Opinion ID: 3038167
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: attorneys’ fees award to drescher

Text: Elwood argues that Drescher, as a pro se attorney- defendant, is not entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees under § 1988. This issue requires us to determine whether Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227, 230-31 (9th Cir. 1980), in which we upheld the award of fees to a pro se attorney-defendant, remains good law in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432 (1991). In Kay, a pro se attorney-plaintiff sought attorney’s fees under § 1988 for the successful prosecution of a civil rights claim. It was undisputed that “a pro se litigant who is not a lawyer is not entitled to attorney’s fees,” and the question therefore was whether an attorney who represents himself should be treated differently. Id. at 435. The statutory text did not provide a clear answer, because “[o]n the one hand, petitioner is an ‘attorney’ . . . . On the other hand, the word ‘attorney’ assumes an agency relationship, and it seems likely that Congress contemplated an attorney-client relationship as the predicate for an award under § 1988.” Id. at 435-36. [1] The Court turned to the purpose of the statute, and found that “the overriding statutory concern” of § 1988 was to promote “independent counsel for victims of civil rights violations.” Id. at 437. Independent counsel would help filter out meritless civil rights claims, but more importantly, the Court found that the statute was intended to ensure “the effective prosecution of meritorious claims.” Id. “The statutory policy of furthering the successful prosecution of meritorious 8474 ELWOOD v. DRESCHER claims is better served by a rule that creates an incentive to retain counsel in every such case.” Id. at 438. Accordingly, the Court held that § 1988 did not authorize the award of fees to pro se litigants, even if they were attorneys. Id. at 437-38. Here, the district court distinguished Kay, noting that the facts in that case dealt with a pro se attorney-plaintiff, while Drescher was a pro se attorney-defendant, stating: The [Supreme] Court’s analysis centered around the policy reasons for providing attorney’s fees to a prevailing plaintiff — i.e. an interest in obtaining independent counsel for victims of civil rights violations. The Court found that “Congress was interested in ensuring the effective prosecution of meritorious claims.” These same policy considerations do not exist when the pro per attorney litigant is a prevailing defendant rather than a prevailing plaintiff. Ensuring that a defendant-attorney obtains counsel does [not]4 help to filter meritless claims nor ensure vigorous prosecution of meritorious ones. In contrast, awarding attorneys fees to prevailing defendants protects them from burdensome litigation with no legal or factual basis. [2] While we recognize that the policy considerations affecting a pro se attorney-defendant differ from those relevant to a pro se attorney-plaintiff, we find Kay to be controlling here for several reasons. First, although the facts of Kay involved a pro se attorney-plaintiff, the decision sweeps broadly, appearing to apply to pro se litigants generally. See, e.g., id. at 435 (“We granted certiorari to resolve . . . whether 4 Based on the overall conclusion of the district court, and the use of the word “nor” in this sentence, it appears that the district court made a typographical error and inadvertently omitted “not.” ELWOOD v. DRESCHER 8475 a pro se litigant who is also a lawyer may be awarded attorney’s fees under § 1988.”); id. at 438 (“A rule that authorizes awards of counsel fees to pro se litigants—even if limited to those who are members of the bar . . . .”). Nothing in the Kay opinion suggests that it was intended to apply only to pro se attorney-plaintiffs; instead, it appears to deny attorneys’ fees generally to all pro se litigants, including pro se litigants who are attorneys. [3] Second, this broad reading is consistent with the decisions we have found on this issue. While there are no published appellate decisions applying Kay to deny § 1988 fees to a pro se attorney-defendant, two district court opinions have done so. Copus v. City of Edgerton, 959 F. Supp. 1047, 1052 (W.D. Wis. 1997) (denying attorney’s fees for pro se attorney-defendant under § 1988), rev’d on other grounds, 151 F.3d 646 (7th Cir. 1998); Prewitt v. Alexander, 173 F.R.D. 438, 440 (N.D. Miss. 1996) (“only those defendants represented by counsel may recover attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988”), aff’d, 114 F.3d 1183 (5th Cir. 1997) (unpublished). In Prewitt, the court, while acknowledging that the policy considerations involving a pro se attorney-defendant are different from those of a pro se attorney-plaintiff, could find no support for awarding fees under § 1988. Id. at 441 n.3. The force of the court’s analysis was limited, however, as it concluded that fees could be awarded on other grounds. Id. [4] Courts have also viewed Kay as precluding the award of fees to pro se attorney-defendants under other fee shifting statutes. See Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 398-400 (4th Cir. 2003) (applying Kay to 17 U.S.C. § 505, but ultimately concluding that law firm defendants were not pro se and instead were represented by in house counsel); DiPaolo v. Moran, 277 F. Supp. 2d 528, 536 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (applying Kay to Rule 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927 to deny attorney’s fees for pro se attorney-defendant). While none of these decisions engaged in lengthy analysis of whether pro se attorneydefendants should be treated differently from pro se attorney8476 ELWOOD v. DRESCHER plaintiffs, all have considered Kay as applying to both. This helps to confirm our view that Kay imposes a general rule that pro se litigants, attorneys or not, cannot recover statutory attorneys’ fees. [5] Finally, we note that some of the policy considerations discussed in Kay would be served by encouraging independent counsel for defendants. Kay described the disadvantages present when a lawyer represents himself in litigation. Ethical considerations may make it inappropriate for him to appear as a witness. He is deprived of the judgment of an independent third party in framing the theory of the case . . . and in making sure that reason, rather than emotion, dictates the proper tactical response . . . . The adage that “a lawyer who rep- resents himself has a fool for a client” is the product of years of experience by seasoned litigators. Kay, 499 U.S. at 437-38. We think that resort to independent counsel for defendants, as well as plaintiffs, serves the statutory policy of ensuring effective prosecution of meritorious civil rights cases. Effective prosecution could suffer where a pro se attorney-defendant is too emotionally and personally involved in contested litigation to respond rationally. Such a defendant could be incapable of exercising independent judgment and could needlessly engage in dilatory or obstructionist litigation tactics. [6] We conclude that the award of attorneys’ fees to Drescher must be vacated.