Opinion ID: 776340
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Officer Samuelson Had Reasonable Suspicion to Initiate the Stop

Text: 13 When a law enforcement officer directs a motor vehicle to stop by the side of the road and detains its occupants for questioning, such an investigatory stop constitutes a search and seizure under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); accord Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996); see also Thomas v. Dickel, 213 F.3d 1023, 1024 (8th Cir.2000). Under Terry and its progeny, [a]n investigatory stop is permissible under the Fourth Amendment if supported by reasonable suspicion. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 693, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996); see also United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985) (applying Terry to investigatory stop of vehicle); United States v. Bell, 183 F.3d 746, 749 (8th Cir.1999) (An investigative stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment if the police have reasonable suspicion that the vehicle or its occupants are involved in criminal activity.). If the investigatory stop is not justified by reasonable suspicion or if the investigating officers exceed the stop's proper scope, any evidence derived from the stop is inadmissible at trial. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); United States v. Ramos, 42 F.3d 1160, 1164 (8th Cir.1994). A passenger in a motor vehicle has standing to challenge the stop of that vehicle. See United States v. Lyton, 161 F.3d 1168, 1170 (8th Cir.1998). 14 Because reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than the probable cause required for an arrest, it can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause, including an anonymous tip. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990). Whether an anonymous tip suffices to give rise to reasonable suspicion depends on both the quantity of information it conveys as well as the quality, or degree of reliability, of that information, viewed under the totality of the circumstances. Id. [I]f a tip has a relatively low degree of reliability, more information will be required to establish the requisite quantum of suspicion than would be required if the tip were more reliable. Id. In White, the Supreme Court considered whether the requisite quantum of suspicion was established by an anonymous tip claiming that a named individual would leave a specific apartment at a particular time and transport an ounce of cocaine in a brown Plymouth station wagon with a broken tail light to a specific motel. Id. at 327, 110 S.Ct. 2412. The Court stated that the tip itself provided virtually no indication that the caller was honest or that the tip was reliable, as it gave no basis for its predictions. Id. at 329, 110 S.Ct. 2412. However the Court held that visual corroboration by law enforcement officers of most aspects of the tip, including the suspect's sex, the time of her departure, the vehicle she drove, and her apparent destination, gave the tip sufficient indicia of reliability. Id. at 332, 110 S.Ct. 2412 (When significant aspects of the caller's predictions were verified, there was reason to believe not only that the caller was honest but also that he was well informed, at least well enough to justify the stop.). 15 Subsequent to White, with respect to two categories of anonymous tips, lower courts tended to find reasonable suspicion even where such tips lacked personal corroboration by law enforcement officers of any predictive elements. First, several federal appellate courts held that verification by police of the innocent details of a tip, such as the suspect's description, could amount to reasonable suspicion when the principal allegation of the tip was that the suspect was armed with a gun and presented a potentially immediate danger. See, e.g., United States v. Clipper, 973 F.2d 944, 946-51 (D.C.Cir.1992); United States v. Bold, 19 F.3d 99, 102-04 (2d Cir.1994); United States v. DeBerry, 76 F.3d 884, 885-87 (7th Cir.1996); United States v. Gibson, 64 F.3d 617, 619-25 (11th Cir.1995); see also United States v. Roberson, 90 F.3d 75, 81 n. 4 (3d Cir.1996) (speculating in dicta that a different rule may apply if an anonymous tip alleged that the suspect possessed a weapon rather than drugs). The courts agreed that the suspect's alleged possession of a firearm was an important factor to be considered in weighing the totality of the circumstances, because the element of imminent danger distinguishes a gun tip from one involving possession of drugs. Clipper, 973 F.2d at 951; accord DeBerry, 76 F.3d at 886 (Armed persons are so dangerous to the peace of the community that the police should not be forbidden to follow up a tip that a person is armed, and as a realistic matter this will require a stop in all cases.); Bold, 19 F.3d at 104; Gibson, 64 F.3d at 624. The courts recognized that an officer who corroborates every item of information reported by an anonymous tipster other than actual possession is left with an unappealing choice. He must either stop and frisk the individual, or wait to see if he ultimately brandishes or uses the firearm. Gibson, 64 F.3d at 624 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (citing Clipper, 973 F.2d at 951). 16 The second category of tips for which courts declined to require corroboration of their predictive elements concerned a different type of potentially immediate threat, and the one at issue in this case: an apparently drunk or reckless driver. Thus, a number of state supreme and intermediate appellate courts 6 held that law enforcement officers could pull over a vehicle for an investigatory stop based on a contemporaneous tip of erratic driving that accurately described a given vehicle, even where the officer did not personally witness any moving violations and therefore lacked probable cause to make an arrest. See, e.g., State v. Melanson, 140 N.H. 199, 200-03, 665 A.2d 338, 339-41 (1995); State v. Sampson, 669 A.2d 1326, 1327 (Me. 1996); State v. Lamb, 168 Vt. 194, 196-203, 720 A.2d 1101, 1102-06 (1998); State v. Slater, 267 Kan. 694, 696-706, 986 P.2d 1038, 1041-46 (1999); see also State v. Markus, 478 N.W.2d 405 (Iowa Ct.App. 1991); State v. Smith, 638 N.E.2d 1353 (Ind.Ct.App.1994); People v. Rance, 644 N.Y.S.2d 447, 227 A.D.2d 936 (N.Y.App. Div.1996); Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231 (Utah Ct.App.1997). But see McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1075-78 (Wyo.1999) (3-2 decision) (holding that corroboration only of color, make, and direction of suspect vehicle anonymously reported to be weaving and dangerously passing other cars did not give rise to reasonable suspicion where officer did not personally witness erratic driving after trailing vehicle a substantial distance); State v. Miller, 510 N.W.2d 638, 640-45 (N.D.1994) (holding that tip that driver in fast-food restaurant's drive-up lane could barely hold his head up and was possibly drunk could not create reasonable suspicion because it was short on reliability,... short on specifics, and uncorroborated by police officer); State v. Lee, 282 Mont. 391, 393-96, 938 P.2d 637, 638-40 (1997) (holding that anonymous caller's belief that driver was under influence of alcohol and was speeding, without any indication that the caller's belief was based on personal observation of drinking, speeding, or erratic driving, did not justify investigatory stop); see also State v. Villegas-Varela, 132 Or.App. 112, 114-19, 887 P.2d 809, 810-13 (1994) (holding that anonymous tip that did not give location or direction of suspect car that was ultimately not stopped until more than an hour later did not give rise to reasonable suspicion). In addition to the fact that in the erratic driving context the tipster is almost invariably claiming to describe contemporaneously perceived behavior, see, e.g., Melanson, 140 N.H. at 202, 665 A.2d at 340, courts tended to agree that, as in the gun possession cases, the exigency of the situation demanded an immediate law enforcement response. See, e.g., id. at 203, 665 A.2d at 340. 17 Last year, however, the Supreme Court appeared to curtail the argument that a purported threat of imminent danger necessarily lessens the government's burden in an analysis of the reliability of an anonymous tip. In Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 120 S.Ct. 1375, 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000), a decision not cited by the parties to the instant case, the Court considered whether an anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun is sufficient to justify a Terry stop and frisk. An anonymous caller had reported that a young black male wearing a plaid shirt and standing at a particular bus stop was carrying a gun; the caller did not identify himself or explain whence he knew such information. Id. at 268, 271, 120 S.Ct. 1375. Police officers responding to the call spotted a young black male in a plaid shirt at the designated bus stop and, though they saw no firearm and had no reason to suspect the individual or his companions of illegal conduct, nevertheless stopped and frisked him, seizing a gun. Id. at 268, 120 S.Ct. 1375. 18 A unanimous Court held that the stop-and-frisk was unconstitutional, as the bare report of an unknown, unaccountable informant who neither explained how he knew about the gun nor supplied any basis for believing he had inside information about the suspect lacked even the moderate indicia of reliability present in White.  Id. at 271, 120 S.Ct. 1375. The Court expressly rejected both the argument that the officers' confirmation of the suspect's visual attributes provided sufficient corroboration of the tip, id. at 271-72, 120 S.Ct. 1375, and the argument that an automatic firearm exception should apply to the standard Terry analysis. Id. at 272, 120 S.Ct. 1375. While recognizing the danger posed by firearms, the Court expressed its fears that an automatic exception would facilitate harassment based on false tips, and that a similar exception would be claimed for bare-boned tips about narcotics, since those who possess large quantities of drugs are frequently assumed to be armed. See id. at 272-73, 120 S.Ct. 1375. At the same time, the Court declined 19 to speculate about the circumstances under which the danger alleged in an anonymous tip might be so great as to justify a search even without a showing of reliability. We do not say, for example, that a report of a person carrying a bomb need bear the indicia of reliability we demand for a person carrying a firearm before the police can constitutionally conduct a frisk. Nor do we hold that public safety officers in quarters where the reasonable expectation of Fourth Amendment privacy is diminished, such as airports and schools, cannot conduct protective searches on the basis of information insufficient to justify searches elsewhere. 20 Id. at 273-74, 120 S.Ct. 1375 (citations omitted). 21 The question we now face is whether, in light of J.L., an anonymous tip about the dangerous operation of a vehicle whose innocent details are accurately described may still possess sufficient indicia of reliability to justify an investigatory stop by a law enforcement officer who does not personally observe any erratic driving. Recognizing the complexity of this issue, we answer affirmatively, and hold that under the totality of the circumstances of this case, Officer Samuelson had reasonable suspicion to detain the car in which Wheat was a passenger. 22 In reaching this conclusion, we have been influenced by the reasoning employed by those state courts that have already considered the issue. The Supreme Courts of Vermont, Iowa, and Wisconsin have held that J.L. does not prevent an anonymous tip concerning erratic driving from acquiring sufficient indicia of reliability to justify a Terry stop, even when the investigating officer is unable to corroborate that the driver is operating the vehicle recklessly and therefore unlawfully. 23 In the first such decision by a state high court, State v. Boyea, 171 Vt. 401, 765 A.2d 862 (2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 917, 121 S.Ct. 2524, 150 L.Ed.2d 696 (2001), the Supreme Court of Vermont affirmed by a 3-2 vote the denial of a motion to suppress where the investigating officer's sole initial basis for detaining the motorist was an anonymous tip, relayed by a police dispatcher, describing a blue-purple Volkswagen Jetta with New York plates, traveling south on I-89 in between Exits 10 and 11, operating erratically. Id. at 863, 868. Although the court admitted that the case was close, see id. at 867 n. 7, it distinguished J.L. on several grounds. First, it stated that the informant's accurate description of the vehicle and correct prediction of its location, just minutes before the stop, gave the tip greater reliability than the bare-bones tip in J.L. Second, the court observed that [i]n contrast to the report of an individual in possession of a gun, an anonymous report of an erratic or drunk driver on the highway presents a qualitatively different level of danger, and concomitantly greater urgency for prompt action. Id. at 867. The court noted that whereas police confronted with a report of a concealed gun could quietly observe the suspect for a reasonable period of time without running the risk of death or injury with every passing moment[, a]n officer in pursuit of a reportedly drunk driver on a freeway does not enjoy such a luxury. Id. Thus, such a driver is not unlike the bomb for which, as the Supreme Court suggested in J.L., a laxer standard of reliability may apply. Id. Finally, the court reasoned that the liberty interest implicated by a simple motor vehicle stop was weaker than the hands-on violation of the person that occurred in J.L. Id. at 868. 24 A very similar analysis informed the decision of the Supreme Court of Iowa in State v. Walshire, 634 N.W.2d 625 (Iowa 2001). The court found that because a tip about erratic driving describes not concealed criminal activity, as in J.L., but rather illegality open to public observation, it therefore demonstrated the tipster's basis of knowledge and its reliability could be demonstrated through corroboration of innocent details. Id. at 627-28. Unlike the unknown informant in J.L., who neither explained how he knew about the gun nor supplied any basis for believing he had inside information, 529 U.S. at 271, 120 S.Ct. 1375, the caller in Walshire made it clear that he or she was a private citizen eyewitness to an ongoing crime. 634 N.W.2d at 629. The court also agreed with the Boyea court that the imminent danger of drunk driving might call for a relaxed threshold of reliability, and that the intrusion on privacy interests is slight in a vehicle stop as compared to a pat-down on a public street. Id. at 630. 25 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has also upheld an investigatory stop of a vehicle based on an anonymous tip alleging erratic driving, albeit under somewhat stronger factual circumstances. In State v. Rutzinski, 241 Wis.2d 729, 623 N.W.2d 516 (2001), the court considered the reliability of the tip provided by an unidentified motorist calling from a cell phone, contemporaneously describing a black pickup truck that was weaving within its lane, variously driving too fast or too slow, and tailgating. Id. at 733, 623 N.W.2d at 519. Although the investigating officer did not personally observe any such erratic driving, id. at 734, 623 N.W.2d at 519, the court affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress, on three grounds. First, the court found that although the caller was never identified, he or she did indicate during the phone tip that he or she was in the car directly in front of the offending vehicle, and would therefore have been aware of the possibility that the police could have traced his or her identity by recording his or her license plate number. Id. at 747, 623 N.W.2d at 525. Next, the court recognized that the caller explained that he or she was making personal observations of the [suspect driver's] contemporaneous actions, unlike the caller in J.L. Id. at 748, 623 N.W.2d at 526. Finally, like the Boyea court, the court acknowledged that the tip in question suggested that the suspect posed an imminent threat to the public's safety. Id. at 748-49, 623 N.W.2d at 526. The court emphasized that it did not advocate a blanket exception to the reliability requirement for tips concerning alleged drunk driving, but at the same time clearly stated that the extraordinary danger of drunk driving meant that any allegation thereof had to be seriously considered in weighing the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 751, 623 N.W.2d at 527. 26 A handful of lower state courts to have considered this issue in light of J.L. have reached a different conclusion, however. In Commonwealth v. Lubiejewski, 49 MassApp.Ct. 212, 729 N.E.2d 288 (2000), a Massachusetts appeals court held that an anonymous cellular phone call claiming that a pickup truck had been driving on the wrong side of the road could not justify an investigatory stop. Id. at 213-17, 729 N.E.2d at 290-93. Although the trooper had corroborated all the innocent details about the truck, including its license plate number, he had not personally witnessed any erratic driving, and the caller had already told the dispatcher that the truck had returned to the correct side of the road, so the emergency had ended. Id. at 215, 729 N.E.2d at 292. In State v. Boyle, 793 So.2d 1281 (La.Ct.App.2001), a divided Louisiana appeals court held that an anonymous tip that the driver of a particular pick-up truck was intoxicated did not justify a Terry stop of the suspect in his own driveway. Id. at 1284-85. The court focused on the fact that the officers had not witnessed any criminal activity or unusual driving, and on the fact that the stop took place on the suspect's private property. Id. at 1284. In Washington v. State, 740 N.E.2d 1241 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), an Indiana appeals court reversed the denial of a motion to suppress marijuana seized during an investigatory stop of a vehicle made pursuant to anonymous tip that the driver was possibly drunk, because the officer had not personally observed any dangerous driving during the two miles he followed the car, and had not corroborated any detailed predictions of the suspect's future behavior. Id. at 1243-1246. And in Stewart v. State, 22 S.W.3d 646 (Tex.Ct.App.2000), a Texas appeals court held that an anonymous tip that a driver had appeared highly intoxicated while entering the vehicle did not justify a stop, because the description of the suspect was so general that the court questioned whether the officer was certain he had stopped the correct suspect, and the officer had not witnessed any erratic driving. Id. at 648-50. However, in State v. Marks, 2000 WL 33298878 (Conn.Super.Ct. Dec.7, 2000), a Connecticut trial court denied a motion to suppress a stop based on an anonymous tip of erratic driving, even though the officer witnessed no unlawful driving and the tipster refused to identify himself, because the tip took the form of a five-minute 9-1-1 call wherein the caller clearly relay[ed] his first hand observations as events [we]re unfolding before him, describing in extensive detail every erratic move of the suspect's car. Id. at . 27 From these cases, and upon further reflection, we believe the following considerations to be integral to a determination of whether an anonymous tip of erratic driving may justify an investigatory stop. In so doing, we bear in mind the Supreme Court's instruction that [r]easonable suspicion, like probable cause, is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability. Both factors — quantity and quality — are considered in the `totality of the circumstances.' White, 496 U.S. at 330, 110 S.Ct. 2412 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)). 28 First, the anonymous tipster must provide a sufficient quantity of information, such as the make and model of the vehicle, its license plate numbers, its location and bearing, and similar innocent details, so that the officer, and the court, may be certain that the vehicle stopped is the same as the one identified by the caller. The time interval between receipt of the tip and location of the suspect vehicle, though going principally to the question of reliability, may also be a factor here. Although the J.L. Court focused on deficiencies in the quality, rather than in the quantity, of the information contained in the tip at issue in that case, we think it significant that that tip only spoke of a young black male wearing a plaid shirt, standing at a particular bus stop. See J.L., 529 U.S. at 268, 120 S.Ct. 1375. That is a rather generic description, and the possibility for confusion of the suspect's identity was compounded by the fact that the police only responded sometime later; the record did not disclose how long. Id. By contrast, in the instant case, the caller identified the color and make of the vehicle, named the first three letters of its license plate, and gave its location and direction. 7 Compare Boyea, 765 A.2d at 863 (caller accurately described a blue-purple Volkswagen Jetta with New York plates, traveling south on I-89 in between exits 10 and 11), with Stewart, 22 S.W.3d at 649 ([G]iven the generality of the radioed description, it is not clear that the officer could even be sure that the automobile was being driven by the man seen to [appear drunk] by the informer.). See also Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 n. 18, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (Th[e] demand for specificity in the information upon which police action is predicated is the central teaching of this Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.). Officer Samuelson effected a stop within minutes of the 9-1-1 call, and at the suppression hearing, he testified that he knew right away that that was the vehicle. Tr. of Hr'g on Mot. to Suppress, at 20. We think that the information in the tip identifying the recklessly driven vehicle was sufficiently copious and precise. 29 The tip must also contain a sufficient quantity of information to support an inference that the tipster has witnessed an actual traffic violation that compels an immediate stop. 8 A law enforcement officer's mere hunch does not amount to reasonable suspicion, see Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868; Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123-24, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000); a fortiori, neither does a private citizen's. Cf. Miller, 510 N.W.2d at 640-45 (holding that tip that driver in fast-food restaurant's drive-up lane could barely hold his head up and was possibly drunk could not create reasonable suspicion in part because it was short on specifics); Lee, 282 Mont. at 393-96, 938 P.2d at 638-40 (holding that anonymous caller's belief that driver was under influence of alcohol and was speeding, without any indication that the caller's belief was based on personal observation of drinking, speeding, or erratic driving, did not justify investigatory stop). In the instant case, the anonymous caller specifically alleged that he had personally observed several different traffic violations involving erratic driving. See Iowa Code §§ 321.299 et seq. (2001) (regulating proper methods of passing and overtaking another vehicle); Iowa Code § 321.277 (2001) (making reckless driving a simple misdemeanor). 30 The second and far more difficult consideration concerns the quality, or degree of reliability, of the information conveyed in an anonymous tip. In J.L., the Court found the anonymous tip unreliable because it provided no predictive information and therefore left the police without means to test the informant's knowledge or credibility. 529 U.S. at 271, 120 S.Ct. 1375. In the context of an anonymous tip of erratic driving, however, the first challenge is to identify the predictive element of the tip that must be corroborated. Is it that the vehicle is being driven dangerously? Wholly aside from the public safety considerations discussed infra, this seems too stringent, because a police officer who corroborated the claim of reckless driving would then have not merely reasonable suspicion to justify an investigatory stop, but probable cause to make an arrest. See United States v. Bell, 86 F.3d 820, 822 (9th Cir.1996) ([A]ny traffic violation, even a minor one, gives an officer probable cause to stop the violator.); accord United States v. Neumann, 183 F.3d 753, 755-56 (8th Cir.1999); see also Iowa Code § 321.277. Thus, police would lose the intermediate step of investigatory stops based on reasonable suspicion. We think that under the proper circumstances Terry stops strike a careful balance between society's interest in crime prevention and the individual citizen's interest in remaining free from wanton government interference, and we are loath to see their use foreclosed in this context. 9 31 Alternatively, the predictive information to be corroborated might be no more than that a vehicle matching a certain description will pass a certain waypoint on a specific road at an approximate time. However, the Supreme Court precluded this approach in J.L., at least with respect to gun possession cases. While acknowledging that corroboration of the suspect's readily observable location and appearance does assure that the police have stopped the person that the tipster meant to accuse, the Court stated that [s]uch a tip ... does not show that the tipster has knowledge of concealed criminal activity. The reasonable suspicion here at issue requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person. J.L., 529 U.S. at 272, 120 S.Ct. 1375. 10 32 A careful reading of the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence suggests that this emphasis on the predictive aspects of an anonymous tip may be less applicable to tips purporting to describe contemporaneous, readily observable criminal actions, as in the case of erratic driving witnessed by another motorist. White did not create a rule requiring that a tip predict future action, United States v. Johnson, 64 F.3d 1120, 1125 (8th Cir.1995), and neither did J.L. As we have previously acknowledged, [s]uch a rule would be contrary to the line of cases holding that reasonable suspicion must be judged on the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 1125 n. 3. The Supreme Court has long emphasized that a primary determinant of a tipster's reliability is the basis of his knowledge. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) ([A]n informant's `veracity,' `reliability,' and `basis of knowledge' are all highly relevant in determining the value of his report.... [T]hese elements should [not] be understood as entirely separate and independent requirements to be rigidly exacted in every case.... Rather, ... they should be understood simply as closely intertwined issues.); accord White, 496 U.S. at 328-29, 110 S.Ct. 2412. Unlike with clandestine crimes such as possessory offenses, including those involving drugs or guns, where corroboration of the predictive elements of a tip may be the only means of ascertaining the informant's basis of knowledge, in erratic driving cases the basis of the tipster's knowledge is likely to be apparent. Almost always, it comes from his eyewitness observations, and there is no need to verify that he possesses inside information. As the court reasoned in Boyea: 33 The offense alleged here did not involve a concealed crime — a possessory offense. What was described in the police dispatch to the arresting officer was a crime in progress, carried out in public, identifiable and observable by anyone in sight of its commission. Unlike the tip alleged in White — that White was carrying narcotics — ... here a total stranger could have observed defendant's driving abilities. No intimate or confidential relationship was required to support the accuracy of the observation. The caller simply reported a contemporaneous observation of criminal activity taking place in his line of sight. 34 765 A.2d at 875 (Skoglund, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). See also Walshire, 634 N.W.2d at 627-28 ([T]he information provided here did not concern concealed criminal activity, but rather illegality open to public observation. The tip here demonstrated the tipster's basis of knowledge: the caller observed the defendant driving in an erratic manner.); Rutzinski, 241 Wis.2d at 748, 623 N.W.2d at 526 (Unlike the caller in J.L., the informant in this case provided the police with verifiable information indicating his or her basis of knowledge. The informant explained that he or she was making personal observations of Rutzinski's contemporaneous actions.). Cf. United States v. Armstead, 112 F.3d 320, 322 n. 3 (8th Cir.1997) (rejecting contention that anonymity of airline agent made his or her tip about a drug courier unreliable, as [t]he exact identity of the airline's agent is unimportant: it is enough that she or he worked for the airline, ... and would therefore have accurate information). 35 By way of contrast, in White corroboration of the predictive aspects of the tip was the only means of confirming the tipster's basis of knowledge. See 496 U.S. at 332, 110 S.Ct. 2412 ([T]he caller's ability to predict respondent's future behavior ... demonstrated inside information ... [that t]he general public would have had no way of knowing.... [A] person with access to [information about an individual's itinerary] is likely to also have access to reliable information about that individual's illegal activities.) (emphasis in original). And in J.L., the tip lacked any predictive elements that would suggest the tipster was in a special position to know about the suspect's clandestine lawbreaking. 529 U.S. at 271, 120 S.Ct. 1375 (All the police had to go on in this case was the bare report of an unknown, unaccountable informant who neither explained how he knew about the gun nor supplied any basis for believing he had inside information.). Although the tipster did provide an ostensibly contemporaneous account of the suspect's actions, inasmuch as he stated that the suspect was standing at a certain bus stop, he neither alleged that he was observing any crime nor even explained how he knew that the suspect carried a gun. See id. at 272, 120 S.Ct. 1375 ([The tip in question] does not show that the tipster has knowledge of concealed criminal activity. The reasonable suspicion here at issue requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality....). We think that an anonymous tip conveying a contemporaneous observation of criminal activity whose innocent details are corroborated is at least as credible as the one in White, where future criminal activity was predicted, but only innocent details were corroborated. 11 36 We recognize the danger that, as with any anonymous tip, even a supposedly contemporaneous account of erratic driving could be a complete work of fiction, created by some malicious prankster to cause trouble for another motorist. Indeed, in J.L. the Supreme Court declined to adopt an automatic firearm exception to the corroboration requirement for this very reason. See 529 U.S. at 272, 120 S.Ct. 1375. However, with respect to anonymous reports of erratic driving that seem otherwise credible under the totality of the circumstances, we think that the risk of false tips is slight compared to the risk of not allowing the police immediately to conduct an investigatory stop, for several reasons. 37 First, the risk that law enforcement officers themselves will fabricate such a tip in order to harass innocent motorists is negligible. Where, as in this case, the tip originates in the form of a 9-1-1 call, and is subsequently broadcast over the police radio channel, there is no chance that the investigating officer has invented the tip, a fear expressed in other circumstances by some commentators. See, e.g., 4 La Fave, Search and Seizure § 9.4(h), at 227 (criticizing the Supreme Court's decision in Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972), where the Court upheld an investigatory stop based on a tip allegedly provided by informant known to officer but otherwise never identified, on the grounds that it facilitates police fabrications). That leaves the possibility of malicious hoaxes perpetrated by private citizens. We wholeheartedly endorse efforts such as those mentioned by Justice Kennedy in his concurrence in J.L., see 529 U.S. at 276, 120 S.Ct. 1375, to encourage law enforcement to use instant caller identification technology or otherwise to try to identify anonymous tipsters, in order to increase the reliability of such tips. In the instant case, however, we confront a situation where the 9-1-1 operator failed to ask the caller for his identity, and the caller did not volunteer such information. 38 We must therefore decide whether that oversight, and the consequent possibility that the allegation of erratic driving was groundless, destroyed the reliability of the tip in question. From Terry, we know that 39 [i]n order to assess the reasonableness of Officer [Samuelson's] conduct as a general proposition, it is necessary first to focus upon the governmental interest which allegedly justifies official intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interests of the private citizen, for there is no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails. 40 Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-21, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (initial brackets added; subsequent brackets in original; internal quotation marks deleted). In cases of possible drunk driving, we think that the governmental interest in effecting an immediate investigatory stop is very strong, and the intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interests of the private citizen, although also significant, is comparatively less so. 41 An erratic and possibly drunk driver poses an imminent threat to public safety. See Rutzinski, 241 Wis.2d at 748-51, 623 N.W.2d at 526-27. Of course, arguably so too does a citizen armed with a gun, yet the Supreme Court firmly declined to adopt an automatic firearm exception to the reliability requirement on that basis. J.L., 529 U.S. at 272, 120 S.Ct. 1375. However, there is a critical distinction between gun possession cases and potential drunk driving cases. In the possessory offense cases, law enforcement officers have two less invasive options not available to officers responding to a tip about a drunk driver. First, they may initiate a simple consensual encounter, for which no articulable suspicion is required. See Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 5-7, 105 S.Ct. 308, 83 L.Ed.2d 165 (1984) (per curiam). Needless to say, that is not possible when the suspect is driving a moving vehicle. 12 42 Alternatively, officers responding to a tip about a possessory violation may quietly observe the suspect for a considerable length of time, watching for other indications of incipient criminality that would give them reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop — as, for example, in Terry, where an experienced officer witnessed several men casing a joint. 392 U.S. at 5-7, 88 S.Ct. 1868. By contrast, where an anonymous tip alleges erratic and possibly drunk driving, a responding officer faces a stark choice. As the Boyea court noted, he can intercept the vehicle immediately and ascertain whether its driver is operating under the influence of drugs or alcohol. 765 A.2d at 862. Or he can follow and observe, with three possible outcomes: the suspect drives without incident for several miles; the suspect drifts harmlessly onto the shoulder, providing corroboration of the tip and probable cause for an arrest; or the suspect veers into oncoming traffic, or fails to stop at a light, or otherwise causes a sudden and potentially devastating accident. Id. In contradistinction to J.L., where the suspect was merely standing at the bus stop, in this context the suspect is extremely mobile, and potentially highly dangerous. See Boyea, 765 A.2d at 867 ([A] drunk driver is not at all unlike a `bomb,' and a mobile one at that.). Thus, we think that there is a substantial government interest in effecting a stop as quickly as possible. 13 43 That interest must be balanced against the individual's right to remain free from unreasonable government intrusion. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-21, 88 S.Ct. 1868. We readily acknowledge that citizens have a liberty interest in proceeding unmolested along public highways and that investigatory stops create a substantial intrusion on that interest. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 657, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (noting that vehicular stops interfere with freedom of movement, are inconvenient, consume time, and may create substantial anxiety). At the same time, we think that such stops are considerably less invasive, both physically and psychologically, than the frisk on a public corner that was at issue in J.L. See Boyea, 765 A.2d at 868 (reasoning that the liberty interest implicated by a vehicular stop is weaker than the hands-on violation of the person of the public frisk in J.L. ); Walshire, 634 N.W.2d at 630. Recognizing the magnitude of the drunken driving problem, the Supreme Court has approved the use by law enforcement of brief roadside sobriety checkpoints. See Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990). We rather doubt that a like recognition of the dangers of illegal handguns would lead the Court to approve a scheme of randomly placed magnetometers (metal detectors) on public sidewalks, even in high-crime neighborhoods. 44 After careful consideration of all of the above factors, we find that the initial stop of the vehicle in which Wheat was a passenger was not unreasonable under the totality of the circumstances. An anonymous caller provided an extensive description of a vehicle that, based on his contemporaneous eyewitness observations, he believed was being operated dangerously, and cited specific examples of moving violations. When Officer Samuelson caught up with the vehicle minutes later while it was stopped at an intersection, he corroborated all its innocent details, confirming that it was the one identified by the tipster. Within seconds after the vehicle resumed motion, Officer Samuelson effected an immediate investigatory stop, rather than allow it to proceed and potentially endanger other vehicles. Under the totality of the circumstances, he had reasonable suspicion to do so, and the stop was valid under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. 45 2. On Plain Error Review, Wheat Cannot Show That He Was Unreasonably Detained After Officer Samuelson Discovered That the Suspension Did Not Need to Be Served 46 Wheat also claims that after Samuelson discovered that no DOT suspension needed to be served, Wheat should have been allowed to leave the scene immediately. Wheat's Brief, at 16. However, Wheat failed to make this argument before the district court. See infra. Reviewing it now for plain error, see Fed. R.Crim. Pro. 52(b); Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 465-66, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997), we find it to be without merit. As the district court discussed in a footnote: 47 Defendant Wheat does not contend that he was unreasonably detained after Officer Samuelson learned that he did not have to serve a license suspension on him. Nor would such an argument have any merit. Immediately after learning that he did not have to serve the license suspension on Wheat, Officer Samuelson and Officer Anderson left Samuelson's patrol car, returned Wheat's license[,] and informed him that he did not need to be served with the license suspension. Immediately after informing Wheat of these events, Officer Samuelson turned to McDonald and requested consent to search the Nissan. 48 Gov't App., at 51, Order Adopting Report and Recommendation, at 19 n. 7 (emphasis in original). 49 We must accept these findings of historical fact except upon a showing that they are clearly erroneous, Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996), and Wheat has offered no evidence to that end. Moreover, we agree with the district court's legal conclusions. After making a valid Terry stop, police officers must diligently work to confirm or dispel their suspicions in a short period of time. United States v. Bell, 183 F.3d 746, 749 (8th Cir.1999). In this case, Officer Samuelson worked diligently to ascertain whether or not the license suspension needed to be served; after learning that it did not, he immediately informed Wheat of that fact. At most, there occurred a momentary conference between Officer Samuelson and Officer Anderson about the latter's previous encounters with the driver. The district court did not err, let alone commit plain error, by denying Wheat's motion to suppress.