Opinion ID: 682427
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Thornburgh's Liability Resulting From Dickman's Acts

Text: 87 The district court also found Thornburgh liable as a result of Dickman's authorization of, and assent to, the contract. 104 Thornburgh does not contest the district court's finding that Dickman authorized or assented to the contract; rather, Thornburgh takes issue only with the court's conclusion that Dickman acted as Thornburgh's general agent with authority to enter into a contract with Rove & Company on Thornburgh's personal behalf. 88 Under Texas law, agency is a mixed question of law and fact. To the extent that the facts are undisputed, the trial court's ruling is freely reviewable on appeal. However, where ... the facts are disputed, the clearly erroneous standard applies. 105 As Thornburgh does not contest the factual findings upon which the district court based its conclusion that Dickman acted as Thornburgh's general agent, we review de novo that court's legal conclusion. 106 89 Agency is a legal relationship created by an express or implied agreement or by operation of law whereby the agent is authorized to act for the principal, subject to the principal's control. 107 As in the formation of any contract, the consent of both parties is necessary to establish an agency relationship. 108 Agency is never to be presumed; it must be shown affirmatively. 109 The party who asserts the existence of agency relationship has the burden of proving it. 110 To prove an agency relation under Texas law, there must be evidence from which the court could conclude that [t]he alleged principal [had] the right to control both the means and the details of the process by which the alleged agent [was] to accomplish the task. 111 90 Thornburgh argues that Rove failed to meet that burden. Specifically, Thornburgh contends that Dickman was the Committee's agent, not Thornburgh's; or, in the alternative, that if Dickman was Thornburgh's agent, it was for the general purposes of running the political side of the campaign--not for the purpose of imposing personal liability on Thornburgh for the debts of the Committee. Thornburgh reminds us that both he and Dickman testified that Dickman was not expressly authorized to act as Thornburgh's agent for any purpose--much less to enter into a contract for Thornburgh personally--and that there is no direct evidence in the record to refute this testimony and support the district court's findings to the contrary. 112 91
92 Although both Thornburgh and Dickman testified that Thornburgh had not constituted Dickman as Thornburgh's agent for any purpose, agency can be implied from the conduct of the parties under the circumstances. 113 In the instant case, Dickman (the person authorized to answer interrogatories on behalf of the Committee) admitted in the Committee's answers to Rove & Company's interrogatories that he was the primary point of contact between the Committee and Defendant Richard Thornburgh. Dickman also acknowledged that he was known as an intermediary to Thornburgh regarding, inter alia, the running and organizing of Thornburgh's campaign. Thornburgh solicited Dickman's opinion on a day-to-day basis about campaign activities, including broad campaign strategies, where Thornburgh should speak, and what issues Thornburgh should address. Thornburgh used Dickman as his go-between to provide mailing lists, a signature exemplar, and edited solicitation letters to the Committee to facilitate the Committee's direct mail contract with Rove & Company. Thornburgh testified that Dickman was a loyal friend, who had served as a high-level assistant to Thornburgh during several of Thornburgh's campaigns and while Thornburgh served in various government positions. 114 93 Consistent with a principal's role, Thornburgh retained the ultimate authority over Dickman and Dickman's activities within the Committee. For example, even though Dickman took part in the Committee's decision to hire Davis as the Committee's Campaign Manager, Dickman acknowledged that, had Thornburgh disapproved of this choice, another campaign manager would have been selected. In addition, although Dickman authorized and assented to the Committee's contract with Rove & Company, Thornburgh retained control over the content of the fundraising letters and whether the letters would be mailed at all. 115 Finally, Thornburgh was the only person authorized to grant the Committee (and thus its employees, one of whom was Dickman) the authority to raise and spend funds on Thornburgh's behalf. Thornburgh thus had the right to withhold his authorization of the Committee, a decision that would have halted all Committee activities--including Dickman's. Consequently, the evidence supports the district court's finding that Dickman served as Thornburgh's agent acting under Thornburgh's control. Nevertheless, we still must determine the scope of Dickman's authority. 94
95 An agent has only as much authority as the principal has either expressly or impliedly conferred. 116 The extent of an agent's authority is determined in light of all surrounding circumstances, including, inter alia, the parties' relations to one another, the undertaking in which the parties are engaged, and the general usages and practices of those engaged in such undertakings. 117 96 The district court found that Dickman acted as Thornburgh's general agent, or, [a]t the very least, Dickman had apparent authority to act on Thornburgh's behalf with respect to the campaign and, specifically, the agreement with Rove. 118 Thornburgh counters that even if Dickman did act as Thornburgh's agent, he was authorized only to run the political side of the campaign, not to enter into contracts making Thornburgh personally liable. 97 Although we recognize that there is some evidence and authority to support the district court's conclusion that Dickman was acting as Thornburgh's general agent, authorized to enter into the September Contract for Thornburgh personally, 119 we need not go that far to hold Thornburgh liable here. The record makes clear that Dickman acted as Thornburgh's agent to the Committee and was authorized to represent Thornburgh in all Committee activities, including whether to enter into the September Contract. This finding alone is sufficient to hold Thornburgh personally liable, given Thornburgh's acknowledgement that Dickman authorized and assented to that Committee's contract with Rove & Company. 98 As discussed earlier, for Thornburgh to be liable for the September Contract, Rove & Company had only to prove that Thornburgh authorized, assented to, or ratified the Committee's decision to enter into the agreement. Thornburgh could manifest his authorization or assent personally or through an agent. In the instant case, the record is clear that Dickman, as Thornburgh's representative to the Committee, authorized or assented to the September Contract. 99 Much of the same evidence that establishes that Dickman acted as Thornburgh's agent also supports the district court's findings that Dickman was Thornburgh's primary point of contact with the Committee 120 and that Dickman's role in the Committee was obviously to assure Thornburgh's interests would best be served and to be Thornburgh's voice. 121 There is no indication that these findings by the district court were clearly erroneous. We also note that Thornburgh testified that it is customary during a political campaign for a candidate to rely on others, such as Dickman, to manage the day-to-day operations of the campaign--which operations would include such things as the purchase of services necessary to support the candidacy. As it is customary to rely on others for such services, and as the district court found that Dickman was the primary person upon whom Thornburgh relied during his senatorial campaign, we are led to but one conclusion: Dickman, as Thornburgh's representative to the Committee, had either actual or apparent authority to bestow Thornburgh's blessings on Committee activities, which included the Committee's decision to contract with Rove & Company. As Dickman had such authority, and as Thornburgh concedes (and the record substantiates with uncontroverted evidence) that Dickman authorized and assented to the September Contract, Thornburgh can also be found liable for the September Contract as a result of Dickman's authorization and assent to the Committee's decision to enter into that agreement. 122 Consequently, we need not, and do not, reach the issue whether Thornburgh also is personally liable because Dickman acted as Thornburgh's general agent vis-a-vis Rove & Company, vested with authority to enter into pacts such as the September Contract and bind Thornburgh personally.C. PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER DIMUZIO 100 Guarding against the possibility that we might reverse the district court's decision holding Thornburgh personally liable for the September Contract, Rove & Company filed a cross appeal in the alternative, contesting the portion of the district court judgment holding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Dimuzio. As we conclude that Thornburgh is liable on the contract, we do not reach this jurisdictional issue. 101 In addition to urging affirmance of the dismissal of the suit against him, however, Dimuzio as cross-appellee seeks double costs as a sanction against Rove & Company for filing a frivolous appeal of the district court's ruling dismissing Dimuzio for lack of personal jurisdiction. Although we agree with Dimuzio that Rove & Company provided no authority and little argument in the section of its brief designated as addressing its cross appeal, we believe that, when read in its entirety, Rove & Company's brief adequately explains the basis upon which it believed that Dimuzio could be held amenable to the district court's jurisdiction and liable for the Committee's debt. Thus, Rove & Company's cross appeal was not so baseless as to constitute frivolousness for purposes of sanctions. Accordingly, in the exercise of our discretion, we elect to consider Rove & Company's cross appeal non-frivolous in the context of the entire case and in light of the content of Rove & Company's entire brief. We thus deny Dimuzio's request for sanctions. III