Opinion ID: 2485442
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Motion to Relate Back

Text: In his fourth claim, Lukehart contends that the postconviction court erred in denying his amended postconviction motion to relate back to the filing of his shell motion. We agree. [A]ppellate courts apply a de novo standard of review when the construction of a procedural rule ... is at issue. Barco v. School Bd. of Pinellas Cnty., 975 So.2d 1116, 1121 (Fla.2008). Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851(a) provides: This rule shall apply to all motions and petitions for any type of postconviction or collateral relief brought by a prisoner in state custody who has been sentenced to death and whose conviction and death sentence have been affirmed on direct appeal. It shall apply to all postconviction motions filed on or after October 1, 2001, by prisoners who are under sentence of death. Motions pending on that date are governed by the version of this rule in effect immediately prior to that date. The record reveals that, on September 27, 2001, Lukehart filed a rule 3.850 shell motion to vacate judgment and sentence. On November 28, 2001, the State filed a motion to dismiss the shell motion. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss on June 17, 2002, and allowed Lukehart to file, on or before June 25, 2002, an amended motion for postconviction relief. Lukehart was given leave to supplement the motion with any additional grounds or to further refine existing grounds based upon public record disclosures that occurred after June 25, 2002. On June 20, 2002, Lukehart filed a motion to vacate judgment of conviction and sentence and a memorandum of law with special request for leave to amend, raising a total of seventeen claims. On September 23, 2003, Lukehart filed a first amended motion to vacate judgment of conviction and sentence and a memorandum of law with special request for leave to amend and raised a total of seventeen claims. On October 14, 2003, the State filed an objection to the motion to amend the postconviction motion. On October 16, 2003, Lukehart filed a response to the State's objection to the motion to amend the postconviction motion. On February 27, 2007, the trial court entertained Lukehart's motion for leave to amend. The State filed a second objection to Lukehart's motion to amend his postconviction motion. On March 5, 2007, the trial court entered an order granting the Lukehart's motion for leave to amend. In Lukehart's first amended motion to vacate judgment and sentence, Lukehart requested that the court reinstate his shell motion as it was filed prior to October 1, 2001. In addition, Lukehart requested the postconviction court to allow his amended motion to relate back to the time of the filing of his shell motion in order to expand his time to file for federal habeas relief. Clearly, Lukehart's shell motion was filed September 27, 2001. Additionally, as the trial court did not deny his shell motion until June 17, 2002, his shell motion was pending on October 1, 2001. Thus, Lukehart's motion for postconviction relief is governed by rule 3.850, and the trial court erred in finding otherwise. Moreover, numerous postconviction cases in Florida refer to a defendant's shell motion and subsequent filing of an amended motion for postconviction relief. See Hartley v. State, 990 So.2d 1008, 1011 (Fla.2008) (shell motion filed initially, amended motion filed later); Branch v. State, 952 So.2d 470, 474 (Fla.2006) (shell motion filed on May 7, 1998, and second amended motion filed April 1, 2003); Miller v. State, 926 So.2d 1243, 1248 (Fla.2006) (shell motion filed September 27, 2001, and amended motion filed March 11, 2002); Knight v. State, 923 So.2d 387, 415 (Fla. 2005) (shell motion filed November 7, 2000, and amended motion filed August 23, 2002); Howell v. State, 877 So.2d 697, 700 (Fla.2004) (filed a shell motion initially, followed by a amended motion); Finney v. State, 831 So.2d 651, 656 (Fla.2002) (shell motion filed in 1997 and amended motion filed in 1999); Washington v. State, 835 So.2d 1083, 1085 (Fla.2002) (shell motion filed in 1997 and amended motion filed in 1999); Moore v. State, 820 So.2d 199, 206 n. 7 (Fla.2002) (shell motion filed March 26, 1999, and amended motion filed June 22, 1999). In Bryant v. State, 901 So.2d 810 (Fla. 2005), this Court noted that Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.190(c) [8] applies to postconviction cases and concluded that Bryant's amended motion would have related back to the date of Bryant's original filing. Id. at 818. Similarly, in Spera v. State, 971 So.2d 754, 761-62 (Fla.2007), this Court relied on Bryant and noted that in Bryant, [w]hat we disapproved was the court's failure, when striking the original motion, to grant leave to amend at that time so that the amended motion would relate back to the date of the original. Spera, 971 So.2d at 760-61. To accomplish this end, this Court concluded that it would allow all defendants an opportunity to amend facially insufficient postconviction claims. Id. at 761. Accordingly, we reverse the postconviction court's finding and instead conclude that Lukehart's motion for postconviction relief is governed by rule 3.850 and his amended motion relates back to the date of his original filing.