Opinion ID: 1473632
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: 1. Was the prosecutor's decision to seek the death penalty after offering a plea to a life sentence an abuse of discretion, resulting in the wanton and cruel imposition of the death penalty in violation of defendant's constitutional rights?

Text: In April 1993, during jury selection, the prosecutor offered a plea agreement to defendant pursuant to which the prosecutor would seek only a life sentence. Defendant claims that the prosecutor thereby announced his view that the death penalty was inappropriate and excessive in his case. When defendant tore up the executed plea in an emotional outburst moments before he was scheduled to enter the plea, the State continued to trial with a capital case. Defendant contends that he was subjected to a sentence of death rather than life imprisonment because he is mentally ill. Defense counsel does not claim that the State's initial decision to make this a capital prosecution was based on unsupported aggravating factors. Instead, they claim that an error lies in the State's reversal of its decision to prosecute his case as a non-capital case solely because the mentally ill defendant did not enter the plea as negotiated. We have recognized the potential for arbitrariness in prosecutorial decisionmaking with respect to capital cases. In State v. McCrary, 97 N.J. 132, 141, 478 A. 2d 339 (1984), we acknowledged the significant consequences that flow from a decision to seek a death sentence and found ourselves persuaded that some judicial scrutiny of prosecutorial charging [was] necessary. Our stated goal was to effect only a minimal intrusion into this area of prosecutorial discretion in light of the broad discretionary powers historically exercised by prosecutors in determining charges. Id. at 142, 478 A. 2d 339. In State v. Koedatich, 112 N.J. 225, 252, 548 A. 2d 939 (1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1017, 109 S.Ct. 813, 102 L.Ed. 2d 803 (1989), we noted that Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed. 2d 859 (1976), holds that the federal Constitution does not require limits on prosecutorial discretion beyond the aggravating factors outlined in the statute.. We looked beyond that requirement, however, and found that the New Jersey Constitution    mandates consistency and reliability in the administration of capital punishment. Id. at 251, 548 A. 2d 939 (citing State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 190, 524 A. 2d 188 (1987)). As we have stated: The critical question in assessing prosecutorial discretion is what standards are applied to move a case from death-possible to death-eligible status.       [T]here are a myriad of reasons why a prosecutor handles different cases differently, such as the willingness of a defendant to plead guilty, the strength of the State's case, a defendant's cooperation in the State's case against a co-defendant, the relative weight of the statutory aggravating and mitigating factors, the availability and relative credibility and persuasiveness of witnesses, and the resources of the county prosecutor's office   . [ Id. at 256, 548 A. 2d 939 (emphasis added).] In applying those principles, we do not find that this prosecution evokes the type of cruel and unusual punishment or arbitrary misuse of prosecutorial power that concerns us. Defendant's mental impairments did not serve as the basis for his exposure to the death penalty. Rather, the prosecutor's original decision, to proceed with the trial of the matter as a capital case, continued to be appropriate when defendant chose not to plead. Obviously, defendant's mental capacity was to be a contested issue in the trial. Only a guilty plea could avert revisiting the catalog of horrors suffered by this family. (Ultimately, the two minor children were not forced to testify at the trial because defendant stipulated that they would testify that they had been sexually assaulted.) In addition, the guilty pleas in Morris County could have become aggravating factors in subsequent proceedings against defendant in Bergen County. We cannot say that the prosecutor abused his discretion in continuing with the capital trial of this matter. This case is not like State v. Jackson, 128 N.J. 136, 607 A. 2d 974 (1992), in which the prosecutor changed course in midstream. In this case it was defendant who caused the change in the course of the proceedings. Defendant had not been declared incompetent to stand trial. Defendant's claim of insanity did not compel the prosecutor to withdraw the notice of aggravating factors. Therefore, the prosecutor's decision to pursue a capital prosecution was not an abuse of discretion.