Opinion ID: 691304
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Is Turkey's proposal an undertaking?

Text: 16 In 1990, when the Secretary of State could have but did not disapprove Turkey's proposal, the NHPA defined an undertaking by indirection, viz., as any action as described in [Sec. 106 of the Act]. 16 U.S.C. Sec. 470w(7) (1988). In 1992, however, the Congress amended the definition of undertaking in the NHPA to read in pertinent part as follows: 17 Undertaking means a project, activity, or program funded in whole or in part under the direct or indirect jurisdiction of a Federal agency, including ... (c) those requiring a Federal permit[,] license, or approval.... 18 16 U.S.C. Sec. 470w(7) (Supp. IV 1992). The plaintiffs argue that this definition applies retroactively to Turkey's proposal, and that the Secretary's authority to disapprove the proposed project rendered it a project ... requiring a Federal permit[,] license, or approval--in short, an undertaking. 19 The question whether the new definition applies retroactively to Turkey's project is complicated by the timing of the amendment. It was enacted after the time for the Secretary's review had passed--indeed, it was enacted after the plaintiffs had filed this suit in district court. See Landgraf v. USI Film Products, --- U.S. ----, ----, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 1505, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994) (holding statutes that would impair rights a party possessed when he acted ... or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed should not be applied retroactively absent an indication of clear congressional intent to the contrary). Rather than explore the mysteries of retroactivity doctrine as applied to these facts, however, we will assume for the sake of the plaintiffs' argument that the 1992 definition applies, for even under that version of the statute the plaintiffs fall short of their mark. 20 Upon a first reading, the amended definition seems actually to confine the notion of an undertaking to a project (etc.) funded in whole or in part under the direct or indirect jurisdiction of a federal agency, and thus by omission to exclude a federally licensed project from the coverage of the statute. That reading of the definition, however, would deprive the references to licensing in Sec. 106 of any practical effect. We infer, therefore, that the amending Congress intended to expand the definition of an undertaking--formerly limited to federally funded or licensed projects--to include projects requiring a federal permit or merely federal approval. 21 Of course, the Secretary was not called upon by the FMA to approve Turkey's proposal, but rather to disapprove it or not, as he saw fit. Other things being equal, we are hesitant to conclude that failure to disapprove means approve in this context, where the result would be to impose a regulatory burden upon the Secretary of State and, more important, to intrude into his conduct of the Nation's foreign relations. The plaintiffs argue, however, that we should overcome our reluctance to decide the question against the Secretary because the ACHP--to which we extend substantial even if not full deference under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984), see McMillan Park Committee v. National Capital Planning Commission, 968 F.2d 1283, 1287-88 (D.C.Cir.1992)--regards his failure to disapprove as an approval under the amended definition of undertaking in 16 U.S.C. Sec. 470w(7)(c). Here the plaintiffs direct us first to a letter from the ACHP to the State Department dated August 25, 1988, opining that the Secretary was required by Sec. 106 to submit Turkey's proposal to the ACHP and to a recent notice of proposed rulemaking in which the ACHP proposes to amend the definition of undertaking in its regulations under the NHPA specifically to include any project that requires a Federal permit, license[,] or approval, including agency authority to disapprove or veto the project. 59 Fed.Reg. 50396, 50404 (October 3, 1994); see also 36 C.F.R. Sec. 800.2(o). First, the ACHP's 1988 letter to the Secretary proffered its interpretation of Sec. 106 prior to the amendment of the definition of undertaking in 1992. Yet the plaintiffs have not argued, even in the alternative, that Turkey's project is an undertaking under that definition. Second, it is far from obvious that the court should defer to an agency's proposed interpretation, upon which it is still considering public comments. 22 As it turns out, however, we need not decide whether the ACHP's interpretation of undertaking warrants our deference. For as shown below, even if Turkey's project is an undertaking within the meaning of 16 U.S.C. Sec. 470w(7), the Secretary was still not required to submit the proposal to the ACHP because the Secretary neither has authority to license nor has he issu[ed] any license for Turkey's undertaking, as is required for Sec. 106 to apply. 16 U.S.C. Sec. 470f. 23