Opinion ID: 2631199
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Extent of Inquiry

Text: Despite the obvious and irreconcilable conflict, not to mention the express wishes of both attorney and client, the trial court denied the motion to withdraw saying, there is no evidence from which I could even begin to conclude that Mr. Stenson was not receiving very competent and professional counsel.  RP (Aug. 3, 1994) at 1503 (emphasis added). The trial court went on to say that competent representation was required and [t]hat's what's present. Id. at 1504. The majority justifies its decision by saying  whatever the disagreements between Stenson and his counsel ... there is no evidence to suggest that the representation Stenson received was in any way inadequate. Majority at 12 (emphasis added). Both the trial court and the majority err by applying generalized standards of adequacy and competency as the measure of irreconcilable conflict between attorney and client. If mere adequacy were the standard, whatever the disagreements between [a defendant] and his counsel, id., an attorney could, over the client's objection, convince a jury his client is guilty and get him convicted as long as the attorney does an adequate job of it. The Ninth Circuit has found error in cases where the court focused on attorney competency rather than the actual conflict, saying the proper focus of such an inquiry is on the nature and extent of the conflict between defendant and counsel, not on whether counsel is legally competent.  United States v. Walker, 915 F.2d 480, 483 (9th Cir.1990), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Nordby, 225 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir.2000). The court also noted that, as in this case, the belief that legal incompetence was the basis of the complaint would only demonstrate the inadequacy of the court's inquiry into the true cause of [defendant's] dissatisfaction. Walker, 915 F.2d at 483. The majority goes so far as to call the effects of the breakdown in communication negligible. Majority at 12. I can scarcely imagine such effects being negligible where (1) two convictions for first degree murder are at stake; (2) the penalty may be death; (3) the attorney and client disagree on whether the only issue in the case is the client's guilt and innocence or life and death; (4) the client asks for substitution of counsel or, in the alternative, to proceed pro se (several times); (5) the attorney doesn't feel like he has an attorney-client relationship, is not communicating with the client, can't stand the sight of him, doesn't want to go on with the case, and asks to be removed; (6) and the client is left in a position where he is afraid to go on with his attorney but also afraid to go on without him. Far from negligible, these circumstances begged for the appointment of new counsel. Both the majority and trial court's focus on competency serves only to demonstrate the inadequacy of the court's inquiry into the true cause of [defendant's] dissatisfaction, and does not satisfy the inquiry into the nature of the conflict itself required under the second factor of the Moore test. Walker, 915 F.2d at 483.