Opinion ID: 856283
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: thumb drive (issues 1−3)

Text: Before trial, Jose moved to suppress the contents of a thumb drive seized from the nightstand drawer in the bedroom he shared with Marchante. In the motion, Jose contended the contents of the thumb drive should be suppressed because: (1) Marchante’s consent to the search was invalid, as the thumb drive did not belong to her; and (2) the search of the thumb drive was executed in a manner that unreasonably infringed on his possessory interest in the device. Marchante adopted Jose’s argument that the contents of the thumb drive should be suppressed due to the delay in searching the thumb drive. The district court denied the motion. The district court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence presents a mixed question of law and fact, so we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its application of the law to the facts de novo. United States v. Perez, 443 F.3d 772, 774 (11th Cir. 2006). Additionally, “[a]ll facts are construed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below.” Id. A warrantless search is constitutional if there is voluntary consent, either by the defendant, or in the absence of consent by the defendant, by showing “that permission to search was obtained from a third party who possessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected.” United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974). “[T]he consent of one who possesses common authority over premises or effects is valid as against 5 Case: 11-11906 Date Filed: 03/26/2013 Page: 6 of 13 the absent, nonconsenting person with whom that authority is shared.” Id. at 170. Third party consent is generally valid if the third party has mutual use of the property, with joint access to or control of the property. Id. at 171 n.7. The Government bears the burden of establishing the third-party’s common authority. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990). The Government made the requisite showing that Marchante had common authority over the thumb drive and could consent to its search and seizure. The thumb drive was found in the nightstand beside Jose’s and Marchante’s bed, intermixed with items belonging to both Jose and Marchante. During the search, agents discovered several items in the nightstand drawer, including: (1) 39 Disney World tickets, several of which were purchased with credit card numbers skimmed in the charged offense; (2) two debit cards embossed with Marchante’s name; and (3) the thumb drive. The nightstand drawer also contained men’s socks and underwear. Although Marchante disclaimed ownership of the thumb drive, she also made a series of exculpatory statements about the other items found in the nightstand. She stated she did not know why the Disney tickets were in the drawer, and while she owned the debit cards, she did not know why they were reencoded. Additionally, Marchante had access to the thumb drive and could exercise control over it at any time. There was no evidence the thumb drive was encrypted 6 Case: 11-11906 Date Filed: 03/26/2013 Page: 7 of 13 or locked such that Marchante could not access it. See United States v. Stabile, 633 F.3d 219, 233 (3d Cir. 2011) (concluding a defendant’s girlfriend had common authority over six hard drives sufficient to consent to their search and seizure based in part on a computer not being password protected). Thus, the district court did not err in finding Marchante’s consent to search the thumb drive was effective as to Jose. Jose and Marchante contend our decision in United States v. Mitchell, 565 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2009), establishes that the Government’s delay between the seizure and search of the thumb drive was unreasonable. In Mitchell, we held the government’s three-week delay in obtaining a warrant to search the contents of a defendant’s hard drive was unreasonable. Id. at 1351-52. Mitchell, however, does not support their position. A search warrant was not required in this case because Marchante gave authorities consent to search the thumb drive. See Stabile, 633 F.3d at 235 (“[W]here a person consents to search and seizure, no possessory interest has been infringed because valid consent, by definition, requires voluntary tender of property.”). Thus, the district court did not err in denying the motion to suppress. Alternatively, even without the evidence contained on the thumb drive, there was overwhelming evidence for the jury to convict both Jose and Marchante. Assuming, arguendo, the thumb drive should have been suppressed at trial, any 7 Case: 11-11906 Date Filed: 03/26/2013 Page: 8 of 13 error in its admission was harmless as to both Jose and Marchante. See United States v. Alexander, 835 F.2d 1406, 1411 (11th Cir. 1988) (“Given the overwhelming evidence of [the defendant’s] guilt, it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that he would have been convicted even if the evidence obtained in the search . . . had been suppressed.”). 3 We therefore affirm the district court.