Opinion ID: 883138
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Whether the District Court erred in admitting the results of DNA tests performed on the muscle tissue found in Moore's camper?

Text: Moore presents three arguments as to why the District Court erred in admitting the RFLP analysis in this case. First, Moore alleges that Cellmark used sloppy laboratory techniques. Moore does not argue that the theory underlying DNA and RFLP analysis is inadmissible, rather, he states that the general reason courts exclude RFLP analysis evidence is because the particular laboratory failed to adhere to generally accepted techniques for obtaining relevant, reliable results. See, State v. Vandebogart (N.H. 1992), 616 A.2d 483; United States v. Martinez (8th Cir.1993), 3 F.3d 1191; State v. Cauthron (Wash. 1993), 846 P.2d 502. After a thorough review of the cases and other current literature and authorities, we conclude that the theory underlying DNA and RFLP technology is generally not open to serious attack and that such evidence is widely admitted in various state and federal courts and jurisdictions. [T]he threshold [test] for admissibility [of DNA evidence] should require only a preliminary showing of reliability of the particular data to be offered, i.e., some indication of how the laboratory work was done and what analysis and assumptions underlie the probability calculations. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d at 799-800. While Moore first argues that the State failed to demonstrate that Cellmark's testing results were reliable because Cellmark used sloppy laboratory techniques, he fails to identify what techniques were sloppy, or objectionable. Rather, he incorporates by reference all the evidentiary arguments made about PCR in the preceding sections [of his opening brief], as well as the technical arguments made at the [admissibility] hearing. We conclude that Moore's argument must fail. Rule 23(a)(4), M.R.App.P., provides in pertinent part: The argument shall contain the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, and the reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities, statutes and pages of the record relied on. Moore failed to properly raise specific points of error concerning Cellmark's laboratory techniques, and this Court will not presume which techniques he considered were sloppy. Accordingly, we will not address this argument further. Allmaras v. Yellowstone Basin Properties (1991), 248 Mont. 477, 483, 812 P.2d 770, 773. Second, Moore argues that the numbers used to mathematically determine a match by Cellmark are unreliable. Moore's argument is without merit, because, as we discussed in issue one, the District Court excluded all testimony concerning statistical evidence. Martinez, 3 F.3d at 1199. Third, Moore argues that the District Court erred in allowing testimony that the DNA profile of the muscle tissue sample was consistent with the DNA profiles of Brisbin's children and his mother, because according to Moore, Cellmark's criteria for declaring a match, or consistency are highly suspect. Moore alleges that two probes contained anomalies and therefore, Cellmark should have declared these probes to be exclusions. According to Moore, the fact that Cellmark declared a match even though two anomalies were present evidences that the RFLP test results did not have a reliable foundation. At this juncture, it is important that we distinguish between DNA identification analysis and DNA paternity analysis. DNA typing for forensic purposes in criminal law is usually used to aid in the identification or exclusion of criminal suspects. The characteristics of a suspect's genetic structure are profiled and compared to the genetic structure found in material such as blood or semen recovered from the crime scene. The two profiles are then compared to see if they match. Because Brisbin's body has never been found, the laboratories conducting the tests could not obtain a comparison sample of his DNA. The scientists therefore conducted a paternity analysis on the muscle tissue found in Moore's camper to determine if the DNA extracted from the sample muscle tissue was consistent with having come from the father of the Brisbin children. Because genes are inherited, a child will have a composite profile which is consistent with his or her parents. Cellmark received blood samples from seven people: Rosaleen Kovash, Brisbin's former wife and the mother of Jeremiah and Erin Brisbin; Maureen Brisbin, Brisbin's wife and the mother of Parker and Mariah Brisbin; and Mary Ann Brisbin, Brisbin's mother. Cellmark used five probes to examine five different genetic locations. The result of each probe is visible on the x-ray film or autorad, and appears as dark lines called bands. A comparison was made between the bands exhibited on the autorads for each mother, her two children, and the DNA from the tissue. For each of those comparisons, Cellmark examined the DNA pattern of the two children, to determine which band in the child was consistent with the mother and if the other band was consistent with the DNA coming from the tissue. Moore contends that because two of the samples failed to visually coincide, the samples could not be said to be consistent, but were exclusions and, therefore, were inadmissible. The first alleged exclusion concerned an autorad for the probe MS1. Both Mariah Brisbin and her mother only showed one band for this probe, and Mariah's band did not coincide with the band expressed for her mother, Maureen. Moore argues that because Mariah's maternal band did not show up on the autorad, the results were inadmissible. In interpreting why only one of Mariah's bands was visible on the autorad, the State's expert explained that Mariah's other band had probably run off the gel and, therefore, could not be seen. The expert noted that even though the band could not be seen on the gel, one could continue with the analysis using the one band which was visible. In this case, the band which was visible on the autorad was consistent with a band from the piece of muscle tissue. Moore also claims that an inconsistency on the probe YNH24 between Brisbin's mother Mary Ann Brisbin, and the piece of muscle tissue rendered the results inadmissible. In this instance, the band from the piece of muscle tissue did not correspond to either band from Mary Ann Brisbin's autorad. Moore claims that because neither of the bands from Brisbin's mother matched the band from the piece of muscle tissue, Cellmark should have excluded Mary Ann Brisbin as the mother of the donor of the muscle tissue. Moore claims that Cellmark should not have concluded that Mary Ann Brisbin's results were consistent with the piece of muscle tissue in light of probe YNH24, which did not match. According to Moore, Cellmark's conclusion that the two DNA profiles were consistent evidences the lack of foundation for the entire RFLP testimony. Of the five probes used to examine Mary Ann Brisbin's DNA profile, nine bands were visible on the autorads. The muscle tissue matched four of those bands. However, as stated above, Mary Ann Brisbin's band was not consistent with the muscle tissue's band for probe YNH224. Cellmark's experts testified that one would still have to conclude that Mary Ann was somehow genetically related to the donor of the muscle tissue, because Mary Ann's bands and the muscle tissue's bands matched on the other probes. The experts testified that given the known high mutation rate at these genetic locations, a reasonable conclusion was that a mutation slightly altered the gene at this locus. The District Court ruled that Moore's objections to Cellmark's RFLP analysis results were a matter of weight for the jury to assign to the testimony, not a question of admissibility. We agree. In determining whether to allow expert testimony concerning novel scientific evidence, this Court has held that it is better to admit relevant scientific evidence in the same manner as other expert testimony and allow its weight to be attacked by cross-examination and refutation. Barmeyer v. Montana Power Co. (1983), 202 Mont. 185, 193-94, 657 P.2d 594, 598. (Citation omitted.) In Barmeyer we rejected the general acceptance test set forth in Frye v. United States (D.C. Cir.1923), 293 F. 1013, holding that the general acceptance rule is not in conformity with the spirit of the new rules of evidence. Barmeyer, 657 P.2d at 598. (While we stated in Martel v. Montana Power Co. (1988), 231 Mont. 96, 103, 752 P.2d 140, 145, that we overruled Barmeyer, it is readily apparent that the only portion of our opinion that was actually overruled was that pertaining to violation of the NESC standards being negligence per se.) More than a decade later, the United States Supreme Court also rejected Frye's general acceptance standard for admissibility of expert testimony in favor of the more liberal test embodied in Rule 702, F.R.Evid. This test requires the trial judge to determine whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993), ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 2796, 125 L.Ed.2d 469. In Daubert, the Court noted that Rule 702, F.R.Evid., still requires the district court to screen such evidence to ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable. Daubert, ___ U.S. at ___, 113 S.Ct. at 2795. To guide the trial court's assessment of the reliability of the scientific evidence offered, the Court established the following non-exclusive factors to be considered: (a) whether the theory or technique can be and has been tested; (b) whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication; (c) the known or potential rate of error in using a particular scientific technique and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation; and (d) whether the theory or technique has been generally accepted or rejected in the particular scientific field. Daubert, ___ U.S. at ___ _ ___, 113 S.Ct. at 2796-97. The Court emphasized that the inquiry under Rule 702, F.R.Evid., is a flexible one, and that the focus is on the principles and methodology underlying the proffered evidence rather than the conclusions they generate. Daubert, 113 S.Ct. at 2797. We conclude that the guidelines set forth in Daubert are consistent with our previous holding in Barmeyer concerning the admission of expert testimony of novel scientific evidence, and we, therefore, adopt the Daubert standard for the admission of scientific expert testimony. Accordingly, we conclude that before a trial court admits scientific expert testimony, there must be a preliminary showing that the expert's opinion is premised on a reliable methodology. We note, however, that the court must be flexible in its inquiry. Not every error in the application of a particular methodology should warrant exclusion. An alleged error in the application of a reliable methodology should provide the basis for exclusion of the opinion only if that error negates the basis for the reliability of the principle itself. Martinez, 3 F.3d at 1198. In the instant case, although the District Court did not apply the Daubert standard, it did hold an admissibility hearing which involved seven days of testimony from scientists in the fields of genetics, molecular biology, and statistics. After considering the testimony, the court concluded: [B]ased upon a thorough and conscientious review of all the DNA evidence, the Court's conclusion is that while there are cracks in the foundation of the testimony of some of the State's expert witnesses, such is sufficiently mitigated by the overall testimony of witnesses, Dr. Schanfield, Dr. Cotton, and Dr. Goldman, to create an issue of fact. In considering admissibility of evidence, the Court must walk a fine line, avoiding considerations of weight to be given the proffered evidence, and, generally, the credibility of the witnesses offering testimony. Under the circumstances presented, it is the opinion of this Court that the DNA evidence proffered by the State meets the threshold test for admissibility. The credibility of witnesses, issues of fact, and the weight to be accorded the testimony of witnesses are issues for a jury to resolve, not the Court. (Emphasis in original.)