Opinion ID: 621257
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of Younger

Text: We conclude that Younger does not permit the state Attorney General to succeed in this attempt to preclude federal court examination of the constitutionality of a state statute. The MDA has a right to pursue its suit in federal court. The Attorney General pushes the Younger doctrine further than the Supreme Court or this court has ever extended it. While it is not an absolute that because the MDA is not a party to the state-court proceedings it may not be subjected to Younger, it would be an unjustified extension of Younger to treat the MDA as if it were such a party. At the very least, such an extension of Younger cannot be justified because there is no interference. Our holding is also consistent with the caselaw of the other circuits. To the extent the circuits have permitted non-parties to state proceedings to nevertheless be subject to Younger under some circumstances, those circumstances are not present here. For related reasons specified below, federal court adjudication of this suit would not interfere with the ongoing state proceedings. We need not address the other arguments the MDA makes.
The Attorney General's argument is based on the premise that the MDA and any of its individual members should be treated, for Younger purposes, as standing in each other's shoes. Distinct parties are typically treated separately for purposes of Younger abstention. This is illustrated by Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 39 L.Ed.2d 505 (1974). There, the Court held that when two protesters were warned to discontinue handbilling or they would be arrested, and one continued and was arrested and prosecuted, and the other was not arrested but could fear prosecution, the latter could maintain a federal suit and was not barred by Younger. The Court explained that [t]he pending prosecution of petitioner's handbilling companion does not affect petitioner's action for declaratory relief. Id. at 471 n. 19, 94 S.Ct. 1209. This conclusion accords with the Court's statement about our `deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court,' Richards v. Jefferson County, Alabama, 517 U.S. 793, 798, 116 S.Ct. 1761, 135 L.Ed.2d 76 (1996) (quoting 18 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 4449, at 417 (1981)), and the principle that federal court abstention from the exercise of otherwise-proper jurisdiction remains `the exception, not the rule,' NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 359, 109 S.Ct. 2506 (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 236, 104 S.Ct. 2321, 81 L.Ed.2d 186 (1984)). The Supreme Court has addressed in two cases whether distinct but very closely related parties should be treated the same for purposes of Younger abstention, but those cases do not lead us to extend Younger to the circumstances presented here. See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 95 S.Ct. 2281, 45 L.Ed.2d 223 (1975); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 95 S.Ct. 2561, 45 L.Ed.2d 648 (1975). In Hicks, two employees of an adult business were prosecuted for showing an obscene movie, and several of the obscene tapes were seized from the business. 422 U.S. at 335-36, 95 S.Ct. 2281. The Court found that the business whose employees were criminally prosecuted was barred from bringing suit by Younger, as the federal suit would have interfered with the state criminal prosecution, id. at 348, 95 S.Ct. 2281, but its reasons do not establish the principle the Attorney General advances. It is true the Court stated the business had a substantial stake in the state proceedings, so much so that they sought federal relief, demanding that the state statute be declared void and their films be returned to them. Obviously, their interests and those of their employees were intertwined; and, as we have pointed out, the federal action sought to interfere with the pending state prosecution. Id. at 348-49, 95 S.Ct. 2281. Even if this were dicta, as it may be for the reasons we describe, such dicta is given weight. See, e.g., SEC v. Rocklage, 470 F.3d 1, 7 n. 3 (1st Cir.2006) (Even dicta in Supreme Court opinions is looked on with great deference.). Immediately after this discussion, the Court identified an independent ground for finding the business subject to Younger : that the state had, subsequent to the filing of the federal suit, initiated criminal proceedings against the business, and that in such circumstances Younger should apply, as no proceedings of substance on the merits [had] taken place in the federal court. Hicks, 422 U.S. at 349, 95 S.Ct. 2281. Hicks must be understood in the context of Doran, which was decided six days later. There, three corporations operated topless bars, only one of which was criminally prosecuted under a new ordinance. 422 U.S. at 924-25, 95 S.Ct. 2561. The Court found that the corporation which the state criminally prosecuted could not bring suit due to Younger. Id. at 929, 95 S.Ct. 2561. More significantly for our purposes, the Court found that the other two corporations, who had similar, perhaps even identical interests, could bring suit and Younger did not apply. Id. at 931, 95 S.Ct. 2561. The Court explained: While there plainly may be some circumstances in which legally distinct parties are so closely related that they should all be subject to the Younger considerations which govern any one of them, this is not such a case;while respondents are represented by common counsel, and have similar business activities and problems, they are apparently unrelated in terms of ownership, control, and management. We thus think that each of the respondents should be placed in the position required by our cases as if that respondent stood alone. Id. at 928-29, 95 S.Ct. 2561. As a second reason not to engage in Younger abstention, the Doran Court explained that neither declaratory nor injunctive relief could interfere with enforcement of contested statutes or ordinances except with respect to the particular federal plaintiffs, and the State is free to prosecute others who may violate the statute. Id. at 931, 95 S.Ct. 2561. Doran makes clear that an alignment of interests among similar but distinct parties is not per se enough, even when the state proceeding is a criminal prosecution and so the state's interest in non-interference is at its height. If two businesses were not barred from pursuing a federal suit despite having interests and representation in common with a state-court criminal defendant, as was the case in Doran, it is difficult to see how an industry association with some interests in common with a few of its members who are state-court civil defendants would be barred by Younger from pursuing its own federal suit. Doran explained that the parties must be so closely related to justify treating them the same before they may all be subject to the Younger considerations which govern any one of them. Id. at 928, 95 S.Ct. 2561. There is no doubt that the MDA is legally distinct from its members, each complying with the formalities established by state law. The MDA and each of its members have their own interests, which may at times be similar to those of some or all of the members, but which may not be the same. Some members may have interests distinct from or even adverse to other members. It is likely that the MDA is responsive to a majority of its members, when there are different views. And here, not even a majority is involved in the state-court suits against three members. Only a small fractionthree out of over fortyof its members are involved in the state court proceedings where § 148B is at issue. Those of its members who are not involved in such proceedings have an interest in a determination of whether § 148B is pre-empted, and the complaint so alleges. The complaint alleges that because many MDA members engage independent contractor delivery drivers or contract with entities that engage independent contractor delivery drivers, they arguably violate the Statute and this places them in peril of an enforcement action and civil actions by private parties. Under these circumstances, neither Hicks nor Doran, justifies treating the MDA the same as its members who are state-court defendants for Younger purposes. Hicks involved (1) a close employer-employee relationship between the federal-court plaintiff and state-court defendant, (2) a particular piece of property at issue in both proceedings, and (3) a federal action that sought to interfere with the pending state prosecution. 422 U.S. at 348-49, 95 S.Ct. 2281. Here, none of those circumstances is present: there is no such relationship, no particular piece of property at issue, and, as is explained below, no risk of interference. Some circuits applying Hicks have found Younger applicable to non-parties where the federal-court plaintiff's right was derivative of the right of a state-court defendant, finding the interests of the parties to be intertwined in such circumstances. See Citizens for a Strong Ohio v. Marsh, 123 Fed.Appx. 630, 635 (6th Cir.2005) ( Younger abstention may also be appropriate for non-parties to the state action when `[s]uccess on the merits ... is entirely derivative' of the rights of the state action parties. (alterations in original) (quoting Spargo v. N.Y. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 351 F.3d 65, 83 (2d Cir.2003)); D.L. v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 497, 392 F.3d 1223, 1230 (10th Cir.2004) ([W]hen in essence only one claim is at stake and the legally distinct party to the federal proceeding is merely an alter ego of a party in state court, Younger applies.); Spargo, 351 F.3d at 83 ( Younger applies where the federal-court plaintiff's claim is entirely derivative of whatever rights that the state-court defendant may have (internal quotation mark omitted)); Stivers v. Minnesota, 575 F.2d 200, 203 (8th Cir.1978) ( Younger applies to non-party where [t]he only [federal-court] standing ... demonstrated ... arises from the alleged impact of the challenged action on the state-court defendants). We need not comment on whether we agree these cases were properly decided, as even assuming they were, their rationale does not apply here. As explained above, the MDA members who are not state court defendantsthe vast majority of MDA's membershave an interest in determining the constitutionality of the state law. The MDA itself has a distinct interest in challenging the Ordinance. [7] As a result, the MDA's basis for bringing suit is not entirely derived from those of its members who are state-court defendants, and this line of cases does not justify applying Younger here. Doran also does not extend to the circumstances present here. There, the Court stated that there may be some circumstances where parties are so closely related in terms of ownership, control, and management to be treated the same for Younger purposes. 422 U.S. at 928-29, 95 S.Ct. 2561. The MDA and its members, who are state-court defendants, on the facts present here are not so closely related to justify treating them the same under Younger : only a small fraction of MDA members are state-court defendants, and the Attorney General makes no claim of any substantial ownership, management, or control between the state-court defendants and the MDA. Indeed, those circuits to have applied Doran to non-defendants have only found organizations to be sufficiently closely related if the degree of ownership, management or control is substantial and involves at least a majority interest. See Cedar Rapids Cellular Tel., L.P. v. Miller, 280 F.3d 874, 882 (8th Cir.2002) (applying Younger to a non-party in whom a state-court defendant had a controlling interest); Warmus v. Melahn, 62 F.3d 252, 256 (8th Cir.1995) (applying Younger where the non-party individual was the beneficial owner, officer and director of the state-court defendant corporation), vacated on other grounds, 517 U.S. 1241, 116 S.Ct. 2493, 135 L.Ed.2d 187 (1996). Not all circuits agree with even that formulation. See Bickham v. Lashof, 620 F.2d 1238, 1244 (7th Cir.1980) (finding the interests of a corporation, which was the state-court defendant, and its sole shareholder to be insufficiently intertwined to justify applying Younger to the shareholder). We need not decide whether we agree with the first line of cases because no such ownership or control relationship is present here. [8] Further, the one circuit which has addressed a more analogous situation has held that Younger does not apply in such circumstances. See Citizens for a Better Env't, Inc. v. Nassau County, 488 F.2d 1353, 1360-61 (2d Cir.1973) (holding that Younger does not bar an organization's challenge to anti-solicitation ordinances notwithstanding pending proceedings against its members because the organization's interests lie in the future applicability of the ordinances). Significantly, the circuits are in accord that the application of Younger to non-parties is proper only in certain limited, exceptional circumstances. See Spargo, 351 F.3d at 84 ([T]his case presents one of the narrow circumstances in which Younger may properly extend to bar claims of third-parties who are not directly involved in the pending state action.); Green, 255 F.3d at 1100 (explaining that Younger applies to non-parties in quite limited circumstances); Harmon v. City of Kansas City, Mo., 197 F.3d 321, 325-26 (8th Cir.1999) ( Younger may apply to non-parties in extraordinary circumstances); United States v. Composite State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 656 F.2d 131, 137 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) ([A]bstention bars prospective relief to a person not a party to the state action only in the extraordinary situation in which the interests of the state defendant and the federal plaintiff are so `intertwined' as to be considered identical.); Robinson v. Stovall, 646 F.2d 1087, 1090 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981) (Except in extraordinary circumstances, a civil rights plaintiff's ability to sue to vindicate his rights in federal court is not affected by the simultaneous pendency of a state prosecution against someone else....). In sum, neither the Supreme Court nor the other circuits have extended Younger abstention to these facts. [9] Nor do the rationales provided by the Court in Hicks and Doran justify the application of Younger here. There is no indication that the Court would extend Younger 's application to non-parties to such circumstances, [10] and such a result would go beyond the outer limits to which the other circuits have extended Younger. What is conclusive is that in these circumstances the Younger interference requirement has not been met.
It is also clear on these facts that there is no real risk of interference with the three ongoing private civil actions in the state courts. Younger abstention is based, in large measure, on the seriousness of federal judicial interference with ongoing state-court proceedings. Huffman, 420 U.S. at 603, 95 S.Ct. 1200; accord Maymó-Meléndez v. Álvarez-Ramírez, 364 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir.2004) ( Younger is ... built around the principle that ... federal courts should refrain from issuing injunctions that interfere with ongoing state-court litigation....). As a result, where neither declaratory nor injunctive relief can directly interfere with the ongoing state proceedings, there is no basis for Younger abstention. Doran, 422 U.S. at 931, 95 S.Ct. 2561; accord Rio Grande, 397 F.3d at 70 ( Younger applies only when the relief asked of the federal court `interfere[s]' with the state proceedings. (alteration in original) (quoting Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 716, 116 S.Ct. 1712)); Green, 255 F.3d at 1096 (The Supreme Court has ... confirmed that `interference' with ongoing state judicial proceedings is a necessary condition for Younger abstention.). Interference is usually expressed as a proceeding that either enjoins the state proceeding or has the `practical effect' of doing so. Rio Grande, 397 F.3d at 70. Nothing in the MDA's requested relief would interfere with the three state-court proceedings involving its members. The prospective injunctive relief sought pertains solely to the Attorney General, and would only preclude the Commonwealth, not private parties, from bringing suit under § 148B(a)(2) with respect to motor carriers engaged in interstate commerce. [11] The declaratory relief sought would also not cause any interference with the state-court proceedings. It is true that the MDA seeks a general declaration that subsection (a)(2) is pre-empted with respect to motor carriers engaged in interstate commerce. The Supreme Court has made clear that is not a basis to invoke Younger. In Steffel and in Doran, the outcomes of the federal suits would create judicial precedent which might or might not coincide with the determinations made by the state courts as to other parties under the same state statutes. That did not warrant Younger abstention. Indeed, the Court in NOPSI made clear that even though the federal court's disposition of such a case may well affect, or for practical purposes pre-empt, a future or, as in the present circumstances, even a pendingstate-court action, such an effect was insufficient to give rise to Younger abstention. 491 U.S. at 373, 109 S.Ct. 2506; see also Rio Grande, 397 F.3d at 71 ([T]he mere possibility of inconsistent results in the future is insufficient to justify Younger abstention.); Green, 255 F.3d at 1097 (explaining that the `mere potential for conflict in the results of adjudications,' is not the kind of `interference' that merits federal court abstention (quoting Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 816, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976))). Beyond that, there is another reason there is no interference here. As a practical matter, the [s]tate courts are not bound by the dictates of the lower federal courts, although they are free to rely on the opinions of such courts when adjudicating federal claims. Evans v. Thompson, 518 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.2008) (citing Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 376, 113 S.Ct. 838, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring)); accord Steffel, 415 U.S. at 482 n. 3, 94 S.Ct. 1209 (Rhenquist, J., concurring) (explaining that a federal declaratory judgment would not be accorded the stare decisis effect in state court that it would have in a subsequent proceeding within the same federal jurisdiction. Although the state court would not be compelled to follow the federal holding, the opinion might, of course, be viewed as highly persuasive.); Magouirk v. Phillips, 144 F.3d 348, 361 (5th Cir.1998) ([T]he Louisiana state courts are not bound by Fifth Circuit precedent when making a determination of federal law.); Bromley v. Crisp, 561 F.2d 1351, 1354 (10th Cir.1977) (en banc) (holding that state courts may express their differing views on the retroactivity problem or similar federal questions until we are all guided by a binding decision of the Supreme Court); United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072, 1076 (7th Cir.1970) ([B]ecause lower federal courts exercise no appellate jurisdiction over state tribunals, decisions of lower federal courts are not conclusive on state courts.); Owsley v. Peyton, 352 F.2d 804, 805 (4th Cir.1965) (Though state courts may for policy reasons follow the decisions of the Court of Appeals whose circuit includes their state, they are not obliged to do so. (citation omitted)). [12] As a matter of state law, Massachusetts state courts do not regard the pronouncements of lower federal courts as binding. ACE Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Comm'r of Revenue, 437 Mass. 241, 770 N.E.2d 980, 986 n. 8 (2002) (Although we are not bound by decisions of Federal courts (other than the United States Supreme Court) on matters of federal law, `we give respectful consideration to such lower Federal court decisions as seem persuasive.' (citation omitted) (quoting Commonwealth v. Hill, 377 Mass. 59, 385 N.E.2d 253, 255 (1979))); Commonwealth v. Montanez, 388 Mass. 603, 447 N.E.2d 660, 661 (1983) (Though we always treat their decisions with deference, we are not bound by decisions of Federal courts except the decisions of the United States Supreme Court on questions of Federal law.). Thus, should the district court issue a declaratory judgment on remand finding the state statute pre-empted, that judgment would not be binding on Massachusetts state courts and litigation by private parties may proceed. That said, a defendant may seek to enforce the declaratory judgment in federal court should the Attorney General continue to bring actions under the statute in state court despite the declaratory judgment. The Attorney General does not argue that a federal decision could result in collateral estoppel effects that would amount to interference with the state proceedings. Even if such collateral estoppel effects were present, they would not suffice to justify Younger abstention. Rio Grande, 397 F.3d at 71 (Normal res judicata effects of federal actions on state actions ... are of course not enough to trigger Younger. ). Given this lack of any interference with the state-court proceedings, Younger abstention is inapplicable. [13]