Opinion ID: 1358920
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: MVDF Act Standing

Text: On cross-appeal, GMC claims that the trial court should have granted its motion for j.n.o.v. on the MVDF Act claim because a retail buyer has no standing to sue a manufacturer for breach of warranty under the Act. We are directed to the provisions of the Act allowing direct claims and remedies for retail buyers against motor vehicle dealers and for dealers against manufacturers, but the Act does not specify such rights to buyers against manufacturers. See §§ 57-16-4 through -7. According to GMC, this lack of express remedy, combined with the existence of a buyer breach of warranty remedy under Section 55-2-714 of the Uniform Commercial Code, indicates a clear legislative intent not to create a consumer cause of action against a manufacturer. The plain language of a statute is the primary indicator of legislative intent. Arnold v. State, 94 N.M. 381, 610 P.2d 1210 (1980). Although this court will not read into a statute language which is not there, we do read the act in its entirety and construe each part in connection with every other part in order to produce a harmonious whole. Westgate Families v. County Clerk of Los Alamos, 100 N.M. 146, 148, 667 P.2d 453, 455 (1983). We agree with the Anayas that the Act's declaration of policy is strong and specific in listing the promotion of compliance with manufacturer's warranties as a priority. § 57-16-1. Although it does not specifically describe a course of action for an aggrieved buyer against the manufacturer, the Act clearly outlines the obligations of a manufacturer to be truthful in advertising (which usually includes some mention of a warranty) and to properly fulfill any warranty agreement. §§ 57-16-5(G) and -7. Under Section 57-16-13,  any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in this act    may sue therefor in the district court. (Emphasis added.) Thus, the statutory language, the explicit legislative object of ensuring a sound system of motor vehicle sale and distribution within the state, and the intent to provide a remedy for warranty abuse, implies a retail buyer's cause of action against a manufacturer for such abuse. See Gutierrez v. City of Albuquerque, 96 N.M. 398, 631 P.2d 304 (1981); State ex rel. Newsome v. Alarid, 90 N.M. 790, 568 P.2d 1236 (1977). See also Albuquerque Hilton Inn v. Haley, 90 N.M. 510, 565 P.2d 1027 (1977) (dicta that remedial legislation should be liberally construed so as to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy). We hold, therefore, that Anayas had standing to invoke the protection of the Act. Because GMAC indicated that it would accept the judgment of the trial court if upheld on appeal, we do not address its request for review of error. The judgment, as reduced by the trial court to prevent double recovery of incidental and consequential damages and to eliminate punitive damages, is affirmed. IT IS SO ORDERED. FEDERICI, C.J., and SOSA, J., concur.