Opinion ID: 1749705
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exclusive Custody of the Marital Home

Text: With regard to the exclusive custody of the marital home, the district court rejected the exclusive possession awarded to the husband, finding it did not meet the requirements set forth by this Court in Duncan v. Duncan, 379 So.2d 949 (Fla. 1980), and remanded for reconsideration. Under the district court's decision, it has interpreted our Duncan decision to mean that the disability of a spouse is not a factor that should be considered in determining whether a spouse is entitled to exclusive possession of the marital home. We disagree and find that a disability suffered by one spouse during the marriage is a factor to be considered in determining whether exclusive custody of the home place should be allowed. The trial judge recognized, in making the exclusive possession award, that there were special circumstances in this case, including that the marital home had been especially modified at a cost of $20,000 to accommodate the husband's disability, and that, if allowed to remain in the home, the husband would have a greater ability to continue his limited psychology practice which would generate sufficient income to pay the wife the rehabilitative alimony directed in the final judgment. Rehabilitative alimony was provided to improve the wife's professional skills by assisting her in obtaining a master's degree and, consequently, allowing her to improve her employability and income. In Duncan, we stated: The award of exclusive possession of property subject to disposition in a dissolution proceeding should either be directly connected to the obligation to pay support or be temporarily necessary to prevent reduction in the value of the subject property. The critical question is whether the award is equitable and just given the nature of the case. A grant of exclusive possession of property to one of the parties in a final judgment must serve a special purpose... . ... . An award of exclusive use of property must be determined by the equity of the cause and should be for a specified period. It is always subject to modification whenever there is a change of circumstances. 379 So.2d at 952 (emphasis added). The property at issue in Duncan was an Alabama residence owned by the parties and occupied by the husband's parents. We found in that case that the fiscal condition of the parties, the husband's ability to provide support, and the termination date of the possession were factors which gave the trial court the discretion to award the husband exclusive possession of the property for the occupancy of his parents. We concluded that to do otherwise would reduce the husband's fiscal ability to support his family, and such circumstances sufficiently established a demonstrated need which enabled the trial judge, in his discretion, to make the exclusive possession award. The trial judge in the instant case also concluded that the Weisfelds' specially modified home was connected with the support provisions of the final judgment. Similar to Duncan, we find the unique facts and circumstances of the parties here sufficient to vest the trial judge with the discretionary authority to award exclusive possession of the marital home, subject to periodic reevaluation. As we noted in Duncan, such an award should not be for an indefinite period of time. However, because we are remanding for consideration of the wife's interest in the workers' compensation award, we also authorize the trial judge to revisit the exclusive possession award in order to afford him the opportunity to consider this matter in its entirety. We commend the judge in this matter for being sensitive in attempting to fashion a fair and equitable solution to some very unique problems presented in this dissolution proceeding. We note that when one spouse suffers the misfortune of a disabling disease or injury during the marriage, that disability is borne in part by the other spouse. As it is in marriage, so must it also be in divorce. The physical misfortune of one spouse clearly cannot be utilized to improperly benefit the noninjured spouse. We also note that the recent equitable distribution legislation does not expressly address personal injury, workers' compensation, or disability awards. See § 61.075, Fla. Stat. (1987). For the reasons expressed above, we approve the result of the district court's decision and remand with directions to the trial judge for reconsideration in accordance with the views expressed in this opinion. It is so ordered. EHRLICH, C.J., and McDONALD, SHAW, BARKETT, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur.