Opinion ID: 1867606
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine

Text: The fugitive disentitlement doctrine bars an individual from calling upon the resources of the court while at the same time thumbing his nose at its orders. Because individuals who have fled or escaped have displayed defiance for the judicial system, appellate courts have been reluctant to hear their appeals. United States v. Wright, 902 F.2d 241, 242 (3d Cir.1990) (citing Hussein v. INS, 817 F.2d 63 (9th Cir.1986); United States v. Holmes, 680 F.2d 1372 (11th Cir.1982)). The fugitive disentitlement doctrine limits access to courts in the United States by a fugitive who has fled a criminal conviction in a court in the United States. The doctrine is long-established in the federal and state courts, trial and appellate. In re Prevot, 59 F.3d 556, 562 (6th. Cir.1995). More specifically, in Tennessee, this Court held that a fugitive's appeal should be peremptorily dismissed on motion. Bradford v. State, 184 Tenn. 694, 202 S.W.2d 647, 648-49 (1947). Furthermore, the denial of access to appellate courts by fugitives is not limited to criminal cases but occurs in civil cases also. In re Prevot, 59 F.3d at 563 (listing cases). As public policy, the doctrine has been justified because of enforceability concerns, because of its deterrence function, because it advances efficiency in the appellate process, because it is a sanction for disrespect of the court, and because flight is construed as a waiver. Ortega-Rodriguez v. U.S., 507 U.S. 234, 240-47, 113 S.Ct. 1199, 122 L.Ed.2d 581 (1993). In Molinaro, the Supreme Court declined to adjudicate a case because the defendant failed to surrender and was considered a fugitive from justice. Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. at 365, 90 S.Ct. 498 (1970). The Court opined, No persuasive reason exists why this Court should proceed to adjudicate the merits of a criminal case after the convicted defendant who has sought review escapes from the restraints placed upon him pursuant to the conviction. While such an escape does not strip the case of its character as an adjudicable case or controversy, we believe it disentitles the defendant to call upon the resources of the Court for the determination of his claims. Id. at 366, 90 S.Ct. 498. Numerous cases have denied appellate access to appellants seeking review of denials of habeas corpus relief. In re Prevot, 59 F.3d at 563 (citations omitted). Moreover, in the Eastern District of Tennessee, the U.S. District Court held that fleeing during the appeal process is an inexcusable procedural default, thus barring federal habeas corpus review. Potter v. Davis, 519 F.Supp. 621, 622 (E.D.Tenn.1981) (citing Strickland v. Hopper, 571 F.2d 275 (5th Cir.1978)). It is sound public policy to discourage the absence and flight of those individuals who disagree with court orders and judgments but still seek appellate relief; the fugitive disentitlement doctrine furthers that goal. For as long as a petitioner flouts the court's judgment in the case in which habeas corpus relief is sought, we conclude that the court may not be required to rule on the merits of the petition and may dismiss it.