Opinion ID: 1931192
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Effect of a Parent's Incarceration on the Determination of Child Support

Text: [¶ 11] Nason argues that the court erred in its determination of White's request to modify child support by failing to apply 19-A M.R.S.A. § 2001(5)(D) (1998), which limits imputed income for an incarcerated party: A party who is incarcerated in a correctional or penal institution is deemed available only for employment that is available through such institutions. Nason was incarcerated continuously from May 3, 2004, through the date of the hearing in July and had an expected release date in mid-September 2004. [¶ 12] The court found that as a member of the Ironworkers' Union, Nason has the ability to earn twenty dollars per hour over a forty-hour workweek, resulting in an imputed annual income of $41,600. The court also imputed to White, who was not working, an annual income of $13,000the minimum average weekly wage for the State of Maine. Based on its determination of the parties' incomes, the court ordered a prospective increase in Nason's weekly child support obligation from $112 per week [1] to $162.64 per week. The court expressly declined to suspend Nason's support obligation while he was in jail, stating that it is not in the best interests of the children. [¶ 13] The only evidence regarding Nason's work and income opportunities during his incarceration was his testimony that he was participating in the two-for-one program in which he was involved in a road detail, wash[ed] vehicles when . . . they need[ed] `em . . . at the sheriff's office [and] work[ed] in the kitchen. Nason also testified that he had maintained his union dues and that he expected to return to work as an ironworker once he was released from jail. Whether Nason could obtain employment as an ironworker at the rate of twenty dollars per hour while incarcerated appears to be unaddressed in the record. [¶ 14] In determining child support, a court may impute income to a party based on that party's earning capacity: Gross income may include the difference between the amount a party is earning and that party's earning capacity when the party voluntarily becomes or remains unemployed or underemployed, if sufficient evidence is introduced concerning a party's current earning capacity. 19-A M.R.S.A. § 2001(5)(D). The court's discretion to impute employment income is constrained by section 2001(5)(D) when a party is incarcerated. Id. Applying section 2001(5)(D), we are unable to determine whether the court engaged in a sustainable exercise of discretion when it imputed to Nason an earning capacity while incarcerated based on his ironworking skills. Imputing that earning capacity to Nason would be justified if, for example, Nason could earn money as an ironworker through a work release or other program during the period of his incarceration. [¶ 15] Accordingly, we vacate the court's judgment and remand for the court to reevaluate the evidence regarding Nason's earning capacity in conjunction with section 2001(5)(D). If the court concludes that Nason is entitled to a reduction in child support as a result of a reduced earning capacity associated with his incarceration, it must then, in the exercise of sound discretion, determine whether to make the reduction retroactive to the date of the hearing, the date of Nason's incarceration that resulted in his diminished earning capacity, or some other date. In any event, a retroactive reduction cannot precede the date of service of White's motion. See Bartlett v. Anderson, 2005 ME 10, ¶¶ 19-20, 866 A.2d 829, 834 (concluding that the trial court acted within the bounds of its discretion by making a child support reduction retroactive to the date the father lost his job, which was subsequent to the service of the mother's post-judgment motion, and that the trial court was prohibited by [19-A M.R.S.A. § 2009(2) (1998)] from making any retroactive reduction for any time preceding the [service of the mother's] motion to modify); see also Longo v. Goodwin, 2001 ME 153, ¶ 11, 783 A.2d 159, 161 (stating that the policy behind section 2009(2) is to require that the party who may be adversely affected by a change in the child support amount be put on notice that the amount may change and that the change may be retroactive to the date of notice). The entry is: Judgment affirmed, except that the child support modification is vacated and this case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. In view of the passage of time, the court may, in its discretion, receive additional evidence.