Opinion ID: 1345017
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Twenty-Five Percent Reduction of Hours Reported

Text: The Commission reduced the number of hours spent by Barker and Flynn on the Stewart case by twenty-five percent. Petitioners argue that the reduction violated due process principles because no one presented the Commission's reasons for reduction at the hearing on fees, depriving petitioners of an opportunity to respond. The Commission contends that it made the twenty-five percent reduction because the attorneys' time records lacked meaningful detail; Barker reconstructed his time spent on the case; two attorneys spent time on the same task; the records reflected inconsistencies in time billed for the same task; and the time billed for certain tasks appeared excessive on its face. The Commission did not violate petitioners' due process rights in making its findings. In Plumb, 809 P.2d at 743, we held that a magistrate violated a class counsel's due process rights by making an attorney fee determination without counsel's having notice and by failing to hold a hearing on the issue. Here, petitioners had adequate notice of the hearing and presented testimony and evidence in support of their case. Furthermore, the hearing transcript reflects the Commission's concerns, for example, when one Commissioner remarked, [T]he Division and the Committee have attacked [Flynn's hours] on various grounds[,] one of which was they are not sufficiently detailed. Therefore, petitioners had an opportunity at the hearing to respond to the Commission's concerns, and the Commission did not violate their right to due process. Thus the Commission's twenty-five percent reduction multiplier was not procedurally deficient. We examine the evidence, however, to determine whether the reduction was justified on substantial grounds. In petitioners' favor, Flynn clarified at the hearing that the twenty-three hours recorded as reading a brief included checking and reading cases, statutes, and other materials as part of reviewing the 112-page brief. Moreover, both petitioners made statements under oath that they had understated their hours in the written submissions by at least twenty-five percent. These statements went uncontested. Furthermore, Dr. Mark Glick, a consultant on law and economics issues, testified that petitioners expended an unusually low number of hours for a case of this nature. An affidavit by Patricia A. O'Rorke, who practices law in the public utility area in Utah, testified that Flynn and Barker worked the number of hours reasonably required to achieve the very substantial benefit conferred on the plaintiff class. Nevertheless, one affidavit  by Gary A. Dodge, a partner specializing in utility and regulatory matters at the law firm of Kimball, Parr, Waddoups, Brown & Gee  does state that the reported hours seem excessive for the work performed, and the descriptions of the work performed provide too little information to decide otherwise. Yet, his testimony also suggests that Flynn's expertise should have reduced the number of hours needed, indicating that Flynn's hours were a bargain, not just reasonable. The Commission also points to occasional inconsistencies in the time records, with Barker at times recording more hours than the other participants for the same meetings. Barker and Flynn initially accepted this case on a pro bono basis. In February 1991, they realized they could not dispose of the case as quickly as they had initially thought. At that point, they asserted a request for attorney fees. They realized that Utah had not previously allowed an award of attorney fees without statutory or contractual authorization, but because the question had never been directly addressed, they decided to pursue it. Because of this history, Barker's failure to log his time simultaneously and Flynn's general time-keeping methods are understandable. The records available do provide a sufficient basis for a determination of the hours they worked. Although we accord the Commission limited discretion in determining the hours in this case, after reviewing the record in light of the Cabrera factors, we award the full amount of hours claimed by Flynn [3] and all but 9.5 hours claimed by Barker. [4] The evidence presented simply does not support the Commission's arbitrary twenty-five percent reduction. Considering, as required by Cabrera, the novelty and difficulty of the questions in Stewart, petitioners' hours are entirely reasonable. The Commission found that the case was not novel or difficult in view of one of Flynn's comments  that the issues at the Commission level were clear-cut in his clients' favor. Aside from the obvious observation that most advocates find the law clear in their favor, the Commission's position also ignores Flynn's testimony that a novel question of mootness arose at the appellate level, requiring much work. In addition, the attorney fees issue itself was clearly novel for Utah, as discussed by the court in Stewart. 885 P.2d at 782. A reading of Stewart further indicates that many issues were at least complex, if not novel. Moreover, as noted in Stewart, the complete lack of support from the Committee of Consumer Services and the actions of the Division and the Commission generally made this case very difficult. See generally id. Furthermore, Flynn adequately explained why some of his hours, which appeared excessive at first glance, actually constituted reasonable work (such as the brief reading example described earlier). With regard to experience, Flynn's expertise in the areas of both state constitutional law and utility law and Barker's knowledge of utility law convince us that less knowledgeable attorneys performing the same work would have taken much longer. Moreover, we do not believe that anything in the financial arrangements between petitioners and their clients caused petitioners to expend excessive hours on the case. Flynn and Barker knew very well the possibility of receiving no remuneration for their time and work. Such knowledge would surely motivate efficiency rather than the reverse. The inconsistencies between times recorded in Barker's records and those of Flynn and a paralegal are of some concern; they may be attributable to the fact that Barker did not keep contemporaneous records, as Flynn did. Thus, we reduce Barker's hours to reflect the hours spent by other members of the litigation team at the same meetings. [5] With this adjustment, we can confidently conclude that Barker claimed a reasonable number of hours.