Opinion ID: 2631813
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutional Error, Harmless Error.

Text: An appellate court's review of the trial court's admission of evidence is a twostep process. First, it must determine whether the evidence was admissible or inadmissible. Then, if the evidence was improperly admitted, it must determine whether to apply the harmless error rule of review or the federal constitutional error rule to the erroneous admission of that evidence. State v. Smallwood, 264 Kan. 69, 80-81, 955 P.2d 1209 (1998). Review of the admission or the exclusion of evidence is usually governed by the harmless error rule. K.S.A. 60-261 provides that no error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence by the court is a ground for granting a new trial or for setting aside a verdict unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. State v. Morris, 255 Kan. 964, Syl. ¶ 6, 880 P.2d 1244 (1994). Under the federal constitutional error rule, an error of constitutional magnitude is serious and may not be held to be harmless unless the appellate court is willing to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Before we may declare the error harmless, we must be able to declare beyond a reasonable doubt that the error had little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial. State v. McClanahan, 259 Kan. 86, Syl. ¶ 4, 910 P.2d 193 (1996). State v. Clark, 261 Kan. 460, 469, 931 P.2d 664 (1997). Recently, in the case of Pham, the Kansas Court of Appeals considered the erroneous admission of the defendant's gang affiliation during his trial on nongang-related crimes. In that case, the Court of Appeals found that where inflammatory evidence has no probative value of significant magnitude to counterbalance its prejudicial effect, its introduction becomes grossly and unfairly prejudicial. 27 Kan. App.2d at 1002. There, because the evidence against the defendant was far from overwhelming, the court held that cumulative trial errors merited reversal and a new trial. 27 Kan. App.2d at 1006. We must consider whether the admission of evidence that Leitner was involved in witchcraft constituted reversible error. In this particular case, overwhelming evidence was presented concerning Leitner's steadfast desire to kill Michael. Moreover, ample evidence illustrated Leitner's belief that she and her boys would be better off financially if Michael were dead. At trial, Leitner did not dispute that she intentionally shot Michael. The issue was whether she acted in self-defense or with premeditation. Leitner's intent was a key factor for the jury to decide. Leitner testified that she made two previous attempts to kill Michael by poisoning him. She expressed to her brother, her sister, and her babysitter a continuing desire to be rid of Michael permanently for the sake of her family. Although she owned two guns of her own, she took two guns belonging to others with her the night she shot Michael. She wore gloves to hide her fingerprints. She told her sister-in-law that she asked Michael to come to Toronto with her to work things out. Leitner also told her that she walked up behind Michael and shot him in the head, then twice again in the temple as he laid on the ground to make sure he was dead. The expert opinion of Dr. Mitchell supports Pam's testimony. Leitner had stopped earlier at a rest stop for the purpose of killing Michael by shooting him, which makes premeditation clear. Here, overwhelming evidence contradicts Leitner's story of self-defense on the night of the murder. While in a close case, the admission of evidence of a defendant's participation in Wicca might serve to inflame a jury to wrongfully convict a defendant and result in a reversal on appeal, it is clear in this case that the jury heard ample evidence to show that Leitner murdered her husband with premeditation. Therefore, based on the particular facts of this case alone, we decline to set aside the jury verdict based on the erroneous admission of witchcraft evidence. II. AGENT HALVORSEN'S TESTIMONY CONCERNING THE NONINVOLVEMENT OF GARY HOCKETT On appeal, Leitner asserts that the trial court erred when it allowed KBI agent Bill Halvorsen to testify that Gary Hockett was telling the truth. Halvorsen is a special agent with the KBI, assigned to the general felony investigations unit. Halvorsen assisted in the investigation of Michael's homicide. Leitner states that Halvorsen served as a sort of expert, noting that he was permitted to observe the testimony of other witnesses throughout the trial prior to his testimony. Expert opinion testimony is admissible if it aids the jury with unfamiliar subjects or interpreting technical facts or if it assists the jury in arriving at a reasonable factual conclusion from the evidence. Necessity is the basis for the admission of expert testimony, arising out of the particular circumstances of the case. Expert conclusions or opinions are not necessary if the normal experience and qualifications of jurors permit them to draw proper conclusions from the given facts and circumstances. Smallwood, 264 Kan. at 80. An expert's opinion, pursuant to K.S.A. 60-456, is admissible up to the point where an expression of opinion would require the expert to pass upon the credibility of witnesses or the weight of disputed evidence. An expert witness may not pass on the weight or credibility of evidence. State v. Rice, 261 Kan. 567, Syl. ¶ 10, 932 P.2d 981 (1997). An expert may testify and give his or her opinion concerning the ultimate issue of the case; however, such testimony is admissible only if it actually assists the jury. State v. Gaines, 260 Kan. 752, 757, 926 P.2d 641 (1996). No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence by the court is a ground for granting a new trial or for setting aside a verdict unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. Smallwood, 264 Kan. at 80 (citing K.S.A. 60-261; State v. Morris, 255 Kan. 964, Syl. ¶ 6, 880 P.2d 1244 [1994]). In particular, Leitner objects to the following testimony: Q. At some point after Gary Hockett's interview that day to today's date were you ever able to positively confirm that Gary Hockett was not involved prior or during the murder of Michael Leitner? MR. CLARK: I guess I'm going to object, your Honor. That's one of the ultimate issues that the jury's going to have to decide, and I don't think it's proper for this witness to render an opinion as to credibility of witnesses. That's the ultimate issue. THE COURT: Not in this trial. You may repeat the question if you wish. You can answer. Q. Were you ever able after the interview of Gary Hockett on October 22nd, the five or six hour interview, ever able to absolutely positively confirm that Gary Hockett was not involved prior to or during the murder of Michael Leitner? A. Yes, I was. At trial in her opening statement, Leitner's theory of defense was that she intentionally shot Michael in self-defense. Upon direct examination, Leitner first stated that Gary encouraged her to take the guns with her and even loaded them for her while she went to the liquor store. Later, during cross-examination, Leitner testified that Gary did not know what she was going to do with the guns or that she was going to commit a crime on the night of the murder. In closing argument, defense counsel argued that Gary was not telling the truth when he testified that he did not give Leitner the two guns that evening. In addition, counsel for Leitner asserted that Pam and Gary lied in order to keep Gary from being prosecuted for his involvement in Michael's murder. The inference defence counsel asked the jury to draw was that if Pam and Gary lied, Leitner's story of self-defense would be more probable. Leitner's theory that the trial court's admission of Halvorsen's testimony was in error because it touched on the ultimate issue of premeditation fails for two reasons. First, when considering whether Leitner committed the murder with premeditation, it makes no difference whether jurors chose to believe either Gary or Leitner. Even if Gary gave Leitner two guns for her protection that Friday night, as Leitner testified, reasonable jurors could conclude that she formed the requisite premeditation during her 2hour drive to Olathe. `Premeditation under the law does not require any specific time frame.' [Citation omitted.] State v. Moncla, 262 Kan. 58, 72, 936 P.2d 727 (1997). Furthermore, a jury `has a right to infer premeditation from the established circumstances of the case provided the inference is a reasonable one.' State v. Murillo, 269 Kan. 281, 286, 7 P.3d 264 (2000). Thus, the fact that Gary's story varied from Leitner's makes no difference as to the issue of premeditation. Second, the State's inquiry did not concern Gary's credibility during the trial; rather the question was designed to elicit a response from Halvorsen as to whether his investigation confirmed the truth of Gary's story of noninvolvement prior to or during the murder. This information is helpful to a jury, and, thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed Halvorsen to testify. Moreover, Leitner's own testimony confirmed that Gary was not involved prior to or during the murder. Thus, Leitner suffered no prejudice from Halvorsen's testimony, and her claim of error is without merit.