Opinion ID: 1636806
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admissibility of Identification Testimony

Text: The defendant filed a pre-trial motion to suppress the identification testimony of Michael Butterworth and Mark Farmer, arguing that the procedures leading to their identifications of the defendant were unduly suggestive and violated his due process rights. The trial court denied this motion. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed on the basis that no state action was involved in the witnesses' identification of the defendant from the television coverage. In this Court, the defendant argues that the presence or absence of state action is not dispositive, and he urges this Court to review the circumstances surrounding the witnesses' identification when determining whether due process was violated. A brief review of the circumstances surrounding these identifications is necessary to place this issue in context. As previously stated, the record reflects that Butterworth spoke with the defendant for a few minutes on February 15, 1997, the night before the murders, when the defendant inquired about employment at Captain D's. Butterworth also worked with police to create a composite drawing of the defendant, although the drawing was not entirely consistent with the defendant's appearance. Attempting to identify the perpetrator, Butterworth looked at many police photographs, and in June of 1997, Butterworth was shown a photographic lineup that contained a photo of the defendant and five other persons. While not positively ruling out any of the persons shown, Butterworth was unable to identify anyone in the array as the man with whom he had spoken on February 15. The next day, while watching the news on television, Butterworth saw coverage of the defendant's arrest, immediately recognized the defendant, and called the police to identify him as the man he encountered at Captain D's the night before the murders. Butterworth explained that he was able to identify the defendant because, unlike the photographic lineup, the news report enabled him to hear the defendant's voice, see the way his lips moved when he talked, and see the way he walked. As to Farmer, the record indicates that he was driving by Captain D's around 9:30 a.m. on the morning of the murders when he saw a man leave the restaurant and approach a car parked in an unusual manner at the front of the building. Farmer and the man made direct eye contact before the man looked away in a suspicious manner. After hearing about the murders, Farmer phoned the police three times to report seeing the man at the restaurant, but the police never contacted him about what he had seen. Then, in June of 1997, Farmer saw televised news coverage of the defendant's arrest, instantly recognized the defendant as the man he had seen on the morning of the murders, and again called the police with this information. Significant to our analysis is the undisputed fact that the police had not told either Butterworth or Farmer to watch the television news broadcasts that resulted in their identifying the defendant. Their viewing is best described as accidental, inadvertent, or coincidental. It was not orchestrated by police. To the contrary, the record reflects that police officers had advised the defendant after his arrest that he could avoid media coverage by covering his head with a jacket and by facing the wall during court proceedings so the television cameras and observers would be unable to see his face. The defendant at first indicated that he intended to follow this advice. Just before leaving the jail, however, the defendant apparently changed his mind, stating This is going to be the Paul Reid trial. Therefore, the defendant did not cover his head, and he turned around and faced everyone in the courtroom during the arraignment. Thus, the defendant's decision to make it a Paul Reid trial, rather than state action, led directly to Butterworth's and Farmer's identification testimony. While this Court has not previously addressed this issue, it is well-settled Tennessee law that in the absence of state action in the identification process, constitutional due process rights are not implicated; therefore, the analysis adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972) is not appropriate in this case. See, e.g., State v. Drinkard, 909 S.W.2d 13, 15-16 (Tenn.Crim.App.), perm. app. denied (Tenn.1995) (refusing to find the identification unduly suggestive and violative of due process because the police did not arrange the confrontation between the defendant and the witness) (citing cases); State v. Newsome, 744 S.W.2d 911, 917 (Tenn.Crim.App.), perm. app. denied (Tenn.1987) (refusing to find the identification unduly suggestive and violative of due process because the police did not arrange the encounter between the defendant and the victim); State v. Dixon, 656 S.W.2d 49, 51 (Tenn.Crim.App.), perm. app. denied (Tenn.1983) (refusing to find the identification unduly suggestive and violative of due process because a confrontation between the defendant and the victim was not a showup arranged by the police); State v. Mosby, 639 S.W.2d 672, 673 (Tenn.Crim.App.), perm. app. denied (Tenn.1982) (refusing to find the identification unduly suggestive and violative of due process because there was no state action where the victim identified the defendant after a neighbor showed the victim a single photograph); Bishop v. State, 582 S.W.2d 86, 91 (Tenn.Crim.App.1979) (refusing to find the identification unduly suggestive and violative of due process because there was no state action where a witness first identified the defendant from a single picture in a local newspaper). Moreover, in so holding, the law in Tennessee is consistent with the rule adopted by a majority of jurisdictions that have considered this issue. See generally Annotation, Admissibility of In-Court Identification As Affected by PreTrial Encounter That Was Not Result of Action by Police, Prosecutors, and the Like, 86 A.L.R. 5th 463 (2001) (citing cases). In a scholarly opinion, the Rhode Island Supreme Court explained why a broader rule is unnecessary: [W]e conclude that absent state action, no constitutional violation that would give rise to the creation of an exclusionary rule has been committed.    Probably the best guarantee of due process in such a situation as that presented by the case at bar would be the opportunity for cross-examination in order to expose the witness's lack of credibility. This opportunity is further buttressed and enforced by the requirement that the state prove every element of the crime, including the identity of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. The guarantee is also supported not only by the requirement of a unanimous jury verdict but also by the power of the trial justice to review the evidence, including credibility, on a motion for new trial. Thus, the due-process rights of defendant in this case, as in all criminal cases, are adequately protected from violations of due process without the fashioning of additional exclusionary rules, whether pursuant to the Federal or the Rhode Island Constitution. State v. Pailon, 590 A.2d 858, 863 (R.I.1991). This case well illustrates the soundness of the Rhode Island Supreme Court's analysis. Here, the trial court scrupulously applied the rules of evidence which admit only relevant evidence that is not unduly prejudicial or misleading. The defendant's attorneys effectively cross-examined these witnesses, focusing upon the weaknesses in their identifications. The trial court properly instructed the jury as to eyewitness testimony, in accordance with this Court's decision in State v. Dyle, 899 S.W.2d 607, 612 (Tenn.1995). The jury's verdicts of guilt were unanimous, and the trial court approved these verdicts as the thirteenth juror. Like the Rhode Island Supreme Court, we conclude that the due process rights of criminal defendants are quite adequately protected by existing rules and procedures. Absent evidence of state involvement in Butterworth's and Farmer's identifications of the defendant, constitutional due process is not implicated, and the analysis adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Neil is not applicable. The identification testimony was properly admitted. This issue is without merit.