Opinion ID: 2219951
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Trial Court's Conduct in the Cross-Examination of Killian

Text: Defendant next contends that the trial court deprived him of due process by acting as an advocate for the State, where the trial judge assisted the prosecutor in cross-examining a defense expert and establishing a foundation for admission of an exhibit that was highly prejudicial to the defense. For purposes of clarity, we note that defendant's argument of error is confined to the trial court's conduct in the sentencing examination of Dr. Killian. Defendant does not otherwise argue that the evidence in question was improperly elicited and placed before the jury. In fact, his argument appears to concede that there was an adequate foundation for the introduction of the evidence. The evidence elicited consisted of certain questions posed to defendant by Dr. Opsahl as part of the sentence-completion test, and defendant's answers to those questions. During the prosecutor's cross-examination of Dr. Killian, Killian admitted that he had reviewed the sentence-completion test when forming his opinion. When the prosecutor handed Killian the sentence-completion test, and asked if that was the test he had reviewed, defense counsel objected, arguing that the test was not relevant unless Killian had relied upon the test in formulating his opinion. The prosecutor was then allowed to question Killian as to whether he had relied upon the report. Killian responded to the prosecutor's question by first acknowledging that he had looked at the test, but had not included a description of it in his own report. When the prosecutor again asked if Killian had relied on the test in his assessment of defendant, Killian said, equivocally, he did not think he did. Pressing for an unequivocal answer, the prosecutor again asked if some of the answers on the test had helped Killian formulate his opinion. Killian then answered that he could not specifically recall, but offered to examine the test again. After he had done so, Killian stated that the defendant's test answers were consistent with what Killian already believed about him from everything else [Killian] had read. When the prosecutor asked Killian to specify, defense counsel objected and asked to approach the bench. The trial court responded by announcing a brief recess and, outside the jury's presence, observed that the witness was not being responsive. The court noted that Killian had stated he had not included the test in his report, but had not unequivocally stated whether he had disregarded the test or relied upon it. He had essentially skirted the issue. The court concluded: I think we need a vigorous interrogation on foundation by the State to see where this witness goes because he's going in both directions. It is unclear from the transcript whether Killian was present when the court's remarks were made; however, it is obvious that the remarks were not directed to him personally. When questioning resumed, out of the presence of the jury, Killian conceded that he had taken into account all of the materials placed before him, and then qualified his answer by adding, [I]t's not accurate to say that each piece of paper received the same amount of attention as any other piece of paper. When the prosecutor asked if defendant's test answers were important in Killian's analysis, Killian stated: I'm answering this as well as I can. The court then admonished Killian to answer the question asked, if he understood it, and, if he did not understand the question, to simply say so. When the court had the question read back, Killian appeared to better understand the question, and answered that he considered defendant's answers to the sentence-completion test somewhat important. When the prosecutor returned to the critical question he had posed at the outset, asking Killian whether he taken defendant's answers into account in arriving at his conclusion, Killian responded with the same unresponsive answer that had initiated the exchange: Not specifically, I did not include them in my report. As the prosecutor began to protest, the court again interceded, stating: Sir, there was a question asked you and you answered a different question.    I want you to listen to the question asked of you and then I want you to answer that question unless you don't understand it. Do we understand each other? Killian responded affirmatively. When the question was read back, he finally answered, unequivocally, that he took defendant's answers into account when forming his own opinion. With that, the court determined that a sufficient foundation existed to go into the sentence-completion test before the jury. Before the jury was called back into the courtroom, the court asked defense counsel if there was anything he wanted to contest in terms of that ruling, and counsel responded, It's proper, I agree. He took it into account; so, it's fair game. The prosecutor then proceeded to question the witness about the sentence-completion test, questioning which  as we have observed  defendant does not otherwise challenge. We note that a trial judge has the discretion, when necessary, to admonish a witness to answer questions directly and responsively. People v. Arnold, 2 Ill.2d 92, 97, 116 N.E.2d 882 (1954); see People v. Gonzalez, 238 Ill.App.3d 303, 320, 179 Ill.Dec. 472, 606 N.E.2d 304 (1992). In our view, the trial court properly exercised its discretion in this case, admonishing a witness who was being evasive. Similar admonitory remarks, even when made in front of a jury, have been found appropriate and not prejudicial. See People v. Kukulski, 358 Ill. 601, 608-09, 193 N.E. 504 (1934) (repeatedly advising the witness to listen and answer the question); People v. Williams, 201 Ill.App.3d 207, 221, 146 Ill.Dec. 924, 558 N.E.2d 1258 (1990) (defendant complained that the court had admonished the defense expert by saying, Doctor, would you do me a favor? Answer the question yes or no, don't ramble. The witness has a tendency to ramble. These are yes or no questions and a date is a date); People v. Osborne, 78 Ill.App.2d 132, 139, 223 N.E.2d 243 (1966) (Mr. Jones, the question is simple. The court believes the witness is being evasive about answering it). We find that the court in this case did not act in the capacity of an advocate, as defendant suggests. Rather, the court sought to ensure the State's right to responsive answers from an evasive witness.