Opinion ID: 1251515
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Inclusion of Nyari's Name in the Central Registry

Text: The parties dispute the import of the inclusion of Nyari's name in the central registry, which was the primary basis for the district court's grant of summary judgment to the government. Under Virginia law, [a]ny person who suspects that a child is an abused or neglected child may make a complaint concerning such child to the Department of Social Services. Va. Code Ann. § 63.2-1510. Founded complaints are maintained in the central registry of Virginia's child abuse and neglect information system. Id. § 63.2-1514(B); 22 Va. Admin. Code § 40-700-10. The contents of the central registry are not open to the public, but appropriate disclosure may be made in accordance with Board regulations. Va.Code Ann. § 63.2-1515. The Virginia Court of Appeals has characterized the inclusion of a person's name in the central registry as an administrative remedy and has stated that the administrative proceedings before the Department of Social Services are not criminal in nature and are not intended to punish or rehabilitate the abuser. J.P. v. Carter, 24 Va.App. 707, 485 S.E.2d 162, 172 (1997). The central registry is distinct from Virginia's Sex Offender and Crimes Against Minors Registry. See, e.g., Va. Code Ann. § 9.1-900. Nyari's name was included in the central registry because DSS determined that the allegations that Nyari had sexually abused his daughters were founded. It was on this basis that the district court concluded, as a matter of law, that Nyari was not a person of good moral character for purposes of § 1427(a). But 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c) requires a district court to subject a denial of a naturalization application to de novo review, to make its own findings of fact, and to conduct a hearing if requested by the applicant. We are aware of no case lawand the government concedes that there is nonein which a court reviewing a denial of a naturalization application has found that the applicant was not a person of good moral character based on the outcome of a civil administrative proceeding. The district court erred in giving preclusive effect to the DSS determination. A founded sexual abuse allegation does not establish that Nyari committed a sexual offense against his children. Furthermore, as explained above, the statutory period for assessing the moral character of a naturalization applicant begins five years immediately preceding the date the application is filed. Id. § 1427(a). The district court emphasized that Nyari's name was listed in the central registry when he applied for naturalization, but 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(a)(2) indicates that an applicant's conduct is the focus of the moral character evaluation. Nyari's conduct for purposes of the good moral character requirement consists of his actions underlying the sexual abuse allegations; Nyari's listing in the central registry is not conduct. Because the sexual abuse allegations arose more than 14 years prior to the filing of Nyari's application, the determination of DSS may only be considered in evaluating Nyari's moral character if Nyari's conduct ... during the statutory period does not reflect that there has been reform of character from an earlier period or if the earlier conduct and acts appear relevant to a determination of [Nyari's] present moral character. Id. The district court erred in not considering whether either of those requirements was met.