Opinion ID: 2276886
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Cross-Examination About Prior Plea Offer

Text: For his second point on appeal, Appellant argues that the circuit court erred in not allowing him to cross-examine Albert Reed about the history of a plea offer made by the State in exchange for Reed's testimony. Pursuant to a plea offer by the State, Reed had pled guilty to two counts of first-degree murder with a recommended sentence of sixty years in exchange for his testimony against Appellant and Cameron Williams. The case against Williams went to trial first, and Reed testified against him. Reed, however, refused to testify against Appellant at his trial and sought to withdraw his guilty plea. The circuit court denied the request and sentenced him to two life sentences. Shortly thereafter, Reed changed his mind and offered to cooperate with the State and testify against Appellant. At that point, there was no deal with the State, but Reed was hoping that his testimony against Appellant would result in a reduced sentence. He testified at Appellant's trial and then petitioned the circuit court for a reduced sentence. The court ultimately denied his petition. Following voir dire but before opening statements, the State argued that Appellant should not be able to tell the jury about the history of Reed's guilty-plea deal. The circuit court directed Appellant not to mention the prior deal between Reed and the State on grounds of lack of relevancy as he had already been sentenced to life in prison. The State commented in its opening statement that Reed had no incentive to lie because he had gotten two life sentences and had nothing to gain from his testimony and had no deal with the State. Appellant cross-examined Reed as directed by the circuit court, asking only whether Reed was hoping for a reduced sentence from the circuit court. On redirect by the State, Reed acknowledged that there was a sentence and no promise had been made by the circuit court to revisit his sentence. Finally, in its closing statement, the State again argued that, with the court's imposition of two life sentences, Reed had nothing to gain from his testimony. When Appellant gave his closing argument, he argued that Reed was hoping to a get a reduced sentence from the circuit court. Appellant argues on appeal that he should have been allowed a wide latitude in his cross-examination of an adverse witness, especially in the case of an accomplice. He asserts that the circuit court's ruling and the State's continued argument that Reed had no incentive to lie gave a false and misleading impression, which was extremely prejudicial and violated Appellant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. Evidentiary rulings are a matter of discretion and are reviewed only for abuse of that discretion. Taylor v. Taylor, 345 Ark. 300, 47 S.W.3d 222 (2001). An accused should be accorded a wide latitude in cross-examination to impeach the credibility of a witness against him. Klimas v. State, 259 Ark. 301, 534 S.W.2d 202 (1976). The latitude of this right of cross-examination is even broader and the court's discretion to limit it is somewhat narrower than in other instances. Id. This is particularly so when the witness is, or may be found to be, an accomplice. Id. It is generally permissible for a defendant to show by cross-examination anything bearing on the possible bias of the testimony of a material witness. Id. This rule applies to testimony given under expectation or hope of immunity or leniency or under the coercive effect of his detention by authorities. Id. The test is the expectation of the witness and not the actuality of a promise. Id. The right of a defendant to show the bias of a witness does not lie within the court's discretion. Id. In the instant appeal, Reed was cross-examined about his motive and desire to have his sentence reduced as a result of his testimony against Appellant. Therefore, Appellant was allowed to show Reed's possible bias or prejudice. Once the main circumstances showing bias have been admitted, the trial court may impose reasonable limits on cross-examination based upon concerns about harassment, prejudice, waste of time, unnecessary duplication of testimony, confusion of issues, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant. Billett v. State, 317 Ark. 346, 877 S.W.2d 913 (1994). Moreover, at the time Reed gave his testimony, there was no offer by the State to reduce his sentence, which Reed understood. In contrast, when the admitted accomplice in Henderson v. State, 279 Ark. 435, 652 S.W.2d 16 (1983), took the stand, he had a plea deal with the State. Appellant's reliance on the Henderson case is therefore misplaced. Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a limit on Appellant's cross-examination of Reed about the history of his prior guilty-plea deal.