Opinion ID: 1129438
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admissibility of Ortega's Statements Implicating Defendant

Text: Accomplice Ortega was tried separately from defendant. Ortega's former girlfriend, Christina Salaices, was permitted to testify at defendant's trial regarding her conversation with Ortega, five months prior to the Winchell slaying, wherein Ortega indicated that he was planning to kill Randy Blythe (Ortega's male lover, who had begun a sexual relationship with victim Winchell). According to Salaices, Ortega expressed his intent to go to Randy's house, ring his doorbell, stab him when he opened the door, and turn the knife in him to see the expression on his face. Ortega also said that Mikey (defendant Morales) would be with him because Mikey wouldn't let him stop. Mikey would help him and Mikey wouldn't let him stop, that Mikey would be there. In addition, Ortega told Salaices that if Terri [victim Winchell] was there, that she was gonna get it, too. 1. Admissibility Under Hearsay Exceptions  (7a) Defendant objected on hearsay grounds to the admission of the foregoing statements as they pertained to him, and he renews that objection here. We conclude that the statements were admissible. Defendant and Ortega had been charged with conspiring to murder Winchell, and Ortega's statements regarding his expectation of defendant's assistance in a related murder plot were relevant to prove the existence and nature of that conspiracy. (8a), (7b) The People thus contend that Ortega's statements were admissible under either (1) the coconspirator's exception to the hearsay rule (Evid. Code, § 1223), or (2) the state-of-mind exception to that rule ( id., § 1250). (8b) Defendant properly disputes the applicability of the coconspirator's exception. Subdivision (a) of section 1223 of the Evidence Code requires that [t]he statement was made by the declarant [Ortega] while participating in a conspiracy to commit a crime or civil wrong and in furtherance of the objective of that conspiracy. Yet no evidence was offered to show that Ortega was conspiring with anyone to kill either Blythe or Winchell at the time of his conversation with Salaices, five months prior to Winchell's murder. (See People v. Irwin (1888) 77 Cal. 494, 504-505 [20 P. 56].) We agree with defendant that, in the absence of proof of an ongoing conspiracy at the time Ortega's statement was made, section 1223 was inapplicable. (It is also doubtful that the statement to Salaices was in furtherance of any conspiracy, rather than mere boasting to a girlfriend.) (7c) As for the state-of-mind exception, section 1250, subdivision (a), of the Evidence Code creates a hearsay exception for relevant statements of a declarant's then existing state of mind ... (including a statement of intent, plan, motive ...), when the evidence is offered (1) to prove the declarant's state of mind at that time or any other time, or (2) to explain his acts or conduct. Defendant contends that Ortega's intentions or state of mind were irrelevant to the case against defendant. The People, on the other hand, assert that, in light of the conspiracy charges against defendant, Ortega's statements were admissible to show his earlier intent or plan to draw defendant into a conspiracy involving the killing of Blythe, and possibly Winchell. We agree with the People. Ortega's admitted plan to kill Blythe, his stated assumption or expectation that defendant would help or encourage him in doing so, and his remark that if Winchell were present she would get it too, in the aggregate were probative of the question whether the two men later conspired to kill Winchell. 2. Confrontation Clause  (9) Defendant argues that the admission of Ortega's statements, coupled with Ortega's unavailability for cross-examination, violated federal confrontation rights guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. (See Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123, 135-136 [20 L.Ed.2d 476, 484-485, 88 S.Ct. 1620].) But because Ortega's statements were properly admitted under the well recognized state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule, the federal confrontation clause would likewise permit admission of such evidence. (See Bourjaily v. United States (1987) 483 U.S. 171, 182-183 [97 L.Ed.2d 144, 157, 107 S.Ct. 2775]; United States v. Inadi (1986) 475 U.S. 387, 393 [89 L.Ed.2d 390, 397, 106 S.Ct. 1121]; Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 [65 L.Ed.2d 597, 607-608, 100 S.Ct. 2531].)