Opinion ID: 1188672
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: body cavity searches

Text: The first question we must decide is under what circumstances the trial court may order that inmates of the state penitentiary at Walla Walla must submit to probe searches before they are allowed to appear in court as defendants or witnesses. [1] The parties agree that convicted incarcerated persons are not wholly stripped of constitutional protections when [they are] imprisoned for crime. There is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this country. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56, 41 L.Ed.2d 935, 94 S.Ct. 2963 (1974). On the other hand, many rights and privileges are subject to limitation in penal institutions because of paramount institutional goals and policies. Bell, at 545-46; Wolff, at 555-56; Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 69 L.Ed.2d 59, 101 S.Ct. 2392 (1981). Courts have addressed the constitutionality of body cavity visual and probe searches in several different contexts. Where persons subjected to such searches are unconvicted and unincarcerated, as in the border search cases, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has required a stringent showing of a real suspicion, directed specifically to that person and supported by objective, articulable facts before authorities may conduct the search. Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805, 808 (9th Cir.1967); United States v. Guadalupe-Garza, 421 F.2d 876, 879 (9th Cir.1970). United States v. Sosa, 469 F.2d 271 (9th Cir.1972). Similarly, courts have invalidated both visual and probe searches of criminal suspects. United States ex rel. Guy v. McCauley, 385 F. Supp. 193, 198-99 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (visual vaginal search of woman seven months pregnant was performed two times by policewomen in nonmedical surroundings); People v. Bracamonte, 15 Cal.3d 394, 540 P.2d 624, 124 Cal. Rptr. 528 (1975) (forcible ingestion of emetic to cause vomiting of plastic bags containing heroin violated U.S. Const. amend. 4 where less intrusive means were available and the conduct of the police officers was brutal and offensive). Moreover, the real suspicion test of the border search cases has been applied to a visual anal search of a visitor to a penitentiary inmate. Black v. Amico, 387 F. Supp. 88, 91 (W.D.N.Y. 1974). As to incarcerated persons, some recent cases provide authority for blanket body cavity searches in the institutional setting. For example, in Bell, pretrial detainees and sentenced prisoners brought suit against a federal short-term custodial facility challenging several security measures, including body cavity visual searches, employed at the institution. In upholding the district court intervention in these matters, the Court of Appeals held that under the due process clause of U.S. Const. amend. 5, pretrial detainees may be subjected to only those `restrictions and privations' which `inhere in their confinement itself or which are justified by compelling necessities of jail administration.' Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 124 (2d Cir.1978). Addressing body cavity visual searches specifically, the court noted that courts which have permitted such intrusions have been presented with a demonstrated security justification. On the record before it, which established only one instance of contraband being found during a body cavity search over several years, the court concluded: The gross violation of personal privacy inherent in such a search cannot be outweighed by the government's security interest in maintaining a practice of so little actual utility. To speak plainly, in the circumstances presented by this record, the procedure shocks one's conscience. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct. 205, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952). (Some italics ours.) Wolfish v. Levi, supra at 131. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Constitution does not provide a source for the compelling necessity standard, and that the due process clause does not prohibit every disability imposed during pretrial detention, but only those that amount to punishment in the constitutional sense. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69, 9 L.Ed.2d 644, 83 S.Ct. 554 (1963). Thus, so long as pretrial detainees did not suffer punishment during their incarceration, the institution's security practices did not violate the due process clause. As to the claim that body cavity searches violate U.S. Const. amend. 4, the court said that the practice of requiring detainees to expose their body cavities for visual inspection as part of a strip-search conducted after every contact visit with a person from outside the institution gave it the most pause. Bell, at 558. However, it nonetheless concluded that these searches did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Employing a standard of reasonableness, the court explained: In each case it requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails. Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559, 60 L.Ed.2d 447, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (1979). [4] In Daughtery v. Harris, 476 F.2d 292 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 872, 38 L.Ed.2d 91, 94 S.Ct. 112 (1973), the court held that prison officials of a maximum security institution containing many dangerous inmates could require rectal searches of all inmates prior to release to the United States Marshal's office for appearance in court. The decision was based on the fact that there were many known incidents of concealed contraband being carried by inmates in the rectal cavity, and that several serious episodes, including the wounding of a court officer, were attributable to the ability of inmates to smuggle weapons out of prison. Daughtery was cited with apparent approval in Bell, at 560 n. 41. [5] On the basis of the cited cases, it is plain that the administrators of the penitentiary at Walla Walla could have ordered prison strip and probe searches of all inmates prior to court appearances. Bell v. Wolfish, supra ; Daughtery v. Harris, supra . The difficult question is whether the trial court's blanket security order required two probe searches  one at the penitentiary and one at the court-house. [2, 3] Aside from the thorny issue of whether a trial court may order officials to perform probe searches within the walls of the institution, a question we are not asked to, and do not, decide, we do not read the blanket order as requiring two body cavity searches. The order states: 1. Inmates will be searched at the prison before departure. They will be brought to the Walla Walla County Jail where they will be skin and probe searched under the supervision of the sheriff's personnel. (Italics ours.) Report of Proceedings, at 52-53; see Appendix. The only probe search required by the plain language of the order is the one to be performed at the jail before a court appearance. Moreover, petitioner's uncontested affidavit reveals that only one probe search was performed on petitioner on the day of his arraignment. The Court of Appeals apparently assumed that a probe search had been conducted at the prison because such searches are common in that setting. State v. Hartzog, 26 Wn. App. 576, 584 n. 9, 615 P.2d 480 (1980); see Appendix. There is, however, nothing in the record to support that assumption. As the security order indicates, the trial court in an earlier case involving penitentiary inmates also assumed authorities had conducted a probe search at the penitentiary. Nonetheless, a Bic lighter containing an explosive was brought into the courthouse, and it caused severe injury to a correctional officer. Referring to this incident, the superintendent of the penitentiary, in his May 12, 1977, testimony in support of the proposed security order, told the court that inmates involved in previous trials had manufactured small bombs which they carried into the courthouse in keister [caches]. It was the superintendent's view that the devices were used as a diversion: when they exploded, causing confusion, inmates could attempt to escape. There was a tradition for that mode of escape from this courtroom, the superintendent testified. Report of Proceedings, at 30. It seems apparent that the trial court in Walla Walla had reasonable grounds, based on past experience, to fear similar breaches of courtroom security in proceedings involving penitentiary inmates. In addition, we may take notice of the fact that the state penitentiary has been the locus of serious ferment in recent years. Hunger strikes, violence, and lock-downs have been reported frequently in the news media. Prison inmates recently brought a civil rights proceeding in federal court, challenging the conditions of their confinement as cruel and unusual punishment. Hoptowit v. Ray, No. 79-359 (E.D. Wash. 1980) (unpublished). In upholding plaintiffs' claims, the district court judge filed a memorandum opinion which is attached to the State's motion for reconsideration to the Court of Appeals. The federal court, basing its ruling on the live testimony and sworn affidavits of over 100 witnesses, made detailed findings that, inter alia, the penitentiary was dangerously overcrowded, Hoptowit, at 7; that there was a high level of physical violence at the penitentiary, Hoptowit, at 10; that the prison administration had imposed in 1979 a lock-down which lasted over 4 months, and which was made necessary because of the extremely high level of tension and violence at the institution and the need to reestablish administrative control, Hoptowit, at 12. Regardless of the disposition of plaintiffs' legal claims on appeal, the federal court's detailed findings support the State's contention, made forcefully in this case, that conditions inside the penitentiary have had a substantial impact on the community of Walla Walla and on the Superior Court's ability to maintain courtroom order and decorum. It is fundamental that a trial court is vested with the discretion to provide for courtroom security, in order to ensure the safety of court officers, parties, and the public. This responsibility has been recognized by the United States Supreme Court: It is essential to the proper administration of criminal justice that dignity, order, and decorum be the hallmarks of all court proceedings in our country. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343, 25 L.Ed.2d 353, 90 S.Ct. 1057 (1970); Burgess v. Towne, 13 Wn. App. 954, 960, 538 P.2d 559 (1975); State v. Basford, 1 Wn. App. 1044, 1050-51, 467 P.2d 352 (1970). Thus, in circumstances where, as here, the record fails to disclose that an inmate-defendant has undergone a body cavity probe search immediately before leaving the penitentiary, the Walla Walla Superior Court may justifiably impose such a search pursuant to its security order. [6]