Opinion ID: 2087959
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: allegations regarding ineffectiveness of trial counsel.

Text: Appellant makes numerous allegations regarding trial counsel's effectiveness. However, before addressing these specific allegations we will address appellant's contention that in the context of a capital penalty case, due process requires that counsel's performance be judged by a more rigorous standard than that applied in non-capital cases. The threshold inquiry in ineffectiveness claims is whether the issue/argment/tactic which counsel has foregone and which forms the basis for the assertion of ineffectiveness, is of arguable merit; for counsel cannot be considered ineffective for failing to assert a meritless claim. Commonwealth v. Pursell, 508 Pa. 212, 495 A.2d 183 (1985); Commonwealth v. Stoyko, 504 Pa. 455, 475 A.2d 714 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 963, 105 S.Ct. 361, 83 L.Ed.2d 297 (1984). If this threshold is met we then determine whether the particular course chosen by counsel had some reasonable basis designed to effectuate his client's interests. Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 235 A.2d 349 (1967). The test is not whether other alternatives were more reasonable, employing a hindsight evaluation of the record. Although weigh the alternatives we must, the balance tips in favor of a finding of effective assistance as soon as it is determined that trial counsel's decisions had any reasonable basis. Id., 427 Pa. at 604-5, 235 A.2d at 352-53. (Emphasis in original; footnote omitted). Appellant offers no convincing argument as to why the foregoing standards are inappropriate in the context of a capital case. Nor does he offer alternatives. We cannot accept appellant's somewhat superficial argument that the Maroney standard is inadequate merely because it does not evaluate the overall representation by trial counsel. Where counsel's representation lacks any specific instances of ineffectiveness, we are at a loss to identify a foundation for finding that his overall representation has been ineffective. Turning to his individual complaints, appellant has grouped his allegations of trial counsel's ineffectiveness into four categories: (1) failure to investigate the facts; (2) failure to interview witnesses; (3) failure to research and know the applicable law; and (4) failure to present mitigating evidence. We will address these issues seriatim. Soon after the appointment of Vincent Lorusso, Esquire, as appellant's attorney, Mr. Lorusso retained an investigator, Kenneth J. Powell. Powell interviewed appellant and prepared a report to trial counsel based on the interview. The report included, inter alia, a list of persons whose statements were needed. Trial counsel sent a letter to Powell stating that they should obtain those statements. When questioned whether he followed up this report by interviewing any of these persons, trial counsel did not recall interviewing any of them. He stated that other than the alibi witness mentioned by appellant, none of the other witnesses would have had any cogent information for appellant's defense. Appellant claims that counsel's failure to interview these persons constituted ineffectiveness with respect to both the trial and the sentencing hearing. Failure of trial counsel to conduct a more intensive investigation or to interview potential witnesses does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, unless there is some showing that such investigation or interview would have been helpful in establishing the asserted defense, or would have developed more than was already known by trial counsel. Commonwealth v. Wade, 501 Pa. 331, 461 A.2d 613 (1983); Commonwealth v. Wallace, 495 Pa. 295, 433 A.2d 856 (1981). Other than the alibi witness, all of the other potential witnesses had nothing to offer to appellant's defense but character testimony. Counsel never presented any character evidence on behalf of appellant during trial or the sentencing hearing. Thus, the issue of whether counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate and interview these witnesses revolves on whether character testimony ought to have been presented in appellant's defense at trial or as evidence of a mitigating circumstance at the sentencing hearing. [11] At the post-trial evidentiary hearing, trial counsel explained that he did not delve into character testimony during trial or at the sentencing hearing because the prosecution had damaging evidence of appellant's bad character which he did not want revealed to the jury. [12] Although evidence of good character may not be rebutted by evidence of specific acts of misconduct, a character witness may be cross-examined regarding his knowledge of particular acts of misconduct by the defendant to test the accuracy of his testimony and the standard by which he measures reputation. Commonwealth v. Jones, 341 Pa. 541, 19 A.2d 389 (1941); Commonwealth v. Becker, 326 Pa. 105, 191 A. 351 (1937); McCormick on Evidence, § 191, 3rd Ed. (1984). [13] We find counsel's concern, that the potential harm from cross-examination of character witnesses outweighed the doubtful value of their testimony, was a reasonable basis for not pursuing potential character witnesses or presenting character evidence. In addition, we do not find that trial counsel's failure to search for a supposed alibi witness was unreasonable. The reasonableness of counsel's investigative decisions depends critically on the information supplied by the defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), reh. denied, 467 U.S. 1267, 104 S.Ct. 3562, 82 L.Ed.2d 864 (1984). Appellant told counsel no more than that he had an alibi witness named Cynthia, whose last name he could not remember; he did not remember her address in Philadelphia, but knew she had moved to somewhere in Texas. This information was clearly insufficient to conduct a meaningful search. At the evidentiary hearing, appellant had Cynthia's former landlady testify that if contacted she could have supplied information about her whereabouts. However, there was no indication that appellant told trial counsel about the landlady; and, contrary to his assertion, the investigator's report does not contain her phone number. Therefore, trial counsel was not ineffective with regards to investigating this possible alibi witness. Appellant also claims that trial counsel breached his duty to research and know the law by (1) his failure to raise constitutional challenges to the Pennsylvania death penalty statute, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711; (2) his failure to vigorously attempt to rehabilitate veniremen expressing their inability to apply the death penalty statute and to object to challenges for cause under Witherspoon; and (3) his failure to raise a constitutional challenge to the jury selection process in capital cases developed in Witherspoon and its progeny. All three of these ineffectiveness claims fail to overcome the initial threshold inquiry, since the underlying claims lack merit. Pursell, supra . Appellant's constitutional challenges to the Pennsylvania death penalty statute, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711, will be discussed subsequently as Part IV of this opinion. Suffice it to say that we do not find any of these challenges to be meritorious; nor has any other meritorious challenge to the statute been raised to this Court. See Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, supra ; Commonwealth v. Beasley, supra ; Commonwealth v. Frey, 504 Pa. 428, 475 A.2d 700 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 963, 105 S.Ct. 360, 83 L.Ed.2d 296 (1984). Accordingly, trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to challenge the statute. Regarding appellant's voir dire complaint, as previously discussed, we find no merit to the underlying issue. We cannot consider counsel ineffective for declining to attempt to rehabilitate veniremen who have emphatically expressed their inability to impose the death sentence or follow the court's instructions with regard thereto; nor is counsel ineffective for failing to object to challenges for cause to such veniremen. Appellant further questions trial counsel's failure to challenge the constitutionality of the death-qualification process in capital cases as developed in Witherspoon and its progeny. Appellant claims that his right to be judged by a representative cross-section of the community has been denied, since excluded from the jury was a distinct group of citizens with a set of attitudes toward the criminal justice system which were not represented on the jury in any way. The United States Supreme Court has recently addressed and rejected this argument as a matter of federal constitutional law. Lockhart v. McCree, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 90 L.Ed.2d 137 (1986). Nor are we, as a matter of state constitutional law, inclined to extend greater protection to an accused in this context than is required by the federal Constitution. The group of citizens which appellant claims were improperly excluded were not excluded on the basis of some immutable characteristic such as race, gender, or ethnic background, but on their expressed inability to carry out their sworn duty to apply the law to the facts. The Commonwealth has a legitimate interest in obtaining a jury that will abide by the jurors' oath and apply the law to the facts. The death qualification process which appellant claims his counsel should have challenged excluded jurors who candidly expressed their inability to abide by their oath should they, as they might, be put to the task of applying the Commonwealth's constitutionally valid death penalty statute. That process serves a legitimate purpose and hence, trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to challenge it. Pursell, supra . Next, appellant contends that trial counsel breached his duty to present mitigating evidence at the sentencing hearing, thereby preventing appellant from appearing human to the jury, and from the jury hearing a true appeal for appellant's life. Appellant suggests that evidence regarding his military background, his ability as a mechanic and his friendships could have been presented. We have previously discussed counsel's reasons for not presenting such character evidence  his concern that he would be opening the door for damaging cross-examination relating to appellant's character. Since none of this proposed evidence in any way mitigated the heinous nature of the crime, it would have been of dubious value, and when that value is weighed against the potential for damaging cross-examination, counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to present such. Finally, appellant raises three miscellaneous claims of ineffectiveness. First, he claims that trial counsel separated and distanced himself from the appellant by telling each panel of potential jurors that he was court-appointed counsel for appellant. Appellant claims that this signalled to the potential jurors that he was not a willing participant in the case. In support of this contention, appellant relies on King v. Strickland, 714 F.2d 1481 (11th Cir.1983), [14] in which counsel was deemed ineffective for stressing in his closing argument at the penalty stage of a first degree murder trial that he was appointed and had reluctantly represented a defendant who had committed a reprehensible crime. The instant case is clearly distinguishable from King. Trial counsel simply noted that he was court-appointed counsel while introducing himself to the jury panels. This reference to his court-appointed status was not coupled with any indication of reluctance to represent the defendant or any comment about his guilt or innocence. We find no inherent prejudice to an accused from the jury's knowledge of whether defense counsel is court-appointed or privately retained; and unless the context demonstrates a likelihood of prejudice, we will not deem counsel ineffective for mentioning that he is court-appointed when introducing himself to a panel of potential juors. [15] Secondly, appellant complains that counsel's closing argument asked the jury to reach conclusions which had no evidentiary support. Actually, counsel's closing argument did not so much ask the jury to reach any specific factual conclusions, as it did to urge the jury to strongly consider whether the Commonwealth had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was the perpetrator of the crimes in light of discrepancies in the crucial testimony of Stanley Trader and Sherry Diggins. Counsel suggested that Trader and Diggins may have been involved in the crimes or were covering up for someone else, possibly a relative. He pointed out that despite denying that they knew each other, Trader and Diggins had common ties through a family named Dennis. This argument was based on the evidence and was a viable challenge to the Commonwealth's burden of proof. Counsel's closing argument was not below the standard of effective representation. Thirdly, appellant claims that trial counsel failed to prepare for sentencing and should have gathered character witnesses. We have discussed counsel's decisions with regard to the presentation of character witnesses and, suffice it to say, counsel will not be deemed ineffective for failing to prepare to present witnesses whom he has decided, on a rational basis, not to call to testify.