Opinion ID: 5129329
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Mail Fraud and Bankruptcy Fraud

Text: Finally, Kusi challenges his convictions for six counts of mail fraud related to his payments to Mercedes-Benz, as well as two counts of bankruptcy fraud. The Government argues Kusi waived these challenges, and though his arguments are sparse, they are sufficient. But Kusi’s arguments fail on the merits. To prove mail fraud, the “evidence must establish beyond a reasonable doubt (1) the defendant’s knowing and willful participation in a scheme or artifice to defraud, (2) with the specific intent to defraud, and (3) the use of the mails . . . in furtherance of the scheme.” United States v. Antico, 275 F.3d 245, 261 (3d Cir. 2001). As for elements one and two, much of the same evidence from which the jury could find Kusi guilty of conspiracy applies with equal force here. For example, when Bentley confronted Kusi with the bounced checks, Kusi claimed he would pay off the car within one week. But Kusi had sold the Bentley to a used car dealership for $82,000 and sent $25,000 of the proceeds to 5 King. Mercedes-Benz caught Kusi before he could repeat the sale, but it was reasonable for the jury to infer Kusi intended to defraud the company in the same manner. Kusi argues he was not “even aware that the mail would be used.” (Kusi Br. at 26.) That is of no moment, as the Government may prove a defendant “does an act with knowledge that the use of the mails will follow in the ordinary course of business, or where such use can reasonably be foreseen, even though not actually intended.” Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1954) (emphasis added). In any event, the Government exceeded that bar by introducing evidence Kusi knew paying off debts meant King and Reynolds would send physical checks to multiple locations in and out of state. Kusi’s bankruptcy fraud appeal meets the same fate. To convict Kusi under section 1519, the Government must prove Kusi “knowingly…falsifie[d]” bankruptcy records “with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence” a bankruptcy proceeding. 18 U.S.C. § 1519. And to convict Kusi under section 152(2), the Government must prove Kusi “knowingly and fraudulently ma[de] a false oath or account in or in relation to” a bankruptcy proceeding. 18 U.S.C. § 152(2). To overturn the convictions, we must find substantial evidence lacking. But there is plenty of evidence. The Government introduced testimony from a task force officer, a bankruptcy expert, an IRS employee, and the bankruptcy trustee who interviewed Kusi under oath to show that Kusi’s petition contained many false statements. Kusi claims that because the false statements are his lawyer’s fault, he did not possess the required intent under section 1519. But he asserted that defense at trial, and the jury 6 exercised its discretion in giving it little weight. As substantial evidence supports these convictions, we will affirm.