Opinion ID: 757675
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Klingele error in this case was harmless.

Text: 101 The majority opinion says an objective examination of the record may disclose that the pro se prisoner litigant has a complete understanding of Rule 56's requirements gained from some other source, but rejects the subjective scrutiny of the prisoner's pleadings in which the dissent engages. The examples the majority gives of objective grounds for treating error as harmless are citation by the prisoner of Rand and finding a Klingele form in another of the prisoner's lawsuit files. 102 The subjective scrutiny in which I engage is precisely the analysis that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 61 requires. The rule and statute do not allow us to limit our consideration of harmless error to such mechanical issues as whether the prisoner received a Klingele form in another recent lawsuit. My subjective scrutiny consisted of reading the record. 103 The Rule 61 test is whether in light of the record in this case, affirmance appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The record shows that Rand was aware of the requirements of Rule 56. He said in one of his own papers that he knew he must respond to the defense motion, and he did so. Rand had a fair chance to establish either a genuine issue of material fact, or that the people he sued were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and he did not do so. 104 The majority opinion reverses, despite the harmless error rule, because (1) the notice was not in plain enough English, and included citations that might confuse a layman; (2) it did not tell Rand that his case would be over if he lost on summary judgment. The majority's first reason is stylistic and highly subjective, a suggestion that our Appendix A is better in writing style than the California Attorney General's statement. Rand used numerous citations himself, so we cannot reasonably infer that he would be intellectually overwhelmed by use of citations in the notice he was sent. Rand did respond, with extensive, appropriate materials, so he plainly was not harmed by failure to tell him that if he did not respond, he would lose his case. Rand's own motion for additional time to oppose the motion said he knew had to oppose it. We must do our duty to decide whether in the individual case we are adjudicating, the error affected substantial rights, and the answer, on this record, has to be no. 105 The Supreme Court held in United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1778, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993), that for error to be prejudicial, it must have affected the outcome of the District Court proceedings. Under Rule 61 and Olano, we cannot treat Klingele error as prejudicial merely on the ground that the plaintiff was deprived of his procedural right to a Klingele warning. 106 The majority opinion seems to proceed on the unstated assumption that the burden is on the party seeking affirmance to demonstrate harmlessness. But that assumption is mistaken. This is a civil action by the prisoner, not a criminal case against him. The Supreme Court held in Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 116, 63 S.Ct. 477, 87 L.Ed. 645 (1943), that (in a civil case) the party seeking reversal carries the burden of showing that prejudice resulted. We need not decide whether this standard still applies to habeas corpus cases, see O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 115 S.Ct. 992, 130 L.Ed.2d 947 (1995), because Rand's case is not a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. It is a civil action for damages and other relief. In a civil case, the standard for treating error as harmless is less stringent than in a criminal case. City of Long Beach v. Standard Oil, 46 F.3d 929, 933 (9th Cir.1995). 107 Of course in many kinds of errors, we cannot know for sure what would have happened, had the decision gone the other way. The clearest example is denial of a continuance. Yet we held, en banc, that a party cannot obtain reversal for failure to grant a continuance without showing actual and substantial prejudice ... measured in terms of the outcome of the trial. Martel v. County of Los Angeles, 56 F.3d 993, 995 (9th Cir.1995) (en banc). There is no justification for failure to apply the same rule here. Rand has not demonstrated that failure to give him a Klingele warning affected the outcome of the district court proceedings, so we have to affirm. 108 Conclusion. 109 Prisoners are not the only people who have rights that need to be protected at summary judgment. The people they sue have rights too. One of these rights is that judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the papers show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The papers showed that, yet we have mistakenly held that the district judge lacked authority to render judgment forthwith. The case has been in litigation for nine years, and we have kept it alive. Reversing for lack of a boilerplate Klingele form, without regard to whether the omission mattered, construes Rule 56 in a way that undermines the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. Fed.R.Civ.P. 1. 110 Klingele unfortunately affects many people whose disputes have nothing to do with prisoners' claims. Because prisoner petitions are about a quarter of our case load, and are mostly frivolous and mostly pro se, if we cannot effectively filter out all the bad ones efficiently, then other people's more substantial cases wait too long to get to the front of the line for arguments. It is not sufficient to dispose of prisoners' appeals rapidly by reversing on a mechanical and technical ground, because that just clogs the district court dockets. Litigants in district court are also entitled to get to the front of the line without waiting too long behind meritless prisoners' cases. 111 In 1996, the last year unaffected by our decision to rehear Rand v. Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520 (9th Cir.1997), en banc, we reversed or vacated 39 summary judgments against pro se prisoners, on the sole ground that the district court had violated the Klingele rule. In some of these, the prisoners basically told us in their appeal papers, I was entitled to a Klingele notice and didn't get one, so I am entitled to reversal. And they won. This is senseless. We should quit reversing judgments in prisoners' lawsuits against other people for lack of a boilerplate form in the file.