Opinion ID: 2328607
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Police Inventory Search

Text: Grant's final contention concerns an allegedly improper inventory search of his backpack after he was arrested. Upon Grant's apprehension on February 10, 1999, the arresting officers seized all the items from his person, including his backpack. The arresting officer then searched the backpack, asserting that the search was a necessary safety precaution. Although the trial court ruled that the arrest was lawful, it left open the issue of whether certain items recovered from the back-pack  in particular a bottle of champagne and a roll of nickels  were admissible as the valid product of an inventory search made after defendant arrived at the police station. The admissibility of the contents of defendant's backpack was raised again during the trial. The prosecution presented the testimony of the Providence detention officer Corey Morris (Morris) concerning the inventory search that had occurred after defendant arrived at the Providence police station. Morris testified that the initial inventory search was conducted by another detention officer, who had not fully complied with standard police procedures and had not fully inventoried the contents of defendant's backpack. Morris also said that he realized the inventory mistake on the morning of February 12, 1999, while conducting a routine inventory search of defendant's backpack to prepare for defendant's appearance in court. Morris discovered a small bottle of Remi Martin champagne and a roll of nickels in defendant's backpack that were not listed on the inventory sheet prepared by the other officer. Realizing that a properly completed inventory had not taken place during the previous search, Morris said that he picked up where [the officer] left off. Morris completed the inventory form and brought the champagne and roll of nickels to the attention of the detectives. Based on these facts, the trial justice concluded that the inventory search Morris conducted was done pursuant to standard police procedure and was a reasonable means of protecting the safety of the police and courthouse occupants. The trial court noted that there was no requirement that the inventory procedure be in writing, as long as the routine nature of the procedure is established. Furthermore, there was no showing that the second search was done in bad faith or conducted for investigatory purposes. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 6, of the Rhode Island Constitution protect citizens from unreasonable searches or seizures. State v. Ortiz, 824 A.2d 473, 480 (R.I.2003). Although most police searches must be undertaken pursuant to a lawfully issued warrant, a warrant is not a requirement for all lawful searches. As the Supreme Court has recognized, [t]he relevant test is not the reasonableness of the opportunity to procure a warrant, but the reasonableness of the seizure under all the circumstances. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 373, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976) (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 509, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) (Black, J., concurring and dissenting)). Inventory searches are an exception to the search warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. See Opperman, 428 U.S. at 372, 96 S.Ct. 3092; State v. Bonin, 591 A.2d 38, 39 (R.I.1991) (per curiam). Inventory searches serve three purposes: (1) to protect the owner's property while it remains in police custody, (2) to protect the police against claims or disputes over lost or stolen property, and (3) to protect the police or others from potential danger. State v. Beaucage, 424 A.2d 642, 644 (R.I.1981) (citing Opperman, 428 U.S. at 369, 96 S.Ct. 3092); see Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 811 n. 1, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). To be valid, the inventory search must be conducted pursuant to standardized criteria, or as part of an established routine; it may not serve as a pretext for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence. Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4, 110 S.Ct. 1632, 109 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990). This Court has recognized the legitimacy of inventory searches conducted on an arrestee's personal effects inside a motor vehicle, State v. Halstead, 414 A.2d 1138, 1149 (R.I.1980), as well as those searches extending beyond motor vehicles and encompassing one's personal property. Beaucage, 424 A.2d at 644. The defendant contends that the failure of the detention officer to properly conduct the initial inventory search made evidence discovered during the subsequent inventory search inadmissible. We perceive no reason, constitutional or otherwise, why this should be the case. The fact that the first officer failed to conduct a comprehensive inventory search does not rise to constitutional dimension, and does not taint the subsequent inventory search. Morris testified, and the trial justice found, that he was following an established routine when he inventoried Grant and his belongings to prepare for his appearance in court. The defendant does not dispute this fact. Furthermore, Morris testified that the purpose of that search was to secure the prisoner and his property to ensure the safety of the courtroom occupants, which is one of the three grounds this Court has expressly recognized as justifying an inventory search. See, e.g., State v. Louro, 589 A.2d 1197, 1199 (R.I. 1991) (per curiam). Finally, despite the defendant's veiled implication, the record discloses no evidence of improper motive or bad faith on the part of Morris, and the trial justice found that none existed. Accordingly, we conclude that the search was a permissible inventory search, not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, and affirm the trial justice's decision to admit the fruits of that search into evidence.