Opinion ID: 166193
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Theory of the Concurrence

Text: 123 Putting forward an argument not made in the briefs or clearly argued below, the concurrence suggests a possible strategy behind the cross-examination. According to the concurrence, defense counsel had little room to maneuver, given the danger that any question about the bases of Dr. Hemphill's opinion or the recent change in it would have led to the admission of Mr. Waller's otherwise inadmissible hearsay statements, which would have been highly damaging to the defense. It was better, the concurrence seems to suggest, to lay low. Con. 1. This assessment of defense counsel's position, however, seriously overestimates the danger of opening the door to Mr. Waller's statement, and glosses over substantial barriers to its admission. 124 The concurrence takes an unduly narrow view of the options available to trial counsel, presupposing that any questions about the medical support for the left-alive theory would have prompted Dr. Hemphill to relate Mr. Waller's statement. According to the concurrence, [e]ven one question regarding the consistency of the physical evidence with the defense theory could open the door. Con. 2. The concurrence assumes that trial counsel could not avoid asking Dr. Hemphill why he changed his opinion before trial. It is far from self-evident, however, that merely establishing that the medical evidence was consistent with the left-alive theory—without mentioning Dr. Hemphill's about-face—would have opened the door to Mr. Waller's statement. Similarly, the concurrence supposes that if defense counsel had called a defense expert on the cause of death, Dr. Hemphill could have introduced Mr. Waller's statement on rebuttal to explain his disagreement. Id. But it is not at all clear why calling another expert to establish the left-alive theory would have opened the door to Mr. Waller's statement on rebuttal. Rebuttal evidence is evidence which attempts to disprove or contradict the evidence to which it is contrasted. Black's Law Dictionary 579 (7th ed.1999). [W]hether or not rebuttal evidence is admissible depends on `whether the initial proof might affect the case and whether the rebuttal evidence fairly meets the initial proof.' Tanberg v. Sholtis, 401 F.3d 1151, 1166 (10th Cir.2005) (quoting Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, 1 Federal Evidence § 12 n. 2 (2d ed.2004)); see also United States v. Stitt, 250 F.3d 878, 897 (4th Cir.2001) ([W]hen otherwise inadmissible, rebuttal evidence must be reasonably tailored to the evidence it seeks to refute.... [T]here must be a nexus between the purported rebuttal evidence and the evidence that the purported rebuttal evidence seeks to rebut.). Expert testimony exploring the medical evidence is not refuted by a layman's purported eyewitness account. 125 Even if Dr. Hemphill attempted to introduce Mr. Waller's statement, it seems quite unlikely that Oklahoma law would have permitted it to come in. 4 First, there is serious doubt whether Mr. Waller's statement was reliable. According to the concurrence, Oklahoma has adopted a relatively relaxed view of permitting experts to testify about the bases of their opinions, even when they have relied on unsubstantiated hearsay and improper character evidence. Con. 2 (quoting Lewis v. Oklahoma, 970 P.2d 1158, 1166 (Okla.Crim.App. 1998)). But Lewis does not support the inference that Oklahoma courts will freely admit otherwise inadmissible evidence as long as it is filtered through an expert. The defendant in Lewis objected to the admission of unsubstantiated hearsay and improper character evidence by an expert witness as part of the basis of his opinion. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals agreed that some of the evidence should not have been admitted because it might not have come from a reliable source. Lewis, 970 P.2d at 1166-67. Because the expert had properly relied on substantial admissible evidence, the court found the error in admitting the unreliable evidence to be harmless on a highly deferential plain error standard of review. Id. at 1167. The Lewis court made clear that the opportunity to admit evidence underlying an expert's opinion is not a license to parade a mass of inadmissible evidence before the jury. Id. (quoting Sellers v. State, 809 P.2d 676, 685 (Okla.Crim.App. 1991)). However relaxed Oklahoma's standard for admitting hearsay and character evidence as the basis of an expert's opinion, Lewis does not stand for the proposition that an expert may shepherd patently unreliable testimony into the record. 126 Second, if experts rely on otherwise inadmissible evidence, it must be of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject. 12 Okla. Stat. Ann. § 2703. It is unlikely that Dr. Hemphill's reliance on Mr. Waller's retracted statement meets that standard. 5 I find it very difficult to believe that medical experts asked to testify about the physical evidence routinely discount scientifically plausible theories on the basis of inadmissible statements by participants in the crime. Furthermore, there was a mechanism available to probe the appropriateness of Dr. Hemphill's reliance on Mr. Waller's statement: Lewis holds that, upon request of either party, [the trial court must] hold an in camera hearing to determine whether an expert's reliance on particular information is reasonable. Lewis, 970 P.2d at 1167. Trial counsel thus had an opportunity to determine—outside the presence of the jury—not only whether Mr. Waller's statement could be admitted, but whether Dr. Hemphill's reliance on it was reasonable. Not to take advantage of this mechanism falls short of effective assistance. 127 Finally, the fact that Dr. Hemphill relied on the Waller statement does not obviate the basic prerequisites to admissibility. Even if evidence is sufficiently reliable and of an appropriate type to justify an expert's reliance, it may be inadmissible if it is unduly prejudicial. The Lewis court admitted the evidence on which the expert properly relied only after determining that it was probative and its probative value was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Id. Defense counsel would have had a strong argument that the danger of prejudice substantially outweighed whatever probative value there was in Mr. Waller's statement. 128 Thus, I cannot agree with the concurrence that a carefully crafted cross-examination of Dr. Hemphill would inevitably, or even probably, have opened the door to introduction of Mr. Waller's damaging statement. That defense counsel feared Dr. Hemphill would introduce the Waller statement does not make it so. See Con. 2. Counsel's unwarranted fear only confirms the real reason for her failure to present the defense theory: she panicked. To abandon one's position for fear of a chimera hardly meets the standard of effective representation. The game was far from up, but trial counsel abandoned the crucial element of the defense. The concurring opinion, like the majority, supplies no adequate reason to dispute the district court's conclusion that this cross-examination was woefully inadequate.