Opinion ID: 697621
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dunn's Fifth Amendment Claims and Other Injuries

Text: 21 We now turn to Dunn's remaining live claims for relief. To be entitled to a preliminary injunction, Dunn must--at a minimum 1 --demonstrate four things: (1) that he is substantially likely to succeed on the merits of his suit, (2) that in the absence of an injunction, he would suffer irreparable harm for which there is no adequate legal remedy, (3) that the injunction would not substantially harm other parties, and (4) that the injunction would not significantly harm the public interest. See, e.g., Wagner v. Taylor, 836 F.2d 566, 575 (D.C.Cir.1987); Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. FPC, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C.Cir.1958). We review a district court's balancing of these factors for abuse of discretion. City of Las Vegas, 891 F.2d at 931. 22 Dunn asserts that the RTC has interfered with his employment prospects since he left the agency and thus deprived him of a liberty interest protected by the Fifth Amendment without due process; he further argues that this infringement of his constitutional rights is irreparable injury sufficient to support preliminary relief. But while Dunn has made allegations of seriously defamatory conduct on the part of the RTC--allegations that have to this point largely gone unrebutted--we agree with the district court that he has not demonstrated government action rising to the level of a constitutional deprivation. 23 Constitutional injury supposes something more than simple defamation or stigma. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976). Even a plaintiff who receives an admittedly defamatory recommendation from a prior government employer that would undoubtedly ... impair his future employment prospects cannot establish a constitutional violation so long as such damage flows from injury caused by the defendant to a plaintiff's reputation alone. Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 234, 111 S.Ct. 1789, 1794, 114 L.Ed.2d 277 (1991). To prove constitutional injury, the plaintiff must show not only that the government has imposed some stigma upon him, but also that it has worked some change in his status under law. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. at 711-12, 96 S.Ct. at 1165-66. 24 Our circuit recently described two ways that a litigant alleging government interference with his future employment prospects may demonstrate the tangible change in status required to prove constitutional injury. In Kartseva v. Department of State, 37 F.3d 1524 (D.C.Cir.1994), we held that if [the government's] action formally or automatically excludes [the plaintiff] from work on some category of future [government] contracts or from other government employment opportunities, that action ... implicates a liberty interest. Id. at 1528. Alternatively, the plaintiff may demonstrate that the government's action precludes him--whether formally or informally--from such a broad range of opportunities that it interferes with [his] constitutionally protected 'right to follow a chosen trade or profession.'  Id. at 1529 (quoting Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895-96, 81 S.Ct. 1743, 1749, 6 L.Ed.2d 1230 (1961)). In other words, government action precluding a litigant from future employment opportunities will infringe upon his constitutionally protected liberty interests only when that preclusion is either sufficiently formal or sufficiently broad. 25 The district court found--without clear error-- that neither was the case for Dunn. The court credited the RTC's assertion that the agency had taken no action to formally debar Dunn or automatically disqualify him from working on any future RTC contracts, and Dunn presents no convincing evidence to the contrary. The Coopers letter, recording that sources within the RTC had told the firm it was specifically prohibited from using Mr. Dunn on any RTC related work, is too second-hand and vague to seriously undermine the sworn statement of the Contractor Ethics Program Manager, credited by the district court, denying any formal debarment. 26 Nor has Dunn demonstrated that the agency took informal action against him so broad that it infringed upon his right to follow a chosen trade or profession. The standard Dunn must meet in this regard--showing that the government has seriously affected, if not destroyed, his ability to obtain employment in [his] field, Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492, 79 S.Ct. 1400, 1411, 3 L.Ed.2d 1377 (1959)--is high: the RTC's misconduct must substantially reduce the value of his human capital, as it would if his skills were highly specialized and rendered largely unmarketable as a result of the agency's acts. Compare Greene, 360 U.S. at 492, 79 S.Ct. at 1411 (exclusion of aerospace engineer from work in all government-sponsored aeronautics facilities infringes constitutional liberty interest), with Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. at 895-96, 81 S.Ct. at 1748-49 (revocation of short-order cook's permission to work on military base does not implicate liberty interest because she remained entirely free to obtain employment as a short-order cook or to get any other job, even with same employer at a different facility). Yet all Dunn proffered in this regard was a simple assertion that he has been unable to find employment in his chosen field, a difficulty that if true might easily be explained in other ways in light of his record at the RTC. The district court therefore did not clearly err in finding that the Coopers & Lybrand incident was only an isolated, one-time occurrence. Dunn has failed to carry his burden of persuasion. 27 Given the inadequacy of Dunn's prospects for success on the merits, there may be no showing of irreparable injury that would entitle him to injunctive relief. We note, however, that should Dunn ultimately prevail, his economic losses would be recoverable under 12 U.S.C. Sec. 1441a(q)(3), which provides for compensatory damages; and in the absence of special circumstances, which Dunn does not assert, recoverable economic losses are not considered irreparable. See Sampson, 415 U.S. at 90, 94 S.Ct. at 952-53 (temporary loss of income, ultimately to be recovered, does not usually constitute irreparable injury); Wisconsin Gas Co. v. FERC, 758 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C.Cir.1985). Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of Dunn's request for a preliminary injunction.