Opinion ID: 4343936
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: failure to cross-appeal

Text: The BIA found that Bula Lopez’s conviction was both a controlled substance violation and a CIMT. Because the IJ found Bula Lopez removable only on the CIMT ground, Bula Lopez argues the BIA could not reach the controlled substance violation ground without a cross-appeal by DHS. DHS responds that the BIA did not err in considering this alternative basis for Bula Lopez’s removability. The BIA’s regulations do not contain any specific rules regarding the filing of cross-appeals. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.38 (providing rules for appeals), 1003.3 (providing requirements for a notice of appeal). In the absence of such rules or BIA precedent on the issue, we look to the general cross-appeal rule applied in federal courts to determine whether the BIA erred by considering DHS’s argument on appeal that Flunitrazepam is a controlled substance and that Bula Lopez was removable for having committed a controlled substance violation. The Supreme Court has explained that “[a]n appellee who does not take a cross-appeal may urge in support of a decree any matter appearing before the record, although his argument may involve an attack upon the reasoning of the lower court.” See Jennings v. Stephens, 574 U.S. __, __, 135 S. Ct. 793, 798 (2015) (internal quotations omitted). In other words, the appellee may argue for 12 Case: 17-15179 Date Filed: 11/21/2018 Page: 13 of 19 affirmance on any ground supported by the record, even one the lower court did not rely on. See id. However, “an appellee who does not cross-appeal may not attack the decree with a view either to enlarging his own rights thereunder or of lessening the rights of his adversary.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). To determine whether the cross-appeal rule applies, we must distinguish between the rights of a party and the reasons a court gives for recognizing those rights. Because “[c]ourts reduce their opinions and verdicts to judgments precisely to define the rights and liabilities of the parties,” it is the judgment of the court, not its opinion, that matters. Id. at 799. In Jennings, for instance, the district court granted habeas relief to the petitioner on two of his ineffective-assistance-ofcounsel theories, but denied relief as to a third theory and entered judgment directing the state either to release him from custody or resentence him. Id. at 798. The state appealed, attacking only the two ineffective-assistance theories on which the district court had granted relief. Id. Without filing a cross-appeal, the petitioner defended the district court’s judgment on all three ineffective-assistance theories. Id. The Fifth Circuit determined it lacked jurisdiction to consider the third ineffective-assistance theory, on which the district court had not relied in granting relief, because Jennings did not file a cross-appeal. Id. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. Id. at 798-802. 13 Case: 17-15179 Date Filed: 11/21/2018 Page: 14 of 19 In concluding that Jennings could raise his third ineffective-assistance theory on appeal without filing a cross appeal, the Supreme Court explained: Jennings’ rights under the judgment [granting habeas relief on the first two theories] were what the judgment provided—release, resentencing, or commutation within a fixed time, at the State’s option; the [third] theory would give him the same. Similarly, the State’s rights under the judgment were to retain Jennings in custody pending resentencing or to commute his sentence; the [third] theory would allow no less. Id. at 798-99. The Court further explained that “[a] prevailing party seeks to enforce not a district court’s reasoning, but the court’s judgment,” and that federal appellate courts “do[] not review lower courts’ opinions, but their judgments.” Id. at 799 (emphasis in original). Accordingly, “[a]ny potential claim that would have entitled Jennings” to the same relief as that provided in the district court’s judgment “could have been advanced to urge . . . support of the judgment,” as long as that alternative ground was present in the record. Id. at 800 (internal quotations omitted). And because Jennings’s third ineffective-assistance theory “sought the same relief” as was awarded under his first two ineffective-assistance theories, he was not required to file a cross-appeal in order to raise it. Id. at 801-02. Here, DHS’s controlled substance argument on appeal to the BIA is akin to the alternative argument raised in Jennings. Like the habeas petitioner in Jennings, DHS here prevailed on one theory of removability (CIMT), but not on another (controlled substance violation) and, on appeal, defended the IJ’s order of 14 Case: 17-15179 Date Filed: 11/21/2018 Page: 15 of 19 removability on both theories. See id. at 798. In arguing to the BIA that Bula Lopez was also removable for having committed a controlled substance violation, DHS “sought the same relief”—Bula Lopez’s removal—as was awarded in the IJ’s removal order based on the CIMT charge. Id. at 801-02. Thus, DHS was not required to file a cross-appeal to advance its controlled substance argument on appeal to the BIA, and the BIA did not err in considering that argument.