Opinion ID: 168767
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Substantial Evidence Supports the ARB's Resolution of Dr. Hall's Constructive Discharge Claim

Text: 19 Dr. Hall contends that the ARB failed to properly evaluate purported direct and circumstantial evidence of retaliation. As noted, we review the factual findings of the Board, not those of the ALJ, and the Board's findings are conclusive if they are supported by substantial evidence. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E); Zoltanski, 372 F.3d at 1200. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence a reasonable person would deem adequate to support the ultimate conclusion. Grubb v. F.D.I.C., 34 F.3d 956, 961 (10th Cir.1994). This standard requires more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent the Board's findings from being supported by substantial evidence. Zoltanski, 372 F.3d at 1200. In determining whether the Board's decision is supported by substantial evidence, the court must also consider that evidence which fairly detracts from the Board's decision. Universal Camera Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 340 U.S. 474, 488, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951). This includes the ALJ's evaluation of witness credibility. Where the Board rejects the ALJ's findings concerning credibility of witnesses ... the Board must have substantial justification apparent from the record. Zoltanski, 372 F.3d at 1201 (quoting Nephi Rubber Prods. Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 976 F.2d 1361, 1364 (10th Cir.1992)). More specifically, when the Board disagrees with the ALJ's assessment of witnesses' credibility, the Board should fully articulate [its] reasons for so doing, and then, with heightened scrutiny, we must decide whether such reasons find support in the record. Aylett v. Sec'y of Hous. and Urban Dev., 54 F.3d 1560, 1561 (10th Cir.1995) (quoting Fierro v. Bowen, 798 F.2d 1351, 1355 (10th Cir.1986)). Also, we will reject the ARB's finding if it rests  solely on testimony discredited by the ALJ. Pogue v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 940 F.2d 1287, 1289 (9th Cir.1991) (emphasis added).
20 Dr. Hall contends that he presented direct evidence of retaliation against him and that the Board's final decision must be reversed because it consequently failed to shift the burden of proof to Dugway. 4 Our review of the record reveals that Dr. Hall did not, in fact, present direct evidence of retaliation, and therefore, the ARB did not err in failing to shift the burden of proof. 21 Direct evidence is evidence, which if believed, proves the existence of a fact in issue without inference or presumption. Shorter v. ICG Holdings, Inc., 188 F.3d 1204, 1207 (10th Cir.1999) (alterations and quotations omitted), overruled on other grounds by Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003). Direct evidence requires proof of an existing policy which itself constitutes discrimination, Tomsic v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 85 F.3d 1472, 1477 (10th Cir.1996) (quotations omitted), or oral or written statements on the part of a defendant showing a discriminatory motivation, Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1225 (10th Cir. 2000). A statement that can plausibly be interpreted two different ways—one discriminatory and the other benign—does not directly reflect illegal animus, and, thus, does not constitute direct evidence. Patten v. Wal-Mart Stores East, Inc., 300 F.3d 21, 25 (1st Cir.2002) (quotation omitted). Statements of personal opinion, even when reflecting personal bias or prejudice, do not constitute direct evidence of discrimination, but at most, are only circumstantial evidence of discrimination because the trier of fact must infer discriminatory intent from such statements. See Shorter, 188 F.3d at 1207. 22 None of the statements Dr. Hall offers as direct evidence of retaliatory motive can be so characterized. First, Dr. Hall claims that in a January 1996 meeting, Dugway Test Center Commander, Lieutenant Colonel William Kiskowski, told Dr. Hall that General George Akin, the Commanding General at the Army Test and Evaluation Command in Aberdeen, Maryland, had called Dr. Hall a traitor in 1990 for reporting environmental violations. Dr. Hall claims that this statement is direct evidence of discrimination. In fact, the ARB concluded—contrary to the ALJ—that Dr. Hall failed to prove that Lieutenant Colonel Kiskowski made this statement at all. The ALJ had determined that Lieutenant Colonel Kiskowski made this statement based only on Dr. Hall's testimony and a similarly blatant statement that General Akin allegedly published in a Dugway newsletter in which the General said he had a deep concern with employees who reported concerns ... outside the chain of command. The ALJ also concluded that Lieutenant Colonel Kiskowski, who testified that he never made such a statement, was not credible. The ARB rejected this credibility determination for several reasons: (1) Jerry Steelman, Dr. Hall's supervisor at the time, and a witness who attended the January 1996 meeting, testified that he did not remember Lieutenant Colonel Kiskowski making this comment to Dr. Hall; (2) the record contains a note from Dr. Hall after the January 1996 meeting expressing positive feelings about the meeting; (3) Lieutenant Colonel Kiskowski testified that the meeting was productive; (4) the record contains a note from Lieutenant Colonel Kiskowski to Dr. Hall, written immediately after the meeting, indicating that the meeting was productive; and (5) the absence in the record of the Dugway newsletter in which General Akin allegedly expressed his concern that employees were reporting environmental issues outside the chain of command. It therefore concluded that Dr. Hall failed to prove that he was called a traitor. The ARB adequately stated its reasons for rejecting the ALJ's credibility determinations as to this claim, and its conclusions find substantial support in the record. The ARB went on to find that even if the statement was made, there was no evidence to suggest that Dr. Hall subjectively perceived the comment as hostile, and there is substantial evidence to support this conclusion. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998) (stating that the objectionable environment must be both objectively and subjectively offensive, one that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive, and one that the victim in fact did perceive to be so.). 23 Second, in the same January 1996 meeting discussed above, which was convened after Dr. Hall reported safety concerns directly to the Department of Defense, Lieutenant Colonel Kiskowski allegedly issued Dr. Hall a chain-of-command gag order requiring Dr. Hall to report his environmental and safety concerns internally through the chain of command as opposed to outside agencies. Specifically, Dr. Hall alleges that Lieutenant Colonel Kiskowski told me I shouldn't even talk to [Dugway's counsel] without clearing it with him. This is not direct evidence of retaliation. Even assuming that Lieutenant Colonel Kiskowski admonished Dr. Hall to report his concerns through the chain of command, this fact alone does not provide the nexus between Dr. Hall's reporting activity and the alleged discrimination. Multiple inferences must be drawn from this statement to find that Dugway's alleged hostility was motivated by a desire to retaliate. Furthermore, in context, the statement is ambiguous because several people testified that they understood Lieutenant Colonel Kiskowski's order not to prohibit Dr. Hall from reporting his concerns to outside agencies, but to ensure that Dugway first was aware of the issues so it could immediately address any safety or environmental problems. 5 24 Third, Colonel Dean Ertwine, the head of Dugway's Material Test Command, which includes both the Chem Lab and the Joint Operations Directorate (JOD), offered Dr. Hall a temporary detail outside Chem Lab in the JOD in 1991. According to Dr. Hall's notes, Colonel Ertwine stated at the time that he was concerned that the transfer not appear as if it were in retaliation for Dr. Hall's reports to OSHA. Dr. Hall's notes read, Col. Ertwine does not want the appearance that I am being moved out in retaliation for having caused an OSHA inspection. He and I agreed that would be very counterproductive insofar as getting employees to take safety and hazardous waste matters seriously. One permissible inference to be drawn from the statement is that Colonel Ertwine wanted to prevent others from feeling inhibited in their ability to report safety concerns because of a belief that Dr. Hall was transferred because he reported such concerns. As noted, statements susceptible to two different interpretations—one discriminatory, the other not—is not direct evidence of illegal animus. 25 Fourth, Dr. Harvey, a fellow chemist at Dugway, testified that in 1997 he was ordered to submit to a fitness-for-duty exam at the same time as another employee (who Dr. Harvey believed to be Dr. Hall) in order to avoid the appearance of disparate treatment with respect to the other employee's exam. Again, retaliatory motive must be inferred from this evidence because Dr. Harvey's testimony requires one to infer that the other employee was Dr. Hall. Moreover, the testimony provides no explicit nexus between Dugway's decision to require Dr. Hall to submit to a fitness-for-duty exam and Dr. Hall's protected activity. See McCowan v. All Star Maint. Inc., 273 F.3d 917, 922 n. 3 (10th Cir.2001) (When a plaintiff alleges that discriminatory comments constitute direct evidence of discrimination, . . . the plaintiff must demonstrate a nexus exists between the allegedly discriminatory statements and the decision to terminate her. (alteration and quotation omitted)). As such, it does not constitute direct evidence. 26 Fifth, Dr. Gary Resnick, a supervisor, instructed Dr. Hall's immediate supervisor at the time, Dr. Lyman Condie, to turkey farm Dr. Hall. Dr. Hall argues this statement is an expression of hostility, but the meaning of this statement is ambiguous. In context, the comment supports an inference that Dr. Resnick intended Dr. Hall to be placed on non-critical assignments due to Dr. Hall's lack of productivity, not due to his reporting of environmental and safety concerns. Though retaliatory comments made by a manager responsible for the employment decision at issue during the decision-making process might constitute direct evidence of discrimination, the same does not hold true for ambiguous statements where the retaliatory motive is not apparent on its face. See Danville v. Reg'l Lab Corp., 292 F.3d 1246, 1249 (10th Cir.2002) (when decision-maker's comment that plaintiff might not be around very long could have referred either to plaintiff's age or to her tendency to change jobs frequently, the comment was only circumstantial evidence of discrimination). 27 Finally, Dr. Hall contends that statements appearing in an internal Dugway memorandum regarding Dr. Hall, composed after Dr. Hall wrote to United States Senator Carl Levin expressing concerns about safety at Dugway, are direct evidence of retaliation. Dr. Hall's letter to Senator Levin resulted in a report to the Secretary of the Army by Senator Levin on behalf of the Senate Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management regarding concerns about safety at Dugway. Colonel Cox, Dugway's Commander, composed an internal memorandum to Dr. Frank Bagley, Dr. Hall's immediate supervisor at the time, explaining the actions he intended to take in response to the Senate's report to the Secretary. These actions included briefing the Under Secretary of the Army and advising employees that they must cooperate to resolve problems in the lab and must advise Dugway in writing of any future safety concerns. The memo expresses anxiety that, in the context of declining defense spending, base closure is a serious concern if Dugway has to explain to Senators why we are not doing our job right. The memo further states that supervisors should discuss the gravity of the situation with Dr. Hall and that he must understand that we can resolve his concerns here using Dugway, then Army assets, prior to raising issues with OSHA, EPA, Congress, etc. 28 There is no indication of retaliatory intent here, and the ARB could infer that Colonel Cox was merely appropriately concerned with resolving issues within the chain of command. Moreover, none of these statements are connected to any hostile action taken against Dr. Hall. As such, Colonel Cox's memo, at best, constitutes circumstantial evidence of retaliatory motive, but it is not direct evidence under the law of this Circuit. 6 29 The statements and evidence advanced by Dr. Hall on appeal are not direct evidence of retaliation. Instead, they are evidence from which a retaliatory purpose could arguably be inferred. Because there is no direct evidence to satisfy Dr. Hall's burden to prove retaliatory motive, the ARB did not abuse its discretion in refusing to shift the burden of proof to Dugway. 30
31 Dr. Hall argues the ARB's determination that he failed to prove a causal nexus between his protected activity and the alleged hostility against him is not supported by substantial evidence. As support for his contention that he was subjected to this hostility because he engaged in protected conduct, he cites the evidence we previously discussed and rejected as direct evidence of discrimination, as well as evidence (1) that the Army has a policy of retaliating against whistleblowers; (2) that Dugway did not follow procedure in dealing with Dr. Hall in different situations; (3) that the timing of certain alleged hostile acts is so close in time to his protected activity to justify finding retaliation; (4) that Dugway subjected his work product to hostile editing; and (5) that the ARB should have payed more credence to the ALJ's positive credibility determination regarding Dr. Hall. We have reviewed Dr. Hall's assertions on appeal, the ARB's decision, and the record on appeal, including the ALJ's RD & O, and find that substantial evidence supports the ARB's conclusions. In so finding, we acknowledge that a reasonable person may infer that the Army's alleged hostility against Dr. Hall was related to his protected activity. Our standard of review, however, is not de novo. We are charged only with determining whether the Board's decision to the contrary is supported by substantial evidence, which we have already described as more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance of the evidence. See Zoltanski, 372 F.3d at 1200. 32 First, the ARB rejected Dr. Hall's contention that there was a clear Army policy that treated employees who reported to outside agencies as disloyal and subject to discipline. As support for his contention that the ARB erred in this determination, he points to: (1) a statement by General Akin in a Dugway newsletter that he had deep concern with employees who reported outside their chain of command; (2) a Defense Investigative Services (DIS) report that stated that one of Dr. Hall's supervisors said Dr. Hall admitted to blowing the whistle in the past but that Dr. Hall has improved in this respect and is more willing to work through proper channels; (3) Dugway's treatment of fellow Dugway employee Judy Moran; and (4) Dr. Hall's testimony that a supervisor made reference to Dr. Hall as one who cannot be trusted not to report to the state environmental agency. 33 Substantial evidence supports the ARB's conclusion that Dr. Hall failed to prove that Dugway had a policy of retaliation against whistleblowers. First, the alleged statement by General Akin does not appear in the record (nor did it appear in the record before the ARB). Second, the statements in the DIS report regarding Dr. Hall's whistle-blowing are evidence as to Dugway's knowledge of Dr. Hall's protected activities, but that fact is not contested. Taken in its full context, the statement indicates legitimate employer concern with employee performance—the statement forms part of a discussion of a supervisor's concerns with Dr. Hall's productivity and difficulty in handling work situations, evidenced by his tendency to go straight to supervisors without attempting to resolve problems on his own. Third, substantial evidence supports the ARB's determination that Dugway's treatment of Ms. Moran does not evidence a retaliation policy. Dr. Hall relies upon the ALJ's conclusion that Ms. Moran credibly testified that Dugway would not hesitate to conceal environmental violations to the State. As the ARB points out, the testimony of one witness that Dugway generally may conceal environmental violations does not conclusively prove that Dugway has a policy of retaliation against whistleblowers, much less that Dr. Hall's supervisors took retaliatory action against him for reporting environmental violations. In rejecting the ALJ's credibility determination of Ms. Moran, the ARB recognized conflicting evidence in the record showing that Dugway did not retaliate against Ms. Moran as Dr. Hall alleged and noted the testimony of three other employees who engaged in whistle-blowing activity but experienced no retaliation from Dugway. The ARB clearly and logically stated its reasons for finding against the ALJ's determination that there was a policy of retaliation at Dugway as alleged by Ms. Moran. Finally, that Dugway managers believed Dr. Hall [could not] be trusted does not require a conclusion that Dugway had a policy of retaliating against whistleblowers because the record also contained evidence that other employees engaged in whistle-blowing but suffered no disciplinary actions. 34 Second, the ARB also rejected Dr. Hall's contention that instances of irregular procedure proves that he was retaliated against. First, he argues that Commander Como's recommendation to revoke Dr. Hall's security clearance without waiting for a response from Dr. Hall showed inadequate investigation and irregular procedure, both of which prove retaliatory motive in that decision. We have already held that Egan prohibits both the Board's and this Court's inquiry in the motives behind security clearance review. Although Egan does allow review of an agency's compliance with its own procedures, Dr. Hall does not provide us with the procedure that Commander Como should have but failed to follow. 7 35 Also as an example of irregular procedure, Dr. Hall argues that Lieutenant Colonel Kiskowski's failure in a February 1997 meeting to comply with procedure requiring advance notice to union officials of meetings with union employees is evidence of retaliatory motive. The ARB concluded that although Lieutenant Colonel Kiskowski did fail to follow procedure in this respect, Dr. Hall failed to prove that this failure was in retaliation for his protected conduct. The ARB martialed substantial evidence to support its finding that the meeting was called as a result of Dr. Hall's deficient work performance, and not evidence of retaliatory motive. 36 Third, Dr. Hall argues that the ARB failed to take account of retaliatory actions that occurred so close in time to his protected activity as to justify an inference of retaliatory motive. A factfinder may infer retaliatory motive from the fact that a hostile action is taken shortly after an employee's protected activity, see, e.g., Weaver v. Chavez, 458 F.3d 1096, 1098 (10th Cir.2006), but it is not required to do so. Dr. Hall was reassigned to the JOD shortly after he engaged in protected activity. The ARB found, however, and the record supports, that Dr. Hall's temporary reassignment to the JOD was motivated by supervisors' desire to give Dr. Hall an environment in which he had better opportunity for advancement and to separate quarreling employees in the Chem Lab. Moreover, the ARB found that the transfer could not even be characterized as a hostile act, and we find the record supports this conclusion for the reasons stated in the ARB's Order. 37 Fourth, the ARB rejected the ALJ's view of the evidence supporting Dr. Hall's claim that hostile editing contributed to a hostile work environment. Dr. Hall alleged that Christine Wheeler, a Dugway technical editor who edited Dr. Hall's work, made it impossible for him to complete a report on time. The ALJ agreed, in part because he believed Ms. Wheeler was arrogant. The ARB rejected the ALJ's conclusion, noting that Ms. Wheeler's purported arrogance alone does not prove that she intentionally obstructed Dr. Hall's efforts to finish his report or that if she did obstruct his report it was because of his protected activity. To support its rejection of the ALJ's credibility determination, the ARB referred to evidence in the record that Ms. Wheeler's edits were routine, prompt, and clear and noted the testimony of Jim Barnett, a union vice president, that Ms. Wheeler's editing of Dr. Hall's report was like her editing of other people's work, including his own. Although the record does contain testimony from union official Michael LeFevre that he believed it was possible that Ms. Wheeler intentionally blocked Dr. Hall's report, the ALJ made no credibility determinations with respect to this witness and, given the other record evidence, the evidence is sufficiently substantial even under the heightened credibility standard to reject the ALJ's conclusion as to the charge of hostile editing. 38 Finally, Dr. Hall objects to the ARB's rejection of the ALJ's across-the-board credibility determination in favor of Dr. Hall in the face of conflicting and substantial evidence in the record. The ALJ found that Dr. Hall took good notes and is an honest, conscientious and dedicated individual, and therefore generally credited his testimony. The ARB found that the ALJ evaluated only Dr. Hall's credibility, despite the fact that 50 witnesses testified, 40 of whom testified against Dr. Hall. See Be-Lo Stores v. N.L.R.B., 126 F.3d 268, 279 (4th Cir.1997) (rejecting ALJ's generalized, conclusory statement about credibility determinations with respect to multiple witnesses). The ARB also explained that the ALJ failed to weigh or to discuss the reasons for discounting conflicting evidence. See Brindisi v. Barnhart, 315 F.3d 783, 787-88 (7th Cir.2003) (rejecting ALJ's conclusions for lack of adequate discussion of conflicting evidence). It is not illogical for the ARB to question the ALJ's credibility determination favoring Dr. Hall in this respect. 39