Opinion ID: 1915437
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Denial of a Late-filed Motion for a Jury Trial

Text: Finally, Pearson argues that the trial court erred by denying his late-filed motion for a jury trial. The Chungs, on the other hand, argue that Pearson erred procedurally in his effort to appeal the trial court's orders denying his motions for trial by jury because he did not specifically make reference to those orders in his notice of appeal. Pearson's notice of appeal stated that he was appealing the Order of June 25, 2007, and orders merged therein. Because an appeal of a final judgment draws into question all prior non-final rulings and orders, Pearson's appeal of the trial court's orders denying his motions for trial by jury was proper. Flax v. Schertler, 935 A.2d 1091, 1099 (D.C.2007) (citations omitted). Super. Ct. Civ. R. 38 entitles a party to a trial by jury of any issue triable of right by a jury only if the demand is made not later than 10 days after the service of the last pleading.... Pearson concedes that he did not make a demand for a jury trial in Superior Court within the required time period. Nonetheless, Super. Ct. Civ. R. 39(b) provides that notwithstanding the failure of a party to demand a jury in an action in which such demand might have been made of right, the Court in its discretion upon motion may order a trial by a jury of any or all issues. Factors to be considered by the court include all elements pertinent to the interests of both parties and also to the general conduct of the business of the court, such as the possibility of prejudice to other parties and the likelihood of delay attendant upon a sudden switch from a non-jury to a jury trial. Dominique v. Ralph D. Kaiser Co., 479 A.2d 319, 322 (D.C.1984) (citation omitted). Pearson asserts that the trial court, in ruling on his motion for a jury trial, abused its discretion by failing to consider four of the five factors that Kass v. Baskin, 82 U.S.App. D.C. 385, 164 F.2d 513 (1947), requires a court to consider when deciding a motion for trial by jury filed after the time frame in which a jury trial is of right. Pearson, however, misreads Kass. It does not require a trial court to consider any particular factors, but instead states that the court may consider and act upon any and all pertinent factors in the case, including particularly the nature of the issues presented by the pleadings and the general orderly disposition of the court's business. 82 U.S.App. D.C. at 387, 164 F.2d at 515. Thus, a trial court has the discretion to consider relevant factors and to rule appropriately. See also May v. Melvin, 78 U.S.App. D.C. 368, 368, 141 F.2d 22, 22 (1944) (under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, if a party fails to request a jury trial within ten days after service of the last pleading, the court has discretion to order a jury trial, but has no obligation to do so). Pearson cites Hiotis v. Sherman Distributors of Maryland, Inc., 607 F.Supp. 217 (D.D.C.1984) for the proposition that [i]t is well established that a [trial] court should grant a Rule 39(b) motion in the absence of strong and compelling reasons to the contrary, and that such a motion should be favorably considered unless there are persuasive reasons to deny it. Id. at 219 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). This language, however, was effectively overruled by BCCI Holdings (Lux.), S.A. v. Khalil, 341 U.S.App. D.C. 408, 214 F.3d 168 (2000), which rejected the Hiotis interpretation of Rule 39(b) and stated that [a]bsent an abuse of discretion by the trial court, a defaulting party who has already waived the right to a jury trial under Rule 38(d) has no viable claim. This does not mean that a trial court can simply ignore a Rule 39(b) motion or whimsically deny it for no good reason. But trial courts have wide latitude under the abuse of discretion standard to weigh the merits of late demands for jury trials. 341 U.S.App.D.C. at 413, 214 F.3d at 173. Pearson's Rule 39(b) motion seeking a jury trial was purportedly based upon his perception that Judge Kravitz, who was the judge assigned to the case at the time of the scheduling conference, had already formed a view of the case adverse to Pearson's position. He based this on his recollection that Judge Kravitz, at the scheduling conference, had voiced the firm view that the case should not be litigated. The transcript of the scheduling conferenceavailable to Judge Kravitz before he ruled on the motiondoes not support Pearson's recollection. On the contrary, the transcript reflects that the parties themselves had agreed before they came before Judge Kravitz that the case should be put on a speedy time schedule (known as Track # 1) in order to expedite it, and that the closest that Judge Kravitz came to saying anything that could possibly constitute belittling the merits of the case was when he pointed out that the claim was not a complicated issue. Indeed, Pearson himself said to Judge Kravitz: [W]e spent a great deal of time discussing settlement. We've agreed to track one in an effort to expedite the case. I'm open to mediation at any time, but we've spent a great deal of time discussing the prospects and there doesn't seem to appear to be any there. Judge Kravitz, following Pearson's suggestion, inquired whether mediation should take place right away before discovery goes any further and the parties spend more time and money and energy on it. In rejecting Pearson's late-filed motion for a jury trial, Judge Kravitz noted that [t]he plaintiff premises his motion upon two accusations of judicial misconduct. The court explained that Pearson's accusations were without merit, recognized that it had discretion to grant the motion, and agreed with Pearson that, as a general matter, such motions should be considered liberally. However, where, as here, the only bases upon which a party has relied in seeking the Court's leave are entirely refuted by the record and by the governing law, the Court does not believe that it should exercise its discretion in favor of that party. Pearson's renewed motion for trial by jury essentially restated his original motion, and was also denied. Pearson has not established that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motions for trial by jury. The trial court had discretion to grant or deny Pearson's Rule 39(b) motion, recognized that it had such discretion, purported to exercise it, and supported its determination with sufficient facts. See Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 363-64 (D.C.1979). There has been no showing that the trial court failed to consider a relevant factor... [or] relied upon an improper factor, and the reasons given reasonably support the conclusion. Id. at 365 (citation omitted). A trial court has discretion in deciding a Rule 39(b) motion and there was no abuse of discretion here. In any event, he cannot possibly show prejudice, since the case was ultimately tried by Judge Bartnoff, not Judge Kravitz. Therefore, we affirm Judge Kravitz's decision on this point.