Opinion ID: 2609775
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Entry of Judgment without Settlement Credit

Text: Appellants argue that the trial court erred in entering judgment for the amount of the verdict without first deducting the amount appellee received from Paul Anselmi and Sleeping Indian, the settling defendants. In this case, prior to trial, appellee settled for the sums shown and dismissed his case against: (a) Sleeping Indian Outfitter (horse owner) $195,000 (b) Paul Anselmi (pasture owner) 10,000 ________ Total agreed upon settlement $205,000 Thereafter, the case was tried to a jury against appellant David Haderlie and his employer, the only defendants remaining, with the settling participants listed on the verdict form. The jury returned the following verdict: (a) Sleeping Indian percentage of fault 0% (b) Paul Anselmi percentage of fault 0% (c) David Haderlie and J.P. Robinson, dba Jack Knife Ranch and Construction percentage of fault 100% Total damages suffered by Sondgeroth $375,000 [1] Thus the jury found that the settling defendants owed appellee nothing since they were 0 percent at fault. The settling defendants, in hindsight, paid more than this jury found they owed. Aside from the law (which is clear), the policy question presented is who should receive the benefit of the $205,000 paid by the settling parties. Should it be: (a) Returned to Anselmi and Sleeping Indian? The parties' settlement agreement does not provide this result. (b) Should that defendant, who took his chances on trial and who was found 100 percent at fault, receive a $205,000 credit? If he does, he will only pay 45 percent of the judgment rather than the 100 percent found due. If this is the result, tortfeasors will hold off settling to get credit for the payment of others. There will be little incentive to settle. (c) Should it go to the injured plaintiff? He gambled that the settlement would be rightif it is less, he losesif it is more, he gains. Prior to 1986, joint tortfeasors were jointly and severally liable for damages payable to an injured party. Thus, all parties liable were jointly obligated for the total damage and each party was individually obligated to pay the total damage. An injured party, not at fault, could recover his entire judgment (100 percent) from a five percent negligent party. With joint and several liability, there was the right of contribution among tortfeasors found in W.S. 1-1-110(b) (1977), which provided: (b) The right of contribution exists only in favor of a tortfeasor who has paid more than his pro rata share of the common liability, and his total recovery is limited to the amount paid by him in excess of his pro rata share. No tortfeasor is compelled to make contribution beyond his own pro rata share of the entire liability. The five percent negligent party, having paid 100 percent of the judgment, then had a right of contribution under W.S. 1-1-110(b) and could recover from the 95 percent negligent party the 95 percent of the judgment paid by the five percent party. In 1986, the Wyoming legislature abolished joint and several liability by amending W.S. 1-1-109 to provide that a party at fault be required to pay for only his proportionate share of the faultin the above example, five percent. At the same time, W.S. 1-1-110(b) providing for contribution among tortfeasors was repealed. Wyoming Statute 1-1-109, as now amended, provides in pertinent part: (d) Each defendant is liable only for that proportion of the total dollar amount determined as damages under paragraph (b)(i) or (ii) of this section in the percentage of the amount of fault attributed to him under paragraph (b)(i) or (ii) of this section. [emphasis added] and § 1-1-109(b)(i) and (ii) provides: (b) The court may, and when requested by any party shall: (i) If a jury trial: (A) Direct the jury to find separate verdicts determining the total amount of damages and the percentage of fault attributable to each actor whether or not a party; and (B) Inform the jury of the consequences of its determination of the percentage of fault. (ii) If a trial before the court without jury, make special findings of fact, determining the total amount of damages and the percentage of fault attributable to each actor whether or not a party. By repeal of W.S. 1-1-110(b), the legislature has clearly and unambiguously stated that appellants may not have help paying this judgment by way of contribution from other tortfeasors. If help in paying the judgment is not available by way of contribution, consistency would demand that such help be unavailable by way of a credit upon the judgment. Whether called contribution or credit, we speak of the same thing, i.e., someone else paying part of the judgment. With the amendment of W.S. 1-1-109(d), W.S. 1-1-110(b) providing for contribution was repealed and for good reason, for after joint and several liability was abolished, no tortfeasor would ever pay more than his proportionate share of a judgment. Thus, there would never be a need for contribution or for credit upon a judgment. Credit would not be given because the amount of judgment for which each defendant is liable is always limited by the percentage of fault assigned to that defendant. Therefore, as a matter of law, Haderlie can have no credit upon the judgment for sums paid by others because Haderlie, if and when he pays 100 percent of this judgment, will not pay more than the percentage of the amount of fault attributed to him by the jury in its verdict finding him 100 percent at fault. The cases we cite to support our conclusion are the only cases that treat the situation existing after repeal of joint and several liability. These cases are the better reasoned and the developing majority in states like Wyoming that have abolished joint and several liability. Of necessity and as a matter of law, they differ substantially from states still retaining joint and several liability and contribution among tortfeasors. A recent Arizona case is nearly identical to this case. See Roland v. Bernstein, 171 Ariz. 96, 828 P.2d 1237 (App.1991) (review denied May 5, 1992). This Arizona court reaches a result identical to that reached by us. In Roland, the plaintiff sued a neurosurgeon, an anesthesiologist, and the hospital. The anesthesiologist and the hospital settled for $700,000 each. Roland, 828 P.2d at 1238. The neurosurgeon and his professional corporation remained in the case for trial. The jury awarded $1,965,000 damages and apportioned fault as follows: neurosurgeon 47 percent; anesthesiologist 28 percent; and the hospital 25 percent. Id. The trial court allowed the neurosurgeon to reduce the total judgment by the amount of the prior settlements. Thus, the trial court subtracted from $1,965,000 (the judgment) $1,400,000 (the settlement) and entered judgment for $565,000 instead of $923,550 (47 percent of the $1,965,000). The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied review. Id. Roland was tried under a recent Arizona statute in which the Arizona legislature, as did the Wyoming legislature, abolished joint and several liability and limited recovery against any defendant to that percentage of the plaintiff's damages representing that defendant's degree of fault. Id., citing A.R.S. § 12-2506. The court stated that under the new statute, there is no contribution because each defendant is liable only for the portion of the injury he caused, not the whole injury; no two are liable for the same injury. Roland, 828 P.2d at 1239 ( citing Kussman v. City and County of Denver, 706 P.2d 776 (Colo.1985)). The rationale of the court of appeals is persuasive: [W]e believe that it would be anomalous to give the benefit of an advantageous settlement, not to the plaintiff who negotiated it, but to the nonsettling tortfeasor. Had plaintiff made a disadvantageous settlement, she would have borne that consequence because her recovery against [the neurosurgeon] would have been limited to $923,550. At a minimum, symmetry requires that if the disadvantage of settlement is hers so ought the advantage be. Beyond that, we see no reason why a nonsettling tortfeasor ought to escape the liability that is his by reason of the faulty assessment of probabilities by a settling tortfeasor. Indeed, such a rule might well discourage settlement by the last tortfeasor on the reasoning that his exposure is limited to his degree of fault and even that might be reduced by reason of preexisting settlements. These considerations have led most courts considering this question to apply the rule we are adopting. Roland, 828 P.2d at 1239. We have acknowledged that guidance in interpreting the Wyoming legislation can be found in court decisions from states which have, like Wyoming, based their statute on Wisconsin's. Board of County Comm'rs v. Ridenour, 623 P.2d 1174, 1190 (Wyo.1981). Minnesota's comparative negligence statute was adopted from Wisconsin's. Id., see also Ferguson v. Northern States Power Co., 307 Minn. 26, 239 N.W.2d 190, 196 (1976). Minnesota faced a similar argument, that credit for settlements with other defendants should be given for the benefit of the nonsettling defendant. While Minnesota has adopted Wisconsin's basic comparative negligence scheme, it has not, as in Wyoming, abolished joint and several liability. Minn. Stat.Ann. § 604.02 (West Cum.Supp.1991). Instead, Minnesota allows the use of a Pierringer release which allows a joint tortfeasor under joint and several liability to settle for his share without fear that the nonsettling defendant will later have a contribution claim against him[.] Shantz v. Richview, Inc., 311 N.W.2d 155, 156 (Minn.1980). When settlement is pursuant to a Pierringer release, Minnesota has held that a nonsettling defendant is not entitled to credit the amount of settlement from settling defendants against the judgment he must pay. The situation is thus analogous to our case. The Minnesota Supreme Court has said, we believe it would be inequitable to allow defendant, the nonsettling party, to profit from a settlement agreement between plaintiff and third-party defendant. Shantz, 311 N.W.2d at 156. The rationale followed by the Minnesota Supreme Court is relevant here. The Minnesota Supreme Court has said: In this case, the settling parties misgauged what the jury's verdict would be and O'Neill's Bar paid too much for its release. This observation, however, is as idle as most hindsight pronouncements. Judged as of the time the settlement was made, weighing the risks as then understood, the settlement amount was just right. In accepting the settlement payment, the plaintiff accepted the likelihood of being under-compensated as well as being over-compensated. If the jury had determined the amount of the O'Neill's Bar fair share at more than O'Neill paid for its release, the Croatian Club, as the nonsettling defendant, would have been relieved of the obligation of making up the difference.    [I]f subsequent events sometimes result in a so-called windfall for plaintiff, that result is acceptable within the context of the law's strong policy to encourage settlement of disputes.    The nonsettling defendant, hoping the jury would provide a windfall which would work to its advantage, would also have a further reason for not settling its own liability exposure. Rambaum v. Swisher, 435 N.W.2d 19, 23 (Minn.1989). See also Thurston v. 3K Kamper Ko., Inc., 482 A.2d 837, 842 (Me.1984). The policy choice is clear. Appellants are liable for 100 percent of the verdict. The jury said so. Appellants are asked to pay that amount, no more. Appellee's contractual settlements with others is not appellants' concern. Common sense, logic and justice tells us that if the injured party must suffer the loss that might result from settlement, he should benefit from the gain. This is the result mandated by law. It is the best result. We hold that entry of the judgment without credit for the payments of the settling parties was proper and in accord with the jury's verdict and Wyoming law.