Opinion ID: 601840
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Tortious Interference with Business Expectations5

Text: 12 The tort of interference with a business expectancy has the following elements: (1) a contract or a valid business expectancy; (2) defendant's knowledge of the contract or relationship; (3) intentional interference by the defendant inducing or causing a breach of the contract or relationship; (4) absence of justification; and, (5) damages resulting from defendant's conduct. Community Title Co. v. Roosevelt Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 796 S.W.2d 369, 372 (Mo.1990) (en banc). Our independent review of the record verifies that elements one and three were not sufficiently developed to withstand Tandy's motion for judgment as a matter of law.
13 MWI and MEI correctly point out that a contract need not exist in order to satisfy the first element; all that is needed is a valid business expectation. A regular course of similar prior dealings may suggest a valid business expectancy. American Business Interiors v. Haworth, Inc., 798 F.2d 1135, 1143 (8th Cir.1986) (citing Rusk Farms, Inc. v. Ralston Purina, 689 S.W.2d 671, 680-81 (Mo.Ct.App.1985)). Here, the lease was silent on the subject of renewal, and there was no regular course of dealings demonstrating the plaintiffs had any expectation JVJ would renew the lease. The evidence does not demonstrate any basis upon which the plaintiffs could reasonably expect a renewal. Cf. Hartbarger v. Burdeau Real Estate Co., 741 S.W.2d 309, 311 (Mo.Ct.App.1987); Rusk Farms, 689 S.W.2d at 680-81 (one transaction insufficient to prove continuing relationship). 14 We also note that MEI never had any dealings with JVJ, and therefore could hardly claim any expectation of continued business relations with the landlord. MEI contends it expected to reap the benefits of Massey's and MWI's relationship with JVJ because profits from the Chesterfield Mall location would be used to improve the Creve Coeur store. Accepting this as true (which we must, given our standard of review), this does not satisfy the requirement that the plaintiff suffer interference with its own business relationships; at best, it demonstrates damage caused by interference with another entity's business relations, but this is not what the first element requires. 15
16 After reading the transcript, we have found no evidence that Tandy attempted to persuade JVJ to take any particular course of action with regard to the lease. The only contact appears to have taken place after JVJ made its decision, when Tandy called JVJ and tried to arrange a meeting between JVJ and Massey. 17 MWI and MEI point to the suspicious circumstances surrounding the two notices, the fact that Tandy has a company-owned Radio Shack in virtually every Mall owned by JVJ, the fact that Tandy opened a Radio Shack in Chesterfield Mall as soon as it could do so without interfering with Massey's AOPR, and the questionable justifications for JVJ's decision not to renew his lease. From these facts, we are to infer that Tandy used its influence to get rid of Massey and open a company-owned store in the mall. These speculative inferences do not satisfy Massey's obligation to present substantial evidence supporting each element of the cause of action. Morton v. Hearst Corp., 779 S.W.2d 268, 272 (Mo.Ct.App.1989). 18 MWI and MEI alternatively argue that the good faith clause required Tandy to exert its influence and force or persuade JVJ to renew the lease. Even if the record is read in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the record does not substantiate that Tandy could accomplish this task. At best, the record reflects that Tandy's desires were important to JVJ, but that Tandy did not always get what it wanted. Furthermore, as in American Business Interiors, whether Tandy had an affirmative duty to intercede is a troubling issue. 798 F.2d at 1144. However, we do not even need to decide whether Tandy had such an obligation because there is no indication that Tandy treated MWI and MEI different than any other franchisees by refusing to exert pressure on JVJ. Cf. id. (decision not to give [plaintiff] the assistance it gave other authorized dealers, however, could be viewed by a jury as part of a concerted effort to deny [plaintiff] the ... job and divert the business to [another individual].)