Opinion ID: 1713078
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Instructions on proximate cause.

Text: The district court's instructions encompassed the plaintiff's theory of lost chance of survival and defined proximate cause. [3] The defendant argues the court erred in not including in its instructions that one's negligent conduct is not a substantial factor in bringing about the harm to another if the harm would have been sustained, even if he had failed to exercise reasonable care. See Restatement, supra, § 432(1), at 430. Without this language, he argues, the jury could find that he caused the plaintiff's imminent death. Pertinent principles on jury instructions are summarized in Estate of Smith v. Lerner, 387 N.W.2d 576, 581 (Iowa 1986). Read together, the instructions in this case clearly did not permit the jury to find that the defendant caused the plaintiff's imminent death. They only permitted the jury to award damages that resulted from a reduction in her chance of survival. Moreover, we agree with the plaintiffs that in light of the definition of proximate cause the requested language was superfluous. The definition set forth the substantial-factor and but-for tests, which were broad enough to include the theory of causation suggested by the defendant's requested instruction. See generally 1 Iowa Uniform Jury Instructions 2.6 (1984). We conclude the district court did not err in its instructions.