Opinion ID: 1500584
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Allen Charge, with Changes

Text: (Deletions are shown by brackets; additions by italicizing.) In a large proportion of cases, absolute certainty cannot be attained or expected. Although the verdict must be the verdict of each individual juror, and not a mere acquiescence in the conclusion of your fellows, yet you should examine the questions submitted to you with candor and with proper regard and deference to the opinions of each other. [It is your duty to decide the case if you can conscientiously do so.] You should consider that it is desirable that the case be decided; that you are selected in the same manner, and from the same source, from which any future jury must be; and there is no reason to suppose that the case will ever be submitted to twelve persons more intelligent, more impartial, or more competent to decide it, or that more or clearer evidence will be produced on the one side or the other. And with this view, it is your duty to decide the case, if you can conscientiously do so. You should listen to each other's arguments with a disposition to be convinced. [If much the larger number of jurors are for conviction, a dissenting juror] Thus, where there is disagreement, jurors for acquittal should consider whether [his] their doubt is a reasonable one which makes no impression upon the minds of [so many jurors,] others, equally honest, equally intelligent with [himself] themselves, and who have heard the same evidence, with the same attention, with an equal desire to arrive at the truth, and under the sanction of the same oath. [If, upon] And on the other hand, [the majority are for acquittal, the minority] jurors for conviction ought seriously to ask themselves whether they might not reasonably doubt the correctness of a judgment which is not concurred in by [the majority] others with whom they are associated; and distrust the weight or sufficiency of that evidence which fails to carry conviction in the minds of their fellows. GALLAGHER, Associate Judge (concurring): While I agree with the court that the recurring nature of this question and its recognized drain on judicial resources does not serve the administration of justice, the growing national trend to discard the Allen charge stems from problems which go deeper than that. This concurrence is to point out considerations additional to those related in the court's opinion. Over ten years ago Mr. Justice Clark reported to the 50th annual meeting of the American Judicature Society that in conducting seminars for trial judges, the Joint Committee for Effective Administration of Justice did not circulate the `Allen charge' to the new judges as I used to do when heading up the criminal division in the Department of Justice. Allen is dead and we do not believe in dead law. [1] In laying the Allen charge to rest this court joins an emerging majority of jurisdictions which have come to conclude the dynamite charge [2] ( Allen charge) has no proper role to play in the courtroom. More important than the difficulties of appellate review that Allen has caused is the inevitability that the charge, insofar as it asks only the minority to reexamine its position, unjustifiably intrudes the trial court into the jury's province of factfinding. This is because the charge pressures the minority and only the minority. [B]ut there is no legal rule that the majority of jurors have better judgment than the minority. There is no legal rule that the minority, merely because they are in the minority, should distrust their own judgment. Green v. United States, 309 F.2d 852, 855 (5th Cir. 1962). It is contrary to the concept of a free society that one who is outnumbered is wrong for that reason alone. No judge should instill that notion in a juror's mind. Our jury system is based upon the assumption that litigants will have their rights or liberties determined by a panel which is free to deliberate, reason and decide according to the court's instructions on the law and their own view of the facts. Each individual juror must reach a decision in accordance with conscience. A conscientious citizen serving as a juror wants earnestly to do his duty. . . . In performing his role in the pursuit of justice, the juror wants to feel that he is as loyal, as conscientious, as fearless, as courageous and as objective as the Judge. He wants to be a good citizen. He desires for at least this one time in his life to measure up to what he senses and feels in the atmosphere of the courtroom. Huffman v. United States, 297 F.2d 754, 758 (5th Cir. 1962) (Brown, J., dissenting). When the trial court instructs the jury that the minority, and only the minority, should examine its position, an extraneous element is injected into the deliberative process. Consensus is preferred over judgment and a preoccupation with numbers is encouraged. For these reasons Allen, a relic of the past, should be laid to rest. The truth of the matter is that the Allen charge has been under continual siege over the decades [3] and all the while it has been more tolerated than embraced. The minority aspect of the charge has rarely been defended on the merits. It is this part of the charge which has caused the most concern. [4] In fairly close succession, New Hampshire's Supreme Court has suggested that in the future trial judges should consider the more circumscribed instructions recommended in the ABA Standards,  State v. Blake, 305 A.2d 300, 306 (N.H.1973), while the Vermont Supreme Court specifically disapproved of the use of any charge that departs from the substance of those standards. State v. Perry, 306 A.2d 110, 112 (Vt.1973). Likewise the Supreme Court of Rhode Island asked trial justices to consider complying with the ABA standards. State v. Patriarca, 308 A.2d 300, 323 (R.I.1973). Perhaps the earliest jurisdiction to bury Allen was Arizona in State v. Thomas, 86 Ariz. 161, 342 P.2d 197 (1959). The Supreme Court of that state found no misstatement of the law in Allen but found that considering each case upon its particular facts and circumstances would cause harassment and distress in the administration of justice and was thus convinced that the evils [of the Allen charge] far outweigh the benefits. The court decreed that its use would no longer be tolerated. Id., 342 P.2d at 200. Closely following upon the heels of Thomas, the Montana Supreme Court condemned the charge. State v. Randall, 137 Mont. 534, 353 P.2d 1054 (1960). In so doing, that court pointed out why such a charge is error: The inevitable effect of the instruction would be to suggest to the minority members of the jury that they ought to surrender their own convictions and follow the majority. A vibrant, pulsating, intelligent minority is a part of our American way of life. The views of the minority often, with the passing of time, become the majority view. . . . The majority view on any given subject is not always the correct view. [ Id., 353 P.2d at 1058.] The Appellate Court of Illinois criticized the Allen charge in People v. Richards, 95 Ill.App.2d 430, 237 N.E.2d 848 (1968), and disposed of it and all other deadlock instructions in People v. Mills, 131 Ill.App.2d 693, 268 N.E.2d 571 (1971), saying: . . . A deadlock instruction is effective only if and to the extent that it interferes with or limits the free and independent deliberation of a juror. Its message is by necessary implication directed primarily to the minority juror or jurors or to that group less adamant in its convictions. The mischief of the instruction is in large measure related to the practical impossibility of determining the effect upon members of the jury or any resulting prejudice. Correspondingly the benefits to be gained from the giving of such an instruction are not apparent unless it has some coercive effect. This is particularly true in a criminal case where the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt imposes a considerably heavier burden on the conscience of each juror . . . . [ Id., 268 N.E.2d at 572.] In 1968, the American Bar Association Advisory Committee on Minimum Standards Relating to Trial by Jury condemned the Allen charge and recommended in its stead the charge appearing in the majority opinion in this case (note 2). This set off a chain reaction of appellate decisions. The South Dakota Supreme Court recommended against future use of the Allen charge to assure the integrity and independence of criminal jury verdicts, State v. Ferguson, 84 S.D. 605, 175 N.W.2d 57, 61 (1970), and considered the American Bar Association (ABA) recommended instruction appropriate for an initial instruction to the jury as to the nature of its duties in the course of deliberations. Id. The Nevada Supreme Court likewise expressed its opinion that [t]he `dynamite' charge should be avoided in Basurto v. State, 86 Nev. 567, 472 P.2d 339, 341 (1970), and in Azbill v. State, 495 P.2d 1064, 1069 (Nev.1972), reiterated the admonition with the further recommendation that there should be an abandonment of all judicial interference in jury deliberations. Stressing their concern with the Allen charge's implication that the minority jury members should yield to the majority and that the majority of the jury need not reexamine their position in light of the reasonable doubt remaining in the mind[s] of the minority, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania barred the future use of the instruction in Commonwealth v. Spencer, 442 Pa. 328, 275 A.2d 299, 304 (1971). A similar concern led to a prohibition on the use of the charge in Alaska, Fields v. State, 487 P.2d 831 (Alaska 1971), where the court reasoned that: At the very least, the Allen charge encourages majority inaction by failing to emphasize any need for reevaluation of the majority's viewpoint. As a result, there is a possibility of substituting a numerical preponderance for the requirement that a verdict not only be unanimous but representative of the honest convictions of each individual juror. [ Id. at 841.] The Supreme Court of Colorado has directed trial courts not to use the Allen charge. See Taylor v. People, 176 Colo. 316, 490 P.2d 292, 295 (1971), and the Supreme Court of Oregon disapproved the charge in State v. Marsh, 260 Or. 416, 490 P.2d 491, 503 (1971), cert. denied sub nom. O'Dell v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 974, 92 S.Ct. 2420, 32 L.Ed.2d 674 (1972). The Supreme Court of Maine followed shortly thereafter in State v. White, 285 A.2d 832, 838 (Me.1972). Florida also has frowned on the Allen charge. Bryan v. State, 280 So.2d 25 (Fla.App.1973). In addition, the Supreme Court of North Dakota has recommended the ABA standards for future use, State v. Champagne, 198 N.W.2d 218, 238-240 (N.D.1972), and the Supreme Court of Wyoming has said of Allen that what little benefit to the proper administration of justice might result. . . is far outweighed by the disadvantages. Elmer v. State, 463 P.2d 14, 22 (Wyo.1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 845, 91 S.Ct. 90, 27 L.Ed.2d 82 (1970). Wisconsin abandoned Allen's most pervasive vice, the singling out of the minority, more than thirty years ago, see Kelley v. State, 51 Wis.2d 641, 187 N.W.2d 810 (1971), as did Nebraska whose Supreme Court now requires compliance with the ABA standards. State v. Garza, 185 Neb. 445, 176 N.W.2d 664 (1970). The Court of Appeals of Maryland has approved the ABA instruction for use prior to the beginning of deliberations and will allow variations consistent with its prior opinion in Leupen v. Lackey, 248 Md. 19, 234 A.2d 573 (1967), to be used at that time. Once sequestered to deliberate, however, the court thinks it advisable that a trial judge, who decides to give an Allen -type charge because of an apparent deadlock, should closely adhere to the wording of the ABA recommended instruction. Kelly v. State, 270 Md. 139, 310 A.2d 538, 542 (1973). The Supreme Court of Minnesota has held that use of the Allen charge shall be discontinued in Minnesota and the procedures set forth in [the ABA standards] are adopted for the trial courts in this state. State v. Martin, 211 N.W. 2d 765, 772 (Minn.1973). The court reasoned in part that the ABA charge avoids the undesirable effect on the minority of having the prestige of the court brought to bear on it by the court's focusing only on the minority to achieve unanimity. Id. [5] While most federal circuit courts have not as yet grasped the nettle, some have favored the ABA Standard as a means to abandon the Allen charge. The first to do so was the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Brown, 411 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1017, 90 S.Ct. 578, 24 L.Ed.2d 508 (1970), [6] on the basis that it would serve the interests of justice to have district courts within the circuit follow the ABA model. The Third Circuit did the same ten days later on the basis of the potential for prejudice its future use may generate and the profound difficulty in confining its use within just and equitable bounds. United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Panaccione v. United States, 396 U.S. 837, 90 S.Ct. 97, 24 L.Ed.2d 88 (1969). This order was subsequently enforced and trial courts were restricted to the ABA charge set out in the majority opinion in this case (note 2). Government of Virgin Islands v. Hernandez, 476 F.2d 791 (3rd Cir. 1973). The District of Columbia Circuit later adopted the ABA Standard to the exclusion of the Allen charge. United States v. Thomas, 146 U. S.App.D.C. 101, 449 F.2d 1177 (1971) ( en banc ). The First Circuit ameliorated the Allen charge by requiring that [w]henever a court instructs jurors to reexamine their positions, it should expressly address its remarks to the majority as well as to the minority. That court also expressly disapproved any admonition to the jury that the case must at some time be decided and required that the jury be reminded of the burden of proof. United States v. Flannery, 451 F.2d 880 (1st Cir. 1971). Subsequently the court offered an instruction based on the ABA model which it considered to be consistent with Flannery. United States v. Angiulo, 485 F.2d 37, 40 n. 3 (1st Cir. 1973). [7] Except among the affirmative supporters of the dynamite charge, a principal point of debate is whether the trial judge may properly exert any pressure on a jury to obtain a verdict. One school argues that once the Allen charge is abandoned the ABA charge should be adopted and with no modifications. [8] They say that if the ABA charge is modified the courts will have the same problem back again, that is, determining whether the ABA charge as modified by the trial judge spilled over into coercion. [9] On the other hand, it is evident that a trial judge's hands should be left free to fit instructions to particular circumstances. Both points of view have merit. But I do not subscribe to the all or nothing approach to the ABA charge. Primarily, this is because I think that while the dynamite of the Allen charge was unjustifiable there is a legitimate public interest warranting some effort to determine if a jury verdict is reasonably attainable. I think a judicious reminder to a deadlocked jury that a verdict is desirable, if within reason, should be left to the option of the trial judge. If carefully worded and well-timed, a supplemental charge of this sort will carry with it only a minimal risk of interference with a jury function. Balancing this risk against a substantial benefit to judicial administration, I think such an instruction is desirable. If it is made clear, in substance, that a verdict is not being demanded, [10] and the jurors are being asked to return to the jury room and try again without sacrificing conscientiously held convictions, this is in the public interest. Actually, this encouragement from the trial judge may be the only way to persuade any stubborn jurors. . . to rethink their positions. [11] Turning to the supplemental instruction proposed by the court, [12] while it deletes the controversial reference to the minority in the Allen charge, it seems to me it may substitute some confusion in its place by specifically addressing itself to jurors for acquittal and jurors for conviction. I think a balanced instruction is one which essentially incorporates all features of the ABA instruction with a temperate prod by the trial judge for a conscientious attempt at a verdict. [13] A supplemental instruction along this line is attached as an Appendix to this opinion.