Opinion ID: 212690
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Adult Entertainment References

Text: At trial, the Government elicited testimony from several witnesses about Crosgrove's interest in the adult entertainment industry, with the purpose of establishing his motive for participating in the conspiracy. The district court did not commit an abuse of discretion in admitting this evidence on the grounds that its probative value was not substantially out-weighed by its potential prejudicial effect. See United States v. Ashraf, 628 F.3d 813, 826 (6th Cir.2011) (scope of review). The Government argued that Crosgrove had two motives for joining and continuing in the conspiracy: improving his short-term financial situation and launching future adult entertainment ventures with Haukedahl. Haukedahl already owned some adult entertainment businesses and planned to expand this segment of his portfolio, and the Government contended that Crosgrove continued working with Haukedahl in the hopes of partnering with him in these endeavors. Crosgrove characterizes the adult entertainment references as improper character evidence repackaged as relevant to motive, and argues that the district court erred in allowing any references to adult entertainment at trial. Although Federal Rule of Evidence 404 generally prohibits the use of past crimes, wrongs, or acts to show action in conformity therewith, the rule allows the use of such evidence to show a defendant's motive. Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). Crosgrove contends, however, that motive is not an element of the crimes charged, suggesting that evidence of motive is therefore irrelevant. But the fact that motive is not an element of either of the crimes for which Crosgrove was charged does not make evidence of motive irrelevant. Motive is not an element of most crimes, but the state is usually entitled to prove motive because motive explains the reason for an act and can be important to a required state of mind. 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 992. Crosgrove next argues that even if evidence of motive was relevant, there was other evidence that would not have the same prejudicial effect, making the adult entertainment references merely cumulative. Crosgrove identifies Ritson's testimony that Crosgrove was barely getting by in his solo DUI practice as the other evidence of financial motive that obviated any need for the adult entertainment references. But the testimony about Crosgrove's financial straits at the time he joined the scheme did not serve the same purpose as the adult entertainment testimony, because the larger potential revenues that could come from the prospective ventures is relevant to Crosgrove's motive for continuing in the conspiracy despite mounting evidence of its illegality. Therefore, the evidence relating to Crosgrove's interest in the adult entertainment industry was not merely cumulative. Although the adult entertainment evidence may have had some prejudicial effect, that effect would have to substantially outweigh the evidence's probative value before exclusion would be appropriate. Fed.R.Evid. 403. Here, because the financial prospects of working with Haukedahl are very probative of motive, the prejudicial effect would have to be great to justify exclusion. See United States v. Cody, 498 F.3d 582, 590-91 (6th Cir.2007). In Cody, this court upheld the admission of testimony about the defendant's cocaine use because his drug addiction and related debts revealed his motive for committing bank robbery. Cocaine use, as opposed to running adult entertainment businesses, is clearly illegal. [2] Nonetheless, because the drug use was inextricably intertwined with the crime at issue, the evidence was admitted. Id. at 591. This court has also affirmed a trial court's admission of evidence of a defendant's interest in adult entertainment as proof of motive. United States v. Murray, 152 Fed.Appx. 492, 494-95 (6th Cir.2005). In Murray, the Government was allowed to present evidence of the defendant's lavish lifestyle, including the fact that he frequented strip clubs, to show that he had a motive to continue committing bank fraud to support his spending. Id. Murray, like Crosgrove, argued that this evidence was both unfairly prejudicial and cumulative. Id. This court rejected both arguments. Id. at 495. It is also worth noting that the trial court took steps to minimize the prejudicial effect of the adult entertainment references. See United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 676, 678-80 (6th Cir.1996). At jury selection, the district court asked potential jurors whether they would have any problem with the fact that the defendant may have had some involvement or interest in the adult entertainment industry. Further, during jury instructions, the district court reminded the jurors that testimony about Crosgrove's interest in pornography was to be considered only as it relates to the government's claim of defendant's motive and opportunity to join and remain in the conspiracy. Because the evidence of Crosgrove's interest in the adult entertainment business is highly relevant to motive, and because its harmful effects do not substantially outweigh its probative value, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence.