Opinion ID: 2607237
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: right to self-representation and speedy trial

Text: Mr. Luvene's trial was initially scheduled to begin on March 8, 1993. On February 18, 1993, the trial court granted a continuance at the request of Mr. Luvene's attorney, Rogers Wilson. Mr. Wilson indicated that he needed additional time to interview witnesses and to begin preparation for the penalty phase. Mr. Luvene, however, strongly opposed any continuance, stating: I've been here since July.... You know, I don't wanna sit here any longer. It's me that has to deal with this. If I'm prepared to go for myself, then that's me. You know, can't nobody tell me what I wanna do. They say I did this, so why notif I wanna go to trial, why can't I go to trial on the date they have set for my life? I'm prepared. I'm not even prepared about that. I wanna go to trial, sir.... I don't wanna extend my time. This is out of my league for doing that. I do not want to go. If he's not ready to represent me, then forget that. But I want to go to trial on this date. Report of Proceedings, at 72-73. Mr. Luvene contends that these statements represent an unequivocal request to proceed pro se and that by granting the continuance, the trial court denied him his state and federal constitutional rights to self-representation. The right of criminal defendants to self-representation is guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal constitution and article 1, section 22 of the state constitution. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2533, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); State v. Bebb, 108 Wash.2d 515, 524, 740 P.2d 829 (1987). However, the assertion of the right to proceed pro se must be unequivocal. Bebb, 108 Wash.2d at 524, 740 P.2d 829 (citing State v. Fritz, 21 Wash.App. 354, 360-61, 585 P.2d 173, 98 A.L.R.3d 1 (1978), review denied, 92 Wash.2d 1002 (1979)). While Mr. Luvene did state that he was prepared to go for myself, he also stated, I'm not even prepared about that, and [t]his is out of my league for doing that. Taken in the context of the record as a whole, these statements can be seen only as an expression of frustration by Mr. Luvene with the delay in going to trial and not as an unequivocal assertion of his right to self-representation. Mr. Luvene also argues that by granting the continuance, the trial court denied him his right to a speedy trial. We have previously held, however, that a trial court may grant a continuance to allow the defense counsel opportunity to prepare for trial over the express objections of a defendant. State v. Campbell, 103 Wash.2d 1, 14-15, 691 P.2d 929 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1094, 105 S.Ct. 2169, 85 L.Ed.2d 526 (1985). The trial court, therefore, committed no error in granting the continuance.