Opinion ID: 2143062
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Beretta's Appeal

Text: Plaintiffs' claim against Beretta contained counts alleging design defect, failure to warn, and breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. As noted, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Beretta on all of plaintiffs' claims. Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their design defect and failure to warn claims, arguing that the trial court erred in holding that the handgun was not unreasonably dangerous for failing to include a magazine disconnect, or a sufficient chamber-loaded indicator, and in finding that Beretta had no duty to warn. Plaintiffs also asserted that the trial court erred in finding that Billy's conduct was an independent intervening cause superceding Beretta's legal responsibility. As noted, the appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's finding that the Beretta was not unreasonably dangerous or defectively designed. However, the appellate court did find that plaintiffs' failure to warn claim presented a question of fact, so that summary judgment was improperly entered in favor of Beretta on that claim. The appellate court also addressed whether the PLCAA required dismissal of plaintiffs' lawsuit against Beretta. The PLCAA was enacted on October 26, 2005, two months after the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of defendants, and applied retroactively to prohibit civil suits against manufacturers, importers, distributors, and dealers of firearms or ammunition products, for harms solely caused by the criminal or unlawful misuse of firearm products or ammunition products that function properly as designed and intended. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901(a)(3), (b)(1), 7902 (2006). The appellate court held that the PLCAA applied to plaintiffs' lawsuit against Beretta, and therefore plaintiffs' cause of action was barred unless the remaining failure to warn claim fit within one of the Act's six exceptions. 378 Ill.App.3d at 533, 316 Ill. Dec. 823, 880 N.E.2d 559. The appellate court found that there was a question of fact concerning whether plaintiffs' failure to warn claim fit within the section 7903(5)(A)(v) exception. That exception allows for claims alleging a defect in design or manufacturing absent a volitional criminal act. In so holding, the appellate court rejected plaintiffs' claim that the PLCAA was unconstitutional because it violated the tenth amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. X). 378 Ill.App.3d at 533, 316 Ill.Dec. 823, 880 N.E.2d 559. In this court, Beretta argues that the appellate court erred in finding that Beretta had a duty to warn. Beretta contends that the danger of pointing a gun at another person and pulling the trigger is open and obvious, even if the person pointing the gun mistakenly believes that the gun is not loaded. In addition, the appellate court ignored the fact that Beretta did provide numerous warnings, any one of which would have prevented Josh's shooting if read and heeded. Beretta also argues that the appellate court erred in holding that plaintiffs' failure to warn claim fit within the exception for manufacturing and design defect claims set forth in the PLCAA. We first address Beretta's claim that the PLCAA bars plaintiffs' sole remaining claim against Beretta. Whether plaintiffs' failure to warn claim is barred by the PLCAA presents a question of statutory interpretation, which is a question of law. Accordingly, our review is de novo. People v. Lucas, 231 Ill.2d 169, 173-74, 325 Ill.Dec. 239, 897 N.E.2d 778 (2008). One of the purposes of the PLCAA is: To prohibit causes of action against manufacturers, distributors, dealers, and importers of firearms or ammunition products, and their trade associations, for the harm solely caused by the criminal or unlawful misuse of firearm products or ammunition products by others when the product functioned as designed and intended. 15 U.S.C. § 7901(b)(1) (2006). To that end, the PLCAA provides that [a] qualified civil liability action may not be brought in any Federal or State court (15 U.S.C. § 7902(a) (2006)) and a qualified civil liability action that is pending on October 26, 2005, shall be immediately dismissed by the court in which the action was brought or is currently pending (15 U.S.C. § 7902(b) (2006)). A qualified civil liability action is: a civil action or proceeding or an administrative proceeding brought by any person against a manufacturer or seller of a qualified product, or a trade association, for damages, punitive damages, injunctive or declaratory relief, abatement, restitution, fines, or penalties, or other relief, resulting from the criminal or unlawful misuse of a qualified product by the person or a third party   . 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A) (2006). A qualified product means a firearm, or ammunition, or a component part of a firearm or ammunition, that has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 7903(4) (2006). The appellate court in this case did not address whether plaintiffs' lawsuit was a qualified civil liability action. Rather, the appellate court concluded, without analysis, that the PLCAA applied to plaintiffs' cause of action, so that plaintiffs were required to show that they fell within the exceptions to the Act in order to avoid the provisions of the Act. 378 Ill.App.3d at 533, 316 Ill.Dec. 823, 880 N.E.2d 559. In this court, plaintiffs deny that their lawsuit is a qualified civil liability action. Plaintiffs do not dispute that their lawsuit is a civil action or proceeding against a manufacturer of a qualified product and that the Beretta is a qualified product. However, plaintiffs deny that their civil action results from the criminal or unlawful misuse of a qualified product. The PLCAA defines unlawful misuse as conduct that violates a statute, ordinance, or regulation as it relates to the use of a qualified product. 15 U.S.C. § 7903(9) (2006). The PLCAA does not define criminal misuse. As Beretta notes, however, the word criminal in this portion of the statute is used as an adjective to modify the term misuse. Black's Law Dictionary defines criminal in its adjective form as, 1. Having the character of a crime; in the nature of a crime . 2. Connected with the administration of penal justice . Black's Law Dictionary 402 (8th ed.2004). In this case, Billy was adjudicated delinquent based upon the finding of the court in the juvenile proceeding that Billy committed involuntary manslaughter and reckless discharge of a firearm when he shot Josh with his father's Beretta. This finding was affirmed on appeal. In re W.S., No. 1-02-1170, 343 Ill.App.3d 1300, 305 Ill.Dec. 890, 856 N.E.2d 695 (2003) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). Billy's use of the Beretta, therefore, certainly violated the Criminal Code, a statute, when he was adjudicated delinquent for involuntary manslaughter and reckless discharge of a firearm, satisfying the definition of unlawful misuse. In addition, involuntary manslaughter (720 ILCS 5/9-3(a) (West 2000)) and reckless discharge of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/24-1.5(a) (West 2000)) are criminal offenses. It follows, then, that Billy's misuse of the Beretta in this case also had the character of a crime and was in the nature of a crime and, therefore, was a criminal misuse. Plaintiffs, however, argue that this court may not look to Billy's juvenile adjudication in determining whether there was a criminal or unlawful misuse because that adjudication was described in an unpublished order pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23 (210 Ill.2d R. 23). Plaintiffs also argue that Billy's conduct could not be criminal or unlawful because Billy was adjudicated delinquent, and thus was not convicted of anything. Moreover, Billy had no criminal intent, so that his conduct could not be criminal. Finally, plaintiffs contend that Billy was not using the handgun, so there could be no unlawful misuse of the handgun, as required under the statute. There is no merit to plaintiffs' claim that this court cannot look to Billy's juvenile adjudication as set forth in the appellate court's Rule 23 order. As Beretta notes, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23 provides that unpublished orders of the appellate court may not be cited by any party for precedential value. 166 Ill.2d R. 23(e). However, this court may take judicial notice of the Rule 23 order addressing Billy's appeal of his juvenile adjudication. See In re Donald A.G., 221 Ill.2d 234, 242, 302 Ill.Dec. 735, 850 N.E.2d 172 (2006) (this court took judicial notice of Rule 23 order in underlying criminal case); People v. Ortiz, 196 Ill.2d 236, 265, 256 Ill.Dec. 530, 752 N.E.2d 410 (2001) (this court took judicial notice of Rule 23 order in codefendant's case). Moreover, the definition of qualified civil liability action also does not contain a requirement that there be criminal intent or a criminal conviction. The statute only requires the criminal or unlawful misuse of a qualified product by the person or a third party. 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A) (2006). With regard to intent, the PLCAA does not limit criminal misuse to specific intent crimes. Likewise, the PLCAA does not require a criminal conviction. As Beretta observes, Congress did require a conviction in order for another exception to the PLCAA to apply. See 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(i) (2006) (an action brought against a transferor convicted under section 924(h) of Title 18, or a comparable or identical State felony law, by a party directly harmed by the conduct of which the transferee is so convicted  (emphases added)). When Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same act, courts presume that Congress has acted intentionally and purposely in the inclusion or exclusion. Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 528, 123 S.Ct. 1072, 1077, 155 L.Ed.2d 88, 95 (2003). Therefore, because Congress specifically included language requiring a conviction in section 7903(5)(A)(i), but did not include such language in section 7903(5)(A), we presume that Congress did not intend criminal misuse to require proof of a criminal conviction. Finally, there is no merit to plaintiffs' claim that Billy was not using the Beretta, so he could not have misused the weapon as set forth in the definition of a qualified civil liability action. Plaintiffs assert that the PLCAA implies the weapon is being used proactively for the purpose of firing or threatening to fire a projectile, and was not designed to apply, for example, where someone using a weapon by holding it drops the weapon, causing it to discharge. Plaintiffs claim that Billy was not using the Beretta as a weapon because he did not intend to fire it, so that Billy was not using the firearm as that word is used in the PLCAA. We again note that the definition of a qualified civil liability action contains no intent requirement, so it does not matter whether Billy intended to fire the Beretta. The relevant inquiry is whether the misuse of the Beretta was criminal or unlawful. Moreover, this is not a case where Billy dropped the Beretta, causing it to accidentally discharge. Rather, Billy took his father's Beretta from his parents' bedroom closet, pointed the Beretta at Josh, and pulled the trigger. Billy therefore used the Beretta, and that use constituted a criminal or unlawful misuse of the Beretta for purposes of the PLCAA. Accordingly, we find that plaintiffs' lawsuit is a qualified civil liability action as defined in the PLCAA. Because we find that plaintiffs' lawsuit was a qualified civil liability action, we next address whether the exceptions to the PLCAA apply in this case. The appellate court held that the only exception that applied in this case was the exception set forth in section 7903(5)(A)(v). 378 Ill. App.3d at 533-34, 316 Ill.Dec. 823, 880 N.E.2d 559. Plaintiffs have not challenged this finding. We therefore limit our discussion to section 7903(5)(A)(v). Section 7903(5)(A)(v) provides that a qualified civil liability action shall not include: an action for death, physical injuries or property damage resulting directly from a defect in design or manufacture of the product, when used as intended or in a reasonably foreseeable manner, except that where the discharge of the product was caused by a volitional act that constituted a criminal offense, then such act shall be considered the sole proximate cause of any resulting death, personal injuries or property damage. 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(v) (2006). With regard to this exception, the appellate court held that there was an issue of fact concerning whether Billy's act was volitional and whether Billy's actions were criminal or unlawful, so that it was for the trier of fact to determine whether the exception applied in this case. 378 Ill.App.3d at 534, 316 Ill.Dec. 823, 880 N.E.2d 559. The appellate court explained that if Billy's actions were criminal, the PLCAA would foreclose plaintiffs' claims against Beretta. 378 Ill.App.3d at 534, 316 Ill.Dec. 823, 880 N.E.2d 559. However, if Billy's actions were purely accidental and not unlawful or criminal, the exception under section 7903(5)(A)(v) would apply and plaintiffs' failure to warn claim against Beretta would not be precluded. 378 Ill.App.3d at 534, 316 Ill.Dec. 823, 880 N.E.2d 559. In questioning whether Billy's act was criminal or unlawful, the appellate court relied on the fact that Billy was adjudicated delinquent. The appellate court, citing this court's decision in People v. Taylor, 221 Ill.2d 157, 302 Ill.Dec. 697, 850 N.E.2d 134 (2006), noted that a juvenile adjudication is not tantamount to a criminal conviction. In addition, Billy did not intend to shoot Josh. Accordingly, the appellate court concluded that there was a question of fact concerning whether Billy's act was volitional or criminal under the PLCAA. We initially note that, like the definition of qualified civil liability action in section 7903(5)(A), the exception in section 7903(5)(A)(v) does not require a criminal conviction. The statute requires only that the volitional act constitute a criminal offense. As discussed, supra, Billy's act of shooting Josh constituted a criminal offense. In any event, the appellate court has read our decision in Taylor too narrowly. Although this court in Taylor held that a juvenile adjudication was not tantamount to a criminal conviction, we also noted that the Juvenile Court Act was radically altered in 1999 to provide more accountability for the criminal acts of juveniles. (Emphasis added.) Taylor, 221 Ill.2d at 165, 302 Ill.Dec. 697, 850 N.E.2d 134. Moreover, the purpose and policy section of article V of the Juvenile Court Act declares that it is the intent of the General Assembly to promote a juvenile justice system capable of dealing with the problem of juvenile delinquency and, to effectuate that intent, declares among the important purposes of the Act [t]o protect citizens from juvenile crime.  (Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS 405/5-101(1)(a) (West 2000). Consequently, the fact that Billy was adjudicated delinquent does not mean that his actions were not criminal for purposes of section 7903(5)(A)(v). We also find that Billy's act was a volitional act. Black's Law Dictionary defines volition as: 1. The ability to make a choice or determine something. 2. The act of making a choice or determining something. 3. The choice or determination that someone makes. Black's Law Dictionary 1605 (8th ed.2004). Likewise, Webster's defines volition as: the act of willing or choosing: the act of deciding (as on a course of action or an end to be striven for): the exercise of the will. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2562 (1993). Webster's defines volitional as of, relating to, or of the nature of volition: possessing or exercising volition. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2562 (1993). Plaintiffs and the appellate court read volitional to require a finding that Billy intended to shoot Josh or understood the ramifications of his conduct. We disagree. As Beretta argues, even if Billy did not intend to shoot Josh, Billy did choose and determine to point the Beretta at Josh and did choose and determine to pull the trigger. Although Billy did not intend the consequences of his act, his act nonetheless was a volitional act. Accordingly, pursuant to the PLCAA, the discharge of the Beretta in this case was caused by a volitional act that constituted a criminal offense, which the PLCAA provides shall be considered the sole proximate cause of any resulting death, personal injuries or property damage. 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(v) (2006). The exception for qualified civil liability actions set forth in section 7903(5)(A)(v), therefore, does not apply, and plaintiffs' failure to warn claims are barred by the PLCAA. Plaintiffs also argue that section 7903(5)(A)(v) does not apply because Billy's act was not the sole cause of Josh's injury. Plaintiffs, however, have misread the PLCAA. The PLCAA does not require a finding that the volitional act that constituted a criminal offense be the sole proximate cause of any resulting death. Rather, the PLCAA provides that where the discharge of the product was caused by a volitional act that constituted a criminal offense, then such act shall be considered the sole proximate cause of any resulting death   . (Emphasis added.) 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(v) (2006). Plaintiffs, however, argue that the PLCAA is unconstitutional because it violates the tenth amendment to the United States Constitution. The tenth amendment states: The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people. U.S. Const., amend. X. Plaintiffs claim that although Congress may generally enact laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it may not direct the action of state governments or state officials. Plaintiffs contend that by commanding state courts to immediately dismiss pending cases, the PLCAA leaves state courts with the function of simply confirming a judicial decision that Congress has already impermissibly made. Further, the PLCAA improperly infringes on state sovereignty by dictating to states how they must conduct their lawmaking function with respect to gun liability. The appellate court in this case rejected plaintiffs' claim that the PLCAA violates the tenth amendment. The appellate court held that plaintiffs have confused Congress's direct regulation and preemption of state law with commandeering state functions. Congress, Beretta correctly asserts, simply established a new federal standard that governs claims against the gun industry, preempting conflicting state tort law, a common action. 378 Ill.App.3d at 533, 316 Ill.Dec. 823, 880 N.E.2d 559. The appellate court noted that the United States District Courts for the Eastern District of New York and the Central District of California have found that the PLCAA is constitutional. The appellate court followed those decisions on the constitutional issues. 378 Ill.App.3d at 533, 316 Ill.Dec. 823, 880 N.E.2d 559 (citing City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp. 401 F.Supp.2d 244 (E.D.N.Y.2005), and Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 421 F.Supp.2d 1274 (C.D.Cal. 2006)). Although the district court in Ileto was not presented with a tenth amendment challenge to the PLCAA, the district court in City of New York v. Beretta did consider and reject such a challenge. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second District affirmed that decision. City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 524 F.3d 384 (2d Cir.2008). The Court of Appeals noted that the critical inquiry with respect to the Tenth Amendment is whether the PLCAA commandeers the states. City of New York, 524 F.3d at 396. This is because federal statutes enacted under one of Congress' enumerated powers, such as the commerce clause, cannot violate the tenth amendment unless the statutes commandeer the states' executive officials or legislative processes. City of New York, 524 F.3d at 396. The Court of Appeals held that Congress validly enacted the PLCAA under the commerce clause. City of New York, 524 F.3d at 394-95. The Court of Appeals further held that the PLCAA does not commandeer any branch of state government because the PLCAA imposes no affirmative duty of any kind on any branch of state government. City of New York, 524 F.3d at 397. The PLCAA, therefore, does not violate the tenth amendment. City of New York, 524 F.3d at 397. We agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals in City of New York v. Beretta. Accordingly, as Beretta argues, because the PLCAA is a valid exercise of the federal power to regulate interstate commerce, Congress has not intruded upon an area of authority traditionally reserved to the states and does not impermissibly commandeer the states or their officials in violation of the tenth amendment. We therefore reject plaintiffs' constitutional challenge to the PLCAA and find that the PLCAA does not violate the tenth amendment. As stated, we find that the PLCAA requires dismissal of plaintiffs' failure to warn claim against Beretta. We therefore reverse the appellate court's finding that there was an issue of fact concerning whether the PLCAA barred plaintiffs' failure to warn claim.