Opinion ID: 4541614
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: application of the first amendment

Text: TO PARAGRAPH NINE {¶ 29} Rasawehr contends that by enjoining him from future posting of messages about appellees, the CSPOs include an unconstitutional prior restraint on expression covered by the First Amendment. We therefore consider these prohibitions in light of First Amendment jurisprudence.2 A. Content-based vs. content-neutral restrictions {¶ 30} Because these injunctive orders regulate speech, we must first determine whether these regulations are content-based or content-neutral. See McCullen, 573 U.S. at 478, 134 S.Ct. 2518, 189 L.Ed.2d 502 (“we think it unexceptional to perform the first part of a multipart constitutional analysis first”). {¶ 31} “Government regulation of speech is content based if a law applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed.” Reed, ___U.S.___, 135 S.Ct. at 2227, 192 L.Ed.2d 236. A law is content based “if it require[s] ‘enforcement authorities’ to ‘examine the content of 2. Rasawehr does not articulate any argument contesting the provision of paragraph nine that ordered him to remove prior postings from CountyCoverUp.com that related to appellees. Compare Coleman v. Razete, 2019-Ohio-2106, 137 N.E.3d 639, ¶ 31 (1st Dist.) (order “[r]equiring [respondent] to remove all existing references to [petitioner] from internet or social-networking sites that [respondent] operate[ed] or control[led] was narrowly tailored to redress the specific pattern of conduct that [respondent] had engaged in to knowingly cause [petitioner] mental distress” and to prevent further mental distress to petitioner, while also “safeguard[ing] free speech concerns”). Because Rasawehr does not contest that provision here and the ordered removal of prior postings would not in any case amount to a prior restraint, we do not consider that provision further in this case. 12 January Term, 2020 the message that is conveyed to determine whether’ a violation has occurred.” McCullen at 479, quoting Fed. Communications Comm. v. League of Women Voters of California., 468 U.S. 364, 383, 104 S.Ct. 3106, 82 L.Ed.2d 278 (1984). A law is also content-based if it is “concerned with undesirable effects that arise from ‘the direct impact of speech on its audience’ or ‘[l]isteners’ reactions to speech.’ ” McCullen at 481, quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321, 108 S.Ct. 1157, 99 L.Ed.2d 333 (1988). {¶ 32} Paragraph nine of the CSPOs ordered Rasawehr to (1) refrain from posting about appellees on any social-media service, website, discussion board, or similar outlet or service and (2) refrain specifically from posting about the deaths of appellees’ husbands in any manner that expressed, implied, or suggested that appellees were culpable in those deaths. Putting aside for the moment the extraordinary scope of these injunctions, we can only conclude that they are intended to regulate the subject matter, the content of speech, or both. {¶ 33} A regulation of speech that is “about” appellees is necessarily a regulation of the subject matter of that speech. The first sentence of paragraph nine fully regulates and in this case puts limits on any expression that relates to that particular subject, i.e., appellees. And the regulation of speech in the second sentence of paragraph nine about the deaths of appellees’ husbands that says anything about possible culpability regulates not only the subject matter but also the message. It is inescapable that a regulation of speech “about” a specific person (or likely any other specific subject of discussion) is a regulation of the content of that speech and must therefore be analyzed as a content-based regulation. {¶ 34} For their part, appellees do not seriously dispute that the regulation of speech concerning their alleged culpability in the deaths of their husbands is a content-based regulation. Appellees do, however, dispute that the prohibition from posting about them in general is content-based and instead contend that this is a content-neutral regulation. They rely on Commonwealth v. Lambert, 2016 PA 13 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO Super 200, 147 A.3d 1221 (Pa.Super.Ct.2015), in which the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, the state’s intermediate appellate court, reviewed a comparable protective order and ruled that the prohibition was “not concerned with the content of Appellant’s speech but with, instead, the target of his speech, namely, Plaintiff, whom the court has already deemed the victim of his abusive conduct.” (Emphasis sic.) Id. at 1229. {¶ 35} But the “target” of such speech necessarily concerns the subject matter of the speech. It “cannot be justified without reference to the content of the prohibited communication.” People v. Relerford, 2017 IL 121094, 422 Ill.Dec. 774, 104 N.E.3d 341, 350 (2017). It requires an examination of its content, i.e, the person(s) being discussed, to determine whether a violation has occurred and is concerned with undesirable effects that arise from “ ‘the direct impact of speech on its audience’ or ‘[l]isteners’ reactions to speech,” McCullen, 573 U.S. at 481, 134 S.Ct. 2518, 189 L.Ed.2d 502, quoting Boos, 485 U.S. at 321, 108 S.Ct. 1157, 99 L.Ed.2d 333. We therefore cannot accept appellees’ attempt to characterize the order banning all posted speech about them as merely a content-neutral regulation. {¶ 36} Nor can the prohibitions in paragraph nine be considered merely incidental to a regulation of conduct. See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-377, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (act of burning Selective Service registration certificate could be prosecuted for violation of law prohibiting destruction of registration certificates even if conduct was intended to express an idea or belief). On the contrary, the regulation of expressive activity is the obvious purpose of paragraph nine of the CSPOs here. {¶ 37} We therefore conclude that the prohibition of certain future speech by paragraph nine is a content-based regulation. B. Exception for speech integral to criminal conduct {¶ 38} Having determined that speech was being regulated on the basis of its content does not necessarily mean, however, that it cannot be regulated. The 14 January Term, 2020 First Amendment does “ ‘permit[] restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas.’ ” United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468, 130 S.Ct. 1577, 176 L.Ed.2d 435 (2010), quoting R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382-383, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992). Those categories include: “advocacy intended, and likely, to incite imminent lawless action; obscenity; defamation; speech integral to criminal conduct; so-called ‘fighting words,’; child pornography; fraud; true threats; and speech presenting some grave and imminent threat the government has the power to prevent   .” (Citations omitted.) United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717, 132 S.Ct. 2537, 183 L.Ed.2d 574 (2012) (plurality opinion). {¶ 39} In this case, the court of appeals suggested—but did not actually decide—that Rasawehr’s restrained speech could have been “ ‘integral to criminal conduct,’ ” 2019-Ohio-57, at ¶ 40, quoting Alvarez at 721, and thus within a class of “unprotected speech,” id. at ¶ 39. Appellees more directly contend that Rasawehr’s speech is “categorically unprotected” because it is “speech integral to criminal conduct.”3 For support, appellees cite Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 69 S.Ct. 684, 93 L.Ed. 834 (1949). In Giboney, unionized ice peddlers picketed against Empire Storage and Ice Company after it refused to agree not to sell ice to nonunion peddlers, a practice that would have violated Missouri’s antitrade-restraint law. When Empire sued to enjoin the picketing, the union answered by asserting a constitutional right to picket for the purpose of forcing Empire to discontinue its sale of ice to nonunion peddlers. {¶ 40} Upholding the trial court’s picketing injunction against the union, the United States Supreme Court ruled that all of the union’s activities “constituted a single and integrated course of conduct, which was in violation of Missouri’s valid law.” Id. at 498. The court expressly rejected the suggestion “that the constitutional freedom for speech and press extends its immunity to speech or 3. Appellees do not contend that Rasawehr’s restrained speech could be subject to regulation on the other possibly applicable categories such as defamation or true threats. 15 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO writing used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute.” Id. According to the court, “the injunction did no more than enjoin an offense against Missouri law, a felony.” Id. Because the “sole, unlawful immediate objective” of the expressive activity was to “induce Empire to violate Missouri law by acquiescing in unlawful demands,” prohibiting that expressive activity did not violate rights protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 502. The court explained: [It] has never been deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed. Such an expansive interpretation of the constitutional guaranties of speech and press would make it practically impossible ever to enforce laws against agreements in restraint of trade as well as many other agreements and conspiracies deemed injurious to society. (Citations omitted.) Id. {¶ 41} According to appellees, Rasawehr’s postings are integral to the criminal conduct of menacing by stalking in violation of R.C. 2903.211(A). But there has been no judicial determination here that future postings Rasawehr might make will be integral to the commission of the crime and thus unprotected by the First Amendment. “The special vice of a prior restraint is that communication will be suppressed, either directly or by inducing excessive caution in the speaker, before an adequate determination that it is unprotected by the First Amendment.” Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm. on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 390, 93 S.Ct. 2553, 37 L.Ed.2d 669 (1973). Speech may not be categorically suppressed by means of a prior restraint absent a judicial determination that the speech would be unprotected by the First Amendment. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 16 January Term, 2020 58, 85 S.Ct. 734, 13 L.Ed.2d 649 (1965) (“because only a judicial determination in an adversary proceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression, only a procedure requiring a judicial determination suffices to impose a valid final restraint”). {¶ 42} Our decision in O’Brien v. Univ. Community Tenants Union, Inc., 42 Ohio St.2d 242, 327 N.E.2d 753 (1975), is instructive. In that case, the plaintiff, a landlord, alleged that the defendant, a tenant-organization, had compiled and published a list of landlords about whom defendant had received the most complaints. The plaintiff alleged that the list contained false and defamatory information about him. The plaintiff’s complaint requested various forms of injunctive relief that would enjoin the defendant from disseminating allegedly defamatory information in the future. The trial court dismissed the complaint because the plaintiff “had not ‘met the heavy burden of justifying prior restraint.’ ” Id. at 244. The court of appeals reversed, determining that if the trial court found the defendant’s statements to be defamatory, “then the question whether defendant should be enjoined from future repetition of the same statements could properly be before the court.” Id. at 245. {¶ 43} We affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals in O’Brien, stating: Once speech has judicially been found libelous, if all the requirements for injunctive relief are met, an injunction for restraint of continued publication of that same speech may be proper. The judicial determination that specific speech is defamatory must be made prior to any restraint. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts (1967), 388 U.S. 130, 149 [87 S.Ct. 1975, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094]. In an analogous area, dealing with obscene materials, the United States Supreme Court, in Southeastern Promotions v. 17 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO Conrad [420 U.S. 546, 558-559, 95 S.Ct. 1239, 43 L.Ed.2d 448 (1975)], said: “   The presumption against prior restraints is heavier— and the degree of protection broader—than that against limits on expression imposed by criminal penalties. Behind the distinction is a theory deeply etched in our law: a free society prefers to punish the few who abuse rights of speech after they break the law than to throttle them and all others beforehand. It is always difficult to know in advance what an individual will say, and the line between legitimate and illegitimate speech is often so finely drawn that the risks of freewheeling censorship are formidable. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) [78 S.Ct. 1332, 2 L.Ed.2d 1460].” Speaking of allowable remedies available, that same court, in Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown (1957), 354 U.S. 436, 437, [77 S.Ct. 1325, 1 L.Ed.2d 1469,] said: “   ‘limited injunctive remedy,’ under closely defined procedural safeguards, against the sale and distribution of written and printed matter found after due trial to be obscene [may be allowed]   .” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 245-246. {¶ 44} Because the plaintiff’s complaint in O’Brien sought to prospectively enjoin further publication of allegedly defamatory information, we held that such relief could be awarded if the plaintiff’s allegations—“that files of a false and defamatory nature are being used to coerce the public into refusing to rent from him”—could be substantiated. Id. at 246. Thus, O’Brien confirms that before a court may enjoin the future publication of allegedly defamatory statements based 18 January Term, 2020 on their content, there must first be a judicial determination that the subject statements were in fact defamatory. Id. {¶ 45} In the case before us, however, there has been no such judicial determination that future postings by Rasawehr will be an integral means to criminal conduct and thus unprotected by the First Amendment. {¶ 46} Even if the trial court here determined solely for purposes of civil protection that Rasawehr violated R.C. 2903.211(A), there has been no valid judicial determination that any future expression Rasawehr might make to others through posted messages would necessarily be integral to the criminal conduct of menacing by stalking in violation of R.C. 2903.211(A). Even if past speech that an offender made to a person that the offender knew would cause that person to believe that the offender would cause physical harm to that person or would cause mental distress to that person could be considered speech that was integral to the criminal conduct of menacing by stalking, we do not believe that this principle may be applied categorically to future speech—that is by its nature uncertain and unknowable—directed to others. {¶ 47} Because of the uncertainty inherent in evaluating future speech that has yet to be expressed, the record here cannot justify a content-based prior restraint on speech when there has been no valid judicial determination that such speech will be integral to criminal conduct, defamatory, or otherwise subject to lawful regulation based on its content. {¶ 48} When it comes to speech, the application of a criminal law should generally occur after the contested speech takes place, not before it is even uttered. As observed by the United States Supreme Court in Carroll v. President & Commrs. of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 180-181, 89 S.Ct. 347, 21 L.Ed.2d 325 (1968), 19 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO Ordinarily, the State’s constitutionally permissible interests are adequately served by criminal penalties imposed after freedom to speak has been so grossly abused that its immunity is breached. The impact and consequences of subsequent punishment for such abuse are materially different from those of prior restraint. Prior restraint upon speech suppresses the precise freedom which the First Amendment sought to protect against abridgement. {¶ 49} For their part, appellees rely on federal-court decisions that have upheld the constitutionality of the federal stalking statute, 18 U.S.C. 2261A.4 See United States v. Gonzalez, 905 F.3d 165 (3d Cir.2018); United States v. Osinger, 753 F.3d 939 (9th Cir.2014); United States v. Sayer, 748 F.3d. 425 (1st Cir.2014); United States v. Petrovic, 701 F.3d 849 (8th Cir.2012). But those decisions are inapposite here inasmuch as they involved prosecutions and convictions under that federal statute for past speech that was integral to the course of criminal conduct. By contrast, there has been no criminal prosecution and conviction of Rasawehr for having engaged in menacing by stalking in violation of R.C. 2903.211 or any other offenses relating to his statements about appellees. More importantly, none of those cases involved prior restraints on future speech like those imposed here by paragraph nine. 4. 18 U.S.C. 2261A(2) prohibits whoever with the intent to kill, injure, harass, intimidate, or place under surveillance with intent to kill, injure, harass, or intimidate another person, uses the mail, any interactive computer service or electronic communication service or electronic communication system of interstate commerce, or any other facility of interstate or foreign commerce, to engage in a course of conduct that— (A) places that person in reasonable fear of the death of or serious bodily injury to a person    or (B) causes, attempts to cause, or would be reasonably expected to cause substantial emotional distress to a person   . 20 January Term, 2020 {¶ 50} Because there was no valid judicial determination that any future Internet postings that Rasawehr might make about appellees would necessarily be integral to the criminal conduct of menacing by stalking in violation of R.C. 2903.211(A), or that such postings would be defamatory or otherwise proscribable, that future expression would not be excluded categorically from First Amendment protection. The trial court’s CSPOs thus represent prior restraints that are unconstitutional unless they can survive strict scrutiny. See Toledo Blade Co., 125 Ohio St.3d 149, 2010-Ohio-1533, 926 N.E.2d 634, at ¶ 21. C. Application of strict scrutiny {¶ 51} A content-based regulation of protected speech cannot be sustained unless it is the least restrictive means to achieve a compelling state interest. See Reed, __ U.S. __, 135 S.Ct. at 2231, 192 L.Ed.2d 236; McCullen, 573 U.S. at 478, 134 S.Ct. 2518, 189 L.Ed.2d 502; Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. at 813, 120 S.Ct. 1878, 146 L.Ed.2d 865; Sable Communications of California, Inc., 492 U.S. at 126, 109 S.Ct. 2829, 106 L.Ed.2d 93. Assuming, without deciding, that there is a compelling state interest in protecting civil-stalking victims from fear of imminent physical harm or mental distress, the means chosen here are not the least restrictive. The scope of paragraph nine, which prohibits Rasawehr from posting anything about appellees is remarkable. It has no defined limits. Anything that Rasawehr might ever post about appellees, no matter how innocuous, would conceivably subject him to proceedings for contempt of court if not criminal prosecution under R.C. 2919.27 for violating the CSPO. By any measure, this regulation of speech is demonstrably overbroad. {¶ 52} In Flood v. Wilk, 430 Ill.Dec. 96, 2019 IL App (1st) 172792, 125 N.E.3d 1114, 1116-1117 (2019), the pastor of a church obtained a “stalking no contact order” that, among other things, prevented the respondent from “communicating, publishing or communicating, in any form any writing naming or 21 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO regarding [the pastor], his family or any employee, staff or member” of the pastor’s church congregation. Vacating that part of the order, the appellate court stated: Since the trial court’s order in the instant case targeted respondent’s speech based on its subject matter—the church or its members—it would be considered a content-based restriction and presumptively prohibited. An injunction that prohibits respondent from writing anything at all about his pastor or any other member of his church congregation—whether flattering or unflattering, fact or opinion, innocuous or significant, and regardless of the medium of communication—certainly would not be that rare case that survives strict scrutiny. It is all but impossible to imagine a factual record that would justify this blanket restriction on respondent’s speech. Paragraph (b)(5) of the order is substantially and obviously overbroad, and it violates respondent’s first-amendment right to free speech. (Emphasis sic.) Id. at 1126. {¶ 53} Not unlike the order in Flood that prohibited the respondent from writing anything about the pastor or any employee or member of the church, the orders issued here prohibited Rasawehr from writing anything about appellees “on any social media service, website, discussion board, or similar outlet or service.” Nothing in the record before us justifies such an utterly sweeping restriction on First Amendment expression. Nor does it justify the attempt to limit its censorship to postings about the deaths of appellees’ husbands or appellees’ alleged culpability in their husbands’ deaths. {¶ 54} Appellees maintain that paragraph nine was narrowly tailored to limit the exercise of free speech to only the degree necessary to achieve the 22 January Term, 2020 compelling state interest of protecting them from “stalking and harassment” and that no less restrictive alternative would be as effective. But we fail to see how an order that prohibits Rasawehr from posting anything about appellees either protects them from certain mental distress or prohibits only distress-causing speech. To the contrary, it prohibits everything. And while the restraint on postings about appellees concerning their alleged culpability in the deaths of their husbands bears at least some factual relation to the allegations contained in their petitions, it suffers from the same fatal flaw by suppressing all expression about that topic regardless of whether it causes mental distress cognizable under R.C. 2903.211(D)(2)(a) and (b). Neither the trial court nor the court of appeals made these First Amendment sensitive determinations in this case. {¶ 55} We by no means discount any mental distress and embarrassment that appellees experienced, nor do we doubt that future statements may cause additional mental anguish. But speech does not lose its protected character simply because it may be upsetting and cause distress or embarrassment. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458, 131 S.Ct. 1207, 179 L.Ed.2d 172 (2011) (antimilitary and homophobic statements near funeral for serviceman killed in action was protected despite jury’s finding that it was “outrageous” as an element of intentional infliction of emotional distress); Natl. Assn. for the Advancement of Colored People v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 910, 102 S.Ct. 3409, 73 L.Ed.2d 1215 (1982) (“Speech does not lose its protected character    simply because it may embarrass others or coerce them into action”). {¶ 56} Moreover, appellees are not without civil tort remedies to redress any cognizable injuries they claim to have suffered as a result of Rasawehr’s statements about them, including but not necessarily limited to actions for defamation. But the special statutory process to provide expedited civil relief to stalking victims under R.C. 2903.214 serves primarily to protect victims from imminent threats of physical harm and mental distress. It is not designed to be a 23 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO shortcut or substitute for conventional civil remedies and thus is not the appropriate means to obtain the panoply of monetary damages and injunctive relief that may properly be awarded through such proceedings. In any case, the potential abuse of speech rights in the future cannot justify the blanket prohibition imposed here on Rasawehr’s speech before it has even been uttered. {¶ 57} Here, the court of appeals observed that “not all speech is of equal First Amendment importance,” 2019-Ohio-57, at ¶ 41, and that “[i]t is speech on ‘ “matters of public concern” ’ that is ‘at the heart of the First Amendment’s protection,’ ” id., quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758-759, 105 S.Ct. 2939, 86 L.Ed.2d 593 (1985), quoting First Natl. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978), citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed 1093 (1940). Appellees similarly maintain, in defending the CSPOs under strict scrutiny, that the value of Rasawehr’s speech concerning private matters is “decidedly low” when balanced against the interest in upholding the CSPOs. They rely on Snyder, in which the United States Supreme Court reviewed a jury verdict that held a church and its leaders liable for the emotional distress caused by their protest using antimilitary statements and homophobic slurs near an American serviceman’s funeral. The court ruled that “[w]hether the First Amendment prohibits holding [the church] liable for its speech in this case turns largely on whether that speech is of public or private concern, as determined by all the circumstances of the case.” Id. at 451. Because the speech at issue in Snyder involved matters of public concern, to include “the political and moral conduct of the United States and its citizens” and “homosexuality in the military,” id. at 454, it was “entitled to ‘special protection’ ” and the court set aside the jury’s verdict against the church, id. at 458459. {¶ 58} In their brief to this court, appellees claim that in contrast to Snyder, 24 January Term, 2020 Rasawehr’s speech (1) consists of a barrage of personal attacks blended with just enough public criticism to create an illusion of public debate; (2) is, by Rasawehr’s own admission, motivated by a personal grudge against his family evidenced by the content of his writings; and (3) did not take place on a public street. As appellees must concede, however, Rasawehr’s statements purported to implicate local public officials in an alleged criminal conspiracy. The United States Supreme Court has said that “ ‘speech on public issues occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values, and is entitled to special protection.’ ” Snyder, 562 U.S. at 452, 131 S.Ct. 1207, 179 L.Ed.2d 172, quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983). Such speech is protected by the First Amendment even though the speaker or writer was motivated by hatred or ill-will. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53, 108 S.Ct. 876, 99 L.Ed.2d 41 (1988) (“while    a bad motive may be deemed controlling for purposes of tort liability in other areas of the law, we think the First Amendment prohibits such a result in the area of public debate about public figures”); see also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73, 85 S.Ct. 209, 13 L.Ed.2d 125 (1964). {¶ 59} In any case, our role here is not to pass judgment on the truth, plausibility, or First Amendment value of Rasawehr’s allegations. To the extent his statements involve matters of both private and public concern, we cannot discount the First Amendment protection afforded to that expression. We most assuredly have no license to recognize some new category of unprotected speech based on its supposed value. Rejecting such a “free-floating test for First Amendment coverage,” the United States Supreme Court declared in Stevens, 559 U.S. at 470, 130 S.Ct. 1577, 176 L.Ed.2d 435, that the First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech “does not extend only to categories of speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits.” “Our decisions    25 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO cannot be taken as establishing a freewheeling authority to declare new categories of speech outside the scope of the First Amendment.” Id. at 472. {¶ 60} Prior restraints on First Amendment expression are presumptively unconstitutional. Because paragraph nine of the CSPOs is content based and does not survive strict scrutiny, we hereby vacate those portions of paragraph nine that enjoin Rasawehr from future postings about appellees or that express, imply, or suggest that appellees were culpable in the deaths of their husbands.