Opinion ID: 2809688
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Impeachment With Juvenile Adjudications

Text: Timothy Conrad, the victim, was twenty-two when he testified at trial. Appellant’s counsel used a prior adult conviction for possession of a controlled 9 substance with the intent to distribute to impeach Conrad’s general credibility and a pending charge for carrying a pistol without a license as evidence of his motivation to curry favor with the prosecution. Appellant contends that the trial court erred when preventing his trial counsel from using several juvenile adjudications to further impeach Conrad on cross-examination. When a defendant claims that his right to cross-examination was improperly restricted, our standard of review depends on “‘whether the trial court has permitted sufficient cross-examination to comport with the requirements of the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.’” Walls v. United States, 773 A.2d 424, 429 (D.C. 2001) (quoting Springer v. United States, 388 A.2d 846, 856 (D.C. 1978)). If the court “wholly deprived the defendant of any opportunity to crossexamine a witness or present evidence concerning bias or a central issue in the case, we may only affirm if we are convinced that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt . . . .” Clark v. United States, 639 A.2d 76, 81 (D.C. 1993). In this case, appellant had ample opportunity to cross-examine Conrad and present evidence suggesting his bias. Appellant’s trial counsel used Conrad’s prior drug conviction to impeach his general credibility, and used his pending gun charge as evidence of bias. The only cross-examination the trial court limited was 10 appellant’s ability to use Conrad’s juvenile adjudications for impeachment. However, “‘[t]he Sixth Amendment does not require the trial court to permit impeachment with juvenile adjudications unless they can be used to establish bias, not merely to challenge general credibility.’” Walls, 773 A.2d at 429-30 (quoting Tabron v. United States, 410 A.2d 209, 212 (D.C. 1979)). Conrad’s juvenile adjudications were not relevant to demonstrate a motive to curry favor with the government because any supervision stemming from those adjudications had ended before his testimony. When pressed by the court, appellant’s trial counsel could not explain how the juvenile adjudications would establish that Conrad was biased. Appellant has also failed to give any such explanation on appeal. We therefore conclude that the trial court’s limitation of Conrad’s cross-examination did not violate the Sixth Amendment and review only for abuse of discretion. See Parker v. United States, 586 A.2d 720, 722 (D.C. 1991). Appellant had ample opportunity to impeach Conrad’s general credibility with his prior drug conviction. Even if it were allowed, 5 any impeachment of 5 Appellant has not challenged the continuing validity of our line of cases outlining when the use of juvenile adjudications for impeachment must be allowed. (continued…) 11 general credibility with his juvenile adjudications would have been cumulative. Moreover, Conrad’s testimony was not central to the government’s case—he testified that he did not recognize anyone in the lobby of the apartment building before the shooting and did not see who shot him. In some respects, Conrad’s testimony was detrimental to the government’s case because it contradicted portions of the testimony of Danisha Keener, the prosecution’s main witness to the shooting. We therefore conclude that preventing appellant from using Conrad’s juvenile adjudications to impeach him was not an abuse of discretion. See Parker, 586 A.2d at 723 (no abuse of discretion where judge allowed some crossexamination on the witness’s bias and defendant made no proffer, when asked, explaining how the questions that were excluded would have been probative of bias).