Opinion ID: 1110109
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: whether ernie, through his parents, properly filed in state court.

Text: ¶ 29. Although fraud is beyond the scope of the Act, an issue remains as to whether Ernie's claim, brought through his parents, was properly filed in state court. While it is clear that the Cooks have the right to bring a suit on Ernie's behalf, Miss. R. Civ. P. 17(c), it is not clear whether a claim for fraud by Ernie was properly filed in state court. ¶ 30. Because Ernie is suing for damages he would have received under the Act had he been able to file, if indeed Ernie were able to file in Federal Claims Court, his case for fraudulent misrepresentation would lack the essential element of injury. Ernie is actually suing for damages arising from a vaccine-related injury associated with the administration of a vaccine. ¶ 31. Ernie's fraud claim is based on the belief that he was time-barred from filing a claim under the Act due to CMG's fraud. The essential determination is whether the Act imposes a statute of repose or a statute of limitations in this instance, allowing the application of equitable estoppel. ¶ 32. As the Cooks properly point out, the Federal Circuit held that 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-16(a)(1) was a statute of repose regarding the filing of suits which involved a vaccine that was administered prior to the effective date of the Act and resulted in a vaccine-related injury. Weddel v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 100 F.3d 929, 932 (Fed.Cir.1996). Compensation for such injury could still be sought under the Act if a petition was filed within twenty-four months of the effective date of the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-16(a)(1). Since it was found to be a statute of repose, equitable tolling was not permitted. Weddel, 100 F.3d at 931-2. ¶ 33. The controlling facts of Weddel are not present in the instant case. Ernie's initial vaccine was administered on April 13, 1990, after the effective date of the Act. For those who were administered a vaccine after the effective date of the Act (October 1, 1988) and suffered a vaccine-related injury, Section 16(a)(2) applies and imposes a thirty-six month statute of limitations which begins to run upon the first symptom or manifestation of the onset of injury, not to be delayed until the time the petitioner has actual knowledge that the vaccine recipient has suffered an injury compensable under the Act. Brice v. Secretary of Dep't of H.H.S., 36 Fed. Cl. 474, 478 (1996). It was further held in Brice that the doctrine of equitable tolling may be applied in such instances. Id. at 480; see also Brown v. Secretary of Dep't of H.H.S., 36 Fed. Cl. 435, 439-40 (1996), aff'd mem. 111 F.3d 145, 1997 WL 187413 (Fed.Cir.1997); Levesque v. Secretary of Dept. of Dept. of H.H.S., 1999 WL 605821, -4, 1999 U.S. Claims LEXIS 199, 4-14 (U.S.Ct.Fed.Cl., July 27, 1999). ¶ 34. Ernie's case falls under Section 16(a)(2) and is governed by the principles of Brice and Brown. The United States Court of Federal Claims has recognized that equitable tolling may be permitted where the petitioner has been delayed in filing through fraud or misrepresentation. Brown, 36 Fed. Cl. at 440 (citing Irwin v. Department. of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 111 S.Ct. 453, 112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990)). Ernie may be able to proceed under the Act so long as he pursued his claim with due diligence. Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 452-53 (7th Cir.1990). ¶ 35. Furthermore, if equitable tolling is permitted, Ernie's claim in state court should not be held to his detriment, but rather he should be allowed to file a petition under the Act within one year of the dismissal of his state civil action (with this appeal tolling such time limit). Brown 36 Fed. Cl. at 437-8 (commenting on 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(a)(2)(B)). Such matter, however, properly belongs before the United States Court of Federal Claims. ¶ 36. Depending upon the decision of the Federal Claims Court regarding the application of equitable tolling principles, Ernie may not be time barred from filing his petition under the Act. Although a fraudulent misrepresentation suit is beyond the purview of the Act, in this instance, Ernie is only seeking those damages which he would have recovered under the Act. Because he may as yet be able to recover under the Act, Ernie's claim should be dismissed. Should Ernie's claim be dismissed by the Federal Claims Court then Ernie may bring his suit in state court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-21. An issue regarding the lower court's dismissal of Ernie's claim, however, remains to be addressed. ¶ 37. CMG filed a motion for summary judgment, essentially claiming the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case because the Act required that the Cooks first file a petition in Federal Claims Court and exhaust the federal remedial system. If a court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear a case, then it cannot have jurisdiction to decide issues of fact and law, as required by Rule 56, in order to grant a motion for summary judgment which acts as an adjudication on the merits. Consequently, the filing of the motion as to Ernie was improper. CMG should have filed a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. ¶ 38. The circuit court improperly granted CMG's motion for summary judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Regarding Ernie, the circuit court should have treated CMG's motion for summary judgment as a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and granted such motion pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(a)(2)(B). See generally Brown v. Secretary of Dep't of H.H.S., 1996 WL 741416 (Fed.Cl.), aff'd Brown, 36 Fed.Cl. 435 (1996), aff'd. mem. 111 F.3d 145, 1997 WL 187413 (Fed.Cir.1997).