Opinion ID: 783502
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Cognizable Property Interest

Text: 15 Maritrans asserts that the government, through its implementation of OPA90's double hull requirement, took the expected useful lives and associated revenue streams from each of its tank barges. Complaint ¶ 42. In other words, Maritrans argues that the government took its barges at the time OPA90 became effective. The government, however, contends that personal property is not entitled to the same protection under the Fifth Amendment as real property. According to the government, the concept of a categorical taking cannot be extended to regulations that restrict the use of personal property. The government further contends that, in any event, the use of single hull tank barges on the navigable waters of the United States increases the risk of oil spills and therefore is a nuisance not subject to Fifth Amendment protection. Finally, the government argues that the use the government has chosen to regulate and, therefore, the property interest asserted by Maritrans, is the use of the navigable waters of the United States by single hull tank vessels to transport oil. The government maintains that no individual or corporation has the right to use a public waterway, but may only do so at the discretion of the government. 16 The Court of Federal Claims concluded that Maritrans possessed a cognizable property interest in each of its single hull tank barges. Maritrans, 40 Fed.Cl. at 801. In reaching that conclusion, the court determined that the fact that Maritrans participates in the marine transport industry, which is highly regulated, does not preclude it from proving that a compensable taking has occurred. Id. at 800-01. The court also held that the operation of Maritrans' barges did not constitute a nuisance. Id. at 799. 17 The Constitution neither creates nor defines the scope of property interests compensable under the Fifth Amendment. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). Instead, existing rules and understandings and background principles derived from an independent source, such as state, federal, or common law, define the dimensions of the requisite property rights for purposes of establishing a cognizable taking. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030, 112 S.Ct. 2886. As an initial matter, we dispose of the government's arguments that personal property is not subject to Fifth Amendment protection and that Maritrans' use of its barges to transport oil constitutes a nuisance. As previously noted, tangible property may be the subject of a takings claim. See Andrus, 444 U.S. at 65, 100 S.Ct. 318. As far as the nuisance point is concerned, it is true that the Supreme Court has indicated that government regulation of a nuisance does not result in a taking. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1022, 112 S.Ct. 2886 (It is correct that many of our prior opinions have suggested that `harmful or noxious uses' of property may be proscribed by government regulation without the requirement of compensation.). We agree with the Court of Federal Claims that Maritrans' use of its tank barges to transport oil does not, by itself, constitute a nuisance. 18 We therefore turn to the government's argument that, since Maritrans utilizes its single hull tank barges on the navigable waters of the United States, the property interest Maritrans asserts is the use of its vessels on such waterways, which it claims is not a protected property interest. The government asserts that such use does not amount to a cognizable property interest because the navigable waters of the United States are public property, in which Maritrans may not assert a property interest. See Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713, 725, 18 L.Ed. 96 (1866) (stating that for the exercise of the commerce power, the navigable waters of the United States are to be deemed the public property of the nation, and subject to all the requisite legislation by Congress). 19 We are not persuaded by the government's argument. It is true that the primary beneficial use of Maritrans' single hull tank barges has been in coastwise Jones Act trade. It is also true that it was OPA90's restriction on the use of those barges in that trade that precipitated Maritrans' suit. However, those facts do not somehow diminish or eliminate the basic property interest that Maritrans has in its single hull tank barges. Maritrans has various rights in its barges that qualify them as property for Fifth Amendment protection. For example, Maritrans may sell or otherwise dispose of the barges; it may possess and transport them; and it may alter them by adding a second hull. See Andrus, 444 U.S. at 66, 100 S.Ct. 318 (suggesting that the right to possess, transport, donate, devise, and sell are all sticks in the bundle of property rights). 20 Maritrans' interest in its tank barges is not unlike the interest that Paul Conti had in his swordfishing vessel, the F/V Providenza, and his swordfishing nets and gear in Conti v. United States, 291 F.3d 1334 (Fed.Cir.2002). Mr. Conti alleged that a ban on drift gillnet fishing in the Atlantic Swordfish Fishery had deprived him of a particular use of his property. Conti, 291 F.3d at 1343. We split our analysis of Mr. Conti's takings claim between his swordfishing permit and his boat, nets, and gear. We found that, while Mr. Conti's permit did not constitute a cognizable property interest under the Fifth Amendment, his boat, nets, and gear did. Id. at 1342-43. In short, Maritrans' property interest in its barges was not compromised by the nature of its claim. Thus, the Court of Federal Claims did not err in holding that Maritrans had a cognizable property interest in its tank barges.