Opinion ID: 1846461
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: errors in charging the jury; granting somejury instructions while denying others.

Text: ¶ 69. Coho and Cockrell next argue that the jury was not properly instructed as to the applicable law, even if the jury instructions are read as a whole. As we have said, on appellate review, we do not isolate the individual instruction attacked, but rather we read all of the instructions as a whole. Payne v. Rain Forest Nurseries, Inc., 540 So.2d 35, 40-41 (1989). Defects in specific instructions do not require reversal where all instructions taken as a whole fairlyalthough not perfectlyannounce the applicable primary rules of law. Id. at 40-41. Further, [t]he trial court enjoys considerable discretion regarding the form and substance of jury instructions. Higgins v. State, 725 So.2d 220, 223 (Miss.1998). Mississippi's law on jury instructions has been summarized as follows: Jury instructions are to be read together and taken as a whole with no one instruction taken out of context. A defendant is entitled to have jury instructions given which present his theory of the case; however, this entitlement is limited in that the court may refuse an instruction which incorrectly states the law, is fairly covered elsewhere in the instructions, or is without foundation in the evidence. We have also held a court's jury instructions will not warrant reversal if the jury was fully and fairly instructed by other instructions. Id. at 223. ¶ 70. Coho and Cockrell assert numerous errors in charging the jury. However, because loss of consortium and premises liability are discussed more fully in other sections of this opinion, we will not address alleged errors in those instructions here. However, we will discuss the allegation that the instructions were deficient in that they failed to allow the jury to apportion fault, between Coho and Cockrell, and among other parties. We will also discuss the jury instruction that dealt with loss of enjoyment of life.
¶ 71. Coho and Cockrell object to instructions P-15 and S-P-14 because the instructions did not allow the jury to apportion fault between the defendants, or consider the fault, if any, of other persons or entities. Coho and Cockrell claim that instruction D-23, which was refused, would have correctly allowed the jury to apportion fault. They quote Miss.Code Ann. § 85-5-7(7)(1999) as follows: In actions involving joint tort-feasors, the trier of fact shall determine the percentage of fault for each party alleged to be at fault. However, they fail to cite any authority that states that a jury instruction, so deficient, is reversible error. ¶ 72. The Stroos correctly respond that the statute does not permit apportionment of liability between an employer and employee, because they shall be considered one (1) defendant when the liability has been caused by the employee. Miss.Code Ann. § 85-5-7(3)(1999). The Stroos further argue that even though it is true that instruction P-15 did not contain a sufficient form for the defendants, instruction D-9 sufficiently instructed the jury as to the form, if the jury found in their favor. Thus, taking P-15 and D-9 together, the jury had ample opportunity to find for the defendants if it was so inclined. After a close examination of the jury instructions at issue, we agree.
¶ 73. Coho and Cockrell further argue that the trial court should have instructed the jury to take into consideration the fault of a party not present in the lawsuit, as well as the fault of the parties to the suit. This means that any negligence attributable to Smith Brothers, its employees, Ainsworth or any other participants to the well workover should have been taken into account. ¶ 74. The Stroos respond that the law at the time of the trial was McBride v. Chevron U.S.A., 673 So.2d 372, 381 (Miss. 1996), which made it permissible, but not mandatory, to permit juries to consider the fault of settling defendants. [2] While jury instructions were being discussed in chambers, the trial judge said: THE COURT: I agree. The statute seems to say you can [have the jury consider the fault attributable to a non-party]. Up until recently I would put in unnamed tortfeasors or unsued tortfeasors and I've been convinced since McBride that was probably wrong. So I stopped doing that. ¶ 75. The Stroos further argue that an interrogatory question was posed to Coho and Cockrell during discovery seeking the identity of any other parties that they would contend had caused the accident. They did not identify any other party in their answer, nor did they supplement that response to name Smith Brothers. As such, they waived any right they may have had to apportion fault to Smith Brothers.
¶ 76. Instruction P-13 allowed the jury to consider awarding damages to McCarthy's estate for any or all the following elements: mental anguish; net present cash value of future earnings; loss of enjoyment of life; loss of love, society and companionship with their father, if any, which each of McCarthy's children would have enjoyed; loss of nurture, training and guidance each child would have received, and the cost of the funeral and burial. There was no instruction which defined any of these six elements. Instruction P-15 provided for a general verdict, directing that if the jury found for the Plaintiff, they should simply fill in the blank with the one total amount. ¶ 77. McCarthy's certified financial analyst did not present to the jury any testimony regarding the value of loss of enjoyment of life. There was minimal testimony from family members about what Kelvin McCarthy enjoyed doing and would be unable to enjoy due to his untimely death. In closing argument, the McCarthy's attorney mentioned specific dollar figures only for net present value of lost earnings ($327,977) mental anguish ($100,000) and loss of enjoyment of life ($817,823) but then ended his argument requesting that the jury return a verdict for $3,500,000. No further testimony was before the jury regarding loss of enjoyment of life, and no instruction gave any specific dollar amount for any of the six elements mentioned above. Because the record does not reveal whether any amount of the damages awarded by the jury was for loss of enjoyment of life, and because the question of the applicability of damages for the loss of enjoyment of life in cases where death is instantaneous is yet unanswered, we cannot say that the trial court was in error on this issue. ¶ 78. In conclusion, although there may have been some defects in specific instructions, where all instructions taken as a whole fairlyalthough not perfectlyannounce the applicable primary rules of law, reversal is not warranted. This issue is without merit.