Opinion ID: 187347
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: General Validity of Pre-sentence Waivers

Text: As the First Circuit has observed, The basic argument against presentence waivers of appellate rights is that such waivers are anticipatory. United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14, 21 (2001). Accordingly, Guillen argues a defendant cannot knowingly waive his right to appeal a sentence that has not yet been imposed. All eleven other courts of appeals with criminal jurisdiction (including the First) have rejected this argument and held such waivers are presumptively valid. [] This court has enforced a waiver of the right to appeal a yet-to-be-imposed sentence on two occasions, see United States v. West, 392 F.3d 450, 458-61 (2004); In re Sealed Case, 283 F.3d 349, 355 (2002), but we have not yet determined whether such waivers are valid as a general matter. West, 392 F.3d at 460-61. We now agree with our sister circuits that such waivers generally may be enforced. A defendant may waive his right to appeal his sentence as long as his decision is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. An anticipatory waiverthat is, one made before the defendant knows what the sentence will beis nonetheless a knowing waiver if the defendant is aware of and understands the risks involved in his decision. Cf. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748-49, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970) (waiver of right to trial by jury); United States v. Cunningham, 145 F.3d 1385, 1391 (D.C.Cir.1998) (waiver of right to counsel). If the record [shows] that [the defendant] knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open, Cunningham, 145 F.3d at 1391 (internal quotation marks omitted), then the Court will enforce an anticipatory waiver. In addition, we note the right to appeal a sentence is a creature of statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742. It would make little sense to hold a criminal defendant, who may waive basic rights guaranteed by the Constitution, may not waive a right created by statute and hence revocable at will by the Congress. See Judiciary Act of 1891, 26 Stat. 826, 828. The defendant cannot be certain of the consequences of waiving his constitutional right to trial by jury or to be represented by counsel any more than he can be certain of the consequences of waiving his right to appeal his sentence. In each situation, he must evaluate the possibilities open to him and their associated probabilities and, with the help of counsel, choose the most favorable alternative. A defendant who waives trial by pleading guilty, for example, believes the sentence he is likely to receive as a result (with credit for accepting responsibility) is more attractive than facing the range of possibilitiesfrom acquittal on all counts to conviction and the maximum sentence on all countsdiscounted by their corresponding probabilities. Pleading guilty allows the defendant to narrow the range of possible penalties. The calculation a defendant makes in waiving his right to appeal his yet-to-be-imposed sentence is fundamentally similar and ought not to be treated differently. Allowing a defendant to waive the right to appeal his sentence also gives him an additional bargaining chip to use in negotiating a plea agreement with the Government. See Teeter, 257 F.3d at 22. For example, the prosecutor might be willing to dismiss a count in exchange for the defendant's waiver of his right to appeal his sentence. Indeed, in certain circumstances an agreement may not be possible if the defendant may not waive his right to appeal. Allowing the defendant to waive this right therefore improves the defendant's bargaining position and increases the probability he will reach a satisfactory plea agreement with the Government.