Opinion ID: 761718
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: description of referrals

Text: 11 The first referral related to the counterclaims made by Gray against the Calliers, and this ultimately ended in default judgment against the Calliers. Specifically, the Calliers point in their brief to what purports to be a default judgment triggered by the magistrate judge: The entry of a Default Judgment is clearly dispositive of a case and is not a pretrial matter within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 636 or Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. [Thus,] [t]he trial court should not have abdicated its responsibility to a Magistrate Judge. The magistrate judge, however, did not enter a default judgment in this case; he specifically indicated: In view of the foregoing, the undersigned [magistrate judge] recommends that the defendant's motion for default judgment as to liability be sustained and that a default judgment be entered .... (emphasis added). No basis for this initial referral was cited by the district court in its order referring this issue to the magistrate judge. 12 The second referral by the district court involved the question of the amount of damages, both liquidated and unliquidated, to be awarded to Gray. The district court in its order referring this issue to the magistrate judge specifically cited 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) as the basis for the authority to do so. Since the district court had already entered a default judgment on the issue of liability as to Gray's claims against the Calliers, the proceeding involving damages was a post-judgment one.