Opinion ID: 542884
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 15 Mr. Buggs contends that the evidence is insufficient in three respects. He claims first that the government failed to prove that he possessed a firearm as that term is statutorily defined. Second, Mr. Buggs contends that the evidence did not establish that the pistol he was seen carrying had traveled across state lines. Finally, the defendant maintains that the government failed to prove that the substance he sold to Officer Jones on June 16, 1988 was in fact heroin. 16 In considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor. United States v. Hogan, 886 F.2d 1497, 1502 (7th Cir.1989); see United States v. Ludwig, 897 F.2d 875, 879 (7th Cir.1990). We must affirm the convictions  '[i]f any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'  Hogan, 886 F.2d at 1502 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (emphasis in Jackson )). 17 As we emphasized in United States v. Giangrosso, 779 F.2d 376, 382 (7th Cir.1985): [T]his court is not the trier of fact and we are required to uphold the jury's verdict where 'any rational trier of fact' could have found the defendant guilty of the crime. ... Only when the record contains no evidence, regardless of how it is weighed, from which the [trier of fact] could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, may an appellate court overturn the verdict. [United States v.] Nesbitt, 852 F.2d [1502,] 1509 [ (7th Cir.1988) ] (quoting United States v. Whaley, 830 F.2d 1469, 1472 (7th Cir.1987), cert. denied, U.S. [1009], 108 S.Ct. 1738, 100 L.Ed.2d 202 (1988) which quoted, in turn, United States v. Moore, 764 F.2d 476, 478 (7th Cir.1985)) (emphasis added). 18 United States v. Vega, 860 F.2d 779, 793 (7th Cir.1988); see Ludwig, 897 F.2d at 879 (quoting Vega ). 19 The appellant shoulders a heavy burden in seeking reversal based on insufficient evidence, particularly when the facts turn upon credibility determinations. United States v. Sims, 895 F.2d 326, 329 (7th Cir.1990). We  'will not weigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses,'  but leave that task to the fact-finder's sound discretion. United States v. Edun, 890 F.2d 983, 988-89 (7th Cir.1989) (quoting United States v. Ramirez, 796 F.2d 212, 214 (7th Cir.1986)). Because the defendant was tried before a jury, we must on review defer to reasonable inferences drawn by the jury and the weight it gave to the evidence. Likewise, we leave the credibility of witnesses solely to the jury's evaluation, absent extraordinary circumstances. Hogan, 886 F.2d at 1502 (citation omitted). With these legal principles in mind, we turn to an analysis of the defendant's claims.
20 The jury returned guilty verdicts on two firearm counts. Specifically, the jury determined that Mr. Buggs had violated 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(g)(1), 6 which prohibits a convicted felon from possessing or receiving any firearm shipped in interstate or foreign commerce, and 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c)(1), 7 which prohibits the use or carrying of a firearm in relation to a narcotics offense. For purposes of these violations, the term firearm means any weapon ... which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 921(a)(3). Mr. Buggs challenges the firearm convictions on the ground that the government failed to prove that the alleged pistol was capable of firing any projectile. Appellant's Br. at 8-9. He argues that Officer Jones and Mr. Perry testified only that they had seen what appeared to them to be a large pistol. It appeared to each of them to be a .357 magnum but neither was sure. Id. at 8 (emphasis in original). 21 At the outset, we cannot accept Mr. Buggs' claim that the government is required to prove that the gun was operable. See, e.g., United States v. Rush, 840 F.2d 580, 582 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1238, 108 S.Ct. 2908, 101 L.Ed.2d 940 (1988); 8 Parker v. United States, 801 F.2d 1382, 1383-85 (D.C.Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1070, 107 S.Ct. 964, 93 L.Ed.2d 1011 (1987); United States v. Harris, 792 F.2d 866, 867-68 (9th Cir.1986). 9 The statute does not require that the Government prove the gun was actually capable of firing. Rather, it is enough that the gun was 'designed to' fire. United States v. Polk, 808 F.2d 33, 34 (8th Cir.1986) (citation omitted). 10 22 The government in this case offered testimony from a veteran officer that Mr. Buggs possessed a Smith and Wesson .357 magnum. Officer Jones testified that a Smith and Wesson .357 magnum, the same sidearm he carries, is a weapon that will or is designed to or may be readily converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive. Tr. at 123. Mr. Perry also testified that he saw the weapon and believed it was a .357 magnum. Such evidence was sufficient to satisfy the government's burden of proving that the gun was designed to fire. See United States v. Rouco, 765 F.2d 983, 996 (11th Cir.1985) (government proved use of firearm where agent testified that he saw defendant remove a .38 caliber pistol from his waistband: Testimony by an experienced federal law enforcement officer familiar with handguns that the defendant carried a .38 caliber pistol certainly authorized the jury to find that the defendant possessed a firearm, defined [by Florida law] as a weapon 'designed to ... expel a projectile.' ), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1124, 106 S.Ct. 1646, 90 L.Ed.2d 190 (1986). 11 23 The fact that the gun was not produced at trial or that the witnesses did not have an opportunity to examine closely the weapon does not prevent conviction of a firearm offense. See Parker, 801 F.2d at 1383-85 (sufficient evidence supported jury verdict that defendant had used or carried a firearm where government did not introduce weapon or evidence that it had been fired, but two bank tellers testified that defendant had carried a gun); Harris, 792 F.2d at 867-68 (court affirmed section 924(c) conviction based on surveillance photograph and witness testimony that defendant had carried a gun); Rouco, 765 F.2d at 996 (proof that defendant used or carried a firearm was sufficient where DEA agent testified that defendant had carried a pistol); United States v. Liles, 432 F.2d 18, 19-20 (9th Cir.1970) 12 (evidence sufficient to prove that object possessed was firearm where gun was not produced but manager of sporting goods department briefly examined gun and identified it as common type of revolver). 24 It was for the trier of fact to weigh the evidence and determine whether the government met its burden of demonstrating that the defendant possessed a firearm. In returning guilty verdicts on the weapons charges, the jury was convinced that the object Mr. Buggs displayed on June 16, 1988 was in fact a firearm. The jury was entitled to find reliable the testimony of Officer Jones and William Perry that the object Mr. Buggs had was a Smith and Wesson .357 magnum. From that evidence, a rational jury could have reached the conclusion that the object was a gun and that guns are designed to expel projectiles. We therefore will not disturb the jury's verdict. See United States v. Hogan, 886 F.2d 1497, 1502 (7th Cir.1989).
25 Mr. Buggs contends that the government failed to establish an element of the section 922(g)(1) count, specifically, that the weapon involved in this case had traveled across state lines or affected commerce. Proof that a weapon has previously traveled in interstate commerce is sufficient to demonstrate the requisite commerce element for the purposes of section 922(g)(1). United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 350, 92 S.Ct. 515, 523, 30 L.Ed.2d 488 (1971); 13 United States v. Petitjean, 883 F.2d 1341, 1347 (7th Cir.1989); United States v. Sutton, 521 F.2d 1385, 1391 (7th Cir.1975). 14 Similarly, evidence that a weapon was manufactured outside of the state in which it was possessed is sufficient proof that the weapon was in or affecting commerce for purposes of the statute. Petitjean, 883 F.2d at 1347; United States v. Lowe, 860 F.2d 1370, 1374 (7th Cir.1988), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 1639, 104 L.Ed.2d 155 (1989). In Lowe, the defendant argued that the testimony of an agent from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms was insufficient to prove a violation of section 922(g)(1). The agent testified that the weapon at issue had been manufactured in West Germany. Id. at 1372. Given that testimony, the court concluded that the defendant had failed to carry the 'heavy burden' that must be shouldered under a sufficiency of the evidence claim. Id. at 1374 (quoting United States v. Bruun, 809 F.2d 397, 408 (7th Cir.1987)). 26 In this case, there was evidence that the weapon had traveled in interstate commerce as well as testimony that the weapon was manufactured outside of Indiana. Officer Jones and William Perry both identified the gun as a .357 magnum. Mr. Buggs maintains that this testimony was equivocal because the witnesses did not testify with certainty that the weapon was a .357 magnum. However, this was a fact question for the jury. Coupled with the testimony of the government agent that a .357 magnum is a revolver and no revolvers are made in Indiana, there was sufficient evidence for a rational jury to conclude that the gun had at some point traveled across state lines before reaching Mr. Buggs. E.g., Bass, 404 U.S. at 350, 92 S.Ct. at 523. Moreover, Officer Jones testified that the weapon was a Smith and Wesson .357 magnum. The government agent testified that Smith and Wesson handguns are manufactured in Springfield, Massachusetts. This testimony also could lead a rational jury to conclude that Mr. Buggs possessed a firearm in or affecting commerce. See Lowe, 860 F.2d at 1374. There is ample evidence to support the conviction under section 922(g)(1).
27 Mr. Buggs maintains that the evidence adduced at trial cannot sustain his conviction for possessing with the intent to distribute half an ounce of heroin on June 16, 1988. He does not dispute that the package he sold to Officer Jones on that date contained heroin. Instead, he maintains that the government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the heroin was in the dark brown substance he provided, rather than the untested substance furnished by William Perry. Although Mr. Perry was searched and the government was aware that he had a small package of light brown powder with him, the powder was not tested. Mr. Buggs does not deny that the heroin could have been in the dark brown substance, but claims it is just as likely that Mr. Perry supplied the drug. Appellant's Br. at 14. This claim is nothing more than an attack on the credibility of Mr. Perry. Such an issue is for the jury's determination. See United States ex rel. Morton v. Mancusi, 393 F.2d 482, 484 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 927, 89 S.Ct. 262, 21 L.Ed.2d 264 (1968). 15 Based on the trial testimony, the jury concluded that on June 16, 1988, Mr. Buggs possessed and intended to distribute heroin. We are invited to reassess that testimony, a function we cannot and will not undertake. 28 Examining the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, United States v. Hogan, 886 F.2d 1497, 1502 (7th Cir.1989), it is clear that the jury verdict is supported by a permissible view of that evidence. Laboratory tests conclusively determined that the package sold to Officer Jones contained heroin. Mr. Buggs does not dispute that the package contained a mixture of the dark brown substance he provided and the powder supplied by William Perry. Mr. Perry testified that the powder was lactose, nothing more. He also testified that he ingested a small amount of the dark brown substance and determined, based upon past experience, that it was heroin. This was sufficient evidence to sustain Mr. Buggs' conviction.