Opinion ID: 2612098
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The allegations of malice defeat defendant's defense of privilege

Text: (1) Since the instant complaint discloses that the editorial in question commented upon the qualifications of plaintiff, a candidate for the Alameda City Council, the publisher acquired the qualified privilege granted by Civil Code section 47, subdivision 3. [5] ( Snively v. Record Publishing Co. (1921) 185 Cal. 565, 571 [198 P. 1].) (2, 3) As we explain, however, defendant fails to establish that the plaintiff's allegations of malice do not suffice to defeat this asserted privilege. (Cf. Locke v. Mitchell (1936) 7 Cal.2d 599, 602 [61 P.2d 922]; Harnish v. Smith (1956) 138 Cal. App.2d 307, 310 [291 P.2d 532].) [6] Supplementing its concededly conclusory claims that defendant wrongfully, wickedly, and maliciously printed the editorials, the complaint alleges a detailed account of past and continuing conflicts between the defendant and plaintiff. Thus plaintiff first states that defendant's hostility toward her initially arose out of her activities, in 1964, as the leader of a group, Alameda Citizens for the Protection of Property Rights, which organized and led a successful campaign against an urban renewal ballot proposal in the City of Alameda. Defendant allegedly supported the ballot measures and would have realized substantial financial gain if the urban renewal project had been approved. The complaint further states that one of the candidates opposing plaintiff in the city council election was an agent or officer of a company owned and controlled by the defendant. Additional friction between the parties allegedly resulted from the plaintiff's announced opposition to a series of real estate developments planned for Alameda, developments in which defendant purportedly had invested a significant sum. The complaint finally recounts a conversation in which defendant warned plaintiff that if she did not remove herself as a candidate for the city council he would print all the `dirt' he could find concerning plaintiff's family. As a result of this hostile relationship, the complaint alleges, defendant published the editorial well knowing that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. This court has in the past consistently held that allegations of malice similar to those set forth above defeated the qualified privilege of section 47. ( Maidman v. Jewish Publications, Inc. (1960) 54 Cal.2d 643 [7 Cal. Rptr. 617, 355 P.2d 265, 87 A.L.R.2d 439]; Brewer v. Second Baptist Church (1948) 32 Cal.2d 791, 797-799 [197 P.2d 713]; Washer v. Bank of America (1943) 21 Cal.2d 822, 831 [136 P.2d 297, 155 A.L.R. 1338].) (4, 5) In the instant case plaintiff has alleged the presence of detailed facts which would justify the trier of fact in finding that defendant published the editorial primarily because of hatred or ill will towards the plaintiff. (Civ. Code, § 48a, subd. 4(b); see, e.g., Maidman v. Jewish Publications, Inc., supra, 54 Cal.2d 643, 654; Hearne v. De Young (1901) 132 Cal. 357, 361-362 [64 P. 576]; Davis v. Hearst (1911) 160 Cal. 143, 157-163 [116 P. 530].) [7] The allegations of malice are thus sufficient to dispatch the defense of the privilege of section 47.