Opinion ID: 773251
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Miscellaneous Evidence of Pretext

Text: 69 Similarly, Straughn tendered insufficient other evidence to generate a trial worthy issue on pretext. Instead, she simply pointed to evidence that Giglio reprimanded her for tardiness, driving excessive miles, visiting too few sales accounts, and failing to generate adequate shuttle flight ticket sales. She maintains that these criticisms were unjustified, given the undisputed evidence that (i) sales representatives in the Boston Marketing Office were not required to report to work at any particular hour; (ii) her sales territory necessitated more driving, as it is one of the two largest in geographic area; and (iii) it normally generates fewer shuttle ticket sales. 70 Straughn relies almost exclusively upon the Thomas case, which held that where poor work performance is the stated reason for discharging an employee, pretext may be established by demonstrating that the evaluation process itself was tainted by racial bias and that the plaintiff's abilities and qualifications were equal or superior to employees who were retained. Thomas, 183 F.3d at 65 (quoting Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 985 F.2d 1113, 1119 (1st Cir. 1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Thomas case is inapposite. 71 There is no record evidence that Straughn's discharge was related in any way to work performance. For that matter, there is no evidence that Straughn ever received a poor work evaluation. See id. at 62-63. On the contrary, following the only documented review of her work performance with the Boston Marketing Office, Straughn received a high rating from none other than Giglio and Meinhold. Consequently, the present contention provides no support for the claim that Straughn was subjected to differential treatment in the workplace. Fernandes, 199 F.3d at 581. 72 Straughn also testified that various privileges available to other sales representatives were withheld from her, including authorization to: (a) provide clients with free promotional flight tickets, (b) obtain reimbursement for meals while entertaining clients, and (c) work on a part-time basis from a virtual home office. Nevertheless, she failed to proffer competent evidence that she and these other sales representatives were similarly situated in all or even most relevant respects. See Conward, 171 F.3d at 20. 73
74 Straughn asserts, in conclusory fashion, that all sales representatives in her office were permitted, at their discretion, to give promotional flight tickets to their respective clients, whereas she rarely was allowed to do so. She makes no attempt to approximate the number of occasions on which promotional flight tickets were made available to her or to other Delta sales representatives. Instead, she focuses on a single instance in which Helen Meinhold directed her to recover a promotional flight ticket which Straughn had made available to the spouse of a client. It is undisputed that Delta policy contemplates that these promotional flight tickets are to be made available to Delta clients, not their spouses. The record also indicates that the episode referred to by Straughn occurred during the first six months of her tenure as a sales representative. Yet Straughn presented no competent evidence that she and these other sales representatives were similarly situated, either in regard to tenure, experience, or the numbers of clients served. 75
76 Straughn asserts that some sales representatives were reimbursed for meal costs incurred while entertaining Delta clients. The one person she names - Jane Martin - began work with the Boston Marketing Office two weeks before Straughn. Other than similar starting dates, however, Straughn tendered no evidence that she and Martin were similarly situated, most notably in regard to the particular characteristics of their respective sales territories and clienteles. Moreover, Straughn admitted that she was never denied reimbursement. Instead, she states that she was reprimanded by Meinhold on one occasion for purchasing donuts for the personnel in a couple of offices and warned not to do so again. See also note 8 supra. 77
78 Straughn testified that all other sales representatives in the Boston Marketing Office were granted the virtual home office privilege. See Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 824 (noting that evidence of differential treatment in the workplace supports pretext claim). Yet Straughn points to no evidence that she and these other sales representatives were similarly situated. 79 Competent proof that the plaintiff was denied privileges and opportunities available to similarly situated employees may constitute probative evidence that an adverse employment action was motivated by discriminatory animus. See Thomas, 183 F.3d at 63 (evidence that supervisors prevented minority employee from making important presentation and withheld appropriate developmental opportunities and computer training, all of which were accorded non-minority employees, supports disparate treatment claim). Straughn testified on deposition that she made at least three requests to work from a virtual home office. The record also reflects that some sales representatives were permitted to work from a virtual home office. Yet Richard Ealey denied Straughn permission to do so following her extended absence from work, since her doctor had advised that, though able to work, Straughn was not yet well enough to drive an automobile - hence unable to service clients, the primary responsibility of her position. 80 As concerns Straughn's previous requests to work from a virtual home office, one was denied by Meinhold and several by Giglio. The record reflects that her first request to Giglio was made within six months of her hiring. Straughn presented no evidence that other new sales representatives were accorded the privilege so early in their tenure. With regard to the other requests which Giglio denied, she points to no evidence (i) that she was similarly situated to any sales representative who was accorded the privilege, or (ii) that she met Delta's criteria for evaluating such requests. Instead, she simply asserts in conclusory fashion that everyone else was permitted to work part-time from a virtual home office. Thus, she failed to present competent evidence that the proffered reason for the challenged employment action was pretextual. See Fernandes, 199 F.2d at 581; Conward, 171 F.3d at 20; Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 824. 81 Moreover, given the overwhelming weight of the evidence that the proffered reason for the dismissal action was both sound and sufficient, the tenuous disparate treatment evidence presented by Straughn was plainly insufficient to enable a reasonable fact finder to conclude that Giglio had fabricated the report about Straughn's prevarications relating to her wrongful retention of the workers' compensation benefits. 9 Nothing more is exigible. 82