Opinion ID: 1145036
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Exculpatory Nature of the Evidence

Text: The district attorney asserts that the defendant has failed to prove that the evidence which was destroyed would have been exculpatory. When that evidence has been destroyed, it is impossible for the court to determine whether it would have exculpated the defendant. Therefore, it is not necessary that the defendant prove the exculpatory value of the evidence so long as that evidence is not merely incidental to the prosecution's case or the defendant's defense. Garcia, supra, citing People v. Harmes, 38 Colo.App. 378, 560 P.2d 470 (1976), and People v. Bynum, 192 Colo. 60, 556 P.2d 469 (1976). The defendant, however, must at a minimum establish the reasonable possibility that the evidence could have been of assistance to the defense. State v. Wright, 87 Wash.2d 783, 557 P.2d 1 (1976); People v. Hitch, 12 Cal.3d 641, 117 Cal.Rptr. 9, 527 P.2d 361 (1974). Here, we will presume that the fingertip evidence was not merely incidental to the prosecutor's case. The district attorney by taking this interlocutory appeal has certified that all evidence relating to the fingertip is a substantial part of the proof of the charge pending against the defendant. C.A.R. 4.1(a). [2] Given this certification, it is difficult for us to perceive how the manner of severance would not be equally significant. In addition, the defendant has established through his expert witness that, had the fingertip been preserved, the manner of severance could have been determined, and that there was a reasonable possibility that the results could have been of assistance to the defense, either to rebut the prosecutor's apparent theory or corroborate his own theory of defense.