Opinion ID: 409059
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Clay's negligence

Text: 7 The district court found the government had negligently maintained the truck that stalled and found Ranger Strang negligent. Harden v. U.S., 485 F.Supp. 380, 389-91 (S.D. Ga. 1980). These findings are not contested. It found Clay guilty of comparative negligence that proximately contributed to his death to the extent of 25 percent and reduced the gross damages accordingly. The findings of the district court on Clay's negligence were: 8 Wesley Clayton Harden also failed to exercise ordinary care or diligence. First, he did not heed the command of Ranger Paul Strang when Strang directed him to halt. At that time, Strang was in uniform in a marked vehicle, and had all of the visual appearances of a duly authorized law enforcement officer. Second, he willingly and actively participated in an indecent public exposure of himself, a disturbance of the peace, and a sequence of events which he knew, or should have known, would cause fear, excitement, and resentment among other persons lawfully within the Ridge Road Campsite Area. Third, Harden accompanied others whom he knew to be engaged in illegal and opprobrious activities. He knew that shots had been fired during their activities. He knew or should have known that exposure, offensive language, and the conduct of the group would cause fear, excitement, resentment, and possibly irrational defensive measures from other persons lawfully in the Ridge Road Campsite Area. Harden owed a duty to the public, and to other users of the campsite area, to refrain from illegal, criminal, opprobrious, or indecent behavior. 9 485 F.Supp. at 388. (Footnotes omitted). 10 The trial court did not err in finding Clay guilty of negligence that proximately contributed to his injury. Strang told the boys to halt. Clay's companion saw the ranger insignia on the side of the truck. The streaking at the family campsite had ended, but the boys had not yet reached the campsite they had rented. The conduct of the group had been such that it was likely to, if not intended to, cause alarm among others in the area. The group had precipitated an uproar at campsites in two or three areas sufficient to cause someone to seek ranger assistance. In the uproar two shots were fired. Women, fearful of safety, locked their children in a camper and hid behind it. When Strang arrived people were agitated and some armed. After the boys left the first campsite area they terrorized one or two more campsites. When the encounter came with the ranger, Clay was walking the road, still naked, with other initiates. The district court could properly find that Clay was negligent. The contention that as a matter of law Clay could not be found negligent is patently untenable. Whether the dangerous situation-that Clay had helped to create-had terminated was a question for the finder of fact. Certainly it had not as a matter of law come to an end. 11 The district court was not plainly erroneous in finding that Clay's negligence was a proximate cause of his death. The intervening act of the ranger in shooting the gun did not break the chain of causation as a matter of law. See William v. Grier, 196 Ga. 327, 26 S.E.2d 698, 699 (1943) (intervening act of a third person does not break causal connection if act could have been reasonably anticipated); Medi-Clean Services, Inc. v. Hill, 144 Ga.App. 389, 241 S.E.2d 290, 293 (1977); Seago Mechanical Contracting Co., Inc. v. Mobile Homes, 128 Ga.App. 261, 196 S.E.2d 346, 349 (1973). As the trial court pointed out, Clay had helped to create the situation of danger that existed. He put himself in a position in which he could anticipate that others would react in some manner such as to cause him injury. The precise form of reaction and injury is not determinative. Medi-Clean Service, Inc. v. Hill, supra 241 S.E.2d at 293. Lewis v. Harry White Ford, Inc., 129 Ga.App. 318, 199 S.E.2d 599, 602 (1973). Clay could anticipate reaction. He exposed himself to the risk of it, and it occurred. For proximate cause purposes it matters not that the reaction was a gun carelessly fired by a ranger rather than a billy club carelessly swung, or a rock or other object carelessly thrown by an aroused parent, a vehicle fleeing the scene driven by a frightened parent, or some other of the general types of reactive acts that might reasonably be anticipated. E.g., Mullis v. Chaika, 118 Ga.App. 11, 162 S.E.2d 448, 451-52 (1968). 12 Citing Johnston v. Pittard, 62 Ga.App. 550, 8 S.E.2d 717 (1940), the plaintiffs argue that Clay's actions were, as a matter of law, purely incidental to his injury. Johnston, however, is easily distinguished from this case. There the plaintiff was the unwitting victim of a practical joke and, unlike here, could not reasonably anticipate that his actions would provoke an injury-causing response. The plaintiff approached a house in the country with a group of friends after they had persuaded him that wild women were there. In fact the house was occupied by an angered and frightened farmer who fired shots, causing the plaintiff to run, fall, and suffer injury. In contrast, Clay was not victimized by deception. He instead had reason to expect that his actions would arouse anger, fear, reaction by others, and possibly injury of some kind. 13 Additionally, the doctrine of last clear chance does not, as the plaintiffs contend, absolve Clay of any comparative negligence. Under Georgia law, last clear chance applies only if the defendant actually knows of the plaintiff's perilous position. It is insufficient to show merely that the defendant should have known of the plaintiff's peril. Southland Butane Gas Co. v. Blackwell, 211 Ga. 665, 670, 88 S.E.2d 6, 10 (1955); Conner v. Mangum, 132 Ga.App. 100, 207 S.E.2d 604, 609 (1974). Although Strang should have known that his handling of his weapon and vehicle, which the court found to be negligent, placed Clay in a position of peril, certainly he was not as a matter of law actually aware that such peril existed.