Opinion ID: 2382418
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Loss-of-Chance Doctrine

Text: [¶ 25] As another ground to pursue his claim for expectancy damages, Rivers asserts that summary judgment was improper because there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Rivers may recover those damages under the loss-of-chance doctrine. The district court rejected Rivers' loss-of-chance argument on the ground that the doctrine applies only where a plaintiff can show a physical injury to person or property. We agree that this is not the type of case for which a claim may be made under the loss-of-chance doctrine, but we do not believe that this case presents the need to address the physical injury distinction or to address whether the doctrine may apply to any legal malpractice case. [¶ 26] The loss-of-chance doctrine typically arises when a plaintiff seeks to recover damages against a medical provider who has reduced the plaintiff's chances of survival. McMackin v. Johnson Cty. Healthcare Ctr., 2004 WY 44, ¶ 7, 88 P.3d 491, 494 (Wyo.2004). To prevail on a loss-of-chance claim, the plaintiff must show: 1) that the patient has been deprived of the chance for successful treatment; and 2) that the decreased chance for successful treatment more likely than not resulted from the provider's negligence. McMackin v. Johnson Cty. Healthcare Ctr., 2003 WY 91, ¶ 15, 73 P.3d 1094, 1098-99 (Wyo.2003). [¶ 27] To date, we have permitted recovery of damages under the loss-of-chance doctrine in only medical malpractice cases. See Gayhart, ¶ 13, 98 P.3d at 168 (declining to consider whether the loss-of-chance doctrine should apply to legal malpractice cases). This case does not present the proper circumstance to address the doctrine's application to legal malpractice cases. [¶ 28] First, Rivers has presented no explanation as to why recovery pursuant to our usual case-within-a-case requirement of proof would not provide an adequate basis for recovery in this case. If it were the case that Rivers lost an opportunity to build a larger, more profitable building because of the Firm's actions, that would be a matter on which concrete evidence could be presented in the form of witness testimony or real estate listings. This case simply does not present circumstances in which the odds must be calculated to determine whether an opportunity was lost. Further, even if this did present such a circumstance, Rivers has not designated an expert to testify as to the basis for quantifying the percentage chance that may have been lost by the Firm's alleged malpractice. Without such testimony, any recovery would be based on the type of speculation and conjecture we do not permit as a basis for damages. See Chrysler Corp. v. Todorovich, 580 P.2d 1123, 1134 (Wyo. 1978). [¶ 29] We do not with this decision declare that there can never be a circumstance under which the loss-of-chance doctrine may apply to a legal malpractice claim. This case does, however, fit squarely within the parameters of the type of case in which the doctrine should have no application. Observing that the jury in a legal malpractice action has the opportunity to decide, in retrospect, the probable outcome of the case within the case also helps capture why the analogy to suits against physicians ultimately breaks down. The critical prerequisite to employment of loss of a chance in the medical context is the existence of reliable statistical information, gleaned from rigorous studies that are typically generated outside the context of litigation, as to the survival rates of patients who are classified by reference to various objective characteristics. This is the sort of information that tells us that a Hispanic woman who is forty years old, and presents a certain medical profile, has a thirty percent chance of surviving a cancer of a given type if it is diagnosed and treated in a certain way. The presence of this sort of reliable statistical information, which is capable of being introduced to the jury at trial by a competent expert witness, helps explain the concern behind, and perhaps the propriety of, the adoption of loss of a chance in the medical setting. For certain kinds of patients, we know with some confidence that three out of ten would survive without malpractice. Yet we also know that, absent a change in the rules on proof of causation, none of those who suffer malpractice and would have survived in its absence will ever recover. There is simply no comparable ground motivating the adoption of loss of a chance in legal malpractice. Because we are dealing with outcomes determined almost entirely by human interactions, rather than events dominated by biological processes, there is now, and may always be, a dearth of controlled studies and meaningful statistical information that might permit a qualified expert justifiably to assign a percentage chance of success to a given type of legal claim. Likewise, there is no well-defined body of expertise that purports to set standards for the drawing of sound inferences about the chances of prevailing on a given kind of legal claim. In short, the jury in a legal malpractice claim is not being presented with sound statistical information as to whether, absent malpractice, this sort of client, in this sort of circumstance, has a three in ten chance of prevailing. Rather, the jury is necessarily required to consider the case within the case as a one-off event. Thus, even granting that attorneys, like doctors, owe it to their clients to take reasonable steps to provide them with the best odds of prevailing, loss of a chance seems out of place in the realm of legal malpractice. John C.P. Goldberg, What Clients are Owed: Cautionary Observations on Lawyers and Loss of a Chance, 52 Emory L.J. 1201, 1212-13 (2003).