Opinion ID: 783810
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Tran v. United States

Text: 21 As an initial matter, we reject Tran's argument that the district court's dismissal of his first § 2255 petition as time-barred was erroneous. Tran's first § 2255 petition was filed on October 16, 1998, almost a year and a half after the AEDPA deadline applicable to petitioners whose convictions became final before AEDPA's effective date. See Mickens, 148 F.3d at 147-48. We find no basis for crediting Tran's claim of detrimental reliance resulting from the alleged delay by the University of Kansas Law School Defender Project in informing him that it would not represent him. As Tran concedes, he was aware of the April 27, 1997 deadline prior to the expiration of the grace period. See Smith, 208 F.3d at 17-18. In addition, we decline to consider in the first instance Tran's argument that AEDPA's limitations period should have been equitably tolled based on his claim of actual innocence, as Tran did not raise this argument before the district court and he has not alleged any other circumstances that might warrant equitable tolling. 22 For the reasons discussed above, the district court's finding that Tran's first § 2255 petition was time-barred is an adjudication on the merits such that Tran is now subject to AEDPA's second or successive requirements. We find that Tran's proposed § 2255 petition qualifies as a second or successive petition because all of the claims raised in the new petition were available to Tran when he filed his first petition. See James, 308 F.3d at 167. In particular, Tran presumably knew at his trial that he had numerous alibi witnesses; he has given us no reason to believe otherwise. Moreover, Tran could have learned of the government's alleged threats of deportation if he had inquired into why his alibi witnesses did not wish to testify at trial. 23 Tran asserts that his present § 2255 petition is not successive, as the district court erroneously recharacterized his coram nobis petition as a first § 2255 petition without providing the proper notice required by Adams, 155 F.3d at 583-84. Unlike Adams, however, Tran specifically requested in his coram nobis petition that he be allowed to proceed under § 2255 if the district court concluded that coram nobis relief was unavailable: 24 Thus if this Court rejects Movant's argument raised in conjunction to whether relief can be afforded him under 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), Movant urges this Court to allow him the chance to litigate his issues pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, following the analogy under, Miller, supra. 25 Finally, we deny Tran leave to file the proposed successive § 2255 petition because it fails to meet AEDPA's requirements for second and successive petitions. Tran's reliance on Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435, is misplaced because its holding has not been made retroactive by the Supreme Court in the context of second or successive § 2255 petitions. See Forbes v. United States, 262 F.3d 143, 145-46 (2d Cir. 2001) (per curiam). In addition, the alibi affidavits offered by Tran do not constitute newly discovered evidence because they could have been obtained by Tran prior to his first § 2255 petition. Similarly, Tran's claims based on alleged discrepancies in the trial record could have been discovered and asserted prior to his first § 2255 petition. None of Tran's remaining claims relies on a new rule of constitutional law or newly discovered evidence.