Opinion ID: 1219144
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the Trial Court's Case Management Order and its Implementation Unfairly Prejudiced AWDI

Text: In May of 1990, three and one-half years after the case was filed, the objectors moved for the entry of a case management order that would structure discovery and the pretrial process, including establishment of a discovery schedule and deadlines for amendments to AWDI's water application. In July of 1990 the court entered its case management order. Dates were set before which all motions to amend the application had to be filed, discovery had to be completed, and lists identifying all expected testifying experts, fact witnesses, and exhibits had to be served upon all parties. AWDI was ordered to identify its experts and their proposed testimony as well as its fact witnesses and exhibits before the times the objectors were required to disclose their own witnesses and exhibits. AWDI now asserts that the case management order and its implementation were unfairly prejudicial. It argues that there was no justification for the requirement that AWDI identify its witnesses and exhibits before the objectors and that this order unfairly enabled the objectors to conduct discovery before providing reciprocal information. In addition, AWDI maintains that because the trial court allowed the objectors to introduce late-designated evidence, there was one-sided enforcement of the order and that AWDI was unfairly afforded fewer procedural protections than the objectors. Generally, pretrial discovery rulings are within the sound discretion of the trial court. In re Marriage of Mann 655 P.2d 814, 816 (Colo.1982); Kerwin v. District Ct., 649 P.2d 1086, 1088 (Colo.1982); Cameron v. District Ct., 193 Colo. 286, 289, 565 P.2d 925, 928 (1977); see also Glisan v. Kurth, 153 Colo. 102, 107, 384 P.2d 946, 949 (1963) (to make pre-trial procedure effective, appellate interference with the trial court in this area must be kept at a minimum). The trial court's decision to prescribe staggered discovery was fully justified by the nature of the issues in this case. AWDI had the burden of proof to establish its alternative claims for tributary or nontributary rights. See Public Service Co. of Colo. v. Board of Water Works of Pueblo, Colo., 831 P.2d 470, 480 (Colo. 1992) (relating to tributary application). The central issue was whether the water to be produced was tributary or nontributary. To evaluate the application it was necessary to understand the complex factual framework concerning the geology and hydrology of the Valley, AWDI's computer model, and the data that would be used in running the model upon which AWDI predicated its claim. It was therefore reasonable to require AWDI to proceed first in order for the objectors to be able to discern the facts AWDI would rely upon to support its application in order to prepare the objectors' own case. Particularly considering the fact that AWDI was allowed to designate rebuttal experts after it had completed discovery from the objectors' expert witnesses, we cannot say that the trial court's decision to compel AWDI to identify its witnesses and exhibits before the objectors was an abuse of discretion. As for the alleged prejudice to AWDI from the court's one-sided implementation of the order, the record does not support this claim. The trial court did modify the management order to allow the objectors to introduce additional evidence, but this evidence did not create unfair surprise. The evidence consisted of another run from a previously introduced computer model showing the predicted results from a particular pumping scenario proposed by AWDI, as well as related testimony, and two demonstrative exhibits that graphically displayed data already available to AWDI. Moreover, the court granted a number of modifications for AWDI itself, including allowing the presentation of rebuttal testimony from a witness not identified until trial was underway. A trial court has broad discretion in allowing deviations from the terms of pretrial orders. Murphy v. Colorado Aviation, Inc., 41 Colo.App. 237, 241, 588 P.2d 877, 881 (1978), impliedly overruled on other grounds by Public Service Co. v. District Ct., 674 P.2d 383 (Colo.1984); see C.K.A. v. M.S., 695 P.2d 785, 788 (Colo.App.1984) (trial courts have broad discretion in determining whether to allow late endorsement of witnesses not listed in pretrial orders). [38] AWDI has not demonstrated that the trial court abused that discretion.