Opinion ID: 1944998
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Are Brown's post-conviction claims barred by res judicata or prohibited by the imposition of procedural bars?

Text: ¶ 31. Brown argues that his post-conviction claims are not barred by res judicata or prohibited by the imposition of procedural bars. Brown asserts that his claims are not only meritorious, but are of such a nature and substance that the application of procedural bar and res judicata would be erroneous. Brown further claims that Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003); Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 124 S.Ct. 2519, 159 L.Ed.2d 442 (2004); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 162 L.Ed.2d 360 (2005); Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 123. S.Ct. 1690, 155 L.Ed.2d 714 (2003); and Jackson v. State, 732 So.2d 187 (Miss. 1999), represent the current state of fundamental constitutional law in the capital litigation arena. Based upon the alleged new legal standards set forth in these cases, Brown believes that he is entitled to have his claims considered. ¶ 32. Under issue two, Brown once again makes the argument that he has a right to effective assistance of counsel on post conviction review and that, pursuant to ABA guidelines, he is required to challenge overly restrictive procedural rules in order to meet the Strickland requirements imposed upon him. According to Brown, the imposition of a procedural bar or the application of the res judicata doctrine to meritorious post-conviction issues is tantamount to an unfair application of his fundamental rights as has been provided to him under the Jackson holding. Brown also states that the extensive investigation required for such appeals cannot be effectively accomplished by appellate counsel because of the limited time counsel has to perfect an appeal. ¶ 33. As stated previously, Brown has not submitted any newly discovered evidence in support of his claims. It is clear that a petitioner seeking post conviction relief must prove that new evidence has been discovered since the close of trial and that it could not have been discovered through due diligence before the trial began. Crawford v. State, 867 So.2d 196, 203-04 (Miss.2003). Furthermore, Brown fails to show how the cases he has cited allow him to disregard the procedural bars or guarantees him the right to effective post conviction relief counsel. Therefore, Brown's claims under issue two also fail.