Opinion ID: 2623326
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Multiple use of term circumstances

Text: Defendant contends the various uses of the term circumstances in the standard jury instructions at the penalty phase misled and confused the jury, in violation of the due process clause and other federal constitutional guarantees. He asserts that a jury could confuse the special circumstances found true during the guilt phase with the aggravating circumstances necessary for imposition of the death penalty, particularly in a case such as his, in which the same evidence was used to prove both special circumstances and aggravating circumstances. Defendant's complaint appears to be with CALJIC No. 8.85, which directs the penalty jury to take into consideration [t]he circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding and the existence of any special circumstances found to be true. (See also ง 190.3, factor (a).) If defendant's argument is that the standard instructions at the penalty phase invite the jury to artificially inflate the aggravating weight of the underlying offense by considering the same evidence under more than one statutory factor in aggravation, we have in prior decisions held that the standard instructions do not inherently encourage such double-counting under section 190.3. ( People v. Ayala (2000) 24 Cal.4th 243, 289, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 532, 6 P.3d 193; People v. Barnett, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 1180, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 121, 954 P.2d 384; People v. Sanchez (1995) 12 Cal.4th 1, 78, 47 Cal. Rptr.2d 843, 906 P.2d 1129; People v. Medina, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 779, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 165, 906 P.2d 2.) Nor does defendant point to anything in the record suggesting any possible confusion by the jury in his case. Here, the prosecutor's closing argument suggested how each piece of evidence fit under the specified statutory factors. He also told the jury, in language similar to CALJIC No. 8.88, also given to the jury, that it should not engage in a mere mechanical counting of factors on each side of an imaginary scale and that, in determining which penalty is justified, it should consider the totality of the aggravating circumstances with the totality of the mitigating circumstances. In light of the prosecutor's remarks and the standard instructions about the weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances given in this case, we find no reasonable likelihood the jurors were misled or confused in the manner defendant suggests. ( People v. Ayala, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 289-290, 99 Cal. Rptr.2d 532, 6 P.3d 193.)