Opinion ID: 1734385
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Causeway Property

Text: The primary Code section governing our consideration of Daphne's attempts to annex the causeway property is, as with the mall property, § 11-42-21, Ala.Code 1975. The requirement of that Code section that affects our analysis of the purported annexation of the causeway property is the requirement of contiguity. Spanish Fort argues that the trial judge should have declared that annexation invalid because that property, Spanish Fort argues, was not contiguous with Daphne's then existing corporate limits. For the reasons discussed below, we agree with Spanish Fort. The causeway property does not consist of a unified block of territory, as the mall property does. Instead, the causeway property consists of a number of separate pockets of property, each completely surrounded by areas that Daphne did not attempt to annex. Daphne purported to annex those pockets of property through a series of ordinances designed to annex that property in phases: 1998-19 (phase one), 1998-21 (phase two), 1998-24 (phase three), 1998-25 (phase four), and 1998-27 (phase five). As a threshold matter, we note that this Court has held that under the contiguity requirement of § 11-42-21 there must be a `touching' at some point. City of Dothan v. Dale County Comm'n, 295 Ala. 131, 134, 324 So.2d 772, 775 (1975). Before City of Dothan, our cases had required a substantial common boundary. Id. There are some exceptions to the actual-touching rule of City of Dothan. A parcel of property is considered contiguous with a municipality's corporate limits, for the purposes of § 11-42-21, if it lies directly across a public roadway from the municipal limits: `[This Court] has said that two parcels of land are contiguous, within the meaning and intent of the legislature, if they lie on opposite sides of a public road. This finding does not, and should not, turn on an exhaustive analysis of who owns the underlying fee to, or who has reversionary rights to, the road right-of-way, or any similar principles of real estate law. Rather, the basis for this interpretation rests most comfortably upon a common sense recognition and understanding of what is necessary for the proper and efficient functioning of city government. In particular, to be considered are matters such as proximity and access (both close and convenient) to existing city services, such as police and fire protection, school bus routes, utility services, and similar functions of city government. It is reasonable to expect a city to provide these services to a parcel of land which merely lies across the street from the existing city limits, but it would be unreasonable in most instances to expect a city to provide these services to a parcel of land that lies fifteen or more miles down the road from the existing city limits. Surely, our legislature intended the former, but just as surely, [it] did not intend the latter.' Johnson v. Rice, 551 So.2d 940, 944-45 (Ala.1989) (quoting an order of the circuit court). While this Court affirmed the judgment in Johnson v. Rice , it did not specifically adopt the trial court's order quoted in that case. We consider that portion of the circuit court's order in Johnson quoted here to be a correct statement. This Court has also recognized that some annexations across public waterways may also meet the contiguity requirement of the statute, although we find only two Alabama cases discussing this issue: City of Madison v. City of Huntsville, 555 So.2d 755 (Ala.1989), and Johnson v. Rice, supra. In those cases, both decided in 1989, this Court approved annexations by the City of Guntersville across Lake Guntersville and by the City of Decatur across Wheeler Lake. ( City of Madison v. City of Huntsville involved not only the two cities named in the style, but also Limestone County and the cities of Decatur and Athens.) In Johnson, the Court analogized the analysis to be applied when considering annexations across a body of water to the analysis to be applied when considering annexations across a public roadway. We reaffirm that analogy. In addition, we note the analogous nature of our cases considering the longlasso method of annexation, which this Court has explicitly rejected. Under that method, a city would purport to annex a public roadway of some length in an effort to create contiguity with an outlying parcel of property that would not otherwise be contiguous with the existing municipal limits. City of Fultondale v. City of Birmingham, 507 So.2d 489, 491 (Ala.1987). In City of Fultondale, this Court explicitly overruled City of Tuskegee v. Lacey, 486 So.2d 393 (Ala.1985). In City of Tuskegee, the City of Tuskegee had annexed 14 miles of a public roadway, without annexing any property lying along that roadway, in order to create contiguity with an outlying parcel of property. Although this Court upheld that annexation in City of Tuskegee, this Court overruled that decision in City of Fultondale. In City of Fultondale, this Court explained its reasons for rejecting the long-lasso method of annexation: Although Alabama law does not require that municipal boundaries form a regular shape, the legal and popular idea of a municipality in this country is `that of oneness, community, locality, vicinity; a collective body, not several bodies; a collective body of inhabitantsthat is, a body of people collected or gathered in one mass, not separated into distinct masses, and having a community of interest because residents of the same place, not different places.' 56 Am. Jur.2d Municipal Corporations § 69 at 125 (1971); City of Dothan, supra. 507 So.2d at 491. The same considerations inform our analysis of the legality of annexations across public waterways. In Johnson v. Rice , the City of Guntersville purported to annex territory directly across Lake Guntersville from the then existing city limits. This Court quoted at length the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment of the trial court and found no reason for reversing the trial court's judgment. See 551 So.2d at 946. The trial court concluded that the annexation met the contiguity requirement because of the presence of a number of specific factors: `In reaching this conclusion, we find essential facts to exist in this case with respect to the [property the City of Guntersville sought to annex] in relation to the existing city limits of Guntersville, and were it not for the presence of each and all these facts, our conclusion as to contiguity would be otherwise: `a) But for the intervention of a public waterway (Guntersville Lake, owned and operated by the Tennessee Valley Authority, a public government entity) and the appurtenant lake-shore property rights owned by TVA (such as flooding rights), the [property sought to be annexed] would actually touch the existing city limits of Guntersville. `b) The [property sought to be annexed] lies directly across the public waterway from the existing city limits of Guntersville, and not diagonally across the waterway. `c) There is a public road (including a bridge and approaches thereto) which crosses the public waterway and connects the existing city limits of Guntersville to the [property sought to be annexed], with no intervening landowners which abut said public road other than TVA. In other words, the bridge and approaches begin inside the City of Guntersville and cross the public waterway (Guntersville Lake), and the first private property owner on the other side of the lake which abuts the public road [owned the property sought to be annexed]. `d) Ordinance 592 annexes both the [property sought to be annexed] and the public road right-of-way which connects it to the city, so after the annexation it is not necessary to go outside of the city to reach the [property sought to be annexed]. ' 551 So.2d at 945 (second emphasis added). In City of Madison v. City of Huntsville , this Court also approved Decatur's annexation of property lying directly across Wheeler Lake from Decatur's then existing corporate limits. Just as in Johnson, the annexation also included the public roadway running across the lake joining the newly annexed property to the then existing city limits. Applying the principles established in the cited cases to the facts of this case, we conclude that Daphne's purported annexation of the causeway properties did not meet the § 11-42-21 requirement of contiguity, as that requirement has been explained by this Court. In its purported annexation of the causeway properties, Daphne did not attempt to annex the public roadways that might have allowed access from the then existing Daphne corporate limits to the properties to be annexed. The properties comprise several pockets of territory that are surrounded on all sides by property Daphne did not attempt to annex. To reach by automobile any of the causeway properties Daphne purported to annex, one would have to travel outside Daphne and through areas that Daphne did not attempt to annex. The trial court found that all the causeway properties were contiguous to the city's existing city limits because they touch by land or by water. However, as explained above, there is no existing route by which the properties may be reached by automobile from the original Daphne boundaries without traveling outside the city; thus, this case is different from Johnson and City of Madison, where the annexing cities annexed public roadways leading directly from the existing boundaries of those cities to the property sought to be annexed. Applying the principles of Johnson, City of Madison, and the other cases cited above, we conclude that Daphne's purported annexations of the causeway properties are similar to the long-lasso annexations explicitly disapproved of by this Court in City of Fultondale and that they are distinguishable from the annexations approved of by this Court in Johnson and City of Madison. Accordingly, we conclude that those annexations were invalid as violating the contiguity requirement of § 11-42-21, and we reverse that portion of the judgment of the trial court declaring those annexations to be valid.