Opinion ID: 2742025
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claims Dismissed for Lack of Jurisdiction

Text: A claim against the government must be filed within six years after the claim first accrues. 28 U.S.C. § 2501; Martinez v. United States, 333 F.3d 1295, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (en banc). A claim accrues for purposes of the statute of limitations “when all the events have occurred HIGGINS v. US 5 which fix the liability of the Government and entitle the claimant to institute an action.” FloorPro, 680 F.3d at 1381 (citation omitted). “The question of whether the pertinent events have occurred is determined under an objective standard; a plaintiff does not have to possess actual knowledge of all the relevant facts in order for the cause of action to accrue.” Fallini v. United States, 56 F.3d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1995). The six-year statute of limitations is “jurisdictional” and thus is not subject to equitable tolling. John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 134–39 (2008).
Higgins argues that her breach of contract claim did not accrue until 2012, when “a certain federal official” revealed to her that the grant termination “was not a true termination,” or until 2013, when she learned about the undelivered closeout documents. Appellant’s Br. 4–5. She also asserts that equitable tolling should apply because she has pursued several remedies in good faith. The government responds that the events in 2012 and 2013 are irrelevant to a determination whether Higgins had filed her complaint within the statute of limitations period. The government asserts that “all events required to assert a claim for unpaid, but due and owing grant money” had occurred when the Modification was signed in 2001. Appellee’s Br. 9. The government contends that even if Higgins’ reimbursement request in November 2005 were considered an event necessary to assert the claim, the February 2006 letter rejecting the request would be the latest event to start the clock, which still puts the claim beyond the six-year period. The government argues that Higgins’ pursuit of other remedies does not affect when the events necessary to assert the claim all occurred. We agree with the government that the Claims Court lacked jurisdiction over the breach of contract claim 6 HIGGINS v. US because the claim first accrued more than six years before Higgins filed her complaint. The breach of contract claim arises from the grant award from DOL to Devereaux. The Claims Court found that May 12, 2004, the date when DOL executed the unilateral closeout, was the “latest date upon which a contractual claim could conceivably be seen to arise.” Opinion at 4. Higgins fails to identify a date subsequent to that date that would have given rise to a breach of contract claim, considering the contract in question had been terminated, amended to expire, officially closed, and then finally processed for closeout. Because the six-year statute of limitations is jurisdictional, equitable tolling exceptions do not apply. We therefore hold that the Claims Court did not err in finding that May 12, 2004, was objectively the latest possible date that the breach of contract claim first accrued.
Higgins argues that because a grantee’s release was never executed, she was unable to formally communicate the disputed claim. She asserts that she thus is entitled to an amended settlement. The government responds that regardless whether a grantee’s release was executed, the amended-settlement claim accrued on May 26, 2004, because the claim arose from the Settlement Notice. We agree with the government that the Claims Court also lacked jurisdiction over the amended-settlement claim because that claim first accrued more than six years before Higgins filed her complaint. The amended-settlement claim stems from the Set- tlement Notice dated May 26, 2004. The only contingency that Higgins claims to apply in her case is for “[u]nresolved disputes or claims identified on the Grantee’s Release.” Appellant’s Br. 9–10; Opinion at 6. While Higgins repeatedly insists that every grantee is entitled HIGGINS v. US 7 to a release, she has provided no statutory or regulatory basis for that entitlement. Regardless whether a release would have been procedurally proper for a closeout, Higgins was on notice of that contingency through the Settlement Notice and she knew that she did not possess a grantee’s release. We therefore hold that the Claims Court did not err in finding that the amended-settlement claim first accrued on May 26, 2004. For the Claims Court to have jurisdiction, Higgins’ claims must have first accrued by December 28, 2006: six years before she filed her complaint. Martinez, 333 F.3d at 1304. To challenge the grant termination or the availability of an amended settlement, Higgins should have filed suit before the statute of limitations expired. Because we agree with the Claims Court’s findings that the clock began running no later than May 2004 for both the breach of contract and amended-settlement claims, we hold that the Claims Court did not err in dismissing those claims for lack of jurisdiction.