Opinion ID: 294003
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: THE PROPRIETY OF PROCEEDING UNDER SECTION 6(b) OF THE COMPACT

Text: 17 Petitioner first contends that the Commission erred in raising fares in a proceeding instituted under Section 6(b) of Article XII of the Compact. The operative language of section 6(b) grants the Commission broad power to take the initiative in adjusting rates: 18 Whenever, upon complaint, or upon its own initiative, and after hearing held upon reasonable notice, the Commission finds that any    fare in effect for transportation subject to this Act    is unjust, unreasonable or unduly preferential or unduly discriminatory, the Commission shall issue an order prescribing the lawful fare    19 (74 Stat. at 1041.) The explanation of this language which is provided in the legislative history is terse and summary, and offers little guidance in resolving the present controversy. See S.Rep.No.1906, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1960); H.R. Rep.No.1621, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1960). However, petitioner relies upon FPC v. Sierra Pacific Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 355, 76 S.Ct. 368, 372, 100 L.Ed. 388 (1956) — which is admittedly distinguishable on its facts — for the proposition that the purpose of the power given the Commission by [a similar section of the Federal Power Act] is the protection of the public interest, as distinguished from the private interests of the utilities. Therefore, he concludes, the Commission's actions under section 6(b) must be tested by the public interest standard, and, when the order presently in issue is measured against that standard, it must be held improper. 20 We agree that the Commission's primary raison d'etre is furtherance of the public interest, and that this notion is in some measure implicit in the standards unjust, unreasonable or unduly discriminatory contained in section 6(b). However, we cannot agree with the specific content which the petitioner seeks to give the public interest test in its application to the present factual situation. First, we can find no support in the language or legislative history of the Compact for petitioner's contention that section 6(b) does not give the Commission power to raise fares in situations where the company could seek a rate increase under section 5(e) of Article XII by filing new tariffs. Even if this argument for an implied exception to section 6(b) were persuasive, however, we think that on the facts of this case it would be an exaltation of form over substance to attribute decisional significance to the company's failure to file new tariffs after entry of Order No. 894. It is clear that expiration of the tariff suspension period in Docket No. 186 came at a time when there were major questions still unresolved, and when the company was threatened with serious financial difficulties. Further proceedings were essential to enlightened resolution of D.C. Transit's many problems and to proper implementation of this court's mandate in Williams. In this situation, it would be unduly formalistic to say that the Commission had to wait for the company to file new tariffs before it could continue its investigation. 21 Although the procedures which the Commission used to initiate the investigation leading to Order No. 900 were proper, the question remains whether the Commission erred in finding that D.C. Transit's fares were unjust and unreasonable within the meaning of section 6(b). (Order No. 900 at 5.) We conclude that this determination was in accord with the concepts of public interest implicit in section 6(b), and supported by substantial evidence. As the facts detailed in part I of this opinion make clear, the Commission's primary concern throughout this complicated series of proceedings was to keep the buses running, while at the same time maintaining the company at the break-even point in order to comply with the spirit of this court's decision in Williams. In Order No. 900, the Commission detailed the reasons for its concern that service would be interrupted if fares were maintained at the prevailing levels: 22 [The Vice-President and Comptroller of D.C. Transit] presented statements of financial condition which showed a steady decline in retained earnings due to operating losses, a steadily worsening ratio of current liabilities to current assets, an income statement for November, 1968, which showed that even under the increased fares authorized by Order No. 882 the company had lost $227,768 in that month alone, and an analysis of cash flow which indicated that a serious cash deficit, amounting to over $600,000 would exist by January 15, 1969. No question as to these facts was raised by any party. [He] stated that D.C. Transit's credit was seriously impaired and that a number of suppliers were now requiring a C.O.D. arrangement. 23