Opinion ID: 1166658
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Instruction re: Tampering with a Motor Vehicle.

Text: The crux of the first two issues presented on this appeal involves the identification of the crimes which are by nature arguably lesser included offenses in the charge of burglary of a motor vehicle. Concerning these first issues, both appellant and respondent objected to two of the trial court's instructions given the jury. The lower court's instructions concerning lesser included crimes were as follows: Jury Instruction No. 9: If you are not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the offense charged he may, however, be found guilty of any other offense, the commission of which is necessarily included in the offense charged, if the evidence is sufficient to establish his guilt of such other offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The offense of Burglary with which the defendant is charged may, given the facts of this case include the offense of Tampering With a Motor Vehicle. Jury Instruction No. 10: Any person who without the consent of the owner, while a vehicle is at rest and unattended, shall attempt to manipulate the starting device shall be guilty of tampering with a vehicle. The State strenuously objected to both these instructions on the basis that tampering with a vehicle (NRS 205.274) [1] is not a lesser included offense to a charge of burglary of a vehicle. The State argued that the misdemeanor tampering offense is separate and distinct from the crime of burglary and that the State had the option of charging appellant with both crimes but elected to proceed only on the burglary offense. The appellant, on the other hand, objects to instruction number 10, stating that it insufficiently reproduces the language of NRS 205.274 by omitting the phrase: shall climb into or upon such vehicle with intent to commit any crime... . Appellant argues that the climb into and the intent to commit any crime language of the tampering statute (NRS 205.274) is virtually synonymous with the enters and the intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony language of the burglary statute (NRS 205.060). [2] Tampering is a misdemeanor while burglary is a felony. Appellant is not content to simply argue that because of the similarity in language but disparity in punishments of the statutes, an instruction for tampering should have been given, but he goes further and contends that the tampering statute itself supercedes the burglary statute with respect to motor vehicles. Neither contention has merit. Appellant contends that the burglary statute is repealed by implication and cites at length authority establishing that the rules for statutory construction are that newer provisions of law supplant older ones, and that specific provisions supercede general. Although there is no showing that the two statutes cover the same subject matter and that they are inconsistent, appellant's own logic is disserving. The burglary is more specific than the tampering statute in that it requires intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony as opposed to the general language of an intent to commit any crime. In addition, the tampering statute was last amended in 1967, whereas the burglary statute was last amended in 1971, the latter expanding the definition of burglary. Further, in reviewing NRS 205.060 and 205.274, it is apparent from the penalty scheme and the class of crimes that the Legislature did not intend for the tampering provisions to comprehend the classic circumstances generally characteristic of a burglary. Unlike in Lapinski v. State, 84 Nev. 611, 446 P.2d 645 (1968), here, it is clear that the elements of the crimes significantly vary, the conduct prohibited is well defined, and the concomitant punishment is also well defined. In short, the Legislature in enacting both statutes has promulgated the laws which will apply to what must be a clearly designated state of facts, id. at 614, 446 P.2d at 646, and appropriate penalties for the violations of same. Appellant's claim that he was entitled to a jury instruction on tampering is more reasonable but remains nonetheless unpersuasive. In Holbrook v. State, 90 Nev. 95, 518 P.2d 1242 (1974), this Court held that while it is arguable that tampering is a necessarily included offense within the crime of grand larceny, the evidence clearly showed appellant's conduct had gone beyond that encompassed by the `tampering' statute. 90 Nev. at 97, 518 P.2d at 1243. Likewise in the instant case, appellant's conduct had gone beyond that contemplated by the tampering statute and he would have been entitled to no jury instruction. The trial court, however, liberally instructed the jury as to the lesser offense but appellant was nevertheless convicted of burglary. This assignment of error is without merit.