Opinion ID: 162305
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Application of the Counts Decision

Text: In our prior order and judgment, we concluded that “the defendants’ own -5- evidentiary materials, attached to their motion for summary judgment, indicate that there are controverted issues of material fact pertaining to Ms. Pinkey’s Eighth Amendment claim.” Wright, 2002 WL 32654 , at . Thus, we reasoned, “the district court’s denial of Ms. Pinkey’s motion for reconsideration is based upon an incorrect application of the governing law.” Id. Applying Counts, we then concluded that, in light of the seriousness of Ms. Pinkey’s allegations (allegations of sexual abuse by a prison guard), the district court’s denial of Ms. Pinkey’s motion for reconsideration should be vacated, even though Ms. Pinkey had not raised the issue on which we decided the case (i.e., that the defendants’ own summary judgment materials indicated that there were controverted material facts). In their petition for rehearing en banc, the defendants observe that the procedural posture of Counts is distinguishable from the procedural posture here. In particular, the defendants note that, in Counts, this court reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment rather than, as here, the denial of a motion for relief from the judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The defendants add that different standards of review are applicable to these two decisions: summary judgment orders are reviewed de novo while the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Although Counts did not involve a Rule 60(b) motion, the significance of -6- that distinction is not entirely clear. In that case, this court did not expressly limit its authority to raise legal issues sua sponte to appeals of particular kinds of rulings. Instead, Counts indicated that the court could exercise this authority if two conditions were satisfied: (1) “the proper resolution is beyond doubt” and (2) “the failure to address the issue would result in a miscarriage of justice.” Counts, 986 F.2d at 1325-26. In order to resolve this case, we need not decide whether, as a general rule, the principle set forth in Counts is applicable to appeals of the denial of Rule 60(b) motions. Instead, upon further review, we conclude that the record does not establish that the failure to address the issue that we raised sua sponte would result in a miscarriage of justice. In reaching this conclusion, we note that Ms. Pinkey was represented by counsel in the district court proceedings. Thus, her counsel had the opportunity to direct the district court to controverted facts set forth in the defendants’ own summary judgment submissions. Her counsel also had the opportunity to submit Ms. Pinkey’s deposition in support of her objection to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. In light of the opportunity afforded Ms. Pinkey’s counsel, we conclude that the rare circumstances justifying the raising of a legal issue sua sponte on appeal are not present here. -7-