Opinion ID: 2169253
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Dismissal of Juror During Second Stage Sentencing Deliberations

Text: Following the completion of evidence at the second stage of the sentencing hearing, the jury heard closing arguments and the trial court instructed the jury. At some point during deliberations, the trial court received a note from the jury foreperson, stating that, We have one juror who from the end of the first part of the trial has made it clear that he does not agree with    the death penalty. Because of that, we have jurors who do not feel comfortable signing that we could not reach a unanimous decision because he does not feel that juror kept an open mind and in any way weighed the evidence. I believe we need your guidance here. The prosecutor suggested that the court interview the jurors, believing that the juror in question had been dishonest during voir dire when asked whether that juror would be able to vote for the death penalty. Defense counsel disagreed, urging the court to tell the jury to continue deliberating and stating that it was too early to question anyone. The trial court sent a note back to the jurors that they should continue to try to reach a verdict and that they should advise the court if they believed the court should interview specific jurors. Subsequently, the trial court received another note from the foreperson, asking the court to interview Juror 20 and Juror 41. The note further stated, The issue is that it seems a juror is absolutely close-minded, and we don't know if we should concede that we can't reach a decision or not. The trial court, over defense counsel's objection, interviewed the two jurors. The court first interviewed Juror 20. The court began by noting that it had asked that juror some questions during voir dire. One of those questions was whether the juror felt that he could weigh the facts and circumstances and address the issues of the case from the evidence that is received in court in each phase of the trial. The juror recalled answering in the affirmative. In answer to the trial court's question as to whether the juror had in fact been able to do that in each phase of the trial, the juror answered, Yes. The trial court then noted that it had previously asked the juror whether he would be able to keep an open mind and follow the court's instructions in each phase of the trial. The juror recalled that question and, in answer to the trial court's inquiry, confirmed that he had, in fact, been able to do that in each phase of the trial. The trial court then reminded the juror that it had originally asked him if his attitude toward the death penalty would prevent him from being fair and impartial to both sides on the question of whether to impose that penalty after defendant had been convicted. The juror stated he recalled the question and, in answer to the trial court's inquiry, confirmed that he had, in fact, been able to do so. When asked to explain his answer, Juror 20 stated, I justI don't really know how to explain it, but I don't feel that that's the punishment that is deserved. When asked whether, when the trial first started, he had a preconceived notion that he would not ever impose the death penalty, the juror replied, No. When asked whether he had a preconceived notion that he would not be able to follow the court's instructions regarding imposition of the death penalty, the juror replied, No. When asked whether his position was based upon the evidence that had been received, the juror replied, Yes. The trial court then questioned Juror 41, asking the same questions that were asked of Juror 20. When the trial court asked if there was anything Juror 41 wanted to advise the court of, the juror said, Yes, I had a concern as we deliberated that the other juror was not open-minded and made it very clear several weeks ago what his decision was going to be regarding the penalty phase before we had heard all the evidence. He made statements that, you know, after we had agreed to convict, that he was not going to go any further. A day after that he made a statement to the effect that that's my belief and this is the way I was raised such that I felt at that time he was not going to be open-minded to hearing any more evidence regarding this. Other jurors felt the same way. So I felt compelled to say something today because I don't think that the system had an opportunity to work correctly under that circumstance. At that point, the trial court listened to both sides in considering what to do next. The prosecutor urged the court to question other jurors to determine whether they agreed with Juror 41. Defense counsel objected, noting that perhaps the two jurors were in some kind of conflict and the court should not be in the position of refereeing conflicts. Counsel noted that Juror 20 had given every indication in his answers that he was doing what he was supposed to be doing; therefore, the jury should continue to deliberate. Counsel further noted that it would be inappropriate for the court to become, in essence, a grand jury. Counsel noted that Juror 41 said that Juror 20 had made the statements weeks previously, at earlier points in the proceedings. Counsel stated that if this had been such a problem, the foreperson would have brought it to the court's attention earlier. The trial court said, Well, Juror 20 answered all my questions in the appropriate fashion. Now, Juror 41 tells me that Juror 20 was saying before the third phase that he wasn't going to listen to the evidence. But, it may very well be that it's only Juror 41 upset about it and that the other ten are saying, well, if that's what's going to happen, then that's what's going to happen. It may be that all 11 are saying that Juror 20 didn't dodidn't keep an open mind. But I don't thinkthe only thing I could very possibly do is ask Juror 20 answered all the questions. Maybe I didn't ask him the right questions. But he said he has been able to keep an open mind in all stages, and he said that his attitude toward the death penalty didn't prevent him from being fair to both sides in deliberations on all phases. He said    he could keep an open mind. He said he weighed the facts. He said that his attitude did not interfere with his fairness, impartiality to both sides once the defendant has been proven guilty. So I don't knowI don't have a good feel for going further at this point with any additional questioning. The court noted that the answers of the two jurors were not, on their face, inappropriate and that it would not be appropriate to continue to question Juror 20 again. The court indicated it would tell the jury to continue to try to reach a verdict. The prosecutors nonetheless persisted in their attempt to get the court to change its mind. They suggested that because the court had two different versions from the two questioned jurors, the court could question the jury foreperson to resolve the conflict. The prosecutors noted that if Juror 20 had the beliefs attributed to him, he was not a qualified juror and should be removed. The trial court expressed concern about the basis for its authority to further question jurors. The court determined that no further questioning would be appropriate and it advised the jury to read and follow the jury instructions and continue to attempt to reach a verdict. Subsequently, the trial court received another note from the jury foreperson indicating continuing conflicts. The note stated: Frustration is mounting. We have several so set on the death penalty that they will not conceed [ sic ] and sign that we cannot unanimously decide for the death penalty. Also we have one so set against the death penalty that he will not agree on that. The problem is that the one has stated to more than just one that he would not decide on the death penalty and we would be here a long time. This was stated when we decided on eligabilty [ sic ]. Although only one would talk about that to you earlier, others are willing to state that they also heard those comments, myself included. The frustration is that no matter how many times we read aloud what the jury instructions state, there is no attempt to consider a change. If that was not the case, or if the other jurors felt that this decision was based on the law and the evidence presented, we would agree to disagree and move on. The prosecutors urged the court to interview the jurors. Defense counsel stated that the note said the jury could not come to a unanimous verdict and if that's the case, we're done. The court decided to interview the jury foreperson. Upon questioning, the foreperson stated that after the jury arrived at its verdict during the guilt phase, Juror 20 said that, `No matter what, I am not going to rule in favor of the death penalty. It's just my, you know, beliefs, from my background, from mythe way I was raised.' The other jurors felt that once they got going, things will get better and that was just how Juror 20 felt at that time. When the jury reached its verdict on eligibility, Juror 20 stated that he would not go any further, that he would not decide in favor of the death penalty. The others thought he was joking, that he was not really serious. However, on almost a daily basis, the juror would say that they would all be there a long time and until the jury decided his way, they were not going to go anywhere. Then, during deliberations, he would not listen as others spoke. He would cross his arms and did not have anything to say. A lot of the other jurors felt that Juror 20 was not following the law and the jury instructions, which the jury read several times and discussed their meaning. The foreperson stated that at least three jurors, and possibly more, did not feel comfortable in signing that the jury could not reach a unanimous verdict. The foreperson stated that, in her opinion, Juror 20 had made up his mind before any of the sentencing proceedings. The jurors really delved into the mitigating evidence, but before they even started talking about the evidence, Juror 20 would write down his vote. When the others asked for mitigating factors, the juror tried to make mitigating factors fit to come up with something because even then he wasn't solid on anything he came up with. The jury foreperson told the trial court that many of the other jurors felt that Juror 20 was not weighing the evidence and not being objective. The court then questioned Juror 20 again. When asked about the statements of the two other jurors that starting from the guilt phase and continuing on from then, he expressed views that he would not impose the death penalty, Juror 20 said that his view at that time was based on the evidence that was brought with the conviction. I didn't feel at that time that it was punishable by death. I did go on. I kept an open mind. I paid attention throughout the whole trial. Juror 20 admitted that he did express those views prior to hearing the evidence in aggravation and mitigation. However, he denied that, by expressing those views, he was unable or unwilling to consider the evidence in aggravation and mitigation. He said the statement made by the other jurors that he said his views are based on his beliefs from his upbringing is not entirely true. I believe that a lot of this stuff does have to do with howwhere you come from, how you're raised. It's just the way I see it. Juror 20 stated that it was possible that he did say that he would not go any further than the eligibility phase. The trial court noted that Juror 20 gave answers that were correct in terms of what the answer should be. However, the court found the juror's answers to be inconsistent, stating on the one hand that he listened to the evidence, but on the other hand, stating that as early as the jury's deliberations on guilt, he would not impose the death penalty. The court noted the juror said, in essence, that he had listened throughout the process, but that he has said throughout the process that he was not going to listen. Ultimately, and over defense counsel's objection, the trial court decided to excuse Juror 20 and replace him with one of the alternates. The court brought the jurors into the courtroom and advised them of the court's action. The court then stated, The law says that the jury should begin to deliberate anew when a new member is seated and not to simply impose the will of the majority on the new juror. And I do want the jury to be aware that the seating of this juror should not be taken in any way as to indicate an opinion as to what your verdict should be. And that is, of course, very important that you not read into this some sense of the Court telling this jury what their verdict should be. I'm doing this based upon representations that were made to me and based upon statements that were made to me by the juror that I have removed. So, I'm directing you to begin your deliberations again. And with one alternate in and the other alternate is not yetnot yet at least a member of this jury. Following retirement of the jury to begin deliberations, defense counsel made an oral motion to discharge the entire jury and to vacate the verdict. The court denied the motion. Subsequently, the trial court received a note from the jury requesting the statements of Dr. Zoot and Dr. Heilbronner. The court noted that the jury had previously requested the statements and the court had agreed to provide them. However, the court stated its desire to make a record that the statements had been requested again by the jury. Sometime later the jury returned with a unanimous verdict of death. The record shows that the original jury initially retired to deliberate at 1:03 p.m. on October 12, 2006. The trial court indicated that the jury deliberated for 10 hours that day. At 10 p.m. on that date, the trial court recessed for the evening and continued the matter for further jury deliberations. The next morning, Juror 20 was dismissed, the alternate was sworn, and the jury retired again to deliberate at 11:21 a.m. The record shows that the reconstituted jury deliberated for 3 hours and 19 minutes following the dismissal of Juror 20 before reaching its verdict. Defendant argues that the trial court's removal of Juror 20 in the midst of sentencing deliberations deprived him of his rights under the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. VIII, XIV), and under article I, sections 2, 8, 10, and 13, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const.1970, art. I, §§ 2, 8, 10, 13). Where the State grants a right to have a jury determine punishment, a defendant acquires a due process interest under the fourteenth amendment in having the jury deliberate his fate. Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 346, 100 S.Ct. 2227, 2229, 65 L.Ed.2d 175, 180 (1980). This court has stated that the decision to discharge a juror after deliberations have begun is within the discretion of the trial court. See People v. Hudson, 157 Ill.2d 401, 448, 193 Ill.Dec. 128, 626 N.E.2d 161 (1993). Defendant argues, however, that a de novo standard applies because the trial court's decision to discharge Juror 20 implicated defendant's due process right to a unanimous jury. Defendant cites an appellate court case, People v. Gallano, 354 Ill.App.3d 941, 290 Ill.Dec. 640, 821 N.E.2d 1214 (2004), in support. In that case, after deliberations had begun, a juror sent a note to the trial court stating that he believed there was reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt and therefore he did not feel comfortable signing a guilty verdict. The prosecutors ran a background check on the juror and found that he had not been truthful about the extent of his criminal background during voir dire. The trial court questioned the juror concerning his background and ultimately dismissed him from the jury based upon his lack of truthfulness during voir dire. The court recalled an alternate juror and the reconstituted jury returned a guilty verdict. On appeal, the defendant argued that the dismissal violated his right to a unanimous verdict because it allowed the State to obtain a conviction despite its failure to persuade all of the jurors of defendant's guilt. The appellate court found the dismissal to be improper. The court stated the test to be applied: if the record evidence discloses any reasonable possibility that the impetus for a juror's dismissal stems from the juror's views on the merits of the case, the court must not dismiss the juror. Gallano, 354 Ill.App.3d at 953, 290 Ill.Dec. 640, 821 N.E.2d 1214. The appellate court noted that the State admitted that the impetus for its background check on the juror was the knowledge that the juror was the lone holdout juror. The court noted that the State could have discovered this information during voir dire, had it chosen to do so. Where the State used its resources to prevent a hung jury, it facilitated the rendering of a guilty verdict, and there was more than a reasonable possibility that the impetus for the juror's dismissal stemmed from his views regarding the sufficiency of the evidence. Once the juror's status as a holdout juror became known, the trial court had two choices, either to send the jury back to deliberate or declare a mistrial. Since the court determined, in its discretion, to discharge the juror for cause, the court's only option was to declare a mistrial. The appellate court thus reversed the defendant's conviction and remanded for a new trial. Gallano, 354 Ill.App.3d at 954-55, 290 Ill.Dec. 640, 821 N.E.2d 1214. We decline to apply a de novo standard of review to this issue. We have held that matters relating to jury selection and management are within the discretion of the trial court. See People v. Roberts, 214 Ill.2d 106, 121, 291 Ill.Dec. 674, 824 N.E.2d 250 (2005) (and cases cited therein). We find this standard to be appropriate here. However, we note that this is a capital case and the vote of one juror is the difference between a sentence of death and a sentence of imprisonment. We have previously recognized the qualitative difference between death and imprisonment as penalties. See People v. Thompson, 222 Ill.2d 1, 35, 304 Ill.Dec. 589, 853 N.E.2d 378 (2006). In Thompson, we addressed the defendant's argument that his death sentence was excessive in light of the aggravation and mitigation presented at the sentencing hearing. In discussing the standard of review, we noted that prior cases applied neither a pure abuse of discretion standard nor a pure de novo standard in deciding the propriety of a death sentence. We noted that this court is less deferential to the trial court in cases involving a sentence of death. Given the qualitative difference between death and imprisonment, we found it appropriate to give some deference to the trial court or jury on matters involving factual and credibility determinations, while at the same time subjecting the record to intense scrutiny to ensure that only those deserving of the ultimate penalty of death are so sentenced. Thompson, 222 Ill.2d at 34-35, 304 Ill.Dec. 589, 853 N.E.2d 378. While Thompson did not involve the issue presented here, we find its statement of the appropriate standard of review instructive. The trial court questioned three jurors and made credibility determinations that led it to discharge Juror 20 and substitute an alternate juror in his place. We must necessarily give those determinations some deference. However, we must also be cognizant of the vital interests at stake in a capital sentencing hearing. The qualitative difference between death and imprisonment calls for us to give less deference than usual to the trial court's findings. See Thompson, 222 Ill.2d at 35, 304 Ill. Dec. 589, 853 N.E.2d 378. After a careful review of the record, we conclude that the trial court erred in dismissing Juror 20. In making this determination, we are mindful that the trial court was faced with a very difficult situation. We also acknowledge that the court interviewed the jurors and could therefore judge their credibility, something this court cannot do. Nonetheless, we find that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing Juror 20. Under questioning by the trial court, the jury foreperson and Juror 41 maintained that Juror 20 had made up his mind prior to hearing any evidence at the second stage of the sentencing hearing and that he refused to consider the evidence presented at that hearing. However, when the trial court questioned Juror 20, he stated that he felt that the death penalty was not the punishment that is deserved. In addition, he confirmed to the trial court his statements during voir dire that he did not have a preconceived notion that he would never vote to impose the death penalty. He stated that his position was based on the evidence. To be sure, Juror 20 did admit in his second interview with the trial court that he may have said that he would not go any further than the eligibility phase. However, he also stated that even though his view after the guilt phase of the trial was that the death penalty was not deserved, he kept an open mind and paid attention throughout the entire trial. The jury foreperson told the trial court that Juror 20 would not deliberate and that when others discussed the aggravating and mitigating evidence, Juror 20 would not participate. He wrote down his vote before the discussions began. However, she also said that when other jurors asked Juror 20 for mitigating factors to support his view, he tried to make mitigating factors fit to come up with something because even then he wasn't solid on anything he came up with. This statement suggests that Juror 20 did in fact deliberate, but that the other jurors felt his reasons for not voting for the death penalty were not adequate. Another matter of concern is the timing of the jurors' complaints about Juror 20. While both the jury foreperson and Juror 41 said that Juror 20 had made up his mind not to vote for the death penalty as early as the guilt phase of the trial, the jury foreperson did not bring this to the trial court's attention until deliberations at the second stage of the sentencing hearing had gone on for some period of time. In fact, it appears from the juror interviews and the foreperson's notes that the jury had taken at least two votes and it had become apparent that the jury would not be able to reach a unanimous verdict before the foreperson notified the trial court of alleged problems with Juror 20. By this time, the jurors' positions had hardened to the point that some of the jurors simply refused to sign the nonunanimous verdict form. The trial court had instructed the jurors that if they could not reach a unanimous verdict of death, they were to sign the nonunanimous verdict form. Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 7C.06 (4th ed.2000) (hereinafter IPI Criminal 4th). The jury failed to follow that instruction, leading to the eventual dismissal of Juror 20. We note, too, that a jury may consider evidence to be mitigating even though it does not come within any of the specific mitigating factors listed in the statute (IPI Criminal 4th No. 7C.06). The jury received such an instruction from the trial court. In addition, mitigation may be found in the evidence presented at trial, as well as in the evidence adduced at the sentencing hearing ( People v. Johnson, 114 Ill.2d 170, 207, 102 Ill.Dec. 342, 499 N.E.2d 1355 (1986)) and the jury here was so instructed (IPI Criminal 4th Nos. 7C.02, 7C.04). The trial court did not find that Juror 20 had been dishonest during voir dire when he said that his views on capital punishment were not such as would preclude him from voting to impose the death penalty in all cases. At most, the court found that Juror 20's answers to the court's questions were inconsistent. In addition, there was some indication that Juror 20 was deliberating. Where one vote is the difference between a sentence of death and a sentence of imprisonment, the dismissal of that one juror under the circumstances present here was an abuse of discretion. We also find that defendant was prejudiced by the error where Juror 20 appeared to be the only juror not willing to sign the unanimous verdict finding death to be the appropriate sentence and where the newly reconstituted jury returned a unanimous verdict of death some three hours later. Although we find an abuse of discretion here, we do not find that the trial court erred in questioning the three jurors. However, such questioning must be undertaken with great caution, lest jurors get the erroneous impression that the trial court prefers a certain outcome. We note that in its initial interview with Juror 20, the trial court did not find that the juror refused to deliberate. Following this interview, and after the court was made aware by the jury foreperson's first and second notes that the jury was deadlocked and that some jurors would not sign the nonunanimous verdict, the court could have given a Prim instruction ( People v. Prim, 53 Ill.2d 62, 75-76, 289 N.E.2d 601 (1972)), instead of questioning the jury foreperson and conducting a second interview with Juror 20. Such an instruction would have been proper given the trial court's initial conclusion that Juror 20 was acting in good faith. If the jurors were thereafter still unable to reach a verdict, they were bound by the jury instructions to sign the nonunanimous verdict. If some of the jurors persisted in their refusal to sign that verdict, the court could then have specifically instructed the jurors to sign the nonunanimous verdict. We emphasize that this is not intended as a criticism of the trial court, but rather to suggest an alternative that the court could have considered that would have reduced the risk of error. The question remains as to the appropriate remedy. Defendant argues that remand for a new sentencing hearing would violate double jeopardy. He argues that, had Juror 20 not been dismissed, a nonunanimous verdict would have been rendered and he would have been spared the death penalty. Thus, according to defendant, the nonunanimous verdict would have been the equivalent of an acquittal. The protections of double jeopardy are applicable to defendants in capital sentencing hearings due to the trial-type nature of those proceedings. People v. Page, 155 Ill.2d 232, 271, 185 Ill.Dec. 475, 614 N.E.2d 1160 (1993). Questions concerning whether remand for a second capital sentencing hearing would violate double jeopardy have most often arisen where the reviewing court finds that the State failed to prove a defendant's eligibility for the death penalty, thus resulting in the equivalent of an acquittal on an element essential to a sentence of death. As a result, the State is precluded by double jeopardy principles from seeking the death penalty again. See People v. Williams, 193 Ill.2d 1, 46, 249 Ill.Dec. 840, 737 N.E.2d 230 (2000); People v. West, 187 Ill.2d 418, 447, 241 Ill.Dec. 535, 719 N.E.2d 664 (1999). The instant case does not implicate double jeopardy. Defendant does not dispute the sufficiency of the evidence of his eligibility for the death penalty nor does he argue any error in the eligibility phase of his capital sentencing hearing. At the time Juror 20 was dismissed, there was no acquittal on the issue of whether defendant should receive the death penalty. Thus, double jeopardy does not preclude a new capital sentencing hearing. This does not end our inquiry, however. Based upon the record, we conclude that had the jury been allowed to continue to deliberate with Juror 20 as a member of the jury, a nonunanimous verdict would likely have been rendered. According to the jury foreperson's notes and interview, the jury was at loggerheads because of Juror 20's position opposing a sentence of death for defendant. Several of the jurors refused to sign the nonunanimous verdict. Had the trial court not dismissed Juror 20, it would have sent the jury back for further deliberations, with or without a Prim instruction. Eventually, the nonunanimous verdict would most likely have been signed and defendant would not have been sentenced to death. To remand this matter for a new capital sentencing hearing under these circumstances would deprive defendant of that one vote that would have resulted in a sentence other than death. We conclude therefore that remand for a second capital sentencing hearing would be inappropriate. Instead, we must remand the matter to the trial court for imposition of a sentence of imprisonment. Due to our disposition of this issue, we find it unnecessary to address defendant's remaining claims of error.