Opinion ID: 1789296
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the corroboration

Text: 1a. Admissions : James Brown called as a witness by the state testified that in August 1959 he was an inmate of the Rice County jail at Faribault, Minnesota, where he was confined on a charge of petty theft. His background included prior felony convictions. His former wife was married to Jay Biehoffer. He engaged in a conversation with defendant while cutting his hair at the jail and defendant stated that he and his brother and another had been picked up for breaking into the Eagles Club; that his brother had already been sentenced to the State Prison at Stillwater; and that he was waiting trial for his part in it. These questions and answers then appear: Q. Did he say anything to you as to whether he had or had not participated in that? A. He said he had. Q. Did he make any reference to what was accomplished there? A. I asked him what they got and he said all we got was $90.00. 1b. Flight to Avoid Arrest : Gerald J. Woody, subpoenaed as a witness by the state, was an employee at the Minneapolis boatworks on or about March 21, 1959, when he received a telephone call from defendant who asked for his brother. Gerald explained that the authorities had taken Jay. Although defendant was known to be a resident of Forest Lake, Minnesota, search and inquiry for him there and elsewhere from that time until July 13 was unavailing. James Crawford, a highway patrolman, who knew defendant to have been a resident in Forest Lake, looked for him during this interval because a warrant had been issued for his arrest. On July 13 he found him sleeping in his Plymouth station wagon on an isolated road near Wyoming, Minnesota. The 1958 license plates attached to the vehicle belonged properly on a panel truck owned by John in 1958, but the 1959 tabs then being used did not belong to him. The license plates which belonged on the station wagon and which, ordinarily, would be of aid to anyone seeking to apprehend him were found later underneath the rubber matting in the rear of the car. Michael McGinnis of the State Bureau of Criminal Apprehension testified that he had assisted in the effort to locate defendant from March 19, 1959, until he was apprehended on July 13, and that he and his associate, Charles Reiter, took the defendant from the sheriff's office at Stillwater to the office of the bureau of criminal apprehension on that day. En route to St. Paul, defendant said, I am glad this is over,    sleeping in the car and the eating here and there and hungry most of the time. Also, the defendant asked if somebody had made a statement to the effect that they had burglarized the Eagles Club in Northfield. Receiving an affirmative reply, he asked, Who? to which McGinnis replied, Ziggie. Mr. Roy T. Noonan, superintendent of the State Bureau of Criminal Apprehension, testified that on July 13, 1959, the defendant was interviewed at the office by agents Reiter and McGinnis at which time he said that this ducking out is for the birds and he was glad it was over with. Reiter gave a similar report as to conversations which, if believed, support the inference that defendant, upon hearing of his brother's arrest, feared and sought to avoid apprehension. 1c. Association with Participants : Under ordinary circumstances evidence introduced to show association between defendant and his brother on the day before the crime took place would be of no particular significance because of their relationship. There are circumstances in this case, however, which make the testimony with respect to their being together on that day out of the ordinary. Jay Biehoffer, called as a witness for the defense, testified that he did not see his brother on March 13 and had not seen him for a week before that date. As previously noted, Zaspel testified that he had lunch on March 13 with Jay Biehoffer, the defendant, and others, including James E. Davidson. Called as a witness for the state, Davidson testified that the Griggs-Midway Building is owned by his father and others and that on or about March 13, 1959, he had eaten lunch in the lunchroom of the building with Jay Biehoffer, Zaspel, and the defendant. The defendant himself did not take the witness stand and no unfavorable inference is to be drawn from that circumstance, but the report of Zaspel about this meeting, being buttressed by an apparently disinterested witness, gives a measure of corroboration to the testimony of the accomplice. 1d. Physical Objects : While it was not established definitely that the jacket found in Zaspel's car by representatives of the bureau of criminal apprehension belonged to the defendant, it was the only object found there which the state's principal witness disclaimed. The gun which Zaspel claimed was in the possession of defendant at the time of the burglary, and which he had observed in his possession on prior occasions, was introduced in evidence. The tools which were discovered in the Eagles Club following the break-in conformed to Zaspel's description of the instruments taken from defendant's car and placed in his before the theft. The gloves found in the vicinity of the Eagles Club were of the same kind used by the participants. Even so, without the testimony of the accomplice, these physical objects were not tied to the defendant. 1e. Proximity to Scene of Crime : Wesley Raadt was employed at the Sinclair oil station at Northfield on the night of March 13, 1959. He recalled that Zaspel, Jay Biehoffer, and a third man, whose appearance he did not note specifically, drove into the station and ordered gasoline at about midnight. His identification was not based on any prior acquaintance because they were strangers to him. There is no evidence that defendant was seen at or near the scene of the crime after its occurrence. The police officers, as noted, saw only two men leave the building and of the two the only one close enough to be identified was Zaspel. Evidence to the effect that a car was stolen the night of the burglary in the city of Northfield and later found abandoned in St. Paul is consistent with Zaspel's testimony attributing to the Biehoffer brothers a statement to the effect that they had stolen a car at Northfield to effect escape. We believe that the corroborative evidence outlined is adequate to meet the test set out by the recent decisions of this court. See, State v. Mathiasen, 267 Minn. 393, 127 N.W. (2d) 534; State v. Lupino, 268 Minn. 344, 129 N.W. (2d) 294. There is also evidence which runs contrary to an inference of guilt. Emma Cornell, who lived in a building immediately adjoining the Eagles Club and who called the police when she saw men entering the second-story window of the building from the rear, observed only two persons, neither of whom she was able to identify positively. But the fact that she saw only two men does not rule out the presence of a third, particularly when we note Zaspel's testimony that only he and defendant entered the Eagles hall through the window while Jay entered the building through a first-floor door opened from the inside by his brother. The police officers who came to the scene in response to Mrs. Cornell's telephone report saw only two men leave the building, but the jury could have concluded that three men were actually in it as Zaspel claimed; that Jay Biehoffer, leaving first, was able to escape apprehension because of the commotion which occurred in the attempt to apprehend Zaspel; and that defendant was able to escape without being observed in the attendant confusion. The fact that Wesley Raadt, the filling station attendant, was able to identify both Zaspel and Jay Biehoffer as being present in the automobile which he serviced with gasoline shortly before the burglary, but was unable to identify defendant, is understandable in view of the testimony that Zaspel and Jay got out of the car while John remained in it. In this connection, the testimony of Jay Biehoffer, called as a witness by the defense, was in direct conflict with the disinterested testimony of Raadt in that Jay Biehoffer denied specifically that he was in the city of Northfield at or near the time the crime occurred. It is true that the testimony of Joseph Caruso to the effect that defendant was in his bar in St. Paul on the night in question represents an alibi which, if believed, would have made defendant's presence in Northfield at the time of the burglary and theft an impossibility. On the other hand, the jury was not required to accept Caruso's testimony merely because he gave it. And, having called Caruso, who stated that his recollection of defendant's presence in his bar was made acute because he associated the occasion with the presence of members of a bowling team sponsored by the bar operated by Caruso and recalled that members of the bowling team were engaged in raucous conversation with John Biehoffer during the evening, the defendant did not produce any of the team members as a supporting witness. It is our conclusion that if the jury believed the testimony of Zaspel then the guilt of the defendant was established beyond reasonable doubt. We have already determined that they were free to accept this testimony, the corroboration being adequate. Defendant also questions whether the proof establishes that property of the value of more than $25 was actually stolen. This is an essential element of first-degree grand larceny. In this connection Richard Rice who was in charge of the Eagles Club on the night in question testified that $90 was missing, a figure at which he arrived by adding to the change on hand in the early part of the evening the receipts as recorded in the usual course of business and deducting from the total the amounts paid out. While this type of evidence is not entirely satisfactory, it is sufficient when coupled with defendant's admission, as reported by the witness Brown, that the amount taken was $90. 2. We now consider the claims of defendant to the effect that he was denied a fair trial in violation of his constitutional rights. 2a. During direct examination by the county attorney of Ziegfried Zaspel, the following questions and answers were elicited: Q. How long have you known either of them? Take one at a time, if you will. A. John I knew, I met, rather, in prison in 1943 or 1944. Q. Where was that in prison? A. Stillwater prison. MR. GRUNDHOEFER: I object to the answers as not being responsive. THE COURT: Overruled. The answer may stand. Q. That was in what year? A. In 1943 or 1944. (Italics supplied.) Upon cross-examination by defendant's attorney, this question and answer appear: Q. You claim that you first met John Biehoffer, that is your story today, is that you first met John Biehoffer in about 1943 or 1944, is that right? A. Yes, that is right. Reference was made then to a prior and seemingly inconsistent statement with respect to which the witness was carefully cross-examined. Upon redirect examination, the following questions and answers appear: Q. You stated you first met the defendant in 1943 at Stillwater, is that right? A. Yes. Q. Between that time and approximately two or three years ago had you seen him at all? A. No, sir. Q. Is it correct to assume when you said you knew him two or three years you are referring to the time when you knew him best? A. That is right. The fact that defendant had previously been imprisoned in Stillwater was wholly irrelevant to the question of his guilt or innocence of the crime here involved. The authorities are reviewed in State v. Currie, 267 Minn. 294, 126 N.W. (2d) 389, where a new trial was granted because of the prejudice created in that case by questions which embodied a testimonial assertion that defendant had been previously arrested. It seems unnecessary to add anything to what was said in that opinion in order to make it clear that foresight and care must be expended to avoid this type of situation. The defendant is entitled to have the case against him fairly presented in accordance with the established rules. The public should not be burdened with the expense of retrials made necessary because of impropriety. In this particular case, we do not believe that reversible error has been made to appear. Zaspel's statement that he had met John in prison in 1943 or 1944 was not responsive to the question asked by the prosecuting attorney. Whatever harm was done occurred at that point and, at that time, there was neither objection nor motion to strike. The following question: Where was that in prison? should not have been asked, but the answer, Stillwater prison, was surely responsive to the question and objection was made at that point on that ground alone. Even so, a new trial might be justified because of the proceedings in this regard were it not for other circumstances in the case. The testimony of Zaspel that he had been on friendly terms with both Jay and John Biehoffer for some time prior to March 13, 1959, was not disputed by the brother, Jay, although he was called as a witness by the defendant and would have surely been in a position to deny the assertion if it was contested. A fairly close association between the two brothers is evident from all of the testimony. The fact that Zaspel had a felony record dating back to 1941 was developed both on direct and cross-examination as noted above, and the defendant himself developed the background of Jay as a felon when he was presented as a witness. It was stated and repeated in the record that the second felony conviction of Zaspel occurred in 1943 and, with this background, a statement by the witness Zaspel that he had first met defendant in that year would, without any amplification, carry with it an unfavorable inference. 2b. When the state called Charles Reiter, a crime investigator for the State Bureau of Criminal Apprehension, he testified as follows: Q.    When approximately was it first known by you that the defendant was wanted for an alleged break-in at the Eagles Club in Northfield? A. Well, he was suspected immediately on March 14th when Mr.  when the sheriff notified our office and came up to the office and talked to me about it. No attempt was made to show the basis for the suspicion, if there was a basis. The answer was not responsive to the question and the matter was not pursued. Experienced police officers should not make statements of this kind because in doing so they unnecessarily raise serious questions as to the fairness of the trial proceedings. In this case, reversible error is not made to appear, but in a different situation such a nonresponsive remark might have made a new trial necessary. 2c. Defendant was charged with grand larceny in the first degree in violation of Minn. St. 1961, § 622.05, and burglary in the third degree in violation of § 621.10. These are two separate and distinct crimes and the commission of one is not necessarily included in the commission of another. See, State v. Hackett, 47 Minn. 425, 50 N. W. 472. The defendant's attorney moved that the two offenses be separated for trial and that defendant first be tried on the charge of grand larceny in the first degree. Minn. St. 1961, § 621.12, then in force, provided: Every person who, having entered a building under such circumstances as to constitute burglary in any degree, shall commit any crime therein, shall be punished therefor as well as for burglary, and may be prosecuted for each crime separately. Defendant contends that the word may as it appears in the statute should be construed to mean must and to give the absolute right to separate trials. State v. Martineau, 257 Minn. 334, 101 N.W. (2d) 410, relied upon by defendant, does not support this claim. That decision holds merely that separate trials should be ordered when, to do otherwise, will be to cause a situation which by its nature will operate to the defendant's prejudice. We do not find that any evidence was introduced in this case of a prejudicial nature which would not have been admissible if the cases were tried separately. Our disposition of this contention is in accord with the weight of authority. 23 C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 931; Minn. Digest, Criminal Law, Key No. 620(1); Annotation, 59 A.L.R. (2d) 841. 2d. We now consider the claims of the defendant involving his alibi defense. The defense rested at 3:30 p.m. in the afternoon the day before the trial ended, and after a conference at the bench, the court announced a recess until 9:30 the following morning. In the morning the state announced that it had one rebuttal witness, namely, Salvatore Maniaci. The attorney representing the defendant at the trial objected on the ground that the defense had rested the day before. He argued that the state should have announced to the court and to the defense attorney that it would require a continuance until the following morning for the purpose of calling a rebuttal witness. In the meantime, the defense had released Caruso. Complaint is made that the court did not grant the defendant a continuance for the purpose of making arrangements to call the witness, Joseph Caruso, to rebut the state's rebuttal witness, Salvatore Maniaci. The following statement by defense counsel appears in the record:    May the record show that yesterday afternoon the defense rested at approximately three-thirty in the afternoon with the testimony of Joseph Caruso, that at that time the state should have presented any rebuttal testimony that may be introduced in this matter. Mr. Caruso yesterday was under doctor's orders, had been transported to Faribault for trial from St. Paul, that it is anticipated that the testimony of this witness will rebut the testimony or attempt to rebut the testimony of Mr. Caruso. The state, we feel, was under obligation to produce its witnesses yesterday afternoon when Mr. Caruso was present. I have been informed by Mr. Caruso's doctor that he cannot be present for testimony this afternoon or this morning. Therefore, the defense has no opportunity to rebut the testimony  the anticipated testimony of this witness. The prosecution, we contend, was aware that Mr. Caruso would testify and had ample opportunity and investigative forces at its disposal to have available for rebuttal any witnesses that may be necessary to rebut Mr. Caruso's testimony. The defense is greatly prejudiced at this time by any introduction of evidence by the present witness because we are unable to produce Mr. Caruso.