Opinion ID: 2284344
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Interaction with Family

Text: Teddy Robertson, Lisa Potter, and Caleb Stewart all testified post-trial that they witnessed Nabb interacting with the victim's family on breaks during the first day of trial. Potter was the only one of the three who could identify the family members; according to her, Nabb spoke with Regina Alexander, Judy Blick, Roxanne Murvine, and Amy Whitaker. None of the witnesses overheard anything that was said. Regina Alexander, one of the family members alleged by Potter to have conversed with Nabb, testified to the contrary, denying having talked to any of the jurors. Sabrina Sawyers, Kay Williams's daughter, who was also at the trial, could not recall either herself or Regina talking to Nabb either. As to these allegations, the trial court made the following findings: The Court finds that during the October 13-17, 2008 trial, both before and after he was sworn as a juror in the case, Charles Nabb had some conversation and contact with members of Kay Williams's family in the environs of the courthouse. However, there is no evidence that juror Nabb discussed the pending case with those family members. These findings are consistent with the testimony at the post-conviction hearing and therefore are not clearly erroneous. Nabb's brief conversation and contact with family members was unquestionably inappropriate. Witnesses are barred by statute from conversing] with the jury or any member thereof upon any subject after they have been sworn. KRS 29A.310(2). The family members who were witnesses at trial and conversed with Nabb were in direct violation of the law. Nonetheless, [a] mistrial is not warranted if the conversation between the witness and the juror was `innocent' and matters of substance were not involved. Talbott v. Commonwealth, 968 S.W.2d 76, 86 (Ky. 1998); Owings v. Webb's Ex'r, 304 Ky. 748, 752, 202 S.W.2d 410 (1947). The true test is whether the misconduct has prejudiced the defendant to the extent that he has not received a fair trial. Talbott, 968 S.W.2d at 86 (citing Byrd v. Commonwealth, 825 S.W.2d 272, 275 (Ky.1992)). In previous cases concerning conversations between jurors and witnesses, Kentucky courts have been able to draw a bright line between conversations about the case and conversations about unrelated matters. The former prejudice the defendant, whereas the latter are harmless. Compare Doyle v. Marymount Hospital, 762 S.W.2d 813 (Ky.App.1988), with Talbott, 968 S.W.2d at 86, and Jones v. Commonwealth, 662 S.W.2d 483, 484 (Ky.App. 1983). But what happens when no one testifies to what the conversation was about? There is no way to determine or even to conjecture about the effect of the error, particularly, whether it was prejudicial or not. Kentucky's harmless error rule provides as follows: No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence and no error or defect in any ruling or order, or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial or for setting aside a verdict or for vacating, modifying or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order unless it appears to the court that the denial of such relief would be inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding that does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. RCr 9.24. The list of errors subject to the rule are evidentiary errors, ruling errors, errors by the court, and errors committed by one of the parties. RCr 9.24. Notably absent from this list is error committed by a juror or witness, as occurred here. Nonetheless, without any other guidance or a binding rule on how such juror errors or witness errors should be treated, this Court will utilize the same rule provided for most other errors. It makes particular sense that an error in something done by a witness should be subject to the same harmlessness test as an error committed by a party. For a juror to converse with a witness cannot be any worse than conversing with a party; such an error committed by a witness is at least as likely to be harmless. The rule generally states that an error is not ground for a new trial unless it appears to the court that the denial of such relief would be inconsistent with substantial justice. Id. (emphasis added). To order a new trial, the court must affirmatively find substantial injustice apparent. The default approach of the rule is against reversal, thus placing the burden on the partyin this case, Appellantclaiming the error. Absent such a showing, a reviewing court has no reason, other than raw speculation, to think that error had a substantial influence on the judgment; nor is it likely that the court would be left in grave doubt about such influence. The lower court did not find the conversation to have caused substantial injustice to Appellant, nor should it have. Without any record of the brief conversation between Nabb and the family members, Appellant cannot meet his burden.