Opinion ID: 1923088
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Order disallowing defense counsel leave to contact jurors.

Text: The trial court denied defendant's postconviction motion for an order granting authority to contact jurors and use their testimony or affidavits in connection with defendant's postconviction motions. Defendant acknowledges the general rule expressed by this court in Boller v. Cofrances (1969), 42 Wis. 2d 170, 166 N. W. 2d 129, against impeachment of a jury verdict. Our attention is directed to United States v. Beach (4th Cir. 1961), 296 Fed. 2d 153, for authority that the instant case qualifies as an exception to that rule. We believe Beach is distinguishable. Electric adding machines were introduced in evidence and the trial court permitted them to go to the jury. The jury requested and received an electric cord to make them function to test the sound. In the home where the adding machines were operated, they were placed on a foam rubber pad some two inches in thickness. The record did not indicate whether the two-inch foam rubber pad (which also went to the jury) was used in any experiments which might have been conducted by the jury. Also, from the decision it cannot be determined whether any experiments with the adding machines were conducted during the trial. On appeal, the cause was remanded for a determination of whether in fact the jury had performed experimentation. It was further held that a direct court inquiry of the jurors would be proper in this regard, relying on the distinction made in Perry v. Bailey (1874), 12 Kan. 539, 545: `Public policy forbids that a matter resting in the personal consciousness of one juror should be received to overthrow the verdict, because being personal it is not accessible to other testimony; it gives to the secret thought of one the power to disturb the expressed conclusions of twelve; its tendency is to produce bad faith on the part of a minority, to induce an apparent acquiescence with the purpose of subsequent dissent; to induce tampering with individual jurors subsequent to the verdict. But as to overt acts, they are accessible to the knowledge of all the jurors; if one affirms misconduct, the remaining eleven can deny; one cannot disturb the action of the twelve; it is useless to tamper with one, for the eleven may be heard. Under this view of the law the affidavits were properly received. They tended to prove something which did not essentially inhere in the verdict, an overt act, open to the knowledge of all the jury, and not alone within the personal consciousness of one.' United States v. Beach, supra, 160. This holding is consistent with the exception to the general rule recognized in Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Amodt (1966), 29 Wis. 2d 441, 450, 451, 139 N. W. 2d 6, and reaffirmed in Boller: . . . We recognize, however, that in some situations (such as Sawyer and Cullen ) jurors may properly be subject to interrogation by the court to determine if an irregularity occurred; however, trial courts should limit such inquiries to those cases in which the court is persuaded (1) that substantial personal awareness of the alleged impropriety is within the direct and independent knowledge of one who did not serve as a member of the jury, (2) that such knowledge was not derived by such person from a juror after the jury's discharge, and (3) that the challenge to the integrity of the verdict originated from such person rather than from a juror. Thus, jurors may sometimes be required to confirm or deny someone else's attack upon their verdict, but they themselves may never embark on a course which will impeach their verdict. The instant case does not fall within the above exception, and we find no error in the trial court's determination.