Opinion ID: 2973584
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Kraemer’s Retaliation Claim

Text: Kraemer fails to specify the theory under which his claim arises. He seems to argue that his transfer following the filing of the grievance constituted unlawful retaliation on two grounds: (1) that he had a right to file the grievance under the MOU, and (2) that he had a First Amendment right, U.S. Const. amend. I, to file the grievance complaining of certain conduct by the Department and that his transfer was a punishment for exercising that right. Luttrell argues that Kraemer had no right to file a grievance under the MOU because municipalities cannot enter into enforceable collective bargaining agreements with their employees under Tennessee law.2 In interpreting questions of state law, we, as a federal court, “must apply state law in accordance with the controlling decisions of the highest court of the state.” Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kellman, 197 F.3d 1178, 1181 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)). Where a state-law issue has not been resolved by the state’s highest court, we must endeavor to determine how the state’s highest court would resolve the issue. Id. In so doing, we “heed the decisions of the intermediate appellate state courts except where [we are] persuaded that the highest court of the state would not so decide.” Pack v. Damon Corp., 434 F.3d 810, 818 (6th Cir. 2006). We “may consider applicable dicta of the state’s highest court” in our effort to ascertain how that court would decide the issue. Id. 2 Kraemer made no argument and cited no authority to the contrary in his initial brief to this court and filed no reply brief to dispute Luttrell’s position. 4 In 1957, the Tennessee Court of Appeals held that a municipality cannot enter into an enforceable collective bargaining agreement with its employees. Weakley County Mun. Elec. Sys. v. Wick, 309 S.W.2d 792, 802 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1957). Shortly after Weakley was decided, the Tennessee Supreme Court expressed that Weakley accurately reflected Tennessee’s public policy. Keeble v. City of Alcoa, 319 S.W.2d 249, 251-52 (Tenn. 1958). A later opinion by the Tennessee Supreme Court acknowledged Weakley’s holding and noted that Tennessee had no general statutory provision authorizing municipalities to engage in collective bargaining with their employees. Fulenwider v. Firefighters Ass’n Local Union 1784, 649 S.W.2d 268, 270 (Tenn. 1982). A more recent unpublished opinion of the Tennessee Court of Appeals continued to follow Weakley. Local Union 760 Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. City of Harriman, No. E2000-00367-COA-R3-CV, 2000 WL 1801856, at -3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 8, 2000); see also 1 TENN. JURIS., LABOR, § 14 (2004). Several authors have suggested that the statements in Weakley, Keeble, and Fulenwider regarding the enforceability of these contracts are dicta and have argued that such contracts should be enforceable, noting a trend toward permitting bargaining for municipal employees in other jurisdictions. See Patrick Hardin, Regulation of Collective Bargaining in Public Employment in Tennessee: The Education Professional Negotiations Act, 47 TENN. L. REV. 241, 241-45 (1980); Robert B. Moberly, Public Sector Labor Relations Law in Tennessee: The Current Inadequacies and the Available Alternatives, 42 TENN. L. REV. 235, 238-41 (1975). However, there has been no indication of a change in this policy as it applies to this case from the Tennessee courts or the legislature, the authorities we must follow in assessing how the Tennessee Supreme Court would 5 decide this question.3 Moreover, we are authorized to consider the dicta of the Tennessee Supreme Court in determining how it would decide this matter. See Pack, 434 F.3d at 818. Given the latest pronouncements of the Tennessee Supreme Court and the Tennessee Court of Appeals, we must conclude that the Tennessee Supreme Court would continue to hold that contracts between municipalities and labor organizations are unenforceable under Tennessee law. Therefore, Kraemer had no independent rights arising under the MOU, and thus his retaliation claim is not sustainable under this theory. As to the second ground, we read Kraemer’s constitutional tort claim as being raised pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,4 even though he fails to mention the statute, because: (1) the one case on which he relies involves a § 1983 claim, see Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc); (2) his statement of the elements of the claim comports with the elements of the constitutional tort of retaliation, see id.; and (3) he discusses municipal liability, which would be relevant for a § 1983 constitutional claim.5 Moreover, Kraemer’s failure to mention § 1983 does not 3 Although the Tennessee legislature passed two statutes in the 1970s authorizing municipalities to engage in collective bargaining with two specific types of workers, educational professionals, TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-5-601, and transit workers, TENN. CODE ANN. § 7-56-101, the Tennessee Court of Appeals held that these statutes had no effect on Weakley’s general bar on collective bargaining agreements between municipalities and their employees except as applied to those two classes of workers. Local Union 760 Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 2000 WL 1801856, at . That court further held that a Tennessee statute that requires labor negotiations between municipalities and public employee unions to be open to the public, TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-44-201, also applied only to the educational and transit workers specifically authorized to bargain by statute and had no broader impact on Weakley. Local Union 760 Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 2000 WL 1801856, at . 4 The means by which to pursue redress for a constitutional violation by a state or municipal actor is 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See McQueen v. Beecher Cmty. Sch., 433 F.3d 460, 471 (6th Cir. 2006); Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999). 5 The district court also analyzed Kraemer’s retaliation claim as a claim under Title VII. Regardless of whether Kraemer ever properly raised a Title VII retaliation claim, Kraemer has 6 appear to be an intentional strategy to circumvent the requirements of the statute. Therefore, we will assume he raised his claim under § 1983. Kraemer never specifies whether he is suing Luttrell in his individual or official capacity. Suing a municipal officer in his official capacity for a constitutional violation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the same as suing the municipality itself, and thus a successful suit against a municipal officer in his official capacity must meet the requirements for municipal liability stated in Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) (explaining that “official-capacity suits generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent” and that “[b]ecause the real party in interest in an official-capacity suit [against a municipal officer] is the governmental entity and not the named official, the entity’s policy or custom must have played a part in the violation of federal law” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 8.6, at 515 (4th ed. 2003). Kraemer states that “to establish the County’s lability for his injuries, there must either be an officially executed policy of the County, or the toleration of a custom within the Sheriff’s department.” Appellants’ Br. at 11. Because he concedes that he must meet the Monell requirements to recover on his claim, we read Kraemer’s suit to be against Luttrell in his official capacity, and thus, in effect, against the County. forfeited any Title VII issue for review because he does not mention Title VII, does not discuss the elements of a Title VII retaliation claim, and cites no Title VII retaliation cases. Kraemer’s concession that he must establish the requirements for municipal liability to recover on his claim also indicates that he is proceeding solely pursuant to § 1983 because Title VII does not require such a showing of municipal liability. See Freeman v. Michigan, Dep’t of State, 808 F.2d 1174, 1178 (6th Cir. 1987). Kraemer has asserted no other statutory basis to support the notion that filing a grievance pursuant to the MOU is a protected activity. 7 2. Elements of the Constitutional Retaliation Claim “It is well established that government actions, which standing alone do not violate the Constitution, may nonetheless be constitutional torts if motivated in substantial part by a desire to punish an individual for exercise of a constitutional right.” Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 386. We have explained that “certain provisions of the Constitution[, such as the First Amendment,] define individual rights with which the government generally cannot interfere — actions taken pursuant to those rights are ‘protected’ by the Constitution.” Id. at 387. A First Amendment retaliation claim entails the following three elements: “‘(1) the plaintiff engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against the plaintiff that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that conduct; and (3) there is a causal connection between elements one and two — that is, the adverse action was motivated at least in part by the plaintiff's protected conduct.’” Dean v. Byerley, 354 F.3d 540, 551 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 394). A public employee’s private communication with his or her employer is protected by the First Amendment. See Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 413 (1979). Therefore, under certain circumstances, the filing of a grievance by a public employee could be considered a protected First Amendment activity. Whether the filing of a grievance is protected depends on the content of the grievance because public employees’ speech is protected from retaliatory conduct primarily when the speech relates to a matter of public concern. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 144-47 (1983); Hardy v. Jefferson Cmty. Coll., 260 F.3d 671, 678 (6th Cir. 2001). Whether the speech at issue is a matter of public concern is assessed by “‘balanc[ing] . . . the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its 8 employees.’” Connick, 461 U.S. at 140 (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)). The Supreme Court has previously held that questions on “office transfer policy, office morale, the need for a grievance committee, [and] the level of confidence in supervisors,” in a questionnaire distributed by an employee were not matters of public concern. Id. at 141, 148. Like the questionnaire in Connick, Kraemer’s grievance merely “reflect[s] one employee’s dissatisfaction with [his employer’s action,]” and, “if released to the public, would convey no information at all other than the fact that a single employee is upset with the status quo.” Id. at 148. Under the rationale of Connick, Kraemer’s complaint regarding his uncompensated on-call time cannot be viewed as a matter of public concern, and thus his grievance cannot be considered a “protected activity” for the purposes of his constitutional retaliation claim. Id. Therefore, summary judgment was appropriately granted on this claim, and we need not address the other elements of the retaliation claim or the municipal liability requirements.