Opinion ID: 2633370
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to seek second counsel

Text: Defendant also contends Mrs. Huffman should have sought the assistance of second counsel when she realized Mr. Huffman would not be back to assist her at the penalty phase due to his illness. Defendant argues Mrs. Huffman was exhausted by having to conduct the sanity phase alone, was depressed and feeling rejected after losing at the sanity phase and, like a prizefighter standing on rubbery legs out on her feet, she was unable to aggressively fight for her client's life. He claims her failure to request help from a second attorney to conduct the penalty phase constituted unreasonably deficient representation. [26] It is impossible to discern from the appellate record whether defense counsel was so inexperienced, fatigued or depressed that her failure to seek second counsel under section 987, subdivision (d) was reversible error. Certainly we may look at counsel's actual performance at trial to determine whether she provided substandard legal representation (but see People v. Mendoza Tello, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 267, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 437, 933 P.2d 1134), but, absent a request for Keenan counsel ( Keenan v. Superior Court, supra, 31 Cal.3d 424, 180 Cal.Rptr. 489, 640 P.2d 108), with counsel making a record about her need for the assistance of second counsel, the facts supporting such a claim must be developed elsewhere. ( People v. Diaz, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 566, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 353, 834 P.2d 1171 [Any assertion that counsel was inadequate in this regard must be raised on habeas corpus].) As we stated in People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 598, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347 when addressing a similar claim: the absence of mitigating character and background evidence is troubling, but the appellate record affords no basis for concluding that the lapse was the result of [an attorney's] incompetent failure to obtain full trial assistance from another attorney, [¶] Similarly, defendant identifies no record evidence, and we discern none, demonstrating a reasonable probability that counsel's mistake, if any, in failing to request full-time second counsel affected the trial outcome. [Citations.] Hence, the claim of ineffective assistance [for failing to seek appointment of a second attorney] must be rejected. As in Anderson, we conclude in this case that the record provides no cause to believe a reasonable probability exists Mrs. Huffman's failure to seek appointment of second counsel affected the jury's decision. Defendant also argues the trial court should have conducted a searching voir dire to determine whether defendant wished to waive his statutory right to second counsel at the penalty phase. Although he waived this right before the sanity phase, defendant contends his own impaired mental condition required heightened scrutiny and a renewed inquiry by the trial court at that important time of the trial. This claim is a reprise of one already discussed, ante, in part II.B.3.b., and defendant adds nothing we have not already considered.