Opinion ID: 555060
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Denial of Immunity to Defense Witness Moore

Text: 40 Petitioner's final claim is that he was denied due process rights to a fair trial by the court's failure to direct the prosecutor to grant immunity to defense witness Anthony Moore. 41 After trial, petitioner moved to set aside the verdict pursuant to N.Y.Crim.Pro.L. Sec. 330.30(1) and (3) on the ground of newly discovered exculpatory evidence. Petitioner submitted an unsigned affidavit in which Moore claimed to have been in Ashman's apartment at the time of the shooting; that the petitioner was not present at the shooting; and that Ashman himself had fired at Bowen. The affidavit was accompanied by an affirmation of counsel explaining that the affidavit was unsigned because Moore had been threatened to deter him from testifying on petitioner's behalf. At a hearing on the motion, Moore asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in response to questions concerning the homicide. When the petitioner requested that Moore be granted immunity, the prosecutor objected on the ground that granting immunity would invite cooperative perjury. The trial court declined to order the government to grant immunity to Moore. 42 After hearing other witnesses presented by the defense, the trial court denied petitioner's new trial motion, ruling that the defense had failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that Moore's testimony would result in a verdict more favorable to the defendant, should there be a new trial. The trial court based this finding on the defense's failure to present a witness who would confirm the information given by [defense counsel]. 1 43 Absent exceptional circumstances, the Due Process Clause imposes no requirement that defense witness immunity be ordered whenever it seems fair to grant it. United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 774 (2d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077, 101 S.Ct. 856, 66 L.Ed.2d 800 (1981). Indeed, a trial court should order the prosecutor to grant a defense witness immunity only in extraordinary circumstances. United States v. Pinto, 850 F.2d 927, 935 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Vence v. United States, 488 U.S. 867, 109 S.Ct. 174, 102 L.Ed.2d 143 (1988) and Castano v. United States, 488 U.S. 932, 109 S.Ct. 323, 102 L.Ed.2d 341 (1988). In addition to ensuring that prosecutorial decisions concerning whom to prosecute and what evidence to present at a criminal trial will not be lightly interfered with by the judiciary, it reduces the possibility of cooperative perjury between the defendant and his witness.  'A person suspected of crime should not be empowered to give his confederates an immunity bath.'  United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223, 229 (3d Cir.1976) (quoting In re Kilgo, 484 F.2d 1215, 1222 (4th Cir.1973)). 44 Nonetheless, extraordinary circumstances warranting a directive that the government grant immunity to a defense witness in the interest of fundamental fairness may arise where (a) prosecutorial overreaching, through threats, harassment, or other forms of intimidation, has effectively forced the witness to invoke the Fifth Amendment, or the prosecutor has engaged in discriminatory use of immunity grants to gain a tactical advantage; (b) the witness's testimony is also material, exculpatory, and not cumulative; and (c) the defendant has no other way to obtain the evidence. United States v. Pinto, 850 F.2d at 935; United States v. Shandell, 800 F.2d 322, 324 (2d Cir.1986); United States v. Todaro, 744 F.2d 5, 9 (2d Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1213, 105 S.Ct. 1186, 84 L.Ed.2d 333 (1985). 45 In order to satisfy the first prong of this standard, petitioner must show prosecutorial overreaching which substantially interferes with the defense, or with a potential defense witness's unfettered choice to testify. Pinto, 850 F.2d at 932. Such interference may involve threats or harassment intended to intimidate and discourage testimony, id. at 932, United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1192 (1st Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Granito v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 130, 112 L.Ed.2d 98 (1990) and Angiulo v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 130, 112 L.Ed.2d 98 (1990); United States v. Lord, 711 F.2d 887, 891 (9th Cir.1983); United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223, 229 (3d Cir.1976). Prosecutorial overreaching may also involve deliberate denial of immunity for the purpose of withholding exculpatory evidence and gaining a tactical advantage through such manipulation. Pinto, at 935, United States v. Shandell, 800 F.2d at 324; United States v. Todaro, 744 F.2d at 10. 46 Here, petitioner points to the prosecutor's grants of immunity to Brownie and Ashman, but not Moore, as an unfair advantage, as well as to the prosecutor's decision to keep[ ] Ashman's immunity from the jury, presumably by refusing to stipulate to it. See supra Point I. 47 We disagree with petitioner that this satisfies the prosecutorial overreaching prong. We have already addressed, and rejected, the argument that immunity must be granted to defense witnesses in order to redress a supposed government advantage over the defense. United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d at 774 (criminal proceedings are in no sense symmetrical). Only when a prosecutor has abused the government's ability to grant immunity by using it in a discriminatory fashion for the purpose of gaining a tactical advantage does due process require a grant of immunity for a defense witness. The record here does not reveal such a discriminatory use of immunity. The number of witnesses immunized[,] ... without more, [does] not support a finding of this type of misconduct. Todaro, 744 F.2d at 10. 48 The prosecutor's refusal to stipulate to Ashman's immunity also does not raise the spectre of excessive prosecutorial gamesmanship. As discussed above, the jury's uncertainty concerning Ashman's immunity arose largely from the defense's failure to elicit the relevant information on cross-examination. It is undisputed that the prosecutor did not hamper petitioner from learning of Ashman's immunity, and that petitioner was fully aware that Ashman had been immunized as a result of his grand jury testimony. The prosecutor's refusal to cooperate in petitioner's request to reopen the trial record after the jury had already begun deliberating does not constitute manipulative conduct which would require a grant of immunity to a defense witness in a new trial proceeding. 49 Since petitioner has not satisfied the first prong of the test, we need not address the issues of the materiality of Moore's evidence and petitioner's access to that evidence, although it is worth observing that petitioner had no guarantee that Moore, if truly in fear for his life, would testify favorably to petitioner even if he were granted immunity. 50 For all of the foregoing reasons, the district court's judgment denying the writ is affirmed.