Opinion ID: 2385655
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Cross-examination Regarding Arrest Record

Text: At trial, appellant's sole defense was that he was insane at the time the offenses were committed. Appellant contends that the trial court erroneously allowed the prosecutor to cross-examine three defense witnesses (a psychiatrist, a psychologist and appellant's sister) about their knowledge of appellant's arrest record. He argues that these involvements with the law were not relevant to his mental state on May 6, 1980, and instead, proved only a propensity to engage in criminal conduct and had an adverse impact upon the jury. We hold, on the facts of this case, that the cross-examination was proper to impeach the credibility of the witnesses. At the close of the government's case, appellant requested the court to preclude use by the prosecutor of information about appellant's arrest record in cross-examining defense witnesses. [16] The trial court denied this request in light of appellant's anticipated insanity defense which, as foreshadowed in appellant's opening statement, would focus upon the murder of appellant's mother in 1975 and appellant's discovery of the body as the precipitating factor of appellant's mental illness. To the extent that the trial court's ruling [17] permitted the introduction of evidence of the arrests to prove that the 1975 event did not itself precipitate criminal conduct, the ruling is erroneous. Such use of the evidence is, in effect, no different from allowing evidence of appellant's evil character to prove criminal disposition and guilt. We agree with appellant that none of these defense witnesses were character witnesses, and the prosecution was therefore not permitted to present evidence of appellant's bad character on the theory that appellant had put his character in issue in the case. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-79, 69 S.Ct. 213, 218-20, 93 L.Ed. 168 (1948); Johns v. United States, 434 A.2d 463, 468 (D.C.1981). In addition, none of the arrests were sufficiently close in time to the homicide to be admissible as relevant to appellant's mental state in 1980, see United States v. Davis, 513 F.2d 319, 321 (5th Cir.1975) (evidence of criminal conduct on same day as charged offense admissible to show defendant is goal-directed and therefore sane), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 921, 96 S.Ct. 1128, 47 L.Ed.2d 329 (1976); United States v. Phillips, 515 F.Supp. 758, 764 (E.D.Ky.1981) (criminal conduct a few weeks prior to charged offense admissible to show state of mind when defense is hypnotic influence). Further, the government does not argue that evidence of these arrests is relevant to appellant's motive or intent on May 6, 1980. See Drew v. United States, 118 U.S.App.D.C. 11, 15-16, 331 F.2d 85, 89-90 (1964); see also United States v. Hauck, 586 F.2d 1296, 1299 (8th Cir.1978) (past use of insanity defense to evade prior criminal charges admissible to show intent and motive for present assertion of defense), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 947, 99 S.Ct. 2170, 60 L.Ed.2d 1050 (1979). In a case like this one, however, where the defense is not a denial of commission of the act, but the interposition of the affirmative defense of insanity, the prejudice pointed to by appellant, the denial of a fair opportunity to defend against the homicide charge, Michelson, supra, 335 U.S. at 477-76, 69 S.Ct. at 218, is difficult to identify. In other words, there is no real danger that the jury could use the arrest evidence as proof that appellant committed the murder on May 6, 1980, or to prejudge his guilt on the basis of his past criminal record, because appellant did not deny commission of the act. Cf. United States v. Caldwell, 178 U.S.App.D.C. 20, 31, 543 F.2d 1333, 1344 (1974) (where sole defense is insanity, not factual innocence, there can be no prejudice from pretrial publicity in absence of a showing that publicity affected jury's impartiality on insanity issue), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1087, 96 S.Ct. 877, 47 L.Ed.2d 97 (1976). The likelihood that the jury could use this evidence on such an improper basis was further diminished by the trial court's lengthy instruction to the jury at the outset of the defense case to keep the evidence compartmentalized and to now allow the defense evidence to affect its determination of whether the government had proved all elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. [18] In fact, in cases of this type, in which insanity is the sole defense, prior criminal conduct is often part of the defendant's case, as tending to show the defendant's inability to conform his conduct to the requirements of law, see United States v. Emery, 682 F.2d 493, 500 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1044, 103 S.Ct. 465, 74 L.Ed.2d 615 (1982); and our cases reflect a concern that prior criminal conduct should not be the sole evidence upon which a defense expert bases his conclusion that a defendant was insane at the time he committed the criminal offense. See, e.g., Bethea v. United States, 365 A.2d 64, 80-81 (D.C.1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911, 97 S.Ct. 2979, 53 L.Ed.2d 1095 (1977). While the admission of the arrest evidence in this case resulted in little identifiable prejudice to the defendant, it did have probative value on the issue of the basis for, and reliability of, the opinions proffered by appellant's lay and expert witnesses. As a lay witness, appellant's sister sought to show that she was in a position to make an informed judgment about her brother's mental state. See Wright v. United States, 102 U.S.App.D.C. 36, 41-42, 250 F.2d 4, 9-10 (1957). She testified that she was close to him and saw him a few times a week between 1969 and 1980; that appellant was a normal, average teenager; that appellant's discovery of his mother's body in 1975 had a terrible effect on him, and that following the event he just couldn't do anything, it seemed like; and that she noticed a more profound change in his personality in the early part of 1980. Yet upon questioning by the prosecution, she denied knowledge of any of appellant's arrests. Use of appellant's arrest record was highly probative on the issue of the accuracy and reliability of Rogers' testimony and was properly admitted to impeach her credibility. The same is true with regard to testimony of the defense's two expert witnesses. Both experts testified that in order to make a proper diagnosis they needed to know as much as possible about appellant, and that they based their opinions on lengthy interviews with appellant and on his life history as he described it and as described by others in affidavits. The psychiatrist, who had diagnosed appellant as a schizophrenic most likely dating from 1975, testified on cross-examination that he knew something about appellant's arrest record, even though he had not mentioned it in his report. The psychologist testified that he specifically asked appellant about his prior arrest record since it was important to his diagnosis, but had received no information about the bulk of the incidents. In cases such as this one, where both experts based their opinions on the life history of appellant, on cross-examination it is proper to examine that history in some detail. This is as it should be.... [T]he material from which an expert fashions his opinion constitutes one of the most important features... of expert testimony. Martin v. United States, 109 U.S.App.D.C. 83, 84, 284 F.2d 217, 218 (1960) (evidence of defendant's prior bad acts and trouble with police admitted). See also Doepel v. United States, 434 A.2d 449, 455 (D.C.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1037, 102 S.Ct. 580, 70 L.Ed.2d 483 (1981) (where defense is insanity, evidence of prior criminal conduct relevant to show psychiatrist's opinion contrary to that suggested by conduct); United States v. Emery, supra, 682 F.2d at 498 (where defense is insanity, evidence of prior criminal conduct relevant when psychiatrist's opinion rests partially on that conduct). In United States v. Ruster, 712 F.2d 409 (9th Cir.1983), the sole issue for the jury to determine, as in this case, was whether the defendant was sane at the time the offense was committed. In that case the Ninth Circuit held that it was not error to admit evidence of the defendant's arrest record upon cross-examination by the prosecution of defendant's expert psychiatrist. When insanity is presented as a defense, the court said, the trial judge should be free in his admission of all possibly relevant evidence. 712 F.2d at 412. We hold that in this fact situation, the probative value of the arrest evidence in testing the foundations for the lay and expert testimony, and in impeaching the credibility of these witnesses, outweighs any prejudicial effect its introduction may have had upon the jury's determination. The fact that several of the charges against appellant ultimately were dropped does not affect this conclusion, for in its final charge to the jury, the trial court stated: Now during the course of the trial evidence has been introduced from time to time that the defendant has had other criminal charges alleged against him. Now, merely because criminal charges are brought does not establish that the defendant committed those offenses. You may evaluate any reference to any such criminal charges in light of all other evidence in the case, and then give it such weight as in your judgment it is fairly and objectively and impartially entitled to receive. Viewed as a whole, these instructions comport with defense counsel's request for a cautionary instruction that the evidence of prior arrests not be considered as proof of commission of the offense charged. In sum, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing cross-examination of defense witnesses about appellant's arrest record. See Staton v. United States, 466 A.2d 1245, 1249 (D.C. 1983). [19]