Opinion ID: 1405642
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: The Statute Of Limitations Was Tolled During The Period Of Ferdinand's Constitutional Immunity From Suit.

Text: Imelda contends that Roxas's claims for relief sounding in battery and false imprisonment, as well as GBC's claim of conversion, were barred by operation of the relevant statutes of limitations. She points out that the instant lawsuit was not filed until seventeen years after the golden buddha was allegedly confiscated, fourteen years after Roxas was last allegedly assaulted, and twelve to thirteen years after the remaining treasure was allegedly recovered from the tunnel near the Baguio General Hospital. HRS § 657-9 (1993) provides that [w]hen a cause of action has arisen in any foreign jurisdiction, and by the laws thereof an action thereon cannot there be maintained against a person, by reason of the lapse of time, an action thereon shall not be maintained against the person in this State, except in favor of a domiciled resident thereof, who has held the cause of action from the time it accrued. Thus, by its terms, HRS § 657-9 requires that the plaintiffsappellees' claims for relief must have been brought in compliance with the time constraints imposed by any applicable Philippine statute of limitations. The parties do not dispute that Imelda adequately established that the relevant time period mandated by the statute of limitations for false imprisonment and battery, pursuant to Article 1146 of Philippine Civil Code, is two years, and, for conversion, pursuant to Article 1140 of the Philippine Civil Code, four years. The jury was instructed regarding these statutes of limitations. However, the jury was also instructed, without objection, that [t]he statute of limitations has been devised to operate primarily against those who slept on their rights and not against those desireous to act but who cannot do so for causes beyond their control. The latter instruction was a direct quotation from Republic of the Philippines v. The Court of Appeals, 137 SCRA 220, 228 (1985) ( de Vera ), an authority supplied to the circuit court by the plaintiffs-appellees. In addition, the jury was instructedin this instance, over Imelda's objectionthat [t]he time for filing a lawsuit does not begin to run on plaintiff if it was impossible or virtually impossible for Roger Roxas to file a lawsuit. The statute of limitations only begins to run from the date that the lawsuit could be filed. In their closing argument, the plaintiffs-appellees urged that the relevant statutes of limitations were tolled in the present case because Ferdinand, while still in power, (1) had engineered an amendment to the Philippine Constitution making him immune from lawsuit during his term of office and (2) had so threatened Roxas that he had justifiably feared challenging Marcos in court. On appeal, Imelda argues that (1) Hawai`i should not recognize duress as a defense to the statute of limitations, citing cases from a number of state and federal jurisdictions, and (2) Ferdinand was not immune from lawsuits unrelated to his official acts. Inasmuch as we disagree with Imelda's latter argument, we need not reach the former. [23] In de Vera, the issue before the Philippine Supreme Court was whether a trial court's issuance of an alias writ of execution of a prior judgment was barred by the statute of limitations, inasmuch as the judgment had become final more than five years before. de Vera, 137 SCRA at 227. The Republic had sued Mercy and Juan de Vera (collectively, the de Veras) for back rent for an apartment the de Veras rented in a building owned by the state. Id. at 222. The Republic prevailed, and a judgment was filed in its favor on May 18, 1961. Id. at 223. The de Veras appealed the judgment, but, by decision filed on August 27, 1968, the Republic prevailed in the Court of Appeals. On April 15, 1969, the Republic filed its first motion for the execution of the trial court's judgment. Id. The motion was granted by an order filed on April 17, 1969. However, the de Veras appealed the order on the ground that service of the Republic's motion had been insufficient. Id. at 224. Pending the appeal, the trial court recalled the writ of execution. Id. at 225. The Republic again prevailed on appeal and filed a motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution on January 25, 1974. Id. The de Veras opposed the motion, but the trial court granted it in an order filed on July 12, 1974. Id. at 226. The de Veras moved to quash the writ, but the trial court refused to do so. Id. at 226. The de Veras then appealed to the Court of Appeals, where they prevailed. Id. In response to the petition for a writ of certiorari filed by the Republic in the Philippines Supreme Court, the de Veras argued that the Republic's motion for the alias writ of execution was time-barred because Rule 39, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court provided that a judgment may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry or from the date it became final[.] Id. at 227. The Philippines Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations had been tolled because the de Veras had, by their own actions, caused the delay in filing the writ. Id. at 228. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. As noted above, the de Vera court also expressly held that the statue of limitations does not apply to those desirous to act but [who] cannot do so for causes beyond their control. Thus, pursuant to de Vera, (1) if a party, through her own actions, causes a delay resulting in her opponent's inability to comply with the statute of limitations in a timely fashion or (2) if it is otherwise impossible for a party to comply with the statute of limitations, then (3) the statute of limitations is tolled under Philippine law. It is manifestly apparent in this case that it would have been impossible for Roxas to file a lawsuit in the Philippines, which asserted the claims for relief at issue herein, during the Marcos regime. Article VII, § 7 of the 1973 Philippines Constitution (adopted through Ferdinand's instrumentality) provided as follows: The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure. In 1981, when the constitution was further amended and the relevant section was renumbered, the following language was added: Thereafter, no suit whatsoever shall lie for official acts done by him or by others pursuant to his specific orders during his tenure. The immunities provided herein shall apply to the incumbent President referred to in Article XVII of this Constitution. Phil. Const. art. VII, § 15 (1981). [24] Imelda argues that the foregoing constitutional language stands only for the proposition that, as president, Ferdinand was immune from suit for his official acts. She points out that, in response to her defenses of head of state and act of state immunity ( see discussion infra ), the plaintiffsappellees have argued that Ferdinand's alleged acts of appropriating the gold and causing Roxas to be unlawfully detained and tortured were not official. However, she cites no Philippine legal authority to support her reading of the constitution. Absent case law construing the relevant provision, this court is left only with the plain language of the constitution itself. Nothing in the plain language of article VII, § 7 of the 1973 constitution supports the proposition that its scope was restricted to lawsuits predicated on official acts, as Imelda suggests. Rather, the more literal sense of the section is that it absolutely barred all lawsuits filed against the president while he held that office. Our interpretation is only fortified by the 1981 amendment, which clarified that, even after his tenure as president, Ferdinand would not be subject to lawsuits based on his official acts. Pursuant to the rule of statutory construction denominated expressio unius est exclusio alterius the express inclusion of a provision implies the exclusion of another, Ferdinand would have been subject to suit only for his nonofficial acts once his presidential term had ended. See Fought & Company v. Steel Eng'g and Erection, Inc., 87 Hawai`i 37, 55, 951 P.2d 487, 505 (1998); Keliipuleole v. Wilson, 85 Hawai`i 217, 227, 941 P.2d 300, 310 (1997); State v. Cornelio, 84 Hawai`i 476, 495 n. 33, 935 P.2d 1021, 1040 n. 33 (1997); Arceo, 84 Hawai`i at 29 n. 38, 928 P.2d at 871 n. 38; International Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Wiig, 82 Hawai`i 197, 200, 921 P.2d 117, 120 (1996). Accordingly, it is clear that Roxas would have been unable to bring any lawsuit against Ferdinand in the Philippines so long as Ferdinand remained in power. Thus, pursuant to de Vera, the statutes of limitations were tolled as a matter of law until the collapse of Ferdinand's regime. The record indicates that Ferdinand's presidency effectively ended on the date he was brought to Hawai`iFebruary 25, 1986. The instant lawsuit was filed on February 19, 1988, within the two-year Philippines statute of limitations relating to battery and false imprisonment ( i.e., Article 1146) and the four-year Phillippines statute of limitations relating to conversion ( i.e., Article 1140). Imelda's statute of limitations defense therefore fails.