Opinion ID: 6491122
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Dismissal of Counts I Through IV of the Second Amended Complaint

Text: On March 6, 2000, Napali Appellees moved for partial summary judgment with respect to Counts I (common law unfair competition), III (interference with prospective business advantage), and IV (conspiracy). Therein, Napali Appellees contended that, inasmuch as Appellants’ purported business tort claims are wholly dependent on Napali Appellees’ alleged violations of HEMP (the county rules and regulations relating to SMA permits) and ORMRA (the state rules and regulations relating to state permits), and neither HEMP nor ORMRA confers a private right of action on private parties, Appellants lack standing to enforce these regulations. As such, Napali Appellees argued that Appellants’ claims of common law unfair competition and interference with prospective business advantage were not cognizable. Napali Appellees also contended that Appellants’ conspiracy claim must fail as a matter of law because it was derivative of Appellants’ underlying claims of common law unfair competition and interference with prospective business advantage. On March 30, 2000, G.F. Hutton Properties dba Cliffs Resort Activities and CAP Management Corp. dba The Cliffs Clubs Activities [hereinafter, collectively, Cliffs defendants], who are, inter alia, tour boat promoters, filed a joinder in Napali Appellees’ motion for partial summary judgment. Cliffs defendants further moved that the circuit court summarily dismiss Counts II (aiding and abetting common law unfair competition) and VI (injunctive relief) as to them. Cliffs defendants contended that, inasmuch as Counts II and VI are “entirely derivative” of Count I (common law unfair competition) and Appellants lacked standing to sue Napali Appellees for common law unfair competition, Counts II and VI should be dismissed. A hearing was held on April 13, 2000 with respect to Napali Appellees’ motion for partial summary judgment. At the hearing, the circuit court orally ruled that Appellants’ claims of common law unfair competition were dismissed inasmuch as HRS § 480-2 “is the exclusive remedy.” 15 The circuit court took the Appellants’ other claims raised in Napali Appellees’ motion for partial summary judgment under advisement. On May 23, 2000, the circuit court entered its written order granting in part and deferring in part Napali Appellees’ motion for partial summary judgment. Therein, the circuit court dismissed Count I (common law unfair competition against tour boat operators) as to all defendants. The circuit court partially dismissed Count IV (conspiracy), dismissing Appellants’ conspiracy to commit common law unfair competition claim. The circuit court deferred on ruling on Count III (interference with prospective business advantage) and ordered the parties to submit supplemental memoranda in support of their positions. Although not clear from the circuit court’s order, it appeared that the circuit court would rule on Appellants’ conspiracy to commit interference with prospective business advantage claim when it ruled on Appellants’ interference with prospective business advantage claim. On July 26, 2000, the circuit court entered a supplemental order, dismissing Count II (common law unfair competition against tour boat promoters) as to all defendants. On August 30, 2000, the circuit court entered an order granting Napali Appellees’ motion for partial summary judgment with respect to Count III (interference with prospective business advantage) as to all defendants. The circuit court also dismissed the remainder of Count IV (conspiracy), dismissing Appellants’ conspiracy to commit interference with prospective business advantage claim as to all defendants. In its August 30, 2000 order, the circuit court stated: 2. The [cjourt finds that the test set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975) controls in this case, and that [Appellants] do not have a private right of action to bring tort claims based on alleged violations of permitting regulations and environmental statutes governing the Hanalei [SMA] and the Napali coastal region. 3. In applying the Cort v. Ash test to this case, the [c]ourt specifically finds as follows: (i) The various permitting regulations and environmental statutes upon which [Appellants] base their tort claims were not enacted for the benefit of commercial boaters, but for the general public. (ii) There is no indication of a legislative intent to create private remedies for [Appellants] within these regulations and statutes, because the primary concerns behind the enactment of these laws were public enjoyment of coastal regions and environmental protection. (iii) Specifically, HRS § 205A-6 [16] was enacted to provide the general public with a cause of action when the objectives, rules, and regulations governing [SMAs] are violated. In this regard, the Court finds as compelling the 1977 Senate Committee Report 779, relating to the purpose behind HRS [chapter 205A. (iv) Allowing [Appellants] to pursue a claim of interference with prospective business advantage based on alleged violations of the objectives, rules, and regulations governing the Hanalei [SMA] would not advance the underlying purpose and legislative scheme of HRS [c]hapter 205A. Consequently, Appellants’ surviving claims were Counts V (unjust enrichmenVaccount-ing against tom’ boat operators) and VI (in-junctive relief against tour boat operators and promoters). 17