Opinion ID: 1288637
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Is Criminal Conviction Necessary?

Text: The petitioner contends she must first be convicted in a criminal trial before the forfeiture of § 2-46 can be invoked against her. We find nothing unusual about this contention. It is similar to those contentions and questions which might arise in any ordinary action. To say the decision of the district court with respect to this question is reviewable on a petition for prohibition would be to say that any crucial question decided by a district court, at any stage of a lawsuit, could be immediately reviewed in the supreme court on a petition for prohibition. Prohibition tests only jurisdiction. It will not issue where there is a plain, adequate and speedy remedy in the ordinary course of the law. Allen v. Keane, 74 Idaho 385, 262 P.2d 998, 999; State ex rel. Fulton v. District Court of Eighth Judicial District, In and For Cascade County, 139 Mont. 573, 366 P.2d 435, 436; State ex rel. Owen v. District Court of Sheridan County, Wyo., 393 P.2d 806. The right of appeal from final orders and judgments of a trial court is usually an adequate remedy, especially if there is no showing of harassment, or that undue hardship would result, or that no apparent cause of action has been asserted. Bowles v. Superior Court of City and County of San Francisco, 44 Cal.2d 574, 283 P.2d 704, 709; Gasper v. District Court of Seventh Judicial Dist., In and For Canyon County, 74 Idaho 388, 264 P.2d 679, 680; Sheffield v. Eagle Lion Films, 40 Wash.2d 361, 242 P.2d 1024, 1025. Of course a writ of prohibition is not a writ of right but is one of sound judicial discretion. It is issued or withheld according to the circumstances of each particular case. It is not issued in a doubtful case. State ex rel. State Tax Commission v. Chavez, 44 N.M. 260, 101 P.2d 389, 390; State ex rel. O'Brien v. Police Court of Seattle, 14 Wash.2d 340, 128 P.2d 332, 335-336, 141 A.L.R. 1257; State ex rel. Powell v. Ilsley, Wyo., 387 P.2d 676, 677. If Mrs. Sheehan, as petitioner in the case before us, had been able to show a lack of jurisdiction over the person or a lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or if she had been able to show extraordinary circumstances rendering the usual and ordinary processes of law inadequate, it is possible her application could be allowed. Having failed in these showings, however, she cannot expect prohibition to issue merely to test the district court's ruling on one of her motions  a motion to dismiss the first count of plaintiffs' amended complaint, in civil case No. 3927, on the ground that such count failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Petitioner seems to be fearful that if a civil court tries the issues asserted in plaintiffs' complaint, she will suffer a lack of due process and denial of certain constitutional rights, in particular the right not to be compelled to testify against herself. She overlooks the fact, however, that constitutional guarantees and immunities are just as binding on civil courts as they are on criminal courts. She can therefore expect the civil court which tries the issues involved in civil case No. 3927 to be zealous in the protection of all her rights, and to see that she and plaintiffs also are afforded due process of law. It is apparent from the papers before us that Mrs. Sheehan has already elected, in an attempted deposition, not to testify in this case for the reason that her testimony might tend to incriminate her. In view of this election, we think it would be improper for plaintiffs in the district court action to make any further attempt, in the presence of a jury, to call Mrs. Sheehan as a witness  unless she first opens the door herself and waives her immunity from testifying. We also think it would be improper for plaintiffs or their attorneys to make any comment to a jury, which would directly or indirectly convey knowledge of the defendant's election, under her constitutional immunity, not to testify. Any violation of these rights on the part of defendant, by plaintiffs or their attorneys, might indeed cause a mistrial. Of course, we are not unmindful that our rules of civil procedure give the right for a party in a civil action to call an adverse party for cross-examination. But constitutional provisions and guarantees necessarily supersede and override conflicting statutory provisions and rules, and in this instance the right of the defendant to be protected in the election she has already made supersedes the right of plaintiffs to call her as a witness.