Opinion ID: 1248805
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Brandishing as a Lesser Included Offense in this Circumstance

Text: The Appellant maintains that the lower court erred in refusing to provide the jury with an instruction on brandishing as a lesser included offense to wanton endangerment with a firearm. In syllabus point one of State v. Jones, 174 W.Va. 700, 329 S.E.2d 65 (1985), this Court explained the standard for determining whether a lesser included offense instruction should be provided, as follows: The question of whether a defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense involves a two-part inquiry. The first inquiry is a legal one having to do with whether the lesser offense is by virtue of its legal elements or definition included in the greater offense. The second inquiry is a factual one which involves a determination by the trial court of whether there is evidence which would tend to prove such lesser included offense. (Citation omitted). In State v. Stalnaker, 167 W.Va. 225, 279 S.E.2d 416 (1981), this Court noted that a trial court must give an instruction for a lesser included offense when evidence has been produced to support such a verdict. Id. at 227, 279 S.E.2d at 417, citing State v. Cobb, 166 W.Va. 65, 272 S.E.2d 467 (1980). Further, it is reversible error for a trial court to refuse to instruct a jury on lesser offenses charged in the indictment if there is any evidence in the record to prove such lesser offenses[.] State v. Wayne, 162 W.Va. 41, 46, 245 S.E.2d 838, 842 (1978), overruled on other grounds, State v. Kopa, 173 W.Va. 43, 311 S.E.2d 412 (1983); see also State v. Davis, 205 W.Va. 569, 585, 519 S.E.2d 852, 868 (1999). Likewise, in syllabus point five of State v. Wright, 200 W.Va. 549, 490 S.E.2d 636 (1997), this Court explained the legal analysis, as follows: `The test of determining whether a particular offense is a lesser included offense is that the lesser offense must be such that it is impossible to commit the greater offense without first having committed the lesser offense. An offense is not a lesser included offense if it requires the inclusion of an element not required in the greater offense.' Syllabus Point 1, State v. Louk, [169] W.Va. [24], 169 W.Va. 24, 285 S.E.2d 432 (1981)[, overruled on other grounds, State v. Jenkins, 191 W.Va. 87, 443 S.E.2d 244 (1994)]. Syllabus Point 1, State v. Neider, 170 W.Va. 662, 295 S.E.2d 902 (1982). In Wright, this Court had the opportunity to review the issue of whether an instruction on wanton endangerment should be provided as a lesser included offense to the crime of malicious assault. Adhering to the two-part inquiry formula enunciated in Jones, the Wright Court examined both legal and factual issues. In the legal analysis, the Court acknowledged that an offense is considered a lesser included offense only where it is impossible to commit the greater offense without having first committed the lesser offense. Id. at 554, 490 S.E.2d at 641. The Court also examined the elements of the two crimes and concluded that [w]anton endangerment also carries a less severe penalty than malicious assault. Id. at 553, 490 S.E.2d at 640, citing 42 C.J.S. Indictments and Information § 218 (1991) (An offense, in order to be a lesser included offense, must be a less serious crime in terms of its classification and degree....). With regard to the particular facts of the crime, the Wright Court reasoned: Given the circumstances of this case, it would have been impossible for Mr. Wright to commit malicious assault with a single gunshot without committing wanton endangerment with a firearm. 200 W.Va. at 553, 490 S.E.2d at 640. Consequently, the Court found that the lower court had erred by refusing to provide the instruction regarding the lesser included offense. The specific issue of whether wanton endangerment could include brandishing was addressed in Hancock v. Commonwealth, 998 S.W.2d 496 (Ky.App.1998), and the court explained that examples of conduct which constitute wanton endangerment include discharging or brandishing firearms in public, using firearms or explosives in a grossly careless manner, and obstructing public highways. Id. at 498. The Hancock court also recognized that wanton endangerment is not limited to specific types of conduct. It `may be committed in many ways.' Id., quoting Hardin v. Commonwealth, 573 S.W.2d 657, 660 (Ky.1978). Similarly, in State v. Estrada, 89 Wash. App. 1008, 1998 WL 46283 (1998), the court found little merit in Mr. Estrada's argument that unlawful display of a firearm is not a lesser included offense of first degree reckless endangerment. Id. at . Citing State v. Workman, 90 Wash.2d 443, 584 P.2d 382 (1978), [4] the Estrada court recognized that a crime is not a lesser included offense unless each of the elements of the lesser offense is a necessary element of the offense charged and the evidence supports an inference that the lesser crime was committed. Id. The court concluded that the lesser offense in that case satisfied both conditions, explaining as follows: The elements of first degree reckless endangerment as charged are that the defendant recklessly discharge a firearm, from a motor vehicle, in a manner creating a substantial risk of death or serious injury to another person. Former RCW 9A.36.045(1). The element of carrying, exhibiting, displaying or drawing a firearm under RCW 9.41.270 is a necessary element of the greater crime. Likewise, the element of circumstances warranting alarm under the lesser offense is an inherent characteristic of acting in a reckless manner endangering others. Id. In the case sub judice, the Appellant introduced evidence tending to show that an instruction on brandishing, as a lesser included offense to wanton endangerment with a firearm, would have been appropriate under this factual scenario. Our examination of the legal issue must include an analysis of whether it would have been impossible for the Appellant to have committed the greater offense of wanton endangerment, under the facts as presented in this circumstance, without having first committed the lesser offense of brandishing. Our analysis must be premised upon the language of the statutes and the facts of this particular case. As syllabus point five of Wright instructs, [a]n offense is not a lesser included offense if it requires the inclusion of an element not required in the greater offense. 200 W.Va. at 550, 490 S.E.2d at 637. The brandishing statute, West Virginia Code § 61-7-11, provides that an individual commits brandishing if, while armed with a firearm or other deadly weapon, he carries, brandishes, or uses such weapon in a way or manner to cause, or threaten, a breach of the peace. [5] By comparison, the wanton endangerment statute, West Virginia Code § 61-7-12, explains that an individual commits wanton endangerment if he wantonly performs any act with a firearm which creates a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another. Thus, a comparison of the two statutes reveals that the offense of brandishing does not require the inclusion of any element not required by the offense of wanton endangerment. To have committed wanton endangerment, requiring the creation of a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury, in the confrontation described by the parties in this case, the Appellant would had to have first carried, brandished, or used his weapon in a manner to threaten a breach of the peace. The state argues that brandishing is not necessarily an included offense because an assailant intent upon wanton endangerment might commit that crime by attacking a victim from behind the victim or otherwise out of a victim's line of vision. We reject that argument because it is equally clear that one may commit brandishing under like circumstances behind a victim or otherwise out of the victim's line of vision. The brandishing statute requires only that the individual carry, brandish, or use a deadly weapon in a manner to cause or threaten a breach of the peace. The fact that a victim may not immediately see the individual using a weapon in such a matter does not mean that the crime of brandishing has not been committed. We find that it would have been impossible for the Appellant to have committed wanton endangerment without first committing brandishing. Accordingly, we hold that the offense of brandishing as defined by West Virginia Code § 61-7-11 is a lesser included offense within the definition of wanton endangerment under West Virginia Code § 61-7-12. [6] We find that there was ample evidence in the trial below to support an instruction on brandishing as a lesser included offense under the indictment returned below. The lower court abused its discretion by refusing to provide the brandishing instruction offered by the Appellant, and this case must be reversed on that assignment of error.