Opinion ID: 2975336
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 11 Cobbs argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain his convictions for conspiracy, possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, possession of firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, possession of a machine gun, and possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number. Cobbs made no motion for judgment of acquittal at trial. In order to appeal a jury’s verdict on the basis of insufficient evidence, the defendant must have moved for acquittal in the district court pursuant to Rule 29. United States v. McBride, 362 F.3d 360, 368 (6th Cir. 2004). Because no Rule 29 motion was made below, the evidence against Cobbs is reviewed under a “manifest miscarriage of justice” standard, and “we only reverse a conviction if the record is devoid of evidence pointing to guilt.” United States v. Carnes, 309 F.3d 950, 956 (6th Cir. 2002).
Cobbs first argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. §846. The elements of a drug conspiracy are: (1) an agreement to violate drug laws; (2) knowledge and intent to join the conspiracy; and (3) participation in the conspiracy. United States v. Caver, 470 F.3d 220, 232-33 (6th Cir. 2007)(citing United States v. Gibbs, 182 F.3d 408, 420 (6th Cir. 1999). The agreement to violate drug laws need not be express or formal; a tacit or mutual understanding among the parties is sufficient. United States v. Forrest, 17 F.3d 916, 918 (6th Cir. 1994). The evidence must show that the defendant had knowledge of the conspiracy’s object and consciously committed himself to the furtherance of that object. Caver, 470 F.3d at 233. “The existence of a conspiracy may be inferred from circumstantial evidence that can reasonably be interpreted as participation in the common plan.” United States v. Martinez, 430 F.3d 317, 330 (6th Cir. 2005). 12 Cobbs argues that the evidence is insufficient to establish that he and King conspired to sell drugs, as opposed to selling drugs independently. The evidence showed that Cobbs and King resided together at the Youker Road residence, and that they both sold crack cocaine at the residence. Only one stash of crack cocaine was found in the residence in a bedroom shared by Cobbs and King. Brandon Way testified that King asked him if he was interested in purchasing crack cocaine, and he began purchasing it as a middleman for Adam Cornell. Way contacted Cobbs when he wanted to purchase cocaine, and he would go to the Youker Road residence to pick it up. On one occasion when Cobbs was not there, King gave him the crack cocaine. Jeremy Shafer testified that he would telephone Cobbs and arrange to purchase crack cocaine. He stated that once or twice, he got the crack cocaine from King and gave her the money. On those occasions, he first talked to Cobbs on the telephone, and Cobbs told him to come to the residence. There is sufficient evidence to support the existence of a conspiracy in which Cobbs and King knowingly, intentionally and voluntarily participated.
Cobbs also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for possession with the intent to distribute the crack cocaine found in the sock. The elements of a charge of possession with intent to distribute illegal drugs under 21 U.S.C. §841(a)(1) are: “(1) the defendant knowingly, (2) possessed a controlled substance, (3) with intent to distribute.” United States v. Coffee, 434 F.3d 887, 897 (6th Cir. 2006). Proof of constructive possession through direct or circumstantial evidence is sufficient. United States v. Welch, 97 F.3d 142, 150 (6th Cir. 1996). To establish constructive possession, the evidence must show that Cobbs knowingly had the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion and control over the crack cocaine either directly 13 or through others. Id. While mere proximity to the drugs is not sufficient, proximity combined with other evidence of the defendant’s involvement in a conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine will suffice to establish possession. Id. at 150-51. A jury may also infer constructive possession over items found in a defendant’s home. United States v. Hill, 142 F.3d 305, 312 (6th Cir. 1998). Testimony was presented at trial that Cobbs was involved in the distribution of crack cocaine from his residence on Youker Road. The sock containing the crack cocaine was found in a dresser located in the bedroom shared by Cobbs and King. A pair of blue jeans belonging to Cobbs was found in the same dresser. The crack cocaine was packaged in individual corner baggies typically used for distribution. Cobbs relies on the testimony of his cousin, Mansour Harrell, who testified that the crack cocaine in the sock belonged to him. Cobbs argues that this testimony provides equal support for his theory of innocence, which therefore must be accepted. However, circumstantial evidence, standing alone, can sustain a guilty verdict, and the circumstantial evidence need not remove every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt. United States v. Jones, 124 F.3d 781, 784 (6th Cir. 1997). In addition, while there was ample evidence that Cobbs sold crack cocaine at his residence, Harrell testified that he used crack cocaine but did not sell it. The evidence showed that the crack cocaine in the sock weighed 36.75 grams, and that each individual package contained about 1.6 grams, sufficient for seven to eight doses. This indicates that the crack cocaine was being held for purposes of distribution, not personal use. The jury apparently found Harrell’s testimony to be unworthy of belief, and such issues of credibility are for the jury to determine. Id. There is sufficient evidence to support Cobbs’s conviction for possession. 3. 18 U.S.C. §924(c) - Possession of Firearms in Furtherance of Drug Offenses 14 Cobbs also disputes the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction for possession of firearms in furtherance of drug trafficking crimes. Under 18 U.S.C. §924(c), defendant must possess a firearm “in furtherance of” a drug trafficking crime. Possession of the weapon may be actual or constructive, and it may be either exclusive or joint. United States v. Paige, 470 F.3d 603, 610 (6th Cir. 2006). “Proof that the person has dominion over the premises where the firearm is located is sufficient to establish constructive possession.” Coffee, 434 F.3d at 896. A firearm is possessed “in furtherance of” a drug trafficking offense if it advances, promotes or facilitates the crime. Paige, 470 F.3d at 609; United States v. Mackey, 265 F.3d 457, 461 (6th Cir. 2001). There must be a “specific nexus between the gun and the crime charged.” Mackey, 265 F.3d at 462. Possession of a firearm on the same premises where drugs are located, without more, is not sufficient; rather, the gun must be “strategically located so that it is quickly and easily available for use.” Id. Other relevant factors may include whether the gun was loaded, the type of weapon, the legality of its possession, the type of drug activity conducted, and the time and circumstances under which the firearm was found. Id. In Mackey, this court found sufficient evidence to support possession “in furtherance of” a drug offense where an illegally possessed, loaded, short-barreled shotgun was found in the living room of the crack house, was easily accessible to the defendant, and was located near the scales and razor blades, and the defendant, who was detained near the gun, possessed cocaine and a large amount of cash. The evidence at trial showed that guns, cash and crack cocaine were found in the master bedroom shared by Cobbs and King. Three rifles and a shotgun were found in the master bedroom. An AR-15 assault rifle was located in a gun rack on the wall next to the dresser where the crack cocaine was stored. The AR-15 had been illegally converted into an automatic weapon. A loaded 15 magazine containing thirty-six rounds for the AR-15 was also in the gun rack ready at hand. A locked safe on a shelf near the dresser was found to contain $2,000 in cash and four handguns, two of them loaded. Although King claimed ownership of these handguns, the safe also contained papers belonging to Cobbs, thus indicating that Cobbs also had access to the safe. Fifty-three dollars in cash was found in a shoe box in the bedroom. The evidence revealed that customers came to the residence to purchase drugs. Thus, there is sufficient evidence of a nexus between the drug offenses and the possession of the firearms, and it was reasonable for the jury to find that the guns were kept ready at hand to protect the drugs and drug proceeds. The evidence is sufficient to sustain Cobbs’s conviction for this offense. 4. 18 U.S.C. §922(k) and (o) - Possession of Firearm with Obliterated Serial Number and Machine Gun Cobbs also contests the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions for possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number under 18 U.S.C. §922(k) and a machine gun under 18 U.S.C. §922(o). To prove an offense under §922(k), the government must prove that Cobbs: (1) knowingly possessed a firearm; (2) which had its serial number altered, removed or obliterated; and (3) had been shipped, received or transported in interstate commerce. United States v. Mixon, 166 F.3d 1216 (table), 1998 WL 739897 at  (6th Cir. Oct. 8, 1998). This offense requires knowledge on the part of the defendant that the firearm he possessed had an obliterated serial number. United States v. Percival, 50 Fed.Appx. 280, 281, 2002 WL 31477848 (6th Cir. Nov. 5, 2002). Cobbs argues that the evidence is insufficient to show that he had knowledge that the serial number was obliterated. Evidence was presented that the firearm was found hanging on a nail in the closet of the master bedroom shared by Cobbs and King. However, in a statement to police, King denied any 16 knowledge of the firearm with the obliterated serial number. From this evidence, the jury could reasonably find that the firearm was placed there and constructively possessed by Cobbs, the other person who had dominion and control over the room. The evidence also established that the scraped-down serial number was located on the back of the handle of the firearm, in the plain view of anyone who handled it. In United States v. Thornton, 463 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2006), the Seventh Circuit held that circumstantial evidence of defendant’s control over a firearm with an obliterated serial number could support the jury’s finding that the defendant knew the serial number had been obliterated, “given that one need only look at the gun to attain that knowledge.” Id. at 699. See also, United States v. Nesmith, 29 Fed.Appx. 681, 685, 2002 WL 243182 (2d Cir. Feb. 15, 2002)(possession by defendant and testimony that a person could not handle gun without noticing the obliteration constituted sufficient basis for finding of knowledge); United States v. Moore, 54 F.3d 92, 101 (2d Cir. 1995)(“A rational juror could also conclude that when Moore distributed guns to members of the organization he had inspected them and was aware that they lacked serial numbers.”). The firearm was introduced into evidence as an exhibit. The jury could reasonably have determined that Cobbs would have observed the obliteration of the serial number on the handle of the gun. To establish an offense under §922(o), the government must prove that the defendant knowingly possessed a machine gun, defined as “any weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger.” 18 U.S.C. §921(a)(23); 26 U.S.C. §5845(b). The government must show that Cobbs was aware that the weapon was a machine gun. United States v. Morgan, 216 F.3d 557, 567 (6th Cir. 2000)(citing Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 128 L.Ed.2d 17 608 (1994)). “Because an apparently innocent rifle can be converted into an illegal machine gun with no outward sign, scienter as to this crime may not be inferred merely from possession[.]” United States v. Nass, 100 Fed.Appx. 415, 417, 2004 WL 1238921 (6th Cir. June 3, 2004). Cobbs acknowledged ownership of the AR-15 rifle. The evidence shows that when he purchased it as a new weapon, it was a semi-automatic rifle. Evidence was presented that the selector switch on the rifle had been altered with replacement parts to permit the rifle to fire in automatic mode. Darrell Silber, the dealer who sold the gun, testified that it would not have come from the factory in that condition. He testified that he would not have broken the rifle down and inspected it before selling it. However, Brandon Way testified that when he fired the rifle approximately two months prior to the execution of the search warrant, the rifle fired as a semi-automatic, thus eliminating the possibility that the factory mistakenly delivered or Silber mistakenly sold a fully automatic weapon. To fire automatically, the weapon had to have been affirmatively altered with replacement parts during that two-month period. There is no evidence that the weapon was not in Cobbs’s custody at any time during this period. The AR-15 was found in Cobbs’s bedroom, along with a magazine holding thirty-six rounds which was identified by Officer Greg Hornkohl as an M—16 magazine, the M—16 being the fully automatic version of the AR-15. Based on these circumstances, we cannot say that the record is “devoid of evidence pointing to guilt.” Carnes, 309 F.3d at 956. Cobbs’s convictions for possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number and a machine gun are supported by the evidence. Based on the foregoing, we cannot find that a miscarriage of justice occurred in this case, and Cobbs’ attack on the sufficiency of the evidence is without merit. 18