Opinion ID: 3010856
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Proximate Cause in Failure to Warn Cases

Text: Our precedents in this area of the law teach that, in a failure to warn case, we focus our causation analysis on the additional precautions that might have been taken by the end user had the allegedly defective warning been different. See Powell, 766 F.2d at 135. This analysis requires the fact finder at trial or a court on summary judgment toconsider not only what did occur, but also what might have occurred . . . . Such a determination as to what might have happened necessarily requires a weighing of probabilities. Remy v. Michael D's Carpet Outlets, 571 A.2d 446, 449-50 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (citing Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280, 1286-87 (Pa. 1978)) (emphasis in original), aff'd sub nom. Kimco Dev. Corp. v. Michael D's Carpet Outlets, 637 A.2d 603 (Pa. 1993). 10 Comment j to S 402A is directed in part to this weighing process, providing that [w]here a warning is given, the seller may reasonably assume that it will be read and heeded. Generally speaking, comment j sets forth a presumption that works in favor of the manufacturer or seller of a product where an adequate warning has been provided.3 See Coffman v. Keene Corp., 608 A.2d 416, 421 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (Coffman I), aff'd, 628 A.2d 710 (N.J. 1993) (Coffman II); Technical Chemical Co. v. Jacobs, 480 S.W.2d 602, 606 (Tex. 1972). From this, it follows logically that the law should also presume that, when no warning or an inadequate warning is provided, the end-user would have read and heeded an adequate warning had one been given by the manufacturer. See Coffman I, 608 A.2d at 421 (collecting cases following this logic); Wolfe v. Ford Motor Co., 376 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978) (holding that the failure to give an adequate warning permits the inference that it would have alerted the user to the danger and forestalled the accident.); but cf. Coffman II, 628 A.2d at 717-18 (extension of comment j based more on public policy than logic). Indeed, many jurisdictions have construed comment j to provide just such a presumption, referred to generally as the heeding presumption. See Coffman II, 628 A.2d at 720 (collecting cases); Allan E. Korpela, Annotation, Failure to Warn as Basis of Liability Under Doctrine of Strict Liability in Tort, 53 A.L.R.3d 239 (1974). This presumption assists the failure to warn plaintiff in satisfying his burden of showing proximate cause. See Coffman II, 628 A.2d at 719. While comment j has been adopted in Pennsylvania, see Incollingo v. Ewing, 282 A.2d 206 (Pa. 1971), to date the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not expressly decided whether the heeding presumption would apply under Pennsylvania's interpretation of S 402A. On two prior occasions we have discussed this question without _________________________________________________________________ 3. It should be noted, however, that the comment j presumption will not apply in those cases in which it is alleged that the warning provided, while substantively adequate, suffers from communicative deficiencies (e.g. small or otherwise illegible type) and is thus unlikely to convey its danger message to the user. We discuss this aspect of comment j infra at pages 18-19. 11 predicting how the Court would rule, see Petree, 831 F.2d at 1196 n.2, Overpeck, 823 F.2d at 756 & n.4; in those cases, we found that even if the heeding presumption existed, the defendants would have successfully rebutted it. We now predict that Pennsylvania would adopt a rebuttable heeding presumption as a logical corollary to comment j. Since the very idea of imposing strict liability for the failure to warn is premised on the belief that the presence or absence of an adequate warning label will affect the conduct of a product user, it would be illogical, and contrary to the basic policy of S 402A, to accept that a product sold without an adequate warning is in a defective condition, see Incollingo, while simultaneously rejecting the presumption that the user would have heeded the warning had it been given. Indeed, in its most recent (albeit limited) discussion of comment j, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated plainly that the law presumes that warnings will be obeyed. Davis, 690 A.2d at 190. We predict, therefore, that Pennsylvania would agree that [c]omment j provides ample support for application of the rebuttable `heeding' presumption . . . to assist a plaintiff in proving the absence of a warning proximately caused harm. Coffman, 608 A.2d at 422. While the heeding presumption benefits a failure to warn plaintiff, it does not change the fact that he still bears the burden of persuasion on the causation prong of his S 402A claim. Accordingly, as we recognized in Petree and Overpeck, the heeding presumption must be rebuttable, and thus [w]hen the opponent of the presumption has met the burden of production thus imposed . . . the office of the presumption has been performed; the presumption is of no further effect and drops from the case. Overpeck, 823 F.2d at 756 (citing Commonwealth v. Vogel, 268 A.2d 89 (Pa. 1970)). To get past the presumption and to a jury, the opponent of the presumption need only introduce evidence sufficient to support a finding contrary to the presumed fact. See McCormick on Evidence S 344 (3d ed. 1984). Applied to the present case, this means that if Lane and Keen can introduce evidence sufficient to support a finding that Stephen Pavlik was fully aware of the risk of bodily injury, or the extent to which [his] conduct could contribute 12 to that risk, so as to be legally chargeable with the consequences, see Petree, 831 F.2d at 1196, then the presumption would be successfully rebutted and the burden of production would shift back to Pavlik to come forward with evidence demonstrating that an adequate warning would have changed Stephen's behavior. At that point, only the facts or actual evidence from which the presumption arose remain, free from any artificial effect, to be considered along with other evidence. See Lynn v. Cepurneek, 508 A.2d 308, 312 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (discussing general law of presumptions in Pennsylvania); 9 Wigmore on Evidence S 2487; cf. Overpeck, 823 F.2d at 756 & n.3 (Where an inference that a warning would have reminded a user of a known danger is unsupported by independent evidence, such an inference is impermissible as mere jury speculation.). To prevail on summary judgment, however, defendants must satisfy a more substantial burden. While they need only produce evidence sufficient to support afinding contrary to the presumed fact to rebut the presumption at trial, see supra, to satisfy Rule 56 the record must show that a reasonable fact finder would be bound tofind that Stephen Pavlik was fully aware of the risk of bodily injury; otherwise, we are presented with a genuine issue of fact for the jury. With this standard in mind, we turn now to determine whether the evidence cited by the defendants is sufficient to establish (to the extent just described) that Stephen Pavlik was fully aware of the risk of bodily injury posed by butane inhalation prior to his accident.