Opinion ID: 860446
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: To purchase drugs and

Text: At this point, Mitchell objected and moved for a mistrial. The trial court overruled the objection, and denied the motion for a mistrial, thereby admitting the statement into evidence as a present sense impression pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Evidence 803 (1). The court further ruled, despite strenuous objections by Mitchell, that the statement of Kennedy concerning the drugs was not overly prejudicial when applying the balancing test between evidence otherwise admissible but highly prejudicial, as set out in Mississippi Rule of Evidence 403. Under our supreme court’s standard of review, the admissibility of evidence rests within the discretion of the trial court. Peterson v. State, 671 So. 2d 647, 655 (Miss. 1996). Moreover, the trial court’s discretion must be exercised within the scope of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence and reversal will be appropriate only when an abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice to the accused occurs. Id. at 656 (citing Parker v. State, 606 So. 2d 1132, 1137-38 (Miss. 1992)); see also M.R.E. 103. From the record before us, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the statement of Kennedy to be considered by the jury. While Mississippi has adopted the general rule that proof of wrongdoing distinct from the crime alleged in the indictment should not be admitted into evidence against a defendant, there are certain well established exceptions to this rule. Where the other crime admitted into evidence is connected with the one charged in the indictment, and proof of such other crime sheds light upon the motive of the defendant for the commission of the crime charged in the indictment, or where the fact of the commission of such other crime forms a part of the chain of facts so intimately connected that the whole must be heard in order to interpret its general parts, then evidence of other crimes is admissible. See Davis v. State, 530 So. 2d 694, 698 (Miss. 1988); see also Townsend v. State, 681 So. 2d 497, 506 (Miss. 1996); and Mackbee v State, 575 So. 2d 16 (Miss. 1990). Moreover, the statement of Kennedy is admissible pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Evidence 404(b), since it helps to explain why a crowd of people converged upon the Appellant’s vehicle when he stopped at the Flamingo. As stated in the official comment to Rule 404(b): [e]vidence of another crime, for instance, is admissible where the offense in the instant case and in the past offense are so inter-connected as to be considered part of the same transaction. Neal v. State, 451 So. 2d 743 (Miss. 1984). (Emphasis added). IV. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN GRANTING THE STATE’S INSTRUCTION AS TO AIDING AND ABETTING WHEN IT WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE? After testimony had been completed, the trial court granted Instruction 8, which provided: The court instructs the jury that each person present at the time and consenting to and encouraging the commission of a crime, and knowingly, willfully and feloniously doing any act which is an element of the crime or immediately connected with it, or leading to its commission, is as much a principal as if he had with his own hands committed the whole offense. This instruction sets out the familiar legal principle that one who is present when a criminal offense is committed and who aids, counsels or encourages another in committing the offense is equally as guilty of the crime as is the principal offender. Swinford v. State, 653 So. 2d 912, 915 (Miss. 1995). In the present case, Mitchell was admittedly present and involved in the shooting, together with Lee and Kennedy. Both Mitchell and Lee, and perhaps Kennedy, fired high powered weapons in the direction of the Flamingo Lounge. According to the testimony, it was never established as to what kind of bullet killed Dotson, who was found in a pool of blood at the doorway of the lounge. However, Mitchell was present at the scene and participated in a shootout with his companions that predictably led to the loss of human life. Thus, Instruction 8 was properly granted for consideration by the jury. V. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FAILING TO PROPERLY INSTRUCT THE JURY AS TO THE CORRECT BURDEN OF PROOF? In his final assignment of error, Mitchell claims that the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury on the burden of proof which the prosecution had to overcome in order for the Mitchell to be found guilty. Specifically, Mitchell claims that in order for him to be found guilty, the State had to prove his guilt beyond all reasonable doubt and not simply beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the Mitchell objected to all instructions which placed the burden upon the State to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court overruled the Mitchell’s objection, although the court did grant Mitchell’s Instruction 4, which stated: The court instructs the jury that you are bound, in deliberating upon this case, to give the defendant of any reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt that arises out of the evidence or want of evidence in this case. (Emphasis added). The Mississippi Supreme Court has ruled for many years that the State’s burden is to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Allman v. State, 571 So. 2d 244, 252 (Miss. 1990); Russell v. State, 220 So. 2d 334, 338 (Miss. 1969). Mitchell cites no cases which hold that such holdings are in error. On the other hand, he cites authority, including Hale v. State, 648 So. 2d 531, 536 (Miss. 1994), where the use of the term all reasonable doubt in defining the State’s burden of proof have been ruled to be acceptable language. See Taylor v. State, 682 So. 2d 359, 362 (Miss. 1996), for a recent example, where our Supreme Court has approved the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. See also Williams v. State, 667 So. 2d 15, 24 (Miss. 1996). Mitchell invites the court to set a new standard and henceforth require the State to prove a defendant’s guilt beyond all reasonable doubt. We decline to do so. In the case sub judice, we hold that the jury was adequately instructed on the State’s burden of proof, especially in light of Mitchell’s Instruction 4. THE JUDGMENT OF THE HARRISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT OF CONVICTION OF MURDER AND SENTENCE OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE TAXED TO HARRISON COUNTY. BRIDGES, C.J., McMILLIN, P.J., COLEMAN, DIAZ, KING, PAYNE, AND SOUTHWICK, JJ., CONCUR. THOMAS, P.J., NOT PARTICIPATING.