Opinion ID: 2269150
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Suppression pursuant to CrRLJ 8.3(b)

Text: ¶ 8 Pursuant to CrRLJ 8.3(b), a court of limited jurisdiction has discretion to dismiss a criminal prosecution that is tarnished by governmental misconduct if the misconduct prejudiced the defendant's rights and materially affected the defendant's right to a fair trial. The rule reads: The court, in the furtherance of justice after notice and hearing, may dismiss any criminal prosecution due to arbitrary action or governmental misconduct when there has been prejudice to the rights of the accused which materially affect the accused's right to a fair trial. The court shall set forth its reasons in a written order. CrRLJ 8.3(b). ¶ 9 We review a lower court's interpretation of a court rule de novo. Spokane County v. Specialty Auto & Truck Painting, Inc., 153 Wash.2d 238, 244, 103 P.3d 792 (2004) (citing City of Seattle v. Guay, 150 Wash.2d 288, 76 P.3d 231 (2003)). Our interpretation of a court rule relies upon principles of statutory construction. Id. at 249, 103 P.3d 792. To interpret a statute, we first look to its plain language. State v. Gonzalez, 168 Wash.2d 256, 271, 226 P.3d 131 (2010) (citing State v. Armendariz, 160 Wash.2d 106, 110, 156 P.3d 201 (2007)). If the plain language is subject to one interpretation only, our inquiry ends because plain language does not require construction. Id. ¶ 10 Dismissal is an extraordinary remedy, one to which a trial court should turn only as a last resort.  State v. Wilson, 149 Wash.2d 1, 12, 65 P.3d 657 (2003) (emphasis added). Trial courts should consider `intermediate remedial steps' before ordering the extraordinary remedy of dismissal. Id. (quoting State v. Koerber, 85 Wash. App. 1, 4, 931 P.2d 904 (1996)). We have stated unequivocally that [d]ismissal is unwarranted in cases where suppression of evidence may eliminate whatever prejudice is caused by governmental misconduct. State v. Marks, 114 Wash.2d 724, 730, 790 P.2d 138 (1990) (citing City of Seattle v. Orwick, 113 Wash.2d 823, 784 P.2d 161 (1989)); accord United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 366, 101 S.Ct. 665, 66 L.Ed.2d 564 (1981)([W]e have not suggested that searches and seizures contrary to the Fourth Amendment warrant dismissal of the indictment. The remedy in the criminal proceeding is limited to denying the prosecution the fruits of its transgression.). ¶ 11 The City contends the trial court erred when it suppressed the breath test results, rather than dismiss the prosecution outright. It asserts dismissal is the sole remedy pursuant to CrRLJ 8.3(b). [5] Answer to Mot. for Discretionary Review at 9-10. Our precedent suggests otherwise. ¶ 12 In Wilson, we held dismissal of a criminal prosecution pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule (CrR) 8.3(b) [6] should be used only as a last resort. 149 Wash.2d at 12, 65 P.3d 657. The language of CrR 8.3(b) is identical to CrRLJ 8.3(b), the rule before us here. In Wilson the superior court dismissed robbery and attempted robbery charges due to governmental misconduct. 149 Wash.2d at 6, 65 P.3d 657. The Court of Appeals reversed. We affirmed the Court of Appeals because we found dismissal under the rule to be inappropriate. Id. at 12, 65 P.3d 657. We emphasized that the trial judge erred by dismissing the case outright instead of taking ameliorative action. The trial judge in each case ignored `intermediate remedial steps' when it ordered the `extraordinary remedy of dismissal.' Id. (quoting Koerber, 85 Wash.App. at 4, 931 P.2d 904). We stated that the lower court abused its discretion by failing to consider a less extreme alternative[] to dismissal. Id. at 12, 65 P.3d 657. ¶ 13 We addressed a similar dilemma in Marks, 114 Wash.2d 724, 790 P.2d 138. Marks involved a former version of CrR 8.3(b), but the rule contained the same pertinent phrase: may dismiss. [7] Relying on the then-recently decided case of City of Seattle v. Orwick, 113 Wash.2d 823, 784 P.2d 161 (1989), we held that [d]ismissal is unwarranted in cases where suppression of evidence may eliminate whatever prejudice is caused by governmental misconduct. Marks, 114 Wash.2d at 730, 790 P.2d 138. ¶ 14 The municipal court relied on the Court of Appeals case of Busig to suppress, rather than dismiss, the prosecution. Busig does not undertake an in-depth analysis of suppression versus dismissal, as Wilson, Marks, and Orwick do, but it does clearly contemplate suppression as an alternative to dismissal. See Busig, 119 Wash.App. at 390, 81 P.3d 143 (neither dismissal nor suppression of the evidence under CrR 8.3(b) was justified for the alleged government misconduct [8] (emphasis added)); see also State v. McReynolds, 104 Wash.App. 560, 579, 17 P.3d 608 (2000) (Dismissal is not justified when suppression of evidence will eliminate whatever prejudice is caused by the action or misconduct.). ¶ 15 There is no tension between our precedent and the plain language of CrRLJ 8.3(b). The rule says that the court may go to the extreme measure of dismissal. It sets the outer bounds of the court's discretion and power. Nothing in the plain language of the rule prohibits other less severe remedies within those bounds. The rule does not limit the court's discretion. Here suppression presents an appropriate, less severe remedy than dismissal under CrRLJ 8.3(b). Suppression stands as an intermediate remedial step and a less extreme alternative that avoids the extraordinary remedy of dismissal. Wilson, 149 Wash.2d at 12, 65 P.3d 657; see also Marks, 114 Wash.2d at 730, 790 P.2d 138. ¶ 16 The trial judge found governmental misconduct and prejudice that materially affected Jacob's right to a fair trial. Because the trial court had the power to suppress rather than dismiss the breath test evidence pursuant to CrRLJ 8.3(b), the trial court did not err. We reverse the Court of Appeals and conclude suppression was a proper intermediate remedial step.