Opinion ID: 1152592
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Issues affecting composition of jury.

Text: The court conducted sequestered voir dire of prospective jurors, limiting its initial examination to death qualification, that is, a determination whether each prospective juror had such conscientious or religious scruples about capital punishment that would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath. ( Adams v. Texas (1980) 448 U.S. 38, 45 [65 L.Ed.2d 581, 589, 100 S.Ct. 2521]; see also Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424 [83 L.Ed.2d 841, 851-852, 105 S.Ct. 844].) The court asked each prospective juror whether he or she believed the death penalty should be imposed automatically after conviction of the charged crimes. The court permitted counsel to conduct voir dire on these points, as well. (27) Defendant argues he was not afforded an adequate opportunity to examine Juror Bojorquez, in violation of the right secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution to exercise his challenges for cause intelligently. ( Morgan v. Illinois (1992) 504 U.S. 719, 733-734 [119 L.Ed.2d 492, 505-506, 112 S.Ct. 2222].) The result, he claims, was that a juror biased in favor of imposing the death penalty sat on his jury. In a capital case, of course, the court must permit counsel to ask each juror whether he or she believes the death penalty should be imposed automatically upon conviction of a capital offense. ( Morgan v. Illinois, supra, 504 U.S. at pp. 735-736 [119 L.Ed.2d at pp. 506-507].) As a general matter, however, as we have recently declared, `[T]he scope of the inquiry permitted during voir dire is committed to the discretion of the court.' ( People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 908 [39 Cal. Rptr.2d 547, 891 P.2d 93], quoting People v. Visciotti (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 48 [5 Cal. Rptr.2d 495, 825 P.2d 388].) We recognize the `considerable discretion of the trial court to contain voir dire within reasonable limits.' ( People v. Wash, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 253.) In this case, contrary to defendant's claim, the trial court did not prevent inquiry into the juror's beliefs regarding automatic imposition of the death penalty for capital crimes. The question was posed more than once. Nor did the court abuse its discretion by unduly restricting voir dire of Juror Bojorquez. (See People v. Chapman (1993) 15 Cal. App.4th 136, 141 [18 Cal. Rptr.2d 738] [abuse of discretion if questioning allowed is not reasonably sufficient to test the jury for bias or partiality]; People v. Chaney (1991) 234 Cal. App.3d 853, 861 [286 Cal. Rptr. 79] [same].) Defense counsel's questions of this juror regarding her attitudes toward the death penalty cover several pages of transcript. The prosecutor, too, covered some of the same ground, trying to establish the juror was committed to being fair to defendant and would listen to the evidence presented at the penalty trial before making a decision regarding penalty. When defense counsel then asked permission to ask one or two questions along the same lines, the court denied the request because the subject had been exhausted. We see no abuse of discretion. (28) Defendant argues that even if the court did not improperly limit voir dire, it erred in refusing to grant his challenge for cause as to Juror Bojorquez. The People correctly argue defendant waived the claim because he failed to exhaust his peremptory challenges. Defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury is not compromised as long has he could have secured the juror's removal through the exercise of a peremptory challenge. To preserve a claim of error in the denial of a challenge for cause, the defense must either exhaust its peremptory challenges and object to the jury as finally constituted or justify the failure to do so. ( People v. Kirkpatrick (1994) 7 Cal.4th 988, 1005 [30 Cal. Rptr.2d 818, 874 P.2d 248]; see also People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1087-1088 [259 Cal. Rptr. 630, 774 P.2d 659].) Defendant did not exhaust his peremptory challenges nor did he object to the jury as finally constituted. Nor does he justify his failure to do so. Accordingly, the point is waived and will not be considered on the merits. ( People v. Kirkpatrick, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1005.) Defendant claims in the alternative that any failure to exhaust peremptory challenges was ineffective assistance of counsel. The claim is meritless; the decision whether to accept a jury as constituted is obviously tactical, and nothing on the appellate record demonstrates counsel's tactical choice here was either unreasonable or prejudicial. In fact, were we to reach the merits of the claim that the court should have granted defendant's motion to exclude Juror Bojorquez for cause, we would reject it. Although at one point the juror stated she thought she probably would vote for the death penalty for any multiple murder, she also protested that she could not say she would impose the death penalty in every such case, that she would have to listen to the to everything that went on, that she realized jurors have to listen to the circumstances, and that she would be willing to listen to evidence regarding the defendant's background and keep an open mind in making the penalty determination. She did not express views indicative of an unalterable preference in favor of the death penalty ( People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 123 [36 Cal. Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887]) such that her protestations that she would listen to all the evidence with an open mind and be fair to defendant could not rehabilitate her. ( Ibid., citing Morgan v. Illinois, supra, 504 U.S. at pp. 734-735 [119 L.Ed.2d at pp. 506-507].) Resolving any ambiguity in the juror's responses in favor of the trial court's ruling below ( People v. Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 456-457 [if juror's responses are conflicting or equivocal, trial court's determination binding on reviewing court]), we conclude the juror did not express views that would `prevent or substantially impair' the performance of the juror's duties as defined by the court's instructions and the juror's oath. ( People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 121, quoting Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412 at p. 424 [83 L.Ed.2d at pp. 851-852]; see also Adams v. Texas, supra, 448 U.S. at p. 45 [65 L.Ed.2d at pp. 589-590].) (29) Defendant also argues in conclusory terms that the trial court should have excused eight other jurors for cause on its own motion. He claims these jurors were biased in favor of the death penalty, because they responded in the affirmative to a questionnaire asking whether they thought the state should execute anyone convicted of an intentional murder during a burglary. As we have noted above, however, defendant did not exhaust his peremptory challenges or express dissatisfaction with the jury, and his claim may be rejected because he fails to demonstrate the court's inaction prejudiced him. ( People v. Kirkpatrick, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1005; see also People v. Bittaker, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 1087-1088.) Assuming arguendo the issue was preserved, we reject the claim on the merits. Defendant's claim of juror bias is so insubstantial that we need not determine the extent of the trial court's power or obligation to excuse jurors on its own motion. [13] The jurors of whose jury questionnaire responses defendant now complains all stated on voir dire that they would not automatically impose the death penalty. It is clear their initial statements in the juror questionnaire, suggesting they would automatically impose the death penalty for certain crimes, did not reflect the views they ultimately expressed during voir dire. None of these jurors stated such views regarding the death penalty during voir dire as would necessarily subject them to excusal for cause. That is, none expressed views that would `prevent or substantially impair' the performance of the juror's duties as defined by the court's instructions and the juror's oath. ( People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 121, quoting Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 424 [83 L.Ed.2d at pp. 851-852].) Accordingly, the claim is rejected.
(30a) After the guilty verdict was entered, defendant moved that a new jury be impaneled for the penalty trial, arguing that the court had conditioned the jury during voir dire to expect that defendant would present evidence in mitigation  an expectation the defense would disappoint, as it had determined to present no evidence. Defendant argues that the trial court's refusal to impanel a new jury for the penalty trial was an abuse of discretion, particularly as it was the court's error during voir dire that caused the potential for prejudice. The record discloses that during sequestered voir dire of several panels of prospective jurors and of two individual prospective jurors, the court explained the procedure involved in a capital trial, including the penalty phase of trial, noting that the prosecution would present evidence in aggravation, the defense would offer evidence in mitigation, and the court would instruct the jury as to the rules that would guide their penalty determination. Seven of the jurors who sat on defendant's jury heard this description. Defendant claims he objected to the court's characterization directly, but points to a portion of the record in which defendant objected to the prosecutor's use of questions that assumed defendant would present evidence in mitigation. The court explained, in response, that both counsel had a great deal of leeway in framing their questions. Defense counsel repeated he might or might not present evidence in mitigation, and the court directed him to prepare a typed statement signed by both counsel stating their reasons for not putting on any evidence in mitigation. Soon thereafter, defense counsel observed that the court had talked to two of the jurors about evidence in mitigation, and pointed out, that may or may not be presented. The trial court simply called the next juror. Defendant claims he repeatedly objected to the court's repetition of his early explanation of penalty phase procedure but he offers no citations to the record in support, nor do we observe any further objections. [14] (31) We review the trial court's decision not to impanel a second jury for the penalty trial under an abuse of discretion standard. ( People v. Rowland, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 268.) Section 190.4, subdivision (c), directs that the same jury shall consider the penalty as considered the guilt verdict, unless good cause is shown for separate juries. The section reflects the long-standing legislative preference for a single jury to determine both guilt and penalty. ( People v. Fauber, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 845; People v. Nicolaus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 551, 574 [286 Cal. Rptr. 628, 817 P.2d 893].) In order to establish good cause, more than speculation or the desire of counsel is necessary. ( People v. Rowland, supra, 4 Cal.4th 238, 268; People v. Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 252-253; People v. Fauber, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 846.) A new jury is not required, for example, simply because there is a deviation between defense strategy at the guilt trial and at the penalty trial ( People v. Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th 195, 252; People v. Taylor (1990) 52 Cal.3d 719, 737-738 [276 Cal. Rptr. 391, 801 P.2d 1142]), or because the penalty jury may be disturbed by evidence of the capital crimes ( People v. Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 252, People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 204 [222 Cal. Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480]). (30b) Here, defendant claimed he needed a new jury to avoid the potential for prejudice caused by the trial court's statements during voir dire that the defense would present evidence in mitigation at the penalty trial. He feared the jury would hold it against defendant that he presented no mitigating evidence. Defendant arguably could have avoided this potential by making a clearer contemporaneous objection to the court's statements. In any event, the potential for prejudice arising from the court's statements on voir dire is minimal. As in other cases in which we have analyzed the harm of misstatements of law during voir dire, the statements on voir dire long preceded the penalty phase, when the jury's attention would be focused on its sentencing responsibility. (See People v. DeSantis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1198, 1242 [9 Cal. Rptr.2d 628, 831 P.2d 1210] [district attorney's misstatements harmless in part because of time elapsed between voir dire and penalty trial]; People v. Pinholster, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 915 [same]; People v. Morris, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 182 [same].) In context, such statements would not be seen as instruction on the jury's function at the penalty trial, but merely as a brief introductory description or overview of the course of the trial. (See, e.g., People v. Morris, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 182 [misstatement on voir dire small part of larger statement giving overview of voir dire procedure].) Any potential for prejudice was obviated by the jury instructions, which did not suggest that defendant had any obligation to present evidence at the penalty trial. (See, e.g., People v. DeSantis, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1243 [defects in voir dire cured by instructions and argument]; People v. Pinholster, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 915-916 [same]; People v. Morris, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 182-183 [same].) [15] And, of course, counsel could stress this point with the jury, and in fact, counsel here drew the jury's attention to the trial evidence as evidence in mitigation under section 190.3, factor (k). The prosecutor also listed defendant's guilt phase testimony about his condition on the night of the crimes as evidence that could be considered in mitigation. Under these circumstances, it was within the court's discretion to conclude that good cause had not been shown and to deny the motion for a second jury. [16]