Opinion ID: 1982226
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Propriety of Instructing on Joint Criminal Conduct Under Iowa Code Section 703.2 (1985).

Text: Defendant's second assignment of error involves the interrelationship of Iowa Code sections 703.1 and 703.2 for purposes of the trial court's instructions to the jury on aiding and abetting. Section 703.1 provides: All persons concerned in the commission of a public offense, whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense or aid and abet its commission, shall be charged, tried and punished as principals. The guilt of a person who aids and abets the commission of a crime must be determined upon the facts which show the part the person had in it, and does not depend upon the degree of another person's guilt. Section 703.2 provides: When two or more persons, acting in concert, knowingly participate in a public offense, each is responsible for the acts of the other done in furtherance of the commission of the offense or escape therefrom, and each person's guilt will be the same as that of the person so acting, unless the act was one which the person could not reasonably expect to be done in the furtherance of the commission of the offense. In instructing the jury with respect to determining defendant's guilt of the FUFI offense, the trial court submitted the issue on a theory of aiding and abetting. The four elements contained in the court's marshaling instruction (Instruction No. 6), which the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, were that: 1. Defendant aided and abetted Lisa Werle in possessing a Visa credit card, 2. The credit card was a financial instrument as defined in other instructions, 3. Defendant aided and abetted Lisa Werle in possession of a credit card knowing she had no right to use or possess it, and 4. Defendant aided and abetted Lisa Werle in the possession of the credit card with the intent to obtain fraudulently anything of value. The trial court in Instruction No. 11 defined aiding and abetting as follows: You are instructed that the law provides that all persons concern[ed] in the commission of a public offense, whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, or knowingly aid and abet its commission, shall be charged, tried and punished as principals. The term aiding and abetting refers to the conduct of persons in the commission of a public offense and means to knowingly assent to an act or to lend countenance or approval either by active participation in it or by some manner knowingly advising or encouraging the act prior to or at the time of its commission. Subsequent conduct may be considered only as it may tend to prove the defendant's prior encouragement or participation. The defendant's mere proximity to or presence at the scene or knowledge of the crime, without more, is not sufficient to constitute aiding and abetting. The guilt of a person who knowingly aids and abets the commission of an offense must be determined solely upon the facts which show the part he had in it, and does not depend upon the degree of another person's guilt. With respect to the intent element of the crime, the trial court instructed the jury: [B]efore you can find the defendant aided and abetted in the commission of the offense charged, you must not only find that the defendant aided and abetted, as that has been explained, but it must also be proved by the State by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant either possessed [intent to defraud] or aided and abetted [Lisa Werle] with the knowledge that [she] possessed such specific intent. In addition to the foregoing instruction on aiding and abetting, the trial court also instructed the jury in Instruction No. 11A. The law provides that when two or more persons, acting in concert, knowingly participate in a public offense, each is responsible for the acts of the other done in furtherance of the commission of the offense, and his guilt will be the same as that of the person so acting, unless the act was one which the person could not reasonably expect to be done in the furtherance of the commission of the offense. The defendant assigns as error the giving of Instruction No. 11A, which he asserts is an improper instruction in an aiding and abetting case. The language of Instruction No. 11A embraces the legal doctrine contained in section 703.2. Some commentators have expressed the view that aiding and abetting as embraced by section 703.1 is a totally separate concept from the joint criminal responsibility established under section 703.2. They state that aiding and abetting creates criminal liability on the part of the aider and abettor for the same crime that he knowingly aids the principal in committing. J. Yeager & R. Carlson, Criminal Law and Procedure § 62 (1979). In contrast, these commentators assert, the theory of criminal liability involved in section 703.2 impose[s] vicarious liability on one for an offense which he does not intend to commit and which he may not have actually foreseen. J. Yeager & R. Carlson, Criminal Law and Procedure § 63 (1979). A similar view concerning the distinction between the intent of section 703.1 and the intent of section 703.2 is contained in Dunahoo, The New Iowa Criminal Code, 29 Drake L.Rev. 237, 287 (1979-80). See also W. LaFave & R. Scott, Criminal Law § 65, at 515-17 (1972). We have no general disagreement with these suggestions concerning the distinct purposes of section 703.1 and section 703.2. Notwithstanding their distinct purposes, we believe they may both be applicable in instructing on certain situations. See State v. Kern, 307 N.W.2d 29, 30 (Iowa 1981). The most we can derive from defendant's argument in the present case is that perhaps Instruction No. 11A was redundant in conveying to the jury the necessary elements of the crime. We find no opportunity, however, under any of the court's instructions, for the defendant to have been found guilty on any theory other than his own conduct in knowingly aiding and abetting Lisa Werle in committing the same crime with which he himself was charged. Submission of the case on this theory was strongly supported by the evidence, and we find no reversible error in the instructions. We have considered all issues presented and conclude that the judgment of the district court should be affirmed. AFFIRMED.