Opinion ID: 2549762
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Judge Sprague's Recusal

Text: Judge Sprague, who was an attorney member of the Court of Judicial Discipline, served as Conference Judge. He decided the pre-trial motions, was one of the three court members who presided over appellant's trial, and authored the court's opinions in Lokuta I and Lokuta III. He also, through his private law practice, represented PA Child Care and Powell. Prior to trial, appellant moved to recuse Judge Sprague, because Moran was a member of Powell's law firm and two of appellant's potential witnesses had been in litigation against Powell or Judge Sprague. Judge Sprague denied this motion. In her post-verdict motion, appellant argued Judge Sprague should have recused himself, highlighting Moran's testimony, and claiming Judge Sprague relied upon Conahan and Ciavarella's testimony. The court dismissed appellant's post-verdict motions. On remand, appellant again moved for Judge Sprague's recusal, contending the after-discovered evidence proved Conahan, Ciavarella, Moran, Sharkey, and Powell were corrupt. She further claimed Judge Sprague must have independently possessed knowledge of matters relevant to her case, and his duty as Conference Judge and Powell's counsel conflicted. Judge Sprague filed a memorandum denying appellant's recusal motion. Judge Sprague denied his representation of Powell involved any discussion of appellant or of the proceedings against her. Judge Sprague maintained no evidence was presented that in any way demonstrated any relationship between the federal investigation and the charges against [appellant]. Court of Judicial Discipline Memorandum, 5/13/09, at 3 (Sprague, J.). He found he had no personal knowledge of the facts in the proceeding, and he had no personal bias concerning any party. Judge Sprague additionally observed appellant's claim that Conahan and Ciavarella orchestrated her ouster was belied by her testimony that she had cordial relations with Ciavarella. He further noted he did not bar damaging disclosures regarding them, noting there was no ruling regarding his clients. He also observed he did not sit alone, but his trial rulings were made together with Judges O'Toole and Streib. Appellant contends Judge Sprague's representation of Powell and PA Child Care should have disqualified him from judging her case, because Powell was intimately involved in Conahan and Ciavarella's misconduct. She claims Judge Sprague made evidentiary rulings limiting the public disclosure of Powell and PA Child Care's involvement with Conahan and Ciavarella at her trial. Appellant notes Judge Sprague represented PA Child Care before Conahan in a case the United States Attorney later identified as being part of Conahan's corruption. [6] The Board argues judicial misconduct giving rise to an appearance of impropriety is not present here. The Board claims appellant never even attempted to present evidence about the corrupt relationships between Powell, PA Child Care, Conahan, and Ciavarella. It further alleges this corruption does not corroborate her claim that witnesses conspired to fabricate evidence against her. The Board also notes appellant never identified any exhibit or witness which would have been harmful to Powell, PA Child Care, Conahan, or Ciavarella. Thus, the Board contends appellant cannot show how Judge Sprague improperly precluded information harmful to Powell or PA Child Care. An appellate court presumes judges are fair and competent, and reviews the denial of a recusal motion for an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Whitmore, 590 Pa. 376, 912 A.2d 827, 834 (2006) (quoting Commonwealth v. Druce, 577 Pa. 581, 848 A.2d 104, 108 (2004)). Nonetheless, an `appearance of impropriety is sufficient justification for the grant of new proceedings before another judge.... A jurist's impartiality is called into question whenever there are factors or circumstances that may reasonably question the jurist's impartiality in the matter.' Joseph, at 634 (quoting In Interest of McFall, 533 Pa. 24, 617 A.2d 707, 713 (1992)). `There is no need to find actual prejudice, but rather, the appearance of prejudice is sufficient to warrant the grant of new proceedings.' Id. (quoting In Interest of McFall, at 714). Appellant does not show Judge Sprague abused his discretion in denying her recusal motions. [7] Appellant does not establish which objections Judge Sprague improperly ruled on, or what evidence regarding Conahan and Ciavarella's corruption she would have introduced had it not been for Judge Sprague. Thus, appellant's appeal of Judge Sprague's denial of her recusal motions fails for lack of development. See Commonwealth v. Walter, 600 Pa. 392, 966 A.2d 560, 566 (2009) (failure to sufficiently discuss issues will cause them to be waived). Nonetheless, certain factual circumstances can create an appearance of impropriety requiring a new proceeding before a new judge. In McFall, the sentencing judge agreed to serve as an agent for federal prosecutors after the prosecutors caught her accepting a bribe. This constituted an appearance of impropriety, as the judge was sentencing criminal defendants while seeking to curry favor with prosecutors. McFall, at 711-12. In Joseph, Joseph sued a newspaper for defamation after it implied he was associated with a reputed mobster. Conahan was associated with, and accepted unmarked envelopes from this mobster; the mobster said the outcome of the case would be favorable to Joseph. Conahan assigned the case to Ciavarella, who failed to reveal to the parties that he and Conahan were receiving payoffs from Powell. We concluded these circumstances created an appearance of impropriety. Joseph, at 635-36. In Malinowski, we ordered new proceedings in one of Ciavarella's cases where Conahan was a board member of one of the parties, and that party loaned money to an entity owned by Conahan's and Ciavarella's wives. Malinowski, at . Such circumstances are not present here. Powell was not a participant or witness, nor was he otherwise related to, appellant's case. While Judge Sprague did have an attorney-client relationship with Powell, the parties knew about this relationship. Appellant does not establish Judge Sprague received illicit payments from anyone. Appellant provides no evidence Judge Sprague obtained evidence, or formed an opinion regarding her or her case, based on his relationship with PA Child Care or Powell, and appellant fails to show what evidence of Conahan's corrupt relationship with Powell she would have introduced. Additionally, Judge Sprague was just one of three judges presiding over appellant's trial and one of seven court members deciding her case, and appellant does not attempt to explain how Judge Sprague's private legal practice affected other court members. Accordingly, appellant fails to show Judge Sprague's relationship with Powell created an appearance of impropriety.