Opinion ID: 1614456
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: violation of due process because of lack of legislative standards

Text: Defendants assert that the statutory scheme, permitting the prosecutor to charge the same act as either general larceny or larceny in a building, denies defendants due process. They rely heavily on Giaccio v Pennsylvania, 382 US 399; 86 S Ct 518; 15 L Ed 2d 447 (1966). In Giaccio, the defendant, although found not guilty of a misdemeanor charge, was, under a peculiar Pennsylvania statute, assessed costs. The statute permitted the jury, after an acquittal in a case, to assess costs in their sole and unguided discretion against the county, the prosecutor, or the defendant with the further provision that if the defendant did not pay costs assessed against him, he would be committed to jail until the costs were paid, unless he gave security to pay within ten days. The United States Supreme Court held that there was a lack of due process because of vagueness and failure to provide legal standards. The Giaccio case is not on point. First of all, the United States Supreme Court in that case found the Pennsylvania statute to be vague, whereas we find no vagueness in the statutory scheme here in question. Second, the problem of delegation is entirely different. In Giaccio, the jury was assigned an exotic duty with which it had no prior experience. In the instant case, as Batchelder, supra, indicates, the delegation of duty to prosecutors is no broader than the authority they routinely exercise in enforcing criminal laws. 442 US 126. In other words, there is guidance    as reasonably precise as the subject matter requires. Osius v City of St Clair Shores, 344 Mich 693, 698; 75 NW2d 25 (1956).
It is well established in due process analysis that the underlying principle is that no person shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which a person could not reasonably understand to be proscribed. See Colten v Kentucky, 407 US 104; 92 S Ct 1953; 32 L Ed 2d 584 (1972); United States v Harriss, 347 US 612; 74 S Ct 808; 98 L Ed 989 (1954); State v Lashinsky, 81 NJ 1; 404 A2d 1121 (1979). See also United States v Batchelder, supra . An additional tenet is that no person may be subject to peril of life, liberty, or property without a settled understanding of the potential sanctions or punishments established by a penal statute. A criminal statute will fall if it fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence reasonable notice that his behavior may be unlawful. United States v Batchelder ; United States v Harriss . The key in resolving this issue is to determine whether the statutory scheme in question describes with sufficient clarity the consequences of violating the relevant criminal statute. On a constitutional due process basis, it should make no difference, without a showing of something more, that two statutes cover the same conduct. Even if particular conduct violates more than one statute, this phenomenon alone does not diminish the notice afforded by each statute: Although the statutes create uncertainty as to which crime may be charged and therefore what penalties may be imposed, they do so to no greater extent than would a single statute authorizing various alternative punishments. So long as overlapping criminal provisions clearly define the conduct prohibited and the punishment authorized, the notice requirements of the Due Process Clause are satisfied. United States v Batchelder, supra, 123. Accord, State v Weiner, 126 Ariz 454; 616 P2d 914 (1980). Thus, since there is no allegation that the statutes in question do not individually describe crimes with sufficient particularity, we hold that such a statutory scheme in and of itself does not violate due process under the Michigan Constitution or the United States Constitution.
Defendants further believe that the statutory scheme of larceny in a building and general larceny provides for great disparity of treatment because there is no guidance in regulating prosecutors when they choose between these two provisions in prosecuting the defendants. Simply stated they believe that the alleged lack of standards is per se objectionable. We do not agree. In United States v Batchelder , the defendant was convicted and sentenced under a federal statute prohibiting a previously convicted felon from receiving a firearm that has traveled in interstate commerce (18 USC 922[h]). This statute carried a five-year maximum penalty. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the sentence on the basis that the substantive elements of 18 USC 922(h) were identical with 18 USC Appendix 1202(a) which carries only a two-year maximum penalty. The Circuit Court of Appeals also postulated that the statutes might impermissibly delegate to federal prosecutors the legislative responsibility to set criminal penalties. The Supreme Court, however, soundly rejected this reasoning by stating: The provisions at issue plainly demarcate the range of penalties that prosecutors and judges may seek and impose. In light of that specificity, the power that Congress has delegated to those officials is no broader than the authority they routinely exercise in enforcing criminal laws. Having informed the courts, prosecutors, and defendants of the permissible punishment    Congress has fulfilled its duty. 442 US 126. In our opinion, Batchelder answers the arguments advanced by the defendants.