Opinion ID: 2639069
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: A Document of Independent Force

Text: We may take it for granted that the meaning of California Constitution article I, section 4, ... is not dependent on the meaning of any provision of the federal Constitution. The state charter declares in so many words that `[r]ights guaranteed by this Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the United States Constitution.' (Cal. Const., art. I, § 24.) ( Smith v. FEHC, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 1177, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 700, 913 P.2d 909.) Respect for our Constitution as `a document of independent force' [citation] forbids us to abandon settled applications of its terms every time changes are announced in the interpretation of the federal charter. ( People v. Pettingill (1978) 21 Cal.3d 231, 248, 145 Cal.Rptr. 861, 578 P.2d 108, quoting People v. Brisendine (1975) 13 Cal.3d 528, 549-550, 119 Cal.Rptr. 315, 531 P.2d 1099.) This is true even when the language is identical to the federal Constitution, but is particularly true when the language differs. (See, e.g., Golden Gateway Center v. Golden Gateway Tenants Assn. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1013, 1019, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 336, 29 P.3d 797 [Unlike the United States Constitution, which couches the right to free speech as a limit on congressional power (see U.S. Const., 1st Amend.), the California Constitution gives `[e]very person' an affirmative right to free speech. [Citation.] Accordingly, we have held that our free speech clause is `more definitive and inclusive than the First Amendment' (fn.omitted)].) Similarly, although we have said California's establishment clause is coextensive with the federal provision ( East Bay Asian Local Development Corp. v. State of California (2000) 24 Cal.4th 693, 718, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 280, 13 P.3d 1122), California's free exercise clause guarantees free exercise and enjoyment of religion without discrimination or preference and specifies that liberty of conscience does not excuse acts that are licentious or inconsistent with the peace and safety of the state. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 4.) We do not have to decide that this language literally embodies the strict scrutiny test. The drafting history of California's free exercise clause is not clear enough to resolve the question definitively. Although the proponents of the licentious acts clause may simply have wanted to preserve the ability of the state to regulate specific practices they considered immoral or dangerous (Browne, Rep. of the Debates in Convention of Cal. on Formation of State Const. (1850) p. 39), that does not mean they thought the language was otherwise synonymous with the language of the federal Constitution.