Opinion ID: 1906701
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: evidence of alleged witness intimidation

Text: Mercer and Terrell challenge the admission of certain evidence, claiming they were unfairly prejudiced. Both appellants claim that the prosecution created an improper inference that Mercer and Terrell were involved in a scheme to intimidate witnesses. The prosecution counters that the evidence was admissible to show the bias and motivation of various government witnesses. Generally, evidence showing the bias or motivation of a witness may be relevant in assessing the witness' credibility. See Springer v. United States, 388 A.2d 846, 855 (D.C.1978). That evidence may be relevant, however, does not end the trial court's analysis. See Johns v. United States, 434 A.2d 463, 473 (D.C.1981). The trial judge has the discretion to exclude relevant and otherwise admissible evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. ( William) Johnson v. United States, 683 A.2d 1087, 1090 (D.C.1996) (en banc). `Unfair prejudice' within its context means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one. FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note. See also Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997); United States v. Doe, 284 U.S.App.D.C. 199, 204, 903 F.2d 16, 21 (1990). Unfairness may be found in any form of evidence that may cause a jury to base its decision on something other than the established propositions in the case. 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN AND MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 403.04[1][b] (2d ed.1998). Federal courts have found appeals to the passions of the jury, such as the presentation of evidence of threats against a witness, to have the potential for great prejudice against the defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 86 F.3d 647, 653-54 (7th Cir.1996); Dudley v. Duckworth, 854 F.2d 967, 970-71 (7th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1011, 109 S.Ct. 1655, 104 L.Ed.2d 169 (1989); United States v. Qamar, 671 F.2d 732, 736 (2d Cir.1982). The court in Thomas, supra, 86 F.3d at 654, viewed the probative value of such evidence as limited, unless admitted to explain specific behavior of the witness, such as inconsistent statements, delay in testifying, or unusual courtroom demeanor. If the trial court admits evidence of threats solely to go to the general credibility or bias of the witness, such admission has been held to be an abuse of discretion. See id. Consistent with this view, we have stated that evidence concerning a witness' fear tends to be prejudicial because it suggests the witness fears reprisal at the hands of the defendant or his associates if she testifies. McClellan v. United States, 706 A.2d 542, 551 (D.C.1997). Evidence concerning the fear of a witness, however, may be admissible where the witness has given conflicting statements. Id. at 551-52. Our case law instructs the trial court to be cautious in the admission of potentially inflammatory evidence. A prosecutor may not ask a question that is totally groundless. McGrier v. United States, 597 A.2d 36, 44 (D.C.1991) (quoting White v. United States, 297 A.2d 766, 768 n. 1 (D.C.1972)). Rather, the prosecution must have a well reasoned suspicion. Id. at 44-45 (quoting United States v. Pugh, 141 U.S.App.D.C. 68, 71, 436 F.2d 222, 225 (1970)). This court has admonished prosecutors for probing about an alleged attempt on the part of the defendant to suborn perjury through intimidation, a potentially inflammatory subject, based on little evidence: It is a generally accepted principle that the government may not attempt to manufacture evidence by creating an impression in the minds of the jurors through questions that imply the existence of facts. Ali v. United States, 520 A.2d 306, 313 (D.C. 1987). See also id. at 315-16. But see Carter v. United States, 614 A.2d 913, 917-18 (D.C.1992) (holding that a question concerning a general threat from the streets and not a specific threat from the defendant was not improper). Similarly, this court has admonished against engaging in tactics that promote the concept of guilt by association. See, e.g., Funchess v. United States, 677 A.2d 1019, 1021 (D.C.1996) (citing 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 3.6(c), at 310 (3d ed.1996)) (stating that companionship with an offender alone is not enough to establish probable cause); Irick v. United States, 565 A.2d 26, 30 (D.C.1989) (guilt by association is a very dangerous principle, and ... inferring culpability from an accused's blood relationship to a wrongdoer is fraught with peril) (footnote omitted); Smith v. United States, 558 A.2d 312, 315 (D.C.1989) (en banc) (stating reasonable, articulable suspicion cannot be based solely on guilt by association). The admission of evidence whose sole purpose is to connect a defendant to a group of people of questionable character and not relevant to some other factual issue is improper. Determining whether the probative value of a piece of evidence is substantially outweighed by its unfair prejudice necessarily involves a balancing test. 2 WEINSTEIN, supra, § 403.02[2][a]. In so weighing the evidence, the trial judge should consider the availability of alternative methods or evidence that can prove the same proposition in a manner that is less unfairly prejudicial to the defendant. Old Chief, supra, 519 U.S. at 184, 117 S.Ct. 644. See also Gross v. Black & Decker (U.S.), Inc., 695 F.2d 858, 863 (5th Cir.1983) (upholding the admission of potentially prejudicial evidence when no other alternative was available); 2 WEINSTEIN, supra, § 403.02[2][a]. In reviewing this determination of the trial judge, we recognize that the evaluation and weighing of evidence for relevance and potential prejudice is quintessentially a discretionary function of the trial court, and we owe a great degree of deference to its decision. ( William) Johnson, supra, 683 A.2d at 1095 (citations omitted). [4] A proper exercise of discretion involves a sufficient factual basis and substantial reasoning to support the trial court's decision. ( James W.) Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 364-65 (D.C.1979). [5] In reviewing a trial court's decision for an abuse of discretion, the appellate court should consider the context in which that decision was made. Id. at 366. Having discussed the applicable legal principles, we now turn to the facts of this case. Mercer and Terrell challenge the prosecution's questioning of six witnesses. We will examine each challenged witness in turn to assess the propriety of the evidence admitted.
The prosecution presented the testimony of Catrice Cunningham, an eyewitness to the crime. Cunningham looked out of her window on June 1, 1995 to see two people having a conversation near a dark blue car that she knew belonged to Melvin Terrell. She saw two men chase Yappy, shooting at him. While she did not directly identify the shooters, Cunningham did state that Melvin Terrell was at the scene. The attorney for Terrell then impeached Cunningham with a statement she gave to a defense investigator. [6] In that statement, she did not say anything about an argument or a blue car. Nor did Cunningham state that Melvin Terrell was at the scene. On redirect, the prosecution asked Cunningham about the circumstances surrounding the statement given to the defense investigator: Q: Ms. Cunningham, can you tell the ladies and gentlemen of the jury what the circumstances were when you were visited by this defense investigator? A: When I was visited, when he came to see me to take that statement, Melvin's girlfriend was with him and I told [the prosecuting attorney] that I gave him  I didn't give him quite the exact information that I gave [the prosecuting attorney], but I gave him part of what I knew. It's been three years ago. I mean what is  how am I supposed to  Q: Ms. Cunningham, you started off when I asked you the circumstances of your giving that statement, the first thing you said was that the investigator was accompanied by Melvin's girlfriend? A: Yes. Q: That would be Melvin Terrell's girlfriend? A: Yes. Q: How did that make you feel when you saw Melvin Terrell's girlfriend? A: It scared me. Q: Was what you told the defense investigator about the, about there not being a blue car the truth? A: No. Q: Why did you tell the defense investigator you didn't see Melvin Terrell and you didn't see the blue car? A: Because I was scared. That's why I didn't tell him. Q: Were you afraid that it was going to get back to Melvin Terrell? A: I know  of course, I know it was going to get back to him. Q: Ms. Cunningham, why are you here today? A: Because I was subpoenaed to be here today. Q: Do you want to be here? A: No. Q: Are you happy about testifying in this case? A: No. Because I could leave here today and y'all might never see me again. Under these circumstances, the evidence initially elicited from Cunningham on redirect was properly admitted. Cunningham had been impeached by a prior inconsistent statement. The prosecution sought to rehabilitate the witness by having her explain the facts and circumstances that surrounded the prior inconsistent statement. The jury could infer that the presence of Terrell's girlfriend influenced Cunningham to give the investigator a statement favorable to Terrell. The statement that Cunningham might never be seen again, however, was not appropriate to rehabilitate the witness. The prosecution had already given Cunningham the opportunity to explain her inconsistent statement. Cunningham provided an adequate explanation. Further, the statement was not necessary to establish Cunningham's motivation in testifying, or her reluctance. The prosecution had already established that Cunningham only testified because of a subpoena, and that she did not want to be in the courtroom. Having elicited this evidence, the prosecution should have then stopped its redirect examination. The statement was prejudicial, as it implied that Cunningham had received some type of threat regarding her testimony. This type of evidence could very well have aroused the passions of the jury, and suggested a conviction based on their aversion. Additionally, the prosecution did not appear to have any evidence to form a well reasoned suspicion that Cunningham had received a threat, or if such threat had occurred, that it came from either Mercer or Terrell. Although it did not appear as though the questioning specifically sought a statement from Cunningham concerning an alleged threat, nonetheless, due to the danger of unfair prejudice, this statement should have been stricken from the record on proper objection or motion and the jury properly instructed.
The prosecution attempted to show that Dominic Gibson first retrieved a gun from Yappy and gave it to Mercer, and then told Yappy to go outside to speak with Mercer and Terrell. Once on the stand, the witness did not cooperate. Gibson first testified that he stayed in the apartment of Robin Motley, having his hair done, during the entire incident. The prosecution proceeded to interrogate Gibson by use of his grand jury testimony. At the end of Gibson's direct examination, the prosecution asked Gibson about spectators attending the trial: Q: And do you know these people seated in the back row of the room today? A: Yeah, I know them. Q: Are they friends of yours? A: They all right. Q: Are they friends of Melvin's and Wayne-Wayne's? A: I don't know. That's them. I don't know who friends with them or not. I don't know. I can't vouch for both of them. Q: Are they friends of yours from Lincoln Heights? A: Who? Q: The people seated in the back of the courtroom? A: Yeah, they are. They from Lincoln Heights. Q: They're from Lincoln Heights? Why are you here testifying today? A: Why am I here testifying? Q: Yeah. Why are you here testifying? Are you here voluntarily? A: Yeah. Y'all keep coming locking me up, picking me up, that's why I'm here. Q: You were subpoenaed, weren't you? A: Right. Q: And you didn't show up the first time, did you? A: Yeah, I was here. You saw me. You looked at me. Q: Do you want to be here today? A: Yeah, I want to be here today. I'm right here. Q: Do you want to be testifying against Melvin and Wayne-Wayne? A: I ain't  you asking me questions. I'm giving you answers. It is clear that Mr. Gibson contradicted his grand jury testimony. As Gibson was confronted with this grand jury testimony, it would be proper to inquire into the reasons why Mr. Gibson was changing his testimony. As in the case of Cunningham, moreover, it was not improper to elicit that Gibson was an unwilling witness. The manner in which the prosecution proceeded, however, was improper. In this instance, the prosecution attempted to link the people in the back of the courtroom to the defendants, Mercer and Terrell. By highlighting that the spectators were from Lincoln Heights, and intimating that they were friends with Mercer and Terrell, the prosecution created an impression that the spectators were there to influence the testimony of the witnesses. Such tactics are fraught with the potential for unfair prejudice for two reasons. First, they suggest to the jury a decision based on guilt by association. That is, the evidence suggests that because these imposing figures in the back of the courtroom were somehow connected to Mercer and Terrell, Mercer and Terrell must need their presence to intimidate witnesses because they are guilty. See United States v. Irvin, 87 F.3d 860, 866 (7th Cir.1996) (stating evidence of gang membership could have a prejudicial effect by increasing the chance of a conviction based on guilt by association). Second, the evidence plays on the passions and fear of the jury, by suggesting that a threat exists against the witnesses. See McClellan, supra, 706 A.2d at 551. That the prosecution did not mention the words intimidation or threat is immaterial in this context. The impression that the spectators from Lincoln Heights were present to influence witnesses was still created. By linking the fact that Gibson had testified at trial in contradiction to his grand jury testimony with the presence of spectators from Lincoln Heights, the prosecution inescapably implied that the spectators were there to intimidate witnesses. Further, the purpose for which the reference to the spectators from Lincoln Heights was made could have been accomplished by an alternative method, less prejudicial to Mercer and Terrell. The prosecution claims that this evidence was relevant to give the jury a glimpse into the state of mind of Gibson. This could have been accomplished without reference to the spectators from Lincoln Heights. The prosecution could have established that Gibson was only testifying due to a subpoena, and that Gibson did not want to be in the courtroom. Given the potential for unfair prejudice, and the availability of an alternative, less prejudicial method to accomplish the same goal, the suggestion that Gibson's recantation of his grand jury testimony was the product of fear was improper. Carter v. United States, 614 A.2d 913 (D.C. 1992), is not to the contrary. There, the prosecution asked whether the witness realized that he could face consequences on the street for his testimony. The court found the questions referred to a general threat, and did not directly implicate the defendant. Id. at 918. Thus, we held that the questions did not require reversal. Id. at 919. The reference to the people from Lincoln Heights in the back of the courtroom in this case, however, was not a reference to a general, abstract threat. By highlighting their presence, the prosecution created the impression of a very real and immediate threat. Additionally, it gave the jury a face with which to associate that threat. Further, by attempting to link the spectators from Lincoln Heights to Mercer and Terrell, the prosecution implied that there was a threat coming from the defendants. Thus, unlike the reference in Carter, the line of questioning in this case did have the potential to create direct, unfair prejudice against Mercer and Terrell.
The prosecution presented the testimony of Linda Washington, a resident of Lincoln Heights, to establish several key facts to this case. Initially, the prosecution showed that Ms. Washington did not want to be in the courtroom, and was testifying only because of a subpoena. Washington then testified that on June 1, 1995, while walking on Fiftieth Street, she saw Mercer and Terrell speaking with Yappy near Terrell's blue car. Washington then heard gunshots. While Washington did not see the actual shooting, she did see Mercer with a gun in his hands immediately after hearing the shots. Washington then testified that she saw Terrell get into his car. Next, a person whom Washington did not identify, got out of the car and shot Yappy again. Washington saw the car drive away, with Terrell driving. Washington's trial testimony was consistent with her grand jury testimony in all relevant respects. The prosecution ended the direct examination by inquiring about Washington's feelings on testifying: Q: Do you still live in Lincoln Heights,  A: Yes. Q:  Ms. Washington? A: Yes. Q: Do you recognize anyone from Lincoln Heights in the courtroom? I'm not asking you to point them out, but sitting in the courtroom. Do you recognize people from Lincoln Heights? A: Yes. Q: And how do you feel about having to testify here today? A: I don't feel right. I don't want to be here. As stated above, the references to spectators from Lincoln Heights created a danger of unfair prejudice by suggesting that the spectators were in the courtroom in an attempt to intimidate witnesses. Here, unlike Mr. Gibson, Ms. Washington did not contradict her grand jury testimony. Thus, there was no inconsistent statement that needed explanation. References to the spectators from Lincoln Heights could only have served to explain Washington's credibility or potential bias in a general sense. Further, the prosecution had established Washington's state of mind early in the direct examination. The prosecution began its questioning of Washington by showing that she did not want to be in the courtroom, and that she was only testifying due to a subpoena. Thus, the prosecution availed itself of an alternative, less prejudicial method of showing the state of mind of the witness. Questions concerning the presence of people from Lincoln Heights in the back of the courtroom were improper, and should have been excluded.
The prosecution opened its questioning of Lynette Brooks by eliciting the fact that Ms. Brooks had been arrested that morning for her failure to appear in court while under subpoena. Ms. Brooks claimed that she did not appear because she could not find a baby-sitter. Ms. Brooks admitted, however, that she was hiding under a pile of laundry when the marshals arrived at her house to arrest her. The prosecution then established that Mercer had fathered a child with Ms. Brooks. Further, Ms. Brooks testified that Jason Brooks, the man who had accompanied Yappy earlier in the day on June 1, 1995, and was later found shot to death, was her younger brother. Here, despite the claim that this line of questioning intimated a scheme to intimidate witnesses, the questions were proper. From the record, it is apparent that the prosecution had been experiencing difficulty with its witnesses. In fact, several bench warrants were issued when witnesses ignored subpoenas. Ms. Brooks was one witness who was arrested for ignoring a subpoena. The fact that Ms. Brooks had to be arrested was relevant, as it showed her motivation not to testify. The fact that she and Mercer had an intimate relationship that produced a child was relevant, as it tended to show bias. Thus, the questioning only tended to show that Ms. Brooks did not want to testify against a man with whom she had a prior romantic relationship. Such testimony is relevant, and does not intimate a scheme to intimidate witnesses, as Mercer and Terrell argue.
The prosecution began its questioning of Natasha Stringfellow asking why she was in court that day. Stringfellow replied that she was under subpoena, and that she had not complied with the subpoena because she was scared: Q: Why didn't you turn up for court? A: I was scared. Q: Do you want to be here today? A: Sure don't. No. Q: Why was it you eventually came in voluntarily? A: Because the people said they was going to take my kids, and I came down here. Q: I'm sorry. A: They said they was going to take my kids. Counsel for Terrell objected, stating that the witness' state of mind had not yet been put into issue. Mercer's counsel joined in the objection. The trial judge stated that she was not going to rule on the objection until after the witness had testified, to see if demeanor had become an issue. [7] Stringfellow testified that she was a friend of both Mercer and Terrell. On June 1, 1995, she was on her way to the house of Jason Brooks after she learned that he had been killed. At that time, she heard Mercer and Yappy arguing. Terrell's car was on the scene. Stringfellow then heard shots. The record indicates that Stringfellow had trouble recalling her prior deposition [8] testimony: Q: Okay, Now, Ms. Stringfellow, what do you remember? What else do you remember? A: I don't remember nothing that paper said he said. I don't remember nothing. Q: Do you remember testifying? A: Yeah. Q: Under oath? A: Yeah, I remember talking to the lady.       Q: You remember what Wayne-Wayne said  A: I don't remember. I don't remember. Q: Let me ask you. Well, how could he get shot and nothing happened to you? A: I don't remember. Q: You got away, and you get to come home and tell everything that happened, and nothing happened to  I mean, he got shot, and you're okay, and you're walking around like nothing  like there ain't nothing wrong. Do you remember testifying to that? A: I don't remember. At the end of Stringfellow's testimony, both defense counsel renewed their objection, fearing the opening portion of the examination was prejudicial to their clients. The court gave a limiting instruction: All right, Ladies and gentlemen, I want to again instruct you that you recall Ms. Stringfellow began her testimony by saying that she had been  had not wanted to be here and that she was scared. I want to emphasize to you, so that you not misuse that type of evidence from this witness, there is absolutely no evidence in this case that either defendant on trial has had anything to do with any conduct that would have any basis for a comment like that from a witness of being scared. There are dozens of reasons why any witness may be concerned that have nothing to do with a particular defendant on trial, and you are not to speculate about what the cause may be, because that's not in evidence. But, I affirmatively instruct you that there is absolutely no evidence that either of these defendants is the cause. And, again, the only reason that kind of testimony is permitted is to help you understand the state of mind of witness at the time of testifying. So, use it for that purpose only, and do not use it against either defendant. Other than on the issue of timing, we find no error in the trial judge's action. First, the witness demonstrated a lack of memory of her prior testimony. Questions about her state of mind, therefore, become relevant to explain the inability to remember. [9] This evidence was meant to explain specific behavior of the witness while testifying; it did not go only to her general credibility, as in the case of Washington. Second, the trial judge instructed the jury on the proper use of this evidence. After an objection by the defense counsel, the judge gave a limiting instruction. This instruction informed the jury that the only reason for the evidence was to place the testimony of the witness in the proper light, and allow them to assess her state of mind and demeanor. Third, the challenged portion of Stringfellow's testimony does not appear to implicate either Mercer or Terrell. Stringfellow commented that they was going to take my kids in response to a question as to why she did testify, not to explain her reluctance to testify. The statement appears to show that Stringfellow perceived there to be a threat by some government agent that if she did not testify, the government would take her children into custody. [10] While not completely clear, a reasonable reading of this testimony is that she only complied with the subpoena and appeared in court to avoid having the government follow through on this threat. Except as noted previously in footnote 7, the conduct of the trial judge was proper as to this witness. The evidence did tend to explain Stringfellow's demeanor, and the judge did give a proper limiting instruction.
Mercer and Terrell challenge the admission of evidence showing that Tamika Jones entered the witness protection program due to an alleged threat on her life. [11] The prosecution claims this evidence was admissible on two separate grounds. First, the prosecution claims the evidence is admissible on an independent basis as relating to Jones' credibility. Second, the prosecution claims the evidence was admissible, anticipatorily, under the doctrine of curative admissibility. With respect to the prosecution's first argument that the evidence was independently admissible, even where this evidence is relevant, as previously noted, the evidence would still be subject to exclusion if its probative value were substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See ( William) Johnson, supra, 683 A.2d at 1090. Jones' state of mind became an issue due to her conflicting accounts. First, Jones told police that she did not see anything. At this time, she was not in the witness protection program. Then, Jones approached the police and gave a detailed description of Yappy's murder. Jones told the police that she saw Terrell shoot Yappy. Mercer and Terrell then got into Terrell's car. Mercer opened his door to knock down Yappy. Then, Mercer stood over Yappy's body and shot him again. Jones repeated this version of events before the grand jury. At trial, Jones recanted her grand jury testimony, testifying that she did not see the actual shooting. Jones claimed that she fabricated the story she told to the grand jury in order to enter the witness protection program. Jones left the witness protection program before trial began. Due to the fact that Jones gave three different accounts of Yappy's murder, evidence of her state of mind became relevant to assess her credibility. The danger of unfair prejudice with respect to Jones' reasons for entering the witness protection program, however, is clear. Jones testified that she received a threat. As stated above, this type of testimony has the danger of appealing to the emotions of the jury by implying  without evidence  that a defendant made the threat, thereby creating the danger of unfair prejudice. While Jones did recant her grand jury testimony at trial, the prosecution could have explained this in a less prejudicial manner by showing that she testified before the grand jury while she was in the witness protection program, and that she had left the witness protection program before testifying at trial. This alternative approach would have minimized the potential prejudice involved in disclosing the alleged threat, coupled with an appropriate limiting instruction. The prosecution next argues that the evidence was admissible, anticipatorily, under the doctrine of curative admissibility. This doctrine provides that in certain circumstances the prosecution may inquire into evidence otherwise inadmissible, but only after the defense has opened the door with regard to this evidence. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985); Jenkins v. United States, 374 A.2d 581, 585-86 (D.C.1977) (citing 1 J. WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 15 (3d ed.1940)). We note that [t]he doctrine of curative admissibility is one dangerously prone to overuse. United States v. McClain, 142 U.S.App.D.C. 213, 216, 440 F.2d 241, 244 (1971). The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit stated that the doctrine should not be used unfairly to prejudice the defendant: The doctrine is to prevent prejudice and is not to be subverted into a rule for injection of prejudice. Introduction of otherwise inadmissible evidence under shield of this doctrine is permitted only to the extent necessary to remove any unfair prejudice which might otherwise have ensued from the original evidence. United States v. Winston, 145 U.S.App.D.C. 67, 71, 447 F.2d 1236, 1240 (1971) (quoting California Ins. Co. v. Allen, 235 F.2d 178, 180 (5th Cir.1956)). The Court of Appeals in Winston quoted the trial judge (Judge William B. Bryant) with approval: This business about opening the door is a much overused issue and it carries with it an oversimplification. Opening the door is one thing. But what comes through the door is another. Everything cannot come through the door. Id. See also Jenkins, supra, 374 A.2d at 585-86. The government further relies on the principle that, under the proper circumstances, the prosecution may anticipate an attack on the credibility of its own witness and disclose facts relating to that witness' credibility on direct examination. See, e.g., Reed v. United States, 452 A.2d 1173, 1179 (D.C.1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 839, 104 S.Ct. 132, 78 L.Ed.2d 127 (1983); United States v. Mobile Materials, Inc., 881 F.2d 866, 875-76 (10th Cir.1989); United States v. Koppers Co., 652 F.2d 290, 299 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1083, 102 S.Ct. 639, 70 L.Ed.2d 617 (1981); United States v. Hasenstab, 575 F.2d 1035, 1040 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 827, 99 S.Ct. 100, 58 L.Ed.2d 120 (1978). There is, however, always a danger in permitting a party to defang prejudicial evidence on direct examination where the admissibility of the evidence depends upon the curative admissibility rationale. This is so because it is often difficult at best to anticipate what will be done on cross-examination to open the door and the extent to which, if any, curative admissibility is appropriate. That becomes evident when we consider the facts of this case. Before presenting the witness, the prosecution discussed potential problems concerning Tamika Jones at a bench conference, out of the presence of the jury. The prosecution informed the court of its understanding that Jones only came forward because of a threat made by Mercer. The court gave the prosecution permission to ask about the threat, without giving the specifics of who may have given the threat. The prosecution wanted to leave the specifics of the threat to the defense attorneys, if they so chose. Defense counsel wants to explore it with her, they can do so, but I don't want  I don't want any missteps regarding that. At this point, the two defense counsel chose different strategies. The attorney for Mercer did not want to question Jones at all about her entry into the witness protection program. Mercer's attorney stated, Your Honor, I think we would  we would waive the value of impeachment testimony if we could avoid talking about the witness protection program as well as the threat to her in this case. The attorney for Terrell, however, wanted to question Jones about her reasons for entering the witness protection program. Specifically, Terrell's attorney wanted to establish that her reason for entering the witness protection program was to get paid by the government. The judge made it clear to Terrell's attorney that if he wanted to attempt to show that Jones was motivated by money, the prosecution would be allowed to show that her motivation was actually fear. To this, Terrell's attorney responded, I'm prepared to take  to deal with the risk involved in the witness saying that she received a threat, in order to get the benefit that the  that she's on the Government payroll or however it is I choose to characterize this. [12] Mercer then moved to sever his case from that of Terrell, but the motion was denied. Given this bench conference, our analysis of the propriety of the admission of this evidence becomes bifurcated. Terrell's attorney made it clear that he was prepared to accept the risk of the potential prejudice in order to impeach Jones concerning her entry into the witness protection program. Had Terrell done so, the prosecution could have rehabilitated Jones on redirect by presenting the evidence of the alleged threat in the manner prescribed by the trial judge. Thus, with respect to Terrell, while the wiser course would have been to await actual cross-examination before ruling on the curative admissibility, we cannot say the trial court erred in permitting the prosecution to anticipate this challenge to Jones' credibility, and thereby disclose Jones' claimed true reason for entering the witness protection program on direct examination. The situation is different as to Mercer. Mercer's attorney emphatically argued that he did not want to create the possibility that the jury would use this evidence in an unfairly prejudicial manner against his client. Mercer's attorney, therefore, was willing to forego the opportunity of impeachment for what he perceived to be the greater benefit of avoiding the potential for unfair prejudice. If means lay at hand for accommodating that wish while respecting Terrell's strategy as well, the trial court was obligated to seriously consider them, which brings us to Mercer's motion for severance.