Opinion ID: 775415
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Analysis: Herman Miller's Appeal

Text: 50 Herman Miller raises four issues in its appeal of the district court proceedings. We will address each of these four arguments in turn. 51

52 This court reviews a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, using the same standard employed by the district court. See Holloway v. Brush, 220 F.3d 767, 772 (6th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Daddy's Junky Music Stores, Inc. v. Big Daddy's Family Music Center, 109 F.3d 275, 280 (6th Cir. 1997). Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, this court views the factual evidence and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See National Enters., Inc. v. Smith, 114 F.3d 561, 563 (6th Cir. 1997).
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54 Herman Miller brings its trade dress claims under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, which prohibits any person from using any false designation of origin that is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive . . . as to the origin . . . of his or her goods . . . . 15 U.S.C. §1125(a)(1)(A). 2 Trade dress refers to the image and overall appearance of a product. Allied Mktg. Group, Inc. v. CDL Mktg., Inc., 878 F.2d 806, 812 (5th Cir. 1989). It embodies that arrangement of identifying characteristics or decorations connected with a product, whether by packaging or otherwise, intended to make the source of the product distinguishable from another and to promote its sale. Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1239 (6th Cir. 1991) (citation and internal quotations omitted). 55 To prove a claim of trade dress infringement under §43(a) of the Lanham Act, Herman Miller must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that its trade dress in the Eames lounge chair and ottoman is protectable; (2) that there is a likelihood of confusion between Herman Miller's lounge chair and ottoman and that of Palazzetti; and (3) that the appropriated features of the lounge chair and ottoman are primarily nonfunctional. See ibid. The district court granted summary judgment to Palazzetti on the basis that Herman Miller's trade dress in the Eames lounge chair and ottoman is not protectable. 3 56 Since the district court issued its decision in this case, the protectability analysis in a trade dress claim based on product design has changed considerably. At the time of the district court's decision, trade dress was protectable if it was proven either to be inherently distinctive or to have acquired distinctiveness through secondary meaning. See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 776. The district court determined that Herman Miller's Eames lounge chair and ottoman neither were inherently distinctive nor had acquired secondary meaning. Therefore, the court granted summary judgment to Palazzetti on Herman Miller's trade dress claim. 57 In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, 529 U.S. 205, 216 (2000), the Supreme Court held that in an action for infringement of unregistered trade dress under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, a product's design is distinctive, and therefore protectable, only upon a showing of secondary meaning. (emphases added). This decision resolved a circuit split in which the circuits differed as to which law to apply to determine whether trade dress was inherently distinctive. Some courts applied different tests depending on whether the trade dress was for the package containing the product or for the product itself. Part of this confusion was a result of the fact that it was only in 1992 that the Supreme Court held that trade dress, like a trademark, could be inherently distinctive. See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 773. 58 In Samara Brothers, the Supreme Court noted several reasons why the inherently distinctive test should not be applied in trade dress cases based on product design. The Court noted the fact that product design almost invariably serves purposes other than source identification, such as making products more useful or appealing. 529 U.S. at 213. The Court also stated that application of the inherently distinctive test in product design cases could deprive consumers of the benefits of competition with regard to the utilitarian and esthetic purposes that product design ordinarily serves . . . . Ibid. 59 The Court then differentiated Samara Brothers from Two Pesos. Samara Brothers concerned a claim brought by a children's clothing designer and manufacturer alleging that Wal-Mart was selling knockoff copies of the designer's clothes, namely a line of spring/summer one-piece seersucker outfits decorated with appliques of hearts, flowers, fruits, and the like. 529 U.S. at 207, 208. In Two Pesos, the Court held that the trade dress of a chain of Mexican restaurants, which the plaintiff described as a festive eating atmosphere having interior dining and patio areas decorated with antiques, bright colors, paintings and murals, id. at 214-15 (quoting Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 765), could be protected under § 43(a) without a showing of secondary meaning. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. at 215 (citing Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 776). The Samara Brothers Court differentiated Two Pesos on the basis that the trade dress at issue, the decor of a restaurant, seems to us not to constitute product design. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. at 215. The Court stated that it was either product packaging--which, . . . normally is taken by the consumer to indicate origin or some tertium quid that is akin to product packaging and has no bearing on the present case. Ibid. 60 After Samara Brothers, trade dress claims based on product packaging can be proven upon a showing of either inherent distinctiveness or secondary meaning, but trade dress claims based on product design can be proven only upon a showing of secondary meaning. The Court noted that this distinction could produce some hard cases at the margin. Ibid. The Court cited one example: 61 a classic glass Coca-Cola bottle, for instance, may constitute packaging for those customers who drink the Coke and then discard the bottle, but may constitute the product itself for those consumers who are bottle collectors, or part of the product itself for those consumers who buy Coke in the classic glass bottle, rather than a can, because they think it more stylish to drink from the former. 62 Ibid. To the extent that difficult cases exist, the Court stated that courts should err on the side of caution and classify ambiguous trade dress as product design, thereby requiring secondary meaning. Ibid. 63 This is not a hard case, however. Herman Miller's trade dress claims regarding the Eames lounge chair and ottoman are based on product design and cannot be confused with product packaging. Therefore, on appeal we must analyze Herman Miller's trade dress claims solely to determine if Herman Miller can demonstrate that its Eames lounge chair and ottoman have acquired sufficient secondary meaning in the marketplace that they have become associated in the public's mind with Herman Miller. The district court's inherently distinctive analysis is no longer relevant to this case in light of the Supreme Court's holding in Samara Brothers. 64
65 Before analyzing whether Herman Miller's Eames lounge chair and ottoman have become protectable trade dress by acquiring secondary meaning, we must note the procedural posture of Herman Miller's trade dress claims. Palazzetti's summary judgment motion as to Herman Miller's trade dress claims was based on the argument that Herman Miller hadabandoned any trade dress rights it may have had in the Eames lounge chair and ottoman. It was only in Herman Miller's response brief that Herman Miller raised the issues of inherent distinctiveness and secondary meaning related to the protectability of its trade dress. Palazzetti responded to these issues in its reply brief. 66 Herman Miller raised the issue of the protectability of its trade dress to the district court as a defense against Palazzetti's claim of abandonment. In its brief to the district court, Herman Miller noted that abandonment occurs [o]nly when all rights of protection are extinguished. Wallpaper Manufacturers, Ltd. v. Crown Wallcovering Corp., 680 F.2d 755, 765 (C.C.P.A. 1982). Herman Miller used the inherently distinctive and secondary meaning inquiries related to protectable trade dress as a means of arguing to the district court that its lounge chair and ottoman have retained their strength as an indicator of source and, therefore, have not been abandoned. Herman Miller appears to have been conflating the protectable trade dress inquiry and the abandonment inquiry. They are separate and distinct. According to Section 45 of the Lanham Act, trade dress may be abandoned: 67 when any course of conduct of the owner, including acts of omission as well as commission, causes the mark to become the generic name for the goods or services on or in connection with which it is used or otherwise to lose its significance as a mark. 68 15 U.S.C. § 1127. Therefore, the fact that trade dress may be protectable by acquiring secondary meaning does not mean it is automatically protected since the owner's trade dress rights might have been abandoned through actions of the owner that caused the trade dress to become generic or lose its significance as a mark. 69 The district court ruled in favor of Palazzetti on the basis that Herman Miller had not presented sufficient factual evidence demonstrating that the Eames lounge chair and ottoman were either inherently distinctive or had acquired secondary meaning. In other words, the district court concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact that the lounge chair and ottoman were protectable trade dress. Since the court concluded that the lounge chair and ottoman were not protectable trade dress, the court did not address the issue of abandonment, since there was no trade dress that Herman Miller could have abandoned. 70 Our task on appeal is to determine if the district court erred in concluding that Herman Miller had presented insufficient factual evidence to demonstrate that its trade dress in the lounge chair and ottoman is protectable. As we will explain, Herman Miller has presented sufficient factual evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to the protectability of its trade dress. Therefore, it has preserved this issue for trial. However, the fact that Herman Miller has raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether its Eames lounge chair and ottoman trade dress is protectable, does not dispose of the issue of abandonment, which we will remand to the district court for further consideration, as the district court did not consider this issue in its summary judgment decision. 71
72 In contrast to the inherently distinctive test, the secondary meaning test focuses on acquired distinctiveness. Secondary meaning has been defined as follows: 73 To acquire a secondary meaning in the minds of the buying public, an article of merchandise when shown to a prospective customer must prompt the affirmation, That is the article I want because I know its source, and not the negative inquiry as to Who makes that article? In other words, the article must proclaim its identification with its source, and not simply stimulate inquiry about it. 74 Ferrari, 944 F.2d at 1239, quoting West Point Mfg. Co. v. Detroit Stamping Co., 222 F.2d 581, 595 (6th Cir. 1955). Herman Miller must demonstrate that its Eames lounge chair and ottoman have become identified with Herman Miller in the minds of the potential customer. 75 The district court applied a six-factor test devised by the Second Circuit in analyzing the issue of secondary meaning.See Centaur Communications, Ltd. v. A/S/M Communications, Inc., 830 F.2d 1217, 1222 (2d Cir. 1987). Since the district court's decision, this court has adopted a similar, but slightly broader, seven-factor test. See Marketing Displays, Inc. v. TrafFix Devices, Inc., 200 F.3d 929, 937 (6th Cir. 1999), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. TrafFix Devices v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 1255 (2001) (adopting test articulated in Sassafras Enters., Inc. v. Roschco, Inc., 915 F. Supp. 1, 7 (N.D. Ill. 1996)). 4 76 In considering this case on appeal we must apply the TrafFix factors that this court has adopted to analyze secondary meaning in a trade dress case. The factors are: 77 1. direct consumer testimony; 78 2. consumer surveys; 79
80 5. amount of sales and number of customers; 6. established place in the market; and 81 7. proof of intentional copying. 82 TrafFix, 200 F.3d at 937. No single factor is determinative and every one need not be proven. See Centaur, 830 F.2d at 1222. 1. Direct consumer testimony 83 Herman Miller provides affidavit evidence from design experts, authors, historians, and past and present Herman Miller employees to support its claim that consumers associate the Eames lounge chair and ottoman with Herman Miller. In addition, Herman Miller presents media coverage relating to individuals who specifically own Herman Miller Eames lounge chairs and ottomans and producers of television shows that specifically purchased Herman Miller Eames lounge chairs and ottomans for their sets. Herman Miller also has presented evidence of a extensive secondary market specifically in Eames lounge chairs and ottomans produced by Herman Miller. Finally, Herman Miller has presented various magazine and newspaper articles warning the consuming public seeking a Herman Miller Eames lounge chair and ottoman of the existence of a market for knockoffs of Eames-designed furniture. 84 Direct consumer testimony need not take the form of explicit testimony from consumers stating that 'I care that X produced this product.' Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 138 F.3d 277, 294 (7th Cir. 1998). Instead of this explicit testimony, Herman Miller has presented a variety of circumstantial testimony indicating a link between Herman Miller and the Eames lounge chair and ottoman in the mind of the consuming public for modern furniture. In concluding that the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence of secondary meaning in TrafFix, this court noted the lack of direct customer testimony, but instead relied upon deposition testimony of employees of the defendant and former employees of the plaintiff indicating they could recognize the plaintiff's sign, which was the subject of the disputed trade dress claim. 200 F.3d at 937. The evidence in this case relating to a connection between Herman Miller and the Eames lounge chair and ottoman among the consuming public is even more extensive. 2. Consumer surveys 85 The district court particularly noted the absence of consumer studies or surveys linking the lounge chair and ottoman with Herman Miller. 5 Because the determination of whether a mark has acquired secondary meaning is primarily an empirical inquiry, survey evidence is the most direct and persuasive evidence. Survey evidence is not the only relevant evidence, however. Sugar Busters LLC v. Brennan, 177 F.3d 258, 269 (5th Cir. 1999) (internal citation and quotations omitted) (emphasis added). Other courts have held that plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence of secondary meaning at summary judgment without consumer surveys. See Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, L.L.C., 212 F.3d 157, 165-66 (3d Cir. 2000); TrafFix, 200 F.3d at 937; Yamaha Int'l Corp. v. Hoshino Gakki Co., 840 F.2d 1572, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Hunting Hall of Fame Found. v. Safari Club Int'l, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1765, 1771 (D. Ariz. 1987). While consumer surveys certainly would have been helpful to Herman Miller's claim, their absence is not fatal, at least on summary judgment. 3. Exclusivity, length, and manner of use 86 In contrast to other Eames-designed products that Herman Miller discontinued producing either temporarily or permanently, Herman Miller has produced the Eames lounge chair and ottoman continuously since 1956. This court has noted that, [t]he duration of use of the mark can establish secondary meaning where the duration is more than a relatively short period. 6 Burke-Parsons-Bowlby Corp. v. Appalachian Log Homes, Inc., 871 F.2d 590, 596 (6th Cir. 1989). In this case, Herman Miller has presented evidence that it has used the Eames lounge chair and ottoman trade dress for far more than a relatively short period.
87 Although Herman Miller does not present evidence of direct advertising expenditures, it provides evidence of publicity it received through unsolicited media coverage. See Centaur, 830 F.2d at 1222. Quoting Duraco Products, Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enterprises, Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431, 1453 (3d Cir. 1994), the district court rejected this evidence on the basis that it reflect[s] interest more in an unusual product [or individual] than in the source of the product. (brackets added in district court opinion). As the district court properly noted, a great deal of the media attention that Herman Miller relies upon highlights the fact that Charles and Ray Eames designed the lounge chair and ottoman, not the fact that Herman Miller sells the furniture. However, many of the articles mentioned that the Eameses produced the furniture for Herman Miller and some of the articles discussed the relationship between Herman Miller and the Eameses. In this sense, the design partnership between Herman Miller and the Eameses generated unsolicited advertising for Herman Miller that helped reinforce the relationship between Herman Miller and the Eameses in the mind of the consuming public. The district court erred in rejecting all of the evidence Herman Miller presented as to this factor.
88 Herman Miller provides evidence that over 100,000 lounge chairs and ottomans have been sold by Herman Miller since the introduction of the lounge chair and ottoman in 1956. The district court discounted this evidence on the basis that sales success alone does not establish the necessary consumer association between the furniture and it source. See Appalachian Log, 871 F.2d at 596 (Sales volume, though relevant, is not necessarily sufficient to indicate recognition of the mark by purchasers as an indication of the source.). The court stated that evidence of sales success is not particularly useful in the absence of other evidence because sales success could be related to factors other than secondary meaning, such as good design or aesthetic edification. See Duraco Prods., 40 F.3d at 1452. The facts indicate, however, that Herman Miller presented a variety of evidence supporting secondary meaning in addition to the amount of Eames lounge chairs and ottomans it has sold. Therefore, this figure cannot be dismissed and adds support to Herman Miller's claim.
89 There is no market-share information presented. Herman Miller presents evidence from affidavits, books, magazines, and an encyclopedia entry specifically stating that Herman Miller is the source for the Eames lounge chair and ottoman. In addition, Herman Miller presents evidence that there is a strong secondary market for used Herman Miller Eames lounge chairs and ottomans and that customers within this secondary market recognize that Herman Miller is the only source for the lounge chair and ottoman. Finally, Herman Miller offers articles describing the market in reproductions of Eames-designed furniture and describing Herman Miller as the source of the original Eames lounge chair and ottoman.
90 Herman Miller has provided deposition testimony demonstrating that Palazzetti boasted that its copy of the lounge chair and ottoman matches as closely as possible the original Herman Miller design. In addition, Herman Miller points to evidence from Palazzetti publications including Eames in the identification of the lounge chair and ottoman. This evidence is especially helpful to establishing secondary meaning because 'there is no logical reason for the precise copying save an attempt to realize upon a secondary meaning that is in existence.' Ferrari, 944 F.2d at 1239 (quoting Audio Fidelity, Inc. v. High Fidelity Recordings, Inc., 283 F.2d 551, 558 (9th Cir. 1960)); see also Osem Food Industries Ltd. v. Sherwood Foods, Inc., 917 F.2d 161, 165 (4th Cir. 1990) (When a newcomer to the market copies a competitor's trade dress, its intent must be to benefit from the goodwill of the competitor's customers by getting them to believe that the new product is either the same, or originates from the same source as the product whose trade dress was copied.). 91