Opinion ID: 355513
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the compensability of de nichilo's disability

Text: 8 On December 28, 1972, De Nichilo reported for work at the Military Ocean Terminal in Bayonne, New Jersey. His normal duty was to operate a forklift inside a warehouse where his employer stuffed and stripped containers. On that day, however, he was assigned as a driver for a group of longshoremen loading cargo on a ship. His task was to bring cargo from remote storage areas to the pier, where it could be hoisted into the ship's hold. According to the testimony credited by the administrative law judge, at about 10:30 A. M. De Nichilo and another longshoreman were directed to pick up several 1000-pound coils of wire which were resting in soft dirt some distance off the paved surface. After unsuccessfully attempting to negotiate their forklifts over the soft dirt, they decided to tow the coils to the paved surface with a hook and a rope. When De Nichilo forced a hook into one of the coils, he experienced chest pains, numbness in his arms, and shortness of breath. The discomfort continued until 4:30 P. M., when he experienced sharp pain and collapsed while attempting to mount his forklift. He was taken by ambulance to the hospital, where he was treated for a myocardial infarction until January 18, 1973. He was discharged from the hospital on that date. However, he has not worked since then and cannot return to work. Prior to December 28, 1972, De Nichilo had a history of heart disease complicated by diabetes mellitus. 1 9 At the hearing before the administrative law judge De Nichilo's medical expert testified that there was a causal connection between the extra-strenuous work De Nichilo performed in moving the wire coils and the December 28, 1972 myocardial infarction. The employer's medical expert disputed this, claiming instead that the December 28, 1972 attack was only a natural progression of De Nichilo's pre-existing coronary artery disease. Both experts agreed that De Nichilo suffered from a pre-existing arteriosclerotic heart disease. The administrative law judge credited the opinion of De Nichilo's expert that the December 28, 1972 attack resulted from the stress of exertion during employment. That opinion, although disputed, provides evidentiary support for the administrative law judge's decision. Similarly, there is disputed evidentiary support for the conclusion that De Nichilo's disability is permanent and total. Since the Benefits Review Board properly applied the substantial evidence standard of review under 33 U.S.C. § 921(b)(3), we must affirm its decision. Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs (Aleksiejczyk), 542 F.2d 602, 608 (3d Cir. 1976). We are not free to weigh the evidence ourselves.