Opinion ID: 1695349
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the law and analysis

Text: The Supreme Court of Mississippi (the Court) has exclusive and inherent jurisdiction of matters pertaining to attorney discipline, reinstatement, and appointment of receivers for suspended and disbarred attorneys, and hereafter such proceedings shall be conducted in accordance with these rules. Rule 1, Rules of Discipline for the Mississippi State Bar. See also Matter of Reinstatement of Nixon, 618 So.2d 1283, 1287 (Miss. 1993) (`[n]o person suspended or disbarred shall be reinstated to the privilege of practicing law except upon petition to the Court.'). Rule 12.1 provides: The petition for reinstatement shall not be filed until three (3) years after the date the order of disbarment became final. Tucker's Petition was filed just over three years after this Court affirmed his disbarment. Rule 12.7 reads: All reinstatement petitions shall be addressed to the Court, shall state the cause or causes for suspension or disbarment, give the names and current addresses of all persons, parties, firms, or legal entities who suffered pecuniary loss due to the improper conduct, the making of full amends and restitution, the reasons justifying reinstatement, and requisite moral character and legal learning to be reinstated to the privilege of practicing law. Upon filing, the petition shall be served on, and an investigatory fee of $500.00 shall be paid to the Bar, same to be in addition to any other sum due the Bar, or persons injured by the petitioner's improper conduct. The matters set out in this paragraph shall be jurisdictional. See The Matter of the Reinstatement to Practice Law of Douglass Talmadge Baker, 649 So.2d 850, 853 (Miss. 1995) (if full amends and restitution have not been made, this Court will dismiss on jurisdictional grounds [1] ); Jennings v. Mississippi State Bar, 533 So.2d 443, 444 (Miss. 1988) (this Court dismissed petition for reinstatement on jurisdictional grounds, stating that requirements of Rule 12.7 had not been met). Tucker's Petition for Reinstatement is addressed to this Court and states the causes for disbarment. Tucker's Petition further states that no pecuniary loss was involved, therefore no restitution was required. [2] As reasons justifying reinstatement, Tucker asserts that: all firms in Texas with which he was affiliated support his reinstatement; his current Texas clients would be adversely affected if his petition is denied because he is subject to reciprocal discipline in Texas; his family and his legal secretary/legal assistant would suffer financial hardship if he is not reinstated; his family name and his own reputation would remain tarnished without reinstatement; and he no longer contests disbarment as the appropriate sanction [3] . Regarding the requisite legal learning for reinstatement, Tucker points to the more than 100 letters supporting his reinstatement, some of which praise his legal abilities, and adds that he will sit for the Mississippi Bar Exam if requested to do so. In further support of his legal learning, Tucker notes that he practiced for almost five years in Mississippi at two well known Jackson law firms  Heidelburg & Woodliff and Copeland, Cook, Taylor and Bush  and that his eight years of practice in Texas have also benefitted him as Texas and Mississippi laws are very similar in many respects. As noted by the Bar, if Tucker's reinstatement should otherwise be granted, the issue of his requisite legal learning will be resolved by his taking the Mississippi Bar Exam, pursuant to Rule 12.5. The Bar states that Tucker has failed to comply with this Court's disbarment order to the extent that he has not provided affidavits certifying that he notified his Mississippi clients, the Mississippi courts, and the Bar of his disbarment. The record does not reveal any such affidavits, although this Court did order him to provide same. See Tucker, 577 So.2d at 849. The Bar alleges this is sufficient to deny Tucker's reinstatement on jurisdictional grounds. The requirements enumerated in Rule 12.7 are jurisdictional; failure to meet these requirements is cause to dismiss the petition. Jennings, 533 So.2d at 444. However, Rule 12.7 does not mention compliance with this Court's order of disbarment. This Court has previously forgiven noncompliance with its order of suspension on a subsequent petition for reinstatement. In re Reinstatement of License to Practice Law, Robert D. Underwood, 649 So.2d 825 (Miss. 1995) (Underwood had engaged in three instances of practicing law while under an order of suspension issued by this Court, yet was reinstated upon petition). Nonetheless, compliance with the portion of this Court's order of disbarment requiring production of affidavits would be required as a condition precedent to reinstatement if reinstatement should otherwise be granted. This Court has recognized a distinction between suspension and disbarment: Implicit in the judgment of suspension, stopping short of disbarment, is that the attorney's character has not been shown so deficient that proof of general moral and professional rehabilitation is required. Haimes v. Mississippi State Bar, 551 So.2d 910, 912 (Miss. 1989). Consequently, when an attorney has been disbarred rather than suspended, [t]he fundamental question to be addressed before reinstatement is the attorney's rehabilitation in conduct and character since disbarment. Burgin v. Mississippi State Bar, 453 So.2d 689, 691 (Miss. 1984) (citing Mississippi State Bar Association v. Wade, 250 Miss. 625, 167 So.2d 648 (1964)). [A]ll that is required to show a rehabilitated character is: `[a] firm resolve to live a correct life evidenced by outward manifestation sufficient to convince a reasonable mind clearly that the person has reformed.' Phillips v. Mississippi State Bar, 427 So.2d 1380, 1382 (1983) (emphasis added) quoting Ex Parte Marshall, 165 Miss. 523, 556, 147 So. 791, 798 (1933). Holmes v. Mississippi Bar, 602 So.2d 847, 854 (Miss. 1992) (Lee, C.J., dissenting). In Reinstatement of Baker, the evidence submitted in support of rehabilitation and found sufficient included letters from attorneys and community leaders, participation in community activities, post-disbarment employment, and recognition of the wrongs committed. Reinstatement of Baker, 649 So.2d at 854. As evidence that he has the requisite moral character to be reinstated, Tucker cites the more than 100 letters submitted in his behalf. These letters, of course, speak of Tucker's good character, high ethical standards, care and concern and good results obtained for his clients, and frequent reduction of his attorney fees. Tucker's Petition for Reinstatement asserts that since his disbarment he has supported his Mississippi alma mater, donated money to legal services for the poor in Texas, and made donations to his church and charities. Unlike the evidence presented in Nixon, there is no evidence that Tucker immersed himself in charitable endeavors. Then again, unlike the facts in Nixon, Tucker has not been deprived of his income, his pension, his home, his insurance coverage, nor the privilege of practicing law. And the requirement is only that one seeking reinstatement must lead a correct life. Phillips v. Mississippi State Bar, 427 So.2d 1380, 1382 (1983) (quoting Ex Parte Marshall, 165 Miss. 523, 556, 147 So. 791, 798 (1933)). The Response Tucker filed to the show cause order in Texas in March 1992 indicates that he feels he was wrongly disbarred because he innocently fell into a trap set by his uncooperative clients and because the Complaint Tribunal, General Counsel for the Bar, and this Court did not treat him fairly. His Response also allows that based upon what he now knows, there are certainly ways he could have handled the matter differently and should have handled it differently. Furthermore, Respondent has indeed learned a valuable lesson to the extent of turning down cases for people he does not know or conduct some investigation into their background to determine whether or not they are reputable or what their background is. Also in the 1992 Response, Tucker claims he has certainly learned his lesson from this episode, and has demonstrated a renewed concentration upon and appreciation of ethical considerations and is very cognizant of any possible ethical transgressions in cases which have transpired in Texas to which he can testify as to how he has handled those particular instances. In his 1994 Petition for Reinstatement, Tucker freely acknowledges the error and wrong he committed in March of 1986 and thereafter in connection with this incident. Miss. Code Ann. § 73-3-337 (Supp. 1994) provides that this Court may reinstate the disbarred attorney if the ends of justice will be served. Ignoring momentarily that Tucker has to date failed to fully comply with this Court's order regarding submission of affidavits and may yet owe restitution to the Copeland, Cook, Taylor and Bush firm, whether the ends of justice will be served by his reinstatement is questionable. Admittedly, Tucker's legal career in Texas appears to be blemish free. Tucker asserts in his Response to the Texas show cause order that his actions which resulted in disbarment in Mississippi would not warrant disbarment in Texas. Tucker has now married a Texan and evidently has a thriving practice in Texas. He has made no mention of a desire to return to Mississippi to practice law. The legal profession has come a long way from the days when attorneys were automatically presumed honorable. The quality and reputation of the Mississippi Bar and the public interest which it serves warrant stringent standards for reinstatement following disbarment. This Court remains firm in its resolve that one who has acted in a manner sufficiently egregious to warrant disbarment must clearly show a rehabilitation of character before reinstatement to the privilege of practicing law. Compromise of the standards to which attorneys are held will surely cripple the profession, with concomitant harm to the public.