Opinion ID: 2571591
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Admission of the Amended Condemnation Petition

Text: The Sextons also contend that the trial court erred by allowing the City, over the Sextons' objections, to introduce into evidence portions of the amended condemnation petition. They argue that, in so doing, the court unfairly permitted the jury to infer that it could consider limitations on the taking. The Sextons specifically take issue with the portion of the amended petition which permitted their use and substantial access to the easements during the City's period of taking. The Sextons contend that the paragraphs of the petition pertaining to the landowners' use and access to the easements actually described a conditional taking, evidence which should not have been presented to the jury. The City argues that the Sextons' characterization of the taking as conditional is merely a red herring. We are limited in our ability to adequately review this issue. The Sextons did not include a copy of the amended condemnation petition in the record on appeal. Instead, they merely attached a copy of the petition to the appendix of their appellate brief. This is insufficient. An appellant has the burden to designate a record sufficient to establish the claimed error; without such a record, the claim of error fails. State ex rel. Stovall v. Alivio, 275 Kan. 169, 172, 61 P.3d 687 (2003). An appellate brief may include an appendix, but that appendix is to consist of extracts from the record on appeal; an appendix cannot be used as a substitute for the record on appeal. Kansas Supreme Court Rule 6.02(f) (2006 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 36); see also In re Marriage of Brotherton, 30 Kan.App.2d 1298, 1300, 59 P.3d 1025 (2002) (materials not in the record on appeal will not be considered by appellate court). Moreover, the Sextons' argument is without merit. The Sextons fail to provide any authority for their contention that the City's taking was conditional. Rather, the petition described the taking, and that taking allowed the use of the property. See Hudson, 246 Kan. 395, 400, 790 P.2d 933 (property rights taken by the condemnor are determined by the language in the condemnation petition and appraisers' report; condemnor bears the burden of drafting the petition to show the limitations in its taking). We further note that K.S.A. 26-513(d), which lists nonexclusive factors to consider in ascertaining the amount of compensation and damages, names convenience as a factor. K.S.A. 26-513(d)(4); see also Montana Dept. of Transp. v. Simonson, 320 Mont. 249, 256, 87 P.3d 416, 420, (Mont.2004) (Compensating a party for loss of access is appropriate only when access has been completely denied or the access provided is unreasonable.). The landowners' opportunity to use or access the property subject to the temporary easements can be considered a convenience. We cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion by allowing testimony pertaining to portions of the amended petition. ISSUE 3: Did the trial court erroneously admit evidence and permit arguments regarding matters previously ruled inadmissible in the court's in limine orders and pretrial instructions to counsel, depriving the Sextons of a fair trial? Finally, the Sextons argue the trial court should have granted their motion for a new trial because the court erroneously admitted evidence and permitted argument regarding matters previously ruled inadmissible in the court's in limine orders and pretrial instructions to counsel, depriving the Sextons of a fair trial. More specifically, the Sextons argue the trial court erred in allowing (a) testimony regarding an itemization of damages assessed to various K.S.A. 26-513(d) factors, (b) testimony regarding the scope of the project and the impact on other landowners; and (c) a speaking objection.