Opinion ID: 1224606
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Similarly Situated Means Similar in All Relevant Respects

Text: In directing a verdict against Furukawa, the trial court ruled as follows: [I]t is apparent to the Court that Plaintiff has not sustained his burden with respect to make [sic] a prima facie case of this matter. There is no direct evidence of discrimination, so the Court needs to look at areas that are through the Mcdonald [sic] Douglas type test circumstantial evidence showing disparate treatment, but as has been noticed, it would appear to the Court that... there are no similar type comparisons to others that the Plaintiff seeks to say that they were given preferential treatment. Miss Kroe was a part-time worker, Miss Kaulupali is a manager of the Zootique. It would appear to the Court that with respect to this area about the comparison with respect to similar situated employees, the Plaintiff does not measure up. (Emphasis added.) In other words, the trial court ruled that because Kroe worked parttime and Furukawa worked full-time, the two employees were not comparable; because Kaulupali and Robertson worked in the Zootique and Furukawa assisted Durbec in the administrative office, any comparison with them was also irrelevant. We disagree. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), the United States Supreme Court developed the following three-part framework for analyzing the development of proof in an employment discrimination case. First, the plaintiff must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that there was discrimination on the basis of a protected characteristic. Establishment of the prima facie case in effect creates a presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). The burden of production then shifts to the defendant to proffer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation of the adverse employment action. Id. at 253, 101 S.Ct. at 1093-94. Finally, if a defendant successfully rebuts the presumption, the burden returns to the plaintiff, to show that the defendant's explanation was pretextual. The burden of persuasion of course remains at all times on the plaintiff. Id. [3] Of course, a federal court's interpretation of Title VII is not binding on this court's interpretation of civil rights laws adopted by the Hawai`i legislature. However, the McDonnell Douglas framework can be a useful analytical tool in resolving the elusive factual question of intentional discrimination. Id. at 256 n. 8, 101 S.Ct. at 1095 n. 8. The central focus of the inquiry in a case such as this is always whether the employer is treating `some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.' The method suggested in McDonnell Douglas for pursuing this inquiry was never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic. Rather, it is merely a sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence in light of common experience as it bears on the critical question of discrimination. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2949, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978). And [t]he burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. at 1094; see also Sischo-Nownejad v. Merced Community College District, 934 F.2d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir.1991) (the amount [of evidence] that must be produced is very little.) (internal quotation marks omitted). In the absence of relevant Hawai`i case law, both parties rely on federal judicial decisions. Unlike federal law, however, the State of Hawai`i extends its employment discrimination protection to all employers, not just employers with fifteen or more employees. HRS § 378-1 (1993) defines employer to mean any person ... having one or more employees[;] cf. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(b) (West 1994). The federal courts have considerable experience in analyzing these cases, and we look to their decisions for guidance. But, as the California Supreme Court recently observed, federal employment discrimination authority is not necessarily persuasive, particularly where a state's statutory provision differs in relevant detail. Romano v. Rockwell Int'l, Inc., 14 Cal.4th 479, 59 Cal. Rptr.2d 20, 30-31, 926 P.2d 1114, 1125 (1996); see also Schweigert v. Provident Life Ins. Co., 503 N.W.2d 225 (N.D.1993) (modifying McDonnell Douglas test). Relying on decisions which have held that comparable employees must be similarly situated in all respects [,] Mitchell v. Toledo Hospital, 964 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir.1992) (original emphasis), the Society insists that Furukawa be required to show, as part of his prima facie case, that any individual he seeks to compare his treatment with must have (1) dealt with the same supervisor, (2) been subject to the same standards, and (3) engaged in the same conduct, without differentiating or mitigating circumstances that would distinguish the conduct or the employer's treatment. The Society urges that discrimination plaintiffs be required to compare their treatment to others only if the comparison involves the same offense or the same performance problems. In light of the applicability of employment discrimination law in Hawai`i to all employers, no matter how small, we find the Society's proposed test excessively narrow. In Pierce v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 796 (6th Cir.1994), the Sixth Circuit faced a claim brought against an employer by a male supervisor who was disciplined for sexually inappropriate behavior with a female subordinate employee. Pierce claimed discrimination in that the subordinate had engaged in similarly egregious behavior, but had not been disciplined. The court held that the comparison was invalid because the two employees were not similarly situated: The following distinctions between Pierce and Kennedy are undisputed: Pierce was a supervisor and Kennedy was not; Pierce had responsibility over three offices, whereas Kennedy was an office administrator with no supervisory control over any other employees; Pierce evaluated employees, including Kennedy, while Kennedy evaluated no one; and, unlike Kennedy, Pierce attended agency group meetings and was responsible for enforcement of the company's sexual harassment policy. Id. at 802. However, the Sixth Circuit's holding does not rest on the simple fact that the two employees held different positions in the workplace hierarchy. Instead, the court focused on a particularly relevant detail that distinguished them: unlike Kennedy, Pierceas a supervisorcould be considered the employer's agent, and because following this incident the employer was on notice of his behavior, the employer could itself be held liable under Title VII for sexual harassment for any such behavior in the future. This was not true of Kennedy. Id. at 803-04. Under these circumstances, the relevant aspects of his employment are not, as Pierce claims, `nearly identical' to Kennedy's employment. Id. at 804. Generally, similarly situated employees are those who are subject to the same policies and subordinate to the same decision-maker as the plaintiff. In considering whether a fellow employee can be considered similarly situated, we agree with the Pierce court's focus on those distinguishing aspects relevant to the claimed discrimination. We hold that Furukawa must prove that all of the relevant aspects of his employment situation were similar to those employees with whom he seeks to compare his treatment. See, e.g., Pierce, 40 F.3d at 802; Smith v. Stratus Computer, Inc., 40 F.3d 11, 17 (1st Cir.1994), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 1958, 131 L.Ed.2d 850 (1995); Pearson v. Macon-Bibb County Hosp. Auth., 952 F.2d 1274, 1280 (11th Cir.1992); Rohde v. K.O. Steel Castings, Inc., 649 F.2d 317, 322 (5th Cir.1981) (Differences in job status and skill may well have an impact on the second phase of proof under McDonnell Douglas, ... but they should not defeat a prima facie case[.]); Hager v. Western Sizzlin Steak House, Inc. (Augusta), 537 F.Supp. 1016, 1017 (S.D.Ga.1982) (The fact that the plaintiff and Bass held dissimilar positions is irrelevant to a determination of what constitutes `similar circumstances' in this case.). Applying this test, we do not agree that Furukawa, Kroe, Kaulupali and Robertson were not similarly situated employees and thus irrelevant to Furukawa's prima facie case of discrimination. All four employees were subject to the same decision-makersDurbec as executive director, Pruett as president of the board, and the other members of the board. While Kroe and Furukawa kept different hours and had differing titles, the two worked in close proximity in the same office under the same supervisor, were subject to the same personnel manual, and interacted with the same individuals whose conduct is at issue in this case. Similar reasoning favors allowing Furukawa to compare his treatment with that of Kaulupali and Robertson. The Society raises the specter of a flood of discrimination suits brought simply because one employee may have committed an offense which no other employee has committed, even though there is no evidence of disparate treatment sufficient to establish a prima facie case. But any lawsuit brought without evidentiary support should be easily dismissed. Amicus curiae Hawai`i Chamber of Commerce protests that [n]o legitimate discriminatory inference can be drawn from pointing to others of the same sex or race who also suffered adverse employment actions without comparing how others not of the same race or sex were treated in similar situations.... Yet under the trial court's ruling, as urged by the Society, Furukawa's entire effort to do exactly thisby demonstrating preferential treatment afforded Kroe, Kaulupali, and Robertson, and the allegedly similar discrimination suffered by Changwas deemed legally irrelevant. Pursuant to the Society's view, Furukawa would be barred from bringing a discrimination claim, in effect, because the Society had only five employees, none of whom were similar to him in all respects. Insistence on the strict similarly situated requirement urged on us here wouldin the absence of outrageous conduct giving rise to direct evidence of discriminationbe equivalent to re-writing this state's employment discrimination law to apply only to those employers with a sufficient number of employees to provide a basis for similarly situated comparisons. This clearly was not the intent of the legislature when it made Chapter 378 apply to all employers. Additionally, the Society argues that Furukawa's claim must fail unless he proffers evidence of similarly situated employees outside the protected class who received better treatment. We disagree. Although proof regarding similarly situated employees outside the protected class may be one way of raising an inference of intentional discrimination, it is not the only way.  Heard v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., Inc., 44 Cal.App.4th 1735, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 620, 632 (1996) (original emphasis). To state that a plaintiff may never establish a prima facie case if the plaintiff fails to produce evidence that similarly-situated employees outside the protected class were promoted [or received other favorable treatment], restricts unfairly the circumstances from which discrimination may be inferred. Such a requirement ... emphasizes one way of proving intentional discrimination instead of properly focussing on the pivotal issue in disparate treatment caseswhether a particular individual was discriminated against and why. Id. 52 Cal.Rptr.2d at 632 (citation omitted) (original emphasis). As this case demonstrates, proof of discriminatory intent will often present a difficult burden for plaintiffs in these cases. The absence of the kind of evidence discussed by the Society will likely bear heavily on Furukawa'sor any plaintiff'sability to prove that he or she was the victim of illegal discrimination. But circumstantial evidence bearing on the ultimate issue should not be automatically excluded by the application of arbitrary rules. Cf. Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 698 (7th Cir.1987) (A plaintiff's ability to prove discrimination... circumstantially, must not be crippled by evidentiary rulings that keep out probative evidence because of crabbed notions of relevance or excessive distrust of juries.).