Opinion ID: 740213
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: admission of the methamphetamine bindles

Text: We review the district court's decision to admit evidence under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) for an abuse of discretion. Houser, 929 F.2d at 1373. We may reverse on this basis only if an abuse of discretion more likely than not affected the verdict. United States v. Karterman, 60 F.3d 576, 578 (9th Cir.1995); United States v. Corona, 34 F.3d 876, 882 (9th Cir.1994). The district court initially excluded from evidence the three bindles of methamphetamine found in Ramirez's belongings at Mitchell's apartment. However, the court stated that it would permit the government to renew its motion to introduce that evidence if Ramirez raised an entrapment defense. The court advised the government that the methamphetamine would be admitted only if the government submitted an acceptable limiting instruction. Ramirez offered an entrapment defense and the district court granted the government's renewed request to admit the methamphetamine. The district court instructed the jury that [t]he evidence which has just been received is not received to prove [Ramirez's] guilt of [the ephedrine possession] charge, but is received simply for the limited purpose to show that he has knowledge of the methamphetamine which was in Exhibit 6, and that is the limited purpose for which this evidence has been received. 2 RT 299. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of the person in order to show action in conformity therewith. Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). However, such evidence may be admissible to prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Id. This court generally disfavors admitting other act evidence. United States v. Vizcarra-Martinez, 66 F.3d 1006, 1013-14 (9th Cir.1995). Under our four-part test, other act evidence is admissible if: (1) the evidence tends to prove a material point; (2) the prior act is not too remote in time; (3) the evidence is sufficient to support a finding that the defendant committed the other act; and (4) (in cases where knowledge and intent are at issue) the act is similar to the offense charged. United States v. Mayans, 17 F.3d 1174, 1181 (9th Cir.1994). Ramirez argues that evidence that he possessed a small amount of methamphetamine is not sufficiently similar to the charged crime of possession of precursor chemicals to satisfy this test. In Vizcarra-Martinez, the defendant was charged with conspiracy to wrongfully possess hydriodic acid and with having reasonable cause to believe the acid would be used to manufacture methamphetamine. Vizcarra-Martinez, 66 F.3d at 1009. We held that evidence of the defendant's possession of a small quantity of methamphetamine did not tend to prove that he was aware that hydriodic acid could be transformed into methamphetamine through a complicated manufacturing process. Id. at 1014. Particularly because the government had produced no evidence indicating that the methamphetamine in question was manufactured by the defendant or his co-conspirators, the court found that admission of the personal-use methamphetamine constituted an abuse of discretion. Id. at 1015-16. We further found that the error was not harmless, since evidence that a defendant uses drugs is highly prejudicial. Id. at 1017. Vizcarra-Martinez differs from this case only in that Ramirez presented an entrapment defense and the government offered the methamphetamine to rebut that defense. Ramirez, like Vizcarra-Martinez, was charged with possession of a precursor chemical to methamphetamine. The government offered the methamphetamine to prove Ramirez's knowledge of the drug, the same purpose for which the prosecution offered the methamphetamine in Vizcarra-Martinez. See 66 F.3d at 1014. The government presented no evidence that Ramirez manufactured the methamphetamine. In light of Vizcarra-Martinez, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the methamphetamine. 2