Opinion ID: 2646880
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Promise of confidentiality

Text: The State Bar asserts that, notwithstanding any public interest in the admissions database, it is not subject to public disclosure because the information 31 contained in it was obtained from applicants under a promise that it would remain confidential. Under longstanding common law and statutory principles, information obtained through a promise of confidentiality is not subject to the right of public access when the public interest would be furthered by maintaining confidentiality. (See Runyon v. Board etc. of Cal., supra, 26 Cal.App.2d at p. 185 [“in order to impartially and intelligently discharge the functions of the state board of prison terms and paroles it is essential to secure all possible information bearing upon applicants for parole; and necessarily much of the information thus obtained can be had only upon the understanding that the persons furnishing the same will be protected and that the information will be treated as confidential”]; Chronicle Pub. Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 54 Cal.2d 548 [complaints to State Bar not resulting in disciplinary action were privileged, where confidentiality furthered State Bar‟s interest in encouraging citizens to provide information and attorneys‟ interests in avoiding publication of unfounded complaints weighed against disclosure]; Pantos, supra, 151 Cal.App.3d at pp. 264-265 [access to the questionnaires used by a jury commissioner to determine the qualifications of potential jurors was denied, in part, because jurors were promised that their responses would be confidential].) This principle is currently reflected in Evidence Code section 1040, which provides a privilege to a public entity to refuse to disclose information acquired in confidence if “there is a necessity for preserving the confidentiality of the information that outweighs the necessity for disclosure.” (Evid. Code, § 1040, subd. (b)(2).) As we have alluded to earlier, however, this principle has not prevented public access to otherwise confidential, private information in the possession of a public entity that is not linked to the individual to which it pertains. (See, e.g., City & County of S.F. v. Superior Court (1951) 38 Cal.2d 156 [names of private employers who provided specific wage information to city civil service 32 commission for purpose of determining prevailing wage rates were confidential, where information could not be obtained without promise of confidentiality and lists of wage rates obtained from employers was available to public in form that did not identify which employer submitted which wage list]; Franchise Tax Board v. Superior Court (1950) 36 Cal.2d 538, 543 [banks seeking right to inspect tax returns of nonfinancial corporations considered by Franchise Tax Board in fixing the tax rate for financial corporations were supplied with “every item of information requested by them . . . with the exception of the individual taxpayers‟ identity”]; see also Zamudio v. Superior Court (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 24 [requiring release of juror questionnaires with personal identifying information redacted].) Because plaintiffs do not seek the information in a manner that would reveal the identities of individual applicants, the State Bar‟s promises of confidentiality do not necessarily preclude public access to the database. Similarly, we cannot hold as a matter of law that bar applicants‟ constitutional rights of privacy preclude disclosure of the information in the database even in a de-identified form. (See Cal. Const., art. I, § 1.) The State Bar cites this court‟s statement in White v. Davis (1975) 13 Cal.3d 757, 775, that the constitutional right to privacy is aimed at, among other things, “the improper use of information properly obtained for a specific purpose, for example, the use of it for another purpose or the disclosure of it to some third party.” The cases cited by the State Bar that apply this principle, however, involve disclosure of information about a named individual. (See Porten v. University of San Francisco (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 825, 830 [complaint alleging that a university disclosed grades the plaintiff had earned at another university despite assurances that the grades would be used only for purposes of evaluating his application for admission stated a claim for violation of the right of privacy]; Urbaniak v. Newton (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1128, 1138 [complaint alleging that doctor disclosed plaintiff‟s HIV 33 status stated cause of action for invasion of privacy].) The State Bar‟s argument that disclosure of the requested data would violate applicants‟ privacy even if it cannot be connected to them as individuals is not supported by authority. The parties disagree concerning whether the information at issue can be provided in a form that does not breach the State Bar‟s promises of confidentiality. The State Bar contends that “the commonly held assumption that any data can be successfully [de-identified] as suggested by [plaintiffs], so that it can be made available to the public without risk that individual people‟s information be revealed, has proved to be false.” Plaintiffs counter that “[d]isclosure of deidentified information regarding individuals obtained from government databases is commonplace. . . . The routine release of such data refutes the claim that such information cannot be disclosed without undue risk of „re-identification‟ of those individuals.” This issue involves disputed questions of fact that we are not currently in a position to decide. By the parties‟ stipulation, litigation of this issue was reserved for the second phase of trial and may be decided in the trial court upon remand. F. Form in Which the Data is Kept The State Bar contends, as it did in the trial court, that in order to comply with Plaintiffs‟ request without infringing bar applicants‟ privacy interests it would be required not only to redact personal information but also to create new categories of information by “clustering” categories of data — a measure proposed by plaintiffs to make it more difficult to re-identify individuals. The State Bar concedes that if the admissions database is subject to the right of access it may be required to redact applicants‟ names, but contends that making the changes to the admissions database necessary to protect applicants‟ privacy would constitute the creation of a “new” record and that creation of a new record is not required. (See, 34 e.g., NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1975) 421 U.S. 132, 162 [federal Freedom of Information Act does not require agency to create documents; it requires only “disclosure of certain documents which the law requires the agency to prepare or which the agency has decided for its own reasons to create”]; Center for Public Integrity v. Federal Communications Comm’n (D.D.C. 2007) 505 F.Supp.2d 106, 114 [producing data in the form requested would amount to creation of a new record, which is not required by Freedom of Information Act].) We agree with the trial court that in the context of electronic records, and in particular electronic databases, to resolve this issue would require consideration of the complexity of the tasks required to produce the data in the form requested; consequently, it would be premature for us to attempt to resolve this issue. The parties have not yet litigated whether and how applicants‟ privacy interests could be protected if public access to the database were permitted. Therefore, we do not yet know what modifications would be necessary to protect these countervailing interests. Furthermore, by stipulation, the parties reserved for the second phase of trial the question whether disclosure would impose an undue burden on the State Bar. Plaintiffs have made clear that they would accept the data in its current form, without any modification other than the redaction of applicants‟ names. They have proposed additional modifications to the data, including the “clustering” of data, in order to satisfy the State Bar‟s concerns about bar applicants‟ privacy. In light of our holding recognizing the public‟s interest in the admissions database, the State Bar may choose to implement these proposals or may propose other measures that will satisfy the public‟s right of access while protecting applicants‟ privacy. If not, it will be necessary for the trial court to resolve whether and how a record that is responsive to plaintiffs‟ requests may be 35 produced without identifying individual applicants or otherwise unduly burdening any legitimate competing interests.