Opinion ID: 2509547
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Number of Cases

Text: As a preliminary matter, Dawson argues that the superior court erred in construing her action as three separate and independent cases instead of only one. She describes the facts and proceedings below as inexorably intertwined. Temanson and Garrison argue that the superior court was correct to characterize the litigation as three separate proceedings. They argue that Dawson filed a complaint for possession and damages on November 8, 2001; that she commenced an appeal in November from the decision in that matter; that she commenced a third proceeding after serving a second notice of termination of tenancy and a second notice to quit; [8] and that the first appeal and second action were ultimately both in front of the same superior court judge. The tenants and the superior court appear to have counted the proceedings commenced by each complaint and the appeal as separate cases. Whether there were two cases or three would seem to be irrelevant, were it not for some question about how the fees award was calculated, and how it might be calculated on remand. Because the award was meant to exclude services performed before commencement of the new proceeding on January 7, the issue is immaterial if the court on remand adheres to that exclusion. But if the award on remand covers any services performed before January 7, the issue might matter. We therefore briefly address the question. In our view, the first complaint and the November appeal relating to it should be considered one case, and the second complaint, filed January 7, should be considered to have commenced a second case. Dawson's first complaint for possession and damages involved the legal and factual issues relating to her September 27, 2001 notice sent by certified mail and the October 5, 2001 notice. Her November appeal (or petition for review) from the November order also related to those efforts to terminate. Her second complaint for possession and damages, filed January 7, involved legal and factual issues that largely related to her November 19, 2001 notice of termination and notice to quit. Some issues were in common. For example, the tenants argued in both cases that a separate notice to quit was required. Because Dawson prevailed on the possession issue in her second case, the superior court dismissed as moot Dawson's interlocutory appeal of her first case. We therefore consider the litigation below to have constituted two cases  corresponding to the first and second complaints.