Opinion ID: 6317681
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Presence of a Conflict

Text: ¶ 13. In diversity actions, federal courts determine the governing law by looking to the forum state’s choice-of-law principles. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). The threshold question in choice-of-law analysis is whether a conflict exists. See Havill v. Woodstock Soapstone Co., 172 Vt. 625, 627, 783 A.2d 423, 427 (2001) (mem.) (explaining that 5 we avoid choice-of-law questions where application of laws of both jurisdictions would produce same result). The parties do not dispute that plaintiff’s common-law negligence claim against coworker was available under Vermont law. See 21 V.S.A. § 624 (providing that exclusiveremedy provision in Vermont workers’ compensation act does not preclude common-law claims against coworkers); Libercent v. Aldrich, 149 Vt. 76, 79, 539 A.2d 981, 983 (1987) (“Third-party suits against co-employees are supported by both the plain language of § 624(a) and by the argument that existing rights of action should not be deemed destroyed in the absence of clear language.” (quotation omitted)). ¶ 14. In contrast, Virginia law would bar plaintiff’s common-law negligence claim against coworker. Generally, in exchange for recovery of workers’ compensation benefits without regard to fault for employees injured on the job, workers’ compensation acts contain “exclusiveremedy” provisions, which make the receipt of compensation benefits the only remedy for the injured worker against entities falling under the scope of the provision. 3 A. Larson & L. Larson, Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law § 100.01(1) (Desk Ed. 2000). Virginia’s workers’ compensation act contains an extremely broad exclusive-remedy provision and states that when an employer and employee are bound by its provisions, “all other rights and remedies” of the injured employee shall be excluded. Va. Code Ann. § 65.2-307(A). The Virginia exclusive-remedy provision applies when an employee is injured by a coemployee and prevents the employee from maintaining a common-law action for negligence against the coemployee. See Feitig v. Chakley, 38 S.E.2d 73, 75 (Va. 1946). ¶ 15. Plaintiff contends that his tort claims were not barred because either of two exceptions to the exclusive-remedy provision in Virginia law applied: when the tortfeasor is a stranger to the work being undertaken, and the coming-and-going exception. Neither exception applies given the undisputed facts of this case. Under the first exception raised, an injured employee may still maintain a common-law tort action against a third party if the third party is a 6 “stranger to the work.” David White Crane Serv. v. Howell, 714 S.E.2d 572, 575 (Va. 2011) (quotation omitted). The Virginia exclusive-remedy statute’s purpose is “to bring within its operation all persons who are engaged in the trade, business[,] or occupation of the contractor who engages to perform the work.” Id. ¶ 16. In this case, plaintiff and coworker have the same employer and were both in Virginia for the purpose of completing work for that employer. They arrived in the state together to conduct this work, stayed in the same employer-provided accommodations, and worked at the same jobsite daily. Furthermore, part of coworker’s assignment was to drive plaintiff for this work in a vehicle provided by employer. All these facts support the conclusion that coworker was engaged in the occupation of employer, and thus he was not a stranger to the work. See id. Contrary to plaintiff’s assertions, this conclusion stands regardless of whether plaintiff calls coworker an agent instead of a coemployee in its filings. See Lucas v. Biller, 130 S.E.2d 582, 586 (Va. 1963) (“It is immaterial whether the defendant was an independent contractor or a fellowservant of the plaintiff since he was engaged in the business of the plaintiff’s employer when her injuries were sustained.”). ¶ 17. Plaintiff’s case also falls outside the coming-and-going exception to the exclusiveremedy provision of Virginia’s workers’ compensation act. “[G]enerally, an employee’s injuries sustained while going to or coming from work are not compensable under [Virginia’s] Workers’ Compensation Act,” and therefore its exclusive-remedy provisions would not apply. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Barnard, 372 S.E.2d 369, 371 (Va. 1988). Although plaintiff was injured on the way to the work site, which would seemingly make his injuries not compensable and allow a claim against coworker, the coming-and-going rule does not apply when “the employee is furnished transportation to or from his work by the employer and is accidentally injured during the course of travel.” Lucas, 130 S.E.2d at 586. This exception to the coming-and-going rule applies under the following circumstances: 7 when such transportation is the result of an express or implied agreement between the employer and his employee; or where the transportation is furnished by custom to the extent that it is incidental to and part of the contract of employment; or when it is the result of a continued practice in the course of the employer’s business which is beneficial to both the employer and the employee. Bristow v. Cross, 173 S.E.2d 815, 817 (Va. 1970). ¶ 18. The facts of Bristow are instructive for the application of this exception to the coming-and-going rule. In that case, the plaintiff and a coworker were employed for the same company. The plaintiff was instructed to go to the coworker’s home in the morning and that the coworker would drive him in a company truck to the office, and then from the office to the day’s jobsite. En route to the office on the plaintiff’s first day on the job, the truck was involved in an accident. The Virginia Supreme Court explained that though no express agreement was negotiated between the plaintiff and the employer, the accident in this case arose out of the plaintiff’s employment and thus fell under the transportation exception to the coming-and-going rule. Id. at 816-18. As a result, the injured worker had no tort claim against the employer or his coworkers as the exclusive-remedy provisions of Virginia’s workers’ compensation act applied. In so holding, the court first focused on the existence of an arrangement made in advance of the commute whereby the employer provided and controlled the vehicle used, even though the plaintiff was not required to accept the arrangement for company transportation and was not paid during the commute to the office. Id. at 817. It then turned to the fact that the arrangement was mutually beneficial to the employer and the plaintiff because the plaintiff’s presence at the job was assured for the employer while the expense and trouble of finding transportation was saved for the plaintiff. Id. at 817-18. ¶ 19. Similarly, in Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Pacific Employers Insurance Co., an employer permitted its employee to drive a company truck to transport crew members to and from their worksite each day. 611 S.E.2d 531, 532 (Va. 2005). Although crew members were not 8 required to use the company truck, they knew they could show up at the arranged meeting site each morning to get a ride to work. While travelling to the worksite, the truck was involved in an accident and the crew-member passengers were injured. The Supreme Court of Virginia emphasized that “[i]t is not necessary that the employee be compensated for the time spent traveling to the worksite” or that the employee “be required by the employer to use the proffered transportation.” Id. at 537. It found that the usual practice of employees riding in a company truck driven by a company employee for the purpose of transporting employees to a jobsite was sufficient to demonstrate a customary practice. Id. It then concluded that the employer and the crew members both derived a benefit from this arrangement, the injured worker’s claim was compensable, and tort claims against the employer and coworkers were barred. Id. ¶ 20. Like in Bristow and Asplundh, employer of plaintiff and coworker owned the car used and prearranged all the transportation for plaintiff by assigning coworker to drive him to and around Virginia to complete his employment duties. The mutual benefit is also comparable. Employer needed to get plaintiff to Virginia and then transport him between accommodations— that employer chose—and the jobsite, as plaintiff did not have a car because coworker had driven him to the state. See Bristow, 173 S.E.2d at 817 (noting employee did not have operable car). Necessarily, plaintiff benefitted from receiving free transportation where he had none. See id. at 817 (stating that employees were “saved the expense and trouble of providing their own transportation”); see also Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 611 S.E.2d at 537 (explaining that benefit to employees “patent” where they were provided free transportation to jobsite). The decisions in these two cases preclude any argument that plaintiff’s injury was not compensable under Virginia’s workers’ compensation act because it occurred while plaintiff was “coming and going.” Plaintiff was using employer-provided transportation when injured and thus was not “coming and going.” ¶ 21. Plaintiff argues the appropriate coming-and-going test in this case is “whether the practice was customary and conferred a benefit to both the employer and the employee,” and 9 asserts that there are no facts to support whether the arrangement in this case was customary or conferred a benefit on both plaintiff and employer. This fixation on a supposed lack of evidence of “custom” ignores the existence of an agreement and the rule as explained in Bristow. See 173 S.E.2d at 817 (describing examples of exception as involving custom or agreement or mutually beneficial practice, and concluding exception applied without discussion of custom). Though a customary practice may be industry-wide, see Lucas, 130 S.E.2d at 584, Virginia courts have found the transportation exception to the coming-and-going rule applies where there is a practice or prearrangement particular to the situation of the employee and employer. See Bristow, 173 S.E.2d at 817; Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 611 S.E.2d at 537. Plaintiff also glosses over the underlying principle of the test: whether the employee’s undertaking at the time of the accident causing his injury “arose out of and in the course of his employment.” Kent v. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Co., 129 S.E. 330, 331 (Va. 1925). That test as applied in Virginia precedent is indisputably met in this case. Therefore, under Virginia law, plaintiff did not have a viable common-law tort claim against coworker.