Opinion ID: 1395325
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Marital Confidence Privilege

Text: The marital confidence privilege prevents compelled disclosure of confidential communications made between spouses during the course of their marriage. The test for determining whether acts or conduct of a spouse constitutes confidential communication is whether the act or conduct was induced by or done in reliance on the confidence of the marital relation, i.e., whether there was an expectation of confidentiality. Syl. pt. 2, in part, State v. Robinson, 180 W.Va. 400, 376 S.E.2d 606 (1988). Furthermore, there is a presumption that all communication between spouses is confidential. State v. Robinson, supra . However, even with these rigorous protections of the marital relationship, it is still questionable whether Mrs. Bradshaw divulged any confidential communications in her testimony. Mrs. Bradshaw's testimony consisted of general comments about family life, which airport she left her husband, his supposed travel plans, and what he was wearing. The trial court specifically held that testimony concerning the defendant's whereabouts was not within the privilege. The trial court's decision was based on its belief the defendant's wife could testify to anything that could be observed by other people. After Robinson, it is clear that observable acts fit within the spousal privilege. However, we agree with the trial court. The marital confidence privilege applies only to communications that are confidential. Communications made in the known presence of third parties or intended to be disclosed to others are outside the privilege. Nash v. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co., 106 W.Va. 672, 146 S.E. 726 (1929). This decision is a logical extension of prior case law where we held the privilege did not cover certain communication because it occurred in the presence of a third party. State v. Richards, 182 W.Va. 664, 391 S.E.2d 354 (1990); Fuller v. Fuller, 100 W.Va. 309, 130 S.E. 270 (1925). The trial court's ruling that the defendant's actions were not meant to be confidential is well supported by the evidence. Although confidentiality is presumed and it is incumbent upon the State to prove otherwise, several factors indicate the defendant's acts and communication were not done in reliance on the marital relationship. For example, the fact that the defendant admitted to lying to his wife concerning his travel plans and to his marriage being very weak adequately demonstrates the absence of reliance. [19] Under these circumstances, we do not find the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Mrs. Bradshaw's testimony concerning her observations of the defendant's purely public behavior. [20]