Opinion ID: 392022
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Need for a Statement of Reasons

Text: 35 Given the opacity of the district court's order, it is possible that the trial court considered denial of leave to amend justifiable on some unstated ground. B&O argues on appeal that Parker's attempt to amend was tainted by undue delay, that the change of counsel was no excuse, and that B&O has been prejudiced in some way by the lapse of time. B&O may reiterate these arguments on remand, but it is evident from the trial court's order that no explicit findings were made in response to these contentions. 36 The Supreme Court has made clear the need for an explicit statement of reasons when a district court denies a party leave to amend his pleadings: 37 Rule 15(a) declares that leave to amend shall be freely given when justice so requires; this mandate is to be heeded.... If the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the merits. In the absence of any apparent or declared reason such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc. the leave sought should, as the rules require, be freely given. Of course, the grant or denial of an opportunity to amend is within the discretion of the District Court, but outright refusal to grant the leave without any justifying reason appearing for the denial is not an exercise of discretion; it is merely abuse of that discretion and inconsistent with the spirit of the Federal Rules. 38 Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 230, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962) (citation omitted). See Gumer v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 516 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1974); Spann v. Commissioners of District of Columbia, 443 F.2d 715 (D.C.Cir.1970).B. Opposition to Unlawful Practices 39 Parker's amended complaint included a claim of unlawful retaliation under Title VII. Section 704(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any employee either because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice under Title VII (the opposition clause), or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under Title VII (the participation clause). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1976). 11 Parker's claim was based on the opposition clause. 12 40 The participation clause speaks in clear, absolute terms, and has accordingly been interpreted as shielding recourse to the EEOC, regardless of the ultimate resolution of the underlying claim on its merits. See, e. g., Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998 (5th Cir. 1969). The opposition clause, however, has received conflicting interpretations some courts have held that its language demonstrates that opposition is protected only if the challenged practice is indeed made an unlawful employment practice by Title VII, see, e. g., Kinard v. National Supermarkets, Inc., 458 F.Supp. 106 (S.D.Ala.1978); EEOC v. C & D Sportswear Corp., 398 F.Supp. 300 (M.D.Ga.1975), while others have found that protection under section 704(a) extends to situations where the employee reasonably believes the practice to violate Title VII, see, e. g., Berg v. La Crosse Cooler Co., 612 F.2d 1041 (7th Cir. 1980); Sias v. City Demonstration Agency, 588 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1978); Hearth v. Metropolitan Transit Comm'n, 436 F.Supp. 685 (D.Minn.1977). 41 The district court's order might be read as rejecting Parker's proffered amendment because it added nothing to the original complaint. If so, the district court must have concluded that Parker's opposition to B&O's affirmative action plan would not be protected by Title VII if that plan was lawful. We reject this interpretation of the opposition clause, because making the protected nature of an employee's opposition to alleged discrimination depend on the ultimate resolution of his claim would be inconsistent with the remedial purposes of Title VII. 42 The obvious concern of Congress, in both the opposition and participation clauses, was to protect the employee who dares to speak out against his employer's hiring practices. The enforcement scheme Congress chose for Title VII relies heavily on the initiative of aggrieved employees, whose efforts in the public interest would be severely chilled if they bore the risk of discharge whenever they were unable to establish conclusively the merits of their claims. 43 Moreover, by extending protection to employees who oppose discriminatory practices without recourse to the EEOC, Congress encouraged voluntary internal attempts to remedy discrimination. The remedial purposes of Title VII would be ill served by telling employees that they can be sure of protection only if they limit their complaints about discrimination to formal EEOC filings, and that internal opposition, though encouraged, is undertaken at the accuser's peril, EEOC v. C & D Sportswear Corp., 398 F.Supp. 300, 306 (M.D. Ga. 1975). 44 The record contains no indication that Parker's opposition to affirmative action was expressed disruptively, insubordinately, or in a manner damaging to B&O's legitimate management interests. Courts have recognized the need to balance the employer's interest in smooth functioning of his business against employees' interest in achieving internal resolution of discrimination disputes, and have sought to determine on a case-by-case basis when excessively forceful opposition forfeits the protection of section 704(a). See, e. g., Pendleton v. Rumsfeld, 628 F.2d 102 (D.C.Cir.1980); Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation for Experimental Biology, 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976). An employer has, however, no legitimate interest in retaliating against an employee for opposition per se, and the fact that a nonfrivolous claim is ultimately resolved in favor of management does not justify an attempt to suppress the claim by penalizing the employee who raised it. The employer is sufficiently protected against malicious accusations and frivolous claims by a requirement that an employee seeking the protection of the opposition clause demonstrate a good faith, reasonable belief that the challenged practice violates Title VII. See Sias v. City Demonstration Agency, 588 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1978); cf. Monteiro v. Poole Silver Co., 615 F.2d 4 (1st Cir. 1980) (opposition not in good faith). 45 B&O argues that most of the cases rejecting a narrow reading of the opposition clause are inapposite here, because they involve mistakes of fact rather than mistakes of law. It is not clear to us that a conclusion that B& O's affirmative action efforts were on the permissible side of some juridical line would necessarily reflect an error of law rather than of fact in Parker's opposition, but in any case we find the suggested distinction irrelevant to the purposes of section 704(a). Characterization of the employee's mistake as one of fact or of law affects neither the employee's interest in acting on his beliefs nor the employer's interest in asserting legitimate management prerogatives. We agree with the Seventh Circuit's conclusion in Berg v. La Crosse Cooler Co., 612 F.2d 1041, 1045-46 (7th Cir. 1980) a layperson should not be burdened with the sometimes impossible task of correctly anticipating how a given court will interpret a particular statute. Opposition based on reasonable belief should be protected from retaliation. 46 We express no opinion, of course, on the merits of Parker's retaliation claim. We hold only that Parker's proposed amendment would not be made futile as a matter of law by a finding that B&O's affirmative action plan was lawful under Title VII. 47 Thus, the Supreme Court's Weber decision does not provide a basis for denying Parker leave to amend. If the district court intended to rely on the legal futility of a claim under the opposition clause of section 704(a), the court was mistaken. If the court relied on some other reason, it is impossible for us to discern from the text of the order what that reason was. On remand, the court should either grant Parker leave to file his amended and supplemental complaint, or make appropriate findings and state its reasons for denial.