Opinion ID: 4542357
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: In the case of a Class C crime, one year.

Text: 17-A M.R.S. § 1604(3) (2020). 9 charged in the indictment, the State had to prove that (1) Asante committed or attempted to commit a theft, (2) at the time of the theft or attempted theft, Asante or an accomplice intentionally inflicted or attempted to inflict bodily injury on the victim, and (3) at the time of the theft or attempted theft, Asante was armed with a dangerous weapon or knew that his accomplice was so armed. See id. § 651(1)(D), (E). [¶15] Although the State argues that the Legislature could not have intended to require the State to prove a robbery pursuant to section 651(1)(A), (B), (C), or (D) to obtain a conviction pursuant to section 651(1)(E), that is precisely what section 651(1)(E), by its plain language, requires: “A person is guilty of robbery if the person commits or attempts to commit theft and at the time of the person’s actions. . . [t]he actor is armed with a dangerous weapon in the course of a robbery as defined in paragraphs A through D or knows that the accomplice is so armed.” (Emphasis added.) C. Propriety of the Robbery Instructions [¶16] Asante is correct that the use of the word “or” in the jury instruction makes it possible that the jury found him guilty of robbery based solely on findings that he committed a theft and, at the time of that theft, was armed with a dangerous weapon or knew that an accomplice was so armed. A 10 conviction on this basis would lack a finding of the required element that Asante or his accomplice intentionally inflicted or attempted to inflict bodily injury on the victim at the time of the theft. See id. § 651(1)(D), (E). The instructions on the elements of robbery, therefore, made it possible that the jury reached “a verdict based on impermissible criteria” by finding guilt based on instructed elements that would satisfy neither paragraph D nor paragraph E. Delano, 2015 ME 18, ¶ 13, 111 A.3d 648 (quotation marks omitted). D. Propriety of the Self-Defense Instruction on the Murder Charge [¶17] The error in the robbery instruction also affects the judgment of conviction of murder because the court instructed the jury, pursuant to State v. Bradley, 521 A.2d 289, 290-91 (Me. 1987), that “if the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Asante is guilty either personally or as an accomplice of the offense of robbery . . . then the State has successfully met its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that deadly force was not used in self-defense and the defense is not available.” See also State v. Ouellette, 2012 ME 11, ¶ 17, 37 A.3d 921 (“It is the State’s burden to both disprove self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt and prove each element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. If the jury finds that the State disproved at least one element of self-defense, the jury may then convict the defendant if it also 11 finds, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed each element of the crime.” (citations omitted)). Without a proper instruction requiring a finding that bodily injury was inflicted “at the time of” the theft, 17-A M.R.S. § 651(1), there is a possibility that the jury found that the State had disproved that Asante acted in self-defense by proving only that Asante was armed with a dangerous weapon, or knew that his accomplice was so armed, at the time of the theft. [¶18] If the jury had received accurate instructions on robbery, the self-defense instruction would have been proper. Because the self-defense justification “is designed to afford protection to one beset by an aggressor and confronted by necessity not of his own making,” Ouellette, 2012 ME 11, ¶ 9, 37 A.3d 921 (quotation marks omitted), “[a] person is not justified in using deadly force to defend himself from the use of such force by another unless the other’s use of force is unlawful,” Bradley, 521 A.2d at 290 (emphasis added). Here, the victim’s use of force was lawful if he was justifiably defending himself against a robbery. See 17-A M.R.S. § 108(2)(A)(2) (2020). Specifically, the victim was “justified in using deadly force upon another person” if he “reasonably believe[d] it necessary and reasonably believe[d] such other person [was] . . . [c]ommitting or about to commit a . . . robbery” against him. 12 Id. “Deadly force” includes “intentionally, knowingly or recklessly discharging a firearm in the direction of another person.” 17-A M.R.S. § 2(8) (2020). [¶19] “Since section 108(2)(A)(2) makes lawful the reasonable use of deadly force against another person ‘committing or about to commit a . . . robbery,’ self-defense is not available to a person committing or about to commit a robbery.” Bradley, 521 A.2d at 291 (quoting 17-A M.R.S. § 108(2)(A)(2)). “When committing or attempting to commit a particular crime may be resisted with deadly force, the self-defense issue is negated when the jury determines that such a crime has been committed by the person seeking to invoke a self-defense justification.” Alexander, Maine Jury Instruction Manual § 6-55 at 6-107 (2019-2020 ed. 2019) (citing Bradley, 521 A.2d 289). [¶20] If the jury had received proper instructions, the jury could not have convicted Asante of robbery pursuant to section 651(1)(D) or (E) unless it found that he or his accomplice, “at the time of” the theft or attempted theft, intentionally inflicted bodily injury or attempted to inflict bodily injury. Id. § 651(1)(D); see 17-A M.R.S. § 57(3)(A) (2020);4 see also State v. Solomon, 2015 “A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of a crime if . . . [w]ith the intent 4 of promoting or facilitating the commission of the crime, the person solicits such other person to commit the crime, or aids or agrees to aid or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing the crime. A person is an accomplice under this subsection to any crime the commission of which was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the person’s conduct.” 17-A M.R.S. § 57(3)(A) (2020). 13 ME 96, ¶ 9, 120 A.3d 661 (“We construe the statute defining an offense de novo to determine what elements constitute the crime. When interpreting a statute de novo, we first examine the plain meaning of the statutory language.” (citation omitted) (quotation marks omitted)). Thus, if the elements of robbery had been stated accurately, and the jury had found Asante guilty of robbery as charged in the indictment beyond a reasonable doubt—meaning that the State had proved that Asante or an accomplice injured or attempted to injure the victim at the time of the theft—the State would have, as the court instructed, “met its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that deadly force was not used in self-defense.” See Ouellette, 2012 ME 11, ¶ 17, 37 A.3d 921; Bradley, 521 A.2d at 290-91. [¶21] Here, however, because the court provided instructions that permitted the jury to find Asante guilty of robbery without a finding that he or an accomplice inflicted or attempted to inflict bodily injury on the victim at the time of the theft, the self-defense instruction was inaccurate. The court instructed the jury that if it found that Asante had committed robbery, that finding would disprove self-defense, but the court’s instructions on robbery permitted conviction in the absence of an element that was necessary to disprove self-defense. 14