Opinion ID: 1609293
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: State v. Hattaway:

Text: In Hattaway, this court held: Article I, Sec. 13 of our state constitution guarantees the accused, at least after the initiation of adverse judicial criminal proceedings and the court's appointment of an attorney to assist him, the right to rely on counsel as the medium between himself and the state. Consequently, the state cannot, under such circumstances, obtain a waiver from the accused or otherwise communicate with him with respect to the offense that is the subject of the proceedings except through the medium of the defense counsel. Hattaway, 621 So.2d at 798. The court first held that a person's right to the assistance of counsel guaranteed by La. Const. Art. I, Sec. 13 attaches no later than a defendant's initial court appearance or first judicial hearing. This conclusion was based on the fact that at the time of the drafting and ratification of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution, Gideon v. Wainwright [372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963)] had constitutionalized an indigent's right to court-appointed counsel in state trials, Kirby v. Illinois [406 U.S. 682, 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972)] had fixed the attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel at the initiation of accusatory or adverse judicial criminal proceedings, and the Louisiana legislature, by enacting La.C.Cr.P. art. 230.1, had established the initial court appearance or first judicial hearing to demarcate investigation and accusation, provide for the initiation of adverse judicial criminal proceedings, and fix the time for the appointment of counsel to assist indigents. Hattaway, 621 So.2d at 808. The court then noted that upon the attachment of the right to counsel, not all activity involving the defendant thereafter will constitute a critical stage or a stage of the proceedings triggering the right to presence of counsel at such a stage. Finding no evidence in the text or the drafting history of Art. I, Sec. 13 to indicate an intent to deviate from the Sixth Amendment test on what constitutes a critical stage, this court looked to United States Supreme Court Sixth Amendment jurisprudence and adopted a functional test to determine at which stages after the attachment of the right to counsel under Art. I, Sec. 13 the accused would be entitled to the assistance of counsel. This determination involves an analysis of whether potential substantial prejudice to defendant's rights inheres in the particular confrontation and the ability of counsel to help avoid that prejudice and includes any pretrial procedure occurring after the attachment of the right to counsel in which a meaningful defense or a fair trial could potentially be impaired if an uncounselled defendant were subjected to a confrontation by the state. Hattaway, 621 So.2d at 802 and 809. Therefore, even though the literal language of Art. I, Sec. 13 gives a defendant the right to counsel at each stage of the proceedings, this court interpreted that phrase to include only those stages occurring after the attachment of the right to counsel which would be considered critical stages under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Hattaway court then addressed whether a defendant, after his right to counsel had attached, could waive the right to have counsel present at a critical stage. This court concluded that once the right to counsel had attached and been asserted by the enrollment or appointment of counsel ... [no] state agent[] [could] communicate directly with the accused, without the knowledge and consent of his counsel, regarding the offense which is the subject of the adverse judicial criminal proceedings, and that any waiver of the right to counsel by defendant in such a case is per se invalid. Id. at 814. In essence, this court held that once the right to counsel had attached and an attorney had either been requested by defendant, or appointed for defendant, there could never be a valid waiver of the right to counsel by defendant. This conclusion was based on several considerations. Most importantly, this court found that the text and history of Article I, Sec. 13 exhibit no intent to dilute the strictness of the standards previously established by the Supreme Court's Sixth Amendment jurisprudence governing the waiver of the right to assistance of counsel. Id. at 810. Therefore, after a review of what purported to be the relevant jurisprudence on the subject, the court concluded the United States Supreme Court had established strong precedent that the state is prohibited from communicating with the defendant about the subject of the proceedings except through his legal representative, regardless of who initiated the confrontation or whether the elicitation was overt or covert. Id. at 809.