Opinion ID: 1654442
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: `A' Residence District

Text: Be it further ordained, that in the `A' Residence District no building or premises shall be used and no building shall be hereafter erected or structurally altered, unless otherwise provided in this ordinance, except for one or more of the following uses: 1. One-family dwellings 2. Two-family dwellings 3. Churches 4. Schools 5. Libraries 6. Farming and Truck Gardening 7. Accessory buildings, including one private garage or private stable when located not less than 60 feet from the front lot line, or a private garage in a (fireproof) compartment as a part of the main building. 8. Uses customarily incident to any of the above uses when located on the same lot and not involving the conduct of a business; including also home occupations engaged in by the occupants of a dwelling not involving the conduct of a business on the premises, and including also the office of a physician, surgeon, dentist, musician or artist, when situated in the same dwelling used by such physician, surgeon, dentist, musician or artist as his or her private dwelling; provided no name plate exceeding one (1) square feet in area, containing the name and occupation of the occupant of the premises, nor a sign exceeding eight (8) square feet in area appertaining to the lease, hire or sale of a building or premise, nor advertising sign of any other character shall be permitted in any `A' Residence District. It will be noticed that under Item 8 of the above quoted Ordinance provision a physician, surgeon, dentist, musician or artist, may have an office in his residence in an `A' Residence District. Absolutely implicit in such a provision is the authority to use that office in the manner in which a physician, surgeon, dentist, musician, or artist would be expected to use such an office. The Zoning Ordinance does not indicate the contrary. Every one knows that a doctor uses his office as a place to which patients are privileged to come for examination and treatment. It necessarily follows that it was intended by this ordinance for patients who desired the services of Dr. Burkhalter to come to his office at his residence and there be examined and treated. In fact, the ordinance expressly authorizes Dr. Burkhalter to inform the public that he is maintaining an office there for that purpose in that it authorizes him to display there at some conspicuous place his name plate informing the public what his occupation there is. There is nothing in the ordinance which justifies an inference that it was intended to limit the number of patients who might see the doctor there on a given day. So it is immaterial to the question here as to whether the doctor had one call or twenty-five a day at this office. If the doctor may use this office it has to follow as a matter of ordinary reasoning that he may do those things which make its use available in a reasonable manner. Otherwise, the ordinance in this respect would not make sense. Now in a doctor's office, as every one knows, there is expected to be the paraphernalia, instruments, furniture and medicines necessary for the examination and treatment of the patients that may call at his office for professional services of the character he is offering to render. So also is it proper that he have a janitor, a receptionist, or other non-professional employee usually employed in such an office. There is no inference in this ordinance that the doctor may not have any of these reasonably necessary articles or employees. Indeed, such a provision would have destroyed the privilege given in that it would permit him to have an office but deny him, for all practical purposes, the privilege of using it. The first seven items of Section 3 of the Zoning Ordinance enumerate uses to which premises in an A Residence District may be put. Then follows Item 8 wherein it is provided that in addition to those seven uses premises may also be put to uses (1) customarily incident to those seven uses when  not involving the conduct of a business, and (2) home occupations of a dwelling not involving the conduct of a business on the premises. (Emphasis supplied) Then follows (3) and including also the office of a physician, surgeon, dentist, musician or artist. There does not follow (3) the expression which follows (1) and follows (2), to-wit, not involving the conduct of a business. The situation in which we thus find the expression not involving the conduct of a business necessarily suggests to the mind the query as to why the ordinance followed (1) and (2) with the expression each time,  not involving the conduct of a business, but omitted it as to (3). The natural conclusion is that as (the) expressions are varied, they were altered because (the) intention in both cases was not the same. Simpson v. Smith, 33 Tenn. 394, 396. Moreover, if the ordinance, after authorizing in a dwelling the office of a physician, had followed that authorization as it did in (1) and (2) with the expression not involving the conduct of a business these provisions of the ordinance would have been repugnant and contradictory. The word office (it being the word used in the ordinance) is universally regarded as meaning a room or building in which a person transacts his business or carries on his stated occupation. Funk & Wagnalls New College Standard Dictionary, Em'Pha. Type Edition. So, it would have been thoroughly illogical for the ordinance to provide that the doctor may have in his dwelling a place in which to carry on his occupation (his office) and then follow that with the provision not involving the conduct of a business. The conclusion seems inescapable that it was the intention of the ordinance not to follow the authorization of an office for the doctor in his dwelling with the provision not involving the conduct of a business. Or, affirmatively stated, it was the intention of the ordinance to authorize a doctor to maintain an office in his residence for the carrying on there of his occupation. For the reasons hereinabove stated, this Court is of the opinion that the office which this record shows Dr. Burkhalter to be maintaining at his dwelling does not violate the Memphis Zoning Ordinance unless, in any event, this office is shown by this record to be a medical clinic. A number of lay witnesses called Dr. Burkhalter's office a clinic. The only expert testimony on the subject is that of the doctor himself. He says that it is not a clinic, and gives a definition which does not include the office which he is maintaining at his residence. The opinion of the Court of Appeals quoted extensively from numerous high authorities as to the definition of a clinic. It is unnecessary to repeat those quotations here. It is sufficient to say that Dr. Burkhalter's office does not come within the definition given by any of these authorities. In as much as we are referring to a medical clinic, it would seem that the most logical place to go for a definition is a medical dictionary. As shown in the opinion of the Court of Appeals, the 21st Edition of The American Illustrated Medical Dictionary by Dorland defines a clinic as an establishment where patients are admitted for special study and treatment by a group of physicians practicing medicine together. It is apparent that Dr. Burkhalter's office does not come within that definition. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals the burden was upon the complainants to establish it as a fact that this office of Dr. Burkhalter is a medical clinic. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the complainants have failed to carry this burden. In fact every definition of a medical clinic which has been made available to the Court forces the conclusion that this office is not a medical clinic. The judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the decree of the Chancellor and dismissing the suit and taxing petitioners here with all costs is affirmed. NEIL, C.J., did not participate in this case.