Opinion ID: 2451
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Security and Foreign Policy

Text: The Executive has practiced rendition since at least 1995. See Extraordinary Rendition in U.S. Counterterrorism Policy: The Impact on Transatlantic Relations: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight and the Subcomm. on Europe of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. 15 (2007) (statement of Michael F. Scheuer, Former Chief, Bin Laden Unit, CIA). Arar gives the mid-1990s as the date for the inception of the policy under which he was sent to Syria for torture. Pl. Maher Arar's Mem. of Law in Opp'n to Defs.' Invocation of the State Secrets Privilege, Mar. 14, 2005, at 6. A suit seeking a damages remedy against senior officials who implement such a policy is in critical respects a suit against the government as to which the government has not waived sovereign immunity. Such a suit unavoidably influences government policy, probes government secrets, invades government interests, enmeshes government lawyers, and thereby elicits government funds for settlement. (Canada has already paid Arar $10 million. [8] ) It is a substantial understatement to say that one must hesitate before extending Bivens into such a context. A suit seeking a damages remedy against senior officials who implement an extraordinary rendition policy would enmesh the courts ineluctably in an assessment of the validity and rationale of that policy and its implementation in this particular case, matters that directly affect significant diplomatic and national security concerns. It is clear from the face of the complaint that Arar explicitly targets the policy of extraordinary rendition; he cites the policy twice in his complaint, and submits documents and media reports concerning the practice. His claim cannot proceed without inquiry into the perceived need for the policy, the threats to which it responds, the substance and sources of the intelligence used to formulate it, and the propriety of adopting specific responses to particular threats in light of apparent geopolitical circumstances and our relations with foreign countries. The Supreme Court has expressly counseled that matters touching upon foreign policy and national security fall within an area of executive action `in which courts have long been hesitant to intrude' absent congressional authorization. Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 192, 113 S.Ct. 2024, 124 L.Ed.2d 101 (1993) (emphasis added) ( quoting Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 819, 112 S.Ct. 2767, 120 L.Ed.2d 636 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)). It has recognized `the generally accepted view that foreign policy was the province and responsibility of the Executive.... Thus, unless Congress specifically has provided otherwise, courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and national security affairs.' Dep't of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529-30, 108 S.Ct. 818, 98 L.Ed.2d 918 (1988) (emphasis added) ( quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 293-94, 101 S.Ct. 2766, 69 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981)). This hesita[tion] and reluctan[ce] is counseled by:  the constitutional separation of powers among the branches of government, see United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Co., 299 U.S. 304, 320-22 [57 S.Ct. 216, 81 L.Ed. 255] (1936) (noting the plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations and discussing the difficulties presented by congressionallet alone judicialinvolvement in such affairs), and  the limited institutional competence of the judiciary, see Boumediene v. Bush, [___ U.S. ___] 128 S.Ct. 2229, 2276-77 [171 L.Ed.2d 41] (2008) (Unlike the President and some designated Members of Congress, neither the Members of this Court nor most federal judges begin the day with briefings that may describe new and serious threats to our Nation and its people. The law must accord the Executive substantial authority to apprehend and detain those who pose a real danger to our security.); see also Munaf v. Geren, [___ U.S. ___] 128 S.Ct. 2207, 2226 [171 L.Ed.2d 1] (2008) (The Judiciary is not suited to [make] determinations [in the area of foreign affairs] that would ... undermine the Government's ability to speak with one voice in this area. In contrast, the political branches are well situated to consider sensitive foreign policy issues, such as whether there is a serious prospect of torture at the hands of any ally, and what to do about it if there is. (citation omitted)). True, courts canwith difficulty and resourcefulness consider state secrets and even reexamine judgments made in the foreign affairs context when they must, that is, when there is an unflagging duty to exercise our jurisdiction. Otherwise: [T]he special needs of foreign affairs must stay our hand in the creation of damage remedies against military and foreign policy officials for allegedly unconstitutional treatment of foreign subjects causing injury abroad. The foreign affairs implications of suits such as this cannot be ignoredtheir ability to produce what the Supreme Court has called in another context embarrassment of our government abroad through multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question. Whether or not the present litigation is motivated by considerations of geopolitics rather than personal harm, we think that as a general matter the danger of foreign citizens' using the courts in situations such as this to obstruct the foreign policy of our government is sufficiently acute that we must leave to Congress the judgment whether a damage remedy should exist. Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 209 (D.C.Cir.1985) 32 (Scalia, J. ) ( quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962)). Absent clear congressional authorization, the judicial review of extraordinary rendition would offend the separation of powers 35 and inhibit this country's foreign policy. It does not matter for our purposes whether such consequences would flow from innocent interference or from deliberate manipulation. These concerns must counsel hesitation in creating a new damages remedy that Congress has not seen fit to authorize.