Opinion ID: 1702151
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: florida law in 1989

Text: In answer to the United States Supreme Court's question, we clarify that Bunkley's conviction was proper under Florida law in 1989. Basically, in light of both Fiore and L.B., Bunkley was not convicted without proof of one of the elements of his crime. Bunkley's knife could have been a dangerous weapon under both the statute and the decisional law at that time. In 1989, whether Bunkley's knife was a weapon was properly a factual determination for his jury. Having heard the evidence and having received proper instructions on the law, Bunkley's jury unanimously determined that his knife was a dangerous weapon, not a common pocketknife. The evolutionary refinement in our decisional law made eight years later in L.B. has no retroactive application under either Florida's well-established law on retroactivity or Fiore. The support for this conclusion is found in our prior decision, the prior federal habeas petition decisions, and the discussion below. Bunkley was convicted of armed burglary under a statute defining the offense as simple burglary while the defendant is armed with a dangerous weapon. § 810.02(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1985). At the time of Bunkley's trial in 1987, whether or not a particular knife was a dangerous weapon under the statute was determined by juries based on the facts of each case after receiving proper instructions on the law. In Bunkley's case, the jury determined that Bunkley's knife was a dangerous weapon, not a common pocketknife. And, because he was armed with a dangerous weapon, he was guilty of armed burglary. The decisional law of Florida was clear in 1989 that the determination of whether Bunkley's knife was a dangerous weapon or an exempted common pocketknife was ordinarily a question of fact for a properly instructed jury, not a pure question of law. Of particular importance, this position is confirmed by State v. Ortiz, 504 So.2d 39, 40 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). Ortiz was charged with possession of a concealed weapon, not armed burglary, but he relied on the same statutory exception on which Bunkley relies. He filed a motion to dismiss because the charge was based on his pocketknife, and the definition of a weapon under section 790.001(13) excludes a common pocketknife. Ortiz, 504 So.2d at 40. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. The Second District Court of Appeal reversed. Although there was no factual dispute about the characteristics of the knife, the Second District held that whether a knife is a `common pocketknife' ordinarily involves a factual determination which may not be made by a trial court on a motion to dismiss. Id. While Ortiz was decided in the context of a motion to dismiss, the Second District has repeatedly affirmed that the Ortiz decision rested on the rule that whether the knife was a common pocketknife was a question of fact that must be resolved by a jury. Baldwin v. State, 857 So.2d 249, 252 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (citing Ortiz, 504 So.2d at 40), review dismissed, 865 So.2d 479 (Fla.2003); see also Mitchell v. State, 698 So.2d 555, 561 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (citing Ortiz for the rule that whether a pocketknife is a weapon is a factual question for the jury), approved, 703 So.2d 1062 (Fla.1997); Bell v. State, 673 So.2d 556 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (affirming a defendant's convictions for concealed weapons offenses and citing Ortiz for the rule that whether a knife qualified as a weapon under section 790.001(13) is a jury question). Ortiz was decided on March 13, 1987, one month before Bunkley's trial began on April 13, 1987. Ortiz remained the law beyond 1989 when Bunkley's conviction became final. Indeed, the Second District's decision in L.B. confirms the rule that whether a knife fell within the common pocketknife exception was a jury question. In L.B., the Second District rested upon this fact when it held that the common pocketknife exception to the statutory definition of weapon was void for vagueness. L.B. v. State, 681 So.2d 1179, 1181 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1996), rev'd, 700 So.2d 370 (Fla.1997). In support of its conclusion, the Second District observed that the statute impermissibly leaves the question of whether a specific pocketknife is or is not a weapon to the `whim of a jury.' Id. at 1180. The Second District also cited with approval the trial court's conclusion that no per se test could be applied to determine whether the [defendant's] knife, as a matter of law, fell within the exception. Id. This Court reversed the Second District's decision. We expressly held that the statute was not void for vagueness. See L.B. v. State, 700 So.2d 370, 373 (Fla.1997). [4] Indeed, this Court in L.B. recognized the rule that whether a knife is a common pocketknife is a jury question, and stated that in most cases the answer will be obvious to fact-finders. L.B., 700 So.2d at 372. Even though juries might reach inconsistent results based on similar facts, L.B. stated that this is an acceptable consequence of our jury system. Id. at 373. Thus, Florida law at the time of Bunkley's conviction unquestionably approved the referral to a jury of the question of whether a specific pocketknife qualified as a weapon under the section 790.001(13) definition, or, specifically to Bunkley, as a dangerous weapon under section 810.02(2)(b). In sum, at the time of Bunkley's conviction juries were given the instructions previously noted and it was up to them to determine unanimously as a question of fact whether or not a particular pocketknife was a dangerous weapon or a common pocketknife. Thus, as a matter of statutory and decisional law in 1989, Bunkley's jury could permissibly conclude that a folding knife with a three-inch blade carried closed in a burglar's pocket was a dangerous weapon. And as the federal district court observed in rejecting Bunkley's claim in his first habeas petition, the evidence presented at trial regarding Bunkley's buck knife clearly provided sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the petitioner was armed with a dangerous weapon. Bunkley v. Dugger, No. 91-113-CIV-T-99B, order at 6 (M.D. Fla. June 1, 1993). Bunkley's jury found that he was armed with a dangerous weapon while he committed the burglary. This was proper under the law at the time of Bunkley's trial in 1987 and at the time his conviction became final in 1989. Bunkley argues that L.B. stated a bright-line rule that a pocketknife with a blade shorter than four inches is a common pocketknife excluded from the section 790.001(13) definition of a weapon, unless other characteristics of the knife, how it is carried, or how it is used establish the weapon-like qualities of the knife. As does the dissent, Bunkley further argues that the L.B. rule existed as a matter of Florida law at the time of his conviction. Bunkley cites several cases to support his argument. See, e.g., Gust v. State, 558 So.2d 450, 452-53 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (stating that a key-chain knife would fall within the common pocketknife exception to the statutory definition of weapon); Arroyo v. State, 564 So.2d 1153, 1154 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (reversing a defendant's conviction for attempted armed burglary and holding that a pocketknife is not a dangerous weapon with regard to attempted armed burglary unless it was used in a manner likely to cause death or great bodily harm); McCoy v. State, 493 So.2d 1093 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) (stating that a small pocketknife is not a weapon, but affirming a defendant's conviction because the State presented sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the way the defendant used the knife constituted assault with a deadly weapon). However, these cases do not support Bunkley's or the dissent's position. These cases do not define the scope of the common pocketknife exception at the time of Bunkley's conviction with respect to the length of knife blade that qualifies as a common pocketknife. Further, only McCoy was decided before Bunkley's conviction became final, and McCoy was a Fourth District case. The precedent of the Second District, cited above, was the uncontradicted law in Florida in 1989 and establishes that the question of whether a particular knife was a common pocketknife or a dangerous weapon was a fact question for the jury. A trial court within the Second District conducted Bunkley's trial. In light of the Second District's precedent, the trial court properly submitted to the jury the question of whether Bunkley's pocketknife was a weapon. Bunkley also relies on the Attorney General's 1951 opinion to support his argument that his knife was a common pocketknife at the time of his conviction. The Florida Attorney General in 1951 opined that a pocket knife ... with blade approximately four inches long is a `common pocket knife' within the meaning of the [statutory] exception. Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 51-358 (1951). However, Bunkley's reliance on the Attorney General's opinion as a statement of 1989 law is misplaced because opinions of the Attorney General are not statements of law. See Leadership Housing, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 336 So.2d 1239, 1241 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); Beverly v. Division of Beverage of the Dep't of Bus. Regulation, 282 So.2d 657, 660 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973) (holding that opinions of the Attorney General are entitled to great weight in construing state law but are not binding on courts). Further, notwithstanding the Attorney General's statement that a pocketknife with a four-inch blade fits within the statutory common pocketknife exception, the Attorney General expressly qualified his opinion by stating that the concealed carrying of the weapons enumerated in this statute must, to a large extent, be governed by the particular and peculiar facts surrounding each case. Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 51-358 (1951). In sum, neither Bunkley nor the dissent cites any law of Florida at the time of Bunkley's conviction to suggest that the court should not have allowed the jury to decide whether Bunkley's particular knife was a dangerous weapon. In Bunkley's case, consistent with the Attorney General's recognition of the factual nature of the issue and as prescribed by applicable Florida law, the trial court properly submitted to the jury the question of whether Bunkley was armed with a dangerous weapon or merely carried a common pocketknife while he committed a burglary.