Opinion ID: 1666085
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Absence of Extreme Emotional Disturbance Instruction

Text: Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in failing to include an instruction pertaining to extreme emotional disturbance as an element of the jury's murder instructions. We agree. The quandary of how extreme emotional disturbance (EED) should figure into the murder statute, KRS 507.020(1), has provided substantial difficulty for litigants, trial courts, and juries within the Commonwealth for a considerable period of time now. Indeed, this Court has oft wrestled with the appropriate interplay between who assumes the burden of proving its existence and, when established, its proper configuration within the statutory pattern. We recently sought to clarify the current status of the law concerning EED in Greene v. Commonwealth, 197 S.W.3d 76 (Ky.2006). In Greene, we reiterated a line of cases which held that the presence of evidence which supports a finding of EED necessitates an instruction including it as a statutory element of murder. Id. at 81; see also Wellman v. Commonwealth, 694 S.W.2d 696, 697 (Ky.1985) (if evidence of EED is presented, defendant is afforded reasonable doubt in that respect); Spears v. Commonwealth, 30 S.W.3d 152, 154 (Ky. 2000) (Commonwealth must disprove element beyond a reasonable doubt); Coffey v. Messer, 945 S.W.2d 944, 946 (Ky.1997) (once evidence of EED is introduced, the absence thereof becomes an element of the offense of murder). Thus, once evidence has been introduced establishing EED as a statutory element, the burden then shifts to the Commonwealth to affirmatively disprove its existence. Greene, 197 S.W.3d at 81. However, we have qualified this requirement by relieving the Commonwealth of an affirmative duty to prove the non-existence of EED if such proof is already present. Id. However, if evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, has been established, which puts the existence of EED in dispute, the Commonwealth has met its burden and the existence of EED becomes a question for the jury. See Spears, 30 S.W.3d at 155. As we noted in Spears, EED is the functional successor to the common law sudden heat of passion, and was introduced into our jurisprudence with the adoption of the Kentucky Penal code. Id. at 154-155. Although the two are seemingly analogous, the evolution of EED has interposed clear and marked distinctions between them, two of which bear upon our consideration of the present issue: namely, (1) notions of what constitutes adequate provocation and (2) the subjective rather than objective dichotomy of the provoking circumstances. This Court has articulated the definition of extreme emotional disturbance as being a temporary state of mind so enraged, inflamed, or disturbed as to overcome one's judgment, and to cause one to act uncontrollably from the impelling force of the extreme emotional disturbance rather than from evil or malicious purposes. McClellan v. Commonwealth, 715 S.W.2d 464, 468-469 (Ky.1986). This comprehensive definition has been reconciled with recent case law to establish how extreme emotional disturbance may manifest itself. Adequate provocation, or a triggering event, was established as a necessary element of EED in Fields v. Commonwealth, 44 S.W.3d 355, 359 (Ky.2001). The dissimilarity in the way common law sudden heat of passion and EED approach what constitutes adequate provocation arises in the rejection of a flash point in extreme emotional disturbance analysis, as well as a requirement that there be a subjectively reasonable excuse for the disturbance. Id. While we have recognized that provocation adequate to induce an EED analysis must be sudden and uninterrupted, we have consistently held that this event need not be contemporaneous with the triggering event. Foster v. Commonwealth, 827 S.W.2d 670, 678 (Ky.1991). Unlike heat of passion, the triggering event for extreme emotional disturbance may fester in the mind before surfacing to exact its damage. Springer v. Commonwealth, 998 S.W.2d 439, 452 (Ky.1999). We have further suggested that such a delayed event may be the impact of a series of related events with no specific time frame between the triggering event and the actual homicide. Lawson and W. Fortune, Kentucky Criminal Law § 8-3(b)(3), at 342 ( citing California v. Wharton, 53 Cal.3d 522, 280 Cal.Rptr. 631, 809 P.2d 290 (1991) and Pennsylvania v. Whitfield, 475 Pa. 297, 380 A.2d 362 (1977)). However, as we have previously stated, there exists a subsidiary inquiry as to whether there intervened between the provocation and the homicide a cooling-off period sufficient enough to preclude a conclusion that the provocation was adequate. Fields, 44 S.W.3d at 359. These sound principles ensure that EED is not so constrained as to be attainable only through instantaneous reactions, yet not so lenient as to allow convenient abuse of the mitigating effects of the doctrine. As a result, this Court need not limit its consideration to only those events immediately prior to the actual crime; our review may well consider all circumstances leading up to and surrounding the commission of the crime. The second distinction between heat of passion and extreme emotional disturbance is found in the transition from the historical objective reasonableness standard to one of subjective reasonableness, where reasonableness is determined from the perspective of the defendant. KRS 507.020(1)(a) states that a person shall not be guilty under this subsection if he acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be.  (emphasis added). On appeal, the reviewing court must make a determination as to the sufficiency of the evidence. Greene, 197 S.W.3d at 82. If the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, is found sufficient, it is for the jury to find whether or not the defendant acted under extreme emotional disturbance. Id. In the present instance, we find that there was sufficient evidence at trial to place the issue before a jury to render a finding of fact. The night before the homicide, Marcus Benjamin was confronted with allegations of infidelity as well as the news that his wife had been engaging in an extramarital affair with a family member. The following morning, the victim returned and the argument between the two resumed, this time including assertions that Benjamin would never see his children again. Further, Benjamin claims that he was physically attacked by the victim during this final argument, at which point the altercation turned deadly. This series of events, while not necessarily establishing that extreme emotional disturbance existed, is wholly sufficient to warrant an instruction for EED for the jury's benefit. Therefore, the trial court committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury on EED.