Opinion ID: 6984387
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Other Retaliatory Actions

Text: 1. Policy as Prior Restraint. We turn next to the claimed restraints on speech. Looking at the Town’s revised Department procedures regarding press conferences, quoted earlier, we note that the language is almost identical to the text in the policies and procedures issued in 1992, and as such plaintiffs’ claims arising from promulgation of this policy arguably were resolved in the 1994 Settlement Agreement. Moreover, because the policy clearly states that it simply requires notification of the subject matter of speech, it is not a prior restraint and does not violate the First Amendment. “Only where the government imposes a requirement of advance approval or seeks to enjoin speech can there be prior restraint.” Dial Info. Servs. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 938 F.2d 1535, 1543 (2d Cir.1991). 2. Implementation of Policy as Prior Restraint. Nonetheless, implementation of the new policy included defendant Lindau’s public threat to discipline Pavone if he “talk[ed] to the press without getting permission.” Such implementation creates á genuine issue of fact with respect to whether there was a prior restraint of Pavone’s speech, therefore summary judgment on this issue is not appropriate. If a First Amendment violation is found on remand, the Board members acting in an executive function may still be shielded from liability by qualified immunity if their actions did not violate “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727. To hold the Town liable, Pavone must show that defendants’ acts amounted to a policy or practice the municipality had adopted. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018. 3. Suit By Outsider. Pavone contends that defendants encouraged an outsider to sue him. In a nearly identical ease, Carlos v. Santos, 123 F.3d 61, 65 (2d Cir.1997), we ruled that members of a town board did not act under color of state law when they allegedly encouraged a third party to sue the chief of police. The reason is plain. Because any citizen may encourage a lawsuit, the alleged wrong cannot be said to have been accomplished because defendants were clothed with the authority of state law. See id. Thus, this claim fails as a matter of law. 4. No Interview for Pavone, Jr. Pavone, Jr. argues that he was denied an interview for a position with the Police Department because of his father’s speech and that he has standing to assert the First Amendment rights of his father. Although there is a limited exception — not here applicable — ordinarily, one may not claim standing to vindicate the rights of a third party. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984). Hence, Pavone, Jr. lacks standing to maintain his § 1983 suit. III Retaliation Claims — Morris Morris’ expressions of support for Pavone, his opposition to Puglisi’s alleged ticket fixing activities, and his filing of grievances and reporting of the Town to OSHA involve matters of public concern and are therefore protected speech. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 146, 103 S.Ct. 1684. To constitute an adverse employment action, a transfer must be accompanied by a negative change in the terms and conditions of employment. See Dahm v. Flynn, 60 F.3d 253, 257 (7th Cir.1994) (transfer involving a dramatic downward shift in duties can rise to the level of an adverse employment action); see also Fyfe v. Curlee, 902 F.2d 401, 405 (5th Cir.1990) (transfer from a productive position to a menial make-work one is an adverse employment action). Morris does not allege that the transfer here involved any change in job description, days and hours, duties, benefits, or opportunity for promotion. It follows that the transfer was not an adverse employment action. His termination in 1996, however, together with the protected nature of his speech satisfies the first two factors of Mount Healthy City, but Morris has faded to establish the third factor, that is, causation between his protected speech and his discharge. No showing was made that defendants were even aware of his support for Pavone. Further, since two years elapsed between Morris’ letter of support for Pavone and his discharge, no inference of causation is justified. Cf. Conner v. Schnuck Mkts., Inc., 121 F.3d 1390, 1395 (10th Cir.1997) (four-month lag defeats inference of causation). Morris also offers no proof that his reporting of ticket fixing activities was causally linked to his termination, and he was uncertain whether the Town knew he had contacted OSHA. Moreover, defendants declare Morris was discharged because of a wrist injury that resulted in his being able to perform only 90 percent of his duties as an animal control officer. Morris acknowledges that the injury restricted the performance of some of his duties as of the date of his termination. He therefore has not presented evidence of retaliatory causation sufficient to survive summary judgment on his First Amendment claim. IV Due Process Claims A. Pavone Pavone argues that various negative statements made by Board members deprived him of his liberty interest in his reputation without due process, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Damage to an employee’s reputation brought about by an employer’s stigmatizing comments standing alone, however, is a matter properly vindicated under state tort law, and does not rise to a deprivation of a constitutional right. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701, 712, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976); Donato v. Plainview-Old Bethpage Cent. Sch. Dist., 96 F.3d 623, 630 (2d Cir.1996). Due process is only implicated when there is “stigma plus,” that is to say a loss of reputation “coupled with some other tangible element.” Valmonte v. Bane, 18 F.3d 992, 999 (2d Cir.1994). For a government employee, a federal cause of action for deprivation of a liberty interest arises when the alleged defamation occurs in the course of some negative alteration of the employee’s status, such as dismissal or refusal to rehire. See Neu v. Corcoran, 869 F.2d 662, 667 (2d Cir.1989). In addition, the defamation must have occurred close in time to the dismissal or other negative employment action for an employee to succeed on a claim of a liberty deprivation. See Martz v. Incorporated Village of Valley Stream, 22 F.3d 26, 32 (2d Cir.1994). In his deprivation of liberty claim, Pavone asserts two negative employment actions by the Board: his alleged constructive demotion and his termination. We have previously concluded that the liberty interest implicated by demotion is “at best ... weak,” and suggested that it requires only limited procedural safeguards. Baden v. Koch, 799 F.2d 825, 831 (2d Cir.1986). We need not explore this issue here. Because the evidence Pavone offers on the subject of his alleged demotion only supports an inference of a de minimis change in responsibility, he has suffered no “ ‘deprivation of [a] legal right or status.’ ” Valmonte, 18 F.3d at 1000 (quoting Neu, 869 F.2d at 667). In contrast, it is well established that defamation coupled with the termination of government employment is a deprivation of a liberty interest. See Davis, 424 U.S. at 710, 96 S.Ct. 1155. Nevertheless, for such a claim to be viable, Pavone will need to furnish proof that the alleged critical statements were both defamatory and concurrent with his termination. See Martz, 22 F.3d at 32 (statements made five months after dismissal were not concurrent with it, and thus “stigma plus” not shown). We further note that any claims based on statements damaging Pavone’s reputation made before November 15, 1994 are deemed covered by the 1994 Settlement Agreement and are thus barred by res judicata. B. Morris Morris insists that he, like Pavone, was deprived of his liberty interest in his reputation without due process of law. The alleged defamation in this case, unlike Pa-vone’s, was concurrent with Morris’ dismissal. The question is whether any stigma has been alleged. Upon examination, the record reveals that the statement by defendants at a Board meeting explained that Morris was being discharged because he was no longer able to perform his duties due to injury. The only evidence Morris provides to show that he was stigmatized by this description of his work related injury is that when he casually inquired from a friend about other work, the friend replied that after being “fired from the municipality,” “no one will ever hire you.” Such is not evidence sufficient to show he was stigmatized. Defendants’ statement made it clear Morris was discharged for being unable to perform his job following a work related injury. Morris’ other allegation of stigma — Nyberg called him a liar in front of an office full of people — did not occur concurrently with his termination. In sum, Morris has not shown a stigma that deprived him of a liberty interest. We also agree with the district court that Morris’ assertion that his discharge deprived him of a property interest in his civil service job does not state a due process violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Even assuming he has a property interest in his civil service position, see Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601-03, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972), he appears to have received adequate process for the reasons stated below. The Town argues that under New York State law it had a statutory right to discharge Morris. See N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 71 (McKinney 1983). Section 71 of the N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law has been interpreted to mean that an employee absent due to an occupational disability for one year is subject to termination if he is physically or mentally unable to return to his full duties. See Allen v. Howe, 84 N.Y.2d 665, 669, 621 N.Y.S.2d 287, 645 N.E.2d 720 (1994). An employee absent for a year may apply for reinstatement and is entitled to a hearing if found unfit for reinstatement. See id. at 672-73, 621 N.Y.S.2d 287, 645 N.E.2d 720. But, Morris does not challenge the adequacy of the § 71 procedures, nor does he argue that he re-applied for reinstatement to his old job and was unfairly rejected. Instead, Morris contends that he could not be discharged without access to the procedural protections afforded by N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 75. Unfortunately, Morris’ union waived these procedural rights when it agreed to a collective bargaining, agreement that stated The only procedure for taking disciplinary action or measures against the employee covered by this Agreement shall be as set forth in the following section and shall, in addition, apply in lieu of Sections 75 and 76 of the Civil Service Law for the employees who would otherwise be covered by those sections. Such waivers in collective bargaining agreements have been held valid, see Romano v. Canuteson, 11 F.3d 1140, 1141 (2d Cir.1993) (citing cases), and Morris does not challenge the validity of this waiver. In fact, Morris initially elected to pursue the grievance procedures provided for in the labor agreement, and later abandoned that path because of disappointing results with it in the past. His personal disappointment with the agreement makes it no less binding on him. See Antinore v. State, 49 A.D.2d 6, 371 N.Y.S.2d 213 (1975), aff'd, 40 N.Y.2d 921, 389 N.Y.S.2d 576, 358 N.E.2d 268 (1976). Where the plaintiff received the benefits of the collective bargaining contract, he must also accept its disadvantages, i.e., he must, so to speak, accept the bitter with the sweet. Morris has failed to prove he was subjected to inadequate process regarding his termination. C. Pavone, Jr. Pavone, Jr. asserts that he was deprived of his property interest by being denied an interview with the Police Department without due process. However, “[t]o have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it.... He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). Pavone, Jr. has no legally protected interest in an interview or a job with the Police Department. See Deas v. Levitt, 73 N.Y.2d 525, 532, 541 N.Y.S.2d 958, 539 N.E.2d 1086 (1989) (plurality opinion) (successful completion of the civil service exam does not create a property interest in an interview or a job); see also Donohue v. New York City Dep’t of Probation, No. 88 Civ. 5110, 1989 WL 126096, at - (S.D.N.Y. Oct.13, 1989) (characterizing Deas as clarifying that New York law creates no legally protected interest in consideration for a job). Without a property interest in the interview, Pavone, Jr.’s due process claim must fail. V Remaining Matters A.Appropriate Relief In determining what relief would be appropriate, it is helpful to look to Carlos v. Santos, 123 F.3d at 61, a case almost identical to this one. In Carlos, members of the Putnam Valley, New York, police force brought suits against certain members of the Town Board and the Town of Putnam Valley. Id. at 63. The plaintiffs alleged that the Board members planned to vote to abolish the Police Department as a means of retaliating against the Chief of Police for exercising his First Amendment rights. Id. In Carlos, we held that absolute immunity protected the local legislators from suit, but that the plaintiffs might recover damages from the municipality. Id. at 63, 66-67. We affirmed the district court’s denial of injunctive relief because the plaintiffs had an adequate remedy at law in the form of potential damages available at trial. Id. at 67. The plaintiffs additionally had rights under N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 80 et seq. to reinstatement were the defendants subsequently to hire a new police force. Id. In the case at hand, if plaintiffs show that the abolition of the Police Department violated their First Amendment rights, the district court then should determine whether they have adequate remedies at law, and whether an injunction would be inappropriate for policy reasons. B.Attorney’s Fees We come finally to the issue raised on cross-appeal: the attorneys’ fees award. The district court awarded plaintiffs attorneys’ fees in Pavone III based upon our “catalyst doctrine” because plaintiffs’ lawsuit had apparently resulted in the abandonment of the plan to abolish the Police Department. Under the “catalyst doctrine,” a plaintiff who obtains a settlement or a voluntary cessation of the challenged activity is a “prevailing party” entitled to attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, if the lawsuit was a catalyst or a substantial factor for the defendant’s favorable action. See Koster v. Perales, 903 F.2d 131, 134-35 (2d Cir.1990). However, since the district court’s decision, the Police Department has in fact been abolished, and plaintiffs at present cannot be considered “prevailing parties” under this doctrine. In light of that fact, we leave consideration of plaintiffs’ claims to the district court. Attorneys’ fees may now only be awarded pursuant to § 1988 depending upon the outcome of this litigation on remand. C.Conspiracy Claims Under § 1985 Plaintiffs also assert that defendants violated § 1985(2) when Town Attorney Wood expressly conditioned renewal of plaintiffs’ collective bargaining agreement upon the discontinuance of their federal civil rights actions. Section 1985(2) proscribes any conspiracy “to deter, by force, intimidation, or threat, any party or witness in any [federal] court ... from attending such court, or from testifying to any manner pending therein, ... or to injure [him] in his person or property on account of his having so attended or testified.” 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2). Because plaintiffs have succeeded in bringing their suits, they must demonstrate that they have been “injured in [their] person or property” by the ensuing acts of defendants and have suffered an actual injury. See Haddle v. Garrison, 525 U.S. 121, 119 S.Ct. 489, 491, 142 L.Ed.2d 502 (1998). It is not clear on the present record whether plaintiffs sustained actual harm from Woods’ conditioning of the renewal of their collective bargaining agreement on dismissal of the federal lawsuits, and the answer to this factual inquiry must also await remand.