Opinion ID: 1972567
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Bennett contends that there was insufficient evidence to convict him either as an accomplice or as a principal of criminally negligent manslaughter. He argues that Maldonado propelled Toler into the window causing his death and that there is no evidence he solicited or aided Maldonado in the commission of that act, or that Toler's death was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of Bennett's involvement in the fight. We disagree. A person is guilty of manslaughter if that person ... [r]ecklessly, or with criminal negligence, causes the death of another human being.... 17-A M.R.S.A. § 203(1)(A) (Supp.1994). The elements of the offense are that (1) the defendant acted recklessly, by consciously disregarding a risk, or acted with criminal negligence by failing to be aware of a risk that his conduct could cause the death of another; (2) this disregard or failure to be aware of a risk rises to a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable and prudent person would observe in the same situation; and (3) the defendant's reckless or criminally negligent conduct caused a death. State v. Gammon, 529 A.2d 813, 815 (Me. 1987). A person is guilty as an accomplice of another person in the commission of a crime if: With the intent of promoting or facilitating the commission of the crime, he solicits such other person to commit the crime, or aids or agrees to aid or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing the crime. A person is an accomplice under this subsection to any crime the commission of which was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of his conduct.... 17-A M.R.S.A. § 57(3)(A) (1983). So long as the accomplice intended to promote the primary crime, and the commission of the secondary crime was a foreseeable consequence of the accomplice's participation in the primary crime, no further evidence of the accomplice's subjective state of mind as to the secondary crime is required. State v. Linscott, 520 A.2d 1067, 1070 (Me.1987). Accomplice accountability to manslaughter arises when some set of circumstances constituting manslaughter is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the intended conduct. Cf. State v. Kimball, 424 A.2d 684, 694 (Me. 1981) (involving planned robbery that resulted in murder by uncontemplated means). It is without legal significance that the actual death was constituted by different circumstances which, fairly regarded, are neither freakish nor outlandish relative to the foreseeable consequences. Id. In examining the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State to determine whether a trier of fact rationally could find beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the offense charged. State v. Barry, 495 A.2d 825, 826 (Me.1985). Pursuant to the rationales of Linscott and Kimball, once death is established as a foreseeable consequence of the primary crime (assault), Bennett becomes an accomplice to manslaughter as long as the circumstances of the death, fairly regarded, are neither freakish nor outlandish relative to the foreseeable consequences. See Kimball, 424 A.2d at 694. On the evidence before it the jury rationally could conclude that Bennett was an accomplice to manslaughter. Accordingly, we need not address whether there was sufficient evidence on which to convict Bennett as a principal of manslaughter. The entry is: Judgments affirmed. All concurring.