Opinion ID: 78704
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law Based on Sovereign Immunity

Text: We review de novo the district court's decision on a Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law. See Wagner v. Live Nation Motor Sports, Inc., 586 F.3d 1237, 1243 (10th Cir.2009). A party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law only if all of the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, reveals no legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the nonmoving party. See id. at 1244; Hurd v. Am. Hoist & Derrick Co., 734 F.2d 495, 499 (10th Cir.1984) (judgment as a matter of law may be entered only if the evidence is such that without weighing the credibility of the witnesses the only reasonable conclusion is in [the moving party]'s favor). As sovereign powers, federally-recognized Indian tribes possess immunity from suit in federal court. Native Am. Distrib. v. Seneca-Cayuga Tobacco Co., 546 F.3d 1288, 1292 (10th Cir.2008). Tribal sovereign immunity generally extends to tribal officials acting within the scope of their official authority. See id. at 1296 ([A] tribe's immunity generally immunizes tribal officials from claims made against them in their official capacities.). On the other hand, a tribe's sovereign immunity does not extend to an official when the official is acting as an individual or outside the scope of those powers that have been delegated to him. Burrell v. Armijo, 456 F.3d 1159, 1174 (10th Cir.2006) (quotations omitted). Thus, the immunity question hinges on the breadth of official power the official enjoys and not whether the official is charged with using that power tortiously or wrongfully. See Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 692-93, 69 S.Ct. 1457, 93 L.Ed. 1628 (1949); Wyoming v. United States, 279 F.3d 1214, 1229 (10th Cir.2002); Tenneco Oil Co. v. Sac & Fox Tribe of Indians of Okla., 725 F.2d 572, 576 (10th Cir.1984) (McKay, J., concurring).
The only conduct of Governor Armijo at issue in this case is his verbal and written order to the Burrells not to bale alfalfa between 9 p.m. and 7 a.m. The district court determined that Governor Armijo was not entitled to sovereign immunity and denied his motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b), apparently reasoning that in issuing the no-baling order, he acted without the approval of the Tribal Council or the BIA. On appeal, Governor Armijo argues that he acted within the scope of his authority as a Pueblo official when he told the Burrells to stop their nighttime baling, and thus he is protected by the Pueblo's sovereign immunity. He contends that he was acting within his authority because he was responding to a Pueblo member's complaint about the noise and was doing so as Governor to essentially keep the peace. The only unequivocal evidence at trial regarding whether Governor Armijo had the power to order the Burrells to stop baling alfalfa at night was the testimony of Juan Montoya, the tribal religious leader, who stated that Governor Armijo acted within his authority when he issued the no-baling directive: Q: Can you tell us whether, based on your knowledge of the governor's position at Santa Ana [Pubelo], a directive like that to the Burrells would be something that's within the governor's authority to carry out? A: Yes. Mr. Montoya's testimony was consistent with that of Governor Armijo himself, who testified that the tribal governor is a sort of jack-of-all-trades. Governor Armijo testified: Being a tribal governor, you're the commander in chief. You're also a dogcatcher. You're also a marriage counselor. You just about hold any position, I guess you would say, within the tribe. He further explained that his position dealt with problems that members of the pueblo have within the village, which Mr. Montoya testified included the noise complaint on June 1, 1997. Indeed, Mr. Burrell himself acknowledged that the tribal governor had fairly broad power to deal with internal matters within Pueblo land, and that the no-baling order was within Governor Armijo's power and authority. Undisputed evidence regarding the structure of the Pueblo's government and how decisions were made further support the conclusion that Governor Armijo had the authority to issue the no-baling order. Evidence at trial generally demonstrated that the governor oversaw all regulatory and business matters within the Pueblo. This was consistent with testimony from both the Burrells that only actual officials within the Pueblo, as opposed to the Tribal Council, wielded any power. Thus, to the extent that the Tribal Council disagreed with any decision of the governor, the Tribal Council could later rescind the decision, or direct [the governor] to undo it or change it. In this way, the Tribal Council had the authority to make the final decision on any agreements or transactions that came through the tribal office. Given this decisionmaking framework, the Burrells testified that they repeatedly sought to appeal Governor Armijo's decision to the Tribal Council so that the Council would rescind or change it. Mr. Burrell testified that he talked with every Tribal Council member he came in contact with in order to have a Tribal Council meeting scheduled. Despite the fact that everybody knew about the no-baling directive, including members of the Tribal Council, no efforts were made to rescind the directive. To the contrary, there was testimony at trial that Governor Armijo reported what he had done to the Tribal Council and that the council found that action to be reasonable. Mr. Burrell testified that he ultimately gave up trying to talk to tribal officials about the baling order. Despite the Burrells' best efforts, the Tribal Council refused to lift the baling restriction until after they had moved off Pueblo land. This evidence leads only to one reasonable conclusion: Governor Armijo acted within his authority as a tribal official when he issued the no-baling order. First, Mr. Montoya explicitly testified on this point. Second, the evidence relating to the structure of the Pueblo's government and how decisions were made demonstrates that Governor Armijo had the authority to issue the no-baling directive. Although the Tribal Council could rescind such an order after the fact through an appeal to the Council, no evidence was presented that suggested the governor did not have the initial power to act in the first place. Moreover, the evidence suggests that the Tribal Council was aware of the order and either expressly approved it as reasonable or at the very least took no action to change it, which demonstrates the Council's implicit approval of the action after the fact. The Burrells rely heavily on a portion of testimony from Tribal Council member Manuel Christobal to support their position that Governor Armijo was acting outside the bounds of his authority. A reasonable jury, however, could not interpret Mr. Christobal's testimony in this manner. The Burrells point to the following exchange between counsel and Mr. Christobal: Q: Were the Burrells treated fairly by Governor Armijo? A: In my opinion at the time, it was an issue that wasshouldn't have happened. You would have to look at the accountability of the leadership at the time. It was cocky, meaning they were irresponsible. Burrell's lease was going to end, and it would have been honorable within the Tribal Council to wait till the terms of the lease agreement came before the council, and the council would have made a decision whether to continue the lease agreement, but this type of behavior, in my opinion, was unjust. It was an issue that shouldn't have happened. It was it was random, you know? This evidence is not at odds with the testimony from Mr. Montoya that Governor Armijo had the power to issue the no-baling directive. Nor does it call into question the evidence regarding the Pueblo's framework of governance. To begin, it is unclear whether this testimony even refers to the actions of Governor Armijo, as opposed to the actions of the Tribal Council. And in any event, to the extent that Mr. Christobal opined that Governor Armijo's action was unjust, random, irresponsible, or not honorable, such statements cannot be interpreted to mean that the action was undertaken outside the scope of the governor's authority. Rather, this testimony suggests only that the substance of the order was not fair or did not comport with the Pueblo's usual practicesan issue entirely distinct from the question of whether the governor's position authorized him to issue such orders at all. See Larson, 337 U.S. 682 at 692-93, 69 S.Ct. 1457; Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1229; Tenneco Oil Co., 725 F.2d at 576 (McKay, J., concurring). [5] The Burrells also suggest, as did the district court, that only the BIA could have ordered them to stop baling during the evening hours. No evidence at trial supports this suggestion. First, although the evidence showed that the BIA administered the Burrells' lease, there was no evidence that this power included the authority to regulate the Burrells' alfalfa baling hours or precluded Governor Armijo from doing so himself. To the contrary, the lease authorized the BIA to perform the following functions: to suspend rental payment when the leased land is held in trust; to approve subleases, assignments, or amendments to the lease; to resolve the amount of damages in the event of an oil and gas or right-of-way dispute; to notify the parties of the termination of federal trust responsibilities with respect to the land; to authorize or prohibit alfalfa plowing during the last year of the lease contract; to plan a soil conservation program and demand specific performance of the program or payment of specified damages; and to enter and inspect the land. At trial, there was no evidence that these provisions included the right to regulate the Burrells' alfalfa baling hours or that the provisions precluded Governor Armijo from issuing the no-baling order. The Burrells point to the testimony of the BIA's soil conservationist, Clyde Sandoval, who testified that he would check the compliance of BIA farming leases, which included looking at the care of natural resources on the land, fertilizer use, crop rotation, and construction of fences. Mr. Sandoval's testimony, however, does not suggest that the BIA was charged with resolving disputes as to when alfalfa could be baled. The Burrells further point to a federal regulation they contend authorized the BIA to respond to concerns of the tribe and resolve conflicts, but the Burrells do not show when (if at all) evidence of this regulation and its applicability to the Burrells' lease was presented during trial. Finally, and in any event, the regulation does not support the conclusion that a tribal governor could not limit a land lessee's baling hours; the regulation relates only to the BIA's responsibilities regarding payment obligations and operating requirements in a lease, neither of which, in the Burrell lease, speaks to the issue of alfalfa baling hours. [6] Because the trial evidence supports only the conclusion that Governor Armijo acted within the scope of his authority as a Pueblo official when he issued the no-baling directive, the district court erred in denying his motion for judgment as a matter of law based on sovereign immunity. See Keylon v. City of Albuquerque, 535 F.3d 1210, 1215-16 (10th Cir.2008) (concluding that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when there are no genuine issues of fact as to whether the defendant is entitled to immunity). We therefore reverse the court on that issue and do not reach Governor Armijo's additional claims on appeal.
The evidence at trial showed that Lieutenant Governor Montoya visited with the Burrells in early June to discuss how to resolve their dilemma, was appointed by the Tribal Council as part of a committee to negotiate with the Burrells for a buyout of their lease, and later hired a third party which baled and hauled away some of the Burrells' crops when it appeared that the fields had been abandoned. The district court determined that Lieutenant Governor Montoya was acting within the scope of his authority because the Burrells had given him permission to do so in their June 18 letter to the Tribal Council. On appeal, the Burrells do not argue that their letter did not authorize Lieutenant Governor Montoya to harvest their crops. Instead, the portion of the Burrells' brief on appeal relating to the sovereign immunity issue focuses primarily on the actions of Governor Armijo. Without specific and reasoned argument as to why the district court erred in granting Lieutenant Governor Montoya's motion for judgment as a matter of law, we have no basis to reverse the district court's decision. See United States v. Kunzman, 54 F.3d 1522, 1534 (10th Cir.1995) (on appeal, issues nominally raised but inadequately briefed need not be considered). [7]