Opinion ID: 2825255
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Honeywell

Text: On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that Honeywell’s GPWS failed to give an alert and therefore caused the crash. They also claim that Honeywell negligently sold the GPWS to the initial operator when it knew the design of the GPWS was outdated and that the more effective EGPWS was available, and failed to advise this initial purchaser to get an EGPWS instead of a GPWS. First we must decide which law governs the plaintiffs’ claims against Honeywell. At summary judgment, Honeywell argued that the court should apply Washington law because the relevant conduct—the design and manufacture of the GPWS unit—occurred in Washington. However, on appeal, Honeywell no longer presses this argument, so it is waived. Ricci v. Arlington Heights, Ill., 116 F.3d 288, 292 (7th Cir. 1997) (arguments not raised in a brief are waived). Since the plaintiffs contend that Illinois law applies, Honeywell has not contested this, and the parties have not presented a 7 The plaintiffs argue that the district court went beyond the scope of Rule 56.1 by ignoring their references to evidence in the record submitted by the defendants, including deposition testimony from employees of the defendants. They reference these depositions in their arguments to this court as well. However, the full transcripts of these depositions were not part of the defendants’ summary judgment submissions. The evidence the plaintiffs seek to rely on was not properly before the district court. We have ignored it as well since our review is limited to the evidence properly before the district court. Blue v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 698 F.3d 587, 596 (7th Cir. 2012). 26 Nos. 14-1707, 14-2481 conflict in the two bodies of law to this court, we apply Illinois law. See Gould, 1 F.3d at 549.
With respect to the plaintiffs’ defective or negligent design and manufacture claims, we find that, like Jeppesen, the plaintiffs have not presented any evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that any defect in the GPWS probably contributed to the crash. See Tragarz, 980 F.2d at 418. Again, the plaintiffs contend that the district court imposed a heightened burden regarding causation on them and that the district court improperly relied upon conclusions of the ATSB report. For the reasons stated in the Jeppesen discussion above, these arguments are rejected. No GPWS unit was found in the wreckage, so we do not know for sure whether the GPWS was on the Aircraft that day. The Aircraft’s cockpit voice recorder was not functioning, so it did not capture the crew’s dialogue or any alerts that a GPWS may have provided, and there are no surviving witnesses to testify about the performance of the GPWS. Because of these limitations, the plaintiffs rely largely on the ATSB report to argue that the GPWS was defective and its defects caused the crash.8 According to the factual findings of the ATSB report, a functioning GPWS would have given a “terrain, terrain” warning at 25 seconds before impact, which the pilots may have ignored because the same warning is given when an aircraft has cleared terrain. It also 8 Again, the plaintiffs seek to rely on other evidence which they failed to submit to the district court in compliance with Local Rule 56.1. The district court ignored that evidence, and so do we. See Blue, 698 F.3d at 596. Nos. 14-1707, 14-2481 27 would have given a “terrain, terrain, pull up” warning at five seconds before impact. The plaintiffs argue that the GPWS computer must have been defective because the flight crew did not pull up as the plane approached the South Pap ridge. A functioning GPWS would have given an alert five seconds before impact, but the flight crew did not pull up in a manner that would indicate a response to the five-second warning. But regardless, according to the ATSB report, an alert five seconds before impact would not have provided the flight crew with enough time to avoid crashing into the ridge (and the plaintiffs do not contend that it would have). So even if the plane was fitted with a GPWS manufactured by Honeywell, and the GPWS malfunctioned or was defective as the plaintiffs claim, the plaintiffs have not presented any evidence from which a jury could conclude that any defect in the GPWS contributed to the crash. We note that at times, the plaintiffs also seem to argue that the GPWS was defective because it did not give more advanced warnings like the EGPWS would have. Expert testimony is required to establish that a product is defective or unreasonably dangerous, Show v. Ford Motor Co., 659 F.3d 584, 588 (7th Cir. 2011), but the plaintiffs have failed to present such evidence. Also, a product is not defective simply because an improved product hits the market that does more than the previous version. See Salerno v. Innovative Surveillance Tech., Inc., 932 N.E2d 101, 111 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (stating a manufacturer’s duty to design reasonably safe products “does not require the product to reflect the safest design possible … . [T]he threshold question is not whether the product could have been made safer, but whether it is dangerous because it fails to perform in the manner reasonably 28 Nos. 14-1707, 14-2481 to be expected in light of its nature and intended function.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
And with this mention of the EGPWS, we move to the plaintiffs’ last claim on appeal, which is that the district court erred in finding that Honeywell did not have a duty to warn operators of the need to install an EGPWS. The plaintiffs contend that the district court failed to consider their claim that Honeywell did not advise the initial purchaser of the GPWS (the Mexican airline) of the alleged “defects” in the GPWS and that it should instead purchase an EGPWS. In their opening brief, the plaintiffs did not contest the district court’s finding that Honeywell did not have a duty to warn Transair, so that argument is waived. See Carroll v. Lynch, 698 F.3d 561, 568 (7th Cir. 2012). In their reply brief, the plaintiffs cite generally Proctor v. Davis, 682 N.E.2d 1203 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) and Fuller v. FendAll Co., 388 N.E.2d 964 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) for the proposition that Honeywell had a duty to warn the initial purchaser of defects in the design of the GPWS. We agree with Honeywell that this argument is likely waived, since the plaintiffs did not cite to any legal authority to support their proposition that Honeywell had a duty in their opening brief. See Mahaffey v. Ramos, 588 F.3d 1142, 1146 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Perfunctory, undeveloped arguments without discussion or citation to pertinent legal authority are waived.”). But even turning to the merits of the plaintiffs’ claim, we agree with the district court that Honeywell did not have a duty to warn the initial purchaser. That is because the plaintiffs have not established that there was any “defect” in the design of the GPWS of which to warn. They failed to comply with Nos. 14-1707, 14-2481 29 Rule 56.1, so little evidence in their favor is properly before this court. They have offered no evidence that the GPWS was actually defectively designed or dangerous. Their failure to come forward with expert testimony regarding any alleged design defect or dangerousness is fatal to their claim. See Salerno, 932 N.E.2d at 112 (“Because products liability actions involve specialized knowledge or expertise outside of a layman’s knowledge, the plaintiff must provide expert testimony” to establish the product’s dangerousness.). Because the plaintiffs’ claims of defect and causation are not supported by any evidence properly before the district court and because Honeywell owed no duty to warn any operator of the Aircraft of the alleged defects in the GPWS, the district court properly granted Honeywell’s motion for summary judgment.