Opinion ID: 1922397
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Employment Discrimination

Text: The plaintiff next argues that the motion justice erroneously discounted her factual allegations in entering summary judgment in favor of defendant on her claims of age and gender discrimination. In doing so, plaintiff contends, the motion justice held her to a nearly insurmountable burden of proof. Since a claim of age discrimination and a claim of gender discrimination employ similar legal analyses, and because plaintiff marshals the same set of facts with respect to each claim, we will address both claims simultaneously. The State Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA), G.L. 1956 chapter 5 of title 28, prevents an employer from discharging an employee because of his or her age or sex, § 28-5-7(1)(i)-(ii). [3] This Court has adopted the federal legal framework to provide structure to our state employment discrimination statutes. Newport Shipyard, Inc. v. Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights, 484 A.2d 893, 898 (R.I.1984). The parties seem to agree that plaintiff's claims are in the nature of disparate treatment, and, therefore, we will apply the now-familiar burden-shifting framework found in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), and its progeny. See Newport Shipyard, Inc., 484 A.2d at 898. This burden shifting allocates burdens of production and orders the presentation of evidence so as `progressively to sharpen the inquiry into the elusive factual question of intentional discrimination.' Center for Behavioral Health, Rhode Island, Inc. v. Barros, 710 A.2d 680, 685 (R.I.1998) (quoting Woodman v. Haemonetics Corp., 51 F.3d 1087, 1091 (1st Cir.1995)). 1