Opinion ID: 2166096
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Availability of the State Writ of Habeas Corpus

Text: In this case, both the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals ruled that the petitioner is prohibited from seeking relief in Tennessee by petition for writ of habeas corpus because of his incarceration in a federal correctional facility. The State asserts that Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-21-102 should be read to support those rulings and argues that the statute prohibits a petitioner who is serving a state sentence in federal custody from pursuing the state writ of habeas corpus. We disagree. The most basic principle of statutory construction is `to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent without unduly restricting or expanding a statute's coverage beyond its intended scope.' Houghton v. Aramark Educ. Res., Inc., 90 S.W.3d 676, 678 (Tenn.2002) (quoting Owens v. State, 908 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn. 1995)). Legislative intent is determined `from the natural and ordinary meaning of the statutory language within the context of the entire statute without any forced or subtle construction that would extend or limit the statute's meaning.' Osborn v. Marr, 127 S.W.3d 737, 740 (Tenn.2004) (quoting State v. Flemming, 19 S.W.3d 195, 197 (Tenn.2000)). When the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we apply the plain language in its normal and accepted use. Boarman v. Jaynes, 109 S.W.3d 286, 291 (Tenn.2003) (citing State v. Nelson, 23 S.W.3d 270, 271 (Tenn.2000)). Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-21-102 provides as follows: Persons committed or detained by virtue of process issued by a court of the United States, or a judge thereof, in cases where such judges or courts have exclusive jurisdiction under the laws of the United States, or have acquired exclusive jurisdiction by the commencement of suits in such courts, are not entitled to the benefits of this writ. Tenn.Code Ann. § 29-21-102 (2000). The State argues that because the petitioner is detained by virtue of process issued by a court of the United States, the terms of the statute prohibit a petition for writ of habeas corpus in Tennessee. This contention, however, overlooks the fact that the petitioner is also detained by process issued by this state. Moreover, the phrase committed or detained by virtue of process issued by a court of the United States is modified by the phrase in cases where such judges or courts have exclusive jurisdiction under the laws of the United States. The United States District Court does not have exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioner's state convictions. In consequence, it is our view that Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-21-102 does not prohibit the petitioner from seeking habeas corpus relief. Indeed, the interpretation advanced by the State would render meaningless the term exclusive in section 29-21-102. The State also submits that the petitioner is prohibited from seeking state habeas corpus relief by issues of supremacy, preemption, and comity. While the facts of this case may not appear to be particularly unique, few jurisdictions have considered this issue. There are a number of cases, beginning in the pre-Civil War era, which hold that the state writ of habeas corpus is not available to those restrained as a result of federal process. See, e.g., Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 16 L.Ed. 169 (1859). However, the question of whether an individual restrained of his liberty as a result of both state and federal process may seek the writ in state court to challenge only his state convictions is one of first impression. The Court of Criminal Appeals relied upon two cases from the nineteenth century, Ableman , and In re Tarble, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 20 L.Ed. 597 (1872), for the proposition that a state court may not inquire into the reasons for the detention of a federal prisoner. Each of these cases is, however, distinguishable. In Ableman , the Supreme Court of Wisconsin twice issued a writ of habeas corpus demanding the release of Ableman, who was in federal custody on federal charges of aiding and abetting a fugitive slave. The United States Supreme Court ruled that the state court lacked the power to order the release of a federal prisoner, even when the custody violated the federal constitution. Ableman, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 523-24. Citing the nature of the dual sovereignties, the Court held that when a prisoner is within the dominion and jurisdiction of the federal government, neither the writ of habeas corpus, nor any other process issued under State authority, can pass over the line of division between the two sovereignties. Id. at 523. This is true so long as the prisoner is within the dominion and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. Id. (emphasis added). Later, in Tarble 's Case, the Court followed the ruling in Ableman and reversed the judgment of the Wisconsin Supreme Court granting habeas corpus relief on grounds that Tarble, a minor, had enlisted in the United States Army without his father's consent. Again citing the nature of dual sovereignty, our highest court ruled that the Wisconsin courts were without authority to grant habeas corpus relief to Tarble. In re Tarble, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 407-08. The Court reiterated that [s]uch being the distinct and independent character of the two governments, within their respective spheres of action, it follows that neither can intrude with its judicial process into the domain of the other. Id. at 407. Both Ableman and Tarble involved the use of the state writ of habeas corpus to free an individual restrained of his liberty under the exclusive authority of the federal government. The petitioner in this case, however, is in custody under the authority of both the state and federal governments. He is serving both state and federal sentences at the same time. While we agree that the petitioner cannot challenge either the validity of his federal convictions or his imprisonment on those crimes through the state writ of habeas corpus, it is our view that he may use the writ to inquire into his state convictions, regardless of the place of his incarceration. This case does not involve issues of supremacy, preemption, or comity. The petitioner is not asking this state to assert control over a federal action. He seeks only to challenge the propriety of his imprisonment by virtue of the state sentences. The petitioner does not desire to compel federal action through the use of the writ. In this instance, the federal jailer who has custody of the petitioner serves a dual role of custodian for the state and the federal governments. By permitting the petitioner to serve both sentences in federal confinement, the federal authorities consented to this arrangement. See United States Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, Designation of State Institution for Service of Federal Sentence, Program Statement 5160.05(9) (Jan. 16, 2003), available at http://www.bop.gov//policy/progstat/5160_ 005.pdf (last visited Apr. 17, 2007) (stating that [t]he Bureau will not, under ordinary circumstances . . . accept transfer of the inmate into federal custody for concurrent service). One author provides an explanation: [T]here are two ways in which the federal sentence may be made concurrent with the state sentence. First, the [Bureau of Prisons (BOP)] may designate the state prison as the place of confinement for the federal term of imprisonment. Second, the BOP may accept a state prisoner into federal custody when state officials offer to transfer a prisoner who has not fulfilled the state term of imprisonment. However, the BOP's authority to make the designation or to accept the prisoner is discretionary. Erin E. Goffette, Note, Sovereignty in Sentencing: Concurrent and Consecutive Sentencing of a Defendant Subject to Simultaneous State and Federal Jurisdiction, 37 Val. U.L.Rev. 1035, 1057-58 (2003) (footnotes omitted). The writ of habeas corpus was deemed of such great import that the founding fathers envisioned a suspension of the procedure only under the most extreme circumstances. See Tenn. Const. art. 1, § 15; see also U.S. Const. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2. The great writ . . . has been for centuries esteemed the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 95, 19 L.Ed. 332 (1869). Its issuance was firmly guarantied by the famous Habeas Corpus Act of May 27, 1679, in England, brought to America by the colonists, and claimed as among the immemorial rights descended to them from their ancestors. Id. Because of the historic significance of the remedy, the Supreme Court has cautioned that decisions concerning the availability of habeas relief warrant restraint. Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 700, 113 S.Ct. 1745, 123 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Our highest court has specifically observed as follows: We do well to bear in mind the extraordinary prestige of the Great Writ, habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, in Anglo-American jurisprudence: the most celebrated writ in the English law. It is a writ antecedent to statute, and throwing its root deep into the genius of our common law. . . . It is perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law of England, affording as it does a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement. It is of immemorial antiquity, an instance of its use occurring in the thirty-third year of Edward I. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 399-400, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963), overruled on other grounds as stated in Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 118 L.Ed.2d 318 (1992) (citations and footnote omitted). Well over two hundred years after Congress first provided for habeas corpus relief the Great Writ continues today to hold a venerable and vibrant role in our jurisprudence. . . . Essentially, it remains the bulwark of our personal liberties, far stronger than it was in the day when Edward Bushell used it to obtain his freedom from the Crown. Max Rosenn, The Great WritA Reflection of Societal Change, 44 Ohio St. L.J. 337, 365 (1983). It is our view, therefore, that a prisoner serving a state sentence in federal custody should not be divested of his constitutional entitlement to test the propriety of his state convictions. [I]t is a maxim of law that there is no right without a remedy, procedural or otherwise. Memphis St. Ry. Co. v. Rapid Transit Co., 133 Tenn. 99, 179 S.W. 635, 639 (Tenn.1915). That the petitioner is not entitled to release from custody even if his petition is successful is not relevant to our analysis. Should the petitioner be entitled to relief from his state convictions, he remains a federal prisoner. His remedy would be limited to the removal of any restraint on his liberty by virtue of his offenses in Tennessee. Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-21-122 provides that upon the grant of habeas corpus relief, the petitioner shall be remanded to custody . . . [i]f it appears the party is detained by virtue of process issued by a court or judge of the United States, in a case where such court or judge has exclusive jurisdiction. Thus, under the terms of this statute, the petitioner would remain in custody on his federal convictions.