Opinion ID: 692054
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Procedural Issues on Appeal

Text: 76 Mr. Smith, once again represented by new counsel, assistant federal public defender Stephen P. McCue, filed a timely notice of appeal challenging the district court's adverse ruling denying his petition for relief. Before turning to the merits of Mr. Smith's claims, however, we must address two threshold procedural issues. The first involves a jurisdictional matter regarding the availability of a certificate of probable cause to appeal, and the second relates to the procedural prerequisites for federal habeas corpus review. 1. Certificate of Probable Cause 77 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2253 provides, in relevant part, [a]n appeal [of an order denying a petition for a writ of habeas corpus] may not be taken to the court of appeals ... unless the ... judge who rendered the order or a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of probable cause. The district court declined to issue a certificate of probable cause to appeal, finding no substantial issue of law for review. Because [t]he statutory certificate of probable cause is a jurisdictional prerequisite to appeals from final orders in habeas corpus proceedings, Ramsey v. Hand, 309 F.2d 947, 948 (10th Cir.1962) (per curiam), 28 cert. denied, 373 U.S. 940, 83 S.Ct. 1547, 10 L.Ed.2d 695 (1963), we must determine whether Mr. Smith has in fact made the requisite showing of an entitlement to a certificate of probable cause to appeal. If he has, then we are authorized under Sec. 2253 to issue a certificate of probable cause to appeal, and upon its issuance, petitioner must then be afforded an opportunity to address the underlying merits. Garrison v. Patterson, 391 U.S. 464, 466, 88 S.Ct. 1687, 1688, 20 L.Ed.2d 744 (1968) (per curiam); see also Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3394-95, 77 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1983). If, however, there has not been a sufficient showing of an entitlement to a certificate of probable cause to appeal, then we are without jurisdiction to consider this appeal. See Ramsey, 309 F.2d at 948. 78 There is no automatic right to appeal a district court's order denying federal habeas corpus relief. By enacting Sec. 2253, Congress authorized a conditional right to appeal, conditioned on the habeas petitioner first obtaining a certificate of probable cause. See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2253. This requirement furthers the salutary purpose of weeding out frivolous appeals, see Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 892-93, 103 S.Ct. at 3394-95 (the primary means of separating meritorious from frivolous [habeas corpus] appeals should be the decision to grant or withhold a certificate of probable cause), by placing the burden on the habeas petitioner to make a threshold showing that the issues sought to be raised on appeal are at least arguably meritorious. See id. 79 In Gallagher v. Hannigan, 24 F.3d 68 (10th Cir.1994), we discussed the criteria courts should look to in evaluating whether a certificate of probable cause is warranted. In general, a habeas petitioner who fails to obtain relief in the district court should be permitted to appeal that disposition only upon a substantial showing of the denial of an important federal right by demonstrating that the issues raised are debatable among jurists, that a court could resolve the issues differently, or that the questions deserve further proceedings. Id. at 68 (citing Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 893 & n. 4, 103 S.Ct. at 3394-95 & n. 4). 80 In the present case, we believe the briefs demonstrate Mr. Smith has carried this threshold burden by making a satisfactory showing that the issues he seeks to raise are arguably meritorious and that they warrant further proceedings. Moreover, given the purpose of the requirement that a petitioner obtain a certificate of probable cause to appeal, we do not find that the claims are frivolous such that Mr. Smith should be denied appellate review of the district court's order denying his petition. Therefore, we grant his request for a certificate of probable cause to appeal. 2. Exhaustion 81 Having thus concluded we have jurisdiction over Mr. Smith's appeal, we next address whether his petition has satisfied the nonjurisdictional, but nonetheless important, procedural prerequisites to federal habeas corpus review. 82 At the time of his direct appeal, the three claims Mr. Smith now raises in federal court--Brady violations, ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and ineffective assistance of appellate counsel 29 --were unavailable to him. In his state petition for post-conviction relief, however, he was permitted to, and did in fact, litigate these three claims on the merits. Thus, he has undoubtedly exhausted these claims by fairly presenting them to the state courts, see, e.g., Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518-20 (1982), and they are therefore ripe for federal habeas corpus review. 30 II. DISCUSSION 83 We now turn to the merits of Mr. Smith's arguments on appeal, beginning with his claim that the prosecution failed to disclose various pieces of material exculpatory evidence. We start with an overview of the Brady doctrine.
84 [S]uppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196-97; accord United States v. Buchanan, 891 F.2d 1436, 1440 (10th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1088, 110 S.Ct. 1829, 108 L.Ed.2d 958 (1990). This oft-quoted language established the prosecutor's broad duty to disclose exculpatory material to the defense. Buchanan, 891 F.2d at 1440. 85 The disclosure principles of Brady are not rooted in the discovery rules of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2399, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976); United States v. Bonnett, 877 F.2d 1450, 1459 (10th Cir.1989) (Brady is not a discovery rule, but a rule of fairness and minimum prosecutorial obligation (citations omitted)). Rather, they are grounded in the constitutional guarantee of due process of law contained in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. 31 See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 107, 96 S.Ct. at 2399; Brady, 373 U.S. at 86, 83 S.Ct. at 1196. The essence of the Brady rule is the proposition that nondisclosure of material exculpatory evidence violates a defendant's due process right to a fair trial. See, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3380-81, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (The Brady rule is based on the requirement of due process.) (opinion of Blackmun, J.); United States v. Robinson, 39 F.3d 1115, 1118 (10th Cir.1994) (Due process mandates disclosure); United States v. Fleming, 19 F.3d 1325, 1330 (10th Cir.) (same), 32 cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 93, 130 L.Ed.2d 44 (1994). 86 We must be cognizant of the fact that [i]f the suppression of evidence results in constitutional error, it is because of the character of the evidence, not the character of the prosecutor. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 110, 96 S.Ct. at 2401; see also Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219, 102 S.Ct. 940, 947, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982) ([T]he touchstone of due process analysis in cases [alleging a Brady violation] is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.). As a result, it is irrelevant for Brady purposes  'whether the nondisclosure was a result of negligence or design.'  Buchanan, 891 F.2d at 1442 (quoting Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S.Ct. 763, 766, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972)); see also Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196-97 (noting that suppression of material exculpatory evidence violates due process irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution); United States v. Pedraza, 27 F.3d 1515, 1527 (10th Cir.1994) (same), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 347, 130 L.Ed.2d 303 (1994); United States v. Montoya, 716 F.2d 1340, 1345-46 (10th Cir.1983). 87 The purpose of Brady is not to displace the adversary system as the primary means by which truth is uncovered, but to ensure that a miscarriage of justice does not occur. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675, 105 S.Ct. at 3379-80. Brady and its progeny are thus grounded in notions of fundamental fairness and they embody a practical recognition of the imbalances inherent in our adversarial system of criminal justice. See, e.g., Bagley, 473 U.S. at 692-95, 105 S.Ct. at 3388-90 (Marshall, J., dissenting). To compensate for these imbalances, Brady represents a limited departure from a pure adversary model in the interest of promoting and enhancing the search for truth. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675 n. 6, 105 S.Ct. at 3379-80 n. 6; see also United States v. Abello-Silva, 948 F.2d 1168, 1180 (10th Cir.1991) (The government's hand is stacked with cards the defense lacks.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 107, 121 L.Ed.2d 65 (1992). Equally important, Brady acknowledges that the prosecutor's role transcends that of an adversary because the prosecutor, acting as the representative of the sovereign, has an obligation to ensure  'not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.'  Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675 n. 6, 105 S.Ct. at 3379-80 n. 6 (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 633, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935)); see also Brady, 373 U.S. at 87-88, 83 S.Ct. at 1196-97. 88 Of course, the Brady principle has limitations. The Constitution, as interpreted in Brady, does not require the prosecution to divulge every possible shred of evidence that could conceivably benefit the defendant. See, e.g., Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 795, 92 S.Ct. 2562, 2568, 33 L.Ed.2d 706 (1972) (We know of no constitutional requirement that the prosecution make a complete and detailed accounting to the defense of all police investigatory work on a case.); United States v. Comosona, 848 F.2d 1110, 1115 (10th Cir.1988) (The Government has no obligation to disclose possible theories of the defense to a defendant.). Due process only requires the disclosure of material exculpatory evidence which, if suppressed, would deprive the defendant of a fair trial. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675, 105 S.Ct. at 3380. Therefore, in order to establish a Brady violation, the defendant bears the burden 33 of establishing: 1) that the prosecution suppressed evidence; 2) that the evidence was favorable to the accused; and 3) that the evidence was material. United States v. Hughes, 33 F.3d 1248, 1251 (10th Cir.1994) (citing United States v. DeLuna, 10 F.3d 1529, 1534 (10th Cir.1993)); accord Fero v. Kerby, 39 F.3d 1462, 1472 (10th Cir.1994). We address the guiding legal principles governing each of these requirements in turn.
89 The first element requires proof that the prosecution suppressed or withheld the evidence in question. Several issues are particularly relevant to the determination in the case at bar of whether specific evidence was suppressed or withheld. First, as indicated above, the term suppression, in the Brady context, does not require a finding of bad faith or any other culpable state of mind on the part of the prosecutor. 34 See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196-97. Second, the prosecutor is the party who is ultimately accountable for the nondisclosure of evidence. See Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154, 92 S.Ct. at 766. Third, the prosecution for Brady purposes encompasses not only the individual prosecutor handling the case, but also extends to the prosecutor's entire office, see id., as well as law enforcement personnel and other arms of the state 35 involved in investigative aspects of a particular criminal venture. Logically, then, it follows that because  ' investigative officers are part of the prosecution, the taint on the trial is no less if they, rather than the prosecutors, were guilty of nondisclosure. '  Buchanan, 891 F.2d at 1442 (quoting United States v. Endicott, 869 F.2d 452, 455 (9th Cir.1989) (quoting United States v. Butler, 567 F.2d 885, 891 (9th Cir.1978))). 90 Thus, while proof the prosecutor had actual knowledge of the existence of the evidence at issue would be sufficient to establish the suppression element of a Brady claim, such proof is by no means necessary. For purposes of Brady, [k]nowledge by police or investigators is ... imputed to the prosecution. Buchanan, 891 F.2d at 1442 (citations omitted). Our recent decision in Fero, which reaffirmed the continuing vitality of this constructive knowledge doctrine in the Brady context, stated [b]ecause the police are considered agents of the prosecution for Brady purposes, the fact that it was the police and not the prosecutor who misplaced the [evidence], is irrelevant. Fero, 39 F.3d at 1472 n. 12 (emphasis added) (citing Buchanan, 891 F.2d at 1442); see also Ballinger v. Kerby, 3 F.3d 1371, 1377 (10th Cir.1993) (Kelly, J., dissenting) (Even imputing the nondisclosure of this [evidence] to the prosecutor). 36
91 The second element of a Brady claim requires proof the evidence in question was exculpatory, or favorable, to the defendant. In this regard, it is worth noting that  'because impeachment is integral to a defendant's constitutional right to cross-examination, there exists no pat distinction between impeachment and exculpatory evidence under Brady.'  Ballinger, 3 F.3d at 1376 (quoting Buchanan, 891 F.2d at 1443); accord Hughes, 33 F.3d at 1252. This is especially true [w]here a witness' credibility is material to the question of guilt. Fleming, 19 F.3d at 1330; see also Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154-55, 92 S.Ct. at 766. As Justice Blackmun stated in Bagley: 92 Impeachment evidence, ... as well as exculpatory evidence, falls within the Brady rule. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 [92 S.Ct. 763, 766, 31 L.Ed.2d 104] (1972). Such evidence is evidence favorable to an accused, Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 [83 S.Ct. at 1196], so that, if disclosed and used effectively, it may make the difference between conviction and acquittal. Cf. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 [79 S.Ct. 1173, 1177, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217] (1959) (The jury's estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence, and it is upon such subtle factors as the possible interest of the witness in testifying falsely that a defendant's life or liberty may depend). 93 473 U.S. at 676, 105 S.Ct. at 3380. 37 In sum, then, the fact that a particular piece of evidence is probative only for purposes of impeachment is not a defense to a Brady claim because  '[i]mpeachment evidence merits the same constitutional treatment as exculpatory evidence.'  Abello-Silva, 948 F.2d at 1179 (citation omitted).
94 The third and final element of a Brady claim requires proof that the evidence was material either to guilt or to punishment. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196-97; see also Ballinger, 3 F.3d at 1376. A fair analysis of the holding in Brady indicates that implicit in the requirement of materiality is a concern that the suppressed evidence might have affected the outcome of the trial. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 104, 96 S.Ct. at 2397; Buchanan, 891 F.2d at 1441. 95 The proper standard of materiality must reflect our overriding concern with the justice of the finding of guilt. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112, 96 S.Ct. at 2401 (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court first addressed the materiality question in Agurs, enunciating three different standards 38 of materiality dependent upon the specificity of the defendant's request and the conduct of the prosecutor. Buchanan, 891 F.2d at 1441. 96 If the defendant made a specific request for disclosure of an identifiable piece of evidence, then the prosecution was on specific notice of what was sought. Thus, the standard of materiality should be, and was, more lenient than if the defendant made either a general request for all Brady evidence or no request at all, both of which fail to provide any descriptive notice of what is being sought. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678-83, 105 S.Ct. at 3381-84 (discussing Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103-12, 96 S.Ct. at 2397-2402). 97 Agurs specifically considered the obligation of the prosecution in cases where no request was made. Recognizing that disclosure obligations are tied to the level of notice afforded to the prosecution, the Court held: 98 If there is a duty to respond to a general request ... it must derive from the obviously exculpatory character of certain evidence in the hands of the prosecutor. But if the evidence is so clearly supportive of a claim of innocence that it gives the prosecution notice of a duty to produce, that duty should equally arise even if no request is made.... [W]e conclude that there is no significant difference between cases in which there has been merely a general request for exculpatory matter and cases ... in which there has been no request at all. 99 Agurs, 427 U.S. at 107, 96 S.Ct. at 2399 (emphasis added). Therefore, while it is certainly more prudent for defense counsel to at least make a general request for Brady material rather than no request at all, the failure to make any request does not relieve the prosecution of its obligation to disclose evidence with an obviously exculpatory character. 100 As a practical matter, this must be true, at least in situations where defense counsel simply has no way of knowing the prosecution possesses certain exculpatory evidence. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 106, 96 S.Ct. at 2399 (In many cases, however, exculpatory information in the possession of the prosecutor may be unknown to defense counsel.). Any other rule would penalize criminal defendants for their counsel's failure to be prescient. Moreover, if defense counsel knew the prosecution possessed particular exculpatory evidence, counsel could vitiate this entire problem by making a specific request for that evidence. It is precisely because defense counsel does not, and cannot, know what potentially exculpatory evidence the prosecution possesses that there cannot realistically be any meaningful distinction between the prosecution's obligation under Brady in a general request case and its obligation in a no request case. If the prosecution possesses evidence that, in the context of a particular case is obviously exculpatory, then it has an obligation to disclose it to defense counsel whether a general request is made or whether no request is made. This represents a paradigmatic example of the imbalances inherent in the criminal justice process, and it serves to illustrate the purpose behind the Brady doctrine. 101 The Agurs framework, however, was unnecessarily rigid and the semantic distinctions between the different standards of materiality were often difficult to apply in practice. In Bagley, five members of the Court, through two separate opinions, adopted a single standard of materiality sufficiently flexible to cover the 'no request,' 'general request,' and 'specific request' cases. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. at 3383 (opinion of Blackmun, J.); id. at 685, 105 S.Ct. at 3385 (opinion of White, J.); 39 see also Bowen v. Maynard, 799 F.2d 593, 603 (10th Cir.) (discussing the three standards of materiality under Agurs and noting that after Bagley, courts are to apply a single test ... to all instances of nondisclosure, including specific request, general request and no request cases), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 962, 107 S.Ct. 458, 93 L.Ed.2d 404 (1986). Under this standard, [t]he evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. at 3383; accord Fero, 39 F.3d at 1472; Ballinger, 3 F.3d at 1376. 102 Under this more flexible, sliding scale approach to assessing the materiality vel non of the evidence in question, the specificity of the request is inversely related to the prosecution's disclosure obligation. As the specificity of the defendant's request increases, a lesser showing of materiality will suffice to establish a violation. Conversely, as the defendant's request becomes more general or even nonexistent, a greater showing of materiality is required to establish a Brady violation. 103 In making the materiality determination, we view the suppressed evidence's significance in relation to the record as a whole, Hughes, 33 F.3d at 1252 (citing United States v. Wolf, 839 F.2d 1387, 1391 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 923, 109 S.Ct. 304, 102 L.Ed.2d 323 (1988)), keeping in mind that [w]hat might be considered insignificant evidence in a strong case might suffice to disturb an already questionable verdict. Robinson, 39 F.3d at 1119 (citing Agurs, 427 U.S. at 113, 96 S.Ct. at 2402). We are also to consider any adverse effect that the prosecutor's failure to respond might have had on the preparation or presentation of the defendant's case ... in light of the totality of the circumstances. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 683, 105 S.Ct. at 3384. 104 We reiterate the question of [w]hether the government was required to disclose certain evidence under Brady is a mixed question of law and fact which we review de novo. Fleming, 19 F.3d at 1330 (citing Buchanan, 891 F.2d at 1440); Abello-Silva, 948 F.2d at 1179. Therefore, [t]he state court's ultimate conclusion under Brady ... is not entitled to a presumption of correctness under section 2254(d) and is open to review by federal courts. Bowen, 799 F.2d at 610 (citing Chaney v. Brown, 730 F.2d 1334, 1344-46 (10th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1090, 105 S.Ct. 601, 83 L.Ed.2d 710 (1985)); see also Case, 887 F.2d at 1393 (No presumption of correctness attaches to legal conclusions or determinations on mixed questions of law and fact. Those are reviewed de novo on federal habeas review.). 40 Findings of fact by the district court are reviewed for clear error. See Thomas v. Kerby, 44 F.3d 884, 886 (10th Cir.1995) (a district court's factual findings in a habeas corpus case are reviewed for clear error) (citing Hill v. Reynolds, 942 F.2d 1494, 1495 (10th Cir.1991)). We must now apply these principles to the facts of the present case.
105 A review of the record in this case reveals the prosecution did in fact fail to disclose most, if not all, the evidence at issue. The State's primary defenses to Mr. Smith's claims were that the evidence was made available pursuant to the district attorney's open file policy, that the evidence was not withheld intentionally, or that the prosecutors did not have knowledge the evidence existed. Because these issues are largely irrelevant to Brady analysis, it follows that the State has not offered a legitimate defense to Mr. Smith's claims. Further, our confidence in the outcome of the trial has been seriously undermined by the cumulative effect of several of these nondisclosures. We therefore find, for reasons set forth below, Mr. Smith is entitled to federal habeas relief.
106 It is undisputed Mr. Smith made a specific request for police reports relating to investigation or inquiring into circumstances surrounding these criminal complaints, and that the trial court entered an order requiring disclosure of all police reports ... made in connection with this case. In Agurs, the Supreme Court warned [w]hen the prosecutor receives a specific and relevant request, the failure to make any response is seldom, if ever, excusable. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 106, 96 S.Ct. at 2399. The State argues it had an open file policy in place that discharged its obligation under Brady by making this material available to the defense. We disagree. 107 An open file policy is neither mandated by the Constitution, see Moore, 408 U.S. at 795, 92 S.Ct. at 2568, nor is it ipso facto constitutionally sufficient. While an open file policy may suffice to discharge the prosecution's Brady obligations in a particular case, it often will not be dispositive of the issue. It is not difficult to envision circumstances where the prosecution possesses, either actually or constructively, Brady information that for some reason is not in the file, such as material in a police officer's file (but not in the prosecutor's file) or material learned orally and not memorialized in writing. No one could reasonably argue that under those circumstances, assuming the evidence was exculpatory, the prosecution's Brady obligations would be satisfied by its open file policy. To adopt such a holding would permit the prosecution to discharge its obligations under Brady by talismanically invoking the words open file policy, and thus circumvent the purpose behind Brady. We believe this reading of Brady is too formalistic and is flawed because it fails to recognize that Brady material may be found in places other than a prosecutor's file. The prosecution's affirmative obligation under Brady may often go beyond divulging what is in the file. 41 Thus, while a prosecution's open file policy is relevant and may be considered in determining whether a Brady violation occurred, it cannot, standing alone, be given dispositive weight.a. Officer Morrison's Report 108 In the present case, it is clear as a threshold matter that the report prepared by Officer Morrison of the New Mexico State Police, that contained information relating to Randy Newell's presence near the vicinity of the bodies on two separate occasions, to the clothes taken from his car and to his status as a suspect in this investigation, falls within the scope of the trial court's disclosure order. Although his report was initially necessitated by a traffic accident involving Randy Newell, both the contents of the report and the caption of the report indicate a relationship between the report and the Talton-McDonnell homicides. The report thus was relevant and within the umbrella of the defendant's request. The question then becomes whether it was disclosed. 109 The magistrate judge made a conclusory finding found that [p]etitioner has not shown that the State failed to comply with its Brady obligation to turn over [Officer Morrison's] report. Although this finding is reviewed only for clear error, and although we are required to afford appropriate deference to the trial courts on factual matters, we must still scrutinize factual findings to insure that there is a sufficient evidentiary basis for the finding. In this case, while we do not do so lightly, we are convinced, for reasons set forth below, that this finding is clearly erroneous. 110 We are troubled by the fact that this finding of disclosure of Officer Morrison's report is unsupported by evidence in the record. In fact, the evidence in the record from the evidentiary hearing strongly suggests and supports a contrary finding, namely, that the report was not disclosed. For example, neither prosecutor had any recollection of specifically disclosing this report to Mr. Smith's counsel. Although no finding was made concerning whether this report was in the file in 1977, the State stipulated the report was not in the file in 1983. While far from conclusive, this fact tends to support a finding of nondisclosure, especially in light of the other evidence. 111 Mr. Harris' testimony was also consistent with a finding of nondisclosure as he testified he never received a copy of that report. But perhaps the most highly probative evidence relating to the disclosure vel non of this report is the conspicuous absence of any cross-examination of Mr. Newell on the matters contained in Officer Morrison's report, matters that were extremely relevant to Mr. Smith's defense. 42 The sum total of this evidence, coupled with the sheer absence of any evidence supporting a finding of disclosure, compels us to conclude the magistrate judge's finding of disclosure of this report was clearly erroneous. 112 Moreover, there can be no doubt the evidence contained therein was favorable to the defense. Officer Morrison's report would have provided important investigative leads and impeachment evidence to Mr. Smith and his attorney regarding Randy Newell. The evidence would have permitted more thorough impeachment of a critical state's witness and would have immeasurably strengthened Mr. Smith's defense that Randy Newell was the perpetrator and not Mr. Smith. 113 To the extent the magistrate judge concluded this impeachment evidence would merely have been cumulative, the record provides no support for this finding and it is therefore clearly erroneous. See Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511-12, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985). Cumulative evidence is defined as evidence which goes to prove what has already been established by other evidence. Black's Law Dictionary 343 (5th ed. 1979). Officer Morrison's report might have been cumulative had the specific contents of it been disclosed to the defense at some other time. But, as the discussion below illustrates, the contents of the report were not disclosed nor was Mr. Newell ever impeached about any of the material contained in the report. 114 Thus, the potential impeachment value of the report cannot be said to be cumulative of anything already established on cross-examination of Mr. Newell. To the contrary, disclosure of this report would have alerted counsel to the existence of the clothing and permitted defense counsel to examine the clothing found and to have it tested. Furthermore, this information, taken together with Mr. Newell's already existing motive of jealousy, which was established on cross-examination, would have undoubtedly inured to Mr. Smith's benefit. 115 The nondisclosure of this report, and the contents thereof, dramatically altered and limited the effectiveness of Mr. Smith's defense at trial. Additionally, while the knowledge the police were investigating Mr. Newell would arguably carry significant weight with the jury in and of itself, that fact would also have been useful in discredit[ing] the caliber of the investigation or the decision to charge the defendant, factors we may consider is assessing whether a Brady violation occurred. Bowen, 799 F.2d at 613. 116 Finally, we cannot agree with the state post-conviction court and the federal district court that, in the alternative, this evidence was not material. We repeat that the failure to disclose this report, in light of a specific request for it, is seldom, if ever, excusable. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 106, 96 S.Ct. at 2399. We believe the nondisclosure of this report clearly impacted the defense's preparation and presentation of its case at trial. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 683, 105 S.Ct. at 3384. In addition, given Mr. Smith's defense at trial, the significance of Randy Newell's testimony, and the fact that the first trial resulted in a mistrial, we believe the disclosure of this evidence, considered in light of the entire record, can reasonably be said to have affected the outcome of the retrial so as to undermine our confidence in the verdict. 117 b. Sergeant Gonzales' Report 118 The same holds true for Sergeant Gonzales' report containing the critical information that Ms. Pitchford indicated Randy Newell was known as Samuel J. Newell. As we discuss below, there is evidence in the record that the prosecution learned this information from Detective Borunda. Detective Borunda stated he told the prosecutors sometime prior to the end of the retrial that he had learned Randy Newell was Samuel J. Newell. 119 Limiting the present discussion to Sergeant Gonzales' report, we note the record does not indicate whether this report was ever in the file. Harris testified he was never advised as to Randy Newell's true identity. If this report was in the file and was not disclosed, then a Brady violation occurred. But even if this report was not in the prosecutor's file, it is clear that for Brady purposes the knowledge of law enforcement personnel is imputed to the prosecutor, thereby constituting constructive knowledge of Newell's true identity. Accordingly, the State's argument, which was accepted by the magistrate judge, that Ms. Ferrara did not actually know the true identity of Newell, is simply misplaced because actual knowledge is not necessary. Moreover, the State has not argued this information would not be evidence favorable to Mr. Smith, subject to Brady disclosure, thereby implicitly conceding that point, which is entirely proper in our view. Finally, we believe this evidence was material in that disclosure of Randy Newell's true identity, with the accompanying information regarding his prior convictions and fugitive status, can reasonably be said to have altered the verdict on this case.
120 The fact of Randy Newell's true identity, and the information as to his background, was not limited to Sergeant Gonzales' report. Detective Borunda testified he told one of the prosecutors some time before the end of the second trial that Randy Newell was Samuel J. Newell, and that he provided a rap sheet with Samuel J. Newell's record. 121 Although Detective Borunda testified he informed the prosecutors of this information, they denied ever learning of this fact or of ever obtaining a copy of a rap sheet for Samuel J. Newell, thereby creating a factual dispute in the record. If it was in fact true the prosecutors actually knew of Mr. Newell's real identity and nonetheless permitted him to testify under a false name, then this case would be governed by Napue, which held the prosecution may not knowingly fail to correct information it knows to be false. See Napue, 360 U.S. at 269, 79 S.Ct. at 1177. Under such circumstances, the nondisclosed evidence would be presumptively material unless the State demonstrates the nondisclosure was harmless error. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 104, 96 S.Ct. at 2398. 122 In this case, the state post-conviction court and the magistrate judge implicitly found Detective Borunda's testimony not credible because both courts concluded there was no evidence the prosecution had actual knowledge of Newell's true identity. We cannot say this finding of the district court is clearly erroneous because the evidence is susceptible to two permissible interpretations depending on the weight given to the testimony of the respective witnesses. See Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573-74, 105 S.Ct. at 1511-12; see also Exxon Corp. v. Gann, 21 F.3d 1002, 1005 (10th Cir.1994) (appellate court must uphold district court's factual findings as long as they are permissible in light of the evidence in the record). The only way these courts could have reached their conclusions would be to discredit Detective Borunda's testimony, and we do not second-guess such credibility determinations on appeal. See, e.g., Church v. Sullivan, 942 F.2d 1501, 1516 (10th Cir.1991) (we treat a state court finding regarding witness credibility as a finding of fact.); cf. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574-75, 105 S.Ct. at 1511-12 (emphasizing appellate courts owe heightened deference to trial court's credibility determinations under Rule 52(a)). 123 But while the factual determination that Detective Borunda did not convey this information to the prosecution avoids a Napue situation, it does not alter the fact that Detective Borunda, who himself was a member of the Albuquerque Police Department, knew of this false identity. Under prevailing principles governing Brady claims, this information, having been possessed by an investigative arm of the state that the prosecution knew was involved in investigating this case, is imputed to the prosecution under Brady. Accordingly, the prosecution is deemed to have known Randy Newell was actually Samuel J. Newell; whether they had actual knowledge of this fact is irrelevant. 43 124 In this respect, both the magistrate judge and the State manifested a misunderstanding of the applicable law. The magistrate judge repeatedly faulted Mr. Smith for failing to prove the prosecution's failure to disclose was done knowingly or intentionally. In so doing, however, we believe the magistrate judge placed an excessive burden on Mr. Smith because Buchanan and the discussion above hold exactly to the contrary, namely, that actual knowledge is not necessary to establish a Brady claim. The State, moreover, argues [c]ommon sense infers the prosecution's obligation to disclose information is limited to that information which is in the possession of the prosecution. The problem is the State interprets the italicized language too narrowly, contending possession means actual possession and that the prosecution is limited to the prosecuting attorneys and not law enforcement personnel. For reasons already expressed, both of these interpretations of law are inaccurate. 125 It follows that because the State is deemed to have had knowledge of Randy Newell's true identity, it is accountable for failing to disclose his prior record of convictions and his fugitive status, which were the subject of a specific Brady request by Mr. Smith's counsel and which the State properly concedes are subject to Brady disclosure. Once again, for the same reasons discussed earlier, we find this evidence to be material because its nondisclosure undermines our confidence in the verdict. The prior convictions serve as significant impeachment evidence of Mr. Newell, 44 as does the fact he was attempting to conceal his true identity. Furthermore, this evidence also supports Mr. Smith's defense that someone else, someone with at least as strong of a motive as that attributed to Mr. Smith, may have committed these crimes. 126 The record thus discloses a classic situation where the left hand did not know what the right hand was doing. It appears that the various investigative agencies involved in this case constructed a wall separating the Bernalillo County investigation of Mr. Smith from the Torrance County investigation of Mr. Newell. But this lack of communication and coordination among arms of the state cannot be, and is not, a defense to the prosecution's failure to disclose favorable, material information to the defendant when that failure to disclose amounts to denying a criminal defendant a fair trial. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108, 96 S.Ct. at 2399-2400. 127
128 We next address Mr. Smith's claim the prosecution failed to disclose the clothes seized from Mr. Newell's car. As indicated above, there is no distinction in the prosecutor's obligation to disclose Brady material when the defense makes a general request as compared to when the defense makes no request at all. If the evidence in question has an obviously exculpatory character, then disclosure of that evidence is mandatory. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 107, 96 S.Ct. at 2399. 129 In the present case, Mr. Smith argues the State was aware of the clothes prior to trial, that it suspected the substance on the women's underwear was blood but that it never tested the substance, and that it did not make the clothing available to the defense to allow it to test the substance. Thus, in the context of this case, given Newell's possible involvement in this case, Mr. Smith argues the prosecution violated Brady by failing to disclose the clothing. The State responds by arguing that any potential exculpatory value of the clothing is speculative since no testing was ever done, that the clothes were in the evidence room and were available upon request from Mr. Harris, and the magistrate judge found the clothing was not material. 45 130 As an initial matter, there can be no doubt if the prosecution had tested the clothing, the results of those tests would have to be disclosed pursuant to the court's discovery order. That order provided, in relevant part, that the district attorney's office shall disclose to the defense, inter alia, scientific experiments made in connection with this case, immediately, and shall continue to provide the copies to the defense counsel during the pendency of this action. The clothes, however, were never tested and no scientific reports ever produced before the clothes were destroyed. It is also undisputed both Ms. Ferrara and Mr. Anuskewicz knew these clothes existed prior to the start of the first trial in this matter; they had examined them at the evidence room in the Albuquerque Police Department. 131 The question thus becomes whether the prosecution had an obligation to disclose either the existence of these clothes, any testing of the clothes, or both, 46 to the defense, knowing that: they were seized from the vehicle of another suspect; everyone who examined the underwear said the substance might have been blood; the substance on the underwear was on the same side as the gunshot wound to Talton's leg; and Mr. Newell, a self-interested witness who was a suspect in these same crimes and who had been stopped in the vicinity where the bodies were found, indicated the substance was menstrual blood even though the substance was not in an area where menstrual blood would ordinarily be found. Under the unusual circumstances of this case, we believe the prosecution failed to comply with the requirements of Brady by not disclosing these clothes to the defense. 132 First, we once again reject the prosecution's reliance on its open file policy. The prosecution knew about the circumstances surrounding the seizure of these clothes, and Mr. Harris testified he was never made aware of their existence. He had no reason to know he should have asked to see these clothes since he did not know they existed. 47 While the clothes were marked in the evidence room with a tag, it stated Articles from vehicle accident, and nothing more. Because Mr. Harris was never given the police reports indicating clothing had been seized from Mr. Newell's car and because he otherwise had no way of knowing he should be looking for these clothes, the prosecution's failure to advise him specifically of their existence was faulty. 133 Second, we have no trouble concluding this evidence was favorable to Mr. Smith. Even without medical tests of the clothing to evaluate whether the substance was in fact blood, the mere fact that Mr. Newell had these clothes in his car would itself have been a subject for cross-examination. As for the lack of any testing, the State's argument that the potential exculpatory value of testing is speculative because none was ever done is not persuasive. The State possessed these clothes and at least Ms. Ferrara recognized the potential importance of the substance on the clothes, and she thus suggested tests be done. In spite of this initial decision, no tests were ever performed and the clothes were never made available to the defense to allow it to conduct independent tests. Under these circumstances, the State may not now claim that whatever exculpatory value the clothes possessed was speculative. 134 Finally, while the State asserts this evidence was not material, in reliance on the magistrate judge's conclusion, we again respectfully disagree with that ruling. Our de novo review of the entire record in this case convinces us the result of the proceeding could reasonably have been different had the clothes taken from Mr. Newell's car been disclosed to the defense. This evidence was highly probative with respect to Mr. Smith's defense at trial and could very well have resulted in the first jury returning an acquittal. Under the circumstances of this case, our confidence in the outcome of the proceeding has been undermined. We cannot say that the result of the trial would have remained the same had this evidence been disclosed. Therefore, we find this evidence was material for Brady purposes.
135 The last pieces of evidence at issue are Mr. Newell's statements to various law enforcement personnel. Although it does not appear a specific request for these statements was made, the State does not dispute its obligation to produce a witness' prior statements. The state post-conviction court found [r]eports indicate statements were taken from Newell which statements were not in the files of the District Attorney, were not examined by the District Attorney, and which have never been located or verified as existing or as to content. The magistrate judge did not expressly address the merits of this claim, stating only: 136 Petitioner ... contends that much of the evidence marshalled by the Torrence [sic] County law enforcement, such as ... statements made by Newell, were material and exculpatory and should have been disclosed.... The Bernalillo County investigation superseded the preliminary one of Torrence [sic] County. The Torrence [sic] County tapes were not part of that investigation. 137 Thus, the magistrate judge seemed to erect a wall between the two local investigations, notwithstanding the fact they were both state entities and that the prosecuting office was aware that both entities were involved in investigating this case. 138 The State attempts to defend the nondisclosure of these statements by arguing its open file policy, and further, that [t]he prosecution apparently did not have possession of or use the supposed statements during the trial or for purposes of investigation. We have previously noted why the State's reliance on the open file policy is misplaced. As an aside, the issue of Mr. Newell's statements presents a perfect example of the inadequacy of an open file policy with respect to the prosecution's obligations under Brady: the state postconviction court found that Mr. Newell's statements were not even in the file. 139 Furthermore, even assuming the prosecution did not know about these statements, 48 it is clear the various law enforcement personnel did. Accordingly, their knowledge is again imputed to the prosecuting attorneys for Brady purposes. The prosecution's alleged nonuse or lack of possession of these statements is an attempt by the State to alter the relevant inquiry. It remains undisputed the law enforcement personnel possessed these statements, and this is what is important, not whether the prosecution did or did not use or possess the statements. 140 Moreover, these statements are again evidence favorable to Mr. Smith as impeachment evidence relative to Mr. Newell's credibility. For the same reasons espoused above, we believe the failure to disclose these statements, when taken in conjunction with the other nondisclosures, undermines our confidence in the outcome of this case. 141 In sum, we hold the cumulative 49 effect of the prosecution's nondisclosures undermines our confidence in the outcome of the trial. We perceive the primary cause for these nondisclosures to be a lack of communication between various law enforcement agencies of the State of New Mexico, rather than a deliberate suppression of evidence. Nonetheless, the prejudice resulting from the prosecution's failure to coordinate the various investigations in this case cannot be allocated to the defendant when his constitutional right to a fair trial lies in the balance. [T]he existence of any small piece of evidence favorable to the defense may, in a particular case, create just the doubt that prevents the jury from returning a verdict of guilty. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 693, 105 S.Ct. at 3389 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Robinson, 39 F.3d at 1119. While some of this evidence, standing alone, may seem somewhat trivial, in the context of the entire record in this case, we believe the disclosure of all of this evidence might have led to a different result. In short, our confidence in the result of the retrial has been sufficiently undermined to warrant relief in this case. 142 Almost all of the nondisclosed evidence was relevant to Mr. Smith's attempt to demonstrate why Randy Newell had as much reason to have committed these murders as did Mr. Smith. The nondisclosure of this evidence altered and affected Mr. Smith's preparation and presentation of his defense at trial. The fact that the prosecution's case was entirely circumstantial, coupled with the fact that the jury in Mr. Smith's first trial was unable to reach a unanimous decision, creates a reasonable probability the result of the proceeding would have been different had this evidence been disclosed to the jury. Prosecutor Virginia Ferrara even expressed her skepticism at whether a conviction would have been possible if this evidence had been disclosed. E.g., Bowen, 799 F.2d at 610 (recognizing the relevance of the prosecutor's own views as to the effect the evidence would have had on the ability to convict). Therefore, we find Mr. Smith has sustained his burden of establishing he was denied a fair trial under Brady. 50