Opinion ID: 2353980
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the trial court properly limited voir dire questioning regarding reasonable doubt

Text: Appellant contends that the trial court erred by refusing to allow him to question the venire panel during voir dire regarding the difference between the burden of proof at a civil trial versus a criminal trial. During voir dire, Appellant's counsel began to ask the venire panel if they knew the difference between a civil trial and a criminal trial with respect to the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. When the Commonwealth objected, trial counsel explained to the judge that he was trying to let the jury know that a different standard of proof applied in criminal cases. Later in the same bench conference, counsel stated that he was trying to educate the jury to the fact that a different standard applied in a criminal case. The trial court sustained the Commonwealth's objection on the grounds that trial counsel was improperly attempting to define reasonable doubt. Although counsel was allowed to tell the panel that the burden in a criminal case is beyond a reasonable doubt, he was not allowed to contrast that with a civil trial's preponderance of the evidence standard. The trial court concluded that explaining to the jury that belief beyond a reasonable doubt differed from belief by a preponderance of the evidence was tantamount to defining reasonable doubt, and would violate RCr 9.56. We affirm the trial court's exercise of discretion in limiting Appellant's counsel's statements to the jury, although we do so for slightly different reasons. Trial courts are granted broad discretion and wide latitude in their control of the voir dire examination under RCr 9.38. While it is within the discretion of the trial court to limit the scope of voir dire, that discretion is not boundless. Appellate review of such limitation is for abuse of discretion. Hayes v. Commonwealth, 175 S.W.3d 574, 583 (Ky.2005) (citing Webb v. Commonwealth, 314 S.W.2d 543, 545 (Ky.1958)). We observe at the outset that under RCr 9.38, voir dire is an examination of the prospective jurors by which the court and counsel seek information from the prospective jurors. It is not an occasion for counsel to educate the juror panel regarding legal concepts, although competent trial lawyers might properly structure their questions to the panel in a way that achieves that end. The principal purpose of voir dire is to probe each prospective juror's state of mind and to... allow counsel to assess suspected bias or prejudice. Lawson v. Commonwealth, 53 S.W.3d 534, 539 (Ky.2001) (quoting Thomas v. Commonwealth, 864 S.W.2d 252, 259 (Ky.1993)). Educating the jury on legal concepts is the function of the trial court. On that basis alone, we conclude the trial judge was well within the bounds of her discretion to limit counsel's attempt to use voir dire for the edification of the jury. We also recognize, however, that in order to fairly exercise the right of peremptory challenges and challenges for cause, it is sometimes necessary to introduce legal concepts to the jury panel to ascertain if any prospective juror is unable or unwilling to adhere to the concept. For example, we have allowed trial counsel during voir dire to present limited information on the applicable sentencing options so that inquiry can be made into the ability of each prospective juror to consider the full range of punishment involved in the case. Lawson, 53 S.W.3d at 544. We recognize that concern for a juror's inclination to apply the reasonable doubt standard of proof may, in some cases, be a concern as serious as the juror's inclination to consider the full range of punishment. RCr 9.56 states that the jury should not be instructed as to the definition of reasonable doubt. In Commonwealth v. Callahan, 675 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Ky.1984), we extended the well-settled prohibition of defining reasonable doubt to all points in a trial's proceedings, stating trial courts shall prohibit counsel from any definition of reasonable doubt at any point in the trial[.] We have held that, subject to appropriate limits, [2] the rule is not offended by stating what reasonable doubt is not. Id. at 392. [3] In Johnson v. Commonwealth, 184 S.W.3d 544, 549 (Ky.2005), we concluded that the prosecutor's statement to the jury panel that beyond a reasonable doubt was not the same thing as beyond a shadow of a doubt did not constitute defining of reasonable doubt. Most recently, in Cuzick v. Commonwealth, 276 S.W.3d 260, 268 (Ky.2009) we declined to overrule Johnson on that very point [4] and expressly reaffirmed Johnson 's point that in the very case that announced the prohibition against defining reasonable doubt [ Callahan ], we held that the prosecutor's allegedly improper statement, which, at most, attempted to show what reasonable doubt was not, did not amount to a violation of the rule against defining `reasonable doubt.' Cuzick, 276 S.W.3d at 269 (citing Johnson, 184 S.W.3d at 549). [5] As we noted above, the voir dire examination is to inform the court and trial counsel about the prospective jurors and not to educate the jury. But just as a juror's ability to consider the full range of penalties is frequently cause for legitimate concern, trial judges or trial counsel on both sides of a criminal case occasionally have reasonable concerns that prospective jurors may be confused or misinformed by the various standards of proof to which they have been exposed by prior jury service, news reports, television shows, or elsewhere, resulting in the inability or unwillingness of jurors to apply the reasonable doubt standard. The history of our cases on the subject plainly demonstrates such concern from the prosecutor's perspective, and we have consistently held their efforts to point out that reasonable doubt is not all doubt or a shadow of a doubt were either proper or were, at most, harmless error. Appellant argues that defense counsel with a similar concern should have the same opportunity to point out that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard required in a criminal case is not the same as the preponderance of the evidence standard applicable in most civil trials. We find no fault in that logic. Accordingly, we agree that stating to the jury that beyond a reasonable doubt is not the same thing as the civil trial standard of beyond a preponderance of the evidence does not constitute defining reasonable doubt. [6] In so holding, we remain consistent with our decisions in Callahan , Johnson , and Cuzick . Subject always to the trial court's sound discretion, such statements to the jury, if limited to the bare comment illustrated in the preceding sentence, are permissible during voir dire when used as the factual predicate for a question seeking to ascertain if any prospective juror would be unable to apply the reasonable doubt standard. Doing so does not violate RCr 9.56's prohibition against defining reasonable doubt, nor does it offend the principles set forth in Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 98 S.Ct. 1930, 56 L.Ed.2d 468 (1978) or Whorton v. Commonwealth, 570 S.W.2d 627, 631 (Ky. 1978) (overruled on other grounds by Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 99 S.Ct. 2088, 60 L.Ed.2d 640 (1979)), which led this Court to amend RCr 9.56 to its present form. Moreover, it accommodates the legitimate interest of all parties in a criminal case for assurance that jurors who cannot apply the reasonable doubt standard will be subject to challenge. Appellant's counsel, however, never suggested to the trial court that he wanted to inquire if any juror would be unable to follow the criminal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt or would instead be inclined to apply the standard used in civil trials. Had he done so, the trial court's refusal to allow the inquiry would be subject to harmless error analysis. Cuzick, 276 S.W.3d at 267. Because our review of the record discloses that Appellant's sole purpose in raising the matter during voir dire was to educate the jury, rather than to elicit potentially disqualifying information about the jury, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it terminated counsel's discussion of the issue.