Opinion ID: 2818270
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Hazel Holmes

Text: We address first Garcia’s Batson claim with regard to prospective juror Hazel Holmes. The prosecution offered the following race-neutral explanations for striking Holmes: (1) her “unequivocal opposition to the death penalty” as stated in her initial juror questionnaire; (2) “that [she] had . . . a son who [had] been subjected . . . to multiple prosecutions[,] some of which occurred in [the instant county];” (3) that she “expressed at least once that she [felt] that her son was not fairly treated either by police officers or the criminal justice system;” and (4) that she vacillated in response to questioning 88 about whether she could ever answer “no” to the special mitigation question. 89 The prosecution noted further “that we requested that this juror be stricken for cause” and directed the court to its “prior reasons.” 90 85 36 RR (1991) at 3763-65 (Holmes); 39 RR (1991) at 4365 (Diaz). 86 Hoffman v. Cain, 752 F.3d 430, 448-49 (5th Cir. 2014). 87 Id. (quoting Murphy v. Dretke, 416 F.3d 427, 432 (5th Cir. 2005)). 88 Although the prosecution referred to “special issue number two” in offering this explanation, 36 RR (1991) at 3764, it is clear from the record that he was referencing his colloquy with Holmes regarding special issue number three, the mitigation question. 36 RR (1991) at 3754-55. 89 Id. at 3763-64. 90 Id. at 3763. 21 Case: 14-70035 Document: 00513120094 Page: 22 Date Filed: 07/17/2015 No. 14-70035 The record amply supports each of the prosecution’s proffered explanations. 91 The trial court expressly found “that [these reasons were] legitimate and racially neutral” 92—a finding to which this court must accord “great deference.” 93 Moreover, during voir dire the prosecution attempted three times to strike Holmes for cause. 94 The trial court noted that, although it denied each for-cause challenge, the decision was “a close call.” 95 Garcia now claims that the prosecution singled out Holmes on the basis of her race and purposefully used a threatening Holocaust analogy to describe the role of a juror in handing down a death sentence—an analogy not used in questioning any other veniremember—to elicit responses unfavorable to the state’s position. The prosecution did in fact use a graphic Holocaust analogy in questioning Holmes. 96 And the Supreme Court has recognized that in some cases the disparate use of a “so-called graphic script, describing the method of execution in rhetorical and clinical detail . . . to prompt some expression of hesitation to consider the death penalty,” can constitute clear and convincing evidence that a prosecution’s proffered justifications are pretextual. 97 91 See id. at 3676-77 (unequivocal opposition to death penalty in questionnaire and testimony); id. at 3689 (Q: “Could you [answer questions that result in death sentence]?” A: “That’s a hard one to answer.”); id. at 3689-90 (indicating she would answer in such a way as to “make sure that the defendant received a life sentence and make sure that he is not executed”); id. at 3716 (“I do not believe in the death penalty.”); id. at 3734 (“I don’t feel like I can [answer the mitigation question ‘no’].”); id. at 3748 (son’s prosecution); id. at 3750-51 (unfairly treated; prosecuted in Collin County); id. 3754-55 (final vacillating answer); 61 RR (1991) at 35 (testimony regarding questionnaire). 92 36 RR (1991) at 3765. 93 Hoffman v. Cain, 752 F.3d 430, 448-49 (5th Cir. 2014). 94 36 RR (1991) at 3710; id. at 3745; id. at 3759. 95 Id. at 3765; see id. at 3759 (“[E]ven though [Holmes] has expressed continued opposition to the death penalty and although she has vacillated back and forth, depending on who was asking her the questions, I deny the State’s motion for challenge, because she essentially has answered, albeit reluctantly, that she could follow her oath and what she understands to be the law.”). 96 See id. at 3683-86. 97 Miller-El v. Dretke (“Miller-El II”), 545 U.S. 231, 255-60, 66 (2005). 22 Case: 14-70035 Document: 00513120094 Page: 23 Date Filed: 07/17/2015 No. 14-70035 Nevertheless, Garcia did not raise this claim in his second state habeas petition. 98 We hold therefore that Garcia failed to exhaust state court remedies with regard to this claim and it is consequently procedurally barred under AEDPA. 99