Opinion ID: 1860428
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether there was sufficient evidence of liability against emi to support the jury verdict.

Text: ¶ 19. As to jury verdicts in civil cases, we have said that we will not direct a judgment to be entered contrary to the jury verdict unless we have concluded that given the evidence as a whole, taken in the light most favorable to the verdict, no reasonable, hypothetical juror could have found as the jury found. Busick v. St. John, 856 So.2d 304, 307 (Miss.2003) (citing Snapp v. Harrison, 699 So.2d 567, 569 (Miss.1997); Starcher v. Byrne, 687 So.2d 737, 739 (Miss.1997)). See also Thompson Mach. Commerce Corp. v. Wallace, 687 So.2d 149, 151-52 (Miss.1997) (this Court resolves all conflicts of evidence in the appellee's favor). ¶ 20. EMI argues the plaintiffs offered no evidence of the standard of care. EMI bases its argument on the premise that [i]n a case alleging liability for professional negligence of an engineer, there must be some testimony as to what the standard of care was; however, the plaintiffs' complaint did not allege the professional negligence of an engineer. The complaint alleged that public utility EMI and its agents breached the duty to install and maintain its energized, electrical lines in a manner and elevation so as to insure that those performing foreseeable tasks there under with due regard to their own safety would not come into contact with the same... and that EMI negligently failed to warn of the danger of its highly energized electrical lines and the dangers associated therewith and negligently failed to isolate, insulate, and guard its lines from those performing such service work.... ¶ 21. The plaintiffs' expert witness, Adams, testified as to what the standard of care required, according to the NESC. EMI offered no evidence to rebut the expert's testimony; rather, EMI argues that because the expert did not state the course of action the original designer should have taken, no standard of care was offered. ¶ 22. In earlier cases alleging negligence of an electrical power distributor, this Court has not required that an expert testify as to what specific act an electricity distributor would have performed, other than some action that would correct or remove the reasonably foreseeable danger, to establish the standard of care. In Read v. Southern Pine Electric Power Ass'n, 515 So.2d 916, 919 (Miss.1987), we said, With regard to duty, Read alleged and SPEPA admitted that SPEPA was in the business of distributing electricity. As a power company, SPEPA, though not an absolute insurer against injury, was under the highest duty of care in distributing electricity. Upton v. Magnolia Electric Power Assoc., 511 So.2d 939 (Miss.1987); City of Starkville v. Harrison, 418 So.2d 51 (Miss.1982); Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Shepard, 285 So.2d 725 (Miss.1973). When a cause of danger is reasonably foreseeable caused by and known to the power company, the company must exercise reasonable care to correct or remove the cause of danger. Shepard, 285 So.2d at 729. This standard of care applies whether the injury is to persons or to property. Mississippi Power Co. v. Luter, 336 So.2d 753, 756 (Miss.1976). Very recently, this Court decided issues in a case with very similar facts to this case; in Ware v. Entergy Mississippi, Inc., ___ So.2d ___, ___, 2003 WL 23096029,  (Miss.2003), we stated: Public policy in Mississippi requires utilities to exercise a very high degree of care in protecting the public from the dangers of electricity. Entergy Mississippi, Inc. v. Burdette Gin Co., 726 So.2d 1202, 1208 (Miss.1998); Shepard, 285 So.2d at 729. There is also a duty on power companies to anticipate and guard against events which may be reasonably expected to occur, and the failure to do so is negligence, even though the power company may not anticipate the identical injury that occurs. Id. at 729 (citing 29 C.J.S. Electricity § 38, 1058-1059 (1965)). While the NESC provides minimum guidelines and the basic provisions that are considered necessary for the safety of employees and the public under the specified conditions, those minimums are not intended as a design specification or as an instruction manual. NESC, Section 1, ¶ 010. We have recognized that a violation of the minimum standards established by the NESC constitutes negligence per se. See Gifford v. Four-County Elec. Power Ass'n, 615 So.2d 1166, 1172 (Miss.1992). While we have held that there is no negligence per se for a utility company which has complied with the minimum safety standards of the NESC, we have said that compliance is not conclusive as to the question of due care in a particular set of circumstances. Galloway v. Singing River Elec. Power Ass'n, 247 Miss. 308, 152 So.2d 710, 712 (1963). ¶ 23. Here, the expert witness did testify that EMI should have known what activity may take place under the lines in the ordinary course of what goes on at a lift station. Also, he testified that EMI had a duty to make the lines as safe as possible. In making the lines safer, he listed several things that could have been done, any of which would have made the situation safer: warning orally, warning in writing, posting signs, insulating the line, putting streamers on the line, putting aircraft balls on the line, burying the cable, placing the cable in concrete, backing off from the location and running lower voltage conductors to various customers. None of those were done, and, in fact, when the lines were moved in 1986, the situation was made more dangerous, according to the expert. We find the expert's testimony adequate to prove what standard of care was required and enough to create a jury question as to whether the duty had been breached and proximately caused the injury. ¶ 24. Additionally, EMI argues that there was no evidence that any breach of standard of care was a proximate cause of Hayes's death. To support this argument, EMI claims the plaintiffs did not prove EMI's wrongful conduct was the cause-in-fact of the decedent's and that the death was not foreseeable. As to the issue of cause-in-fact, it is not a stretch to see that but-for the lines being directly over the lift station, the metal pipe being used in the lift station's maintenance would not have come into contact with it, causing Hayes's electrocution. ¶ 25. In Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Shepard, 285 So.2d 725, 734-35 (Miss. 1973), we relied on the holding in a much earlier case, Southern Pine Electric Power Ass'n v. Denson, 214 Miss. 397, 57 So.2d 859, 59 So.2d 75 (1952), which is factually similar to the present case. In Southern Pine Electric Power Ass'n, the plaintiff's decedent was electrocuted while he was removing a section of well pipe 21 feet in length and a strainer five feet in length, totaling 26 feet, from his well. The top section of the well pipe came into contact with the defendant's 7,620 volt primary transmission line strung at a height of 25 feet almost directly over the well. 57 So.2d 859. In affirming the verdict for the plaintiff, this Court noted: A fair statement of the rule as regards liability of power companies in the erection and maintenance of their wires is stated in 18 Am.Jur., Electricity, par. 53, pages 448-9, to wit: `    they are bound to anticipate only such combinations or circumstances and accidents and injuries therefrom as they may reasonably forecast as likely to happen, taking into account their own past experience and the experience and practice of others in similar situations, together with what is inherently probable from the condition of their appliances as they relate to the conduct of their appliances business,' ... Id. at 862. Subsequently, this Court found that the power company should have reasonably foreseen at the time of the power line construction and placement almost directly over the well that the deceased would do work in and about his well, exposing him to danger from its lines, if the line was only 25 feet above the ground. Id. We held: Electricity is a highly dangerous agency, and it must be denominated negligence to erect so close to the well a high voltage line, unless insulated, or unless, in the exercise of the highest degree of care, it was [strung] high enough off of the ground reasonably to prevent injury to him.' Id. Just two years later, when a nearly identical accident came before this Court, we declared: Appellant should have reasonably anticipated that someone working on or about the well in repairing it would likely come in contact with appellant's transmission line. 4-County Electric Power Ass'n v. Clardy, 221 Miss. 403, 424, 73 So.2d 144, 148 (1954). Id. ¶ 26. This is not the first time EMI has put lines directly over a work station, creating some possibly hazardous situation, which then resulted in electrocution. Therefore, the lack of foreseeability argument has no merit. Accordingly, we find there was ample evidence to support the jury's verdict that EMI was negligent and liable. II. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REALLOCATING TO EMI ALL CAUSAL FAULT ALLOCATED BY THE JURY IN THE FIRST TRIAL TO JIM AVIS AND ASSOCIATES, THE IMMUNE EMPLOYER OF THE PLAINTIFF'S DECEDENT. ¶ 27. This Court reviews questions of law de novo. Saliba v. Saliba, 753 So.2d 1095, 1098 (Miss.2000). The trial court incorrectly stated that Accu-Fab v. Ladner , had been decided by this Court one week before the trial in this case was conducted. Actually, Accu-Fab was handed down almost one year after this case was tried. Therefore, the decision in Accu-Fab was not controlling at the time of this trial. ¶ 28. The rule from Estate of Hunter v. Gen. Motors Corp., 729 So.2d 1264, 1276 (Miss.1999), allowed apportionment of fault to absent settling tort-feasors, parties. However, in Accu-Fab, 778 So.2d 766, this Court ruled that the term party used in the Estate of Hunter decision did not include immune employers, so that fault could not be apportioned to an immune employer. We reversed our Accu-Fab decision in Mack Trucks II, 841 So.2d at 1115. In Mack Trucks II, we stated, [t]o the extent that Accu-Fab may be construed as stating that immune parties may not be assessed fault (as opposed to liability) under [Miss.Code Ann. § 85-5-7], therefore, that opinion is overruled. ¶ 29. Accordingly, it was proper to allow allocation of fault to Jim Avis and Associates as an absent tortfeasor. We find the trial court erred in reallocating fault based on Accu-Fab.