Opinion ID: 677891
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: failure to cite the substantive drug statutes

Text: 6 Echavarria-Olarte first argues that Counts I and II of his indictment are insufficient because they cite only the federal Attempt and Conspiracy drug statutes, 21 U.S.C. Secs. 963 and 846 and not the underlying substantive offense statutes. 1 He contends that this failure to list the relevant substantive offense statutes violates his Fifth Amendment right to indictment by a grand jury and Sixth Amendment right to be informed of the charges against him. 2 7 To be sufficient, an indictment must state the elements of the offense charged with sufficient clarity to apprise a defendant of the charge against him, primarily so that he can defend himself against the charge and plead double jeopardy in appropriate cases. United States v. Normandeau, 800 F.2d 953, 958 (9th Cir.1986); Fed.R.Crim.P. 7(c). The indictment must be 'read as a whole' and construed according to common sense. Dischner, 974 F.2d at 1518 (quoting United States v. Buckley, 689 F.2d 893, 899 (9th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1086, 103 S.Ct. 1778, 76 L.Ed.2d 349 (1983)). 8 An indictment under 21 U.S.C. Sec. 846 is sufficient if it alleges: a conspiracy to distribute drugs, the time during which the conspiracy was operative, and the statute allegedly violated. United States v. McCown, 711 F.2d 1441, 1450 (9th Cir.1983) (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Tavelman, 650 F.2d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 939, 102 S.Ct. 1429, 71 L.Ed.2d 649 (1982)); see also United States v. Shabani, 993 F.2d 1419, 1420 (9th Cir.1993) (also quoting this language), cert. granted, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1047, 127 L.Ed.2d 370 (1994). 9 Echavarria-Olarte contends that, under this case law, a conspiracy indictment must cite the relevant substantive offense statute which was the object of the alleged conspiracy. He emphasizes that Secs. 963 and 846 both provide that 10 Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in this subchapter shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy. 11 21 U.S.C. Secs. 963, 846. 3 A citation to these statutes, thus, does not indicate the precise object of the conspiracy. 12 Echavarria-Olarte relies heavily on United States v. Miller, 774 F.2d 883 (8th Cir.1985), in which the Eighth Circuit invalidated an indictment charging the appellant with operating a gambling establishment in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1955. Under Sec. 1955, it is a federal crime to operate a gambling business in violation of state or local law. Miller's indictment cited the federal statute, but did not specify which local law the business violated. The Eighth Circuit ruled that the particular state statute alleged to have been violated is an essential and substantive element of a violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1955 ... [because, with some exceptions] the elements of a Section 1955 violation are actually contained in the underlying state law alleged to have been transgressed. Id. at 885. Miller's indictment was therefore fatally defective: It contained no assurance that the grand jury deliberated on the elements of any particular state offense and did not describe the activities forming the basis of the charge. Id. 13 The Ninth Circuit has similarly held that an indictment under the federal aiding and abetting statute, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2, must be accompanied by an indictment for a substantive offense. United States v. Medina, 940 F.2d 1247, 1249 (9th Cir.1991) (quoting Londono-Gomez v. INS, 699 F.2d 475, 477 (9th Cir.1983). Section 2 provides that one who aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures the commission of an offense against the United States ... is punishable as a principal. A citation to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2 does not indicate the particular crime at issue, and thus does not inform a defendant of the elements of his alleged offense. Id. 14 Echavarria-Olarte contends that, under this case law, his indictment is defective because the citations to Secs. 963 and 846 told him only that he was charged with conspiring or attempting to violate an offense within this subchapter and thus did not indicate the substantive drug offense at issue. This argument is not wholly frivolous: Had Echavarria-Olarte's indictment cited only the conspiracy statutes and given no explanation of the conspiracy's unlawful object, Echavarria-Olarte's argument might have some merit. 15 However, Echavarria-Olarte's indictment did more than simply cite the conspiracy statutes. It also charged that Echavarria-Olarte conspired to import approximately five tons of cocaine and to possess with intent to distribute approximately five tons of cocaine. Therefore, unlike the indictments discussed in Miller and Medina, the indictment notified Echavarria-Olarte that the underlying substantive offenses were cocaine importation and possession with intent to distribute cocaine. This language describes the activities forming the basis of the charge with sufficient particularity to assure that the Grand Jury deliberated on the elements of the crime. In fact, because the conspiracy statutes cited refer to offenses within this subchapter, rather than to a violation of United States law or in violation of state or local law, the cited statutes and the indictment, read together, were sufficient to inform Echavarria-Olarte not only of the elements of his crime but also of the underlying substantive offense statutes, Sec. 952 and Sec. 841(a). 4 16 [A] conviction will not be reversed merely because a minor or technical deficiency in the indictment is later discovered. Normandeau, 800 F.2d at 958. An error in the citation or its omission shall not be grounds for ... reversal of a conviction if the error or omission did not mislead the defendant to his prejudice. Fed.R.Crim.P. 7(c)(3). The key question ... is whether an error or omission in an indictment worked to the prejudice of the accused. Normandeau, 800 F.2d at 958 (Internal quotations omitted). Echavarria-Olarte has not shown that the indictment's failure to cite the substantive offense statutes prejudiced him or that the alleged error, if any, was a defect of substance, rather than of form. United States v. Zavala, 839 F.2d 523, 525 (9th Cir.) (indictment for using a telephone to facilitate drug crimes which failed to name the specific controlled substance involved had a defect of form, not substance), cert. denied 488 U.S. 831, 109 S.Ct. 86, 102 L.Ed.2d 62 (1988). 5 17