Opinion ID: 852796
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Judicial Statements About the Moral/Penal Weight of Facts

Text: The second aggravator is that Trusley was in a position of trust with the victim. In a recent case we stated that a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights are not implicated when the language of an aggravator is meant to describe the factual circumstances, not to serve as a fact itself. Morgan v. State, 829 N.E.2d 12, 17 (Ind. 2005). In Morgan, the trial judge took note of the defendant's multiple prior convictions and observed that previous convictions had failed to rehabilitate the offender. We categorized such statements as observations [that] merely describe the moral or penal weight of [underlying facts]. Id. Because such observations do not involve impermissible judicial fact-finding, but rather reflect the efforts of a judge to describe in a concise manner what the underlying facts mean, and why they demonstrate that a particular defendant deserves an enhanced sentence, we concluded that their use did not violate the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 17-18. Nevertheless, we also held that to satisfy the requirements of Blakely such statements must be 1) supported by facts otherwise admitted or found by a jury and 2) meant as a concise description of what the underlying facts demonstrate and therefore [rely] upon a legal determination otherwise reserved as a power of the judge. Id. In establishing the factual basis of the plea in this case, the following exchange occurred between Trusley and her lawyer: Lawyer: And again, you were a day-care provider for him [Small] and you had custody of him during the period of time in which he died? Trusley: Yes. (Plea Tr. at 10.) Judge Vaidik, dissenting in this case, commented that these admissions are sufficient to establish that Trusley was in a position of trust with the victim. Trusley, 818 N.E.2d at 114 (Vaidik, J., dissenting) vacated. She is correct. The aggravator is an attempt to articulate the obvious nature of the relationship that existed between the defendant and the victim at the time the crime was committed. Of course, as we said in Morgan, judicial statements such as in a position of trust cannot serve as separate aggravating circumstances. Morgan, 829 N.E.2d at 17. The trial court in Morgan, however, had enumerated both prior convictions and failure to rehabilitate as aggravating circumstances. We held that the judicial statement merely described the moral/penal weight of the prior convictions and could not serve as a separate aggravating circumstance[] in addition to the fact of prior conviction. Id. Here, the court did not enhance the sentence on the grounds that Trusley was both in a position of trust and Small's day care provider. Rather, it supported the position of trust aggravator by reference to the admitted fact that Trusley was Small's day care provider. This was an appropriate legal observation about properly established facts and constituted a legitimate aggravating circumstance.