Opinion ID: 2274149
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sentencing IssuesAffirming Sentences for Murder and Robbery but Vacating Judgment and Remanding to Trial Court for New Judgment Running Sentences Concurrently Rather than Consecutively.

Text: Winstead argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial because he could not be subject to any type of life sentence under the terms of the agreement reached by the United States and Costa Rica concerning his extradition from Costa Rica. We disagree because we construe the agreement to allow for a life sentence with a possibility of parole, so the trial court did not abuse its discretion [40] in denying his motion for a new trial on this ground. Winstead submitted a memorandum to the trial court in support of his motion for a new trial, arguing, among other issues, that the LWOP/25 sentence that he received violated the terms of his extradition. Attached to his memorandum was a copy of a diplomatic note, Note 185, conveying the United States government's response to Costa Rican requests for assurances regarding sentencing limitations. [41] He also submitted an alternate translation of Costa Rican court documents concerning his extradition, claiming that an earlier translation provided to the trial court was inaccurate and erroneously showed that Costa Rica had only sought an assurance that a life without parole sentence would not be imposed. Although the trial court conducted a thorough inquiry into the differences between and accuracy of the two translations, we need not pass judgment on its resolution of this translation controversy because the bilateral agreement between the two nations controlsnot the unilateral requests, understanding, or communications of Costa Rica. International extraditions are governed by any applicable treaties between the two nations. In this case, the Extradition Treaty between the United States and Costa Rica controls, along with any conditions that the two nations have agreed to in negotiations about any individual fugitive. [42] Typically, the United States and the other nation will engage in a formal diplomatic conversation conducted through written documents known as Diplomatic Notes to negotiate the terms of an individual extradition. This is done through requests for assurances and responses to these requests: when a foreign nation seeks to impose a limitation on a sentence as a condition of granting the extradition of a defendant to the United States, it formally requests assurances from the United States by way of diplomatic note. The DOJ [Department of Justice], in consultation with the State Department, determines whether the United States can and should provide the requested assurances, and relays the official position by diplomatic note. The foreign nation then considers the response of the United States in deciding whether to extradite the defendant. [43] In Winstead's case, extradition negotiations are memorialized in Note 185, which the United States Government sent to the Costa Rican government. Note 185 opens by acknowledging Costa Rica's requests for assurances, stating that [t]he Embassy takes note that, as a condition for the extradition of Mr. Winstead, the Costa Rican authorities have requested assurances that Mr. Winstead will not be subjected to the death penalty, life imprisonment, or cruel or degrading treatment. Note 185 then contains the United States' response to Costa Rica's requests for assurances. After assuring Costa Rica that Winstead would not be subjected to the death penalty, Note 185 provides that the Government of the United States informs the Government of Costa Rica that if Mr. Winstead is extradited to the United States... [he] will not receive a sentence that requires him to spend his natural life in prison as a punishment for committing the offenses charged. Apparently, Note 185 was the final communication between the two nations before Costa Rica extradited Winstead. And the parties have not cited any evidence of record of further negotiations. So we appropriately treat Note 185 as the last word memorializing the sentence-limitation terms of the extradition agreement between the United States and Costa Rica regarding Winstead. [44] The governing U.S.-Costa Rica Extradition Treaty does not explicitly establish any limitations on life sentences. Over Winstead's objection, the trial court permitted the jury to recommend a sentence of LWOP/25. The jury recommended LWOP/25, and the trial court sentenced Winstead in accordance with that recommendation. Winstead argues that the plain language of Note 185 prohibits life imprisonment as a possible punishment. This extradition-related issue appears to be a matter of first impression in Kentucky. Under the principle of specialty, the individual who has been extradited may raise any objections the surrendering country would have been able to raise. [45] Since interpreting an extradition agreement is a matter of law, our review is de novo. [46] Winstead contends that the trial court violated the terms of his extradition when it instructed the jury that LWOP/25 was a sentencing option and when it sentenced him to LWOP/25. He argues that any type of life sentence in this case was impermissible because of Costa Rica's apparent requests for assurances that he would not be subject to life imprisonment and of communications made to him by Costa Rican judicial officials during extradition proceedings, which allegedly indicated that he would not be subject to any type of life sentence in the United States. However, neither such requests for assurances nor such communications by Costa Rican officials, by themselves, precludes a sentence of life imprisonment unless the United States agreed to that sentencing limitation. [47] Essentially, even though Note 185 ostensibly reflects a request by Costa Rica that no life sentence be imposed, the United States does not simply parrot the exact requested assurance. Presumably, if it saw fit, the United States government could have followed the language of the noted request for assurance and assured Costa Rica that Winstead would not be subject to life imprisonment similarly to the response it gave to the request for assurance that the death penalty would not be imposed. Instead, the United States government responded to Costa Rica's purported request for assurance of no life imprisonment [48] with an alternative assurance that Winstead would not receive a sentence that requires him to spend his natural life in prison. The Costa Rican government, if it was not satisfied with the assurance given by the United States, could have stated through diplomatic channels that it required an assurance that life imprisonment or any type of life sentence would not be imposed to extradite Winstead. Instead, Costa Rica released him, thus, implicitly accepting the terms offered by the United States. [49] In determining the type of sentence that may properly be imposed under the extradition agreement as memorialized by Note 185, we look not to Costa Rica's requests for assurances but to what the United States actually agreed to in negotiating Winstead's extradition. Instead of determining whether the LWOP/25 instruction and sentence complied with Costa Rica's request for an assurance that life imprisonment would not be imposed, we must construe whether the LWOP/25 sentencing option was permitted under the actual assurance giventhat a sentence that required Winstead to spend his natural life in prison would not be imposed. The Commonwealth contends that the fact that Winstead will be eligible for parole in 25 years satisfies Note 185 because the possibility of parole means that Winstead will not necessarily be required to spend his natural life in prison since he will become eligible for parole under KRS 532.030 after 25 years. But Winstead counters by asserting that parole is a mere possibility, not a right, and that he will be required to spend his natural life in prison if he does not receive parole. Although the assurance is not necessarily ambiguous on its face, the parties' arguments reveal a latent ambiguity concerning whether the assurance would be satisfied by any type of life sentence offering the possibility of parole. We believe the ambiguity is properly resolved in favor of allowing the LWOP/25 sentencing option because evidence of record supports the Commonwealth's interpretation of Note 185the document that sets forth the agreed-upon terms of Winstead's extradition. [50] In resolving the ambiguity about the meaning of the assurance that Winstead would not receive a sentence which requires him to spend his natural life in prison[,] we look to the Declaration of Mary D. Rodriguez. [51] This Declaration was provided to the trial court during post-trial proceedings on Winstead's motion for a new trial when the trial court contacted the Office of International Affairs at the United States Department of Justice, requesting a translation of the disputed document (a Costa Rican court document), which was not available. Although the trial court obtained the Declaration in an effort to resolve the controversy over translating Spanish-written Costa Rican documents, which are not controlling, the Declaration also provides insight into the meaning of the controlling agreement between the two countries as memorialized in Note 185. Specifically, Rodriguez, who is apparently an experienced United States Justice Department official assigned to facilitating extradition proceedings with Costa Rica and other Latin American nations, [52] interpreted Note 185 to allow for any type of life sentence offering a possibility of parole: Based upon my review of the file in this case and my experience with requests for assurances from countries in Latin America, the assurance that the United States gave to the Government of Costa Rica regarding life sentence assurances, i.e., that Winstead would not receive a sentence that required him to spend his natural life in prison, precludes Winstead from receiving a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole. As long as the possibility exists that Winstead could apply for and receive parole at some future time then the life sentence assurance given to Costa Rica is satisfied. Before arriving at this conclusion, Rodriguez noted that Costa Rica had accepted the United States' assurances and extradited Winstead in February 2006 and, also, detailed the history of negotiations between the two countries, including the United States' extradition request and Costa Rica's requests for assurances. We note that although Costa Rica's requests for assurances and other unilateral communications are not controlling, Rodriguez found that even these requests for assurances would not preclude a life sentence so long as the possibility for parole existed: the Criminal Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San Jose, Costa Rica, requested further assurances from the United States that, upon conviction, Winstead would not be subjected to the death penalty, life imprisonment, or cruel or degrading treatment. With regard to life imprisonment, Costa Rica's communication to the United States used the Spanish language term cadena perpetua  the literal English translation of the term is perpetual chain. Based on my experience with other countries in Latin America where requests for assurances that life imprisonment will not be imposed are sought from the United States, I have come to understand that cadena perpetua refers to a penalty where the defendant remains incarcerated in perpetuity and has no possibility of release. It is akin to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole in the United States. In my experience with other countries in the region, an assurance that a defendant may be sentenced to a term of life imprisonment but has the possibility of being considered eligible for parole at some point during the service of his sentence, has satisfied the country's request that a sentence of cadena perpetua not be imposed. [53] Rodriguez also stated that based on her review of Winstead's file, attorneys for the Justice Department had been in close communication with attorneys for the Commonwealth of Kentucky and were satisfied that the Commonwealth of Kentucky would be able to comply with the assurances requested by Costa Rica. In addition to the support provided for the Commonwealth's interpretation in Rodriguez's Declaration, the trial court also articulated a plain-meaning approach to defining life imprisonment when resolving the translation controversy that we regard as apropos in interpreting the connotations of the assurance given that Winstead would not receive a sentence which required him to spend his natural life in prison: The plain meaning of the word life in the context of sentencing one to a term of imprisonment would be from sentencing until death.... The term life in this context should not be defined by the parameters of sentencing statutes, but should be afforded its plain meaning. That is, the plain meaning of life is life, and the extra words without parole are surplus verbiage. As the trial court orally explained in a hearing, we cannot presume that the Costa Rican government would be aware of Kentucky's statutory sentencing scheme; and the fact that under our statutes, a life sentence other than perhaps a sentence of life without parole does not necessarily mean that one will literally remain in prison until death. [54] Apparently, the Costa Rican government was satisfied with an assurance that Winstead would have some hope of eventually being released and did not demand a further assurance that Winstead would not receive a life sentence of any kind. So the trial court did not err in instructing the jury on the LWOP/25 sentencing option [55] and in denying Winstead's motion for a new trial.
Although we otherwise affirm Winstead's sentence, we must vacate the judgment because it provides that the twenty years' imprisonment sentence for robbery run consecutively with the LWOP/25 sentence for murder. [56] We remand the case to the trial court for resentencing that runs the term of years concurrent with LWOP/25 and entry of a new judgment reflecting this sentence.