Opinion ID: 2708522
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Special Condition 4 (The Search Condition)

Text: Before we proceed to review the condition on its merits, we must first determine the proper standard of review. The Government argues that because Farmer did not raise an objection despite the district court’s general “anything else?” query at the end of sentencing, he waived his objection to the special condition and the condition is unreviewable. However, Farmer neither explicitly approved the search condition, cf. United States v. O’Malley, 739 F.3d 1001, 1007 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding that an affirmative statement of no objection constitutes waiver), nor had a strategic reason to forego the argument at the hearing, cf. United States v. Allen, 529 F.3d 390, 395 (7th Cir. 2008) (“If a specific objection was not raised at sentencing, we will view it as having been waived if the defendant had a strategic reason to forego the argument, that is, only if the defendant's counsel would not be deficient for failing to raise the objection.”). And Farmer’s response to the district court’s general query of whether there was “anything else”—a query that came after the statement that the court was imposing sentence—cannot constitute waiver. Even so, there is some question as to whether the objection to the search condition was forfeited because of Farmer’s silence at the hearing and should be reviewed for 8 No. 13-3373 plain error, or whether it should be reviewed for an abuse of discretion because there was no opportunity for Farmer to object before the sentence was imposed. (As we note above, “not knowing [the Probation Service’s] recommendation [for supervised release terms] . . . may make it difficult for the defendant to mount an effective challenge to it.” Bryant, 2014 WL 2612349, at .) We have “recognized some tension in our cases as to the proper standard of review in these circumstances.” United States v. Shannon, 743 F.3d 496, 499 (7th Cir. 2014) (detailing the conflict between our cases that have reviewed for plain error where a defendant did not “object” to a “judicial choice after it ha[d] been made” and cases where we reviewed for abuse of discretion because of the potential lack of notice to the defendants regarding the court’s impending filing of its sentencing order); see also United States v. Goodwin, 717 F.3d 511, 522–23 (7th Cir. 2013) (noting the conflict between cases like United States v. Bartlett, 567 F.3d 901, 910 (7th Cir. 2009), and United States v. Courtland, 642 F.3d 545, 547 (7th Cir. 2011), but reasoning that “[w]e need not resolve whether plain-error review . . . or review for abuse of discretion . . . applies in these circumstances, since we find that the special conditions must be vacated under either standard”). As in Shannon and Goodwin, we leave for another day the decision on the proper standard of review, as the outcome here is the same regardless of the standard used.
We note that the district court did not give a reason for imposing the search condition. See Transcript of Plea and Sentencing and Competency Hearing, United States v. Farmer, No. 4:12-cr-00026 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 14, 2013), ECF No. No. 13-3373 9 84, at 52 (imposing search condition without explanation). Farmer contends that the search condition appears to be a standard condition suggested by the Probation Service of the Southern District of Indiana, claiming to have found it imposed in 39 of 42 cases examined in that court—a statistic not disputed by the government. The search condition is a broad restriction that requires him to submit to searches of his person, car, place of business, residence, computer, and other property, with no requirement that the entity conducting the search have any suspicion to justify the search. The searches may be conducted just by a probation officer, but also with the assistance of law enforcement. Farmer is also subject to the “seizure of any contraband found” during these searches. The scope of this search clause is broader even than the explicit searches that the sentencing guidelines authorize for the purpose of monitoring sex offenders: the latter provision requires reasonable suspicion that the defendant has violated a condition of supervised release as a prerequisite for the search, whereas the search condition to which Farmer is subject requires no suspicion, reasonable or otherwise, to trigger a search. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(3) (authorizing a court to order, as an explicit condition of supervised release, that a person and his property submit to search “by any law enforcement or probation officer with reasonable suspicion concerning a violation of a condition of supervised release or unlawful conduct by the person”) (emphasis added); U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(d)(7)(C) (recommending as a special condition of supervised release for sex offenders “[a] condition requiring the defendant to submit to a search, at any time, with or without a warrant . . . upon reasonable suspicion concerning a violation of a condition of supervised release or unlawful conduct by the defendant”) (emphasis added). 10 No. 13-3373 “[W]e are . . . at a loss to see how this broad search and seizure authority is connected to [Farmer’s] offense, history, and personal characteristics, or how it is reasonably necessary to furthering the deterrence, public protection, and rehabilitative goals articulated in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2).” Goodwin, 717 F.3d at 523. The record does not indicate that contraband played any role in Farmer’s current or past offenses. “Although we stop short of stating that such restrictions could never be appropriate in these circumstances, our skepticism leads us to conclude that the district court must provide some justification for these particular conditions.” Id. The error here is not harmless, because the consistency of this condition with the statutory sentencing factors is far from plain: it is difficult to identify how this search condition is reasonably related to the nature of the offense, the characteristics of the defendant, or the need to deter, protect the public, or provide the defendant with rehabilitation. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(d)(1), 3553(a); cf. Siegel, 2014 WL 2210762 at  (holding that a district court that did not give reasons for a condition it was imposing committed harmless error if “[t]he consistency of that condition with the statutory sentencing factors is plain, given the nature of [the underlying] crime”). Accordingly, we vacate this condition of supervised release and remand for further consideration consistent with this opinion.