Opinion ID: 1111231
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: On Issue Of Materiality

Text: Gullett next assigns as error admission of the opinion testimony of both District Attorney Williams and Circuit Judge Baker on the issue of materiality. The testimony was offered by the prosecution in the context of its obligations to establish that Gullett's allegedly false swearing was material to the determination of some issue of consequence in the Harden murder trial. See Roberts v. State, 224 Miss. 754, 759, 80 So.2d 841, 843 (1955). As to materiality, the State questioned District Attorney Williams as follows: Q. Having reviewed that testimony [Gullett's at trial of Harden], do you recall what part, if any, that testimony played in the defense of Owen Lee Harden? A. Yes, sir. Q. What part was it? A. In my judgment, it's what allowed a guilty man to walk. Thereafter, the prosecution called Circuit Judge Andrew C. Baker, who presided over the Harden trial, and questioned him, over Defendant's objection, about materiality: Q. Do you have an opinion as to whether John Tailer Gullett, III's testimony in the trial of State of Mississippi v. Owen Lee Harden played any part at all in the acquittal of Owen Lee Harden? A. Yes, sir, I think it was material to the outcome of the case. The question of materiality in a perjury case is one for the court to determine, not the jury. See Brewer v. State, 233 So.2d 779, 782 (Miss. 1970); Saucier v. State, 95 Miss. 226, 234, 48 So. 840, 841 (1909); Cothran v. State, 39 Miss. 541, 547 (1860). Indeed, this view is reflected as being that of our state and many others in Annot., Materiality of Testimony Forming Basis Of Perjury Charge As Question For Court Or Jury In State Trial, 37 A.L.R.4th 948, 953-54 (1985). Ordinarily, materiality may be shown by offering that portion of the prior proceedings necessary to identify matters there at issue. The trial judge may then consider the alleged perjured testimony in light of the issues and resolve the materiality question. The trial judge in a perjury trial should be sensitive to the possibilities that presence of and identification of another judge and the district attorney on the side of the prosecution may substantially prejudice the defendant in the eyes of the jury. Still, we should not hold that such evidence is never admissible. Where the prosecution offers witnesses to prove materiality, ordinarily we do not reverse. See Brewer, 233 So.2d at 782; Saucier, 95 Miss. at 234, 48 So. at 841; Cothran, 39 Miss. at 547. This assignment of error is rejected. There is a related matter. District Attorney Williams in a fit of pique proclaimed from the witness stand: The net result of the jury verdict [at Harden's capital murder trial] let a cold-blooded hired killer walk out of this courthouse a free man. The defense attorney objected to this remark as inflammatory and prejudicial. The Circuit Court promptly sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard it. The remark was obviously made in a fit of pique. We are confident the district attorney knows better and that the comment will not be repeated upon remand.