Opinion ID: 1539955
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Statute Of Limitations Begins Date Of Alleged Negligent Act

Text: As in Dunn, this case presents the question of whether the statute of limitations commenced to run when the negligent act or omission was committed or when the harm first manifested itself to the patient. [55] Like the plaintiff in Dunn, Meyer argues that there was no damage, and therefore no injury, until her cancer later manifested itself, by metastasizing in Meyer's case. Like the plaintiff in Dunn, Meyer seeks an alternative interpretation of the phrase in the statute, date upon which such injury occurred, so that the commencement of the statute of limitations will be calculated from a different date. [56] Like the plaintiff in Dunn, Meyer now asserts that her cause of action for medical negligence began to accrue when all of the elements of classical negligence could be metnegligence, proximate cause and damage. [57] As we did in Dunn, this Court rejects the argument that the common law theory of torts applies to medical negligence claims. As we explained in Dunn, the statute of limitations for medical negligence claims is a product of statute, not common law, and can only be amended by statute and not as a matter of common law. [58] In examining the legislative history of the then-Medical Malpractice Act, this Court explained that the statute was a response to a particular issue in a particular context and ... to construe it broadly without the bounds of that context, as plaintiff desires, would emasculate its very purpose. [59] The particular issue was the establishment of a clear and unambiguous statute of limitations in medical negligence cases. [60] The drafting committee of the Medical Malpractice Act explained that the overall effect [of section 6856] will be to eliminate the uncertainty created by the present open-ended period of limitations. [61] In Dunn, the plaintiff tried create an element of proximate cause to link the later onset of pain with an act of negligence five years earlier. This Court rejected that argument, holding that, had the General Assembly intended there to be a line of demarcation based on the no pain/no injury rationale, it would have said so in some precise manner. [62] This Court explained in Dunn that [w]e cannot frustrate the clear legislative intent.... The statutory context and history makes it unnecessary for us to explore when damage occurred in the context plaintiff argues. [63] Since this Court decided Dunn in 1979, the General Assembly has not established a similar demarcation to address cases in which the alleged act of medical negligence is the failure to diagnose cancer or some other disease. Therefore, this Court cannot infer that such a demarcation was intended with the enactment of section 6853. Under Dunn, Meyer's injury occurred on March 8, 2005, the date on which her cancer was present and diagnosable and the date on which the defendants failed to diagnose the cancer. The fact that Meyer's cancer later metastasized relates to the amount of damages but does not determine the date of Meyer's injury, which occurred when the defendants failed to diagnose Meyer's cancer. In Meekins, this Court held that the plaintiff's cause of action accrued when the defendants allegedly misread her mammogram results as negative for cancer and did not accrue six months after the mammogram was misread, as the plaintiff's expert had opined. [64] There, this Court explained that [i]n theory, Meekins could have brought an action at [the time of the alleged misreading of the mammogram results] had Meekins known of the allegedly negligent diagnosis, although her damages would [have been] difficult to quantify [at that time]. [65] This Court also explained that [t]he fact that Meekins did not know of the potential claim for misdiagnosis until her next annual examination ... did not toll the beginning of the two-year statute of limitations. [66] This Court also explained in Meekins that it would be artificial to predicate the commencement of the statute of limitations period based on a theoretical six-month period as suggested by the plaintiff's expert. [67] In the six months following the date on which the defendants failed to diagnose the Meekins plaintiffs cancer from her mammogram results, [t]here was no cause of action that actually arose ... because no affirmative happening or event of medical negligence occurred at that time. [68] As this Court acknowledged in Meekins, a statute of limitations that begins to run from the date of the alleged failure to diagnose can sometimes have harsh results, such as in cases where the patient was unaware of the allegedly negligent error that caused the injury. [69] In Meyer's case, however, Meyer became aware that she had cancer, and that she possibly had been misdiagnosed, in May 2006, ten months prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations. Therefore, she cannot argue that her injury was unknowable prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations. Even if the injury Meyer sustained on March 8, 2005, did not manifest itself until the cancer metastasized sometime after November 1, 2005, Meyer still had a cognizable claim for medical negligence on March 8, 2005, when she was injured by the defendants' failure to diagnose her allegedly then-existent cancer. Under Delaware's doctrine of lost chance or increased risk, as a direct and proximate result of the defendants' negligence on March 8, 2005, when they failed to diagnose Meyer's cancer, Meyer was unable to obtain prompt treatment when her cancer was in its early stages. In fact, that is one of the allegations in Meyer's complaint. The failure to diagnose placed Meyer at a very high risk that her cancer would advance and created a compensable injury, but did not toll the running of the statute of limitations. [70] Under section 6856 and this Court's opinions interpreting that statute, the injury occurred on the date of the allegedly negligent act or omission. In this case, that was March 8, 2005, when the defendants failed to diagnose Meyer's cancer. The 2003 amendments to the Medical Negligence Act, including the requirement in section 6853 that all complaints alleging medical negligence be accompanied by an affidavit of merit, did not change or modify the date on which the injury occurred. As this Court has explained: The goal of statutory construction is to determine and give effect to legislative intent. [71] The synopsis of the 2003 legislation and the text of the statute itself do not mention any impact that section 6853 has on section 6856 or on the determination of when the statute of limitations begins to run. In Ewing v. Beck , this Court noted that there were various exceptions to the statute of limitations for medical negligence cases prior to 1976, when section 6856 was enacted. [72] In Layton v. Allen , for example, this Court considered when the two-year statute of limitations began to run when the injury was inherently unknowable and the plaintiff was blamelessly ignorant [73] and concluded that the then-applicable statute of limitations was ambiguous and that the General Assembly had not intended for the statute of limitations to bar actions before the harm had manifested itself. [74] This Court also concluded in Layton that the injury was sustained, and the statute of limitations period commenced, when the harmful effect manifested itself. [75] In Ewing, however, this Court recognized that the inherently unknowable injury rule was applied frequently in medical negligence cases so that the seemingly finite two year statute of limitations did not begin to run in certain cases until many years after the date of the injury. [76] When the General Assembly enacted the Medical Malpractice Act in 1976, it addressed this and other perceived problems with medical negligence actions. [77] Specifically, the act provided, among other things, for a new statute of limitations for medical negligence claims to address the problem that arose from the Layton decision. [78] This Court then interpreted section 6856 as creating a two-year statute of limitations that begins to run from the date on which the injury occurred, that is, the date on which the allegedly negligent act or omission occurred, and not when the injury manifested itself. [79] Absent subsequent legislative enactments changing or modifying this Court's precedent, Meekins remains the law in Delaware. The Superior Court erred when it concluded that the affidavit of merit requirement changed the statute of limitations in cases where the injury manifested itself later, such as in cases of failure to diagnose cancer.