Opinion ID: 223162
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Motion for New Trial: Materiality of Suppressed Impeachment Evidence

Text: Mr. Cooper next challenges the district court's denial of his motion for a new trial, arguing that the district court erred in determining that the suppressed impeachment evidence and Mr. Gleason's substantive testimony were cumulative. This court reviews de novo claims that the prosecution violated Brady by failing to disclose material exculpatory evidence, including the determination of whether suppressed evidence was material. United States v. Hughes, 33 F.3d 1248, 1251 (10th Cir.1994). Under Brady, the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. United States v. Smith, 534 F.3d 1211, 1221 (10th Cir.2008) (quoting Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194) (internal quotation marks omitted). Impeachment evidence is exculpatory for Brady purposes. Id. at 1222 (citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985)). A defendant seeking a new trial based on a Brady violation must show that (1) the prosecution suppressed evidence, (2) the evidence was favorable to the defendant, and (3) the evidence was material. United States v. Torres, 569 F.3d 1277, 1281 (10th Cir.2009) (quoting United States v. Velarde, 485 F.3d 553, 558 (10th Cir.2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted). As discussed above, the government conceded that the first two elements are met in this case; that is, that it suppressed favorable impeachment evidence that Mr. Gleason was engaged in fraudulent activity throughout the trial, including providing the IRS with false information about his income, concealing bank accounts, falsely encumbering assets, titling his businesses in the names of relatives, funneling income through accounts held in relatives' names, filing fraudulent and frivolous IRS forms, and making false claims via the Internet. Therefore, the only issue presented is whether the impeachment evidence at issue was material. [E]vidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. at 1282 (alteration in original) (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375 (Blackmun, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The critical question is whether the lack of impeachment evidence shakes our confidence in the guilty verdict. Smith, 534 F.3d at 1223. To make the materiality determination, we view the suppressed evidence's significance in relation to the record as a whole. Hughes, 33 F.3d at 1252. What might be considered insignificant evidence in a strong case might suffice to disturb an already questionable verdict. Torres, 569 F.3d at 1282 (quoting United States v. Robinson, 39 F.3d 1115, 1119 (10th Cir.1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted).