Opinion ID: 2600470
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Double-counting Special Circumstances

Text: The court instructed the jury, pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.85, that it could consider under section 190.3, factor (a), the circumstances of the crime and the existence of any special circumstances, and could consider under factor (b) criminal activity other than the crimes charged in the present case. Defendant argues that these instructions, coupled with the prosecutor's argument that the jury should consider each of these murders in turn, the first degree murders, and each of the special circumstances in turn, and make a decision on each one, impermissibly invited the jury to double-count the special circumstances in violation of our decision in People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 768-769, 244 Cal.Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741. He further contends that these instructions and argument rendered the penalty determination unreliable, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution. In People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d 713, 768, 244 Cal.Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741, we recognized a theoretical problem in section 190.3, factor (a), because it directs the jury to consider both the circumstances of the crimes and the existence of any special circumstances. We noted: Since the latter are a subset of the former, a jury given no clarifying instructions might conceivably double-count any `circumstances' which were also `special circumstances.' On defendant's request, the trial court should admonish the jury not to do so. We were quick to point out, however, that the possibility of actual prejudice seems remote. . . . ( Ibid. ) Defendant did not request an instruction admonishing the jury not to double-count the special circumstances, and we repeatedly have held that the trial court has no duty to so instruct the jury sua sponte. ( People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1225, 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 112, 105 P.3d 487; People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1180, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 121, 954 P.2d 384; People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 68, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224.) Defendant asserts that the prosecutor in closing argument in effect told the jury to double-count the special circumstances. To the contrary, the prosecutor expressly told the jury not to do so. After quoting the pertinent language from section 190.3, factor (a), as reflected in CALJIC No. 8.85, the prosecutor told the jury: You may consider those crimes [of which defendant was convicted] in aggravation in determining penalty in this case only once; you can't consider them in section a and section b. You can consider them only once.