Opinion ID: 1852774
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Lack of Timely Prosecution

Text: Plaintiffs seek to justify their lack of activity by dissatisfaction with one attorney and the seeking of other counsel. Plaintiffs contend in their brief that during 1982, 1983 and 1984 they were represented by three attorneys, and while not contained in the settled record, there were settlement negotiations and correspondence between the various attorneys representing them. As indicated, there is no proof of this in the settled record and we refuse to consider it. In addition, none of this claimed activity was communicated to defendant or his counsel. It is also clear that the defendant did nothing to protract or delay this case. It was the defendant that took the initiative to get rid of this case by filing the motion to dismiss on January 15, 1985. Defendant's motion to dismiss was based upon SDCL 15-6-41(b) and SDCL 15-11-11. SDCL 15-6-41(b) provides in part as follows: For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with this chapter or any order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action ... against him.... SDCL 15-11-11 provides as follows: The court may dismiss any civil case for want of prosecution upon written notice to counsel of record where there has been no activity for one year, unless good cause is shown to the contrary. In reviewing the delay in this case, we note that it is substantial. We also note that the duty of the defendant in this case was simply to meet the plaintiffs step-by-step. In Fox et al. v. Perpetual National Life Insurance Company, 273 N.W.2d 166 (S.D.1978), reh'g denied, February 2, 1979, we stated: `It is true that the defendant may bring about a trial of the case, but he is under no legal duty to do so. His presence in the case is involuntary, and his attitude toward it is quite different from that of the plaintiff; he is put to a defense only, and can be charged with no neglect for failing to do more than meet the plaintiff step by step....' Id. at 168, quoting Wiggins v. Washington National Life Insurance Co., 246 Cal. App.2d 840, 847, 55 Cal.Rptr. 129, 133 (1966). In reviewing the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss, our inquiry is whether the circuit court abused its discretion. Duncan v. Pennington County Housing Authority, 382 N.W.2d 425, 426 (S.D.1986). Although the power to dismiss for failure to prosecute is a discretionary power, it should be exercised cautiously and granted only in cases of an unreasonable and unexplained delay in prosecution. Id. at 427. [W]e have observed that the `mere passage of time is not the test ....but whether, under all the facts and circumstances of the particular case, the plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude.' Id., quoting Chicago & North Western Ry. Co. v. Bradbury, 80 S.D. 610, 612-613, 129 N.W.2d 540, 542 (1964). Defendant submits that the four year delay in this case was an unreasonable length of time. Plaintiffs seek to be relieved of fault by excusable neglect in removing the file from one lawyer's office and delivering it to another lawyer's office for a second opinion. Defendant argues that such excuse is insufficient and does not constitute good cause. In this case, there was a delay of over four years from the time of service to the time that defendant moved to dismiss. The last activity in the court file was the deposition of Dr. Alvine, which was taken on December 15, 1981. From that date there was a three year and one month period where there was absolutely no activity. SDCL 15-6-41(b) does not provide for any specific length of time, but the cases indicate that a three or four year delay is an unreasonable length of time under the circumstances. See: Duncan, 382 N.W.2d at 428. SDCL 15-11-11 has a one year limitation from the date of the last activity as reflected by the file. It should also be noted in this case that there was no file started with the court and that the plaintiffs did not comply with the rules which require the prompt filing of actions. SDCL 15-6-5(d). Defendant argues that it is significant that he prompted this issue by filing his motion to dismiss, and that it is highly possible that had he not moved for a dismissal when he did this case would still be laying dormant. Accordingly, defendant argues that this is an aggravated case and that if the rules are to mean anything this case should be dismissed because of lack of timely prosecution. Plaintiffs contend that the activity between themselves and their attorneys in 1982 constitute good cause under SDCL 15-11-11. One problem with this argument is that the file was removed from one attorney and given to another attorney for a second opinion, which opinion was apparently never obtained, and that despite the absence of the second opinion, there was no other activity on the part of the plaintiff from the fall of 1982 until the motion to dismiss in January of 1985. Another problem with this argument is that there is no explanation whatsoever for these last two years of total inactivity. This unexplained inactivity, exceeding two years, does not constitute the good cause or excuse the statute requires. [2] Two recent South Dakota cases, Duncan, supra, and Reed et al. v. Heath et al., 383 N.W.2d 873 (S.D.1986), support defendant's position in this matter. When the motion to dismiss was made in Duncan, more than eight years had passed since the action was initiated, and more than five years had elapsed since all the information for trial was available. 382 N.W.2d at 428. In affirming the dismissal in Duncan, we noted that this court previously affirmed motions to dismiss for failure to prosecute where the inactivity lasted three years. Id. In Reed, supra, we affirmed the dismissal of an action for fraud due to inactivity for over one year under SDCL 15-11-11. 383 N.W.2d at 874. Although the plaintiffs in Reed claimed their three year period of inactivity was caused by the illness and death of defendants' original counsel and further inaction by his firm, we found that there was nothing probative in the record to support plaintiffs' claims. Id. The same arguments apply here. The fault lies with plaintiffs and it is clear that they are chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude. Duncan, 382 N.W.2d at 427. Under these circumstances, plaintiffs' unexplained inactivity does not constitute good cause under SDCL 15-11-11, nor excuse under SDCL 15-6-41(b). Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of timely prosecution under these two statutes. We reverse.