Opinion ID: 1677390
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Continuance Issue

Text: Boros argues that the trial court improperly refused to grant him a continuance on the day of trial. Boros asserts that he was mentally and physically exhausted from preparing his own case and otherwise acting as his own counsel. He argues that the trial judge abused his discretion in refusing to continue the case. Generally, parties acting pro se should be treated as parties represented by counsel are treated. See, Cofield v. McDonald's Corp., 514 So.2d 953 (Ala.1987); Hines v. City of Mobile, 480 So.2d 1203 (Ala.1985); Hubbard v. Montgomery, 372 So.2d 315 (Ala.1979); and Lockett v. A.L. Sandlin Lumber Co., 588 So.2d 889 (Ala. Civ.App.1991). In particular, pro se litigants must comply with legal procedure and court rules. Lockett, 588 So.2d at 890. Furthermore, continuances are not favored and ... a trial court's denial of a motion for continuance will be upset only when a palpable or gross abuse of discretion has been shown. Scullin v. Cameron, 518 So.2d 695, 698 (Ala.1987). Here, we note that this case began in October 1985. After every judge in the Tenth Judicial Circuit (Jefferson County) recused himself, this Court appointed Judge Billy C. Burney to handle the case. According to the defendants, Judge Burney attempted three times to have the case tried. Ultimately, Judge Burney retired before the case was tried, and Judge Robert Parker was appointed to handle the matter. Judge Parker granted Boros a continuance on May 28, 1991, and set the case for trial on October 21, 1991. On that trial date, Boros requested the continuance at issue here. We find no abuse of discretion here. Boros had six years to prepare his case for trial. Further, the trial court was in a better position than is this Court to evaluate Boros's claims of mental and physical exhaustion and to rule on the motion for continuance.