Opinion ID: 1438798
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Our Holding on Appeal

Text: We hold that this issue is to be decided on state constitutional grounds. We accept the rationale in Wheeler and its progeny, and in the cited cases that have not explicitly relied on Wheeler but which have nonetheless relied on the sixth amendment to prohibit the prosecution from using racially discriminatory peremptory challenges that would prevent the defendant from being tried by a jury that represents a fair cross section of the community in which the defendant is being tried. We agree with the court in Taylor that it is unnecessary for the petit jury to mirror the community and reflect the various distinctive groups in the population. Defendants are not entitled to a jury of any particular composition. 419 U.S. at 538, 95 S.Ct. at 702. At the same time, however, we feel that the state should not be able to accomplish indirectly at the selection of the petit jury what it has not been able to accomplish directly at the selection of the venire. In the case before us, while the venire may have reflected a fair cross section of the number of Blacks in the county in which defendant was to be tried, if those Blacks are then excluded as soon as the prosecution sees them in the venire, of what practical effect is the constitutional protection of Article II, Section 14 of our constitution? Using the criteria chosen by the court in Fields, we find the prosecutor's conduct in the case before us lacking. First, Appellant showed that the prosecutor struck the only two Blacks who had a chance to serve on the jury. Second, Appellant showed that the two prospective jurors ostensibly shared only this one characteristic: membership in the same cognizable racial minority. Third, other than their race, the two prospective jurors were ostensibly as heterogenous as the community as a whole. Fourth, the prosecutor failed to engage these individuals in more than a random voir dire, and specifically, he failed to engage them in questions about their relationship to the other defendant whom the State was allegedly prosecuting in the same court. In other words, the prosecutor established no predicate for his subsequent explanation for his peremptory challenges, in that he elicited no testimony on voir dire to establish that the two individuals were indeed related to the other defendant. Having found that Appellant established at trial a prima facie showing that the prosecution violated his rights under Article II, Section 14, entitling him to a jury representing a fair cross section of the community, we now determine whether the trial court properly resolved the challenge to the prosecutor's use of his peremptory strikes. In other words, did the trial court properly assess the prosecutor's explanation for his peremptory striking of the Black jurors and did it correctly decide that this explanation passed constitutional muster? As the court stated in Goode: Did the state meet its burden of showing its peremptory challenge was racially neutral? [T]he state must justify its peremptory challenge by explaining what racially-neutral considerations led to the challenge. The state's explanations need not rise to the level justifying removal of the juror for cause. State v. Sandoval . They must, however, be clear and reasonably specific reasons that are related to the case to be tried    [T]he prosecutor may not rebut by denying a discriminatory motive   . Instead, the prosecutor must articulate a neutral explanation related to the particular case, giving a clear, concise, reasonably specific legitimate explanation for excusing those jurors   . Further, the trial court may not merely accept the state's proffered explanations, but has the duty to examine them and decide whether they are genuine and reasonable. 107 N.M. at 301-02, 756 P.2d at 581-82. By the above criteria, the trial court's resolution of Appellant's challenge to the prosecutor's peremptory strikes of the two Blacks was constitutionally inadequate. The prosecutor's assertion that he feared the two Blacks were related to another defendant was based on nothing more than the prosecutor's own words. The prosecutor's explanation was hardly a clear, concise, reasonably specific legitimate explanation for excusing those jurors as required by Goode. Instead it amounted to simply a bare denial of a discriminatory motive. Further, the trial court did nothing more than listen to the prosecutor's explanation and rubber stamp it, without inquiry or scrutiny, and without demanding of the prosecutor articulate and explicit substantiation. Such a procedure prevented Appellant from gaining access to the prosecutor's motives for striking the two Blacks and effectively violated his right to a jury drawn from a representative cross section of the community in which he was to be tried. Accordingly, his rights under Article II, Section 14 of our state constitution were abrogated, and he should be given a new trial. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for a new trial to be conducted in a manner that is not inconsistent with our decision herein. IT IS SO ORDERED. RANSOM, J., and STEVE HERRERA, District Judge, concur.