Opinion ID: 2713861
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: ACCA Violent Felony

Text: Farrow appeals his classification as an “armed career criminal” under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). Because Farrow did not present this argument at the sentencing hearing, plain-error review applies. As previously noted, in plain-error review, this court evaluates whether: “(1) an error occurred in the district court; (2) the error was obvious or clear; (3) the error affected defendant’s substantial rights; and (4) the adverse impact -13- No. 13-5401 United States v. Christopher Farrow seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d at 406. The district court assigned Farrow the “armed career criminal” classification after determining that his two Tennessee convictions for facilitation of aggravated robbery were violent felonies under the ACCA. The ACCA defines “violent felony” as: [A]ny crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . that (i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or (ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). Under Tennessee law, “[a] person is criminally responsible for the facilitation of a felony, if, knowing that another intends to commit a specific felony, but without the intent required for criminal responsibility under [the statute that criminalizes aiding the commission of an offense], the person knowingly furnishes substantial assistance in the commission of the felony.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39–11–403. Facilitation also requires that the underlying crime actually occur. United States v. Sawyers, 409 F.3d 732, 738 (6th Cir. 2005), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Vanhook, 640 F.3d 706 (6th Cir. 2011). Farrow argues that Sixth Circuit precedent requires a finding that facilitation of aggravated robbery in Tennessee is not a violent felony. Three recent circuit cases have considered whether certain facilitation crimes fall within particular sentencing categories. In United States v. Gloss, 661 F.3d 317 (6th Cir. 2011), we considered whether Tennessee convictions for facilitation of aggravated robbery are violent felonies under the ACCA. Gloss analyzed the issue under the “use of force clause,” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i), and found that the government must prove every element of aggravated robbery to prove -14- No. 13-5401 United States v. Christopher Farrow facilitation of an aggravated robbery. Gloss, 661 F.3d at 320. Since aggravated robbery must be “either accomplished with a deadly weapon (or an article disguised as a deadly weapon), or result[] in the victim suffer[ing] serious bodily injury,” the use of force is an element of both aggravated robbery and facilitation of aggravated robbery. Id. at 319 (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, Gloss concluded, facilitation of aggravated robbery is a violent felony. Id. at 319–20. Farrow contends that we should follow our opinion in United States v. Woodruff, 735 F.3d 445 (6th Cir. 2013), rather than Gloss. In Woodruff, we considered whether facilitating the sale of cocaine qualified as a controlled-substance offense for the purpose of a sentencing enhancement under the federal sentencing guidelines. 735 F.3d at 449. For a conviction to qualify as a controlled-substance offense under USSG § 4B1.2(b), a defendant must himself have formed intent equivalent to the intent required for “aiding and abetting, conspiracy, and attempt.” Id. at 449–50 (citing §4B1.2 cmt. n.1). A facilitator, under Tennessee law, lacks such intent. Id. at 450–51. Thus, facilitating the sale of cocaine is not a controlled-substance offense. Id. Woodruff and Gloss are not in conflict because the requirements necessary to qualify a Tennessee facilitation-of-sale-of-cocaine offense as a controlled-substance offense under USSG §4B1.2 are different from the requirements necessary to qualify a Tennessee facilitation-ofaggravated-robbery offense as a violent felony under the “use of force” clause of the ACCA. Unlike a controlled-substance offense under §4B1.2, the ACCA violent felony “use of force” clause includes no intent requirement; it is satisfied here because this case involves a crime under the ACCA “use of force” clause and the use of force is an element of both aggravated robbery and facilitation of aggravated robbery. Gloss, 661 F.3d at 320. The intent requirement that was dispositive in Woodruff is not applicable here. -15- No. 13-5401 United States v. Christopher Farrow The third case to consider facilitation was Vanhook, 640 F.3d 706, which analyzed whether Tennessee convictions for facilitation of burglary are violent felonies under the ACCA. The court considered the issue under the “residual clause,” § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), and found that facilitation of burglary was not categorically a violent felony. Vanhook, 640 F.3d at 710, 715– 16. Farrow argues that because Vanhook was issued before Gloss, it established a binding analytical framework that Gloss failed to follow. Vanhook, however, involved facilitation of burglary, not facilitation of aggravated robbery. 640 F.3d at 710. The threat or use of force or violence is not an element of burglary, but it is an element of aggravated robbery. Id. at 711; Gloss, 661 F.3d at 319–20. Additionally, Gloss and Vanhook address facilitation under different clauses of the ACCA. Gloss is directly on point as it involves the same crime and the same sentencing scheme at issue in this case. The district court did not err in determining that Farrow’s convictions for facilitation of aggravated robbery were violent felonies under the use-of-force clause in §924(e)(2)(B). It properly applied the ACCA. D. Reckless Endangerment Sentencing Enhancement As Farrow concedes, we only reach this issue if we find that the district court erred in applying the ACCA. Because the ACCA applies, we need not address this argument.