Opinion ID: 626043
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The 2005 IEP

Text: Appellants complained to the district court that the IHO erred in concluding that the 2005 IEP complied with the IDEA without first determining D.B.'s potential for learning and self-sufficiency. In light of that alleged error, they argue to us that the district court should not have upheld the IHO's decision. They do not dispute that, as the party challenging the 2005 IEP, they bore the burden of persuasion in the administrative due process hearing before the IHO. See Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 62, 126 S.Ct. 528. The standard applied by the district court to its review of the IHO's decision differs from the standard we apply to our review of the district court's decision. See Lt. T.B., 361 F.3d at 83. [A] district court reviews the administrative record, which may be supplemented by additional evidence from the parties, and makes an independent ruling based on the preponderance of the evidence. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). However, [t]hat independence is tempered by the requirement that the court give due weight to the hearing officer's findings. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). As a result, a district court's review falls somewhere between the highly deferential clear-error standard and the non-deferential de novo standard. Lessard I, 518 F.3d at 24. We have characterized this intermediate level of review as one of involved oversight. Lenn, 998 F.2d at 1087 (internal quotation marks omitted). Our review of the district court's order is more traditional. We examine the record as a whole and review the district court's answers to questions of law de novo and its findings of fact for clear error. C.G., 513 F.3d at 284; see also Lessard II, 592 F.3d at 269; Lenn, 998 F.2d at 1087. Whether an IEP is adequate is a mixed question of law and fact, and our degree of deference depends on whether a particular determination is dominated by law or fact. See C.G., 513 F.3d at 284. The appeal from the summary judgment entered on the IDEA claim raised in Count 10 requires us to resolve both a legal issue and a closely related factual one, as well as a mixed question of law and fact. We begin our discussion with the legal issue-whether a determination as to a child's potential for learning and self-sufficiency must precede a determination that the child's IEP complies with the IDEA.
In Polk v. Central Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, the Third Circuit held that the educational benefit of a child's IEP must be gauged in relation to the child's potential. 853 F.2d 171, 185 (3d Cir.1988); see also Shore Reg'l High Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. P.S. ex rel. P.S., 381 F.3d 194, 198 (3d Cir.2004) (The IEP must be `reasonably calculated' to enable the child to receive `meaningful educational benefits' in light of the student's `intellectual potential.' (quoting Polk, 853 F.2d at 181)). As the Sixth Circuit subsequently explained, there is some intuitive appeal to this view: children of different abilities are capable of different achievements, and [o]nly by considering an individual child's capabilities and potentialities may a court determine whether an educational benefit provided to that child allows for meaningful advancement. Deal, 392 F.3d at 864. We have intimated as much ourselves, citing Polk for the proposition that levels of progress must be judged with respect to the potential of the particular child, Lessard I, 518 F.3d at 29, and we recognize that the BSEA has incorporated this view into its proceedings, see, e.g., In re Fall River Pub. Sch., 11 Mass. Spec. Educ. Rep. 242, 254 (BSEA 05-5383) (2005) (considering child's potential in assessing IEP). In most cases, an assessment of a child's potential will be a useful tool for evaluating the adequacy of his or her IEP. Developmental disability takes many forms, however. It is not always feasible to determine a disabled child's potential for learning and self-sufficiency with any precision, particularly where the child's disability significantly impairs his or her capacity for communication. In that situation, even without a complete understanding of the upper limits of the child's abilities, there can still be an assessment of the likelihood that the IEP will confer a meaningful educational benefit by measurably advancing the child toward the goal of increased learning and independence. If an IEP is reasonably calculated to confer such a benefit, it complies with the IDEA. For example, if a child's potential is unknowable, his or her IEP still could be reasonably calculated to confer a meaningful educational benefit if it is closely modeled on a previous IEP pursuant to which the child made appreciable progress. See Thompson R2-J Sch. Dist. v. Jeff P. ex rel. Luke P., 540 F.3d 1143, 1153 (10th Cir. 2008). Of course, previous success does not guarantee future success. Cf. Rome Sch. Comm. v. Mrs. B., 247 F.3d 29, 32 (1st Cir.2001) ([T]he IDEA recognizes that children's needs change over time, and it thus requires annual evaluation and development of an IEP for each school year.). Nevertheless, if the two IEPs are substantially similar in design, that similarity provides a reasonable basis for assessing the likelihood of future progress. See Jeff P., 540 F.3d at 1153 (Such past progress is, of course, not dispositive of the controlling question whether, going forward, the [new] IEP was reasonably calculated to confer some educational benefit, but it does strongly suggest that, modeled on prior IEPs that had succeeded in generating some progress, the [new] IEP was reasonably calculated to continue that trend.). Accordingly, we agree with the district court that a determination as to a child's potential for learning and self-sufficiency does not have to precede a determination that the child's IEP complies with the IDEA.
The factual issue, then, is whether there was any clear error in the district court's finding that D.B.'s potential was unknowable. Echoing the IHO's view that D.B.'s baseline cognitive abilities are the subject of debate and have been difficult to assess because of his communication disorders and difficulty with attention, the district court found that [a]ssessing D.B.'s capabilities presents a significant, perhaps impossible, challenge and that D.B.'s potential for learning and self-sufficiency simply cannot be ascertained with any substantial degree of confidence. The district court took particular care to document the relevant evidence, focusing on the difficulties associated with testing D.B. For example, the court cited Dooley-Smith's observation that D.B.'s cognitive levels are not accurately known at this time, a Lindamood-Bell Learning Center staff member's comment that it was very difficult ... to gauge [D.B.'s] potential in terms of his language skills, and an independent evaluator's warning that [i]n light of [D.B.'s] difficulties, the test results... may not accurately represent his cognitive potential. The court also referred to statements by Marsha Chaskelson and Shelly Vellemantwo witnesses called by D.B.'s parents at the BSEA hearing highlighting the indeterminacy of D.B.'s potential. Taken together, this evidence precludes any judgment by us that the district court clearly erred in finding that D.B.'s potential for learning and self-sufficiency was unknowable.
We turn now to the mixed question of law and fact, which is whether the 2005 IEP complied with the IDEA because it was reasonably calculated to confer a meaningful educational benefit. The IHO's opinion as to the adequacy of the 2005 IEP was based on findings that D.B.'s previous IEPs had resulted in meaningful advancement, and that the 2005 IEP kept in place the therapy and tutoring services offered by the previous IEPs, while supplementing those services with the multi-sensory, structured learning program recommended by Dooley-Smith: [D.B.'s] progress was meaningful. Despite enormous challenges, [D.B.] developed from a child who did not speak at all and only had access to a few signs to a child who could communicate many of his wants and needs via sign, spoken words, and emerging use of augmentative communication, who was developing pre-reading skills, whose physical skills had improved enormously. There is no reason to believe that [D.B.] would not have made continued, and likely more rapid progress in the newly-proposed program. The district court also looked to D.B.'s progress under his previous IEPs and agree[d] with the IHO that this progress, even if less than optimal, was likely to continue under the new IEP and would have been sufficient to satisfy the IDEA. It was not error for the IHO and the district court to conclude retrospectively that D.B.'s previous IEPs had resulted in meaningful educational benefits. While in the Sutton school system, D.B. had developed from a nonverbal and unfocused child into a total communicator who, by the time the 2005 IEP was scheduled to be implemented, knew over one hundred words, spoke short phrases, followed simple directions, was more focused, and could identify seven written words and the numerals 0 through 15. Even without knowing the upper limit of D.B.'s potential for learning and self-sufficiency, we have no trouble concluding that these achievements were meaningful for him, and advanced him measurably toward the goal of increased learning and independence. See R.P. ex rel. C.P. v. Prescott Unified Sch. Dist., 631 F.3d 1117, 1123 (9th Cir.2011) (upholding district court's conclusion that IEP delivered meaningful benefit on analogous facts). [4] It also was not error to conclude prospectively that, since D.B.'s previous IEPs had conferred meaningful educational benefits, the 2005 IEP was reasonably calculated to do the same, having kept in place, and even supplemented, the services offered by the previous IEPs. See Jeff P., 540 F.3d at 1153. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment on the IDEA claim raised in Count 10.