Opinion ID: 1325306
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Gray's Telephone Statement to Officer Moore.

Text: Gray moved to suppress certain statements that he made over the telephone to Officer Moore, contending that there was an insufficient identification of Gray as the party with whom Moore spoke. The trial court refused to suppress the statements, concluding that the matter was a question for the jury's consideration, and Gray assigned error to this ruling. Because a proper foundation had been laid for the admission of these statements, we find no merit to this contention.
Gray contends that the seizure of certain evidence pertaining to McClelland's murder found in his home violated his Fourth Amendment rights. He also claims that the search of his automobile was illegal. On May 10, 1985, police officers went to Gray's residence armed with a search warrant that authorized a search of his house for marijuana, paraphernalia, and other drug-related items. During the search, the officers found and seized a quantity of marijuana, cocaine, and drug paraphernalia. The police also seized other items, unrelated to the drug charge, that connected Gray to the McClelland murder. Among the items seized were a quantity of .32-caliber cartridges, a pistol holster, a jewelry box and jewelry bearing Murphy's Mart price tags, and gym bags similar to those reported missing from Murphy's Mart. Gray does not contest the validity of the search warrant as it related to the drug charge; nor does he question the propriety of the seizure of the drug-related items. Moreover, he concedes that during the conduct of a valid search, the police are entitled to seize evidence of other crimes or contraband without securing an additional warrant. See Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 155, 67 S.Ct. 1098, 1103, 91 L.Ed. 1399 (1947). Gray also concedes that given the character of the evidence specified in the warrant, the police were permitted to search the places where evidence of the murder was found. See Holloman v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 947, 949, 275 S.E.2d 620, 622 (1981). Gray contends, nonetheless, that the search for drug-related evidence was a sham; he says the true purpose of the search was to look for evidence related to the McClelland murder. The Attorney General acknowledges that the police knew that Gray was a potential suspect in the McClelland murder when they secured the search warrant and suspected that evidence pertaining to the murder might be discovered during the course of the drug search. The Attorney General contends, however, that seizure of such evidence was proper. We agree. The validity of the warrant authorizing the search and seizure of drug-related evidence is not an issue in this appeal. Drug-related evidence was found and seized, and Gray was arrested for possessing marijuana. The search was not a sham merely because Gray was a possible suspect in the murder case and the police anticipated that during the drug search they might find evidence relating to the murder. See Horne v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 512, 517, 339 S.E.2d 186, 190 (1986). The police had a right to be in Gray's residence to conduct a search for drugs, and in the course of the search, they were entitled to seize evidence of other crimes that was in plain view. Blair v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 483, 490, 303 S.E.2d 881, 885-86 (1983). After searching the residence and arresting Gray on the marijuana charge, the police asked Gray for permission to search his automobile. Gray consented to the search, and the police seized a gasoline can, a siphon hose, and three pairs of gloves from the trunk of the automobile. Gray does not deny that he gave his consent for the search, but he claims the consent was not voluntary. He asserts that in view of all the circumstances, particularly his arrest and being in handcuffs, his consent was the product of police coercion. The burden is on the Commonwealth to prove that a consent is voluntary. Lowe v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 670, 678, 239 S.E.2d 112, 117 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 930, 98 S.Ct. 1502, 55 L.Ed.2d 526 (1978); Hairston v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 387, 388, 219 S.E.2d 668, 669 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 937, 96 S.Ct. 1671, 48 L.Ed.2d 179 (1976). Whether a consent to a search was voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227, 93 S.Ct. at 2048. The mere fact that a defendant is in custody is not enough in itself to demonstrate a coerced consent to search. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 828, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976); Lowe, 218 Va. at 678, 239 S.E.2d at 117. The trial court concluded that the consent was voluntary. Nothing in the record suggests that Gray was threatened or intimidated. When asked if they could search his car, Gray said, Go ahead and search it. The police told Gray he could withdraw his consent at any time, and he never retracted it. Moreover, after he was arrested and taken to the Suffolk police station, he executed a form authorizing the search of his car. From a totality of all the circumstances, we conclude that Gray's consent to search his automobile was given freely and voluntarily.