Opinion ID: 1399946
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: the remaining assignments, less 96 through 123:

Text: All of these assignments, like several previously discussed, relate to the admission of evidence. Assignments 27, 28, 30, 31, and 32 all label Rosenbaum's testimony hearsay. Assignments 17, 18, 34, and 51 to 64, inclusive, are all based on the argument that the testimony relating to English Electric was irrelevant, clearly inadmissible, and prejudicial. Assignment 66 attached a hearsay, irrelevant, and immaterial label to documentary proof of a $1 million extra work order. Appellant sought to support assignments 69, 70, 71, 77, 79-84, 87, and 88 by calling certain exhibits irrelevant, self-serving, and hearsay (the exhibits concerned work done by the prosecutor's office after November 5, 1958). In support of the other assignments under this heading, appellant goes so far as to challenge the credibility of a witness, assert that the appellant was confined to the best evidence rule whereas the state was not, and complain about the insufficiency of cross-examination allowed to appellant against a particular witness. It would be possible to go through each of these assignments of error and show that none of these assertions are true, that the standards applied to both parties were entirely consistent, that each bit of challenged evidence would have been admissible even in a trial before a jury, and that the judge did not abuse his discretion in any single instance. However, it is unnecessary to go through such a labored process when the trial was to a court sitting without a jury. [17] In such a case, we must first consider the liberal admissibility policy which this state has adopted, which was first set forth in 1907, in the case of Degginger v. Martin, 48 Wash. 1, 92 Pac. 674 (1907): The appellant has contended that the trial court erred in refusing to admit certain evidence offered by her. We find no prejudicial error in this regard, but in view of a new trial, we will suggest that, while the court in an action tried without a jury should reject all evidence clearly incompetent and immaterial, to avoid encumbering the record, yet a liberal practice should be adopted in admitting evidence so that this court, in the event of an appeal, will on a trial de novo have all material facts before it for consideration, and thus avoid the necessity of the cause being remanded for the admission of material evidence erroneously rejected. Not only do we encourage liberal admission of evidence in nonjury trials, but that policy is furthered by the presumption on appeal (which has been mentioned several times already) that: ... Since there is no affirmative evidence to the contrary, we must presume that the trial judge, knowing the rules of evidence, did not consider matters which were inadmissible when making his findings. Kemp v. Putnam, 47 Wn. (2d) 530, 288 P. (2d) 837 (1955); Walker v. Herke, 20 Wn. (2d) 239, 147 P. (2d) 255 (1944); Whiting v. Seattle, 144 Wash. 668, 258 Pac. 824 (1927). Davis v. Sill, 55 Wn. (2d) 477, 480, 348 P. (2d) 215. See, also, State v. Ryan, 48 Wn. (2d) 304, 308, 293 P. (2d) 399 (1956): Where a case is heard by a judge without a jury, a new trial should not be granted for error in the admission of evidence, if there remains substantial admissible evidence to support the findings, unless it appears that the findings are based on the evidence which should have been excluded.... See, also, State ex rel. Cummings v. Kinne, supra , and Davis v. Seattle, supra . In the present case there is no indication that any of the evidence was used for an improper purpose. We hold that there was no reversible error in the admission of evidence.