Opinion ID: 1900997
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Verdict contrary to evidence

Text: The plaintiffs initially argue that there was error below, because, as they view the evidence, they say the jury under no circumstances could return a verdict for the defendant on the issue of negligence. We disagree. First, we must decide whether that issue is open for review under the circumstances of this case. We noted previously that, unlike the defendant, the plaintiffs failed to file at trial a motion for a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence pursuant to Rule 50(a), M.R.Civ.P., nor did they move for judgment notwithstanding the jury verdict at any time under Rule 50(b), M.R.Civ.P. On the other hand, on December 8, 1981, they did make a motion for a new trial on the same grounds which they now advance on appeal. Thus, the new trial motion was filed prior to the time when the judgment of November 30, 1981 became final and efficient with the entry of the cross-claim dismissal order of May 25, 1982. The question is, was this then pending motion for a new trial available for court action after the initial judgment became final and prior to the taking of the second appeal. We answer in the affirmative. It is permissible under the rules to file a motion for a new trial before the actual judgment is entered or before the judgment, if prematurely entered, becomes a final appealable judgment. Boynton v. Adams, 331 A.2d 370, 373, n. 2 (Me. 1975). The language of Rule 59(b), M.R. Civ.P., requiring that [a] motion for a new trial shall be served not later than 10 days after the entry of the judgment, does not mean that the motion must be served during the 10-day period following the entry of the judgment. Rather, it only denotes the outside limit within which the motion for a new trial can be made and not an inside limit. Cf. Gilbert v. Cliche, 379 A.2d 717, 719 (Me.1977). Thus, the motion for a new trial filed December 8, 1981, was pending and available for court action following the cross-claim dismissal order which impacted the defendant's previously interlocutory judgment with that degree of effectiveness and finality contemplated by rules 58 and 73. We note, however, that, instead of pressing their motion for a new trial, the plaintiffs filed their second appeal on May 28, 1982, claiming on appeal as one of their points of relief from judgment the identical point made in their motion for a new trial, that the evidence was wholly insufficient to support a verdict for the defendant. If the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the defendant's jury verdict became reviewable on the mere taking of the appeal without an adverse ruling by the trial court on the motion for a new trial, then the taking of the appeal in the instant case must be deemed an election to go forward with the appeal and an abandonment of the motion for a new trial as such. See Torrey v. Full Gospel Church of Searsport, 394 A.2d 276, 279 (Me.1978). Cf. Herman v. Greene, 140 Me. 54, 55, 34 A.2d 17, 18 (Me. 1943). Prior to December 1, 1959, when the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure became effective, the traditional methods of review of jury verdicts for insufficient evidence to support them consisted of 1) either a bill of exceptions allowed by the presiding justice based on an adverse ruling on the aggrieved party's motion for a directed verdict or for a new trial, or 2) a general motion for a new trial on the law and the evidence presented directly to the Law Court. As stated in the commentary to Rule 59, 2 Maine Civil Practice, Field, McKusick and Wroth, § 59.2, p. 59, the rules in the area of new trials are not designed to effect any change, thus indicating that review of the question whether the jury verdict is against the law and the evidence as previously available pursuant to a general motion for a new trial presented directly to the Law Court was still viable by reason of the appeal from judgment itself. [3] Rule 73 abolishes appellate review otherwise than by appeal, expressly discontinuing review by bills of exception or the general motion to the Law Court. See Werner v. Lane, 393 A.2d 1329, 1331 (Me.1978). Rule 73 further provides that [w]henever a judgment of the Superior Court ... is by law reviewable by the Law Court, such review shall be by appeal in accordance with these rules. Also, [a]n appeal from a judgment, whenever taken, preserves for review any claim of error in the record [such as that the jury verdict is against the law and the evidence] including any claim of error in any of the orders specified in the preceding sentence [such as the denial of a motion for a new trial under Rule 59], even if entered on a motion filed after the notice of appeal. (Emphasis provided). We hold that in the instant case the issue, whether the jury verdict in favor of the defendant was against the law and the evidence, is properly before us for review. We have carefully examined the evidentiary record before us and find that it presented factual questions for jury determination. Driving her car at a speed of ten miles per hour and at a distance of two car lengths behind the plaintiffs' automobile on a clear morning, even while descending a hill on a wet but sanded roadway with ice patches mixed in, did not make the defendant's operation negligent conduct as a matter of law, as claimed by the plaintiffs. Skidding does not necessarily prove negligence. The defendant's limited speed, the severity of the downgrade, the freakish pattern of the ice patches, the plaintiffs' ability to stop their car without incident, the trivial impact of the vehicles, were all surrounding circumstances to be evaluated by the jury in determining whether the defendant failed to meet the standard of the reasonably prudent person under the existing circumstances. Tinker v. Trevett, 155 Me. 426, 156 A.2d 233 (1959). See also Robichaud v. St. Cyr, 150 Me. 168, 107 A.2d 540, 542 (1954).