Opinion ID: 772527
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Michael Scott

Text: 23 Scott stipulated in his plea agreement that he played a leadership role in a conspiracy comprised of five or more participants. After an evidentiary sentencing hearing, the district court found that Scott was a manager or supervisor of the conspiracy and imposed a three-level upward adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b). On appeal, Scott argues, as he did in the district court, that he was merely a low-level manager and therefore deserves a two-level adjustment. However, we have repeatedly held that the Guidelines do not authorize such a compromise adjustment -- if the criminal activity involved five or more participants, as Scott stipulated, § 3B1.1 permits either a four-level adjustment, a three-level adjustment, or no adjustment at all. See, e.g., United States v. Kirkeby, 11 F.3d 777, 778-79 (8th Cir. 1993). 24 FBI Agent Mento, the lead investigator of the conspiracy, testified at the sentencing hearing that Scott was clearly the leader of the [gang] in Minnesota. He was running all the narcotics activities of the gang in Minnesota, he set prices for narcotics and directed the actions of numerous individuals in the conspiracy. This testimony was based upon numerous intercepted telephone conversations and Mento's extensive interviews and dealings with other conspirators. Mento's testimony was corroborated by the testimony of Atkins at Louis's trial. Thus, although Scott testified that he played a less significant role in the offense and argues that Mento's testimony was based upon unreliable information provided by conspirator Carolyn Owens, the district court's finding that he was a manager or supervisor is not clearly erroneous. 25 In a pro se supplemental brief, Scott raises additional sentencing issues. First, he argues that his counsel provided ineffective assistance at sentencing by failing to object to the testimony of Agent Mento and by failing to subpoena or require the government to produce Carolyn Owens for cross examination. As there is not an adequate record to permit us to consider these ineffective assistance claims on direct appeal, they must be raised in a post-conviction proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See United States v. Jennings, 12 F.3d 836, 840 (8th Cir. 1994). 26 Second, Scott attacks the district court's drug quantity finding, asserting that the court relied on hearsay testimony of an unreliable witness (Owens), that the court double-counted quantities of powder and crack cocaine, and that the drugs were not reasonably forseeable to him. Like Pearson, Scott waived these contentions by agreeing to a base offense level of 36 in his plea agreement, based upon the quantities of cocaine and cocaine base ('crack'). In addition, he failed to object to the drug quantity finding at sentencing; as the facts summarized earlier in this opinion make clear, the drug quantity finding, which was based upon the crack cocaine sold to an undercover agent and the cocaine powder seized at the Twin Cities airport, was not plain error. See United States v. Karam, 37 F.3d 1280, 1285 (8th Cir. 1994) (standard of review). 27 The judgments of the district court are affirmed.