Opinion ID: 71897
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: application of the supreme court's ratzlaf

Text: 46 DECISION TO THIS CASE IS NOT BARRED BY THE TEAGUE DOCTRINE 47 The government contends that the retroactivity rules of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989), prohibit Brown from relying on the Supreme Court's Ratzlaf decision in mounting a collateral attack on his conviction. 6 We disagree. 48 As the Supreme Court has explained, Teague stands for the proposition that new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be announced or applied on collateral review. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372, 113 S.Ct. 838, 844, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993). However, the Supreme Court did not announce any new constitutional rules in its Ratzlaf decision, which does not even mention any provision of the Constitution. Instead, that decision interprets substantive provisions of a criminal statute, the one Brown was charged with violating. 49 As we have held, the Supreme Court does not express a new rule of constitutional law ... [when] it merely interpret[s] a substantive criminal statute using rules of statutory construction. In re Blackshire, 98 F.3d 1293, 1294 (11th Cir.1996) (citation omitted). That is precisely what happened in Ratzlaf. See 510 U.S. at 140-48, 114 S.Ct. at 659-63. By applying rules of statutory construction, and by examining relevant legislative history, the Supreme Court reached its authoritative interpretation of the willfulness requirement contained in 31 U.S.C. § 5322, the criminal enforcement provision then applicable to 31 U.S.C. § 5324. We agree with the Tenth Circuit that Ratzlaf is a substantive non-constitutional decision concerning the reach of a federal statute. United States v. Dashney, 52 F.3d 298, 299 (10th Cir.1995). Accordingly, Teague does not bar Brown's claim for § 2255 relief. 7