Opinion ID: 222706
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Comparability of plaintiffs' and defense's counsel fees

Text: Although we have concluded already that remand is necessary, it is appropriate to address and firmly reject plaintiffs' other challenge to the fee award, arising from the Supreme Court's recent opinion in Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 1662, 176 L.Ed.2d 494 (2010). In Perdue, the Court approved, only in extraordinary circumstances, an increase in the attorneys' fee lodestar due to superior performance and results. Id. at 1669. Two Justices specially concurred in emphasis of the rarity of such cases. See id. at 1677 (Kennedy, J, concurring); id. at 1677-78 (Thomas, J., concurring). True, Perdue notes in passing that the lodestar method produces an award that roughly approximates the fee that the prevailing attorney would have received if he or she had been representing a paying client who was billed by the hour in a comparable case. Id. at 1672 (emphasis in original). But Perdue never requires or even hints at the plaintiffs' proposition: that their hourly rates should approximate those charged by the defense counsel. The plaintiffs persuaded the district court to allow discovery of defense counsel's fees and to write on the question of parity between plaintiff and defense counsel. No prior Fifth Circuit authority requires this comparison, nor does common experience, because the tasks and roles of counsel on opposite sides of a case vary fundamentally. If there were logical comparability, this court's decisions would have recognized it in the Johnson factors or in past lodestar decisions. And if, perchance, defense counsel had charged less in the course of this litigation, plaintiffs would have avoided any paean to comparability. See Graves v. Barnes, 700 F.2d 220 (5th Cir.1983). To top it off, opposing counsel's total charge for the litigation was $4,864,923.37only $124,728 more than the court awarded to plaintiffs. That difference is just 2.63% of plaintiffs' total fee award (and 2.15% of plaintiffs' total award including costs). One would suppose a 2.63% disparity falls within a rough approximation, [6] but this leads plaintiffs down a new rabbit trail, and they begin to argue about the higher time-value of money for fees paid during the litigation than at its conclusion. We decline to layer needless complexity in an area in which current law is practical and clear. On remand, the district court need not consider Perdue.