Opinion ID: 782233
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: transborder abduction and the law of nations

Text: 41 Alvarez claims that his arrest violated Mexico's sovereign rights because Mexico had not granted the United States permission to exercise police power on its soil. Because such an encroachment on Mexico's sovereignty violates the law of nations within the meaning of the ATCA, Alvarez reasons, he is entitled to relief under that statute. The district court agreed and rejected Sosa's objection that Alvarez lacks standing to invoke Mexico's sovereignty rights. 42 We have little trouble accepting the premise from which Alvarez begins. Few principles in international law are as deeply rooted as the general norm prohibiting acts of sovereignty that offend the territorial integrity of another state. See generally 1 L. Oppenheim, Oppenheim's International Law § 119 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992); see also F.A. Mann, Reflections on the Prosecution of Persons Abducted in Breach of International Law, in International Law at a Time of Perplexity 407 & n. 2 (Yoram Dinstein & Mala Tabory eds. 1989) (referring to this incontrovertible rule as elementary). This tenet, as Alvarez points out, can be traced to the earliest decisions of the Supreme Court. Most notably, in 1812, when faced with the question whether an American citizen could assert title to an armed French vessel found in the territorial waters of the United States, Justice Marshall began his landmark decision by emphasizing the exclusive and absolute nature of territorial jurisdiction, exceptions to which must be traced up to the consent of the nation itself. Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136, 3 L.Ed. 287 (1812). 43 Twelve years later, Justice Story voiced similar sentiments. Analyzing an American seizure of a foreign ship that had sailed into Spanish waters, he observed that [i]t would be monstrous to suppose that our ... officers were authorized to enter into foreign ports and territories, for the purpose of seizing vessels which had offended against our laws. It cannot be presumed that Congress would voluntarily justify such a clear violation of the laws of nations. The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 371, 6 L.Ed. 111 (1824). 44 Alvarez seeks to invoke a principle, concomitant with this precept of territorial sovereignty, that prohibits a state's law enforcement agents from exercising their functions in the territory of another state without the latter's consent. The Supreme Court clearly recognized this proscription in The Appollon. In addition, several notable authorities are in accord. See Restatement on Foreign Relations § 432(2) (A state's law enforcement officers may exercise their functions in the territory of another state only with the consent of the other state, given by duly authorized officials of that state.); 1 Oppenheim, supra, § 119, at 387-88 (It is ... a breach of international law for a state without permission to send its agents into the territory of another state to apprehend persons accused of having committed a crime.); see also M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Extradition: United States Law and Practice 255 (4th ed. 2002) (recognizing the rule and noting that it is grounded in the notion that international law is designed to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states by restricting impermissible state conduct). But whatever the modern contours of this principle or its corollaries, they are inapplicable here and need not be explored because Alvarez cannot establish, as a threshold matter, that he has standing to assert Mexico's interests in its territorial sovereignty. 8 45 The Supreme Court has instructed that to meet the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing under Article III, plaintiffs must [f]irst and foremost show the existence of an injury in fact. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 102-03, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Related to this constitutional prerequisite is a separate prudential requirement of standing: plaintiffs must demonstrate they are proper proponents of the particular legal rights on which they base their suit. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 112, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976). This requirement applies even when the very same allegedly illegal act that affects the litigant also affects a third party. United States Dep't of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 720, 110 S.Ct. 1428, 108 L.Ed.2d 701 (1990). Although Alvarez may have properly alleged that Mexico's sovereignty was infringed during his abduction — an issue we need not resolve here — he has not demonstrated that he is a proper party to vindicate Mexico's national interests. 46 Alvarez argues that he meets the standing requirements because courts may review ATCA claims whenever an alien is injured tortiously in the course of the defendant's violation of international law. But the ATCA creates a remedy for a tort ... committed in violation of the law of nations, not in the course of any recognized international law violation. 28 U.S.C. § 1350. The legal rights on which Alvarez bases his claim, and which the ATCA recognizes, are those that protect the individual from tortious conduct. By its terms, the ATCA provides only for suits by individual aliens; it does not allow for an individual to vindicate the rights of a foreign government. 47 To allow state-on-state injuries like the one Alvarez alleges here to be vindicated by a third party not only would read too much into the ATCA, but would lead to the judiciary's intrusion into matters that are appropriately reserved for the Executive branch. Although international human rights litigation under the ATCA inevitably raises issues implicating foreign relations, sovereigns' prerogatives are ordinarily and traditionally handled through diplomatic channels. 9 The right of a nation to invoke its territorial integrity does not translate into the right of an individual to invoke such interests in the name of the law of nations. 48 Alvarez seeks refuge in Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 7 S.Ct. 225, 30 L.Ed. 421 (1886), the case that previously doomed his attempt to secure dismissal of his criminal indictment. See Alvarez-Machain II, 504 U.S. at 662, 112 S.Ct. 2188. Like Alvarez, Ker claimed forcible abduction from a foreign country, in his case Peru. Although the Supreme Court refused to dismiss Ker's indictment, it observed that Ker was probably not ... without redress, for he could sue [his abductor] in an action of trespass and false imprisonment. Ker, 119 U.S. at 444, 7 S.Ct. 225. The Court made no guarantees, however, regarding a claim under the ATCA or any other federal statute; nor did it intimate that Ker could sue to avenge Peru's sovereignty rights. Rather, the Court noted that Peru could pursue a separate remedy — the kidnapper's extradition. Id. Ker thus implicitly drew the distinction between vindication of individual rights and a sovereign's vindication of its rights. Ker does not bridge the gap in Alvarez's claim. 49
50 Apparently cognizant of the constitutional barrier to his claim, Alvarez offers an alternative theory: he seeks to bypass the standing hurdle by arguing that, notwithstanding any infringements upon Mexico's sovereignty, the act of transborder kidnapping was, in itself, a violation of customary international human rights law. This norm, as defined by Alvarez, creates a personal right under the law of nations. 51 Sosa, the DEA agents, and the United States all urge that this norm fails the law of nations test. They contend that the prohibition that Alvarez identifies has not reached the level of acceptance in the international community sufficient to qualify as universal and obligatory. They also argue that, whatever degree of agreement other nations have reached, the United States has affirmatively and definitively rejected this principle. We agree. The United States does not recognize a prohibition against transborder kidnapping, nor can it be said that there is international acceptance of such a norm. 52 We embrace the Supreme Court's directive that the law of nations may be ascertained by consulting the work of jurists, writing professedly on public law; or by the general usage and practice of nations; or by judicial decisions recognising and enforcing that law. Smith, 18 U.S. at 160-61; see also The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700, 20 S.Ct. 290, 44 L.Ed. 320 (1900) ([W]here there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations; and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators....). Evidence of the law of nations may also be garnered from international agreements and United Nations declarations. See Siderman, 965 F.2d at 716-17; Filartiga I, 630 F.2d at 883-84. 53 Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice serves as a convenient summary of the sources of international law, although we recognize that defining [t]he `sources' of international law is a subject of much continuing scholarship. United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 100-01 (2d Cir.2003). Article 38 provides, in part: 54 1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: 55 a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; 56 b. international custom, as evidence of a general ractice accepted as law; 57 c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 58 d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. 10 59 Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, U.S.T.S. 993. 60 International agreements to which the United States is a signatory provide an obvious and convenient starting point. It would be, of course, a relatively simple analysis if we could pinpoint in such an agreement a prohibition against transborder abductions. Despite eloquent arguments to the contrary, we find no such support in the text of any international agreement. 61 Alvarez and the amici point to a number of international human rights instruments which, they argue, support an individual right to remain free of transborder abductions. But no authority cited by Alvarez recognizes an explicit prohibition against forcible abduction. 11 Rather, each of the authorities speaks to general prohibitions against restricting an individual's right to freedom and movement and security of person. For example, the American Convention on Human Rights (American Convention), which Alvarez cites, states that [e]very person has the right to personal liberty and security and [n]o one shall be deprived of his physical liberty except for the reasons and under the conditions established beforehand by the constitution of the State Party concerned or by a law established pursuant thereto. Art. 7(1), 7(2), opened for signature Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (signed but not ratified by the United States). Similarly, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) provides that [e]veryone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence. Art. 12, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) (ratified by the United States Sept. 8, 1992). See also Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal Declaration), art. 13(1), G.A. Res. 217A (III), 3 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) (Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.); 12 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, art. VIII, May 2, 1948, O.A.S. Res. XXX, reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.LV/II. 82 doc. 6 rev. 1, at 17 (1992) (Every person has the right to fix his residence within the territory of the state of which he is a national, to move about freely within such territory, and not to leave it except by his own will.). Such general prohibitions are insufficient to support Alvarez's claim that there is an international norm against transborder abduction because an actionable claim under the ATCA requires the showing of a violation of the law of nations that is specific, universal, and obligatory. 62 Looking beyond the declarations and covenants to treaties does not yield a different result. 13 At the time of Alvarez's abduction, the United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty did not extend to transborder abduction and there was no separate treaty with such a prohibition. See Alvarez-Machain II, 504 U.S. at 669-70, 112 S.Ct. 2188. The absence of any agreement is consistent with our conclusion that the United States has not embraced the prohibition urged by Alvarez. That is not to say that Alvarez's abduction went unnoticed. Indeed, it was met with a formal diplomatic protest by Mexico and considerable public outcry. 14 63 In 1994, four years after Alvarez was abducted, the United States and Mexico reached an agreement to prohibit the practice of transborder arrest. Treaty to Prohibit Transborder Abductions, Nov. 23, 1994, U.S.-Mex., reprinted in Michael Abbell, Extradition to and From the United States, at A-303 (2002). That agreement is not yet in force, however, because the President has not submitted it to the Senate for its advice and consent. See id. at A-287. In any event, the proposed treaty would not help Alvarez: it would explicitly foreclose the right of abductees to sue their abductors. See id. at A-303. If anything, this development underscores the void that existed before the treaty was signed and the reality that the United States does not yet consider itself bound by the supposed norm against transborder abductions. Alvarez offers no other legislative or judicial source that supports a specific, enforceable norm against transborder abductions. 64 The United States claims that unilateral, transborder abductions are a rare occurrence. And the notion of sneaking across the border to nab a criminal suspect surely raises more than a diplomatic eyebrow. Nonetheless, our review of the international authorities and literature reveals no specific binding obligation, express or implied, on the part of the United States or its agents to refrain from transborder kidnapping. Nor can we say that there is a universal consensus in the sense that we use that term to describe well-entrenched customs of international law. Any agreement that may exist on this score has failed to surface in the declarations and accords that commonly manifest the mutual concern of states. See Filartiga I, 630 F.2d at 888 (It is only where the nations of the world have demonstrated that the wrong is of mutual, and not merely several, concern, by means of express international accords, that a wrong generally recognized becomes an international law violation within the meaning of the statute.). Because a human rights norm recognizing an individual's right to be free from transborder abductions has not reached a status of international accord sufficient to render it obligatory or universal, it cannot qualify as an actionable norm under the ATCA. This is a case where aspiration has not yet ripened into obligation. 15 65