Opinion ID: 1228203
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: APPEAL OF THE DEFENDANT McIVER

Text: The defendant McIver, like Braxton and Burden, in his statement of the case on appeal, makes three assignments of error: (1) The court erred in the admission of certain evidence, this being based upon 58 exceptions to various rulings with reference to the admission or exclusion of testimony or exhibits; (2) the court erred in denying certain motions of this defendant, this being based upon exceptions to 13 rulings upon various motions made by McIver; (3) the signing and entry of the judgment. As above stated, the third assignment of error is purely formal and requires no detailed discussion. The court had jurisdiction and no error appears upon the face of the record proper. Furthermore, this assignment of error is abandoned due to the failure of the defendant to bring it forward in his brief on appeal. Rule 28 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, supra. Like Braxton and Burden, this defendant has abandoned virtually all of the exceptions to rulings of the court upon the admission of evidence which were cited in his statement of the case on appeal as the basis for his Assignment of Error No. 1, through his failure to bring them forward into his brief on appeal. Rule 28 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, supra. As in the appeals of those defendants, we have, however, examined those exceptions and the portions of the record pertinent thereto and find no merit in any of them. No useful purpose would be served by a discussion of these abandoned exceptions. In his brief McIver contends that the court erred in admitting, over his objection, irrelevant evidence. He states, correctly, that the test of relevancy of evidence is whether it tends to shed any light on the subject of the inquiry or has as its only effect the exciting of prejudice or sympathy. This Court so stated in State v. Page, 215 N.C. 333, 1 S.E.2d 887 (1939), cited by the defendant, and again in State v. Hamilton, 264 N.C. 277, 141 S.E.2d 506 (1965), cert. den., 384 U.S. 1020, 86 S.Ct. 1936, 16 L.Ed.2d 1044 (1966). The defendant lists, as instances of this alleged error, 11 of his exceptions to the rulings of the court on the admission of evidence, but he does not state wherein these portions of the evidence of the State fail to meet the above test of relevance. Our examination of the portions of the records to which these exceptions relate discloses beyond question the relevancy of each such bit of evidence as measured by the foregoing test. No useful purpose would be served by a detailed recounting of these bits of the evidence. McIver contends further, in connection with his Assignment of Error No. 1, that the evidence with respect to the activities on this occasion of the other three defendants should not be used to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant McIver and that the introduction of such evidence at the trial of McIver was error such as to entitle him to a new trial. This contention is utterly without merit so far as the question of the relevancy of such evidence is concerned. The evidence for the State, if true, as the jury obviously found it to be, shows clearly that the four defendants acted in concert throughout in carrying out a common plan to accomplish a common purpose. The uncontradicted evidence of the victim is that each of the four defendants was present, aiding and abetting throughout the entire occurrence, from the abduction in the Fayetteville parking lot to the abandonment of the victim on a lonely road in Robeson County some three hours later. Each was present, aiding and abetting, while each of the other defendants raped the victim. Thus, each would be accountable for such rapes, as principal in the second degree, even if he, himself, had not had sexual intercourse with the victim. State v. Overman, 269 N.C. 453, 473, 153 S.E.2d 44 (1967); State v. Hairston, 121 N.C. 579, 28 S.E. 492 (1897); State v. Dowell, 106 N.C. 722, 11 S.E. 525 (1890); State v. Jones, 83 N.C. 605 (1880). It is upon this theory that these cited cases hold a woman may be convicted of rape and so may the husband of the victim. The entire occurrence from the abduction to the final release of the victim was a unified course of criminal activity, in every part of which each of the four defendants was a participant. Consequently, all of the evidence recounting acts of the several defendants is relevant upon the inquiry as to the guilt of each and was properly admitted unless some other rule of evidence requires its exclusion. There is no merit in McIver's Assignment of Error No. 1. With reference to his Assignment of Error No. 2, McIver contends that it was error to consolidate for trial his case with the cases of the other three defendants. We have discussed this contention in reference to the appeal of Braxton and no further discussion thereof is required in connection with the appeal of this defendant. McIver also makes the related contention that, in violation of the rule of Bruton v. United States, supra, his right to a fair trial was prejudiced by the admission in evidence, over his objection, of the carefully edited statements made to the investigating officers by Burden and Howell. The statement of neither Burden nor Howell, so edited, implicates McIver in any part of the activities of the declarant related in such statement. Therefore, the admission of such statement in evidence does not violate the Bruton rule. McIver's contention that it was error to deny his motion for judgment of nonsuit is obviously lacking in merit. The testimony of the prosecuting witness was that McIver was the driver of the car in which she was transported from the point of abduction in the City of Fayetteville to the abandoned house in Robeson County wherein the multiple rapes occurred. Her testimony was that McIver there twice had sexual intercourse with her without her consent. The rule governing the consideration of a motion for judgment of nonsuit is as above stated in connection with the appeal of Braxton. It need not be restated here. There is simply no merit whatever in this contention of McIver. There is no error in the denial of McIver's motion to suppress the evidence of his own statement to the investigating officer. Before this statement was admitted in evidence the court conducted a voir dire examination in the absence of the jury. McIver did not testify at this voir dire examination. The evidence of the officer was that McIver was taken to the Sheriff's Department at 4:30 a. m., on 11 February 1977 (the night the alleged offense occurred). He made his statement at approximately 11:40 a. m., the same day. After the interviewing officer reduced McIver's oral statement to writing, McIver said that the written statement was correct and signed it. Before the statement was made, the officer advised McIver of his constitutional rights, pursuant to the Miranda formula, and McIver signed a written waiver of those rights, including his right to have counsel present during his interrogation. No promises or threats were made to McIver in order to procure his statement. The court found the facts to be as the officer so testified. We find no error in the denial of McIver's motion to suppress evidence as to the statement so given by him. The defendant McIver's motions to set aside the verdict as contrary to the weight of the evidence and for the granting of a new trial for unspecified errors were directed to the discretion of the trial court and its rulings thereon are not reviewable in the absence of an abuse of discretion, which does not appear in this case. State v. Manuel, 291 N.C. 705, 231 S.E.2d 588 (1977); State v. Smith, 291 N.C. 505, 231 S.E.2d 663 (1977); State v. Downey, 253 N.C. 348, 117 S.E.2d 39 (1960). McIver's motion to suppress evidence found in the car by investigating officers has no merit. The registered owner of the automobile was McIver's mother. The court conducted a voir dire examination and found that she consented to this search of the automobile by the officers, having consented to their taking it from the yard of her home, where the officers found it, to the courthouse. Evidence on the voir dire supports this finding and it is, therefore, conclusive. State v. Fox, 277 N.C. 1, 24, 175 S.E.2d 561 (1970); State v. Gray, 268 N.C. 69, 79, 150 S.E.2d 1 (1966), cert. den., 386 U.S. 911, 87 S.Ct. 860, 17 L.Ed.2d 784 (1967). Neither the brief of McIver, nor our careful search of the entire record, reveals any error entitling McIver to a new trial. His conviction and the sentence imposed upon him will, therefore, not be disturbed.