Opinion ID: 10022
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Conventional Subrogation.

Text: 26 The district court held that because Wilhite was also an obligor to the RTC, and had already extinguished the debt to the RTC, he could not seek conventional subrogation against Schendle. The court based its conclusion on Louisiana Civil Code article 1854, which provides that performance by the obligor extinguishes the obligation. This interpretation is correct. Wilhite and Schendle were liable for the same obligation, although in divisible portions. As such, article 1854 applies. Because Wilhite was an obligor, and paid the obligation, he cannot now be a third party to that same obligation, and seek subrogation from another obligor. 27 In addition, under Louisiana law, third party subrogation can not arise unless so provided by law or by agreement. 14 Wilhite argues that paragraph six provides the necessary authorization to pursue conventional subrogation. As discussed above, however, paragraph six is merely meant to preserve pre-existing rights, not to create new ones. Thus, Wilhite has no right to conventional subrogation against Schendle. 28