Opinion ID: 186950
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Threat to Picket Beall's

Text: 4 In September 2003 a Union representative wrote the president of Beall's a letter stating: 5 Our organization has an ongoing labor dispute with Energy Air, Inc. This contractor has been charged with serious Federal Law Violations and is currently being investigated by the Federal Government. 6 We understand that Energy Air is performing HVAC mechanical work on [two] Beall's Department Store construction projects .... 7 The union will be compelled to publicize our dispute with Energy Air by the way of leafleting, protesting and the possibility of picketing at the sites. 8 If you have any questions I can be contacted at .... 9 Based upon this letter alone, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded the Union had violated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B), which makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce [viz., Beall's] where ... an object thereof is ... forcing or requiring any person [viz., Beall's] ... to cease doing business with any other person [viz., Energy Air]. Id. 10 Under the longstanding rule of Sailors' Union of the Pacific (Moore Dry Dock), 92 NLRB 547 (1950), the proprietor of a so-called common situs — a job site at which the employees of multiple employers are working — may create a reserved gate or entrance for use solely by the employees of any employer that is then the target of union picketing; if a reserved gate is set up, the union may picket only there. Id. at 549-50. In this case the ALJ concluded the Union's threat to picket Beall's violated § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) because it was not qualified by an assurance the Union would limit its picketing to a reserved gate, as required under Moore Dry Dock, citing Teamsters Local 456 (Peckham Materials), 307 NLRB 612, 619 (1992) (where union threatens neutral contractor with picketing of job site at which primary employer is working, union has affirmative obligation to qualify its threat by clearly indicating that the picketing would conform to Moore Dry Dock ... or otherwise be in uniformity [sic] with Board law). 11 Although the Ninth Circuit has expressly rejected the proposition that a union must affirmatively declare its intention to conform with Moore Dry Dock, see United Ass'n of Journeymen, Local 32 v. NLRB (Local 32), 912 F.2d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 1990), the ALJ noted the Board continues to require a union to indicate that its picketing will conform to Moore Dry Dock  and cited a recent Board decision to that effect, Electrical Workers, Local 98 (MCF Services), 342 NLRB 740 (2004). The ALJ accordingly held the Union had violated § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) by uttering a proscribed threat but dismissed the complaint insofar as it pertained to leafleting and protests at the Beall's job site because such activities were not coercive and therefore did not violate the Act. In its Decision and Order the Board affirmed these decisions of the ALJ. 12