Opinion ID: 2550075
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Denial of Appellant's motion for physical testing of pieces of evidence

Text: Appellant next contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion requesting, inter alia, the trial court's permission to have a ballistics expert examine one of the bullets found with the gun under the rock on July 7, 2004. Appellant's Fifth Supplemental Pretrial Motion, filed 8/22/2005, at ¶ 4A. The trial court scheduled a hearing on this motion for October 7, 2005, during which Appellant, through counsel, made an oral request that the clothing and shoes the deputies were wearing, as well as the shoes worn by Appellant and his girlfriend, Duva, be forwarded to R.J. Lee Group, Monroeville for examination. N.T. Hearing, 10/7/05, at 2. The Commonwealth responded by requesting the defense make an offer as to why the requested testing was material to his defense. Appellant refused, stating: Your Honor, we believe that under Rule 572(b) [sic] subsection (1)(f), that we're permitted to examine any tangible evidence. It's a mandatory discovery. And that's our position. Wewe have discussed whether it is our burden to come forth and to tell you in open court before the Commonwealth as to the reason behind that. I will tell you that it is Mr. Lepley and my opinion that to do that would divulge our theory of the case, and that we do not believe that that's in the interest of our defendant to do that. And at this point in time, our request isas you know, the one in regarding Mr. Wently looking at the cartridges and taking `em apart. The other one is to have these items forwarded to the R.J. Lee group for examination. That's our offer. We believe that we're entitled to do that under the applicable discovery rules. Id. at 4-5. The trial court denied the motion. Presently, Appellant, principally citing Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(B)(1)(f), [33] asserts that the trial court erred by denying him the right to examine these clothing items and the bullet. [34] We review a trial court's decision to deny a discovery request pursuant to this rule under an abuse of discretion standard. Commonwealth v. Ogrod, 576 Pa. 412, 461, 839 A.2d 294, 323 (2003). Unless an appellant demonstrates how he was prejudiced by the decision to deny discovery he cannot show an abuse of discretion. Id. As noted above, Appellant refused at the hearing to offer a reason why the specific testing he requested was necessary to his defense. Further, even after the trial court indicated at the hearing that it would be denying the motion, Appellant's counsel reiterated his refusal to make an offer of proof regarding the reason for the request, stating he would not be calling his firearm expert to testify what he would be doing with the items. Additionally, he admitted to not having anyone from the R.J. Lee Group present to testify and explain what testing that organization would be conducting. N.T. Hearing, 10/7/05, at 6-7. Under these circumstances, the trial court denied the motion for testing, citing this failure to lay a proper foundation for the discovery request, and its concern for the potential destruction of evidence, i.e., the `breaking down' of cartridges. Trial Court Opinion, 10/12/05, at 5. According to the trial court, it had, in fact, previously granted permission for Appellant to conduct tests on the evidence which could possibly consume the evidence, provided that a representative of the Commonwealth was present for oversight. Trial Court Opinion, 7/6/07, at 5. Appellant presented no rationale at the hearing as to why this requirement could not be met during the conduct of the testing he requested. Appellant contends that he was severely prejudiced by the trial court's decision and unable to prepare an adequate defense. Appellant's Brief at 24. In support of this contention, he now avers, baldly and for the first time, without citation to support in the record: As testified to by the Commonwealth's experts, the testing completed by Skip Schwoebel could have been used to determine if Appellant was in an area where a firearm was discharged. If the test proved negative, then Appellant could have arguably been ruled out as the shooter. Id. However, Appellant did not present this argument to the trial court in support of his request for testing, nor did he proffer any other rationale beyond his bare claim of entitlement to testing under Pa.R.Crim.P. 573. While Appellant was not obligated to divulge his entire theory of the case in order to obtain the requested testing, he was, nevertheless, under the plain language of Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(B)(1), required to present some plausible reason to the trial court as to why the testing would be material to his defense. [35] See id. ([T]he Commonwealth shall disclose to the defendant's attorney all of the following requested items [including any tangible objects or other tangible evidence] provided they are material to the instant case. The Commonwealth shall, when applicable, permit the defendant's attorney to inspect ... such items. (emphasis supplied)). Further, since the testing would have, by Appellant's own admission, resulted in physical alteration and potential destruction of the evidence, he also needed to offer reasons why he could not comply with the terms of the trial court's protective decree, authorized by this rule, that a representative of the Commonwealth be present during such testing. Because Appellant failed to make such offers of proof to the trial court, his current claim of trial court error in denying his request is waived under Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) for purposes of this direct appeal.