Opinion ID: 690287
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: a bona fide need for the testimony of his co-defendant;

Text: 11 (2) the likelihood that the co-defendant would testify at a second trial and waive his Fifth Amendment privilege; 12 (3) the substance of his co-defendant's testimony; and 13 (4) the exculpatory nature and effect of such testimony. 14 Parodi, 703 F.2d at 779. 15 Because of the conditional nature of Roane's offer to testify, Reavis is unable to satisfy the second element of the Parodi test. 16 Severance is not required when the co-defendant would testify only if his case came first. Rusher, 966 F.2d at 878. Were we to accede to the co-defendant's demand, we would create a situation where, following his own trial, the witness would be more inclined to 'throw a bone' to his codefendants by testifying favorably to them because his own case had been disposed of and he had little to lose by testifying. Becker, 585 F.2d at 706. The second prong of the Parodi test is not satisfied where a co-defendant places conditions on his willingness to testify. Parodi, 703 F.2d at 779. Roane's counsel expressly stated at the motions hearing that if Ms. Reavis were tried in a ... separate trial later, my client would testify. Roane never offered to testify irrespective of the order in which he and Reavis were tried. We will not grant a severance when doing so would allow co-defendants to obtain benefits that they would not have but for their joint indictment. Id. at 780 (quoting Becker, 585 F.2d at 706). 17 A severance motion will not be granted unless the moving party demonstrates that her co-defendant's testimony would be more than a vague and conclusory statement ... of purely cumulative or negligible weight or probative value. Parodi, 703 F.2d at 780. The movant's showing in this regard must be sufficiently definite so that the trial court can evaluate the exculpatory nature and effect of the co-defendant's potential testimony. Id. Here, the handful of remarks made by Roane regarding Reavis' involvement in the conspiracy would have had virtually no exculpatory effect at trial. On April 28, 1992, Roane wrote Reavis a letter from jail in which he told Reavis I know you didn't know about no killing's [sic]. Such testimony, on Roane's part, would have had a potentially exculpatory effect had Reavis been facing a murder charge. Reavis, however, was only facing drug conspiracy charges. Nothing in Roane's letter suggests that Reavis was equally innocent with respect to the gang's drug activity. Beyond the single line in Roane's letter to which Reavis repeatedly cites in her briefs, Reavis failed to present this court or the district court with any specific information Roane could have supplied affecting the outcome of Reavis' trial. Roane supposedly was prepared to present some extremely specific information about his lack of a drug-related relationship with Reavis. Roane's counsel admitted, however, that [t]his information had been given in extremely general terms. Reavis failed to present anything other than vague and conclusory statements by Roane that could have been used to buttress her defense. 18 Applying the principles outlined in Parodi, we find that the district court's denial of the motion for severance did not constitute reversible error. Roane's offer to testify was conditioned on being tried first, the district court did not possess enough information from which it could have concluded that Roane's testimony would have had an exculpatory effect, and Reavis has made no affirmative demonstration that she was deprived of a fair trial by the denial of her severance motion.