Opinion ID: 2582271
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sexual Harassment Claim

Text: Alaska law prohibits an employer from discriminating against a person because of the person's sex. [6] We have held that this law prohibits sexual harassment against employees. [7] Alaska Statute 09.10.070 requires that claims for sexual harassment be brought within two years of the wrongful conduct's occurrence. [8] The two-year limit starts when a party knows or should have known of a claimusually the date that the alleged incident occurs. [9] Mahan filed her claim on March 14, 2002. Barring some basis for extending the statutory period, then, her sexual harassment claim would be limited to acts occurring within the two years preceding this filing date. Mahan testified in her deposition that almost all the incidents of sexual harassment occurred at Arctic's Badami camp during her first period of employmentbetween January 25 and March 11, 1999. She stated that Richard Gobaleza first made sexual comments to her soon after he began working as her supervisor at Badami in February 1999. Mahan claimed that she eventually told Todd Harris, Arctic's operations manager, about Gobaleza's comments, but [he] seemed like he didn't care. According to Mahan, Harris began making sexual comments to her as well, and the harassment by both men continued until Mahan left Badami on March 11. Because this alleged harassment all occurred more than two years before Mahan filed her complaint, her sexual harassment claim was time-barred to the extent that it was based on the Badami camp incidents. Mahan did describe one incident of possible sexual harassment by Gobaleza that occurred at Alpine camp during her second period of employment. She testified at her deposition that when Gobaleza first saw her at Arctic, he hugged her and asked how she was doing. When asked at the deposition if she thought this conduct was inappropriate, Mahan initially insisted that she was unable to respond, saying, I don't know how to answer that question, I don't know, and I can't answer. She then added, I guess, when he rubbed his hand down by my bra strap, when he went to give a hug, that's inappropriate; if he was just giving me a hug, that's not. In a supplemental affidavit filed two months after her deposition, Mahan specified that this incident occurred at least seven days prior to March 16, 2000that is, sometime before March 9, 2000. In responding to a written interrogatory before testifying at her deposition, Mahan also had claimed to remember a sexually harassing remark that Harris made to her one morning at Alpine camp; but she could not pin this incident to any specific date. Later, at her deposition, Mahan did not mention this incident and recalled only one episode of possible sexual harassment at Alpine: Gobaleza's hug. Although Mahan testified that she remembered seeing Harris at Alpine camp the day she was fired and that she thought he had been there earlier as well, she acknowledged: But I can't remember how many days or anything. When asked if Harris said or did anything at Arctic that she considered harassment, Mahan replied, I can't remember right now. Whatever I had put on the paperwork, that's what it was. In testifying about the difficulties at Alpine that led up to her termination, Mahan did not claim that any new acts of harassment at Alpine contributed to her firing; to the contrary, she specifically attributed her firing to the harassment she had experienced the year before at Badami: I was terminated because of what happened in the past, at Badami.... Because I was sexually harassed by Todd Harris and by Ricardo. And I guess theyit reminded them of it every time they'd see me anyplace else. Although Mahan's post-deposition affidavit specified that Gobaleza's hug occurred before March 9, 2000, the affidavit omitted any mention of her pre-deposition claim that Harris had made a sexually harassing comment to her at Alpine. Even construing the totality of this evidence in Mahan's favor for summary judgment purposes, we find no substantial evidence of any incident of sexual harassment occurring within the two-year period before March 14, 2002, the date Mahan filed her complaint. By Mahan's own account, the Gobaleza hug occurred sometime before March 9, 2000several days outside the two-year statutory limit. Mahan's initial interrogatory responses included an additional claim that Harris made a sexually harassing remark to her at Alpine. But Mahan acknowledged that this remark occurred on some date unknown. At her subsequent deposition, Mahan could not recall this allegation and she provided no further information about it in her supplemental affidavit. Given these circumstances, we think that it would be sheer speculation to assume that Harris's alleged comment at Alpine occurred sometime within the three-day span between March 14, 2000 (the outside limit of the statutory filing period), and Mahan's termination on March 16, 2000. In fact, Mahan does not seriously contest this point. She insists instead that because her case involves a continuous course of severe and pervasive sexual harassment, the continuing violations doctrine resurrects her claim. Under this doctrine, certain patterns of ongoing discriminatory conduct can preserve a sexual harassment claim that might otherwise be time-barred. [10] To benefit from this theory, though, a plaintiff must first demonstrate that some discriminatory act occurred within the limitations period. The plaintiff must then show that the timely filed claimbased upon this act within the limitation periodis closely related to the otherwise time-barred claims. [11] Upon making this showing, the plaintiff can use evidence of earlier events to prove the defendant's liability for the acts within the statutory period. [12] But here, as we have already mentioned above, Mahan has failed to show any acts of sexual harassment occurring within two years of her complaint. And the only evidence of other discriminatory acts she offers is the evidence she relies on to support her wrongful termination claim. Because Mahan's sexual harassment claim ultimately depends on the same evidence as her claim for retaliatory discharge, we turn to the discharge claim. [13]