Opinion ID: 848775
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ski Area Safety Act

Text: This case concerns Michigan's Ski Area Safety Act (SASA), M.C.L. § 408.321 et seq., particularly M.C.L. § 408.342(2), which provides: Each person who participates in the sport of skiing accepts the dangers that inhere in that sport insofar as the dangers are obvious and necessary. Those dangers include, but are not limited to, injuries which can result from variations in terrain; surface or subsurface snow or ice conditions; bare spots; rocks, trees, and other forms of natural growth or debris; collisions with ski lift towers and their components, with other skiers, or with properly marked or plainly visible snow-making or snow-grooming equipment. The majority properly characterizes the two types of dangers inherent in the sport, as provided by the statute, as natural hazards and unnatural hazards. MCL 408.342(2) gives as examples the following unnatural hazards: collisions with ski lift towers and their components, with other skiers, or with properly marked or plainly visible snow-making or snow-grooming equipment. However, such hazards must be obvious and necessary before a ski operator may be protected by the statute. In this case, we must determine whether the timing equipment, including the shack in which the equipment was housed, is a danger inherent in the sport, and whether the danger is obvious and necessary. As the statute expressly states, it is the danger that must inhere in the sport. Timing the race itself is not the danger to be considered; the timing equipment is the danger; thus, the equipment must be the inherent danger before we can continue the inquiry posed by the statute. It is not disputed that timing and equipment are necessary in ski racing. Nor is it disputed that timing equipment must be protected from the elements. However, it does not follow that a timing shack is necessary, or that the placement of the timing shack in this case, near the finish line of the race course at the bottom of the hill, was obvious and necessary, as required by M.C.L. § 408.342(2). Therefore, I disagree with the majority that the placement of the timing shack is a danger skiers are held to accept as a matter of law. Further, the unnatural hazards in the statute are not described as particular items, but collisions with the particular items. (E.g., collisions with ski lift towers and their components, with other skiers, or with properly marked or plainly visible snow-making or snow-grooming equipment). Therefore, we must focus on the collision with the timing shack, not just the timing shack itself. Location, location, location! Contrary to the majority's analysis, location must be a factor because it relates to whether the danger of collision is necessary. MCL 408.342(2) does not simply read that dangers that inhere in the sport are ones for which skiers assume the risk. The dangers must also be obvious and necessary. If the timing equipment can be located in a way that poses no danger of collision, such as at the top of the hill as it is now, then the danger posed by the timing shack is not necessary as required by M.C.L. § 408.342(2). The inquiry is whether plaintiff assumed the risk and accepted the danger of colliding with this particular timing shack. We must examine the necessity of the shack itself, as well as the necessity of the location. The majority accuses me of misconstruing the SASA and creating a strict-liability test for ski-area operators. Quite the contrary, it is the majority that overzealously misconstrues the SASA in favor of ski-area operators by skimming over the obvious and necessary requirement imposed by the Legislature. I cannot agree with the majority that simply because timing equipment is necessary, as is protection for such equipment, that plaintiff's collision with the timing shack was necessary. That the timing shack is a hazard that inheres in the sport and is of the same type as ski towers and snow-making machines does not mandate the conclusion that plaintiff accepted the risk of colliding with the timing shack as a matter of law. I respectfully disagree with the majority's recharacterization of the question I pose in this case, ante at 761. I would ask, as the statute requires, whether the collision with the timing shack was necessary. Because there was testimony from which a jury could find that plaintiff's collision with the timing shack was not necessary, summary disposition is inappropriate. Ultimately, in its response to my dissent, the majority misses the point with its discussion of foreseeability. [1] My focus is on the language of M.C.L. § 408.342(2). Because the statute requires the danger to be inherent as well as obvious and necessary, and because there remains a question of fact with respect to the necessity of this timing shack and its location, summary disposition for defendant is inappropriate at this time. The trial court properly denied defendant's motion, and this Court should not disturb that ruling.