Opinion ID: 494142
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Statement Concerning Ryan's Social Security Number.

Text: 38 Ryan urges that there is no tenable basis for holding that a 'dash' through the space requesting a Social Security number can be legally sufficient to constitute a false statement. Appellant's Brief at 20. We disagree. Common experience teaches that people often make statements with the nod or shake of a head, or with a particular motion of the hand, or with a myriad of symbolic, non-verbal actions that, through a common cultural understanding, have communicative content. Thus, the fact that a word was not spoken or written, does not necessarily mean that a message was not sent and received. This rather basic concept is embodied in Fed.R.Evid. 801(a), which defines a statement as any (1) oral or written assertion, or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by him as an assertion. Similarly, we hold that a statement for purposes of Sec. 1014 includes assertive non-verbal conduct. 39 Having decided that non-verbal conduct, such as the making of a dash, can constitute a statement, we now must determine whether there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the statement made by Ryan was false. There are two possible interpretations of Ryan's statement: 1) he has no Social Security number, or 2) he, for some unspecified reason, chose not to respond to the question. At trial, the government presented evidence showing that at the time Ryan made the statement, he did in fact have a Social Security number; therefore, if the first interpretation correctly describes the intended meaning of Ryan's answer, then the jury was entitled to conclude that the statement was false. However, if the second interpretation is correct, then the statement cannot be characterized as either true or false, and consequently cannot form the basis of a Sec. 1014 conviction, 3 Williams v. United States, 458 U.S. at 284-85, 102 S.Ct. at 3091-92, but the mere fact that Ryan's answer might generate two interpretations does not necessarily make his conviction invalid. United States v. Williams, 552 F.2d 226, 229 (8th Cir.1977). 40 When the defendant's answer to an unambiguous question is capable of two or more constructions, it is up to the jury to decide which construction the defendant intended to convey. 4 Id.; see Long, 534 F.2d at 1101. In making its determination, the jury need not examine isolated segments of the question and answer exchange, but may also consider extrinsic or circumstantial evidence that bears on the defendant's intent. Lighte, 782 F.2d at 373; United States v. Williams, 552 F.2d at 229; United States v. Marchisio, 344 F.2d 653, 661 (2d Cir.1965). Such evidence exists in this case. Shortly before submitting the credit card application, Ryan said to Ms. Auriemma, the bank manager, that he did not have a Social Security number. Ryan sent the application to the bank along with a letter to Ms. Auriemma. Though the oral statement to Ms. Auriemma was not a subject of the indictment, evidence of the statement was admissible to prove which of two objectively reasonable interpretations Ryan assigned to his answer on the application. In light of this evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude that Ryan intended to and did represent falsely that he had no Social Security number. 41 Ryan further contends that even if the statement is false, it is not material. A statement is materially false for purposes of Sec. 1014 if it has the capacity to influence the bank to which it is made. Goberman, 458 F.2d at 229. Actual reliance by the bank on the defendant's false statement is not necessary for a conviction under Sec. 1014; it is enough that the statement is of a type that could disturb the balance of facts that would otherwise be available to the bank. See United States v. Glassey, 715 F.2d 352, 353 (7th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1032, 104 S.Ct. 566, 78 L.Ed.2d 733 (1983). Materiality is also established when it is shown that the inquiry ... concerns the 'discovery of assets, including the history of [the defendant's] financial transactions.'  United States v. Phillips, 606 F.2d at 887 (quoting United States v. O'Donnell, 539 F.2d 1233, 1237 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 960, 97 S.Ct. 386, 50 L.Ed.2d 328 (1976)) (emphasis added). Whether a particular statement is material is a question of law, decision upon which is reserved to the court. United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68, 73 (3d Cir.1985) (speaking about the materiality requirement in a false statements prosecution under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1001 (1982)). 42 In United States v. Phillips, the Ninth Circuit held that a false Social Security number in a bankruptcy petition was a material falsehood because the false social security number might have impeded the investigation into the appellant's financial history.... 606 F.2d at 887. Similarly, in this case the government presented ample evidence indicating that a loan applicant's Social Security number is a key piece of information in the bank's effort to obtain an accurate credit report. Ryan attempts to distinguish Phillips by pointing out that the defendant in Phillips actually supplied a false Social Security number, while he merely represented that he had no Social Security number. We believe that this is a distinction without a difference. In either case the bank is thwarted from pursuing a path of investigation that could conceivably uncover information adverse to the success of the loan application. Accordingly, we hold that if the statement is false, then it is materially false and could support a conviction under Sec. 1014. 43