Opinion ID: 65780
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: False Arrest: August 2005 Arrest

Text: To establish that the individual defendants violated Deville's constitutional rights by arresting her in August 2005, plaintiffs must show that the officers lacked probable cause. See Haggerty v. Tex. S. Univ., 391 F.3d 653, 655 (5th Cir. 2004). A warrantless arrest must be based on `probable cause.' Probable cause exists when the totality of the facts and circumstances within a police officer's knowledge at the moment of arrest are sufficient for a reasonable person to conclude that the suspect had committed or was committing an offense. Resendiz v. Miller, 203 F.3d 902, 903 (5th Cir.2000). If there was probable cause for any of the charges made . . . then the arrest was supported by probable cause, and the claim for false arrest fails. Wells v. Bonner, 45 F.3d 90, 95 (5th Cir.1995). Turning to Deville's false arrest claim against Tarver, Deville was charged with three offenses: failure to sign a traffic ticket, resisting an officer, and speeding. Plaintiffs have met their burden at summary judgment to show that there is a genuine issue as to the material fact of whether Tarver lacked probable cause to arrest Deville for those offenses. First, the relevant Louisiana statute permits officers to make full-custody arrests of persons who refuse to sign a traffic ticket, in lieu of issuing the usual citation. See La. Rev.Stat. § 32:391(B) (West.2002). [3] But the statute does not establish a criminal offense; it only establishes the procedure for arrests when a traffic offense has already occurred. See id. In this case, there is a disputed issue of fact as to whether the officers presented a ticket to Deville and, consequently, whether she refused to sign it. Second, under Louisiana law, a person commits the offense of resisting arrest only if he resists a lawful arrest; that is, an arrest supported by probable cause. See La.Rev.Stat. § 14.108(A) (West 2004); State v. Lindsay, 388 So.2d 781, 782 (La.1980) (It is a long-established principle in Louisiana law that a citizen has the right to resist an unlawful arrest.). Thus, whether Deville was lawfully arrested depends on whether Tarver had probable cause to conduct an arrest at all. If not, then any resistance by Deville was lawful and did not constitute resisting arrest. See Lindsay, 388 So.2d at 782. An officer may conduct a warrantless arrest based on probable cause that an individual has committed even a minor offense, including misdemeanors. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001). Tarver stated in his deposition testimony that he detected Deville going 50mph in a 40mph zone using his radar gun, which he said he was operating correctly. [4] Plaintiffs have offered Deville's deposition testimony, in which she testified that she was in fact not speeding, as evidenced by the fact that she set her vehicle's cruise control at the 40mph speed limit. However, evidence that the arrestee was innocent of the crime is not necessarily dispositive of whether the officer had probable cause to conduct the arrest because probable cause requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 244 n. 13, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). Thus, Tarver's uncontradicted testimony that his radar gun indicated that Deville was speeding could establish probable cause for the arrest. See United States v. Coney, 456 F.3d 850, 857 (8th Cir.2006). Plaintiffs, however, have provided evidence that would allow the jury to disbelieve Tarver's testimony. [A] motion for summary judgment cannot be defeated solely by conclusional allegations that a witness lacks credibility. Nevertheless, when the circumstances are conducive to lying, well-supported suspicion of mendacity may serve as a legitimate basis for the factfinder's reasonable inferences concerning the ultimate facts at issue. Thomas v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 233 F.3d 326, 331 (5th Cir.2000) (footnote omitted). Summary judgment is not appropriate when questions about the credibility of key witnesses loom . . . large and the evidence could permit the trier-of-fact to treat their testimony with skeptical scrutiny. Id. at 331. Tarver admitted that he has a history of problematic arrests and that citizens have made complaints against him. The Evangeline Parish Sheriff asked him to resign his position as a sheriff's deputy (which he held simultaneously with his position with the Village of Turkey Creek) because of a complaint of excessive force in an unrelated case. More directly implicating his credibility, Tarver admits the parish district attorney asked him to resign from the Turkey Creek police department because he filed a false charge of possession of marijuana against an individual who in fact did not have marijuana (that incident is also otherwise unrelated to the instant case). [5] And although Tarver testified that the radar gun had the ability to lock-in a detected speed, he did not lock-in the speed in the Deville case  and, as a result, he was unable to verify the speed when asked by Deville's husband to do so. In light of this discrediting evidence  especially evidence that Tarver has falsified other charges  and Deville's sworn testimony that she was not speeding because her cruise control was set on 40mph, a reasonable jury could disbelieve Tarver's testimony and find that he lacked probable cause for the first arrest. [6] Despite their participation in. . . constitutionally impermissible conduct, Defendants may nevertheless be shielded from liability for civil damages if their actions did not violate `clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.' Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). There is no doubt that it was clearly established in August 2005 that [a]n arrest is unlawful unless it is supported by probable cause. Flores v. City of Palacios, 381 F.3d 391, 402 (5th Cir.2004); see Blackwell v. Barton, 34 F.3d 298, 303 (5th Cir.1994). An officer's conduct is objectively reasonable if a reasonable person in their position could have believed he had probable cause to arrest. Goodson v. City of Corpus Christi, 202 F.3d 730, 740 (5th Cir. 2000). Thus, because there are genuine issues as to the material facts of whether Deville was detected to have been speeding, whether she was asked sign a traffic ticket and whether she was validly exercising her established right under Louisiana law to resist an unlawful arrest, we conclude that Tarver is not entitled to qualified immunity. Turning to Deville's false arrest claim against Marcantel stemming from the August 2005 arrest, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment. We pretermit considering or deciding whether Marcantel unlawfully arrested Deville because it is clear that his actions with respect to Tarver's initial arrest of Deville were not objectively unreasonable. [W]here a police officer makes an arrest on the basis of oral statements by fellow officers, an officer will be entitled to qualified immunity from liability in a civil rights suit for unlawful arrest provided it was objectively reasonable for him to believe, on the basis of the statements, that probable cause for the arrest existed. Rogers v. Powell, 120 F.3d 446, 455 (3d Cir.1997). Here, the uncontroverted evidence shows that Tarver communicated the reason for the stop to Marcantel, specifically relaying that Deville had been speeding and refused to sign the traffic ticket. And there is no evidence that Marcantel had a reason to disbelieve Tarver's account at the time of the August 2005 arrest. Accordingly, Marcantel could reasonably believe that Deville was speeding because he had an account of criminal activity from a seemingly reliable witnessing officer.