Opinion ID: 39988
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Independent Evidence of a Conspiracy

Text: Summers maintains that, aside from the statements themselves, the state produced insufficient independent evidence to support the admission of those statements under the coconspirator exception. While it may be true that this circuit and many others have required - 16 - independent evidence in support of a conspiracy, see, e.g., United States v. Narviz-Guerra, 148 F.3d 530, 536 (5th Cir. 1998), that is not the question before this court. We need not reach the issue. The doctrine of federalism, as embodied in AEDPA, precludes the result Summers urges. Under AEDPA, the state courts are bound, not by our jurisprudence or the jurisprudence of our sister circuits, but by “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The Supreme Court has not mandated a requirement for independent evidence in support of a conspiracy finding under the Confrontation Clause. See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 182 (1987) (ho lding that “independent indicia of reliability [are] . . . not mandated by the Constitution.”). Indeed, just the opposite is true: “Bourjaily declined to decide whether there must be any evidence independent of coconspirator statements to determine that a conspiracy has been established by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Fragoso, 978 F.2d 896, 901 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 179, 181). Because the Supreme Court does not require it, Summers’s demand for independent evidence of a conspiracy fails. The state court’s application of law accords with the mandates of the Supreme Court. Whether we agree or not, it is not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, the Confrontation Clause as announced by the Supreme Court. We cannot grant habeas relief. Moreover, the state habeas court identified two items that corroborated the conspiracy finding: Spaulding’s testimony regarding Summers’s confession and a letter from Summers to Spaulding.7 Summers takes issue with the admissibility of the state’s corroborating evidence as a 7 In his brief the Director identified more evidence corroborating the conspiracy finding, e.g., the testimony of both Aguirre (circumstances of meetings between Summers and Cantu) and Wilcox (prior attempts at hiring someone to murder his parents). - 17 - general matter, but the Constitution does not prevent a state court from considering possibly inadmissible evidence to determine the admissibility of other evidence. See Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 178 (holding that a court may determine admissibility by “considering any evidence it wishes, unhindered by considerations of admissibility”) (applying FED. R. EVID. 104(a)). In addition, Summers claims that Aguirre’s testimony does not prove the conspiracy. However, even if the Aguirre testimony alone is insufficient, the Supreme Court has been clear that the testimony can make up part of the admissibility analysis. See Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 180 (“[I]ndividual pieces of evidence, insufficient in themselves to prove a point, may in cumulation prove it.”). The state court fo und the supporting evidence, in conjunction with the statements, sufficient to prove the statements’ reliability, and we are in no position to upset that finding where, as here, it is not unreasonable.