely on the municipality's decision. The superior court ruled that the Cizeks did not reasonably rely on the municipality's decision finding the airstrip to be a valid, nonconforming use and, even if such a decision on the part of the municipality would estop the municipality from enforcement, Concerned Citizens could not be estopped from enforcing the zoning laws. [6] We agreed with the trial court's reasoning. [7] As the Cizeks base their argument on their substantive appeal, which we rejected, we likewise reject their claim for relief from attorney's fees.
The Cizeks argue that Concerned Citizens' attorney, Suzanne Ewy, donated her services and that Concerned Citizens was at no point under an obligation to pay her. Because Concerned Citizens did not incur any fees, the Cizeks argue that no fee award is appropriate. We have held in several cases, however, that a client's absence of obligation to pay for legal services rendered does not preclude an award of attorney's fees under Civil Rule 82. [8] Accordingly, the trial court did not err in awarding fees to Concerned Citizens despite its lack of an obligation to compensate its attorney.
The Cizeks next argue that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Concerned Citizens additional time to supplement its motion, to file a reply, and to reapply for fees. Under Civil Rule 82(c), a motion for an award of attorney's fees must be filed within ten days of the date of the distribution of the final judgment. Failure to file within ten days, or such additional time as the court may allow, is construed as a waiver of the party's right to recover attorney's fees. [9] We have held that a trial court will not be found to have abused its discretion in allowing a party additional time under Rule 82 unless the amount of time was unreasonable or resulted in prejudice to the opposing party. [10] Here, the trial court issued an order on January 31, 2000 stating that partial judgment had been entered on January 20 and giving Concerned Citizens twenty days to supplement its earlier, premature request for an evidentiary hearing on its public interest litigant status. Concerned Citizens supplemented its motion on February 22. [11] On March 7 Concerned Citizens requested a stay of proceedings until March 21 and additional time in which to file its reply to the Cizeks' March 3 opposition. The reply was filed on April 3. The trial court issued its order on Concerned Citizens' motion on September 15, denying the motion and granting Concerned Citizens sixty days to address the deficiencies identified by the court in its motion. Concerned Citizens filed its reapplication within that time. Given that the initial filing was early, that Concerned Citizens filed the supplement requested by the court within the specified time, and that all briefing was completed within one month of the filing of the opposition to fees, the court's provision of additional time cannot be said to have been unreasonable, nor have the Cizeks demonstrated that it resulted in any prejudice to them. We find that the court did not abuse its discretion in granting Concerned Citizens additional time as provided for by Civil Rule 82(c).
The superior court awarded Concerned Citizens partial fees based on the court's determination that Concerned Citizens was a public interest litigant. In the alternative, the court awarded Concerned Citizens enhanced partial fees under Civil Rule 82(b)(3). Because we affirm the court's decision to award partial fees under Civil Rule 82, we do not reach the question whether the award of fees based on Concerned Citizens' public interest litigant status was appropriate.
The Cizeks first argue that the trial court improperly considered the public interest nature of the case in awarding enhanced fees to Concerned Citizens. The Cizeks offer no support for their position that the court considered Concerned Citizens' status as a public interest litigant in awarding fees under Rule 82. Instead the Cizeks seem to rely on their arguments that Concerned Citizens should not have been granted public interest litigant fees in the first place. Because we find the trial court's decision to award fees under Civil Rule 82(b) to be adequately supported by the equitable factors it cites in its decision and because the Cizeks point to no facts supporting their theory that the court considered the public interest status of Concerned Citizens as a factor in determining fees under Rule 82, we reject this argument.
The Cizeks next argue that none of the reasons stated by the court for enhancing attorney's fees supports its doing so. Under Civil Rule 82(b)(2), in cases which have gone to trial but which have not resulted in an award of money damages to the prevailing party, the court is instructed to enter an award of 30 percent of the prevailing party's reasonable actual attorney's fees which were necessarily incurred. This award may be varied on the basis of relevant equitable factors as provided in Civil Rule 82(b)(3). In departing from the general rule, the court must state any reasons for its variation from the prescribed percentage of fees. [12] We review reasons relying on factual findings for clear error. [13] In its order awarding Concerned Citizens partial attorney's fees, the superior court cited several factors justifying an increase under Civil Rule 82(b)(3): Plaintiffs' attorney was required to participate in extensive and sometimes unduly repetitive motion practice, most of it generated by the Cizek[s'] attorney, which increased the complexity of the case, and which, in most cases, was resolved in plaintiff[s'] favor. The trial was long in duration, requiring many extra hours of work that should be compensated. The plaintiffs reduced their attorney's bills by performing a number of paralegal tasks themselves. The Cizeks argue that the length and complexity of the case will be reflected in the fees themselves and therefore should not be used to increase the percentage of fees awarded. However, these factors are explicitly listed as permissible considerations under Civil Rule 82(b)(3), and therefore are an appropriate basis for the trial court's decision. According to Civil Rule 82(b)(3), enhanced fees may be based on factors such as the complexity of the litigation, [14] the length of the trial, [15] the reasonableness of the claims and defenses pursued, [16] and the relationship between the amount of work performed and the significance of the matters at stake. [17] The Cizeks have not demonstrated that any of the findings underlying the trial court's decision were clearly erroneous. Once these findings have been made, the only requirement imposed on the trial court by the civil rules is that the court explain the reasons behind any variation in the fee schedule. The court retains broad discretion to award fees and to alter the amount it intends to award. [18] Because the court clearly stated its reasons for enhancing the award of attorneys fees to Concerned Citizens, we affirm its decision to award enhanced fees under Rule 82.
Finally, with respect to the fee award, the Cizeks argue that, rather than increasing the amount under Rule 82(b)(3), the trial court should have reduced the award to Concerned Citizens on the basis of the above-discussed equitable factors. The Cizeks contend that Concerned Citizens claimed an unreasonable number of hours, did not attempt to minimize its fees, pursued an unreasonable claim in bad faith, and attempted to influence a non-party, the municipality, with its litigation. Under Rule 82(b)(3), the court may vary a fee award based on, among other things, the reasonableness of the number of hours expended, the attorney's effort to minimize fees, the reasonableness of the claims, bad faith conduct, the extent to which a fee award may be so onerous that it would deter similarly situated litigants from voluntary use of the courts, the extent to which a party's claims suggest an influence apart from the case at bar, and any other equitable factors the court deems relevant. [19] Here, the court accounted for the unreasonableness of Concerned Citizens' fees by discounting its claimed fee altogether and instead using the Cizeks' fee as the basis for the award. In the substantive appeal, we affirmed the lower court's decision, which indicates our belief that Concerned Citizens pursued reasonable claims in good faith. [20] Again, the decision to award and to alter fees under Rule 82 is committed to the discretion of the trial court and will only be reversed if the court has abused its discretion. [21] As Judge Shortell's decision not to penalize Concerned Citizens for the reasons argued by the Cizeks cannot be said to be manifestly unreasonable, we reject the Cizeks' position and affirm the holding of the trial court.