Opinion ID: 4469021
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Preliminary Legal Argument

Text: On appeal, Vinton raises a preliminary legal argument as part of his larger argument that the evidence is insufficient to show that he attempted to entice a minor.5 We review legal arguments de novo. United States v. Ali, 557 F.3d 715, 720 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Grenier, 513 F.3d 632, 636 (6th Cir. 2008). 5Arguably, Vinton raised this argument in his motion to dismiss as well, albeit inartfully. It is unclear what the district court made of this argument, because it never directly addressed it at the hearing on the motion to dismiss, and it dismissed the indictment without a written opinion. Nevertheless, we need to decide what conduct § 2422(b) criminalizes in order to determine whether a reasonable juror could find that it reaches Vinton’s conduct in this case. No. 18-2354 United States v. Vinton Page 7 Vinton contends that for a defendant to be convicted under § 2422(b), the defendant must send “persuasive communication directed at the minor.” This might sound like Vinton is arguing that a defendant must message a minor directly, but that’s not quite right. In United States v. Roman, this Court held that a defendant need not communicate directly with a minor to violate § 2422(b); a defendant who works through an adult intermediary to persuade or entice a child still violates the statute. 795 F.3d at 516. Vinton recognizes that holding, but Vinton reads Roman to require that the defendant work through the adult intermediary in a specific way: he must use the adult intermediary as a messenger to convey the defendant’s own enticing messages to the minor. In other words, the specific means of inducing or enticing the child must come from the defendant himself. We disagree. First, Vinton’s reading of Roman is strained. In Roman the defendant communicated only with a law enforcement officer posing as the father of a minor girl. Id. at 515. The defendant did say he would “spoil” the girl by performing sexual acts that she would enjoy, buying her gifts, and taking her shopping. Id. at 514. But he never asked the father to pass on these messages. And the court never found that he implied such a request or that he intended that the father pass on these messages. See id. at 514, 517–18. Therefore, it is a stretch to read Roman to require that the defendant send persuasive messages directly to or directed at the minor. Further, accepting Vinton’s argument would have illogical results. If we adopted Vinton’s interpretation of Roman, it would mean that § 2422(b) would reach the defendant who promises to bring cake for the child but not the defendant who promises an adult intermediary $10,000 if the intermediary convinces the child to have sex with him. Both defendants intend to persuade or entice the minor. Both defendants work through an adult intermediary. But only the first defendant sends a persuasive message arguably directed at the child. The second defendant relies on the expertise of the parent in determining how best to entice the child. We don’t think Congress, or the Roman court, meant to make this distinction and exempt defendants like the second one from conviction under § 2422(b). By rejecting Vinton’s legal argument, we also align our interpretation of § 2422(b) with the interpretations of several of our sister circuits. For example, in United States v. Caudill, a No. 18-2354 United States v. Vinton Page 8 defendant raised the same argument that a defendant can be convicted under § 2422(b) only if he “directs ‘some of his intended inducements to the [child].’” 709 F.3d 444, 446 (5th Cir. 2013) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Olvera, 687 F.3d 645, 647–48 (5th Cir. 2012)). The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument, holding that a defendant need not “seek to have any of his communications with the adult passed on directly to a child.” Id. Other circuits have also affirmed convictions under similar circumstances, where the defendant never sent messages directed at the minor. Id. at 446–47 (collecting cases). “The gravamen of the attempt offense under § 2422(b) is the intention to achieve the minor’s assent.” Roman, 795 F.3d at 513. Whether the defendant aims to achieve a minor’s assent by contacting the minor directly, by sending the minor enticing messages through an adult intermediary, or by enlisting an adult intermediary to persuade the minor, the defendant has the same intent to gain the minor’s assent. And that intent is criminalized under § 2422(b). 2. Substantive Error in Dismissing the Indictment Although the district court dismissed the indictment on sufficiency-of-the-evidence grounds, because it concluded that no reasonable juror could find that Vinton intended to persuade or entice a minor, the issue on appeal is whether the government could prove its case as a matter of law, thus requiring the district court to deny Vinton’s motion to dismiss the indictment.6 See Roman, 795 F.3d at 515. We review such decisions de novo. Id. When we view the facts in the light most favorable to the government, we conclude that the government could prove that Vinton intended to persuade or entice the twelve-year-old minor. Specifically, a juror could reasonably conclude that Vinton chatted with the analyst with the aim of using the mother’s influence on her child to persuade the minor to have sex with him. 6By framing the issue this way, we do not mean to fully equate Vinton’s argument to legal arguments like those raised in United States v. Roman, 795 F.3d 511, or United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1976). In those cases, the defendants raised legal questions that are appropriate in a motion to dismiss an indictment. Roman, 795 F.3d at 515 (“Roman’s argument requires us to interpret the meaning of § 2422(b).”); Jones, 542 F.2d at 665 (6th Cir. 1976) (“The District Court was justified in deciding Appellee’s motion to dismiss the indictment before trial, because it raised the legal question of whether 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) was intended to apply to interspousal wiretaps.”). Vinton’s argument that the government cannot prove his intent based on this record is a different kind of argument that may not be appropriate in a pretrial motion to dismiss an indictment. We are not deciding the procedural issue here, because it wouldn’t affect the outcome of this case. See supra Part II.A. No. 18-2354 United States v. Vinton Page 9 A reasonable juror could find that Vinton responded to the analyst’s post because he wanted to find minors for sex. Vinton was the one who sent the first private message, responding to a post that referenced a series of child pornography. Vinton was also the first one to mention the possibility of sex with the child. Vinton points out that he only mentioned it as part of a question; he was asking what the analyst was interested in, not saying what he was interested in. That’s true. But the fact that he could deduce what the analyst was interested in without being told suggests that he knew what the post was advertising from the start. And if he knew what the post was advertising when he responded to it, then his responding suggests that he was seeking out minors for sex. Then there’s the fact that when the analyst confirmed that she was interested in someone having sex with her and her daughter, Vinton said that he “would love to try something like that.” When the analyst specified that her daughter was twelve years old, he maintained that he “want[ed] to do . . . both [the analyst and her daughter.]” A reasonable juror could infer that Vinton was specifically seeking minors for sex when he logged into Whisper and responded to the analyst’s post. A reasonable juror could also find that Vinton continued the conversation with the aim of getting the minor’s assent to have sex with him. Vinton asked explicitly about what specific sexual acts the girl could and would perform. He requested that the pair exchange photos of Vinton, the analyst, and the minor. And when he sent a picture of male genitalia, he asked if the analyst and the minor would like it. When the police searched Vinton’s car, they found $1,400 in cash. It’s hard to imagine why Vinton would need the money for consensual sex with an adult. Thus, it seems like Vinton may have planned to pay the minor for sex or pay the purported mother for helping to convince the minor. Either way, it suggests that Vinton intended to persuade or entice the minor. A reasonable juror could also conclude that Vinton specifically intended to use the analyst’s influence, as a parent, to lead the minor to have sex with him. Vinton believed from the beginning of the conversation that the analyst was the mother to the fictitious twelve-yearold. Vinton is likely aware of the special influence of parents over their children, and a reasonable juror could infer that he intended to exploit that influence. In several instances, he specifically relied on the mother’s help. He suggested that the analyst could help him be gentle No. 18-2354 United States v. Vinton Page 10 with the girl and help him make sure the girl enjoyed the sexual encounter. Near the end of their conversation, he told the analyst that both she and her daughter would “have to be naked” when he arrived. A reasonable juror could view these as two specific instances in which Vinton sought the mother’s help in persuading the girl to have sex with him. The mother would prepare the minor for Vinton by instructing her to get undressed before Vinton arrived, and the mother would make the girl feel comfortable during the sexual encounter to help coax her into having sex with Vinton. A reasonable juror could also view Vinton’s promises to be gentle as examples of “agree[ing] with any parameters [the mother] set” as part of his effort to enlist the mother’s help. Roman, 795 F.3d at 517–18. The district court found that Vinton was interested primarily in sex with the adult FBI analyst and that he only passively acquiesced in her request that the minor join them. We don’t think that this means that the government could not prove that Vinton intended to persuade the minor. First, the fact that Vinton was interested in consensual sex with an adult doesn’t necessarily mean that he didn’t also intend to persuade the minor. After all, the conversation began with Vinton responding to a post that referenced a series of child pornography. One of his first messages said that he was interested in “incest and younger women.” And throughout the conversation, Vinton repeatedly affirmed his interest in both the adult analyst and the minor; he asked for pictures of both of them, he asked what they both would think of his genitalia, and he said baldly “I do want to f both of you.” Then there’s the $1,400 that the police found in Vinton’s car. If Vinton wanted to persuade a minor badly enough that he was willing to spend $1,400, then he was far from passive. It is possible that Vinton wanted to have sex with both the analyst and the twelve-year-old daughter and that he intended to persuade or entice the minor in order to get what he wanted. In sum, based on the undisputed evidence before the district court, the government could prove its case, specifically that Vinton intended to persuade or entice the minor through her purported parent. Thus, the district court erred in dismissing the indictment. No. 18-2354 United States v. Vinton Page 11