Opinion ID: 2545670
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: aggravated first degree arson

Text: Payne argues the district judge erred in giving a jury instruction on what was denominated the lesser included offense of aggravated first degree arson. Payne contends that, under both the statutory and pleading theories which are applied to ascertain whether an offense properly is included as a lesser offense of that charged, aggravated first degree arson is not a lesser included offense of felony murder. The determination of whether a particular crime is an included offense of the crime charged involves a question of law over which the Court exercises free review. State v. Curtis, 130 Idaho 522, 523, 944 P.2d 119, 120 (1997). While we agree with Payne that aggravated first degree arson is not a lesser included offense of felony murder, we so conclude because aggravated first degree arson is not a separately charged crime. Rather, the aggravating factors set forth in the statute, Idaho Code § 18-805, if found by the jury, simply enhance the penalties which may be imposed for the crimes of first, second or third degree arson. Thus, aggravated first degree arson is merely an aggravated form of first degree arson which provides for enhanced punishment when a person dies or is permanently injured as a result of the first degree arson, much as aggravated assault, aggravated battery and aggravated driving while under the influence of alcohol are enhanced forms of the respective underlying offenses. See I.C. §§ 18-905, 18-907, 18-8006. Given our conclusion that aggravated first degree arson is not a lesser included offense of felony murder, we next examine whether the jury was, nevertheless, properly instructed. Whether the trial court properly instructed the jury presents a question of law over which this Court exercises free review. Upon review, this Court examines whether the instructions as a whole fairly and accurately reflect the applicable law. An erroneous instruction provides a basis for reversal if the instruction misled the jury or otherwise prejudiced the complaining party. State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 239, 985 P.2d 117, 119 (1999) (citations omitted). First degree arson requires that a person willfully and unlawfully damage by fire or explosion, any dwelling or structure in which persons are normally present. I.C. § 18-802. The jury was provided the following aggravated first degree arson instruction: In order for you to find the Defendant guilty of the crime of Aggravated Arson in the First Degree as an included offense to Count I of the Information, the State of Idaho must prove to each of you each of the following essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 1. That on or about April 11, 1998, 2. in the State of Idaho, 3. the Defendant John L. Payne, 4. willfully and unlawfully damaged by fire or explosion, 5. a) a dwelling, to wit: the Greystone Hotel, or b) a structure in which persons are normally present, to wit: the Greystone Hotel, and 6. regardless of intent or lack of intent to cause such harm, said fire resulted directly or indirectly in the death of a person, to wit: Herman Barela. The instruction thus required the jury to find all elements of first degree arson as well as the aggravating factor that the arson resulted, indirectly or directly, in the death of a person. See I.C. §§ 18-802, 18-805. It unquestionably would have been preferable to instruct the jury separately on the crime of first degree arson, followed by an instruction asking the jury to determine, if first degree arson has been proved, whether any of the statutory circumstances exist which would constitute aggravation for the purposes of sentencing. See Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions 1308 and 1311. We cannot say, however, that the jury was improperly instructed under these circumstances. The fact that the crime was referred to as an included offense is of no consequence since that would not affect the jury's examination of each of the elements required to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, the instruction read in its entirety required the jury to find Payne guilty of each element of first degree arson, together with the factor which resulted in aggravating the charge. Absent some showing the jury didn't find each of those elements as instructed, we cannot say the jury was misled or reached an erroneous result. Payne also argues the instruction is confusing in that the first degree arson portion of the instruction requires a person willfully and unlawfully caused damage by fire, but the aggravated enhancement portion of the instruction, paragraph 6, contradicts that intent requirement by allowing the jury to find that Payne caused such harm regardless of intent. Payne reads such harm in paragraph 6 to refer to the fire damage and not to the death of a person. This interpretation would require us to ignore other provisions of the instruction and would mean the jury totally disregarded what they were told to find as an element in paragraph 4. Absent some showing to the contrary, we must assume the jury read, understood and followed the instructions given. We decline to place such a strained interpretation on the instruction and agree with the district judge that the instruction required the jury to find that Payne willfully damaged the Hotel by fire, and that fire resulted in the death of a person, regardless of Payne's intent to do so. The jury was thus not misled by paragraph 6 and we hold that the jury was properly instructed. While we affirm the district judge's ruling on the jury instructions, our characterization of the offense charged as first degree arson with a sentence enhancement requires that we set aside one of the offenses of aggravated first degree arson. The record is clear that Payne committed only one act of first degree arson. Although Payne's act of arson was enhanced to aggravated arson by virtue of the deaths of two persons, it does not follow that Payne may be convicted for two acts of arson when there was only one fire. We therefore affirm a single judgment of conviction against Payne for aggravated first degree arson and vacate the second.