Opinion ID: 1192049
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Systematic Underrepresentation in the Jury Pool

Text: (1a) Before trial, defendant moved to quash the petit jury, arguing that the manner in which Kern County assembled its master jury list violated his right to an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community. [2] In support, he presented evidence that he claimed demonstrated a prima facie case that Hispanics were systematically underrepresented in the jury pool. The trial court denied the motion, and defendant now renews the contention.
At the time of defendant's trial, Kern County assembled its master jury list by randomly drawing names from the county's voter registration list. Questionnaires were then sent to those chosen to determine eligibility to serve as jurors. There was no attempt to ensure that the ethnic composition of the group selected for jury service approximated that of the county as a whole. Although there were plans in the future to use names of those holding driver's licenses to supplement those names from the voter registration lists when assembling the master jury list, such plans had not yet been implemented at the time defendant was tried. The parties stipulated that defendant could rely, in support of his motion to quash, on the expert testimony presented in three other recent Kern County Superior Court cases. (See People v. Cantu, Nos. 21891, 22229 ( Cantu ); People v. Robinson, No. 21518 ( Robinson ); People v. Streeter, Nos. 22346, 22056, 21910, 21368 ( Streeter ).) Dr. Newell, an expert in psychology and statistics, testified in the Cantu and Robinson cases (and his testimony was admitted in the Streeter case). He stated that he had scrutinized the available data from the 1980 census and had analyzed jury panels in Kern County between October 1980 and February 1981, as well as panels in May 1981. In Cantu, he testified that the government census reported that Kern County was 21.59 percent Hispanic, and estimated that 17.76 percent of the county was both Hispanic and at least 18 years old, i.e., presumptively jury eligible. [3] To determine the ethnic makeup of the group summoned for jury duty during the period in question, Dr. Newell scrutinized the master jury list, presumably noting those with Spanish surnames. He also conducted telephone surveys to confirm the number of those on the list who were Hispanic. He concluded that 8.3 percent of those appearing for jury duty were Hispanic. In the Robinson case a few months later, Dr. Newell presented even more refined statistics. From the Immigration and Naturalization Service, he obtained the information that 14,387 Hispanic resident aliens resided in Kern County in 1978. (Such evidence was not available for 1980.) Deducting that number from the total number of Hispanics in the county (based on 1980 census figures), Dr. Newell opined that 19.81 percent of Kern County residents were Hispanic. (2) (See fn. 4.) Using the same methodology as in the Cantu case (see fn. 3, ante ), he estimated that 16.3 percent of the county was made up of adult Hispanics. [4] He reiterated that 8.3 percent of those appearing for jury duty were Hispanic. He concluded that the likelihood the exhibited disparity would occur by chance was one in one million. After reading the transcripts of the Cantu, Robinson, and Streeter cases and hearing argument on the issue, the trial court denied without prejudice defendant's motion to quash, stating, I do believe that there has been a prima facie showing that there is a disproportionate number of people with Hispanic surnames called for jurors, but I am not sure that that means a thing, and everybody knows by reading the Los Angeles Times and any other publication that there are an enormous number of people in this country illegally or green card-wise [ sic ] who are not even citizens. [¶] So, I don't think that really in and of itself means anything. Defendant renewed the motion later and it was again denied.
(3) In California, the right to trial by jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community is guaranteed equally and independently by the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution ( Taylor v. Louisiana (1975) 419 U.S. 522, 530 [42 L.Ed.2d 690, 698, 955 S.Ct. 692]) and by article I, section 16 of the California Constitution. ( People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 272 [148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748].) ( Williams v. Superior Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 736, 740 [263 Cal. Rptr. 503, 781 P.2d 537].) In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a `distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process. ( Duren v. Missouri (1979) 439 U.S. 357, 364 [58 L.Ed.2d 579, 99 S.Ct. 664]; see also Bell, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 525; People v. Morales (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 543 [257 Cal. Rptr. 64, 770 P.2d 244].) If a defendant demonstrates a prima facie case of systematic underrepresentation under this tripartite test, the burden shifts to the state to come forward with either a more precise statistical showing that no constitutionally significant disparity existed or that there was a compelling justification for the procedure which results in the disparity in the jury pool. ( Harris, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 50.)
(1b) The first prong of the Duren test is clearly satisfied; Hispanics, or those with Spanish surnames, constitute a distinctive group for purposes of a fair cross-section analysis. ( Morales, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 543.) The second prong may be satisfied by showing that the number of members of the cognizable group is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of members in the relevant community. ( Bell, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 526.) Working from defendant's most refined statistics, adult Hispanic citizens made up 16.3 percent of Kern County, whereas only 8.3 percent of those appearing for jury duty were Hispanic. Thus, there was an 8 percent absolute disparity and a 49 percent comparative disparity. [5] We have previously noted that the [United States] Supreme Court has not yet spoken definitively on either the means by which disparity may be measured or the constitutional limit of permissible disparity. ( Bell, supra, 49 Cal.3d at pp. 527-528, fns. omitted.) [6] As in Bell, however, we need not resolve this difficult line-drawing question because defendant fails to establish a prima facie case under Duren 's third prong by showing the disparity is caused by systematic exclusion of Hispanics from Kern County juries. By basing his motion to quash on the expert statistical evidence given in the Cantu, Robinson, and Streeter cases, defendant sought to show a statistical disparity occurred over time and was thus the result of a systematic exclusion of Hispanics. As we recently explained in Bell, supra, however, such a showing is insufficient, standing alone, to make out a prima facie case of a Sixth Amendment violation. When, as here, a county's jury selection criteria are neutral with respect to race, ethnicity, sex, and religion, more is required to shift the burden to the People. The defendant must identify some aspect of the manner in which those criteria are being applied that is: (1) the probable cause of the disparity, and (2) constitutionally impermissible. ( Bell, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 524.) Evidence that race/class neutral jury selection processes may nonetheless operate to permit the de facto exclusion of a higher percentage of a particular class of jurors than would result from a random draw is insufficient to make out a prima facie case. ( Morales, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 546, italics in original.) Defendant claims he has satisfied this requirement in Bell ( supra, 49 Cal.3d 502) by relying not only on the statistical disparity, but on the fact that at the time of defendant's trial, Kern County assembled its master jury list solely from the voter registration list. Not only does he argue this is the probable source of the disparity, he contends the practice is constitutionally impermissible, citing People v. Harris, supra, 36 Cal.3d 36. Our concern here is with the latter requirement: because the county's juror selection procedures were facially neutral, has defendant shown that procedure is nevertheless constitutionally impermissible within the meaning of Bell ? There is some language in the lead opinion in Harris suggesting that sole reliance on voter registration lists in assembling the master jury list is constitutionally prohibited. We do not, however, read Harris so broadly. In that divided opinion, a three-justice plurality held the defendant made a prima facie showing of a fair cross-section violation based on a statistical showing of racial disparity and the fact that the county assembled its master jury list using only voter registration lists. (36 Cal.3d at p. 58 [plur. opn. by Broussard, J., joined by Bird, C.J., & Reynoso, J.].) Although the trial court did not find the defendant made a prima facie case  and thus the People were never asked to present any rebuttal evidence  the plurality reversed the judgment. Three other justices dissented on this point. ( Id. at pp. 72 [dis. opn. by Mosk, J., joined by Richardson, J.], 75 [dis. opn. by Kaus, J.].) In a pivotal separate opinion, Justice Grodin provided a reluctant fourth vote to reverse. He expressly agreed with the plurality that defendant made a prima facie case, despite relying on total population statistics. Justice Grodin further stated that in light of published studies which point to the exclusive reliance upon voter registration lists as a likely source of racial and ethnic disparity in the composition of juries, I am prepared to say that defendant's showing should be regarded as sufficient to trigger further inquiry. ( Harris, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 71 [conc. opn. by Grodin, J.].) Significantly, he further explained that he  would not reverse the judgment on that account.  ( Harris, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 71, italics added.) Because the People had no occasion to present rebuttal evidence, he opined the case should be remanded to allow them to do so. ( Id. at pp. 71-72.) Upon full consideration of the relevant evidence it might be concluded that `no disparity of constitutional significance exists,' or that `even with the use of multiple sources and all other practical means, a certain level of disparity is unavoidable,' or that the underrepresentation which does exist is justified by a showing of overriding state interest. ( Id. at p. 72, quoting plur. opn. at p. 59.) Justice Grodin then explained that although he preferred the remand option, there would be no disposition of the case were he to insist on that alternative. Finding this an intolerable result, and concluding that he fundamentally disagreed with the dissenting opinions, he reluctantly joined the plurality opinion's disposition to reverse. ( Ibid. ) As is clear, Justice Grodin did not join the Harris plurality's far-reaching conclusion that sole reliance on voter registration lists was itself constitutionally prohibited. [7] Indeed, he twice stated his position that identification of that fact, coupled with an adequate statistical showing of racial disparity, merely established a prima facie case of a constitutional violation, and should not itself require reversal. Since Harris, supra, 36 Cal.3d 36, however, this court has refined the procedure by which a criminal defendant can establish a prima facie case of a fair cross-section violation. Unlike in Harris, a defendant attacking facially neutral procedures as the probable cause of the statistical disparity must now demonstrate that such procedures are either constitutionally impermissible or are being implemented in a constitutionally objectionable manner. ( Bell, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 524.) As explained above, Harris does not constitute controlling authority for this latter point. Resort to other authority is similarly unhelpful to defendant's position. We begin our analysis by noting that, at the time of defendant's trial, our state Legislature permitted sole reliance on voter registration lists to assemble the master jury list. As explained below, former Code of Civil Procedure section 204.7 stated that source lists for jurors shall include those who are registered voters. The section also provided that the list should be supplemented from lists from the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) in those counties where such supplementation was practical and would not entail significant cost. The negative implication of this statutory language was that sole reliance on voter registration lists was permissible where supplementation was impractical or costly. (4) We presume this statute was constitutional. `In considering the constitutionality of a legislative act we presume its validity, resolving all doubts in favor of the Act. Unless conflict with a provision of the state or federal Constitution is clear and unquestionable, we must uphold the Act. [Citations.]' ( County of Sonoma v. State Energy Resources Conservation etc. Com. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 361, 368 [220 Cal. Rptr. 114, 708 P.2d 693], quoting California Housing Finance Agency v. Elliot (1976) 17 Cal.3d 575, 594 [131 Cal. Rptr. 361, 551 P.2d 1193].) (1c) Our past decisions, and those of other courts, are in accord. As discussed, ante, at page 494 footnote 7, we held in 1972 that sole reliance on voter registration lists was not itself constitutionally invalid. ( Sirhan, supra, 7 Cal.3d at pp. 749-750.) Moreover, the federal circuits are unanimous on this point. Interpreting the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 (28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1867), circuit courts of appeal have routinely held sole reliance on voter registration lists does not violate the fair cross-section rule absent some evidence of active discrimination. United States v. Cecil (4th Cir.1988) 836 F.2d 1431 (cert. den. (1988) 487 U.S. 1205 [101 L.Ed.2d 883, 108 S.Ct. 2846]), is illustrative. In that case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit opined that sole use of voter registration lists cannot be described `as systematically excluding classes that do not register in proportion to their numbers'; it is a process that comports with the `need for efficient jury selection' even though it may not `perfectly reflect population.' Nor does it follow that the voter registration lists do not satisfy the fair cross-section ... [requirement] simply because... members of one group neglected to register in the same proportion as was their share in the overall population. The Constitution and the [federal] statute do not require such perfection. It is sufficient that the system adopted provides a fair cross-section and we find both common sense and precedent establish that if the voter registration lists do this they are not tainted by some affirmative form of discrimination. ( Id. at pp. 1448-1449; see generally id. at pp. 1444-1451, and cases cited; Annot., Construction and Application of Provisions of Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 (28 USCS §§ 1861-1867) Governing Plans for, and Manner of, Selecting Federal Grand and Petit Jurors (1973) 17 A.L.R.Fed. 590, 608, § 7[a] and cases cited.) Significantly, the rule laid down in Sirhan, supra, 7 Cal.3d at pages 749-750, as well as the complementary rule of law in numerous federal cases, existed before and during defendant's trial. Former Code of Civil Procedure section 204.7 was also in force at that time. In light of these persuasive authorities, we conclude defendant fails to demonstrate the county's race-neutral procedures for using voter registration lists to assemble the county's master jury list was constitutionally impermissible and, accordingly, we conclude the trial court correctly denied the motion to quash. [8]