Opinion ID: 202809
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Section 4(b) Tank Barge Manning Requirement in Buzzards Bay

Text: Massachusetts argues that although section (4)(b)'s tank barge manning requirement could be encompassed by Title II, there is nonetheless overlap with Title I. Because of this overlap, the state contends that more facts needed to be developed, and so the issue should not have been resolved at the pleadings stage. The United States disagrees, arguing that because the manning of vessels is listed in Title II, [15] see 46 U.S.C. § 3703(a)(4), all state manning regulations are field preempted by Title II and no overlap analysis is necessary. That contention overreaches. The position of the United States, which the district court accepted, is inconsistent with Locke 's recognition that Title I and Title II can overlap. See 529 U.S. at 111, 120 S.Ct. 1135. While the district court was correct to begin with the text of the Title II, this should not have ended the inquiry. Title II of the PWSA addresses the manning of vessels to which this chapter applies, 46 U.S.C. § 3703(a), and the chapter applies to tank vessels, see id. § 3702(a). A tank vessel is in turn defined as a vessel that is constructed or adapted to carry, or that carries, oil or hazardous material in bulk as cargo or cargo residue, and that(A) is a vessel of the United States; (B) operates on the navigable waters of the United States; or (C) transfers oil or hazardous material in a port or place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. Id. § 2101(39). Congress required the Coast Guard to promulgate regulations addressing the manning of [tank] vessels and the duties, qualifications, and training of the officers and crew. Id. § 3703(a)(4). Courts must also examine the text of Title I when analyzing the preemptive effect of the PWSA on particular state regulations. See Locke, 529 U.S. at 111-12, 120 S.Ct. 1135. As the state points out, Title I gives the Secretary authority to promulgate regulations for protecting the marine environment, which may include operating requirements. 33 U.S.C. § 1223(a)(1). Further, for areas the Secretary considers to be hazardous, the Secretary may establish vessel operating conditions and/or may restrict operations to vessels which have particular operating characteristics or capabilities which he considers necessary for safe operation. Id. § 1223(a)(4)(C), (D). The state argues that its manning requirements are thus a type of operational requirement under Title I, for certain vessels in Buzzards Bay, and not a general manning requirement under Title II. The United States responds that the phrase operating requirements is a term of art that refers only to navigational operations in a traffic safety system of the type expressly addressed in Title I of the PWSA. The general operation and manning of vessels, the United States says, are dealt with in Title II and are thus field preempted. See 46 U.S.C. § 3703(a). As the state notes, however, Title I's Statement of Policy also refers to manning: The Congress finds and declares . . . that increased supervision of vessel . . . operations is necessary in order to . . . insure that vessels operating in the navigable waters of the United States shall comply with all applicable standards and requirements for vessel construction, equipment, manning, and operational procedures. 33 U.S.C. § 1221(c)(3) (emphases added). Analysis of the texts of Title I and Title II does not fully resolve the source of the potential preemption here. Nor does initial consideration of the purposes behind Title I and Title II resolve the matter. Both Titles are concerned with enhanced protection of the marine environment. See Locke, 529 U.S. at 110-11, 120 S.Ct. 1135. As a result, that cannot itself be the distinguishing factor. Nor is it helpful to talk abstractly about the safety of vessels, which, depending on the particular regulations at issue, may be a Title I or a Title II concern. The analysis becomes clearer when one considers Locke 's approach. The Court invalidated training requirements which applied statewide, controlled manning outside of state waters, and did not address matters unique to the waters of Puget Sound. Id. at 113, 120 S.Ct. 1135. The Court also invalidated an English language proficiency requirement for tanker crews that affected staffing decisions outside of state waters and was not limited to governing local traffic or local peculiarities. Id. at 113-14, 120 S.Ct. 1135. Further, the Court invalidated as field preempted a statewide navigation-watch requirement. The Court noted that this was a general operation and manning requirement under Title II because [t]he general watch requirement is not tied to the peculiarities of Puget Sound; it applies throughout Washington's waters and at all times. Id. at 114, 120 S.Ct. 1135. Locke thus held that the state's general watch regulationrequiring at least four specified personnel in state waters at all timeswas preempted by Title II as an attempt to regulate a tanker's operation and manning under 46 U.S.C. § 3703(a). Id. However, at the same time, the Court remanded for performance of an overlap analysis to determine whether a narrower navigation-watch requirement, for times of restricted visibility, should be analyzed under Title I. In line with the Court's articulation of the method for differentiating between Title I and Title II concerns, the Court suggested that, on remand, consideration should be given to Washington's arguments that the narrower requirement was of limited extraterritorial effect and necessary to address the peculiarities of Puget Sound. Id. at 116, 120 S.Ct. 1135. Relying on this aspect of Locke, the state suggests that any time a state regulation on a given topic is restricted to a particular local waterway, overlap analysis is required. This argument stretches too far and is inconsistent with the balance of Locke as well as Ray. Some topics are Title II topics, regardless of limited geographic application, as the state has essentially conceded in not attempting to defend other sections of its statute. With regard to the manning requirement before us, however, the district court must undertake an overlap inquiry, including a full consideration of the various Locke factors. Further development of the record is in order to resolve this point. The United States suggests to us that even if Title I conflict preemption analysis were used, various federal requirements in the area of manning, including regulations promulgated under Title I, suffice to preempt. See, e.g., 33 C.F.R. § 164.13(c). The argument has not been sufficiently made either before the district court or on appeal, and can be made on remand.