Opinion ID: 701298
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: fetal experimentation ban

Text: 31 Section 310 provides: Live unborn children may not be used for experimentation, but when advisable, in the best medical judgment of the physician, may be tested for genetic defects. Utah Code Ann. Sec. 76-7310. Any violation of this section, regardless of mental state, is a felony of the third degree. See Utah Code Ann. Sec. 76-7-314(2). Plaintiffs argued below that this statute was unconstitutionally vague and impinged upon their constitutionally protected right to privacy. In rejecting these arguments, the district court concluded that the plain meaning of the statutory phrase used for experimentation is to protect unborn children from tests or medical techniques which are designed solely to increase a researcher's knowledge and are not intended to provide any therapeutic benefit to the mother or child. Jane L. II, 794 F.Supp. at 1550. The court further concluded that [a]s long as there is intent to benefit the fetus or the mother, the fetus is not being 'used for experimentation.'  Id. Thus determining that the statute does not proscribe beneficial tests or therapies, the court summarily rejected the right to privacy claim. Id. at 1551. 32 Plaintiffs assert that the fetal experimentation statute should be deemed void for vagueness, contending that the district court's interpretation of the statute contradicts its plain meaning and legislative history and violates established rules of statutory interpretation. Plaintiffs also reassert their argument that the statute violates their constitutionally protected right to privacy. After a de novo review, Horowitz v. Schneider Nat'l, Inc., 992 F.2d 279, 281 (10th Cir.1993), we hold that the statute is unconstitutionally vague. 33 Vague laws frustrate several principles that have been sturdy pillars of our legal system. 34 First, because we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judge, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory applications. 35 Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 498, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1193, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982) (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2299, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972)). We therefore invalidate vague criminal statutes when they fail to alert the average person of the prohibited conduct. Brecheisen v. Mondragon, 833 F.2d 238, 241 (10th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1011, 108 S.Ct. 1479, 99 L.Ed.2d 707 (1988). 36 We indulge a presumption of constitutionality when reviewing vagueness challenges to state statutes. Id. In a civil context, where the enactment does not implicate constitutional rights, a court should find a statute unconstitutionally vague only if the enactment is impermissibly vague in all of its applications. Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 494-95, 102 S.Ct. at 1191. Where a statute imposes a criminal penalty, we can invalidate it even when it could conceivably have had some valid application. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 n. 8, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1859 n. 8, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983) (quoting Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 494, 102 S.Ct. at 1191). In the instant case, anyone who violates section 310 is subject to third degree felony charges and penalties. See Utah Code Ann. Sec. 76-7-314(2). Consequently, the less demanding Kolender standard governs this case. 37 Section 310 bans experimentation on live unborn children. Experimentation is an ambiguous term that lacks a precise definition. What tests and procedures constitute experimentation? There are at least three possible answers: 1) those procedures that a particular doctor or hospital have not routinely conducted; 2) those procedures performed on one subject that are designed to benefit another subject; and 3) those procedures that facilitate pure research and do not necessarily benefit the subject of experimentation. See Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F.Supp. 1361, 1364-65, 1376 (N.D.Ill.1990) (concluding the term experimentation was unconstitutionally vague and therefore invalidating similar fetal experimentation ban); see also Margaret S. v. Edwards, 794 F.2d 994, 998-99 (5th Cir.1986) (invalidating Louisiana fetal experimentation statute because experimentation was unconstitutionally vague). Testimony in the record highlights the ambiguities in the term experimentation. For example, one doctor testified that experimentation can have two distinct meanings: 1) [W]hen you do things to see--just wonder 'What would happen if I did this? What would happen if I gave a fetus this drug; what would be the outcome[?]' ; and 2) doing a procedure without a data base of many cases to rely upon. Aplt.App. at 172. Because there are several competing and equally viable definitions, the term experimentation does not place health care providers on adequate notice of the legality of their conduct. 38 The Supreme Court recognizes that a scienter requirement may mitigate a law's vagueness, especially with respect to the adequacy of notice to the complainant that his conduct is proscribed. Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499, 102 S.Ct. at 1193; see also Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395, 99 S.Ct. 675, 685-86, 58 L.Ed.2d 596 (1979). While this statute has a clear scienter requirement for those who perform an abortion, Utah Code Ann. Sec. 76-7-314(1), it has no similar requirement for those who conduct fetal experimentation. In fact, the statute explicitly states that any violation of section 310 is a felony of the third degree. Id. at Sec. 76-7-314(2) (emphasis added). We thus cannot salvage the ambiguities inherent in the term experimentation through resort to an additional scienter requirement. 39 Defendants argue that the district court cured the statute's ambiguity and vagueness by interpreting used for experimentation as prohibiting only those experiments that do not benefit either mother or fetus. We reject this argument for three reasons. First, the district court rewrote the statute. Second, the district court's interpretation contradicts the legislative history, thereby violating steadfast rules of statutory interpretation. Finally, even as interpreted by the district court, used for experimentation is unconstitutionally vague. 40 In an effort to cure the fatal ambiguity in the statute, the district court grafted its own meaning onto the statute's language. We do not understand how used for experimentation translates to tests or medical techniques which are designed solely to increase a researcher's knowledge and are not intended to provide any therapeutic benefit to the mother or child. Jane L. II, 794 F.Supp. at 1550. The district court blatantly rewrote the statute, choosing among a host of competing definitions for experimentation. This is an improper use of judicial power. 41 In rewriting the statute, the court also contradicted legislative intent. The Utah legislature enacted the fetal experimentation ban in its present form in 1974. The same legislature enacted two choice of method provisions, which were amended in 1991 and are now codified at Utah Code Ann. Secs. 76-7-307 and 308. 5 In 1974, these provisions required doctors performing post-viability abortions to choose the abortion method that would give the unborn child the best chance of survival unless doing so would cause serious and permanent damage to the woman's health. Utah Code Ann. Secs. 76-7-307 and 76-7-308 (amendment notes). It would be anomalous to require that a woman suffer serious health damage to benefit a fetus when pursuing an abortion but to permit a woman to undergo any beneficial, but experimental, treatment regardless of its effect on the fetus. In other words, the choice of method provisions enacted concurrently reveal the legislature's intent to protect the life of the fetus. Grafting an interpretation onto the fetal experimentation section that weighs benefits to the pregnant woman on a par with benefits to the fetus is patently inconsistent with legislative intent. By construing the fetal experimentation ban to include an exception for experimentation designed to benefit the pregnant woman, the district court improperly substituted its own judgment for that of the legislature. 42 The district court's interpretation also violated rules of statutory interpretation. As a general principle of statutory interpretation, if a statute specifies exceptions to its general application, other exceptions not explicitly mentioned are excluded. United States v. Goldbaum, 879 F.2d 811, 813 (10th Cir.1989); see also Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-17, 100 S.Ct. 1905, 1910, 64 L.Ed.2d 548 (1980). Section 310 arguably contains an exception to the comprehensive ban to allow testing for genetic defects. 6 The district court's interpretation excludes from the general ban all procedures beneficial to the pregnant woman or fetus, thereby creating additional, unspecified exceptions and violating this canon of statutory construction. Moreover, a court's interpretation of a statute should not render any clauses superfluous. See Bridger Coal Co. v. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 927 F.2d 1150, 1153 (10th Cir.1991). As interpreted by the district court, the fetal experimentation ban would allow all diagnostic testing because the pregnant woman benefits from knowing more information about the welfare of her child. Genetic testing is a particular type of diagnostic testing. The genetic testing exception therefore becomes superfluous. 43 Finally, the district court interpreted used for experimentation to prohibit only those procedures that provide no benefit to mother or fetus. Although curing some of the imprecision in the term experimentation, this construction is not free from ambiguity. What does benefit mean? If the mother gains knowledge from a procedure that would facilitate future pregnancies but inevitably terminate the current pregnancy, would the procedure be deemed beneficial to the mother? Does the procedure have to be beneficial to the particular mother and fetus that are its subject? In vitro fertilization exposes and fertilizes several ova to assure that one can be implanted in the mother. The other ova are destroyed. Would this common procedure be proscribed under the statute because some ova are subjected to non-therapeutic experimentation, i.e., of no benefit to the ovum or the mother? Accordingly, we conclude that the district court's interpretation is itself unconstitutionally vague. 44 The criminal law must clearly demarcate criminal conduct from permitted action. Section 310 does not do that here. During the course of the proceedings, one doctor testified that he had developed a procedure to cure a fatal abnormality in a fetus. Not only was he unsure whether this treatment constituted experimentation for the purposes of the statute, but he was also reluctant to testify for fear that his actions could theoretically be considered illegal under the Utah statute that was in effect when he began the treatment. Aplt.App. at 182. Because of the vagaries of the statute, individuals like this doctor may avoid conduct that would not be proscribed in order to avert criminal liability to the detriment of beneficial research. By failing to draw a clear line between proscribed and permitted conduct, section 310 violates established legal principles that provide a crucial backdrop to our criminal legal system. We hold section 310 unconstitutionally vague and reverse the district court's decision with regard to this claim.