Opinion ID: 411288
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Need for a Prejudice Requirement

Text: 59 We are confronted at the outset with Washington's contention that the courts should find ineffective assistance of counsel prejudicial per se. Under petitioner's proposed rule, the writ would issue automatically upon petitioner's showing of ineffective assistance. In support of this rule, Washington cites numerous cases including Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. at 335, 83 S.Ct. 729, Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 96 S.Ct. 1330, 47 L.Ed.2d 592 (1976), and Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980). We find that these cases are instantly distinguishable. 60 In Gideon v. Wainwright the state refused to appoint counsel to assist in the defense of an indigent defendant. This absolute deprivation of the right to counsel is so inherently prejudicial that the courts will not conduct a particularized inquiry into whether harm was realized in a particular case. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. at 43, 87 S.Ct. at 837 (Stewart, J., concurring). 61 In Geders the trial court ordered a defendant not to consult with his attorney during an overnight recess after his direct examination and before his cross-examination. While the defendant did not suffer a total deprivation of the right to counsel, the trial court's action constituted direct state interference with important aspects of the attorney's representation of his client. See also Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 95 S.Ct. 2550, 45 L.Ed.2d 593 (1975); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 92 S.Ct. 1891, 32 L.Ed.2d 358 (1972); Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 81 S.Ct. 756, 5 L.Ed.2d 783 (1961); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. at 45, 53 S.Ct. 55. Although such limited interference is not inherently prejudicial, a rule of automatic reversal serves to deter the state from engaging in action that poses a direct threat to the defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel. See United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d at 201. 62 Finally, in cases such as Cuyler the defendant was represented by an attorney who functioned under an actual conflict of interest. This impediment to effective representation was neither inherently prejudicial nor the product of direct state interference in the representation process. The Supreme Court granted automatic reversal, however, because the subtle and pervasive effect of conflicting loyalties upon an attorney would necessarily make any inquiry into prejudice an exercise in unguided speculation. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 491, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 1182, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978); see Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 75-76, 62 S.Ct. 457, 467, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942). 63 In this case Washington did not suffer the inherent prejudice that attended the total deprivation of counsel in Gideon. Nor does he complain of state interference in the attorney-client relationship as was evident in Geders. Rather, he contends that the attorney provided to him by the state, a competent and experienced criminal lawyer, rendered assistance that was below the standard of reasonably effective counsel. Unlike the defendant in Cuyler, Washington does not contend that this ineffectiveness resulted from any subtle or pervasive impediment to Tunkey's performance. Rather, he contends that Tunkey committed several discrete errors of omission and commission that reasonably effective counsel would not have committed. The process of identifying and the evaluating the effect of these individual errors is not an exercise in unguided speculation. Rather, the inquiry into whether these errors resulted in harm is a task that the district courts are well suited to perform. See Davis v. Alabama, 596 F.2d at 1222-23; United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d at 201-03 (plurality opinion), 257-58 (Robinson, J., concurring); Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d at 1332; United States ex rel. Green v. Rundle, 434 F.2d 1112, 1115 (3d Cir.1970). See also Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 54, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 1982, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970) (relief for ineffective assistance of counsel denied where the claim of prejudice was without substantial basis). 26 Accordingly, we conclude that no Supreme Court decision requires a finding of per se prejudice in this type of case. We also perceive several strong considerations that militate against creating such a rule. 64 First, a rule of per se prejudice would be contrary to the teachings of United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364-65, 101 S.Ct. 665, 668, 66 L.Ed.2d 564 (1981), that the remedy for a violation of defendant's right to adequate assistance of counsel should be tailored to the harm caused by that violation. The defendant in Morrison demonstrated no prejudice of any kind and the Court found: 65 There is no effect of a constitutional dimension which needs to be purged to make certain that respondent has been effectively represented and not unfairly convicted. The Sixth Amendment violation, if any, accordingly provides no justification for interfering with the criminal proceedings against [defendant]. 66 Id. at 366-67, 101 S.Ct. at 669. Washington's proposed rule of per se prejudice would require the unwarranted interference in criminal proceedings that Morrison expressly forbids. 27 67 Additionally, a rule of per se prejudice is especially inappropriate in the case of ineffective assistance because the state is not responsible for the violation of the petitioner's rights. Since the rule would not serve to deter the state from any unconstitutional course of action, the sole effect of the rule would be to bestow an undeserved windfall upon criminal defendants who were not harmed by the errors of their attorneys. See Note, supra, at 1436-37. 28 68 Finally, the proposed rule would distort the function of the writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254. The writ exists to redress fundamental unfairness in state criminal proceedings. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 543, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 1216, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Services Agency, 458 U.S. ----, ----, 102 S.Ct. 3231, 3239-40, 73 L.Ed.2d 928 (1982). A particularized inquiry must be made in cases of ineffective assistance of counsel to determine whether the fundamental unfairness that the writ was intended to redress exists in an individual case. See Nelson v. Estelle, 642 F.2d 903, 906 (5th Cir.1981); United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d at 207.