Opinion ID: 555115
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: ian gohagen and raymond a. ebanks

Text: 6 Gohagen and Ebanks also argue that the district court erred in denying their motion to suppress certain statements made and evidence seized in the course of an airport encounter at LaGuardia Airport in New York City on November 5, 1987. As previously discussed, officers of the Kansas City, Missouri Police Department had notified authorities at LaGuardia that persons suspected of carrying large amounts of currency were on board a particular flight from Kansas City to New York City. Subsequent thereto, Gohagen, Ebanks and a female companion were questioned in the terminal immediately after deplaning by agents of the DEA and the Port Authority Police Department. In circumstances remarkably similar to those attendant to the encounter between Stephenson and agent Hicks, Gohagen and Ebanks were approached by the agents and asked if they would answer a few questions. They agreed to do so. The questioning revealed that Gohagen, Ebanks and their female companion were all traveling under fictitious names on airplane tickets purchased that same morning for cash. Ebanks' attempted explanation of the situation was misleading and inconsistent. Both Gohagen and Ebanks subsequently consented to a search of their carry-on bags, whereby the agents discovered what was later determined to be $6,190 in cash. After a drug detection dog reacted positively to the presence of narcotics residue on it, the currency was seized by the agents. 7 Although the facts and circumstances surrounding the airport incidents of Stephenson in Kansas City and Gohagen and Ebanks in New York City are very similar, the legal arguments advanced in support of their respective motions to suppress are somewhat different. Whereas Stephenson focused primarily upon Fourth Amendment considerations in his motion, Gohagen and Ebanks contend in theirs that the use at trial of the statements and evidence obtained during the LaGuardia encounter violates their rights under the Fifth Amendment pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). 8 As noted previously, a district court's findings of fact on a motion to suppress are reviewable under the clearly erroneous standard. United States v. Campbell, supra; United States v. Flett, 806 F.2d 823, 826 (8th Cir.1986). We find no clear error in the district court's findings of fact regarding the November 5, 1987 encounter at LaGuardia airport involving Gohagen and Ebanks and the various law enforcement agents. 9 As for the legal conclusions to be drawn from those findings, let it first be said that we find Miranda inapposite to the facts of this case. But cf. United States v. Blackman, 897 F.2d 309 (8th Cir.1990) (detention custodial for Miranda purposes where numerous police officers were waiting to arrest defendant on specific charge; however, trial court's denial of suppression motion harmless due to great weight of other evidence). Further, we find, consistent with the determination below, that Gohagen and Ebanks were not, and should not have felt, deprived of their liberty by the encounter and that the statements and evidence obtained were the products of a consensual encounter and search and, thus, were properly admitted at trial. Although the question presented here is somewhat closer than that raised by Stephenson, we are nonetheless convinced that this encounter amounted to something less than the custodial interrogation to which Miranda applies.
10 Gohagen contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment as to him on the ground of former, or double, jeopardy in light of his previous conviction for distribution of crack during the same time frame as the alleged conspiracy. Gohagen urges this Court to follow the totality of the circumstances test articulated in United States v. Thomas, 759 F.2d 659, 662 (8th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 980, 106 S.Ct. 382, 88 L.Ed.2d 336 (1985), in determining whether his conviction below was violative of the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In Thomas, however, each of the two indictments charged defendant with a conspiracy offense. The analysis in Thomas is not particularly helpful in this case. Here, Gohagen was previously charged with and convicted of the substantive offense of distribution of cocaine base. In the later indictment, with which we are concerned on this appeal, he was charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine base. 11 A defendant may be cumulatively punished if conviction on each offense requires proof of a fact not required by the other. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 2225, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977); United States v. Martin, 867 F.2d 476, 478 (8th Cir.1989). More specifically, we have previously held that where it was not necessary to prove completion of the substantive offense in order to prove conspiracy, nor was proof of a conspiracy necessary for a conviction of the substantive crime charged, double jeopardy did not exist. United States v. Udey, 748 F.2d 1231, 1238 (8th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1017, 105 S.Ct. 3477, 87 L.Ed.2d 613 (1985). The motion to dismiss was properly denied. 12