Opinion ID: 146367
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Leon Exception

Text: In its opinion and order denying Thomas' motion to suppress, the district court also ruled that the Leon good-faith exception was applicable even if the search warrant were deficient. In his brief to this Court, Thomas' counsel recites verbatim the elements of the Leon doctrine but fails to explain how they entitle him to any relief. Nor does he actually argue that the district court's Leon ruling was error. However, since Thomas would also need a reversal of this decision in order to gain relief, and because his brief does refer to the Leon doctrine, we will review this decision as well. In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), the Supreme Court established that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does not apply in cases where law enforcement officers acted in good faith and reasonably relied on a search warrant that is ultimately found invalid. The inquiry on review is whether a reasonably trained police officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the [issuing judge's] authorization. Id. at 923 n. 23, 104 S.Ct. 3405. To help reviewing courts properly answer this question, the Court identified four specific situations in which an officer's reliance on a subsequently invalidated warrant cannot be considered objectively reasonable: 1) when the warrant is issued on the basis of an affidavit that the affiant knows (or is reckless in not knowing) contains false information; 2) when the issuing magistrate abandons his neutral and detached role and serves as a rubber stamp for police activities; 3) when the affidavit is so lacking in indicia of probable cause that a belief in its existence is objectively unreasonable; and 4) when the warrant is so facially deficient that it cannot be reasonably presumed to be valid. United States v. Laughton, 409 F.3d 744, 748 (6th Cir.2005) (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 914-23, 104 S.Ct. 3405). In this case, Thomas has failed to satisfy any of these exceptions. Thomas has not submitted any evidence to suggest that the state court served as a rubber stamp for police activity. And we have already explained above that Thomas has failed to show that the officers knowingly inserted false information into the affidavit or even acted in reckless disregard for the truth. Based on our analysis above regarding the facial validity of the affidavit and search warrant, we also cannot say that a reasonable officer could not have presumed the affidavit and warrant to be valid. In an attempt to undercut this ruling, our dissenting colleague again improperly divides and attacks the evidence provided in the affidavit instead of viewing the evidence in its totality. We agree with the district court's explanation that the officers presented a neutral judicial officer with an affidavit stating that he was aware of information indicating the presence of a marijuana growing operation at a specific location based on the report of a reliable informant that was corroborated by electric usage records and other details about the Defendant. The officer in this case independently investigated and corroborated the informant's tip to the extent possible, see United States v. King, 227 F.3d 732, 742 (6th Cir.2000), both in his verification of Thomas' address and in his obtaining the NES records. Accordingly, we find the district court did not err in concluding that the officers acted in good faith in seeking the search warrant, and the exclusionary rule would not apply here even if the information in the search warrant failed to establish probable cause.