Opinion ID: 185900
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Deference to the ALJ’s credibility findings

Text: Next Biltmore, now joined by Orion, argues that the ALJ’s finding that Klemmer ‘‘strain[ed] credulity’’ and ‘‘blatantly dissembled’’ is a credibility determination to which we must give special deference on review. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 496 (1951) (‘‘The significance of [the ALJ’s] report, of course, depends largely on the importance of credibility in the particular case’’). They maintain that the ALJ must have based his finding upon Klemmer’s demeanor, which of course defies appellate inspection. See United States v. Zeigler, 994 F.2d 845, 849 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The Commission and Liberty, on the other hand, argue the ALJ’s finding reflects not his assessment of Klemmer’s and Warner’s credibility but rather his ultimate judgment on the issue whether Klemmer had misrepresented the availability of a transmitter site. Similarly, they claim it was the proposition that Klemmer had a reasonable assurance the Utter site was available to Liberty, rather than Klemmer’s testimony, that ‘‘strain[ed] credulity.’’ As the Commission emphasizes, the important issue in the misrepresentation inquiry was not whether Klemmer had a reasonable assurance, but whether she was lying when she said she had a reasonable assurance. Indeed, the ALJ’s entire discussion of the misrepresentation issue focuses upon the inadequacy of Klemmer’s efforts to secure a site, as compared to the efforts Utter expected her to make (and the efforts Lee did make). 5 F.C.C. Rcd. at 2866-67 ¶ ¶ 36-51, 2879 ¶ 8. The ALJ seems to have reasoned that any reasonable person would know the effort Klemmer made was inadequate, so Klemmer must have been lying when she said she thought it was adequate. Nowhere does the ALJ directly attack Klemmer’s testimony that she believed at the time that her efforts were adequate, let alone attribute such disbelief to his interpretation of her demeanor. Instead, his appeal is to other evidence in the record, and we owe no special deference to the ALJ’s interpretation of the record. 16 3. Substantial evidence for the Commission’s finding of no misrepresentation Finally, Biltmore and Orion argue that the Commission’s finding Liberty did not misrepresent the facts in its application is not supported by substantial evidence in the record. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E); Contemporary Media, Inc. v. FCC, 214 F.3d 187, 194 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Commission precedent establishes that misrepresentation can be either intentional or grounded in ‘‘an indifference and wanton disregard for the licensee’s obligations to the Commission that is equivalent to an affirmative and deliberate intent.’’ Liberty Cable Co., Inc., 15 F.C.C. Rcd. 25050, ¶ 50 (2000) (quoting RKO General, Inc. v. FCC, 670 F.2d 215, 225 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). Under either approach there is substantial evidence to support the Commission’s finding that Klemmer did not misrepresent Liberty’s situation. Klemmer’s testimony was that Warner, who she had reason to believe was knowledgeable about such things, told her that an oral agreement with Utter would suffice to constitute a reasonable assurance of having a transmitter site. She further testified that she believed she had reached such an oral agreement, and she described a meeting that the Commission could reasonably accept as justification for that belief. Although Utter gave a different account of the meeting, her testimony was internally inconsistent and the Commission need not have credited it. In sharp contrast, Klemmer’s testimony was consistent and corroborated by that of Warner. Although Warner was a friend of Klemmer’s, that is not enough, contrary to Orion’s suggestion, to require that the Commission discount his testimony. The testimony of Klemmer and Warner is surely sufficient to support the Commission’s finding that Klemmer believed she had a reasonable assurance that Utter’s site was available to Liberty.