Opinion ID: 1058662
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: We recently set forth the standard of review for subdivision applications: When a local governing body's decision regarding an application for approval of a preliminary subdivision plat is appealed, a trial court must sustain the decision unless the local governing body failed to comply with the applicable subdivision ordinances or acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying the application. Code § 15.2-2260(E); Hanover County v. Bertozzi, 256 Va. 350, 355, 504 S.E.2d 618, 620 (1998). On appellate review, the trial court's judgment is presumed correct and will not be set aside unless the judgment is plainly wrong or unsupported by the evidence. Ravenwood Towers, Inc. v. Woodyard, 244 Va. 51, 57, 419 S.E.2d 627, 630 (1992). Board of Supervisors v. Greengael, L.L.C., 271 Va. 266, 277, 626 S.E.2d 357, 363 (2006).
At a pretrial hearing, Judge Kemler granted partial summary judgment to Seymour because the trial court held pursuant to section 11-1710(B) that the City could not consider improvements when considering subdivision applications. The trial court was correct in its analysis. Section 9.24 of the City's Charter confers on the City the power to adopt resolutions relative to the subdivision of land in the manner hereinafter provided. Such regulations may prescribe standards and requirements for the subdivision of land which may include but shall not be limited to the following: Location, size and layout of lots so as to prevent congestion of population and to provide for light and air; . . . adequate open spaces; adequate and convenient facilities for vehicular parking; . . . planting of shade trees and shrubs. . . . Consistent with this section of the City's Charter, section 11-1701 of the Ordinance explains that the purpose of subdivision regulations is to provide for the orderly division of land for development or transfer of ownership. We have stated that: [T]he words of the ordinance are to be given their plain and natural meaning. The purpose and intent of the ordinance should be considered but the ordinance should not be extended by interpretation or construction beyond its intended purpose. Higgs v. Kirkbride, 258 Va. 567, 573, 522 S.E.2d 861, 864 (1999) (quotation omitted). Pursuant to section 9.24 of the City Charter, sections 11-1701 and 11-1710(B) of the Ordinance involve the division of land and do not concern building and zoning specifications. The trial court properly distinguished zoning and subdivision regulations based on the power authorized under the City's Charter. Fogarty, the Director of the Department of Planning and Zoning, correctly advised the Planning Commission that the term `lot' in Subsection 11-1710(B) [sic] refers to really the use of the land, and not so much the design of the structures that are built on the property. Accordingly, we hold that Judge Kemler correctly ruled that the City could not consider the anticipated improvements on Seymour's proposed lots when considering Seymour's resubdivision application. See also Board of Supervisors v. Countryside Inv. Co., 258 Va. 497, 504-05, 522 S.E.2d 610, 613-14 (1999) (holding that the local government could not deny a subdivision based on zoning considerations).
At all times relevant to the underlying proceedings, section 11-1710(B) of the Ordinance provided: No lot shall be resubdivided in such a manner as to detract from the value of adjacent property. Lots covered by a resubdivision shall be of substantially the same character as to suitability for residential use, areas, street frontage, alignment to streets and restrictions as other land within the subdivision, particularly with respect to similarly situated lots within the adjoining portions of the original subdivision. (Emphasis added.) Section 11-1710(B) prohibits the approval of a subdivision that will detract from the value of adjacent property. The City conceded in an interrogatory answer that [t]he division of land into lots is a purely legal construct that, by itself, can have no effect on the value of anything. Therefore, the Planning Commission erred in denying Seymour's resubdivision application on the basis that, as the City explained in answering an interrogatory, the Commission was not satisfied that the lots, as improved, would be compatible with the . . . value of the adjacent lots. (Emphasis added.) Section 11-1710(B) also requires that the proposed lots must be of substantially the same character as other similarly situated lots within the subdivision before a resubdivision application will be granted. Section 11-1710(B) explains that suitability for residential use, areas, street frontage, alignment to streets and restrictions as other land within the subdivision are considered when determining whether the proposed lots are of substantially the same character. Whether the Seymour lot is a corner or interior lot is relevant to this appeal because the terms relate to street frontage and alignment to streets and whether a lot is of substantially the same character to other lots within the subdivision. The City conceded on several occasions that the Seymour lot was not a corner lot. First, the Staff Report concluded that the proposed subdivision of the Seymour lot was consistent with other interior lots in the Latham Subdivision. Second, prior to trial, the parties stipulated that the Seymour lot was not a corner lot under the City's zoning ordinance provisions. Third, Josephson, Deputy Director for the Office of Planning and Zoning for the City, testified at trial the Seymour lot was an interior lot pursuant to the zoning ordinance. Finally, joint exhibit 11, a list of interior lot sizes and addresses prepared by the City, identified 227 North Latham Street, the Seymour lot, as an interior lot in the Latham Subdivision. In contrast, joint exhibit 10, a list of corner lot sizes and addresses prepared by the City, did not include the Seymour lot. Consequently, for purposes of this appeal, the Seymour lot is an interior lot rather than a corner lot. Because the definitions of a corner lot and an interior lot are mutually exclusive, a corner lot and an interior lot cannot be similarly situated. Therefore, Seymour's interior lot and the corner lots in the Latham subdivision are not similarly situated. The Staff Report recommended that the Planning Commission approve the application because the [t]he proposed lots will be consistent with other [interior] lots in the neighborhood in terms of lot area, width, and configuration. No evidence was presented to the contrary. We hold that the trial court's decision affirming the Planning Commission's disapproval of Seymour's resubdivision application was plainly wrong and without evidence to support it. Because the disapproval was not proper under section 11-1710(B) of the Ordinance, the trial court's decision was erroneous.