Opinion ID: 1060855
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: constitutional validity of the search warrant

Text: Initially, the defendant contends that the affidavit, upon which the search warrant was issued, did not establish probable cause because the affidavit failed to allege facts from which the credibility of the informant and the reliability of the information could be determined as is constitutionally required in Tennessee by this Court's decision in State v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430 (Tenn.1989). The State first responds that the affidavit contained facts from which the magistrate could determine the credibility of the informant and the reliability of the information, and alternatively argues that any deficiencies in the affidavit were remedied by the independent police corroboration outlined in the affidavit in this case. We agree. The Fourth Amendment [2] to the United States Constitution requires that search warrants issue only upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation. Article I, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution precludes the issuance of warrants except upon evidence of the fact committed. Therefore, under both the federal and state constitutions, no warrant is to be issued except upon probable cause. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983); State v. Jacumin, supra ; Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-6-103 (1997 Repl.). Probable cause has been defined as a reasonable ground for suspicion, supported by circumstances indicative of an illegal act. Lea v. State, 181 Tenn. 378, 181 S.W.2d 351, 352 (1944). In Tennessee, a finding of probable cause supporting issuance of a search warrant must be based upon evidence included in a written and sworn affidavit. Tenn.Code Ann. 40-6-104 (1997 Repl.); Tenn. R.Crim. P. 41(c); Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d at 432. Indeed, an affidavit containing allegations from which the magistrate can determine whether probable cause exists is an indispensable prerequisite to the issuance of a search warrant in this State. Id. ; see also State ex rel. Blackburn v. Fox, 200 Tenn. 227, 230, 292 S.W.2d 21, 23 (1956). The affidavit must set forth facts upon which a neutral and detached magistrate, reading the affidavit in a common sense and practical manner, can find probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant. State v. Bryan, 769 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tenn.1989). To ensure that the magistrate exercises independent judgment, the affidavit must contain more than mere conclusory allegations by the affiant. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d at 432; State v. Moon, 841 S.W.2d 336, 337 (Tenn.Crim.App.1992). An affidavit may contain hearsay information and need not reflect the direct personal observations of the affiant. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d at 432; State v. Melson, 638 S.W.2d 342, 354 (Tenn.1982). However, under the Tennessee Constitution, an affidavit containing hearsay information supplied by a confidential informant can not support a finding of probable cause unless it also contains factual information concerning the informant's basis of knowledge and credibility. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d at 432, 436. While independent police corroboration can make up deficiencies in either prong, we have recognized that each prong represents an independently important consideration that must be separately considered and satisfied in some way. Id. Appellate courts reviewing the existence of probable cause to support issuance of a warrant may consider only the affidavit and may not consider other evidence provided to or known by the issuing magistrate or possessed by the affiant. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d at 432; Moon, 841 S.W.2d at 337. Having delineated the guiding principles, we now consider whether the affidavit in this case sufficiently describes the informant's credibility and basis of knowledge. The affidavit, in pertinent part, provides as follows: Personally appeared before me, Capt. Thomas Coleman, who makes oath that he has probable cause for believing and does believe that Johnny Henning is in possession of the following described property, to-wit: illegal narcotics, crack cocaine, pictures, ledgers, tapes, or records of drug sales or records of proceeds therefrom. . . . Affiant has been provided information by a reliable informant whose reliability has been established by providing information which has resulted in several arrest[s] in the past. Said informant was in the company of a subject who stated the intention to obtain crack cocaine and did go to the above described residence and did enter the described residence and did display crack cocaine obtained within the residence. Investigators with the drug task force did observe five transactions of a type believed to be drug sales. The resident of the dwelling, Mr. Henning has two prior arrest for possession of drugs with intent to sale[sic], and a vehicle seizure for possession of drugs. These transactions were observed within the last 6 hours and the informant has been on the property within the last 72 hours. Affiant therefore asks that a warrant issue to search the person of Johnny Henning and the premises herein described . . . [for] illegal narcotics crack cocaine. With respect to the informant's basis of knowledge, the affidavit contained specific allegations: [s]aid informant was in the company of a subject who stated the intention to obtain crack cocaine and did go to the above described residence and did enter the described residence and did display crack cocaine obtained within the residence. The affidavit also alleged that the informant had been on the premises in the last 72 hours. The informant's personal observation and knowledge of Henning's activities satisfies the basis of knowledge prong of Jacumin . See State v. Valentine, 911 S.W.2d 328, 330 (Tenn.1995). However, as the Court of Criminal Appeals recognized, the affidavit contains only a conclusory allegation regarding the informant's credibility: a reliable informant whose reliability has been established by providing information which has resulted in several arrest[s] in the past. Although there is no specific allegation in the affidavit which, on its face, establishes the credibility of the informant, the independent police corroboration of the informant's tip, explained in the affidavit, is sufficient to establish the informant's credibility. As Judge Wade, writing for the Court of Criminal Appeals, stated: While the affidavit here contains nothing more than a conclusory attestment of the reliability of the informant, police had seen `five transactions of what appeared to be drug sales.' Police learned that the defendant had two prior arrests for drug violations and vehicle seizure. That officers knew of the prior arrests and seizure, that they had placed his residence under surveillance for six hours within three days of the report by the informant, and that they had observed actions by the defendant consistent with the sale of illegal drugs, does provide the very kind of corroboration envisioned by the ruling in Jacumin . We agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals that the independent police corroboration sufficiently established the informant's credibility, and the affidavit in this case was sufficient to support a finding of probable cause justifying issuance of the search warrant.
The defendant next contends that the search warrant is unconstitutional because it failed to adequately specify the items to be located during the search of the premises. The State responds that the search warrant adequately delineated the items for which a search had been authorized. We agree. Under the Fourth Amendment a search warrant must contain a particular description of the items to be seized. See Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 48 S.Ct. 74, 72 L.Ed. 231 (1927). Likewise, Article I, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution prohibits general warrants, and, in addition, Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-6-103 (1997 Repl.), specifically requires that search warrants describe the property to be seized with particularity. See Lea v. State, supra ; Hampton v. State, 148 Tenn. 155, 252 S.W. 1007 (1923). The constitutional prohibition against general warrants is designed to limit governmental intrusion upon a citizen's privacy and property rights to only that shown to the magistrate to be necessary and to limit the discretion of the officer conducting the search. Marron, supra ; Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 4.6(a) (3rd ed. 1996)(hereinafter LaFave). To satisfy the particularity requirement, a warrant `must enable the searcher to reasonably ascertain and identify the things which are authorized to be seized.' State v. Meeks, 867 S.W.2d 361, 367 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1993) (quoting United States v. Cook, 657 F.2d 730, 733 (5th Cir.1981)). However, as this Court stated in Lea , [W]here the purpose of the search is to find specific property, it should be so particularly described as to preclude the possibility of seizing any other. On the other hand, if the purpose be to seize not specified property, but any property of a specified character which, by reason of its character, and of the place where and the circumstances under which it may be found, if found at all, would be illicit, a description, save as to such character, place and circumstances, would be unnecessary, and ordinarily impossible. 181 Tenn. at 382-83,181 S.W.2d at 352-53 (emphasis added). The warrant issued in this case authorized a search for crack cocaine, illegal narcotics, pictures, records, ledgers, tapes or items that tend to memorialize [sic] drug sales and proceeds therefrom. In our view, the warrant describes the character of the property subject to seizure with sufficient particularity to enable the searcher to reasonably ascertain and identify the things which are authorized to be seized. See Melson, 638 S.W.2d at 353; State v. Meadows, 745 S.W.2d 886, 891 (Tenn. Crim.App.1987). Accordingly, the warrant is not unconstitutionally general and the defendant's claim is without merit.
The defendant next contends that the warrant was invalid because the underlying affidavit was not attached to nor filed with the warrant. We disagree. While an affidavit must be retained in order to ensure subsequent judicial review of the probable cause determination, there is no statute or rule in Tennessee which requires an affidavit upon which a search warrant is issued to be attached or otherwise kept with the warrant. State v. Smith, 836 S.W.2d 137, 141 (Tenn.Crim. App.1992). Rule 41(c), Tenn. R.Crim. P., contains mandatory recording and filing requirements for warrants, but not for affidavits. The affidavit is not considered part of the search warrant in this State even if it appears on the same printed form as the warrant. Minton v. State, 186 Tenn. 541, 212 S.W.2d 373 (1948); Hampton, supra . Therefore, the fact that the affidavit here was not attached to the warrant is inconsequential. The magistrate maintained a copy of the affidavit and it was made a part of the record at the hearing on the defendant's motion to suppress. There is a printed reference on the search warrant to the affidavit made by Capt. Thomas Coleman. The affidavit reflects that it was sworn to before the general sessions court judge of Madison County on October 21, 1993, the same date that the warrant issued. This issue is without merit.