Opinion ID: 2313088
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appellant's Pretrial Request for New Counsel

Text: Whether the trial court erred in denying appellant's pretrial request for new counsel turns on the adequacy of the court's inquiry to dispose of appellant's complaints. We have held that when a defendant asserts a pretrial claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the trial court has a constitutional duty to conduct an inquiry sufficient to determine the truth and scope of the defendant's allegations. [9] More than pro forma inquiry is required; the court's questioning must be specific and thorough enough to elucidate counsel's degree of compliance with the applicable criteria of professional competence. [10] Subject to that standard, the substance and scope of the inquiry are committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. [11] Thus, we will defer to the trial judge's determination as to the form, substance and scope of the inquiry unless the record compels us to act otherwise. [12] The trial court's decision as to whether to grant new counsel will be disturbed on appeal only if the court has abused its discretion. [13] We find no abuse of discretion here. At the outset, when appellant vaguely declared that his counsel did not have his best interest at heart, the judge urged him to articulate his specific complaint. Appellant said he was dissatisfied because his case was not being investigated. The judge then questioned appellant and defense counsel extensively about the circumstances and particulars of that complaint. Among other things, the judge confirmed (and appellant himself conceded) that counsel had hired an investigator, visited the crime scene, obtained extensive discovery from the government, reviewed applicable law, conferred at length with appellant about his potential defenses, subpoenaed documents suggested by appellant, and interviewed nearly all the witnesses that appellant had identified. Upon further probing, the judge ascertained that counsel had not fulfilled appellant's request that she interview his mother and the day care center employees who cared for Parker's young children. According to appellant, his mother could have attested to his continuing relationship with Parker after March, and the day care workers could have confirmed that he picked up Parker's children during the summer of 2000 (inferentially bolstering his claim that he and Parker were still together then). However, additional questioning satisfied the judge that counsel had not been neglectful in failing to interview these witnesses. Counsel explained that she viewed the proffered testimony of appellant's mother and the day care personnel as harmful or, at best, unnecessary to the defense and essentially irrelevant. Appellant's mother had obtained a protective order against him and left town. When counsel went looking for her, appellant's brother told her none of us want anything to do with him, and don't you dare call my mother [] and upset her. As to the day care personnel, counsel was wary because she believed their suggested testimony would only substantiate one of Parker's allegations of stalking  that appellant kept showing up at the day care center. Appellant expressed no disagreement with this reasoning. Moreover, counsel stated, Parker doesn't deny that she and appellant were still together after March; [s]he says that they did continue to talk on the phone and be friends, that it was in August that things took a downward turn. The judge confirmed with counsel her understanding that Parker already acknowledges what Mr. Aiken is trying to show. On hearing counsel's statement that Parker admitted their relationship continued into the summer, appellant expressed surprise. [W]hen she first testified, he stated, she said after March we had no dealings. Appellant faults the judge for not picking up on this discrepancy and inquiring about it. Had the judge done so, appellant argues, she would have unearthed the fact that his counsel was ignorant of Parker's CPO hearing testimony and partially mistaken about what she would say on the witness stand. We are not persuaded. Without more, appellant's comment was not enough to alert the judge that counsel's investigation of the complainant was inadequate. Appellant did not complain that counsel was unfamiliar with Parker's earlier testimony. So far as appeared, to both appellant and the judge, counsel had fulfilled her duty to investigate what Parker would say at trial. Under the circumstances, the judge's failure to question counsel's apparent knowledge of Parker's version of events was far from an abuse of discretion. [14] As it turned out, contrary to counsel's expectation, Parker insisted at trial that she ended her relationship with appellant in March and did not resume it thereafter. But we must evaluate the court's Monroe-Farrell inquiry on the basis of the situation presented to the court pretrial, rather than by hindsight examination in light of later developments at trial or afterward. [15] Even if the testimony at trial revealed inadequate preparation by counsel, appellant may not rely on that revelation to challenge the trial judge's otherwise justified pretrial ruling. Subsequently disclosed deficiencies must be raised in a motion for a new trial pursuant to D.C.Code § 23-110. When defense counsel described Parker's anticipated testimony, appellant's expression of surprise was a sign that counsel might not have communicated with him adequately regarding his defense. A possible issue of inadequate attorney-client communication also was indicated when counsel explained that she had not sent her investigator to interview witnesses (such as the day care personnel) whose testimony she believed would be harmful or irrelevant, and appellant interjected, Why not tell me this? I had this [ sic ] over two months ago. Recognizing the issue, the judge asked counsel how many times she had met with appellant, how many hours they had conferred, and whether they had discussed matters of defense and what potential defenses are. Counsel stated that she had met with appellant at the D.C. Jail five or six times for a minimum of one hour and usually an hour and a half to two [hours each time]. She confirmed that they had pored over his defense together, commenting that he's been very good about giving me suggestions and notes and with his ideas for defense. We've gone through those page by page. Counsel attributed appellant's sudden dissatisfaction with her to a meeting the previous evening, in which her law partner cross-examined appellant to prepare him for taking the stand at trial. According to counsel, appellant stormed out when her partner advised him to work something out because everything you say in your testimony convicts you. Up until then, counsel stated, we had spent several hours together and it was fine. Appellant argues that the judge should have replaced his counsel after she admitted feel[ing] very uncomfortable with [appellant's] outburst. If he doesn't want me that much, because I have to, he wants to testify, I have to be able to talk to him and feel comfortable. But counsel's acknowledgment of her discomfort did not mean she was unprepared or unable to represent appellant effectively, so long as he cooperated with her. Later that day, in fact, counsel announced that appellant had apologized to her and wanted to apologize to the judge as well. Counsel believed that [she and appellant were] back on track as far as an attorney-client relationship. The judge asked appellant if this was true, and he responded affirmatively. Even if this was not a waiver by appellant of any of his complaints, we cannot fault the judge for declining to remove his counsel merely because the attorney was disconcerted by her client's outburst. Ultimately, the judge declared herself satisfied that [counsel] is doing an adequate job in her pretrial investigation and her pretrial matters. We think the judge's inquiry was sufficient to support that conclusion. With commendable persistence, the judge carefully explore[d] the specifics of appellant's complaints, followed up on each of appellant's assertions, and gave appellant several opportunities to state all of his complaints. [16] From the judge's perspective at the time, counsel rebutted appellant's charges, displayed a firm grasp of the case, and confirmed that she had prepared diligently for trial. We conclude the judge did not abuse her discretion in denying appellant's pretrial request for new counsel.