Opinion ID: 760895
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: exclusion of hearsay evidence concerning other suspects

Text: 40 Prior to trial, Hall filed a motion in limine seeking to admit numerous hearsay statements offered to show that someone other than Hall committed the kidnapping and murder of Jessica Roach. Hall argued to the district court that the various hearsay statements were admissible under Federal Rules of Evidence 803(2), 803(24), and/or 804(b)(3). In the alternative, Hall argued that he had a constitutional right to introduce the statements as a matter of due process under Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973) and Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 99 S.Ct. 2150, 60 L.Ed.2d 738 (1979). After a hearing during which the district court examined each of the proffered hearsay statements, the court orally ruled all the statements inadmissible. Hall now appeals those rulings. 6 We review a district court's decision that a particular hearsay statement is not admissible under an abuse of discretion standard. See United States v. Sinclair, 74 F.3d 753, 758 (7th Cir.1996); United States v. Moore, 791 F.2d 566, 570 (7th Cir.1986). 41 First, Hall argues that he should have been allowed to introduce various hearsay statements and suspicious acts of behavior attributed to Lester O'Toole to establish that he, rather than Hall, committed the crime. Specifically, Hall sought to offer the testimony of Jerry Brannin, who is married to O'Toole's ex-wife. Brannin would have testified that O'Toole and his wife told him that they had to get out of town because of the Jessica Roach abduction. Hall also sought to admit the statement of Jamie Wheeler, an acquaintance, who claimed that approximately two days after Jessica Roach's disappearance, O'Toole, while in the process of loading his van in the alley behind Wheeler's mother's home, said to Wheeler's mother: Dee, I have to get out of town before the shit hits the fan. In addition, Hall sought to admit the statement of Eduardo Vela, another acquaintance, who claimed that O'Toole told him that she'd be found in harvest time in a cornfield in Indiana. Hall also sought to introduce evidence that O'Toole, like Hall, owned a van, which, according to O'Toole's brother-in-law, disappeared for three days sometime in September of 1993. His brother-in-law would further testify that when O'Toole returned, he washed the van, something that he normally never did. 42 Hall also argues that he should have been allowed to introduce the confession of Keith Goble. Police investigated Goble after he went to the funeral home preparing for Jessica Roach's funeral and asked to see the body. In a subsequent interview with investigators, Goble stated that he picked up Jessica Roach, attempted to have sex with her, and then dropped her off by a cornfield in Indiana. 43
44 Hall first contends that the district court erroneously concluded that two of O'Toole's statements did not qualify as excited utterances under Rule 803(2). Specifically, Hall argues that O'Toole's statement to Jamie Wheeler's mother that I have to get out of town before the shit hits the fan and the statement to Jerry Brannin that O'Toole and his wife had to get out of town because of the Jessica Roach abduction should have been admitted as excited utterances. Rule 803(2) allows hearsay testimony of [a] statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition. Fed.R.Evid. 803(2). Under 803(2), a hearsay statement may be introduced into evidence as an excited utterance only if each of the following three conditions is met: (1) a startling event occurred; (2) the declarant makes the statement while under the stress of excitement cause by the startling event; and (3) the declarant's statement relates to the startling event. United States v. Sowa, 34 F.3d 447, 453 (7th Cir.1994); Moore, 791 F.2d. at 570. 45 We turn first to O'Toole's statement to Wheeler's mother that he had to leave town, which O'Toole allegedly uttered approximately two days after the disappearance of Jessica Roach. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding this testimony. Even if we assume that the requisite startling event was the Roach abduction itself, the record contains ample support for the district court to conclude that neither the second nor third conditions were satisfied. 46 In order to conclude that a declarant made the statement while under the stress of excitement caused by the event, the court must be able to determine that the declarant's state at the time the declaration was made excluded the possibility of conscious reflection. Moore, 791 F.2d at 571-72. While the length of time between the startling event and when the statement is made is not dispositive, it certainly is relevant to a district court's inquiry into whether the declarant uttered the statement while still under the stress of excitement caused by the startling event. Id. at 572. According to Wheeler, O'Toole made the statement at least two days after Jessica Roach was abducted. Thus, even though Wheeler stated that O'Toole appeared pale and upset at the time, we find that a lapse of time of several days between the event and the alleged statement militates against a finding of spontaneity so as to exclude the possibility of conscious reflection. More importantly, however, Hall failed to offer sufficient evidence to show that the statement related to the startling event. In fact, the district court noted that O'Toole could have made the statement for any number of reasons not involving the Jessica Roach abduction. Based on these factors, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Hall failed to qualify this statement for admission under Rule 803(2). 47 Nor can we conclude that the district court erred in excluding O'Toole's alleged statement to Brannin that O'Toole and his wife had to get out of town because of the Jessica Roach abduction. First, Hall offers no evidence as to who uttered the statement--O'Toole or his wife. Second, Hall does not offer any evidence as to when the alleged statement was uttered. See Sowa, 34 F.3d at 453 (reasoning that a proponent must show that the statement [was] made under such circumstances and so recently after the occurrence of the transaction as to preclude the idea of reflection or deliberation (quoting Gross v. Greer, 773 F.2d 116, 120 (7th Cir.1985))). In light of these shortcomings, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in concluding that Hall failed to satisfy the three conditions necessary to qualify this statement as an excited utterance under 803(2). 48
49 At the hearing, Hall requested that Goble's confession and all of O'Toole's alleged statements be admitted under Rule 803(24), 7 the residual exception. The district court refused to admit the confession or any of O'Toole's alleged statements, ruling that there had been an insufficient showing as to the trustworthiness of the statements to justify admission. Because we agree that neither Goble's confession nor O'Toole's alleged statements bore sufficient indicia of reliability to justify admission under 803(24), we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding these statements. 50 Under Rule 803(24), a hearsay statement must meet five requirements to be admissible: (1) circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness; (2) materiality; (3) probative value; (4) the interests of justice; and (5) notice. Moffett v. McCauley, 724 F.2d 581, 583 (7th Cir.1984). Critical to the admission of a hearsay statement under 803(24) is a finding by the district court that the statement is trustworthy. See id.; see also United States v. Romo, 914 F.2d 889, 896 (7th Cir.1990) (concluding that statements which the district court finds not to have such guarantees of trustworthiness cannot be admitted under 803(24)). The district court excluded the proffered statements on the ground that they were untrustworthy. Because none of the other necessary requirements under the Rule were challenged as not being satisfied, on appeal, we need only address whether the statements contained circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness as required under Rule 803(24). 51 As stated, we review a district court's decision that a particular hearsay statement is not admissible under an abuse of discretion standard. Sinclair, 74 F.3d at 758. Moreover, we have emphasized that trial courts have a considerable measure of discretion in deciding when a hearsay statement fits the residual exception of Rule 803(24). Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted). Therefore, a trial judge has considerable discretion in determining whether hearsay statements contain the necessary circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, United States v. Guinan, 836 F.2d 350, 354 (7th Cir.1988), and we will find an abuse in circumstances only where the trial court committed a clear and prejudicial error of judgment in determining whether a statement met the conditions for the application of the residual exception. Sinclair, 74 F.3d at 758-59. With respect to the statements proffered by Hall, we find no error in the district court's exercise of that discretion. 52 We begin by noting that [o]ut-of-court statements are generally inadmissible because they are presumed to be unreliable. United States v. Hooks, 848 F.2d 785, 796 (7th Cir.1988). Thus, the party wishing to introduce hearsay evidence must rebut the presumption of unreliability by appropriate proof of 'trustworthiness.'  Id. In determining whether a statement is sufficiently reliable for purposes of Rule 803(24), a court should examine, among other factors: (1) the probable motivation of the declarant in making the statement; (2) the circumstances under which it was made; and (3) the knowledge and qualifications of the declarant. Cook v. Hoppin, 783 F.2d 684, 690-91 (7th Cir.1986) (citation omitted). Similarly, in construing Rule 804(b)(5), we have identified several additional factors that may be considered in determining whether hearsay testimony has sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness. 8 Some of these other factors which are relevant to the statements in this case include: (1) the character of the declarant for truthfulness and honesty and the availability of evidence on the issue; (2) whether the testimony was given voluntarily, under oath, subject to crossexamination and a penalty for perjury; (3) the extent to which the witness' testimony reflects his personal knowledge; (4) whether the witness ever recanted his testimony; and (5) whether the declarant's statement was insufficiently corroborated. United States v. Seavoy, 995 F.2d 1414, 1418 (7th Cir.1993) (citation omitted). Although these factors are neither exhaustive nor necessary prerequisites for admissibility of hearsay under 803(24), they shed light on the sort of considerations a district court should take into account when evaluating the trustworthiness of a hearsay statement. In this case, the district court carefully examined Goble's confession and each of O'Toole's alleged statements and concluded that the evidence offered by Hall failed to establish the trustworthiness of the proffered statements. 53 In contending that Goble's confession was trustworthy, Hall simply argues that Goble's confession had 'circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness' equivalent to the circumstantial guarantees surrounding Larry Hall's confession. The district court, however, concluded that Goble's confession lacked even the barest indicia of reliability. We agree. First, we have previously reasoned that the physical and mental condition of the declarant at the time a statement is made can be grounds for excluding the hearsay statement as inherently untrustworthy. United States v. Wilkus, 875 F.2d 649, 655 (7th Cir.1989). In this case, the district court had serious doubts about Goble's mental condition as it appeared that Goble was psychotic and he confessed to any crime he was questioned about by the police. In addition, Goble lacked knowledge regarding the pertinent facts of the case. Unlike the instant case, it became clear to investigators during the course of the police interview that Goble knew nothing about the specifics of the crime. Further, Goble's confession was insufficiently corroborated. Police thoroughly searched Goble's vehicle and failed to produce any evidence linking him to the crime. While there was also a corresponding lack of physical evidence tying Hall to the crime, there were no witnesses who could place Goble at or near the scene of the abduction. In contrast, four eyewitnesses testified against Hall. In light of these considerations, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Goble's confession was not sufficiently trustworthy to justify admission under Rule 803(24). 54 Hall also argues that statements O'Toole purportedly made regarding his involvement in the Jessica Roach abduction should have been admitted by the district court under Rule 803(24). Hall baldly asserts that these hearsay statements had even greater 'circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness' than [Goble's] confession, having been made to relatives and friends and, therefore, should be admissible. We disagree. 55 Because it is the most probative hearsay testimony offered by Hall, we first turn to O'Toole's alleged statement to Eduardo Vela that he had disposed of Jessica Roach's body and that she would be found at harvest time in a cornfield in Indiana. Based on several factors, the district court found Vela's testimony regarding this statement unreliable. First, Vela's recollection was inconsistent as to when O'Toole supposedly made the statement--whether it was before or after the discovery of Jessica Roach's body. Only if it was before the discovery would the statement show that O'Toole possessed independent knowledge about the crime. Otherwise, because of the publicity following the Roach case, O'Toole may well have been aware that Jessica's body had been discovered when he allegedly made this statement. Second, the statement was insufficiently corroborated. Hall offered no physical evidence linking O'Toole to the crime, and the statement itself did not contain any specific details of the crime of which only the perpetrator would have knowledge. In addition, O'Toole denied making the statements and passed a polygraph examination regarding his involvement in the crime. Based on these considerations, we agree with the district court that this statement lacked trustworthiness, and we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in excluding this statement. 56 With respect to the remaining statements attributed to O'Toole, we can dispense with them largely based on the same analysis expressed immediately above. None of the statements indicate that O'Toole had unique knowledge of the crime because the statements did not contain specific details of the crime unknown to the public at large. Aside from the hearsay statements themselves, O'Toole's additional statements are not corroborated by any physical evidence or eyewitness testimony. In addition, O'Toole recanted his statements and passed a polygraph examination in which he proclaimed his innocence. Finally, except for O'Toole's statement to Jamie Wheeler's mother about having to get out of town before the shit hits the fan, the dates O'Toole allegedly made these statements cannot be established with any degree of reliability in relation to the discovery of Roach's body. Thus, we conclude that these factors clearly support the district court's conclusion that the proffered hearsay testimony lacked trustworthiness. In sum, we cannot say that district court, relying on the factors expressed above, abused its discretion in concluding that Hall failed to show the trustworthiness of these statements such as to justify admission under Rule 803(24). 57
58 Hall also alleges that Goble's confession and all of O'Toole's alleged statements should have been admitted under Rule 804(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 9 the statement against interest exception. Under Rule 804(b)(3), a hearsay statement may be admitted at trial only if the proponent can satisfy the following three-part test: (1) the declarant's statements must have been against the declarant's interest; (2) corroborating circumstances exist which clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the declarant's statement; and (3) the declarant must have been unavailable as a witness. See United States v. Garcia, 897 F.2d 1413, 1420 (7th Cir.1990). The district court excluded Goble's confession and all of O'Toole's statements because the corroborating evidence does not clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statements. We agree. A district court's determination of the trustworthiness of an out-of-court statement should be upheld unless the finding is clearly erroneous. Id. at 1421. 59 Unlike Rule 803(24), which contemplates the presence of corroborating circumstances as just one factor a court may consider in determining whether a statement has circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, Rule 804(b)(3) expressly requires the exclusion of out-of-court statements offered to exculpate the accused unless there are corroborating circumstances that clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. Garcia, 897 F.2d at 1420; see also United States v. Silverstein, 732 F.2d 1338, 1346 (7th Cir.1984) (emphasizing that corroborating circumstances under 804(b)(3) must clearly indicate a proffered hearsay statement's trustworthiness). Thus, for the same reasons we determined that Goble's confession and O'Toole's statements were insufficiently corroborated under Rule 803(24), see Part II.C, supra, (the lack of physical evidence and eyewitness testimony tying the declarants to the crime, O'Toole's later recantation of his statements, the dates of most of the statements are largely unknown in relation to the discovery of the victim's body, and the fact that the statements themselves did not contain specific facts that only the perpetrator would have known), we also hold that Hall failed to show that sufficient corroborating circumstances existed that clearly indicated the trustworthiness of these statements under Rule 804(b)(3). See Moore, 936 F.2d at 1516-17 (applying the same reasoning in determining that a statement lacked trustworthiness under Rule 804(b)(3) and circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness under 804(b)(5)); see also, United States v. Groce, 999 F.2d 1189, 1190-91 (7th Cir.1993) (concluding that a hearsay statement lacked trustworthiness under Rule 804(b)(3) where the declarant made conflicting statements and later recanted the version most favorable to the defendant); Silverstein, 732 F.2d at 1346-47 (concluding that mere opportunity and ability to commit crime to which hearsay declarant confessed is insufficient corroboration where the statement does not contain facts that only the perpetrator would have known and there was a lack of other evidence linking declarant to the crime). Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not commit clear error in refusing to admit Goble's and O'Toole's hearsay statements under Rule 804(b)(3). 60
61 Hall also alleges that he had a constitutional right to introduce the statements of O'Toole and Goble as a matter of due process under Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973), and Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 99 S.Ct. 2150, 60 L.Ed.2d 738 (1979), because these statements would be considered sufficiently reliable for the government to use against the declarants in a criminal prosecution. Concluding that the statements were unreliable and that the government would not use such unreliable evidence to prosecute the declarants, the district court rejected Hall's argument that he had a constitutional right to introduce the statements. We agree with the district court. 62 In Chambers, the hearsay declarant gave a sworn statement to the defendant's attorneys confessing to the crime to which the defendant was charged and also admitted responsibility for that crime three other times in private conversations with friends. 410 U.S. at 287-88, 93 S.Ct. 1038. Reasoning that the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice, id. at 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038, the Supreme Court held that the trial court's exclusion of this third party's confessions on hearsay grounds violated the defendant's due process rights where circumstances revealed the confessions to be reliable. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court reasoned that the statements were made under circumstances which provided considerable assurance of their reliability. Id. at 300, 93 S.Ct. 1038. These circumstances included: (1) each statement was made spontaneously to a close acquaintance shortly after the murder had occurred; (2) each statement was corroborated by some other evidence in the case whether it was the declarant's sworn confession, eyewitness testimony or evidence linking the declarant to the murder weapon; (3) each statement was against the declarant's interest; and (4) the declarant was available to be cross-examined under oath about his out-of-court statements. Id. at 300-01, 93 S.Ct. 1038. 63 Similarly, in Green, the defendant sought to admit the testimony of a third party who had testified for the government at the co-defendant's trial. 442 U.S. at 96, 99 S.Ct. 2150. The third party testified that the co-defendant admitted that he had committed the murder for which the defendant was being charged and that the defendant was not present. Id. The Supreme Court found several reasons existed to assume the hearsay testimony's reliability, including: (1) the declarant made the statement spontaneously to a close friend; (2) there was ample evidence corroborating the confession; (3) the statement was against interest; (4) and the government considered the testimony sufficiently reliable to use it against the co-defendant. Id. at 97, 99 S.Ct. 2150. Based on these circumstances, the Supreme Court found the hearsay statement reliable and held that the exclusion of reliable hearsay testimony of a co-defendant offered to exculpate the defendant violated the defendant's due process rights. Id. 64 We have since recognized Chambers and Green to stand for the proposition that states must allow defendants to put reliable third-party confessions before the jury, despite the hearsay rule, when necessary to assist in separating the guilty from the innocent. Carson v. Peters, 42 F.3d 384, 385 (7th Cir.1994) (emphasis added); see also Lee v. McCaughtry, 933 F.2d 536, 538 (7th Cir.1991) (Chambers did not do away with the hearsay rule. The Supreme Court contemplated that the judge would be a gatekeeper, that unreliable statements could be excluded.). As we have previously indicated, [w]e have understood Chambers and Green as establishing the rule that 'if the defendant tenders vital evidence the judge cannot refuse to admit it without giving a better reason that it is hearsay.'  Carson, 42 F.3d at 387 (quoting Rivera v. Director, 915 F.2d 280, 281-82 (7th Cir.1990)). However, if the district court does give a 'better reason,' then Chambers and Green have served their purpose. Id. A better reason was given in this case--the statements were unreliable. 65 Unlike the statements in Chambers and Green, the hearsay statements involved in this case were not made under circumstances that provided considerable assurance of their reliability. As we examined in detail in Parts II.B and II.C above, there was insufficient evidence corroborating these statements. In addition, Goble's and O'Toole's statements were neither sworn nor used against either declarant in a criminal proceeding. 66 Relying on our decision in Rivera v. Director, 915 F.2d 280 (7th Cir.1990), Hall nevertheless argues that Goble's confession and O'Toole's statements should have been admitted under Chambers because they are the sort of statements that prosecutors regularly use against defendants. We disagree. In Rivera, the defendant sought to introduce the confession of his co-defendant, a confession which was placed into evidence against the co-defendant at his separate trial and which contributed to the co-defendant's ultimate conviction. Rivera, 915 F.2d at 281. In that confession, the co-defendant stated that he alone committed the crime. Id. The trial court excluded the confession from the defendant's trial on the basis that under applicable state law the availability of the out-of-court declarant for cross-examination is necessary for the admission of hearsay evidence. Id. Perhaps recognizing the vulnerability of the state's ruling on constitutional grounds, during oral argument in Rivera, the government provided a different reason for excluding the confession--that it was unreliable. Id. at 282. As a factor in determining the reliability of the co-defendant's confession in a trial against the defendant, we reasoned that, if the confession was reliable enough to be used to put [the co-defendant] away for the rest of his life, it should be reliable evidence of [the defendant's] innocence as well. Id. Because the government offered no plausible reason for believing that the exculpatory portion of the confession was unreliable, and because Chambers dictates that a statement may not be excluded merely by classifying it as hearsay, we reversed and granted the defendant a new trial. Id. at 281-83. 67 Contrary to Hall's assertions, Rivera does not stand for the proposition that any statement that could be used by a prosecutor against the declarant is sufficiently reliable to justify admission under Chambers. Rather, Rivera merely recognizes that where the government does in fact introduce a statement at trial and uses it to secure a conviction against the declarant, a court should not later preclude a co-defendant from offering that statement in his trial merely on the basis that the statement is hearsay. Since neither O'Toole nor Goble were even charged in this case, Rivera does not undermine the district court's conclusion that the hearsay statements were unreliable and, therefore, inadmissable. 68 In sum, we conclude that Hall's constitutional due process rights were not violated by the district court's decision not to admit the hearsay statements. 69