Opinion ID: 2356627
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: There was sufficient evidence to support Appellant's conviction for manufacturing methamphetamine.

Text: Appellant next alleges that Kotila v. Commonwealth, 114 S.W.3d 226 (Ky.2003) required a directed verdict on the charge of manufacturing methamphetamine since Appellant did not possess all of the equipment necessary to manufacture methamphetamine. In Kotila, this Court held that a defendant cannot be convicted of manufacturing methamphetamine pursuant to KRS 218A.1432(1)(b) [1] unless he possesses either all the equipment or all the chemicals necessary for manufacture. Id. at 236. However, as noted by the Commonwealth, this interpretation of the statute was abrogated by Matheney v. Commonwealth, 191 S.W.3d 599 (Ky.2006), which interpreted KRS 218A.1432(1)(b) to require that one must possess two or more chemicals or items of equipment with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine to fall within the statute. Id. at 604. Accordingly, Appellant's argument that he was entitled to a directed verdict pursuant to Kotila, supra , is without merit. Citing Hayes v. Commonwealth, 175 S.W.3d 574 (Ky.2005), Appellant further claims that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that he intended to manufacture methamphetamine. Specifically, he notes that no chemicals were found in the apartment, some of the equipment needed to be modified prior to manufacture, and the equipment was not found in his possession, but in his wife's possession. First, the facts in Hayes, supra , are clearly distinguishable from the facts in this case. Unlike in Hayes , the evidence in this case was more than sufficient to support an inference that. Appellant possessed the equipment found in his apartment. Mrs. Pate testified that Appellant actually lived in the apartment and his clothing and legal documents (e.g. social security card) were located in the apartment. When he was arrested, Appellant told police that the equipment they were seizing was his and that they were seizing it illegally. In light of this evidence, we reject Appellant's argument that he did not possess, constructively or otherwise, the equipment found in the apartment. See Pate v. Commonwealth, 134 S.W.3d 593, 598-99 (Ky.2004) (To prove constructive possession, the Commonwealth must present evidence which establishes that the contraband was subject to the defendant's dominion and control.). Second, the fact that no chemicals were found in the apartment is not dispositive. If it were, then the statute would not permit a finding of intent where only equipment is found in the possession of the defendant. See KRS 218A.1432(1)(b)(A person is guilty of manufacturing methamphetarnine when he knowingly and unlawfully... [w]ith intent to manufacture methamphetamine possesses two (2) or more chemicals or two (2) or more items of equipment for the manufacture of methamphetamine.)(Emphasis added). In this case, Mrs. Pate testified that Appellant intended to use the equipment to manufacture methamphetamine. She explained that Appellant intended to modify the equipment to make it portable so that he could travel into the woods during the actual manufacturing process. Expert testimony further opined that the specialized modifications found on much of the equipment indicated that the equipment was intended to be used for the manufacture of methamphetamine. Finally, it was established at trial that Appellant had previously been found in possession of the chemicals and equipment necessary to manufacture methamphetamine. When all this evidence is coupled with Appellant's own statements to police, we find sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that Appellant intended to manufacture methamphetamine. See Anastasi v. Commonwealth, 754 S.W.2d 860, 862 (Ky.1988) (Intent can be inferred from the actions of an accused and the surrounding circumstances. The jury has wide latitude in inferring intent from the evidence.).