Opinion ID: 867747
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Relevant LHWCA Provisions

Text: The LHWCA provides that “compensation shall be payable under this chapter in respect of disability . . . of an employee, but only if the disability . . . results from an injury occurring” at a covered situs. 33 U.S.C. § 903(a). “Disability” is defined, in relevant part, as an “incapacity because of injury.” 33 U.S.C. § 902(10). And “injury” is defined as an “accidental injury or death arising out of and in the course of employment, and such occupational disease or infection as arises naturally out of such employment or as naturally or unavoidably results from such accidental injury . . . .” 33 U.S.C. § 902(2). The Supreme Court has determined that the phrases “arising out of” and “in the course of” are separate requirements for establishing an injury: “the former refers to injury causation; the latter refers to the time, place, and circumstances of the injury.” See U.S. Indus./Fed. Sheet Metal, Inc. v. Dir., OWCP, 455 U.S. 608, 615, (1982) (hereinafter U.S. Industries). “Not only must the injury have been caused by the employment, it also must have arisen during the employment.” Id. To make a claim for compensation under the LHWCA, an injured employee “must timely file a claim with the Deputy Commissioner” that gives notice of the injury and contains “a statement of the time, place, nature, and cause of the injury.” Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 912(b)). The LHWCA also specifies the order of proof in compensation cases. Section 20(a) of the Act provides: “[in] any proceeding for the enforcement of a claim for compensation under this chapter it shall be presumed, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary . . . [t]hat the claim comes within the 6 No. 12-20228 provisions of this chapter.” 33 U.S.C. § 920(a). To invoke the presumption, a claimant must offer a prima facie case that he (1) suffered a “harm,” and (2) a workplace condition “could have caused, aggravated, or accelerated” the harm. Conoco, Inc., v. Dir., OWCP, 194 F.3d 684, 687 (5th Cir. 1999). If the claimant establishes a prima facie case, “the burden shifts to the employer to rebut it through facts—not mere speculation—that the harm was not work-related.” Id. at 687-88. If the employer rebuts the presumption, it drops out of the case, and the ALJ must weigh the totality of the evidence to determine whether the injury arose out of the claimant’s employment. Del Vecchio v. Bowers, 296 U.S. 280, 286-87 (1935); see also U.S. Indus., 455 U.S. at 612 n.6 (noting that it seems fair to assume that the Section 20(a) presumption is of the same nature as the presumption created under Section 20(d) of the LHWCA, as construed in Del Vecchio); Amerada Hess, 543 F.3d at 761. Throughout this burden-shifting process, the claimant retains the burden of persuasion.