Opinion ID: 2747928
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Resulting Litigation in the District Court

Text: Daisy Aguayo-Cuevas, the decedent’s consensual partner, individually and on behalf of her and Torres-López’s four minor children (the “Torres-Aguayo heirs,” and together with their mother the “Aguayo plaintiffs”) filed a wrongful death complaint in the United States District Court on September 15, 2011. Cason and Benavides, the decedent’s sisters, also joined the action as named plaintiffs. The named defendants were PREPA, the PRTC, and their insurance companies (collectively “Defendants”). All plaintiffs sought relief for their own pain and suffering resulting from the illegal death of Torres-López.1 In addition, the Torres-Aguayo heirs sought to recover for the damages their father suffered prior to his death via a survivorship action.2 1 Puerto Rico law permits relatives of the deceased and certain other individuals, such as consensual partners, to bring a personal claim under Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, for their personal damages caused by the decedent’s wrongful death. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31 § 5141. Such an action is not limited to family members, is not dependent upon status as an heir, and does not require plaintiff to have suffered physical injury or economic loss. See Montalvo v. González-Amparo, 587 F.3d 43, 47 (1st Cir. 2009); Hernández v. Fournier, 80 P.R. Dec. 93, 98-99 (1957). 2 At times, the term “survivorship action” or “inherited claim” has been confused by the parties to refer to claims brought by the decedent’s heirs for their own pain and suffering resulting from an illegal death. This is incorrect. As will be discussed further, there are two types of actions that stem from the tort of wrongful death: individual damages and survivorship actions. Both actions are separate and distinct from one another. See Montalvo, 587 F.3d at 46; Widow of Delgado v. Boston Ins. Co., 1 P.R. Offic. -5- The District Court’s jurisdiction was premised on diversity of citizenship; at the time the complaint was filed, all named plaintiffs were domiciled in San Antonio, Texas, and all named defendants were domiciled in Puerto Rico. On November 10, 2011, PREPA filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as well as Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(7), for failure to join a necessary party under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19. Therein, PREPA contended that the survivorship cause of action should be dismissed pursuant to Cruz-Gascot v. HIMA-San Pablo Hosp. Bayamón, 728 F. Supp. 2d 14 (D.P.R. 2010), which held that all members of an estate must be named as parties to a survivorship action brought under Puerto Rico law. PREPA averred that a fifth member of TorresLópez’s estate was missing from the action, to wit, a child from a previous relationship (hereinafter the “fifth minor child”). PREPA argued that this additional heir was a necessary and indispensable party, and thus, the case could not proceed without him. However, because this child was domiciled in Puerto Rico, joining him would vitiate the court’s diversity jurisdiction. Moreover, PREPA argued that the personal actions for damages brought by Cason and Benavides should also be dismissed in “equity and good conscience” pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b) because dismissal would allow Trans. 823, 825, 101 P.R. Dec. 598, 602 (1973). -6- said plaintiffs to initiate a suit in the Commonwealth court of Puerto Rico. On January 9, 2012, the Aguayo plaintiffs voluntarily moved to dismiss without prejudice of all their personal damages claims, as well as the estate’s survivorship action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). They informed the court that they no longer resided in Texas having moved to Puerto Rico. They also stated that they intended to pursue all their claims in Commonwealth court along with the fifth minor child.3 However, they noted that Cason and Benavides, who remained Texas citizens, would continue to assert their personal claims in federal court. The Defendants did not file any opposition to the voluntary dismissal request. On January 9, 2012, all plaintiffs opposed PREPA’s motion to dismiss noting that the same became moot upon the Aguayo plaintiffs’ request for voluntary dismissal, as Cason and Benavides were now the only remaining plaintiffs. On January 31, 2012, PREPA replied to plaintiffs’ opposition to dismissal. It did not challenge Cason and Benavides’s Texas domicile and solely argued that the District Court should nonetheless abstain from adjudicating Cason and Benavides’s personal actions under Colorado River Water 3 Plaintiffs-Appellants allege they had no prior knowledge of the fifth minor child’s existence when they filed their federal suit. It appears they learned he existed once PREPA asked the District Court to take judicial notice of a Commonwealth court case brought by his mother on his behalf. -7- Conservation Dist. v. U.S., 424 U.S. 800 (1976). PREPA posited that, regardless of the sisters’ diverse status, they should be required to join the other plaintiffs’ state action and litigate in Commonwealth court. On May 2, 2012, a magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation on PREPA’s motion to dismiss suggesting that the District Court grant the Aguayo plaintiffs’ voluntary dismissal motion. The report and recommendation further suggested that the District Court deny the motion to dismiss for failure to join an indispensable party because the heirs who brought the survivorship action were no longer parties. The magistrate judge noted that there was no concern for the failure to join an indispensable party, as articulated in Cruz-Gascot. More so, she noted that Cason and Benavides, who are not estate members, only claimed individual damages for the pain and suffering their brother’s untimely death personally caused them. Said claims were the only ones left and thus, were jurisdictionally sound. Regarding Colorado-River, the magistrate judge noted that abstention under said doctrine required exceptional circumstances and was improper because Cason and Benavides were not heirs of the decedent. Contrary to PREPA’s assertion, there was no parallel state court action for them to join. On May 16, 2012, PREPA objected to the report and recommendation. Thereafter, on September 28, 2012, the District -8- Court issued a memorandum and order rejecting the same. The court held that the non-diverse fifth minor child was indispensable and his presence was required to adjudicate the suit. However, his joinder would destroy the parties’ complete diversity. The District Court thus dismissed the entire action, including Cason and Benavides’s individual claims, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In doing so, it relied exclusively on Cruz-Gascot.4