Opinion ID: 2599897
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: A Batson Challenge Must be Raised Before the Jury is Sworn to be Timely Under Utah Law

Text: ¶ 22 In ruling that Valdez's Batson challenge was timely under rule 18(c)(2), the court of appeals relied heavily on its decision in Harrison. See State v. Valdez, 2004 UT App 214, ¶¶ 9-10, 95 P.3d 291 (citing State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 775-76 (Utah Ct. App.1991)). In Harrison, the Utah Court of Appeals considered the timeliness of a Batson challenge raised immediately after the jury was sworn but before the venire was dismissed. 805 P.2d at 776. Although the parties did not brief or argue the applicability of rule 18, the court determined sua sponte that rule 18(c)(2) governs the timeliness of a Batson objection in Utah. [13] Id. The relevant language of that rule, which has not changed since Harrison was decided, provides as follows: A challenge to an individual juror may be either peremptory or for cause. A challenge to an individual juror may be made only before the jury is sworn to try the action, except the court may, for good cause, permit it to be made after the juror is sworn but before any of the evidence is presented. Utah R.Crim. P. 18(c)(2). Thus, in Harrison, the court of appeals held that a Batson challenge is timely under rule 18(c)(2) even when it is raised after the jury is sworn if the trial court finds good cause to permit it. 805 P.2d at 776. The court of appeals also held that a trial court implicitly finds good cause under rule 18(c)(2) by allowing counsel to proceed with their [ Batson ] arguments. Id. ¶ 23 In Valdez, the Utah Court of Appeals dramatically expanded the scope of Harrison by ruling that a district court may consider a defendant's Batson challenge beyond the dismissal of the venire. [14] Valdez, 2004 UT App 214, ¶ 10, 95 P.3d 291 (emphasis added). Relying on Harrison, the court of appeals stated, So long as it `allows counsel to proceed with their [ Batson ] arguments,' the district court impliedly finds good cause under rule 18 to consider the constitutional claim. Id. (quoting Harrison, 805 P.2d at 776) (alterations in original). Because the district court requested that the State respond to Valdez's Batson challenge despite the State's timeliness objection, the court of appeals held that the district court had impliedly found good cause to allow the Batson challenge under rule 18(c)(2). Id. ¶ 24 The court of appeals erred as a matter of law in holding that Valdez's Batson challenge was timely under rule 18(c)(2) because rule 18(c)(2) is inapplicable on its face to Batson challenges. By its terms, rule 18(c)(2) provides procedural guidelines for a litigant's peremptory or for cause challenge to an individual juror. Utah R.Crim. P. 18(c)(2) (emphasis added). In other words, rule 18(c)(2) provides a time-frame in which a litigant may choose to exercise a peremptory or for cause challenge to remove an individual juror from the venire. Id. Under rule 18(c)(2), a litigant who wishes to remove a juror with either a peremptory or for cause challenge may only do so before the jury is sworn unless the trial court finds good cause to allow a challenge afterward. Id. In any event, a litigant may not remove a juror with a peremptory or for cause challenge once evidence has been presented. Id. ¶ 25 The procedural framework contained in rule 18(c)(2) does not govern Batson challenges. A peremptory challenge is a common law procedural device designed to assist litigants in selecting an impartial jury. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 620, 111 S.Ct. 2077, 114 L.Ed.2d 660 (1991). In contrast, a Batson challenge is not itself a peremptory challenge, but rather an objection to an opposing litigant's improper use of peremptory challenges. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) (noting that the Batson test is designed to prevent the use of peremptory challenges to purposefully discriminate in the empaneling of the petit jury). A litigant who raises a Batson challenge is objecting that the jury was improperly constituted due to an equal protection violation. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 414, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991); see also Batson, 476 U.S. at 85-86, 106 S.Ct. 1712 ([T]he defendant [has] the right to be tried by a jury whose members are selected pursuant to non-discriminatory criteria.). In other words, a Batson challenge amounts to a statement that the opposing litigant's use of peremptory challenges violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and as a result the empaneled jury is improperly composed. See, e.g., Powers, 499 U.S. at 412-13, 111 S.Ct. 1364 (noting that a Batson challenge is a challenge to the composition of the trier of fact); Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 420 n. 5, 111 S.Ct. 850, 112 L.Ed.2d 935 (1991) (noting that a Batson challenge is an objection to the selection of an objecting defendant's own jury). Rule 18(c)(2) has no applicability to an objection made to the composition of the empaneled jury, and thus does not govern Batson challenges. Therefore, the Utah Court of Appeals erred in relying on it as the standard for determining whether a Batson objection is timely under Utah law. [15] ¶ 26 The court of appeals also erred as a matter of law in its determination that a rule that would prohibit Batson challenges after the venire has been dismissed and the jury has been sworn, [is] not ... a `firmly established and regularly followed state [procedure].' Valdez, 2004 UT App 214, ¶ 11, 95 P.3d 291 (quoting Ford, 498 U.S. at 423, 111 S.Ct. 850) (alteration in original). According to the court of appeals, At best, this rule could be gleaned by analogy and implication from Harrison and rule 18[ (c)(2)]. Id. As discussed above, rule 18(c)(2) is inapplicable in any event. Furthermore, a survey of Utah law indicates that it is a well established principle that Batson challenges must be raised both before the jury is sworn and before the remainder of the venire is dismissed in order to be deemed timely. ¶ 27 In State v. Bankhead, 727 P.2d 216 (Utah 1986), a case decided by this court prior to Batson, we considered the timeliness of a challenge to the composition of the jury. The defendant, who was African American, argued that her constitutional rights had been violated because the jury selected to try her case did not include any members of her race. Id. at 217. She moved to quash the jury panel, but not until all of the evidence had already been admitted. Id. Citing section 78-46-16(1) of the Utah Code, we held that the defendant's objection was waived because any challenge to the jury must be lodged before the jury is sworn. Bankhead, 727 P.2d at 217 (emphasis added). We also cited the United States Supreme Court's decision in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 95 S.Ct. 692, 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975), noting that under Taylor a litigant does not have a Sixth Amendment right to a jury that is a perfect cross section of the community but is entitled to a jury selected from a venire that represents a cross section of the community. Bankhead, 727 P.2d at 217 (citing Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538, 95 S.Ct. 692). ¶ 28 Taylor is generally representative of the Supreme Court's pre- Batson jurisprudence regarding the composition of juries, which was concerned largely with discrimination during selection of the venire. Batson, 476 U.S. at 88, 106 S.Ct. 1712. This trend began with Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 25 L.Ed. 664 (1880) where the Court held that it is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause to exclude members of the defendant's race from the jury venire solely on account of race. Id. at 307-09. Over time, Strauder came to stand for the principle that under the Equal Protection Clause the jury venire must be selected pursuant to nondiscriminatory criteria, see Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316, 319-21, 26 S.Ct. 338, 50 L.Ed. 497 (1906), and must be representatively drawn from the community, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968). However, the Court consistently held that the Equal Protection Clause does not guarantee a litigant a jury of a certain composition. See Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403, 65 S.Ct. 1276, 89 L.Ed. 1692 (1945). In Taylor, the Court applied these same rules under the Sixth Amendment, holding that although the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee that a petit jury will mirror the community, it does guarantee that the petit jury will be selected from a venire that is representative of the community. 419 U.S. at 538, 95 S.Ct. 692. ¶ 29 In Batson, the Court extended the principles established in its previous cases regarding the composition of the venire to the composition of the petit jury. [16] 476 U.S. at 88, 106 S.Ct. 1712. The Court noted that the Fourteenth Amendment principles that prevented purposeful discrimination in the selection of the jury venire were indistinguishable from the principles animating concern over purposeful discrimination in the selection of the petit jury. See id. ([T]he State may not draw up its jury lists pursuant to neutral procedures but then resort to discrimination at `other stages in the selection process.' (citations omitted)). Thus, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence regarding the selection of the venire and its jurisprudence regarding the selection of the petit jury are complementary. ¶ 30 The relationship in Utah law between challenges to the venire and challenges to the petit jury is also complementary, particularly with regard to procedural rules. Beginning with Bankhead, this court has consistently held that challenges to the jury, both to the composition of the venire and the composition of the petit jury, must be raised before the jury is sworn or they are untimely. In Bankhead, we relied on the procedural guidelines contained in the Jury and Witness Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-46-1 to -41 (1953), in holding that the defendant's objection to the composition of her petit jury was untimely. Bankhead, 727 P.2d at 217. Two portions of that Act are relevant to our discussion. First, section 78-46-3 states, A citizen shall not be excluded or exempt from jury service on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, occupation, disability, or economic status. Utah Code Ann. § 78-46-3 (2002). Second, section 78-46-16 provides that a party seeking relief based on a failure to comply with this act in selecting a ... trial jury must move for relief  before the trial jury is sworn. Id. § 78-46-16(1) (2002) (emphasis added). That section also states that this procedure is the exclusive means by which a [litigant]... may challenge a jury on the ground that the jury was not selected in conformity with this act. Id. § 78-46-16(3) (emphasis added). ¶ 31 We note that the Jury and Witness Act purports to impose procedural rules on Utah's courts and therefore may be in tension with article VIII, section 4 of the Utah Constitution. As we recently noted in Burns v. Boyden, 2006 UT 14, 133 P.3d 370, this provision of the Utah Constitution vests the Utah Supreme Court with the authority to adopt rules of procedure to be used in Utah's courts, id. ¶ 15 n. 3, 133 P.3d 370 (quoting Utah Const. art. VIII, § 4), and the legislature with power to alter the procedural rules adopted by this court upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the Legislature, Utah Const. art. VIII, § 4. However, the status of the procedural rules contained within the Jury and Witness Act is not before us. In addition, this court has previously stated on one occasion that the Act does not govern constitutional challenges to the jury selection process. [17] State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 574 n. 115 (1987). Accordingly, the procedural rules contained within the Act could not conflict with any procedural rules relevant to our determination of this case, nor do they. A careful review of our case law demonstrates that the timeliness standards applied by this court to constitutional challenges to the jury selection process, including Batson challenges, continued to mirror those contained in section 78-46-16 following our decision in Tillman. [18] ¶ 32 In State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591 (Utah 1988), the first case decided by this court under the Batson framework, the timeliness of the defendant's Batson challenge was not at issue because the defendant had moved to quash the entire jury panel on fair cross-section grounds before the prosecution's peremptory challenges were even exercised, and he apparently renewed the objection immediately after the prosecution exercised a peremptory strike to remove a minority jury member. Id. at 592-93, 596. ¶ 33 However, in Redd v. Negley, 785 P.2d 1098 (Utah 1989), the timeliness of a challenge to the composition of the jury was squarely before the court. There, the plaintiff apparently raised the issue of the composition of the selected jury off the record before the jury was sworn. Id. at 1099. After the jury was sworn and dismissed for lunch, the plaintiff made a vague objection on the record regarding the number of minority jurors on the petit jury. Id. at 1099-1100. The trial court denied the plaintiff's objection under section 78-46-16, ruling that the objection had not been raised before the jury was sworn. Id. at 1100. On appeal, this court disagreed as to the proper way to view the plaintiff's vague objection. The majority believed the plaintiff's objection amounted only to an objection that there was not a proportionate number of minority jurors on the petit jury. Id. at 1100-01. In contrast, the dissent stated that the plaintiff's objection could also be characterized as an objection to the composition of the jury venire or to the defense's use of peremptory challenges to remove the only two minority members from the selected panelin other words, a Batson challenge. Id. at 1103-04 (Durham, J., dissenting). However, the court drew no distinction between these characterizations in its treatment of the plaintiff's objection. Rather, the court noted that the record indicated that plaintiff objected to the jury selection prior to the swearing of the jury and that the jury was passed for cause only with the reservation that plaintiff's challenge could be later made. [19] Id. at 1100. The court held that because the challenge was raised before the jury was sworn in, the trial court had erred in denying the challenge on timeliness grounds, citing both section 78-46-16 and Bankhead. Id. ¶ 34 In State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329 (Utah 1991), this court again addressed the timeliness of a Batson challenge. There, the defendant alleged that the prosecutor had used a racially motivated peremptory challenge to remove the only minority juror from the jury venire. Id. at 336. The defendant raised his Batson challenge by moving to quash the jury panel before the jury was sworn. Id. The trial court allowed the prosecutor to explain the reasons for the peremptory challenge, then denied the motion on timeliness grounds. Id. at 336-37. On appeal, the State conceded that the trial court had erred in denying the Batson challenge on timeliness grounds. Id. at 337. This court agreed, noting that the defendant's Batson challenge had been raised immediately after the peremptory challenges were completed and before the jury was sworn. Id. The court also cited section 78-46-16 and Bankhead in support of the position that the motion had been timely made. Id. ¶ 35 In all of this court's decisions since Span, we have never deviated from the rule that a challenge to the composition of the jury must be raised before the jury is sworn in. See State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 338 (1993) (defendant objected to composition of the jury on fair cross section grounds before the jury was sworn in); State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450, 456 (Utah 1994) (defendant raised Batson challenge [p]rior to the swearing of the jury); State v. Higginbotham, 917 P.2d 545, 546 (Utah 1996) ( Batson challenge raised as soon as prosecutor used peremptory challenge to remove only minority juror from panel of prospective jurors); State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, ¶ 14, 994 P.2d 177 ( Batson challenge raised as soon as prosecutor used peremptory challenge to remove only African American juror from panel of prospective jurors). Even the Utah Court of Appeals' decision in Salt Lake County v. Carlston, 776 P.2d 653 (Utah Ct.App.1989), which properly cited Bankhead, followed this rule, see id. at 656 n. 5. The sole aberration prior to the court of appeals' decision in this case is Harrison, in which the court of appeals erroneously applied rule 18(c)(2) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure to Batson challenges. Harrison, 805 P.2d at 775-76. However, our decision in Span, which followed Harrison, clearly indicates that this court continued to rely on the standard established in Bankhead. Span, 819 P.2d at 337. It has therefore long been the law in Utah that constitutional challenges to the composition of the jury  both the venire and to the selected jury  must be raised before the jury is sworn. ¶ 36 Our decision is bolstered by the fact that the only rule of criminal procedure that applies to the composition of juries requires that a challenge be brought before the jury is sworn. In contrast with rule 18(c)(2), which does not apply to challenges to the jury as a panel, rule 18(c)(1) governs challenges to [t]he panel . . . of jurors called to serve at a particular court or for the trial of a particular action. Utah R.Crim. P. 18(c)(1). Under this rule, a party may challenge the panel based on a material departure from the procedure prescribed with respect to the selection drawing, summoning and return of the panel. Utah. R.Crim. P. 18(c)(1)(i). In other words, this rule governs challenges to the composition of the entire venire. Under this rule, all challenges to the jury panel must be taken before the jury is sworn. Utah R.Crim. P. 18(c)(1)(ii) (emphasis added). As discussed above, supra ¶¶ 28-29, Batson challenges are based on Fourteenth Amendment concerns identical to those implicated by discrimination in the selection of the entire venire. Batson, 476 U.S. at 88, 106 S.Ct. 1712. Moreover, Utah procedural law does not distinguish between challenges to the venire and challenges to the petit jury. Therefore, while rule 18(c)(1) does not explicitly apply to Batson challenges, which are challenges to the composition of the selected jury, it contains the same timeliness rule that applies to Batson challenges. We also note that the annotations for rule 18 cross-reference the Jury and Witness Act, which we have relied on for our Batson timeliness standards. Utah R.Crim. P. 18 cross references. ¶ 37 We agree with the court of appeals that Utah's procedural standards with respect to Batson challenges would best be addressed by an amendment to the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Valdez, 2004 UT App 214, ¶ 11 n. 1, 95 P.3d 291. The Rules of Criminal Procedure should clearly reflect our case law with respect to this important procedural requirement, and we will request the assistance of our Advisory Committee in drafting such a rule. It is nonetheless clear under Utah law that a constitutional challenge to the jury selection process  whether it be to the entire venire or to the jury selected to try the case  must be brought before the jury is sworn. This rule has long been a firmly established and regularly followed state practice in Utah, as required by Ford. 498 U.S. at 423, 111 S.Ct. 850 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, we hold that Valdez's Batson challenge, which was not brought until after the jury was sworn, was untimely. ¶ 38 While our holding is dispositive of this case, it does not end our analysis. We hold that a Batson challenge must be raised not only before the jury is sworn, but also before the remainder of the venire is dismissed in order to be deemed timely under Utah law. While we believe that the second part of this rule is established state law, even if it is not firmly established and regularly followed, id., we hold that it is a procedural requisite to a Batson challenge from this point forward. [20] We first address the origins of this rule in Utah law, and then the justifications for it.