Opinion ID: 1807431
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 26

Heading: Gun Sale

Text: In two related assignments, Boppre complains about the district court's refusal to allow his father and an acquaintance to testify as to whether Boppre told them he sold his .32-caliber handgun to Valdez. Boppre made an offer of proof at trial that the acquaintance would testify that within a month ... of the murders ... Boppre informed him that he had sold that .32 caliber handgun to Richard Valdez. And that he would also testify that he was aware that [Boppre] had been attempting to sell that gun prior to ... that time. Boppre concedes that any statements he may have made to his father or his acquaintance are hearsay, but argues that the statements are admissible under § 27-803(2). That rule sets forth a hearsay exception, even where a witness is available, for [a] statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of declarant's will. As specifically provided under § 27-803(2), hearsay statements of memory offered to prove the fact remembered are not admissible under the state-of-mind exception. Thus, Boppre's statements that he sold his gun to Valdez are not admissible under § 27-803(2) to prove that he did indeed sell his gun to Valdez. According to the offer of proof, the acquaintance would have testified that he was aware that [Boppre] had been attempting to sell that gun prior to the time he allegedly sold it to Valdez. The offer of proof is not sufficient to show that the evidence should have been admitted. The record provides no indication of whether the acquaintance's awareness that Boppre was trying to sell his gun was based upon his own personal knowledge, in which case the evidence would be admissible, or whether the acquaintance's awareness was based upon statements that another person made to him, in which case the evidence would be hearsay. If the acquaintance's awareness that Boppre had been trying to sell his gun was based on statements Boppre had made to him prior to allegedly selling the gun, statements that he was planning to sell the gun, then those statements would be admissible under § 27-803(2). However, if the acquaintance's awareness that Boppre had been trying to sell his gun was based on statements Boppre had made to him after he sold the gun, statements that he had been trying to sell the gun, then the statements would not be admissible under § 27-803(2). Thus, the district court did not err in refusing to admit the testimony on the basis of the offer of proof. Boppre made no offer of proof with respect to his father, and, thus, there is nothing to discuss with respect to that matter. See, State v. Schroder, 218 Neb. 860, 359 N.W.2d 799 (1984); Neb.Rev.Stat. § 27-103 (Reissue 1989).