Opinion ID: 556525
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Existence of Contested Material Facts

Text: 13 The district court issued an express statement of uncontroverted facts and conclusions of law on the Bank's laches defense. The court resolved each of the E-Systems factors in the Bank's favor, concluding that (1) the Group's mark is not strong since the term American International has commonly been employed by many companies; (2) the Group has failed to diligently police infringement of its mark since it did nothing--intentionally or unintentionally--while [the Bank] struggled to establish itself as a viable entity, even though [the Group] probably knew of the struggle and surely knew of the existence of defendant ... at least as early as 1983, and yet it took no step to enforce its alleged rights until 1986; (3) any prejudice accruing to the Group in the event the Bank is permitted to continue using the name American International is likely to be de minimis; (4) the Bank was acting in good faith ignorance of the Group's rights since even had appellee performed a trademark search before selecting its name it would only have discovered a registration restricted to insurance underwriting services, not commercial banking; (5) there is minimum competition between the two parties making it extremely improbable that consumers will confuse their services; and (6) as a struggling entity that only recently turned the corner into profitability in the highly competitive Southern California banking world, detriment to the Bank would be extreme should the Group prevail in this litigation. 14 Despite the district court's extensive findings on these factors, we conclude that the entry of summary judgment on the grounds that laches was established as a matter of law was improper. First, with regard to the strength and value of the American International mark and appellant's diligence in protecting it, the Group presented uncontroverted evidence showing that it had utilized the American International name since 1926; that over 80 of its subsidiaries also use the name; that it had operated successfully under this name, amassing assets in the billions of dollars; that it has conducted extensive advertising; and that it has on many occasions attempted through litigation and otherwise to protect its service mark from infringement by companies representing a variety of financial fields, not simply infringers in the insurance industry. Although a suggestive or descriptive mark such as American International is inherently a weak mark, it may be strengthened by such factors as extensive advertising, length of exclusive use, public recognition.... Accuride Int'l, Inc. v. Accuride Corp., 871 F.2d 1531, 1536 (9th Cir.1989). With the material evidence it submitted, the Group has raised genuine factual disputes as to the strength and value of its mark and its diligence in protecting it. 15 The Group was unsuccessful in demonstrating present confusion stemming from the Bank's use of the term American International. However, actual confusion is not necessary to a finding of likelihood of confusion under the Lanham Trade Mark Act. New West Corp. v. NYM Co. of California, 595 F.2d 1194, 1201 (9th Cir.1979). The parties apparently agree that there is some minor overlap of their respective services. Although the parties are not direct competitors, they both provide financial services. Their businesses may be sufficiently complementary or related that the public is likely to be confused as to the source of the services. See AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348 (9th Cir.1979) (high-speed waterskiing boats for racing and recreational boats for families are related); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 314 F.2d 149, 152-55 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 830, 83 S.Ct. 1870, 10 L.Ed.2d 1053 (1963) (beer and Scotch whiskey are sufficiently similar to create a likelihood of confusion regarding the source of origin when sold under the same trade name). See also E-Systems, 720 F.2d at 607 (mentioning that plaintiff's and defendant's products are complementary). Given the similarities between the services offered by the two companies, the Group could well be harmed by customer confusion, particularly if the Bank at some point plunges into its former unfortunate condition of financial instability. As the party opposing the summary judgment motion, the Group was entitled to have all inferences of this sort resolved in its favor. The Group should be permitted to present relevant evidence at trial. 16 Finally, there is no demonstration in the record that the Bank was prejudiced by the Group's delay in filing its complaint. The fact that the Bank was admittedly unaware of the Group prior to the date it received a warning from Hopgood precludes the possibility of detrimental reliance. 17 Similarly, the record is devoid of direct evidence bearing on the likelihood and extent of injury to the Bank should the court enjoin its further use of the term American International. Since mere delay alone generally will not constitute laches without some further showing of prejudice to the junior user, this factor is critical. Graham v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 176 F.2d 819, 827 (9th Cir.1949) (mere delay without injury will not give rise to laches). Consequently, it was inappropriate for the trial judge to have concluded that harm to the Bank was bound to be extreme based upon appellee's unsubstantiated projections that a major loss of goodwill would necessarily result from a forced name change. 18 Since five of the six E-Systems factors involve disputed questions of material fact, it cannot be said that, as a matter of law, the balance of the factors tips in favor of the Bank. Thus, the district court's grant of summary judgment was inappropriate.