Opinion ID: 792865
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: 17
18 This court previously has determined that, when a defendant is convicted of an offense that commenced before but continued after the enactment of an amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines, he shall be subject to the amended version of the Guidelines at sentencing. 7 See United States v. Parolin, 239 F.3d 922, 926 n. 2 (7th Cir.2001) (upholding the district court's application of the amended Guidelines, given that the defendant engaged in conduct subsequent to the effective date of the 1995 amendments). 8 This rule holds particular force in a conspiracy case, where, as we noted in United States v. Couch, the crime typically is not a singular, discrete offense that occurs at a point in time and fades into the past but rather represents an ongoing course of criminal conduct. 28 F.3d 711, 714 (7th Cir.1994). A defendant convicted of conspiracy may be sentenced under a version of the Guidelines enacted at any time prior to his withdrawal from the conspiracy — even if he took part in no overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy post-enactment. Withdrawal requires an affirmative act to either defeat or disavow the purposes of the conspiracy, such as making a full confession to the authorities or communicating to co-conspirators that one has abandoned the enterprise. See United States v. Hall, 212 F.3d 1016, 1023 (7th Cir.2000) (holding that, because the defendant did not affirmatively disavow[] the purposes of the conspiracy before the guideline amendments became effective, he was subject to those Guidelines at sentencing) (emphasis removed). 9 19 We therefore turn to consider the district court's factual finding that Mr. Vaughn did not withdraw from the conspiracy prior to November 1, 2001 — a finding that we review deferentially and shall overturn only if clearly erroneous. See United States v. Julian, 427 F.3d 471, 489 (7th Cir.2005). There is ample evidence supporting the district court's conclusion that Mr. Vaughn's criminal conduct, including his participation in the conspiracy, continued well past the effective date of the 2001 Guidelines. As Mr. Vaughn points out, by November 1, 2001, many goals of the conspiracy already had been accomplished. For example, Mr. Vaughn had: (1) accepted the transmittal of most of the stolen checks from his co-conspirators in California; (2) opened the first account at Wells Fargo; (3) deposited into that account the vast majority of the stolen funds, totaling $388,378.26; and (4) recruited various accomplices. Nevertheless, he remained a member of the conspiracy and acted to further this conspiracy after the effective date of the 2001 Guidelines, as well. In 2002, he recruited another accomplice, his niece Tominka Vaughn. He continued to receive treasury checks through July 2002 from his co-conspirators. He opened the second checking account at Wells Fargo under a fictitious name in March 2002, into which he deposited $16,023.47 in stolen money. He opened a third account in June 2002, this time at Bank One, under a fictitious name; and he fraudulently endorsed and deposited $24,773.64 in stolen treasury checks into that account. In light of the plethora of evidence demonstrating that Mr. Vaughn's criminal conduct straddled two versions of the Sentencing Guidelines, and the general practice of applying the version of the Guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing, we hold that the district court did not err in calculating Mr. Vaughn's guideline range under the 2001 Guidelines.
20 Mr. Vaughn submits that, even if the district court properly calculated the advisory sentencing range, it should have departed from that range to account for: (1) the fact that more than 90% of the checks ($388,278 of $429,000) were stolen, transported, fraudulently endorsed, deposited and laundered while the old Guidelines were still in effect; and (2) the harsh difference between the 2000 and 2001 Guidelines' sentencing recommendations for the crimes in question. The failure of the district court to consider these factors, according to Mr. Vaughn, renders his sentence unreasonable and unjust. 21 Before reaching the merits of Mr. Vaughn's argument, we pause to address our jurisdiction to review a district court's refusal to grant a downward departure. The Government notes that, when the district court recognizes its authority to depart under the Guidelines but in an exercise of its discretion chooses not to do so, the general rule pre- Booker was that an appellate court lacks jurisdiction to review that decision. See, e.g., United States v. Fish, 388 F.3d 284, 288-89 (7th Cir.2004). 10 According to the Government, because there is no evidence that the district court mistakenly believed it lacked the authority to depart from the advisory sentencing range, its discretionary refusal to do so is unreviewable. 22 However, as we recently remarked, the concept of a discretionary departure — over which we previously had no jurisdiction — has been rendered obsolete in the post- Booker world. Instead, `what is at stake is the reasonableness of the sentence, not the correctness of the departures as measured against pre- Booker decisions that cabined the discretion of sentencing courts to depart from guidelines that were then mandatory.' United States v. Arnaout, 2005 WL 3242213, at  (7th Cir.2005) (internal citation omitted). 11 Post- Booker, because we must review all sentences for reasonableness in light of the factors specified in § 3553(a), we necessarily must scrutinize, as part of that review, the district court's refusal to depart from the advisory sentencing range. 23 We therefore turn to Mr. Vaughn's claim that his sentence is unreasonable. After Booker, although the Sentencing Guidelines are advisory, sentencing judges nevertheless are required to compute correctly the applicable sentencing range; they then may depart from this range if appropriate justification is offered for the departure. Sentences that fall within a properly computed sentencing range are entitled to a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness. United States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir.2005). Ultimately, [w]hether a sentence is reasonable depends on its conformity to the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)[]. United States v. Cunningham, 429 F.3d 673, 675 (7th Cir.2005). Although the district court need not discuss every argument made by a litigant, there must be sufficient indication that it considered the § 3553 factors relevant to the calculation of the defendant's sentence and that the application of those factors to the facts of the case was not unreasonable. Id. at 678 (holding that the sentencing judge gave insufficient attention to the defendant's psychiatric problems and substance abuse as mitigating factors in calculating the appropriate sentence, and remanding for re-sentencing). 24 Mr. Vaughn argues that, because his involvement in the conspiracy began when the 2000 Guidelines — which recommend almost half the sentence suggested by the 2001 Guidelines — were still in effect, the sentence imposed in this case is both unjust and unnecessary. We find no error in the district court's determination of Mr. Vaughn's sentence, despite that it is significantly longer than the range advised by the 2000 Guidelines. Mr. Vaughn's 112-month sentence falls at the midpoint of the range recommended by the 2001 Guidelines, and thus is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d at 608. It will be a rare Guidelines sentence that is unreasonable, id., and Mr. Vaughn's is not one of them. As we have noted earlier, the district court's application of the 2001 Guidelines to criminal conduct occurring both pre — and post-enactment of those Guidelines enjoys the support of well-established case law. 12 25 Moreover, the district court, evaluating the facts of Mr. Vaughn's case in light of the factors listed in § 3553(a), concluded that the sentencing range recommended by the 2001 Guidelines better served the goals of retribution, punishment and deterrence than did the former sentencing regime. It held that, given Mr. Vaughn's significant involvement in the conspiracy and his lengthy criminal history, he ha[d] not [yet] learned the lessons from the error of [his] way[s]. Sent. Tr. Vol.II at 42. Therefore, reasoned the court, the advisory range of the 2000 Guidelines understated the seriousness of the offense. Id. at 43 (noting that if the 2000 Guidelines were in effect, the court really ought to depart upwardly in light of these factors). Because the district court's conclusions are supported by the record and appropriately related to the factors specified in § 3553(a), see United States v. Johnson, 427 F.3d 423, 429 (7th Cir.2005), we cannot find unreasonable the court's decision not to depart from the 2001 sentencing range. 26 Mr. Vaughn also contends that his sentence is unreasonable because the district court failed to consider adequately the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(7). 13 Although the district court did not specifically cite § 3553(a)(7) during the sentencing hearing, nor explicitly reference the defense's argument concerning the desirability of facilitating the prompt repayment of restitution, it must be remembered that the argument was presented to the district court in a different light than it is now presented on appeal; instead of being framed as a justification for downward departure, it was framed as a motion for concurrent time. Specifically, prior to the sentencing hearing, the defense filed a motion for a concurrent term, along with a supporting memorandum; in these documents, the defense asked the district court to consider the possibility of running the defendant's sentence concurrent to his current state sentence. R.176 at 1. If released at an earlier date, the defense noted, Mr. Vaughn will be in a better position to pay back restitution and his debt to society. Id. at 2. This suggestion was repeated at the sentencing hearing. Defense counsel requested a partially concurrent sentence, one in which perhaps a couple years or more would run concurrent with his state sentence, in order to help facilitate early payment of restitution. Sent. Tr. Vol.II at 29. 27 Although not discussing at-length its decision to do so, the sentencing judge adopted this recommendation in full, noting that this result was compelled by the interests of justice. Id. at 46. Specifically, the district court directed that Mr. Vaughn's sentences on Counts I and II run concurrently, and that two years of the 112-month sentence — the length of time suggested by defense counsel — run concurrently with Mr. Vaughn's three concurrent seven-year state sentences for forgery currently being served. The concurrent nature of Mr. Vaughn's sentences renders the length of imprisonment not nearly as extreme as it may seem at first glance; the district court effectively reduced the total time Mr. Vaughn will spend in prison for his federal offenses to 88 months, which is 9 months below the advisory range applicable to this case under the Guidelines. The need to provide restitution does not demand an even lower sentence than that imposed. As the district court noted, Mr. Vaughn committed a sophisticated and calculated crime involving multiple players and large sums of money. A lengthy sentence is necessary to account for the gravity of the offense and for Mr. Vaughn's criminal history, to protect the public and to really act[] in a meaningful way to deter future [criminal] conduct. Id. at 42. 14