Opinion ID: 1163307
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Right to Representation

Text: Smith next contends that he was denied the right to counsel in his Wisconsin criminal trial and that therefore his conviction is void and not eligible for full faith and credit in Utah. We addressed the right to representation by counsel in State v. Triptow, 770 P.2d 146, 149 (Utah 1989). There we reasoned that after proof of the previous conviction is introduced, the burden is on the defendant to raise the issue and produce some evidence that he or she was not represented by counsel and did not knowingly waive counsel. Smith has attempted to do this. The record indicates that his original counsel withdrew due to Smith's lack of cooperation in preparing the defense and his failure to pay the retainer fee. In addition, in December of 1985, the court, sua sponte, rescheduled the trial date for April of 1986, giving Smith an additional four months to retain new counsel. At that time, the court warned him that the new trial date was firm, that no additional continuances would be granted, and that he would need to either obtain new counsel or be prepared to proceed pro se. Smith subsequently filed motions with the court indicating that he would be representing himself for the time being. One week before the trial date, he contacted the court and requested a continuance to allow his newly retained counsel time to prepare. The court denied his request, reiterating that he had received notice of the firm trial date which gave him ample time to hire counsel. On the morning of trial, Smith, for the first time, objected to the withdrawal of his original counsel, claimed to be indigent, and requested court-appointed counsel. There was no court finding of indigence. Smith's previous successful business and legal dealings cast serious doubt on his claim that he was unable to pay for representation. Because the court refused to further delay the trial and required him to proceed on his own, Smith argues that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. We stated in Triptow that when a defendant has offered evidence of a denial of right to counsel in the absence of a knowing waiver, the presumption of regularity is rebutted and the burden shifts to the State to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was in fact represented or knowingly waived representation. Id. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals and the United States District Court found that the facts recited above, coupled with the fact that Smith was an experienced attorney and capable of representing himself, were sufficient to establish that he knowingly waived representation. The Wisconsin trial court noted that in light of his past behavior, there was no assurance that Smith would obtain counsel for a later trial date, even if a continuance were granted. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals observed that while a defendant must be afforded a fair opportunity and reasonable time to secure counsel of his own choice, his right to select his own counsel cannot be manipulated so as to obstruct the orderly procedure for trials or to interfere with the administration of justice. State v. Smith, No. 87-1179-CR, slip op. at 10. The United States District Court, in denying Smith's habeas petition on the merits, remarked: The facts show unequivocally that petitioner put himself in the position of going forward without counsel. If he had funds, he had plenty of time to find a lawyer to represent him. If he did not have funds, he had plenty of time to make that fact known to the court or to talk directly with the public defender's office. As a lawyer licensed to practice in Wisconsin, petitioner cannot argue seriously that he was unaware of his options or the risks of trying to represent himself in a criminal proceeding. Smith v. Doyle, No. 88-C-932-C, slip op. at 6 (W.D.Wis. Dec. 22, 1992). We are satisfied from the record that the issue of Smith's right to representation was fully and fairly litigated in the Wisconsin courts and that the prosecution met its burden of showing that Smith knowingly waived his right to counsel. The rationale for full faith and credit, in addition to promoting consistency and judicial economy, is to protect fairly adjudicated decisions from after-the-fact alteration by courts that lack access to true adversarial proceedings. Smith would persuasively put his own arguments before us, but who would represent the prosecution? Thus, under full faith and credit, these issues are res judicata, and we are constitutionally prohibited from exercising appellate jurisdiction over the courts of Wisconsin. Public Policy ... dictates that there be an end of litigation; that those who have contested an issue shall be bound by the result of the contest, and that matters once tried shall be considered forever settled as between the parties. Durfee, 375 U.S. at 111, 84 S.Ct. at 245.