Opinion ID: 2099776
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Interest in Controversy

Text: To have standing, a plaintiff seeking declaratory relief must present an actual controversy between adverse parties, as to which controversy the plaintiff is not merely curious or concerned about the outcome but possesses some personal claim, status, or right, a distinct and palpable injury to which is fairly traceable to the defendant's conduct and substantially likely to be prevented or redressed by the grant of such relief. ( Greer v. Illinois Housing Development Authority (1988), 122 Ill.2d 462, 493.) One who challenges the constitutionality of a statute by a declaratory judgment action must bring himself within the class as to whom the law is allegedly unconstitutional and therefore must have sustained or be in immediate danger of sustaining a direct injury from enforcement of the challenged statute. Illinois Gamefowl Breeders Association v. Block (1979), 75 Ill.2d 443, 451. As for the requirement that a controversy be actual, it is meant merely to distinguish justiciable issues from abstract or hypothetical disputes but is not intended to prevent resolution of concrete disputes admitting of a definitive and immediate determination of rights. Miller v. County of Lake (1980), 79 Ill.2d 481, 487; Gamefowl, 75 Ill.2d at 451-52. Though standing to sue is an amorphous concept not readily definable ( Murphy v. Collins (1974), 20 Ill. App.3d 181, 186), the purpose of the standing requirement is to assure sufficient sharpness in defining the issues so that the court may be aided in deciding the case; it is meant to preclude uninterested persons from suing but is not meant to preclude a valid controversy from being litigated ( Di Santo v. City of Warrenville (1978), 59 Ill. App.3d 931, 935 (citing cases), appeal denied (1978), 71 Ill.2d 607). The declaratory judgment remedy should be liberally applied and not restricted by unduly technical interpretations. Gamefowl, 75 Ill.2d at 452. Standing requirements have been liberalized to some degree during the past two decades. For example, although at one time a plaintiff not proceeding under specific statutory authority was restricted from suing to enjoin misuse of property held in public trust without showing special damage not suffered by the public at large, that doctrine was abrogated in Paepcke v. Public Building Comm'n (1970), 46 Ill.2d 330. In Paepcke, this court stated: If the `public trust' doctrine is to have any meaning or vitality at all, the members of the public, at least taxpayers who are the beneficiaries of that trust, must have the right and standing to enforce it. To tell them that they must wait upon governmental action is often an effectual denial of the right for all time. ( Paepcke, 46 Ill.2d at 341.) The Paepcke holding was later cited to support reversal of an appellate court ruling that a taxpayer lacked standing to appeal derivatively the award of attorney fees against a public agency pursuant to settlement of a suit to which he had not been a party in the trial court. ( Metropolitan Sanitary District ex rel. O'Keeffe v. Ingram Corp. (1981), 85 Ill.2d 458, 475-76.) In O'Keeffe, the appellate court had held that the taxpayer was only indirectly aggrieved in common with taxpayers generally, but our court noted that the holding, resting as it did on the nature of the taxpayers' interest in the controversy, contravened the Paepcke holding. O'Keeffe, 85 Ill.2d at 476. Thus, the liberalized standing requirements recognized by Paepcke were expanded from suits based on the public trust doctrine to derivative appeals by taxpayers in behalf of public agencies, without reliance by the court or the taxpayer in either case on such a specific statutory right of taxpayer action as is provided by section 11-301 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 11-301), which concerns actions to restrain and enjoin the disbursement of public funds. And, even when there was no actual controversy concerning the collection of revenue, this court has previously allowed an individual citizen and resident of Chicago to join in an original action for a declaratory judgment that a statute relating to revenue (see Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 4(a)) was invalid on the ground, among others, that it represented an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. ( Polich v. Chicago School Finance Authority (1980), 79 Ill.2d 188.) Moreover, a plaintiff has been held to have standing to seek a declaratory judgment when it was merely in the class of companies that might have won a contract, although it had not shown that it was the one that should have been awarded the contract. State Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. Village of Pleasant Hill (1985), 132 Ill. App.3d 1027, 1030, appeal denied (1985), 108 Ill.2d 590. In the present case, plaintiffs allege that their right to be represented by a duly elected legislator is violated by operation of the challenged statute. Lang does not dispute that there is an actual controversy. He merely asserts that plaintiffs lack sufficient interest in it. Yet, the fact that plaintiffs share their right of representation with other voters in the district does not mean that the right is any less personal. The essence of the democratic voting right is that it is equally and separately vested in each member of the electorate. The right to vote is not a common right of the public, such as the beneficial interest in property held in public trust, or the assurance that public funds will be expended lawfully. Rather, the voting right is by definition capable of being exercised individually by each voter; indeed, this is its genius. The right to be represented is intertwined with the right to vote and is likewise personal to each voter. Here, plaintiffs in effect claim injury to their voting right by the statutory creation of what they deem an unconstitutional selection mechanism to replace the Representative as to whom their voting right was originally exercisable. The alleged violation of plaintiffs' right is traceable at least in part to Lang's conduct in seeking and accepting appointment to the vacancy in office, and the remedies sought, if granted, would be likely to redress the violation. In terms of the standards that we have previously enunciated, plaintiffs therefore have shown an actual controversy and their interest in it. See Greer v. Illinois Housing Development Authority (1988), 122 Ill.2d 462, 493; Springfield Rare Coin Galleries, Inc. v. Johnson (1986), 115 Ill.2d 221, 228; Metropolitan Sanitary District ex rel. O'Keeffe v. Ingram Corp. (1981), 85 Ill.2d 458, 476; Illinois Gamefowl Breeders Association v. Block (1979), 75 Ill.2d 443, 451-52; Underground Contractors Association v. City of Chicago (1977), 66 Ill.2d 371, 376. [T]he salient aspect of standing is its focus on the party seeking an adjudication and not the issue he desires to have adjudicated. ( Murphy v. Collins (1974), 20 Ill. App.3d 181, 186, citing Flast v. Cohen (1968), 392 U.S. 83, 20 L.Ed.2d 947, 88 S.Ct. 1942.) The `gist of the question of standing' is whether the party seeking relief has `alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.' ( Flast v. Cohen (1968), 392 U.S. 83, 99, 20 L.Ed.2d 947, 961, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1952, citing Baker v. Carr (1962), 369 U.S. 186, 204, 7 L.Ed.2d 663, 678, 82 S.Ct. 691, 703.) Since the right to vote for a Representative, and the concomitant right to be represented through a lawfully established mechanism, are equally dispersed throughout the electorate, no other plaintiffs could sharpen the issues by bringing a keener interest to the litigation. Though, as in the Federal system, our courts should not be called upon to decide cases of abstract rather than concrete injury ( Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War (1974), 418 U.S. 208, 219-21, 41 L.Ed.2d 706, 717-19, 94 S.Ct. 2925, 2931-32), and though it is ordinarily not sufficient that a plaintiff have merely a general interest common to all members of the public ( Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 219-20, 41 L.Ed.2d at 718, 94 S.Ct. at 2931, citing Ex parte Levitt (1937), 302 U.S. 633, 634, 82 L. Ed. 493, 493, 58 S.Ct. 1, 1; cf. Greer v. Illinois Housing Development Authority (1988), 122 Ill.2d 462, 494), the United States Supreme Court has squarely held that voters who allege facts showing disadvantage to themselves as individuals have standing to sue ( Baker v. Carr (1962), 369 U.S. 186, 206, 7 L.Ed.2d 663, 679, 82 S.Ct. 691, 704; cf. Pontikes v. Kusper (N.D. Ill. 1972), 345 F. Supp. 1104 (three-judge court), aff'd (1973), 414 U.S. 51, 38 L.Ed.2d 260, 94 S.Ct. 303 (voters had standing to challenge 23-month rule on participation in different party's primary); Bendinger v. Ogilvie (N.D. Ill. 1971), 335 F. Supp. 572, 574 (three-judge court) (supporters of candidate had standing because their right to vote was impaired by 24-month rule on candidate's changing parties); Jackson v. Ogilvie (N.D. Ill. 1971), 325 F. Supp. 864 (three-judge court), aff'd mem. (1971), 403 U.S. 925, 29 L.Ed.2d 705, 91 S.Ct. 2247 (candidate's supporters' right to vote impaired by petition signature requirements)). In this connection, the trial court's and Lang's reliance on People ex rel. Turner v. Lewis (1982), 104 Ill. App.3d 75, is unwarranted. The trial court relied on Turner to hold that Kluk, unlike Daniel, had standing because he was a rival claimant to the office. According to the Turner court, such a claimant would have the standing that Turner lacked. ( Turner, 104 Ill. App.3d at 80.) However, the standing of neither Daniel nor Kluk need depend on status as a rival, since it can rest on their claim of injury to their representational right; and neither of them should have to allege or prove that he would have been appointed instead of Lang ( cf. State Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. Village of Pleasant Hill (1985), 132 Ill. App.3d 1027, 1030, appeal denied (1985), 108 Ill.2d 590). Moreover, unlike the relator in Turner, who alleged that the challenged officeholder had not been appointed in accordance with statute, the present plaintiffs allege that the statute itself is unconstitutional. Even though Kluk appeared before the committee, he could not consistently maintain both that he is a rival claimant and that the statute under which he would claim is unconstitutional, nor does he do so. Neither does Lang contend that Kluk is estopped by virtue of his appearance before the committee. Therefore, as Lang himself argues, though with somewhat different intent, no distinction as to standing can correctly be made between Kluk and Daniel on the ground that Kluk is a rival claimant to the office. This is all the truer since Turner was a quo warranto case, and historically the requirements for a private person's standing to maintain quo warranto proceedings have been stricter than those for declaratory judgment standing. (See People ex rel. Miller v. Fullenwider (1928), 329 Ill. 65; People ex rel. Turner v. Lewis (1982), 104 Ill. App.3d 75, 77; People ex rel. Hiller v. Bevirt (1938), 297 Ill. App. 335, 338-40; see generally Annot., 51 A.L.R.2d 1306 (1957); E. Borchard, Declaratory Judgments 362-63, 858-74 (2d ed. 1941).) Cases cited by Lang on the standing issue are inapposite precisely because they involved quo warranto proceedings. See People ex rel. Miller v. Fullenwider (1928), 329 Ill. 65; People ex rel. Turner v. Lewis (1982), 104 Ill. App.3d 75; People ex rel. Palmatier v. Tighe (1956), 11 Ill. App.2d 1; People ex rel. Hiller v. Bevirt (1938), 297 Ill. App. 335. Accordingly, we hold that both plaintiffs had standing to bring their declaratory judgment actions.