Opinion ID: 2291534
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The proper timing of the decision whether to admit other crimes evidence.

Text: Our holding that the intent exception applies only where intent is a meaningful controverted issue, and that admission of other crimes evidence turns in part on the defense presented, provides a persuasive reason to require trial judges to make the determination to admit or exclude only after they have sufficient information to assess both probative value and prejudicial effect. Accordingly, we make explicit what was at least implicit in this court's prior decisions, and now hold that the decision whether other crimes evidence is admissible under the intent exception should ordinarily be deferred until the trial judge has sufficient knowledge of the government's need for the evidence, and of the defendant's defense, to make an informed judgment. [15] Specifically, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, [16] the government may not be permitted to introduce other crimes evidence in its case in chief to prove intent, (including specific intent where the evidence of such intent is sufficient to go to the jury when the prosecution rests, and the defendant so acknowledges). Graves, supra, 515 A.2d at 1142; see also, Willcher, supra, 408 A.2d at 76; Pounds v. United States, 529 A.2d 791, 795 n. 6 (D.C.1987). As explained in Graves, 515 A.2d at 1141-42, this approach has the virtues of faithfulness to Drew's basic message and of assuring that other crimes evidence is not admitted until the court is in a position to weigh probative value against prejudice by reference to the defense case. In so holding, we join what we believe to be the more persuasive authorities on an issue on which the courts are sharply divided. We agree with the writer of a leading treatise that when the evidence of another crime is offered with regard to knowledge, intent or the like, it often will be wise to wait until the defendant has sharpened the issue by claiming accident, mistake or involuntariness in his opening statement or presentation of evidence, or by raising special defenses in advance. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE, § 190, at 565 (1984 ed.). As Judge Feinberg explained for the court in United States v. Benedetto, 571 F.2d 1246, 1248-1249 (2d Cir.1978), the danger that the jury, if told of other crimes at the outset, will impermissibly infer that the defendant is a bad man who probably committed the crime charged, requires that such strongly prejudicial evidence should normally await the conclusion of the defendant's case, since the court will then be in the best position to balance the probative worth of, and the government's need for, [17] such testimony against the prejudice to the defendant. There are cases to the contrary. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 725 F.2d 462, 466 (8th Cir.1984) (where intent is an element of the offense, the government need not await the defendant's denial of intent before offering evidence of similar acts relevant to that issue); United States v. Webb, 625 F.2d 709, 710 (5th Cir.1980). [18] We decline to follow these decisions because we believe that the approach described in this opinion fully protects the legitimate interests of the prosecution and at the same time prevents the premature reception of devastatingly prejudicial evidence in cases in which it may subsequently appear that its admission was unnecessary.