Opinion ID: 4586640
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Services of a Religious Institution

Text: The clearly pronounced public policy behind West Virginia Code §§ 18-28-1 to 7 leads us to conclude that the Legislature also did not intend to empower the Attorney General to regulate a religious institution’s educational and recreational services under the deceptive practices provisions of the CCPA. The Legislature stated this broad policy in § 18-28-1 (1983): In conformity with the constitutions of the United States and of West Virginia, it is the public policy of the State in matters of education that no human authority shall, in any case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of conscience or with religious liberty and that no person shall be enforced, restrained, molested or burdened, in body or goods, or otherwise suffer, on account of his or her religious opinions or belief, but all people shall be free to profess, and by argument, to maintain their opinions in matters of religion; and further be free to select their religious instructor, and to make for his or her support, such private contract as they shall please, and that religion, morality and knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of humankind, the means of education shall forever be encouraged. As explained above, enforcement of the deceptive practices provisions depends on an assessment of the nature of the education actually supplied by the church 36 We emphasize that a church school is not entitled to the exemption of § 18-28-6 if it is not in compliance with the requirements of Chapter 18, Article 28. 14 school. The Attorney General’s position—that he is empowered to apply those provisions to the educational and recreational services offered by a religious institution, rather than just a school operated by the institution—necessarily undermines the public policy of § 18-28-1, the prohibition of § 18-28-6, and reason. Consider a church-sponsored fee-based trip: could the Legislature have intended the Attorney General to regulate a religious institution’s representations about the trip but not representations made by its affiliated church school? That is absurd. It would also be absurd to conclude that the Legislature intended to exempt a church school’s representations about its educational services from regulation under the deceptive practices provisions of the CCPA, but not those same representations when made by the affiliated religious institution regarding its recreational services. “This Court has recognized that the CCPA is a remedial statute intended to protect consumers from unfair, illegal and deceptive business practices, and must be liberally construed to accomplish that purpose.” 37 To that end, the Legislature has directed that the deceptive practices provisions “shall be liberally construed so that its beneficial purposes may be served.” 38 We are also cognizant that those provisions are “among the most broadly drawn provisions contained in the Consumer Credit and Protection Act and 37 Harper v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 227 W. Va. 142, 151, 706 S.E.2d 63, 72 (2010). 38 W. Va. Code § 46A-6-101 (2015). 15 [they are] also among the most ambiguous.” 39 So, without a clear statement from the Legislature as to how it intended the deceptive practices provisions to interact with §§ 18-28-1 to 7, we must determine the reach of the deceptive practices provisions by applying our tools—the rules of statutory construction—to the materials available. We cannot ignore the public policy expressed by the Legislature in §§ 18-28-1 to 7 and its apparent conflict with application of the deceptive practices provisions to educational and recreational services offered by a religious institution. Nor can we overlook the absurd results of resolving that conflict by construing those statutes to regulate a church school’s representations about its educational and recreational services, but not a religious institution’s. “‘Where a particular construction of a statute would result in an absurdity, some other reasonable construction, which will not produce such absurdity, will be made.’ Syl. Pt. 2, Newhart v. Pennybacker, 120 W.Va. 774, 200 S.E. 350 (1938).” 40 As we stated in 1925: It is the duty of a court to construe a statute according to its true intent, and give to it such construction as will uphold the law and further justice. It is as well the duty of a court to disregard a construction, though apparently warranted by the 39 McFoy v. Amerigas, Inc., 170 W. Va. 526, 529, 295 S.E.2d 16, 19 (1982). 40 Syl. Pt. 3, Sheena H. ex rel. Russell H. ex rel. L.H. v. Amfire, LLC, 235 W. Va. 132, 772 S.E.2d 317 (2015). 16 literal sense of the words in a statute, when such construction would lead to injustice and absurdity.[41] So, we hold that the deceptive practices provisions, W. Va. Code §§ 46A-6-101 to 106 (2015), in the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act do not apply to or regulate the educational or recreational services offered by a religious institution. The Attorney General’s allegations against the Diocese are deeply troubling. Diocesan leaders allegedly exposed children and adults to admitted sexual abusers—or to those credibly accused of sexual abuse—for decades. And, when offered the opportunity to separate those abusers from students and church faithful, the Diocese allegedly failed to take it. Children trust adults not to hurt them. The faithful trust their leaders to embody the tenets of the faith. If the Diocese acted, or failed to act, as the Attorney General alleges, then the Diocese has violated that trust and harmed those tendered to its care. While we recognize that violations of this trust may subject the Diocese to liability under other legal theories, our sympathy cannot rewrite the law and we cannot ignore the existence and import of §§ 18-28-1 to 7 and its conflict with the deceptive practices provisions when applied to the educational and recreational services of a religious institution. 42 41 Syl. Pt. 2, Click v. Click, 98 W.Va. 419, 127 S.E. 194 (1925). 42 Nothing in our decision today relieves a religious institution, or a school or camp operated by a religious institution, from its obligation to maintain a safe environment or its obligation to comply with other provisions of law as the case may be. For example, our mandated reporter statute, West Virginia Code § 49-2-803 (2018), requires school teachers, youth camp administrators and counselors, and members of the clergy, inter alia, to timely 17 We emphasize that the circuit court asked for an answer to a narrow legal question, and that is what we have supplied. As we have cautioned before when answering a different certified question regarding the reach of the deceptive practices provisions of the CCPA, this opinion should not be read as an attempt to in any way diminish the power of the office of the Attorney General. This Court recognizes and respects the powers granted the Attorney General by the Constitution and by statute, including the authority to enforce the provisions of the consumer protection act. Rather, it must be understood that the legal issue before us is a narrow one and that our resolution of this issue rests, as explained above, solely on this Court’s understanding of the Legislature’s intent in drafting W.Va. Code § 46A–6–104.[43]