Opinion ID: 3172726
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Count One: The Section 1983 Claim

Text: Snyder's first argument is that the district court erred in failing to construe the section 1983 claim in his complaint as raising two theories of constitutional violation not addressed on the merits by our prior opinion in this case: a violation of his First Amendment rights and a violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free of excessive fines. Recognizing that a complaint need plead facts and not necessarily the specific names of the legal theories and causes of action fairly raised by these facts, Morales-Vallellanes v. Potter, 339 F.3d 9, 14 (1st Cir. 2003), we nevertheless find in Snyder's complaint barely a hint of any facts that might support such theories. The complaint contains no allegation that the municipal officials retaliated against Snyder because he supplied information to a state tribunal. While it mentions that a state - 8 - tribunal requested information from Snyder, and denied Collura benefits, it does not even allege that Collura knew what information he supplied to the tribunal. It also expressly alleges that the retaliatory campaign began before the state agency requested any information. Leaving no room for doubt as to the motive for the alleged retaliation, the complaint expressly alleges that the acts of which it complains were [in] retaliation for [Collura's] termination of employment. As for the lawsuit against Collura's brother, the complaint does allege that Waltham issued a notice of fine on the very same day that Snyder prevailed in a lawsuit against Collura's brother, but makes no allegation that the latter preceded the former, or was a reason for the notice. Finally, as for the Eighth Amendment claim, the complaint mentions notice of a $300 fine for each day a zoning violation was not abated, but offers no facts suggesting how such a fine was excessive, or was either paid or still threatened. See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 337 (1998) (gravamen of Eighth Amendment excessive fines inquiry is whether the amount of the forfeiture is grossly disproportional to the gravity of the defendant's offense). Even if we were to assume that such vague hints of a claim were enough to survive a motion to dismiss, the motion to dismiss stage in this lawsuit has long passed. Snyder has not done what he needed to do to develop and preserve such arguably - 9 - latent claims. In our prior opinion, we noted that Snyder had not preserved his Eighth Amendment theory. While that holding might be read narrowly as limited to the immunity issues on interlocutory review, or as not preclusive of subsequent efforts to revive such a claim, we make clear now that, to the extent one might arguably glean these claims from the spare hints in the complaint, Snyder waited too long to undertake such a recasting of his lawsuit. See Schneider v. Local 103 I.B.E.W. Health Plan, 442 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (Even an issue raised in the complaint but ignored at summary judgment may be deemed waived. (citing Grenier v. Cyanamid Plastics, Inc., 70 F.3d 667, 678 (1st Cir. 1995))); Torres-Rios v. LPS Labs., Inc., 152 F.3d 11, 16 (1st Cir. 1998) (mere hint of a possible additional claim insufficient [g]iven the absence of any development of such a claim as the suit progressed). The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the section 1983 claim in whole, and they then later moved for summary judgment after discovery. Unlike Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, motions of this type necessarily call on a plaintiff to tie his allegations to a tangible theory of recovery. Otherwise, waiver looms. See Grenier, 70 F.3d at 678; Johnston v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 595 F.2d 890, 894 (1st Cir. 1979) (It is by now axiomatic that an issue not presented to the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.). In response first to the motion to dismiss and - 10 - then in response to the original motions for summary judgment, Snyder omitted any mention of the theories that he now urges we find implicit in the complaint. In short, to the extent that the complaint left Snyder leeway in picking his legal theories, the point at which he needed to reveal those theories passed well before he announced the theories that he now wishes to pursue. See Torres-Rios, 152 F.3d at 16 (Given the absence of any development of such a claim by the time of the Joint Case Management Memorandum, we join the district court in concluding that a design defect claim was not raised by the complaint.) To rule otherwise would be to turn an orderly marshalling of the reasons for and against dismissal of a claim into a game of whack- a-mole, with seriatim summary judgment proceedings not ending until the defendant manages to guess every possible legal theory upon which a plaintiff might rely to support a claim. That leaves Snyder's appeal from his request for leave to amend the complaint. The proposed amendment did not contain new facts. Rather, it simply served as an alternative vehicle arguing that he should be able to recast his claims at what would otherwise be the end of the case. The district court rejected the effort on the grounds that it was futile. Snyder II, 2015 WL 758546, at  n.1. For all the reasons we have already stated, we agree. We add only that once a court sets a deadline for seeking - 11 - leave to amend,1 the complaint may be modified only for good cause. Martinez, 792 F.3d at 180 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4)). And '[g]ood cause' does not typically include a change of heart on a litigation strategy. Id.; see also Trans-Spec Truck Serv., Inc. v. Caterpillar Inc., 524 F.3d 315, 327 (1st Cir. 2008) (a party is bound by the consequences of its litigation strategy and leave is properly denied when it delays moving to amend because it thought that it would prevail on the motion to dismiss without any need to further amend).