Opinion ID: 518087
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Classes of Prospective Purchasers

Text: 52 As in some of our previous cases, we treat these three factors simultaneously. See Volkswagenwerk, 814 F.2d at 818. 53 The parties sell their shirts predominantly in Boston-area retail shops, at the exposition, and along the race course. Sales are largely seasonal, centering on the race date. The parties use the same general method of advertising: displays in store windows, in booths at the exposition, and along the race course. Prospective purchasers are drawn from the public at large. The shirts involved here retailed for about $7-10 and were sometimes sold under hectic conditions. Inexpensive items, bought by the casual purchaser, are not likely to be bought with great care. Courts have found less likelihood of confusion where goods are expensive and purchased after careful consideration. Pignons, 657 F.2d at 489; see also 3A Callman Sec. 20.10 at 60. 54 The virtual identity between the parties' sales outlets and advertising methods, as well as the purchasing public's lack of opportunity to exercise discrimination in making such purchases, all point toward a likelihood of confusion. 55 Before we move to the sixth factor, we must first address the district court's initial division of the purchasing public into two classes. In fashioning its preliminary injunction, the court split the purchasing public into a class of those interested enough in racing to attend the exposition and all others. It found that only the former were likely to connect BAA with the Boston Marathon, and thus, were the only ones likely to infer sponsorship of defendants' products by BAA. In its summary judgment decision, the court stated that there was a genuine issue as to the public's knowledge of BAA's sponsorship of the Marathon but that this issue was not material because resolution of the issue would not alter the outcome. 56 Distinctions based on expertise can be useful in analyzing likelihood of confusion, see, e.g., Astra, 718 F.2d at 1206-1207; Pignons, 657 F.2d at 489, but we find no reason for such a distinction here. Unlike the sophisticated hospital personnel involved in Astra or the expert camera buffs in Pignons, it is the general public that is the market for shirts commemorating the Boston Marathon. In making its distinction, the court appears to have reasoned as follows: defendants' logos mean Boston Marathon; Boston Marathon shirts imply sponsorship by someone; the public (as opposed to those who attend the exposition) does not know that BAA sponsors the Marathon; therefore, the public cannot infer that BAA sponsors defendants' shirts. 7 The key step in this reasoning--the public's lack of knowledge of BAA's sponsorship of the race--is not supported in the record. Indeed, the evidence is to the contrary. Plaintiffs submitted voluminous, uncontradicted evidence, in the form of numerous newspaper and magazine articles dating back to 1897, videotapes of television broadcasts, and encyclopedia entries, all showing that the public was continually exposed to the fact of BAA's sponsorship of the Boston Marathon. Defendants argue that the plaintiffs' evidence is not sufficient to show the public's knowledge because a public poll was not conducted. The lack of survey data, however, does not fatally undercut plaintiffs' claims. The defendants offered no evidence tending to contradict plaintiffs' assertions. Plaintiffs were not bound to a particular form of evidence. A poll might have been more accurate, but the lack of one does not nullify the evidence plaintiffs did introduce. 57 We find that no genuine issue of fact exists as to the public's general awareness of BAA's sponsorship of the Boston Marathon; there was, therefore, no reason to divide the purchasing public into two classes.