Opinion ID: 2581317
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: testimony of detective martin

Text: Petitioner Everybodytalksabout claims Respondent State of Washington impermissibly relied on his character traits of leadership and assertiveness through the testimony of Detective Jeffrey D. Martin to argue that Petitioner encouraged Phillip Lara Lopez to rob and kill Rigel Jones. [14] He asserts that acts inadmissible under ER 404(b) are not limited to bad acts, but the rule prohibits evidence of any prior acts to establish the defendant's propensity to act in a certain manner. [15] Petitioner claims Respondent misinterpreted State v. Halstien [16] as limiting exclusion of acts under ER 404(b) to unpopular or disgraceful conduct. [17] Petitioner argues the language in Halstien indicates that while misconduct includes acts that are unpopular or disgraceful, it is not limited to those acts. [18] Respondent State of Washington argues the court in Halstien held that only acts that are unpopular or disgraceful are excluded under ER 404(b). [19] It argues that, unlike in Halstien, the acts in this case were not unpopular nor disgraceful and thus should not be excluded. [20] IT CLAIMS THE TESTIMONY of Detective Martin was brief and offered only to show the nature of the relationship between Petitioner and Mr. Lopez: that they were close associates and that Petitioner often took the lead in their interaction with other people. [21] But the State acknowledges it relied upon that testimony to establish that Petitioner was liable as an accomplice. The Court of Appeals concluded the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Detective Martin. [22] The court indicated that acts under ER 404(b) are not limited to bad acts, [23] stating the rule applies when evidence of prior acts is used to arouse prejudice and invites the jury to convict a defendant based upon the defendant's character. [24] ER 404(b) provides: Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. (Emphasis added.) To admit evidence of other crimes or misconduct under ER 404(b), the trial court must identify on the record the purpose for which it is admitted. [25] ER 404(b) evidence must be relevant to a material issue and its probative value must outweigh its prejudicial effect. [26] EVIDENCE OF PRIOR Misconduct is inadmissible to show that the defendant is a dangerous person or a `criminal type' and is thus likely to have committed the crime for which [the defendant] is presently charged. [27] This does not answer the question whether any prior conduct, which is not misconduct, is governed by the same rule. In Halstien this court concluded the defendant's prior conduct did not rise to the level of misconduct, but that his conduct constituted acts under ER 404(b). [28] The court discussed whether the defendant's prior contacts with the victim were acts within the meaning of ER 404(b), [29] concluding that `prior misconduct,' including acts that are merely unpopular or disgraceful, [are] inadmissible to show that the defendant is a `criminal type' and is likely to have committed a crime for which charged. [30] Petitioner correctly concludes that acts inadmissible under ER 404(b) include any acts used to show the character of a person to prove the person acted in conformity with it on a particular occasion. The court in Halstien did not limit inadmissible acts under ER 404(b) to unpopular or disgraceful acts, but only stated the prior misconduct may include acts that are merely unpopular or disgraceful. Inadmissible acts under ER 404(b) are not limited to acts that are unpopular or disgraceful. Respondent State of Washington argues the court in State v. Brown concluded evidence was admissible because it was not negative and did not reflect any misconduct. [31] Petitioner responds that the court in Brown used overly broad language to hold the evidence admissible simply because it was not used as propensity evidence to suggest that the defendant committed the offense for which he was charged. [32] The Court of Appeals concluded Respondent incorrectly relied on Brown, pointing out that this case is distinguishable from Brown because, unlike in that case, Petitioner's prior acts were in fact offered to show that Petitioner was the leader and that the incident might not have happened were it not for Petitioner; and that the trial court gave no limiting instruction to the jury concerning the evidence. [33] In Brown this court concluded that evidence of the defendant's contacts with two women unrelated to the crime was not prohibited under ER 404(b), reasoning the testimony was relevant to establish background information; that the defendant was not prejudiced because his conduct with both women involved no crime or misconduct; and any possibility the jury might have speculated he was stalking the two women was obviated by the trial court's limiting instructions. [34] This court in Brown did not conclude that only acts involving crime or misconduct are inadmissible under ER 404(b). The court discussed whether the evidence was relevant and whether its probative value was outweighed by prejudice under ER 403. The court stated that the evidence was relevant to provide background information and the defendant was not prejudiced by the testimony of [the two women] because his contact with both women involved no crime or misconduct to establish evidence in the case and thus it did not come within the purview of ER 404(b). [35] The court did not address whether defendant's conduct would be considered inadmissible acts under ER 404(b) under different facts, but instead focused on whether the testimony of the two women was relevant, admissible and prejudicial. Respondent's reliance on Brown is misplaced. The relevance of Detective Martin's testimony in this case was not established. Relevant evidence is evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. [36] Evidence admissible under ER 404(b) must be relevant. [37] The fact that Detective Martin believed from his past observation from the middle of 1992 to the beginning of 1996 that Petitioner Everybodytalksabout was the leader in his relationship with Mr. Lopez is not relevant to establish that Petitioner was the leader between February 3 and 4, 1996 when Mr. Jones was killed by Mr. Lopez. Detective Martin was not present at that time and he testified to nothing relating to the specific incident involving the killing of Mr. Jones by Mr. Lopez. Nor did he testify to observing any behavior by Petitioner which occurred on any date even close to February 3 or 4, 1996. Even if the testimony of Detective Martin were relevant, it was not admissible under ER 404(b). Although Petitioner's prior acts about which the detective testified were not misconduct, unpopular or disgraceful, they were offered to show his qualities of leadership; that he acted in conformity with those qualities at the time Mr. Jones was killed; and he therefore somehow participated with Mr. Lopez in killing Mr. Jones. The evidence is inadmissible under ER 404(b). The Court of Appeals was correct in concluding it was error for the trial court to admit the testimony of Detective Martin. An evidentiary error which is not of constitutional magnitude, such as erroneous admission of ER 404(b) evidence, requires reversal only if the error, within reasonable probability, materially affected the outcome. [38] The error is not prejudicial unless, within reasonable probabilities, the outcome of the trial would have been materially affected had the error not occurred. [39] The error is harmless if the evidence is of minor significance compared to the overall evidence as a whole. [40] In her dissent to the Court of Appeals opinion, Acting Chief Judge Mary Kay Becker reasoned that the error was not harmless, stating that: To convict in this case, the jury had to rule out the possibility that the defendant merely stood by and watched while Phi[l]lip Lopez stabbed and robbed the victim. With only the hazy recollections of Yolanda Lopez to go on, the jury probably would have been less willing to believe that Everybodytalksabout had criminal intent when he approached the man on the street. But once the jury was allowed to hear from a reliable witness that Everybodytalksabout usually took the lead while Phi[l]lip stayed in the background, the possibility that Phi[l]lip committed the crime without Everybodytalksabout's participation would have seemed remote. Such is the power of character evidence: He typically acts this way, therefore he must have acted this way on the night in question. The testimony of Yolanda Lopez was sufficient to support the conviction, as the majority notes, but sufficiency is not the test for harmless error. The officer's testimony added significant weight to an otherwise weak case. It went directly to the key issue: whether the defendant participated in the crime. There is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been materially affected had the error not occurred. The defendant is entitled to a new trial.[ [41] ] Petitioner argues the trial court's error in admitting the testimony of Detective Martin was not harmless because there was not sufficient evidence to convict Petitioner without that testimony. [42] He claims the court could not use the testimony of Ms. Yolanda Ramirez-Lopez to determine the error was harmless because she was impeached by multiple conflicting prior statements and was intoxicated at the time Mr. Jones was killed. [43] He asserts the State did not sufficiently prove its case because it is beyond dispute that Respondent's key witness, Richard Prevost, perjured himself in the first trial with the consequence of a mistrial. [44] Petitioner maintains the crime laboratory did not find any physical evidence connecting him to the crime. [45] He contends that without Detective Martin's testimony there is nothing to connect him with the crime. [46] Respondent State of Washington asserts that even if Detective Martin's testimony were improperly admitted, the error was harmless. [47] Respondent claims the testimony was brief and cumulative because Ms. Ramirez-Lopez' testimony and Petitioner's own taped statement indicated he took the lead in his relationship with Mr. Lopez. [48] The Court of Appeals concluded the error was harmless and the outcome of the trial probably would not have been affected even if Detective Martin's testimony had been excluded. [49] The court stated there was sufficient evidence to convict Petitioner based upon properly admitted evidence even without the testimony of Detective Martin. [50] The court indicated the testimony that Petitioner was a leader was not particularly significant because he was convicted under a felony murder theory. [51] Based upon our review of the record, we do not agree with the conclusion that the error was harmless. We conclude the error in admitting Detective Martin's testimony was not harmless. There was not sufficient evidence to convict Petitioner without it. Ms. Ramirez-Lopez' testimony of itself was not sufficient to convict Petitioner. She testified that during the time of the incident she was intoxicated on a daily basis which affected her memory and that she did not witness the robbing or stabbing of Mr. Jones. Petitioner's taped statement is not sufficient of itself to convict him. In that statement he does not indicate that he participated in any manner or that he encouraged Mr. Lopez to rob and kill Mr. Jones. [52] The State presented no physical evidence to connect Petitioner with the crime. Petitioner was convicted under an accomplice liability theory. [53] Respondent State was required to prove he actually participated in the crime. The State in justifying its conduct points out that Petitioner was charged as an accomplice and that, therefore, admission of testimony concerning his apparent qualities of leadership was proper. RCW 9A.08.020 provides, in part: (1) A person is guilty of a crime if it is committed by the conduct of another person for which [the person] is legally accountable. (2) A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another person when: . . . . (c) He is an accomplice of such other person in the commission of the crime. (3) A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of a crime if: (a) With knowledge that it will promote or facilitate the commission of the crime, he (i) solicits, commands, encourages, or requests such other person to commit it; or (ii) aids or agrees to aid such other person in planning or committing it; or (iii) His conduct is expressly declared by law to establish his complicity. . . . . Under the accomplice statute, RCW 9A.08.020, a person is not an accomplice unless [that person] knowingly `solicits, commands, encourages, or requests' the commission of a crime, or aids in the planning or commission [of the crime].... [P]hysical presence and assent alone are insufficient to constitute aiding and abetting.... [S]omething more than presence alone plus knowledge of ongoing activity must be shown to establish the intent requisite to finding [an accused] to be an accomplice. [54] Petitioner does not claim error by the trial court in its instructions on accomplice liability, and indeed did not take exception to them at trial. We nevertheless question the accuracy of instruction 5 actually given when read together with instruction 6 because they tend to mislead the jury concerning the law. Instruction 5 read: A person is an accomplice in the commission of a crime if, with knowledge that it will promote or facilitate the commission of a crime, he or she either: (1) solicits, commands, encourages, or requests another person to commit the crime; or (2) aids or agrees to aid another person in planning or committing a crime. The word aid means all assistance whether given by words, acts, encouragement, support, or presence. A person who is present at the scene and ready to assist by his or her presence is aiding in the commission of the crime. However, more than mere presence and knowledge of the criminal activity of another must be shown to establish that a person present is an accomplice.[ [55] ] The court's instruction 6 stated merely, A participant is an accomplice or principal in the underlying crime. [56] The to convict instructions, in order to avoid reference to former co-defendant Phillip Lara Lopez, used the following language in instruction 4, for example: To convict the defendant of the crime of murder in the first degree, as charged in count I, each of the following elements of the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) That on or about the 4th day of February, 1996, Rigel Jones was killed; (2) That the defendant or an accomplice was committing or attempting to commit robbery in the second degree; (3) That the defendant or an accomplice caused the death of Rigel Jones in the course of or in furtherance of such crime or in immediate flight from such crime; . . . .[ [57] ] Without Detective Martin's testimony there was not sufficient evidence to support Respondent's theory that Petitioner was an accomplice. The error in admitting the testimony of Detective Martin was not harmless. It is likely the outcome of the trial would have been different if the error had not occurred. STATE'S MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD Two days prior to oral argument, the State filed a motion to supplement the record on appeal under RAP 9.10. Petitioner filed no answer within the one day allowed. The State asked to supplement the record with Pretrial Exhibit 5 from the defendant's first trial, which is a transcript of codefendant Phillip Lopez's second statement to police. The State did not adequately explain its delay in filing the motion, why the document is relevant, and, if it is, why it was not included in the record initially. Notwithstanding that, we grant the motion without setting a precedent for similar circumstances in future cases.