Opinion ID: 1778775
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Flight Instruction Issue

Text: ¶ 10. At trial, Liggins's counsel specifically objected to the deliverance of the flight instruction by pointing out that more than one incident could have been reason for the flight. This Court has established that flight generally is admissible as evidence of consciousness of guilt. Fuselier v. State, 702 So.2d 388, 390 (Miss.1997) [hereinafter Fuselier III ]; see also Williams v. State, 667 So.2d 15, 23 (Miss. 1996). Yet, pursuant to such an objection, this Court reasons that an instruction that flight may be considered as a circumstance of guilt or guilty knowledge is appropriate only where that flight is unexplained and somehow probative of guilt or guilty knowledge. Fuselier v. State, 468 So.2d 45, 56-57 (Miss.1985) [hereinafter Fuselier I ], see also Reynolds v. State, 658 So.2d 852, 856 (Miss.1995). When determining whether a flight instruction is appropriate, we further have explained that two considerations are paramount: (1) only unexplained flight merits a flight instruction; and (2) flight instructions are to be given only in cases where that circumstance has considerable probative value. Banks v. State, 631 So.2d 748, 751 (Miss.1994); Pannell v. State, 455 So.2d 785, 788 (Miss.1984); Tran v. State, 681 So.2d 514, 519 (Miss.1996); see also Mack v. State, 650 So.2d 1289, 1308 (Miss. 1994): and see Brown v. State, 690 So.2d 276, 294 (Miss.1996). A flight instruction is appropriate where flight is highly probative to the facts of the particular case. Fuselier III, 702 So.2d at 390. Evidence of flight is inadmissible where, as in this case, there is an independent reason for flight known by the court which cannot be explained to the jury because of its prejudicial effect upon the defendant. Id. Indeed, in Fuselier I, we stated the turning principle in this case: Fuselier was obviously put in a no-win situation by either being required to explain his flight and the fact that he was a prison escapee or not explaining the flight and subjecting himself to a flight instruction. Here, because the court was aware of an explanation for Fuselier's flight, which was at that time inadmissible, we are of the opinion that the flight instruction should not have been granted. Fuselier I, 468 So.2d at 57. ¶ 11. Plenty of evidence exists that Liggins may not have known from what he was fleeing. The record reflects Liggins's concern about carrying a weapon, gambling, drinking, and involvement with drugs, not to mention the counts on which this case is based. The record further reflects that Liggins was under indictment in Cause Number 11,960-V from October 1994 for sale of cocaine as an offense that happened on August the 12th, 1994. Given such prejudicial information, Liggins's September 23 flight may have been from guilt of selling cocaine, rather than the counts at issue in this case. ¶ 12. This case is best summed by our own words: ... To paraphrase previous considerations by this Court, no person accused, however angry the people, however evil the crime, regardless of how strong the appearance of guilt, can be denied the full protection of the law and a fair and orderly trial. Fuselier III, 702 So.2d at 394.