Opinion ID: 77981
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Federal Law Issue

Text: The remaining issue in this case is whether the Act  on its face  is vague or overbroad in violation of the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs contend that the Act's provisions banning expenditures as well as its compensation reporting provisions are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. On the issue of vagueness, Plaintiffs argue that statutory terms such as expenditure or direct and indirect are so inadequately defined that a person of common intelligence must guess at their meaning and that, as a result, the Act allows for unbridled discretion in its enforcement. To overcome a vagueness challenge, a statute must give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited; and it must provide explicit standards for those who apply them to avoid arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298-99, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972). We conclude that the Act does not violate due process standards about vagueness. For instance, it clearly provides that an expenditure  which is separately defined in sections 11.045(1)(d) and 112.3215(1)(d)is unlawful only if it is made by a lobbyist or principal and accepted by a government official. Contrary to Plaintiffs' suggestion, the Act cannot reasonably be read to bar all expenditures for lobbying purposes (for example, a cab fare to the capitol). Instead, it only bars those lobbying expenditures that are accepted by a government official. See Fla. Stat. §§ 11.045(4)(a), 112.3215(6)(a) (stating that no lobbyist or principal shall make, directly or indirectly, and no member or employee of the legislature nor any agency official, member, or employee shall knowingly accept, directly or indirectly, any expenditure (emphasis added)). In a similar way, we do not regard the term indirect as vague: a person of common intelligence would understand that it applies to expenditures or compensation paid through a third party. In short, the statutory language at issue provide[s] explicit standards for those who apply them and give[s] the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited. Grayned, 92 S.Ct. at 2298-99. As the Supreme Court observed, we can never expect mathematical certainty from our language. Id. at 2300. With this observation in mind, we cannot conclude that the statutory language Plaintiffs challenge is so vague as to violate the Constitution. Plaintiffs also contend that the Act's compensation reporting provision is unconstitutionally overbroad because it requires disclosure of compensation paid to a lobbyist even where that compensation has not been paid for expressly advocating passage or defeat of legislation. A law is overbroad that does not aim specifically at evils within the allowable area of State control but, on the contrary, sweeps within its ambit other activities that in ordinary circumstances constitute an exercise of freedom of speech. Thornhill v. State of Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736, 742, 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940). The First Amendment doctrine of overbreadth is an exception to the normal rules governing facial challenges. Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 123 S.Ct. 2191, 2196, 156 L.Ed.2d 148 (2003). [7] For the First Amendment, a law is facially invalid if it punishes a 'substantial' amount of protected free speech, 'judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep.' Hicks, 123 S.Ct. at 2196 (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2918, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973)). We note, however, the Supreme Court's admonition that application of the overbreadth doctrine is strong medicine that should be used sparingly and only as a last resort. Broadrick, 93 S.Ct. at 2916. Plaintiffs do not deny the Legislature's legitimate interest in the public disclosure of compensation paid to a lobbying firm for the purpose of lobbying. They instead contend that the statute sweeps too broadly by requiring the reporting of all compensation paid to lobbyists irrespective of how the funds are spent. We agree with the district court that Plaintiffs have misconstrued the Act. Contrary to their claim that the Act requires the disclosure of all compensation paid to lobbyists regardless of how the funds are used, the Act actually only requires the reporting of compensation that lobbyists receive for any lobbying activity. Fla. Stat. §§ 11.045(1)(b), 112.3215(1)(c). That the compensation reporting provision is limited to compensation received for any lobbying activity does not end the matter, however. The Act defines lobbying as influencing or attempting to influence legislative action or nonaction through oral or written communication or an attempt to obtain the goodwill of a member or employee of the Legislature. Id. § 11.045(1)(f); see also id. § 112.3215(1)(f) (defining lobbies as seeking, on behalf of another person, to influence an agency with respect to a decision of the agency in the area of policy or procurement or an attempt to obtain the goodwill of an agency official or employee). Plaintiffs argue that lobbying activity, as defined in the Act, encompasses not only direct communications from lobbyists to legislators and state officials (which is undoubtedly a legitimate object of regulation [8] ), but also indirect communicationssuch as opinion articles, issue advertisements, and letterwriting campaignsfrom lobbyists on behalf of their clients to the press and public at large for the purpose of influencing legislation or policy. We have made clear that the state has a compelling interest in `self-protection' in the face of coordinated pressure campaigns directed by lobbyists. Fla. League of Prof'l Lobbyists, Inc. v. Meggs, 87 F.3d 457, 460, 461 (11th Cir.1996). Also, lobbyist disclosure laws of the sort at issue here allow voters to appraise the integrity and performance of officeholders and candidates, in view of the pressures they face. Id. at 460. We have said that these interests are compelling not only when the pressures to be evaluated by voters and officeholders are direct, but also when they are indirect. See id. at 461 ([T]he government interest in providing the means to evaluate these pressures may in some ways be stronger when the pressures are indirect, because then they are harder to identify without the aid of disclosure requirements.); see also Minn. State Ethical Practices Bd. v. Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am., 761 F.2d 509, 511-13 (8th Cir.1985) (upholding a state's interest in applying its reporting requirements to indirect communications between a lobbyist and members of an association for the purpose of influencing specific legislation). Because the First Amendment allows required reporting of considerably more than face-to-face contact with government officials, we decline to invalidate the Act on its face as substantially overbroad. See Meggs, 87 F.3d at 461. Instead, we leave whatever overbreadth may exist [to] be cured through case-by-case analysis of the fact situations to which [the Act's] sanctions, assertedly, may not be applied. Broadrick, 93 S.Ct. at 2918.