Opinion ID: 2544926
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alaskans for a Common Language

Text: Alaskans for a Common Language claims an interest in the litigation because its members have invested a large amount of time and effort in protecting and encouraging the use of English by government in Alaska. It claims that its members need to protect their initiative, the will of the Alaskan voters, and the purpose of the initiative. It particularly asserts that it represents organization directors and officers Fischetti and Jacobus, and that they have an interest because as initiative committee members they have a duty to represent the initiative's signers and subscribers. An intervention movant's interest must be direct, substantial, and significantly protectable to satisfy Rule 24(a). [19] Generally when the government exercises its sovereign power to enforce and defend duly enacted laws, no other entity can have an interest sufficient to satisfy Civil Rule 24(a). [20] But when the people of a state have reserved the power of direct legislation, those who take responsibility for that direct legislation may have a sufficient interest. [21] In McCormick v. Smith [22] we determined that the interest of a voter and a sponsor of a recall petition in pursuing the recall of an elected official was of constitutional dimension and that those individuals, as initiators of the recall, had a heightened interest in a lawsuit which would determine the fate of the recall attempt. [23] Similarly, Fischetti and Jacobus, as initiative committee members, have a constitutionally based, heightened interest in a lawsuit that will determine whether their successful initiative will be enforced. Fischetti and Jacobus, as initiative committee members, are also obliged by law to represent the sponsors in all matters concerning the initiative. [24] This heightened, constitutionally based, and statutorily bolstered interest is a direct, substantial and significantly protectable interest as required by Civil Rule 24(a). Moreover, the interests of Fischetti and Jacobus, as initiative committee members, may be impaired by this lawsuit. A preliminary injunction has already been granted by the superior court enjoining the initiative's enforcement. The Kritz and Alakayak plaintiffs seek a declaration that the initiative is void because it violates constitutional protections. [25] If the initiative were declared unconstitutional, its enactment would obviously be vitiated and the efforts of Jacobus and Fischetti, as initiative committee members, to enact a law requiring the use of English in government would be frustrated. We recognize a presumption of adequate representation when government entities are parties to a lawsuit because those entities are charged by law with representing the interests of the people. [26] That presumption may be rebutted and inadequate representation may be proved by a showing of collusion, adversity of interest, possible nonfeasance, or incompetence. [27] We held in McCormick that when a city accepted defeat in the trial court and failed to appeal an order enjoining it from pursuing a recall election, the city had relinquished its responsibility to defend the fundamental right to vote. [28] That relinquishment constituted possible nonfeasance. [29] Here, the governor has a duty to defend a law that was enacted through the people's initiative powers. [30] That duty is executed by the attorney general. [31] Nonetheless, two circumstances could raise questions in the mind of the public about whether the executive branch is committed to defending the constitutionality of the initiative with conviction and vigor. First, despite its recommendation that the lieutenant governor certify the initiative application, the Attorney General's Office questioned the constitutionality of the initiative. In the 1997 ballot litigation, the Attorney General's Office asserted that it was unclear whether and to what extent the Native American Languages Act protected the use of Native languages in Alaska from the requirements proposed in the initiative. It specifically questioned whether NALA protected a non-Native state employee's use of an Alaskan Native language. The Kritz plaintiffs, who now argue that the state's representation is adequate, argued in the 1997 ballot litigation that the Attorney General's Office has taken inconsistent positions on the effect of NALA on the initiative. Because the movants assert on appeal that one of the goals of the initiative is to protect the use of Native languages, the state's previous position on the reach of NALA is potentially relevant. The initiative's supporters could question whether the state could argue convincingly or with conviction that NALA protects the use of Native languages when it previously questioned NALA's reach. Second, the governor personally opposed the measure publicly and unequivocally by stating that it was unnecessary, unfair and unfortunate. The initiative's supporters could interpret that statement as an indication that the chief executive and the rest of the executive branch would not unequivocally defend the constitutionality of the initiative. Based on the presumption of adequate government representation, we presume that the Attorney General's Office would not fail to defend the constitutionality of the initiative energetically and capably. Based on that same presumption, we also presume that the governor would not interfere. But Jacobus and Fischetti, as initiative committee members and sponsors, used the process of direct legislation to enact a law that the executive branch questioned and opposed. They cannot be faulted for wanting to guarantee that the initiative is defended zealously or for trying to ensure that the credibility of institutional arguments in favor of the initiative is not diminished by the previous comments from the executive branch. To them, and to the public in sympathy with the initiative, the governor's opposition and the Attorney General's Office's questions about the reach of NALA during the campaign, could create an appearance of adversity. Every strategic decision made by the Attorney General's Office in defending the legislation might be publicly questioned and second-guessed by the initiative's sympathizers. That this suspicion may be unfounded does not make it less inevitable. The Attorney General's Office does not oppose intervention here. It objected to Alaskans for a Common Language's assertions that the ballot language was misleading, that the state would use the litigation for political purposes, and that its position on the meaning of the initiative was extreme. But the Attorney General's Office recognized that Alaskans for a Common Language had an interest, that it was uniquely qualified to raise arguments about the intent of the initiative, and that it might offer a different perspective that should be heard by the court. Because the state does not oppose intervention, and because there might be a misperception by the initiative's supporters that the interests of Fischetti and Jacobus were not being defended vigorously by the executive branch, we conclude that a possible adversity of interest has been demonstrated. [32] In McCormick we determined that possible nonfeasance was sufficient to show inadequacy. [33] Here, because of the nature of direct legislation through the initiative process, the possible appearance of adversity of interest is sufficient to overcome the presumption of adequate representation. Indeed, we believe that a sponsor's direct interest in legislation enacted through the initiative process and the concomitant need to avoid the appearance of adversity will ordinarily preclude courts from denying intervention as of right to a sponsoring group. We recognize that the Ninth Circuit has adopted a virtual per se rule allowing initiative sponsors to intervene in litigation challenging laws enacted by the initiative. [34] But we believe that Alaska courts should retain discretion to deny intervention in exceptional cases, because AS 15.45.060 places no limit on the number of initiative sponsors and therefore potentially opens the door to an unlimited number of motions for intervention. As an alternative to limiting intervention in those cases, courts may instead choose to reduce duplication by requiring those sponsors with substantially similar interests to consolidate their briefing and to participate through lead counsel. As initiative sponsors, Fischetti and Jacobus have shown an interest that may be impaired and that may not be adequately represented by the state. Therefore they would have been entitled to intervene as of right under Civil Rule 24(a) if either had moved to intervene as an individual. The remaining question is whether Alaskans for a Common Language may represent Fischetti and Jacobus in this litigation. The Alakayak plaintiffs assert that Alaskans for a Common Language lacks a sufficient interest to have standing in this litigation. In the same vein, the Kritz plaintiffs assert that Alaskans for a Common Language lacks standing to assert the interests of Fischetti and Jacobus because the interest injured under Civil Rule 24(a) must be that of the intervenor. [35] But Alaskans for a Common Language argues that it may represent the interests of its members Fischetti and Jacobus because it has associational standing. Associations have previously represented the interests of their members in Alaska courts in lawsuits regarding initiative and recall attempts, although we have not previously specified criteria for associational standing. [36] The United States Supreme Court has held that an association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when: (1) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (2) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit. [37] We adopt this test. First, the movants must show that their members have either citizen-taxpayer or interest-injury standing. [38] Under the interest-injury approach a party must have an interest which is adversely affected by the complained-of conduct. [39] The degree of injury need not be great; an identifiable trifle is said to suffice to fight out a question of principle. [40] The interest may be economic, or it may be intangible, such as an aesthetic or environmental interest. [41] This threshold is lower than the interest needed to satisfy Rule 24(a) where the interest must be direct, substantial, and significantly protectable. [42] Because we held above that Fischetti and Jacobus have a sufficient interest to satisfy Alaska Civil Rule 24(a), they necessarily also satisfy that element of the associational standing requirement. Second, Alaskans for a Common Language seeks to represent the interests of initiative sponsors and signers Jacobus and Fischetti, who worked to enact the initiative as law. Alaskans for a Common Language was incorporated by Fischetti and Jacobus on the same day the initiative application was certified for the petition process. And the articles of incorporation of Alaskans for a Common Language state that its purpose is to promote the use of English as the official language of the State of Alaska. The enactment of the initiative is not only germane to Alaskans for a Common Language's organizational purposes, it is its primary organizational purpose. Finally, the constitutionality of the initiative is a pure question of law which will not require direct testimony or other participation by Fischetti or Jacobus. Therefore, Alaskans for a Common Language meets the requirements for associational standing and may represent the interests of Fischetti and Jacobus in this litigation. [43]