Opinion ID: 2499529
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Suppression of police statements

Text: Maestas contends that his death sentence is unconstitutional because the prosecution used statements that were obtained in violation of his right to remain silent. Maestas moved to suppress his statements in the district court, and the district court denied the motion after hearing argument. He challenges that decision. [17] We will not disturb a district court's determination of whether a defendant invoked his right to remain silent if that decision is supported by substantial evidence. See generally Harte v. State, 116 Nev. 1054, 1065, 13 P.3d 420, 427-28 (2000); Tomarchio v. State, 99 Nev. 572, 575, 665 P.2d 804, 806 (1983). Before interviewing Maestas while he was in custody in Utah, Nevada police officers advised him of his constitutional rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). In response to a police officer's invitation to tell us your side, Maestas stated, You know I think that I'd like to take the uh silencebut I would say that, ah, the act or crime I did do alone. I didn't have any help. The interrogating officer told Maestas, If you want to tell us about it and not implicate your sister, that's entirely up to you, to which Maestas stated, I just did, didn't I. The police officer inquired whether Maestas want[ed] to tell us how this came about, to which he responded, I really don't know. The interrogating officer then stated, Why don't you start from the beginning? Maestas then explained his involvement in the crimes. The district court found that Maestas' statement about remaining silent was equivocal and that he did not invoke the protections of Miranda. It further found that Maestas was admonished of his right to remain silent and waived that right. We agree with the district court that nothing in the interview demonstrates the kind of unambiguous invocation of the right to remain silent that is required by the Supreme Court, Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. ___, ___, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 2260, 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010); rather, Maestas initially indicated that he wanted to invoke his right to remain silent but in the same breath admitted that he alone committed the crimes, and when asked again if he wished to discuss the crimes, Maestas equivocated but then proceeded to make incriminating statements. We further agree with the district court that Maestas' conduct during the interview indicates an implied waiver of the right to remain silent. Id. at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 2262. The district court did not err by admitting Maestas' statement. [18]