Opinion ID: 1901039
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Challenge to Subject Matter Jurisdiction.

Text: Bruegger asserts that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enhance his sentence. Bruegger admits that the State, in documents filed on January 10 and 11, sought to amend the information to allege that his offense of sexual abuse in the third degree was a second offense for purposes of Iowa Code chapter 901A. Bruegger asserts, however, the controlling document in this case is an additional supplemental information filed by the State on January 12. This final document contained no mention of the enhancement or Iowa Code chapter 901A. According to Bruegger, the supplemental filing controls in this case, and because it lacks reference to the enhancement, the district court was without authority to impose the enhancement. Bruegger relies upon State v. Thacker, No. 05AP-834, 2006 WL 1826079 (Ohio Ct.App. June 30, 2006), in support of his argument. In Thacker, an appellate court held that the trial court erred by finding the defendant a violent sexual offender at sentencing when no such specification appeared in the indictment. Thacker, No. 05AP-834, 2006 WL 1826079, at . The State counters that this case is controlled by Oetken. In Oetken, the defendant claimed that the State filed a substituted and supplemental trial information that did not mention his purported status as an habitual offender, thereby depriving the court of jurisdiction to sentence him as a habitual offender. Oetken, 613 N.W.2d at 686. This court held that the substituted and supplemental trial information was filed to comply with Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(5), which provides that a `supplemental indictment shall be prepared for the purpose of trial of the facts of the current offense only' in cases where a prior conviction will be used for enhancement purposes. Id. at 687 (quoting Iowa R.Crim. P. 6(5) (now rule 2.6(5))). Failure of the supplemental information to note the enhancement thus did not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the enhancement. Id. Bruegger responds that under Oetken, the State must first file a trial information alleging the previous crime that is the basis for enhancement and only then may file a supplemental trial information. Bruegger argues that because the file does not contain a file-stamped copy of an amended trial information, the holding in Oetken does not apply. We disagree. The record shows that on November 28 the State requested a preliminary ruling on the issue of the sentencing enhancement and outlined the facts related to the Minnesota juvenile offense. Bruegger thus had sufficient notice of the State's intent to add the sentencing enhancement. While it is true that the record contains no file-stamped copy of any version of the second-amended-and-substituted trial information, the district court at a hearing on January 12 stated that the State's second motion to amend the trial information, together with its proposed supplemental information, was before the court. When asked if he wished to be heard on the matter, Bruegger's counsel stated, No, Your Honor. I think that this complies with the law. . . . I don't have any objection to it. The court then stated that the second amended trial information simply alleged a prior conviction and a sentencing enhancement, that the State gave the defendant notice of its intention in November, and that there is no unfair surprise or prejudice by the motion. As a result, the district court sustained the motion to amend orally. In light of these facts, Bruegger's claim, stripped to its essentials, is that the failure of the State to file copies of the second-amended-and-substituted trial information after the hearing prevents this court from relying upon them in any way. We reject this assertion. In a number of contexts, we have held that technical irregularities in the development of the record do not require reversal if the record clearly shows what transpired at trial and there is no prejudice to the defendant. See State v. Sheffey, 234 N.W.2d 92, 95 (Iowa 1975) (holding information may be amended by order of court before or during trial to correct errors of form or substance); State v. Harding, 204 Iowa 1135, 1143-44, 216 N.W. 642, 646 (1927) (holding that information filed shortly before its approval by district judge has same effect as if it had been approved and then filed); State v. Japone, 202 Iowa 450, 455, 209 N.W. 468, 471 (1926) (holding that failure to make amendment after leave was not prejudicial error, where trial was conducted as if amendment had been made). Under the circumstances presented here, we conclude that the technical failure of the State to file an approved second-amended-and-substituted trial information, where the motion to amend was not resisted by the defendant and which was sustained by the district court, does not defeat subject matter jurisdiction in this case. We further hold, as in Oetken, that the supplemental information was simply designed to comply with Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.6(5) and does not provide Bruegger with grounds for relief.