Opinion ID: 200393
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicability of the Discretionary Function Exception to the Army Corps' Survey

Text: 22 It is well established that the discretionary function exception will not apply when a federal statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to follow. See Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536, 108 S.Ct. 1954. However, if there is no mandatory regulation that requires a particular course of action, then the discretionary function exception can apply. Id. Here, plaintiffs argue that the Army Corps failed to follow mandatory internal procedures requiring its survey of the Boston Harbor to be conducted in accordance with NOAA guidelines. Because they contend that compliance with the NOAA guidelines was mandatory, plaintiffs claim that the discretionary function exception cannot protect the United States from suit. We disagree. 23 No mandatory internal procedures or directives required the Army Corps to adhere to the NOAA guidelines in conducting its survey of the Boston Harbor, thus the element of judgment prong of the Berkovitz test is met. The Army Corps generally follows its own manual when it performs oceanic surveys, and there is no dispute that the Army Corps' Hydrographic Surveying: Engineer Manual (1994) ( Army Corps Manual ) applies to hydrographic surveys planned and performed by the Army Corps and sets forth the applicable procedures. Army Corps Manual at 1-4 (stating that manual establishes standard procedures, minimum accuracy requirements, instrumentation and equipment requirements, and quality control criteria for hydrographic surveys). The Army Corps Manual states: 24 This manual is intended to cover only those engineering and construction survey activities which support typical river, harbor, harbor approach channel, or inland waterway projects.... [it] does not cover classical hydrographic surveying functions which are more traditionally associated with the preparation of nautical charts. These procedures are detailed in the [NOAA Hydrographic Manual ]. 25 Army Corps Manual at 1-4(b). Here, the parties agreed and the district court found that the Army Corps conducted the Boston Harbor survey as a condition survey, which is a periodic survey carried out to determine the present condition of navigation channels [and] underwater features, but is not a survey in conjunction with the preparation of a nautical chart. Army Corps Manual at 2-10. There is no mandatory language in the Army Corps Manual indicating that the Army Corps must follow the NOAA guidelines when carrying out a condition survey, even if it is aware that such a survey may be used by other agencies to prepare nautical charts — what matters is the purpose of the survey at the time it is conducted by the Army Corps. 5 Since the purpose of the survey at the time it was conducted was to determine the condition of the harbor rather than to chart its depth, the Army Corps was under no obligation to comply with NOAA guidelines. 26 Having found that the choice to conduct the condition survey according to the Army Corps guidelines constituted a discretionary choice, we now turn to the second part of the Berkovitz test and consider whether that decision is of the type the discretionary function exception was designed to protect. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 537, 108 S.Ct. 1954. 27 Where a regulation allows the employee discretion, the very existence of the regulation creates a strong presumption that a discretionary act authorized by the regulation involves consideration of the same policies which led to the promulgation of the regulations. 6 United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 324, 111 S.Ct. 1267, 113 L.Ed.2d 335 (1991). Plaintiff bears the burden of rebutting this presumption and demonstrating that the conduct at issue is not policy-based. See Wood v. United States, 290 F.3d 29, 37 (1st Cir.2002). Here, the plaintiffs fail to meet this burden. Indeed the Corps' decision to follow its own less stringent guidelines is most likely a choice aimed to maximize efficient use of resources, and is thus policy-based. See, e.g., Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 820, 104 S.Ct. 2755 (recognizing the efficient allocation of agency resources as a policy choice). 28 2. Applicability of the Discretionary Function Exception to NOAA's use of the Army Corps Survey in Creating the Chart 29 This leaves only the argument that once NOAA made the decision to create a chart, it had a duty to produce it accurately. 7 In Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 76 S.Ct. 122, 100 L.Ed. 48 (1955), the Supreme Court held the United States liable for negligently maintaining a lighthouse built by the Coast Guard. Id. at 69, 76 S.Ct. 122. Mariners relied on the lighthouse for navigation and plaintiff's ship was damaged when it ran aground because the light went out. Id. at 62, 76 S.Ct. 122. The Indian Towing Court indicated that once the Coast Guard exercised its discretion to operate the lighthouse, it was under an obligation to do so with reasonable care. Id. at 68, 76 S.Ct. 122. We find that Indian Towing can be distinguished from the instant case because there the government conceded that the discretionary function exception did not apply. Id. at 64, 76 S.Ct. 122. In this case, however, the government vigorously argues, and we agree, that the decision by NOAA to use the Corps' data to create the chart was discretionary and was thus the type of decision the discretionary function exception was meant to protect. 8 30 The element of judgment prong of the Berkovitz test is satisfied because NOAA's decision to use the Army Corps survey in fact contains an element of judgment. As stated above, the discretionary function applies unless a federal statute, regulation or policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to follow. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 537, 108 S.Ct. 1954; accord Wood, 290 F.3d at 36. Nowhere in NOAA's Hydrographic Manual are employees directed to use as the basis for charts only surveys conducted by NOAA or by other entities following NOAA's guidelines. In fact, the manual only stipulates that if NOAA itself conducts a survey, it must conform with the manual's specific directives. Here, NOAA did not conduct the 1990 survey of the Boston Harbor which formed the basis for the chart. Since there is no specific regulation, and thus no mandatory language either (1) directing the cartographer as to the surveys that ought to be used when making a chart, or (2) prohibiting use of non-NOAA conforming surveys in creation of a chart, it was within the cartographer's discretion to use the survey made by the Army Corps. See Baird v. United States, 653 F.2d 437, 441 (10th Cir.1981). 31 Plaintiffs cite In re Glacier Bay, 71 F.3d 1447 (9th Cir.1995) in support of their argument that the discretionary function does not apply here because NOAA did not follow mandatory procedures regarding hydrographic surveys. Glacier Bay involved the grounding of a vessel on a rock that was omitted from the nautical chart. Id. at 1449-50. In that case, the Ninth Circuit allowed a negligence suit against the government to proceed because NOAA did not comply with its internal guidelines in conducting the survey for the chart. See id. at 1453 (holding that the general grant of discretion was superseded by mandatory requirements and thus the discretionary exception function [sic] does not apply). The Glacier Bay case dealt with surveys conducted by NOAA hydrographers for the purpose of preparing nautical charts. Id. at 1450. Glacier Bay is inapposite, however, because this case deals with NOAA's decision to use an Army Corps condition survey for the preparation of a chart rather than with NOAA's failure to follow its own procedures in conducting an independent hydrographic survey. 32 The second requirement of the Berkovitz test, that the judgment is the type the discretionary function was designed to protect, is also satisfied with respect to NOAA's decision. The allocation of resources for the production and dissemination of ocean charts by a budget-constrained entity like NOAA is a policy decision that falls within the ambit of the discretionary function exception. Allocation of resources and budget management involve prioritizing and are quintessentially policy-based choices. See Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 820, 104 S.Ct. 2755; Weissich v. United States, 4 F.3d 810, 813 (9th Cir.1993) (finding budget and personnel allocation decisions fall within discretionary function exception); Chute v. United States, 610 F.2d 7, 12 (1st Cir.1979) (indicating the allocation of resources among competing priorities is a policy function). If this Court were to agree with plaintiffs, we would be second-guessing NOAA's policy decision and would be going against the clear intent of the implied discretionary function exception, which is to prevent judicial second-guessing of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536-37, 108 S.Ct. 1954 (quoting Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 814, 104 S.Ct. 2755). 33 Because NOAA's decision to rely on the Army Corps' survey for the creation of its chart was a policy-based discretionary decision, the discretionary function exception applies. Given the applicability of the discretionary function exception to both the Army Corps and NOAA decisions, we find that the United States has not waived sovereign immunity and cannot be subjected to suit in this matter. See Wood, 290 F.3d at 33-34. 34 Even if the decision to use the Corps' survey is not protected by the discretionary function exception, we find that no liability attaches here. Indian Towing does not stand for the proposition that once the United States undertakes a function, such as production of a nautical chart, the most effective and best means must always be selected. Chute, 610 F.2d at 13. Instead, the general principle gleaned from Indian Towing is that the government must not mislead, and must not induce reliance upon a belief that it is providing something which, in fact, it is not providing. United States v. Sandra & Dennis Fishing Corp., 372 F.2d 189, 195 (1st Cir.1967). 35 Here, the government cannot be held liable under the principles established by Indian Towing, because (1) it is unreasonable for mariners to rely solely on the chart; and (2) in the alternative, the government did not create the danger in the Boston Harbor. In order for Indian Towing to apply, the chart would need to induce reasonable reliance on the part of mariners. See Whitney Steamship Co. v. United States, 747 F.2d 69, 78 (2d Cir.1984) (Tenney, J., dissenting) (arguing that Indian Towing applies only where reliance is reasonable). Given the constant possibility that silting or other events may alter the depth of the harbor at any given point, reliance on a year-old chart was unreasonable. Further, the state law requirement that foreign vessels employ a special harbor pilot in the Boston Harbor suggests that at least the Massachusetts legislature believed that reliance on the accuracy of a chart is unreasonable. Were such reliance reasonable, then nautical charts alone would be sufficient for navigation, and presumably a mariner inexperienced with the Boston Harbor would be able to maneuver a vessel safely through its waters by simply using a chart. 36 Even if there were no statutory requirement for an experienced harbor pilot, the prudent mariner does not rely on charts alone when navigating a body of water. See, e.g., Sheridan Transp. Co. v. United States, 897 F.2d 795, 798 (5th Cir.1990) (aids to navigation do not exist in a vacuum and there are various documents which a mariner must use to determine whether he is justified in relying on an aid); Tidewater Marine, Inc. v. Sanco Int'l, Inc., 113 F.Supp.2d 987, 997 (E.D.La. 2000) (Buoys, radar, Loran, charts, Notices to Mariners, and lookouts are all aids to navigation. None of these alone can be considered absolute indicators of sea conditions.). Here, the chart itself contained prominent warnings that mariners should look to other sources for up-to-date information about the harbor. Because a mariner cannot reasonably rely solely on a chart, nautical charts do not induce reliance such that the government has a duty to ensure their accuracy, especially where the government specifically directs mariners to other publications through warnings or cautions on the chart itself. 9 37 Where the government does not create a danger but rather only fails to render adequate performance, liability does not attach. Brown v. United States, 790 F.2d 199 (1st Cir.1986) (distinguishing Indian Towing, where the government created a danger by representing that an operating lighthouse was present from cases where the government does not itself create the danger, as in the case where the government issues weather advisories but does not control the weather). Here, the government did not create the dangers of the Boston Harbor, but merely undertook to produce a chart depicting the depths of the harbor.