Opinion ID: 2313650
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Pena's Four Factors

Text: The right to remain silent is derived from the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. [9] While the State may not put a penalty on the exercise of a constitutional right, `every reference to the exercise of the right to remain silent [does not] mandate ... reversal.' [10] In Pena, [11] this Court enumerated four factors to consider in deciding whether a mistrial should be granted in response to an allegedly prejudicial remark by a witness: first, nature and frequency of the offending comment; second, the likelihood of resulting prejudice; third, closeness of the case; and fourth, the adequacy of the trial judge's actions to mitigate any potential prejudice. [12] In this appeal, the State argues that the brief reference by Detective Papili to Revel previously asserting his right to remain silent and invoking his right to counsel was the result of defense cross-examination and not questioning by the State. Therefore, the four factor test of Pena is the more appropriate analytical paradigm to apply rather than the analysis, advocated by Revel, that we applied to State actions in Hughes v. State [13] and Hunter v. State. [14] We agree with the State's position. Although Detective Papili was a State witness, his challenged comment did not result from any action by the prosecutor. Accordingly, we will apply the four-part Pena analysis in this appeal, rather than the analysis prescribed by Hughes and Hunter.