Opinion ID: 393167
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: relevance of internal union affairs proviso

Text: 38 Section 8(b)(1)(A) is different from Section 8(a)(1) in one essential respect. As we noted in our discussion of Allis-Chalmers, supra, Section 8(b) (1)(A) contains an internal union affairs proviso which states that a union does not commit an unfair labor practice when it prescribes its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership(.) 51 This proviso extends some protection to union conduct that would otherwise fall within the prohibition against restraint or coercion of employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights. We conclude, however, that it does not insulate the conduct at issue here. 52 39 In adopting the internal union affairs proviso Congress recognized that unions have an interest in preserving and strengthening their positions as collective bargaining agents. It further recognized that they cannot serve this interest unless they have some freedom to discipline members who violate rules and regulations governing membership. 53 However, union power cannot be absolute. The desire to minimize intrusion upon internal union affairs must be balanced against the need to protect employees who wish to assert their independence from the union, as well as against any other public policies embodied in the federal labor laws. 54 40 In Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423, 89 S.Ct. 1154, 22 L.Ed.2d 385 (1969), the Supreme Court set forth a test for determining whether union action is protected by the proviso that accommodates these competing concerns. The Court stated that Section 8(b)(1)(A) leaves a union free to enforce a properly adopted rule, provided that the rule (1) reflects a legitimate union interest, (2) impairs no policy Congress has imbedded in the labor laws, and (3) is reasonably enforced against union members who are free to leave the union and escape the rule. Id. at 430, 89 S.Ct. at 1158. 55 41 The union's conduct here does not pass this test. At the outset, there is a serious question whether the union's decision to prohibit the posting of PROD materials was made pursuant to a properly adopted rule. 56 Certainly there was no such rule in the union bylaws or constitution or in the collective bargaining agreement. Nor was Helton given any other form of prior notice. 57 But even assuming the union's action was pursuant to a valid rule, it fails to satisfy the three criteria set forth in Scofield. First, removal of Helton's PROD materials does not reflect a legitimate union interest. The union claimed that removal was necessary to prevent altercations and to limit undesirable criticism. But the NLRB has expressly held that the desire to prevent controversy or to suppress criticism of union leadership does not constitute a legitimate union interest. 58 See Internat'l Union of Operating Engineers Local 400, 225 NLRB 596 (1976); Carpenters Local Union No. 22, 195 NLRB 1 (1972). 59 In any event, the ALJ found that the union's fear that such literature could lead to altercations between parties was mere conjecture and without any evident(i)ary support. 60 42 Second, the union's conduct impairs policies imbedded in the labor laws. It restrained expression protected not only under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 61 but also under Title I of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA), the Bill of Rights for union members. 62 Section 101(a)(2) of that statute, 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) (1976), provides that (e)very member of any labor organization shall have the right to meet and assemble freely with other members; and to express any views, arguments or opinions(.) 63 Congress intended this free speech right to parallel the rights conferred under the First Amendment; it hoped to secure union democracy by establishing a right to express dissenting views without fear of discipline. The LMRDA was in part designed to protect the rights of union members to discuss freely and criticize the management of their unions and the conduct of their officers. Salzhandler v. Caputo, 316 F.2d 445, 448-449 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 996, 84 S.Ct. 344, 11 L.Ed.2d 275 (1963). 64 43 The importance of protecting the free speech rights of union members has been consistently recognized by courts asked to consider the scope of Section 101(a) (2) of the LMRDA. See, e. g., Grand Lodge of Internat'l Ass'n of Machinists v. King, 335 F.2d 340, 344 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 920, 85 S.Ct. 274, 13 L.Ed.2d 334 (1964). 65 Indeed, the right of free speech has been described as almost absolute. Turner v. Air Transport Lodge 1894 of Internat'l Ass'n of Machinists, 590 F.2d 409, 410 (2d Cir. 1978). 66 Thus it is clear that the union conduct at issue here, by interfering with Helton's efforts to challenge the Teamsters' leadership, deprived him of rights guaranteed by the LMRDA. If the union's conduct were endorsed, an important policy of the federal labor laws would be undermined. 67 44 As for the third prong of the Scofield test, it seems unlikely that Helton could have avoided the union's action by resigning his membership. Presumably, the union would have removed Helton's materials from the bulletin board even if he had not been a union member. Under the circumstances, it is difficult to view the union's activity simply as an effort to police its membership. 68 45