Opinion ID: 1811795
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the chancellor correctly ordered fancher to pay pell $2500 in attorney's fees.

Text: ¶ 16. Fancher argues that the chancellor erred in ordering him to pay Pell's attorney's fees in a contempt proceeding because Fancher was found not to be in contempt. He further argues that Pell's lack of candor and refusal to communicate necessitated the proceedings. ¶ 17. Fancher cites Cumberland v. Cumberland, 564 So.2d 839, 845 (Miss. 1990), for the proposition that a court's denial of an ex-spouse's petition for contempt prevents an award of attorney's fees to the spouse filing the petition. Cumberland is factually distinguishable from the case sub judice. In Cumberland, the ex-wife petitioning the court for contempt was found by the court to not only have the ability to pay her attorney's fees, but found much of the litigation expense incurred by the ex-wife to be unreasonable. Also, the ex-husband in Cumberland unilaterally reduced his child support payments because of his substantial reduction in income. This was not a case of a refusal to pay any of the educational expenses of a child. So, while it is true, as this Court wrote in Cumberland, that failing a finding of contempt, (filing ex-spouse) argument for fees fails, Id., the circumstances leading to that decision were markedly different. ¶ 18. Regardless, we find Fancher was in contempt (see Issue III), and this issue is moot.