Opinion ID: 2755588
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Juror Removal Claim

Text: The case was submitted to the jury at about 4:15 p.m. on Monday, March 23, 2009. On the morning of Tuesday, March 24, Judge Weisberg received a note, signed by the jury foreperson, stating that one juror, who was later identified as Juror 13, had a “family emergency and will be unable to be here Monday or Tuesday, the 30th and the 31st” and that “[o]ur sense is that it would be advisable to contact the alternate.” Upon coming into the courtroom to discuss her situation with the judge, Juror 13 said that she would not have a problem if (as the court had suggested might occur) the jury would not be deliberating on Friday. About two and a half hours later, Judge Weisberg received another note signed by the foreperson that read: Judge, we have a problem. One of the jurors has said [crossing out the word “announced”] that her mind is closed as to the case. Our deliberations are unproductive already. All eleven jurors are in agreement on this point. 28 Judge Weisberg consulted with the prosecutor and defense counsel. The court expressed concern that the juror described in the note might again be Juror 13, about whom the prosecutor had raised concerns during the presentation of evidence. The prosecutor had earlier reported observing the juror shaking her head disapprovingly at court rulings and during the questioning of some witnesses; failing to follow the written transcripts during playbacks of recorded phone calls; speaking out loud and talking to herself while the calls were being played; appearing to sleep during portions of the trial; and casting her eyes up to the ceiling and “clearly not listening” during closing arguments and the court’s instructions. The juror had also loudly commented that the number of security personnel in the courtroom was “ridiculous” and unnecessary. Both defense counsel argued that, regardless of the identity of the juror, an instruction to the jury to continue deliberations and a renewed instruction to deliberate in good faith would be adequate curative measures. Judge Weisberg commented that if the juror who was the subject of the foreperson’s note was the same juror about whom the prosecutor had raised concerns, he would be inclined to dismiss that juror without additional instruction because, “after the concerns were expressed about this juror’s attitude toward her juror service,” he had already 29 instructed the jury three times on the importance of deliberating with an open mind,20 and was skeptical that a fourth instruction would have “a salutary effect[.]” Judge Weisberg also told counsel that he was “concerned because it happened so quickly in the deliberations after such a lengthy trial,” and because 20 First, Judge Weisberg had instructed the jury that [I]f you go into the jury room . . . with your mind already firmly made up, it kind of defeats the whole purpose of deliberations, which is to talk about it for the first time freely and openly, among yourselves, [and] if there are disagreements, to talk about the disagreements respectfully with each other, to see why somebody may see it differently than the way you see it. And so, it’s very important that you go into that process with a completely open mind. So don’t try to make up your mind about anything in the case any stage, including this late stage. On the following day, Judge Weisberg instructed the jury further that [I]t’s very important that when you go into deliberations, you haven’t made up your own minds firmly about any aspect of the case, until you have a chance to talk to each other about it. That’s the whole point of deliberations. The next day, Judge Weisberg instructed jurors that they should [t]ry to retain everything you’ve heard, but please, as I’ve told you last night, don’t try to make up your mind. It’s unfair to the parties. It’s unfair to yourselves to go into your deliberations . . . with a mind already firmly made up. You should keep a completely open mind until you begin your deliberations. 30 “an unwillingness to deliberate further at such an early stage . . . suggests . . . that it’s a closed mind, . . . not a dissenting mind[.]” He reasoned that the jury had not had “a chance to get far enough to know whether there’s a dissent or disagreement about the merits of the case” and that there appeared to be “just a closed mind and a refusal to even listen to the point of view of others.” He explained that if the note was about Juror 13, he would have to view the note “in the context of the entire trial[,] beginning with her response on voir dire where I was commiserating with the venire about the length of the trial and her response was, the longer the trial, the better, I hate my job anyway.” Responding to defense counsel’s suggestions that without an additional instruction, the court would not be in the position of having “tried to address it and concluded that that has failed[,]” Judge Weisberg said, “I would say that’s true of any other juror, [but] I’m not as sanguine about this one.” Judge Weisberg decided to question the foreperson about the note using language taken from Brown v. United States,21 explicitly recognizing that the situation was “extremely dicey” and that he needed to be “quite careful” in his inquiry. The foreperson confirmed that the juror referred to in the foreperson’s note was indeed Juror 13. The foreperson told the court that Juror 13 had 21 818 A.2d 179 (D.C. 2003). 31 announced on the evening of March 23, “before deliberations had begun[,]” “that there was going to be disagreement. Apropos of nothing said there would be disagreement.” The foreperson further explained that at the very beginning of deliberations on the morning of March 24, when the foreman began expressing his views on the case and before anyone else had spoken, Juror 13 “stood up, walked out of the room or started to walk out of the room, because she was afraid of a scheduling conflict and said, we’re going to be here through the weekend and into Monday and Tuesday.” In addition, the foreperson told Judge Weisberg the following: [A]s we talked over the course of the day and more extensively about the case, [Juror 13] said repeatedly that nothing anybody said could persuade her one way or the other. Um, that her mind was made up. Um, she also at times said, oh, I’ll listen, I’ll listen, I’ll listen. She would say at times, I’ll listen, okay, but it was the unanimous view of the eleven jurors in the room that [Juror 13’s professions of willingness to deliberate] were not sincere. Asked by Judge Weisberg how he knew that, the foreperson replied that, after the lunch break, We had come in and we were speaking about the case, things became more — rather heated, not terribly so, [Juror 13], in the middle of — really somebody else talking, stood up and said, can I go to the bathroom outside of the jury room? And nobody was going to stop her. It wasn’t a break, so she walked out[.] 32 The foreperson continued: And I should emphasize that there’s a lot of disagreements in the jury room . . . [T]here are disagreements between people that are not this juror and that are being handled in an . . . upright and thoughtful fashion. . . . [T]his [i.e., the situation with Juror 13] is something very different. The foreperson acknowledged that Juror 13 was (in Judge Weisberg’s words) “going over [the] evidence and what it shows,” but added that Juror 13 “emphasizes her conclusions — significantly more than the evidence in the case.” Asked by Judge Weisberg whether he took Juror 13’s comments to mean “I have made up my mind and I will not be open to further deliberations, and won’t discuss it further” or instead to mean, “I’m willing to listen but it’s going to take a lot to change my mind on my view of the case[,]” the foreperson responded, Significantly closer to the former. She expresses formally those words. She does not listen. She puts her head down and closes her eyes. Um, is combative, accuses people of having agendas. From the foreperson’s answers, Judge Weisberg concluded that “from his expression of it, her mind is completely closed, was closed before they started, will not be reopened no matter what[.]” He also told counsel that he didn’t “think it’s 33 so far in the deliberations that we [could] single [Juror 13] out as a dissenting juror on the merits because, as [the foreperson] expressed himself, there’s lots of disagreements going on the merits, among the others.” He also observed that he had “enough basis to conclude that an instruction would be very unlikely to be productive.” Judge Weisberg next questioned each of the jurors, telling them that he was not “asking any juror what their . . . view of the case is, or what views have been expressed in the jury room.” He asked each juror (except Juror 13), “Do you believe that one or more jurors went into deliberations with a closed mind and he or she is unwilling to consider the views of others and possibly changing his mind” and whether the juror’s answer was “based on expressions by that juror[.]” Each juror confirmed that that was his or her belief and basis for belief. When Juror 13 herself came in for questioning and Judge Weisberg informed her that other jurors believed that she had “entered into the deliberations with [her] mind already made up[,]” she responded by saying: No, that’s not true. I was not in agreement with them, so they tried to force me to be in agreement with them. . . . I was standing on the evidence that was there and they tried to force me to agree with them by hollering and becoming belligerent, and I told them that I made up my mind with the decision that I made and they cannot force me to agree with them, no matter how many ways they 34 tried to tell it to me. I’m a very smart educated woman. I have degrees and everything. You cannot force me to agree with you for something that I don’t believe in standing on the evidence that is presented there. So they were very upset about that. .... That’s the overall problem. They can’t force me to agree with them. .... I’m here to do the job of the juror. And that is to base the facts on the actual evidence. At the conclusion of the voir dire, Judge Weisberg decided to remove Juror 13 and replace her with an alternate pursuant to Super. Ct. Crim. R. 24 (c). He explained his decision as follows: [E]leven others say somebody has a closed mind, entered the deliberations with a closed mind and is refusing to deliberate with an open mind . . . . [I]t’s as clear as it could possibly be, that leaving this juror on the jury whatever any of their views are about the merits of the case, including her, is not conducive to a jury that can fulfill its oath and perform its duty to deliberate based solely on the evidence and the law of and the facts of the case. Judge Weisberg added: [I]f we were in the fifth day of deliberations, and they had thoroughly discussed the case with [Juror 13] 35 participating, and she had a view that was different from all the others and said they just don’t agree with me and they can’t force me to change my mind, we wouldn’t be in this discussion. She’d be on the jury. . . . [But] [s]he went into the jury room with a closed mind, expressed it last night before they even began talking about the case, reinforced it this morning, saying, I’ll listen, but my mind is made up, and all eleven other jurors have confirmed what the foreperson told us. And I think that’s just not conducive to . . . the type of deliberations [to] which all parties in this case are entitled. After the removal of Juror 13 and substitution of an alternate juror, the jury deliberated for approximately three days before reaching its verdicts.22 Following announcement of the verdicts, appellants sought new trials on the ground that there was no “‘just cause’” to remove Juror 13. In its opposition, the government disagreed and also asserted that its subsequent investigation had revealed that Juror 13, a Maryland resident, had not been qualified to serve as a juror to begin with. Judge Weisberg denied appellants’ motion, specifying that his ruling was based “solely on the record as it existed at the time” of removal, but noting that the subsequently discovered information about Juror 13’s 22 Judge Weisberg later told counsel that he was “pleased that we were able to get through that very difficult inquiry without any juror telling us where she or any other jurors stood based on the one day of what I would call non-deliberations or partial deliberations with eleven people participating and one not.” 36 misrepresentation of her eligibility “corroborate[d] the court’s assessment of her lack of credibility.”23 In their initial briefs on appeal, appellants argued that Judge Weisberg erred in denying their motion for a new trial because the removal of Juror 13 violated both Super. Ct. Crim. R. 24 (c) and their constitutional rights to an impartial and unanimous jury. Following oral arguments before this court in November 2012, we remanded the case and instructed the trial court to make additional findings of fact regarding whether “during jury selection, the removed juror failed to disclose disqualifying information out of ‘a desire to serve on [the] jury for some improper purpose,’ Young v. United States, 694 A.2d 891, 894 (D.C. 1997), and whether she otherwise was biased against the government.” After remand proceedings that included a July 2013 evidentiary hearing (at which Juror 13, Michelle Suggs, testified), Judge Weisberg found that during voir dire Juror 13 “intentionally lied about her [non-District of Columbia] residence,” “failed to disclose her 2007 misdemeanor conviction,” and “failed to disclose her close personal or family 23 Judge Weisberg later commented that the “dishonesty and potential fraud unearthed by the government after the trial and brought out at the hearing on remand” “reinforce[d] [his] view that [Juror 13] is a person with little regard for the truth if it stands in the way of getting what she wants.” 37 relationship with a convicted felon, which may have been intentional.”24 However, while finding that “[t]he inference is compelling that [Juror 13] did all of these things because she wanted to serve on a jury in the District of Columbia” and that “[t]here is enough in the record to surmise” that this desire arose from an antiprosecution bias, Judge Weisberg concluded that the government had not proven “by a preponderance of the evidence that [Juror 13’s] motive for wanting to serve on defendants’ jury was to acquit the defendants or hang the jury because of her bias against the government.”
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 24 (c) provides in pertinent part that “[a]n alternate juror, in the order called, shall replace a juror who, becomes or is found to be unable or disqualified to perform juror duties.” The Rule limits the discretion of the trial judge in removing and replacing a juror in order to safeguard the defendant’s “valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal,” a 24 The government submitted evidence that Juror 13 had not lived in the District of Columbia since at least 2006 and had failed to disclose a 2007 conviction for driving under the influence. The government also presented evidence that Juror 13 had failed to disclose a close relationship with a man named Wendell Clay, who was convicted of first-degree burglary in 1998, served a twelve-year sentence, lived with Juror 13 in Maryland between his release in 2009 and his arrest on another charge in 2010, and listed Juror 13 on prison visitation forms as, variously, his spouse or his aunt. 38 right that is rooted in the constitutional rights to an impartial jury and a unanimous verdict and in the guarantee against double jeopardy. Hinton v. United States, 979 A.2d 663, 674-75, 681-82, 682 n.76, 688-89 (D.C. 2009) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted).25 “It is well-settled that each of those rights ‘would be abrogated if it were permissible for the judge to intervene in deliberations and remove a juror for dissenting from the majority view.’” Id. at 682; see also id. at 685 (“[R]emoving a juror because of his views of the evidence [is] one of the principal evils against which Rule 24 (c)’s restrictions are directed.”); Shotikare v. United States, 779 A.2d 335, 344 (D.C. 2001) (“[A] juror may not be excused for the purpose of breaking a deadlock or because of her views on the merits.”). We review a trial court’s decision to replace a juror with an alternate for abuse of discretion. Darab v. United States, 623 A.2d 127, 138 (D.C. 1993). A court abuses its discretion in replacing a juror under Rule 24 (c) “if it replaced the juror for an improper or legally insufficient reason, if its ruling lacked ‘a firm factual foundation,’ or if the trial court otherwise failed to ‘exercise its judgment in a rational and informed manner.’” Hinton, 979 A.2d at 683-84 (internal citations 25 See also Hobbs v. United States, 18 A.3d 796, 800 (D.C. 2011) (noting that Hinton “described a far more limited scope for the trial court’s exercise of discretion in ruling on motions for excusal of empaneled jurors,” such that “[o]nce jeopardy attaches and jurors begin their duties, they can no longer be removed for reasons that would meet only the good cause standard”). 39 omitted). We will reverse an appellant’s conviction “if the record evidence discloses any reasonable possibility that the impetus for a juror’s dismissal stems from the juror’s views on the merits of the case[.]” Shotikare, 779 A.2d at 345; see also United States v. Brown, 823 F.2d 591, 597 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“Because the record evidence in this case discloses just such a possibility, we must reverse the convictions.”). Appellants argue that Judge Weisberg lacked a sufficient factual basis for a finding that Juror 13 was, as Rule 24 (c) requires for removal, “‘unable’ to perform her [juror] duties[.]” They assert that there was at least a reasonable possibility that the other jurors’ difficulties with Juror 13 and their assessment of her willingness to deliberate related to their disagreement with her views on the merits of the case. Accordingly, appellants argue, Judge Weisberg’s decision to remove Juror 13 violated their rights to a unanimous and impartial jury and to a fair and neutral tribunal. We disagree. Appellants do not dispute that “[e]vidence of a juror’s . . . seriously disruptive behavior” can be adequate to support a finding of incapacity to serve under Rule 24 (c) and can thus be a “legally sufficient basis” for removing a 40 juror.26 That is precisely what the foreperson’s answers described and what Judge Weisberg found to exist.27 According to the foreperson, Juror 13 twice stood up and walked out of the jury room while other jurors were expressing their views (the first time, when the foreperson began to describe his initial take on the case and Juror 13 stood up and left or attempted to leave to address her scheduling issue; and the second time when the jury had just reconvened after the lunch break and another juror began speaking, and Juror 13 stood up and walked out to go to a bathroom outside the jury room). Each time, she interrupted the jury’s efforts to deliberate. Even when she remained within the jury room, she put her head down and closed her eyes rather than engage with her fellow jurors. She expressed to them that her mind was made up and that while she would listen, nothing they could say could change her mind. According to the foreperson, what Juror 13 expressed was something close to “I have made up my mind and I will not be open to further deliberations, and won’t discuss it further[.]” We are satisfied that Judge Weisberg had a sufficient basis for finding that, in all these ways, Juror 13 was not deliberating and was disrupting her fellow jurors’ efforts to deliberate and 26 Hinton, 979 A.2d at 684 n.90 (“Evidence of a juror’s . . . seriously disruptive behavior is certainly adequate reason to conclude [that the juror lacked capacity to continue to serve as a juror].”). 27 See Shotikare, 779 A.2d at 340 (holding that the judge properly excused a juror for “intimidating the jury and disrupting its deliberations.”). 41 rendering those efforts (as the foreperson described) “unproductive.” Cf. Hinton, 979 A.2d at 680 (“[W]e think a trial court appropriately may find an empaneled juror ‘unable or disqualified to perform juror duties’ . . . where the court perceives a serious risk that the juror’s ability to deliberate fully and fairly will be compromised . . . .”). Judge Weisberg also had an adequate basis for finding that Juror 13 entered deliberations with a closed mind and an intent to cause the jury’s work to be protracted and unproductive. Before discussions had begun, she predicted “disagreements” that would cause the jury still to be deliberating a week later,28 possibly because of her “the longer, the better” sentiment. Necessarily, to avoid intruding into the jury’s deliberations, “the record that [was] generated in the course of the [court’s] inquiry [was] less than exhaustive[,]” Shotikare, 779 A.2d at 345, but Judge Weisberg was entitled to credit the foreperson’s stated impression, and the other jurors’ agreement, that Juror 13 expressed that her mind was closed as to the case and said repeatedly that “nothing anybody said could persuade her 28 Notably, the foreperson’s report of Juror 13’s concern about her conflicting travel plans on March 30 and 31 prompted Cheadle’s counsel to comment that it was “a little premature [for Juror 13] to conclude that [the jury] won’t have a decision by then.” 42 one way or the other” (emphasis added). Judge Weisberg’s assessment was that Juror 13 lacked credibility, and he was entitled to discredit her claim that she was merely “standing on the evidence.”29 We have no basis for second-guessing Judge Weisberg’s assessment that comments such as those Juror 13 made right off the bat after a lengthy trial on multiple charges evinced a closed mind and a refusal to listen to others’ points of view — an impediment to deliberations going forward30 — rather than a conscientiously dissenting mind.31 29 See Brown, 818 A.2d at 186 (“[T]he judge was not obliged to accept [the removed juror’s answer] at face value.”); Shotikare, 779 A.2d at 347 (“[A] juror’s assurance that he or she can render a fair and impartial verdict is not dispositive.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 30 As Judge Weisberg put it, “if you can’t listen to each other’s point of view, deliberations just can’t occur.” 31 Cf. Brown, 818 A.2d at 187 (noting that where the trial court “credited the broad consensus among the jurors that Juror Three had refused to participate in the deliberation process from the beginning[,]” this finding would be reviewed for clear error, since the court was uniquely situated to make the credibility determinations that must be made where a juror’s motivations and intentions are at issue); United States v. Baker, 262 F.3d 124, 130 (2d Cir. 2001) (“A [trial] court’s finding on the question whether a juror has impermissibly refused to participate in the deliberation process is a finding of fact to which appropriate deference is due.”); see also Hinton, 979 A.2d at 683-84 (recognizing “the trial judge’s superior ability to observe the demeanor of the juror” and stating that it is not this court’s “function . . . to second-guess a reasonable judgment of the trial court”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Braxton v. United States, 852 A.2d 941, 949 (D.C. 2004) (“[E]ven though the evidence of juror misconduct was less than overwhelming, it was sufficient to preclude us from second-guessing the trial judge’s finding. . . .”); Shotikare, 779 A.2d at 345 (noting that “the questioning of the jurors supported the judge’s factual findings concerning [the removed juror’s] (continued…) 43 Nor can we agree on this record that there is a reasonable possibility that Juror 13 was removed because she was a dissenting voice or because of her views on the evidence, such that her removal violated appellants’ Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.32 We deem it important, as Judge Weisberg did, that the issue of Juror 13 came to light early after the case had gone to the jury, when there were still what the foreperson described as “lots” of disagreements among the jurors, meaning that no juror could be identified as a dissenter.33 Notably, too, following (…continued) behavior” and “defer[ring] to the judge’s findings, particularly inasmuch as they turned, in part, on his evaluation of the jurors’ demeanors”). 32 Cf. United States v. Symington, 195 F.3d 1080, 1087 n.5 (9th Cir. 1999) (“We emphasize that the standard is any reasonable possibility, not any possibility whatever.”). 33 Citing Symington, appellants argue that, since it is unlikely that the other jurors would have suggested the removal of Juror 13 if she had agreed with their views on the merits, the very fact that they sought intervention from Judge Weisberg gave rise to a reasonable possibility that the removal of Juror 13 was motivated by her views on the merits. However, this case is readily distinguishable from Symington. In Symington, there was “considerable evidence to suggest that the other jurors’ frustrations with [the removed juror] derived primarily from the fact that she held a position opposite to theirs on the merits of the case[,]” and the Ninth Circuit noted that individual jurors asked the district court “to dismiss [the removed juror] because otherwise the result would be ‘an undecided vote, a hung jury[]’” and because “‘we are blocked and blocked and blocked [and] don’t want to be blocked any more.’” 195 F.3d at 1088. Moreover, the jury note was sent when the jury had been deliberating for a week. Id. at 1083. There was no similar communication in this case, and the jury had had the case for only a few hours. (continued…) 44 the replacement of Juror 13, deliberations continued for a further three days before the jury reached its verdicts, suggesting that there remained much room for discussion at the time Juror 13 was removed.34 Appellants also argue that “the decision to remove [Juror 13] . . . entail[ed] influencing the outcome of deliberations in a known direction.” Braxton, 852 A.2d at 947 (internal quotation marks omitted). It is true that, even though Judge Weisberg scrupulously avoided any indication of the jurors’ views on the merits of the case and explicitly and repeatedly admonished each juror that they should reveal nothing to him about the content of their deliberations, Juror 13’s demeanor during the presentation of evidence seemed to reveal that she had some hostility to (…continued) 34 We also note that, as in Shotikare, the court “took pains” to let the remaining members of the jury know that the juror’s removal “had nothing to do with her views on the merits.” 779 A.2d at 346. Judge Weisberg reminded the jurors that he did not know and “never w[ould]” know “anything about what you’ve talked about the case[,]” and explained that Juror 13 had been excused because “the process couldn’t even get started because somebody went into the process with their mind made up, [such] that it became impossible for the others to persuade or to talk about[,] in a meaningful way, any differences that may exist in your deliberations.” Judge Weisberg also told the remaining jurors that if, by contrast, deliberations had been going on for days and “a juror came in and said I just disagree with them,” he would not have been able to do anything about that, because it “sometimes happens” that “we can’t get a verdict[.]” 45 the government.35 However, here, as in Baker (where the removed juror had told the trial judge that she felt the defendants had been “unfairly prosecuted”), the juror “was not removed for her nonconforming view of the evidence[,]” but “was removed for her . . . refusal to perform her duty as a juror by deliberating together with the other jurors”; and “[t]he complaints of the other jurors, although including reference to [the removed juror’s] statement that ‘the evidence was not going to change her mind,’ focused on her ‘refusal to deliberate on any of the counts.’” 262 F.3d at 131-32 (holding that the trial court was within its discretion in removing the juror). See also Shotikare, 779 A.2d at 345-46 (“It was known, of course, that Juror # 5 was in disagreement with at least some of her fellow jurors. The jury had reported itself deadlocked, and it reasonably could be surmised that Juror # 5 contributed to the logjam. . . . However that may be, the deadlock was not the impetus for Juror # 5’s removal. More precisely, we may say that there is no reasonable possibility apparent on the record before us that Juror # 5 was dismissed, or that her dismissal was sought, for the purpose of undoing the deadlock, or because of her views on the merits.”). 35 We note that, in support of his new-trial motion, Cheadle attached a declaration from Juror 13 in which she made her views as to the merits known for the first time, stating that she “did not find that the evidence in this case proved that the defendants were guilty” and that she specifically disbelieved the testimony of George Haynes because he was cooperating with the prosecution. 46 Finally, we turn to appellants’ argument that the Rule 24 (c) “incapacity” standard incorporates a requirement that a juror be shown not merely to have failed to deliberate at one point in time, but to have repeatedly failed to heed remedial measures (such that the trial court can conclude that the juror not only has been unwilling to deliberate, but is not able to do so prospectively). Cf. Braxton, 852 A.2d at 948-49 (“reluctan[tly]” concluding that there was no error in removal of juror where the foreperson’s reports of misconduct occurred after “a forceful reinstruction of the jury[,]” “suggest[ing] that the judge’s directive fell on one pair of deaf ears[,]” and where there thus was “substantial record support for the judge’s finding that a juror was not carrying out her responsibilities appropriately”). We agree that seeing how a non-deliberating juror conducts herself after a re-instruction can move a trial court closer to a firm factual foundation about the juror’s capacity going forward. However, Rule 24 (c) imposes no explicit “exhaustion of alternative remedies” requirement, and we are satisfied that other circumstances can provide the necessary factual foundation for a finding that a juror is unable to carry out her oath. We find no clear error in Judge Weisberg’s determination that that was the case here. What he had observed and heard from counsel about Juror 13’s demeanor during trial gave him a 47 sufficient basis for concluding that an additional instruction “would be very unlikely to be productive.” 36