Opinion ID: 2570593
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Law Enforcement Testimony

Text: Contreras next argues that the trial court erred when it allowed Deputy Burchell to explain procedures used to ensure the reliability of drug buys, and testify that those procedures were followed in this case. Since Contreras' defense counsel did not object to the testimony at trial, we will apply our plain error standard of review. Plain error will not be assigned unless (1) the record clearly reflects the incidents urged as error; (2) appellant is able to demonstrate violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law; and (3) it is shown that a substantial right of the appellant was materially prejudiced. Dike v. State, 990 P.2d 1012, 1019 (Wyo.1999) ( quoting Bradley v. State, 635 P.2d 1161, 1164 (Wyo.1981)). The first prong of our test is satisfied: the record clearly reflects the deputy's testimony. Contreras argues that the second prong is satisfied because the testimony improperly bolstered the testimony of the deputy and the informant. He further contends that the challenged testimony was admitted in violation of W.R.E. 403, which reads: Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. The State responds that the deputy's testimony did not offer an opinion about the informant's credibility, and was probative of how the drugs came into the informant's possession by showing that the drugs could not have came from anywhere other than Contreras' apartment. In support of his argument that Deputy Burchell's testimony improperly bolstered his own testimony and that of the informant, Contreras cites decisions of this Court holding that a witness may not testify or offer an opinion that another witness is telling the truth. Dudley v. State, 951 P.2d 1176, 1179 (Wyo.1998); McCone v. State, 866 P.2d 740, 751 (Wyo.1993), aff'd 83 F.3d 432 (10th Cir. 1996); Whiteplume v. State, 841 P.2d 1332, 1340 (Wyo.1992); Zabel v. State, 765 P.2d 357, 362 (Wyo.1988). He also cites authority from outside this jurisdiction for the proposition that law enforcement officers may not give irrelevant testimony about law enforcement procedures or opinion testimony that affirms the credibility of a prosecution witness. People v. Alfonso, 194 A.D.2d 358, 599 N.Y.S.2d 543, 544 (1993); People v. Ciaccio, 47 N.Y.2d 431, 418 N.Y.S.2d 371, 391 N.E.2d 1347, 1351 (1979). Although Contreras accurately summarizes our holdings in the cases he cites, the facts of this case are distinguishable. The record reveals that Deputy Burchell never offered an opinion about the truthfulness of the informant's testimony. He merely explained departmental procedures designed to produce reliable information, which laid a proper foundation for the admission of the State's evidence. The deputy's testimony corroborated some elements of the informant's testimony, but admissible testimony that has the incidental effect of bolstering or corroborating other testimony is not inappropriate. Zabel, 765 P.2d at 361 ( quoting State v. Kennedy, 320 N.C. 20, 357 S.E.2d 359, 367 (1987)). The facts here are also distinguishable from the New York cases that Contreras cites. In Alfonso, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 544, a police officer testified, in detail, over repeated objections, about police tactics. The officer explained how locations were selected for anti-drug operations; described the roles of various members of the operation; described the equipment used by officers; and described the modus operandi of typical drug dealers. He also testified that he observed the defendant commit two uncharged offenses. Id. A bare majority of the court held that the officer's testimony was inappropriate because it was not essential to fill any void in the evidence or to render otherwise incomprehensible testimony more understandable to the jurors   . Id. Deputy Burchell's testimony here was necessary to fill a void in the evidence; without it, the jury would have had no assurance that the informant entered Contreras' apartment with cash but not drugs, and left with drugs but no cash. Ciaccio is similarly distinguishable. There, an officer testified that a hijacking victim's testimony was consistent with the modus operandi of local hijackers. Ciaccio, 418 N.Y.S.2d 371, 391 N.E.2d at 1351. The court held that [w]here, as here, the sole reason for questioning the expert witness is to bolster the testimony of another witness (here the victim) by explaining that his version of the events is more believable than the defendant's, the expert's testimony is equivalent to an opinion that the defendant is guilty, and the receipt of such testimony may not be condoned. Id. As previously discussed, Deputy Burchell's testimony was admissible for purposes other than bolstering the informant's testimony. Ciaccio, therefore, is inapplicable here. Contreras also asserts that the deputy's testimony violated W.R.E. 403 because its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury   . He goes on to paraphrase the rule, but offers nothing in the way of cogent argument or pertinent authority. Pursuant to W.R.A.P. 1.03, this Court need not consider the issue further. Hamburg v. Heilbrun, 891 P.2d 85, 87 (Wyo.1995). Contreras cannot show that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated; therefore, no plain error occurred.