Opinion ID: 2384481
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: McGINNIS v. COMMONWEALTH

Text: Dante Lee McGinnis was convicted on two charges, wanton murder and first-degree wanton endangerment, following a shooting incident about 3:30 a.m. on February 8, 1990. He was sentenced to 40 years imprisonment on the charge of wanton murder and one year for wanton endangerment, to run concurrently. McGinnis was 19 years old. He and many others were congregated in the parking lot of a White Castle restaurant at Seventh and Broadway in downtown Louisville, Kentucky. McGinnis was with friends, including Reginald Stroud and Blair Kidwell. He became involved in a bottle-throwing incident and a fist fight with one Eric Rufus, who can fairly be described as a member of a hostile gang, and a number of Rufus' confederates. While the men traded insults and fought, Kidwell ran to McGinnis' car and drove it around the corner, parking it in front of the Bank of Louisville at 626 West Broadway, with motor running. McGinnis and Stroud, chased by Rufus and others, and followed by a crowd of onlookers, ran from the parking lot to the bank. McGinnis went to the car, got a big silver revolver he had bought recently as the trouble escalated between these opposing gangs, and fired it into the ground. His friend Stroud then attempted to take the gun away, but McGinnis grabbed it back, accidentally shooting Stroud in the leg in the process. In spite of the weapon, Rufus continued to advance, threatening violence. McGinnis shot at Rufus' legs without hitting him, and threatened to kill him. Suddenly one of Rufus' confederates, Antonio Miller, ran up from behind McGinnis and hit him in the side of his face. McGinnis stumbled, turned around, and shot Miller full in the chest, killing him. McGinnis then fled the scene in a car with Kidwell and two others, disposing of the gun in the process. Only McGinnis was armed in this conflict. McGinnis' defense to killing Antonio Miller was: (1) that he carried the gun because he was in fear of his life; (2) that he shot Miller to protect himself and his friend, Stroud, whom Miller had kicked after Stroud fell to the sidewalk upon being accidentally shot by McGinnis; and (3) that he did not mean for it to happen. It should be noted that, while McGinnis testified that he carried the weapon with him in the glove box of his car because he believed his life was in danger from members of this hostile gang, McGinnis admitted throwing the bottle at Rufus to hit him in the head, and admitted that this was the first blow thrown. The jury acquitted McGinnis of the second-degree assault charge in connection with accidentally shooting his friend, Reginald Stroud, and found him guilty of the first-degree wanton endangerment charge based on shooting at the feet of Eric Rufus. As previously stated, they also acquitted McGinnis of the intentional murder charge under Instruction No. 1, but convicted him of wanton murder under Instruction No. 2. McGinnis raised six issues on appeal, one of which concerns whether the jury should have been instructed on wanton murder, and, if so, how instructed (the Shannon problem, which we have discussed and will discuss further later in this opinion). The remaining five issues do not merit reversal. They are as follows: First, appellant, a black man, contends the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to eliminate blacks from the jury. The prosecutor struck three of the six black people remaining in the final draw. Defense counsel objected to the strikes as racially motivated in violation of the United States Supreme Court holding in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). The prosecutor explained two of the jurors had previously sat on a jury which returned a reckless homicide verdict, which he considered pro-defense under the particular circumstances. The third appeared confused as to whether she had sat on a criminal or a civil case during prior jury service, and the prosecutor was wary of her answers. The trial judge found the reckless homicide verdict was an appropriate and racially-neutral explanation for eliminating two of the jurors but found the third strike questionable. However, the trial judge stated he was comfortable with the jury and chose not to set aside the panel. In Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991), the United States Supreme Court, demonstrating great deference to the trial court, used a clearly erroneous standard to review a trial court finding of no discriminatory intent in the exercise of peremptories. We have since chosen to follow Hernandez. See Commonwealth v. Snodgrass, Ky., 831 S.W.2d 176 (1992). In the present case, the trial court's finding was not clearly erroneous, and there was no abuse of discretion. Second, appellant maintains that in light of the overwhelming evidence of self-protection the court improperly denied his motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on the murder charges, both intentional and wanton. He was entitled to a directed verdict on the wanton murder charge because the only evidence was that he shot intentionally. The evidence in this case, however, was not conclusive on the issue of self-protection, so the appellant was not entitled to a directed verdict on the intentional murder charge. As appellant was the only one armed, it would not have been unreasonable for the jury to find appellant did not act in self-defense or that in doing so he used deadly force when he did not believe such force was necessary to protect himself (or another). KRS 503.050 and .070. In any case, we need not even reach the question of whether there was sufficient evidence to convict appellant of intentional murder, because the jury found him not guilty of intentional murder. Appellant was convicted of wanton murder. Therefore the appellant suffered no prejudice from the trial court failing to direct a verdict on the intentional murder charge. Third, appellant contends it was error not to include a definition of extreme emotional disturbance in the instructions. The intentional murder instruction given to the jury included extreme emotional disturbance as a negative element stating: You will find the defendant, Dante Lee McGinnis, guilty under this Instruction if, and only if, you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt all of the following: (a) [That he shot and killed Antonio Miller]. (b) That in so doing, he caused the death of Antonio Miller intentionally and not while acting under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance. Appellant correctly argues that where the evidence warrants the inclusion of extreme emotional disturbance as a mitigating factor to murder, the trial court should separately instruct on extreme emotional disturbance so that the jury [can] understand how to apply extreme emotional distress to differentiate the two intentional homicide crimes; intentional murder and manslaughter in the first degree. Holbrook v. Commonwealth, Ky., 813 S.W.2d 811, 815 (1991). We need not decide whether the absence of such a separate instruction should constitute reversible error in this case, however, for two reasons: (1) appellant failed to specifically object to the failure to give this instruction, as required by RCr 9.54(2), nor did he tender his own, and the issue is therefore unpreserved; and (2) appellant was convicted of wanton murder and therefore suffered no prejudice from any potential error in the instruction on intentional murder. Fourth, appellant argues it was error to limit the self-protection instruction with provocation and initial aggressor qualifications. KRS 503.060(2) and (3). Appellant concedes he threw a Coke bottle at Rufus earlier, back at the White Castle, but states there was no evidence presented at trial that he provoked or was the initial aggressor in the use of force against the victim, Miller. Again, this is an issue we need not decide because the appellant was convicted of wanton murder, and self-protection is not a defense to criminal homicide where wantonness or recklessness constitutes the culpable mental state. See KRS 503.050 and .120, and Commentary. Finally, appellant argues it was error to admit evidence of prior misdemeanor convictions during the sentencing phase where the evidence did not adequately reflect knowing and intelligent guilty pleas. Evidence of a concealed weapon conviction and a possession of a stolen credit card conviction was introduced by the Commonwealth during the sentencing phase of trial. Appellant had pled guilty to both counts. Appellant contends that, as no transcripts of the guilty plea hearings were presented, the Commonwealth had the burden of proving appellant's guilty pleas were constitutionally valid. Appellant applies the wrong standard. The United States Supreme Court in Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. ____, 113 S.Ct. 517, 121 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992), upheld our own Kentucky procedure for using evidence of judgments of conviction on prior guilty pleas in the penalty phase as set out in Dunn v. Commonwealth, Ky., 703 S.W.2d 874 (1985). While Dunn involved proof of a prior conviction in a persistent felony proceeding, there is no reason for a different rule in a truth-insentencing proceeding. Under Kentucky law, once the Commonwealth has proved the existence of a conviction entered on a guilty plea, the burden shifts to the defendant to introduce evidence of its invalidity. In the present case, appellant offered no evidence that the pleas were involuntary. The trial court properly allowed the Commonwealth to introduce evidence of the prior misdemeanors. Turning now to the Shannon issues, here, in addition to seeking a directed verdict on the charge of wanton murder, the defense specifically objected to the giving of a wanton murder instruction, and the defense included a wanton murder instruction in the set of instructions submitted on behalf of McGinnis only after its objection was overruled. In doing so the defense noted in the record that the instruction was not a waiver of the previous objection. As we have discussed supra, the various provisions of the Penal Code, construed as a whole, do not justify submitting the case on a wanton murder instruction where the issue is self-defense, as in this case. The appellant claims to have shot reluctantly in self-defense. This is yet another case wherein the defendant killed with a lethal weapon in self-defense, but also claimed that he did not mean to kill. Sizemore, supra at 407, Leibson, J., dissenting. One of the problems with Shannon , perhaps, is that it did not sufficiently address the problem that arises where, in claiming self-defense, the defendant also denies meaning to kill the victim. An intentional murder instruction requires a jury finding of intent to cause the death of another person. KRS 507.020(1). McGinnis stated he did not mean to kill the victim. Intent may be inferred from consequences, notwithstanding a disclaimer. As the Commentary to KRS 501.020 explains in the process of defining the various culpable mental states, homicide and assault are result offenses. Regardless of whether the accused means to kill, knowing the conduct is of a nature to cause the result suffices to prove intentionally: For offenses of this type [`homicide' and `assault'] the distinction between `intentionally' and `knowingly' is practically nonexistent[.] Commentary to KRS 501.020. Shannon holds that when one deliberately commits a lethal act, the claim that he did not mean to kill is part of the self-defense claim, but it does not change the character of intentional murder to wanton murder. If the defendant presents testimony sufficient to persuade a jury that the defendant intended to shoot, but not to cause the result, the criminal homicide statutes provide a menu adequate to address the diminished culpability issue raised by such testimony. First of all, the jury should be instructed on voluntary manslaughter, which sufficiently covers the situation where one shoots with intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, but causes death. KRS 507.030(1)(a). This instruction would apply where the jury does not believe the claim of self-defense, but further concludes the defendant did not intend to kill. This instruction, of course, should be qualified by a self-defense instruction with Manslaughter II and Reckless Homicide as options available if the jury concludes there was an act of self-defense, wanton or reckless in character. Next, assuming the jury believes the defendant did not even intend serious physical injury, i.e., that he intended slight injury or no injury, surely any shooting in the direction of the victim which cannot be justified as reasonable qualifies as wantonly caus[ing] the death of another person (Manslaughter II, KRS 507.040(1)) or with recklessness [causing] the death of another person (Reckless Homicide, KRS 507.050(1)). The offenses described under Manslaughter II and Reckless Homicide are sufficient to cover both a jury finding of a subjective belief in the need for self-defense which was objectively unreasonable (wanton or reckless) and a jury finding that, while there was no act of self-defense, there was no intent to kill or seriously injure. Intentionally shooting a lethal weapon at another human being, even if the intent is only to scare the victim, qualifies as Manslaughter II or Reckless Homicide if the consequence is to kill the victim. The effect of evidence that the accused did not mean to cause the death of the victim, if believed, is to establish diminished culpability, not to establish wanton murder. He cannot be convicted on evidence of this nature of wanton murder because, although the element of wantonness is presented, the element of extreme indifference to human life is not. The degree of culpability required for a finding of wanton murder was not sufficiently addressed in Barbour v. Commonwealth, Ky., 824 S.W.2d 861 (1992) and Sizemore v. Commonwealth, Ky., 844 S.W.2d 397 (1992). As stated by Justice Dan Jack Combs in his dissenting opinion in Sizemore : [W]antonness suffices to establish culpability for manslaughter in the second degree, but it does not suffice to establish culpability for wanton murder, which requires the additional state-of-mind element of manifest extreme indifference to human life [`the actor's conscious disregard of the risk']. [Emphasis original.] Citing Model Penal Code § 210.2, comment, p. 21 (Am.Law Inst.1980). . . . . As the statutes reveal, the General Assembly intends that a defendant who has used deadly force in the [subjective, erroneous] belief that such force was necessary to protect himself against death or serious physical injury is not guilty of wanton murder. The rationale for this legislative decision is similarly plain: where the actor believes in the need to protect his life, the circumstances, while they may demonstrate wantonness, cannot manifest extreme indifference to human life. 844 S.W.2d at 403. (Emphasis original.) As summarized in Holbrook v. Commonwealth, Ky., 813 S.W.2d 811, 814 (1991): In Shannon , we recognized that an individual may intentionally commit murder while acting under a wanton or reckless belief, and that the actor's subjective belief may be unreasonable when viewed by an objective standard. Shannon, supra at 550-51 . . . . If the jury believes from the evidence that the defendant's claimed need for self-defense is objectively reasonable under the circumstances, then it becomes a complete defense. However, if the justification is not reasonable, then the defendant can only be convicted under Shannon of either the offenses of manslaughter in the second degree or reckless homicide, depending upon the jury's determination of the defendant's state of mind at the time of the act. Shannon, supra at 552. . . . [T]he gist of the reasoning is that `[a] subjective belief in the need for self-defense, which is objectively wanton or reckless, is a `circumstance' falling within the definition of wanton or reckless behavior, punishable under Manslaughter II or Reckless Homicide. . . .' Id. at 551-52. Thus, to the extent that Barbour v. Commonwealth, supra , and Sizemore v. Commonwealth, supra , have misinterpreted the opinion in Shannon , they are overruled. The bench and bar have engaged in extensive debate regarding whether it is appropriate to include self-defense as an element of the instructions when the defendant is charged with a wanton or reckless homicide. See Cooper and Lawson, Self-Defense in Kentucky: A Need for Clarification or Revision, 76 Ky.L.J. 167 (1987-88). But the Shannon opinion plainly states that self-defense is no defense where the culpable mental state is either wanton or reckless (citing KRS 503.120). By the same token, wanton murder is no option in the self-defense scenario. The instructions in the McGinnis case directed the jury to consider Wanton Murder If you do not find the defendant guilty under Instruction No. 1 (on Intentional Murder). Wanton Murder is not, of course, a lesser included offense of Intentional Murder, simply dropping out the element of self-defense, as it would so appear from these instructions. The Commentary to the Penal Code ties together the relationship between self-defense as described in KRS 503.050 and the diminished culpability in KRS 503.120 as follows: . . . if a defendant, in killing another, believes himself in danger of death but is wanton in having such a belief, he cannot be convicted of murder [3] . But since manslaughter in the second degree is committed through `wantonness' and since this subsection denies a defendant justification for such an offense, he can be convicted of this lesser degree of homicide. Commentary to KRS 503.120. (Emphasis added.) Here the prosecutor argued in effect, repeatedly, that self-defense was not available on the charge of wanton murder, so forget his self-defense claim  the accused had convicted himself of wanton murder out of his own mouth. A wanton murder conviction followed as a matter of course, as we have seen in a number of appeals based on this scenario. In structuring four degrees of criminal homicide based on the degree of culpability, the Penal Code intended no such result. The various provisions in KRS Chapter 503 on justification establish differences in criminal homicide and assault depending on the culpable mental state. The instructions in McGinnis should not have included wanton murder as an available option.