Opinion ID: 770823
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Cunningham/Soly Lawsuits

Text: 19 Based on the facts and allegations described above, plaintiffs Cunningham and Soly brought a section 1983 action 9 against the City and the following City officials: 1) SIS officers who participated in the gunfight following the armed robbery of the Southwest Liquor and Deli, 10 2) SIS officers who participated in the surveillance operation, but did not actually use force against either Cunningham or Soly, 11 3) various supervising officers who had the alleged authority to control the conduct of SIS officers, 12 4) police commissioners, 5) various members of the city council, 6) the mayor, 13 and 7) several assistant Los Angeles city attorneys. Given the number of defendants involved in this case, the procedural history of this case is quite lengthy and complex. We review only the relevant aspects of the procedural history of this case.
20 On February 10, 1997, all defendants moved for summary judgment against Cunningham and Soly pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), which holds that a claim under section 1983 that would necessarily imply the invalidity of the plaintiff's state criminal conviction or sentence is not cognizable until the conviction or sentence is overturned. Defendants argued that a finding that the officers used excessive force would invalidate the criminal jury's determination that the officers were justified in using deadly force against Cunningham. 14 The district court rejected these arguments, ruling that Heck does not apply to suits that allege official misconduct unrelated to legal process, such as an unconstitutional arrest without a warrant or the use of excessive force on the arrested person. The district court also found that Heck could not bar Soly's section 1983 action because Soly was never prosecuted for events underlying the present lawsuit. Defendants appeal the district court's ruling.
21 With the exception of all but one of the officers who participated in the gunfight with Cunningham and Soly, defendants moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The non-shooting officers 15 argued that plaintiffs failed to show that they had the opportunity to intercede or otherwise caused plaintiffs to suffer constitutional injury. Council members argued that indemnifying officers against punitive damages on a discretionary, case-by-case basis, in good faith compliance with the requirements of California Government Code Section 825(b), 16 entitles them to qualified immunity under Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911 (9th Cir. 1996). The City attorneys argued that 1) plaintiffs are third parties to whom the city attorney defendants owe no duty and 2) there was no clearly established law at the time of the Cunningham/Soly robbery that a policy of indemnifying officers against punitive damage awards would violate a private citizen's constitutional rights. The police commissioners and supervisors also moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs failed to establish that they violated clearly established law. 17 In two separate opinions, the district court denied virtually all of the defendants' motions for summary judgment. See Cunningham v. Gates, 989 F.Supp. 1256 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Cunningham v. Gates, 989 F.Supp. 1262 (C.D. Cal. 1997). 22
23 As previously mentioned, the district court denied the non shooting officers' motion for summary judgment. Rather than analyze the individual actions of each officer, the district court focused on plaintiffs' allegations of a department-wide scheme and the actions of the officers who actually shot Cunningham and Soly. The court first found a disputed fact issue concerning whether officers had probable cause to shoot Cunningham and Soly, explaining that: 24 The officers' explanations of why they did not think that they had probable cause to arrest before the rob beries occurred, why the robberies could not be pre vented, and why it was necessary to shoot everyone who was shot will be examined and compared as among all the alleged common course incidents. Plaintiffs will attempt to demonstrate that the things claimed to have been unintended have happened too often to be attributable to accident or mistake, and that perceived threats that could not have been real occur too often, for the officers' explanations of what happened and why to be credible. 25 Cunningham, 989 at 1260. The district court never conducted an individualized analysis to determine whether each moving defendant was entitled to qualified immunity based on his or her individual actions. Rather, the district court, after focusing on injuries caused by the shooting officers, concluded that: 26 It is settled law . . . that if a group of officers agree that if and when some of them knowingly commit unlawful acts others will falsify records and testify falsely to cover up the truth of the relevant events, all of those involved are liable for the unlawful acts. . . . Proof of plaintiffs' allegations that the SIS officers engage in a continuing course of unconstitutional conduct whereby some commit excessive force with complete impunity and others assist by covering up those unconstitutional acts would constitute proof of violation of clearly established law. 27 Id. at 1261-62. Apparently unaware of any evidence that the moving defendants participated in the alleged course of conduct, 18 the district court found it necessary to go beyond the declarations submitted by the parties and consider how the officers may be impeached with testimony given on prior occasions and whether an inference might then be drawn that the alleged course of conduct might include the element of planned fabrication of documents and testimony. Id. Based on possible impeachment evidence and strategies of which only the court was aware, the district court found that a reasonable juror could find the existence of a common course of conduct based on the totality of the evidence, and, thus, denied the moving officers' motion for summary judgment. See id. 28
29 The district court denied all City officials' motions for summary judgment, with the exception of the City Mayor, finding that a jury could find that these defendants knowingly acquiesced in the use of excessive force by SIS officers. See Cunningham, 989 F.Supp. at 1276. To summarize, the district court reasoned that a reasonable jury could find that the City officials failed to take action to eliminate the officer code of silence after publication of the Christopher Commission Report, 19 and, thus, could be held liable under section 1983 for knowingly refusing to terminate a series of acts by others which led to Cunningham and Soly's constitutional injuries. See id. at 1267. The district court further found that a reasonable jury could find a causal connection between the City official's acquiescence in the code of silence and the use of force against Cunningham and Soly.