Opinion ID: 64228
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admission of Evidence Pertaining to Money Laundering Counts

Text: Arledge argues that the district court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of his lavish spending to prove several money laundering charges; the government withdrew some of those counts and the jury acquitted him of the remaining money laundering charges. He asserts that the admission of this evidence resulted in a spillover to the rest of the counts against him and thus was highly prejudicial, because jurors likely did not share Arledge's lifestyle and likely found it offensive. The Supreme Court has recognized that prosecutorial appeals to class prejudice are highly improper and can be prejudicial. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 237-39, 60 S.Ct. 811, 84 L.Ed. 1129 (1940). However, the evidence of Arledge's lavish spending was properly admitted to prove the money laundering counts; [3] thus, we must consider whether there was any spillover to the other counts. Generally, this court uses the term `spillover' in discussing whether a district court abused its discretion in denying a motion for severance. United States v. Edwards, 303 F.3d 606, 639-40 & n. 20 (5th Cir.2002) (citing United States v. Holzer, 840 F.2d 1343, 1349 (7th Cir.1988) (No rule of evidence is violated by the admission of evidence concerning a crime of which the defendant is acquitted, provided the crime was properly joined to the crime for which he was convicted and the crimes did not have to be severed for purposes of trial. It makes no difference, moreover, whether the jury acquits on some counts or the trial or reviewing court sets aside the conviction.)). Arledge has not asserted that he was improperly denied severance. Instead, Arledge asks for a new trial based on the alleged prejudice arising from the admission of evidence to prove the money laundering charges. In Edwards, we considered whether evidentiary spillover from invalid claims can be a basis for granting a new trial. Id. at 639. The court stated that to make such a claim, [a]t a minimum, ... defendants must show that they experienced some prejudice as a result of the joinder of invalid claims, i.e., that otherwise inadmissible evidence was admitted to prove the invalid fraud claims. Id. at 640. We have stated that Edwards requires the defendant demonstrate both that the evidence was inadmissible and [that it was] prejudicial. Fiber Sys. Int'l, Inc. v. Roehrs, 470 F.3d 1150, 1170 nn. 18 & 19 (5th Cir.2006) (citing United States v. Cross, 308 F.3d 308, 319 (3d Cir.2002) (recognizing that courts must conduct two distinct inquiries. First, was there a spillover of evidence from the reversed count that would have been inadmissible at a trial limited to the remaining count? Second, if there was any spillover, is it highly probable that it did not prejudice the jury's verdict on the remaining count, i.e., was the error harmless?)). Thus, Arledge must demonstrate prejudice from the introduction of the evidence. See Edwards, 303 F.3d at 640. Regardless of whether the evidence would have been admitted in a trial solely on the remaining counts, Arledge has failed to prove that the evidence prejudiced him. Arledge has not identified any instances in which the prosecution inappropriately used the evidence of Arledge's wealth or lavish spending to prejudice or bias the jury. See FED.R.EVID. 403 (excluding evidence in which the probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice); see also id. advisory committee's note (defining unfair prejudice as an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.). In addition, the jury was discerning, despite the introduction of evidence of Arledge's wealth, in its acquittal of Arledge on all the remaining money laundering counts and one count of wire fraud. Arledge was found not guilty on all money laundering counts, demonstrating that the jury did not believe beyond a reasonable doubt that he had participated in any activity that would fall under the statute. The jury's acquittal suggests that it did not allow any potential bias against Arledge to sway its verdict. See United States v. Arzola-Amaya, 867 F.2d 1504, 1514 (5th Cir.1989) (The jury's ability to discern a failure of proof of guilt on some of the alleged crimes indicates a fair minded consideration of the issues.). Arledge has provided no evidence that would suggest otherwise. Accordingly, we find that the jury was not improperly prejudiced and deny Arledge's request for a new trial.