Opinion ID: 466310
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The 180-day limitations period

Text: 15 LESA contends that plaintiffs' claims of wage discrimination were not filed within 180 days of any unlawful employment practice. Plaintiffs' current salaries, LESA argues, are merely the present effect of an act--the decision to hire plaintiffs at a given salary--that took place more than 180 days prior to the filing of plaintiffs' charge with the EEOC. Under United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 97 S.Ct. 1885, 52 L.Ed.2d 571 (1977), claims based on the present effect [of] a past act of discrimination, are time-barred. Id. at 558, 97 S.Ct. at 1889. Thus, LESA argues, the district court erred by holding that LESA's biweekly wage payments to plaintiffs constituted a practice currently actionable under Title VII. 16 This court has squarely rejected LESA's theory of discriminatory wage payments. In Bartelt v. Berlitz School of Languages of America, Inc., 698 F.2d 1003 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 915, 104 S.Ct. 277, 78 L.Ed.2d 257 (1983), we considered the identical argument and wrote: 17 We disagree. The policy of paying lower wages to female employees on each payday constitutes a continuing violation. We conclude that the claims are timely because each plaintiff filed charges with the EEOC within three hundred days of a payment of allegedly discriminatory wages. 18 Id. at 1004-05 (citations and footnote omitted). By finding that each payment of discriminatory wages constituted a continuing violation, we implicitly rejected the LESA's characterization of wage payments as merely the present effect of a past act. As each plaintiff in the instant action filed charges with the EEOC within 180 days of a payment, we conclude that plaintiffs' action is not time-barred.