Opinion ID: 1184244
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Sixth Cause of Action

Text: The sixth cause of action sounds in inverse condemnation, and Veta seeks damages in the sum of $8,815,250 for an alleged unconstitutional taking of its property. (11) It is first alleged that Veta had a vested right to develop its property, and that the Commission invaded and appropriated said right by unlawfully applying the provisions of the Act to the property. These allegations are obviously deficient. It is evident from the face of the petition that Veta itself invoked the application of the Act to its development by applying to the Commission for a permit, and that it did not seek a declaration from the Commission that it had a vested right to proceed without a permit. Under these circumstances, the fact that the Commission denied the permit cannot constitute the basis for an action in inverse condemnation on the ground that the Commission invaded and appropriated Veta's vested rights. (12a) The primary basis of the sixth cause of action is that Veta's application for a permit was denied in order that its land would remain undeveloped and devoted to, and held for, public use as open space land. Veta alleges that the denial of the permit on that ground constitutes a taking or damaging of its land, either permanently or temporarily, without compensation. We must, of course, accept as true for the purposes of the general demurrer, Veta's assertion as to the reason for the denial of the permit. [11] In order to decide if the sixth count states a cause of action for inverse condemnation, we must examine the purposes of the Act as well as the effect of the Commission's action upon Veta's property. The Act declares that the coastal zone is a valuable resource belonging to all the people, that its permanent protection is a paramount concern to the citizens of the state, and that in order to protect this valuable resource it is necessary to study the coastal zone, prepare a comprehensive plan for its orderly, long-range conservation and management, and insure that any development which occurs in the permit area during the study and planning period will be consistent with the objectives of the Act. (Pub. Resources Code, § 27001.) The Commission is enjoined to submit such a plan to the Legislature by December 1, 1975. (Pub. Resources Code, §§ 27300, 27320.) Among the objectives of the coastal zone plan are the avoidance of irreversible and irretrievable commitments of coastal zone resources. (Pub. Resources Code, § 27302, subd. (d).) In order to assure that the purposes of the Act are not impaired during the period in which the plan is in the process of formulation, those who seek to perform any development within the permit area are, with certain exceptions, required to seek a permit from the Commission. (Pub. Resources Code, §§ 27400-27405.) However, the Act, including the permit requirement, is automatically repealed by its own terms on the 91st day after the final adjournment of the 1976 Regular Session of the Legislature. (Pub. Resources Code, § 27650.) (13) Thus, the requirement for a permit is an interim measure to assure that developments in the coastal zone are consistent with the objectives of the Act so that priceless coastal resources are not irreversibly committed to uses which would be inconsistent with the plan ultimately developed. The situation involved in the present case is virtually indistinguishable from Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation etc. Com. (1970) 11 Cal. App.3d 557, 570-572 [89 Cal. Rptr. 897]. In that case the plaintiff alleged a taking of its property based upon the denial by the Bay Conservation and Development Commission of a permit to fill a parcel of land in San Francisco Bay. It was alleged that the land had no value except as fill. The purpose of the legislation involved in Candlestick is strikingly similar to the rationale underlying the Act. The Legislature declared that the bay is the most valuable natural resource in the region, that it was threatened by haphazard filling, and that in order to protect it during the formulation of a conservation and development plan, the Bay Conservation and Development Commission must have the power to regulate any proposed project which involves placing fill in the bay. (Gov. Code, §§ 66600-66604.) The Court of Appeal held that the denial of a permit in the interim before the completion of the plan did not constitute an unconstitutional taking and that the restrictions placed upon the land were a valid exercise of the police power. Nor can the present case be distinguished in principle from numerous authorities upholding the validity of interim zoning ordinances. The leading authority is Miller v. Board of Public Works (1925) 195 Cal. 477 [234 P. 381, 38 A.L.R. 1479]. There, the plaintiff not only applied for but was issued a permit to construct four-family dwellings in a residence district. The permit was revoked after the city council passed an ordinance prohibiting the construction of such units on the ground that the city was contemplating a comprehensive zoning plan covering the entire city. The court, in upholding the revocation, held that a zoning plan of the extent contemplated would take considerable time to develop, and that it would be destructive of the plan ultimately adopted if, during the period of its incubation, parties seeking to evade the operation thereof should be permitted to enter upon a course of construction which might progress so far as to defeat in whole or in part the ultimate execution of the plan. (195 Cal. at p. 496.) This principle has been followed in numerous cases both in this state and in other jurisdictions, [12] upholding temporary measures to preserve the status quo pending adoption of a comprehensive zoning plan. Thus, courts have refused to invalidate a freeze on building permits pending adoption of a zoning plan ( Hunter v. Adams (1960) 180 Cal. App.2d 511 [4 Cal. Rptr. 776]) or a proscription of subdivision ( Metro Realty v. County of El Dorado (1963) 222 Cal. App.2d 508 [35 Cal. Rptr. 480]), and a requirement for a special permit pending the completion of studies preparatory to the adoption of a zoning ordinance has also been held to be proper ( Anderson v. City Council (1964) 229 Cal. App.2d 79 [40 Cal. Rptr. 41]). Generally these decisions have upheld the ordinances as a proper exercise of the police power. It is true that the Act is not an interim zoning measure since it does not zone any property but merely requires the Commission to formulate a coastal zone plan for submission to the Legislature. Nevertheless, the cases cited above demonstrate that even more severe restrictions on the use of private property than those provided by the Act have been supported as a valid exercise of the police power pending the adoption of a comprehensive zoning ordinance (e.g., a moratorium on the issuance of building permits in Hunter v. Adams (1960) supra, 180 Cal. App.2d 511). (12b) In view of the foregoing authorities, denial of a building permit to Veta on the ground that the land it proposes to develop may ultimately be designated for public use in the coastal zone plan to be adopted by the Commission by December 1975, does not amount at this time to a taking of property for public use without compensation. The trial court therefore erred in overruling the general demurrer to the sixth cause of action.