Opinion ID: 71475
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Mixed-motive framework in Title VII retaliation cases

Text: In Gross v. FBL Financial Services., Inc ., the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether direct evidence of age discrimination is necessary to obtain a mixed-motive jury instruction in a case brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). [19] The Court did not answer that question, however, because it held that the kind of mixed-motive jury instruction proper under Price Waterhouse in a Title VII case was never proper in an ADEA discrimination case. Its reasoning was based on the text of the statute and a comparison of Congress's approach to Title VII and the ADEA. First, the Court reasoned that the text of the ADEA differed from the text of Title VII; unlike § 2000e-2(m) in Title VII, Congress did not authorize motivating factor claims in the ADEA. [20] Second, the Court noted that when Congress amended Title VII in 1991 adding § 2000e-2(m), it had also amended the ADEA in several ways yet chose not to include a similar motivating factor provision. [21] The Court presumed that Congress acted intentionally by omitting motivating factor in age discrimination cases. [22] The Court concluded, therefore, that a plaintiff in an ADEA case retains the burden of persuasion to establish that age was the `but-for' cause of the employer's adverse action. [23] We recognize that the Gross reasoning could be applied in a similar manner to the instant case. The text of § 2000e-2(m) states only that a plaintiff proves an unlawful employment practice by showing that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor. [24] It does not state that retaliation may be shown to be a motivating factor. Moreover, although Congress amended Title VII to add § 2000e-2(m) in 1991, it did not include retaliation in that provision. These considerations are, of course, similar to the Supreme Court's reasoning in Gross, and Xerox understandably urged at oral argument that Gross dictates the same conclusion here, i.e., a Title VII retaliation plaintiff, like an ADEA discrimination plaintiff, may not obtain a motivating factor jury instruction and must instead prove that retaliation was the but-for cause for the adverse employment action. We believe, however, that such a simplified application of Gross is incorrect. [25] To state the obvious, Gross is an ADEA case, not a Title VII case. The Gross Court cautioned that when conducting statutory interpretation, courts must be careful not to apply rules applicable under one statute to a different statute without careful and critical examination. [26] The Court's comparison of Title VII with the ADEA, and the textual differences between those two statutory schemes, led it to conclude that Title VII decisions like Price Waterhouse and Desert Palace did not govern its interpretation of the ADEA. [27] But we are concerned with construing Title VII, albeit in the retaliation context, so those decisions, along with our own precedent recognizing the application of mixed-motive analysis in Title VII retaliation cases, are not unimportant. [28] In other words, the decision before us is how to proceed in light of Price Waterhouse, which specifically provided that the because of language in the context of Title VII authorized the mixed-motive framework, and Gross, which decided that the same language in the context of the ADEA meant but-for, but also refused to incorporate its prior Title VII decisions as part of the analysis. We believe that under these circumstances, the Price Waterhouse holding remains our guiding light. Although the dissent would extend Gross into the Title VII context, we think that would be contrary to Gross 's admonition against intermingling interpretations of the two statutory schemes. [29] It is not our place, as an inferior court, to renounce Price Waterhouse as no longer relevant to mixed-motive retaliation cases, as that prerogative remains always with the Supreme Court. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc. [30] The Supreme Court recognized that Title VII and the ADEA are materially different with respect to the relevant burden of persuasion. [31] Because the Court recognized this difference but was not presented in Gross with the question of how to construe the standard for causation and the shifting burdens in a Title VII retaliation case, we do not believe Gross controls our analysis here. As noted above, we have previously recognized that the motivating factor analysis and burden shifting scheme of Price Waterhouse may be applicable in Title VII mixed-motive retaliation cases, although we have held that direct evidence is necessary to shift the burden to the defendant. [32] We are bound by our circuit precedent, as we may not `overrule the decision of a prior panel unless such overruling is unequivocally directed by controlling Supreme Court precedent.' Cain v. Transocean Offshore USA, Inc. [33] Although Title VII and Price Waterhouse provided the backdrop for its decision, the Gross Court made clear that its focus was on ADEA claims. [34] We conclude therefore that Gross did not overrule our prior decisions addressing Title VII retaliation. [35] Because we believe that Gross does not unequivocally control whether a mixed-motive jury instruction may be given in a Title VII retaliation case, we must continue to allow the Price Waterhouse burden shifting in such cases unless and until the Supreme Court says otherwise. Therefore, we proceed to consider whether the direct evidence requirement of our Title VII retaliation precedent remains valid. In light of Desert Palace, we conclude that it does not. [36]