Opinion ID: 500164
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The 1976 Inspection by Wells on Behalf of U.S.S.

Text: 42 The district court granted summary judgment to defendants on the parties' claims of negligent inspection by Wells under Sec. 324A of the Restatement of Torts 2d. We agree and affirm. Section 324A provides: 43 One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if 44 (a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, or 45 (b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third person, or 46 (c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person upon the undertaking. 47 In his deposition, Stouffer, then Paulding County Engineer, gave conflicting and often equivocal testimony with respect to his meeting with Wells on August 3, 1976. At some points, he insisted that Wells never explained the danger of potential collapse nor gave explicit instructions regarding performance of the recommended periodic measurements or the point at which corrective measures, such as closing down the bridge and replacing the backfill, needed to be taken. However, he also repeatedly asserted that he had absolutely no recall of the specifics of their conversation: 48 Q. Is it safe to say that you do recall Mr. Wells having come to Paulding County to examine the culvert and speaking to you after his examination? 49 A. I don't remember if he did. I don't remember what he said if he did. 50 Stouffer Deposition at 274. 51 In contrast, Wells testified by deposition that he told Stouffer of the possible consequences if the bridge continued to move, describing what is known in the industry as the tin can effect (the steel plates buckle until they reach the snapping point). Wells further testified that he even drew a sketch of the arch to graphically show Stouffer at what point the deformation should cause concern and when it would be dangerous and approaching collapse. To determine whether the structure was continuing to move, he recommended periodic measurements of the arch be taken in the areas of the flattening plates, the span, the peak, and the base. Finally, Wells advised Stouffer that, if the bridge continued to move, the backfill would have to be removed, the arch restored to its original shape, and new backfill placed and compacted. 52 It is undisputed that Wells was never contacted again by the county. A few days after his visit, Wells recorded the gist of his observations and his recommendation for periodic measurements in a letter to American Culvert, which letter was subsequently hand delivered to Stouffer. In the report of the architects employed to analyze the causes of the bridge collapse, it was specifically found that Wells did notify Stouffer of both the necessity for periodic measurements to determine whether the structure had stabilized as well as the eventual consequences of continued unchecked movement. Further, it is undisputed that, although the third measurement taken by the county in November of 1976 still showed continued, albeit decreased, movement of the structure, the county unilaterally determined that no further measurements were necessary. Indeed, no further attempt was ever made to monitor the structure's continued movement despite the fact that the road surface required numerous subsequent applications of additional asphalt. 53 Although the district court found no reliance on the part of the County and no duty arising from this inspection, Wells admitted during his deposition that he knew the county was relying on him for an assessment of the nature of the problem which the bridge had developed. We conclude that, while he did incur a limited duty to ascertain the general nature of the problem and notify the county of his findings, that duty was clearly discharged. 54 In Thomas v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 769 F.2d 367 (6th Cir.1985), we held that even where a party has undertaken to conduct a safety inspection, once he has warned those in control of the premises of dangerous conditions, he is under no duty to ensure that the conditions have been corrected. In Thomas, a TVA safety inspector had discovered that a contractor, Jones, was using unsafe cable guardrails. TVA pointed out this problem to Jones and instructed it to correct the situation. No further action was taken by TVA, the contractor did not follow TVA's instructions and, thereafter, the decedent fell through the cable guardrail. Plaintiffs in Thomas claimed that TVA was negligent in noticing the safety violation and warning the contractor about it, but doing nothing further to correct the violation. The court, through Judge Edwards, affirmed the grant of summary judgment to TVA, stating that under Sec. 324A, TVA's duty, if any, was simply to exercise reasonable care. The written and verbal instruction to cease using cable guardrails was a reasonable response to the hazard under these circumstances. Id. at 371. Although Judge Wellford, concurring, felt that the case was properly predicated on federal question rather than diversity jurisdiction, he nevertheless expressed agreement with Judge Edwards's rationale. 55 In the case at bar, Wells, although admittedly not trained in aspects of bridge inspection, correctly identified the nature of the problem and communicated his findings to the appropriate county authority. The Paulding County Engineer was a registered professional engineer and surveyor and, by law, was responsible for maintaining the county's roads and bridges. Wells was entitled to rely upon the County Engineer's qualifications, as well as his responsibility for the structure at issue, and was under no duty to anticipate the future lack of action by the county in response to the problem. As the Ohio Supreme Court observed in Swoboda v. Brown, 129 Ohio St. 512, 196 N.E. 374 (1935): 56 One may rightfully assume the observance of the law and the exercise of ordinary care by others, and action by him in accordance with such assumption in the absence of notice or knowledge to the contrary is not negligence. 57 Id. at 513. Accord Jones v. Wittenberg University, 534 F.2d 1203, 1210 (6th Cir.1976) (applying Ohio law). 58 We find no evidence that, by virtue of Wells's inspection, the defendants either increase[d] the risk of harm under Sec. 324A(a), undertook to perform a duty to correct the hazard which it pointed out to Paulding County under subsection (b), or that the harm was suffered because of the reliance of the injured parties or Paulding County upon any undertaking of the defendants via Wells's 1976 inspection under subsection (c). See Thomas, 769 F.2d at 371. Thus, the court below correctly held, as a matter of law, that defendants were not liable under Sec. 324A for Wells's acts or omissions allegedly arising from the 1976 inspection. 59 In conclusion, we hold that American Culvert and U.S.S. are not entitled to the shield of Sec. 2305.131 with respect to any of the claims asserted against them. However, summary judgment is granted to them as a matter of law as to all pending products liability claims as well as claims arising out of their employee's inspection of August 1976. The case is remanded for further proceedings with respect to the claims of negligence; in addition, the warranty claims must be reevaluated since the district court based its dismissal of those claims primarily upon the time limitations bar of Sec. 2305.131, which we have held inapplicable as to these defendants. Nothing in this opinion should be taken to preclude the subsequent grant of summary judgment to the defendants on these remaining claims, if warranted.