Opinion ID: 202348
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Invalid grounds for departure

Text: 100
101 The PSR recommended a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice based on the defendant's perjury at trial. During sentencing, the district court explained that an upward departure beyond the two-level enhancement was appropriate: 102 That enhancement takes into account only the perjurious testimony of the defendant at trial. It does not account for the fact that he was a fugitive from justice for over four years. It does not account for the fact that the defendant provided false information to the Court.... In this case, the defendant has not only perjured himself at trial but provided false information to the Court and provided false information to the Office of Probation. And as I said, in addition to that, he was a fugitive from justice. So in my view, the obstruction enhancement contained in the presentence report does not adequately reflect the degree and number of occurrences of obstructed behavior engaged in by this defendant so an enhancement beyond the two points contained in the presentence report would be appropriate. 103 The defendant argues that an upward departure from the two-level obstruction of justice enhancement was not appropriate because (a) flight from arrest without engaging in reckless endangerment is classified in the guidelines as the type of conduct not ordinarily warranting an obstruction of justice adjustment and (b) the court offered no factual predicate for its conclusions that the defendant provided false information to the court and the probation office beyond the testimony viewed as perjurious. 12 104 The guidelines provide for a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice if 105 the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice during the course of the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of conviction, and (B) the obstructive conduct related to (i) the defendant's offense of conviction and any relevant conduct; or (ii) a closely related offense. 106 U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. The advisory guidelines further permit a district court to depart upwardly for a factor already taken into consideration in a specific enhancement under certain circumstances: 107 A departure may be warranted in an exceptional case, even though the circumstance that forms the basis for the departure is taken into consideration in determining the guideline range, if the court determines that such circumstance is present in the offense to a degree substantially in excess of ... that which ordinarily is involved in that kind of offense. 108 U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0(a)(3). In this case, the court identified two main reasons for upwardly departing on grounds of obstruction of justice: (1) the defendant's flight from justice and (2) his extensive perjury, beyond perjury at trial. 109 We agree with the defendant that it was not appropriate for the court to justify its departure from the two-level obstruction of justice enhancement based on the defendant's flight from justice. The commentary to the obstruction of justice enhancements lists avoiding or fleeing from arrest (where reckless endangerment was not involved) as a type of conduct which ordinarily do[es] not warrant application of this adjustment but may warrant a greater sentence within the otherwise applicable guideline range or affect the determination of whether other guideline adjustments [e.g., Acceptance of Responsibility] apply. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, cmt. n. 5(d) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Gibson, 409 F.3d 325, 341 (6th Cir.2005) (noting limitations on applicability of obstruction of justice enhancement). The court should have taken this commentary into account when considering whether to apply this departure provision. Cf. United States v. Zapete-Garcia, 447 F.3d 57, 60-61 (1st Cir.2006) (noting that, although the guidelines are not binding, [a] policy statement [in the guidelines] ... must be duly considered by the district judge). 110 We also agree with the defendant that there was not an adequate factual predicate, as far as we can discern from the record, for the court's finding at sentencing that the defendant provided false information to the court and the probation office beyond the perjurious testimony he provided at trial. Such a finding, if factually supported, would have been relevant to the obstruction of justice analysis, and thus whether an upward departure was justified. See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, cmt. n. 4 (b), (f), & (h) (citing, as examples of conduct typically considered to be obstruction of justice, providing materially false information to a judge or magistrate and providing materially false information to a probation officer in respect to a presentence or other investigation for the court). However, the district court never explained what materially false information Wallace provided to the probation office or to the court beyond his trial testimony, and we find nothing apparent from the PSR or other parts of the record in this case. Without any explanation from the district court, we conclude that an upward departure from the two-level enhancement already applicable due to Wallace's perjury at trial was not justified. 111
112 Under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.3, 113 [i]f a victim or victims suffered psychological injury much more serious than that normally resulting from commission of the offense, the court may increase the sentence above the authorized guideline range. The extent of the increase ordinarily should depend on the severity of the psychological injury and the extent to which the injury was intended or knowingly risked. 114 Normally, psychological injury would be sufficiently severe to warrant application of this adjustment only when there is a substantial impairment of the intellectual, psychological, emotional, or behavioral functioning of a victim, when the impairment is likely to be of an extended or continuous duration, and when the impairment manifests itself by physical or psychological symptoms or by changes in behavior patterns. The court should consider the extent to which such harm was likely, given the nature of the defendant's conduct. 115 The district court described how the defendants, particularly this defendant, terrorized their victims. Reciting at length testimony from DiBiasio and Gallinelli, the district noted that the victims thought they were going to die and never see their families again. As DiBiasio testified, he had to stare into the gun pointed at his head, thinking that he would be killed because he could identify the defendant, face unhidden, pointing the gun at him. 116 The defendant argues that, while the victims were no doubt terrified at the time of the robbery, there was no evidence that they suffered the kind of substantial impairment that ordinarily justifies the application of this departure provision. We agree with the defendant that the district court's finding here was clearly erroneous. The district court pointed to no evidence of the victims' physical or psychological symptoms or [] changes in behavior patterns or the extended or continuous duration of any such psychological injuries. U.S.S.G. § 5K2.3. There was some testimony at trial regarding the understandable trauma experienced by the victims, but the vast majority of that testimony relates to how the victims felt at the time of the robbery. The only statement regarding the long-term after-effects of robbery was made by DiBiasio, when he stated that he still dream[s] about [the defendant's] face. Other references in the testimony were made to the fear and emotional state of Gallinelli and the store clerk who hid in the basement, but those statements apparently refer to the trauma they experienced at the time of, or in the days immediately after, the robbery. 117 We do not in any way minimize the terror that the victims felt or the real possibility that this traumatic event might have longstanding psychological consequences for them. However, to support the departure ground invoked by the court, there must be evidence of such consequences in the record. The witnesses did not testify about their sustained psychological injury at trial. No medical or psychiatric records were presented. According to the PSR, no victim impact statement appears to have been submitted by any of the victims. 118 Robbery has a relatively high base offense level, reflecting the serious nature of the offense. See U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1, cmt. (background). While there is evidence that this armed robbery was more terrifying and more personal than typical armed robberies, there is insufficient evidence of sustained psychological injuries suffered by the victims. Without that evidence, there is no basis for concluding these victims' injuries, whatever they may be, are significantly worse than the injuries suffered by victims in the majority of armed robbery cases. Cf. United States v. Pelkey 29 F.3d 11, 16 (1st Cir.1994) (holding that fraud victims' testimony about their feelings of lack of trust, frustration, shock, and depression was altogether insufficient to permit departure for psychological injury because the injuries these people suffered were no worse than that of many fraud victims). Given the lack of evidence, this was an invalid ground for departure in this case. 119
120 Under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.9, [i]f the defendant committed the offense in order to facilitate or conceal the commission of another offense, the court may increase the sentence above the guideline range to reflect the actual seriousness of the defendant's conduct. In applying this departure provision, the court noted two factors: (1) that there is at least some passing reference to the involvement of the defendant and his brother with another brother and the involvement in other criminal activity and (2) that there can be no other purpose for stealing an arsenal of weapons than the facilitation of additional criminal activity .... [s]o the stealing of an arsenal of weapons is by its nature designed to facilitate the commission of other crimes. 121 The defendant argues that there is no factual basis supporting the application of this departure provision here and that the district court erred by relying on speculation that this crime was designed to facilitate some other crimes. We agree. The focus of a criminal facilitation departure from a guidelines range is on the specific criminal activity being facilitated or concealed and the nexus between that criminal activity and the offense charged. See United States v. Hawkins, 901 F.2d 863, 866 (10th Cir.1990). While the sentencing guidelines permit the court to consider uncharged conduct related to the offense of conviction in applying this departure provision, Figaro, 935 F.2d at 7, the specific criminal conduct relied upon here is unclear. A passing reference at trial to the fact that one of the stolen guns was found in the apartment of the defendant's brother Kamal does not establish that some other type of criminal activity was being facilitated or concealed by the robbery. And we cannot conclude that, in every conceivable factual scenario, the theft of multiple weapons is always designed to facilitate some other crime. Indeed, such a finding would be problematic here because the adjusted offense level for the underlying crime already accounts for the fact that a large number of guns were stolen. See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(C) (multiple weapons enhancement). 122 The district court needed to make a specific factual finding of the criminal conduct being facilitated in this case, and it did not do so. Without that finding, we cannot conclude that a proper nexus between the offense here and some other criminal conduct exists. See United States v. Ogbeide, 911 F.2d 793, 796 (D.C.Cir. 1990) (concluding that, in absence of an explanation of what other offense the sentencing court had in mind in upwardly departing under § 5K2.9, the sentencing court may have improperly relied on conduct already accounted for in the guidelines); see also Hawkins, 901 F.2d at 866 (Without a demonstration of [] a nexus [between the charged offense and the other criminal conduct], there is no factual support for an upward departure under § 5K2.9.). Thus, this was an invalid ground for departure in this case. 123
124 Under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a), [i]f reliable information indicates that the defendant's criminal history category substantially under-represents the seriousness of the defendant's criminal history or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes, an upward departure may be warranted. The type of information that may support such an upward departure is whether a defendant was pending trial or sentencing on another charge at the time of the instant offense. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(2)(D); see also id., cmt., n. 2(A)(iv) (An upward departure from the defendant's criminal history category may be warranted based on ... [c]ommission of the instant offense while on bail or pretrial release for another serious offense.). When a departure is appropriate, the sentencing court shall determine the extent of a departure ... by using, as a reference, the criminal history category applicable to defendants whose criminal history or likelihood to recidivate most closely resembles that of the defendant's. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(4)(A). 125 In this case, the PSR assigned zero criminal history points to Wallace because he had no prior criminal convictions, resulting in a criminal history category of I (applicable to defendants with 0-1 criminal history points). In upwardly departing from a criminal history category of I to a category of III (applicable to defendants with 4-6 criminal history points), the district court relied on the fact that the defendant committed the robbery while under indictment for murder. The defendant argues that the district court made no findings as to whether he was aware of the indictment at the time of the robbery, and thus there was no basis to depart upwardly. The defendant further argues that, assuming that the commission of a crime while under indictment for another crime was a proper basis for an upward departure in his case, remand is warranted because the district court offered no explanation for its conclusion that the facts in his case justified an upward departure to a criminal history category of III, effectively adding 4-6 points to his criminal history points. 126 We have not previously addressed whether the commission of a crime while under indictment for another serious crime is an appropriate ground for upwardly departing from a defendant's criminal history category. If the defendant knew that he was indicted for a certain crime, his commission of another offense while under that indictment is arguably indicative of his likelihood to commit other crimes. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a). 13 This situation is akin to the example listed in the guidelines of committing an offense while on bail or pretrial release for another serious offense. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(2)(D), cmt., n. 2(A)(iv). In both scenarios, no adjudication of guilt has occurred, but the defendant's commission of a crime during a period in which one would expect a careful abidance to the law arguably demonstrates his or her propensity for criminal behavior, at least for the purposes of sentencing. In this case, the defendant is hard pressed to argue that he did not know that he was under indictment for murder at the time of the robbery, given his numerous arguments on appeal that his flight and use of aliases during that period of time might have been due to evading the murder charge. 127 It is a more difficult question whether the defendant's commission of this robbery while under indictment is a valid basis for finding that his criminal history category, or even the next higher criminal history category,  substantially under-represents the seriousness of the defendant's criminal history or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3. Assuming that the facts do support an upward departure in criminal history category in general, we note that the district court here departed to a criminal history category of III — a departure that, with a 34 adjusted offense level, shifted the guidelines range for Counts I and II from 155-188 months to 188-235 months. The court did not explain why such an increase was appropriate in this case. The upward departure essentially added 4-6 points to Wallace's criminal history points. Yet, under the guidelines, if a defendant had committed a robbery while under any criminal justice sentence, including probation, parole, supervised release, imprisonment, work release, or escape status, only 2 points would have been added to his or her criminal history points. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d); see also U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(4)(A) (explaining that the sentencing court shall determine the extent of a departure ... by using, as a reference, the criminal history category applicable to defendants whose criminal history or likelihood to recidivate most closely resembles that of the defendant's). Without any explanation of why the court chose a departure of this extent, we cannot conclude that it was justified on the record here. As we have explained, 128 [a]lthough we accord substantial leeway to a sentencing court's determination of the appropriate degree of departure, this freedom does not relieve [it] from explaining its ultimate decision of how far to depart. Merely explaining why a departure was made does not fulfill the separate requirement of stating the reasons for imposing the particular sentence. 129 United States v. Pratt, 73 F.3d 450, 453-54 (1st Cir.1996) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (remanding for further explanation why upward departure from Criminal History Category I to III was justified). Thus, even assuming that some departure in criminal history category is justified here, we are unable to evaluate responsibly the reasonableness of the extent of the court's departure absent explication, which we observe might include at least an indication of why a one category increase is inadequate in this case. Id. at 454. 130