Opinion ID: 844199
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Demonstration of Prejudice

Text: Defendant focuses on the availability of an appropriate remedy for the presumed error rather than the threshold question of whether prejudice resulted. The Court of Appeal, in concluding that a defendant must first pursue writ relief when a request for a lineup is denied, opined there is no adequate remedy on appeal: “If a defendant forgoes writ review of the lineup ruling, and instead undergoes a preliminary hearing and trial, the witness will have ordinarily viewed the defendant at the preliminary hearing and/or at trial. Even if an appellate court reversed and ordered a lineup on remand, the results of that lineup would have no evidentiary value: a positive identification would be tainted by the fact the witness saw the defendant at trial, and a negative identification would be tainted by the lengthy passage of time during which fading memories and changing appearances would operate.” Defendant asserts that, on the contrary, an appropriate remedy would be remand for a new trial with a jury instruction allowing the jury to infer that if a lineup had been held the witness would have been unable to identify the defendant. The question of remedy, however, is premature.12 12 Defendant‟s argument and the Court of Appeal‟s concern as to the adequacy of remedy should prejudicial error be demonstrated are policy considerations more properly addressed by the Legislature if it chooses to impose a prerequisite or alternative to appellate review. (Ante, at p. 15.) 19 Defendant puts the cart before the horse. Before he can demand a remedy, he must first establish that he was prejudiced by the trial court‟s error. As noted, under Watson, a defendant must show it is reasonably probable a more favorable result would have been obtained absent the error. (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.) Prejudice under Watson “must necessarily be based upon reasonable probabilities rather than upon mere possibilities.” (Id. at p. 837.) The dilemma for a defendant in this circumstance is that the trial court erred in denying the opportunity for a lineup. The outcome of that lineup is unknown because it was never conducted. “[I]t has long been recognized that „[i]n the case of in-court identifications not preceded by a lineup . . . , the weaknesses, if any, are directly apparent at the trial itself and can be argued to the court and jury . . . .‟ [Citations.]” (People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1155.) This court‟s decision in Evans, supra, 11 Cal.3d 617, “did not overrule the principle that an identification made in front of the jury carries with it the circumstances under which it was made, which, in turn, can be argued to and weighed by the jurors.” (People v. Breckenridge (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 913, 936.) There may be some circumstances in which a defendant would be able to establish prejudice. However, many attempts to do so will founder on the shoals of speculation. The mere assertion that the witness might possibly have failed to make a positive identification cannot demonstrate prejudice under Watson. A contrary conclusion confers a windfall on a defendant who forgoes writ relief and proceeds to trial. In that circumstance, the defendant could argue prejudice on appeal simply by asserting that the witness might have failed to make the identification. However, if the defendant had been successful on the writ and obtained a lineup, the defendant may have been identified. Establishing prejudice is even more problematic when, as here, the witness fails to identify the defendant at trial or is uncertain. Again, any suggestion as to the outcome of an erroneously denied lineup would rest on speculation. It is possible the witness would have identified the defendant at the lineup. But even if 20 the witness failed to do so or was uncertain, the defendant would have gained little or nothing of evidentiary value in light of the witness‟s failure to make an identification before the jury. The tactical decision whether to seek immediate writ review or wait until after judgment to bring a direct appeal is an individualized one that involves consideration of potential risks and rewards. It is true, as defendant asserts, that seeking writ review requires additional effort and may cause delay. In fact, a decision to assert a misidentification defense gives rise to a number of tactical choices. For example, requesting an Evans lineup in the trial court has the potential for both positive and negative results. A defendant who is confident that a witness cannot make a lineup identification may wish to press the issue and then be able to point to the witness‟s failure. A defendant who is less confident of that outcome may not want to risk an identification. In the latter case, the defense may conclude that the wiser course is not to seek a lineup and argue at trial that no lineup was provided, thus attacking the witness‟s in-court identification as unfairly tested by law enforcement. If the lineup motion is made and denied, tactical factors remain in deciding whether to seek a writ. As illustrated here, one of those factors is the requirement of establishing prejudice on appeal. A showing of prejudice is, obviously, not required in a writ proceeding. Indeed, the purpose of seeking review is to foreclose any irremediable detriment that might ensue if the writ relief is not granted. However, seeking and securing writ relief may be a Pyrrhic victory if a witness does identify the defendant in the lineup sought. On the other hand, not seeking writ relief allows the defense to raise the denial of the lineup as an appellate issue after judgment. But to succeed, that appellate claim will require the defendant to establish error and show prejudice. 21 D. Any Error in Denying Defendant’s Motion for a Lineup Was Harmless We turn now to the merits of defendant‟s claim. The Court of Appeal assumed the trial court abused its discretion in denying the lineup motion. It applied the more rigorous Chapman standard (Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. 18) and concluded that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, stating: “Mena asserts the erroneous ruling deprived him of evidence that Jesus would not have identified him in a lineup conducted in June of 2007 (near the time of Mena‟s Evans motion), and we should reverse and instruct the jury on remand to that effect. However, Jesus testified at trial that he did not recognize Mena as one of his attackers, and he had not been able to identify Mena as one of his attackers in June of 2007 when he saw Mena at the preliminary hearing.” Thus, the jury convicted defendant even though it heard testimony substantially identical to the evidence of which defendant claimed he was deprived when not afforded a lineup. We also assume, without deciding, that the trial court erred in denying defendant‟s lineup motion. Applying the Watson standard (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818), we conclude that any such error would have been harmless under the particular circumstances of this case. Indeed, our conclusion would be the same even under Chapman. Defendant argues it is wrong to consider Jesus‟s failure to identify him in court as a weakness in the prosecution‟s case or to conclude that the lineup would have added nothing of evidentiary value. He urges that the prosecutor turned Jesus‟s failure to identify into affirmative evidence of guilt by insinuating that Jesus was too frightened to make an identification. Defendant contends the lineup evidence would have defeated this argument. Defendant‟s assertion fails. At trial, the prosecutor questioned Jesus about his identifications at the curbside showup. Jesus said he had not wanted to look at the detained men “[b]ecause that would have made me — because I didn‟t want to.” The prosecutor then asked Jesus about the consequences of being a “snitch.” Jesus testified that a 22 “snitch” could be killed or hurt, and that his neighborhood friend had been shot two years earlier. Jesus confirmed his own worry that he would be killed or hurt. On cross-examination, Jesus stated that when he arrived at the showup, he was concerned about being recognized. The prosecutor asked Jesus: “When you made those identifications back in April were you telling the truth to the best of your ability?” Jesus answered, “Yes.” Jesus confirmed the men he pointed out at the curbside showup were the men who had been involved in the chase. On cross-examination, he did acknowledge testifying at the preliminary hearing that he was “90 percent” certain of his identification at the curbside showup. When asked at trial whether he recognized anyone who was involved in the attack, Jesus said, “No.” The prosecutor asked, “Are you saying these guys were not involved?” Jesus replied, “I‟m not sure.” Jesus also testified that he could not identify anyone at the preliminary hearing, and had also been unsure at that proceeding. Jesus told the prosecutor that he did not want to testify at trial, and was doing so only because he was subpoenaed. The following colloquy ensued: “Q. Did you want to be here back in June [at the preliminary hearing]? “A. No. “Q. How come? “A. Because I just didn‟t want to. I want to leave everything as it is. “Q. You want to leave everything as it is? “A. Yes. “Q. Are you worried about something happening to you? “A. Yes.” In closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury that, in evaluating a witness‟s credibility, it must consider possible reasons why a witness said or did not say something. The prosecutor continued: “It is a lot different sitting in that chair up there just a few feet away from some people that did some very violent things and being asked to look at those people and identify them as guilty parties 23 as people who participated [than] it is to sit in the back of a patrol car with armed officers in the front seat where those people can‟t see you.” The prosecutor argued, “I would submit to you [Jesus] was scared stiff when he was in here when I asked him to look around the courtroom. . . . He could barely look over to the left side of the courtroom. His eyes flashed over there for a second and he said, „No, I do not recognize anybody.‟ He is scared stiff. He doesn‟t live in this courtroom. . . . He‟s got to go back and walk on those streets. That is something that you can consider in deciding whether or not he was giving truthful, accurate testimony or not. [¶] It doesn‟t change the fact that he didn‟t ID them. What I‟m saying is a failure to identify in court doesn‟t mean that these defendant[s] are not guilty.” Defendant asserts that the prosecution‟s argument would have been undermined had the court ordered a lineup. According to defendant, the prosecutor acknowledged that Jesus “was not fearful” when he viewed the suspects from the rear of the patrol car because he was protected and could not be seen. Defendant maintains that during a police-supervised lineup, Jesus would have viewed defendant and others from behind one-way glass. If Jesus had failed to identify him in a lineup shortly after the crimes, the prosecutor could not have credibly argued that Jesus did not make an in-court identification because he was afraid. Defendant urges, “the results of the lineup would have provided crucial evidence that Jesus C. had misidentified Mena at the curbside showup, and that his failure to identify Mena at the preliminary hearing and trial was not the result of intimidation.” These arguments miss the mark. First, the prosecutor did not argue that Jesus “was not fearful” during the curbside showup. Indeed, there was clear evidence to the contrary. The prosecutor merely distinguished the circumstances of the showup from the more intimidating setting of an in-court identification. More importantly, however, defendant‟s argument assumes that Jesus would not have identified him at a lineup. Defendant attempts to establish 24 prejudice by arguing the failure to order a lineup effectively excluded “evidence that Jesus C. would not have been able to identify Mena in a formal lineup.” Defendant‟s argument illustrates the dilemma for reviewing courts on appeal from a judgment. It rests on sheer speculation. It simply cannot be determined what Jesus might have said or done at a lineup. He might have identified defendant, or affirmatively said defendant was not his assailant, or, as he did at both the preliminary hearing and trial, said he could not identify anyone because he was uncertain. The best outcome from defendant‟s perspective would have been a firm statement from Jesus that his attacker was not in the lineup. In light of his repeated in-court testimony, which was substantially less definitive, such a result appears unlikely. Yet, even if Jesus had expressly said his assailant was not in the lineup, the prosecutor could still have argued Jesus acted out of fear. The incident occurred on April 13, 2007. The lineup motion was argued on May 29, 2007, a little more than a week before the June 6 preliminary hearing. At that hearing, Jesus was a reluctant witness. Had a lineup been conducted where Jesus made no identification, the prosecutor could have reasonably argued at trial that Jesus was acting with the same reluctance he displayed at the preliminary hearing. Neither the presence of police nor the protection of one-way glass could have ensured the secrecy of any identification Jesus made. The result of his lineup statement would have been revealed during discovery and his appearance and testimony would make his identity known to those inclined to retaliate. Defendant fails to establish on this particular record that, but for the trial court‟s failure to order the lineup, he would have obtained a more favorable result. (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.) Defendant also argues the harmless error standard cannot be satisfied because the balance of the evidence against him was not strong. This argument also fails. It is true that some harmless error conclusions are reached by relying on the overall strength of the evidence of guilt. Such an approach is not the thrust of 25 our analysis here. We are concluding that any assumed error was harmless because, even if defendant had been given a lineup, no foreseeable outcome from that procedure would have further assisted him.