Opinion ID: 2066191
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Nature of Witness' Testimony

Text: In Irwin v. Board of Ed. of Sch. Dist. No. 25, 215 Neb. 794, 340 N.W.2d 877 (1983), this court addressed the constitutional requirements of procedural due process in the contested termination of a tenured teacher. Quoting the Fifth Circuit, we stated: Within the matrix of the particular circumstances present when a teacher who is to be terminated for cause opposes his termination, minimum procedural due process requires that: (a) [the teacher] be advised of the cause or causes for his termination in sufficient detail to fairly enable him to show any error that may exist, (b) he be advised of the names and the nature of the testimony of witnesses against him, (c) at a reasonable time after such advice he must be accorded a meaningful opportunity to be heard in his own defense, (d) that hearing should be before a tribunal that both possesses some academic expertise and has an apparent impartiality toward the charges. Id. at 796-97, 340 N.W.2d at 879, quoting Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852 (5th Cir.1970). The constitutional due process requirements set forth in Irwin were later applied in Benton v. Board of Ed. of Sch. Dist. No. 17, 219 Neb. 134, 361 N.W.2d 515 (1985), and Eshom v. Board of Ed. of Sch. Dist. No. 54, 219 Neb. 467, 364 N.W.2d 7 (1985). In Benton, the notice did not provide the factual allegations underlying the charges against a school principal, but, rather, offered only the  `just cause' reasons for considering termination in the conclusory language of the applicable statute. Id. at 137, 361 N.W.2d at 518. We held that the notice failed to afford the principal constitutional due process. Id. In Eshom, we held that a principal's reference to informal evaluations of a teacher, the nature of which testimony was not disclosed in the notice, did not violate due process. Thus, although Benton clearly indicates that notice of the cause or causes for termination must be presented in some detail, Eshom indicates that the nature of each witness' testimony need not be presented in exacting detail. In Wells v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 793 F.2d 679 (5th Cir.1986), which was decided after both Benton and Eshom, the Fifth Circuit limited the language in Ferguson v. Thomas, supra , the case upon which this court originally relied in Irwin. In Wells, the question was whether a school superintendent's constitutional due process rights were violated when a termination hearing was held without the superintendent's having previously received a list of witnesses and a summary of those witnesses' testimony. The court held that there was no due process violation, stating: When an administrative termination hearing is required, federal constitutional due process demands either an opportunity for the person charged to confront the witnesses against him and to hear their testimony or a reasonable substitute for that opportunity. One who is present, who sees and hears the witnesses against him, has notice of who they are and what they maintain before he must meet them with his case; his confrontation rights are satisfied. It is only when he was not present when they were heard that such measures are called for as [a notice containing a summary of each witness' testimony]. When, as here, the adjudicator acts on the sole basis of testimony produced at a hearing at which the accused is present, then by the time the accused must present his case he has necessarily already heard the witnesses' names and the substance of their testimony. The authorities upon which [the superintendent] relies to demand names and summaries of testimony in advance plus confrontation are cases in which there was no confrontation and we required the other as a substitute. Dixon [v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.1961) ]; Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852 (5th Cir.1970). Any charged person is constitutionally entitled once to be told what he is charged with and on what evidence; none is entitled to be told so twice. To so require would be to impose on state administrative proceedings a higher standard than the Constitution requires for criminal trials.... This we have never done. (Emphasis omitted.) (Citations omitted.) Wells v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 793 F.2d at 683. In the instant case, Johanson was present at the hearing. Based on Wells v. Dallas Independent School Dist., supra , and our own holding in Eshom, we can only conclude that Johanson was not constitutionally entitled to a summary of the nature of the testimony of the witnesses against him. Johanson was likewise not entitled to such by statute. The proceedings in the instant case were brought pursuant to Neb. Rev.Stat. §§ 79-829 to 79-832 (Reissue 1996). Section 79-832(1) states: A formal due process hearing ... means a hearing procedure adopted by the school board which contains at least the following: (a) Notification to the certificated employee in writing at least five days prior to the hearing of the grounds alleged for action, cancellation, termination, or nonrenewal of the teacher's contract; (b) upon request of the certificated employee a notification, at least five days prior to the hearing, of the names of any witnesses who will be called to testify against the certificated employee and an opportunity to examine any documents that will be presented at the hearing; (c) the right to be represented; and (d) an opportunity to cross-examine all witnesses and to examine all documents and to present evidence material to the issues. Statutory language is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Hilliard v. Robertson, 253 Neb. 232, 570 N.W.2d 180 (1997). Although § 79-832 provides for a list of witnesses upon request, it does not require the District to provide a summary of the nature of the witnesses' testimony.