Opinion ID: 714140
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure To Disclose Teixeira's Prior Testimony.

Text: 22 Figueroa argues that a new trial is warranted because the government intentionally failed to disclose transcripts of Teixeira's prior testimony in the Restrepo and Salcedo trials. Those transcripts indicate that Teixeira received a tidy and regular income over a period of several years for serving as an informant, and that his cooperation in ongoing drug investigations may have earned him favorable treatment by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. In addition, while his testimony was unclear, Teixeira admitted in those trials either that he did not file an income tax return for 1987, or that he did not file an income tax return for 1988 reporting his 1987 income. As Figueroa contends, this newly produced evidence reflects Teixeira's bias, interest, and dishonesty. 23 At the outset, we note that a [Rule 33] motion for a new trial based upon previously-undiscovered evidence is ordinarily 'not favored and should be granted only with great caution.'  United States v. Stofsky, 527 F.2d 237, 243 (2d Cir.1975) (quoting United States v. Costello, 255 F.2d 876, 879 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 937, 78 S.Ct. 1385, 2 L.Ed.2d 1551 (1958)), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819, 97 S.Ct. 65, 50 L.Ed.2d 80 (1976). See also United States v. Spencer, 4 F.3d 115, 118 (2d Cir.1993) (new trial is warranted only in the most extraordinary of circumstances (citation and emphasis omitted)). A new trial is warranted under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), however, where (1) the government failed to disclose favorable evidence, and (2) ... the evidence it 'suppressed' was material. United States v. Payne, 63 F.3d 1200, 1208 (2d Cir.1995) (citing Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196-97). 24 As to the first factor, evidence whose disclosure is required under Brady may consist not only of exculpatory evidence but also of impeachment evidence. Id. at 1210 (citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3380, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985)). As to the second factor, evidence is material generally if it could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict. Kyles v. Whitley, --- U.S. ----, ----, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 1566, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995); see also Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678, 105 S.Ct. at 3381-82. Evidence of impeachment is material if the witness whose testimony is attacked supplied the only evidence linking the defendant(s) to the crime, United States v. Petrillo, 821 F.2d 85, 90 (2d Cir.1987), or where the likely impact on the witness's credibility would have undermined a critical element of the prosecution's case. Payne, 63 F.3d at 1210. However, new impeachment evidence is not material, and thus a new trial is not required when the suppressed impeachment evidence merely furnishes an additional basis on which to impeach a witness whose credibility has already been shown to be questionable. Id. (citations omitted). See also United States v. Rosner, 516 F.2d 269, 273-74 (2d Cir.1975) (additional impeachment evidence was not material where other evidence supported conviction), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 911, 96 S.Ct. 3198, 49 L.Ed.2d 1203 (1976). In sum, a new trial is warranted only if the evidence is material, noncumulative, and would probably lead to an acquittal. United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 949 (2d Cir.1993) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1645, 128 L.Ed.2d 365 (1994). 25 The government concedes that the transcripts of Teixeira's prior testimony should have been disclosed as Brady material, as well as pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3500 and in compliance with the district court's disclosure order; but the government argues that these transcripts were not material to the outcome of the trial because Teixeira's credibility was called into question by the defense in cross-examination, and therefore that the further evidence eroding his credibility would have been merely cumulative. 26 We agree with the district court that any evidence of bias, interest or dishonesty stemming from Teixeira's prior testimony in Restrepo or Salcedo would not have been material to the outcome of the trial. Figueroa's jury was aware that Teixeira's testimony regarding his taxes was untrue, because Teixeira recanted it later in the cross-examination. Thus, on the one hand Teixeira swore that he had always paid his taxes, and that he had turned in his 1988 income figures to the IRS at the time of trial; on the other hand Teixeira conceded under oath that, as of the time of trial in 1989, he had not yet filed his 1987 and 1988 tax returns. In summation defense counsel used Teixeira's inconsistent testimony concerning his taxes to attack his credibility. (The district court duly instructed the jury that it could disregard Teixeira's testimony in its entirety if the jury found him unworthy of credence.) Moreover, Teixeira testified that he had received a large sum of money from the government in exchange for testifying and serving as a confidential informant, and defense counsel exploited that testimony in summation to establish Teixeira's interest in the outcome of the case and his bias in favor of the government. 27 In short, defense counsel had sufficient ammunition concerning Teixeira's mendacity, interest and bias as to justify the district court's conclusion that the undisclosed impeachment evidence in the Restrepo and Salcedo transcripts was cumulative. It is also clear that independent evidence was adduced to corroborate Teixeira's testimony regarding Figueroa's participation in the drug deal. 4 We therefore hold that Figueroa is not entitled to a new trial based on newly disclosed evidence because it is probable that the evidence newly discovered would not have altered the outcome of the trial. See United States v. Reyes, 49 F.3d 63, 68 (2d Cir.1995) (New evidence that is merely impeaching will not ordinarily justify a new trial.); Locascio, 6 F.3d at 949 (new trial not warranted unless evidence would probably lead to an acquittal); United States v. Gordils, 982 F.2d 64, 72 (2d Cir.1992) (affirming denial of Rule 33 motion where impeachment evidence was cumulative), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1054, 113 S.Ct. 1953, 123 L.Ed.2d 657 (1993); United States v. White, 972 F.2d 16, 22 (2d Cir.) (cumulative evidence is routinely held insufficient to warrant a new trial), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1026, 113 S.Ct. 669, 121 L.Ed.2d 593 (1992). 28