Opinion ID: 2274894
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: failure to make prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination in the commonwealth's use of a peremptory challenge

Text: Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in concluding that he had not made a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination in the Commonwealth's use of a peremptory strike against an African-American juror. Following voir dire, the Commonwealth used peremptory strikes against two African-American jurors. Appellant did not object to one of the strikes (a juror whom the Commonwealth had attempted to remove for cause based on her response to a question on voir dire), but did object as to Juror No. 219296, on grounds that this juror had said nothing during voir dire. Pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), Appellant requested the Commonwealth provide its reason for using a peremptory strike against this juror. The trial court found that Appellant had not made a prima facie showing because the Commonwealth had used peremptory strikes against only two of the possible five African-American jurors. [8] As such, the trial court found the Commonwealth was not required to articulate its reason for striking Juror No. 219296. The trial court did order the Commonwealth, for avowal purposes, to submit a written reason under seal. [9] In Batson, the United States Supreme Court set forth a three-part test for determining whether a state's use of peremptory challenges violates the Equal Protection Clause: A defendant first has the burden of making a prima facie showing that a peremptory challenge has been exercised on the basis of race; second, if this showing is made, then the burden shifts to the prosecutor to articulate a race-neutral reason for striking the juror in question; and third, the trial court must then determine whether the burden of proving purposeful discrimination has been met. Chestnut v. Commonwealth, 250 S.W.3d 288, 300-01 (Ky.2008) (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-98, 106 S.Ct. 1712). To establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on race, the opponent of the challenge must show that: 1) he is a member of a cognizable racial group; 2) peremptory challenges are being exercised to remove from the venire persons of the defendant's race; and 3) the circumstances raise an inference that the exclusion was based on race. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96, 106 S.Ct. 1712. Because the trial court is the best `judge' of the Commonwealth's motives in exercising its peremptory strikes, great deference is given to the court's ruling. Gray v. Commonwealth, 203 S.W.3d 679, 691 (Ky.2006) (citing Wells v. Commonwealth, 892 S.W.2d 299, 303 (Ky. 1995)). On appellate review, a trial court's denial of a Batson challenge will not be reversed unless clearly erroneous. Chestnut, 250 S.W.3d at 302 (citing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 369, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) and Washington v. Commonwealth, 34 S.W.3d 376, 379-80 (Ky.2000)). In the present case, Appellant meets the first prong of the test because he is African-American. With regard to the second prong, there were five African-American jurors, of whom the Commonwealth struck two (one of which strikes Appellant did not object to), leaving three African-American individuals on the jury panel. Based on numbers alone, the trial court found that a prima facie case had not been made. Without more, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred in its ruling. Chestnut, 250 S.W.3d at 300-02. Cf. Washington v. Commonwealth, 34 S.W.3d 376 (Ky.2000) (prima facie showing made where Commonwealth used peremptory strike against only remaining African-American juror, to whom no questions had been directed on voir dire).