Opinion ID: 1242445
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The murderer had made an effort to hide or partially cover each body before leaving the scene.

Text: J. Each of the killings occurred during a weekend. K. Unusually large amounts of seminal fluid were found outside the body of each victim. L. The source of the seminal fluid was, in each case, a person having Spencer's blood and enzyme types, a combination found in 13% of the population. M. In each of the four cases, the source of the seminal fluid was a person having either the same DNA print or the same DQ-Alpha genotype as Spencer. As previously noted, the DQ-Alpha genotype present in this case, when combined with the bloodtype and enzyme characteristics, resulted in a combination found in less than 1% of the population. In the other three cases, where DNA printing could be utilized, the probability of the source being anyone other than Spencer was infinitesimally small. The question of the circumstances justifying the admission of evidence concerning other crimes has been a troubling one. Generally, evidence of other offenses should be excluded if offered merely to show that the accused is a person likely to commit the crime charged. Kirkpatrick v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 269, 272, 176 S.E.2d 802, 805 (1970). But there are important exceptions to that rule. See Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 393 S.E.2d 599 (this day decided). Evidence of other crimes is admissible if it tends to prove any fact in issue, even though it also tends to show the defendant guilty of another crime. Woodfin v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 89, 95, 372 S.E.2d 377, 380-81 (1988), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 1649, 104 L.Ed.2d 163 (1989); Scott v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 519, 527, 323 S.E.2d 572, 577 (1984). As Spencer concedes, one of the issues upon which other crimes evidence may be admitted is that of the perpetrator's identity, or criminal agency, where that has been disputed. See Woodfin, 236 Va. at 95, 372 S.E.2d at 381; Huffman v. Commonwealth, 168 Va. 668, 683-84, 190 S.E. 265, 272 (1937); C. Friend, The Law of Evidence in Virginia § 152, at 397-98, § 153, at 402 (3rd ed. 1988). Proof of modus operandi is competent evidence where there is a disputed issue of identity. Kirkpatrick, 211 Va. at 272, 176 S.E.2d at 805. The trial court instructed the jury: Where evidence of a separate crime is used to establish the identity of the accused, more is required than merely proving the repeated commission of crimes of the same class. Generally, the device used to commit the crime, or the manner in which the crime was committed, must be so distinctive as to indicate a modus operandi, or to act as a signature. The instruction was given without objection, and is therefore the law of the case. Infant C. v. Boy Scouts of America, 239 Va. 572, ___, 391 S.E.2d 322, 326 (1990). The court's use of the signature homology was evidently based upon the Court of Appeals' decision in Sutphin v. Commonwealth, 1 Va.App. 241, 246-47, 337 S.E.2d 897, 900 (1985). The term is a useful one if it is understood only in the sense of requiring a distinctive modus operandi, such that the evidence of other crimes so resembles the pattern of the offense charged as to raise the probability of a common perpetrator. However, the term signature can also be misunderstood to require that evidence of other crimes may not be admitted unless they are virtual carbon copies of the case on trial. [3] That, in our view, is an unwarranted restriction of the modus operandi exception. We adopt the standard articulated by the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Hudson, 884 F.2d 1016 (7th Cir.1989): evidence of other crimes, to qualify for admission as proof of modus operandi, need not bear such an exact resemblance to the crime on trial as to constitute a signature. Rather, it is sufficient if the other crimes bear a singular strong resemblance to the pattern of the offense charged. 884 F.2d at 1021 (quoting United States v. Shackleford, 738 F.2d 776, 783 (7th Cir.1984)). That test is met where the other incidents are sufficiently idiosyncratic to permit an inference of pattern for purposes of proof, id., thus tending to establish the probability of a common perpetrator. Ultimately, the question whether to admit evidence of other crimes involves the same considerations as any other circumstantial evidence. Every fact, however remote or insignificant, that tends to establish the probability or improbability of a fact in issue, is relevant, and if otherwise admissible, should be admitted. Harrell v. Woodson, 233 Va. 117, 122, 353 S.E.2d 770, 773 (1987) (citation omitted). Other crimes evidence bearing sufficient marks of similarity to the case on trial to establish the probability of a common perpetrator is, therefore, usually relevant. The question remains, however, whether it is otherwise admissible. That question requires the trial court to weigh its probative value against its prejudicial effect. Whenever the legitimate probative value outweighs the incidental prejudice to the accused, evidence of prior offenses, if otherwise competent, is admissible. Lewis v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 497, 502, 303 S.E.2d 890, 893 (1983). The responsibility for balancing the competing considerations of probative value and prejudice rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. The exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear abuse. Coe v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 83, 87, 340 S.E.2d 820, 823 (1986). The other crimes presented to the jury in the present case were not carbon copies of the crimes on trial. The defense points out a number of differences among them: the materials used to strangle the victims differed; two of the women were single, one was married, and one was separated; Diane Cho was younger and smaller than the others; she was the only victim found with duct tape over her mouth; she was the only one marked with a figure 8 or infinity sign. Nevertheless, the similarities between the offenses, particularly the indications of a common modus operandi and the scientific evidence that the defendant was the common criminal agent, strongly support the trial court's ruling. Although there was undoubtedly a prejudicial effect upon the defendant, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that the prejudicial effect was outweighed by the probative value of that evidence. Under a separate assignment of error, Spencer contends that even if the court decided to admit evidence of the other three rape-murders, it was improper for the court to admit the results of the serological tests and the DNA fingerprinting that had been accomplished in those cases. He contends that the evidence was unnecessary because he offered, at trial, to stipulate that he was the person who had been convicted of those crimes. The Commonwealth points out that Spencer did not offer to stipulate that he was the person who had committed the crimes, and that the serological and DNA evidence were the links, in addition to modus operandi, which showed that all four crimes had a common perpetrator. A defendant in a criminal case may not preclude the Commonwealth from introducing otherwise admissible evidence by offering to stipulate the facts which the evidence would show. See Clanton v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 41, 51, 286 S.E.2d 172, 177 (1982). A fortiori, a defendant may not preclude the introduction of otherwise admissible evidence by an offer to stipulate less than the evidence would show. The purpose of the other crimes evidence was proof of criminal agency, or identity. We agree with the Commonwealth's contention that the serological and DNA evidence from the Spencer I, II, and III cases furnished an important link with the scientific evidence adduced in this case, tending to prove the identity of the perpetrator. Therefore, the court did not err in admitting it.