Opinion ID: 2058062
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Excited Utterance Issue

Text: The defendant's first argument on appeal is that the trial justice committed clear error in admitting certain evidence under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. The defendant contends that the trial justice abused his discretion in ruling that the statements that Jane made to her mother both over the telephone and at her aunt Ligna's apartment were admissible under this exception. We disagree with defendant's contention. The excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule is set forth in Rule 803(2) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. Rule 803(2) provides that [a] statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition is not excluded by the hearsay rule notwithstanding the fact that the declarant may be available to testify as a witness. It is well settled in this jurisdiction that, in order to qualify as an excited utterance, the statement need not have been strictly contemporaneous with the startling event. State v. Momplaisir, 815 A.2d 65, 70 (R.I.2003); State v. Vaccaro, 111 R.I. 59, 62, 298 A.2d 788, 790 (1973) (In this state we have never insisted on strict contemporaneity.). This Court has rejected any approach to the determination of what constitutes a spontaneous utterance strictly on the basis of the lapse of time which occurs between the incident and the utterance. Vaccaro, 111 R.I. at 63, 298 A.2d at 790; see also State v. Jalette, 119 R.I. 614, 623, 382 A.2d 526, 531 (1978) ([T]he delay in time between the exciting event and the utterance is only one factor to be considered.); State v. Nordstrom, 104 R.I. 471, 476, 244 A.2d 837, 840 (1968) (We eschew any approach to this question [of whether or not a statement is an excited utterance] which calls for a blind obedience to a clock and hour by hour count of the time that has transpired between the event and declaration.). [4] Instead, the determinative factor in deciding whether or not a statement qualifies as an excited utterance is whether the declarant was still laboring under the stress of excitement caused by the event when he or she made the statement at issue. See Nordstrom, 104 R.I. at 476, 244 A.2d at 840 (The crucial question is whether from a consideration of all the facts the trial justice is satisfied the declarant was still laboring under the stress of the nervous excitement when    she spoke.); see also State v. Wright, 817 A.2d 600, 606 (R.I.2003) (Spontaneous exclamations can be admitted as an excited utteranceeven if the statement is not strictly contemporaneous with the exciting eventif, after considering all the facts in the case, it is apparent that the declarant was still laboring under the stress of the excitement produced by the event described when he or she uttered the statement in question.). In sexual assault cases, especially cases in which the victim is a child of tender years, the time requirement with respect to excited utterances is less demanding. See State v. Souza, 456 A.2d 775, 778 (R.I.1983); Jalette, 119 R.I. at 619, 382 A.2d at 529; see also State v. Burgess, 465 A.2d 204, 207 (R.I.1983). The advisory committee's notes concerning Rule 803 explain the rationale for this less demanding criterion as follows: [I]n sexual assault cases the shock of the event often lasts longer and the outpouring may come only later, when a parent, friend, or officer is present. Nevertheless, even in these cases, the trial justice must find that each statement at issue was a spontaneous verbal reaction to some startling or shocking event made at a time when [the victim] was still in the state of nervous excitement produced by that event and before she had time to contrive or misrepresent before the statement can be admitted as an excited utterance. Jalette, 119 R.I. at 621, 382 A.2d at 530; see also Nordstrom, 104 R.I. at 475-76, 244 A.2d at 840. The spontaneity of the statement at issue must be evaluated by examining the circumstances that existed when said statement was made. Jalette, 119 R.I. at 621, 382 A.2d at 530. In the present case, it is our opinion that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in ruling that the statements that Jane made to her mother both over the telephone and at her aunt Ligna's apartment on October 5 were admissible under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. See Krakue, 726 A.2d at 462. Evidence was presented at trial which could reasonably support a conclusion that Jane was still laboring under the stress of the nervous excitement engendered by the event when she spoke with her mother. See Vaccaro, 111 R.I. at 63, 298 A.2d at 790; see also Wright, 817 A.2d at 606. Jane's mother, Pilar, testified that Jane seemed frightened and was crying when she spoke with her by telephone on the morning of October 5. Pilar further testified that Jane looked sad and frightened and was crying when she spoke with her in person at Ligna's apartment. Although this testimony was contradicted by the testimony of Jane's aunt (Ligna) and that of her cousin (Thomas), both of whom testified that Jane seemed fine and did not cry the day after the alleged incident, the trial justice clearly found Pilar's testimony to be credible. See State v. Roberts, 705 A.2d 1380 (R.I.1997) (mem.) (When the trial justice is faced with a credibility determination, this court will give great deference to his or her determination and will not itself weigh the credibility of the witnesses.). The existence of this evidence of Jane's demeanor when she made the statements at issue distinguishes this case from State v. Poulin, 415 A.2d 1307, 1311 (R.I.1980), in which we held that the trial justice erred in admitting certain hearsay evidence under the excited utterance exception because there was a total absence of demeanor evidence presented at trial. Given the evidence before the trial justice in this case, it is our opinion that he was not clearly erroneous in concluding that Jane was still laboring under the stress of the nervous excitement engendered by the event when she made the statements to her mother. Therefore, we will not reverse his ruling that the statements were admissible under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. See Vaccaro, 111 R.I. at 63, 298 A.2d at 790; see also Wright, 817 A.2d at 606. Although some period of time had elapsed between the alleged incident and Jane's statements to her mother, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial justice to find that these statements met the less demanding time requirement that applies in sexual assault cases involving children. See Souza, 456 A.2d at 778; Jalette, 119 R.I. at 619, 382 A.2d at 529. The trial justice did not abuse his discretion in finding that Jane's statements, although made hours after the alleged incident, were nonetheless, in the words of Jalette, spontaneous verbal reaction[s] to the alleged sexual assault made while Jane was still in the state of nervous excitement, even though she did not articulate those verbal reactions until the next morning-after defendant had left the house and she had an opportunity to speak with her mother. See Jalette, 119 R.I. at 621, 382 A.2d at 530; see also Nordstrom, 104 R.I. at 476-77, 244 A.2d at 840-41 (holding that statements made by a five-year-old girl to her mother when they were first reunited approximately thirty hours after the alleged sexual assault, and soon after the girl was separated from the defendant, were an instinctive outpouring which resulted from the child's overwhelming emotional and shocking experience and thus were admissible under the excited utterance exception). Accordingly, we will not disturb the trial justice's ruling to admit Jane's statements to her mother under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule.