Opinion ID: 2353947
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Revocation Must Occur Before the Expiration of Probation

Text: Appellee's argument that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to hold the revocation hearing is based on KRS 533.020(1). That statute provides that if the defendant commits an additional offense or violates a condition, [the court may] revoke the sentence at any time prior to the expiration or termination of the period of probation. If probation is not revoked before it expires, the defendant shall be deemed finally discharged. KRS 533.020(4). This Court finds Appellee's argument persuasive. The statute states in clear and unambiguous terms that revocation must occur prior to the expiration ... of probation. There is no plausible interpretation other than that probation must be revoked, if at all, before the probationary period expires. The circuit court has no jurisdiction to revoke Appellee's probation, or to hold a revocation hearing, after that time. Curtsinger v. Commonwealth, 549 S.W.2d 515, 516 (Ky.1977). In this case, Appellee's probation expired on June 17, 2009. After that date, Appellee was deemed finally discharged under KRS 533.020(4), and the court no longer had jurisdiction to revoke his probation. The revocation hearing was initially scheduled after this date, on July 23, 2009. It follows, therefore, that the court had no jurisdiction to conduct this hearing. The Commonwealth argues that this literal interpretation of the statute would have the undesirable effect of creat[ing] a window at the end of each probationary period in which the probationer would be free to violate his probation. It therefore urges this Court to hold that the initiation of revocation proceedings, such as by the Commonwealth's motion, tolls the period of probation. This Court is not persuaded. First and foremost, granting and revoking probation is not an inherent power in the courts, but is a power vested in the courts by statute. E.g., Lovelace v. Commonwealth, 285 Ky. 326, 147 S.W.2d 1029, 1033-34 (1941). Thus, this Court cannot create some common-law tolling exception to the probation statutes, as the Commonwealth urges. The statute is plain on its face, and it allows revocation only prior to the expiration ... of probation. That did not occur in this case. Second, even if this Court were compelled to ignore the plain meaning of the statute, the problem is not nearly as dire as the Commonwealth suggests. A probationer who commits crimes while on probation can of course still be charged with and convicted of those crimes. In fact, any felony committed while on probation could qualify the probationer as a persistent felony offender, see KRS 532.080(2)(c)(2), which, needless to say, is a strong disincentive. It is simply not the case that probationers will go on crime sprees in the waning hours of their probation; they are still subject to criminal prosecution, just like anyone else. In addition, probationers would benefit from this window only if the court decides the violation warrants revocation. This will often not be the case for minor violations near the end of the probationary period that do not amount to criminal offenses. The Commonwealth also argues that this literal interpretation could result in probationers abusing the judicial process, such as by delaying or avoiding the hearing until their probation expires. This was the issue presented to this Court in Huffines v. Commonwealth, 2006-SC-000460-DG (Ky.2008), but it is not presented by this case. Huffines' probation expired on February 15, 2005. Before it expired, on December 6, 2004, the Commonwealth filed a motion to revoke her probation. However, her probation was not actually revoked until after her probation had expired, on May 9, 2005. The Court of Appeals reversed in a split decision, holding that KRS 533.020(1) states in clear and unambiguous terms that the court may revoke probation at any time prior to the expiration or termination of the period of probation. This language is subject to but one interpretation, that being probation must be revoked, if at all, before the probationary period expires. Huffines v. Commonwealth, 2006 WL 1652868, at  (Ky.App.2006) (unpublished opinion). This Court granted discretionary review, but never issued an opinion resolving the issue because the justices were evenly divided; thus this Court affirmed the opinion of the Court of Appeals by way of a bare order pursuant to SCR 1.020(1)(a). [1] But Huffines is different from this case in one important respect. When [Huffines] repeatedly appeared without a lawyer even though she was represented by counsel in other simultaneous revocation proceedings, the trial court graciously permitted her to delay her hearing until she could appear with counsel. Id. at  (Henry, J., dissenting). In other words, Huffines herself was partly responsible for the hearing being held after her probation expired. Thus, that case presented the issue of whether a probationer's own delaying tactics could estop her from asserting that the revocation hearing occurred after probation expired. The dissent at the Court of Appeals complained that the majority was permitt[ing] her to `beat the system.' Id. This no doubt concerned the members of this Court, too. This case presents no such estoppel issue. Appellee was not in any way responsible for delaying the hearing until his probation had expired. The Commonwealth complains that a strict interpretation of KRS 533.020(1) would allow probationers to avoid revocation by intentionally avoid[ing] the authority of the trial court ... by absconding until after the probationary period expires. Such a complaint might be persuasive in a case where the probationer actually does anything remotely like that. But here, Appellee never tried to delay the hearing, abscond, or otherwise manipulate the process. The circuit court scheduled the revocation hearing on a date after his probation expired. The court could not do this. In short, given that probation is a statutory creature, this Court is bound by the plain meaning of the probation statutes. The statutes are clear that probation must be revoked, if at all, before the probationary period expires. This Court rejects the Commonwealth's invitation to ignore this plain language.