Opinion ID: 6316806
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prison Sentence

Text: Williams challenges the substantive reasonableness of his 84-month prison sentence. The district court calculated an advisory guideline range of 57–71 months (after reducing the PSR’s recommended total offense level from 20 to 18 to comport with Williams’s position on the amount of loss). It then varied upward by two levels back to 20, and to an advisory guideline range of 70–87 months, after considering the sentencing factors set out at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Once there, the court imposed an 84-month sentence, an upward variance of thirteen months, or 18 percent. 11 11 In the district court, Williams sought downward departures and variances. On appeal, he argues against the district court’s sentence both as an upward departure and as a variance. We see no confusion in the record. The court “var[ied] upward.” R. vol. 8 at 34. It applied the section 3553(a) factors: “Next, I considered carefully the sentencing factors and needs of the federal sentencing statute codified at 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a)(1) through (7) and made an individualized assessment based on the facts presented.” Id. at 31. The court mentioned departures only in rejecting Williams’s motion for a downward departure. 20 Appellate Case: 19-1229 Document: 010110565060 Date Filed: 08/23/2021 Page: 21 In its § 3553(a) analysis, the district court noted that Williams’s fraud “was a serious offense in the way it was planned and perpetrated, and in the terms of the victims affected and the amount of actual loss to those victims.” R. vol. 8 at 32. Further, the court noted Williams’s long criminal history, which included fifteen felony convictions for “offenses including robbery, forgery, criminal attempt to commit theft, or burglary, theft, aggravated motor vehicle theft, and identity theft.” Id. at 33. The court remarked that “[t]his is one of the most extensive criminal records that I’ve seen on the bench.” Id. The district court also addressed Williams’s “threat to the public, the need for deterrence, and the need for avoidance of unwarranted sentencing disparities[.]” Id. It described Williams as “a career and habitual offender who presents a clear, present, and ongoing threat to the public, especially our financial institutions.” Id. In considering all the circumstances, the court noted that “[t]roubling here, there are no special or compelling mitigating circumstances.” Id. Reviewing the failure of past “judicial interventions,” the court noted that Williams’s “philosophy and lifestyle evince an abject disrespect for our laws and the rights of our citizens.” Id. at 34. And the court noted “[a]nother troubling and exacerbating, aggravating circumstance,” that is, Williams’s “continued exploitation of a hapless female drug addict to execute his scheme, and that continued exploitation is unconscionable.” Id. 12 The PSR advised the court of interviews conducted with Ms. X’s sister in 12 which she stated that Ms. X had been addicted to crack cocaine for five years (and during Williams’s bank-fraud scheme) so badly that she was emaciated, weighing about 80 pounds. During this time, the sister said, Williams was the only person who would provide Ms. X cash. 21 Appellate Case: 19-1229 Document: 010110565060 Date Filed: 08/23/2021 Page: 22 The district court’s sentence fell within the limits of Williams’s appeal waiver. Williams reserved the right to appeal the length of his prison time only if “the sentence exceeds the maximum sentence within the advisory guideline range that applies to a total offense level of 20[.]” R. vol. 1 at 118. It doesn’t. But as earlier explained, because Williams can appeal his total-restitution amount, he can appeal his prison sentence too. We review substantive reasonableness for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Smart, 518 F.3d 800, 805–06 (10th Cir. 2008). In doing so, we ask “whether the length of the sentence is reasonable given all the circumstances of the case in light of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” United States v. Carter, 941 F.3d 954, 960–61 (10th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “A district court abuses its discretion when it renders a judgment that is arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable.” United States v. Huckins, 529 F.3d 1312, 1317 (10th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Williams complains of comments the district court made after explaining and imposing its 84-month sentence. After reviewing Williams’s crime and the § 3553(a) factors, the court ruled that a seven-year sentence was proper “to achieve and vindicate the important requirements and needs of the federal sentencing statute.” R. vol. 8 at 34. Immediately after that, the district court stated an afterthought: “Additionally, even if only parenthetically, in my long experience[,] a sentence of seven years for a 16th felony conviction where the actual loss approaches $1.5 million is certainly not unreasonable. In the state court system in Colorado, Mr. Williams would easily be approaching habitual criminal territory.” Id. at 34–35. 22 Appellate Case: 19-1229 Document: 010110565060 Date Filed: 08/23/2021 Page: 23 Williams contends that the court abused its discretion by treating a loss of $1,114,828.28 as one that “approaches $1.5 million.” Opening Br. at 46–48. Whatever “approaches” means, we note that the district court had just reviewed the loss figures and knew what they were. This comment doesn’t show the abuse of discretion necessary to warrant a resentencing. Williams also complains that the district court tied its sentence to Colorado state law. But we see nothing showing that the district court’s remark about habitual-offender status under Colorado law impacted his sentence. As mentioned, the district court had already explained and imposed its sentence. Finally, Williams complains that though his criminal-history category was VI, the court increased his sentence based on his criminal history. But the district court was free to consider Williams’s long criminal history and explained its basis for doing so. In short, we see no abuse of discretion.