Opinion ID: 2372033
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Burden of Proof Challenge

Text: Bedi contends that the Committee improperly placed upon him the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that he did not commit the wrongful acts upon which it relied in concluding that he failed to demonstrate good moral character and fitness. In support of his argument, Bedi relies, in part, on the Committee's written response to his motion concerning the procedure for the hearing and the burden of proof. Specifically, he refers to the Committee's counsel's statement that it believes that the written record . . . is sufficient to establish a prima facie case on each of the specifications. Therefore, Sukhbir Singh Bedi shall have both the burden of going forth and the burden of persuasion, for the negative. Bedi argues that this language indicates that the Committee essentially placed upon him the burden of proving, clearly and convincingly, (1) that he did not cheat or attempt to cheat on the bar examination, and (2) that his application for special accommodations was not fudged. The Committee argues that, contrary to Bedi's contention, its response to his inquiry acknowledged its counsel's obligation to establish a prima facie case on the specified charges of misconduct and did not state any particular quantum of proof imposed upon him for rebutting that prima facie case. The Committee contends that it used the clear and convincing evidence standard only in its determination of whether the applicant possesses the requisite moral character and fitness for admission as provided in Rule 46(e). [6] However, the Committee suggests that once it establishes a prima facie case, it is appropriate for both the burden of going forward, and the burden of persuasion, to shift to the applicant to rebut the prima facie case against him. Our review of the Committee's response and report persuade us that the Committee did not require Bedi to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he did not engage in the specified misconduct or otherwise allocate improperly the burden of proof. First, the Committee's response itself does not indicate the quantum of proof required for the applicant to defeat the  prima facie case on the Committee's specification of charges against Bedi, as opposed to that required ultimately to show good moral character. [7] The only reference to Bedi having a clear and convincing evidence burden is in subsection (b) of the response which, consistent with Rule 46(e), refers to Bedi's ultimate burden of demonstrating that he possesses good moral character and general fitness to practice law. [8] Second, subsection (a) of the Committee's response is read most reasonably to mean that the Committee had the burden of establishing a prima facie case with respect to its allegations of misconduct, which it could satisfy with the information on file, and therefore, Bedi had the burden of producing evidence to rebut this prima facie showing of misconduct. [9] This reading is consistent with the general rule that a party asserting . . . an issue has the burden of proof i.e., burden of persuasion and its constituent burden of production  i.e., the initial burden of going forward with evidenceas to each material element of such issue in order to prevail. . . . A party satisfies his burden of production with respect to an issue material to his case when he has made out a prima facie case as to such issue  i.e., a sufficient quantum of evidence which, if credited, would permit judgment in his favor unless contradicted by credible evidence offered by the opposing party. Nader v. de Toledano, 408 A.2d 31, 48 (D.C.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1078, 100 S.Ct. 1028, 62 L.Ed.2d 761 (1980) (internal citations omitted). When the Committee's response is read in light of the traditional meanings accorded the language it used, it is apparent that it recognized its obligation to make out a prima facie case by offering evidence that, if credited, would permit a finding that Bedi had engaged in the alleged misconduct. Since it was the Committee that alleged the acts of wrongdoing, it was the Committee that had the initial burden of going forward with evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case as to these particular issues. The Committee informed Bedi that once a prima facie case was established with respect to the allegations against him, the burden of production shifted to him to offer contradictory evidence. See id. (The establishment of a prima facie case by the party bearing the burden of persuasion as to an issue shifts the burden of producing contradictory evidence to the adverse party.). As used by the Committee, the burden of going forward terminology necessarily refers to Bedi's burden of producing contradictory evidence, i.e., evidence that would refute any credible showing made by the Committee in its prima facie case related to its allegations of wrongdoing. See id. Bedi argues that by including in that same sentence that he also had the burden of persuasion, for the negative must have been intended to mean that he had the ultimate burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that he did not engage in the alleged acts of misconduct. As already discussed, we see no basis to conclude that the Committee placed such a heavy evidentiary burden on Bedi. Indeed, in its response to this court, the Committee candidly states that [h]ad the applicant been able to rebut the substantial evidence of his misconducteven by `a mere preponderance of the evidence'the Committee's conclusions and ultimate determination would have been entirely different. We are not persuaded that the burden of persuasion statement in the Committee's response undermines its obvious recognition of its obligation to prove that the misconduct it alleged had occurred. It stated clearly that once the Committee had met its burden of establishing a prima facie case with respect to the allegations of wrongdoing, it was incumbent upon the applicant to offer evidence contradicting or discrediting that prima facie showing that he engaged in the wrongful acts as alleged. [10] Consistent with the rule, the Committee stated in the next subparagraph of its response that the ultimate burden was on the applicant to prove good moral character. [11] Once the Committee challenged Bedi's good character with evidence of conduct that would reflect adversely on his character, Bedi had the burden of producing evidence either to discredit the Committee's evidence or to support further his claim of good moral character in the face of the adverse evidence. See Lubetzky v. State Bar of California, 54 Cal.3d 308, 285 Cal.Rptr. 268, 815 P.2d 341, 343 (1991) (citations omitted) (describing a bar applicant's burden to make a prima facie showing of good character, the State bar's rebuttal, if any, and the applicant's burden to present further evidence in light of any such rebuttal); see also Green, supra note 10, 499 A.2d 870 at 873 (citing MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 336 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984)) (explaining that the [burden of production] refers to the burden of coming forward with satisfactory evidence of a particular fact in issue). Bedi argues that the Committee's report shows that, in fact, it based its unfavorable recommendation on his failure to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the alleged wrongful acts did not occur. He contends that if he only had to rebut the evidence offered against him, he succeeded by showing deficiencies in the Committee staff's presentation on the cheating incident and good faith reliance on a physician's certification that he suffered from dyslexia. He contends that since the acts of wrongdoing alleged by the Committee form the basis for its conclusion that he failed to prove good moral character and fitness by clear and convincing evidence, the Committee must have held him to that same standard in rebutting the specifications of wrongdoing made against him. Further, he contends that there is no way that these two considerations can be compartmentalized. Contrary to Bedi's argument, the Committee's Report shows that it did not require him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he did not engage in misconduct, but rather held him to that standard on the ultimate burden of proof of good moral character and fitness as required by Rule 46(e). The Committee challenged in the proceeding Bedi's claim of good moral character based on the information concerning the acts of wrongdoing alleged against him. After a hearing, the Committee first found that substantial credible evidence established that Bedi had cheated on the February 1996 bar examination, that he was not truthful with the Committee and its staff concerning his misconduct, and that he knowingly used a fudged diagnosis in an effort to obtain special testing accommodation. [12] The Committee never required Bedi to prove by clear and convincing evidence the negative, as he contends ( i.e., that these events did not occur). Once the Committee determined that the allegations of misconduct were established by credible evidence, it then considered whether Bedi had demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that he possessed the requisite moral character and fitness to practice law. Given that the Committee had found, based on substantial evidence, that the wrongful conduct, in fact had occurred, the Committee concluded that Bedi did not meet his burden of showing that he possessed the requisite moral character and fitness to practice law. Put another way, the Committee concluded essentially that the acts of wrongdoing that were established against Bedi by substantial, credible evidence reflected so adversely upon his character and fitness to practice that he could not meet his burden of proving clearly and convincingly his present good moral character. The Committee's approach has been sanctioned in similar bar admissions proceedings. For example, in Dortch, supra, this court considered whether an applicant with serious prior felony convictions had met his ultimate burden of demonstrating good moral character and general fitness to practice law under Rule 46(d) & (e). 860 A.2d at 361. This court stated that [g]iven the `extremely damning' character of his crimes, it was incumbent on Dortch to make an exceptionally compelling showing of his full and complete rehabilitation in order to assure [the court] of his present good moral character. Id. While Dortch produced some evidence of his rehabilitation efforts, this court held that, viewed in its entirety, the evidence did not show clearly and convincingly proof of Dortch's good moral character. Id. Thus, we described in Dortch essentially a shifting of the burden of production between the applicant and the Committee, with the ultimate burden for demonstrating good moral character remaining upon the applicant. See Konigsberg, supra, 366 U.S. at 41-42, 81 S.Ct. 997 (recognizing that under rules requiring the applicant to demonstrate good moral character, he or she must make a prima facie showing of good moral character, and [t]he examining Committee then has the opportunity to rebut that showing with evidence of bad character.); Lubetzky, supra, 285 Cal. Rptr. 268, 815 P.2d at 343 (explaining that under rule placing burden of showing good moral character on bar applicant, if applicant makes a prima facie case, and the State Bar rebuts that evidence, applicant must introduce further evidence of good moral character or discredit the State Bar's evidence); R.D.I., supra, 581 So.2d at 29 (describing applicant's burden to show good moral character, any objector's obligation to rebut that prima facie showing, and explaining that [w]hile the burden of proof never shifts, the burden of proceeding does). Bedi argues that although such a procedure is fair in cases where the misconduct involved is based on past events as to which a record has already been established, it is unfair when based upon charges of misconduct as to which there is no established past record. We discern no reason that the Committee on Admissions cannot determine in a character and fitness hearing whether allegations of misconduct bearing upon these issues are true based on evidence presented at the hearing. Our rule provides for an evidentiary hearing at which the applicant has a right to be represented by counsel . . ., to examine and cross-examine witnesses, to adduce evidence bearing on moral character and general fitness to practice law . . ., and for the Committee to make factual determinations. Rule 46(f)(2)(iv) and (3). Thus, the rule contemplates a procedure whereby disputed issues of fact are examined and resolved by the Committee just as in other civil cases. The Committee's fact finding role is well established, and we accord some deference to its findings, accepting them if they are supported by substantial evidence. Baker, supra, 579 A.2d at 680. Other jurisdictions rely upon similar committees to make factual determinations as to any allegations of specific acts of misconduct in bar admission proceedings based on the evidence presented. See, e.g., R.D.I., supra, 581 So.2d at 29 (concluding that the Florida Board of Bar Examiners could find from the evidence, including the circumstances surrounding a Bar applicant's business activities, that he was involved in `prior, substantial criminal activity'); In re Legg, 325 N.C. 658, 386 S.E.2d 174, 180 (1989) (holding that the evidence supported the North Carolina Board of Law Examiners' finding that the Bar applicant, without authorization, assumed the right of ownership to funds of another), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 906, 110 S.Ct. 2589, 110 L.Ed.2d 270 (1990). Bedi has provided no reasons that the specific acts of misconduct involved in this case could not be addressed by the Committee on Admissions at the hearing, and we discern none. In summary, pursuant to Rule 46(e), the applicant has the ultimate burden of demonstrating good moral character and fitness to practice law by clear and convincing evidence. In a bar admissions proceeding, the initial burden of showing good character and fitness is with the applicant. The Committee on Admissions may rely upon specific acts of misconduct to rebut the applicant's prima facie showing of good character. When the Committee relies upon specific acts of misconduct to defeat the applicant's prima facie showing of good character, and the applicant denies the charges, the applicant may offer evidence to refute or discredit the Committee's charges. If the evidence of misconduct is sufficient to rebut the applicant's prima facie showing of good character, then the applicant may introduce further evidence of good moral character for consideration. See Dortch, supra, 860 A.2d at 361 (explaining the need for an applicant having prior criminal convictions to make a compelling showing of rehabilitation to prove present good moral character). The Committee must then decide, based upon all the evidence, whether the applicant has carried the ultimate burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that he or she possesses good moral character and fitness to practice law. Rule 46(e); see also R.D.I., supra, 581 So.2d at 29; Lubetzky, supra, 285 Cal. Rptr. 268, 815 P.2d at 342-43. In this case, the Committee conducted the proceedings and submitted a report consistent with the procedure outlined here, and it did not improperly allocate the burden of proof.