Opinion ID: 791237
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Evidence of Willfulness

Text: 41 Under the ADEA, a plaintiff who establishes a willful violation of that statute can be awarded liquidated damages in an amount equal to unpaid wages. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b). As a general rule, the question of willfulness is properly left to the jury, and a reviewing court is not permitted to substitute [its] judgment for that of the jury even if it might have resolved the issue differently had [it] been the finder of fact. Grant v. Hazelett Strip-Casting Corp., 880 F.2d 1564, 1572 (2d Cir.1989). 42 Despite this deferential standard of review, the defendants assert that the liquidated damages award against them in this case must be vacated because the proof of willfulness was insufficient as a matter of law. They submit that plaintiffs failed to show that the charged age discrimination was committed by persons with actual knowledge of the ADEA or the existence of federal laws prohibiting discrimination based on age. The argument is unconvincing because actual knowledge is not the only means of proving willfulness. 43 Well-established precedent recognizes that the willfulness necessary to support liquidated damages under the ADEA can be established either by proof that a defendant actually knew that his conduct violated federal law or by reckless disregard of that fact. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 614, 113 S.Ct. 1701, 123 L.Ed.2d 338 (1993) (noting that ADEA violation is `willful' if the employer knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the ADEA (quoting Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 126, 105 S.Ct. 613, 83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); accord Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 381 F.3d 56, 76-77 (2d Cir.2004) (citing Hazen Paper v. Biggins, 507 U.S. at 614, 113 S.Ct. 1701), vacated on other grounds by KAPL, Inc. v. Meacham, ___ U.S. ____, 125 S.Ct. 1731, 161 L.Ed.2d 596 (2005) (mem.) 3 ; Padilla v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 92 F.3d 117, 123 (2d Cir.1996). Thus, it is hardly surprising that the defendants can cite cases in which willfulness was established by proof of actual knowledge. Such evidence is obviously enough to satisfy a willfulness requirement. McGinty v. New York, 193 F.3d 64, 70 (2d Cir.1999). But where actual knowledge cannot be shown, evidence of a defendant's reckless disregard of the law prohibiting age discrimination can also serve as an alternative basis for finding willfulness. Id.; see Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 381 F.3d at 76-77 (recognizing two standards for proving willfulness and upholding liquidated damages where jury had sufficient proof of reckless disregard); Benjamin v. United Merchs. & Mfrs., Inc., 873 F.2d 41, 44 (2d Cir.1989) (upholding liquidated damages when the proof shows that an employer was indifferent to the requirements of the governing statute and acted in a purposeful, deliberate, or calculated fashion). 44 In this case, the evidence was sufficient to support a jury finding that the defendants recklessly disregarded federal law prohibiting age discrimination. Viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the evidence shows that Transit Authority supervisors who made age-hostile remarks to and about Cross and Francis deliberately afforded these men less training than younger provisional Maintainers in order to have an excuse to demote them. The creation of a calculated subterfuge to support an adverse employment action supports an inference that the employer knew or recklessly ignored the fact that their real reason for demoting the plaintiffs — age — was unlawful. See, e.g., Kirsch v. Fleet St., Ltd., 148 F.3d 149, 164-65 (2d Cir.1998) (upholding jury verdict on willfulness under the ADEA because [t]he jury permissibly found that [defendant] intentionally discharged [plaintiff] because of his age and that defendants sought to conceal their age-based motivation by proffering a pretextual rationale of corporate financial exigency); Benjamin v. United Merchs. & Mfrs., Inc., 873 F.2d at 44-45 (finding that jury could have inferred a willful violation of the ADEA where employer proffered false and shifting justifications for unlawful termination calculated to conceal deliberate age discrimination; such evidence could support a finding that the employer knew the law but at the same time attempted to evade it); Russo v. Trifari, Krussman & Fishel, Inc., 837 F.2d 40, 45 (2d Cir.1988) (internal memo discrediting sincerity of company's explanation for adverse action could support finding of willfulness because it might be thought by the trier of fact to demonstrate not only deliberate age discrimination but also an appreciation of its illegality and a resultant attempt to conceal it); see also Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 551, 119 S.Ct. 2118, 144 L.Ed.2d 494 (1999) (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (There are other means of proving that an employer willfully violated the law. An employer, may, for example . . . conceal evidence regarding its `true' selection procedures because it knows they violate federal law.). 45 Further supporting this inference is evidence that the union specifically complained to defendants that their treatment of Cross and Francis was impermissibly discriminatory. Although these complaints apparently focused on plaintiffs' race rather than age, the fact that defendants ignored the warning and proceeded to demote plaintiffs, to replace them with younger Helpers, and to place these younger hires in a structured training program strengthens the inference that the defendants were indifferent to whether federal law proscribed age discrimination; their calculated purpose was to develop a corps of young Maintainers. See Benjamin v. United Merchs. & Mfrs., Inc., 873 F.2d at 44. 46 In sum, because the record is sufficient to support a jury finding that the defendants willfully discriminated against the plaintiffs based on age, this prong of their challenge to the liquidated damages award must be rejected as without merit. 47