Opinion ID: 1833263
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: whether the use of the term temporary disfigurement as the sole basis for determining what constitutes a serious bodily injury in a felony child conviction is unconstitutionally overbroad, ill-defined and vague, so as to violate the due process and equal protection clauses of the state of mississippi and united states constitutions.

Text: ¶ 12. The statute which governs felony child abuse reads as follows: Any person who shall intentionally (a) burn any child, (b) torture any child or, (c) except in self-defense or in order to prevent bodily harm to a third party, whip, strike or otherwise abuse or mutilate any child in such a manner as to cause serious bodily harm, shall be guilty of felonious abuse and/or battery of a child and, upon conviction, may be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not more than twenty (20) years. Miss.Code Ann. § 97-5-39(2) (2000). ¶ 13. The question which has often arisen since the adoption of this statute is what constitutes serious bodily harm. A plurality of this Court most recently concluded that [s]erious bodily harm, as it pertains to this section, means bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death, or permanent or temporary disfigurement, or impairment of any bodily organ or function. Wolfe v. State, 743 So.2d 380, 385 (Miss.1999). Prior to Wolfe, only permanent disfigurement was found sufficient to prove felony child abuse. ¶ 14. In the present case, Brittany's injuries consisted of bruises and abrasions. The doctor did not find any broken bones or internal damage. Buffington argues that these bruises are not enough evidence to convict her under this statute. It is clear, however, in this case that the bruises were not the result of a well-deserved spanking. The exhibits do not show a few superficial bruises from a spanking or two, rather they show a little girl who is covered from one end of her body to the other with bruises of varying ages and whose hair is falling out in patches due to malnourishment. Buffington admitted in her testimony that she hit [the child] too hard. Other testimony describes Buffington beating her two-year old daughter with her hand, a belt and a dog collar, slapping her, kicking her in the head and throwing her against a wall. ¶ 15. The Wolfe plurality stated that the controlling statute is not so overly broad, ill-defined and vague, so as to violate the due process and equal protection clauses of the State of Mississippi and the United States Constitutions. The child's parents knew that their actions were wrong. Buffington further complains that the trial court utilized an inappropriate standard in defining felony child abuse. She argues that Wolfe was a plurality decision, and thus has no precedential value. It is true that a majority of all sitting judges is required to create precedent, and therefore, it follows that a plurality vote does not create a binding result. Churchill v. Pearl River Basin Dev. Dist., 619 So.2d 900, 904 (Miss.1993) (citation omitted). We find that the definition initially set forth in Yates v. State, 685 So.2d 715 (Miss.1996), is not appropriate when considering child abuse. Yates is thus overruled. Rather, as we stated in Wolfe, the definition provided in Yates, while appropriate in aggravated assault cases, is highly problematic due to the heightened level of vulnerability inherent in victims of child abuse. Wolfe, 743 So.2d at 385. Today this Court holds that serious bodily harm means bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death, or permanent or temporary disfigurement, or impairment of any function of any bodily organ or function, and thus, we find that the standard espoused in Wolfe is an appropriate definition of serious bodily harm. Id. We do so noting that this is the definition provided for in § 4f of the Model Child Protection Act of the National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect (1977). Id. at 384. ¶ 16. As stated in Wolfe, [i]t is important to note ... that this Court's decision... should in no way be construed as an attempt to prevent parents, teachers and other custodians involved in child care from properly disciplining their children. As long as the discipline is moderate and reasonable in light of the age and condition of the child, and other surrounding circumstances, the parent or custodian will not incur criminal liability. Id. In other words, temporary disfigurement will not be met by a few bruises. In fact, the trial court gave Jury Instruction D-8A, which advised the jury that they should find Buffington not guilty if they found discipline was administered to the child and that it was done so in a moderate and reasonable fashion. ¶ 17. We note also that the trial court gave Jury Instruction D-7, which allowed the jury to find, if the evidence warranted, the lesser charge of contributing to the neglect or abuse of a child. The form of verdict Jury Instruction S 5 also provided for such lesser offense as a possible verdict of the jury. As observed previously, in the case at bar there was testimony that the child had been thrown against the wall more than once and hit with belts and dog collars. She was covered with bruises from head to toe, her hair was falling out in patches, and she had cuts and scratches on her face and body. This was not a case involving just a few bruises, but rather was a severe case, which clearly meets the established felony criteria. ¶ 18. Thus, while the standard given by the trial judge was based on the Wolfe plurality decision, there was no error as we find that standard to be correct. Viewing the jury instructions as a whole, the jury was adequately instructed regarding felony child abuse, the lesser offense of abuse, and a possible not guilty verdict due to moderate or reasonable discipline being administered to the child. Further, upon review of the record below, this Court finds that Buffington's actions qualify as felony child abuse under either the Yates or Wolfe standard.