Opinion ID: 2633509
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 23

Heading: Prohibition on Defense Use of Chart in Jury Argument

Text: In closing argument, defense counsel proposed to use an illustrative chart stating, among other things, that the jury [m]ust vote for LWOP if mitigation and aggravation are equal. The trial court ruled the chart could not be used because when you start telling [a penalty jury] what they `must' do, that's inappropriate. Defendant contends this ruling violated state law and his federal constitutional rights to counsel, due process, and a reliable penalty hearing. We have repeatedly approved penalty phase instructions telling the jurors that to return a death verdict they must each be persuaded that the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of life without parole. (See, e.g., People v. Sakarias, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 637-639, 94 Cal. Rptr.2d 17, 995 P.2d 152; People v. Raley, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 919-920, 8 Cal. Rptr.2d 678, 830 P.2d 712.) The jury in the present case was so instructed. (CALJIC No. 8.88 (1989 rev.).) Defendant argues it follows from the principle expressed in this approved instruction that when the aggravating and mitigating circumstances are of equal weight, the jury must vote for life rather than death. As he puts it, the words `so substantial in comparison' [must] mean, at a minimum, `greater than.' For this reason, he contends, the precluded chart stated the law correctly and should have been allowed. We addressed related contentions in People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 643, 276 Cal.Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d 376 ( Hayes ), People v. Samayoa, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pages 852-853, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 938 P.2d 2 ( Samayoa ), and People v. Smith (2005) 35 Cal.4th 334, 370, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 554, 107 P.3d 229 ( Smith ). In Hayes, we rejected the claim that the jury should have been instructed what to do if it found the circumstances in aggravation and mitigation to be precisely equal in weight. ( Hayes, at p. 643, 276 Cal.Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d 376.) No such instruction was needed or proper, we held, [b]ecause the determination of penalty is essentially moral and normative . . . . The jurors cannot escape the responsibility of making the choice by finding the circumstances in aggravation and mitigation to be equally balanced and then relying on a rule of law to decide the penalty issue. ( Ibid. ) In Samayoa, we approved an instruction stating that the law expresses no preference as to which sentence is appropriate. ( Samayoa, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 852, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 938 P.2d 2.) Relying on Hayes, and rejecting the defendant's reliance on the standard instruction's so substantial language, we held that neither death nor life is presumptively appropriate or inappropriate under any set of circumstances, but in all cases the determination of the appropriate penalty remains a question for each individual juror. ( Samayoa, at p. 853, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 938 P.2d 2.) More recently, in Smith, we observed that CALJIC No. 8.88, by instructing the jury to choose death only if the aggravating circumstances were so substantial in relation to the mitigating circumstances as to warrant that penalty, convey[ed] to the jury that a life sentence is mandatory if aggravation does not outweigh mitigation. ( Smith, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 370, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 554, 107 P.3d 229.) Partly on this basis, we rejected the defendant's claim of instructional error. ( Ibid. ) Defendant's theoretical position, that the principle embodied in CALJIC No. 8.88 implied that a jury must vote for life if it finds the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in equipoise, is consistent with Smith's analysis but seemingly inconsistent with that in Samayoa. But even if, as defendant contends, Samayoa and Hayes are distinguishable as involving instructions rather than argument, we find no prejudicial error in the court's precluding defense counsel's use of a chart. Although counsel was not permitted to use the chart, she was allowed to argue the principle involved, that jurors should vote for life if they found the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of equal weight. Without objection, counsel told the jury that You could find that the factors are equal, and the appropriate penalty is life without possibility of parole. She further argued, without objection, that [u]nless you find that the factors in aggravation substantially outweigh the factors in mitigation, you don't even reach the decision about whether you should impose the death penalty. Counsel thus told the jury that equally weighted mitigation and aggravation must lead to a verdict of life without possibility of parole. No possibility of prejudice, even under the standard of Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at page 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, arose from the ruling preventing counsel from using a chart to make the same point.