Opinion ID: 2581010
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Alleged withholding of evidence at the preliminary hearing and deprivation of the right to a continuous preliminary hearing

Text: As noted above, the prosecutor learned on the evening of December 5, 1989 (the day before the preliminary hearing began), from interviews with Donna Guthrie and Maurice Solvang, of a plot to prevent Terry Guillory from testifying. Defendant asserts the prosecutor committed misconduct by failing immediately to disclose that and related information [20] to the court and to defense counsel at or prior to the start of the preliminary hearing on the morning of December 6, 1989, and instead delaying disclosure until the noon recess on that date (following Guillory's testimony on direct examination that he heard gunshots, saw defendant peek out from the door of the Pillow home, and heard defendant cuss upon being observed by Guillory). [21] Defendant also asserts that this claimed misconduct in turn tainted his personal waiver of his right to a continuous preliminary examination, which he had given at the start of the hearing, and subsequently forced him and his counsel to accept and seek later continuances (ultimately until January 21, 1990), all thereby violating his rights under section 861, subdivision (a). [22] Assuming for purposes of analysis only that the prosecutor committed misconduct by failing to disclose this newly discovered information concerning the plot at the commencement of the preliminary hearing in the morning rather than during the noon recess and that the continuance violated defendant's right to a continuous preliminary hearing, defendant has not demonstrated entitlement to relief. As we held in People v. Pompa-Ortiz (1980) 27 Cal.3d 519, 165 Cal.Rptr. 851, 612 P.2d 941 ( Pompa-Ortiz ), when a defendant presents, by way of a pretrial writ petition, claims that establish irregularities in preliminary hearing procedures, the court will grant relief  for example, dismissal and remand for a new, properly conducted preliminary hearing  without any showing of prejudice. ( Id., at p. 529, 165 Cal.Rptr. 851, 612 P.2d 941.) But when such claims are presented for the first time on appeal, irregularities ... which are not jurisdictional in the fundamental sense shall be reviewed under the appropriate standard of prejudicial error and shall require reversal only if the defendant can show that he was deprived of a fair trial or otherwise suffered prejudice as a result of the error at the preliminary examination. ( Ibid., italics added.) We observed that such an approach is consistent with the United States Supreme Court's treatment of constitutional error at the preliminary examination. Thus, even in a situation as extreme as the denial of counsel, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the harmless error rule is applicable. ( Id., at p. 530, 165 Cal.Rptr. 851, 612 P.2d 941, citing Coleman v. Alabama (1970) 399 U.S. 1, 11, 90 S.Ct. 1999, 26 L.Ed.2d 387.) We held that although the defendant's statutory right to a public preliminary hearing had been violated  and the resulting commitment had been  rendered unlawful within the meaning of Penal Code section 995 ( Pompa-Ortiz, supra, 27 Cal.3d 519, 522, 165 Cal.Rptr. 851, 612 P.2d 941, italics added)  the defendant was not entitled to relief, because he failed to show that he was subsequently deprived of a fair trial or was otherwise prejudiced by reason of the error. ( Id. at p. 530, 165 Cal.Rptr. 851, 612 P.2d 941.) As defendant concedes, he presented none of his current challenges to the preliminary hearing procedures by way of a pretrial writ petition. Nor does he make any meaningful attempt to establish that he subsequently was deprived of a fair trial or otherwise suffered prejudice, as required by Pompa-Ortiz, supra, 27 Cal.3d 519, 165 Cal.Rptr. 851, 612 P.2d 941. Instead, defendant asserts that the prosecutor's failure to earlier disclose the newly discovered evidence amounted to deliberate, thoughtfully conceived, misconduct that should be treated as structural error, entitling him to relief without any showing of prejudice and without regard to whether the ultimate trial was fair. As the high court held in Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302, although most trial errors (including the denial of counsel at a preliminary hearing) are subject to harmless error analysis ( id., at pp. 306-308, 111 S.Ct. 1246), some errors  those amounting to a structural defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself ( id., at p. 310, 111 S.Ct. 1246) are reversible per se, without inquiry into prejudice. Structural defects identified in Arizona v. Fulminante include: (i) total deprivation of the right to counsel at trial; (ii) trial by a judge who was not impartial; (iii) unlawful exclusion of members of the defendant's race from the grand jury; (iv) denial of the right to self-representation at trial; and (v) denial of the right to a public trial. ( Id., at pp. 309-310, 111 S.Ct. 1246.) Defendant offers no authority for the proposition that the errors or irregularities claimed here constitute structural defects warranting reversal per se, and we decline to endorse that position. Because defendant has failed to argue, much less demonstrate, that he subsequently was deprived of a fair trial or otherwise suffered prejudice as a result of the asserted misconduct and asserted errors at the preliminary examination, he is not entitled to relief on appeal. We reject for the same reasons defendant's related claim, asserted in cursory fashion in his reply brief, that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective in failing to seek pretrial writ review concerning the continuous preliminary examination claim. The record on appeal does not preclude a satisfactory explanation for counsel's actions, and hence provides no basis upon which to find deficient performance by trial counsel. (See Mendoza Tello, supra, 15 Cal.4th 264, 266, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 437, 933 P.2d 1134; Pope, supra, 23 Cal.3d 412, 426, 152 Cal.Rptr. 732, 590 P.2d 859.) Moreover, even assuming deficient performance under an objective standard of professional reasonableness ( Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. 668, 687-691, 104 S.Ct. 2052; Ledesma, supra, 43 Cal.3d 171, 216-217, 233 Cal.Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839), as suggested above defendant has not established prejudice, that is, a reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome in the absence of the assertedly deficient performance. ( Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. 668, 691-696, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674; Ledesma, supra, 43 Cal.3d 171, 217-218, 233 Cal.Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839.) On the record before us, any assumed error by defense counsel in failing to seek writ review is insufficient to undermine confidence in the judgment.