Opinion ID: 2144137
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Stottlar v Ginsburg Dev. Corp

Text: Plaintiff Stottlar was an employee of W.C. Shopovick & Co., Inc., a carpentry subcontractor on a construction project on which defendant Ginsburg Development Corporation was the general contractor. Stottlar fell from a plank and was injured while on the job. He then sued Ginsburg under theories of common-law negligence and Labor Law §§ 200 and 240. Ginsburg in turn impleaded Shopovick, asserting claims for common-law contribution and indemnification, as well as contractual indemnification. [3] Shopovick made a demand for defense and indemnification from its two insurers  the State Insurance Fund, Shopovick's workers' compensation insurer, and CNA Insurance Company, Shopovick's insurer under a commercial general liability policy. [4] CNA agreed to defend Shopovick, but reserved its right to disclaim coverage on Ginsburg's contractual indemnification claim if Ginsburg was found negligent. At trial on the issue of liability only, the court dismissed the Labor Law § 241 (6) claim. Plaintiff's remaining causes of action were submitted to the jury. The jury determined that Ginsburg's violation of Labor Law § 240 (1) was not a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff on the negligence and Labor Law § 200 causes of action and determined that Shopovick was 50% negligent, Ginsburg was 35% negligent, and Stottlar was 15% negligent. Prior to a trial on plaintiff's damages, Shopovick commenced a fourth-party action against CNA and the State Fund seeking a declaratory judgment to determine the carriers' responsibilities under their respective policies with Shopovick. The personal injury case was ultimately settled and CNA reserved its right to seek a judicial determination of its duty to indemnify Shopovick in the fourth-party action. CNA and the State Fund submitted an agreed statement of facts for a stipulated controversy to Supreme Court. That court held that the indemnification agreement between Ginsburg and Shopovick was unenforceable under General Obligations Law § 5-322.1, because of the jury's apportionment of negligence to include Ginsburg. Thus, since the agreement was invalid, CNA was not liable under the provisions of its policy to indemnify Shopovick on Ginsburg's contractual indemnification claim. The Appellate Division reversed. Noting that General Obligations Law § 5-322.1 was intended only to preclude a contractor (Ginsburg) from seeking contractual indemnification for damages caused by the negligence of the contractor, the court went on to hold that CNA was required to honor its contractual obligation to the extent that the [indemnification] contract requires indemnification caused by or resulting from the negligence of a party other than Ginsburg ( Stottlar v Ginsburg Dev. Corp. , 229 AD2d 483, 485). The Appellate Division concluded that the contractual indemnification clause remained in effect and rendered CNA and the State Fund coinsurers. We granted CNA leave to appeal.