Opinion ID: 780522
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Elements of Complicity to Commit Rape under Kentucky Law

Text: 30 Crockett and Greene were arrested for the offense of complicity in a first degree rape. Under Kentucky law, first degree rape of persons capable of consent is defined as sexual intercourse with another person by forcible compulsion. KY.REV.STAT. ANN. § 510.040(1)(a) (Banks-Baldwin 2002). Kentucky Revised Statute § 502.020 provides two separate and distinct theories under which a person may be an accomplice to a crime: `complicity to the act' under subsection (1) of the statute, which applies when the principal actor's conduct constitutes the criminal offense, and `complicity to the result' under subsection (2) of the statute, which applies when the result of the principal's conduct constitutes the criminal offense. Tharp v. Commonwealth, 40 S.W.3d 356, 360 (Ky. 2001); see also KY.REV.STAT. ANN. § 502.020(1) & (2) (Banks-Baldwin 2002). 31 This case implicates the complicity to the act prong of accomplice liability, and not the complicity to the result prong. As the Kentucky Supreme Court made clear in Tharp, complicity to the act applies when the principal actor's conduct constitutes the criminal offense. 40 S.W.3d at 360. Under the allegations here, Bostic, by holding Doe down, and Shannon, by raping her, intentionally engaged in conduct that constitutes a criminal offense. Thus, if Crockett and Greene were accomplices, their liability would be premised directly on Shannon and Bostic's conduct. There is no basis for applying the complicity to the result prong here. Under Kentucky law, complicity to the result occurs when an unintended consequence of a person's actions constitutes a criminal offense. See Ky.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 502.020 cmt.; see also Tharp, 40 S.W.3d at 360-61. Because there were no unintended consequences associated with the rape and facilitation of the rape here, there could be no basis for holding Crockett and Greene liable under a complicity in the result theory. 32 Accomplice liability for rape under complicity to the act prong, requires proof that the defendant engaged in one of three forms of conduct: (a) the solicitation, command, or conspiracy with another person to commit rape; (b) the aiding, counseling, or attempt to aid such person in planning or committing the rape; or (c) the failure to make a proper effort to prevent the rape where the person has the legal duty to prevent the rape. See KY.REV.STAT. ANN. §§ 502.020(1) & 510.040(1)(a) (Banks-Baldwin 2002). Additionally, complicity to the act accomplice liability, unlike complicity in the result liability, requires specific intent. Compare KY.REV.STAT. ANN. § 502.020(1) (requiring action with the intention of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense), and KY.REV.STAT. ANN. § 502.020 cmt. (To be guilty under subsection (1) for a crime committed by another, a defendant must have specifically intended to promote or facilitate the commission of that offense.), with KY.REV.STAT. ANN. § 502.020(2) (requiring only action with the kind of culpability with respect to the result that is sufficient for the commission of the offense). A person acts with the intentional mental state under Kentucky law, when his conscious objective is to cause that result or to engage in that conduct. KY.REV.STAT. ANN. § 501.020(1). 33 Of course, [p]robable cause does not require the same type of specific evidence of each element of the offense as would be needed to support a conviction. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 149, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972). In order to have probable cause to arrest Crockett and Greene, Hamlin reasonably had to believe that plaintiffs aided, counseled, or attempted to aid Shannon and Bostic in planning or committing the rape and that plaintiffs specifically intended to promote or facilitate the commission of the rape. 34