Opinion ID: 587244
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Shawmut's Joinder

Text: 21 The contention that Shawmut did not join the creditors' petition, in that the petition was signed by an officer of Shawmut rather than counsel of record, is simply wrong. Official Form 11 (Involuntary Case: Creditors' Petition) and Bankruptcy Rule 9011 both contemplate the signing of a creditors' petition by a duly authorized lay person. 10 See also Bankruptcy Code § 101(42), 11 U.S.C. § 101(42) (definition of petition). Official Form 11 expressly states: Petitioners sign if not represented by an attorney. As there is no contention that the officer who executed the creditors' petition in behalf of Shawmut was unauthorized, and Shawmut was not yet represented by counsel, the signing requirements imposed by Bankruptcy Rule 9011 were met. 22 The second challenge to Shawmut's status as a petitioning creditor asserts that Shawmut was unrepresented at the hearing on the merits of the contested creditors' petition. Corporate entities are not allowed to participate at bankruptcy court hearings except by counsel. In re Las Colinas Dev. Corp., 585 F.2d 7, 13 (1st Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 931, 99 S.Ct. 1268, 59 L.Ed.2d 487 (1979). The record indicates, however, that Shawmut did not participate at the hearing on the contested creditors' petition. Instead, the court conditionally ruled that Shawmut appear by counsel within twenty-four hours after the hearing, without deciding whether it need be represented at all. Later, at the request of LaRoche, the bankruptcy court ordered Shawmut disqualified unless its counsel entered an appearance, and Shawmut appeared within the allotted time. 23 The district court correctly determined that LaRoche had acquiesced in this resolution of the representation issue, thereby waiving the present claim. Indeed, LaRoche played an active role in fashioning the resolution adopted by the bankruptcy court. Moreover, at no time did LaRoche suggest to the bankruptcy court that Shawmut should be disqualified notwithstanding its later appearance by counsel. 11 As we have said on numerous occasions, we do not consider claims not raised in the trial court. In re 604 Columbus Ave. Realty Trust, 968 F.2d 1332, 1343 (1st Cir.1992) (It is the general rule in this circuit that arguments not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.); In re Boston Shipyard Corp., 886 F.2d 451, 455 (1st Cir.1989) (argument not raised before bankruptcy court will not be reviewed on appeal); Clauson v. Smith, 823 F.2d 660, 666 (1st Cir.1987) (we have regularly declined to consider points which were not seasonably advanced below); Johnston v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 595 F.2d 890, 894 (1st Cir.1978) (an issue not presented to the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal). 12 C. Suffield's Joinder 24 Finally, LaRoche claims unfair surprise and prejudice as a consequence of the bankruptcy court decision allowing Suffield to join the creditors' petition. LaRoche neither objected to Suffield's joinder on the ground of prejudice, 13 nor requested a continuance to permit the discovery he now says was necessary. 14 Thus, the issue was not preserved for appeal. See, e.g., In re 604 Columbus Ave. Realty Trust, 968 F.2d at 1343; United States v. Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d 43, 47 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 862, 110 S.Ct. 177, 107 L.Ed.2d 133 (1989) (claim of surprise is severely undermined, if not entirely undone, by failure to request continuance). 15 Moreover, as the district court correctly noted, no prejudice was occasioned by Suffield's joinder on the day of the hearing, as LaRoche was well aware of the nature of the Suffield judgment claim, to which he raised no defense or challenge whatever. 16 25 Affirmed; double costs to appellee.