Opinion ID: 775981
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Consecutive Sentencing for Counts 13 and 14

Text: 89 Graham's final assignment of error is that the district court improperly sentenced him for his conviction on Count 14, which was based on a violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c). Graham received a consecutive five-year sentence on that count for carrying a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime as charged in Counts 10 and 11; and a consecutive twenty-year sentence on Count 13 for carrying a semiautomatic weapon in relation to a crime of violence as charged in Count 1. 20 The question for this court, as framed by Graham, is whether his conviction on Count 14 is duplicative of his conviction on Counts 1 and 13 and thereby violates the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause. 90 Graham claims that the conspiracy to commit crimes against the United States, for which he was convicted of Count 1, and the drug trafficking crime, for which he was convicted of Counts 10 and 11, were all part of one underlying offense. To support this proposition, Graham relies on one sentence in the indictment which alleges that [i]t was part of the [ 371] conspiracy that its members planned to finance their organization by engaging in narcotics trafficking. J.A. at 79. If the drug trafficking is considered part of the 371 conspiracy, then, Graham argues, the second 924(c)(1) conviction, which used the drug trafficking convictions as the predicate offenses, is duplicative of the first 924(c)(1) conviction, which used the 371 conviction as the predicate offense. In other words, Graham argues that he committed only one predicate offense for the purposes of a 924(c) conviction, but that he was sentenced twice under the statute. Graham claims that the district court's refusal to sever the weapons and drug-related counts is proof that the crimes are so interrelated that they constitute one overarching conspiracy. 91 The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits multiple punishments for the same criminal act or transaction. United States v. Sims, 975 F.2d 1225, 1233 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 999 (1993). In this Circuit, it is well-settled that because of th[e] [Double Jeopardy Clause's] prohibition [on multiple punishments] a court may not impose more than one sentence upon a defendant for violations of section 924(c) which relate to but one predicate offense. Id. We have upheld multiple convictions and sentences under 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1) so long as such convictions are based on separate predicate acts. See United States v. Burnette, 170 F.3d 567, 572 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 908 (1999) (It is now firmly established that the imposition of separate consecutive sentences for multiple 924(c) violations occurring during the same criminal episode are lawful.); United States v. Nabors, 901 F.2d 1351, 1357-58 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 871 (1990). The question for this court is whether Count 14 relies upon a separate predicate act from Count 13. 92 In Nabors, a panel of this court upheld separate 924(c)(1) convictions for use of a firearm during a drug trafficking crime, namely possession of crack cocaine with the intent to distribute, and for use of a firearm during a crime of violence, namely the attempted murder of a federal agent. Both predicate offenses occurred as part of one ongoing criminal activity: Nabors shot the federal agent after agents broke down his door while initiating a search of his apartment. Once inside, the agents found drugs and related paraphernalia. We held that because the two convictions under 924(c)(1) were based on distinct predicate acts and required proof of different facts there was no problem of multiplicity. See Nabors, 901 F.2d at 1358. 93 In this case, as in Nabors, the counts at issue rely on different predicate offenses, and one requires proof of facts not required by the other. First, the predicate offenses for the Count 14 conviction are the substantive crimes at 21 U.S.C. 841(a) and 846, which make it illegal knowingly or intentionally to attempt or conspire to manufacture or possess with the intent to manufacture a controlled substance. The predicate act for the Count 13 conviction is the inchoate crime at 18 U.S.C. 371, which makes it illegal for two or more persons to conspire to commit any offense against the United States and to take an act in furtherance of the conspiracy. Notably, none of the statutes which were named as objects of the 371 conspiracy involved drug offenses. 94 Second, Count 14 relied on proof of different facts than Count 13. Graham's conviction on Count 14 was for carrying a weapon while engaged in a crime of drug trafficking; the evidence for this conviction came from William Huggett's testimony that Graham carried a weapon while tending his marijuana patches. In contrast, Graham's conviction on Count 13 was for carrying a weapon while engaged in a conspiracy to commit crimes against the United States; this conviction involved different weapons carried for a different purpose than for Count 14. Indeed, the fact that Graham carried a weapon while cultivating marijuana was completely unnecessary to the proof for his 371 conviction. Moreover, as the district court properly pointed out, the marijuana conspiracy began much earlier than the conspiracy to commit a crime of violence. 21 Thus, this case is similar to Burnette, in which we upheld two convictions under 924(c), one relating to a kidnapping conviction and one relating to a robbery conviction. While we noted that the kidnapping and the robbery were part of the same criminal episode, we affirmed the 924(c) convictions after holding that the predicate offenses were distinct and the kidnapping occurred significantly before, and independent of, the actual bank robbery. Burnette, 170 F.3d at 572. 95 Although Graham claims that United States v. Johnson, 25 F.3d 1335, 1338 (6th Cir. 1994) (en banc), rev'd on other grounds, 529 U.S. 53 (2000), is controlling, we disagree. In Johnson, we held that a defendant may not be sentenced for two 924(c) convictions for the possession of one or more firearms during a drug trafficking crime when the predicate offenses involve simultaneous possession of different controlled substances. Graham's predicate offenses were not committed simultaneously, nor did they consist of identical conduct. Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not err in sentencing Graham to consecutive sentences on two convictions under 924(c)(1) and AFFIRM this aspect of the sentencing. 96