Opinion ID: 2508357
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Review of Referee's Findings

Text: The referee's findings are not binding on us, but are entitled to great weight when supported by substantial evidence. ( In re Ross (1995) 10 Cal.4th 184, 201 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 892 P.2d 1287]; In re Marquez (1992) 1 Cal.4th 584, 603 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 727, 822 P.2d 435].) Deference to the referee is called for on factual questions, especially those requiring resolution of testimonial conflicts and assessment of witnesses' credibility, because the referee has the opportunity to observe the witnesses' demeanor and manner of testifying. ( In re Ross, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 201, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 892 P.2d 1287; In re Jackson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 578, 585 [11 Cal.Rptr.2d 531, 835 P.2d 371].) ( In re Malone (1996) 12 Cal.4th 935, 946, 50 Cal. Rptr.2d 281, 911 P.2d 468.) Upon review, we find each of the referee's findings supported by substantial evidence and, like the parties, we accept them.
Ipsen testified at the reference hearing, as he stated in his earlier declaration, that his presentation of inconsistent theories was not intentional. He noted that in the interval between the trials he probably handled other cases and described himself as an instinct[ive] litigator who did not typically follow detailed notes or a script in his examination of witnesses. When he made his closing argument in the Sakarias case, he did not have in mind what he had argued to the Waidla jury: the last thing I'm thinking about when I'm arguing in one trial is trying to remember what I argued in another trial. The referee found Ipsen's claim of inadvertence unconvincing: Despite a lapse of eight months between trials, it is unlikely that a competent and committed prosecutor like Ipsen, handling the severed trials of two defendants jointly charged with capital murder, would simply forget at the second trial what specific factual theory of the gruesome murder he presented at the first.... [T]he Waidla and Sakarias trials were Ipsen's first murder cases, his first death penalty cases. He was depressed about the death verdict in Waidla for approximately two weeks.[ [1] ] It is improbable that his factual depiction of the killing in Waidla would have totally escaped his notice in Sakarias. Moreover, the assertion of inadvertence in presenting the inconsistent theories implies a level of carelessness that is simply not present in Ipsen's prosecution of Sakarias. Substantial evidence supports the referee's conclusion. Ipsen testified at the hearing that he always, including at the time of Waidla's trial, had a belief that Mr. Sakarias inflicted hatchet wounds in the back room. Ipsen also testified he probably had the Sakarias statement, which contained that admission, before Waidla's trial. In addition, Waidla's statement to police, admitted at his trial, indicated that Sakarias had taken the hatchet into the bedroom after they dragged Viivi Piirisild there. Yet, in argument to the Waidla jury, Ipsen not only did not suggest Sakarias had ever used the hatchet, instead impliedly attributing all such blows to Waidla, but expressly argued Waidla had struck Viivi repeatedly with the blade, inflicting not only the hemorrhagic death blow but also the additional non-hemorrhagic chop wounds to the head. As Ipsen, according to his testimony, believed at the time that Sakarias had struck some of the hatchet blows, and as Waidla's statement, which was in evidence, would have supported such an argument (or at least an argument that Sakarias might have struck Viivi with the hatchet in the bedroom), the inference, as the referee found, is clear: Ipsen set aside that belief, and argued that Waidla inflicted all the hatchet wounds, thus enhancing the theory of Waidla's culpability. At Sakarias's trial, of course, the prosecutor introduced, and relied upon, Sakarias's confession, which included his account of taking the hatchet into the bedroom and striking Viivi twice with it. But Ipsen also attributed to Sakarias the hemorrhagic, antemortem chopping wound, despite having proven and argued in Waidla's trial, some months earlier, that Viivi was already dead when moved to the bedroom. As the referee found, on substantial evidence, Ipsen intentionally refrained from putting the same evidence before the Sakarias jury. The inference is therefore strong that his argument to the Sakarias jury, that Sakarias had inflicted the hemorrhagic chopping wound, was also intentional.
Although there were slight grounds for doubt, the referee found, the great weight of the available evidence supported the view that Viivi Piirisild died in the living room. The postmortem abrasion, in particular, was best explained as the result of Viivi's body being dragged across the carpet to the bedroom. While the abrasion could conceivably have had other causes, [t]he dragging explained the size, nature, and location of the abrasion and was also consistent with the condition of Viivi's clothing. The finding that Ipsen had strong reason to believe Viivi was already dead when moved to the bedroom is supported by substantial evidence. The police detective testified in Sakarias's trial that among the bloodstains on the living room carpet was a large concentration of blood consistent with a body lying in that position bleeding for ... an extended period of time ..., possibly as long as 10 or 15 minutes. In contrast, the detective described no bloodstains on the floor of the bedroom and no large-volume stains at all; rather, the blood in the bedroom, spattered on walls and the ceiling, was in one area minimal in volume and in another had enough substance to actually start to trickle down the wall but wasn't a great amount of blood. By far the most persuasive explanation for the abrasion on Viivi's lower back, as the referee stated, was that it was caused by dragging her body to the bedroom. Since the medical examiner, as far as Ipsen knew, had not changed his opinion that the abrasion was incurred after death, Ipsen had no objective grounds on which to abandon his theory, which fit with all this evidence, that petitioners' initial attack on Viivi Piirisild, in her living room, was fatal.
The referee, observing that in Sakarias's trial Ipsen had introduced virtually all the same autopsy photographs as in Waidla's trial but had omitted exhibit 59K, which showed the abrasion on Viivi Piirisild's back, concluded Ipsen's omissions of this exhibit and of questioning regarding the abrasion were deliberate, designed to avoid the presentation of evidence inconvenient to his new and different theory of the attack, evidence much easier to omit than to explain. We conclude this finding is supported by substantial evidence. Though Ipsen testified he had no memory of deciding not to introduce that [exhibit], he agreed it was odd that the one photograph is not in. To be sure, Ipsen's examination of Dr. Ribe in Sakarias's trial was not as long as in Waidla's; Ipsen testified he was less concerned with the medical and physical evidence in Sakarias's trial, where Sakarias had confessed to the attack and raised a psychiatric defense, than in Waidla's. But even in Sakarias's trial, the examination of Dr. Ribe was methodical, covering each of Viivi Piirisild's major injuries and including questions as to the hemorrhagic or nonhemorrhagic character of most. In an earlier examination of the police detective, moreover, Ipsen had already presented evidence that the abrasion on Viivi's body and the condition of the carpeting corroborated Sakarias's statement that petitioners had dragged her body to the bedroom. As the referee reasoned, It is highly improbable that Ipsen recognized the significance of the abrasion as evidence that the body was dragged, but forgot the significance of the abrasion as evidence that Piirisild died in the living room before being dragged to the bedroom. In light of this circumstantial evidence, and given Ipsen's lack of specific memory as to how he came to omit examination on the postmortem character of the abrasion, the referee could reasonably conclude the omission was deliberate.
Ipsen testified he would have liked to introduce Sakarias's confession, which implicated Waidla equally, in Waidla's trial, but assumed it would be subject to a successful objection. My understanding of the law at the time and still today, is that when I'm prosecuting Mr. Waidla and charging him with murder, I can't use the statement of his accomplice against him. At trial before a judge he knew to be highly experienced in criminal law, If I had tried to get in evidence, which everyone knows is inadmissible and is wrong, I'd look like an idiot to say I'd like to offer the codefendant's statement. The referee accepted Ipsen's testimony on this point, stating the confession would have been inadmissible under People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518, 47 Cal.Rptr. 353, 407 P.2d 265 and Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476. The prosecutor's failure to offer the statement, the referee found, did not relate to its inconsistency with the factual theory he intended to present at Waidla's trial. Ipsen's testimony constitutes substantial evidence supporting the referee's finding. Though the Aranda/Bruton rule of exclusion applies only to statements of jointly tried codefendants ( People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 537, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 145, 73 P.3d 1137), Ipsen could have reasonably assumed that most or all of Sakarias's confession would be inadmissible in Waidla's trial. Under California's hearsay exception for declarations against penal interest (Evid.Code, § 1230), admissibility is limited to the `specifically disserving' portions of the statement. ( People v. Duarte (2000) 24 Cal.4th 603, 612, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 701, 12 P.3d 1110; People v. Leach (1975) 15 Cal.3d 419, 441, 124 Cal. Rptr. 752, 541 P.2d 296.) Thus, Sakarias's statements that Waidla had initiated the attack on Viivi Piirisild, struck Viivi with the hatchet as she pleaded for him to stop, called for Sakarias to assist, and later directed him to strike Viivi with the hatchet in the bedroom (see Sakarias, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 613, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 17, 995 P.2d 152) could well have been held inadmissible as attempts to deflect culpability away from the declarant. (See People v. Duarte, supra, at pp. 612-613, 101 Cal. Rptr.2d 701, 12 P.3d 1110; see also id. at p. 626, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 701, 12 P.3d 1110 (conc. opn. of Baxter, J.) [6th Amend. confrontation clause may most often prohibit the use against an accused of directly incriminating statements against him that were made by a nontestifying accomplice while in police custody].) [2] Redaction of the confession to excise those portions would not necessarily have endowed the statement as a whole, made as it was under custodial questioning regarding Sakarias's role in the homicide, with the indicia of reliability required under Evidence Code section 1230. (See People v. Duarte, supra, at pp. 614-618, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 701, 12 P.3d 1110.) Finally, while the prosecutor might have overcome hearsay and confrontation clause objections to portions of the Sakarias statement solely implicating Sakarias, those portions would have been irrelevant in Waidla's trial. With this background law, Ipsen's testimony that he assumed the Sakarias statement would be inadmissible is believable and constituted substantial evidence to support the referee's findings. Like the parties, we therefore accept each of the referee's findings as supported by substantial evidence.