Opinion ID: 2973681
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Possession of a Firearm Instruction

Text: Sixth, Peyton challenges the district court’s jury instruction on possession of a firearm. Again, this issue is reviewed for plain error, as Peyton did not object to the instruction below. Peyton contends that the following instruction effectively made the crime one of strict liability and also constituted an unconstitutional bill of attainder: To establish [possession of a firearm], it is not necessary for the Government to prove the Defendant knew that the firearm previously traveled in interstate commerce, nor is the Government required to prove that at the time the defendant possessed the firearm, he knew that he was breaking the law. It is sufficient if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed in commerce what he knew to be a firearm after he had been convicted of a felony offense. 3 The pattern “reasonable doubt” instruction is available at http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/internet/crim_jury_insts/html/chap1_8.htm (last visited May 17, 2006). -15- However, this Court has already considered and summarily rejected these same arguments as to an identical jury instruction. See United States v. Davis, 27 F. App’x 592, 599-600 (6th Cir. Dec. 27, 2001) (unpublished decision). Having no reason to reconsider this reasoned decision, we conclude that the instruction was not erroneous. G. Commerce Clause Challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) Seventh, Peyton argues that the federal carjacking statute, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), is an unconstitutional use of Congress’ power to enact legislation under the Commerce Clause, in light of United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). Although this issue is likely waived because Peyton did not raise it below, see United States v. Chesney, 86 F.3d 564, 567 (6th Cir. 1996), it fails nonetheless. Federal courts, including this one, have unanimously rejected this constitutional challenge to the carjacking statute. See United States v. McHenry, 97 F.3d 125, 129 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding the carjacking statute constitutional post-Lopez); see also United States v. Rivera-Figueroa, 149 F.3d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 1998) (joining “the unanimous opinion of the other circuits” that even after Lopez the carjacking statute is constitutional). H. Escape and Aggravated Robbery as “Crimes of Violence” Eighth, Peyton challenges the district court’s determination that his prior state convictions for escape and aggravated robbery are “crimes of violence” for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”). See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.2 (2004). Peyton did not object to the district court’s crime of violence determination as to his aggravated robbery conviction. Thus, Peyton has forfeited his right to raise the issue on appeal. See United States v. Dobish, 102 F.3d 760, 762 (6th Cir. 1996) (per curiam). He did, however, properly preserve a challenge to the characterization of his escape conviction as a crime of violence. -16- A district court’s determination of whether a particular offense is a crime of violence is reviewed de novo. See United States v. Galloway, 439 F.3d 320, 322 (6th Cir. 2006). The Supreme Court has stated that “crime of violence” determinations must be made using the categorical approach. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990). The categorical approach first requires reference to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the offense, but not to the underlying facts. United States v. Martin, 378 F.3d 578, 581 (6th Cir. 2004). Peyton stipulated to the fact of his escape conviction. Thus, the only remaining issue is whether the crime of escape is properly characterized as a crime of violence. If the statutory definition of the offense alone is not determinative, a court may consider “the statutory definition, charging document, written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant assented.” Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 15 (2005). This is most often used “where the prior offense is defined broadly enough for it to encompass some offenses that meet the ACCA’s definition of a ‘violent felony’ and some that do not.” United States v. Hargrove, 416 F.3d 486, 494 (6th Cir. 2005). In Ohio, the crime of escape is defined broadly enough to encompass both violent and nonviolent conduct. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2921.34(A)(1) (“No person . . . shall purposely break or attempt to break the detention, or purposely fail to return to detention . . .”). Under Shepard, then, we must look to other sources to make the “crime of violence” determination. See Hargrove, 416 F.3d at 494. Peyton’s state court indictment is dispositive of our inquiry. In charging Peyton with the crime of escape, the state of Ohio left out the possibility that Peyton’s conduct was non-violent, charging only that Peyton, “knowing he was under detention or being reckless in that regard, did purposely break or attempt to break such detention.” The indictment did not include the possibility -17- that Peyton merely failed to return to detention. Therefore, Peyton’s escape conviction satisfies the statutory definition of a crime of violence.