Opinion ID: 758030
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Habeas Remedy

Text: 29 Finally, the Government argues that the even if it is determined that a Sixth Amendment violation occurred, the appropriate remedy is resentencing rather than vacatur of the underlying convictions. The Government contends that [a] sentence should be imposed consistent with the limited plea discussion between the parties, which consisted of a recommendation by the government that the low end of the applicable guideline range be imposed. This range, after taking into account the two level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, is 168 to 210 months. Accordingly, the Government requests that we order Gordon to be resentenced to 168 months' imprisonment. In support of this argument, the Government primarily relies on Boria, 99 F.3d at 498-99. We review the district court's choice of remedy under § 2255 for an abuse of discretion. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255; cf. Day, 969 F.2d at 47. 30 The Supreme Court has announced that where there has been a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel in a § 2255 proceeding, the remedy should be tailored to the injury suffered from the constitutional violation and should not unnecessarily infringe on competing interests. United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364, 101 S.Ct. 665, 66 L.Ed.2d 564 (1981). Those competing interests include the necessity for preserving society's interest in the administration of criminal justice. Id. 31 In Day, the Third Circuit applied the principles in Morrison to a petitioner who complained of ineffective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations based on his lawyer's incorrect estimate of the maximum sentencing exposure. In that context, the Third Circuit interpreted Morrison to mean that a second opportunity to accept a plea agreement ought not be automatic, but it does not follow that the relief of 'specific performance' of a plea bargain is never appropriate. 969 F.2d at 47. Further, the district court would have considerable discretion in fashioning a remedy appropriate under the circumstances. Id. 32 In Boria, we ordered that the § 2254 petitioner's sentence be reduced to time served and that he be discharged but that the judgment of conviction should remain because: (1) the trial was not affected by constitutional error; (2) there was no assurance that witnesses necessary for the prosecution would be available for a new trial; and (3) the petitioner had served six years in prison which was twice as long as the three-year plea offer. 99 F.3d at 499. We do not believe that the logic used in arriving at the remedy in Boria is necessarily applicable to the instant case. It is true that the district court found that Gordon's trial was not affected by constitutional error. However, the lapse of time between trial and Gordon's habeas petition does not present a serious practical obstacle to re-trial. 33 Furthermore, in Boria, we made no ruling that resentencing was the sole remedy available for ineffective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations. In fact, we found that a new trial was not necessarily impossible but merely inappropriate under the circumstances of that case. Boria, 99 F.3d at 499. This circumspect approach is appropriate considering that § 2255 leaves the choice of relief in a habeas case to the sound discretion of the judge ruling on the motion. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 34 Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in vacating Gordon's convictions and granting him a new trial.