Opinion ID: 514801
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: application of tanner

Text: 10 Under Tanner, Count I of the indictment in this case can survive only if it alleges that an object of the conspiracy was to defraud HUD, either directly or by causing EDCO to perpetrate the fraud. A close examination of Count I reveals that it alleges no such thing. The Government contends that the dismissal of Count I was error because the facts as alleged are sufficient to charge a Sec. 371 conspiracy. However, Count I of the indictment states quite specifically that Hope's conduct was aimed directly and exclusively at agencies and officials of Dade County. (Appendix A). The accusatory language in Count I closely tracks the language of the statute, but it does not allege any object of the conspiracy or overt act which is directed at the United States. Since under Tanner EDCO may not itself be treated as the United States, Count I fails to allege a conspiracy to defraud the United States directly. 11 It is a closer question whether Count I permits the Government to prove at trial that Hope conspired to manipulate EDCO in order that HUD and the United States be defrauded indirectly. The Court noted in Tanner that Sec. 371, covering conspiracies to defraud in any manner or for any purpose does not limit the method which may be used to defraud the United States: A method that makes uses of innocent individuals or businesses to reach and defraud the United States is not for that reason beyond the scope of Sec. 371. Tanner at 2752; see also United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303, 309, 96 S.Ct. 523, 528, 46 L.Ed.2d 514 (1976); United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 63 S.Ct. 379, 87 L.Ed. 443 (1943) (fact that a false claim passes through a third party on its way to the government does not preclude liability under the False Claims Act). 12 We agree, as a general matter, with the Government's contention that it need not have specified in a separate clause of the indictment that the conspiracy contemplated an indirect fraud on the United States in order for the Government to introduce evidence in support of that theory. 6 In this case, however, the indictment as framed fails to allege a conspiracy to defraud the United States either directly or indirectly. By explicitly naming county agencies as the sole and ultimate targets of the conspiracy in Count I, the Government precludes itself from claiming that it fully intended to present sufficient proof that HUD was either directly or indirectly defrauded by the defendant. (Brief for appellant at 10) 13 The former Fifth Circuit has held that if an indictment enumerates the particular facts alleged to constitute the element of a charged crime and the proof makes out the elements in a different manner, a fatal variance results. United States v. Guthartz, 573 F.2d 225, 228 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 864, 99 S.Ct. 187, 58 L.Ed.2d 173 (1987). 7 Under Tanner, the particular facts alleged in the indictment in this case even if taken as true, do not state a violation of Sec. 371. To allow the Government to introduce evidence to show that the defendants violated Sec. 371 by conspiring to defraud the United States would be to permit a fatal variance from the words of the indictment.