Opinion ID: 844263
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Motion to Suppress Gonzales's Taped Statements

Text: As recounted above, fellow inmate and gang member Salvador Berber wore a wire, which recorded his conversation with Gonzales while the two were being transported in a sheriff's van. At the time he was tape-recorded, Gonzales was serving time at the Los Angeles County jail for felony possession of methamphetamine, having pleaded guilty to that offense. He had not yet been charged with either the Eaton murder or the Skyles and Price murders. In the taped conversation, Gonzales admitted his participation in both sets of murders. Gonzales contends the trial court erred in denying his motion under section 1538.5 to suppress his taped statements to Berber on the grounds he (1) was subjected to custodial interrogation by Berber without being advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602], and (2) was questioned in the absence of counsel in violation of Massiah v. United States (1964) 377 U.S. 201 [12 L.Ed.2d 246, 84 S.Ct. 1199]. For the reasons discussed below, we reject both contentions. (2) In ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court must find the historical facts, select the rule of law, and apply the rule to the facts in order to determine whether the law as applied has been violated. ( People v. Hoyos (2007) 41 Cal.4th 872, 891 [63 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 162 P.3d 528].) We review the trial court's resolution of the factual inquiry under the deferential substantial evidence standard. ( Ibid. ) Selection of the applicable law is a mixed question of law and fact that is subject to independent review. ( Ibid. ) (3) Gonzales renews on appeal the arguments he made in his suppression motion, which are based on undisputed facts. First, he contends Berber was acting as an agent for law enforcement and therefore was required to inform Gonzales of his Miranda rights (see Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 471-474) before eliciting incriminating statements from him. Assuming for the sake of argument that Berber was acting as an agent for law enforcement, we note the United States Supreme Court has rejected `the argument that Miranda warnings are required whenever a suspect is in custody in a technical sense and converses with someone who happens to be a government agent.' ( People v. Webb (1993) 6 Cal.4th 494, 526 [24 Cal.Rptr.2d 779, 862 P.2d 779], quoting Illinois v. Perkins (1990) 496 U.S. 292, 297 [110 L.Ed.2d 243, 110 S.Ct. 2394].) As the high court has explained,  Miranda forbids coercion, not mere strategic deception by taking advantage of a suspect's misplaced trust in one he supposes to be a fellow prisoner. ( Illinois v. Perkins, at p. 297.) Although Gonzales misplaced his trust in confiding in Berber, his tape-recorded statements were voluntary and free of compulsion. Consequently no Miranda warnings were required. ( Webb, at p. 526.) (4) Second, Gonzales argues he was questioned in counsel's absence in violation of Massiah v. United States, supra, 377 U.S. 201. But at the time Gonzales spoke with Berber, he had not yet been charged with either the Eaton murder or the Skyles and Price murders, and thus no counsel had been appointed. Even assuming Gonzales was still represented by counsel in the methamphetamine case, in which he had already pleaded guilty and begun to serve a sentence, his Massiah argument still fails: The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense specific. ( People v. Carter (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1166, 1210 [135 Cal.Rptr.2d 553, 70 P.3d 981].) Alternatively, Gonzales argues that rule 2-100 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits a lawyer from communicating with another party in a case without the consent of the other party's lawyer, and the prosecutor violated this rule by having his agent Berber communicate with Gonzales. We have, however, previously rejected the argument that rule 2-100 applies to this situation. ( People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 408-409 [133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1] [addressing Cal. Rules Prof. Conduct, former rule 7-103].)