Opinion ID: 1945963
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct During Penalty-Phase Summation

Text: In the State's summation at the penalty-phase of the trial, the prosecutor stated: This has been a long, it has been a difficult, ... it has been a somewhat stressful trial for everyone involved. And the trial is the matter of State of New Jersey versus Thomas Koskovich. It is not the case of Thomas Koskovich versus Bertha Lippencott. This is the matter of the State of New Jersey versus Thomas Koskovich. The prosecutor also remarked: When you begin your deliberations you will be talking about death. It's a topic that none of us likes to talk about, yet it is something that we all face. And I ask that you face it in that jury room, as you must, with respect to your deliberations in this matter, with the same courage, with the same dignity, and with the same discipline that, for instance, a terminal cancer patient faces death. [Defense counsel], in her opening statement, in the guilt phase of this trial, back a month ago, talked to you about some of the responsibilities of citizenship that we all have. Potential for military service, potential for jury service. She compared those two. And in military service we ask our soldiers, who are summoned to face life and death decisions on a regular basis, often times without the opportunity to deliberate, to consult with others before acting. In jury service we're certainly going to ask you to deliberate, to consult with each other before reaching a decision. And I ask you to face the decision that you must make as a soldier called to service to his country would, with that same courage and dignity and discipline with respect to a topic that admittedly we don't like to talk about. Before the trial court, defendant argued that those comments were improper. More specifically, defendant objected to the prosecutor's reference to Bertha Lippencott, contending that the prosecutor inappropriately suggested to the jury that defendant attempted to blame others, namely, his grandmother, for his crimes. The trial court disagreed, explaining that the prosecutor's reference was a fair comment based on the evidence defendant presented to the jury. Defendant also objected to the State's soldier and cancer-patient analogy, contending that the prosecutor improperly asked the jury to have the courage to impose the death penalty. Defendant asserted that in doing so, the prosecutor improperly minimized the importance of the jury's responsibility. Again, the trial court disagreed. The trial court indicated that, although the prosecutor's analogy was not the reference I might have chosen myself, it was broadly appropriate. Defendant repeats both objections in this appeal. In reviewing allegations of prosecutorial misconduct at the guilt phase of a capital trial, we utilize the same standards that are used to review allegations of misconduct in the penalty phase. Timmendequas, supra, 161 N.J. at 589, 737 A. 2d 55. See also State v. Pennington, 119 N.J. 547, 565, 575 A. 2d 816 (1990) (The `fair trial' standard applies to alleged prosecutorial misconduct in both the guilt ... and penalty phases of a capital trial[.]). Thus, we incorporate by reference our discussion found in Section II.B. Ante at 488, 776 A. 2d at 167. We first address defendant's argument that the prosecutor impermissibly suggested to the jury that defendant tried to blame others for his actions. A similar argument was made in State v. Feaster, supra, 156 N.J. at 85, 716 A. 2d 395. There, the prosecutor remarked in summation that the defendant `should be required to accept the ultimate responsibility for that act and that's the death penalty.' Ibid. The defendant claimed that the prosecutor's comment impermissibly characterized the mitigating evidence as the defendant's attempt to escape responsibility for his conduct. Id. at 86, 716 A. 2d 395. Although we determined that the prosecutor's comments were tantamount to characterizing the mitigating evidence as an excuse, we concluded that defense counsel's argument to the jury and the trial court's instructions about the role of aggravating factors made the jury well aware of their responsibility and the proper role mitigating evidence was to play in the discharge of that responsibility. Id. at 87, 716 A. 2d 395. We conclude similarly in the present case. The prosecutor in the present case did not state that defendant blamed others for his actions, nor did the prosecutor encourage the jury to impose the death penalty as a method of forcing defendant to accept responsibility for his actions. In mitigation, defendant presented a considerable amount of testimony about his difficult background, much of which focused on his grandmother. Within that context, the prosecutor's statement about Bertha Lippencott merely focused the jury's attention on the central issues involved in the penalty phase. We are satisfied that the prosecutor's comments did not have the capacity to distract the jury from its duties and thus did not deprive defendant of a fair penalty-phase hearing. We turn next to the prosecutor's comments concerning soldiers and terminal cancer patients. A decision of the United States Supreme Court, Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed. 2d 231 (1985), provides a useful analytical framework within which to review those comments. In that case, the prosecutor suggested that the ultimate responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the death sentence rested with appellate courts, not the jury itself. Id. at 323, 105 S.Ct. at 2636, 86 L.Ed. 2d at 235-36. Emphasizing the important duty and role of the jury in death penalty cases, the Court observed that its capital punishment jurisprudence was premised on the assumption that a capital sentencing jury recognizes the gravity of its task and proceeds with the appropriate awareness of its `truly awesome responsibility.' Id. at 341, 105 S.Ct. at 2646, 86 L.Ed. 2d at 247. The Court overturned the death sentence, concluding [b]ecause we cannot say that [the State's effort to minimize the jury's sense of responsibility for determining the appropriateness of death] had no effect on the sentencing decision, that decision does not meet the standard of reliability that the Eighth Amendment requires. Ibid. See also State v. Rose, supra, 112 N.J. at 478, 548 A. 2d 1058 (concluding that prospective jurors who expressed strong desire to avoid responsibility for decision resulting in death were properly excluded from jury). Like the United States Supreme Court, we also assume that capital-sentencing jurors recognize the gravity and significance of their responsibility. In that regard, the State must in no way minimize the importance or significance of the jury's role. Viewing the prosecutor's statement within that framework, we do not believe that the statement had the capacity to dispel the jury's sense of responsibility. To the contrary, the prosecutor's comments tended to convey to the jury the seriousness of its task. We also reject defendant's argument that the prosecutor impermissibly suggested to the jurors that they needed the courage to impose a penalty of death. Our review of the record persuades us that the prosecutor's statement emphasized to the jury that it should deliberate with courage and dignity. Such encouragement is not inconsistent with our capital jurisprudence. The prosecutor's comments reinforced to the jurors that they had a grave task, and did not impermissibly minimize the importance of the jury's decision. We add this brief cautionary note. In State v. Papasavvas, 163 N.J. 565, 622-26, 751 A. 2d 40, corrected by, 164 N.J. 553, 753 A. 2d 1148 (2000), we recently observed the frequency with which some prosecutors approach the bounds of propriety by their remarks to jurors. Although the prosecutor's remarks at issue here were not improper, we emphasize that prosecutors must avoid prejudicial and overly emotional or extraneous references at all stages of the criminal process, especially in capital proceedings. For present purposes, we are satisfied that defendant's right to have the jury deliberate fairly in the penalty phase was not violated by the prosecutor's remarks in summation.