Opinion ID: 1989907
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Equal Protection and Lowered Breath Volume Requirement

Text: Lowering the minimum breath volume for women over sixty implicates both age and gender classifications and requires us to consider a potential challenge brought pursuant to both the federal and state constitutions. Because these standards are different and because the decision-making paradigm is different in the federal and state courts, we address them in turn. The Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution mandates that no state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The Equal Protection Clause is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254, 87 L.Ed. 2d 313, 320 (1985). The federal equal protection analysis looks to the characteristics of the impacted protected class or the nature of the right being affected by the government action. The federal test used to evaluate an age-based challenge is concerned with whether the age classification in question is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. The rationality commanded by the Equal Protection Clause does not require States to match age distinctions and the legitimate interests they serve with razorlike precision. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83, 120 S.Ct. 631, 646, 145 L.Ed. 2d 522, 542 (2000). On the other hand, if the government distinguishes between males and females, the classification is subject to a heightened scrutiny. Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728, 123 S.Ct. 1972, 1978, 155 L.Ed. 2d 953, 963 (2003). For a gender classification to survive this scrutiny, the government must show `at least that the [challenged] classification serves `important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed' are `substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.'' United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533, 116 S.Ct. 2264, 2275, 135 L.Ed. 2d 735, 751 (1996) (alteration in original) (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724, 102 S.Ct. 3331, 3336, 73 L.Ed. 2d 1090, 1098 (1982) (quoting Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150, 100 S.Ct. 1540, 1545, 64 L.Ed. 2d 107, 114 (1980))). Unlike its federal counterpart, the New Jersey Constitution does not contain an equal protection clause. Instead, we have found that [a] concept of equal protection is implicit in Art. I, par. 1 of the 1947 New Jersey Constitution. . . . McKenney v. Byrne, 82 N.J. 304, 316, 412 A. 2d 1041 (1980). Therefore, even though Article I, paragraph 1 of our Constitution does not include the phrase equal protection, it is well settled law that the expansive language of that provision is the source for [this] fundamental constitutional guarantee [ ]. Sojourner A. v. N.J. Dep't of Human Servs., 177 N.J. 318, 332, 828 A. 2d 306 (2003). Although conceptually similar, the right under the State Constitution can in some situations be broader than the right conferred by the Equal Protection Clause. Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 94, 662 A. 2d 367 (1995). Indeed, we have held that our Constitution provides analogous or superior protections to our citizens in the context of equal protection. Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trs., 77 N.J. 55, 79, 389 A. 2d 465 (1978). [W]here an important personal right is affected by governmental action, this Court often requires the public authority to demonstrate a greater public need than is traditionally required in construing the federal constitution. Specifically, it must be shown that there is an appropriate governmental interest suitably furthered by the differential treatment. [ Taxpayers Ass'n of Weymouth Twp. v. Weymouth Twp., 80 N.J. 6, 43, 364 A. 2d 1016 (1976) (citing Collingswood v. Ringgold, 66 N.J. 350, 370, 331 A. 2d 262 (1975)).] In considering equal protection-based challenges, we have not followed the traditional equal protection paradigm of the federal courts, which focuses rigidly on the status of a particular protected class or the fundamental nature of the implicated right. Instead, when analyzing equal protection challenges under New Jersey's Constitution, we have applied a balancing test that weighs the nature of the affected right, the extent to which the governmental restriction intrudes upon it, and the public need for the restriction. Caviglia v. Royal Tours of Am., 178 N.J. 460, 473, 842 A. 2d 125 (2004) (quoting Greenberg v. Kimmelman, 99 N.J. 552, 567, 494 A. 2d 294 (1985)). Finally, in addressing equal protection challenges raised in the context of the exercise of police power, we have held that [t]he constitutional principles of due process and equal protection demand that the exercise of the power be devoid of unreason and arbitrariness, and the means selected for the fulfillment of the policy bear a real and substantial relation to that end. Katobimar Realty Co. v. Webster, 20 N.J. 114, 123, 118 A. 2d 824 (1955). There are, in theory, two potential equal protection challenges to the adoption of a different minimum volume standard for women over the age of sixty. First, one could argue that the lowered volume allows testing of a smaller sample of shallower depth and therefore results in a lower BAC reading. As to this challenge, it is undisputed that the device will not accept a sample that has not reached a plateau. An older woman who is capable of producing a greater volume of air but does not do so can be identified by her failure to meet the plateau. Therefore, we can be certain that all test subjects, regardless of age or gender, will only achieve a valid sample when the deeper lung air is included. Second, one could argue that the differentiation permits older women who produce a sample with a volume between 1.2 and 1.5 liters to avoid being charged with refusal but exposes both younger women and all men who provide samples of the same volume to be prosecuted with that offense. The record on which the differentiation between the test groups is based, however, demonstrates that the older women, and only the older women, may be physically incapable of producing the larger sample. The right to equal protection does not require us to scrutinize gender distinctions that are based on real physiological differences to the same extent we would scrutinize those distinctions when they are based on archaic, invidious stereotypes about men and women. See State v. Vogt, 341 N.J.Super. 407, 418, 775 A. 2d 551 (App.Div.2001) (recognizing that [t]he Equal Protection Clause . . . does not demand that things that are different in fact be treated the same in law, nor that a state pretend that there are no physiological differences between men and women). Similarly, the federal courts have recognized that not all sex-based differentiations are actionable. For example, in the employment context some standards that appropriately differentiate between the genders are not facially discriminatory. Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 444 F. 3d 1104, 1109-10 (9th Cir.2006); see Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F. 3d 128, 132 (3d Cir.1996) (recognizing that gender may, in certain defined circumstances, be a bona fide occupational qualification for employment). Applying the principles we have derived from both the federal and state constitutional analyses, we discern no meritorious ground for an equal protection challenge to the proposed two-tiered approach for minimum breath sample volume, regardless of which level of scrutiny we apply. Viewed against our flexible approach to equal protection challenges as derived from Article I, paragraph 1 of our Constitution, the system survives the constitutional challenge. The governmental policy of achieving accurate breath samples as part of law enforcement's role in ridding our roads of drunk drivers is appropriately coupled with the authority to prosecute for refusal. The proposed two-tiered system for minimum breath volume, however, is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary for it advances these goals without holding the identified class, older women, to a standard that they cannot meet. In this manner, the policy goals are fulfilled through means . . . [that] bear a real and substantial relation to that end. Katobimar, supra, 20 N.J. at 123, 118 A. 2d 824. Similarly, under either the rational relationship test applicable to age-based classifications, or the heightened level of scrutiny applied to gender-based classifications under the federal constitution, the lowered requirement for women over sixty passes constitutional muster. The policy goals we have identified for our state constitutional analysis are, in federal parlance, important governmental objectives, see Hibbs, supra, 538 U.S. at 728-29, 123 S.Ct. at 1978, 155 L.Ed. 2d at 963. The selection of the two tiers for this aspect of the test requirements is both rationally related to those goals and substantially related to their achievement. Ibid. Notwithstanding the concern voiced by the NJSBA, there is no scientific or other ground in the record to direct that the minimum volume be lowered for all test subjects. On the contrary, there is ample support for the Special Master's two-tiered approach and we discern no equal protection violation in lowering the required breath volume to 1.2 liters for women over the age of sixty.