Opinion ID: 2302242
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Counterclaims

Text: In addition to granting summary judgment on the enforceability of the release and finding that the release barred most of the counterclaims, the trial justice also granted summary judgment as a matter of law on other counts in the counterclaim. I respectfully suggest that the majority opinion, which simply vacates the judgment as to the direct claims against Marguerite and Charles Takian, fails to conduct appropriate de novo review of these findings. Accordingly, because several counts in the counterclaim ultimately may be presented to a jury, I deem it necessary to note my concerns. In reviewing the grant of summary judgment by a justice of the Superior Court, this Court conducts de novo review. Hill v. National Grid, 11 A.3d 110, 112 (R.I.2011). In so doing, we abide by the same standards and benchmarks as applied by the trial justice. Id. Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact is evident from the record before the trial justice and he or she finds that the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Beacon Mutual Insurance Co. v. Spino Brothers, Inc., 11 A.3d 645, 648 (R.I.2011). I note at the outset that in addition to the counts against Randolph that are discussed by the majority, Randolph is named as a party-defendant in other counts in the counterclaim, which the majority opinion fails to address  a situation that I find confusing and will, I suggest, result in chaos on remand. For instance, count 5, entitled Breach of Fiduciary Duty [Against] the Takians and Randolph, specifically names Randolph as a defendant, claiming damages based on breach of fiduciary duty. Because the trial justice found, as a matter of law, that Randolph owed no duty to defendants, summary judgment on this count in the counterclaim as to Randolph should be affirmed. Furthermore, count 5 also seeks to impose liability on the Takians for breach of fiduciary duty to Lumar. Like count 1, this is a shareholder derivative claim and should be dismissed. With respect to count 9, which alleges abuse of process against both the Takians and Randolph for filing a miscellaneous petition in Superior Court seeking the Rafaelians' financial records, as well as this declaratory judgment action, the majority opinion fails to address this count as it relates to Randolph. Clearly, the release does not relate to any conduct occurring after the sale of the property. The majority opinion overlooks this count and provides no guidance to the parties or the trial court on remand. Finally, I find the RICO counts particularly troubling. The trial justice, based on his conclusion that the release was valid, granted summary judgment on count 10, entitled Violation of Rhode Island Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. The majority opinion reinstates that claim, but fails to address the fact that the allegations in this count rely on the moribund Lumar, as the enterprise  a crucial element in any RICO action. Furthermore, the racketeering activity alleged to have occurred rests, in part, on the allegations set forth in count 1, the derivative claim. Whether a RICO action can survive when the enterprise is a defunct corporation is a question that is left unanswered by the majority. What is the organized enterprise in this case? Moreover, whether count 11, Conspiracy to Violate RICO survives summary judgment is an open question. This counterclaim alleges that the Takians and Randolph have combined, conspired and confederated to conceal and further their larceny and further the goals of the enterprise[, the defunct Lumar]   . I would affirm the grant of summary judgment on counts 10 and 11, but on grounds other than those relied upon by the trial justice.