Opinion ID: 1181141
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Lungren's Legislative History Argument

Text: Lungren advances a complicated and unpersuasive legislative history argument on his own behalf. Proposition 9, which embodied section 5(b), originated as Assembly Constitutional Amendment No. 94 (hereafter ACA 94), introduced by Assemblyman (now Senator) Lockyer, who was also one of the persons who later argued in favor of the proposition in the election ballot pamphlet. ACA 94 in turn had its genesis in a bill introduced by the assemblyman in 1974 (Assem. Bill No. 253, hereafter AB 253) which, after undergoing various amendments, passed both houses, but was vetoed by the Governor in 1975. AB 253, in its final version, and ACA 94 were substantially similar to Proposition 9. Lungren relies on the legislative history of AB 253, arguing that it demonstrates the Legislature intended that the bill would require that both houses must reject a nominee in order to defeat the nomination. He places his reliance largely on a statement made in a staff memorandum drafted while the measure was in the Assembly. In January 1975 AB 253 provided, like the first sentence of section 5(b), that the Governor's nominee for Treasurer must be confirmed by both houses, but it did not include what is now the second sentence of the section. [15] The bill was approved in this form by the Assembly Committee on Governmental Organization and reported out to the Assembly. However, the Assembly referred the bill back to the committee. A staff report prepared after the referral stated as follows: It is understood that the author will submit amendments to permit the nominee to take office on the 91st day after nomination unless both Houses vote to reject the nominee. Thereafter, AB 253 was amended by Assemblyman Lockyer to add the second sentence as it now appears in section 5(b). [16] Lungren contends that the statement in the staff report strongly suggests that in passing AB 253, the Legislature intended to require that both houses must disapprove a nominee in order to reject the nomination. We disagree. The statement in the staff report represents neither the intent of the Legislature that drafted the section ( California Teachers Assn. v. San Diego Community College Dist. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 692, 700-701 [170 Cal. Rptr. 817, 621 P.2d 856]), nor that of the electorate in adopting it ( People v. Castro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 301, 311-312 [211 Cal. Rptr. 719, 696 P.2d 111]). (8) The first of the cited cases stands for the proposition that in construing a statute we will not consider as evidence in favor of a particular meaning the opinions of individual legislators who voted for the bill nor those of the author, on the ground there is no assurance that other legislators shared such opinions. A fortiori, the understanding of an unnamed staff member of a legislative committee, derived from an unnamed source, as to the anticipated contents of a forthcoming amendment to a bill, is not admissible as an indication of the Legislature's intent in ultimately enacting the measure. This is obviously the correct rule where, as here, it appears that the report was distributed only to the members of the committee that was considering the bill and its author, and was not before the general membership of either house of the Legislature. [17] Moreover, in Castro, supra, 38 Cal.3d 301, we rejected as evidence of the voters' intent in adopting an initiative measure the majority and minority reports of a legislative committee on the ground that these reports did not represent either the intent of the drafters or of the electorate in approving the measure. We stated that because the reports were not included in the voters' pamphlet they were not helpful in interpreting the intent of the voters, and we can only speculate on the extent to which the voters were cognizant of them. (38 Cal.3d 301, 312.) We can state with confidence in this case that the voters were not aware of the obscure staff memorandum now relied on by Lungren. (3d) We conclude that section 5(b) requires confirmation by both houses of the Legislature unless it fails to act on a nomination within 90 days, in which case the nominee is deemed to be confirmed under the second sentence of the provision. When, as here, one house votes to disapprove a nominee, the nomination is rejected, just as in other matters requiring legislative action. This construction fulfills both the major and minor premises of the section: i.e., that both houses must confirm a nominee, but that he may not be rejected merely by the Legislature's failure to vote on the nomination. Under this interpretation, the nomination process moves expeditiously by virtue of a 90-day time limit on the Legislature's opportunity to vote and by allowing the Governor to appoint another person upon rejection of his nominee by one house. Only this construction is consistent with the voters' intention in adopting the constitutional provision. The alternative writ is discharged and a peremptory writ is denied.