Opinion ID: 1169301
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: denial of treatment

Text: Price's final contention is that the court denied his fundamental right to treatment when it transferred him to the penitentiary a year after it committed him to the hospital. [A]ll the evidence indicat[ed] that the State Hospital had not provided even adequate diagnosis, let alone proper treatment, according to Price. He argues that his transfer to the penitentiary before being properly treated violated the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. [4] We disagree with Price's factual premise that all of the evidence indicated that he had not received proper treatment. As previously indicated, the hospital staff stated a number of times that Price had received all of the treatment available and had made progress. On October 23, 1984, the trial judge was informed that Price had been involved in group and individual therapy and had completed all phases of the Substance Abuse Program, as well as individual counseling and had exhausted all treatment modalities available for him at the Wyoming State Hospital. On February 20, 1985, the Wyoming State Hospital staff informed the trial judge that Price had made considerable therapeutic gains and that the additional [t]hree or four years at the Wyoming State Hospital, as recommended by Dr. Thorn, is not seen as therapeutic by the Wyoming State Hospital staff. Price's claim that he did not receive proper treatment is based upon Dr. Thorn's opinion that Price's problems had not been adequately dealt with by the hospital staff. Clearly Dr. Thorn disagreed with Dr. Burnett and Dr. Karn as to Price's problems and the adequacy of the treatment provided. But this difference of opinion does not support Price's contention that all of the evidence indicated that the Wyoming State Hospital had not provided adequate treatment. The conclusion that Price should not be further treated at the hospital was made by hospital staff involved in the day-to-day treatment of the patient. In this situation, the sentencing judge obviously felt that the value of a third professional opinion was limited, which is an approach shared by other courts. See, e.g., Cruz v. Ward, supra, 558 F.2d 658. We believe that Price's contention in this context amounts to a challenge to the lower court's finding that treatment had been provided. On appeal we must accept this finding of fact as long as [it is] supported by substantial evidence from which a reasonable inference may be drawn. Fortin v. State, Wyo., 622 P.2d 418, 420 (1981). Clearly the lower court's finding must be accepted in this case. We disagree with Price's initial premise that he did not receive adequate treatment. Therefore, it is unnecessary for this court to determine the constitutional question of whether Price's confinement, in the penitentiary, violates the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The sentence imposed was within the dictates of §§ 7-13-604 and 7-13-605. There was no constitutional right to a hearing upon Price's transfer from the hospital to the penitentiary. Finally, the record does not support the claim that Price failed to receive treatment from the hospital.