Opinion ID: 754789
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Jurisdiction to Vacate Previous Order

Text: 34 Finally, the Respondent contends that the district court erred by vacating its previous order dated May 16, 1995, granting relief on only one of Wilkins' claims, after our court remanded the case for resolution of all matters contained in the first amended petition for writ of habeas corpus. (J.A. at 976.) Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure affords district courts much discretion to vacate their orders. See Tungseth v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 43 F.3d 406, 409 (8th Cir.1994). The district court did not abuse its discretion or exceed the scope of the remand order by choosing to decide all of Wilkins' claims in a single order. Similarly, we reject the Respondent's assertion that Wilkins' challenge to the validity of his waiver of counsel constitutes an abuse of the writ. The Respondent's abuse-of-the-writ claim hinges upon the argument that the district court exceeded its jurisdiction by vacating its previous order. Because the district court had the authority to vacate its previous order and consider all of Wilkins' claims together, we reject as meritless Respondent's assertion that Wilkins has abused the writ.