Opinion ID: 2820459
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutional Claims—Qualified Immunity

Text: The Robbinses argue the district court erred in granting summary judgment on their constitutional claims based on qualified immunity. “Qualified immunity shields a government official from liability and the burdens of litigation in a § 1983 action for damages unless the official’s conduct violated a clearly established constitutional or statutory right of which a reasonable official would have known.” Chambers, 641 F.3d at 904 (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). “Liability for damages for a federal constitutional tort is personal, so each defendant’s conduct must be independently assessed.” Wilson v. Northcutt, 441 F.3d 586, 591 (8th Cir. 2006). To survive summary judgment, the Robbinses must present sufficient facts, viewed in their favor, to show each “officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), overruled in part on other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 227 (2009). The Robbinses have not done that.
The Robbinses claim the officers’ conduct violated their Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights. “To breach the shield of qualified immunity by establishing a ‘violation of substantive due process rights by an . . . official, [the Robbinses] must show (1) that the official violated one or more fundamental constitutional rights, and (2) that the conduct of the . . . official was shocking to the contemporary conscience.’” Winslow v. Smith, 696 F.3d 716, 731 (8th Cir. 2012) (first and third alterations in original) (quoting Flowers v. City of Minneapolis, Minn., 478 F.3d 869, 873 (8th Cir. 2007)). The Robbinses propose to meet the first part of this test by asserting the officers interfered with the Robbinses’ “constitutionally protected property interest in their business expectancy in the towing and wrecker business” and deprived the Robbinses of their “fundamental constitutional right to make a living and engage in their chosen occupation.” In large measure, the Robbinses’ substantive due process claims track those raised in Habhab v. Hon, 536 F.3d 963, 966 (8th Cir. 2008), but -5- without Habhab’s serious allegations of ethnic discrimination. In Habhab, we decided a towing company operator, who alleged state law enforcement officers “interfered with his right to earn a living” by (1) encouraging potential towing customers to use other companies; (2) ordering him to leave a towing site; and (3) disparaging his business, did not have a constitutionally protected property or liberty interest to support his due process claims. Id. at 966-68. In rejecting Habhab’s proposed property interest, we observed, “‘Property interests protected by due process are not created by the Constitution but, rather, are created and their dimensions are defined, by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.’” Id. at 968 (quoting Forrester v. Bass, 397 F.3d 1047, 1054 (8th Cir. 2005)). Reiterating that discretionary policies do not create a protected property interest, we concluded “[t]he inclusion of Habhab’s name on a list of towing companies used by dispatchers does not give Habhab a property interest in obtaining any particular work, because the dispatchers have reasonable discretion in assigning the towing services to any of the towing companies on the wrecker list.” Id.; accord Morley’s Auto Body, Inc. v. Hunter, 70 F.3d 1209, 1215 (11th Cir. 1995) (concluding, based on towing rotation list case law in other circuits, that a towing company does not have a constitutionally protected property interest in remaining on a rotation list unless the company “‘has alleged a claim of entitlement supported by a formal and settled source such as a state statute or regulatory scheme’” (quoting Blackburn v. Marshall, 42 F.3d 925, 938 (5th Cir. 1995))). Here, the Missouri state court order abolishing the MSHP’s use of rotation lists arguably gave the officers more discretion than the officers in Habhab. But the Robbinses contend the state court order enjoining the MSHP—and not the individual officers—from using a rotation list created a constitutionally protected property interest in their towing and wrecker business. We are not persuaded. “To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need -6- or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). Nothing in the order’s language—which altered MSHP policy to give the individual officers greater discretion to choose a towing company when the customer has no preference—gave the Robbinses “a legitimate claim of entitlement” to any particular towing work. Id. With respect to the Robbinses’ asserted liberty interest, we explained in Habhab that the Fourteenth Amendment protects “‘the liberty to pursue a particular calling or occupation, . . . not the right to a specific job.’” Habhab, 536 F.3d at 968 (quoting Piecknick v. Com. of Pa., 36 F.3d 1250, 1259 (3d Cir. 1994)). Because none of the officers in Habhab deprived the towing company operator of the “right to pursue his chosen occupation,” his due process claims failed. Id. The same is true here. At most, some of the individual officers’ alleged conduct interfered with the Robbinses’ ability to perform certain towing jobs. The officers did not deprive the Robbinses of their right to make a living or pursue their chosen occupation. The Robbinses also have not shown the challenged conduct was “‘so egregious or outrageous that it is conscience-shocking.’” Id. (quoting Forrester, 397 F.3d at 1058). Only in the rare situation when the state action is truly egregious and extraordinary will a substantive due process claim arise. Substantive due process is concerned with violations of personal rights so severe so disproportionate to the need presented, and so inspired by malice or sadism rather than a merely careless or unwise excess of zeal that it amounted to brutal and inhumane abuse of official power. Winslow, 696 F.3d at 736 (internal marks and quotations omitted). The Robbinses’ allegations do not shock the conscience. See Habhab, 536 F.3d at 968 (concluding -7- the plaintiff did not allege facts that shocked the conscience where the plaintiff alleged the officers interfered with his towing business because of ethnic prejudice).
The Equal Protection Clause provides, “No State shall . . . deny to any persons within its jurisdiction the equal protection of laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. “The purpose of the equal protection clause . . . is to secure every person within the state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted agents.” Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield Twp., 247 U.S. 350, 352 (1918). Unequal treatment of “‘those who are entitled to be treated alike[] is not a denial of equal protection unless there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination.’” Batra v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Neb., 79 F.3d 717, 721 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8 (1944)). “The good faith of [state] officers and the validity of their actions are presumed; when assailed, the burden of proof is upon the complaining party.” Sunday Lake, 247 U.S. at 353. Without more, “opprobrious epithets” like “‘willful’ and ‘malicious’” and characterizations of an officer’s conduct “as an unequal, unjust, and oppressive administration of the laws” are not enough. Snowden, 321 U.S. at 10. The Robbinses allege the officers violated their equal protection rights by treating them “differently than multiple other towing and wrecker services.” See, e.g., City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (explaining equal protection is “essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike”). The Supreme Court recognizes such a “class of one” equal protection claim—meaning “the plaintiff did not allege membership in a class or group”—“where the plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam); accord Barstad v. Murray Cnty., 420 F.3d 880, 884 (8th Cir. 2005). -8- This class-of-one theory does have limits. In light of the importance of “a clear standard against which departures, even for a single plaintiff, [can] be readily assessed,” the class-of-one theory may not apply to forms of state action . . . which by their nature involve discretionary decisionmaking based on a vast array of subjective, individualized assessments. In such cases the rule that people should be “treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions” is not violated when one person is treated differently from others, because treating like individuals differently is an accepted consequence of the discretion granted. Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 602-04 (2008) (illustrating the point with a hypothetical involving a traffic officer—on a busy highway frequented by speeders—exercising the discretion inherent in deciding which vehicle operator to issue a speeding ticket). Applying Engquist’s rationale to a “police officer’s decisions regarding whom to investigate and how to investigate,” we held “that while a police officer’s investigative decisions remain subject to traditional class-based equal protection analysis, they may not be attacked in a class-of-one equal protection claim” because investigative decisions “necessarily involve discretion.” Flowers v. City of Minneapolis, Minn., 558 F.3d 794, 799-800 (8th Cir. 2009); cf. Douglas Asphalt Co. v. Qore, Inc., 541 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir. 2008) (extending Engquist’s reasoning to circumstances “involving a government-contractor relationship”). But cf. Hanes v. Zurick, 578 F.3d 491, 495 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Engquist does not support the officers’ argument that malicious police conduct is off-limits from class-of-one claims.”). The Robbinses and the officers dispute whether Engquist and Flowers preclude the Robbinses’ class-of-one claim because the officers’ decisions to refer jobs to particular towing companies involved discretion. We need not decide that thorny issue today because, even if we assume the Robbinses’ claim is cognizable under -9- Engquist and Flowers, the Robbinses have not provided sufficient “evidence of ‘specific facts creating a triable controversy,’” Howard, 363 F.3d at 800 (quoting Jaurequi, 173 F.3d at 1085), as to whether they suffered “intentional and arbitrary discrimination,” Sunday Lake, 247 U.S. at 352. “The threshold inquiry in [the class-of-one] equal protection [claim the Robbinses assert] is whether the [Robbinses are] similarly situated to others who allegedly received preferential treatment.” Domina v. Van Pelt, 235 F.3d 1091, 1099 (8th Cir. 2000). “Absent [such] a threshold showing[,] . . . the [Robbinses do] not have a viable equal protection claim.” Klinger v. Dep’t of Corr., 31 F.3d 727, 731 (8th Cir. 1994). “To be similarly situated for purposes of a class-of-one equal-protection claim, the persons alleged to have been treated more favorably must be identical or directly comparable to the plaintiff in all material respects.” Reget v. City of La Crosse, 595 F.3d 691, 695 (7th Cir. 2010); accord Bills v. Dahm, 32 F.3d 333, 335 (8th Cir. 1994) (explaining equal protection comparators must be similarly situated “in all relevant respects”). “Identifying the disparity in treatment is especially important in class-of-one cases.” Barstad, 420 F.3d at 884. “A class-of-one plaintiff must therefore ‘provide a specific and detailed account of the nature of the preferred treatment of the favored class,’ especially when the state actors exercise broad discretion to balance a number of legitimate considerations.” Nolan v. Thompson, 521 F.3d 983, 990 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Jennings v. City of Stillwater, 383 F.3d 1199, 1214 (10th Cir. 2004)). The Robbinses do not meet this demanding standard. The Robbinses complain the officers interfered with their business and treated them unfairly, but fail to allege and prove facts showing they were similarly situated to other towing and wrecker services, or that those companies were treated more favorably under similar circumstances. Although the Robbinses nominally identify Chuck’s Towing, Miles Towing, and C&C Towing as purported comparators, they do not provide any -10- supporting details. Merely “saying the magic words is not enough,” Charleston v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill. at Chi., 741 F.3d 769, 775 (7th Cir. 2013), to state a viable equal protection claim.3 See Habhab, 536 F.3d at 967.
The Robbinses’ failure to establish their substantive due process and equal protection claims is also fatal to their claim that the officers conspired to violate their constitutional rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). “Absent a constitutional violation, ‘there is no actionable conspiracy claim.’” Slusarchuk v. Hoff, 346 F.3d 1178, 1183 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting Cook v. Tadros, 312 F.3d 386, 388 (8th Cir. 2002)).