Opinion ID: 1160943
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Absence of a Federal Constitutional Right to Counsel Is Irrelevant

Text: Respondent contends petitioner's abandonment by counsel is of no legal consequence, because petitioner does not have a federal constitutional right to appointment of counsel for state collateral proceedings. A criminal defendant, of course, is entitled at trial to representation by competent legal counsel, a right guaranteed by both the federal and state Constitutions. ( In re Fields (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1063, 1069, 275 Cal.Rptr. 384, 800 P.2d 862; U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.) We are well acquainted with claims of ineffectiveness of trial counsel in capital cases, for they are made in many, if not most, such cases. (See, e.g., In re Jones (1996) 13 Cal.4th 552, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 52, 917 P.2d 1175 [judgment vacated in its entirety due to ineffectiveness of trial counsel]; In re Marquez (1992) 1 Cal.4th 584, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 727, 822 P.2d 435 [judgment vacated insofar as it imposes the death penalty due to ineffectiveness of trial counsel]; In re Sixto (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1247, 259 Cal.Rptr. 491, 774 P.2d 164 [judgment vacated in entirety due to ineffectiveness of trial counsel].) If a state provides convicted criminals a first appeal of right, the federal constitutional guarantees of due process (fair procedure) and equal protection (equality among litigants) [10] require that state to provide appellate counsel for indigent defendants. ( Murray v. Giarratano (1989) 492 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 2765, 106 L.Ed.2d 1 ( Murray) ; Douglas v. California, supra, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811.) Under such circumstances, due process requires that an appellate attorney appointed by the state provide constitutionally effective legal assistance. ( Evitts v. Lucey (1985) 469 U.S. 387, 396, 105 S.Ct. 830, 83 L.Ed.2d 821.) Our Legislature has provided generally for the appointment of appellate counsel for indigents (§ 1240.1), and we have, in the past, held a criminal defendant is guaranteed the right to effective legal representation on appeal. (See, e.g., People v. Lang (1974) 11 Cal.3d 134, 142, 113 Cal.Rptr. 9, 520 P.2d 393; In re Smith (1970) 3 Cal.3d 192, 202-203, 90 Cal.Rptr. 1, 474 P.2d 969; but see Jones v. Barnes (1983) 463 U.S. 745, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 77 L.Ed.2d 987 [appellate counsel need not raise all nonfrivolous claims on appeal]; Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-696, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 [relief for ineffective assistance of trial counsel requires showing of prejudice].) Although the law thus requires an attorney to maintain a basic level of professional competence when representing a client in a direct criminal appeal, respondent argues petitioner's abandonment by his court-appointed attorney during the postverdict habeas corpus investigation period cannot constitute good cause for the delay in the presentation of issues in the present petition. In support, respondent cites decisions of the United States Supreme Court holding a criminal defendant enjoys no federal constitutional right to the assistance of state-appointed counsel in mounting a discretionary challenge to a final criminal judgment. As we explain, this authority is irrelevant. Respondent is correct the federal Constitution does not guarantee appointment of counsel for discretionary review proceedings, such as state habeas corpus proceedings. ( Coleman v. Thompson (1991) 501 U.S. 722, 752-754, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 ( Coleman) ; Murray, supra, 492 U.S. at pp. 7-8, 109 S.Ct. 2765; Pennsylvania v. Finley (1987) 481 U.S. 551, 107 S.Ct. 1990, 95 L.Ed.2d 539; see also Ross, supra, 417 U.S. at pp. 610 [discretionary appeal to state's highest court], 616-618, 94 S.Ct. 2437 [petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court]; Wainwright v. Torna (1982) 455 U.S. 586, 102 S.Ct. 1300, 71 L.Ed.2d 475 ( per curiam ) [petition for certiorari in Florida Supreme Court].) Respondent further argues that if a defendant has no federal constitutional right to the assistance of counsel in state habeas corpus proceedings, the defendant necessarily has no right to the effective assistance of such counsel. This, indeed, is the prevailing federal rule. ( Coleman, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 752, 111 S.Ct. 2546, citing Wainwright v. Torna, supra, 455 U.S. 586, 102 S.Ct. 1300, 71 L.Ed.2d 475 [there being no right to counsel for discretionary appellate review, attorney's failure to file a timely petition could not be ineffective assistance of counsel]; Campbell v. Wood (9th Cir.1994) 18 F.3d 662, 676-678; Odle v. Calderon (N.D.Cal.1995)  884 F.Supp. 1404, 1433-1434.) Concluding the argument, respondent asserts that if petitioner has no federal constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel for state habeas corpus proceedings, then abandonment by counsel similarly should not constitute good cause for a delay in filing. Irrespective, however, of whether or not a criminal defendant enjoys the right, under the federal Constitution, to appointed counsel as a matter of due process or equal protection, a state may choose, as a matter of state law, to appoint an attorney to assist a death row prisoner in investigating, preparing and filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. If a state thus chooses to appoint an attorney for that purpose, the absence of a federal constitutional right to the appointment does not obligate this court to tolerate abandonment of a capital defendant by that attorney. Consequently, notwithstanding the above stated rule of federal constitutional law, nothing prohibits this court from considering habeas corpus counsel's actions (or inaction) when evaluating whether, under policy 3 of the Supreme Court Policies, good cause exists for filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus after a substantial delay. In California, appointment of counsel to assist capital defendants [11] to prepare and file petitions for writs of habeas corpus has long been this court's practice. We first announced this practice in In re Anderson (1968) 69 Cal.2d 613, 73 Cal.Rptr. 21, 447 P.2d 117, where we stated: We believe that it will protect the interests of defendants and promote the cause of justice for this court to appoint counsel to represent indigent defendants in capital cases in the following proceedings undertaken between the termination of their state appeals and their execution: (a) Proceedings in this court for post-conviction review .... Hereafter, as a matter of policy, and upon application of the defendant, we will appoint counsel in such instances. ( Id. at p. 633, 73 Cal.Rptr. 21, 447 P.2d 117, fn. omitted, italics added.) This practice is currently memorialized in three places. First, part XV A of the Internal Operating Practices and Procedures of the California Supreme Court (hereafter Internal Operating Practices) states: In criminal matters, upon a verified or certified statement of indigency, the court, acting through the Clerk's Office, will appoint an attorney for a party in the following instances: [¶] ... [¶] 2. In a pending automatic appeal and/or related state habeas corpus ... proceedings. (Italics added.) Part XV B of the Internal Operating Practices continues: At or after the time the court appoints appellate counsel to represent an indigent appellant on direct appeal, the court also shall offer to appoint habeas corpus ... counsel for each indigent capital appellant. (Italics added.) Part XV C of the Internal Operating Practices goes on to explain that this court maintains an Automatic Appeals Monitor who is responsible for assisting the court in locating available attorneys for appointment, and part XV D sets forth the manner in which such appointed counsel are compensated. A capital defendant's right, under state law, to appointment of counsel for state collateral proceedings also finds voice in the Supreme Court Policies. At the time petitioner's habeas corpus petition should have been filed, standard 1-1 of policy 3 provided in part: Appellate counsel in capital cases shall have a duty to investigate factual and legal grounds for the filing of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. (Supreme Ct. Policies, supra, policy 3, former std. 1-1, adopted June 6, 1989.) [12] Policy 3 thus made clear, at least as of June 6, 1989, that we expected appointed counsel in capital cases to investigate the grounds for a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and then, if warranted by the investigation, to prepare and file a petition. ( Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 808, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 153, 959 P.2d 311.) Third, most recently, the Legislature has provided that [t]he Supreme Court shall offer to appoint counsel to represent all state prisoners subject to a capital sentence for purposes of state post-conviction proceedings.... (Gov.Code, § 68662.) Although this statute was not in effect when petitioner's appointed attorney should have investigated and filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the Legislature's enactment underscores our conclusion that state law requires appointment of counsel to represent capital defendants in postconviction proceedings. In sum, although the federal Constitution does not require this state to appoint counsel to represent indigent death row prisoners in state habeas corpus proceedings, (i) In re Anderson, supra, 69 Cal.2d 613, 73 Cal.Rptr. 21, 447 P.2d 117, (ii) this court's own Internal Operating Practices, (iii) policy 3 of the Supreme Court Policies, and now (iv) Government Code section 68662 all require such appointment. The question is a matter of state law, not federal constitutional law, and the absence of a federal right does not prevent this court, under state law, from considering counsel's abandonment as good cause for the delay.