Opinion ID: 662464
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: issues on appeal relating to delay

Text: 50 A threshold question that must be addressed in every habeas case is that of exhaustion. Federal habeas relief is not available to a state prisoner unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, or that there is either an absence of available State corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(b). 51 The exhaustion doctrine, which was codified in 1948, began as a judicially crafted instrument which reflects a careful balance between important interests of federalism and the need to preserve the writ of habeas corpus as a 'swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement.'  Braden v. 30th Judicial Cir. Ct. of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 490, 93 S.Ct. 1123, 1127, 35 L.Ed.2d 443 (1973) (quoting Secretary of State for Home Affairs v. O'Brien, [1923] A.C. 603, 609 (H.L.)). Although the doctrine advances several interests, see Deters v. Collins, 985 F.2d 789, 794 (5th Cir.1993), it is principally designed to protect the state court's role in the enforcement of federal law and prevent disruption of state judicial proceedings. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 1203, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982). 52 Because it would be unseemly in our dual system of government for a federal district court to upset a state court conviction without an opportunity to the state courts to correct a constitutional violation, federal courts apply the doctrine of comity, which teaches that one court should defer action on causes properly within its jurisdiction until the courts of another sovereignty with concurrent powers, and already cognizant of the litigation, have had an opportunity to pass upon the matter. 53 Id. (quoting Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204, 70 S.Ct. 587, 590, 94 L.Ed. 761 (1950)). 54 Exhaustion is, therefore, based on principles of comity; exhaustion is not jurisdictional. Patterson v. Leeke, 556 F.2d 1168, 1170 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 929, 98 S.Ct. 414, 54 L.Ed.2d 289 (1977). Although there is a strong presumption in favor of requiring the prisoner to pursue his available state remedies, his failure to do so is not an absolute bar to appellate consideration of his claims. Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 131, 107 S.Ct. 1671, 1674, 95 L.Ed.2d 119 (1987). The State may waive a prisoner's failure to exhaust by failing to raise the defense in federal district court. Id. at 135, 107 S.Ct. at 1675. Likewise, some cases may present special circumstances that make it appropriate for an appellate court to address the merits of a habeas corpus petition notwithstanding the lack of complete exhaustion. Id. at 131, 107 S.Ct. at 1673; Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 521, 72 S.Ct. 509, 511, 96 L.Ed. 541 (1952). One such circumstance is when the State's process is inadequate to protect a prisoner's rights. See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(b); Darr, 339 U.S. at 210, 70 S.Ct. at 593. 55 [W]here state procedural snarls or obstacles preclude an effective state remedy against unconstitutional convictions, federal courts have no other choice but to grant relief in the collateral proceeding. Bartone v. United States, 375 U.S. 52, 54, 84 S.Ct. 21, 22, 11 L.Ed.2d 11 (1963); see also Hankins v. Fulcomer, 941 F.2d 246, 250 (3d Cir.1991) ([T]he principle of comity weighs less heavily [when] the state has had an ample opportunity to pass upon the matter and has failed to sufficiently explain its ... delay.); United States ex rel. Hankins v. Wicker, 582 F.Supp. 180, 182 (W.D.Pa.1984) (If an appropriate remedy does not exist or its utilization is frustrated in the state system, ... [t]he deference accorded the state judicial process must give way to the primary role of the federal courts to redress constitutional deprivations.), aff'd, 782 F.2d 1028 (3d Cir.) (table), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 831, 107 S.Ct. 118, 93 L.Ed.2d 64 (1986). 56 Thus, inexcusable or inordinate delay by the state in processing claims for relief may make the state process ineffective to protect the petitioner's rights and excuse exhaustion. Wojtczak v. Fulcomer, 800 F.2d 353, 354 (3d Cir.1986); accord Hill v. Reynolds, 942 F.2d at 1496 ([T]he delay [petitioner] faced in having a direct appeal filed proves his state remedies ineffective.). 57 In Way v. Crouse, 421 F.2d 145, 146-47 (10th Cir.1970), we concluded that it was proper for a habeas petitioner who had experienced an eighteen-month delay in the adjudication of his direct criminal appeal to seek vindication of his asserted constitutional grievance in the federal, rather than the state, courts. Noting that  '[t]he concept of federal-state comity involves mutuality of responsibilities, and an unacted upon responsibility can relieve one comity partner from continuous deference,'  we vacated the order dismissing the habeas petition for failure to exhaust. Id. at 147 (quoting Dixon v. Florida, 388 F.2d 424, 426 (5th Cir.1968)). 58 Later, in Harris I, we set forth the standard that when a habeas petitioner makes colorable and sufficient allegations of an unconstitutional delay in obtaining direct state appellate review of his criminal conviction, ... the federal district court should consider that claim on the merits without requiring that he exhaust his direct state appeal first. 938 F.2d at 1068-69. Because exhaustion is a threshold issue, it often can be addressed on the pleadings without the need for an evidentiary hearing. However, an evidentiary hearing was deemed necessary in Harris I to investigate the reasons for delay in light of the allegations of systemic delay. 59 We turn now to the question: At what point does delay in the state process become so inordinate that exhaustion should be excused? In addressing this question, we must keep in mind that [i]t is the legal issues that are to be exhausted, not the petitioner, Park v. Thompson, 356 F.Supp. 783, 788 (D.Haw.1973). We cannot, of course, announce a bright line rule. As we noted in Way, 421 F.2d at 146-47, and Jones v. Crouse, 360 F.2d 157, 158 (10th Cir.1966), it is necessary to know the facts and circumstances surrounding the delay in order to determine whether the State is providing the petitioner an effective appeal. 60 In Way, we concluded that an eighteen-month delay in docketing a direct appeal before the state supreme court was enough to excuse exhaustion in the absence of facts and circumstances justifying that delay. 421 F.2d at 146-47. Based on other facts and circumstances, courts have found other periods of delay sufficient to conclude that the state process was ineffective and exhaustion should be excused. See Simmons v. Reynolds, 898 F.2d 865, 870 (2d Cir.1990) (suggesting that [t]he doctrine of exhaustion of state remedies does not require a prisoner to wait ... three or four years before enlisting federal aid to expedite an appeal); Rheuark v. Wade, 540 F.2d 1282, 1283 (5th Cir.1976) (remanding for district court to excuse exhaustion if fifteen-month delay in preparing transcript could not be justified); Dozie v. Cady, 430 F.2d 637, 638 (7th Cir.1970) (remanding for district court to excuse exhaustion if seventeen-month delay in briefing direct criminal appeal could not be justified); United States ex rel. Hankins, 582 F.Supp. at 182 (finding the twenty four month delay in the disposition of [petitioner's] direct appeal, to which is added the nine month period between his conviction and the filing of a notice of appeal, sufficient to question the adequacy of the state remedy and to excuse exhaustion); cf. Smith v. Kansas, 356 F.2d 654, 657 (10th Cir.1966) (remanding for district court to take such steps as it deems necessary to secure petitioner's right to a prompt hearing on his claim of unconstitutional restraint where more than one year passed between filing of motion for post-conviction relief and entry of appealable order), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 871, 88 S.Ct. 154, 19 L.Ed.2d 151 (1967); Breazeale v. Bradley, 582 F.2d 5, 6 (5th Cir.1978) (excusing exhaustion because state habeas petition had been completely dormant for over one year and the State had offered no reason for its torpor); St. Jules v. Beto, 462 F.2d 1365, 1366-67 (5th Cir.1972) (remanding for district court to excuse exhaustion and address merits if seventeen-month delay in state trial court ruling on motion for post-conviction relief could not be justified); Jones, 360 F.2d at 158 (remanding for district court to excuse exhaustion if eighteen-month delay in adjudicating appeal from denial of post-conviction relief could not be justified); Dixon, 388 F.2d at 426 (remanding for district court to excuse exhaustion and address merits if eighteen-month delay in state trial court ruling on post-sentencing motion could not be justified); Seemiller v. Wyrick, 663 F.2d 805, 807-08 (8th Cir.1981) (remanding for district court to excuse exhaustion and address claims if state court had not ruled within sixty days on motion for post-conviction relief that had been pending for two years); Wojtczak, 800 F.2d at 355-56 (excusing exhaustion because motion for post-conviction relief had been pending for more than two and one-half years); Moore v. Deputy Comm'rs of SCI-Huntingdon, 946 F.2d 236, 242 (3d Cir.1991) (excusing exhaustion because petition for post-conviction relief had been pending for three years), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1509, 117 L.Ed.2d 647 (1992). 61 Although we cannot establish a bright line, we think it would be helpful to articulate a time period beyond which there is at least a presumption that the state process has become ineffective because of delay. Based upon the record before us, as well as our review of the case law in this and other circuits, we conclude that delay in adjudicating a direct criminal appeal beyond two years from the filing of the notice of appeal gives rise to a presumption that the state appellate process is ineffective. 9 62 We recognize that cases may arise in which exhaustion should be excused even though an appeal has been pending for less than two years. Conversely, we also recognize that, in particular cases, the State may show that a delay of more than two years is justified and, therefore, good cause exists for not excusing exhaustion. Thus, we hold only that the state appellate process should be presumed to be ineffective and, therefore, exhaustion should presumptively be excused, when a petitioner's direct criminal appeal has been pending for two years without resolution absent a constitutionally sufficient justification by the State. See Burkett v. Cunningham, 826 F.2d 1208, 1218 (3d Cir.1987) (Burkett I ) ([W]here a petitioner has demonstrated inordinate delay, we have placed the burden on respondents to demonstrate why further resort to the state courts should be required.). 63 Although Sec. 2254 requires a habeas petitioner to exhaust his or her underlying claims before coming to federal court, it does not require a petitioner to exhaust the issue of exhaustion, itself. Because exhaustion functions as a federal court gatekeeper, the federal, not the state, courts decide when the state process has been exhausted or should be deemed ineffective because of delay. Moreover, requiring a petitioner to raise the issue of exhaustion first in state court would unnecessarily frustrate a petitioner's right to a speedy adjudication of his or her claims. See Way, 421 F.2d at 146-47 (conditionally excusing petitioner from having to raise issue of delay to the very courts which are responsible, on the face of the pleadings, for the very delay of which he complains); Brooks v. Jones, 875 F.2d 30, 31 (2d Cir.1989) (When the petitioner can substantiate his complaint that his right to appeal is being violated by inattention and time-consuming procedures, to require one more technical step would be to tolerate the frustration of the petitioner's due process rights.); United States ex rel. Hankins, 582 F.Supp. at 182 ([W]here the state process is itself the basis for the claim[ed] denial of due process the issue has properly been presented [to the state judiciary].). But see Schandelmeier v. Cunningham, 819 F.2d 52, 54-55 (3d Cir.1986) (holding that because petitioner had not pursued procedures for presenting his claims based on sentencing delay to the state court, he had not exhausted his remedies and could not seek federal relief), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 938, 107 S.Ct. 1584, 94 L.Ed.2d 774 (1987). 64 Once exhaustion is excused, a federal court has the power to review the merits of a petitioner's habeas petition to the extent that it raises federal issues. See, e.g., Jones, 360 F.2d at 158. In many (indeed, most) instances, however, proceeding directly to the merits of a petitioner's claims after excusing exhaustion may not be the preferred course of action, or even an effective one. 65 If exhaustion is excused due to delay in adjudicating a petitioner's direct criminal appeal, the federal habeas review will, in some regards, serve as a surrogate for a direct state appeal. This raises several concerns. First, because the petitioner would be entitled to appointed counsel on direct appeal, Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356-58, 83 S.Ct. 814, 816-17, 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963), it may be appropriate to appoint counsel to represent the petitioner on habeas review. Likewise, the federal court may need to ensure that an indigent petitioner has a free copy of the trial transcript if it is necessary to evaluate his or her habeas petition. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19-20, 76 S.Ct. 585, 590, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956). 66 Furthermore, to the extent the petitioner's underlying claims of error are state claims, the federal court cannot review them even if exhaustion is excused, because federal habeas review is limited to alleged violation[s] of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254; see also Estelle v. McGuire, --- U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991) ([I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state court determinations on state law questions. In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.). 67 Finally, federal courts should not be required as a routine matter to fulfill the State's obligation to provide an adequate and effective direct criminal appeal to its indigent criminal defendants, Griffin, 351 U.S. at 20, 76 S.Ct. at 591. Requiring the federal courts to do so on a regular basis just because the State does not fulfill its own constitutional obligations would unnecessarily tax federal resources and inject the federal courts into the State's process. 68 Thus, we consider an alternative. We start by noting that delay in adjudicating a state prisoner's direct criminal appeal may do more than simply excuse exhaustion. It also may give rise to an independent due process claim. Harris I, 938 F.2d at 1068; accord United States v. Pratt, 645 F.2d 89, 91 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 881, 102 S.Ct. 369, 70 L.Ed.2d 195 (1981); Cody v. Henderson, 936 F.2d 715, 719 (2d Cir.1991); Burkett v. Fulcomer, 951 F.2d 1431, 1446 (3d Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 3055, 120 L.Ed.2d 921 (1992) (Burkett II ); Rheuark v. Shaw, 628 F.2d 297, 302 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 931, 101 S.Ct. 1392, 67 L.Ed.2d 365 (1981); Coe v. Thurman, 922 F.2d 528, 530-31 (9th Cir.1990). Thus, a habeas petition may be predicated on a due process violation arising from the State's delay in adjudicating a petitioner's direct criminal appeal even if the petitioner's allegations of error at the trial level are based on state law and, therefore, not proper for federal habeas review. 69 Once appellate delay rises to the level of an independent due process violation, a wide range of remedies is available with which the federal district court can redress the constitutional violation. These remedies often will be more effective in redressing state appellate delay than will merely excusing exhaustion and considering the petitioner's underlying claims on the merits. We turn, therefore, to the requirements for establishing an independent due process claim based on the State's delay in processing a direct criminal appeal. 70

71 The Due Process Clause provides that No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.... U.S. Const. amend. V. Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment provides nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. Id. amend. XIV, Sec. 1. 72 The right to a speedy trial, which is guaranteed an accused by the Sixth Amendment, is a fundamental right imposed on the states by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 515, 92 S.Ct. at 2184. Although the Constitution does not require the State to afford a criminal defendant a direct appeal to challenge alleged trial court errors, see McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687, 14 S.Ct. 913, 914, 38 L.Ed. 867 (1894), the Supreme Court has held that 73 if a State has created appellate courts as an integral part of the ... system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant, Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S., at 18 [76 S.Ct. at 590], the procedures used in deciding appeals must comport with the demands of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution. 74 Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393, 105 S.Ct. 830, 834, 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985) (alteration in original). 75 To ensure the defendant's right to a meaningful appeal, Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. at 358, 83 S.Ct. at 817, the Court has held that when the State affords a criminal defendant an appeal by right, the Fourteenth Amendment requires, among other things, that counsel be appointed to represent an indigent defendant id. at 356-58, 83 S.Ct. at 816-17, that the representation of counsel be effective, Evitts, 469 U.S. at 396, 105 S.Ct. at 836, and that either an indigent defendant be provided a free transcript or some equivalent method of reporting the trial proceedings be employed, Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 495, 83 S.Ct. 774, 778, 9 L.Ed.2d 899 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. at 19-20, 76 S.Ct. at 590-591. 76 We may add to this list the requirement that the State afford the defendant a timely appeal, for an appeal that is inordinately delayed is as much a meaningless ritual, Douglas, 372 U.S. at 358, 83 S.Ct. at 817, as an appeal that is adjudicated without the benefit of effective counsel or a transcript of the trial court proceedings. See Burkett I, 826 F.2d at 1221-22; United States ex rel. Smith v. Twomey, 486 F.2d 736, 739 (7th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 994, 94 S.Ct. 2408, 40 L.Ed.2d 773 (1974); cf. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 449, 82 S.Ct. 917, 923, 8 L.Ed.2d 21 (1962) (No general respect for, nor adherence to, the law as a whole can well be expected without judicial recognition of the paramount need for prompt, eminently fair and sober criminal law procedures.... Delay in the final judgment of conviction, including its appellate review, unquestionably erodes the efficacy of law enforcement.); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S.Ct. 893, 902, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.' ). 77 When determining whether a criminal defendant has been deprived of his or her right to timely process at the trial level, the Supreme Court has established a balancing test to be applied on an ad hoc basis. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. at 2191. Four factors should be assessed and balanced: (1) [l]ength of delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant's assertion of his right, and (4) prejudice to the defendant. Id. (numbers added). The fourth factor should be assessed in the light of the interests of defendants which the speedy trial right was designed to protect. Id. at 532, 92 S.Ct. at 2193. The Court has identified three such interests: (i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired. Id. 78 Although Barker addressed only a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, the balancing test the Court enunciated provides an appropriate framework for evaluating whether a defendant's due process right to a timely direct criminal appeal has been violated. See Rheuark v. Shaw, 628 F.2d at 303 (The factors of Barker are preferred [over] the standard announced in United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 [97 S.Ct. 2044, 52 L.Ed.2d 752] ... (1977) [concerning pre-indictment delay], since the reasons for constraining appellate delay are analogous to the motives underpinning the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.) (footnote omitted); DeLancy v. Caldwell, 741 F.2d 1246, 1248 (10th Cir.1984) (We agree with the Fifth Circuit that the right to avoid unreasonable delay in the appellate process is similar to the right to a speedy trial.); Burkett II, 951 F.2d at 1445-46 (holding that delay in adjudicating an appeal, which infringes on due process rights, is effectively no different than delay in imposing a sentence, which infringes on Sixth Amendment speedy trial right). 79 We can apply the first three factors of the Barker test to claims of appellate delay without modification. We must modify the fourth factor of prejudice to the defendant, however, to reflect the interests sought to be protected by an appeal unencumbered by excessive delay. Rheuark v. Shaw, 628 F.2d at 303 n. 8. 80 The Fifth Circuit has identified the following interests that should be considered when assessing prejudice arising from appellate delay: (1) prevention of oppressive incarceration pending appeal; (2) minimization of anxiety and concern of those convicted awaiting the outcome of their appeals; and (3) limitation of the possibility that a convicted person's grounds for appeal, and his or her defenses in case of reversal and retrial, might be impaired. Id. In DeLancy, 741 F.2d at 1248, we adopted the Fifth Circuit's modification of the Barker prejudice factor for purposes of appellate delay. We also heeded the Supreme Court's admonition that the four factors of the balancing test are related and should be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant. Barker, 407 U.S. at 533, 92 S.Ct. at 2193; DeLancy, 741 F.2d at 1248. 81 Nevertheless, as we discuss below, we view the first factor--length of delay--as a threshold that a petitioner must meet before the court need consider the other factors. Furthermore, we agree with the Ninth Circuit that, ordinarily, a petitioner must make some showing on the fourth factor--prejudice--to establish a due process violation. United States v. Tucker, 8 F.3d 673, 676 (9th Cir.1993) (en banc). 82 Therefore, in determining whether delay in adjudicating a petitioner's direct criminal appeal violated the petitioner's due process rights, we must balance the following factors: 83
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88 ii. causing the petitioner to suffer constitutionally cognizable anxiety and concern awaiting the outcome of his or her appeal; or 89 iii. impairing the petitioner's grounds for appeal or his or her defenses in the event of a reversal and retrial. 90 We will address each of these factors in turn. 91 a. The length of the delay 92 The first factor in the balancing test is the length of the appellate delay. Only passage of an inordinate amount of time triggers due process concern[s]. Hill v. Reynolds, 942 F.2d at 1497 (emphasis added). Therefore, if a petitioner cannot establish at least some degree of inordinate delay, the court need not inquire into the other factors. Cf. Doggett v. United States, --- U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 2690-91, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992) (holding that because no speedy trial violation occurs if the government prosecutes a defendant with customary promptness, to trigger a speedy trial analysis, an accused must allege that the interval between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from 'presumptively prejudicial' delay). 93 We cannot set an inflexible length of time that will constitute inordinate delay in every case. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 521, 92 S.Ct. at 2187 (We cannot definitely say how long is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift but deliberate.); Coe v. Thurman, 922 F.2d at 531 ([T]here is no talismanic number of years or months, after which due process is automatically violated.). Nonetheless, it seems appropriate to judge appellate delay by the same two-year presumptive standard that we used earlier to excuse exhaustion. See supra at p. 1556. Therefore, a two-year delay in finally adjudicating a direct criminal appeal ordinarily will give rise to a presumption of inordinate delay that will satisfy this first factor in the balancing test. 94 Creating a presumption that a two-year delay in adjudicating an appeal is inordinate comports with the district court's ruling that a two-year period, from the notice of appeal or order permitting same, be established as the time period for resolution of a direct criminal appeal in Oklahoma beyond which any delay will be presumed to be unconstitutional, ... absent a showing of good and sufficient cause or special circumstances. R., Doc. 255 at 8 (footnote omitted). 10 Respondents do not challenge the district court's two-year presumptive period. Although petitioners argue for a shorter period, the only basis for their argument is that in 1991, the Tenth Circuit's median time for deciding direct criminal appeals was 11.7 months. See Appellant's Principal Br. (No. 93-5123) at 57; Appellant's Principal Br. (No. 93-5209) at 18-19. We are not sufficiently persuaded by this single statistic to conclude that the district court erred in establishing a two-year presumptive period. See United States v. Pratt, 645 F.2d at 91 (declining to hold nine-month appellate delay unconstitutional in absence of exacerbating factors); United States ex rel. Harris v. Reed, 608 F.Supp. 1369, 1376 (N.D.Ill.1985) (holding that a seven-and-one-half-month delay in adjudicating a motion for post-conviction relief was not so egregious as to violate petitioner's due process rights); Doescher v. Estelle, 454 F.Supp. 943, 952 (N.D.Tex.1978) (determining as a matter of law that a one-year delay in processing petitioner's appeal was not unjustified), appeal dismissed, 597 F.2d 281 (5th Cir.1979) (table). 95 The district court concluded that two years to adjudicate an appeal in Oklahoma is both customary and feasible. 11 Furthermore, a two-year delay is within the time frame that other courts have found to raise due process concerns. For example, in United States ex rel. Hankins, 582 F.Supp. at 184-85, the court held that the pendency of an appeal for two years with no decision by the state appellate court, coupled with a nine-month delay by the trial court in ruling on post-trial motions, gave rise to a prima facie due process violation. See also Dozie v. Cady, 430 F.2d at 638 (holding that seventeen-month delay in filing opening brief warranted inquiry into possible due process violation); Burkett II, 951 F.2d at 1445-46 (holding that eighteen-month delay between sentencing and decision on appeal gave rise to due process violation); United States v. Antoine, 906 F.2d 1379, 1382-83 (9th Cir.) (holding that three-year delay in adjudicating federal appeal was substantial and remanding for further findings regarding prejudice), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 963, 111 S.Ct. 398, 112 L.Ed.2d 407 (1990); Snyder v. Kelly, 769 F.Supp. 108, 111 (W.D.N.Y.1991) (holding that three years is an excessive amount of time to await the resolution of an appeal), aff'd 972 F.2d 1328 (2d Cir.1992) (table); cf. Jones v. Crouse, 360 F.2d at 158 (holding that delay of more than eighteen months in processing appeal of collateral attack warranted inquiry into possible due process violation). 12 96 The passage of two years creates only a presumption of inordinate delay on appeal. The particular circumstances of a case may warrant a finding that the passage of less than two years constitutes inordinate delay or that the passage of more than two years does not. For example, although the length of the sentence cannot be a controlling factor in light of the time requirements inherent in processing an appeal, a case in which a very short sentence was imposed may warrant more expedited treatment. See Wheeler v. Kelly, 639 F.Supp. 1374, 1379 (E.D.N.Y.1986) (holding that the length of the sentence is a factor in determining whether post-conviction delay is excessive), aff'd, 811 F.2d 133 (2d Cir.1987). On the other hand, a particularly complex case may warrant a more lengthy appellate process. Cf. Geames v. Henderson, 725 F.Supp. 681, 685 (E.D.N.Y.1989) (holding that delay of three-and-one-half years was excessive because issues on appeal were no more complex than in most criminal appeals). 97 Because it is a balancing test that we employ, however, delay substantially beyond two years, at least in a case that does not warrant a lengthier appellate process, will reduce the burden of proof on the other three factors necessary to establish a due process violation. See Doggett, --- U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 2693 (holding that the more protracted the delay, the more prejudice may be presumed from the delay). 98 b. The reason for the delay 99 The second part of the balancing test is the reason for the delay. In Harris I, we laid to rest any argument that delays by the Public Defender in filing briefs could be attributed to petitioners on the ground that the Public Defender requested the continuances on petitioners' behalf. 938 F.2d at 1065. The record indicated that the delay in preparing petitioner's brief on appeal [was] caused by the inability of [the Public Defender] to address petitioner's case in a timely fashion. Id. Because this delay was forced upon an unwilling petitioner by reason of his indigency, we held it should not be attributed to the petitioner. Id. The parties do not dispute that the delays in adjudicating petitioners' direct criminal appeals are attributable to the State of Oklahoma and not to petitioners. 13 See R., Doc. 29 at 9 (Attorney General); Addendum to Br. of OIDS Defs. at 17 (Public Defender); R., Doc. 27, Ex. 3(c), Attachment 1 (Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals); see also Hankins v. Fulcomer, 941 F.2d at 252 (holding that court had numerous opportunities to rule on pending matters and its delay in doing so was not attributable to petitioner); Wojtczak v. Fulcomer, 800 F.2d at 356 (holding that delay in adjudicating motion for post-conviction relief was not attributable to petitioner, but to disinterest on the part of court appointed counsel and to a failure on the part of the court to require them to provide minimally effective representation). 100 The State has offered no constitutionally sufficient justification for the delays, such as that the cases are unusually complex or that they involve the death penalty. The only reasons offered by the State were the lack of funding and, possibly, the mismanagement of resources by the Public Defender. See R., Doc. 29 at 9; Addendum to Br. of OIDS Defs. at 17; R., Doc. 27, Ex. 3(c), Attachment 1. 14 Neither of these reasons constitutes an acceptable excuse for delay. See United States ex rel. Smith, 486 F.2d at 739 (The rights announced in Griffin v. Illinois and Douglas v. California cannot be allowed to become meaningless through understaffing of the state offices responsible for assuring those rights.) (citations omitted); Snyder, 769 F.Supp. at 111 (holding that the brobdingnagian case load of assigned counsel is not an acceptable reason for delay); Rheuark v. Shaw, 477 F.Supp. 897, 912 n. 17 (N.D.Tex.1979) ([T]he constitutional requirements of due process on appeal may not be abridged by failing to fund substitute court reporters.), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 628 F.2d 297 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 931, 101 S.Ct. 1392, 67 L.Ed.2d 365 (1981); cf. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 1496, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977) ([T]he cost of protecting a constitutional right cannot justify its total denial.); Todaro v. Ward, 565 F.2d 48, 54 n. 8 (2d Cir.1977) (Inadequate resources no longer can excuse the denial of constitutional rights.). 101 c. Petitioner's assertion of his or her right to a timely 102 appeal 103 The third factor we must balance in determining whether a due process violation has occurred is the petitioner's assertion of his or her right to a timely appeal. The Supreme Court rejected in Barker the rule that a defendant who fails to demand a speedy trial forever waives his right. 407 U.S. at 528, 92 S.Ct. at 2191. Instead, the Court held that whether and how strongly a defendant asserts his or her right to a speedy trial should be balanced with the other factors. Id. at 528-29, 92 S.Ct. at 2191. 104 We will not require petitioners to have made an affirmative assertion of their right to a timely appeal in state court for this factor to weigh in their favor. Under the circumstances, the filing of these federal habeas petitions constitutes a sufficient assertion of petitioners' respective rights to a timely appeal. See Snyder, 769 F.Supp. at 111. 105 Unlike a criminal defendant who stands accused and may not wish to have any trial, much less a speedy one, e.g., Barker, 407 U.S. at 535, 92 S.Ct. at 2194, a criminal defendant who has already been convicted usually wants a speedy appeal and has little or no incentive to delay the outcome. Cody v. Henderson, 936 F.2d at 719; cf. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. at 520, 102 S.Ct. at 1204 (The prisoner's principal interest, of course, is in obtaining speedy federal relief on his claims.). Therefore, we presume every petitioner desired a timely appeal. 106 Furthermore, petitioners were hampered by the fact that they had to speak through their counsel in the state court appellate process and, in most instances, it was that very counsel who was responsible for the delay. Under these circumstances, we cannot fairly expect petitioners to have raised the issue of delay in state court. See Gaines v. Manson, 194 Conn. 510, 481 A.2d 1084, 1093 (1984) (The petitioners have been handicapped in asserting rights through their counsel when it is the counsel itself that has been the source of the challenged delays.). 107 Moreover, because the Public Defender had a policy of briefing cases on a first in, first out basis and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals was unwilling to expedite the briefing of one Public Defender's case over another, see Manous v. State, 797 P.2d at 1005-06, even if petitioners had complained vigorously about delays in prosecuting their appeals, those complaints probably would have been unavailing. See Gaines, 481 A.2d at 1093. Therefore, absent evidence that a petitioner affirmatively sought or caused delay in the adjudication of his or her appeal, this third factor should weigh in favor of finding a due process violation. 108 d. Prejudice to the petitioner as a result of delay 109 The fourth factor we must consider when determining whether a petitioner's due process rights have been violated is whether the petitioner has suffered any prejudice due to delay in adjudicating his or her appeal. As we stated earlier, prejudice may result from any of the following: (i) oppressive incarceration pending appeal; or (ii) constitutionally cognizable anxiety awaiting resolution of the appeal; or (iii) impairment of a defendant's grounds for appeal or a defendant's defenses in the event of a retrial. DeLancy, 741 F.2d at 1248; Rheuark v. Shaw, 628 F.2d at 303 n. 8. 110 We have not previously had occasion to discuss the meaning of prejudice in the context of appellate delay. We take this opportunity to do so, beginning with the last and most serious form of prejudice: impairment of the grounds for appeal or the grounds for defense in the event of a retrial. 15 [T]he most serious [form of prejudice] is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system. If witnesses die or disappear during a delay, the prejudice is obvious. There is also prejudice if defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately events of the distant past. 111 Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. at 2193. 112 Impairment of one's grounds for defense in the event of a retrial is the most difficult form of ... prejudice to prove because time's erosion of exculpatory evidence and testimony 'can rarely be shown.'  Doggett, --- U.S. at ---- - ----, 112 S.Ct. at 2692-93 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. at 2193). The Supreme Court has recognized that excessive delay presumptively compromises the reliability of a trial in ways that neither party can prove or, for that matter, identify, id. --- U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 2693, and the likelihood of injury increases with the length of the delay, id. To support such a finding of prejudice, unjustified delay unaccompanied by particularized trial prejudice must have lasted longer than [unjustified delay] demonstrably causing such prejudice. Id. --- U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 2694. 113 That delay has impaired a petitioner's ability to mount a defense on retrial is irrelevant, however, if a petitioner has no credible grounds for reversal and retrial. See Tucker, 8 F.3d at 676. Therefore, in addition to establishing that excessive delay has impaired his or her defense on retrial, a petitioner also must assert a colorable state or federal claim that would warrant reversal of his or her conviction. 16 See id. But see Harris v. Kuhlman, 601 F.Supp. 987, 994 (E.D.N.Y.1985) (finding that seven-year delay might impair petitioner's defense if he were retried, even though review of petitioner's claims suggested very little chance of reversal). Thus, if a petitioner's conviction has been affirmed by the time the petitioner's claims are heard in the federal habeas proceeding, the petitioner will not be able to show prejudice on retrial because the state appellate court has finally decided there will be no retrial. 114 Likewise, because the only prejudice with which we are concerned is that which arises from excessive delay, for a petitioner to make a particularized showing of prejudice, the prejudicial event, such as the death of a key witness, must have occurred, or have been exacerbated, during the period of delay that is found to be excessive. Therefore, in most cases, particularized prejudice that occurs during the first two years that an appeal is pending will not support a due process violation because the prejudice would have occurred even in the absence of any excessive delay in adjudicating the appeal. 115 We turn then to the second type of prejudice: constitutionally cognizable anxiety awaiting resolution of the appeal. Once again, we are concerned only with anxiety arising out of excessive delay. Therefore, that a petitioner is anxious about the outcome of the appeal from the day the notice of appeal is filed is of no consequence; the anxiety must relate to the period of time that the appeal was excessively delayed. 116 The courts appear split on the showing of anxiety that a petitioner must make. The Ninth Circuit, for example, requires a showing of particular anxiety distinguishable from that of any other prisoner awaiting the outcome of an appeal. Antoine, 906 F.2d at 1383; see also Tucker, 8 F.3d at 676; Coe, 922 F.2d at 532. In Burkett II, the Third Circuit concluded that the petitioner had established prejudice in part because he was able to detail anxiety related to the processing of his case post-conviction. 951 F.2d at 1447. The Second Circuit, on the other hand, has affirmed findings of prejudice based solely on the district court's assumption hat the delay of four or more years worried the petitioner, who awaited hopefully the outcome of the appeal. Yourdon v. Kelly, 969 F.2d 1042 (2d Cir.1992) (table), aff'g, 769 F.Supp. 112, 115 (W.D.N.Y.1991); Snyder v. Kelly, 972 F.2d 1328 (2d Cir.1992) (table), aff'g 769 F.Supp. 108, 111 (W.D.N.Y.1991). We think the better approach is to require the petitioner to make some particularized and substantial showing of anxiety and concern, absent a delay so excessive as to trigger the Doggett presumption of prejudice. 117 A petitioner has no reason to be anxious or concerned about the time it takes to adjudicate an appeal that is without merit. Therefore, to establish prejudice resulting from anxiety, a petitioner must once again assert a colorable state or federal claim that would warrant reversal of the petitioner's conviction or reduction of sentence to an amount of time less than that taken to adjudicate the appeal. 17 118 The third form of prejudice a petitioner may suffer is oppressive incarceration pending appeal. In many respects this form of prejudice merely duplicates the prejudice of anxiety discussed above. In both cases, the petitioner must make some showing that his or her incarceration is wrongful. In addition, the petitioner must make a particularized showing that the incarceration is oppressive beyond that experienced by others awaiting the outcome of their appeals. That is, the petitioner must show some oppressiveness unique to his or her situation that is directly attributable to the excessive delay in adjudicating the petitioner's appeal. 119 While we recognize that a habeas petitioner has a right to assert a properly exhausted habeas claim even if incarcerated under another, unchallenged sentence, Sciberras v. United States, 404 F.2d 247, 249 (10th Cir.1968) (Sec. 2255); Rhodus v. Patterson, 404 F.2d 890, 891 (10th Cir.1968) (Sec. 2254), incarceration under an unchallenged sentence substantially negates a claim of prejudice arising from incarceration under the challenged sentence. Because the quality of a petitioner's incarceration may be affected by the very multiplicity of his or her convictions or the seriousness of the offense that is being challenged, however, a petitioner's incarceration under another, unchallenged sentence may not always negate the claim of prejudice altogether. 120 Recognizing that proving any of the three forms of prejudice is difficult, we will not require a level of proof that would necessitate a full blown trial simply to determine whether a petitioner suffered actual prejudice as a result of excessive appellate delay. Instead, the petitioner need make only a colorable and particularized showing of prejudice. As we stated earlier, however, regardless of the form the prejudice takes, it must arise during the period of appellate delay that the court finds to be excessive if it is to factor into the Barker balancing test. 121 The district court determined that it could not evaluate petitioners' due process claims without examining each petitioner's case individually. We agree. While one or more of the factors in the balancing test may weigh the same for every petitioner, not all the factors will. Prejudice, in particular, will vary with the individual. Because the district court has not yet conducted the individual inquiries necessary to resolve petitioners' due process claims, the record is not sufficiently developed for us to review those claims at this time. We therefore remand the action for the district court to conduct the necessary inquiry and make an appropriate record for review. 18
122 If the district court finds that a petitioner's due process rights have been violated, it must then address the matter of a remedy. We agree with the district court's conclusion that any petitioner whose direct criminal appeal has now been decided and whose conviction has been affirmed is not entitled to habeas relief based solely on delay in adjudicating his or her appeal, unless the petitioner can show actual prejudice to the appeal, itself, arising from the delay. 19 See Muwwakkil v. Hoke, 968 F.2d 284, 285 (2d Cir.) (holding that once petitioner's state conviction was affirmed, he was not entitled to release unless he could show a reasonable probability that, but for the appellate delay, his appeal would have been decided differently), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 664, 121 L.Ed.2d 589 (1992). 123 Only when appellate delay prejudiced [the petitioner's] due process rights so as to make his confinement constitutionally deficient, would habeas relief based on appellate delay be appropriate for a petitioner whose conviction has been affirmed. Diaz v. Henderson, 905 F.2d 652, 653 (2d Cir.1990). 124 An untainted affirmance of a petitioner's state appeal while his habeas petition is pending makes clear that the petitioner was confined pursuant to a valid judgment of conviction throughout the period of delay. The affirmance establishes that if the delay had not occurred and petitioner's due process right to a timely appeal had been fully satisfied, he would have been subject to exactly the same term of confinement. Because the due process violation did not result in an illegal confinement, it cannot justify granting the habeas remedy of unconditional release. 125 Cody, 936 F.2d at 720. 126 We also agree with the district court that a petitioner whose conviction the state court has reversed with prejudice to retrial is not entitled to federal habeas relief. Because the state court has set such a petitioner's release in motion, federal habeas relief is neither necessary nor available. 127 [A]bsent absolute or qualified immunity or other appropriate defenses, a petitioner for whom habeas relief is not available may seek redress from the responsible parties for any due process violation caused by state appellate delay through a claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. DeLancy, 741 F.2d at 1248; accord Diaz, 905 F.2d at 654; McLallen v. Henderson, 492 F.2d 1298, 1299-1300 (8th Cir.1974); Doescher v. Estelle, 477 F.Supp. 932, 934 (N.D.Tex.1979), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 616 F.2d 205 (5th Cir.1980). Because this appeal concerns only petitioners' habeas claims, we will not rule on the implications of any pending Sec. 1983 claims. 128 A petitioner whose direct criminal appeal has not yet been decided, however, is entitled to some form of habeas relief if he or she can establish a due process violation arising from delay in adjudicating his or her state appeal. 20 The most appropriate remedy in these circumstances is to grant a conditional writ, i.e., release the petitioner if the State does not decide the petitioner's appeal within a specified period. 21 See Harris I, 938 F.2d at 1070; Coe, 922 F.2d at 532-33; Brooks v. Jones, 875 F.2d at 32. The district court should order the State to decide the appeal within sixty days--or such other time as the district court decides is appropriate for good cause shown 22 --or release the petitioner. 23 129 Although a conditional order of release is the preferred procedure, if the petitioner's underlying substantive claims are federal in nature and, either because of the clarity of the issues or the particular equities involved, the district court concludes that the better procedure would be for it to resolve the federal claims in the absence of exhaustion, the district court has discretion to adjudicate the merits of those claims. 24 As we discussed supra at p. 1557, however, because review on the merits by the district court in many regards replicates the petitioner's direct criminal appeal, the district court should consider the appropriateness of appointing counsel for the indigent petitioner, Douglas, 372 U.S. at 356-57, 83 S.Ct. at 816, and providing the indigent petitioner a free transcript, Griffin, 351 U.S. at 19-20, 76 S.Ct. at 590-91, when reviewing the petitioner's federal claims. 130
131 Unfairness results ... if indigents are singled out by the State and denied meaningful access to the appellate system because of their poverty. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. at 611, 94 S.Ct. at 2444. In Harris I, we noted that delay by the Public Defender in briefing appeals for indigent clients may implicate equal protection concerns. 938 F.2d at 1067; see also United States ex rel. Smith v. Twomey, 486 F.2d at 738; Gaines v. Manson, 481 A.2d at 1094. Our informal survey of published Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals opinions in Harris I suggested that appeals by criminal defendants who were represented by retained counsel were decided considerably faster than appeals by indigent criminal defendants who were represented by the Public Defender. 938 F.2d at 1070 & n. 9. 132 In its ruling of September 9, 1993, the district court determined the parties did not dispute that criminal defendants in Oklahoma who were represented by private counsel had their appeals decided in significantly less time than criminal defendants who were represented by public appointed counsel. R., Doc. 255 at 11. The court, however, postponed any ruling on petitioners' equal protection claims until it conducts the individual inquiries necessary to resolve petitioners' due process claims. 133 Determination of petitioners' equal protection claims raises a variety of issues, including the level of scrutiny to be applied. If the State's conduct creates classifications that impermissibly interfere[ ] with the exercise of a fundamental right or operate[ ] to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class the classifications are subject to strict scrutiny. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 2566, 49 L.Ed.2d 520 (1976) (per curiam) (footnotes omitted). Absent a classification that interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class, however, the State's conduct need only be rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Oklahoma Educ. Ass'n v. Alcoholic Beverage Laws Enforcement Comm'n, 889 F.2d 929, 932 (10th Cir.1989). 25 134 Whether the right to a direct appeal is a fundamental right depends on whether it is explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1296-1297, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973). The Supreme Court has held that appeals from state criminal convictions are not 'explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution,'  and has noted that in dealing with equal protection challenges to state regulation of the right of appeal in criminal cases [the Court has] applied the traditional rational-basis test. Estelle v. Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534, 538, 95 S.Ct. 1173, 1176, 43 L.Ed.2d 377 (1975) (per curiam); see also McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. at 687, 14 S.Ct. at 914 (holding that the Constitution does not require a state to afford a criminal defendant a direct appeal). 135 While it would appear that the rational basis test applies to petitioners' equal protection claims, the Ninth Circuit has suggested in dicta that when the classification is based on wealth, the right to a direct appeal may be a fundamental right for equal protection purposes. See United States v. Avendano-Camacho, 786 F.2d 1392, 1394 (9th Cir.1986); Bell v. Hongisto, 501 F.2d 346, 353 (9th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962, 95 S.Ct. 1351, 43 L.Ed.2d 439 (1975). But see Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471, 97 S.Ct. 2376, 2381, 53 L.Ed.2d 484 (1977) ([T]his Court has never held that financial need alone identifies a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis.). 136 Because the record on appeal is insufficient for us to review petitioners' equal protection claims at this time, we need not decide the proper level of scrutiny to apply to petitioners' claims. Nor need we decide other thorny issues relating to those claims, such as how unequal the appellate processing time for indigents and non-indigents must be to constitute an equal protection violation. See Ross, 417 U.S. at 612, 94 S.Ct. at 2444 (The Fourteenth Amendment does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages, nor does it require the State to equalize economic conditions.... The question is not one of absolutes, but one of degrees.) (internal quotations and citations omitted); Gaines, 481 A.2d at 1094 (holding that the difference in processing appeals of indigents and non-indigents of four years and six months, respectively, reflects a disparity in opportunity of access to the appellate forum that is constitutionally impermissible); Carter v. Thomas, 527 F.2d 1332, 1333 (5th Cir.1976) (holding that alleged delays of up to twenty-one months between the submission of motions to proceed in forma pauperis and the filing of complaints stated an equal protection claim). The district court must address these issues in the first instance on remand. 137 We note that the district court may not need to reach the equal protection claim in some cases. Because the habeas remedies available to redress an equal protection violation based on appellate delay do not differ from the habeas remedies available to redress a due process violation based on appellate delay, once the court determines that a due process violation has occurred that warrants habeas relief, it need not address the other constitutional issues for purposes of the petitioner's habeas action. Likewise, as we discussed earlier with regard to the due process claims, see supra at p. 1566, if the State has upheld the petitioner's conviction on direct appeal, the petitioner is precluded from obtaining habeas relief based on any equal protection violation resulting from delay in adjudicating the petitioner's appeal. In any event, because we have neither the factual record necessary to evaluate petitioners' equal protection claims, nor the benefit of a reasoned analysis of these claims by the district court, we decline to address petitioners' equal protection claims at this time. 138
139 A first appeal as of right ... is not adjudicated in accord with due process of law if the appellant does not have the effective assistance of an attorney. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. at 396, 105 S.Ct. at 836. In the appellate context, the right to effective assistance of counsel requires that counsel be available to assist in preparing and submitting a brief to the appellate court and ... play the role of active advocate. Id. at 394, 105 S.Ct. at 835 (citation omitted). 140 In Harris I, we said that, although a criminal defendant technically may have appointed counsel, past and future alleged delays may be so great that at some point his [or her] counsel's delay in filing [an] appellate brief either has or will render such assistance ineffective. 938 F.2d at 1068. The courts in the Second Circuit also have acknowledged that delay by counsel in prosecuting an appeal can give rise to a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. See Simmons v. Reynolds, 898 F.2d at 868 (holding that counsel's failure to file a brief for five years constituted ineffective assistance of counsel as a matter of law); Harris v. Kuhlman, 601 F.Supp. at 993 (By any measure, counsel's failure to perfect the appeal [for approximately seven years] must be considered ineffective assistance.); Yourdon v. Kelly, 769 F.Supp. at 115 (holding that delay of nearly four years attributable to counsel was sufficiently long to constitute ineffective assistance of counsel as a matter of law); Williams v. James, 770 F.Supp. 103, 107 (W.D.N.Y.1991) (holding that delay of two and one-half years, even if attributable to counsel, was not sufficient to constitute ineffective assistance of counsel as a matter of law). 141 To establish a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must show both that counsel's performance was deficient, and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). To establish the first of these requirements, a petitioner must show that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness measured by prevailing professional norms. Id. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. To establish the prejudice requirement, a petitioner usually has to show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. Prejudice will be presumed, however, if the assistance of counsel is actually or constructively denied altogether. Id. at 692, 104 S.Ct. at 2067. 142 Many of the petitioners here have had to wait three or more years just to get their court-appointed counsel to file an appellate brief on their behalf. The district court may well find that delays of this magnitude fall below the prevailing professional standards for providing effective legal assistance. The real question, therefore, is whether the petitioners can prove prejudice as a result of the briefing delay. 143 During the time that counsel delays excessively in preparing and submitting an appellate brief, the petitioner is left in the same position as someone who has no counsel on appeal at all. See Evitts, 469 U.S. at 396, 105 S.Ct. at 836 ([A] party whose counsel is unable to provide effective representation is in no better position than one who has no counsel at all.). Under these circumstances, prejudice is presumed. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. at 2067. So long as the brief remains unfiled, a petitioner's claim for ineffective assistance of counsel arising from briefing delay may be redressed through a habeas claim. The federal court may direct the State to appoint new counsel to represent the petitioner or otherwise ensure that the petitioner is provided effective assistance of counsel on appeal, and may grant a conditional writ, i.e., order that the petitioner be released if the brief is not filed and the appeal decided within a specified period of time. 144 Once counsel files an appellate brief, however, counsel's ineffectiveness because of delay ends. See Simmons v. Reynolds, 708 F.Supp. 505, 510 (E.D.N.Y.1989), aff'd 898 F.2d 865 (2d Cir.1990) (noting that although petitioner was denied effective assistance by counsel who failed to file a brief for six years, petitioner ultimately received effective assistance from new counsel, who filed a brief). Thus, ineffective assistance of counsel arising from delay in filing an appellate brief is unlike other types of ineffective assistance in that it has a temporal limitation. Furthermore, unlike ineffectiveness arising from, for example, counsel's failure to cross-examine a key witness or to raise a crucial argument on appeal, ineffectiveness arising from delay in filing a brief is unlikely to affect the actual outcome of the appeal. 145 As we said earlier in the context of due process, supra at p. 1566, if a constitutional violation does not affect the integrity of the State's decision, the petitioner's confinement is not unconstitutional. Granting the petitioner habeas relief based on counsel's past ineffective assistance, which has since ended and has not affected the outcome of the appeal, would go too far. Therefore, if an appellate brief has already been filed on the petitioner's behalf at the time the federal court addresses the petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel arising from delay in filing an appellate brief, the petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief absent a showing that the briefing delay impaired the petitioner's chances of prevailing on appeal. 26 Redress for the past constitutional violation is available, if at all, only through a Sec. 1983 (or other) claim for damages. 146 In sum, a future habeas petitioner may be able to obtain habeas relief for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on counsel's ongoing and excessive delay in filing a brief in the petitioner's direct criminal appeal. Such relief appears to be foreclosed for the petitioners here, however, in light of the district court's finding that an appellate brief has been filed with the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals on behalf of all but one petitioner and our assumption that, by now, a brief has been filed on behalf of this petitioner, as well.