Opinion ID: 2083453
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Evidence of Defendant's Mental Impairments

Text: Defendant next argues that his counsel was ineffective because he failed to investigate and present available mitigating evidence that defendant was mentally impaired. In support of this contention, defendant offered affidavits from two of his siblings, which stated that when defendant was a young boy he placed a fork into an electrical outlet and received a shock. Defendant contends that, had counsel investigated his family background, he would have learned of defendant's purported electrocution, which would have indicated a need to further evaluate defendant's mental abilities. Defense counsel's failure to investigate mitigating evidence, under certain circumstances, can be deemed deficient performance. See Perez, 148 Ill.2d at 189-91, 170 Ill.Dec. 304, 592 N.E.2d 984. Nevertheless, we do not find counsel's performance deficient in the instant case. The record indicates that defense counsel did indeed interview defendant about his background and family life. In addition, defense counsel commissioned the NCIA to investigate defendant's background and draft an extensive report. However, the NCIA report indicates that defendant's family rejected numerous requests to be interviewed about defendant. Furthermore, no medical records exist on the incident where defendant was shocked and other records state that defendant never suffered from any serious injury or illness. See People v. Brisbon, 164 Ill.2d 236, 250-51, 207 Ill.Dec. 442, 647 N.E.2d 935 (1995) (affidavits of family members asserting defendant's brain damage, without supporting medical records, are insufficient to establish counsel's deficiency). Therefore, the record does not persuasively establish that counsel's failure to learn of the incident was due to his negligence or incompetence. See Eddmonds, 143 Ill.2d at 533, 161 Ill.Dec. 306, 578 N.E.2d 952. Defendant also offered copies of his school records through the ninth grade, the year he dropped out of school. These records consist of grade reports, IQ testing results, and the report of a school psychologist written when defendant was nine years of age. Defendant contends that counsel should have inquired into defendant's education because defendant had informed counsel that he was slow in school and did not reach the ninth grade until he was 18 years old. Defendant asserts that these records, if discovered by counsel, would have indicated that defendant suffered severe mental disabilities. Defendant's school records reveal that in elementary school it was determined that defendant failed to achieve at expected levels and had a slow rate of mental growth. The school psychologist determined defendant would benefit from a special education program, which defendant was referred to at age nine. For two years of defendant's elementary education, he received grades indicating unsatisfactory progress. However, in all the other years, defendant received grades indicating either acceptable or good progress. Results of IQ tests conducted when defendant was nine years of age indicated an IQ between 73 and 76. In addition, the records show that defendant was actually only 15 years old when he dropped out of school. Defendant also offered the results of Dr. Gelbort's psychological evaluation of defendant. Dr. Gelbort compiled this evaluation for defendant's post-conviction petition after reviewing defendant's records, court files, the post-conviction evidence, and conducting psychological tests and personal interviews with defendant. Testing by Dr. Gelbort indicated defendant's IQ was between 71 and 82. In Dr. Gelbort's opinion, defendant suffered from mild mental retardation and a schizotypal personality disorder. Even if we assume that defendant's trial counsel was incompetent for failing to learn of defendant's educational inadequacies and consequently submitting defendant to psychological evaluation, defendant has failed to demonstrate how these facts create a reasonable probability that the sentencing judge would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. at 2069, 80 L.Ed.2d at 698. Initially, we note that there is information in the school records that is potentially aggravating to defendant. Defendant's high school records indicate that he was excessively truant. Moreover, defendant dropped out of school after he was caught breaking into the school building. See Henderson, 171 Ill.2d at 154, 215 Ill.Dec. 147, 662 N.E.2d 1287 (truancy and lack of interest in education are aggravating); People v. Jones, 144 Ill.2d 242, 274, 162 Ill.Dec. 15, 579 N.E.2d 829 (1991) (same). Furthermore, the type of psychological evidence defendant offers is not inherently mitigating. Although evidence of defendant's psychological or educational disabilities may have evoked compassion from the sentencer, it also could have demonstrated defendant's continued dangerousness. See Coleman, 168 Ill.2d at 537-38, 214 Ill.Dec. 212, 660 N.E.2d 919 (some characteristics of personality disorders are aggravating); People v. Franklin, 167 Ill.2d 1, 27, 212 Ill.Dec. 153, 656 N.E.2d 750 (1995) (psychological problems could show a need to protect society from the defendant because he is not deterrable); Jones, 144 Ill.2d at 274, 162 Ill.Dec. 15, 579 N.E.2d 829 (psychological report reveals information damaging to defendant). Defendant also relies on People v. Perez, 148 Ill.2d 168, 170 Ill.Dec. 304, 592 N.E.2d 984 (1992), where this court ordered a new sentencing hearing because defense counsel was deficient for failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence. Nevertheless, that case is inapposite. Perez dealt with a defendant who had little evidence in aggravation and a great deal of evidence in mitigation which his attorney failed to introduce in any manner. In the instant case, defense counsel presented mitigating testimony and proffered a report from an in-depth investigation into defendant's background. Moreover, unlike Perez, this defendant has a great deal of aggravating evidence that was overwhelming compared to any evidence in mitigation. See Coleman, 168 Ill.2d at 539-40, 214 Ill.Dec. 212, 660 N.E.2d 919; Ashford, 168 Ill.2d at 506, 214 Ill.Dec. 237, 660 N.E.2d 944; Thomas, 164 Ill.2d at 430, 207 Ill.Dec. 490, 647 N.E.2d 983. The aggravating evidence in the instant case established that defendant planned and directed the armed robbery of three individuals in a private home. During this robbery, defendant taunted and humiliated the victims while they were bound and gagged. Defendant then savagely killed William Feuling, laughing as he did so. He then directed his accomplices to execute the other two robbery victims. When one of the victims fled, defendant shot him in order to prevent the escape. The evidence also showed that defendant participated in the armed assault and attempted kidnapping of Oscar Smith shortly after the robbery. The State's evidence also established that defendant had an extensive history of criminal behavior, beginning at age 13 and continuing until his arrest for the Feuling murder. Moreover, this murder occurred only one month after defendant was released from the Department of Corrections. Furthermore, the State's evidence showed that while defendant was incarcerated awaiting sentencing, he attempted to escape from the Cook County jail. Defendant does not dispute that his individual circumstances constitute overwhelming evidence of aggravation. Rather, defendant cites several cases involving similar heinous murders where the defendant was not sentenced to death. See People v. Allen, 228 Ill.App.3d 149, 170 Ill.Dec. 11, 592 N.E.2d 447 (1992); People v. Rodriguez, 227 Ill.App.3d 397, 169 Ill.Dec. 531, 592 N.E.2d 18 (1991); People v. Hartzol, 222 Ill.App.3d 631, 165 Ill.Dec. 112, 584 N.E.2d 291 (1991); People v. Wilson, 133 Ill.App.3d 265, 88 Ill. Dec. 246, 478 N.E.2d 561 (1985); People v. Wilson, 132 Ill.App.3d 862, 88 Ill.Dec. 241, 478 N.E.2d 556 (1985). Defendant's argument is essentially a request for proportionality review, which was raised and rejected on direct appeal and is, thus barred by res judicata (see Johnson, 149 Ill.2d at 158, 171 Ill.Dec. 401, 594 N.E.2d 253). We cannot conclude that defendant suffered prejudice as a result of this alleged deficiency of his trial counsel. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in dismissing defendant's claim without an evidentiary hearing.