Opinion ID: 2995200
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Evidence of Green’s prior drug

Text: transactions. Green next contends that the district court improperly admitted Clifton Rock’s testimony that he purchased from Green an average of about 1 ounces of cocaine per week, and that he saw Green sell cocaine to other individuals, during a period ending more than a year before the conspiracy charged in this case. Evidence of other wrongs is admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) if the evidence: (i) is directed toward establishing a matter in issue other than the defendant’s propensity to commit the crime charged; (ii) shows that the other act is similar enough and close enough in time to be relevant; (iii) is sufficient to support a finding that the defendant committed the other act; and (iv) has probative value not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. United States v. Williams, 238 F.3d 871, 874 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Moore, 115 F.3d 1348, 1354 (7th Cir. 1997). Green contends that Rock’s testimony fails all four prongs of this test. As to the first prong of the test, we have held on numerous occasions that when a defendant is charged with a specific intent crime (here, conspiracy to distribute cocaine), evidence of the defendant’s prior drug transactions may be relevant to show knowledge and intent- -purposes distinct from simply showing the defendant’s propensity for drug dealing. United States v. Jones, 248 F.3d 671, 675-76 (7th Cir. 2001); Williams, 238 F.3d at 875 n.1 and cases cited therein; United States v. Monzon, 869 F.2d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1989). Green argues that his theory was not that he lacked intent, but rather that he was not the person who delivered the drugs to Guzman. This distinction is irrelevant because the government must prove all elements of the crime, and therefore evidence probative of intent is relevant whether or not the defendant makes intent an issue. See Jones, 248 F.3d at 675; United States v. Kellum, 42 F.3d 1087, 1093 (7th Cir. 1994); Monzon, 869 F.2d at 344. Whether the evidence meets the second prong of the test, similarity and proximity, is evaluated in relation to the purpose for which the evidence is offered. United States v. Ruiz, 178 F.3d 877, 880 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Torres, 977 F.2d 321, 326 (7th Cir. 1992). Where, as here, the evidence relates to prior drug sales of the same or similar type of drug, transactions ending 14 months before the charged crime are not too remote to be relevant to the defendant’s knowledge and intent. See Ruiz, 178 F.3d at 880 (two years between offenses); United States v. Kreiser, 15 F.3d 635, 640 (7th Cir. 1994) (seven years). Rock’s testimony that he sold drugs to Green and saw Green sell drugs to others is sufficient to support a jury’s finding that Green did in fact engage in that conduct, and therefore the third prong of the test is satisfied, notwithstanding Green’s assertions about Rock’s credibility. See United States v. Smith, 995 F.2d 662, 672 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that uncorroborated direct testimony of an accomplice is sufficient for purposes of Rule 404(b) unless it is incredible on its face or otherwise insubstantial). Finally, as to the fourth prong, we find no error in the district court’s determination that the evidence was not unfairly prejudicial when weighed against its probative value, particularly in light of the district court’s instruction limiting the jury’s consideration of the evidence to the narrow purpose for which it was offered. See United States v. Den berg, 212 F.3d 987, 994 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Brooks, 125 F.3d 484, 500 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that limiting instructions are sufficient to cure any potential prejudice resulting from the admission of 404(b) evidence). Thus, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to admit this evidence./7