Opinion ID: 1735417
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Trial Court's Voir Dire of Prospective Jurors.

Text: ś 46. In his first issue, Walker alleges that the trial court erred in refusing to grant a recess during voir dire to allow the defense to begin its questioning on the following day. As a result, Walker asserts that he was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel, due process and a fair trial. Walker alleges that the full day of voir dire, starting at 8:30 a.m. and ending around 6:00 p.m., warranted such continuance. Walker claims that due to the trial court's refusal to allow a recess, he was denied a reasonable opportunity to inquire into the prejudices, preconceptions and ideas the venire had about the death penalty, especially in this case, where Walker claims Richardson's murder was well publicized and that the victim was well-liked and well-known among the community and was a quasi-celebrity in the Tupelo area. According to Walker, the denial of the continuance/recess prevented Walker from conducting voir dire adequately enough to secure a fair and impartial jury. ś 47. In his second issue, Walker claims the trial court failed to explore the issue of whether or not jurors would favor imposing the death penalty. Walker also claims the trial court refused to allow the defense to voir dire the prospective jurors on that issue. According to Walker, these actions, along with a denial of a recess, violated his right to adequately determine the prejudices and biases of potential jurors regarding the punishment of death. Walker states: The court refused to permit [Walker] to adequately voir dire by virtue of [the] prosecutor's sustained objections and prodding to `move on.' ś 48. As Issues I and II are interrelated, they shall be addressed in concert. ś 49. The State argues that Walker failed to object to the these issues and, therefore, is procedurally barred. Failure to raise an issue at trial bars consideration on an appellate level. See Smith v. State, 729 So.2d 1191, 1201 (Miss.1998) (A trial judge will not be found in error on a matter not presented to him for decision.); Williams v. State, 684 So.2d 1179, 1203 (Miss.1996) (contemporaneous objection rule is applicable in death penalty cases); Foster v. State, 639 So.2d 1263, 1270 (Miss.1994) (If no contemporaneous objection is made, the error, if any, is waived. This rule's applicability is not diminished in a capital case.); but see Grubb, 584 So.2d at 789 (plain error will allow an appellate court to address an issue not raised at trial if the record shows that error did occur and the substantive rights of the accused were violated). ś 50. Walker failed to make a timely objection regarding the recess and the possible prejudice or biases during the voir dire process; further, Walker failed to object at all to these issues during the trial or sentencing phase. Walker's counsel, Wayne Housley, [12] claims that his failure to object was because [he] felt that he must not seem overly aggressive toward the bench because strategy was such that credibility of counsel addressing voir dire would also take the lion's share of the sentencing phase. However, we find that Walker is procedurally barred from raising these issues for the first time on appeal. ś 51. Notwithstanding the procedural bar for failing to make a contemporaneous objection, these issues are without merit as Walker has offered no proof that his substantive rights were violated. ś 52. Walker has presented no evidence from the record to show that he did not have a fair and impartial jury. In fact, Walker does not even claim the jury possessed such characteristics as to prejudice his right to a fair trial. Importantly, following Walker's voir dire, his attorney announced on the record, Your Honor, the defense is satisfied for cause. ś 53. Trial courts enjoy broad discretion in passing upon the extent and propriety of questions posed to prospective jurors. Davis v. State, 684 So.2d 643, 651-52 (Miss.1996). The court must conduct its own voir dire on the issue of death qualifications to determine whether the juror could follow the law and return a verdict of guilty even though such a verdict could result in the imposition of death. Crawford v. State, 716 So.2d 1028, 1042 (Miss.1998). The court must nevertheless exercise caution in its voir dire, so as not to suggest that there is only one proper answer to the death qualification questions. Bell v. State, 725 So.2d 836, 844-45 (Miss.1998). ś 54. On June 2, 2003, the venire panels (both regular and special) met at 8:30 a.m. The court qualified the jury prior to lunch, questioning the venire about age, voting registration, possible felony convictions, bootlegging, gambling, illnesses, lack of child care, job-related excuses, past jury duty, etc. During the court's initial qualification, it briefly touched on the subject matter of jurors who were not able to render a verdict on another human being, i.e., jurors who, because of religious or moral reasons, cannot reach a verdict after hearing all of the evidence and being instructed on the law. Although the court was not yet conducting voir dire on the death penalty issue, one juror did inform the court that she could not impose the death penalty. In light of that juror's statement that she could not impose the death penalty, an opportunity for other like-minded jurors to voice their concerns arose, but no other juror spoke up. ś 55. The court continued questioning until 11:50 a.m. and then took a ten minute recess until noon. Both panels were seated according to the clerk's direction, and at approximately 12:30 p.m., the court recessed for lunch, with instructions that the jurors were to return at 2:00 p.m. The court began voir dire of both panels around 2:00 p.m. During the court's voir dire, personal convictions and legal duties regarding the death penalty were discussed in detail, with the court fully exploring the issue. The following dialogue ensued during voir dire: BY THE COURT: The Court is going to use some terms in questioning you further that by their nature require that you understand their meaning as intended and understood by the Court. Therefore, let me explain their meaning as the Court wants you to consider them in responding to the questions of the Court directed to you. Death penalty means that as a punishment imposed by statute as a consequence of the conviction of the commission of an offense the person convicted is put to death in the manner and at the time prescribed by law. A conscientious scruple is an objection or repugnance growing out of the fact that a person believes that the thing demanded of him or her to be morally wrong, his or her conscience being the sole guide to his or her decision, as opposed to a decision dictated by reason or judgment. It is necessary whether the Court know whether or not, as a matter of law, you have any conscientious scruples against the imposition of the death penalty. The Court must know whether or not you so strongly favor the death penalty that you would automatically vote to impose it in the event an accused was found guilty of capital murder. Also, the Court must know whether or not your feelings toward the death penalty would prevent you from serving as a completely fair and impartial juror as to the guilt or innocence of the accused.    Do either of you have any religious convictions or conscientious scruples that would prevent you from imposing the death penalty when the law authorizes it and the facts and evidence warrants it? I ask you that question on the special venire. The court asked if any prospective jurors had religious convictions or conscientious scruples that would prevent them from imposing the death penalty on a human being. Thereafter, seventeen members of the venire came forward to state that they could not impose the death penalty. The court then individually asked these jurors whether they would be able to impose the death penalty under any circumstances; all seventeen said that they could not. ś 56. The court not only inquired as to which jurors opposed to the death penalty, but also asked if anyone on the panels so strongly favored the death penalty that in the event Walker was found guilty of capital murder, that juror would automatically vote to impose death regardless of the facts or evidence. The court stated: BY THE COURT: Do any of you so strongly favor the death penalty that, in the event the defendant is found guilty of capital murder, that you would automatically vote for the death penalty regardless of the evidence you might hear or receive in reference to whether or not the death penalty should be imposed? I ask that question to the persons on the special venire. No one from the special venire responded in the affirmative. The Court then asked the same question of the regular panel. Not one juror from the regular panel responded in the affirmative. ś 57. Following these questions to both panels, the court asked whether any juror had such feelings about the death penalty that they would be prevented from making a fair and impartial decision on the question of guilt or innocence of Walker. BY THE COURT: Do any of you have such feelings about the death penalty that you would be prevented from making a fair and impartial decision on the question of the guilt or innocence of the defendant? I ask that question to the special venire. The court then asked the same question to the regular panel. This was another opportunity for any panel member to express reservation. An additional person on the regular panel responded to the court's question stating that she opposed death under any circumstances. ś 58. The court again asked the question regarding whether any juror had any feelings that would prevent them from being fair and impartial on the question of Walker's guilt or innocence. BY THE COURT: Since we have had a response, I will ask this question again, now that you have had some time to think about it. Do any of you have such feelings about the death penalty that you would be prevented from making a fair and impartial decision on the question of the guilt or innocence of the defendant? Other than Mr. McGraw. Anyone else? No one responded in the affirmative to the court's question. The court concluded its voir dire at 3:44 p.m. ś 59. Walker has presented no evidence that any potential juror withheld death penalty favorable preferences. ś 60. The trial court properly and thoroughly questioned the venire on the dual issues of opposition to and preference towards the death penalty. Consequently, this issue is without merit. ś 61. Upon concluding its voir dire, the court gave the venire a fifteen minute recess. At approximately 4:00 p.m., the State began its voir dire, which concluded around 5:00 p.m. Following the conclusion of the State's voir dire, Walker moved for a recess until the next morning, citing the late hour and the need to do a very thorough voir dire. The court overruled Walker's motion for a recess. Although Walker's counsel made no formal objection, the following dialogue ensued: BY MR. HOUSLEY: Your Honor, as the Court is well aware of this, this is a death penalty case. A little disruption, a little inconvenience to the panel is, although unfortunate, it is necessary to ensure that a fair trial is received, Your Honor. BY MR. GEDDIE: Your Honor,â BY THE COURT: I have heard enough. The motion to recess and reconvene in the morning for the defendant's voir dire is overruled. You may proceed. ś 62. Walker began his voir dire at approximately 5:00 p.m. A review of the record does not reveal exactly what time Walker concluded his voir dire; however, following Walker's voir dire, the court spoke to the jury about being sequestering. The jury was released at 6:05 p.m. until the following morning. Walker's voir dire lasted less than one hour. Following his voir dire, Walker did not state that he had additional questions for the jury. Walker did not mention the allegedly late hour at that point and most importantly did not renew his motion to recess for the day. Walker conducted his voir dire, and then announced on the record, Your Honor, the defense is satisfied for cause. (Emphasis added). ś 63. Voir dire `is conducted under the supervision of the court, and a great deal must, of necessity, be left to its sound discretion.' Ballenger v. State, 667 So.2d 1242, 1250 (Miss.1995) (quoting Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 2230, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992)) (citations omitted). See also Simmons v. State, 805 So.2d 452, 498 (Miss.2001) (Ordinarily, trial judges have broad discretion in determining how long trials last on any given day.); Dye v. State, 498 So.2d 343, 344 (Miss.1986) (stating that trial judges are ordinarily given broad discretion in deciding when to begin or stop trials on any given day). Therefore, since there is no bright line rule as to when a trial judge should grant a continuance or recess, the peculiar facts of each case are the proper focal point of the analysis. Hooker v. State, 716 So.2d 1104, 1113 (Miss.1998). This Court will not reverse the decision of the trial court on a failure to grant a continuance or recess where the defendant fails to show he was prejudiced by the trial court's denial of his request. Forbes v. State, 437 So.2d 59, 61 (Miss.1983) (citing Howell v. State, 246 So.2d 95, 96 (Miss.1971)). ś 64. Walker has not provided any proof to show prejudice resulting from the trial court's initial denial of his request for a recess until the next morning. Walker conducted less than one hour of voir dire, and at such conclusion, did not renew his request for a recess, but instead announced that he was satisfied with the jury. There can be no error in the court's decision not to recess to continue questioning the next day, when no request was made. We further find that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in determining that voir dire would continue past 5:00 p.m. ś 65. In the case sub judice, neither party disputes that voir dire was a lengthy process. However, the jury was given ample time for lunch and breaks. Therefore, we hold that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing, at 5:00 p.m., to allow an evening recess until the next morning. The trial judge never stated that Walker was required to conclude his voir dire only on that day; Walker was only required to begin voir dire that day. The fact remains that Walker's counsel concluded his voir dire in less than one hour and did not indicate that he was finishing solely because it was past 5:00 p.m. At the conclusion of his voir dire, Walker's counsel did not indicate that he had any more proposed questions for the jurors such that a renewed motion for a recess should be granted. Walker's counsel simply stated that he was satisfied with the jury for cause. ś 66. Walker claims that he was denied the opportunity to adequately question the jurors during voir dire regarding death qualification because the State made constant objections, which were sustained by the court. The following dialogue ensued during Walker's voir dire: BY MR. HOUSLEY: Youâ whichever 12 of you are chosen will be embarking on something I feel like you will never forget. You will be challenged to determine whether he will be given life or death. You will literally haveâ BY MR. GEDDIE: Your Honor,â Q. (Continuing by Mr. Housley):â Mr. Walker'sâ BY MR. GEDDIE: Your Honor,â Q. (Continuing by Mr. Housley):â life in your hands. BY MR. GEDDIE: Objection. BY THE COURT: Sustained. Q. (Continuing by Mr. Housley): I hesitate to even discuss the sentencing phase, because he sits there presumed innocent. But because of the very natureâ BY MR. GEDDIE: Objection, Your Honor. BY THE COURT: Mr. Housley, are you leading up to additional questions? BY MR. HOUSLEY: Yes, Your Honor. BY THE COURT: If you would, getâ move on to those questions. ś 67. The trial court was correct in sustaining the State's objections as Walker's counsel was not asking proper voir dire questions, but rather making speeches. ś 68. Walker's counsel's only other attempt to qualify the jury came in yet another speech in which he attempted to instruct the jury with a mercy charge during the middle of voir dire. The following ensued: BY MR. HOUSLEY: Do each of you understand that you are neverâ that means neverâ required to return a death penalty? Evenâ even if the State proves capital murder and that there are sufficient aggravators, it is never required that any of you render a death penalty. Do you understand that? In other words, each and every one of you can hold on to your beliefs and your feelings and render yourâ BY MR. GEDDIE: Your Honor,â Q. (Continuing by Mr. Housley):â own opinion. BY MR. GEDDIE: Objection. He is instructing the jury on the law. I'm not sure of the validity of the law he is instructing on, but it's the Court's duty to instruct the jury. It's the jury's duty to follow the law as the Court gives it to them, not as counsel says. BY THE COURT: The objection is sustained. Counsel and ladies and gentlemen of the jury, at the appropriate time the Court will instruct you fully and completely on the law as it applies in this particular case. ś 69. [C]ounsel's statement concerning mercy was doubly incorrect, violating both the rule prohibiting attorneys from instructing the jury on the law, as well as the rule denying such instructions to the jury in the first place. See Goodin v. State, 787 So.2d 639, 645-48, 657-58 (Miss.2001) (stating that counsel should not instruct the jury as to what the law is during voir dire, and mercy instructions could induce a jury to base its decision on emotion, whim and caprice). ś 70. Additionally, we find that the trial court not only fully explored the issue of jurors predisposed in favor of or in opposition to the death penalty, but it also did not improperly hinder Walker's efforts to fully explore same. The court sustained three objections during Walker's voir dire. Two of the objections were validly based on the fact that Walker was not questioning the jury, but rather making speeches. The third objection was validly based on the fact that Walker was not only instructing the juryâ a duty reserved to the courtâ but also that such an instruction was a mercy instructionâ a charge not even the trial court can give. As such, despite the procedural bars on the two claims, Walker's first and second issues must fail otherwise. ś 71. Walker's argument that the court's actions caused trial counsel to be ineffective during voir dire must fail as Walker has shown no merit in the underlying issues presented. As such, there can be no prejudice, and thus, no ineffectiveness of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064-65, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693-95 (1984) (requiring appellant to prove: (1) that his counsel's performance was deficient; and (2) that this alleged deficiency prejudiced his defense); Stringer v. State, 454 So.2d 468, 476-77 (Miss.1984) (where this Court adopted the standard set forth in Strickland ). We find that voir dire was more than sufficient, and Walker's counsel as much as conceded this fact following his questioning. Consequently, Walker's claim that the trial court's actions forced counsel to conduct an ineffective voir dire must necessarily be rejected. [13]