Opinion ID: 1510269
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Tennessee Constitutional Considerations

Text: I examine the questioned portions of the implementing statute in light of pertinent provisions of the Constitution of Tennessee. Article I, Section 8 That no man shall be taken or imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land. Article XI, Section 8 (in pertinent part) The Legislature shall have no power to suspend any general law for the benefit of any particular individual, nor to pass any law for the benefit of individuals inconsistent with the general laws of the land ; nor to pass any law granting to any individual or individuals, rights, privileges, immunitie, [immunities] or exemptions other than such as may be, by the same law extended to any member of the community, who may be able to bring himself within the provisions of such law. (Emphasis supplied) The law of the land clauses of these two sections are substantially equivalent to those contained in the due process and equal protection clauses of the federal constitution. Motlow v. State, 125 Tenn. 547, 590, 145 S.W. 177 (1911). As a general rule, that which violates the one would also violate the other. Railroad v. Crider, 91 Tenn. 489, 19 S.W. 618 (1892). It is settled law that a special act affecting a county in its governmental capacity is valid so long as it does not contravene the general law. Brentwood Liquors Corp. of Williamson County v. Fox, 496 S.W.2d 454 (Tenn. 1973); Donathan v. McMinn County, 187 Tenn. 220, 213 S.W.2d 173 (1948). Numerous cases draw a distinction between special or private acts affecting a county in its governmental capacity when there is no general statute, and those attempting to impose liabilities or create exemptions not sanctioned by the general law. An often quoted and correct statement of applicable general principles will be found in Sandford v. Pearson, 190 Tenn. 652, 231 S.W.2d 336 (1950), wherein Justice Gailor, writing for the Court, said: Our cases make a clear distinction between (1) Private Acts which confer special benefits and impose special burdens on the citizens of one county, when there is no general statute, and when before the Private Act, there was only the common law, and (2) those Private Acts which undertake to amend or abrogate a prior general statute in its application to a particular county or class of counties. Private Acts of the former class have been upheld, and those of the latter class struck down. (Emphasis supplied) 190 Tenn. at 657-58, 231 S.W.2d at 338. Exceptions or exemptions contained in a general act, or an act amendatory thereto are in precisely the same category and must be tested by the same rules. There must be a valid justification and a rational or reasonable basis for the distinction. A most excellent articulation of this general rule will be found in the landmark case of Town of McMinnville v. Curtis, 183 Tenn. 442, 192 S.W.2d 998 (1946), wherein then Special Justice Tomlinson recognized that many acts had been upheld which affected particular counties in their governmental or political [10] capacities, but pointed out that the act either was not in conflict with the provisions of the general law, or the classification was upon a reasonable basis. 183 Tenn. at 447, 192 S.W.2d at 999. Justice Tomlinson tersely and thoroughly translated the precedents established by this Court: [T]he well settled law [is] that the legislature may constitutionally enact a special act affecting one particular county or municipality alone in its political or governmental capacity, provided such special act is not contrary to the provisions of a general law, applicable to all the counties or municipalities. 183 Tenn. at 448, 192 S.W.2d at 1000. Our cases uniformly hold that an act, general or private, which suspends the general law must be dependent for its constitutionality upon the existence of a reasonable basis for the exclusion. Brentwood Liquors Corp. of Williamson County v. Fox, supra ; Crewse v. Beeler, 186 Tenn. 475, 212 S.W.2d 39 (1948). It is a matter of public record that exemptions or exceptions from public acts are frequently accomplished by the expedient of identifying counties by population brackets. This is not per se a pernicious practice. Indeed, in much legislation, Tennessee counties are classified according to their population, e.g. Sec. 8-2402, T.C.A., et seq., relating to the compensation of county officers. But these acts affirmatively show a rational scheme of classification. When general acts binding on all counties throughout the state, or on all that are similarly situated, contain exceptions that remove an otherwise affected county from the reach of the enactment, such exclusions are suspect. This situation becomes particularly acute when general bills are modified by floor amendments. This Court has addressed the exemption of counties from general laws on numerous occasions, and uniformly has required a rational or reasonable basis. Thus, in the landmark case of State ex rel. Bales v. Hamilton County, 170 Tenn. 371, 95 S.W.2d 618 (1936), the Court had under consideration an act wherein Hamilton County, by population provisions, was required to pay its teachers in a manner inconsistent with the general law. Chief Justice Green wrote for the Court: These acts are not saved because Hamilton county is designed therein by reference to its population. Unless the act relates to a matter in respect of which a difference in population would furnish a rational basis for diversity of laws, classification on such a basis will not be upheld. (Emphasis supplied) 170 Tenn. at 375, 95 S.W.2d at 619. As noted in Davidson County v. City of Nashville, 190 Tenn. 136, 228 S.W.2d 89 (1950), when legislation deals with a county as a governmental agency a classification of the county by reference to population is not of controlling significance, but an act is not valid merely because it deals with a county in its governmental capacity. It is in making this insistence that the brief of the Attorney General falls wide of the mark. As noted in Davidson County, the discrimination must be upon a reasonable basis. 190 Tenn. at 139, 228 S.W.2d at 90. Another significant holding is Board of Education of Memphis v. Shelby County, 207 Tenn. 330, 339 S.W.2d 569 (1960), in which the Court held that a population based exception to a general or uniform law violates Article XI, Section 8 of the Constitution of Tennessee. A most excellent articulation of this issue appears in State v. Shelby Co. Election Commission, 209 Tenn. 289, 352 S.W.2d 809 (1961), wherein the Court again held that legislation affecting particular counties or municipalities in their governmental capacities does no violence to our constitution, when there is no conflict with general law or the classification is on a reasonable basis. While we did not labor the issue in the recent case of Pirtle v. City of Jackson, 560 S.W.2d 400 (Tenn. 1977), we struck down a portion of Section 6-310, T.C.A. containing a population based exception to the state zoning law. Justice Cooper spoke for the Court: No rational basis has been suggested, nor does any occur to us, to justify the exclusion of a few chosen municipalities from the burden of proving the reasonableness of their annexation ordinances when such a burden is placed upon all other municipalities by the general law of this state. 560 S.W.2d at 402. I would reaffirm these principles and hold that a population based exception to a general law is offensive to Article I, Section 8 and Article XI, Section 8 of the Constitution of Tennessee in those cases where there is no sound reason and no rational basis for the exclusion. In the instant case the Act recites no basis for the variance in favor of Wayne County, nor are we cited to any, nor does any occur to us. Wayne County is excepted from significant provisions of a mandatory statewide law and from an Act specifically declared by the Legislature to be passed pursuant to a legislative intent to create a uniform system of county government . . while providing a reasonable period of transition, leaving the Act in an internally inconsistent posture. The arbitrary nature of the exclusion is revealed by the fact that 26 counties smaller than Wayne County and 68 larger (less those having other recognized forms of government) are covered. I would, therefore, hold that so much of Sections 8, 16, 17, and 18 of Chapter 934 of the Public Acts of 1978, as operate to exempt Wayne County, or place it on a different footing from other counties similarly situated, is unconstitutional and void under Article I, Section 8, and Article XI, Section 8 of the Constitution of Tennessee. The same considerations operate to render those portions of those sections offensive to the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Again, the test must be the reasonableness of the classification. We so held in an extensive opinion in Harrison v. Schrader, 569 S.W.2d 822 (Tenn. 1978), in which we pointed out that if the reasonableness of the class is fairly debatable it must be upheld. Here, it is not fairly debatable. We further pointed out that the classification would be upheld if it had a reasonable or natural relation to the legislative intent. Here, to the extent of Wayne County, it defeats the legislative intent to create a uniform system of county government. While I agree with the conclusion reached by the majority with respect to the constitutionality of the provision governing election of the legislative body, I do not agree that a different legal situation exists, nor do I place any significance upon the provisions being transitional as opposed to permanent. I know of no rule of law that permits a temporary violation of a constitutional imperative. Section 5-502, T.C.A. is unconstitutional as it relates to Wayne County for the same reasons that invalidate those provisions requiring Wayne County to elect a county executive in 1978. These provisions are either both constitutional or both unconstitutional  and for the same reasons. Any different conclusion rests upon a flawed foundation. At the very outset of its opinion, the majority summarized the Act as follows: The 1978 legislation permitted most of the county judges, except in some of the larger counties and except in Wayne and Roane Counties, to remain in office until the expiration of their terms, performing both judicial and executive, or fiscal, duties. In Wayne and Roane Counties, a county executive was to be elected in 1978, as in those counties formerly having county chairmen, but judicial functions were not conferred upon the county executive and were not to be transferred until 1982 or until the death or resignation of the county judge. In most of the other counties having a county judge, judicial functions were to be transferred to the county executive in 1982, or sooner in the event of the death, resignation or removal from office of a county judge. (Emphasis supplied) I adopt the summary. From its recitation, there emerges the inescapable conclusion that these provisions are constitutionally unsound. FONES, J., concurs in this dissent.