Opinion ID: 1725375
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: The following facts are relevant to the jurisdiction issue. On March 7, 1973, three areas, the Towns of Armstrong and Doty, and part of the Town of Riverview, all in a third school district, filed a petition for attachment to the White Lake District. On April 5, 1973, CESA denied the petition for attachment and the areas seeking attachment appealed. On June 19, 1973, the board affirmed the decision of CESA. No appeal was taken from this decision. On May 3, 1973, the Towns of Lakewood and Townsend, being the areas involved in this appeal, petitioned for detachment from the White Lake District and attachment to the Wabeno District. On May 29, 1973, CESA  granted the detachment petition. On August 17, 1973, the board affirmed the determination of CESA. Thus, the appeal relating to the three areas in the third district and decided by the board on June 19, 1973, was pending before the board at the time Lakewood and Townsend filed detachment petitions with CESA on May 3, 1973. Chapter 117, Stats., provides for school district reorganizations. Sec. 117.01 (1) (d), reads, in part: (d) While a reorganization proceeding is pending and until an order granting or denying school district reorganization made therein takes effect, any other reorganization proceeding commenced or order made, pertaining to any territory included in the reorganization proceeding or order, is void.... Chapter 92, Laws of Wisconsin, 1967, revised the statutes with respect to public education. The provisions of the statutory section cited, supra, were formerly contained in sec. 40.025 (1) (c), Stats. 1965, and read in part: ... When the making of a reorganization order is pending before a reorganization authority or such order has been made, any other reorganization proceeding or order made by that or any other reorganization authority, after jurisdiction has been acquired as provided in par. (a) or (b) and prior to the going into effect of an order made and filed pursuant thereto, pertaining to all or any part of the territory included in the order, is void. The pertinent phrase in sec. 40.025 (1) (c), Stats. 1965, reads: ... pertaining to all or any part of the territory included in the order, ... (Emphasis added.) The pertinent phrase in sec. 117.01 (1) (d), reads: ... pertaining to any territory included in the reorganization proceeding or order ... (Emphasis added.) Appellants urge that by adding the term reorganization proceeding, the legislature intended that no reorganization proceedings are to be undertaken which in any way affect  a school district if there are other reorganization proceedings pending which might also affect that district. We are of the opinion the position of the appellants is untenable. In School Board v. State Superintendent (1963), 20 Wis. 2d 160, 121 N. W. 2d 900, factual circumstances similar to the cases at bar were presented and the question of jurisdiction challenged on the same grounds, pursuant to sec. 40.025 (1) (c), Stats. 1965, supra. In that case, several different petitions were pending at the same time with respect to the school district of the city of Sheboygan. It was contended that an order entered attaching a certain geographical area to the district was void because other petitions requesting attachment of different geographical areas to the Sheboygan district were then pending. This court found that argument without merit, stating that: A reorganization order contemplated by sec. 40.025 (1) (c), Stats., which detached territory from one school district and which attached it to another includes only that territory detached and attached. Also an order which dissolves a whole school district and attaches it to another or one which consolidates all or several districts to form a new district includes only that territory dissolved and attached or that consolidated. If it were the intention of the drafters of sec. 40.025 (1) (c) to preclude subsequent petitions from being filed, which included territory in the proposed `reorganized district' or `school district affected' they would have used those terms as they are specifically defined in sec. 40.01 (11), (13). To read those terms in the light proposed by the appellants would produce a result inconsistent with the manifest intention of the legislature.... School Board v. State Superintendent, supra, p. 169. This construction of sec. 40.025 (1) (c), Stats. 1965, supra, was reaffirmed in Olson v. Rothwell (1965), 28 Wis. 2d 233, 137 N. W. 2d 86, and In re School District No. 5, Vil. of Bear Creek (1969), 42 Wis. 2d 264, 272,  166 N. W. 2d 160. In the former case, in response to the same argument, this court stated: ... The contention of the appellants can only have merit on the proposition that if a school-reorganization order affects part of the territory comprising a school district, such order pre-empts all the territory in the school district. There is no authority for such a proposition. All the authority is to the contrary. Sec. 40.025 (1) (c) provides only the second school reorganization proceeding is void if it pertains to all or any part of the territory included in the order of the first proceeding which is then pending or whose order has not then become effective. The pre-empted jurisdiction of the first proceeding extends no farther than the particular and identical land or territory involved.... Olson v. Rothwell, supra, p. 237. In construing sec. 40.025 (1) (c), Stats. 1965, this court on several occasions stated that a second proceeding is void if it pertains to the territory involved in a first proceeding, whether or not the order issued in the second proceeding affected the territory involved in the first proceeding. Olson v. Rothwell, supra, p. 238. In Balson v. Joint County School Comm. (1963), 19 Wis. 2d 96, 119 N. W. 2d 438, two petitions were pending involving the town of Calumet. The order issued in the second proceeding omitted Calumet, leaving its status the same, even though the petition and proceedings thereon had requested a change in its status. It was determined that the fact that the order did not include the town did not save it from being void, because a competing reorganization proposal involving the same town had been pending at the same time. Thus, the legislature, by adding the words reorganization proceeding to the statutory directive merely clarifed the statute to comport with its construction by this court. This conclusion is substantiated by the language in Olson v. Rothwell, supra , wherein the holding refers to the reorganization proceeding as well as the order itself.  The purpose of the provision is to prevent consideration of competing petitions relating to the same geographical area at the same time. Balson v. Joint County School Comm., supra . The addition of the term reorganization proceedings emphasizes this intent, rather than indicating any purpose to change the existing construction relating to the extent of territory involved. Finally, the legislature is presumed to act with full knowledge of existing laws, including both statutes and the decisions of this court interpreting those statutes. State ex rel. Klingler & Schilling v. Baird (1972), 56 Wis. 2d 460, 468, 202 N. W. 2d 31. This court made clear in State Board v. State Superintendent, supra, what terms would be appropriate to indicate a legislative intent different from that recognized by the determination in that case. Nevertheless, when the provision was amended, those terms were not incorporated. The inclusion of the words reorganization proceeding intended to refer to a particular procedural step in the reorganization process, in addition to the order itself, rather than to an expansion of the definition of the entity which is considered to be included within the terms of the provision. Therefore, the board had jurisdiction to enter the orders herein.