Opinion ID: 1111382
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the lower court erred in overruling appellant's motion to suppress photographic lineup, voice identification tests, and the resulting in-court identification.

Text: Under this assignment of error, Mr. Nicholson argues three issues: (1) that the showup (actually a voice overhearing) of the defendant on September 3, 1985, was an impermissible ploy by the state to allow Ms. McKinion to identify the defendant as her assailant; (2) that the voice identification lineup conducted by the Newton Police Department on September 5, 1985, was calculated to be suggestive as to the identity of the defendant; (3) that the photographic lineup shown to Ms. McKinion on September 5 was suggestive because the defendant was the only one of the six pictured with bare arms displaying a tattoo; therefore, the argument continues, the in-court identification of the defendant was impermissibly tainted. As such, the defendant was denied due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. Further, Nicholson argues that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated because the pre-trial identifications were conducted in the absence of counsel for the defendant. A suppression hearing was held as to the pre-trial identifications. The trial judge overruled the motion to suppress, allowing testimony as to the pre-trial identifications and allowing Ms. McKinion to make an in-court identification of the defendant. The three identification procedures will be analyzed in turn.
This Court has stated its scope of review of suppression hearing findings in pre-trial identification cases as follows: The combined effect of the circuit court's pre-trial and trial rulings is that of a finding of fact that, under the totality of the circumstances ... in-court identification testimony had not been impermissibly tainted. We may, of course, disturb such a finding only where there is an absence of substantial credible evidence supporting it. [emphasis added] Ray v. State, 503 So.2d 222, 224 (Miss. 1986). Therefore, this Court must determine if, in this case, there is substantial credible evidence supporting the trial judge's findings.
The  Wade Trilogy and its progeny are the guidelines this Court must follow in determining the competency of identification testimony. York v. State, 413 So.2d 1372, 1374 (Miss. 1983). York is the leading case in Mississippi on this issue and has been followed by this Court on numerous occasions. See e.g., Davis v. State, 510 So.2d 794 (Miss. 1987); White v. State, 507 So.2d 98 (Miss. 1987); Jones v. State, 504 So.2d 1196 (Miss. 1987); Smith v. State, 492 So.2d 260 (Miss. 1986). As pointed out in York, there are two lines of analysis when considering pre-trial identifications: the Fourteenth Amendment due process analysis and the Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel analysis. Mr. Nicholson raises both points in his assignment of error, claiming that the photographic display was suggestive and that it was conducted in the absence of his legal counsel. In United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 93 S.Ct. 2568, 37 L.Ed.2d 619 (1973), the United States Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment does not grant the right to counsel at photographic displays conducted ... for the purpose of allowing a witness to attempt an identification of the offender. Ash at 321, 93 S.Ct. at 2579. Therefore, this aspect of Mr. Nicholson's argument is without merit. His argument under the due process analysis has to do with suggestiveness of the photographic display. He points out that he was the only one of the six men who was pictured with bare arms, prominently displaying his tattoo, a characteristic described to police by Ms. McKinion. Such is undeniably a suggestive photographic display. See Bankston v. State, 391 So.2d 1005, 1008 (Miss. 1980) (holding that showing the victim only one photograph of a man with a mustache was impermissibly suggestive). A series of photographs where one is conspicuously singled out in some manner from others ... is impermissibly suggestive. York at 1383, citing Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 89 S.Ct. 1127, 22 L.Ed.2d 402 (1969) and Simmons v. U.S., 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968). However, an impermissibly suggestive pre-trial identification does not preclude in-court identification by an eyewitness who viewed the suspect at the procedure unless: (1) from the totality of the circumstances surrounding it, (2) the identification was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. York at 1383, citing Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967) and Simmons, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968). York continues that even if testimony is proffered of the out-of-court identification itself, as was done in this case, the same standard applies, except with the omission of the word irreparable, a slightly higher burden of proof for the state. York at 1383, citing Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972). York goes on to set out the Neil factors to consider in determining whether these standards have been fulfilled: 1. Opportunity of the witness to view the accused at the time of the crime; 2. The degree of attention exhibited by the witness; 3. The accuracy of the witness's prior description of the criminal; 4. The level of certainty exhibited by the witness at the confrontation; 5. The length of time between the crime and the confrontation. York at 1383; Neil, 409 U.S. at 199, 93 S.Ct. at 382. See also Ray v. State, 503 So.2d at 223. Applying these factors to the present case,
Ms. McKinion testified that at the time of the attack, the lighting in her bedroom was sufficient to permit her to observe her assailant's face and parts of his body. The man remained in the bedroom about 15 minutes. She also observed him under the kitchen light for five or ten minutes, and in her living room for another 15 or 20 minutes. This testimony shows ample opportunity for Ms. McKinion to observe her assailant.
During her observation of her assailant, Ms. McKinion noticed he had a short, neat haircut, a little mustache, a space between his front teeth, and a tattoo with the letters IOA on his arm, and a scar on his rib cage.
Officer Allen testified that Ms. McKinion provided the above description when she first reported the rape. This turned out to be an accurate description of Mr. Nicholson.
Upon viewing the photographic display, Ms. McKinion immediately identified Mr. Nicholson.
The photographic display was conducted only six days after the crime. There is ample credible evidence to support the trial court's determination that there was no substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification in allowing the in-court identification, nor was there substantial likelihood of misidentification in allowing the testimony of the out-of-court identification itself.
Officer Clarence Allen brought Ms. McKinion to the police station on the night of September 3 at 11:30 p.m. for further questioning. Mr. Nicholson was in a room with the door shut talking with Police Chief Joe Mowdy. As Ms. McKinion walked into the station, she overheard Nicholson's voice and immediately identified the voice as that of her assailant. She became upset and Officer Allen immediately drove her back home. Officer Allen testified that he knew Nicholson was in the station that night, but that knowledge did not prompt him to bring Ms. McKinion into the station, nor did he expect Nicholson to still be there when he returned with Ms. McKinion. He did not tell Ms. McKinion that Nicholson was at the station. Police Chief Mowdy testified that he did not know Ms. McKinion was in the station, that he and Nicholson were behind a closed door, and that there was no ploy to effect a show-up. Thus, there is substantial evidence that this incident was inadvertent. Mr. Nicholson claims that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated. In Thompson v. State, 483 So.2d 690 (Miss. 1986), this Court addressed the issue of right to counsel at an inadvertent show-up. Relying on United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir.1982), this Court held that there is no violation of right to counsel where the encounter was inadvertent and there was no evidence that the prosecutor staged it. Thompson at 692. Therefore, in the absence of any evidence that this incident was staged, Nicholson's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not violated, assuming that this voice overhearing is even equivalent to a show-up, since Ms. McKinion did not actually see Mr. Nicholson. Mr. Nicholson next argues that this incident tainted Ms. McKinion's subsequent in-court identification of Mr. Nicholson. Again applying the Neil factors, Ms. McKinion had ample opportunity at the time of the crime to hear her assailant speak. She testified that he kept threatening to kill her if she told the police. According to the record, she immediately identified his voice when she overheard it, and the overhearing took place only four days after the crime. Therefore, there is substantial evidence that there was not substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification in allowing the in-court identification, nor was there substantial likelihood of misidentification in allowing testimony of this out-of-court identification of Nicholson's voice.
Mr. Nicholson argues that the voice lineup conducted at the police station on September 5 was permeated with taint and held in absence of his legal counsel. The procedure involved seven black men standing in an adjoining room with the door closed and speaking the same line through the door louvers. Mr. Nicholson was speaker # 4, who Ms. McKinion immediately identified as that of her assailant. The test was conducted a second time and immediately she identified his voice. She never saw Mr. Nicholson. The initial question is whether such a voice lineup is equivalent to a corporeal lineup, which requires the protection of the right to counsel if that right has attached, where the witness sees the persons in the lineup and perhaps hears them speak. In U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967), the U.S. Supreme Court held that a corporeal pre-trial lineup not capable of reconstruction at trial is a critical stage of criminal proceedings requiring aid of counsel for the defendant in order to avert prejudice and assure meaningful confrontation at trial. Wade at 236, 87 S.Ct. at 1937. Wade specifically spoke to postindictment lineups where it was clear that criminal proceedings against a defendant had begun. We hold today that when the right to counsel has attached, this kind of voice lineup closely resembles the trial-like confrontation of a corporeal lineup amounting to a critical stage for which counsel should be present under Wade and its progeny and under York. Under the rationale of Wade, counsel's absence from a voice lineup forestalls effective cross-examination on this point to bring out any suggestive or prejudicial circumstances surrounding the voice lineup. Therefore, we analyze the voice lineup like a corporeal lineup. The next question, then, is whether Nicholson's right to counsel had attached. Unlike the lineup in Wade, this voice lineup occurred before indictment, arraignment or preliminary hearing. It may have occurred before Nicholson was arrested. Unfortunately, the record is not clear on this point. In Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the right to counsel does not attach until such time as adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against him. Kirby at 688, 92 S.Ct. at 1881. Kirby indicates that the starting point of the whole system of adversary criminal justice is that point at which [g]overnment has committed itself to prosecute... . Kirby at 689, 92 S.Ct. at 1882. This point may be at formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment, according to Kirby, implying that the states must determine, within the context of their criminal justice systems, how early that point will be. Taking the earliest possible point in Mississippi as being arrest pursuant to warrant, if the voice lineup was conducted before Nicholson was arrested pursuant to warrant, his right to counsel claim is without merit. If, however, he was arrested pursuant to warrant at the time of the voice lineup, his right to counsel had attached. If the voice lineup was conducted in violation of Nicholson's right to counsel, testimony about the voice lineup identification would be inadmissible. Under Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 98 S.Ct. 458, 54 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977), the prosecution cannot buttress its case-in-chief by introducing evidence of a pretrial identification made in violation of the accused's Sixth Amendment rights, even if it can prove that the pre-trial identification had a different source. Moore at 231, 98 S.Ct. at 466, citing Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 273, 87 S.Ct. 1951, 1957, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178 (1966). Therefore, it would have been error for the trial court to allow the testimony into evidence. Under Moore and Gilbert this Court would next have to determine if beyond a reasonable doubt the admission of the testimony in this case would have constituted harmless constitutional error under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 828) Moore, 434 U.S. at 232, 98 S.Ct. at 466, Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 274, 87 S.Ct. at 1957. See also Cannaday v. State, 455 So.2d 713 at 724 (Miss. 1984). The record in this case is unclear as to whether or not Nicholson was even under arrest at the time of the voice lineup. However, even if the voice lineup was conducted in violation of Nicholson's right to counsel, use of the voice lineup identification testimony at trial was harmless constitutional error. In so holding, we note that the voice lineup was not the first confrontation of the victim and defendant. Ms. McKinion had previously identified Nicholson as her assailant in a photo identification and an inadvertent voice showup, both of which she was able to make because of the substantial amount of time she spent in intimate contact with her assailant. Had this voice lineup been the first confrontation, and in violation of Nicholson's right to counsel, under the rationale of Moore and Gilbert, testimony of any subsequent pretrial identifications would also have been inadmissible because of the possibility of exploitation of the initial illegality. See Moore, 434 U.S. at 231, 98 S.Ct. at 466, Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 273, 87 S.Ct. at 1957. In a related matter, we note that even if the voice lineup had been conducted in violation of Nicholson's right to counsel, the in-court identification would still be permitted upon a showing by clear and convincing evidence that the in-court identifications are based on observations of the suspect other than a lineup identification. York at 1383, citing U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967). We hold that there was clear and convincing evidence that Ms. McKinion made her in-court identification of Nicholson based on her intimate observations of him for some three hours on the night of the crime, observations which she accurately gave to Officer Allen when he first spoke with her. As to Nicholson's claim that the voice lineup was permeated with taint, there is no evidence on the record that Nicholson's voice was in any way singled out, pointed out, or suggested to Ms. McKinion. Nicholson's contention is without merit. In summary, under our scope of review, we hold that there is substantial evidence to support the trial judge's suppression hearing findings that, under the totality of the circumstances, the identification testimony was not impermissibly tainted.