Opinion ID: 469790
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: common law privilege

Text: 15 The District Court and the previous panel of this court applied a common law privilege for communications to the legislature, reflected in section 590A of the Restatement, Second, of Torts, 561 F.Supp. at 1188, but neither court explicitly grounded the privilege in the law of any particular jurisdiction. Although we ultimately conclude that the policy of the Restatement accurately reflects the applicable law, we think it is necessary to explain why District of Columbia law should govern this case. 16 Congress has not chosen to provide any specific level of protection for those who provide it with information. Moreover, because no significant conflict between some federal policy or interest and the use of state law in the premises [has] be[en] specifically shown, Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68, 86 S.Ct. 1301, 1304, 16 L.Ed.2d 369 (1966), 4 this case is not an appropriate one for the creation of federal common law. See Yip v. Pagano, 606 F.Supp. 1566, 1569-1570 (D.N.J.1985); Bio-Basics International Corp. v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 545 F.Supp. 1106, 1110-1113 (S.D.N.Y.1982). The appropriate state law should therefore provide the rule of decision. 17 In a diversity case such as this a federal court must apply the choice of law principles of the jurisdiction in which it sits. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496-497, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 1021-1022, 85 L.Ed.2d 1477 (1941); Lee v. Flintkote Co., 593 F.2d 1275, 1278-1280 (D.C.Cir.1979). Under District of Columbia law, when there is conflict between the laws of two arguably relevant jurisdictions, we apply the law of the state that has the more substantial interest in the resolution of the issue. Fowler v. A & A Co., 262 A.2d 344, 348 (D.C.App.1970) (citations omitted); see also Dovell v. Anne Arundel Supply Corp., 361 F.2d 543, 544 (D.C.Cir.1966). 18 Assuming, arguendo, that a conflict exists between the law of the District of Columbia and the law of Pennsylvania or Arizona, 5 we have no difficulty in concluding that the interest of the District of Columbia is more substantial. The memorandum at issue was prepared in the District of Columbia and transmitted (or published) only in the District of Columbia by defendants who do business in the District of Columbia. Moreover, the entire episode was prompted by plaintiff Webster's significant promotional activities here. 19 Having concluded that the common law of the District of Columbia should control this case, we observe that the earlier panel's requirement of an intention to inform the legislature appears to have no basis in the common law of the District of Columbia, 6 and we doubt that it ever should have been applied. The District Court's original opinion, 561 F.Supp. 1184, seems to us much more consistent with the majority common law approach, embodied in the Restatement, that is typically followed by the District of Columbia. The intention test is nonetheless the law of this case, so we will apply it here. 20
21 The question of intention, as this court wrote in its earlier opinion, is an issue of material fact. 731 F.2d at 7. The findings of the District Court on issues of fact must be affirmed by this court unless they are clearly erroneous. Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a). 22 On remand the District Court held a hearing at which Anderson was the sole witness. Anderson testified that he had forwarded the memorandum to Lindahl both because he wanted Lindahl to know that Sun had pursued the matter and because he thought that the information contained in the memorandum would be helpful to Lindahl and CRS. He said that because congressional aides live on information and facts up there[,] our opinions are worthless, really.    If we hadn't done any work, he [Lindahl] wouldn't have been interested    [and] I wouldn't have sent it. Transcript at 16-17. 23 The District Court's opinion correctly distinguished Anderson's intention--what he meant to do--from his motivation --why he did it: 24 Like any other lobbyist [Anderson acted] with his employer's best interests in mind: he hoped to rehabilitate the reputation of Sun. The presence of that underlying motive does not strip his communication of protection under the legislative process privilege; indeed, to narrow the scope of the privilege on that basis would drastically frustrate the objective of promoting candid legislative input. 731 F.2d at 5. In the real world, altruism is not the rule: most persons providing input into the legislative process do so with some degree of self-interest. 25 Mem.Op. at 7, RE 23. 26 Notwithstanding Anderson's self-serving motive, the District Court found that [t]he credible and convincing evidence demonstrates that Anderson's intention in forwarding the memorandum to Lindahl was to provide information that would be of value to the CRS in its investigation of the Webster-Heise devise. Id. at 6, RE 22 (emphasis added). We cannot say that this factual finding is clearly erroneous.