Opinion ID: 2166469
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: The essence of the RHC's argument that we lack jurisdiction to consider the merits of Askin's claim is that under a proper reading of our rules and the RHC's rules for reconsideration then in effect, [8] the period in which to file an appeal lapsed well before September 12, 1984, the day Askin filed his appeal. First, RHC contends, Askin failed to timely file his motion for reconsideration. This failure had the effect of not tolling the time in which Askin could petition for review in this court, pursuant to D.C.App.R. 15(b) and (c), [9] thereby making Askin's petition untimely and depriving us of jurisdiction. Alternatively, RHC contends that even if the motion for reconsideration was timely filed, Askin's motion was automatically denied by operation of RHC rules on August 21, 1984, rather than on August 30, 1984, the date of the formal order denying his motion for reconsideration, and that the earlier date is the time to which we should look when we apply Rule 15(c). Again, under this formulation, Askin's petition would not be timely and we would lack jurisdiction. We will consider each argument in turn.
The Commission's ruling against Askin was entered on July 13, 1984. RHC Rule 3320.1, 14 DCMR 3320.1 (1983), required that a party seeking reconsideration file in writing such a motion within ten (10) days of the date of the decision. Excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays, as provided in 14 DCMR 3313.1 (1983), the ten-day period expired on July 27, 1984. Askin did not file his motion until July 31, 1984. However, as noted above, this order was not postmarked until July 19, 1984. The mailing of such a notice was required by 14 DCMR 3383.3 (1983), which read: A copy of each decision shall be mailed to each party or the party's representative of record, and shall promptly be made available to the public. [10] The issue here is whether the delay in mailing the notice of decision effectively extended the period within which Askin had to file his motion for reconsideration. We encountered a somewhat analogous situation in Poyner v. Police and Firemen's Retirement and Relief Board, 456 A.2d 1249 (D.C.1983). There we were faced with an interpretation of D.C.App.R. 15(c), which provided that the time for filing a petition for review after the denial of a motion for reconsideration was to be computed from the date of the order denying said petition. The motion for reconsideration was denied on January 29, a Friday. However, the notice of the denial was not mailed until Monday, February 1. We said: Even if [petitioner] or his counsel had coincidentally happened to travel to the Board office on January 29, it is not clear from the record that he would have learned that his motion had been officially denied as of that day, as the Board appears to have prescribed no formal procedure for release of decisions other than by letter. The most appropriate date for use, therefore, is February 1, when the decision was mailed by certified mail to [petitioner]. Recognition of January 29 as the decision date, as the Board proposes, charges the three days during which the decision remained entirely within the internal processes and control of the Board to the petitioner, and also diminishes any incentive for the Board to dispatch decisions promptly. Such untrammeled power to shorten a petitioner's time to appeal could arguably lead to increasingly dilatory mailing of orders. 456 A.2d at 1251. The same reasoning, we believe, is applicable to the facts presented here. If the date of the Commission's decision is deemed to be July 19, 1984, the date of the mailing (as required by commission rule) to Askin, his motion for reconsideration was timely filed. [11]
The RHC's second argument is that even if the motion for reconsideration was timely filed, Askin did not timely file his petition for review to this court following its denial. The Commission points to its Rule 3320.6, 14 DCMR 3320.6 (1983), which states that failure of the Commission to act within [15 days of receipt of the motion for reconsideration] shall constitute a denial of the motion for reconsideration. Since Askin filed the motion on July 31, 1984, RHC concludes, that fifteen-day period expired on August 21, 1984, fifteen business days thereafter. [12] D.C.App.R. 15(c), as it then read, provided that where a petition for reconsideration was timely filed with an agency, the full time for filing a petition for review as fixed by subdivision (b) of this Rule [fifteen calendar days] commences to run and is to be computed from the date of the order denying said petition. The Commission argues that since the denial of the motion is deemed to have occurred on August 21, 1984, and Askin didn't file his appeal until September 12, 1984, this court lacks jurisdiction over the matter, citing Totz v. District of Columbia Rental Housing Commission, 474 A.2d 827, 828-29 (D.C.1984). [13] Askin, however, points out that in fact, the Commission, by a document dated August 30, 1984, [14] entered a formal order denying the petition. The document on its face is in all respects a formal order of the RHC, in no way implying that it is merely confirming any previous automatic denial of the petition. It bears the signatures of the two commissioners in the majority and of the third commissioner dissenting without opinion. It appears likely that Askin received a copy of this order on or before September 5, 1984, [15] which would be the time limit under our rules, [16] using the automatic denial date of August 21 as a starting point. We think that under these circumstances, where a formal order arrives before the period to appeal the automatic denial has expired, the later order should be held to be the date of the order denying said petition within the meaning of our Rule 15(c). Because the ambiguity created by such a situation can lead a party to rely upon the latter order as the date from which to appeal, the Commission cannot say that the prior date of the automatic denial controls our appellate jurisdiction. [17] In situations where ambiguity exists regarding the date of an order or decision, this court has resolved the ambiguity in favor of the party seeking review. Very recently, in Donnelly Associates Limited Partnership v. District of Columbia Historic Preservation Review Board, 520 A.2d 270 (D.C.1987), we confronted a situation where an oral decision by an administrative body was followed by later written notice of the decision. In holding the later notice to constitute formal notice, we stated: If the decision is oral, there is no written recordation of its substance, and the losing party may be uncertain whether the result and the reasons for it will be the same when the written decision comes down. We should, if possible, minimize guesses by the parties on which decision is the proper one to be appealed. We likewise resolve the ambiguity, here created by the possibility that two orders exist denying the motion for reconsideration, by holding that the written order, at least when it arrives during the period when a petitioner can still appeal the automatic denial, fixes the time for the appeal period to run. We have stressed the importance of removing ambiguity from the notice context in other areas of administrative law. See, e.g., Ploufe v. D.C. Department of Employment Services, 497 A.2d 464 (D.C.1985) (notice of ten-day time period to appeal must specify whether calendar or working days); Bailey v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services, 499 A.2d 1223 (D.C. 1985) (language regarding petition for review inadequate as a matter of law, because it incorrectly suggested that reason might be given which would excuse untimely filing). Consequently, Askin's petition was timely filed. We conclude, therefore, that we have jurisdiction and now turn our attention to the merits of petitioner's appeal.