Opinion ID: 3150619
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: McCoy’s Relocation

Text: With the above standards in mind, we must consider whether the circuit court’s finding that McCoy’s relocation to Fayetteville constituted a material change in circumstances. In its September 20, 2013 letter opinion, the circuit court held as follows: [T]he parties entered into an agreement that was described as joint custody with the children spending each week during the school year with their father and the first three weekends of each month with their mother, the fourth weekend with their father (with their mother having time with the children that week on Thursday night), and the fifth weekend if there was one, with their mother. The Court approved this arrangement and the terminology that it was joint custody based on the Court’s understanding that both parties resided in Mountain Home and this arrangement was essentially a true joint custody arrangement with the children spending roughly equal time with both parents. The testimony at trial established that the arrangement has never been as the Court believed it was. Within a month the respondent, Ms. McCoy, had moved to Fayetteville. Once she did that the aspects of this agreement that the Court understood made it joint custody no longer truly existed. The parties apparently immediately made adjustments and rearrangements to the Court’s order and have lived with the original agreement, with modifications, for the past nine years. It is the Court’s finding that the fundamental nature of the original agreement of “joint custody” changed with the potential to significantly affect the well being of the children. To their credit, the parties have made it work for the past eight, going on nine, years until it came to affect the lives of the children as they grew older. 9 Cite as 2015 Ark. 389 Here, a review of the record demonstrates that there was not a material change in circumstances. It is unclear how the “fundamental nature of the original agreement of ‘joint custody’ changed with the potential to significantly affect the well being of the children.” When McCoy moved to Fayetteville, the parties immediately modified the schedule to remove McCoy’s Thursday visitation; however, the remainder of the original order remained the same for almost nine years. The original child-custody agreement stated as follows: The general scheme of physical custodial time with the children set out above is subject to change by agreement of the parties. The parties commit to being flexible with each other so as to meet the children’s need to spend time with both of their parents. Based on the language of the original child-custody agreement, McCoy and Kincade were free to modify the physical custodial time with the children, which they did for almost nine years. Pursuant to the original custody agreement, the parties agreed to be flexible in order to meet the children’s need to spend time with both parents. The parties’ physical custodial arrangement, for the last nine years, demonstrates their compliance with the original child-custody agreement. The custodial arrangement has been consistent for almost nine years; therefore, McCoy’s move to Fayetteville did not amount to a material change in circumstances. Further, the circuit court found that the “initial move by the respondent to Fayetteville by itself did not significantly change the circumstances contrary to the children’s best interests, but it did significantly change the fundamental nature of the custody arrangement back in 2005 by making it no longer anything resembling a ‘joint custody’ 10 Cite as 2015 Ark. 389 arrangement with shared equal time between the parents.” However, the circuit court expressed its “admiration for the job done by both parents to this point” and expressed its belief that the “parents made the best of this changed circumstance until the present.” I cannot agree with the circuit court’s finding that McCoy’s move to Fayetteville constituted a material change in circumstances sufficient to warrant modification. As noted above, the circuit court repeatedly praised McCoy and Kincade for their ability to modify the original agreement for almost nine years, thus it is unclear, in the almost nine-year span of modifications, when McCoy’s move to Fayetteville transformed into a material change of circumstances. McCoy’s move simply did not amount to a material change in circumstances.