Opinion ID: 796482
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The ALJ's Conduct During the Administrative Hearing

Text: 32 In further support of his due process claim, Keith cites to three excerpts from the transcript of the administrative hearing. Specifically, he points to two statements made by the ALJ and a verbal exchange between the ALJ and appellant's counsel. The two statements ( see supra p. 786) were made following counsel's objection to Dr. Hutson's participation in the hearing, an objection that was raised, considered, and overruled, twice prior to the hearing. The verbal exchange between the ALJ and counsel (which Keith contends was meant solely to disrupt the presentation of his evidence) occurred after counsel attempted to solicit testimony from Keith regarding potential courses of future medical treatment for his impairments and consists of the following statements: 33 ALJ: Counsel, is this really necessary? Are we really talking about 1982 and prior to that? 34 Counsel: Well, I think his condition is a continuation of — 35 ALJ: Well, he's presenting [sic] receiving SSI and I certainly don't intend to disturb that. 36 Counsel: Okay. 37 ALJ: So why don't we just go with 1982 and forward.... 38 A review of the hearing transcript makes clear that the ALJ's actions fall far short of the extreme conduct necessary to sustain a claim of bias. See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 546, 114 S.Ct. 1147 (requiring that evidence be presented that demonstrates deep-seated and unequivocal antagonism that would render fair judgment impossible). The ALJ's statements to counsel — rather than evidence of the requisite hostility or antagonism necessary to sustain an allegation of bias — are more aptly characterized as an attempt to dissuade counsel from continuing to argue the issue of Dr. Hutson's testimony and instead focus his remarks on the merits of the case. After all, the ALJ had considered and ruled upon the objection on two prior occasions. The exchange between the ALJ and counsel is of a similar vein: the ALJ was simply attempting to focus the hearing on the precise issue at hand — whether Keith was disabled at any time prior to his loss of insured status. Routine efforts at courtroom administration, such as these — even if they reflect impatience — cannot sustain a claim of bias. Cf. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555-56, 114 S.Ct. 1147 ( Not establishing bias or partiality, however, are expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger, that are within the bounds of what imperfect men and women, even after having been confirmed as federal judges, sometimes display. A judge's ordinary efforts at courtroom administration — even a stern and short-tempered judge's ordinary efforts at courtroom administration — remain immune.) and Ivezaj v. INS, 84 F.3d 215, 220 (6th Cir.1996) (finding that the judge's actions, while abrupt, constituted attempts to control the pace of the hearings, and to focus the hearings on relevant matters, and failed to establish a violation of due process) with United States v. Donato, 99 F.3d 426, 434-39 (D.C.Cir.1996) (finding that judge's intense hostility toward the defendant and defense counsel raised a serious question of bias).