Opinion ID: 3010867
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The CCE Statute & Specific Unanimity

Text: The CCE statute under which Russell was convicted requires that the government prove the following elements: (1) that the defendant committed a drug-related felony under U.S.C. Title 21, Chapter 13, subchapter I or II; (2) that this violation was part of a continuing series of violations of the subchapter; (3) that the defendant acted as an organizer, supervisor or manager of five or more other persons in committing this series of violations; and (4) that the defendant obtained substantial income or resources from such activities. 21 U.S.C. S 848. At issue here is the second element, which requires proof that such violation is a part of a continuing series of violations. Id. With respect to this issue, the trial judge instructed the jury as follows: The phrase, a continuing series of violations means three or more violations of the federal narcotics laws which are in some way -- laws which are in some way related to each other. In order to find that this element has been established, you must unanimously agree that the Defendant, Mr. Russell, participated in at least three or more violations of the federal narcotics laws which are in some way related to each other App. at 2094. Russell claims that the district court's instruction failed to advise the jury of the requirement that they unanimously agree as to the identity of the three related drug offenses constituting the criminal enterprise. Appellant's Br. at 27. At trial the government introduced substantial evidence of Russell's drug-related activity. But Russell claims that the general unanimity instruction permitted the jury to convict him so long as each juror was convinced that he had committed a series comprised of any three related drug violations, regardless of whether they unanimously agreed as to the identity of each underlying violation. See, e.g., United States v. Edmonds, 80 F.3d 810, 814 (3d Cir. 1996) (For example, six jurors may have felt that violations A, B, and C (but no others) were related, and the other six jurors may have concluded that violations D, E, and F (but no others) were related.). 5 While it is true that in most cases a general unanimity instruction is sufficient to support a conviction, see United States v. Beros, 833 F.2d 455, 460 (3d Cir. 1987), a specific unanimity instruction is required where the complexity of the case, or other factors, creates the potential that the jury will be confused. Id.; cf. United States v. Ryan, 828 F.2d 1010, 1020 (3d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, United States v. Wells, 117 S. Ct. 921 (1997) ([I]n any case where a count will be submitted to the jury on alternative theories, prudence counsels the trial court to give an augmented unanimity instruction if the defendant requests such a charge. Unanimity is an indispensable element of a federal jury trial.) (internal citation omitted). The purpose of a specific unanimity instruction is to ensure that the jurors are in substantial agreement as to just what a defendant did as a step preliminary to determining whether the defendant is guilty of the crime charged. Beros, 833 F.2d at 460 (quoting United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453, 45758 (5th Cir. 1977)). In Edmonds, we had to decide whether jury instructions relating to a charge under the CCE statute must direct the jury to agree unanimously on which of the alleged violations constitute the continuing series required by the statute. We held that a general unanimity instruction was insufficient to support a conviction under the CCE statute, concluding that the statute requires unanimous agreement as to the identity of each of the three related offenses comprising the continuing series.1 Edmonds, 80 F.3d at 822 (emphasis added). Our decision in Edmonds was rooted in the principle that a federal defendant in a criminal trial has a constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict. Id. at 823 ([T]he district court's failure to give . . . [the] proposed specific unanimity instruction was error . . . implicat[ing] Edmonds's Sixth Amendment right to a unanimous verdict in a federal criminal trial.); see also, _________________________________________________________________ 1. In United States v. Echeverri, 854 F.2d 638 (3d Cir. 1988), we held that a jury considering a CCE charge must unanimously agree on which three acts constitute the continuing series of violations. In Edmonds, sitting en banc, we explicitly recognized the opportunity to reconsider Echeverri and reaffirmed the decision reached in that case. 80 F.3d at 812. 6 Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 748 (1948) (Unanimity in jury verdicts is required where the Sixth and Seventh Amendments apply.); Beros, 833 F.2d at 461 ([J]ust as the sixth amendment requires jury unanimity in federal criminal cases on each delineated offense that it finds a defendant culpable, it must also require unanimity regarding the specific act or acts which constitutes that offense.) (internal citation omitted). The jury instruction at issue in this case is constitutionally deficient in the same manner as was the instruction in Edmonds. In Edmonds, the trial court instructed the jury as follows: The government has to prove [ ] that such violation was part of a continuing series of related violations of the federal narcotics laws. A continuing series of violations requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that three or more violations of the laws occurred and that they, those three or more, were related to each other. 80 F.3d at 813. Although Russell's jury was instructed that they must unanimously agree that he participated in at least three or more violations of the federal narcotics laws, App. at 2094, this charge still amounted to a general, not a specific, unanimity instruction. The jury should have been instructed that unanimous agreement was required not only to find the existence of a continuing series, but in determining the composition of that series. Our holding in Edmonds was clear: [t]he CCE statute requires unanimous agreement as to the identity of each of the three related offenses comprising the continuing series. Edmonds, 80 F.3d at 822 (emphasis added); see also Gipson, 553 F.2d at 456-57 (The unanimity rule . . . requires jurors to be in substantial agreement as to just what a defendant did as a step preliminary to determining whether the defendant is guilty of the crime charged.) To be sure, the government introduced compelling evidence that Russell had, in fact, engaged in a large number of drug-related transactions, any number of which could have been the basis for an individual juror's determination that he had participated in a continuing series of violations under the CCE statute. But the 7 instruction given by the district judge permitted the jurors to convict on the CCE count even if different jurors determined that Russell had committed different acts. Although the jurors may, in fact, have unanimously agreed on a particular set of predicate acts, we cannot speculate as to the content of the jury's deliberations. See United States v. Beros, 833 F.2d 455, 461 (3d Cir. 1987) ( `[W]e are not free to hypothesize whether the jury indeed agreed to and was clear on the' transaction or theory by which it found [the defendant] guilty.) (quoting United States v. Echeverry, 698 F.2d 375, modified, 719 F.2d 974 (9th Cir. 1983) (en banc)). Thus, because the jurors may well have agreed that a continuing series of violations had occurred, yet disagreed as to the identity of the three related offenses comprising the series, we conclude that the district court's failure to give a specific unanimity charge violated Russell's Sixth Amendment right to a unanimous verdict.2