Opinion ID: 868638
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Impoundment and Search of the Vehicle

Text: Mr. Akinlade argues that the search of, and seizure of items from, his vehicle were unconstitutional. As Mr. Akinlade sees it, he did not have access to his vehicle, as he was already arrested, and the officers did not have information that there would be evidence relating to his obstruction offense in the vehicle. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 344 (2009) (“Because police could not reasonably have believed either that Gant could have accessed his car at the time of the search or that evidence of the offense for which he was arrested might have been found 2 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to close of business on September 30, 1981. 10 Case: 11-15840 Date Filed: 05/22/2013 Page: 11 of 15 therein, the search in this case was unreasonable.”). Mr. Akinlade also argues that the search was illegal because his vehicle was impounded in violation of the rules of the Gwinnett County Police Department. We need not address Mr. Akinlade’s Gant argument because the impoundment and inventory of the vehicle were permissible on other grounds. A police officer may impound and inventory a vehicle when he has acted pursuant to standard criteria or police procedures. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 375-76 (1987) (holding that officer’s inventory of impounded van was permissible under the Fourth Amendment because it was done according to standard criteria and on the basis of something other than suspicion of evidence of criminal activity); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 376 (1976) (holding that routine inventory search—pursuant to standard police procedures—of an automobile lawfully impounded by police for violations of municipal parking ordinances did not violate the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Roberson, 897 F.2d 1092, 1096-97 (11th Cir. 1990) (police officer’s impoundment and inventory of car in accordance with standard police procedures was not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment). See also Sammons v. Taylor, 967 F.2d 1533, 1543 (11th Cir. 1992) (qualified immunity case: “Even if an arrestee’s vehicle is not impeding traffic or otherwise presenting a hazard, a law enforcement officer may impound the vehicle, so long as the decision to impound is made on the basis of standard 11 Case: 11-15840 Date Filed: 05/22/2013 Page: 12 of 15 criteria and on the basis of ‘something other than suspicion of evidence of criminal activity.’”). Mr. Akinlade asserts that, according to the Gwinnett County Police Department Directives Manual, if the operator of a vehicle is arrested, the officer’s decision to impound the vehicle must be reasonable under the circumstances. Mr. Akinlade argues that because the vehicle was parked in the bank parking lot and there were no safety concerns with leaving the vehicle there, the decision to impound was improper. See Directives Manual § 427.03 (Supp. Ex. to the Suppression Hearing) [D.E. 54-1 at 1-2]. The Manual, however, also permits an officer to impound and “hold” a vehicle if “there is a question as to who the lawful owner of the vehicle is.” See Directives Manual § 427.05. See also United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1508 (10th Cir. 1996) (car can be impounded until ownership is determined). Here, the BOLO stated that the vehicle was registered under a fraudulently obtained driver’s license and that it was unknown who the true owner might be. In addition, Mr. Akinlade had used three different names (Mr. Mozingo, Peter Akinlade, and Mike), creating more questions about the vehicle’s ownership and Mr. Akinlade’s relationship to the vehicle. Officer Von Behren’s impoundment and inventory thus adhered to the requirement that they be conducted according to standardized criteria. See Bertine, 479 U.S. at 375; Directives Manual § 427.06 (“Before impound . . . [the] vehicle will be inventoried”); Transcript of 12 Case: 11-15840 Date Filed: 05/22/2013 Page: 13 of 15 Suppression Hearing at 53 (Officer Von Behren testified that inventory of the contents of the vehicle was “standard procedure for any impounded vehicle”); id. at 67 (“Department policy requires me to inventory the contents of the vehicle to identify any items of value”). Inspector Schaefer’s searches after the inventory were lawful because they were conducted pursuant to valid search warrants. We therefore reject Mr. Akinlade’s Fourth Amendment arguments.