Opinion ID: 1952817
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: dismissal of the bill of mcginnis and dudley for specific performance

Text: The record on remand has strengthened the original finding of Judge Sachse, as has been pointed out with clarity by Judge Childs, that McGinnis and Dudley slept on their rights. The contract of September 23, 1963, expressly states, Buyer will immediately proceed with due diligence to clear title to said property but in no event will the time of this contract exceed eighteen months. We find an appropriate analogy in the case of Development Sales Company v. McWilliams, 254 Md. 673, 255 A.2d 1 (1969), in which there was a contract for the purchase of land calling for zoning to be obtained by the purchaser within eighteen (18) months, with extension at the consent of the owners, should it prove necessary. Otherwise, the contract was to terminate. In that case, although the purchasers diligently pursued rezoning, they were unable to obtain it within the time limit stipulated in the contract. The owners would not grant an extension and this Court held:    [W]e are of the opinion that the contract terminated according to its own terms and provisions when the zoning classification sought for had not been obtained within eighteen months from the date of the contract, and no consent to extend the contract or to further pursue the zoning reclassification was forthcoming from the McWilliamses. The contract was predicated on a contingency which was not fulfilled. Thereafter, the McWilliamses, as Sellers, were free to negotiate with whomsoever they may have chosen to negotiate a new contract. 254 Md. 678-679. The law is well settled that when the optionee obligates himself to perform a required condition within an agreed time he must perform the condition within the time agreed upon at the risk of losing his option. Schlee v. Bryant, 247 Md. 689, 697, 234 A.2d 457 (1967). Another case in which the condition precedent for the execution of the option to purchase was the rezoning of the tract, is Michael v. Towers, 253 Md. 114, 251 A.2d 878 (1969). The language used in Towers regarding the contingency of rezoning was quite similar to that found in the case at bar regarding the clearing of the title. In Towers the contract provided: Purchaser shall apply for rezoning immediately and shall prosecute the application for rezoning with due diligence and as expeditiously as possible, with all expense therefor being charged to the purchaser without obligation to the Seller. (Emphasis supplied.) The Court speaking through Judge Singley said: Here the contract provided that the purchaser would proceed with diligence and expedition. He had more than two years in which to act between the signing of the contract and the filing of the suit and nearly a year from the filing of the suit to the time when the case was heard. The conclusion that the zoning problem could have been resolved in either of these periods is as nearly irrefutable as can be imagined, and proof of Michael's lack of activity established a prima facie case for Mrs. Brown and the Towers. 253 Md. 119. Also as to what constitutes reasonable diligence, see Atholwood Development Company v. Houston, 179 Md. 441, 446, 19 A.2d 706 (1941); Stern v. Schapiro, 138 Md. 615, 626, 627, 114 A. 587 (1921); and cf. Jones v. Saah, 261 Md. 340, 344, 275 A.2d 165 (1971). The chancellor was aware of the thrust of these authorities when he observed:    Dixon, knowing the date on which the option was to expire, had not taken the barest minimum of preparation in the event of an adamant refusal to extend the option. He had not undertaken to bring the title to date to protect his client from possible newer developments in the title nor had he prior to filing suit actually made anyone an unequivocal offer to settle or tendered performance.    If he were convinced as he now says he is of the validity of Rogers' title through adverse possession, there would be no reason why his client could not have taken title within the option period and then await the final protection of the provisions of Chapter 182 of the Acts of 1964. To this we would add that Dixon did practically nothing about clearing the title for the first ten months after the Rogerses had given the option and he testified that in June of 1964 he was told that the deeds of the Queen heirs had been executed and were about to be recorded. He elected to take a passive course of action (which undoubtedly entailed less effort and expense) and in fact exhibited little concern until the approach of the termination date of the option in the early part of 1965. Such lackadaisical conduct is scarcely compatible with the obligation to immediately proceed with due diligence. The appellants McGinnis and Dudley also contend that Rogers and his attorney Urciolo were guilty of conduct which should estop them from refusing to extend the termination date of the contract. Specifically, they refer to the failure to inform McGinnis and Dudley of the Clarke v. Rogers equity suit (the existence of which they argue made it impossible for McGinnis to clear the title) and also Urciolo's actions near the end of the option period when he failed to respond to Dixon's desperate pleas for an extension of final settlement and a response by Urciolo in some manner to O'Ferrall's memorandum on the status of the title. First of all, if we hold, as we do, that McGinnis and Dudley breached their obligation under the contract to immediately proceed with due diligence to clear the title, they could not avail themselves of the doctrine of estoppel, for those who would invoke the equitable relief of specific performance cannot themselves be guilty of a breach of the contract. However, assuming arguendo, that they did not breach the contract, we agree with the chancellor that there are no facts or circumstances that give rise to an estoppel on the part of Rogers or Urciolo. The evidence shows that Dixon, McGinnis' attorney, knew about the Chance deeds and challenge to Rogerses' title before any of the other parties. Furthermore, the testimony is undisputed that Chance and the Rogerses in agreeing to the disposition of their respective claims (when they settled the Clarke v. Rogers equity suit), agreed they would abide the decision of McGinnis as to his exercising or not exercising his option. Additionally, on the facts of the present record, it is obvious that for Dixon to have assumed by Urciolo's silence that he was extending the option period is nothing more than the most fanciful type of wishful thinking. It is true that this Court has at times held that silence may be the basis for creating estoppel where one maintains his silence while observing another person act to that person's detriment, as well as to the detriment of the party who remains silent. Bean v. Steuart, 244 Md. 459, 468, 224 A.2d 295 (1966). However, there was nothing in Urciolo's silence which would have justified Dixon's not endeavoring to continue his efforts to clear the title to the land up to the last minute that the option was in effect, or to exercise the option on the theory that the Rogerses had a good and sufficient title based on adverse possession; nor do we recognize any obligation on the part of either Urciolo or Rogers to inform McGinnis, Dudley or Dixon of their agreement with Chance. This agreement was a legitimate business end which Rogers had a right to pursue to protect his own interests. As previously noted, the record in the instant case, primarily through the testimony of Mr. Rogers reveals an abundance of evidence to show that the Clarke v. Rogers equity suit was a bona fide adversary proceeding. Once that is acknowledged the sinister gloss which Urciolo's actions might otherwise mirror, as was the case in the original proceeding, is dissipated. We are also of a mind that the determination that the Clarke v. Rogers equity suit was a true adversary proceeding, which Clarke and the Rogerses had a right to compromise, quells any contention that Chance or the Urciolos were guilty of tortious interference with the McGinnis contract with the Rogerses. We would further note that this issue of tortious interference with their contract with the Rogerses was not raised below by McGinnis or Dudley and we do not think that it is properly before us on this appeal. (Maryland Rule 885.) However, were it before us on the basis of the evidence in the record, we would be compelled to hold that such a claim was without merit.