Opinion ID: 2997337
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Vena Had Probable Cause to Seize Lawrence

Text: The facts in this case, taken in the light most favorable to Lawrence, do not amount to a constitutional violation. The Fourth Amendment protects people from unreasonable searches and seizures. A formal arrest is not valid unless there is probable cause. Probable cause exists “if the totality of the facts and circumstances known to a reasonable arresting officer would support the belief that the suspect has committed or is committing a crime.” Driebel v. City of Milwaukee, 298 F.3d 622, 643 (7th Cir. 2002). An investigative stop, however, requires only that the officer is able “to produce articulable facts giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that a defendant has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity.” Smith v. Ball State Univ., 295 F.3d 763, 768 (7th Cir. 2002) (internal quotations omitted). An investigative stop becomes a seizure at the point when a reasonable person would feel that he is not free to leave. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). There must also be “an intentional acquisition of physical control.” Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989). Lawrence was seized when Vena grabbed Lawrence’s arm and attempted to physically remove him from his vehicle. A reasonable person, at that point, would have felt that he No. 04-1472 7 was not free to leave.3 This seizure, however, was not unconstitutional because it was based on probable cause. After Lawrence refused to produce his driver’s license, Vena had an objectively reasonable belief that Lawrence had violated a Wisconsin law making it a misdemeanor to knowingly resist or obstruct an officer when he is performing any act in his official capacity and with lawful authority. See Wis. Stat. § 946.41. Police officers are permitted under the Fourth Amendment to make warrantless arrests for minor criminal offenses. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001). Lawrence’s contention that he did not know Vena was a police officer must be taken as true for purposes of this appeal. However, because Vena’s badge and weapon were in plain sight on his belt and he was wearing a Sheriff’s Department hat, it was reasonable for Vena to think that Lawrence knew he was a police officer. Therefore, a reasonable police officer would believe that Lawrence knowingly violated the officer’s lawful order to produce his license. Probable cause existed and, thus, the seizure was not a constitutional violation. C. The Amount of Force Applied by Vena Was Reasonable Under the Circumstances Now we must consider whether Vena applied excessive force in his lawful seizure of Lawrence. The Supreme Court has made it very clear that “all claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force . . . in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its 3 Lawrence argues that he was unaware that Vena was a police officer. Therefore, the seizure did not occur until Deputy W. Peck approached the vehicle and asked Vena if he needed assistance. It was then that Lawrence realized that he was arguing with a police officer and would not have felt that he was free to leave. 8 No. 04-1472 ‘reasonableness’ standard.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (emphasis in original). In determining whether a particular seizure was reasonable, a court should carefully consider the “facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. at 396. The officer’s behavior will be “evaluated for objective reasonableness based upon the information the officers had when the conduct occurred.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 207 (2001). The assessment of reasonableness “must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97. The facts here, according to Lawrence, are that Vena grabbed his left arm and attempted to pull him out of his vehicle. Then after he got out of the vehicle, Vena pulled Lawrence’s wrist behind him and up to his neck. Lawrence contends that this action caused injury to his rotator cuff.4 Accepting Lawrence’s accusations as true, the amount of force used by Vena was not excessive. Lawrence refused to produce his driver’s license when Vena requested it. He was combative and irrationally angry. The fact that his vehicle was in motion as he argued with Vena could lead a reasonable officer to believe that he was attempting to evade arrest. Vena could also have reasonably believed that Lawrence was posing a danger to pedestrians and stopped traffic in the area. “To say that police officers have acted within the bounds that the Constitution sets is not neces- 4 It should be noted that Lawrence’s doctor was unable to confirm that Lawrence’s shoulder pain was caused by anything that might have occurred in the altercation with Vena. No. 04-1472 9 sarily to say that they have acted wisely.” Bell v. Irwin, 321 F.3d 637, 641 (7th Cir. 2003). But a police officer’s ability to make a stop or an arrest “necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. The force used in making the seizure was not excessive. D. Kenosha County Is Not Liable A government entity is responsible under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). A municipality cannot be held liable solely on the grounds of respondeat superior. Id. at 691. This court summarized relevant Supreme Court cases on the issue and found there to be three ways in which a municipality can be held liable under § 1983. There must be: (1) an express policy that would cause a constitutional deprivation if enforced; (2) a common practice that is so widespread and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law even though it is not authorized by written law or express policy; or (3) an allegation that a person with final policy-making authority caused the constitutional injury. See Baxter v. Vigo County Sch. Corp., 26 F.3d 728, 735 (7th Cir. 1994) (superceded by statute on unrelated point) (citations omitted). Lawrence points to a letter that he received from Sheriff Larry Zarletti in response to his citizen’s complaint as proof that the county “ratified and approved” Vena’s actions. The letter states that “[w]e find Captain Vena was identified appropriately with what we [sic] was wearing and acted within proper authority to ask for your identification and to stop your vehicle from moving and pursue the action he did to remove you from the vehicle when you were not willing 10 No. 04-1472 to cooperate.” This letter was simply a response to a citizen’s complaint. It clearly does nothing to prove that the county had an express policy or widespread practice which condones the use of excessive force on people who refuse to present their driver’s licenses. Lawrence has neither alleged, nor presented, any evidence that would provide a basis for holding Kenosha County liable under § 1983. E. Lawrence’s State Law Claim Is Barred Lawrence asserts a state law negligence claim. Kenosha County and Vena correctly argue, however, that his claim is barred by the governmental immunity afforded by Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4). Lawrence does not address this argument in his complaint or his appellate brief. The district court’s decision to retain jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 and to dismiss Lawrence’s state law claims with prejudice was appropriate.