Opinion ID: 3065954
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The district court abused its discretion

Text: The lack-of-luggage argument played a prominent role in the government’s rebuttal during closing arguments. As part of his rebuttal, the prosecutor asserted for the first time that Maloney must have been lying about the purpose of his trip between the California cities of El Centro and Blythe because there was no luggage found in the truck when it was stopped at the Highway 78 Border Patrol checkpoint. The prosecutor made this lack-of-luggage argument despite the fact that there was no evidence presented at trial to establish whether Maloney did or did not have luggage during the trip. Emphasizing the new lack-of-luggage argument, the prosecutor began his rebuttal by describing a scene from A Few Good Men, a movie about a murder trial. In the scene described, an attorney played by Tom Cruise argued that he could prove that certain Marine officers had lied when they testified that the victim—who had died in the middle of the night—was scheduled to permanently leave the naval base at Guantanamo Bay early the next morning because there was no evidence that the victim had packed any of his belongings. The prosecutor in the present case urged the jury to think about the evidence that was not presented, just like Tom Cruise had done in the movie: 38 UNITED STATES V . MALONEY Which comes to the final thing that is not there. And when I tell you this, you will realize why I remembered the scene in A Few Good Men. Remember the testimony [of Maloney]: I met Mr. Hernandez. He wanted me to drive. I have this truck that has the long-haul capacity. I can drive a long way. I can sleep in the back. But I tell you what, I can only limit it to 10 or 11 days because of my personal situation. .... And the final thing that is not there: luggage. Where is his stuff? I [(speaking as Maloney)] am going to—I know that I have long-haul capabilities for 10 to 11 days. I go with this Clorox to Las Vegas. I spend the night in Las Vegas. I get a call[;] I got to go to El Centro. I have two days in El Centro. Where is his stuff? .... Where is his stuff? Knowing it was going to be 10 days—knowing that he could go up to 10 days, he has the sleeping accommodations. UNITED STATES V . MALONEY 39 .... Because remember what is missing, among other things: luggage. If he didn’t have any luggage—or if he had luggage, then the possibility would have been, I got to put it somewhere. And he put it—where would he put it? He would put it on the bed or on that top shelf [where the marijuana was located]. .... Ladies and Gentlemen, the evidence here shows the defendant knew exactly what he was doing. That his versions of the events are not true, they are not reasonable, they make no sense. And that someone would not [sic] hire him and then risk the discovery by just putting [the marijuana] up on a shelf; when, if the defendant had luggage, that is where he would put it. (Emphasis added.) The government concedes that it never raised this argument before its rebuttal summation. And the prosecutor admitted to this court, in the following colloquy at oral argument, that he “sandbagg[ed]” Maloney by withholding the lack-of-luggage argument until rebuttal, when Maloney had no opportunity to respond: 40 UNITED STATES V . MALONEY Judge Gilman: Alright, then why didn’t you raise this [lack-of-luggage] argument in your first argument on summation? Assistant U.S. Attorney, Steve Miller: Because I don’t believe that I needed to. Judge Gilman: Aren’t you sandbagging a bit—to wait for rebuttal? Miller: Yes I was. Put simply, the government held back the lack-of-luggage argument for rebuttal when the argument could have, and should have, been made earlier in the trial. See United States v. Taylor, 728 F.2d 930, 937 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding “that a prosecutor cannot use rebuttal to put forth new arguments, but is restricted to responding to the points made by the defense counsel in closing argument”). The majority excuses the government’s belated argument by reasoning that defense counsel “opened the door to argument addressing the credibility and believability of Maloney and his story.” (Maj. Op. at 27) But the open-thedoor exception makes sense only if the door was unexpectedly opened for the first time during the defendant’s closing argument. See United States v. Rubinson, 543 F.2d 951, 966 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that defense counsel, by pointing out gaps in the government’s proof that the government would “have been expected to negate previously,” did not open the door to the government’s reference to new facts on rebuttal that “it could have, but did not, introduce at trial”). The government should not be able UNITED STATES V . MALONEY 41 to take advantage of this exception when it had ample notice of the defendant’s credibility argument. In this case, Maloney’s main defense throughout the trial was to demonstrate his propensity for truthfulness. He called two character witnesses to testify to just that. And we have the government’s concession that its failure to raise the lackof-luggage argument earlier was part of its strategy to “sandbag” Maloney, not because it was surprised by any contentions made by Maloney’s counsel in closing argument. The lack-of-luggage argument, moreover, was improper not just because it was raised for the first time on rebuttal. It was also improper because, in contrast to the information regarding the insurance certificate, drivers permit, trip log, and cargo manifest (which the prosecutor also presented in his rebuttal summation), the lack-of-luggage argument had no foundation in the record. See United States v. Gray, 876 F.2d 1411, 1417 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting that “it is improper to base closing arguments upon evidence not in the record”). This crucial distinction is not addressed by the majority. Instead, the majority concludes that, “even though defense counsel’s closing argument did not expressly mention the date of the insurance certificate, drivers permit, trip log, cargo manifest, or luggage, defense counsel opened the door to that information being presented in the prosecutor’s rebuttal summation by basing its argument on the proposition that the Government had not cast doubt on Maloney’s credibility and not shown him to be a liar.” (Maj. Op. at 28) The majority then flatly states that “[t]he specific content of the prosecution’s arguments are red herrings” because “[d]efense 42 UNITED STATES V . MALONEY counsel opens the door to topics or issues, not specific facts.” (Id. at 28) But the case cited by the majority in support of that statement, United States v. Lawson, 483 F.2d 535 (8th Cir. 1973), stands only for the proposition that, “[w]hen confined to the evidence or reasonable inferences [drawn therefrom], the arguments of counsel are not to be too narrowly limited.” Id. at 539 (internal quotation marks omitted). Lawson has nothing to say about closing arguments that are not confined to the evidence in the record or reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Under Ninth Circuit caselaw, those arguments are improper, Gray, 876 F.2d at 1417, and the majority fails to explain why a rebuttal argument fashioned from whole cloth (regarding the lack of luggage) should be treated the same as ones based on facts in the record (regarding the insurance certificate, drivers permit, trip log, and cargo manifest). A brief hypothetical example reveals the flaw in the majority’s reasoning. Suppose that the prosecutor in this case had mentioned for the first time during rebuttal, despite the lack of supporting evidence, that Maloney had broken his marriage vows and cheated on his tax returns. Under the majority’s rule—that “defense counsel opens the door to topics or issues, not specific facts”—this argument would presumably be permissible because it bears on the “issue” of Maloney’s credibility. But any such rebuttal argument would surely be improper. I do not think that this court should adopt a rule that, when taken to its logical conclusion, leads to such obviously incorrect results. The majority later concludes that “the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the Government’s UNITED STATES V . MALONEY 43 rebuttal argument regarding Maloney’s lack of luggage was a permissible inference from the record” because “the prosecution’s inference that the trip necessitated luggage was ‘certainly within the bounds of fair advocacy.’” (Maj. Op. at 32 (quoting United States v. Blueford, 312 F.3d 962, 968 (9th Cir. 2002)) But the prosecutor did not simply infer that the trip necessitated luggage; he also repeatedly stated that Maloney did not in fact have any luggage—an argument that is based on absolutely no record evidence. I therefore fail to see how “there was support for the inference that could be drawn from facts in the record.” (Maj. Op. at 32 (internal quotation marks omitted)) In sum, I believe that the district court abused its discretion in denying Maloney an opportunity to respond to the government’s improper lack-of-luggage argument.