Opinion ID: 6334233
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant’s Reasons and Alleged Pretext

Text: In its motion for summary judgment, WMT claimed that it terminated Courtney “due to disruptive behavior and inability to work effectively with his supervisor, Barry Regan.” (Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., R. 53-1, Page ID # 145.) It referenced the three discrete incidents listed above as evidence of this “disruptive behavior and inability to work effectively” with Regan, namely, (1) the email exchange about the in-rack sprinkler system; (2) the letters from the Arlington Fire Department; and (3) Courtney’s conversation with Hoffbeck. See supra pp. 4–7; (see also id. at Page ID # 145–48). Courtney argues that there are genuine and material factual disputes as to the pretextual nature of WMT’s reasoning. See White, 533 F.3d at 393. Plaintiff can demonstrate that such reasons are in fact pretextual by providing evidence showing “that the employer’s stated reason[s] for the adverse employment action . . . (1) ha[ve] no basis in fact, (2) w[ere] not the actual reason, or (3) [are] insufficient to explain the employer’s action.” White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 393 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Imwalle v. Reliance Med. Prods., Inc., 515 F.3d 531, 545 (6th Cir. 2008)). A plaintiff “may also demonstrate pretext by offering evidence which challenges the reasonableness of the employer’s decision ‘to the extent that such an inquiry sheds light on 11 No. 21-5683, Courtney v. Wright Med. Tech., Inc. whether the employer’s proffered reason for the employment action was its actual motivation.’” White, 533 F.3d at 393 (quoting Wexler v. White’s Fine Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564, 578 (6th Cir. 2003)). Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff “has produced enough evidence for a reasonable jury to infer that [WMT]’s proffered explanation for its hiring decision may be merely a pretext for unlawful discrimination.” White, 533 F.3d at 394–94; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (“The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.”) (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158– 59 (1970)); see also Brewer v. New Era, Inc., 564 F. App’x 834, 840 (6th Cir. 2014). First, a reasonable jury could find that WMT’s claims about the email exchange are not factually supported and provide an insufficient basis for Courtney’s termination. See generally White, 533 F.3d at 393; see also supra pp. 4–5. As previously discussed, the parties dispute whether Courtney’s responses contained the information that Regan requested. Viewing the evidence in Plaintiff’s favor, a jury could determine that the emails from Courtney did provide “an explanation as to why there were in-rack sprinklers in the Arlington warehouse” and also gave a “narrative explanation as to the decision-making process.” (Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., R. 53-1, Page ID # 146.) Indeed, the emails show that Courtney did more than “simply attach[] documents related to code and insurance guidelines.” (Id.) Courtney’s responses cite the relevant fire code provisions and discuss the fact that those provisions applied to the warehouse in question. See supra pp. 4–5. The emails also call into question Defendant’s contention that Plaintiff was “evasive,” “coy,” and “short” in his communications with Regan. (Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., R. 53- 1, Page ID # 146; Def.’s Statement of Facts, R. 53-2, Page ID # 161.) To the contrary, the emails indicate that Regan initiated the conversation with stern and accusatory language. (See Ex. B to 12 No. 21-5683, Courtney v. Wright Med. Tech., Inc. Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J., R. 56, Page ID # 391–92) (“In 25 years[,] I have never seen this . . . . This is ridiculous and was a terrible waste of money.”); see also supra p. 4. Additionally, a reasonable jury could question the factual basis and the conclusions drawn from the second incident: WMT’s exchange with the Arlington Fire Department. See generally White, 533 F.3d at 393; see also supra pp. 5–7. In its summary judgment motion, WMT argued that Courtney “went to the Arlington Fire Department and clearly disparaged Mr. Regan.” (Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., R. 53-1, Page ID # 147.) However, the letters from the fire department fail to confirm this allegation. Indeed, each letter suggests that the fire department received “several inquiries” from various “Wright Medical Representatives.” (Ex. B to Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J., R. 56, Page ID # 398, 401); see also supra pp. 5–7. The letters also fail to show that Regan was “clearly disparaged” by any of the inquiries. Rather, the letters indicate the fire department was informed that “current management” requested an explanation regarding the need for the sprinkler system. (Ex. B to Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J., R. 56, Page ID # 398, 401.) Drawing all inferences in favor of Plaintiff, the letters thus fail to substantiate the allegation that Courtney “went to the Arlington Fire Department and clearly disparaged Mr. Regan.” (Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., R. 53-1, Page ID # 145–147.) Nor do they reflect Courtney’s alleged inability to work with Regan. To be sure, Courtney testified that he contacted the Fire Department to ask for copies of the relevant fire code provisions. But a reasonable jury could find that this demonstrated Courtney’s desire to thoroughly answer Regan’s questions, rather than any attempt to denigrate Regan or his reputation. Furthermore, a reasonable jury could determine that the third incident cited by WMT also supports a pretext finding. Indeed, there are factual disputes regarding WMT’s assertions about the May 2019 incident between Courtney and Hoffbeck and whether those assertions align with WMT’s stated reasons for firing Courtney. (Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., R. 53-1, Page ID # 145 (stating 13 No. 21-5683, Courtney v. Wright Med. Tech., Inc. that Courtney was allegedly fired “due to disruptive behavior and inability to work effectively with his supervisor, Barry Regan”)); see also supra p. 7. Importantly, the parties dispute the nature and severity of the interaction as well as Defendant’s contention that it amounted to “workplace violence.” (Compare Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., R. 55-2, Page ID # 314 with Pl.’s Statement of Facts, R. 55-1, Page ID # 305–306.) Plaintiff asserts that the interaction between Courtney and Hoffbeck was neither confrontational nor violent. Indeed, Hoffbeck testified that while Plaintiff “comment[ed] on the way that [Hoffbeck] had talked to the contractors,” Courtney neither raised his voice nor threatened him. (Hoffbeck Dep., R. 61-6, Page ID # 637–38.) Viewing this evidence in Plaintiff’s favor, a jury could determine that the incident served as pretext for WMT’s termination. The jury could rely on the fact that that the record contains no evidence that the incident was elevated through Human Resources or was otherwise processed as a workplace violence incident. Critically, each of Defendant’s proffered explanations suffer from one additional flaw. In an attempt to cite “legitimate, non-discriminatory reason[s] for the adverse employment action,” Defendant claims that Courtney “already had ongoing issues with senior leadership” prior to Regan’s arrival at WMT. White, 533 F.3d at 391; (Def.’s Statement of Facts, R. 53-2, Page ID # 159–160). However, prior to Regan’s arrival, all of Courtney’s available reviews indicate that he either exceeded expectations or was outstanding in his role, and WMT was simultaneously unable to identify any other individuals with whom Courtney allegedly “had ongoing issues.” (See Ex. B to Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J., R. 56, Page ID # 404–18; see also Pl.’s Statement of Facts, R. 55-1, Page ID # 305.) Additionally, any “issue” that predated Regan’s arrival at the company is tangential to WMT’s argument that Courtney was unable to “work effectively with his supervisor, Barry Regan.” (Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., R. 53-1, Page ID # 145.) 14 No. 21-5683, Courtney v. Wright Med. Tech., Inc. All told, WMT’s explanation for its termination decision relied on disputed facts that Plaintiff has since rebutted. The evidence on the record raises genuine and material questions regarding whether WMT’s stated reasons for terminating Courtney were “its actual motivation.” Wexler, 317 F.3d at 578. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s pretext arguments should be heard by a jury.5 See White, 533 F.3d at 393; see also Blair v. Henry Filters, Inc., 505 F.3d 517, 532 (6th Cir. 2007).