Opinion ID: 2621488
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Public Policy As Declared By The Legislature Supports Applying Section 1166 To Defendants Who Plead Guilty.

Text: As previously explained, the Legislature passed the 1999 amendment to section 1166which requires a court to commit a defendant after conviction unless it concludes the evidence supports its decision to allow the defendant to remain out on bailbecause, in the Legislature's view, the risk that a defendant will flee substantially increases after conviction. The Legislature wanted to assure that a judge has an opportunity to examine the record of a convicted individual prior to release and pending sentencing if that individual is out on bail. (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 476 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) Mar. 23, 1999, p. 2.) As we long ago recognized, the `great majority' of convictions are obtained by guilty plea. ( People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595, 604, 91 Cal.Rptr. 385, 477 P.2d 409.) Thus, we best serve the Legislature's purpose by construing the statute, if reasonably possible, to apply to all defendants who are convicted, including those who plead guilty. As I have already demonstrated, such a construction is both reasonable and most likely reflective of the Legislature's intent. By contrast, the majority substantially defeats the Legislature's purpose by adopting a construction that renders section 1166 inapplicable to the great majority of defendants who are convictedthose who plead guilty. Moreover, although the majority purports not to decide any question regarding convictions after nonjury trials (maj. opn., ante, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d at p. 846, 62 P.3d at p. 84), its analysis necessarily further defeats the Legislature's purpose by rendering section 1166 inapplicable under these circumstances, because such convictions occur by court finding, not by jury `Verdict. (§ 689.) The majority offers no public policy justification for its construction. It speculates, without basis, that the Legislature may have concluded that a defendant convicted by guilty plea is less likely to pose a flight risk or a danger to public safety than a defendant convicted by jury verdict. (Maj. opn., ante, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d at p. 847, 62 P.3d at p. 85.) As I have already explained, nothing in the legislative history supports this speculation. Moreover, even were the majority correct, the majority fails to explain why the Legislature would want to allow courts to release defendants convicted by guilty plea without first going through the process section 1166 mandates to protect public safety. Thus, although the majority can think of a distinction (maj. opn., ante, at p. 848, 62 P.3d at p. 85) that, in its view, is not completely baseless (maj. opn., ante, at p. 847, 62 P.3d at p. 85), the majority offers no reason why the Legislature would want to draw this distinction. In short, from the perspective of the public policy the Legislature has declared, the majority's construction is both unjustified and unjustifiable. Instead, the majority insists that section 1166 is not necessary to protect the public from the great majority of convicted defendants, i.e., those convicted by guilty plea. According to the majority, as to all defendants admitted to bail, the factors section 1166 specifies were, under section 1275, already considered at the time bail was initially set, and the only new factor after a defendant pleads guilty is the fact of the conviction itself. (Maj. opn., ante, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d at p. 847, 62 P.3d at p. 85.) Although acknowledging that courts must evaluate this new factor to determine whether a defendant should remain out on bail, the majority states that section 1166 does not have to apply in order for a court to take the defendant's conviction into account. . .. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 847, 62 P.3d at p. 85.) For several reasons, the majority's reasoning is unpersuasive. First and foremost, it is inconsistent with both the Legislature's view and purpose in amending section 1166. As explained above, the Legislature viewed individuals who are free on bail after conviction  by verdict or guilty plea as posting] a greater flight risk than other persons on bail, and it therefore amended section 1166 to require courts to consider the fact of conviction before allowing convicted defendants to remain on bail. (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 476 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) p. 4, italics added; Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 476 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) July 13, 1999, p. 5, italics added.) Contrary to this intent, the majority's holding leaves it to the trial court's discretion to consider the fact of conviction in determining whether to permit defendants convicted by guilty plea to remain out on bail. Moreover, the majority's observation that section 1166 does not have to apply for a court to take this factor into account (maj. opn., ante, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d at p. 847, 62 P.3d at p. 85) is of no consequence, because the same is true of every factor section 1166 specifies. The Legislature's purpose in amending section 1166 was to make consideration of all of the specified factors mandatory, not discretionary. The second flaw in the majority's reasoning is that the differences between section 1166 and section 1275 in terms of the factors a court must consider are both greater and more significant than the majority indicates. Whereas section 1275, subdivision (a), requires courts to consider the seriousness of the offense charged and the probability of [the defendant's] appearing at trial or hearing of the case, section 1166 requires courts to consider the seriousness of the offense charged and proven and the probability of the defendant failing to appear for the judgment of the court. . . . [8] (Italics added.) Obviously, a defendant at the beginning of a prosecution who does not yet know the strength of the state's case and who faces only the possibility of trial, of conviction on some charge, and of uncertain punishment, generally poses a different and, in the Legislature's view, a lesser-flight risk than a defendant who has been convict ed of a specific offense, even if by guilty plea, who faces certain punishment, who knows the statutory punishment for the offense, and who awaits only judgment. Accordingly, as several legislative analyses explained, the Legislature amended section 1166 in 1999 to grant[ ] an additional safeguard against convicted felons fleeing jurisdiction by requiring a judge to again look at the defendant's flight risk in deciding whether to permit the now convicted defendant to remain out on bail. (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Republican Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 476 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) Mar. 22, 1999, italics added; Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Republican Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 476 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) Apr. 23, 1999, italics added; see also Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Republican Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 476 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) Sept. 2, 1999 [amendment grants an additional safeguard against convicted felons fleeing the jurisdi ction or menacing the community by requiring trial judge's [ sic ] to look again at the defendant's overall fitness for remaining out on bail].) Under the majority's analysis and holding, a court may, in its discretionbut is not required to consider the fact and seriousness of the conviction in making this determination as to defendants convicted by guilty plea. Because the great majority of convictions now occur by guilty plea, the majority's construction of section 1166 renders the increased public protection the Legislature sought to provide inapplicable to the great majority of defendants who are convicted. Finally, and unfortunately, rather than respond to my argument, the majority completely miscasts and misrepresents my position in an apparent attempt to arouse emotions against it. The majority states my view to be that judicial discretion in this context is bad policy. (Maj. opn., ante, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d at p. 849, 62 P.3d at p. 87.) However, I make no judgment on this policy question, because it is not my job to do so here. My position is that the Legislature has declared public policy in this context and, as I have explained, the majority's construction defeats the public policy the Legislature has declared. The fact remains that the majority offers no reason why the Legislature would have wanted to exempt the great majority of convicted defendants from a mandatory process that the Legislature thought was necessary to protect public safety. Thus, the majority offers no valid response to my actual positionthat the majority's construction defeats public policy as declared by the Legislature.