Opinion ID: 2324802
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Discount Provision

Text: We now turn our attention to whether the discount provision was part of the consent judgment rendered by the trial court. If it was part of the consent judgment, then it is an order of the court and, thus, subject to the Maryland Rules. We hold that the discount provision was an integral part of the consent judgment. Respondent argues that we should only look to the first sentence of the judgment, which states, judgment in favor of Plaintiff, Selbe Hubbard and against Oliver Jones and Mattie B. Jones in the amount of $5,000.00. Her contention is that the second sentence, Judgment can be settled upon payment of $2,5[5]0.00 within 30 days, should be ignored because it is contractual in nature and not a part of the consent agreement. This is simply wrong. The trial court's rendition of the entire judgment and its entry in the docket embody the consent judgment. Only by reading the consent judgment in whole can we interpret the intent and effect of the judgment. The discount provision clearly was intended by the parties and by the trial court to be part and parcel of the consent judgment. We noted in Roged, Inc. v. Paglee, 280 Md. 248, 254, 372 A.2d 1059, 1062 (1977), a case involving a consent decree, that: It is well settled that Maryland follows the objective test in the interpretation of contracts . . . that where the language is plain and unambiguous, there is no room for construction, and it must be presumed that the parties meant what they expressed: not what the parties intended the contract to mean, but what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have thought it meant. We have extended this principle to the interpretation of judicial decrees. [Citations omitted.] We had earlier said: We fail to see why a somewhat analogous approach should not be taken in the interpretation of a judicial decree, whether or not it supplants a prior agreement of the parties that it is not so much a question of what the parties or what the court intended the decree to mean, but what a reasonable person in the position of the parties, or of the court, would have thought it meant. Monticello v. Monticello, 271 Md. 168, 173, 315 A.2d 520, 523 (footnote omitted) cert. denied, 419 U.S. 880, 95 S.Ct. 145, 42 L.Ed.2d 121 (1974); see Shanty Town Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Department of the Env't, 92 Md.App. 103, 112, 607 A.2d 66, 70 (Where the language of the consent order is clear and unambiguous ... all terms are to be given their plain meaning in construing the order.), cert. denied, 328 Md. 94, 612 A.2d 1316 (1992). The objective test of interpreting contracts can be summarized, [t]he written language embodying the terms of an agreement will govern the rights and liabilities of the parties, irrespective of the intent of the parties at the time they entered into the contract, unless the written language is not susceptible of a clear and definite understanding, or unless there is fraud, duress or mutual mistake. Billmyre v. Sacred Heart Hosp., 273 Md. 638, 643, 331 A.2d 313, 317 (1975) (quoting Slice v. Carozza Properties, Inc., 215 Md. 357, 368, 137 A.2d 687, 693 (1958)). Implied in this test is that the interpretation of the language is to be of the entire language of the agreement, not merely a portion thereof. This implication was demonstrated by the Court of Special Appeals in Shanty Town Assocs., 92 Md. App. 103, 607 A.2d 66. In that case involving the interpretation of a consent judgment, the court implied that one needs to read the complete language of a consent judgment to determine its purpose. Thus, to understand the true meaning of a consent order, the language of the judgment must be [r]ead as a whole. Id. at 114, 607 A.2d at 71. [T]he entire judgment all provisions consideredshould be read as a whole in the light of all the circumstances as well as of the conduct of the parties. Hanson v. Hearn, 521 So.2d 953, 955 (Ala.1988). When interpreting a consent decree, or any other agreement, words must be read in context. The decree must be read as a whole, each of its provisions being interpreted together with its other provisions. Westinghouse Air Brake Div. v. United Electrical, 294 Pa.Super. 407, 414, 440 A.2d 529, 533 (1982). An interpretation of the judgment that gives meaning according to its entirety is favored over one that makes some part of it mere surplusage. Hanson, 521 So.2d at 955. In the case sub judice, all parties agree as to what the judgment meanta discount if paid within thirty days. The agreement was turned into a court order when the parties jointly sought to have the trial court render and cause the entering of a judgment. When respondent initiated action in the case a Petition for Disposition in Aid of Enforcement of Judgmentand petitioners responded with an answer and a Motion for Injunction in the case, the issue was framed as an action to enforce a court judgment, i.e., a court order. At this stage, it was not an action for specific enforcement of a contract; it was a proceeding based upon a court judgment and court order. The rules regarding judgments and court orders apply in proceedings based upon the judgment and order, starting the moment the entire judgment is rendered by the judge and entered and indexed by the clerk. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has similarly interpreted consent agreements. In Richardson v. Edwards, 127 F.3d 97, 101 (D.C.Cir.1997), that court stated: The Supreme Court has warned against searching for the `purpose' of a consent decree and then construing it in that light. [ United States v.] ITT Continental Baking [Co., ] 420 U.S. [223,] 235, 95 S.Ct. [926,] 933[, 43 L.Ed.2d 148 (1975) ]. The decree must be construed as it is written. Id. at 238, 95 S.Ct. at 935[, 43 L.Ed.2d 148]. Ordinary aids of construction, such as the circumstances surrounding the formation of the consent order, may be consulted. Id. at 238 & n. 11, 95 S.Ct. at 935 & n. 11[, 43 L.Ed.2d 148]. But ultimately the question for the lower court, when it interprets a consent decree incorporating a settlement agreement, is what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have thought the language meant. Read in its entirety, the wording of the consent judgment is plain and unambiguous. It clearly includes the language: Judgment can be settled upon payment of $2,5[5]0.00 within 30 days. It is evident from the wording of the entire judgment that the parties intended for the discount provision to be part of the consent judgment. Generally, the consent judgment must be construed in its entirety, as written, rendered, and entered. In the case sub judice, the discount provision was included in the consent judgment. Clearly it was the intent of the parties to agree to the discount provision. In fact, the transcript indicates that it is an essential part of the consent agreement: MR. WRIGHT: Your Honor, by consent of the Parties, a judgement will be entered in the amount of $5,000.00 in favor of the MISS DAVIS: [$]2,550. MR. WRIGHT:in favorwell, you can hear out what I thought was our settlement proposalin favor of the Plaintiff against the Defendants, which may be settled within 30 days by payment of [$]2[,]550. Is that consistent with our agreement? MISS DAVIS: That's good enough. That's fine, Judge. The evidence points towards the conclusion that the discount provision was an integral part of the consent agreement. In other words, if the petitioner paid the judgment within thirty days, then the amount of the judgment would be discounted. Once the trial court entered the entire judgment, i.e., the money judgment and the discount provision, it became an order of the court. See Md. Rule 1-202(n), supra. As we have noted, a judgment is a judgment. We shall not enforce only part of its wording. Consequently, under the consent order, the judgment could be settled within thirty days at the payment of the discount sum.