Opinion ID: 3039908
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Extrinsic Evidence of Probable Cause

Text: Finally, the government argues that we may consider evidence of facts not contained in the affidavit to demonstrate that the officers acted in good faith. The government relies on UNITED STATES v. LUONG 19343 authority from other circuits to support this argument, including United States v. Legg, 18 F.3d 240, 243-44 (4th Cir. 1994) (considering oral unrecorded answers to magistrate’s questions to establish objectively reasonable reliance on warrant), and United States v. Maggitt, 778 F.2d 1029, 1036 (5th Cir. 1985) (allowing same in dicta). [8] On the facts of this case, where the underlying affidavit is entirely lacking in indicia of probable cause, we reject the government’s invitation to look to facts orally conveyed to the magistrate in order to generate the colorable theory of probable cause. Leon clearly and unequivocally states that when the affidavit itself is entirely lacking in indicia of probable cause, it cannot be said that the officer acted in good faith in relying on a warrant that issues. That is the precise situation we have in this case. [9] This Court has repeatedly held that “[a]ll data necessary to show probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant must be contained within the four corners of a written affidavit given under oath.” United States v. Gourde, 440 F.3d 1065, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Anderson, 453 F.2d 174, 175 (9th Cir. 1971) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Where the affidavit itself lacks all indicia of probable cause, it would unduly undermine the foregoing rule to permit extrinsic indicia of probable cause to be presented through an unsworn, unrecorded oral colloquy. Related to the foregoing, the Constitution also requires that probable cause be established “by Oath or affirmation.” If unsworn, unrecorded oral colloquies, which may not be used to establish probable cause, are admissible to establish good faith, the constitutional and prudential standards for showing probable cause will be undermined. In effect, the good faith exception would swallow the Fourth Amendment rule. [10] Given that the facts of this case fall squarely within the situation explicitly identified in Leon as one in which the 19344 UNITED STATES v. LUONG good faith exception does not apply, we need not inquire further. The good faith exception does not apply in this case.