Opinion ID: 1358766
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Countervailing Arguments

Text: The countervailing arguments and the present appellants' arguments depend largely on broad statements of legislative intent. As described by an Eighth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel in In re Wilson, 383 B.R. 729 (8th Cir.BAP2008), the purpose of [the BAPCPA] amendments to §§ 707(b) and 1325(b) was to require above-median income debtors to make more funds available to their unsecured creditors, and to do so by limiting the court's authority to allow expenses. Id. at 733; see also Frederickson, 545 F.3d at 658-60. In Ross-Tousey, the Seventh Circuit found arguments based on this intent relatively non-compelling in the context of a Chapter Seven bankruptcy case. There the court noted that, in Chapter Seven, the means test is for determining whether a bankruptcy petition is presumptively abusive. Ross-Tousey, 549 F.3d at 1161. Even where a petition is not presumptively abusive, a court may still find a Chapter Seven petition abusive for reasons of bad faith or based on the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 1162. Accordingly, in the context of Chapter Seven, it is unnecessary to incorporate the IRM into the means test to honor the Congressional intent of limiting the courts' ability to allow expenses and making it more difficult to discharge consumer debt. Rather, the catch-all provisions of Chapter Seven provide a backstop that permits the dismissal of abusive Chapter Seven petitions. Our case, however, arises under Chapter Thirteen rather than Chapter Seven, and the same issues of presumptive abusive or non-presumptive abuse are not directly in play. Still, the question before us today is how to properly interpret a provision of Chapter Seven, and we do not believe it is appropriate to give § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) one meaning when applied in a Chapter Seven proceeding and another when applied in a Chapter Thirteen proceeding without a legislative basis for doing so. Accordingly, even though the argument based on BAPCPA's intent to make more funds available to creditors is more compelling in the present case than in Chapter Seven cases such as Ross-Tousey or Tate, we find the Seventh and Fifth Circuits' balancing of competing legislative intentions convincing. Accordingly, we hold that a debtor need not in fact owe a vehicle loan or lease payment to claim a vehicle-ownership expense in accordance with § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I).