Opinion ID: 809319
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Analysis of the three issues

Text: Rule 16(c) provides: Continuing Duty To Disclose. A party who discovers additional evidence or material before or during trial must promptly disclose its existence to the other party or the court if: (1) the evidence or material is subject to discovery or inspection under this rule; and (2) the other party previously requested, or the court ordered, its production. Because the government learned during trial that Officer Petrich’s testimony would not be consistent with the search warrant affidavit he signed under oath or with his report, the government violated Rule 16(c) by failing to disclose this development to the defense immediately. See United States v. Hardy, 586 F.3d 1040, 1043 (6th Cir. 2009). Two of the Zuern factors favor Wilson’s motion for a mistrial because the government solicited Officer Petrich’s trial testimony and the government’s line of questioning was not reasonable where the defense was not given previous notification of the changed testimony. The remaining three factors, however, favor the government. Wilson did not contemporaneously object or seek other relief, he did not prove that the government acted in bad faith, and the details concerning Wilson’s walk with the informant was only a small part of the trial evidence presented against Wilson. Defense counsel did not ask to approach the bench when the changed testimony first came to light. Had counsel objected and asked for a sidebar, the district court might have granted Wilson a continuance to prepare to meet the changed testimony, or the court might have interrupted the trial 9 No. 11-1021 United States v. Wilson to allow Wilson an opportunity to make a motion to suppress and challenge the search warrant and affidavit under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d). If the district court had found a violation under Rule 16(c), Brady, or Giglio, the court might have excluded the evidence seized from 613 Thomson Apartment 2 as a sanction for the violation. But defense counsel did not object, ask for a continuance or sanctions, or request a Franks hearing. Even if defense counsel had asked for a Franks hearing during trial, however, Wilson would not have prevailed. To obtain a Franks hearing, the defendant must make a substantial preliminary showing that the police officer included—knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth—in the warrant affidavit a false statement that was necessary to the finding of probable cause. United States v. Poulsen, 655 F.3d 492, 504 (6th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1772 (2012). A Franks hearing is warranted only “[i]f, when the alleged false statement is put aside, the affidavit no longer provided the court with probable cause.” Id. at 504–05. We have “repeatedly held that there is a higher bar for obtaining a Franks hearing on the basis of an allegedly material omission as opposed to an allegedly false affirmative statement.” United States v. Fowler, 535 F.3d 408, 415 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing cases). When material omissions are at issue, “the defendant is entitled to a hearing if and only if: (1) the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that the affiant engaged in deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth in omitting information from the affidavit, and (2) a finding of probable cause would not be supported by the affidavit if the omitted material were considered to be a part of it.” Id. Therefore, the law requires both redaction of false statements from the affidavit and consideration of material omitted from the affidavit in order to determine whether there was probable cause for a search warrant. 10 No. 11-1021 United States v. Wilson Although a Franks hearing was not held, direct examination and thorough cross-examination provided a record of the false statements included in and the true statements omitted from the affidavit. Officer Petrich admitted that his affidavit contained false statements that the confidential informant went inside 613 Thomson Apartment 2 during the controlled purchase and that the controlled purchase occurred on the premises. Petrich also conceded that the affidavit omitted the information that Wilson and the informant walked from 613 to 702 Thomson to complete the drug transaction. He denied, however, that he intended to mislead and states that he omitted the detail to protect the identity of the informant. If we redact the admittedly false statements from the affidavit, see Poulsen, 655 F.3d at 504, and consider the information omitted from the affidavit, see Fowler, 535 F.3d at 415, Wilson was not entitled to a Franks hearing because the affidavit provided a sufficient nexus to cocaine trafficking at 613 Thomson Apartment 2 to support probable cause for the search warrant. See United States v. Moore, 661 F.3d 309, 312–14 (6th Cir. 2011). The informant knocked on the door of 613 Thomson Apartment 2, Wilson emerged and walked with the informant down the street, and Wilson handed the informant a quantity of crack cocaine in exchange for money, all while under the surveillance of the police. The confidential informant had earlier informed Officer Petrich that quantities of cocaine were being sold from 613 Thomson Apartment 2. Although the affidavit should have explained why Officer Petrich thought the informant was credible and reliable, the controlled purchase corroborated the informant’s knowledge about drug trafficking at 613 Thomson and this was enough to show reliability. See Moore, 661 F.3d at 313; United States v. Thomas, 605 F.3d 300, 307 (6th Cir. 2010). The affidavit also included information that the informant was 11 No. 11-1021 United States v. Wilson searched by police before and after the purchase, and the informant did not possess any crack cocaine other than the amount purchased from Wilson during the controlled buy at 702 Thomson and promptly turned over to the police. The information about the controlled purchase was not stale because Officer Petrich sought the search warrant the day after the sale. See id. at 312–13. The affidavit was thin. However, judged on the totality of the circumstances, it contained sufficient information to establish a substantial basis upon which the state judge could conclude that probable cause existed to search 613 Thomson Apartment 2. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983); Thomas, 605 F.3d at 307–08 (affirming denial of suppression motion where affidavit offered “relatively thin justification for probable cause”). We further conclude that a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), did not occur. The government should have notified the defense as soon as possible that Officer Petrich would testify about Wilson’s walk with the informant to 702 Thomson. Although the government could have been more prompt in making this disclosure, the information was provided during trial. “If previously undisclosed evidence is disclosed during trial, no Brady violation occurs ‘unless the defendant has been prejudiced by the delay in disclosure.’” United States v. Garner, 507 F.3d 399, 405 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Word, 806 F.2d 658, 665 (6th Cir. 1986)). Wilson has not shown prejudice resulting from the government’s delay. See United States v. Blood, 435 F.3d 612, 627 (6th Cir. 2006). His counsel effectively utilized the late-disclosed evidence to impeach Officer Petrich during cross-examination by pointing out to the jury the differences between the trial testimony and the search warrant affidavit and report. The district court should have addressed the 12 No. 11-1021 United States v. Wilson Brady issue directly. Despite this failure, we conclude that reversal is not necessary. Wilson did not timely request a continuance when the district court could have addressed the issue.