Opinion ID: 668594
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Departure in Haversat's Sentencing

Text: 11 The district court referred to the following factors in support of its decision to depart downward in Haversat's case: 2 Haversat's assistance to the court; his good character and exemplary life; the coercive economic influence of Stanley; and the fact that he was a relative newcomer who swam with the crowd and lacked the courage to object to the scheme. The government contends that none of the factors enumerated by the district court support the departure. Haversat argues on appeal that two of those factors support the departure: his substantial assistance to the courts and his exceptional character. 3 12 (1) Assistance to the Court 13 The district court found that a downward departure was appropriate because Haversat's actions assisted the court in administering justice and saving court resources. (Defs.' Jt.App. at 190-91.) Haversat contends his nolo plea and his assistance in settling the related civil antitrust lawsuit are the particular acts that assisted the court. The government argues that these acts are not, as a matter of law, a basis for a downward departure under section 5K2.0. Haversat argues that this assistance to the courts presents a sufficient basis for the departure. See United States v. Garcia, 926 F.2d 125, 127-28 (2d Cir.1991) (defendant's substantial assistance to the courts is grounds for departure). 14 We have never authorized a downward departure on the basis of a defendant's assistance to the courts. 4 We have held, however, that district courts lack the authority to depart downward under U.S.S.G. Sec. 5K2.0 on the basis that the defendant's early guilty plea conserved judicial resources. United States v. Garlich, 951 F.2d 161 (8th Cir.1991). A guilty plea before trial is a factor to be considered only in the acceptance of responsibility determination under U.S.S.G. Sec. 3E1.1. Id. at 163-64. 5 15 The reasoning of Garlich applies with equal force in this case. Haversat's argument that his early nolo plea should be a basis for a downward departure because it assisted the court is virtually identical to Garlich's argument that downward departure was appropriate because his early guilty plea saved judicial resources. The nolo plea then is a factor to be considered (if at all) only in the determination of acceptance of responsibility. Similarly, Haversat's assistance in settling a related civil lawsuit is also more properly treated as a factor to be considered in relation to acceptance of responsibility. Helping to settle a related civil suit is somewhat similar to providing voluntary assistance to authorities in the recovery of the fruits and instrumentalities of the offense, which is an appropriate consideration for determining acceptance of responsibility. U.S.S.G. Sec. 3E1.1, comment. (n. 1(e)). 16 Moreover, substantial assistance to the administration of justice is also counted, to some degree, under U.S.S.G. Sec. 5K1.1, which allows a sentencing court to depart downward [u]pon motion of the government stating that the defendant has provided substantial assistance to the prosecution. It is difficult to imagine any material assistance to the prosecution that does not aid the courts in the administration of justice. Nor can assistance to the courts fail to aid the prosecution in some measure. United States v. Shrewsberry, 980 F.2d 1296, 1298 (9th Cir.1992) (specifically declining to follow Garcia ). 17 We conclude that a defendant's early nolo plea and a defendant's assistance in settling a related civil suit do not provide a basis for downward departure under section 5K2.0. The district court erred in relying on these factors in imposing Haversat's sentence. 18 (2) Good Character 19 The district court also found Haversat's good character supported a downward departure under section 5K2.0. (Defs.' Jt.App. at 191; Appellant's App. at 8.) Haversat argues that his outstanding charitable and community service work exhibited his exceptional character to the district court and supported the departure. Haversat contends that we have authorized downward departures under Sec. 5K2.0 on the basis of a defendant's good character. United States v. David Big Crow, 898 F.2d 1326, 1330-32 (8th Cir.1990). We disagree. 20 We did not authorize a general good character departure in Big Crow. We simply found that the fact that Big Crow had consistently made efforts to overcome the extreme hardship of life on the reservation supported a departure. Id. at 1331-32. We have characterized the Big Crow analysis as inapplicable where the defendant failed to show that he struggled in a difficult environment like the defendant in [Big Crow ]. Garlich, 951 F.2d at 164. Subsequent cases also have observed that the departure authorized in Big Crow is limited to cases where a defendant overcame many substantial obstacles presented by the difficult life on the reservation. See, e.g., United States v. Alex One Star, 9 F.3d 60, 61 (8th Cir.1993) (Big Crow departure based on defendant's excellent employment record and other consistent efforts to overcome difficult conditions of reservation life). Given the fact that Haversat and the district court failed to point to any evidence in record to show how Haversat struggled in a difficult environment or otherwise overcame some significant hardship, the district court's downward departure was not authorized under Big Crow. 21 Charitable or volunteer activities conceivably can serve as the basis for downward departure but only where those activities are truly exceptional in nature. See United States v. Neil, 903 F.2d 564, 565-66 (8th Cir.1990); see also U.S.S.G. Sec. 5H1.11, p.s. (Nov.1991) (civic, charitable, or public service, as well as employment related contributions and record of prior good works, not ordinarily relevant in determining whether to depart under 5K2.0.). Departure on that basis is appropriate only where the district court 'finds an atypical case, ... where [the] conduct [in question] significantly differs from the norm,'  Neil, 903 F.2d at 565 (quoting U.S.S.G. Ch. 1, Pt. A, 4(b) at 1.6 (Oct. 1987)). We conclude that Haversat's charitable and volunteer activities, while considerable, do not make him an atypical defendant in antitrust price-fixing cases. A number of his codefendants, including Gibson, for example, have made identical arguments in support of downward departure based on equally worthy records of charitable and volunteer activity. It would appear that high-level business executives, those who are in a position to commit Sherman Act violations, also enjoy sufficient income and community status so that they have the opportunities to engage in charitable and benevolent activities. See U.S.S.G. Sec. 5H1.10 (socio-economic status not relevant to determination of sentence). Haversat's activity, while laudible, is not extraordinary. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court's downward departure on the basis of Haversat's charitable activities and good character was not permissible because there has been no showing that  'the circumstances the district court relied on for departure are sufficiently unusual in kind or degree to warrant departure.'  Sweet, 985 F.2d at 445 (quoting Lara-Banda, 972 F.2d at 960); see also United States v. Groene, 998 F.2d 604, 607-08 (8th Cir.1993) (reversing as clear error district court's finding that circumstances demonstrated that defendant's community service was sufficiently extraordinary to justify downward departure). 22 (3) Coercive Economic Influence of Stanley 23 The district court also found that the coercive economic influence of Stanley on the other participants in the conspiracy, including Haversat, provided an additional reason to depart downward. Even assuming that such facts existed, this is not a sufficient basis for departure. The Guidelines explicitly state that [t]he Commission considered the relevance of economic hardship and determined that personal financial difficulties and economic pressures upon a trade or business do not warrant a decrease in sentence. U.S.S.G. Sec. 5K2.12, p.s. Thus, the district court erred in relying on the economic coercion of Stanley as a ground for departure. 24 (4) Relative Newcomer Who Lacked Courage to Object 25 The district court also noted that it departed downward because Haversat was a relative newcomer to this level of industry and just 'swam with the crowd' without exercising the courage to object to the unlawful price fixing. (Appellant's Addend. at 8.) We need not determine whether this constitutes sufficient legal grounds for departure because there is simply no factual support for the district court's statements. It is undisputed that Haversat was not a newcomer to this level of industry as he had been the President of McKinney from 1977 to 1986 when the conspiracy began. Likewise, Haversat did not simply swim with the crowd. He jumped into the pool willingly and was a participant from the very beginning of the scheme. 26 We find that none of the reasons provided by the district court support the downward departure in sentencing Haversat. Accordingly, we set aside his sentence and remand for resentencing pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3742(f)(1).