Opinion ID: 2534147
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defendant's absence during penalty phase

Text: At his request and pursuant to his written waiver, defendant absented himself from the courtroom during the penalty phase of the trial and observed the proceedings on a television monitor in the holding cell. Defendant now contends his absence violated the federal Constitution and sections 977 and 1043. We conclude defendant validly waived his constitutional right to be present, and although sections 977 and 1043 were violated, the error was harmless under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243. Before the penalty phase began, defense counsel informed the court defendant did not wish to be in the courtroom during the proceeding. Counsel advised the court he had discussed the issue with defendant, and that he did not oppose defendant's wishes in this regard. He observed, with the video setup that's available in the holding area, obviously there's no confrontation issue. The court confirmed we have a holding cell right next to this courtroom, we have a TV monitor in there ... so that you will both be able to see and hear what is going on in this courtroom. While stating he was prepared to comply with defendant's wish to be absent, the court advised defendant it would probably be wiser to be in the courtroom during the taking of the testimony, and if defendant changed his mind at any time, we'll bring you back immediately. Defendant responded, I would just as soon that the defense not even say nothing, just rest. I don't intend to plead nothing to the jury. I'd just as soon sit in the cell. I have no intentions or desire to try to have any sympathy or pity from the jury that convicted me of these crimes. I don't intend to be present, neither; I don't wish to be. Having readvised defendant of his confrontation and cross-examination rights, the court took an oral waiver in which defendant confirmed he understood his right to be present, that he was voluntarily asking to absent himself, and that he understood he could return to the courtroom anytime you want to come back. The oral waiver was confirmed in a written waiver signed in open court after defendant himself actively participated in its wording. A defendant has the right, under the Sixth Amendment of the federal Constitution, to be present at trial during the taking of evidence. Nonetheless, as a matter of both federal and state constitutional law, a capital defendant may validly waive his presence at critical stages of the trial. ( People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 966, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103 ( Weaver ); People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1209-1210, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254 ( Jackson ).) Defendant's waiver was valid; accordingly, his constitutional rights were not violated. A capital defendant cannot voluntarily waive his rights under sections 977 and 1043 to be present at trial. ( Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 967-968, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103; Jackson, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1210, 56 Cal. Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254.) However, permitting defendant to waive those rights was merely statutory error, and thus we should reverse the judgment on this ground only if we conclude the error was prejudicial. ( Weaver, at p. 968, 111 Cal. Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103; Jackson, at p. 1211, 920 P.2d 1254.) The standard for reviewing error in permitting a defendant to absent himself from the penalty phase of a capital case is whether there is a `reasonable possibility ' the jury would have reached a different result had the error not occurred. ( People v. Hernandez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 835, 877, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 602, 69 P.3d 446, italics added; People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 448, 250 Cal. Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135.) Weaver and Jackson were also capital cases, and we used the reasonable probability standard in those cases. ( Weaver, at p. 968, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103; Jackson, at p. 1211, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254.) However, the error in Weaver occurred in the sanity phase of the trial ( Weaver, at p. 965, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103), and in the guilt phase in Jackson ( Jackson, at p. 1209, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254). We conclude it is not reasonably possible a result more favorable to defendant would have been reached in the absence of the error. First, the television monitor in the holding room enabled defendant to see and hear the proceedings, and the court made it clear defendant would be brought back into the courtroom the moment defendant decided he wanted to return. Second, the only witness who testified during the penalty phase was the detective who provided the foundation for the admission of the autopsy photographs of the victims. The admissibility of the autopsy photographs had already been vigorously contested by defense counsel, and it is not apparent what value defendant's presence during the detective's testimony would have been to defense counsel. (See Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 968, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103.) Third, given defendant's professed lack of any desire to receive sympathy or pity from that jury that convicted me of these crimes, his demeanor, had he been present in the courtroom, might have undermined his counsel's argument. Finally, the court advised the jury that defendant had exercised his option of not being present, but that he was following the proceedings on a television screen in the holding cell, and that they were not to consider his absence in their deliberations.