Opinion ID: 1473555
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Stepparent Exception

Text: The final question is whether, despite the legality of an adoption by an unmarried couple in the best interests of the child, the legal effects provision, D.C.Code § 16-312(a)quoted in full in Part III. B. abovewould cut off Bruce's relationship with Hillary as her adoptive (and thus natural) parent if Mark's petition to adopt Hillary is granted. This provision has two discernible purposes: (1) to guarantee the adopted child's right of inheritance and succession as though that child had been born to the adopting parent or parents in lawful wedlock, and (2) to cut off all rights and duties between the natural parents and the adopted child, including those of inheritance and successionexcept that no such rights and relations, including inheritance and succession, shall be altered in any way when one of the natural parents is the spouse of the adopter. The specified exception reflects the typical stepparent situation identified in § 16-302. It recognizes that when a natural parent remarries and plans to live with his or her children and new spouse as a family unit, the statutory cut off requirementterminating the birth parent's rights so that the adopting parent and child can begin a new family without interference by the birth parentdoes not apply. Indeed, an important goal of adoption, to strengthen the [] family as a social unit, Application of Sage, 21 Wash. App. 803, 586 P.2d 1201, 1203 (1978), would be frustrated altogether if adoption by a stepparent would terminate the parental relationship between the birth parent and the child with whom both parents plan to live. The trial court concluded that the cut-off language of § 36-312 is mandatory, not directory, and that its literal limitation to preserving the parental rights of the spouse of an adopting stepparent would preclude its use to save Bruce's parental rights if Mark were allowed to adopt Hillary. To the contrary, we do not hesitate to hold that this stepparent exception applies here, even though the natural parent (by adoption), Bruce, is not the spouse of the adopter, Mark. In the first place, the stepparent exception easily applies here by analogy; Bruce and Mark are living together in a committed personal relationship, as though married, and are jointly caring for Hillary as their child. Second, we have held that the particular provisions in § 16-302 referring to adoption by a married couple do not foreclose adoption by an unmarried couple. Section 16-312, which announces the legal effects of adoption, does not apply unless and until a petitioner qualifies for adoption under § 16-302, which prescribes who may adopt. Accordingly, § 16-312 is subject to the fundamental inclusiveness of § 16-302. It follows that the stepparent exceptionreflecting the married couple example identified in § 16-302cannot be limited exclusively to couples who marry. Were we to limit the exception literally to a stepparent, forcing a cutoff of Bruce's parental rights if Mark were allowed to adopt, we would be interpreting the plain language of the statute in a way that imposes absurd results and obvious injustice, Peoples Drug Stores, 470 A.2d at 754, whenever two unmarried persons, one of whom has adopted a child, decide to live together and form a family with that child. See also Adoption of B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d at 1274 (unreasonable and irrational result). If the limitation were literally applied, unmarried couples who simultaneously seek to adopt a child could do so unaffected by the cut off provision of § 16-312(a), whereas unmarried couples in Bruce's and Mark's situation could not do soa result that would make no sense whatsoever, and would clearly harm the child if joint adoption were in the child's best interests. Finally, the case law supports extending the § 16-312 stepparent exception to Mark's, Bruce's, and Hillary's situation. In In re J.H., we held that D.C.Code §§ 16-302 and 312(a) authorized a father of an illegitimate child to adopt the child, with the natural mother's consent, in order to make him the petitioner's heir-at-law. 313 A.2d at 874. The mother and father apparently were not married. Although the § 16-312 cut off issue was not raised, it did not appear that the mother was giving up her child, and there was not a hint that the adoption would affect her parental rights. In Adoption of B.L.V.B., the Supreme Court of Vermont applied a statutory scheme that included a cut off provision with a stepparent exception similar to D.C.Code § 16-312(a). One member of a committed, same-sex couple (Jane) had given birth to two sons after artificial insemination by an anonymous sperm donor; her partner (Deborah) sought to legally adopt the children, while leaving Jane's parental rights in tact. 628 A.2d at 1272. The probate court denied the adoption on purely legal grounds; the Supreme Court of Vermont reversed. With respect to the interplay between the cut off provision and the stepparent exception, as they affected Jane's rights upon Deborah's adoption of Jane's children, the court opined: The statute also terminates the natural parents' rights upon adoption, but this provision anticipates that the adoption of children will remove them from the home of the biological parents, where the biological parents elect or are compelled to terminate their legal obligations to the child. This legislative intent is evidenced by the stepparent exception, which saves the natural parent's rights in a stepparent adoption. The legislature recognized that it would be against common sense to terminate the biological parent's rights when that parent will continue to raise and be responsible for the child, albeit in a family unit with a partner who is biologically unrelated to the child. Although the precise circumstances of these adoptions may not have been contemplated during the initial drafting of the statute, the general intent and spirit of § 448 [the cut off provision] is entirely consistent with them. The intent of the legislature was to protect the security of family units by defining the legal rights and responsibilities of children who find themselves in circumstances that do not include two biological parents. Despite the narrow wording of the step-parent exception, we cannot conclude that the legislature ever meant to terminate the parental rights of a biological parent who intended to continue raising a child with the help of a partner. Such a narrow construction would produce the unreasonable and irrational result of defeating adoptions that are otherwise indisputably in the best interests of children. 628 A.2d at 1274 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Other courts have held the same. See Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 321 (sustaining joint petition for adoption of child by biological mother and her same-sex, committed life partner, without termination of biological mother's parental relationship under termination provision similar to D.C.Code § 16-312(a)); In re Evan, 153 Misc.2d 844, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997, 1000 (Sur.Ct. 1992) (upholding adoption of child by biological mother's same-sex partner under statutory provision similar to D.C.Code § 16-312(a)); but see In Interest of Angel Lace M., 184 Wis.2d 492, 516 N.W.2d 678, 683 & nn. 8-9, 11 (1994) (unmarried mother's life partner could not adopt child without terminating mother's parental rights because statute literally required such termination unless birth parent is spouse of adoptive parent). In light of the logic inherent in the statutory scheme, and given the case law where courts have extended stepparent exceptions under cut off provisions to cover unmarried, though personally committed, same-sex couples, we are satisfied that § 16-312(a) is no impediment to Bruce's retaining his parental relationship with Hillary upon Mark's adoption of Hillary.