Opinion ID: 29291
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: lindsey’s disability discrimination claim

Text: Lindsey also argues that Chevron violated the ADA when it failed to accommodate his alleged disability. A plaintiff cannot assert that his employer is required to make reasonable accommodations to his physical or mental limitation until he satisfies the test for disability discrimination. See, e.g., Burch v. City of Nacogdoches, 174 F.3d 615, 619 (5th Cir. 1999). The first element of a prima facie case for disability discrimination is that the plaintiff was a qualifiedly disabled employee. E.g., Dupre v. Charter Behav. Health Sys. of Lafayette, Inc., 242 F.3d 610, 613 (5th Cir. 2001). Hence, the threshold issue in this case is whether Lindsey is considered disabled under the ADA. 10 To qualify as disabled, Lindsey must demonstrate that: (1) he has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limited one or more of his major life activities; (2) he has a record of such impairment; or (3) he is regarded as having such an impairment. E.g., Aldrup v. Caldera, 274 F.3d 282, 286 (5th Cir. 2001). The Supreme Court has defined major life activity as those activities that are “of central importance to daily life.” Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, - - -, 122 S. Ct. 681, 691 (2002).2 A substantial limitation on such life activities would be a limitation that is “considerable” or “to a large degree.” Id. On appeal, Lindsey asserts that Chevron failed to move expeditiously in providing him the necessary equipment that would assist him at work. Such delay in accommodation, he continues, violates the ADA. Chevron argues that Lindsey cannot satisfy his burden that he was terminated because of his alleged disability. Chevron also agrees with the district court’s determination that there was no evidence to support the contention that Lindsey’s heart condition, depression or diabetes substantially limited or impaired any of his major life activities. Simply put, Lindsey’s ADA accommodation claim falls short because he failed to adduce evidence suggesting that he was 2 Examples of major life activities include speaking, breathing, learning, and working. E.g., Aldrup, 274 F.3d at 286. 11 qualifiedly disabled. The summary judgment record provides no indication of whether Lindsey’s heart condition, depression or diabetes substantially limited one or more major life activity. Lindsey has never provided evidence indicating that his medical conditions ever came close to limiting his major life activities considerably or to a large degree.3 Moreover, Lindsey has never contended that he had a record of such an impairment or that Chevron regarded him as having such an impairment, preventing him from establishing disability through these methods. Because Lindsey could not raise a genuine issue of material fact as to the first element of a prima facie case for disability discrimination, he is precluded from claiming that Chevron was required to make reasonable accommodations to his physical condition. Summary judgment was appropriate.4