Opinion ID: 1529322
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The lawyers

Text: Although Ms. Skokos asks us to disqualify one of the lawyers representing Mr. Skokos as well as an attorney ad litem appointed to represent a minor child of the parties, the only argument presented with respect to the two lawyers appears as part of her brief contending that the Chancellor should have recused. Ms. Skokos's contention is that the attorney ad litem is a member of a law firm, one of whose partners is a partner with a lawyer for Mr. Skokos in another firm, and thus there is a disqualifying conflict. The response made to the Chancellor and to us is that the two law firms in question are separate entities and that the attorney ad litem thus has no relationship with Mr. Skokos's lawyer. We find no independent argument devoted to the authority we may or may not have to declare a lawyer disqualified during proceedings before a trial court. Again, no cases are cited in which an appellate court has done such a thing. Our own research reveals that we have held on appeal that a lawyer and law firm were disqualified, Burnette v. Morgan, 303 Ark. 150, 794 S.W.2d 145 (1990), but absent convincing argument or citation of authority we decline to address the matter in response to a petition for certiorari. In response to a motion by Ms. Skokos, on September 9, 1994, we stayed all proceedings in this matter other than a hearing to be held by the Chancellor on whether she should recuse. Now that the hearing has been held, and we decline to change the result by granting certiorari, the stay is lifted. Writ denied. GLAZE, J., concurs. EDDIE H. WALKER, Jr., Special Justice, joins in the majority opinion. HAYS and BROWN, JJ., not participating.