Opinion ID: 2099735
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admissibility of Defendant's Court-Reported Statement

Text: The State argues that the appellate court erred in reversing the trial court's decision to deny the defendant's motion to suppress. The State asserts that the trial court was correct because the defendant's court-reported inculpatory statement, like the oral inculpatory statements that preceded it, was voluntary. The defendant argues that the appellate court did not err. The defendant asserts that the trial court was incorrect because his court-reported statement was involuntary. According to the defendant, he was held by the police in order to draw out a confession while they gathered evidence to justify retroactively his arrest. We review the trial court's fact determinations for manifest error, and we review de novo its ultimate decision on the motion to suppress. See People v. Love, 199 Ill.2d 269, 274-75, 263 Ill.Dec. 808, 769 N.E.2d 10 (2002), citing In re G.O., 191 Ill.2d 37, 50, 245 Ill.Dec. 269, 727 N.E.2d 1003 (2000); People v. Pitman, 211 Ill.2d 502, 511, 286 Ill.Dec. 36, 813 N.E.2d 93 (2004). In Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114, 95 S.Ct. 854, 863, 43 L.Ed.2d 54, 65 (1975), the United States Supreme Court held that the fourth amendment requires the State to afford a fair and reliable judicial determination of probable cause either before or promptly after a suspect's arrest. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 125, 95 S.Ct. at 868-69, 43 L.Ed.2d at 71-72. In County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 54, 111 S.Ct. 1661, 1669, 114 L.Ed.2d 49, 61 (1991), the Court reiterated that the State must afford promptnot immediate probable cause determinations. Generally, the State satisfies this requirement if it provides judicial determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 56, 111 S.Ct. at 1670, 114 L.Ed.2d at 63. Even if a probable cause hearing is held within this 48-hour window, however, the State still may violate Gerstein if the defendant can prove unreasonable delaychiefly, delay to gather additional evidence to justify the defendant's arrest. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 56, 111 S.Ct. at 1670, 114 L.Ed.2d at 63. Here, the defendant was arrested at 2 p.m. on September 25, 1999, and finished his court-reported inculpatory statement around 1 a.m. on September 27, 1999. The defendant was presented to the trial court five hours later. Thus, the defendant was in custody for 35 hours before he confessed and 40 hours before he was taken before a judgewell within McLaughlin's 48-hour window. Thus, the defendant bears the burden of showing that the delay was unreasonable. The defendant argues that the delay between his arrest and his presentment was expressly to gather additional evidence to justify his arrest at an impending probable cause hearing and, therefore, that the delay was unreasonable under Gerstein/McLaughlin. The record, asserts the defendant, clearly shows that the Assistant State's Attorney would not approve the charges for a [probable cause] hearing until he got more evidence and, therefore, the investigation that the police were doing was to justify the arrest. The defendant refers to Detective McNally's testimony that [Assistant State's Attorney] O'Reilly classified the case as a continuing investigation. In other words, he was requesting additional work to be done on the case before it would be reviewed. McNally specified that O'Reilly wanted police to recanvas the neighborhood for additional witnesses and to find the handgun. As McNally stated, The state's attorney has to approve a felony case in order for it to go to court, where presumably the defendant would be presented for a probable cause determination. The State argues that the delay was not unreasonable or unnecessary because the police were engaged in an ongoing dialog with the defendant, which was interrupted for 18 hours between his invocation of his right to remain silent and his reinitiation of contact with the police. The State insists that the police were not gathering evidence to justify the defendant's arrest, but to bolster the case against him at trial. Although this court has held that postarrest delays of similar duration pass constitutional muster (see People v. House, 141 Ill.2d 323, 379-80, 152 Ill.Dec. 572, 566 N.E.2d 259 (1990) (37 hours); People v. Nicholls, 42 Ill.2d 91, 101, 245 N.E.2d 771 (1969) (34 hours)), we need not decide whether the defendant has shown that the delay here was to gather additional evidence to justify his arrest, and thus ran afoul of Gerstein/McLaughlin. Even if there were a fourth amendment problem and we do not suggest there waswe would still have to decide whether the defendant's confession was voluntary. See Willis, 215 Ill.2d at 535, 294 Ill.Dec. 581, 831 N.E.2d 531 (When faced with a Gerstein/McLaughlin violation, we ask simply whether the confession was voluntary). Admitting an involuntary confession into evidence violates the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. V) and article I, section 10, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 10). A confession is voluntary if it is the product of free will, rather than the product of the inherently coercive atmosphere of the police station. See Willis, 215 Ill.2d at 535, 294 Ill.Dec. 581, 831 N.E.2d 531. To determine whether the defendant's confession was voluntary, we consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding it, including the defendant's age, intelligence, education, experience, and physical condition at the time of the detention and interrogation; the duration of the interrogation; the presence of Miranda warnings; the presence of any physical or mental abuse; and the legality and duration of the detentionthat is, whether the detention violated the fourth amendment as construed by Gerstein and McLaughlin. See Willis, 215 Ill.2d at 536, 294 Ill.Dec. 581, 831 N.E.2d 531 (citing People v. Ballard, 206 Ill.2d 151, 177, 276 Ill.Dec. 538, 794 N.E.2d 788 (2002), and People v. Gilliam, 172 Ill.2d 484, 500-01, 218 Ill.Dec. 884, 670 N.E.2d 606 (1996)). At the time of the shooting, the defendant was a 22-year-old high school dropout who had no prior experience with the criminal justice system. He was taking classes toward his high school equivalency degree, and was employed by UPS as a loader. When he was arrested, he was apparently in fine physical condition, and his answers to police and prosecution questions indicate he was alert and articulate. The defendant voluntarily accompanied the police to Area 1 on September 24, and voluntarily returned there after his polygraph test. Between his arrest at 2 p.m. on September 25 and his confession at 1 a.m. on September 27, 1999, the defendant was questioned several times. The police or prosecutor began each interview by reading to the defendant Miranda warnings and receiving from the defendant an acknowledgment and waiver of his rights. In one interview, the defendant even indicated he understood his rights by reciting them back to the police, stating that he had learned them from a television program. On September 25, the defendant spoke with an attorney and subsequently invoked his fifth amendment rights. The police scrupulously abided by the defendant's decision. The next day, the defendant reinitiated contact with the police, and the police obtained a written waiver from the defendant before speaking further with him. Hours later, the defendant gave a 46-page court-reported inculpatory statement. There is no evidence of physical or mental abuse against the defendant, other than the defendant's suppression hearing testimony that unnamed police officers threatened that he would be sexually assaulted in jail. This testimony is contrary to the defendant's court-reported statement, in which he stated that he was not induced to confess, and the trial court found him to be not credible. By his own admission, the defendant was treated very fairly, nice while in police custody. He was given food, drink, and cigarettes throughout his detention. [2] He was given breaks during the interrogation, he was allowed to use the bathroom, and he was never handcuffed. Finally, the police had probable cause to arrest the defendant after his first oral inculpatory statement. This probable cause did not diminish during the defendant's detention and, in fact, increased with each additional oral inculpatory statement. The police were not required to interrupt an ongoing dialog with the defendant if the defendant was in lawful custody, had waived his Miranda rights, and indicated his willingness to talk to the police. See People v. Groves, 294 Ill. App.3d 570, 578, 229 Ill.Dec. 150, 691 N.E.2d 86 (1998); People v. Smith, 203 Ill.App.3d 545, 563, 148 Ill.Dec. 946, 561 N.E.2d 252 (1990). We agree with the State: the defendant's court-reported statement was voluntary, and admissible. The appellate court erred in reversing the trial court's order denying the defendant's motion to suppress.