Opinion ID: 2716451
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Testimony of Police Officers Ruling out Trucks Other Than Defendant’s

Text: ¶ 8. One of the critical issues at trial was the identification of defendant’s truck using video from the CCTA camera at the scene of the crime. Because the truck was relatively unique, police investigators working with the Department of Motor Vehicles were able to identify approximately twenty vehicles registered in Vermont which matched the make and color of the truck seen on camera. Ten vehicle owners testified at trial for the purpose of eliminating their truck or trucks from identification. The police interviewed five other owners prior to trial. These owners did not testify at trial. Instead, the investigating officers testified that based on the out-of-court interviews with the owners, the officers were able to eliminate those remaining trucks from the identification process. ¶ 9. The first issue is whether defense counsel offered a sufficient objection at trial to this testimony. See State v. Decoteau , 2007 VT 94, ¶ 10, 182 Vt. 433, 940 A.2d 661 (“The party opposing introduction of evidence must object at the time the evidence is offered to preserve this issue for appeal.”). Prior to the testimony of Detective Carlson, who had contact with two of the vehicle owners who did not testify, defense counsel objected in the following terms: [M]y understanding is that this [testimony about the remaining trucks] is just what was reported to him and what was provided to him through photographs that he doesn’t have any individual foundation to establish . . . [W]e move to exclude him on that basis . . . . . . . . The difference is all the other truck owners are going to be here—my understanding is they’re going to be here to testify on their own. Detective Carlson is acting as a substitute for these other two. So this isn’t something that can be tied in later with independent evidence, this is just [the detective] coming in and saying well, they said they weren’t here and so they weren’t here. The court ruled that the officers could testify about what they had learned from the remaining vehicle owners, but that the State could not elicit “hearsay statements as to what the person told the police officer.” When the same issue arose during the testimony of three detectives, defense counsel renewed his objection on the ground of “foundation based on hearsay” and “objection based on hearsay.” Over these objections, the court permitted the State to introduce testimony from the detectives concerning their elimination of four trucks from involvement in the crime. [2] ¶ 10. We are satisfied that the objections were sufficient to preserve the issue of admissibility of the testimony under Vermont Rule of Evidence 602. The issues of hearsay and personal knowledge are closely linked in this case. A police officer’s repetition of a statement made by a vehicle owner would raise issues under the hearsay rule. Testimony that a truck was eliminated from suspicion based on the owner’s out-of-court statement raises a slightly different question under Rule 602. In considering the preservation issue, courts have generally considered a hearsay objection sufficient to alert the trial court to the issue even when the precise objection arises under Rule 602. United States v. Davis , 596 F.3d 852, 856 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Elizarraras v. Bank of El Paso , 631 F.2d 366, 374 (5th Cir. 1980); State v. Okumura , 894 P.2d 80, 95-96 (Haw. 1995), overruled on other grounds by State v. Cabagbag , 277 P.3d 1027, 1040 (Haw. 2012); but see United States v. Stout , 599 F.2d 866, 869 (8th Cir. 1979) (holding that police officer’s testimony that eight people were in bank at time of robbery, which was based on his interviews of other witnesses, was admissible over hearsay objection). In this case, the shorthand objection on hearsay grounds was supplemented by the prior discussion at the bench of the issue. Defense counsel plainly registered an objection not only to the officers’ recitation of statements by the owners who were not present, but also to testimony from the investigating officers concerning their conclusions about which trucks they could exclude from further suspicion. ¶ 11. We turn now to the merits of the dispute over admissibility. We begin our analysis with Rule 602, which provides in relevant part that “[t]he testimony of a witness may be excluded or stricken unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that he has personal knowledge of the matter.” ¶ 12. In this case, the witnesses knew only what the vehicle owners told them. These statements were not independently admissible as, for example, admissions by a party opponent. See In re Estate of Maggio , 2012 VT 99, ¶ 27, 193 Vt. 1, 71 A.3d 1130 (holding that evidence admissible as party-opponent admissions under Rule 801(d)(2) need not satisfy personal knowledge requirement of Rule 602). Nor were the statements offered as the basis for an expert opinion. See V.R.E. 703 (providing that facts relied upon by expert witness need not be admissible for expert’s opinion to be admitted, if facts are reasonably relied upon by experts in the field). Instead, this is a case in which the substance of hearsay statements was introduced in the guise of conclusions reached by the witnesses. Permitting the witnesses to testify about their conclusions violated the personal knowledge requirement of Rule 602. ¶ 13. The need to guard against the admission of the substance of out-of-court statements has long been recognized by the courts and commentators. The reason for the exclusion is the same as for hearsay: the fact-finder has no basis for judging the reliability of the information because the credibility of the declarant cannot be challenged. This case illustrates the problem very clearly. A truck owner who testifies that his truck was elsewhere on the date of the crime can be cross-examined on issues of memory, mistake, actual knowledge, and other factors that may reduce the reliability of his statement. The same information passed along to an investigator in a private conversation cannot be challenged in any meaningful way because the declarant is absent. ¶ 14. The authors of C. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure (2d ed. 2012), warned against the admission of out-of-court statements as the basis for testimony by investigators and others who heard these statements: One of the most common grounds for a Rule 602 objection is that the witness’ testimony is based on the observation of others as reflected in their hearsay statements. While a witness who gives testimony containing hearsay may have perceived an out of court statement with her senses, the testimony is offered to prove facts observed by the hearsay declarant, not the witness. Thus, the personal knowledge requirement is satisfied only where the testimony of a witness who quotes an out of court statement is offered for the limited purpose of proving that the out of court statement was made or that the witness heard the statement made. The requirement might not be satisfied if the testimony is offered to prove the facts asserted in the statement. Id . § 6026, at 252-53. In this case, the out-of-court statements about the trucks were relevant only for their truth. Information about the location of the other trucks was introduced only because, if true, it eliminated other suspects and focused suspicion on defendant. ¶ 15. Turning to the specific facts of this case, it is clear that the investigating officers had no basis upon which to offer admissible testimony that the information they received from the truck owners met the personal knowledge requirement of Rule 602. Such testimony would have to come from the declarants themselves—which would have removed any need for repetition through the officers. In fact, that was the course the State followed with the majority of the other truck owners who appeared live at trial. In the absence of evidence that the statements were based on personal knowledge, the requirement of Rule 602 was not met and the testimony of the officers should have been excluded. ¶ 16. We consider finally whether the admission of the officers’ testimony was prejudicial to defendant. See State v. Mumley , 2009 VT 48, ¶ 20, 186 Vt. 52, 978 A.2d 6 (“When conducting a harmless-error analysis to determine whether the jury would have convicted without the offending evidence, we consider the extent to which the offending evidence was inculpatory, whether it was cumulative or duplicative of other evidence, and how prominent it was at trial.”); V.R.Cr.P. 52(a) (stating that “[a]ny error . . . which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded”). The identification of defendant’s truck as the truck caught on video at the scene was one of the principal pieces of evidence connecting defendant to the crime. All trucks of the correct make, model, and color registered in Vermont were identified. The State called ten witnesses who owned the same type of vehicle to demonstrate that they could not have been involved in the crime. The elimination of the remaining trucks through the testimony of the officers closed the circle on that issue—essentially identifying defendant as the last possible owner of that type of vehicle in the entire state. In closing, the State described its success in narrowing the inquiry to defendant in the following terms: And on Monday, you saw the people coming back and forth from all across the state of Vermont; truck owners, police officers, all telling you about their trucks and why they were eliminated as being involved in this attempted abduction. Everyone was eliminated except one truck; [defendant]’s truck. ¶ 17. In arguing that there was no prejudice, the State points to other evidence linking defendant to the truck shown on video at the crime scene. While several witnesses testified that defendant’s truck looked similar to the truck shown on the CCTA video, this testimony was not cumulative with the officers’ testimony, because it did not rule out other similar trucks. The admission of impermissible evidence through three successive witnesses on a central issue in the case is sufficient to demonstrate prejudice to defendant. Under the circumstances, we cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have convicted defendant if the testimony had not been admitted. See State v. Brillon , 2010 VT 25, ¶ 21, 187 Vt. 444, 995 A.2d 557 (holding that it was not harmless error to admit condition-of-release order where prosecution’s case relied heavily on order). ¶ 18. Accordingly, we reverse the conviction on this ground. Although our ruling on the admission of the officers’ testimony is dispositive of this appeal, we will address other issues raised by defendant because they have the potential to reoccur at a subsequent trial. We do not reach the issue of the claimed discovery violation, however, because the evidentiary error is a sufficient basis for reversal and on retrial there can no longer be any secret about the testimony of the State’s expert witness.