Opinion ID: 2632550
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING MENZIES' 60(b) MOTION

Text: ¶ 63 On appeal, Menzies argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to set aside Brass' defaults under multiple provisions of rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, Menzies claims that he is entitled to relief under rule 60(b)(1) and 60(b)(4) through (6). The pertinent portions of rule 60(b) state as follows: On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; . . . (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reason[ ] (1), . . . not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. . . . The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action. Rule 60(b) is an equitable rule designed to balance the competing interests of finality and fairness. See Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, ¶ 10, 11 P.3d 277; Laub v. S. Cent. Utah Tel. Ass'n., 657 P.2d 1304, 1306 (Utah 1982). In balancing these competing interests, the district court must consider all of the attendant circumstances. See Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 93 n. 2 (Utah 1986); Heath v. Mower, 597 P.2d 855, 858 (Utah 1979); Olsen v. Cummings, 565 P.2d 1123, 1124 (Utah 1977). Because of the equitable nature of the rule, a district court has broad discretion to rule on a 60(b) motion. Lund, 2000 UT 75, ¶¶ 9-10, 11 P.3d 277. However, this discretion is tempered by the fact that the rule is designed to be remedial and must be liberally applied. Id. ¶ 10; see also Cmty. Dental Servs. v. Tani, 282 F.3d 1164, 1169-70 (9th Cir.2002) (discussing rule 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). [J]udgment by default is an extreme measure and a case should, whenever possible, be decided on the merits. Tani, 282 F.3d at 1170 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also State Dept. of Soc. Servs. v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053, 1055 (Utah 1983) (same). Accordingly, a district court should be generally indulgent toward vacating default judgments, Katz, 732 P.2d at 93, and must incline towards granting relief in a doubtful case to the end that the party may have a hearing. Lund, 2000 UT 75, ¶ 10, 11 P.3d 277 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, it is quite uniformly regarded as an abuse of discretion to refuse to vacate a default judgment where there is a reasonable justification or excuse for the . . . failure . . . and timely application is made to set it aside. Id. ¶ 11 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). ¶ 64 In general, a movant is entitled to have a default judgment set aside under 60(b) if (1) the motion is timely; (2) there is a basis for granting relief under one of the subsections of 60(b); and (3) the movant has alleged a meritorious defense. See Erickson v. Schenkers Int'l Forwarders, Inc., 882 P.2d 1147, 1149 (Utah 1994); Musselman, 667 P.2d at 1055-56. These considerations should be addressed in a serial manner. See Erickson, 882 P.2d at 1149. In other words, there is no need to consider whether there is a basis for setting aside a default judgment if the motion was not made in a timely manner, and no need to consider whether there is a meritorious defense if there are not grounds for relief. See id.; see also Musselman, 667 P.2d at 1056 ([I]t is unnecessary, and moreover inappropriate, to even consider the issue of meritorious defenses unless the court is satisfied that a sufficient excuse has been shown.). Accordingly, in determining whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Menzies' 60(b) motion, we consider these elements in turn.
¶ 65 The first question we must consider is whether Menzies' 60(b) motion was timely. A motion under 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time and for reason[ ] (1) . . . not more than 3 months after the judgment . . . was entered. Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). In cases where subsection (b)(1) applies, a movant may not attempt to circumvent the three-month filing period by relying on another subsection. Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193, 1195 (Utah 1984); Laub v. S. Cent. Utah Tel. Ass'n., 657 P.2d 1304, 1308 (Utah 1982); Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons Co., 817 P.2d 382, 387 (Utah Ct.App.1991). Under rule 60(b), a reasonable time depends upon the facts of each case, considering such factors as the interest in finality, the reason for the delay, the practical ability of the litigant to learn earlier of the grounds relied upon, and prejudice to other parties. Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah 1993) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In general, the moving party satisfies the reasonable time requirement if she shows that she acted diligently once the basis for relief became available, and that the delay in seeking relief did not cause undue hardship to the opposing party. Workman v. Nagle Constr., Inc., 802 P.2d 749, 752 (Utah Ct.App.1990) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). ¶ 66 In the case before us, the district court's judgment dismissing Menzies' case was entered on January 11, 2002. Brass filed Menzies' 60(b) motion exactly three months later, on April 11, 2002. This motion was not accompanied by a supporting memorandum, but instead stated that [t]he specific grounds for this motion shall be set forth in a subsequent memorandum. However, Brass never filed a subsequent memorandum, and the 60(b) motion was not supported until Hunt entered her appearance and filed a supporting memorandum on August 12, 2003. Thus, sixteen months elapsed between the time Brass filed the 60(b) motion and the time that motion was properly briefed. Our task is to determine whether Menzies' 60(b) motion was timely filed under these circumstances. ¶ 67 The State argues that Menzies' 60(b) motion was insufficient under the Utah rules governing motion practice and was therefore untimely. The State argues that the motion did not meet rule 7(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which states that [a] motion shall be in writing and state succinctly and with particularity the relief sought and the grounds for the relief sought. The State also argues that Menzies' motion was required to be accompanied by a memorandum of points and authorities . . . relied on in support of the motion. Utah Code J.D. Admin. 4-501(1)(A) (repealed 2003). As the State correctly notes, Menzies' 60(b) motion filed on April 11, 2002, did not meet either of these requirements. The State asserts that Menzies therefore did not file a proper motion until nineteen months after the district court entered judgment, when Hunt filed the supporting memorandum. According to the State, this renders Menzies' 60(b) motion untimely. ¶ 68 The problem with the State's argument is that the State fails to distinguish between a motion that is properly supported for purposes of the particularity requirement and a motion that is timely filed for purposes of avoiding the limitations provisions of 60(b). Both rule 7 and rule 4-501 are designed to promote the policies of (1) mitigating prejudice to opposing parties by allowing that party to respond to the motion . . . and (2) assuring that a court can be apprised of the basis of a motion and rule upon it with a proper understanding. See Holmes Dev., LLC v. Cook, 2002 UT 38, ¶ 58, 48 P.3d 895 (discussing requirements for motions to amend). If a party fails to comply with Utah's formal motion practice rules, a district court may, within its discretion, deny the motion on the grounds that it is insufficient. Id. ¶ 59. However, sufficiency is not a logically necessary component of timeliness. A party can timely move the court for relief despite the fact that its motion may be insufficient because, for example, it lacks particularity. In such a situation, the court has the discretion, consistent with the policy concerns noted above, either to deny the motion as being insufficient or to allow the party to supplement the originally insufficient motion. In the case before us, the district court chose the latter option, holding that Menzies' 60(b) motion was timely filed and that Menzies should be allowed to supplement the motion under the circumstances. The district court was entirely within its discretion to do so. ¶ 69 We hold that Menzies' 60(b) motion was timely filed. Menzies not only complied with the three-month limitation contained in rule 60(b), but also moved the district court to set aside the default judgment within a reasonable time under the circumstances. Although the motion was not supported until sixteen months later, this delay was due to Brass' deficient representation and the fact that he was misleading Menzies about the status of the case. Menzies was not fully aware of the grounds for relief until August 2003, when Hunt finally informed him of Brass' failures. At that point, Hunt promptly filed a supporting memorandum on Menzies' behalf, and the State had adequate opportunity to oppose Menzies' motion. Moreover, the State acquiesced in the delay during the entire sixteen months. The State never challenged Menzies' motion on the basis of particularity but instead waited nine months and then requested permission to file a late response. The district court never ruled on the State's request, and the State did not raise the issue again. Under these circumstances, the factors militate in favor of Menzies. See Gillmor, 850 P.2d at 435 (In assessing whether a movant requested 60(b) relief within a reasonable time, the court considers such factors as the interest in finality, the reason for delay, the practical ability of the litigant to learn earlier of the grounds relied upon, and prejudice to other parties. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, we hold that Menzies' 60(b) motion was timely filed and proceed to address the asserted grounds for relief.
¶ 70 The second issue we address in our 60(b) analysis is whether Menzies is entitled to relief under any of the subsections of rule 60(b). As noted above, Menzies argues that he is entitled to relief under multiple subsections of rule 60(b). However, the asserted grounds for Menzies' requests for relief are the same in each instance, namely, Brass' deficient representation. Therefore, our initial task is to determine which subsection of rule 60(b) applies to Menzies' arguments. See Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons Co., 817 P.2d 382, 385 (Utah Ct.App.1991); Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193, 1195 (Utah 1984). We hold that rule 60(b)(6) applies to Menzies' arguments and therefore do not address Menzies' arguments under the other asserted subsections of rule 60(b). ¶ 71 Rule 60(b)(6) is the catch-all provision of rule 60(b). It provides that a party may be relieved from a judgment for any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) (emphasis added). Because rule 60(b)(6) is meant to operate as a residuary clause, it may not be relied upon if the asserted grounds for relief fall within any other subsection of rule 60(b). See Cmty. Dental Servs. v. Tani, 282 F.3d 1164, 1168 (9th Cir.2002); Russell, 681 P.2d at 1195; Laub v. S. Cent. Utah Tel. Ass'n., 657 P.2d 1304, 1306-07 (Utah 1982). In other words, the grounds for relief under 60(b)(6) are exclusive of the grounds for relief allowed under other subsections. See Russell, 681 P.2d at 1195; Tani, 282 F.3d at 1168 & n. 8. Furthermore, relief under rule 60(b)(6) is meant to be the exception rather than the rule; we have previously held that it should be sparingly invoked and used only in unusual and exceptional circumstances. Laub, 657 P.2d at 1307-08 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs., 507 U.S. 380, 393, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993) (remarking that under rule 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party must show extraordinary circumstances); Tani, 282 F.3d at 1168 (same). ¶ 72 Menzies argues that there are exceptional circumstances warranting relief under rule 60(b)(6) because Brass rendered ineffective assistance of counsel and was grossly negligent. While we have not yet had occasion to consider whether conduct such as Brass' warrants relief under 60(b)(6), we have previously examined attorney conduct in the context of rule 60(b)(1). Under rule 60(b)(1), a party may obtain relief from a judgment if he or she can demonstrate mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). A judgment entered due to attorney misconduct may be set aside under this subsection only if the conduct is excusable. See Mini Spas v. Indus. Comm'n, 733 P.2d 130, 132 (Utah 1987). In other words, if the attorney exercised due diligence, defined as conduct that is consistent with the manner in which a reasonably prudent attorney under similar circumstances would have acted, a judgment may be set aside under 60(b)(1). Id. Thus, in Lund we held that a default judgment should be set aside because it had been entered due to a good faith, legitimate legal interpretation that turned out to be erroneous. 2000 UT 75, ¶¶ 16-19, 11 P.3d 277. ¶ 73 However, the conduct alleged by Menzies hereineffective assistance of counsel and gross negligenceis a far cry from the excusable neglect that warrants relief under 60(b)(1). Menzies does not allege that Brass exercised due diligence or that his failures were due to a good faith interpretation of the law. Rather, Menzies argues that Brass' performance was exceptionally deficient in that he willfully failed to comply with his most basic obligations and consistently misled Menzies about the status of his case. As the district court noted, Brass' inaction appears to have been willful and deliberate rather than the result of ignorance or carelessness. In other words, Menzies argues that Brass' conduct was inexcusable, a proposition with which the district court agreed and which the State concedes on appeal. Menzies' allegations amount to an extraordinary situation which cannot fairly or logically be classified as mere `neglect.' Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co., 507 U.S. at 394 (quoting Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 613, 69 S.Ct. 384, 93 L.Ed. 266 (1949)). Accordingly, Menzies' asserted grounds for relief cannot be addressed by rule 60(b)(1). ¶ 74 While the district court found that the conduct alleged by Menzies did not fit the criteria of rule 60(b)(1), it also found that it could not grant Menzies relief under 60(b)(6) because it had already considered the conduct under 60(b)(1). This is a misapplication of the law. The rule is that 60(b)(6) cannot be relied upon if the grounds for relief fall within another subsection, not that 60(b)(6) does not apply if the court has already considered another ground. See Laub v. S. Cent. Utah Tel. Ass'n, 657 P.2d at 1306-08. Having concluded that Brass' conduct was too egregious and exceptional to be encompassed by rule 60(b)(1), the district court should have proceeded to consider Menzies' arguments under rule 60(b)(6) instead of concluding that 60(b)(6) could apply only if extraordinary circumstances [we]re also present (emphasis added). ¶ 75 We therefore draw a distinction between willful or grossly negligent attorney conduct and conduct that amounts to mere negligence or inadvertence. While the latter types of conduct are addressed by rule 60(b)(1), conduct such as that alleged by Menzies is clearly beyond the scope of that subsection and is more properly addressed under 60(b)(6). As the Utah Court of Appeals has noted, Rule 60(b)(6) is `sufficiently broad' to permit a court to set aside a judgment for ineffective assistance of counsel. In re A.G., 2001 UT App 87, ¶ 9 n. 3, 27 P.3d 562 (quoting Stewart v. Sullivan, 29 Utah 2d 156, 506 P.2d 74, 76 (1973)). Our decision is also consistent with the decisions of the majority of federal courts of appeal that have considered this issue. See, e.g., Tani, 282 F.3d at 1169 ([W]here the client has demonstrated gross negligence on the part of his counsel, a default judgment against the client may be set aside pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6).); Virginia Info. Sys. Corp. v. Wang Labs, Inc., 932 F.2d 338, 342 (4th Cir.1991) ([A]ttorney malfeasance which actively misleads a client or is comparably culpable might successfully ground a Rule 60(b) motion.); Carter v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 804 F.2d 805, 806, 808 (3d Cir.1986) (reversing denial of a rule 60(b)(6) motion based on attorney's blatant disregard for explicit [court] orders); L.P. Steuart, Inc. v. Matthews, 329 F.2d 234, 235 (D.C.Cir.1964) (stating that rule 60(b)(6) is broad enough to permit relief when . . . personal problems of counsel cause him grossly to neglect a diligent client's case and mislead the client). ¶ 76 Before addressing the merits of Menzies' arguments under rule 60(b)(6), we pause to address an argument raised by the State that is relevant to the distinction we have drawn above. The State argues that Menzies must be held accountable for Brass' failures through principles of agency and therefore Menzies cannot obtain relief under 60(b). The State's position is certainly true as a general proposition: an attorney's negligence is ordinarily attributable to the client because an attorney acts as an agent for her client. Tani, 282 F.3d at 1168; see also Russell, 681 P.2d at 1195 (holding that attorney's neglect was attributable to [the client] through principles of agency). Under the American representative system of litigation, a party voluntarily chooses her attorney and therefore is generally bound by the acts or omissions of his or her attorney. See Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co., 507 U.S. at 396-97, 113 S.Ct. 1489. Under this rule, a court considering whether to set aside a default judgment under rule 60(b)(1) must generally determine whether the actions of both a party and his or her counsel are excusable in assessing whether all the surrounding circumstances warrant equitable relief. Id. at 397, 113 S.Ct. 1489. ¶ 77 The situation is vastly different, however, when an attorney willfully disregards a client's interests, acts in a grossly negligent fashion, or renders ineffective assistance of counsel. When relief is sought on these grounds under rule 60(b)(6), the client is seeking relief on the basis that his or her attorney display[ed] neglect so gross that it is inexcusable. Tani, 282 F.3d at 1168 (internal quotation marks omitted). In such circumstances, the attorney is not acting on behalf of the client but is blatantly disregarding his or her representative capacity and subverting the client's interests. Therefore, an unknowing client should not be held liable on the basis of a default judgment resulting from an attorney's grossly negligent conduct, and . . . sanctions should be imposed on the lawyer, rather than the faultless client. [9] Id. at 1169. To hold otherwise would be to ignore the remedial and equitable nature of rule 60(b). Id. at 1169-70. Rule 60(b)(6) is designed to remedy a judgment when exceptional circumstances are present, and it would defeat the purpose of the rule if a client could not obtain relief under that subsection because he or she was held responsible for egregious lawyer misconduct. When an attorney is grossly negligent . . . the judicial system loses credibility as well as the appearance of fairness, if the result is that an innocent party is forced to suffer drastic consequences. Id. at 1170. Furthermore, the justification for imputing the acts and omissions of counsel to his or her client are not present here; Brass was appointed by the district court pursuant to Utah Code section 78-35a-202(2)(a) (2002), which does not entitle Menzies to make a voluntary choice with regard to his counsel. [10] See, e.g., Tani, 282 F.3d at 1168 (noting that a lawyer's negligence is ordinarily attributable to the client because the client is presumed to have voluntarily chosen the lawyer as his representative and agent). Nor does it appear that Menzies had a choice, for the record indicates that Brass was appointed by the court after a fruitless four-month search yielded no other attorney willing and able to represent Menzies. Accordingly, Menzies' request for rule 60(b) relief cannot be defeated on the basis that he is accountable for Brass' conduct. With this distinction clarified, we now address Menzies' request for rule 60(b)(6) relief, beginning with his arguments that Brass rendered ineffective assistance of counsel.
¶ 78 As discussed above, egregious lawyer misconduct constitutes an exceptional circumstance that may allow a litigant relief from a default judgment under rule 60(b)(6). Menzies argues that Brass' actions in this case amount to ineffective assistance of counsel and thus he is entitled to relief under rule 60(b)(6). Before addressing whether Brass' actions qualify as ineffective assistance of counsel, however, we must determine whether Menzies has a right to the effective assistance of counsel. Menzies advances three arguments on this point: (1) he has a statutory right to the effective assistance of counsel pursuant to Utah Code section 78-35a-202 (2002); (2) he has a right to the effective assistance of counsel under the Utah Constitution; and (3) he has a right to the effective assistance of counsel under the United States Constitution. ¶ 79 Several sections of the Utah Code are relevant to Menzies' first argument. Section 78-35a-202(1) provides that [a] person who has been sentenced to death and whose conviction and sentence has been affirmed on appeal shall be advised in open court, on the record . . . of the provisions of this chapter allowing challenges to the conviction and death sentence and the appointment of counsel for indigent defendants. In addition, section 78-35a-202(2)(a) states as follows: If a defendant requests the court to appoint counsel, the court shall determine whether the defendant is indigent. . . . If the court finds that the defendant is indigent, it shall promptly appoint counsel who is qualified to represent defendants in death penalty cases as required by Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Finally, section 78-35a-202(2)(b) provides that [a] defendant who wishes to reject the offer of counsel shall be advised on the record by the court of the consequences of the rejection before the court may accept the rejection. ¶ 80 In T.S. v. State, 2003 UT 54, 82 P.3d 1104, we considered an argument very similar to that made by Menzies, albeit in the context of a proceeding to terminate parental rights. In that case, the petitioner's parental rights had been terminated, and her appointed counsel had failed to file an appeal within thirty days, as required by rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Id. ¶¶ 1-3. The petitioner moved to file an overdue notice of appeal, arguing that the failure should be excused due to excusable neglect or good cause under rule 4(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Id. ¶ 1. The district court denied the motion, and the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on the principle that a party is accountable for her attorney's neglectful conduct. Id. ¶¶ 4-5. ¶ 81 On certiorari review, we reversed the court of appeals, holding that rule 4(e)'s `good cause' exception . . . includes within its reach the unusual circumstance where a person who is entitled to appointed counsel under [the Utah Code] does not receive effective counsel. Id. ¶ 9. Citing Utah Code section 78-3a-913(1)(a) (1999)which contains language that is strikingly similar to section 78-35a-202(1)(a)we stated that [t]he legislature has expressly codified a parent's right to be represented by counsel at every stage of a termination proceeding. Id. ¶ 7. We noted that the statute would be meaningless or illusory if it guaranteed only ineffective assistance of counsel. The legislature's omission of `effective' should not be read to suggest an intent to provide only ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶ 82 Our analysis in T.S. is equally applicable to the case before us. [B]y extending the right to appointed counsel to [death penalty defendants in post-conviction cases], our legislature has expressly recognized that [these] proceedings are unlike the traditional civil case. Id. ¶ 6. This intent is consistent with our habeas corpus jurisprudence and with the underlying nature and policy of post-conviction death penalty proceedings. Given the high stakes inherent in such proceedingslife and libertyproviding a petitioner the procedural safeguard of appointed counsel is an important step in assuring that the underlying criminal conviction was accurate. We refuse merely to pay lip service to this legislatively created protection by holding that a petitioner in a post-conviction death penalty proceeding is only entitled to ineffective assistance of appointed counsel. Therefore, we hold that Menzies has a statutory right to effective assistance of counsel under Utah Code section 78-35a-202. ¶ 83 The State makes two arguments regarding section 78-35a-202. The State first asserts that we should not establish a statutory right to the effective assistance of counsel because, by providing that appointed counsel must meet the qualifications of rule 8, the legislature has presumptively established the boundaries of counsel's obligations in post-conviction cases. This argument drastically oversimplifies the intent and import of rule 8. Consistent with section 78-35a-202(2)(a), rule 8 requires a court to appoint counsel to represent indigent petitioners in post-conviction proceedings challenging a death sentence. Utah R. Crim P. 8(e). The subsections of rule 8(e) contain qualifications that an appointed attorney in such cases must meet. [11] See Utah R. Crim P. 8(e)(1)-(5). However, these subsections contain no provisions regarding appointed counsel's obligations in post-conviction death penalty proceedings. In fact, rule 8(f) expressly states that [m]ere noncompliance with this rule . . . shall not of itself be grounds for establishing that appointed counsel ineffectively represented the defendant. Therefore, the rule clearly contemplates that the standards for ineffective assistance of counsel in post-conviction death penalty cases are found elsewhere. Nor could such gaps in the statutes and rules applicable to post-conviction death penalty proceedings presumptively limit this court's constitutional authority over such cases. As the United States Supreme Court has stated, When faced with such gaps in the habeas statute, we have looked first to the considerations underlying our habeas jurisprudence, and then determined whether the proposed rule would advance or inhibit these considerations by weighing the marginal costs and benefits of its application on collateral review. O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 445, 115 S.Ct. 992, 130 L.Ed.2d 947 (1995) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). ¶ 84 The State also argues that writing an effective assistance requirement into section [78-35a-202] would make capital post-conviction litigation interminable and end the finality of death sentences. It is true that there is a general judicial policy favoring the finality of judgments. See Hurst, 777 P.2d at 1035. However, [a]s important as finality is, it does not have a higher value than constitutional guarantees of liberty. Id. We would be remiss in our constitutional role if we were to allow finality to trump the interests at stake in post-conviction death penalty proceedings. See id. at 1033 (discussing the judiciary's constitutional supervisory power over extraordinary writs). Moreover, Utah's post-conviction legislation and associated rules contain appropriate limitations to assist courts in streamlining post-conviction review in death penalty cases. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106 (2002) (discussing various grounds under which relief may be precluded); Utah R. Civ. P. 65C (containing procedural provisions governing the progression of post-conviction litigation). We are confident that the judiciary, relying on this framework as well as the common law, can properly advance post-conviction death penalty litigation while ensuring that petitioners receive the protections to which they are legally entitled. Because we conclude that Menzies has a statutory right to the effective assistance of counsel under section 78-35a-202(2)(a), we do not address his federal and state constitutional claims. We do, however, note that the United States Supreme Court has previously declined to recognize a federal constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel in state post-conviction proceedings. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 755-57, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). While we have not yet considered whether such a right exists under the Utah Constitution, there is no need to do so in this case because of the statutory right provided by section 78-35a-202. We do not foreclose the possibility that an indigent death row inmate may have a right to the effective assistance of counsel under the Utah Constitution, but that question must wait for another day. ¶ 85 Having established that Menzies has a statutory right to the effective assistance of counsel, we now address whether he has demonstrated that Brass' performance was ineffective. The analytical framework for assessing ineffective assistance of counsel was originally developed by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). In the federal context, the right to the effective assistance of counsel is premised on a defendant's right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. As the Supreme Court has noted, this right is designed to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair and reliable proceeding before life or liberty are taken. Id. at 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052; see also Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 482, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000) (noting that the right to the effective assistance of counsel is recognized not for its own sake, but because of the effect it has on the ability of the accused to receive a fair [proceeding] (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). This fairness is derive[d] from the adversarial nature of our justice system, which is premised on the `well-tested principle that truthas well as fairnessis best discovered by powerful statements on both sides of the question.' United States v. Collins, 430 F.3d 1260, 1264 (10th Cir.2005) (quoting Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 84, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988)); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (recognizing the law's presumption that counsel will fulfill the role in the adversary process that the [Sixth] Amendment envisions). The right to the effective assistance of counsel therefore ensures the fairness and reliability of proceedings by requiring counsel to adequately discharge his or her role in the adversary process. See, e.g., Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 482, 120 S.Ct. 1029 (discussing how the Strickland test requires a litigant to show[ ] how specific errors of counsel undermined the reliability of the [proceedings] (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691-92, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (The purpose of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a defendant has the assistance necessary to justify reliance on the outcome of the proceeding.). Thus, [t]he benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the [proceeding] cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052. ¶ 86 The State argues that we should not rely on the Supreme Court's Sixth Amendment jurisprudence in assessing Menzies' statutory right to effective assistance of counsel. However, this court has long relied upon the Strickland test to assess ineffective assistance of counsel claims. See Bundy v. Deland, 763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988). We can discern no reason why a statutory right to effective assistance of counsel should be premised on something different from that of the constitutional right: ensuring that the proceeding is reliable and fair by requiring a properly functioning adversarial process. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Menzies is no less entitled to a proceeding that meets these standards when counsel is required by statute than he would be if counsel were required by the Constitution. The underlying concern is the same in each instance: when an indigent litigant has a legal right to counsel, counsel must render effective assistance in order to give effect to the litigant's right. See T.S., 2003 UT 54, ¶ 11, 82 P.3d 1104. We therefore use Strickland to evaluate Menzies' claim. ¶ 87 The Strickland test for assessing whether an attorney's performance amounted to the ineffective assistance of counsel is two-part: (1) whether counsel's performance was deficient in that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) whether counsel's performance was prejudicial in that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 688-89, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. If a litigant meets both parts of this test, then the proceeding is inherently unreliable and the result cannot stand. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 695, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002). We examine each part of the Strickland test in turn.
¶ 88 Our first inquiry under the Strickland test is whether Brass' performance was unreasonably deficient. This issue is not disputed. Though the district court did not engage in a thorough Strickland analysis, it stated in its 60(b) ruling that Brass' actions were inexplicable failures to follow rudimentary procedural guidelines and comply with court-ordered deadlines and that the ineffective assistance of counsel exceeds any neglectful conduct that could be deemed `excusable.' The State does not contest this finding on appeal, but instead concedes that Brass' performance was deficient. We nevertheless discuss the first part of the Strickland analysis in order to clarify Utah's standards for the performance of counsel in post-conviction death penalty proceedings. ¶ 89 Under Strickland, an attorney's performance must be objectively reasonable, with reasonableness measured by prevailing professional norms. 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052. However, judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential because it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel's [performance] after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Therefore, the court must eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight . . . and . . . evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Id. This requires that the court indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Id. In order to overcome this presumption, the litigant must demonstrate that the challenged actions cannot be considered sound strategy under the circumstances. Id. ¶ 90 Menzies requests that we consult the American Bar Association Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (ABA Death Penalty Guidelines) in addressing whether Brass' representation was reasonable under the circumstances. Courts frequently rely on the professional standards established by the ABA when determining the relevant professional norms under the first prong of the Strickland analysis. See, e.g., Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 375, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 162 L.Ed.2d 360 (2005) (citing the ABA Death Penalty Guidelines and stating that [w]e long have referred [to these ABA Standards] as guides to determining what is reasonable (second alteration in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 191, 125 S.Ct. 551, 160 L.Ed.2d 565 (2004) (citing ABA Death Penalty Guidelines in addressing ineffective assistance under Strickland ); Canaan v. McBride, 395 F.3d 376, 384 (7th Cir.2005) (We follow the [Supreme] Court's lead . . . by looking first to the [ABA Death Penalty Guidelines].). Indeed, the Supreme Court referred to the ABA Death Penalty Guidelines in Strickland itself, noting that the guidelines reflect [p]revailing norms of practice. 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052. While the ABA standards are not determinative of whether counsel's performance was ineffective and courts should examine counsel's conduct in light of all the contemporary circumstances, id. at 688-89, 104 S.Ct. 2052, they do represent well-defined norms that provide guidance to courts. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003). Because Utah's post-conviction rules do not currently contain any provisions regarding counsel's performance in post-conviction death penalty proceedings, and because it is traditionally the duty of the courts to supervise the performance of counsel, [12] we rely on the ABA Death Penalty Guidelines to the extent they are relevant to our decision. ¶ 91 ABA Death Penalty Guideline 10.15.1 specifically details the duties of post-conviction counsel. This guideline imposes on post-conviction counsel the duty to fully discharge the ongoing obligations imposed by these guidelines. ABA Death Penalty Guideline 10.15.1(E) (2003). One of these obligations is the duty to maintain close contact with the client regarding litigation developments. Guideline 10.15.1(E)(1). This duty is discussed in depth in guideline 10.5, which states that counsel should maintain close contact with the client, guideline 10.5(A) (2003), including discussing with the client the progress of and prospects for the factual investigation, and what assistance the client might provide, guideline 10.5(C)(1). Counsel should also keep the client informed of litigation developments, guideline 10.15.1(E)(1), including litigation deadlines and the projected schedule of case-related events, guideline 10.5(C)(6). The commentary to guideline 10.5 makes clear that counsel is obligated at every stage of the case to keep the client informed of developments and progress in the case and that the failure to maintain such a relationship is professionally irresponsible. Guideline 10.5 cmt. ¶ 92 In addition to the duty to communicate, guideline 10.15.1 also imposes on counsel the duty to continue an aggressive investigation of all aspects of the case. Guideline 10.15.1(E)(4). Likewise, guideline 10.7 provides that [c]ounsel at every stage have an obligation to conduct thorough and independent investigations relating to the issues of both guilt and penalty. Guideline 10.7(A). As the commentary to guideline 10.7 notes, counsel has a duty to take seriously the possibility of the client's innocence, to scrutinize carefully the quality of the state's case, and to investigate and re-investigate all possible defenses. Guideline 10.7 cmt. The duty to investigate extends to the penalty phase, and counsel has a duty to investigate and present mitigating evidence. Guideline 10.7 cmt.; see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 395-96, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (holding that counsel was ineffective for failing to uncover and present mitigating evidence). These parallel tracks of investigation also apply in post-conviction proceedings, where post-conviction counsel has a duty to investigate the facts underlying the conviction and sentence, as well as such items as trial counsel's performance. ABA Death Penalty Guideline 10.15.1 cmt. Counsel also has a duty to investigate the client in order to discover mitigation that was not presented previously [and] also to identify mental health claims. Guideline 10.15.1 cmt. ¶ 93 Finally, guideline 10.15.1 provides that [p]ost-conviction counsel should seek to litigate all issues, whether or not previously presented, that are arguably meritorious under the standards applicable to high quality capital defense representation. In addition, guideline 10.8 provides that [c]ounsel at every stage of the case, exercising professional judgment, must consider all legal claims potentially available and thoroughly investigate the basis for each potential claim before reaching a conclusion as to whether it should be asserted. Guideline 10.8(A)(1)-(2) (2003). [13] ¶ 94 In the case before us, Brass' ineffective representation went far beyond a failure to comply with the ABA Death Penalty Guidelines. During the five and a half years that Brass represented Menzies, Brass provided Menzies with virtually no representation and willfully disregarded nearly every aspect of Menzies' case. Brass did not communicate with Menzies about the status or progress of his case, repeatedly refusing Menzies' telephone calls and failing to respond to Menzies' written correspondence. These actions kept Menzies in the dark about the procedural posture of his case. Indeed, Brass did not inform Menzies that his case had been dismissed until nearly a year after summary judgment was entered, and Menzies was not aware of Brass' repeated discovery defaults and the resulting sanctions until Hunt began representing him. Moreover, Brass purposely misled Menzies to believe that the summary judgment was not a problem, informing Menzies that he was doing what was necessary to have it set aside, despite the fact that he never filed a memorandum supporting the rule 60(b) motion and defaulted in Menzies' appeal from the summary judgment several times. ¶ 95 In addition, Brass never conducted any investigation, despite the availability of investigative funds, a voluminous record indicating that investigation was necessary in order to develop Menzies' claims, and his own awareness of that necessity. During the course of Brass' representation, Menzies repeatedly asked Brass to investigate issues pertaining to both actual innocence and ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Brass disregarded Menzies' requests and then sat by as the State served discovery on Menzies because Brass had developed no factual bases for Menzies claims. Brass never informed the court that he could not respond to the State's discovery requests because he had not developed the case and never objected when sanctions were imposed that effectively precluded Menzies from pursuing his claims. Nor did Brass litigate the issues that were present in the case when he undertook Menzies' representation. The second amended petition Brass filed on Menzies' behalf was little more than a repetition of the claims that had been asserted in the first amended petition filed three years earlier, and Brass did not oppose the State's motion to dismiss most of Menzies' asserted claims. In short, Brass gradually defaulted Menzies' post-conviction case away and never informed Menzies that he was doing so. ¶ 96 There is no question that Brass' actions under these circumstances constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. While counsel's actions are normally entitled to a presumption of reasonableness, Brass' willful disregard for Menzies' case cannot possibly be construed as sound strategy. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052; see also Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 477, 120 S.Ct. 1029 (holding that a lawyer who disregards specific instructions from the defendant to file a notice of appeal acts in a manner that is professionally unreasonable because such a failure cannot be considered a strategic decision; filing . . . is a purely ministerial task, and the failure to file reflects inattention to the defendant's wishes). Brass' representation falls far below an objective standard of reasonableness, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, and therefore Menzies has satisfied the first prong of the Strickland test.
¶ 97 Our second inquiry under the Strickland test is whether Brass' actions prejudiced Menzies' case. Under this portion of the analysis, a litigant is required to show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. Judicial proceedings are normally entitled to a strong presumption of reliability, and therefore a litigant must overcome this presumption by demonstrating that counsel's errors rendered the proceeding unreliable. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 482, 120 S.Ct. 1029 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). ¶ 98 However, if a litigant is constructively denied the assistance of counsel in a proceeding in which he or she is entitled to counsel, the adversary process itself is rendered inherently unreliable, and prejudice is legally presumed. See id. at 483, 120 S.Ct. 1029; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. 2052. A litigant can be constructively denied counsel in several ways. For example, a constructive denial of counsel occurs if counsel completely fails to subject the opposition's case to meaningful adversarial testing. See Bell, 535 U.S. at 696, 122 S.Ct. 1843; Collins, 430 F.3d at 1265; Turrentine v. Mullin, 390 F.3d 1181, 1208 (10th Cir.2004). In Turrentine, the Tenth Circuit stated this occurs where the evidence overwhelmingly establishe[s] that [the] attorney abandoned the required duty of loyalty to his client, and where counsel acted with reckless disregard for his client's best interests and, at times, apparently with the intention to weaken his client's case. 390 F.3d at 1208 (second alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In Collins, the Tenth Circuit expanded upon this reasoning and held that an attorney failed to subject the opposition's case to meaningful adversarial testingdespite not recklessly disregarding his client's interestsbecause he did not argue his client's position at a competency hearing due to a pending motion to withdraw. 430 F.3d at 1265. The court noted that the proceeding was inherently unreliable because counsel had not engage[d] his legal skills in advocating [his client's] position. Id. at 1266. ¶ 99 Constructive denials of counsel have also been found where, due to counsel's deficient performance, a proceeding itself is forfeited. See Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 483-84, 120 S.Ct. 1029. A denial of the entire judicial proceeding itself, which a [litigant] wanted at the time and to which he had a right, . . . demands a presumption of prejudice because the litigant has been entirely denied the adversary process. Id. at 483, 120 S.Ct. 1029. Because no presumption of reliability can be accorded to judicial proceedings that never took place, a forfeiture due to counsel's deficient representation renders the proceedings inherently unreliable. Id. ¶ 100 Whether a litigant is required to show actual prejudice or whether prejudice is instead presumed turns on the magnitude of the deprivation of the right to effective assistance of counsel. Id. at 482, 120 S.Ct. 1029. In this case, Brass' abdication of his duties was of sufficient magnitude to presume prejudice and meets both of the exceptions discussed above. First, Brass completely failed to provide meaningful adversarial testing because he took no actions to develop Menzies' case and did not respond to any of the State's various motions. Brass not only acted with reckless disregard for Menzies' case, but he willfully disregarded nearly every aspect of it. Second, Brass' actions effectively forfeited the entire post-conviction proceeding itself. Brass never responded to the State's repeated discovery requests and never informed Menzies or the court of his failures or the reasons for them. The result is that discovery sanctions were imposed preventing Menzies from doing anything to establish his grounds for relief. After the discovery sanctions were imposed, there were no disputed issues of material fact because no facts had been introduced to support Menzies' claims, and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the State. In summary, Brass' performance not only failed to subject the State's case to the crucible of meaningful adversary testing but also resulted in the denial of the post-conviction proceeding itself. Under these circumstances, Brass' actions were clearly prejudicial. Accordingly, Menzies is entitled to relief under rule 60(b)(6).
¶ 101 In addition to arguing that he is entitled to relief under rule 60(b)(6) due to Brass' ineffective assistance of counsel, Menzies also argues that he is entitled to relief on the independent ground that Brass' actions were grossly negligent and therefore constitute exceptional circumstances under 60(b)(6). As discussed above, both grounds constitute exceptional circumstances that warrant relief under 60(b)(6). While a litigant must have a right to the effective assistance of counsel in order to seek relief on that ground, relief under 60(b)(6) may also be sought where a lawyer's performance is grossly negligent and therefore not excusable under rule 60(b)(1). See Cmty. Dental Servs. v. Tani, 282 F.3d 1164, 1170 n. 11 (9th Cir. 2002). ¶ 102 While it dealt with this issue in a purely civil context, Tani is remarkably similar to the case at bar. There, the defendant was sued on grounds of trademark infringement and retained counsel to represent him. Id. at 1166. The parties agreed to extend the time for filing the defendant's answer, but the defendant's counsel failed to sign the stipulation and also failed to file a timely answer. Id. The plaintiff filed for default, only to learn that an answer had been filed one day before, two weeks late. Id. Having not received a copy, the plaintiff telephoned the defendant's counsel, who assured the plaintiff that he would send a copy. Id. However, the defendant's counsel failed to do so. Id. At a subsequent hearing, the magistrate judge ordered the defendant's counsel to serve the answer and to participate in a settlement conference call. Id. at 1167. When the defendant's counsel failed to do either of these things, the plaintiff moved to strike the answer and again asked for a default judgment. Id. The defendant's counsel failed to file a memorandum in opposition and, at a hearing on the plaintiff's motion, still did not provide the plaintiff with a copy of the answer. Id. Therefore, the magistrate judge granted the plaintiff's motions. Id. ¶ 103 During this entire course of events, the defendant's counsel represented to the defendant that the case was proceeding smoothly. Id. It was not until the order of default judgment was mistakenly mailed to the defendant's office that he became aware of his counsel's failures. Id. The defendant promptly retained new counsel and filed a motion to set aside the default judgment pursuant to rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. The district court denied the motion, finding that although counsel's actions were not excusable under rule 60(b)(1), those actions were still chargeable to the defendant. Id. at 1167 & n. 6. The court also found that relief was not warranted due to the defendant's own `culpable conduct.' Id. at 1167. ¶ 104 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court. Id. at 1166. The court held that while an attorney's negligent acts are ordinarily chargeable to the client, a client should not be held liable for the attorney's actions where those actions are grossly negligent. Id. at 1168-69. It also held that grossly negligent conduct constitutes exceptional circumstances that entitle a litigant to relief under rule 60(b)(6). Id. The court then noted that the defendant's counsel had performed in a grossly negligent fashion because his failures were inexcusable and inexplicable and that he had virtually abandoned his client. Id. at 1170. The court also noted that the attorney had deliberately misled his client by repeatedly assuring the client that he was performing his responsibilities, thereby depriving him of the opportunity to take action to preserve his rights. Id. at 1171. While the court did note that a litigant's own culpable conduct could serve as grounds for a court to deny a rule 60(b)(6) motion, the court's review of the record did not demonstrate culpable conduct on the part of the defendant. Id. at 1172. Therefore, the court held that the district court had abused its discretion by denying the defendant's rule 60(b)(6) motion. Id. ¶ 105 In this case, the district court abused its discretion by denying Menzies' rule 60(b)(6) motion because Brass' conduct was grossly negligent. As in Tani, Brass repeatedly failed to comply with straightforward procedural requirements and court-ordered deadlines. He took no action to build Menzies' case and allowed the State to obtain a default judgment by failing to respond to discovery. Thus, Brass virtually abandoned his client. See id. at 1170. He also misled Menzies about the procedural posture of his case, the result being that Menzies was not fully aware of Brass' failures until years after they occurred. This conduct clearly constitutes gross negligence, entitling Menzies to relief under rule 60(b)(6). ¶ 106 Before addressing whether Menzies has met the meritorious defense requirement, it is necessary first to address one additional portion of the district court's 60(b) ruling. The district court found that Menzies was not entitled to 60(b) relief because he intentionally acquiesced in the delay of his case. In coming to this conclusion, the court relied on our holding in T.S. v. State, 2003 UT 54, 82 P.3d 1104. In that case, we held that good cause for extending the time to file an overdue notice of appeal under rule 4(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure encompasses the situation where a litigant's failure to file a timely notice of appeal is due to the violation of a statutory right to the effective assistance of counsel. Id. ¶ 9. However, we also noted that a party's own negligent or intentional acts might render rule 4(e) relief inequitable, notwithstanding a showing of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. ¶ 12. Based on this language, the district court found that Menzies was required to exercise that level of diligence that a reasonably prudent person in his circumstances would exercise. The district court found that Menzies was not reasonably prudent because he retained Brass as his attorney and failed to inform the court about Brass' failures. Thus, the district court denied Menzies 60(b) relief on this basis. ¶ 107 It is true that in considering a rule 60(b) motion, the district court must take into consideration all of the attendant circumstances in order to determine whether rule 60(b) relief is equitable. See Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 93 n. 2 (Utah 1986); Olsen v. Cummings, 565 P.2d 1123, 1124 (Utah 1977). To the extent that a litigant has acted negligently or intentionally, a court may consider these acts in striking an equitable balance between finality and allowing the litigant a fair hearing, notwithstanding the gross negligence or ineffective assistance of counsel. See Tani, 282 F.3d at 1172; T.S., 2003 UT 54, ¶ 12, 82 P.3d 1104. However, a rule 60(b) ruling must be based on adequate findings of fact. Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, ¶ 9, 11 P.3d 277. In this case, our review of the record leads us to the conclusion that the district court clearly erred on the record facts in finding that Menzies was negligent. The record indicates that Menzies was unaware of the status of his case during most of the time Brass was representing him. Indeed, he was not aware that a default judgment had been entered until a year after the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the State. When Brass informed Menzies of the default, he also assured Menzies that he was taking steps to have it set aside, and Menzies relied on his representation. Moreover, Menzies was not informed of the reasons for the default judgment and of Brass' multiple discovery failures until Hunt began representing him; prompt steps to set aside the default judgment were then taken. Finally, the record indicates that Menzies kept Brass as his attorney despite his concerns about the progress of his case because Brass and other attorneys repeatedly told Menzies that Brass would provide effective representation. Therefore, we hold that the district court's findings that Menzies was negligent for keeping Brass as his attorney and for failing to contact the court regarding Brass' failures were clearly erroneous; and we also hold that the district court abused its discretion by denying Menzies rule 60(b) relief on this ground.
¶ 108 The final inquiry in our rule 60(b) analysis is whether Menzies has alleged a meritorious defense. The purpose of the meritorious defense requirement is to prevent the necessity of judicial review of questions which, on the face of the pleadings, are frivolous. Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, ¶ 28, 11 P.3d 277 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, a litigant seeking rule 60(b) relief must proffer some defense of at least sufficient ostensible merit as would justify a trial on the issue thus raised. Downey State Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corp., 545 P.2d 507, 510 (Utah 1976). This requirement does not set an overly burdensome threshold: A defense is sufficiently meritorious to have a default judgment set aside if it is entitled to be tried. Erickson v. Schenkers Int'l Forwarders, Inc., 882 P.2d 1147, 1149 (Utah 1994). Thus, where a party presents a clear and specific proffer of a defense that, if proven, would [warrant relief] by the claimant . . . it has adequately shown a nonfrivolous and meritorious defense. Lund, 2000 UT 75, ¶ 29, 11 P.3d 277. Even general denials that would allow a litigant to prevail if proven are sufficient. Erickson, 882 P.2d at 1149. ¶ 109 Menzies easily meets the meritorious defense requirement. In his amended petition, Menzies alleged multiple trial errors that, if proven, would allow Menzies to prevail in his post-conviction proceeding. While the record is far from fully developed with regard to Menzies' claims as a direct result of the ineffective assistance of his counsel, Menzies is not required to prove any of his claims or meet an evidentiary threshold in order to demonstrate that his claims have merit. Lund, 2000 UT 75, ¶¶ 29, 32, 11 P.3d 277. Because this final requirement of our 60(b) analysis is met, Menzies is entitled to relief under rule 60(b)(6). ¶ 110 Having concluded that Menzies is entitled to rule 60(b) relief, it is necessary also to consider what relief is warranted. Merely setting aside the default judgment would be insufficient, for the sanctions that were imposed by the district court would still preclude Menzies from investigating his claims. Moreover, Brass' ineffective representation extended well beyond the entry of the discovery sanctions because Brass was willfully neglecting Menzies' case long before the sanctions were imposed. Brass' actions pervade the entire course of his representation, for he took no actions to develop Menzies' case even when he was first appointed. Even the second amended petition filed by Brass, the first pleading he filed, did little more than repeat the allegations of the amended petition that had been filed three years previously. In addition, Brass took no action to oppose the State's motion to dismiss, which disposed of many of Menzies' claims. Thus, in order to fully correct the harm of Brass' ineffective assistance, it is necessary to set aside the entire course of his representation and give Menzies an opportunity to properly develop his case. We do not undertake this decision lightly. The post-conviction proceedings in this case have now extended for eleven years, with no resolution apparent in the immediate future. However, as we have noted repeatedly, while finality in judicial proceedings is an important policy, the constitutional guarantees of life and liberty must prevail in this instance. See Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1035 (Utah 1989). We simply cannot allow Menzies' sentence to be carried out without allowing him to exercise his right to post-conviction review. In order to ensure that this right is adequately protected, it is necessary that Menzies have the opportunity to investigate his claims and present them to the district court for proper adjudication. ¶ 111 Accordingly, we remand this case to the district court with instructions to set aside the proceedings that took place during the time that Brass was representing Menzies. Menzies should be allowed to investigate his claims in accordance with the pertinent Utah rules and should be given the opportunity to amend his post-conviction petition in the event that it is warranted. We now address Menzies' final claim, relating to the district court's evidentiary rulings during the rule 60(b) proceedings.