Opinion ID: 894531
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Activities

Text: Khan asserts Shell controlled several security-related activities at the station. With respect to activities, an owner or general contractor who retains a right to control an independent contractor's work may be liable for negligence in the exercise of that control. [8] Neither party here asks us to revisit this rule or has briefed any alternatives; accordingly, we apply it to these facts. [9] Right to control may be shown by explicit contractual assignment or actual exercise of control. [10] Generally, the former is a question of law for the court and the latter a question of fact for the jury. [11] The dealer agreement here specifically stated that La Sani was an independent contractor and Shell had no right to control operations: Dealer is an independent businessperson, and nothing in this Agreement shall be construed as reserving to Shell any right to exercise any control over, or to direct in any respect the conduct or management of, Dealer's business or operations conducted pursuant to this Agreement; but the entire control and direction of such business and operations shall be and remain in Dealer, subject only to Dealer's performance of the obligations of this Agreement. Khan argues the final phrase making an exception for La Sani's duties under the contract is an exception that swallows the rule. That overstates the case. It is true that if the contract obligated La Sani to obey Shell's directions in every detail of security, this recital of independence would have to be ignored. But if the contract delegates security matters to La Sani, then its performance of that obligation does nothing to diminish its independence, or create liability for Shell. We construe contracts as a whole in an effort to harmonize and give effect to all the provisions of the contract so that none will be rendered meaningless. [12] No single provision taken alone will be given controlling effect; rather, all the provisions must be considered with reference to the whole instrument. [13] Accordingly, we construe this provision as indicating La Sani had control of all operations (including security-related matters) unless other provisions of the contract clearly indicate the contrary. Khan asserts that several do.
First, Khan points to the dealer agreement, which provided that La Sani would hire an adequate and competent staff. [14] Khan does not allege Shell actually exercised any control over hiring employees. But he does allege this part of the dealer agreement gave Shell the right to insist that La Sani hire a security guard, and blames Shell because none was. In other words, Khan asks us to construe a contract requiring dealers to hire an adequate number of competent employees to create liability for Shell if they do not. Shell concedes it could have forced La Sani to hire a security guard by threatening to terminate the dealership. But a contracting party's right to order work stopped or fire an independent contractor for non-compliance does not create liability for everything the independent contractor does (or fails to do). [15] Generally, an owner of land does not owe any duty to ensure independent contractors perform their work in a safe manner. [16] An owner may be liable if it specifies by contract a particular safety device and then approves operations that omit it. [17] But the contract here made no mention of security personnel, and delegated entirely to La Sani the duty to hire adequate and competent employees. This is not enough to show a contractual right to control hiring, or to make Shell responsible because La Sani chose not to hire security personnel.
Next, Khan alleges he was injured because he was not trained in robbery prevention. He asserts Shell had a right to control training, pointing to a provision in the dealer agreement requiring La Sani to train its employees, [18] and evidence that Shell distributed a training manual to all dealers and required them to take a training course that addressed security and other topics. For four reasons, this evidence is legally insufficient to show Shell had a right to control Khan's training. First, as with staffing, the dealer agreement specifically delegated staff training to La Sani. There was no summary judgment evidence that Shell (1) knew La Sani routinely failed to train its employees, and (2) had a contractual right to intervene to correct it. [19] Accordingly, we cannot construe a contract requiring dealers to conduct training to create liability for Shell if they do not. Second, we have held that a contract requiring independent contractors to comply with general safety practices and train their employees to do so cannot constitute a right to control job-site safety. [20] Instead, requiring subcontractor's employees to learn and follow general safety procedures subjects an owner only to a narrow duty to avoid increasing the risk of injury. [21] In this case, there is neither allegation nor evidence that Shell's materials or its insistence that La Sani train its employees increased any risk of injury to Khan. Third, it is not enough to show that an oil company controlled some security activities if the ones it controlled had nothing to do with the criminal act that ultimately occurred. [22] Khan does not cite any errors or omissions in Shell's manual or training course; instead, his complaint is that he did not receive the same training. Because no errors or omissions in Shell's training or manual caused Khan's injuries, Shell's right to control them creates no nexus with the injuries Khan alleges. Finally, while the manual excerpts in the record include measures that might be taken before and after robberies, they were clearly labeled as suggestions and recommendations. [23] We have held repeatedly (following the Restatement) that merely making recommendations is no evidence of a right to control. [24] Accordingly, Shell had neither contractual nor actual control of Khan's training.
Both the lease and the dealer agreement required La Sani to keep the station open twenty-four hours a day. In Tidwell, we held the focus is not on who had the right to control general operations of the station, but on who had specific control over safety and security. [25] Control over general hours of operation necessarily falls in the former category rather than the latter. The contractual requirement for round-the-clock operation is no evidence that Shell controlled security at the station. Khan further contends Shell was responsible for his presence outside during a dangerous time of night. He presented evidence (albeit hearsay) that Syed said Shell said the service-bay areas had to be cleaned before the morning rush-hour traffic began. But while Shell may have mandated a particular result, there was no evidence Shell dictated who should do this work or when. A general requirement that work be done by a certain time is insufficient to show right of control. [26] Finally, Khan asserts La Sani was required to report any criminal acts to Shell. It has long been the rule that a right to receive reports is not a right to control. [27] In conclusion, Khan has presented no evidence that Shell had a right to control security-related activities at the station. As an independent contractor with sole control of safety and security operations, La Sani owed Khan a duty to conduct those operations with care, but Shell did not. The trial court properly granted summary judgment to that extent.