Opinion ID: 158786
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Crossroads as a state actor

Text: 65 Crossroads sought summary judgment on the ground that as a private corporation it is not a state actor and thus not subject to section 1983 suit. [T]he only proper defendants in a Section 1983 claim are those who represent the state in some capacity, whether they act in accordance with their authority or misuse it. Gallagher v. Neil Young Freedom Concert, 49 F.3d 1442, 1447 (10th Cir. 1995). 66 There are numerous tests used to determine whether a private entity is acting under color of state law and is thus subject to section 1983 liability. See, e.g., id. at 1447 (describing the nexus text, the symbiotic relationship test, the joint action test, and the public functions test). 67 Appellants argue they have demonstrated state action under three of these four tests. These tests apply with more or less force depending on the factual circumstances of each case, and each test really gets at the same issue is the relation between a nominally private party and the alleged constitutional violation sufficiently close as to consider the nominally private party a state entity for purposes of section 1983 suit? If any one of the tests indicates a party is a state actor, that alone is sufficient to find the party a state actor. At the summary judgment stage of this case, we find the joint action test speaks most clearly to whether Crossroads acted as a state actor. Further, because we hold at this stage that Crossroads may be a state actor under this test, we do not consider the same facts under the other tests. 68 State action is . . . present if a private party is a 'willful participant in joint action with the State or its agents.' Id. at 1453 (quoting Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980)). The query is thus, whether state officials and private parties have acted in concert in effecting a particular deprivation of constitutional rights. Id. [S]ome courts have adopted the requirements for establishing a conspiracy under Section 1983. These courts conclude that '[a] requirement of the joint action charge . . . is that both public and private actors share a common, unconstitutional goal.' See id., at 1454 (quoting Cunningham v. Southlake Ctr. for Mental Health, Inc. 924 F.2d 106, 107 (9th Cir. 1991)). 69 The record clearly establishes that Crossroads acted in concert with state officials. Mr. Lucero, the Executive Director of Crossroads, created the Advisory Board. The Advisory Board existed for the express purpose of work[ing] toward the re-establishment of local Detox services [in Trinidad]. See Aplt's App. at 272(a). By Mr. Lucero's design, the Advisory Board was composed almost exclusively by the state-actor defendants in this lawsuit who had the power to implement policies making reopening of detox services in Trinidad a possibility. The minutes of the Advisory Board meetings are replete with agreements between the state actors and Crossroads to increase referrals to the Pueblo detox center so Crossroads would have a viable application to reopen the Trinidad detox center. For example, Mr. Lucero made it clear that at a minimum, 50 referrals a month [were required] for a full service detox [in Trinidad], and insisted that we all need to come together and find solutions to the money problems. See id. at 261-63. Chief Montoya predicted imminent increases in referrals to the Pueblo detox, and when these increased referrals became reality, Mr. Lucero complemented the City Police Department on their referrals. Id. at 259, 274. Finally, when the goal of reopening detox services in Trinidad had been realized, Mr. Lucero complemented Chief Montoya on his support and assistance in the re-opening. Id. at 277. 70 The record thus supports and possibly establishes that Crossroads worked in conjunction with state officials, but was it the concerted action that caused the deprivation of constitutional rights alleged? 71 To the extent Crossroads is being sued for its role in implementing the policy that caused the plaintiffs to be illegally arrested and eventually detained in detox, summary judgment would be premature. The record supports the conclusion that Crossroads collaborated with state actors in reopening the Trinidad detox center. Further, the record supports the conclusion that Crossroads had reason to collaborate and even initiated this effort. 72 Crossroads' motivation to implement the new policy has been made clear. Crossroads derives over ninety percent of its funding from government entities. See Aplt's App. at 288. The existence of state funding does not by itself support a finding that an otherwise private entity is a state actor. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982). However, this factor does add plausibility to the plaintiffs' claims that Crossroads orchestrated the entire sequence of events that led to their illegal seizures. Prior to the reopening of the Trinidad facility, Crossroads was paying transportation costs of sixty dollars per trip for referrals from Trinidad to Pueblo. Perhaps Crossroads' interest in the new detox center was great enough to overcome any concern about the rights that would be violated to effect its opening. 73 Further, the alleged efforts by Crossroads to increase seizures were successful. The minutes of the Advisory Committee meetings clearly document the requests by Crossroads for more referrals by police, and the granting of these requests by the police. Following the reopening of detox services in Trinidad, referrals more than tripled in the first month. And General Order 95-03 itself states, The [Crossroads] Detox will remain available contingent on full utilization. A great deal of cooperation, effort and resources went into the re-opening of this facility. If client referrals are not frequently made the facility will not remain available. Aplt's App. at 63. 74 But Crossroads' mere lack of concern or even recklessness for causing the violation of others' constitutional rights would not seem to rise to the level of establishing Crossroads' liability under section 1983. What might establish such liability, however, is Crossroads' role in creating the unconstitutional detention policy that led to the allegedly illegal seizures. The record suggests there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Crossroads directly participated in the creation of the policy. 75 Mr. Lucero discussed policies adopted by other towns that would increase referrals to detox at the March 23, 1994 Advisory Board meeting. See Aplt's App. at 262-66. Among these measures was that used by Alamosa, where [p]eople are being referred for detox when charged with a crime. Id. Mr. Lucero seems to have been proposing a similar policy. Such a policy would increase referrals and thus secure the Trinidad detox center. However, it might run afoul of the standard for civil arrests of the intoxicated. 76 Furthermore, at the June 22, 1994 Advisory Board meeting (again, held between town and county officials and police, and Crossroads executives), [a] discussion took place on the required utilization needed to re-open Detox services in Trinidad. Revision of arrest protocol has increased referrals to Detox. Id. at 272(b). What revision of arrest protocol had occurred at that point is not clear from the record. Also unclear on the current record is the extent to which Mr. Lucero's presentation three months earlier effected the new arrest protocol. 77 These recorded discussions do create a triable issue of fact as to Crossroads' role in developing the policy that caused the plaintiffs' alleged illegal seizures. Because Crossroads might have been a state actor in creating the policy that led to the arrests, summary judgment in favor of Crossroads is, at this juncture, premature and erroneous.