Opinion ID: 215844
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Selsor's new trial

Text: The Tulsa County District Attorney's Office initiated retrial proceedings in May of 1996. On August 6, 1996, the prosecution filed a Bill of Particulars alleging that Selsor should be punished by Death for the offense of Murder in the First Degree, as charged in the [original] Information, as a result of the following aggravating circumstances: (1) [t]he Defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person; (2) [t]he murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel; (3) [t]he murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution; and (4) [t]he existence of a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society. S. R., Vol. I at 191. Selsor moved to strike the Bill of Particulars, arguing that [a]llowing the State to seek the death penalty against [him would] violate[] the prohibition against ex post facto laws and expose [him] to more severe punishment than was lawful at the time [he] committed the alleged crime of Murder in the First Degree. Id., Vol. II at 203. On July 20, 1997, on the eve of trial, the state trial court denied Selsor's motion. Selsor immediately petitioned the OCCA for a writ of mandamus and obtained from that court a stay of the impending trial. Id. at 288. On October 14, 1997, the OCCA issued a published decision affirming the trial court's decision. Selsor v. Turnbull, 947 P.2d 579 (Okla.Crim.App. 1997). In doing so, the OCCA expressly overturned its decision in Riggs (which concluded, in pertinent part, that the death penalty statutes enacted by the Oklahoma Legislature in 1976 changed the burden of proof to the detriment of criminal defendants, as compared to the burden of proof under the 1973 first degree murder statute), and then concluded that the filing of a Bill of Particulars under the contemporaneous death penalty statutes (i.e., statutes enacted in 1976 that remained effective in 1997) did not violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws or implicate the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 583. Following the OCCA's decision, Selsor's retrial began on February 2, 1998. At the outset, Selsor's counsel moved to dismiss the charges against Selsor, arguing that the Information, which was filed in 1975 and which charged Selsor under the language of the 1973 first degree murder statute, alleged both that . . . Selsor with premeditated design effect[ed] the death of Clayton Chandler and during the course of a robbery with firearms did kill Clayton Chandler. Tr., Vol. IV at 738. The state trial court overruled Selsor's motion. Id. at 739 (I think that the Information, albeit old, properly informs Mr. Selsor of the charge that is against him.). At the conclusion of the government's first-stage evidence, the jury found Selsor guilty of the three charges against him, i.e., murder in the first degree, shooting with intent to kill, and robbery with firearms. The second-stage proceedings began following a short recess. To prove the four alleged aggravating circumstances, the prosecution presented evidence that Selsor and Dodson committed four similar armed robberies shortly prior to the robbery of the Tulsa U-TOTE-M convenience store, two of which involved the actual use of violence against store clerks (specifically the shooting of one clerk by Selsor and the stabbing of another clerk by Dodson). The prosecution also presented evidence establishing that Selsor attempted to escape from prison in December 1984. Lastly, the prosecution presented testimony from the widow and daughter of Clayton Chandler, the murder victim in the case, and from Ina Morris, the store clerk wounded by Dodson during the robbery. All three of these witnesses read into the record victim impact statements they had prepared prior to trial. As part of their testimony, each of these three witnesses testified that they agreed with the District Attorney's recommended sentence of death. Selsor in turn presented testimony from a data entry clerk employed by the Tulsa County Sheriff's Department, who testified that during the nineteen months Selsor was confined in the Tulsa County Jail awaiting retrial, Selsor had no write-ups of any kind. Selsor also presented testimony from four current or former Oklahoma Department of Corrections employees, all of whom knew Selsor because of their contact with him during his post-trial incarceration. All four of these witnesses testified, in pertinent part, that, despite their being generally in favor of the death penalty, they disagreed with the District Attorney's recommended sentence of death for Selsor. At the conclusion of the second-stage evidence, the jury found the existence of two of the four aggravating circumstances alleged by the prosecution: that Selsor knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person, and that the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding and preventing a lawful arrest. In turn, the jury fixed Selsor's punishment at death for the first degree murder conviction. As for the other two counts of conviction, the jury recommended life imprisonment for the shooting with intent to kill conviction, and twenty years' imprisonment for the robbery with firearms conviction. The state trial court entered judgment consistent with the verdicts on May 6, 1998. The judgment stated, in pertinent part, that Selsor was found guilty of MURDER, 1st DEGREE, in violation of 21-701.7, the 1976 murder statute enacted by the Oklahoma state legislature. S. R., Vol. III at 436.