Opinion ID: 6215959
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prosecutor Closing Argument Issues

Text: The major focus of the government’s initial closing argument, not surprisingly, was sympathy for the four witnesses who were victims of the shooting -- “[f]our souls that had done nothing wrong that day” who identified Obi as the shooter who endangered their lives. “We are here for truth and we are here for justice for these four witnesses.” The focus of defense counsel’s closing argument, also not surprising because Obi did not testify or present alibi evidence, was (i) to emphasize contradictions in the eyewitness testimony, particularly Bogan’s admission that her pretrial identification of Obi might have been a mistake; (ii) to accuse Little Rock Police Officers of preparing contemporary reports that included mistakes and did not include aspects of their trial testimony, and conducting a faulty investigation that did not seek a warrant to search Obi’s residence or check on the three kids left alone in Bogan’s residence in a high crime area; and (iii) to criticize the government’s attorneys for telling Bogan “if she doesn’t appear in court, she can be arrested” and to “[t]hink about your kids.” The government’s rebuttal responded to these issues. -4- Neither side objected to any of these closing arguments, which take up 38 pages of the 339-page trial transcript. Now, on appeal, new appellate counsel for Obi argues the government in closing argument made no less than six “inflammatory, improper, and prejudicial statements” that deprived Obi of his right to a fair trial. This argument implicitly accuses the district court of repeatedly failing to exercise its broad discretion to control closing argument. See United States v. Levering, 431 F.3d 289, 293 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1185 (2006). Obi did not contemporaneously object, so we review each specific contention for plain error. United States v. Patterson, 684 F.3d 794, 799 (8th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1148 (2013). “[W]e will only reverse under exceptional circumstances.” United States v. Eldridge, 984 F.2d 943, 947 (8th Cir. 1993) (declining to reverse despite closing argument that “push[ed] the case to the very brink of mistrial”). To obtain relief on this ground, Obi must show “(1) the prosecutor’s remarks or conduct were improper, and (2) the remarks or conduct prejudicially affected the defendant’s substantial rights so as to deprive him of a fair trial.” United States v. Mullins, 446 F.3d 750, 757 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 923 (2006). Here, there was no plain error. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993); Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). The statements under attack all came during the government’s rebuttal closing argument. First, Obi challenges statements that allegedly denigrated defense counsel, contrary to our divided panel decision in United States v. Holmes, 413 F.3d 770, 775 (8th Cir. 2005) (“statements are highly improper [if] they improperly encourage the jury to focus on the conduct and role of [defendant’s] attorney rather than on the evidence of [defendant’s] guilt”). Specifically, Obi challenges the prosecutor saying during rebuttal that defense counsel’s closing argument had “done some classic things here . . . like a classic throw everything I can against the wall, hope something sticks . . . [t]hrow some red herrings out there,” saying “[s]o this nonsense about where’s the search warrants and where’s the phone warrant,” and improperly suggesting that Bogan had colluded with the defense by saying, “Now, I find it interesting that she had actually talked to defense more than she talked to us . . . .” -5- The context of these remarks and the rebuttal in Holmes were very different. In Holmes, the defendant had testified, providing an alternative explanation to the police officers’ incriminating testimony, so prejudicial comments about defense counsel raising a “red herring” and needing to “get his stories straight” were likely to improperly strengthen the officer’s incriminating interpretation in a case where “the government’s case was less than overwhelming.” 413 F.3d at 775-76. Here, the prosecutor’s rebuttal was aimed at persuading the jury that defense counsel’s criticism of the police for not getting a warrant, and criticizing the eyewitnesses for traveling too far to get milk for an infant, were irrelevancies -- “red herrings” -- that should not distract the jury from the government’s eyewitness testimony that Obi was the shooter and evidence that the shell casings came from the shooter’s gun. We have previously held that the term “red herring” is not improper if used “to argue that some of the issues raised by the defense were not central to the ultimate finding of guilt.” United States v. Shan Wei Yu, 484 F.3d 979, 986-87 (8th Cir. 2007), citing United States v. Milk, 447 F.3d 593, 604-06 (8th Cir. 2006) (Gruender and Colloton, J.J., concurring). The prosecutor’s rebuttal plainly passes that test. See Patterson, 684 F.3d at 799 (distinguishing Holmes). The comment regarding Bogan talking to defense counsel more than government attorneys was a fair reply to defense counsel’s suggestion that the government had improperly coerced Bogan to testify. These were competing explanations of Bogan’s obvious discomfort and ambiguous statements when testifying. Viewed individually or cumulatively, these comments did not improperly encourage the jury to focus on the conduct of defense counsel rather than on the evidence of Obi’s guilt. The district court did not abuse its discretion, much less commit plain error, when it did not sua sponte strike these comments. “It is not improper for the government to comment on its interpretation of the evidence,” United States v. Jewell, 614 F.3d 911, 928 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1290 (2011), nor “on the strength or credibility of the defense case,” United States v. Hunter, 770 F.3d 740, 745 (8th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 575 U.S. 1020 (2015). -6- Second, Obi argues the prosecutor’s rebuttal improperly appealed to the passion and prejudice of the jury when he argued: This guy [Obi] in this picture smirking this way thought he got away with what he did that night. Shot at four people, shot at a car, he took off with a gun, got rid of the gun. He didn’t think about a federal charge on ammunition that night. . . . That’s why we have this law and that’s why he should be found guilty because he thought he got away with it.” After summarizing the trial evidence, the prosecutor said: That’s the truth of what happened in this case. You know it. You heard it from these witnesses. You’ve seen it in this evidence. Now comes the justice. Justice for Little Rock, justice for the community, justice for these four people sitting here who suffered through this that night. Their justice. This is the only chance to hold him accountable, and that’s what I’m asking you to do. You go back there, you work together, you see the evidence, you see the truth. And you find him guilty. “[U]nless calculated to inflame, an appeal to the jury to act as the conscience of the community is not impermissible.” United States v. Johnson, 968 F.2d 768, 770 (8th Cir. 1992) (quotation omitted). In Johnson, applying this standard, we held that the prosecutor’s appeal to the jury to “stand as a bulwark against the continuation of what Mr. Johnson is doing . . . putting this poison on the streets,” was unduly improper and inflammatory. Id. This is a fact intensive inquiry. If an attorney’s remark, in context, simply “urge[d] a conclusion based on the evidence,” rather than referring to larger societal problems, it “is not improper.” United States v. Felix, 867 F.2d 1068, 1075 (8th Cir. 1989). Here, the prosecutor’s context was to argue that the four eyewitness victims who testified to the trauma Obi inflicted deserved justice. This argument focused on the facts of the case; it was not an exceptional circumstance warranting a new trial on plain error review. Cf. United States v. Alaboudi, 786 F.3d -7- 1136, 1145 (8th Cir. 2015), where we concluded there was no plain error despite the prosecutor urging the jury to “speak for” or “stand up for” victims who did not testify. Third, Obi argues the prosecutor’s rebuttal improperly injected his personal opinion when he said, after again summarizing the eyewitness testimony, “Ladies and gentlemen, I think it’s true, I think the truth is there that he’s the shooter.” Obi cites United States v. Singer, where we noted that “a personal expression of a defendant’s culpability, which inserts an extraneous and irrelevant issue before the jury, is particularly objectionable and highly improper when made by the prosecutor.” 660 F.2d 1295, 1303 (8th Cir. 1981) (quotation omitted) (cleaned up). The remark at issue in Singer was made during the government’s initial closing argument. We upheld the denial of defendant’s motion for a mistrial, concluding that, “[f]airly read, this comment refers to the government’s evidence and introduces the government’s theory of the case.” Id. at 1304. Here, there was no motion for mistrial, and the comment was made in the midst of the prosecutor’s lengthy argument based on the trial evidence. Cf. United States v. Griffin, 437 F.3d 767, 770 (8th Cir. 2006). In United States v. Plumley, defendant argued the prosecutor erred in rebuttal by saying: “Here’s what happened in my view. The defendant lied to his mother. He lied to his girlfriend. He lied to his probation officer.” 207 F.3d 1086, 1094 (8th Cir. 2000). We held there was no improper vouching, first, because the remark “is more plausibly read as the equivalent of [the prosecutor] saying ‘Here is what the evidence established’ than as constituting an unvarnished expression of his personal belief in [the defendant’s] guilt,” and second, because “if in fact [the remark] crossed over into the gray zone . . . [it] was at most harmless error.” Id. (cleaned up). We conclude both reasons apply in this case. In context, reasonable jurors will interpret the statement, “the truth is there,” as meaning, “the truth is in the evidence I just discussed,” which is not improper. -8- For these reasons, the district court did not abuse its broad discretion to control closing arguments when it did not sua sponte question the statements first challenged on appeal. Cf. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 10-13 (1985).