Opinion ID: 4166897
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Orders

Text: The provisions of the Labor Code are not to be construed in isolation, but in harmony with a second set of rules governing employment. The Legislature established the Industrial Welfare Commission (IWC) a century ago to regulate and protect the working conditions of women and minors. (Martinez v. Combs (2010) 49 Cal.4th 35, 54–55.) The IWC carried out that mission by adopting a series of wage orders, quasi-legislative enactments ―establishing minimum wages, 6 maximum work hours, and conditions of labor.‖ (Kilby v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc. (2016) 63 Cal.4th 1, 10; accord, Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1026.) As a result, ―wage and hour claims are today governed by two complementary and occasionally overlapping sources of authority: the provisions of the Labor Code, enacted by the Legislature, and a series of 18 wage orders, adopted by the IWC.‖ (Brinker Restaurant Corp., at p. 1026.) Our role in interpreting the IWC wage orders and reconciling them with the Labor Code is settled: ―The IWC‘s wage orders are to be accorded the same dignity as statutes. They are ‗presumptively valid‘ legislative regulations of the employment relationship [citation], regulations that must be given ‗independent effect‘ separate and apart from any statutory enactments [citation]. To the extent a wage order and a statute overlap, we will seek to harmonize them, as we would with any two statutes.‖ (Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1027.) In 1919, the IWC first guaranteed a weekly day of rest for workers in the mercantile industry: ―No person, firm or corporation shall employ, or suffer or permit any woman or minor to work in any mercantile establishment more than eight (8) hours in any one day, or more than forty-eight (48) hours in any one week, or more than six (6) days in any one week.‖ (IWC wage order No. 5 Amended, subd. 8 (June 21, 1919); see IWC wage order No. 5, subd. 12 (July 31, 1920) [same]; IWC wage order No. 5A, subd. 13 (Apr. 8, 1923) [same].) In 1943, the IWC added to this requirement a presumption that Sunday would be the weekly day of rest absent other arrangements: ―Every woman and minor shall have one day‘s rest in seven. Sunday shall be considered the established day of rest for all women and minors unless a different arrangement is made by the 7 employer for the purpose of providing another day of the week as the day of rest.‖ (IWC wage order No. 7NS, subd. 3(c) (June 21, 1943).) These early wage orders, adopted by the agency entrusted by the Legislature to regulate wage and hour matters, at a time far closer than our own to the enactment of the Legislature‘s day of rest law, are telling in two respects. First, the IWC‘s orders, applicable to what was perceived by the Legislature as a more vulnerable portion of the work population, guaranteed only a weekly day of rest rather than at least one day of rest every seven on a rolling basis. We can safely infer the IWC did not intend less day of rest protection for women and children than for the general employee population, and thus that the statutory day of rest protection was understood by the IWC to ensure a weekly day of rest, not a ―rolling seven‖ guarantee. Second, the IWC‘s 1943 mercantile industry order uses language materially indistinguishable from the statutory guarantee, and interprets that language as ensuring a weekly, rather than rolling, day of rest. (Compare IWC wage order No. 7NS, subd. 3(c) (June 21, 1943) [―one day‘s rest in seven‖] with § 551 [―one day‘s rest therefrom in seven‖].) In time, the Legislature acknowledged various circumstances where emergencies or the nature of the work might necessitate women working beyond the normal daily and weekly hour limits, and provided for overtime pay. (See Stats. 1953, ch. 1254, § 1, p. 2813.) The IWC followed suit, allowing women to work ―in excess of six (6) days in one week‖ in circumstances where the Labor Code permitted it, so long as they received overtime pay for all work done on the seventh day. (IWC wage order No. 1–52, subd. 3(a)(1) (Aug. 1, 1952).) Consistent with previous wage orders, each subsequent iteration of the mercantile industry wage order continued to make clear that the day of rest guarantee applied on a weekly, rather than rolling, basis. (See IWC wage order No. 7–57, subd. 3(a) (Nov. 15, 1957) [general prohibition against working ―more than six (6) days in 8 any one week‖]; IWC wage order No. 7–63, subd. 3(a) (Aug. 30, 1963) [same]; IWC wage order No. 7–68, subd. 3(a) (Feb. 1, 1968) [same].) In 1976, after the Legislature expanded the IWC‘s jurisdiction to include adult men (see California Hotel & Motel Assn. v. Industrial Welfare Com. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 200, 207), the IWC revised the presumption against working more than six days in a week (IWC wage order No. 7–76, subd. 3(A) (Oct. 18, 1976)), while making clear through the addition of an explicit definition that regulation of days of work was on a weekly, rather than rolling, basis. The wage order defined a ― ‗[w]orkweek‘ ‖ as ―any seven (7) consecutive days, starting with the same calendar day each week. ‗Workweek‘ is a fixed and regularly recurring period of 168 hours, seven (7) consecutive 24-hour periods.‖ (Id., subd. 2(N).) The corresponding days of work regulation incorporated this term, henceforth allowing adults to work ―more than six (6) days in any one workweek‖ so long as specified levels of overtime were paid. (Id., subd. 3(A).) Essentially the same rule is still in effect, with overtime premiums for failing to afford a day off calculated on a workweek-by-workweek basis. (IWC wage order No. 7–2001 (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11070, subds. 2(Q), 3(A); hereafter IWC Wage Order No. 7–2001); see IWC, Statement as to the Basis re: IWC 2001 wage orders (Jan. 1, 2001) p. 8.) We must harmonize the foregoing history and wage orders with the statutory guarantees. (Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1027.) Interpreting sections 551 and 552 as applying on a weekly rather than rolling basis does so. It subjects employees and employers to a single set of consistent day of rest requirements, thereby facilitating the scheduling of work. Reading the day of rest statutes this way, the IWC‘s wage orders provide comparable protection but in clearer language, rather than altering or more narrowly guaranteeing employee day of rest protection. Nor does this reading render the wage order and Labor Code requirements redundant, as the sanctions 9 for seventh-day work under each scheme are complementary but different. (Compare §§ 553 [misdemeanor], 558 [civil penalties] with IWC wage order No. 7–2001, subd. 3(A) [premium pay].)