Opinion ID: 170604
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Federal subject-matter jurisdiction

Text: Although neither party contests subject-matter jurisdiction, neither party provides any analysis of the issue  or even the correct citation to the statutory provision granting federal subject-matter jurisdiction over admiralty disputes. Before we address the merits of the case, therefore, we must first determine whether the federal district court, and likewise this court, has subject-matter jurisdiction over the dispute between Kendrick and Albany. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 278, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977) ([W]e are obliged to inquire sua sponte whenever a doubt arises as to the existence of federal jurisdiction.). Although the dispute between Kendrick and Albany might not, by itself, fall within our subject-matter jurisdiction, [5] we have subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Section 1333(1) provides the federal courts with subject-matter jurisdiction over admiralty claims: The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of: (1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled. 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1). In addition, 46 U.S.C. § 30101 clarifies the extent of our admiralty jurisdiction in cases of damage or injury: (a) In general.  The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States extends to and includes cases of injury or damage, to person or property, caused by a vessel on navigable waters, even though the injury or damage is done or consummated on land. 46 U.S.C. § 30101(a). [6] Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) and 46 U.S.C. § 30101, the district court had federal subject-matter jurisdiction over Aramark's original complaint under the Limitation of Vessel Owner's Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30501 et seq. In Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 115 S.Ct. 1043, 130 L.Ed.2d 1024 (1995), the Supreme Court addressed the extent of federal admiralty jurisdiction under § 1333(1), where a party had filed an action seeking protection under the Limitation of Vessel Owner's Liability Act. [7] The Court began by explaining: A federal court's authority to hear cases in admiralty flows initially from the Constitution, which extend[s] federal judicial power to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction. U.S. Const., Art. III, § 2. Congress has embodied that power in a statute giving federal district courts original jurisdiction ... of ... [a]ny civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction.... 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1). Id. at 531, 115 S.Ct. 1043 (alterations in original). The Court then provided the test for determining whether a party may invoke federal admiralty jurisdiction: [A] party seeking to invoke federal admiralty jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) over a tort claim must satisfy conditions both of location and of connection with maritime activity. A court applying the location test must determine whether the tort occurred on navigable water or whether injury suffered on land was caused by a vessel on navigable water. [46 U.S.C. § 30101.] The connection test raises two issues. A court, first, must assess the general features of the type of incident involved, to determine whether the incident has a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce. Second, a court must determine whether the general character of the activity giving rise to the incident shows a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity. Id. at 534, 115 S.Ct. 1043 (some citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In its complaint, Aramark alleged that Kendrick and Sevy were engaged in recreational boating on the navigable waters of Lake Powell, at Bullfrog Bay, when they collided with a canyon wall or cliff. Aramark Compl., ROA, Vol. I, at 20. Consequently, Aramark's claim readily satisfied Grubart 's location test. See Grubart, 513 U.S. at 534-38, 115 S.Ct. 1043. Aramark's claim also satisfied the first of the maritime connection enquiries, because the boating collision was an incident ... of a sort with the potential to disrupt maritime commerce. Id. at 538, 115 S.Ct. 1043; see also id. at 538-39, 115 S.Ct. 1043 (noting that a fire on a vessel docked at a marina on navigable waters had satisfied this test in Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 363, 110 S.Ct. 2892, 111 L.Ed.2d 292 (1990), and holding that the damag[e][to] a structure beneath the riverbed in Grubart also satisfied the test, because it could lead to a disruption in the water course itself ... and ... could lead to restrictions on the navigational use of the waterway during required repairs). Finally, Aramark's complaint satisfied the second of the maritime connection enquiries  whether the general character of the activity giving rise to the incident shows a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity  because it involved [n]avigation of boats in navigable waters, which clearly falls within the substantial relationship. Id. at 539-40, 115 S.Ct. 1043. With subject-matter jurisdiction over Aramark's original claim, the district court appropriately exercised its supplemental jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, over the third-party insurance dispute between Kendrick and Albany. Section 1367 provides: (a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Under this provision, a federal court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related third-party claims when the court has admiralty jurisdiction over the original claim. See Loeber v. Bay Tankers, Inc., 924 F.2d 1340, 1347 (5th Cir.1991); Roco Carriers, Ltd. v. M/V Nurnberg Express, 899 F.2d 1292, 1297 (2d Cir.1990); Moeller v. Mulvey, 959 F.Supp. 1102, 1111 (D.Minn.1996); Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. S/S Cape Charles, 843 F.Supp. 893, 894-95 (S.D.N.Y.1994); cf. Grubart, 513 U.S. at 531, 115 S.Ct. 1043 (The parties do not dispute the Seventh Circuit's conclusion that jurisdiction as to Counts II and III (indemnity and contribution) hinges on jurisdiction over the Count I claim. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367) (other citations omitted)). The third-party insurance dispute between Kendrick and Albany falls squarely within the terms of 28 U.S.C. § 1367, which, when coupled with 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) and 46 U.S.C. § 30101(a), provided federal subject-matter jurisdiction here.