Opinion ID: 1407576
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 23

Heading: criticisms of the studies relating to the witherspoon and ballew contentions

Text: The Attorney General raises several major methodological arguments to attack the conclusions which petitioner would draw from these studies. Most of the criticisms do not have merit. (8a) However, there is merit in one of his arguments  what he calls the crux of his position. Consequently, petitioner's Witherspoon and Ballew contentions must be rejected as not established by the record presently before this court. (9) Several of the criticisms do not require extended discussion. For example, it is contended that none of the studies can be considered reliable indices of how real jurors would act, since the subjects of the studies did not have the same sense of felt responsibility as would a juror in an actual criminal trial. There are several responses to the criticism. First, the criticism is inapplicable to the Zeisel study, since he drew his data from jurors who had actually sat and deliberated on real criminal cases. The fact that Zeisel's study is fully consistent with the results of the other, controlled experiments strongly indicates that the absence (if any) of felt responsibility did not produce spurious results. Second, it appears that the subjects in the Ellsworth Conviction-Proneness Study did g[e]t very, very into deliberations. Those subjects in this study who had had prior jury experience reported that the experimental situation corresponded well with their jury service. The defense experts also testified that it was not at all unusual for subjects in controlled jury studies to become involved in their cases to the degree that Ellsworth's subjects did. Significantly, a comparison among the controlled conviction-proneness studies shows that the differences found in voting behavior tend to get wider as the studies become more realistic and involving. Thus, the studies using written stimuli found differences of 6 and 7 percent ( Goldberg, Harris 1971 ). However, this rose to 13 percent when an audiotape was used ( Jurow ) and to 25 percent when a videotape was employed ( Ellsworth Conviction-Proneness ). This trend also indicates that any absence of felt responsibility would not alter the conclusions to be drawn from the studies. Finally, it must be noted that in reaching its constitutional conclusions in Ballew v. Georgia, supra, 435 U.S. 223, the United States Supreme Court relied heavily on controlled studies, none of which involved real jurors and hence real felt responsibility. It would appear that the use of such studies has been already approved. [107] Similar considerations lead this court to reject the Attorney General's next criticism of the studies, i.e., that they did not involve juror interaction and deliberation. Again, this critique is inapplicable to the Zeisel study. Further, the subject/jurors in the Ellsworth Conviction-Proneness Study deliberated for an hour, and the significant differences between the guilt phase includable jurors and the Witherspoon -qualified jurors remained even after that time. Moreover, much of the force of this criticism is further overcome by the findings of Kalven and Zeisel, supra, and others that in the overwhelming number of cases, the jury will eventually reach a unanimous verdict consistent with the position of the first ballot majority. (Cf., ante, fn. 56.) This indicates that the critical factor in jury decision making is not the process of juror interaction but the jurors' original views of the case, which are formed at or near the time the case is submitted to them for decision. [108] Next, it is asserted that the studies (except the various polls and the Harris 1971 and Ellsworth Attitude surveys) must be disregarded because the subjects involved were not representative of the general population. This contention reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of the conclusions sought to be drawn from these studies, a misunderstanding which was repeatedly addressed by the experts at the hearing below. The studies are being used to show differences in behavior and attitudes between groups; they are not being used to show the relative size of one group to another. Under these circumstances, a researcher need not insure that the groups are included in the study in the same proportions as they appear in the general population. Rather, it must merely be insured that there is a sufficiently large number of persons in each group to enable the researcher to draw conclusions about the characteristics of that group. [109] In any event, the criticism concerning representativeness all but disappears when the studies are viewed as a whole, not in isolation. As Dr. Zeisel noted, the results of these studies are consistent irrespective of whether the subjects are southern college students, northern industrial workers, Illinois or New York jurors, persons eligible for jury service in California, or persons selected randomly from throughout the nation. It defies reason to attribute the studies' results to unrepresentative or nonrandom samples. (8b) However, there is a more telling criticism of the conclusions which petitioner seeks to draw from the evidence relating to the Witherspoon and Ballew issues. The pool of jurors eligible to serve in a capital trial in California consists of those persons eligible to serve in a noncapital case whose attitudes toward capital punishment would place them in either the favor death penalty, indifferent, or oppose death penalty group. (Cf., ante, fns. 34, 48.) Thus, in order to establish that a capital case jury in this state is drawn from a pool that is less than neutral with respect to guilt or is inadequate to effectuate the purposes and functions of a jury, petitioner must establish deficiencies in a pool consisting of those three groups, i.e., the California death-qualified groups. None of petitioner's studies expressly focused on a pool comprised in this manner. They do focus on the deficiencies in a pool of  Witherspoon -qualified jurors. However; at least in theory, a pool of  Witherspoon -qualified jurors differs from a pool of California death-qualified jurors. The former contains a fourth group in addition to the three California death-qualified groups, i.e., a Witherspoon -qualified jury pool also contains the automatic death penalty group. [110] Thus, in order to draw conclusions about a pool of California death-qualified jurors on the basis of the evidence introduced below, petitioner must be able to account for the automatic death penalty jurors. It is asserted by the Attorney General that petitioner is unable to do this in a scientifically adequate fashion. In short, petitioner is said to have proved the wrong proposition. Petitioner seeks to overcome the critique in several ways. First, he contends that the automatic death penalty group is a tiny group compared to the Witherspoon -qualified group as a whole. If this were true, it is urged, then the results of petitioner's studies would not be appreciably altered by subtracting the few automatic death penalty jurors from the large class of Witherspoon -qualified jurors. However, there is no reliable evidence in the record to support petitioner's assumption as to the minute size of the automatic death penalty group. The defense experts below repeatedly admitted that nobody knows the size of this group. There are tentative indications in the record that this group may be as small as 1 percent (or less) of the adult population or as large as 28 percent. [111] Petitioner notes that there is no reliable data indicating that this group does appear in substantial numbers in California jury pools, but this observation does not advance his cause. Witherspoon placed the burden on the accused to establish the nonneutrality of a death-qualified jury. (Cf., ante, fns. 37 and 38 and accompanying text.) Until petitioner makes out at least a prima facie case of unconstitutionality, the state is not required under Witherspoon to make any factual showing. The lack of reliable evidence on the effect of California's exclusion of automatic death penalty jurors from capital cases means petitioner has not made any reliable showing that a pool of California death-qualified jurors differs from the pool of jurors who are eligible to serve at noncapital trials. [112] Following oral argument in the present proceeding, the United States Supreme Court decided Adams v. Texas (1980) 448 U.S. 38 [65 L.Ed.2d 581, 100 S.Ct. 2521]. There, the court struck down a Texas statute which disqualified a prospective juror from serving in a capital case unless he states under oath that the mandatory penalty of death or imprisonment for life will not affect his deliberations on any issue of fact. (Tex. Pen. Code Ann., § 12.31(b) (Supp. 1980), quoted at 448 U.S. at p. 42 [65 L.Ed.2d at p. 587].) The Supreme Court reasoned that the statute violated the principles of Witherspoon, since it authorized the exclusion of jurors on broader grounds based on their opinions concerning the death penalty than is permitted by Witherspoon. ( Id., at p. 49 [65 L.Ed.2d at p. 592].) In the course of seeking to uphold Adams' death sentence, the State of Texas argued the statute was neutral in that it permitted the disqualification of persons favoring the death penalty on the same basis as persons opposed. ( Id., at p. 49 [65 L.Ed.2d at p. 592].) The high court responded by stating that this feature of the statute created only an appearance of neutrality. ( Ibid. ) The court noted the hypothetical existence of the juror who believes literally in the Biblical admonition `an eye for an eye,' but, it stated, it is undeniable, and the State does not seriously dispute, that such jurors will be few indeed as compared with those excluded because of scruples against capital punishment. ( Ibid. [65 L.Ed.2d at p. 592].) These comments by the United States Supreme Court do not persuade this court to alter its conclusions with respect to petitioner's failure to account for the automatic death penalty group in his challenge to the neutrality of a California death-qualified jury. Even if this court were to accept the Supreme Court's suggestion as to the relative sizes of the two groups in question, petitioner's problem would not be solved. In order to extrapolate from petitioner's showing about a  Witherspoon -qualified jury to his intended conclusion as to a California death-qualified jury, it is necessary to know more than just the relative size of the automatic death penalty group. The impact of this group on petitioner's statistical calculations would depend on both its size and its voting behavior in the jury room. (Cf., post, fn. 115 and accompanying text.) A small group would have an impact beyond its sheer numbers if it tended to be more unified in its voting behavior (or other relevant characteristic) than a larger but less cohesive group. Petitioner's evidence contains no indication of the relevant characteristics of the automatic death penalty group as compared to the other groups. [113] Next, petitioner contends that the Ellsworth Conviction-Proneness Study enables him to draw conclusions about the appropriate California death-qualified groups. At the time this study was conducted, none of the subject/jurors was asked a question which would have identified him or her as an automatic death penalty juror. However, when it appeared from the testimony of earlier witnesses at the hearing on the Moore brothers' motion that this may have been an imperfection in her study, Ellsworth recontacted by telephone those subjects who had previously indicated they strongly favored the death penalty. [114] Of the 23 subject/jurors in the strongly favor category, she was able to contact 22. All 22 indicated they would be willing to consider voting for life imprisonment or death depending on the evidence ... in the case. While the Ellsworth Conviction-Proneness Study was in other respects an outstanding piece of research, the propriety of relying on such a delayed call-back procedure as a reliable means of retroactively identifying the attitudes of one's subjects is doubtful. Ellsworth herself indicated it was conceivable (albeit doubt[ful]) that different answers would have been obtained had the automatic death penalty question been asked several months earlier along with the other questions about capital punishment attitudes. Petitioner's assertion that the Ellsworth Conviction-Proneness Study demonstrates the nonneutrality of a California death-qualified jury presents another problem as well. Even if this study reliably showed that California death-qualified jurors tend to be more conviction-prone than guilt phase includable jurors, it does not necessarily follow that the former would also tend to be more conviction-prone than are jurors in a noncapital case. [115] It is this latter showing which is the crux of the Witherspoon issue. However, the study's omission of the automatic death penalty group  which comprises an unknown proportion of the pool of jurors in noncapital cases  renders unsound petitioner's leap from the results of this study (that California death-qualified jurors are more conviction-prone than guilt phase includable jurors) to the conclusion that California death-qualified jurors are also more conviction-prone than a neutral jury. [116] In view of these gaps in the Ellsworth Conviction-Proneness Study, this court cannot ground a constitutional decision on its results alone. Finally, petitioner urges, in response to the Attorney General's contention, that he (petitioner) is entitled to the representation [in] his jury [pool] of all viewpoints and outlooks that are represented in the population; he is entitled to any fair-minded juror who may properly be randomly selected to serve. The first half of the statement is correct, but his evidence has not established that any viewpoints or outlooks have been excluded from the jury pool. All he has shown is that if a state used all four  Witherspoon -qualified groups in a capital trial, the jury would not be neutral. California is not such a state. The second half of petitioner's statement may be a correct statement of law under a cross-sectional analysis, but petitioner has repeatedly declined to invoke such an analysis. However, petitioner's assertion is incomplete under the Witherspoon analysis. The exclusion of fair-minded jurors is improper under Witherspoon only if it can be established that such exclusions tend to result in a nonneutral jury, i.e., in the elimination or underrepresentation of those fair and impartial jurors who would tend to draw conclusions favorable to the accused about issues in the trial, and in the overrepresentation of such jurors favorable to the prosecution. Petitioner has failed to make such a showing as to death-qualified juries in California. Therefore, until further research is done which makes it possible to draw reliable conclusions about the nonneutrality of California death-qualified juries in California, this court does not have a sufficient evidentiary basis on which to bottom a constitutional holding under Witherspoon and Ballew. It is, indeed, unfortunate that so much research, time, and energy has been expended in this area with the result that no one stopped to consider the differences between a  Witherspoon -qualified jury and a California death-qualified jury. The trial court properly rejected petitioner's motion under Witherspoon and Ballew to limit the exclusion for cause of jurors unalterably opposed to capital punishment.