Opinion ID: 748781
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Bloom's Claims Under ADA Title III

Text: 9 Regardless of whether Bloom was disabled, the district court correctly granted summary judgment on Bloom's ADA Title III claims because ADA Title III expressly does not apply to public entities, including local governments. ADA Title III makes it unlawful for public accommodations and private entities that provide public transportation to discriminate against individuals with disabilities in the provision of goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). Title III defines public accommodations as certain private entities, and includes a list of the types of private entities included within that definition, such as places of lodging, food and drink establishments, places of exhibition or entertainment, sales or rental establishments, service establishments, and others. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Section 12181(6) qualifies this definition by defining the term private entity as any entity other than a public entity (as defined in [ADA Title II] ). 42 U.S.C. § 12181(6). The definition of public entity in ADA Title II includes any State or local government. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(A). Accordingly, the structure and language of ADA Title III expressly precludes Bloom's claims against Bexar County under that title. 10 Several recent holdings support the inapplicability of ADA Title III to public entities such as Bexar County. In Sandison v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 64 F.3d 1026 (6th Cir.1995), the Sixth Circuit held that [p]ublic school grounds and public parks are of course operated by public entities, and thus cannot constitute public accommodations under title III. 64 F.3d at 1036. In reaching this conclusion, the Sixth Circuit relied on the statutory exclusion of public entities from the definition of private entities, as well as Department of Justice regulations defining place of public accommodation as  'a facility, operated by a private entity, whose operations affect commerce and fall within at least one of the following categories'.... Id. (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 36.104). More recently, in the context of a claim that a public school district's refusal to administer a prescription drug to a student, the Eighth Circuit held that [e]ntities subject to Title III include private schools, but not public ones. DeBord v. Board of Educ., 126 F.3d 1102, 1106 (8th Cir.1997). In so holding, the Eighth Circuit noted Title III of the ADA applies to private entities providing public accommodations[,] not to public entities. Id.; accord., e.g., Rhodes v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 939 F.Supp. 584, 591 (N.D.Ohio 1996) ([The] definitions [in 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181(6)-(7) ] have been understood to mean that a place of public accommodation must be operated by a private entity.); Kessler Inst. for Rehabilitation, Inc. v. Mayor and Council of Essex Fells, 876 F.Supp. 641, 652 (D.N.J.1995) (Municipalities, as well as municipal departments, instrumentalities, and agencies, are specifically excluded from the definition of 'private entities' subject to [Title] III.); Crowder v. Kitagawa, 842 F.Supp. 1257, 1267 (D.Haw.1994) (The definition of 'private entity' in 42 U.S.C. § 12181(6) specifically excludes any public entity such as the State of Hawaii. Accordingly, neither Title III of the ADA nor its regulations concerning service animals apply to the Hawaii quarantine system.), rev'd on other grounds, 81 F.3d 1480 (9th Cir.1996) (reversing based on analysis of ADA Title II, rather than ADA Title III).