Opinion ID: 4242777
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Wrongful Death and Plaintiff's Alleged Breach of Contract

Text: ¶14 The common law provided no remedy in tort when a person's injury to another resulted in that person's death because the injured person's right of action abated on death. 5 Generally, a cause of action in the common law based on contract survived and could be enforced by the personal representative of the deceased. 6 Whether an action survived was not based upon the form of the action being in contract versus tort, but whether the alleged injury was to property and rights of property which survived, or injury to the person which did not survive. 7 ¶15 The harshness of this situation was ameliorated by statutes allowing for the decedent's personal representative to bring an action for the decedent's death only if at the time of his or her death, the decedent had a right of recovery for the injuries in suit. 8 General survival and abatement statutes are codified at 12 O.S.2011 §§ 1051-155, inclusive, where, for example, 12 O.S. §§ 1051 9 & 1053 10 include causes of action for injury to the deceased, including pain and suffering, as well as a cause of action for damages resulting from the death of the injured person. 11 ¶16 The § 1053 action allows a plaintiff to recover for loss of consortium and the grief of the surviving spouse. Plaintiff argues a wrongful death action may be based upon a breach of contract where damages for personal injuries are sought. Again, plaintiff argues the action is for consequential damages resulting from a wrongful death and is based in contract. ¶17 Historically, when an action is a claim which seeks to recover for unliquidated damages for a personal injury caused by negligence, although the negligence complained of amounts to a breach of contract on the part of the defendant , the action is one ex delicto and the law of torts governs that claim. 12 We have explained a surviving spouse's wrongful death action is purely statutory, [and] suit may be brought only by a person expressly authorized by statute to do so within the two-year limitations period provided by § 1053. 13 Of course, an action founded upon a contract survives and may be brought by an executor or administrator of the deceased. 14 ¶18 We have explained that the injury-to-the-plaintiff action lies only if at the time of death the decedent had a right of recovery for the injury in suit, 15 but the wrongful death independent survivor statutory action is viewed as not a derivative action 16 arising completely from the personal-injury-to-the-plaintiff action. 17 An action for breach of contract and an action in tort may arise from the same set of facts and a person injured by the substandard performance of a duty derived from a contractual relationship may rely on a breach of contract or tort theory, or both. 18 A person injured by the substandard performance of a duty derived from a contractual relationship may rely on a breach of contract or tort theory, or both; but even if the evidence supports both, the claimant can achieve but a single recovery. 19 This single recovery by a plaintiff has been historically recognized by the Legislature in statute, and our Court has explained that an employer and insurance carrier have been protected from a claimant obtaining a double recovery for the same injury. 20 ¶19 As we explain, plaintiff's action against the insurance carrier is for allegedly causing or contributing to the cause of the worker's death, this same death for which workers' compensation benefits were paid. Plaintiff's action is attempting to make the insurance carrier a type of unspecified successive tortfeasor 21 or impose one type of concurrent-breach-of-contract doctrine 22 where the insurance carrier's actions independent of the workers' compensation cause of action have concurred with the injury element of the compensation cause of action to produce the single or indivisible injury, i.e., the death of the deceased. Further, plaintiff's alleged successive/concurrent cause of action assumes a right to recover damages without the prior payment of death benefits creating any legal consequence for the asserted successive/concurrent cause of action. ¶20 Plaintiff's action arises from a workers' compensation insurance policy and a court-ordered duty based on that policy where (1) plaintiff alleges a death occurred and (2) workers' compensation death benefits were previously paid for that death. Plaintiff's District Court action to recover for Troy's injury is governed by workers' compensation jurisdictional remedies as we now explain, and we need not reach the issues of alleged successive or concurrent liability for an injury for which workers' compensation benefits were previously paid. 23