Opinion ID: 2382556
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alaska Statute 47.10.011(8) domestic violence

Text: The superior court found that OCS met its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that both children were in need of aid based on domestic violence between Barbara and Leo. The court first noted that Barbara and Leo had stipulated that Michael was a child in need of aid under this provision, after which the court had adjudicated him as such. It then reviewed the evidence presented at trial demonstrating that there has been domestic violence throughout Barbara and Leo's relationship beginning in 2005 and continuing until just before trial: Barbara's request for a protective order; testimony by the parents at trial concerning violent incidents, at least one of which happened while Barbara was holding Michael; Barbara's cancellation of joint visits with Leo; and her visit to Mat-Su Regional Urgent Care in August 2008. The court did not find Barbara's denial that there was domestic violence in her relationship with Leo to be credible. Because Gary was taken into custody by OCS at birth, the court recognized that he could not be adjudicated a child in need of aid under a provision requiring direct exposure to domestic violence. But relying on AS 47.10.011(8)(B)(i), the court found that Gary was in need of aid because the parents placed him at substantial risk of mental injury as a result of a pattern of ... terrorizing ... behavior that would, if, continued, result in mental injury. The court based this finding on evidence of ongoing domestic violence between Barbara and Leo and expert testimony regarding domestic violence. The court did not credit Barbara's and Leo's testimony that they had ended their relationship, finding it quite possible that [Barbara] and [Leo] will re-initiate their relationship. Barbara first argues that the superior court improperly relied on the stipulation of the parties and precluded her from disputing their alleged domestic violence. But the superior court neither precluded Barbara from offering evidence on this issue nor relied solely on the stipulation in finding that OCS had satisfied its burden; it simply noted that it was difficult to understand how Barbara and Leo were contesting a fact they admitted at adjudication. Because the burden of proof is lower in an adjudication than at a termination proceeding, [24] a prior adjudication of a child as a child in need of aid is not conclusive in the termination proceeding. [25] Nonetheless, a court can consider a parent's stipulation and any other evidence offered at a prior adjudication hearing along with additional evidence presented at the trial in finding a child to be in need of aid for purposes of termination of parental rights. [26] Therefore, it was not improper for the court to consider the parties' stipulation among other evidence that Michael was a child in need of aid based on domestic violence. Barbara next argues that the superior court erred in finding Michael to be a child in need of aid under AS 47.10.011(8)(A), which requires OCS to prove that conduct by the parents resulted in actual mental injury to the child, defined as serious injury ... as evidenced by an observable and substantial impairment in the child's ability to function in a developmentally appropriate manner that is supported by the opinion of a qualified expert witness. [27] OCS offered no expert witnesses at trial to testify that Michael had suffered mental injury as a result of Barbara's and Leo's conduct, and in fact no expert witness has evaluated the children. But there is no indication that the superior court made a CINA finding under AS 47.10.011(8)(A). The superior court did not specify the paragraph of subsection (8) under which it found that Michael was a child in need of aid as a result of domestic violence. [28] Given that the court made no reference to Michael suffering actual mental injury, it appears that the court made its CINA finding under paragraph (8)(B), which requires only a substantial risk of mental injury. Barbara argues that any CINA finding under paragraph (8)(B) would have been error because OCS's petition only requested a CINA finding under paragraph (8)(A). But Barbara was on notice that the State intended to present evidence regarding domestic violence during the termination trial and had an adequate opportunity to rebut this evidence and offer legal argument: the petition for termination references Michael's exposure to domestic violence, Barbara's request for a protective order, her continued association with Leo, and the case plan requirement that she complete a Family Violence Intervention class; the petition for adjudication of Gary as a child in need of aid filed several weeks before and consolidated with the termination hearing explicitly requested a finding under subsection (8) and described a lengthy history of domestic violence between Barbara and Leo; and Michael had already been adjudicated a child in need of aid under subsection (8). Even after trial began, Barbara had time to gather and present her own evidence regarding domestic violence. OCS elicited testimony from Barbara concerning domestic violence and its effect on the children early on the first day of trial (and over her counsel's objection). In scheduling the next day of trial more than 30 days later, the superior court gave counsel for the parents time to work through all this discovery and to allow them to assess fully the ramifications of all this [domestic violence] evidence. Moreover, Barbara had the opportunity to present legal argument on why OCS had failed to prove that the children were in need of aid under subsection (8), and made arguments concerning both paragraphs (A) and (B) in her closing brief. Given the foregoing, Barbara suffered no prejudice from OCS's failure to explicitly reference paragraph (8)(B) in its termination petition. Therefore, the superior court could properly make a finding under any paragraph of subsection (8) supported by the evidence. [29] Finally, Barbara argues that the superior court's finding under subsection (8) was not supported by the evidence at trial because the children had minimal exposure to domestic violence, and OCS failed to prove any pattern of ... behavior in the children's presence. But AS 47.10.011(8)(B)(i) does not require that the children be physically present when there is domestic violence (although Michael was in fact present in one instance). [30] Rather, it requires proof that conduct by the parent places the child at substantial risk of mental injury as a result of a pattern of ... terrorizing ... behavior that would, if continued, result in mental injury. There was substantial evidence presented at trial of ongoing domestic violence between Barbara and Leo and testimony by an expert witness that exposure to domestic violence creates a substantial risk of mental harm to a child, even where the child is not physically present. This evidence supports a finding that Leo's acts toward Barbara created a significant risk of mental injury to the children if they had been placed with their parents. Therefore, the superior court did not err in finding that OCS proved by clear and convincing evidence that Michael and Gary were children in need of aid under AS 47.10.011(8) of the CINA statute.