Opinion ID: 1881923
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Carlson's Statements About Davis

Text: Brooks argues that the trial court erred in admitting statements by Carlson to her coworkers, along with an e-mail sent by Carlson to Davis, evidencing her intent to drive to Crestview with Davis on the night of the murders. Several of Carlson's coworkers and friends testified that Carlson had told them that she and Davis were going to visit Davis's aunt in Crestview on the evening of April 24. Several of these people also testified she had told them that she needed some money from him and that she wanted him to sign some paternity papers. Michael Lynes, a computer employee at Eglin Air Force Air Base, testified that he retrieved an e-mail message sent by Carlson to Davis. The message was dated April 24 and read as follows: We can go there again tonight, but I need gas money. Also, let's try to go a little earlier. I'm about to fall over I'm so tired from the last two nights. Also, if you can, I need some money for diapers. She's almost out and I'm flat broke. Call me. This message was deleted from Davis's computer at work at 7:03 a.m. on April 25, the morning after the murders. The trial court allowed this testimony as an exception to the hearsay rule under section 90.803(3), Florida Statutes (1997), which provides an exception for evidence of the state of mind of the maker of the statements when such state of mind is relevant to an issue at trial. Brooks claims this was error because a statement admitted to show state of mind is only allowed to prove the state of mind or subsequent act of the declarant, not of a defendant. Here, Brooks alleges that the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce these statements directly against Brooks to show that Davis traveled to Crestview with Carlson on the night of the murders. We agree. Hearsay is defined as a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. § 90.801(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (1997). Section 90.803 provides an exception to the hearsay rule and that the following are not inadmissible as evidence, even though the declarant is available as a witness: (3) Then-Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condition. (a) A statement of the declarant's then-existing state of mind, emotion, or physical sensation, including a statement of intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, or bodily health, when such evidence is offered to: 1. Prove the declarant's state of mind, emotion, or physical sensation at that time or at any other time when such state is an issue in the action. 2. Prove or explain acts of subsequent conduct of the declarant. § 90.803(3), Fla. Stat. (1997). Under this exception, however, a declarant's statement of intent under section 90.803(3) is only admissible to infer the future act of the declarant, not the future act of another person. See Bailey v. State, 419 So.2d 721 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (stating that statements by a victim are not admissible to prove subsequent acts of a defendant). Further, ordinarily, a victim's state of mind is not a material issue, nor is it probative of a material issue in a murder case. See Woods v. State, 733 So.2d 980, 987 (Fla.1999). However, there are some exceptions to this general rule. First, a victim's state of mind may be relevant to an element of the crime. See Stoll v. State, 762 So.2d 870 (Fla.2000). Second, the victim's state of mind may become relevant to an issue in the case where the defendant claims: (1) self-defense; (2) that the victim committed suicide; or (3) that the death was accidental. Id. at 874-75 (citing Woods, 733 So.2d at 987-88); see also Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 803.3a (2000 ed.). Finally, the state of mind of the victim-declarant may become an issue in a case when it is used to rebut a defense raised by the defendant. 762 So.2d at 875 (citing State v. Bradford, 658 So.2d 572, 574-75 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)). However, in the instant case, as in Stoll, the victim's state of mind was not relevant to an element of the crime. Moreover, Brooks did not claim either self-defense, that Carlson committed suicide, or that the death was accidental. Further, the record does not demonstrate that Carlson's state of mind became relevant to rebut a defense raised by the defendant Brooks. At trial, Brooks asserted no alibi defense and did not dispute that he was in Crestview on the night of the murders. Moreover, we find that Bradford is inapplicable here. In Bradford, the defendant was charged with the first-degree murder of his ex-girlfriend. Part of the evidence against the defendant was the presence of his fingerprints in the victim's new car. In response to this evidence, the defendant claimed that his fingerprints were in her car because even after their break-up, the victim would visit him and would allow him into her car. To rebut this explicit claim, the State sought to introduce statements under § 90.803(3)(a)(1) made by the victim to her daughter expressing fear of her ex-boyfriend. These statements included the victim's changing of apartments and vehicle so that the defendant would not be able to find her. The trial court disallowed these statements. On appeal, the Fifth District disagreed and held: The victim's statements of fear are not admissible as proof that it was the defendant who killed her, but her statements of fear are admissible to rebut the defendant's theory that the victim willingly let him inside her car and that is how his fingerprints got in her car. If the defendant does not put forth the theory that the victim willingly let him in the car, then her state of mind would not be an issue. 658 So.2d at 575. As in Bradford, it is initially important to note that Carlson's statements could not be admitted to prove that Brooks killed her and her baby, especially since the statements reflected Carlson's intent to travel to Crestview with Davis, not Brooks. Importantly, even the Bradford court specifically noted that in this context, the statements could only be used as rebuttal evidence of the claim asserted by the defendant. See id. at 575. In the instant case, the State sought and was permitted to introduce the statements in its case-in-chief, not as rebuttal evidence. Second, and more importantly, because the State used the statements to show Brooks' subsequent acts of driving to Crestview with Carlson, their admission was error. As noted earlier, under section 90.803(3), statements of intent can ordinarily be used to prove the subsequent acts of the declarant, not a defendant. See Bailey. For the foregoing reasons, we find that the State failed to demonstrate any proper predicate for admitting these statements against Brooks, and the trial court erred in allowing these out-of-court statements to be heard by the jury.