Opinion ID: 2600739
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Dog Sniff Searches

Text: The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 7 of the Colorado Constitution protect a person's reasonable expectation of privacy from governmental intrusion. See U.S. Const. amend. IV; Colo. Const. art. II, § 7; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967); People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135, 139 (Colo.1983). The prosecution argues that the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983), should apply here. In Place, the court held that exposing an individual's luggage located in a public place to a dog sniff did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment. [2] Id. at 707, 103 S.Ct. 2637. Nevertheless, in applying Article II, Section 7 of the Colorado Constitution, we have ruled that Colorado law affords broader protections in some instances than the Fourth Amendment. See People v. Oates, 698 P.2d 811, 815 (Colo.1985)(Several times we have determined that the Colorado proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures protects a greater range of privacy interests than does its federal counterpart.); People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135, 140 (Colo.1983)(Although Article II, Section 7 of the Colorado Constitution is substantially similar to its federal counterpart, we are not bound by the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment when determining the scope of state constitutional protections.); see also People v. Mason, 989 P.2d 757, 759 (Colo.1999)([W]e have afforded suspects in Colorado greater rights than are available under the federal Constitution.); People v. Young, 814 P.2d 834, 842-43 (Colo.1991)(We have recognized and exercised our independent role on a number of occasions and on several have determined that the Colorado Constitution provides more protection for our citizens than do similarly or identically worded provisions of the United States Constitution.). In some instances, we have determined certain investigative activities to be searches, even though the United States Supreme Court determined that they were not. See Oates, 698 P.2d at 816 (government-installed beeper in a 110 lb. drum of phenyl-acetic acid purchased from a chemical company was a search under Colorado Constitution); Sporleder, 666 P.2d at 139-40 (governmental installation of a pen register is a search under Colorado Constitution); Charnes v. DiGiacomo, 200 Colo. 94, 98-99, 612 P.2d 1117, 1120-21 (1980)(governmental seizure of bank records violated the Colorado Constitution). Article II, Section 7 of the Colorado Constitution applies to the case before us. We therefore distinguish Place, and our recent ruling in People v. Ortega, 34 P.3d 986, 2001 Colo. LEXIS 783 (Colo.2001), both of which were decided under the Fourth Amendment and did not involve a prolonged traffic stop without reasonable suspicion to continue the investigation. [3] In Place and Ortega the police conducted dog sniff searches of luggage at an airport and on a Greyhound bus traveling interstate, respectively. We stated in Ortega that the officers' actions in no way delayed the departure of Defendant's bus. See Ortega, 34 P.3d at 993, 2001 Colo. LEXIS at . Based upon our precedent under the Colorado Constitution, we conclude that a dog sniff search of a person's automobile in connection with a traffic stop that is prolonged beyond its purpose to conduct a drug investigation intrudes upon a reasonable expectation of privacy and constitutes a search and seizure requiring reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Our holding here accords with cases we decided after Place. See People v. May, 886 P.2d 280, 282 (Colo.1994)(holding that a dog sniff of an express mail package was a search); People v. Boylan, 854 P.2d 807, 812 (Colo.1993)(holding that a dog sniff of a federal express package was a search); People v. Unruh, 713 P.2d 370, 377-78 (Colo.1986)(holding that a dog sniff search of a safe taken by a burglar from the defendant's home was a search); see also People v. Redinger, 906 P.2d 81, 85-86 (Colo.1995)(holding that reasonable suspicion is required to prolong a traffic stop after the purpose for which the investigatory stop was instituted has been accomplished). [4] An individual must have a reasonable expectation of privacy in order to succeed in a challenge based on illegal search or seizure. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353, 88 S.Ct. 507; May, 886 P.2d at 281; Unruh, 713 P.2d at 377. In evaluating the legitimacy of the defendant's constitutional privacy interest, the proper inquiry involves two parts: whether the defendant expected that his or her privacy interest would be free from governmental intrusion, and if so, whether that expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Sporleder, 666 P.2d at 140; United States v. Nicholson, 144 F.3d 632, 636 (10th Cir.1998). We have previously held that whether an expectation of privacy is reasonable may be tested against the customs, values, and common understandings that confer a sense of privacy upon many of our basic social activities. Oates, 698 P.2d at 816. The prosecution argues that a dog merely enhances the olfactory senses of an officer, does not involve physical intrusion into a private area, and is minimally intrusive because all that the dog detects is in the air surrounding the object. We do not find this argument persuasive. [5] Here, in the absence of reasonable suspicion that illegal activity was occurring other than the traffic infraction, Officer Miller's sole purpose was to conduct a drug investigation and to detect whether evidence hidden from view was within the car. In May, we reasoned that such use of a drug dog amounted to a search because the defendant had a constitutional interest in a sealed package and the dog sniff of the package with its contents hidden from view amounted to a search. May, 886 P.2d at 282. While we acknowledge that automobiles enjoy a lesser expectation of privacy in our society than private homes, citizens have a reasonable expectation of privacy from search and seizure in their cars and in their persons as they travel the state's roads. See New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986)(A citizen does not surrender all the protections of the Fourth Amendment by entering an automobile.). Even though police may search an automobile without a warrant following an arrest, [6] pursuant to a police inventory, [7] when they observe something in plain view, [8] or to secure the officer's safety, [9] these exceptions do not establish precedent for unconstrained police searches of automobiles. See Sporleder, 666 P.2d at 141 (The mere fact that our ordinary social intercourse, uncontrolled by government, imposes certain risks upon us hardly means that government is constitutionally unconstrained in adding to those risks.). Travelers on the roads of Colorado may reasonably expect that law enforcement officers may stop them for violating traffic laws; they do not expect that persons will be detained and their automobiles searched because of traffic stops once the reason for those stops has been accomplished. The intrusion is limited to the reason for the stop unless other circumstances or acts permit the intrusion to continue. During a valid traffic stop an officer may request a driver's license, vehicle registration and proof of insurance. An officer may also run a computer check for outstanding warrants so long as this procedure does not unreasonably extend the duration of the temporary detention. These intrusions are brief and minimal. Once a driver produces a valid license and proof that he is entitled to operate the vehicle, he must be allowed to proceed on his way, without being subject to further delay by police for additional questioning. People v. Rodriguez, 945 P.2d 1351, 1360 (Colo.1997) (citations and quotation marks omitted).