Opinion ID: 1805327
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: did phipps prove a likelihood of confusion to the consumer by the use of the names country corner family restaurant and nelson's kountry korner?

Text: Proof of likelihood of confusion in trademark infringement cases does not require actual confusion; however, a mere possibility is not enough. There must be a substantial likelihood that the public will be confused. Vitek Sys., Inc. v. Abbott Lab., 675 F.2d 190, 192 (8th Cir.1982) (quoting SquirtCo., 628 F.2d at 1091; Fisher Stoves, Inc. v. All Nighter Stove Works, Inc., 626 F.2d 193, 194 (1st Cir.1980)). The party claiming injury bears the burden of proving infringement. Sun Banks, 651 F.2d at 315; see In re Estate of Armstrong, 400 N.W.2d 267 (S.D.1987); Pearson v. Pearson, 312 N.W.2d 34 (S.D.1981). The test of whether there is a substantial likelihood of confusion among consumers requires the court to consider numerous factors to determine whether, under all the circumstances, there is a likelihood of confusion. SquirtCo., 628 F.2d at 1090-91 (citing Grotrian v. Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2d 1331 (2nd Cir.1975)). One commentator has noted: In cases involving a restaurant's name or mark, courts have identified several criteria to be considered in determining whether such a likelihood exists, including the strength of the allegedly infringed mark, the similarity of the parties' marks, the similarity of the parties' products or services, the similarity of their clientele or marketing efforts, the defendant's intent in adopting its name or mark, evidence of actual confusion between the parties' businesses, the presence of the parties in the same geographic market, the likelihood of expansion of the parties' product lines, and the degree of care consumers are likely to exercise in distinguishing between the parties' businesses [ ]. It appears that this list is not exhaustive, that not every factor appearing therein will invariably be relevant to every case, and that no single factor or group of factors is invariably of overriding significance. Tim A. Thomas, Annotation, Restaurant Name or Mark as Infringement of Trademark Under § 32(1) or § 43(a) of Lanham Act (15 USCS §§ 1114(1), 1125(a)), 95 A.L.R.FED. 31, 37 § 2 (1986). The trial court found that Phipps had been using the name Country Corner Family Restaurant since 1984 and had acquired a valid common-law trademark under SDCL 37-6-27, and further found the trade names were similar in appearance, pronunciation and suggestion. The trial court then performed what appears to be a balancing test, weighing the similarities and the dissimilarities between the Country Corner and Kountry Korner business establishments. Conceding that Phipps did present evidence of customer confusion, the trial court held that there was insufficient evidence to show likelihood of confusion largely because, in the trial court's view, the similarities of the businesses were outweighed by the differences. This was an incorrect application of the likelihood of confusion test. Further, a review of the record indicates the trial court's findings are not supported by the evidence. The record reveals strong evidence of actual confusion: 1. Testimony indicated that when Nelson adopted the Kountry Korner name, many people were under the impression that Nelson had bought out the Phipps' restaurant. Questions were asked of Country Corner employees and management, as well as a neighboring businessman. 2. There was some confusion at an area radio station regarding whether Country Corner or Kountry Korner had previously participated in a special promotion. 3. Country Corner customers began incorrectly designating the payee on their personal checks as Kountry Korner. Other customers asked whether they should spell the name with a C or a K, indicating that there was another Country Corner (or Kountry Korner) in Edgemont. 4. A carpet ordered by Nelson's Kountry Corner was shipped to Country Corner in Hot Springs. 5. A regular patron of the Country Corner ceased patronizing the restaurant when he saw a promotion for the Nelson Kountry Korner. This patron assumed that Country Corner had been purchased by Jack Nelson, an individual whose businesses he avoided patronizing. 6. A supplier asked Phipps to fill out a new credit application, under the mistaken belief that the Country Corner had been sold. 7. A driver for Food Services of America mistakenly drove up to the dock at Country Corner to make a delivery that was intended for the Kountry Korner. Plaintiff is required to show only that there is a `likelihood of confusion,' as between the parties. Country Properties, Inc. v. Bill's Country Kitchen, 204 U.S.P.Q. 548, 1979 WL 25065 (M.D.Fla.1979) (citing World Carpets, Inc. v. Dick Littrell's New World Carpets, 438 F.2d 482, 487 (5th Cir.1971). [6] In Country Properties, the court found facts showing actual confusion as to the respective parties on the part of customers, prospective employees, suppliers and delivery services. The court stated: There can be no more positive or substantial proof of the likelihood of confusion than proof of actual confusion. Moreover, reason tells us that while very little proof of actual confusion would be necessary to prove the likelihood of confusion, an almost overwhelming amount of proof would be necessary to refute such proof. Id. (citing World Carpets, 438 F.2d at 489) (emphasis added). Phipps produced ample evidence of actual confusion to meet the burden of proof. We also note that the trial court appears to have placed importance on the fact that the business locations were more than twenty miles apart. We find no authority for designating an arbitrary radius of any distance that would excuse trademark infringement. Therefore, we hold that Phipps met the burden of proof for likelihood of confusion, and reverse the trial court on this issue.