Opinion ID: 2196613
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Timing of the Ruling on the Motion

Text: Petitioner's first complaint is that the trial court was not authorized to act on her motion for new trial while her appeal from the judgments of conviction was pending in the Court of Special Appeals. This is an issue that was not raised in the circuit court, in the Court of Special Appeals, or in petitioner's petition for certiorari. As we indicated, we added it on our own initiative in the order granting certiorari, and it is therefore addressed by the parties at our invitation. Petitioner acknowledges that the issue added by us is not a jurisdictional onethat the circuit court did have jurisdiction to act on the motion. That is a proper concession. In and since Pulley v. State, 287 Md. 406, 412 A.2d 1244 (1980), we have made clear that a circuit court is not divested of fundamental jurisdiction to take post-judgment action in a case merely because an appeal is pending from the judgment. What the court may not do is to exercise that jurisdiction in a manner that affects either the subject matter of the appeal or the appellate proceeding itselfthat, in effect, precludes or hampers the appellate court from acting on the matter before it. See In re Emileigh F., 355 Md. 198, 733 A.2d 1103 (1999); State v. Peterson, 315 Md. 73, 553 A.2d 672 (1989). Any post-judgment ruling by a circuit court that has that effect may be subject to reversal on appeal, but it is not void ab initio for lack of jurisdiction to enter it. Responding to the issue we raised, petitioner argues that (1) in her appeal, she claimed that the evidence was legally insufficient to show that the murder was committed in furtherance of a felony; (2) if she prevailed on that claim, the murder conviction would have to be reversed and, under Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978), she could not have been retried on that charge; (3) if the trial court, in the meanwhile, had granted her motion for new trial, she would have been retried; (4) a granting of her motion would have rendered moot her appeal by eliminating the final judgment necessary for appellate jurisdiction, thereby depriving her of her right to an absolute reversal of the judgment without retrial; and (5) although denial of the motion would clearly not have that effect, if the trial court could not properly grant the motion, it should not be able to deny it either. In the Federal system, this issue is dealt with directly by rule. Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure specifies that, when a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence is filed while an appeal is pending from the judgment of conviction, the court may grant the motion only on remand of the case from the appellate court. The Federal courts have interpreted the rule as permitting the court to deny the motion, notwithstanding the pendency of the appeal, but not to grant the motion absent a remand. See United States v. Blanton, 697 F.2d 146 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v. Coleman, 688 F.2d 663 (9th Cir.1982); United States v. Burns, 668 F.2d 855 (5th Cir.1982); United States v. Pullings, 321 F.2d 287 (7th Cir.1963), overruled on other grounds by United States v. White, 405 F.2d 838 (7th Cir.1969). The comparable Maryland Rule is not so specific. We need not consider in this appeal whether an order granting the motion for new trial would have been subject to reversal on the ground noted. That would, indeed, have presented some interesting issues, not the least of which would be whether petitioner could complain that, at her express urging, the trial court may have frustrated her appeal. See State v. Peterson, supra, 315 Md. 73, 553 A.2d 672. Here, of course, because the motion was denied, there was no adverse impact at any time on the jurisdiction of the Court of Special Appeals or on its ability to resolve the issue then before it; denial of the motion eliminated any possible conflict with the appeal. We reject as unsound the assertion that, if the court was not authorized to grant the motion, it was equally unauthorized to deny it. That is tantamount to the extraordinary contention that, whenever a court is presented with a motion or other issue requiring a decision, it is unauthorized to make any ruling on the matter unless all possible rulings would be authorized. No authority is cited for such a proposition, and we know of none that would support it. Accordingly, we find no error in the court's having denied the motion for new trial while petitioner's appeal was pending.