Opinion ID: 3063838
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Judgment as a Matter of Law Against Bolton

Text: Barker and Access Now assert that the district court erred in denying judgment as a matter of law against Bolton based on Bolton’s flawed design of public pathways, thresholds, thermostat height, and clear floor space in bathrooms and kitchens. Barker and Access Now argue that Bolton should have been held liable for at least some of the FHA violations that TCR was held liable for because the two worked closely together. Barker and Access Now further contend that the district court erred in not giving judicial deference to the Fair Housing Accessibility Guidelines (“FHAG”) under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 14 Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844, 104 S. Ct. 2278, 2782 (1984), which requires courts to defer to an administrative agency’s reasonable interpretation of a statute it administers. Because Barker and Access Now demonstrated violations of the FHAG and Bolton did not demonstrate compliance with any alternate measure of accessibility, Barker and Access Now maintain that the district court should have granted judgment as a matter of law in their favor. In response, Bolton argues that Barker and Access Now failed to preserve some of these arguments in its original motion for judgment as a matter of law. We review de novo the district court’s denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law. See Action Marine, 481 F.3d at 1309. A reversal requires the facts and inferences to be overwhelmingly in the moving party’s favor “such that reasonable people could not arrive at a contrary verdict.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). In making a Rule 50(a) motion, the moving party must specify both the law and facts which entitle it to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(2). A party may renew this motion after trial under Rule 50(b) but it may not raise new grounds. See Shannon v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 292 F.3d 712, 717 n.3 (11th Cir. 2002); Middlebrooks v. Hillcrest Foods, Inc., 256 F.3d 1241, 1245 (11th Cir. 2001). We may affirm the denial of a Rule 50(b) motion on the basis that arguments were not previously raised in a Rule 50(a) motion. See 15 Middlebrooks, 256 F.3d at 1246. At the close of evidence, Barker and Access Now argued that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the following alleged design violations: (1) public and common use areas in which Bolton hired its landscape architect, Hughes, Good, O’Leary, and Ryan (“HGOR”); (2) lack of barrier rails below the standpipe; (3) thresholds; and (4) thermostat height. Barker and Access Now specifically acknowledged that the issue of clear floor space was a factual issue for the jury to decide. Although Barker and Access Now did not identify specific aspects of the public and common use areas which constituted design violations, their expert testified during trial that these included public pathways. In addition, Barker and Access Now referred to the issue of accessible paths during discussion of their Rule 50(a) motion. Accordingly, we will address Barker and Access Now’s claims on appeal concerning public pathways, thresholds, and thermostat height.2 We will not entertain any claims relating to clear floor space as Barker and Access Now conceded this was an issue for the jury when it argued its Rule 50(a) motion and the district court found that Barker and Access Now had failed to preserve this issue for review. See Middlebrooks, 256 F.3d at 1246. 2 As Barker and Access Now did not raise the issue of barrier rails below standpipes in their initial brief, that issue is now waived on appeal. See United States v. Curtis, 380 F.3d 1308, 1310 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (defendant waives issues not raised in the initial brief on appeal). 16 Furthermore, we will not entertain Appellant’s argument that the district court should have given judicial deference to the FHAG. This argument was never raised by Barker and Access Now (nor addressed by the district court) in the Rule 50(a) motion or the renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. When an issue is raised for the first time on appeal, we have discretion to either address the issue or consider it waived. See United States v. Dupree, 258 F.3d 1258, 1259 (11th Cir. 2001). We decline to address this issue as none of the exceptional conditions to a waiver apply in this case. See Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1332 (11th Cir. 2004) (issue may be considered for the first time on appeal when the issue involves a pure question of law and refusal to consider it would result in a miscarriage of justice, the appellant had no opportunity to raise the issue in district court, substantial justice is at stake, the issue’s proper resolution is beyond any doubt, and the issue “presents significant questions of general impact or of great public concern”) (citation omitted). The FHA, as amended in 1988, prohibits discrimination based on handicap. See Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island, 544 F.3d 1201, 1212 (11th Cir. 2008). Discrimination under the FHA includes the failure to design and construct multifamily dwellings in such a manner that: (1) “the public use and common use portions of such dwellings are readily accessible to and usable by handicapped 17 persons”; (2) there is “an accessible route into and through the dwelling”; and (3) thermostats are in accessible locations. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(C)(i), (iii)(I), (iii)(II). The Department of Housing and Urban Development has issued guidelines, the FHAG, to assist builders and developers in complying with the FHA. See 24 C.F.R. Ch. I, Subch. A., App. II (1991). The guidelines are not mandatory, however, nor do they establish performance standards or minimum requirements. See 24 C.F.R. Ch. I, Subch. A., App. III. Rather, the guidelines constitute only one of several safe harbors for compliance with the FHA. See id.; 24 C.F.R. § 100.205(e)(2)(i) (2008). Both parties cite Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc. v. Rommel Builders, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 661 (D. Md. 1998), for the standard of liability under the FHA. The court in that case interpreted the “design and construct” language broadly, holding that “[w]hen a group of entities enters into the design and construction of a covered dwelling, all participants in the process as a whole are bound to follow the [FHA].” Baltimore Neighborhoods, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 665 (emphasis in original). The court was careful to distinguish between liability based solely on participation in a joint project (which it did not suggest) versus liability based on participation in actual wrongdoing. See id. As an example, the court noted that an architect who designed noncompliant plans and a builder who followed those plans would both 18 be liable as wrongful participants. See id. at n.2. If, on the other hand, the builder corrected those plans to comply with FHA regulations, then the builder would not be liable because he did not wrongfully participate in a FHA violation. See id. Applying this standard here, the evidence supports the jury’s finding that Bolton did not wrongfully contribute to any FHA violations. With respect to public pathways, Barker and Access Now argue that the walks and curb cuts contained slopes and cross-slopes exceeding the percentages recommended by various accessibility guidelines and that there was no level area in front of exterior entry doors. Bolton did not design the curb cuts, however. The civil engineers, not Bolton, were responsible for all the grading and elevation changes along the pathways, including the slopes and cross-slopes. Bolton and its landscape architect, HGOR, only designed the general location of the pathways and the aesthetic details such as brick color. Futhermore, Southern Civil Engineering contracted directly with TCR. Bolton’s contract specifically excluded any civil engineering services or responsibility to review Southern Civil Engineering’s designs for compliance with applicable accessibility laws. Viewing all the facts in the light most favorable to Bolton, there was sufficient evidence to support a jury’s finding that Bolton did not wrongfully participate in a FHA violation with respect to the public pathways. 19 The next alleged violation is that of thresholds, which are the transitions between the outside and inside of entry doors. According to Barker and Access Now’s expert, William Hecker (“Hecker”), the majority of the 432 dwelling units in the Clairmont Campus housing had thresholds which were too high. Rafael Garcia, Bolton’s project manager for the Clairmont Campus project, testified that he utilized various safe harbor standards while designing the project but relied principally upon the FHAG. In his project manual, he instructed the contractor to purchase a specific brand of thresholds which complied with the FHA guidelines. Garcia also designed the floor of the breezeways to be level with the floor of the units. Nevertheless, after Garcia discovered in June 2001 that some of the breezeway floors had been poured too low, he notified TCR and Emory University of the problem and offered corrective solutions. Emory never authorized TCR to proceed with the corrective measures though. The jury could reasonably have concluded from this evidence that Bolton did not contribute to a FHA violation as to the thresholds. A final matter concerns the height of the thermostats. According to Hecker, thermostats should be no higher than 54 inches from the floor in order to be handicapped-accessible from a side approach. Hecker’s inspection of twelve representative units of the 432 dwellings revealed that most of the thermostats were 20 installed higher than 54 inches. Hecker admitted that he had not seen the design instructions for installing the thermostats, however. According to Bolton’s project manual, thermostats were to be mounted 60 inches above the floor. Nevertheless, Garcia testified that he designed the thermostats to be mounted 54 inches above the floor and he issued a field report to this effect in February 2002. “It is the jury’s task – not ours – to weigh conflicting evidence and inferences, and determine the credibility of witnesses.” Shannon, 292 F.3d at 715 (quotation marks and citation omitted). The jury resolved the conflict in the evidence in favor of Bolton and we may not “substitute our judgment for its judgment.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). Based on the foregoing, we conclude the district court correctly denied Barker and Access Now’s motion for judgment as a matter of law against Bolton.