Opinion ID: 1843606
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Remedy Plan

Text: The State parties contend that the trial judge, in fashioning the Remedy Plan, clearly and grossly usurped subject-matter jurisdiction over the establishment, administration and funding of the public school system of the State of Alabama ..., violat[ing], thereby, the cardinal principles of separation of powers. Brief and Argument of Appellants, at 27. They do not, however, contend that a different Remedy Plan is called for. They do not apprise us of what, if any remedy, the trial court would be authorized to order. In essence, if not in fact, they insist that the court possessed no authority to remedy the constitutional violation declared in this case. More specifically, they contend that the judiciary of this state cannot go further than did the Kentucky Supreme Court in Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky.1989), which stated: We have declared the system of common schools to be unconstitutional. It is now up to the General assembly to re-create ... a system of common schools within this state which will be in compliance with the Constitution. Id. at 214 (emphasis added). Because the State parties challenge the Remedy Plan as void in toto, the resolution of this issues turns on whether the judiciary had the power to order a remedy in this case. Parties on both sides of this disputein addition to the trial courthave relied on Rose, which declared unconstitutional the entire statutory scheme upon which Kentucky's public education system was based. Id. That case, however, does not hold that a court has no power to order a remedy. On the contrary, the Kentucky court deferred the formulation of a remedy to the Kentucky legislature upon the express assumption that it would promptly and fully comply with the constitutional mandate, stating: We have no doubt they will proceed with their duty. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 214 (emphasis added). Other courts have deferred to their legislatures, expressing in language similar to that used in Rose confidence that their legislatures would promptly act to remedy constitutional infirmities in their public educational systems. See, e.g., Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. State, 90 Wash.2d 476, 585 P.2d 71, 104 (1978) (We have great faith in the Legislature and its ability to define `basic education' and a basic program of education....); Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal.3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal.Rptr. 345 (1976) (We are confident that the Legislature, aided by what we have said today ..., will be able to devise a public school financing system which achieves constitutional conformity....), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907, 97 S.Ct. 2951, 53 L.Ed.2d 1079 (1977). None of the cases we have found in our research, however, has held that the judiciary lacks the power to order a specific remedy if the legislature ultimately fails adequately to address the constitutional deficiency. Particularly instructive in this regard are Washakie County School Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824, 101 S.Ct. 86, 66 L.Ed.2d 28 (1980), and Campbell County School Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238 (Wyo.1995). Herschler involved an action commenced by, among others, county school districts, seeking a judgment declaring Wyoming's statutory school financing scheme unconstitutional. 606 P.2d at 314. The trial court dismissed the complaint and the plaintiffs appealed. Id. The Wyoming Supreme Court reversed the judgment. In doing so, it examined `the entire system from organization of school districts through tax bases and levies and distribution of foundation funds,' Campbell County School Dist., 907 P.2d at 1246, and held the Wyoming system of school financing unconstitutional in that it fail[ed] to afford equal protection in violation of the Wyoming Constitution. Herschler, 606 P.2d at 315. It also remanded the action to the trial court with directions to retain jurisdiction until a constitutional body of legislation [was] enacted, and to tak[e] such action as... necessary to assure conformity. Id. at 337. (Emphasis added.) In 1983, the Wyoming legislature responded to Herschler by creating a transitional education financing system. Campbell County School Dist., 907 P.2d at 1247. This temporary measure was intended to be succeeded by a new system designed to more accurately measure costs of education. Id. Unfortunately, however, [t]he legislature never studied, enacted, or implemented a new ... system and the 1983 interim system became permanent. Id. Consequently, in 1992, a number of school districts, including one that was a plaintiff in Herschler, filed another complaint seeking a judgment declaring certain aspects of the interim funding system unconstitutional. 907 P.2d at 1244. The trial court entered a judgment declaring some components of the system constitutional and invalidating others. Id. The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed that portion of the judgment invalidating aspects of the system, but reversed that portion of the judgment upholding some aspects. Once again, the supreme court held Wyoming's public school finance system [to be] unconstitutional. Id. The court stated: In [ Herschler ], this court, having examined the `entire system,' emphasized [that] the legislature's goal `is to arrive at financial parity.' ... We had confidence the legislature would meet the challenge of fulfilling its constitutional duties to `provide for the establishment and maintenance of a complete and uniform system of public instruction....' 907 P.2d at 1246 (emphasis added). It concluded that since Herschler the legislature not only had failed to create a funding system that would eliminate the inequities of the system, but, through a lack of participat[ion] in the substantive aspects of the educational system, had in fact impeded the efforts made by local educators and communities. Id. at 1255. Consequently, the court ordered the legislature to achieve constitutional compliance and to achieve it not later than July 1, 1997. Id. at 1280. Once again, the court remanded the cause to the trial court with directions to retain jurisdiction until a constitutional body of legislation [was] enacted and in effect and to tak[e] such action as [should] be necessary to assure conformity with the constitution. Id. It has been suggested that the judiciary has the power to fashion specific remedies if action by the other branches of government is ineffective, where deference is made to the legislature with a caveat. McDuffy v. Secretary of the Exec. Office of Educ., 415 Mass. 545, 615 N.E.2d 516 (1993), for example, stated: We have concluded the current state of affairs falls short of the constitutional mandate. We shall presume at this time that the Commonwealth will fulfil its responsibility with respect to defining the specifics and the appropriate means to provide the constitutionally-required education. 415 Mass. at 619 n.92, 615 N.E.2d at 554 n.92 (emphasis added). Moreover, despite the American judiciary's understandable preference for restraint in this complex area of litigation, it routinely doesin addressing the constitutionality of state statutory schemesformulate guidelines of varying specificity within which it essentially requires the legislature to operate. Id. As stated in Abbott v. Burke, 119 N.J. 287, 388, 575 A.2d 359, 410 (1990): Judicial power to require a thorough and efficient education is not limited to a money remedy. Cf. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Mount Laurel Township ( Mount Laurel II ), 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983) (power to require municipalities to take affirmative action to satisfy their affordable housing obligations). For these reasons, we reject the proposition that the separation of powers principle, which applies in every jurisdiction that has considered the constitutionality of its public education system, prohibits the judiciary of this State from fashioning a remedy for constitutional violations of the nature involved in this case. For the following reasons, however, we have considered only the trial court's power to devise a remedy plan in general and not this Remedy Plan in particular. First, as we have already stated, the State parties have not challenged the Remedy Plan provision by provision, preferring, instead, to challenge the trial court's power to devise any remedy. This broad-brush approach has not afforded their opponentsor the trial courtthe opportunity to address objections to specific provisions. The best approach, in litigation as complex and sensitive as this, is, as suggested by Harper in the context discussed in Part III.C., infra, for the [State parties] to identify any particular section with which they disagree, for all parties to present evidence on that section, for the trial court to rule, and for [this Court to review that ruling pursuant to the proper procedural device]. Brief of Harper, ACE, ADAP, and John Doe Appellees, at 17-18 [hereinafter Harper Brief ] (emphasis added). [3] We reiterate that this case has not come to us postured in this manner. Second, and even more fundamentally, it is the legislature that bears the primary responsibility for devising a constitutionally valid public school system. McDuffy v. Secretary of the Exec. Office of Educ., 415 Mass. 545, 619 n.92, 615 N.E.2d 516, 554 n.92 (1993) (quoting Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 399 (Tex.1989)) (emphasis added). Although the judiciary is not without the power to enforce judgments designed to remedy constitutional defects in the educational system, the judiciary should exercise this power only in the event the legislature fails or refuses to take appropriate action. Moreover, the judiciary should not presume at the outset of litigation of this nature that legislative and executive officials will be derelict in their duties. Indeed, it must assume the contrary. The best approach for the judiciary, having invalidated the present public education system, would be to stay further action in the casebut retaining jurisdictionfor a reasonable time, thus affording the legislative and executive officials the first opportunity to devise a constitutional public education system. In other words, the judiciary should upon its first encounter with this species of litigationforgo specific remedial action until the coordinate branches of government have had a reasonable opportunity to discharge their constitutional responsibilities consistent with its holding of liability. Ultimately, of course, the action, or inaction, of those branches in this subject area, or in any area, is ... subject to the scrutiny of the judiciary. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 214 (emphasis added). We reiterate that the power inherent in this judicial scrutiny also includes the power to fashion a remedy and to require compliance therewith. We hasten to add that we do not disapprove of the Remedy Plan challenged in this case, only of the timing of its attempted implementation. The implementation thereof was premature. Consequently, we vacate the October 6, 1995, judgment of the trial court to the extent that it concerns the implementation of the Remedy Plan. This cause is remanded with directions to stay the action  while retaining jurisdiction for one year from the date of this Court's certificate of judgment. If, at the end of that time, the coordinate branches of government have not formulated an educational system that complies with the Liability Phase, the trial court may enter an order implementing a remedy. This Court is prepared to consider any such remedy should it be called upon to do so under conditions consistent with those explained above. We hold, therefore, not that the trial court lacked the power to implement the Remedy Plan, but that it abused its discretion in attempting to do so before providing the coordinate branches of government the opportunity to act unilaterally. The question is not one of power, but of expedience. We are certain that officials of both coordinate branches of government will hasten to discharge their duties to fashion a remedy consistent with the judgment in the Liability Phase.