Opinion ID: 2054541
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Declarant's Admission to a Prior Crime of Dishonesty

Text: Williams' next contention on appeal is that, although his crime of dishonesty was properly admitted for the purpose of impeaching him at trial, [52] the Superior Court committed plain error by not sua sponte issuing a limiting instruction regarding this evidence. We hold that, even though the judge erred in failing to issue a limiting instruction, this error does not rise to the level of plain error. Under D.R.E. 609(a), it is permissible to attack the credibility of a witness by admitting crimes of dishonesty without balancing the prejudicial effect of the conviction against its probative value. [53] On the other hand, character evidence is not admissible to show that the witness acted in conformity therewith. This is because there is a possibility that the jury may use the impermissible inference rather than the permissible evidence to convict the defendant. [54] In Williams' trial, the State confronted Williams during cross-examination regarding his convictions for crimes of dishonesty. Williams admitted to one of the convictions. Plain error is a material defec[t] which [was] apparent on the face of the record, which [was] basic, serious and fundamental in ... character, and which clearly deprive[d] an accused of a substantial right or which clearly show[ed] manifest injustice occurred. [55] This Court has previously ruled that the lack of a limiting instruction, in the context of prior crimes, is not plain error. [56] Accordingly, the fact that the jury heard of Williams' prior crime of dishonesty is not plain error because it did not deprive Williams of a substantial right or jeopardize the fairness of his trial.