Opinion ID: 6350094
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Immigration Court’s Exercise of Jurisdiction

Text: Zuniga’s jurisdictional argument pursuant to Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474 (2021) is without merit. In Niz-Chavez, the Supreme Court addressed “[w]hat qualifies as a notice to appear sufficient to trigger the stop-time rule,” a rule which governs whether a non-lawful resident’s removal order should be canceled. Id. at 1479. Zuniga urges the dismissal of the entire removal proceedings for lack of jurisdiction because the originally issued NTAs lacked the date and time of the hearing. However, this Court’s precedent forecloses this argument because such omissions in an NTA do not deprive an immigration judge of jurisdiction to adjudicate a case. Rafael v. Garland, 15 F.4th 797, 801 (6th Cir. 2021) (citing another source) (“For jurisdictional purposes, it is not necessary that the [NTA] contain all the required information or that all the information be included in a single document.”). Because Zuniga received subsequent notices with the time and date of the hearing, the immigration judge had jurisdiction. To the extent that Zuniga argues that the agency failed to comply with an adequately invoked claims-processing rule, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider it, given that it is raised for the first time on appeal, and it is thus untimely. See Hih v. Lynch, 812 F.3d 551, 554 (6th Cir. 2016). C. Legal Principles of Asylum and Withholding of Removal To receive asylum, Zuniga must show that she is a “refugee.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b). A “refugee” is someone “who is unable or unwilling to return to [her] home country because of past persecution or a ‘well-founded fear’ of future persecution ‘on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.’” Umana-Ramos v. Holder, 724 F.3d 667, 670 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Bonilla-Morales v. Holder, 607 F.3d 1132, -6- No. 21-3312, Zuniga-Martinez, et al. v. Garland 1136 (6th Cir. 2010)). Therefore, as relevant here, Zuniga bears the burden of establishing: (1) past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution, where that persecution is “on account of” membership in a particular social group; (2) a nexus between the persecution and the protected ground; and (3) the persecution was committed by non-government actors whom the government was unable or unwilling to control. Pilica v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 941, 950–51 (6th Cir. 2004). To qualify for withholding of removal under the INA, a petitioner must similarly establish that if removed to her country of origin, her “life or freedom would be threatened” based on her “race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). An applicant seeking withholding of removal faces “a more stringent burden than what is required on a claim for asylum,” and must demonstrate “that there is a clear probability that [s]he will be subject to persecution if forced to return to the country of removal.” Pilica, 388 F.3d at 951 (citations omitted). For the following reasons, the BIA’s decision to affirm the immigration judge’s denial of asylum and withholding of removal under the INA is not supported by substantial evidence.
To establish refugee status based on past persecution, Zuniga must demonstrate being harmed on account of a protected ground. The immigration judge found that Zuniga experienced harm rising to the level of persecution “because there was a physical injury [during the motorcycle incident] with some severe wounding to [Zuniga’s] leg[,] . . . along with the four years of extortion demands from the gangs.” (Immigr. J. Decision, A.R. # 54). Nevertheless, it went on to find that Zuniga had not shown “past persecution because what is missing was this lack of government action or inaction.” (Id. at A.R. # 56). The immigration judge’s determination that Zuniga failed to establish past persecution is not supported by the record. “[P]ersecution ‘requires more than a -7- No. 21-3312, Zuniga-Martinez, et al. v. Garland few isolated incidents of verbal harassment or intimidation, unaccompanied by any physical punishment, infliction of harm, or significant deprivation of liberty.’” Singh v. Ashcroft, 398 F.3d 396, 401 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Mikhailevitch v. INS, 146 F.3d 384, 390 (6th Cir. 1998)). In Zuniga’s credible testimony, she discussed repeated harassment and extortion demands by MS-13, leading to the violent encounter on the motorbikes. These instances surpass mere harassment or an unfulfilled threat. Indeed, Zuniga describes regular threats and acts of extortion; she testified: “[B]ecause I couldn’t pay the extortion money [MS-13 members] were asking me for, they attempted against my life.” (A.R. at # 108). Considering the harms suffered cumulatively, the determination that Zuniga failed to demonstrate past persecution is not supported by substantial evidence; the record compels a contrary conclusion. Haider v. Holder, 595 F.3d 276, 286 (6th Cir. 2010).
An asylum applicant must also show that she was persecuted on account of her membership in the particular social group. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). In applying this nexus test, the immigration judge and the Board agreed that Zuniga failed to draw a sufficient connection between the particular social groups (i.e., a small Honduran business owner and a female Honduran small business owner) and the harm inflicted upon her. Instead, the agency courts found Zuniga was “being targeted by the MS[-13] gang for economic gain, for money, and really for no other reason.” (Immigr. J. Decision, A.R. # 55). Substantial evidence does not support the BIA’s conclusion that Zuniga failed to establish the required nexus between her membership and persecution by the gang members. Specifically, the record seems to indicate that small business owners and female small business owners in Honduras are particularly vulnerable to gang violence by extortion. The record -8- No. 21-3312, Zuniga-Martinez, et al. v. Garland shows that “protection payments” are used by the maras to “reaffirm control over poor urban enclaves.” (Int’l Crisis Grp., Mafia of the Poor: Gang Violence and Extortion in Cent. Am. (2017), A.R. ## 222–55; see also id. at A.R. # 224 (“Extortion schemes . . . depend on coercive control over communities and businesses”); id. at A.R. # 257 (“Gang members typically extort store owners for between 200 and 600 lempiras . . . per month . . . . However, the charges can be much higher.”)). Consequently, “in Honduras[,] the Chamber of Commerce no longer publishes a registry of its members.” (Int’l Crisis Grp., Mafia of the Poor, A.R. # 227). Small business owners are particularly vulnerable because they cannot afford private security. (Id.; see Tr., A.R. # 136 (“Larger businesses have mostly avoided this problem because they have the money to pay for private security services[.]”)). The exhibits in the record also suggest that female small business owners are uniquely exposed to maras’ extortion tactics. (U.S. Dep’t of State, Honduras 2018 Hum. Rts. Rep., (2018), A.R. at # 193 (“Extortion . . . and other threats and violence directed against . . . women, and members of vulnerable populations.”); Int’l Crisis Grp., Mafia of the Poor, A.R. at # 241 (“[W]ith women making up the largest share of victims.”)). It would seem to follow that because the gang members were keen to accept sexual favors in lieu of monetary payment from Zuniga, the Board’s finding that Zuniga was targeted only for financial gain is undermined. (Compare Tr., A.R. # 306 (“The gang noticed that [her husband] would leave town, and [she] stayed alone with the business.”), with Int’l Crisis Grp., Mafia of the Poor, A.R. # 243 (“Male control over female bodies . . . [is] integral to gang culture.”)). Nor did the Board consider that the harassment and extortion began only when Zuniga opened her shop, a factor this Court has found counsels towards proof of nexus. Cf. BonillaMorales, 607 F.3d at 1138 (“[T]he incidents that predate Carlos’[] recruitment appear to be more -9- No. 21-3312, Zuniga-Martinez, et al. v. Garland severe than those that occurred after he refused to join the gang.”). The testimony and evidence on the record separate Zuniga’s claim from a scenario where an asylum applicant bemoans general lawlessness and criminality. Cf. Sanchez-Robles, 808 F.3d at 692. Taken together, the evidence corroborates rather than undermines a nexus between the persecution and membership in a particular social group. The BIA’s finding to the contrary is thus not supported by substantial evidence; rather, the record compels a finding that Zuniga was persecuted as a result of her membership in a particular social group. Consequently, the BIA erred by concluding that Zuniga had not established the requisite nexus between her past persecution and her membership in her social groups. 3. Country Conditions and Government’s Ability to Control An immigration judge should consider evidence of the country’s conditions, particularly where an asylum applicant does not report alleged persecution to the authorities. K.H. v. Barr, 920 F.3d 470, 476 (6th Cir. 2019). In this case, the Board did not discuss evidence of country conditions at all. The immigration judge did conclude that “not all the police in the entire country are corrupt.” (Immigr. J. Decision, A.R. # 56; id. (“[T]he respondent must show that the government of Honduras either condoned the actions of the MS gang, or showed an inability to protect the victims[.]”)). In so finding, the immigration judge emphasized that Zuniga did not report the incidents of extortion or acts of intimidation or physical violence to the police department. (Id. (“[I]n this case, having never made any report to anyone, that simply has not been done.”)). Because neither the BIA nor the immigration judge addressed the documentary evidence of the country conditions that Zuniga submitted, and because it is entirely unclear whether the immigration judge or BIA analyzed the evidence in the context of determining whether the - 10 - No. 21-3312, Zuniga-Martinez, et al. v. Garland government was unable or unwilling to protect Zuniga, the agency’s finding is not supported by substantial evidence. Zometa-Orellana v. Garland, 19 F.4th 970, 980 (6th Cir. 2021). That documentary evidence, including a Country Report from the U.S. Department of State, substantiates Zuniga’s credible testimony that she believed that the police would not act in any meaningful way to protect her. Juan Antonio v. Barr, 959 F.3d 778, 796 (6th Cir. 2020) (“This [C]ourt has counseled that State Department reports are generally the best gauge of conditions in foreign countries.”) (citations omitted)). In support of that position, the reports submitted appear to demonstrate that the Honduran “government lacks the resources to address crime and violence fully.” (U.S. Dep’t of State, Honduras 2018 Crime & Safety Rep. (2018), A.R. # 179; see also id. at A.R. # 193 (U.S. Dep’t of State, Honduras 2018 Hum. Rts. Rep., (2018) (“Impunity existed in many cases . . . as evidenced by . . . [the] few convictions of perpetrators[.]”); id. at A.R. # 195 (reviewing gang “intimidation of police.”); id. at A.R. # 199 (“Corruption and impunity remained serious problems within the security forces.”)). Reporting crimes is often futile as “police may take hours to arrive at the scene of a violent crime or may not respond at all. As a result, criminals operate with a high degree of impunity.” (U.S. Dep’t of State, Honduras 2018 Crime & Safety Rep. (2018), A.R. # 188; see also id. at A.R. ## 207–08 (“Anticorruption efforts continued to lag[.]”). The evidence of country conditions seems to show that “[i]n a context of competitive violence between rival maras and a flawed or absent state—with police lacking equipment . . . [i]nstitutional flaws in the security and justice systems are evident[.]” (Int’l Crisis Grp., Mafia of the Poor, A.R. ## 240, 245). Neither the BIA nor the immigration judge grappled with the significance of those reports in the context of Zuniga’s failure to report the harm suffered to the Honduran authorities in the first instance. See Zometa-Orellana, 19 F.4th at 980. Because the Board did not address these - 11 - No. 21-3312, Zuniga-Martinez, et al. v. Garland issues, we leave them to the Board to consider in the first instance on remand. In particular, the BIA should assess the sufficiency of this evidence and consider whether it establishes that the Honduran Government is unable or unwilling to act. 4. Internal Relocation If an applicant establishes past persecution, she is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.12(b)(1). If unable to show past persecution, and where the national government is not the alleged persecutor, then the asylum applicant bears the burden of showing that the persecution is not geographically limited in such a manner that relocation within the country of origin would be unreasonable. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3)(i). We need not assess Zuniga’s ability to relocate within Honduras because the record compels a finding that she experienced past persecution, entitling her to the presumption as to future persecution. Instead, the government must bear the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence either that “[t]here has been a fundamental change in circumstances such that the applicant’s life or freedom would not be threatened on account of any of the five grounds . . . upon the applicant’s removal to that country,” or that “[t]he applicant could avoid a future threat to [her] . . . life or freedom by relocating to another part of the proposed country of removal and, under all the circumstances, it would be reasonable to expect the applicant to do so.” Stserba v. Holder, 646 F.3d 964, 975–76 (6th Cir. 2011) (“After a petitioner demonstrates past persecution, the government may rebut the presumption[.]”); 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(1)(i) and (ii). On remand, therefore, the Board is entitled to determine whether the government has rebutted the presumption of a well-founded fear of future harm in the first instance. - 12 - No. 21-3312, Zuniga-Martinez, et al. v. Garland 5. Withholding of Removal The immigration judge denied Zuniga’s application for withholding of removal under the INA because Zuniga had failed to prove her eligibility for a grant of asylum. However, since the Board erred in deciding that Zuniga failed to prove her eligibility for a grant of asylum, this Court also vacates the denial of Zuniga’s application for withholding of removal. Because Zuniga’s withholding claim rests on the same facts as her asylum claim, the agency should also consider the former on remand. D. Convention Against Torture Zuniga additionally requested relief under CAT. To obtain withholding of removal under the CAT, “[t]he burden of proof is on the applicant . . . to establish that it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2). The Board determined that Zuniga waived review of her request to withhold removal under the CAT because she failed to raise a meaningful challenge during her administrative appeal. This Court agrees and denies the petition to review on that basis. E. Right to Due Process A non-resident individual in removal hearings is entitled to the Fifth Amendment guarantee of due process. Huicochea–Gomez v. INS, 237 F.3d 696, 699 (6th Cir. 2001). On appeal, Zuniga argues that a defect in the removal proceedings occurred because the immigration judge and the Board failed to properly consider the supporting documentation and corroborating evidence. Zuniga waived any due process claim. Sterkaj v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 273, 279 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[O]nly claims properly presented to the BIA and considered on their merits can be reviewed by this [C]ourt in an immigration appeal.”) (quoting another source). That aside, it is unlikely Zuniga could show a deprivation of due process of a constitutional magnitude. This portion of Zuniga’s - 13 - No. 21-3312, Zuniga-Martinez, et al. v. Garland appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Fang Huang v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 640, 650 (6th Cir. 2008).