Opinion ID: 4527763
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Vaughn’s Section 1983 Claim

Text: In this appeal, Vaughn also seeks to renew his arguments regarding our prior affirmance of the District Court’s dismissal of his Section 1983 claim. 25 Those efforts are barred by the law-of-the-case doctrine, which “commands that when a court has ruled on an issue, that decision should generally be adhered to by that court in subsequent stages in the same case unless cogent and compelling reasons militate otherwise.” 26 Compelling reasons include “an intervening change in law, availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” 27 Previously, we concluded that Vaughn’s Section 1983 claim was untimely because the most recent state action alleged by Vaughn—the state court’s ordering his compliance with the rehabilitation program—took place in April 2011, which was outside the three-year statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims. 28 The law-of-the-case doctrine therefore applies here. Vaughn offers no compelling reason to disturb our prior decision. He argues that he remained at Phoenix House after April all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 25 See Vaughn, 722 F. App’x at 6. 26 Johnson v. Holder, 564 F.3d 95, 99 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 27 Id. at 99–100 (internal quotation marks omitted). 28 Vaughn, 722 F. App’x at 6. 11 2011 because a state court judge ordered him to do so, or else he would be required to serve his lawfully-imposed state term of imprisonment. But Vaughn cannot show that any state action occurred after April 2011. The fact that Vaughn remained at Phoenix House is insufficient to state a Section 1983 claim because Phoenix House is a private entity that cannot be said to have engaged in state action. To state a Section 1983 claim against a private entity, the plaintiff must show that: (1) “the entity acts pursuant to the coercive power of the state or is controlled by the state”; (2) “the state provides significant encouragement to the entity,” and “the entity is [either] a willful participant in joint activity with the state or the entity’s functions are entwined with state policies”; or (3) “the entity has been delegated a public function by the state.” 29 Vaughn cannot show that Phoenix House engaged in state action under any of these three theories. A private actor is a willful participant in joint activity with the state under Section 1983 if the two “share some common goal to violate the plaintiff’s rights,” which Vaughn’s does not allege. 30 Although the state judge required Vaughn to stay at Phoenix House after April 2011 and told him that he needed to complete the work requirements, Vaughn had agreed to participate in treatment at Phoenix House in lieu of being incarcerated. Because the program was ultimately voluntary, the fact that the state judge informed Vaughn of the 29 Sybalski v. Indep. Grp. Home Living Program, Inc., 546 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). 30 Betts v. Shearman, 751 F.3d 78, 85 (2d Cir. 2014). 12 consequences of his decision not to work at Phoenix House does not make Phoenix House a state actor. Further, the fact that Phoenix House may be subject to regulation by the state 31 is not alone sufficient to make it a state actor. 32 And treatment and care of the chemically dependent, like care for the mentally ill and disabled (at issue in Sybalski), 33 is not a function traditionally and exclusively reserved to the state. 34 Therefore, the fact that Vaughn remained at Phoenix House after April 2011 does not make his Section 1983 claims timely.