Opinion ID: 211635
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: We have previously recognized that “‘it is well-established that an oral settlement agreement is binding on the parties, particularly when the terms are memorialized into the record.’” Tiburzi, 269 F.3d at 1351 (quoting Sargent v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 229 F.3d 1088, 1090 (Fed. Cir. 2000) and citing Goodwin v. Dep’t of Treasury, 983 F.2d 226, 228 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (noting that an oral settlement agreement “was valid 05-3137 3 and binding on the parties”)). Barkett concedes that he did enter into a settlement agreement with the Agency, and he does not dispute the finding that he was in noncompliance with the settlement agreement. Barkett, however, continues to maintain that the Agency is in noncompliance with the settlement agreement. Specifically, Barkett argues on appeal that the Agency (1) did not implement the settlement agreement because it delayed signing the written document thereby deferring his ability to benefit from the settlement agreement; and (2) violated the settlement agreement by providing information to others. We find these arguments unpersuasive. Although the settlement agreement binds the Agency to certain obligations, the settlement agreement provides no time frame for the Agency to implement these obligations. The Agency implemented all but one of these obligations by March 1, 2004, prior to the Administrative Judge’s decision denying the petition to enforce the settlement agreement. Initial Decision at 5. As for the sole obligation that the Agency had not implemented by March 1, 2004, namely that the Agency process Barkett’s resignation paperwork, the Board found that the Agency’s failure to implement this obligation did not breach the settlement agreement and, even if it did, there was no additional relief the Board could grant to Barkett due Barkett’s failure to submit the SF52 form. Thus, the Board held that Barkett failed to establish that the Agency breached the settlement agreement. Given that the settlement agreement does not specify a time frame within which the Agency must implement its obligations, any delay on the part of the Agency in fulfilling these obligations cannot constitute a breach of the settlement agreement. See Kasarsky v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd. 296 F.3d 1331, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (where no time for performance is specified, a delay in the performance of a contractual duty does not 05-3137 4 amount to a breach unless it rises to repudiation, which entails a statement or “voluntary affirmative act” indicating that the promisor will commit a breach) (citations omitted). Because the Agency could not process Barkett’s SF-52 form until such time as Barkett signed and submitted the form to the Agency, and because the Agency implemented all other obligations by March 1, 2004, the Board’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and is in accordance with law. We also reject Barkett’s argument that the Agency violated the settlement agreement by providing information to others. Barkett alleges that the Agency violated the settlement agreement when Mark Menefee, Barkett’s supervisor for employment history purposes, responded to an employment inquiry by stating that Barkett was on leave without pay status until March 15, 2004. Initial Decision at 5. Paragraph 3d of the settlement agreement, the only paragraph regarding limitations on the disclosure of information related to Barkett’s removal, provides: If the Agency’s ITA Office of Human Resources Management is contacted for an employment reference, it will provide the following information: the title, series, grade and salary of Appellant’s last position with the Agency, no performance appraisal was conducted, and that Appellant voluntarily resigned effective March 15, 2004 or earlier. Consistent with prior precedent, we construe this provision strictly and according to its express terms. See generally Godwin v. Dep’t of Def., 228 F.3d 1332, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (discussing differences in confidentiality provisions and holding that, because an agency’s misrepresentation of its true views as to the employee's performance deceives prospective employers who are relying on the agency for an accurate recommendation, the court will not readily construe agreements to require an agency to deceive prospective employers but instead will construe such agreements strictly according to 05-3137 5 their terms). Paragraph 3d does not expressly require the Agency to refrain from disclosing truthful information regarding Barkett’s leave without pay status. Moreover, the Board found as a fact, and the evidence supports that finding, that the Agency’s disclosure regarding Barkett’s status was accurate. Initial Decision at 5. Because Barkett has failed to establish reversible error in the Board’s decision, we reject this argument.