Opinion ID: 2053596
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admissibility of the Narcotics

Text: Jones contends that the cocaine seized after the search of his car should have been suppressed because he did not give a valid consent to search. He says he was in custody at the moment the officers asked for his consent and thus was entitled to be warned of his right to consult counsel before deciding whether to consent. He further argues that his consent was not voluntary. The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution provide the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. . . . U.S. CONST, amend. IV; IND. CONST, art. 1 § 11. Created to protect one's right to privacy, this protection against unreasonable, State-sponsored searches and seizures is a principal mode of discouraging lawless police conduct. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1875, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Consequently, evidence obtained through an unreasonable search and seizure is not admissible. Calender v. State (1923), 193 Ind. 91,138 N.E. 817. The warrant requirement commands that an agent of the government obtain a search warrant from a neutral, detached magistrate prior to undertaking a search of either a person or private property, except under special circumstances fitting within certain carefully drawn and well-delineated exceptions. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514-15, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967); Murrell v. State, (1981), Ind, 421 N.E.2d 638. One such circumstance occurs when consent is given to the search. The theory underlying this rule is that when an individual gives permission to a search of either his person or property, governmental intrusion thereon is presumably not unreasonable. Consent must be freely and voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied, to be effective. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (to sustain consent for search given by person not in custody, government need show only that consent was voluntary in fact). Indiana law on consent given while in custody derives from Pirtle v. State, (1975), 263 Ind. 16, 323 N.E.2d 634. Pirtle was in police custody due to an arrest for possession of a stolen automobile. Id. at 21, 323 N.E.2d at 636. The police read Miranda rights to him in the squad car and again at the police station. Id at 22, 323 N.E.2d at 637. Pirtle did not waive his rights either time and requested to speak to an attorney when questioned at the station. Though counsel was not provided, approximately twelve hours later two other officers questioned Pirtle again. One asked for permission to search his apartment, which Pirtle authorized. The police searched the apartment and discovered witnesses and direct evidence linking Pirtle to a homicide. Id. Pirtle challenged admission of that evidence, and we held that a person who is asked to give consent to search while in police custody is entitled to the presence and advice of counsel prior to making the decision whether to give such consent. Id. at 28, 323 N.E.2d at 640 (emphasis added). We noted the U.S. Supreme Court's observation in Miranda that the atmosphere of in-custody interrogation was inherently coercive. Id at 22, 323 N.E.2d at 637 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)). We observed that the guarantees of an accused's right to counsel in both the Sixth Amendment and Art. I, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution apply `at any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel's absence might derogate from the accused's right to a fair trial.' Id. at 26, 323 N.E.2d at 639 (citing United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1931-32, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967)). Because Pirtle was not afforded counsel after he requested it, he could have no conception of the extent of his Fourth Amendment rights. Id. We extended the Pirtle rule by holding that a person in custody must be informed of the right to consult with counsel about the possibility of consenting to a search before a valid consent can be given. Sims v. State (1980), 274 Ind. 495, 413 N.E.2d 556. We held that giving an arrestee Miranda warnings before commencing interrogation does not sufficiently inform him of his right to consult with counsel prior to consenting to a search. Id. at 499-500, 413 N.E.2d at 569; [2] but see Martin v. State (1986), Ind., 490 N.E.2d 309 (reminding of consent form read to accused twenty-five minutes earlier was sufficient for valid consent to search). Because Jones claims he was entitled to receive a warning about consultation with counsel before consenting to the search of his car, we must determine whether his right to receive the warning had attached. This right can only be said to have attached if Jones was in custody when he consented to the search. A seizure implicating the Fourth Amendment occurs when an officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 19 n. 16, 88 S.Ct. at 1879 n. 16. Because of the limited nature of the intrusion, brief investigative detentions may be justified on less than probable cause. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2579-80, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975). Accordingly, not all seizures of the person equate to arrests [3] and not all questioning pursuant to a seizure and brief investigative detention amounts to custodial interrogation. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976) (routine border stop and request for identification permissible); Davis v. Mississippi 394 U.S. 721, 89 S.Ct. 1394, 22 L.Ed.2d 676 (1969) (stop and detention for fingerprinting permissible). Neither Federal nor Indiana constitutional jurisprudence has developed a bright line test for determining when an investigatory detention moves beyond merely a Terry stop and becomes an arrest or custodial interrogation. The rule largely applies an objective test asking whether a reasonable person under the same circumstances would believe that she was under arrest or not free to resist the entreaties of the police. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 433-34, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 2386, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991). [4] We have considered whether a person was in custody and thus entitled to warnings in a variety of settings. In Peterson v. State (1987), Ind., 514 N.E.2d 265, the accused was stopped on the street by two police officers and asked to identify himself. They asked to search his car and hotel room, and he consented. At trial, the accused contested the admission of drug paraphernalia and a gun found during the search, claiming he was not apprised of his Pirtle right. Ultimately, we found he was not entitled to the Pirtle warning because he was not in custody when he gave his consent. Id. at 272. In so doing, we explained the accused was subject to a limited seizure of the person, namely an investigatory stop, supportable by knowledge of the officer of facts which would warrant a man of reasonable caution in believing that the limited action taken was appropriate. Id. at 271-2 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868). Moreover, in Huspon v. State (1989), Ind., 545 N.E.2d 1078, we found an individual's consent was a valid waiver of his Fourth Amendment right, absent the State's provision of his Pirtle warnings, because he was not in custody. Huspon claimed he was in custody because he was alone in his room with two police officers when they requested his consent. We held otherwise, explaining that appellant was unrestrained and had no reason to believe he could not leave, explaining that it was his perception of his position as to whether he reasonably believed his freedom of movement would have been curtailed by police which was relevant in determining whether he was in custody. Id. at 1081. The facts of Pirtle, Peterson and Huspon make clear that Jones was not in custody when he consented to the search of his vehicle. It is obvious that Jones was seized within the Fourth Amendment when he was stopped for obstructing traffic and then asked to exit his car. It is readily apparent, however, that Jones was neither arrested nor in police custody during the initial traffic stop. Although the number of officers present for a traffic stop was unusually high, none of officers touched Jones or physically restrained his freedom of movement before the moment he consented to a search of his car, and Jones was not asked mcriminating questions. Jones was never in the care and control of the police or interrogated in a manner implicating the Fifth Amendment and necessitating the giving of Miranda warnings. The instant case contrasts starkly to Pirtle, in which the defendant was asked for consent to search his home while he was in jail, detained for more than twelve hours, and after his right to counsel had been denied. Furthermore, the procedure governing the stop obligated Fautz not to detain Jones any longer than necessary, but not to recite his Miranda rights. Ind.Code Ann. § 34-4-32-2 (West 1983). Had Jones refused to give the police permission to search, he would have been given two citations and been free to leave. The police had no right even to frisk the vehicle without Jones' consent, and they would have had no option but to cease detaining him. Thus, we conclude that at the moment Jones was asked for permission to search his car, the prosecutorial process had not yet begun against him and Pirtle and Sims rights had not attached. Because Jones' consent to search was not constitutionally defective, the seizure of the cocaine was proper. The fact that Jones rescinded his consent does not affect the constitutionality of this search because the rescission was made too late; it came after the police discovered the drugs. The trial judge properly denied Jones' motion to suppress evidence seized during this search of his car.