Opinion ID: 216062
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Exclusion of Hearsay

Text: Borrasi first argues that the district court erroneously interpreted and applied the Federal Rules of Evidence when it prevented him from using comments in meeting minutes during his defense, despite its earlier decision to allow the government to introduce the minutes into evidence and use them for a different purpose. According to Borrasi, this ruling prejudiced his case and warrants reversal of his conviction. We review the district court's decision to exclude the evidence or limit its use for an abuse of discretion, but we review its interpretation of the Rules de novo. United States v. Rogers, 587 F.3d 816, 819 (7th Cir.2009). Even if we determine the evidentiary decision was erroneous, we will not reverse it if the jury's ultimate decision was not influenced by the error. United States v. Oros, 578 F.3d 703, 707 (7th Cir.2009). The meeting minutes at issue were taken during Rock Creek committee meetings. The face sheet of each set of minutes lists attendees at the meetings. The government sought to introduce them to support its expert's summary of the attendance of Borrasi and his Integrated physicians at Rock Creek meetings. This summary purported to show that they did not participate sufficiently in their assigned committees to justify receiving salaries from Rock Creek for their respective activities. The government and Borrasi stipulated to the minutes' admissibility, and Borrasi now argues that the scope of the stipulation agreement was not limited to specific contemplated uses of the evidence. Some of the minutes contained comments about committee reports submitted to Rock Creek's board of directors. Borrasi sought to introduce the minutes as exhibits so the jury could consider the information in those referenced reports, including the descriptions of medical services and his employees allegedly performed for Rock Creek. He believed the substantive information in the reports partially incorporated by the minutes would refute the government's assertion that he and the other Integrated employees did not have to perform any work to receive a salary from Rock Creek. On the government's objection, the district court ruled the minutes' substantive descriptions of the reports inadmissible because the statements would constitute hearsay. It did allow Borrasi to examine Rock Creek witnesses about whether they received the reports, and Borrasi questioned Mamoon about the reports and committee meetings at length. Nevertheless, Borrasi contends that the exclusion was erroneous because the reports met the business-records exception to the hearsay prohibition. Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) excepts certain records of regularly conducted activity from Rule 802's general ban on the admission of hearsay evidence. Borrasi argues that hospital committee meeting minutes plainly fall within the scope of the business records exception because they were record[s] ... of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time ... kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity and because it was Rock Creek's regular practice to take minutes of business meetings. Fed.R.Evid. 803(6). The district court accepted the parties' stipulation that the minutes themselves would fall within this exception. Borrasi now contends that, because the government did not limit the uses to which the minutes could be put upon their admission, it waived any opportunity to later limit the evidentiary uses to which he could apply the minutes. To support this broad premise, he cites Rule 105, [1] yet he cites no case for his proposition that the Rule has such a preclusive effect at the moment of admission. Indeed, this argument inverts the very spirit of the Rule. Rule 105 is a vehicle for the enforcement of the Federal Rules of Evidence, but Borrasi's attorney would turn it into a trapset upon admission of evidence and sprung later in trialto effectively prevent enforcement of the Rules. The meeting minutes almost certainly fell within Rule 803(6), especially given thatdespite the involvement of Rock Creek officers in the fraudulent scheme the government did not question the reliability of the documents. See Fed.R.Evid. 803(6) (excluding from the business records exception those records whose source of information or ... method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness). Borrasi, however, challenges the exclusion of the reports referenced in the minutes and any comments in the minutes regarding the substance of those reports. Those reports and any statements therefrom are hearsay, as each comprises statements written by physicians not testifying before the court that Borrasi wished to introduce for the truth of the matters asserted. See Fed.R.Evid. 801(c). The government arguesand Borrasi does not refutethat Borrasi never laid any additional foundation for the admission of these reports or the minutes' substantive discussion of them. That alone justifies the district court's decision to bar the jury's receipt of the reports, as courts may not permit the introduction of hearsay contained within hearsay unless each layer is properly admitted under an exception to Rule 802. Fed.R.Evid. 805. Specifically, statements made by third parties in an otherwise admissible business record cannot properly be admitted for their truth unless they can be shown independently to fall within a recognized hearsay exception. United States v. Christ, 513 F.3d 762, 769 (7th Cir.2008) ( quoting Woods v. City of Chicago, 234 F.3d 979, 986 (7th Cir.2000)). Borrasi broadly concludes that the minutes are not double hearsay because the minutes did not contain statements of outsiders to Rock Creek, but rather statements of reports by Integrated physicians with privileges at Rock Creek. But he does notand could notargue that the reports were themselves trustworthy business records falling within Rule 803(6) or any other exception. Accordingly, the statements contained in the reports, as well as any quotations from or specific references to them in the minutes, constituted inadmissible hearsay. The district court did not erroneously interpret Rules 802 and 803(6). It properly allowed Borrasi to argue that certain reports were made and then tendered during the meetings, and it allowed him to use the admitted minutes in an attempt to prove those arguments. But the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit any substantive descriptions of the reports in the minutes or the reports themselves. Had we found the exclusion erroneous, we would nevertheless have found it to constitute harmless error because it could not have had a substantial and injurious effect on the outcome of the trial. See Oros, 578 F.3d at 709. Borrasi argues that he was prejudiced in his defense because he was barred from showing the jury that he and other Integrated physicians earned their salaries. Yet Borrasi was able to expound on this theory of defense throughout his cross-examinations, his case-in-chief, and his closing arguments. Even if the court allowed Borrasi to introduce the minutes' specific discussions of the reports purporting to show the Integrated physicians' work, it is highly unlikely that the evidence would have offset the overwhelming evidence that Borrasi and the other physicians were being paid in significant part for their referrals instead of their services. Baig testified that he paid kickbacks to Borrasi; Jawich testified that he did minimal administrative work for Rock Creek and that his contract's job description was not accurate; and the jury heard recorded conversations in which Borrasi described the free money Integrated received for their referrals. Accordingly, any error the district court committed was harmless and a reversal is not warranted. Id. at 710.