Opinion ID: 2823846
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: CRE 301 Represents the Better Approach

Text: Â¶21Â Â Â Â Â After considering extra-jurisdictional precedent and the policies behind each view of res ipsa loquiturâs burden-shifting effects, we conclude that CRE 301 represents the better approach. 3 Not only does keeping the burden of proof on the plaintiff throughout cases involving res ipsa loquitur comport with the majority of other jurisdictionsâ treatment of the doctrine, but it also represents better policy. Â¶22Â Â Â Â Â As the Restatement points out, âthe great majority of the courts . . . treat res ipsa loquitur as creating nothing more than a permissible inference,â while others give it âthe effect of a presumption, which requires a directed verdict for the plaintiff if the defendant offers no evidence to rebut it,â and â[a]n even smaller number treat [it] as imposing the burden of proof upon the defendant.â Â§ 328D cmt. m. Colorado courts have repeatedly held res ipsa loquitur to be a rebuttable presumption, and we see no reason to deviate now. See, e.g., Kendrick, 252 P.3d at 1061; Stoneâs Farm, 805 P.2d at 1114. Â¶23Â Â Â Â Â Regarding whether the burden of proof shifts, however, our examination of the law in other jurisdictions reveals that the burden-shifting approach approved by Weiss is indeed a fringe position. In fact, the parties have directed us to only four jurisdictions in which this burden-shifting rule arguably remains entrenched, and we can find no others. See Schmidt v. Gibbs, 807 S.W.2d 928, 931 (Ark. 1991); Wellington Assocs., Inc. v. Capital Fire Prot. Co., 594 A.2d 1089, 1092 (Me. 1991); Woosley v. State Farm Ins. Co., 18 P.3d 317, 321 (Nev. 2001); Kemper v. Builderâs Square, Inc., 671 N.E.2d 1104, 1110 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996). The remaining jurisdictions that recognize res ipsa loquitur regard it as a permissible inference or a rebuttable presumption shifting only the burden of production. Additionally, the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly rejected theproposition that res ipsa loquitur shifts the burden of proof over 100 years ago. Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U.S. 233, 238 (1913) (â[I]n cases where [res ipsa loquitur] does apply, it has not the effect of shifting the burden of proof.â). While none of this precedent can lead us down one path or the other, it provides a persuasive map in light of our own precedentâs unnavigability. Â¶24Â Â Â Â Â Furthermore, keeping the burden of proof on the plaintiff throughout is better public policy. First, fitting res ipsa loquitur within CRE 301âs general schema of rebuttable presumptions unifies the state and federal effects of the presumption, âthus achieving a desirable degree of uniformity and simplicity.â CRE 301 committee cmt. Second, despite Respondentâs contention to the contrary, treating res ipsa loquitur as a rebuttable presumption without shifting the burden of proof does not turn it into an âillusory remedy.â Medical malpractice plaintiffs have ample opportunity to perform factual discovery, both through documents and depositions, to determine what happened during a procedure even if they were unconscious at the time. See, e.g., C.R.C.P. 30, 33, 34, 36. Though they cannot discover documentation from peer reviews or quality management programs, see Â§Â§ 12-36.5-104(10), 25-3-109(3) and (4), C.R.S. (2014), they can still discover the facts underlying these internal investigations and then hire their own experts to make sense of the data. The effect of res ipsa loquitur as a rebuttable presumption adequately corrects any lingering informational disparity. As we have previously indicated, even when the defendant satisfies the shifted burden of production and destroys the presumption of negligence with evidence that the trial court deems legally sufficient, a permissible inference remains that the jury may add tootherwise inadequate evidence in order to tip the scales in favor of the plaintiff. Krueger, 205 P.3d at 1154. Â¶25Â Â Â Â Â Accordingly, we hold that CRE 301 applies to the res ipsa loquitur doctrine in Colorado; thus, satisfying res ipsa loquiturâs elements creates a rebuttable presumption that âimposes upon the party against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but . . . the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of non-persuasion . . . remains throughout the trial upon the â plaintiff. CRE 301. Like other rebuttable presumptions, res ipsa loquitur shifts to the defendant only the burden of producing legally sufficient evidenceâthe burden of proof always remains on the plaintiff. See Krueger, 205 P.3d at 1154 (describing the effects of a rebuttable presumption). If the defendant satisfies that burden of production, the presumption is destroyed and only a permissible inference of negligence remains. Id. Â The jury may consider this inference alongside the other evidence in determining whether the plaintiff satisfied his burden to prove that the defendant was negligent, but it is not required to do so, and the trial court has discretion to determine whether or not to instruct the jury on the remaining permissible inference. Id. at 1152. To the extent that Weiss, Stoneâs Farm, or any other previously decided case holds to the contrary, these cases are hereby overruled.