Opinion ID: 2637971
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Nature of prosecutor's role in swearing out a probable cause affidavit.

Text: In Kalina, the United States Supreme Court distinguished the work of a prosecutor as an advocate from the act of testifying to facts contained in a probable cause certification. 522 U.S. at 129-30. The facts in Kalina are similar to those here. There, the plaintiff filed suit against Kalina, a deputy prosecuting attorney, based on a Certification for Determination of Probable Cause that summarized the evidence supporting the charges against plaintiff. 522 U.S. at 121. The Court distinguished Kalina's act of personally vouching for the truth of facts set forth in the certification under penalty of perjury, stating: [P]etitioner argues that the execution of the certificate was just one incident in a presentation that, viewed as a whole, was the work of an advocate and was integral to the initiation of the prosecution. That characterization is appropriate for her drafting of the certification, her determination that the evidence was sufficiently strong to justify a probable-cause finding, her decision to file charges, and her presentation of the information and the motion to the court. Each of those matters involved the exercise of professional judgment; indeed, even the selection of the particular facts to include in the certification to provide the evidentiary support for the finding of probable cause required the exercise of the judgment of the advocate. But that judgment could not affect the truth or falsity of the factual statements themselves. Testifying about facts is the function of the witness, not of the lawyer.... Even when the person who makes the constitutionally required `Oath or affirmation' is a lawyer, the only function that she performs in giving sworn testimony is that of a witness. 522 U.S. at 130-31. Therefore, the Court of Appeals was correct in finding that while a prosecutor is fully protected by absolute immunity when performing traditional functions of an advocate, Long would only be entitled to qualified immunity as to the affidavit she swore out. See 522 U.S. at 131.