Opinion ID: 569313
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Right to Object under the RLA

Text: 43 In the agency shop context, the RLA, and the judicial interpretation of it, extend the right to object only to nonmember employees. The Court found the right to object for involuntary members of union shops by construing the RLA to authorize unions to compel fees only for the duties placed upon them by the RLA, namely, collective bargaining activities. In the absence of § 2, Eleventh, the unions could not have obtained any money from employees who chose not to be members of the union, Street, 367 U.S. at 762, 770, 81 S.Ct. at 1796, 1800, therefore the unions could only use this coerced money for the limited purpose for which § 2, Eleventh was enacted--to solve the free rider problem by sharing the costs of negotiating and administering collective agreements, and the costs of the adjustment and settlement of disputes. Id. at 764, 81 S.Ct. at 1797. The rationale, elucidated in Street, struck a balance. If coerced employees had to pay for the union's political activities, it would mean that Congress sanctioned an expansion of historical practices in the political area by the rail unions. Id. at 770, 81 S.Ct. at 1800. The Court refused to allow unions greater power to collect money but also declined to curtail the traditional political activities of the railroad unions. Id. The Street Court held that its holding meant only that those unions must not support those activities, against the expressed wishes of a dissenting employee, with his exacted money. Id. 44 The reasoning behind Street goes far to dissolve Kidwell's argument. Where the employee has a choice of union membership and the employee chooses to join, the union membership money is not coerced. The employee is a union member voluntarily. Moreover, to find that the union may not collect money for political activities from its members would curtail the political activities traditionally funded by voluntary union membership prior to the enactment of the RLA. Id. at 750-51, 770, 81 S.Ct. at 1790-91, 1800. 45 The Street rationale remains valid. Even after Abood with its First Amendment analysis, 9 the Court returned in Ellis to base the right for nonmembers to object in the RLA. The Court echoed Street: Congress' essential justification for authorizing the union shop was the desire to eliminate free riders--employees in the bargaining unit on whose behalf the union was obliged to perform its statutory functions, but who refused to contribute to the cost thereof. 466 U.S. at 447, 104 S.Ct. at 1892. The Ellis Court emphasized that because [o]nly a union that is certified as the exclusive bargaining agent ..., id. at 447-48, 104 S.Ct. at 1892, could collect fees, [u]ntil such a contract is executed, no dues and fees may be collected from objecting employees who are not members of the union.... Id. at 448, 104 S.Ct. at 1892. Thus, once again the Court reasoned that the union's right to collect money from objecting nonmembers arose only because of the RLA, and therefore the RLA limited an objecting nonmember employee's burden under § 2, Eleventh to expenditures necessarily or reasonably incurred for the purpose of performing the duties of an exclusive representative of the employees in dealing with the employer on labor-management issues. Id. 46 That the right to object is intended to benefit only nonmembers-those employees who, in the absence of the collective bargaining arrangements, would prefer not to be involved at all with the union-is demonstrated by Beck, decided under the parallel provision in the NLRA, § 8(a)(3). In Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 108 S.Ct. 2641, 101 L.Ed.2d 634 (1988), the Court found the political objection limitation of the RLA present in the NLRA. 10 The Court read Street to hold that s 2, Eleventh of the RLA does not permit a union, over the objections of nonmembers, to expend compelled agency fees on political causes. 487 U.S. at 745, 108 S.Ct. at 2648 (emphasis added). It read Ellis to hold that  'Congress' essential justification for authorizing the union shop' limits the expenditures that may properly be charged to nonmembers under § 2, Eleventh to those 'necessarily or reasonably incurred for the purpose of performing the duties of an exclusive [bargaining] representative.'  Id. at 752, 108 S.Ct. at 2652 (emphasis added) (quoting Ellis, 466 U.S. at 447-48, 104 S.Ct. at 1892). 47 Moreover, the Court repeatedly suggested that § 8(a)(3) was concerned with the rights of nonmembers who are compelled to pay union dues.... Id., 487 U.S. at 758, 108 S.Ct. at 2655 (emphasis in original). For example, the petitioners had argued that Congress' rejection of a House bill that suggested regulation of union finances was significant in interpreting § 8(a)(3). The Court distinguished the bill by explaining that it had sought to establish a 'bill of rights for union members ' vis-a-vis their union leaders, and addressed internal union affairs rather than the rights of nonmembers. Id. at 758, 108 S.Ct. at 2655 (emphasis in original). The Court added, Congress understood § 8(a)(3) to afford nonmembers adequate protection by authorizing the collection of only those fees necessary to finance collective-bargaining activities.... Id. at 759, 108 S.Ct. at 2655. And it concluded that Congress understood § 8(a)(3) simply to enable unions to charge nonmembers only for those activities that actually benefit them. Id. at 760, 108 S.Ct. at 2656. 11 48 Although Beck was decided under the NLRA, the Court relied heavily on the RLA and cases construing it. Id. at 745-46, 750-56, 761-62, 108 S.Ct. at 2648-49, 2650-54, 2656-57. Indeed, the Court stated that § 8(a)(3) of the NLRA and § 2, Eleventh of the RLA had parallel purpose[s], structure, and language and should be interpreted in the same manner. Id. at 752, 108 S.Ct. at 2652. We thus find highly persuasive Beck 's extension only to nonmembers of the right to object. 49 Although the compelled nature of nonmember contributions justifies limiting them to the collective bargaining activities contemplated by the RLA, nothing in the RLA supports such a limit on contributions by voluntary union members. Of course, members' contributions are statutorily limited in the federal election area. One section of the laws governing federal election campaigns requires contributions or expenditures from unions to federal elections to be voluntarily obtained from informed union members. 2 U.S.C. § 441b; see Pipefitters v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 92 S.Ct. 2247, 33 L.Ed.2d 11 (1972); American Fed. of Labor & Cong. of Ind. Orgs. (AFL-CIO) v. Federal Election Comm'n, 628 F.2d 97 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 982, 101 S.Ct. 397, 66 L.Ed.2d 244 (1980). But that limitation appears to be the only one on members' contributions to the union for political activities. Congress was fully conversant with the long history of intensive involvement of the railroad unions in political activities. Street, 367 U.S. at 767, 81 S.Ct. at 1799. Congress was well aware of the broad scope of traditional union activities, Ellis, 466 U.S. at 446, 104 S.Ct. at 1891, and that unions had historically expended funds in the support of political candidates and issues. Id. at 447, 104 S.Ct. at 1891. In light of this knowledge, the absence of further explicit restrictions on membership fees is notable. See Beck, 487 U.S. at 756-61, 108 S.Ct. at 2654-56. 50 Kidwell, however, argues the enactment of the RLA gave the union power over the conditions of her employment and so her decision about union membership can no longer be understood as truly voluntary. According to the district judge, without union membership, as merely an agency shop member, she has to give up the following rights or privileges: 51 1. Voting on the representatives who are given the exclusive right to negotiate her terms of employment. 52 2. Voting on the terms and conditions of employment that the Union representatives negotiate and to which she will be subjected. 53 3. Participating in the resolution of disputes over conditions of employment.Although we understand Kidwell's desire to participate in those activities, the RLA does not contemplate the direct employee participation that Kidwell claims. Moreover, the RLA assures that all employees, regardless of union membership, obtain the same benefits. 54 The first privilege, the right to vote on collective bargaining representatives, Kidwell cannot actually even relinquish. The RLA guarantees to each employee the right to vote on the exclusive collective bargaining representative. Section 2, Second, Third, Fourth, and Ninth state that employees  vote on the collective bargaining representative. 45 U.S.C. § 152. The Court has explained the role of the bargaining representative under parallel provisions in the NLRA: 55 [The NLRB] exemplifies the faith of Congress in free collective bargaining between employers and their employees when conducted by freely and fairly chosen representatives of appropriate units of employees.... Any authority to negotiate derives its principal strength from a delegation to the negotiators of a discretion to make such concessions and accept such advantages as, in the light of all relevant considerations, they believe will best serve the interests of the parties represented.... A bargaining representative ... often is a labor organization but it is not essential that it be such. The employees represented often are members of the labor organization which represents them at the bargaining table, but it is not essential that they be such. The bargaining representative, whoever it may be, is responsible to, and owes complete loyalty to, the interests of all whom it represents. 56 Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337-38, 73 S.Ct. 681, 686, 97 L.Ed. 1048 (1953). If any dispute shall arise among a carrier's employees as to who are the representatives of such employees designated and authorized, the Mediation Board must investigate and certify the name or names of the individuals or organizations that have been designated.... Section 2, Ninth. To carry out this duty, the Board can require a secret poll of all employees. Thus all employees vote on the individual or organization designated the collective bargaining representative. 57 Apparently what Kidwell dislikes is that, in the present case, the employees vote to designate the union and then the union votes on a particular individual or individuals to represent the union. If Kidwell is not a union member, then admittedly she has no vote on the union's internal delegation. But Kidwell's inability to vote on the internal delegation if she relinquishes union membership does not deprive her of her initial vote. The process appears to be an acceptable and expected delegation of authority from all employees to the union and then to a smaller decision-making group within the union. If Kidwell objects to the designation of the union in the first place, she has remedies. She can convince a majority of her coworkers to vote only for specific individuals rather than the union or for some other union or association. 58 The second privilege, ratification of the terms and conditions of employment negotiated, follows from the internal union delegation. When a union votes to choose an individual or individuals to negotiate the terms and conditions of employment, union ratification of the negotiated agreement appears to be a proper method of delegating and reconfirming the union's authority. The process of delegation and ratification has long been held in this country to be an appropriate process when one wants to assure that the body politic has approved the issue. U.S. Const. art. V. The best way for the union to fulfill its responsibility as collective bargaining representative may be by delegation and ratification. Once again, if Kidwell dislikes choosing an entire union as the bargaining representative and the union's subsequent internal delegation and ratification, she can convince the majority of employees to select an individual or an independent group as the collective bargaining representative. 59 In fact, the Court has rejected a similar argument about ratification under the NLRA when made by a company. In NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 78 S.Ct. 718, 2 L.Ed.2d 823 (1958), the Court held that an employer could not require that the union as the collective bargaining representative agree to a ballot clause under which all employees, union and nonunion, would vote by secret ballot on the acceptance of the company's final offer. Id. at 343-44, 78 S.Ct. at 720. The Court explained, 60 The 'ballot' clause ... deals only with relations between the employees and their unions. It substantially modifies the collective bargaining system provided for in the statute by weakening the independence of the 'representative' chosen by the employees. It enables the employer, in effect, to deal with its employees rather than with their statutory representative. 61 Id. at 350, 78 S.Ct. at 723. The reasoning of Wooster would seem equally to apply to a case brought by an employee under the RLA. 62 The third privilege Kidwell claims, participation in the resolution of disputes, is delegated to the exclusive bargaining representative as an inherent part of the RLA scheme. Once the employees have voted on a collective bargaining representative, that representative has a duty fairly to represent all employees. See Steele, 323 U.S. at 201-02, 65 S.Ct. at 231. That representative, bound by the duty of fair representation, has broad authority under the RLA. Id. The second provision of the RLA states that [a]ll disputes between a carrier ... and its ... employees shall be considered, and if possible, decided, with all expedition, in conference between representatives designated and authorized so to confer.... 45 U.S.C. § 152, Second. Similarly, the sixth provision states that disputes arising out of grievances or the interpretation of agreements are to be decided between the designated representative ... of such employees and the carrier. Id., Sixth. The entire plan of the RLA is to reduce labor problems by requiring a single representative of the employees and the carrier to settle issues. Street, 367 U.S. at 760, 81 S.Ct. at 1795; Hanson, 351 U.S. at 233-34, 76 S.Ct. at 718-19. Thus, the NLRA and the RLA give[ ] a bargaining representative not only wide responsibility but authority to meet that responsibility. Huffman, 345 U.S. at 339, 73 S.Ct. at 686-87; see Steele, 323 U.S. at 202, 65 S.Ct. at 232. 63 Moreover, the Court has upheld a union's decisions to limit these exact issues to union members under parallel provisions in the NLRA. For example, in NLRB v. Financial Inst. Employees, 475 U.S. 192, 106 S.Ct. 1007, 89 L.Ed.2d 151 (1986), the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) had required the union to permit nonmember employees to vote on the union's decision to affiliate. On appeal, the NLRB did not even argue that all employees must be allowed to participate in the affiliation process; it argued only that requiring that all employees vote was a reasonable way to protect the right to select a bargaining representative. The Supreme Court rejected even the NLRB's narrow argument. The Court explained that, in the absence of the issue of whether a majority of the employees continued to support the affiliated union, the NLRB violated the policy Congress incorporated into the Act against outside interference in union decisionmaking. Id. at 204, 106 S.Ct. at 1014. The Court continued by observing that the effect on representation was no different from the many decisions made by the union that  'affect' its representation of nonmember employees. Id. at 205, 106 S.Ct. at 233. The Court explained, It may decide to call a strike, ratify a collective-bargaining agreement, or select union officers and bargaining representatives. Id. at 205, 106 S.Ct. at 233. We pause to emphasize that Kidwell has claimed a right to participate in those same issues. The Court concluded, 64 [T]he Act allows union members to control the shape and direction of their organization, and [n]on-union employees have no voice in the affairs of the union. We repeat, dissatisfaction with the decisions union members make may be tested by a Board-conducted representation election only if it is unclear whether the reorganized union retains majority support. 65 Id. at 205-06, 106 S.Ct. at 233 (citation omitted). 66 Kidwell's claim depends on an employee's right to participate in all aspects of all decisions related to conditions of employment. As discussed above, however, the rights accorded an individual employee under the RLA are not so infinite. The employee, regardless of union membership, has the right to vote on the collective bargaining representative. The employee, regardless of union membership, has the right to be represented fairly and heard by the collective bargaining representative. But, if the majority of all employees should choose a union as representative, the employee does not have the right to participate in each and every aspect of the union's internal actions in carrying out its duties as representative. 67 Therefore, at least so far as the RLA is concerned, the union can offer every employee two choices: (1) union membership, and with it, if the union is elected collective bargaining representative, a right to vote on the internal delegation of collective bargaining power, the ratification of the negotiated agreement, and any political or other cause in which the union by majority vote decides to participate but with the responsibility for paying complete dues or (2) a nonmembership with the right to vote on whether the union should be the collective bargaining representative and responsible, if the union is so elected, for paying only the portion of the dues related to collective bargaining activities. The union's refusal to allow objections by members does not violate the RLA. 68