Opinion ID: 159750
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: admission of other accidents

Text: 31 Ingersoll-Rand's third proposition of error is the district court's admission of evidence concerning six other accidents involving the company's milling machines. We review the admission of evidence for abuse of discretion. C.A. Associates v. Dow Chemical Co., 918 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1990). We must afford great deference to the district court; review of a cold record is a poor substitute for a trial judge's intimate familiarity with the evidence and its role in the context of the trial as a whole. 32 The threshold inquiry in any dispute over the admissibility of evidence is whether the evidence is relevant. Id. at 1489. In situations involving the admissibility of other accidents, relevance is determined by the substantial similarity test. Ponder v. Warren Tool Corp., 834 F.2d 1553, 1560 (10th Cir. 1987). Accidents bearing substantial similarity to the case before the court make the existence of a fact of consequence to the action before the court more or less probable, while dissimilar accidents are less likely to bear on a fact of consequence to the case before the court. The precise degree of similarity required to ensure the relevance of another accident depends on the theory of defect underlying the case. Four Corners Helicopters, Inc. v. Turbomeca, S.A., 979 F.2d 1434, 1440 (10th Cir. 1992); Ponder, 834 F.2d at 1559. Hence we require a high degree of similarity when plaintiffs offer other accident evidence to prove causation in their case, but accept a lesser degree of similarity when evidence of other accidents is offered to show the defendant had notice of potential defects in its product. Wheeler v. John Deere Co., 862 F.2d 1404, 1407 (10th Cir. 1988); Ponder, 834 F.2d at 1559. We must consider, then, with considerable precision, not only the facts of the other incidents but the theories under which plaintiffs urge their admission. 5 33 In this case, the plaintiffs offered the six other incidents involving Ingersoll-Rand milling machines to show that: (1) the milling machine which injured Mr. Smith was defectively designed; (2) Ingersoll-Rand had notice of the defective design; and (3) Ingersoll-Rand had a culpable mental state for purposes of assessing punitive damages. Although the district court admitted evidence of all six accidents, its grounds for doing so are less than clear. Ruling from the bench on October 20, 1997, the district court denied Ingersoll-Rand's motion in limine to exclude the evidence of the other accidents stating, I find a substantial similarity between all of these accidents and the one that is in issue here. I also believe that they are relevant to the question of existence of a default. In court on November 7, 1997, while addressing Ingersoll-Rand's objection to the admission of accident reports prepared by private investigators employed by Ingersoll-Rand, the trial judge remarked, the evidence with regard to other accidents that occurred involving this type of equipment and the specificity involved in those particular accidents are clearly relevant and admissible on the question of Ingersoll-Rand's knowledge of what kind of potential hazards existed because of their equipment, the seriousness of the injuries and, for purposes of punitive damages, their mental state in terms of what they did about this. 34 However, the court's written orders indicate a narrower basis for admission. The court's written order of November 12, 1997, denying the motion in limine to exclude evidence of the other incidents concludes the accidents at issue are substantially similar to Mr. Smith's alleged accident, and are therefore admissible to show notice of the existence of a design default. Likewise in its Memorandum Opinion and Order in response to Ingersoll-Rand's Motion for a New Trial and Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, the court reiterates its finding that the other accidents were substantially similar for purposes of demonstrating notice of defect. 35 Our review, however, is not contingent on the theory of admissibility adopted by the district court: evidence does not become inadmissible simply because the district court relied on an erroneous reason for admitting it. So long as the evidence is admissible under some legally correct theory, no error occurred. United States v. Jackson, 88 F.3d 845, 847 (10th Cir. 1996). We are free to affirm the rulings of a district court on any ground that finds support in the record, even where the lower court reached its conclusions from a different or even erroneous course of reasoning. Cayce v. Carter Oil Co., 618 F.2d 669, 677 (10th Cir. 1980). We thus proceed to evaluate each of the six incidents admitted by the trial court and the three grounds of admissibility offered by the plaintiffs. 36 We begin with the plaintiffs' theory that the other incidents were admissible to show Ingersoll-Rand had notice of the defects which caused Mr. Smith's injury. To be admissible on the theory of notice, the incidents must be similar enough to the event in question that they would have alerted the defendant to the problem or danger at issue. In this case, four of the six incidents (Johnson, Madden, Washington, and Alexander) were incorrectly admitted to show notice, as they occurred after the incident at issue here. See Julander v. Ford Motor Co., 488 F.2d 839 (10th Cir. 1973) (holding evidence of subsequent incident inadmissible to show notice of defect). The district court's holding as to the remaining two incidents (Ledgerwood and Rogers) appears correct. Both incidents involved injuries to members of the ground crew caused by reversing milling machines. Both cases raise the issue of visibility, which is one of the plaintiffs' theories of defect in this case, and both incidents sufficiently preceded Mr. Smith's accident to serve as notice to Ingersoll-Rand. 37 We consider now the admissibility of the six incidents as proof of defective design. The Smiths' claim of defective design is composed of four subparts: (1) lack of mirrors which would allow the operator to see the sides and back of the machine; (2) defective design of the ski system; (3) lack of a physical guard over the large opening behind the front tires; and (4) lack of an emergency stop switch accessible to the ground crew. Of the plaintiffs' four theories of defectiveness, the centerpiece of their case at trial was the lack of visibility from the operator's platform and the feasibility of equipping the machine with mirrors. 38 We first note that under New Mexico substantive law, which governs this case, incidents occurring after the incident at issue, but before the date of trial, may be used to prove a product is defective. See Brooks v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 902 P.2d 54, 63 (N.M. 1995) (quoting Dart v. Wiebe Manufacturing, Inc., 709 P.2d 876, 881 (Ariz. 1985)) (The quality of the product may be measured not only by the information available to the manufacturer at the time of design, but also by the information available to the trier of fact at the time of trial.). The fact that four of the incidents proffered occurred subsequent to Mr. Smith's accident does not preclude their admissibility to prove the existence of a defect. 39 Ingersoll-Rand urges that the six incidents are too dissimilar to support admissibility on a defect theory. First, the six incidents proffered by the plaintiffs involve several different models of milling machines. In addition to the MW-6520 which injured Mr. Smith, two incidents involved the MT-6520, two the MT-7000 and two the MT-7500, also known as the Pro Cut 2200. The record indicates the MW-6520, which injured Mr. Smith, was Ingersoll-Rand's first foray into the milling machine market. It is apparently smaller than the other three milling machines, and it moves on wheels, while the other machines move by means of tracks, like a military tank. 40 The substantial similarity rule does not require identical products; nor does it require us to compare the products in their entireties. The rule requires substantial similarity among the variables relevant to the plaintiff's theory of defect. Here, for example, the plaintiffs' primary allegation of defect is the lack of visibility from the operator's platform and the feasibility of equipping the machines with mirrors. The Smiths argue the configuration of the MW-6520's operator platform, which enables the operator to move back and forth across the machine and steer from either side, rather then sitting in a fixed position, creates dangerous visibility problems; when an operator stands on one side, his ability to see people on the other side is greatly diminished. Although the milling machines are of different sizes, and thus their blind spots are not identical, they are substantially similar when viewed from the perspective of this allegation of defect. All the machines in question have open platforms with no fixed operator station, none are equipped with mirrors, and none of the operators saw the victims immediately prior to hitting them. 41 Similarly, Ingersoll-Rand's defense to this allegation of defect demonstrates the propriety of treating the models as similar. Ingersoll-Rand argued mirrors would be of little use because they would become dirtied or broken by the rigors of the milling operation, vibrate to a degree making them unusable, and instill a false sense of security in the machine operator. These assertions are equally applicable to all of the milling machines in question, underscoring our conclusion that the machines are substantially similar for purposes of the visibility defect. 42 Ingersoll-Rand also contends the circumstances surrounding the incidents are too dissimilar to warrant comparison. Similarity of circumstances is, like similarity of the product, viewpoint dependent. For example, from the broadest perspective, all six incidents could be construed as similar, since all occurred while the milling machine was moving. More narrowly, five incidents occurred as the machine was moving in reverse. Still more narrowly, only two of the incidents occurred while the machine was moving in reverse and turning. Finally, only Mr. Smith was struck while attempting to dislodge a jammed ski while the machine was moving in reverse and turning. We select the appropriate viewpoint by reference to the plaintiff's theory of defect. In this case, plaintiffs' theory regarding lack of visibility is broad enough to encompass all six incidents. The plaintiffs produced evidence that in each case lack of visibility was at least a potential cause of the incident. 43 We also note the plaintiffs introduced evidence indicating Ingersoll-Rand itself did not consider the various milling machine incidents too dissimilar to warrant comparison. The record indicates that in 1994 Ingersoll-Rand held both an internal meeting and a meeting with members of the Construction Industry Manufacturer's Association (CIMA) to discuss the six milling machine accidents. 44 Finally, we consider the admissibility of the other incidents to demonstrate Ingersoll-Rand had the culpable mental state necessary to award punitive damages. 6 Under New Mexico law, evidence going toward the defendant's mental state is relevant for purposes of punitive damages, and such evidence may include conduct occurring after the incident in question. See Gonzales v. Surgidev Corp., 899 P.2d 576, 584 (N.M. 1995) (allowing admission of articles criticizing defendant's lens implants published after plaintiff's surgery, but before defendant removed lens from market). New Mexico law also provides evidence supporting punitive damages need not have been admissible on the issue of compensatory damages. See Clay v. Ferrellgas, Inc., 881 P.2d 11, 17 n.4 (N.M. 1994) (upholding admission of evidence defendant routinely neglected to file required forms with state inspector in case alleging defendant negligently installed a propane tank in plaintiff's automobile). 45 We believe all six other incidents are clearly relevant to Ingersoll-Rand's mental state. Plaintiffs argued throughout trial that Ingersoll-Rand rushed to enter the milling machine market, and in so doing neglected to adequately conduct a human factors analysis. In particular, the plaintiffs emphasized Ingersoll-Rand's failure to study the feasibility of placing mirrors on the machine to ameliorate visibility problems. The other acts evidence allowed the jury to make the reasonable inference that Ingersoll-Rand persevered in its refusal to place mirrors on its machines despite numerous accidents potentially caused by poor visibility. 46 We conclude, then, that all six incidents were appropriately admitted to show mental state for the purposes of assessing punitive damages, and all six were appropriately admitted to show the visibility defect, but only the Rogers and Ledgerwood incidents were properly admissible to show notice. Ideally, of course, the district court should have instructed the jury about limitations on the use of each other incident. The burden in this situation, however, fell to Ingersoll-Rand to request an appropriate limiting instruction. United States v. Barbee, 968 F.2d 1026 (10th Cir. 1992). Ingersoll-Rand's failure to request a limiting instruction constitutes waiver of any objection based on the court's failure to give such an instruction. Robinson v. Audi NSU Auto Union Aktiengesellschaft, 739 F.2d 1481, 1485 (10th Cir. 1984). 47