Opinion ID: 1434840
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Bifurcation (Issue 3)

Text: The district court did not abuse its discretion by bifurcating the trial into liability and punitive damages phases. The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any claim . . . or of any separate issue. . . . Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(b). A district court's decision to bifurcate a trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Wilson v. Morgan, 477 F.3d 326, 339 (6th Cir.2007). Here, defendants argue that the district court abused its discretion by bifurcating the trial during defendants' case-in-chief, and thus prejudiced defendants by admitting only plaintiffs' evidence relevant to the issue of punitive damages during the liability phase. Although [s]ound judicial practice requires that, so far as practicable, the trial court's decision to bifurcate proceedings occur prior to trial, Helminski v. Ayerst Labs., 766 F.2d 208, 213 n. 3 (6th Cir.1985), [t]he late bifurcation of a trial does not constitute reversible error in the absence of a showing of prejudice, id. at 212. Defendants were not, however, prejudiced by the district court's decision. Defendants sought to admit evidence of their settlement offers that they argue would have rebutted plaintiffs' evidence of plaintiffs' settlement offers. The district court, upon learning that defendants were going to present this evidence, decided to bifurcate the trial. See J.A. 2912-13 (As a result of the position of the defendant, I am going to bifurcate this hearing. . . . I want to make it clear as a result of your request I am now going to bifurcate the punitive damage issue because I think that's more appropriate given the testimony you seek to offer, so we're going to bifurcate the punitive damage issue. We're not going to have any settlement evidence before this jury on the liability question.). [7] But as discussed above in Part II.B., defendants' evidence of settlement offers was not relevant to the issue of liability, whereas plaintiffs' evidence of settlement offers showed that defendants' had notice of the infringement, and thus was relevant. Defendants argue that they were prejudiced by the bifurcation because plaintiffs were able to introduce all of their evidence with respect to punitive damages during the liability phase. It is true that plaintiffs stated to the district court, I think that the proof that we have put on, quite frankly, is sufficient to the extent that Your Honor is going to allow settlement, any type of settlement discussions to be admitted. But plaintiffs specifically limited this statement to settlement evidence, and in fact plaintiffs did present evidence at the punitive damages phase of the trial. In any event, the evidence that defendants sought to admit during the liability phase did not concern the issue of whether defendants acted willfully, while plaintiffs' evidence was relevant to the issue of willfulness (as discussed in Part II.B., supra ), and the fact that plaintiffs' evidence was also relevant with respect to the amount of punitive damages did not place a legal impediment to the district court's bifurcating the trial. [8] Furthermore, when defendants did introduce their evidence during the punitive damages phase of the trial, the jury nonetheless awarded a very large amount of punitive damages, which indicates that any error by the district court in bifurcating the trial was harmless.