Opinion ID: 175792
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether, in this Booker Resentencing, the District Court Should Have Considered Post-Sentencing Rehabilitation

Text: Franklin argues that the Sentencing Commission's policy precluding district courts from considering consider [sic] post-sentencing rehabilitation is not based on any study or on the Commission's institutional competence. (Appellant's Brief, p. 12). He further claims that the general rule in this Circuit is that a remand for resentencing directs the trial court to begin anew. Id. at 22. Franklin urges this court to revisit its ruling in Worley and find that district courts may consider post-offense rehabilitation. Id. at 23. Franklin's argument is not well taken. This Court's remand for resentencing in Franklin II was not a general remand. We specifically said [w]e agree with the United States that the re-sentencings were misapplications of Booker, and the case should be remanded for re-sentencing in accordance with Booker. Franklin II, 499 F.3d at 587. In United States v. Worley, 453 F.3d 706 (6th Cir.2006), we rejected consideration of post-sentencing rehabilitation on a Booker remand as follows: We conclude, as did the district court, that our prior order directed a remand for the limited purpose of reviewing the initial sentence to ensure that it did not violate the Sixth Amendment and that the order of remand did not require or permit consideration of factors postdating the original sentencing hearing. Id. at 707. We quoted with approval the Seventh Circuit's opinion in United States v. Re, 419 F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir.2005), as follows: [In a Booker remand] the conduct or circumstances that bear on the § 3553(a) factors must have been in existence at the time the original sentence was imposed.... The goal of the [ Booker ] remand is to determine if, at the time of sentencing, the district judge would have imposed a different sentence in the absence of mandatory guidelines. Post-sentencing events or conduct simply are not relevant to that inquiry. Worley, 453 F.3d at 709. This Circuit clarified in United States v. Keller, 498 F.3d 316 (6th Cir.2007), why factors after the original sentencing are irrelevant in Booker remands: We held [in Worley ] that the scope of a Booker remand does not require or permit consideration of factors postdating the original sentencing. [ Worley ] at 707. We agreed with the district court that because the purpose of a Booker remand is to ensure that the defendant's sentence is consistent with the Sixth Amendment, the district court may consider only those facts that existed at the time the defendant was first sentenced.... Worley is predicated not on any notions of what is or is not compulsory or permissive for district courts but on the conclusion that consideration of post-sentencing factors is incompatible with the limited scope of a Booker remand, that is, reviewing whether the defendant would have received the same sentence had the Guidelines been advisory, rather than mandatory, at the time of the original sentencing. Id. at 323-24, (emphasis added). See also United States v. Gapinski, 561 F.3d 467, 474 (6th Cir.2009) (Gapinski's argument for a variance based upon his rehabilitative efforts while in prison was an argument that this court has previously rejected.); United States v. Erpenbeck, 532 F.3d 423, 434 (6th Cir.2008) (reiterating that post-sentencing facts or conduct are not relevant in Booker remands). As in Keller, there is no issue in the present case of whether the district court agreed or disagreed with the Guidelines policy on post-sentencing rehabilitative efforts. The limitation on the re-sentencing court has nothing to do with Guidelines policy. The constraint on relevant factors to be considered for re-sentencing is derived solely from the limited scope of a Booker remand. The decisions in Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 128 S.Ct. 558, 169 L.Ed.2d 481 (2007), Spears v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 840, 172 L.Ed.2d 596 (2009), and United States v. Pepper, 570 F.3d 958 (8th Cir. 2009), cert. granted ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 3499, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2010), have no impact on the issue in the present case, as none of those cases involved a limited Booker remand. In the present case, Franklin's sentence was vacated and remanded because of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). Franklin I, 415 F.3d at 557-8. His second sentence was vacated and remanded as a result of a misapplication of Booker. Franklin II, 499 F.3d at 586-7. Booker remands are limited in scope and permit consideration of only those facts that existed at the time the defendant was first sentenced. Keller, 498 F.3d at 324. Franklin's argument does not support reconsideration of Worley. Moreover, a panel of this Court cannot overrule the decision of another panel. The prior decision remains controlling authority unless an inconsistent decision of the United States Supreme Court requires modification of the decision or this Court sitting en banc overrules the prior decision. Salmi v. Sec. of Health and Human Services, 774 F.2d 685, 689 (6th Cir. 1985).
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Franklin's sentence.