Opinion ID: 867372
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutionality of (F)(6) aggravating circumstance

Text: ¶ 17 Pandeli asserts that the (F)(6) especially heinous, cruel or depraved aggravating circumstance is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. He makes three separate arguments in support of his assertion: (1) This Court has failed to sufficiently define the factor through specific and consistent guidelines; (2) Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990), [2] no longer saves the (F)(6) factor from unconstitutional vagueness because juries, rather than judges, now find aggravating circumstances; and (3) the jury instruction in this case failed to cure the facial vagueness of the statutory language because it used terms that are equally vague. The Court reviews alleged constitutional violations de novo. McGill, 213 Ariz. at 159, ¶ 53, 140 P.3d at 942.
¶ 18 In Walton v. Arizona , the Supreme Court of the United States held that Arizona's (F)(6) statutory aggravating circumstance is facially vague. 497 U.S. at 654, 110 S.Ct. 3047. That Court ultimately held, however, that the (F)(6) aggravating circumstance is constitutional because Arizona judicial opinions have provided a narrowing construction that gives meaningful guidance to the sentencer. Id. at 653-55, 110 S.Ct. 3047. Pandeli's first argument thus does not provide a basis for reversal.
¶ 19 Pandeli argues that Walton does not save the (F)(6) factor from unconstitutional vagueness because juries, rather than trial judges, now find the existence of aggravating circumstances. We have rejected this argument several times. State v. Cromwell, 211 Ariz. 181, 188-89, ¶¶ 40-42, 119 P.3d 448, 455-56 (2005), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2291, 164 L.Ed.2d 819 (2006); State v. Anderson (Anderson II), 210 Ariz. 327, 352-53, ¶¶ 109-14, 111 P.3d 369, 394-95 (2005). Cromwell and Anderson hold that the (F)(6) aggravator may be constitutionally applied if given substance and specificity by jury instructions that follow this Court's constructions. State v. Hampton, 213 Ariz. 167, 176, ¶ 36, 140 P.3d 950, 959 (2006), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 972, 166 L.Ed.2d 738 (2007). We next address the adequacy of the instructions given in Pandeli's case.
¶ 20 Pandeli argues that the jury instructions given at his sentencing did not sufficiently define heinous and depraved because those words were defined by equally vague terms. We disagree. The terms heinous and depraved were properly defined using terms that were themselves clearly defined. The instructions stated, in relevant part: The terms heinous or depraved focus upon a defendant's state of mind at the time of the offense, as reflected by his words and actions at or near the time of the offense. A murder is especially heinous if it is hatefully or shockingly evil: grossly bad. A murder is especially depraved if it is marked by debasement, corruption, perversion or deterioration. To determine whether Defendant's actions were especially heinous or depraved, you should consider whether Defendant's behavior evidenced any of the following: 1. Relishing the murder; or 2. Inflicting gratuitous violence on the victim beyond that necessary to kill; or 3. Mutilating the victim's body. In this context, relishing refers to Defendant's words or actions that demonstrate debasement or perversion. In order to support a finding of relishing, Defendant must say or do something, other than committing the murder itself, to show that he savored or reveled in the killing. In this context, gratuitous violence refers to violence committed upon the victim beyond that necessary to kill. Gratuitous violence also may be found if you determine that the circumstances evidence that the murder could have been accomplished by less violent manners. In this context, needless mutilation means that Defendant, in any act separate and distinct from the killing itself, committed other acts with the intent to mutilate the victim's corpse, such as the purposeful severing of body parts. ¶ 21 We conclude that the terms heinous and depraved were defined using easily understood terms or terms that were themselves defined. Moreover, the instructions are virtually identical to the ones we approved in Anderson II, 210 Ariz. at 352-53 n. 19, ¶ 111, 111 P.3d at 394-95 n. 19. The only significant difference between the two instructions is that the Anderson II instructions included a paragraph explaining that certain statements by a defendant cannot be considered relishing. Id. It was unnecessary to provide a similar instruction in this case, however, because the State did not allege that Pandeli made any statements that demonstrated relishing. The jury instructions in this case properly narrowed and defined the (F)(6) aggravating factor.