Opinion ID: 173490
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Sufficiency of the evidence challenges are reviewed de novo to determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Flanders, 491 F.3d 1197, 1207 (10th Cir.2007). [2] In making this determination, this court will not weigh conflicting evidence or second-guess the fact-finding decisions of the jury. United States v. Gallant, 537 F.3d 1202, 1222 (10th Cir.2008) (quotation omitted). Rather, this court evaluate[s] the sufficiency of the evidence by considering the collective inferences to be drawn from the evidence as a whole. Id. at 1223 (quotations omitted).
The federal mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, prohibits the mailing of any matter for the purpose of executing any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses. The federal mail fraud statute reaches only instances in which the use of the mails is a part of the execution of the fraud. Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 710, 109 S.Ct. 1443, 103 L.Ed.2d 734 (1989). To be actionable as mail fraud, however, use of the mails need not be an essential element of the scheme, as long as it is incident to an essential part of the scheme or a step in the plot. United States v. Cardall, 885 F.2d 656, 680 (10th Cir.1989) (quotations and citation omitted). Indeed, routine mailings may supply the basis for a mail fraud conviction even if they contain no false information. Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 715, 109 S.Ct. 1443. The relevant inquiry is whether the mailing was part of the execution of the scheme as conceived by the perpetrator at the time. Id. Nevertheless, there is no requirement that the perpetrator personally effect the mailing. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8-9, 74 S.Ct. 358, 98 L.Ed. 435 (1954). Rather, it suffices if the perpetrator does an act with knowledge that the use of the mails will follow in the ordinary course of business, or where such use can reasonably be foreseen, even though not actually intended. Id. The eight charged mailings at issue were deeds of trust sent from the Denver County Clerk and Recorder to the lenders designated on the deeds. On appeal, Weiss argues the charged mailings were insufficient to support a mail fraud conviction because they were not part of the execution of the scheme as conceived by the perpetrator at the time, as required by Schmuck, and because they were post-fruition mailings which had no effect on the ongoing viability of his scheme. The evidence at trial, however, was sufficient for a reasonable jury to convict Weiss based on the charged mailings. Weiss's argument that the mailings were not part of the execution of the scheme as conceived by [him] at the time rests on his assertion that he was not involved in the actual mailings of the deeds of trust or the marketing of the loans in the secondary mortgage market. Id. Weiss's lack of involvement with the actual mailings of the deeds of trust (and the downstream securitization transactions they facilitated) is immaterial if Weiss knew the mailings would follow in the ordinary course of business or could reasonably be foreseen. Pereira, 347 U.S. at 9, 74 S.Ct. 358. Weiss does not argue the mailings at issue here were not reasonably foreseeable by someone with his level of knowledge about real estate transactions. Even if Weiss had made this argument, the evidence presented was sufficient for the jury to reasonably conclude Weiss could have reasonably foreseen deeds of trust would be mailed to the lenders after closing. Weiss was an experienced, licensed real estate broker. He had several years of experience working with FHA-insured loans, and attended numerous closings. Weiss's level of knowledge about real estate transactions in general, and the particular scheme at issue here, certainly allowed the jury to reasonably conclude Weiss could have reasonably foreseen the mailings would occur. Accordingly, his lack of involvement in the physical dispatch of the deeds of trust from the recorder's office to the lenders and his lack of involvement in the secondary mortgage market are irrelevant. Furthermore, a jury could have reasonably concluded Weiss's scheme did not involve a series of independent frauds which reached fruition after the completion of each home sale. A scheme is not necessarily limited to each individual fraudulent act. See United States v. Massey, 48 F.3d 1560, 1566 (10th Cir.1995) ([A] `scheme to defraud' has a wider meaning than an individual act of fraud.). Rather, [a] scheme refers to the overall design to defraud one or many by means of a common plan or technique. Id. Based upon the evidence presented at trial, the jury could have reasonably concluded Weiss operated an ongoing, long-term scheme, many aspects of which were interrelated from transaction to transaction, and that each of the charged mailings was part of Weiss's overall scheme, rather than post-fruition surplusage. Finally, a jury could also have reasonably concluded the charged mailings were necessary in maintaining the ongoing viability of the fraud because of their beneficial effect on the downstream marketability of the FHA-insured loans. Cardall, 885 F.2d at 682. Although there was no testimony directly addressing whether the scheme could have continued without the mailings, such an inference was reasonable in light of the evidence presented. The evidence revealed lenders required their closing agents to have the deeds of trust executed at the closing, and required the deeds of trust to be promptly recorded and sent back to the lender. The evidence further established lenders preferred original copies of these recorded deeds of trust to facilitate the smooth securitization and marketing of the mortgages in the secondary market. Representatives from several lenders testified Ginnie Mae, the primary guarantor of FHA-insured loans, required lenders to provide the original deeds of trust to meet its certification requirements. A representative from Ginnie Mae testified Ginnie Mae required the original recorded deeds of trust to perfect its interest in the mortgage in the event of default. This evidence at trial highlighted the important role the deeds of trust played in insuring the marketability of FHA-insured loans. This ready marketability in turn enabled lenders to quickly sell their FHA-insured loans. The continued success of Weiss's scheme depended on his relationships with a small number of HUD-approved mortgage brokers, and their relationships with HUD-approved lenders. [3] These valued relationships were maintained through the appearance of legitimacy of Weiss's transactions, and the mailings of the original deeds of trust bolstered the legitimacy of these transactions from the lenders' perspective. Consequently, although each mailing may not have been essential to complete the loan with which it was associated, each mailing was essential to the continuation of the scheme. In its totality, the evidence was sufficient to allow a jury to reasonably conclude the charged mailings were indeed incident to an essential part of [Weiss's] scheme. Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 711, 109 S.Ct. 1443 (quotation omitted). [4]
The wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, prohibits transmissions by wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce for the purpose of executing a scheme to defraud. On appeal, Weiss argues there was insufficient evidence that he cause[d] the internet transmissions on which the wire fraud convictions were based. 18 U.S.C. § 1343. To establish the element of causation, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt Weiss had actual knowledge that the wires would be used in the ordinary course of business or that he reasonably should have foreseen such use. Pereira, 347 U.S. at 8-9, 74 S.Ct. 358; United States v. Roylance, 690 F.2d 164, 166 (10th Cir.1982) (holding the causation element is met when the defendant set forces in motion which foreseeably would involve mail uses.). [5] Weiss's wire fraud convictions rest upon five wire transmissions between mortgage brokers and the FHA requesting access to the Computerized Home Underwriting Management System (CHUMS) to generate an FHA case number for properties involved in Weiss's scheme. Weiss argues the government presented no evidence demonstrating he either had actual knowledge the brokers would send these transmissions in association with the loan applications or from which a reasonable jury could conclude he should have reasonably foreseen such transmissions. The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to allow the jury to reasonably infer Weiss intentionally applied for FHA-insured loans. Weiss was an experienced, licensed real estate broker who had at least two years of experience in transactions involving FHA loans. Weiss had access to the buyers' credit reports, and knew many would have difficulty qualifying for loans. However, he knew they could qualify for FHA-insured loans because he knew the HUD accepted alternative forms of credit documentation. As a result, Weiss specifically sought to work with FHA-approved loan brokers. He provided these mortgage brokers with fraudulent credit letters that specifically catered to the HUD's requirements for FHA loans. Furthermore, all of the loans in Weiss's scheme were federally insured and funded by HUD-approved lenders who maintained sponsor/correspondent relationships with HUD-approved mortgage brokers with whom Weiss worked. This evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to reasonably infer Weiss intended to apply for FHA-insured loans. A question remains as to whether the government met its burden of showing Weiss could have reasonably foreseen that these fraudulent applications for FHA-insured loans would cause the use of a wire transmission facility. There was no direct evidence Weiss had knowledge of the CHUMS system, or any knowledge of the specific protocols the mortgage brokers followed in processing the charged FHA loan applications. Weiss therefore argues he could not have reasonably foreseen the specific wire transmissions between the loan processors in Colorado and the FHA in Maryland. To establish causation, the government need not prove Weiss could have reasonably foreseen the specific wire transmissions requesting access to the CHUMS system. Rather, the government need only prove Weiss could have reasonably foreseen that the fraudulent FHA applications would result in the use of a wire communications facility. See, e.g., Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. at 8-9, 74 S.Ct. 358 (Where one does an act with knowledge that the use of the mails will follow in the ordinary course of business, or where such use can reasonably be foreseen, even though not actually intended, then he `causes' the mails to be used.); United States v. Ratliff-White, 493 F.3d 812, 818 (7th Cir.2007) (To satisfy the causation element, the government need only show that the defendant knew that some use of the wires would follow. Our case law does not require that a specific mailing or wire transmission be foreseen.); United States v. Pimental, 380 F.3d 575, 589 (1st Cir.2004) ([I]t is simply the `use of the mails' in the course of a scheme rather than the particular mailing at issue that must be reasonably foreseeable for the causation element of a mail fraud offense to be satisfied.); United States v. Bortnovsky, 879 F.2d 30, 38 (2d Cir.1989) ([W]hile [the defendants] may well not have anticipated that the adjuster would send the particular letter at issue, they undoubtedly could expect that the mails would be used to further and monitor their claim.); United States v. Bruckman, 874 F.2d 57, 60 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding the causation element was met by evidence from which the jury could conclude ... that some use of the mails was to be anticipated in the course of [the defendant's] scheme). [6] Accordingly, to establish the element of causation, the government need not prove Weiss had knowledge the specific wire transmissions charged in the indictment would follow in the ordinary course of business or that those transmissions were reasonably foreseeable. Rather, the government need only prove Weiss had knowledge of or could reasonably foresee that his fraudulent FHA applications would result in the use of a wire communications facility. Under the facts of this case, it was reasonable for the jury to conclude Weiss could have reasonably foreseen that wire communication facilities would be used to process his fraudulent applications for FHA-insured loans. Weiss regularly engaged in real estate transactions in his capacity as a licensed real estate broker. These transactions often involved out-of-state underwriters and lenders. Weiss regularly generated credit reports on potential buyers, and knew the FHA loan applications he submitted would result in the generation of additional credit reports. All of the evidence presented at trial regarding the generation of credit reports indicated wires were used in the process. Further, other evidence indicated Weiss's mortgage brokers often called him after pulling a borrower's credit report to inform him of any problems with the credit report or if the underwriters had additional requirements for a particular borrower. In addition, at each closing, Weiss signed a HUD settlement form which detailed the various funds that would be transferred at closing. These funds would generally arrive by wire, often from out-of-state underwriters. [7] In sum, this evidence allowed the jury to reasonably conclude Weiss could have reasonably foreseen that the use of wire communication facilities would follow in the wake of his fraudulent applications for FHA-insured loans.
The federal witness tampering statute makes it unlawful to corruptly persuade[ ] another person, or attempt[ ] to do so ... with intent to ... hinder, delay, or prevent the communication to a law enforcement officer or judge of the United States of information relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3). The corruptly persuades element of the witness tampering statute requires the government to prove a defendant's action was done voluntarily and intentionally to bring about false or misleading testimony or to prevent testimony with the hope or expectation of some benefit to the defendant or another person. United States v. Baldridge, 559 F.3d 1126, 1143 (10th Cir.2009) (quotation omitted); see also United States v. Khatami, 280 F.3d 907, 913 (9th Cir.2002) (holding non-coercive encouragement to lie falls within the reach of § 1512(b)); United States v. Farrell, 126 F.3d 484, 488 (3rd Cir.1997) (noting attempting to persuade someone to provide false information to federal investigators is punishable under § 1512(b)). The evidence at trial showed that Weiss, through his codefendant Jesus Guevara, asked three witnesses to lie to investigators about the true source of the down payments on the loans at issue in Counts 14-16. This evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, is sufficient to establish the corruptly persuades element of § 1512(b)(3). As to Count 14, Sergio Nunez testified Weiss told him there were some investigators that were going around asking questions whether they had paid for the down payment... and that if asked I should say that I had made the down payment. As to Count 15, Fernando Salazar testified that Weiss, through Guevara, told Salazar he should tell anyone who asked that Salazar himself was the source of the down payment, which was a lie. Finally, as to Count 16, Edgar Torres testified he was told by Weiss to tell anyone who asked that the down payment came from Torres's employment or savings. The evidence at trial established Weiss's conduct fell within the ambit of § 1512(b)(3) and was therefore sufficient to support the jury's verdict. Weiss additionally argues the witness tampering counts were improperly charged because they allowed the jury to convict him of persuading the witnesses to exercise their Fifth Amendment right to withhold self-incriminating information. Specifically, he argues Count 15 is insufficient because it charges only that he attempted to persuade Salazar not to say anything to investigators. In addition, he argues Counts 14 and 16 are equally defective because, as charged, the jury could convict Weiss either if it found he persuaded witnesses to lie about the source of the down payment or if it found he persuaded the witnesses not to talk to investigators. Weiss did not challenge the sufficiency of the indictment below. Thus, this court reviews Weiss's claim only for plain error. United States v. Barrett, 496 F.3d 1079, 1091-92 (10th Cir.2007). Plain error occurs when there is (1) error, (2) that is plain, which (3) affects substantial rights, and which (4) seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 732 (10th Cir.2005) (en banc) (quotation omitted). As to Counts 14 and 15, even assuming there was an error that is plain, Weiss cannot demonstrate that this error affected his substantial rights. An error only affects substantial rights when it is prejudicial, meaning that there is `a reasonable probability that, but for the error claimed, the result of the proceeding would have been different.' United States v. Algarate-Valencia, 550 F.3d 1238, 1242 (10th Cir.2008). As the government points out, there was no evidence presented at trial indicating Weiss told Nunez and Salazar, the witnesses at issue in Counts 14 and 15, not to talk to investigators. Rather, the evidence at trial established Weiss told both buyers to lie about the source of the down payment. The jury could only have convicted Weiss upon the testimony of both Nunez and Salazar that Weiss told them they should lie if asked about the source of the money for their down payments, and should specifically say they made the down payments with their own money. Accordingly, Weiss's challenges to Count 14 and 15 of the indictment fail because he cannot show any error affected his substantial rights. [8] Edgar Torres, the witness at issue in Count 16, on the other hand, testified Weiss attempted to persuade him to tell investigators: (1) he didn't know anything; (2) he shouldn't say anything regarding the purchase of the house; and (3) if asked, he should say the down payment came from [his] employment or savings, or something. Other circuits have held that requesting a witness to withhold information from investigators is insufficient to support a conviction under § 1512(b). See Farrell, 126 F.3d at 489 ([M]ore culpability is required for a statutory violation than that involved in the act of attempting to discourage disclosure in order to hinder an investigation.). If the jury instructions had left open the option of convicting Weiss solely based on his attempt to persuade Torres not to talk to investigators, this court would be required to determine whether such conduct was legally sufficient to support a conviction under § 1512(b). See Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 57-59, 59, 112 S.Ct. 466, 116 L.Ed.2d 371 (1991) (When ... jurors have been left the option of relying upon a legally inadequate theory, there is no reason to think that their own intelligence and expertise will save them from that error.). The jury instructions, however, foreclosed the jury from relying on this potentially inadequate legal theory. Jury Instruction 24 stated the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt [Weiss] corruptly persuaded or attempted to corruptly persuade [Torres]. The instruction also explained [o]nly persons conscious of wrongdoing can be said to knowingly corruptly persuade. Juries are presumed to follow the instructions they are given. Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234, 120 S.Ct. 727, 145 L.Ed.2d 727 (2000). The instructions here foreclosed the possibility the jury convicted Weiss of innocently persuading Torres to exercise his constitutional right to remain silent. Further, Torres testified Weiss instructed him not only to remain silent, but to lie and tell investigators he didn't know anything and, if asked, to tell them that he himself provided the down payment. In light of the evidence presented and the jury instruction given, Weiss cannot establish the language of the indictment pertaining to his witness tampering convictions satisfies the plain error standard.