Opinion ID: 2587254
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Refusal to instruct on lesser offenses

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury other than on a theory of first degree felony murder, in violation of state law as well as defendant's right to an impartial jury under the Sixth Amendment and to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution. The record reflects that defendant requested instructions on second degree malice murder, second degree felony murder, voluntary manslaughter, as well as instructions that referred to involuntary manslaughter and theft. The trial court declined to give these instructions to the jury and instead instructed only on first degree murder based upon a felony-murder theory. [10] `[A] defendant has a constitutional right to have the jury determine every material issue presented by the evidence....' [Citations.] ( People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 645, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 629, 22 P.3d 392.) To protect this right and the broader interest of safeguarding the jury's function of ascertaining the truth, a trial court must instruct on lesser included offenses, even in the absence of a request, whenever there is substantial evidence raising a question as to whether all of the elements of the charged offense are present. ( Ibid. ) Conversely, even on request, a trial judge has no duty to instruct on any lesser offense unless there is substantial evidence to support such instruction. (See People v. Avena, supra, 13 Cal.4th 394, 414, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 301, 916 P.2d 1000.) `Substantial evidence is evidence sufficient to deserve consideration by the jury, that is, evidence that a reasonable jury could find persuasive.' [Citation.] ( People v. Lewis, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 645, 106 Cal. Rptr.2d 629, 22 P.3d 392.) The record in the present case does not contain any substantial evidence to support defendant's conviction of second degree malice murder rather than first degree felony murder. There is no substantial evidence to support the theory that defendant may have shot Treto with the intent to kill or with a conscious disregard of a high probability of danger to human life, but without taking or attempting to take Treto's money or his vehicle. (ง 189; People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th 690, 739-740 & fn. 17, 94 Cal. Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46; People v. Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 926, 940-941, 13 Cal. Rptr.2d 259, 838 P.2d 1212; People v. Neely (1993) 6 Cal.4th 877, 897, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 189, 864 P.2d 460; see People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 211, 279 Cal.Rptr. 720, 807 P.2d 949.) The evidence of defendant's conduct prior to and at the time of the killing consistently reveals that he anticipated, intended, and committed, a robbery, and, if he did not anticipate, he certainly intended, to commit murder. Similarly, there is no substantial evidence to support the theory that defendant formed the intent to steal the property only after committing the murder, thus justifying an instruction on theft. ( People v. Lewis (1990) 50 Cal.3d 262, 276-277, 266 Cal.Rptr. 834, 786 P.2d 892.) Moreover, the trial court instructed the jury, pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.21, that an unlawful killing in which death occurred as a result of first degree robbery is first degree murder if the perpetrator had the specific intent to commit robbery. The jury would have known from this instruction that defendant's intent to steal had to have arisen prior to the murder. (See People v. Lewis, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 647-648, fn. 6, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 629, 22 P.3d 392; see also People v. Silva (2001) 25 Cal.4th 345, 371-372, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 93, 21 P.3d 769.) Nor does the record contain any substantial evidence to support defendant's conviction of second degree felony murder based upon the commission of a felony other than robbery or another felony enumerated in section 189, but nonetheless inherently dangerous to human life. ( People v. Rios (2000) 23 Cal.4th 450, 460, fn. 6, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 512, 2 P.3d 1066; People v. Millwee (1998) 18 Cal.4th 96, 156-157, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 418, 954 P.2d 990; People v. Patterson (1989) 49 Cal.3d 615, 620-621, 262 Cal.Rptr. 195, 778 P.2d 549.) Defendant suggests that that instruction was supported by the evidence establishing that defendant, a convicted felon, possessed a firearm. In People v. Satchell (1971) 6 Cal.3d 28, 39-1, 98 Cal.Rptr. 33, 489 P.2d 1361, overruled on another ground in People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869, we held that the latter offense does not constitute a felony inherently dangerous to human life. Again ignoring the evidence that defendant committed robbery, defendant asserts there is substantial evidence to support an instruction on voluntary manslaughter on the theory that he acted in the heat of passion after the occurrence of a racial incident somehow engendered when Treto confronted the African-American man who was riding a bicycle prior to the shooting. Nothing in the evidence suggests any relationship between defendant's acts in demanding money and shooting the victims, and the earlier incident involving the other man. (See People v. Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th 195, 250, 10 Cal. Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643.) Defendant suggests that, in the alternative, there is substantial evidence to support the theory that he acted in unreasonable self-defense. The combined evidence of Treto's conduct and the distance between the two men at the time of the shooting negates rather than supports that theory. Finally, there is no substantial evidence to justify instruction on involuntary manslaughter based upon the theory that defendant's intoxication prevented his forming the specific intent to kill. Effective January 1, 1982, the Legislature abolished diminished capacity as a defense, while continuing to permit evidence of voluntary intoxication or mental disorder on the issue whether the defendant actually formed the requisite mental state. (งง 22, 28.) The evidence of intoxication was too insubstantial to support any such instruction. The trial court's refusal to so instruct the jury did not constitute error. ( People v. Neely, supra, 6 Cal.4th 877, 897, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 189, 864 P.2d 460.)