Opinion ID: 842363
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Heading Rank: 1

Heading: violation of deed restriction

Text: A deed restriction represents a contract between the buyer and the seller of property. Uday v. City of Dearborn, 356 Mich. 542, 546, 96 N.W.2d 775 (1959). Undergirding this right to restrict uses of property is, of course, the central vehicle for that restriction: the freedom of contract, which is . . . deeply entrenched in the common law of Michigan. Terrien, supra at 71 n. 19, 648 N.W.2d 602, citing McMillan v. Mich. S. & N.I.R. Co., 16 Mich. 79 (1867). The United States Supreme Court has listed the right to make and enforce contracts among those fundamental rights which are the essence of civil freedom. United States v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3, 22, 3 S.Ct. 18, 27 L.Ed. 835 (1883). We respect[ ] the freedom of individuals freely to arrange their affairs via contract by upholding the fundamental tenet of our jurisprudence . . . that unambiguous contracts are not open to judicial construction and must be enforced as written,  unless a contractual provision would violate law or public policy. Rory v. Continental Ins. Co., 473 Mich. 457, 468, 470, 703 N.W.2d 23 (2005) (emphasis in original). As one court has stated: Courts do not make contracts for parties. Parties have great freedom to choose to contract with each other, to choose not to do so, or to choose an intermediate course that binds them in some ways and leaves each free in other ways. [ Rarities Group, Inc. v. Karp, 98 F.Supp.2d 96, 106 (D.Mass., 2000).] `Were courts free to refuse to enforce contracts as written on the basis of their own conceptions of the public good, the parties to contracts would be left to guess at the content of their bargains. . . .' Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 903 F.2d 1073, 1077 (C.A.6, 1990), quoting St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Duke Univ., 849 F.2d 133, 135 (C.A.4, 1988). Because the parties have freely set forth their rights and obligations toward each other in their contract, when resolving a contractual dispute, society is not motivated to do what is fair or just in some abstract sense, but rather seeks to divine and enforce the justifiable expectations of the parties as determined from the language of their contract. Rich Products Corp. v. Kemutec, Inc., 66 F Supp 2d 937, 968 (E.D.Wis., 1999). Rather than attempt to apply an abstract notion of justice to each particular case arising out of a contract, we recognize that refusal to enforce a contract is contrary to the real justice as between [the parties]. Mitchell v. Smith, 1 Binn 110, 121 (Pa., 1804). See also Brown v. Vandergrift, 80 Pa. 142, 148 (1875) (holding that enforcing a contract is essential to do justice). Consequently, when parties have freely established their mutual rights and obligations through the formation of unambiguous contracts, the law requires this Court to enforce the terms and conditions contained in such contracts, if the contract is not contrary to public policy. [1] Sands Appliance Services, Inc. v. Wilson, 463 Mich. 231, 239, 615 N.W.2d 241 (2000). When contracts are formed, the parties to the contract are the lawmakers in such realm and deference must be shown to their judgments and to their language as with regard to any other lawmaker. Because of this Court's regard for parties' freedom to contract, we have consistently support[ed] the right of property owners to create and enforce covenants affecting their own property. Terrien, supra at 71, 648 N.W.2d 602. Such deed restrictions `generally constitute a property right of distinct worth.' Rofe v. Robinson, 415 Mich. 345, 350, 329 N.W.2d 704 (1982), quoting Cooper v. Kovan, 349 Mich. 520, 531, 84 N.W.2d 859 (1957). Deed restrictions `preserve not only monetary value, but aesthetic characteristics considered to be essential constituents of a family environment.' Rofe v. Robinson (On Second Remand), 126 Mich.App. 151, 157, 336 N.W.2d 778 (1983), quoting Bellarmine Hills Ass'n v. Residential Systems Co., 84 Mich.App. 554, 559, 269 N.W.2d 673 (1978). If a deed restriction is unambiguous, we will enforce that deed restriction as written unless the restriction contravenes law or public policy, or has been waived by acquiescence to prior violations, because enforcement of such restrictions grants the people of Michigan the freedom freely to arrange their affairs by the formation of contracts to determine the use of land. Rory, supra at 468, 703 N.W.2d 23. Such contracts allow the parties to preserve desired aesthetic or other characteristics in a neighborhood, which the parties may consider valuable for raising a family, conserving monetary value, or other reasons particular to the parties. The deed restriction at issue here states: Each lot or lots shall be used for strictly residential purposes only, and no buildings except a single dwelling house and the necessary out-buildings shall be erected or moved upon any lot or lots except that Lot 1 may be used for four dwelling houses and the necessary out-buildings, and that three houses may be erected on Lots 40 and 41. [Emphasis added.] At issue then is the meaning of the phrase strictly residential purposes only. Although the deed restriction does not define residential, where a term is not defined in a contract, we will interpret such term in accordance with its `commonly used meaning.' Terrien, supra at 76-77, 648 N.W.2d 602, quoting Henderson v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 460 Mich. 348, 354, 596 N.W.2d 190 (1999). Moreover, under the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, `a word or phrase is given meaning by its context or setting.' Koontz v. Ameritech Services, Inc., 466 Mich. 304, 318, 645 N.W.2d 34 (2002), quoting Brown v. Genesee Co. Bd. of Comm'rs (After Remand), 464 Mich. 430, 437, 628 N.W.2d 471 (2001). The deed restriction limits the use of restricted land to strictly residential purposes only. The term residential means pertaining to residence or to residences. Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1997). Residence means the place, esp[ecially] the house, in which a person lives or resides; dwelling place; home. Id. The term residential in the deed restriction thus refers to homes where people reside. By using the terms strictly and only, the deed restriction seeks to underscore or emphasize that restricted land may only be used for this purpose. This conclusion is bolstered by the remaining language in the deed restriction, which states that no buildings except a single dwelling house and the necessary out-buildings shall be erected or moved upon any lot or lots. This language indicates that when the deed restriction refers to residential purposes, the intended use is as a single dwelling house and immediately related purposes. The only exceptions listed that Lot 1 may be used for four dwelling houses and the necessary out-buildings, and that three houses may be erected on Lots 40 and 41  further clarify that the term residential refers to a single dwelling house. Neither of the two listed exceptions allows for use of Lot 52 as a park. Therefore, the phrase strictly residential purposes only precludes use of Lot 52 as a park and such use violated the deed restriction. Because use of the restricted land as a park violated the deed restriction, the use of Lot 52 as a dog park violated the deed restriction as well. Our prior holdings support this conclusion. Cf. Wood v. Blancke, 304 Mich. 283, 288-289, 8 N.W.2d 67 (1943) (The raising of 40 carrier pigeons for private use did not constitute use for residence purposes.). Defendant argues that the deed should be construed to allow a broad range of activity to be considered residential. Although our courts have noted that [a] restriction allowing residential uses permits a wider variety of uses than a restriction prohibiting commercial or business uses, Beverly Island Ass'n v. Zinger, 113 Mich.App. 322, 326, 317 N.W.2d 611 (1982), those cases have concerned a landowner who was using his or her home for business purposes in addition to residential use. In Beverly, the Court of Appeals permitted a homeowner to run a small day care facility from her home because this use was indistinguishable from the use resulting if the homeowner simply ha[d] a large family. [2] Id. at 328, 317 N.W.2d 611. In Miller v. Ettinger, 235 Mich. 527, 209 N.W. 568 (1926), we allowed a landowner burdened by a restriction that the land be used solely for residence purposes to build an apartment building on the land. Here, Lot 52 is being used as a park, and prospectively as a dog park. Neither of these uses involves the use of Lot 52 as a dwelling place, and consequently these uses do not conform to the deed restriction. Defendant further argues that using the land to allow dogs to roam constitutes a residential use because homeowners may allow dogs to wander in their own backyards under residential purposes only restrictions. However, the instant case is distinguishable from the backyard scenario. Most importantly, a backyard is attached to a home, and hence fits within the actual meaning of the term residential. That is, a backyard is an extension of a residence. A dog park is not attached to a home, and hence does not accord with the meaning of the term residential. Moreover, a dog park lacks two characteristics of a backyard, which suggests that a dog park is not included within the commonly understood meaning of residential use. First, because a backyard is attached to a home, the master exercises some level of control over the backyard. Here, no one person controls the dog park. Second, the dog park may permit use by a great multitude of dogs at one time, while a backyard generally contains at most a few dogs. [3] These characteristics sufficiently distinguish a dog park from the meaning normally ascribed to residential use, thereby indicating that the dog park violates the deed restriction limiting Lot 52 to residential use. [4] Thus, use of Lot 52 as both a park and a dog park violates the deed restriction, which limits the use of the land to residential purposes only.