Opinion ID: 2262056
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: [¶ 7] Granzer questions the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting her conviction. Subsumed in her argument is a challenge to the adequacy of the evidence at the close of the State's case and, thus, the propriety of the district court's denial of her motion for judgment of acquittal. As noted above, Granzer introduced evidence in her defense after the district court denied her motion. We have previously held that a defendant's introduction of evidence following the denial of a judgment of acquittal motion at the conclusion of the State's case constitutes a waiver of that motion, thereby precluding appellate review of the trial court's ruling. Butcher v. State, 2005 WY 146, ¶¶ 12, 14, 123 P.3d 543, 548 (Wyo.2005); Robinson v. State, 11 P.3d 361, 368 (Wyo. 2000); Hodges v. State, 904 P.2d 334, 339 (Wyo.1995). Consistent with this precedent, we hold that Granzer waived her right to challenge the propriety of the district court's denial of her motion in this appeal. [1] [¶ 8] We now turn our attention to Granzer's claim that the trial evidence as a whole is insufficient to support her conviction. When reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we must determine whether the evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn from it, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, are adequate to permit the trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Granzer, ¶ 23, 193 P.3d at 273; Dettloff v. State, 2007 WY 29, ¶ 23, 152 P.3d 376, 383 (Wyo.2007); Statezny v. State, 2001 WY 22, ¶ 15, 18 P.3d 641, 645 (Wyo. 2001). The jury has the responsibility to resolve conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence and draw reasonable inferences from the facts. Sotolongo-Garcia v. State, 2002 WY 185, ¶ 11, 60 P.3d 687, 689 (Wyo. 2002). We will not substitute our judgment for that of the jury; our only duty is to determine whether a quorum of reasonable and rational individuals would, or even could, have found the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Conine v. State, 2008 WY 146, ¶ 5, 197 P.3d 156, 159 (Wyo.2008); Grissom v. State, 2005 WY 132, ¶ 24, 121 P.3d 127, 136 (Wyo.2005). [¶ 9] Granzer was convicted of child endangerment under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-4-405(a)(iii) (LexisNexis 2009), which states in pertinent part: no person shall knowingly and willfully ... permit any child to ... [e]nter and remain in a ... dwelling ... that the person knows is being used to ... store methamphetamines. At trial, and in accordance with the statute, the district court instructed the jury that it should not convict Granzer unless it found the following elements were proven beyond a reasonable doubt: 1. On or about the 10th day of October, 2006; 2. In Campbell County, Wyoming; 3. The Defendant, Sally Jo Granzer; 4. Knowingly and willfully permitted; 5. A child (GL); 6. To enter and remain in a dwelling; 7. That the Defendant knew was being used to store methamphetamines. [¶ 10] In attacking her conviction, Granzer does not challenge the adequacy of the evidence proving that methamphetamine was stored in her trailer. Nor does she claim the evidence failed to prove she knew of the drug's presence. Rather, her complaint concerns whether sufficient evidence was presented to support the jury's determination that she knowingly and willfully permitted GL to enter and remain in the residence on October 10, 2006. [¶ 11] At trial, Deputy Seeman testified that on the morning of October 10, Granzer informed him that both Melissa Selfe and GL were present in the trailer. He also testified it appeared GL had been staying with her mother at the trailer. In addition, Selfe testified that, although GL resided elsewhere, she occasionally babysat GL during the day. Selfe testified that Granzer knew about her babysitting responsibilities, knew it was possible GL could be in the trailer at any time, and knew GL had been at the trailer with Selfe on October 1. Based on this testimony, the jury could have rationally concluded that Granzer had, for some time, extended permission for GL to enter and remain in the trailer for such purposes. The jury could also have reasonably inferred from Granzer's knowledge of GL's presence that she had at least tacitly given permission for the child to visit and stay with her mother. Although no direct evidence was presented that Granzer expressly consented to GL's presence in the trailer on October 10, the statute does not require that a defendant give express consent or permission for a child to enter and remain in a dwelling, nor does it require that the permission be given at the exact time the child enters and remains in the dwelling. We find sufficient evidence exists to support the jury's guilty verdict.