Opinion ID: 2785746
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ohio OCSPA Claim

Text: Wise also appeals the dismissal of his claim under the OCSPA, which provides: “No supplier shall commit an unfair or deceptive act or practice in connection with a consumer transaction.” Ohio Rev. Code § 1345.02(A); see also § 1345.03(A) (similarly protecting against “unconscionable” acts and practices). The statute defines “consumer transaction” to specifically exclude transactions between consumers and financial institutions, as defined at Ohio Rev. Code § 5725.01, with certain exceptions that do not apply here. Ohio Rev. Code § 1345.01(A). American Express is a “state chartered industrial loan bank chartered in the state of Utah,” R. 1-1, PageID 10, and as such, meets the definition of a financial institution in Ohio Rev. Code § 5725.01(A)(3). A debt collector is governed as a “supplier” by the OCSPA if the underlying debt was accrued during a consumer transaction. See, e.g., Schroyer v. Frankel, 197 F.3d 1170, 1177 (6th Cir. 1999) (concerning debt collection for an unpaid plumbing bill); Celebrezze v. United Research, Inc., 482 N.E.2d 1260, 1262 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984). However, Wise’s allegations of unfair, deceptive, and unconscionable activity all arise in connection with one transaction: his credit card agreement with American Express. This transaction between a consumer and a financial institution falls outside Ohio’s statutory definition of a “consumer transaction.” There is some authority holding that the OSCPA applies to debt collection activities where the debt arises out of a transaction with a financial institution but is later sold to another entity that is not 5 The defendants’ argument that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine limits the application of the FDCPA to their activities is inapposite. The FDCPA specifically includes lawyers and litigation activities within its purview. See Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291 (1995). The defendants present no cases in which a court has applied the NoerrPennington doctrine to FDCPA claims. In fact, this circuit has already rejected Noerr-Pennington protection for false statements in a debt-collector’s complaint, recognizing that the Petition Clause does not protect “sham petitions, baseless litigation, or petitions containing ‘intentional and reckless falsehoods.’” Hartman v. Great Seneca Fin. Corp., 569 F.3d 606, 616 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 484 (1985)). The defendants attempt to distinguish Hartman by maintaining that there is a special protection for representations and demands made only in a complaint’s prayer for relief. Even if such protection existed, it would not protect these defendants because Wise pled that they demanded attorney’s fees in contexts outside the litigation. No. 14-3278 Wise v. Zwicker & Assocs. Page 13 a financial institution. See Williams v. Javitch, Block & Rathbone, LLP, 480 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1024 (S.D. Ohio 2007). In this case, however, the debt has always been held by American Express, a financial institution; its agents fall outside the scope of the OCSPA. See Lewis v. ACB Bus. Servs., Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 412 (6th Cir. 1998); Martin v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 825 N.E.2d 1138, 1147 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005). The claim under the OCSPA was properly dismissed.