Opinion ID: 2249080
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Count VI: Negligence

Text: In order to prevail in an action for negligence, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant owed a duty, that defendant breached that duty, and that defendant's breach was the proximate cause of injury to the plaintiff. ( Deibert v. Bauer Brothers Construction Co. (1990), 141 Ill.2d 430, 434, 152 Ill.Dec. 552, 566 N.E.2d 239.) In count VI of its second-amended complaint, the Bank alleged that National, lessee of the sign in question, breached its duty of care by, inter alia, placing the walkrail in dangerous proximity to high-voltage electrical wires, failing to demand insulation and relocation of the wires, and failing to warn of the danger of contacting the wires, thus proximately causing decedent's death. Defendant responded that, as the high-voltage wires were an open and obvious danger, National had no duty to warn of their presence. Unless a duty is owed, there is no negligence. ( Dunn v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. (1989), 127 Ill.2d 350, 365, 130 Ill.Dec. 409, 537 N.E.2d 738.) Whether a duty exists is a question of law for the court to decide. ( Ward v. K mart Corp. (1990), 136 Ill.2d 132, 140, 143 Ill.Dec. 288, 554 N.E.2d 223.) Among the factors which this court has considered relevant to the existence of a duty are reasonable foreseeability, the likelihood of injury, and the extent of the burden placed upon the defendant in guarding against an injury. Ward, 136 Ill.2d at 140-41, 143 Ill.Dec. 288, 554 N.E.2d 223. It is undisputed that National was the lessee of the land on which the billboard stood, and was responsible for the sign's maintenance. In Genaust v. Illinois Power Co. (1976), 62 Ill.2d 456, 343 N.E.2d 465, this court adopted section 343 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which provides: A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees by a condition on the land if, but only if, he (a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and (b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and (c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger. (Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 (1965).) Comment a of the Reporter's Notes to section 343 observes that section 343 should be read together with section 343A, which limits the liability stated above. Section 343A states in pertinent part: (1) A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical harm caused to them by any activity or condition on the land whose danger is known or obvious to them, unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A (1965). Contrary to National's allegations, the Bank does not concede that the danger of the power line was open and obvious. Both through depositions and in its answer to defendant's petition for leave to appeal to this court, the Bank presented testimony by individuals who had worked on the sign that they were unaware of the power line's presence. Such testimony presents a question of fact as to whether or not the danger was open and obvious. However, the Bank contends that, even if the danger were open and obvious, National should have foreseen the harm caused to decedent. Further, the Bank cites comment f of the Reporter's Notes to section 343A, which states: There are    cases in which the possessor of land can and should anticipate that the dangerous condition will cause physical harm to the invitee notwithstanding its known or obvious danger. In such cases the possessor is not relieved of the duty of reasonable care which he owes to the invitee for his protection. This duty may require him to warn the invitee, or to take other reasonable steps to protect him, against the known or obvious condition or activity, if the possessor has reason to expect that the invitee will nevertheless suffer physical harm. Such reason to expect harm to the visitor from known or obvious dangers may arise, for example, where the possessor has reason to expect that the invitee's attention may be distracted, so that he will not discover what is obvious, or will forget what he has discovered, or fail to protect himself against it. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A, Comment f (1965). The parties agree that decedent came into contact with the electrical wire as he was transferring from the walkrail to the ladder. Photographs of the accident site reveal that, at least in the light and from the angle at which the photographs were taken, the wire is clearly visible. Thus the danger was arguably open and obvious. National cites Genaust, 62 Ill.2d 456, 343 N.E.2d 465, in arguing that a landowner has no duty to warn of such an open and obvious danger. However, Genaust is distinguishable on its facts. In Genaust, plaintiff was installing a metal tower and antenna on the roof of defendant's premises when electricity from a neighboring power line arced to the antenna and injured plaintiff. In finding that defendant was not liable, this court took into consideration that the landlord could not have discovered the danger of electricity arcing from power lines which were neither on its property nor under its control. (Emphasis in original.) ( Genaust, 62 Ill.2d at 468, 343 N.E.2d 465.) Further, the court found that an employer would expect a worker with expertise in installing antennae to be reasonably aware of the hazards of installing metal equipment near power lines. Subsequent to Genaust, this court considered two other cases in which the plaintiff was injured when he encountered an open and obvious hazard. In Ward, 136 Ill.2d 132, 143 Ill.Dec. 288, 554 N.E.2d 223, plaintiff collided with a post as he exited the defendant's store carrying a large mirror. Although the plaintiff conceded that he had probably seen the post when entering the store, the court relied upon comment f of the Reporter's Notes to section 343A in finding that the owner nonetheless had a duty of care because the injury was reasonably foreseeable. In Deibert, 141 Ill.2d 430, 152 Ill.Dec. 552, 566 N.E.2d 239, a construction worker stepped out of a portable toilet and stumbled into a rut after looking up to watch for falling debris. Guided once again by comment f, the court found that the defendant contractor should have anticipated that the worker's attention might be distracted. As the court observed, the accident was foreseeable because the plaintiff could not look both down and up at the same time. ( Deibert, 141 Ill.2d at 439, 152 Ill.Dec. 552, 566 N.E.2d 239.) In the present case, it could be foreseen that a worker would have to watch his footing when stepping from the walkrail over the sign to the ladder. He could not simultaneously look down at his feet and up at the overhead power line. `Foreseeability means that which it is objectively reasonable to expect, not merely what might conceivably occur.' (Emphasis in original.) ( Genaust, 62 Ill.2d at 466, 343 N.E.2d 465, quoting Winnett v. Winnett (1974), 57 Ill.2d 7, 12-13, 310 N.E.2d 1.) Since the purpose of the walkrail was to allow workers to walk the full length of the sign in order to make repairs, it was objectively reasonable to expect that a worker could come into contact with a power line that hung only 4½ to 5 feet above the walkrail. It was also reasonable to expect that a worker might be distracted by having to watch where to place his feet, and consequently would not be aware of or remember the presence of the electric wires. Thus, defendant had reason to anticipate an injury such as the one which occurred. Further, the burden on defendant to protect workers against the hazardous power line would not have been heavy. National might have shortened the walkrail so that it no longer ran under the power line. Alternatively, National might have demanded that the utility company relocate the power line. At very little expense or inconvenience, National might have warned workers of the hazard. For the above reasons, we find that National owed a duty of reasonable care to the decedent. Whether a defendant has breached its duty is a question of fact. ( Deibert, 141 Ill.2d at 441, 152 Ill.Dec. 552, 566 N.E.2d 239.) If the jury finds that National failed to exercise reasonable care, it must then determine whether that failure was the proximate cause of decedent's death. As this court stated in Ward and repeated in Deibert, [w]hether in fact the condition itself served as adequate notice of its presence or whether additional precautions were required to satisfy the defendant's duty are questions properly left to the trier of fact. ( Ward, 136 Ill.2d at 156, 143 Ill.Dec. 288, 554 N.E.2d 223; Deibert, 141 Ill.2d at 441, 152 Ill.Dec. 552, 566 N.E.2d 239.) The record reveals that some workers on the sign had not noticed the overhanging wires; there is also testimony from one worker that he had seen the wires and was aware of the danger they represented. The trier of fact must evaluate all the evidence. The jury must also determine whether National took any safety precautions, and, if so, whether the measures were adequate to satisfy its duty of reasonable care. If the jury finds defendant National liable, it must then decide whether and to what degree Lukas was also negligent. In evaluating Lukas' possible negligence, the jury can take into account the decedent's experience as a sign painter, and whether the use of ordinary care would have caused him to avoid the accident. For the reasons stated, we reverse the appellate court judgment as to its reversal of the circuit court's summary judgment on count IV, and affirm the appellate court judgment as to its reversal of the circuit court's summary judgment on court VI. Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part; circuit court affirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded.