Opinion ID: 1889175
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Was the State's Examination of Vega-Lara Reversible Error?

Text: Having determined that Mitchell applies, we consider the facts of this case to determine whether the district court committed reversible error by allowing the State to call Vega-Lara as a witness. See Mitchell, 268 Minn. at 518, 130 N.W.2d at 132 (We must determine the issue before us on the basis of the record.). We, as well as other courts, have articulated two different theories under which the State's decision to call a witness who refuses to testify may be reversible error. Id. at 517, 130 N.W.2d at 131; Namet, 373 U.S. at 186-187, 83 S.Ct. 1151. Under the first theory of errorthe bad-faith theoryreversible error results, regardless of actual prejudice, where the prosecution calls a witness for the purpose of prejudicing the defendant in the minds of the jury, knowing that the witness will claim immunity. Mitchell, 268 Minn. at 517, 130 N.W.2d at 130; see also Namet, 373 U.S. at 186, 83 S.Ct. 1151. Under the second theory of errorthe unfair-prejudice theoryreversible error results if the State calls a witness in good faith and the State's examination is of a type that has prejudiced defendant to the extent that he has been denied a fair trial. Mitchell, 268 Minn. at 517, 130 N.W.2d at 131; see also Namet, 373 U.S. at 187, 83 S.Ct. 1151.
Morales argues that the State called Vega-Lara in bad faith because the State knew Vega-Lara would claim a privilege and refuse to testify. In Mitchell, we stated that a codefendant or accomplice may not be called [by the State] for the purpose of extracting a claim of privilege against incrimination because the State is obligated to refrain from invalid conduct creating an atmosphere prejudicial to the substantial rights of the defendant. 268 Minn. at 515-16, 130 N.W.2d at 130. Based on this premise, we held in Mitchell that where the prosecution calls a witness for the purpose of prejudicing the defendant in the minds of the jury, knowing that the witness will claim immunity, reversible error results, regardless of actual prejudice. Id. at 517, 130 N.W.2d at 131. We indicated in Mitchell that the State's knowledge that a witness will refuse to testify may be enough to conclude that it called the witness in bad faith. See id. at 516, 130 N.W.2d at 130. We quoted Judge Learned Hand for the proposition that if the prosecution puts the question knowing the privilege will be asserted, `it is charged with notice of the probable effect of his refusal upon the jury's mind.' Id. at 516, 130 N.W.2d at 130 (quoting United States v. Maloney, 262 F.2d 535, 537 (2d Cir. 1959)). In both Mitchell and Black , in which we concluded that the State did not call a witness in bad faith, we noted that it was not clear whether the witness would actually refuse to answer questions. Black, 291 N.W.2d at 212; Mitchell, 268 Minn. at 520, 130 N.W.2d at 132. [8] Here, unlike in Mitchell and Black , the State knew with a high degree of certainty that Vega-Lara would refuse to testify. Vega-Lara consistently and persistently refused to do so. In pretrial proceedings, Morales explained that Vega-Lara would not testify. Later, Vega-Lara's counsel explained to the district court that even if the court granted Vega-Lara immunity, he would not testify for fear of a perjury prosecution. Finally, immediately before being called as a witness, Vega-Lara reaffirmed that he would refuse to testify. And, unlike in Mitchell, Morales objected, asserting at trial that the State wants[s] to call this witness solely for the purpose of having the jury see him, an alleged co-conspirator of the defendant, invoke a [F]ifth [A]mendment privilege and objected to the State's decision to call Vega-Lara on those grounds. In this case, the State had notice that the jury would draw unfavorable inferences from Vega-Lara's refusal to testify and impute Vega-Lara's perceived culpability onto Morales. See Mitchell, 268 Minn. at 516, 130 N.W.2d at 130. But because the district court ordered Vega-Lara to testify and the State believed that Vega-Lara did not have a valid privilege to refuse to testify, the State may have had a legitimate reason for calling Vega-Lara besides creating an atmosphere prejudicial to Morales by extracting a claim of privilege from Vega-Lara. See id. at 520, 130 N.W.2d at 132. The State may have called Vega-Lara so that the court would hold him in contempt upon his expected refusal. Though the lack of a valid privilege does not proscribe the application of the Mitchell framework to a defendant's claim of error, we have cited a lack of privilege and seeking to have a refusing witness held in contempt as indications that the State did not call a witness in bad faith. See Black, 291 N.W.2d at 212. [9] Additionally, the State may have wanted to call Vega-Lara so that it could introduce Vega-Lara's prior testimony. See id. ([I]t is fair to say that the prosecution called her to determine with certainty whether or not she would testify and, if not, to lay a foundation for the introduction of her prior statements and testimony.). Though the court did not allow Vega-Lara's prior testimony to be admitted as substantive evidence, Vega-Lara's prior testimony demonstrates that the State may have had other reasons for calling Vega-Lara besides extracting a claim of privilege against incrimination. Mitchell, 268 Minn. at 515, 130 N.W.2d at 130. We acknowledge that the State gave no indication that it wanted the district court to hold Vega-Lara in contempt, nor did it made such a request. Instead, the State sought to question Vega-Lara. The State believed it was entitled to call Vega-Lara and question him because it believed that Vega-Lara did not have a valid privilege. The State declared to the court: In this circumstance Mr. Vega-Lara has been granted use immunity by this Court, he has been ordered to answer all of the questions put to him by the State, and I would intend to ask him each question and if he chooses not to answer then we would proceed that way until I have exhausted the questions I intend to... ask him. The State was mistaken in this assertion; it did not have an absolute right to question Vega-Lara. As we have already stated, a witness's refusal to testify can be unfairly prejudicial to the defendant even if the refusal is not legitimate. See Griffin, 66 F.3d at 71; see also Martin, 756 A.2d at 905; Gearns, 577 N.W.2d at 434-35. It cannot be disputed that the State knew with a great degree of certainty that Vega-Lara would refuse to testify and therefore is `charged with notice of the probable effect of his refusal upon the jury's mind.' Mitchell, 268 Minn. at 516, 130 N.W.2d at 130 (quoting Maloney, 262 F.2d at 537). But the record also indicates that the State may have called Vega-Lara as a witness for reasons other than to obtain[] from him the claim of privilege against incrimination in the presence of the jury. Id. at 515, 130 N.W.2d at 130. Therefore, under the facts and circumstances of this case, we conclude that the State did not call Vega-Lara in bad faith.
Even though the State's decision to call Vega-Lara was not by itself reversible error, the unfairness of extracting a claim of privilege from Vega-Lara may still be reversible error under the second theory of error that we articulated in Mitchell the unfair-prejudice theory. See 268 Minn. at 517, 130 N.W.2d at 131. When analyzing the unfair-prejudice theory, the focus is on the substance and manner of the State's examination of the witness rather than on the decision to call the witness to testify. In Mitchell, we stated that reversible error occurs when the State's examination of a witness who refuses to testify prejudices a defendant to the extent that he has been denied a fair trial. 268 Minn. at 517, 130 N.W.2d at 131. Similarly, the Supreme Court has said that reversible error occurs when inferences from a witness' refusal to answer add[] critical weight to the prosecution's case in a form not subject to cross-examination, and thus unfairly prejudice[] the defendant. Namet, 373 U.S. at 187, 83 S.Ct. 1151. Therefore, we next address whether the State's questioning of Vega-Lara was prejudicial to the extent that the act of questioning Vega-Lara denied Morales a fair trial. See Mitchell, 268 Minn. at 517, 130 N.W.2d at 131. In concluding that there was no error under the unfair-prejudice theory, we observed in Mitchell that the State's questions were brief, were not fact-laden, and did not go to the substance of the [charged] offense. Id. at 521, 130 N.W.2d at 133. In reaching the same conclusion in Black , we observed that the State's questions were brief and that the jury was not left to speculate as to what [the witness's] testimony might have been, because her earlier statements were introduced into evidence substantively as statements against penal interest under Minn. R. Evid. 804(b)(3). Black, 291 N.W.2d at 212-13. Here, the circumstances of the State's questioning and Vega-Lara's refusals were quite different from those in Mitchell or Black . The State's direct examination of Vega-Lara was extensive, taking up 20 pages of trial transcript, and Vega-Lara refused to answer each question posed by the State. Moreover, the State's questions were heavily fact-laden and each went directly to the substance of the charged offenses. The questions were leading and represented an extensive narrative of the robbery and murder. The State asked Vega-Lara about the events leading up to the murder, including whether Vega-Lara spoke with Morales about robbing the house of prostitution, whether Vega-Lara went to the house carrying a gun on March 13 with Morales and Solorzano-O'Brien, whether Morales also carried a gun and wore a hat, and whether Vega-Lara and Solorzano-O'Brien went into the bedrooms with the two women while Morales sat on the couch. The State also asked a sequence of questions about the specific events of the murder, including these questions in the following order:  When you were at [the house of prostitution] on March 13th of 2006, did Angel Morales pull out his gun?  [D]id Angel Morales point the gun at Victor Mesa-Ortiz for the purpose of robbing him?  Did Victor Mesa-Ortiz resist when Angel Morales pointed the gun at him and tried to rob him?  When Angel Morales and Victor Mesa-Ortiz were struggling over the gun that was held by Angel Morales, did you take your gun and shoot Victor Mesa-Ortiz? As Vega-Lara refused to answer each question, the State in essence attempted to impeach him with his prior testimony, asking further leading questions about the events of the crime. For example, the State was allowed to ask Vega-Lara, Do you recall being asked was there a reason that Angel Morales wanted to go to [the house of prostitution].... And did you then say, `yeah, because he had told me he wanted to rob the [house]?' and, Did you previously testify that [Morales] pointed the gun at Victor Mesa-Ortiz ... for the purpose of robbing him? When pieced together, the State's questions to Vega-Lara at trial provided the only detailed narrative of the crime that was consistent with the State's theory of the case. The only other evidence the State introduced that implicated Morales were statements Morales allegedly made to M.G. about his plans to rob a house of prostitution. But those statements gave little detail about Morales's plans, and the credibility of M.G.'s testimony on these statements was attacked on cross-examination. In contrast, Vega-Lara's examination was lengthy and provided the jury with the only descriptive eyewitness account of the murder. The State had no other direct evidenceand very little circumstantial evidenceagainst Morales beyond evidence that a third man wearing a hat accompanied Vega-Lara and Solorzano-O'Brien to the house of prostitution on the day of the murder. We guard against allowing the State to call a witness who refuses to testify because such refusals encourage the jury to draw unfavorable inferences that may prejudice the defendant. See Mitchell, 268 Minn. at 516, 130 N.W.2d at 130. Because Vega-Lara refused to answer each of the State's questions in what was a lengthy and detailed examination, the jury had several opportunities to draw inferences unfavorable to Morales. The fact that the State was allowed to introduce Vega-Lara's prior testimony for what was essentially impeachment purposes perhaps added to the prejudice, because Vega-Lara's prior testimony essentially supplied the jury with particular incriminating inferences consistent with the State's theory. [10] In addition to the unfair-prejudice concern about improper inferences from an accomplice's refusal to testify articulated in Mitchell, we have warned in other cases against allowing the State to call a witness only to impeach the witness with prior testimony. In State v. Dexter, we affirmed a district court's ruling barring the prosecution from impeaching one of its own witnesses with extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statement[s] because the State sought to present, in the guise of impeachment, evidence which is not otherwise admissible. 269 N.W.2d 721, 721 (Minn.1978). Later, in State v. Ortlepp, we explained that: [A] problem arises when a prosecutor calls a witness who has given a prior statement implicating the defendant.... If the prosecutor is permitted to call th[e] witness and use the prior statement for impeachment purposes, there is a large risk that the jury, even if properly instructed, will consider the prior statement as substantive evidence. 363 N.W.2d 39, 42-43 (Minn.1985). Here, because Vega-Lara's testimony consisted of nothing more than his refusals to testify, there was an especially great risk that the jury would treat his prior testimony as substantive evidence. As Ortlepp explains, the district court's instruction to the jury did not necessarily cure the prejudice. See 363 N.W.2d at 42-43. We acknowledge that in some situations, the introduction of prior testimony may have the opposite effect: it may reduce the danger of unfair prejudice. For example, in Black , we stated that the State's questioning of the witness was not unfairly prejudicial in part because [t]he jury was not left to speculate as to what [the witness's] testimony might have been as the witness's prior testimony was introduced into evidence. 291 N.W.2d at 212. But in Black , the prior testimony was admitted as substantive evidence, see id. at 213; here, the evidence was not. We conclude that the State's ability to call Vega-Lara and then present his prior testimony provided the State with an opportunity to introduce evidence that the district court had ruled was not otherwise admissible. See Dexter, 269 N.W.2d at 721. In this situation, unlike in Black , the introduction of the prior testimony increased the unfair prejudice we were concerned about in Mitchell. Given that the State's examination of Vega-Lara was lengthy, provided the jury with numerous opportunities to make inferences, and additionally provided specific prejudicial inferences in the form of non-substantive evidence, we conclude that the State's questioning of Vega-Lara was prejudicial and unfair and amounted to reversible error under Mitchell. [11] Because we conclude that the questioning of Vega-Lara requires reversal of Morales's conviction, we need not address Morales's argument that the impeachment of Vega-Lara was improper for the reason that Vega-Lara's refusal to testify at Morales's trial was not inconsistent with and did not contradict his prior testimony. The dissent argues that the questioning of Vega-Lara was not unfairly prejudicial because the State was attempting to lay the foundation for Vega-Lara's testimony to be admitted as substantive evidence under Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(A). The dissent states that [b]ecause the State's questions were grounded in our rule of evidence, Morales was not subject to unfair prejudice. We disagree. Even if the State's actions were within the rules of evidence, that fact alone does not dictate that we conclude the State's actions were not unfairly prejudicial. According to Mitchell, the test is whether the State's examination of the refusing witness was brief, fact-laden, and went to the substance of the charged offensenot whether the State was following the rules of evidence in questioning the witness. 268 Minn. at 521, 130 N.W.2d at 133. The same principle is true in other contexts: even if evidence is admissible under some rule of evidence, it may be error to admit that evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Minn. R. Evid. 403. In Black , we cited the State's need to lay foundation for a prior inconsistent statement as a legitimate reason to call a witness the State thought would refuse to testify. 291 N.W.2d at 212. But we did not cite the need for foundation as a reason why the questioning of the witness was not prejudicial to the defendant in Black . Rather, we concluded that the questioning of a refusing witness was not reversible error after considering the substance of the questioning and determining that the questions were brief. Id. It appears that in Black , the witness's attorney and the district court asked the witness questions, and then the court held the witness in contempt after the witness refused to testify during direct examination by the State. See id. Nothing in our opinion in Black suggests that the State was allowed to question the witness at length after she refused to testify. Therefore, the questioning at issue here is distinguishable. We recognize that the State was in a difficult position in this case. The only alleged eyewitness to the crime, beside Morales, refused to testify after being ordered to do so by the district court. Regardless of the State's difficult position, Morales has a right to a fair trial, and the obstinacy of a witness who refuses to testify cannot threaten that right or justify trial conduct we held in Mitchell to be unfairly prejudicial. We and other jurisdictions have explained that a witness's refusal to testify can be prejudicial to the defendant when the questions asked of the witness are fact-laden and `plant in the jury's mind full details as to how [the State] claimed [the] crime was committed.' Mitchell, 268 Minn. at 520-21, 130 N.W.2d at 133 (quoting Washburn v. State, 164 Tex.Crim. 448, 299 S.W.2d 706, 707 (Tex.Crim.App.1956)). Neither Vega-Lara's refusal to cooperate nor the State's need to lay foundation excuses the State's unfairly prejudicial questioning. Given the State's difficult position and the risk of unfair prejudice, a better course of action may have been for the district court to allow the State to question Vega-Lara outside of the presence of the jury in order to lay foundation, or, in other words, to ascertain if Vega-Lara would testify in a manner inconsistent with his previous testimony. Under such a scenario, if the district court ultimately determined that the evidence is not admissible as substantive evidence as the court did here, there would have been no unfair prejudice to Morales because the prejudicial questioning would have occurred outside the presence of the jury.
The State argues that the district court erred when it refused to admit Vega-Lara's statements as substantive evidence under the catchall hearsay exception in Minn. R. Evid. 807, or as non-hearsay under Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(A). The State then cites Ortlepp, 363 N.W.2d 39 (Minn.1985) for the proposition that any Dexter problem that may arise when a prosecutor calls a witness and is permitted to use a prior statement for impeachment purposes is resolved if the prior statements admitted for impeachment purposes were also admissible as substantive evidence. See id. at 42-43. According to the State's argument, if Vega-Lara's statements were admissible as substantive evidence, there was no reversible error. While we may have said in Ortlepp that there is no Dexter problem if the impeachment evidence was also admissible as substantive evidence, we have never said that such an event would resolve concerns under Mitchell. But, as indicated above, we did state in Black that the admission of a refusing witness's prior statement reduced the unfair prejudice to the defendant because the prior testimony made it so [t]he jury was not left to speculate as to what [the witness's] testimony might have been. 291 N.W.2d at 212. If Vega-Lara's prior out-of-court statements were admissible substantively under Rules 807 or 801(d)(1)(A), that fact may affect whether Morales was unfairly prejudiced by the State's questioning of Vega-Lara. Therefore, we address the State's claim that Vega-Lara's testimony was admissible as substantive evidence under Rules 801(d)(1)(A) and 807. Minnesota Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A) provides that a statement is not hearsay if [t]he declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is (A) inconsistent with the declarant's testimony, and was given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition. Prior statements must meet all the requirements under Rule 801(d)(1)(A) in order to be admissible as substantive evidence. We conclude that Vega-Lara's prior testimony cannot be admitted under Rule 801(d)(1)(A) because Vega-Lara was not subject to cross examination at Morales's trial concerning the statement[s]. Rule 801(d)(1) requires that a witness be `testable about the statement, meaning that he must be reasonably responsive to questions on the circumstances in which he made it.' State v. Amos, 658 N.W.2d 201, 206 (Minn.2003) (quoting 4 Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 404, at 175 (2d ed.1994)). Vega-Lara answered one question on cross-examination but was otherwise completely unresponsive. He refused to answer all other questions regarding his prior testimony. For example, counsel for Morales asked Vega-Lara, Did you testify at your own trial that the planning was done by Mr. Morales in order to place the blame on Mr. Morales instead of yourself? And Vega-Lara responded, Refuse to answer. This answer, like all but one of Vega-Lara's answers, was not reasonably responsive to the question asked. See Amos, 658 N.W.2d at 206. Accordingly, we conclude that Vega-Lara was not reasonably responsive to the questions regarding the circumstances in which he made his prior statements, and therefore, his prior testimony was not admissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(A). Having reached this conclusion, we need not address the other requirements of Rule 801(d)(1)(A). Therefore, we hold that Vega-Lara's prior statements were not admissible as substantive evidence under Rule 801(d)(1)(A). The State argues that Vega-Lara's testimony was also admissible as substantive evidence under Minn. R. Evid. 807. Rule 807 is the residual exception to the rule against admitting hearsay. It provides: A statement not specifically covered by rule 803 or 804 but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is not excluded by the hearsay rule, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party, sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing, to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it.... Minn. R. Evid. 807. Here, we conclude that Vega-Lara's prior statements do not have equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness as the statements intended to be covered by Rules 803 and 804. While Vega-Lara's statements were made under oath, he was testifying at his own trial and had much to gain from bending the truth and implicating others in the crime. Thus, the State has failed to show that Vega-Lara's statements were sufficiently reliable to overcome the general prohibition against admitting out-of-court statements. Additionally, as the district court noted, there were notice issues with respect to the admission of Vega-Lara's prior testimony under Rule 807. The State sent a transcript of Vega-Lara's prior testimony to Morales on July 20, 2007, and Morales knew Vega-Lara was on the State's witness list. But there was no pretrial notice that the State would seek to introduce Vega-Lara's prior testimony as substantive evidence under Rule 807 or any other hearsay exception. The State moved to admit a transcript of Vega-Lara's prior testimony as substantive evidence near the close of trial. We conclude that Vega-Lara's prior testimony was not admissible as substantive evidence under Rule 807. Nor was it admissible as substantive evidence under Rule 801(d)(1)(A). Therefore, the Dexter problem created when the State called Vega-Lara as a witness and used his prior testimony was not resolved. Similarly, the unfair prejudice to Morales caused by the State's questioning of Vega-Lara, a refusing witness, was not reduced. For all the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the State's examination of Vega-Lara, an accomplice witness who refused to testify, was prejudicial to Morales to such an extent that it denied Morales a fair trial. Under Mitchell, such unfair prejudice is reversible error. Therefore, we reverse and remand for a new trial.