Opinion ID: 1923817
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Did trial court permit the State to range too far in defendant's cross-examination?

Text: Generally, the allowance or denial of cross-examination is a matter of trial court discretion. An appellate court will reverse only for an abuse of discretion, and then only if it appears that prejudice resulted. See State v. Ege, 274 N.W.2d 350, 357 (Iowa 1979); Avery v. Harms Implement Co., 270 N.W.2d 646, 649 (Iowa 1978); State v. Frazer, 267 N.W.2d 34, 38 (Iowa 1978). Division V disposes in part of defendant's allegation trial court permitted the State to go beyond the scope of defendant's direct examination. We hold trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the questions relating to defendant's acquaintance with his supplier, and the identity of the supplier. See Gibb, 286 N.W.2d at 186. But defendant asserts impermissible questions were asked relating to his relationship with John Furman. He testified on direct examination he had known Furman two years, had received money from him in the two transactions, and that Furman owed him money from a previous loan. On cross-examination he was asked if Furman had called him between September 1 and September 16 for reasons other than the purchase of cocaine. Trial court overruled an objection that the question plunged beyond the scope of direct examination. Defendant answered, Yes, he saw me or stopped over or called me. Defendant does not indicate how the court's ruling prejudiced his case; in fact, the answer would support his entrapment theory. We find no abuse of discretion in these rulings.