Opinion ID: 2083824
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admissibility of Mailing Certification

Text: The trial court overruled the defendant's timely objection to that portion of State's Exhibit 1 purporting to be a certification dated May 11, 1989, of a notice that a Habitual Traffic Violator Notice of Suspension was mailed to the defendant at the indicated address on December 17, 1986. The Court of Appeals found the present factual situation identical to that in Harris v. State (1990), Ind. App., 555 N.E.2d 495, which held that a certification of mailing did not qualify as an official record because there was no duty, either statutory or implied, to maintain records of the mailing of suspension notices. Because transfer was not sought in Harris, this Court has not had occasion to review this ruling. In Harris, the majority recognized that with the advent of State v. Keihn (1989), Ind., 542 N.E.2d 963, the duty of keeping a record of mailing of suspension notices may be necessarily implied, but concluded that such duty did not exist before the decision in Keihn.  Harris, 555 N.E.2d 495 at 498, n. 3. Judge Baker dissented, viewing Keihn as articulating an already existing duty to keep records of mailing of notice. In Keihn, this Court expressly approved Burdine v. State (1987), Ind. App., 510 N.E.2d 1385, which required the State in a prosecution for driving after having been adjudged a habitual traffic violator to prove the defendant's knowledge of the suspension as a result of such status. Explaining our belief that the prosecution's difficulty in proving such knowledge was not a strong enough consideration to obviate knowledge as a required element of proof, we observed: When the Bureau of Motor Vehicles mails a notice of license suspension to the defendant's last known address, proof of such notice would allow the trial court to infer a defendant's knowledge. Keihn, 542 N.E.2d at 968. As correctly noted in Chambers v. State (1989), Ind. App., 547 N.E.2d 301, proof of mailing is not an actual element of the offense of operating a motor vehicle while suspended as a habitual violator. However, applying Keihn, we recognize it as permissible evidence from which a necessary element, a driver's knowledge of the suspension, may be inferred. The State contends that the questioned exhibit was admissible as an official record because the Bureau of Motor Vehicles had a duty to record the mailing of notice resulting not only from Keihn but also from the applicable statutory provisions that require the Bureau to mail a notice, and to suspend a violator's license 30 days after the notice is sent. Indiana Code § 9-12-2-1 provides: (a) Whenever it appears from the records maintained in the bureau that a person's driving record brings him within the definition of an [sic] habitual violator under IC 9-12-1-4, the commissioner shall mail a notice to the person's last known address that informs the person that his driving privileges will be suspended in thirty (30) days because the person is an [sic] habitual violator according to the records of the bureau. (b) Thirty (30) days after the commissioner has mailed a notice under this section, he shall suspend the person's driving privileges for: (1) ten (10) years if the person is an [sic] habitual violator under IC 9-12-1-4(b); (2) ten (10) years if the person is an [sic] habitual violator under IC 9-12-1-4(c); or (3) five (5) years if the person is an [sic] habitual violator under IC 9-12-1-4(d). (c) The notice must inform the person that he may be entitled to relief under section 2 of this chapter or may seek judicial review of his suspension under this chapter. The State argues that a duty to record mailing should be inferred from the fact that proof of mailing is an evidentiary prerequisite to establishing that the suspension is valid as occurring 30 days after the notice was mailed. Chambers v. State (1989), Ind. App., 547 N.E.2d 301. We agree. Because of the resulting duty to record the mailing of notice, the certification of mailing contained in State's Exhibit 1 was admissible as within the official records exception to the hearsay rule. On this point Harris is overruled. The trial court did not err in overruling the defendant's objection.