Opinion ID: 2559104
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Then

Text: On June 16, 1999, Then pleaded guilty in Supreme Court to criminal sale of a controlled substance in the second degree (Penal Law § 220.41 [1]), a class A-II felony. On June 30, 1999, Supreme Court sentenced Then to an indeterminate prison term of five years to life; on October 8, 2002, he was released to parole supervision. In December 2002barely two months laterThen was again arrested and indicted on drug charges. On July 8, 2003, he pleaded guilty in Supreme Court to criminal possession of a controlled substance in the second degree (Penal Law § 220.18 [1]), another class A-II felony, in full satisfaction of the indictment; on July 29, 2003, Supreme Court sentenced him as a second felony offender to an indeterminate prison term of six years to life. On August 8, 2003, Then's parole on the 1999 conviction was revoked based on the July conviction, and a time assessment of five months and 26 days was imposed. [2] Citing the 2005 DLRA, on December 12, 2005 Then moved in Supreme Court for resentencing on his 1999 conviction; he requested a determinate term of three years. He subsequently also applied for resentencing on his 2003 conviction, this time asking Supreme Court to resentence him to a determinate term of six years. Then argued that he was entitled to consideration for resentencing on the 1999 and 2003 convictions because he was in the Department of Correctional Services' (DOCS) custody, had been convicted of two class A-II drug felonies, and was more than three years away from his parole eligibility date. The People did not contest Then's eligibility for resentencing for the 2003 conviction; however, they argued that he did not qualify for resentencing for the 1999 conviction because he had already been released on parole in 2002 for that conviction. In a decision and order dated April 10, 2006, Supreme Court ruled in Then's favor. Supreme Court concluded that while various lower court decisions . . . have concerned issues similar to that currently before this court (citations omitted), Then's case was [u]nique because he was currently in the custody of the Department of Corrections on two separate A-II felony convictions, albeit, his incarceration on the [1999 conviction was the] result of a parole violation resulting from his second A-II conviction; and that the purposes underlying the drug reform act call[ed] for eligibility in [Then's] case. On April 24, 2006, Supreme Court resentenced Then to a determinate term of five years' imprisonment and a five-year period of postrelease supervision for the 1999 conviction, to run concurrently with a determinate term of six years' imprisonment and a five-year period of postrelease supervision for the 2003 conviction. The People appealed, and the Appellate Division unanimously reversed and reinstated Then's original sentence for the 1999 conviction. The court reasoned that Then's release to parole in 2002 precluded resentencing on his 1999 conviction. Under the 2005 DLRA, a defendant applying for resentencing must be more than three years away from parole eligibility. When defendant applied for resentencing in 2005, he did not qualify, because he had already been paroled ( People v Then, 47 AD3d 404, 405 [1st Dept 2008] [citations omitted]). A Judge of this Court subsequently granted Then leave to appeal (10 NY3d 845 [2008]).