Opinion ID: 2505697
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 24

Heading: Further Response To The Majority Opinion

Text: Despite the majority's statements to the contrary, see Maj. Op. at 241, fn. 2, it is this dissenting opinion, rather than today's majority opinion, that endeavours to resolve this case based on neutral principles of law as set forth in Jones as opposed to what the majority misleadingly characterizes as a formal title approach. Unlike the majority, I would insist on using only those neutral principles enumerated in Jones. Further, I would not follow the majority down the primrose path of identifying any number of nonneutral principles as neutral principles such as, church history and the Dennis Canon. The majority's undisciplined analysis of neutral principles simply does not comport with the language or the spirit of Jones. For example, under the majority's peculiar reasoning, this Court concludes that the National Church intended to form a trust on CCS's property based in large part on a skewed church history and documents that predate the existence of the National Church itself. Only under the topsy-turvy reasoning of the majority opinion could this Court conclude that the National Church intended to form a trust based on the National Church's professed intentions before the National Church even existed. Additionally, the majority opinion is apparently so confused about the meaning of Jones that the majority considers the intention of the parties over the span of an approximately 250-year period of the history to be controlling rather than the intention revealed in the neutral principles themselves. CCS certainly is not bound by any purported intentions expressed in the church history submitted by the National Church's expert witness for the express purpose of this litigation. Further, it is worth noting that the prior church canons of the 19th Century, relied on by the majority opinion and the National Church's church historian, clearly do not establish a trust. These prior canons are directives as often to the diocese as to the local church, and they do not claim any right to tell the local churches for what purpose each local church holds its own deeds and property. In addition, these prior church canons make no claim to be a document transferring title. Moreover, the National Church has no right to impose its after-the-fact alleged understandings of church history on CCS hundreds of years after CCS came into existence. Indeed, under the majority's reasoning, no one would be free to even allow their mind to wander without this Court accusing it of some fanciful thought that necessarily creates a trust by displaying one's fleeing intent to create a trust. Plainly, only the parties' intentions as expressed in the actual neutral principles matter as per Jones. How else could a reviewing court discover an intention to create a trust by examining neutral principles if the intent to create a trust can be derived without reference to any objective standards pursuant to today's majority opinion? Unlike the majority, I would hold that the neutral principles approach does not encompass irrelevant discussions about ephemeral understandings of a trust as expressed by the National Church's hired church historian who relied heavily on multiple layers of hearsay about what unidentified people thought, even though these unidentified people are not shown to know what a trust is or the legal requirements of a trust. In my view, the church historian's affidavit is completely irrelevant as it is not a recognized neutral principle. Moreover, I question whether the views of the church historian would be admissible at trial. Multiple layers of hearsay and opinions based upon the opinion of unidentified other persons that lack any probative value certainly are not admissible evidence, and that is exactly what the church historian proffered here. Moreover, the majority opinion simply errs when it states that the parties did not complain that various state statutes constituting neutral principles were not used in the majority opinion's title analysis. See Maj. Op. at 245, fn. 7. For example, both the Brief for Appellants and the Appellants' Supplemental Brief discuss the Court of Appeals' failure to discuss the state statutes requiring a trust to be in writing signed by the person charged; the state statutes requiring one to own the land on which they settle a trust; and many other applicable state statutes. These state statutes were discussed during oral argument as well. Does the majority actually hold that justice cannot complain about the complete absence of any document conveying a beneficial interest to any trust or conveying any interest to the National Church as required by Georgia law? In my view, the utter failure of the majority to discuss the numerous state statutes that unarguably apply to the facts of this case bolsters my conclusion that if the majority forced itself to grapple with these state statutes, the majority would realize that the result it reaches today is untenable. Another important point missed by the majority opinion is that it would take the joint intention of the parties, and not just the intention of the National Church, to express the intention to create a trust. The intention to create a trust cannot be imposed from the unilateral intention of one party who has no interest in the property at the time that party intends to create a trust for its own benefit. It is worth emphasizing that the majority opinion fails to identify or describe any document indicating the parties' mutual intention to create a trust that is also a neutral principle. Perhaps this is unsurprising because all but one of the relevant deeds to CCS, which are neutral principles under Jones, were created before the National Church ever existed. Therefore, these deeds cannot indicate the National Church's intention to form a trust. Moreover, there is no other document that is an enumerated neutral principle that can establish the mutual intention of the relevant parties to create a trust on CCS's property for the benefit of the National Church. Furthermore, the majority opinion fails to clearly explain how CCS's property was conveyed by CCS to the National Church. Again, there are no deeds, no state statutes, no corporate charters, and no provisions in the organizational constitution of the National Church stating that CCS intends to create a trust on its property for the benefit of the National Church. Are we left with a new legal principle taking CCS's property by retroactive application of a new principle of law created out of whole cloth by today's majority opinion? A new variety of implied trust? Implied by what? What law provides for the implication of such a trust? What does this law say? What permits this Court to imply what this new variety of trust is? Which version of neutral principles, the neutral principles approach set forth in Jones or the majority's non-neutral neural principles approach, applies in this case and future cases regarding church property disputes? I also strongly disagree with the majority's statement that CCS and this dissenting opinion mischaracterize this dispute as the Episcopal Church trying to take Christ Church's property. What else is the National Church trying to do but take CCS's property? None of the parties have claimed that the National Church is trying to take its own property from CCS. How else can the National Church obtain this property except by taking it away from CCS? CCS has spent large amounts of time and money to prevent the National Church from wrongfully taking CCS's property through judicial action without the National Church having any document that qualifies as a title document under Georgia law. How else can we fairly describe the National Church's conduct other than an attempt to take CCS's property without paying CCS for it; leaving CCS with a million dollar debt on a renovation loan CCS would not have undertaken if it had known that the National Church claimed a trust on its property. I would underscore that the National Church's failure to timely advise CCS of its claimed trust interest amounts to a wrongful taking of CCS's property that will cost CCS more than one million dollars on this one renovation loan, in addition to CCS's loss of its property valued at several million dollars. In addition, I disagree with the majority that it is necessary for this dissenting opinion or for CCS to cite any case law in addition to All Saints Parish Waccamaw to support the self-evident principle of law that a trust cannot be created on someone else's property when the entity attempting to create a trust for its own benefit does not hold title in that property. In my view, the South Carolina Supreme Court correctly described this principle as axiomatic, stating that [i]t is an axiomatic principle of law that a person or entity must hold title to property in order to declare that it is held in trust for the benefit of another or transfer legal title to one person for the benefit of another. All Saints Parish Waccamaw v. Protestant Episcopal Church, etc. of South Carolina, 385 S.C. 428, 449, 685 S.E.2d 163 (2009). Further, I disagree with the majority opinion that CCS needs to marshal more case law in support of this self-evident or axiomatic principle of law. Id. CCS has various neutral principles of law, including state statutes, all of which favor CCS retaining control of its property as the undisputed majority faction. Any case law stating otherwise is not a neutral principle. Finally, I am confounded by the majority's decision to give itself the power, wisdom, knowledge, and authority to discern the parties' intentions regarding the creation of a trust without hearing a single word about CCS's intention. The majority then makes the peculiar claim that CCS's intention to create a trust on its property for the benefit of the National Church is not in dispute. One must ask what then has this four-year litigation been about if not about the parties' alleged intentions to create or not create a trust? This issue has been addressed in the parties' briefs and in the oral arguments before this Court. What else has CC been doing but denying its intent to create a trust for years now? If CCS's intention is, in fact, undisputed, then what would explain all of the discussion about whether CCS ratified a trust by doing things it benefited the National Church as much as they benefited CCS, including: buying prayer books, hiring the National Church's seminary graduates, and joining the National Church's retirement fund? After carefully reviewing the pleadings of the parties, their arguments, and the other evidence on the record, I question whether the majority's claim that CCS's intention is not disputed would withstand even the slightest bit of scrutiny.