Opinion ID: 749134
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Speedy Trial Act violations

Text: 10 A district court's application of the Speedy Trial Act is reviewed de novo. United States v. George, 85 F.3d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir.1996). The court's factual findings under the Speedy Trial Act are reviewed for clear error. United States v. Contreras, 63 F.3d 852, 855 (9th Cir.1995). In rendering a decision whether to dismiss with or without prejudice for a Speedy Trial Act violation, the district court shall make factual findings and apply them to the relevant statutory factors. United States v. Delgado-Miranda, 951 F.2d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir.1991) (per curiam). 11 The Speedy Trial Act provides that a defendant must be brought to trial within 70 days of his indictment. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). When, upon the motion of the government, an indictment is dismissed without prejudice, upon reindictment the 70-day clock begins again where it left off before the first indictment was dismissed. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(6). On the other hand, if the indictment is dismissed upon the defendant's motion, the clock begins to run anew if the defendant is reindicted for the same charges. 12 Story made his initial appearance on his second indictment on November 23, 1994. At that point, 28 days were still available in order to bring him to trial, but the government did not inform the court of this limit. Trial was set for January 23, 1995. Story did not object to that date. On December 16, Story's initial counsel withdrew from the case, and new counsel was substituted on December 20. On January 4, 1995, the government filed a superceding indictment that retained the original charge and added a new charge. That same day, trial was reset for March 13, 1995. On January 6, the government requested the court to accelerate the trial date to the present because the speedy trial clock either had or was about to run. In that motion, the government suggested that should the scheduling be impossible, the court might move the trial date up and then find it necessary to delay it in the interests of justice pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A). The district court denied the government's motion to accelerate the trial date. It noted that Story would not have enough time to prepare his defense on his second, just-indicted charge, and that the standards set out in the cited statute did not support delaying the trial in the interests of justice. Story then moved to dismiss the indictment for speedy trial violations and the court dismissed the indictment without prejudice. 13 Story essentially argues that the government had an obligation to dismiss the earlier charge and that it acted in bad faith by failing to do so. The district court found that the government did not act in bad faith. We agree. The government conceded that the indictment was dismissible, and left it to the court to decide what to do. The court dismissed the indictment, and the question remaining is whether it properly did so without prejudice. 1 14 A violation of the Speedy Trial Act alone does not require dismissal with prejudice. United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 342 (1988). In order to decide whether a Speedy Trial Act violation requires dismissal with prejudice, a court must consider three factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2): the seriousness of the offense; the facts and circumstances of the case that led to dismissal; and the impact of reprosecution on the administration of the Speedy Trial Act and on justice. The district court looked carefully at each of these issues. It found that the crime was serious. It analyzed the facts that led up to that point and found that Story suffered no actual prejudice and that some of the delay could be attributed directly to Story, such as his late substitution of a lawyer and his refusal to waive his statutory right to 30 days to prepare for trial when the government moved to have the trial date accelerated. And it found that because there was no evidence of any intention to harass by repeated indictments and/or by delay, reprosecution would not negatively impact the administration of the act or of justice generally. We hold that the district court did not err in deciding to dismiss without prejudice. Because the third indictment was dismissed without prejudice, the fourth indictment was properly brought.