Opinion ID: 203924
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Reconsidering Issues Decided in the First Appeal

Text: Wallace also explicitly asks us to reconsider our prior decision on the dangerous weapons and the disruption of government function grounds for departure. We decline to do so.
Wallace argues that his use of a dangerous weapon during the robbery was an improper basis for an upward departure because his use of that weapon, the TEC-9, was already accounted for by various other Guidelines provisions. The application of the subsequent appellate panel branch of the law of the case doctrine to this claim is straightforward. We have already held that appellant's use of a dangerous weapon was a valid basis for the upward departure, 461 F.3d at 36, and Wallace cannot meet the heavy burden required to invoke an exception under the law of the case doctrine. He cites no newly discovered evidence or intervening legal authority that requires us to reconsider, and there can be no credible claim that our failure to do so would work a manifest injustice in this case. As a general matter, we have long held that double-counting is less sinister than the name implies. United States v. McCarty, 475 F.3d 39, 46 (1st Cir.2007) (quotation marks and citation omitted). This is because two (or more) guidelines will often rely on the same underlying facts, although accounting for different sentencing concerns. Id. (citing Wallace, 461 F.3d at 36). Wallace cannot cite any Guidelines that explicitly prohibit the double-counting he alleges here, and the other enhancements he cites clearly account[] for different sentencing concerns. McCarty, 475 F.3d at 46. Therefore, this claim is barred by the law of the case doctrine.
We similarly refuse to revisit our prior affirmance of the district court's decision to depart upwardly based on appellant's disruption of government functions. See Wallace, 461 F.3d at 36-37. We held that the departure was justified by Wallace's deliberate evasion of arrest, which required the government to expend significant resources in trying him separately, four years after the initial trial of his co-conspirator. Id. at 37. He now argues that there were insufficient factual findings in the record to support the departure because the government cannot prove that its ability to prosecute the underlying crime was materially prejudiced by Wallace's evasion of arrest. Here, too, his arguments are unavailing. Our prior opinion provided a full explanation as to why the departure was justified even on the record as it stood after the first sentencing. Id. at 36-37. On remand, the district court, in addition to citing our decision that the departure was appropriate, reiterated its own reasons for imposing the departure. The reasonableness of this explanation precludes any argument that the application of this departure works a manifest injustice in Wallace's case. Therefore, this claim is also barred by the law of the case doctrine.