Opinion ID: 1233878
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: There is sufficient evidence to uphold Deitz's conviction for the narcotics conspiracy

Text: Deitz first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for the narcotics conspiracy. The relevant question on appeal is `whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.' United States v. Martinez, 430 F.3d 317, 330 (6th Cir.2005) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). In making this determination, however, we may not reweigh the evidence, reevaluate the credibility of witnesses, or substitute our judgment for that of the jury. Id. [T]o sustain a conviction for conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846, the government must have proved: (1) an agreement to violate drug laws, in this case 21 U.S.C. § 841; (2) knowledge and intent to join the conspiracy; and (3) participation in the conspiracy. Martinez, 430 F.3d at 330 (citing United States v. Welch, 97 F.3d 142, 148-49 (6th Cir.1996)). [P]roof of a formal agreement is not necessary; a tacit or material understanding among the parties will suffice. Id. (internal citations omitted). The existence of a conspiracy `may be inferred from circumstantial evidence that can reasonably be interpreted as participation in the common plan.' United States v. Salgado, 250 F.3d 438, 447 (6th Cir.2001) (quoting United States v. Avery, 128 F.3d 966, 971 (6th Cir.1997)). Once a conspiracy is shown beyond a reasonable doubt, a defendant's connection to the conspiracy, need only be slight, and the government is only required to prove that the defendant was a party to the general conspiratorial agreement. Id. A conspiracy requires: `(1) An object to be accomplished. (2) A plan or scheme embodying means to accomplish that object. (3) An agreement or understanding between two or more of the defendants whereby they become definitely committed to cooperate for the accomplishment of the object by the means embodied in the agreement, or by any effectual means.' United States v. Gibbs, 182 F.3d 408, 420 (6th Cir.1999) (quoting United States v. Bostic, 480 F.2d 965, 968 (6th Cir.1973)). Drug distribution conspiracies are often chain conspiracies such that agreement can be inferred from the interdependence of the enterprise. One can assume that participants understand that they are participating in a joint enterprise because success is dependent on the success of those from whom they buy and to whom they sell. United States v. Henley, 360 F.3d 509, 513 (6th Cir.2004) (quoting United States v. Spearman, 186 F.3d 743, 746 (6th Cir. 1999)). We also have noted that the government must show the willful membership of [a] defendant in the conspiracy, but the government need not prove that the defendant committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Gardner, 488 F.3d 700, 711 (6th Cir.2007). Deitz contends that his conviction for conspiracy is not supported by sufficient evidence because: (1) the government failed to prove that his alleged possession of cocaine in 1991 constituted an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (2) the government failed to prove that his methamphetamine sales to Jerry Bloor, a confidential informant, and his marijuana transactions with Danny Tubby Garland, an Indianapolis chapter Outlaw, occurred within the scope of the conspiracy; (3) his 1998 drug possession and his 1999 offer to sell drugs to James Dilts, a confidential informant, involved single-participant acts that were not connected to the charged conspiracy; and (4) Bloor's testimony does not support the special verdict as to drug quantity. We consider each of Deitz's arguments in turn.