Opinion ID: 77432
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jury Instruction Regarding Producing

Text: 60 Smith argues that the district court erred by not providing a jury instruction defining producing as used in 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a). Producing is statutorily defined, somewhat circularly, as producing, directing, manufacturing, issuing, publishing, or advertising. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(3). It is well settled that a court need not define terms that are not unduly technical or ambiguous or that are within the common understanding of the jury. United States v. Pepe, 747 F.2d 632, 674 n. 78 (11th Cir.1984). We do not believe that producing is so unduly technical or ambiguous as plainly to require a specific instruction. Smith contends, however, that because producing necessarily requires an individual to be in the business of making child pornography, a definition was plainly in order. Nowhere in the statutory definition or the common understanding of the word producing 20 do we discern a requirement of a monetary profit motive. Thus, even if producing, as used in the statute, did require the accused to be in the pornography business—a proposition about which we are quite skeptical— it is not obviously so. Accordingly, the district court did not plainly err by not defining producing for the jury. 21 61