Opinion ID: 1391168
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: land use restrictions equal protection and due process

Text: In the nomenclature of zoning, use restriction is understood to mean a restriction on the type of use to which land may be put. The land use restrictions which we treat in this Part include both qualitative and quantitative restrictions on the right to use land. When a land use permitted to one landowner is restricted to another similarly situated, the restriction is discriminatory, and, if not substantially related to the public health, safety, or welfare, constitutes a denial of equal protection of the laws. A restriction on the right to use which thus denies equal protection also constitutes a taking of one of the most valuable components of the package of private property rights, and, absent just compensation, such taking is a denial of due process of law.
The buildable area, i. e., the acreage on which buildings in a B-2 zone may be constructed, is restricted by 8A to what remains after compliance with the 75-foot setback line on the front, the requirement of a 10-foot perimeter open space adjoining the property lines on the sides and rear, and the requirement of a 10-foot perimeter open space adjacent to buildings. The perimeters of open-space areas must be increased (and the buildable area decreased) by one foot for each foot of building height in excess of 35 feet, and no part of such open spaces may be used for automobile parking. The size of the buildable area is also affected by the restriction that no building may be constructed on lots less than 150 feet wide (or 120 feet wide for lots existing on January 10, 1973). Code § 15.1-486 authorizes local governing bodies to adopt ordinances to regulate, restrict, permit, prohibit, and determine. . . [t]he areas and dimensions of land, water, and air space to be occupied by buildings, structures and uses, and of courts, yards, and other open spaces to be left unoccupied by uses and structures. . . . Standing alone, this language is broad enough to authorize the use of the police power to impose reasonable restrictions on buildable area. Repeatedly, we have recognized the authority of local governments to adopt setback line restrictions. French v. Town of Clintwood, 203 Va. 562, 125 S.E.2d 798 (1962); Nusbaum v. Norfolk, 151 Va. 801, 145 S.E. 257 (1928); Gorieb v. Fox, 145 Va. 554, 134 S.E. 914, aff'd., 274 U.S. 603, 47 S.Ct. 675, 71 L.Ed. 1228 (1926). The power to prescribe reasonable minimum lot width restrictions and open space requirements is clearly within the ambit of Code § 15.1-486, and, by necessary implication from the authority to regulate, so is the power to require that open spaces on privately-owned land be landscaped and maintained in good condition. Here, each of these requirements and restrictions on buildable area enjoys the presumption of legislative reasonableness, and the burden of rebutting the presumption, by evidence of the unreasonableness of each, rested upon the landowners. Considering each in isolation from the others, we believe that the landowners failed to overcome that presumption. However, while local governments have been given the power to enact ordinances imposing such building restrictions and open space requirements, such ordinances to be valid must be to promote public health, safety, prosperity, morals and public welfare. The mere power to enact an ordinance . . . does not carry with it the right arbitrarily or capriciously to deprive a person of the legitimate use of his property. Board of Supervisors v. Carper, supra, 200 Va. at 662, 107 S.E.2d at 396. With the Carper rule in mind, we must consider these building restrictions and requirements and examine their cumulative effect. The landowners' evidence shows that the setback restriction and the open-space requirements would prohibit construction of buildings upon a total of 16.78 acres, or about 29% of the 58 acres classified B-2. Based upon market values prior to the enactment of 8A, the value of the 16.78 acres was $1,959,167.35. These acreage and valuation computations make no allowance for any restriction of buildable area that may result from surpassing the building height limitation or from reservation of acreage for parking needs. Parking on the service road and open spaces is forbidden. If businesses are to serve customers, landowners must provide space for parking in some area not reserved for open spaces. That area must be at least as wide as twice the length of an automobile to enable it to maneuver into and out of parking position. The landowners introduced an expert witness whose testimony, illustrated by exhibits, showed that the buildable area restrictions as a whole rendered 17 of the 51 B-2 lots undevelopable. Disputing this evidence, the Board says that 8 of the 17 lots are developable because two or more adjacent lots are held in common ownership. Since the restrictions are addressed to individual lots, individually assessed and taxed, and since an owner of several lots (any of which he has the right to sell) cannot be deprived of the beneficial use of any individual lot, we fail to see how common ownership is constitutionally significant. The Board also argues that, while some of the individually-owned lots are too small for B-2 development, they are large enough to accommodate some productive development under a variance. As we noted in Part I, supra, however, if development requires a variance so broad that it violates the spirit and purpose of 8A, an application for a variance would be futile. [10] On cross-examination, the Board's witness, the real estate assessor and financial director of the City of Williamsburg, testified that [s]ales have stopped after the B-2 zone went into effect. The landowners' witness, a real estate broker, testified that, based upon prior sales of similar property, the market value of the subject property prior to adoption of 8A had been $2.69 per square foot and thereafter had declined to $1.50 per square foot, while the values of neighboring properties had remained constant. Although, as we have said, we are of opinion that the landowners' evidence was insufficient to overcome the legislative presumption of reasonableness as it pertains to these buildable area restrictions individually, we hold that their evidence was sufficient to show that, collectively, those restrictions are unreasonable and bear no substantial relationship to the public health, safety, or welfare; that such evidence overcame the presumption of legislative validity; that the Board's evidence of reasonableness was insufficient to make the question fairly debatable; and that the cumulative effect of the restrictions upon buildable area was such as to deprive a person of the legitimate use of his property in violation of the rule in Carper.
After dividing its jurisdiction into districts, a local governing body may, within each district, regulate, restrict, permit, prohibit, and determine . . . [t]he use of land, buildings, structures and other premises for agricultural, commercial, industrial, residential, flood plain and other specific uses. Code § 15.1-486. Here, the Board divided its jurisdiction into districts and placed each in a broad category. Two of these categories are reserved for business uses, and the subject property has been assigned to one of these. We have rejected a constitutional challenge to this classification structure ( see Part II, supra ). We now consider whether the subclassifications the Board made within the category to which the subject property is assigned violate constitutional restraints. Within the B-2 business classification, 8A separates commercial uses into two distinct sub-classes. Hotels, motels, and theatres are permitted; banks, office buildings, and grocery stores are prohibited. Antique shops are permitted; shops selling antique reproductions are prohibited. Restaurants are permitted; fast food or drivein restaurants are prohibited. Gift shops are permitted, provided they are accessory to hotels or motels having 50 or more dwelling or lodging units and are designed and scaled only to meet the requirements of occupants and their guests; other retail stores selling identical gifts are prohibited. Like classifications of districts into broad use categories, sub-classifications of uses permitted and uses prohibited are, to some degree, arbitrary. Such sub-classifications are presumed to be reasonable, but, unless they are substantially related to the public health, safety, or welfare, the restrictions on use offend both the equal protection and due process guarantees. [A] classification cannot prohibit or restrict certain uses and permit other uses where there is no valid basis, reasonably related to the public health, safety, morals, welfare or other proper object of the police power, for distinguishing between them. 8 McQuillin, supra at § 25.123(332). See e. g., Frost v. Village of Glen Ellyn, 30 Ill.2d 241, 195 N.E.2d 616 (1964) (holding exclusion of drive-in restaurant from a business zone unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious); Vernon Park Realty v. Mount Vernon, 307 N.Y. 493, 121 N.E.2d 517 (1954) (striking down an ordinance which excluded all uses except vehicular parking). One of the permissible purposes of a zoning ordinance is to protect against destruction of or encroachment upon historic areas. Code § 15.1-489. Nothing in the evidence shows that implementation of any of the commercial uses prohibited by 8A would destroy or encroach upon Colonial Williamsburg. Nor is there any evidence that such uses are noxious, dangerous, or otherwise inimical to the public health, safety, or welfare. The exclusion from a zoning district of a particular use, or category of uses, will be upheld where that exclusion is substantially related to a proper exercise of the police power. Fairfax County v. Parker, supra, 186 Va. at 688, 44 S.E.2d at 15 (upholding a use restriction against a commercial junkyard within a residential district). But 8A excludes a large number of otherwise legitimate retail business uses from a retail business district, when nothing in the record shows that the uses excluded would be more detrimental to the public welfare than the uses permitted. The trial court ruled that 8A imposes unreasonable restrictions upon the use of properties within said B-2 zone. Finding no substantial nexus between the commercial use restrictions imposed and the public weal, we are of opinion that the ruling of the trial court was correct; that the evidence was sufficient to overcome the legislative presumption of reasonableness; that the Board's evidence was insufficient to make the question of reasonableness fairly debatable; and that the commercial use restrictions deny B-2 landowners equal protection of the laws and constitute a taking of property without due process of law.
Under 8A, approval of preliminary site plans is made conditional, subject to Architectural Design Review procedures as set forth under General Provisions, Article 12, Section 12-13. That article requires the applicant to submit schematic architectural plans indicating accurate elevations of each facade, and sufficient detailing to indicate materials, colors, texture, light reflecting characteristics, and special features intended for the building. In deciding whether the proposed building is acceptable, the five-man Architectural Design Review Board is to be governed solely by the purposes of architectural design review. These purposes are: . . . to protect property values and to promote the general welfare by insuring buildings in good taste, proper proportion, in general and reasonable harmony with the existing buildings in the surrounding area, and to encourage architecture which shall be distinct from the Colonial Williamsburg architecture. Landowners assert that nothing in the enabling statutes delegates authority to local government to impose restrictions on architectural design. The Board relies upon Code § 15.1-489 which provides that ordinances shall be designed . . . to facilitate the creation of a convenient, attractive and harmonious community . . . A community in which all buildings are required to conform to a particular design, or one in which a particular design is forbidden to all buildings, may be convenient, attractive and harmonious. However, a county cannot limit or restrict the use which a person may make of his property under the guise of its police power where the exercise of such power would be justified solely on aesthetic considerations. Kenyon Peck v. Kennedy, 210 Va. 60, 64, 168 S.E.2d 117, 120-21 (1969). While the fact that aesthetic considerations entered into the reasons for the passage of an ordinance will not invalidate it, it is valid only if other elements within the scope of police power are present. Id. The Board argues that the preservation of the commercial value of an area as a tourist attraction is within the police power of the local government. It is true that Code § 15.1-503.2(a) (Cum.Supp.1974) authorizes certain counties, including James City County to adopt an ordinance setting forth the historic landmarks within the county and to create one or more historic districts adjacent to such landmarks in which no building . . . shall be erected . . . unless the same is approved by the board of supervisors of such county as being architecturally compatible with the historic landmark. . . . However, for two reasons this statute does not give the Board the police power it claims. First, the statute expressly provides that [n]o such historic district shall extend further than one-quarter mile from the property line of the land pertaining to any such historic landmark, and, as the parties stipulated, the Board has never adopted any ordinance designating any historical landmark within one-quarter mile of the B-2 zone. Second, the only architectural design power delegated to the county is the power to require architectural design compatible with the historic landmark; here, the requirement is that architectural design be distinct from the landmark. Some jurisdictions have adopted the rule upholding architectural design regulations when it appears that the purpose of the ordinance was to protect property values within the zone. State v. Berkeley, 458 S.W.2d 305 (Mo.1970); Reid v. Architectural Board of Review, 119 Ohio App. 67, 192 N.E.2d 74 (1963); Saveland Park Holding Corporation v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841, 76 S.Ct. 81, 100 L.Ed. 750 (1955). We decline to follow this rule when, as here, it appears that the predominant purpose of the ordinance was to promote aesthetic values and the purpose recited in the ordinance to protect property values was merely an incidental goal. Finding nothing in the enabling statutes which delegates to the Board the power it claims, we hold that the Board was without authority to impose the architectural design restrictions incorporated in 8A and that, as the trial court ruled, 8A includes purposes and provisions not authorized by law. In light of our holding, it is unnecessary to consider whether the standards governing the exercise of the legislative power delegated by the Board to the Architectural Design Review Board were unconstitutionally vague.