Opinion ID: 1729457
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the trial judge erred in revoking appellant's probation.

Text: Jurisdiction arises from the trial judge's denial of appellant's oral motion to dismiss revocation proceedings pursuant to Section 949.10 on constitutional grounds. Appellant properly contended then as now that Section 949.10 must be read in pari materia with Sections 949.11 and 949.12. I accept the facts as stated by the majority except to emphasize that appellant was not adjudicated guilty prior to being placed on probation and to add that all charges were nolle prossed after revocation was ordered. Section 949.10 provides essentially that a subsequent felony arrest of a probationer constitutes prima facie evidence of probation violation, immediately revokes probation upon such arrest and denies the right to bail until hearing. Section 949.10 operates together with Sections 949.11 and 949.12. Section 949.11 requires a hearing within ten days of arrest and Section 949.12 denies bail prior to the hearing provided in Section 949.11. First, as to Appellant's argument that Section 949.10 is unconstitutional for vagueness, I concur with the majority although I could not agree on the same ground as to another statute in Lindsey v. State, supra, cited by the majority as authority for upholding Section 949.10 here. I must also concur in the majority's observations as to the nature and purpose of probation. Second, I agree with Appellant's argument that on the facts herein the combined effect of Section 949.10 together with Sections 949.11 and 949.12 deprives him of his constitutional right to bail. But I also agree with the majority, which declines to reach the issue of constitutionality on the ground of denial of bail, in finding that so far as Section 949.10 deprives the court of its discretion in granting bail it is superseded by Rule 3.790, Fla.Cr.P.R. since rules of practice and procedure adopted by this Court supersede any legislation inconsistent therewith. While the federal courts have held that denial of bail to a suspected probation violator is not violative of the federal constitution, the statute must also meet the test of the Florida Constitution which in Article I, Section 14 imposes a different standard: Bail. Until adjudged guilty, every person charged with a crime or violation of municipal or county ordinance shall be entitled to release on reasonable bail with sufficient surety unless charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by life imprisonment and the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption is great. (Emphasis supplied.) Section 949.10 provides for a probationer subject to the statute to remain in custody until a hearing ... Section 949.12 provides for temporary denial of bail to  any person whose probation has been temporarily revoked pursuant to § 949.10 (Emphasis supplied.) In the instant case Appellant was never adjudged guilty prior to being placed on probation and as such he never lost his civil rights and was still entitled to bail under the above constitutional provision. Yet he was not bailable under Sections 949.10 and 949.12. Without supersession by the rule of that part of Section 949.10 which would eliminate the discretionary element in granting bail, Section 949.10 as applied would fail the constitutional test and fall to higher authority. I would strike it down on other grounds, but if the statute stands it should be made clear that it must operate without denying bail with reference made to the discretion vested in the trial judge by Rule 3.790. Third, I cannot agree with the majority that Section 949.10 meets the minimum due process requirements of Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, as made applicable to probation revocation by Gagnon v. Scarpelli, supra, or that such requirements were afforded Appellant here. As I read Morrissey and Gagnon , two revocation hearings are required, each with its own minimum requirements of due process. In Gagnon the United States Supreme Court unequivocally said: Accordingly, we hold that a probationer, like a parolee, is entitled to a preliminary and a final revocation hearing, under the conditions specified in Morrissey v. Brewer, supra. 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d, at 662. With regard to the hearings themselves, the Court said: ... At the preliminary hearing, a probationer or parolee is entitled to notice of the alleged violations of probation or parole, an opportunity to appear and to present evidence in his own behalf, a conditional right to confront adverse witnesses, an independent decision-maker, and a written report of the hearing. Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, 408 U.S. at 487, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484. The final hearing is a less summary one because the decision under consideration is the ultimate decision to revoke rather than a mere determination of probable cause, but the `minimum requirements of due process' include very similar elements: `(a) written notice of the claimed violations of [probation or] parole; (b) disclosure to the [probationer or] parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a neutral and detached hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking [probation or] parole.' Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, 408 U.S. at 489, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484. These requirements in themselves serve as substantial protection against ill-considered revocation ... 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d at 664. Section 949.10, however, expressly preempts one of the two hearings the Supreme Court mandated as minimum requirements and by so doing, at least in this case, encourages ill-considered revocation. The statute provides that a subsequent felony arrest of a probationer shall be prima facie evidence of the violation of the terms and conditions of such ... probation. (Emphasis supplied.) Yet Morrissey and Gagnon impose a preliminary hearing to establish whether there exists such evidence in arriving at a determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to detention of a probationer until a more formal final hearing can be held. The majority reasons as follows: Implicit in the language of Section 949.10, to-wit: subsequent arrest on a felony charge is that the arrest be lawful in accordance with Chapter 901, Florida Statutes, based on probable cause that the probationer or parolee has committed a felony or on a warrant buttressed by a judicial determination of probable cause. Florida law nowhere authorizes a mere arrest without probable cause. Or, in effect, that probable cause sufficient for a felony arrest is sufficient to satisfy the preliminary hearing requirements of Morrissey and Gagnon . The argument fails when comparison is made between the prima facie evidence language of Section 949.10 and the probable cause inherent in a felony arrest on the one hand; the notice of alleged violations, opportunity to appear and present evidence, conditional right to confront adverse witnesses, an independent decisionmaker, and written hearing report, each of which the probationer is entitled to under Morrissey and Gagnon on the other. There are clear substantive as well as procedural differences which cannot be ignored and cannot be swept away by reliance on the state statute. The statute denies a probationer minimum due process as explicated in Morrissey and Gagnon and is therefore unconstitutional. Fourth, assuming arguendo that due process does not require a preliminary revocation hearing, then the final and only revocation hearing afforded Appellant pursuant to Section 949.10 still fails to comply with the requirements of Morrissey and Gagnon . I have carefully examined the hearing transcript and find it inadequately satisfies element (f) as quoted above from Gagnon . Nowhere in the record is there a written statement as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for revoking probation. The transcript and the ruling of the trial court leave the reasoning as to its decision obscured. On this ground alone I would reverse the lower court for denial of due process in light of the requirements herein stated.