Opinion ID: 1468940
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the collateral order exception

Text: [¶ 8] In order to invoke the collateral order exception to the final judgment rule, the appellant must establish three things: (1) the decision is a final determination of a claim separable from the gravamen of the litigation; (2) it presents a major unsettled question of law; and (3) it would result in irreparable loss of the rights claimed, absent immediate review. Maine State Employees Ass'n, 482 A.2d at 464. Here the first and third elements are not satisfied, and we need not determine whether this case presents a major unsettled question of law. [¶ 9] The denial of Carter's motion for summary judgment is not separable from the gravamen of the litigation because it involves the very question that is the subject of this foreclosure action: whether Carter is obligated on the note. Although Carter contends that the question of whether he is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law differs from whether he should ultimately prevail at trial, his contention is unpersuasive. Whether Carter is entitled to judgment as a matter of law involves the same basic determinations that will have to be made at a trial. [¶ 10] Nor will Carter's rights be irreparably lost if he is not allowed to immediately appeal the denial of summary judgment. Carter's interest in not being burdened by being required to participate in a trial cannot, in and of itself, be the basis for invoking the collateral order exception because it is a burden common to every party whose motion for a summary judgment is denied. [3] See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 694 F.2d 1041, 1043 (5th Cir.1983) (The only injury that [the appellant] asserts is that it will have to present its defense at trial, but that sort of injury follows in every denial of a motion to dismiss a complaint and does not justify an exception to the final-judgment rule.). If the expense of litigation were a sufficient reason for granting an exception to the final judgment rule, the exception might well swallow the rule. Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 436, 105 S.Ct. 2757, 86 L.Ed.2d 340 (1985) (quoting Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 747 F.2d 174, 178 (3rd Cir.1984)). [¶ 11] Carter also contends that he has a right not to have his credit harmed by this litigation. The factual basis for this contention is not clearly articulated, but even if there is information about this suit being reported to credit agencies, the reporting is temporary, and is a necessary incident to litigation of this nature; it is not significant enough to justify the application of the collateral order exception. Moreover, we cannot evaluate whether the appearance of a foreclosure action on Carter's credit report is unfair without first deciding the merits of this case. Thus the collateral order exception to the final judgment rule cannot be applied.