Opinion ID: 2223930
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: People v La Carrubba

Text: Relying on People v La Carrubba (46 NY2d 658, 664-665 [1979]), both the Supreme Court and the Appellate Division found that the Code cannot be used in such a manner. In La Carrubba, this Court held: We find nothing in section 195.00 of the Penal Law which suggests that by the device of incorporation by reference a prosecutor may initiate and take charge of proceedings to enforce the Code of Judicial Conduct as such. To accept the proposition advanced by [appellant] District Attorney would be to countenance the institution of criminal proceedings for any alleged violation of the provisions of the code. We perceive no intention on the part of the Legislature to cloak the District Attorney with responsibility for compelling conformity with the Code of Judicial Conduct. (46 NY2d 658, 664-665 [1979], supra. ) In La Carrubba, the issue was enforcement of Penal Law § 195.00 (2) for official misconduct by a judge. This Court determined that judges can be prosecuted for criminal acts but not on the basis of the judicial rules of conduct which were never meant to serve as part of the penal code ( see 46 NY2d 658, 663 [1979], supra ). In this case, judges are not put on notice that misconduct under the Rules of Judicial Conduct could serve as a basis for criminal prosecution ( see id. ). Thus, as the Supreme Court has found, the prosecution in the case at bar is precluded from imposing criminal penalties under Penal Law § 200.25 based upon 22 NYCRR 100.2 and 100.3. While the Rules of Judicial Conduct are meant to include sanctions which can include removal from the bench ( see Matter of Sims [State Commn. on Jud. Conduct], 61 NY2d 349, 356 [1984]; Matter of VonderHeide [State Commn. on Jud. Conduct], 72 NY2d 658, 660-661 [1988]), there is no indication that the Rules were meant to be used as a predicate for criminal sanctions ( see La Carrubba, 46 NY2d 658, 664-665 [1979], supra ; People v Stuart, 100 NY2d 412, 419 [2003]). As a result, the six charges of receiving reward for official misconduct in the second degree, as outlined by the Supreme Court, were properly dismissed. Finally, the majority refers to language in La Carrubba that the Code of Judicial Conduct that existed in 1974 was merely `a compilation of ethical objectives and exhortations' which were `[c]ouched in the subjunctive mood,' adopted by the American Bar Association, then the New York State Bar Association and then incorporated by reference in the respective rules of the Appellate Divisions. (Majority op at 616.) Thus, the Code consisted of rules adopted by the Appellate Divisions. Here, the Rules of Judicial Conduct were promulgated by the Chief Administrator of the Courts and designed to provide guidance to judges and candidates for elective judicial office and to provide a structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies. (22 NYCRR part 100 [preamble].) The Legislature thus directed the Chief Administrator of the Courts to adopt rules of conduct, not criminal statutes.