Opinion ID: 3065256
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Standard of Proof in Finding Sentencing Facts

Text: Berger next argues that, in circumstances such as these, due process requires the district court to find the loss amount by clear and convincing evidence, rather than by a preponderance of the evidence.
Maintaining that preponderance of the evidence is the proper standard, the government first argues that Berger challenged only the methodology of the district court’s determination, which is a purely legal dispute. See, e.g., United States v. Hardy, 289 F.3d 608, 613 (9th Cir. 2002). The government asserts that where there is no factual dispute, but only a legal dispute, preponderance of the evidence is the appropriate standard of proof for the district court to use in determining facts relevant to sentencing. In support, the government cites United States v. Romero-Rendon, 198 F.3d 745, 748 (9th Cir. 1999),13 withdrawn by 220 F.3d 1159, 1165 (9th Cir. 2000)). This argument fails for two reasons. First, contrary to the government’s characterization, Romero-Rendon declined to address the appropriate standard of proof; instead, the court held that the unchallenged pre-sentence report constituted clear and convincing evidence of the critical predicate fact. See id. at 1165. Here, however, Berger vigorously challenged the loss calculations before the district court. Second, although the parties disputed the validity of the district court’s loss calculation, making such a calculation 13 The government cites only a withdrawn version of Romero-Rendon, 198 F.3d at 748, withdrawn by 220 F.3d 1159. The government maintains that Romero-Rendon states that preponderance of the evidence is an adequate standard where the defendant did not challenge the accuracy of the sentencing report. The superceding version of our decision in that case, however, did not so hold. UNITED STATES v. BERGER 15635 necessarily involved the district court’s determination of how much loss was suffered, an issue we have held to be one of fact. See, e.g., United States v. Garro, 517 F.3d 1163, 1167 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Lawrence, 189 F.3d 838, 844 (9th Cir. 1999)) (holding that “[a] calculation of the amount of loss is a factual finding”). Thus, by challenging the loss amount, Berger raised both a factual and legal dispute. We proceed to consider what standard of proof the district court should have employed in resolving the factual dispute. We review the issue de novo because it, like the question regarding calculation method, is a question of law. B. Standard of Proof for Finding Sentence-Enhancing