Opinion ID: 2639482
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: admissibility of expert evidence on eyewitness identification

Text: Defendant sought to call Dr. Kathy Pezdek to testify as an expert on scientific research that refuted many commonly held assumptions about eyewitness testimony. The prosecutor told the trial court that eyewitness identification was not a key element of his case; instead, he was relying primarily on defendant's admissions. Relying on this representation, the court denied defendant's request, reasoning that the expert testimony would not assist the jury. Defendant renewed his request at the close of the prosecution's case, but the court again denied the motion. In People v. McDonald (1984) 37 Cal.3d 351, 208 Cal.Rptr. 236, 690 P.2d 709 McDonald ), the leading California case allowing the introduction of expert testimony on eyewitness identification, this court said: [T]he decision to admit or exclude expert testimony on psychological factors affecting eyewitness identification remains primarily a matter within the trial court's discretion; ... `we do not intend to open the gates to a flood of expert evidence on the subject.' [Citation.] We expect that such evidence will not often be needed, and in the usual case the appellate court will continue to defer to the trial court's discretion in this matter. Yet deference is not abdication. When an eyewitness identification of the defendant is a key element of the prosecution's case but is not substantially corroborated by evidence giving it independent reliability ..., it will ordinarily be error to exclude that testimony. ( Id. at p. 377, 208 Cal.Rptr. 236, 690 P.2d 709, fn. omitted.) The Attorney General cites People v. Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 751, 905 P.2d 420, which distinguished McDonald. Sanders said: Although eyewitness testimony was a key element of the prosecution's case, here, unlike McDonald, eyewitness testimony was not the only evidence linking the defendant to the crime. The eyewitness identification was corroborated by other independent evidence of the crime and the conspiracy leading to it. ( People v. Sanders, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 509, 46 Cal. Rptr.2d 751, 905 P.2d 420, italics in original.) But this language from Sanders cannot be viewed as limiting the holding of McDonald, supra, 37 Cal.3d at page 376, 208 Cal.Rptr. 236, 690 P.2d 709, to cases in which, apart from the eyewitness identification, there is no other evidence whatever linking defendant to the crime: Exclusion of the expert testimony is justified only if there is other evidence that substantially corroborates the eyewitness identification and gives it independent reliability. The corroborating evidence here meets McDonald's standard. Kane's identification of defendant was corroborated by testimony of Muslim, Cruz, Luna, Hunt, and Burton. It does not matter, for this purpose, that Muslim, Cruz, and Luna may have been accomplices whose testimony would require corroboration to support a conviction. (§ 1111.) Neither does it matter that all five witnesses could be impeached by proof of bias or prior inconsistent statements. The cumulative corroborative effect of the testimony of defendant's admissions is sufficient to give independent reliability to the eyewitness identification.