Opinion ID: 218450
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Other Race-Based Claims

Text: Plaintiffs' other race-based claims, alleging discrete acts of discrimination, fare no better. They proceed under the indirect method of proof announced in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). The indirect method is a summary judgment filtering device that allows a plaintiff to make out a prima facie case of discrimination. The burden then shifts to the defendant to advance a non-discriminatory explanation for its conduct, and shifts back to the plaintiff to adduce evidence that the defendant's explanation is a lie. To make out a prima facie case of racial discrimination under the indirect method of proof, plaintiffs must (among other things) identify an adverse employment action. McGowan v. Deere & Co., 581 F.3d 575, 578 (7th Cir.2009) (burden-shifting analysis generally works the same under Title VII and § 1981). To qualify as adverse means materially adverse, not merely an inconvenience or a change in job responsibilities. Griffin v. Potter, 356 F.3d 824, 829 (7th Cir.2004); see also Davis v. Town of Lake Park, 245 F.3d 1232, 1238-39 (11th Cir.2001) (noting that courts have talked about materiality in different ways but noting that to qualify as a change to terms, conditions, or privileges of employment within Title VII's meaning requires an impact on plaintiff's job in a real and demonstrable way). In other words, the change needs to be significant, although exactly what that means will vary on the facts of a given case. Herrnreiter v. Chicago Housing Authority, 315 F.3d 742, 744 (7th Cir.2002) (discussing three types of adverse actions that have supported claims). Plaintiffs point to four actions on appeal that they say were materially adverse: (1) the 2005 shift-change policy, (2) a three-day suspension received by plaintiff Ellis, (3) restrictions on lunch break associations, and (4) their constructive discharge. We can jettison plaintiffs' cryptic lunch plaints with basically no discussion because the allegations were made by, and relate to, nurses who did not appeal from the district court's summary judgment ruling. The other claimed adverse actions are properly before us, but do not support viable claims. The 2005 shift-change policy does not qualify as materially adverse on these facts. See Washington v. Ill. Dep't of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2005) (plaintiff could maintain a retaliation suit based on shift changes given that the defendant knew the plaintiff's son had a medical condition so that a 9-to-5 schedule was a materially adverse change for her, even though it would not have been for 99% of the staff). A change in shift assignments will not normally be sufficient to qualify as an adverse employment action, unless it is accompanied by some other detriment. E.g., Grube v. Lau Indus., Inc., 257 F.3d 723, 728 (7th Cir.2001) (no adverse employment action where change in shift was not accompanied by a reduction in pay or significantly diminished job responsibilities). With respect to plaintiffs Ellis, Forrest, and Jones, they do not point to any objective hardship that indicates that the change might qualify as materially adverse. Herrnreiter, 315 F.3d at 744. And only on appeal have plaintiffs contended that family considerations made the shift-change materially adverse for plaintiff Ellis. They never made that argument to the district court, and so the issue has been waived. Tully v. Barada, 599 F.3d 591, 594 (7th Cir.2010). Likewise, Ellis cannot prevail on her claim of discrimination based on her three-day suspension, an incident she also points to in her state-law retaliation claim. Ellis and Forrest were both punished for investigating a third nurse's medication errors. The nurse in question felt harassed, and the parties dispute whether Ellis was told that higher-ups, not Ellis, would address the matter. There is no question that the suspension could qualify as an adverse employment action. However, plaintiffs fail to show that CCA's explanation is pretext. Under the indirect method of proving a discrimination claim, a plaintiff first establishes a prima facie case of discrimination (an adverse employment action is one of the elements, and we will assume the others). After the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a non-discriminatory explanation for its conduct. If the employer does so, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the explanation is pretextual. Germano v. Int'l Profit Ass'n, Inc., 544 F.3d 798, 807 (7th Cir.2008). Here, the district court reviewed the record evidence and concluded that CCA has established that its practice was to discipline Caucasian employees as well as African American employees for similar activities.... Plaintiffs are left merely to speculate as to the reasons they were disciplined, stating that they `believe' their discipline was pretextual without ever providing a factual foundation for that belief. App. 30. We agree. Finally, plaintiffs' constructive discharge claim cannot succeed. Establishing constructive discharge is more difficult than establishing a hostile work environment. Thompson v. Mem'l Hosp. of Carbondale, 625 F.3d 394, 401-02 (7th Cir. 2010). The failure of the latter thus dooms the former. Id.