Opinion ID: 610900
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Santana

Text: 44 Santana challenges his conviction on the ground that the district court improperly denied consideration of his pre-trial motion to suppress evidence based upon a detention and seizure for which he says the police officers and FBI agents lacked probable cause. 45 Santana's motion in the district court was untimely. The district court granted three extensions of time to file pre-trial motions prior to the final motion date set by the court, April 26, 1991. On that date, Santana filed nine motions, including motions to suppress certain evidence. Thirty-nine days later Santana filed the motion at issue, along with a motion to file out of time. The district court denied both motions without a hearing. 46 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3) and 12(c) require the filing of all motions to suppress by the date set by the court. The failure to file a timely motion constitutes a waiver, see Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(f); however, a district court may grant relief from the waiver upon a showing of: (1) cause for the defendant's non-compliance, and (2) actual prejudice arising from the waiver. See United States v. Hamm, 786 F.2d 804, 806-07 (7th Cir.1986); 1 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure (Criminal) § 193, at 698 n. 24 (2d ed. 1982) (citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 84, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 2505, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977)). We review a district court's denial of a Rule 12(f) motion only for clear legal error, see United States v. Wertz, 625 F.2d 1128, 1132 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 904, 101 S.Ct. 278, 66 L.Ed.2d 136 (1980), or an abuse of discretion, see United States v. Leal, 831 F.2d 7, 10 (1st Cir.1987). 47 Santana failed to make the threshold showing of good cause for his failure to make a timely motion. Santana's counsel contends that she did not learn of all of the circumstances surrounding defendant's arrest until a lengthy meeting with Mr. Santana [in] jail in late May, 1991. Counsel filed her motion two and one-half months after the district court gave its first extension and nearly five months after Santana was arrested. Yet, counsel offers no reason for her failure to discuss with her client the circumstances of his arrest before the court's April 26 deadline. Absent a demonstration of cause, we need not address the merits of Santana's fourth amendment argument. See United States v. Ulloa, 882 F.2d 41, 43 (2d Cir.1989).
48 On counts one, two and four, Santana was awarded a Guidelines base offense level of 28, and his prior convictions made him eligible for a criminal history category of IV. Because he had previously been convicted of three violent and/or drug-related crimes, including one conviction for attempted burglary and two convictions for armed robbery, Santana was classified as an armed career criminal within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Thus, Santana's sentence was enhanced under guideline § 4B1.4, which applies to § 924(e)(1). Pursuant to § 4B1.4, Santana's offense level was increased to 34, and he was placed in criminal history category VI, making him eligible for a sentence of between 262 and 327 months. As noted above, Santana received three concurrent sentences of 290 months on counts one, two and four, in addition to a mandatory 60 month consecutive sentence for his conviction on count three for violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1) and 2. 49 Santana argues that the district court improperly classified him as an armed career criminal under § 924(e)(1). He also contends that § 4B1.4 is in conflict with the legislative intent of Congress in promulgating the Guidelines and was applied to him in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. However, we need not address these arguments to uphold Santana's sentence because he would have received the same offense level and criminal history category if § 4B1.4 had not been applied to him. 50 Santana, like Koontz, qualifies as a career offender under § 4B1.1; he: (1) was 18 years old at the time he committed the instant offenses, (2) was convicted of a controlled substance offense, and (3) has two prior violent crime convictions. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. And, under § 4B1.1, Santana would have received offense level 34 and criminal history category VI, the same Guidelines range he received under § 4B1.4. See id. (career offender's criminal history category in every case shall be Category VI; career offender receives offense level 34 where statutory maximum term for instant offense is 25 years or more and less than life imprisonment). 51 We also need not reach Santana's remaining challenge to his sentence, by which he purports to adopt Koontz's argument that the district court misapplied the narcotics guidelines. Because Santana was sentenced under the armed career criminal guideline and could properly have been sentenced under the career offender guideline, this argument is irrelevant.