Opinion ID: 1036292
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Applicability of Neb. Const.

Text: art. VIII, § 4, to Excise Tax With the exception of Kiplinger, all of our cases applying the constitutional prohibition against the commutation of taxes have involved property taxation.21 In Kiplinger, we implicitly assumed that article VIII, § 4, applied to excise taxes, but we did not decide that issue, because it was not raised. We address it now as an issue of first impression. [7] Constitutional provisions are not open to construction as a matter of course; construction is appropriate only when it has been demonstrated that the meaning of the provision is not clear and that construction is necessary.22 It is true, as the Knox Countians argue, that the language of article VIII, § 4, does not expressly differentiate between various types of tax. But its prohibition of the release or discharge of a taxpayer’s “proportionate share of taxes” and the commutation of “such taxes” raises a legitimate question as to its scope.23 [8,9] It is a fundamental principle of constitutional interpretation that each and every clause within a constitution has been inserted for a useful purpose.24 In ascertaining the intent of a constitutional provision from its language, a court may not supply any supposed omission, or add words to or take words from the provision as framed.25 The language of article VIII, § 4, does not prohibit the release, discharge, or commutation of “taxes,” but, rather, a taxpayer’s “proportionate share” of taxes. 21 See, Sarpy Cty. Farm Bureau v. Learning Community, 283 Neb. 212, 808 N.W.2d 598 (2012); Swanson v. State, 249 Neb. 466, 544 N.W.2d 333 (1996); Jaksha v. State, 241 Neb. 106, 486 N.W.2d 858 (1992); Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. State Bd. of Equal., 237 Neb. 357, 466 N.W.2d 461 (1991); Peterson v. Hancock, 155 Neb. 801, 54 N.W.2d 85 (1952); Steinacher v. Swanson, 131 Neb. 439, 268 N.W. 317 (1936); Woodrough v. Douglas County, 7l Neb. 354, 98 N.W. 1092 (1904); State v. Graham, l7 Neb. 43, 22 N.W. 114 (1885). 22 State ex rel. Johnson v. Gale, 273 Neb. 889, 734 N.W.2d 290 (2007). 23 Neb. Const. art. VIII, § 4. 24 City of North Platte v. Tilgner, 282 Neb. 328, 803 N.W.2d 469 (2011); State ex rel. Lemon v. Gale, 272 Neb. 295, 721 N.W.2d 347 (2006). 25 Tilgner, supra note 24. Nebraska Advance Sheets BANKS v. HEINEMAN 399 Cite as 286 Neb. 390 That phrase, which we are not free to ignore or disregard, correlates with the requirement of Neb. Const. art. VIII, § 1, that taxes be levied by valuation uniformly and proportionally. We have held that this constitutional provision does not apply to an excise tax.26 When article VIII, § 4, was enacted in 1875, property taxes provided the sole means of funding state and local government in Nebraska. In Woodrough v. Douglas County,27 we noted that article VIII, § 4, was taken verbatim from a provision of the Constitution of Illinois which was adopted to address “[a]n evil [which] had grown up in that state which had commenced to break down the principles of uniformity and equality of taxation.” Article VIII, § 4, has been amended twice, in 1958 and 1966, and both amendments related to real property.28 [10,11] The Nebraska Constitution, as amended, must be read as a whole.29 Based on the semantic and historical linkage between the prohibition against commutation of a taxpayer’s “proportionate share” of taxes in article VIII, § 4, and the uniform and proportionate requirements of article VIII, § 1, we conclude that the scope of the two provisions is the same. We therefore hold that the constitutional prohibition against commutation of taxes set forth in article VIII, § 4, does not apply to an excise tax. To the extent that Kiplinger can be read to suggest otherwise, it is disapproved.