Opinion ID: 1933904
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Did the Drug Test Violate Iowa Code Section 730.5(2)?

Text: A. Legality of drug test. Section 730.5(2), as it existed in 1996 and 1997, clearly prohibited random drug testing of employees. See Iowa Code § 730.5(2) (An employer shall not request, require, or conduct random or blanket drug testing of employees.). The statute also contained specific exceptions to this prohibition: [T]his section does not apply to preemployment drug tests authorized for peace officers or correctional officers of the state, or to drug tests required under federal statutes or under federal regulations adopted as of July 1, 1990, or to tests conducted pursuant to a nuclear regulatory commission regulation, or to drug tests conducted to determine if an employee is ineligible to receive workers' compensation under section 85.16, subsection 2. Id. The statute does not expressly include an exception for long-term employees who have been terminated and are seeking reinstatement. In interpreting section 730.5(2), we focus on what the legislature said. State v. Adams, 554 N.W.2d 686, 689 (Iowa 1996) (To ascertain legislative intent, we look to what the legislature said.). Nevertheless, what the legislature did not say may be just as important as what the legislature did say. See id. In this regard, we follow the rule that legislative intent is `expressed by omission as well as by inclusion.' Wiebenga v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 530 N.W.2d 732, 735 (Iowa 1995) (quoting Barnes v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 385 N.W.2d 260, 263 (Iowa 1986)). We believe that if the legislature had intended to allow random drug testing of long-term employees who had been given a last chance, then it would have specifically said so in the statute. The fact that it did not indicates that the legislature did not intend to include such an exception to section 730.5(2)'s prohibition of random employee drug testing. See Marcus v. Young, 538 N.W.2d 285, 289 (Iowa 1995) (stating that the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of others not so mentioned). Similarly, to adopt the agency's interpretation of the statute would require us to read something into the law that is not apparent from the words chosen by the legislature. This we cannot do. State v. Guzman-Juarez, 591 N.W.2d 1, 2 (Iowa 1999). To the extent the agency's decision can be interpreted as including a finding that Eaton's drug test was random, we hold that the test falls squarely within the prohibition of section 730.5(2). Therefore, the agency erred in holding that the test did not violate this statute. B. Effect of memorandum of agreement. In an effort to legitimize Eaton's drug test, Deere points out that Eaton agreed to random drug testing in the 1996 agreement. This agreement, however, does not validate the drug test because the agreement itself also violates section 730.5(2). As we have previously noted, section 730.5(2) states that an employer shall not require or request employees or applicants for employment to submit to a drug test as a condition of employment, preemployment, promotion or change in status of employment. Stegmaier and Eaton both testified at the unemployment hearing that Eaton was required to sign the memorandum of agreement permitting random drug testing as a condition of his re-employment. The agreement itself states that Eaton will be discharged if he violates the terms of the agreement, thus making his continued employment conditioned on his submission to random drug tests. The fact that Eaton may have voluntarily signed the agreement rather than challenge his 1996 discharge, as argued by Deere, does not nullify the fundamental fact giving rise to the statutory violationthat Deere, the employer, required or requested the test as a condition of employment. We conclude the agreement clearly violated section 730.5(2) and cannot justify the drug test conducted in April of 1997. [6]