Opinion ID: 1377787
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 24

Heading: Proof of Prior Crimes Beyond a Reasonable Doubt

Text: (38) For the same reason we reject defendant's claim that the court erred in failing to instruct the jury that before the prior criminal conduct could be considered in determining the appropriate penalty, the crimes must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. A plurality of this court stated in People v. Robertson, supra, 33 Cal.3d 21, 53, that the rule of People v. Stanworth (1969) 71 Cal.2d 820, 840 [80 Cal. Rptr. 49, 457 P.2d 889], was applicable to jury consideration of other-crimes evidence during the penalty phase of a capital trial conducted under the 1977 death penalty law. Stanworth held that [i]t is now settled that a defendant during the penalty phase of a trial is entitled to an instruction to the effect that the jury may consider evidence of other crimes only when the commission of such other crimes is proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the court must so instruct sua sponte. The evidence of other crimes in Robertson and Stanworth was introduced by the prosecution as an aggravating factor. Justice Broussard, concurring, concluded that on the facts of Robertson the instruction should have been given. He noted, however, that other-crimes evidence was often admissible for other purposes at a penalty trial, among which was to show that the defendant's mental faculties were impaired, a mitigating factor. When offered for this purpose, Justice Broussard suggested, there is no reasonable doubt standard to be met before the jury can consider that evidence. (33 Cal.3d at p. 61.) The exception anticipated by Justice Broussard in Robertson is present here. The evidence of uncharged crimes was introduced by and relied on by defendant at all three phases of the trial  guilt, sanity, and penalty. He admitted commission of these crimes in his testimony at the guilt phase and in his statements to the psychiatrists which he read into the record during the sanity phase. [42] In these circumstances it cannot reasonably be said that the prosecution must prove their commission. Defendant has no burden under the reasonable-doubt standard. Although the jury might have considered the evidence of other crimes for a purpose other than mitigation the court had no obligation to instruct the jury here that this evidence, introduced by defendant, could not be considered an aggravating factor unless proved beyond a reasonable doubt, but could be considered in mitigation under a lesser standard. Neither our Constitution, nor the statutory and judicially pronounced rules governing the trial of criminal proceedings requires that such metaphysical distinctions be made by a jury. (Cf. People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518, 525 [47 Cal. Rptr. 353, 407 P.2d 265] [The rule calls upon the jury to perform `a mental gymnastic which is beyond not only their powers, but anybody's else'].) Defendant asked the jury to believe that he had committed the prior offenses. He may not now be heard to complain that they did.
(39) Defendant next argues that the court erred in failing to delete reference to irrelevant mitigating factors from the instruction on aggravating and mitigating circumstances. He cites in particular factors (d) and (e), whether the victim was a participant in or consented to the homicidal conduct, and whether the circumstances were such that the defendant believed his conduct to be morally justified or extenuated. We do not agree with the assumption implicit in defendant's argument that the instruction, given pursuant to statute, included irrelevant factors. While not all of the factors were applicable to the circumstances of defendant's crimes, they were relevant in the determination by the jury of the appropriate penalty. Their relevance lies in the fact that the Legislature has identified each of them as a proper consideration in the selection of an appropriate penalty. The instruction calls the attention of the jury to the range of factors considered in all capital sentencing and thereby assists the jury in weighing the relative culpability of the defendant and heinousness of his or her offense. An instruction which directs the jury's attention to the factors that the state considers particularly relevant assists the jury in selecting the appropriate penalty by narrowing or channeling the focus of the jury's discretion. The instruction helps the jury to determine the appropriate penalty in light of all the factors which the state considers relevant. The instruction thereby lessens the possibility that the penalty of death may be imposed arbitrarily or capriciously. (Accord People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 104-105 [241 Cal. Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127]; People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 776-777 [239 Cal. Rptr. 82, 739 P.2d 1250].) We agree with defendant that the absence of any of the statutory mitigating factors should not be considered aggravating ( People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 289 [221 Cal. Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861]), but no instruction was given here that might suggest to the jury that it should look at the absence of mitigating factors from that perspective. Although the prosecutor referred to those factors that were not applicable here, recalling for the jury evidence that would disprove their presence, he did not go beyond that approach to argue that their absence was an aggravating factor which militated in favor of the death penalty. Rather he properly asked the jury rhetorically, do you find anything that mitigates for the defendant? and exhorted the jury weigh the aggravating and you weigh the mitigating. [43]
(40) Defendant next contends that the judgment must be reversed because the jury was not instructed that it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that death was the appropriate penalty. We reject that claim. The trial court properly instructed the jury that the People had no burden of proof. We are satisfied that the instructions now given to the jury regarding its obligation to consider any mitigating evidence proffered by a capital defendant are adequate to impress the jurors with the high degree of certainty a juror should have before voting to impose the death penalty. Since the decision is a normative judgment reflecting the juror's individual moral assessment of the defendant's culpability (see People v. Allen, supra, 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1287), application of a reasonable-doubt standard is neither appropriate nor constitutionally compelled. (See also, People v. Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d 57, 107; People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d 730, 777-779.)
Defendant repeats his earlier claims of error with regard to the capacity in which Doctors Brannan and Lloyd were appointed and to the admission in evidence at the guilt and sanity trials of the incriminating statements he made to the psychiatrists, urging these same errors as penalty phase error because the jury was instructed to consider all of the evidence presented during those phases in determining the penalty. He also argues that the statements were obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and again asserts error in the court's failure to instruct the jury that the statements could not be considered for the truth of the facts contained therein. Only the self-incrimination claim differs from those considered and rejected above. Defendant made no objection to consideration of the evidence on this or any other ground and is therefore precluded from urging its admission as error on appeal. As discussed above this omission appears to have been a deliberate tactical choice by counsel who intended to and did rely on defendant's background as support for his argument that defendant's culpability was affected by intoxication and/or mental defect. [44] An objection would have been meritless in any event. The appointment of a psychiatrist pursuant to sections 1026 and 1027 is made only in response to the defendant's entry of a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. The examination, initiated at the behest of the defendant, is not compelled and Miranda [45] warnings are not required. (41) Statements made to the examining psychiatrist are admissible at the guilt and sanity phases of the trial if the defendant puts his mental state in issue. ( People v. Arcega, supra, 32 Cal.3d 504, 521.) At the penalty phase defendant again placed his mental state in issue, inviting the jury to reject death as the appropriate penalty in light of his history of mental illness or diminished capacity. Although the question of admissibility at the penalty phase of psychiatric evidence obtained in a sanity examination was not resolved in Arcega or Estelle v. Smith (1981) 451 U.S. 454 [68 L.Ed.2d 359, 101 S.Ct. 1866], the Supreme Court has recently confirmed that when a defendant initiates a psychiatric examination by court-appointed experts, admission of the defendant's statements in a subsequent proceeding in which he has placed his mental state in issue violates neither his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination nor his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Even if the defendant or his counsel is not aware at the time of the examination of all of the possible uses to which his statements might be put, he is on notice that they are admissible in rebuttal in such proceedings. ( Buchanan v. Kentucky (1987) 483 U.S. 402,  [97 L.Ed.2d 336, 354-357, 107 S.Ct. 2906, 2916-2919].) Defendant next contends that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during his opening and closing penalty-phase arguments by making inflammatory statements based on facts not in evidence, misstating the law, and making reference to irrelevant factors, and thereby corrupted the entire penalty phase of the trial. Not only do we disagree with the assertion that specific portions of the argument which defendant cites as misconduct were improper, but we note that defendant failed to object to any aspect of the argument. ( People v. Haskett (1982) 30 Cal.3d 841, 863 [180 Cal. Rptr. 640, 640 P.2d 776]; People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d 1, 27.) [46] The trial court promptly and properly corrected the erroneous statement of the prosecutor regarding the jury's obligation in weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances. To the extent that any other part of the argument might have been misleading or improper, it could have been clarified or cured by a prompt admonition had there been a timely objection. ( People v. Murtishaw, supra, 29 Cal.3d 733, 757-758.) Defendant first cites the prosecutor's reference to irrelevant aggravating and mitigating factors. In his opening argument the prosecutor listed in abbreviated form, the 10 statutory factors to be considered by the jury in selecting the appropriate penalty, and then examined their relevance by pointing to the presence or absence of evidence to establish the existence of such factors. As to each he assumed, and by implication invited the jury to accept his assumption, that the factor was aggravating or mitigating. The argument did not suggest that the absence of a mitigating factor or factors was itself aggravating. With regard to the circumstances of the offense the prosecutor asked the jurors to recall that three persons had been murdered, and the jury had found the killings to be willful, deliberate, and premeditated, and that two had occurred in the commission of robbery. The prosecutor then briefly summarized the evidence of prior violent criminal conduct, including that which defendant had described in his interviews with the examining psychiatrists. Referring to the third factor, acting under extreme mental or emotional disturbance, the prosecutor asked the jurors to recall their deliberations during the guilt phase as to impaired capacity, consider the evidence related to the manner and circumstances in which the killings were committed, and petitioner's statement to the officers who transported him from Arizona. With respect to remorse, the prosecutor emphasized evidence regarding defendant's actions after the murder of Miguel and Salvador Vargas as demonstrating a lack of remorse. As to whether defendant acted under the domination of Tyson, the prosecutor recalled the evidence that defendant planned and took the lead in committing the crimes, and had described Tyson as sniveling. The final factor, whether the victims participated in or consented to the homicidal acts, was dismissed with this comment: I don't mean to insult your intelligence, but it's a factor, it's either an aggravating or it's a mitigating factor. The prosecutor then suggested a robbery scenario, in which the victim of a murder was one of the robbers shot by the resisting robbery victim, as an example of consent by consenting to the felony, concluding that in this particular case, it would seem to insult, seriously insult the mind of any reasonable juror to say that the victims in this case participated in any of the acts that resulted in the deaths of Miguel and Salvador. After a brief discussion of the evidence and similar reference to Lourdes Meza's lack of consent or participation, the prosecutor then referred to the absence of any basis for concluding that defendant believed his acts were morally justified, again suggesting circumstances in which that factor might be present. He then summed up by briefly mentioning and dismissing the other factors that, if present, might be considered mitigating  whether defendant was a mere accomplice, was under the substantial domination of Tyson, lacked capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or his mental capacity was substantially impaired, and whether any other relevant factor was mitigating. In relation to that possibility, the prosecutor suggested that defendant's age, 37 years, was not mitigating. He was not a youngster, but was of an age in which responsibility should be assessed. The prosecutor closed this argument by asserting that defendant apparently had an intent to kill and recalling evidence that when asked by an officer which person came to the door of the victim's home, defendant replied. He's just a Mexican. The prosecutor's closing argument was a somewhat confusing melange of ideas, emphasizing the apparent lack of remorse reflected in defendant's statement to Dr. Brannan that if released in 20 years he would do it again, [47] and the evidence that had been offered to rebut the defense of diminished capacity. Defendant first asserts as misconduct the reference to all 10 of the statutory factors enumerated in section 190.3 of the 1977 death penalty law, and the argument based thereon. We disagree. As we have pointed out earlier, instructions are properly given on all of the statutory factors that the Legislature has identified as considerations which the state believes are particularly relevant to selection of the appropriate penalty. It follows that it is proper for counsel in argument to assist the jury in determining the relevance of those factors, or lack thereof, in the case before it. A capital jury, lacking the overview of cases in which the death penalty has been imposed that a judge might have, is not familiar with the range of factors by which culpability is appropriately assessed in such cases. When counsel do this by summarizing or marshalling the evidence and arguing its relation to those factors in light of the full range of factors identified by the state as particularly relevant, a capital jury is better able to place the particular defendant's conduct in perspective. If all jurors are made aware of these factors, their exercise of discretion is further channeled and directed, and the possibility of arbitrary or capricious imposition of the death penalty is lessened. Indeed, giving the jury this type of guidance was encouraged by the United States Supreme Court in Gregg v. Georgia, supra, 428 U.S. 153, 192 [49 L.Ed.2d 859, 885], where the court recognized that jury inexperience in sentencing might make it difficult for jurors to recognize and properly use information relevant to the sentence choice. The court said there: [T]he problem will be alleviated if the jury is given guidance regarding the factors about the crime and the defendant that the State, representing organized society, deems particularly relevant to the sentencing decision. The single statement by the prosecutor here that the participation or consent to the homicidal-act factor had to be either aggravating or mitigating cannot fairly be characterized as defendant does  as misconduct applicable to every factor. The related argument emphasized circumstances of the crime and the lack of any prior relationship or involvement of the victims with defendant and Tyson, a proper subject for argument. Similarly, the argument about age explained to the jury the situation in which age might be mitigating, but did not suggest that defendant's age was an aggravating factor. The argument itself left that factor in a neutral posture. After his examination of the 10 statutory factors the prosecutor asked rhetorically: So as you consider these, how do you add these up? Sometime later in his peroration he asked: Do you find anything there that mitigates for the defendant? Weigh the aggravating and you weigh the mitigating. Now can you conscientiously ... go through this list of circumstances to consider and tell us that you find that the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating. Defendant also assigns this argument as misconduct, reading into it a suggestion that the jury should weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors in numerical terms and make the penalty selection a quantitative determination. Again, we disagree. Unlike the instruction that necessitated reversal in People v. Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d 512, a case tried under the 1978 law, the jury here was not instructed in mandatory terms that it must impose the death penalty if it found the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating. Although at the outset of his argument the prosecutor had told the jury this was the law, defense counsel had warned the jury that if something comes out that indicates to you it's mandatory, you don't hear that in the instructions, your obligation would be to disregard whatever counsel may have said about something being mandatory and use your judgment and discretion. Then, after the closing argument, the court corrected any misunderstanding the jury might have had in that regard, telling the jury that is not the law that applies to this case and expressly told the jury that while it might use the factors, the way you go about it is up to you. And the law does not say you shall do one or the other. (Cf. People v. Easley, supra, 34 Cal.3d 858, 881-884.) We do not agree with defendant that the prosecutor's exhortation to weigh the aggravating and weigh the mitigating factors implied a mechanical or numerical comparison, and if this impression were left we have no doubt that it was adequately dissipated by the court's instructions. (42) We reject defendant's claim that the prosecutor's comment on lack of remorse violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and constituted misconduct because that consideration is not a statutory aggravating factor. Prosecutorial comment on a defendant's silence may in some instances violate the privilege against self-incrimination. ( Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609 [14 L.Ed.2d 106, 85 S.Ct. 1229].) The argument here did not, however, either directly or indirectly, call to the attention of the jury defendant's failure to testify (cf. People v. Vargas (1973) 9 Cal.3d 470 [108 Cal. Rptr. 15, 509 P.2d 959]), nor was it directed to prearrest silence in circumstances in which that silence might reflect an exercise of that privilege. This is not a case in which the defendant asserted the privilege. He confessed to the police. He described the crimes to the psychiatrists, and in his testimony at trial, but in none of his statements about the crimes did he express sorrow. Comment regarding this omission invaded no constitutional right or privilege. [48] The presence or absence of remorse was recognized as a factor relevant to the penalty decision under the prior law ( People v. Coleman (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1159, 1168 [80 Cal. Rptr. 920, 459 P.2d 248]), although it is not among the statutorily enumerated aggravating factors in the 1978 law. The court held in People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 772-773 [215 Cal. Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782], that under the 1978 law the prosecutor may not introduce evidence that is irrelevant to the statutory aggravating factors. Because remorse is universally accepted as a possibly mitigating factor, however, the prosecutor may call to the attention of the jury an apparent absence of remorse in a defendant who has admitted that he has killed another human being. ( People v. Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d 739, 771.) The prosecutor's argument here went no further than that. It was in accord with the prior law and the 1977 statute has not been construed to prohibit reference to a consideration any juror, without the necessity for instruction or argument, would have in mind. The prosecutor's references to defendant's apparent lack of remorse could hardly have done more than call the jury's attention to that which was apparent from the evidence. Even were the 1977 law construed to prohibit reference to nonstatutory aggravating factors at the penalty phase, or argument that lack of remorse should be considered aggravating in selecting the penalty, the rule could not prevent a capital juror from bringing to bear on his decision knowledge gained from his life experience. The United States Supreme Court has indicated that to do so would be constitutionally impermissible. Any sentencing decision calls for the exercise of judgment. It is neither possible nor desirable for a person to whom the state entrusts an important judgment to decide in a vacuum, as if he had no experiences.... [¶] We have never suggested that the United States Constitution requires that the sentencing process should be transformed into a rigid and mechanical parsing of statutory aggravating factors. But to attempt to separate the sentencer's decision from his experiences would inevitably do precisely that. It is entirely fitting for the moral, factual, and legal judgment of judges and jurors to play a meaningful role in sentencing. ( Barclay v. Florida, supra, 463 U.S. 939, 950 [77 L.Ed.2d 1134, 1144].) The prosecutor's reference to defendant's apparent lack of remorse was not misconduct. (43) Defendant next assigns as misconduct the prosecutor's comments to the jury about the victims, asserting that this portion of the argument was an appeal to passion and prejudice. Again, we note there was no objection on this ground, but such objection would not have been meritorious. In fact, the argument appeared to be no more than low key rhetoric. The idea of retribution was not put forth. (Cf. People v. Floyd (1970) 1 Cal.3d 694, 721, 722 [83 Cal. Rptr. 608, 464 P.2d 64].) Nor did the prosecutor appeal to racial prejudice or otherwise engage in conduct which seriously threatened juror objectivity. (Cf. People v. Bain (1971) 5 Cal.3d 839, 848-849 [97 Cal. Rptr. 684, 489 P.2d 564].) He simply asked that the jury not forget the victims and that the jurors consider the lives they might have had. This argument is permissible at the penalty phase. ( People v. Haskett, supra, 30 Cal.3d 841, 864.) Defendant also urges that there was misconduct in the prosecutor's asking the jurors to recall their promise on voir dire, that if sworn as jurors they would consider imposition of the death penalty if it was appropriate. (44) We find no error in reminding the jurors of their obligation at the penalty phase to consider the death penalty. This argument did not improperly convey to the jury the prosecutor's personal view or belief that the case was an appropriate one. The use of the word promise was an accurate description of the obligation assumed by the jurors' oaths and was consistent with the subsequent instruction by the court that it was now the duty of the jury to select which of the two possible penalties should be imposed. (45) Defendant also argues that the prosecutor's reference to the alleged rape of Lourdes Meza was improper in light of the prior finding that her murder was not committed during the perpetration or attempted perpetration of rape. The actual statement during argument was to intercourse, not rape. This reference was not, however, like that condemned by this court in Haskett, supra, 30 Cal.3d 841. It did not suggest that the jury verdict rejecting that charge had been erroneous, or impliedly criticize the jury. Since defendant admitted, during his trial testimony, the act of intercourse to which the prosecutor referred, the statement was supported by the evidence and was proper. (See People v. Love (1961) 56 Cal.2d 720, 730 [16 Cal. Rptr. 777, 366 P.2d 33].) The reference to defendant's admission that he had intercourse with Lourdes Meza during the trip to Sonora was offered as illustrative of defendant's lack of remorse for the murders of Miguel and Salvador. We cannot say it was not relevant to his state of mind while transporting his third victim to the location at which she was to be killed. (46) Defendant next argues that it was error to permit the jury to consider the evidence contained in the psychiatrists' reports at the penalty phase. This evidence, he contends, without citation of authority other than section 1026, subdivision (a), which does not so provide, was admitted for the limited purpose of determining defendant's sanity at the time of the offense. Not only is this claim unsupported by authority, but there was no objection to jury consideration of the evidence, and defendant relied on the evidence. [49] The evidence was relevant to the statutory factor [w]hether or not at the time of the offense the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental disease or the affects of intoxication. (Former § 190.3, subd. (g).) Because we conclude that there was no prosecutorial misconduct during the penalty-phase argument, we need not consider defendant's further claims that no objection is necessary to preserve for review on appeal such misconduct when it occurs during the penalty phase of a capital case; that the trial court denied defendant a fair trial by failing to intervene to curb the asserted misconduct; or that defense counsel's failure to object establishes constitutionally ineffective representation.