Opinion ID: 2827843
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Issues raised for first time on appeal

Text: 1. Count Two (money laundering): sufficiency of indictment Deason claims that Count Two of the indictment is defective because it failed to charge that he knew the transaction involved criminally-derived property, asserting that this prejudiced his defense. Specifically, he contends that the word “knowingly,” as used in Count Two, applies only to his efforts to engage in a monetary transaction, and not to the subsequent qualifier “in 25 See id. 26 See United States v. Newsom, 508 F.3d 731, 735 (5th Cir. 2007). 27 See Brantley, 537 F.3d at 348, 350 (upholding 253% variance); United States v. Jones, 444 F.3d 430, 441-42 (5th Cir. 2006) (more than double variance). 12 Case: 14-10461 Document: 00513157744 Page: 13 Date Filed: 08/17/2015 No. 14-10461 criminally derived property of a value greater than $10,000.” Deason failed to object in the district court, so we review the sufficiency of the indictment for plain error. 28 “To be sufficient, an indictment must conform to minimal constitutional standards, standards that are met where the indictment alleges every element of the crime charged and in such a way as to enable the accused to prepare his defense . . . .” 29 Count Two charges: On or about April 24, 2012, in the Fort Worth Division of the Northern District of Texas, Caleb Deason, the defendant, did knowingly engage and attempt to engage in a monetary transaction, by, through, or to a financial institution, affecting interstate or foreign commerce, in criminally derived property of a value greater than $10,000, that is the purchase of a cashier’s check in the amount of approximately $67,133, such property having been derived from a specified unlawful activity, that is, Wire Fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343. Count Two essentially tracks the language of 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a), which is the statute under which Deason was convicted: “Whoever . . . knowingly engages or attempts to engage in a monetary transaction in criminally derived property of a value greater than $10,000 and is derived from specified unlawful activity shall be punished. . . .” 30 Deason’s challenge to the sufficiency of the indictment is grounded in a deliberate misreading of Count Two and § 1957(a). “As a matter of ordinary 28 United States v. Hoover, 467 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2006). Plain error review involves four prongs: (1) There must be an error or defect; (2) the legal error must be clear or obvious; (3) the error must have affected the appellant’s substantial rights; and, (4) if the first three prongs are satisfied, the appellate court has the discretion to remedy the error if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). 29 United States v. Partida, 385 F.3d 546, 554 (5th Cir. 2004). 30 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a). 13 Case: 14-10461 Document: 00513157744 Page: 14 Date Filed: 08/17/2015 No. 14-10461 English grammar, it seems natural to read [a] statute’s word ‘knowingly’ as applying to all the subsequently listed elements of the crime.” 31 This is consistent with the manner in which courts usually interpret criminal statutes, i.e., “courts ordinarily read a phrase in a criminal statute that introduces the elements of a crime with the word ‘knowingly’ as applying that word to each element.” 32 Moreover, even if we assume arguendo that Deason was unaware that “knowingly” modifies criminally-derived property, any putative prejudice is belied by the fact that he defended himself at trial by claiming that he did not know the funds in his bank account were criminally derived. Several months prior to trial, he filed a proposed jury charge listing the “knowledge” element as it applied to the criminally-derived property element. For him to contend on appeal that the indictment is insufficient because he had no idea that “knowingly” applies to “criminally derived property” stretches his credulity beyond the breaking point. We are satisfied that Count Two of the indictment is constitutionally sufficient. 2. Count One (wire fraud): false evidence and improper venue Deason presents a series of related challenges to his conviction for wire fraud that relies on what he describes as “newly discovered and available evidence.” This evidence comprises only his own affidavit that relates to one exchange between an unnamed “individual working on my behalf” and a Wells Fargo customer service representative. The Wells Fargo employee purportedly stated to the unnamed individual that Wells Fargo has only “one wire room, where all incoming wires are received and posted . . . [that is] located [in] . . . San Francisco, California.” Relying solely on his own affidavit, Deason contends that (1) the government violated his right to due process by 31 Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646, 650 (2009). 32 Id. at 652. 14 Case: 14-10461 Document: 00513157744 Page: 15 Date Filed: 08/17/2015 No. 14-10461 knowingly presenting false testimony about the wire transfer, so the court should order a new trial; and, (2) his conviction should be vacated based on improper venue. Because he contests venue for the first time on appeal, his challenge is waived. 33 And, we review his claim that the government knowingly presented false testimony for plain error only because he did not move for a new trial on this basis or otherwise alert the district court to his objection. 34 To establish a due process violation based on the government’s use of false or misleading testimony, a petitioner must show that “(1) the statements in question are shown to be false; (2) the prosecution knew they were false; and (3) the statements were material.” 35 We note at the outset that Deason’s affidavit – the only “evidence” he submits in support of his claim that the government knowingly presented false testimony – is inadmissible hearsay and cannot be used to obtain a new trial. 36 But, even if we were to assume the veracity of the hearsay statements contained in his affidavit and their 33 Deason contends that he preserved his venue objection by filing a motion to acquit under Rule 29(a) and (c). Appellant’s Brief at 53. We disagree. See United States v. Rodriguez-Lopez, 756 F.3d 422, 430 (5th Cir. 2014) (“A defendant waives his right to contest venue on appeal, however, when his motion for acquittal [at the close of the government’s evidence] fails to put the court and the United States on notice of the challenge to venue.”). Deason moved for acquittal at the close of the government’s presentation of evidence “on the grounds that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction at this time.” As he did not articulate any challenge to venue, his challenge is waived. See id.; United States v. Carbajal, 290 F.3d 277, 288 n.19 (5th Cir. 2002). 34 See United States v. Houston, 648 F.3d 806, 813 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v. Caballero, 277 F.3d 1235, 1243-44 (10th Cir. 2002). By neglecting to file a motion for a new trial on the basis of the newly-discovered evidence, Deason failed to provide the district court an opportunity to correct the now-alleged error. United States v. Nixon, 918 F.2d 895, 905 (11th Cir. 1990); cf. United States v. Blackthorne, No. 00-51256, 2002 WL 971621, at  (5th Cir. May 3, 2002) (declining to resolve whether plain error applies when a defendant fails to raise a Napue objection in the district court). 35 United States v. O’Keefe, 128 F.3d 885, 893 (5th Cir. 1997). 36 See United States v. Anderson, 755 F.3d 782, 800 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Fleming, 540 F. App’x 344, 346 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (defendant’s affidavit containing hearsay insufficient evidence to support a motion for a new trial); United States v. Neuman, 505 F. App’x 308, 309 (5th Cir. 2013) (same). 15 Case: 14-10461 Document: 00513157744 Page: 16 Date Filed: 08/17/2015 No. 14-10461 admissibility, we would conclude that he has failed to make out any due process violation. The evidence adduced at trial included (1) a copy of the wire transfer form authorizing Transamerica to wire the funds to Deason’s Wells Fargo account and (2) his bank account statement reflecting a wire transfer of $1,004,028.41 from HSBC Bank USA to his Wells Fargo account. Even if Deason’s unverified and inadmissible statement were true, it would create, at most a conflict with the evidence adduced at trial concerning Wells Fargo’s wire procedures. It would not establish that the evidence and testimony concerning the wire at issue are “actually false.” 37 Deason has failed to make out a due process violation on the basis of the information contained in his affidavit. 3. Counts One and Two: double jeopardy Deason contends further that his conviction and sentence for both wire fraud and money laundering violate the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause. Specifically, he claims that, because he was convicted of knowingly purchasing a cashier’s check with proceeds from a wire fraud crime, the § 1957(a) charge incorporated all of the essential elements of his wire fraud offense under § 1343, thereby merging the two offenses under Blockburger v. United States. He failed to raise this claim before the district court, so we review it for plain error only. 38 The Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits multiple punishments for the same offense. 39 “When a defendant challenges multiple punishments for the same conduct—rather than multiple prosecutions—our double jeopardy analysis turns on whether Congress has authorized the result at issue.” 40 37 See Kimmel v. Quarterman, 199 F. App’x 338, 344-45 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Wall, 389 F.3d 457, 473 (5th Cir. 2004)). 38 United States v. Odutayo, 406 F.3d 386, 392 (5th Cir. 2005). 39 United States v. McRae, 702 F.3d 806, 839 (5th Cir. 2012). 40 Id. (citation and internal quotation mark omitted). 16 Case: 14-10461 Document: 00513157744 Page: 17 Date Filed: 08/17/2015 No. 14-10461 When, in one prosecution, a defendant is convicted of multiple counts stemming from the same criminal conduct, our review is limited to whether Congress intended multiple convictions and sentences under the statutes. 41 We discern the intent of Congress by parsing the statutory language and reviewing the legislative history. 42 Section 1957, which was enacted as part of the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, forbids engaging in monetary transactions involving criminally-derived property. The essential elements are: (1) the defendant engages or attempts to engage (2) in a monetary transaction (3) in criminallyderived property (4) knowing that the property is derived from unlawful activity, and (5) the property is derived from “specified unlawful activity,” which is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7). 43 Here, the specified unlawful activity is wire fraud, which is punishable under 18 U.S.C. § 1343. The government had to prove the essential elements of wire fraud to establish a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957. Thus, we cannot rule that each statutory provision “requires proof of a fact that the other does not.” 44 Contrary to Deason’s contention, the Blockburger test, however, is not dispositive; it is solely a rule of statutory construction. “Insofar as the question is one of legislative intent, the Blockburger presumption . . . yield[s] to a plainly expressed contrary view on the part of Congress.” 45 Our review of the statute’s text and legislative history reflects that Congress intended that the conduct defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1957 should be punished as a separate offense, in addition to, and not as a substitute for, the underlying specified unlawful 41See Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 779 (1985). 42Id. 43 18 U.S.C. § 1957. 44 United States v. Lovett, 964 F.2d 1029, 1041-42 (10th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation mark omitted). 45 Garrett, 471 U.S. at 779. 17 Case: 14-10461 Document: 00513157744 Page: 18 Date Filed: 08/17/2015 No. 14-10461 activity. 46 Deason’s convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 1343 and § 1957 do not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. 4. Improper questioning Deason claims that the district court’s questioning during the trial violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to a fair trial by an impartial jury. He contends that the court posed pointed, attacking questions undermining his credibility and chosen defense strategy. Deason accepted the court’s proposed curative instruction, so he failed to preserve his objection to the court’s questioning and plain error review applies. 47 Federal Rule of Evidence 614 permits a trial judge to call or examine a witness. 48 “A trial judge has wide discretion over the ‘tone and tempo’ of a trial and may elicit further information from a witness if he believes it would benefit the jury,” but its efforts to move the trial along may not interfere with its “strict impartiality.” 49 We have stressed that “[o]ur review of the trial court’s actions must be based on the entire trial record” and that we will conclude that a 46 See THE MONEY LAUNDERING CRIMES ACT OF 1986, S. REP. NO. 99-433, at 4 (1986) (noting the importance of “enacting a new Federal offense against money laundering”) (emphasis supplied); see also United States v. Kirkland, Nos. 93-2231, 93-2313, 1994 WL 454864, at  (6th Cir. Aug. 22, 1994) (per curiam) (“Logically this must be true or else § 1957 would serve only as an alternative charge for each ‘specified unlawful activity’ listed in the statute and not a separate criminal offense.”); Lovett, 964 F.2d at 1042-43. 47 Deason contends that he preserved this claim by means of objection, but our review of the record indicates that he failed to preserve the error. Although his counsel objected to the trial court’s questioning, his counsel subsequently proposed that the court take a “remedial measure, which would be to instruct the jury that you did not mean to communicate any partiality or belief as to the truth or nontruth of Deason’s testimony.” The trial court agreed and so instructed the jury. As such, Deason failed to preserve his objection to the district court’s questioning. See United States v. Potts, 644 F.3d 233, 236 (5th Cir. 2011) (“[The defendant] accepted the court’s curative instruction without objection, thus failing to preserve error.”). 48 Fed. R. Evid. 614. 49 United States v. Saenz, 134 F.3d 697, 701-02 (5th Cir. 1998). 18 Case: 14-10461 Document: 00513157744 Page: 19 Date Filed: 08/17/2015 No. 14-10461 court’s questioning warrants reversal only when the “cumulative effect” is substantial and prejudices the defendant. 50 Reviewing here for plain error, we conclude that, when analyzed in the context of the entire record, the cumulative effect of the trial court’s questioning did not prejudice Deason. We acknowledge that the court did engage in several salty exchanges with both sides during the course of the trial, but we perceive no reversible plain error. The court’s questioning concerning the timing of the $1,004,028.41 transfer to Deason’s Wells Fargo account in relation to the text message he sent to Mrs. Secker’s sister-in-law expressing doubt that the claim would ever be paid, as well as his intent in sending the text message, is relevant to the issues presented by his “mistake” defense. And, because Deason referred to several text messages and emails throughout the course of his testimony, it was not unreasonable for the trial court to seek clarification of Deason’s somewhat circuitous testimony to aid the jury. We conclude that the trial court did not plainly err. 5. Count One (wire fraud): constructive amendment Deason contends that Count One of his indictment was constructively amended, claiming that his conviction relied on evidence that did not support his transmission of the charged wire. This claim returns to the “Iowa bank wire” theory he raised in his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence related to Count One: “[I]t is impossible that the jury properly convicted [him] for the indicted act of causing the transmission of the Iowa bank wire listed in Count One.” Deason failed to object to the alleged constructive amendment, so we review for plain error. 51 50 Id. at 702. 51 United States v. Bohuchot, 625 F.3d 892, 897 (5th Cir. 2010). 19 Case: 14-10461 Document: 00513157744 Page: 20 Date Filed: 08/17/2015 No. 14-10461 “A constructive amendment occurs when it permits the defendant to be convicted upon a factual basis that effectively modifies an essential element of the offense charged or permits the government to convict the defendant on a materially different theory or set of facts than that with which she was charged.” 52 Deason has failed to show any constructive amendment, let alone that the district court plainly erred. As explained earlier, Count One does not charge an “Iowa bank wire,” and, the jury charge essentially tracks the language of Count One. 53 And finally, although not clearly articulated in Deason’s brief, we reject any (assumed) challenge to the government’s presentation of Rule 404(b) evidence as constructively amending the indictment. The district court instructed the jurors that they could consider the Rule 404(b) evidence for limited purposes only. We assume that a jury follows the trial court’s instructions unless “there is an overwhelming probability that the jury [was] unable to [do so] and there is a strong probability that the effect is devastating.” 54 Deason does not contend that the jury did not follow its instructions. We conclude that he has failed to show that Count One of the indictment was constructively amended. 6. Ineffective assistance of counsel Deason claims that his trial counsel was constitutionally deficient for failing to challenge Count One on the theory that it charged an Iowa bank wire and for failing to obtain admissible evidence establishing that Wells Fargo had “one wire room” as described in Deason’s post-conviction affidavit. 52 United States v. Thompson, 647 F.3d 180, 184 (5th Cir. 2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 53 See, e.g., United States v. Seher, 562 F.3d 1344, 1363 (11th Cir. 2009) (rejecting a defendant’s constructive amendment claim when the “jury charge merely tracked the language of [the statute]”). 54 United States v. Fortenberry, 350 F. App’x 906, 910 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Tomblin, 46 F.3d 1369, 1390 (5th Cir. 1995)) (internal quotation mark omitted). 20 Case: 14-10461 Document: 00513157744 Page: 21 Date Filed: 08/17/2015 No. 14-10461 Generally, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel “cannot be resolved on direct appeal when [they have] not been raised before the district court since no opportunity existed to develop the record on the merits of the allegations.” 55 The Supreme Court has emphasized that a § 2255 habeas corpus motion is the preferred vehicle for raising claims of ineffective assistance of counsel: “When an ineffective-assistance claim is brought on direct appeal, appellate counsel and the court must proceed on a trial record not developed precisely for the object of litigating or preserving the claim and thus often incomplete or inadequate for this purpose.” 56 Here, the record is not sufficiently developed concerning Deason’s allegations of his trial counsel’s deficient performance. We decline to review his ineffective-assistance claim – without prejudice, however, to his right to raise it in a collateral attack on his sentence. 57 7. Restitution order The trial court ordered Deason to make full restitution to Transamerica in the amount of $99,491.75. For the first time on appeal, he asserts that the court’s restitution order violates his Sixth Amendment rights because it is based on judicial findings of fact. We have reviewed this claim for plain error, and we conclude there is none. Deason’s theory is foreclosed by numerous decisions of this court holding that “judicial fact-finding supporting restitution orders does not violate the Sixth Amendment.” 58