Opinion ID: 2637756
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: gilchrist's waiver requirements

Text: For his first issue, the appellant argues that two of his prior convictions should not have been included in the calculation of his criminal history because the written waiver of the right to counsel that he signed in those cases did not include a certification by the municipal court judge that is identical to the example waiver form offered by this court in Gilchrist. The State must prove a defendant's criminal history score by a preponderance of the evidence. K.S.A. 21-4715(c). In that respect, this court's standard of review is limited to determining whether substantial competent evidence supports the district court's finding that the State has met this burden. State v. Presha, 27 Kan.App.2d 645, 648, 8 P.3d 14, rev. denied 269 Kan. 939 (2000). However, to the extent that we are asked to review the effect of the holding in Gilchrist, we are presented with a question of law subject to de novo review. See State v. Jefferson, 287 Kan. 28, 33-34, 194 P.3d 557 (2008). Hughes' argument that the waiver of counsel he signed was invalid stems from this court's holding in Gilchrist, 238 Kan. 202, 708 P.2d 977. In Gilchrist, this court examined the requirements for a valid waiver of the right to counsel. Gilchrist was found guilty of battery in municipal court. He was not represented by counsel at trial, and no record was made of the proceeding. At sentencing, Gilchrist informed the court that he wanted counsel present. Despite this request, the court proceeded with sentencing, stating that Gilchrist could appeal the decision within 10 days. Although Gilchrist informed his counsel that he wished to appeal, an appeal was never filed. 238 Kan. at 203-04, 708 P.2d 977. While in jail, Gilchrist filed a writ of habeas corpus with the district court, complaining that he had been denied his right to counsel in the municipal court proceedings. At the hearing, the municipal court judge, who had prior knowledge of Gilchrist's personal circumstances and knew he was not indigent, testified that at the time of Gilchrist's first appearance, he read to him the charges, explained the penalties, and asked if Gilchrist intended to have an attorney at trial. He testified that Gilchrist responded that he did not wish to have an attorney. Gilchrist, 238 Kan. at 204, 708 P.2d 977. Gilchrist admitted under oath that this testimony was accurate. In the end, the district court denied the writ because of Gilchrist's failure to directly appeal. 238 Kan. at 204-05, 708 P.2d 977. That denial was thereafter appealed to this court. While it was ultimately decided that Gilchrist had been both properly advised of his rights and validly waived them by admitting that the judge's testimony was accurate, this court developed a procedure for recording future waivers of the right to counsel in municipal courts. Without requiring that every waiver of counsel be made on the recorda process too burdensome for the municipal courtsthis court concluded that obtaining a written waiver was an effective solution. 238 Kan. at 209, 708 P.2d 977. A sample of the suggested waiver form was included in the opinion: SAMPLE WAIVER FOR THE CITY OF ____, ____ COUNTY, KANSAS CITY OF ____, Plaintiff, vs. ____, Accused Person (Municipal Court Identification No. ____) WAIVER OF COUNSEL The undersigned acknowledges that he or she has been informed by the Municipal Court of the charges against him or her, of the possible penalty, of the nature of the proceedings before the Court, of his or her right to have counsel appointed to represent him or her, if he or she is financially unable to obtain counsel and is determined to be indigent, all of which the undersigned fully understands. The undersigned now states to the Court that he or she does not desire to have counsel, either retained or appointed, to represent him or her before the Court, and wishes to proceed without counsel. ______________ SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this ___ day of ____, 19____. _____________ I hereby certify that the above named person has been fully informed of the charges against him or her and of the accused's right to have counsel, either retained or appointed, to represent the accused at the proceedings before this Court and that the accused has executed the above waiver in my presence, after its meaning and effect have been fully explained to the accused, this ___ day of ____, 19____. ______________ JUDGE OF THE MUNICIPAL COURT 238 Kan. at 212, 708 P.2d 977. It is the certification language at the bottom of the sample form that is the source of the present complaint. Gilchrist indicated that a properly executed written waiver, such as the example above, would meet the State's burden to prove that a defendant's waiver of counsel was knowingly and intelligently made. 238 Kan. at 208-09, 708 P.2d 977. Importantly, however, the court also held that admissions by the defendant regarding the waiver could be used to cure any defect resulting from failing to obtain the written waiver. 238 Kan. at 210, 708 P.2d 977. This court held that Gilchrist's acknowledgement that the municipal court's testimony was accurate cure[d] any defect resulting from the absence of a written waiver and eliminate[d] the problem of proof. 238 Kan. at 210, 708 P.2d 977. Thus, we ruled that it is not the specific form of the waiver, but rather the ability to verify the specific circumstances under which it was given that is the critical factor in deciding whether a waiver is valid. Post- Gilchrist, the Court of Appeals has issued several opinions reviewing how municipal courts have applied Gilchrist's requirements when accepting a defendant's waiver of counsel. See State v. Allen, 28 Kan. App.2d 784, 20 P.3d 747 (2001); State v. Likins, 21 Kan.App.2d 420, 903 P.2d 764, rev. denied 258 Kan. 861 (1995); State v. Flores-Picasso, No. 100,602, 2009 WL 2436686, unpublished opinion filed August 7, 2009; State v. Reed, No. 90,170, 2004 WL 556754, unpublished opinion filed March 19, 2004, rev. denied 278 Kan. 851 (2004). Of these, the State cites Likins for the proposition that a signed waiver form and a journal entry indicating the defendant was advised of his rights was enough to show that the waiver was knowingly and intelligently given. Likins, 21 Kan.App.2d at 433, 903 P.2d 764. In Likins, the defendant challenged the sufficiency of his signed waiver form as failing to demonstrate that he knowingly and intelligently waived counsel. However, the court did not address whether the form itself was satisfactory in light of Gilchrist. While, as the State suggests, the court did conclude that [t]he record affirmatively show[ed] defendant was advised of his right to counsel and waived that right and that there was no evidence suggesting any irregularity with the prior plea, the court did so under the assumption that the challenge was a collateral attack, requiring that every reasonable presumption in favor of the validity of the judgment should be indulged. 21 Kan. App.2d at 433, 903 P.2d 764. It therefore did not evaluate whether the documents in the record addressing his waiver complied with the Gilchrist requirements. In contrast, Hughes cites State v. Allen, 28 Kan.App.2d 784, 20 P.3d 747 (2001), where the Court of Appeals distinguished Likins. In Allen, the court reasoned that a challenge to the constitutional validity of prior convictions required that the court do more than merely presume that all of the actions of the municipal court followed the law ..., there must be a showing that the waiver was knowingly and intelligently made, and the attempted waiver must be strictly construed. 28 Kan.App.2d at 791-92, 20 P.3d 747. Based on that standard, the Court of Appeals concluded that a journal entry with the language defendant has been advised of his constitutional rights and enhancements, coupled with the handwritten word waiver, was not enough to meet the State's burden to show that he had knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. Specifically, the court noted that the word waiver did not affirmatively explain what was being waived and remanded the issue for further findings. 28 Kan.App.2d at 788-91, 20 P.3d 747. Two unpublished Court of Appeals opinions are more on point. In Reed, Reed challenged the use of two of his prior uncounseled misdemeanor convictions to enhance his sentence because the State had not shown that they were obtained after a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel. In one of the convictions, Reed had signed a waiver form that followed the Gilchrist sample form; however, it lacked a complete caption, contained no case or docket number, was undated, and was not file stamped. Reed never signed a waiver form in the other conviction, and instead the State presented a journal entry that contained a handwritten note stating 6/16/00 factual basis-fully advised of rights, waives them. Reed, slip op. at 5. The Court of Appeals determined that these entries fell short of meeting the State's burden to show that in both cases the waiver was knowingly and intelligently given. Another unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals was filed after the petition for review was granted in this case. In Flores-Picasso, slip op. at 1, defendant Flores-Picasso also challenged the aggregation of his two prior uncounseled misdemeanor convictions. Specifically, he argued that his waiver was not knowingly and intelligently made because the forms he signed did not fully inform him of his right to counsel. Flores-Picasso, slip op. at 1-2. The forms at issue in Flores-Picasso contained very detailed language explaining the nature of the charges against him and the maximum possible punishment; his right to an attorney and the method for appointment if he could not afford one; and the benefits of representation and the disadvantages of proceeding to trial without counsel. Further, both written waiver forms contained certification statements signed by the municipal court judge acknowledging that the judge had informed Flores-Picasso of these rights, which he then intelligently waived in the judge's presence. Flores-Picasso, slip op. at 2-3. Importantly, while the forms used were quite detailed, they contained language different than the sample form in Gilchrist. In fact, the forms Flores-Picasso signed provided more information and in greater detail than the Gilchrist example. In specifically addressing this discrepancy, the Court of Appeals stated:  Gilchrist did not mandate that waivers of counsel obtained in municipal courts contain the exact language of its sample.... As long as the written waiver shows that the `accused was properly advised of his or her rights and that he or she knowingly and intelligently waived those rights,' the waiver, regardless of the specific language used, is sufficient for purposes of showing that the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not violated. Flores-Picasso, slip op. at 4 (citing Gilchrist, 238 Kan. at 210, 708 P.2d 977). Thus, with substance prevailing over form, the Court of Appeals concluded that the forms Flores-Picasso signed did constitute substantial competent evidence that he made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. Flores-Picasso, slip op. at 4. As in Flores-Picasso, the Court of Appeals in the present case examined Gilchrist's requirements and concluded:  Gilchrist did not mandate that waivers of counsel obtained in municipal courts contain the exact language of its sample. The court specifically noted that the sample was a suggested form which it recommended for use in municipal courts. [ Gilchrist, ] 238 Kan. at 209, 708 P.2d 977. Gilchrist clearly focused on whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived the right to counsel, which can be accomplished without specific certification language by the judge in the waiver form. `[T]he reason for the requirement of a record of the proceedings and a written waiver of counsel are for the purpose of proving an accused was properly advised of his [or her] rights and that he [or she] knowingly and intelligently waived those rights.' 238 Kan. at 209-10, 708 P.2d 977. Hughes, slip op. at 8. As further support for its position, the Court of Appeals relied on State v. Strayer, 242 Kan. 618, 628, 750 P.2d 390 (1988), and State v. Turner, 239 Kan. 360, 365-68, 721 P.2d 255 (1986). Both cases, decided after Gilchrist, upheld waivers even though no written waiver form was signed by either defendant. Hughes, slip op. at 8-9. In Strayer, this court determined that while the district court judge never explicitly informed the defendant about his right to have an attorney present, because the defendant had apparently hired and fired an attorney during the course of the litigation, and had also been involved in previous legal proceedings, the defendant's statements to the court that he had no objection to continuing with sentencing absent counsel was a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to have counsel at sentencing. 242 Kan. at 628, 750 P.2d 390. Likewise, in Turner, based on the review of an expanded record, this court concluded that the defendant's failure to dispute a pretrial journal entry stating that the court had informed him of his right to counsel and requirements for appointment of counsel, together with entries in the plea transcript showing that he was asked whether he had been informed of his right to counsel, was enough to show that the defendant's waiver was knowingly and intelligently made despite the lack of a written waiver. 239 Kan. at 367-68, 721 P.2d 255. The Court of Appeal's reliance on Strayer and Turner is not completely determinative because neither of the cases involved municipal court waivers. More to the point, neither opinion addresses the issue of a written waiver at all. Both simply analyze what other types of evidence could satisfy the State's burden of proof. Further, both decisions relied in part on transcripts from the record, something generally not available in municipal courtthe main reason for requiring a written waiver to begin with. Ultimately, however, we find that Gilchrist does not require that municipal courts use forms identical to the sample included in the opinion. At the heart of Gilchrist was finding a way to assure that a defendant's right to counsel was adequately protected without unduly burdening the municipal courts. What is clear after Gilchrist is that because municipal courts are not courts of record, a written document should be obtained so that there is evidence that the defendant was fully informed of his or her rights to counsel and that any waiver thereof was knowingly and intelligently made. Gilchrist merely mandated that the use of the sample written waiver satisfies the constitutional requirement of establishing a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel. It did not invalidate the use of other methods for recording the same information. This court has on many occasions reiterated that ``[t]he law of this state is realistic. Substance prevails over form.' ' Kelly v. VinZant, 287 Kan. 509, 528, 197 P.3d 803 (2008); State v. Fewell, 286 Kan. 370, 389, 184 P.3d 903 (2008). As long as the necessary information is ascertainable from other means or waiver forms, Gilchrist's requirements are satisfied.