Opinion ID: 1913753
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Admissibility of Blood and Urine Tests

Text: After arriving at the hospital, Stetter was given the Miranda warnings and the implied consent warning. [6] After learning that this would be Stetter's third DUI, the officer informed Stetter that he was required to give a blood sample. Stetter complied. Later, Stetter was asked to give another blood sample, as well as a urine sample. He complied. At the motions hearing, Stetter moved to suppress the results of the blood and urine tests. His motions were denied under the authority of State v. Heinrich, 449 N.W.2d 25 (S.D.1989). Stetter argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the results of the tests. In making evidentiary rulings, the trial court has broad discretion. [Defendant] must show an abuse of discretion to reverse the trial court's ruling. Jacobson, 491 N.W.2d at 458 (citation omitted). The trial court's findings in connection with a motion to suppress are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. State v. Corder, 460 N.W.2d 733, 736 (S.D.1990) (citation omitted). SDCL 32-23-10 provides in part: Any person who operates any vehicle in this state is considered to have given his consent to the withdrawal of blood or other bodily substance and chemical analysis of his blood, breath or other bodily substance to determine the amount of alcohol in his blood and to determine the presence of marijuana or any controlled drug or substance. The person shall be requested by the officer to submit to the withdrawal of blood or other bodily substance for chemical analysis or chemical analysis of his breath and shall be advised by the officer that: (1) If he refuses to submit to the withdrawal or chemical analysis, no withdrawal or chemical analysis may be required unless he has been arrested for a third, fourth or subsequent violation of § 32-23-1, constituting a felony offense under § 32-23-4 or 32-23-4.6[.] We have recognized that SDCL 32-23-10 eliminates the right of a third offense DUI suspect to refuse a blood test, under the implied consent law. Jacobson, 491 N.W.2d at 458 (citation omitted). Under Heinrich and Jacobson, to enforce the implied consent law in SDCL 32-23-10, a law enforcement officer must make a preliminary determination as to whether an individual is entitled to the statutory grant of the right to refuse to submit to a blood or urine test. Id. at 459. An officer can only do that by taking steps prior to administration of a forced blood test to confirm whether an individual has a history of DUI convictions sufficient for forfeiture of his statutory right of refusal. Id. Although a review of the motions hearing indicates conflicting testimony as to whether the officer knew that Stetter had two prior DUI convictions as opposed to two prior DUI arrests, the trial court entered a finding of fact that [s]hortly after the arrest it was determined that i[t] was the Defendant's third offense DWI in the past five years. See Jacobson, 491 N.W.2d at 459 (remanding to the trial court for a determination of the factual question of whether the arresting officer had information prior to administration of Defendant's blood test that the arrest was his third DUI offense). Stetter has failed to demonstrate that this finding is clearly erroneous. Therefore, under the implied consent law, Stetter had no right to refuse the blood or urine tests and they were admissible.