Opinion ID: 3013505
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Stay-and-Abey Possibility

Text: The Commonwealth argues, citing Merritt v. Blaine, 326 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2003), that Slutzker could have amended his federal petition to assert the Brady claim, and then “requested that the current Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be stayed until the completion of state review of his claim.” We do not find this argument compelling. Slutzker certainly could have requested such a stay, but in the fall of 2001 there was significant doubt that he would have received one, or that if he did it would be upheld on appeal. Merritt itself was decided some nineteen months after 9 Of course, the statute of limitations starts running from “the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence,” § 2244(d)(1)(D) (emphasis added), not the date on which the factual predicate actually was discovered. See Schlueter v. Varner, 384 F.3d 69, 74 (3d Cir. 2004). On the record before us, we cannot be sure whether Slutzker “could have” discovered the Brady materials prior to September 11, 2001. But we note that, in general, Slutzker has been a paragon of due diligence, and the Commonwealth has not disputed that the Brady claim is timely. 13 Slutzker received the police reports, and did not squarely hold that such a “stay and abey” procedure was appropriate. Instead, it merely noted in a footnote that when petitioners have filed habeas actions in federal courts before they have fully exhausted their state remedies, many federal courts have suggested that the federal actions should be stayed to give the petitioners an opportunity to file their state action because an outright dismissal, even without prejudice, could jeopardize the timeliness of a collateral attack. 326 F.3d at 170 n.10. Not until Crews v. Horn, 360 F.3d 146, 15152 (3d Cir. 2004), did we specifically hold that “[s]taying a habeas petition pending exhaustion of state remedies is a permissible and effective way to avoid barring from federal court a petitioner who timely files a mixed petition.” In Crews, we relied on Justice Stevens’s concurrence in Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. at 182-83, which stated that “in our post-AEDPA world there is no reason why a district court should not retain jurisdiction over a meritorious claim and stay further proceedings pending the complete exhaustion of state remedies.” Walker was decided in June 2001; four Justices agreed that mixed habeas petitions should be stayed rather than dismissed, while the other five did not discuss the issue. Most of the Courts of Appeals have held, before and after Duncan, that District Courts could stay mixed petitions when dismissal might render them untimely. See, e.g., Neverson v. Bissonnette, 261 F.3d 120, 126 n.3 (1st Cir. 2001); Zarvela v. Artuz, 254 F.3d 374, 380-82 (2d Cir. 2001); Mackall v. Angelone, 131 F.3d 442, 445 (4th Cir. 1997); Brewer v. Johnson, 139 F.3d 491, 493 (5th Cir. 1998); Palmer v. Carlton, 276 F.3d 777, 781 (6th Cir. 2002); Freeman v. Page, 208 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 2000); Calderon v. United States Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Calif., 134 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 1998). Many of these cases from other Circuits were decided before Slutzker received his Brady materials, so a conscientious attorney in Slutzker’s position might have considered the “stay-and-abey” procedure as a possibility. (Slutzker was, of course, proceeding pro se at the time.) But before Crews, or at least Merritt, there was no Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent approving this 14 procedure.10 Moreover, one Court of Appeals, the Eighth Circuit, had held that a District Court lacked the power to stay habeas cases pending state-court resolution of unexhausted claims. Carmichael v. White, 163 F.3d 1044 (8th Cir. 1998).11 Even a prompt request for a stay would thus have carried the risk that the stay might be overturned on appeal, if we had chosen to follow the reasoning of Carmichael. If a stay were granted and then overturned, Slutzker’s claims would be dismissed under Rose v. Lundy as not fully exhausted, his limitations period would run, and all of his nonBrady habeas claims would become untimely.