Opinion ID: 1094077
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Secretary's Decision to Deny the Tidelands Lease

Text: ¶ 26. Columbia argues that by denying the lease, the Secretary of State usurped the authority of the Mississippi Gaming Commission's determination that the site was legally suitable for a casino. The Secretary of State restates the question before this Court as to whether the Secretary of State was obligated to lease the tidelands to Columbia simply because the Mississippi Gaming Commission had granted preliminary site approval. As previously discussed, the proper question is whether the Secretary of State must enter into a lease with Columbia. As likewise previously discussed, the Secretary of State has been given by statute considerable discretion in determining whether to enter into a lease of the public trust tidelands. ¶ 27. There is no statutory or constitutional provision or common law pronouncement directing the Secretary of State to consider any specific criteria in making a determination as to whether to lease the public trust tidelands. The only guidance provided by the Legislature is found in Miss.Code Ann. § 29-1-107(2) (Rev.2000) which simply provides that the Secretary of State may lease or rent the tidelands with the approval of the Governor. However, Miss.Code Ann. § 29-15-3(1) (Rev. 2000) states: It is declared to be the public policy of this state to favor the preservation of the natural state of the public trust tidelands and their ecosystems and to prevent the despoliation and destruction of them, except where specific alteration of specific public trust tidelands would serve a higher public interest in compliance with the public purposes of the public trust in which such tidelands are held. Absent a higher public interest, the natural state of the public trust tidelands is paramount. Any direction as to specific factors which the Secretary of State should consider in determining whether to enter into a public trust tidelands lease must come from the Legislature, not this Court. ¶ 28. Columbia argued before the trial court, as they do before this Court, that the sole basis for the denial was stated in the letter of September 18, 1996, from Margaret Anne Bretz, Senior Attorney of the Secretary of State's Office, which stated inter alia that: In [the Secretary of State's] judgment, this site does not conform with legislative intent and is not on the Bay of St. Louis, but on a tributary thereto and that any post-hoc allegations should be discounted. The chancellor found that [s]uch a ruling would deny the reality of the actual process: the various attorneys had discussions; Columbia principal John C. Ellis, Jr., and Secretary Clark had a personal meeting in Jackson to address the various concerns of the Secretary of State in denying a lease. The chancellor's order found that the Secretary of State testified to the following additional reasons for the denial of the lease: (1) the rural/residential nature of the area, its remoteness effecting [sic] the viability of a casino, the lack of infrastructure, and its incompatibility with a casino; (2) the added impairment of the pollution in Bay St. Louis; (3) negative environmental effect on the tidelands and uplands due to casino development; the relatively pristine nature of the site and surroundings; and (5) the costs to the community in taxes and infrastructure costs. Additionally, the Secretary of State stated that there was no casino operator/developer with sufficient financial resources committed to the project and the effects of a failed casino were harmful to the environment. (footnotes omitted). ¶ 29. Columbia has placed the Secretary of State's concerns into three categories: environmental, economical, and opposition from constituents. Columbia asserts that each of these reasons for denial of the public trust tidelands lease fall within the purview of the various agencies which have been given statutory authority to make these determinations. However, as already stated, the Secretary's role as trustee is much broader in scope than that of these various agencies regarding the public trust tidelands. As stated in Turney: The rule is that trustees are bound in the management of all the matters of the trust to act in good faith and employ such vigilance, sagacity, diligence and prudence as in general prudent [persons] of discretion and intelligence in like matters employ in their own affairs. The law does not hold a trustee, acting in accord with such rule, responsible for errors of judgment. All that equity requires from trustees is common skill, common prudence, and common caution. Turney, 481 So.2d at 777-78 (footnotes omitted). ¶ 30. Again, the question is whether the Secretary of State must lease the land to Columbia. The answer is no. In sum, the chancellor found: based on the totality of what this Court heard, the Secretary's actions were not arbitrary (not done according to reason or judgment) or capricious (a lack of understanding or a disregard for surrounding facts and settled controlling principles). This decision was a judgment call, a discretionary act, a decision based on the Secretary's understanding of his trusteeship. This Court agrees. Columbia has failed to show that the decision of the chancellor is manifestly wrong, not supported by substantial credible evidence, or that an erroneous legal standard was applied.