Opinion ID: 628601
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: CERCLA Sec. 107's Applicability to RCRA Costs

Text: 38 Defendants note that most of the oversight costs in question here were incurred by the government in overseeing a RCRA Sec. 3008(h) Consent Order. They argue that RCRA and CERCLA represent two distinct statutory schemes and that costs incurred pursuant to RCRA are not recoverable under CERCLA Sec. 107. In the defendants' view, costs which would be removal costs if incurred under CERCLA are nevertheless not removal costs if incurred under RCRA. We are unpersuaded. 39 Section 107(a) expressly stipulates that all costs of removal ... incurred by the United States Government are recoverable, and neither it nor the definition of removal contains CERCLA specific language. 42 U.S.C. Secs. 9601(23), 9607 (emphasis added). Moreover, Sec. 107(a) expressly provides for the situation in which more than one statutory scheme purports to provide a governing rule. The opening clause--notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law--decrees that where another statute, as well as Sec. 107(a), is applicable, the liability provisions of Sec. 107(a) will prevail even where the commands of the two statutes are in conflict. It follows that if both RCRA and CERCLA read on the situation before us, the fact that RCRA provides no authority for assessing government oversight costs could take nothing away from any authority found in Sec. 107(a) for such assessment. Thus, if a particular government action qualifies as a removal action under the definition contained in CERCLA, the government's costs are recoverable under the unambiguous language of Sec. 107, regardless of what statutory authority was invoked by EPA in connection with its action. 40 We find no support in the text or legislative history of CERCLA for the suggestion that identical oversight activity on the part of the government should be considered a removal if the government invokes CERCLA, but not a removal if other statutory authority is invoked. Moreover, given the similarity of the provisions of RCRA and CERCLA authorizing EPA to order private parties to conduct corrective activity, we fail to perceive any reason why Congress might have wished to make government oversight expenses recoverable if the government invoked CERCLA statutory authority, but not if it invoked RCRA. 15