Opinion ID: 12
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appeals from Verdicts for Plaintiffs on U.S. Constitution Fourth Amendment Claims

Text: We first consider whether Vieira and Lennon were entitled to qualified immunity. The defendants have preserved their objections to the district court's denial of immunity. Plaintiffs do not seriously contend otherwise. [19] Our review of the denial of qualified immunity is de novo. Guillemard-Ginorio v. Contreras-Gómez, 585 F.3d 508, 525 (1st Cir.2009). To the extent it is relevant, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. Id. We conclude the court erred in denying the individual defendants qualified immunity. Officials are entitled to qualified immunity unless (1) the facts that a plaintiff has alleged or shown make out a violation of a constitutional right and (2) the right at issue was `clearly established' at the time of [their] alleged misconduct. Pearson v. Callahan, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 808, 816, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009). The Supreme Court has given this second prong two aspects. The first is whether, based on the clarity of the law at the time of the alleged civil rights violation, `[t]he contours of the right ... [were] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 269 (1st Cir.2009) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)). The second aspect is whether, based on the facts of the particular case, a reasonable defendant would have understood that his conduct violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Id. Qualified immunity generally protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986). Courts need not address these questions in order. Pearson, 129 S.Ct. at 818; Maldonado, 568 F.3d at 269-70. We turn to the second part of the test and specifically ask whether the right in question was so clearly established as to give notice to defendants that their actions were unconstitutional in 2002. [20] This is a question of pure law. This question must be resolved based on the state of the law at the time of the alleged violation. See Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198, 125 S.Ct. 596, 160 L.Ed.2d 583 (2004). Further, this inquiry `must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition,' id. (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001)), and [t]he relevant, dispositive inquiry ... is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151 (emphasis added). Thus, the relevant question in this case is not whether in 2002 the Fourth Amendment generally prohibited the recording of telephone calls. The question is whether, in 2002, public safety employees, like plaintiffs, had a clearly established right under the Fourth Amendment not to have calls made at work recorded. We hold there was no such clearly established law. There were no Supreme Court cases, no cases of controlling authority in [plaintiffs'] jurisdiction at the time of the incident, and no consensus of cases of persuasive authority showing that plaintiffs' asserted Fourth Amendment rights were clearly established in 2002. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999) (holding that where none of these sources had relevant supporting precedent, the asserted right was not clearly established); see also Brady v. Dill, 187 F.3d 104, 116 (1st Cir.1999). In 2002, there was no Supreme Court precedent that addressed whether defendants' particular conduct violated the Fourth Amendment. Plaintiffs rely heavily on Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), which held that the Fourth Amendment generally requires the government to obtain prior judicial sanction before recording calls from a public telephone booth. Id. at 355-59, 88 S.Ct. 507. They likewise cite O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 107 S.Ct. 1492, 94 L.Ed.2d 714 (1987), which merely held that an employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office desk and file cabinets that he did not share with other employees. Id. at 718, 107 S.Ct. 1492. Neither of these cases address public safety employees' expectations of privacy at work, and neither can be construed to show that defendants' particular conduct was unlawful. This is precisely the kind of high level of generality that the Court has held insufficient, Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 200, 125 S.Ct. 596, particularly given the Court's recognition that an individual's expectation of privacy varies within different parts of the workplace and depending upon the nature of his or her work. See O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 716-17, 107 S.Ct. 1492. Nor had any First Circuit case held as of 2002 that the Fourth Amendment was violated if police and fire public safety employers recorded all calls to and from their employees' offices. There was also no clear consensus among other circuit courts. Indeed, this lack of consensus was explicitly recognized by the one court of appeals to squarely address a factual situation similar to the case at hand. In that case, Blake v. Wright, 179 F.3d 1003 (6th Cir.1999), the Sixth Circuit held that a police chief was entitled to qualified immunity for his implementation of a system that recorded almost all personal, emergency, and administrative calls at a police station without the police employees' knowledge. It so held because the unconstitutionality of these recordings was not clearly established as a matter of law. Id. at 1010-11. [21] This certainly would not have informed the individual defendants that their specific conduct violated the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, other circuits' precedents in a line of cases under Title III of the federal wiretap act would have led reasonable officials to conclude that recording all calls into and out of a police station was neither illegal nor unconstitutional. If under Title III law the defendants could have concluded their actions were not illegal, then they could reasonably have concluded it was not clearly established that the same actions would violate the Constitution. Congress enacted Title III in response to Katz, see Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 523, 121 S.Ct. 1753, 149 L.Ed.2d 787 (2001), and in doing so attempted to provide at least as much protection as the Constitution affords. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 531-32, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985); Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 256 n. 18, 99 S.Ct. 1682, 60 L.Ed.2d 177 (1979). Further, Title III statutory requirements are relevant to the question of what public safety employees' reasonable expectations of privacy were. [22] The lead Title III case that defendants relied on for their immunity claims is Amati v. City of Woodstock, 176 F.3d 952 (7th Cir.1999). There, the court upheld a jury finding that a police department's practice of recording all calls on a line used by employees for both personal and business calls was not a violation of Title III. Id. at 955-56. The court held that the calls fell within the exception for recording by an investigative or law enforcement officer in the ordinary course of his duties. Id. at 954-55. The court found [i]t is routine, standard, hence `ordinary' for all calls to and from the police to be recorded, because the calls may constitute vital evidence and can be used to evaluate[] the speed and adequacy of the response of the police to tips, complaints, and calls for emergency assistance. Id. at 954. The Amati court further explained it was irrelevant whether personal calls on a police department's lines were recorded, holding that if all the lines are taped, as is the ordinary practice of police departments, then the recording of personal as well as of official calls is within the ordinary course. Id. at 956. Other courts had also taken the view before 2002 that the routine and almost universal recording of phone lines by police departments ... as well as other law enforcement institutions is exempt from the [federal wiretap statute] and the practice of routinely and indiscriminately record[ing] all phone activity in and out of the police department is well known in the industry and in the general public. Adams v. City of Battle Creek, 250 F.3d 980, 984 (6th Cir.2001); see also Abraham v. County of Greenville, 237 F.3d 386, 391 (4th Cir.2001) (recognizing the County's need to monitor for law enforcement purposes calls relating to Detention Center inmates and employees); First v. Stark County Bd. of Comm'rs, No. 99-3547, 2000 WL 1478389, at  (6th Cir.2000) (holding the routine recording of all conversations in a sheriff's office dispatchers' department was protected by Title III's law enforcement provisions and dismissing plaintiffs' constitutional claims). We need not address the jury's verdict. This is an issue of law on which the district court erred. The individual defendants are entitled to judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.
This leaves the City's Rule 50 motion on the Fourth Amendment claims against it. [23] The City says there is no municipal liability for the recordings because plaintiffs' calls were not recorded pursuant to any official policy or custom. This issue was preserved. We review de novo. Valentin-Almeyda v. Mun. of Aguadilla, 447 F.3d 85, 95-96 (1st Cir. 2006). We hold, contrary to the district court, that the City was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Municipal defendants may be held liable under § 1983 for actions taken pursuant to an official policy or an official custom that violated the Constitution. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018; Young v. City of Providence, 404 F.3d 4, 26 (1st Cir.2005). A plaintiff can establish the existence of an official policy by, inter alia, showing that the alleged constitutional injury was caused ... by a person with final policymaking authority. Welch v. Ciampa, 542 F.3d 927, 941 (1st Cir.2008) (internal citations omitted). Whether an official is a final policymaker is also a question of law for the trial judge to decide. [24] Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989). This determination requires a showing that a deliberate choice to follow a course of action [was] made from among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986) (plurality opinion); see also Wilson, 421 F.3d at 59-60 (applying this test). Whether an official has this requisite level of specific policymaking authority is a matter of state law. Jett, 491 U.S. at 737, 109 S.Ct. 2702. Courts must look to state law, including valid local ordinances and regulations, for descriptions of the duties and obligations of putative policymakers in the relevant area at issue. City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 125, 108 S.Ct. 915, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988) (plurality opinion). This does not mean that we look simply to state law labels to determine whether an official is a final policymaker, [b]ut our understanding of the actual function of a governmental official, in a particular area, will necessarily be dependent on the definition of the official's functions under relevant state law. McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 786, 117 S.Ct. 1734, 138 L.Ed.2d 1 (1997). This, too, is a question of law for the judge to decide. Plaintiffs argue, and the district court agreed, that Vieira was a final policymaker with respect to the decisions to procure and implement the Total Recall system. They say that Vieira was responsible for the RFP and the actual decision to award Expanets the bid. They also say that he had final authority with regards to how the system was implemented. We reject these arguments and hold that Vieira was not a final policymaker in this case. Both as a matter of state law and in practice, Vieira did not have final policymaking authority over the decision to procure the recording system and award Expanets the bid. The City Charter clearly states that the Board of Contract and Supply, not the Department of Public Safety or its officials, is the department with responsibility... [t]o make all contracts for purchase of materials, supplies, services, equipment and property on behalf of the city, the price or consideration of which shall exceed five thousand dollars. [25] Charter, art. X, § 1007(c)(1). Moreover, the Board controls key aspects of the bidding process, since bids are to be submitted, opened and considered in accordance with rules and regulations approved by the board. Id. The Board also has total discretion [t]o reject any or all bids submitted to it for a specific purpose if, in its judgment, the public interest will be best served thereby. Id. § 1007(c)(3). Although the Commissioner of Public Safety has, through the Director of Communications, responsibility for the procurement, installation, and proper operation of all municipal radio, television, teletype and other associated equipment, id. at § 1001(c), this procurement function is constrained by the Board of Contract's control over the bidding process. The Department of Public Safety can, through the Director of Communications, influence the general substantive parameters of an RFP in these areas, but it cannot, by law, control which vendor ultimately receives the award. The Board of Contract and Supply, not Vieira, was also responsible in practice for all of the relevant decisions involved in awarding Expanets the bid to install its telephone system, including Total Recall, in the Complex. Uncontested testimony at trial showed that Vieira was one voice among many during the planning meetings and did not single-handedly set the desired parameters for the Complex phone system himself. Although Vieira used those parameters to create the RFP he sent to Alan Sepe, the Acting Director of the Department of Public Property, Vieira did not have final policymaking authority over the RFP. It was only adopted after the Board of Contract and Supply reviewed it and voted on it, and Vieira was not a member of that body. Nor did Vieira have final policymaking authority over the decision to award Expanets the bid. The RFP itself clearly stated that the Board of Contract and Supply had decisionmaking authority and that the ordinary practice was to award the bid to the lowest responsible bidder who met the RFP's specifications. Expanets only received the bid after the Board of Contract and Supply, pursuant to the City Charter, voted to do so. Plaintiffs claim, and the district court held, that Vieira was nonetheless the final policymaker because he recommended to the Commissioner of Public Safety and Sepe that Expanets' bid be accepted and both of them deferentially reviewed his recommendation. That conclusion is contrary to the relevant law. Simply going along with discretionary decisions made by one's subordinates ... is not a delegation to them of the authority to make policy. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 130, 108 S.Ct. 915. It also ignores the fact that the Board of Contract and Supply ultimately voted to award the bid, and there is no argument that the board did not independently review the merits of Expanets' proposal. As a matter of state law and in practice, Vieira also lacked final policymaking authority over the implementation of the Total Recall system. The Charter makes clear that the Director of Communications's authority is subsidiary to the Commissioner of Public Safety, who heads the Department of Communications and is ultimately responsible, through the [D]irector of [C]ommunications, for the complete operation of the department ... and for the design, procurement, installation and proper operation of all the equipment under its jurisdiction. Charter, art. X, § 1001(c)(2). [W]hen a subordinate's decision is subject to review by the municipality's authorized policymakers, [the policymakers] have retained the authority to measure the official's conduct for conformance with their policies. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 127, 108 S.Ct. 915. Vieira also did not have final policymaking authority over the implementation of the Total Recall system in practice. All indications suggest the Total Recall system was activated by Expanets technicians in May 2002 immediately after its installation and pursuant to Expanets' contract with the City. Vieira was also not a final policymaker with respect to the decision to shut the system down. Rather, Police Chief Esserman, when he learned of the system, unilaterally ordered it shut down, apparently without having to consult with Vieira. There was also no custom or practice for which the City could be held liable, and to the extent the jury's finding of liability rested on that theory, a reasonable person could not have reached that conclusion. Visible Sys. Corp. v. Unisys Corp., 551 F.3d 65, 71 (1st Cir.2008). To find municipal liability, we have required that the custom or practice be so well-settled and widespread that the policy making officials of the municipality can be said to have either actual or constructive knowledge of it yet did nothing to end it. Bisbal-Ramos v. City of Mayagüez, 467 F.3d 16, 24 (1st Cir.2006) (quoting Silva v. Worden, 130 F.3d 26, 31 (1st Cir.1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The recordings in this case were neither so widespread nor so well-settled as to be a custom or practice. They occurred at a single building and for a period of eight months. This was different from the City's otherwise-established practice of not recording calls except pursuant to the policy at the EOC. Nor did plaintiffs show the City's policymaking officials had constructive knowledge of it and yet did nothing to end it. Indeed, when Fire Chief Lanzi learned of it, he had his own telephone lines removed, while Police Chief Esserman, on learning of the recordings, had the Total Recall system shut down. Plaintiffs presented no evidence any other officials knew of the recordings. Nor on appeal do plaintiffs point to any evidence presented that showed a policy or custom was established. The City is entitled to judgment on the Fourth Amendment claims.