Opinion ID: 2453310
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: risk of erroneous deprivation and probable value of additional safeguards

Text: ¶ 44 E.S. argues that children facing initial truancy hearings do not have the knowledge or sophistication to adequately protect their rights and that a lawyer is necessary for them to meaningfully be heard. We have recognized that children are often vulnerable, powerless, and voiceless. In re Parentage of L.B., 155 Wash.2d 679, 712 n. 29, 122 P.3d 161 (2005). Minors generally lack the experience, judgment, knowledge, and resources to effectively assert their rights. DeYoung v. Providence Med. Ctr., 136 Wash.2d 136, 146, 960 P.2d 919 (1998). In other contexts, this State has recognized the limited ability of children to act and reason to the same degree as adults. See ch. 26.28 RCW (establishing age of majority at 18 when persons may independently enter into contracts, vote, or sue in court to the same extent as adults, etc.). A child does not enjoy the full panoply of rights that adults have under the law precisely because, unlike adults, they are generally less capable of fully understanding the consequences of their actions. See RCW 9A.04.050 (children between ages 8 and 12 presumed incapable of committing a crime). The risk that children will be placed at a disadvantage in legal proceedings is as real in the truancy context as it is in many other civil contexts in which they are provided counsel. See RCW 13.34.100(6) (counsel appointed for children in dependency cases); RCW 13.32A.192(1)(c) (counsel must be appointed for children in at-risk youth petitions); RCW 13.32A.160(1)(c) (counsel must be appointed for children in need of services). Without the benefit of legal counsel, a child's ability to assert her rights is severely limited and the risk of error is high. ¶ 45 The majority says that issues that are before the court at the initial hearing on a truancy petition are uncomplicated and straightforward. Majority at 577. To prove its point, the majority turns once again to the facts of the case, observing that the record shows that E.S. was able to explain to the juvenile court why she missed school. Id. But the reasons behind a child's continued absences from school are often complicated. It is unlikely that children will be able to understand the school's statutory duties to provide services, or be able to explain the complex social, economic, or family issues that may be underlying factors in the absences. In the formal setting of a courtroom, children might well find these issues complicated and have difficulty understanding and protecting their rights without the assistance of counsel. A lawyer can ensure that services are properly provided and help the court help the child reengage in school. Further, even assuming that E.S.'s explanation was as cogent and accurate as the majority asserts, the reliance yet again on specific facts of a moot case is entirely misplaced. Many children will not be in a position to explain themselves as well as E.S., and the fact that this particular child was able to explain her particular situation in this particular case is simply not a valid basis for a blanket denial of counsel to all children in all initial truancy hearings. ¶ 46 In addition, while the majority is correct that children must be appointed counsel when the school district has actually filed for contempt, the ability of a lawyer to effectively argue for their client at this point is severely limited. Once an initial decision to place a child under the jurisdiction of the court has been made, that decision cannot be collaterally attacked at a contempt hearing. See In re J.R.H., 83 Wash.App. 613, 616, 922 P.2d 206 (1996) (court order cannot be collaterally attacked in contempt proceedings as contempt judgment will stand even if order violated was erroneous or later ruled invalid). In other words, counsel cannot argue that the underlying order giving rise to sanctions against the child should not have been entered in the first place. ¶ 47 Although certain conditions must be met before a school district may file a petition for truancy, without appointed counsel children will be less able to ensure that the school district met its burden. A school district must not only prove that the child has been absent the requisite number of days before filing a petition, it must also prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the steps taken by the school district to address the absences have been unsuccessful, and that court intervention and supervision are necessary to assist the parents and the school district to reduce or eliminate the child's absences. RCW 28A.225.035(1)(a)-(c). In this case, counsel for E.S. could have argued at the initial hearing that the Bellevue School District (District) had not taken adequate steps to assist E.S. in returning to school. E.S. contends that the District should have communicated with her mother, Velma Serdar, in her native language rather than in English. She also argues that the District should have met with E.S. and Ms. Serdar on more than one occasion, and that E.S. should have been referred to a community truancy board or truancy workshop program before a court order was put in place. [3] While the District may have been able to meet its burden even if adequately challenged, the nature of the rights involved and the risk of erroneous deprivation demand that children facing these proceedings have an effective advocate on their side. As the Court of Appeals stated: The statute requires that before the court's intervention may be invoked, there will be a meaningful exploration of, and attempt to address, the causes of child's truancy. Nothing in the present procedure ensures this will happen. The risk of error is therefore high. E.S., 148 Wash.App. at 219, 199 P.3d 1010. I agree.