Opinion ID: 1273939
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Asserted Error in Accomplice Instructions

Text: The majority hold ( ante, pp. 394-396) that the trial court prejudicially erred in instructing that whether or not any witness in the case was an accomplice was for the jury to determine, and in failing to give on its own motion an instruction that Hickman was an accomplice as a matter of law. But even if we assume error was so committed, consideration of the other instructions given on this subject shows that it could not reasonably have been prejudicial. The majority predicate prejudice on the ground ( ante, p. 396) that this claimed error denied the codefendants the protection intended by Penal Code section 1111. But here the court actually gave better protection to the coconspirators than would have been provided by instructing that Hickman was an accomplice as a matter of law: the court went right to the point and specifically told the jury that In weighing the testimony of defendant WILLIE WARNER HICKMAN as against his codefendants you ought to view it with distrust. Obviously the real protection afforded by Penal Code section 1111 is not the right to an instruction that on the facts shown a certain witness is an accomplice as a matter of law; that instruction is at most preliminary to the true protection provided by that section  i.e., the right to be free from a conviction had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless it be corroborated by such other evidence as shall tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense.... The latter right was fully accorded to Hickman's codefendants, for complete instructions were given in the language of section 1111 and in the language of our prior decisions explaining the jury's duties with respect thereto. [8] The majority also assert ( ante, p. 395) that the trial court should not have invited the jury to speculate on who was an accomplice. But when, as here, the jury are otherwise properly instructed [9] and the facts establishing complicity are so clear that an appellate court can hold (as do the majority here) that the witness is an accomplice as a matter of law, we must presume that the jury obediently applied the instructions to those facts and found Hickman to be an accomplice. To do otherwise would be to presume that the jury violated their duty. [10] Since the jury must have thus found Hickman to be an accomplice, and in any event were specifically instructed that You ought to view [Hickman's testimony] with distrust, it is not reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the defendant Drivers would have been reached in the absence of the declared error, and hence no prejudice appears. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 4 1/2; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [12] [299 P.2d 243].) The issue, moreover, is far from novel, and has been decided in the manner set forth above by at least two opinions of this court ( People v. Barclay (1953) 40 Cal.2d 146, 152-153 [5] [252 P.2d 321], and People v. Ferlin (1928) 203 Cal. 587, 601-602 [10] [265 P. 230]) and a long line of cases in the District Courts of Appeal (see, e.g., People v. Richardson (1960) 182 Cal. App.2d 620, 623 [2, 3] [6 Cal. Rptr. 61]; People v. Chapman (1949) 93 Cal. App.2d 365, 383 [21]-384 [22] [209 P.2d 121]; People v. Wahnish (1937) 20 Cal. App.2d 58, 62-63 [1] [66 P.2d 677]; People v. Bonner (1935) 5 Cal. App.2d 314, 316-318 [3] [42 P.2d 694]; People v. Rous (1931) 118 Cal. App. 534, 537 [4] [5 P.2d 470]; People v. Knoth (1931) 111 Cal. App. 250, 253-254 [3] [295 P. 577]; cf. People v. MacKenzie (1956) 144 Cal. App.2d 100, 108-109 [300 P.2d 700]; but see People v. Dailey (1960) 179 Cal. App.2d 482, 485 [3]-486 [5] [3 Cal. Rptr. 852].) The above mentioned specific accomplice instruction (In weighing the testimony of ... HICKMAN as against his codefendants you ought to view it with distrust  (italics added)) was, of course, obedient to the command of Code of Civil Procedure section 2061, which declares that the jury are ... to be instructed by the court on all proper occasions: ... 4. That the testimony of an accomplice ought to be viewed with distrust, ... It bears emphasis that here the court did not qualify the latter instruction by telling the jury that it was applicable only if they found Hickman to be an accomplice; rather, the jury were affirmatively instructed that in weighing Hickman's testimony as against his codefendants you ought to view it with distrust. The court thereby indicated its opinion that Hickman was an accomplice as a matter of law; and in any event, the giving of this instruction on the court's own motion afforded better than the measure of protection to Hickman's codefendants that would have been provided by instructing that as a matter of law Hickman was an accomplice.