Opinion ID: 609601
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Evidence Considered in Sentence Determination

Text: 22 The appellant also objects to the evidence considered by the sentencing court in determining the quantity of drugs to be attributed to him under the sentencing guidelines. He argues: (i) that it was improper to consider evidence upon which a jury acquitted him, (ii) that the testimony of Darren Hogg was unreliable, and (iii) that the use of evidence not brought out at trial was improper. 23 We review the sentencing court's factual determinations, including drug quantities, for clear error. United States v. Coleman, 947 F.2d 1424, 1427 (10th Cir.1991). The quantum of proof necessary to support a finding of fact under the sentencing guidelines is a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Rutter, 897 F.2d 1558, 1560 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 829 (1990). 24 The defendant first objects that the sentencing court erred when it considered evidence during sentencing that the jury found inadequate to establish guilt on the conspiracy charge. We find that the court properly considered the evidence in sentencing. This court has held that evidence that was applicable to a charge upon which the defendant was acquitted may properly be considered by the sentencing court. Coleman, 947 F.2d at 1429. Further, the defendant's argument is not necessarily correct. Simply because a jury acquits on a conspiracy charge does not mean that it did not find the underlying factual allegations to be true. That is, because conspiracy requires specific showings--e.g. agreement among two or more parties--a jury can return a verdict that there was no conspiracy while believing that a party such as this defendant individually engaged in the underlying conduct. Furthermore, because the burden of proof for a factual finding under the sentencing guidelines (preponderance of the evidence) is lower than that required for conviction at trial (beyond a reasonable doubt), there need not be an inconsistency between the findings of the sentencing court and the jury. 25 The defendant next objects that the testimony of the prosecution's principle witness, Darren Hogg, was unreliable and lacked the minimum indicia of reliability as required by United States v. Easterling, 921 F.2d 1073, 1077 (10th Cir.1990), cert. denied 111 S.Ct. 2066 (1991). We are bound to accept the resolution of conflicting evidence and the assessment of the credibility of witnesses as they are found by the trier of fact. United States v. Youngpeter, 1992 U.S.App. Lexis 2293 (10th Cir.1993); United States v. Espinosa, 771 F.2d 1382, 1391 (10th Cir.1985). This court has held that testimony regarding drug quantities can be reliable even where based on estimates. Coleman, 947 F.2d at 1428; Easterling, 921 F.2d at 1077-78. 26 In the instant case, the sentencing judge was careful to ensure the accuracy of the quantity of drugs attributable to the defendant. When a review of the trial transcript revealed inconsistencies, the court scheduled another hearing and heard testimony from the defendant's principle supplier, Darren Hogg, to clarify the amounts of cocaine that he sold to the defendant. The sentencing judge had the opportunity to assess the credibility and demeanor of the witness. The weight of the testimony supported a finding that Darren Hogg sold 5 ounces of cocaine to the defendant each week for a period of several months. However, the court chose only to attribute 3 ounces per week, Hogg's estimate of the smallest amount he may have sold to the defendant in any given week. This figure is consistent with other testimony adduced at trial. We are unable to conclude that Darren Hogg's testimony that was elicited at sentencing lacked a sufficient indicia of reliability to support the court's finding of the quantity of drugs attributable to the defendant. Accordingly, we find no error. 27 Finally, the defendant objects to the use at sentencing of evidence that was not brought out at trial. He contends that the district court should not have relied on the testimony of Darren Hogg that was brought out at the second evidentiary hearing because it was not offered at trial. 4 28 According to the Guidelines, to determine the appropriate guideline range we must consider all such acts and omissions that were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2). 5 In determining facts relevant to the sentencing proceeding, the court is not limited to evidence that would be admissible at trial. 18 U.S.C. § 3661; United States v. Beaulieu, 893 F.2d 1177, 1180-81 (10th Cir.1990). 29 We find that the sentencing court properly considered the testimony of Darren Hogg in determining the defendant's base offense level.