Opinion ID: 460222
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Facial Validity of the Ordinances.

Text: 14 The district court upheld the facial validity of the two ordinances on the ground that regulation of activity which has demonstrated a capacity to induce breaches of the peace is a traditional and legitimate exercise of a municipality's police power. Grand Faloon Tavern, Inc. v. Wicker, 670 F.2d 943 (11th Cir.1982). The court was satisfied that the City Council had a factual basis upon which to regulate nudity and semi-nudity in establishments where food, drink or alcoholic beverages are served. Evidence of the City's factual basis before the court was limited to the assertions in the ordinances themselves that competitive commercial exploitation of nudity is adverse to the public health, peace, morals and good order, and ... it is in the best interest of the public health, safety and convenience to restrict such nudity ... as hereinafter set forth, Sec. 16-110; that the presence of live nude or semi-nude entertainment at commercial establishments generates violent and unruly behavior and moral degradation among the patrons of such commercial establishments ... [which] poses a threat to the safety and well-being of those in attendance, as well as those in the surrounding community, Sec. 16-112; and that nuisances, criminal and otherwise disruptive activity [sic] take place when patrons depart from such commercial establishments ... placing an enormous and disproportionate burden on the law enforcement officials of the City.... Sec. 16-112. 15 Considering the two ordinances separately, we affirm the district court's order as to Sec. 16-110, which prohibits nudity or semi-nudity when serving food and drink and when coming into close proximity to customers in an area where food and drink is served. We emphasize that this holding turns on our finding that this ordinance does not on its face govern activity protected by the First Amendment. The ordinance does not, as appellants seem to assume, prohibit protected expression such as nude dancing. Section 16-110 expressly excludes from its ambit all such protected expression. As passage of the ordinance was an ordinary exercise of governmental police power that did not implicate First Amendment values, its necessity is sufficiently established by the findings of the City Council contained in the language of the ordinance. 16 Such limited evidence of the need for the ordinance normally would not be sufficient to satisfy the stricter standard typically used to review an infringement on a protected liberty interest justified solely under the government's police power. Krueger v. City of Pensacola, 759 F.2d 851 (1985). It is under this stricter standard that Sec. 16-112 must be struck down. 2 17 This ordinance, which prohibits nude or semi-nude entertainment in any commercial establishment, clearly includes within its coverage nude dancing. Because some forms of nude dancing fall under the protection of the First Amendment, California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 116, 93 S.Ct. 390, 396, 34 L.Ed.2d 342 (1972); Krueger, supra, 759 F.2d at 854 and n. 4, appellees must come forth with more than simply an articulation of some legitimate interest that the city could have had to justify its prohibition. Where a fundamental interest such as freedom of expression is regulated, the City must also show that the legitimate concern it articulates has more than merely speculative factual grounds, and that it was actually a motivating factor in the passage of the legislation. Krueger, supra, 759 F.2d at 855. 18 In this case, the City made no showing as to the factual basis for its articulated concerns and the motivation for passage of Sec. 16-112 beyond the conclusions stated in the ordinance itself. While the district court was satisfied with this minimal showing, we hold that Krueger requires more than a conclusory assertion of the factual basis and motivation underlying an ordinance that treads upon First Amendment rights. Because the court in Krueger had before it independent evidence that the City's alleged concerns were not factually justified and did not actually motivate passage of the municipal ordinance at issue (prohibiting nude dancing at establishments serving alcohol), it did not reach the question whether statements in the purpose and findings sections of an ordinance might constitute sufficient evidence of factual basis and motivation upon which to uphold an ordinance in the face of a First Amendment challenge. Nonetheless, the showing required by Krueger would serve little purpose if it could be made by simply pointing to an assertion of concern and motivation unsupported by any factual record. Such a minimal showing is an insufficient safeguard for fundamental constitutional values. The statement of factual basis and motivation contained in Sec. 16-112 does not justify its infringement on protected expression. 3 19 Furthermore, the ordinance's statement of findings refers to the moral degradation generated by nude and semi-nude entertainment, thereby indicating that impermissible motives entered into the City Council's decision to prohibit such entertainment. Where a legislative body acts with impermissible as well as permissible motives, it must show by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the decision to pass the legislation even without the impermissible motive. Krueger, supra, at 856 n. 6. The City here has made no such showing. Because the City has failed to carry its burden of justifying the infringement of protected expression, we hold that Sec. 16-112 is overbroad and unconstitutional. 20 Therefore, as to the issues of the standing of the individual plaintiffs and the facial validity of Sec. 16-112, we REVERSE. As to the constitutionality of Sec. 16-110, we AFFIRM. 21 AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part.