Opinion ID: 1346416
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: other evidentiary errors

Text: The appellant assigns additional errors that are also evidentiary in nature and involve discretionary rulings by the trial court as to their admissibility. It is well established in West Virginia that [r]ulings on the admissibility of evidence are largely within a trial court's sound discretion.... State v. Louk, W.Va., 301 S.E.2d 596, 599 (1983). Consequently, this Court has held: `The action of a trial court in admitting or excluding evidence in the exercise of its discretion will not be disturbed by the appellate court unless it appears that such action amounts to an abuse of discretion.' Syl. pt. 5, Casto v. Martin, 230 S.E.2d 722 (W.Va.1976) citing Syl. pt. 10, State v. Huffman, 141 W.Va. 55, 87 S.E.2d 541 (1955). Syllabus Point 2, State v. Rector, W.Va. 280 S.E.2d 597 (1981). Syl. pt. 3, State v. Oldaker, W.Va., 304 S.E.2d 843 (1983). See generally 1 Wigmore on Evidence § 16 (Chadbourn Revision Supp.1981); 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 1556 (Cum.Supp.1983); 5 Am.Jur.2d Appeal and Error § 881 (Cum.Supp.1983). The appellant contends that the trial court erred when it allowed a knife to be displayed in the courtroom upon the assurance of the prosecution that it would be connected to the murder of Edna Karver. The knife in question had been found in the Plymouth Trailduster that the appellant and Gallo had borrowed the night of the murder. The owner of the Trailduster, Joyce Cooper, testified that the knife was not in the vehicle prior to loaning it to the appellant. Sergeant William Beatty of the Weirton Police Department testified that he discovered the knife in the vehicle shortly after its impoundment. The record indicates that scientific analysis revealed no blood on the knife. At the trial, the medical examiner testified that the knife could have been the murder weapon, however, on cross-examination the appellant established through the testimony of the medical examiner that five knives from the courthouse kitchen could also have inflicted the deadly wounds of the victim. Upon motion of the prosecution to admit the knife into evidence the appellant objected and the knife was excluded from the trial. The trial court later denied the appellant's motion for a mistrial based upon the prosecution's use of the knife. We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed the knife to be displayed in the courtroom but later excluded it from evidence. The appellant further argues that the trial court erred when it denied the appellant's pre-trial motion to exclude certain evidence from trial. Specifically, the appellant sought to exclude the pair of gloves found in the Trailduster, one of which had a bloodstain the size of a thumbnail, a pair of the appellant's tennis shoes, one of which had a speck of blood on it, and the expert testimony surrounding the identification of that blood. The appellant contends that the prejudicial effect of those items outweighs their probative value and therefore, renders them irrelevant. The appellant also contests the relevance of the expert testimony identifying the bloodstains because the expert indicated that the amount of blood found on these items was only sufficient to identify it as human and was too limited in its amount to specify its type or group. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the appellant's motion to exclude such evidence. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Hancock County is hereby reversed and this case is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded.