Opinion ID: 2508574
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Two-track Approach

Text: Some jurisdictions have rejected the bright-line rule in favor of a two-track approach that follows conventional accrual and tolling rules. See, e.g., Silvers v. Brodeur, 682 N.E.2d 811 (Ind.Ct.App.1997); Gebhardt v. O'Rourke, 444 Mich. 535, 510 N.W.2d 900 (1994); Seevers v. Potter, 248 Neb. 621, 537 N.W.2d 505 (1995); Gibson v. Trant, 58 S.W.3d 103 (Tenn.2001). These courts reason that this approach promotes the policies that underlie statutes of limitations, is consistent with the intent of legislatures, and protects the interests of criminal defendants. Under the two-track approach, a criminal defendant must file a malpractice claim within the period defined in the statute of limitations. See Gebhardt, 510 N.W.2d at 907. In jurisdictions following the discovery rule, the criminal defendant must file a malpractice claim within the specified period after the defendant learns or should have learned of the injury and its cause. See § 13-80-108(1); Gebhardt, 510 N.W.2d at 907. The criminal defendant then may seek a stay in the civil suit until the criminal matter is resolved. Gebhardt, 510 N.W.2d at 907. As in most situations in which related criminal and civil matters are simultaneously pending, courts have discretion as to whether the civil suit should proceed or whether it should yield to the criminal matter. Id. This approach therefore allows both the civil and criminal matters to proceed along separate tracks. Id. Courts adopting the two-track approach reason that it promotes the objectives of statutes of limitations. They explain that statutes of limitations aim to promote stability in the affairs of persons and to avoid the unfairness and burdens inherent in defending stale claims. Stevens v. Bispham, 316 Or. 221, 851 P.2d 556, 571 (1993) (Unis, J., specially concurring). These courts reason that by tying the statute of limitations period to the time at which the criminal defendant knew of the negligence rather than at exoneration, the two-track approach prevents criminal defendants from bringing malpractice actions decades after the negligence occurred. Silvers, 682 N.E.2d at 817; see also Stevens, 851 P.2d at 571-72 (Unis, J., specially concurring); Gibson, 58 S.W.3d at 117. In their view, this approach protects attorneys by guaranteeing that they receive formal, seasonable notice of malpractice claims. Silvers, 682 N.E.2d at 817; see also Gibson, 58 S.W.3d at 117. Additionally, these courts explain that the two-track approach ensures that malpractice claims are brought before they become stale. Stevens, 851 P.2d at 571-72; see also Coscia v. McKenna & Cuneo, 25 Cal.4th 1194, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 471, 25 P.3d 670, 680 (2001). Thus, courts adopting the two-track approach perceive it as furthering the purposes of statutes of limitations. Additionally, courts that have endorsed the two-track approach reason that it is consistent with the intent of the legislatures. According to these courts, legislatures have chosen to define the statute of limitations for a professional negligence claim as two years after the plaintiff learns of the injury and its cause. See Stevens, 851 P.2d at 573 (Unis, J., specially concurring); see also Duncan v. Campbell, 123 N.M. 181, 936 P.2d 863, 866 (N.M.Ct.App.1997). Because legislatures did not distinguish between malpractice claims arising out of civil and criminal cases when defining the statutes of limitations, courts adopting the two-track approach have concluded that legislatures intended for the same rule to apply to each. See Stevens, 851 P.2d at 573 (Unis, J., specially concurring); see also Seevers, 537 N.W.2d at 511. These courts therefore reason that the two-track approach is consistent with legislative intent because it mandates that statutes of limitations begin to run once a criminal defendant learns of the injury and resulting damage. Finally, courts that endorse the two-track approach differ with those that adopt the bright-line approach, contending that the two-track approach also serves the interests of both defendants and judicial economy. They believe that the approach safeguards the rights of criminal defendants because trial courts have discretion to stay the civil suit until the criminal matter is resolved. See, e.g., Gebhardt, 510 N.W.2d at 907. Similarly, these courts maintain that the two-track approach does not waste judicial resources because trial courts may choose to continue the civil proceedings if such course does not jeopardize the criminal defendants' rights. See id. Therefore, these courts reason that the two-track approach sufficiently protects both the interests of defendants and those of judicial economy.