Opinion ID: 196676
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Foreseeable Reliance Exception

Text: 1. The Foreseeable Reliance Exception In order to sustain a claim of legal malpractice, ONB must show that Antonellis owed One National a duty of care. See Spinner v. Nutt, 631 N.E.2d 542, 544 (Mass. 1994); DaRoza v. Arter, 622 N.E.2d 604, 608 (Mass. 1993). The issue of whether such a duty exists is a question of law. Id. at 381. The 3 The parties do not argue on appeal that there was either an express or implied attorney-client relationship. See Sheinkopf, 927 F.2d at 1265-66; Falherty v. Baybank Merrimack Valley, N.A., 808 F. Supp. 55, 60 (D. Mass. 1992); DeVaux v. American Home Ins. Co., 444 N.E.2d 355, 357 (Mass. 1983). Accordingly, we focus solely on whether Antonellis' liability extends to ONB under Massachusetts' theory of liabilitybased on foreseeable reliance. -6- general rule is that an attorney's liability for negligence arises out of a duty owed to a client. Norman v. Brown, Todd & Heyburn, 693 F. Supp. 1259, 1265 (D. Mass. 1988). Massachusetts case law has crafted an exception to this general proposition based on foreseeable reliance, however, so that an attorney is not 'absolutely insulated from liability to nonclients.' Spinner, 631 N.E.2d at 544 (quoting Page v. Frazier, 445 N.E.2d 148, 154 (Mass. 1983)). As defined in the case law, the foreseeable reliance exception demands that two requirements be met. First, a duty is only owed to nonclients who the attorney knows will rely on the services rendered. Robertson v. Gaston Snow & Ely Bartlett, 536 N.E.2d 334, 350 (Mass.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 894 (1989); see Spinner, 631 N.E.2d at 544; DaRoza, 622 N.E.2d at 608. It is not enough that a plaintiff claims actual reliance: [i]t must be shown that the attorney should reasonably foresee that the nonclient will rely upon him for legal services. Id. at 608 n.7. Second, the court will not impose a duty of reasonable care on an attorney if such an independent duty would potentially conflict with the duty the attorney owes to his or her client. Lamare, 636 N.E.2d at 219; see Robertson, 536 N.E.2d at 350; Kirkland Constr. Co. v. James, 658 N.E.2d 699, 701 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995). Here, the district court found there was some question as to the first, foreseeable reliance prong of the test, but that there was no question that there were potentially conflicting duties. (District Court Memorandum and -7- Decision, p. 15). Reviewing the issue de novo, we agree with the court below that there was a potential conflict between Antonellis' duty to Milford and his alleged duty to One National, so that ONB cannot meet the test's second requirement. Accordingly, we need not determine whether Antonellis should reasonably have foreseen ONB's reliance on the title certificate.