Opinion ID: 1359265
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Double Counting of Factors

Text: (32) Defendants point out that as part of the instruction describing the factors in aggravation and mitigation, the trial court told the jury that it could consider: (a) The circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding, and the existence of any special circumstances found to be true; [¶] (b) The presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence, or the express or implied threat to use force or violence; [¶] (c) The presence or absence of any prior felony conviction.... Defendants argue that this portion of the instruction improperly permitted the jury to double count the violent conduct that led to their convictions of burglary, robbery, and murder at the guilt phase of the trial, by considering their conduct both as circumstances of the crime (§ 190.3, factor (a)) and as criminal activity ... which involves the use ... of force or violence ( id., factor (b)). Similarly, they argue that the jury may have considered the special circumstances it had found to be true at the guilt phase of trial both as circumstances of the offense ( id., factor (a)) and as prior felony convictions ( id., factor (c)). In People v. Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d 57, we directed that henceforth the trial court should explain to the jury that the violent criminal conduct referred to in section 190.3, factor (b) and the prior felony convictions referred to in factor (c) do not include the evidence underlying the guilt determination. (44 Cal.3d at p. 106, fn. 28.) Because this case was tried before our decision in Miranda, the trial court gave no such explanation. But as we said in People v. Montiel, supra, 5 Cal.4th at page 938: [W]e have consistently found that the absence of a clarifying instruction on this issue is harmless. The same is true here. In his closing argument, the prosecutor did not suggest to the jury that it should double count the evidence introduced or the jury's findings at the guilt phase of trial; as a result, it is unlikely that the jury gave the evidence and findings duplicative consideration. Defendants complain that the instruction describing aggravating and mitigating circumstances was defective because the jury was not instructed that the fact that [defendants] had been convicted of first degree murder and the fact of the true findings on the special circumstances were not, in themselves, aggravating circumstances. They appear to contend that because the trial court did not give this instruction, the jury may have double counted the circumstances of their offenses by considering the convictions and special circumstances, and by separately considering the facts that led to the convictions and special circumstance findings. Such an instruction would only have confused the jury; therefore, the trial court acted properly in not giving it. Defendant Champion faults the trial court for not telling the jury that it could not consider his felonious assaults on Vincent Verkuilen and Jose Bustos both as violent criminal conduct (§ 190.3, factor (b)) and as a prior felony conviction ( id., factor (c)). We have held, however, that a penalty phase jury is entitled to consider such evidence under both factors. ( People v. Montiel, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 939, fn. 34; People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 764.)