Opinion ID: 2180547
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: School Desegregation Remedies

Text: After rigidly and narrowly interpreting the term compensatory damages in section 9-102 of the Act, the majority then concludes that the school desegregation remedies in the federal class action clearly involve mandatory injunctive relief and not compensatory damages awarded to the plaintiffs. 193 Ill.2d at 506, 250 Ill.Dec. at 754, 739 N.E.2d at 517-18. The majority overlooks settled federal law. A federal injunction can have a substantial ancillary effect on the state treasury. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 278, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 2940, 92 L.Ed.2d 209, 227 (1986). Federal courts have ordered state officials to stop violating federal law by refraining from doing particular activities, e.g., violating civil rights, or specifically, discriminating in schools, even if it would cost the state some money. Robbins Resource Recovery Partners, L.P. v. Edgar, 947 F.Supp. 1205, 1210 (N.D.Ill.1996) (collecting cases). In the specific context of school desegregation remedies, I agree with the federal district court's reasoning in this litigation: The court also finds that the nature of the remedies sought in the PWC [People Who Care] case are of the type contemplated by the term `damages' in the Tort Immunity Act. While the PWC case may be characterized generally as one of equity seeking mandatory injunctive relief, it is unique in the type of relief it seeks. The essence of the injury alleged in the PWC case is a denial of an education for minority students comparable to that afforded to white students in the district. The commensurate relief sought is an education comparable to that afforded to white students. What was lost was equal education, what is sought is equal education. The People Who Care plaintiffs do not seek purely some action on the part of the school district to prevent future injury, or in other words, the classic prospective relief associated with injunctive actions. Rather, much of what the People Who Care plaintiffs request in their lawsuit is compensation for past wrongs, and for this type of past wrong, direct money compensation to the class plaintiffs is not the appropriate remedy. For the school district's stock in trade is education. An equal educational opportunity was denied, and that is what ultimately must be provided through monies received by the tax levies. This notion finds support in Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 97 S.Ct. 2749, 53 L.Ed.2d 745 (1977). While addressing a different issue, the United States Supreme Court discussed the nature of the relief sought in a school desegregation lawsuit. [Citation.]    [T]he Court also recognized the compensatory nature of such relief. In that regard, the Court stated that the fact that `the programs are also compensatory in nature does not change the fact that they are part of a plan that operates prospectively to bring about the delayed benefits of a unitary school system.' Id. at 290, 97 S.Ct. at 2762. (Emphasis in original.) The court here considers this language from Milliken to support its characterization of the relief sought in the PWC case. Clearly, the relief requested has components of both traditional injunctive and compensatory relief. It is the significant compensatory aspects of the remedies sought, however, that bring it within the ambit of the Tort Immunity Act's tax levying provisions. In re Application of the County Collector, 918 F.Supp. at 242. The majority misapprehends the nature of school desegregation and educational discrimination remedies.