Opinion ID: 2519810
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Brady Considerations in Light of Penal Code Section 832.5

Text: The majority counters the above argument by holding that the Pitchess process operates in parallel with Brady, and that citizen complaints older than five years that the superior court finds to be exculpatory, as defined by Brady, after in-chambers review, may be subject to disclosure, notwithstanding the five-year limitation in Evidence Code section 1045, subdivision (b)(1). (Maj. opn., ante, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d at p. 212, 52 P.3d at p. 137.) While this holding may be tenable in theory, the majority ignores the stark reality that, as a practical matter, there will be no document older than five years available for an in-chambers review. This is so because the majority also upholds the leg of the Pitchess scheme (Pen.Code, § 832.5, subd. (b)) that, as interpreted by the majority, permits police agencies to routinely destroy every relevant Pitchess document over five years old: The Pitchess procedures not only require law enforcement agencies to compile citizen complaints, but they also contemplate the destruction of such complaints after five years. [Citation.] Many if not most law enforcement agencies have a policy of routinely destroying citizen complaints after five years. (Maj. opn., ante, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d at pp. 209-210, 52 P.3d at p. 135.) Citing Trombetta, supra, 467 U.S. at page 488, 104 S.Ct. 2528, the majority concludes that such destruction does not violate due process because [a] law enforcement agency's destruction of a citizen's complaint violates a defendant's right to due process only when the complaint's exculpatory value to a particular criminal case is readily apparent before its destruction. [Citation.] The mere `possibility' that the complaint might be exculpatory in some future case is insufficient. [Citation.] Unless there is bad faith by the law enforcement agency, the destruction of records does not implicate a defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial.... (Maj. opn., ante, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d at p. 210, 52 P.3d at pp. 135-136.) The majority concludes that the routine destruction [of evidence] by a law enforcement agency `acting ... in accord with [its] normal practice' tends to indicate `good faith.' ( Ibid.) I disagree. Trombetta addressed the issue of the government's duty to take affirmative steps to preserve [physical] evidence ... destroyed through prosecutorial neglect or oversight ( Trombetta, supra, 467 U.S. at p. 486, 104 S.Ct. 2528), in the specific context of whether the police were required to preserve breath samples in order to introduce an Intoxilyzer (breath-analysis) test. ( Id. at p. 481, 104 S.Ct. 2528.) The high court stated that the states' duty to preserve evidence must be limited to evidence that might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect's defense. To meet this standard of constitutional materiality, [citation], evidence must both possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means. ( Id. at pp. 488-189, 104 S.Ct. 2528, fn. omitted.) Because the respondents sought to challenge the Intoxilyzer results, the high court concluded the breath samples themselves were of marginal relevance. ( Trombetta, supra, 467 U.S. at p. 489, 104 S.Ct. 2528.) First, the Intoxilyzer was routinely checked and two independent breath measurements were taken. ( Id. at p. 490, 104 S.Ct. 2528.) Moreover, the respondents had alternate means of demonstrating how the Intoxilyzer might malfunction, such as faulty calibration, extraneous interference with machine measurement, or operator error. ( Ibid. ) The high court thus held there was no constitutional error in the destruction of the breath samples. Arizona v. Youngblood (1988) 488 U.S. 51 ( Youngblood) addressed the negligent failure of police to preserve physical evidence of which no more can be said than that it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated the defendant. ( Id. at p. 57, 109 S.Ct. 333.) In this instance, the high court held that there is no due process violation unless the defendant could show bad faith on the part of the police. ( Id, at p. 58, 109 S.Ct. 333.) Both Trombetta and Youngblood are inapposite to the instant case. Under the Pitchess scheme, our state systematically destroys relevant evidence contained in sustained citizen complaints that might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect's defense. ( Trombetta, supra, 467 U.S. at p. 488, 104 S.Ct. 2528.) Moreover, once a sustained citizen complaint is destroyed, there is no alternate means of obtaining comparable evidence. In this manner too, the Pitchess scheme fails the Trombetta test. The majority does not address the specific issue of destroying sustained citizen complaints. The majority concludes (maj. opn., ante, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d at p. 211, 52 P.3d at p. 136) that citizen complaints that are more than five years old and whose exculpatory value to a specific case is not readily apparent may be destroyed because they fail to distinguish between complaints that have been determined to be without substance and those that have been sustained by the officer's employing agency. But a sustained citizen complaint, which contains an allegation of misconduct that the officer's own agency has found true, does possess an exculpatory value to any particular case in which that officer is a material witness. This exculpatory value, moreover, is apparent to both the prosecutor and defense attorney before the document is destroyed: it contains witness statements and other evidence gathered during that investigation that details such misconduct. Such a complaint, therefore, likely contains relevant impeachment evidence under Wheeler, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pages 295-297, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 418, 841 P.2d 938. Indeed, once a police agency sustains a citizen complaint, the government is on notice that it possesses an apparent exculpatory value within the meaning of Brady and thus may not be systematically destroyed after five years. Brady material includes exculpatory impeachment evidence. (See, e.g., Strickler v. Greene (1999) 527 U.S. 263, 282, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286, fn. 21 [Brady's disclosure requirements extend to materials that ... may be used to impeach a witness].) The state-sponsored destruction of exculpatory documents constitutes bad faith. ( Youngblood supra, 488 U.S. at p. 58, 109 S.Ct. 333.) Moreover, recent Court of Appeal pronouncements have made it clear that prosecutors and defense attorneys cannot invoke Brady, Wheeler, or Penal Code section 1054.1 to obtain sustained citizen complaints. Instead, such documents must be obtained through the Pitchess scheme. ( Garden Grove, supra, 89 Cal. App.4th 430, 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 642, and Highway Patrol, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th 1010, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 379.) Thus, prosecutors and defense attorneys only receive such documents after a trial court's inchambers review. But the majority holds that sustained citizen complaints can be systematically destroyed after five years. Because they are in the control of the police agency, no one, not the prosecutor, defense attorney, or judge, can review these exculpatory documents prior to their destruction. But the Pitchess scheme must not trump a prosecutor's obligations under Brady. As we stated in In re Brown (1998) 17 Cal.4th 873, 879-880, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 698, 952 P.2d 715: Pursuant to Brady, supra, 373 U.S. 83, [83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215], the prosecution must disclose material exculpatory evidence whether the defendant makes a specific request ( id. at p. 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194), a general request, or none at all ( United States v. Agurs (1976) 427 U.S. 97, 107, [96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342]). The scope of this disclosure obligation extends beyond the contents of the prosecutor's case file and encompasses the duty to ascertain as well as divulge `any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf... .' ( Kyles [v. Whitley (1995) ], supra, 514 U.S. [419,] at p. 437, [115 S.Ct. 1555].) Courts have thus consistently `decline[d] to draw a distinction between different agencies under the same government, focusing instead upon the `prosecution team' which includes both investigative and prosecutorial personnel.' ( United States v. Auten (5th Cir.1980) 632 F.2d 478, 481.) ... Thus, `whether the nondisclosure was a result of negligence or design, it is the responsibility of the prosecutor. The prosecutor's office is an entity and as such it is the spokesman for the Government.' ( Giglio v. United States (1972) 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104; Kyles, supra, 514 U.S. at p. 439, 115 S.Ct. 1555.) As a concomitant of this duty, any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf is imputed to the prosecution.... The Supreme Court recently reiterated this principle: `whether the prosecutor succeeds or fails in meeting this obligation [to learn of favorable evidence] (whether, that is, a failure to disclose is in good faith or bad faith, [citation] ), the prosecution's responsibility for failing to disclose known, favorable evidence rising to a material level of importance is inescapable.' ( Kyles, supra, 514 U.S. at pp. 437-438, [115 S.Ct. 1555].) (Fn.omitted.) Even though police agencies have dominion and control over sustained citizen complaints, the prosecutor, as spokesperson for the government, is required under Brady to disclose the same. Penal Code section 832.5, subdivision (b) requires that citizen complaints be retained for at least five years. For the majority to interpret section 832.5 as permitting the wholesale destruction of sustained citizen complaints, simply because they are older than five years, violates Brady, the constitutional right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and the constitutional right to due process. As stated by the Attorney General: We recognize, of course, that subdivision (b) of section 832.5 allows for a records retention period of longer than five years. As a matter of prudent policy, a law enforcement agency may determine that a longer period would promote greater public confidence in its procedures and practices. (83 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 103, 109 (2000).) The Constitution demands no less.