Opinion ID: 1203361
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Richey's Motion for Judgment N.O.V.

Text: Richey argues that the superior court erred in not granting her motion for judgment n.o.v. for two reasons. First, she asserts that reasonable persons could not have concluded other than that she suffered some damages. Second, she contends that the superior court committed an abuse of discretion in allowing a physician, Dr. Pervier, to give expert testimony. Oen argues that the denial of the judgment n.o.v. should be affirmed because Richey failed to move for a directed verdict specifically as to damages and causation. The standard of review for a denial of a judgment n.o.v. requires us to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, is such that reasonable persons could not differ in their judgment of the facts. Mullen v. Christiansen, 642 P.2d 1345, 1348 (Alaska 1982). In making this determination, we do not weigh conflicting evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. Holiday Inns of America v. Peck, 520 P.2d 87, 92 (Alaska 1974). Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) provides in part: [A] party who has moved for a directed verdict may move to have the verdict and any judgment entered thereon set aside and to have judgment entered in accordance with his motion for a directed verdict... . Where a party fails to move for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence, a superior court's refusal to grant a judgment n.o.v. cannot be considered on appeal. Metcalf v. Wilbur, Inc., 645 P.2d 163, 170 (Alaska 1982). At the close of all the evidence, Richey's attorney stated, Your Honor, if I may at this time formally of record move for a directed verdict based on the status of the evidence, all the evidence, that is before the Court on the issue of negligence of the Defendant driver [.] (Emphasis added). Richey's attorney then proceeded to explain in detail how Oen's conduct was negligent and how Richey did absolutely nothing to contribute to the accident. Applying this court's ruling in Green v. Plutt, 790 P.2d 1347 (Alaska 1990), the superior court stated, I will grant the motion for directed verdict and will instruct the jury that the issue of the Defendant's negligence is no longer before them. The court noted, [o]f course, the issue with regard to causation of injury and preexisting injury remains. Richey's attorney thereafter made a motion for a directed verdict as to joint tortfeasors, which the court denied. [5] Following the return of the jury's verdict, Richey moved for a judgment n.o.v., which the court denied. The narrow question here is whether Richey's motion for directed verdict included the causation and damages issues ultimately resolved by the jury. In our opinion, it did not. A party seeking to prevail in a negligence action must prove a duty, a breach of that duty, and an injury which was proximately caused by the breach. Leigh v. Lundquist, 540 P.2d 492, 494 (Alaska 1975). In proving its case, a party may choose to move for a directed verdict as to its entire case, City of Palmer v. Anderson, 603 P.2d 495, 501 (Alaska 1979), or only one part of its case, Gregory v. Padilla, 379 P.2d 951, 953 (Alaska 1963). We read Richey's motion for a directed verdict as pertaining only to Oen's negligence, that is, to Richey's burden of proving that Oen owed her a duty to exercise due care and that Oen breached that duty. If Richey's attorney had intended the motion to include the causation and damages issue, he should have included them in either his argument in support of the directed verdict motion or a separate motion after the court stated it was letting the two issues go to the jury. Richey's attorney did neither and, consequently, Richey was precluded from moving for a judgment n.o.v. Under our ruling in Metcalf, Richey is barred from appealing the superior court's denial of the motion.