Opinion ID: 2271140
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Perry Facts and Significant Holdings.

Text: In Perry, the Commonwealth cross-appealed from the trial court's granting the defendant a new trial on the basis the jury was improperly instructed on and convicted the defendant of first-degree assault, although he was not indicted for this offense. [25] The defendant was indicted for attempted murder. He argued he was improperly convicted under the first-degree assault instruction for an offense that included elements of a distinct criminal offense from that for which the appellant had been indicted. . . . [26] We characterized Perry's argument as calling for a strict statutory elements approach for determining whether to instruct on another offense as a lesser-included offense of a charged offense. Such a strict statutory elements approach calls for looking at the elements of crimes as set forth by statute rather than looking at the facts set out in the indictment or the evidence presented at trial. [27] We declined to adopt a strict statutory elements approach, finding it to be an inherently inflexible standard embraced by only a minority of courts. [28] We seemingly acknowledged in Perry that first-degree assault would not be a lesser-included offense of attempted murder under a strict statutory elements approach. We noted: Assault in the first degree requires a state of mind, an act and a result, `serious' physical injury. Attempted murder requires only a state of mind and an act, but does not require any injury. [29] So the statute defining first-degree assault requires finding at least one elementserious physical injurynot required by the statute defining attempted murder. But we concluded the trial court properly instructed on first-degree assault as a lesser-included offense of attempted murder under the facts of that case. We noted determinations of whether one offense could properly be characterized as a lesser-included offense of another offense are governed by Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 505.020(2), which provides: A defendant may be convicted of an offense that is included in any offense with which he is formally charged. An offense is so included when: (a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or (b) It consists of an attempt to commit the offense charged or to commit an offense otherwise included therein; or (c) It differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a lesser kind of culpability suffices to establish its commission; or (d) It differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less serious injury or risk of injury to the same person, property[,] or public interest suffices to establish its commission. And we determined under the facts of that case first-degree assault could qualify as a lesser-included offense under KRS 505.020(2)(a), which provides that a crime qualifies as a lesser-included offense if [i]t is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged. . . . [30] Essentially, first-degree assault was established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish attempted murder in Perry because serious physical injury was not at issue. Because Perry shot the victim, causing serious physical injury but not death, the jury could convict Perry of attempted murder if the jury believed he intended to kill the victim. But it could convict Perry of first-degree assault if the jury believed he intended only to injure the victim. We noted that Perry did not dispute that serious physical injury did occur because of the victim's being shot and that Perry's causing serious physical injury would satisfy the substantial step element of attempted murder. [31] Employing a fact-based approach rather than a strict statutory elements approach, [t]he only element in this case which separated a conviction for attempted murder from first-degree assault was the mental state of Perry at the time of the incidents. [32] And we concluded that the jury properly determined from the evidence that Perry only intended to injure the victim, whom he was convicted of assaulting in the first degree, in contrast to their decision that he indeed intended to kill another victim, whom Perry was convicted of attempting to murder. [33] So we determined in Perry that the trial court properly instructed the jury on first-degree assault and reversed the trial court's order granting a new trial on the assault conviction.