Opinion ID: 2962682
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Denial of Davis's Waiver Petition

Text: Davis argues that both the IJ and the BIA erred in denying his waiver petition. His argument appears to take two forms: first, that the IJ violated Davis's due process rights when it refused to allow Davis's counsel to use Davis's passport to refresh his recollection but allowed DHS to introduce the three unsworn statements from Woodley; and second, that he presented sufficient evidence to establish a bona fide marriage to Woodley. We address -- and reject -- each in turn. -15- Where the BIA adopts the IJ's opinion and discusses some of the bases for the IJ's decision, we have authority to review both opinions. Jing Lin v. Holder, 759 F.3d 110, 112 (1st Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). We review the factual findings under the quite deferential substantial evidence standard. Id. (quoting Kinisu v. Holder, 721 F.3d 29, 34 (1st Cir. 2013)). This means that we will uphold the decisions if they are supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole, Acevedo-Aguilar v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 8, 9 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Carcamo-Recinos v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 253, 256 (1st Cir. 2004)), and will only disturb the findings where the record evidence would compel a reasonable factfinder to reach a contrary determination. Jing Lin, 759 F.3d at 112 (quoting Kinisu, 721 F.3d at 34). Conclusions of law, meanwhile, are reviewed de novo but with some deference to the agency's founded interpretation of statutes and regulations that it administers. McKenzie-Francisco v. Holder, 662 F.3d 584, 586 (1st Cir. 2011). Davis first argues that his due process rights were violated. An immigration petitioner's right to due process entails, at its core, the right to notice of the nature of the charges and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Choeum v. INS, 129 F.3d 29, 38 (1st Cir. 1997). In other words, an alien is entitled to a fundamentally fair proceeding where the alien must -16- have a meaningful opportunity to present evidence and be heard by an impartial judge. Muñoz-Monsalve v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2008); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B). The right to present evidence is not unlimited, however, and [a]n immigration judge, like other judicial officers, possesses broad (though not uncabined) discretion over the conduct of trial proceedings. Sharari v. Gonzáles, 407 F.3d 467, 476 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting Aguilar-Solís v. INS, 168 F.3d 565, 568 (1st Cir. 1999)). This necessarily includes the admission or exclusion of evidence. Thus, to prove a violation of an alien's due process rights, the alien must show that the admission or exclusion was an abuse of the IJ's discretion and that the alien was prejudiced as a result. Id. Here, we find no due process violation with the IJ's refusal to allow Davis's counsel to use the passport. After Davis's conflicting and inconsistent testimony, Davis's counsel sought to use the passport to refresh Davis's recollection. DHS objected and the IJ sustained the objection for two separate reasons.5 We fail to see how either ruling was an abuse of discretion or how it meaningfully prevented Davis from presenting evidence to support his position since Davis did not seek to introduce the passport into evidence. See Muñoz-Monsalve, 551 F.3d 5 Notably, Davis's counsel never offered to show the passport to DHS to attempt to overcome the second objection. -17- at 6 (explaining that due process requires that an alien have a meaningful opportunity to present evidence). Moreover, the IJ's decision did not prejudice Davis. The IJ based its decision in part on the fact that Davis gave inconsistent testimony and was not able to recall key visits with Woodley -- dates that, in the IJ's view, should have been readily known by Davis if they actually occurred as he described. Thus, regardless of what dates Davis testified to after reviewing the passport, the IJ's view as to Davis's credibility would not likely have changed. The IJ's decision, therefore, did not deprive Davis of a fair trial. See Sharari, 407 F.3d at 476 (explaining that an alien must be prejudiced for the exclusion of evidence to be a due process violation). Similarly, we reject Davis's argument that his due process rights were violated because the IJ admitted a letter from Woodley stating that the marriage was a fraud and two documents showing that Woodley twice attempted to withdraw the visa petitions even though they were unsworn and had not been previously submitted to the IJ and Davis. Davis never objected to the fact that they had not been previously submitted to the IJ or that he had not had a chance to review them, and thus any argument that this violated his due process rights is not properly before us. See Olujoke v. Gonzáles, 411 F.3d 16, 22-23 (1st Cir. 2005); Chan v. Ashcroft, 93 F. App'x 247, 252-53 (1st Cir. 2004); Mendes v. INS, 197 F.3d 6, 12 -18- (1st Cir. 1999) (This Court has long acknowledged that the doctrine of administrative exhaustion bars issues 'raised for the first time in a petition for review.' (quoting Bernal-Vallejo v. INS, 195 F.3d 56, 64 (1st Cir. 1999))). As for the fact that the letters were unsworn, and thus unauthenticated, the IJ did not abuse its discretion in admitting them. The Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply to immigration proceedings, so any authentication and hearsay requirements are less rigid. See Yongo v. INS, 355 F.3d 27, 30 (1st Cir. 2004); see also Sharari, 407 F.3d at 476 (finding that an immigration judge possesses broad discretion over trial proceedings, including the admission of evidence). While [h]ighly unreliable hearsay might raise due process problems, id., there is nothing to suggest that that is the case here. Indeed, the IJ specifically noted that it would take into account the fact they were not notarized or authenticated when it decided how much evidentiary weight to give the document. This decision is consistent with the IJ's stated treatment of the unsworn and undated letters submitted by Davis in support of his petition, so we fail to see how this treatment was fundamentally unfair to Davis. Thus, there is no due process violation. Having rejected Davis's due process allegations, we can turn to the real heart of his argument: that his waiver should have been granted because his marriage to Woodley was bona fide. His -19- challenge, however, essentially boils down to a disagreement with how the IJ and the BIA weighed the competing evidence, and we find ample support in the record to support the IJ and the BIA determinations that Davis's marriage to Woodley was not contracted in good faith. Davis was the only witness to testify at the hearing, and though neither the IJ nor the BIA made a formal adverse credibility determination, there is substantial evidence to support the conclusion that there were serious doubts about Davis's credibility. For example, Davis was unable to accurately describe his and Woodley's visits to each other both before and after they were married. Davis testified that he and Woodley visited each other multiple times between when he first met her in Jamaica in August 2006 and when they were wed in April 2007, but he was unable to pinpoint when or where those trips took place. And though he did testify about a Thanksgiving trip prior to his marriage, this trip could not have occurred consistent with his testimony, since he also testified that he did not visit Woodley in the United States until the April 2007 trip when they wed. Even more damning, however, is the fact that Davis was unable to explain to the IJ why he told the Consulate in November 2007 that he was single and visiting Nadine Woodley despite being married to Woodley for seven months at the time. See Chanthou Hem v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 67, 69 (1st Cir. 2008) (In evaluating the -20- agency's credibility determination, we consider whether the reasons given by the IJ are specific and cogent and based on omissions and discrepancies in the record that were not adequately explained by the alien.). Given these inconsistencies, it is not surprising that the IJ and the BIA concluded that the lack of corroborating evidence cast further doubt on Davis's credibility -- especially since there were no other witnesses to testify about Davis and Woodley's relationship and such documentation should have been readily available to Davis. See Kheireddine v. Gonzáles, 427 F.3d 80, 88 (1st Cir. 2005) (Nothing in Matter of S-M-J-[, 21 I. & N. Dec. 722 (BIA 1997),] precluded the IJ from deeming already not credible petitioners even less credible when they failed to back up their claims with information reasonably available.); Matter of Y- B-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 1136, 1139 (BIA 1998) ([T]he weaker an alien's testimony, the greater the need for corroborative evidence.). For example, Davis testified that he spoke and emailed with Woodley every day prior to their marriage and that their communications increased after their marriage, yet he failed to provide any telephone or email records to the IJ. Similarly, Davis failed to provide any evidence of commingled accounts. Though Davis did provide copies of credit cards, debit cards, and health insurance cards issued in both his and Woodley's names, he submitted no bank statements or receipts to suggest that the cards were actually used -21- or that Davis and Woodley's finances were actually joined. And while Davis claimed that he sought counseling due to his somewhat severe marital troubles, there is no evidence that he and Woodley actually met with a pastor; to the contrary, the evidence suggested that Davis and Woodley attended an interview with immigration services and described their relationship as good. All of this evidence (or lack thereof) is relevant to the bona fides of Davis's marriage, and the IJ and the BIA were correct to consider it.6 Compare McKenzie-Francisco, 662 F.3d at 587 n.2 (noting that a 6 Though Davis did provide additional documentation in his appeal before the BIA, the BIA refused to accept it, explaining that the Board does not review evidence first presented on appeal, that Davis had not shown that any of this evidence was not available at the time of his hearing, and that Davis failed to show that the evidence is material to his application and will likely change the outcome of his case. Davis does not challenge this ruling in his petition, and thus it is waived. Ouk v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 63, 66 n.3 (1st Cir. 2007) (Because [petitioner] did not raise the issue in his opening brief . . . it is deemed waived.). Still, we note that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in rejecting these additional documents. See Olujoke, 411 F.3d at 23 (explaining that a BIA decision to reopen proceedings and consider new evidence is discretionary). None of the evidence Davis ultimately produced was unavailable at the time of Davis's initial hearing, and even if it were, it would not compel a reasonable factfinder to make a contrary determination. Acevedo-Aguilar, 517 F.3d at 9 (quoting Stroni v. González, 454 F.3d 82, 87 (1st Cir. 2006)). The newly provided checking account statements, for example, only show the last three months of the marriage and thus say nothing about the preceding seventeen months of marriage. And while Davis ultimately provided a copy of his email inbox showing some communications between Davis and Woodley, the frequency of the communications is nowhere near the daily communication to which Davis testified. Moreover, the newly provided leasing documents show that both Davis and Woodley signed the lease, but there is no evidence that both of them actually lived there together. Thus, even if these documents were considered, there still existed substantial evidence to conclude the marriage was not entered into in good faith. -22- joint membership card was of little moment since it could be procured by unrelated individuals), with Cho v. Gonzáles, 404 F.3d 96, 103 (1st Cir. 2005) (finding a bona fide marriage where petitioner introduced evidence that, after the marriage, she and her husband jointly enrolled in a health insurance policy, filed tax returns, opened bank accounts, entered into automobile financing agreements, and secured a credit card and also provided extensive counseling records). Davis's testimony was vague, at times inconsistent, and contained no corroboration through objective and easy-to-obtain documentation. Accordingly, after thoroughly reviewing the record, we conscientiously find that the evidence supporting [the IJ and the BIA's] decision is substantial, when viewed in the light that the record in its entirety furnishes, including the body of evidence opposed to the [IJ and the BIA's] view. Cho, 404 F.3d at 104 (quoting Mukamusoni v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 110, 119 (1st Cir. 2004)). We thus see nothing to compel a contrary determination. See Jing Lin, 759 F.3d at 112 (explaining that the court will only disturb the IJ's and the BIA's findings where the record evidence would compel a reasonable factfinder to reach a contrary determination (quoting Kinisu, 721 F.3d at 34)). -23-