Opinion ID: 195986
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the denial of appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

Text: 6 A district court may permit a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea prior to sentencing for any fair and just reason. United States v. Daniels, 821 F.2d 76, 78 (1st Cir. 1987); Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(d). We have recently reiterated that: 7 There are several factors to consider in determining whether a defendant has met this burden, the most significant of which is whether the plea was knowing, voluntary and intelligent within the meaning of Rule 11. The other factors include: 1) the force and plausibility of the proffered reason; 2) the timing of the request; 3) whether the defendant has asserted his legal innocence; and 4) whether the parties had reached a plea agreement. 8 United States v. Cotal-Crespo, 1995 WL 27378 at  1 (1st Cir. Jan. 30, 1995) (citations omitted). We will reverse the district court only for an error of law or for demonstrable abuse of discretion. Id. at  3. We do not think that reversal is warranted here. 2 9 Appellant argues that the district court erred in requiring him to provide a strong rather than fair and just reason for withdrawal, and that it unfairly held him to this higher standard because he was an attorney. We find no error. Appellant had argued below, inter alia, that the district court failed to adequately inform him of, and determine that he understood, the nature of the charges. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c). The district court was entitled to consider appellant's background and sophistication in determining whether these core concerns of Rule 11 were satisfied. See United States v. Allard, 926 F.2d 1237, 1245 (1st Cir. 1991) (The manner in which the charge is explained and the method for determining the defendant's understanding necessarily vary from case to case depending upon the capacity of the defendant and the attendant circumstances.). The court's ruling on the motion to withdraw leaves no doubt that it evaluated the motion under the correct legal standard, and that it denied the motion because it found no fair and just reason for withdrawal. 10 Appellant also argues that he should have been allowed to withdraw his guilty plea because there was insufficient factual basis for it. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(f). In support of this argument, he draws our attention to various statements he made at the change of plea hearing which could be construed as denials by him that he had the intent to defraud. See United States v. Grant, 971 F.2d 799, 802 (1st Cir. 1992) (discussing elements of bankruptcy fraud). In addition, appellant cites to various documents, appended to his brief, which he suggests demonstrates his innocence of the crimes charged in counts 1 and 20. 11 It is well-settled that the prosecutor's statement of facts on the record can satisfy the requirement of a factual basis for the plea. See, e.g., United States v. Ray, 828 F.2d 399, 405-06 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 964 (1988). This statement of facts need not be uncontroverted. A court may accept a plea even when the defendant protests his innocence if there is a strong evidence in the record of the defendant's actual guilt. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970); United States v. Walsh, 7 F.3d 1064, 1066 (1st Cir. 1993). Similarly, when the district court establishes a sufficient factual basis for the plea at the Rule 11 hearing, the guilty plea may stand even if the defendant later claims innocence and challenges the plea. See United States v. Keiswetter, 860 F.2d 992, 998 (10th Cir. 1988) (Moore, J., dissenting); United States v. Owen, 858 F.2d 1514, 1516-17 & n.2 (11th Cir. 1988). 12 In the instant case, the prosecutor's proffer provided ample factual basis for accepting the guilty plea. In this proffer, the prosecutor detailed a lengthy pattern of omissions, material misstatements, and transfers of bankruptcy estate property by appellant. Given the sheer number of mistakes, the size of the assets concealed, and appellant's many years of experience practicing bankruptcy law, we think the judge was entitled to conclude that a substantial basis existed for believing that appellant's actions were knowing and fraudulent. 3 13 The documents that appellant cites do not alter our conclusion. Count 1, which relates to the Hartwell bankruptcy, charged appellant with failing to disclose approximately $350,000.00 in loans owing to Hartwell from appellant and his business partner. Appellant contends that there can be no fraudulent intent since the final decision to treat the $350,000.00 as a loan to officers (rather than compensation) was not made until November 1991, roughly ten months after he filed Hartwell's bankruptcy petition. 4 However, appellant should have disclosed the asset even if its status at the time of filing was uncertain. See United States v. Cherek, 734 F.2d 1248, 1254 (7th Cir. 1984) (It is a reasonable reading of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 152 to conclude that the statute requires a bankrupt to disclose the existence of assets whose immediate status is uncertain.), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1014 (1985). Moreover, appellant did not disclose the asset even after November 1991, and the indictment charged him with a continuing failure to disclose through October 1992. Under the circumstances, the district court could reasonably conclude that he was guilty. 14 Count 20, which relates to appellant's personal bankruptcy, charged him with failing to disclose approximately $25,000 worth of Keystone Fund money market shares which he owned. Appellant contends that various documents, submitted to the district court at sentencing, prove his lack of fraudulent intent. These documents indicate that in February 1986, appellant requested that these shares be transferred to his wife. However, the government proffered evidence that appellant received monthly statement and interest payments from Keystone, mailed to his law office, both before and after filing his bankruptcy petition in May 1992. Under the circumstances, there was a strong basis for concluding that appellant knew the transfer had not occurred and intended to conceal the asset. The fact that appellant reported the asset to the bankruptcy trustee in February 1993, two months prior to his indictment, does not alter our conclusion. There is evidence in the record which suggests that he knew by then that he was under criminal investigation in connection with several bankruptcy filings. 15 Finally, having determined that appellant's principal points are without merit, we consider the traditional factors relevant to the review of a change of plea request. The record reveals that appellant understood the substance of the charges against him, and suggests that he made a calculated decision that it was in his interest to plead guilty. The plea was part of a quid pro quo negotiated with the government. See United States v. Pellerito, 878 F.2d 1535, 1541 (1st Cir. 1989). A defendant is not entitled to withdraw his guilty plea simply because he asserts a subjective belief in his innocence. See United States v. Ramos, 810 F.2d 308, 312 (1st Cir. 1987). Given the totality of the circumstances, we cannot say the district court abused its discretion in finding no fair and just reason for retraction. 16