Opinion ID: 1190445
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Alleged excessive delay on appeal

Text: (30) Defendant argues at length that his death penalty must be set aside because the delay inherent in the capital appeal process constitutes prohibited cruel and unusual punishment. (U.S. Const., 8th Amend.) Defendant, however, does not  and in good faith cannot  allege even the slightest undue delay by the state in this case. Briefing was not final until December 20, 1991, and we were able to obtain defendant's reply brief only after granting numerous extensions of time to defendant's appellate counsel. The linchpin of defendant's argument therefore is necessarily that the very existence of a capital appeal renders the death penalty unconstitutional. The argument is, of course, specious. Because an appeal is constitutionally mandated, defendant's argument is in reality a frontal attack on the validity of the death penalty in all cases. The existence of an automatic appeal under state law is not a constitutional defect; it is a constitutional safeguard. ( Gregg v. Georgia (1976) 428 U.S. 153, at p. 199 [49 L.Ed.2d 859, 889, 895-896, 96 S.Ct. 2909] (lead opn. of Stewart, J.) and at p. 211 (conc. opn. of White, J.).) Defendant relies heavily on People v. Anderson (1972) 6 Cal.3d 628 [100 Cal. Rptr. 152, 493 P.2d 880], in which this court held California's death penalty system was unconstitutional under then-existing article I, section 6 of the California Constitution. Defendant is correct that Anderson relied in part on the inherent delay in the appeal of a capital sentence. (At pp. 649-650.) Defendant's reliance on Anderson is, however, unavailing for two obvious reasons. First, defendant bases his challenge only on the federal Constitution, but the Anderson court explicitly based its decision solely on the California Constitution. Second, Anderson was promptly repudiated by California voters, who amended the California Constitution to make clear that the death penalty and its related statutory scheme do not constitute cruel or unusual punishment or any other violation of the state Constitution. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 27.) The Anderson court's reasoning, including its reliance on appellate delay, ceased to have any force or effect when article I, section 27 became effective. We decline to find a federal constitutional violation based on the partial reasoning of a decision under state law, which decision is no longer operative. To the extent we have previously addressed the federal claim raised here, our reasoning is contrary to defendant's position. In People v. Chessman (1959) 52 Cal.2d 467 [341 P.2d 679], we rejected the argument that confinement for more than 11 years while appealing a death sentence was unconstitutionally cruel or unusual punishment. ( Id., at p. 499.) Defendant's claim also suffers from a lack of federal support. A federal court recently rejected a defendant's contention that fulfillment of his sentence after sixteen years on death row would constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments. [Fn.] We know of no decision by either the United States Supreme Court or this circuit that has held that the accumulation of time a defendant spends on death row during the prosecution of his appeals can accrue into an independent constitutional violation.... ( Richmond v. Lewis (9th Cir.1990) 921 F.2d 933, 949.) We are similarly unaware of any such authority. Indeed, the longest postconviction delay in most capital cases accumulates during the defendant's collateral attacks in the federal courts, and to our knowledge, those courts  which, of course, have the last word in matters of federal law  have never set aside a death sentence based on the inherent delay in either an appeal or collateral challenge. Indeed, the inherent-delay argument is untenable in a capital case, like this one, in which the judgment as to the defendant's guilt and death-eligibility, i.e., a statutory special circumstance, are affirmed on appeal. Such a defendant faces only two possible outcomes as to penalty  death or life in prison without parole. If the death sentence is set aside, there is no conceivable basis on which to claim that a delay  no matter how lengthy  resulted in prejudice to the defendant. By common understanding imprisonment for life is a less penalty than death. ( Biddle v. Perovich (1927) 274 U.S. 480, 487 [71 L.Ed. 1161, 1164, 47 S.Ct. 664, 52 A.L.R. 832].) Conversely, if the death sentence is affirmed, the delay  again, no matter how long  benefitted defendant rather than prejudiced him because the delay prolonged his life. For all the foregoing reasons, we hold that the inherent delay of which defendant complains is not a basis for finding that either the death penalty itself or the process leading to it is cruel and unusual punishment.