Opinion ID: 1663690
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: failing to require the jury to fix the sentence of the underlying charge, second-degree escape before enhancing as a pfo offender

Text: The penalty phase was a combined sentencing/enhancement hearing. The instructions allowed the jury to find the appellants guilty as persistent felons and enhance their sentences as such without requiring that the jury first set sentences for the underlying offense. Specifically, the only instruction given at the penalty phase (Instruction No. 1), specified the elements necessary to find the appellant guilty as a persistent felon, and then stated: If you find the Defendant guilty under this instruction, you will fix his punishment at confinement in the Penitentiary for not less than ten (10) years nor more than twenty (20) years in your discretion. If you do not find the Defendant guilty under this instruction, you will fix his punishment at confinement in the penitentiary for not less than one (1) year nor more than five (5) years, in your discretion. [Emphasis original.] Thus the thrust of this instruction was to allow the jury to fix a penalty as a persistent felony offender without having first fixed a penalty for the underlying offense, second-degree escape, which carried a range of penalty from one to five years. The instruction was so worded that only in the event the jury did not find appellants guilty of being persistent felons were the jury to set the sentences within the range of penalty provided for the underlying offense. There was no instruction directing the jury to set any sentence on the underlying offense before deliberating a setting a sentence within the range provided on the PFO charge. The jury fixed the maximum penalty, 20 years, within the range provided (ten to twenty years) upon conviction as a PFO offender. The appellants complain that the procedure used is contrary to the procedure approved in Commonwealth v. Reneer, Ky., 734 S.W.2d 794 (1987). But the appellants concede that defense counsel did not object to the procedure employed. Their position is that the failure to require the jury to set a sentence for the underlying offense violates mandatory (shall) language in the PFO statute, KRS 532.080, and therefore we should apply the rule established in Wellman v. Commonwealth, Ky., 694 S.W.2d 696, 698 (1985), which provides `sentencing is jurisdictional . . . [and] cannot be waived by failure to object.' In Well-man , the final judgment erroneously provided for consecutive sentences to life imprisonment on each count of a murder/persistent felony offender conviction contrary to KRS 532.080(1) which provides that the sentence for persistent felony shall be in lieu of the sentence for the principal offense. Id. at 698. [Emphasis original.] The sole reason for correcting the error despite the absence of contemporaneous objection (i.e., considering the matter jurisdictional) was because the error resulted in a longer sentence than the law allows. There is nothing to suggest that here the failure to follow the procedure advised in Reneer resulted in a longer sentence. Reneer addressed the problem as an abstract proposition, whereas the trial court in the present case was called upon to make a concrete application of the impact of KRS 532.055(3) (Truth-in-Sentencing) on KRS 532.080 (persistent felony offender sentencing). KRS 532.055(1) changes the sentencing structure heretofore by specifying that the jury will no longer fix a penalty for the principal offense in the guilt phase of the trial. This applies in any case, including situations involving consideration of enhancement by reason of persistent felony offender status. KRS 532.055(1) provides: In all felony cases, the jury in its initial verdict will make a determination of not guilty, guilty, guilty but mentally ill, or not guilty by virtue of insanity, and no more. KRS 532.055(3) provides in pertinent part: All hearings held pursuant to this section shall be combined with any hearing provided for by KRS 532.080 [Persistent Felony Offender Sentencing]. . . . The PFO statute, KRS 532.080, provides the jury, in lieu of the sentence of imprisonment assessed, . . . shall fix a sentence. . . as authorized by subsection (5) or (6) of this section. [Emphasis added.] The American Heritage Dictionary, New College Edition, defines in lieu of as instead of. Even though the instructions of the trial court in the instance case was different from the procedure outlined in Reneer , it is at most a procedural matter which was unobjected to at the time of trial and which did not result in an enhancement of the penalty. It is as likely that the failure of the jury to set a sentence on the underlying offense had a mitigating effect, as that it had a punitive effect. The Wellman principle does not apply in these circumstances. The Appellants' Brief takes note of a comment in Commonwealth v. Hayes, Ky., 734 S.W.2d 467, 469 (1987): no doubt because the persistent felony offender statute, KRS 532.080(1), does not authorize an enhanced sentence of imprisonment when there has been no sentence of imprisonment assessed for the underlying offense. Hayes is factually distinguishable because the jury imposed only a fine for the underlying offense which it thereafter attempted to enhance with a prison sentence upon conviction as a PFO. The holding in Hayes is that only a prison sentence and not a fine can be enhanced under the language of the PFO statute. Thus we were confronted in Hayes (as in Wellman ) with a longer sentence than the law allowed, which is not the case here. The error here, if there was one, was a procedural matter which we need not address in the absence of a contemporaneous objection. We affirm the trial court on Points I, III and V, and reverse and remand on Points II and IV. STEPHENS, C.J., and REYNOLDS, J., concur. LAMBERT, J., concurs, except he concurs in results only on Part IV. LEIBSON, J., concurs in Parts II, IV and V and in results, but dissents to Parts I and III by separate Opinion. COMBS, J., concurs in Parts II, III, IV and V and in results, but joins the separate Dissenting Opinion by LEIBSON, J., on Part I. WINTERSHEIMER, J., dissents by separate opinion, and SPAIN, J., joins in the dissent. LEIBSON, J., concurring in part/dissenting in part. I concur in Parts II, IV and V of the Majority Opinion, and in the results, which is to reverse and remand for a new trial. Respectfully, I dissent from Parts I and III. Part I affirms the decision of the trial court to deny a change of venue, and Part III affirms the decision of the trial court to refuse a choice of evils instruction.