Opinion ID: 2590262
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Basic Education Act, Chapter 28A.150 RCW

Text: The inmates first argue that the plain language of the basic education act clearly establishes an education system available to all students aged 5 through 21, and excluding none. Response Br. of Resp'ts at 14 (citing RCW 28A.150.220(5)) (footnote omitted). [3] Under the inmates' theory, because children incarcerated in adult prisons are not specifically exempted from the basic education act, they are covered by the act, and are thus entitled to the same education offered to all other children in Washington. We disagree. While the basic education act does not explicitly exclude youths incarcerated in adult facilities, the inquiry does not end there. A fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the court must interpret legislation consistently with its stated goals. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Tri, 117 Wash.2d 128, 140, 814 P.2d 629 (1991). Another well-established principle of statutory construction provides that apparently conflicting statutes must be reconciled to give effect to each of them. E.g., State v. Fagalde, 85 Wash.2d 730, 736, 539 P.2d 86 (1975); see also Fray v. Spokane County, 134 Wash.2d 637, 648, 952 P.2d 601 (1998) (courts avoid construing statutes in way that renders any statutory language superfluous) (citing case). To resolve apparent conflicts between statutes, courts generally give preference to the more specific and more recently enacted statute. See In re Estate of Little, 106 Wash.2d 269, 283, 721 P.2d 950 (1986) (more specific statute) (citing cases); Morris v. Blaker, 118 Wash.2d 133, 147, 821 P.2d 482 (1992). [4] Along these same lines, courts also consider the sequence of all statutes relating to the same subject matter. Department of Labor & Indus. v. Estate of MacMillan, 117 Wash.2d 222, 229, 814 P.2d 194 (1991) (citation omitted). Based on these principles of statutory interpretation, we examine the Legislature's statutory scheme regarding education to determine whether the basic education act applies to the inmate class. The basic education act, originally enacted in 1977, sets up a general program of education that does not specifically address the educational needs of DOC inmates. Chapter 28A.193 RCW, on the other hand, was enacted in 1998 with the intent to provide for the operation of education programs for the department of corrections' juvenile inmates.  RCW 28A.193.005 (emphasis added). Under chapter 28A.193 RCW, individuals up to, and potentially including, age 18 who are incarcerated in DOC facilities may participate in DOC education programs. RCW 28A.193.030(3)-(4); see also RCW 72.09.460(2). [5] Furthermore, the compulsory school attendance and admission law, chapter 28A.225 RCW, was amended in 1998 to specifically exempt individuals who are incarcerated in adult correctional facilities from mandatory school attendance. Laws of 1998, ch. 244, § 14; RCW 28A.225.010(1)(d). [6] Applying the previously discussed rules of interpretation, we hold that chapters 28A.193 and 72.09 RCW, not the basic education act, apply to the inmate class. First, applying the basic education act to DOC inmates would render chapter 28A.193 RCW and portions of chapter 72.09 RCW superfluous. See Fray, 134 Wash.2d at 648, 952 P.2d 601. Second, chapters 28A.193 and 72.09 are the more recent and far more specific statutes regarding inmate education, and thus should be given preference. See Little, 106 Wash.2d at 283, 721 P.2d 950; Blaker, 118 Wash.2d at 147, 821 P.2d 482. Finally, as stipulated to by the parties, the new mandatory declination provisions passed in 1997 were expected to significantly increase the number of juveniles under 18 incarcerated in DOC facilities. Relying upon the sequence in which these statutes were enacted, it is reasonable to conclude that the Legislature intended the more recent statutes and amendments to address an unmet need  the education of juvenile DOC inmates. See MacMillan, 117 Wash.2d at 229, 814 P.2d 194. In addition to their statutory construction arguments, the inmates contend that Tommy P., which held that the basic education act applies to children incarcerated in juvenile detention facilities, mandates application of the basic education act to the inmate class. Response Br. of Resp'ts at 14-15 (citing Tommy P. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 97 Wash.2d 385, 391-93, 645 P.2d 697 (1982)). [7] The inmates argue that Tommy P. stands for the proposition that children do not lose their rights to an education under the basic education act simply because they are incarcerated. Response Br. of Resp'ts at 14-15 (citing Tommy P., 97 Wash.2d at 391-93, 645 P.2d 697). We disagree, noting at least three major flaws in the inmates' arguments. First, contrary to inmates' assertions, the holding in Tommy P. does not rest on the basic education act ; rather, it is dependent upon the compulsory attendance law's applicability to juvenile detainees. RCW 28A.27 (recodified and amended by RCW 28A.225). This court specifically held: the compulsory education law requires the provision of a program of education in juvenile detention centers. Tommy P., 97 Wash.2d at 398, 645 P.2d 697 (emphasis added). [8] Second, as previously stated, the compulsory school attendance and admission law, upon which Tommy P. was based, was amended in 1998 to specifically exclude individuals incarcerated in an adult correctional facility. RCW 28A.225.010(1)(d); see also Tommy P., 97 Wash.2d at 394-98, 645 P.2d 697 (court held that, absent specific exemption, compulsory school attendance law applied to juveniles in detention facilities). Finally, Tommy P. involved offenders incarcerated in juvenile facilities, not youths who were declined to adult court or incarcerated in adult facilities. For these reasons we find Tommy P. distinguishable.