Opinion ID: 691020
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Khadir Ghanayem

Text: 16 With regard to Ghanayem's directed judgment of acquittal, the government raises only one issue on appeal: the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's conclusion that Ghanayem was a knowing member of the charged conspiracy and was not entrapped as a matter of law. The standard for appellate review of a trial court's post-verdict judgment of acquittal is the same as that applied by the trial court. United States v. Beck, 615 F.2d 441 (7th Cir.1980); see United States v. Brennan, 994 F.2d 918, 922 (1st Cir.1993). The test is whether the record contained sufficient evidence from which the jury could reasonably find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, recognizing that it is the exclusive function of the jury to determine the credibility of witnesses and draw reasonable inferences. United States v. Douglas, 874 F.2d 1145, 1155 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 841, 110 S.Ct. 126, 107 L.Ed.2d 87 (1989). The defendant bears a heavy burden on appeal, as he must demonstrate that no rational trier of fact could decide beyond a reasonable doubt that he was not entrapped. United States v. Cervante, 958 F.2d 175, 178 (7th Cir.1992). Only when the record contains no evidence, regardless of how it is weighed, from which the jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, may an appellate court overturn the verdict. United States v. Whaley, 830 F.2d 1469, 1473 (7th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1009, 108 S.Ct. 1738, 100 L.Ed.2d 202 (1988); United States v. Atterson, 926 F.2d 649, 655 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1259, 111 S.Ct. 2909, 115 L.Ed.2d 1072 (1991). 17 In entrapment cases, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant who raises a colorable defense of entrapment, as Ghanayem did, has not in fact been entrapped. United States v. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1196, 1203 (7th Cir.1994) (en banc ) (citing Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 547-49, 112 S.Ct. 1535, 1540, 118 L.Ed.2d 174 (1992)). The defense of entrapment consists of two elements: (1) government inducement of the crime; and (2) a lack of predisposition on the part of the defendant to engage in criminal conduct. Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63, 108 S.Ct. 883, 886-87, 99 L.Ed.2d 54 (1988); United States v. Gootee, 34 F.3d 475, 477 (7th Cir.1994); United States v. Johnson, 32 F.3d 304, 307 (7th Cir.1994). The lack of predisposition is the principal element in the entrapment defense. Johnson, 32 F.3d at 307 (citing United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 433, 93 S.Ct. 1637, 1643, 36 L.Ed.2d 366 (1973); United States v. Evans, 924 F.2d 714, 717 (7th Cir.1991)). Moreover, once the defendant presents sufficient evidence tending to show that the government induced him to break the law, the burden shifts to the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was disposed to commit the crime prior to being approached by government agents. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 547-49, 112 S.Ct. at 1540; United States v. Ellis, 23 F.3d 1268, 1272 (7th Cir.1994); United States v. Groll, 992 F.2d 755, 759 (7th Cir.1993). 3 18 Predisposition focuses on whether the defendant was an unwary innocent or, instead, an unwary criminal who readily avails himself of the opportunity to perpetrate the crime. Johnson, 32 F.3d at 307 (quoting Mathews, 485 U.S. at 63, 108 S.Ct. at 886-87) (internal quotations omitted). This Court looks to five factors to determine whether the defendant had the predisposition to commit the charged offense: (1) the character or reputation of the defendant; (2) whether the suggestion of criminal activity was originally made by the government; (3) whether the defendant was engaged in criminal activity for a profit; (4) whether the defendant evidenced a reluctance to commit the offense, overcome by government persuasion; and (5) the nature of the inducement or persuasion offered by the government. Johnson, 32 F.3d at 307, n. 5 (citing United States v. Haddad, 976 F.2d 1088, 1095 (7th Cir.1992)); Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1205 n. 1 (Coffey, J., dissenting); United States v. Gonzalez, 19 F.3d 1169, 1172 (7th Cir.1994); United States v. Santiago-Godinez, 12 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1630, 128 L.Ed.2d 354 (1994). The most important factor is whether the defendant exhibited a reluctance to commit the offense that government agents overcame. Johnson, 32 F.3d at 307 n. 5 (citing Santiago-Godinez, 12 F.3d at 728). 19 Generally ... the question of entrapment is one for the jury, rather than for the court. Johnson, 32 F.3d at 307. Although Fed.R.Crim.P. 29 permits a court to direct a verdict of acquittal where there is no evidence from which a jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, see Whaley, 830 F.2d at 1473, in cases where there is at least some evidence in the record, it is for the jury to decide questions of fact, to weigh conflicting testimony, to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence and to make credibility determinations. The jury must examine the evidence as a whole (including trial testimony and tape recordings), assess its weight and reliability, and resolve contradictions in favor of either side. This is especially true in the entrapment context, for whether entrapment occurred is a factual issue; 'the defense ... is intertwined with the issue of intent and is often based on credibility determinations, which are traditionally reserved for jury resolution.'  Johnson, 32 F.3d at 307 (quoting Santiago-Godinez, 12 F.3d at 727). 20 The district court, however, concluded that the evidence introduced at trial established beyond a reasonable doubt, as a matter of law, that the government had entrapped Ghanayem. In granting Ghanayem's Rule 29 motion, the district court stated: 21 Taking [Grant's] testimony in a vacuum, the jury was presented with sufficient evidence upon which to find that Ghanayem was predisposed to arrange a cocaine deal. However, the testimony of agent Grant and Ghanayem must be considered together with the unimpeached taped recorded conversations introduced by the government. These tapes, which the government introduced as authentic representations of later recorded conversations, effectively undercut the weight and reliability of agent Grant's testimony about Ghanayem's behavior at the earlier meetings. In light of the tapes, the government's evidence was insufficient to support a finding of predisposition. 22 845 F.Supp. at 561. In reaching this conclusion, the district court examined the government's predisposition evidence. It first determined that the government had presented no evidence that Ghanayem had ever been involved in, arrested for, or convicted of any drug offense, or that Ghanayem had anything to do with illegal drug trafficking. Second, the court found that the government had initiated negotiations with Ghanayem. The court then examined the government's other evidence, including the taped conversations between Ghanayem and Grant, and concluded that the government had not presented sufficient circumstantial evidence to support a finding of Ghanayem's predisposition. Id. at 562-63. We disagree. 23 The district court relied heavily on what it considered conflicting testimony regarding Ghanayem's responses to Grant's contact with him. The court determined that the taped conversations introduced by the government not only showed Ghanayem as unwilling to participate 4 but also showed Grant's testimony to be of questionable reliability and accuracy. 5 24 Examining all the evidence in the record in the light most favorable to the government, we conclude that the government presented sufficient evidence to permit a jury to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that Ghanayem had the requisite predisposition. By reason of Ghanayem's previous experiences and acquaintances, it is likely that if the government had not induced him to commit the crime, some criminal would have done so. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1200. We reach this conclusion on the basis of the five factor test this Court follows. 25 First, the government proffered evidence that Ghanayem's character and reputation predisposed him to being involved in a drug transaction. The district court concluded that [t]he government presented no evidence that Ghanayem had ever been involved in, arrested for, or convicted of any drug offense. 845 F.Supp. at 559. A review of the trial record, however, leads us to a different conclusion. Although Ghanayem had no previous cocaine-related offenses, Agent Grant testified that Ghanayem had a previous marijuana conviction. 6 Furthermore, Ghanayem used terminology that indicated he was experienced in the drug trade. See Johnson, 32 F.3d at 308; Cervante, 958 F.2d at 179 (ease in communicating in drug dealing jargon is relevant in examining character and reputation); United States v. Rivera-Espinoza, 905 F.2d 156, 158 (7th Cir.1990) (defendant's use of drug business terms of art evidenced his knowledge of the drug trade). Ghanayem also showed his awareness of the usual course of dealings in drug transactions. On May 20, 1993, Ghanayem informed Grant that although he did not want to participate directly in the negotiations between Grant and Shunnarah, he wanted Grant to add $1,000 to the price of each kilogram of cocaine sold (which Grant would pass along to Ghanayem as a finder's fee). This insistence on $1,000 per kilogram sold to Shunnarah indicates that Ghanayem was aware of the range for a broker's fee for bringing together a supplier and distributor of cocaine. See Santiago-Godinez, 12 F.3d at 729-30 ($2,000 per kilogram fee is not extraordinary). He thus indicated his sophistication and knowledge of the drug business, United States v. Perez-Leon, 757 F.2d 866, 872 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 831, 106 S.Ct. 99, 88 L.Ed.2d 80 (1985); United States v. Beverly, 913 F.2d 337, 355 (7th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1052, 111 S.Ct. 766, 112 L.Ed.2d 786 (1991), and demonstrated that [he] was 'not unfamiliar with the business for which' [he] was convicted by using terms of art. Beverly, 913 F.2d at 355 (internal punctuation omitted). 26 The second factor is not in dispute. The government concedes that on April 22, 1993, it approached Ghanayem, made the initial contact and suggested the drug deal. While this factor does support Ghanayem's case, mere solicitation by a government agent is insufficient to establish entrapment. Johnson, 32 F.3d at 308; Cervante, 958 F.2d at 179; United States v. Blackman, 950 F.2d 420, 424 (7th Cir.1991); Perez-Leon, 757 F.2d at 872. 27 The third factor favors the government in that the record reflects that Ghanayem engaged in criminal activity for a profit. In fact, it appears that the singular purpose of Ghanayem's involvement in the drug transaction was to profit. Grant testified that from the outset, Ghanayem maintained a what's-in-it-for-me attitude and insisted on his piece of the action. As discussed above, Ghanayem wanted $1,000 per kilogram of cocaine as a profit on sales to Shunnarah. Record testimony also indicates that Ghanayem repeatedly stressed the importance of the $1,000 and wanted to prevent any direct contact between him (Ghanayem) and Shunnarah in order to insure he received this broker's fee. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we recognize that a jury could reasonably have concluded that a person who operates in a chain of cocaine distribution does not do so at a financial loss, Beverly, 913 F.2d at 356; Perez-Leon, 757 F.2d at 872, and that Ghanayem sought to profit from the drug transaction. 28 The fourth, and most important factor, also favors the government. It was reasonable for the jury to conclude that the defendant did not express reluctance which government persuasion overcame. While Ghanayem maintains that he informed Grant that he did not buy, sell or deal in drugs, Grant testified that Ghanayem did not express any reluctance at becoming involved and serving as a middleman. Furthermore, the record is void of any evidence that Ghanayem was cajoled into the conspiracy. Rather, Grant approached Ghanayem with the opportunity not only to provide Shunnarah with a source of cocaine, but also to make a considerable profit (for minimal effort). Grant's testimony concerning his contacts with Ghanayem demonstrates that Ghanayem was willing and eager to participate in a drug transaction and, with the exception of Ghanayem's own testimony, the record is devoid of any evidence suggesting that Ghanayem was reluctant to participate. 29 Ghanayem remained an enthusiastic and active participant in the conspiracy. Throughout the course of the dealings, Ghanayem did not abandon the transaction when it encountered trouble spots; to the contrary, Ghanayem expressed his willingness to pursue the transaction. On May 7, 1993, Ghanayem informed Grant that he could not reach his contact, but that he would continue to try to reach him that evening. On May 12, when Grant inquired as to when Ghanayem's contact would be ready, Ghanayem told Grant that he would find out right away. On May 17, Ghanayem told Grant that although he had been unable to reach his contact, he would continue his communication efforts. Again, on May 19, Ghanayem noted his difficulty in reaching his contact but reassured Grant that he would try to call him later. 30 Once the transaction was off and running, Ghanayem expressed in his numerous meetings with Grant neither reluctance at being involved nor the desire to get out. On May 20, Ghanayem drove around with Grant and Shunnarah, working out the details of the transaction. He was directly involved in setting up the time and place for the deal to be fully completed. On May 21, even after Grant had direct contact with Shunnarah, Ghanayem was instrumental in attempting to complete the deal. On May 23, Ghanayem again was the pivotal figure in setting up each aspect of the deal. He remained in constant contact with Grant and, with Shunnarah, communicated with Theodosopoulos. Ghanayem was present in the Chicago Billiard's parking lot when the cocaine for money transaction was to occur and when Theodosopoulos flashed the money at Grant. 31 Fifth, the nature of the government's inducement and persuasion do not support Ghanayem's entrapment theory. The government did not threaten, intimidate or coerce Ghanayem. They did not spend over two years pressuring him into this transaction, as in Jacobson, nor a year, as in Hollingsworth. Rather, the government's interaction with Ghanayem merely stretched over the course of three months and nine meetings. The government did not offer any special inducements or promises to Ghanayem. Although Ghanayem contends that the legitimate car repair transaction created pressure on him to continue a relationship with Grant, when viewed in light of his $1,000 per kilogram profit, it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that this was not actually a coercive factor. Ghanayem stood to make at least $5,000 ($1,000 for each of 5 kilograms) for the cocaine--a far greater profit than he would net from the car repairs. Finally, even if we were to credit Ghanayem's testimony, the $450 was not overly large, and [w]hen a person accepts a criminal offer without being offered extraordinary inducements, he demonstrates a predisposition to commit the type of crime involved. Evans, 924 F.2d at 718; see Cervante, 958 F.2d at 180. 32 Thus, it was reasonable for the jury to have concluded that Ghanayem was in a position without the government's help to become involved in illegal activity. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1200. Although Ghanayem may not have otherwise become involved in the drug conspiracy at that particular moment in time, the government sufficiently proved that he was predisposed to commit the crime at some point. In this case, the government's involvement may have affected the timing of the offense; it did not force the offense. Based on our review of the record, and in light of the five factors discussed above, we conclude that there was more than enough evidence to support the jury's conclusion that Ghanayem was predisposed to conspire to possess with the intent to distribute cocaine and, as such, was not entrapped. We will not disturb the jury's credibility determinations unless it credits exceedingly improbable testimony, Cervante, 958 F.2d at 108 (citing United States v. Jones, 950 F.2d 1309, 1315 (7th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 996, 112 S.Ct. 1700, 118 L.Ed.2d 410 (1992); United States v. Cardona-Rivera, 904 F.2d 1149, 1152-53 (7th Cir.1990)), and such is not the case here.
33 Ghanayem also argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for a new trial. He contends that he was entitled to a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence which demonstrates that he was not predisposed to commit the crime. Specifically, Ghanayem maintains that after the trial, Mazen Shunnarah would have provided testimony, previously unavailable, which would have exculpated Ghanayem. 34 The government brought Shunnarah to the Northern District of Illinois under subpoena. In Shunnarah's initial interview with the government, he admitted that he had attempted to purchase the five kilograms of cocaine from Grant, that Ghanayem had arranged the contact, that Ghanayem was to receive a percentage of the profits, and that Theodosopoulos was providing a portion of the purchase money. Closer to the trial date, Shunnarah changed his story and withdrew his statements regarding Theodosopoulos's involvement. Because of these differing stories, the government did not call Shunnarah as a witness. Ghanayem did call Shunnarah as part of his defense. Although Shunnarah had already pled guilty in Lexington, he had not yet been sentenced. Shunnarah thus refused to testify, exercising his Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination. 35 We will reverse a district court's denial of a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence only if the district court has abused its discretion. Gootee, 34 F.3d at 479; United States v. DePriest, 6 F.3d 1201, 1216 (7th Cir.1993). We approach such motions with great caution and are wary of second-guessing the determinations of both judge and jury. DePriest, 6 F.3d at 1216; United States v. Kamel, 965 F.2d 484, 490 (7th Cir.1992). 36 Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that [t]he court on motion of a defendant may grant a new trial to that defendant if required in the interests of justice. To justify a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, Ghanayem must satisfy a stringent multi-stage test. United States v. Young, 20 F.3d 758, 763 (7th Cir.1994). He must show that the evidence: (1) came to his knowledge only after trial; (2) could not have been discovered sooner through the exercise of due diligence; (3) is material, and not merely impeaching or cumulative; and (4) would probably lead to an acquittal in the event of a new trial. Gootee, 34 F.3d at 479; DePriest, 6 F.3d at 1216-17. 37 Ghanayem fails to satisfy either of the first two prongs. 7 First, Ghanayem has not established that the evidence came to his knowledge only after trial. To the contrary, Ghanayem and his counsel knew during trial the substance of Shunnarah's testimony. Prior to the commencement of trial, defense counsel interviewed Shunnarah. At trial, counsel for Ghanayem explicitly stated that when [Shunnarah] took the stand he would have said that Shunnarah [sic Ghanayem] had nothing to do with the deal, that Chris [Theodosopoulos] had nothing to do with the deal, that he was doing the deal with Grant himself.... I interviewed Mr. Shunnarah.... he told us those things. See United States v. Ellison, 557 F.2d 128, 133 (7th Cir.) (the facts alleged in support of a motion for a new trial were within the defendant's knowledge at the time of trial and therefore not newly discovered), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 332, 121 L.Ed.2d 250 (1992). Other courts have also held that this kind of post-trial testimony does not qualify as newly discovered evidence. See United States v. Dale, 991 F.2d 819, 838 (D.C.Cir.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 650, 126 L.Ed.2d 607 (1993); United States v. Reyes-Alvarado, 963 F.2d 1184, 1188 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 258, 121 L.Ed.2d 189 (1992); United States v. Munoz, 957 F.2d 171, 173 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 332, 121 L.Ed.2d 250 (1992); Blissett v. LeFevre, 924 F.2d 434, 441 & n. 1 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 852, 112 S.Ct. 158, 116 L.Ed.2d 123 (1991); United States v. Lockett, 919 F.2d 585, 591 (9th Cir.1990). 38 Ghanayem also fails to meet the second prong of the test. In order to satisfy this element, Ghanayem would have to show that he could not have discovered the relevant evidence despite the exercise of due diligence. Kamel, 965 F.2d at 492-93. Even if we assume (however unlikely it may be) that Ghanayem had no knowledge of Shunnarah's potential testimony, Ghanayem cannot demonstrate that he exercised the requisite due diligence. He took no steps to secure Shunnarah's testimony. Rather, Ghanayem chose another strategy: give a missing witness instruction and then argue forcefully to the jury the substance of Shunnarah's missing testimony. That Ghanayem's trial tactics failed is not grounds for a new trial. As a result, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ghanayem's motion for a new trial. 8