Opinion ID: 3002062
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statutorily protected activity

Text: The Hospital argues that Houston was not engaging in statutorily protected activity because, even by Houston’s allegations, the retaliation was a response to her approaching Wade to complain about Goddard’s complaint-management skills (“in retaliation for me No. 07-2197 9 turning her in”), not her earlier approach to Goddard to complain about Carl’s alleged sexual harassment. The district court implicitly rejected this argument, stating that “[e]ven though the Hospital is correct that Ms. Houston’s complaint to Mr. Wade about Ms. Goddard can’t be seen as a complaint about sexual harassment or discrimination, Ms. Houston’s complaint about inappropriate touching by Mr. Carl clearly falls within Title VII protection.” In support of her position, Houston cites the district court’s decision in Johnson v. County of Nassau, 480 F. Supp. 2d 581, 602 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). The court there found that the plaintiff, who was Director of the Office of Diversity, had stepped outside his job duties and therefore engaged in protected activity, because in addition to raising employee complaints of discrimination “he complained that Defendants were not fulfilling their duties under Title VII in properly investigating these complaints.” While that case is obviously not binding on this court and the facts are somewhat different, we find it persuasive. Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Houston, as we must at this stage, the complaint to Goddard with the follow-up complaint to Wade made up one continuous complaint process to which Houston resorted. In effect, she was asking Wade to ensure that the institution do something about sexual harassment; there is not a hint that she had another, unrelated, grievance about Goddard.1 1 We note in this connection that the procedures for addressing sexual harassment play a critical role in this area of the law. (continued...) 10 No. 07-2197 We note that, to succeed on a retaliation claim, Houston need not prove that the underlying conduct she perceived as sexual harassment actually was serious enough to constitute a Title VII violation. Instead, she need only show that, when instituting her grievance, she had a “sincere and reasonable belief” that she was opposing an unlawful practice. Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701, 706-07 (7th Cir. 2000). The objective reasonableness of the belief is not assessed by examining whether the conduct was persistent or severe enough to be unlawful, but merely whether it falls into the category of conduct prohibited by the statute. Contrast id. (holding that grievance about harassment engendered by “homophobia” was not objectively reasonable and thus could not form the basis of a retaliation claim, because “[s]exual orientation is not a classification that is protected under Title VII”). Title VII does protect employees from discrimination on the basis of sex, and 1 (...continued) Indeed, in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998), and Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998), the Supreme Court recognized a procedural affirmative defense for employers, when harassment by a supervisor does not result in a tangible employment action. If the employer has exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct harassment (typically through an effective anti-harassment policy for the workplace) and the employee has unreasonably failed to avail herself of that policy, then the employer will prevail. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764-65. An employee in the midst of complaining about underlying harassment may well wish to criticize the company’s procedures at the same time. No. 07-2197 11 sexual harassment is a recognized species of such discrimination. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11. In this case, the record sufficiently demonstrates that Houston subjectively felt that she had been sexually harassed. In addition, the lap incidents involved actual touching. This court has often recognized in the past that unwanted physical contact falls on the more severe side for purposes of sexual harassment. As we noted in Patton v. Keystone RV Co., 455 F.3d 812 (7th Cir. 2006): Our precedent provides some guidance on how to evaluate the severity of harassment: On one side lie sexual assaults; other physical contact, whether amorous or hostile, for which there is no consent express or implied; uninvited sexual solicitations; intimidating words or acts; obscene language or gestures; pornographic pic- tures. On the other side lies the occasional vulgar banter, tinged with sexual innuendo, of coarse or boorish workers . . . . 455 F.3d at 816, citing Baskerville v. Culligan Int’l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 1995). See also, e.g., Worth v. Tyer, 276 F.3d 249, 268 (7th Cir. 2001) (“The fact that conduct that involves touching as opposed to verbal behavior increases the severity of the situation.”); Hostetler v. Quality Dining, Inc., 218 F.3d 798, 806 (7th Cir. 2000). Having a man old enough to be her father plop into her lap and put his lips to her ear to whisper “you’re beautiful” is the type of occurrence that, if it happened often enough, could constitute sexual harassment, and so Houston’s grievance was objectively reasonable. 12 No. 07-2197 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Houston, we conclude that she has shown that she engaged in a statutorily protected activity when she complained up the chain of command.