Opinion ID: 781300
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The trial court's failure to inquire into the alleged conflict of interest

Text: 136 The petitioners allege that the district court committed reversible error by failing to inquire into the Attorney Murphy's successive representations. Under Holloway and Sullivan, a trial court has the duty to inquire adequately into a trial counsel's conflict of interest if it knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict exists. See Holloway, 435 U.S. at 483-84, 98 S.Ct. 1173 (establishing duty); Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 347, 100 S.Ct. 1708 (holding that a trial court must make an inquiry if it knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict exists). However, absent special circumstances,... trial courts may assume either that multiple representation entails no conflict or that the lawyer and his clients knowingly accept such risk of conflict as may exist. Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 347, 100 S.Ct. 1708. 137 In Mickens, the Supreme Court rejected the approach of several circuits which determined that a trial court's failure to inquire into a conflict of interest compels automatic reversal of the conviction. The Mickens Court held that the trial court's failure to inquire into a potential conflict of interest on the part of the defendant's attorney, about which the court knew or reasonably should have known, does not automatically require reversal of the conviction, observing: 138 [A] proposed rule of automatic reversal when there existed a conflict that did not affect counsel's performance, but the trial judge failed to make the Sullivan mandated inquiry, makes little policy sense.... The trial court's awareness of a potential conflict neither renders it more likely that counsel's performance was significantly affected nor in any way renders the verdict unreliable. Nor does the trial judge's failure to make the Sullivan mandated inquiry often make it harder for reviewing courts to determine conflict and effect, particularly since those courts may rely on evidence and testimony whose importance only becomes established at trial. 139 Mickens, 122 S.Ct. at 1246, 122 S.Ct. 1237. In sum, the trial judge's failure to inquire into a suspected conflict is not the kind of error requiring a presumption of prejudice. Mickens, 122 S.Ct. at 1247, 122 S.Ct. 1237 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 140 As the petitioners have failed to demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected Attorney Murphy's performance, we reject the petitioners' claim that reversal is warranted by the trial court's failure to inquire into the successive representations. The petitioners' argument parallels that of the argument expressly presented to and rejected by the Mickens Court. Accordingly, we deny the petitioners' request for an automatic reversal of their convictions. 141