Opinion ID: 2624500
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Excusal for Cause of Prospective Juror W.B.

Text: Defendant next contends the trial court erroneously excused for cause Prospective Juror W.B. after voir dire concerning his views on the death penalty. We see no error. (2) `The state and federal constitutional guarantees of a trial by an impartial jury include the right in a capital case to a jury whose members will not automatically impose the death penalty for all murders, but will instead consider and weigh the mitigating evidence in determining the appropriate sentence.' ( People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 910 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103]; accord, People v. Crittenden [(1994) 9 Cal.4th 83,] 120-121 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887].) However, a `juror may be challenged for cause based upon his or her views concerning capital punishment only if those views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of the juror's duties as defined by the court's instructions and the juror's oath.' [Citation.] ( People v. Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 338-339 [60 Cal.Rptr.3d 209, 160 P.3d 84].) `Assessing the qualifications of jurors challenged for cause is a matter falling within the broad discretion of the trial court. [Citation.] The trial court must determine whether the prospective juror will be `unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law in the case.' [Citation.] A juror will often give conflicting or confusing answers regarding his or her impartiality or capacity to serve, and the trial court must weigh the juror's responses in deciding whether to remove the juror for cause. The trial court's resolution of these factual matters is binding on the appellate court if supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] `[W]here equivocal or conflicting responses are elicited regarding a prospective juror's ability to impose the death penalty, the trial court's determination as to his true state of mind is binding on an appellate court. [Citations.]' [Citation.]' ( People v. Boyette [(2002) 29 Cal.4th 381,] 416 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391]; accord, People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 14 [32 Cal.Rptr.3d 894, 117 P.3d 591].) ( People v. Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 339.) In other words, the reviewing court generally must defer to the judge who sees and hears the prospective juror, and who has the `definite impression' that he is biased, despite a failure to express clear views. ( People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 1007 [47 Cal.Rptr.3d 467, 140 P.3d 775].) The United States Supreme Court recently explained: Deference to the trial court is appropriate because it is in a position to assess the demeanor of the venire, and of the individuals who compose it, a factor of critical importance in assessing the attitude and qualifications of potential jurors. ( Uttecht v. Brown (2007) 551 U.S. ___ [167 L.Ed.2d 1014, 127 S.Ct. 2218, 2224].) Prospective Juror W.B. made statements during voir dire that suggested he could be fair to both sides and had not foreclosed the possibility of returning a verdict of either death or life without the possibility of parole. In his answers to the juror questionnaire, however, he indicated he was opposed to the death penalty, [8] and when pressed further by both parties and the court, he gave conflicting and ambiguous answers. The trial court asked if he could ever actually return a verdict of death. W.B. replied, No, sir. He explained that he believed there were better ways of doing it, even though we haven't come up with one. Not to say that I couldn't be opposed to it. He then stated, It really doesn't serve a purpose. I mean an eye for an eye, . . . what does an eye for an eye mean? The court asked, Realistically, then, do you think you would always choose the other choice, the other option of life without possibility of parole? W.B. answered, Yes. The court asked, The [P]eople here don't really have any realistic chance of persuading [you to] return a death verdict, do they? W.B. replied, There's always that possibility. You know, it depends on the situation. But I really look at it is [ sic ] that it's  there's really no  life imprisonment is a better way of doing it, but I'm not saying that I couldn't be convinced otherwise, but that's the human side of it. When asked if he had thought it out pretty well, he stated, I've seen enough death in my life. The court granted the prosecutor's challenge for cause. Defendant now argues the court erred because even though W.B. voiced opposition to the death penalty, he also indicated he could still impose death in an appropriate case. The record shows that W.B.'s demeanor and attitude as observed by the court revealed more about his opinion regarding the death penalty than what he expressed in words. The court watched him as he was answering questions and decided he was a man of pretty strong convictions who did not like to appear to have a closed mind or to speak in absolutes and say always or never, but who, nonetheless, would unequivocally put [himself] in that absolute extreme position of always voting against the death penalty. The court concluded W.B. was substantially impaired within the meaning of the applicable law because realistically and honestly he would not be able to give the prosecution a fair hearing and a fair opportunity to at least persuade him to [vote for] the death penalty. In light of substantial evidence in support, we defer to the court's assessment of W.B.'s attitudes and in the decision to excuse him for cause.