Opinion ID: 186802
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The 2005 Orders Lack Reasoned Decisionmaking

Text: 36 The problem with FERC's incomplete information rationale is that it is not supported by any reasoned analysis in the orders themselves. Although we suspect that the orders may reflect an unstated endorsement of the two principles discussed above, we have no good basis upon which to rest this supposition. Arbitrary and capricious review strictly prohibits us from upholding agency action based only on our best guess as to what reasoning truly motivated it. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. FERC, 448 F.3d 382, 387 (D.C.Cir.2006) (It will not do for a court to be compelled to guess at the theory underlying the agency's action; nor can a court be expected to chisel that which must be precise from what the agency has left vague and indecisive. (quoting SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196-97, 67 S.Ct. 1575, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947))); PDK Labs. Inc. v. DEA, 362 F.3d 786, 798 (D.C.Cir.2004) ([I]t is important to remember that if we find that an agency's stated rationale for its decision is erroneous, we cannot sustain its action on some other basis the agency did not mention.); AT & T Corp. v. FCC, 236 F.3d 729, 734-35 (D.C.Cir.2001) ([W]e may not supply a reasoned basis for the agency's action that the agency itself has not given. (quoting State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856)). 37 In order to rely on the two principles, FERC had to acknowledge the need to reconsider its precedent, announce its definitive adoption of the principles, and explain their impact on the existing primary function test. If FERC intended to adopt a new policy specifying that the classification of the downstream facility must yield where the principles demand corrective action, FERC was obliged to explain that extension of its case law as well. See PG & E Gas, 315 F.3d at 390 (FERC has given no explanation whatsoever for this apparent shift in Commission policy. FERC's failure to come to terms with its own precedent reflects the absence of a reasoned decisionmaking process.); Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FERC, 234 F.3d 36, 41 (D.C.Cir.2000) (A passing reference . . . is not sufficient to satisfy the Commission's obligation to carry out reasoned and principled decisionmaking. We have repeatedly required the Commission to fully articulate the basis for its decision.) (internal quotation marks omitted). But instead of openly acknowledging its intention to reverse course to bring order to its case law, FERC attempted to gloss[] over its prior holding in Sea Robin II Rehearing Order and its position in ExxonMobil, and, in so doing, cross[ed] the line from the tolerably terse to the intolerably mute. PG & E Gas, 315 F.3d at 390 (internal quotation marks omitted). 38 In its briefs, FERC attempts to make the required showing, explaining that the Commission reversed the Transco lateral's classification in order to eliminate a fundamental inconsistency in its case law. Respondent's Br. at 3, 13. But counsel's explanation to this court cannot substitute for reasoned decisionmaking at the agency level.  Kansas City, 923 F.2d at 192; see Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 145 (D.C.Cir.2005) ([The agency] — not its counsel and not this court — is charged by the Congress with bringing its expertise and its best judgment to bear upon [an issue of policy].); Village of Bensenville v. FAA, 376 F.3d 1114, 1121 (D.C.Cir.2004) (We do not ordinarily consider agency reasoning that `appears nowhere in the [agency's] order.' (quoting PanAmSat Corp. v. FCC, 198 F.3d 890, 897 (D.C.Cir.1999))). Since we conclude that FERC neither explained how the incomplete information finding fit within its muddled case law nor rehabilitated that morass by clearly charting a new course, we find that the rationale cannot support the 2005 orders. 39 This conclusion is dispositive. Although FERC rested its decision on both the incomplete information rationale and its finding that no gas is collected along either the Jupiter pipeline or the Transco lateral, it did so without according the two conclusions individual weight. [W]hen an agency relies on multiple grounds for its decision, some of which are invalid, we may only sustain the decision [where] one is valid and the agency would clearly have acted on that ground even if the other were unavailable. Casino Airlines, Inc. v. Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., 439 F.3d 715, 717-18 (D.C.Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Int'l Union, United Mine Workers v. Dep't of Labor, 358 F.3d 40, 44-45 (D.C.Cir.2004) (finding that an agency failed to provide an adequate explanation for its decision where [t]wo of the three reasons it gave . . . would not support its decision, and the court did not know — nor [was it] free to guess — what the agency would have done had it realized that it could not justify its decision [based on the two invalid grounds]). Here, the 2005 orders do not reveal whether FERC would have reclassified the Transco lateral on the basis of its lack of gas collection finding alone. See Recording of Oral Argument at 24:33 (admitting that the 2005 orders do not indicate the relative weight accorded to the two bases). The assurance of FERC's counsel, see id. at 25:03 (urging the court to uphold the decision based on the lack of gas collection rationale alone), does not provide an acceptable substitute. Allegheny Power v. FERC, 437 F.3d 1215, 1226 (D.C.Cir.2006) (refusing to consider counsel's clarification of a standard where counsel ha[d] pointed to nothing said by FERC itself establishing such a concept); KeySpan-Ravenswood, LLC v. FERC, 348 F.3d 1053, 1059 (D.C.Cir.2003) ([P]ost hoc salvage operations of counsel cannot overcome the inadequacy of the Commission's explanation.) (internal quotation marks omitted). We thus need not inquire into the validity of FERC's lack of gas collection rationale. See Petitioners' Br. at 19-25 (arguing that FERC's lack of gas collection justification is inconsistent with FERC precedent); Respondent's Br. at 15-19 (contending that the lack of gas collection rationale is consistent with precedent); Intervenors' Br. at 11-13 (same). Because FERC rested its determination, at least in part, on its infirm incomplete information ground, we must find the 2005 orders devoid of reasoned decisionmaking and set them aside as arbitrary and capricious.