Opinion ID: 852188
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Lucio's Statement to Cassada, Duckworth's Statement to Tamayo

Text: Delarosa contends the statements Lucio and Duckworth made to their girlfriends after the shooting of Rebecca and George were inadmissible hearsay. Delarosa concedes that he failed to object to the relevant portions of Cassada and Tamayo's testimonies at trial, but argues that the wholesale admission of statements of co-conspirators that were not made `during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy' constitutes fundamental error. Even assumingwithout decidingthat the statements were hearsay, we find there is no fundamental error. A failure to object when the evidence is introduced at trial waives the issue for appeal. Jackson v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1146, 1152 (Ind.2000). But a claim waived by a defendant's failure to raise a contemporaneous objection can be reviewed on appeal if the reviewing court determines that a fundamental error occurred. Brown v. State, 929 N.E.2d 204, 207 (Ind.2010). The fundamental error exception is extremely narrow, and applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process. Mathews v. State, 849 N.E.2d 578, 587 (Ind.2006). The error claimed must either make a fair trial impossible or constitute clearly blatant violations of basic and elementary principles of due process. Clark v. State, 915 N.E.2d 126, 131 (Ind.2009). This exception is available only in egregious circumstances. Brown v. State, 799 N.E.2d 1064, 1068 (Ind.2003). This doctrine has been applied, for example, to review a conviction without proof of an element of the crime despite the lack of objection. Smith v. State, 459 N.E.2d 355, 357 (Ind. 1984). Here, Delarosa argues the portions of the girlfriends' testimonies which recounted their boyfriends' statements as to what happened the night of the shooting were substantially damaging because it corroborated Duckworth's account at trial. Because Duckworth was a witness of dubious credibility, Delarosa contends that there exists a substantial question as to whether the jury would have convicted Delarosa of [murder] based solely on Duckworth's questionable testimony. But the jury did not convict Delarosa of murder based solely on Duckworth's questionable testimony. Duckworth's testimony regarding what Delarosa said when he returned to the car was clearly admissible. His testimony corroborated with the testimonies of unchallenged witnesses and with the other evidence introduced at trial. Duckworth's testimony about Delarosa describing the shooting was consistent with the crime scene and forensic experts' testimonies. The State presented phone records that showed a spike in communication between Payne, Lucio, Delarosa, and Duckworth from when the protective order was served on Payne to when the bodies were discovered. These records placed Delarosa near the scene of the crime and corroborated Duckworth's testimony that he had moved his car and Delarosa called Lucio after the shooting to ask where they were. There was no issue as to whether the State obtained the coconspirators' cell phones and phone records lawfully, and no issue as to who owned the phones. Other evidence bolstered the State's case. The officer who pulled Duckworth over shortly after the shooting recognized Delarosa, who was wearing dark-colored clothing, in the backseat of Duckworth's car. A warrant search of Delarosa's bedroom uncovered incriminating evidence, including keys that matched Rebecca's front door and a rag that smelled like it may had been used recently to clean a gun. The Hamilton County Jail cellmate's testimony, viewed in context of the phone records and Cassada's testimony that Lucio brought Delarosa on to do the actual shooting, independently linked Delarosa to the shooting. The claimed error did not make a fair trial impossible. Nor was its harm or potential harm substantial. As further discussed in Part III, there was ample evidence pointing to Delarosa as the shooter. Cassada and Tamayo's challenged testimonies did not add anything of consequence to what Duckworth already testified. Their testimonies did not result in the admission of additional pieces of evidence. All the witnesses were subject to rigorous cross examinations. A thorough review of the transcript suggests trial counsel was competent in preserving objections and protecting the record. In short, the claimed error does not rise to the level of fundamental error.