Opinion ID: 24281
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Quantity of cocaine involved

Text: Defendants, for different reasons, contest the district court’s finding that the quantity of drugs attributable to them for sentencing purposes is between two and 3.5 kilograms. United States Sentencing Guidelines (“USSG”) § 1B1.3(a)(1)-(2) provides that a defendant’s sentence is to be determined on the basis of all 27 We note that even if we were to conclude that the instant error was “plain” and, moreover, that it affected Defendants’ substantial rights, we would decline to exercise our discretion to reverse the district court’s refusal to suppress the wiretap evidence because this error is not one that calls into doubt the “‘fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Calverley, 37 F.2d at 64 (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936)). 28 United States v. Huerta, 182 F.3d 361, 364 (5th Cir. 1999). 29 United States v. Huskey, 137 F.3d 283, 291 (5th Cir. 1998). 16 criminal acts he participated in during the offense of conviction as well as all criminal acts that were part of the same course of conduct as the offense of conviction. Defendants were convicted of individually possessing with the intent to distribute and conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute cocaine over an extended period of time, encompassing several distinct transactions. The district court made its determinations of drug quantity by adopting the presentencing report (“PSR”), finding that the PSR was well-supported by the evidence adduced at trial. The PSR stated that it was accurate to hold Cage responsible for between two and 3.5 kilograms by adding (1) the two kilograms he was found with on his return trip from Houston, (2) “the ½ kilogram that he obtained from an unindicted coconspirator and [(3)] the fourteen ounces [392 grams] that he sold to Calvin Brown during the course of the conspiracy.” Cage objects to this finding, contending that the district court clearly erred in finding that the packages found in his possession when he was stopped on his return from Houston contained two kilograms of cocaine. He argues that the district court had no basis for that finding because only one of the packages was tested for cocaine and that neither was weighed. Therefore, he contends, the record at best supports an inference that the packages amounted to approximately 1½ kilograms because that was the amount Easterling, the apparent prospective purchaser of these packages of cocaine, testified that he was buying. 17 We note first that the district court was well within its discretion in crediting the testimony of the forensic chemist from the Louisiana Police Crime Lab that both packages had been tested (positively) for cocaine. Cage correctly points out, however, that there is no proof in the record that the packages were ever weighed. Although Cage argues on appeal that he properly objected to the district court’s adoption of the PSR’s finding of the weight of those packages,30 our conclusion need not turn on the efficacy of Cage’s purported objection: His claim fails on the merits as well. The record contains sufficient evidence to support a conclusion by the district court that the packages contained at least 1.5 kilograms, as Cage concedes. In conjunction with the court’s other undisputed findings, the record clearly contains sufficient evidence to support the finding that Cage should be held responsible for more than two kilograms of cocaine. 30 Cage did argue before the district court, during sentencing, that the government had not presented evidence that the packages in question had been weighed. However, he did not do so in the context of objecting to the PSR’s finding regarding the quantity of drugs but rather in the course of arguing for a sentencing reduction for an acceptance of responsibility. Specifically, he argued that he was willing to enter into a plea bargain for the quantity of drugs that he was charged with and ultimately convicted for being responsible for —— between two and 3.5 kilograms —— but was unwilling to accept the government’s plea offer because it required him to accept responsibility for five kilograms of cocaine. In the course of his explanation of why accepting responsibility for that larger amount was unacceptable to him, he mentioned in passing that even though the government had not shown at trial that he should be responsible for even two kilograms, he had been willing to acknowledge responsibility for two to 3.5 kilograms, implying the accuracy of that range. 18 The district court found that Cage was responsible for at least 0.9 kilograms of additional cocaine. This finding was adopted by the district from the PSR, specifically its statement that Cage had obtained one-half a kilogram from an unindicted coconspirator and had sold at least 14 ounces (392 grams) to Brown. “The PSR generally bears sufficient indicia of reliability to be considered as evidence by the district court in resolving disputed facts. A district court may thus adopt facts contained in the PSR without further inquiry if the facts have an adequate evidentiary basis and the defendant does not present rebuttal evidence.”31 Because Cage presents no such rebuttal evidence regarding the attribution of the one-half kilogram that he is said to have obtained from the unindicted coconspirator or the 392 grams that he allegedly sold to Brown, the district court was free to adopt the PSR’s finding. Accordingly, we find that the district court did not clearly err in adopting the PSR’s findings that Cage was responsible for more than two kilograms of cocaine. In combination with the finding that Cage possessed approximately 1.5 kilograms when his vehicle was stopped, the finding that he was responsible for an additional 0.9 kilograms clearly supports the district court’s determination that Cage was responsible for more than two kilograms of cocaine. 31 United States v. Brown, 54 F.3d 234, 241 (5th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). 19 As for Brown, he too contests the district court’s attribution to him of more than two kilograms of cocaine. The court predicated its findings on the PSR’s conclusion that Brown should be found responsible for at least two kilograms of cocaine, based on (1) the approximately 1.5 kilograms32 that Cage obtained in Houston and was arrested with, (2) the 14 ounces (392 grams) that Brown purchased from Cage during the conspiracy, and (3) the two ounces (56 grams) discarded by Brown while he was being chased immediately prior to his arrest. For sentencing purposes, a defendant convicted of being part of a drug conspiracy is responsible not only “for the drugs with which [he] was directly involved but also those that can be attributable to him as part of his ‘relevant conduct’ under § 1B1.3 of the Sentencing Guidelines.”33 “Relevant conduct” includes “reasonably foreseen acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity.”34 Brown first argues that the district court committed clear 32 Brown does not challenge the weight of the packages of cocaine that Cage was found to have in his possession. As we discussed regarding the quantity of drugs for which Cage was held responsible, for sentencing purposes, the district court found that those packages contained two kilograms of cocaine. Because the issue is slightly in doubt but is ultimately immaterial to our inquiry, however, we will assume that the packages of cocaine weighed only 1.5 kilograms of cocaine, the amount that Cage concedes they contained. 33 United States v. Gallardo-Trapero, 185 F.3d 307, 325 (5th Cir. 1999). 34 USSG § 1B1.3. 20 error in finding that it was foreseeable to him that Cage would obtain 1.6 kilograms of cocaine from his source in Houston. Brown points out that (1) the agent who testified regarding the meaning of the wiretap conversations stated that he did not think Brown knew that Cage was going to Houston to obtain cocaine from his supplier, and (2) the wiretap evidence produced by the government did not show that Brown knew Cage was going to Houston to obtain cocaine. This argument misapprehends the applicable law. Although it is unlikely that Brown knew all the details of Cage’s plans or the quantities of cocaine Cage intended to procure from his sources, the district court was only required to find that Brown was aware that Cage undertook other actions in furtherance of the conspiracy, especially plans and actions to obtain cocaine from his sources. Such a finding is well supported by the evidence. Brown next challenges the sentencing court’s finding that he had purchased 14 ounces of cocaine from Cage, a finding based on police analysis of the wiretap conversations. Again, we disagree. The district court was free to infer, as did the jury, that the numbers discussed during the recorded conversations referred to money and drugs. Moreover, Brown’s contentions to the contrary notwithstanding, the wiretap evidence reasonably supports the PSR’s conclusion that Brown purchased at least 14 ounces of cocaine from Cage because the district court was free to credit the agent’s testimony to that effect, including his interpretation of the “coded” recorded conversation. As with Cage, in combination these 21 separate findings support the district court’s determination that Brown was responsible for more than two kilograms of cocaine. The district court’s finding of drug quantities for which Defendants should be held responsible is reasonably supported by the record evidence or, in some instances, by unchallenged statements of the PSR. We are satisfied not only that the district court did not commit clear error in attributing between two and 3.5 kilograms of cocaine to both Brown and Cage, but that the court affirmatively reached the correct results.