Opinion ID: 626865
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Multiple Conspiracies and the Statute of Limitations

Text: Defendants argue that, based on the gap in the conspiracy, they actually committed two separate conspiracies rather than one continuous conspiracy. Defendants therefore argue that prosecution for the first conspiracy is barred by the statute of limitations. We agree. Actions that cannot be prosecuted because of the statute of limitations can be considered as part of an ongoing conspiracy so long as one overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy occurred during the limitations period. See United States v. Fuchs, 218 F.3d 957, 961 (9th Cir.2000). The question here is whether the Wilburs' conspiracy ran continuously from 1999 through 2007, or whether the Wilburs engaged in two separate conspiracies, one before the Swinomish CTC went into effect from 1999 through 2003, and the other after their Swinomish tobacco license expired in 2005. The general rule is that a conspiracy continues until there is affirmative evidence of abandonment, withdrawal, disavowal or defeat of the object of the conspiracy. United States v. Recio, 371 F.3d 1093, 1096 (9th Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). There are relatively few cases in which defendants have argued that gaps in their activity demonstrated abandonment or withdrawal from the conspiracy such that the government was required to charge two separate conspiracies. See, e.g., United States v. Krasn, 614 F.2d 1229 (9th Cir.1980); United States v. Payne, 635 F.2d 643 (7th Cir.1980); Continental Baking Co. v. United States, 281 F.2d 137 (6th Cir.1960). The most similar case to the one before us is Continental Baking, decided by the Sixth Circuit. The government indicted the Continental Baking Company for a continuous conspiracy based on the fixing and stabilization of uniform and non-competitive prices of bakery products in the Memphis, Tennessee area. 281 F.2d at 141. For a period of slightly over two years in the middle of the alleged conspiracy, however, the Director of the Office of Price Stabilization set a price ceiling on bakery products. Id. at 154. Defendants argued that this terminated any conspiracy entered into prior thereto, and therefore any continuing conspiracy necessarily began as of the termination of the governmental control. Id. The Sixth Circuit rejected this argument, concluding that [e]ven if the price freeze were to be considered as interrupting an existing conspiracy, if the conspiracy were resumed upon the termination of the price freeze, the intervening period is more properly characterized as a period of suspension of activities rather than a termination resulting in two separate conspiracies. Id. We adopted the Sixth Circuit's reasoning in a case with very similar facts. Krasn, 614 F.2d at 1236. We conclude that Continental Baking and Krasn are distinguishable. In this case, there was affirmative evidence that there was a termination rather than a suspension of the conspiracy during the 2003-2005 period. In Continental Baking, the legal change that interrupted the conspiracy did not affect the legality of what the defendants were conspiring to do. Rather, by establishing a fixed price ceiling, the legal change made it impossible for them to achieve their object. In this case, however, the signing of the Swinomish CTC and subsequent state retrocession of its cigarette taxes did not prevent the Wilburs from achieving their object. Rather, it made the pursuit of that object legal under federal law. During the two years in which the Swinomish CTC was in effect and the Trading Post had its Swinomish tobacco license, the Wilburs could not have conspired to violate the CCTA because the purpose of their alleged conspiracy, to sell tax-free cigarettes, did not violate the CCTA. The Wilburs may have been engaged in a conspiracy to violate tribal law, but a violation of tribal cigarette tax law is not criminalized by the CCTA. We therefore conclude that the fact that the Wilburs could achieve their desired end without violating the CCTA during the second period is affirmative evidence that the Wilburs terminated their conspiracy during the period in which the Swinomish CTC was in effect and they possessed a Swinomish tobacco license. No overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy ending in 2003 occurred within the five-year statute of limitations for CCTA offenses. The government argues that the Wilburs waived a statute of limitations defense by not raising it in the district court. The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense and, generally, is waived if not raised in the trial court. See United States v. LeMaux, 994 F.2d 684, 689 (9th Cir.1993). However, a defendant's failure to raise a statute of limitations defense in the trial court does not result in waiver if raising the defense would have been futile. United States v. Manning, 56 F.3d 1188, 1195 (9th Cir. 1995). Defendants were charged in the indictment with a single continuing conspiracy, the last overt act of which occurred in 2007, well within the five-year statute of limitations period. Because there was no available statute of limitations defense to the conspiracy charged, to which they conditionally pled guilty, the Wilburs have not waived the defense. Prosecution for the first conspiracy, between 1999 and 2003, is barred by the statute of limitations. The conviction in the second conspiracy, between 2005 and 2007, the period after the Trading Post's tobacco license was revoked, is valid.