Opinion ID: 1770148
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Heading: principles and history of eminent domain

Text: In its most basic aspect, eminent domain is the power of a government to compel its subjects to give up property interests in land or things. W. Stoebuck, Nontrespassory Takings in Eminent Domain 4 (1977). Since 1825 our Civil Code has declared that, it being the first law of society that the general interest shall be preferred to that of individuals, every individual who possesses under the protection of the laws, any property, is tacitly subjected to the obligation of yielding it to the community, wherever it becomes necessary for the general use. La.C.C. art. 2626 (1870), La.C.C. art. 2604 (1825). Eminent domain, therefore, always concerns property. That is, it always involves the taking or damaging of property interests by the state or some alter ego of the state, such as a public utility, that has been delegated the power to condemn. Stoebuck, supra, at 15; see also, La.Const. of 1974, Art. I, § 4; La.R.S. 48:441 (1977). A problem arises because the word property was usedand continues to be used in two senses. In the United States, it is frequently used to denote indiscriminately either the objects of rights that have a pecuniary content or the rights that persons have with respect to things. Thus, lands, automobiles, and jewels are said to be property; and rights, such as ownership, servitudes, and leases, are likewise said to be property. This latent confusion between rights and their objects has its roots in texts of Roman law and is also encountered in other legal systems of the western world. A. Yiannopoulos, Property, 1 La.Civil Law Treatise § 1 (3d ed. 1991) [hereinafter Yiannopoulos on Property]. Moreover, in both the state and federal constitutions, the ambiguous word property is always used without further definition. Consequently, there was an early division of opinion as to whether the constitution used property to include the rights that persons have with respect to things as well as the objects of those rights. The early popular notion became no taking without a touching. In 1823, in Callender v. Marsh, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 418 (1823), an influential decision, Massachusetts denied compensation for the blocking of an abutting owner's street access caused by the cutting down of the street. On the other hand, Chancellor Kent in 1816 in Gardner v. Trustees of Village of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162 (N.Y.1816), recognized a nonphysical concept in allowing compensation to a riparian owner whose water level was lowered by municipal action. For over a hundred years some legal writers have opposed the physical notion of property. See, e.g., J. Bentham, 3 Bentham's Works 182 (1843 Ed.); see also, Stoebuck, supra, at 16, citing 1 J. Lewis, Eminent Domain 52, 55 (3d ed. 1909); T. Sedgwick, Statutory and Constitutional Law 524 (1857). Professor Yiannopoulos is in accord with this view: Accurate analysis should reserve the use of the word property for the designation of rights that persons have with respect to things. Yiannopoulos on Property, supra. Although the physical concept still exerts a heavy influence in some opinions, the trend has been away from a touching requirement, with increasing acceptance of the possibility of takings without any physical invasion. Stoebuck, supra, at 16-17; P. Nichols, Eminent Domain § 5.01[1] (3d ed. 1991). As a matter of fact, it is now hornbook law that any substantial interference with the free use and enjoyment of property may constitute a taking of property within the meaning of federal and state constitutions. Nichols, supra, at §§ 6.01[1], 6.09 (3d ed. 1991). Accord Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 43 S.Ct. 158, 67 L.Ed. 322 (1922); Adaman Mutual Water Co. v. United States, 278 F.2d 842 (9th Cir.1960), and cases cited therein. Thus, in most jurisdictions, property has come to be recognized, at least tacitly, as a nonphysical legal construct in eminent domain law. See, e.g., La.R.S. 48:441 (1977) (Recognizing both corporeal real estate and incorporeal servitudes as property). Whenever a court allows compensation for governmental interference with an abutting owner's street access, it is compensating for access as a property right separate from rights of possession. The same phenomenon occurs when compensation is given for state action that causes the owner a loss of riparian rights, an impairment of easements or servitudes the owner has on neighboring land, the violation of his restrictive covenant on nearby land, or loss of lateral support. The courts are not always explicit about it; but impliedly, if not expressly, they recognize street access, riparian rights, easements and servitudes, restrictive covenants, and lateral support as forms of property. See Stoebuck, supra, at 17. There can be little doubt that one aim of Article I, § 4, of our state constitution in requiring that the owner shall be compensated for property taken or damaged... to the full extent of his loss was to assure that the State and its subdivisions compensate owners for any taking or damaging of their rights with respect to things as well as for any taking or damaging of the objects of those rights. The history of Section 4 reveals a desire to increase the level and scope of compensation beyond that provided by pre-existing state law. The change from the 1921 constitution's language (just and adequate compensation) to the new phrase (compensated to the full extent of his loss) was deliberate, prompted by a belief on the part of the sponsors that inadequate awards had been provided under the prior law. L. Hargrave, The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 35 La.L.Rev. 1, 15 (1974); cf., State, Dept. of Transp. & Dev. v. Dietrich, 555 So.2d 1355, 1358-59 (La.1990); State, Dept. of Highways v. Constant, 369 So.2d 699, 702 (La. 1979) (the purpose of the additional language in Article I, § 4 was to compensate an owner for any loss sustained by reason of the taking, and not merely restricted as under the former constitution to the market value of the property taken and to reduction in the market value of the remainder). Further, our constitution requires compensation even though the State has not initiated expropriation proceedings in accordance with the statutory scheme set up for that purpose. If there has been any taking or damaging, the expropriating entity is bound to make reparations according to Article I, § 4. Although the legislature has not provided a procedure whereby an owner can seek damages for an uncompensated taking or damaging, this court has recognized the action for inverse condemnation arises out of the self-executing nature of the constitutional command to pay just compensation. See Reymond v. State, Dept. of Highways, 255 La. 425, 231 So.2d 375, 383 (1970). The action for inverse condemnation provides a procedural remedy to a property owner seeking compensation for land already taken or damaged against a governmental or private entity having the powers of eminent domain where no expropriation has commenced. Id. The action for inverse condemnation is available in all cases where there has been a taking or damaging of property where just compensation has not been paid, without regard to whether the property is corporeal or incorporeal. La.Const. of 1974, Art. I, § 4; see also, Ursin v. New Orleans Aviation Board, 506 So.2d 947, 955 (La. App. 5th Cir.1987). Because the taking and damaging of legal property rights, as opposed to the concrete objects of rights, is by nature abstract and conceptual and often incompletely understood, there is an uncommon need for a firm framework of analysis. Accordingly, we have decided to adopt a three-pronged analysis, similar to that recommended by Professor Stoebuck, in determining whether a claimant is entitled to eminent domain compensation. Compare Stoebuck, supra, at 19. Under this analysis, we must first determine if a person's legal right with respect to a thing or an object has been affected. In other words, we must be able to identify a recognized species of private property right that has been affected, regardless of whether causes of action may exist on other theories; otherwise, it cannot be said there has been an exercise of the power of eminent domain. Second, if it is determined that property is involved, we must decide whether the property, either a right or a thing, has been taken or damaged, in a constitutional sense. If property is taken or damaged, one may say that there has been an attempted exercise of the eminent domain power. The final question then is whether the taking or damaging is for a public purpose under Article I, § 4. See Stoebuck, supra. In the present case, the parties have stipulated that the taking and damaging is for a public purpose; accordingly, we must assume that the requirements of this prong have been fulfilled. We have not overlooked the fact that other jurisdictions would apply the consequential damages doctrine in analyzing problems of non-physical damage to property rights. A conscious choice to eschew the doctrine was made because it is ambiguous, confusing, and counter-productive to compensating the owner to the full extent of his loss. As Professor Nichols observed, The term `consequential damage' is ambiguous in character, and is not truly relevant to any discussion respecting the different classes of damage. In the proper sense of the term, all damages must of necessity be consequential, since all damage is the consequence of an injurious act. The use of the term introduces an equivocation which is detrimental to any hope of a clear settlement of the question. It means both damage which is so remote as not to be actionable, and damage which is actionable. Sometimes the term is used to denote damage which, [though] actionable, does not follow in point of time upon the doing of the act complained of. Nichols, supra, § 14.01. Generally speaking, courts following consequential damages principles have drawn a distinction between severance damages, compensable in a condemnation proceeding, and damages to the remainder resulting from the intended use of the land taken. The latter generally have been declared not compensable as consequential damages with little or no explanation. See, e.g., United States v. 79.20 Acres of Land, More or Less, 710 F.2d 1352, 1356 (8th Cir.1983); Howard Johnson Co. v. Division of Admin., State of Florida, 450 So.2d 328 (Fla.App.1984); cf., M. Dakin & M. Klein, Eminent Domain in Louisiana 68 (1970 and Supp.1978); Nichols, supra, § 14.01[1], and cases cited therein. For this reason, the consequential damages approach tends to operate as a blanket rule barring landowners' recovery although in many cases property rights in fact have been taken or damaged without compensation.