Opinion ID: 1014453
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Plaintiffs’ Illegal Search Claim

Text: We initially consider Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim arising from the allegedly defective search warrant application. We hold that the district court erred in denying summary judgment to Willman and Dunford. In determining whether a law enforcement officer should be held liable for knowingly or recklessly making false statements or material omissions in a warrant application, we apply the qualified immunity analysis, which examines the objective reasonableness of [the] officer’s conduct. Smith v. Reddy, 101 F.3d 351, 355 (4th Cir. 1996). This standard accommodates the allegation of falsity because a reasonable officer cannot believe a warrant is supported by probable cause if the magistrate is misled by statements that the officer knows or should know are false. Id. It bears emphasis, moreover, that the pertinent question is not whether probable cause was, in fact, present, but rather whether the officer could have reasonably thought there was probable cause to seek the warrant. Id. at 356. We conclude that the probable cause determination made by Willman was reasonable. To be sure, Kelley’s analysis of the documents provided by Shofner tended to establish that Mom’s was substantially underreporting its income. The district court ruled, however, that it was unreasonable for Willman to rely on Kelley’s analysis. We disagree. The district court determined that Shofner was so patently unreliable that it was unreasonable for Willman to rely on the documents Shofner provided (which were the source for Kelley’s analysis). It is true, as noted above, that Willman and her fellow investigators were aware of numerous circumstances tending to undermine Shofner’s MOM’S, INC. v. WILLMAN 13 credibility. On the other hand, Shofner enhanced her credibility by inculpating herself in some of the unlawful activities she accused Mom’s and its principals of conducting. In particular, Shofner said that she maintained two sets of books—one that recorded all of Mom’s income and one that recorded only a portion of that income, with the latter to be used for tax purposes. See Mom’s, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 510. The district court determined that such statements by Shofner were not self-incriminating because she never actually prepared or filed any inaccurate tax returns. See id. at 532. But assisting the preparation of false records for the purpose of evading taxes is itself a crime. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 7206(2) (West 2002); see also United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 518 (1943) (discussing aider and abettor liability in tax evasion cases). Moreover, as the district court recognized, the fact that an informant’s statements are against her penal interest significantly strengthens the informant’s credibility. See United States v. Patterson, 150 F.3d 382, 386 (4th Cir. 1998). The district court further opined that, regardless of whether Shofner herself was credible, the conclusions reached by Kelley (based on Shofner’s documents) were implausible. See Mom’s, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 534-35. The court did not cite any evidence to support this, however, and neither have Plaintiffs done so. In the absence of evidence that Kelley’s figures were inherently unbelievable, and that a reasonable investigator should have been aware of this, Plaintiffs cannot use the allegedly extraordinary nature of these figures to show that it was unreasonable for Willman to rely on Kelley’s analysis. We therefore hold that an investigator in Willman’s position could reasonably have determined that Shofner, the documents she provided, and the analysis of those documents by Kelley were sufficiently credible to establish probable cause. It follows that the district court erred in denying Willman’s motion for summary judgment with respect to Plaintiffs’ illegal search claim. Furthermore, the reasonableness of Willman’s conduct severs the causal connection between Dunford’s allegedly improper conduct and the acquisition of the search warrants at issue here. The district court opinion leaves no question that Dunford was the driving force behind much of the investigation of the Jewish Mother restaurants. See, e.g., id. at 509 (noting that Dunford began investigating the Virginia Beach Jewish Mother even before he was advised of the licensing problem 14 MOM’S, INC. v. WILLMAN affecting the Norfolk Jewish Mother). Nevertheless, the district court correctly noted that Dunford cannot be held liable based on any possible malice [or] motivation, id. at 541; instead, the court concluded that summary judgment was inappropriate because [a] jury could conclude that Dunford intentionally supplied exaggerated and misleading information to Willman for the purpose of obtaining a search warrant, id. at 542. However, in light of the other material that was before Willman when she sought the warrants, it would be mere speculation to conclude that the defective information provided by Dunford caused Willman to seek the warrants. Because there is no evidence indicating that Dunford in any way induced Willman to seek a warrant without probable cause, Dunford was entitled to qualified immunity on the illegal search claim.