Opinion ID: 2295379
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Statements made during trial of State v. McGranahan

Text: It is well settled that statements made in open court by a witness testifying under oath are included within the absolute privilege, provided they are pertinent to the proceeding. See, e.g., Pagoto v. Hancock, 41 Mich. App. 622, 200 N.W.2d 777 (1972); Aborn v. Lipson, 357 Mass. 71, 256 N.E.2d 442 (1970). Nearly a century ago, we affirmed the need for such a rule: Public policy, and the safe administration of justice, require that witnesses, who are a necessary part of the judicial machinery, be privileged against any restraint, except that imposed by the penalty for perjury. Stevens v. Rowe, 59 N.H. 578, 579 (1880); see Palmer v. City of Concord, 48 N.H. 211, 217 (1868); 50 AM. JUR. 2d Libel & Slander § 249 (1970); Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 1423, 1425 (1970). [16] In this case there is no serious contention that Dahar's testimony was not relevant to the criminal trial in which it occurred. In fact, the basis of McGranahan's complaint is that it was Dahar's testimony, and that alone, which was responsible for the entire proceeding. Under these circumstances, we hold that Dahar is immune from suit for defamation stemming from his testimony.