Opinion ID: 75729
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the substantive due process claim involving mental competency

Text: 44 The second issue the district court specified in the certificate of appealability is: Whether petitioner's trial without a determination of his competency to stand trial violated his Sixth and/or Fourteenth Amendment rights. That specification seems to include the first one, the Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process issue, which we have already discussed. To the extent that the second specification raises the issue of whether there is a Sixth Amendment right, or a Fourteenth Amendment right to a mental competency examination in addition to the procedural due process right we have already discussed, it is a non-starter for Wright. There is no Supreme Court decision that dictates the rule that trial without a determination of mental competency violates any constitutional provision other than the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of procedural due process. Accordingly, recognition and application of such a rule in this collateral attack proceeding is barred by the non-retroactivity doctrine of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989), and its progeny. Besides, Wright does not appear to have raised such a claim in the district court. 45 In any event, the parties have not treated the second issue specified in the certificate of appealability as raising the question of whether the failure of the trial court to determine if Wright was competent to stand trial violated some yet unannounced rule of constitutional law. Instead, they have argued this second specification issue to us as though it were the question of whether Wright was actually tried while mentally incompetent in violation of the substantive due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, we will construe the COA so that the second question specified in it includes the substantive due process issue that was actually presented to the district court and which the parties have argued to us. See McCoy v. United States, 266 F.3d 1245, 1248 n. 2 (11th Cir.2001) (Although our review is limited to the issues specified in the COA, we will construe the issue specification in light of the pleadings and other parts of the record. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 46 Wright did claim in the district court that he had been tried while mentally incompetent in violation of his substantive due process rights. Without reaching the merits of that claim, the district court held that it was procedurally barred because it had not been raised on direct appeal. Wright concedes he failed to raise the claim on direct appeal but contends that the law of this circuit establishes that a petitioner's substantive due process claim that he was tried while mentally incompetent cannot be procedurally defaulted. The COA the district court issued did not explicitly cover this procedural default issue. Notwithstanding that, Wright urges us to conclude that when a COA has been issued as to a claim on the merits, after the district court has held that claim to be procedurally barred, we should construe the COA as including the threshold issue of procedural default as well as the merits. That makes sense to us. Unless we review a district court's threshold ruling that a claim is procedurally barred from consideration, it would be a waste of our time to consider the merits of the claim. See Jones v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1227, 1231 (9th Cir.2000) (Absent an explicit statement by the district court, in cases where a district court grants a COA with respect to the merits of a constitutional claim but the COA is silent with respect to procedural claims that must be resolved if the panel is to reach the merits, we will assume that the COA also encompasses any procedural claims that must be addressed on appeal.). So, we will decide that procedural bar issue. 47 The district court's ruling that Wright had procedurally defaulted his substantive due process mental competency claim is contrary to the law of this circuit that such claims generally cannot be defaulted. See Johnston v. Singletary, 162 F.3d 630, 637 (11th Cir.1998); Medina v. Singletary, 59 F.3d 1095, 1107 (11th Cir.1995); Adams v. Wainwright, 764 F.2d 1356, 1359 (11th Cir.1985). Bound as we are to follow prior panel precedent, we conclude that Wright's substantive due process claim relating to mental competency is not procedurally barred, and we will address its merits. We review it without any § 2254(d)(1) deference, because there is no state court decision on the merits of this claim. 48 As we have held, `a petitioner raising a substantive claim of incompetency is entitled to no presumption of incompetency and must demonstrate his or her incompetency by a preponderance of the evidence.' Medina, 59 F.3d at 1106 (quoting James v. Singletary, 957 F.2d 1562, 1571 (11th Cir.1992)). Only [a] petitioner who presents clear and convincing evidence creating a real, substantial, and legitimate doubt as to his competence to stand trial is entitled to a hearing on his substantive competency claim. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The point is that on this claim, the standard of proof is high and the facts must positively, unequivocally, and clearly generate the legitimate doubt about whether the petitioner was mentally competent when he was tried. Id. (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted). Not every manifestation of mental illness demonstrates incompetence to stand trial; rather, the evidence must indicate a present inability to assist counsel or understand the charges. Id. at 1107 (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted). 49 Wright has not met that high standard. The fact that he suffers from chronic schizophrenia the effects of which have come and gone over the years is not enough to create a real, substantial, and legitimate doubt as to whether he was competent to stand trial in January of 1987. His incompetency to stand trial seven and eight months later, like his incompetency to stand trial seventeen years earlier, is relevant, but it is not enough to counter the best evidence of what his mental condition was at the only time that counts, which is the time of the trial. The best evidence of Wright's mental state at the time of trial is the evidence of his behavior around that time, especially the evidence of how he related to and communicated with others then. The unrebutted evidence at trial is that in the days and weeks leading up to the trial Wright behaved in a perfectly normal fashion, related well to others, and had no problem at all communicating with them. There is no evidence that he behaved abnormally at trial, nor is there any evidence that he had any problem understanding the charges against him or communicating with his counsel. This claim fails on the merits.