Opinion ID: 53858
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Discussion Jury instruction on compliance with federal safety standards

Text: We review properly preserved claims of jury instruction error for abuse of discretion using a two-part inquiry, giving the district court discretion to fashion jury instructions. The Wrights first must demonstrate that the charge as a whole creates `substantial and ineradicable doubt whether the jury has been properly guided in its deliberations.' Flores v. Cameron County, Tex., 92 F.3d 258, 262 (5th Cir. 1996); EEOC v. Manville Sales Corp., 27 F.3d 1089, 1096 (5th Cir.1994). Second, even if the jury instructions were erroneous, we will not reverse if we determine, based upon the entire record, that the challenged instruction could not have affected the outcome of the case. Flores, 92 F.3d at 262. The only issue to reach the jury was the Wrights' design defect claim. The Wrights claim the district court erred in instructing the jury to rebuttably presume that the Ford Expedition was not defectively designed, pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 82.008. Section 82.008 provides: (a) In a products liability action brought against a product manufacturer . . . there is a rebuttable presumption that the product manufacturer . . . is not liable for any injury to a claimant caused by some aspect of the . . . design of a product if the product manufacturer . . . establishes that the product's . . . design complied with mandatory safety standards or regulations adopted and promulgated by the federal government, or an agency of the federal government, that were applicable to the product at the time of manufacture and that governed the product risk that allegedly caused harm. (b) The claimant may rebut the presumption in Subsection (a) by establishing that: (1) the mandatory federal safety standards or regulations applicable to the product were inadequate to protect the public from unreasonable risks of injury or damage; or (2) the manufacturer, before or after marketing the product, withheld or misrepresented information or material relevant to the federal government's or agency's determination of adequacy of the safety standards or regulations at issue in the action. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE § 82.008. Ford claims it complied with the relevant safety standard governing the risk at issue  Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 111, Rearview Mirrors(FMVSS 111). [3] 49 C.F.R. § 571.111 (1998). FMVSS 111 addresses rearview mirror performance placement in order to protect the public from backing into deaths and injuries due to limited rearview vision. Therefore, Ford claims it is entitled to the presumption of no defect provided by section 82.008(a). The judge instructed the jury that the presumption was applicable and that it could be rebutted if the Wrights established that the federal standard was inadequate to protect the public. The jury instruction at issue stated: You are instructed that Ford Motor Company complied with a mandatory federal safety standard or regulation existing at the time of manufacture that was applicable to the product and that governed the product risk that allegedly caused harm and, therefore, is presumed not to be liable for the injuries to claimants. The claimants may rebut the presumption by establishing that the mandatory federal safety standard or regulations applicable to the product were inadequate to protect the public from unreasonable risks of injury or damage. The Wrights contend that the jury instruction was erroneous for two reasons: (1) the purported federal standard, Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 111 (FMVSS 111), [4] does not govern the rear sensing system with which they argue the Expedition should have been equipped; and (2) the presumption that a vehicle is not defective if it complies with FMVSS is rebuttable and should not be conveyed to the jury once a plaintiff produces evidence rebutting it. (a) The Wrights first argue that the applicability of FMVSS 111 is confined by its scope, rearview mirror performance and placement, and this case concerns the absence of a reverse sensing systemthereby rendering the section 82.008 presumption instruction erroneous since section 82.008 is only triggered when a federal statute actually applies to the defect at issue. To support their arguments, they point to the legislative history of section 82.008, in which there is some discussion that the statute does not apply to a defect not asserted. Rearview mirrors are not the defect herethe lack of a reverse sensing system combined with an overly large rear blind spot are. Ford maintains, and we agree, that the risk that caused the harm in this case is precisely what FMVSS 111 covers, as stated in section 571.111 S2  its purpose is to reduce the number of injuries and deaths that occur when the driver of a motor vehicle does not have a clear and reasonably unobstructed view to the rear. See note 3 supra. When we interpret a Texas statute, we follow the same rules of construction that a Texas court would applyand under Texas law the starting point of our analysis is the plain language of the statute. See International Truck and Engine Corp. v. Bray, 372 F.3d 717, 722 (5th Cir. 2004) (When we interpret state law . . . we . . . apply the law as the state's highest court would.); National Liability and Fire Ins. Co. v. Allen, 15 S.W.3d 525, 527 (Tex.2000) (In construing a statute, our objective is to determine and give effect to the Legislature's intent [and] first look at the statute's plain and common meaning[, presuming] that the Legislature intended the plain meaning of its words.). As the Texas Supreme Court described in Fitzgerald v. Advanced Spine Fixation Sys., Inc., 996 S.W.2d 864, 866 (Tex.1999): There are sound reasons we begin with the plain language of a statute before resorting to rules of construction. For one, it is a fair assumption that the Legislature tries to say what it means, and therefore the words it chooses should be the surest guide to legislative intent. Also, ordinary citizens should be able to rely on the plain language of a statute to mean what it says. Moreover, when we stray from the plain language of a statute, we risk encroaching on the Legislature's function to decide what the law should be. The Wrights claim that the legislative history of section 82.008 establishes that the emphasis is upon whether the particular defect claimed was governed by a federal safety standard and not the risk arising from that defect. However, section 82.008's statutory language is clear, and we see no reason to address the legislative history as urged by the Wrights. [5] Section 82.008 clearly provides for a rebuttable presumption if the product at issuehere, Ford's 2001 XLT Expeditionwas manufactured in compliance with federal regulations that governed the product risk that allegedly caused harm. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE § 82.008(a) (emphasis added). It is a much closer question, however, whether FMVSS 111 governed the product risk asserted in this case. The risk that caused the harm and forms the basis of the Wrights' suit is the rear blindspot of the Expedition. Indeed, several times in the Wrights' experts' reports and their lawyer's opening statement to the jury it is asserted that the allegedly defective design feature that caused the tragic accident at issue was the Expedition's rather substantial blind area behind it and there is a huge blind spot behind this Expedition. The testimony of their expert Geoffrey Mahon also reflects that the product risk they asserted was that arising from the unreasonably dangerous blind spot behind the Expedition when it was not equipped with the non-federally required ultrasonic reverse sensing system. FMVSS 111, last updated in 1998, expressly states that it addresses rear blindspot risks (see note 3, supra ). On November 27, 2000, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) published, under the heading Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 111, `Rearview Mirrors'; Rear Visibility Systems, an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (Notice), 65 Fed.Reg. 70,681, that indicated the possibility of amending FMVSS 111 to require further rear visibility systems, such as cross-view mirrors or the ultrasonic reverse sensing system, rear video cameras or other such devices on commercial trucks with a gross vehicle weight of 10,000 pounds or more to reduce pedestrian deaths caused by backing vehicles. In a passing comment regarding possible preemption issues, the Notice indicated that NHTSA had previously stated that the requirements in [FMVSS] 111, `Rearview Mirrors', do not address the visibility of the area directly and immediately behind a vehicle. Accordingly, Standard No. 111 does not preempt any State from requiring rear cross-view mirrors on vehicles. 65 Fed.Reg. 70,681. The Notice indicated, as well, that a Washington statute requiring commercial vehicles up to 5.5 meters in length to be equipped with driver-warning backup alerts (as urged here for the Expedition) or rear-mounted cross-view mirrors was not preempted by FMVSS 111 due to the afore-quoted NHTSA's interpretation of FMVSS 111. This preemption matter mentioned by the Notice, however, does not conclusively indicate that FMVSS 111 does not govern the product risk of which the Wrights complain. Section 82.008(a) is not limited to preemptive regulations, and, in fact, appears to assume non-preemptive regulations (as compliance with a preemptive regulation would of itself normally be determinative regardless of whether the claimant established under section 82.008(b)(1) that it was inadequate to protect the public). See also 49 U.S.C. § 301.03(e) (compliance with federal motor vehicle safety standards under 49 U.S.C. § 301.01 does not exempt a person from liability at common law). However, the statutes and measures mentioned by the Notice address entirely different issues than the one present heresuch as Washington's statute requiring the additional blindspot-reducing equipment on large commercial vehicles. Also, FMVSS 111 has a section discussing requirements of motorcycles and passenger cars under the weight of the 10,000-pound vehicles addressed by the November 2000 Notice. Indeed, the Notice specifically says that reverse sensing systems installed on passenger vehicles are, as the technology stood as of the date of the Notice, of questionable help in terms of detecting people in the vehicles' blind spots. [6] The Notice states that rear sensing systems are relatively expensive technologies that do not presently reliably detect pedestrians and that there are not yet commercially available systems that can reliably detect pedestrians and children to the rear of the vehicle. 65 Fed.Reg. 70,681. The Notice then continues on to limit its applicability, stating: The agency [NHTSA] will reevaluate the need for and practicability of means of avoiding fatal backing crashes as technology progresses and performance is improved. However, public comment is specifically invited on the agency's current intentions of limiting the requirements [of cross view mirrors] to straight trucks with a GVWR between 10,000 and 26,000 pounds. [7] Id. The federal agency chose to not even pursue amending FMVSS 111 to require such systems on passenger vehicles because it concluded that the ultrasonic reverse sensing systems were not yet sufficiently reliable to detect pedestrians. The goals were admirable but the technology was simply not there yet. Indeed, the fact that the November 2000 proposal centered upon amending FMVSS 111 to address the same risk of which the Wrights complain in a similar manner as they suggest is a further indication that this federal regulation governs the risk that allegedly caused the harm. This is sufficient to come within section 82.008. The product risk addressed by FMVSS 111 is and was that of deaths and injuries that occur when the driver of a motor vehicle does not have a clear and reasonably unobstructed view to the rear. When consideration was given to further expanding the vehicle requirements to meet this risk, the November Notice addressed amending FMVSS 111 to expand its requirements designed to address that same risk. So far as applicable to passenger vehicles, it was decided not to impose additional requirements to address that risk, because the technology was not then available. As to such vehicles, that product risk would be governed by, and only by, the requirements of FMVSS 111 as it then stood. The 2001 Ford XLT Expedition met those requirements. As to the larger vehicles, further consideration would be given to amending FMVSS 111 to add further requirements addressing that same product risk. We hold that FMVSS 111 applies to the product risk asserted in this case. Accordingly, the Wrights' objection to the jury charge on the basis that FMVSS 111 did not so apply was properly overruled by the district court. (b) The Wrights next argue that even if FMVSS 111 sufficed to trigger the presumption provided by section 82.008, they rebutted that presumption because they produced at trial some evidence that would support a jury finding that the standard was inadequate to protect the public from unreasonable risk of injury or damage. Therefore, they argue the presumption should not have been included in the jury instructions at all. We decline to find reversible error on this issue. The Wrights did not object to the jury instruction on this ground at trialthey only objected on the grounds previously addressed, that FMVSS 111 did not govern the defect asserted. A party may not object to an instruction on one ground at trial and then attempt to rely on a different ground on appeal. Coastal Distributing v. NGK Spark Plug Co., 779 F.2d 1033, 1039 (5th Cir.1986). See also, e.g., 9A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2554 at 426 (A party may not state one ground when objecting to an instruction to the jury and attempt to rely on a different ground for an objection on appeal or on a motion for a new trial). Where a claimed ground of instructional error raised on appeal was not properly preserved below we may reverse only for plain error, which requires not only error, but also that the error was clear or obvious, that substantial rights were affected and that, consistent with our discretion whether to correct any plain error, `not correcting the error would seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.' Texas Beef Group v. Winfrey, 201 F.3d 680, 689 (5th Cir.2000) (citations omitted). See also, e.g., Rizzo v. Children's World Learning Centers, Inc., 213 F.3d 209, 213 (5th Cir.2000) (en banc). The plain error standard is not met here. To begin with, it is by no means clear or obvious that the mere introduction of evidence which would support (though not legally compel) a factual finding that the applicable federal standards (here, those of FMVSS 111) were inadequate to protect the public from unreasonable risks of injury or damage (as provided in section 82.008(b)(1)) suffices of itself to rebut the rebuttable presumption established under section 82.008(a) and cause that presumption to disappear from the case so as to be an improper subject of jury instruction. [8] It is true that under Texas law presumptions are generally treated as being of the so called Thayer variety, namely presumptions which shift only the burden of production of evidence, which disappear from the case once evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding contrary to the presumed fact, and which do not shift the burden of persuasion. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Saenz, 873 S.W.2d 353, 359 (Tex.1993) (common law presumption that adequate warnings on products will be headed). However other Texas presumptions  often referred to as Morgan presumptions  do not so disappear and do operate to shift the burden of persuasion. See, e.g., Trevino v. Ortega, 969 S.W.2d 950, 953, 960 (Baker, J., concurring) (Tex.1998); Bogart v. Somer, 762 S.W.2d 577 (Tex.1988); In re R.D.Y., 51 S.W.3d 314, 321 (Tex.App. Hou. [1st] 2001, pet. denied); K.B. v. N.B., 811 S.W.2d 634, 642 (Tex.App.SA, 1991). See also, e.g., Steven Goode et al, Guide to the Texas Rules of Evidence, 1 Texas Practice Series § 301.2 (2002). [9] We have been cited to no Texas appellate court opinion directly addressing this aspect of the section 82.008 presumption (that section applies only to suits filed after September 1, 2003). Given that the section 82.008(a) presumption is a statutory one, the language of the statute would appear to control its operation. The statute provides that the claimant may rebut the presumption in subsection (a) by establishing that . . . [the applicable federal standards] were inadequate. Section 82.008(b) (emphasis added). Establish connotes something more than simply introducing some evidence from which a factfinder might  or might not  find that which is to be established. If, as here, the assertedly rebutting evidence is not such as to require as a matter of law that the federal standards be held inadequate, but rather presents a fact question in that respect, then, in a jury tried case, it appears logical to conclude that the statute proceeds on the assumption that any such fact question as whether the presumption has been rebutted will be submitted to the jury. We conclude that it is not clear or obvious that the presumption provided for by section 82.008(a) and (b) is a Thayer type  rather than a Morgan type  presumption, and accordingly the Wrights' contention, not properly preserved below, that the trial court erred by failing to treat the section 82.008 presumption as a Thayer-type (rather than a Morgan-type) presumption, does not present any plain error. Further, there is ample evidence (apart from any section 82.008 presumption) to sustain the verdict and certainly no clear indication that the verdict would probably have been different absent the section 82.008 instruction, and accordingly, even if the minimum standards to authorize reversal under the plain error standards were met, we would not exercise our discretion to do so because it does not appear that failure to address the claimed error would seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.