Opinion ID: 757051
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Jurors' Failure to Find Abusive Childhood as a Mitigating Factor

Text: 145 Hall next complains of the fact that only one of the twelve jurors found the circumstances surrounding his upbringing to be a mitigating factor. He contends that the conclusion of the remaining eleven jurors that the circumstances surrounding his upbringing did not constitute a factor militating against a death sentence was clearly erroneous. In support of this contention, he notes that his mother, Betty Hall, and his older sister, Cassandra Hall, offered uncontroverted testimony that Hall's father, A.J. Hall, beat Hall's mother throughout their marriage, which ended in divorce when Hall was fifteen. 146 As an initial matter, we question whether the jurors' failure to find a particular mitigating factor constitutes a proper subject of review for this court. The district court in this case submitted to the jury a special verdict form whereby they recorded the number of jurors who found each of the listed mitigating factors. However, this procedure is not required by the FDPA. Section 3593(d) provides that the jury shall return special findings identifying any aggravating factor or factors set forth in section 3592 found to exist and any other aggravating factor for which notice has been provided under subsection (a) found to exist. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(d). However, the statute does not require the jury to return special findings regarding which mitigating factors the jury found to exist or the number of jurors who found that a particular mitigating factor existed. See id. 147 Assuming, arguendo, that we possess the authority to review the jurors' special findings regarding mitigating factors, we must accept the jurors' factual determinations unless no reasonable juror could have arrived at the conclusion reached by the juror in question. Cf. United States v. Robichaux, 995 F.2d 565, 569 (5th Cir.1993) (noting that, in evaluating a claim that a jury's guilty verdict in a criminal trial is supported by insufficient evidence, the court inquires whether a reasonable juror could find the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (internal quotation marks omitted)). [D]etermining the weight and credibility of the evidence is within the sole province of the jury. United States v. Garza, 990 F.2d 171, 173 (5th Cir.1993) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Kelley, 140 F.3d 596, 607 (5th Cir.1998). 148 In support of his claim that he experienced an upbringing that militated against the imposition of the death penalty, Hall offered only the testimony of two of his family members, which the jury was free to believe or disbelieve. Additionally, this testimony indicated that Hall was not himself the object of his father's abuse and that, throughout his childhood, Hall attended school and church and was properly housed, fed, and clothed. We cannot conclude that no reasonable juror could conclude that Hall failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he experienced a childhood that rendered him in some degree less deserving of the death penalty than he might otherwise be.