Opinion ID: 612494
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The District Court's Admission of the Deposition Testimony

Text: Matus-Zayas contends that his Confrontation Clause rights were violated when the videotaped deposition testimony was admitted at trial despite the fact the government never provided evidence to establish that the material witnesses were unavailable. [6] We review this issue for plain error. [7] See Hagege, 437 F.3d at 956. a. The Existence of Plain Error It is well-established that [t]he Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees an accused the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. United States v. Norwood, 603 F.3d 1063, 1068 (9th Cir.2010), as amended (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 225, 178 L.Ed.2d 250 (2010). Testimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial have been admitted only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had the prior opportunity to cross-examine. Id. (citation and alteration omitted). The constitutional requirement that a witness be unavailable before his prior testimony is admissible stands on separate footing that is independent of and in addition to the requirement of a prior opportunity for cross-examination. United States v. Yida, 498 F.3d 945, 950 (9th Cir.2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A witness is considered unavailable for purposes of the Confrontation Clause if the prosecutorial authorities have made a good-faith effort to obtain his presence at trial. Forn v. Hornung, 343 F.3d 990, 995 n. 3 (9th Cir.2003), as amended (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In the detained material witness context, the government typically bears the burden of proving the [material] witness' unavailability as a predicate to the admission of the [material witness'] deposition testimony. Aguilar-Ayala, 973 F.2d at 417-18 (citation omitted); see also Santos-Pinon, 146 F.3d at 736 (noting that demonstrating unavailability through good faith efforts to procure witnesses is still required after § 1324(d)); United States v. Fuentes-Galindo, 929 F.2d 1507, 1511 (10th Cir.1991) (concluding that deposition testimony of a detained material witness was inadmissible when the government did not meet its burden of demonstrat[ing] a `good faith' effort or use `reasonable means' in attempting to obtain the three material witnesses' presence at trial). In this case, it is undisputed that the government failed to present any evidence at trial to establish that efforts were made to procure the witnesses's presence. As a result, the district court did not make any findings on the record that the material witnesses were unavailable. The government now seeks to establish for the first time on appeal that it made a good faith effort to procure the material witnesses's presence at trial. Specifically, the government points to a letter written to the material witnesses's attorney approximately one month prior to trial which requested the material witnesses's presence to testify at trial. The letter also indicates that the government offered to pay for the material witnesses's travel expenses. The government alleges that neither this letter nor any other evidence about the government's efforts to secure the witnesses' attendance was introduced at trial because [Matus-Zayas] did not object at trial to the admission of the depositions on any grounds[.] Unfortunately for the government, our precedent dictates that, even absent an objection by the defendant, the obligation remains on the government to provide evidence at trial demonstrating the witness's unavailability as a predicate to the admission of the material witness's testimony. In United States v. Vasquez-Ramirez, 629 F.2d 1295, 1297 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), we relied on United States v. Provencio, 554 F.2d 361 (9th Cir.1977) (per curiam), as modified, to hold that it was plain error to permit the introduction of depositions of alien witnesses without any proof that the deposed witnesses were unavailable and without a stipulation permitting the use of the depositions. This language compels the conclusion that the district court also committed plain error in this case by admitting the deposition testimony into evidence without any showing by the government at trial that the material witnesses were unavailable. To avoid committing plain error, the district court should have followed our well-established precedent and required the government to place on the record some evidence of the continued unavailability of the material witnesses. See Vasquez-Ramirez, 629 F.2d at 1297. Indeed, such a showing is necessary to avoid a successful Confrontation Clause challenge. See Santos-Pinon, 146 F.3d at 736 (discussing the constitutional requirement of establishing unavailability) (internal quotation marks omitted). The government could have met its obligation by detailing its efforts to procure the witnesses's presence at the trial and by making a showing that despite its efforts, the witnesses remained unavailable. This required showing is not unique to the facts of this case. Indeed, the government is routinely required to demonstrate the unavailability of witnesses prior to using preserved testimony. See Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057, 1083 (9th Cir.2008) ([T]he prosecution may introduce the prior testimony of a witness without running afoul of the Sixth Amendment... [if] the prosecutor ... prove[s] that the witness is unavailable ... and if the defendant had the opportunity to crossexamine the witness at the prior hearing.) (citations omitted). Because the government failed to meet its burden of establishing at trial that the material witnesses were unavailable, we conclude that admission of the depositions at trial was error that was plain and that affected Matus-Zayas' substantial Confrontation Clause rights. Hammons, 558 F.3d at 1103; see also Vasquez-Ramirez, 629 F.2d at 1297 (describing the right of confrontation as a fundamental constitutional right[]). b. Exercise of Discretion to Grant Relief Having determined that the trial court committed plain error that affected Matus-Zayas's substantial rights, we may exercise our discretion to grant relief if we are persuaded that the error seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Hammons, 558 F.3d at 1103 (citation omitted). In Provencio, we concluded that reversible error occurred because the government failed to introduce proof that the deposed material witnesses were unavailable, not-withstanding the fact they were not released[from custody] and were still available at the time of trial. Provencio, 554 F.2d at 362. Unlike in Provencio, it is not evident from this record that the material witnesses were available for trial. Notably, Matus-Zayas does not allege that the witnesses were in fact available, and he does not assert that the deposition testimony would not have been admitted had he made a proper objection at trial. In fact, had Matus-Zayas raised a Confrontation Clause objection at trial, the government likely would have provided evidence to establish that a good faith effort was made to produce the material witnesses for trial. Because we are not persuaded that either the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of [the] judicial proceedings was adversely affected, Hammons, 558 F.3d at 1103 (citation omitted), we decline to exercise our discretion to grant relief.
Matus-Zayas argues that the district court committed two different procedural errors in applying Rule 15. First, Matus-Zayas contends that the district court failed to comply with Rule 15(a)(2) when it did not require the material witnesses to file written requests to be deposed. Second, Matus-Zayas alleges that the district court did not comply with Rule 15(a)(2) when it failed to require the material witnesses to sign their deposition transcripts under oath. [9] Matus-Zayas's first argument conflates the standards under Rule 15(a)(1) and (2). As Matus-Zayas correctly notes, Rule 15(a)(2) provides that [a] witness who is detained under 18 U.S.C. § 3144 may request to be deposed by filing a written motion and giving notice to the parties... Fed.R.Crim.P. 15(a)(2) (emphasis added). Matus-Zayas, however, ignores Rule 15(a)(1), which unlike Rule 15(a)(2), provides that any party may move that a prospective witness be deposed in order to preserve testimony for trial. Fed. R.Crim.P. 15(a)(1). At the hearing on Matus-Zayas's motion to detain the material witnesses, the magistrate judge made clear that he was permitting the depositions to proceed pursuant to Rule 15(a)(1), and not Rule 15(a)(2), when he noted that [a] party may move, and the government has moved to take their depositions, that a prospective witness be deposed in order to preserve the testimony for trial. The magistrate judge also referenced the exceptional circumstances standard contained in Rule 15(a)(1). Because Rule 15(a)(1) permits any party to move that a prospective witness be deposed, we conclude that the magistrate judge committed no error by permitting the government to move to depose the material witnesses rather than requiring the material witnesses to make the motion. We further note that at least one court has expressly rejected the notion that only material witnesses may move to have their depositions taken. In United States v. Lai Fa Chen, 214 F.R.D. 578, 580 (N.D.Cal. 2003), a magistrate judge held that Rule 15 and 18 U.S.C. § 3144 are inextricably bound even when the government, and not the detained material witness, moves for a Rule 15 deposition. The magistrate judge noted that it would be illogical to refrain from reading Rule 15 in conjunction with 18 U.S.C. § 3144 when the government is the moving party, [because] the [c]ourt would: (1) needlessly require serial Rule 15 motions from each material witness; (2) deter the government from playing an active role in ensuring that material witnesses are only detained as long as necessary to secure their testimony; and (3) forestall the government from effective enforcement of its immigration laws. Id. at 581 (footnote reference omitted). According to the magistrate judge, [t]he better practice, in the detained material witness context, is to consider the impact that an order permitting depositions would have on the detained material witness even when a party and not the witness makes the motion. Id. This reasoning persuades us that Matus-Zayas's argument is unavailing. Matus-Zayas's second argument presents a closer question. In contrast to Rule 15(a)(2), Rule 15(a)(1) does not contain a requirement that witnesses sign their own deposition transcripts under oath. Compare Fed.R.Crim.P. 15(a)(1) with Fed.R.Crim.P. 15(a)(2). Nevertheless, an argument could be made that Rule 15(a)(2), which specifically addresses detained material witnesses should have been applied by the court and its failure to abide by the provisions of Rule 15(a)(2) constituted plain error. See San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. Nuclear Reg. Comm'n, 635 F.3d 1109, 1117 (9th Cir. 2011) (observing that a specific provision qualif[ies] and suppl[ies] exceptions to the general [provision].) (citation omitted). Matus-Zayas, however, does not allege that a review of the transcripts was ever requested or that changes were made. The jury viewed videotapes of the depositions, which would have made them aware of any inaccuracy in the deposition transcripts. Indeed, Matus-Zayas has not cited any specific examples of possible inaccuracies in the deposition testimony and has not demonstrated any prejudice which might have resulted from the failure of the deponents to review and sign the transcripts of their testimony. United States v. Campbell, 845 F.2d 1374, 1379 (6th Cir.1988) (describing harmless error). Accordingly, any error in admitting the unsigned depositions at trial did not affect Matus-Zayas's substantial rights. See Hammons, 558 F.3d at 1103.
Matus-Zayas asserts that the district court failed to comply with General Order 05-34 (General Order) of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona by not affording his attorney three working days in which to interview the material witnesses. Matus-Zayas also contends that the General Order is in direct conflict with Rule 15 ... which requires deponents to attest to the accuracy of the deposition transcripts. [11] We disagree. Paragraph 3 of the General Order provides that an attorney for a defendant shall have three working days, after notification orally or in writing by the District Judge or Magistrate Judge that a witness is being detained in the case, within which to interview a detained material witness who is an adult. Matus-Zayas's attorney was appointed in this case on June 16, 2008, and the record reflects that she never requested to interview the detained material witnesses at any time prior to their release. Paragraph 3 does not require the district court to ensure that the interview takes place absent a request by the defendant's attorney. Therefore, we conclude that no plain error was committed. Matus-Zayas has also failed to establish that the General Order conflicts with Rule 15. As noted above, Rule 15(a)(1) does not require deponents to attest to the accuracy of their depositions unless review is requested and changes are made. Moreover, the General Order expressly states that depositions of material witnesses shall be conducted in accordance with Rule 15[.] Therefore, we conclude that this argument lacks merit.
Matus-Zayas's facial challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 3144 fails. The statute does not abrogate the constitutional requirement of establishing the unavailability of a material witness prior to allowing preserved testimony to be introduced at trial. The magistrate judge complied with the provisions of § 3144 by considering the affidavit submitted by the government, determining that it would become impracticable to secure the presence of the material witnesses by subpoena, and authorizing the preservation of the witnesses's testimony by deposition prior to releasing them. However, the district court did plainly err when it allowed admission of the deposition testimony without requiring the government to present proof of the witnesses's continued unavailability. Nevertheless, we decline to exercise our authority to grant relief because we are not persuaded that the error adversely affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of [the] judicial proceedings. Hammons, 558 F.3d at 1103 (citation omitted). Similarly, any error committed by the district court in its application of Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure did not affect Matus-Zayas's substantial rights. Finally, the district court committed no plain error when its actions are measured against General Order 05-34. AFFIRMED.