Opinion ID: 2457042
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Epic

Text: Anderson's waiver arguments against Epic center on her claim that Epic waited too long, after learning of the alleged conflict of interest, to assert its motion to disqualify Anderson's counsel. Anderson points out that although Epic first knew of Jordaan's involvement when it was served in April 1994, Epic did not hint of any alleged conflict until it removed the case to federal court and the McKool firm entered its appearance. Epic then delayed another seven months before moving to disqualify Anderson's counsel. Anderson further argues that Epic abandoned its motion to disqualify by not joining and urging disqualification in the directors' second amended motion to disqualify Anderson's attorneys heard by Judge Tyson in June 1995. The record clearly reflects, and Epic does not dispute, that only George and the directors [3] pursued disqualification in June 1995. Epic counters that it temporarily abandoned its disqualification efforts only because Anderson and her attorneys represented that Anderson would not challenge any aspect of Epic's 1988 formation. However, the representations Epic cites (two letters from the McKool firm, a response to a request for admission, and a statement in a trial brief) either occurred well before Epic filed its initial motion for disqualification or after it had abandoned its disqualification efforts in Judge Tyson's court. These undisputed facts undercut Epic's arguments that it abandoned its initial motions in reliance on these representation and show that Epic abandoned its initial disqualification efforts in June 1995. Epic thereby waived its right to complain about Anderson's lawyers by waiting over a yearuntil its July 1996 interventionto renew its disqualification efforts. See Tenneco, Inc., 925 S.W.2d at 643; Grant, 888 S.W.2d at 468. Epic asserts that it should be excused from abandoning its original efforts to disqualify Anderson's attorneys because its renewed disqualification motion in July 1996 urged a new basis for disqualification. Epic asserts that its new basisthat Anderson's attorney should be disqualified under Rule 1.09(a)(1)(challenging earlier work product) was not available to Epic until after the 1996 mistrial. I would reject this argument. Despite the fact that Epic brought its original motions under Rule 1.09(a)(3)(regarding substantially related matters), the thrust of Epic's original argument was that the two matters were substantially related because Anderson was challenging Johnson & Gibbs's work product in forming Epic in 1988. For example, in its original motion, Epic argued that Anderson was challenging the 1988 stock incentive program and the 1988 employment agreements, including the directors' compensation package. Thus, even though Epic's original motions were not expressly based on Rule 1.09(a)(1), that ground was certainly available, and indeed Epic raised it. After abandoning its initial efforts and arguments for disqualification, Epic should not be allowed to raise essentially the same arguments one year later. See Tenneco, Inc., 925 S.W.2d at 643; Grant, 888 S.W.2d at 468. Accordingly, based on this record I would hold that Epic abandoned its right to complain about disqualifying Anderson's attorneys and deny Epic any relief.