Opinion ID: 2509064
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Request for an Evidentiary Hearing for a Motion to Strike the Special Circumstance Finding

Text: Prior to the hearing on his modification application, defendant moved for an evidentiary hearing for a motion to strike the jury's special circumstance finding. The trial court declined to entertain the motion as beyond the scope of this court's remand directive. The court properly refused to consider defendant's request. The decision in Lewis I specified that the matter was returned to the trial court for the limited purpose of a rehearing on the question of penalty modification (see Lewis I, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 287, 266 Cal.Rptr. 834, 786 P.2d 892), and the dispositional order expressly stated that the cause is remanded to the trial court for the limited purpose of redetermining defendant's application for modification of the verdict in accordance with this opinion. ( Id. at p. 292, 266 Cal.Rptr. 834, 786 P.2d 892.) Reading these two portions of the opinion together, it is clear we did not contemplate any further or other proceedings. (Cf. People v. Sheldon (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1136, 1141-1142, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 368, 875 P.2d 83.) This limitation is consistent with the generally applicable rule that [t]he order of the appellate court as stated in the remittitur, `is decisive of the character of the judgment to which the appellant is entitled.' ( Hampton v. Superior Court (1952) 38 Cal.2d 652, 656, 242 P.2d 1.) On remand, the lower court may act only within these express jurisdictional limits. (See generally 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Appeal, § 742 et seq.) Here, the trial court correctly interpreted our disposition and properly denied a hearing on the motion to strike as in excess of its authority. Defendant cites People v. Williams (1981) 30 Cal.3d 470, 484, 179 Cal.Rptr. 443, 637 P.2d 1029, as authority for the motion to strike and raises numerous constitutional objections to the imposition of a procedural bar to preclude its consideration on the merits. In Williams, the court heldin the context of a life imprisonment without possibility of parole sentencethat the trial court retains discretion pursuant to section 1385 to strike a special circumstance finding and resentence the defendant accordingly. ( Williams, at p. 490, 179 Cal.Rptr. 443, 637 P.2d 1029.) We expressly reserved the question whether our analysis applies to a finding of special circumstances after the jury has returned a verdict of death. ( Id. at p. 490, fn. 11, 179 Cal.Rptr. 443, 637 P.2d 1029.) Although section 1385.1 now divests the trial court of such discretion in death cases for crimes committed on or after June 6, 1990 (see Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 298-299, 279 Cal.Rptr. 592, 807 P.2d 434), this court has never definitively resolved the question for earlier cases. (See, e.g., People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 849, 281 Cal.Rptr. 90, 809 P.2d 865.) We have noted, however, that [i]t is at least arguable that section 190.4, subdivision (e), provides the sole remedy after a death verdict. ( Ibid. ) Given the procedural posture of this case, we may continue to postpone final determination of the extent, if any, of the trial court's discretion in this regard. A modification application pursuant to section 190.4, subdivision (e), addresses a specific and limited aspect of a capital trial, the final act of the court prior to pronouncement of judgment and imposition of penalty. This presupposes the defendant has made any and all other pertinent motions. Thus, when a case is remanded solely for the purpose of rehearing on the application, no further opportunity is available for consideration of matters outside the scope of that narrow proceeding. This determination does not deny equal protection because trial courts can, on remand, strike special circumstance and enhancement findings for noncapital defendants. Capital and noncapital defendants are not similarly situated. The penalty modification application, and the trial court's role in ruling on the application, are unique to capital proceedings. Whether in the first instance or on remand, the court is not resentencing the defendant, but reweighing the evidence to determine whether the jury's verdict is supported under the law and the evidence presented. (§ 190.4, subd. (e).) Noncapital defendants are in an entirely different position at resentencing, where the trial court reassesses the appropriate penalty. (See, e.g., People v. Gutierrez (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 230, 233, 167 Cal.Rptr. 162.) Defendant raises other constitutional objections to the refusal to hear his motion to strike based in part on the fact that trial counsel failed to make such a motion at the appropriate time and place prior to the original modification application. Assuming without deciding that a motion to strike would be tenable in this case, we reach the same conclusion that the trial court did not err. If counsel acted incompetently in his omission, defendant's remedy is by petition for writ of habeas corpus based on alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, not a motion that would have caused the trial court to exceed its jurisdiction on remand and distort the capital sentencing statutory scheme.