Opinion ID: 2197835
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Testimony of Child Witness

Text: Appellant also contends that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of C.M.'s six-year old son, Michael, arguing that he was incompetent to testify and was impermissibly led by the prosecutor during direct examination. Two requirements must be satisfied before a child witness can be found competent to testify: (1) the child must be able to recall the events which are the subject of the testimony; and (2) the child must understand the difference between truth and falsehood and appreciate the duty to tell the truth. Barnes v. United States, 600 A.2d 821, 823 (D.C.1991). This court will not disturb the trial court's decision unless it is clearly erroneous, recognizing that the trial court has the opportunity to observe the witness' demeanor and conduct at trial. Id. Prior to trial in this case, the trial judge conducted a voir dire of Michael and ruled that he was competent to testify. The trial judge specifically found that Michael was able to recall the events of the attack and could differentiate between falsehood and truth. Appellant's sole argument as to why Michael was incompetent to testify is that his testimony during voir dire was inconsistent with his testimony at trial on the issue of whether his sister was present during the attack on the complainant. The record demonstrates no inconsistency. The transcript of the voir dire shows that Michael testified that his sister was in his bedroom when appellant was hitting his mother, and the trial transcript shows that he similarly testified that his sister was present during the attack. Appellant cites no other purported inconsistency in the child's testimony. Without any evidence in the record to support that Michael's voir dire testimony contradicted his testimony at trial, we have no basis to conclude that the trial judge's finding that Michael could accurately recall the events was clearly erroneous. [11] Appellant also argues that the prosecutor asked Michael leading questions during direct examination. Prior to trial, Michael had described the attack he witnessed against his mother during a videotaped interview. During the interview, Michael said that appellant kicked his mother with his boots, but at trial Michael testified during direct examination that he saw appellant hit C.M. with his fists. When asked whether appellant used anything else during the attack, Michael responded no. The prosecutor then approached the bench and informed the judge that he could proceed in either of two ways: (1) by impeaching Michael with the videotaped statement indicating that appellant kicked C.M.; or (2) by leading Michael by asking did [appellant] also kick your mommie?. The trial judge permitted the prosecutor to ask the leading question, to which Michael responded in the affirmative. Appellant objected to the question and on appeal continues to complain that it was error to permit the prosecutor to lead the child witness. Leading questions should not be used on the direct examination of a witness except as may be necessary to develop the witness' testimony. Bailey v. United States, 831 A.2d 973, 984 (D.C. 2003) (quoting FED R. EVID. 611(c)). The trial court, however, has fairly broad discretion to allow leading questions to be asked, and reversal is usually not required if the record shows that the court exercised that discretion. Id. (citing Green v. United States, 121 U.S.App. D.C. 111, 112, 348 F.2d 340, 341 (1965)). [A] hostile witness, an adverse party, or a witness identified with an adverse party may be interrogated by a leading question. Jenkins v. United States, 500 A.2d 1019, 1021 n.  (D.C.1985) (quoting 2 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 415 at 531-32 (1982)). This situation includes not only the case of witnesses hostile, biased, or interested, by their sympathies, with the opponent's cause, but also of witnesses unwilling for any other reason to tell all they may know. . . . 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 774 (CHADBOURN REV. 1970). We discern no error in the face of a clear exercise of judicial discretion. Although we have previously urged the judicious[ ] exercise of discretion in permitting leading questions to suggestible witnesses, we have, at the same time, recognized that it is often necessary to use leading questions in the case of young witnesses. Scott v. United States, 412 A.2d 364, 371 (D.C.1980). The witness on the stand was the complainant's young child, who, was five-years-old at the time of the attack and six at the time of trial, and due to his age, may have required a leading question to fully stimulate his recollection. See WIGMORE § 778; see also United States v. Flute, 363 F.3d 676, 678 (8th Cir.2004) ([W]hile leading questions are generally prohibited on direct examination, the child witness is a long-recognized exception to this rule.) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Once Michael said no when asked whether appellant had used anything other than his fists during the attack, he demonstrated that he was unwilling to disclose all that he knew, and the prosecutor was therefore permitted to ask him a leading question on the precise issue. Moreover, if the leading question had not been allowed, the alternative course, to impeach Michael with his prior inconsistent statement, likely would have prompted the same response. On this record, we conclude there is no abuse of discretion.