Opinion ID: 1758492
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Golden Spread Council

Text: The court of appeals concluded that GSC owed a duty based on the principle of negligent hiring. 888 S.W.2d at 41-43. The fundamental problem with that conclusion is that GSC did not hire Estes. Thus, the facts of this case do not fit within the boundaries of the negligent hiring doctrine. Nevertheless, we must examine whether a duty exists in this case on other grounds. As stated above, this decision must be made by balancing several interrelated factors. Phillips, 801 S.W.2d at 525. The injury to C.C. was foreseeable to GSC. As stated earlier, the summary judgment evidence shows that GSC knew of complaints that Estes was messing with some boy scouts and was concerned that they might be serious. Only two to three months later, a local church asked Herbert, a GSC employee, to introduce it to a potential scoutmaster. Herbert, with full knowledge of the allegations, recommended Estes to the church. Taking all of the evidence and inferences from the evidence in support of Akins's position as true, we conclude that a factfinder could determine that Herbert and GSC, by recommending Estes, should have foreseen that they were creating an unreasonable risk of harm to the scouts in the newly formed troop. This foreseeability weighs heavily in favor of imposing a duty on GSC. However, foreseeability alone is not sufficient to justify the imposition of a duty. Bird v. W.C.W., 868 S.W.2d 767, 769 (Tex.1994). Thus, we must also consider other factors. The risk and likelihood of injury are high in this case. The Boy Scout Handbook informs all scouts that their troop leader carries out his duties because he likes boys and wants to help them become real men and that the troop leader is a friend to whom you can always turn for advice. By introducing a person about whom doubts had been raised to a church knowing that the church would likely put that person in a position of trust with young boys, GSC could be found to have actually increased the risk and likelihood of injury in this case. We have recognized that in some circumstances, at least, a person is under a duty to avoid such an affirmative act that may actually worsen a situation. Otis Eng'g Corp. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Tex.1983). Against the above factors, the Court must also weigh the social utility of GSC's conduct, the magnitude of the burden on GSC, and the consequences of placing such a burden on GSC. Phillips, 801 S.W.2d at 525. It is indisputable that the social utility of GSC's conduct is high. GSC provides the scouting program to various civic organizations, allowing morals and values to be taught to young boys. But the magnitude and consequences of imposing a limited duty on GSC are low. GSC was not obliged to investigate Estes on its own, or to risk liability for defamation by publishing the information it had received. If GSC should have known from the information it received from the Hearns that there was an unreasonable risk that Estes would molest boys, GSC simply should not have recommended Estes to the church sponsor of Troop 223. On balance, all of these factors favor the imposition of a duty in this case. Moreover, the Legislature has voiced a strong policy to protect children from abuse by requiring a person having cause to believe that a child's physical or mental health or welfare has been or may be adversely affected by abuse or neglect by any person to immediately make a report to the proper authorities. Tex. Fam.Code § 261.101(a). The Family Code also provides civil and criminal immunity to those who make such a report in good faith. Id. § 261.106(a). Finally, we have also emphasized other factors in determining whether a duty exists, including whether one party has superior knowledge of the risk or the right to control the actor whose conduct caused the harm. Graff, 858 S.W.2d at 920. Both of these factors weigh in favor of imposing a duty on GSC in this case. Although GSC did not control the everyday activities of its chartered organizations and scoutmasters, it certainly was not obliged to recommend Estes. Article VI, section 4, clause 4 of the Rules and Regulations of the Boy Scouts of America states that the local councils, like GSC, shall provide means for assisting chartered organizations in securing and training individuals to serve as unit leaders and assistants. In addition, Article VIII, section 1, clause 5 states that all recommendations for unit leadership are subject to local council approval before transmission to the BSA national office. These rules show that GSC might well have prevented Estes from being scoutmaster simply by not recommending him to the church. Viewing all of these factors as a whole, we conclude that GSC owed a duty in this case. GSC clearly owed a duty to the church that asked GSC to introduce it to a potential scoutmaster. We hold that this duty also extends to the children and parents involved in Troop 223 who relied on GSC and those involved in selecting Estes to provide a scoutmaster who was fit to serve. GSC's affirmative act of recommending Estes as a potential scoutmaster to the church created a duty on the part of GSC to use reasonable care in light of the information it had received. See Otis Eng'g, 668 S.W.2d at 309. GSC's duty is best expressed in comment e to Section 302B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which recognizes that there may be liability [w]here the actor has brought into contact or association with the other a person whom the actor knows or should know to be peculiarly likely to commit intentional misconduct, under circumstances which afford a peculiar opportunity or temptation for such misconduct. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302B, cmt. e, ¶ D. Cases from other jurisdictions support this conclusion. See, e.g., L.P. v. Oubre, 547 So.2d 1320, 1324 (La.Ct.App.1989) (concluding that parents stated negligence cause of action against local scout council where scout was sexually molested by scoutmaster); Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., 102 A.D.2d 100, 476 N.Y.S.2d 309, 316 (1984) (Murphy, P.J., dissenting) (concluding that BSA had duty to discharge scoutmaster because it knew of his previous misconduct with boys); Wilson v. Tobiassen, 97 Or.App. 527, 777 P.2d 1379, 1383 (1989) (noting that plaintiff proved negligence where local scout council failed to investigate allegations of sexual abuse by scoutmaster); cf. Souza v. Narragansett Council, Boy Scouts of Am., 488 A.2d 713, 715 (R.I.1985) (concluding that local council was not liable for injuries scout sustained in boxing match where no employee of council knew of boxing match). Accordingly, we hold that if GSC knew or should have known that Estes was peculiarly likely to molest boys, it had a duty not to recommend him as a scoutmaster. We impose no other duty on GSC than this. Specifically, GSC had no duty to investigate Estes on its own or to divulge to the church sponsor of Troop 223 or others the information it had received from the Hearns. GSC's only duty was to exercise reasonable care, based on the information it received, in recommending scoutmasters. The dissent argues that GSC owes no duty under a number of theories of liability and appears to attack the evidence of causation. We emphasize that the sole issue before us is whether GSC owed a legal duty under the theory of common-law negligence. Although we conclude that there are fact issues precluding summary judgment on this issue, we express no view on whether GSC breached its duty or whether GSC's actions were the cause of C.C.'s injuries, if any. To the extent the dissent addresses common-law negligence, it focuses solely on the evidence of GSC's control over Estes. The dissent errs by concluding that absent a special relationship, there can be no duty in this case. 926 S.W.2d 293 (Enoch, J., dissenting). This Court, in Bird, 868 S.W.2d at 769-70, set forth the proper duty analysis. First, the Court balanced the duty factors reiterated at length in this opinion. Id. at 769. The Court then, after deciding that these factors did not weigh in favor of imposing a duty, examined whether a special relationship existed. Id. at 770. This two-part analysis is proper when deciding whether a duty exists. There are some cases in which a duty exists as a matter of law because of a special relationship between the parties. Otis Eng'g, 668 S.W.2d at 309. In such cases, the duty analysis ends there. However, in most negligence cases a special relationship does not exist and, contrary to the dissent's view, the duty factors must be weighed by the Court. If the dissent's conclusion that without a special relationship there can be no duty were correct, there could be no recovery in most negligence cases. In this case, the Court, consistent with the analysis in Bird, weighed the duty factors. Because we conclude that these factors weigh in favor of imposing a duty, we need not consider whether a special relationship exists. Also, the dissent errs by concluding that this is a duty to control case. We are not imposing a duty on GSC to control Estes's sexual conduct. The dissent incorrectly focuses on control to the exclusion of the other factors we must balance when deciding whether a duty exists. It is well established that the issue of whether a duty exists is to be decided by balancing several interrelated factors listed earlier in this opinion. See, e.g., Bird, 868 S.W.2d at 769; Graff, 858 S.W.2d at 920; Phillips, 801 S.W.2d at 525; El Chico, 732 S.W.2d at 311; Otis Eng'g, 668 S.W.2d at 309. In our opinion today, we have balanced these factors while being careful to follow the proper standard of review. In conclusion, we recognize that there is no way to ensure that this type of conduct will never happen, despite an organization's best efforts. However, GSC and similar organizations deal with children. The public has a strong interest in protecting children from abuse, and parents put their trust in such organizations. Having undertaken to recommend a potential scoutmaster for the church, GSC had a duty to use reasonable care in doing so to prevent an unreasonable risk of harm to C.C. and others who would be affected. GSC breached that duty if it knew or should have known that Estes was peculiarly likely to molest boys. On this record, this is the issue determinative of GSC's liability. Fact issues exist with regard to whether GSC breached its duty, warranting a trial. Thus, summary judgment for GSC was improper. We therefore affirm the judgment of the court of appeals as to GSC. CORNYN, J., concurs. ENOCH, J., concurs and dissents.