Opinion ID: 770685
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: State Discretion Under the IDEA to Define School

Text: 16 The school district contends, and the district court held, that state law controls the definition of private school under the IDEA, and that therefore Christopher does not qualify, because exempted home education does not qualify as a private school in Nevada. Private schools, under pre-1999 Nevada law, means private elementary and secondary educational institutions. The term does not include a home in which instruction is provided to a child excused from compulsory attendance pursuant to NRS 392.070. NRS 394.103 (1997) (emphasis added). Thus, Christopher does not qualify as a private school child under Nevada law, and thereby does not qualify for ancillary services under the school district's policy. 17 The Hooks family does not dispute the school district's interpretation of Nevada law, and we do not address that issue of state law interpretation. Rather, the appellants contend that Nevada's definition, and by extension the school district's policy, violates the IDEA. The appellants invite us to craft our own definition of private school or facility  and impose it upon the States from the federal level. We decline this invitation. 18 Instead, we hold that the IDEA leaves discretion to the States to determine that home education that is exempted from the State's compulsory attendance requirement does not constitute an IDEA-qualifying private school or facility. In holding that this matter is left to the States, we affirm the district court. 19 We start with the words of the statutory and regulatory provisions. The common meaning of those words--their plain language--does not require that exempted home education qualify as a private school or facility. A school can be commonly defined as an institution for the instruction of children. Webster's II, New Riverside University Dictionary 1045 (1994) (emphasis added); and an institution  can be commonly defined as an established organization or foundation, esp[ecially] one dedicated to public service. Id. at 633; cf. Black's Law Dictionary 800, 1344 (6th ed. 1990) (similarly defining [i]nstitution and [s]chool). Moreover, a facility can be commonly defined as [s]omething created to serve a particular function, such as a new mental health facility. Webster's II, New Riverside University Dictionary 460 (1994) (emphasis in original); cf. Black's Law Dictionary 591 (6th ed. 1990) (similarly defining [f]acility). 20 These common definitions comport almost precisely with Nevada's definition of a private school as a private institution, which excludes an exempted private home. NRS 394.103 (1997). Under these common definitions, such a home is neither a school, a facility,  an institution, an established organization, nor something created to serve the particular function of education. We do not offer this analysis to suggest, and we do not hold, that a State can never define private school broadly enough to include home education within the sphere of IDEA-benefitted educational environments. We merely conclude that the plain language does not compel such a broad definition. 21 Second, we look to the interpretation embraced by the policy letter issued by OSEP, which is charged with implementing and enforcing the IDEA. See 20 U.S.C. S 1402(a)(2000). According to OSEP, the determination of whether a home education constitutes private school placement must be made on the basis of state law. OSEP Policy Letter to Williams, 18 IDELR 742, 744. The Supreme Court has taken guidance from an OSEP policy letter, as we do today, to define an ambiguous provision of the IDEA. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 325 n.8 (1988); see also Mary P. v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 919 F.Supp. 1173, 1179 (N.D. Ill. 1996). 22 Third, Congress explicitly ratified OSEP's view that States must define the ambit of private schools.  Specifically, the amended IDEA provides inter alia that [t]he term `elementary school' means a nonprofit institutional day or residential school that provides elementary education, as determined under State law. 20 U.S.C. S 1401(5) (2000) (emphasis added). Elsewhere, the new IDEA's definition of secondary school is likewise committed to State law. 20 U.S.C. S 1401(23) (2000). 23 When a Congress that re-enacts a statute voices its approval of an administrative or other interpretation thereof, Congress is treated as having adopted that interpretation. United States v. Sheffield Bd. of Comm'rs, 435 U.S. 110, 134 (1978); see also Ward v. Commissioner, 784 F.2d 1424, 1430 (9th Cir. 1986) (describing legislative reenactment doctrine). Here, Congress went further than merely silently reenacting the IDEA or tacitly consenting to OSEP's deference to the States; Congress expressly embraced such deference to the States. 24 Contrary to the contentions of the appellants, leaving such discretion to the States does not clash with Congressional intent. The appellants rely on Congressional findings contained within the IDEA, providing that state and local educational agencies have a responsibility to provide education for all children with disabilities. 20 U.S.C. S 1400(b)(8) (1996); accord 20 U.S.C. S 1400(c)(6) (2000). The school district has not failed in its responsibility to provide education for Christopher, id. (emphasis added); indeed, the school district has offered free enrollment in the public school, replete with subsidized special services. Cf. Irving Independent School Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883, 890 (1984) (By enacting the IDEA, Congress sought primarily to make public education available to handicapped children and to make access meaningful.) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Nothing in the IDEA requires that school districts provide services to children whose parents have rejected the State's offer of an education and have failed to enroll in any school, under the State's definition of that word. 25 Nevada's 1999 legislation providing for speech therapy for home-educated students is but additional evidence that federal courts need not strain to capture this subject from the States. On this issue, we affirm the district court.