Opinion ID: 590931
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Downward Departure from Sentencing Guideline Range

Text: 30 At the sentencing hearing, the district judge found that adhering to the presentence report's calculated guidelines' range of 121-to-151 months' imprisonment would work[ ] an injustice in this case, and therefore imposed a downward departure, sentencing defendant to only thirty-six months' imprisonment. As part of its cross-appeal, the government argues that both the imposition of and the extent of the downward departure were unjustified and inappropriate. 31 A sentencing court may depart from the sentences prescribed by the guidelines only where the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). In determining whether a circumstance was adequately taken into consideration, a court may consider only the sentencing guidelines, policy statements, and official comments to the guidelines. Id. Furthermore, the court must state the specific reason for its departure in a short, clearly written statement or a reasoned statement from the bench. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2); United States v. Todd, 920 F.2d 399, 408-09 (6th Cir.1990). 32 A written statement attached to the judgment and order of the district court provides the following reasons for the downward departure: 33 The statute of conviction in this case is almost exclusively used after a crime has been committed. In the instant offense, the crime was incomplete, and the Court notes that the alleged victims were never confronted or contacted in any manner by the defendant. The Court further finds that the guidelines are based on the underlying offense which in this instance was kidnapping. The offense behavior fell far short of what is normally considered a kidnapping offense. Consequently, the Court has some question as to whether or not the Sentencing Commission contemplated calculations based upon the offense behavior involved in this case. 34 The Court further finds that the psychological evaluation prepared in this case was insufficient in determining the defendant's intent as well as a prognosis for dangerous behavior in the future. 35 This circuit has adopted the three-pronged analysis set out in United States v. Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d 43, 49 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 862, 110 S.Ct. 177, 107 L.Ed.2d 133 (1989), for reviewing downward as well as upward departures from the sentencing ranges called for by the guidelines. United States v. Nelson, 918 F.2d 1268, 1270 (6th Cir.1990). Under the first prong, we assay the circumstances relied on by the district court in determining that the case is sufficiently 'unusual' to warrant departure; this is a question of law, subject to de novo review. Id. (quoting Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d at 49). Under the second prong, we determine whether the circumstances, if conceptually proper, actually exist in the particular case. That assessment involves fact finding and the trier's determinations may be set aside only for clear error. Id. Under the third prong, the direction and degree of departure must, on appeal, be measured by a standard of reasonableness. Id.
36 The government argues that the fact that 18 U.S.C. § 924(b) is used almost exclusively after a crime has been committed and that victims were never confronted in this case does not justify a departure, because unconsummated offenses were clearly contemplated by the Sentencing Commission. Section 924(b) applies to anyone who carries a firearm in interstate commerce with intent to commit a felony, and the corresponding post-November 1989 guidelines section 2K2.3 states that the defendant is to be sentenced pursuant to section 2X1.1 in respect to the offense that the defendant intended ... to be committed with the firearm; nothing in the wording of either indicates any requirement that an intended offense be consummated. 7 Furthermore, the government argues, section 2X1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines provides for sentencing level decreases in most cases in which attempts, solicitations, and conspiracies are not consummated, see U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1(b), and thus the guidelines in general clearly contemplate offenses that are not consummated and never reach the point of endangering victims. 37 The government contends that the district court's other rationale for the departure, doubts concerning defendant's intent, is not valid because intent was an element of the government's case-in-chief and the jury clearly found that such intent existed. 38 The government's arguments are persuasive. According to section 2K2.3, the post-1989 section applicable to § 924(b) crimes, the base offense level is calculated by application of the offense level from § 2X1.1 with respect to the target crime. Section 2X1.1 then mandates a three-level decrease for attempts, conspiracies, and solicitations unless the defendant completed all the acts the defendant believed necessary for successful completion of the offense or the circumstances demonstrate that the [defendant or conspirators were] about to complete all such acts but for apprehension or interruption by some similar event beyond defendant's control. U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1(b)(1). Since this downward adjustment for attempts, solicitations, and conspiracies is included in scheme for sentencing those convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 924(b), it cannot be said that the Commission failed to take into consideration situations where the target crime would not be consummated. 39 In this case, defendant was convicted of transporting a firearm in interstate commerce with the intent to commit an offense punishable by a prison term of more than one year, but he did not actually commit the target crime. Under the guidelines, failure to complete a target offense underlying a § 924(b) conviction is the equivalent of an attempt, and thus subject to the three-point reduction in the appropriate circumstances. Since the guidelines explicitly contemplate that those convicted under § 924(b) will receive a lesser penalty when the target crime was not completed, any further departure downward was unwarranted. 40 The court's second justification for departure, the insufficiency of the psychological evaluation regarding defendant's intent and prognosis for future behavior, is also misplaced. As the government noted, intent, as an element of the section 924(b) offense, was conclusively decided by the jury. Moreover, the guidelines expressly provide that a defendant's mental and emotional state is ordinarily irrelevant to departure. U.S.S.G. § 5H1.3. 41 Since the Sentencing Commission did contemplate the offense behavior involved in this case, the downward departure was not appropriate for the reasons articulated by the district court. We therefore remand for resentencing. 42