Opinion ID: 2606510
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: impermissible presumption

Text: Ruland claims that it was error to give the statutory definition of murder because it says that malice shall be implied when no considerable provocation appears, or when all the circumstances of the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart. In Ford v. State, 99 Nev. 209, 214, 660 P.2d 992, 995 (1983), a similar objection was made to the following instruction on felony-murder, There are certain kinds of murder which carry with them conclusive evidence of malice aforethought. One of these classes of murder is murder committed in the prepetration or attempted perpetration of robbery... . This court held, The instruction in question merely states the law of the felony murder doctrine rather than instructs the jury to find a presumed fact against the accused. 99 Nev. at 215, 660 P.2d at 995. Similarly, the instruction in the instant case defines implied malice rather than directs the jury to find any presumed fact. Thus, cases cited by appellant are inapposite. Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 103 S.Ct. 969, 74 L.Ed.2d 823 (1983), for example, involved an instruction stating that one is presumed to intend the natural and necessary consequences of his act. For the above reasons, the convictions of Scott Vincent Ruland are affirmed.