Opinion ID: 757309
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Appoint a Psychiatrist

Text: 11 In Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985), the Supreme Court held that the state has a constitutional obligation to provide an indigent criminal defendant with access to the assistance of a psychiatrist in the following two circumstances: (1) when a defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial and (2) in the context of a capital sentencing proceeding, when the State presents psychiatric evidence of the defendant's future dangerousness. Id. at 83, 105 S.Ct. 1087. 12 Based upon his belief that the state would offer psychiatric evidence to establish his future dangerousness during the punishment phase of his trial, White made a motion for the appointment of a psychiatrist. The trial court offered White the following options: (1) a simultaneous, joint examination conducted by a government psychiatrist and a psychiatrist of White's choosing or (2) an examination by a court-appointed psychiatrist who would then report to the trial court, the prosecution, and White. White declined both options and the trial court therefore denied his motion. 13 White contends that the options offered by the trial court did not satisfy Ake because they forced him to make a choice between exercising his due process and equal protection-based rights to psychiatric assistance and his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. He bases this argument on the fact that both options proposed by the trial court would have resulted in full disclosure of the results of the examination and any incriminating statements made by White during the examination to the state. The state concedes that its intention to offer psychiatric evidence of White's future dangerousness was sufficient to vest White with a right to psychiatric assistance under Ake. However, it contends that the options proposed by the trial court were sufficient to satisfy Ake. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that we need not reach the issue of whether the options posed by the trial court satisfied Ake because, assuming arguendo that they did not, the error was harmless. 2 1. Applicability of harmless-error analysis to the 14 alleged Ake error 15 To date, this court has not squarely addressed the question of whether Ake error is amenable to harmless-error analysis, though in Volson v. Blackburn, 794 F.2d 173 (5th Cir.1986), we implied that a habeas petitioner must make some showing of prejudice in order to be entitled to habeas relief on the basis of Ake error. See id. at 176. Three other circuits have expressly concluded that Ake error is subject to harmless-error analysis, and we now join them. See Tuggle v. Netherland, 79 F.3d 1386, 1388 (4th Cir.1996); Brewer v. Reynolds, 51 F.3d 1519, 1529 (10th Cir.1995); Starr v. Lockhart, 23 F.3d 1280, 1291 (8th Cir.1994). 16 Whether a particular constitutional error is subject to harmless-error analysis hinges upon whether the error constitutes trial error or structural error. Trial error is error that  'occur[s] during the presentation of the case to the jury.'  Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 629, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (brackets in original) (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307-08, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991)). Such error is amenable to harmless-error analysis because it 'may ... be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine [the effect it had on the trial].'  Id. (ellipses and brackets in original) (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307-08, 111 S.Ct. 1246). Structural error is error affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310, 111 S.Ct. 1246. By its very nature, structural error def[ies] analysis by 'harmless-error' standards. Id. at 309, 111 S.Ct. 1246. 17 The Supreme Court has observed that classification of an error as structural, and therefore not subject to review for harmlessness, is the exception and not the rule. Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986). [I]f the defendant had counsel and was tried by an impartial adjudicator, there is a strong presumption that any other errors that may have occurred are subject to harmless-error analysis. Id. at 579, 106 S.Ct. 3101. 18 As noted earlier, Ake recognizes a constitutional right on the part of a criminal defendant to the assistance of a psychiatrist in two general circumstances: (1) when [the] defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, and (2) when the State presents psychiatric evidence of the defendant's future dangerousness during a capital sentencing hearing. Ake, 470 U.S. at 83, 105 S.Ct. 1087. In this case, as White himself concedes in his reply brief, we need only concern ourselves with the potential harmlessness of a trial court's error in denying a request for the assistance of a psychiatrist in developing a defense on the issue of future dangerousness during the punishment phase of trial because this was the only basis upon which White predicated his request for expert psychiatric assistance. 3 See Williams v. Collins, 989 F.2d 841, 844 n.10 (5th Cir.1993) (noting in dicta that, in evaluating an Ake claim, we should look only to the evidence before the trial judge at the time he ruled on the request for psychiatric assistance); Messer v. Kemp, 831 F.2d 946, 960 (11th Cir.1987) (en banc) (evaluating an Ake claim by examining the information before the trial judge when he denied the defendant's motion for the appointment of an independent psychiatrist). 19 White's motion requesting the appointment of a psychiatrist merely stated the following: 20 This case involves complex issues of fact. It is necessary for the defendant's counsel to have full access to an accurate knowledge of the facts involved in the case in order to render effective assistance to the defendant in the preparation and trial of this case. Such knowledge can come only through the concentrated efforts of an experienced psychiatrist. 21 During a pretrial hearing on this and other motions, White's counsel clarified the basis of his request for the appointment of a psychiatrist as follows: 22 Your Honor, its [sic] our feeling that the State is going to attempt to offer psychiatric testimony at the punishment phase of the case, if the punishment phase is reached, to bear on the question of how the jury will be [asked] by the State to answer the Special Issues which will be submitted to them on the punishment phase, if there is a punishment phase. 23 ... [I]t would be our position that the Defendant, in fairness, should be granted our own expert psychiatric witness who would examine the Defendant and come to some conclusions about his mental state and questions of future dangerousness in order to have a balanced view presented to the jury in the punishment phase, if there is a punishment phase. 24 Of course we would want to, and our motion is predicated upon the Court's cloaking the expert with the attorney/client privilege. 25 We have little difficulty concluding that the trial court's refusal to appoint an independent psychiatrist to examine White without disclosure to the state on the grounds White advanced in support of his request for such an appointment was trial error subject to harmless-error analysis if it in fact constituted error at all. White's right to the assistance of a psychiatrist in this case was predicated upon the fact that the state intended to, and did, introduce psychiatric testimony regarding future dangerousness. Absent such testimony by the state, White would have had no constitutional right under Ake to the appointment of a psychiatrist. Thus, if the state's admission of psychiatric testimony is subject to harmless-error analysis, then the purported Ake error is likewise subject to harmless-error analysis. 26 The Supreme Court has held that the erroneous admission of psychiatric testimony is subject to harmless-error analysis. See Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 257-58, 108 S.Ct. 1792, 100 L.Ed.2d 284 (1988); see also Brown v. Butler, 876 F.2d 427, 430-31 (5th Cir.1989). Such error constitutes trial error because the effect of the erroneous admission of evidence is generally capable of being quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine [the effect it had on the trial]. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307-08, 111 S.Ct. 1246. Therefore, we conclude that Ake error of the type alleged by White likewise constitutes trial error and is therefore subject to harmless-error analysis. 27 White argues, however, that the effect of the purported Ake error in this case was greater than the effect of the mere erroneous admission of psychiatric testimony offered by the state and that the purported error therefore constitutes structural error. In support of this contention, White argues that he was entitled to the appointment of a psychiatrist based solely upon the fact that his future dangerousness was a significant issue during the punishment phase of his trial. He therefore contends that he was entitled to the assistance of a psychiatrist regardless of whether the state offered psychiatric evidence of future dangerousness and thus that the impact of the court's purported error was much broader than the admission of the state's psychiatric evidence, encompassing the more-difficult-to-quantify assistance that a psychiatrist could have provided in preparing White's defense. 28 At the core of White's argument is a contention that all Texas capital defendants are entitled to the appointment of a psychiatrist because their future dangerousness will always be a significant factor during the punishment phase of trial. This is so because, under Texas's capital sentencing scheme, both at present and at the time of White's trial, imposition of the death penalty requires that the state prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. § 37.071 (Vernon & Supp.1998). However, we recently rejected this contention in Goodwin v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 162 (5th Cir.1997). There, we explained, 29 In Ake, the Court indicated that the due process entitlement to the assistance of a psychiatrist when the state presents psychiatric evidence of future dangerousness is predicated upon the notion that psychiatric testimony offered on behalf of the defendant is uniquely capable of uncover[ing], recogniz[ing], and tak[ing] account of ... shortcomings in predictions' made by the state's psychiatrists. 30 Id. at 188-89 (brackets in original) (quoting Ake, 470 U.S. at 84, 105 S.Ct. 1087). We further noted, and reiterate here, that [i]t is simply not the case that ... nonpsychiatric evidence of future dangerousness ..., such as [the defendant's] criminal history and [statements by the defendant indicating a lack of remorse], are uniquely capable of being rebutted only by psychiatric testimony. Id. at 189. 31 We acknowledged in Goodwin that a few other circuits have adopted a more expansive reading of Ake, holding that a defendant may be entitled to the appointment of a psychiatrist in some circumstances in which the state offers only nonpsychiatric evidence of future dangerousness. See id. (citing Clisby v. Jones, 960 F.2d 925, 929 n.7 (11th Cir.1992), and Liles v. Saffle, 945 F.2d 333, 34041 (10th Cir.1991)). However, even under the expansive reading of Ake adopted by these circuits, a defendant must establish that his mental condition could have been a significant mitigating factor. Liles, 945 F.2d at 341; see also Clisby, 960 F.2d at 929 (Ake requires a state to provide the capital defendant with such access to a competent psychiatrist upon a preliminary showing to the trial court that the defendant's mental status is to be a significant factor at sentencing.). As was the case in Goodwin, White made no such showing to the trial court. See Goodwin, 132 F.3d at 189-90. The conclusory allegation contained in White's motion for the appointment of a psychiatrist that such an appointment [was] necessary for [White's] counsel to have full access to an accurate knowledge of the facts involved in the case was insufficient of itself to demonstrate White's entitlement to the appointment of a psychiatrist. See Volanty v. Lynaugh, 874 F.2d 243, 245-47 (5th Cir.1989) (holding that a motion for the appointment of a psychiatric expert based on an allegation that the defendant was temporarily insane at the time of the offense as a result of drug use was insufficient to support an Ake claim absent additional supporting evidence); Volson, 794 F.2d at 176 (holding that an attorney's conclusional allegation that his client was unable to understand the difference between right and wrong at the time of the offense was insufficient to entitle him to the appointment of a psychiatrist under Ake). Further, when asked by the trial court to clarify the basis on which he sought the appointment of a psychiatrist, White merely stated that he was entitled to the appointment of a psychiatrist based on the fact that the state intended to present psychiatric evidence and made no additional factual showing evidencing his entitlement to the appointment of a psychiatrist on any other basis. 32 Because White did not make a showing to the trial court that he was entitled to expert psychiatric assistance on any basis other than the fact that the state intended to present psychiatric evidence regarding his future dangerousness, he had no right to the assistance of a psychiatrist but for the state's offering psychiatric evidence regarding his future dangerousness. See Williams, 989 F.2d at 844 n.10; Messer, 831 F.2d at 960; cf. Ake, 470 U.S. at 83, 105 S.Ct. 1087 (noting that an indigent defendant has a constitutional right to the appointment of a psychiatrist when the defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial (emphasis added)). Thus, assuming that the trial court committed Ake error by (1) conditioning the appointment of a psychiatrist on White's submission to a mental examination and state access to the results thereof and (2) allowing the state to present psychiatric evidence, such error would have been cured had the court simply precluded the state from admitting psychiatric evidence. As noted earlier, the erroneous admission of psychiatric evidence during a capital sentencing hearing is subject to harmless-error analysis. See Satterwhite, 486 U.S. at 257-58, 108 S.Ct. 1792. We therefore proceed to a determination of whether the admission of such evidence was harmless in this case. 2. Harmlessness of the alleged Ake error 33 White's Ake claim is before us in the context of a collateral attack on a final state judgment of conviction and sentence. Interests of comity and federalism, as well as the State's interest in the finality of convictions that have survived direct review within the state court system mandate that the alleged Ake error does not entitle White to habeas relief unless it  'had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.'  Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623, 635, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946)). We conclude that it did not. 34 During the penalty phase of White's trial, the state's psychiatric evidence consisted of the testimony of Dr. Ronald Markman, who testified on the basis of a hypothetical scenario predicated upon the evidence adduced during both the guilt and punishment phases of White's trial, that a person who had engaged in the type of violent criminal activity in which the evidence indicated White had engaged has an antisocial personality disorder and poses a risk of future dangerousness. Specifically, Dr. Markman testified as follows during direct examination: 35 Q: Okay if you were going to use a one to ten scale of sociopaths, because you indicated there are some people that actually meet the diagnostic criteria that are actually functioning in our society without being criminals, and one being the mildest form of antisocial personality disorder, mildest towards society, and ten being the extremest [sic] form of antisocial personality where would you place the individual in our hypothetical question? 36 A: In the 9 or 10 area. 37 Q: Extreme end [of] the spectrum? 38 A: That's right. 39 Q: Is such a person dangerous? 40 A: In the presence of past dangerous activity, the answer is yes. 41 Q: Okay, at least if you were to cut off your inquiry in 1974, let's just go back 13 years in time and you are sitting here and we are all sitting here, was that person dangerous in 1974? 42 A: Clearly, yes. 43 Q: How dangerous? 44 A: Dangerous to the point that he would have to be segregated in order to make the society safe. 45 Q: Something would have to be done to protect society from him? 46 A: That's right. 47 Q: Now you have indicated that there is no cure; is that correct? 48 A: Nothing that could alter the behavioral pattern, no. Not at this time. 49 ... 50 Q: ... I am going to ask you whether or not you have an opinion, based upon reasonable medical certainty, as to whether or not there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society right now? 51 ... 52 A: In my [o]pinion, with the information at hand, it suggests a high possibility of recidivistic activity, and, therefore, would qualify as being dangerous to society at large. 53 Q: You consider it probabl[e] that that person would commit criminal acts of violence in the future? 54 ... 55 A: Yes. 56 During closing argument, counsel for the state focused to some degree upon Dr. Markman's testimony, particularly Dr. Markman's quantification of White's degree of sociopathy. Additionally, counsel for the state noted that Dr. Markman's testimony was unrefuted and that White could have put on psychiatric evidence of his own had he chosen to do so. 57 Assuming that the trial court's refusal to appoint a psychiatrist to examine White privately rendered the admission of Dr. Markman's testimony error, we cannot conclude that such error had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury's answers to the special issues presented pursuant to article 37.071 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Prior to Dr. Markman's testimony, the jury heard a tremendous amount of additional non-psychiatric evidence that, in all likelihood, rendered Dr. Markman's medical opinion that White posed a threat of future dangerousness a foregone conclusion in the minds of the jurors. 58 During the guilt phase of White's trial, Gerald Kunkle, a former deputy sheriff of Collin County and one of the law enforcement officers responsible for transporting White back to Texas after he surrendered to law enforcement authorities in Mississippi, testified that during the trip back to Texas, White indicated that he felt no remorse for his killings. He further testified that when he asked White how he felt about the Hill Top Grocery murders, White responded that they were [j]ust like stepping on a fly. 59 At the punishment phase of White's trial, Glenda McFadden, to whom White was married in the early 1970s, testified that White beat her and threatened to kill her. She also testified that she witnessed him beating another of his former wives who was in her third trimester of pregnancy at the time. Ira Lee Bragg testified that, on September 22, 1972, White invited him into White's apartment for a beer and that, while he and a few others were talking amicably, White approached him from behind and, without provocation, cut his throat with a hunting knife. 60 The jury heard considerable evidence of White's murder of Roy Perryman, including White's detailed confession thereto. Johnny White, White's cousin, testified that, after arriving at his home in Mississippi following the Hill Top Grocery murders, White told him that he had killed Perryman because [h]e had been dreaming of killing somebody, and he wanted to kill him to see how it was. Howard Alford, a Texas Ranger who was one of the law enforcement officers who transported White from Mississippi back to Texas after his surrender, testified that during his confession to the murder of Perryman, White seemed proud of what he had done. 61 Johnny White further testified that, when White came to his home after the Hill Top Grocery murders, White told him that he wished to kill a local Mississippi justice of the peace known as Judge Micky because she had convicted him of driving while intoxicated the previous year. He further testified that, based upon his contact with White even before the Hill Top Grocery murders, he was of the opinion that White is a threat and always will be. Michael LaRue, a former Waco police officer, also testified that White's reputation for being a peaceable and law-abiding citizen was bad and that he also had a reputation for violence. 62 Additionally, the state introduced a letter that White wrote to his wife in December 1986, which stated in part the following: 63 Margaret you have told me several times that you don't want to be married anymore. For a good long while I thought you really wanted to be free from me, but now I don't think that's what you want at all. I think you still love me and want us to remain married; but you also want to be able to live with that other dude out there or write to someone else in here without me knowing it, or just don't think I'll do anything about it one. You better think again Margaret, because I'm not about to share you with anyone, and if you keep fucking around, you gonna end up getting someone hurt real bad woman. And that include here or when I get out and come to Montana. Because if you are still married to me when I get out of here, I'm coming to Montana and taking what is mine, and you are mine as long as you are married to me. And if you are fucking around with someone here behind my back, someone is just before getting hurt because no man in prison will let another prisoner come between him and his wife and get by with it. 64 ... 65 P.S. Margaret its very dangerous to play around with someone's wife and love life and future, and its equal as dangerous to deprive a man of what is his concerning financial help when that man is in prison depending wholy [sic] on his wife for the help he gets and needs. You might should pass that message on to the son of a bitch that split us up, because he's playing a dangerous fucking game, and it could very easy cost him dearly. More than he wants to pay too. I do know one thing he took everything away from me, even my love and joy when he came between us, and I'm not going to forget that very easy. So tell him I said walk slow and watch out for shadows in the dark, because shadows can creep up when he's least expecting them!!!!!!!! Do you catch my drift Margaret? Your Husband Love Excell 66 Dawn Apolito, one of the detention officers responsible for White's custody during his trial, also testified that White threatened Johnny White during a recess after Johnny White had testified against him. She testified that White seemed extremely tense and that he stated to her, I guess you could see what I wanted to do back there. He then said, That's all right, I'll get that son-of-a-bitch. 67 In light of the tremendous amount of evidence indicating White's propensity for violence, we are convinced that it is highly unlikely that Dr. Markman's testimony swayed the jury in its answer to the second special issue under article 37.071 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that Dr. Markman acknowledged during cross-examination that the psychiatric profession is sharply divided by disagreement as to whether past behavior is predictive of future dangerousness. He further stated that dangerous behavior by persons with antisocial personality disorders decreases significantly with age because individuals begin to run out of energy as they reach their fifth and sixth decades. At the time of his second trial, White was forty-nine years old and thus well into his fifth decade. Based on the foregoing, we are confident that, if the trial court erred in admitting Dr. Markman's testimony, such error did not have a substantial and injurious effect upon the jury's answers to the special issues presented to it during the punishment phase. 68 White argues, however, that the purported Ake error in this case was not harmless because, had a psychiatrist been appointed to assist him, he may have been able to more fully develop a defense both in regard to the mens rea element of capital murder and the two special issues that the state sought to establish during sentencing. Specifically, White offers the affidavit of Dr. George Woods, which states his medical opinion that White suffered from a toxic delirium at the time of the offense and that it is highly probable that [ ] White suffered from an organic brain disorder at the time of the offense. However, as demonstrated in Part III.A.1, supra, Dr. Woods's affidavit has no impact upon our harmless-error analysis because White did not request the appointment of a psychiatrist on any ground independent of the fact that the state intended to offer psychological evidence of future dangerousness. White's trial counsel did not bring to the attention of the trial court any facts that would have evidenced the existence of a mental disorder that may have warranted the appointment of a psychiatrist to assist White. As indicated supra, if the trial court erred at all in declining to appoint White an independent psychiatrist, it erred in declining to appoint one on the basis that the state intended to offer psychiatric evidence of future dangerousness; it did not err in declining to appoint an expert on any other basis because White did not ask for the appointment of a psychiatrist on any other basis. See Williams, 989 F.2d at 844 n.10; Messer v. Kemp, 831 F.2d at 960. Because we conclude that Dr. Markman's testimony did not have a substantial and injurious effect on the jury's answers to the special issues presented to them pursuant to article 37.071 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, any Ake error that occurred in this case was harmless. The district court therefore properly denied White's request for habeas relief on the basis of the alleged Ake error.