Opinion ID: 529751
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether a New Trial is Proper

Text: 60 Although the district court decided that its jurisdiction over the motion for a new trial had lapsed, it briefly addressed the merits of the motion: 61 Additionally, the Court agrees with the Government that the defendant has woefully failed to carry his burden of proving the four factors necessary for a new trial as his new evidence appears merely to be a series of assertions about the evidence adduced at trial. He had shown neither that the evidence was newly discovered, material, would likely produce an acquittal, nor that his failure to learn of it earlier was due to no lack of diligence on his part. 62 695 F.Supp. at 503. We conclude from this statement that the district court did not apply the correct legal standard to all of the issues involved in the determination of the motion. 63 Walgren based his motion for a new trial on three grounds: 1) the government made knowing use of perjured testimony; 2) the government failed to disclose evidence favorable to him in response to his discovery requests; and 3) even if the government did not act improperly, the newly-discovered evidence entitles him to a new trial. The defendant carries a different burden in order to establish each of these bases for a new trial. Here, however, the district court applied the same standard to all three claims. 64 Walgren's first basis for a new trial should have been decided under the following standard: If the prosecutor knew or should have known that his case contained perjured testimony, then the conviction must be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that this evidence could have affected the judgment of the jury. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2397, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976) (emphasis added). In United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1984), the court restated this test as a materiality standard under which the fact that testimony is perjured is considered material unless failure to disclose it would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 680, 105 S.Ct. at 3382. 65 Walgren's second basis for a new trial should have been decided under the following standard: When the prosecutor fails to disclose evidence favorable to the accused, The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. at 682, 105 S.Ct. at 3383. The trial court should assess the possibility of an adverse effect that the prosecutor's failure to respond may have on the defendant's case in light of the totality of the circumstances and with an awareness of the difficulty of reconstructing in a post-trial proceeding the course that the defense and the trial would have taken had the defense not been misled by the prosecutor's incomplete response. Id. at 683, 105 S.Ct. at 3384. 66 If Walgren fails to demonstrate governmental misconduct under the standards described above, his showing must then satisfy the four-part test on which the district court relied: 1) the evidence is newly discovered and was unknown to the defendant at the time of trial; 2) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative or impeaching; 3) the evidence will probably produce an acquittal; and 4) failure to learn of the evidence sooner was not due to lack of diligence. United States v. Kenny, 645 F.2d 1323, 1343 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 920, 101 S.Ct. 3059, 69 L.Ed.2d 425 (1981). 67 The district court erred in applying the incorrect legal standard to the first two bases of Walgren's motion when it concluded that, on the entire motion, Walgren failed to carry his burden of proving the four factors necessary for a new trial.... 695 F.Supp. at 503 (emphasis added). As we have seen this standard, the third standard described above, does not apply when the motion implicates governmental misconduct. 68 It is the district court which should determine in the first instance whether or not Walgren's new evidence is material under the more lenient Agurs standard. On remand, the district court should review the evidence with respect to asserted governmental misconduct in light of the materiality test set forth in Agurs and Bagley. With respect to the third basis for Walgren's motion for a new trial, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the evidence presented by Walgren on the motion was not material.