Opinion ID: 77840
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of a Quartz Crystal

Text: The Committee denied Smith the possession of a quartz crystal after reviewing his written request, as well as a number of background materials on Odinism, because there was a lack of supporting materials validating a need for this item. R2-98, Exh. M at 1. Smith contends that this decision substantially burdened his observance of Odinism. We have previously defined a substantial burden as being significant pressure which directly coerces the religious adherent to conform his or her behavior accordingly. Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1227. More pertinent to the present action, we have made clear that, in order to constitute a substantial burden on religious practice, the government's action must be more than . . . incidental and must place more than an inconvenience on religious exercise. Id. (citation omitted). That is, to constitute a substantial burden under RLUIPA, the governmental action must significantly hamper one's religious practice. Here, Smith contends that the fact that the quartz crystal was denied outright should be sufficient, standing alone, to demonstrate that his religious practice was substantially burdened. The Committee's denial alone, however, does not necessarily establish a substantial burden. Rather, in reviewing the entirety of the record evidence, we find that Smith has failed to present sufficient evidence to demonstrate how, if at all, the ADOC's denial of a small quartz crystal constituted a substantial burden on his practice of Odinism. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). The decision to ultimately deny Smith's request for a quartz crystal was reached after the Committee undertook a probing and thorough review of Smith's religious requests. The ADOC Chaplain personally met with Smith to discuss his request, including the need for the crystal; reviewed documentation on Odinism submitted by Smith's non-incarcerated friend; conducted independent research on the tenets of Odinism; held discussions with Chaplains in other prisons on the religion's doctrines; and encouraged Smith to submit as much evidence as he could in support of his request. In conducting his review, the Chaplain found that the evidence in support of Smith's request for a small quartz crystal was incomplete and sketchy. R2-63, Exh. K at 3. After gather[ing] more informative sources on [his] own and research[ing] the [credibility] of each of Smith's requested items, id., the Chaplain found that there were no supporting materials validating [the] need for a crystal in connection with Smith's practice of Odinism, and, accordingly, the Committee denied that item. R2-98, Exh. M at 1. [13] In challenging that decision on appeal, Smith has presented no evidence to demonstrate that a small quartz crystal was fundamental to his practice of Odinism, such that the denial of the crystal effectuated any more than an inconvenience on [his] religious exercise. See Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1227. Indeed, Smith has failed to establish the relevance of the crystal to his practice of Odinism, as he was obligated to do in order to demonstrate that the denial of that item would significantly hamper his religious observance. Smith's request states only that the crystal was essential because it allows communication with the netherworld. R1-20, Exh. K. Similarly, the sources on Odinsim that were submitted by Smith stated, in rather general terms, that [q]uartz crystals are used in shamanism around the world, that they are used in many prehistoric religions, such as Old world alchemy, witchcraft, and magic, and that they are still in use in many traditional societies. R2-61. There is no mention in these third party sources of Odinism, nor is there any indication that a small, quartz crystal is necessary to observe the rites of Odinism. In short, neither Smith's request, nor the outside sources that he submitted in connection with it, demonstrate the need for a quartz crystal in order to practice Odinism. While it is true that courts are not to inquire into the centrality of a particular religious tenet in undertaking the substantial burden analysis, Adkins, 393 F.3d at 559, at a minimum the substantial burden test requires that a RLUIPA plaintiff demonstrate that the government's denial of a particular religious item or observance was more than an inconvenience to one's religious practice. See Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1227. On appeal, Smith argues that a substantial burden can be found based on the simple fact that (1) he asked for the crystal to use in Odinism; (2) the request was based on Smith's sincer[e] religious beliefs; and (3) the Committee flatly denied that request. Br. Of Appellant at 47. Smith contends that this evidence should be enough, standing alone, to demonstrate that his religious exercise was substantially burdened under RLUIPA. Such an expansive reading of section 3, however, would require us to find a substantial burden whenever any request in connection with a sincere religious belief was denied by a state prison. If the word substantial in the statutory phrase substantial burden, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a), is to retain any meaning, it must, at a minimum, be construed as requiring something more than solely the denial of a request that is sincere. An alternate approach, like the one advocated by Smith, would result in the word substantial in § 2000cc-1(a) as being mere surplusage, since every governmental action denying a requested item to be used in religious observance would give rise to a prima facie RLUIPA claim. We decline to adopt such an expansive reading of section 3 of RLUIPA. Put simply, we are not convincedand there is no evidence, other than Smith's own assertion and his scant sources, to establishthat the Committee's decision denying Smith a small, quartz crystal place[d] more than an inconvenience on [his] religious exercise. See Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1227. If anything, the denial of the crystal strikes us as an incidental burden on Smith's Odinism, which, we have held, is not sufficient to meet the threshold of a substantial burden under RLUIPA. See id. Because Smith did not present evidence to demonstrate a substantial burden on his Odinist observances by the denial of the crystal, he failed to establish a prima facie case under RLUIPA, and the defendants-appellees are entitled to summary judgment on Smith's RLUIPA claim. See id. at 1228 (summary judgment is appropriate if the RLUIPA plaintiff fails to make out a prima facie case, and the court need not inquire into whether the government interest asserted is compelling). See also Johnson, 263 F.3d at 1243 (summary judgment is appropriate if the party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial) (quotations and citation omitted).