Opinion ID: 712182
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The sufficient indicia of reliability standard

Text: 16 The use of hearsay in making findings for purposes of Guidelines sentencing violates neither the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 nor the Due Process Clause. United States v. Sciarrino, 884 F.2d 95, 98 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 997, 110 S.Ct. 553, 107 L.Ed.2d 549 (1989); United States v. Inigo, 925 F.2d 641, 660 (3d Cir.1991). The sentencing court can give a high level of credence to hearsay statements, going so far as to credit hearsay evidence over sworn testimony, especially where there is other evidence to corroborate the inconsistent hearsay statement. Miele, 989 F.2d at 664 (3d Cir.1993). However, in order to avoid misinformation of constitutional magnitude, Sciarrino, 884 F.2d at 97, we require that information used as a basis for sentencing under the Guidelines ... have 'sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.'  Miele, 989 F.2d at 663; see also United States v. Torres, 926 F.2d 321, 324 (3d Cir.1991) (noting necessity that information upon which Guidelines sentences are based be reliable). The Sentencing Guidelines themselves provide: 17 In resolving any reasonable dispute concerning a factor important to the sentencing determination, the court may consider relevant information without regard to its admissibility under the rules of evidence applicable at trial, provided that the information has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy. 18 U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a) (1995). The commentary to § 6A1.3 further provides: 19 In determining the relevant facts, sentencing judges are not restricted to information that would be admissible at trial. 18 U.S.C. § 3661. Any information may be considered, so long as it has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy. Reliable hearsay evidence may be considered. Out-of-court declarations by an unidentified informant may be considered where there is good cause for the nondisclosure of his identity and there is sufficient corroboration by other means. 20 U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a), Commentary. We have held that this standard [sufficient indicia of reliability] should be applied rigorously. Miele, 989 F.2d at 664. 21 In Miele, we vacated the sentence imposed on the defendant because the statements used to support the factual findings for sentencing were found to fall short of the sufficient indicia of reliability standard. The statement at issue, involving the quantities of drugs transacted by the defendant, was from early testimony by Frank Habera, an informant and drug addict at the time of the events in question. We outlined three flaws in the district court's reliance on Mr. Habera's statement. First, we found that [t]he vast disparity between Habera's estimate in the PSI and the significantly lower estimates he provided at the co-defendants' trial casts doubt on the reliability of the PSI's estimate, particularly in view of Habera's status as an addict informant. Id. at 664. Second, the district court did not address the inconsistency between Habera's various estimates, and did not explain why it apparently followed Habera's hearsay estimate in the PSI rather than the lower estimates Habera provided under oath.... Id. Third, no other witnesses testified as to specific drug quantities. Id. at 665. While there was ample evidence of Miele's extensive and continued involvement with cocaine, we found that a determination that Miele's drug activity was substantial does not translate readily into a specific drug quantity finding, which is the ultimate issue for sentencing purposes. Id. at 668. In light of the inconsistencies in Mr. Habera's statements, the district court's failure to explain its adoption of Mr. Habera's statement cited in the PSI report over that Mr. Habera made under oath, and the lack of other corroborating evidence to support Habera's hearsay estimate, id. at 665, we vacated the sentence and remanded for further factfinding. Id. at 668. 22 As the Third Circuit has emphasized in the past, we should exercise particular scrutiny of factual findings relating to amounts of drugs involved in illegal operations, since the quantity of drugs attributed to the defendant usually will be the single most important determinant of his or her sentence. United States v. Collado, 975 F.2d 985, 995 (3d Cir.1992). This mandate is only reinforced when the court seeks to attribute the quantity of drugs to an accomplice. 23 Accomplice attribution often results in a dramatic increase in the amount of drugs for which the defendant is held accountable, which translates directly into a dramatic increase in the sentence. As we have explained, whether an individual defendant may be held accountable for amounts of drugs involved in reasonably foreseeable transactions conducted by co-conspirators depends upon the degree of the defendant's involvement in the conspiracy. In assessing the defendant's involvement, courts must consider whether the amounts distributed by the defendant's co-conspirators were distributed in furtherance of the ... jointly-undertaken ... activity, were within the scope of the defendant's agreement, and were reasonably foreseeable in connection with the criminal activity the defendant agreed to undertake. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, application note 1. We wish to emphasize that in deciding whether accomplice attribution is appropriate, it is not enough to merely determine that the defendant's criminal activity was substantial. Rather, a searching and individualized inquiry into the circumstances surrounding each defendant's involvement in the conspiracy is critical to ensure that the defendant's sentence accurately reflects his or her role. 24 Id. This standard applies in particular when the court seeks to determine whether a particular defendant may be held accountable for amounts of drugs involved in transactions conducted by a co-conspirator. Id. at 992.