Opinion ID: 3172548
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Endorsement Clauses and the Campaign

Text: Prohibition Wolfson also argues that Arizona’s Endorsement Clauses and Campaign Prohibition are not narrowly tailored to Arizona’s compelling interest in public confidence in the judiciary’s integrity.9 These Clauses prohibit him, while running for judicial office, from personally soliciting funds for a campaign for another candidate or political organization, publicly endorsing or making a speech on behalf of another candidate for public office, or actively taking part in any political campaign. Wolfson contends that the prohibitions are underinclusive, overbroad, and generally not tailored enough to the interest at hand. We disagree. Arizona can properly restrict judges and judicial candidates from taking part in political activities that undermine the public’s confidence that judges base rulings on law, and not on ?party affiliation.
Wolfson contends that Arizona’s Endorsement Clauses and Campaign Prohibition are underinclusive because they allow judicial candidates to receive endorsements, allow judicial candidates to endorse public officials and noncandidates, and allow other candidates to participate in judicial campaigns. “[U]nderinclusiveness can raise ‘doubts 9 Wolfson again does not contest that Arizona has a compelling interest in upholding the Endorsement Clauses and Campaign Prohibition. Arizona has a compelling interest in upholding the public confidence in the judiciary and furthers this interest through a ban on personal solicitation and curtailment of judicial candidates’ ability to engage with the political branches of government. WOLFSON V. CONCANNON 15 about whether the government is in fact pursuing the interest it invokes, rather than disfavoring a particular speaker or viewpoint,’” Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1668 (quoting Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2740 (2011)), and can “reveal that a law does not actually advance a compelling interest.” Id. However, “[a] State need not address all aspects of a problem in one fell swoop” and can “focus on . . . [the] most pressing concerns.” Id. Once again, Williams-Yulee controls our reasoning. In assessing whether Florida’s solicitation clause was underinclusive, the Court looked at whether Canon 7C(1) was “aim[ed] squarely at the conduct most likely to undermine public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary,” “applie[d] evenhandedly to all judges and judicial candidates, regardless of their viewpoint,” and was “not riddled with exceptions.” Id. at 1668–69. We do not believe that the analysis should be any different when assessing a prohibition of endorsements or participation in political campaigns. Williams-Yulee may have been about a prohibition on direct candidate solicitations of campaign contributions, but the Supreme Court’s reasoning was broad enough to encompass underinclusivity arguments aimed at other types of judicial candidate speech prohibitions such as Arizona’s Endorsement Clauses and its Campaign Prohibition. And both the Endorsement Clauses and Campaign Prohibition fit easily under the Williams-Yulee underinclusivity analysis. First, Arizona squarely aimed at preventing conduct that could erode the judiciary’s credibility. When a judicial candidate actively engages in political campaigns, a judge’s impartiality can be put into question, and the public can lose faith in the judiciary’s ability to abide by the law and not make decisions along 16 WOLFSON V. CONCANNON political lines. Arizona’s Endorsement Clauses and Campaign Prohibition are aimed at these valid concerns. See Arizona Judicial Code of Conduct Rule 4.1, Comment 1 (“Rather than making decisions based upon the expressed views or preferences of the electorate, a judge makes decisions based upon the law and the facts of every case. Therefore, in furtherance of this interest, judges and judicial candidates must, to the greatest extent possible, be free and appear to be free from political influence and political pressure.”). Further, the Endorsement Clauses and Campaign Prohibition apply to both judges and judicial candidates and have few exceptions.10 We need not question whether Arizona could have, as Wolfson argues, prohibited more types of endorsements or campaign participation. “[P]olicymakers may focus on their most pressing concerns” and the fact that the state could “conceivably could have restricted even greater amounts of speech in service of their stated interests” is not a death blow under strict scrutiny. Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1668. Arizona’s Endorsement Clauses and Campaign Prohibition are not underinclusive.
Wolfson next contends that the Endorsement Clauses and Campaign Prohibition are unconstitutionally overbroad because the Campaign Prohibition bans involvement with 10 Judges and judicial candidates may make limited contributions to another candidate or political organization under Rule 4.1(A)(4) and may engage in political activity that pertains to the legal system or attend dinners or similar functions that do not constitute a public endorsement of candidates under Rule 4.1(C). WOLFSON V. CONCANNON 17 ballot measures, and the Endorsement Clauses forbid judges from endorsing anyone, even candidates like the President of the United States who are highly unlikely to appear before the judge.11 A regulation “may be overturned as impermissibly overbroad because a substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.” Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 n.6 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Again, Williams-Yulee forecloses Wolfson’s arguments. There, the petitioner contended that even though Florida could constitutionally prevent judges from soliciting one-on- one or in person with lawyers and litigants, Canon 7C(1) was overbroad because it included a prohibition of solicitation through mass mailings. Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1670–71. The petitioner argued that the latter would have less impact on the public confidence of the judiciary. Id. at 1671. But the Supreme Court was not convinced, reasoning that such distinctions became so fine as to be unworkable, and in large part, Florida’s restriction still left judicial candidates “free to discuss any issue with any person at any time.” Id. at 1670–71. Further, the Court held that though 11 We need not reach whether Arizona could constitutionally forbid judges from discussing ballot measures. Arizona interprets the Clauses to allow candidates to discuss any disputed issue, including those in issuebased initiatives, while cautioning that judicial candidates shall not “with respect to cases, controversies, or issues that are likely to come before the court, make pledges, promises or commitments that are inconsistent with the impartial performance of the adjudicative duties of the office” and shall “act in a manner consistent with the impartiality, integrity and independence of the judiciary.” Ariz. Sup. Ct. Judicial Ethics Advisory Op. 06-05 (2006); see also Ariz. Sup. Ct. Judicial Ethics Advisory Op. 0801 (2008). 18 WOLFSON V. CONCANNON these speech restrictions must be narrowly tailored, they need not be “perfectly tailored.” Id. at 1671 (quoting Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 209 (1992)). “[M]ost problems arise in greater and lesser gradations, and the First Amendment does not confine a State to addressing evils in their most acute form.” Id.; see also O’Toole v. O’Connor, No. 153614, 2015 WL 5515061, at  (6th Cir. Sept. 21, 2015). Wolfson asks us to draw a similarly unworkable and unnecessary line. Although supporting a United States presidential candidate may have less of an effect on the public confidence than endorsing or campaigning for an Arizona State senator or a local prosecutor, creating a rigid line is as unworkable as it is unhelpful. Judges engaging in political acts may present different levels of impropriety in different situations. It is not our proper role to second-guess Arizona’s decisions in this regard. Much as the state drew a line between personal solicitation by candidates and by committees in order to preserve public confidence in the judiciary’s integrity, Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1671, so too can the state decide that judicial candidates should not engage in legislative or executive campaigns. “These considered judgments deserve our respect, especially because they reflect sensitive choices by States in an area central to their own governance—how to select those who ‘sit as their judges.’” Id. (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991)). Our conclusion is consistent with White I. Arizona’s prohibitions do not prevent judicial candidates from announcing their views on disputed legal and political subjects. See White I, 536 U.S. at 788. Instead, Arizona simply makes the distinction that a judicial candidate may do so only in relation to his or her own campaign. This follows WOLFSON V. CONCANNON 19 the reasoning in White I, where the Supreme Court was concerned about restrictions on the ability to express legal views while campaigning, see id. at 770–74, not on the ability to advance the political views and aspirations of another candidate. The latter is not the kind of speech the Court in White I sought to protect. See Wersal v. Sexton, 674 F.3d 1010, 1026 (8th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he endorsement clause does not regulate speech with regard to any underlying issues, and thus the candidates are free to state their positions on these issues, in line with White I.”); Siefert, 608 F.3d at 984 (“While an interest in the impartiality and perceived impartiality of the judiciary does not justify forbidding judges from identifying as members of political parties, a public endorsement is not the same type of campaign speech [as that] targeted by the impermissible rule against talking about legal issues the Supreme Court struck down in White I.”); Bauer, 620 F.3d at 711–12 (holding that the reasoning employed in Siefert to uphold a prohibition against judicial candidate endorsements is equally applicable to a prohibition on partisan activities). The compelling interest in preserving public confidence in the integrity of judiciary warrants a favorable view of Arizona’s attempt to foreclose judicial candidates from engaging in political campaigns other than their own. The Endorsement Clauses and Campaign Prohibition are not fatally overbroad.
Finally, Wolfson contends that Arizona’s Endorsement Clauses and Campaign Prohibition are not narrowly tailored because they do not offer the least restrictive means to further the state’s interest. He argues that the Clauses do not prevent 20 WOLFSON V. CONCANNON judges from favoring certain candidates that may appear in court, and even if they did, recusal would be the best way to handle such impartiality or appearance of impartiality. The government may only “regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest.” Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989). But recusal is no answer at all, and this unworkable alternative was flatly dismissed in Williams-Yulee. A rule requiring judges to recuse themselves from every case where they endorsed or campaigned for one of the parties could “disable many jurisdictions” and cripple the judiciary. See Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1671. Four of Arizona’s counties have only one superior court judge and two other counties have only two superior court judges. Arizona Judicial Branch, Fiscal Year 2014 Annual Report 4, http://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/38/2014%20Annual%20R eport.pdf. Campaigning for frequent litigants would cause an insurmountable burden that other judges and other counties may not be able to bear. Moreover, an extensive recusal record could cause the same erosion of public confidence in the judiciary that Arizona’s Endorsement Clauses and Campaign Prohibition are trying to prevent. We hold that the Endorsement Clauses and Campaign Prohibition are narrowly tailored to achieve Arizona’s compelling interest.