Opinion ID: 2050956
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Dismissal and Default Under Super.Ct.Civ.R. 41(b)[7]

Text: The trial court also dismissed the Smiths' complaints and plea of title under Super.Ct.Civ.R. 41(b). Pursuant to that rule, the trial court can dismiss involuntarily an action `[f]or failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of court.' Whether to impose such a sanction is left to the discretion of the trial court, and its decision will be overturned only where the court abuses its discretion or `impos[es] a penalty too strict or unnecessary under the circumstances.' Solomon v. Fairfax Village Condominium IV Unit Owner's Ass'n, 621 A.2d 378, 379 (D.C.1993) (quoting Braxton, supra, 472 A.2d at 1365 (other citations omitted)). Thus, the sanction should be used sparingly and only `upon some showing of willful and deliberate delay by the plaintiff' and a determination that `appellee was prejudiced by appellant's delay.' Id. at 379 (quoting Durham v. District of Columbia, 494 A.2d 1346, 1351 (D.C.1985)) (other citations omitted). Given the severity of dismissal as a sanction. . . and the oft-stated preference for trial on the merits, this discretion must be exercised carefully and in accordance with standards identified in our cases. Van Man, supra, 663 A.2d at 1247 (quoting Wolfe v. Fine, 618 A.2d 169, 173 (D.C. 1992)) (quoting Techniarts Video v. 1631 Kalorama Assocs., 572 A.2d 1051, 1054 (D.C.1990)). Among the factors which the trial court should consider are: (1) the nature of the party's conduct, including whether it was willful; (2) the length of any delay in complying with the court's order; (3) the reasons for the delay; and (4) any prejudice to the opposing party. District of Columbia v. Serafin, 617 A.2d 516, 519 (D.C.1992) (citing Techniarts, supra, 572 A.2d at 1054) (other citation omitted). Dismissal is warranted only `upon some showing of willful and deliberate delay by the plaintiff,' and a determination that `[defendant] was prejudiced by [plaintiff's] delay.' Solomon, supra, 621 A.2d at 379 (quoting Durham, supra, 494 A.2d at 1351). Against that standard, we consider whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting dismissal and default under Rule 41(b). In deciding whether the Smiths' transgressions were willful, deliberate and prejudicial to Fairfax Village, the factual context is significant; therefore, we summarize the facts again briefly. Mediation was set early in the proceeding for November 1st. In the meantime, both sides had discovery disputes which they sought to resolve by agreement as ordered by the court. They were ordered to resolve the disputes by October 5, 1995 or appear in court on October 13th for a hearing. On October 10th, the parties filed a consent motion indicating that they had resolved their disputes and requesting a postponement of the November 1st mediation session in order to effectuate the terms of their agreement and because meaningful mediation could not occur in absence of completion of discovery. While the parties could not know definitively whether the trial court would accept their amicable resolution of the discovery issues, it was not unreasonable for them to anticipate that it would, and both sides labored under the same misapprehension. The trial court's order rejecting the parties' resolution of their discovery disputes and denying a request for postponement of the November 1st mediation and extension of discovery deadlines was not docketed and mailed to them until November 3, 1995. Fairfax Village states that it was notified by telephone that the court had rejected the consent motion, and they appeared for mediation. The record does not show that the Smiths were notified of the denial of the continuance request and the court's insistence upon adherence to the November 1st mediation date. [8] Nevertheless, the court's original scheduling order states that the parties must adhere strictly to the court's schedule and that deadlines could not be changed by stipulation of the parties without court approval. [9] Therefore, the parties should have understood that in the absence of an order of the court approving their stipulation, mediation must proceed as ordered. Accordingly, we are not prepared to treat the Smiths' non-appearance at mediation as a mere accidental oversight. However, we cannot agree that their failure to appear was so willful and contumacious that the extreme sanction of dismissal was warranted. See Solomon, supra, 621 A.2d at 379 (citation omitted). The situation was sufficiently unusual to render some measure of confusion at least understandable, a point that the trial court's order of dismissal and default did not address. As mentioned, in considering Rule 37 sanctions, the trial court did not indicate that it had considered lesser sanctions nor did it weigh the prejudice element. Both are essential factors which must be considered in determining to impose the extreme sanction of involuntary dismissal or default. Failure to consider lesser sanctions alone has been held to be sufficient to warrant remand. Serafin, supra, 617 A.2d at 520 (citing LaPrade v. Lehman, 490 A.2d 1151, 1155-56 (D.C.1985)). The prejudice factor was not, but should have been, considered in assessing the appropriate actions under Rule 41(b). See Serafin, 617 A.2d at 519. The Smiths also failed to appear for their deposition scheduled by consent for November 8th. One of the reasons stated by the court for entering a default and dismissing the case under Rule 41, was also their failure to appear for depositions. [10] Whether this failure, in light of the Smiths' reasons for failing to appear, is sufficient to warrant the extreme sanction of dismissal and default is an issue which the trial court can weigh on remand. For the foregoing reasons, the case is reversed and remanded to the trial court to vacate the judgment and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is further ordered the trial court's order denying the Petition to Forego Posting a Separate Supersedeas Bond to Cover the Costs of the appeal challenged in appeal no. 96-CV-491 is affirmed. [11] So ordered.