Opinion ID: 771747
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Doan's Right to a Fair Trial

Text: 22 When reviewing the district court's disposition of a habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254, this court reviews the district court's legal conclusions de novo. See DeLisle v. Rivers, 161 F.3d 370, 380 (6th Cir. 1998) (en banc),cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1075 (1999). Under §2254, habeas relief may not be granted with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the adjudication: 23 (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 24 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1)-(2). 25 The Supreme Court, in Williams v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct. 1495 (2000), further elaborated upon the precise meaning of this statutory language, holding that independent meaning should be given to the phrases contrary to and unreasonable application of in §2254(d)(1). Id. at 1519. The Court stated that, for a state court's decision to be contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent, it must arrive[] at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law[,] or it must face a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent and still arrive at an opposite result. Id. A state court unreasonably appli[es] clearly established Supreme Court precedent when it correctly identifies the governing legal principle in the case, yet it unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the defendant's case. Id. at 1520. A state court also unreasonably applies Supreme Court precedent when it unreasonably extends a legal principle from our precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply. Id. The Williams Court further stated that a federal habeas court may not overturn a state court's decision simply because it believes that a state court applied Supreme Court precedent incorrectly. Id. at 1522. Instead, the state court's application of Supreme Court precedent must also be objectively unreasonable. Id. at 1521-22. 26 In analyzing whether a state court's decision is contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent, we may only look to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of th[e] Court's decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision. Id. at 1523. As is dictated by the statute, we may not look to lower federal court decisions in deciding whether the state decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. Herbert v. Billy, 160 F.3d 1131, 1135 (6th Cir. 1998). 27
28 The Ohio Court of Appeals was the last court in Ohio to address the merits of Doan's appeal. In his brief to the Ohio Court of Appeals, Doan argued that the juror's misconduct in conducting an experiment in her own home, the results of which she told to other members of the jury, violated his Sixth Amendment right under the United States Constitution to have a fair trial before an impartial jury inwhich the jury's verdict is based solely upon the evidence presented at trial. See Appellant's Br. to Ohio Ct. App. at 7, 11. The Ohio Court of Appeals did not address this argument in its opinion, however. Instead, it based its decision entirely on Ohio Evid. R. 606(B), 4 which states that in order for a juror to testify as to an extraneous influence that was brought to the jury's attention during the trial or deliberations, there must be some independent evidence from a source with firsthand knowledge other than the jurors themselves. See State v. Schiebel, 564 N.E.2d. 54, 61 (Ohio 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 961 (1991). The Ohio Court of Appeals noted that, because there was no outside evidence of juror misconduct that stemmed from evidence provided by anyone other than the jurors themselves, Ohio Evid. R. 606(B) rendered Juror A's affidavit acknowledging her experimentation inadmissible. The state court of appeals, because it found the Ohio evidence rule to be controlling, apparently did not deem it necessary to address Doan's federal constitutional argument that such juror experimentation effectively denies his rights under the Sixth Amendment. 29 Ohio's Rule 606(B) codifies the aliunde rule, a rule dating back to the day of Lord Mansfield, which states that the verdict of a jury may not be impeached by the evidence of a member of the jury unless foundation for the introduction of such evidence is first laid by competent evidence ... from some other source. State v. Adams, 48 N.E.2d 861, 863 (Ohio 1943). This rule is designed to protect the finality of verdicts and to ensure that jurors are insulated from harassment by defeated parties. Schiebel, 564 N.E.2d at 61. While Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) closely parallels the Ohio rule in most respects, it does not codify the aliunde rule. Instead, Federal Rule 606(b) allows a juror to testify about any extraneous prejudicial information [that] was improperly brought to the jury's attention[.] This is quite different from the aliunde rule, which allows consideration only of extraneous prejudicial information that can be verified by some source outside the jury. The Ohio Court of Appeals noted explicitly in its opinion that if Federal Rule 606(b) had applied to Doan's trial, the evidence of juror misconduct would likely have been admissible. Doan, 1995 WL 577524, at  (Ohio's rule is different, requiring a different result in the present case.). 30 Because the Ohio Court of Appeals did not even identify in its opinion that Doan had a federal constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury that considers in its deliberations only the evidence presented against him at trial, the unreasonable application prong of §2254(d)(1) does not govern our analysis. The Ohio Court of Appeals did not, as the Supreme Court defined an unreasonable application, correctly identify the governing legal principle only to unreasonably apply that principle to the particular facts of the case at hand. See Williams, 120 S. Ct. at 1520. On the contrary, the Ohio Court of Appeals completely failed to identify Doan'sSixth Amendment rights in its analysis, implicitly holding that Ohio Evid. R. 606(B) trumps the constitutional arguments that the defendant raised. 31 The question, then, is whether the Ohio Court of Appeals's decision applying Ohio's Rule 606(B) in spite of Doan's Sixth Amendment claim is contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent as of the time of its decision. We hold that it is. 32 As stated earlier, the Supreme Court in Williams further defined what it means for a state court decision to be contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent. The Williams Court noted that contrary is defined as diametrically different, opposite in character or nature, or mutually opposed. Williams, 120 S. Ct. at 1519 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, a state court decision will be contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent only if it applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases[,] or if it confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a [Supreme Court decision] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court] precedent. Id. 33 Doan argues that, because Ohio Evid. R. 606(B) prevents the consideration of clear evidence of jury misconduct in this case, the rule's application violated his federal constitutional right to a fair trial. The Supreme Court has recognized the right to a fair trial as arising out of both the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments 5 . See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818 (1975); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973). In explaining what is encompassed in the right to a fair trial, the Court has held that it adheres to the 'undeviating rule' that the rights of confrontation and cross-examination are among the fundamental requirements of a constitutionally fair trial. Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 364-65 (1966) (citation omitted). The Court has further held that: 34 In the constitutional sense, trial by jury in a criminal case necessarily implies at the very least that the evidence developed against a defendant shall come from the witness stand in a public courtroom where there is full judicial protection of the defendant's right of confrontation, of cross-examination, and of counsel. 35 Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472-73 (1965) (quotation omitted). 36 In Parker, the Supreme Court held that prejudicial comments to a jury by a bailiff during deliberations violated the defendant's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The bailiff, who was assigned to a sequestered jury, stated to one of the jurors in the presence of others that the defendant was a wicked man, that he was guilty, and that if there was an error in finding the defendant guilty, the Supreme Court would correct it. Parker, 385 U.S. at 363-64. The Court held that the defendant's right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him was violated by these comments, and that, given the official nature of the bailiff's position, the likelihood for prejudice was high. Id. at 365. 37 Just as the bailiff in Parker was essentially acting as a witness whose testimony the defendant could not confront and possibly discredit through cross-examination or the presentation of other evidence, so too was Juror A acting as a witnesshere in her statements to her fellow jurors regarding the results of her out-of-court experiment. As applied in this case, Ohio's Rule 606(B) allowed Juror A to conduct an experiment in her own home, even though it may have been deeply flawed in its methodology, and to present the results of that experiment to her fellow jurors, even though it may have substantially impaired the defendant's credibility, simply because no one else saw her conduct the experiment or heard her relay the results of that experiment to other jurors. Ohio Rule 606(B), by denying the Ohio courts the ability to consider evidence of the jury misconduct in this case, denied Doan's right to confront the witnesses and the evidence against him, and thus clearly stands in conflict with Supreme Court precedent recognizing the fundamental importance of this constitutional right. 38 The Warden argues that Doan's case is distinguishable because no inappropriate communications between a court official, or other outside source, and Doan's jury occurred. See Appellee's Br. at 20-21. Rather, the Warden argues that any misconduct in this case was the result of communication among the jurors themselves, and that 'the evidence of jurors[,] as to the motives and influences which affected their deliberations[,] is inadmissible either to impeach or to support the verdict.' Appellee's Br. at 20-21 (quoting Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 149 (1892)). The Warden, however, misrepresents the holding of Mattox. 39 In Mattox, following a federal jury's guilty verdict, the defendant attempted to introduce several jurors' affidavits stating that the bailiff in charge of the jury had made inappropriate comments to them regarding the defendant's guilt and concerning certain incriminating evidence against the defendant that was not presented at trial. Id. at 142. The jurors also stated in their affidavits that, while they were deliberating, a newspaper was brought into the jury room that contained an opinion piece on the details of the trial and the strength of the evidence against the defendant. Id. at 143. This article was read aloud in the presence of the entire jury. Id. 40 The Supreme Court held that the juror affidavits in Mattox should have been considered by the trial court when addressing the defendant's motion for a new trial, and, in light of the affidavits, the Court then granted the defendant's motion for a new trial. Id. at 148-49, 151. In doing so, the Court distinguished between that juror testimony which can and that which cannot be used to set aside a jury verdict. Id. The Court held that a matter resting in the personal consciousness of one juror may not be used to upset a jury's verdict because, being personal, it is not accessible to other testimony. Id. at 148. The Court stated that it would not give the secret thought[s] of one [juror] the power to disturb the expressed conclusions of twelve. Id. In sharp contrast to the secret thoughts of jurors, the Court held that juror testimony as to overt acts of misconduct can be considered because the remaining members of the jury can testify as to whether or not those acts of misconduct actually occurred. Id. at 148-49. The Court recognized that, by drawing this distinction, verifiable evidence of a jury's consideration of extraneous prejudicial information could be considered by courts while still respecting the finality of jury verdicts by disallowing testimony as to the unverifiable thoughts of jurors 6 . See id. at 148-49. 41 Thus, the Supreme Court in Mattox held that, when addressing a motion for a new trial, courts should consider juror testimony concerning any overt acts of misconduct by which extraneous and potentially prejudicial information is presented to the jury, including juror testimony showing that a newspaper article relevant to the case was read aloud in the jury room.See Mattox, 146 U.S. at 148-49. The Mattox Court did not state, however, that courts should consider only those instances of misconduct in which there is inappropriate contact between the jury and a court official, or some other outside source.See id. 42 It is important to stress that we are not calling Doan's verdict into question by reviewing the private, internal deliberations of the jury. As the Supreme Court has noted, substantial policy considerations, including the finality of verdicts and the avoidance of post-verdict juror harassment, weigh in favor of limiting the extent to which we delve into that thicket. Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 119-21 (1987). Instead, what makes this case different, and what triggers concerns of a constitutional dimension, is the fact that Juror A conducted an out-of-court experiment and reported her findings to the jury in the manner of an expert witness. Unlike an expert witness, however, Juror A's testimony was not presented on the witness stand, nor was it subject to confrontation and cross-examination by Doan's attorneys. Juror A's testimony was not on the record, nor was it governed by the same evidence rules as all the other evidence presented at trial. In short, Juror A's experiment and her subsequent report of its results, results which indicated that Doan may not have been truthful in his testimony on the witness stand, injected extraneous and potentially prejudicial evidence into the jury's deliberations, evidence which Doan and his attorneys had no chance to refute. 43 A review of this misconduct stands in stark contrast to an examination of internal factors affecting the jury. Whether the jury understood the evidence presented at trial or the judge's instructions following the presentation of the evidence, whether a juror was pressured into arriving at a particular conclusion, and even whether jurors were intoxicated during deliberations, are all internal matters for which juror testimony may not be used to challenge a final verdict. See Tanner, 483 U.S. at 117-22, 125. For a juror to perform and report to other jurors the results of an out-of-court experiment, however, conflicts with Doan's constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury that considers only the evidence presented at trial. 44 The Sixth Amendment requires, at the very least, that the evidence brought against a defendant and considered by the jury be presented at trial where the defendant can confront that evidence to the fullest extent possible. Turner, 379 U.S. at 472-73. Ohio Rule 606(B), by refusing to allow consideration of evidence of the improper juror experiment in this case, fails to protect adequately Doan's constitutional right to a fair trial. The state court's use of this rule to decide Doan's constitutional claim is contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent recognizing the fundamental importance of this right. See Parker, 385 U.S. at 364-65; Turner, 379 U.S. at 472-73 7 . 45 While we may not look to the decisions of lower federal courts for guidance when deciding whether a state court decision is contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent, Herbert, 160 F.3d at 1135, it is worth noting that we are by no means the first federal court of appeals to recognize that a state's aliunde evidence rule cannot be applied to violate a defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial. Thirty years ago, in United States ex rel. Owen v. McMann, 435 F.2d 813 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971), the Second Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Friendly, decided a case strikingly similar to this one. In Owen, a state prisoner sought federal habeas relief, arguing that his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation had been violated by extraneous statements made by three jurors about the defendant. Id. at 815. In Owen, the jurors had no outside contact with a court official, or anyone else for that matter; instead, several jurors told other jurors during the trial that they knew about the defendant's history, and that he was a bad person who was always getting in trouble. Id. As in Ohio, New York evidence law dictated that juror testimony regarding this misconduct was inadmissible to impeach the verdict. Id. at 819. 46 On appeal, the State of New York argued that, pursuant to a firmly embedded rule of evidence in New York, jurors could not impeach a verdict simply on the basis of what they said occurred in the deliberating room, that there were strong public policy justifications for that rule, and that the Second Circuit should not carve out an exception to the rule in that case. Id. Judge Friendly noted, however, that the State could not seriously contend that even if Owen were denied due process by virtue of the jury's consideration of prejudicial extra-record facts, New York law may independently foreclose him from challenging his conviction on federal constitutional grounds[.] Id. Despite the policy considerations weighing in favor of the New York evidence rule, the Second Circuit held that the habeas petitioner's constitutional right to due process was violated. Id. at 816-20. 47 Judge Friendly explained that while jurors can take into account their own wisdom, experience, and common sense, in doing so [they] must not bring extra facts into the jury room .... To the greatest extent possible all factual [material] must pass through the judicial sieve, where the fundamental guarantees of procedural law protect the rights of those accused of crime. Id. at 818 (citation omitted). The State claimed that, because this case involved jury misconduct inside the jury room as opposed to impropriety outside the jury room, both federal and New York law would hold it inadmissible. See id. at 819. The Second Circuit disagreed, stating that it is the nature of the extraneous material and its likely effect on the hypothetical average jury, not the source of the information or the locus of its communication, which determines whether thedefendant has been prejudiced[,] and thus whether his constitutional rights were violated. Id. at 820. 48 Since Owen, several circuits have followed suit in holding that a jury's consideration of extraneous material violates a defendant's constitutional rights. In Durr v. Cook, 589 F.2d 891, 892 (5th Cir. 1979), another case similar to this one, a Louisiana prisoner petitioned for habeas corpus relief on the grounds that a juror's out-of-court experiment violated his constitutional rights to confrontation and due process. In Durr, the jury foreman allegedly conducted an experiment at a local Ford dealership during the trial, making twisting movements in a Ford pickup truck in order to test the defendant's self-defense explanation. Id. The state trial court, on a motion for a new trial, enforced a Louisiana statute which prevented a juror from impeaching his own verdict, and held that the foreman could not testify as to the experiment or whether the results of that experiment were passed on to the rest of the jury. Id. at 892-93. The Fifth Circuit on habeas review, however, held that the defendant's constitutional rights take precedence over the Louisiana statute, and because the defendant presented a substantial claim that his rights may have been violated, the foreman must be allowed to testify as to his conduct. Id. at 893. The Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing and for further proceedings. 49 This circuit has also addressed the threat that out-of-court juror experiments pose to a defendant's right to a fair trial. InIn re Beverly Hills Fire Litigation, 695 F.2d 207, 211-12 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 929 (1983), a federal diversity case, following a plaintiffs' expert witness's testimony, a juror conducted an improper experiment when he examined the aluminum wiring in his home and reported his findings to at least six other jurors during the course of the trial. The defendants in the case contended that the juror's conduct was neither an experiment nor an intentional attempt to uncover additional information, but instead was a personal experience which could not have affected the judgment of that juror or those to whom he communicated that information. Id. at 213. This court held to the contrary, however, stating that, rather than this being a mental or emotional reaction or expression during deliberations, this was an experiment that tainted the jury's verdict by injecting extraneous information into the trial. Id. 50 We explained in Beverly Hills that while the general rule under federal evidence law is that a juror may not impeach his verdict, an exception to this rule exists where external factors were present that may have affected the jury's deliberations.Id. This exception exists to assure that the parties receive a fair trial and that the integrity of the system itself is maintained. Id. We held that, because the experiment effectively provided the jurors with evidence not presented at trial, and because the information was so likely to have been prejudicial, we had no choice but to reverse the jury's verdict and remand for a new trial. Id. at 214-15. It is important to note that, even though the Federal Rules of Evidence applied inBeverly Hills, we spoke generally of the fundamental requirements of a fair trial, protections that are not relinquished upon entering the doors of a state courtroom 8 . See id. at 213-14. 51 Thus, we conclude that the Ohio courts' application of Ohio Evid. R. 606(B) effectively denied Doan the opportunity to show a violation of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to confront the evidence and the witnesses presented against him, as well as his right to a jury that considers only the evidence presented at trial. Furthermore, the Ohio courts applied Ohio Rule 606(B) while ignoring Doan's constitutional claim, thereby violating clearly established Supreme Court precedent recognizing the fundamental importance of Doan's constitutional right to a fair trial. Nevertheless, we may not grant habeas relief simply because Juror A presented the results of an improper experiment to other members of Doan's jury in violation of Doan's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Instead, even though we hold that the extraneous influence on the jury in this case amounted to constitutional error, we may not grant habeas relief if that error was harmless. Nevers v. Killinger, 169 F.3d 352, 369-70 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1004 (1999). We now turn to the question of whether the constitutional error at trial was, indeed, harmless.
52 In applying the harmless error analysis on habeas review for cases governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, this circuit has held that the harmless error standard set out in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993), should apply, even when the federal habeas court is the first to review for harmless error. Gilliam v. Mitchell, 179 F.3d 990, 995 (6th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 945 (2000). Under this standard, a habeas petitioner must show that the trial error had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict[.] Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, in order for this court to grant Doan habeas relief, he must demonstrate that the results of Juror A's experiment, having been relayed to other members of the jury, substantially affected or influenced the jury's verdict. After an exhaustive review of the state trial record, we conclude that the jury's consideration of extraneous material in this case was harmless error. 53 The most damaging evidence presented by the prosecution was, of course, Doan's taped statements confessing to striking, shaking, and scalding the face of fifteen-month-old Star Hollingsworth. The police officers who interviewed Doan on the night of the murder explained the substance of Doan's confession to the jury, and the taped confessions were played, in their entirety, during the trial. In his direct examination, Doan denied harming the baby and stated that the police officers convinced him to make an insincere confession by telling him that, if he admitted to shaking, striking, and burning Star, [i]t would help [him] in court. (Tr. at 678). Other evidence and testimony presented attrial, however, including Doan's impeached testimony on cross-examination, convincingly show that Doan's taped confessions were reliable. 54 Catherine Beisel's mother, Shirley Beisel, testified at trial that she had spent time with Star just a few hours before Doan was left with the children on the night of Star's death. Shirley Beisel testified that she had played with Star at approximately 4:00 p.m. and that she did not notice anything unusual about Star's appearance or behavior. When Doan arrived home that evening before driving Catherine to work, he said he noticed that Star looked pale and sick, yet he did not note anything else unusual about her appearance. 55 Star's autopsy report revealed numerous contusions and hemorrhaging over much of Star's body, including her head. A theme of Doan's defense, developed both during his direct examination and in closing arguments, was that there was a gap of time between approximately 4:00 p.m., when Star's grandmother last saw her alive, and 7:30 p.m., when Doan arrived at the apartment after work, that was unaccounted for, and that Star's injuries may have occurred during this time. In his closing, Doan's defense attorney lamented the fact that he was unable to call Catherine Beisel as a witness to determine if Star had suffered injuries before Doan arrived 9 . 56 While Doan's defense insinuates that many of Star's injuries may have been inflicted before Doan arrived, Doan admitted on cross-examination that the contusions on Star's head occurred while he was watching her. Doan insisted throughout his testimony that, on the night in question, he never actually saw Star without her being fully clothed, and thus he could not determine whether the bruises that covered her body after he had watched her were there prior to the time he arrived home that night. Doan had a difficult time keeping his story straight, however. 57 When Doan and the children arrived home after dropping Catherine off at work, Doan testified that he laid Star in her bed while he tended to Sophia. When tucking Sophia in for the night, he turned the bedroom light on and noticed that Star, who was still fully clothed, had vomited in her bed. Doan picked her up and carried her into the living room, where he laid her down on the sofa. Doan stated initially that he saw her vomit again on the sofa, and he then took her clothes off so he could give her a bath. On cross-examination, Doan stated that the living room was too dark to see if she had bruises on her body, yet he admitted that he was able to see her vomit on the sofa. The prosecuting attorney pointed out several of the major contusions on Star's body, and Doan stated that he could not see any of those bruises even after he had taken her clothes off. Nevertheless, Doan still briefly maintained that he could see her vomit 10 . Immediatelythereafter, however, Doan changed his story. Rather than being able to see Star's vomit, Doan testified that he knew she had vomited because he could hear her vomiting. Doan admitted that this was the first time he had ever told anyone this version of the events of that evening. (Tr. at 738-40). 58 Doan testified that, after undressing Star, he then took her into the bathroom to give her a bath. As with other rooms in the house, Doan testified that it was too dark in the bathroom to see if she had any bruises. Doan stated that he turned the water on in the tub and left the child sitting in the bathtub in the very dark bathroom while he went to clean up the vomit on the sofa. (Tr. at 661-63). Doan testified that, while cleaning up the sofa, he heard Star scream and then heard two booms as she fell in the tub. (Tr. at 663). Upon rushing into the bathroom, Doan testified that he saw Star lying on her back, and that hot water from the tub's faucet was striking her face. Doan took her out of the tub and could see that she had burned her face. On the night in question, Doan told both fire fighters and police officers that Star must have climbed up and adjusted the faucet handles. 59 There are several problems with Doan's explanation of how Star incurred both her head injuries and her second-degree burn. First, a medical expert testified at trial that the burn on Star's face was not consistent with the splashing or splattering of water, and that there was a clear line of demarcation on her face between where there was and was not a burn. Nor was there an indication of recent scalding on any other part of her body. Second, the same expert testified that the skull fractures, which were consistent with the contusions on Star's head, would not have occurred from a fall in the tub. 60 In addition, we again see inconsistency in Doan's testimony regarding what he could and could not observe in the dimly lit apartment. Doan claimed that the bathroom was very dark so that he could not see if Star had any bruises, yet he later testified that, upon rushing into the darkened bathroom, he immediately noticed that Star had burned her face because it was bright red, like a sunburn. (Tr. at 664). 61 Finally, the State, in its closing argument, discussed another fundamental problem with Doan's story. Doan states that he heard two booms as Star allegedly fell in the bathtub. Apparently, Doan would have the jury believe that these two booms resulted in the two major contusions on Star's head. Yet, the pathologist who conducted Star's post-mortem examination noted that the two contusions were on opposite sides of the back of the child's head. Thus, Doan would have the jury believe that the child fell twice, in rapid succession, while attempting to climb up in the tub and adjust the faucet handles. The skull fractures, however, are inconsistent with falling in the tub, and the second-degree burn is inconsistent with being splashed by hot water. 62 Thus, in light of Doan's own taped confessions that were admitted into evidence describing in detail the violent acts that he committed against Star, the serious inconsistencies between Doan's testimony and the medical evidence, and the clear inconsistencies in Doan's testimony itself, we hold that the jury's consideration of a juror's out-of-court experiment testing the credibility of Doan was harmless error. The burden in this analysis is on the habeas petitioner, and he has failed to show that the juror misconduct had [a] substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict[.] Nevers, 169 F.3d at 371. Instead, the significant holes and inconsistencies in Doan's testimony show that the juror experiment regarding her ability to see lipstick on herarm in a darkened room would not substantially affect or influence the jury's view that Doan was not a credible witness, nor would it similarly affect or influence the jury's ultimate verdict. Thus, habeas relief cannot be granted.