Opinion ID: 2823814
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Interest on the Repayment of the Equitable Adjustment

Text: Â¶42Â Â Â Â Â Â Finally, we affirm the court of appealsâ conclusion that interest on Mrs. BerenâsÂ repayment of her equitable adjustment cannot be awarded pursuant to statute but instead only under restitution principles, subject to countervailing equitable considerations. See Estate of Beren, Â¶Â¶ 146â56. Â¶43Â Â Â Â Â Â David Beren argues that the general interest statute entitles him to interest on Mrs. Berenâs repayment of the probate courtâs equitable award. Section 5-12-106(1)(b), C.R.S. (2014), provides for postjudgment interest when a matter is reversed on appeal. It states in relevant part: If a judgment for money in a civil case is appealed by a judgment debtor and the judgment is modified or reversed with a direction that a judgment for money be entered in the trial court, interest, as set out in subsections (2) and (3) of this section, shall be payable from the date a judgment was first entered in the trial court until the judgment is satisfied and shall include compounding of interest annually. David Beren claims that the court of appeals construed the postjudgment interest statute too narrowly when it excluded him, a rival claimant of the assets of an estate in distribution, from being considered a âjudgment debtor.â Instead, he argues, we should consider him the âfunctional equivalentâ of a judgment debtor and grant him an award of statutory interest. However, we have instructed that the language of section 5-12-106 âmust be strictly construed by the court,â and that â[i]f the statute is clear and unambiguous on its face, then the court need look no further.â Sperry v. Field, 205 P.3d 365, 367 (Colo. 2009). Â¶44Â Â Â Â Â Â The court of appeals correctly concluded that this statute does not apply here because a judgment debtor has not appealed and the court did not direct that a money judgment be entered upon remand. See Estate of Beren, Â¶ 151. A judgment debtor isÂ â[a] person against whom a money judgment has been entered but not yet satisfied.â Blackâs Law Dictionary 921 (9th ed. 2009). The probate court did not order David Beren to pay a judgment to Mrs. Beren. Rather, the probate court ordered the estate to pay Mrs. Beren, and any distribution that she must return goes back to the estate, not David Beren individually. Accordingly, David Beren is not a judgment debtor under the plain language of section 5-12-106(1)(b), and he is not entitled to statutory interest. Â¶45Â Â Â Â Â Â Interest is also not appropriate under section 5-12-102, C.R.S. (2014). Section 5-12-102(1)â(3) codified the doctrine of moratory interest in contract and property damage cases. Farmers Reservoir, 113 P.3d at 133. However, this case is not a contract or property damage case; it is a probate case. Our case law clarifies that, as a precondition to a wrongful withholding, there must be a party who has acted wrongfully in the legal sense, e.g., a party has breached a contract. See Mesa Sand & Gravel Co. v. Landfill, Inc., 776 P.2d 362, 364â66 (Colo. 1989) (collecting cases). There has been no âwrongful withholdingâ here because Mrs. Beren did not breach a contract, nor has she damaged physical property. Â¶46Â Â Â Â Â Â David Beren alleges that the court of appealsâ opinion conflicts with Rodgers v.Â Colorado Department of Human Services , 39 P.3d 1232 (Colo. App. 2001). We disagree. In Rodgers, the court of appeals awarded interest pursuant to section 5-12-102 in a case involving a lawsuit between a state employee and his employer, where the court was satisfied that the employee was a breaching party who wrongfully obtained money from the state agency. Id. at 1238. Rodgers is therefore distinguishable from this case because here no court ever found wrongful withholdingÂ or a breaching party. Accordingly, Rodgers does not provide support for an award of interest on Mrs. Berenâs repayment of the equitable adjustment. Â¶47Â Â Â Â Â Â Nevertheless, interest may be granted on equitable grounds, pursuant to the Restatement (First) of Restitution Â§ 74 (1937), which provides: A person who has conferred a benefit upon another in compliance with a judgment, or whose property has been taken thereunder, is entitled to restitution if the judgment is reversed or set aside, unless restitution would be inequitable . . . . Comment d to that section explains that, âupon reversal of the judgment the payor is entitled to receive from the creditor the amount thus paid with interest.â (Emphasis added.) Â¶48Â Â Â Â Â Â Section 74 provides for restitution âunless restitution would be inequitable.â Therefore, on remand, the probate court shall consider, and may, in its discretion, take additional evidence on whether equitable considerations reduce or eliminate Mrs. Berenâs obligation to repay interest to the estate.