Opinion ID: 775981
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Application of U.S.S.G. 3A1.4 to Sentence

Text: 75 Graham's fourth assignment of error presents an issue of first impression in our court, namely when may a district court apply Sentencing Guideline 3A1.4, the domestic terrorism enhancement, to a defendant's sentence. There is a paucity of case law and scholarly work on this section of the Guidelines. 12 We review a district court's interpretation and application of the Guidelines de novo, but limit our review of its factual findings to determine whether they were clearly erroneous. United States v. Jeter, 191 F.3d 637, 638 (6th Cir. 1999). Section 3A1.4 provides: 76 (a) If the offense is a felony that involved, or was intended to promote, a federal crime of terrorism, increase by 12 levels; but if the resulting offense level is less than level 32, increase to level 32. 77 (b) In each such case, the defendant's criminal history category from Chapter Four . . . shall be Category VI. 78 Application note 1 to the Guidelines instructs us that a Federal crime of terrorism is defined at 18 U.S.C. 2332b(g). Turning to the statute, the term Federal crime of terrorism is defined in the conjunctive: it is an offense that is calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct, 18 U.S.C. 2332b(g)(5)(A), and is a violation of one of the enumerated statutory provisions provided in 2332b(g)(5)(B). 13 Graham argues that the district court improperly applied the adjustment because he did not commit a Federal crime of terrorism as defined by the statute. 79 The district court applied the terrorism adjustment to Graham's sentence for his conviction on Count 1, a conspiracy in violation of the general conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. 371. Graham's 371 conviction was premised on the following substantive offenses: to possess machineguns, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(o)(1); to threaten to assault and murder federal officers and employees, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 115(a)(1)(B); to forcibly assault, resist, oppose, impede, intimidate, and interfere with federal officers when they were engaged in their official duties, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 111; and to maliciously damage and destroy and attempt to damage and destroy by means of an explosive any building, vehicle, or other real or personal property used in interstate commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 844(i). 14 80 At the sentencing hearing, the district court addressed Graham's objection to the terrorism enhancement. In its discussion of the Guidelines provision and the applicable statute, the district court cited the following enumerated offenses in 2332b(g)(5)(B) as relevant to its sentencing determination: 18 U.S.C. 32 (relating to destruction of aircraft or aircraft facilities); 844(i) (relating to malicious destruction of property used in interstate commerce by explosives); 1114 (relating to protection of federal officers); 1362 (destruction of communication lines and radio stations); 1366 (destruction of property at an energy facility); and 2155 (destruction of and conspiracies to destroy national defense materials). In determining that the adjustment was properly applied to Graham's sentence, the district court then stated that [s]ection 3A1.4 makes this victim adjustment applicable to not only the federal crimes of terrorism listed [in the statute] but [to] other offenses intended to promote . . . the commission of a list of federal crimes of terrorism. J.A. at 1405. According to the district court, the facts alleged in Graham's trial demonstrated that his participation in the 371 conspiracy was intended to promote the above mentioned crimes of terrorism listed in the statute. J.A. at 1405. Based on that conclusion, the district court rejected Graham's objection to the sentencing adjustment. 81 Similar to the district court's analysis, the government argues that Graham's 371 conviction is sufficiently analogous to several of the enumerated sections in 2332b(g)(5)(B) so as to make the sentencing adjustment appropriate. 15 The government urges that [t]he fact that Defendant was charged and convicted of a conspiracy to commit these terrorist acts under different statutes, rather than the specific offenses enumerated in the statute cited in the commentary, should not be fatal to application of the guideline. Appellee's Br. at 61. 82 Our first task is to determine whether 3A1.4 may be applied to a sentence for conviction of the general conspiracy statute, which is not mentioned in 2332b(g)(5)(B). 16 Noting that there is no applicable case law to assist us, 17 we turn to the language of the Guidelines and analogous provisions for guidance. Section 3A1.4 provides that, in order for the upward adjustment to apply, the offense must be a felony that either involved or was intended to promote a federal crime of terrorism. The word involved occurs frequently throughout the Guidelines, both in the substantive provisions and in the commentary, and is typically employed to mean included. See, e.g., U.S.S.G. 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(j) (1998) (noting that 'serious bodily injury' is deemed to have occurred if the offense involved conduct constituting criminal sexual abuse under 18 U.S.C. 2241 or 2242); 2A2.2 cmt. n.1 ('Aggravated assault' means a felonious assault that involved (A) a dangerous weapon with intent to do bodily harm (i.e., not merely to frighten), or (B) serious bodily injury, or (C) an intent to commit another felony); 2B3.2(b)(1) (stating that, for the offense of extortion by force, [i]f the offense involved an express or implied threat of death, bodily injury, or kidnapping, increase by 2 levels); 3B1.1(a) (If the defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive, increase by 4 levels). Based on its usage throughout the Guidelines, we believe that in the context at hand, the word involved signifies that a defendant's offense included a federal crime of terrorism; in other words, that a defendant committed, attempted, or conspired to commit a federal crime of terrorism as defined in 18 U.S.C. 2332b(g)(5). 83 In our case, the district court chose to rely on the intended to promote language in sentencing Graham. Therefore, we turn our analysis to that prong of the guideline. We begin with the assumption that the intended to promote language means something different from the word involved. A defendant who intends to promote a federal crime of terrorism has not necessarily completed, attempted, or conspired to commit the crime; instead the phrase implies that the defendant has as one purpose of his substantive count of conviction or his relevant conduct the intent to promote a federal crime of terrorism. On this reading, the offense of conviction itself need not be a Federal crime of terrorism. 84 This interpretation of the phrase intended to promote is in harmony with the fact that, pursuant to U.S.S.G. 1B1.3, a defendant's base offense level may be adjusted for acts which the defendant did not necessarily commit but were committed by others in furtherance of a jointly undertaken criminal activity with the defendant and were reasonably foreseeable to the defendant in connection with that activity. See U.S.S.G. 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) & cmt. n.2. These acts are not necessarily the same as those for which the defendant may be held liable as a principal, accomplice, or conspirator. See id., cmt. n.1. 85 The district court held, as a matter of law, that [s]ection 3A1.4 makes this victim adjustment applicable to not only the federal crimes of terrorism listed [in the statute] but [to] other offenses intended to promote . . . the commission of a list of federal crimes of terrorism. J.A. at 1404-05. Based on our interpretation of the word involved and the phrase intended to promote, as well as our understanding of the relevant conduct provision, we believe that this statement of law is correct: the defendant need not have been convicted of a federal crime of terrorism as defined in 18 U.S.C. 2332b(g)(5) for the district court to find that he intended his substantive offense of conviction or his relevant conduct to promote such a terrorism crime. 18 In sentencing the defendant under 3A1.4, we hold that the district court must, however, identify which enumerated Federal crime of terrorism the defendant intended to promote, satisfy the elements of 2332b(g)(5)(A), and support its conclusions by a preponderance of the evidence with facts from the record. See United States v. August, 984 F.2d 705, 714 (6th Cir. 1992) ([T]his circuit has held numerous times that the preponderance of the evidence standard is the correct and appropriate standard for sentencing under the guidelines.). 19 86 The district court pointed to six statutes enumerated in 2332b(g)(5)(B) and held that Graham intended, as a consequence of his 371 conspiracy, to promote those crimes of terrorism. One of the statutes mentioned by the district court, 18 U.S.C. 844(i), makes punishable whomever maliciously damages or destroys, or attempts to damage or destroy, by means of fire or an explosive, any building, vehicle, or other real or personal property used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce. At the sentencing hearing, the district court found that Graham participated in the illegal conspiracy charged and attempted to achieve the objects of the conspiracy charged. J.A. at 1404. The district court then found that the following targets were known to Graham or were reasonably foreseeable to him in light of the scope of the conspiracy: the intersection of I-94 and U.S. Route 131; power facilities; radio stations; an A-10 ground support aircraft; a federal building in Battle Creek, Michigan; and a television station in Kalamazoo, Michigan. J.A. at 1404. The district court concluded that Graham and his co-conspirators intended to influence and intimidate federal officers in the performance of their duties; that they conspired to possess machineguns and other weapons; and that they discussed plans to attack their targets with the weapons they had acquired, all in furtherance of the conspiracy. 87 Based on our review of the record, we cannot say that the district court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous. Witness testimony established that Graham or his co-conspirators targeted these places for attack. Moreover, there is no dispute that the targets mentioned by the district court and the acts attributable to Graham were within the scope of the conspiracy and were reasonably foreseeable to the defendant. Given our review of the trial record, the district court's determination that the defendant's 371 conspiracy was intended to promote a federal crime of terrorism, in particular the crime of maliciously damaging or destroying, by means of fire or an explosive, any building, vehicle, or other real or personal property used in interstate or foreign commerce, was not error. Therefore, we AFFIRM the district court's adjustment of Graham's sentence under 3A1.4. 88