Opinion ID: 2648794
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Thompson's Compliance Letter

Text: In the compliance letter, Thompson recited the four general standards set forth in CLO Ordinance § 90-332.6 and indicated that McQueen's property met those standards. Thompson then stated, [p]lease let this letter serve as notice that your property does meet the provisions of the CLO [O]rdinance for byright development in Prince George County. (Emphasis added.) Thompson also advised that McQueen would need to meet all other applicable provisions of federal, state, and local codes. In addition, she explained, [o]nce final approval of the proposed development is obtained through the CLO [O]rdinance you will need to obtain Site Plan Approval and a Land Disturbance Permit prior to beginning any work on the site. According to 4 Thompson, the letter was not required by the CLO Ordinance, and it did not approve a specific project. D. McQueen's Present Declaratory Judgment Action Several months after Thompson issued the compliance letter, the Board repealed the CLO Ordinance. In response, McQueen filed this declaratory judgment action against the County and the Board (collectively, the County). McQueen sought a declaration that he obtained a vested right under Code § 15.2- 2307 to develop his property as a by-right cluster subdivision in accordance with the terms of the CLO Ordinance. Under Code § 15.2-2307, a landowner may establish a vested right in a land use when he (i) obtains or is the beneficiary of a significant affirmative governmental act which remains in effect allowing development of a specific project, (ii) relies in good faith on the significant affirmative governmental act, and (iii) incurs extensive obligations or substantial expenses in diligent pursuit of the specific project in reliance on the significant affirmative governmental act. The statute does not define what constitutes a significant affirmative governmental act. Instead, it provides a list of seven acts deemed to be significant affirmative governmental acts. 3 Id. The list is 3 The seven deemed significant affirmative governmental acts in Code § 15.2-2307 consist of the following: (i) accepting proffers related to a zoning amendment; (ii) approving a rezoning application, (iii) granting a special exception or use 5 non-exclusive, however, as the statute expressly provides that the list is without limitation. Id. At the time Thompson issued the compliance letter, the statute listed acts one through six; the seventh act was added by legislative amendment in 2010. See 2010 Acts ch. 315. 4 McQueen asserted that Thompson's compliance letter constituted a significant affirmative governmental act, that he relied in good faith on that act, and that he incurred extensive obligations and substantial expenses in diligent pursuit of developing his property as a cluster subdivision. Therefore, McQueen concluded, he met the three elements set forth in Code § 15.2-2307 for the vesting of a right to use his property for that purpose. As to the first statutory element, McQueen acknowledged that the compliance letter did not represent any one of the six significant affirmative governmental acts listed in Code § 15.2- 2307 at that time. Rather, McQueen contended, the letter permit, (iv) approving a variance, (v) approving a preliminary subdivision plat, site plan or plan of development, (vi) approving a final subdivision plat, site plan or plan of development, and (vii) issuing a written order, requirement, decision or determination regarding the permissibility of a specific land use that is no longer subject to appeal and that is no longer subject to change or reversal under Code § 15.2- 2311(C). 4 Code § 15.2-2307 was also amended in other respects by 2010 Acts ch. 698, however, those amendments are not germane to the issues considered in this appeal. 6 constituted a significant affirmative governmental act under this Court's case law, citing Board of Supervisors v. Crucible, Inc., 278 Va. 152, 158-61, 677 S.E.2d 283, 286-87 (2009) (applying the without limitation provision of the statute). McQueen argued that the letter was clear and unambiguous, not subject to change, and affirmatively approved his proposed development, thereby meeting the criteria set forth in Crucible for determining when a zoning administrator's letter may constitute a significant affirmative governmental act. See id. at 160, 677 S.E.2d at 287-88. In further support of this position, McQueen asserted that the letter represented a determination of legislative compliance, leaving only ministerial approvals for his proposed development. Alternatively, McQueen argued that the compliance letter met the terms of the seventh governmental action subsequently added to Code § 15.2-2307, and that this provision should be applied retroactively for the circuit court to reach that determination. The County responded by arguing, inter alia, that Thompson's compliance letter was not in the nature of a legislative act, and did not constitute an unambiguous approval of McQueen's proposed development. Rather, the County asserted that it was simply a courtesy to McQueen to confirm that his property qualified for a cluster subdivision as a permissive use 7 by-right under the CLO Ordinance's general standards, and nothing more. Thus, the County contended, the letter did not constitute a significant affirmative governmental act, thereby negating McQueen's vesting claim. Following an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court ruled in favor of McQueen, finding that he established each of the three elements required under Code § 15.2-2307 for a land use right to become vested. As to the first statutory element, the circuit court agreed with the parties that the issuance of Thompson's compliance letter did not fall within any one of the six significant affirmative governmental acts set forth in the statute at that time. Nor did the circuit court apply the seventh act retroactively, as urged by McQueen. Citing Crucible, the circuit court indicated that its ruling on the first statutory element was, instead, based on case law - pursuant to the without limitation provision of the statute. Code § 15.2-2307. The circuit court accordingly declared in its final order that McQueen's land use rights [to develop his property as a cluster subdivision] have vested.