Opinion ID: 1127049
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the chancellor erred in awarding david glenn chamblee permanent possession, custody and control of the former marital residence of the parties and ten (10) acres of other land.

Text: Appellant Sheila Chamblee proffers several arguments and cites several cases to support the proposition that property is to be equitably divided by the chancellor in a divorce case. This misses the point. This issue does not go to the actual ownership of the property as Sheila Chamblee seems to believe. Rather, it goes to the possession, custody and control of the property. Although we cannot be sure of what the chancellor's intent as to this issue is as he did not himself write this part of the opinion, we can infer from the language the he borrowed that the title in this property is to remain unchanged. The exact words used to describe the interest in the house that was to be transferred to David from Sheila are permanent possession, custody, and control and the words used to describe the interest to the ten acres are permanent exclusive use, possession and control. In regard to other properties he uses the term ownership. From this it would be safe to read the opinion as keeping the actual ownership in the hands of both parties. The case of Gray v. Gray, 562 So.2d 79 (Miss. 1990), states that an award to the wife of sole and exclusive possession, use and control of the home owned by the parties, not subject to partition ... in no way destroys or diminishes (the husband's) interest in the ... property. Id., at 83. The words used to describe the interest transferred in that case are almost identical to the ones used in the case at bar. Sheila still owns whatever part of the house and the land that she owned before the divorce; she has simply lost its possession, custody (or use) and control. Based on the facts of this case, such an award can not be described as manifest error. Furthermore, when one considers that David has custody of Justin, the award of use and possession of the house was proper. It is preferable that the party who is awarded such custody should also be awarded use of the marital home. Indeed, McIlwain v. McIlwain, 441 So.2d 517 (Miss. 1983), goes so far as stating that a chancellor abused his discretion by awarding the marital home to the party which did not receive custody of the couple's two children. Use, possession, and control of property is not without value. A more equitable ruling might have been to award possession and control to David and have him pay a reasonable rent for the use of the property to Sheila. Nevertheless, the fact that he did not structure the award in this way does not make his ruling rise to the level of a manifest error. The chancellor's findings as to this issue should therefore be affirmed.