Opinion ID: 1913939
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: acceptance of benefits of the decree

Text: Susan claims that Daniel waived his right to appeal because he accepted (1) proceeds from the liquidation of joint assets; (2) certain property awarded him by the dissolution decree; and (3) the district court's award of Ideal Cleaners, the family business, and treated its assets as his own. Daniel agrees that one who accepts a money judgment is precluded from appealing, but he contends that this rule does not apply to one who accepts a judgment of property. The Court of Appeals agreed with Daniel. There appears to be no Nebraska case which directly addresses the issue raised by this appeal in the context of a property judgment rather than a money judgment. However, the rule in Nebraska as to money judgments is clear. We most recently considered this issue in Shiers v. Shiers, 240 Neb. 856, 485 N.W.2d 574 (1992). In that case, the district court ordered the husband to pay the wife $56,000 to equalize the property distribution. The husband paid this amount into the court, and the wife accepted the money, but then appealed the court's refusal to award her alimony. We held that by accepting the $56,000, the wife had waived her right to appeal from the judgment. The court reviewed prior case law and stated the general rule that in a dissolution of marriage action, one who accepts any part of a judgment in her or his favor forfeits the right to challenge by appeal any issue but those affecting the interests and welfare of such children as may be involved. (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 860, 485 N.W.2d at 576. The court recognized an exception to this general rule in Kassebaum v. Kassebaum, 178 Neb. 812, 815, 135 N.W.2d 704, 706 (1965): If the outcome of [an] appeal could have no effect on [an] appellant's right to the benefit accepted, its acceptance does not preclude the appeal. There is no acceptance of benefits under a judgment, and hence no waiver of rights of appeal, where a party exercises a right which existed prior to the judgment and which, though recognized or confirmed by the judgment, is not merged in it. (Emphasis supplied.) In Kassebaum, the husband had paid court costs, attorney fees, and all child support required by the decree. In the court-ordered property division, he received a pickup truck, an automobile, farm property, equity in a real estate contract, and a joint savings account with a balance of $511.54. This was approximately half the property. The husband appealed on the ground that the property division was inequitable, and the wife moved for dismissal of the appeal on the basis that the husband had accepted the benefit of the judgment by paying the costs, fees, and child support and by withdrawing $200 from the former joint savings account after entry of the decree. The court held that payment of costs, fees, and child support did not deprive the husband of his right of appeal, as these were not voluntary payments. They were made pursuant to court order, and the husband could have been held in contempt for failing to make the payments. The court further noted that cases which follow the general rule that acceptance of benefits waives the right of appeal  generally involve the acceptance of money deposited or paid into court. (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 814, 135 N.W.2d at 705. The only act in Kassebaum which might have constituted acceptance of the benefit of the judgment was the husband's withdrawal of $200 from the savings account. The court held that it did not, because this was less than half the money in the account, and the husband would have been entitled to half the money in the account. In Shiers, the court commented that Kassebaum also could have been decided on the basis that the husband had accepted no benefit conferred upon him, but, rather, had merely discharged, pending the outcome of the appeal, the obligations imposed upon him. 240 Neb. at 859, 485 N.W.2d at 576. In the case under consideration, Daniel's alleged acceptance of the benefits of the decree must be examined in light of the above rules. The court-ordered sale of joint assets such as the family home, the stocks and bonds, and the lot and the equal division of the proceeds did not confer any right which did not exist in each party prior to the judgment, and they are permitted by Kassebaum. As a joint owner, Daniel was entitled to half of these assets prior to the judgment. The court in Kassebaum held that payment of child support and other costs pursuant to court order does not deprive a party of the right to appeal. As we noted of the husband in that case, Daniel would have been subject to contempt proceedings for failure to comply with court-ordered payments. Daniel's acceptance of Ideal Cleaners, however, does not fall within the Kassebaum exception. The cleaning business was a joint asset of the parties during the marriage, and Daniel received this entire asset. Susan's claim in her affidavit that Daniel has used the funds of the cleaning business since the time of the decree to pay his $24,239.64 premarital debt to First National Bank in Kearney, as well as to pay personal debts and expenditures in excess of $50,000, is uncontroverted by Daniel. He has admitted on separate occasions that either he has no personal checking account or his personal account has no funds in it and that he pays his expenses from Ideal Cleaners' account. Daniel could have requested the district court to appoint a receiver, perhaps even himself as trustee, to oversee the operation of Ideal Cleaners during the pendency of an appeal, but instead he took complete control of the business and engaged in acts which clearly indicate that he considered Ideal Cleaners to be his sole personal asset. Although Daniel states in his affidavit that nothing has been done by [Daniel] or [Susan] with respect to ownership transfers of stock or the sale and execution of stock certificates, we are puzzled as to what more Daniel believes can be done in this regard. He concedes that there are no stock certificates for Ideal Cleaners and that he has been awarded 100 percent of the interest in Ideal Cleaners by the dissolution decree. Daniel also states in his affidavit that the real estate upon which Ideal Cleaners is located, and which was awarded to him in the decree, is still in the names of both himself and Susan and that he has done nothing to enforce the decree with respect to that property. Susan has not disputed this. However, even assuming that the real estate upon which Ideal Cleaners is located is still titled in the names of both Daniel and Susan, the fact that Daniel has not yet received the entire benefit of the judgment does not preclude application of the doctrine of waiver. The rule enunciated in Shiers does not require acceptance of all of the judgment before one forfeits the right of appeal. The acceptance of any part of a judgment is sufficient. By way of analogy, Susan was awarded $67,000 and two automobiles with a combined worth of $8,000 in lieu of her $75,000 interest in Ideal Cleaners. The court ordered Daniel to make payments to Susan over a period of 60 months, so Susan has not yet received the total property granted to her in the dissolution decree. Nonetheless, under Shiers, Susan waived her right to appeal the property division by accepting payments toward the judgment awarded her. There appears to be no good reason why the same rule of law should not apply to Daniel, even though he urges otherwise, simply because he has received the benefit of a business rather than a cash settlement. Although we stated in Kassebaum that this rule generally applies to acceptance of a money judgment paid into court, that statement is no more than an observation, and it is not the law. Accordingly, we hold that by accepting the award of Ideal Cleaners and treating its assets as his own, Daniel accepted the benefit of the property awarded him in the dissolution judgment and forfeited his right to appeal that judgment.