Opinion ID: 1923690
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: review of agency discretion or policy

Text: The essence of Aetna's position, and the essence of the majority's opinion, is that the Buyer's Guide and Policy Summary are deficient because they emphasize the SCI [22] and do not contain two other indices which may be of use to a prospective life insurance policy purchaser. The circuit court reasoned that the rules were misleading because the Commissioner failed to include useful information. Aetna and the majority seek to force the Commissioner to require insurance companies to make more detailed disclosure because they conclude that additional information would make the Guide and Summary more helpful for the consumer. Although everyone agrees on the desirability of presenting the consumer with effective, meaningful cost disclosure, it is clear from the record, the briefs, the circuit court opinion and the majority opinion that reasonable people disagree as to the best means of achieving fair, meaningful, accurate cost disclosure which the consumer can understand. The dispute in this case really goes to the issue of whether the Commissioner's exercise of her authority as to what information must be disclosed is sound and reasonable, that is whether the Commissioner has abused her discretion, whether the exercise of discretion is outside the range of discretion delegated to the Commissioner by law, whether the rule substantially furthers the objectives sought, whether the rule is a rational means to an end. The legislature has delegated to the Commissioner the power to select the means to reach the objective. Selecting the means involves assessing existing and projected facts and predicting the effectiveness of a course of action. As I said previously, this court might review each component of the Commissioner's rule making process. The court would review the Commissioner's assessment of the facts to determine if they are supported by substantial evidence. Facts and policy blend together. In some instances of rule making, the Commissioner deals less with `evidentiary' disputes than with normative conflicts, projectories from imperfect data, experiments and simulations, educated predictions, differing assessments of possible risks, and the like. Amoco Oil Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 501 F.2d 722, 735 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See 1 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise sec. 6.13, p. 510 (2d ed. 1979). In this case the Commissioner's decision as to what information will be helpful to the consumer is in the nature of a prediction for which supporting data is conflicting. Whether one index is better for the consumer than two or whether three are better than one, is not readily capable of objective determination. This fact, really unknowable, can best be characterized as an educated prediction, or more skeptically as a hunch, based on available empirical data. The Commissioner's decision rests on an essentially legislative policy judgment, rather than on a factual determination. Cf. FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm'n for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 813-14 (1978). [23] Where the rule turns on facts which are interrelated with policy choices, risk assessment, and predictions of the future, the court's review should be directed to the reasons and explanations advanced by the Commissioner in support of the policy choices, risk assessments, and predictions, and should not dwell only on assurances of the correctness of the factual support for the rule. When fact and policy are mixed, as they often are, the court's objective is to see whether the agency, given an essentially legislative task to perform, has carried it out in a manner calculated to negate the dangers of arbitrariness and irrationality in the formulation of rules for general application in the future. Automotive Parts and Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1968). See also Wisconsin Environmental Decade v. Pub. Service Comm., 79 Wis.2d 409, 425, 256 N.W.2d 149 (1977); Industrial Union Dept. v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 474-475 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In dealing with Aetna's contention that the Summary and Guide are inadequate and should include two more indices, I again turn to the court's instructive analysis in the Wawszkiewicz Chardonnay wine case. The second issue in that case involved the consumers' seeking to force the Treasury to require disclosures more detailed than were necessary to prevent the label from being misleading. The court compared its review of the Treasury's statutory power to prohibit false and misleading statements and its review of the Treasury's statutory power to require labels which provide the consumer with adequate information as to the identity and quality of the products. The court said that unlike the statutory obligation on the Treasury to prohibit false or misleading statements, there is a separate and different statutory obligation on the Treasury to ensure that the disclosure is adequate. The decision of what information to include or exclude for purposes of adequacy is subject to review, said the court, but the issue is one of agency discretion and policy and the standard of review is a highly deferential one. The reviewing court must affirm the agency if it assures itself that a rational basis exists for the agency determination, and that the agency considered all relevant factors in arriving at its choice. Wawszkiewicz v. Department of Treasury, 480 F. Supp. 739, 746 (D. D.C. 1979). [24] This statement of the standard of review of agency discretion and policy making is substantially similar to the traditional statement, which this court has adopted, of the scope of review of a rule or of a quasi-legislative administrative decision. This court has said it will review quasi-legislative administrative acton to determine if it is arbitrary or capricious, willful or irrational; if it bears any reasonable relation to its objective; if it is reasonably intended and calculated to fulfill the legislatively authorized purposes; if it shocks the sense of justice, indicates lack of fair and careful consideration, or is not the result of the winnowing and sifting process. Daly v. National Resources Board, 60 Wis.2d 208, 216, 208 N.W.2d 839 (1973); Kachian v. Optometry Examining Board, 44 Wis.2d 1, 8, 170 N.W.2d 743 (1969); Josam Mfg. Co. v. State Board of Health, 26 Wis.2d 587, 603, 605, 133 N.W.2d 301 (1965); Olson v. Rothwell, 28 Wis. 2d 233, 239, 137 N.W.2d 86 (1965); 2 Cooper, State Administrative Law 761 (1965). [25]