Opinion ID: 71635
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Challenge of the Imposed Sanctions

Text: 19 Bama also argues that the Secretary erred in increasing the period of suspension from fourteen days to thirty days. [W]here Congress has entrusted an administrative agency with the responsibility of selecting the means of achieving the statutory policy, however, our review is limited. Butz v. Glover Livestock Comm'n Co., 411 U.S. 182, 185, 93 S.Ct. 1455, 1458, 36 L.Ed.2d 142 (1973) (internal quotation marks omitted). We cannot disturb the action of the Secretary, as accomplished through the judicial officer, so long as the proceedings were properly conducted in accordance with constitutional and statutory standards, unless the judgment is 'unwarranted in law or ... without justification in fact.'  13 J. Acevedo and Sons v. United States, 524 F.2d 977, 979 (5th Cir.1975) (quoting Glover Livestock, 411 U.S. at 185-86, 93 S.Ct. at 1458). 20 A thirty-day suspension for violation of the employment bar provision is warranted under section 499h(b) of the PACA. 14 In fact, even revocation of Bama's license would have been warranted in law. See 7 U.S.C. § 499h(b) (The Secretary may, after thirty days' notice and an opportunity for a hearing, suspend or revoke the license of any licensee who, after the date given in such notice, continues to employ any person in violation of this section.). Because we find that the suspension imposed by the Secretary was warranted in law, we turn to whether the facts of this case justified a thirty-day suspension. 21 The ALJ took into account several mitigating factors when he imposed a reduced suspension of fourteen days. Specifically, the ALJ considered Bama's record as a financially responsible company and the effect of a suspension on Bama's employees. The judicial officer considered the same factors and explicitly rejected them. Instead, the judicial officer considered the duration of the violation, 15 the numerous warnings that Bama received, and the fact that Mims worked for Bama during the period of time when he was ineligible to work, even with approval and a bond. The judicial officer also rejected explicitly Bama's contention that it had made numerous efforts to prevent Mims from continuing to work during the period of violation. 22 Bama contends that the judicial officer erred in failing to give weight to the mitigating factors considered by the ALJ and in failing to consider other factors, including Bama's efforts to prevent Mims' employment and the sporadic nature of Mims' presence at Bama during the period of alleged violation. 16 We disagree. Although the Secretary could permissibly have given weight to these factors, we think it clear that their presence cannot preclude a [thirty-]day suspension. Maine Potato Growers, Inc. v. Butz, 540 F.2d 518, 524 (1st Cir.1976). Thus, we find that the thirty-day suspension is warranted in law and justified by the facts of the case.