Opinion ID: 1782405
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the gonzalez provision

Text: The majority fails to mention some of the pertinent facts of this cause. First, the testimony in the trial court reflects that Gonzalez never defaulted on a payment under the contract. Neither Gainan's nor General Motors Acceptance Corporation ever attempted to repossess the vehicle due to default. Second, the record reflects that the contract was executed by Gonzalez on July 1, 1976 and provided for thirty-six monthly payments. The payments were to begin on August 16, 1976. The last payment was due under the contract on July 16, 1979. Suit was filed on June 30, 1980, one day prior to the running of the applicable statute of limitations. At the institution of the lawsuit, there was not even an effective contract between Gonzalez and Gainan's or General Motors Acceptance Corporation. Indeed, the statement of facts affirmatively reflects that Gonzalez had paid off the contract to General Motors Acceptance Corporation. Because of these facts, I entertain serious doubts as to whether Gonzalez has satisfied the case and controversy requirement set out by this court. See City of West University Place v. Martin, 132 Tex. 354, 356, 123 S.W.2d 638, 639 (1939); State v. Society for Friendless Children, 130 Tex. 533, 534, 111 S.W.2d 1075, 1076 (1938). The provision under consideration in this cause is: Further, in any such event [default], seller or any sheriff or other officer of the law may take immediate possession of said property without demand, including any equipment or accessories thereto; and for this purpose seller may enter upon the premises where said property may be and remove same. The majority appears to distinguish Southwestern Investment Co. v. Mannix, 557 S.W.2d 755, 758 (Tex.1977) from the present cause. Mannix is distinguishable. In Mannix, we analyzed the following contract provision: nothing shall prevent the Secured Party from removing the property from any premises to which same may be attached, upon default or breach, and stated that SIC could, for example, forcefully enter Mannix' home. Id. at 763. The Mannix provision is an authorization for unlawful entry because an unconditional non-preventable right of entry was given. The provision in this cause does not suffer the same infirmity. The majority properly distinguishes Charlie Hillard, Inc. v. Heath, 624 S.W.2d 758 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 1981, no writ); Dub Shaw Ford, Inc. v. Jackson, 622 S.W.2d 664 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 1981, no writ); and Woolard v. Texas Motors, Inc., 616 S.W.2d 706 (Tex.Civ.App.Fort Worth 1981, no writ), from the cause before us. Our courts of appeals have held that retail installment contracts containing free right of entry language do not violate the Consumer Credit Code, TEX.REV. CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 5069-7.07 (Vernon 1984). See Heath, 624 S.W.2d at 760; Jackson, 622 S.W.2d at 665; Woolard, 616 S.W.2d at 709; and Caskey, 600 S.W.2d at 869-70. The majority seems to place emphasis on favorable language in Woolard, 616 S.W.2d at 709, and the absence of similar free right of entry language in the contract in this cause in concluding that the present provision violates the Consumer Credit Code. This court has not decided whether free right of entry language will obviate a violation of the Code. The presence of such language may in fact distinguish a provision which is violative of the Code from one which is not. However, the absence of free right of entry language does not establish the converse proposition that the provision in this cause is violative of the Consumer Credit Code. We must analyze the contract before us not on the basis of language which could be written into it, but on the basis of language actually contained within it. The language contained in the contract signed by Gonzalez has been considered by our courts of appeals. In Martens, the court considered the provision which we consider today. A violation of article 5069-7.07(4) was alleged. The court stated: We cannot agree that a contract is illegal merely because it is susceptible to an interpretation that violates the Code.... Here, we have a contract provision which can be more reasonably construed to comply with the Code, and we so construe it.... [A]rticle 5069-7.07(4) prohibits only contractual provisions waiving liability for illegal acts of the seller. We hold that paragraph six does not violate the Consumer Credit Code because we do not believe this contract would be likely to mislead even an unsophisticated buyer by giving the false impression that he had waived any rights of buyer against seller for seller's illegal acts. 585 S.W.2d at 944. (Emphasis in original). See Hinojosa, 678 S.W.2d at 710-11. I agree with the analysis presented in Martens. It is more reasonable to conclude that the provision in this cause does not violate article 5069-7.07(3). The provision authorized entry. No unconditional right of entry is given. No right to enter illegally is authorized. No clear violation of the Consumer Credit Code has been demonstrated. Therefore, no penalty under article 5069-8.01 should be assessed. I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. GONZALEZ, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.