Opinion ID: 844163
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Composition and Conduct of the Grand Jury

Text: Defendant contends that his September 15, 1992 indictment was defective because the grand jury members were selected with “constitutionally impermissible methods” and its proceedings were “prejudicially flawed.” Before the start of his trial, defendant moved to set aside the indictment, asserting four distinct challenges, all of which the trial court rejected. On appeal, defendant renews three of these challenges, which we address in turn below. As preface to our discussion, we note that in these claims and most others on appeal, defendant contends that the asserted error or misconduct he raises infringed his state and federal constitutional rights to a fair and reliable trial. What we stated in People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 441, footnote 17 (Boyer), applies in the present case: “In most instances, insofar as defendant raised the issue at all in the trial court, he failed explicitly to make some or all of the constitutional arguments he now advances. In each instance, unless otherwise indicated, it appears that either (1) the appellate claim is of a kind (e.g., failure to instruct sua sponte; erroneous instruction affecting defendant‟s substantial rights) that required no trial court action by the defendant to preserve it, or (2) the new arguments do not invoke facts or legal standards different from those the trial court itself was asked to apply, but merely assert that the trial court‟s act or omission, insofar as wrong for the reasons actually presented to that court, had the additional legal consequence of violating the Constitution. To that extent, defendant‟s new constitutional arguments are not forfeited on appeal. [Citations.] [¶] In the latter instance, of course, rejection, on the merits, of a claim that the trial court erred on the issue actually before that court necessarily leads to rejection of the newly applied constitutional „gloss‟ as well. 17 No separate constitutional discussion is required in such cases, and we therefore provide none.” (Italics in original.) a. Failure to maintain a record of the entire grand jury proceedings Defendant contends that the transcript of the grand jury proceedings is incomplete and therefore violated his statutory right to have all proceedings in his death penalty case conducted with a court reporter present. (§ 190.9, subd. (a)(1) [in any case in which the death penalty may be imposed, “all proceedings” must be conducted on the record with a court reporter present].) The record indicates that four times during the grand jury‟s proceedings, the prosecutor went “off the record” by requesting that the court reporter not transcribe the proceedings. These instances occurred during the prosecutor‟s opening statement, during his closing argument, during a recess in which a juror‟s unspecified question was addressed, and during a discussion that occurred after a witness finished testifying. The Attorney General concedes that some of the grand jury proceedings were improperly conducted without a court reporter present. The parties disagree, however, on whether a showing of prejudice is necessary for us to reverse the judgment based on this error. Defendant relies on Dustin v. Superior Court (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1311 (Dustin), in which the prosecutor ordered the court reporter to leave the grand jury room during his opening statement and closing argument. Based on this irregularity, the defendant filed a pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment. When the trial court denied the motion, the defendant filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal, citing section 190.9, agreed that the defendant was entitled to have these remarks transcribed. (Id. at pp. 1321-1323.) The court presumed that the defendant was prejudiced by this omission from the transcript, granted the defendant‟s mandate petition, and directed the trial court to dismiss the indictment without prejudice to the 18 filing of a complaint or another indictment. (Id. at pp. 1325-1328.) The Attorney General contends that Dustin was incorrectly decided. We need not address the Attorney General‟s concerns about Dustin because defendant‟s reliance on it is misplaced. In People v. Booker (2011) 51 Cal.4th 141 (Booker), which was, like this case, an automatic appeal from a death judgment, we rejected a complaint about an irregularity that occurred during the grand jury proceedings. We explained that postconviction challenges to irregularities during grand jury proceedings are generally reviewed for prejudice. (Id. at p. 156.) In contrast, pretrial challenges to grand jury proceedings, such as those raised by way of a petition for writ of mandate filed before trial, may warrant relief without a showing of prejudice. (Ibid.; Dustin, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1325-1326.) As the Attorney General notes, Dustin involved a pretrial challenge to the grand jury proceedings. Because defendant here did not seek pretrial relief in the Court of Appeal for the denial of his motion to set aside the indictment, he is entitled to a postconviction reversal only if the error prejudiced him. Assuming the failure to transcribe all of the grand jury proceedings implicated defendant‟s federal constitutional rights, he is entitled to relief unless the prosecution can show beyond a reasonable doubt that the irregularity did not affect the outcome of the trial. (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman); see Booker, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 158.) We conclude defendant here is not entitled to relief because the record shows that the evidence presented to the grand jury was sufficient to support an indictment and because defendant “has failed to identify anything other than mere speculation to support his contention that he has suffered prejudice, i.e., that the grand jury‟s decision to indict may have been in some way influenced by the alleged unreported communications.” (People v. Bennett (2009) 45 Cal.4th 577, 591-592; cf. Vasquez v. Hillery (1986) 474 U.S. 254 [racial animus may have affected grand jury‟s decision whether and how to charge the defendant].) 19 b. Failure to provide requested evidence Section 939.7 provides, in pertinent part, that when the grand jury “has reason to believe that other evidence within its reach will explain away the charge, it shall order the evidence to be produced, and for that purpose may require the district attorney to issue process for the witnesses.” Defendant contends that the prosecutor violated section 939.7 by refusing to provide the grand jury with evidence it requested. As we explain, defendant‟s contention lacks merit. As noted, law enforcement personnel videotaped defendant‟s interrogation and made audiotapes of the hostage situation. During the proceedings, the prosecutor indicated to the grand jury that one or more jurors had asked if they would be able to review the audio and video recordings. The prosecutor explained to the grand jury that the recordings were obtainable, but that he did not intend to present them. The prosecutor added, “However, if the jury so wishes, then we will do that.” He then suggested that the grand jury meet outside the presence of the prosecution to discuss whether it needed any additional evidence. The prosecutor expressly said, “[I]f you feel you need more evidence . . . we‟re willing to serve whatever the needs of the [grand jury] feels are necessary.” The grand jury, however, at no time actually asked the prosecutor to present the recordings. The prosecutor, therefore, did not violate section 939.7 by not presenting them. Defendant nonetheless contends that the prosecutor‟s statements dissuaded the grand jury from requesting the evidence and improperly implied that the recordings had no exculpatory value. We are not persuaded that the statements had such an effect. The grand jury was aware that it had the authority to request additional evidence and that the prosecutor was willing to produce the recordings if requested. Hence, defendant suffered no prejudice. (See Cummiskey v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1018, 1029-1034 [prosecutor did not mislead the grand jury into believing it could not request additional evidence].) In addition, defendant has failed to identify anything other than speculation 20 that, had the grand jury considered the recordings, they would have affected its decision to indict. c. Underrepresentation of minorities on the grand jury Defendant contends that the grand jury that indicted him was not a “fair crosssection” of the community because it did not contain anyone from the African American, Native American, Asian Indian, or Hmong communities, all of which, according to defendant, comprised a substantial portion of Yuba County. Although defendant successfully moved to have his cased tried in Napa County, he committed his crimes in Yuba County and was indicted there. This underrepresentation in Yuba County, defendant contends, violated his right to an impartial jury under the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution and article I, section 16 of the California Constitution. Defendant relies upon the rule that a violation of the requirement that a petit jury be drawn from a fair cross-section of the population is established by showing “(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a „distinctive‟ group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in the venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.” (Duren v. Missouri (1979) 439 U.S. 357, 364.) In support of his motion in the trial court, defendant introduced evidence that African Americans constituted 4.2 percent of the population of Yuba County, Native Americans constituted 2.9 percent, Asian Indians constituted 0.7 percent, and Hmongs constituted 3.7 percent, whereas Whites accounted for 78.2 percent of the population. The Superior Court for Yuba County had no data regarding the racial or ethnic identity of its grand jury venire members. The grand jurors served for a term of one year, with their term of service starting on July 1, and the parties stipulated that an Asian American 21 served on the 1989-1990 grand jury and that an Asian American and two African Americans served on the 1986-1987 grand jury. Bonita Marqua, the jury commissioner who presided over the selection of the grand jury that indicted defendant, explained how grand jurors were selected in Yuba County. The Superior Court randomly selected approximately 10,000 people from DMV and voter registration records, and sent juror questionnaires that were to be returned to the court. The grand jury venire was created from those who responded. Returned responses were randomly selected and then added to the previous term‟s venire. In addition, any member of the public could volunteer or be nominated; such an applicant would be added to the grand jury venire if the presiding judge consented. The venire was capped at 200 people. No special effort was made to encourage racial or ethnic minorities to volunteer for grand jury service. Court staff and the presiding judge then interviewed the venire members to determine whether they were qualified and able to serve as grand jurors, and excused those who were not. Nineteen people were randomly selected from this smaller group to serve. Peter Sperlich, a professor of political science at the University of California, Berkeley, testified as an expert in grand jury selection processes. In Dr. Sperlich‟s opinion, from 1986 to 1993, there was significant underrepresentation of minorities on Yuba County grand juries that he attributed to flaws in the selection process, such as “the lack of follow-up” on those who did not return the initial questionnaire or make an appointment to be interviewed, the lack of a clear policy on granting excusals or deferments, lack of a true random selection of returned questionnaires, the ability of applicants to volunteer or be nominated for grand jury service, and the carrying over of grand jury venire members from term to term. In denying the motion, the court acknowledged defendant had identified distinctive minority groups in the community. In light of the lack of evidence about the composition 22 of the grand jury venires, however, the court ruled that defendant failed to prove that the representation of these groups on the venires was not fair and reasonable in relation to their numbers in the county. The trial court also noted defendant failed to identify any procedures that systematically excluded members of these groups. Defendant contends the trial court‟s selection process for grand jurors systematically excluded various minority groups, which deprived him of a grand jury selected from a fair cross-section of the community. When addressing a similar claim in People v. Carrington (2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 177, we preliminarily noted that neither the high court nor this court has held the fair cross-section rule applies to state grand juries. In rejecting a similar claim in Carrington, we cited People v. Corona (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 529, 534-536, which held that lack of a fair cross-section of the community in the grand jury, unlike a finding of intentional racial discrimination, does not compel automatic reversal. Citing the “general rule prohibiting reversal absent actual prejudice,” the court in Corona rejected the fair cross-section claim. (Id. at p. 537.) We followed this process in Carrington and similarly rejected the fair cross-section claim in that case because there was no prejudice apparent in the record before us. (Carrington, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 179.) We need not and do not resolve whether the Sixth Amendment right to a fair crosssection of the community applies to state grand juries because the record before us supports the trial court‟s assessment that defendant failed to make a showing of underrepresentation of these groups on the venires in relation to their numbers in the county. (Cf. Castaneda v. Partida (1977) 430 U.S. 482, 487-488 [prima facie case of intentional discrimination against Mexican-Americans in grand jury selection process established by examining jurors‟ surnames].) Defendant contends the trial court‟s lack of records regarding the ethnicity of the grand jurors violated his due process rights, but he fails to supply any authority for this contention. Accordingly, we conclude defendant 23 failed to demonstrate evidence of substantial underrepresentation over a significant period of time on the grand jury.