Opinion ID: 2649691
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motions to Continue

Text: ¶18 Forde argues that the trial court violated her rights to due process, a fair trial, effective assistance of counsel, and to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by denying motions to continue the trial because (1) the State belatedly disclosed evidence that necessitated investigation, and (2) the Giffords shootings on the eve of trial tainted potential jurors. A trial court must grant a continuance “only upon a showing that extraordinary circumstances exist and that delay is indispensible to the interests of justice.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 8.5(b). We review a trial court’s denial of a motion to continue for an abuse of discretion, State v. Dixon, 226 Ariz. 545, 555 ¶ 53, 250 P.3d 1174, 1184 (2011), which we will find only if the defendant demonstrates prejudice, State v. VanWinkle, 230 Ariz. 387, 390 ¶ 7, 285 P.3d 308, 311 (2012).
¶19 In the hours after the shootings, a text message was sent from Forde’s cell phone stating that “Red” had been injured; Bush was nicknamed “Red.” Less than a week before the January 11, 2011 start of trial, the State disclosed FBI reports containing a witness’s statement that Leland “Red” Sprout had been involved in the shootings. Forde moved to continue the trial so she could investigate, claiming that evidence of Sprout’s involvement was exculpatory because Forde had no connection to him and it impeached the witness, who had not mentioned Sprout during defense interviews. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the information had only speculative evidentiary value and would not be 6 STATE V. FORDE Opinion of the Court materially exculpatory. But the court permitted Forde to re-interview the witness, who later testified at trial. ¶20 Forde primarily argues that the trial court erred by considering whether the evidence was exculpatory rather than determining whether the late disclosure was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the standard applied in State v. Krone, 182 Ariz. 319, 897 P.2d 621 (1995). Krone did not alter the standard for considering trial continuances, as Forde suggests. The issue in Krone was whether a new trial was warranted in light of the introduction of evidence in violation of disclosure rules. Id. at 321, 897 P.2d at 623. Resolving that issue turned on whether the state could demonstrate harmless error. In this case, because the FBI reports were not introduced in evidence, Krone is inapplicable. The trial court correctly placed the burden on Forde to demonstrate “extraordinary circumstances” necessitating a continuance. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 8.5(b). ¶21 Forde also argues that the belated disclosure constituted “extraordinary circumstances” justifying a continuance because an investigation could have revealed evidence of Sprout’s involvement, which would have created a reasonable doubt about Forde’s guilt or the appropriateness of death sentences. We disagree. Although Sprout’s involvement could have cast doubt on Bush’s presence at the shootings, it would not have shown Forde’s absence or otherwise tended to exculpate her. ¶22 Forde further fails to show that the denial of her motion prejudiced her rights. She does not allege that her second interview of the witness was inadequate, and she does not show that the court’s ruling hampered her investigation of Sprout’s alleged involvement. Moreover, because the trial was ultimately continued for eight days for other reasons, Forde had additional time to investigate.
¶23 Two days after the Giffords shootings, Forde moved to continue her trial, which had been scheduled to start the next day, arguing that trying the case in the immediate aftermath of the Giffords shootings would be unfair because jurors might transfer their emotional distress to Forde in light of similarities between the crimes. Although the court 7 STATE V. FORDE Opinion of the Court denied the motion, it nonetheless continued the trial for eight days, in part because “the events of the past several days along with continuing developments within the community have created an atmosphere that’s not conducive to going forward with the trial today.” On the new trial date, Forde renewed her motion, contending that the publicity and emotions stemming from the Giffords shootings had not subsided. The trial court denied the motion. ¶24 Forde argues that the shock and grief experienced by Tucson residents after the Giffords shootings presented the type of “extraordinary circumstances” that warranted a trial continuance. She points out that her lead attorney, Eric Larsen, initially argued he was emotionally incapable of providing Forde with an adequate defense, which was later evidenced by inadequate voir dire. But Larsen later told the court that the eight-day trial continuance alleviated his personal issues. And any inadequacy in the voir dire should be considered in the context of an ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claim, which is not before us. See State v. Spreitz, 202 Ariz. 1, 3 ¶ 9, 39 P.3d 525, 527 (2002) (requiring “ineffective assistance of counsel claims . . . to be brought in Rule 32 proceedings”). ¶25 Forde additionally contends that “extraordinary circumstances” existed because it was impossible to seat a jury not deeply affected by the Giffords shootings. As previously explained, however, Forde fails to demonstrate that the emotional distress caused by the Giffords shootings affected the jurors’ ability to fairly reach a verdict. ¶26 The appropriate way to determine the impact of a significant unrelated event in the community is to question potential jurors during the voir dire process. Forde’s attorney took that opportunity and questioned potential jurors about the impact of the Giffords shootings. Only one person indicated he might not be able to be fair, and the court excused him. ¶27 Accordingly, the trial court did not err by denying Forde’s motions to continue. 8 STATE V. FORDE Opinion of the Court