Opinion ID: 521932
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: liability under rcra

Text: 50 Plaintiffs' theory of liability under RCRA is really no different from their theory under CERCLA, although the statutory requirements are somewhat different under each statute. RCRA section 7003, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 6973, provides in relevant part: 51 Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, upon receipt of evidence that the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation or disposal of any solid waste or hazardous waste may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment, the Administrator may bring suit on behalf of the United States in the appropriate district court against any person (including any past or present generator, past or present transporter, or past or present owner or operator of a treatment, storage, or disposal facility) who has contributed or who is contributing to such handling, storage, treatment, transportation or disposal to restrain such person from such handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal, to order such person to take such other action as may be necessary, or both. 52 42 U.S.C. Sec. 6973(a). 53 RCRA thus imposes liability on any person who contributed or who is contributing to the disposal of solid or hazardous waste, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 6973, rather than on those who arrange for the disposal of hazardous substances. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9607(a)(3). RCRA also authorizes suit upon receipt of evidence of an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 6973(a), rather than after a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9607(a). 9 54 Defendants make the initial argument on appeal that because the EPA cleaned up the Aidex site before it brought suit, there was (and is) no imminent and substantial endangerment as is required under the Act. We agree with the district court, however, that RCRA's imminent and substantial endangerment language does not require the EPA to file and prosecute its RCRA action while the endangerment exists. As the district court aptly noted, in the context of a reimbursement action, this would be an absurd and unnecessary requirement. The endangerment language is plainly intended by Congress to limit the reach of RCRA to sites where the potential for harm is great. See United States v. Reilly Tar & Chemical Corp., 546 F.Supp. 1100, 1109-10 (D.Minn.1982). 55 The express language of the statute permits suit as soon as the United States receives information indicating a potential endangerment. The purpose of the statute is to give broad authority to the courts to grant all relief necessary to ensure complete protection of the public health and the environment. Conservation Chemical Co., 619 F.Supp. at 199. See NEPACCO, 810 F.2d at 737-41, 745-46; Reilly Tar, 546 F.Supp. at 1109-10. The limitation urged by defendants would defeat this purpose. The allegations of the complaint in this case, if true, place the Aidex site within the imminent and substantial endangerment category prior to the EPA's clean up efforts. These allegations are sufficient to authorize suit under section 6973. 56 Defendants also contend, and the district court found, that their relationships with Aidex were not sufficient to establish they contributed to Aidex's disposal of wastes arising from the formulation process. In reaching its conclusion, the district court construed RCRA narrowly, holding that the lack of an express allegation that defendants had authority to control how Aidex disposed of the waste from the formulation process was fatal to plaintiffs' claims under section 6973. 57 We disagree with the district court's conclusion that RCRA should be narrowly construed. The relevant legislative history supports a broad, rather than a narrow, construction of the phrase contributed to. Although RCRA's contemporaneous legislative history is not very helpful, see NEPACCO, 810 F.2d at 738, subsequent reports which reviewed the statute after enactment expressly state that contributing to is to be liberally construed. H.R.Rep. No. IFC 31, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1979) (the Eckhardt Report); S.Rep. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1980 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 5019, 5023. See United States v. Waste Industries, Inc., 734 F.2d 159, 166 (4th Cir.1984). More importantly, like CERCLA, RCRA is a remedial statute, which should be liberally construed. See United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 211, 213-14 (3d Cir.1982). See also Conservation Chemical Co., 619 F.Supp. at 199; Reilly Tar, 546 F.Supp. at 1108-10. 58 We also disagree with the district court's conclusion that an explicit allegation of control is required. We find the complaint alleges sufficient facts from which a trier of fact could infer defendants contributed to Aidex's disposal of wastes. Defendants contracted with Aidex to formulate their technical grade pesticides; they retained ownership of the pesticide throughout the process; and inherent in the process is the generation of wastes. Defendants supplied the specifications for their commercial grade products to Aidex; it may reasonably be inferred that they had authority to control the way in which the pesticides were formulated, as well as any waste disposal. 59 Defendants attempt to analogize this case to United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 22 Env't Rep.Cas. (BNA) 1230 (S.D.Ind.1983), in which the court rejected both CERCLA and RCRA claims brought by Westinghouse against Monsanto. Unlike Monsanto, however, defendants in this case did not sell their technical grade pesticide to Aidex; they retained ownership throughout the formulation process. 10 Moreover, Aidex was not manufacturing a product for its own use; it was formulating defendants' pesticide products for them. Cf. id. at 1233. We thus find the Westinghouse case distinguishable from the facts alleged here. 60 Although the phrase contributing to is not defined by the statute, its plain meaning is to have a share in any act or effect. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 496 (1961). To have a share in is arguably less involvement than might be required by the plain meaning of the phrase to arrange: to make plans, prepare, id. at 120, and we have already held the complaint sufficiently alleges defendants arranged for the disposal of hazardous substances under CERCLA section 9607(a)(3). 61 Defendants have cited no persuasive reason or authority for distinguishing between the phrase arranging for under CERCLA and the phrase contributing to under RCRA in the context of this case. Accordingly, for the same reasons we held plaintiffs' allegations were sufficient to state a claim under CERCLA, we now hold plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged defendants contributed to the disposal of solid or hazardous wastes under RCRA.