Opinion ID: 692069
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Scope of Review in a Collateral Challenge to the Agency Regulation

Text: 42 The extent, if any, to which Guthrie can collaterally attack in his criminal prosecution the regulation listing the Alabama red-bellied turtle as an endangered species is a question of law, which we review de novo. See United States v. Osburn, 955 F.2d 1500, 1503 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 223, 121 L.Ed.2d 160 & --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 290, 121 L.Ed.2d 215 (1992). Although no Eleventh Circuit precedent addresses this issue, other decisions suggest that collateral review of an agency regulation in a criminal proceeding should be narrow or nonexistent. In two cases involving criminal prosecutions for activities involving species protected under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, federal courts have declared that where [the Secretary] has promulgated facially valid regulations [under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act] we do not think that a defendant in a criminal case can collaterally attack them. United States v. Gigstead, 528 F.2d 314, 317 (8th Cir.1976); see also United States v. Darst, 726 F.Supp. 286, 287 (D.Kan.1989) (same). 43 The Supreme Court applied a narrow review to regulations in a criminal prosecution under the Clean Air Act, when it allowed criminal defendants to challenge whether the Administrator of the EPA had authority to promulgate emission standards under the language of the statute. In Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 98 S.Ct. 566, 54 L.Ed.2d 538 (1978), the Court reviewed the Administrator's action but limited its review to the question of whether the promulgated regulation could be considered an emission standard: 44 The narrow inquiry to be addressed by the court in a criminal prosecution is not whether the Administrator has complied with appropriate procedures in promulgating the regulation in question, or whether the particular regulation is arbitrary, capricious, or supported by the administrative record.... The question is only whether the regulation which the defendant is alleged to have violated is on its face an emission standard within the broad limits of the congressional meaning of that term. 45 Adamo, 434 U.S. at 285, 98 S.Ct. at 573. The language of the Clean Air Act limits Adamo's applicability, however, because the statute expressly prohibited review of the Administrator's emission standard promulgations in any criminal or civil proceedings for enforcement. See Clean Air Act, Pub.L. No. 91-604, Sec. 307(b), 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. (84 Stat. 1676) 1954, 1994 (current version codified at 42 U.S.C. Sec. 7607(b)(2)). As the ESA has no such preclusive language, Adamo is distinguishable. 46 The Adamo decision therefore does not answer the question of whether the scope of review applicable to regulations listing animals as endangered species under the ESA is narrower when the regulations are collaterally attacked in a criminal proceeding than the scope of review would be on direct review of those same regulations. We need not decide that question either, because its answer is not essential to the disposition of this case. Even assuming that the scope of collateral review is as broad as the scope of direct review, the regulation in this case must still be upheld. 47