Opinion ID: 2452857
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Guilt-Phase Statements

Text: During the guilt phase, Hall complains that the prosecutor: 1) suggested that Hall fabricated his testimony after he sat in court for a week and heard the state's evidence; 2) stated that If this is not deliberation, I don't know what would be deliberation; 3) went outside the evidence to personally vouch for the credibility of a state's witness; and 4) suggested that Hicks was a battered spouse. Hall claims these statements are grounds for reversal because they: 1) invited the jury to use Hall's exercise of his right to testify as evidence of his guilt; 2) implied that the prosecutor believed that the evidence of deliberation was stronger here than in his past cases; 3) included the prosecutor's personal knowledge to vouch for the state's witnesses; and 4) implied that the prosecutor knew that Hall was guilty of other, uncharged offenses. In the first three of the four statements Hall complains of, Hall failed to object to the statements at trial and therefore failed to preserve his arguments for appellate review. Thus for those three statements, reversal is only required upon a finding of plain error. Simmons, 955 S.W.2d at 737. A court should rarely grant relief on assertions of plain error at guilt-phase closing arguments. Storey, 901 S.W.2d at 897. Plain error review also requires that the argument have a decisive effect on the jury's determination. State v. Shurn, 866 S.W.2d 447, 460 (Mo. banc 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 837, 115 S.Ct. 118, 130 L.Ed.2d 64 (1994). The prosecutor stated that Hall has had to adapt and improvise as the trial has gone on, after he has seen the evidence.... But we discover this isn't the first story he's told.... The first story he cooked up about a month after the crime was, I walked into the shop and found him dead and panicked and grabbed this stuff and ran, and Donna never went into the store. Well, which story is it? He sat in here for a week and found out that story wouldn't fly, so now we hear that it was self-defense or an accident. The prosecutor may comment on the evidence and the credibility of the defendant's case. State v. Kreutzer, 928 S.W.2d 854, 872 (Mo. banc 1996), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 752, 136 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997). In Kreutzer , we noted that [c]ounsel may even belittle and point to the improbability and untruthfulness of specific evidence. The prosecutor's argument here suggested that Hall offered a theory of self-defense because Hall realized that the evidence overwhelmingly established that he shot White. The trial court did not err by permitting this comment. The prosecutor's statement: If that is not deliberation, I don't know what would be deliberation, is an acceptable statement during closing arguments. In Roberts, 948 S.W.2d at 594, we held that the prosecutor's closing statement that [t]his is as brutal a murder as ever occurred in St. Louis County, was improper. Unlike the statement in Roberts , the prosecutor's statement here does not imply that the prosecutor is comparing his knowledge of past cases to the facts in Hall's case to determine that Hall is more brutal or deliberate a murderer than the prosecutor has charged in past cases. The prosecutor simply argued that Hall deliberated before killing White. The trial court did not err by permitting this comment. During guilt-phase closing arguments, defense counsel suggested that State's witness Kimball Morton lied about White's murder in order to get out of jail early. Hall's attorney stated: And then he [Morton] held out just one time too long and said, I'm not coming over there unless you let me out of jail. And then the state decided to deal with him yesterday. They reached a settlement and I believe the agreement was that they would write the parole board. He still is going to get out early, and so he did have something to gain, something other than the thousand dollars he received, he will be leaving the penitentiary early. In his rebuttal, the prosecutor stated during closing argument: Am I telling you that Kimball Morton is a saint? Nope. Am I telling you that Kimball Morton might not like to benefit financially for sharing the truth? Nope. But I can tell you one thing, there's been no deals cut other than what he told you. I'm not going to let him loose. Hall claims that the prosecutor's comment went outside of the evidence to vouch for his own personal integrity, Morton's credibility as a witness and the strength of the state's case. The prosecutor's statement was proper retaliation for defense counsel's closing argument, which suggested that Morton received a reduced sentence in exchange for testifying for the state. A defendant may not provoke reply to his own argument and then assert error. Kreutzer, 928 S.W.2d at 875. The prosecutor's comment was not improper. During closing arguments, Hall's counsel argued that Hicks was not a credible witness because she was a liar and because her memory had been impaired by drug use and electric convulsion therapy. In his closing argument, the prosecutor rebutted as follows: She [defense counsel] wants to talk about [Hicks] having all these problems, she's a classic battered spouse. I'm not saying she's perfect and I'm not  Hall's counsel objected on the grounds that there was no evidence that Hicks was a battered spouse. The trial court sustained the objection. Hall now asserts that a mistrial should have been granted sua sponte because the prosecutor went outside the evidence to give the jury information of an uncharged offense. Hall contends that the prosecutor's use of the term battered spouse implied that Hall had been convicted of abusing Hicks. Hall argues that the comment also implies that the prosecutor knew more about the case than the jury knew, including that Hall was guilty of other crimes. The fact that Hall's objection was sustained was sufficient to correct any error in the comment. State v. Basile, 942 S.W.2d 342, 351 (Mo. banc 1997). Hall fails to establish that any manifest injustice resulted from the prosecutor's statement that would entitle him to a mistrial. State v. Shurn, 866 S.W.2d 447, 461 (Mo. banc 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 837, 115 S.Ct. 118, 130 L.Ed.2d 64 (1994). Points denied.