Opinion ID: 1976302
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Remaining Certified Questions

Text: The second question certified by the Court of Special Appeals asks, in effect, how many designees may be named by the administrative judge under the statute and rule. For purposes of this case, we shall assume that Administrative Judge Kaplan named four designees (out of the 24 judges of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City) pursuant to the statute and rule: one judge to handle postponement requests in felony cases and three judges (those sitting from time to time in court conducting arraignments or trials in misdemeanor cases) to deal with those requests in other cases. [4] Rosenbach argues that this sort of designation is not permitted. He asserts that the judge who makes the good cause determination must have extensive knowledge of all facets of the court's operations: its procedures, its caseload, its backlog, the availability of judges and courtrooms, and the like. See Frazier, 298 Md. at 453-454, 470 A.2d at 1285-1286 (discussing the safeguards contemplated by the requirement that the county administrative judge order postponements). A judge sitting temporarily in misdemeanor court, he posits, is not likely to possess the kind of overview requisite to making an informed decision on a postponement request. He points to Farinholt v. State, 299 Md. 32, 37-38 n. 2, 472 A.2d 452, 454 n. 2 (1984), where we cautioned that any procedure adopted by a circuit court consisting of several trial judges, by which all trial judges are purportedly authorized to grant postponements for purposes of § 591 and Rule [4-271(a)], would not comply with § 591 and Rule [4-271(a)] [emphasis in original]. The State responds by discussing what it sees as the practical demands of the massive caseload in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City and by citing the broad authority to delegate contained in Rule 1200 d 3. We shall not resolve this dispute. It is true that Rosenbach's motion to dismiss asserted, among other things, that neither the Administrative Judge or his designee has granted a change in the trial date. That argument was apparently directed to the factual issue of whether Judges Pines and Arabian had been designated by Administrative Judge Kaplan and not to the question of whether numerous judges could be lawfully designated under the statute and rule. But in any case, we have scrutinized with care over 78 pages of transcript that are devoted to the argument before a patient Judge Hubbard. The transcript shows that Rosenbach abandoned the assertion we have quoted from his motion, whatever its exact thrust. Instead, he relied exclusively on the arguments we have considered in part II of this opinion. Two examples from the transcript suffice to make the point. Counsel for Rosenbach argued that no judge had postponed the case beyond 180 days ( i.e., had made a specific determination that the postponement would carry the case beyond that limit). Judge Hubbard took the position (as do we) that this was not necessary. It was enough that the case was postponed for good cause by two judges that this Court has to presume were designees of the administrative judge. [COUNSEL FOR ROSENBACH]: I'm willing to concede that, Your Honor. Some 27 pages later Judge Hubbard summarized: THE COURT: That's your whole argument, right, in that there's nothing on this form that indicates that even if a postponement is granted, even if there's good cause for this postponement, that it should be granted past the 180 days? [COUNSEL FOR ROSENBACH]: Yes, ma'am. Under these circumstances, it is clear that if Rosenbach ever raised the issue embodied in the second certified question, he subsequently abandoned it. He did not argue it to Judge Hubbard, and she did not decide it. Neither shall we. See Md. Rule 8-131(a) (Supp. Aug. 1988) (generally, the appellate court will not decide any ... issue unless it plainly appears by the record to have been ... decided by the trial court ...). [5] The third question certified by the Court of Special Appeals has meaning only if we address the second question. The fourth question assumes that we have found some impropriety under either the first or second question. Since we have held there was no error with respect to the first question, and since we shall not address the second question, the fourth question is moot. CERTIFIED QUESTIONS ANSWERED AS ABOVE SET FORTH. CASE REMANDED TO THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS, CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. COSTS TO ABIDE THE RESULT IN THAT COURT.