Opinion ID: 692054
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Brady Doctrine

Text: 84 [S]uppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196-97; accord United States v. Buchanan, 891 F.2d 1436, 1440 (10th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1088, 110 S.Ct. 1829, 108 L.Ed.2d 958 (1990). This oft-quoted language established the prosecutor's broad duty to disclose exculpatory material to the defense. Buchanan, 891 F.2d at 1440. 85 The disclosure principles of Brady are not rooted in the discovery rules of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2399, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976); United States v. Bonnett, 877 F.2d 1450, 1459 (10th Cir.1989) (Brady is not a discovery rule, but a rule of fairness and minimum prosecutorial obligation (citations omitted)). Rather, they are grounded in the constitutional guarantee of due process of law contained in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. 31 See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 107, 96 S.Ct. at 2399; Brady, 373 U.S. at 86, 83 S.Ct. at 1196. The essence of the Brady rule is the proposition that nondisclosure of material exculpatory evidence violates a defendant's due process right to a fair trial. See, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3380-81, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (The Brady rule is based on the requirement of due process.) (opinion of Blackmun, J.); United States v. Robinson, 39 F.3d 1115, 1118 (10th Cir.1994) (Due process mandates disclosure); United States v. Fleming, 19 F.3d 1325, 1330 (10th Cir.) (same), 32 cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 93, 130 L.Ed.2d 44 (1994). 86 We must be cognizant of the fact that [i]f the suppression of evidence results in constitutional error, it is because of the character of the evidence, not the character of the prosecutor. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 110, 96 S.Ct. at 2401; see also Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219, 102 S.Ct. 940, 947, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982) ([T]he touchstone of due process analysis in cases [alleging a Brady violation] is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.). As a result, it is irrelevant for Brady purposes  'whether the nondisclosure was a result of negligence or design.'  Buchanan, 891 F.2d at 1442 (quoting Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S.Ct. 763, 766, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972)); see also Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196-97 (noting that suppression of material exculpatory evidence violates due process irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution); United States v. Pedraza, 27 F.3d 1515, 1527 (10th Cir.1994) (same), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 347, 130 L.Ed.2d 303 (1994); United States v. Montoya, 716 F.2d 1340, 1345-46 (10th Cir.1983). 87 The purpose of Brady is not to displace the adversary system as the primary means by which truth is uncovered, but to ensure that a miscarriage of justice does not occur. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675, 105 S.Ct. at 3379-80. Brady and its progeny are thus grounded in notions of fundamental fairness and they embody a practical recognition of the imbalances inherent in our adversarial system of criminal justice. See, e.g., Bagley, 473 U.S. at 692-95, 105 S.Ct. at 3388-90 (Marshall, J., dissenting). To compensate for these imbalances, Brady represents a limited departure from a pure adversary model in the interest of promoting and enhancing the search for truth. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675 n. 6, 105 S.Ct. at 3379-80 n. 6; see also United States v. Abello-Silva, 948 F.2d 1168, 1180 (10th Cir.1991) (The government's hand is stacked with cards the defense lacks.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 107, 121 L.Ed.2d 65 (1992). Equally important, Brady acknowledges that the prosecutor's role transcends that of an adversary because the prosecutor, acting as the representative of the sovereign, has an obligation to ensure  'not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.'  Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675 n. 6, 105 S.Ct. at 3379-80 n. 6 (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 633, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935)); see also Brady, 373 U.S. at 87-88, 83 S.Ct. at 1196-97. 88 Of course, the Brady principle has limitations. The Constitution, as interpreted in Brady, does not require the prosecution to divulge every possible shred of evidence that could conceivably benefit the defendant. See, e.g., Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 795, 92 S.Ct. 2562, 2568, 33 L.Ed.2d 706 (1972) (We know of no constitutional requirement that the prosecution make a complete and detailed accounting to the defense of all police investigatory work on a case.); United States v. Comosona, 848 F.2d 1110, 1115 (10th Cir.1988) (The Government has no obligation to disclose possible theories of the defense to a defendant.). Due process only requires the disclosure of material exculpatory evidence which, if suppressed, would deprive the defendant of a fair trial. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675, 105 S.Ct. at 3380. Therefore, in order to establish a Brady violation, the defendant bears the burden 33 of establishing: 1) that the prosecution suppressed evidence; 2) that the evidence was favorable to the accused; and 3) that the evidence was material. United States v. Hughes, 33 F.3d 1248, 1251 (10th Cir.1994) (citing United States v. DeLuna, 10 F.3d 1529, 1534 (10th Cir.1993)); accord Fero v. Kerby, 39 F.3d 1462, 1472 (10th Cir.1994). We address the guiding legal principles governing each of these requirements in turn.
89 The first element requires proof that the prosecution suppressed or withheld the evidence in question. Several issues are particularly relevant to the determination in the case at bar of whether specific evidence was suppressed or withheld. First, as indicated above, the term suppression, in the Brady context, does not require a finding of bad faith or any other culpable state of mind on the part of the prosecutor. 34 See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196-97. Second, the prosecutor is the party who is ultimately accountable for the nondisclosure of evidence. See Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154, 92 S.Ct. at 766. Third, the prosecution for Brady purposes encompasses not only the individual prosecutor handling the case, but also extends to the prosecutor's entire office, see id., as well as law enforcement personnel and other arms of the state 35 involved in investigative aspects of a particular criminal venture. Logically, then, it follows that because  ' investigative officers are part of the prosecution, the taint on the trial is no less if they, rather than the prosecutors, were guilty of nondisclosure. '  Buchanan, 891 F.2d at 1442 (quoting United States v. Endicott, 869 F.2d 452, 455 (9th Cir.1989) (quoting United States v. Butler, 567 F.2d 885, 891 (9th Cir.1978))). 90 Thus, while proof the prosecutor had actual knowledge of the existence of the evidence at issue would be sufficient to establish the suppression element of a Brady claim, such proof is by no means necessary. For purposes of Brady, [k]nowledge by police or investigators is ... imputed to the prosecution. Buchanan, 891 F.2d at 1442 (citations omitted). Our recent decision in Fero, which reaffirmed the continuing vitality of this constructive knowledge doctrine in the Brady context, stated [b]ecause the police are considered agents of the prosecution for Brady purposes, the fact that it was the police and not the prosecutor who misplaced the [evidence], is irrelevant. Fero, 39 F.3d at 1472 n. 12 (emphasis added) (citing Buchanan, 891 F.2d at 1442); see also Ballinger v. Kerby, 3 F.3d 1371, 1377 (10th Cir.1993) (Kelly, J., dissenting) (Even imputing the nondisclosure of this [evidence] to the prosecutor). 36
91 The second element of a Brady claim requires proof the evidence in question was exculpatory, or favorable, to the defendant. In this regard, it is worth noting that  'because impeachment is integral to a defendant's constitutional right to cross-examination, there exists no pat distinction between impeachment and exculpatory evidence under Brady.'  Ballinger, 3 F.3d at 1376 (quoting Buchanan, 891 F.2d at 1443); accord Hughes, 33 F.3d at 1252. This is especially true [w]here a witness' credibility is material to the question of guilt. Fleming, 19 F.3d at 1330; see also Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154-55, 92 S.Ct. at 766. As Justice Blackmun stated in Bagley: 92 Impeachment evidence, ... as well as exculpatory evidence, falls within the Brady rule. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 [92 S.Ct. 763, 766, 31 L.Ed.2d 104] (1972). Such evidence is evidence favorable to an accused, Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 [83 S.Ct. at 1196], so that, if disclosed and used effectively, it may make the difference between conviction and acquittal. Cf. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 [79 S.Ct. 1173, 1177, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217] (1959) (The jury's estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence, and it is upon such subtle factors as the possible interest of the witness in testifying falsely that a defendant's life or liberty may depend). 93 473 U.S. at 676, 105 S.Ct. at 3380. 37 In sum, then, the fact that a particular piece of evidence is probative only for purposes of impeachment is not a defense to a Brady claim because  '[i]mpeachment evidence merits the same constitutional treatment as exculpatory evidence.'  Abello-Silva, 948 F.2d at 1179 (citation omitted).
94 The third and final element of a Brady claim requires proof that the evidence was material either to guilt or to punishment. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196-97; see also Ballinger, 3 F.3d at 1376. A fair analysis of the holding in Brady indicates that implicit in the requirement of materiality is a concern that the suppressed evidence might have affected the outcome of the trial. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 104, 96 S.Ct. at 2397; Buchanan, 891 F.2d at 1441. 95 The proper standard of materiality must reflect our overriding concern with the justice of the finding of guilt. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112, 96 S.Ct. at 2401 (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court first addressed the materiality question in Agurs, enunciating three different standards 38 of materiality dependent upon the specificity of the defendant's request and the conduct of the prosecutor. Buchanan, 891 F.2d at 1441. 96 If the defendant made a specific request for disclosure of an identifiable piece of evidence, then the prosecution was on specific notice of what was sought. Thus, the standard of materiality should be, and was, more lenient than if the defendant made either a general request for all Brady evidence or no request at all, both of which fail to provide any descriptive notice of what is being sought. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678-83, 105 S.Ct. at 3381-84 (discussing Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103-12, 96 S.Ct. at 2397-2402). 97 Agurs specifically considered the obligation of the prosecution in cases where no request was made. Recognizing that disclosure obligations are tied to the level of notice afforded to the prosecution, the Court held: 98 If there is a duty to respond to a general request ... it must derive from the obviously exculpatory character of certain evidence in the hands of the prosecutor. But if the evidence is so clearly supportive of a claim of innocence that it gives the prosecution notice of a duty to produce, that duty should equally arise even if no request is made.... [W]e conclude that there is no significant difference between cases in which there has been merely a general request for exculpatory matter and cases ... in which there has been no request at all. 99 Agurs, 427 U.S. at 107, 96 S.Ct. at 2399 (emphasis added). Therefore, while it is certainly more prudent for defense counsel to at least make a general request for Brady material rather than no request at all, the failure to make any request does not relieve the prosecution of its obligation to disclose evidence with an obviously exculpatory character. 100 As a practical matter, this must be true, at least in situations where defense counsel simply has no way of knowing the prosecution possesses certain exculpatory evidence. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 106, 96 S.Ct. at 2399 (In many cases, however, exculpatory information in the possession of the prosecutor may be unknown to defense counsel.). Any other rule would penalize criminal defendants for their counsel's failure to be prescient. Moreover, if defense counsel knew the prosecution possessed particular exculpatory evidence, counsel could vitiate this entire problem by making a specific request for that evidence. It is precisely because defense counsel does not, and cannot, know what potentially exculpatory evidence the prosecution possesses that there cannot realistically be any meaningful distinction between the prosecution's obligation under Brady in a general request case and its obligation in a no request case. If the prosecution possesses evidence that, in the context of a particular case is obviously exculpatory, then it has an obligation to disclose it to defense counsel whether a general request is made or whether no request is made. This represents a paradigmatic example of the imbalances inherent in the criminal justice process, and it serves to illustrate the purpose behind the Brady doctrine. 101 The Agurs framework, however, was unnecessarily rigid and the semantic distinctions between the different standards of materiality were often difficult to apply in practice. In Bagley, five members of the Court, through two separate opinions, adopted a single standard of materiality sufficiently flexible to cover the 'no request,' 'general request,' and 'specific request' cases. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. at 3383 (opinion of Blackmun, J.); id. at 685, 105 S.Ct. at 3385 (opinion of White, J.); 39 see also Bowen v. Maynard, 799 F.2d 593, 603 (10th Cir.) (discussing the three standards of materiality under Agurs and noting that after Bagley, courts are to apply a single test ... to all instances of nondisclosure, including specific request, general request and no request cases), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 962, 107 S.Ct. 458, 93 L.Ed.2d 404 (1986). Under this standard, [t]he evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. at 3383; accord Fero, 39 F.3d at 1472; Ballinger, 3 F.3d at 1376. 102 Under this more flexible, sliding scale approach to assessing the materiality vel non of the evidence in question, the specificity of the request is inversely related to the prosecution's disclosure obligation. As the specificity of the defendant's request increases, a lesser showing of materiality will suffice to establish a violation. Conversely, as the defendant's request becomes more general or even nonexistent, a greater showing of materiality is required to establish a Brady violation. 103 In making the materiality determination, we view the suppressed evidence's significance in relation to the record as a whole, Hughes, 33 F.3d at 1252 (citing United States v. Wolf, 839 F.2d 1387, 1391 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 923, 109 S.Ct. 304, 102 L.Ed.2d 323 (1988)), keeping in mind that [w]hat might be considered insignificant evidence in a strong case might suffice to disturb an already questionable verdict. Robinson, 39 F.3d at 1119 (citing Agurs, 427 U.S. at 113, 96 S.Ct. at 2402). We are also to consider any adverse effect that the prosecutor's failure to respond might have had on the preparation or presentation of the defendant's case ... in light of the totality of the circumstances. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 683, 105 S.Ct. at 3384. 104 We reiterate the question of [w]hether the government was required to disclose certain evidence under Brady is a mixed question of law and fact which we review de novo. Fleming, 19 F.3d at 1330 (citing Buchanan, 891 F.2d at 1440); Abello-Silva, 948 F.2d at 1179. Therefore, [t]he state court's ultimate conclusion under Brady ... is not entitled to a presumption of correctness under section 2254(d) and is open to review by federal courts. Bowen, 799 F.2d at 610 (citing Chaney v. Brown, 730 F.2d 1334, 1344-46 (10th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1090, 105 S.Ct. 601, 83 L.Ed.2d 710 (1985)); see also Case, 887 F.2d at 1393 (No presumption of correctness attaches to legal conclusions or determinations on mixed questions of law and fact. Those are reviewed de novo on federal habeas review.). 40 Findings of fact by the district court are reviewed for clear error. See Thomas v. Kerby, 44 F.3d 884, 886 (10th Cir.1995) (a district court's factual findings in a habeas corpus case are reviewed for clear error) (citing Hill v. Reynolds, 942 F.2d 1494, 1495 (10th Cir.1991)). We must now apply these principles to the facts of the present case.