Opinion ID: 1196062
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the agencies' continued implementation of the treaty

Text: In its second claim for relief, Salmon Spawning asserted that the agencies' and officials' continued participation in the implementation of the Treaty jeopardized listed salmon in violation of ESA § 7(a)(2), and that such participation was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA. Section 7(a)(2) confers upon agencies that are considering discretionary actions an affirmative do-no-harm obligation when their actions could cause harm to an endangered species. Defenders of Wildlife, 420 F.3d at 965. This duty is separate from an agency's responsibility to comply with the procedures required by § 7. See id. at 957 (noting that a plaintiff may allege both procedural and substantive violations of the ESA). In other words, even if an action agency has satisfied the ESA's consultation requirements, a court may conclude that the agency has not complied with its substantive duty to avoid jeopardy. Id. So, in contrast to its first claim, which focused on alleged procedural flaws that occurred during the pre-Treaty consultation process, Salmon Spawning's second claim challenges the agencies' decision to continue allowing excessive Canadian harvesting now that the United States is a party to the Treaty. Even assuming that Salmon Spawning meets the injury-in-fact requirementby asserting that its scientific, educational, aesthetic, recreational, economic, and business interests in the listed species will continue to be harmed by the failure to correct overharvesting by the Canadiansa more difficult question is whether the groups have established causation and redressibility with respect to this claim. To show causation, the plaintiff must demonstrate a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained ofthe injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted)). In the complaint, Salmon Spawning alleged that the groups' injury is caused by the United States' continued implementation of the Treaty, without exercising the authority to withdraw from the Treaty or requesting additional conservation measures to benefit listed salmon. On these allegations alone, the district court properly concluded that causation was lacking. The excessive harvesting permitted under the Treaty is not fairly traceable to the United States' failure to withdraw from the Treaty. If the United States withdrew, the harvesting of listed species would arguably increase, because the Treaty set abundance-based limits on the Canadians' take. The over-harvesting is also not fairly traceable to the agencies' failure to ask the Canadians to take additional conservation measures. Although the Canadians, if asked, might agree to require a reduction in their fisheries' take, they could also refuse to accommodate the United States' request. If we consider only these grounds as the bases for establishing causation, the causal connection put forward by the conservation groups relies on an attenuated chain of conjecture insufficient to support standing. See Ecological Rights Found. v. Pacific Lumber Co., 230 F.3d 1141, 1152 (9th Cir.2000). But, on appeal, the groups have focused on a different ground to illustrate their injury: the ability of the federal agencies to limit the take of United States fisheries. [5] They argue that because the agencies can limit the take of United States fisheries and thus offset the effects of Canadian harvesting, the failure to take such action while permitting Canadian overharvesting under the Treaty violates the ESA. Though we are dubious about this proposition for purposes of causation and we are not inclined to read the complaint so broadly as to encompass an entirely new theory of causation, even if we were to credit this argument, redressibility poses an upstream battle. Salmon Spawning argues that a court order declaring that the agencies and officials violated the ESA and APA would require the defendants to exercise their authority to reduce the take of United States fisheries. We are not persuaded. According to Salmon Spawning, if we declared that the agencies violated their ESA obligation to avoid jeopardy, that would leave it up to Defendants to determine whether ... negotiations with Canadaor changes in U.S. fisheriesare needed to meet their obligations under the ESA. This argument highlights the key difference between asserting substantive and procedural violations of the ESA: a plaintiff alleging procedural violations of the ESA must show only that the procedural right could protect their interest, whereas a plaintiff alleging a substantive violation must demonstrate that its injury would likely be redressed by a favorable court decision. For much the same reason as the first claim fails, this claim hinges on agency action vis-a-vis the Treaty. The court cannot order renegotiation of the Treaty, and discretionary efforts by the agencies are too uncertain to establish redressibility. That a favorable judicial decision would leave matters to the discretion of the State Department and NMFS makes equally likely the possibility that the agencies would decide to take no agency action with respect to Canada's fisheries  so as not to be constricted by § 7's no jeopardy requirementas the possibility that they would renegotiate a Treaty that would more aggressively limit the Canadians' take. Because Salmon Spawning has failed to show redressibility, we affirm the district court's dismissal of the second claim for relief.