Opinion ID: 1909895
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Truth in Sentencing Act/Retroactivity

Text: Rule 61(i)(1) provides an extended limitations period if the application for postconviction relief asserts that a retroactive right applies that is newly recognized after the conviction at issue is final. Robinson argues that the newly enacted Truth in Sentencing Act repealed the statutes under which he was convicted. Thus, Robinson contends that his sentence is illegal and should be corrected pursuant to Rule 61(i)(1). According to Robinson, the Truth in Sentencing Act is a retroactive right applicable to him, newly recognized, and should be applied to reduce his sentence. If this argument is valid, Robinson's motion would not be time barred, since Rule 61 allows a motion to be made within three years after the newly recognized retroactive right is established. The Truth in Sentencing Act, in Section 3 of the Act, states: The provisions of this Act will take effect with respect to all crimes which are committed as of 12:01 a.m., June 30, 1990 and thereafter. Section 4 states: The provisions of Title 11 and Title 16 which are repealed by this Act shall remain in force and effect for the purpose of trial and sentencing for all crimes which occur prior to 12:01 a.m., June 30, 1990. See 16 Del.C. ch. 47. Robinson is correct in his assertion that the Truth in Sentencing Act repealed the version of 16 Del.C. § 4751 under which he was convicted. However, with the enactment of 67 Del.Laws, ch. 130, § 15, the General Assembly continued to criminalize Possession of Narcotic Schedule I or II Controlled Substances with Intent to Deliver. Compare 16 Del.C. § 4751(a) (1983) with 16 Del.C. § 4751(a) (Supp.1989). The savings clause in Section 4 of the Truth in Sentencing Act and the continued criminalization of the particular conduct at issue reflect the General Assembly's unambiguous intention not to abolish the offenses for which Robinson was convicted. See Wicks v. State, Del.Supr., 559 A.2d 1194, 1195-96 (1989). The Truth in Sentencing Act did not take effect until 12:01 a.m., June 30, 1990. Robinson was arrested on June 18, 1984, and sentenced on May 17, 1985, more than five years before the Act became operative. While certain provisions of the Truth in Sentencing Act clearly change the statutes under which Robinson was convicted, once again, the General Assembly's intention is clear. An analysis of the Truth in Sentencing Act shows that it is not a retroactive right available to Robinson. Compare United States v. Stewart, 865 F.2d 115 (7th Cir.1988). [1] The Truth in Sentencing Act was never intended by the Delaware General Assembly to have a retroactive effect. Consequently, Robinson's motion for postconviction relief does not fall within the exception to the three years filing requirement in Rule 61.