Opinion ID: 853485
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion for mistrial made during voir dire

Text: During jury selection, a potential juror recounted that he was a friend and neighbor of another member of the jury pool and the two had talked about this case. Before he said anything further, a hearing was conducted outside the presence of the other members of the pool. The potential juror then recounted that while present in the jury room, his friend and neighbor informed him that this was a retrial of Flowers. After questioning both potential jurors outside the presence of the other members of the pool, the trial court discharged them for cause. Flowers moved for mistrial on grounds that other members of the jury pool may have overheard the conversation between the two discharged jurors. Indicating he was satisfied that no one else overheard the conversation, the trial court denied the motion. Further voir dire indicated that another juror had overheard the conversation as well, and he too was discharged for cause. In this appeal, Flowers contends the trial court erred in denying his motion and that at the very least, the trial court should have polled the seated jurors individually regarding whether they heard the conversation. Brief of Appellant at 21-22. To support his contention, Flowers cites Monserrate v. State, 265 Ind. 153, 352 N.E.2d 721 (1976). In that case, the defendant had been found guilty of murder and sentenced to death. The judgment was reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial. During voir dire upon retrial, it was revealed that a newspaper article concerning the defendant had been passed among some of the prospective jurors. In order to insure that the jury did not possess knowledge of the defendant's prior conviction and death sentence, the trial judge attempted to eliminate any prospective juror who had even heard of the word retrial. Id. at 722. When it became apparent that a large number of jurors had at least heard of the existence of the article, the court announced that all previous challenges by the defense would be treated as challenges for cause. Also, the trial court individually polled each juror who had already been accepted to determine whether he or she had seen or heard of the article. On appeal the defendant claimed error in the trial court denying his motion for mistrial or, in the alternative, quashing the panel of prospective jurors on the ground that they had been exposed to improper and prejudicial out-of-court information. This Court concluded there was no error, reasoning in part that the defendant presented no evidence suggesting that the trial court's efforts did not succeed in selecting an impartial jury. Id. at 723. Monserrate is of no help to Flowers. Unlike the facts in that case, here Flowers has not alleged that the panel of prospective jurors was actually exposed to improper out-of-court information. Rather, he suggests that the trial court in this case was required to use the procedure employed by the trial court in Monserrate to determine whether any juror had been exposed to any improper information. Flowers is mistaken. This Court outlined the correct procedure in Lindsey v. State, 260 Ind. 351, 295 N.E.2d 819 (1973). The Lindsey procedure anticipates an in-court collective interrogation where there has been a suggestion that the jury has been exposed to improper and prejudicial publicity. Id. at 358-59, 295 N.E.2d at 824. Pursuant to Lindsey, once presented with the possibility of extra-judicial comments made to a juror, the trial court must first make a threshold determination of whether there is an actual likelihood of prejudice. If the risk of prejudice appears substantial, as opposed to imaginary or remote then the court must interrogate the jury collectively to determine who, if any, has been exposed and take additional remedial action. Id. at 358-59, 295 N.E.2d at 824; see also Gregory v. State, 540 N.E.2d 585, 589 (Ind.1989) (citing Lindsey, 260 Ind. at 358-59, 295 N.E.2d at 824). Absent a showing in the first instance that the supposed extra-judicial comments actually raised a risk of substantial prejudice, the trial court has no responsibility to engage in a collective interrogation. Here, the record does not show that the two prospective jurors discussed the merits of this case or any of its details. Rather, one prospective juror simply commented to his friend and neighbor that this was a retrial. Even though the trial court discharged the two prospective jurors as well as a third prospective juror who overheard the comment, the trial court could very easily have determined there was no risk of substantial prejudice necessitating an inquiry of those jurors already accepted by the parties. A trial court's ruling on a motion for mistrial is afforded great deference on appeal because the trial court is in the best position to evaluate the circumstances and their impact on the jury. Kent v. State, 675 N.E.2d 332, 335 (Ind.1996). A mistrial is an extreme remedy invoked only when no other measure can rectify the situation. Id. This extreme remedy was not warranted here.