Opinion ID: 1928943
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Malicious Destruction of Property

Text: For the damage his rock-throwing caused to various vehicles, Ford was charged with twenty-four counts of malicious destruction of an automobile under Maryland Code (1957, 1992 Repl.Vol.), Article 27, § 111. [2] Section 111 divides the crime of malicious destruction of property into two degrees of misdemeanor. At the time Ford was charged, the statute provided that the malicious destruction of property valued at less than $300 carried a penalty of up to a $500 fine or 60 days imprisonment or both; malicious destruction of property valued at $300 or greater carried a penalty of up to a $2,500 fine or three years imprisonment or both. [3] Ford's indictment did not specifically allege value on any of the twenty-four counts. Ford contends that, by failing to specifically allege value of $300 or greater, the indictment charged only the lesser degree of the crime. Therefore, he contends that even though he did not object to submission of the greater crime to the jury, he could not be found guilty of fourteen counts of that greater crime. Ford relies on dictum in Spratt v. State, 315 Md. 680, 556 A.2d 667 (1989), in which we said that if the State wishes to pursue the more serious offense, it must specifically charge and prove the value of the destroyed property, [$300 or greater]. Id. at 686, 556 A.2d at 669-70. This was dictum in Spratt because the defendant there was properly charged with the greater offense; rather, the issue in Spratt was the court's failure to instruct the jury that it must specifically find that the defendant destroyed property of $300 or more in value to convict on that charge. Nonetheless, we think Spratt correctly stated the law with respect to charging as well. An apt analogy can be found in our construction of the consolidated theft statute, § 342. Section 342(f) divides theft into the felony of theft of $300 or more and the lesser included misdemeanor of theft under $300. In Hagans v. State, 316 Md. 429, 441, 559 A.2d 792, 798-99 (1989), we considered whether the value of the stolen property was an element of the theft offenses or simply a factor to be considered for sentencing purposes. We held that valuation is an element of theft that the State must set forth in the charging document. We placed great emphasis on valuation in part because [o]ne should know, long before the imposition of sentence, whether he has been charged with a felony or a misdemeanor. Id., 559 A.2d at 798. Although the lesser and greater offenses of malicious destruction at issue in the instant case are both misdemeanors, the maximum sentences differ considerably. The maximum sentence for the lesser offense is 60 days, while the maximum for the greater offense is three years. For the same reasons set forth in Hagans with respect to theft, one should know, long before the imposition of sentence for malicious destruction of property, with what degree of the crime he or she has been charged. The State initially argues that the charging document was not defective. It contends that, upon his indictment for destruction of an automobile, Ford should have known he was being charged with the greater offense since automobiles generally cost more than $300. We disagree, as we do not believe that the correctness of the charging document can turn on what a defendant should or might know about the value of property. [4] The State also argues that if failure to include value in the indictment did make the charging document defective, Ford waived this defect by not objecting to it before trial, or when it became apparent during trial. Maryland Rule 4-252(a)(2) provides that a defect in the charging document other than its failure to show jurisdiction in the court or to charge an offense is waived if not raised in the circuit court. First, we agree with Ford that the indictment did not properly charge malicious destruction in the amount of $300 or greater. As we have said: A primary purpose to be fulfilled by a charging document under Maryland law is to satisfy the constitutional requirement of Article 21 of the Declaration of Rights that each person charged with a crime be informed of the accusation against him, first, by characterizing the crime and, second, by so describing it as to inform the accused of the specific conduct with which he is charged. Jones v. State, 303 Md. 323, 336, 493 A.2d 1062, 1069 (1985) (citations omitted). It is not too burdensome to require that the State properly charge the crime for which it seeks to convict the defendant. As we noted in Spratt, 315 Md. at 683, 556 A.2d at 668, the General Assembly intended that the crime of malicious destruction of property be treated as a single misdemeanor offense with two different classifications. Where the State intends to seek a sentence for the greater offense, it should include a value of $300 or greater in the indictment. [5] Acknowledging a defect in the charging document does not resolve the issue, however. We must now ask whether the failure to charge value is the type of defect that Ford can raise on appeal having not raised it at trial. In general, Md. Rule 4-252(a)(2) requires that a party raise any objections related to defects in the charging document at trial, or else waive the objections. An exception to this general rule is where the charging document fails to show jurisdiction in the court or to charge an offense. Md. Rule 4-252(c). A party may raise such defects at any time. Id. Thus, the issue here is whether the defect in Ford's charging document was jurisdictional in nature. Previously, we have said that not all of an offense's essential elements need be set forth in the charging document. Campbell v. State, 325 Md. 488, 495, 601 A.2d 667, 671 (1992). A document that contains words that sufficiently characterize the crime will satisfy the jurisdictional requirement. Williams v. State, 302 Md. 787, 793, 490 A.2d 1277, 1280 (1985). Although Ford's charging document did not allege the element of value of $300 or greater, it sufficiently characterized the misdemeanor of malicious destruction of property to establish the jurisdiction of the court and to charge an offense. As we held in Campbell, 325 Md. at 501-03, 601 A.2d at 673-74, omission from the charging document of an element which serves to aid a defendant in determining the maximum possible penalty was not a jurisdictional defect, and could be waived if no objection is made at trial. At issue in Campbell was the sufficiency of the indictment charging the defendant with conspiracy to violate Maryland's controlled dangerous substances law. The indictment did not allege the object of the conspiracy, possession with intent to distribute cocaine. Campbell claimed that before he could be sentenced for conspiracy to violate Maryland's controlled dangerous substance law, he must have been charged with enough specificity to inform him of the identity of the controlled dangerous substance and how it was to be used. Otherwise, Campbell alleged, the indictment would be jurisdictionally defective for failing to give him notice of the charge or permit his determination of the applicable penalty, which was dependent on the punishment for the underlying offense. See § 38 (punishment for conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum punishment provided for the offense [defendant] conspired to commit). We noted that while the indictment might well have been defective, the defect was not jurisdictional because the indictment sufficiently characterized the crime of conspiracy. Campbell, 325 Md. at 501, 601 A.2d at 673. Campbell had never moved to dismiss the conspiracy count as defective, nor had he requested a bill of particulars. From this, as well as from the counts of the indictment, we held it could be inferred that the indictment adequately informed him of the charges he faced. Moreover, the judge's conspiracy instruction properly included the specific object of the conspiracy, and he never objected to these instructions. Based on these facts, we affirmed Campbell's conviction. In the instant case, both the jury instructions and the verdict sheet specifically included a value greater than $300. If the defendant believed that the charging document alleged only a value of less than $300, he should have objected to the jury instructions. Md. Rule 4-325(e). Ford never contended at trial that the charging document, by not stating value, had charged only malicious destruction under $300. There was ample opportunity to raise this objection when the judge gave the jury instructions on degrees of malicious destruction, when the verdict sheet was prepared for submission, or at any time before the jury retired to consider the evidence. Ford never raised any objection on this issue below and acquiesced in the instructions and verdict sheet. By not objecting when the circuit court construed the indictment to cover both degrees of the misdemeanor and by failing to object after the court instructed the jury, Ford waived the issue and did not preserve it for appellate review. Johnson v. State, 310 Md. 681, 684-89, 531 A.2d 675, 676-79 (1987); Campbell, 325 Md. at 501-03, 601 A.2d at 673-74.