Opinion ID: 1188059
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: other contracts

Text: Contrary to the contract involved in this case, the contracts involved in the cases cited in the majority opinion do afford insurance coverage to the actor as an insured and the issues do then involve the interplay to the severability of interest clause and the exclusion clause. The wording in such contracts is similar to the wording in the Comprehensive General Liability Insurance part of this contract. [2] Included under its Persons Insured provisions are the named insured and any executive officer, director or stockholder thereof while acting within the scope of his duties as such, but fellow employees are not excluded as Persons Insured except with respect to mobile equipment [3] operated on a public highway. Accordingly, the severability of interest clause would apply to Barnette if this coverage part was available to his use inasmuch as he would be an insured under this coverage part of the contract. As in the cases cited in the majority opinion, the Exclusions provisions of this part of the contract provide in pertinent part (as do those in the Comprehensive Automobile Liability Insurance Coverage part, supra): This insurance does not apply:       (i) to any obligation for which the insured or any carrier as his insurer may be held liable under any workmen's compensation, unemployment compensation or disability benefits law, or under any similar law; (j) to bodily injury to any employee of the insured arising out of and in the course of his employment by the insured   . Under the Comprehensive General Liability Insurance part of this contract, the seemingly contradictory provisions (severability of interest clause and cross employee exclusionary clause) referred to by the majority opinion could exist and the result reached by the majority opinion could result. But the Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Coverage part of the contract does not apply to this case (see fn. 2), and Barnette's recovery against appellee, if any, must be based on the Comprehensive Automobile Liability Insurance Coverage part of the contract. As already noted, the Comprehensive Automobile Liability Insurance Coverage part does not include Barnette as an insured as does the Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Coverage part  and as do the cases cited in the majority opinion relative to Barnette's coverage under the policy. The lengthy quotation in the majority opinion from Commercial Standard Insurance Company v. American General Insurance Company, Tex., 455 S.W.2d 714, 48 A.L.R.3d 1 (1970), recognizes that the severability of interest clause applies separately to the insureds and that, therefore, the exclusion from insurance must be separately applied. The contract included the actor as an insured and then provided an exclusion with the words this policy does not apply   . This is not the same as in the case where the actor was not an insured at all and therefore not subject to the severability of interest clause. Barnette was never an insured, and it would be straining the reasoning of the Texas court to apply such reasoning to this case. The Texas case is also distinguishable on the facts. It is a contest involving insurance for a subcontractor, and it is a contest between insurance companies  as are some of the other cases cited in the majority opinion. The insurance contract involved in the following cases which are those cited or quoted from in the majority opinion relative to this issue did not exclude the actor from the status of an insured and the issue centered around the exclusion clauses in the contracts. The contract directions were that this policy does not apply    or this insurance does not apply    to the actor under certain circumstances: General Aviation Supply Co. v. Insurance Company of North America, 181 F. Supp. 380 (E.D.Mo. 1960); Zenti v. Home Insurance Company, Iowa, 262 N.W.2d 588 (1978); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company v. Globe Indemnity Company, 60 Ill.2d 295, 327 N.E.2d 321 (1975); Marwell Construction, Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, Alaska, 465 P.2d 298 (1970); Liberty Mutual Insurance Company v. Iowa National Mutual Insurance Company, 186 Neb. 115, 181 N.W.2d 247 (1970); United States Fire Insurance Company v. McCormick, 286 Ala. 531, 243 So.2d 367 (1970); Shelby Mutual Insurance Co. v. Schuitema, Fla.App., 183 So.2d 571 (1966), aff'd 193 So.2d 435 (1967); Ratner v. Canadian Universal Insurance Company, 359 Mass. 375, 269 N.E.2d 227 (1971); Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Home Insurance Indemnity Co., 116 N.H. 12, 351 A.2d 891 (1976); and Bankers & Shippers Insurance Company of New York v. Watson, 216 Va. 807, 224 S.E.2d 312 (1976). The annotation at 48 A.L.R.3d 13, supra, quoted in the majority opinion, concerns itself with the specific provisions in automobile liability insurance policies expressly excluding from coverage under the policy injury to, or death of, an employee of the insured. It is predicated on the assumption that the actor is an insured. It discusses the definite split of authority on the question of insurance coverage under the exclusion clause when the actor is not the employer of the injured person [4]  thus addressing the question of who is an insured under the exclusion clause. But it anticipates that the actor is an insured in the first instance, a condition not here present. The quotation in footnote 3 of the majority opinion from 12 Couch on Insurance 2d, § 45:581 also has reference to the effect of the exclusion clause on an insured. Couch goes on to say in § 45:589: In order to avoid the conflicting results discussed above with regard to actions between fellow employees, insurers have in recent years inserted in the omnibus clause a limitation stating that `the insurance with respect to any person or organization other than the named insured does not apply to any employee with respect to injury to or death of another employee of the same employer injured in the course of such employment in an accident arising out of the maintenance or use of the automobile in the business of such employer.' Accordingly, regardless of whether the suit is brought against the named insured or the additional insured, the insurer will generally be relieved of liability where the circumstances fall within the language of the exclusionary provision. (Footnotes omitted.) The language of the contract in this case is similar and the result should be the same. The omnibus clause (see fn. 1) and the clause extending coverage to officers, etc., are part of the definition of the insured and the definition specifically provides that any person while engaged in the business of his employer with respect to bodily injury to any fellow employee of such person injured in the course of his employment is not an insured.