Opinion ID: 4525104
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Enmund/Tison finding

Text: ¶8 The Eighth Amendment prohibits “all punishments which by their excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the offenses charged.” Tison, 481 U.S. at 148 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 371 (1910)). Thus, a jury cannot impose a death sentence on a defendant convicted of first degree felony murder unless it first ensures that a death sentence is proportionate to the defendant’s “personal responsibility and moral guilt.” State v. Miles, 243 Ariz. 511, 514 ¶ 13 (2018) (quoting Enmund, 458 U.S. at 801). ¶9 To justify imposition of a death sentence on a person convicted of felony murder, the jury must find that the defendant either: (1) “kill[s], attempt[s] to kill, or intend[s] that a killing take place or that lethal force will be employed,” Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797, or (2) is a major participant in the underlying felony and acts with reckless indifference to human life, Tison, 481 U.S. at 158. “The Enmund/Tison inquiry does not concern the guilt or innocence of the defendant but acts as an Eighth Amendment sentencing restraint.” Miles, 243 Ariz. at 514 ¶ 13. ¶10 For different reasons, the jurors unanimously found that Allen’s actions satisfied Enmund/Tison. Eleven jurors found that Allen killed A.D., and eleven jurors found that Allen was a major participant in committing the child abuse that resulted in A.D.’s death and acted with reckless indifference towards her life. ¶11 Allen argues that insufficient evidence supports the jury’s Enmund/Tison finding. We review that finding for “substantial evidence, ‘viewing the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury verdict.’” State v. Garcia, 224 Ariz. 1, 15 ¶ 54 (2010) (quoting State v. Roseberry, 210 Ariz. 360, 368–69 ¶ 45 (2005)). “Substantial evidence exists when there is such proof that reasonable persons could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Mathers, 165 Ariz. 64, 67 (1990)). Because the jury was not unanimous regarding how 4 STATE V. ALLEN Opinion of the Court Enmund/Tison was satisfied, substantial evidence must exist for both findings. ¶12 Allen argues there was insufficient evidence that he actually killed A.D. per Enmund because nothing suggests he knew that shutting her in the box could kill her, and her death was “an unfortunate accident, not a purposeful killing.” But Enmund is satisfied if Allen actually killed A.D., regardless of his intent. See Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797; see also State v. Joseph, 230 Ariz. 296, 300 ¶ 17 (2012) (“A defendant convicted of felony murder may receive a death sentence regardless of his intent if he actually kills a victim during the course of a felony . . . .”). Sufficient evidence exists that A.D. died as a direct result of Allen’s actions. He told her to get inside a plastic box that was twenty-one inches shorter than her, shut the lid, placed a lock on it to prevent her escape, kept the only key, and left her there unsupervised while he went to bed. Dr. Philip Keen, the chief medical examiner, testified that A.D. died from “being stuffed inside this box,” which had decreased air availability and, given the size of the box, also restricted her “ability to have air exchange” by pushing her chin down against her chest. ¶13 Turning to the Tison finding, Allen does not dispute he was a major participant in committing the child abuse that resulted in A.D.’s death but argues that insufficient evidence shows he acted with reckless indifference to human life. See Tison, 481 U.S. at 158. He points out that because A.D. had been placed in the box at least ten times before without suffering injury, he “never contemplated” that A.D. could suffer serious physical injury or die. ¶14 Under Tison’s “reckless indifference” inquiry, the state must prove the defendant “subjectively appreciated that [his] acts were likely to result in the taking of innocent life.” State v. Lynch, 225 Ariz. 27, 36 ¶ 43 (2010) (quoting Tison, 481 U.S. at 152). That likelihood exists when the defendant “knowingly engag[es] in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death.” See Tison, 481 U.S. at 157. Locking a child in a plastic box that, according to a police detective, was “not perfectly air tight but [] fairly tight” and twenty-one inches shorter than she is for more than six hours without supervision and with no way to escape carries a significant risk of death. That A.D. had previously been confined in the box and had not been seriously injured did not lessen the risk of death, just as playing Russian Roulette without injury does not lessen the risk of death attendant to that “game.” See id. at 157–58 (stating that reckless disregard for human 5 STATE V. ALLEN Opinion of the Court life can exist when “conduct causes its natural, though also not inevitable, lethal result”). Also, on those occasions, A.D. had only been inside the box for a couple hours. Even then, she would emerge from the box sweaty. On the day she died, Allen left her in the box for more than six hours in a room “significantly warmer” than other rooms in the house, creating an even greater risk of death. Unlike on prior occasions, A.D. was also unable to escape if in distress because the box was locked. ¶15 Allen’s indifference towards A.D.’s life is further evidenced by his decision to leave her unsupervised and go to bed, which risked his falling asleep and rendering him incapable of checking on A.D.’s welfare. And upon awakening, rather than immediately unlocking the box, he took the time to dress while giving the lock key to Sammantha. Substantial evidence supports the Tison finding that Allen was a major participant in commission of the child abuse that resulted in A.D.’s death and that he subjectively appreciated that his acts would likely kill A.D., making him recklessly indifferent regarding her life. ¶16 In sum, sufficient evidence supports the Enmund/Tison finding.