Opinion ID: 700482
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Coffee Beans

Text: 31 Mr. Penny also alleges that he was unfairly prejudiced when the district court allowed Deputy United States Marshal James DeVito to testify that drug dealers place coffee beans in door frames in order to throw off the dogs for the scent of drugs or cocaine. R. 103-6 at 818. Mr. Penny objected to the testimony at trial. He submitted that Marshal DeVito was not qualified as an expert in narcotics investigations, and thus did not possess special knowledge concerning the use of coffee beans by drug dealers. We review this claim under the abuse of discretion standard. We therefore review the determination of the district court with great deference. We shall find reversible error only if the district court's decision is not among those options from which one could have expected the court to choose on the basis of this record. Raines v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 1355, 1362 (7th Cir.1995); see United States v. Koen, 982 F.2d 1101, 1114 (7th Cir.1992) (stating that a court does not abuse its discretion when its decision is within the range of options from which one could expect a reasonable trial judge to select). 32 Initially, we note that there is nothing improper with eliciting testimony from law enforcement officers concerning the techniques and methods used by criminals if it is plainly within that testifying officer's area of knowledge. Fed.R.Evid. 702, 703. Here, Marshal DeVito was relying on his experiences in three prior drug investigations in which he had observed the use of coffee beans in door frames. Our colleagues in the Second Circuit have stated that, in fact, [i]t is not improper to elicit expert testimony from an officer who is a fact witness, even if he was not formally qualified as an expert at trial. United States v. Matos, 905 F.2d 30, 34 (2d Cir.1990). 33 It is possible that a witness testifying both as a fact witness and an expert witness may blur these two very different roles and consequently increase the possibility that the jury will not understand its function in evaluating the evidence. See United States v. Foster, 939 F.2d 445, 453 (7th Cir.1991) (citations omitted). We note that the district court was sensitive to the need to prevent any jury confusion that could have been engendered by Marshal DeVito's testimony as both an eyewitness and an expert during the course of the same trial. At a sidebar conference held during Marshal DeVito's cross-examination, the district court informed defense counsel that she was entitled to ask what the basis for [his] belief was. R. 103-6 at 817-19. The court also acknowledged that, in relation to jury perception, it would obviously be a mistake for the government to introduce evidence, such as this, that is not credible. Id. As such, any prejudicial concerns were addressed by defense counsel's opportunity to use cross-examination to counter such testimony. See Foster, 939 F.2d at 453. Mr. Penny's attorney, though, opted not to explore the statement in any manner. 34 In sum, the small impact of the coffee bean statement in light of the wealth of evidence presented to the jury of Mr. Penny's narcotics trafficking, in combination with the appropriate handling of Marshal DeVito's statement by the district court, militates in favor of finding that there was no unfair prejudice to Mr. Penny. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the district court's decision was an abuse of discretion.