Opinion ID: 1580899
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: appellant's statement to dobson.

Text: Appellant asserts it was error to permit Dobson to repeat the incriminating response which Appellant made to Dobson's inquiry about the origin of the blood on his body and clothing, because Appellant had not been readvised of his Miranda rights before the inquiry was made. We note at the outset that Miranda was concerned with the protection which must be given to the privilege against self-incrimination when the individual is first subjected to police interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1629, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Miranda does not require that the warnings be repeated each time the interrogation process is resumed after an interruption. United States v. Delay, 500 F.2d 1360, 1365 (8th Cir.1974); Evans v. Swenson, 455 F.2d 291, 296-97 (8th Cir.1972), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 929, 92 S.Ct. 2508, 33 L.Ed.2d 342 (1972); Miller v. United States, 396 F.2d 492, 496 (8th Cir.1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1031, 89 S.Ct. 643, 21 L.Ed.2d 574 (1969). In each case, the ultimate question is: Did the defendant, with a full knowledge of his legal rights, knowingly and intentionally relinquish them? Miller v. United States, supra, at 496. At the time of his arrest, Appellant told Officer Lindeman that he was aware of his Miranda rights and, in fact, recited them verbatim to Lindeman. He does not claim and there is no reason to assume that he suddenly forgot them while being transported from the crime scene to the hospital. Furthermore, Dobson was not a police officer, but an employee of the hospital. There was no evidence to support a conclusion that he was a state actor as is required to support a claim of a violation of a constitutional right. Absent police conduct causally related to the confession, there is simply no basis for concluding that any state actor has deprived a criminal defendant of due process of law. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164, 107 S.Ct. 515, 520, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986); see also Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 41 S.Ct. 574, 65 L.Ed. 1048 (1921); Commonwealth v. Cooper, Ky., 899 S.W.2d 75, 76-77 (1995), cf. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487-90, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2048-50, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971); Brock v. Commonwealth, Ky., 947 S.W.2d 24, 29 (1997). Appellant relies on Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981), in which incriminating statements made by a defendant to a psychiatrist during a competency examination were held inadmissible against him, because the statements were elicited absent preliminary Miranda warnings. The psychiatrist was deemed a state actor, because he had been appointed by the court to conduct the examination. Here, there was no evidence that EMT Dobson was requested or appointed by any state agency to interrogate Appellant about the origin of the blood on his body and clothing. The mere fact that the police transported Appellant to King's Daughters' Hospital for treatment of his wounds did not, ipso facto, transform Dobson from a hospital employee into a state actor.