Opinion ID: 538896
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Judicial Comments

Text: 134 It is enough to reverse this judgment that there is no evidence to support it and that we cannot tease apart a general verdict that may have been based on a theory the majority recognizes is faulty. The confusion is compounded when the trial judge invades the province of the jury and comments on ultimate issues of fact. 135 We will reverse a judgment on the basis of judicial behavior at trial where the judge's actions preclude a fair and dispassionate consideration of the evidence. Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 472, 53 S.Ct. 698, 700, 77 L.Ed. 1321 (1933). Accord, Ward v. Westland Plastics, Inc., 651 F.2d 1266, 1271 (9th Cir.1980); Shad v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 799 F.2d 525, 531 (9th Cir.1986). We have said that [a] trial court commits reversible error when it expresses its opinion on an ultimate issue of fact in front of the jury.... Shad, 799 F.2d at 531. 136 A. There is age discrimination. 137 Ada Kern brought an age discrimination claim against Levolor. She presented no evidence to support her charge. She presented insufficient evidence to support any of her other charges. During the trial, the judge commented in front of the jury, There is age discrimination. RT 7/29 at 47. Subsequently, the jury returned a general verdict in favor of Kern. If we are to sustain such a verdict, I'm not sure I know what a fair trial is. 138 In upholding the verdict, the majority proposes a rather remarkable reading of the judge's age discrimination comment. [T]he context, the majority says, makes it clear that the judge was simply explaining his evidentiary ruling: that evidence that other workers had not been laid off did not mean that Kern was not discriminated against. Majority op. at 780. That may be what he meant, but it's not what he said; and we must concern ourselves with how the jury perceived his statement. The immediate exchange between Levolor's counsel and the judge, in front of the jury, contains some rather forthright pronouncements: 139 Mr. Brown: So there's no age discrimination. 140 The Court: There is age discrimination. They discriminated against this lady and didn't lay off the others. 141 RT 7/29 at 47. The majority does not see this as reversible error. They believe that from context, a jury will take the judge to mean: I will not allow evidence showing that Levolor failed to lay off other employees who were older than Ada Kern, because such evidence, standing alone, does not prove that Levolor did not discriminate against Ada Kern because of her age. 142 Not only does this attribute to jurors more sophistication than we normally do, I am not at all convinced that this is what the judge meant. Consider again his statement during the jury instruction discussion: 143 The Court: Age discrimination. But they're all the same. That's all the same ball of wax in federal court. I can join them all together if I want to. We have quite a bit of power over here that you may not have in the state. I told the jury: Breach of contract or breach of implied warranty because of age discrimination. They figured she was too old. So they terminated her. 144 The question is: Did you do so correctly? 145 RT 7/27 at 121. How is one to interpret this curious comment? It seems that the judge was assuming that Levolor had discharged Ada Kern because she was too old, but that it could defend itself by demonstrating that the discharge was, nonetheless, within its standard procedures. This, in my view, is a significant indication that the district judge misunderstood the evidence as well as the applicable law. How then can we expect the jury to have drawn an innocuous inference from his comments? 146 B. Are you trying to get rid of her? 147 The ball of wax comment was not made in front of the jury; other comments were. 8 On one of the numerous occasions when the judge took it upon himself to examine witnesses, he confronted Steven Smithling about the failure to give Ada Kern a golf score: 148 The Court: Why did you do that? I don't get it. Some you give a golf score to and some you don't and yet they're all in the same category of being the one and only employee in the department. 149 The Witness: But at the time-- 150 The Court: Nobody else to compare them to, no Jack Nicholas [sic] or Arnold Palmer to compare them to, but you give them a golf score. On what theory? 151 . . . . . 152 The Witness: Just Ada's score wasn't on here. 153 The Court: Why not? 154 The Witness: I don't know why not. During the-- 155 The Court: Are you trying to get rid of her? What's your problem? 156 RT 7/28 at 104. When a cross-examining attorney asks such argumentative questions, the judge sustains an objection and the trial moves on; the jury can attribute the attorney's comments to advocacy. When the judge asks such questions there is no one to overrule him; and the jury gets a clear impression of the judge's view of the evidence. 157 In Maheu v. Hughes Tool Co., 569 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.1977), the district judge commented on the credibility of a witness when the witness's character was at issue. We found reversible error. Here, Ada Kern presented no evidence of her own on the procedures Levolor used in discharging her. Her case depended critically on the jury's disbelieving Levolor's witnesses, particularly Steven Smithling. The judge committed reversible error when he impeached Smithling. 158 C. I know what the law is. 159 To show Levolor's insidious motive, Ada Kern relied heavily on Exhibit 105, the June 1985 letter from the Levolor profit-sharing office, notifying her that she had been terminated as of February. Her theory was that Levolor discharged her because of her age, and that they never had any intention of bringing her back--that she was terminated, not laid off: 160 To me the number one important exhibit is No. 105. And this is the Levolor letter dated June 12, 1985, where it states that Ms. Kern had been terminated as of February 4, 1985. Nothing explaining the fact that maybe this was just terminated from some kind of a payroll record or that maybe she was still on layoff and might come back. It was a very, very clearly written letter and you will be able to see that for yourself. It was termination and it had been effective February 4th, which is what everybody had planned all along; one of the reasons probably that Ms. Kern was never asked to voluntarily layoff or never was in on any of these meetings where the layoff was discussed. 161 Plaintiff's Closing Argument, RT 7/29 at 144-45. 162 Leslie Craun, a Levolor personnel assistant, testified that termination was a generic term Levolor used for all forms of separation from the company, including layoff, discharge and quitting. RT 7/28 at 118. She explained that Levolor did not intend by the June letter to suggest to Ada Kern that she was no longer eligible for recall; the letter did not affect her layoff or seniority status. Id. at 119; RT 7/29 at 5. 163 The judge would have none of it; Levolor would not be allowed to explain its use of the English language: 164 The Court: You cannot use the words discharge or layoff. It's different and I'm so instructing the jury. There's a difference between layoff, discharge and quitting. And discharge and quitting have nothing to do with layoff even though this witness tries to tell you so. I know what the law is. They are different. 165 Layoff means you're still on the payroll. Quitting means you're finished. Discharged means you're finished. Termination means you're finished. You got it? Despite what she says. She doesn't know what she's talking about. Go ahead. 166 . . . . . 167 The Court: I don't know who drafts these things for you people. But some idiot lawyer back East, you know, they draft all kinds of--sometimes absolute trash and they think a judge is going to swallow it. No way. Termination and discharge are not layoff. And layoff is not termination and discharge, period. The law says so and I say so, and you got to take the law from me. Thank you. 9 168 . . . . . 169 The Court: And they did for whatever. And I'm not going to let the jury get the idea that exhibit 5 is a termination. It's nothing of the kind--or a discharge. Nothing of the kind. As a matter of law I tell you it is only a layoff, Exhibit 5. 170 Now, when they later in June--June 12th, I think it was, in Exhibit 105--tried to say--in my judgment they tried to say that you were terminated as of the date of the layoff. Ridiculous. If that were true she wouldn't have that 50 percent vested, and she's got it. And she got it already. Put it in the bank somewhere. All right. Go ahead. 171 RT 7/29 at 6, 11, 14. 172 Layoff, discharge, and termination are not legally defined terms in a wrongful termination/age discrimination suit; and the parties to this suit obviously defined the terms differently. In light of the importance attached to these words by the plaintiff, the judge had no business offering his own definitions, let alone presenting them as law. 10 173 It may be that none of the judge's comments, on their own, constitute reversible error. But taken together, and in the context of a trial where the plaintiff has presented virtually no relevant evidence, they cast serious doubt on whether the jury's verdict reflects a dispassionate evaluation of the facts.