Opinion ID: 2068788
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Healthcare Peer Review Report is covered by the peer review privilege.

Text: OCME contends that Superior Court erred in determining that the Healthcare Peer Review Report was privileged under Section 1768. The Healthcare Peer Review Report was created by the mental health technician who escorted Heverin to the cafeteria on February 25, 2008. It was prepared at the direction of DBHS's Director of Risk Management exclusively for the peer review committee's use. OCME argues that no privilege applies, because the Healthcare Peer Review Report was merely furnished to the peer review committee. It contends that Section 1768 does not treat records furnished to and records generated by the peer review committee equally. This argument is without merit. OCME relies upon the following emphasized phrases in Section 1768(b): Unless otherwise provided by this chapter, the records and proceedings of committees and organization described in subsection (a) of this section are confidential and may be used by those committees or organizations and the members thereof only in the exercise of the proper functions of the committee or organization. The records and proceedings are not public records and are not available for court subpoena, nor are they subject to discovery. A person in attendance at a meeting of any such committee or organization is not required to testify as to what transpired at the meeting. A person certified to practice medicine, or a hospital, organization, or institution furnishing, in good faith and without gross or wanton negligence, information, data, reports, or records to such a committee or organization or a member thereof with respect to any patient examined or treated by a person certified to practice medicine or examined, treated, or confined in the hospital or institution is not, by reasons of furnishing such information data, reports, or records, liable in damages to any person or subject to any other recourse, civil or criminal. . . . [27] OCME contends that the statute protects the records and proceedings of committees, and treats them differently from information, data, reports, or records [furnished] to such a committee. OCME asserts that, although the records of the committee are not public and are not subject to subpoena or discovery, the information furnished to the committee is not expressly privileged, even though certain persons who supply that information may be immune from liability. OCME reads into Section 1768 a distinction that is not there. A more natural interpretation of the statute is to read the phrase the records and proceedings of committees as encompassing information, data, reports, and records that are both furnished to and generated by the peer review committee. This interpretation is supported by the structure of the statute. Subsection (a) addresses protection for committee members, while subsection (b) addresses protection for committee information. The thrust of subsection (b) is to protect the records and proceedings of the committee from discovery, but that protection encompasses corollary protections. Examples include protecting attendees from testifying as to what transpired at the meeting (including what evidence was introduced), establishing civil and criminal immunity for those furnishing information to the committee, and identifying certain instances when disclosure of such privileged information is permitted. Moreover, given the Superior Court's consistent interpretation of Section 1768, the General Assembly's actions indicate that it intended to treat records furnished to and generated by the peer review committee the same way. After the Superior Court decisions adopting this interpretation, the General Assembly re-enacted Section 1768 without significant alterations to the statutory language relied on by the Superior Court in Riggs National Bank v. Boyd and McBroom v. Graybeal . [28] Therefore, we can presume that the General Assembly was aware of these interpretations and adopted them when it re-enacted the statute. [29]