Opinion ID: 78113
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Waiver of Counsel by the Uncooperative Defendant

Text: Although the Sixth Amendment guarantees counsel, it does not grant defendants the unqualified right to counsel of their choice. An indigent criminal defendant does not have a right to have a particular lawyer represent him, nor to demand a different appointed lawyer except for good cause. Thomas v. Wainwright, 767 F.2d 738, 742 (11th Cir.1985). Good cause in this context means a fundamental problem, such as a conflict of interest, a complete breakdown in communication or an irreconcilable conflict which leads to an apparently unjust verdict. United States v. Young, 482 F.2d 993, 995 (5th Cir.1973). [3] In practical terms, then, defendants who lack the means to hire a private attorney must either accept the counsel appointed to represent them or represent themselves. Nevertheless, it is not uncommon for defendants to demand what they cannot have: substitute counsel. When confronted with defendants who, by their words and conduct, reject both appointed counsel and self-representation, several of our fellow circuits have concluded that a litigant may waive his right to court-appointed counsel not only by expressly invoking the right to self-representation, but also by engaging in conduct that evinces a knowing desire to reject the counsel to which he is entitled. See King v. Bobby, 433 F.3d 483, 492 (6th Cir.2006); United States v. Massey, 419 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Oreye, 263 F.3d 669, 670-71 (7th Cir.2001); McKee v. Harris, 649 F.2d 927, 931 (2d Cir.1981). But see Fischetti v. Johnson, 384 F.3d 140, 146 (3d Cir.2004) (suggesting only dilatory behavior or other misconduct might justify waiver by conduct). These courts hold that a defendant who rejects appointed counsel but refuses to cooperate with the court by affirmatively expressing his desire to proceed pro se, effectively chooses self-representation by rejecting the only other choice to which he is constitutionally entitled. The reasoning behind this approach is simple: The question of waiver is one of inference from the facts. As a matter both of logic and of common sense ... if a person is offered a choice between three things and says no to the first and the second, he's chosen the third even if he stands mute when asked whether the third is indeed his choice. Oreye, 263 F.3d at 670-71. In the past, we have treated the express, affirmative request for self-representation discussed in Faretta as the exclusive means by which a defendant may waive the right to counsel. [4] Recognizing any waiver of counsel will result in self-representation and anxious to prevent unintentional waiver of the protections afforded by the right to counsel, we have suggested anything less than a clear and unequivocal written or oral invocation of the right to self-representation is insufficient to invoke the right to self-representation, regardless of context. See, e.g., Marshall v. Dugger, 925 F.2d 374, 377 (11th Cir.1991) (It is necessary ... that the defendant clearly and affirmatively express a desire to represent himself in the proceedings.); Stano, 921 F.2d at 1143 ([T]he right to self-representation must be manifested to the trial court by an oral or written request in order to be recognized and to trigger the requisite examination by the court.). A prime example is our decision in Marshall. In that case, a criminal defendant asked to fire his lawyer on the eve of trial, contending his counsel, Thomas Osteen, was ineffective. Marshall, 925 F.2d at 375. Finding no good cause to discharge counsel, the [trial] court explained to Marshall that he had three choices: (1) Mr. Osteen could continue to represent him; (2) he could proceed pro se; or (3) he could represent himself with the aid of Mr. Osteen as standby counsel.     Rather than choose any of the options offered, Marshall simply insisted that he did not feel that Osteen was qualified to represent him. At no point in the colloquy did Marshall ever state that he wished to represent himself. He simply repeated his opinion that Osteen was unqualified. Id. at 376. Interpreting Marshall's rejection of his lawyer as a decision to proceed pro se, the district court discharged counsel. At trial, Marshall represented himself and was convicted. On appeal, a panel of this Court reversed, concluding Marshall's actions were insufficient to invoke the [S]ixth [A]mendment right of self-representation because Marshall had made no written or oral request to represent himself. Id. at 377. Marshall demonstrates the problem with recognizing affirmative waiver as the only valid means of waiver: it forces judges to ignore words, actions, and circumstances relevant to the Sixth Amendment inquiry. Marshall did not ask to proceed pro se. But he also did not remain neutral on the question of representation. To the contrary, Marshall made repeated, unequivocal statements rejecting his lawyer even though he knew the court would not appoint another lawyer to represent him. Insofar as Marshall failed to recognize waiver may occur outside the context discussed in Faretta, we conclude it was wrongly decided. Today we recognize it is possible for a valid waiver of counsel to occur not only when a cooperative defendant affirmatively invokes his right to self-representation, but also when an uncooperative defendant rejects the only counsel to which he is constitutionally entitled, understanding his only alternative is self-representation with its many attendant dangers. [5] Without diminishing in any way our concern that district courts protect defendants from unwittingly waiving fundamental Constitutional rights, we conclude our prior precedents fail to recognize a defendant may intentionally and voluntarily waive his right to counsel and accept the consequent necessity of self-representation in more than one way. As the Second Circuit has aptly noted: [T]he very essence of a voluntary waiver is that it be the product of a free and meaningful choice. This does not mean, however, that a court may not, under certain circumstances, require the defendant to select from a limited set of options a course of conduct regarding his representation. A criminal defendant may be asked, in the interest of orderly procedures, to choose between waiver and another course of action as long as the choice presented to him is not constitutionally offensive. McKee, 649 F.2d at 931 (citations and quotations omitted). When a defendant rejects his court-appointed counsel or otherwise engages in behavior that creates tension between his right to counsel and his right to self-representation, a district court does not compromise the defendant's free choice by presenting him with accurate information regarding his lawful choices and asking him to choose between them. And, when an indigent defendant rejects competent, conflict-free counsel, he may waive his right to counsel by his uncooperative conduct, so long as his decision is made with knowledge of his options and the consequences of his choice. [6] In recognizing that a defendant may waive counsel by his uncooperative conduct as well as by his express request, we do not suggest that district courts are bound to interpret the uncooperative behavior of every defendant as a waiver of the right to counsel. Nor do we suggest a district court would err by requiring any particular defendant to make a clear statement of his intention to proceed pro se before agreeing to dismiss appointed counsel. In any given case, the proper course of action will turn on factors the district court is best positioned to assess. What we recognize today is that, in some instances, a defendant's conduct will reveal a voluntary decision to choose the path of self-representation over the continued assistance of counsel. In such cases, the district court may, in its discretion, conclude the defendant has voluntarily waived his right to counsel. In order for a defendant to validly waive his right to counsel, his choice must be knowing, as well as voluntary. Waiver of the right to counsel, as of constitutional rights in the criminal process generally, must be a `knowing, intelligent ac[t] done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances.' Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 81, 124 S.Ct. 1379, 1383, 158 L.Ed.2d 209 (2004) (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1469, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970)). Whether a defendant has waived his rights knowingly depends upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused. Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464, 58 S.Ct. at 1023. Put another way: To be valid such waiver must be made with an apprehension of the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses included within them, the range of allowable punishments thereunder, possible defenses to the charges and circumstances in mitigation thereof, and all other facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole matter. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 724, 68 S.Ct. 316, 323, 92 L.Ed. 309 (1948). This Court has held the ideal method of assuring that a defendant understands the consequences of a waiver is for the trial court to conduct a pretrial hearing at which the district court should inform the defendant of the nature of the charges against him, possible punishments, basic trial procedure and the hazards of representing himself. United States v. Kimball, 291 F.3d 726, 730 (11th Cir.2002) (quotations omitted). We have emphasized the trial judge's duty to engage the defendant in a colloquy to elicit information regarding the defendant's background, understanding of the charges against him, and knowledge of courtroom rules and procedures, and we have warned that [t]he closer to trial an accused's waiver of the right to counsel is, `the more rigorous, searching and formal the questioning of the trial judge should be.' [7] United States v. Cash, 47 F.3d 1083, 1088 (11th Cir.1995) (quoting Strozier v. Newsome, 926 F.2d 1100, 1105 (11th Cir.1991)); see also Stano, 921 F.2d at 1148. We continue to stress that when a right as fundamental as the right to counsel is at stake, it is important for trial courts to do all in their power to ensure every defendant, from the most cooperative to the most obstreperous, is informed of the risks of proceeding pro se and is prevented from waiving counsel without sufficient knowledge of the protections he is surrendering. Before a court concludes a defendant has knowingly waived his right to counsel, the defendant should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2541 (quotations omitted). To that end, the best practice is for district courts to begin by attempting to engage the defendant in a full discussion of the dangers of self-representation whenever a defendant expresses a desire to waive his right to counsel, whether affirmatively or by his conduct. [8] Nevertheless, an unwilling defendant can foil a district court's best efforts to engage in dialogue, thereby preventing the court from eliciting clear information regarding the defendant's understanding of the dangers of proceeding pro se. A dialogue cannot be forced; therefore, when confronted with a defendant who has voluntarily waived counsel by his conduct and who refuses to provide clear answers to questions regarding his Sixth Amendment rights, it is enough for the court to inform the defendant unambiguously of the penalties he faces if convicted and to provide him with a general sense of the challenges he is likely to confront as a pro se litigant. So long as the trial court is assured the defendant (1) understands the choices before him, (2) knows the potential dangers of proceeding pro se, and (3) has rejected the lawyer to whom he is constitutionally entitled, the court may, in the exercise of its discretion, discharge counsel or (preferably, as occurred here) provide for counsel to remain in a standby capacity. [9] In such cases, a Faretta -like monologue will suffice.