Opinion ID: 2411770
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: trial day publicity

Text: On the day of trial, the local newspaper included a lead article with a wide range of statements by the Commonwealth Attorney regarding the nature of this case and the need for prosecution of drunk drivers and severe punishments, replete with references to the widely known Larry Mahoney case. Many on the jury panel regularly read the newspaper. At least twelve on the panel read the article in question and so stated when interviewed. Only two of these jurors were excused. One of the remaining jurors was not excused even though she admitted to being influenced by the article. Clearly, the trial court should have granted a continuance in this case to permit sufficient time to pass to dispel the prejudice caused by the article. Alternatively, the trial court could have changed venue to a place where the prejudice from the article would not have been a factor. The prosecutor committed a clear violation of the Kentucky Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.6, Trial Publicity (SCR 3.130), and in particular of RPC 3.6(a) and of (b)(4), (5) and (6). Among other things, these rules prohibit dissemination of information that would be inadmissible evidence at trial. The limit of what is permitted in a criminal case is described in RPC 3.6(c)(7), and was far exceeded in this case. We have no hesitancy in condemning such conduct and declaring it grounds for reversal, thereby denying the prosecutor an advantage improperly obtained. The prosecutor compounded this error by arguing to the jury on several occasions that appellant's conduct was wanton based on widespread publicity that drinking and driving is improper and unsafe. Appellant also asked for a continuance after opening statement when Wilson then stated that she would refuse to testify. Wilson's testimony was the heart of the defense and without it the appellant was unprepared to proceed. Appellant's request for a postponement on this ground was well taken because of the extraordinary circumstances which we have already discussed wherein this change was induced by the intimidating remarks of police and prosecutor after appellant's counsel had already told the jury what Wilson could be expected to say. It was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny him time to prepare a defense. Cf. Stump v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 747 S.W.2d 607 (1987). In this case, failure to grant a continuance was prejudicial error.