Opinion ID: 1636895
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether Ms. Harlow is the surviving spouse of Mr. Harlow.

Text: Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-210(a) provides: For the purposes of the Workers' Compensation Law, the following described persons shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent: (1) A surviving spouse, unless it is shown that the surviving spouse was voluntarily living apart from the surviving spouse's spouse at the time of injury; Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-210(a)(1). Under the Tennessee Code, a surviving spouse with no children is entitled to fifty percent (50%) of the average weekly wages of the deceased. Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-210(e)(1). Further, the trial judge may commute the award to a lump sum payment. Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-229. A marriage license is a statutory requirement in Tennessee. Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-3-103(a) provides: Before being joined in marriage, the parties shall present a license under the hand of a county clerk in this state, directed to such minister or officer, authorizing the solemnization of a marriage between the parties. Such license shall be valid for thirty (30) days from its issuance by the clerk. Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-3-103(a) (2001). After notification by the tax preparer in 1998, both Ms. Harlow and Mr. Harlow knew that no marriage license existed to legally validate their remarriage. Despite repeated requests from Ms. Harlow to obtain a license, Mr. Harlow refused to do so for reasons that are not known. However, the inescapable fact remains that the parties knowingly cohabited for over four years without obtaining a marriage license. Although certain evidence in the record points to the Harlows living as husband and wife, other evidence establishes that their perception of the relationship was otherwise. For example, Mr. Harlow and Ms. Harlow filed separate income tax returns for the tax years of 1997, 1998 and 1999 as separate or head of household. Thus, not only did the Harlows fail to comply with the licensing statute, but they also asserted to the federal government that they were not married. To substantiate her claim, Ms. Harlow relies on cases in which the Supreme Court has awarded death benefits to alleged surviving spouses when a marriage is challenged by a third party. In these cases, the surviving spouse claiming death benefits was unaware of the deceased spouse's earlier valid marriage, with a bigamous marriage resulting. The Court held for the claimant surviving spouse because either a reasonable belief or mistaken belief existed that the surviving spouse was in a legal marriage. See Perry v. Sun Coal Co., 183 Tenn. 141, 191 S.W.2d 181, 182 (1945); Summers v. Tennessee Eastman Corp., 169 Tenn. 335, 87 S.W.2d 1005 (1935); Kinnard v. Tennessee Chemical Co., 157 Tenn. 206, 7 S.W.2d 807 (1928). Because Ms. Harlow possessed no reasonable belief of a legally valid marriage nor a mistaken belief regarding her legal marital status, the present case is distinguishable from Perry and its predecessors. We find the present case more closely analogous to Jones v. D. Canale & Co., 652 S.W.2d 336, 338 (Tenn.1983), in which the Supreme Court denied the claim of an alleged surviving spouse who, despite living together with the deceased as husband and wife for twenty-five years, was still legally married to another man and consciously chose not to divorce that man. At the center of the Court's reasoning was the parties' knowledge of their marital status and the intentional choice to take no action to remedy the deficiency. Id. Similarly, Ms. Harlow knew she was not legally married after notification by the tax preparer in early 1998, and no action was pursued to rectify the situation. Ms. Harlow argues that she desired to be legally married as established by her repeated requests of Mr. Harlow to obtain a marriage license. However, rather than support her position, this fact reinforces the nature of the Harlows' relationship as non-marital because, for reasons unknown, Mr. Harlow refused to take the required legal step of securing a marriage license. Relying on the preference for a liberal construction of the workers' compensation statute, Ms. Harlow urges this panel to stretch the interpretation of surviving spouse to include her relationship with Mr. Harlow. However, we decline to extend the meaning of surviving spouse to include cohabiting individuals who wilfully ignore the licensing statute. Such a construction would exceed the parameters set by the legislature in defining eligible parties for death benefits. If Ms. Harlow were allowed to recover death benefits, uncertainty would ensue in the determination of who is lawfully married, causing problems to arise in many areas, including workers' compensation. Without guidance from the legislature authorizing the extension of workers' compensation benefits to parties such as Ms. Harlow, we are constrained from awarding Ms. Harlow benefits as a surviving spouse. The failure to comply with the statutory requirement for a marriage license, along with the knowledge of that deficiency, dooms Ms. Harlow's claim. The trial judge incorrectly relied on the remarriage ceremony, and subsequent living arrangement, as the basis for finding Ms. Harlow a lawful wife and surviving spouse. Therefore, we hold that a legal marriage did not exist between the Harlows at the time of Mr. Harlow's death, and thus Ms. Harlow is not a surviving spouse under the workers' compensation statute. Ms. Harlow raises an additional argument that she is entitled to death benefits as an actual dependent of Mr. Harlow because she was a [w]ife ... who [was] wholly supported by the deceased employee at the time of death.... Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-210(c). Because we hold that Ms. Harlow is not a surviving spouse, she likewise is not a wife within the meaning of the statute.