Opinion ID: 2805792
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the filing of a complaint for divorce;

Text: (2) the date of final separation (i.e., the earlier of the date the trial is completed or the unconditional, unmodified communication from one spouse to the other that the marriage has ended and divorce is desired); or 31 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER (3) a substantial step is taken toward final separation, which later occurs, or filing the complaint, which later is filed. See Higashi, 106 Hawaiʻi at 241, 103 P.3d at 401; Myers v. Myers, 70 Haw. 143, 151-52, 764 P.2d 1237, 1243 (1988) (defining the date of final separation). In the present case, the family court did not make a finding that the parties’ divorce commenced on a specific date. While the family court found that Ira purchased airline tickets for his girlfriend and her daughter in December 2008 and began dating and living with her in 2009, the court did not make a specific finding of the date the divorce commenced for the purpose of determining whether dollar reductions to the value of the marital estate were chargeable to Ira. Although the family court found that the exact date at which Ira “moved out” of the marital residence was “unclear,” the family court’s findings referred to the “July 2010” date as the “time of separation.” Notwithstanding the absence of a finding regarding the date the divorce commenced, the ICA held that the parties’ divorce date occurred prior to 2010 because Ira took a substantial step towards the date of separation through the purchases expended on his girlfriend. The family court awarded Susan $41,830 representing wasted marital assets with regard to Ira’s relationship with his girlfriend. Presumably, the family court awarded Susan this 32 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER amount in light of the $10,000 Ira paid for his girlfriend’s criminal defense in addition to the $30,000 he spent on jewelry in 2010. 20 However, the family court should have first determined the parties’ date on which the divorce commenced before designating Ira’s expenditures on his girlfriend as marital waste. If the starting date of the divorce was a date in early 2009, any subsequent dissipation of marital assets, which would include the jewelry expenditures, could be chargeable to Ira as marital waste, and the family court may accordingly “treat that dollar amount as having been awarded to the divorcing party who caused that chargeable reduction.” 21 Higashi, 106 Hawaiʻi at 241-42, 103 P.3d at 401-02. However, if the divorce began in July 2010, Ira’s dissipation of marital 20 Ira’s purchasing of the $30,000 in jewelry for his girlfriend is closely related to his failure to pay the IRS tax debt in full with the second home equity line. The family court found that the money Ira used for the purchase of the jewelry “was intended to be utilized for the payment of taxes.” On remand, the family court may consider whether the excess penalties and fees incurred because of Ira’s failure to pay the IRS debt with the second equity line should be considered a wasted marital asset. This determination will depend on the court’s determination of the date of the commencement of the divorce. 21 Instead of considering Ira’s expenditures on his girlfriend as having been awarded to Ira, the family court awarded Susan a property settlement to be paid from Ira’s share of the escrow account for the marital residence, and if the funds from the escrow account were insufficient, Ira would have to make payment in full within a certain number of days from the filing of the Decree. The amount of the settlement awarded to Susan appeared to be the full value of the waste. This is contrary to Higashi, which requires the court to treat the dollar amount as being a part of the marital partnership property and treating it as already awarded to Ira. In requiring Ira to pay the full amount of the waste to Susan, the family court required Ira to pay more than he was required under the Higashi approach. 33 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER assets could not be considered a chargeable reduction because the March and April 2010 jewelry purchases would be considered as having occurred during the marriage. Id. at 241, 103 P.3d at 401. Thus, absent a finding by the family court regarding the date the divorce commenced, it is unclear as to whether or not Ira’s dissipation of marital assets should have qualified as a chargeable reduction in the division of marital assets. The ICA therefore erred in affirming the family court’s award to Susan for wasted marital assets. 22 C. Whether the Family Court Erred by Basing the Alimony Award on Ira’s Financial Misconduct In his third question presented, Ira argues that the family court erroneously based its alimony ruling on its finding of his financial misconduct while failing to consider Susan’s “actual expenses” and his “age, health, ability to pay, and “adverse financial condition after the divorce.” The ICA declined to find that the family court’s alimony award to Susan constituted an abuse of discretion in light of the family court’s finding that Ira was “not credible.” 22 Consequently, we do not address Ira’s argument that the family court and the ICA also erred by penalizing him twice for the asserted financial misconduct by treating it both as an equitable consideration justifying deviation from partnership principles and as marital waste. 34 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER However, because the court’s division of property likely had an impact in determining Susan’s entitlement to alimony, the ICA should have also vacated the family court’s alimony award. 23 Kuroda v. Kuroda, 87 Hawaiʻi 419, 430, 958 P.2d 541, 552 (App. 1998) (vacating an alimony award and remanding for reconsideration in light of the court’s decision to vacate the corresponding property division of the divorce decree). Secondly, although the ICA characterized the family court as having relied on the financial condition of the parties in determining the alimony award, the family court’s justification for the award apparently took into account Ira’s financial misconduct. Because alimony will be re-determined on remand, we discuss the appropriate circumstances that may be considered in an award of spousal support. HRS § 580-47(a) (2006) requires the family court upon decreeing a separation to take into consideration the following criteria when making further orders for the support and maintenance of either spouse: “the respective merits of the parties, the relative abilities of the parties, the condition in which each party will be left by the divorce, the burdens imposed upon either party for the benefit of the children of the parties, and all other circumstances of the case.” The court 23 We do not suggest that vacating a division of property would require vacating an award of alimony in all cases. 35 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER must also consider all of the following factors in ordering spousal support and maintenance: (1) Financial resources of the parties;