Opinion ID: 2736423
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exclusion of Taos County Policy Evidence

Text: We review a district court’s ruling on motions in limine, and its determination to exclude evidence, for abuse of discretion. Cavanaugh v. Woods Cross City, -7- 718 F.3d 1244, 1249 (10th Cir. 2013) (motion in limine); Tanberg v. Sholtis, 401 F.3d 1151, 1162 (10th Cir. 2005) (exclusion of evidence). Moreno argues that the district court erred in excluding evidence of violation of Taos County policy related to the use of the Taser because such evidence was relevant to his state-law tort claims. In ruling on defendants’ motion in limine to exclude evidence of violation of the policy, the district court observed the irrelevance of such a violation to the determination of Moreno’s Fourth Amendment excessive force claim. It further determined that the probative value of evidence of violation of the policy was outweighed by the danger that the jury would use a violation of the policy to find a constitutional violation. Accordingly, it granted defendants’ motion in limine. We find no abuse of discretion by the district court. The violation of police operating procedures is insufficient to ground a § 1983 claim for excessive force under the Fourth Amendment. Tanberg, 401 F.3d at 1163; Marquez v. City of Albuquerque, 399 F.3d 1216, 1222 (10th Cir. 2005) (stating that “violations of state law and police procedure generally do not give rise to a [§] 1983 claim for excessive force” (internal quotation marks omitted)). This principle stems from the requirement to assess the constitutionality of an officer’s conduct under the Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard. Marquez, 399 F.3d at 1222; see also Cavanaugh, 718 F.3d at 1248 (stating that the reasonableness of an officer’s use of force must be “judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight” (internal quotation marks -8- omitted)). “That an arrest violated police department procedures does not make it more or less likely that the arrest implicates the Fourth Amendment, and evidence of the violation is therefore irrelevant.” Tanberg, 401 F.3d at 1163-64. The district court’s finding that evidence of violation of Taos County policy was inadmissible as to the excessive force claim comports with our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Further, we “accord considerable deference to a trial court’s determination that evidence is likely to cause jury confusion.” Id. at 1164. In Tanberg, we affirmed a district court’s determination that evidence of police standard operating procedures was inadmissible because the evidence was irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment excessive force claim and was likely to cause jury confusion regarding state-law claims for assault and battery. See id. at 1162, 64. Similarly here, we conclude that it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to exclude evidence of the violation of Taos County policy on the basis of jury confusion with regard to Moreno’s state-law claims. Finally, even if the district court’s exclusion of evidence amounted to an abuse of discretion, such error is not reversible error as it did not affect Moreno’s substantial rights. See Fed. R. Evid. 103(a); United States v. Charley, 189 F.3d 1251, 1270 (10th Cir. 1999) (stating that an error affects the substantial rights of a party if it “had a substantial influence on the outcome or which leaves one in grave doubt as to whether it had such effect” (internal quotation marks, brackets, omitted)). -9-