Opinion ID: 610151
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defendant's Proposed Instruction 2A1

Text: 9 Defendant's proposed instruction 2A discusses the defense of good faith. Jones argues that the instructions which were given did not adequately tell the jury that if it found that Jones acted in good faith, she could not have acted with intent to defraud. 10 The third factor in Douglas requires the defendant to show that the instructions given did not adequately express her theory of defense. Douglas, 818 F.2d at 1322 (citing Green, 779 F.2d at 1320). If the tendered instruction necessarily encompass[es] the defendant's theory of defense, she is not entitled to the instruction. United States v. Brimberry, 961 F.2d 1286, 1291 (7th Cir.1992) (because willfulness was an essential element of the charges, the instructions on willfulness necessarily encompassed defendant's theory of good faith reliance); United States v. Kelly, 864 F.2d 569 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811 (1989); see United States v. Schwartz, 787 F.2d 257 (7th Cir.1986). 11 The instructions which were given placed the burden on the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Jones knowingly took mail out of a mailbox before delivery to the person to whom it was directed as charged, that she intended to obstruct the correspondence, that she knew at the time that the checks were forged, and that she cashed the forged Treasury checks with intent to defraud. Govt.Sug.Jury Instr. 12. The court also gave the jury an instruction stating, [t]o act with an 'intent to defraud' means to act knowingly and with the intention or the purpose to deceive or to cheat. Govt.Sug.Jury Instr. 15. The instructions defined knowingly as the defendant realized what she was doing and was aware of the nature of her conduct, and did not act through ignorance, mistake or accident. Govt.Sug.Jury Instr. 14. Taking together the instructions which were given, the jury could not have found that Jones acted with the intent to defraud and simultaneously find that she acted in good faith. Furthermore, the entire trial focused on whether Jones knew that her actions were illegal; she admitted her conduct in her testimony and her lawyer pressed the good faith argument in closing argument. Even without a separate instruction, the jury was given the opportunity to consider whether Jones acted in good faith. The district court did not commit plain error by refusing to give defendant's proposed instruction 2A.