Opinion ID: 4529351
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Relevant Evidence

Text: “Despite our generally deferential review of IJ and BIA opinions,” we require “a certain minimum level of analysis” to allow for meaningful judicial review. Poradisova v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 2005); see Gashi v. Holder, 702 F.3d 130, 138 (2d Cir. 2012). While the IJ and BIA need not “expressly parse or refute on the record each . . . piece of evidence offered by the petitioner,” there must be some indication of “reasoned consideration” and “adequate findings.” Zhi Yun Gao v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 86, 87 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d at 272−73; Tian-Yong Chen v. INS, 359 F.3d 121, 128−29 (2d Cir. 2004) (vacating and remanding where BIA failed to consider petitioner’s testimony that he had been beaten). Applying these principles here, we note that the BIA concluded that two pieces of evidence defeated Scarlett’s claim that authorities were unwilling or unable to protect him from gang violence: “the police [1] were able to warn [Scarlett] about impending harm to his family and [2] offered to transfer him to another location.” Admin. R. 3. Such evidence may have sufficed to support an agency finding that Scarlett failed to show that Jamaican police were “unwilling” to 22 protect him from gang violence, but it provided little insight as to their ability to do so. See Rosales Justo v. Sessions, 895 F.3d 154, 163 (1st Cir. 2018) (recognizing willingness and inability as distinct issues); Zelaya de Ceron v. Lynch, 648 F. App’x 78, 79–80 (2d Cir. 2016) (remanding because agency failed to consider evidence that government had little control over gangs); Madrigal v. Holder, 716 F.3d 499, 506 (9th Cir. 2013) (identifying error where BIA “focused only on . . . government’s willingness to control [gang], not its ability to do so” (emphasis in original)); Hor v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 497, 501 (7th Cir. 2005) (explaining that while one “cannot even claim asylum on the basis of persecution by a private group unless the government either condones it or is helpless to prevent it, . . . if either of those conditions is satisfied, the claim is a good one”). In determining whether Scarlett satisfied the “unable” prong of the unwilling-or-unable standard, the agency needed to consider Scarlett’s testimony that, although police warned him that his daughter was about to be kidnapped, they told him that he was “on [his] own” in protecting against the threat, and provided him with no assistance either in retrieving the child or finding a safe home for the family. Admin. R. 542. In fact, Scarlett’s children never returned to school in Jamaica, and he and his family lived in hiding for several months until he was given permission to leave the country. None of these facts—all pertinent to whether Jamaican authorities, however willing, were nevertheless unable to protect Scarlett from gang violence—are mentioned in any of the various agency decisions. Moreover, in citing the transfer offer as evidence of police willingness and ability to protect Scarlett, the agency nowhere mentions that Scarlett’s Guanaboa Vale supervisor told him transfer 23 was the only thing police could do to protect him from gang violence. It was after—i.e., despite—Scarlett’s transfer from Guanaboa Vale to Bog Walk that gang members threatened to kidnap his daughter and burn his home. In short, it was after transfer proved ineffective in deterring gangs from targeting Scarlett that police told him he was on his own in responding to gang threats. Reinforcing our concern with the agency’s “reasoned consideration” of the totality of relevant evidence is the fact that the BIA, in rejecting Scarlett’s claim that Jamaican police “did not have adequate resources to provide him protection,” cited a single page of the IJ’s decision to conclude that “the facts of the respondent’s claim prove otherwise (I.J. 12).” Admin. R. 3 (stating that IJ’s “finding in that regard is not clearly erroneous”). But the only pertinent “facts” referenced by the IJ on the cited page relate to the offered transfer to Bog Walk, which, as just indicated, proved insufficient to safeguard Scarlett and his family from threats of imminent gang harm. Moreover, the IJ may have mistakenly understood Scarlett to have rejected this transfer offer because he stated: “it does appear that the respondent was offered the opportunity to transfer to the [Bog Walk] division, which the respondent did not wish to do.” Id. at 315–16 (emphasis added). Insofar as the BIA opinion refers only to an “offer[]” of transfer, the misunderstanding may have persisted on appeal, particularly as the BIA does not acknowledge that the threat to kidnap Scarlett’s child and burn his home occurred after actual transfer. In sum, because we cannot conclude from the existing record that the agency gave reasoned consideration to all the facts relevant to assessing Scarlett’s claim that Jamaican authorities were unable to 24 protect him from gang violence, we must remand for further proceedings.