Opinion ID: 1754893
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: extent of vocational disability

Text: The appellant first argues that the preponderance of the evidence established that she is permanently and totally disabled. Any award of permanent total disability must be in compliance with the statutory definition of total disability contained in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(4). See Prost v. City of Clarksville, Police Dept., 688 S.W.2d 425, 427 (Tenn.1985). The statute defines permanent total disability as follows: When an injury not specifically provided for in this chapter as amended, totally incapacitates the employee from working at an occupation which brings him an income, such employee shall be considered totally disabled, and for such disability compensation shall be paid as provided in subdivision (4)(A). . . . Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-207(4)(B) (1999). As the statute and our case law make clear, the legal definition of permanent total disability does not carry the same meaning as permanent and total medical disability. Rather, any inquiry as to whether an employee is permanently and totally disabled from a legal perspective must focus on the employee's ability to return to gainful employment. Davis v. Reagan, 951 S.W.2d 766, 767 (Tenn.1997). Accordingly, [t]he assessment of permanent total disability is based upon numerous factors, including the employee's skills and training, education, age, local job opportunities, and his [or her] capacity to work at the kinds of employment available in his [or her] disabled condition. Roberson v. Loretto Casket Co., 722 S.W.2d 380, 384 (Tenn.1986); see also Perkins v. Enterprise Truck Lines, Inc., 896 S.W.2d 123, 127 (Tenn.1995). Although a rating of anatomical disability by a medical expert is also one of the relevant factors, the vocational disability is not restricted to the precise estimate of anatomical disability made by a medical witness. Henson v. City of Lawrenceburg, 851 S.W.2d 809, 812 (Tenn.1993) (citing Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 458 (Tenn.1988)). In addition, the employee's own assessment of her physical condition and resulting disability is competent testimony that should be considered. . . . McIlvain v. Russell Stover Candies, Inc., 996 S.W.2d 179, 183 (Tenn.1999). In this case, the appellant, who was 72 years old at the time of the injury, had no particular trade skill or training in a given occupation or profession. Her formal education ended after the tenth grade, and she took no vocational or special classes after that time. She did not receive a GED, and she lacked a certification in any area. Because she was a homemaker until her husband retired due to his health in 1980, she had no previous work history or experience prior to her employment with Wal-Mart in 1989. Presumably for these reasons, the chancery court found that the appellant has no future in the job market other than what the defendant is willing to give her. The appellee argues that the appellant cannot be permanently and totally disabled because she demonstrated that she was able to work in some capacity in her former position and earn the same wages as she did before her injury. While it is true that the appellant returned to Wal-Mart in some capacity for a short time after her medical release, the evidence in the record establishes that she was unable to continue in that position because of the pain in her arm and shoulder. Not only did the appellant testify as to this fact herself at trial, but this reason is further supported by the advice of both examining physicians that the appellant should resign due to her injuries and age. In fact, the appellant testified that but for this injury to her shoulder, she would have remained employed with Wal-Mart for as long as she could because the family needed the income. Although we give strong deference to the trial court on issues of witness credibility, we do not find anywhere in the record that the trial court found the appellant's testimony not to be credible. In fact, it appears that she was a credible witness given the fact that her testimony with regard to her injury or pain was not challenged by Wal-Mart, and given the fact that even Wal-Mart's witness at trial believed the appellant to be a real honest lady. Assuming the appellant to be a credible witness with regard to the extent of her pain and the reasons for leaving her employment, we view her testimony particularly helpful in determining the extent of her vocational disability. While we agree that the fact of employment after injury is a factor to be considered in determining whether an employee is permanently and totally disabled, this fact is to be weighed in light of all other considerations. Based upon our own review of the record, it is clear that the appellant was not able to continue in her employment with the appellee because of her injuries, and consequently, she was not employable in the open job market or in any capacity with the appellee. We hold, therefore, that the preponderance of the evidence weighs against the trial court's finding of permanent partial disability and establishes that the appellant is permanently and totally disabled. Although somewhat similar to the facts of this case, we are also of the opinion that this case is not controlled by our recent decision in Nelson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 8 S.W.3d 625 (Tenn.1999). In Nelson , the plaintiff, who was a 67 year-old sales associate for Wal-Mart, fell and broke her hip in the course and scope of her employment. Although the plaintiff claimed that she was permanently and totally disabled due to her age and lack of transferrable job skills, we held that the preponderance of the evidence only established permanent partial disability because she was not totally incapacitated in working at an occupation which brings . . . an income. Id. at 629. The plaintiff's occupational expert testified that the plaintiff could perform part-time, sedentary work, which was consistent with her medical restrictions, and neither doctor testified that the plaintiff was permanently and totally disabled. Moreover, because the plaintiff never attempted to perform the door-greeter position that Wal-Mart offered later her, the evidence did not preponderate against the findings of the trial court. Unlike Nelson , however, the evidence in this case does preponderate in favor of permanent total disability. Although no occupational expert testified in this case that the appellant was permanently and totally disabled, the trial court correctly confirmed this fact by finding that the appellant has no future in the job market. Further in contrast to Nelson , the appellant in this case attempted to return to work at Wal-Mart in her position as a door greeter. Although Wal-Mart, to its credit, was certainly willing to make reasonable accommodations to assist the plaintiff, the appellant discovered upon her brief return to work that she could no longer perform even this job because of the intense pain from her injuries. It was at this point that the appellant's treating physician recommended to her that she resign due to her advanced age and injuries, a recommendation that was agreed to by the appellant's evaluating physician. Accordingly, we hold that the preponderance of the evidence establishes that the appellant is permanently and totally disabled, and that the appellant is entitled to receive 260 weeks of benefits pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(4)(A)(i). Upon remand, the trial court should determine whether, and to what extent, the appellee is entitled to any offset from any Social Security old age insurance benefits received by the appellant. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-207(4)(A)(i); McCoy v. T.T.C. Illinois Inc., 14 S.W.3d 734 (Tenn.2000).