Opinion ID: 1121458
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Define

Text: (40) The jury was instructed on the presumption of consciousness based upon the language of CALJIC No. 4.31. [35] Defendant argues that the instruction was defective because it did not include a definition of unconscious. The defendant further contends that the trial court had a sua sponte duty to define this term. We reject defendant's claims. Assuming without deciding that unconscious has a sufficiently legal, technical meaning to require a sua sponte instruction (see People v. Howard (1988) 44 Cal.3d 375, 408 [243 Cal. Rptr. 842, 749 P.2d 279]), there is no question in this case that the jury instructions as given adequately conveyed to the jurors that the law contemplates that an unconscious person can be capable of movement. CALJIC No. 4.31 itself advised the jury that a reasonable doubt that the defendant was conscious required a finding that he was unconscious even if he acted as if he were conscious.... CALJIC No. 8.47, as given by the court, told the jurors that [i]f you find that the Defendant killed while unconscious as a result of voluntary intoxication and therefore did not form a specific intent to kill or did not harbor malice aforethought, his killing is involuntary manslaughter. Both of these instructions unmistakably convey to a reasonable juror the information that defendant claims was missing from the instructions.