Opinion ID: 163083
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Gender-Based Remedial Measures

Text: 20 This court applies intermediate scrutiny to the gender-based measures contained in the ordinances. See Concrete Works II, 36 F.3d at 1519. To withstand CWC's challenge, Denver must establish an exceedingly persuasive justification for those measures. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524, 116 S.Ct. 2264, 135 L.Ed.2d 735 (1996) (quotation omitted). Denver can meet its burden by demonstrating that the gender-based preferences serve[] important governmental objectives and are substantially related to achievement of those objectives. Id. (quotation omitted). Neither this court nor the Supreme Court has developed a framework for analyzing equal protection challenges to gender-based remedial measures. See Eng'g Contractors Ass'n, 122 F.3d at 909 (The Supreme Court has not addressed the question explicitly, and there is a similar dearth of guidance in the reported decisions of other federal appellate courts.). Further, the parties have not provided this court with any comprehensive arguments on this issue. CWC implicitly advocates that the gender-based classifications must also survive strict judicial scrutiny. Denver argues that the statistical and anecdotal evidence it presented is sufficient to survive strict scrutiny so, a fortiori, the gender-based measures necessarily survive intermediate scrutiny. 21 To meet its burden of demonstrating an important governmental interest, Denver must show that the gender-based measures in the ordinances were based on reasoned analysis rather than through the mechanical application of traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 726, 102 S.Ct. 3331, 73 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1982). Thus, the evidentiary basis necessary to demonstrate Denver's important governmental interest may be something less than the strong basis in evidence required to justify race-based remedial measures. See Eng'g Contractors Ass'n, 122 F.3d at 909; Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa., Inc., 6 F.3d at 1010 (Logically, a city must be able to rely on less evidence in enacting a gender preference than a racial preference because applying Croson 's evidentiary standard to a gender preference would eviscerate the difference between strict and intermediate scrutiny.). 22 Denver argues that it can satisfy its burden of production without introducing evidence showing its active or passive participation in gender discrimination. This approach has been embraced by both the Ninth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeal. See Ensley Branch, NAACP v. Seibels, 31 F.3d 1548, 1580 (11th Cir.1994) (Under the intermediate scrutiny test, a local government must demonstrate some past discrimination against women, but not necessarily discrimination by the government itself. One of the distinguishing features of intermediate scrutiny is that, unlike strict scrutiny, the government interest prong of the inquiry can be satisfied by a showing of societal discrimination in the relevant economic sector.); Coral Constr. Co., 941 F.2d at 932 (Unlike the strict standard of review applied to race-conscious programs, intermediate scrutiny does not require any showing of governmental involvement, active or passive, in the discrimination it seeks to remedy.). We need not resolve this issue, however, because Denver has introduced evidence that links the City to gender discrimination in the local construction industry. See §§ IV.C. & VI.A.1., infra. 23