Opinion ID: 877940
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Intemperate Language.

Text: In a dissenting opinion written by you in the case of State v. McKenzie, Mont., 581 P.2d 1205, 1235, you employ the following language with reference to the majority of the court. `This court no more granted a fair review to defendant than the citizens of Pondera County could have given him a fair trial. The people of Montana can be well advised there is no law in the State of Montana.' P. 1236 `It is intellectual dishonesty for the majority not to recognize that the combination thereof is a radical departure from existing interpretations of constitutional law in this state   ' P. 1238 `And this is not the only manner in which the opinion is rather slippery with the facts.' P. 1250 `The dishonesty of the majority opinion is manifest   ' P. 1260 The foregoing quoted excerpts appear to be in violation of Canons 4 and 19 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics and may constitute conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrespect. You are hereby notified that you may have fifteen days after service of this notice to file a verified answer with the commission addressed to the Chairman of the Commission. Following receipt of your answer the Commission will decide what further action is to be taken. For your information reference is made to Rule 7 of the Rules of the Commission, providing that all proceedings before the Commission shall be confidential and only loses their confidential character when the record is filed with the Supreme Court. Reference is also made to Section 3-1-1109 MCA which provides that a judicial officer is disqualified from acting as such without loss of salary while a `formal proceeding' is pending. By Rule 2(j) of the Commission's Rules, `formal proceeding' is defined as the proceedings that follow the Commission's recommendation to the Supreme Court. Dated this 28th day of Dec., 1979. On February 22, 1980, Daniel J. Shea filed in writing with the Judicial Standards Commission his motions and brief asserting the following grounds for dismissal of the proceedings before the Judicial Standards Commission: 1. The Judicial Standards Commission is without jurisdiction to investigate the conduct of a judge which results in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrespect. 2. The Commission violates section 3-1-1106, MCA, by proceeding against him without a verified complaint. 3. The Commission itself has no power to proceed to investigation without receiving from some party a verified complaint. 4. Canons 4 and 19 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics are vague or overbroad when used to support the charges of the Judicial Standards Commission. The Judicial Standards Commission denied the motions of Daniel J. Shea, and set the matter for formal hearing before the Commission. However, the Commission granted Daniel J. Shea 30 days from the date of the denial in which to petition for an original writ of mandate or other appropriate writ. Daniel J. Shea petitioned the District Court of the First Judicial District for Lewis and Clark County for relief. That court granted alternative writs of prohibition and mandamus and writ of review, and stayed the proceedings before the Judicial Standards Commission, pending a hearing which was held on January 20, 1981. The Commission had filed its response, and moved for the dismissal of the petition and the quashing of all writs on November 10, 1980. The matter was finally deemed submitted to the District Court on February 3, 1981. On February 23, 1981, the District Court dismissed Daniel J. Shea's petition for writ of prohibition, mandamus and certiorari, and quashed the alternative writs. It is from that order of dismissal by the District Court that Daniel J. Shea here appeals.