Opinion ID: 2531181
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Due Process Requirements

Text: ¶ 23 The guarantee of due process normally compels the government to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard before a person is deprived of property. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 47, 114 S.Ct. 492, 126 L.Ed.2d 490 (1993). This general rule, however, is subject to some exceptions. Id. at 53, 114 S.Ct. 492. For example, a predetention hearing is not required if the property is mobile and could be removed to another jurisdiction, destroyed or concealed if advanced warning of confiscation were given. Id. at 52-53, 114 S.Ct. 492. ¶ 24 In the present case, the claimants do not argue that due process required a predetention hearing. Rather, they argue that they are entitled to a meaningful hearing at a meaningful time after the seizure has occurred. They contend that waiting for the outcome of the forfeiture proceeding, which could take months, does not satisfy this standard in the absence of a prompt probable cause hearing after the seizure. ¶ 25 We believe that claimants' due process argument is unpersuasive when compared with United States Supreme Court precedent and must therefore be rejected. In United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred & Fifty Dollars ($8,850) in United States Currency, 461 U.S. 555, 103 S.Ct. 2005, 76 L.Ed.2d 143 (1983), Customs Service officials seized $8,850 from the claimant when she failed to declare the currency upon entry into this country. The federal statutory and regulatory scheme in effect at the time $8,850 was decided was not much different in key respects from our current Illinois forfeiture statute. In $8,850, Customs was required by federal regulation to notify any person who appeared to have an interest in the seized property of the property's liability to forfeiture and of the claimant's right to petition the Secretary of the Treasury for remission or mitigation of forfeiture. 19 C.F.R. § 162.31(a) (1982). Another federal provision also gave the Secretary discretion to remit any forfeiture or penalty    in whole or in part upon such terms and conditions as he deems reasonable and just. 31 U.S.C. § 1104. The regulations required the claimant to file a remission petition within 60 days of notification. 19 C.F.R. § 171.12(b) (1982). If the claimant did not file a petition, or if the decision on the petition made legal proceedings appear unnecessary, Customs was required to prepare a full report of the seizure for the United States Attorney. 19 U.S.C. § 1603 (1982). At the time of the seizure in $8,850, the federal scheme did not contain a time limit or a requirement of a prompt report by Customs to the United States Attorney for purposes of instituting forfeiture proceedings. $ 8,850, 461 U.S. at 558 n. 3, 103 S.Ct. 2005. Upon receipt of the report, however, the United States Attorney was required `immediately to inquire into the facts' and if it appears probable that a forfeiture has been incurred, `forthwith to cause the proper proceedings to be commenced and prosecuted, without delay.' $ 8,850, 461 U.S. at 558, 103 S.Ct. 2005 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1604). There was, however, no strict time limit within which the forfeiture proceeding had to be concluded. Finally, the statute provided that once a case is reported to the United States Attorney for legal proceedings, no administrative action may be taken on any petition for remission or mitigation. 19 C.F.R. § 171.2(a) (1982). ¶ 26 In $8,850, claimant's currency was seized on September 10, 1975, and eight days later the Customs Service formally notified her by mail that the seized property was subject to forfeiture and that she had a right to petition for remission or mitigation. A week later, the claimant filed a petition for remission or mitigation, stating that the violation was unintentional because she had believed that she was only required to declare funds that had been obtained in another country and that she had brought the seized funds with her from the United States at the start of her trip. Thereafter, the Customs officer assigned to the case delayed filing the report of the seizure with the United States Attorney for seven months while the officer investigated the case. Claimant was eventually indicted on charges of making false statements to a Customs officer and of transporting currency into the United States without filing the required report. Disposition of the remission petition was then held pending the resolution of the criminal trial. Finally, in March 1977, some 18 months after the currency was seized, the United States Attorney filed a civil complaint seeking forfeiture of the currency. Claimant raised an affirmative defense to the suit, asserting that the government's `dilatory processing' of her petition for remission or mitigation and `dilatory' commencement of the civil forfeiture action violated her due process right to a hearing at a meaningful time. $ 8,850, 461 U.S. at 560-61, 103 S.Ct. 2005. ¶ 27 The Supreme Court in $8,850 framed the question before it as when does a postseizure delay become so prolonged that the dispossessed property owner has been deprived of a meaningful hearing at a meaningful time. $ 8,850, 461 U.S. at 562-63, 103 S.Ct. 2005. The Court then found that the question of when the government's delay in commencing the forfeiture suit violates the due process right to a hearing is analogous to the issue of when the government's delay violates the right to a speedy trial. Id. at 564, 103 S.Ct. 2005. Using that analogy, the Court then adopted the test it developed in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), to resolve speedy-trial issues. $ 8,850, 461 U.S. at 564, 103 S.Ct. 2005. The Barker test calls for the weighing of four factors: length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant. $ 8,850, 461 U.S. at 564, 103 S.Ct. 2005 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182). After applying the Barker test, the Court concluded that the 18-month delay in initiating the forfeiture suit did not violate claimant's due process right to a meaningful hearing at a meaningful time, and that the delay in filing the suit was reasonable. Id. at 563-69, 92 S.Ct. 2182. ¶ 28 In the present case, claimants acknowledge that the Supreme Court in $8,850 did indeed frame the issue as when a postseizure delay may become so prolonged that the dispossessed property owner has been deprived of a meaningful hearing at a meaningful time. They argue, however, that $8,850 does not apply to this case because $8,850 involved the seizure of cash and not the seizure of an automobile, upon which one's livelihood might depend. Moreover, we add that one might also argue that $8,850 involved the time limits within which the forfeiture action itself must be initiated, and not the timing of an interim postseizure hearing. We find, however, that such limited readings of $8,850 might be supportable if the United States Supreme Court itself had not read the case more expansively less than three years later in United States v. Von Neumann, 474 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 610, 88 L.Ed.2d 587 (1986). See Krimstock v. Safir, No. 99 Civ. 12041 MBM, 2000 WL 1702035, at  (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2000), vacated, 306 F.3d 40. ¶ 29 In Von Neumann, the claimant argued that the government's delay in responding to his remission petition filed to challenge the seizure of his car by United States Customs agents deprived him of his property without due process of law. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit emphasized the importance of the automobile in our society before holding that Customs' 36-day delay violated claimant's due process rights. The Ninth Circuit further held that Customs was constitutionally required to act promptly `on a petition for remission or mitigation within 24 hours of receipt,'    [and] claimant ha[d] a right to a personal appearance to present his or her claim. See Von Neumann, 474 U.S. at 247, 106 S.Ct. 610 (citing Von Neumann v. United States, 660 F.2d 1319, 1326-27 (9th Cir.1981)). But the United States Supreme Court reversed. In doing so, the high Court found that the claimant did not have a constitutional right to a prompt disposition of his remission petition while awaiting the forfeiture proceeding. Von Neumann, 474 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 610. The Court found that this was because [i]mplicit in this Court's discussion of timeliness in $8,850 was the view that the forfeiture proceeding, without more, provides the postseizure hearing required by due process to protect [claimant's] property interest in the car. (Emphasis added.) Von Neumann, 474 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 610. Later in the opinion, the Court again underscored this precept by stating, [W]e have already noted that [claimant's] right to a forfeiture proceeding meeting the Barker test satisfies any due process right with respect to the car   . Von Neumann, 474 U.S. at 251, 106 S.Ct. 610. ¶ 30 From the foregoing discussion of $8,850 and Von Neumann, we conclude that if the due process right to a meaningful postseizure hearing at a meaningful time requires only the forfeiture proceeding, it does not also require a probable cause hearing. Accordingly, we find that the trial court's determination to the contrary was erroneous.