Opinion ID: 2230069
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: doctrine of equivalents

Text: As previously noted, the district court concluded the Orthman device did not infringe on claim 22 of the '080 patent. New Tek argues the court erred in not finding an issue of material fact based upon the doctrine of equivalents. The doctrine of equivalents prevents a copyist from evading patent claims with insubstantial changes. Valmont Industries, Inc. v. Reinke Mfg. Co., Inc., 983 F.2d 1039 (Fed.Cir.1993). An unscrupulous copyist may not make unimportant and insubstantial changes and substitutions in a patent which, though adding nothing, would be enough to take the copied matter outside the claim. Id., citing Graver Mfg. Co. v. Linde Co., 339 U.S. 605, 70 S.Ct. 854, 94 L.Ed. 1097 (1950). An equivalent under the doctrine of equivalents results from an insubstantial change which, from the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art, adds nothing of significance to the claimed invention. Id. An equivalent under the doctrine of equivalents, though not literally meeting the claims, still infringes the patent. Id. Each element contained in a patent claim is deemed material to defining the scope of the patented invention, and the doctrine of equivalents is applied to individual elements of the claim, not to the invention as a whole. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17, 117 S.Ct. 1040, 137 L.Ed.2d 146 (1997). If an accused device lacks any limitation or an equivalent, it does not infringe the claim. Valmont Industries, Inc., supra . In this case, it is not entirely clear whether the district court's analysis of allegedly equivalent structure in the Orthman device was conducted pursuant to § 112, ¶ 6, or the equitable doctrine of equivalents. Section 112, ¶ 6, and the doctrine of equivalents have separate origins and purposes. Section 112, ¶ 6, limits the broad language of means-plus-function elements in combination claims to equivalents of the structures, materials, or acts in the specification. The doctrine of equivalents equitably expands exclusive patent rights. Valmont Industries, Inc., supra . But although these analyses are not coextensive, and have different origins and purposes, their tests for equivalence are closely related. Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts v. Cardinal Industries, 145 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir.1998), citing Warner-Jenkinson Co., supra . One difference is a question of timing. A proposed equivalent must have arisen at a definite period in time, either before or after the patent filing. If before, then a § 112, ¶ 6, structural equivalents analysis applies and any analysis for equivalent structure under the doctrine of equivalents collapses into the § 112, ¶ 6, analysis. Frank's Casing Crew v. Weatherford Intern., 389 F.3d 1370 (Fed.Cir.2004). If after, then a nontextual infringement analysis proceeds under the doctrine of equivalents. Id. See, generally, Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Intern., Inc., 174 F.3d 1308 (Fed.Cir.1999); Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, supra . Another difference is that under § 112, ¶ 6, the accused device must perform the identical function as recited in the claim element, while the doctrine of equivalents may be satisfied when the function performed by the accused device is only substantially the same. Al-Site Corp., supra . But where, as here, there is no evidence that the alleged equivalent is after-arising technology, and equivalence of the function of the claimed element is not disputed, the test for insubstantial differences is the same under either § 112, ¶ 6, or the doctrine of equivalents. See, e.g., Frank's Casing Crew, supra; Searfoss v. Pioneer Consol. Corp., 374 F.3d 1142 (Fed.Cir.2004); Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, supra . Where there is identity of function and no after-arising technology, a means-plus-function limitation that is infringed under the doctrine of equivalents is also literally present in the accused device. Similarly, if an accused product performs an identical function yet avoids literal infringement under § 112, ¶ 6, for lack of a structural equivalent, it will fail the doctrine of equivalents test for the same reason. See Frank's Casing Crew, supra ; Al-Site Corp., supra . Therefore, it is not significant, for purposes of our review, that the district court's analysis did not clearly distinguish between these two related inquiries. The inquiry for equivalent structure under § 112, ¶ 6, examines whether the assertedly equivalent structure performs the claimed function in substantially the same way to achieve the same result as the corresponding structure described in the specification. Frank's Casing Crew, supra . See, also, Ishida Co., Ltd. v. Taylor, 221 F.3d 1310 (Fed.Cir.2000). The doctrine of equivalents does not require a one-to-one correspondence of components. Wiener v. NEC Electronics, Inc., 102 F.3d 534 (Fed.Cir.1996), abrogated on other grounds, Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed.Cir.1998). The vantage point of one of ordinary skill in the relevant art provides the perspective for assessing the substantiality of the differences between the claimed invention and the accused device. Lighting World, Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc., 382 F.3d 1354 (Fed.Cir.2004). Here, the district court determined that a substantial difference existed and that the Orthman device did not infringe on claim 22. The court noted that claim 22 specifically described a pivotal connection between each hydraulic cylinder in element 4 and the elongated member and respective lever. The Orthman device, on the other hand, employs a single hydraulic cylinder, directly mounted on the elongated member without employing a pivotal connection. The court did not address whether the single hydraulic cylinder of the Orthman device was equivalent to the two hydraulic cylinders recited in claim 22 of the '080 patent; rather, the court concluded that the difference between a pivotal connection and direct mount to the end of the hydraulic cylinder on the elongated member was substantial. However, we conclude that the record fails to establish the defendant's prima facie case for summary judgment on this issue. On a motion for summary judgment, the question is not how a factual issue is to be decided, but whether any real issue of material fact exists. Range v. Abbott Sports Complex, 269 Neb. 281, 691 N.W.2d 525 (2005). The party moving for summary judgment has the burden to show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and must produce sufficient evidence to demonstrate that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Woodhouse Ford v. Laflan, 268 Neb. 722, 687 N.W.2d 672 (2004). A party moving for summary judgment must make a prima facie case by producing enough evidence to demonstrate that the movant is entitled to judgment if the evidence were uncontroverted at trial. Once the moving party makes a prima facie case, the burden to produce evidence, showing the existence of a material issue of fact that prevents judgment as a matter of law, shifts to the party opposing the motion. Richards v. Meeske, 268 Neb. 901, 689 N.W.2d 337 (2004). Determination of infringement, both literal and under the doctrine of equivalents, is a question of fact. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Space Systems/Loral, Inc., 324 F.3d 1308 (Fed.Cir.2003). Whether the accused device exactly contains each element, as properly construed, or its equivalent, is a determination of fact. Overhead Door Corp. v. Chamberlain Group, Inc., 194 F.3d 1261 (Fed.Cir.1999). See, also, Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Technology Corp., 185 F.3d 1259 (Fed.Cir.1999) (whether accused device infringes § 112, ¶ 6, claim as equivalent is question of fact). Here, the evidence adduced in support of the defendant's motion for summary judgment consisted of the relevant patent documents and the depositions of William Orthman, of Orthman Manufacturing, and Richard Wood, New Tek's expert witness. Orthman's testimony primarily concerned the development and sales of the Orthman device, although Orthman's counsel took the position, on behalf of Orthman Manufacturing, that the Orthman device did not infringe the '080 patent. It suffices to say that no aspect of Orthman's testimony provides a basis for a finding of noninfringement. Wood, on the other hand, clearly expressed his opinion that the Orthman device infringed on the '080 patent pursuant to the doctrine of equivalents. Wood is a patent attorney and has a degree in mechanical engineering and experience as an engineer. The primary purpose of Wood's testimony was to opine about the relevant standard of care for a patent attorney, and Beehner's alleged breach of that standard. However, Wood was also asked to opine on the doctrine of equivalents. Wood specifically opined, although not in great detail, that the Orthman device incorporated equivalents to each and every element recited in claim 22 of the '080 patent. We recognize that Wood's opinion is similar to conclusory opinions regarding infringement that have been rejected by the Federal Circuit as insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., Schoell v. Regal Marine Industries, Inc., 247 F.3d 1202 (Fed.Cir.2001). Compare, e.g., Optical Disc Corp. v. Del Mar Avionics, 208 F.3d 1324 (Fed.Cir.2000). But equivalence is evaluated from the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the relevant art. Lighting World, Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc., 382 F.3d 1354 (Fed.Cir.2004). An element in the accused product is equivalent to a claim limitation if the differences between the two are insubstantial to one of ordinary skill in the art. Searfoss v. Pioneer Consol. Corp., 374 F.3d 1142 (Fed.Cir.2004); Overhead Door Corp., supra . Here, aside from Wood's admittedly conclusory testimony, there is no evidence that would permit a trier of fact to conclude, one way or the other, whether one of ordinary skill in the pertinent art would consider the difference between element 4, claim 22, of the '080 patent and the corresponding structure of the Orthman device to be substantial, or whether the different structure of the Orthman device is merely an insubstantial change which adds nothing of significance to the structure disclosed in the '080 patent specification. See Ishida Co., Ltd. v. Taylor, 221 F.3d 1310 (Fed.Cir.2000). The defect in the defendant's motion for summary judgment was its failure to present evidence regarding the perspective of one of skill in the art. See Lighting World, Inc., supra . The district court, however, concluded that because the Orthman device did not employ a pivotal connection, the pivotal connection limitation of element 4 was missing from the Orthman device. But a pivotal connection is not a limitation for purposes of determining whether each limitation of claim 22 has been met, literally or equivalently, by the structure of the Orthman device. The individual components, if any, of an overall structure that corresponds to the claimed function are not claim limitations. Rather, the claim limitation is the overall structure corresponding to the claimed function. This is why structures with different numbers of parts may still be equivalent under § 112, ¶ 6, thereby meeting the claim limitation. Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Technology Corp., 185 F.3d 1259, 1268 (Fed.Cir.1999). Here, the limitation at issue was the overall structure corresponding to the function recited in element 4. The district court erred in construing the pivotal connection as a limitation, instead of determining whether the structure of the Orthman device was equivalent, pursuant to the principles explained above, to the overall structure corresponding to the function recited in element 4. The defendant contends that the issuance of patent No. 5,511,623 (the '623 patent) for the Orthman device tends to prove noninfringement; presumably, the Patent Office would not have issued the '623 patent if the Patent Office had believed it to interfere with the '080 patent, which had been disclosed as prior art in the application for the '623 patent. However, federal law permits a civil action to resolve claims of interference between issued patents, which implicitly admits the possibility that issued patents may nonetheless conflict. See, generally, 35 U.S.C. § 291 (2000); Slip Track Systems, Inc. v. Metal-Lite, Inc., 304 F.3d 1256 (Fed.Cir.2002). Moreover, the application for the '623 patent was filed September 12, 1994, and the patent was not issued until April 30, 1996well after the expiration of the '080 patent due to Beehner's failure to pay the maintenance fee for the '365 patent. Even if it was presumed that the Patent Office would not issue a patent that conflicted with a preexisting patent, that presumption would not apply where the preexisting patent had expired. The defendant's burden, under Nebraska law, was to present evidence that would, if uncontradicted at trial, prove that New Tek could not have prevailed in an action against Orthman Manufacturing for enforcement of the '080 patent. But there was no evidence sufficient to support a finding that element 4, claim 22, of the '080 patent was not equivalent to the corresponding structure of the Orthman device, and no other evidence that would show that the Orthman device, as a matter of law, did not infringe on the '080 patent. In the absence of evidence tending to prove noninfringement, when New Tek is given the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible from the evidence, the defendant did not present a prima facie case for summary judgment. The district court erred in concluding to the contrary.