Opinion ID: 704047
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claims Against Administaff and Contract Claims Against H & R Block

Text: 10 We first address the district court's grant of summary judgment on Meinecke's claims against Administaff and her contract claims against H & R Block. Meinecke contends that summary judgment on these claims was inappropriate because all parties had filed a stipulation that these claims would be dismissed and because the court entered an order approving the dismissal on the same day it entered the order granting summary judgment. H & R Block and Administaff counter that this court does not have jurisdiction to review the summary judgment on these claims because the dismissal rendered the issues moot. 2 11 We begin our analysis, as we must, with the question of mootness. The parties' stipulation to the dismissal of these claims and the district court's order granting summary judgment on the same claims are contradictory and irreconcilable. Only one of these actions can be valid. H & R Block and Administaff, however, would like to give effect to both. In particular, they would like to use the action that is less favorable to them, the dismissal, to deny this court jurisdiction to review the action that is more favorable, the summary judgment, thereby insulating it from reversal. 3 The logical fallacy in the appellees' mootness argument is that it presupposes the validity of the dismissal; however, where the issue before us is whether we should give effect to the dismissal or the contradictory order of summary judgment, we cannot make such a supposition. 4 The conflict between the dismissal and the summary judgment presents us with a live controversy. Furthermore, even if the dismissal rendered moot the claims in question, the conflicting order granting summary judgment on these claims effectively resurrected the controversy. Accordingly, we find the appellees' mootness argument to be without merit. 12 We now turn to the question of whether summary judgment on the claims against Administaff and the contract claims against H & R Block was appropriate in light of the stipulation of dismissal. Administaff and H & R Block point out in their brief that the parties voluntarily dismissed these claims by filing a stipulation for dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(ii) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. According to this Rule, such stipulations take effect when filed and do not require an order of the court. Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(1)(ii). Therefore, the district court's order approving the dismissal is of no consequence. This distinction should eliminate any confusion created by the fact that the district court entered the order approving the dismissal and the order granting summary judgment on the same day. The claims were dismissed when the parties filed the stipulation, which was three days before the court entered the order granting summary judgment. We have held that, when the parties file a stipulation of voluntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(ii), any further actions by the court [are] superfluous. United States v. Kellogg (Matter of West Texas Mktg. Corp.), 12 F.3d 497, 501 (5th Cir.1994); see also Williams v. Ezell, 531 F.2d 1261, 1264 (5th Cir.1976). Thus, that part of the district court's order granting summary judgment to Administaff on all claims and to H & R Block on the contract claims is void. 13