Opinion ID: 3010510
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: e. public concern speech.3

Text: 3. This is what the Court meant when it observed in Connick that a public employee's speech, even if not touching upon a matter of public concern, may be entitled to some protection under the First Amendment. 461 U.S. at 147. Speech unrelated to a matter of public concern is not, like obscenity, entirely outside the protection of the First Amendment. While the government as employer may discharge a public employee for such speech, the government as sovereign may not sanction the same individual when 19 To understand what is meant by “public concern” speech, it is crucial to understand the Court’s justification for distinguishing between speech relating to matters of public concern and speech not relating to such matters. As the Court explained it: The First Amendment was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964). [S]peech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964). Accordingly, the Court has frequently reaffirmed that speech on public issues occupies the 'highest rung of the heirarchy [sic] of First Amendment values,' and is entitled to special protection. Connick, 461 U.S. at 145. It is the value of exchanges of information and ideas relevant to self-governance that entitles public concern speech to special protection.” It was for this reason that the Court, in delineating the expressive rights of public employees, chose to draw the line at speech related to matters of public concern. Silencing a public employee seeking to speak on a matter of public concern deprives a self-governing society of information that may be vital to informed decision-making. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571-72 (depriving community of teachers’ opinions on how school funds should be allotted seriously hinders free and open debate and is inconsistent with intent of First Amendment); Watters, 55 (..continued) she engages in such speech as a citizen, outside the employment context. 20 F.3d at 886 (finding former police department employee’s statements about employee assistance program to be public concern speech, because public had significant interest in learning about problems which might impair effective operation of program). This can be a particularly serious loss because public employees, by virtue of their constant interactions with a public office, are often in the best position to know what ails that office. See Board of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, __ U.S. __, 116 S. Ct. 2342, 2347 (1996). Given that the basis for the special protection accorded public concern speech is its instrumental value to the community in enabling self-governance, a court asked whether a public employee’s speech relates to a matter of public concern must determine whether expression of the kind at issue is of value to the process of self-governance. This task does not, of course, involve the court’s passing judgment on the merit of the view expressed or its source. Rather, the issue is whether it is important to the process of self-governance that communications on this topic, in this form and in this context, take place. This point is well illustrated by the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987). There, a clerical employee of a constable’s office, after hearing a news report of an attempt to assassinate the President, said to a co-worker in what she thought to be a private conversation, 'If they go for him again, I hope they get him.' Id. at 380. This remark was reported to her supervisor and she was discharged. While acknowledging that the employee’s opinion 21 might understandably be regarded by some as ill-considered, the Court concluded that her statement could nevertheless be 'fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern.' Id. at 384 (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 146). As the Court explained: Considering the statement in context, as Connick requires, discloses that it plainly dealt with a matter of public concern. The statement was made in the course of a conversation addressing the policies of the President’s administration. It came on the heels of a news bulletin regarding what is certainly a matter of heightened public attention: an attempt on the life of the President. . . . The inappropriate or controversial character of a statement is irrelevant to the question whether it deals with a matter of public concern. [D]ebate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and . . . may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); see also Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 136 (1966): Just as erroneous statements must be protected to give freedom of expression the breathing space it needs to survive, so statements criticizing public policy and the implementation of it must be similarly protected. Id. at 386-87 (footnote omitted.) Connick teaches a number of other lessons that are useful when applying its holding to new situations. First, Connick expressly recognizes that the community's interest in the free exchange of information and ideas relating to matters of public concern is not limited to public declarations. That interest is implicated in private exchanges between two individuals as well as in exchanges between an individual and 22 members of the public. Private dissemination of information and ideas can be as important to effective self-governance as public speeches. Thus, if the content and circumstances of a private communication are such that the message conveyed would be relevant to the process of self-governance if disseminated to the community, that communication is public concern speech even though it occurred in a private context. Connick, 461 U.S. at 146, 148; see also Givhan v. Western Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415-16 (1979) (Neither the [First] Amendment itself nor our decisions indicate that [the] freedom [of speech] is lost to the public employee who arranges to communicate privately with his employer rather than to spread his views before the public.). Second, Connick contains helpful lessons concerning the kinds of subject matter that are likely to be of public concern. Racial discrimination in the assignment of school personnel, the subject matter of the private communication in Givhan, 439 U.S. at 410, was characterized by the Connick Court as a matter inherently of public concern. 461 U.S. at 148 n.8. The Court also suggested that a communication would be of public concern, barring a form or context that detracted from its value to the process of self-governance, if it (1) indicated that the District Attorney's office was not discharging its governmental responsibilities in the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases, or (2) brought to light actual or potential wrongdoing or breach of public trust on the part of [the District Attorney] and others that would be relevant in evaluating the performance 23 of a public office or official. Id. at 148; see also Swineford v. Snyder County Pennsylvania, 15 F.3d 1258, 1271 (3d Cir. 1994) (allegation of malfeasance by election officials is speech fall[ing] squarely within the core public speech delineated in Connick). Finally, Connick indicates that the speaker's motive, while often a relevant part of the context of the speech, is not dispositive in determining whether a particular statement relates to a matter of public concern. Myers' motive for devising and distributing her questionnaire was to defeat the proposed transfer. Despite this same motive underlying all of her questions, the Court found that some of them related to matters of public concern and some did not. If motive were dispositive, the inquiry could only have resulted in finding either that all of Myers' speech was public concern speech or that none of it was. See also Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1201 (3d Cir. 1988) (explaining that motivation [is] merely one factor to be considered, [and] not necessarily controlling, in assessing the character of the employee's speech). With this background, we now turn to an application of the governing law to the facts of this case. The subject matter of Azzaro's reports to Fox and Sirabella was an incident of sexual harassment by an assistant to the Commissioner which occurred in the Commissioner's office during the course of an appointment Azzaro had made, in her capacity as the spouse of an employee, to plead for her husband's job. The harassment was a form of gender discrimination since Fusaro presumably would not 24 have behaved in the same manner toward a supplicant male spouse of a female employee. We believe this form of discrimination, when practiced by those exercising authority in the name of a public official, is as much a matter of public concern as racial discrimination practiced under similar circumstances. We also believe that Azzaro's communications to Fox and Sirabella brought to light actual wrongdoing on the part of one exercising public authority that would be relevant to the electorate’s evaluation of the performance of the office of an elected official.4 For these reasons, we conclude Azzaro's communications should be regarded as a matter of public concern unless something in their form or context deprived them of their value to the process of self-governance. Turning to form and context, we find nothing that detracts significantly from the value of these communications to the process of self-governance. Based on her deposition, it is fair to say that Azzaro complained reluctantly, that her interest in each instance was in saving her job and that of her husband, and that she might have been content if the only relief she had received was protection from discharge. But this, in our judgment, would not cause a citizen engaged in an evaluation of the Commissioner's office to disregard or discount her complaint. 4. We are thus not here presented with a situation in which a public employee has filed a complaint about an isolated incident of what he or she perceived to be inappropriate conduct on the part of a non-supervisory co-worker. While we express no opinion on such a situation, it would presumably be less important to an evaluation of the performance of the public office involved than the situation now before us. 25 Assessing content, form, and context, including Azzaro's motivation, we conclude that Azzaro's reports to Fox and Sirabella were matters of public concern. In reaching this conclusion, we have considered several distinctions that other courts of appeals have found to be controlling on the issue of whether a public employee's speech is speech of public concern. Although in each instance we find relevance in the factor relied upon by our sister courts, we respectfully decline to give those factors controlling significance. A distinction has been suggested between speech uttered by a public employee as an employee and speech uttered by a public employee as a citizen.5 See, e.g., David v. City and County of Denver, 101 F.3d 1344, 1355 (10th Cir. 1996) (stating that this distinction is the fundamental inquiry in deciding whether speech involves matter of public concern). An employee 5. The apparent origin of this distinction is the following language from Connick: We hold only that when a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public concern, but instead as an employee upon matters only of personal interest, absent the most unusual circumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the employee's behavior. 461 U.S. at 147. In context, however, we believe this sentence was intended to contrast matters of public concern with matters only of personal interest and not to suggest a critical distinction based on the subjective motivation of the employee. As we point out in text, the latter interpretation is inconsistent with the holding in the case. 26 speaks as an employee, it is said, when her primary purpose is to secure relief for herself, and as a citizen only when her primary purpose is to bring about systemic reform. See id. at 1356. Under this view, if the employee's purpose was primarily to solve her own personal problem, the fact that her statement would be of value to the process of self-governance does not make the speech public concern speech. See, e.g., Morgan v. Ford, 6 F.3d 750, 754 (11th Cir. 1993). The distinction between speaking as a citizen and speaking as an employee, then, is simply an alternative way of describing the inquiry into the speaker's motive. While, as we have explained, an employee's motive may be relevant to whether speech is on a matter of public concern, giving controlling significance to primary purpose is inconsistent with the result in Connick. Myers' purpose in asking her question about pressure to participate in political campaigns was no different than her purpose in asking her questions on the same questionnaire about office morale and the general reputation of the office supervisors for trustworthiness. Her purpose with respect to each of these questions was clearly to gather ammunition for another round of controversy with her superiors. 461 U.S. at 148. Nevertheless, the question regarding pressure to campaign was speech about a matter of public concern because, even taking into account its form and context, it was important to a selfgoverning society that public employees be free to express themselves about it. As the Court explained: [T]here is a demonstrated interest in this country that government service should depend upon 27 meritorious performance rather than political service. Given this history, we believe it apparent that the issue of whether assistant district attorneys are pressured to work in political campaigns is a matter of interest to the community upon which it is essential that public employees be able to speak out freely without fear of retaliatory dismissal. Id. at 149 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). A related distinction has been suggested between situations in which the employee is seeking to bring information to the attention of the public and those in which the employee did not want her speech to be publicly circulated. Under this view, oral statements [about sexual harassment] intended to be confidential and to lead to the internal resolution of a problem without public controversy are not speech on a matter of public concern even though incidences of sexual harassment in a public [institution] are inherently matters of public concern . . . . Callaway v. Hafeman, 832 F.2d 414, 417 (7th Cir. 1987). Here again, although we think a request for confidentiality may be relevant to the public concern issue, we conclude that it would be inconsistent with Connick and Givhan to give it controlling significance. A final, closely related distinction suggests that a grievance about sexual harassment is only a matter of public concern if it includes indications that there is a systemic problem interfering with the public agency's performance of its governmental functions, and not if the complaints relate solely to the employee's own situation. See David, 101 F.3d at 1356; Saulpaugh v. Monroe Community Hosp., 4 F.3d 134, 143 (2d Cir. 28 1993). In rejecting this notion, we do not suggest that all public employee complaints about sexual harassment are matters of public concern. We do believe, however, that under all of the surrounding circumstances, Azzaro's reports address a matter of public concern even though they referred to a single incident.