Opinion ID: 4185676
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admissibility of Martin’s Testimony

Text: Before addressing the merits of Baines’ claim, we first address Walgreens’ argument that the critical portion of Martin’s testimony is inadmissible hearsay. Evidence offered at summary judgment must be admissible to the same extent as at trial, at least if the opposing party objects, except that testimony can be presented in the form of affidavits or transcripts of sworn testimony rather than in person. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2); Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp., 113 F.3d 738, 742–43 (7th Cir. 1997). The critical portion of Martin’s testimony was that Ruehs told her in 2015 that she had wanted to hire “Regina” (Baines) in 2014 but that district manager Birch had told Ruehs she could not hire Baines. While Walgreens agrees that Martin may testify about what Ruehs told her about Ruehs’ own thoughts, it argues No. 16-3335 9 that Martin may not testify about what Birch told Ruehs. According to Walgreens, this is a “classic example of hearsay within hearsay,” so that the innermost layer of hearsay (Birch’s statement to Ruehs) is inadmissible. If this were correct, Martin’s testimony about what Birch said to Ruehs could not be considered. See Eisenstadt, 113 F.3d at 742. Walgreens’ analysis is mistaken. There are two layers of out-of-court communications here. Working from the inner layer, what Birch said to Ruehs cannot be hearsay because it was not a “statement” but a command. The outer layer is Martin’s testimony about what Ruehs told her. That is a statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but it is excluded from the definition of hearsay and so is admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(D) as an admission of a party’s agent within the scope of the agency. To explain: Rule 801(c) defines hearsay as “a statement that: (1) the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” (Emphasis added.) A “statement,” in turn, is a person’s “oral assertion, written assertion, or nonverbal conduct, if the person intended it as an assertion.” Fed. R. Evid. 801(a). In other words, statements assert propositions that may be true or false. They are distinct from other forms of communication, such as questions or commands. “[A] command is not hearsay because it is not an assertion of fact.” United States v. White, 639 F.3d 331, 337 (7th Cir. 2011), citing United States v. Murphy, 193 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1999); see also United States v. Love, 706 F.3d 832, 840 (7th Cir. 2013) (“questions are not ‘statements’ and therefore are not hearsay”) (collecting cases). 10 No. 16-3335 It is possible in certain contexts for a question or command to function effectively as an assertion, such as with a code phrase. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez-Lopez, 565 F.3d 312, 314 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Indeed, if the statements were questions or commands, they could not—absent some indication that the statements were actually code for something else—be offered for their truth because they would not be assertive speech at all.”); see also George E. Dix et al., McCormick on Evidence, § 246 (Kenneth S. Broun et al. eds., 7th ed. June 2016 Update) (noting that courts sometimes categorically exclude from the hearsay definition questions and commands but that “[m]ore appropriately nuanced opinions find such statements hearsay despite their form if the circumstances and/or wording demonstrate an intent to assert”). Here, Martin testified that Birch commanded Ruehs not to hire Baines. According to Martin, Ruehs said, “You didn’t hear this from me, but I was told from higher up, Ms. Birch, that I could not hire her.” (Emphasis added.) What Birch reportedly said to Ruehs was not a statement because it was not an assertion of fact. It was a command: you may not hire Regina Baines. There is no evidence that the command was intended to communicate indirectly an assertion, such as with a code. Birch’s command to Ruehs was not hearsay. Next, as Walgreens acknowledges, Martin may testify about what Ruehs said to her—that she wanted to hire Baines but Birch ordered her not to—because what Ruehs said was a statement of a party opponent being offered against that party. Under Rule 801(d)(2)(D), a statement is not hearsay when “offered against an opposing party and … made by the party’s agent or employee on a matter within the scope of that relationship and while it existed.” Ruehs’ statement to Martin No. 16-3335 11 is a clean fit. We have explained, in reversing summary judgment in another discrimination case against Walgreens, coincidentally, that a “subordinate’s … account of an explanation of the supervisor’s … understanding regarding the criteria utilized by management in making decisions on hiring, firing, compensation, and the like is admissible against the employer, regardless of whether the declarant has any involvement in the challenged employment action.” Simple v. Walgreen Co., 511 F.3d 668, 672 (7th Cir. 2007), quoting Marra v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 497 F.3d 286, 298 (3d Cir. 2007); see also Makowski v. SmithAmundsen LLC, 662 F.3d 818, 823 (7th Cir. 2011) (reversing summary judgment based on defendant’s agent’s out-of-court statements about reasons for firing plaintiff). In sum, Birch’s command to Ruehs is not hearsay, and Ruehs’ statement to Martin is an admission by the agent of a party opponent. The critical portions of Martin’s testimony are admissible. Weighing their credibility will be a question for the jury.