Opinion ID: 2470930
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Application of the Strong-Basis-in-Evidence Standard

Text: Under the strong-basis-in-evidence standard, the City Defendants need to show three things in order to avail themselves of the defense the Supreme Court recognized in Ricci: (1) that they were faced with a prima facie (or, potentially, a strong basis in evidence of a prima facie case) of disparate impact; [59] (2) a strong basis in evidence that either the challenged employment practice was not job-related or there was a less discriminatory alternative to the practice; and (3) a strong basis in evidence that each Offeree was a victim of the challenged practice and received no more than make-whole relief. This showing needs to be made separately for each of the challenged employment practicestesting and recruiting. [60] The district courtunderstandably, as it decided this case before Ricci erred in its Title VII analysis in several respects. First, the district court applied the affirmative action framework of Johnson and Weber, and therefore required for Title VII purposes only a manifest imbalance instead of a prima facie case of disparate impact. Second, the district court failed to require of the City Defendants a strong basis in evidenceor, for that matter, any evidence at alleither of non-job-relatedness or a less discriminatory alternative. Third, the district court held that no showing concerning victimhood was required to justify the awards of transfer and TCA seniority, but that a showing of actual victimhood was required for layoff seniority. For all of these aspects of competitive seniority, the court should, instead, have required a strong basis in evidence of victimhood. Accordingly, and as further described in the discussion below, we remand for the district court to apply this correct standard in the first instance.

Before the district court, it was undisputed that the City Defendants were faced with a prima facie case of disparate-impact testing discrimination for all three of the challenged exams, except that the Brennan Plaintiffs questioned whether there was a prima facie case that Exam 8206 had a disparate impact on Hispanics. See NYC Board III, 448 F.Supp.2d at 425-27. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court found that such a prima facie case had been made out. See NYC Board IV, 487 F.Supp.2d at 224-32. The Brennan Plaintiffs have not appealed that determination. Accordingly, there is no reason for the district court to revisit it on remand.
The district court held that the City Defendants were not faced with a prima facie case of disparate-impact recruiting discrimination, reasoning that although the Government had shown a disparity between the expected and actual numbers of female and minority test-takers, there was no evidence connecting the ... disparity to the Board's recruiting practices, a causal link not established by the statistical evidence presented in support of the recruiting claim. NYC Board IV, 487 F.Supp.2d at 234; see also NYC Board III, 448 F.Supp.2d at 446 n. 57. The question of whether the district court erred in this respect is complicated. The Government, for example, wishes to argue to that court that it did. Because the court below reached its decision on this issue before Ricci, and because Ricci raises a question regarding the proper standard to apply, we think it appropriate to remand this issue for further consideration in the light of the still-to-be-determined Ricci standard. We note in particular that even if there was not an actual prima facie case of disparate impact recruiting liability, Ricci mightbut does not necessarilypermit a showing that the City Defendants had a strong basis in evidence of such a prima facie case. See supra Part V.A.1. Whether such a strong basis in evidence would suffice remains an open question. But the district court need not reach or decide this question if it finds that the City Defendants lacked even a strong basis in evidence of a prima facie case of recruiting discrimination. At the same time, we reject the Brennan Plaintiffs' contention that the City Defendants' allegedly discriminatory recruiting practicesword-of-mouth recruiting, and limited advertisingare not prohibited by Title VII even if they cause a disparate impact. Like the other courts that have addressed similar arguments, we are unpersuaded. As the Sixth Circuit has stated, the assertion that disparate impact analysis is inapplicable to ... recruiting practices is plainly incorrect. The very purpose of Title VII's disparate impact theory is to eradicate barriers which discriminate on the basis of race, gender, religion, and other protected classifications. United States v. City of Warren, 138 F.3d 1083, 1094 (6th Cir.1998) (quotations, modifications, and footnote omitted); see also Thomas v. Wash. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 915 F.2d 922, 924-26 (4th Cir.1990) (a school board violated Title VII through a combination of nepotism, word-of-mouth recruiting, and the general practice of posting notice of vacancies only in the schools, where minorities were unlikely to see them); United States v. Ga. Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 925 (5th Cir.1973) (Word-of-mouth hiring and interviewing for recruitment only at particular scholastic institutions are practices that are neutral on their face. However, under the facts of the instant case, each operates as a `built-in-headwind' to blacks....). In addition, this court, many years ago, concluded that a prima facie case of disparate impact existed based on subjective word-of-mouth hiring methods. See Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 635 F.2d 1007, 1016 (2d Cir.1980). The Brennan Plaintiffs do not deny that recruitment practices qualify as employment practices. Their argument is, essentially, that § 703(a)(2), which makes it illegal for an employer to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities, does not refer to recruiting, because people who don't even apply for a job because of recruiting discrimination are not applicants for employment. But, as the Government says, the Supreme Court has all but held that applicants includes potential applicants in the § 703(a)(2) disparate-impact context. See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 651 & n. 7, 109 S.Ct. 2115 (suggesting that a prima facie case of disparate impact would be made out if it were found that [a] dearth of qualified nonwhite applicants was due to practices on [an employer's] part which expressly or implicitlydeterred minority group members from applying for ... positions.); see also Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330, 97 S.Ct. 2720, 53 L.Ed.2d 786 (1977). [61] Accordingly, we make explicit what may have only been implicit in our decision in Grant and hold that potential applicants for employment are applicants for employment for § 703(a)(2) purposes. [62]
The next component of the Ricci strong-basis-in-evidence standard requires that the employer show, for each disputed employment practice, a strong basis in evidence either that the practice was not job-related or that there was a less discriminatory alternative to that practice. See Ricci, 129 S.Ct. at 2678. The district court considered evidence concerning job-relatedness and less discriminatory alternatives neither for the challenged exams, nor for the recruiting practices. See NYC Board III, 448 F.Supp.2d at 426 n. 37. On remand, the district court should determine whether the City Defendants had a strong basis in evidence that each of the three challenged exams was not job-related or had a less discriminatory alternative. [63] See supra Part V.A.1. Whether the district court needs to make such a determination with respect to the two challenged recruiting practices depends on whether the recruiting defense survives the initial, prima facie case/strong-basis-in-evidence of prima facie case, step of the Ricci inquiry.
Next, the district court must determine whether the City Defendants had a strong basis in evidence that their race- and gender-conscious actions were necessary to avoid disparate impact liability. See Ricci, 129 S.Ct. at 2677; supra Part V.A.2. As we have explained, that means the City Defendants must have had, at the time they took their race- and gender-conscious actions, a strong basis in evidence that each Offeree was an actual victim of discrimination who received no more than make-whole relief, i.e., a strong basis in evidence that, in such a disparate impact suit, he or she would have been entitled to receive, by a court order pursuant to § 706(g) of Title VII, the race- or sex-conscious relief that he or she received from the City Defendants through the voluntary settlement agreement. The district court's decision as to job-relatedness and less discriminatory alternatives will affect this step in several important ways. First, if there was no strong basis in evidence that any of the challenged testing and recruiting practices were either not job-related or that there was a less discriminatory alternative to them, then the district court need not make any determinations as to particular Offerees. [64] The Brennan Plaintiffs would then have successfully shown that implementation of the settlement agreement as a whole made the City Defendants liable for reverse discrimination, under § 703(a) of Title VII. That is so because an employer cannot have a strong basis in evidence that anyone is a victim of discrimination if there is no strong basis in evidence that discrimination has occurred. Second, and for the same reason, if the City Defendants can show a strong basis in evidence of non-job-relatedness or of a less discriminatory alternative as to one or more of the challenged employment practices, but not as to others, then the City Defendants have violated § 703(a) to the extent they have given relief to Offerees for whom there was no strong basis in evidence that such Offerees were victims of the practice or practices for which there was a strong basis in evidence of non-job-relatedness or of a less discriminatory alternative. For example, if the City Defendants had a strong basis in evidence that their tests were not job-related, but they lacked a strong basis in evidence that their recruiting practices were neither job-related nor that there existed a less discriminatory alternative to these recruiting practices (or could not make out a prima facie/ strong-basis-in-evidence of a prima facie showing of recruiting discrimination), then the City Defendants would, for each Offeree, have to show a strong basis in evidence that that Offeree was a victim of testing discrimination. Essentially, the City Defendants would be required to show a strong basis in evidence that the Offeree took the test, or that the Offeree could successfully have undertake[n] [his or her] difficult task of proving that [he or she] should be treated as [an] applicant[ ] and therefore [is] presumptively entitled to relief accordingly under § 706(g). See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 364, 97 S.Ct. 1843. [65] Third, if the district court does find a strong basis in evidence of disparate-impact liability, the appropriate extent of relief the City Defendants could have given each Offeree without violating § 703(a) turns on which theorynon-job-relatedness or a less discriminatory alternative supports the district court's determination. If the Government successfully shows on remand, as it hopes to, that there was a strong basis in evidence that the provisional hiring process was a less discriminatory alternative to a particular hiring practice, then it follows that any Offeree, as to whom there is a strong basis in evidence that the Offeree was a victim of that particular discriminatory practice, properly received retroactive seniority to his or her provisional hiring date. For if an Offeree was hired under the provisional hiring process and that process was a less discriminatory alternative, then there is a strong basis in evidence that that Offeree would have received a permanent appointment if the City Defendants had used the less discriminatory alternative instead. Alternatively, if there was a strong basis in evidence that an employment practice that had a disparate impact discriminated only because it was not job-related, it becomes much more difficult for the district court to determine how much retroactive seniority the City Defendants could properly give each Offeree without violating § 703(a). Suppose, for example, that the challenged tests were discriminatory; it is nigh-impossible to tell exactly when (if at all) an Offeree would have been hired if the test had not been discriminatory. In that hypothetical world, some Offerees might have passed with flying colors and would then have been the first to be hired from the eligibility lists; others might have found themselves in the middle of the eligibility lists; and still others might still have failed, or might have passed with such a low score that they would have been placed near the bottom of the eligibility lists, where they probably would never have been hired. And, those who passed a test might have been rejected at the interview stage (which is not here being challenged as discriminatory), once or twice, thus having their employment delayed; or three times, resulting in removal from the eligibility list. Finally, they might have failed the experience papers stage, and then they might or might not have succeeded in having that decision overturned on administrative appeal. To say the least, [t]he task remaining for the District Court on remand will not be a simple one. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 371, 97 S.Ct. 1843. Th[e] process of recreating the past will necessarily involve a degree of approximation and imprecision. Id. at 372, 97 S.Ct. 1843. Recreating the past is difficult in the § 706(g) context addressed in Teamsters. It is even more difficult when an employer undertakes voluntary remedial action that is challenged under Ricci and § 703(a). In the § 706(g) context, a court necessarily has already found an actual violation of Title VII. See id. at 361-62, 97 S.Ct. 1843. All the court has then to do is to determine who is an actual victim of that discrimination, and `recreate the conditions and relationships that would have been had there been no' unlawful discrimination, id. at 372, 97 S.Ct. 1843 (quoting Franks, 424 U.S. at 769, 96 S.Ct. 1251). That process is not easy, because there may be more victims of discrimination than there are vacancies that were discriminatorily refused to them, and their interests must be balanced against the legitimate expectations of other employees innocent of any wrongdoing. Id. But when an employer undertakes voluntary action to remedy an unintentional disparate impact, the employer has not proven, and does not need to prove, that it has actually violated Title VII. Ricci, 129 S.Ct. at 2674. Instead, the employer must have a strong basis in evidence that it would be liable in a disparate-impact suit unless it took the race- or gender-conscious action. See id. at 2675-76. Once an employer has a strong basis in evidence that it faces disparate-impact liability, the employer must also undertake a recreation of the past that is supported by a strong basis in evidence. Where, as here, incumbent employees subsequently bring a § 703(a) challenge to the employer's race- or gender-conscious action, the court must determine whether there really was a strong basis in evidence to support the employer's recreation of the past. [66] That is a very difficult project indeed. It is one that only a district court can undertake, and whose difficulty should serve to caution any appellate court attempting to review the district court's conclusions.