Opinion ID: 867207
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Premeditation jury instruction and argument

Text: ¶ 20 Nelson asserts that the trial court gave the jury an erroneous premeditation instruction and that instruction, coupled with the prosecutor's closing arguments, require reversal. ¶ 21 We review de novo whether the jurors were properly instructed. State v. Dann, 220 Ariz. 351, 364 ¶ 51, 207 P.3d 604, 617 (2009). Because Nelson did not object to either the premeditation instruction or the prosecutor's arguments regarding premeditation, we review only for fundamental error. See Dann, 220 Ariz. at 364 ¶ 51, 207 P.3d at 617; Henderson, 210 Ariz. at 567 ¶ 19, 115 P.3d at 607. ¶ 22 The trial court gave the following jury instruction: `Premeditation' means that the defendant intended to kill another human being or knew he would kill another human being and that after forming that intent or knowledge reflected on the decision before killing. It is this reflection, regardless of the length of time in which it occurs, that distinguishes first degree murder from second degree murder. An act is not done with premeditation if it is the instant effect of a sudden quarrel or heat of passion. The time needed for reflection is not necessarily prolonged, and the space of time between the intent or knowledge to kill and the act of killing may be very short. This instruction is nearly identical to the one prescribed in Thompson, 204 Ariz. at 479 ¶ 32, 65 P.3d at 428. Although we cautioned there that the instruction's last sentence need be given only when the facts require it, id., Thompson does not suggest that giving the entire instruction constitutes error. Under the facts of this case, in which Nelson admitted the murder but denied premeditation, the instruction was not fundamental error. ¶ 23 Nor did the prosecutor incorrectly argue premeditation. The prosecutor noted that the time to reflect may be short and highlighted the circumstantial evidence and decisions made by Nelson: to leave the motel, to walk to the store, to buy the mallet, to walk back to the room, and to hit Amber with the mallet. See id. at 480 ¶ 33, 65 P.3d at 429. The prosecutor did not suggest passage of time alone was sufficient to prove premeditation. See State v. Kiles, 222 Ariz. 25, 31 ¶ 21, 213 P.3d 174, 180 (2009) (finding no fundamental error in prosecutor's arguments that the time required to actually premeditate could be `instantaneous,' because he made clear that such was not the case in this matter [and h]is argument focused on the circumstantial evidence of premeditation).