Opinion ID: 1203248
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Effect on Jury

Text: (7a) In a related argument, defendant argues that the prosecutor's pervasive use of the facts of the case during death-qualifying voir dire permitted eight of the jurors actually selected to prejudge the facts, in violation of defendant's constitutional rights to an unbiased jury, due process of law, and a reliable determination of penalty under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and article I, sections 7, 15, 16 and 17 of the California Constitution. He claims this error requires reversal of both the guilt and penalty verdicts. Defendant complains that in her hypothetical questions, the prosecutor imputed specific intent to kill to defendant, and introduced as facts that defendant had no mental defect or diminished capacity, and that defendant had stabbed both victims. He quotes such questions as: If you were to learn, or have a fact situation, this is purely a hypothetical, where two people set out to commit a burglary, and while they are inside a residence committing a burglary โ by the way no one is at home so they do break into a residence โ while they are inside the home, the owner of the residence and a friend return to the home, and burglars kill them to avoid detection or avoid the police being called. [ถ] Can you envision imposing the death penalty on either one of the burglars in that particular fact situation? (8a) As we have seen, the scope of questions to be asked at voir dire is a matter for the trial court's discretion. Under Williams [ supra, 29 Cal.3d 392] the court must permit questioning about legal doctrines that are material to the trial and controversial in the sense that they are likely to invoke strong feelings and resistance to their application. ( People v. Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.3d at pp. 1224-1225.) Certainly, we have cautioned that the trial court may limit voir dire couched in terms of the facts expected to be proved, in order to avoid the danger of indoctrinating the jury on a particular view of the facts. ( People v. Mason, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 940.) (9a) We have also commented that the death-qualifying voir dire should focus on juror attitudes toward the death penalty in the abstract, and should not be used to seek a prejudgment of the facts to be presented at the trial. ( People v. Clark (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583, 597 [268 Cal.Rptr 399, 789 P.2d 127].) (7b) Having examined the record, we think that for the most part, the prosecutor's questions were aimed at exploring the jurors' views regarding legal doctrines and the death penalty in the abstract. The question quoted above, and others like it, seem to us to be directed primarily at determining the jurors' attitudes toward the felony-murder special circumstance. To the extent that the court allowed questions laden with too many examples of facts to be proved at trial, we find no reasonable possibility that any error in permitting these questions prejudiced defendant at the penalty phase of trial, nor do we see any reasonable probability that such questions prejudiced defendant at the guilt phase of trial. (See People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 190 and fn. 19 [222 Cal. Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480].) First, in the face of hypothetical questions framed in terms of the general facts of this case, the jurors sturdily refused to be drawn into prejudging the case. They repeatedly said that they could not say how they would vote, and that they needed more facts or instruction in the law. Two who hazarded some response to the hypotheticals were noncommittal: Jurors Docken and Mackey. Two remaining jurors were asked only a single question using facts expected to be proved at trial, in the context of ascertaining their views regarding imposing the death penalty for a felony murder: Jurors Goodnight and Mitchell. Much of the questioning came from defense counsel, who presumably could phrase the questions to avoid leading the jury to prejudge the case in favor of the prosecution. [4] Second, because these questions occurred during the sequestered portion of voir dire, the jurors only heard the questions once, and were not bombarded with the ... questions and instructions directed at all the other panel members. ( People v. Balderas, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 190.) Further, the court instructed the jury before voir dire that the questions were merely hypothetical, and counsel and the court reiterated this during the course of voir dire. At the beginning of general voir dire, the court instructed the jurors that they were the sole judges of the facts and that they must consider only the evidence presented in court, and the court repeated these instructions at the conclusion of the guilt phase and again at the end of the penalty phase of trial. Finally, defendant did not indicate dissatisfaction with the jury before it was sworn, and in fact, defendant still had two individual peremptory challenges and ten peremptory challenges to be exercised jointly with his codefendant when he accepted the jury. Defendant's unexplained failure to exhaust his peremptory challenges or express dissatisfaction with the jury as seated means that he cannot complain on appeal regarding the seating of these eight jurors. ( People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 184 [279 Cal. Rptr. 720, 807 P.2d 949]; People v. Stankewitz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 103 [270 Cal. Rptr. 817, 793 P.2d 23]; People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1086-1087 [259 Cal. Rptr. 630, 774 P.2d 659].)