Opinion ID: 2183822
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: and VII

Text: Under these headings, appellant contends that the Governor vetoed [the Act] by reason of his failure to sign it within six days after presentation to him, and a litigant    may inquire behind the forms of authentication [of a bill] and the General Assembly actions   . The special session ended on March 9, 1962. On the same day, the Chief Clerk of the House of Delegates delivered the Bill to the Secretary of State, who, on March 12, 1962, handed it, together with other bills, to the Governor. The Governor acknowledged their receipt by letter, and, in accordance with normal procedure, forwarded them to the Attorney General for review as to form and legal sufficiency. The authenticated copy of the Bill states in a memorandum signed by the Chief Clerk of the House that it was sealed and presented to the Governor on March 23, 1962; and it was signed by him on the same day. Appellant argues that the authentication on the Bill is not conclusive, it has a right to go behind the same, and the Governor's letter and the testimony of the Chief Clerk imply that the Bill was presented on March 12, 1962. It is true that in a proper case the courts may inquire beyond the forms of authentication on a bill to determine whether it has been constitutionally enacted. Berry v. Baltimore Drum Point Railroad Co., 41 Md. 446; Legg v. Annapolis, 42 Md. 203; Redwood v. Lane, 194 Md. 91, 69 A.2d 907. However, an act which has been duly authenticated and published as law, as the Bill in the instant case has, bears a strong presumption that all constitutional provisions have been complied with, and it has been validly enacted into law; and this presumption continues to exist until the contrary is clearly made to appear. Berry v. Baltimore Drum Point Railroad Co., supra ; Baltimore Fid. Warehouse Co. v. Canton Lumber Co., 118 Md. 135, 84 A. 188; Redwood v. Lane, supra . And a statute which has been duly authenticated is not to be impeached by parol evidence alone. Berry v. Baltimore Drum Point Railroad Co., supra ; Ridgely v. Baltimore City, 119 Md. 567, 87 A. 909. The appellant's effort to impeach the certification by the Chief Clerk that the Bill was presented to the Governor on March 23, 1962, falls far short of what is necessary to accomplish such an impeachment; and demonstrates, we think, a failure to comprehend the true meaning of the presentation of a bill to the Governor as provided for by Article 2, Section 17, of the Constitution and Code (1957), Article 41, Section 45. Such a presentation to the Governor for his signature is a formal act and anticipates that the bill will be sealed with the great seal and actually and formally presented to the Governor for his signature by the Secretary of the Senate or Chief Clerk of the House, who in the presence of the Governor, shall make a memorandum thereon in writing of the day and hour of its presentation, and sign the same. The mere informal receipt by the Governor's office of a bill for other purposes is not a requirement of law, and carries with it no legal significance such as to require action by the Governor in any specified time. [2] If this were not true, many practical difficulties would be encountered on such occasions as when several hundred bills passed by the General Assembly are delivered to the Governor before he has had time carefully to consider them and to have the Attorney General pass upon their validity. We hold that the Bill was actually presented to the Governor on March 23, 1962, and that this was a reasonable and legal time after passage of the Bill for its presentation. Robey v. Broersma, 181 Md. 325, 26 A.2d 820. The remainder of appellant's argument under these headings is answered by a short quotation from the opinion in the above case: After it has been presented to the Governor, there are three ways in which such a bill may become law: (1) by being signed by the Governor; (2) by being passed over his veto; (3) by his failure to return the bill within six days after its receipt by him unless the General Assembly has adjourned and thereby prevented its return. [citations] In the case before us, the Legislature [as in the case at bar] had adjourned before the bill was presented to the Governor, and, therefore, under the provisions of the Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 17, it could only become a law by the signature of the Governor.