Opinion ID: 2513925
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application to the Landowners' Claims

Text: Despite the long history of implied easements in Colorado, the court of appeals in this case rejected the landowners' claims of an implied easement. The court did so because it believed that, although easements in the form of access rights could be implied, easements in the form of profits could not. Lobato, 13 P.3d at 833. In reaching this conclusion, the court misapplied a 1964 decision of this court, Dawson v. Fling, 155 Colo. 599, 396 P.2d 599 (1964). In Dawson, the Flings claimed easement rights to a lake owned by a corporation. The document establishing the rights was a deed which read, in part, that the lake could be used for boating and swimming purposes, for the use of said grantees by themselves, their heirs and assigns, their servants, agents, friends, guests, and whomever they may select. Id. at 602, 396 P.2d at 601. Although the deed specified boating and swimming rights, the Flings petitioned the court to find that they had the right to fish as well. This court concluded that the language of the conveyance clearly limited the rights to boating and swimming and thus declined to imply fishing rights as well. Id. at 604, 396 P.2d at 602. In dicta, this court asserted that [a] right to profits à prendre must be expressly granted. Id., 396 P.2d at 601. However, from the circumstances of the case it is clear that this court declined to find implied rights because the deed of conveyance expressly limited the rights: A court cannot rewrite a contract and thereby change its terms when it is plain, clear and unambiguous. Id. at 604-05, 396 P.2d at 602. In Dawson, then, a crucial element of an implied easement was missing because a contrary intention was expressly stated in the deed. For that reason, we declined to imply additional profits in Dawson. Although this court has not addressed implied profits for over thirty-five years, there is a modern trend to apply the same rules to easements of access and to profits. See, e.g., State v. Kortge, 84 Or.App. 153, 733 P.2d 466, 469 (1987)(noting that [w]hether defendants' rights are in the nature of a profit à prendre or an easement, the interests in this case are governed by the same general rules); Figliuzzi v. Carcajou Shooting Club, 184 Wis.2d 572, 516 N.W.2d 410, 415 (1994)(applying a statutory rule of easements to profits in part because the court was persuaded by the Restatement of Property § 450 Special Note (1944), which states that it treats easements and profits the same because in no case was there a rule applicable to one of these interests which was not also applicable to the other). The Restatement explains that, although some profits such as mineral and water rights [9] have specific rules, generally as between easements in the form of access rights and easements in the form of profits, there are no doctrinal differences between them. Restatement, supra, § 1.2 reporter's note. [10] Generally, the rules governing creation, interpretation, transfer, and termination of easements and profits are the same in American law. Id. § 1.2 cmt. e. Easements and profits are treated equally because the same public policy and practical considerations that underlie implied rights of access also underlie implied profits. A recognition that parties do not always comply with strict rules of express conveyance, a desire to effectuate the intent of the parties, and the aim of fairness apply equally to easements and profits. Colorado law is replete with precedent that reflects a strong policy to be true to parties' intentions and recognizes that Colorado's unique history and geography further necessitate judicial recognition of implied rights in land. See, e.g., Roaring Fork Club v. St. Jude's Co., 36 P.3d 1229, 1231 (Colo.2001)(noting that our lawmakers [have] recognized that our arid climate require[s] the creation of a right to appropriate and convey water across the land of another); Lazy Dog Ranch, 965 P.2d at 1235 (in determining the scope of an easement, noting that the paramount concern is to ascertain the intentions of the parties and that when a deed is silent as to a particular right, the court shall look at the circumstances surrounding the transaction); Thompson, 895 P.2d at 540 (in implying an easement, noting that sound public policy dictates that land should not be rendered unfit for occupancy and that there is a presumption, therefore, that whenever a party conveys property he conveys whatever is necessary for the beneficial use of that property (quotation marks omitted)); Yunker, 1 Colo. at 554 (noting that certain water rights are necessary for enjoying land and that the law will imply a grant of such easement where it is especially necessary to the enjoyment of the dominant estate, and that such rights come not out of the literal terms of the contract, but rather out of pre-existing and higher authority of laws of nature, of nations, or of the community to which the parties belong). Thus, the aim of honoring parties' intentions and avoiding injustice that the Restatement expresses has long been the goal of Colorado law. Specifically, Colorado has a strong history of implying servitudes based on equitable concerns. As the Restatement concludes, it is arbitrary and inconsistent to apply these principles to easements of access but not to profits. [11] Such a limitation would be directly contrary to our legacy of implied easements. Having concluded that the trial court and court of appeals in this case incorrectly held that Colorado law does not recognize implied easements in the form of profits, we now apply the law of implied easements to the landowners' claims. Our review of the record leads us to conclude that there is ample evidence to imply certain rights in the landowners to access and use the Taylor Ranch. The prior unity of title of the landowners' and Taylor's land; the necessity of the rights; the significant reliance upon the promise of these rights; the fact that the rights were exercised for over one hundred years; and fact that these rights were memorialized in the Beaubien Document, the Gilpin agreement, and every deed of conveyance in Taylor's chain of title, satisfy every element of the Restatement test and the implied easements we recognized in the cases discussed above.
Because Taylor's deed indicates that Taylor's ownership of the land is subject to the landowners' prescriptive rights, we begin with an application of the law of prescriptive easements. The court of appeals in this case concluded that the landowners failed to prove a prescriptive easement claim because their use was not adverse. Lobato, 13 P.3d at 834. The court erred in this respect. Although adversity is a necessary requisite for adverse possession claims, Smith v. Hayden, 772 P.2d 47, 52 (Colo. 1989), it is not required for a prescriptive easement. Courts often find prescriptive easements even when the owner of the servient estate allows the use. Significantly, the Restatement articulates that a prescriptive use is either: (1) a use that is adverse to the owner of the land or the interest in land against which the servitude is claimed, or (2) a use that is made pursuant to the terms of an intended but imperfectly created servitude, or the enjoyment of the benefit of an intended but imperfectly created servitude. Restatement, supra, § 2.16. Although an easement by prescription without adversity has been codified only in the recent restatement, it has always been present in American servitudes law. Id. § 2.16 cmt. a. Because many jurisdictions technically required adversity for a prescriptive easement, decisions in those states often used convoluted explanations to explain how a permitted use was actually hostile and met the adversity requirement. Id. Some courts acknowledged an exception to the adversity rule in certain circumstances. See, e.g., Nat'l Props. Corp. v. Polk County, 386 N.W.2d 98, 105 (Iowa 1986)(noting that there may be a prescriptive easement even where the original use was with a servant [sic] owner's consent); Kirby v. Hook, 347 Md. 380, 701 A.2d 397, 404 (1997)(applying an exception to the general rule [that] permissive use can never ripen into a prescriptive easement ... where there has been an attempt to grant an irrevocable easement which is void because of the statute of frauds). Other jurisdictions, such as Colorado, simply glossed over the adversity requirement without comment. See, e.g., Wright, 697 P.2d at 388 (finding an easement by prescription in the form of a right of way across the servient estate even though the use of the right of way was permitted and ultimately reduced to writing); Proper, 827 P.2d at 595-96 (listing adversity as a requirement of an easement by prescription but then, although the parties stipulated that the use was permissive, finding a prescriptive easement for access and use of a commercial parking lot via a complex application of presumptions). It has long been established, then, that the element of adversity is not required in all circumstances. It is not required when other evidence makes clear that the parties intend an easement, but fail because they do not fully articulate their intent or reduce their agreement to writing, or because they fail to comply with some other formal requirement imposed in the jurisdiction. Restatement, supra, § 2.16, cmt. a. Thus, the court of appeals in the current case erred when it required a finding of adversity in all circumstances. Having established that adversity is not required when a grant has been imperfectly attempted, we turn to the facts of the current case. The trial court's findings of fact and our interpretation of the Beaubien Document fit every element of a prescriptive easement. First, the use must be open and notorious. There is no doubt that the landowners' use was well known to Taylor and his predecessors in title. The trial court noted that Taylor's predecessors in title not only knew of the landowners' access, but they even went so far as to direct the location of grazing. Most significantly, Taylor and his predecessors in title had express notice of the landowners' claims of right from the language of their deeds. The use was open and notorious. Second, the use must continue without effective interruption for the prescriptive period. In Colorado, the statutory period is eighteen years. § 38-41-101, 10 C.R.S. (2001); Proper, 827 P.2d at 595. Here, the trial court explicitly found that the landowners and their predecessors in title grazed cattle and sheep, harvested timber, gathered firewood, fished, hunted and recreated on the land of the defendant from the 1800s to the date the land was acquired by the defendant, in 1960. The trial court also found that this access was never denied. This more than satisfies the statutory time period. Third, the access must either be adverse or pursuant to an intended, but imperfectly executed, grant. Here, the access was permissive, rather than adverse. However, there is ample evidence of an intended grant of these rights. The Beaubien Document, although imperfect as an express grant, evidences Beaubien's intent to grant rights to the landowners' predecessors in title ( see supra ). Moreover, the express language in the deeds of conveyance for the Taylor Ranch, from Gilpin ultimately to Taylor, indicate an intention that the rights burden the land. Thus, the landowners have established a prescriptive claim. [12]
The landowners have also established every element of an easement by estoppel. First, Taylor's predecessors in title permitted [the settlers] to use [the] land under circumstances in which it was reasonable to foresee that the [settlers] would substantially change position believing that the permission would not be revoked. Restatement, supra, § 2.10. The settlers' reliance was reasonable because rights were expected, intended, and necessary. It was expected because of the Mexican settlement system discussed above. Also discussed above, this settlement system, combined with the actual practices and the deeds associated with the Taylor Ranch, show that rights were intended. The rights were also necessary. The plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Marianne Stoller, testified that access to wood was necessary to heat homes, access to timber was necessary to build homes, and access to grazing was necessary for maintaining livestock. [13] Moreover, Beaubien included each of these resources in a lease to the United States for the first military post in Colorado. See LeRoy R. Hafen & Ann W. Hafen, Colorado: A Story of the State and its People 130 (1947). The trial court found that during the 1850s Beaubien executed a lease to the United States government for the maintenance of Fort Massachusetts on grant land. In this lease Beaubien granted the army the right to pasture, cut grass, timber and collect firewood on Beaubien's land. We can safely assume that the United States was more sophisticated in its dealings with Beaubien than were the landowners' predecessors in title and that it insisted on putting Beaubien's promises into writing. [14] Under these circumstances, it is reasonable to foresee that that a settler would substantially change position believing that the permission would not be revoked. The second element, that the user substantially change position in reasonable reliance on the belief, is easily found. The landowners' predecessors in title settled Beaubien's grant for him. They moved onto the land and established permanent farms. The third element, the avoidance of injustice, is also undeniably present. The original Sangre de Cristo grant was given on the condition that it be settled. Indeed, under Mexican law, the grant would have been revoked if settlement did not succeed. The settlers, then, fulfilled the condition of the grant that made Beaubien fee owner of one million acres of land. Beaubien attracted settlers to the area by convincing them that he would provide them with the rights they needed for survival. Beaubien knew that families would rely on his promises and leave their homes to travel hundreds of miles on foot or horseback to establish new homes. A condition of the conveyance of Beaubien's land, from Gilpin down to Taylor, was that the owner honor these rights. Although these promised rights were exercised for over one hundred years, although these rights were necessary to the settlers' very existence, and although Taylor had ample notice of these rights, Taylor fenced his land over forty years ago. It is an understatement to say that this is an injustice. The landowners have established each element of an easement by estoppel.
Lastly, every element of an easement from prior use has been shown. First, both Taylor's and the landowners' lands were originally under the common ownership of Beaubien who owned the entire Sangre de Cristo grant before settlement. See Tameling v. United States Freehold Land & Emigration Co., 2 Colo. 411 (1874). Second, the rights were exercised prior to the severance of the estate. As discussed above, many of the rights the landowners claim were needed and expected for life in the San Luis Valley. This necessity existed from the first days of settlementindicating that these rights were exercised prior to severance of title. The third and fourth prongsthat the use was not merely temporary and is reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the landare also easily established. The trial court's findings of fact establish that the rights were exercised from the time of settlement until Taylor came on the scene. Moreover, as discussed above, the rights were reasonably necessary. Lastly, no contrary intention is expressed or implied; thus, the fifth element is present. Custom, expectation, practice, and language in the documents and deeds surrounding the Taylor ranch property indicate not only that a contrary intention did not exist, but that the parties affirmatively intended for these rights to exist. All five elements of an easement from prior use have been established.