Opinion ID: 2981542
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prima Facie Case Under the ADA

Text: The district court analyzed the prima facie case of disability discrimination under the ADA offered by Gaglioti under a four-part test, where the plaintiff must show: “(1) the employee was qualified for the position; (2) the employee was subject to an adverse employment action; (3) the - 12 - No. 11-3744 Gaglioti v. Levin Group, Inc. employee was known to be associated with a disabled individual; and (4) the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances that raise a reasonable inference that the disability of the relative was a determining factor in the decision.” Stansberry v. Air Wisconsin Airlines Corp., 651 F.3d 482, 487 (6th Cir. 2011). The district court found that Gaglioti made out a prima facie case of association discrimination, holding that the temporal proximity between the submission of Gaglioti’s insurance form and his termination raised an inference that Gaglioti was terminated for the purpose of reducing health care costs. See also Larimer v. IBM Corp., 370 F.3d 698, 700 (7th Cir. 2004) (articulating the “expense” theory of association discrimination); Stansberry, 651 F.3d at 487 (citing Larimer). Levin Group concedes that there was an adverse employment action, but argues on appeal that Gaglioti can meet none of the other three prongs. On the qualification prong, Levin Group reasserts that Gaglioti was not qualified for the position due to his inability to properly do the job. As discussed above, however, the qualification prong turns on the objective qualities of the applicant, not on a subjective belief on the part of the employer that the work product was deficient. Thus, as with his age discrimination claim, the district court was correct to find that Gaglioti was “qualified” for purposes of his ADA claim. Levin Group also asserts that the key decision-makers, Levin and Pursley, were not aware that Gaglioti’s wife was disabled. Gaglioti argues that Levin saw that his wife was disabled at the initial meeting at the cocktail party that led to the job offer. Gaglioti also asserts that he spoke to Pursley informally on numerous occasions about his wife’s medical problems. Finally, it is undisputed that Gaglioti submitted two medical insurance forms to Levin Group—once at his initial - 13 - No. 11-3744 Gaglioti v. Levin Group, Inc. hiring, and once in July 2009. While Pursley disputes that he reviewed the insurance forms prior to Gaglioti’s termination, taking the facts in the light most favorable to Gaglioti, there is enough evidence in the record to find that the key Levin Group decision-makers were aware of the condition of Gaglioti’s wife. However, the evidence does not support an inference that Gaglioti’s termination was related to his wife’s disability. The district court relied on the temporal connection between Gaglioti’s submission of the July 2009 insurance form and his termination as the basis for the inference of discrimination. Yet, it is undisputed that the insurance form Gaglioti provided at the time of his initial hire contained the same basic information as the form he submitted in July 2009. In other words, the July 2009 insurance form—the only event close in time to Gaglioti’s termination—added nothing new, and thus cannot be the basis for an inference of discrimination. See Stansberry, 651 F.3d at 488 (“Because Air Wisconsin knew of her disability for a long period of time, this undercuts the inference that Stansberry’s termination was based on . . . his wife’s disability. . . .”) Gaglioti argues that the July 2009 form was significant because it came in an environment where Pursley was seeking to cut costs, and thus the later form influenced the firing decision in a way the former did not. While it is true that Levin Group’s medical insurance was up for renewal, and that Gaglioti’s wife was a high-risk beneficiary, Gaglioti has not put forth any evidence that Levin or Pursley were concerned about the cost of Gaglioti’s wife’s coverage. The district court found that “Pursley and Levin never had a conversation with other employees or Plaintiff that the company was concerned with health care costs.” Moreover, Levin Group’s insurance broker, Shelley Chornak, testified that she never discussed Gaglioti’s situation with anyone associated with Levin - 14 - No. 11-3744 Gaglioti v. Levin Group, Inc. Group. The few prior cases in this circuit dealing with the “expense” theory of association discrimination all require some showing that the potential medical expenses of the fired employee were on the minds of the decision maker at the time of the termination. Compare White v. Carmeuse Lime & Stone, Inc., No. 2:09-cv-265, 2011 WL 3585064, at  8 (W.D. Mich. May 31, 2011) (“In short, no evidence is found in the record to show that Himes, Mickelson, Tunnicliffe, or any other Carmeuse managers were aware of the amount of [Plaintiff’s daughter’s] healthcare expenses or health care claims, or that they were in any respect concerned about those expenses.”) with Lyons v. Core Systems, LLC, No. 2:10-cv-75, 2011 WL 4402777, at  (S.D. Ohio September 21, 2011) (“Lyons argues that the Core Systems’ management employee’s repeated statements about the high cost of health care at Mt. Gilead raise a reasonable inference that Core Systems fired Lyons because his wife’s disability was too expensive. This fact may be sufficient to shift the burden to Core Systems to offer a legitimate reason for the termination . . . .”); see also Stansberry, 651 F.3d at 488 (“A plaintiff cannot bypass the prima facie showing requirement and must offer some evidence to suggest that the adverse employment action he or she suffered was due in some measure to discriminatory animus. . . .”). There is no evidence, beyond Gaglioti’s allegations, that Gaglioti’s wife’s medical expenses were on the minds of Levin or Pursley. Gaglioti cannot make out a prima face case of association discrimination under the ADA. As we may affirm a grant of summary judgment “on any grounds supported by the record,” Pahssen - 15 - No. 11-3744 Gaglioti v. Levin Group, Inc. v. Merrill Comm. Sch. Dist., 668 F.3d 356, 362 (6th Cir. 2012), we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to the ADA claim2.