Opinion ID: 751707
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: legality of search conducted by detective croft

Text: 22 Paige argues that Detective Croft's initial warrantless search, conducted in his official capacity as a narcotics investigator, violated the Fourth Amendment. To resolve this issue, we turn to the first step of our well-established analysis for determining whether governmental investigative activity rises to the level of a Fourth Amendment transgression. See York, 895 F.2d at 1028. 23 Did a Fourth Amendment Search Take Place? 24 The Fourth Amendment does not provide blanket protection against searches ... on private property. Rather, the Fourth Amendment protects [only] those areas in which ... citizens have a reasonable expectation of privacy. United States v. McKeever, 5 F.3d 863, 866 (5th Cir.1993) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)) (emphasis added). Although it no doubt can be said that our constitutional precedent on the concept of reasonable expectation of privacy comprises an amorphous realm, this concept nonetheless plays the crucial gatekeeping role in our inquiry, allowing us to separate that which falls within the ambit of the Fourth Amendment from that which does not. Only if [governmental] activity intrudes upon a reasonable expectation of privacy in a significant way does the activity constitute a search for Fourth Amendment purposes. York, 895 F.2d at 1028. Moreover, [a] subjective expectation of privacy does not, by itself, give rise to Fourth Amendment protection[;] rather, the expectation of privacy must be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Smith, 978 F.2d at 177. 25 Generally speaking, the right to privacy in the home is certainly a reasonable expectation. York, 895 F.2d at 1029. Indeed, the right to be free from unreasonable government intrusion into one's own home is a cornerstone of the liberties protected by the Fourth Amendment. Id. (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583-89, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1378-82, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)). However, the protection granted the home is not unassailable, and we have noted, for example, that home occupants lose their expectation of privacy in those portions of the home (and the activities taking place therein) that can be observed from outside the premises through undraped windows. York, 895 F.2d at 1029. Other similar activities of [a] home's occupants[,] creating comparable reasonably foreseeable risk[s] of intrusion, id. (internal quotations omitted), such as leaving doors open, likewise compromise any reasonable expectation of privacy. In addition, we have noted that activities or circumstances within a dwelling [itself] may also lessen an occupant's privacy expectation, provided that such activities or circumstances create a risk of intrusion [that] is reasonably foreseeable. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (citing United States v. Bomengo, 580 F.2d 173 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117, 99 S.Ct. 1022, 59 L.Ed.2d 75 (1979)). 26 In York, we held that no Fourth Amendment search took place within a home when police, responding to a guest's request for help in dealing with an intoxicated and belligerent homeowner, entered the home as community caretak[ers] to assist the guest in removing his (and his family's) possessions and noticed several illegal firearms in plain view. York, 895 F.2d at 1029-30. Because the guest had been invited to stay in the house, we found that the homeowner's threatening behavior, combined with the guest's occupancy, made it reasonable for the guest to secure the help of police in removing his possessions from the home. Id. Given that the police intrusion was a reasonably foreseeable intrusion (based on the activities and circumstances existing within the home at the time), the homeowner no longer possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area where the police observed the firearms in plain view. Id. 27 We confronted similar factual circumstances, with a slight twist, several years ago in Bomengo. In that case, the chief engineer of an apartment complex noticed a large water leak (i.e., a circumstance within a dwelling) originating from a temporarily unoccupied apartment. After attempting unsuccessfully to locate the apartment's occupant (Bomengo), the engineer entered the apartment to investigate whether Bomengo was sick or disabled inside and to check on the severity of the water leak. In the course of conducting these duties, the engineer observed two illegal firearms in plain view within an open closet, prompting him to contact the apartment complex security guard. The guard then summoned a police detective, who entered the apartment with the engineer and observed the firearms in the same position in which the engineer had previously discovered them. Acknowledging as long-recognized the proposition that a police view subsequent to a search conducted by private citizens does not constitute a 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment so long as the view is confined to the scope and product of the initial search, Bomengo, 580 F.2d at 175, we held that the police detective's viewing of the firearms did not implicate the Fourth Amendment. 10 28 The government argues in the instant case that Detective Croft's inspection of the attic space was not a search under the Fourth Amendment, because its scope was limited to that of the search conducted by private parties Willard and Windell (i.e., a mere viewing) and clearly did not extend to the lengths of the examination conducted by private party W.R. Cox (i.e., a touching of the marijuana). In addressing this argument, we note that our decision in Bomengo, although acknowledging that a prior private-party search may frustrate one's reasonable expectation of privacy, hinged on the fact that the initial entry--pursuant to which the private-party viewing occurred--was a reasonably foreseeable intrusion of privacy, Bomengo, 580 F.2d at 176, occasioned by the particular circumstances within the dwelling at the time. York, 895 F.2d at 1029. Generally speaking, entries into apartment units by apartment maintenance personnel, when made necessary by emergency situations, are by no means unforeseeable intrusions when they occur. Consequently, in Bomengo, given that the firearms were left in plain view, Bomengo no longer possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy in their viewing after the engineer's initial search. Because the [subsequent] police view was confined strictly to the scope of the initial review, Bomengo, 580 F.2d at 176, and thus infringed only upon that portion of Bomengo's expectation of privacy that had already reasonably been frustrated, we were compelled to hold that no search within the Fourth Amendment had taken place. 29 In Bomengo, we also had occasion to survey the line of decisions that preceded our holding in that case. Id. at 176; see Barnes v. United States, 373 F.2d 517 (5th Cir.1967) (motel owner searched defendant's travel bag after it was inadvertently left behind and found suspicious checks; no Fourth Amendment search where police subsequently examined contents of bag); United States v. Blanton, 479 F.2d 327 (5th Cir.1973) (airline employees, after opening defendant's unidentifiable, unclaimed baggage in an effort to determine ownership, found an illegal firearm; no Fourth Amendment search where police subsequently reopened and inspected baggage); United States v. McDaniel, 574 F.2d 1224 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 952, 99 S.Ct. 2181, 60 L.Ed.2d 1057 (1979) (same factual scenario as Blanton ). The common denominator among these cases is easily identified: in each, either the activities or conduct of the defendant (i.e., inadvertently leaving travel bags behind or failing to timely claim unidentifiable baggage) and/or the circumstances of the situation (i.e., apartment employees trying to stop a water leak or airline employees attempting to find rightful owner of bags) significantly lessened the defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy by creating a risk of intrusion [by private parties] which [was] reasonably foreseeable. York, 895 F.2d at 1029. Therefore, the subsequent police search in each case, limited in scope to the initial private search, did not rise to the level of a Fourth Amendment search. 30 Based on the foregoing discussion, we realize that the facts of the instant case implicate two principles within our precedent on reasonable expectations of privacy, which, when applied to this case, create considerable tension. On the one hand, we have noted that occupants have a heightened interest of privacy associated with being free from intrusion in [their] home. Fontenot v. Cormier, 56 F.3d 669, 674 (1995); see also York, 895 F.2d at 1029. This principle, however, is tempered by our observation that a prior private-party search of an area ordinarily frustrates one's expectation of privacy therein, such that a subsequent police search, limited in scope to the private-party search, does not cause us much concern. See Bomengo, 580 F.2d at 175-76. 31 In an attempt to synthesize these principles, and in light of our decisions in Bomengo and York, we find that the proper Fourth Amendment inquiry, when confronted with a police search of a home that extends no further than a previously-conducted private party search, is to determine whether the homeowner or occupant continues to possess a reasonable expectation of privacy after the private search occurs. In making this determination, consideration must be given to whether the activities of the home's occupants or the circumstances within the home at the time of the private search created a risk of intrusion by the private party that was reasonably foreseeable. If indeed the private party's intrusion was reasonably foreseeable (based on such activities or circumstances), the occupant will no longer possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area or thing searched, and the subsequent police search will not trigger the Fourth Amendment. If, however, the private party's initial intrusion was not reasonably foreseeable, the occupant's reasonable expectation of privacy will survive, and the subsequent police search will indeed activate the Fourth Amendment. 11 32 In the instant case, both Paige's conduct and the circumstances of the situation created a risk of intrusion into his garage's attic that was reasonably foreseeable. Paige himself had hired W.R. Cox Enterprises to repair his roof, and the roofing employees' search for siding began only after they inadvertently damaged the side of his home. Accidents of this type, related to the task at hand and arising contemporaneously therewith, are reasonably expected to occur. Given Willard's testimony that a lot of people keep [siding] around, we find it no surprise that he immediately began to look for replacement siding. According to the unchallenged testimony of Willard, Paige had advised the workers that they could go into the garage if they needed anything; moreover, Paige had specifically directed the workers to the garage and pointed out various tools and supplies they could access. Collectively, Paige's actions in this regard authorized the workers to enter the garage for any purpose related to their roofing task, including, inter alia, the securing of materials to replace damaged siding. Given that Willard's entry into the garage was thus sufficiently justified, we do not find unreasonable Willard's decision to explore the attic, as it was rational to believe that siding could be stored there. Under the foregoing facts, we find that Willard's discovery of the marijuana, and the subsequent searches by Windell and W.R. Cox, stripped Paige of his reasonable expectation of privacy in the garage attic. Both the conduct of Paige, and the circumstances of the situation, made these intrusions reasonably foreseeable. Consequently, we find that Detective Croft's subsequent examination of the attic did not qualify as a search for Fourth Amendment purposes. 33