Opinion ID: 2826267
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Pro-Se Status and Developing the Record

Text: Next, Cannon argues that requiring a pro-se prisoner to develop the record during post-conviction review violates his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. In making this argument, Cannon points to the Supreme Court’s decision in Martinez -15- v. Ryan for the proposition that a pro-se prisoner is in “no position to develop the evidentiary basis for a claim of ineffective assistance, which often turns on evidence outside the trial record.” 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1317 (2011). In that case, the Supreme Court concluded that, where a state does not allow for ineffective trial assistance claims to be brought on direct appeal, ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel can excuse a petitioner’s failure to bring a trial-assistance claim at that stage. Id. at 1317–19. Cannon also points to Trevino v. Thaler, in which the Supreme Court extended Martinez to circumstances where it was “virtually impossible” to assert ineffectiveness claims on direct review because of obstacles created by state law. 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1915 (2013). Cannon argues that, because his trial and appellate counsel were not separate, his first realistic opportunity to raise his ineffective assistance claims was on post-conviction review. Citing the difficulty of investigating his claims from prison, which motivated both Martinez and Trevino, he argues that he could not have been required to develop the record pro se on post-conviction review. We see two problems with this argument. First, Oklahoma law, in contrast to the Supreme Court cases, grants defendants the right to an attorney for postconviction challenges. As a result, petitioners are not required to develop either trial or appellate ineffective assistance claims on their own. And that is what happened here, at least initially. Cannon was provided appointed counsel through the Oklahoma Indigent Defense System for purposes of his post-conviction -16- appeal. See Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 1089(B) (1995). After several months, however, dissatisfied with appointed counsel, he insisted on representing himself. At a hearing to consider his request to go pro se, the trial court advised him to keep appointed counsel and detailed the problems with representing oneself from prison. Cannon insisted on proceeding pro se and the trial court reluctantly conceded Cannon was entitled to represent himself. Nonetheless, the trial court appointed stand-by counsel who was available to assist Cannon in investigating and presenting his application to the OCCA. In these circumstances, Cannon cannot refuse the assistance of counsel and then use his resulting pro-se status to argue that it would violate the Sixth Amendment to require him to develop the record. Nor has Cannon demonstrated how his confinement, as a practical matter, interfered in any particular way with his ability to obtain affidavits from his relatives and friends. As the district court found, Cannon did not need access to his legal files or records to obtain affidavits from his family members, and he never alleged any restrictions on his communications with them. In sum, Cannon’s pro-se status during postconviction review does not excuse the requirement that he act diligently to develop the record. At oral argument, Cannon’s attorney advanced the theory that Cannon had diligently sought affidavits from eyewitness family members but that his relatives refused to accommodate him. In support of this contention, he referenced three -17- family-member affidavits he provided in support of diligence after our remand in Cannon I. In those affidavits his relatives asserted that Cannon had asked them to prepare affidavits for his state post-conviction application but they either were unable or refused because they did not understand the usefulness of additional evidence after completion of trial and direct appeal. 3 Cannon contends their reluctance constituted an obstacle excusing his failure to more fully develop the record and that the affidavits prove he was diligently attempting to develop the state court record. But Cannon did not pursue this argument in either his opening or reply brief to this court. Neither brief mentions that he previously requested affidavits from his family members, much less that his family members refused to provide them. This is especially problematic because the district court found that “Cannon’s diligence in obtaining the affidavits began in earnest only after the Tenth Circuit noted in its 2004 opinion that he had not provided affidavits from any of the alleged witnesses.” R., Vol. I, Doc. 222 at 9. The court also found “a reasonably diligent person would have been able to obtain the affidavits earlier” 3 We note that, despite claiming that they did not understand the value of providing affidavits after Cannon had already been convicted and lost his appeal, two of the affiants attended a post-conviction hearing at which Cannon sought to waive his appointed counsel. -18- because “each of the affiants states he or she was willing to testify at a hearing.” Id. at 11. 4 This court will not consider issues initially raised at oral argument. United States v. Irving, 665 F.3d 1184, 1210 n.23 (10th Cir. 2011) (issues raised for the first time in oral argument are waived); United States v. Rivera-Nevarez, 418 F.3d 1104, 1112 n.12 (10th Cir. 2005) (same). Not only is it “unfair to lie in wait until oral argument to present issues material to the appeal,” but “[r]aising [an] issue for the first time at oral argument affords the [opposing party] an inadequate opportunity to address it.” United States v. Almaraz, 306 F.3d 1031, 1040–41 (10th Cir. 2002). Consequently, we decline to consider this argument as it has been waived.