Opinion ID: 2508462
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Legislative Amendments Subsequent to Rash and Heedless Progeny Eliminated Plain Language on Which Definition Was Based

Text: Shortly after Bowman was decided, the legislature in 1961 repealed and reenacted all motor vehicle laws with House Bill 2, codifying them in Title 46 RCW. LAWS OF 1961, ch. 12. Though the legislature did not alter the language criminalizing reckless driving and vehicular homicide, it did add what is now RCW 46.98.020, which directs the courts to construe the act's provisions in pari materia and as if they were enacted at the same time. LAWS OF 1961, ch. 12, at 435, codified at RCW 46.98.020. The section has remained unchanged ever since. Three years later the legislature enacted House Bill 234 to remove the phrase [f]or the purpose of this section that had existed at the time Dickert and its progeny were decided. LAWS OF 1965, Ex.Sess., ch. 155, § 59 [8] ; cf. LAWS OF 1937, ch. 189, § 118. That the legislature chose to repeal the fundamental basis for Dickert and its progeny (including Bowman ) cannot be ignored. Every action by the legislature must be given effect, for [t]he [l]egislature `does not engage in unnecessary or meaningless acts, and we presume some significant purpose or objective in every legislative enactment.' In re Recall of Pearsall-Stipek, 141 Wash.2d 756, 769, 10 P.3d 1034 (2000) (quoting John H. Sellen Constr. Co. v. Dep't of Revenue, 87 Wash.2d 878, 883, 558 P.2d 1342 (1976)). Nor are we permitted to presume the omission of that language was unintentional and therefore inconsequential. In re Custody of Smith, 137 Wash.2d 1, 12, 969 P.2d 21 (1998) (A `court cannot read into a statute that which it may believe the legislature has omitted, be it an intentional or inadvertent omission.' (quoting Auto. Drivers & Demonstrators Union Local 882 v. Dep't of Ret. Sys., 92 Wash.2d 415, 421, 598 P.2d 379 (1979))), aff'd sub nom. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000); see also Jepson v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 89 Wash.2d 394, 403, 573 P.2d 10 (1977) (We are not authorized to read into it those things which we conceive the legislature may have left out unintentionally. We must assume the legislature meant what it said. (citations omitted)). To the contrary we must presume the legislature consciously intended to eliminate the language which served as the underpinning of Dickert, namely the phrase [f]or the purpose of this section which prohibited the court from applying the reckless driving definition to the vehicular homicide statute. See Dickert, 194 Wash. at 632, 79 P.2d 328. As a result there is no longer any statutory basis to distinguish the reckless driving definition from the operating a motor vehicle in a reckless manner prong of the vehicular homicide and assault statutes. The majority however avers Bowman's interpretation of the vehicular homicide and assault statutes operates as though the legislature had originally written it into the statute. Were we confronted with the same statute at issue in Bowman, I would be inclined to agree. But the legislative amendments subsequent to Bowman unequivocally demonstrate we face a different legislative scheme. [9] Rather than follow a line of cases based on grounds that no longer exist, I instead abide by the legal maxim cessante ratione legis cessat et ipsa lex: When the reason of the law ceases, the law itself also ceases. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1622 (7th ed.1999); see also State ex rel. King County v. Superior Court, 104 Wash. 268, 275, 176 P. 352 (1918) (following doctrine). Reckless as used in the vehicular homicide and vehicular assault statutes, RCW 46.61.520(1)(b), RCW 46.61.522(1)(a), has the same meaning as reckless driving as defined by RCW 46.61.500(1). Plain language requires as much. RCW 46.98.020. [10]