Opinion ID: 796140
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendants Cloud's and Caver's letters

Text: 55 Defendants Cloud and Caver next argue that their convictions should be vacated because the district court admitted various letters that they wrote to coconspirators. Defendants contend that the letters were inadmissible because their admission violated Federal Rule of Evidence 403. We review the district court's evidentiary rulings under Rule 403 for abuse of discretion. United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 567 (6th Cir.1993). The district court has very broad discretion in weighing the evidence under Rule 403. United States v. Newsom, 452 F.3d 593, 603 (6th Cir.2006) (quoting United States v. Vance, 871 F.2d 572, 576 (6th Cir.1989)). Moreover, because Defendants did not object to the admission of the letters at trial, we review only for plain error. Id at 602. 56 Rule 403 governs whether evidence that is relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 401 is admissible. Rule 403 states that, [a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Here, Defendants contend that the prejudicial effect of the letters substantially outweighed their probative value. We note that [u]nfair prejudice does not mean the damage to a defendant's case that results from the legitimate probative force of the evidence; rather it refers to the evidence which tends to suggest [a] decision on an improper basis. Newsom, 452 F.3d at 603 (quoting Bonds, 12 F.3d at 567) (alteration in original). 57
58 The district court admitted five letter letters from Defendant Caver to Ralph Jones, exhibits 41, 42, 46, 47, and 48; one letter from Defendant Caver to Wilson, exhibit 50; and one letter from Defendant Caver to Hall, exhibit 51. Exhibit 41 states Defendant Caver's hope that Jones will sign an affidavit stating that Jones and Defendant Caver did not engage in any drug transactions together. Exhibit 42 expresses Defendant Caver's happiness in being able to see Jones, and Defendant Caver's belief that Jones would have a better chance at trial than Defendant Caver. Exhibit 46 asks Jones for information as to what he knows concerning the testimony he might proffer, so that Defendant Caver may prepare his defense. Exhibit 47 expresses Defendant Caver's opinion that Jones should wait before pleading guilty, and that Jones should not testify against Defendant Caver. Exhibit 48 instructs Jones not to listen to his lawyer. Exhibit 50, to Wilson, summarizes the indictment for Wilson, contains an affidavit for Wilson to sign stating that Wilson did not conspire with any of the persons indicted, and expresses Defendant Caver's belief that Wilson would get a minimal amount of prison time if he went to trial. Exhibit 51, translated from a crude code, asks Hall if he admits that some of his statements are lies, but instructs Hall not to answer that question, and goes on to state that the letter is just about saying hello. 59 The evidence was all relevant to some degree. The indictment against Defendant Caver included an obstruction of justice specification. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3C1.1 (2004) (hereinafter U.S.S.G.) (defining obstructing or impeding the administration-of-justice specification and directing a sentencing increase of two levels). Exhibits 41 and 50, which request affidavits, are unquestionably relevant to this specification. Although the connection is less direct, the other letters to Jones can be construed as part of an on-going attempt to influence Jones to change his legal strategy for Defendant Caver's benefit, and thus they are relevant under Rule 401. See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 178-79, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997) (discussing relevance). As for the letter to Hall, the relevance is still more attenuated, but we cannot say that this letter does not have `any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.' Id. at 178 (quoting Fed. R.Evid. 401). The letter does ask Hall to admit that some of his statements are lies, which could be fairly interpreted as an attempt to convince Hall not to testify against Defendant Caver. 60 The question then becomes whether the district court abused its discretion in concluding that the probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect. We cannot conclude that it so clearly did as to rise to the level of plain error. Generally, the tone of Defendant Caver's letters was congenial, and the letters were consistently nonthreatening. The only improper prejudice suggested by Defendant Caver is that the letters used foul language and derogatory terms for counsel and the criminal justice system. Any improper prejudice stemming from these bases is low, at least when compared to the prejudice that was present in cases where an appellate court concluded that the district court abused its discretion under Rule 403. See, e.g., id. at 191, 117 S.Ct. 644 (concluding that prejudice from a felony conviction for assault outweighed probative value in trial for assault and being a felon in possession of a firearm where defendant was willing to stipulate to the fact that he had a prior felony conviction); Newsom, 452 F.3d at 604 (prejudice from defendant's tattoos of thug life and depiction of an armed man outweighed any conceivable probative value). Thus, although the probative value of some of the letters was low, so was the unfair prejudice. We cannot conclude that admitting the evidence was plain error. 61
62 The district court admitted nine letters against Defendant Cloud. 12 Exhibit 29 is a letter to an unknown recipient (it is addressed to family) seized as a result of Defendant Cloud's October 3, 2003 arrest. It expresses anger towards the recipient for sharing information with Defendant Cloud's mother, and Defendant Cloud's readiness to retaliate should the recipient cross Defendant Cloud. Exhibit 31 is a letter to Morris, where Defendant Cloud expresses his anger with Morris for cooperating with the government. Defendant Cloud does not threaten Morris, but rather pleads for Morris not to testify against him. He also asks Morris to sign an affidavit indicating that Morris had not engaged in drug transactions with Defendant Cloud. Exhibit 33 is a letter addressed to Collier (although Collier never received it). The letter contains thinly-veiled threats that Collier would place his family in danger by cooperating with the government. Exhibit 34 is a letter to Walker, where Defendant Cloud calls Walker a snitch and a rat. Exhibits 39 and 40 are letters to Hall where Defendant Cloud expresses his anger at Hall for cooperating with the government. Exhibit 44 is another letter to Walker where Defendant Cloud expresses his dissatisfaction with Walker's cooperation with the government. Exhibit 45 is a letter to Ralph Jones in which Defendant Cloud states that he signed Jones's affidavit, so now Jones should sign Defendant Cloud's affidavit. 63 The indictment also contained an obstruction of justice specification against Defendant Cloud. Exhibits 31, 33, and 45 are all clearly relevant to this specification. See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. Exhibits 29, 34, 39, 40, and 44 are less relevant, although they could still fairly be construed as an attempt to unlawfully influence government witnesses. See id. at cmt. 4(a). The question then becomes whether the unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value. As an initial matter we note that, with respect to the threats, the probative value rises in tandem with the unfair prejudice—the more serious and imminent the threat, the greater the possibility that the jury convicted Defendant Cloud because he is an individual who makes violent threats (as opposed to being a conspirator), but the more probative the letter was to the obstruction of justice specification. Defendant Cloud argues, however, that the letters were nonetheless unfairly prejudicial, because they contained street jargon, profanity, and painted an unfavorable picture of him. While Defendant Cloud is surely correct that the letters interjected some risk of unfair prejudice, we cannot say, given the broad discretion afforded to the district court, that it was a plain error to admit them. See Newsom, 452 F.3d at 603. 64 Moreover, even assuming that it was plain error, we would still be compelled to affirm Defendant Cloud's conviction. Before this Court will reverse for plain error, the defendant must meet the burden of showing that the error must have affected the outcome of the District Court proceedings. United States v. Thomas, 11 F.3d 620, 630 (6th Cir.1993) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993)). Given the substantial evidence in the record supporting Defendant Cloud's conviction, we cannot conclude that Defendant Cloud has demonstrated that the error, if any, affected the outcome.