Opinion ID: 509284
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Fugitive from Justice Doctrine

Text: 27 The alternative basis on which the district court granted the government's motion to dismiss also cannot stand. The fugitive from justice doctrine simply cannot be extended far enough to justify the seizure of this property. One of the main considerations in the fugitive from justice cases is the fact that the fugitive is trying, either successfully or unsuccessfully, to reap the benefit of the judicial process without subjecting himself to an adverse determination. See, e.g., United States v. Puzzanghera, 820 F.2d 25, 27 (1st Cir.1987); United States v. Gordon, 538 F.2d 914, 915 (1st Cir.1976). That concern does not arise here. Fogarty is not appealing a conviction or seeking habeas relief. On the contrary, the government seized his property and will hold it forfeit if Fogarty does not respond. As we see below, while technically he is a claimant, in reality Fogarty's claim is more in the nature of a response. 28 The Supreme Court recognized this possibility in Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 78 S.Ct. 1087, 2 L.Ed.2d 1255 (1958). There, the Court reversed the imposition of sanctions on plaintiff by the district court for failing to comply with a discovery order in a case in which it was trying to recover assets previously seized by the government. The Supreme Court said petitioner, though cast in the role of plaintiff, cannot be deemed to be in the customary role of a party invoking the aid of a court to vindicate rights asserted against another. Rather petitioner's position is more analogous to that of a defendant, for it belatedly challenges the government's action by now protesting against a seizure and seeking the recovery of assets.... Id. at 210 (emphasis in original). These observations apply equally well to Fogarty in this case. We thus disagree with the district court's determination that Fogarty has invoked the processes of this court. 29 Neither can Fogarty avoid the rigors of an adverse determination by failing to appear. Again, Fogarty's situation is similar to the plaintiff's in Societe Internationale. The allocation of the burden of proof, and, as a result, the effect of Fogarty's non-compliance (here non-appearance) on the trial is the same. The Court in Societe Internationale recognized that the petitioner bore the ultimate burden of proof, and that by not producing the documents at issue, it was simply impairing its own ability to carry that burden. Id. at 212-13, 78 S.Ct. at 1095-96. In the same way here, if Fogarty does not appear to prove an alternate source of income once the government establishes probable cause, he stands to lose his property. Fogarty, therefore, would fully feel the rigors of an adverse determination, and can do nothing to avoid such a result without submitting to the court's jurisdiction. 30 Furthermore, while we have previously extended the application of the doctrine beyond an appeal in a criminal case, to a civil case, see United States, ex rel. Bailey v. U.S.C.O. of Provost Marshal, U.S. Army, 496 F.2d 324, 326 (1st Cir.1974), it is clear that this must be a civil case closely related to the criminal matter from which the applicant is a fugitive. See United States v. $129,374 in United States Currency, 769 F.2d 583, 588 (9th Cir.1985) (clear ... that Lewis' criminal conviction and the property involved in this civil forfeiture proceeding are integrally related parts of the same unlawful drug dealing scheme); Schuster v. United States, 765 F.2d 1047, 1049 (11th Cir.1985) (no question that the civil case here at issue ... is related to the criminal case); United States v. $45,940 in United States Currency, 739 F.2d 792 (2d Cir.1984) (criminal prosecution was for illegally importing the money subject to forfeiture in civil case); Conforte v. C.I.R., 692 F.2d 587, 590 (9th Cir.1982) (criminal conviction and tax court appeal are each related components of a general tax evasion scheme.). The two proceedings here--the civil forfeiture and the Florida criminal indictment--may very well be related. At this point, however, we can only speculate as to the contents of that indictment. The fact that the property was purchased eight years before the indictment was obtained only suggests that this action cannot be based solely on the facts alleged in that indictment. Without more, we cannot conclude that Fogarty's status as a fugitive is sufficiently related to the civil forfeiture to deprive him of the right to process of any sort before his property is taken from him. 31 Perhaps most importantly, there is no evidence that Fogarty had notice of this proceeding, and elected not to defend it. Compare, United States v. $129,374, 769 F.2d at 589; United States v. $45,940 in U.S. Currency, 739 F.2d 792 (2d Cir.1984). The record here does not show that Fogarty is acting willfully and hiding from the court while asking it to resolve his claims. True, he has not appeared to answer the indictment in the Southern District of Florida, but there is no evidence that he is purposely avoiding the Rhode Island District court or flaunting its processes. The core concept in the fugitive from justice doctrine seems to be that the courts need not act on behalf of an individual who has attempted to bring about the same result by the self-help method of escaping from justice. That characterization simply does not fit Fogarty's actions. Fogarty should be treated, therefore, like any other absent civil litigant, and any misconduct or prejudice to the opposing party should be redressed subject to the strictures of the rules set up for that purpose. 32 As we have seen, Rule 37 does not support the drastic sanction of dismissal, and we see no other reason under the facts of this case to relieve the government of even its minimal burden of showing probable cause. 33 The case is reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. The district court may dismiss the government's complaint with leave to amend, if it feels such action is proper.