Opinion ID: 7638574
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Negligence claims asserted against the Riviera employees

Text: As to DeBell, Tomlin, and Wallace, based on the concessions in the Hilburns' response to the Riviera employees' summary-judgment motion in the trial court and their responsive brief in this Court, we conclude that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact concerning the negligence claims asserted against DeBell, Tomlin, and Wallace and that those employees are entitled to a summary judgment as to the negligence claims against them. Their petition for a writ of mandamus as to the negligence claims against them is due to be granted. As to Saucier, however, the Hilburns do not concede that he is entitled to a summary judgment as to their negligence claim against him. We therefore address Saucier's argument that he is entitled to State-agent immunity and to a summary judgment in his favor as to the Hilburns' negligence claim. In Ex parte Cranman , 792 So.2d 392 (Ala. 2000), a plurality opinion, this Court formulated a test for immunity referred to as State-agent immunity. A majority of this Court subsequently adopted the Cranman test in Ex parte Butts , 775 So.2d 173 , 178 (Ala. 2000). This Court extended State-agent immunity to municipal employees in City of Birmingham v. Brown , 969 So.2d 910 , 916 (Ala. 2007). The standard for State-agent immunity as stated in Cranman is as follows: A State agent shall be immune from civil liability in his or her personal capacity when the conduct made the basis of the claim against the agent is based upon the agent's (1) formulating plans, policies, or designs; or (2) exercising his or her judgment in the administration of a department or agency of government, including, but not limited to, examples such as: (a) making administrative adjudications; (b) allocating resources; (c) negotiating contracts;  (d) hiring, firing, transferring, assigning, or supervising personnel; or (3) discharging duties imposed on a department or agency by statute, rule, or regulation, insofar as the statute, rule, or regulation prescribes the manner for performing the duties and the State agent performs the duties in that manner; or (4) exercising judgment in the enforcement of the criminal laws of the State, including, but not limited to, law-enforcement officers' arresting or attempting to arrest persons; or (5) exercising judgment in the discharge of duties imposed by statute, rule, or regulation in releasing prisoners, counseling or releasing persons of unsound mind, or educating students. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the foregoing statement of the rule, a State agent shall not be immune from civil liability in his or her personal capacity (1) when the Constitution or laws of the United States, or the Constitution of this State, or laws, rules, or regulations of this State enacted or promulgated for the purpose of regulating the activities of a governmental agency require otherwise; or (2) when the State agent acts willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond his or her authority, or under a mistaken interpretation of the law. 792 So.2d at 405 . This Court has established a burden-shifting process when a party raises the defense of State-agent immunity. Ex parte Estate of Reynolds , 946 So.2d 450 , 452 (Ala. 2006). A defendant asserting State-agent immunity bears the burden of demonstrating that the plaintiff's claims arise from a function that would entitle the State agent to immunity. Id . If the State agent makes such a showing, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show that one of the exceptions to State-agent immunity recognized in Cranman is applicable. Ex parte Kennedy , 992 So.2d 1276 , 1282 (Ala. 2008). In their motion for a summary judgment based on State-agent immunity, the Riviera employees set forth facts they considered sufficient to establish such immunity. The evidence applicable to Saucier, viewed in the light most favorable to the Hilburns, the nonmovants, see Ex parte Price , 256 So.3d 1184 (Ala. 2018), reveals the following facts. The Hilburns' claims against Saucier are based on the 811 ticket submitted by Gulf Equipment that noted bridge construction would be performed during the bridge-repair project on County Road 52. Wallace, the operations manager of Riviera Utilities, testified in his deposition that the line-locate ticket-the 811 ticket-alerted Riviera Utilities to the risk of harm resulting from the proximity of construction equipment to uninsulated electrical wires above the construction site and that Riviera Utilities should have de-energized them or insulated them. Tomlin, who was Riviera Utilities' superintendent of safety and training during the period pertinent to this case, testified in his deposition that the line-locate ticket alerted Riviera Utilities to the risk of harm resulting from the proximity of construction equipment to uninsulated electrical wires above the construction site. He also testified that had he seen the line-locate ticket he would have taken steps to see that that risk was eliminated. Saucier testified in his deposition that he disagreed with the conclusions as to what Riviera Utilities should have learned from an examination of the 811 ticket, but that factual dispute is not dispositive of the  threshold issue whether Saucier has established a prima facie case of State-agent immunity. The operative facts relevant to this analysis stem from the undisputed fact that Saucier never saw the 811 ticket before the accident that is the basis of this claim. Riviera Utilities, and specifically Saucier's department, did not have any policy or procedure that provided any specific direction to Saucier for supervising line-locate technicians, nor was there a protocol for making further inquiry of the contractor as to the necessity for deactivating overhead wires when notice was received of an impending underground excavation. The Hilburns contend that whether Riviera Utilities had any such policy or procedure for review of 811 tickets is irrelevant because, they maintain, the information concerning the hazard presented by the bridge-repair project was apparent on the face of the 811 ticket. The Hilburns acknowledge that Saucier did not have actual knowledge of the hazard, but they contend that Deese's knowledge that the 811 ticket stated that bridge construction would be taking place, combined with the evidence indicating that other Riviera Utilities employees had experience with job-hazard analysis in bridge-construction scenarios, provided Saucier with constructive knowledge of a potential hazard at the bridge-construction site. If Saucier had constructive knowledge of the impending bridge construction and his job responsibilities included safety precautions regarding overhead power lines, the Hilburns argue, he owed a duty to Charles that allowed no exercise of judgment or discretion; therefore, they insist, there can be no State-agent immunity. On the other hand, the Hilburns argue, if Saucier had no notice of the danger, either actual or constructive, or his job responsibilities did not include safety precautions as to overhead power lines, a view they say is contrary to the evidence, they concede he would have no duty to Charles and hence no liability for that reason. The Hilburns argue that issues of fact as to Saucier's notice of the danger and his job responsibilities preclude the entry of a summary judgment as to their negligence claim against him. Therefore, the Hilburns argue, Saucier is either not liable to the Hilburns because he owed Charles no duty or he is liable and has no immunity. In the context of review by mandamus of claims subject to a defense of State-agent immunity pursuant to Ex parte Cranman , supra, we first review the facts surrounding the activities of the agent. If those facts support immunity and the burden therefore shifts to the claimant, we review any facts offered to establish an exception to immunity as prescribed in Cranman to determine whether that exception is supported by substantial evidence. Ex parte Price , supra. As the head of Riviera Utilities' risk and safety department, Saucier testified that his responsibilities are detailed in Riviera Utilities' written position description for that job. Item number 4 in the section of the position description titled Essential Duties and Responsibilities states that the risk manager [i]nspects and observes equipment, facilities, and work habits of field crews to detect existing or potential accident and health hazards. Responds to complaints of unsafe conditions and evaluates the conditions. Recommends corrective or preventative measures where indicated, develops new policies and protocols to address issues, and coordinates with employees and supervisors to find solutions. Item number 11 of that section states that the risk manager [s]upervises and oversees  the daily operations of the Line Locate Department. The line-locate technicians are also supervised by Riviera Utilities' compliance and risk supervisor, Jacqueline McClinton, who works in Saucier's department and whose position description includes monitoring line-locate notifications. Saucier, McClinton, and the line-locate technicians have access to the 811 ticket information; however, as previously noted, Riviera Utilities receives thousands of 811 tickets every year. The operative evidence for determining State-agent immunity deals with Saucier's activities relative to his activities as a State agent, and not with the merits of the Hilburns' underlying tort claim. We must first determine, therefore, whether acting without any policy or procedure that provided for supervising line-locate technicians or a protocol for making further inquiry of the contractor as to the necessity for deactivating overhead wires when notice was received of an impending underground excavation constituted activity on Saucier's part, as head of the risk and safety department, that falls outside the parameters established for immunity in Cranman . Put another way, the inquiry turns on whether the facts associated with Saucier's management of his department in a manner that failed to prevent the accident made the basis of this claim deprive him of the immunity afforded under Cranman . As previously noted, [a] State agent shall be immune from civil liability in his or her personal capacity when the conduct made the basis of the claim against the agent is based upon a State agent's formulating plans, policies, or designs or exercising his or her judgment in the administration of a department or agency of government, including, but not limited to ... allocating resources ... [and] supervising personnel. Cranman , 792 So.2d at 405 . It is undisputed that Deese was the only employee of Riviera Utilities who actually saw the 811 ticket at issue here, that he perceived no hazard from the wording of the ticket or from his visit to the construction site, and that he did not bring the ticket to the attention of any of his supervisors or anyone else at Riviera Utilities. Deese is not a defendant; therefore, the availability of immunity for his actions is not before us. In light of the thousands of 811 tickets submitted annually, Saucier's failure to manage his department in a manner that would have enabled him to prevent the incident made the basis of this action falls squarely within the immunity from liability for actions based upon a State agent's formulating plans, policies, or designs or exercising his or her judgment in the administration of a department or agency of government, including, but not limited to, allocating resources and hiring and supervising personnel. That Saucier may have had constructive notice, as the Hilburns urge, is a factor that could be of critical importance in a proceeding against an employee of an entity not entitled to immunity, such as a private utility, but is not determinative in this proceeding where the issue is the employee's entitlement to immunity. State-agent immunity under Cranman having been established, the burden then shifted to the Hilburns to show, by substantial evidence , that one of the two exceptions to State-agent immunity recognized in Cranman applies. Ex parte Price , 256 So.3d at 1191 (emphasis added). 2 See  also Ex parte City of Homewood , 231 So.3d 1082 , 1088 (Ala. 2017) (Because the materials submitted by the officers established that they qualified for immunity, the burden then shifted to Mines to show that one of the two Cranman exceptions to immunity applied.). The only possible exception here deals with the merits of the claim as they apply to whether the State agent acted willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond his or her authority, or under a mistaken interpretation of the law. Cranman , 792 So.2d at 405 . We turn, therefore, to the Hilburns' contention that State-agent immunity is not available to Saucier as to their negligence claim against him. The Hilburns contend that Saucier cannot be immune because, they say, he disregarded his duty to Charles and, in doing so, acted beyond his authority or under a mistaken interpretation of the law and that, therefore, he forfeited his State-agent immunity. 3 We see no substantial evidence here that Saucier exceeded his authority or that he acted under a mistaken interpretation of law. His discharge of his duties as head of the risk and safety department fall well within the parameters of the authority conferred on him. The allegation of the commission of a tort was once viewed as evidence of action in excess of authority. See Elmore v. Fields , 153 Ala. 345 , 351, 45 So. 66 , 67 (1907), in which this Court found immunity unavailable to the State agent in his individual capacity and observed that the authorities hold that [a State agent] has no authority to act for the state in the commission of a tort. This view no longer prevails. In Taylor v. Shoemaker , 605 So.2d 828 (Ala. 1992), cited with approval in Cranman , the Court noted that the holding in Elmore v. Fields that the commission of a tort constituted acting beyond authority had subsequently been very clearly rejected. Moreover, there is no evidence indicating that Saucier relied on a mistaken interpretation of state law simply because the Hilburns alleged that he was guilty of an unintentional tort in the discharge of his duties as a State agent. Saucier has demonstrated that he has (1) a clear legal right to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) the properly invoked jurisdiction of the court. BOC Group , 823 So.2d at 1272 . Therefore, his motion for a summary judgment as to the Hilburns' negligence claim asserted against him was due to be granted on the basis of State-agent immunity. 4