Opinion ID: 1796846
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: whether the circuit judge erred in failing to recuse himself from this case.

Text: Neal requested on several separate occasions that the trial judge recuse himself from presiding over the evidentiary hearing in this case. The trial judge denied the motion to recuse himself in each instance, but allowed his deposition into evidence to preserve the record. The trial judge stated that he had reviewed the deposition of the witnesses and the Court has no independent recollection that differs in any wise, shape, form, or fashion with what they have asserted, and the Court has nothing before it to show that the Movant herein has any disagreement with any of the recollections of those parties. And the Court is open for any factual proof to the contrary, and the Court assumes that what Mr. Neal may be complaining of may not even have anything to do with the time period that the depositions and my recollection go to, and may be entirely different. Neal argues that Judge Prichard had personal knowledge of evidentiary facts which went to proving one of the central aspects of Petitioner's claim, that given his mental retardation and the circumstances surrounding his attempt to assert his rights, any waiver of his right to testify or address the jury was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary. The issue before the court during the evidentiary hearing was whether Neal was denied the right to testify on his own behalf during the trial for the murder of Amanda Joy Neal. It is undisputed that it was brought to the attention of the trial court that Neal wanted to take the witness stand. There was a conference held between Judge Prichard, Neal and the attorneys for both sides. During this conference, Judge Prichard agreed to allow Neal to testify, but requested that he confer further with his attorneys. Judge Prichard was not present during the meeting between Neal and his attorneys. After conferring privately with Neal, his attorneys informed the Court that Neal had decided not to testify. There was some conflicting testimony regarding the circumstances surrounding Neal's decision not to testify. All the witnesses agreed that the conference concerning Neal's desire to testify occurred. Everyone except Joe Dale Walker remembered it occurring during the first trial. With the exception of John Clay, everyone remembered Neal wanted to address the jury for the purpose of requesting the death penalty. No one remembered how long the conference between Neal and his attorneys lasted, but all agreed that it was not a long conference. There was no dispute that Judge Prichard was willing to let Neal testify after he conferred with his attorneys. Everyone agreed that Judge Prichard was not present during the meeting between Neal and his attorneys after which the court was informed Neal had changed his mind. This Court addressed the issue of recusal in Collins v. Joshi, 611 So.2d 898 (Miss. 1992). There it was held: The standard by which the Court determines if a judge should have disqualified him or herself, is an objective standard under Canon 3. A judge is required to disqualify himself if a reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances, would harbor doubts about his impartiality. Rutland v. Pridgen, 493 So.2d 952, 954 (Miss. 1986); Jenkins, 570 So.2d at 1192; Collins, 543 So.2d at 166. The presumption is that a judge, sworn to administer impartial justice, is qualified and unbiased. To overcome the presumption, the evidence must produce a `reasonable doubt' (about the validity of the presumption)[.] Turner v. State, 573 So.2d 657, 678 (Miss. 1990). When a judge is not disqualified under the constitutional or statutory provisions, the propriety of his or her sitting is a question to be decided by the judge and is subject to review only in case of manifest abuse of discretion. Buchanan v. Buchanan, 587 So.2d 892 (Miss. 1991); Turner, 573 So.2d at 677; Ruffin v. State, 481 So.2d 312 at 317 (1985) (quoting McLendon v. State, 187 Miss. 247, 191 So. 821, 823 (1939)). Under the appropriate standard, the judge is presumed qualified and unbiased. This presumption may only be overcome by evidence showing beyond a reasonable doubt that the judge was biased or not qualified. If a reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances, would doubt the judge's impartiality, the judge is required to recuse him or herself from the case. Collins, 611 So.2d at 901. See Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(C)(1)(a). Neal cites Collins v. Dixie Transport, Inc., 543 So.2d 160 (Miss. 1989), wherein this Court held that the trial judge erred in not recusing himself from the case. That case differs from the case sub judice. In Collins v. Dixie Transport , the trial judge was in the room during the critical settlement conference. Throughout the hearing the trial judge felt compelled to testify. He went so far as to request the court clerk to swear him in so he could be questioned, but the attorneys balked at that. In reversing the case, this Court held: On the record before us, the trial judge was both a witness to and adjudicator of fact issues with respect to which he was obliged to have played but one role. As those matters went to what was central  the credibility of Curtis Lee Collins and his sons, we may but reverse the order enforcing settlement. 543 So.2d at 167. Here, Judge Prichard was not present during the critical conference between Neal and his attorneys. His only personal knowledge was concerning the events that led up to that meeting between client and counsel. Regardless of what Neal would have us believe, those events do not concern us here. It is undisputed that it was brought to the trial court's attention that Neal wanted to testify. However, Judge Prichard had no personal knowledge concerning whether or not Neal's attorneys refused, against his will, to allow him to testify. It is that issue that was the subject of the evidentiary hearing. Neal argues that the events leading up to the time when Neal's attorneys informed the court that he had decided not to testify go to show that Neal did not make a voluntary, knowing and intentional waiver of that right. See Hollenbeck v. Estelle, 672 F.2d 451, 453 (5th Cir.1982). This is just another attempt to put the matter of Neal's competence into issue. The issue of Neal's competence to stand trial was decided at a pre-trial hearing and the finding has previously been affirmed by this Court. Judge Prichard had no personal knowledge concerning the issue before the court during the evidentiary hearing. Neal has not offered evidence to produce a reasonable doubt as to the trial judge's impartiality. From the facts presented it cannot be said that there was a manifest abuse of the trial court's discretion in failing to recuse himself from the evidentiary hearing.