Opinion ID: 2330517
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Workers' Compensation Benefits Disclosure Claim

Text: Spencer next claims that the Superior Court reversibly erred by informing the jury that she had received workers' compensation benefits. Spencer argues that because the collateral source rule would have prohibited the admission of evidence of her receipt of workers' compensation benefits, the Superior Court abused its discretion in informing the jury that a workers' compensation lien existed and disclosing the amount of the lien. A trial judge's decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. [17] Judicial discretion is the exercise of judgment directed by conscience and reason, and when a court has not exceeded the bounds of reason in view of the circumstances and has not so ignored recognized rules of law or practice so as to produce injustice, its legal discretion has not been abused. [18] To find an abuse of discretion, there must be a showing that the trial court acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. [19] In Yarrington v. Thornburg, [20] this Court articulated the collateral source rule thusly: a tortfeasor has no right to any mitigation of damages because of payments or compensation received by the injured person from an independent source. [21] The collateral source rule is predicated upon the theory that a tortfeasor has no interest in, and therefore no right to benefit from, monies received by the injured person from sources unconnected with the defendant. [22] The collateral source rule is inapplicable here. In Bounds v. Delmarva Power & Light Co., [23] we upheld the same jury instruction as was given in this case: You have heard testimony about the workers' compensation benefits that Craig Bounds has received. You should not consider the fact that some of the medical expenses and lost wages that he claims in this lawsuit have been paid through workers' compensation because Craig Bounds has a legal obligation to repay this compensation from any money that you might award in this case. On the other hand, if he does not recover in this case, there is no obligation for Craig Bounds to reimburse. The workers' compensation instruction given here is a pattern civil instruction that, together with the instruction on damages, is designed to inform the jury that if it finds for the plaintiff, it should award the full amount of lost wages and medical expenses that it finds to exist by a preponderance of the evidence, without deducting any amount paid by workers' compensation. The instruction is also intended to dispel any jury concerns about possible double recovery by the plaintiff of medical bills or lost wages. In this case, there was a significant risk that evidence that Spencer had received workers compensation could mislead the jury to conclude that Spencer was seeking a double recovery. To prevent any such misconception, the trial court properly exercised its discretion in advising the jury how to determine the damages. [24] Nor was Spencer prejudiced by that instruction, which was given for the jury to consider in determining the amount of damages. The jury never reached the damages issue, because the jury found no liability on the part of Wal-Mart. Because no prejudice resulted to Spencer from the instruction, there is no basis to find that the Superior Court abused its discretion.