Opinion ID: 805977
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Ineffective Assistance of Atkins Counsel

Text: We come, then, to Mr. Hooks’s claim that counsel at his Atkins trial was ineffective. Under this heading, he raises several arguments. He asserts that his counsel was constitutionally deficient for failing to (1) obtain an additional IQ score, (2) investigate his functioning in prison, (3) secure Pat Prater as a witness, (4) uncover evidence to impeach Shanna Dinh, (5) comply with a discovery order related to evidence -49- of Dr. Murphy’s probationary status, and (6) seek redaction of crime facts from the State’s exhibits. Also, as a threshold matter, Mr. Hooks claims that the standard for counsel’s performance here is United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), rather than Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The State counters that there is no right to counsel at all in an Atkins proceeding and also contests Mr. Hooks’s claim on the merits. As we explain below, we reject the State’s threshold argument and hold that there is indeed a right to counsel in Atkins proceedings. We also reject Mr. Hooks’s initial argument regarding the appropriate analytical framework, and thus apply Strickland rather than Cronic, because counsel was an active, zealous participant in the trial proceedings. On the merits of Mr. Hooks’s claim, we ultimately conclude that counsel was not ineffective and the OCCA’s decision so finding was not unreasonable.
The State asserts at the outset that we need not review the merits of Mr. Hooks’s ineffective-assistance claim because he has no right to counsel in an Atkins proceeding: [T]here is no clearly established federal law that guarantees Petitioner the right to counsel in a post-conviction mental retardation trial. The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the assistance of counsel for his defence.” Post-conviction review “is not part of the criminal proceeding itself, and is in fact considered to be civil in nature.” Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 8 (1989). Therefore, the Supreme Court has held that “[t]here is no constitutional right to an attorney in state postconviction proceedings[,]” and, “[c]onsequently, a petitioner cannot claim constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in such proceedings.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991). -50- Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim must fail. Aplee. Br. at 50 (alterations in original). As far as we can tell, this is a question of first impression in the federal courts. We reject the State’s argument. We have held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause applies as fully to an Atkins proceeding as to any other jury trial. See Ochoa, 669 F.3d at 1143. Included, or “implicit,” within the “liberty” secured by the Due Process Clause is the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341–44 (1963). That right, “a bedrock principle in our justice system” and “the foundation for our adversary system,” Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1317 (2012), is grounded in the “obvious truth” that a person “cannot be assured a fair trial” without the effective advocacy of his attorney, id. (quoting Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344) (internal quotation marks omitted). On this basis alone, we think we are justified in holding that the right to effective assistance of counsel extends to jury-based Atkins proceedings of the kind employed in Oklahoma. The State seeks to deflect this conclusion by analogizing an Atkins proceeding to state postconviction proceedings where, it is true, “[t]here is no constitutional right to an attorney.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991). Whatever the value of that analogy in other contexts, it is merely superficial here. Mr. Hooks’s Atkins trial was “postconviction” only in the strict chronological sense: Atkins was handed down in 2002, after Mr. Hooks had been convicted in 1989. Of far greater importance is that his 2004 Atkins trial was “the first designated proceeding” at which he could raise a claim of -51- mental retardation. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1317. No court had yet addressed his claim, the Atkins jury was the first to consider its merit, and Mr. Hooks had no “brief from counsel or an opinion of the court” on the issue. Id. In that situation, with Mr. Hooks surely “ill equipped to represent [himself],” id. (quoting Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 617 (2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted), the usual rationale for denying a right to counsel in postconviction proceedings is inapposite, cf. id.18 In any event, we think the State’s analogy also fails for a different reason. It is beyond cavil that “the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to have counsel present at all ‘critical’ stages of the criminal proceedings.” Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 786 (2009). Under this rubric, whether Mr. Hooks has a right to counsel at his Atkins trial depends on two things: Is such a trial part of the “criminal proceedings”? And is it a “critical stage” of them? On the first question, contrary to the State’s contention, we think an Atkins trial is “part of the criminal proceeding itself” and not “civil in nature.” Giarratano, 492 U.S. at 8 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 556–57 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In one sense, it is analogous to a competency hearing. See United States v. Collins, 430 F.3d 1260, 1264 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that a competency hearing is a “critical stage” of the criminal proceedings such that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches, and citing other circuits that agree). 18 We wonder, too, whether the retroactive applicability of Atkins to cases on collateral review under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A)—“the only such new rule” since AEDPA’s enactment in 1996, Ochoa, 669 F.3d at 1142 n.9—makes void, as a matter of law, any “postconviction” character that an Atkins proceeding might have. -52- More importantly, an Atkins trial is inextricably intertwined with sentencing. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (“[The Eighth Amendment] ‘places a substantive restriction on the State’s power to take the life’ of a mentally retarded offender.” (quoting Ford, 477 U.S. at 405)). And there is no doubt that sentencing is part of the criminal proceedings. See Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 137 (1967) (holding that sentencing is a “critical stage” of the criminal proceedings such that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches). As to the second question, we harbor little doubt that an Atkins trial is a “critical stage,” that is, “a step of a criminal proceeding” that holds “significant consequences for the accused.” Cone, 535 U.S. at 696. We are hard-pressed to imagine a more “significant consequence[] for the accused” than a determination of whether the State has the power to take his life. We come, then, to the question of clearly established federal law. We have concluded that defendants in Atkins proceedings have the right to effective counsel secured by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. But that does not perforce answer the question of whether that right is clearly established. Based on our analysis below of the nature of the right and its nexus to the proceedings allowable under Atkins, however, we further conclude that the right to counsel flows directly from, and is a necessary corollary to, the clearly established law of Atkins. Cf. Ochoa, 669 F.3d at 1143. Consequently, we hold that the right to counsel in Atkins proceedings is “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). To be sure, as we must, we acknowledge that the Supreme Court has never said that defendants -53- have a right to counsel in Atkins proceedings, nor has it ever identified such a proceeding as one of the “critical stages” to which the right attaches. So it might be said that the Court’s “cases provide no categorical answer” to our question, Van Patten, 552 U.S. at 125, or that the Court “has never addressed [this] claim,” Musladin, 549 U.S. at 76. But we are deeply troubled by that prospect and find that reasoning to be ultimately untenable under the law. The idea that a mentally retarded defendant has a right not to be executed by the State, but not a right to counsel in proceedings where the question of mental retardation will be determined, smacks of the absurd. Can a person with “diminished capacities to understand and process information, to communicate, . . . [and] to engage in logical reasoning,” Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318, be expected to argue his own condition to a court or jury? On the contrary, the more persuasively he argued his case, the more he would doom it, and if he could not help but perform poorly, he would be unable to carry his burden of proof. Having no right to counsel in a mental-retardation proceeding—at least where that proceeding is the first opportunity to raise a claim of mental retardation—could render Atkins a nullity. We “should not be ignorant as judges of what we know as” human beings. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 52 (1949) (plurality opinion). Guideposts erected long ago mark out the proper path here. The right to counsel is “fundamental and essential to a fair trial”—a necessity, not a luxury. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342, 344 (quoting Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 465 (1942)) (internal quotation marks omitted). [The defendant] requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in -54- the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence. If that be true of men of intelligence, how much more true is it of the ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932) (emphasis added). We think these concerns are heightened still further when a defendant’s life, rather than liberty, is at stake. See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357 (1977) (plurality opinion) (“[D]eath is a different kind of punishment from any other which may be imposed in this country.”). Therefore, we hold that defendants in Atkins proceedings have the right to effective counsel secured by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments—a right that stems directly from, and is a necessary corollary to, Atkins. For that reason, we further hold that the right to counsel in Atkins proceedings is “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
Because there is a right to counsel in Atkins proceedings, we must next determine which standard governs counsel’s performance. Generally, ineffective-assistance-ofcounsel claims are analyzed under the rubric of Strickland. See Byrd, 645 F.3d at 1167. But Mr. Hooks argues that Cronic, rather than Strickland, applies in this case. In Cronic, decided the same day as Strickland, the Supreme Court recognized that there are “circumstances that are so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified.” 466 U.S. at 658. The Court in Cronic set forth “three situations when Strickland does not apply” such that a court may “presume -55- prejudice without inquiring into counsel’s performance.” Danny Hooks v. Workman, 606 F.3d 715, 724 (10th Cir. 2010).19 Mr. Hooks asserts that his Atkins trial involved the second of the three: “a breakdown in the adversarial process.” Cronic, 466 U.S. at 662. According to Mr. Hooks, when Atkins was decided, it “created a log jam” of cases in the Oklahoma criminal defense system, with insufficient resources and staff to handle them, and his case was assigned to attorneys whose experience involved postconviction proceedings, not criminal jury trials. Aplt. Opening Br. at 64. Standing alone, these circumstances do not warrant a presumption of prejudice. When the Court in Cronic spoke of “a breakdown in the adversarial process,” it envisioned a situation in which “counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing.” 466 U.S. at 659, 662 (emphasis added). This means that “the attorney’s failure must be complete.” Cone, 535 U.S. at 697. It is not enough even that defense counsel “failed to [oppose the prosecution] at specific points.” Id. Rather, for Cronic’s presumption to apply, that failure must run “throughout the . . . proceeding as a whole.” Id. Plainly, this kind of case will be an “unusual” one. Davis v. Exec. Dir. of Dep’t of Corr., 100 F.3d 750, 757 n.3 (10th Cir. 1996). This is simply not a case in which counsel “entirely fail[ed] to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing.” Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659. The 19 Our decision in Danny Hooks v. Workman, 606 F.3d 715 (10th Cir. 2010), involved a § 2254 petition by Oklahoma prisoner Danny Keith Hooks. That case is unrelated to this one. -56- record reveals a vigorous adversarial trial, with numerous objections by Mr. Hooks’s counsel, poignant cross-examination of the State’s witnesses, several side bars with the court to advance Mr. Hooks’s cause, and a competent closing argument. See Cooks v. Ward, 165 F.3d 1283, 1296 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that Cronic did not apply because counsel “conducted limited cross-examination, made evidentiary objections, and gave a closing argument”); Hooper v. Mullin, 314 F.3d 1162, 1175 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that Cronic did not apply because “[d]efense counsel cross-examined the State’s guilt-stage witnesses, made objections to the State’s evidence, presented some evidence in Petitioner’s defense, and made opening and closing arguments”). The fact that attorneys assigned to Mr. Hooks’s case were responsible for a number of Atkins cases at the time, or that they had no experience with criminal jury trials, may bear upon actual performance but does not warrant application of Cronic. See Cronic, 466 U.S. at 665 (“The character of a particular lawyer’s experience may shed light in an evaluation of his actual performance, but it does not justify a presumption of ineffectiveness in the absence of such an evaluation.”).20 Because we find that counsel for Mr. Hooks actively and zealously participated in all phases of the trial proceedings, we will not presume prejudice under Cronic. Strickland, therefore, remains the appropriate standard for evaluating counsel’s 20 We also take note of the OCCA’s finding that “the record reflects that counsel is qualified and able to represent defendants in capital mental retardation proceedings.” Hooks Atkins Collateral, slip op. at 8. That finding is presumed correct under § 2254(e)(1), and Mr. Hooks has not rebutted it. -57- performance. See Hooks, 606 F.3d at 725. Mr. Hooks “must show both that his counsel’s performance ‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness’ and that ‘the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.’” Byrd, 645 F.3d at 1167 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88). These two prongs may be addressed in any order, and failure to satisfy either is dispositive. Id. “[O]ur review of counsel’s performance under the first prong of Strickland is a ‘highly deferential’ one.” Id. at 1168 (quoting Hooks, 606 F.3d at 723). “Every effort must be made to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time . . . .” United States v. Challoner, 583 F.3d 745, 749 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting Dever v. Kan. State Penitentiary, 36 F.3d 1531, 1537 (10th Cir. 1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, “counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Byrd, 645 F.3d at 1168 (alteration omitted) (quoting Dever, 36 F.3d at 1537) (internal quotation marks omitted). Surmounting this “high bar” is not an “easy task.” Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 788 (2011) (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Fox, 200 F.3d at 1295 (“[Petitioner] bears a heavy burden in that he must overcome the presumption that his counsel’s actions were sound trial strategy . . . .”). A state prisoner in the § 2254 context faces an even greater challenge. Byrd, 645 F.3d at 1168. “[W]hen assessing a state prisoner’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on habeas review, ‘[w]e defer to the state court’s determination that counsel’s -58- performance was not deficient and, further, defer to the attorney’s decision in how to best represent a client.’” Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Crawley v. Dinwiddie, 584 F.3d 916, 922 (10th Cir. 2009)). As the Supreme Court has explained, “because the Strickland standard is a general standard, a state court has even more latitude to reasonably determine that a defendant has not satisfied that standard.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009). Thus, our review of ineffective-assistance claims in habeas applications under § 2254 is “doubly deferential.” Id. “[T]he question is not whether counsel’s actions were reasonable. The question is whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 788. The second prong of Strickland—prejudice—requires an applicant to show “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the counsel’s error, ‘the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” Challoner, 583 F.3d at 749 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). Reasonable probability is more than mere speculation, and an applicant must show more than “some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.” Turrentine v. Mullin, 390 F.3d 1181, 1205 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693) (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, “‘reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome’ of the trial.” Byrd, 645 F.3d at 1168 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). With one exception, which relates to counsel’s failure to redact certain letters, the OCCA denied relief on all of the instances of ineffective assistance alleged by Mr. Hooks -59- under the second (prejudice) prong of Strickland. This was an entirely appropriate mode of analysis. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Strickland intimated that resolving ineffectiveassistance claims on prejudice grounds may be preferable: “The object of an ineffectiveness claim is not to grade counsel’s performance. If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.” 466 U.S. at 697. Of course, this is not a hard and fast rule, and Strickland contemplates that relative ease in certain cases may (though not “often”) counsel resolution under the performance rather than prejudice prong. We believe this is such a case. We could, as the OCCA did, resolve each of Mr. Hooks’s allegations of ineffective assistance on prejudice grounds. That, however, would not be sufficient to dispose of the claim because a further analysis of “cumulative prejudice” would be necessary. See Spears, 343 F.3d at 1251 (considering the cumulative impact of prejudice “assuming that [petitioner’s] attorney was deficient” in two respects); Cargle v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1196, 1212 (10th Cir. 2003) (“[A] decision to grant relief on ineffective assistance grounds is a function of the prejudice flowing from all of counsel’s deficient performance . . . .” (emphasis added)). The cumulative-prejudice analysis is sometimes difficult to conduct because, whether we assume or determine that counsel performed unreasonably, we must assess the aggregate impact of these numerous errors and decide whether they collectively “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Wilson v. Sirmons, 536 F.3d 1064, 1122 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Thornburg v. Mullin, 422 F.3d 1113, 1137 (10th Cir. 2005)) -60- (internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, save for one instance—which relates to Mr. Hooks’s counsel’s failure to comply with a discovery order—we believe the performance prong of Strickland provides “a more certain basis” for resolving Mr. Hooks’s ineffective-assistance claim, even though the state court rested its conclusions on lack of prejudice. Pondexter v. Quarterman, 537 F.3d 511, 521 (5th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, taking into account its impact on the standard of review, we follow that course in our analysis below. Cf. Gilson v. Sirmons, 520 F.3d 1196, 1248 (10th Cir. 2008) (finding it “unnecessary” to address the first Strickland prong, even though the OCCA resolved the ineffective-assistance claim on that ground, because “applying a de novo standard of review” the applicant could not satisfy the second Strickland prong). More specifically, in those instances where the OCCA did not address the performance prong of Strickland and we elect to do so, our review is de novo. See id.; Pondexter, 537 F.3d at 524; see also Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 390 (2005) (“Because the state courts found the representation adequate, they never reached the issue of prejudice, and so we examine [the prejudice] element of the Strickland claim de novo . . . .” (citation omitted)).21
Mr. Hooks argues that his Atkins counsel was deficient for failing to obtain a more recent IQ score. He points to testing done in 2006, two years after the Atkins proceeding, 21 We reiterate that there was nothing improper about the OCCA’s tackling most of counsel’s alleged errors on prejudice, rather than performance, grounds. -61- that pegged his IQ at 67. On collateral review, the OCCA found that Mr. Hooks was not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to order additional testing. See Hooks Atkins Collateral, slip op. at 9–10. Applying de novo review, we conclude that counsel did not act unreasonably in failing to order an additional IQ test. A wide range of IQ scores was already available for presentation at trial, some low and some high. Indeed, the jury was presented with nine IQ scores ranging from 53 to 80. Mr. Hooks’s counsel was almost certainly aware that IQ scores remain fairly stable over a person’s lifetime, see Ochoa, 669 F.3d at 1137 n.6 (citing American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 40 (4th ed.1994)), and could reasonably think that an additional score would not be significantly different than the scores already available. Further, counsel could not know in advance what the results of the test would be. The 2006 post-trial test resulted in a score of 67, but at the time of trial, counsel could equally have anticipated a higher score—up to 80—if the existing range of scores was any guide. We evaluate conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time, not in hindsight. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 381 (“[I]n applying Strickland . . . , hindsight is discounted by pegging adequacy to counsel’s perspective at the time investigative decisions are made and by giving a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.” (citation omitted) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 691) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Challoner, 583 F.3d at 749. We conclude that counsel made a reasonable decision not to order an additional IQ score and that her performance was not unreasonable under Strickland. -62-
Mr. Hooks asserts that counsel was deficient for failing to investigate his “adaptive functioning during his fifteen year stay on death row,” which would have revealed that he had help writing the letters on which the State relied to show his communicative abilities and that he had not in fact participated in an allegedly improper scheme involving the use of the mails to solicit and obtain money from women that supposedly he describes in one of the letters. Aplt. Opening Br. at 67–68. With respect to letter-writing assistance, Mr. Hooks points to post-trial affidavits from fellow prisoners Walanzo Robinson and Paris Powell, both of whom state that they have assisted Mr. Hooks from time to time in reading and writing letters. See R., Vol. 1, pt. 2 at 435–36 (Aff. of Walanzo Robinson, dated Mar. 9, 2003); id. at 438–42 (Aff. of Paris Powell, dated Dec. 29, 2004). With respect to the scheme, Mr. Hooks points to prison records tending to show that he was not involved. See Aplt. Opening Br. at 67. The OCCA resolved this aspect of Mr. Hooks’s claim by concluding that he was not prejudiced by counsel’s failure in light of “other significant evidence bearing on Hooks’s intellectual and adaptive functioning.” Hooks Atkins Collateral, slip op. 10–12. We resolve this issue de novo under the first prong of Strickland. We “must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance,” and that “the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)). Mr. Hooks has not overcome that presumption -63- here. First, the referenced affidavits allege only generally that Messrs. Robinson and Powell assisted Mr. Hooks in writing letters from time to time. There is no evidence that these individuals assisted Mr. Hooks in writing the specific letters admitted into evidence at the Atkins trial. Second, while Mr. Hooks’s counsel has stated that she did not have time to investigate “fully” whether “Mr. Hooks had assistance from other inmates writing the letters,” R., Vol. 1, pt. 2 at 462 (Aff. of Vicki Werneke, dated Mar. 8, 2006), she did attempt at several points to cast doubt on whether Mr. Hooks had written the letters on his own, eliciting testimony from Dr. Cowardin that Mr. Hooks performed poorly on writing tests, had to use a straightedge to write, and had to use a dictionary to spell correctly. See 4 M.R. Tr. at 178–79, 184, 187–88. Finally, there is at least a suggestion that relying on testimony of fellow prisoners would have been not only fruitless, but also harmful. See Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794 (1987) (holding that a limited investigation by counsel was reasonable because witnesses brought to counsel’s attention would have provided potentially damaging information). In one of the letters, Mr. Hooks seemingly referred to the scheme of his that was discovered. See State Ex. to M.R. 1 (Letter from Victor Hooks to Shalimar Hooks, dated Aug. 18, 2002) (“[T]hese damn ‘Hillbillies’ sweatin me. They cut my hustle off through the mail. . . . [C]ause this ‘one-stupid-white-bitch’, was sending me her money . . . .” (emphases omitted)). The trial transcript suggests that Mr. Hooks’s counsel was aware of the scheme and also suspected Mr. Hooks’s cell-mate of being involved. See 5 M.R. Tr. at 102 (cross-examination of Dr. Hall). A reasonable attorney could have -64- wanted to avoid drawing more attention to the letters than necessary and could have surmised that allowing fellow prisoners to testify might open them up to crossexamination about Mr. Hooks’s knowledge of their improper scheme. In that light, relying on objective testing of writing skills, such as that administered by Dr. Cowardin, would have been the sounder strategy. See 4 M.R. Tr. at 187–88. We therefore conclude that counsel’s performance was not unreasonable under Strickland.
Mr. Hooks alleges that counsel performed deficiently when she failed to secure Pat Prater as a witness after seeing the memorandum from Ms. High. (As earlier discussed, the memorandum summarized a conversation between Ms. High and Ms. Prater regarding the latter’s observations of and interactions with Mr. Hooks.) Mr. Hooks believes that “Ms. Prater would have provided objective evidence of Petitioner’s significant adaptive deficits and an opinion he was mentally retarded.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 68. The OCCA resolved this claim on prejudice grounds, concluding that “there is not a reasonable probability that, with this evidence, jurors would have found Hooks was mentally retarded.” Hooks Atkins Collateral, slip op. at 14. We resolve this issue de novo under the first prong of Strickland. Trial counsel does not act unreasonably in failing to call every conceivable witness that might testify on a defendant’s behalf. See Crittenden v. Ayers, 624 F.3d 943, 967 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Trial counsel’s duty to investigate . . . does not necessarily require that every conceivable witness be interviewed.” (omission in original) (quoting Douglas v. -65- Woodford, 316 F.3d 1079, 1088 (9th Cir. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 383 (“[T]he duty to investigate does not force defense lawyers to scour the globe on the off chance something will turn up.”). The information in the memorandum received by Mr. Hooks’s counsel pointed to a lay witness, Ms. Prater, who could testify that her observations of Mr. Hooks, particularly his conversational abilities, indicate that he is mentally retarded. This was not novel information. Mr. Hooks called two expert witnesses who related substantially the same information to the jury. See 3 M.R. at 191–94 (Test. of Dr. Gelbort); 4 M.R. at 74–78, 81–82, 101–02, 116 (Test. of Dr. Cowardin). Counsel must be allowed leeway in prioritizing the evidence and witnesses she puts on. See Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 383 (“[R]easonably diligent counsel may draw a line when they have good reason to think further investigation would be a waste.”). In light of the fact that the legal definition of mental retardation tracks the clinical definition, we may fairly view counsel here as making a reasonable, strategic decision to focus on expert rather than lay witnesses, and she reasonably could have believed that Ms. Prater’s testimony would have been duplicative or unhelpful. See Matthews, 577 F.3d at 1192–93 (holding that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to call witnesses whose testimony “would have been largely cumulative of evidence the jury did hear”). We therefore conclude that counsel’s performance was not unreasonable under Strickland. f. Failure to uncover evidence to impeach Shanna Dinh Mr. Hooks claims that counsel was ineffective because she failed to contact Shanna Dinh’s ex-husband, Cuc Van Dinh, who could have testified that he and Ms. Dinh -66- lived together during the time that she claimed to have been living with Mr. Hooks. The OCCA resolved the claim on prejudice grounds, concluding that “[w]hether Dinh lived with Hooks for months or years, her testimony went to her observations of his behavior and mental ability.” Hooks Atkins Collateral, slip op. at 15. We resolve this issue de novo under the first prong of Strickland. It is worth noting that Ms. Dinh’s story appears to be so convoluted that unraveling the truth is impossible on the record before us. Ms. Dinh claimed at the Atkins trial that she lived with Mr. Hooks “90 percent of the time” between 1984 and 1987. 4 M.R. Tr. at 198. In 1989, during the murder trial, she claimed to have lived with him for “a couple of months” during that period. 2 Trial Tr. at 413 (Test. of Ms. Dinh). Meanwhile, Mr. Hooks’s counsel was aware of a presentence investigation report indicating that Ms. Dinh was in foster care during that same time period. See 4 M.R. Tr. at 218 (statement of Ms. Werneke to the court). To muddy the waters further, the affidavit of Cuc Van Dinh states that Ms. Dinh was living with him during that time period and not “with anyone else.” R., Vol. 1, pt. 2 at 477 (Aff. of Cuc Van Dinh, dated Jan. 19, 2005). Finally, on direct appeal from Mr. Hooks’s Atkins trial, the OCCA stated that “[s]ubsequent investigation indicates that [Ms.] Dinh’s husband had [later] filed for divorce, claiming abandonment.” Hooks Atkins Appeal, 126 P.3d at 643 n.21. Abandonment would cast doubt on Mr. Dinh’s claims that he and Ms. Dinh were living together during the period in question. No doubt, counsel for Mr. Hooks was as confused as we are. We note, however, that she did not neglect to impeach Ms. Dinh. On cross-examination, she sought to -67- highlight one of these discrepancies in Ms. Dinh’s story, asking twice whether Ms. Dinh was in foster care at the time she claimed to have been living with Mr. Hooks. See 4 M.R. Tr. at 217, 220–21. Ms. Dinh denied the allegation both times. Counsel was not unreasonable for choosing to focus on only one of the discrepancies in Ms. Dinh’s story. Indeed, counsel could have reasonably believed that bringing Cuc Van Dinh’s putative testimony to light would have undermined her own strategy. Specifically, if counsel had suggested that Ms. Dinh was both in foster care and living with her husband during the relevant period, the jury may have perceived the conflict. Moreover, if counsel was aware that Cuc Van Dinh had claimed abandonment in his divorce proceedings, she reasonably could have concluded that Mr. Dinh was likely susceptible to strong impeachment by the State, which would have further weakened Mr. Hooks’s case. Because there is good reason to believe that counsel made a reasonable, strategic decision not to seek the testimony of Cuc Van Dinh, we conclude that her performance was not unreasonable under Strickland. g. Failure to comply with a discovery order Mr. Hooks alleges that counsel was constitutionally deficient because her failure to comply with a discovery order disabled her from introducing evidence that Dr. Murphy had been professionally disciplined, a fact bearing on the reliability of his IQ testing of Mr. Hooks; his test resulted in a score of 80. The OCCA resolved the issue on prejudice grounds, noting that the score obtained by Dr. Murphy “was one of a range of test scores, that the information about this test was sparse, that no expert relied on it in forming their -68- opinion of Hooks’s abilities, and that evidence discrediting Murphy could not have affected the jury’s determination.” Hooks Atkins Collateral, slip op. at 16. We resolve this issue, like the OCCA, on prejudice grounds, and we defer to the OCCA’s determination under AEDPA. To show prejudice under the second prong of Strickland, Mr. Hooks must establish “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the counsel’s error, ‘the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” Challoner, 583 F.3d at 749 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). “‘[R]easonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome’ of the trial.” Byrd, 645 F.3d at 1168 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). Mr. Hooks has not carried his burden here. As the OCCA found on direct appeal and in collateral proceedings, no expert (for the State or Mr. Hooks) relied on Dr. Murphy’s test score in forming an opinion regarding Mr. Hooks’s mental abilities. Hooks Atkins Appeal, 126 P.3d at 643; Hooks Atkins Collateral, slip op. at 16. Moreover, the OCCA found that “[t]he expert witnesses agreed that the most reliable scores were those obtained by Dr. Gelbort and Dr. Cowardin, with results of 72 and 76.” Hooks Atkins Appeal, 126 P.3d at 640. Mr. Hooks contends only that “there is no assurance” that the jury did not rely on Dr. Murphy’s score. Aplt. Opening Br. at 70. That is simply not enough to establish a “reasonable probability” of a different result, particularly when the other evidence of Mr. Hooks’s intellectual and functional abilities is considered. Consequently, Mr. Hooks has failed to show that the OCCA’s adjudication of this claim resulted in an unreasonable application of Strickland. -69- h. Failure to seek redaction of crime facts from the State’s exhibits Mr. Hooks asserts ineffective assistance for counsel’s failure to redact “crime facts” from letters written by Mr. Hooks and admitted at trial. Aplt. Opening Br. at 71. Specifically, he claims that “[t]he letters contained references to Petitioner’s victim and the fact she was no longer ‘out there’ to care for her daughter.” Id. The OCCA did not review the letters because Mr. Hooks did not attach them as exhibits to his habeas application. See Hooks Atkins Collateral, slip op. at 16. However, relying on a portion of a letter that Mr. Hooks quoted in his postconviction application, the OCCA found that there were “no references to the facts of murder of which Hooks was convicted.” Id. Accordingly, the OCCA concluded that “[n]othing properly before this Court suggests that the jury was informed of the facts of the crime,” and that it would “not find counsel was ineffective for failing to . . . redact information in the letters.”22 Id. at 17. The letters are available in the record before us. Only two of the six letters mention Ms. Blaine. Those letters were the focus of Mr. Hooks’s arguments before the OCCA. Like the OCCA, we resolve this issue under the first prong of Strickland, according AEDPA deference to the OCCA’s decision. In doing so, we recognize that there is a significant question regarding whether we are authorized under AEDPA and, 22 Mr. Hooks asserts that “[t]rial counsel admitted she did not review the letters prior to trial.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 71. Actually, counsel has stated that she did review the letters prior to trial, just not immediately prior. See R., Vol. 1, pt. 2 at 462 (“At the time of the evidentiary hearing, I had read [the letters] thoroughly. However, I failed to review them again before the trial.”). -70- more specifically, the Supreme Court’s holding in Pinholster, to review the full text of the two letters. We recall that, in Pinholster, the Court observed that § 2254 (d)(1) employs “backward-looking language” indicating that “the record under review is limited to the record in existence at th[e] same time [the state-court decision is made] i.e., the record before the state court.” 131 S. Ct. at 1398. Although this clear and unequivocal language would seemingly foreclose any review under § 2254(d)(1) of any materials that were not before the state court rendering the adverse decision, the circumstances of this case are somewhat unique: the two letters were presented to the state trial court and the jury in the metal-retardation proceeding, were referred to by Mr. Hooks in his briefing before the OCCA (although inexplicably omitted from the exhibits submitted to the OCCA), and were addressed on the merits to a significant degree by the OCCA in ruling against Mr. Hooks. It may be questionable (perhaps even doubtful) whether even these circumstances would be enough for Mr. Hooks to escape Pinholster’s holding, but we need not definitively determine the matter because, even if we review the full text of the two letters, Mr. Hooks cannot prevail on this claim of error.23 Cf. id. at 1399 (“It would be contrary to that purpose [of requiring state-court exhaustion of remedies] to allow a petitioner to overcome an adverse state-court decision with new evidence introduced in a 23 In its pre-Pinholster decision, the district court did consider all of the letters. However, it found that “the letter set out here and at the OCCA by Petitioner is the only one with any allegedly questionable language referring to the murder,” Hooks Habeas II, 693 F. Supp. 2d at 1322 (emphasis added), and concluded that the OCCA did not unreasonably apply Strickland in ruling that Mr. Hooks’s counsel was not constitutionally deficient for failing to redact that language. -71- federal habeas court and reviewed by that court in the first instance effectively de novo.” (emphasis added)). In the first letter, Mr. Hooks scolded his daughter for some trouble she had found herself in, and he stated, “I know for a fact if Shalimein was out there she would of kickyo-ass all the way to the berry house. Cause she love you and don’t want nothing bad to happen to you Shalimar. You already know if I was out there you wouldn’t be caught-up in no shit like that none.” State’s Ex. 2 to M.R. In the second letter, Mr. Hooks states that a particular look from his daughter would tear-at-my-heart cause your “mom” would look at me the same way. “LORD” know’s I done everything I could do to protect [and] “save her.” Shalimar if I had a choice she would be with you now. “I love you all that way.” I wish I hadn’t loved her. Maybe she would still be out there, I don’t know. State’s Ex. 6 to M.R. The two letters contain no reference to the murder of Ms. Blaine. Both letters referred to Ms. Blaine as not being “out there,” although in the first letter, Mr. Hooks also referred to himself as not being “out there.” A juror could infer that Mr. Hooks was talking about the death of Ms. Blaine in these references (as opposed to, for example, talking about her being in prison like Mr. Hooks). Even so, it would require a further inferential leap to conclude that Mr. Hooks was responsible for her death, especially since he pledged that he had “done everything [he] could to protect [and] save” Ms. Blaine and that “if [he] had a choice, she would be with [his daughter] now.” State’s Ex. 6 to M.R. (internal quotation marks omitted). Counsel for Mr. Hooks has averred that she read the -72- letters “thoroughly” prior to trial. R., Vol. 1, pt. 2 at 462. In light of the vague and contradictory nature of the letters, counsel did not act unreasonably in failing to seek redaction, nor did the OCCA unreasonably apply Strickland in reaching the same conclusion.