Opinion ID: 1460162
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Danny St. John

Text: The Michigan Court of Appeals analyzed Ferensic's claim regarding the trial court's failure to grant an adjournment to permit the appearance of St. John under the following standard: In determining whether a trial court abused its discretion in denying a motion for an adjournment, this Court should consider whether defendant (1) asserted a constitutional right, (2) had a legitimate reason for asserting the right, (3) had been negligent, and (4) had requested previous adjournments. Defendant must also show that he was prejudiced by the denial of the adjournment. The witness in question would have testified to some differences in identification of the offenders and the vehicle they were driving. The purported testimony was not especially strong, however, and inconsistency inherent in the victims' identification was otherwise shown. Accordingly, defendant has failed to satisfy the requirement that he show prejudice. 2001 WL 865089, at  (citations omitted) (quoting People v. Lawton, 196 Mich.App. 341, 492 N.W.2d 810, 814 (1992)). The majority primarily criticizes the Michigan Court of Appeals's decision to affirm on the basis that it unreasonably applied clearly established federal law. However, the majority also asserts that the Michigan Court of Appeals applied harmless error analysis in disposing of the argument, and implies that since Scheffer requires inquiry into whether evidentiary rules are arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve, the Michigan Court of Appeals analysis is contrary to clearly established federal law. See Opinion at 481-83. This is not true. As the Supreme Court has explained, avoiding contrariness to federal law does not require citation of our cases  indeed, it does not even require awareness of our cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8, 123 S.Ct. 362, 154 L.Ed.2d 263 (2002). The majority points to no Supreme Court case forbidding the application of harmless error analysis. The majority also concludes that the Michigan Court of Appeals unreasonably applied federal law to Ferensic's claim regarding the exclusion of St. John's testimony. The Court of Appeals relied on defense counsel's proffer of evidence at trial to determine that St. John's testimony was not especially strong, and therefore that defendant has failed to satisfy the requirement that he show prejudice. 2001 WL 865089, at . This evaluation of the proffered evidence is confirmed by St. John's testimony at the evidentiary hearing before the district court below. St. John testified that he was laying carpet in one of the homes on the victims' street, and his attention was drawn to a truck because the truck that was parked in front of the [victims'] house, my neighbor's got one exactly like it. Tr. of June 19, 2006, at 6. He saw two men standing outside the truck; both men were white, and [o]ne looked like he was probably in his early forties. Id. at 7-8, 13. He confirmed that he was not able to provide a full description of either one of these individuals. Id. at 8. On cross-examination by the government, he clarified that he wasn't actually parked in the driveway outside when he saw the men and the truck; he was driving and passed it on the street, and he got [j]ust a glance at the two men. Id. at 12-13. St. John also answered No, sir to the district court's question, Never saw him before? referring to the defendant sitting in court at the evidentiary hearing. Id. at 13. The import of St. John's testimony was thus that he got very little chance to look at either of the two men and could not describe them. In view of this evidence, it is not clear that St. John's testimony at the trial would have had any probative value at all, let alone sufficient probative value to outweigh the considerations of delay attendant upon granting an adjournment. The district court below concluded that Mr. St. John also would have helped the defense, because his description of a suspect with curly black hair matched the description that the Kostoffs gave the police. At trial, the Kostoffs denied telling the police that Petitioner had curly black hair. Ferensic v. Birkett, 451 F.Supp.2d 874, 883 (E.D.Mich.2006). It is true that at trial, the Kostoffs denied describing the robber as having curly black hair. However, St. John's testimony at the evidentiary hearing does not include such a description of either man. Perhaps more tellingly, Ferensic's counsel never even asked whether St. John would describe either man in this way, or what color hair either had. The only suggestion that St. John would have so testified was counsel's proffer at trial. Even supposing that St. John would have testified that one of the men had black curly hair, and that counsel below simply forgot to ask him about this description, that testimony would at most have contradicted Mr. Kostoff's testimony that he never described one of the robbers as having black, curly hair. However, the fact that the Kostoffs initially described one of the robbers as having black, curly hair appears in the police report, which was used for impeachment at trial. This would seem to be a considerably stronger refutation of their testimony that they did not describe the robber that way than would St. John's testimony that one of the robbers had black, curly hair. Moreover, Ferensic does not contend that St. John's testimony would actually have indicated that neither robber resembled him, or otherwise tended to exonerate him. The conclusion of the Michigan Court of Appeals that St. John's testimony was not especially strong is supported by the record. The majority's assertion that, on the other hand, Ferensic was asking for the briefest of delays in order to present St. John's testimony does not tell the whole story. It is true that Ferensic finished his evidence at 10:25AM and trial counsel stated that St. John was due to arrive at the courthouse at 11:00AM. However, the trial court also noted for the record that we were supposed to start at 9:00 this morning. Your witness was not here. I told you to put on your next witness. He's not here. Tr. of June 29, 1999, at 73-74. Two of the scheduled defense witnesses were thus not present when proceedings began for the day, even though defense counsel knew that there was an outstanding question as to permissible impeachment testimony which would determine whether or not Ferensic himself elected to testify. In fairness, Ferensic did have one witness available to testify that morning, but that witness was Ferensic's father, who likely was in attendance throughout the trial. In its full context, the trial court's refusal to grant an adjournment until 11:00 when St. John was expected to arrive does not appear the `myopic insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay' that the majority terms it. On the contrary, in view of the absence of multiple witnesses from the beginning of proceedings that morning and the very limited helpfulness of St. John's testimony, even assuming it would have been consistent with the proffer, the district court's denial of a continuance was not arbitrary or disproportionate to the interest it was designed to serve, and the Michigan Court of Appeals did not unreasonably apply established law in affirming Ferensic's conviction on that basis. Because the Michigan Court of Appeals decision did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law, I believe that the district court was not authorized to grant a writ of habeas corpus. See Taylor, 288 F.3d at 850. A harmless error review, including the cumulative prejudice analysis of the majority, is therefore unnecessary. See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 795, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) ( Even if our precedent were to establish squarely that the prosecution's use of the Peebles report violated Penry's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, that error would justify overturning Penry's sentence only if Penry could establish that the error `had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.') (emphasis added) (quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637, 113 S.Ct. 1710); see also Fulcher v. Motley, 444 F.3d 791, 808-09 (6th Cir.2006) (performing harmless error review only after finding that habeas relief was otherwise warranted); Biros v. Bagley, 422 F.3d 379, 388 (6th Cir.2005) (same); Stapleton v. Wolfe, 288 F.3d 863, 867 (6th Cir.2002) (same). [2]