Opinion ID: 3135612
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Testimony at the Pretrial Hearing

Text: In another separate argument, Averett contends that he did not forfeit his challenge to the trial court’s deferral of its ruling by deciding not to testify at trial because he testified to the critical facts at a pretrial hearing on his motion to suppress evidence. He was subjected to cross-examination at the pretrial hearing. Thus, Averett argues the prejudice from the trial court’s error is not speculative. Rather, the record is sufficient to assess the harm from the trial court’s deferral of its ruling on his motion in limine. Despite Averett’s testimony at the pretrial hearing, the record is still insufficient to review the trial court’s error in deferring its ruling. Because Averett chose not to testify at trial, we do not know whether the trial court would have actually allowed impeachment with his prior convictions, whether the prosecutor would have decided to use those convictions as impeachment, or whether the State would have focused its arguments on the prior convictions. All of those factors are important in assessing whether the error was harmless. See Patrick, 233 Ill. 2d at 75-76 (considering the impact of impeachment with prior convictions and the prosecutor’s arguments based on those convictions in assessing whether error was harmless). We cannot speculate on the substance of the direct examination or the crossexamination at trial. Patrick, 233 Ill. 2d at 78-79, quoting Whitehead, 116 Ill. 2d at 443-44. Further, our reasoning for finding the deferral of a ruling unreviewable when a defendant decides not to testify is not limited to the failure to present a sufficient record for harmless error review. Our reasoning includes preventing a defendant from “hav[ing] it both ways” by altering trial strategy to make the best of the order and then, if the trial strategy proves unsuccessful, claiming on appeal that the order was erroneously entered. Patrick, 233 Ill. 2d at 79, quoting Whitehead, 116 Ill. 2d at 443-44. As we held in Patrick, a defendant must testify and obtain a definitive ruling on the motion in limine for the issue to be reviewable on appeal. Patrick, 233 Ill. 2d at 79. E. Article I, Section 12, of the Illinois Constitution Tucker also raises a separate contention that the failure to review his claim of error because he chose not to testify at trial violates article -14- I, section 12, of the Illinois Constitution. Tucker asserts he is entitled to a remedy for the trial court’s error under that constitutional provision. The Illinois Constitution provides that “[e]very person shall find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs which he receives to his person, privacy, property or reputation. He shall obtain justice by law, freely, completely, and promptly.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §12. This court has held article I, section 12, only expresses a philosophy, however, and does not require a certain remedy in any specific form. Schoeberlein v. Purdue University, 129 Ill. 2d 372, 379 (1989). Limiting or restricting available remedies does not violate this aspirational goal. Schoberlein, 129 Ill. 2d at 379. Based on this court’s interpretation of article I, section 12, as aspirational, we conclude that provision does not require a specific remedy for the trial court’s error in deferring its ruling on Tucker’s motion in limine. Tucker’s argument that he is entitled to a certain remedy under article I, section 12, of the Illinois Constitution therefore fails. F. Summary The defendants have not provided any valid basis for finding the trial court’s blanket deferral of its rulings reviewable on appeal despite their decision not to testify. We conclude that our decision in the Phillips portion of Patrick controls here. In Tucker and Averett, the trial courts employed a blanket policy of deferring rulings on motions in limine until after the defendant testified. The use of the blanket policy was an abuse of discretion. See Patrick, 233 Ill. 2d at 74-75. In Phillips’ case, the trial judge did not use a blanket policy, but he nonetheless abused his discretion in failing to timely rule on the admissibility of three of the defendant’s prior convictions for impeachment purposes. Patrick, 233 Ill. 2d at 77. In both situations, the failure to timely rule was an abuse of discretion. Additionally, in both situations the defendants decided not to testify at trial based on the trial court’s deferral of its ruling on their motions. See Patrick, 233 Ill. 2d at 77 (Phillips chose not to testify based on the trial judge’s ruling). In our view, Tucker and Averett were in the same position faced by Phillips prior to trial. Each was required to wait for a ruling on the -15- admissibility of prior convictions for impeachment purposes until after testifying. Thus, each of them faced the same strategic and tactical decisions and the same uncertainty over whether they would be impeached with their prior convictions if they chose to testify. Therefore, in accordance with our decision in Phillips’ case, we conclude that the trial courts’ decisions to defer ruling on the defendants’ motions under a blanket policy is unreviewable on appeal because the defendants chose not to testify at trial.