Opinion ID: 2429378
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Count IThe Contract Claim

Text: The plaintiff knew that Shakey's was looking for a reliable source of mozzarella cheese. In 1977 he had a discussion with Gene Bass, the defendant's general sales manager, and they agreed that, if the plaintiff could put a program together for the sale of defendant's cheese to Shakey's, defendant would pay him a commission or brokerage fee of 2¢ per pound. The plaintiff made his facilities available for and assisted in experiments in the search for a suitable cheese blend, and sought to promote the defendant's product in the Shakey's organization. He arranged a meeting on April 24, 1980 between Jerry Snyder, who was Shakey's newly-hired purchasing agent, and several representatives of the defendant including its vice president of consumer products. After the meeting Snyder entered into hard bargaining with defendant. The plaintiff did not participate in subsequent discussions. On May 10, 1980 Shakey's and defendant reached an agreement, with a price lower than the price quoted in April and an oral agreement that Shakey's would receive a rebate of 2¢ per pound on cheese sold to it or its franchisees. Bass's testimony that he rejected the plaintiff's proposed commission or brokerage arrangement and Snyder's statement that plaintiff was not responsible for his coming to Springfield in April of 1980 make no difference at this stage of the case. There was evidence which the jury apparently believed in support of the plaintiff's contract claim. The defendant recognizes this but challenges the contract claim on a number of grounds. We reject the argument that the terms of the alleged oral contract, calling for a commission if plaintiff brought Shakey's and defendant together are too vague, indefinite and uncertain to give rise to an enforceable obligation. The phrase brought together, is a clear and concise description of the kind of services brokers and sales agents customarily render to their clients. Sometimes success comes from comparatively slight effort; sometimes many hours are spent without fruition. The plaintiff testified that he asked for a written brokerage contract and that Bass told him that the defendant operated on the basis of mutual trust rather than through written contracts. There is ample evidence that the plaintiff worked with the defendant in developing cheese and made contact with Shakey's representatives. The jury could find that these efforts culminated in a meeting of representatives of both parties and that an agreement came about as a direct result. It is next argued that the oral contract was one not to be performed within one year from the making thereof, and so was unenforceable by reason of the statute of frauds, § 432.010, RSMo 1986. The plaintiff suggests that, for some reason not fully explained in the record, Shakey's could not do business with defendant on behalf of its franchisees until 1979, and so an oral agreement made in 1977 could not be performed within one year. The argument is misdirected. As the defendant later points out, the plaintiff's testimony established an offer for a unilateral contract. That the offer was still open on April 24, 1980 is shown by the defendant's presence at the meeting held on that date. There was no contract with plaintiff until Shakey's actually consummated a purchase pursuant to the agreement of May 10, 1980. The commission contract, furthermore, was one which could be fully performed within one year following the initial sale. There is no assurance that there would be any repeat orders. Our cases hold, consistently, that a contract is not unenforceable under the statute of frauds if it could possibly be performed in compliance with its terms within one year, even though the actual performance is expected to continue over a much longer period. Thus an oral contract to work for a person for two years would violate the statute, but a parol undertaking to hire a man 30 years old for the rest of his life would not. Cf. Biest v. Ver Steeg Shoe Co., 97 Mo.App. 137, 70 S.W. 1081, 1085 (1902). See also Koman v. Morrissey, 517 S.W.2d 929, 935 (Mo.1974); Kansas City Stock Yards Co. v. A. Reich & Sons, Inc., 250 S.W.2d 692, 699 (Mo. 1952); Want v. Century Supply Co., 508 S.W.2d 515, 516 (Mo.App.1974). The defendant cites Zupan v. Blumberg, 2 N.Y.2d 547, 161 N.Y.S.2d 428, 141 N.E.2d 819 (1957). The case seems to be on all fours, but it simply shows that New York takes a view of the statute of frauds different from the one consistently adhered to by the Missouri courts. The defendant complains of the admission of testimony of the plaintiff's brother, Jack Crabb, over objection as follows: Q. [By Mr. Lowther] All right. From what Gene Bass told you was there any doubt that Gene Bass was going to see that Eddie got his two cents if he got Mid-Am and Shakey together? MR. JOYNER: We object, the same objection. THE COURT: Overruled. MR. JOYNER: It invades the province of the trier of fact in this case. Calls for a conclusion he is not authorized to make. THE COURT: Overruled. Go ahead, sir. A. There was never any question in my mind. I would not have got involved if there had been. The objection is perhaps well taken, but we perceive no prejudicial error. There is ample testimony in support of the agreement the plaintiff relies on, and so the answer was cumulative. The evidence of course was disputed, but any suggestion that this single question and answer tipped the scales of credibility represents the height of speculation. The law does not guarantee a perfect trial. The verdict director for Count I reads as follows: INSTRUCTION NUMBER 7 Your verdict must be for plaintiff if you believe: First, defendant agreed to pay plaintiff a commission of two cents (2¢) for each pound of cheese that defendant sold to Shakey's Inc., Shakey's cheese distributors and Shakey's franchisees, and Second, defendant agreed that if plaintiff brought defendant and Shakey's together, and if, as a result thereof, defendant agreed to sell to Shakey's and Shakey's agreed to buy from defendant, then the two cent (2¢) per pound commission would be payable to plaintiff for so long as defendant sold cheese to Shakey's, and Third, the agreement was made on behalf of defendant by Gene Bass acting within his apparent authority, and Fourth, plaintiff rendered full performance to defendant, and Fifth, defendant has failed to pay any of the said commissions, and Sixth, plaintiff was thereby damaged. Acts were within the apparent authority as that term is used in this instruction if: 1. The defendant knowingly permitted Gene Bass to act as General Sales manager, and 2. Plaintiff knew that the defendant knowingly permitted Gene Bass to so act, and 3. The duties of a General Sales Manager in defendant's industry include entering into broker contracts, and 4. Plaintiff, acting reasonably and in good faith, actually believed Gene Bass had the authority to so act, and 5. Plaintiff relied on the authority of Gene Bass, and 6. Plaintiff will be damaged if said acts of Gene Bass are not binding on the defendant. The defendant suggests numerous faults in this instruction. It is first asserted that the phrase, brought the defendant together, as found in the second paragraph of the instruction, is no more permissible in an instruction than in a contract, and that words such as plaintiff produced a purchaser should have been used. We have rejected the argument as it applies to contract terms. Any remaining uncertainty is effectively clarified by the conjunctive submission in the balance of the paragraph, in which the jury is obliged to find that as a result thereof, defendant agreed to sell to Shakey's and Shakey's agreed to buy from defendant. Paragraph second as a whole is quite clear and legally correct in defining the plaintiff's burden. It is suggested that such phrases in the second paragraph as agreed to sell to Shakey's and sold cheese to Shakey's, are faulty, because the plaintiff is claiming damages for all sales to Shakey's franchisees, as well as to Shakey's, Inc. The first paragraph refers to cheese ... sold to Shakey's, Inc., Shakey's cheese distributors and Shakey's franchisees. Perhaps the plaintiff, in the exercise of care and caution, should have repeated that phrase in the second paragraph, [1] but the jury could reasonably and properly read the word Shakey's in the second paragraph as a collective term comprehending the franchisor and its franchisees. The defendant complains about the phrase, full performance in the fourth paragraph of the verdict director, suggesting that it is impermissibly vague and indefinite so as to give the jury the oft-asserted roving commission. It suggests instead, now but not at trial, such language as did produce a purchaser (MAI 29.01), or sold the property as a direct result of plaintiff's efforts (MAI 29.02, 29.03). The instruction is not erroneous for the reason assigned. Instructions must be read as a whole. The second paragraph describes the performance required of the plaintiff. MAI 16.04 appropriately equates substantial performance and performance. Beck v. Modern American Life Insurance Co., 589 S.W.2d 98, 103 (Mo.App.1979). Full performance is no less clear, and can be perfectly understood as referring back to the second paragraph. After complaining that parts of the verdict director were too indefinite and uncertain, the defendant next complains that the definition of apparent authority in the verdict director is so prolix and verbose as to violate the norms for not-in-MAI instructions (Rule 70.02(e)), and that it is not an accurate statement of Missouri law. The definition is supported by respectable authority, [2] and is not shown to be inaccurate or misleading. In the absence of an MAI definition, or a specific request by the plaintiff for another definition, we are unwilling to hold that the instruction is erroneous in any respect. The defendant absolutely fails to suggest how the jury could have been confused or misled by the definition. The defendant, turning from the specifics, next suggests that Instruction 7 should not have been given at all, asserting that a not in MAI instruction was inappropriate under Rule 70.02(b) because MAI 26.01, Breach of Unilateral Contract is sufficient to submit the case. We could reject this point without further discussion inasmuch as no objection was made at trial or in the motion for new trial. We conclude, however, that there was no error. The transaction is somewhat more complicated than one involving a simple unilateral contract and does not fit easily into the 26.01 mold. The instruction is similar to one approved in Beck v. Modern American Life Insurance Co., supra . MAI cannot include all possible fact situations. Plaintiffs should be allowed some discretion in preparing verdict directors, for which the book can provide no more than a skeleton, so long as the instructions submitted are legally correct. We will not reverse for instructional error unless prejudice is demonstrated. Hudson v. Carr, 668 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. banc 1984). We again remind counsel that one who considers that a proposed instruction may confuse the jury or affect his presentation adversely has the opportunity to suggest modification or to submit alternatives at the instruction conference. Although objection at that time is not necessary to preserve error (Rule 70.03), its absence may be considered in assessing prejudicial effect. Cornell v. Texaco, Inc., 712 S.W.2d 680, 682 (Mo. banc 1986). [3] We conclude that Count I gave rise to a factual dispute which was properly submitted to the jury. No error is shown and judgment for $111,010.64 was properly entered on the verdict on that count.