Opinion ID: 4555484
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fees incurred on appeal

Text: “The routine allocation of appellate costs” under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 39 is distinct from the recovery of attorneys’ fees. Sciambra v. Graham News, 892 F.2d 411, 414 (5th Cir. 1990). Our judgment from the first appeal ordering each party to bear its own costs has no relevance to the issue of attorneys’ fees incurred during that appeal. The City argues that because Rule 54(d)(2) requires a movant to “state the amount sought or provide a fair estimate of it,” Zimmerman could have met the 14-day deadline by filing a prospective request for appellate fees in the district court, accompanied by some estimate of what his fees would be on appeal. As Zimmerman discusses, though, the applicable Western District of Texas Local Rule precludes this option; it requires fee requests to “include a supporting document organized chronologically by activity or project, listing attorney name, date, and hours expended on the particular activity or project, as well as an affidavit certifying (1) that the hours expended were actually expended on the topics stated, and (2) that the hours expended and rate claimed were reasonable.” W.D. TEX. Civ. R. 7(j). Zimmerman could not have complied with this requirement by filing a prospective request with mere estimates of future fees. Caselaw in this court is the relevant authority for analyzing how parties may seek attorneys’ fees incurred on appeal. We have held that this issue may properly be raised before us, even if only “raised on appeal and not considered below.” Marston v. Red River Levee & Drainage Dist., 632 F.2d 9 Case: 19-50857 Document: 00515526351 Page: 10 Date Filed: 08/13/2020 No. 19-50857 466, 467 (5th Cir. 1980). The rules of this court anticipate that such requests will be made and outline the documentation required to support such a request. 5TH CIR. R. 47.8. Although we have the authority to award such fees, “[o]ur preferred procedure is to remand for the determination of the amount of such an award.” Marston, 632 F.2d at 468. We have employed this preferred procedure quite recently. See Hill v. Washburne, 953 F.3d 296, 310–11 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Instone Travel Tech Marine & Offshore v. Int’l Shipping Partners, Inc., 334 F.3d 423, 433 (5th Cir. 2003)). We have also recognized that “[t]he issue of appellate attorney’s fees is a matter for the district court following the resolution of an appeal.” Instone, 334 F.3d at 433. In conclusion, the district court did not err when it denied Zimmerman’s request for fees incurred on appeal. Zimmerman made no request within the 14-day time period after the district court entered its initial judgment. There also was no new judgment entered following a reversal or remand from this court because this court affirmed the district court’s initial judgment in full. In the initial appeal, Zimmerman could have filed a petition or motion in this court requesting such fees, accompanied by supporting documentation pursuant to Local Rule 47.8, but he did not. We indicate no opinion as to merit or timeliness should Zimmerman later file in this court a request for fees incurred during his first or the present appeal. AFFIRMED. 10