Opinion ID: 3159960
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Other Due Process Issues

Text: Relying on In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968), Mr. Walwyn asserts that the attorney disciplinary process is “quasi-criminal” in nature, and therefore, he is entitled to the same due process rights afforded criminal defendants. We addressed and rejected this argument in Moncier, 406 S.W.3d at 156, explaining that, “[r]ead as a whole, In re Ruffalo stands for the proposition that a lawyer subject to discipline is entitled to procedural due process, including notice and an opportunity to be heard.” Id. We concluded in Moncier that “Tennessee‟s disciplinary process affords lawyers notice and an opportunity to be heard, as well as other protections, including the right to have counsel present, the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, and the right to present evidence.” 406 S.W.3d at 156. We reaffirm our holding in Moncier that the Tennessee attorney disciplinary system comports with due process. Mr. Walwyn next asserts that Tennessee‟s attorney disciplinary process improperly combines investigative and adjudicatory functions. This argument has also been thoroughly considered and rejected in prior decisions. In Moncier, we considered and rejected the contention that hearing panel members are biased and must recuse themselves because of the combination of investigative and adjudicative functions of the Board. 406 S.W.3d at 161. We reaffirmed this holding in Long v. Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, 435 S.W.3d 174, 186 (Tenn. 2014), explaining that, “[a]ttorney disciplinary proceedings are not criminal proceedings, and to 11 We note that disciplinary proceedings against medical licensees in Tennessee are conducted in accordance with the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (“UAPA”). See Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-6- 216. The standard of proof in such proceedings is “substantial and material [evidence] in light of the entire record.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(h)(5)(A). This standard has been described as “something less than a preponderance of the evidence but more than a scintilla or a glimmer.” Ware v. Greene, 984 S.W.2d 610, 614 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998); see also McEwen v. Tenn. Dep‟t of Safety, 173 S.W.3d 815, 821 n.10 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (noting that the “preponderance of the evidence” standard is harder to satisfy than the “substantial and material evidence” standard). 12 Even if the clear-and-convincing standard applied, the overwhelming proof contained in the record on appeal would have satisfied that standard. -24- prove a risk of bias that would give rise to a due process violation, a litigant must point to more than a simple combination of functions within the Board.” Mr. Walwyn also asserts that “the interrelated functions of the [B]oard and [D]isciplinary [C]ounsel related to the receipt and disbursement of funds creates an intolerable financial incentive within this adjudicatory system.” Additionally, he contends that “[t]he functionality of the Board and Disciplinary Counsel is compensated only when the petition approved by the Board and prosecuted by Disciplinary Counsel is sustained.” In Long, we recognized that Hearing Panel members “receive no compensation, other than reimbursement for travel expenses, for sitting as the adjudicatory body in a disciplinary matter.” 435 S.W.3d at 188. Since reimbursement of travel expenses is afforded, regardless of the outcome of the disciplinary proceeding, it appears the real “financial incentive” to which Mr. Walwyn refers is the assessment of costs against attorneys who are adjudged to have violated ethical rules. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 24.3. Again, we upheld the constitutionality of this system of assessing costs in Moncier, explaining: The attorney disciplinary process is a costly endeavor. A large portion of the registration fees paid by attorneys who strive each day to follow ethical guidelines is now used to pay for the disciplinary mechanism necessary to police those attorneys who do not comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct. Shifting the financial burden of formal disciplinary proceedings to those directly responsible for the costs is equitable and “serves the additional function of deterring other lawyers from engaging in unprofessional conduct.” In re Shannon, 876 P.2d 548, 575 (Ariz. 1994). 406 S.W.3d at 150. Finally, Mr. Walwyn submitted as supplemental authority North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners v. F.T.C., _____ U.S. _____, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015). Although this supplemental authority is purportedly provided “in support of [Mr. Walwyn‟s] challenge of [the] unconstitutional and anti-trust nature of the Tennessee disciplinary system[,]” Mr. Walwyn did not allege any antitrust violation in any of the proceedings below. Thus, one of the arguments to which the supplemental authority purportedly relates was not raised below and is waived. See Powell v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 312 S.W.3d 496, 511 (Tenn. 2010) (“It is axiomatic that parties will not be permitted to raise issues on appeal that they did not first raise in the trial court.”). Additionally, the supplemental authority provides no support for Mr. Walwyn‟s constitutional claims because it does not address any issue regarding the constitutionality of professional disciplinary processes. -25- IV. Conclusion For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the judgment of the trial court, which upheld the Hearing Panel‟s judgment. Costs of this appeal are taxed to Paul J. Walwyn, for which execution, if necessary, may issue. ________________________________