Opinion ID: 2230068
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the statute under review

Text: Three months after the Court's determination in Kiryas Joel II that chapter 241 was unconstitutional, the Legislature enacted a third statutechapter 390 of the Laws of 1997, or The Kiryas Joel School Billwhich is before us on this appeal (Education Law § 1504 [3], added by L 1997, ch 390). Education Law § 1504 (3) [3] delineates criteria which a municipality, situated wholly within one central or union free school district but whose boundaries are not coterminous with the boundaries of such school district, may follow in order to establish its own school district. The statute prescribes that (i) the new school district equal at least 2,000 children and that it be no greater than 60% of the enrollment of the existing school district from which the school district will be organized, (ii) the newly formed district have an actual valuation per total wealth pupil unit at least equal to the State-wide average, and (iii) the enrollment of the existing school district from which the new district is formed equal at least 2,000 children, excluding the residents of the municipality (Education Law § 1504 [3] [a], as added by L 1997, ch 390). Plaintiffs Louis Grumet and Caroline Shipley, citizen taxpayers, [4] commenced the present action against the Governor and various departments and officials, the Board of Education of the Kiryas Joel Union Free School and Monroe-Woodbury, challenging the constitutionality of chapter 390 under both the Federal and State Constitutions. The court concluded that chapter 390 definitively applies to only two municipalities Kiryas Joel and one otherand that the law represented unequivocal but impermissible favoritism by the State to the Satmar community. The court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and permanently enjoined defendants from taking any and all present, future action or expending any State monies or resources for the purpose of implementing Chapter 390 of the Laws of 1997. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed, agreeing that the record supports the conclusion that the new statute applies to only two of the State's 1,545 municipalities and concluding that chapter 390 is not a `truly religious-neutral law of general applicability    [available to] a broad array of eligible municipalities' ( Grumet v Pataki, 244 AD2d 31, 36, quoting Grumet v Cuomo , 90 NY2d, supra, at 75). The Appellate Division further concluded that chapter 390 failed the second prong of the Lemon test because it clearly provides an impermissible preference to the Village in response to the Satmars' desire to provide their handicapped children with special education services in an exclusive Satmar environment in light of the statute's legislative history and context (244 AD2d, at 36-37). Finally, the Appellate Division noted that the Supreme Court's decision in Agostini v Felton (521 US 203) overruled the Court's prior decision in Aguilar v Felton (473 US 402, supra ). Thus, Monroe-Woodbury was no longer precluded from offering Kiryas Joel's children special educational services at the Hasidic school. Accordingly, the Court stated that the fact that the underlying reason for the creation of the challenged school districts has now been eliminated also supports plaintiffs' assertion that chapter 390 should be perceived as yet another improper endorsement by the Legislature in providing the Satmar community the continued existence of a publicly funded exclusive environment in which to educate their children in accordance with their religious preferences (244 AD2d, at 37). Defendants appealed as of right, and we now affirm the order of the Appellate Division. [5]