Opinion ID: 1298190
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Reconsideration of Prior Decision

Text: We turn first to the contention that our prior decision should be reconsidered. The underlying facts are as follows: The relevant contracts called for ADF to build several schools for the School District. At trial, the central dispute was over when completion was required. The contracts state on their face that completion was required by August 31, 1980. ADF, however, presented evidence that the School District told ADF during a pre-bid conference it could actually complete construction up to eleven months later and that this was the purpose behind a contract provision which imposes only nominal liquidated damages for the first eleven months after August 31. After work began, the School District pressured ADF to complete the schools by August 31, 1980. ADF employees testified that they did accelerate the work pace in response to this pressure. ADF seeks compensation for its costs resulting from what it perceives as this unwarranted acceleration. Lower Kuskokwim, 734 P.2d at 63. We held that the contracts were integrated and that therefore they could not be varied by prior negotiations or agreements. Id. at 64. It followed that the school district did not breach the contracts by requiring compliance with the August 31 deadline. We therefore reversed the judgment in favor of ADF and remanded for a disposition consistent with the opinion. Id. ADF now requests that we overrule this decision primarily because (1) it is contrary to an overwhelming body of Alaska precedent which had as a practical matter rendered the parol evidence rule a dead letter in Alaska, and (2) this court should not have determined that the contracts were integrated. Our scope of review on the question of reconsideration is narrow. The doctrine of law of the case generally prohibits reconsideration of issues which have been decided in a prior appeal in the same case. Wolff v. Arctic Bowl, Inc., 560 P.2d 758, 763 (Alaska 1977). Former decisions will not be reconsidered absent exceptional circumstances, Patrick v. Sedwick, 413 P.2d 169, 173 (Alaska 1966), a term which refers to clear error constituting a manifest injustice. White v. Higgins, 116 F.2d 312, 317 (1st Cir.1940). No such circumstances appear in this case. ADF's argument that our decision was contrary to an overwhelming body of precedent which had made the parol evidence rule a dead letter in Alaska reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of the parol evidence rule. ADF cites a number of cases typified by Wright v. Vickaryous, 598 P.2d 490, 497 (Alaska 1979), which hold that extrinsic evidence can be utilized in determining the meaning of a contract. [1] ADF evidently believes that the fact that extrinsic evidence can be utilized in determining the meaning of a contract means that the parol evidence rule is inoperative. This belief is mistaken. The parol evidence rule is a rule of substantive law which holds that an integrated written contract may not be varied or contradicted by prior negotiations or agreements. Before the parol evidence rule can be applied, three preliminary determinations must be made: (1) whether the contract is integrated, (2) what the contract means, and (3) whether the prior agreement conflicts with the integrated agreement. [2] Alaska Northern Dev., Inc. v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 666 P.2d 33, 37-40 (Alaska 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1041, 104 S.Ct. 706, 79 L.Ed.2d 170 (1984). Extrinsic evidence may always be received on the question of meaning. [3] Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. O'Kelley, 645 P.2d 767, 771 n. 1 (Alaska 1982). Once the meaning of the written contract is determined, however, the parol evidence rule precludes the enforcement of prior inconsistent agreements. Alaska Northern, 666 P.2d at 37. ADF's contention that the parol evidence rule had become ineffective in Alaska is particularly untenable in light of Alaska Northern, where we explicitly recognized that in determining the meaning of a contract prior to the application of the parol evidence rule, extrinsic evidence should be consulted. [4] Id. This is not to say that the parol evidence rule is easy to apply. There is an obvious tension between using extrinsic evidence of a prior agreement for the purpose of determining the meaning of an integrated contract, and barring the use of a prior agreement to change an integrated contract once its meaning is determined. The evidence which is consulted to determine meaning may be the same evidence which is later excluded, or rendered irrelevant, by the parol evidence rule. However, this apparent conflict is made manageable in most cases by various practical rules. For example, while extrinsic evidence should be consulted in determining the meaning of a written contract, nonetheless after the transaction has been shown in all its length and breadth, the words of an integrated agreement remain the most important evidence of intention. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 212 comment b. Further, questions of interpretation of the meaning of written documents are treated as questions of law for the court except where they are dependent for their resolution on conflicting extrinsic evidence. O'Kelley, 645 P.2d at 771 n. 2; Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 212, comments d, e. The question of the meaning of a written contract, including a review of the extrinsic evidence to determine whether any of the extrinsic evidence is conflicting, is a preliminary question for the court. Where there is conflicting extrinsic evidence the court, rather than the jury, must nonetheless decide the question of meaning except where the written language, read in context, is reasonably susceptible to both asserted meanings. Alaska Northern, 666 P.2d at 39. ADF's argument that this court could not have determined that the contracts were integrated also lacks merit. As we stated in our prior opinion, that question is one for the court. Lower Kuskokwim, 734 P.2d at 63. See also Mitford v. de Lasala, 666 P.2d 1000, 1004 (Alaska 1983); Alaska Northern, 666 P.2d at 37; Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 209(2) & comment c. It is a question which this court is as well situated to decide as the trial court. [5] ADF's contention that by so ruling this court unconstitutionally deprived it of the opportunity to be heard as to the issue of integration lacks merit. ADF presented its arguments to this court. The evidence which would prove or disprove integration was admitted at trial for the purpose of proving the existence of a prior inconsistent agreement. The thrust of ADF's argument below was that the parties intended the prior agreement to survive the execution of the contract. ADF also stresses the absence of an integration clause in the contracts. [6] However, the Instructions to Bidders form supplied to ADF contains a clause which is functionally equivalent to an integration clause. It deals specifically with pre-bid oral instructions: Explanation to Bidders. Any explanation desired by bidders regarding the meaning or interpretation of the drawings and specifications must be requested in writing and with sufficient time allowed for a reply to reach them before the submission of their bids. Oral explanations or instructions given before the award of the contract will not be binding. Any interpretation made will be in the form of an addendum to the specifications or drawings and will be furnished to all bidders and its receipt by the bidder shall be acknowledged. (Emphasis added). The terms of this clause highlight the correctness of the ruling that these contracts were integrated. They were publicly bid contracts whose terms could not be modified materially except in a formal fashion, so that all those interested in obtaining the contract would be treated equally. [7] We also reject as insubstantial ADF's remaining arguments as to reconsideration. Exceptional circumstances do not exist, thus the law of the case doctrine precludes reconsideration.