Opinion ID: 2213859
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Interpretation of Written-Request Requirement.

Text: The broad issue presented in this appeal is whether the use of a computer screen, rather than a paper document, to make the request for withdrawal of a bodily substance for testing satisfies the statutory written request requirement of the implied-consent statute. We begin our resolution of this issue with the simple recognition that our legislature has specifically defined written in the chapter on general rules of statutory construction. We recognize the legislature may act as its own lexicographer. Henrich v. Lorenz, 448 N.W.2d 327, 332 (Iowa 1989). When it does so, we are normally bound by the legislature's own definitions. Inter-State Nurseries, Inc. v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue, 164 N.W.2d 858, 861 (Iowa 1969). In relevant part, the legislature's rules of construction provide: In the construction of the statutes, the following rules shall be observed, unless such construction would be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the general assembly, or repugnant to the context of the statute: . . . . 39. Writtenin writingsignature. The words written and in writing may include any mode of representing words or letters in general use, and include an electronic record as defined in section 554D.103. Iowa Code § 4.1(39) (first emphasis added). In turn, electronic record is defined as any record created, generated, sent, communicated, received, or stored by electronic means. Id. § 554D.103(7). Although section 554D.103 was enacted as part of the laws affecting commerce, its reference in the general definition section of the Code reflects a clear intention of our legislature for the meaning of writing to continue to evolve to recognize the realities of our information age. In a rare articulation of legislative purpose, the General Assembly wrote, in relevant part, It is the intent of the general assembly in enacting this chapter to effectuate all of the following purposes: . . . . 3. Facilitate electronic filing of documents with state and local government agencies and promote efficient delivery of government services by means of reliable electronic records. . . . . 5. Promote public confidence in the integrity, reliability, and legality of electronic records. . . . 2000 Iowa Acts ch. 1189, § 2 (codified at Iowa Code § 554D.102 (2003)). The section was later repealed without explanation in 2004, 2004 Iowa Acts ch. 1067, § 10, but the legislature retained the provisions from 2000 relating to discretionary governmental use of electronic records, 2000 Iowa Acts ch. 1189, §§ 19, 20 (codified at Iowa Code §§ 554D.119, .120 (2007)). Additionally, the fiscal note prepared for the 2000 legislation indicates part of the purpose behind the enactment of the statute was to reflect current government spending on technology from the general fund. See H.F. 2205 Fiscal Note, 78th G.A., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2000). Consequently, the statutory definition of the word written is an important consideration in our resolution of whether a computer screen can be used to satisfy the statutory written request requirement. Clearly, the word written means any mode of representing words and includes a record communicated . . . or stored by electronic means. Iowa Code § 554D.103(7). The word written plainly includes words on a computer screen under the definition provided by the legislature. Nevertheless, our inquiry does not end with the statutory definition. As directed by our legislature, the rules and definitions set out in section 4.6 do not apply if inconsistent with the manifest intent of the general assembly, or repugnant to the context of the statute. . . . Iowa Code § 4.1; see also State v. Hopkins, 465 N.W.2d 894, 896 (Iowa 1991) (Second, we look beyond the ordinary meaning of the statutory language when a statute's literal terms are in conflict with its general purpose.). We must, therefore, consider whether a construction of written request that includes a computer screen would be inconsistent with the intent of the legislature or repugnant to the context of the statute. The legislature did not specifically articulate a purpose for the written request requirement under the implied-consent law. We have, however, explored the role of the written request requirement within the Act as a whole in our prior cases. See State v. Charlson, 261 Iowa 497, 502, 154 N.W.2d 829, 831 (1967) ([I]t is fundamental that in arriving at the correct interpretation of any particular provisions of the [implied-consent] Act and the intention of the legislature as expressed therein courts should consider the entire Act and, so far as possible, interpret its various provisions in the light of their relation to the whole.). Several helpful considerations can be derived from these cases. We have found the written request requirement for the withdrawal of a bodily substance for testing to be procedural, rather than substantive in character. Charlson, 261 Iowa at 505, 154 N.W.2d at 833 (referring to section 321J.6 at its previous designation in section 321B.3 in the 1966 Code). The written-request requirement is one of numerous procedural requirements found in section 321J.6. See Iowa Code § 321J.6(1)(a)-( g ). Each requirement has separate, but related, purposes. In State v. Schlemme, we found the broad purpose of the procedural requirements of the Act were to protect the health of the person submitting to the test and to guarantee the accuracy of the test for use in judicial proceedings. 301 N.W.2d 721, 723 (Iowa 1981). More specifically, we have indicated [t]he primary purpose of the request [requirement] is `to provide a record of the relevant communication for subsequent review.' State v. McCoy, 603 N.W.2d 629, 630 (Iowa 1999) (quoting Henry v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 426 N.W.2d 383, 387 (Iowa 1988)) (holding the procedural requirement of a written request was sufficient, even when an officer asked for a breath sample and inadvertently checked the box next to blood sample on the form, and the record clearly shows the driver understood the real sample being requested was breath); see also Meissner, 315 N.W.2d at 741 ([T]he writing provides a record of the relevant communication. This promotes accuracy and furnishes a record for subsequent review.). This written record is important for trial because an involuntary chemical test is not admissible in criminal proceedings. See Charlson, 261 Iowa at 506, 154 N.W.2d at 834 (highlighting importance of properly obtaining consent prior to test). Moreover, the record must show the request was administered prior to the test, not contemporaneously with or following the test as a formality. See State v. Richards, 229 N.W.2d 229, 233 (Iowa 1975) (rejecting State's argument that the written request may follow the test and ratif[y] what had been done). In past cases, the purpose of the written request requirement in section 321J.6(1) was often tied to the advisory given to inform a suspected drunk driver of the consequences of submitting to or refusing a chemical test to enable the driver to make an educated decision under section 321J.8. However, this integration of the two sections was a result of law enforcement practice, not legislative policy. For example, the written request in Meissner also contained language of advisory, stating ` I have been informed that my driver's license for privilege to operate a motor vehicle will be revoked for failing to provide a specimen of a specified body substance for chemical testing,' Meissner, 315 N.W.2d at 740 (quoting text of request given to defendant) (emphasis added), and the advisory in Gottschalk plainly stated that a refusal to submit to a chemical test would result in a revocation of plaintiff's driver's license for a period of 120 days to a year. 258 Iowa at 1175, 140 N.W.2d at 867. Although it may seem intuitive to make a more detailed record of the transaction by documenting the advisory within the signed request, this is not statutorily required. Only the request needs to be in writing. As a result, the policies behind the two separate procedural requirements can be more clearly articulated: the advisory is meant to inform the driver of the consequences to enable fair opportunity for decision making while the written request requirement ensures an accurate and reliable record that a pretest request was made. Having identified the purpose of the written request requirement, we turn to consider whether the use of a computer screen as the writing would contravene the intent of the legislature in making the requirement a part of the implied-consent law. As a general proposition, we recognize our society is in the midst of a transformation to paperless commerce and interaction between people. This transformation is even observable in Iowa's court system, which has begun the process of becoming a totally paperless system. Additionally, many of our rules have been modified to accommodate the use of computers to store and communicate information. The paper-laden world of yesterday will be much different tomorrow. This transformation is largely based on the ability of computers to maintain accurate and reliable records, perhaps better in many ways than paper. In particular, the TraCS system used by Trooper Scott is a sophisticated data collection and reporting tool for the public safety community to streamline and automate the capture of incident data in the field and transfer the data from the local agency to a statewide enterprise system. Iowa Dep't of Transp., TraCS, History of the National Model, http://www.iowatracs. us/About/NationalModel.aspx (last visited July 16, 2010). Moreover, some of the cited benefits of recording data at the point of origination are improvements in accuracy, completeness, and timeliness, in part because the system eliminates the need for duplicate entries in local and state databases. Id. The system also facilitates a greater electronic network within the State of Iowa: TraCS enables electronic filings with and data transfers to the courts. Id. Thus, the system used in this case is not only consistent with the legislature's purpose for written requests in OWI cases, it also appears to affirmatively support it. Because using an electronic form of the written request for a breath sample does not conflict with the legislative purpose behind the requirement in section 321J.6(1), we apply the definition of writing in section 4.1(39) and allow the use of the electronic form to meet the statutory requirement. Notwithstanding, Fischer more specifically argues that the purpose of the written request requirement is broader than to merely maintain accurate and reliable records. He asserts the requirement also exists to allow a driver to view the request before making the decision to consent to give a sample or refuse to give a sample and that the manner in which the computer screen was used in this case, in conjunction with the way the program operated, did not allow him to view the entire written request. In particular, Fischer asserts the use of a computer screen does not allow a driver to view the entire electronic record prior to signing the signature line on the pop-up window. In this way, he claims the use of the computer as a writing frustrates the purpose of the written request requirement of the rule. The record in this case revealed the written request portion of the implied-consent procedures existed on the computer screen, but in small font and at an angle from Fischer. The form on the screen was a work in progress, requiring Fischer's signature and selection of consent or refuse on the Request for Specimen section of the form, along with several unrelated inputs by the officer, before the form was locked in its final version. Yet, the only portion of the Notice and Consent form at issue in the case is the specific section requesting a specimen of the driver's breath. The request itself is the only portion that is statutorily required to be writing and signed by the driver prior to administration of the test. See Iowa Code ch. 321J. It is undisputed that the relevant request existed in writing on the computer screen at the time Fischer signed the form. Moreover, the purpose of the written request requirement is not as broad as claimed by Fischer. It is irrelevant that a driver does not see the entire Request and Notice form because the statute does not require the entire form to be given to or observed by a driver prior to the test. The only component of the overall form required to be in writing, as it pertains to a driver, is the Request for Specimen. Fischer narrows his argument even further by asserting the statute required the law enforcement officer in this case to make an affirmative effort to draw his attention to the form that appeared on the computer screen, so he could have reviewed it for himself to provide a better opportunity for his decision making. However, the written-request requirement of section 321J.6(1) is not concerned with providing information to a driver to assist in assessing the available options under the implied-consent law. Additionally, the language of the request provides no alternative options for the driver to assess. Instead, the relevant text simply recites a summary of the request that was made by the officer. The policy behind Fischer's concern for adequate mechanisms to enable informed decision making is reflected within the other procedural requirements of the implied-consent law that clearly express this intention. See, e.g., Iowa Code §§ 321J.6(1) (reasonable suspicion prerequisite), 321J.8 (statement of consequences of implied consent); see also Garcia, 756 N.W.2d at 222 (reasonable methods must be used to convey the advisory to provid[e] the accused driver a basis for evaluation and decision-making); Voss v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 621 N.W.2d 208, 211-12 (Iowa 2001) (stating the clearly articulated purpose of the implied-consent advisory is to benefit the driver). [4] We do not read a requirement into a statutory scheme when none exists because [i]t is not our province to write such a requirement into the [implied consent] statute. Gottschalk, 258 Iowa at 1183, 140 N.W.2d at 872. Further, the written request need not be given to the driver for an opportunity to read it because the purpose is to create a record of the relevant communication; such a record can be created with the driver's participation, but the driver's permission to create or finalize the record is not contained in section 321J.6(1). See id. ([T]he statute does not provide that the written request of the officer for a chemical test be handed or given to the arrested motorist or served upon him in the manner of an original notice commencing a civil action.). The request must certainly exist in writing prior to the administration of the test, but the purpose of section 321J.6(1) is to record the request, not to provide notice of what was orally requested or an opportunity to alter the document. We hold an electronic version of the written request satisfies the requirement of section 321J.6(1). The request need not be printed for the driver in order for the request to be adequately written. The written-request requirement of section 321J.6(1) is satisfied by the use of a computer screen. Additionally, we hold the officer does not need to call the driver's attention to the request that appears on the screen for the request on the screen to satisfy the definition of written. The use of a document appearing on a computer screen is consistent with the legislative intent of the requirement and conforms to the context of the statute. We also recognize that electronic forms may be altered until they are permanently saved. This is an improvement over the prior practice of discarding paper in mass quantities when a mistake or change of heart occurs in order to start over on a fresh page. The nature of computerized documents allows for changes in documents without the consequence of producing additional waste. This technological reality does not affect our decision that, although alterable on the same screen, documents on a computer constitute a writing for purposes of section 321J.6(1).