Opinion ID: 203908
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Facially Conclusive Preemption Under Younger

Text: Ordinarily, we review the grant of a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion. Boston Duck Tours, LP v. Super Duck Tours, LLC, 531 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir.2008). However, we review de novo whether Younger mandates a district court's abstention. Rio Grande Cmty. Health Ctr., Inc. v. Rullan, 397 F.3d 56, 68 (1st Cir.2005) (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 45-47, 91 S.Ct. 746). If Younger requires abstention, there is no discretion to grant injunctive relief. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 n. 22, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976).
As a matter of comity, federal courts are required to abstain from enjoining ongoing state court proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-47, 91 S.Ct. 746 (addressing state criminal prosecutions); New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. City of New Orleans ( NOPSI ), 491 U.S. 350, 366-68, 109 S.Ct. 2506, 105 L.Ed.2d 298 (1989) (extending Younger to civil proceedings). Ordinarily, the Younger question [of abstention] must be decided before decision on the merits of the underlying claim. Local Union No. 12004, USW v. Massachusetts, 377 F.3d 64, 76 n. 11 (1st Cir.2004) (citing Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 346, 95 S.Ct. 2281, 45 L.Ed.2d 223 (1975)). Under Younger, a federal court must abstain if (1) there is an ongoing state judicial proceeding involving the federal plaintiff that (2) implicates important state interests and (3) provides an adequate opportunity for the federal plaintiff to assert his federal claims. Id. at 77, 91 S.Ct. 746 (citing Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982)). The district court found that the three criteria for abstention under Younger were met here, and we agree. The parties do not dispute two of the criteria, namely, that a state judicial proceeding was pending before MCAD, and that those proceedings provided an adequate opportunity to raise the federal questions at issue. Under the remaining criterion, Colonial and UMass argue that the state proceedings do not implicate important state interests. We disagreeprohibiting unlawful employment discrimination is a sufficiently important state interest to warrant abstention. See Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 629, 106 S.Ct. 2718, 91 L.Ed.2d 512 (1986). Because the three criteria of Younger are satisfied, abstention would be required unless an exception applies. See Local Union No. 12004, 377 F.3d at 77. The district court concluded it did not need to abstain because preemption was facially conclusive, and we now turn to consideration of whether that exception was in fact applicable here.
The Court has acknowledged that, even assuming the state proceedings ... are the sort to which Younger applies, abstention may not be appropriate if the federal plaintiff will `suffer irreparable injury' absent equitable relief. NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 366, 109 S.Ct. 2506 (quoting Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44, 91 S.Ct. 746). NOPSI further suggested that [i]rreparable injury may possibly be established ... by a showing that the challenged state statute is `flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions.' Id. (quoting Younger, 401 U.S. at 53-54, 91 S.Ct. 746). This suggestion, in turn, formed the basis for the Court's observation that a facially conclusive claim of preemption may likewise be sufficient to render abstention inappropriate. Id. at 367, 109 S.Ct. 2506. Because the Court concluded that the proceedings there at issue would not meet such a standard, it stopped short of determining whether such an exception actually existed. Id. That observation, however, has provided a sufficient basis for several circuits, including the First Circuit, subsequently to recognize an exception to abstention where preemption is facially conclusive. See Chaulk Servs., Inc. v. Mass. Comm'n Against Discrimination, 70 F.3d 1361, 1370 (1st Cir.1995); Local Union No. 12004, 377 F.3d at 78. As is often the case with abstract legal standards, courts have largely defined the term facially conclusive by rejecting that which it is not. For example, the NOPSI Court explained that merely showing a substantial claim of federal pre-emption is not enough. 491 U.S. at 366-67, 109 S.Ct. 2506 (emphasis supplied). Likewise, it noted that [w]hat requires further factual inquiry can hardly be deemed flagrantly unlawful for purposes of a threshold abstention determination. Id.  Finally, two of our sister circuits have held that questions of first impression preclude application of the facially conclusive exception. See GTE Mobilnet of Ohio v. Johnson, 111 F.3d 469, 478 (6th Cir.1997); Woodfeathers, Inc. v. Wash. County, Or., 180 F.3d 1017, 1022 (9th Cir. 1999). Calderon and MCAD argue that these principles preclude application of the facially conclusive exception here. We turn first to Calderon's argument that ERISA preemption was not facially conclusive because a question of first impression existed regarding her claims under the ADA.
As the district court correctly noted, ERISA preempts any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under section 1003(b) of this title. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 91, 103 S.Ct. 2890, 77 L.Ed.2d 490 (1983). ERISA, however, does not preempt other federal laws, such as the ADA. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) ([N]othing in this subchapter shall be construed to alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair, or supersede any law of the United States.); Shaw, 463 U.S. at 102-03, 103 S.Ct. 2890; Tompkins v. United Healthcare of New Eng., Inc., 203 F.3d 90, 96-97 (1st Cir.2000). Further, because the ADA contemplates that state laws will contribute to the overall federal enforcement regime, we have held that state statutory claims target[ing] conduct unlawful under the ADA ... would be exempt from ERISA preemption as well. Id. Calderon argued before the district court that her state law claims allege acts that are prohibited by the ADA, thus barring preemption. She further argued that, because the ADA's applicability to her claims presents a question of first impression in this circuit, preemption was not facially conclusive and that abstention was required. Colonial and UMass responded by arguing that, where preemption turns on the scope of another federal law, district courts have the authority to weigh novel arguments about that scope in order to determine the scope of preemption. We have not had occasion to decide whether the ADA prohibits as discriminatory an employer's decision to provide short-term disability benefits to individuals with physical disabilities, but not to those with mental disabilities. [3] Therefore, this constitutes a question of first impression in our circuit. That, however, is not the question before us today. Rather, we must decide whether the district court properly delved into the question of the ADA's applicability to Calderon's claims under the strictures of the abstention doctrine as set forth in Younger and its progeny. The district court acknowledged the lack of controlling precedent on the question of whether the ADA applies to claims such as Calderon's, but concluded that, under Partners Healthcare Sys., Inc. v. Sullivan, 497 F.Supp.2d 29, 40 (D.Mass.2007), it was permitted to answer that question before determining whether preemption was facially conclusive. It further concluded that, in fact, it was required to do so under Shaw. Thus, the district court considered the rationale behind both positions and determined that the conclusion and reasoning of the court in Wilson [were] substantially more compelling and made considerable practical sense. [4] We consider first whether Shaw, indeed, requires a district court to undertake such an analysis and conclude that it does not, for the simple reason that Shaw was a straightforward preemption case and did not address abstention under Younger. See Shaw, 463 U.S. 92-93, 103 S.Ct. 2890. It is true that Shaw indicates that a district court faced with a preemption question must determine whether the alleged acts are prohibited by federal law. See id. at 95-96, 103 S.Ct. 2890. Shaw, however, does not address the interplay between facially conclusive preemption and the Younger abstention doctrine, let alone hold that a district court's preemption inquiry must trump Younger 's requirements. Indeed, the Supreme Court has already rejected such an approach to the abstention inquiry. In NOPSI, the Court expressly rejected NOPSI's argument that a district court presented with a preemption-based request for equitable relief should take a quick look at the merits; and if upon that look the claim appears substantial, the court should endeavor to resolve it. See NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 364-65, 109 S.Ct. 2506; see also Local Union No. 12004, 377 F.3d at 76 n. 11 (Ordinarily, the Younger question must be decided before decision on the merits of the underlying claim.). Thus, while we recognize that Colonial and UMass may have stated a substantial claim of federal pre-emption, such a claim is not enough to justify a federal court's intervention in an ongoing state proceeding. NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 366-67, 109 S.Ct. 2506. In sum, the district court's need to conduct a detailed analysis, including resolving interjurisdictional differences, demonstrates that ERISA preemption of Calderon's state law claims was not, in fact, facially conclusive. See GTE Mobilnet, 111 F.3d at 478. Therefore, we conclude that the principles set forth in Younger required the district court to abstain in deference to the state proceeding already underway. The same principles of comity and federalism that proscribe the district court's jurisdiction likewise prohibit our consideration of the merits of Calderon's ADA claims in the first instance. See id. at 476-78. In fact, to decide this preemption issue would require us to enter into a detailed analysis of state [and federal] law, a task in which we will not engage. Id. at 478. MCAD has jurisdiction to conduct this analysis in the first instance, and must be permitted to do so.
Because the existence of a question of first impression regarding the ADA's applicability to Calderon's claims precludes preemption from being facially conclusive, and requires the district court to abstain under Younger, we need not address whether the existence of a factual dispute as to the ERISA status of Colonial's STD plan required the district court either to make a factual determination or abstain under Younger. We note, however, that the record shows Calderon presented evidence sufficient to raise a factual dispute as to whether the STD plan she purchased from Colonial was governed by ERISA, or would instead find refuge in the safe harbor regulation under which the Secretary of Labor chose to exempt from ERISA certain group insurance programs where the employer is only minimally involved in providing the coverage. See 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1(j). We observe here only that, given the existence of this factual dispute, we see several problems with the district court's determination that preemption was facially conclusive. First, contrary to the district court's assertion that it did not need to resolve this question, ERISA only preempts state laws to the extent that they relate to any employee benefit plan governed by ERISA. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). Thus, [e]xpress ERISA preemption analysis... involves two central questions: (1) whether the plan at issue is an `employee benefit plan' [within ERISA] and (2) whether the cause of action `relates to' this employee benefit plan. Hampers v. W.R. Grace & Co., Inc., 202 F.3d 44, 49 (1st Cir.2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because Younger prohibits a district court from addressing the merits of the parties' claims unless preemption is facially conclusive, and ERISA preemption requires that the plan at issue be covered by ERISA, the plan's ERISA status would have to be facially conclusive. See Local Union No. 12004, 377 F.3d at 78. At this juncture, we have substantial doubts as to whether such was the case in this instance.