Opinion ID: 795250
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Prima Facie Case of Negligence

Text: 23 FELA provides, as noted, that any railroad engaging in interstate commerce shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce . . . for such injury or death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier. 45 U.S.C. § 51. In FELA actions, the plaintiff must prove the traditional common law elements of negligence: duty, breach, foreseeability, and causation. See Sinclair v. Long Island R.R., 985 F.2d 74, 77 (2d Cir.1993) (citing Robert v. Consol. Rail Corp., 832 F.2d 3, 9 (1st Cir. 1987)). At the same time, the plaintiff's burden in making a showing of causation and negligence is lighter under FELA than it would be at common law because the theory of FELA is that where the employer's conduct falls short of the high standard required of him by the Act and his fault, in whole or in part, causes injury, liability ensues. Kernan v. Am. Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 438-39, 78 S.Ct. 394, 2 L.Ed.2d 382 (1958). Thus, under FELA, an employer has a duty to provide its employees with a safe workplace, which it has breached if it knew or should have known of a potential hazard in the workplace, and yet failed to exercise reasonable care to inform and protect its employees. Ulfik v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 77 F.3d 54, 58 (2d Cir.1996). Accordingly, we have observed that an employer may be held liable under FELA for risks that would otherwise be too remote to support liability at common law. Id. 24 The district court appears to have concluded that Tufariello failed to make out a prima facie case of negligence because (1) he did not provide expert testimony as to whether his exposure to the horn blasts caused his hearing loss, 9 and (2) he did not offer an objective measurement of the horns' decibel level, which the court deemed necessary to show both causation and a breach of the LIRR's duty of care to Tufariello. See Tufariello, 364 F.Supp.2d at 261-62.
25 To establish causation in a common law negligence action, a plaintiff generally must show that the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the harm. Restatement 2d of Torts § 431(a); cf. Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 308, 315, 414 N.E.2d 666, 670, 434 N.Y.S.2d 166, 170 (1980) (To carry the burden of proving a prima facie case, the plaintiff must generally show that the defendant's negligence was a substantial cause of the events which produced the injury.). Under the federal common law of FELA actions, see Morant v. LIRR, 66 F.3d 518, 522 (2d Cir.1995), though, the plaintiff carries a lighter burden. Williams v. Long Island R.R. Co., 196 F.3d 402, 406 (2d Cir.1999) (The Supreme Court has said, based on the explicit language of the statute, that with respect to causation, a relaxed standard applies in FELA cases.). Thus, the test of a jury case in a FELA action is simply whether the proofs justify with reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury or death for which damages are sought. Rogers v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506, 77 S.Ct. 443, 1 L.Ed.2d 493 (1957). 26 The LIRR argues that the question of whether Tufariello's exposure to the sound of train horns caused his hearing loss is a technical issue[] that requires expert testimony. Appellee's Br. at 10. See Fed.R.Evid. 701 (prohibiting non-expert witnesses from offering opinions or making inferences based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702). We disagree. We think that our decision in Ulfik, supra, is controlling on this point. 27 In Ulfik, the plaintiff was an employee of the Metro-North Railroad. While working at Grand Central Station, in New York City, Ulfik fell down a flight of stairs as a result of dizziness allegedly caused by his having inhaled paint and solvent fumes in the railroad tunnels a few days earlier. He brought an action for negligence under FELA. In reversing the district court's grant of judgment as a matter of law in favor of the defendant at the close of the plaintiff's case-in-chief, we concluded that the trier of fact could reasonably determine, without expert testimony, that prolonged exposure to paint fumes would cause headache, nausea, and dizziness. Ulfik, 77 F.3d at 59-60. 28 The evidence Tufariello proffered to the district court here is analogous. Here, as in Ulfik, there is a generally understood causal connection between physical phenomena—in this case, very loud sounds, which we refer to colloquially as deafening 10 —and the alleged injury that would be obvious to laymen. Simpson v. Northeast Ill. Reg'l Commuter R.R. Corp., 957 F.Supp. 136, 138 (N.D.Ill.1997). And here, as there, the right of the jury to decide the issue of causation must be most liberally viewed. Marchica v. Long Island R.R. Co., 31 F.3d 1197, 1207 (2d Cir.1994) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 11 We therefore think that Tufariello's claim—like Ulfik's—may be decided by a factfinder even in the absence of expert testimony. 29 In contending otherwise, LIRR relies on two toxic tort cases. In Wills v. Amerada Hess Corp., 379 F.3d 32 (2d Cir.2004), we agreed with the district court's exclusion of the plaintiff's expert testimony because it failed to include scientific evidence that could prove the necessary link between benzene exposure and squamous cell carcinoma. Id. at 37. Similarly, in Simpson, supra, the district court granted summary judgment to the defendant because the plaintiff had failed to offer expert testimony to establish that his exposure to particular chemicals was the cause of his migraine headaches. Simpson, 957 F.Supp. at 137-38. The court noted that [e]xpert testimony usually is necessary to establish a causal connection between an injury and its source unless the connection is a kind that would be obvious to laymen, such as a broken leg from being struck by an automobile. Id. at 138 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 30 The causal link Tufariello seeks to establish between hearing loss and repeated exposure to noise so loud that it causes physical pain or ear-ringing is, as we have noted, widely known and, so far as we are aware, not the subject of scientific dispute. 12 It is, indeed, not so very far from the connection between a broken leg and being struck by an automobile, the example used by the Simpson court as an instance in which expert testimony is unnecessary. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Toxic contamination cases such as Wills and Simpson, in which genuine doubt exists as to whether exposure to any amount of a particular chemical could cause the plaintiff's injury, are therefore unhelpful to the LIRR. 13
31 The district court also found fatal to Tufariello's case his failure to provide objective measurements of the decibel levels to which he had been exposed. The court did not make entirely clear whether it thought that such measurements were necessary to establish causation or breach of duty, but in neither case does the law support the court's conclusion. 32 1. Causation. The district court noted that Tufariello has presented no objective measurements of the sound levels that he experienced and instead relies on the subjective opinions of plaintiff and others that the horns were `very, very loud,' and his expert's opinion that `the connection between excessively loud noise and hearing loss has been medically accepted as fact for more than 200 years.' Tufariello, 364 F.Supp.2d at 262 (citation omitted) (quoting Pl.'s Mem. of Law at 1,7). The court concluded that such evidence was insufficient as a matter of law. Id. We do not think that the plaintiff must produce objective measurements of the sound levels, id., to carry his burden under FELA of showing that the LIRR's alleged negligence played any part, even the slightest, in causing plaintiff's hearing loss. Rogers, 352 U.S. at 506, 77 S.Ct. 443. 33 Federal Rule of Evidence 701 permits non-expert witnesses to offer opinions and to draw inferences so long as they are limited to those opinions or inferences which are . . . rationally based on the perception of the witness. A witness's testimony as to the pain he or she experienced is admissible under Rule 701 to show the cause and extent of such injuries if it is based on the witness's own perceptions. See Bushman v. Halm, 798 F.2d 651, 660 (3d Cir.1986) (ruling admissible under Rule 701 a plaintiff's testimony that he experienced recurrent pain in his knees and surrounding soft tissues after they contacted his truck's dashboard during the accident). Tufariello testified that he experienced pain upon hearing the train blasts and that they made his ears ring. McFarland also said that the horn blasts were so loud that [y]ou would have to put your hands over your ears. McFarland Dep. at 25. Such testimony is based on the perception of the witnesses and is therefore admissible under Rule 701. 34 Tufariello then offered expert evidence to show the causal connection between such pain-causing noise and hearing loss. Dr. Danziger attested to the fact that [n]oise which is perceived as painful or causes the recipient's ears to ring or sounds to seem dull after the noise ends or that is loud enough to prevent a person from being heard without raising one's voice by another person who is one arm's length away is considered hazardous. Danziger Aff. at ¶¶ 12, 13. Assuming that Dr. Danziger is qualified to give such an expert opinion, see supra n. 8, a reasonable juror could conclude, under the relaxed showing of causation permitted by FELA and based on all the testimony presented, that it is more likely than not that the LIRR's negligence [in failing to give Tufariello protective equipment] played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury of which Tufariello complains, see Rogers, 352 U.S. at 506-07, 77 S.Ct. 443. A demonstration of the exact decibel level to which Tufariello was subjected—proof that might be exceptionally difficult to obtain in light of the LIRR's decision to alter the horns subsequent to the time Tufariello allegedly suffered his injury—is thus not necessary for Tufariello to make a showing on the issue of causation. 14 35 2. Breach of Duty of Care. According to the district court, [t]he problem is that in the absence of any evidence as to the noise levels actually experienced by Mr. Tufariello, it is impossible for anyone to say that the railroad was negligent. Tufariello, 364 F.Supp.2d at 262. The court therefore concluded that without such objective measurements, the trier of fact would be required to accept the LIRR's assertion that the relevant sound levels were within OSHA limits and that, therefore, the plaintiff will have a difficult, if not impossible, time establishing that the railroad was negligent. Id. 36 The question this case presents, however, is whether the LIRR was negligent in failing to provide safety gear to protect Tufariello's hearing in the presence of loud noises, not whether such noises conformed to OSHA regulations. Under FELA, liability attaches whenever an employer breaches the statute's high standard of care, [a]nd this result follows whether the fault is a violation of a statutory duty or the more general duty of acting with care. Kernan, 355 U.S. at 439, 78 S.Ct. 394. Indeed, [c]ompliance with OSHA standards . . . has been held not to be a defense to state tort or criminal liability. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 214, 111 S.Ct. 1196, 113 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991) (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see also Del Cid v. Beloit Corp., 901 F.Supp.539, 548 n. 7 (E.D.N.Y.1995) (noting that even if the defendant's machine complied with the New York State and OSHA regulations, compliance or lack of compliance with such regulations is not dispositive of the issue of a design defect, but is merely some evidence of such a defect). The fact that the LIRR's Hearing Conservation Program complied with OSHA regulations regarding hearing protection therefore does not conclusively demonstrate that the LIRR was free from negligence. See Restatement 2d of Torts § 288C (1965) (Compliance with a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation does not prevent a finding of negligence where a reasonable man would take additional precautions.); see also Robertson v. Burlington N. R., 32 F.3d 408, 410 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that a violation of OSHA standards did not constitute negligence per se but that such standards were admissible as some evidence of the applicable standard of care); cf. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Wholesale Liquidators, 279 F.Supp.2d 358, 361 n. 3 (S.D.N.Y.2003) (in a negligence action under New Jersey law, where the plaintiff alleged that inadequate sprinklers failed to contain a fire, noting that although the sprinklers were code [compliant], such compliance does not, of itself, establish due care as a matter of law). 37 It is [indisputable] that [the LIRR] had a duty to provide its employees with a safe workplace. Ulfik, 77 F.3d at 58. The question is whether it breached that duty. Under FELA, the LIRR did so if it knew or should have known of a potential hazard in the workplace, and yet failed to exercise reasonable care to inform and protect its employees, including Tufariello. Id.; see also id. n. 1 ([N]umerous appellate courts, including ours, have construed the statute, in light of its broad remedial nature, as creating a relaxed standard for negligence as well as causation.). 38 Tufariello testified that while working at the Patchogue railroad yard he endured repeated exposure to train horns that caused him physical pain. He also offered evidence that he and others complained of the loud volume of the horns. And he testified that he specifically asked his superiors for hearing protection but was denied it. On that evidence, viewing the facts in Tufariello's favor and in light of FELA's relaxed burden, we think that a reasonable factfinder could find that the LIRR breached its duty to ensure that its workers were protected from extremely loud noises, irrespective of whether the LIRR complied with the relevant OSHA regulations. Cf. Ulfik, 77 F.3d at 58 (concluding that to establish negligence, a FELA plaintiff need only prove that Metro-North could have reasonably foreseen that the paint would increase the likelihood of injury, and that Metro-North failed to take reasonable precautions); Broussard v. Union Pac. R.R., 700 So.2d 542, 548 (La.Ct.App.1997) (concluding, on facts similar to those of the case at bar, that [a] FELA plaintiff can present his hearing loss case without reference to a specific regulation or without proving the precise decibel level of noise in the workplace). 15 39 We therefore conclude that Tufariello has adduced sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case under FELA that the LIRR breached its duty of care to Tufariello by exposing him to hazardous noise and that such exposure caused him permanent hearing loss.