Opinion ID: 1057611
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Next, the Defendant complains that the trial court erred by failing to grant a judgment of acquittal as to the aggravated burglary charge at the conclusion of the State's proof-in-chief based upon the insufficiency of the evidence. Rule 29(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure provides as follows: Grounds for Judgment of AcquittalOn defendant's motion or its own initiative, the [trial] court shall order the entry of judgment of acquittal of one or more offenses charged in the indictment, presentment, or information after the evidence on either side is closed if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses. This rule empowers the trial judge to direct a judgment of acquittal when the evidence is insufficient to warrant a conviction either at the time the state rests or at the conclusion of all the evidence. Overturf v. State, 571 S.W.2d 837, 839 & n. 2 (Tenn.1978). At the point the motion is made, the trial court must favor the opponent of the motion with the strongest legitimate view of the evidence, including all reasonable inferences, and discard any countervailing evidence. Hill v. State, 4 Tenn.Crim.App. 325, 470 S.W.2d 853, 858 (1971). When the motion for acquittal is made at the conclusion of the state's evidence and is not granted, the defendant may offer evidence without having reserved the right to do so. Tenn. R.Crim. P. 29(c). The standard by which the trial court considers a motion for judgment of acquittal is identical to that which applies on appeal in determining the sufficiency of the evidence. State v. Blanton, 926 S.W.2d 953, 957-58 & n. 5 (Tenn.Crim. App.1996); State v. Anderson, 880 S.W.2d 720, 726 (Tenn.Crim.App.1994). In considering a sufficiency of the evidence question on appeal, we must afford the State the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from it. State v. Hanson, 279 S.W.3d 265, 274 (Tenn.2009) (quoting State v. Vasques, 221 S.W.3d 514, 521 (Tenn.2007)). The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given their testimony, and the reconciliation of conflicts in the proof are matters entrusted to the jury as the trier of fact. Id. (quoting State v. Campbell, 245 S.W.3d 331, 335 (Tenn.2008)). The relevant question when the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged is whether a rational trier of fact, after having reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781; Tenn. R.App. P. 13(e). The burden on appeal of showing that the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict lies with the criminal defendant, because the verdict of guilt removes the presumption of innocence and raises a presumption of guilt. State v. Casper, 297 S.W.3d 676, 683 (Tenn.2009). This standard is the same whether the conviction is based upon direct or circumstantial evidence. Id. (quoting Hanson, 279 S.W.3d at 275); State v. Brown, 551 S.W.2d 329, 331 (Tenn.1977). Where direct evidence is absent, a criminal offense may, of course, be established exclusively by circumstantial evidence. Duchac v. State, 505 S.W.2d 237, 241 (Tenn.1973); Marable v. State, 203 Tenn. 440, 313 S.W.2d 451, 456-58 (1958). Our courts have traditionally ruled that before an accused may be convicted based upon circumstantial evidence alone, however, the facts and circumstances must be so strong and cogent as to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save the guilt of the defendant, and that beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Crawford, 225 Tenn. 478, 470 S.W.2d 610, 612 (1971). In other words, [a] web of guilt must be woven around the defendant from which he cannot escape and from which facts and circumstances the jury could draw no other reasonable inference save the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. [14] Id. at 613. This Court has cited with approval language from Wharton's Criminal Evidence: In the effort to guard against improper verdicts, it is commonly stated that in determining the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, (1) all the essential facts must be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, as that is to be compared with all the facts proved; (2) the facts must exclude every other reasonable theory or hypothesis except that of guilt; and (3) the facts must establish such a certainty of guilt of the accused as to convince the mind beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is the one who committed the offense. Smith v. State, 205 Tenn. 502, 327 S.W.2d 308, 317 (1959) (quoting 3 Wharton's Criminal Evidence § 980 (12th ed. 1955)). How much weight to give circumstantial evidence and the extent to which such evidence is consistent with guilt or inconsistent with innocence are questions for the jury. Id. at 318; see also Pruitt, 460 S.W.2d at 391. An individual commits burglary who, without the effective consent of the property owner ... [e]nters a building and commits or attempts to commit a felony, theft, or assault. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-14-402(a)(3) (2006). An [a]ggravated burglary is burglary of a habitation. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-14-403(a) (2006). A habitation is defined as any structure ... designed or adapted for the overnight accommodation of persons. Tenn.Code. Ann. § 39-14-401(1)(A) (2006). The Defendant described the State's proof that he entered the residence of the victim as nonexistent. He insists, therefore, that the trial court erred by failing to grant his motion for judgment of acquittal at the conclusion of the proof and argues that the burglary charge should not have been submitted to the jury. We will address not only whether the motion should have been granted but also whether the evidence was sufficient to support the aggravated burglary conviction. On the side of the Defendant, no witness testified to having seen him at or near the victim's residence during the time period the burglary could have taken place. Of the items taken from inside the residence, only the car keys were found in his possession (while the vehicle, of course, was parked outside). No fingerprints were discovered. The State was unable to produce a confession or any admission on the part of the Defendant as to any role in the burglary. There is further evidence consistent with the defense theory: that the Defendant used his real name, social security number, and address when applying for the loan, and that he drove the Toyota openly within the general area of the burglary until his arrest a week later. Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, however, the evidence established that a residential burglary took place either late at night on July 2 or during the predawn hours of July 3, 2007. Although the cash and computer taken from the residence were never recovered, the cash was taken from the victim's pocketbook, where the keys to the Toyota were also located. During regular business hours on the day immediately following the night-time burglary, the Defendant had possession of the keys, the stolen Toyota, and the car title. He lied not only to the assistant manager at TitleMax in order to get a loan but also to an employee at the Hamilton County Clerk's Office when he applied for a title. He was also untruthful about the date of the claimed purchase, his relationship with the victim as a family friend, and, inferentially, the identity and address of the co-signer on the loan documents. The name the co-signer provided to the loan officer was an individual known to the Defendant, and the co-signer was obviously not that individual. He was arrested within a mile of where the burglary took place. When first questioned by the police, he provided few details, and, later, when he testified at the preliminary hearing, the Defendant did not enhance the credibility of his explanation. Under these circumstances, particularly where the Defendant provided demonstrably false information to a loan officer and a county clerk within hours of the break-in, the trial judge properly denied the motion for judgment of acquittal as to the burglary charge and permitted the jury to consider the issues drawn. Further, the jury, at the conclusion of the trial, acted within its prerogative by finding the Defendant guilty of theft, thereby rejecting altogether the Defendant's explanation to the police as to how he acquired the stolen vehicle. After finding the Defendant guilty of theft, the jury properly considered whether he could have acquired the vehicle only by participating in the burglary, taking into account the short period of time between the break-in of the victim's residence and the Defendant's possession of the vehicle and car keys, the implausibility of his explanation to the police, and his lack of truthfulness in acquiring the new title and loan. Ms. Williams' testimony was not helpful to the defense and served to confirm the Defendant's awareness of the falsity of his loan co-signor's identity. The jury is entitled to assess whether the facts and circumstances, however slight, corroborate the burglary and otherwise satisfy the standard required for conviction. When an explanation is given for the possession of recently stolen property, the truthfulness of the claim or the lack thereof is for the jury to determine. See, e.g., Adams v. State, 552 S.W.2d 812, 815 (Tex.Crim.App. 1977). False or conflicting explanations may serve as the corroboration necessary to support a conviction. See Pruitt, 460 S.W.2d at 392. Each case, as suggested by the various authorities cited, must be assessed upon its own facts. Under these circumstances, the corroborative evidence connecting the Defendant to the aggravated burglary warranted the permissive inference from the recently stolen property. [15] In summary, there is a rational connection between the possession and the participation, guilt of burglary more likely than not stems from the possession, and the untruthfulness of the Defendant may serve as the corroborative evidence. The trial court did not err by denial of the motion for acquittal. Further, the evidence is sufficient to support the aggravated burglary conviction.