Opinion ID: 1303659
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the michigan gross indecency statutes

Text: Although sodomy does not as a matter of law include fellatio, People v Schmitt, supra , it does not inexorably follow that gross indecency includes only fellatio. This case hinges on the question whether the term gross indecency is to be construed broadly or narrowly. [8] The answer to this question begins with an examination of the statutory scheme. Gross indecency between males was not proscribed by statute until 1903. [9] See 1903 PA 198, § 1. In 1931, that statute was reenacted as part of the criminal code. See 1931 PA 328, § 338. The offenses of gross indecency between females and gross indecency between males and females were first enacted in 1939, see 1939 PA 148, only three years after a decision of this Court carrying implications for the original statute. In Schmitt, 275 Mich 577-578, which followed the historical narrow interpretation of the sodomy statute, the Court noted that the offense of fellatio is now prohibited by [the gross indecency statute]. The fact that the Legislature thereafter employed identical language in the companion statutes lends support to the argument that the statute applies only to oral-genital contact. The very addition of those two offenses, which meant that gross indecency was prohibited regardless of the gender of the participants, provides additional support for the narrow interpretation. If any sexual act could constitute the offense, then the 1939 act would have instituted decency regulation for all sexual behavior. Though this interpretation of the statutes would not necessarily have prohibited all sex, it would seem to mean that any person who had sex could be bound over and tried on a felony charge. The outrageousness of this possibility is stronger evidence that the Legislature intended the statutes to apply only to a specific act or acts. While there is a textual argument [10] for application of the statute to any unnatural or immoral act, that argument is belied by the number and variety of statutes addressing specific sexual behavior. [11] The Legislature's awareness of the numerous offenses, and the distinctions between them, is illustrated in 1952 PA 73, which amended 1948 CL 750.85 to apply to [a]ny person who shall assault any female with intent to commit the crime of rape, and any person who shall assault another person with intent to commit the crime of sodomy or gross indecency.... Another example is MCL 750.145a; MSA 28.341, which makes it a misdemeanor to accost, entice, or solicit a child under the age of 16 with intent to induce or force said child to commit an immoral act, or to submit to an act of sexual intercourse, or an act of gross indecency, or any other act of depravity or delinquency.... The statute contemplates an act of depravity that is not an act of gross indecency. Michigan case law also supports this view. Although early opinions of this Court hesitate to provide explicit details, they reflect a certainty that particular conduct is rendered criminal by it. People v Carey, 217 Mich 601, 603; 187 NW 261 (1922). As illustrated by the Court of Appeals in People v Dexter, 6 Mich App 247, 250-251; 148 NW2d 915 (1967): Appellant raises the question of whether the counts charging gross indecency merged into the sodomy counts. Michigan follows the common-law definition of sodomy. People v Hodgkin (1892), 94 Mich 27 [53 NW 794]. At common law, sodomy covered only copulation per anum. Penetration per os did not constitute sodomy, or the `crime against nature,' People v Schmitt (1936), 275 Mich 575, 577 [267 NW 741], and cases therein cited. The legislature has shown no inclination to depart from the common-law definition of sodomy. Penetration per os, fellatio, is prohibited by the gross indecency statute. People v Schmitt, supra . The elements of gross indecency and sodomy differ. Greater detail was recounted in People v Myers, 161 Mich App 215, 219-220; 409 NW2d 788 (1987), in which the Court held that the statute did not apply to the touching of another's genital area over clothing: [P]ost- Dexter appellate decisions that have construed the gross indecency statute at issue have arisen from a factual background in which fellatio occurred.... No cases were found in which another sexual act, i.e., the massage of fully covered male genitalia, has occurred. [P]rosecutions brought under other gross indecency statutes which also do not define an act of gross indecency, namely MCL 750.338a; MSA 28.570(1) (gross indecency between females) and MCL 750.338b; MSA 28.570(2) (gross indecency between a male and a female) have involved acts of fellatio or cunnilingus. People v Livermore, 9 Mich App 47, 56-59; 155 NW2d 711 (1967) (sexual conduct between two females); People v McCaleb, 37 Mich App 502; 195 NW2d 17 (1972), lv den 389 Mich 784 (1973) (fellatio); People v Rea, 38 Mich App 141; 195 NW2d 809 (1972), lv den 388 Mich 795 (1972) (cunnilingus); People v Roy Edwards, 58 Mich App 146; 227 NW2d 263 (1975), reversed in light of People v Howell, supra, 396 Mich 825; 238 NW2d 536 (1976) (fellatio); People v Towlen, 66 Mich App 577; 239 NW2d 668 (1976), lv den 397 Mich 831 (1976) (fellatio). In each of the above cases (except Livermore, which did not involve a determination of whether the sexual act committed constituted gross indecency), the trier of fact determined that the act was grossly indecent in light of community mores. The only case from this Court to suggest that the gross indecency statutes proscribe unnatural acts other than fellatio and cunnilingus was People v Howell, 396 Mich 16, 24; 238 NW2d 148 (1976). That case and its companion case, People v Helzer actually involved forced fellatio and fellatio with a minor, respectively. The Court held that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to the defendants because the statutes have long been applied in the courts of this state to acts of forced fellatio and fellatio with a minor. Id. at 21. However, three justices would have adopted a definition of gross indecency that encompassed acts that had not been previously held to be acts of gross indecency: manual sexual acts committed without consent or with a person under the age of consent or any ultimate sexual act committed in public. Id. at 24. Because the three other justices did not sign this section, it is not binding precedent. [12] Negri v Slotkin, 397 Mich 105, 109; 244 NW2d 98 (1976). The dispute we now face was perpetuated as the Court of Appeals wrestled with the assertion in Howell that the offense of gross indecency encompassed acts that the common sense of society test would regard as indecent and improper. See 396 Mich 23. Some panels read Dexter as impermissibly endorsing a broad common sense of society test and held that the gross indecency statute did not apply to the act of touching a covered groin. See, e.g., People v Emmerich, 175 Mich App 283; 437 NW2d 30 (1989). Others noted that the gross indecency statute had only been applied to cases involving oral sexual acts. See, e.g., People v Myers, supra, 161 Mich App 221. Still others found in Carey and Dexter a broad common-sense test to find mutual masturbation in public a question left to the discretion of the jury, and thus chargeable as gross indecency. See, e.g., People v Austin, 185 Mich App 334, 340; 460 NW2d 607 (1990).