Opinion ID: 1433861
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 21

Heading: Cumulative Effect of Error

Text: Finally, defendant contends that even if harmless individually, the cumulative effect of the trial errors mandates reversal. Because we have rejected all of his claims, we perforce reject this contention as well.

Defendant makes several claims regarding the jury's consideration of unadjudicated criminal activity as a circumstance in aggravation. (ง 190.3, factor (b).) He acknowledges this court has previously upheld the use of such evidence at the penalty phase. ( People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 204-205, 222 Cal.Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480.) He argues, however, that he was denied his constitutional right to an impartial fact finder and reliable penalty determination because the same jury that decided his guilt could not be expected to evaluate this evidence without bias or prejudice. We have considered and rejected this argument in People v. Balderas, supra, 41 Cal.3d at pages 204-205, 222 Cal.Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480, and find no reason to reconsider our conclusions. We have also previously determined that the use of factor (b) evidence does not run afoul of the statute of limitations. ( People v. Jennings (1988) 46 Cal.3d 963, 981-982, 251 Cal. Rptr. 278, 760 P.2d 475.) Nor was the jury required unanimously to agree defendant committed the alleged crimes. ( People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 99, 241 Cal. Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127.) On this record, we find no error by virtue of the trial court's failure to repeat the presumption of innocence instruction given prior to guilt phase deliberations. At the beginning of the penalty phase, the court expressly alerted the jury that [m]ost of the rules that I gave you before ... will apply to this case. Nothing in the court's subsequent penalty instructions suggested the jury should disregard the earlier admonition that a criminal defendant is presumed innocent, and a reasonable juror would assume it continued to apply. ( People v. Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 561, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 751, 905 P.2d 420.)
Over defense objection, the trial court admitted evidence of a threatening letter defendant sent to Jerry Halfacre while in jail awaiting trial. [11] Defendant renews his claims that the prosecution failed to give proper notice under section 190.3 and that the evidence did not constitute criminal activity. With respect to notice, the record discloses that the trial began on December 3, 1990. On November 1, at the time of the change of venue motion, the court reviewed various other matters including the notice of circumstances in aggravation, one being the threatening letter, which the prosecution had received approximately two weeks earlier. A prior written motion, served October 22, requesting an order for a handwriting exemplar from defendant, indicated the letter was an important part of the case. At the November 1 hearing, defense counsel acknowledged the prosecutor had informed him of her intention to use the letter in aggravation and expressly disavowed any objection as to form or timeliness of the notice. Nor did he request a continuance to prepare a response to the evidence. In light of these circumstances, any further challenge to the sufficiency of the notice or alleged prejudice is precluded. ( People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 771, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 165, 906 P.2d 2.) With respect to the substantive claim, section 422 makes it a crime to willfully threaten[] to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to another person, with the specific intent that the statement is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of actually carrying it out, which, on its face and under the circumstances in which it is made, is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat, and thereby causes that person reasonably to be in sustained fear for his or her own safety.... Relying on People v. Brown (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1251, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 76, defendant contends that because the letter did not contain an unconditional threat, it did not constitute a violation of section 422 as a matter of law and was therefore inadmissible as evidence of prior unadjudicated criminal activity. In his reply brief, he further argues that even if section 422 does not mandate an unconditional threat (see, e.g., People v. Stanfield (1995) 32 Cal. App.4th 1152, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 328), the letter was still insufficient on its face to come within the statutory proscription. In People v. Brown, the defendant accosted two women approaching their apartment and made several menacing statements as he pointed a gun at the head of one of the women. (20 Cal.App.4th at p. 1253, 25 Cal. Rptr.2d 76.) When the other said they should call the police, the defendant said he would kill them if they did. ( Ibid. ) A jury found him guilty of violating section 422. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment, construing the statute to preclude conviction when the threat is conditional in any respect. The plain meaning of an `unconditional' threat is that there be no conditions, ` If you call the police ...' is a condition, [ถ] Toโby some linguistic legerdemainโconstrue `unconditional threat' to include a `conditional threat' would only create `serious constitutional problems.' ( People v. Mirmirani ... (1981) 30 Cal.3d 375, 382, 178 Cal.Rptr. 792, 636 P.2d 1130....) ( People v. Brown, supra, 20 Cal.App.4th at p. 1256, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 76.) Since Brown, several Court of Appeal decisions have expressly disagreed with this strict interpretation of section 422. ( People v. Dias (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 46, 60 Cal. Rptr.2d 443; People v. Stanfield, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th 1152, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 328; People v. Brooks (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 142, 31 Cal. Rptr.2d 283; see also People v. Gudger (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 310, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 510 [construing section 76, prohibiting threats against a judge].) We find the reasoning of these subsequent cases more persuasive and now hold that prosecution under section 422 does not require an unconditional threat of death or great bodily injury. [12] In reaching this conclusion, we begin with the original source of the statutory language. In 1981, this court invalidated former section 422 as unconstitutionally vague. ( People v. Mirmirani (1981) 30 Cal.3d 375, 388, 178 Cal.Rptr. 792, 636 P.2d 1130.) The Legislature subsequently repealed the statute and enacted a substantially revised version in 1988, adopting almost verbatim language from United States v. Kelner (2d Cir.1976) 534 F.2d 1020. (See Stats.1987, ch. 828, ง 28, p. 2587; Stats.1988, ch. 1256, ง 4, pp. 4184-4185.) In Kelner, the defendant, a member of the Jewish Defense League, had been convicted under a federal statute for threatening to assassinate Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, who was to be in New York for a meeting at the United Nations. Kelner argued that without proof he specifically intended to carry out the threat, his statement was political hyperbole protected by the First Amendment rather than a punishable true threat. ( United States v. Kelner, supra, 534 F.2d at p. 1025.) The reviewing court disagreed and concluded threats are punishable consonant with constitutional protections when the following criteria are satisfied. So long as the threat on its face and in the circumstances in which it is made is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate and specific as to the person threatened, as to convey a gravity of purpose and imminent prospect of execution, the statute may properly be applied. ( United States v. Kelner, supra, 534 F.2d at p. 1027.) In formulating this rationale, the Kelner court drew on the analysis in Watts v. United States (1969) 394 U.S. 705, 89 S.Ct. 1399, 22 L.Ed.2d 664, in which the United States Supreme Court reversed a conviction for threatening the President of the United States. Defendant Watts had stated, in a small discussion group during a political rally, 'And now I have already received my draft classification as 1-A and I have got to report for my physical this Monday coming. I am not going. If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.' ( Id. at p. 706, 89 S.Ct. at p. 1400.) Both Watts and the crowd laughed after the statement was made. ( Id. at p. 707, 89 S.Ct. at p. 1401.) The Supreme Court determined that taken in context, and considering the conditional nature of the threat and the reaction of the listeners, the only possible conclusion was that the statement was not a punishable true threat, but political hyperbole privileged under the First Amendment. ( Id. at pp. 707-708, 89 S.Ct. at pp. 1401-1402.) As the Kelner court understood this analysis, the Supreme Court was not adopting a bright line test based on the use of conditional language but simply illustrating the general principle that punishable true threats must express an intention of being carried out. (See United States v. Kelner, supra, 534 F.2d at p. 1026.) In effect, the Court was stating that threats punishable consistently with the First Amendment were only those which according to their language and context conveyed a gravity of purpose and likelihood of execution so as to constitute speech beyond the pale of protected [attacks on government and political officials]. ( Ibid. ) Accordingly, [t]he purpose and effect of the Watts constitutionally-limited definition of the term `threat' is to insure that only unequivocal, unconditional and specific expressions of intention immediately to inflict injury may be punished-only such threats, in short, as are of the same nature as those threats which are ... `properly punished every day under statutes prohibiting extortion, blackmail and assault....' ( Id. at p. 1027.) Given the rationale of Kelner and Watts, it becomes clear the reference to an unconditional threat in section 422 is not absolute. As the court in People v. Stanfield noted, By definition, extortion punishes conditional threats, specifically those in which the victim complies with the mandated condition. [Citations.] Likewise, many threats involved in assault cases are conditional. A conditional threat can be punished as an assault, when the condition imposed must be performed immediately, the defendant has no right to impose the condition, the intent is to immediately enforce performance by violence and defendant places himself in a position to do so and proceeds as far as is then necessary. [Citation.] It is clear, then, that the Kelner court's use of the word `unconditional' was not meant to prohibit prosecution of all threats involving an `if clause, but only to prohibit prosecution based on threats whose conditions precluded them from conveying a gravity of purpose and imminent prospect of execution. ( People v. Stanfield, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at p. 1161, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 328; People v. Brooks, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at pp. 145-146, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 283; see also In re M.S. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 698, 714, 42 Cal. Rptr.2d 355, 896 P.2d 1365.) As the court commented in United States v. Schneider (7th Cir.1990) 910 F.2d 1569, 1570: Most threats are conditional; they are designed to accomplish something; the threatener hopes that they will accomplish it, so that he won't have to carry out the threats. Moreover, imposing an unconditional requirement ignores the statutory qualification that the threat must be so ... unconditional... as to convey to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution .... (ง 422, italics added.) The use of the word `so' indicates that unequivocality, unconditionality, immediacy and specificity are not absolutely mandated, but must be sufficiently present in the threat and surrounding circumstances to convey gravity of purpose and immediate prospect of execution to the victim. ( People v. Stanfield, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at p. 1157, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 328.) If the fact that a threat is conditioned on something occurring renders it not a true threat, there would have been no need to include in the statement the word `so.' ( People v. Brooks, supra, 26 Cal. App.4th at p. 149, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 283.) This provision implies that there are different degrees of unconditionality. A threat which may appear conditional on its face can be unconditional under the circumstances.... [ถ] Language creating an apparent condition cannot save the threatener from conviction when the condition is illusory, given the reality of the circumstances surrounding the threat. A seemingly conditional threat contingent on an act highly likely to occur may convey to the victim a gravity of purpose and immediate prospect of execution. ( People v. Stanfield, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at p. 1158, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 328.) Accordingly, we reject defendant's threshold contention that the letter was inadmissible because it contained only conditional threats. Alternatively, defendant argues that the letter still does not meet the statutory definition because the threat lacked immediacy and Halfacre did not testify he feared for his safety. We need not definitively resolve these contentions. [13] Even if the trial court should have excluded the letter, we find no reasonable possibility the error affected the verdict. ( People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 446-148, 250 Cal.Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135.) Although some of the language in the letter is menacing, it also reflects defendant's concern for his daughter's and granddaughter's well-being, a point stressed by the defense in mitigation. Moreover, the nature and circumstances of the threats would not necessarily provoke serious concern, especially considering defendant was incarcerated and would at the least have to make outside arrangements to effect them. Halfacre waited four months before giving the letter to his probation officer, during which time apparently nothing had happened. More importantly, the letter paled compared to other aggravating evidence, which the prosecutor focused on in closing argument. In particular, the guilt phase testimony revealed defendant as a calculating and callous individual, willing to kill defenseless victims, including his friend and partner Huffstuttler, in cold blood to protect his drug enterprise. In addition, the assault with great bodily injury against Matthew Spencer and attempted manslaughter against Kenneth Ross confirmed defendant's pattern of resorting to violence in dealing with problems. Given this history, it is unlikely the jury accorded the letter much, if any, weight fixing the penalty at death.