Opinion ID: 1697763
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Case Law Under The Evidence Code

Text: Since the adoption of the evidence code, this Court has stated: A spontaneous statement must be made at the time of, or immediately following, the declarant's observation of the event or condition described. J.M. v. State, 665 So.2d 1135, 1137 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). This exception requires that the statement must be made without the declarant first engaging in reflective thought. Id. The statements admitted under section 90.803(1) are limited to statements which describe or explain an event. Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence  803.1, at 772 (2005 ed.). Ibar v. State, 938 So.2d 451, 467 (Fla.2006). Other cases, however, have suggested a continuing requirement of a startling event. As noted, in Hutchinson, this Court stated, Both the excited utterance and the spontaneous statement exceptions require the declarant to be laboring under the influence of a startling event at the time that the statement is made. 882 So.2d at 951. In Lyles v. State, 412 So.2d 458 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982), the Second District held, In order for the spontaneous statement exception to the hearsay rule to be applicable, there must be some occurrence startling enough to produce nervous excitement and render the utterance spontaneous and unreflecting. Id. at 460. In State v. Skolar, 692 So.2d 309 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997), the Fifth District held a 911 call inadmissible because it was not made as the result of a startling or stressful event, and it therefore cannot qualify under  90.803 as either a spontaneous statement or an excited utterance. Id. at 311. However, because we now conclude that this view requiring a startling event in order for the spontaneous exception to apply is contrary to the underlying principles embodied in section 90.803(1), we now reject this view.