Opinion ID: 1439456
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Hearing before court or jury

Text: (1) When ... the defendant is found guilty of ... an offense under subsection (e) of this section, the judge ... shall conduct a separate sentencing hearing to determine the punishment to be imposed. The hearing shall be conducted (A) before the jury which determined the defendant's guilt; (B) before a jury impaneled for the purpose of the hearing if... (iii) the jury which determined the defendant's guilt has been discharged for good cause; ... (2) A jury impaneled under paragraph (1)(B) shall consist of 12 members, unless, at any time before the conclusion of the hearing, the parties stipulate with the approval of the court that it shall consist of any number less than 12. 21 U.S.C. § 848(i). [17] Honken claims the plain language of § 848(i) precludes substitution of an alternate during the penalty phase because the penalty phase jury must be the same jury which determined the defendant's guilt. Honken argues the only alternatives allowable under § 848(i) were to declare a mistrial or discharge the whole jury for good cause, impaneling an entirely new jury to hear the penalty phase evidence and conduct penalty phase deliberations. At least two sister circuits have addressed this issue. See Battle v. United States, 419 F.3d 1292, 1301-02 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Johnson, 223 F.3d 665, 669-71 (7th Cir.2000). [18] Both the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits concluded the district court's substitution of an alternate for penalty phase deliberations did not violate the Federal Death Penalty Act (FDPA). See Battle, 419 F.3d at 1302; Johnson, 223 F.3d at 670. In Johnson, the Seventh Circuit reasoned: The statute makes no provision for the situation that occurred here [substituting an alternate for penalty phase deliberations], leaving it to the good sense of the judges to deal with. We find guidance to the proper resolution in the 1999 amendment to Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which, altering the previous practice [which required the court to discharge alternates when the jury retires to deliberate], allows the trial judge to replace a regular juror with an alternate during deliberations, which must then recommence. Fed.R.Crim.P. 24(c)(3). In other words, the fact that the alternate missed some of the deliberations is no longer regarded as a fatal objection, or indeed as any objection, to his participating in the jury's decision. The analogy to the procedure employed here is close. Johnson, 223 F.3d at 670 (internal citation omitted). The Johnson court further explained, the issues of guilt and punishment are sufficiently distinct that the alternate didn't have to hear the [guilt phase] deliberations ... in order to be able to participate meaningfully in the [penalty phase] deliberations.... [The alternate] had sat through the entire trial, which is the important thing. Id. In Battle, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Johnson. Battle, 419 F.3d at 1302. We are persuaded by the reasoning in Johnson and Battle. Like the FDPA, § 848(i) makes no specific provision for the substitution of an alternate during penalty phase deliberations. Instead of retrying this lengthy and complex capital case or representing penalty phase evidence before a newly impaneled jury that had not heard guilt phase evidence, the district court chose the most reasonable solution available under the circumstancesreplacing a juror with an alternate who sat through Honken's entire trial. The substitution took place shortly after penalty phase deliberations began. In further jury instructions, the district court emphasized the significance of beginning deliberations anew by providing new copies of the penalty phase verdict form and specifically instructing the jury to begin your discussions and deliberations concerning the penalty phase from the very beginning. Because § 848(i) provides no procedure for the situation that occurred here, we conclude it was not error for the district court to replace a juror with an alternate and instruct the jury to begin penalty phase deliberations anew.
Next, Honken asserts the district court violated his Sixth Amendment rights by upholding the guilty verdict despite dismissing Juror 523 during the penalty phase. Honken contends the guilty verdict should not be allowed to stand because the allegedly inappropriate comments by Juror 523's boss occurred before guilt phase deliberations. We review for abuse of discretion the district court's ruling on Honken's motion for a mistrial based on alleged jury taint. See United States v. Lussier, 423 F.3d 838, 841-42 (8th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). A district court's determinations as to the credibility of witnesses are virtually unreviewable on appeal. United States v. Ralph, 480 F.3d 888, 890 (8th Cir.2007). Honken claims there is no support for the district court's conclusion Juror 523 was upset by the stress of her duties as a juror, rather than by the comments Juror 523 attributed to her boss. The district court conducted a searching inquiry into the allegations of jury taint: questioning Juror 523 on two separate days, individually questioning each juror and each alternate, and conducting a post-trial evidentiary hearing where the court again questioned Juror 523, the boss who allegedly made the comments, and a number of Juror 523's co-workers who might have had knowledge of the purported comments. The trial judge found Juror 523's boss did not make comments to the effect of guilty, guilty, guilty, fry him, or when are you gonna burn him? Instead, the district court determined Juror 523's testimony was inconsistent, and the only comment supported by credible testimony was Juror 523 should have said something `outrageous' to get out of jury duty. The court also found credible the boss's testimony he did not know what trial Juror 523 was hearing; did not follow the Honken trial; did not know what the trial was about, apart from `drugs'; did not know that the case was a death penalty case, until after the trial was in progress; and that he did not pay attention to the process. The district court then resolved Juror 523 was not troubled and upset by the comments that her boss was purportedly making, but by the stress of the duties of a juror in a capital case, coupled with the stress of changing `gears' to return to work when she was not in trial, and the fact that she had to go to work while other jurors did not, all of which manifested in a desire to finish deliberations as quickly as possible and to `get her life back.' Each of these determinations is supported by the record and was well within the district court's discretion. Honken also disputes the district court's decision Honken suffered no prejudice as a result of Juror 523's participation in guilt phase deliberations. Honken claims he was prejudiced because the one comment the district court foundthat Juror 523 should have said something outrageous to get out of jury serviceoccurred before guilt phase deliberations. Honken contends prejudice is presumed because Juror 523 was exposed to extraneous information from a third party. To support his argument, Honken relies on Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 74 S.Ct. 450, 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954), where the Supreme Court held [i]n a criminal case, any private communication, contact, or tampering directly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial about the matter pending before the jury is, for obvious reasons, deemed presumptively prejudicial ... [and] the burden rests heavily upon the Government to establish ... that such contact with the juror was harmless to the defendant. Id. at 229, 74 S.Ct. 450 (citations omitted). In Remmer, a juror was offered money in exchange for a favorable verdict. Id. at 228-29, 74 S.Ct. 450. We have consistently held the Remmer presumption of prejudice does not apply unless the alleged outside contact relates to factual evidence not developed at trial. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 367 F.3d 1019, 1029 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Hall, 85 F.3d 367, 371 (8th Cir.1996)); United States v. Wallingford, 82 F.3d 278, 281 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. Blumeyer, 62 F.3d 1013, 1016 (8th Cir.1995)). We also have concluded the Remmer presumption of prejudice applies in cases with facts like Remmer 'sthose involving outside communication or tampering. We explained, [c]ontamination of a different kind occurs when, rather than being exposed to a fact not in evidence, a juror is subjected to psychological pressure by an outsider trying to coopt that juror's vote. United States v. Tucker, 137 F.3d 1016, 1032 (8th Cir.1998). Juror 523's boss's remark that Juror 523 should have said something outrageous to get out of jury service does not involve improperly received facts or relate in any way to any issue in Honken's case. The comment could hardly be construed as an attempt to influence Juror 523's vote, particularly in light of the district court's conclusion Juror 523's boss did not know what trial Juror 523 was hearing. The comment took place before Juror 523 was even seated on the jury. We therefore determine, as the district court did, that the comment amounted to nothing more than an unsolicited, passing remark which was made, and taken, in jest. Thus, the Remmer presumption of prejudice does not apply. As we explained in Tucker, whether the presumption shifts the burden of proof to the government or not, the ultimate question is the same: `Did the intrusion affect the jury's deliberations and thereby its verdict?' Id. at 1030 (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 739, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993)). Even if we presume Honken was prejudiced by Juror 523's boss's suggestion to say something outrageous to get out of jury duty, our review of the record reveals any such presumption was soundly dispelled by the evidence adduced during the district court's various hearings on the issue. The evidence uniformly pointed to one conclusionJuror 523's boss's comment was completely insignificant and the comment had no affect on the jury's deliberations or its verdict. Honken was not prejudiced by Juror 523's exposure to her boss's relatively insignificant comment. Finally, Honken maintains, under Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) (Rule 606(b)), the district court was prohibited from asking Juror 523 whether her boss's purported comments affected her ability to be fair and impartial. Rule 606(b) provides a juror may testify about (1) whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention, [and] (2) whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror, but may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict ... or concerning the juror's mental processes in connection therewith. Fed.R.Evid. 606(b) (emphasis added). The circuits disagree whether Rule 606(b) prohibits a juror from testifying as to whether extraneous information or an outside influence affected the juror's ability to be impartial. A number of circuits addressing the issue have concluded such questioning is improper. See United States v. Greer, 285 F.3d 158, 173-74 (2d Cir.2002) (noting, where the district court asked jurors in a post-verdict evidentiary hearing whether the extra-record information impacted their ability to be fair and impartial ... that line of questioning was improper (citations omitted)); Haugh v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 949 F.2d 914, 917 (7th Cir.1991) (stating, [t]he proper procedure [to determine the existence of any unauthorized communication made to a juror] is for the judge to limit the questions asked the jurors to whether the communication was made and what it contained, and to make that determination emphatically without asking them what role the communication played in their thoughts or discussion [or] whether there is a reasonable possibility that the communication altered their verdict (citations omitted)); United States v. Simpson, 950 F.2d 1519, 1521 (10th Cir.1991) (explaining a juror may testify as to whether any extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to bear upon a juror... [but] may not testify as to the effect the outside information had upon the juror). By contrast, the Sixth Circuit found a district court abused its discretion by not asking jurors about whether their exposure to outside influences affected their ability to be impartial. See United States v. Herndon, 156 F.3d 629, 637 (6th Cir. 1998) (vacating a defendant's conviction and sentence, and remanding for a hearing so the defendant could have an opportunity to prove actual bias, where the district court not only failed to adequately investigate the allegation of juror partiality, but the juror never personally assured the court of his impartiality); United States v. Walker, 1 F.3d 423, 431 (6th Cir.1993) (remanding for a new trial where the judge den[ied] the reasonable request to inquire into the jurors' states of mind after jurors were exposed to unredacted deposition transcripts). The Ninth Circuit appears to agree with the Sixth. See United States v. Rutherford, 371 F.3d 634, 644 (9th Cir.2004) (stating, evidence regarding any influence that such improper conduct or contacts had on the jurors' abilities to fairly and impartially receive the evidence, listen to the testimony presented, and the judge's instructions is also admissible). We have found no Eighth Circuit case specifically addressing whether a district court may, at a post-verdict hearing, ask a juror whether an outside influence affected that juror's ability to be impartial. However, we generally have observed Rule 606(b) prevent[s] any examination into the effect ... extrinsic material had on the mental processes of the jurors. United States v. Bassler, 651 F.2d 600, 603 (8th Cir.1981). We now hold Rule 606(b) prohibits a juror from testifying at a post-verdict hearing as to whether extraneous information or an outside influence affected that juror's ability to be impartial. The plain language of Rule 606(b) permits a juror to testify as to  whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention [and] whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror but the rule expressly prohibits a juror from testifying as to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict ... or concerning the juror's mental processes in connection therewith. Fed.R.Evid. 606(b) (emphasis added). Asking a juror whether he or she believes extraneous information or an improper influence affected his or her ability to be impartial in reaching a verdict goes directly to the effect of anything upon that ... juror's mind or emotions, or mental processes. We conclude it was improper for the district court to ask Juror 523 what effect her boss's comment had on her and whether exposure to the boss's comment affected her ability to be impartial. This conclusion does not necessitate remanding Honken's case for a new trial. In Haugh, after finding the district court improperly questioned jurors, the Seventh Circuit reasoned: So there was error; what is to be done? One possibility would be to remand for a further hearing before the judge. But that would be futile because it would be unrealistic to expect him to erase the impression that the jurors' answers had made on him; nor is it irrelevant that the case is already a decade old. In the circumstances we think we should make our own judgment.... Haugh, 949 F.2d at 919. Similarly, the Second Circuit in Greer made an independent determination as to whether the outside contact ... presented [any] information that could have been improperly used in deliberations, determining a `hypothetical average juror' would not have been influenced by the extrinsic information in this case. Greer, 285 F.3d at 174. The circumstances of Honken's case also warrant an independent determination by this court. Because Rule 606(b) precludes questioning the jurors as to the subjective effects of an outside influence, the court must apply an objective test, assessing for itself the likelihood that the influence would affect a typical juror. Simpson, 950 F.2d at 1522 (citing Bassler, 651 F.2d at 603). The inquiry is whether there exists a reasonable possibility that the external influence or information affected the verdict. Id. (citation omitted). In Honken's case, no evidence suggests Juror 523's boss's remark, that Juror 523 should have said something outrageous to get out of jury service, presented even a remote possibility of influencing any typical or reasonable juror's verdict either in favor of or against Honken. The record does suggest the comment amounted to nothing more than an unsolicited, passing remark which was made, and taken, in jest. Honken is not entitled to a new trial. [19]
Honken protests the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury it had to find unanimously the identity of the five persons Honken directed as part of the CCE. See 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(2)(A) (requiring a defendant to have acted in concert with five or more other persons whom the defendant organized, supervised, or managed). Because [Honken] did not object to the instructions at trial, we review for plain error. United States v. Cuervo, 354 F.3d 969, 994 (8th Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds sub nom. ; Norman v. United States, 543 U.S. 1099, 125 S.Ct. 1049, 160 L.Ed.2d 994 (2005), aff'd on remand 427 F.3d 537 (8th Cir.2005). See United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 549 (8th Cir.2005) (en banc); Fed.R.Crim.P. 51(b) and 52(b). In Cuervo, we held a district court's failure to give such a unanimity instruction under § 848(c)(2)(A)'s five or more other persons provision was not plain error. Cuervo, 354 F.3d at 995. The district court did not plainly err by failing to give such an instruction in Honken's case. [20]
Honken contends the district court erred in instructing the jury to weigh Honken's intent as an aggravating factor, when such intent was properly considered only as a threshold or gateway factor for death penalty eligibility. Honken argues (1) the ADAA should set forth the same punishment scheme as the FDPA, which considers intent only as a gateway factor for death penalty eligibility; and (2) the ADAA is constitutionally infirm because the ADAA fails adequately to narrow the field of defendants who may receive the death penalty. We review the district court's jury instructions for abuse of discretion, [affirming] [i]f the instructions, taken as a whole, fairly and adequately submitted the issues to the jury[.] United States v. Lalley, 257 F.3d 751, 755 (8th Cir.2001). We review federal constitutional questions de novo. United States v. Bates, 77 F.3d 1101, 1104 (8th Cir.1996) (citation omitted). To withstand constitutional scrutiny, an aggravating factor which makes the defendant eligible for the death penalty must not apply to every defendant convicted of a murder, but instead only to a subclass of murder defendants, and it must not be unconstitutionally vague. United States v. Paul, 217 F.3d 989, 1001 (8th Cir.2000) (citation omitted). Title 21 U.S.C. § 848(k) provides: The jury ... shall return special findings identifying any aggravating factors set forth in subsection (n) of this section, found to exist. If one of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (n)(1) of this section and another of the aggravating factors set forth in paragraphs (2) through (12) of subsection (n) [21] of this section is found to exist, a special finding identifying any other aggravating factor for which notice has been provided under subsection (h)(1)(B) of this section, may be returned.... If an aggravating factor set forth in subsection (n)(1) of this section is not found to exist or an aggravating factor set forth in subsection (n)(1) of this section is found to exist but no other aggravating factor set forth in subsection (n) of this section is found to exist, the court shall impose a sentence, other than death, authorized by law. If an aggravating factor set forth in subsection (n)(1) of this section and one or more of the other aggravating factors set forth in subsection (n) of this section are found to exist, the jury ... shall then consider whether the aggravating factors found to exist sufficiently outweigh any mitigating factor or factors found to exist, or in the absence of mitigating factors, whether the aggravating factors are themselves sufficient to justify a sentence of death. 21 U.S.C. § 848(k). Thus, [the subsection (n)(1)] factors act as both a gateway and as aggravators. If the jury does not find at least one of these factors, its consideration of a penalty of death must stop; once the jury finds an (n)(1) factor, it must later weigh that factor (along with other aggravators) against any mitigating factors. United States v. Flores, 63 F.3d 1342, 1370 (5th Cir.1995). The district court's instructions followed the procedure set forth in 21 U.S.C. § 848(k). In Step One, Honken's jury was instructed to consider eligibility aggravating factors, requiring a determination of whether Honken had the requisite criminal intent, as set forth in § 848(n)(1). In Honken's case, this determination required the jury to choose whether: (1) Honken intentionally killed the victims, or (2) Honken intentionally engaged in conduct intending the victims be killed. The jury unanimously determined Honken intentionally killed each of the victims. In Step Two, the jury determined the existence of statutory aggravating factors, as set forth in § 848(n). The jury unanimously found at least one statutory aggravating factor applied to each of the victims. Step Three required the jury to determine the existence of non-statutory aggravating factors. The jury found the existence of each non-statutory aggravating factor alleged. The jury was then instructed to determine the existence of any mitigating factors in Step Four. Finally, the jury was required to weigh the aggravating factors found in Steps One, Two, and Three, and the mitigating factors found in Step Four, to determine whether death was the appropriate punishment. Honken asserts the intent factors set forth in § 848(n)(1) are not really aggravators at all, but merely pre-conditions to the consideration of the death sentence. To support his argument, Honken points out, under the FDPA, intent is considered to be a gateway finding only with no further weight given to intent when weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors takes place. Honken contends the doctrine of constitutional avoidance requires an interpretation of the ADAA consistent with the FDPA. Honken further claims the intent factors are constitutionally infirm because they apply to every defendant eligible for the death penalty, and do not narrow the universe of defendants eligible for the death penalty. This court has not directly addressed whether it is constitutional for intent to be considered both in terms of eligibility and also as an aggravating factor. Several other circuits have squarely rejected Honken's argument. For example, in United States v. McCullah , the Tenth Circuit observed the clear language of the ADAA provides for intent to be considered both as an eligibility factor and as an aggravating factor. McCullah, 76 F.3d at 1108-09. The McCullah court reasoned: The fact that Congress changed the capital sentencing scheme for other crimes six years after the adoption of § 848(e) et seq. does not alter the plain language interpretation of § 848(e). The [FDPA] created a new capital sentencing scheme for many federal offenses, but significantly did not alter § 848(e). Even had the [FDPA] been an amendment to § 848, it would merely indicate that Congress can, and did, alter the federal capital sentencing scheme for drug conspiracies. However, this does not in any way indicate any error in the prior scheme; there is more than one proper method of structuring a capital sentencing scheme. Id. at 1109 (internal citations omitted). The McCullah court also rejected Honken's claim § 848 fails adequately to narrow the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty, explaining, Congress has statutorily narrowed the field of death eligible defendants by limiting the possibility of capital punishment to homicides in furtherance of continuing criminal enterprises or other specified offenses. Thus, contrary to [defendant]'s assertion, only a small subset of all potentially death-eligible defendants are subject to capital punishment under the federal scheme, and thus the requisite narrowing is present. Id. (internal citation omitted). See also United States v. Tipton, 90 F.3d 861, 897-98 (4th Cir.1996); Flores, 63 F.3d at 1370-71. We agree with the reasoning of our sister circuits. The fact the FDPA and ADAA are similar in a number of respects does not support the conclusion the ADAA must provide exactly the same sentencing scheme and penalty phase procedure as the FDPA. Further, the ADAA indeed narrows the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty. We conclude the district court did not err in instructing the jury to weigh Honken's intent as both an eligibility factor and an aggravating factor.
Honken contends the district court erred by denying his motion to give a statement to the jury without being cross examined. We have previously explained defendants have neither a constitutional nor a statutory right to allocution before a jury. See United States v. Purkey, 428 F.3d 738, 761 (8th Cir.2005) (citations omitted). [Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure] 32(i)(4)(A)(ii) requires that `[b]efore imposing sentence,' the district court must `permit the defendant to speak or present any information to mitigate the sentence.' Id. We acknowledged in Purkey [the defendant]'s allocution could not have mitigated his sentence because it followed the jury's recommendation of the death penalty. Id. Nevertheless, Rule 32 does not grant [defendants] a right to allocution before a jury; Rule 32 speaks only of the court.' Id. The district court did not err by denying Honken's motion to allocute before the jury. [22]