Opinion ID: 4510144
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The District Court’s Failure to Inquire

Text: We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s decision not to permit substitution of counsel. See United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1097 (3d Cir. 1995). Generally, “[w]hen a defendant requests a substitution of counsel . . . the district court must engage in at least some inquiry as to the reason for the defendant’s dissatisfaction with his existing attorney.” United States v. Welty, 674 F.2d 185, 187 (3d Cir. 1982). In the course of the inquiry, the defendant must demonstrate good cause for appointment of new counsel, “such as a conflict of interest, a complete breakdown in communication, or an irreconcilable conflict with his attorney.” Id. at 188. Although the requisite inquiry may consider a variety of sources and need not include a one-onone colloquy with the defendant, we have noted the importance of allowing the defendant, as well as counsel, the opportunity to be heard on the matter. See United States v. Hodge, 870 F.3d 184, 202 (3d Cir. 2017). Under our precedent concerning district courts’ obligation to inquire when a defendant lodges complaints regarding counsel’s representation, the facts here present a close case. Initially, the District Court appears to have made little or no effort to probe Diaz’s request that Kalinowski be replaced. Typically, if a district court fails to make “any onthe-record inquiry as to the reasons for the defendant’s dissatisfaction with his existing attorney,” it abuses its discretion. McMahon v. Fulcomer, 821 F.2d 934, 944 (3d Cir. 1987); Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1098; Welty, 674 F.2d at 190. We have not made that obligation dependent upon the number of times a defendant has made this request. We have specifically instructed that a Court must “engage in at least some inquiry,” 8 “[e]ven when the trial judge suspects that the defendant’s contentions are disingenuous, and motives impure.” McMahon, 821 F.2d at 942 (citation omitted). The District Court’s inaction would thus normally raise serious questions, particularly given that Diaz complained not only about strategy but also about a total lack of communication. But this case presents a unique circumstance. Soon after Diaz made his request, the District Court had good reason to believe Kalinowski was communicating with Diaz such that Diaz’s request was withdrawn or moot. On these facts—particularly given the deference owed the District Court under the abuse of discretion standard—we cannot conclude that the Court’s lack of inquiry constituted an abuse of discretion. It is clear that the Court was aware of Diaz’s concerns, and it took some action to remedy the situation when it ordered Kalinowski to file a response to Diaz’s December 5 letter. The District Court did not follow up on this order or insist that Kalinowski respond to Diaz’s complaints, nor did it schedule a hearing to address the request, as it had when Diaz had previously sought to replace O’Brien as counsel. 2 However 2 Diaz contends that, in not quickly holding a hearing as it had when Diaz sought to replace O’Brien, the District Court was enforcing an unspoken “one-substitution rule.” See Appellant’s Br. at 35. We are not persuaded that the Court had such a policy in place. It goes without saying that there is no numerical limit on the right to counsel. To say that, after having had more than one lawyer, a defendant complaining about counsel’s representation must automatically represent himself would impose an arbitrary limit on the Sixth Amendment. Unless a defendant forfeits the right to counsel due to “extremely serious misconduct” or knowingly, 9 undesirable the Court’s initial inaction may have been, within a month, the Court received information that Kalinowski was communicating with Diaz, and Diaz no longer sought new counsel. Thus, the Court’s intervention was unnecessary. The information the Court received made clear that Kalinowski was paying attention to Diaz’s requests. When, on March 24, 2017, Kalinowski, in a motion for continuance, wrote that he had had a meeting with Diaz the day before and all issues between them “ha[d] been resolved and … [Diaz] wishe[d] to continue with counsel’s representation,” App. at 102–03, the District Court did not have any basis to question that statement. Thereafter, Diaz appeared alongside Kalinowski at a pretrial conference on April 7 and did not raise any further complaints about the representation. Although Diaz renewed his complaints about Kalinowski in April and June letters to the Court, he stopped short of asking for counsel’s replacement. Further, Diaz continued to appear alongside Kalinowski throughout the trial and sentencing without complaint. Despite numerous opportunities to address the court, Diaz never again requested new counsel, nor did he ever complain of Kalinowski’s effectiveness at trial. From these facts, it appears that Kalinowski and Diaz had, indeed, resolved their issues and were working together effectively. Therefore, although ideally the District Court would have inquired into Diaz’s various complaints, we cannot conclude voluntarily, and intelligently waives that right, his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel persists. See United States v. Leggett, 162 F.3d 237, 249–50 (3d Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). 10 from this record that the Court’s failure to do so amounted to an abuse of discretion. 3