Opinion ID: 2355918
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Does Sovereign Immunity Entitle the Commission to Judgment as a Matter of Law?

Text: The commission argues that the trial court erred in overruling its motions for directed verdict and motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the commission was protected by sovereign immunity. The State of Missouri and its entities, including the commission, are protected from lawsuits by sovereign immunity. Section 537.600.1 contains two exceptions. The second of these exceptions is involved in this case. [3] Subdivision (2) states that immunity shall be waived for injuries caused by the condition of a public entity's property if the plaintiff establishes the following elements: (1) the property was in dangerous condition at the time of the injury, (2) the injury directly resulted from the dangerous condition, (3) the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of harm of the kind of injury that was incurred, and (4) either a negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the course of his employment created the dangerous condition or a public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition in sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition. Section 537.600.1(2). The question is whether there was evidence to meet all of these statutory elements. The facts show that Cain met her burden as to elements (2) and (3). The elements at issue are (1) whether there was a dangerous condition and (4) whether the dangerous condition was created by an employee of a public entity.
The commission argues that Cain failed to demonstrate a dangerous condition of the property. This Court has explored the meaning of dangerous condition in two prior cases. Kanagawa v. State ex rel. Freeman, 685 S.W.2d 831, 835 (Mo. banc 1985), held that low fences at a prison, which allowed a rapist to escape and attack the plaintiff, were not defects in the physical condition of the fence. Dangerous condition, this Court said, refers to defects in the physical condition of the public entity's property. Id. (emphasis added). [4] This Court expanded on the definition of dangerous condition in a second case, Alexander v. State, 756 S.W.2d 539 (Mo. banc 1988). There, this Court held that the placement of a partition at the bottom of a ladder created a dangerous condition even though there was no physical defect in any of the property. Id. at 541-542. The Court explained that the danger was created not by any intrinsic defect in the property involved, but by the dangerous condition created by the positioning of various items of property. [5] Id. at 542. The condition was dangerous because its existence, without intervention by third parties, posed a physical threat to plaintiff. Id. The commission argues that there was no physical defect in the tree before the crew arrived to fell it. That is true, but under Alexander , it has no legal bearing on the issue. In Alexander , when the plaintiff climbed the ladder, there was no dangerous condition. Before he descended, someone placed the partition at the bottom of the ladder creating the dangerous condition. The present case is analogous. When Cain and her crew arrived, the tree was not dangerous. Cain's co-worker stopped cutting twice to fix the chain saw. When the tree fell, the co-worker was not cutting it but was trying to fix the saw with the help of another inmate. The tree was standing for several minutes, after the sawing, before it fell. During this time, a dangerous condition existed: the tree could fall at any moment. This evidence was sufficient for a jury to conclude that the manner in which the inmate worker cut the tree, prior to it falling, created a dangerous condition within the meaning of the statute. [6]
The commission argues that Cain fails to meet the statutory exception to sovereign immunity because Fitzpatrick is not an employee of a public entity for purposes of section 537.600.1(2). The statute does not define employee of a public entity but the phrase has a commonly understood meaning. An employee is one employed by another . . . usually for wages. Websters Third New International Dictionary 743 (1976). A public entity encompasses any state agency. Stacy v. Truman Medical Center, 836 S.W.2d 911, 917-921 (Mo. banc 1992). Fitzpatrick, Cain, and Korte were employees of a public entity because they performed services for the state for which they were paid. Bowman v. State, 763 S.W.2d 161, 164 (Mo.App.1988). Specifically, Fitzpatrick cut the tree at the direction of Perkins, the MoDOT supervisor. The other inmates were told to stay at the base of the tree. Perkins, and therefore the commission, controlled the details of how the work was done. Though Fitzpatrick was an inmate of a state correctional institution, she was in this setting performing services for the state and, thus, was an employee of a public entity for purposes of section 537.600. Since both Cain and Fitzpatrick are employees of a public entity for purposes of section 537.600, it may be questioned why Cain may recover in tort rather than under workers' compensation. Inmate workers are specifically exempt from workers' compensation. Section 287.090.1(3). Since Cain is not covered by the workers' compensation statute, she is not limited to its exclusive remedy provisions.
In addition to the four requirements of the statute, the commission argues there is an additional requirement for the state to waive sovereign immunity: a lack of third party intervention. The commission bases its argument on Alexander , where this Court said that the placement of the partition was dangerous because its existence, without intervention by third parties, posed a physical threat to plaintiff. Alexander, 756 S.W.2d at 542 (emphasis added). The language in Alexander was not meant to add a fifth element under section 537.600.1(2); rather it was used to contrast Alexander from two previous decisions. Those two cases are Kanagawa and Twente v. Ellis Fischel State Cancer Hospital, 665 S.W.2d 2 (Mo.App.1983). In Kanagawa , the plaintiff was attacked by an escaped rapist. The court held there was no dangerous condition when the state allowed the rapist to escape because there was no physical defect in the property. In Twente , the plaintiff was raped in a hospital parking lot. Again, the court held that a lack of security in the parking lot was not a dangerous condition because there was no physical defect. The Alexander Court, after eliminating the physical defect requirement, used intervention by third parties to distinguish criminal acts by third parties with an indirect connection to state property from negligent acts of state employees. The commission's argument relies on appellate court decisions that expanded the third party intervention language of Alexander in a manner that is not consistent with the statute. In State ex rel. St. Louis State Hospital v. Dowd, 908 S.W.2d 738 (Mo.App.1995), the plaintiff was a part-time employee who was cleaning out a paper shredder. His boss turned on the shredder causing plaintiff to lose four fingers. The court of appeals held there was no exception to sovereign immunity because the injury was caused by third party intervention. Id. at 741. Similarly in Farrell v. St. Louis County, 190 S.W.3d 401 (Mo.App.2006), an inmate was working in the kitchen when another inmate, who was stacking tables, slid a table too fast. The inmate injured his shoulder trying to stop the sliding table. The court of appeals held that the plaintiff did not qualify for the dangerous condition exception because the injury was caused by third party intervention. Id. at 403-404. In State ex rel. Nixon v. Westbrooke, 143 S.W.3d 737 (Mo. App.2004), the plaintiff was removing debris on a highway, following an accident. He was struck by a car when the highway patrol removed the cones that were diverting traffic. The appellate court concluded there could be no recovery because of the intervening acts of the highway patrolmen. Id. at 740. This expansion of Alexander's third party intervention language is unfounded. The language of [section 537.600.1(2)], which refers to conditions created by the negligence of state employees, unquestionably contemplates some negligence by agents of the public entity. Alexander, 756 S.W.2d at 542. Much of the confusion has arisen because Alexander failed to define who is a third party. A third party is someone whose act intervenes but who is not connected to the state in any kind of employment or agency relationship. Using this definition, the rapists in Kanagawa and Twente would be considered third party intervenors, while the state employees in Dowd , Farrell [7] and Westbrooke would not be third parties. To the extent that Dowd , Farrell , and Westbrooke are inconsistent with this decision and section 537.600.1, they should no longer be followed. There was no third party intervention in this case. Fitzpatrick, whose actions undoubtedly caused the dangerous condition, was for the purposes here in the employ of the state. Her movements were controlled by the state. She was instructed by her state supervisor as to which tree to cut down, provided with a chainsaw by the state, and paid by the state for her work. For third party intervention to be a factor in this case, a person outside the inmate work crew and MoDOT would have had to have intervened. This did not occur.