Opinion ID: 259
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Elements of Retaliation

Text: Turning to the first element of a retaliation claim, we agree with the District Court that plaintiffs have shown a reasonable likelihood of establishing that coercing Doe's participation in the education program violated (a) Jane Doe's Fourteenth Amendment right to parental autonomy and (b) Nancy Doe's First Amendment right against compelled speech.
Parents have a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right to raise their children without undue state interference. Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 303. [12] Choices about marriage, family life, and the upbringing of children are among associational rights this Court has ranked as of basic importance in our society, rights sheltered by the Fourteenth Amendment against the State's unwarranted usurpation, disregard, or disrespect. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 116, 117 S.Ct. 555, 136 L.Ed.2d 473 (1996) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Indeed, the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children[] is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests, Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000), and is well-established by long-standing Supreme Court precedent. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 401, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923) (recognizing that the Constitution protects the right of parents to bring up children and to control the education of their own); Pierce v. Soc'y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925) (acknowledging parents' right to direct the upbringing and education of their children); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944) (observing the cardinal principle that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972) (recognizing parents' right to instill in their children moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship). Here, Jane Doe objects to the education program's lessons in why the minors' actions were wrong, what it means to be a girl in today's society, and non-traditional societal and job roles. Appellees' Br. at 18-19. She particularly opposes these value lessons from a District Attorney who has stated publicly that a teen[]age girl who voluntarily posed for a photo wearing a swimsuit violated Pennsylvania's child pornography statute. Id. at 19. The program's teachings that the minors' actions were morally wrong and created a victim contradict the beliefs she wishes to instill in her daughter. We agree that an individual District Attorney may not coerce parents into permitting him to impose on their children his ideas of morality and gender roles. An essential component of Jane Doe's right to raise her daughterthe responsibility to inculcate moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship, Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 307was interfered with by the District Attorney's actions. While it may have been constitutionally permissible for the District Attorney to offer this education voluntarily (that is, free of consequences for not attending), he was not free to coerce attendance by threatening prosecution. Our case law and Pennsylvania's statutory law recognize that school officials have a `secondary responsibility' in the upbringing of children, and in certain circumstances the parental right to control the upbringing of a child must give way to a school's ability to control curriculum and the school environment. C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 182 (3d Cir.2005) ( quoting Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 307); 24 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 13-1317 (Every teacher, vice principal and principal in the public schools shall have the right to exercise the same authority as to conduct and behavior over the pupils attending his school, during the time they are in attendance, including the time required in going to and from their homes, as the parents, guardians or persons in parental relation to such pupils may exercise over them.). We can say with assuredness, however, that the District Attorney is not imbued with that same secondary responsibility. Indeed, we find no support for this proposition in any related statute, regulation, or case. The District Attorney is not a public education official, but a public law enforcement official. We do not express a view on the propriety of this program had it been offered as part of the school curriculum, [13] though we note that Jane Doe has a constitutionally protected right to choose the school her child attends, see Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 178, 96 S.Ct. 2586, 49 L.Ed.2d 415 (1976), a choice lacking in the current context. We conclude that Jane Doe is likely to succeed in showing that the education program required by the District Attorney impermissibly usurped and violated her fundamental right to raise her child without undue state interference.
Government action that requires stating a particular message favored by the government violates the First Amendment right to refrain from speaking. C.N., 430 F.3d at 187; [14] see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 512 U.S. 622, 641, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994) (recognizing that [g]overnment action that ... requires the utterance of a particular message favored by the Government ... contravenes th[e] essential right to refrain from speaking protected by the First Amendment); Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796-97, 108 S.Ct. 2667, 101 L.Ed.2d 669 (1988) ([T]he First Amendment guarantees `freedom of speech,' a term necessarily comprising the decision of both what to say and what not to say.) (emphasis in original). A violation of the First Amendment right against compelled speech occurs only in the context of actual compulsion, although that compulsion need not be a direct threat. C.N., 430 F.3d at 189. According to plaintiffs, the compelled speech arises from the program's requirement that the minors write a homework paper explaining how [their] actions were wrong. Jane and Nancy Doe do not agree that appearing in the photograph was wrong, and they assert that requiring Nancy Doe to write an essay to that effect invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control. W.V. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943) (holding that mandatory participation in Pledge of Allegiance violated children's First Amendment free speech rights). The compulsion here takes the form of the District Attorney's promise to prosecute Doe if she does not satisfactorily complete the education program. We agree with the District Court at this preliminary stage that Nancy Doe likely can show that the education program would violate her First Amendment freedom against compelled speech. She would be required to explain why her actions were wrong (presumably as a moral, not a legal, matter) in the context of a program that purports to teach, as Mitchell's counsel described at oral argument, [w]hat it means to be a girl; sexual self-respect, [and] sexual identity. Oral Arg. Tr. at 14. We see a fundamental distinction between this requirement and the oft-used and constitutionally sound requirement in pre-indictment or pre-trial diversion programs that a potential defendant acknowledge responsibility for his or her criminal conduct or admit wrongdoing. [W]hat it means to be a girl in today's society, while an important sociological concern, in this case is a disconnect with the criminal and juvenile justice systems. This mismatch is all the more troubling given the age of the program's participants. Minors often are more susceptible to external influences, and while this susceptibility may weigh in favor of certain educational or rehabilitative programs, it also cautions against allowing actors in the juvenile and criminal justice systems to venture outside the realm of their elected authority.
Under the second element of a retaliation claim, plaintiffs must show the Government responded with a retaliatory act. The test in our Circuit for determining whether an action is treated as retaliation is whether it is sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional rights. Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted). There is no doubt a prosecution meets this test, and the District Attorney does not argue otherwise. See Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 126 S.Ct. 1695, 164 L.Ed.2d 441 (2006) (discussing retaliatory prosecution cases).
The third element of a retaliation claim connects the previous twothere must be a causal link between the protected activity (the first element) and the retaliatory act (the second element). Plaintiffs allege that there is no probable cause to prosecute Doe, and the District Attorney's only motive for bringing a prosecution is to retaliate against her for refusing to attend the education program. [15] We agree that plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success on the causation prong of their retaliation claim, given the District Attorney's explicit statement that he will respond to (that is, retaliate for) Nancy Doe's failure to attend the education program, or not completing that program if she starts, by prosecuting her. Among other examples, a letter signed by Skumanick states that charges will be filed against those that do not participate or those that do not successfully complete the program. He reiterated this threat at the February 12 meeting, and asserted on appeal unequivocally that [Doe] could have refused to attend the class or write any essay and merely defended herself against the Juvenile Petition. ... Appellant's Br. at 10. By agreeing not to prosecute the minors if they attended and completed the program, the District Attorney's only motive for bringing a prosecution against Doe would be, as he stated, a consequence of her not attending or completing it. In other words, it is uncontroverted that the District Attorney would not have brought criminal charges had Doe attended and completed the program. Of course, every offer of a pre-indictment diversionary program presents a choice potential defendants must make, and a prosecution brought after the offer of diversion is refused ordinarily is not considered retaliation. The difference here is the decision not to attend the program is constitutionally protected (at least at this stage plaintiffs have shown a reasonable likelihood this is so) for the reasons stated in Part IV.B.1. That the District Attorney's motive in bringing a prosecution is likely retaliatory, rather than a good faith effort to enforce the law, is supported by the lack of evidence of probable cause. See Hartman, 547 U.S. at 265, 126 S.Ct. 1695 ([A] retaliatory motive on the part of an official urging prosecution combined with an absence of probable cause supporting the prosecutor's decision to go forward are reasonable grounds to suspend the presumption of regularity behind the charging decision, see Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364, 98 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978) (emphasizing that `so long as the prosecutor has probable cause,' the charging decision is generally discretionary), and enough for a prima facie inference that the unconstitutionally motivated inducement infected the prosecutor's decision to bring the charge.). Assuming that the sexual abuse of children law applies to a minor depicted in the allegedly pornographic photograph, and that the photo in question could constitute a prohibited sexual act [16] (issues on which we need not opine), we discern no indication from this record that the District Attorney had any evidence that Doe ever possessed or distributed the photo. When asked at oral argument the basis for probable cause to charge Doe with possession or distribution of child pornography, Mitchell's counsel answered that it was [t]he existence of that photograph ... [,] the presence of that photograph on the cell phones of one or more of her ... classmates. Oral Arg. Tr. at 20. But appearing in a photograph provides no evidence as to whether that person possessed or transmitted the photo. Mitchell's counsel could not make a representation to us as to whether the District Attorney had, at the time of the TRO hearing (which, we note, was months after Skumanick threatened to prosecute), any evidence of her transmission of the photo. Oral Arg. Tr. at 21. Despite ample opportunity, the District Attorney has failed to present any semblance of probable cause. The District Court may revisit this determination at a later date, and the District Attorney is free to move to vacate the injunction if he thinks he has secured probable cause. In Hartman, the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs bringing retaliatory prosecution claims must allege and prove lack of probable cause as an element of causation. 547 U.S. at 252, 126 S.Ct. 1695. Therefore, if probable cause exists, the injunction must be lifted. The suit in Hartman was brought against criminal investigators for inducing prosecution in retaliation for protected speech. A distinct problem of causation exists in retaliatory-inducement-to-prosecute cases, as a causal gap exists between the actor possessing the retaliatory animus (the government agent) and the other actor (the prosecutor) instituting the retaliation. Id. at 262-64, 126 S.Ct. 1695. This distinct problem of causation does not exist here, as the same actor (the District Attorney) possesses the retaliatory motive and would institute the prosecution. However, given Hartman 's broad holding that probable cause must be pled and proven in retaliatory prosecution cases, and the Supreme Court's reliance on the longstanding presumption of regularity accorded to prosecutorial decision making, id. at 263, 126 S.Ct. 1695, we eschew any attempt to distinguish Hartman from our case. [17] See Barnes v. Wright, 449 F.3d 709, 720 (6th Cir.2006) (applying Hartman, even though the concerns regarding the intervening actions of a prosecutor did not applythe officers themselves initiated the allegedly retaliatory grand jury proceedingsbecause the Hartman Court recognized that its rule swept broadly by stating that causation in retaliatory prosecution cases is  usually more complex than it is in other retaliation cases) ( quoting Hartman, 547 U.S. at 261, 126 S.Ct. 1695) (emphasis supplied in Barnes ). Under Hartman, then, plaintiffs cannot succeed without proving an absence of probable cause. Given that the only items of evidence in the record of the District Attorney's motive, at least at this preliminary stage, are (1) the existence of the photograph on another student's phone, and (2) the District Attorney's threat to prosecute for nonattendance at the education program, plaintiffs have established a reasonable likelihood of success as to causation. In sum, absent an injunction, the Does would have to choose either to assert their constitutional rights and face a prosecution of Nancy Doe based not on probable cause but as punishment for exercising their constitutional rights, or forgo those rights and avoid prosecution. On the facts before us, this Hobson's Choice is unconstitutional. While the Government retains broad discretion as to whom to prosecute, the decision to prosecute may not be deliberately based on ... arbitrary classification, including the exercise of protected statutory and constitutional rights. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-08, 105 S.Ct. 1524, 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372, 102 S.Ct. 2485, 73 L.Ed.2d 74 (1982) (For while an individual certainly may be penalized for violating the law, he just as certainly may not be punished for exercising a protected statutory or constitutional right.). We realize that considerations of comity, federalism, and prosecutorial discretion are implicated by this injunction, and that judicial intrusion into executive discretion of such high order should be minimal. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 263, 126 S.Ct. 1695. Indeed, there is a presumption of regularity behind the charging decision, id. at 265, 126 S.Ct. 1695, and so long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364, 98 S.Ct. 663. Yet we have a limited authority to affect prosecutorial actions when those actions are taken in violation of the Constitution, United States v. Santtini, 963 F.2d 585, 596 (3d Cir.1992), and there are rare instances where a federal court may assess the quantum of evidence underlying a threatened state prosecution. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751 n. 8, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970) (suggesting that a prosecutor's broad authority may be questioned where the prosecutor threatened prosecution on a charge not justified by the evidence). This case presents one of those rare instances. [18]