Opinion ID: 2092036
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Work-Product Doctrine and Attorney-Client Privilege

Text: The plaintiff next contends that the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine should not broadly prevent Hagelthorn from all consulting and testimony in this case. The plaintiff further argues that no attorney-client privilege applies because Hagelthorn was neither an attorney nor an agent of Fruehauf's attorneys. She argues that work-product protection is inapplicable both because it shields only documents and tangible items, not general engineering knowledge, and because claims of work product must be asserted and considered on a particularized, document-by-document basis. The plaintiff further argues that Fruehauf has waived any work-product or attorney-client privilege claims by utilizing Hagelthorn as an independent expert witness on behalf of Fruehauf. Fruehauf responds by arguing that the trial court record shows that Hagelthorn was an agent of Fruehauf lawyers and was privy to information protected by the attorney-client privilege and the attorney work product doctrine. [7] Brief of Fruehauf Corporation, Appellee at 22. We first observe that courts disfavor blanket claims of privilege such as that asserted by Fruehauf. Petersen v. U.S. Reduction Co., 547 N.E.2d 860, 862 (Ind.Ct.App. 1989). The party seeking to assert a privilege has the burden to allege and prove the applicability of the privilege as to each question asked or document sought. Owens v. Best Beers of Bloomington, Inc., 648 N.E.2d 699, 702 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (citing In re Walsh, 623 F.2d 489, 493 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 994, 101 S.Ct. 531, 66 L.Ed.2d 291 (1980)). Claims of privilege must be made and sustained on a question-by-question or document-by-document basis. Petersen, 547 N.E.2d at 862. In its request for injunctive relief, Fruehauf does not merely request the protection of specific documents or particularized information but seeks generally to isolate Hayworth and preclude him from any communications in this case. The plaintiff argues that Fruehauf waived the privilege with regard to all matters when it called Hagelthorn as an expert witness in unrelated litigation. The Michigan trial court noted in its bench opinion that Fruehauf itself utilized Hagelthorn as an expert witness about thirteen or fourteen times between the years 1982 and 1986. Record at 334. While the attorney-client privilege is waived with respect to matters disclosed in previous testimony, Taylor v. Taylor, 643 N.E.2d 893, 898 (Ind.1994), and as to communications not treated as confidential, Lewis v. State, 451 N.E.2d 50, 55 (Ind.1983), we decline to construe the waiver to apply to all potential testimony by Hagelthorn. The fact that Fruehauf previously utilized Hagelthorn as a witness demonstrates only that Fruehauf believes that Hagelthorn possesses general expertise, perhaps on matters never privileged to begin with, to which his testimony could be limited without confidential information being revealed. Presumably, the same or similar general matters could be the subject of his testimony in this case without Fruehauf's interests being harmed. The fact that Hagelthorn previously testified for Fruehauf does not effect a complete waiver of Fruehauf's claim of attorney-client privilege. Although rare circumstances might exist in which a blanket claim of privilege might prevail, they are not present here. The record does not support any argument that Hagelthorn's participation in this case would present a substantial, unavoidable risk of disclosure of a matter constituting a trade secret, covered by attorney-client privilege, or otherwise confidential. Because Hagelthorn might thus feasibly testify about various matters without violating any privileges or revealing trade secrets or other confidential matters, the complete prohibition of Hagelthorn's participation in the case is improper. If Fruehauf wishes to prevent the disclosure of specific communications or particular materials, it may seek such limited protection and must demonstrate its entitlement thereto. As to Hagelthorn's deposition or trial testimony, Fruehauf may seek relief from the trial court on a question-by-question basis. [8] Fruehauf further argues that the trial court's order is supported by American Motors Corp. v. Huffstutler, 61 Ohio St.3d 343, 575 N.E.2d 116 (1991), wherein the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed a 1989 trial court order permanently enjoining Huffstutler, a former employee-attorney of American Motors Corp. (AMC), from consulting or testifying in products liability cases involving AMC. Huffstutler was employed by AMC as an engineer in 1974 and thereafter attended law school with partial assistance from AMC, became a lawyer, served as general manager of the AMC Product Design Studies Group, and worked intimately with the legal department and its privately retained counsel in products liability cases involving AMC Jeep, particularly `rollover' claims. American Motors Corp., 575 N.E.2d at 118. The trial court found that he had access to confidential attorney-client information, attorney work product information involving rollover and other litigation, and highly confidential trade secrets. Id. After AMC terminated his employment in 1988, Huffstutler immediately began offering his services as an expert witness in cases against AMC wherein he sold to plaintiffs' counsel privileged documents and materials that he had improperly removed from AMC. Id. In affirming the trial court order, the Ohio Supreme Court noted that, even if only considering Huffstutler as an agent acting on behalf of legal counsel to AMC, he was subject to all the legal implications of the attorney-client and attorney work product privileges, id. at 119; moreover, it concluded, In order to protect the attorney-client and work product privilege, injunctive relief is appropriate, particularly where, as here, it is demonstrated that the former employee-attorney has already violated the privilege and threatens to continue such practice. Id. at 121. In contrast to Huffstutler, an attorney, who one year following the termination of his AMC employment was ordered to return all AMC materials that he had removed without AMC's consent and was enjoined from testifying and consulting regarding products liability litigation involving AMC, id. at 117-18, the witness at issue here is a non-attorney who operated an independent engineering consulting firm for over six years following his retirement from Fruehauf and who was not found by the trial court to have unlawfully removed any protected documents from his former employer. Because of the substantial factual distinctions and our state's preference for individualized, rather than blanket, determinations of claims of privilege, we do not reach the same result as did Ohio in Huffstutler. Amicus curiae Indiana Defense Lawyers Association urges the application of the approach utilized in Cua v. Morrison, 626 N.E.2d 581 (Ind.Ct.App.1993), adopted, 636 N.E.2d 1248 (Ind.1994), and Canfield v. Sandock, 563 N.E.2d 526 (Ind.1990). While both of those cases principally involved the physician-patient privilege, this Court in Canfield observed the structural equivalence of the physician-patient and the attorney-client privileges, noting that the statutory source of both privileges, Indiana Code section 34-1-14-5, provides as much protection to physician-patient confidences as is provided to attorney-client confidences because of the marked similarity of interests being protected. Canfield, 563 N.E.2d at 529. In Canfield, a personal injury action, the trial court had quashed subpoenas requesting all of the plaintiff's medical records and had granted a protective order prohibiting the defendant from seeking those records from the plaintiff's treating physicians. Id. at 527-28. Although affirming the rulings of the trial court, we noted that when the privilege is asserted, the trial court must review the contested materials and determine whether the claim of privilege is justified or mistaken. Id. at 531. We further observed: The expectation of all parties should be that ... requested documents are either relevant and discoverable or irrelevant but innocuous such that no harm will result from disclosure, that discovery will proceed without the court's participation, and that invocation of the privilege will be reserved to protect from discovery information about only those conditions of the most intimate nature. Id. In Cua, the trial judge was found to have abused his discretion by ordering a personal injury plaintiff to sign a release allowing defense counsel to engage in ex-parte communication with the plaintiff's medical care providers, for the reason that this method poses a substantial threat that privileged information would be disclosed and that such information is not required for fair and efficient trial preparation. Cua, 626 N.E.2d at 584. The court noted the following principal public policy concern: The relationship of patient to physician is a particularly intimate one. To the physician we bare our bodies and or [sic] psyches. We do that in confidence that what is seen and heard will remain unknown to others. The protection of that confidential relationship is worth some inconvenience to the legal process. Id. at 586. We need not decide in the present case whether the structural equivalence of the physician-patient and the attorney-client privileges necessarily requires completely symmetrical application or whether the unique personal intimacy that characterizes the physician-client privilege demands specialized enforcement methodology. In both Sandock and Cua, the existence of the confidential relationship and the resulting privilege was unquestioned, and the information sought to be discovered was clearly derived from that relationship. In contrast to Sandock and Cua, wherein the existence of a physician-patient relationship and its attendant obligation of confidentiality was not in dispute, in the present case the parties vigorously dispute whether non-attorney Hagelthorn's relationship to Fruehauf and its attorneys created enforceable obligations of confidentiality and attorney-client privilege. Furthermore, unlike a physician's knowledge of her patient's medical history, the vast substance of Hagelthorn's general professional engineering knowledge necessarily embodies information not claimed to be privileged. This is not a case calling for extraordinary court action to protect presumptively confidential information. Although the trial court noted Fruehauf's argument that Hagelthorn had been privy to communications protected as work-product or attorney-client privilege, the injunction was not limited to precluding disclosure of specific documents or information that may have fallen within such protections but imposed a blanket restriction upon his right to communicate regarding any and all matters, including his general engineering knowledge and expertise. We conclude that it was an abuse of discretion to enjoin Hagelthorn generally from all consulting and testifying in this case. If Fruehauf seeks to prevent Hagelthorn from the alleged unlawful disclosure of specific information that was obtained by Hagelthorn during his employment and that may be entitled to protection under law, the disclosability of such information is preferably resolved by individual, particularized consideration and adjudication. We vacate the trial court order granting Fruehauf's motion to enjoin Hagelthorn's participation in this case. This case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. SHEPARD, C.J., and DeBRULER, SULLIVAN and SELBY, JJ., concur.