Opinion ID: 1735344
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The IAD

Text: ¶ 14 The IAD is an interstate compact that prescribes procedures by which a member State may obtain for trial a prisoner incarcerated in another member jurisdiction and by which the prisoner may demand the speedy disposition of certain charges pending against him in another jurisdiction. State v. Eesley, 225 Wis. 2d 248, 254, 591 N.W.2d 846 (1999) (quoting United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 343 (1978)). Both Wisconsin and Nevada are party states to the IAD. The IAD is set out in Wis. Stat. § 976.05 and Nev. Rev. Stat. § 178.620 (2005). The IAD aids in efficient prosecution of crimes and it removes uncertainties that obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation by clarifying prisoner status. § 976.05(1). ¶ 15 The IAD is a congressionally sanctioned interstate compact within the meaning of the Compact Clause of the United States Constitution, Art. I, § 10, cl. 3, and thus is a federal law subject to federal construction. Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 719 (1985) (citing Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 438-442 (1981)). Therefore, in order to accord more consistency with the IAD interpretations of other federal and state courts, we may employ federal rules of construction in interpreting Wis. Stat. § 976.05. ¶ 16 We begin by determin[ing] whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning . . . . Our inquiry [will] cease if the statutory language is unambiguous and `the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.' Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997) (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240 (1989)). To determine whether statutory language is plain and unambiguous, we look to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole. Id. at 341 (citations omitted). A fundamental canon of statutory construction is that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, meaning. Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979) (citing Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1975)). If a statute is plain and unambiguous on its face, the legislative history is not ordinarily used as a guide to its meaning. [4] Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 n.29 (1978) (citing Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 61 (1949)). [5] ¶ 17 The provisions of the IAD are triggered when a detainer is filed or lodged for an untried criminal charge by any party state that seeks custody with a party state that has custody. Mauro, 436 U.S. at 343-44. There are two IAD provisions by which a receiving state may obtain transfer of temporary custody of a prisoner and cause him or her to appear for trial, Article III or Article IV. [6] Cuyler, 449 U.S. at 443-45; Wis. Stat. § 976.05(3)-(4). ¶ 18 Article III of the IAD, Wis. Stat. § 976.05(3), comes into play when the prisoner is notified that a detainer has been lodged and he or she initiates a request for final disposition of outstanding indictments, informations or complaints. Cuyler, 449 U.S. at 444; § 976.05(3)(a). [7] An IAD Article III Request for Disposition by a prisoner includes a waiver of extradition to stand trial and a waiver of extradition to serve any sentence that is imposed subsequent to conviction. § 976.05(3)(e). [8] ¶ 19 Article IV of the IAD, Wis. Stat. § 976.05(4), effects prisoner transfer when the prisoner is notified that a detainer has been filed, but he or she does not make an affirmative request under Article III. Instead, the prosecuting attorney of the receiving state that filed the detainer initiates transfer by filing a written notice of the custody request with the proper authorities in the sending state. Cuyler, 449 U.S. at 444; § 976.05(4)(a). [9] The prisoner effects no waiver of extradition in an Article IV proceeding so that a hearing on the prisoner's right to resist extradition may be held under the UCEA, in those states that have enacted the UCEA. Cuyler, 449 U.S. at 448; § 976.05(4)(d). [10] ¶ 20 Pharm made a Request for Disposition under Article III, Wis. Stat. § 976.05(3). An Article III Request for Disposition requires waivers of extradition to face pending charges and to serve any sentence subsequently imposed. § 976.05(3)(e). Therefore, under the IAD no hearing pursuant to the UCEA is available to him in regard to extradition for either his trial or service of any term of incarceration imposed by Wisconsin under the IAD detainer it filed. Cuyler, 449 U.S. at 445. ¶ 21 Pharm contends that Wisconsin had only temporary custody of him while he was in a Wisconsin prison. Therefore, he argues, when he was paroled by Wisconsin, Wisconsin was required by the IAD to return him to Nevada. Pharm misperceives the scope of temporary custody under the IAD. ¶ 22 In an Article III case, such as Pharm's, when final disposition of the charges has been requested by the prisoner, the sending state offers to deliver temporary custody of the prisoner in order that speedy and efficient prosecution may be had. Wis. Stat. § 976.05(5)(a). The temporary custody referred to for this transfer is only for the purpose of permitting prosecution on the charge or charges contained in one or more untried indictments, informations or complaints which form the basis of the detainer . . . . § 976.05(5)(d) (emphasis added). Then, [a]t the earliest practicable time consonant with the purposes of this agreement, the prisoner shall be returned to the sending state. § 976.05(5)(e). For all purposes other than that for which temporary custody as provided in this agreement is exercised, the prisoner shall be deemed to remain in the custody of and subject to the jurisdiction of the sending state . . . . § 976.05(5)(g). ¶ 23 Under the plain language of the statute, temporary custody does not include custody for the purpose of subsequent incarceration in a receiving state. State of New York by Coughlin v. Poe, 835 F. Supp. 585, 590-91 (E.D. Okla. 1993) (stating that temporary custody does not expressly, or by implication, indicate custody for the purpose of service or execution of sentence in the receiving State). This interpretation is supported by the record before us in regard to Nevada's actions prior to each time Pharm was taken to Wisconsin. For example, Nevada executed an Offer to Deliver Temporary Custody prior to Pharm's being transported to Wisconsin to face untried charges, but it executed no such document when it released Pharm to be transported to Wisconsin to begin to serve his term of incarceration. In addition, when Pharm was returned to Wisconsin to begin his term of incarceration, Wisconsin executed no document that evidenced an acceptance of temporary custody as it had when Pharm was sent to Wisconsin for trial. ¶ 24 Furthermore, the language of the IAD is clear and unambiguous. The IAD applies to detainers lodged against prisoners that are based on untried indictments, informations or complaints. As its purpose set out in Article I explains: this agreement [is] to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of such charges and determination of the proper status of any and all detainers based on untried indictments, informations or complaints. Wis. Stat. § 976.05(1). The reference to untried or pending charges is repeated in § 976.05(3)-(5). There is nothing in the IAD that indicates that the rights accorded to prisoners under it attach when there are no untried charges outstanding. Therefore, we conclude that under the plain language of the statute, a prisoner has the following rights after he or she files a Request for Disposition under Article III (§ 976.05(3)): (1) transportation to a receiving state to answer pending charges; (2) commencement of a trial within 180 days in the receiving state; (3) return to the sending state to complete the prisoner's term of incarceration; and (4) upon completion of the prisoner's term of incarceration in the sending state, return to the receiving state to serve any term of incarceration that has been imposed there. ¶ 25 Pharm also argues that his Nevada parole is imprisonment, as that term is used in the IAD. Imprisonment is not defined in the IAD. Therefore, it is defined according to its common meaning. Perrin, 444 U.S. at 42 (stating that unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their common meaning) (citation omitted)). Federal courts have defined imprisonment as that definable period of time during which a prisoner must be confined in order to complete or satisfy the prison term or sentence which has been ordered. United States v. Dobson, 585 F.2d 55, 58-59 (3rd Cir. 1978) (emphasis in original); see also United States v. Reed, 620 F.2d 709, 711 (9th Cir. 1980) (concluding a person on parole is not imprisoned under the IAD). ¶ 26 We note that under truth-in-sentencing in Wisconsin, imprisonment is defined as a bifurcated sentence comprised of initial confinement and extended supervision. See Wis. Stat. § 973.01; State v. Cole, 2003 WI 59, ¶27, 262 Wis. 2d 167, 663 N.W.2d 700. This definition is in contrast to the definition that was commonly used in Wisconsin prior to the enactment of § 973.01. At that time, Wisconsin defined imprisonment as incarcerated or confined in a jail or prison. Id., ¶26. However, state law does not drive the interpretation of the IAD, which is a federal compact subject to federal construction. Carchman, 473 U.S. at 719 (citing Cuyler, 449 U.S. at 438-442). ¶ 27 In addition, if the definition of imprisonment under the IAD were interpreted to include both actual confinement and extended supervision or parole, a prisoner sentenced to parole for life in a sending state would remain indefinitely in the sending state and would never be eligible to serve his or her sentence in the receiving state. This result is not in accord with the plain language of the IAD. State ex rel. Otterstetter v. McManus, 243 N.W.2d 730, 732-33 (Minn. 1976). [11] ¶ 28 The issue in Otterstetter was whether a penal sentence imposed by a foreign state, running concurrently with a Minnesota sentence, required the return of the prisoner to the foreign state upon his release on parole in Minnesota. Id. at 731. The court noted that term of imprisonment was not defined in the IAD, but concluded that it is clear that the phrase is used in this section [Article III] to refer to the period of actual physical confinement of the prisoner. Id. at 732. ¶ 29 Pharm also contends that his status as a Nevada parolee keeps him within the IAD. We do not agree. The United States Supreme Court decision in Carchman supports our conclusion. In Carchman, the Court stated that Article III applies only to a detainer based on an untried indictment, information or complaint, which refers to criminal charges pending against a prisoner. Carchman, 473 U.S. at 725. Respondent Nash sought to invoke his rights under the IAD because his probation-revocation charges were not brought to hearing within 180 days. Id. at 722. The United States Supreme Court held that Article III did not apply to probation-violation detainers because a probation-violation charge is not a criminal charge pending against a prisoner. Id. at 734. ¶ 30 Like Carchman, Pharm does not have any criminal charges pending against him in Nevada; he has been paroled by Nevada. Furthermore, no detainers have been lodged in Wisconsin by Nevada against Pharm to trigger the IAD. While probation and parole are not the same, Carchman is instructive because Pharm has no outstanding criminal charges pending against him that could trigger an IAD detainer and that fact was significant in the Court's decision in Carchman. Id. Stated otherwise, Carchman concluded that all detainers do not trigger the IAD; only those detainers for untried criminal charges trigger the IAD. Id. ¶ 31 Other courts have also recognized that the IAD does not apply to parolees who are not incarcerated or who are confined while awaiting a parole revocation hearing. See Hopper v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 702 F.2d 842, 846 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that an adjudicated parole violator warrant is not a complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged within the meaning of Article III); United States v. Black, 609 F.2d 1330, 1333 (9th Cir. 1979) (stating that when a prisoner was released on parole and transferred to federal custody to serve an outstanding sentence, he was no longer covered by the IAD); Dobson, 585 F.2d at 59 (holding that a parole violator held in custody pursuant only to a parole violation does not come within the provisions of the IAD because he or she is not serving a term of imprisonment); State v. Bellino, 557 A.2d 963, 964 (Me. 1989) (holding that the IAD does not apply to parolees because they are not prisoners serving a sentence in prison); Bush v. Canary, 286 N.W.2d 536, 538 n.1 (S.D. 1979) (stating the IAD is not applicable to detainers lodged for parole violations). ¶ 32 Pharm argues that Snyder v. Sumner, 960 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1992), supports his assertion that the IAD applied to him after he was placed on parole by Nevada and transported to Wisconsin to begin his Wisconsin incarceration. However, we conclude that Snyder is not applicable. In Snyder, Nevada filed a detainer for pending felony charges under the IAD while Snyder was incarcerated in Iowa. Id. at 1450. Snyder was then transported to Nevada for trial, which did not commence for 426 days. Id. While Snyder was awaiting trial in Nevada, Iowa paroled him. Id. On appeal subsequent to his convictions of the Nevada charges, Snyder argued that Nevada had violated his right to be brought to trial within 120 days as required by the IAD, and therefore, his convictions should be overturned. Id. Nevada contended that once he was paroled, the IAD no longer applied. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Snyder, reasoning that once the IAD's guarantees for a speedy trial attached to Snyder, which they did when he was first transferred to Nevada to stand trial, that guarantee was not changed by Snyder's subsequent parole by Iowa. Id. at 1453. ¶ 33 Pharm's argument that Snyder means the IAD continues to apply to him even after he was sent to Wisconsin to complete his sentence is not applicable because none of the IAD's guarantees to Pharm were changed by his Nevada parole. He had already been given a speedy trial in Wisconsin; he had been returned to Nevada to complete the term of incarceration Nevada sought to impose and then returned to Wisconsin for confinement. At the time of Pharm's return to Wisconsin, he had no further rights under the IAD that had not been provided. Accordingly, Snyder is not helpful in resolving the issues presented by Pharm's circumstances. ¶ 34 Pharm was accorded all his rights under Wis. Stat. § 976.05, which he triggered by his Request for Disposition. He was given notice that a detainer had been lodged in Nevada and he responded with a Request for Disposition. In order to meet his request, he was transported to Wisconsin to face trial for the outstanding Wisconsin charges; he was accorded a speedy trial; he was returned to Nevada until parole and he was returned to Wisconsin after parole by Nevada. All occurrences were in accord with the IAD. Eesley, 225 Wis. 2d at 255 n.2. ¶ 35 Pharm also contends that Nevada had a right to his return that Wisconsin did not honor. [12] Again, we disagree. Nevada did not have any IAD right remaining after Pharm was returned to Nevada to complete his term of incarceration there. When Pharm was incarcerated in Wisconsin, Nevada could have triggered additional rights under the IAD if it had lodged a detainer in Wisconsin based on untried indictments, informations or complaints that were open in Nevada. However, Nevada has not done so. In fact, Nevada has never made any type of request that Pharm be returned to it. [13] Nevada did send periodic letters to the Wisconsin Department of Corrections while Pharm was incarcerated, but the letters requested only that Wisconsin authorities notify Nevada authorities prior to Pharm's release. Because the record shows that Nevada was aware of Pharm's pending release, we conclude Wisconsin complied with that request.