Opinion ID: 866196
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Sua Sponte Instruction

Text: But the district judge didn’t merely refuse to give an instruction favorable to the defense. Without being asked by the government, he effectively instructed the jury not to fall for defense counsel’s argument that the government didn’t put Bejaran on the stand because he would have testified in a manner favorable to the defense. The government urges us to review this instruction for plain error because Ramirez failed to object. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 30(d). But Ramirez’s lawyer had no opportunity to object beforehand because the district judge did not consult with counsel about what he was going to say prior to giving the instruction. The judge did mention more than once that he was contemplating an instruction of some sort on the missing witness issue, but he did not commit to giving such an instruction or disclose its content. Defense counsel thus had nothing to object to. The question, then, is whether Ramirez’s attorney should have objected after the judge gave the instruction and risked calling the jury’s special attention to it. Under these circumstances, we conclude defense counsel wasn’t required to object. By his earlier request for a missing witness instruction, Ramirez “made his point clear” that Bejaran’s absence should be counted against the government. See United States v. Castagana, 604 F.3d 1160, 1163 n.2 (9th Cir. 2010). “There was no doubt of his continuing position” that Bejaran’s absence should be noted and no need for Ramirez to make “a futile formal objection” to the sua sponte instruction. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We 8 UNITED STATES V . RAMIREZ therefore review de novo. See United States v. Verduzco, 373 F.3d 1022, 1030 n.3 (9th Cir. 2004). We have held that “[w]hen the government can call a key percipient witness, but relies instead on out-of-court statements,” it’s “permissible” for the jury to infer that the witness’s testimony would have been “unfavorable to the prosecution.” United States v. Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315, 1317 (9th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. United States v. Stever, 603 F.3d 747, 754 (9th Cir. 2010). Juries have “broad discretion in deciding what inferences to draw from the evidence presented at trial.” See Coleman v. Johnson, 132 S. Ct. 2060, 2064 (2012) (per curiam). “It is the jury, not the court, which . . . weighs the contradictory evidence and inferences, . . . and draws the ultimate conclusion as to the facts. The very essence of its function is to select from among conflicting inferences and conclusions that which it considers most reasonable.” Tennant v. Peoria & Pekin Union Ry. Co., 321 U.S. 29, 35 (1944). The judge here instructed the jury not to “speculate” about the reasons for Bejaran’s absence. The term “speculate” has a vaguely pejorative cast; when judges use it, they generally refer to inferences that are irrational or impermissible. For instance, we occasionally reverse Immigration Judges’ findings by saying that they are based on “speculation and conjecture.” See, e.g., Joseph v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1235, 1247 (9th Cir. 2010); Chawla v. Holder, 599 F.3d 998, 1009 (9th Cir. 2010). And, indeed, it would have been perfectly proper for the district judge to warn the jury not to draw impermissible inferences by telling the jurors not to speculate, for example, as to why the judge had UNITED STATES V . RAMIREZ 9 stricken certain testimony or what a witness might have said if he’d been allowed to answer an objectionable question. But jurors are entitled—nay, required—to draw inferences on matters that are not off-limits to them. Without inferences, the government could seldom prove up its case, as it must rely on the common sense and life experience of the jurors to fill in matters that are not provable by direct evidence, such as intent, premeditation or the existence of a conspiracy. As explained above, it would have been entirely reasonable and permissible for the jury to infer that Bejaran was within the control of the government, and that the government would have put him on the stand if it believed his testimony would be helpful to it. From that, it would have been possible for the jurors to infer that his testimony would have helped the defendant. This was a relatively weak inference, but decidedly helpful to the defense, as it would have cast doubt on whether the handful of Bejaran’s hearsay statements introduced at trial told the whole story. The district court may have known or suspected that this was the wrong inference, and perhaps decided to “help” the jurors by keeping them from making a mistake. But it is the government’s job, not the court’s, to make sure the jury doesn’t draw incorrect inferences. Doing so here would have complicated the prosecution’s case somewhat, and perhaps that is why the government chose not to say anything about the reasons for Bejaran’s absence. But that was the government’s choice to make. It was not the court’s function, after both sides had rested, to give an instruction that filled in the evidentiary gap the court believed the government had left 10 UNITED STATES V . RAMIREZ in its case. By labeling the inference about the reasons for Bejaran’s absence as “speculation” and instructing the jury not to credit it, the judge put off-limits a legitimate inference that could have been helpful to the defense. A judge may not preclude the jury from drawing any inferences that it may legitimately draw. The sua sponte instruction, therefore, was error. By instructing the jurors to disregard any uncertainty about why the prosecution didn’t call a witness—who might have been the key witness—the court improperly inserted itself into the jury room and interfered with the jury’s role as a factfinder. This incident demonstrates why it’s a good practice for the court to discuss the language of a proposed instruction with the parties before giving it. Had the court done so here, defense counsel may have pointed out the error and convinced the judge not to deliver the instruction, thus avoiding an issue on appeal. However, the court’s sua sponte instruction didn’t rise to the level of constitutional error, which would have required us to reverse Ramirez’s convictions unless the error was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” See Leal-Del Carmen, 697 F.3d at 975. To be sure, the Constitution protects a criminal defendant’s right to argue a point that goes to the heart of his defense. See, e.g., Stever, 603 F.3d at 755–57; United States v. Kellington, 217 F.3d 1084, 1099–1101 (9th Cir. 2000). But discussing Bejaran’s absence was merely a small part of the defense’s broader strategy of casting doubt on the government’s evidence wherever and whenever possible. UNITED STATES V . RAMIREZ 11 In the absence of constitutional error, we may reverse Ramirez’s conviction only if we “cannot say, with fair assurance, . . . that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.” United States v. Hernandez, 476 F.3d 791, 801 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under this standard, the sua sponte instruction was harmless with regards to the charges of distribution and possession with intent to distribute. Even if the jury had drawn a negative inference about Bejaran’s absence, the government presented substantial evidence—including testimony from the undercover and other law enforcement officers—indicating that Ramirez was a drug dealer. There was simply no plausible alternative explanation for Ramirez’s presence at the precise time and place of several drug transactions where the undercover witnessed Bejaran walk up to Ramirez’s car with a wad of cash and return minutes later with meth, or for the various bank and phone records linking Ramirez to the transactions. And when the police arrested him, Ramirez was sitting in his car with Bejaran, $5200 and four baggies of meth. We needn’t decide whether the sua sponte instruction had a prejudicial effect on the conspiracy charge because we reverse that conviction on other grounds.