Opinion ID: 1119024
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Unavoidable or Unforeseen Circumstances

Text: Specifically, Petitioner claims there were no unavoidable or unforeseen circumstances beyond the control of the court or the parties to justify the court's granting trial extensions under CrR 3.3(d)(8). [40] He argues the speedy trial problems were not unforeseen or unavoidable because the court administrator had informed all counsel and the judge of the potential speedy trial problem; other attorneys were available to try the case; the court could have obtained other judges or courtrooms; the court could have continued the Smith trial and ordered this trial to proceed; and the actual reason extensions were granted was that Respondent had miscalculated the speedy trial expiration date. [41] Respondent contends unavoidable and unforeseen circumstances did exist because defense counsel, the prosecutor and the judge assigned to this case were in fact unavailable for the reason that they were all engaged in another trial in the same court and also because there was confusion about the speedy trial expiration date. [42] CrR 3.3(d)(8) provides in pertinent part that: When a trial is not begun on the date set because of unavoidable or unforeseen circumstances beyond the control of the court or the parties, the court, even if the time for trial has expired, may extend the time within which trial must be held.... (Emphasis added.) The decision of a trial court in granting an extension under CrR 3.3(d)(8) is reviewed only for abuse of discretion. [43] The trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is based upon untenable grounds or upon untenable reasons. [44] Our courts of appeal have consistently held that unavailability of counsel may constitute unforeseen or unavoidable circumstances to warrant a trial extension under CrR 3.3(d)(8). [45] The record in this case does not indicate why Petitioner was not brought to trial on July 20, 1992. But both counsel and the trial judge involved in the case were in fact unavailable from July 21, 1992 to August 3, 1992 because they were participating in another case. Their unavailability under these circumstances constitutes an unavoidable circumstance under CrR 3.3(d)(8). The record also shows there was a mistaken belief [46] about the speedy trial expiration date. At the hearing on August 3 and 4, 1992, the prosecutor argued that during discussions about the potential speedy trial problem in Petitioner Carson's case, everyone, including the court and both counsel, mistakenly believed the speedy trial period expired on August 5, 1992. [47] However, defense counsel later contended he knew all along when the speedy trial period expired, but that he had no obligation to tell anyone about it. [48] The court is ultimately responsible for ensuring a speedy trial for the defendant under CrR 3.3. [49] But counsel for a defendant bears some responsibility for asserting CrR 3.3 rights of a client and assuring compliance with the rule before the speedy trial period expires. [50] The superior court speedy trial rules were promulgated to give the defendant a prompt trial once prosecution is initiated. [51] [They] were not designed to be a trap for the unwary. [52] In this case, the trial court and the prosecutor evidently miscalculated the speedy trial expiration date. They did not deliberately create a delay to oppress Petitioner. [53] Petitioner's counsel acknowledged he knew all along when the speedy trial period expired. When the trial in State v. Smith was begun on July 21, 1992, defense counsel knew Petitioner's case would not be set within the 60 days required by CrR 3.3, but he did not object. He did not assert his client's CrR 3.3 rights nor notify the court or the State of his intent to rely on CrR 3.3 until almost two weeks after the speedy trial period had expired. [54] Counsel for Petitioner also argues other attorneys could have tried Petitioner Carson's case, but, as the Court of Appeals recognized, [he] did not object however to the court proceeding with the Smith case nor did he insist on Mr. Carson's right to a speedy trial or advise the court that another lawyer in his office was available to try the case. [55] Because of the unavailability of both counsel and the trial judge, the mistaken belief about the speedy trial expiration date, and because defense counsel did not advise the court or Respondent of his intent to rely on the speedy trial rule before the speedy trial period expired, there were unavoidable circumstances beyond the control of the court or parties to justify trial extensions under CrR 3.3(d)(8).