Opinion ID: 2292789
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Res Adjudicata, Estoppel?

Text: Appellants have one additional argument, namely, that Walter's residuary legatee Merle and his executor are estopped from asserting Merle's claim because after his father's death, Mary as his executrix filed an executor's account to which no objection was made or exception filed, and which consequently was confirmed under a rule of Court in Beaver County. In 1940, Beaver County did not have a separate Orphans' Court. Consequently, pursuant to § 47(c) of the Fiduciaries Act of 1917, [] and the rules of the Orphans' Court of Beaver County, Mary's account in her capacity as executrix of the will of her husband Walter J. Moltrup was filed in the office of the clerk of the Court. Solely as the result of this filing in Beaver County, the account was ipso facto confirmed nisi and no objections having been filed thereto, it was then confirmed under their Court rules without any audit [] and without any notice of Mary's claim having been given to any remaindermen. The only notice given to any remainderman or any heirs or any party having an interest or possible interest in the remainder, was an advertisement in a publication that an account had been filed by Mary E. Moltrup as executrix of the will of her husband Walter J. Moltrup, and in the absence of exceptions would be confirmed absolutely. The account, which included debits and credits, contained the following: Distribution in kind of the balance has been made as follows: Mary E. Moltrup. There then follows an enumeration of shares of stock of twelve different companies, plus a Pierce sedan automobile valued at $100, and cash $501.67. At the time of Mary's death, some of these stocks were registered in the name of Mary E. Moltrup, some were registered Mary E. Moltrup life tenant u/w, Walter J. Moltrup with power of sale, and some were registered Mary E. Moltrup, as life tenant under will of Walter J. Moltrup. Mary's appointees contend that advertisement of the filing of the executrix's account, absence of exceptions thereto and the pro forma confirmation of the account constituted in legal effect a Court-awarded distribution to Mary personally and absolutely, with the same legal effect as if notice of her claim had been given to every party having a possible remainder interest and as if there had been an adversary proceeding and a binding adjudication with respect to her claim. We reject this contention and place our decision on the ground that no actual or appropriate notice of Mary's present claim was ever given to the remainderman until after Mary's death in 1958. We further note that at the time of the filing of Mary's account as executrix of her husband's will, the only questions appropriately and timely before the Orphans' Court were (1) a confirmation of the debits and credits contained in the account and (2) the award to Mary of a life interest with power of consumption. The disposition and the award of the unconsumed remainder, on this record, was clearly and unquestionably a matter for later determination by the Court when Mary's life estate had terminated. Certainly, the record, the advertisement and the above-mentioned award to Mary, with no actual notice to present and potential remaindermen  some of whom were unknown or unborn and all of whom were unrepresented  of the claim which Mary's executors made after her death (which was 18 years after her account as executrix of Walter's estate) could not bar the interest of remaindermen who had no notice of Mary's claim. See Emmerich Estate, 347 Pa. 307, 311, 32 A. 2d 400; Johnson's Estate, 276 Pa. 291, 296, 120 Atl. 128; Partridge-Remick, Pennsylvania Orphans' Court Practice, Vol. III, page 295. Cf. also Stotesbury Estate, 387 Pa. 591, 595, 128 A. 2d 587; Ray's Estate, 345 Pa. 210, 25 A. 2d 803; Robins's Estate, 180 Pa. 630, 37 Atl. 121; Jones's Appeals, 99 Pa. 124. In Johnson's Estate, 276 Pa., supra, this Court struck down a testamentary appointment by the life tenant, and held that the interest of the remainderman must be governed and controlled by the will of the testator who created the gifts for life and the gifts in remainder. The Court pertinently said (pp. 295-296): . . . The point is, Did he have more than a life interest? and, as involved in that point, What became of the estate at his death? The most convenient, if not appropriate, time to raise and settle these questions was at the audit of the account filed after Elwood's [the life tenant's] death; . . . As for the contention of res judicata, we agree with the opinion of the court below that the prior adjudications `did not go further than to determine the validity of the trust for the life of Elwood [the life tenant], if they went that far.' Under the above-mentioned authorities, it is clear that at the time of the confirmation of the account of Mary E. Moltrup as executrix of Walter's will, the rights of the remaindermen were not properly and timely before or determinable or actually determined by the Orphans' Court, and therefore under the facts and the record in this case, the doctrine of res adjudicata or estoppel is inapplicable. Decree affirmed, each party to pay own costs.