Opinion ID: 2789212
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Issue Preclusion as to Materiality

Text: Contrary to Kantengwa's assertions, the immigration judge's decision that her false statements did not go to the heart of her asylum claim is not a finding as to the materiality of those false statements under the criminal statute of prosecution, 18 U.S.C. § 1621(1).10 The two are distinct standards. The heart of the matter rule from immigration law prohibits basing an adverse credibility determination on inconsistencies in an applicant's testimony that do not go to the heart of [her] claim. Jabri v. Holder, 675 F.3d 20, 24 (1st Cir. 2012). By contrast, a statement is material in a criminal prosecution for perjury under § 1621(1) if it is material to any proper matter of the [decisionmaker's] inquiry. United States v. Scivola, 766 F.2d 10 The heart of the matter rule applied to Kantengwa's asylum application because she filed before May 11, 2005. See Jabri v. Holder, 675 F.3d 20, 24 (1st Cir. 2012). This rule has been superseded by the REAL ID Act, which permits consideration of inconsistencies without regard to whether [the] inconsistency . . . goes to the heart of the applicant's claim for applications filed on or after May 11, 2005. See id. (alteration in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(C)). -12- 37, 44 (1st Cir. 1985) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Moreno Morales, 815 F.2d 725, 747 (1st Cir. 1987) (applying Scivola to 18 U.S.C. § 1621). The immigration judge's conclusion that Kantengwa's misrepresentations did not go to the heart of her claim was limited to the finding that such inconsistencies did not provide specific and cogent reasons to conclude that [Kantengwa]'s testimony was incredible with regard to the grounds of her fear of future persecution, Ying Jin Lin v. Holder, 561 F.3d 68, 72 (1st Cir. 2009), namely, that the government would target her based on her relationship to her late husband (who some believe left her incriminating files) and to her brother (a well-known member of the opposition). Indeed, far from deciding that Kantengwa's misrepresentations were immaterial, the immigration judge specifically found that Kantengwa's misrepresentations were material as adverse factors counting against granting asylum. That these inconsistencies were not dispositive of the asylum claim -- that, in the words of the immigration judge, a discretionary denial based on [them] alone [would be] inappropriate -- does not mean that they were not capable of influencing . . . the decision of the decisionmaking body. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); see also United States v. Birrell, 470 F.2d 113, 115 n.1 (2d Cir. 1972) ([A] mistatement of fact does not need to -13- be dispositive of the inquiry in question to be 'material' within the meaning of § 1621.). Kantengwa's removal proceedings cannot bar the government from litigating materiality in a later criminal proceeding because those removal proceedings did not resolve the materiality issue. B. Issue Preclusion as to Falsity of Roadblock Testimony The immigration judge's determination that the government failed to conclusively establish that there was a roadblock outside Hotel Ihuriro during the relevant period also does not provide a basis for issue preclusion in the later criminal proceeding. Collateral estoppel applies only where the previously decided issues . . . were 'essential to the [earlier] judgment.' United States v. Ledée, 772 F.3d 21, 31 (1st Cir. 2014) (second alteration in original) (quoting Ríos-Piñeiro v. United States, 713 F.3d 688, 692 (1st Cir. 2013)). The immigration judge expressly stated that the truthfulness of Kantengwa's claim about the roadblock did not affect her finding that Kantengwa's testimony concerning matters central to her claim [for asylum] necessarily overcomes an adverse credibility finding.