Opinion ID: 1351145
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Asserted misconduct

Text: a. The terms of Charlene's plea bargain. Before addressing the claims, some background is necessary. In late June 1982, Charlene entered into plea negotiations with prosecutors from California, Nevada and Oregon concerning 10 murders in which she implicated defendant. Eventually she entered into a plea bargain under which she agreed to testify fully, accurately and fairly in defendant's trials. Under the agreement Charlene was to plead guilty to the first degree murders of Miller and Sowers, and be sentenced to a fixed term of 16 years, 8 months in prison, with no time off for good behavior. The agreement contemplated that the Board of Prison Terms (BPT)  which was not a party to the contract  would schedule a hearing one year after the date of Charlene's sentencing. The agreement contained a backup provision to take effect if the BPT declined to ratify the agreed sentence within that time. In that event, Charlene's California plea would be deemed involuntary and vacated, and she would be transferred to Nevada to plead guilty to a crime there, and serve a determinate term of 16 years, 8 months, if that plea was acceptable to the Nevada authorities. If neither the BPT nor Nevada would limit Charlene's term to 16 years, 8 months, the pleas in both states would be deemed involuntary, and vacated, and Charlene would have the right to a jury trial or she could plead to related offenses with sentences that would amount to 16 years and 8 months' imprisonment. After the various prosecutors and Charlene, through her attorneys, agreed to the plea, Charlene pleaded guilty to two counts of first degree murder in November 1982, and was sentenced. By the terms of the agreement, the BPT was to hold its hearing and ratify the sentence by November 1983. This agreement was fully explained to the jury during Charlene's testimony, and the testimony of her attorney, Hamilton Hintz. Thereafter in February 1983, in conformity with the agreement's backup provision, Charlene pleaded guilty to second degree murder in Nevada, and was sentenced to 16 years, 8 months in prison. In mid-June 1983 the BPT  since reconstituted with new members  wrote to the Sacramento prosecutor informing him that at its May 1983 meeting it had decided it would not hold a parole consideration hearing for Charlene by November 1983, but instead, pursuant to statutory directives, would not consider the question until Charlene had served 15 years and 7 months of her term, i.e., June 1996. Charlene moved to dismiss her California plea. At an April 1984 hearing on the motion (made part of the record in this case on defendant's motion), the prosecutor testified he had always expected the BPT to ratify the California plea bargain, based on his conversations with the former director of the BPT. He asserted he first learned of the board's decision not to hold an early hearing in the June 1983 letter, and that there had been an innocent misunderstanding between him and the BPT about the BPT's ability to hold a hearing to ratify the sentence within a year of sentencing. Over the prosecutor's objections the court dismissed Charlene's plea pursuant to the terms of the agreement, and dismissed the information concerning the California charges. Pursuant to the agreement's backup provision, however, Charlene's position remained for all practical purposes the same. She was still sentenced to a 16-year, 8-month prison term, albeit under Nevada rather than California jurisdiction. (40) We reject defendant's suggestion that the prosecution failed in its duty to disclose the terms of the plea agreement at defendant's trial. (See Brady v. Maryland, supra, 373 U.S. 83, 87 [10 L.Ed.2d at pp. 218-219].) Defendant insists, however, that the prosecution misled the jury by failing to disclose that the BPT would reject the plea agreement by refusing to hold a parole consideration hearing within a year of the sentence, in November 1983. Defendant suggests the June 1983 letter establishes the prosecutor, contrary to his testimony, knew as early as June 1982 that the BPT would not honor the agreement's condition concerning ratification within a year of sentencing. The letter to the trial prosecutor states: The Board appreciates the difficult and sensitive negotiations the parties went through in reaching this agreement. Although the Sacramento District Attorney did meet with the [Board of Prison Terms] Chairman and Executive Officer on June 29, 1982, the Chairman made clear at that time that Mrs. Gallego would not be considered for parole until she had served fifteen years, seven months (June 1996) and that he would only recommend to the panel considering Mrs. Gallego for parole that she be released after serving sixteen years and eight months. Additionally, as inferentially disclosing the prosecutor's knowledge of the BPT's likely action, defendant quotes a July 1982 confidential memo to the file, in which the BPT executive officer memorialized both his and the BPT chairman's meeting with the trial prosecutor in this case. The memo notes that the present board cannot legally bind future boards to parole decisions, that the release decision would not be made for 16 years, and that although the present board would recommend release on the minimum eligible parole date, it is clearly acknowledged, however, that an actual decision on release would be made by the Board having jurisdiction at the time, namely 16 years from the date of conviction. We find no reason to doubt the prosecutor's testimony at the April 1984 hearing, that there had simply been a misunderstanding between him and the BPT. In any event, we fail to perceive how the prosecution's alleged suppression of BPT's refusal to ratify Charlene's sentence prejudiced defendant. Under the terms of the agreement as explained to the jury, Charlene pleaded guilty and agreed to testify and assist the prosecution in return for a fixed sentence of 16 years, 8 months. Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, that is precisely what Charlene ended up with, and the jury was not misled about the inducement offered for her cooperation. b.  Forum shopping.  (41) Defendant asserts the prosecutor and Charlene's attorneys sought out Sacramento Superior Court Presiding Judge Virga  who was not the trial judge assigned to the case  to preside over the taking of Charlene's plea, and that the jury was misled by not being so apprised. Preliminarily, as the People note, defendant earlier attempted to obtain a writ of mandate to challenge Charlene's plea on this ground, and the Court of Appeal denied relief on the basis, inter alia, that defendant lacked standing to challenge entry of Charlene's plea. The parties argue whether this ruling is law of the case. In any event, however, we fail to perceive how defendant's charge, if true, enhanced the credibility of Charlene's testimony, or prejudiced defendant. c. Misconduct during argument. During defendant's closing argument the following occurred: DEFENDANT: The district attorney wants you to believe that I did the Vaught/Scheffler murders as Charlene told you. I'd like to point out to you that I'm not charged with these crimes. Charlene made her deal with the district attorney sometime in June I believe ... and this is March of the next year, and I am not charged, and to have someone implicate me in murder and not give me a jury trial is not fair, and I demand a jury trial. THE PROSECUTOR: You got it. DEFENDANT: I demand to be tried on each and every charge. THE PROSECUTOR: I will do that. DEFENDANT: In front of a jury, in front of a judge. [¶] All right. He might sit over there and laugh, like he has or will, but he hasn't, and that's a fact. (42) Defendant asserts the prosecutor committed misconduct. As the People observe, however, defendant failed to object, and cannot raise the issue on appeal because on this record a timely admonition would have cured any harm. ( People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d 1, 34.) In any event, on this record any misconduct was plainly harmless. d. Misconduct by courtroom staff. (43) Defendant complained to the court that the bailiff, a sheriff's deputy, and Charlene's attorney would stand up as if expecting an attack each time he approached Charlene on cross-examination. The court agreed defendant should be treated like a lawyer until he proved he deserved to be treated otherwise, and directed everyone to remain seated during his cross-examinations in the future. Defendant asserts the court erred in failing, sua sponte, to caution the jury to ignore the past conduct described above. Defendant cites no authority establishing such a sua sponte duty. We perceive no error. e. Juror misconduct. (44) After the guilt phase instructions were delivered, two jurors  Schindly and Youngman  asked to communicate with the court. Schindly revealed that a month earlier he had begun to read an article that mentioned defendant's father had been executed. He did not finish the article, but he did tell Youngman about it, and together they decided to inform the court. On examination, both jurors repeatedly, expressly, and unambiguously stated that their knowledge from the article would not affect their ability to deliberate fairly and remain impartial. The prosecutor stated he did not believe the information would prevent the jurors from being fair, and the trial court agreed the problem was de minimis, but nevertheless decided to permit defendant to consider over a three-day weekend whether he wished to have the two jurors replaced with alternates. On his return to court after the weekend, defendant stated, My position, Your Honor, is that I feel that the damage is prejudicial, but I feel that  I feel their honesty in coming forth would nullify any damage, and I would ask that they stay on. The court stated it felt the damage was not prejudicial, and that it would do nothing as long as defendant had no objection. Contrary to defendant's suggestion, there is no basis in the record to conclude that the court and/or prosecutor tricked him into waiving removal of the jurors. Defendant's waiver at trial precludes his claim on appeal. (See People v. Wilson (1965) 235 Cal. App.2d 266, 280-281 [45 Cal. Rptr. 267].) Moreover, in view of the jurors' testimony, we are satisfied defendant was not prejudiced in any event by the misconduct.