Opinion ID: 1683171
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the refusal of the court to permit the filing of a plea of qualified privilege

Text: (Hn 15) After the appellee had rested his case, the appellant asked leave to amend his answer and set forth the defense of qualified privilege, based on fair comment. This motion was denied on the ground that it had been filed too late. Be that as it may, however, the measurable privilege of publications, dealing with public officials, requires that such publications must be within the bounds of fair comment and must not be motivated by actual malice. In the case of Krebs v. McNeal, 222 Miss. 560, 76 So.2d 693, at p. 576 of the State Report, 76 So.2d 699, this Court cited and quoted from 33 Am. Jur., Libel and Slander, Sec. 169, pp. 161-164, as follows: Although there are a few decisions to the contrary, the great weight of authority supports the view that publications dealing with political matters, public officers, and candidates for office are entitled to a measurable privilege by reason of the public interest involved therein. The principal limitations upon the rule are that the statements must be within the bounds of fair comment and must not be motivated by actual malice    The rule does not, however, place such persons wholly without the protection of the law, and although there is authority to the contrary, it is generally held that accusations of crime, dishonesty, fraud, corruption, immorality, etc., and imputations of dereliction of duty, favoritism, or misconduct in office, are not privileged. See also Edmonds v. Delta Democrat Publishing Company, 230 Miss. 583, 93 So.2d 171; Scott-Burr Stores Corporation v. Edgar, 181 Miss. 486, 177 So. 766; Kroger Grocery & Baking Company v. Harpole, supra; Louisiana Oil Corporation v. Tenno, 173 Miss. 609, 157 So. 705; Hodges v. Cunningham, 160 Miss. 577, 135 So. 215; Hines v. Shumaker, supra. Likewise, the Law of Torts, Harper and James, p. 457, is to the effect that proof of actual malice defeats the qualified immunity of fair comment. (Hn 16) The statements in this case accused the appellee of being guilty of crimes. There was no evidence to sustain such a charge. The appellant, who was called by the appellee as an adverse witness in the presentation of his case, had, in no way, offered any suggestion of a qualified privilege under the theory of fair comment. Consequently, such a defense would have been without avail. The appellant therefore could have suffered no injury whatever from the denial of his motion in this particular.