Opinion ID: 1129351
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: award of attorney's fees and costs to defendant g & p

Text: The Myers argue that the court erred in awarding $10,000 in attorney's fees to G & P against the Myers because the great bulk of the fees incurred resulted from G & P's defense of cross-claims brought by other defendants. [3] G & P counters this argument contending that its fees and costs were incurred defending against Myers's direct claim. The evidence on this dispute was conflicting. The trial court found that G & P was the prevailing party against the Myers because it had been granted a directed verdict at the close of the case. Thus, the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, had the task of allocating the amount of the attorney fees and costs between the Myers' direct action and the cross-claims among the defendants. We conclude that the trial court's award of 20% of G & P's actual attorney's fees was a reasonable allocation between G & P's actual attorney fees and costs necessarily incurred defending against the Myers's direct claim, as opposed to fees spent defending against the cross-claims of the other defendants. The Myers object to the court clerk's assessment of costs in favor of G & P. They argue that costs spent in connection with trial were unnecessary. Our review of the record indicates the trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding these costs to G & P. Finally, the Myers contend that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding G & P more in attorney's fees than the prevailing plaintiffs. The premise of this argument is mooted in view of our disposition herein. Each request for fees or costs to a prevailing party in a multiparty lawsuit should be considered objectively on its own merits. Civil Rule 82 does not require that the trial court compare the attorney fees awarded to each of the prevailing parties so as to provide for a particular net award of fees. We held in Irving v. Bullock, 549 P.2d 1184, 1189 (Alaska 1976) that where the trial court applied radically different standards of partial compensation in awarding attorney's fees to the parties such awards would be considered an abuse of discretion absent findings or an explanation by the trial court supporting such disparate treatment. On remand the trial court should consider this in awarding attorney's fees to the Myers, and is authorized to adjust the award of fees to G & P if, in its discretion, doing so appears to be required in order to avoid the use of radically different standards. The award of attorney's fees to the plaintiffs is REVERSED. This case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, for an award of attorney's fees to the plaintiffs, and for reconsideration of the award of attorney's fees to G & P, if required.