Opinion ID: 891574
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act

Text: {50} In analyzing the applicability of the PKPA to the present case, we first note a fundamental difference between the federal statute and the UCCJEA. While the UCCJEA is a state enactment which is not binding on tribal courts, the PKPA would apply to tribes if Congress intended it to do so, because of Congress's plenary power over the tribes. See S.D. v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 343, 118 S.Ct. 789, 139 L.Ed.2d 773 (1998) (Congress possesses plenary power over Indian affairs, including the power to modify or eliminate tribal rights.). If the PKPA were to define tribes as states, then, unlike the UCCJEA, the PKPA would require the tribes to abide by its conditions, even if the tribe did not explicitly pass such a statute. But see Canby, supra, at 228-29 (Neither the Constitution nor federal statutes appear to require tribal courts to give full faith and credit to state court judgments. As a matter of practice, however, many tribal courts regularly give full effect to state court judgments, presumably also as a matter of `comity.'). [8] We, therefore, turn to an analysis of whether the PKPA applies to tribes.