Opinion ID: 6226757
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Status-Based Discrimination

Text: Milord-Francois’s racial discrimination claims under Title VII, § 1983, and NYSHRL are subject to the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. See Kirkland v. Cablevision Sys., 760 F.3d 223, 225 (2d Cir. 2014) (Title VII); Garcia v. Hartford Police Dep’t, 706 F.3d 120, 127 (2d Cir. 2013) (§ 1983); Tolbert v. Smith, 790 F.3d 427, 434 (2d Cir. 2015) (NYSHRL). Under this standard, Milord-Francois “bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination by showing (1) [s]he belonged to a protected class; (2) [s]he was qualified for the position [s]he held; (3) [s]he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) that the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discriminatory intent.” Tolbert, 790 F.3d at 435 (internal quotation marks omitted). Once a plaintiff “makes a prima facie case of . . . discrimination . . . , the burden shifts to the employer to give a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions.” Kirkland, 760 F.3d at 225. “If the employer does so, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer’s explanation is a pretext for race discrimination . . . .” Id. For this last step, when a discrimination claim is based on § 1983, a plaintiff must meet a more stringent showing of “but-for” causation. See Naumovski v. Norris, 934 F.3d 200, 213 (2d Cir. 2019). By contrast, for claims under Title VII and NYSHRL, a plaintiff need meet only the less rigorous “motivating factor” standard. See Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 137–38 (2d Cir. 2008). “In other words, a Title VII [or NYSHRL] plaintiff need only prove that the employer’s [or supervisor’s 3] stated non-discriminatory reason was not the exclusive reason for the adverse employment action. By contrast, to establish ‘pretext’ under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that the employer’s stated reason would not, alone, constitute a sufficient basis for pursuing an adverse action”—i.e., “that the employer’s stated non-discriminatory reason is either false or inadequate to support the adverse employment action.” Naumovski, 934 F.3d at 3 Although “claims brought under New York State’s Human Rights Law are analytically identical to claims brought under Title VII,” there is one notable exception: “while an individual defendant with supervisory control may not be held personally liable under Title VII[,] an individual defendant may be held liable under the aiding and abetting provision of the NYSHRL if [they] actually participate[] in the conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim.” Rojas v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Rochester, 660 F.3d 98, 107 n.10 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 4 214–15. Milord-Francois claims that she raises a triable issue as to whether racial discrimination contributed to her demotion. She argues that Daniels-Rivera, also a black woman, “demoted Milord after she refused to ignore Henzel’s discrimination” and thus imposed on Milord-Francois “a type of racial stereotyping” which includes “[t]he belief that black people must excuse racism to advance their careers.” Appellant’s Br. at 26. The questions before us are whether MilordFrancois met her burden at the prima facie stage; if so, whether Defendants proffered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Milord-Francois’s demotion (namely, poor performance); and if so, whether Milord-Francois raised a factual dispute as to whether racial discrimination was a motivating factor for, or a but-for cause of, that decision. First, although the question is close, we conclude that Milord-Francois has established a prima facie case of discrimination based on race in light of Daniels-Rivera’s statements to “accept” and “deal with it,” made in response to Milord-Francois’s complaints of Henzel’s racist comments. Although those statements may very well have been intended to convey to Milord-Francois nothing more than a view that she had a responsibility as a manager to address racially charged comments by a subordinate, there is just enough ambiguity in those statements—given the particular facts of this case, and viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party—to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Daniels-Rivera was instead perpetuating a racial stereotype by suggesting that Milord-Francois, as a black woman, should ignore racism. Second, we conclude that Defendants have met their burden in providing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for demoting Milord-Francois: her unsatisfactory performance as an Associate Attorney. See App’x at 185–88, 216, 689–90, 1079–82, 1633–38. In deciding whether a defendant articulated a sufficient nondiscriminatory reason for an adverse action, we do not “assess the credibility of the[] witnesses; nor . . . determine whether the [defendant’s] explanation of its action is convincing. Instead, we ask whether [the] defendant has introduced evidence that, ‘taken as true, would permit the conclusion that there was a nondiscriminatory reason.’” Holcomb, 521 F.3d at 141 (internal citation omitted) (quoting St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509 (1993)). Third, Milord-Francois raises several arguments as to why a jury could conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that this reason was pretextual. We are unpersuaded by most of Milord-Francois’s arguments, but viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we conclude that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to what Daniels-Rivera meant when she told Milord-Francois to “accept” and “deal with it.” Milord-Francois has “raised sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable jury could conclude by a preponderance of the evidence” that Daniels-Rivera’s reason for demoting her is pretextual, and that this decision “was based, at least in part,” on her race. Id. We therefore vacate the district court’s grant of summary judgment against Milord-Francois with respect to her NYSHRL claim against Daniels-Rivera and Title VII claim against OMIG, and remand for further proceedings on those two claims. We do, however, reject several other arguments raised by Milord-Francois. First, MilordFrancois argues that Henzel’s racial animus caused Rosen to demote Milord-Francois, which is enough to show pretext under the cat’s paw theory. Under that theory, “an employer may be held 5 liable for an employee’s animus . . . , regardless of the employee’s role within the organization, if the employer’s own negligence gives effect to the employee’s animus and causes the victim to suffer an adverse employment action.” Vasquez v. Empress Ambulance Serv., Inc., 835 F.3d 267, 276 (2d Cir. 2016) (emphasis added). Based on the record, no jury could find that Rosen caused Milord-Francois’s demotion. He did not assist in preparing Milord-Francois’s probation evaluation reports and the decision to demote Milord-Francois rested with Daniels-Rivera, not Rosen. The district court therefore properly granted summary judgment on the status-based discrimination claims against Rosen (i.e., claims under § 1983 and NYSHRL). Further, Milord-Francois has failed to show that racial stereotyping “played a decisive role” in her demotion, such that she can establish “but-for” causation, as required for a § 1983 claim. Naumovski, 934 F.3d at 217 (emphasis added). Indeed, she failed to show that Daniels-Rivera’s proffered reason for her demotion—poor performance—was false and inadequate, especially given that Defendants put forward significant evidence that Daniels-Rivera’s decision to demote MilordFrancois was based on perceived deficiencies in Milord-Francois’s work rather than any racial considerations. Daniels-Rivera started providing negative feedback before Milord-Francois told her in May 2016 about the interactions between Milord-Francois and Henzel. Moreover, DanielsRivera’s criticisms were frequent, documented, thorough, and unrelated to Milord-Francois’s race. See App’x at 185–88 (Milord-Francois’s negative interim probation report), 216 (email to MilordFrancois’s direct supervisor criticizing Milord-Francois’s work), 689–90 (email to MilordFrancois providing constructive criticism), 1079–82 (Daniels-Rivera’s testimony concerning another employee’s complaint about Milord-Francois), 1633–38 (Milord-Francois’s final unsatisfactory probation report). We therefore affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Daniels-Rivera on Milord-Francois’s § 1983 claim.