Opinion ID: 2972038
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Miranda Requirements

Text: Ellis claims that Dalrymple gave him a defective Miranda warning. Ellis says that when reading Ellis his Miranda rights, Dalrymple failed to state the phrase, “you have the right to stop answering questions and assert your rights at any point after questioning has begun.” The government responds that the warnings Dalrymple gave Ellis adequately informed Ellis of his rights. In Miranda, the Supreme Court held that criminal suspects in custody may not be interrogated until they have been advised of their rights, including the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to counsel. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478-79. He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise these rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been give, and such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions 14 or make a statement. Id. at 479. Law enforcement officers are not, however, required to give warnings that precisely track Miranda’s language. Rather, the Supreme Court has held that there is no rigidity in the form of the warnings that are required to be given to a criminal defendant; no “talismanic incantation” is required to satisfy Miranda. California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 359 (1981). See also Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 297 (1980) (noting that procedural safeguards to protect a defendant’s privilege against compulsory selfincrimination include Miranda warnings “or their equivalent.”). Dalrymple testified that he read Ellis his Miranda rights from a statement of rights card that he carries with him on a daily basis. Dalrymple testified that he advised Ellis as follows: You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used against [you] in court. You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions and you have th[e] right to have a lawyer with you during questioning. If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for you before any ask [sic] questioning, if you wish. Do you understand? There is nothing defective about the warnings Dalrymple read Ellis. The phrase Ellis suggests that Dalrymple should have included, i.e., a statement instructing Ellis that he has the right to stop answering questions at any point after questioning has begun, is not a phrase that the Supreme Court in Miranda suggested should be read to criminal suspects before interrogation. Ellis cites no authority for his argument, and, as discussed above, there is no rigid requirement with respect to the form of Miranda warnings an officer must give a suspect before custodial interrogation. Dalrymple and O’Bannon testified 15 that Ellis was read his rights before he made any statements, and it is significant that Ellis signed a statement of rights form acknowledging that he was informed of his Miranda rights. Additionally, Ellis is not a stranger to the criminal justice system. He has been arrested before and admittedly was aware of his rights. Ellis has failed to demonstrate a Miranda violation.