Opinion ID: 2638625
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: part ii(b).

Text: ¶ 13 Absent a specific statutory exception a trial court may consider pension benefits accumulated during the marriage as jointly acquired property subject to equitable division in a divorce. Rice v. Rice, 1988 OK 83, 762 P.2d 925, 926. Further, this Court has consistently held that a final property division judgment is not subject to modification at a later date. In re Key, 1996 OK 130, 930 P.2d 824, 825-826; Clifton v. Clifton, 1990 OK 88, 801 P.2d 693, 695 (in absence of fraud, a property settlement award, as opposed to an award for support alimony, cannot be modified in a post-decretal hearing); see also Ozment v. Ozment, 2000 OK CIV APP 52, ¶ 6, 11 P.3d 635, 637 (COCA, Div.3)(recognizing that pursuant to 43 O.S.Supp.1997, § 134(A), [p]ayments pertaining to a division of property are irrevocable and not subject to subsequent modification by the court making the award.). [13] ¶ 14 Here, appellant admits the divorce decree awarded former wife a share of his retirement income under the System; that no appeal was lodged from the decree; and the decree became final. The decree expressly found that part of appellant's vested interest in the System was his separate property and part marital property. Rather than specifying a particular amount or percentage of appellant's anticipated future retirement benefit, the decree set out a formula for use in calculating former wife's share of the benefit. In that appellant does not dispute (as noted, he admits) that the decree awarded appellee part of his retirement income, and he also concedes or admits that the System rejected both the 1993 and 1996 QDROs as inadequate, the crux of this case is whether the trial court had authority to interpret the meaning of the formula contained in the decree and to issue the 1999 QDRO, after two previous QDRO's, in an effort to have an order acceptable to the System so that it would be empowered to pay appellee what she was awarded by the decree. ¶ 15 Although this Court has never had the opportunity to specifically decide the issue, on more than one occasion Court of Civil Appeals' opinions have recognized that a QDRO is generally the mechanism by which a divorce decree awarding retirement benefits to a spouse is enforced and collected with regard to the particular retirement program covered by the decree. Troxell v. Troxell, 2001 OK CIV APP 96, ¶ 5, 28 P.3d 1169, 1171; Taylor v. Taylor, 2001 OK CIV APP 16, ¶ 13, 19 P.3d 895, 898; Ozment v. Ozment, supra, 2000 OK CIV APP 52, at ¶ 10, 11 P.3d at 638. Ozment further ruled that a trial court has the authority to issue a subsequent QDRO if an initial one contains some ambiguity concerning the proper division of a retirement benefit under an earlier entered divorce decree, as long as the later QDRO does not alter what was awarded initially by the decree, but conforms to it. [14] ¶ 16 Recitals in a journal entry of judgment are taken as true and correct and are prima facie proof of the facts stated therein where not impeached or contradicted by the record. Haskett v. Turner, 1955 OK 329, 290 P.2d 133 First Syllabus by the Court. Furthermore, where a journal entry of judgment contains the words, It is by the court ordered, adjudged and decreed, the order following these words is the final and controlling portion of the judgment of the trial court, and, where the same is clear and unambiguous, this Court will give effect to the order, judgment and decree therein rendered. Imo Oil & Gas Co. v. Charles E. Knox Oil Co., 1926 OK 842, 250 P. 117 Syllabus by the Court. In our view, the formula-driven recitation in the decree for awarding appellee a portion of the marital interest in appellant's future benefit in the System is clear and unambiguous and the 1999 QDRO conforms to the formula there spelled out. Filling in the appropriate total months of employment of appellant as a firefighter to the formula gives former wife nineteen percent (19%) of the pension, which, again, is about one-half (½) or fifty percent (50%) of the benefit earned during the marriage. Nothing has been presented that such amount is inequitable, an abuse of discretion or contrary to applicable law. ¶ 17 Furthermore, the COCA majority plainly erred in viewing the divorce decree formula as granting appellee only twenty-four percent (24%) of the System benefit for the months the couple were married, i.e. the percentage delineated in the 1996 QDRO. Such a view is plainly erroneous because, if the one hundred fifteen (115) months is properly understood as the approximate months of marriage, which, as the formula sets out, is divided by its denominator (i.e. appellant's total months of employment), this figure is always multiplied by one-half (½) or fifty percent (50%) under the formula. In other words, this will always give former wife about one-half (½) or fifty percent (50%) of the pension earned during the marriage, even though her percentage of the entire pension decreased the longer former husband worked as a firefighter after the marriage because the total months of employment increased until former husband finally retired, thus making the second figure or fraction of the divorce decree's formula smaller. In that the 1996 QDRO is patently inconsistent with the formula spelled out in the divorce decree it cannot act as the division of the marital interest in the System benefit because to give it force would plainly be allowing an alteration/change/modification of the property division concerning the System benefit spelled out in the final divorce decree. [15] ¶ 18 Even if it is assumed there is some ambiguity in the divorce decree formula, we believe the trial court correctly resolved the ambiguity in his 1999 QDRO. [16] Once a ruling has become final (either for want of an appeal or in consequence of an appellate court's decision), any controversy over the meaning and effect of the decision must be resolved by resort solely to the face of the judgment roll. Fent v. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co., a Div. of Oneok, Inc., 1994 OK 108, 898 P.2d 126, 132. Furthermore, mere ambiguity will not affect a judgment's validity, unless none of its terms is susceptible to construction which will make it conformable to law. Mayhue v. Mayhue, 1985 OK 68, 706 P.2d 890, 893. Also, merely entering a second judgment cannot, per se, vacate a prior judgment in the same action. Aishman v. Taylor, 1973 OK 130, 516 P.2d 244, 245. An unclear judgment should be construed so as to carry out its evident purport and intent, rather than defeat it, and a court should consider the situation to which it was applied and the purpose sought to be accomplished. Hicks v. Hicks, 1966 OK 91, 417 P.2d 830, 832-833. ¶ 19 This is not the first time this Court has confronted the issue of whether a trial court's action involved a modification of an earlier judgment or merely involved the trial court's construction of what was deemed an unclear judgment or part thereof. Hicks, supra . The purpose and function of a court in construing a divorce decree earlier entered is to give effect to that which is already in the judgment, although expressed ambiguously, and the court has no authority to add new provisions to the decree or to change substantive provisions already in the decree, under the guise of construing said decree. Titsworth v. Titsworth, 1952 OK 184, 244 P.2d 295 First and Second Syllabi by the Court. Here, a reasonable construction (assuming ambiguity) of the formula set out in the decree is exactly that meaning given by the trial court in the 1999 QDRO, to wit: nineteen percent (19%) of the System benefit, which, as noted is about one-half (½) or fifty percent (50%) of the benefit earned during the marriage. [17]