Opinion ID: 2053313
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the letter as an answer

Text: The default judgment herein was rendered pursuant to sec. 270.62, Stats. 1973, which provided in pertinent part: 270.62 Default judgment. (1) NATURE OF DEFAULT. A default judgment may be entered as provided in this section if no issue of law or fact has been joined and if the time for joining issue has expired. (2) GENERAL. Upon filing with the court the summons and complaint and proof of service of the summons on one or more of the defendants and an affidavit that the defendant is in default according to subsection (1), the plaintiff may apply to the court for judgment according to the demand of the complaint. If taking an account or the proof of any fact is necessary to enable the court to give judgment, a reference may be ordered to take such account or proof and to report the same to the court, and such reference may be executed anywhere in the state; or the court may take the accounts or hear the proof. The court may order damages to be assessed by a jury. If the defendant has appeared in the action, he shall be entitled to notice of the application for judgment. No notice of application for the default judgment was given. Kaishian's first contention is that his letter of December 5, 1974 was in fact an answer to the complaint, that issue was joined, and that the trial court therefore lacked jurisdiction to enter a default judgment without first having entertained and granted a motion to strike the answer. Reynolds v. Taylor, 60 Wis.2d 178, 208 N.W.2d 305 (1973). As previously noted, the trial court had the letter before it when the default judgment was granted. Under then-applicable statutes, all pleadings were required to be subscribed by the party or his attorney, sec. 263.23, Stats. 1973, and every pleading except a demurrer was required to be verified. Sec. 263.24, Stats. 1973. Sec. 269.33, Stats. 1973, required that the papers in any action or proceeding have endorsed thereon the title of the action. Kaishian's letter was neither subscribed nor verified, nor did it refer to the pending action or indicate that it related to any judicial proceeding. Nor did the letter comply with sec. 263.13, which prescribes the contents of an answer. [4] The letter did contain Kaishian's explanation of the events in question and his assertion that an unidentified individual at Northern Motors told him Northern Motors had no lien on the automobile. However, no denial or comment on the allegations in the complaint was made. Under sec. 263.26, the effect of the December 5th letter as an answer at best would have been to admit all allegations in the complaint and to set up a possible affirmative defense in the nature of an estoppel. It does not appear that Kaishian intended to admit the allegations in the complaint, for his proposed answer denied all allegations save those identifying the parties. The absence of signature and title from an otherwise acceptable answer would probably constitute defects of form rather than substance. They would be curable by amendment and would not as a general matter permit a plaintiff to take a default judgment without notice. [5] Regarding the absence of verification, sec. 263.24, Stats. 1973, provides in part: Where service is made either pursuant to ch. 262 or otherwise, no defect or irregularity in a verification shall defeat the jurisdiction of the court but shall be ground for a timely motion to strike the pleading unless amended. The appropriate remedy for a defective verification of a pleading is to move to strike the pleading or perhaps to seasonably return it to the pleader. The objection may be waived if not timely raised. G. M. C. Hotels, Inc. v. Hanson, 234 Wis. 164, 169, 290 N.W. 615 (1940); Feldmeier v. Springfield F. & M. Ins. Co., 171 Wis. 377, 380, 177 N.W. 583 (1920); Kirby v. Corning, 54 Wis. 599, 601, 12 N.W. 69 (1882). However, these cases all involved documents which clearly were intended to be and were in fact pleadings. They dealt with the problem of remedies for defects in verification of a pleading; they did not speak to the question of whether the document was a pleading in the first instance. [1] The letter cannot be deemed an answer to the complaint. The complete absence of any indicia of a legal pleading is more than a matter of mere form in this case, though the individual omissions viewed in isolation might be so characterized. The letter written by Kaishian in the instant case is no more than a business letter. It in no way purports to be an answer to the plaintiff's complaint. It was an answer in a colloquial sense to an inquiry into the nature of the transaction in question, but it was not a proper legal response to the plaintiff's complaint, no matter how forgivingly and generously construed. [2, 3] The purpose of pleadings is to notify the opposing party of the pleader's position in the case and to frame the issues to be resolved in the action for the benefit of the litigants and the court. Knapke v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 54 Wis.2d 525, 533, 196 N.W.2d 737 (1972); Schneck v. Mut. Service Cas. Ins. Co., 18 Wis.2d 566, 572, 119 N.W.2d 342 (1963). The pleading is to define the pleader's position in the pending litigation. If a document is to be treated as a pleading, it must evidence to the recipient that it is intended to speak to the controversy in the judicial forum. It is unreasonable to expect either a plaintiff or a court to treat that which on its face is no more than a business letter as a legal pleading, even where the letter is written to an attorney. Kaishian's letter should be compared to a letter by a defendant to plaintiff's attorney in response to a summons and complaint described in Lyons v. Paul, 321 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959). That letter stated it was in reply to the attorney's greeting dayted August 6, 1956. The writer inclosed some copys for you [the attorney] to look over if you need further proof. The writer closed saying do hope this is what you wants to no. Although the Texas court did not specifically find that the letter constituted an answer, the court noted that the letter put the attorney on notice that the defendant (appellant) intended the letter to be an answer and that the attorney was obligated to advise the court of the letter. (In the case at bar, counsel for Northern Motors did so advise the court.) The Texas court noted: [The appellant's letter] apprised him of the fact that appellant was uneducated and that she was under a mistaken belief that her answer was sufficient and the place where it should be filed.... Under the foregoing conditions, appellees' attorney moved for default judgment while in possession of a written instrument, with enclosures attached, that he should have known that appellant considered as her answer and her defense to the cause of action. In so doing he at least impliedly represented to the court that appellant did not intend to defend the suit and that she had not answered and to this extent misled the court. See 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client sec. 23, p. 741. Lyons v. Paul, 321 S.W.2d 944, 949, 950. Kaishian may have hoped by this letter to settle the controversy or to induce the plaintiff to abandon the suit. However, these expectations were not fulfilled. The letter did not reveal Kaishian to be an uneducated person, nor did it indicate that Kaishian considered it his answer and defense. [6] The letter did not constitute a colorable answer to the complaint such as would have prevented a default judgment from being entered until the answer was stricken on motion of the plaintiff. [4] The remaining issue in this case is whether the trial court properly declined to relieve Kaishian from the judgment. Before reaching that issue, however, we note in passing that while Kaishian's letter was neither an answer nor an appearance [7] in the action, it does not follow that the letter was wholly immaterial to the proceeding in which the default judgment was granted. Sec. 270.62, Stats. 1973 provides that a default may be entered if the requisite circumstances exist. The word may means the court is not required to enter a default judgment. Kaishian's failure to join issue did not automatically entitle Northern Motors, as a matter of right, to a default judgment; rather the question of whether the judgment should be granted was a matter for the exercise of the trial court's discretion. [8] Reynolds v. Taylor, 60 Wis.2d 178, 208 N.W.2d 305 (1973); Production Credit Ass'n v. Goede, 50 Wis.2d 509, 513, 514, 184 N.W.2d 830 (1971); Willing v. Porter, 266 Wis. 428, 429, 430, 63 N.W.2d 729 (1954). [5] Where plaintiff's counsel informs the courtas counsel of course should dothat he has received a letter such as Kaishian's, the court should question counsel closely on the matter, with an eye to determining whether notice of entry of application for the default judgment should be given. The trial court has discretion to require such notice even though such notice may not be required by the statute.