Opinion ID: 2381704
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Suit Is One For Damage To Property Rather Than For A Taking Thereof.

Text: I disagree with this Court's holding that this is a suit for a taking. Even the Court of Civil Appeals in affirming the trial court's judgment declined to hold that the instant suit was one for a taking of the plaintiff's property. It did not decide but brushed off the defense of limitation by saying that the two-year Statute probably did not apply to incorporated cities and that even if it did, the cause of action pleaded by the city was not shown to have accrued more than two years before the suit was filed on September 19, 1957. The Court of Civil Appeals comments additionally that no issue was submitted or requested touching the defense of limitation thereby inferring some sort of waiver of the defense. The court cited as authority for its holding Baker v. City of Fort Worth, 146 Tex. 600, 210 S.W.2d 564, 5 A.L.R.2d 297. The constitutional provision involved, Article I, Section 17, reads in part as follows: No person's property shall be taken, damaged or destroyed for or applied to public use without adequate compensation being made, unless by the consent of such person; and, when taken, except for the use of the State, such compensation shall be first made, or secured by a deposit of money;   . [Emphasis added.] Because of the fact that the Constitution itself distinguishes between a damaging of land, and a taking thereof and requires precompensation in case of the latter, the courts have had frequent occasion to construe Article I, Section 17 and to give effect to the distinction therein made. The early case of McCammon & Lang Lumber Co. v. Trinity & Brazos V. Ry. Co., 104 Tex. 8, 133 S.W. 247, 36 L.R.A.,N.S., 662, decided by the Supreme Court in 1911, and the others which have followed it, establish the proposition that a taking must result from an actual physical invasion of property and that damage to land not actually and physically taken or used affords a cause of action for damage to land only. This distinction between a taking of land and a damaging thereof has been followed without departure for so many years that the law involved has become elementary. Stevens v. City of Dublin, Tex. Civ.App., 169 S.W. 188, no wr. hist.; City Com'rs of Port Arthur v. Fant, 193 S.W. 334, no wr. hist.; City of Orange v. Rector, Tex.Civ.App., 205 S.W. 503, no wr. hist.; Dallas County v. Barr, Tex.Civ.App., 231 S. W. 453, no wr. hist.; Dallas Hunting & Fishing Club v. Dallas County Bois D'Arc Island Levee District, Tex.Civ.App., 235 S.W. 607; Fry v. Jackson, Tex.Civ.App., 264 S.W. 612; Johnson v. Lancaster, Tex.Civ.App., 266 S.W. 565; Donna Irrigation District No. 1 v. Piper, Tex. Civ.App., 269 S.W. 157; City of Houston v. Wynne, Tex.Civ.App., 279 S.W. 916; Holderbaum v. Hidalgo County Water Improvement District, No. 2, Tex.Civ.App., 297 S.W. 865, affirmed Hidalgo County Water Improvement District No. 2 v. Holderbaum, Tex.Com.App., 11 S.W. 506; Duvall v. City of Dallas, Tex.Civ.App., 27 S.W.2d 1105, wr. ref.; Kahn v. City of Houston, 121 Tex. 293, 48 S.W.2d 595; Shelton v. City of Abilene, Tex.Civ.App., 80 S.W.2d 351, no wr. hist.; Brazos River Conservation and Reclamation Dist. v. Costello, Tex.Civ.App., 142 S.W.2d 414, 135 Tex. 307, 143 S.W.2d 577, 130 A.L.R. 1220; Boyd v. Dillard, Tex.Civ.App., 151 S.W.2d 847, dism. cor. judgment; Tarrant County Water Control & Improvement District Number One v. Reid, Tex.Civ.App., 203 S. W.2d 290, wr. ref. n. r. e.; Webb v. Dameron, Tex.Civ.App., 219 S.W.2d 581, wr. ref. n. r. e.; City of Dallas v. Winans, Tex.Civ.App., 262 S.W.2d 256, no wr. hist. Writing on this precise question, the Dallas Court of Civil Appeals in Duvall v. City of Dallas, supra [27 S.W.2d 1107], stated as follows: Construing this provision of the Constitution, our courts have consistently held that a taking of property, within its meaning, is    an appropriation, and not simply the infliction of an incidental injury   . It is appropriate to observe at this point that the lands and facilities belonging to the City of Graham have not been physically appropriated. The plaintiff's property is not located within the basin of Possum Kingdom Lake nor has the property of the city been destroyed in the physical sense by inundation. The city, in answer to questions from the bench, admitted that all three of the city's facilities, its Sewage Disposal Plant, Channel Reservoir, and its Water Treatment Plant were still being used daily by the City of Graham. The gravamen of the plaintiff's complaint is therefore seen to be, not that its facilities have been physically taken and appropriated, but only that the recurrent flooding of which the city complains has interfered with the use of these facilities to such extent as to destroy completely their value to the city. The case of Tarrant County Water Control & Improvement District Number One v. Reid, Tex.Civ.App., 203 S.W.2d 290, wr. ref. n. r. e., is the only prior case in Texas involving a claim of damage because of the siltation of the State's river beds brought about by the construction of the great flood control and conservation storage projects which are essential to the economy of this semi-arid region. The Reid case, although it involved a claim of damage to a pecan grove rather than to a municipal facility, is on all fours with the case at bar. Reid contended, as does the City of Graham in this case, that the overflow damage to his land amounted to a taking thereof because such over-flow had been caused by the deposit of silt in the river channel brought about by the slowing of the velocity of the flow in the West Fork of the Trinity which had been caused by the construction of Eagle Mountain Dam and Lake in 1934. Reid alleged that the damage to his land began in the year 1941. The Fort Worth Court of Civil Appeals, declining to decide whether Reid had a valid cause of action or not, held that in any event Reid's claim was based upon a damaging of his property rather than a taking thereof, and that a suit to recover such damage brought in 1945 was barred by the two-year Statute of Limitation. The Court distinguished the case before it from the holding in Tarrant County Water Control & Improvement District Number One v. Fowler, Tex.Civ. App., 175 S.W.2d 694, wr. ref. w. o. m. by the Supreme Court, 142 Tex. 375, 179 S.W. 2d 250, saying: An analysis of the holding in the Fowler case, supra, reveals that the dam under discussion in that case was constructed so as to `take' Fowler's land by submersion. It was to be a part of the lake basin   . [Emphasis added.] [203 S.W.2d 292.] This same distinction exists with reference to the present case. The Reid case therefore is direct authority for the proposition that siltation cases, such as the one here, involve a claim for damage to land and not a taking thereof. It was probably for this reason that the present Fort Worth court, recognizing the possibility of conflict, refused in the instant case to hold contrary to its earlier decision. (b) The Instant Cause Of Action To Recover For Permanent Damage To The Plaintiff's Facilities Accrued More Than Two Years Prior To The Time Suit Was Filed. Before the Court of Civil Appeals wrote its opinion, all of the parties, including respondent and its attorneys, assumed that the City's cause of action arose in July, 1953. There was no argument on this point. Respondent had affirmatively asserted in its brief in the Court of Civil Appeals that the cause of action has arisen in July, 1953, making this assertion as a part of its argument that the cause of action had not arisen at a date earlier in point of time so as to put in motion the Ten-year Statute of Limitation. This ground of the Court of Civil Appeals opinion, that it was not shown that the cause of action arose more than two years before the suit was brought, was therefore a ground which had never been urged by the city. As a matter of fact, the holding is not only directly at variance with the city's theory of the case but it is based upon Baker v. City of Fort Worth, a case not in point and not even referred to in respondent's brief in the Court of Civil Appeals. The Court of Civil Appeals misapplied to the case at bar, the rule laid down in the Baker case. The same error was made by the Austin Court of Civil Appeals in Fromme v. Tennessee Gas Transmission Company, 263 S.W.2d 574, and the error was corrected by this Court in Tennessee Gas Transmission Company v. Fromme, 153 Tex. 352, 269 S.W.2d 336. We reversed the judgment and specifically held that the Baker doctrine was not applicable and that the cause of action asserted by Fromme was barred by the two-year Statute of Limitation. As is made plain in the Fromme opinion, the difference between the Baker case and the Fromme case is the fundamental difference between an action to recover for temporary or transient damage and one to recover for permanent damage, to land. The same difference exists between the Baker case and the present case. Having reviewed the city's pleadings, the testimony of its witnesses and the written arguments filed by it both in the Court of Civil Appeals and in this Court, I am convinced that the cause of action sought to be alleged by the city is one for the recovery of permanent damage to its lands and facilities brought about by the siltation occurring in the Brazos River bed and Possum Kingdom Reservoir following the construction in 1941 of the Possum Kingdom Dam. I am equally convinced that the city took the position in its pleadings and supported it by the testimony of its witnesses that although the dam was completed in 1941, the onset of the injury to its lands and facilities began in July, 1953. As pointed out in the Fromme opinion, the rule laid down by Judge Stayton in Houston Water-Works v. Kennedy, 70 Tex. 233, 8 S.W. 36, 37 (a case basic to the decision in the Baker and Fromme cases, as well as the case at bar) gives rise to two distinct classes of action. One class of action, that involving a claim for permanent damage to land arises from the time of the first injury to the plaintiff be the damage however slight. This was the rule applied in the Fromme case. The second class of action involves a claim for intermittent or recurrent injury to land resulting in temporary damage. In such cases, separate causes of action arise from the date of each injury and plaintiff may recover such damage as has been suffered within the two-year period next preceding the filing of the suit. This was the rule applied in the Baker case. To what classification of cases does the cause of action here asserted by the City of Graham belong? Even in the brief filed by respondent in this Court it is frankly admitted that the instant cause of action is one to recover for permanent injury to the plaintiff's facilities. At page 48 of its brief in the Supreme Court, the city says: Both the Brazos River Authority and the City's witnesses have predicted that the flood hazard from Possum Kingdom Lake will continue to increase. Nevertheless, this being a suit for permanent injury to the City's facilities, the City has but one cause of action and may have but one recovery. City of Waco v. Rook, Tex.Civ.App. 1932, 55 S.W.2d 649,   . [Emphasis ours.] Under the pleading, the testimony, the judicial admissions of the city and the applicable law, the instant cause is one to recover for permanent damage to land. The plaintiff itself alleged that the injury complained of began in July, 1953. The testimony of its own witnesses substantiated this date. There had never been, between Brazos and the city, any dispute or difference on this point. Under these circumstances, the statement in the Court of Civil Appeals [335 S.W.2d 252] opinion that no issue was submitted or requested touching the defense of limitations is erroneous if it means to imply some sort of waiver of this defense. A fact established by the testimony or admitted by the pleadings is no longer a fact in issue and requires no further proof. Ogden & Johnson v. Bosse, 86 Tex. 336, 344, 24 S.W. 798; Houston E. & W. T. R. Co. v. Dewalt, 96 Tex. 121, 70 S.W. 531; 17 Tex.Jur. 576. (c) The 1953 Amendment To Article 5517 Does Not Exempt The City Of Graham From The Two-Year Statute Of Limitation. In 1953, the Legislature amended Article 5517, Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes, to read as follows: The right of the state, all counties, incorporated cities and all school districts shall not be barred by any of the provisions of this Title, nor shall any person    acquire, by occupancy or adverse possession, any right or title to any part or portion of any road, street, alley, sidewalk, or grounds which belong to any town, city, or county, or which have been donated or dedicated for public use to any such town, city, or county by the owner thereof, or which have been laid out or dedicated in any manner to public use in any town, city, or county in this State. This 1953 amendment which added the italicized words, retained the word Title which had been substituted in Article 5517 by the Codification of 1925, in lieu of the word Chapter which had been used in all of the codifications of the statutes prior to 1925. The question is whether, by the insertion of the words all counties, incorporated cities and all school districts, preceding the words shall not be barred by any of the provisions of this Title, the Legislature intended to extend to these particular governmental subdivisions a complete immunity from all the laws of limitations embraced in Title 91, or whether the Legislature merely intended by the 1953 amendment to exempt such subdivisions from the provisions of the first part of Title 91, which bears the title Limitations Of Actions For Land. The cardinal rule in statutory construction is the determination of the legislative intent. As stated in Mills County v. Lampasas County, 90 Tex. 603, 40 S.W. 403, 404: Strictly speaking, there is but one rule of construction, that is that the legislative intent must govern. All canons of interpretation, so called, are but grounds of argument resorted to for the purpose of ascertaining the true meaning of the law. Our task therefore is simply to find out what the Legislature intended and to give effect to that intention. The rules of statutory construction do not compel the court to come blindly to an unintended result. In a situation somewhat similar to the one presented here, the Supreme Court of Alabama in Touart v. American Cyanamid Company, 250 Ala. 551, 35 So.2d 484, 488, held that the word Chapter as used in Section 6 of an Act in a proviso exempting certain plants from ad valorem tax, would be constructed as referring to Section and as not applying to Section 10, exempting plants manufacturing calcium cyanamide, aluminum or aluminum products from state, county, and municipal taxation for ten years, notwithstanding that both sections were located in the same chapter. In Southwestern Gas & Electric Company v. State, Tex.Civ.App., 190 S.W.2d 132, affirmed by the Supreme Court, 145 Tex. 24, 193 S.W.2d 675, the court said that the terms Section and Article are interchangeable if that is discerned to be the legislative intent. Other courts have held that Section sometimes means Subdivision, State ex rel. Burnham v. Babcock, 23 Neb. 128, 36 N.W. 348; that Paragraph can be synonymous with Section. Lehmann v. Revell, 354 Ill. 262, 188 N.E. 531; that Section may sometimes mean Sections, Ellis v. Whitlock, 10 Mo. 781, and at other times a subdivision of a section, Spring v. Collector of City of Olney, 78 Ill. 101; State ex rel. Ekern v. Zimmerman, 187 Wis. 180, 204 N.W. 803; that Section may mean Provision and hence not relate to all of the provisions of an entire section, United States v. Healey, 160 U.S. 136, 16 S.Ct. 247, 40 L.Ed. 369. Reference to the House and Senate Journals for the Regular Session of the 53rd Legislature indicate quite clearly that the Legislature did not intend to provide blanket exemption from the Statute of Limitations to counties, cities and school districts by the 1953 amendment to Article 5517, Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes. In Volume II of the House Journal for the 53rd Legislature, Regular Session, at page 3151 under the title History of House Bills, the following description of the bill appears. House Bill 398. By Mr. Garrett of Nueces: To amend Art. 5517 of RCS of Texas, 1925, as amended, so as to provide that the right of the state, all counties, incorporated cities and all school districts shall not be barred by any of the provisions of this title, etc.: Concerns right or title to roads or streets, etc., by adverse possession. [Emphasis added.] At page 2272 of the House Journal is recorded the action of the House in placing House Bill 398 on the Local and Uncontested Bill calendar. On the same day, May 14, 1953, the bill was finally passed in the House with only two dissenting votes (House Journal p. 2281). The Senate Journal at page 1393 under the caption History of House Bills likewise identified House Bill No. 398 as one which concerned only the matter of limitation of actions for lands. This is made plain by the following description of the subject matter of the bill: 398. Amending Statute of Limitations as to rights of state, county, incorporated cities and school districts to lands. [Emphasis added.] The House Bill was received by the Senate on May 18 (Senate Journal p. 933); immediately referred to committee (Senate Journal p. 951); reported favorably by the committee the following day (Senate Journal p. 954); and on this same day, May 19, 1953, laid out before the Senate and passed unanimously on second and third readings. (Senate Journal p. 1017). The foregoing journal references make it certain that the Legislature conceived the amendment to Article 5517 as applying only to Limitation with reference to actions for lands. The ease with which the bill passed the Legislature is evidence of the fact that it was so understood by the members of both the House and Senate. The bill was considered noncontroversial in character and was placed on the Local and Uncontested Bill calendar of the House on May 14. In the next five days of the waning session the measure passed both Houses of the Legislature with only two dissenting votes and was placed on the governor's desk for signature. The bill was signed by him on May 25, 1953. The Legislature adjourned on May 27th. Had House Bill 398 been intended to extend to all incorporated cities, counties, and school districts complete immunity from all Statutes of Limitation, as the City of Graham contends, a more controversial bill could hardly have been presented. A measure introduced for the express purpose of repealing the law of Limitations with respect to counties, incorporated cities, and school districts would undoubtedly have encountered some opposition, at least enough to keep the bill off of the Local and Uncontested Bill calendar. A bill of this scope and magnitude surely would have encountered enough difficulty in the Legislature to have prevented it from being steam-rollered through both Houses of the Legislature within the space of five days as an Uncontested Bill. If the amendment of 1953 was not intended to exempt the named governmental subdivisions from the bar of limitations in personal actions as well as in actions for the recovery of land, then what was the intent of the Legislature? A review of the background and history of Article 5517, Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes, together with the history of the 1953 amendment taken from the Legislative Journals, makes it quite certain that the Legislature intended, and only intended, to extend the exemption contained in Article 5517 to cover all lands owned by counties and incorporated cities rather than just such lands as had been dedicated or donated to public use as roads, streets, sidewalks, or grounds, and intended further to extend the exemption, in actions for lands, to school districts. Under this construction the amendment would take care of such cases as Brown v. Fisher, 1917, Tex.Civ.App., 193 S.W. 357, wr. ref., holding that limitation title could ripen against the city as to outlying wild and unimproved land; and Texas Company v. Davis, 1936, Tex.Civ.App., 93 S.W.2d 180, wr. ref., holding that school districts were not exempt from the operation of the Statute in actions to recover realty. In summary, the suit brought by the City of Graham, if it states a cause of action, states one for the recovery of damage to its property and facilities rather than for a taking thereof. Being a suit for the recovery of permanent damages to land, the case is governed by the rule laid down by the Supreme Court in Tennessee Gas Transmission Company v. Fromme, supra, and the cause of action to recover such damage accrued in July 1953. The instant suit brought in September 1957, is therefore barred by the Two-year Statute of Limitation. This Court should specifically hold that the amendment to Article 5517, supra, did not exempt the city from the Two-year Statute of Limitations. The remaining point is the contention of Brazos that the trial court erred in excluding from evidence a deed from the City to the Authority. Clearly this was error. On January 24, 1939, the Mayor of the City of Graham executed a deed to the Brazos River Authority conveying a tract of 3.94 acres of land which deed contained a covenant releasing the Authority for damages resulting from the overflowing or flooding any other lands owned by the city occasioned by the construction, maintenance, or operation of Possum Kingdom Dam. The deed containing the release was filed of record in 1940 and had never been repudiated or questioned by the city until the filing of the instant suit almost eighteen years later. The trial court refused to sustain the plaintiff's exceptions to the pleading of this release but on the trial of the case excluded the deed from evidence. The deed involved represented a conveyance of property in lieu of condemnation and the City of Graham had the authority to execute this deed and the release embodied within it. Kingsville Independent School District v. Crenshaw, 1942, Tex. Civ.App., 164 S.W.2d 49, wr. ref. w. o. m. The voluntary conveyance by the City of Graham including the release of damage to its remaining land was neither invalid nor void. There is a presumption that the Mayor acted with authority, City of San Antonio v. Newnam, 1919, Tex.Civ.App., 218 S.W. 128, wr. den.; State ex rel. Osborne v. City of McAllen, 1933, Tex.Civ. App., 56 S.W.2d 297, Tex.Com.App., 91 S.W.2d 688; 1 McCormick and Ray, Texas Law of Evidence 117. And if that authority had not been formally conferred on the Mayor, as plaintiff has contended, the circumstances do not foreclose the possibility that the instrument including the release had been ratified and confirmed by the city's acquiescence over a period of almost eighteen years. Interstate Materials Corp. v. City of Houston, 1951, Tex.Civ.App., 236 S.W.2d 653, wr. ref. n. r. e. The conveyance having been of record more than ten years was, of course, admissible without proof of its execution. Article 3726, Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes. Whether the release was included in the deed by reason of mutual mistake or whether the consideration paid by the Authority therefor was inadequate, present issues which the trial court had no right unilaterally to determine as a question of law. Olvey v. Jones, 137 Tex. 639, 156 S.W.2d 977. The deed was admissible. The release as to damage to other lands owned by the city is recited in the deed. It was no doubt a part of the consideration. At least, it was a question of fact. The city has never repudiated the deed. How can it be said that a separate resolution was necessary? Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 24 shows the general location of the tract conveyed relative to the location of plaintiff's facilities which are the subject matter of this suit. The 3.94 acres was acquired for the purpose of constructing, operating, and maintaining Possum Kingdom Dam on the Brazosand the city's contract of sale so recites. The resolution of the city dated August 11, 1938, the contract of sale executed by the Mayor, dated October 4, 1938, and the deed dated January 24, 1939, were tendered as Exhibits 40, 41, and 42. The trial court overruled all objections to the introduction of these instruments. But, in spite of such action, the court excluded the instruments. The court justified his action on the theory that one administration could not bind another, etc. This theory was the product of the court's vivid imagination. It was not advanced by either party. The theory was without regard to the record. The resolution dated August 11, 1938, states the purpose of Brazos River Authority in acquiring the 3.94 acres, a part of the M. Dunn and the M. McGary surveys. It authorized the contract of sale and the deed. The contract of sale dated October 4, 1938 and the deed were ratified and confirmed. The resolution and deed were filed for record in Young County as one instrument on February 9, 1940. The record shows that prior to the execution of the resolution, contract of sale and the deed, the city officials and representatives of Brazos River Authority discussed the question of flooding the sewage plant, etc. They discussed the elevation at spillway level, etc. The contract of sale and the deed contains the following: The grantee contemplates constructing, maintaining and operating Possum Kingdom Dam across the Brazos River in Palo Pinto County, Texas, situated downstream from the property herein conveyed, at an elevation at spillway level 1000 feet above mean sea level. The Grantor, for himself and his successors in title hereby releases the Grantee from liability for damages resulting from overflowing or flooding any other lands owned by him occasioned by the construction, operation or maintenance of said Possum Kingdom Dam, including, but not limited to, the following lands:  . The deed and contract then specifically mention the same two surveys as the ones of which the 3.94 acres is a part. The sewage plant is situated on another survey, the N. White Survey. The Water Treatment Plant and Pump Station (not inundated) are situated on the George Cox Survey. The Channel Reservoir is located on Salt Creek at a point which bears South 168 feet; Thence North 252 feet from the Northeast corner of the M. McGary Survey, (this is the same survey as the 3.94 acres) which point on Salt Creek is approximately 1200 feet downstream from the Water Treatment Plant. I briefly refer to some of the United States Supreme Court cases cited by the Court of Civil Appeals: Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 43 S.Ct. 158, 67 L.Ed. 322; Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. 166, 80 U.S. 166, 20 L.Ed. 557, and Mugler v. State of Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 8 S.Ct. 273, 31 L.Ed. 205. The Pumpelly case and the Holderbaum case (Texas case) are cited for the proposition that It is settled that one who obstructs the flow of the stream so as to make the waters flow onto and injure the lands of another is liable. [335 S.W.2d 250.] I have no quarrel with such proposition. These cases and the others cited simply have no application here. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 43 S.Ct. 158. This case cited by the Court of Civil Appeals is another U. S. Supreme Court case which has no bearing upon the question here. That case involved rights under the Kohler Act. Briefly, the Act provided that it shall be unlawful so to conduct the operation of mining anthracite coal as to cause the caving-in, collapse or subsidence of(a) Any public building or any structure customarily used by the public   . (b) Any street, road, bridge, etc. (c) Any track, roadbed, right of way, pipe etc. (d) Any dwelling, etc. (e) Any cemetery or other public burial ground. Act Pa. May 27, 1921, P.L. 1198. This case speaks about regulation under police power, and that if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking. Mugler v. State of Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 8 S.Ct. 273. This is another U.S. Supreme Court case cited by the Court of Civil Appeals. That case held that state legislation which prohibits the manufacture of spirituous, malt, vinous, etc. intoxicating liquors, does not necessarily infringe any right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by the Amendments thereto. This case should be reversed and judgment here rendered for Brazos. In any event, the action of the trial court in excluding the deed from evidence deprived the Authority of one of its meritorious defenses. This error alone requires that the entire cause be remanded to the trial court for a new trial. GRIFFIN and HAMILTON, JJ., join in this dissent.