Opinion ID: 4385361
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), an employer cannot “discharge any individual . . . because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). ADEA protection extends to individuals who are 40 years of age or older. See id. § 631(a). “[A] plaintiff suing under the ADEA must prove that the challenged employment action was motivated, at least in part, by age.” Riggs, 497 F.3d at 1114. This burden may be met “either by presenting direct evidence of the employer’s discriminatory intent or by presenting circumstantial evidence creating an inference of a discriminatory motive using the tripartite burden-shifting analysis” articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Riggs, 497 F.3d at 1114. burden-shifting analysis.” Id. Because Montoya 5 has no direct evidence of discriminatory intent, his claim must rely on circumstantial evidence and proceed under the McDonnell Douglas framework. “Under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff first bears the burden of proving a prima facie case of discrimination.” Id. “If the plaintiff successfully proves a prima facie case, the employer must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Once the employer [does so], the burden shifts back to the employee to prove that the proffered legitimate reason was a pretext for discrimination.” Id. at 1114-15 (citation omitted). For purposes of appeal, Jacobs assumes that Montoya could establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, and Montoya concedes that Jacobs has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision to terminate his employment. As a result, “[t]he employer’s articulation of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action causes the presumption of discrimination . . . to simply drop out of the picture.” Timmerman v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 483 F.3d 1106, 1113 (10th Cir. 2007) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Now, the only issue is whether Montoya met his burden to “show[] that the proffered reason [for his termination] is a pretext for illegal discrimination.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We agree with the district court that Montoya “failed to carry his burden of showing that [Jacobs’s] legitimate reason for discharge was a pretext.” Aplt. App., Vol. 2 at 499. “Under our precedents, a plaintiff can establish pretext by showing the defendant’s proffered non-discriminatory explanations for its actions are so 6 incoherent, weak, inconsistent, or contradictory that a rational factfinder could conclude they are unworthy of belief.” Johnson v. Weld Cty., 594 F.3d 1202, 1211 (10th Cir. 2010) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). “Evidence that the employer should not have made the adverse employment decision—for example, that the employer was mistaken or used poor business judgment—is not sufficient to show that the employer’s explanation is unworthy of credibility.” Hiatt v. Colo. Seminary, 858 F.3d 1307, 1316 (10th Cir. 2017) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, even if a jury could conclude “that [Jacobs’s] decision was intemperate and unfair,” as Montoya alleges, “[s]uch considerations . . . are not within the purview of . . . the ADEA.” Timmerman, 483 F.3d at 1120 (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he issue is not whether the decision to terminate [Montoya] was wise, fair or correct, but whether [Jacobs] reasonably believed at the time of the termination that [Montoya] had violated company policy, and acted in good faith upon that belief.” Id. Montoya argued in district court, and repeats in this court on appeal, that “[a] reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Jacobs’ stated reasons for terminating Montoya were [a pretext for age discrimination].” Aplt. Opening Br. at 26-27. But “[t]o support an inference of pretext, . . . a plaintiff must produce evidence that the employer did more than get it wrong. He or she must come forward with evidence that the employer didn’t really believe its proffered reasons for action and thus may have been pursuing a hidden discriminatory agenda.” Johnson, 594 F.3d at 1211. 7 Montoya cites seven facts that he contends raise a genuine issue about whether Jacobs’s beliefs were sincere. None of this evidence, however, relates to the beliefs of the decision-maker Adams, or Ramos, the human-resources manager who conducted the investigation and made the recommendation to terminate Montoya. As such, Montoya cannot satisfy his burden to present evidence of pretext. First, Montoya argues that “inconsistencies” regarding the reason he was terminated and who made the decision to fire him “would allow a reasonable factfinder to question the credibility of Jacobs’ stated reasons.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 27. It is unclear whether Montoya raised this argument in the district court. Nonetheless, we agree with Jacobs that the record does not support these assertions. Adams, Ramos, and Smith all disbelieved Montoya and found safety violations. No one disputes that Adams made the final decision with input from Ramos and others. Second, while it is true that Montoya and Lombardi gave different accounts of the incident, Jacobs’s believing Lombardi does not make the decision insincere. “This court’s function is not to second guess business decisions made by employers, and our inquiry is not whether [Jacobs’s] decision to fire [Montoya] was ultimately correct or wise.” Cillo v. City of Greenwood Vill., 739 F.3d 451, 463 (10th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). 8 Third, contrary to Montoya’s assertion, Smith did not say that the conclusion that Montoya lied was illogical. What Smith actually said was that walking into the truck was not a “logical” thing to do. Aplt. App., Vol. 2 at 328. Indeed, “based on the results of the investigation,” including Montoya’s statement that he was facing the truck on its passenger side yet was stuck on his left side, the only logical conclusion Smith could reach was that Montoya had walked into the truck. Id. at 329-30. Fourth, Montoya’s reliance on Smith’s and the union representative’s deposition testimony about never having had reason to question Montoya’s truthfulness avails nothing. The union representative was not part of the decisionmaking process, and Smith’s testimony concerned his observations as Montoya’s supervisor, not as the decision-maker. Moreover, Smith testified unequivocally that he believed that Montoya had been untruthful about the July 10, 2015 incident. Fifth, Montoya argues that Adams failed to ask him for his “side of the story,” which demonstrates his indifference. Aplt. Opening Br. at 29. This argument overlooks the fact that Adams was present when Ramos questioned Montoya and was well aware of his version of events. Sixth, Montoya maintains that Lombardi’s more favorable treatment—a threeday suspension—is evidence of pretext. In this regard, he relies on Dewitt v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 845 F.3d 1299, 1311 (10th Cir. 2017), in which we recognized that “showing disparate treatment—by demonstrating that the employer treated employees similarly situated to the plaintiff employee differently (i.e., more 9 favorably)—is a particularly potent instrument to discredit an employer’s allegedly legitimate reasons.” The problem for Montoya, however, is that he is not similarly situated to Lombardi. Jacobs determined that Montoya provided false and misleading information about the incident. By contrast, Lombardi’s version of events was corroborated by a third-party witness. Because there are significant differences between Montoya’s and Lombardi’s conduct, Montoya’s “allegations of disparate discipline do not suffice to show pretext.” Salguero v. City of Clovis, 366 F.3d 1168, 1177 (10th Cir. 2004). Last, Montoya maintains that Jacobs did not follow company policy in firing him, which in turn demonstrates pretext. We agree with Montoya’s general statement that pretext can be shown by evidence that the defendant acted contrary to a written company policy prescribing the action to be taken under the circumstances. It is equally true, however, that where “progressive discipline [is] entirely discretionary . . . , the failure to implement progressive discipline is not evidence of pretext.” Timmerman, 483 F.3d at 1120. The stated purpose of Jacobs’s policy is “[t]o provide employees with guidelines regarding disciplinary actions . . . .” Aplt. App., Vol. 2 at 441 (emphasis added). Further, the policy defines “discharge” as “[a]ction taken for a serious offense or for repeated minor offenses,” but does not further define “serious” or “minor.” Therefore, whether an offense is “serious” is left to the discretion of the company. Jacobs determined, in its discretion, that Montoya’s offense was “serious” 10 and that he should lose his job. This discretionary decision is not evidence of pretext.