Opinion ID: 1166192
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: 3. The benefits payable under the Judges' Retirement Law are community property.

Text: In Phillipson v. Board of Administration (1970) 3 Cal.3d 32 [89 Cal. Rptr. 61, 473 P.2d 765], we held that the accumulated contributions of a retired employee to the Public Employees' Retirement System were community property, subject to the jurisdiction of the divorce court; we upheld that court's award of those funds to the wife of the former employee. Although defendant seeks to distinguish Phillipson, most of his arguments run squarely into conflict with the express and considered language of that opinion. Recognizing that Phillipson held that contributions to a pension fund that are accumulated during the marriage compose community property, defendant first contends that pension benefits should be classed as separate property. Phillipson, however, stated clearly that Monies contributed to the Public Employees' Retirement System, and benefits payable, are community property. (3 Cal.3d at p. 39.) (Italics added.) Surely pension benefits do not represent the beneficient gratuities of the employer; they are, rather, part of the consideration earned by the employee. ( Sweesy v. L.A. etc. Retirement Board (1941) 17 Cal.2d 356, 359-360 [110 P.2d 37].) [3] Consequently the community property of the marriage includes not only the contributions but also the matured pension rights payable as a benefit of employment. ( Phillipson v. Board of Administration, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 49.) [4] Secondly, defendant quotes our statement in Benson v. City of Los Angeles (1963) 60 Cal.2d 355, 362 [33 Cal. Rptr. 257, 384 P.2d 649], that a wife of a public employee acquires no vested interest in a pension until it becomes payable to her. He then argues that no benefits would become payable to plaintiff directly under the Judges' Retirement Law until defendant died, and then only if plaintiff qualified as surviving spouse. (Gov. Code, § 75077.) Consequently, defendant argues, the wife acquired no vested interest. Yet Phillipson rejected the identical argument; we there pointed out that the sentence that defendant quotes from Benson refers only to the wife's contingent right to a widow's benefit; both Benson and Phillipson clearly distinguish the spouse's vested community interest in the employee's lifetime pension. [5] ( Phillipson v. Board of Administration, supra, 3 Cal.3d at pp. 42-43; see also Packer v. Board of Retirement (1950) 35 Cal.2d 212, 216 [217 P.2d 660].) Finally, defendant contends that Phillipson is limited to pensions under the Public Employees' Retirement System, and that pensions paid pursuant to the Judges' Retirement Law are not community property. He notes that pensions under the Public Employees' Retirement System are payable in predetermined dollar amounts. Judges' pensions, however, are fixed as a percentage of the salary of the judicial office; an increase in pay to the judge's successor in office increases the retired judge's pension. (Gov. Code, § 75072.) Furthermore, the acceptance by a retired judge of a temporary judicial assignment reduces his pension to the extent of the salary he receives. (Gov. Code, § 68543.5.) Thus defendant argues that retired judges, unlike all other retired public employees, do not enjoy an unconditional and vested right to pension payments. Yet, as we shall explain, defendant's points of alleged difference between judicial and non-judicial pensions cannot realistically affect our determination as to whether the judicial pension constitutes community or separate property. The plan of payment of the pension  whether fixed, or reflective of subsequent salary increases in the relevant position  does not change the nature of the right to the pension. The right flows from the services rendered by the employee during marriage; the manner of the expression of the right does not distort it or alter its community characteristic. Legislative enactment may change the amount of pensions payable in the future ( Sweesy v. L.A. etc. Retirement Board (1941) 17 Cal.2d 356, 361 [110 P.2d 37] [Los Angeles City firemen]; Jorgensen v. Cranston (1962) 211 Cal. App.2d 292, 297 [27 Cal. Rptr. 297] [superior court judge]); often such increases become necessary to avoid an inflationary-caused dimunition in the real dollar value of the pension. The only difference in this respect between pensions of judges and those of other public employees is that under the present statute retired judges' pensions automatically increase whenever the Legislature raises the salaries of active judges, while other retired employees obtain increases only if the Legislature initiates such an increase. But all public employees, including judges, may obtain increased pensions through Legislative enactment, and none, including judges, receive such increases without some kind of prior or coincident legislative action. (6) Whether a pension plan provides for fixed or variable payments, and whether adjustments occur automatically or require legislation, the basic point remains that the pension payment serves as a remuneration for services rendered by the employee; if these services were discharged during the marriage, that remuneration must compose a community asset. Once the employee's right to a pension vests upon his retirement, variations in the amount of such payments do not affect the community character of that asset. Defendant correctly points out that in Phillipson we spoke of the retired employee's unconditional right to a pension (3 Cal.3d at p. 41), while in this case defendant's right carries the condition that the judge not accept judicial assignment at a salary in excess of his pension. (7) Yet the choice of whether or not the judge accepts future judicial assignments, if any are offered by the Chairman of the Judicial Council, lies with the judge; the exercise of any right accorded by the Judges' Retirement Law is completely within his control; hence this option does not reduce the pension to a conditional one. Defendant's rights under the Judges' Retirement Law, coupled with his power to refuse further judicial assignment, render his pension fully as secured, as vested, as that of any other public employee. Defendant would, in essence, invite us to declare that the matured pension rights of all public employees except judges are community property; that those of judges somehow are separate property. As we have seen, however, the differences between the Public Employees' Retirement Act and the Judges' Retirement Law, either do not exist at all or are relatively minor, and from a realistic view do not render judicial pensions less certain and secure than pensions of other employees. We conclude that judicial pensions must also be classed as community property.