Opinion ID: 3000124
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The ADA Discrimination Claims

Text: Although we concluded above that Habitat had notice of Burnett’s medical condition, Burnett’s ADA claims fail because the existence of a medical condition does not satisfy the ADA’s disability standard. Indeed, “ ‘[d]isability’ under the ADA and ‘serious health condition’ under the FMLA are distinct concepts that require different analyses.” Rhoads v. F.D.I.C., 257 F.3d 373, 387 n.12 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 825.702(b)); see also Hurlbert 7 This is not to say that the FMLA allows an employee to exercise his FMLA rights in a patently insubordinate way, but rather that a question of fact remains regarding Habitat’s motivation. No. 06-1013 19 v. St. Mary’s Health Care Sys., Inc., 439 F.3d 1286, 1295 (11th Cir. 2006); Stekloff v. St. John’s Mercy Health Sys., 218 F.3d 858, 861 (8th Cir. 2000). Therefore, in order to prevail on his ADA claims, Burnett must show that he was entitled to the ADA’s protections at the time of his termination. The ADA prohibits discrimination against “a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Therefore, before we consider Burnett’s claims under the ADA for failure to accommodate or discriminatory termination, we must first assess whether Burnett was disabled within the meaning of the ADA. An individual is considered to have a disability under the ADA if (1) he has an impairment that substantially limits one or more of his major life activities; (2) he has a record of such an impairment; or (3) his employer regards him as having such an impairment. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)). Because Burnett had no record of impairment, to prevail on his ADA claims, he must show that either (1) he had an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity; or (2) Habitat regarded him as having such an impairment. Burnett cannot satisfy the first option. Burnett would have us find that he was disabled purely because he was suffering from undiagnosed prostate cancer at the time of the adverse employment action. Unfortunately for Burnett, however, typically diagnosis does not prove disability. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App., § 1630.2(j) (“The determination of whether an individual has a disability is not necessarily based on the name or diagnosis of the impairment the person has, but rather on the effect of that 20 No. 06-1013 impairment on the life of the individual.”); see also Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 566-67 (1999) (holding that while some conditions are invariably substantially limiting, to determine whether other conditions are disabling requires an individualized assessment); Tice v. Ctr. Area Transp. Auth., 247 F.3d 506, 513 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[I]t is well-established that a particular diagnosis, no matter how severe (or severe-sounding to the layperson), standing alone, is not sufficient to establish ‘disability.’ Rather, the inquiry as to disability is to be made on a case-by-case basis.”); Kocsis v. Multi-Care Mgmt., 97 F.3d 876, 884 (6th Cir. 1996) (“Although both arthritis and [multiple sclerosis] can be disabling in some instances, they [are] not so substantially limiting in [every] case.”). As a result, even though Burnett suffered from undiagnosed prostate cancer, that fact alone does not prove that he was disabled under the ADA. Rather, we must consider the specific facts of Burnett’s case in our assessment of whether he was disabled at the time of his termination. Even giving Burnett the benefit of all inferences, we find he has failed to show that he had an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity. Although Burnett fails to expressly identify the affected major life activity, we will presume that he seeks to show that he was substantially limited in the major life activity of working. Under the ADA, “[t]he inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i); see Kupstas v. City of Greenwood, 398 F.3d 609, 612 (7th Cir. 2005). Rather, “[t]he term substantially limits means significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (emphases added); see also Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 491 (1999). No. 06-1013 21 Because Burnett has failed to show (or to even attempt to show) that his frequent urination and his temporary restriction on heavy lifting and strenuous activity substantially limited his ability to perform a class or broad range of jobs, he has not established a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working. Burnett has likewise failed to show that Habitat regarded him as having a substantially limiting impairment. Nothing in the record suggests that Habitat considered Burnett to be impaired or substantially limited in his ability to carry out his duties. Habitat did not alter its expectations of his work performance although it was aware of Burnett’s doctor’s appointments, high PSA, and biopsy. Even when he requested assistance at work following his biopsy, Habitat considered him fully capable and did not provide assistance. Accordingly, we find no basis for concluding that Habitat ever regarded Burnett as disabled. Summary judgment was proper on Burnett’s ADA claims.