Opinion ID: 2523730
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Sentencing Standard

Text: Defendant next argues that the circuit court violated his constitutional rights by applying the wrong standard to the sentencing determination. When it announced its determination, the court stated, There are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death penalty. The court's decision mirrored the language of the death penalty statute as it existed prior to November 2003. At that time, the statute directed that if a sentencing court found one or more aggravating factors, the Court shall consider any aggravating and mitigating factors   . If the Court determines that there are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death sentence, the Court shall sentence the defendant to death. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(h) (West 2002). However, the statute was changed in 2003, and it now directs: the Court shall consider any aggravating and mitigating factors   . If the Court determines, after weighing the factors in aggravation and mitigation, that death is the appropriate sentence, the Court shall sentence the defendant to death. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(h) (West 2004). The change in the sentencing statute was effective November 19, 2003; defendant's sentencing hearing began September 3, 2003, and defendant was sentenced March 9, 2004. Defendant raised this claim in his posttrial motions. The circuit court acknowledged that the statute had changed and that it had not said that death was the appropriate sentence during its imposition of sentence. The court explained: When I wrote my notes on the yellow sheet of paper, I had both standards because Mr. Baez I thought had the right to elect both, and I certainly thought I said that death was the appropriate sentence. Those words I do not see in the transcript, even though I read it quickly. I certainly didn't see them. But it is clear that under either standard, death is the appropriate sentence. There were mitigating factors, but there were no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of death. And, therefore, death in this Court's opinion was the appropriate sentence in the case. Later, the court added: I wouldn't have used the wrong standard, but I've indicated that I had the benefit of both standards, and I think that they go hand in hand. If there were mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of death, then of course death would not be the appropriate sentence. Because there are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of death, then death is in fact without a doubt in my mind the appropriate sentence. Thus, contrary to defendant's argument, it is clear that the court did apply the death is the appropriate sentence standard in sentencing defendant. Defendant takes issue with the court's equation of the two standards, but we have held that the new standard is really nothing more than a refined codification of the balancing process sentencing authorities already used in determining whether the death penalty should be imposed. People v. Mertz, 218 Ill.2d 1, 93, 299 Ill.Dec. 581, 842 N.E.2d 618 (2005). Moreover, irrespective of its discussion of the previous sentencing statute, the court explicitly noted in the posttrial hearing: death is in fact without a doubt in my mind the appropriate sentence. Defendant argues, however, that we should not consider the court's comments at the posttrial hearing. According to defendant, the court is bound by its statements while imposing sentence, and considering the court's subsequent comments is tantamount to impeaching the verdict. See, e.g., People v. Hobley, 182 Ill.2d 404, 457, 231 Ill.Dec. 321, 696 N.E.2d 313 (1998) (It is well settled that a statement by a juror taken after the jury has rendered its verdict, has been polled in open court, and has been discharged will not be admitted to impeach the jury's verdict.). Defendant misunderstands the purpose of a posttrial motion. To preserve a claim of error for appeal, a defendant must object at trial and include the claim in a written posttrial motion. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill.2d 176, 186, 119 Ill.Dec. 265, 522 N.E.2d 1124 (1988). Failure to include a claim in the posttrial motion results in forfeiture of that claim. Id. This rule applies with equal force to claims of error at sentencing; all such claims must be included in a postsentencing motion, which is the functional equivalent of a posttrial motion for the purpose of preserving issues for appeal. People v. Reed, 177 Ill.2d 389, 394, 226 Ill.Dec. 801, 686 N.E.2d 584 (1997). As this court has explained: Requiring a written post-sentencing motion will allow the trial court the opportunity to review a defendant's contention of sentencing error and save the delay and expense inherent in appeal if they are meritorious. Such a motion also focuses the attention of the trial court upon a defendant's alleged errors and gives the appellate court the benefit of the trial court's reasoned judgment on those issues. Id. Thus, comments by the trial court at a postsentencing hearing that shed light on claims of errors raised by the defendant are permissible; in fact, they are encouraged, to give[] the appellate court the benefit of the trial court's reasoned judgment on those issues. Id. We therefore reject defendant's arguments that the court's postsentencing explanation of its sentencing rationale is inadmissible or equivalent to impeaching the verdict. Based on the court's explanation, we find that it applied the correct statutory standard in finding that death was the appropriate sentence in this case.