Opinion ID: 4383339
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: standard of review

Text: An appellate court reviews for abuse of discretion a trial court’s “rulings on the record of the voir dire process as a whole[.]” Pearson, 437 Md. at 356, 86 A.3d at 1235 (citation omitted). Law In Dingle v. State, 361 Md. 1, 8-9, 5-6, 759 A.2d 819, 823, 821 (2000), this Court held that a trial court abused its discretion by asking during voir dire compound questions, such as: “[H]ave you or any family member or a friend been the victim of a crime, and[,] if the answer to that part of the question is yes, would that fact interfere with your ability to be fair and impartial in this case?” This Court observed that a trial court “must decide whether, and when, cause for disqualification exists for any particular [prospective juror]. That is not a position occupied, or a decision to be made, by . . . the individual [prospective juror]s.” Id. at 14-15, 759 A.2d at 826. This Court determined that, in Dingle, the trial court “avoid[ed] examination of each affected [prospective juror] as to the admittedly relevant matters[,] and allow[ed] each such person to make his or her own call as to his or her qualification to serve.” Id. at 14, 759 A.2d at 826. In other words, this Court concluded that the compound questions “usurped the [trial] court’s responsibility” to “determine, in the final analysis, the fitness of the individual” prospective jurors. Id. at 8-9, 759 A.2d at 823. This Court explained that the compound questions also “deprived [the defendant] of the ability to challenge . . . for cause” any prospective jurors who did not respond to the compound questions because the defendant lacked “information bearing on the relevant experiences or associations of” those prospective jurors. Id. at 21, 759 A.2d at 830. This - 18 - Court reiterated that the compound questions interfered with both the trial court’s ability to determine whether prospective jurors were biased and the defendant’s ability to move to strike prospective jurors for cause, stating: Because [the trial court] did not require an answer to be given to the question as to the existence of the status or experience unless accompanied by a statement of partiality, the trial [court] was precluded from discharging [its] responsibility, i.e. exercising discretion, and, at the same time, the [defendant] was denied the opportunity to discover and challenge [prospective juror]s who might be biased. Id. at 17, 759 A.2d at 828. Despite having expressly disapproved of compound questions in Dingle, in three subsequent cases, this Court held that trial courts abused their discretion by refusing to ask compound “strong feelings” questions. In State v. Thomas, 369 Md. 202, 204-05, 798 A.2d 566, 567-68 (2002), this Court held that a trial court abused its discretion by refusing to ask: “Does any member of the jury panel have such strong feelings regarding violations of the narcotics laws that it would be difficult for you to fairly and impartially weigh the facts at a trial where narcotics violations have been alleged?” (Footnote omitted). In Sweet v. State, 371 Md. 1, 9-10, 806 A.2d 265, 270-71 (2002), this Court held that a trial court abused its discretion by refusing to ask: “Do the charges stir up strong emotional feelings in you that would affect your ability to be fair and impartial in this case?” And, in State v. Shim, 418 Md. 37, 40, 42, 12 A.3d 671, 672-73, 674 (2011), this Court held that a trial court abused its discretion by refusing to ask: “Does any member of the jury panel have such strong feelings concerning the violent death of another human being that you would be unable to render a fair and impartial verdict based solely on the evidence presented?” - 19 - Notably, “although Thomas, Sweet, and Shim postdate Dingle, in none of the three cases did this Court supersede Dingle; in Thomas, Sweet, and Shim, this Court did not address any issue regarding the ‘strong feelings’ [] questions’ phrasings.” Pearson, 437 Md. at 363-64, 86 A.3d at 1240. In Thomas, 369 Md. at 204 n.1, 798 A.2d at 567 n.1, in a footnote in the background section of this Court’s opinion, this Court commented, in dicta: “When the inquiry is into the state of mind or attitude of the [prospective jurors] with regard to a particular crime or category of crimes, it is appropriate to phrase the question as was done in this case.” This Court did not explain how a compound “strong feelings” question could be permissible under Dingle, or otherwise provide any reasoning for its dicta. See Thomas, 369 Md. at 204 n.1, 798 A.2d at 567 n.1. In any event, in Thomas, no issue as to the phrasing of the “strong feelings” question was before this Court, as the defendant specifically requested that the trial court ask the “strong feelings” question in compound form, and the trial court refused; thus, the question was whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to ask the “strong feelings” question, not whether the “strong feelings” question was phrased properly. See id. at 204, 798 A.2d at 567. In Pearson, 437 Md. at 363, 86 A.3d at 1239, this Court overruled Thomas, Sweet, and Shim to the extent that they required a trial court, on request, to ask the “strong feelings” question in compound form, and held “that, on request, a trial court must ask during voir dire: ‘Do any of you have strong feelings about [the crime with which the defendant is charged]?’” (Brackets in original). This Court “reaffirm[ed] this Court’s essential holding in Shim that, on request, a trial court must ask during voir dire whether any prospective juror has ‘strong feelings’ about the crime with which the defendant is - 20 - charged.” Pearson, 437 Md. at 363, 86 A.3d at 1239. This Court “simply recognize[d] that, in Shim and its parent cases, the ‘strong feelings’ [] questions’ phrasings were at odds with Dingle, 361 Md. at 21, 759 A.2d at 830.” Pearson, 437 Md. at 363, 86 A.3d at 1239 (citations omitted). This Court explained why compound “strong feelings” questions are inconsistent with Dingle, stating: Just like the phrasing of the [compound] questions in Dingle, [361 Md.] at 5, 759 A.2d at 821, the phrasing of the “strong feelings” [] question in Shim “shifts from the trial [court] to the [prospective jurors] responsibility to decide [prospective] juror bias.” Dingle, 361 Md. at 21, 759 A.2d at 830. In other words, as with the [compound] questions’ phrasings in Dingle, id. at 5, 759 A.2d at 821, the phrasing of the “strong feelings” [] question in Shim required each prospective juror to evaluate his or her own potential bias. Specifically, under Shim, 418 Md. at 54, 12 A.3d at 681, each prospective juror decides whether his or her “strong feelings” (if any) about the crime with which the defendant is charged “would [make it] difficult for [the prospective juror] to fairly and impartially weigh the facts.” That decision belongs to the trial court, not the prospective juror. Pearson, 437 Md. at 362, 86 A.3d at 1239 (some alterations in original). In Pearson, id. at 354-55, 86 A.3d at 1234, during voir dire, the trial court asked the following compound “strong feelings” question: “Does any member of the panel hold such strong feelings regarding violations of the narcotics laws that it would be difficult for you to fairly and impartially weigh the facts of this trial where narcotics violations have been alleged?” The trial court refused to ask whether any of the prospective jurors knew anyone who had been the victim of a crime, or who had been a member of a law enforcement agency. See id. at 354-55, 86 A.3d at 1234. Before this Court, the defendant contended that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to ask the “victim” question. See id. at 356, 86 A.3d at 1235. “[F]or three - 21 - reasons, [this Court] conclude[d] that a trial court need not ask during voir dire whether any prospective juror has ever been the victim of a crime.” Id. at 359, 86 A.3d at 1237. “First, a prospective juror’s experience as the victim of a crime lacks a demonstrably strong correlation with a mental state that gives rise to specific cause for disqualification.” Id. at 359, 86 A.3d at 1237 (cleaned up). “Second, the ‘victim’ [] question may consume an enormous amount of time.” Id. at 359, 86 A.3d at 1237 (citation omitted). “Third, this Court ha[d] already held that, on request, a trial court must ask during voir dire whether any prospective juror has ‘strong feelings about’ the crime with which the defendant is charged.” Id. at 360, 86 A.3d at 1238 (quoting Shim, 418 Md. at 54, 12 A.3d at 681). This Court explained: “The ‘strong feelings’ [] question makes the ‘victim’ [] question unnecessary by revealing the specific cause for disqualification at which the ‘victim’ [] question is aimed”—“assuming that the ‘strong feelings’ [] question is phrased properly.” Pearson, 437 Md. at 360, 361 n.4, 86 A.3d at 1238 & n.4 (footnote omitted). As discussed above, this Court concluded that the “strong feelings” question is phrased properly if and only if it is in non-compound form. See id. at 363, 86 A.3d at 1239. Accordingly, this Court determined that, in Pearson, although the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to ask the “victim” question, the trial court abused its discretion by asking the “strong feelings” question in compound form. See id. at 364, 86 A.3d at 1240. The defendant also argued that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to ask the “law enforcement agency” question. See id. at 364, 86 A.3d at 1240. This Court held that: where all of the State’s witnesses are members of law enforcement agencies - 22 - and/or where the basis for a conviction is reasonably likely to be the testimony of members of law enforcement agencies, on request, a trial court must ask during voir dire: “Have any of you ever been a member of a law enforcement agency?” Id. at 369, 86 A.3d at 1243. This Court determined that, because all of the State’s witnesses in Pearson were law enforcement officers, the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to ask the “law enforcement agency” question. See id. at 369, 86 A.3d at 1243.