Opinion ID: 77401
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Extrinsic Evidence in Second Trial

Text: 149 During the second trial, Appellants Garcia, Gonzalez, and Quintero moved for a mistrial on the grounds that the jury was tainted by extrinsic evidence introduced by two former jurors dismissed during deliberations. After their convictions, Appellants also moved for a new trial on the same grounds. The district court denied both their motions for a mistrial and their motions for a new trial, and Appellants reassert their tainted jury claim on appeal. 33 150 After a five-week trial followed by five days (approximately twenty-five hours) of deliberation, a series of notes from jury members in the second trial led the district court to dismiss three jurors and seat two alternates. The dismissals all occurred in succession over two days. We first review why three jurors were dismissed during the trial, and then explain why the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellants' motions. 151 (1) Juror # 10 152 Juror # 10 advised the court by note that her apartment had been burglarized and that she thought the burglary might have been related to her jury service. After receiving the note, the district court interviewed Juror # 10 outside the presence of the other jurors, revealing that (1) Juror # 10 suspected that the defense might have been involved in the burglary; (2) Juror # 10 was concerned for her safety; and (3) Juror # 10 had read her note to the entire jury and expressed her concern to them. 34 Juror # 10 claimed, however, that she could still perform her duties as a juror impartially. 153 The parties agreed that the other jurors needed to be questioned individually about Juror # 10's note. Upon individual questioning, all eleven jurors testified that they were aware of the note and Juror # 10's fear, as it had been discussed in the jury room. 35 Nevertheless, all jurors stated that it would not affect their impartiality. However, one Juror (Juror # 4) individually admitted that Juror # 10's story scared her, although Juror # 4 stated that the fear would not affect her performance on the jury. At the conclusion of questioning each juror, the district court reminded each juror of their commitment to decide the case purely on the basis of the evidence produced during trial. 154 Appellants Garcia, Gonzalez, and Quintero all moved for a mistrial, which the district court denied. Given that there would be no mistrial, the government and the defense agreed that Juror # 10 should be dismissed. Because the jury was already well into deliberating, the parties agreed to continue the trial with only eleven jurors. After bringing the entire jury back into the courtroom, the district court instructed the jury that it was convinced that the burglary of Juror # 10's apartment was unrelated to the trial. The district court reiterated that the jury was to disregard the incident and decide the case based solely on the evidence presented in court. 155 (2) Juror # 1 156 At the same time that Juror # 10 was being dismissed, Juror # 11 gave the court a note alleging that Juror # 1 had told the other jurors that she was watching the news and researching the case. Juror # 11's note alleged that Juror # 1 had tried to find out the result in the first trial and was trying to tell the other jurors about what she knew. The note also alleged that Juror # 1 was refusing to deliberate. 157 Outside the presence of the other jurors, the district court questioned Juror # 1, confining its inquiry to the issue of whether she had become aware of extrinsic evidence. After initially denying watching the news, Juror # 1 admitted that she had heard the news once, after which she had joked with the other jurors because the news report had stated that she was fifty years old when she in fact was seventy-two. Juror # 1 also stated that she had seen the media interviewing the defendants but provided no details. Juror # 1 claimed that she had not heard the results from the first trial, done any research, or told the jurors anything of substance. 158 The district court then questioned the remaining jurors individually. In direct contradiction to Juror # 1's explanation, six jurors asserted that Juror # 1 had told them that she had watched news reports about the trial and that she had conducted research to find out the results of the previous trial. Two of these jurors asserted that Juror # 1 had made references to her extrinsic knowledge and that they had asked Juror # 1 what information she had. However, all six jurors assured the court that ultimately Juror # 1 had not conveyed extrinsic evidence to them. 159 After hearing from each juror, the district court found Juror # 1's assertions that she had done no research not credible. The district court ruled that it was beyond a reasonable doubt that Juror # 1 had done independent research and that she blatantly disregarded the court's instructions not to listen to the news. See United States v. Abbell, 271 F.3d 1286, 1302 (11th Cir.2001) (stating that a juror should be excused only when, beyond a reasonable doubt, no substantial possibility exists that the juror is basing her decision on the sufficiency of the evidence). The district court therefore dismissed Juror # 1. 160 Appellants moved for a mistrial, and objected to the removal of Juror # 1. Appellants made alternative arguments. On the one hand, Appellants claimed that the extrinsic evidence Juror # 1 had learned and shared with the other jurors tainted the entire jury, requiring a mistrial. On the other hand, Appellants claimed that Juror # 1 had testified truthfully, had not been exposed to any extrinsic evidence at all, and should not be dismissed. Appellants theorized that the jurors who complained about Juror # 1 had invented the story about her watching the news in order to remove her from the jury, when their real motivation was their frustration with Juror # 1's refusal to change her position during deliberation. The district court rejected both arguments and denied Appellants' motion for mistrial. 161 (3) Juror # 4 162 As the district court was finalizing its response about Juror # 1, Juror # 4 sent a note requesting to be dismissed because the trial was adversely affecting her sleep and health. Juror # 4's note also indicated that she was being insulted, yelled at and offended by other jurors. The parties and the district court were concerned that Juror # 4's request for dismissal was not health-related but rather was motivated by the deliberations themselves. 163 The district court questioned Juror # 4 outside the presence of the other jurors. She claimed that her request was not related to her opinion in deliberations, but rather truly was due to health concerns. Juror # 4 explained that she had felt the same way previously and had been hospitalized for three days. 164 The district court elected to delay deliberations so that Juror # 4 could see her doctor, who might be able to determine whether her complaints were truly health-related. Juror # 4 went to her doctor on the afternoon of March 29, 2004. Juror # 4 did not report for jury duty on March 30, 2004, at which point the district court contacted Juror # 4's doctor. Testifying by phone, the doctor explained that Juror # 4 had a history of panic attacks and depression and that her mother had died recently. The doctor told the district court that my medical opinion is that she just is not mentally capable of handling [jury service] at this point. The district court accepted the doctor's professional judgment and dismissed Juror # 4 over the objections of Appellants. 165 (4) Two Alternates Empaneled 166 After the three jurors were dismissed, the parties agreed to add two alternates rather than three. Two alternates were empaneled, and the Appellants raised no objections to them. The district court ordered that all notes from the first five days of deliberation be removed from the jury room and instructed the jury to begin anew. The district court also gave the reconstituted jury the entire legal instructions once more. The new jury deliberated for a total of fourteen hours before reaching a verdict of guilty on all counts. 167 (5) Motions Properly Denied 168 On appeal, Appellants argue that a mistrial during the trial, or alternatively at least a new trial after their convictions, was required because the jury was tainted by extrinsic information, in particular (1) the jurors' knowledge of Juror # 10's burglary-related fear, and (2) the fact that Juror # 1 told the other jurors that she had read the news and researched the first trial. Although the jury was clearly exposed to this extrinsic evidence on account of Jurors # 1 and # 10, we conclude that the district court did not err in denying Appellants' motions. 169 A mistrial or new trial is required only if the extrinsic evidence known by the jury posed a reasonable possibility of prejudice to the defendant. United States v. Perkins, 748 F.2d 1519, 1533 (11th Cir.1984). The defendant has the burden to show that the jury has been exposed to extrinsic evidence or extrinsic contacts. Once the defendant establishes that such exposure in fact occurred, prejudice is presumed and the burden shifts to the government to rebut the presumption. See Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229, 74 S.Ct. 450, 451, 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954); McNair v. Campbell, 416 F.3d 1291, 1307-08 (11th Cir.2005), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 1828, 164 L.Ed.2d 522 (2006); Parker v. Head, 244 F.3d 831, 839 (11th Cir.2001); United States v. Martinez, 14 F.3d 543, 550 (11th Cir.1994); United States v. Spurlock, 811 F.2d 1461, 1463 (11th Cir.1987); United States v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487, 1503 (11th Cir.1986); Perkins, 748 F.2d at 1533. 36 170 To rebut the presumption of prejudice, the government must show that the jurors' consideration of extrinsic evidence was harmless to the defendant. Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229, 74 S.Ct. at 451; McNair, 416 F.3d at 1307-08; Caporale, 806 F.2d at 1503; Perkins, 748 F.2d at 1533-34. To evaluate whether the government has rebutted that presumption, we consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the introduction of the extrinsic evidence to the jury. Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229-30, 74 S.Ct. at 451; McNair, 416 F.3d at 1307-08; Parker, 244 F.3d at 839. The factors we consider include: (1) the nature of the extrinsic evidence; (2) the manner in which the information reached the jury; (3) the factual findings in the district court and the manner of the court's inquiry into the juror issues; and (4) the strength of the government's case. See McNair, 416 F.3d at 1307-08. 171 In this case, the nature of the extrinsic evidence and the district court's thorough and careful response to that evidence convince us that the presumption of prejudice has been clearly rebutted. First and foremost, the nature of the extrinsic evidence here was relatively inconsequential and ultimately does not indicate prejudice. Not a single juror learned anything substantive about the first trial from Juror # 1, 37 nor did a single juror claim to believe that the burglary at Juror # 10's residence was in any way related to the trial. The district court also took care to instruct the jury that the burglary was in no way related to the trial, and that the jury was to reach a verdict based solely on the evidence presented at trial. Thus, the government has shown that the particular extrinsic evidence at issue in this case was not only unlikely to prejudice the jury in any meaningful fashion, but also did not in fact prejudice the jury. 172 Second, the record demonstrates that the district court carefully, thoroughly and correctly handled these issues at trial. The district court began by carefully investigating the juror issues. See Rowe, 906 F.2d at 656-57. In addition to interviewing Jurors # 10 and # 1 outside the presence of the other jurors, the district court interviewed every other juror individually and conferred extensively with counsel to decide upon a course of action. 173 After speaking with each juror, the district court wisely chose to dismiss Jurors # 10 and # 1, the two jurors who had introduced the extrinsic evidence. The district court then rehabilitated the remaining jurors by curatively instructing the jury not to consider the extrinsic evidence, by reissuing the entire legal instructions to the newly constituted jury, and by emphasizing multiple times that the reconstituted jury should begin deliberations anew. The district court concluded that (as every juror individually testified) the extrinsic evidence did not prejudice the remaining jurors nor render any juror incapable of deciding the case impartially. 174 In light of every juror's assurance to the district court that the extrinsic evidence would not affect their impartiality, and especially given the district court's careful investigation and curative measures, we agree with the district court that there was no reasonable possibility of prejudice. The manner in which the district court inquired of the jury in this case closely parallels United States v. Gabay, 923 F.2d 1536 (11th Cir.1991), where this Court affirmed a district court's conclusion that a dismissed juror's extrinsic discussions did not preclude a fair trial. In Gabay, we deferred to the district court's assessment of the remaining jurors' impartiality, noting in particular the district court's careful and lengthy investigation, which included voir dire and curative instructions. Id. at 1542-43. We also noted the district court's observation of the jurors for several weeks, and the jurors' unequivocal pledges to deliberate fairly. Id. at 1543. 175 Here, the district court's careful and lengthy efforts to ensure that the jury remained impartial are quite similar to those taken in Gabay. As in Gabay, the district court's reasonable conclusion that the jury was not tainted demands deference because the `determination of [the jury's] impartiality, in which demeanor plays such an important part, is particularly within the province of the trial judge.' Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 595, 96 S.Ct. 1017, 1020, 47 L.Ed.2d 258 (1976) (quoting Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 733, 83 S.Ct. 1417, 1423, 10 L.Ed.2d 663 (1963) (Clark, J., dissenting)). As this Court has stated, [t]he factual determination of whether consideration of extrinsic evidence caused the defendant prejudice is committed to the trial court's `large discretion.' BankAtlantic v. Blythe Eastman Paine Webber, Inc., 955 F.2d 1467, 1472 (11th Cir.1992); see also Martinez, 14 F.3d at 547 (a district court's denial of a motion for a new trial based on jury's exposure to extrinsic evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion). 176 Despite unusual circumstances, the district court ensured that the extrinsic evidence did not pose a reasonable possibility of prejudice. After extensive review of the trial transcript and district court orders, we are confident that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellants' motions. Rather, the district court carefully rehabilitated and instructed the reconstituted jury, and there is no evidence that the extrinsic evidence influenced the jury in any way. See United States v. Kopituk, 690 F.2d 1289, 1307-08 (11th Cir.1982) (affirming the district court's decision to dismiss a juror and replace her with an alternate after five days of deliberation).