Opinion ID: 2548176
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Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admissibility of the expert evidence in this case

Text: In attempting to resolve the issue here by construing section 1107 we confront a conundrum. On the one hand, section 1107 speaks of expert testimony regarding battered women's syndrome; that syndrome, as set out by Dr. Lenore Walker and as described by the Court of Appeal in Aris, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d 1178, 264 Cal.Rptr. 167, and by this court in People v. Romero, supra, 8 Cal.4th 728, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 270, 883 P.2d 388, and Humphrey, supra, 13 Cal.4th 1073, 56 Cal. Rptr.2d 142, 921 P.2d 1, pertains to women who have been subjected to an extended period of abuse. On the other hand, section 1107 authorizes the expert to testify regarding the nature and effect of physical, emotional, and mental abuse on the beliefs, perceptions, or behavior of victims of domestic violence. Persons who have only been assaulted once are still victims of domestic violence. [10] Here, however, the admission of expert testimony does not depend on fitting it under section 1107. As we noted earlier, under subdivision (a) of section 801, expert testimony is admissible on any subject sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact. Before the Legislature's enactment of section 1107, the Court of Appeal in Aris, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d 1178, 264 Cal.Rptr. 167, upheld the admissibility of expert testimony on the behavior of victims of domestic violence. In People v. Day, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th 405, 415-417, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 916, the Court of Appeal held that in a trial before the enactment of section 1107 defense counsel was incompetent for not presenting expert testimony on the behavior of victims of domestic violence. Day relied on McAlpin, supra, 53 Cal.3d 1289, 283 Cal.Rptr. 382, 812 P.2d 563, which this court decided under section 801. And in Humphrey, supra, 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1088, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 142, 921 P.2d 1, we upheld the admission of expert testimony under both sections 1107 and 801. The Legislature, courts, and legal commentators have noted the close analogy between use of expert testimony to explain the behavior of domestic violence victims, and expert testimony concerning victims of rape or child abuse. (See Sen. Com., supra, p. 4; Aris, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at p. 1193, 264 Cal.Rptr. 167; People v. Day, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 415, 2 Cal. Rptr.2d 916; Schroeder, supra, 76 Iowa L.Rev. at p. 570.) In People v. Bledsoe (1984) 36 Cal.3d 236, 203 Cal.Rptr. 450, 681 P.2d 291, we held expert testimony concerning rape victims  the rape trauma syndrome  to be admissible under section 801 to dispel common misconceptions about how such victims behave ( Bledsoe, at pp. 242-243, 203 Cal.Rptr. 450, 681 P.2d 291), but not to prove that the victim had actually been raped ( id. at p. 251, 203 Cal.Rptr. 450, 681 P.2d 291). And in People v. Bowker (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 249 Cal.Rptr. 886, the Court of Appeal said that when an allegedly abused child recants his story in whole or in part, a psychologist could testify on the basis of past research that such behavior is not an uncommon response for an abused child. ( Id. at p. 394, 249 Cal.Rptr. 886.) Although the expert in Bowker had referred to the child abuse accommodation syndrome, the Court of Appeal observed: [A]n expert has little need to refer to the syndrome in order to testify that a particular type of behavior is not inconsistent with a child having been abused. ( Id. at p. 392, 249 Cal.Rptr. 886.) Thereafter, in McAlpin, supra, 53 Cal.3d 1289, 283 Cal.Rptr. 382, 812 P.2d 563, we made it clear that admissibility of expert testimony does not depend on a showing based on a recognized syndrome. That case concerned expert testimony about the behavior of parents of abused children. We first explained the admissibility of evidence about the behavior of the children themselves: [E]xpert testimony on the common reactions of child molestation victims is not admissible to prove that the complaining witness has in fact been sexually abused; it is admissible to rehabilitate such witness's credibility when the defendant suggests that the child's conduct after the incident  e.g., a delay in reporting  is inconsistent with his or her testimony claiming molestation. `Such expert testimony is needed to disabuse jurors of commonly held misconceptions about child sexual abuse, and to explain the emotional antecedents of abused children's seemingly self-impeaching behavior.' ( Id. at pp. 1300-1301, 283 Cal. Rptr. 382, 812 P.2d 563.) We then addressed the admissibility of evidence relating to the credibility of the mother of an abused child. Notwithstanding the absence of a parents of abused children syndrome encompassing such evidence, McAlpin held it admissible, explaining: It is reasonable to conclude that on the basis of their intuition alone many jurors would tend to believe that a parent of a molested child ... would promptly report the crime to the authorities.... Yet here the prosecution had evidence to the contrary  the expert opinion of Officer Miller that in fact it is not at all unusual for a parent to refrain from reporting a known child molestation, for a number of reasons. Such evidence would therefore `assist the trier of fact' (Evid.Code, § 801, subd. (a)) by giving the jurors information they needed to objectively evaluate [the mother's] credibility. ( McAlpin, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1302, 283 Cal.Rptr. 382, 812 P.2d 563; see also People v. Housley (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 947, 955-956, 8 Cal. Rptr.2d 431 [expert testimony admissible to explain why child recanted her claim that the defendant molested her].) Similar reasoning supports admissibility of the expert testimony here. When the trial testimony of an alleged victim of domestic violence is inconsistent with what the victim had earlier told the police, the jurors may well assume that the victim is an untruthful or unreliable witness. (See Arcoren v. United States (8th Cir.1991) 929 F.2d 1235, 1239; State v. Stringer, supra, 897 P.2d at pp. 1068-1069; Schroeder, supra, 76 Iowa L.Rev. at p. 573.) And when the victim's trial testimony supports the defendant or minimizes the violence of his actions, the jurors may assume that if there really had been abusive behavior, the victim would not be testifying in the defendant's favor. (See Humphrey, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1087, 56 Cal. Rptr.2d 142, 921 P.2d 1; People v. Day, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 415, 2 Cal. Rptr.2d 916; Commonwealth v. Goetzendanner (1997), 42 Mass.App.Ct. 637, 679 N.E.2d 240, 243-245; State v. Ciskie (1988) 110 Wash.2d 263, 751 P.2d 1165, 1169-1170; Rogers, supra, 8 Colum. J. Gender & L. at p. 78.) These are common notions about domestic violence victims akin to those notions about rape and child abuse victims that this court discussed in People v. Bledsoe, supra, 36 Cal.3d 236, 203 Cal.Rptr. 450, 681 P.2d 291, and McAlpin, supra, 53 Cal.3d 1289, 283 Cal.Rptr. 382, 812 P.2d 563, and that the Court of Appeal discussed in People v. Housley, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at pages 955-956, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 431. At trial, expert witness Jeri Darr described the tendency of domestic violence victims to recant previous allegations of abuse as part of the particular behavior patterns commonly observed in abusive relationships. The cycle of violence in an abusive domestic relationship, she explained, does not necessarily begin with physical abuse. Most abusive relationships begin with a struggle for power and control between the abuser and the victim that later escalates to physical abuse. The initial tension building stage of the cycle can appear in deceptively mundane ways, such as complaints about the cleanliness of the house. Often the abuser uses psychological, emotional, or verbal abuse to control the victim. When the victim tries to leave or to assert control over the situation, the abuser may turn to violence as an attempt to maintain control. Later, even if there has been no other episode of violence, the victim may change her mind about prosecuting the abuser and may recant her previous statements. Here, there was an adequate foundation for that expert testimony, because evidence presented at trial suggested the possibility that defendant and Kimberly Pipes were in a cycle of violence of the type described by expert Jeri Darr. Pipes told Deputy Wheeler that defendant had complained about the cleanliness of the apartment on the evening of the assault. There was also evidence that Pipes and defendant also argued that evening about defendant's failure to take her side in an argument with his cousin (their landlord) regarding the rent, that defendant told Pipes that if she did not pay the rent she would have to move out, and that he later threatened to kill her if she did leave. Finally, there was evidence that when Pipes actually tried to leave the apartment, defendant assaulted her. To assist the jury in evaluating this evidence, the trial court properly admitted the expert testimony by Darr. Defendant argues that a trial court should not admit evidence on domestic violence under section 801 unless it first determines that the evidence is admissible under section 1107. He maintains that section 1107 is a special statute that takes precedence over the more general terms of section 801. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1859.) The Legislature, however, was aware that evidence on domestic violence had been held admissible under section 801 (See Assem. Com., supra, p. 1; Sen. Com., supra, p. 3), and in enacting section 1107, it stated expressly: The Legislature does not intend Section 1107 of the Evidence Code to preclude the admissibility of evidence of battered women's syndrome under other statutory or case law. (Stats.1991, ch. 812, § 2, p. 3612.) Finally, defendant contends that the argument for admitting expert testimony after a single incident of violence is circular, because the jury must first find the preliminary fact of abuse to be true before it may consider the expert evidence. We do not share that view. The argument that evidence relating to credibility cannot be admitted until the underlying charge has been found true was rejected by the Court of Appeal in People v. Morgan (1998) 58 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1215-1216, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 772, a domestic violence case, and in People v. Housley, supra, 6 Cal. App.4th 947, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 431, a child molestation case. To be sure, this kind of evidence cannot be admitted to prove the occurrence of the charged crimes. (See § 1107; People v. Bledsoe, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 251, 203 Cal.Rptr. 450, 681 P.2d 291; People v. Bowker, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at p. 394, 249 Cal.Rptr. 886; Humphrey, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1088, fn. 5, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 142, 921 P.2d 1.) There must be independent evidence of domestic violence  otherwise the expert testimony about how victims of domestic violence behave would lack foundation. Here such evidence was supplied by both Pipes's trial testimony in court and by her earlier statement to Deputy Wheeler. Once there is evidence from which the trier of fact could find the charges true, evidence relating to the credibility of the witnesses becomes relevant and admissible. There is no rule requiring a preliminary finding that the charged act of abuse occurred before the jury can consider the evidence relating to credibility. In rape and child abuse cases, we do not require either the trial judge or the jury to determine that the victim was raped or abused before the trial court admits expert testimony on credibility. The same principle applies to admission of expert testimony on domestic violence. We therefore conclude that the Court of Appeal did not err in upholding the trial court's admission of expert testimony concerning the behavior of victims of domestic violence even though the evidence showed only one violent incident. Any language in People v. Gomez, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th 405, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 101, contrary to this conclusion, is disapproved.