Opinion ID: 1684716
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Parkerson v. Smith

Text: ¶ 24. In denying the motion to compel arbitration, the trial court relied upon Justice Diaz's concurring opinion in Parkerson v. Smith, 817 So.2d 529 (Miss.2002). In Parkerson, this Court held that the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act superceded the FAA and prohibited the enforcement of otherwise binding arbitration agreements contained in warranty contracts which were subject to the MMWA. However, the plurality opinion did not address the issues of whether the arbitration clause was unconscionable or whether the clause impermissibly waived Parkerson's right to a jury trial. ¶ 25. In a concurring opinion, Justice Diaz discussed why he believed the arbitration agreement was unconscionable. Id. at 535-37. The arbitration provision required Parkerson to pay the attorney's fees and costs if she lost in arbitration. Id. at 536. Here, there is no such stipulation found in the arbitration clause. NCA and Advance America agreed to advance the cost of arbitration to the Customers, but the Customers were not required to reimburse NCA or Advance America if they did not prevail. ¶ 26. Justice Diaz next cited a case dealing with an indemnity clause, not an arbitration clause, to find that the defendants must show that `the provision was reasonably related to the business risks of the parties.' Id. (quoting Entergy Miss. Inc. v. Burdette Gin Co., 726 So.2d 1202, 1207-08 (Miss.1998)) (quoting Bank of Indiana, Nat'l Ass'n v. Holyfield, 476 F.Supp. 104, 109 (S.D.Miss.1979)). In East Ford, Inc. v. Taylor , this Court held: While Burdette concluded that an indemnity clause within a contract of adhesion is presumptively unconscionable, the same is not true for arbitration clauses. Burdette involved an agreement to indemnify, which essentially allows a party to contract away or escape liability. Arbitration agreements merely submit the question of liability to another forumgenerally speaking, they do not waive liability. Furthermore, Congress has expressed no federal interest in enforcing indemnification agreements as it has in guaranteeing the enforcement of valid arbitration agreements. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. As noted, questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration, with any doubt concerning the scope of the agreement resolved in favor of arbitration. Bank One, [N.A. v. Coates, 125 F.Supp.2d 819,] 827 [ (S.D.Miss.2001) ] (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Co., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765). East Ford, 826 So.2d at 716. ¶ 27. Again, Justice Diaz's concurring opinion was not the holding of this Court. [2] Regardless, the facts of the case sub judice are clearly distinguishable from Parkerson. Therefore, this Court finds that the circuit court erred in relying on the concurring opinion in Parkerson when it denied NCA and Advance America's motion to compel arbitration.