Opinion ID: 764161
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: LIUNA's Liability

Text: 31
32 LIUNA contends that the district court erred for a number of reasons by allowing plaintiffs' claims against it to proceed. First, LIUNA suggests that claims against it are barred by the statute of limitations governing Title VII claims. 33 Generally, the timely filing of a charge of discrimination with the EEOC is a condition precedent to a Title VII lawsuit. See Atlas Paper Box, 868 F.2d at 1495. Usually, if the alleged discrimination occurred more than 180 days prior to the plaintiff's filing of an EEOC charge, claims implicating these actions are barred. See id. However, if the alleged unlawful practice occurs in a deferral state, in this case Ohio, which has enacted its own laws prohibiting discrimination in employment, the plaintiff must file suit within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory act. See 42 U.S.C.. § 2000e-5(e); EEOC v. Penton Indus. Pub. Co., 851 F.2d 835, 837 n. 5 (6th Cir.1988). 34 In this case, plaintiff Ronald Colvin first filed an EEOC charge against LIUNA on September 7, 1989. From this filing date, the 300-day statute of limitations applicable to Title VII actions filed in deferral states normally would preclude consideration of alleged violations occurring prior to November 11, 1988. Based on this chronology, LIUNA argues that none of the allegedly discriminatory acts occurring before this date supports a finding of liability against it. Because we conclude that the defendants, including LIUNA, are guilty of a continuing violation, as explained below, this argument is unavailing. 35 This court has long recognized that an ongoing, continuous series of discriminatory acts may be challenged if one of those discriminatory acts occurred within the limitations period. See, e.g., Haithcock v. Frank, 958 F.2d 671, 677 (6th Cir.1992); see also Dixon v. Anderson, 928 F.2d 212, 216 (6th Cir.1991). If a continuing violation is shown, a plaintiff is entitled to have a court consider all relevant actions allegedly taken pursuant to the employer's discriminatory policy or practice, including those that would otherwise be time barred. Van Zant v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 80 F.3d 708, 713 (2d Cir.1996). We view continuing violations as falling into two categories of narrowly limited exceptions to the usual rule that statutes of limitations are triggered at the time the alleged discriminatory act occurred. See Haithcock, 958 F.2d at 677. The first category of continuing violations arises where there is some evidence of present discriminatory activity giving rise to a claim of a continuing violation; that is where an employer continues presently to impose disparate work assignments or pay rates between similarly situated groups. Dixon, 928 F.2d at 216. However, at least one of the forbidden discriminatory acts must have occurred within the relevant limitations period. Id. The second category of continuing violations arises where there has occurred a longstanding and demonstrable policy of discrimination.... Unrelated incidents of discrimination will not suffice to invoke this exception; rather there must be a continuing over-arching policy of discrimination. Id. at 217 (internal quotations omitted). 36 The facts in this case clearly support the district court's conclusion that the defendants are liable regardless of the statute of limitations because their actions were part of a continuing violation. Floyd Conrad testified that over a significant period of time, he refused African Americans membership in Local 496 based on the working-in-the-calling rule. The district court found that this practice continued at least through January 1990. Also as late as January 1990, Local 496's personnel failed to apprise African-American non-members of the procedure necessary to maintain their eligibility for employment referrals, though the union's overwhelmingly white membership was informed of the relevant procedure. Further, Floyd Conrad's testimony supports a finding that although the official membership and referral policies of Local 496 may have changed over the years, the practice of excluding black applicants continued into the relevant limitations period. Moreover, the working-in-the-calling rule, memorialized in Local 496's constitution and by-laws, resulted in the de facto exclusion of African Americans from the ranks of Local 496 as well as from employment at Perry. Thus, the defendants committed both types of continuing violations recognized by this court: a series of related discriminatory acts and an established policy of discrimination. 5 See Haithcock, 958 F.2d at 678 (recognizing that a continuing violation exists where a policy of discrimination is longstanding and manifested in discriminatory treatment in more than one instance); see also Hull v. Cuyahoga Valley Joint Vocational Sch. District Bd. of Ed., 926 F.2d 505, 510-11 (6th Cir.1991) (stating that a complaint is timely filed and the continuing violation doctrine applies where a plaintiff challenges not just one incident of unlawful conduct but an unlawful practice that continues into the limitations period) (quotation omitted); see also United States v. International Assoc. of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, Local No. 1, 438 F.2d 679, 683 (7th Cir.1971) ([I]t is proper for a court to look at past discrimination to see whether an employer is perpetuating a pattern of discrimination through other means.... [T]he past sheds light on the present as well as the future. Past discrimination ... may be relevant to show motive and intent as to present practice or to establish a pattern or practice of discrimination or to show that present ... practices are designed to perpetuate or have the effect of perpetuating a past policy of discrimination.). 37 Local 496 has a despicable and egregious history of excluding African Americans from membership. We will not ignore this legacy of discrimination, paradigmatic of a continuing violation. To do so would be inequitable and unjust. Therefore, because the defendants' actions constitute a continuing violation, the district court correctly considered those actions which took place prior to the limitations period, as well as those that occurred within the limitations period. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court with regard to this issue. 38
39 LIUNA contends that the district court erred by finding it liable for the alleged racial discrimination of Local 496. The district court found that LIUNA was liable both because Local 496 was acting as the international union's agent and because LIUNA breached its affirmative duty to oppose Local 496's discriminatory practices by neglecting to remedy the alleged discrimination when it learned of the plaintiffs' claims. Again, we review these findings of fact for clear error. See Berger v. Iron Workers Reinforced Rodmen Local 201, 843 F.2d 1395, 1407 (D.C.Cir.1988). 40 Common law agency theories of vicarious liability govern the liability of international labor organizations for the acts of their local unions that violate Title VII and § 1981. See id. at 1427-28. At common law, a principal may be held liable for the intentional torts of its agent if the agent's conduct is within the scope of his agency and if, with the knowledge of the conditions, the principal intends the conduct or its consequences. See id. at 1430. In other words, in a case such as this, a plaintiff must adduce specific evidence that the international 'instigated, supported, ratified, or encouraged' those actions, or 'that what was done was done by their agents in accordance with their fundamental agreement of association.'  Id. at 1427 (quoting Carbon Fuel v. United Mine Workers, 444 U.S. 212, 217-18, 100 S.Ct. 410, 62 L.Ed.2d 394 (1979)). Furthermore, where an agency relationship exists, international unions are not only vicariously liable, they have an affirmative duty to oppose the local's discriminatory conduct. See Sinyard v. Foote & Davies Div. of McCall Corp., 577 F.2d 943, 945 (5th Cir.1978). 6 Thus, [a]s a general proposition ... international labor unions must bear a heavy responsibility in giving effect to the remedial provisions of both Title VII and § 1981. Id. 41 In this case, the district court correctly found that LIUNA is liable both vicariously and directly. LIUNA and Local 496 have clearly maintained a principal/agent relationship since March 1985 when LIUNA became a signatory to the National Maintenance Agreement, which included a provision stating that Local 496 was to fill all maintenance laborer positions at Perry. 7 However, the structure of the relationship between the local and the international was no different before this date, during Perry's construction phase. The working-in-the-calling requirement, which we have determined had a disparate impact on African Americans, was in fact a product of LIUNA's own Uniform Local Constitution. Article III, § 1(a) provides, In order to be eligible for membership a person must be working in the calling within the territory of the Local Union in which the individual applies for membership. We are baffled and amazed as to how LIUNA can contend that it did not instigate, support, ratify, or encourage a policy that it created. Moreover, LIUNA was aware and on notice of the charges of discrimination filed against Local 496, as Floyd Conrad and the EEOC both informed LIUNA personnel of such developments. Thus the international cannot feign ignorance, and cannot be excused for breaching its duty to end Local 496's discrimination. 8 See Berger, 843 F.2d at 1428 (Having ... approved a practice of the local that was later found to be discriminatory in effect, the international would surely have been held accountable for the local's conduct under the agency standard of the common law ....); see also Sagers v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 529 F.2d 721, 736, n. 32 (5th Cir.1976) (stating that international unions who are parties to national agreements have a duty under Section 1981 to inquire into the effect of contract provisions when it is reasonable to assume that such provisions might lead to discrimination, and that international unions have an affirmative obligation to protect members from agreements they help negotiate when such agreements lock in past discrimination). 42 Here, the district court's conclusion that LIUNA is liable is based on an eminently reasonable interpretation of the relationship between the international and local unions. Because the record and the applicable precedent support the district court's conclusion that LIUNA is liable for Local 496's discriminatory practices and policies, we affirm the judgment of the district court on this issue as well.