Opinion ID: 1482099
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Record Interrogation Electronically

Text: Defendant advances the additional argument that modern notions of due process require the electronic recordation of his custodial statements as a condition for their admissibility. Because that purported condition was not satisfied in this case, defendant asserts that his statements should have been suppressed. Moreover, he asserts, with the able assistance of amici, that the policy reasons for requiring such additional protection to defendants and to law enforcement, and indeed, for the enhanced efficiency of the judicial system as a whole, outweigh any inconvenience or cost occasioned by such a requirement. We consider those assertions in turn. The federal standard for the admissibility of confessions was established in Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168, 107 S.Ct. 515, 523, 93 L.Ed. 2d 473, 485 (1986), which held that a state must prove admissibility of a confession by a preponderance of the evidence. As a matter of our own jurisprudence, we require the voluntariness of a confession to be demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 123, 134, 548 A. 2d 887 (1988) ( Bey II ). We have held that whether a statement is memorialized or not is but a factor contributing to the overall determination of a statement's voluntariness. See State v. Burris, 145 N.J. 509, 534, 679 A. 2d 121 (1996). We require the State to introduce independent proof of facts and circumstances that tend to generate a belief in a statement's trustworthiness. State v. Lucas, 30 N.J. 37, 56, 152 A. 2d 50 (1959). Furthermore, the jury is charged to treat an oral confession with caution, State v. Kociolek, 23 N.J. 400, 421, 129 A. 2d 417 (1957), and to judge its credibility against the circumstances of its elicitation. State v. Hampton, 61 N.J. 250, 272, 294 A. 2d 23 (1972). Despite those safeguards, and cautionary instructions about how an incriminating statement should be evaluated, defendant contends that his statements to the police should have been suppressed solely because his interrogation was not recorded electronically. For support, defendant relies on decisions from two other state supreme courts. In Stephan v. State, 711 P. 2d 1156, 1158 (Alaska 1985), the Alaska Supreme Court held that the unexcused failure to record electronically an interrogation conducted in a place of detention violates the right to due process under the Alaska constitution. The court reasoned that a recording requirement would provide an objective means for evaluating what occurred during an interrogation, protect the public's interest in honest and effective law enforcement, and protect the interests of police officers wrongfully accused of improper tactics. Id. at 1161. The court also noted that compliance with the recording requirement would not be unduly burdensome as many places of detention already had working recording devices. Noting that in the cases before the court the police had recorded portions of the questioning, the court reasoned, turning the recorder on a few minutes earlier entails minimal cost and effort. Id. at 1162. The Minnesota Supreme Court imposed a recording requirement in State v. Scales, 518 N.W. 2d 587 (Minn.1994), although not on the basis of a due process requirement. The Minnesota Supreme Court declined to make a determination on whether a criminal suspect has a right to have his interrogation recorded under the Minnesota Constitution. Relying instead on its supervisory power, the Court held that all custodial interrogations, including any information about rights, waiver of those rights, and all questioning, must be recorded electronically when feasible and whenever questioning occurs at a place of detention. The court observed that many factual disputes about the denial of a defendant's constitutional rights would be avoided if all conversations between the police and a suspect were recorded. Id. at 591. As best we can determine, two additional states have enacted legislation that requires custodial interrogations to be electronically recorded. See 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/103-2.1 (West 2003) (establishing presumption against admissibility for statements made during custodial interrogation unless statement is electronically recorded); Tex.Crim. Proc.Code Ann. art. 38.22 § 3 (Vernon 1999) (conditioning use of oral custodial statements on electronic recording of statement). In the absence of any such legislative requirement in other states that have considered the issue, no court other than the Alaska Supreme Court has found a due process requirement for electronic recordation. Thus, the overwhelming majority of courts have declined to require recording as a constitutional dictate. See Starks v. State, 594 So. 2d 187, 196 (Ala.Crim.App.1991), cert. denied, 594 So. 2d 187 (Ala.Crim.App. 1992); State v. Jones, 203 Ariz. 1, 49 P. 3d 273, 279 (2002); People v. Holt, 15 Cal. 4th 619, 63 Cal.Rptr. 2d 782, 937 P. 2d 213, 241-43, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1017, 118 S.Ct. 606, 139 L.Ed. 2d 493 (1997); People v. Raibon, 843 P. 2d 46, 49 (Colo.Ct. App.1992); State v. James, 237 Conn. 390, 678 A. 2d 1338, 1357-60 (1996); Coleman v. State, 189 Ga.App. 366, 375 S.E. 2d 663, 664 (1988); State v. Kekona, 77 Hawai'i 403, 886 P. 2d 740, 745-46 (1994); State v. Rhoades, 119 Idaho 594, 809 P. 2d 455, 462 (1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 987, 112 S.Ct. 2970, 119 L.Ed. 2d 590 (1992); People v. Everette, 187 Ill.App. 3d 1063, 135 Ill.Dec. 472, 543 N.E. 2d 1040, 1047 (1989), rev'd on other grounds, 141 Ill. 2d 147, 152 Ill.Dec. 377, 565 N.E. 2d 1295 (1990); Stoker v. State, 692 N.E. 2d 1386, 1390 (Ind.Ct.App. 1998); State v. Morgan, 559 N.W. 2d 603, 609 (Iowa 1997); State v. Speed, 265 Kan. 26, 961 P. 2d 13, 24 (1998); Brashars v. Commonwealth, 25 S.W. 3d 58, 60-63 (Ky. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1098, 121 S.Ct. 828, 148 L.Ed. 2d 710 (2001); State v. Thibodeaux, 750 So. 2d 916, 922-24 (La.1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1112, 120 S.Ct. 1969, 146 L.Ed. 2d 800 (2000); State v. Buzzell, 617 A. 2d 1016, 1018 (Me.1992); Baynor v. State, 355 Md. 726, 736 A. 2d 325, 331-32 (1999); Commonwealth v. Fryar, 414 Mass. 732, 610 N.E. 2d 903, 909 n. 8 (1993); People v. Fike, 228 Mich.App. 178, 577 N.W. 2d 903, 906-07 (1998); Williams v. State, 522 So. 2d 201, 208 (Miss.1988); Jimenez v. State, 105 Nev. 337, 775 P. 2d 694, 696-97 (1989); State v. Barnett, 147 N.H. 334, 789 A. 2d 629, 631-33 (2001); People v. Martin, 294 A.D. 2d 850, 741 N.Y.S. 2d 763, app. denied, 98 N.Y. 2d 711, 749 N.Y.S. 2d 9, 778 N.E. 2d 560 (2002); State v. Thibodeaux, 341 N.C. 53, 459 S.E. 2d 501, 507 (1995); State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St. 3d 89, 684 N.E. 2d 668, 686 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1125, 118 S.Ct. 1811, 140 L.Ed. 2d 949 (1998); Commonwealth v. Craft, 447 Pa.Super. 371, 669 A. 2d 394, 394-97 (1995); State v. Godsey, 60 S.W. 3d 759, 771-72 (Tenn.2001); State v. James, 858 P. 2d 1012, 1017-18 (Utah Ct.App.1993); State v. Gorton, 149 Vt. 602, 548 A. 2d 419, 421-422 (1988); State v. Spurgeon, 63 Wash.App. 503, 820 P.2d 960, 961-64 (1991); State v. Kilmer, 190 W.Va. 617, 439 S.E. 2d 881, 892-93 (1993); Gale v. State, 792 P. 2d 570, 588 (Wyo.1990). Many of those courts have noted approvingly the protections that are provided by recording an interrogation. Jones, supra, 49 P. 3d at 279 (stating that recording entire interrogation process is preferable because it protects against admission of involuntary or invalid confessions and enables law enforcement to establish that tactics were proper); Holt, supra, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 782, 937 P. 2d at 241-43 (noting that requiring recording of interrogations might enhance reliability of confessions); Raibon, supra, 843 P. 2d at 49 (recognizing that recording of suspect's interview may remove questions that may arise later in respect of interview's contents); Kekona, supra, 886 P. 2d at 746 (stressing importance of utilizing tape recordings during custodial interrogations when feasible); Stoker, supra, 692 N.E. 2d at 1390 (recommending that law enforcement adopt procedure to record interrogations); Buzzell, supra, 617 A. 2d at 1018 (noting obvious benefits to be realized when statements are recorded); Fryar, supra, 610 N.E. 2d at 909 n. 8 (finding that electronic recording of interrogations would be helpful in evaluating voluntariness of confessions because defendants, prosecutors, and courts must spend considerable time and effort to determine what transpired during custodial interrogation); Williams, supra, 522 So. 2d at 208 (noting that recording helps to demonstrate voluntariness, context, and content of statement); Jimenez, supra, 775 P. 2d at 696-97 (stating that requiring recordings would alleviate credibility questions for police when claiming defendant made incriminating statements); Godsey, supra, 60 S.W. 3d at 771-72 (noting that electronically recording custodial interrogations would reduce court time spent on resolving interrogation disputes); James, supra, 858 P. 2d at 1017-18 (describing numerous reasons for recording interrogations, including avoiding unwarranted claims of coercion and coercive tactics by police); Kilmer, supra, 439 S.E. 2d at 892-93 (declining to establish blanket rule requiring recording, and holding that law enforcement should record interrogation of suspect where feasible and equipment is available). So, too, have commentators canvassed the many benefits that electronic recordation would appear to provide. Paramount is the obvious benefit derived from a recording that creates an objective, reviewable record. See Heath S. Berger, Let's Go to the Videotape: A Proposal to Legislate Videotaping of Confessions, 3 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 165, 173-74 (1993); Wayne T. Westling, Something is Rotten in the Interrogation Room: Let's Try Video Oversight, 34 J. Marshall L.Rev. 537, 549 (2001). Courts are required routinely to determine what has occurred in the interrogation room, weighing the testimony of a police officer against the testimony of an accused. Westling, supra, 34 J. Marshall L.Rev. at 549. A recording would enhance a judge or juror's assessment of credibility by providing a more complete picture of what occurred. Berger, supra, 3 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. at 173-74. Because [e]ven the most scrupulous of witnesses is subject to forgetfulness, Westling, supra, 34 J. Marshall L.Rev. at 549, a recording of an interrogation would also provide judges and juries with a more accurate picture of what was said, as words can convey different meanings depending on the tone of voice or nuance used. Id. at 550. The commentators are quick to point to the benefits that electronic recording would provide to the police also, noting that recording would protect police officers from false allegations and lend credibility to police work by demonstrating the fairness of the methods used and the legality of confessions obtained. Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J.Crim. L. & Criminology 621, 683 (1996). Recording also may improve the ability of the police to assess the guilt or innocence of suspects, it is contended, because law enforcement officials later can review an entire interrogation after investigation reveals new evidence. Ibid. Finally, it is asserted that electronic recording may improve the overall quality of police work by providing law enforcement officials with the ability to monitor the quality of the interrogation process and recordings can be used in training courses to demonstrate effective versus ineffective, or legally impermissible, interrogation techniques. Leo, supra, 86 J.Crim. L. & Criminology at 683-84; Westling, supra, 34 J. Marshall L.Rev. at 551. Lastly, the commentary notes that recording ultimately may preserve judicial resources by discouraging defendants from raising frivolous pretrial challenges to confessions. Daniel Donovan and John Rhodes, Comes a Time: The Case for Recording Interrogations, 61 Mont. L.Rev. 223, 229 (2000); see also Daniel Donovan and John Rhodes, The Case for Recording Interrogations, 26-DEC Champion 12, 14 (2002). A recording of an interrogation might influence a defendant's decision on whether to go to trial. Donavan and Rhodes, Comes a Time, supra, 61 Mont. L.Rev. at 229. The potential savings that recording may have on judicial resources has been noticed by many of the courts that have considered the issue because of the significant amount of time and resources devoted to resolving disputes over confessions. See, e.g., Fryar, supra, 610 N.E. 2d at 909, n. 8 (noting electronic recordation could relieve courts of enormous amount of time and resources spent attempting to determine what transpired during custodial interrogation). See also Godsey, supra, 60 S.W. 3d at 772 (noting there is little doubt that electronic recordation would reduce time spent in court resolving disputes over what occurred during custodial interrogation). On the other hand, the drawbacks to imposing an absolute requirement on recording likewise have been catalogued. One of the most common arguments against a recording requirement is the cost. Potential costs include purchase and maintenance of recording equipment, storage of tapes, transcription of tapes, and remodeling of interrogation rooms. Leo, supra, 86 J.Crim. L. & Criminology at 684-85. Some commentators point to the difficulty that rural towns may have in affording appropriate equipment. Berger, supra, 3 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. at 179. Other frequently cited drawbacks are that the recording of interrogations will hamper police interrogation techniques and reduce the ability of police officers to obtain truthful confessions and admissions. Id. at 180. Commentators acknowledge that suspects may be reluctant to speak candidly in front of a camera. Ibid.; Leo, supra, 86 J.Crim. L. & Criminology at 685-86. See also Major Joshua E. Kastenberg, A Three-Dimensional Model for the Use of Expert Psychiatric and Psychological Evidence in False Confession Defenses Before the Trier of Fact, 26 Seattle U.L.Rev. 783, 812 (2003) (stating that knowledge of electronic recording can reduce chances of effective discussion because suspects often are more willing to talk when they perceive discussion as being between only themselves and interrogating officer(s)). Beyond the question whether to record electronically, there is the additional consideration of what portion of an interrogation ought to be recorded. While some police departments already record a suspect's confession at the end of an interrogation, advocates of recording stress that the entire interrogation session must be recorded to achieve the positive benefits of recordings. Westling, Something is Rotten in the Interrogation Room, supra, 34 J. Marshall L.Rev. at 554. To create a detailed and complete record, those commentators argue that recording must begin with the initial contact, including the Miranda warnings and any waiver of Miranda rights. Ibid.; Berger, supra, 3 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. at 176. In that respect, we note that both the Supreme Courts of Alaska and Minnesota require recording of the entire interrogation session. See Scales, supra, 518 N.W. 2d at 592 (requiring all custodial interrogations, including information about rights, waiver of those rights, and all questioning to be electronically recorded); Stephan, supra, 711 P. 2d at 1162 (holding that recording of custodial interrogation in place of detention must clearly indicate that it recounts entire interview). [6] See also Barnett, supra, 147 N.H. 334, 789 A. 2d 629 (allowing admission of taped statement by defendant only if entire interrogation is recorded; otherwise proof of defendant's incriminating statement subject to admission via traditional evidential tests for reliability). We view as significant the consequences attendant to imposing a rule precluding the admissibility of a confession based on a failure to record electronically. Indeed, even apart from requiring suppression in all such cases, if we were to encourage electronic recording of custodial interrogations, a balancing of the benefits to suspects in custodial interrogations with any drawbacks to law enforcement would be necessary. Moreover, there does not appear to be any agreement as to how electronic recordation should be implemented, or whether it should be required, encouraged formally through evidential rules, or encouraged through other informal means. We recognize that due process is a flexible concept that depends on the facts and circumstances of the matter at hand. New Jersey Parole Bd. v. Byrne, 93 N.J. 192, 209, 460 A. 2d 103 (1983). But, there is a pragmatic aspect to a due process inquiry. We have rejected claimed due process violations in the past where the asserted deprivations implicated an area in which fair-minded men can disagree, and points of view could range over a spectrum of conclusions in respect of the alleged right involved. State v. Garvin, 44 N.J. 268, 276, 208 A. 2d 402 (1965) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because there is otherwise fair-minded disagreement concerning the appropriateness of imposing a sweeping requirement of electronic recordation of custodial statements we hold that defendant's point of error is not of constitutional dimension. Ibid. As noted, other than Alaska, no state has found a due process dictate that compels electronic recording of custodial interrogations. The other states have declined to impose by judicial fiat a constitutional requirement in the absence of any legislative direction. We similarly decline to do so. We reject defendant's constitutional due process argument. His statements were not wrongfully admitted merely because they were not electronically recorded. Their admissibility can be assessed adequately under our current standards for voluntariness and trustworthiness. That said, we perceive benefits to all involved if custodial interrogations are recorded electronically. Our prior decisions highlight a concern for the reliability and trustworthiness of confessions as a prerequisite to their use. Confessions obtained through undue compulsion or coercion are considered involuntary and, therefore, unreliable. State v. Jordan, 147 N.J. 409, 425-28, 688 A. 2d 97 (1997). We exclude from evidence such confessions, not only because we view an involuntary confession as intrinsically unreliable, but also because its admission would offend the community's sense of decency and fairness. State v. Kelly, 61 N.J. 283, 292, 294 A. 2d 41 (1972). Similarly, we have held that a confession obtained through a custodial interrogation after an illegal arrest should be excluded unless the chain of causation between the illegal arrest and the confession is sufficiently attenuated so that the confession was `sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint.' State v. Worlock, 117 N.J. 596, 621, 569 A. 2d 1314 (1990) (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486, 83 S.Ct. 407, 416-17, 9 L.Ed. 2d 441, 454 (1963)). The requirements of Reed, supra, likewise grew out of our perception of the potential coerciveness of custodial interrogations. 133 N.J. at 264-65, 627 A. 2d 630. We also have cautioned against an unmitigated faith in the truth and probity of confessions generally. As elaborated infra, we require confessions to be corroborated by independent evidence that bolster[s] the confession and tend[s] to generate a belief in its trustworthiness. Lucas, supra, 30 N.J. at 56, 152 A. 2d 50. See also State v. Mancine, 124 N.J. 232, 261, 262, 590 A. 2d 1107 (1991) (Handler, J., concurring) (noting confessions have long been regarded as generally suspect and describing experience of courts, the police and the medical profession recount[ing] a number of false confessions voluntarily made (citation omitted)). The foregoing concerns militate in favor of pursuing the study of whether and how to implement the benefits of recording electronically part, or all, of custodial interrogations. We acknowledge the State's concern that electronic recording may create an artificial restriction on the interrogation dynamic. However, the fact that numerous law enforcement agencies of this State have found themselves able to overcome that drawback and are using electronic recording reduces the force of the State's concern. Those agencies apparently valued more the benefits that come from having a recording of a custodial interrogation. Indeed, in that respect, we are informed that the Attorney General, acting in conjunction with the county prosecutors, has taken steps to implement an administrative policy requiring electronic recording of final statements of suspects in homicide investigations. We are told that pilot projects concerning further use of electronic recordation are contemplated. The State also has brought to our attention that there is the potential for legislative action in this area as well. See Senate Bill No. 287 (establishing pilot program requiring use of electronic recording of custodial interrogations concerning certain violent crimes). Those steps are welcome, but this issue deserves the broad involvement of all stakeholders and, importantly, must involve the judiciary. The judiciary bears the responsibility to guarantee the proper administration of justice ... and, particularly, the administration of criminal justice. State v. Williams, 93 N.J. 39, 62, 459 A. 2d 641 (1983) (citations omitted). Our courts thus have the independent obligation ... to take all appropriate measures to ensure the fair and proper administration of a criminal trial. Ibid. See also State v. Maisonet, 166 N.J. 9, 22, 763 A. 2d 1254 (2001) (noting our responsibility to guarantee the proper administration of justice (citation omitted)); State v. Carter, 64 N.J. 382, 392, 316 A. 2d 449 (1974), overruled on other grounds, State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236, 344 A. 2d 289 (1975) (The court's power to fashion remedies in the realm of criminal justice is unquestioned.). Where such appropriate measures are available, they should be employed to the fullest extent feasible to enhance the fairness of proceedings. The proverbial time has arrived for this Court to evaluate fully the protections that electronic recordation affords to both the State and to criminal defendants. That inquiry should include whether to encourage electronic recordation through the use of a presumption against admissibility of a non-recorded statement, or other means. See, e.g., Barnett, supra, 147 N.H. 334, 789 A. 2d 629. Those considerations are important and nuanced, and should be addressed in a context broader than that permitted in any one criminal appeal. The balancing of interests will require careful and deliberate study if we are to be successful in securing to the judicial system, law enforcement, and defendants the benefits of recordation without unduly hampering the legitimate needs of law enforcement. We believe that the criminal justice system will be well served if our supervisory authority is brought to bear on this issue and we will exercise that authority mindful of the various interests involved. Accordingly, we will establish a committee to study and make recommendations on the use of electronic recordation of custodial interrogations.