Opinion ID: 844217
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Admission of Assertedly Prejudicial Photographs, Physical Evidence, and Testimony

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erroneously admitted, over defense counsel's objection, allegedly inflammatory evidence to establish the circumstances of the deaths of Officers MacDonald and Burrell. According to defendant, because the circumstances of the officers' deaths were not in dispute, much of this evidence was either irrelevant or cumulative and, to the extent it had some relevance, it was more prejudicial than probative. Specifically, he argues that the evidence in question allowed the prosecutor to improperly generate sympathy for the victims and bias against defendant, making it impossible for the jury to evaluate the evidence fairly and dispassionately. Defendant claims that admission of this evidence constituted an abuse of the trial court's discretion under Evidence Code section 352 and denied him his state and federal constitutional rights to due process, a fundamentally fair trial, and a reliable adjudication of his capital case. The physical evidence at issue includes photographs of the two officers taken during the autopsy; life-size mannequins used to illustrate the coroner's testimony regarding the location of the wounds and the trajectories of the bullets, and photographs of these mannequins; articles of clothing taken from the bodies of the officers that were stained with blood and tissue; and photographs showing the two officers when they were alive. The allegedly inflammatory testimony includes the coroner's testimony regarding the autopsy results, which was illustrated by the above mentioned photographs, mannequins, and articles of clothing; testimony by Officer Reynolds, one of the first to arrive at the scene, regarding his friendship with Officer Burrell [9] and Officer Burrell's condition when he arrived; [10] testimony by Officer Metcalf regarding the condition of the two officers as they were dying; and testimony by a nurse regarding the condition of the officers as she found them at the scene, including her observation that when she felt for a pulse on one of the officers she heard a gurgling sound. The trial court did not require the prosecution to accept defendant's offer to stipulate to the testimony of the nurse and to the cause of death and the manner in which the wounds were inflicted, concluding that the prosecution was entitled to determine how it would meet its burden of proof. Evidence Code section 352 gives the trial court discretion to exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will ... create substantial danger of undue prejudice .... A trial court's exercise of discretion under section 352 will be upheld on appeal unless the court abused its discretion, that is, unless it exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner. ( People v. Williams (2008) 43 Cal.4th 584, 634-635; [75 Cal.Rptr.3d 691, 181 P.3d 1035]; Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 1124-1125.) (13) We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's admission of the testimony and evidence at issue. As a rule, the prosecution in a criminal case involving charges of murder or other violent crimes is entitled to present evidence of the circumstances attending them even if it is grim. ( People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 675 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 26, 919 P.2d 640].) Photographs and other graphic evidence are not rendered irrelevant or inadmissible simply because they duplicate testimony, depict uncontested facts, or trigger an offer to stipulate. ( Stitely, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 545.) The trial court could reasonably conclude that the probative value of the evidence at issue was not outweighed by its potentially prejudicial effects. The testimony of the police officers and nurse who responded to the scene of the shootings had probative value in proving the circumstances of the crime. The coroner's testimony went to the cause and manner of the officers' deaths. The testimony regarding the condition of the officers and their wounds also was relevant to corroborate the testimony of the eyewitnesses to the shootings and as evidence that the shootings were deliberate and premeditated. To the extent some of the physical evidence and photographs that were used to illustrate the testimony may have been duplicative of testimony, it nevertheless had some value in helping the jury to understand the testimony or in corroborating the observations of witnesses. (14) We have described the `prejudice' referred to in Evidence Code section 352 as characterizing evidence that uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias against a party as an individual, while having only slight probative value with regard to the issues. ( People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 134 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887].) The testimony, photographs, and physical evidence whose admission defendant challenges were unpleasant, but not to the point of distracting the jury from its proper function. ( Stitely, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 545.) Consequently, their admission did not violate Evidence Code section 352 or deny defendant his constitutional rights to a fair trial and a reliable death verdict. (See People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1035 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 5 P.3d 68] [Application of the ordinary rules of evidence generally does not impermissibly infringe on a capital defendant's constitutional rights.].) Defendant notes that the record shows that Officer MacDonald's mother was upset by the coroner's testimony and that Officer Reynolds became emotional during his own testimony. Defendant contends that the jury's observations of these reactions must have further aggravated the emotional impact of the challenged evidence, thereby overwhelming the jury's ability to respond in a reasoned manner to the evidence. That individuals who were close to the victims should become upset when hearing about, or describing, their deaths is not surprising. As we previously have observed, victim photographs and other graphic items of evidence in murder cases always are disturbing. ( People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 134.) Nevertheless, absent evidence to the contrary, we may assume that the jurors were able to `face [their] duty calmly and undismayed.' ( People v. Osband, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 675, quoting People v. Campbell (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 38, 43 [43 Cal.Rptr. 237].)