Opinion ID: 853600
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Heading: Right to Remedy Clause

Text: Within the Bill of Rights of the Indiana Constitution, Section 12 provides in relevant part: All courts shall be open; and every person, for injury done to him in his person, property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law. [1] The majority today holds that the statute of repose in the Indiana Products Liability Act, which denies remedy to citizens injured by defective products that happen to be more than ten years old, [2] does not violate this provision. Noting prior cases that have considered the Due Course of Law Clause of the Indiana Constitution analogous to the Due Process of Law Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the majority correctly acknowledges that the two provisions are not synonymous, but nevertheless finds the statute of repose provision proper because it concludes that there is no constitutional right to remedy in Indiana. I disagree. Our standard of review of state constitutional claims is well established. Proper interpretation and application of a particular provision of the Indiana Constitution requires a search for the common understanding of both those who framed it and those who ratified it. Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72, 75-76 (Ind.1994); Bayh v. Sonnenburg, 573 N.E.2d 398, 412 (Ind.1991). Furthermore, the intent of the framers of the Constitution is paramount in determining the meaning of a provision. Boehm v. Town of St. John, 675 N.E.2d 318, 321 (Ind.1996); Eakin v. State ex rel. Capital Improvement Bd. of Managers of Marion County, 474 N.E.2d 62, 64 (Ind.1985). In order to give life to their intended meaning, we examin[e] the language of the text in the context of the history surrounding its drafting and ratification, the purpose and structure of our constitution, and case law interpreting the specific provisions. Indiana Gaming Comm'n v. Moseley, 643 N.E.2d 296, 298 (Ind.1994). See also Price v. State, 622 N.E.2d 954, 957 (Ind.1993); State Election Bd. v. Bayh, 521 N.E.2d 1313 (Ind.1988). In construing the constitution, we look to the history of the times, and examine the state of things existing when the constitution or any part thereof was framed and adopted, to ascertain the old law, the mischief, and the remedy. Sonnenburg, 573 N.E.2d at 412 (citing State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389, 391 (1871)). The language of each provision of the Constitution must be treated with particular deference, as though every word had been hammered into place. Warren v. Indiana Tele. Co., 217 Ind. 93, 102, 26 N.E.2d 399, 403 (Ind.1940). The framers emphatically declared, and the ratifiers approved, that every person for injury done to him in his person, property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law. IND. CONST. art. I, § 12 (emphasis added). In choosing the language of this provision, they did not say that every person might have whatever remedy the common law or the legislature may allow from time to time, nor did they merely reiterate the language of the then-existing federal Due Process Clause, which states that [n]o person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. U.S. CONST. amend. V. They did not craft Section 12 merely to provide due process. Instead, our framers and ratifiers unequivocally enhanced the protections afforded by our state constitution, expressly establishing the additional right to remedy for injuries suffered. Indiana first adopted a remedy by due course of law provision as part of its original Constitution in 1816. [3] This provision was retained with only slight modification (replacing lands, goods with property) when our present Constitution was adopted in 1851. When Section 12 was adopted in 1851 (and when adopted in its initial form in 1816), the only source of federal due process protection was that provided in the Fifth Amendment, which did not contain a right to remedy clause and was not applicable to the states. From the time of the Declaration of Independence until after the Civil War, the rights and liberties of citizens were protected against government infringement only by the declarations of rights in the individual states. Justice Randy J. Holland, State Constitutions: Purpose and Function, 69 TEMPLE L.REV. 989, 998 (1996). The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, [4] which includes the Due Process Clause that is applicable to the states, was not adopted until 1868, and thus could not have served as the model for Article I, Section 12 of Indiana's 1851 Constitution. When the framers of our constitution adopted Article I, Section 12, the primary definition of the term remedy was [t]he means employed to enforce a right or redress an injury. [5] 2 BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY 436 (14th ed. 1878). Thus, the Right to Remedy Clause does not entitle a person to automatic reparation or recompense, but rather ensures access to the courts to seek reparation or recompense for wrongful injury. Thirty-seven other state constitutions [6] also include a remedies provision. [7] These provisions trace their roots to chapter 40 of the Magna Carta: To no one will we sell, to no one will we deny, or delay right or justice. [8] It is this assurance of access to justice that is embodied in our Right to Remedy Clause. The right to remedy for injury has long been important in Indiana and our nation. Although the historical records from the 1816 and 1851 conventions provide no direct evidence of the intent of the framers regarding this clause, this Court declared within the first decade following the adoption of our present Right to Remedy Clause: `No one,' says Judge Story, `will doubt that the Legislature may vary the nature and extent of remedies, so always that a substantial remedy exists.' Maynes v. Moore, 16 Ind. 116, 122 (Ind. 1861) (quoting Story's Com. § 1379). Later, this Court reiterated the importance of remedy: It has always been a general principle under our legal system that for every wrong there should be a remedy. State ex rel. Reichert v. Youngblood, 225 Ind. 129, 142, 73 N.E.2d 174, 179 (Ind. 1947). Chief Justice of the United States John Marshall also stated: The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163, 2 L.Ed. 60, 69 (1803). Applying our well-established methodology of constitutional interpretation, I conclude that Section 12 provides separate and distinct protections and is not coextensive with federal due process jurisprudence. I am also convinced that Section 12 ensures not only that procedures must comply with due course of law, but further that both the text and the history provide strong support for understanding Section 12 of Indiana's Bill of Rights to provide a substantive right to remedy for injuries suffered. The legislature has the authority to modify or abrogate common law rights as long as such change does not interfere with constitutional rights. [9] Martin v. Richey, 711 N.E.2d 1273, 1283 (Ind.1999); State v. Rendleman, 603 N.E.2d 1333, 1336 (Ind.1992). Although constitutional rights may be subjected to legislative restraints and burdens necessitated by the State's exercise of its police power to promote the peace, safety, and well-being of the public, this police power is not unlimited: [T]here is within each provision of our Bill of Rights a cluster of essential values which the legislature may qualify but not alienate. Price v. State, 622 N.E.2d 954, 960 (Ind.1993). A right is impermissibly alienated when the State materially burdens one of the core values which it embodies. Id. The right to remedy for injury is such a core value. While legislative qualifications of this right may be enacted under the police power, the total abrogation of an injured person's right to remedy is an unacceptable material burden. [10] The statute of repose provision in the Products Liability Act is no mere qualification. It does not merely limit the time within which to assert a remedy, nor does it merely modify the procedure for enforcing the remedy. Nor is it a narrow, limited immunity necessitated by police power. On the contrary, the repose provision completely bars the courthouse doors to all persons injured by products over ten years old, even for claims alleging negligence, and even where the products were designed, built, sold, and purchased with the expectation of decades of continued use. [11] Although this provision denies all Indiana citizens access to justice ensured by the Right to Remedy Clause, it is especially pernicious to those economically disadvantaged citizens who must rely on older or used products rather than new ones. I would find that the Products Liability Act repose provision, Indiana Code section 34-20-3-1(b), violates our Right to Remedy Clause, Article I, Section 12 of the Indiana Constitution.