Opinion ID: 617237
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: GE's Underlying Reasons for Reclassification Were Pretextual

Text: Balser contends that GE's reasons for reclassifying, and thereby effectively removing her from, [17] the Zyglo Sorter position are nothing more than a specious excuse to favor more senior employees for a position to which she alleges she was entitled. Specifically, Balser asserts that GE's consideration of the Union's ardent objections to Balser's being hired on a permanent basis was both pretextual and a violation of the CBA. [18] Balser points to nothing in the recordnor any legal authorityestablishing that GE's consideration of the Union's investigation of GE's hiring practices and its views on how GE filled the Zyglo Sorter position constitute a violation of the CBA. Indeed, the record reflects the contrary. The evidence of record demonstrates that the Union had both the right and obligation to assess whether positions were filled in accordance with GE practice or CBA provisions, and notably, Balser has adduced no evidence indicating that Local 201 lacked authority to review how GE filled a position. Here, on receiving updated information concerning the Zyglo Sorter vacancies and complaints from union members as to how GE was filling those openings, the Union took immediate action. Union Business Agent Casilli and Executive/Grievance Board member Merchant looked into the Zyglo Sorter postings, with Casilli directly contacting GE's Manager of Union Relations Sampson to obtain all available information and details concerning the postings, Balser's layoff, and the vacancies themselves. On reviewing the acquired informationincluding that Balser only had been employed at GE for seven months; that it was general company practice to hire more senior-level employees on an upgrade basis for the lucrative piecework positions; that GE had not filled a higher paying job, like the Zyglo Sorter position, with lack of work employees in over a decade; that Balser obtained the position due to her lack of work (and not upgrade) status; and that the postings were due to anticipated retirement vacancies that in fact were inaccurateLocal 201 strongly urged GE to reclassify the Zyglo Sorter position from permanent to temporary. GE, taking all of these relevant factors into consideration, elected to reclassify the position, as it was entitled to do pursuant to its exclusive, discretionary rights under the CBA. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Balser, as we must, even if we were to agree that GE's reasons for reclassifying the position likely were motivated by favoritism towards more senior employees and Union pressure, such motivations do not show a violation of the CBA. At most, they show the backstage politicking that likely occurs in many bureaucratically governed relations between a company and its union, which is not prohibited by case law nor the underlying CBA at issue. Indeed, our labyrinthian review of the record returns us to the same central point as the district court: because GE unquestionably had the right under the CBA to reassess staffing needs (either before or after a position had been filled), and either to reclassify a position before an employee punched in, or to conduct layoffs after an employee had started her position, the true issue is one of timing. The record clearly shows that GE reclassified Balser's position from permanent to temporary; thus, the determinative question is whether GE reclassified the Zyglo Sorter position before Balser officially had started as a Zyglo Sorter, or whether it reclassified her position after her rights in the position had vested. [19] The evidence shows that although Balser was scheduled to start work as a Zyglo Sorter on February 19, she did not first punch into work until February 20. Both GE and Local 201 members' testimony and internal correspondence confirm that as of February 19, at the latest, GE had reclassified Balser's 11983A Zyglo Sorter position from permanent to temporary. Although Balser argues that her rights in the Zyglo Sorter position vested before her February 20 start datespecifically, when she first orally accepted the position on February 14her contention cannot drown out the sirenic call of the evidentiary record, which confirms that (1) an employee's rights in a GE position do not vest until he or she has officially punched in to the position, and (2) GE may change a position from permanent to temporary, provided that it does so before an employee has punched in. Because Balser does not contest her February 20 punch in date, nor offer evidence contradicting GE and Local 201 testimony and internal correspondence showing that her Zyglo Sorter position was reclassified as of, at the latest, February 19, we find no genuine issue of material fact as to whether GE's pre-start date reclassification violated the CBA.
Balser cannot firmly plant one foot of her hybrid claim in legally and factually-supported ground, and under the law, her remaining arguments cannot stand on the remaining foot of her amputated hybrid action. Because Balser has failed to offer evidence showing that GE breached the CBA when it reclassified Balser's Zyglo Sorter position from permanent to temporary before her actual start date, Balser's now monopod claim against the Union likewise fails. See Mulvihill, 335 F.3d at 27 (Our conclusion that [defendant] did not breach the CBA when it terminated [plaintiff's] employment serves to dispose of [plaintiff's] case against the Union as well.); Laurin, 150 F.3d at 62 (holding that because plaintiff did not show defendant's violation of the CBA, her hybrid claim accordingly failed); see also DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 165, 103 S.Ct. 2281 (stating that a plaintiff must show an employer's violation of the CBA to prevail against either defendant in a hybrid section 301 action). Balser having no argumentative leg left on which to stand, we hold that the district court properly granted summary judgment as to her hybrid claim.