Opinion ID: 2566841
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: 30-day period

Text: As an alternative for upholding the trial court's declaratory ruling, Mr. Costich argues the January 30 settlement offer's failure to remain open for a 30-day period mandated its invalidation. This court may affirm a lower court's ruling on any grounds adequately supported in the record. In re Marriage of Rideout, 150 Wash.2d 337, 358, 77 P.3d 1174 (2003). As Mr. Costich adequately presented this argument below, we address its merits. The operative language at issue stems from the same statutory provision discussed supra. Again, the statute provides the settlement offer to which the jury award is compared is the highest written offer in settlement submitted to those condemnees appearing in the action by condemnor in effect thirty days before the trial.  RCW 8.25.070(1)(b) (emphasis added). Both parties contend the plain language of the emphasized words support their view. The State claims the plain language of the statute requires the offer to be operative merely 30 days before trial, regardless of whether the offer subsequently lapses, is revoked, or is rejected. In other words, the State proffers a construction of temporal proximity. The State argues the trial court's interpretation impermissibly adds the word for between in effect and 30 days. See Kilian v. Atkinson, 147 Wash.2d 16, 20, 50 P.3d 638 (2002) (court will not add language to an unambiguous statute even if it believes the Legislature intended something else but did not adequately express it). Mr. Costich, on the other hand, argues the State's interpretation wrongfully modifies the language to read in effect [on the 30th day] before trial, thereby requiring affirmance of the lower courts' holdings. The statute certainly may be read either way, and resolution of this issue would be much simpler had the legislature used more clarity when drafting the text. The statute's ambiguity permits this court to look beyond the plain language of the statute and examine the circumstances leading to its enactment. Mahoney v. Shinpoch, 107 Wash.2d 679, 684, 732 P.2d 510 (1987). A review of these circumstances reveals in effect 30 days before trial imposed a temporal proximity requirement rather than a durational requirement. Prior to 1984 the comparative factor was the the highest written offer in settlement submitted to those condemnees appearing in the action by condemnor at least thirty days prior to commencement of said trial.  Former RCW 8.25.070(1)(b) (LAWS OF 1971, 1ST Ex.Sess. ch. 39, § 3) (emphasis added). This language was construed in State v. Olson, 31 Wash.App. 403, 642 P.2d 410 (1982), in which the condemnees rejected a $90,000 settlement offer tendered by the State prior to a flood severely damaging their property. Id. at 404-05, 642 P.2d 410. The State subsequently offered $35,000, which the condemnees rejected, and obtained a jury award of $57,000. Id. at 505, 642 P.2d 410. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of reasonable attorney and expert witness fees since the $90,000 offer, though made five months before the flood and over a year before the valuation trial, was literally ... the highest written offer in settlement. Id. at 405, 642 P.2d 410. Conceding the result was unfair and injudicious, id. at 406, 642 P.2d 410, the court expressed its concern and recommended the legislature modify the statute to compar[e] ... the amount awarded by the jury with the last offer in effect prior to trial.  Id. at 407, 642 P.2d 410 (emphasis added). The court continued, Because of these perceived inequities, we believe the statute should be amended so as to base attorney and witness fee entitlement on the highest written offer in settlement in effect 30 days before trial.  Id. (emphasis added). In direct response the legislature adopted the exact wording used by Olson to amend RCW 8.25.070. LAWS OF 1984, ch. 129, § 1; see also 1984 FINAL LEGISLATIVE REPORT, 48th Wash. Leg., at 139. [10] It is clear from Olson the intent behind the amendment was to impose a temporal proximity requirement rather than a durational requirement. Mr. Costich argues this interpretation would allow the condemnor to escape the requirement by tendering an offer on the 30th day before trial only to have it expire mere hours later. Supp'l Br. of Resp'ts at 14. There may be factual scenarios where the State's hasty withdrawal of its settlement offer might be enough to invalidate it, but we do not opine when or if those circumstances exist. As with his itemization argument, Mr. Costich advances arguably good policy for the imposition of such a durational requirement on the State's offer. Again though, such policy debates are for the legislature to resolve, not the courts. State v. Gentry, 125 Wash.2d 570, 629, 888 P.2d 1105 (1995).