Opinion ID: 2974210
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Challenge to Count 3 of the Indictment

Text: Despite the fact that Beasley reserved the right to appeal only the propriety of the district court’s suppression decision, he now also asserts that he should not have been -5- 05-5645 United States v. Beasley convicted of possessing firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime because the indictment improperly mixed the elements of the two separate offenses proscribed by 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). According to the defendant, such confusion in the charging instrument results in an indictment that fails to charge any offense at all. Beasley also contends that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the improper indictment. We have explicitly recognized “that 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) criminalizes two separate and distinct offenses.” United States v. Combs, 369 F.3d 925, 933 (6th Cir. 2004). Indeed, subsection (c)(1)(A), in relevant part, punishes “any person who, during and in relation to any . . . drug trafficking crime . . . for which the person may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm,” as well as “any person . . . who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm” (emphasis added). In United States v. Mackey, 265 F.3d 457, 461-62 (6th Cir. 2001), moreover, we explained that the “in furtherance of” language in the statute creates “a more stringent requirement than [the] ‘during and in relation to’” language. Inexplicably, the defendant argues in his appellate brief that “Mr. Beasley’s indictment charges him using the same charging language as the Comb’s [sic] indictment, both indictments charging each defendant with possession of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime.” Thus, Beasley contends that the charging instrument improperly referenced the “during and in relation to” language of the “use and carry” -6- 05-5645 United States v. Beasley offense for the offense of “possession” of a firearm, which should instead include the “in furtherance of” language of the statute. Beasley, however, has simply misread the indictment in this case. Count 3 of the indictment clearly alleges that the defendant, “in furtherance of the drug trafficking crime set out in Count 1 of this indictment . . . did knowingly possess two firearms . . .” (emphasis added). Furthermore, during the plea hearing in this matter, the court spoke only in terms of possession of the firearms “in furtherance of your drug-trafficking crime, which is the possession of the crack with intent to sell.” Nevertheless, the actual judgment entered by the district court does mistakenly refer to “[p]ossession of firearm during and in relation to drug Trafficking crime” (emphasis added). In light of the fact that such an improper mixing of the elements of separate offenses did not occur at any other point in this prosecution, the lone, erroneous reference in the judgment itself must be viewed as a harmless, clerical error that may be corrected by the court at any time “[a]fter giving any notice it considers appropriate.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 36.