Opinion ID: 1168287
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the admission of the victim's statements.

Text: Bingham asserts that the statements the victim made to her mother and the police officer about Bingham's actions should not have been admitted as excited utterances under I.R.E. 803(2). We disagree. We reject the argument that the victim's statements were not excited utterances within the meaning of this exception to the hearsay rule. In State v. Parker, 112 Idaho 1, 730 P.2d 921 (1986) this Court upheld the admission of the victim's taped statement to an Idaho Fish and Game officer two to three hours after the alleged rape. There we said: In sex crime cases, the excited utterance exception often receives broader application than in other cases. From the traditional admission of evidence of the fact of a victim's complaint of sexual assault, there has developed an expansion of the excited utterance exception under which many jurisdictions admit not only the fact of complaint, but its details. [Citations omitted.] ... The tendency to admit such statements, even when made hours after the event, probably lies in their high probative value. Given that sexual assault crimes violate one's most intimate physical and mental feelings, the victim can reasonably be expected not to discuss the crime until meeting with a family member, close friend, law enforcement agent, or other trusted individual. .... A sexual assault is one of the most distressing experiences a person could have. The distress is likely to remain bottled up in the victim until she or he can talk about what happened. 112 Idaho at 4, 730 P.2d at 924. This Court has traditionally followed the rule that the admission of excited utterances as an exception to the hearsay rule is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. E.g., State v. Chacon, 36 Idaho 148, 155, 209 P. 889, 891 (1922); State v. Breyer, 40 Idaho 324, 334, 232 P. 560, 564 (1925); Parker, 112 Idaho at 4, 730 P.2d at 924. Here, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the statement of the victim to her mother and the police officer. The circumstances in which the victim made the statements at issue here support the decision of the trial court to admit them as evidence. The statements were made within two hours after the event. The victim's mother and the police office both testified that the victim was upset when she made the statements to them. Bingham also argues that by allowing the victim's mother and the police officer to testify as to what the victim told them, the victim was allowed, in effect, to testify without taking the witness stand and without being subjected to cross examination. This position overlooks a basic principle of the law of evidence in this state. The admissibility of excited utterances is not dependent on whether the person making those statements is called as a witness, or is, in fact, competent to be a witness. I.R.E. 803 states: The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness. .... (2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition. (Emphasis supplied.) This makes it clear that the admissibility of excited utterance evidence does not depend on whether the declarant is available as a witness or not. In State v. Breyer, 40 Idaho 324, 232 P. 560 (1925) this Court held that the statements of a wife that would otherwise be admissible under the excited utterance exception are not rendered inadmissible merely because the wife is not a competent witness in a criminal action against her husband. In Breyer this Court noted: By the weight of authority the declarations of persons not competent to testify  for instance, infants  may be received as part of the res gestae.  40 Idaho at 335, 232 P. at 564. We point out that there was never any determination that the victim was incompetent to testify. Neither the state nor Bingham put the trial court to the task of determining that question, since neither called the victim as a witness during the trial. We note that in considering an objection by Bingham's attorney during the testimony of the victim's sister, the trial court conducted a hearing out of the presence of the jury in the form of an offer of proof as to what the sister would testify the victim told her. During that hearing the trial court stated to the prosecutor: I'm going to require you at this time to inquire of the witness. I'm going to require that you lay a proper foundation, I'm going to require that you prove to my satisfaction that the time, content and circumstances of the statements have sufficient indicia of reliability as required by Idaho Code 19-3024. We will use this hearing at this time for the purpose of determining whether or not the proper foundation can be laid. The statute to which the trial court referred provides: 19-3024. Statements by child.  Statements made by a child under the age of ten (10) years describing any act of sexual abuse, physical abuse, or other criminal conduct committed with or upon the child, although not otherwise admissible by statute or court, are admissible in evidence after a proper foundation has been laid in accordance with the Idaho rules of evidence in any proceedings under the child protective act, chapter 16, title 16, Idaho Code, or in any criminal proceedings in the courts of the state of Idaho if: 1. The court finds, in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury that the time, content, and circumstances of the statements provide sufficient indicia of reliability; and 2. The child either: (a) Testifies at the proceedings; or (b) Is unavailable as a witness. A child is unavailable as a witness when the child is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity. Provided, that when the child is unavailable as a witness, such statements may be admitted only if there is corroborative evidence of the act. Statements may not be admitted unless the proponent of the statements notifies the adverse party of his intention to offer the statements and the particulars of the statements sufficiently in advance of the proceedings to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet the statements. Following the offer of proof, the trial court reserved ruling on the admissibility of the sister's proposed testimony as to the victim's statements to her. It appears that the subject of the victim's competency was never raised again during the trial. In any event, the testimony of the victim's mother and the police officer concerning the excited utterances of the victim were offered under I.R.E. 803(2) and not under I.C. § 19-3024. For that reason, and in view of Breyer, whether the victim was competent to testify or not is not the issue. The statements were admissible as excited utterances, regardless of whether the victim ever testified or was competent to testify.