Opinion ID: 1175465
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Duplicitous Information

Text: Defendant argues that Count II of the information is duplicitous in that it alleges that defendant intentionally placed DONNA ... AND/OR DENISE ... in reasonable apprehension of imminent physical injury.... The law in Arizona requires that each offense must be charged in a separate count. State v. Axley, 132 Ariz. 383, 392, 646 P.2d 268, 277 (1982); Ariz.R.Crim.P. 13.3(a), 17 A.R.S. An indictment which does not comply with Rule 13.3 because it charges separate crimes in the same count is duplicitous. Baines v. Superior Court, 142 Ariz. 145, 151, 688 P.2d 1037, 1043 (App. 1984). Duplicitous indictments are prohibited because they fail to give adequate notice of the charge to be defended, they present a hazard of a non-unanimous jury verdict, and they make a precise pleading of prior jeopardy impossible in the event of a later prosecution. Wong Tai v. United States, 273 U.S. 77, 81, 47 S.Ct. 300, 301, 71 L.Ed. 545 (1927); Spencer v. Coconino County Superior Court, Div. 3, 136 Ariz. 608, 610, 667 P.2d 1323, 1325 (1983). However, as our court of appeals has noted: The fact that one of the elements of the crime alleged is a separately indictable offense does not render the indictment duplicitous. In this respect, the indictment is no different than an indictment under the felony-murder statute. Baines, 142 Ariz. at 151, 688 P.2d at 1043 (citing A.R.S. § 13-1105(A)(2)). In this case, defendant was charged with one count of aggravated assault based on his pursuit of the two girls with his pickup truck. Even though the effect of his actions was an assault on both of the girls, the count in question is predicated on a single act. We have noted: [W]here numerous transactions are merely parts of a larger scheme, a single count encompassing the entire scheme is proper. State v. Via, 146 Ariz. 108, 116, 704 P.2d 238, 246 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1048, 106 S.Ct. 1268, 89 L.Ed.2d 577 (1986) (citing United States v. Zeidman, 540 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.1976)). We also note that even if the count was duplicitous, it could be cured by a proper instruction: [A] duplicitous ... indictment is remediable by the court's instruction to the jury particularizing the distinct offense charged in each count of the indictment. State v. Axley, 132 Ariz. 383, 392, 646 P.2d 268, 277 (1982) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 651 F.2d 1188, 1194 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 875, 102 S.Ct. 351, 70 L.Ed.2d 183 (1981).) In the instant case, the instruction stated: In order for the second count of aggravated assault to be proven, the following two things must be shown: 1. The defendant, Gerald Arthur Whitney, committed an assault on Donna ... and/or Denise.... 2. The defendant used a dangerous instrument in committing the assault. Proof of an assault is shown by proving the defendant intentionally put Donna ... and/or Denise ... in reasonable apprehension of immediate physical injury. From this instruction, the jury had to find that the defendant's action in chasing the girls with his pickup was one aggravated assault. Also, the defendant's ability to plead prior jeopardy in a subsequent prosecution was not hindered in any way. The record is clear that he was convicted for his single act of S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970). Neither was the defendant denied an essential right to his defense. The defendant's defense was that the offenses charged never took place and that the victims merely fabricated their stories. We find no prejudice to the defendant.