Opinion ID: 492486
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: United States Army Agreement.

Text: 24 Cavic argues on cross-appeal that he is entitled to commissions from products sold to the United States Army because the contract originated in part of his exclusive territory. Cavic relies on several documents on file with Pioneer which listed the Army contract issuer as the Army Commander in Illinois. Cavic also notes two specific purchase orders on file with Pioneer that list the customer as the U.S. Army Command in Illinois. 25 The trial court's determination that Cavic is not owed commissions on the Army contract is supported by sufficient evidence. Most of the documents Cavic refers to also list the contract administrator as the Army Commander in Colorado, outside of Cavic's exclusive territory. Pioneer's president, Daniel League, testified that Pioneer was on a governmental bidders list from which Pioneer received requests for bids from various governmental agencies, including the Army. Mr. League also testified that although some manufactured parts were sent to Illinois, all of Pioneer's dealings with the Army were done in Colorado. William Steed, head of Pioneer's manufacturing section, testified that he had personally dealt with the Army on the contract in question, and that all negotiations were performed in Colorado. Therefore, the district court had ample evidence to find that the contract was neither solicited by Cavic nor linked to his exclusive territory. In light of this evidence, the court's finding was not clearly erroneous and therefore will not be disturbed on review.IV. Attorneys' Fees and Penalties. 26 Cavic argues that the trial court erred by not awarding a fifty percent penalty for unpaid wages under Colo.Rev.Stat. Sec. 8-4-104, and for attorneys' fees under Colo.Rev.Stat. Sec. 8-4-114. The trial court refused to award Cavic penalties or fees because Cavic was an independent contractor and therefore not a person protected by either statute. We agree. 27 Section 8-4-104 makes an employer liable to an employee for a fifty percent penalty on all wages withheld, if that employer refuses to pay wages without a good faith legal justification. Section 8-4-114 provides for attorneys' fees to the prevailing party when an employee files suit for recovery of wages. Section 8-4-101(5) defines employee as any person ... performing labor or services for the benefit of an employer in which the employer may command when, where and how much labor or services shall be performed. 28 Section 8-4-101(5) was recently discussed in Hyland v. Pikes Peak Capital Corp., 714 P.2d 914 (Colo.Ct.App.1985). In Hyland, the court found that a real estate salesman was not a corporate employee for purposes of the statute where there was sufficient evidence that the salesman's activities were not controlled by the corporation. Id. at 916. Similarly, in the case at bar, there is sufficient evidence on the record that Cavic was not an employee under Sec. 8-4-101. Cavic was Pioneer's sole manufacturing representative and was free to solicit orders in any manner, at any time, from anyone listed by the 1974 agreement or in his three exclusive states. He paid his own travel and business expenses. Further, the agreement between Pioneer and Cavic specifically noted that Cavic was an independent contractor. Because Cavic was not an employee, the trial court did not err in denying either penalties or attorneys' fees under Colorado's wage laws. 29