Opinion ID: 2325741
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Did the Cease-and-Desist Order comply with procedural requirements of the Insurance Article?

Text: We review an alleged violation of regulatory procedures to see if there is a violation of a substantial right of the complaining party and, if so, whether prejudice occurred. Pollock, 374 Md. at 469 n. 3, 823 A.2d at 630 n. 3. Respondents claim that the Commissioner's Cease-and-Desist Order violated the procedural requirements of the Insurance Article by failing to comply with § 2-209 requiring the MIA to give a copy of the proposed report to the person that was examined at least 30 days before filing a report and making it public. The MIA, in response, makes a distinction between a formal examination and the less formal investigation (or analysis) here, each having different procedural requirements. There is no need for us to dissect the Insurance Article to determine whether an examination, investigation, or analysis was conducted, or what the associated procedural requirements may be with regard to each inquisitory exercise. The only question we need to ponder here is whether, assuming such a shortcoming as the PFCs point to, a substantial right of the PFCs was violated. We answer that question in the negative. The investigation by the Commissioner was based on undisputed facts that were stipulated to eventually by all parties at the administrative hearing. The rationale for the Commissioner's decision was detailed in the Cease-and-Desist Order, provided to Respondents. The results of the investigation were provided to the PFCs in advance of the administrative hearing. The automatic stay of the Cease-and-Desist Order, triggered by the PFCs' request for a hearing, and the subsequent hearing, provided substantially similar procedural protections for the PFCs than are given by Ins. Art., § 2-209. The notice provisions of Ins. Art., § 2-209(c) allow the person examined an opportunity for a hearing to comment on the report and to suggest changes to the proposed report. Section 2-209 only requires the Commissioner to accept changes to the report, sought by a responding party, that he/she considers proper. The ultimate dispute in this case is over the interpretation of Ins. Art., § 23-304. It is unlikely that the Commissioner would have accepted the PFCs' interpretation of the statute advanced here had he given them 30-days advance notice of the report and received the PFCs' views during that period. Thus, even assuming the alleged procedural misstep by the MIA, there was no substantial impairment of any rights of the PFCs and no prejudice to the conduct of the hearing or any subsequent judicial review proceeding.