Opinion ID: 39963
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Written Consent

Text: 26 Mendez contends that his later written consent to enter and search his home for physical evidence was both involuntary and ineffective due to the earlier alleged violations. Consensual searches are established exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 250, 111 S.Ct. at 1803. A person must freely and voluntarily consent, however, for the search to be valid. United States v. Tompkins, 130 F.3d 117, 121 (5th Cir.1997) (citations omitted). In reviewing a district court's voluntariness finding, we will not overturn the court's decision unless it is clearly erroneous. United States v. Olivier-Becerril, 861 F.2d 424, 426 (5th Cir.1988). Additionally, [w]here the judge bases a finding of consent on the oral testimony at a suppression hearing, the clearly erroneous standard is particularly strong since the judge had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses. United States v. Sutton, 850 F.2d 1083, 1086 (5th Cir.1988). 27 The voluntariness of consent depends upon the totality of the circumstances surrounding the search. Tompkins, 130 F.3d at 121 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2048, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973)). In examining the totality of the circumstances, we consider six factors: 28 (1) the voluntariness of the defendant's custodial status; 29 (2) the presence of coercive police procedures; 30 (3) the extent and level of the defendant's cooperation with the police; 31 (4) the defendant's awareness of his right to refuse to consent; 32 (5) the defendant's education and intelligence; and 33 (6) the defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence will be found. 34 Olivier-Becerril, 861 F.2d at 426 (citations omitted). Although all six factors are relevant, no single factor is dispositive or controlling. Id. 35 The district court found that the first and fifth factors weighed against finding that Mendez's consent was voluntary, because Mendez was in custody at the time he signed the consent form, and Mendez did not know how to read and had limited education. The district court, however, determined that Mendez's consent was voluntary because the remaining four factors weighed in favor of voluntary consent. 36 We find no clear error in the district court's determinations that there was no police coercion, 4 that Mendez cooperated with the police, 5 that Mendez was aware of his right to refuse consent, 6 and that Mendez probably believed that no incriminating evidence would be found. 7 In short, the district court's finding of voluntary consent was not clearly erroneous.