Opinion ID: 854102
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Amendment to the Charging Information

Text: Haak asserts that the trial court erred in allowing the charging information to be amended approximately three weeks before trial. [5] Conviction of conspiracy requires proof that the defendant or a co-conspirator performed an overt act in furtherance of the unlawful agreement. IND.CODE § 35-41-5-2(b) (1993). The amended information deleted one of eight overt acts allegedly taken in furtherance of the conspiracythat Haak shot and killed Pronger on or about August 15, 1988.
Amendments to the charging instrument are governed by Indiana Code § 35-34-1-5, which broadly distinguishes between amendments of immaterial defect or form and amendments of substance. [6] The former by virtue of subsections (a) and (c) may be made at any time if there is no prejudice to the defendant. Pursuant to subsection (b), the latter require written notice to the defendant of the proposed change and may not occur after specified times in advance of the omnibus date. The omnibus date here was in 1994 and the amendment was in 1996. Thus, if the amendment was of substance, or prejudicial to the defendant even if of form, it was impermissible under the statute. The form/substance distinction has been explained as follows: If the defense under the original information would be equally available after the amendment is made and the accused's evidence would be equally applicable to the information in one form as in the other, the amendment is one of form and not of substance. An amendment is of substance only if it is essential to the making of a valid charge of the crime. Sharp v. State, 534 N.E.2d 708, 714 (Ind. 1989) (citation omitted).
Haak relies on Abner v. State, 497 N.E.2d 550 (Ind.1986), a case construing the predecessor statute, for the proposition that allowing the deletion of the killing as an overt act was error. In Abner, an information alleging conspiracy to commit murder was amended six days before trial to change the overt act from a shooting to pushing the victim into a river. Id. at 553. The conviction was reversed on the ground that this was a substantial alteration of an essential fact amounting to an impermissible shift in the State's theory of the case. Id. at 554. [7] However, the change here did not surprise Haak with a new factual allegation that he was unprepared to counter as trial approached. Because the amendment only reduced the possible grounds on which the jury could find one element of conspiracy, there was no unfair surprise. Cf. Sides v. State, 693 N.E.2d 1310, 1312-13 (Ind.1998) (deletion of the word auto from auto theft in habitual offender allegation was non-substantive and did not prejudice defendant); Taylor v. State, 663 N.E.2d 213, 218 (Ind.Ct.App.1996) (deletion of mere surplusage from the information was not error), trans. denied. In the parlance of Sharp, the amendment did not cause Haak to lose any defenses or affect the application of his evidence to the crimes charged; nor was it essential to the making of a criminal charge. Sharp, 534 N.E.2d at 714. The change was not of substance, and the amendment therefore was permissible at any time if not prejudicial to Haak. IND. CODE § 35-34-1-5(c) (1993). Haak's real claim as to prejudice is not that he was caught off guard, but rather that the amendment was a prerequisite to the State's obtaining convictions on both counts. He asserts that because the information alleged the killing as an overt act before it was (impermissibly) amended, murder and conspiracy to commit murder under the facts of this case are the same offense for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. [8] Because it is presumed in the absence of a contrary intent that the legislature did not intend to attach cumulative penalties to the same offense, Grinstead v. State, 684 N.E.2d 482, 485 (Ind.1997), the argument goes, conviction on both counts is barred. Even if we accepted the premise of this contentionthat Haak was or should have been tried on an information alleging Pronger's murder as an overt actthere would be no error because the inquiry in determining whether two offenses are the same for federal double jeopardy purposes focuses on the statutes defining the crimes, not the charging instrument. If each offense contains at least one statutory element that the other does not, the offenses are distinct for federal Fifth Amendment purposes and there is no bar on conviction and sentence on both. Games v. State, 684 N.E.2d 466, 477 (Ind. 1997), modified on reh'g, 690 N.E.2d 211 (Ind.1997), petition for cert. filed, ___ U.S.L.W. ___ (U.S. May 13, 1998) (No. 97-9143). Murder and conspiracy to commit murder are separate offenses under this analysis. Compare IND.CODE § 35-42-1-1 (1988) with IND.CODE § 35-41-5-2 (1993). Because the federal double jeopardy claim fails, the amendment to the charging information deleting the killing as an overt act did not prejudice Haak's substantial rights. IND. CODE § 35-34-1-5(c) (1993).