Opinion ID: 2209116
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Child Witness

Text: LeMaster also alleges error in the trial court's determination that the younger of the two girls, who was seven years old at the time of trial, was a competent witness. After she was sworn and took the stand, the trial court questioned the child as follows: COURT: You understand (name) you've taken an oath to tell the truth. Do you understand that? WITNESS: No WITNESS: Well do you understand I had you swear to tell the truth. Do you understand that is an oath? WITNESS: Yes COURT: Now will you tell the truth in everything you say in the Courtroom from now on? WITNESS: Yes COURT: Do you think that anything will happen to you if you don't tell the truth? WITNESS: Yes COURT: What do you think will happen to you if you don't tell the truth? Will it be good or will it be bad? WITNESS: A wackin'. COURT: Pardon? WITNESS: A wackin'. COURT: Get a wackin, huh? Is that what you said? WITNESS: Yes COURT: Do you think something bad will happen to you, is that what you are telling me? WITNESS: Yes The court then requested her age, birthdate, name, school and grade. The child did not know her birthday but otherwise answered the questions. Now, are you going to tell the truth in everything you say here from now on? the court then asked. The child responded, Yes. The prosecutor subsequently questioned the child in greater depth about her knowledge of an oath and the meaning of truth. The child was unclear about the definition of an oath, but she discerned the difference between truth and falsehood. She once again promised to tell the truth. LeMaster claims the trial court's questioning of the child was insufficient to determine her competency as a witness. Children under 10 years old are incompetent witnesses unless it appears they understand the nature and obligation of an oath. Ind. Code § 34-1-14-5 (Burns 1985 Supp.). A child is competent if the court finds: (1) that the child knows the difference between telling the truth and telling a lie and (2) that the child knows she is under some compulsion to tell the truth. Johnson v. State (1977), 265 Ind. 689, 359 N.E.2d 525. The determination of a child's competency lies within the trial court's discretion because it has the opportunity to observe the child's intelligence, demeanor and maturity. Lindsay v. State (1984), Ind. 465 N.E.2d 721. LeMaster claims the trial court abused its discretion because the determination of competency was allegedly based upon insufficient questioning. There is no prescribed form for this type of questioning. Scales v. State (1975), 165 Ind. App. 588, 333 N.E.2d 814. The trial court's determination of competency has been affirmed when it asked only three questions. Id. It is, of course, the nature of the questions and the responses which form the foundation for the trial court's determination of competency, rather than the number of questions posed. Our deference to the trial court's conclusion has been expressed as follows: In reviewing such a determination, we recognize that our examination of the transcribed record of the questioning cannot compare with the trial court's personal presence at the hearing as a basis for resolution of the issue. We, therefore, entrust this determination to the discretion of the trial court and will reverse only where we find clear error, where there is no evidence from which the trial court could have found that the child understood the nature and obligation of an oath. Johnson v. State, 265 Ind. at 692, 359 N.E.2d at 528. In this case, the trial court asked a number of questions to which the child responded with answers indicating she knew the difference between the truth and a lie and that she believed she was under a compulsion to tell the truth. The child's responses to the prosecutor's questions created a similar inference. While she clearly did not understand the meaning of the word oath, a child does not need to be able to define that term to be a competent witness. Id. Applying the standard enunciated in Johnson, we conclude that there was evidence from which the trial court could have determined that the child was competent and accordingly find no abuse of discretion. This cause is ordered remanded for entry of new sentences. The trial court is affirmed on all other issues. GIVAN, C.J., and DeBRULER, PIVARNIK and DICKSON, JJ., concur.