Opinion ID: 68934
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Minimum Wage and Straight Time Pay Claims

Text: 3 Mena argues that products were never destined for a particular customer. He contends that he would go to the warehouse, pick up a variety of dairy and refrigerated products, and “there was not a determination of what would be purchased by the customers until Appellant showed up with the mix . . . .” Such a claim is belied by the record. The record reflects that although there would be slight variations as to customers’ actual needs, Mena did not merely stock his truck with a random variety of perishable refrigerated products and proceed from customer to customer, inquiring as to which items they wished to purchase. Specific products were earmarked for particular stores based on a formula that incorporated each customer’s past usage and projected current needs. 9 Mena argues that even if he is exempted from the FLSA’s overtime provision due to the motor carrier exemption, he is nonetheless entitled to straight time pay of twenty-two dollars per hour, or at least minimum wage for his hours worked in excess of forty hours per week. He argues that the district court misconstrued his minimum wage claim and erroneously failed to consider his straight time pay claim. In its order, the district court noted that Mena’s complaint (1) referred to “similarly situated security guards” even though Mena is a truck driver, (2) referenced “Defendants” even though there is but one defendant in the instant case, and (3) noted that the applicable minimum wage never exceeded $6.67 per hour and that Mena “was paid at $22.00/hr,” but also alleged that McArthur violated minimum wage laws. The court reasoned that in light of these puzzling statements and the fact that Mena’s counsel “uses the same general form complaint in each of the [FLSA] lawsuits his office brings,” “the Court is satisfied that Plaintiff did not intend to allege minimum wage violations.” Alternatively, the court held, were the Court to conclude that Plaintiff meant to bring a claim for minimum wage violations, Defendant would be entitled to judgment on the pleadings, considering Plaintiff’s allegations that he worked an average of 72 hours per week for Defendant and was compensated at a rate of $22 per hour, far in excess of the minimum wage for the applicable time period. 10 Although we do not endorse the district court’s conclusion that Mena recycled a complaint from another case and thereby accidentally included the minimum wage claim, nonetheless we conclude that summary judgment was appropriate because Mena failed to state a claim for straight time pay or minimum wage violations.4 Mena’s complaint and submissions to the district court never used the term “straight time” or articulated an argument that should have put McArthur on notice of this theory of liability. As to the minimum wage claim, Mena’s complaint contained nothing more than a bare bones assertion that “he was not paid any amount of wages for hours worked in excess of forty hours weekly which would constitute a minimum wage violation.” This nondescript statement was rendered further confusing by Mena’s statement that the relevant minimum wage never exceeded $6.67 per hour, but that he received an hourly rate of $22. Moreover, Mena had an opportunity to clarify his position on the minimum wage claim, but again declined to go into any substantive detail. In his response to McArthur’s motion for summary judgment, Mena discussed the motor carrier exemption and then, without explanation, stated, “[e]ven if this Court was to disagree with Plaintiff’s overtime arguments below and find that Defendants are entitled to the Motor Carrier Exemption regarding Plaintiff’s overtime claim, 4 See McCabe v. Sharrett, 12 F.3d 1558, 1560 (11th Cir. 1994) (“[W]e may affirm on any adequate ground, regardless of whether the district court relied on that ground.”). 11 Plaintiff points to the Complaint filed in this action wherein Plaintiff also seeks unpaid minimum wages in addition to the overtime wages.” McArthur then filed a reply brief in which it stated that “McArthur believed Plaintiff had abandoned his minimum wage claim after it shared with Plaintiff and his counsel weeks before his deposition payroll records that established, contrary to his claim, that McArthur paid him at least minimum wage for the hours worked in his final week of employment.” In its order, the district court addressed the minimum wage issue in light of the limited information presented to it and, after the court disposed of this issue, Mena did not file a motion to reconsider or provide other documentation to clarify his position. It is only on appeal that Mena explains his position and alleges that the straight time pay claim and minimum wage claim are alternative theories of liability that were only intended to apply in the event that the district court found that the motor carrier exemption prohibited Mena from collecting FLSA overtime pay for time accrued in excess of forty hours per week. “[A] complaint need not provide detailed factual allegations . . . . Nonetheless, a complaint requires more than labels and conclusions . . . .” Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 555 F.3d 949, 958 (11th Cir. 2009) (citations, quotations, and editing marks omitted). Because Mena was represented by counsel throughout the duration of this case, his pleadings and submissions are not entitled 12 to liberal construction. See GJR Inv., Inc. v. County of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Courts do and should show a leniency to pro se litigants not enjoyed by those with the benefit of a legal education.”). We conclude that Mena failed to properly assert claims for straight time pay or minimum wages because his complaint never mentioned straight time pay and only contained a conclusory allegation as to the minimum wage violation. Even to the extent that Mena’s complaint could be construed as asserting some theory of liability as to a minimum wage violation, we decline to address any such claim because the argument raised on appeal was not raised below and Mena has not presented any evidence to warrant circumventing our general rule prohibiting review of unpreserved arguments. See Denis v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 846, 848-49 (11th Cir. 1986) (“Failure to raise an issue, objection or theory of relief in the first instance to the trial court generally is fatal.”).