Opinion ID: 1454001
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: admissibility of evidence of other crimes

Text: The charges relating to the stolen church checks were severed from the charges relating to the forgery of Cary Montoya's personal checks. Since the Macey's clerk was only 70% certain that the defendant was the man who used the name of Cary Montoya to cash the check drawn on the Four Square Church account and was unable to identify the defendant at a police lineup, the State called Nora Welch, a Stimson's clerk to testify that she was positive that Johnson had presented himself at Stimson's as Cary Montoya and cashed a check on Montoya's account. She also identified Johnson at a police lineup. The trial court allowed her testimony on the ground that the issue of the defendant's identity was in dispute, and her testimony, even though of another crime, was highly probative since other identity evidence was somewhat uncertain. The evidence was held admissible under the identity exception to the rule against admitting evidence of other crimes against a defendant. See Utah R.Evid. 404(b). [4] The essence of Rule 404(b) is the same as old Utah R.Evid. 55. Evidence of other crimes is admissible when the probative value of the evidence as to one of the elements of an offense and the need for the evidence to prove a specific issue outweigh the potential for prejudicing the factfinder's consideration of the merits of the crime charged. State v. Forsyth, 641 P.2d 1172, 1175 n. 5 (Utah 1982). State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 539, 547 (Utah 1983), emphasized the need to avoid unfair prejudice against the accused by the admission of evidence of other crimes: [T]he judge must weigh not only the probative value of the evidence but also the need for the evidence and the necessity for a full inquiry into the facts relating to the issues against the potential for undue prejudice to the defendant. State v. Lopez, 22 Utah 2d 257, 262, 451 P.2d 772, 775 (1969)... . However, we emphasize that the reception of such evidence is justified by necessity and, if other evidence has substantially established the element of the crime involved (motive, intent, identity, absence of mistake, etc.), the probative value of showing another offense is diminished, and the trial court should rule it inadmissible even though relevant. Tucker v. State, 82 Nev. 127, 412 P.2d 970, 971 (1966). In a long line of cases, this Court has repeatedly held that evidence of other crimes may not be admitted to prove that the defendant has a bad character or a disposition to commit the crime charged. See, e.g., State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353, 356 (Utah 1980), State v. Gibson, 565 P.2d 783 (Utah 1977). To give meaning to the policy embodied in Rule 404(b), evidence of other crimes must be reasonably necessary and highly probative of a material issue. Johnson's identity was the subject of problematic evidence. Ms. Welch's testimony was directly probative on the issue of identity and was indirectly probative on the identity issue because it indicated that a common scheme was employed by the perpetrator of the crimes in using the same name on the forged checks, both of which were cashed the same day. On these facts, we hold that the probative value of the other-crimes evidence was properly admitted. See State v. McHenry, 7 Utah 2d 289, 323 P.2d 710, 711 (1958). See also State v. Brown, 125 Ariz. 160, 161, 608 P.2d 299, 300 (1980); People v. Casper, 641 P.2d 274, 275 (Colo. 1982); State v. Thompson, 107 Idaho 666, 667, 691 P.2d 1281, 1282 (1984). The defendant also argues that the evidence should have been disallowed because the charges had been severed and because the purpose of the severance was to avoid prejudicing the defendant with evidence of another crime. Although it is true that the policies embodied in the rule excluding evidence of other crimes to show bad character are similar to the policies of the rule requiring the severance of unrelated charges, the severance of two crimes for trial does not necessarily preclude the admission of evidence of the severed crime in the trial of the other. However, we recognize that admission of evidence of other crimes creates such a great likelihood of prejudice, irrespective of whether there has been a severance, that the defendant is entitled upon request to an instruction that the evidence may be considered only for the limited purpose for which it is specifically offered. No such request was made in this case. State v. Cowan, 26 Utah 2d 410, 490 P.2d 890 (1971).