Opinion ID: 2633294
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Analysis of RLUIPA and relevant case law

Text: Congress enacted RLUIPA in 2000 in response to the United States Supreme Court's decision in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997), which held that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq., exceeded the scope of Congress's enforcement powers under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. Congress sought to define the scope and extent of the first amendment's Free Exercise Clause through RLUIPA, which prescribes a strict scrutiny standard of review in land use cases. In particular, as noted supra at note 3, RLUIPA prohibits governments from imposing or implementing a land use regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a religious assembly or institution, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person, assembly, or institution  (A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1). [7] Congress enacted RFRA in direct response to the [Supreme] Court's decision in Employment Div. Dept. of Human Res[.] of Or[.] v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872[, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876] . . . (1990). City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512[, 117 S.Ct. 2157]. As the Supreme Court elucidated in City of Boerne, the Smith Court considered a Free Exercise Clause claim brought by members of the Native American Church who were denied unemployment benefits when they lost their jobs because they had used peyote. Their practice was to ingest peyote for sacramental purposes, and they challenged an Oregon statute of general applicability which made use of the drug criminal. In evaluating the claim, we declined to apply the balancing test set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398[, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965] . . . (1963), under which we would have asked whether Oregon's prohibition substantially burdened a religious practice and, if it did, whether the burden was justified by a compelling government interest. We stated: [The] government's ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful conduct . . . cannot depend on measuring the effects of a governmental action on a religious objector's spiritual development. To make an individual's obligation to obey such a law contingent upon the law's coincidence with his religious beliefs, except where the State's interest is `compelling' . . . contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense. 494 U.S.[ ] at 885[, 110 S.Ct. 1595] . . . (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The application of the Sherbert test, the Smith decision explained, would have produced an anomaly in the law, a constitutional right to ignore neutral laws of general applicability. The anomaly would have been accentuated, the Court reasoned, by the difficulty of determining whether a particular practice was central to an individual's religion. We explained, moreover, that it is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants' interpretations of those creeds. 494 U.S.[] at 887[, 110 S.Ct. 1595] . . . (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512-13, 117 S.Ct. 2157. In July 2000, Senators Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) and Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) introduced RLUIPA in the Senate and, upon gaining bipartisan support, the statute passed unanimously in both houses Congress and was signed by President Clinton on September 22, 2000. The jurisdictional underpinning for RLUIPA is distinct from RFRA. First, RLUIPA only covers state action aimed at land use decisions and persons in jails or mental facilities. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc [to] 2000cc-1. Second, application of RLUIPA is limited to cases that affect federally financed programs, interstate and foreign commerce, or cases where the land use decisions are part of a system of individualized assessments. [ Id. ] § 2000cc(a)(2). By limiting RLUIPA in this way, Congress has acted primarily pursuant to its power under the Spending and Commerce Clauses, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 3. Only application of RLUIPA to land use regulation[s] or system[s] of land use regulations, under which a government makes, or has in place formal or informal procedures or practices that permit the government to make, individualized assessments comes under the rubric of Congress's authority under the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(C). To the extent that RLUIPA is enacted under the Enforcement Clause, it merely codifies numerous precedents holding that systems of individualized assessments, as opposed to generally applicable laws, are subject to strict scrutiny. Cottonwood, 218 F.Supp.2d at 1220-21. As a preliminary matter, we note that the interpretation of RLUIPA as applied to ROH ch. 38 is a question of first impression in this court. More broadly, this court has never had occasion to address the provisions of RLUIPA in any context. RLUIPA, by its terms, prohibits a governments' imposition or implementation of a land use regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a religious assembly or institution. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1). RLUIPA defines a land use regulation as a zoning or landmarking law, or the application of such a law, that limits or restricts a claimant's use or development of land (including a structure affixed to land), if the claimant has an ownership, leasehold, easement, servitude, or other property interest in the regulated land or a contract or option to acquire such an interest. Id. § 2000cc-5(5). Under this definition, a government agency implements a land use regulation only when it acts pursuant to a zoning or landmarking law that limits the manner in which a claimant may develop or use property in which the claimant has an interest. Nevertheless, RLUIPA does not provide religious institutions with immunity from land use regulation, nor does it relieve religious institutions from applying for variances, special permits or exceptions, hardship approval, or other relief provisions in land use regulations, where available without discrimination or unfair delay. 146 Cong. Rec. at S7776 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sens. Hatch and Kennedy) [hereinafter, Joint Statement]. Thus, as a threshold matter, [t]he applicability of RLUIPA in the present matter . . . turns on whether the City acted pursuant to a zoning or landmarking law, Prater v. City of Burnside, 289 F.3d 417, 434 (6th Cir.2002), when it sought to condemn certain units of the Admiral Thomas pursuant to ROH ch. 38. A landmark is defined as [a] feature of the land, monument, marker, or other erection set up on the boundary line of two adjoining estates or as a [b]uilding or site having historical significance. Black's Law Dictionary 879 (6th ed.1990). The definition further notes that [t]he removing of a landmark is a wrong for which an action lies. Id. Zoning is defined as [t]he division of a city or town by legislative regulation into districts and the prescription and application in each district of regulations having to do with structural and architectural designs of buildings and of regulations prescribing use to which buildings within designated districts may be put. Id. at 1618. Zoning is also the [d]ivision of land into zones, and within those zones, regulation of both the nature of land usage and the physical dimensions of uses including height setbacks and minimum area. Id. Therefore, a zoning or landmarking law as defined by RLUIPA must pertain either (1) to the division of a city into districts and the regulation of the land usage within those districts or (2) to a monument, marker, or building having historical significance. ROH § 38-1.1 establishes the right of any person, who is a lessee under any long-term lease of land upon which is situated. . . residential condominium property regime projects created under HRS Chapter 514A . . . to purchase at a fair and reasonable price the fee simple title to such land. On its face, therefore, ROH ch. 38 is not concerned with either zoning or landmarking. In Prater, the fact that the city had already acquired an interest in the property at issue gave it the right to choose the property's fate and was thus not based upon any zoning or landmarking law restricting development or use of the Church's own private property. 289 F.3d at 434. As such, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that no jurisdictional basis existed for the church's RLUIPA claim. Id. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois recently held that Chicago's proposed expansion of O'Hare airport did not implicate RLUIPA because, inter alia, the city's authority to acquire the land did not stem from a zoning regulation or landmarking law. St. John's United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, 401 F.Supp.2d 887, 899 (N.D.Ill.2005). RLUIPA only applies to government actions that impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc. The term land use regulation is defined as a zoning or landmarking law, or the application of such a law, that limits or restricts a claimant's use or development of land. . . . 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(5). In this case the City is seeking to exercise eminent domain power. Nothing in the. . . complaint leads to the inference that the City's authority to acquire the land stems from any zoning regulations or landmarking law. Id. (emphasis added). In Faith Temple Church v. Town of Brighton, 405 F.Supp.2d 250 (W.D.N.Y.2005), the United States District Court for the Western District of New York held that a town's eminent domain proceedings did not constitute a land use regulations for purposes of RLUIPA. Faith Temple does not appear to contend. . . that the Town's condemnation of the Groos parcel would involve a landmarking law. Landmarking laws generally involve the regulat[ion] and restrict[ion of] certain areas as national historic landmarks, special historic sites, places and buildings for the purpose of conservation, protection, enhancement and perpetuation of these places of natural heritage. Nothing of that nature is involved here. The eminent domain proceedings here also do not amount to a zoning law or the application of such a law. . . . . Given these differences between zoning and eminent domain, it seems very unlikely that Congress assumed that courts would interpret RLUIPA's reference to zoning laws as including eminent domain proceedings as well. The simple fact is that Congress chose to limit the application of RLUIPA to cases involving a zoning or landmarking law, or the application of such a law, that limits or restricts a claimant's use or development of land . . . . Conspicuously absent is any mention of eminent domain. Eminent domain is hardly an arcane or little-known concept, and the Court will not assume that Congress simply overlooked it when drafting RLUIPA. Id. at 254-55 (citation omitted). In the only case to challenge Hawai`i's land use laws and claim RLUIPA as a bar to their enforcement, Hale O Kaula Church v. Maui Planning Comm'n, 229 F.Supp.2d 1056 (D.Haw.2002), the United States District Court for the District of Hawai`i held, inter alia, that Hawai`i statutes governing special use permits were facially valid land use regulations in the context of RLUIPA. The plaintiffs argued that the county's denial of a special use permit to expand their facility and hold religious services along with Hawai`i's land use law violated the equal terms and nondiscrimination provisions of RLUIPA, which state that [n]o government shall impose or implement a land use regulation that either treats a religious assembly or institution on less than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or institution or discriminates against any assembly or institution on the basis of religion or religious denomination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1)-(2). The court found that HRS §§ 205-4.5 (1993 & Supp.1998) [8] and 205-6 (1993 & Supp. 1998) [9] are land use regulations for purposes of RLUIPA, despite Maui County's contention that because the state land use classification system, and not county zoning codes, were at issue, a land use regulation was not involved. Hale O Kaula, 229 F.Supp.2d at 1070. The court rejected the church's argument that merely having to obtain a permit is a violation of federal law by concluding that the statutory provisions do not facially discriminate against religious institutions and that classifying land into agricultural, rural, urban, and conservation districts does not discriminate against church buildings or uses. Id. The court further concluded that the law is facially neutral and of general applicability, which did not treat the church on less than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or institution, and that [t]o rule otherwise would exempt religious institutions from all zoning laws, which clearly was not the intent of RLUIPA. Id. at 1070-71. The court's designation of HRS §§ 205-4.5 and 205-6 as land use regulations within the meaning of RLUIPA in Hale O Kaula can easily be distinguished from ROH ch. 38, at issue in the present matter. HRS §§ 205-4.5 and 205-6, see supra notes 8 and 9, by their plain language, involve the division of land into zones and the regulation of [] the nature of land usage within those zones. Indeed HRS § 205-5, housed in the same chapter, is entitled Zoning and describes appropriate land uses within agricultural districts. Furthermore, the above-quoted section (b) provisions of RLUIPA that were the basis for the church's claim in Hale O Kaula are not at issue in the present matter. Finally, the Church's reliance on Cottonwood is misguided. In Cottonwood, a church sued the city for denial of land use permits to allow it to build a church facility on land it owned and sought to preliminarily enjoin the city from continuing eminent domain proceedings to condemn the land for use as commercial retail space. 218 F.Supp.2d at 1209. The question at issue in Cottonwood was whether the city's actions should be subject to strict scrutiny, and the court subsequently applied the strict scrutiny standard because the [c]ity's refusal to grant Cottonwood its application for a [conditional use permit] involves a `land use regulation or system of regulations, under which a government makes, or has in place formal or informal procedures or practices that permit the government to make, individualized assessments. 218 F.Supp.2d at 1222 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(C)). Cottonwood did not hold, as the Church contends, that a condemnation action is a `land use regulation' subject to RLUIPA. Following its explanation of the applicability of the strict scrutiny standard, the court noted: Defendants argue that RLUIPA does not apply because the exercise of eminent domain is not a land use regulation under RLUIPA. . . . Moreover, Defendants insist that only the condemnation proceedings are at issue in this motion, a position with which the Court has already disagreed. Even if the Court were only considering the condemnation proceedings, they would fall under RLUIPA's definition of land use regulation which is defined as a zoning or landmarking law, or the application of such a law, that limits or restricts the claimant's use or development of land . . . 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(5). The Redevelopment Agency's authority to exercise eminent domain to contravene blight, as set forth in the Resolution of Necessity, is based on a zoning system developed by the City (the LART Plan). It would unquestionably limit[ ] or restrict [] Cottonwood's use or development of land. 218 F.Supp.2d at 1222 n. 9 (emphasis added) (some ellipses added, some in original). The fact that the Cottonwood court denominated the authority of the Cypress, California Redevelopment Agency to exercise its power of eminent domain as being based on a zoning system has no bearing on the present matter. The Redevelopment Agency's authority apparently emanated from the Resolution of Necessity and a zoning system developed by that city, which by no means signifies that all exercises of eminent domain are grounded in a zoning system. As such, the court's analysis in Cottonwood does not affect this court's interpretation of ROH ch. 38. See St. John's United Church of Christ, 401 F.Supp.2d at 899-900 (holding that Cottonwood does not stand for the proposition that all exercises of eminent domain authority are subject to RLUIPA; that case can be read to suggest that RLUIPA is applicable to the specific eminent domain actions where the condemnation proceeding is intertwined with other actions by the city involving zoning regulations). Furthermore, the Church's contention that the condemnation powers conferred under ROH ch. 38 apply only to lessees on multi-family residential land as opposed to leasehold lands zoned or developed for other purposes such as industrial, commercial or agricultural use is incorrect. The condemnation right under ROH ch. 38 derives from the fact that a person is a lessee under any long-term lease of land upon which is situated [ ] residential condominium property regime projects. ROH § 38-1.1. A condemnation right, standing alone, is not a zoning law, and the self-evident fact that ROH ch. 38 applies to buildings that happen to be situated on land zoned to permit residences does not alter that reality. A plain reading of RLUIPA compels the conclusion that the application of ROH ch. 38 to qualified units of the Admiral Thomas condominium complex does not violate RLUIPA. Because ROH ch. 38 is neither a zoning nor a landmarking law, it does not constitute a land use regulation pursuant to the RLUIPA definition of that term. Inasmuch as we hold that ROH ch. 38 is not a landmarking law, we need not determine whether its application imposes a substantial burden on the Church's religious exercise, involved an individualized assessment, or is a least-restrictive compelling interest. Therefore, we hold that the circuit court did not err in concluding that RLUIPA was unavailable to the Church as a defense to the condemnation of its fee simple interests in qualified Admiral Thomas residential condominium units. We thus affirm the circuit court's July 8, 2004 grant of summary judgment on the issue of the inapplicability of RLUIPA to the present matter.