Opinion ID: 1711020
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: Whether Hillary's Predecessors in Interest Intended to Abandon Implied Easement

Text: `An easement may be abandoned by unequivocal acts showing a clear intention to abandon and terminate the right, or it may be done by acts in pais without deed or other writing. The intention to abandon is the material question, and it may be proved by an infinite variety of acts. It is a question of fact to be ascertained from all the circumstances of the case....' Mader v. Mettenbrink, 159 Neb. 118, 130, 65 N.W.2d 334, 343 (1954) (quoting Williams v. Lantz, 123 Neb. 67, 242 N.W. 269 (1932)). Hillary argues that its predecessors in interest had no intention of abandoning the implied easement. At trial, Fuller unequivocally testified that she never intended to abandon the right to use the tracks. Furthermore, after Fuller acquired parcel C, she advertised it for sale, at all times, as having rail access. U.S. Cold argues that the following factors illustrate that Stewart Seed and/or Fuller intended to abandon the implied easement: (1) nonuse of the tracks from 1981 forward; (2) refusal to pay for any portion of maintenance, repairs, or replacement of the tracks; (3) acquiescence in the installation of a fence and padlocked gates across the tracks; and (4) failure to expressly convey the implied easement to their respective grantees. As for factor (1), in determining whether there was an intent to abandon an easement, `[t]ime is not a necessary element; it is not the duration of the nonuser, but the nature of the acts done by the dominant owner, or of the adverse acts acquiesced in by him, and the intention which the one or the other indicates, that are important....' Mader v. Mettenbrink, 159 Neb. at 130, 65 N.W.2d at 343 (quoting Williams v. Lantz, supra ). As stated in Masid v. First State Bank, 213 Neb. 431, 435-36, 329 N.W.2d 560, 563 (1983): It is true the evidence is that the land to which the easement is appurtenant was vacant for a period of 11 or 12 years. However, this circumstance, in and of itself, does not establish abandonment.... [T]he plaintiff herein did not by his own act render the use of the easement impossible, nor did he obstruct it in a manner inconsistent with its further enjoyment. There is no abandonment in this case.... Regarding factor (2), the only evidence adduced at trial was that in 1977 Stewart Seed refused to compensate U.S. Cold for reconstructing the tracks on parcel B from two parallel tracks to a single track. Kratvill testified that when he last used the tracks in 1976, they were in adequate condition. Thus, Hillary argues that this reconstruction project was an unnecessary, unilateral activity by U.S. Cold and that its predecessors did not contribute because they were of the opinion that the tracks did not need to be reconstructed. Considering factor (3), the record reflects that the fence that was constructed contained a swinging gate large enough for a train to pass through. See, Spiegel v. Ferraro, 142 A.D.2d 573, 529 N.Y.S.2d 908 (1988); DeJong v. Abphill Assoc., 121 A.D.2d 678, 504 N.Y.S.2d 445 (1986) (failure of owner of dominant estate to act to have removed an obstruction placed on easement by owner of servient estate did not establish abandonment). As for factor (4), in Ballinger v. Kinney, 87 Neb. 342, 345, 127 N.W. 239, 240 (1910), this court held, The easement, being appurtenant, passe[s] by ... deed ... notwithstanding said instrument contains no reference thereto. See, also, section IV(2)(a) on Conveying Dominant Tenement, supra. We find that these factors, as a whole, do not rebut the evidence presented by Hillarythat its predecessors in interest did not intend to abandon the tracks. We further find that Hillary did not obstruct the easement in any manner or acquiesce in any acts inconsistent with its further enjoyment of the easement. See, Masid v. First State Bank, supra ; First Investment Co. v. State Fire Marshal, 175 Neb. 66, 120 N.W.2d 549 (1963); Toelle v. Preuss, 172 Neb. 239, 109 N.W.2d 293 (1961). See, also, Lackaff v. Bogue, 158 Neb. 174, 62 N.W.2d 889 (1954). Thus, we determine that Hillary met its burden of rebutting the presumption of abandonment by proving that it was more likely than not that its predecessors in interest did not intend to abandon the easement. As a result, we conclude the implied easement existed at the time Fuller conveyed parcel C to Hillary.