Opinion ID: 2679982
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Legal Standards and Standards of Review

Text: [¶29] When reviewing the denial of a motion for a new trial pursuant to M.R. Crim. P. 33 on the basis of newly discovered evidence, we review the court’s findings of fact for clear error and its determination of whether the defendant has met the necessary elements for an abuse of discretion. State v. Cookson, 2003 ME 136, ¶ 28, 837 A.2d 101; see also State v. Sheldon, 2000 ME 193, ¶ 7, 760 A.2d 1083 (stating that the ultimate decision on a motion for a new trial involves mixed questions of law and fact and is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.) Motions for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence are looked upon with “disfavor,” in light of “the need for finality and for the preservation of the integrity of criminal judgments.” Cookson, 2003 ME 136, ¶ 28, 837 A.2d 101 (citing State v. Ardolino, 1999 ME 14, ¶ 8, 723 A.2d 870). Pursuant to our precedents, a defendant seeking a new trial based on newly discovered evidence must establish by clear and convincing evidence that 17 (1) the evidence is such as will probably change the result if a new trial is granted; (2) it has been discovered since the trial; (3) it could not have been discovered before the trial by the exercise of due diligence; (4) it is material to the issue; and (5) it is not merely cumulative or impeaching, unless it is clear that such impeachment would have resulted in a different verdict. Id. ¶ 29 (quoting Ardolino, 1999 ME 14, ¶ 8, 723 A.2d 870). “The trial court determines both the weight and the credibility to be attached to the newly discovered evidence.” State v. Dechaine, 630 A.2d 234, 236 (Me. 1993). [¶30] As we have explained, the defendant’s burden in seeking a new trial based on newly discovered evidence is a heavy one: It is not enough for the defendant to show that there is a possibility or a chance of a different verdict. [I]t must be made to appear that, in light of the overall testimony, new and old, another jury ought to give a different verdict; there must be a probability that a new trial would result in a different verdict. Id. (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted). Where the newly discovered evidence is merely impeaching, the standard is even higher, as we have required a showing of a “nearly certain change in result.” State v. Melanson, 566 A.2d 83, 85 (Me. 1989); see also State v. Heald, 395 A.2d 457, 458 (Me. 1978) (requiring a “clear” showing that new impeachment evidence would produce a different verdict). 18
[¶31] A somewhat less stringent standard applies, however, where a defendant alleges a violation of the State’s obligations under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The U.S. Supreme Court has described the Brady rule as follows: In Brady, this Court held that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. We have since held that the duty to disclose such evidence is applicable even though there has been no request by the accused, and that the duty encompasses impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory evidence. Such evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Moreover, the rule encompasses evidence known only to police investigators and not to the prosecutor. In order to comply with Brady, therefore, the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to others acting on the government’s behalf in [a] case, including the police. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280-81 (1999) (citations and quotation marks omitted). The protections of Brady stem from the requirement of due process and the right to a fair trial.8 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985). Because Brady is a trial right, its requirements do not apply after conviction. See Dist. Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 68-69 (2009) (stating that “Brady 8 The State also has disclosure obligations pursuant to M.R. Crim. P. 16. See State v. Carr, 2012 ME 136, ¶¶ 8-10, 58 A.3d 1102; State v. Gould, 2012 ME 60, ¶¶ 22, 24-27, 43 A.3d 952. 19 is the wrong framework” in the post-conviction context). Where Brady does not apply, a defendant is “left with an argument that the prosecutor’s non-disclosure amounted to conduct contrary to fundamental notions of fair play and that defendant was thereby deprived of a fair trial.” State v. Whitten, 499 A.2d 161, 162-63 (Me. 1985). [¶32] The Supreme Court has identified three elements of a Brady violation: “The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.” Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281-82. The element of prejudice is satisfied if the undisclosed evidence is material—that is, “the nondisclosure was so serious that there is a reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence would have produced a different verdict.” See id. (equating prejudice element with materiality inquiry); see also State v. Silva, 2012 ME 120, ¶ 10, 56 A.3d 1230 (“Evidence is material when there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” (quotation marks omitted)). A “reasonable probability” of a different result exists where “the government’s evidentiary suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995) (quotation marks omitted); see also Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 (“A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to 20 undermine confidence in the outcome.”); State v. Harnish, 560 A.2d 5, 7 (Me. 1989) (applying Bagley formulation of the materiality analysis). The materiality of undisclosed evidence is considered collectively. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 436 & n.10. The defendant retains the burden of proof, see Strickler, 527 U.S. at 296, and the denial of a motion for a new trial based upon alleged Brady violations is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, see United States v. Connolly, 504 F.3d 206, 211-12, 219 (1st Cir. 2007). [¶33] The Supreme Court has cautioned that the materiality inquiry is not a simple preponderance standard or a sufficiency of the evidence test. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434-35. Materiality, the Court has stated, is not just a matter of determining whether, after discounting the inculpatory evidence in light of the undisclosed evidence, the remaining evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s conclusions. Rather, the question is whether the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 290 (citations and quotation marks omitted). Put another way, “[t]he question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434; see also Smith v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627, 630 (2012) (“A reasonable probability does not mean that the defendant would more 21 likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, only that the likelihood of a different result is great enough to undermine[] confidence in the outcome of the trial.” (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted)).