Opinion ID: 1638115
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Summary Judgment Prior to Completion of Discovery

Text: In his final argument plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment before he was able to submit some records from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. At the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, plaintiff asked the trial court to refrain from ruling on the motion until he obtained a protective order and then could submit some FDIC records and an affidavit by an expert witness. He stated that the affidavit was prepared and he could file it with the court if the court entered the protective order on that day. The trial court entered the protective order on the day of the hearing as requested. The summary judgment was granted upon consideration of the pleadings, affidavits, and other materials both in support of and in opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment (including without limitation certain materials submitted by the plaintiff after the hearing). The FDIC records were submitted after the hearing; therefore, plaintiff's argument most likely is lacking for a factual basis. However, even if the trial court should not have considered the FDIC records, we would not reverse. Whether to grant a continuance to allow for further discovery is a matter within the discretion of the trial court. ARCP Rule 56(f); Jenkins v. Int'l Paper Co., 318 Ark. 663, 887 S.W.2d 300 (1994). In order for this court to reverse the trial court's denial of the continuance, the appellant must show that the trial court abused its discretion and that the additional discovery would have changed the outcome of the case. Id. Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the summary judgment prior to the completion of all discovery or that the additional discovery would have changed the outcome of the case. Plaintiff relies on First National Bank v. Newport Hospital and Clinic, Inc., 281 Ark. 332, 663 S.W.2d 742 (1984). That case was a medical malpractice case, and the plaintiff had the burden of proving, by expert testimony, that her injuries were caused by the failure of the defendant to exercise the degree of skill and learning possessed by other physicians engaged in the same kind of practice in similar localities. The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment based on the lack of expert testimony to support the plaintiff's claims prior to the defendant producing medical records which the plaintiff had requested in discovery. We reversed and stated that there was no suggestion of lack of diligence on the part of the plaintiff or any reason to challenge the relevancy of the discovery sought. We concluded: Where, as in this case, the decision of a question of law by the Court depends upon an inquiry into the surrounding facts and circumstances, the Court should refuse to grant a motion for a summary judgment until the facts and circumstances have been sufficiently developed to enable the Court to be reasonably certain that it is making a correct determination of the question of law. Id. at 336, 663 S.W.2d at 744 (quoting Palmer v. Chamberlin, 191 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1951)). Unlike First National Bank v. Newport Hospital and Clinic , the facts in the case at bar were sufficiently developed for the trial court to determine whether summary judgment was appropriate. Plaintiff asserts that the FDIC records, the affidavits, and the depositions were relevant to show that defendant had a motive to shift liability from himself to plaintiff in the continuing guaranty. While such evidence may have supported plaintiff's theory of the case had it gone to trial, it does not change the fact that plaintiff did not show damage or justifiable reliance, two elements necessary to a cause of action based on fraud. Motive is not an element of fraud. See Hampton v. Taylor, 318 Ark. 771, 887 S.W.2d 535 (1994). Nor does it establish a fiduciary relationship or breach of that relationship. Thus, plaintiff has not demonstrated that postponing the ruling for further discovery would have enabled him to rebut the motion for summary judgment. In addition, plaintiff has not shown that he was diligent in obtaining the additional discovery. See Jenkins v. Int'l Paper Co., 318 Ark. 663, 887 S.W.2d 300 (1984). Affirmed.