Opinion ID: 1165306
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Absence of the United States Bureau of Reclamation as a party

Text: Defendants argue that the Bureau, as a party to the original tripartite and repayment contracts, was indispensable to this action and that the trial court could make no adjudication concerning the validity of such contracts in its absence. However, the trial court did not purport to make any declaration concerning the rights of the Bureau under the above contracts. In fact, the court expressly stated: This Judgment shall not be construed, and is not intended, to affect in any manner any rights or interest of the United States of America in the subject matter involved in this litigation. The issue of the validity of the tripartite and repayment contracts as they pertain to the Bureau is res judicata. Immediately following the execution of the latter contract, defendants, pursuant to a promise contained therein, filed an action in the Seventh Judicial District Court in order to obtain an adjudication of the validity of these contracts. That court declared, in a decree dated June 16, 1944: [S]aid [repayment] contract is legal and valid as an act of the Carbon Water Conservancy District and . .. said contract is binding in all respects as therein provided upon said district. ... [S]aid [tripartite] contract ... was duly confirmed, ratified, and approved by the electors of Carbon Water Conservancy District and is a legal and valid contract binding in all respects as therein provided upon said district. No known events have occurred since the time of the Seventh District Court's judgment to alter the rights or responsibilities of the parties under the contracts in question. Nor, according to the record, has any of these parties sought to deny its responsibilities under these contracts. The Bureau, represented by its regional director, Nelson W. Plummer, recently reaffirmed its own recognition of the validity of the contracts in an affidavit received in evidence by the court. Likewise, counsel for defendants acknowledged in an evidentiary hearing before the trial court: [W]e don't contend that that [Seventh District] confirmatory proceeding was wrong or that the contracts were never valid or they're [sic] not valid now, as to the parties. I think there is no question about that... .       ... There is no issue before Your Honor as to the validity of the repayment contract or the Tripartite Contract. It's a question of whether the plaintiff is in a position to sue... . By declaring the contract to be valid and binding against defendants, the trial court adjudicated no new issue with respect to the rights of the Bureau. It merely confirmed the position taken by all parties to the contracts in favor of the validity of such contracts. The purpose of Rule 19(a), Utah R.Civ.P., which requires the joinder of indispensable parties as a condition to suit, is to guard against the entry of judgments which might prejudice the rights of such parties in their absence. [5] In the present case, the declaratory judgment of the trial court has no prejudicial effect upon the rights of the Bureau and, in fact, supports the official position taken by its regional director as to the two contracts in question. Defendants argue, without explanation or citation to authority, that by bringing the present suit, plaintiff intended to have itself adjudicated as successor to the United States under its tripartite contract and as entitled to benefit from the reservations contained in the contract. Defendants appear to suggest that the declaratory judgment may have transferred to plaintiff some of the Bureau's rights under the tripartite contract and that joinder of the Bureau was therefore necessary in order to protect its interest. Defendants' argument finds possible support in the phraseology of paragraph 3 of the declaratory judgment, which reads: Plaintiff is a third party beneficiary and entitled to the benefits of and enforce [sic] the provisions of said contracts relating to the Gooseberry Plan, particularly as those provisions are applicable to the rights and obligations of plaintiff as set forth in its agreement with the United States dated July 22, 1975. As discussed in Part I, above, the trial court's classification of plaintiff as a third-party beneficiary of the tripartite and repayment contracts was not a necessary part of its judgment, since plaintiff's assignee status gives it standing to sue. Therefore, the court's judgment gives plaintiff no rights under the tripartite contract other than those conferred by its assignment contract with the Bureau. In order to clarify the fact that the judgment did not purport to transfer to plaintiff any of the Bureau's rights under the tripartite contract beyond those described in the assignment agreement, we modify the quoted paragraph as follows: Plaintiff is a third party beneficiary and entitled to receive the benefits of and enforce the provisions of said contracts relating to the Gooseberry Plan, particularly as those provisions are applicable to the rights and obligations of plaintiff as set forth in its agreement with the United States dated July 22, 1975. With the above clarification, the judgment clearly infringed on none of the Bureau's rights under the contracts in question and was not invalidated by its absence as a party.