Opinion ID: 1856211
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The verdict for the murder of Tracie Williams Ortiz

Text: The first circumstance asserted by the state to support defendant's conviction of the first degree murder of Tracie Williams Ortiz was that Ortiz was a principal to a murder committed with specific intent to kill while the perpetrator was engaged in the course of an aggravated burglary. In order to support a conviction pursuant to La. R.S. 14:30(A)(1), the evidence had to show that the perpetrator committed a felony-murder with specific intent to kill and that Ortiz was a principal to that act. La. R.S. 14:24 provides: All persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether present or absent, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, aid and abet in its commission, or directly or indirectly counsel or procure another to commit the crime, are principals. (Emphasis added). Not all principals are automatically guilty of the same grade of the offense. We have held that in order to be a principal to first degree murder, an accused who did not physically commit the crime must be shown to have personally possessed the specific intent that the victim be killed. State v. West, 568 So.2d 1019 (La.1990); State v. Holmes, 388 So.2d 722 (La.1980). [11] In the instant case, the jury could reasonably have concluded based on the evidence that Ortiz shared with the assassin the specific intent to murder Tracie in accordance with the plan he had devised. The testimony of Carlos Saavedra demonstrated that Ortiz wanted Tracie dead in order to collect insurance proceeds approaching one million dollars. He concocted a plan whereby he would give a key to her home to a hit-man who would be paid a cut of the insurance money. He planned to provide the murder weapon and to be out of the country when the murder occurred. The crime occurred in substantial compliance with defendant's plan. Thus, there was sufficient evidence to support the specific intent component of the crime so that Ortiz could be found guilty as a principal to first degree murder if the crime was committed in the course of an aggravated burglary and he was a principal to the aggravated burglary. La. R.S. 14:60 defines an aggravated burglary as the unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling with the intent to commit a felony therein if the offender is armed with a weapon upon entry, arms himself after entering, or commits a battery upon any person while inside or upon entering or leaving. To be guilty as a principal to a burglary, the offender does not have to personally enter the burgled building. State v. Kimble, 375 So.2d 924 (La.1979). And while possession of a dangerous weapon is an essential component of the commission of the aggravated burglary, a person may be a principal to the offense even though he did not personally have possession of the weapon used in the commission of the crime. See State v. Dominick, 354 So.2d 1316 (La.1978). An essential element of the crime of aggravated burglary is  unauthorized entry.  The only evidence offered suggested that defendant himself had lawful access to the premises. However, that did not prevent a finding by the jury that an unauthorized entry and aggravated burglary occurred under the particular facts and circumstances of this case. An unauthorized entry is an entry without consent, express or implied. State v. Dunn, 263 La. 58, 267 So.2d 193 (1972). In the case of a private dwelling, a person must have the consent of an occupant or an occupant's agent to constitute a defense to unauthorized entry. This consent must be given by a person with the authority and capacity to consent. State v. Lozier, 375 So.2d 1333 (La.1979). However, even if a person has lawful access to enter a premises himself, he is not empowered to grant lawful authority to another to enter for the purpose of committing a felony. In State v. Gendusa, 193 La. 59, 190 So. 332 (1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 511, 60 S.Ct. 133, 84 L.Ed. 436, we held that although a servant may have authority to enter a residence, where he conspires with another and allows entry so that his co-conspirator can commit a felony, both are guilty of burglary. Of particular interest is the decision in Davis v. State of Mississippi, 611 So.2d 906 (Miss.1992). In that case, a husband charged as a principal to a burglary of his own home contested his conviction. He claimed that he had authorized his friend, Brown, to enter his home for the purpose of robbing and raping his wife. He argued that since there was no unauthorized entry, there had been no burglary and, consequently, he could not be an accessory to that offense. The court soundly rejected such reasoning and explained: While Davis had the authority to consent to Brown's entry into the trailer for a lawful purpose, by no stretch of reasoning could he be considered as having a right to authorize Brown's entry to rob and rape Mrs. Davis. .... It would be monstrous to hold that Davis had any authority whatever to permit Brown to enter the trailer for the purpose of robbing and raping his wife, and having no such authority, his consent did not prevent Brown's entry from having been burglarious. 611 So.2d at 912. Since Davis aided and abetted Brown in the burglary, he was equally guilty as a principal to the burglary. Other courts considering the issue have also concluded that one party with lawful access to a premises cannot grant lawful authority to another to enter to commit a felony against another occupant. Any purported permission given for such a purpose is without effect and does not prevent the entry from constituting a burglary. [12] Just as in Davis, the person(s) who murdered Tracie cannot reasonably have believed that Ortiz had lawful authority to grant access to the premises for the purpose of murdering her. Accordingly, under the particular circumstances of this case, the jury could have found that the assassin did not have authority to enter the victim's residence. [13] The final key element of the crime of burglary is that the accused must have had the intent to commit a felony at the moment of entry. State v. Lockhart, 438 So.2d 1089 (La.1983). The jury had sufficient evidence to warrant a conclusion that the murderer entered the residence with the intent to carry out the murder-for-hire plan hatched by Ortiz and that Ortiz aided and abetted him in doing so with the intent that Tracie be killed. The evidence suggested that Ortiz had given the assassin a key to the residence and provided information about the victim's activities. It was not necessary for the state to prove the identity of both principals in order to convict Ortiz of burglary; it was only necessary to prove that someone made an unauthorized entry with the requisite mental intent and that the accused was a person concerned in the commission of the crime. State v. Irvine, 535 So.2d 365 (La.1988). Accordingly, the jury was entitled to return a verdict of first degree murder of Tracie Williams Ortiz pursuant to La. R.S. 14:30(A)(1). Defendant was a principal with specific intent to kill and aided, abetted and procured another to commit a murder in the course of an aggravated burglary. The second circumstance asserted by the state as a basis for the first degree murder conviction is that the offender had a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm upon more than one person. La. R.S. 14:30(A)(3). There is no question that the assassin had the requisite specific intent and did, in fact, cause the death of more than one person. Whether or not he expected to find Cheryl Mallory in the condominium when he entered, he formed the specific intent to kill her once her presence was known. Thus, the evidence clearly established that the assassin was guilty of first degree murder by virtue of having caused the deaths of more than one person. A more difficult question is whether Ortiz, as a principal to the crime, had the requisite specific intent to kill more than one person. A principal to a crime must personally possess the requisite mental intent required for the commission of the offense. State v. West, 568 So.2d 1019 (La. 1990). For purposes of the guilt phase of the trial, it was not sufficient for the jury to find that defendant merely created a risk of the death of more than one person. The statute required the jurors to find that defendant actively desired the result that followed from his actions. The evidence supported the jury's conclusion that Ortiz procured someone to kill his wife, Tracie, in order to collect the proceeds of policies of insurance on her life. However, there was no evidence to suggest that Ortiz conceived of the death of Mallory as part of the insurance fraud scheme. Rather, the evidence suggested that Mallory was murdered simply because she happened to be at the condominium when the assassin appeared to kill Tracie. No evidence was adduced to suggest that Ortiz contemplated Mallory's presence at the condominium, much less her murder. Based on the evidence in this record, the jury could not have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Ortiz actively desired the death of Cheryl Mallory. Thus, the jury could not reasonably have found that he was a principal to a murder committed with the intent to kill or seriously injure more than one person. A verdict of guilty pursuant to La. R.S. 14:30(A)(3) was not warranted. Finally, the state asserted that the first degree murder conviction was justified pursuant to La. R.S. 14:30(A)(4) because the evidence showed that Ortiz had specific intent to kill Tracie and offered something of value to someone else to induce the commission of the murder. The evidence that Ortiz paid or offered to give something of value to the assassin who actually accomplished the murder was circumstantial. However, Saavedra testified that less than two months before the murders, defendant was negotiating with Saavedra for Tracie's murder in exchange for 1/3 of the life insurance proceeds. Ortiz only broke off negotiations with Saavedra because Saavedra represented that he could not do the job alone and wanted to involve another person unknown to Ortiz. There was no evidence that Ortiz ever abandoned his murder-for-hire scheme. The last understanding of Saavedra was that defendant was going to bring in an assassin with para-military experience from El Salvador, who was known as Hercules, to do the job in place of Saavedra. The fact that Saavedra was reporting these details of the planned murder to FBI agents months before its occurrence, and the fact that they testified to their numerous meetings with Saavedra corroborated Saavedra's testimony of the murder-for-hire scheme. The crime was eventually committed less than two months after the cessation of these negotiations in a manner strikingly similar to that planned with Saavedra. The evidence supported the conclusion that Ortiz had purchased the murder weapon (a relatively rare knife) that killed Tracie just days before the murder. He also left the country right before the crime, just as he had told Saavedra he would. The jury was entitled to conclude that Ortiz arranged for someone to commit the crime. In our view, the circumstances were also sufficient to support the conclusion that he paid the assassin for the job. The only other hypothesis is that he found someone to commit the crime as a favor. In view of the prior negotiations with Saavedra, the jury could have excluded this hypothesis as unreasonable. A jury is entitled to accept the prosecution's hypothesis of guilt based on circumstantial evidence, when it is consistent overall with the evidence, and where the defendant's circumstantial theory of innocence is remote. State v. Graham, 422 So.2d 123 (La.1982). Defendant primarily argues that the first degree murder verdict is insupportable because the state's case rested heavily on the testimony of Carlos Saavedra, which he claims was so inconsistent and unreliable that it cannot be considered constitutionally sufficient to support his conviction. We disagree. While Saavedra's testimony may have been inconsistent in some instances and while he may have been impeached regarding his sale of Florida lottery tickets, his story regarding his conversations with Ortiz was corroborated by the FBI agents who testified that he was working with them and reporting the details of the murder-for-hire insurance fraud scheme throughout the summer before the murders. The fact that the crime was committed in substantial conformity with the plan he reported to the FBI substantiated Saavedra's testimony. Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant with the first degree murder of Tracie Williams Ortiz pursuant to La. R.S. 14:30(A)(4).