Opinion ID: 33204
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: 25 Walters argues that the district court erred in admitting into evidence both the title and a chapter from The Anarchist's Cookbook. The government offered the evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), which provides: 26 Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 27 FED.R.EVID. 404(b). Extrinsic evidence must satisfy two criteria for admission under Rule 404(b): (1) it must be relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 401 to an issue other than the defendant's character; and (2) it must have probative value that substantially outweighs its prejudicial impact under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 911-13 (5th Cir.1978) (en banc). This court reviews the admission of evidence under Rule 404(b) for abuse of discretion. United States v. Grimes, 244 F.3d 375, 383 (5th Cir.2001). Although this review is necessarily heightened in criminal cases, United States v. Anderson, 933 F.2d 1261, 1268 (5th Cir.1991), abuse of discretion is only reversible if a defendant can demonstrate prejudice. United States v. Coleman, 78 F.3d 154, 156 (5th Cir.1996). 28 The government contends that the only portions introduced from The Anarchist's Cookbook were relevant to show that Walters knew how to make bombs similar to the bomb that injured McWilliams. Walters responds that two categories of differences between the government's theory against him and the contents of the book diminish its relevance: Walters asserts that the type of bomb used in this case was very different from the explosive devices discussed in the book, and that the government's theory as to the motivation for the bombing — revenge for a private wrong — was very different from The Anarchist's Cookbook's anti-government rhetoric. Walters contends that differences so diminish the relevance of the book that the prejudicial impact of the title and the sections of the chapter that included discussions of explosions of large buildings — an emotionally charged topic after September 11, 2001 — outweigh the minimal probative value. 29 The government gave notice before trial that it would offer portions of The Anarchist's Cookbook as extrinsic evidence under Rule 404(b). Coleman, 78 F.3d at 156. 2 The trial court carefully limited what the government could show the jury, admitting only the title for identification purposes, the inside cover page on which Walters's name was handwritten, and one chapter dealing with making explosives and booby traps. The trial court found that, so limited and with the proper instruction, the admitted portions of The Anarchist's Cookbook met the requirements of Rule 404(b). This court agrees. 30 The first issue is the extent to which the admitted portions were relevant under Rule 401 to an issue other than Walters's character. 3 The only chapter admitted discussed how to assemble components of explosive devices similar to components found in the Lackland bomb. The chapter discussed how to obtain and handle black powder, which was the explosive used in the bomb. The chapter also discussed tamping, a technique for channeling the power of the explosive used, a technique used on the black powder in the Lackland bomb. The chapter outlined a booby-trap triggering mechanism with the same sequence, power sources, conductors, and switches used in the Lackland bomb. The chapter that the trial court admitted was relevant to show Walters's knowledge and ability to make a bomb using such components. The admission of the title and inside cover page containing Walters's handwritten name were relevant to identify the source of the chapter and its relationship to Walters. See Coleman, 78 F.3d at 156; Royal, 972 F.2d at 647. 31 Walters's challenge to relevance based on temporal remoteness fails. The evidence at trial showed that Walters had been in Utah as recently as three months before the bombing and had visited his mother's home, where the book was found, as recently as March or April of 2000. The relatively short time between Walters's last visit to the place where the book was found and the date of the bombing does not diminish the probative value of the evidence. See Grimes, 244 F.3d at 385 (holding that a one-year gap between an extrinsic act and the charged offense does not remove relevance and stating that a ten-year gap would be too large). 32 Walters argues that the unduly prejudicial impact of The Anarchist's Cookbook substantially outweighed its probative value, in violation of Rule 404(b) and Rule 403. 4 Walters understates the probative value of the excerpts admitted and overstates their prejudicial impact. The similarity between specific components of the Lackland bomb and those described in The Anarchist's Cookbook chapter admitted made the evidence highly probative. The government redacted the book to admit relevant portions and placed no emphasis on the title or the contents unrelated to the components similar to the bomb at issue. The district court gave the jury a limiting instruction governing its consideration of this evidence. The instruction told the jurors that they could consider the evidence only for the limited purpose of determining the identity of the defendant as the person who constructed the destructive device used to commit the crimes alleged in the indictment, or for the limited purpose of deciding whether the defendant acted in preparation for constructing the destructive device used to commit the crimes alleged in the indictment, or for the limited purpose of deciding whether the defendant had the knowledge to construct the destructive device used to commit the crimes alleged in the indictment. Given the redaction of irrelevant portions of the Cookbook, the absence of any effort by the prosecutor to emphasize the title or create an unduly prejudicial impact, and the judge's instruction limiting the jury's use of the evidence, this court concludes that admission was proper under Rule 404(b). See United States v. Gonzalez, 328 F.3d 755, 760 n. 2 (5th Cir.2003) (a limiting instruction mitigates potential prejudicial effect). 5 33 Walters is not the first defendant found in possession of The Anarchist's Cookbook or similar how-to manuals to challenge their admission under Rule 404(b). In United States v. Rogers, 270 F.3d 1076 (7th Cir.2001), the defendant was charged with possession of an unregistered firearm after agents discovered a homemade silencer for a semiautomatic pistol in his garage. Id. at 1077. At trial, the defendant contended that he thought the device was an extension of the pistol and had no idea that it functioned as a silencer. Id. at 1081. The district court admitted the entirety of The Anarchist's Cookbook into evidence. The prosecutor treated the title as significant and read to the jury not only the parts about building silencers, but other portions as well. Id. The appellate court found error in some respects. Id. Although portions of the Cookbook were relevant, the trial court should have limited the portions admitted to those pertinent to the charged offense. Id. The appellate court nonetheless affirmed the conviction because of the weight of the evidence against the defendant, noting that [t]here is no problem ... in presenting to the jury written material in the defendant's possession that shows how to commit the crime, for this makes it more likely that the defendant rather than someone else was culpable. Id. 34 In United States v. Ellis, 147 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir.1998), the defendant was charged with illegally possessing stolen explosives. Id. at 1133. The government introduced The Anarchist's Cookbook based on evidence that the defendant had borrowed it a month before the explosives were reported stolen. Id. at 1134. The district court admitted the entire Cookbook into evidence. On appeal, the court found error because prejudicial books and manuals... are normally inadmissible when they are `entirely unnecessary to support the charge....' Id. at 1135 (internal citation omitted). Intent was not an element of the possession offense charged in Ellis, making the Cookbook unnecessary to support the charge. The prejudicial impact of the introduction of a revolutionary text and the absence of any probative value made admission erroneous under Rule 404(b). Id. at 1135-36. 35 In the present case, in contrast to Ellis, intent is an element of the offenses charged. 6 In the present case, in contrast to Rogers, the trial court limited the Cookbook portions admitted, allowing the jury to see only the chapter containing the description of building explosives with features similar to the bomb Walters allegedly assembled. The portions of the Cookbook pertinent to making a bomb with features similar to the one that exploded at the base were relevant to show Walters's knowledge and ability to make such a device. See United States v. Stotts, 176 F.3d 880, 890-91 (6th Cir.1999) (bomb-making books in defendant's residence admitted to show that an explosion at a suspected methamphetamine lab was from a device intended to be destructive and not merely an accidental result of chemicals combining); United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 111 (2d Cir.1998) (possession of documents detailing how to construct bombs provided circumstantial proof of familiarity with bomb making and the use of explosives and had probative value in light of the similarity to the actual bomb); United States v. Ford, 22 F.3d 374, 381 (1st Cir.1994) (book seized from drug defendant's home entitled Secrets of Methamphetamine Manufacture properly admitted to show that the defendant was a drug dealer as opposed to someone who possessed drugs for personal use). The careful approach in this case distinguishes it from Rogers, in which the prosecutor treated the title, The Anarchist's Cookbook, as significant and read to the jury portions of the book in addition to those relating to the charged offenses. See Rogers, 270 F.3d at 1081 (warning that admission should be limited to those portions of the book relevant to the charge and the prosecutor may not suggest that a defendant should be convicted because he owned such seditious literature); see also Grimes, 244 F.3d at 385 (suggesting that the government redact narratives describing crimes of a different nature than those charged). 36 In addition, the weight of the evidence against Walters prevents him from demonstrating prejudice. See Rogers, 270 F.3d at 1081 (affirming conviction despite certain errors in the introduction and use of The Anarchist's Cookbook at trial, based on the weight of the evidence against the defendant). Walters had a history of education and training in bomb making and repeatedly expressed animosity toward the bomb victim. After the bombing, agents found in Walters's room a number of components also found in the exploded bomb. The amount and strength of the evidence against Walters does not support reversal based on the admission of the Cookbook. 37
38 Walters contends that the government's delay in disclosing the identity of Bott, another possible suspect, until approximately one month before trial violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). Walters urges reversal on the ground that the court abused its discretion in refusing to grant Walters a continuance to investigate this evidence. Under Brady v. Maryland, the government must disclose material, exculpatory evidence to a defendant. Id. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194. To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must show that: (1) the prosecution suppressed evidence; (2) the evidence was favorable to the petitioner; (3) the evidence was material either to guilt or punishment; and (4) nondiscovery of the allegedly favorable evidence was not the result of a lack of due diligence. Graves v. Cockrell, 343 F.3d 465, 475 (5th Cir.2003). 39 The record does not support Walters's contention of a Brady violation. The government disclosed the evidence nearly four weeks before trial. See Lawrence v. Lensing, 42 F.3d 255, 257 (5th Cir.1994) (Because we find that the existence and contents of the [evidence] were disclosed at trial, we hold that the prosecution did not suppress any evidence.); United States v. McKinney, 758 F.2d 1036, 1049-50 (5th Cir.1985) (holding same). The complaint that the government had the information for some time before disclosing it to Walters does not, in itself, show a Brady violation. If the defendant received the material in time to put it to effective use at trial, his conviction should not be reversed simply because it was not disclosed as early as it might have and, indeed, should have been. McKinney, 758 F.2d at 1050. Walters had almost a month after the government disclosed the information about Bott to investigate and put it to effective use at trial. At trial, defense counsel was able to put evidence before the jury that other students had made threats about bombs or violence at the Lackland base. See United States v. O'Keefe, 128 F.3d 885, 898-99 (5th Cir.1997) (holding that the disclosure of reports after cross-examination had begun did not violate Brady where the defense was able to review the reports for a few days and use them to conduct an effective cross-examination); United States v. Randall, 887 F.2d 1262, 1269 (5th Cir.1989) (holding that the government's disclosure of a witness's drug addiction during trial did not violate Brady due process where the defendant had ample time to cross-examine the witness on the issue); McKinney, 758 F.2d at 1050 (finding no Brady violation where the defendant was able to use documents disclosed during trial in an effective cross-examination); United States v. Anderson, 574 F.2d 1347, 1352 (5th Cir.1978) (finding the disclosure of exculpatory grand jury testimony during trial was timely provided under Brady ). 40 The record also fails to demonstrate that the information the government allegedly delayed in disclosing was material, as Brady requires. [E]vidence is material `if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.' Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999) (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433-34, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995)). In light of the fact that Bott denied making the statement attributed to him and left the state before the bombing occurred, the record does not support Walters's argument that the information the government disclosed about Bott was material. See Graves, 343 F.3d at 476 (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109-110, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976)) (The mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish `materiality' in the constitutional sense.). 41 Walters also argues that the district court erred by refusing to grant a continuance to enable him further to investigate Bott as a viable suspect. A trial court's decision to grant or deny a continuance is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Hopkins, 916 F.2d 207, 217 (5th Cir.1990). In reviewing the denial of a continuance, this court looks to the totality of the circumstances, including (a) the amount of time available; (b) the defendant's role in shortening the time needed; (c) the likelihood of prejudice from denial; (d) the availability of discovery from the prosecution; (e) the complexity of the case; (f) the adequacy of the defense actually provided at trial; and (g) the experience of the attorney with the accused. Id. ; United States v. McDonald, 837 F.2d 1287, 1289 (5th Cir.1988). Walters had previously requested, and been granted, two continuances. Walters's defense team, which included the resources of three attorneys and a hired investigator, had nearly four weeks after the government disclosed the information at issue to contact, interview, or subpoena Bott at the address and telephone number the government provided. Walters has not shown why he was unable to do so, nor argued that Bott was unavailable. See United States v. Olaniyi-Oke, 199 F.3d 767, 771 (5th Cir.1999) (requiring a party requesting a continuance based on the unavailability of a witness to demonstrate (1) the exercise of due diligence to obtain the witness's attendance; (2) that the witness would tender substantial favorable evidence; (3) that the witness will be available and willing to testify; and (4) that denial would materially prejudice the movant). The prosecution provided Walters with Bott's identity, contact information, travel movements, and statements about his presence at Lackland. Walters's counsel presented an effective defense, eliciting admissions from government witnesses that other students had threatened violent acts at the Air Force base. With a cushion of nearly four weeks and little new information available, Walters has not demonstrated a likelihood of prejudice from the denial of the continuance. See Hopkins, 916 F.2d at 218 (finding no prejudice from the denial of continuance to obtain documents where the document's contents were either previously known, available from other sources, or cumulative). No abuse of discretion is shown on this record. See United States v. Kelly, 973 F.2d 1145, 1148-49 (5th Cir.1992) (finding no abuse of discretion in denial of continuance under similar circumstances). Neither the timing of the government's disclosure of the information about Bott, nor the trial court's denial of a continuance after the disclosure, supports reversal. 42
43 Walters challenges his convictions on two counts charging violations of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), 7 which resulted in a mandatory life sentence, as an improper application of the statute. Although both offenses occurred simultaneously with the single explosion of a single bomb, Count Two of the government's indictment charged Walters with the use of the bomb to assault a federal officer, while Count Four charged him with the use of the same bomb to damage a federal building. The district court, in accordance with section 924(c)(1)(B)(ii), sentenced Walters to 360 months under Count Two. Following that conviction, and in accordance with section 924(c)(1)(C)(ii), the court sentenced Walters to life imprisonment under Count Four (as a second conviction subsequent to the Count Two conviction for use of the bomb). Walters primarily relies on United States v. Phipps, 319 F.3d 177 (5th Cir.2003), in which this court held that section 924(c)(1) does not authorize multiple convictions for a single use of a single firearm based on multiple predicate offenses. Id. at 183. Walters contends that because the charged offenses involved only a single use of a single destructive device, only one of the section 924(c)(1) counts of conviction can stand. The government attempts to limit Phipps to its facts and urges the application of United States v. Salameh, 261 F.3d 271, 279 (2d Cir.2001), in which the Second Circuit permitted convictions for two counts under section 924(c)(1), one alleging the transportation and one alleging the use and carrying of a bomb set off in the World Trade Center in 1993. 44 In Phipps, the defendants abducted a woman in her car at gunpoint, gave the gun to an accomplice, and drove off. They repeatedly raped the victim before she escaped. 319 F.3d at 180-81. Defendants were convicted of kidnapping and carjacking. The jury also convicted the defendants for two counts under section 924(c)(1), one charging use of a firearm during and in relation to the kidnapping and one charging use of a firearm during and in relation to the carjacking. Id. at 181. On appeal, defendants urged that they could not be convicted twice under section 924(c)(1) for a single use of a single firearm, despite their convictions for two predicate offenses. The court began the analysis with the statutory language defining the unit of prosecution under section 924(c)(1), holding that it criminalized the use, carriage, or possession of a firearm during and in relation to a predicate offense. Id. at 186. The court concluded that the statute did not unambiguously authorize multiple convictions for a single use of a single firearm during and in relation to multiple predicate offenses. The court instead concluded that the language allows for only as many counts as there are uses of the firearm. Id. at 186. The court reasoned that although the defendants had committed two crimes (kidnapping and carjacking), they used the gun only once — in put[ting] the firearm to [the victim's] head — and could be convicted of only a single section 924(c)(1) violation. Id. 45 The Phipps court analyzed two earlier cases holding that section 924(c)(1) does not authorize multiple convictions for a single use of a single firearm based on multiple predicate offenses. In United States v. Wilson, 160 F.3d 732 (D.C.Cir.1998), the court held that a defendant convicted of first degree murder and killing a witness, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512, could be convicted of only a single violation of section 924(c)(1) because the defendant used a firearm only once. Id. at 749. The Second Circuit reached a similar conclusion in United States v. Finley, 245 F.3d 199 (2d Cir.2001). The Finley defendant was convicted of both drug distribution and drug possession with intent to distribute after an undercover officer purchased drugs from the defendant and found additional drugs in a subsequent search of the defendant's home. Id. at 202. The officer also found a gun in the home. Id. The defendant was charged with and convicted of one count for using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to drug possession and one count for using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to drug distribution. Id. at 201. Agreeing with the widely-shared view that [section 924(c)]'s text is ambiguous, the Second Circuit reversed the defendant's second conviction under the statute. Id. at 208. The court reasoned that [t]he statute does not clearly manifest an intention to punish a defendant twice for continuous possession of a firearm in furtherance of simultaneous predicate offenses consisting of virtually the same conduct. Id. at 207. 46 In Salameh, however, the Second Circuit considered and rejected a similar challenge to two section 924(c)(1) convictions, one for the use or carriage of a firearm in relation to the underlying offense of assaulting a federal officer, and one for the use or carriage of a firearm in relation to the underlying offense of conspiracy to bomb buildings and property and to transport explosives in interstate commerce. 261 F.3d at 277. In finding that the defendants' section 924(c) convictions did not rest on a single use of a single explosive device, the court emphasized two facts. First, the indictment charged separate uses of the explosive device: transportation of the bomb from one state to another and use of the bomb by detonating it in the World Trade Center. Id. at 279. These separate uses distinguished Wilson and Finley, in which the defendants were charged with only a single use of a single firearm. Id. The Salameh court expressly noted that we are not here faced with a situation in which defendants' § 924(c) convictions rest on a single `use' of the firearm in question. Id. Second, Congress had separately criminalized transportation of a bomb, making it an offense independent of a later detonation. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 844(d). Given the separate, and separately culpable, nature of defendants' use and carriage of the bomb, the multiple convictions under section 924(c)(1) could stand. Id. 47 In the present case, in contrast to Salameh, the jury did not have to find that Walters both transported and used the bomb to convict him of the predicate offenses charged in the indictment. In contrast to the indictment in Salameh, the government did not charge Walters with separate offenses consisting of different actions relating to the bomb. Unlike Salameh, the government did not allege transportation of the explosive device as a separate, and separately culpable offense from the use of the device. Like the Phipps, Wilson, and Finley defendants, Walters used a single explosive device on a single occasion, during and in relation to the separate predicate offenses of assaulting a federal officer and damaging a federal building. Under the binding precedent of Phipps, Walters can be convicted of only a single section 924(c)(1) conviction for his single use of the single bomb. Phipps, 319 F.3d at 183; see Finley, 245 F.3d at 207; Wilson, 160 F.3d at 749. 48 The government argues that Phipps is distinguishable because of the unusual fact that defendants gave the firearm to [the accomplice] immediately after using it. Id. at 188. The government argues that this voluntary restriction on defendants' use of the firearm made Phipps unique. In that case, the voluntary transfer of the firearm at an early point in the defendants' criminal rampage was important because it limited how they used the firearm under section 924(c)(1). That limit precluded a sentence based on two convictions under section 924(c)(1), despite the fact that the defendants accomplished dual criminal purposes, carjacking and kidnaping. Similarly, the fact that Walters used a single bomb on a single occasion precludes sentencing based on two counts of conviction under section 924(c)(1), despite the fact that Walters accomplished the dual criminal purposes of assaulting a federal officer and damaging a federal building. 49 In Phipps, the court held that `[t]he proper remedy for multiplication of punishment is to vacate the sentences on all the counts and remand for resentencing with instructions that the count elected by the government be dismissed. The defendant[s are] then to be resentenced.' Phipps, 319 F.3d at 189 (quoting United States v. Privette, 947 F.2d 1259, 1263 (5th Cir.1991)). This court vacates the sentences for the two 924(c)(1) counts and remands for resentencing, with instructions that after the government chooses which of the section 924(c)(1) counts to dismiss, either Count Two or Count Four, the district court will resentence Walters on the remaining section 924(c)(1) count.