Opinion ID: 1607506
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: summary judgment for insured [5]

Text: Next, Broker argues that the court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Insured for two reasons: (1) Insured failed to timely assert its claim that the policy was void in Insurer's summary judgment motion, thus allowing an order to be entered that predicated its decision on the fact that a valid policy was existent for Insured at the time Financier cancelled it; and (2) the trial court previously held in Insurer's summary judgment motion that the policy was in effect, but had been cancelled by Insured's attorney-in-fact, thus precluding an order that no policy was in existence by reason of mutual mistake. We agree on both bases. Though Broker attempts to fit its analysis within a res judicata theory, that is incorrect because at the time of the second summary judgment, Insurer's summary judgment order was not final and unreversed. The correct analysis is found in the theory of law of the case. We explained this doctrine in Shaffer v. Honeywell, Inc., 249 N.W.2d 251, 260 (S.D.1976). The law of the case doctrine is intended to afford a measure of finality to litigated issues. It is a rule of practice and procedure which for policy reasons provides that once an issue is litigated and decided it should remain settled for all subsequent stages of the litigation. See, e.g., Topps-Toeller, Inc. v. City of Lansing, 1973, 47 Mich.App. 720, 209 N.W.2d 843.... It is the weaker corollary of the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel and stare decisis and is intended to prove some degree of certainty where those doctrines could not yet apply. Topps-Toeller, supra. Its scope of application is reflected in the statement of the general rule: `In the earlier decisions of this court it was well settled that a question decided on a former appeal became the law of the case, not to be questioned in a second or any subsequent appeal involving any branch of the case.' Gamble v. Keyes, 1925, 49 S.D. 39, 43, 206 N.W. 477, 478. See also, American State Bank v. List-Mayer, 350 N.W.2d 44, 46 (S.D.1984). Here, all parties litigated whether Insured had cancelled the policy through its attorney-in-fact, Financier. Insured had notice of the hearing on Insurer's summary judgment motion and was present with counsel. The trial court ruled that Insured had cancelled the policy. A policy could not have been cancelled without first being in effect. Insured allowed this order to be entered without any objection. This order by the trial court precluded it from then, two weeks later, ruling that no policy existed because of mutual mistake. Therefore, under the doctrine of law of the case, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Insured. Shaffer, supra ; American State Bank, supra . Therefore, we affirm the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Insurer, but we reverse the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Insured, and remand with instructions to enter an order in accord with this opinion.