Opinion ID: 2573749
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: This Appeal Satisfies the Public Interest Exception to the Mootness Doctrine, and We Will Consider Its Merits.

Text: We generally will not consider questions where events have rendered the legal issue moot. [12] A claim is moot if it is no longer a present, live controversy or if the court system cannot provide the relief the claimant seeks. [13] We have previously found cases moot when agency-issued permits had expired but the permit opponents still sought declaratory judgment that the agency actions were unlawful. [14] We have emphasized that [m]ootness is particularly important in a case seeking a declaratory judgment because there is an added risk that the party is seeking an advisory opinion. [15] Our decision in Kodiak Seafood Processors Association makes clear that whenas in this casethe challenge is to the procedures used by the agency and the relief sought is a declaratory judgment, the claim is technically moot if the underlying permit has expired. [16] There are exceptions to the general rule that we will not hear cases that are moot. [17] The public interest exception requires considering and weighing three factors: (1) whether the disputed issues are capable of repetition, (2) whether the mootness doctrine, if applied, may cause review of the issues to be repeatedly circumvented, and (3) whether the issues presented are so important to the public interest as to justify overriding the mootness doctrine. [18] As to the first prong of this test, Copeland and Ott claim that agency regulations, as applied, violate the due process clause of the Alaska constitution and that this violation is capable of repetition because DEC has consistently applied and interpreted its regulations incorrectly and arbitrarily. We accept this as sufficient for the first prong of the public interest exception to mootness. We have previously analyzed the second prongwhether an issue is likely to repeatedly evade reviewby comparing the time it takes to bring the appeal with the time it takes for the appeal to become moot. [19] We have also emphasized that if the appeal involves a threshold issue or agency interpretation of law, we will view this requirement of the public interest exception more leniently. [20] Current contingency plans have a five-year life span. [21] The appeal in this case, which began in November 2002, demonstrates that it is unreasonable to assume an opponent to an approved contingency plan would be able to appeal the agency decision within the five-year duration of the plan. Copeland and Ott also raise threshold questions about the production of the agency record and agency interpretations of law that could deter future litigants. This satisfies the second prong of the public interest exception to mootness. The third prong of the public interest exception requires a showing that the issues presented are so important to the public interest as to justify overriding the mootness doctrine. [22] We have found this prong met when the case involved concepts of fairness underlying the right to procedural due process, [23] the preservation of clean water, [24] or situations, otherwise moot, where the legal power of public officials was in question. [25] This case involves two matters fundamental to the public interest. The first is approval of contingency plans to protect Alaska's marine and coastal environments in the event of an oil spill, and given the potentially devastating effects of oil spills on the ecology and economy of the state, this is a matter of utmost importance to the public interest. The second is an administrative procedures challenge grounded in the due process clause, and given the need for transparency in governance and access to administrative records, this also is a matter of importance to the public interest. This case meets the requirements of the third prong of the public interest exception to mootness. We therefore address the merits of Copeland and Ott's due process claims.