Opinion ID: 855053
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Before and During Trial

Text: The right to self-representation is unqualified if invoked before the start of trial. U.S. ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1965). This right derives not from statute but from the United States Constitution. Id. at 15; see also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (holding that under the Sixth Amendment, the accused is guaranteed the right of electing to represent himself). A criminal defendant may proceed pro se if he “knowingly, voluntarily, and unequivocally” waives his right to appointed counsel. Williams v. Bartlett, 44 F.3d 95, 99 (2d Cir. 1994). At the time of Rahman’s arrest, Assistant Federal Defender Martin Cohen was assigned to represent Rahman. During Rahman’s arraignment on May 5, 2009, Rahman asked the court to replace Cohen with other counsel. The court appointed CJA counsel, Kafahni Nkrumah. One week later, on May 12, 2009, Rahman wrote a letter to the court asking that Atty. Nkrumah be replaced because “[he] need[ed] someone older with experience.” During the May 19, 2009 bail hearing, the district court urged Rahman to give Atty. Nkrumah “a chance” and declined to act on Rahman’s request at that time. On May 28, 2009, Rahman sent a letter to the court stating that Nkrumah’s performance was inadequate and moved to proceed pro se. 3 The district court held a conference and, at the suggestion of Atty. Nkrumah, ordered a competency evaluation of Rahman. On July 20, 2009, Atty. Nkrumah filed a motion to withdraw as counsel and asked the court to appoint new counsel in his place. On July 30, 2009, the district court held a hearing to discuss the status of Rahman’s case. During the hearing, the district court granted Atty. Nkrumah’s motion, held that Rahman was competent, appointed Charles Hochbaum to represent Rahman, and cautioned Rahman that Atty. Hochbaum would be his last court-appointed lawyer. Rahman did not object to the appointment of Hochbaum nor did he reassert his desire to proceed pro se. On appeal, Rahman argues that the district court erred when it failed to consider his request to proceed pro se and instead appointed substitute counsel. Under the circumstances presented we are not persuaded that Rahman’s request was unequivocal. Although clearly styled as a motion for self-representation, Rahman’s letter in support of the motion reiterated the same concerns he expressed in his motion to replace Atty. Nkrumah, i.e., Rahman’s dissatisfaction with the outcome of the bail hearing and his belief that Atty. Nkrumah lacked the experience necessary to represent Rahman. Those concerns were further shared with the psychologist evaluating Rahman, to whom Rahman expressed the view that his first preference was for new counsel rather than proceeding pro se. We recognize that generally “a defendant is not deemed to have equivocated in his desire for self-representation merely because he expresses that view in the alternative, simultaneously requests the appointment of new counsel, or used it as a threat to obtain private counsel,” Williams, 44 F.3d at 100. Here, however, Rahman’s prior and unresolved motion for new counsel, coupled with his repeated complaints about Atty. Nkrumah and his expressed wish for substitute counsel, evinced a desire 4 not to represent himself but instead to have the district court appoint new counsel. Compare Wilson v. Walker, 204 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 2000) (defendant’s repeated requests to proceed pro se, notwithstanding the appointment of new counsel, indicated a clear desire to invoke the right to self-representation); see also LaValle v. Artus, 403 Fed. Appx. 607, 609 (2d Cir. 2010) (summary order) (request to proceed pro se at trial was not unequivocal where defendant expressed dissatisfaction with current counsel’s trial strategy, stated that he wished to remain represented by counsel, and that self-representation was his “last option.”). Even if Rahman’s request to represent himself was sincere and unequivocal at the time made, his subsequent statements to the evaluator and his acceptance, without objection, of Atty. Hochbaum as trial counsel indicated that he was vacillating on the issue or had abandoned his request altogether. Wilson, 204 F.3d at 37; see also Williams, 44 F.3d at 99–100 (citing Brown v. Wainwright, 665 F.2d 607, 611 (5th Cir. 1982) (waiver when, after initial request to proceed pro se, defendant asked counsel to continue representation and then, once again, requested to proceed pro se on the third day of trial)); United States v. Bennett, 539 F.2d 45 (10th Cir. 1976). Accordingly, on this record we conclude that Rahman’s request was not clear and unequivocal and therefore the district court did not err in granting Rahman’s May 12, 2009 motion to replace Atty. Nkrumah. See United States v. Purnett, 910 F.2d 51, 55 (2d Cir. 1990) (“‘[C]ourts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver’ of fundamental constitutional rights[.]”) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)); see also United States v. Frazier-El, 204 F.3d 553, 559 (4th Cir. 2000) (“[W]e must ascribe a constitutional primacy to the right to counsel because this right serves both the individual and collective good, as opposed to only the individual interests served by protecting the right of self-representation.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 5