Opinion ID: 4510461
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Statutory Text Requires Applicants To

Text: Certify a Willingness To Comply With “All . . . Applicable Federal Laws” The Certification Condition requires a Byrne grant applicant to certify that, throughout the grant period, it will comply with 8 U.S.C. § 1373, the federal law prohibiting any government entity or official from restricting the receipt, maintenance, or exchange of information regarding citizenship or immigration status as specified in that 35 statute. See supra at 15 (quoting condition). The Attorney General’s statutory authority to impose this condition derives from 34 U.S.C. § 10153(a)(5)(D). Therein, Congress specifically requires a Byrne grant applicant to include in its application “[a] certification, made in a form acceptable to the Attorney General” stating that “the applicant will comply with all provisions of this part and all other applicable Federal laws.” 34 U.S.C. § 10153(a)(5)(D) (emphasis added). The conjunctive structure of § 10153(a)(5)(D) makes plain that a Byrne grant applicant must certify its willingness to comply with more than those provisions of law specifically pertaining to the Byrne Program (“this part”). It must also certify its willingness to comply with “all other applicable Federal laws.” Id. At the same time that this phrase expands an applicant’s certification obligation, the word “applicable,” as used in the phrase, serves a limiting function. A Byrne applicant is not required to certify its willingness to comply with the United States Code in its entirety as well as all accompanying regulations. Rather, an applicant must certify its willingness to comply with those laws—beyond those expressly stated in Chapter 34—that can reasonably be deemed “applicable.” This raises two questions: What is an “applicable” law? And who identifies it? We answer the second question first because it is not seriously disputed and, thus, requires only brief discussion. 1. The Attorney General Is Authorized To Identify “Other Applicable Federal Laws” Requiring § 10153(a)(5)(D) Compliance Certification 36 The statutory text signals that the Attorney General identifies the laws requiring § 10153(a)(5)(D) compliance certification. This is evident in the requirement that Byrne grant applicants provide certification in a “form acceptable to the Attorney General.” Id. § 10153(a)(5). A “form” is commonly understood to be a “document” for providing “required or requested specific information.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 892 (1986). By requiring that § 10153(a)(5)(D) certification be in a “form acceptable to the Attorney General,” the statute makes clear that it is the Attorney General who has authority to “require[] or request[] specific information,” to ensure a grant applicant’s intended compliance with all other applicable federal laws. See id. Thus, § 10153(a)(5)(D) authorizes the Attorney General to decide not only the style (e.g., format and typeface) for § 10153(a)(5)(D) certification, but also the specificity of its content, i.e., whether certification is “acceptable” in a form that references “all other applicable Federal laws” generally, or whether such certification needs to be in a form that identifies specific applicable laws.19 That Congress would vest such authority in the Attorney General makes sense for several reasons. First, while Congress itself requires compliance certification as to “all other applicable Federal laws,” the number of laws that could apply to States and localities seeking Byrne funding is large, variable, and not easily identified in a 19While matters of “substance” are frequently distinguished from matters of “form,” see, e.g., PPL Corp. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 569 U.S. 329, 340–41 (2013) (distinguishing between form and substance of a tax), a form serves to ensure the communication of required substance. 37 single statutory provision. Second, the Attorney General, as the nation’s chief federal law enforcement official, is particularly suited to identify the federal laws applicable to persons and circumstances. Third, having the Attorney General identify specific laws requiring § 10153(a)(5)(D) certification serves the salutary purpose of affording applicants clear notice of what is expected of them as Byrne grant recipients.20 2. “All Other Applicable Federal Laws” Encompasses Both Laws Applying To the Entity Seeking a Grant and Laws Applying To the Proposed Grant Program The district court nevertheless concluded that the Attorney General was not authorized to identify § 1373 as an applicable law. It held that “‘applicable Federal laws’ for purposes of 34 U.S.C. § 10153(a)(5)(D) means federal laws applicable to the grant,” not to the grant applicant. New York v. Dep’t of Justice, 343 F. Supp. 3d at 230– 31. Because it thought that § 1373 applies only to applicants in their capacities as State and local governments, not to their grants, the district court ruled that the statute could not be an “applicable” law requiring § 10153(a)(5)(D) certification. Id. at 231. The Third Circuit subsequently reached the same conclusion. See City of Philadelphia v. Attorney Gen., 916 F.3d at 28890. In so ruling, both courts acknowledged that it would be reasonable to construe the statutory text to mean laws applicable to a grant applicant as well as to a requested grant. See id. at 288; New York v. Dep’t of Justice, 343 F. Supp. 20 We discuss this notice point further infra at 47–49. 38 3d at 23031. Nevertheless, the Third Circuit concluded that a narrower construction was required by the canon against surplusage, the structure of the statute, the historical practice of DOJ, and the formula‐grant nature of the program. See City of Philadelphia v. Attorney Gen., 916 F.3d at 28991. The district court relied on similar reasoning, as well as Congress’s obligation “unambiguously” to impose conditions on grants of federal money, to justify its narrow reading of § 10153(a)(5)(D). New York v. Dep’t of Justice, 343 F. Supp. 3d at 231 (internal quotation marks omitted). We cannot agree. First and foremost, we do not think the statutory text admits such narrowing. See generally Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992) (stating that “when the words of a statute are unambiguous . . . judicial inquiry is complete” (internal quotation marks omitted)); accord Mei Xing Yu v. Hasaki Rest., Inc., 944 F.3d 395, 403 (2d Cir. 2019) (citing Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain). The word “applicable,” as used in § 10153(a)(5)(D), is not statutorily defined. Thus, it is properly construed according to its contemporary dictionary definition, see Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560, 566 (2012); accord Munoz‐Gonzalez v. D.L.C. Limousine Serv., Inc., 904 F.3d 208, 213 (2d Cir. 2018), which is “capable of being applied: having relevance,” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 105. Statutes are “capable of being applied,” and can be relevant both to persons and to circumstances. A second dictionary definition for the word “applicable”—“fit, suitable, or right to be applied,” id.—only reinforces that conclusion, in that a statute may be 39 fit, suitable, or right to apply both to persons and to circumstances.21 Thus, an “applicable Federal law” under § 10153(a)(5)(D) is one pertaining either to the State or locality seeking a Byrne grant or to the grant being sought. To the extent the district court might be understood to have construed “all other applicable laws” to mean only laws applying to States and localities as recipients of federal grants, nothing in the statutory text suggests that Congress there used the word “applicable” only in that limited sense. To the contrary, Congress’s use of the adjective “all” to introduce the phrase “all other applicable Federal laws” signals an intent to give the word “applicable” its full effect, not to narrow it. See Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Am. Train Dispatchers Assʹn, 499 U.S. 117, 128–29 (1991) (explaining that phrase “all other law” is “clear, broad, and unqualified” and “indicates no limitation” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Second, we cannot agree with the Third Circuit that a redundancy or surplusage problem arises if “all other applicable Federal laws” is construed to mean laws pertaining both to Byrne applicants and to the grants they seek. See City of Philadelphia v. Attorney Gen., 916 F.3d at 289 (concluding that such construction effectively equates phrase with “other Federal laws,” making word “applicable” mere surplusage). As explained supra at 36, the word 21 See Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 562 U.S. 61, 69–70 (2011) (using both dictionary definitions in construing phrase “debtor’s applicable monthly expense amounts” in provision of Bankruptcy Code (emphasis added) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I))). 40 “applicable” does serve a limiting function in the statutory text—even if not as limiting as plaintiffs might wish. Thus, to raise a redundancy concern, the Third Circuit must imply that if Congress had used the phrase “all other Federal laws” in § 10153(a)(5)(D), then courts would have to infer the word “applicable” because of the improbability of Congress requiring certification for the entirety of federal law. But Congress did not use that broader phrase in § 10153(a)(5)(D). And we do not think its use of a modifying word—“applicable”—to make explicit in actual statutory text what our sister circuit thinks would have to be implied in a hypothetical alternative manifests surplusage. Rather, we think it demonstrates clear drafting. Third, the formula nature of the Byrne Program does not warrant limiting the phrase “all other applicable Federal laws.” While Congress’s intent in appropriating funds for formula (as distinct from discretionary) grants is to have all the money distributed, even a formula grant applicant must satisfy the program’s requirements before being entitled to receive funding. Cf. Richard B. Cappalli, Rights and Remedies Under Federal Grants 40 (1979) (remarking that states typically qualify for formula grants after submitting document statutorily described as “state plan,” which serves as “vehicle by which the state commits itself to abide by the conditions which Congress attaches to the funds”). As to the Byrne Program, this is evident from the fact that Congress has expressly provided for alternative distributions of appropriated funds if “a State will be unable to qualify” for a Byrne granta matter Congress also leaves for “the Attorney General [to] determine[].” 34 U.S.C. § 10156(f); see supra at 13. Thus, Byrne Program formula funding can 41 be denied to an applicant that fails to provide the required § 10153(a)(5)(D) certification as to any “applicable Federal law[],” whether that law pertains to the particular grant sought or to the applicant seeking it.22 Indeed, whether a grant is awarded by formula or by discretion, there is something disquieting in the idea of States and localities seeking federal funds to enforce their own laws while themselves hampering the enforcement of federal laws, or worse, violating those laws. One has only to imagine millions of dollars in 22 The Third Circuit inferred from the fact that qualifying Byrne (and other federal) grant recipients could lose a specified (often small) percentage of their annual distribution if they fail to comply with certain other statutes, that the Attorney General was not statutorily authorized “to withhold all of a [Byrne] grantee’s funds for any reason the Attorney General chooses.” City of Philadelphia v. Attorney Gen., 916 F.3d at 286 (emphases in original) (citing 34 U.S.C. § 20927(a) (providing mandatory 10% penalty for failure to comply with Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act); id. § 30307(e)(2) (mandating 5% penalty for failure to comply with Prison Rape Elimination Act); id. § 40914(b) (withholding up to 4% of funding for failure to meet requirements of National Instant Criminal Background Check System)). That reasoning does not apply here, where the issue is not whether the Attorney General can withhold Byrne funding for any reason from qualifying applicants, but whether he can deny any such funding to an applicant that fails to demonstrate qualification under the Program’s statutory requirements, indeed, fails to satisfy them in a “form acceptable to the Attorney General,” as Congress has mandated. 34 U.S.C. § 10153(a)(5). To be sure, the form acceptable to the Attorney General must be grounded in the qualifying requirements it serves, but where that is the case, an applicant’s failure—or refusal—to satisfy the statutory requirement in that form can result in denial of a Byrne grant. While the Attorney General cannot “finally disapprove” a deficient Byrne grant application “without first affording the applicant reasonable notice of any deficiencies . . . and opportunity for correction and reconsideration,” id. § 10154, if those deficiencies persist after such notice and opportunity, then the Attorney General is authorized to deny the grant in its entirety and to reallocate funds as provided in § 10156(f). 42 Byrne funding being sought by a locality that is simultaneously engaged in persistent, serious violations of federal environmental laws. The formula nature of the Byrne Program does not dictate that such an applicant must be given federal money even as it continues to flout federal law. To the contrary, § 10153(a)(5)(D) authorizes the Attorney General to condition the locality’s receipt of a Byrne grant on its certified willingness to comply with all federal laws applicable to that locality, which includes environmental laws. The conclusion obtains with even more force here, where enactment of the law at issue, 8 U.S.C. § 1373, was informed by Congress’s concern that States and localities receiving federal grants were hampering the enforcement of federal immigration laws. See supra at 17–20. Subsequent reports that increasing numbers of federal grant recipients were limiting cooperation with federal immigration authorities prompted a congressional request for DOJ investigation, the results of which led two successive Attorneys General serving different administrations to identify § 1373 as an “applicable Federal law” requiring compliance certification. See supra at 20–25.23 We are satisfied that these identifications are authorized by the plain 23The IG’s findings, see supra at 21–23, might well be found to demonstrate the “high risk” identified by the Ninth Circuit for imposing “special conditions” on Byrne grants, see City of Los Angeles v. Barr, 941 F.3d at 940 (holding that “special conditions,” as referenced in § 10102(a)(6), means “unusual” or “extraordinary” conditions for a “high‐risk grantee,” i.e., a grantee with “a history of noncompliance with grant requirements, financial stability issues, or other factors that suggest[] a propensity toward violation of a grant’s terms” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 43 language of § 10153(a)(5)(D), and the formula nature of the Byrne Program requires no contrary conclusion. Fourth, the Third Circuit observes that certain § 10153(a)(5) certification requirements appear, on their face, to pertain to the requested grant rather than to the grant applicant. See City of Philadelphia v. Attorney Gen., 916 F.3d at 289 (citing § 10153(a)(5)(A) (requiring certification that “the programs to be funded by the grant meet all the requirements of this part”); § 10153(a)(5)(B) (requiring certification that “all the information contained in the application is correct”); and § 10153(a)(5)(C) (requiring certification that “there has been appropriate coordination with affected agencies”)). That, however, is insufficient reason to impose a similar limitation on § 10153(a)(5)(D), when the plain language of that provision—“all other applicable Federal laws”—reaches more broadly. See generally Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Am. Train Dispatchers Ass’n, 499 U.S. at 127, 129 (rejecting argument that exemption from “antitrust laws and from all other law” was limited to antitrust‐related laws; ejusdem generis canon does not apply where neither statutory text nor context supports urged limitation (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)). In urging otherwise, plaintiffs point to 34 U.S.C. § 10228, which states that “[n]othing in this chapter or any other Act shall be construed to authorize any department, agency, officer, or employee of the United States to exercise any direction, supervision, or control over any police force or any other criminal justice agency of any State or any political subdivision thereof.” As the Fourth Circuit has 44 observed in construing § 10228’s predecessor statute, the provision is intended “to guard against any tendency towards federalization of local police and law enforcement agencies.” Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130, 1136 (4th Cir. 1971) (construing statute to prohibit federal authorities from “[prescribing] the type of shoes and uniforms to be worn by local law enforcement officers, the type or brand of ammunition to be purchased and used by police departments and many other vital matters pertaining to the day‐to‐day operations of local law enforcement” (citation omitted)). Section 1373 raises no such federalization concern. It does not direct, control, or supervise the day‐to‐day operations of any State or local police force or law enforcement agency. It does not mandate that State or local law enforcement authorities cooperate with federal immigration officers. It requires only that nothing be done to prohibit voluntary communication about citizenship or immigration status among such officials. See supra at 24. To hold that § 10228 places such a statutory requirement outside the scope of applicable laws requiring § 10153(a)(5)(D) compliance certification is to render that qualification condition a nullity, as compliance with every federal law necessarily places some limits on a grant applicant’s actions. Indeed, that conclusion applies whether the law pertains to the applicant or the grant program. We decline to construe § 10228 so broadly as to render § 10153(a)(5)(D) inoperative. Cf. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237, 250 (1985) (noting “elementary canon of construction that a statute should be interpreted so as not to render one part inoperative” (internal quotation marks omitted)). See generally Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d at 1136 (declining to construe predecessor provision “so broadly as unnecessarily to undercut 45 solutions adopted by Congress to preserve and protect other societal values”).24 Fifth, DOJ’s own focus on laws pertaining to grants rather than applicants in its past identifications of “applicable” federal laws does not itself limit the word. Given the scope of local programs that can be funded with Byrne grants, it is not surprising that DOJ would most frequently identify laws applicable to a particular program in specifying the form of an acceptable § 10153(a)(5)(D) certification. See generally City of Philadelphia v. Attorney Gen., 916 F.3d at 290 (observing that if requested grant was to be used for body armor purchases or human research, applicants were expected to certify willingness to comply with applicable federal regulations in those areas). Far fewer, one expects, will be the occasions when States and localities seeking Byrne grants are themselves violators of federal laws applicable to them. Nevertheless, in such circumstances, the violated laws fall within the plain meaning of the phrase “all other applicable Federal laws” as used in § 10153(a)(5)(D). To illustrate, while the Attorney General can—and has—required applicants proposing to use Byrne grants for construction or renovation projects to comply with federal environmental laws specifically applicable to such work, that hardly means he cannot also require an applicant that has a history of violating environmental laws generally from certifying its willingness going forward to comply with such laws. The laws are applicable in 24Insofar as plaintiffs rely not only on § 10228, but also on the Tenth Amendment to argue that § 1373 cannot be an “applicable” law requiring Compliance Certification, we discuss that constitutional point infra at 49–61. 46 the former instance to the grant purpose; in the latter, to the grant applicant. In either case, the Attorney General is requiring compliance certification as to “applicable Federal laws.” Sixth, Congress’s duty to speak unambiguously in imposing conditions on federal grant money also does not require “all other applicable Federal laws” to be construed to mean only laws pertaining to grants and not to grant applicants. See New York v. Dep’t of Justice, 343 F. Supp. 3d at 231. The duty derives from Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981). The Supreme Court there analogized federal spending legislation to “a contract: in return for federal funds, the States agree to comply with federally imposed conditions.” Id. at 17. It concluded therefrom that Congress must “speak with a clear voice” in placing conditions on federal grants because there “can . . . be no knowing acceptance [of the putative contract] if a State is unaware of the conditions or is unable to ascertain what is expected of it.” Id. “Knowing acceptance” is no concern here. Section 10153(a)(5)(D) provided plaintiffs with clear notice that their Byrne grant applications had to include a certification, in a form acceptable to the Attorney General, of their willingness to comply not only with laws specifically applicable to the Byrne Program, but also with “all other applicable Federal laws.” To the extent the quoted phrase fails to specify precisely which laws are “applicable,” that uncertainty can pertain as much for laws applicable to requested grants as for those applicable to grant applicants. Thus, the district court’s Pennhurst reasoning does not support its conclusion that “applicable Federal 47 laws” can pertain only to requested Byrne grants, not to grant applicants. But more to the point, no Pennhurst concern arises here because plaintiffs were given advance notice that their 2017 Byrne grant applications had to certify a willingness to comply with § 1373. Indeed, they were given such notice twice, first in 2016, and again in 2017. See supra at 23–25. To be sure, that notice was provided by DOJ rather than Congress. But the Supreme Court has recognized that, in establishing federal grant programs, Congress cannot always “prospectively resolve every possible ambiguity concerning particular applications of the [program’s statutory] requirements.” Bennett v. Kentucky Dep’t of Educ., 470 U.S. 656, 666, 669 (1985) (making point in context of federal education grant program). Thus, it has upheld an administering agency’s clarifying interpretations, and even its violation determinations, as long they were grounded in “statutory provisions, regulations, and other guidelines provided by the Department” at the time of the grant. Id. at 670–71; see also United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 67273 (1997) (recognizing agency authority to prescribe legislative rules consistent with statute). Plaintiffs here may disagree with the identification of § 1373 as an “applicable Federal law,” but they can hardly complain of inadequate notice. In a final argument in support of their APA challenge to the Attorney General’s identification of § 1373 as an applicable federal law, plaintiffs point to Congress’s rejection of various legislative proposals to impose immigration‐related conditions on receipt of 48 federal funds. As the Supreme Court has cautioned, “subsequent legislative history is a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier Congress.” Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 650 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted). Such legislative history “is a particularly dangerous ground” of construction where, as here, the “proposal[s] . . . do[] not become law.” Id. Indeed, “several equally untenable inferences may be drawn from” congressional inaction, “including the inference that the existing legislation already incorporated the offered change.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, this challenge to the Attorney General’s § 10153(a)(5)(D) authority to identify § 1373 as an “applicable” law also fails. In sum, we conclude that the plain language of § 10153(a)(5)(D), authorizes the Attorney General to require certification in a form that specifically references federal laws applicable either to the Byrne grant sought or to the State or locality seeking that grant. Because 8 U.S.C. § 1373 is a law applicable to all plaintiffs in this action, the Attorney General was authorized to impose the challenged Certification Condition and did not violate either the APA or separation of powers by doing so.