Opinion ID: 1105721
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: whether the trial judge erred in denying jury instruction d-2 and in granting instructions s-3 and s-4?

Text: ¶ 15. Wall's next assignment of error is that the trial judge erred in denying jury instruction D-2 and in granting instructions S-3 and S-4. Wall first made a request for a peremptory instruction, D-2, instructing the jury to return a verdict of not guilty on Count 2 of the indictment which was denied by the trial judge. The standard of review for peremptory instructions and directed verdicts are the same. In passing upon a request for a peremptory instruction, all evidence introduced by the State is to be accepted as true, together with any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from that evidence, and if sufficient evidence to support a verdict of guilty exists, the motion for a directed verdict is to be overruled. Brown v. State, 556 So.2d 338, 340 (Miss.1990) (citing Butler v. State, 544 So.2d 816 (Miss. 1989)). Furthermore, when the trial court has erred in refusing to grant the defendant's request for a peremptory instruction, then the case must be reversed and the defendant discharged. Brown, 556 So.2d at 340 (citing Sisk v. State, 290 So.2d 608, 611 (Miss.1974)). However, this Court recognizes that a defendant shall not be discharged short of a conclusion that given the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the verdict, no reasonable, hypothetical juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty. Id. ¶ 16. However, as discussed in the previous issue, there was sufficient evidence to support a finding by the jury that Wall had constructive possession over the controlled substance found in his vehicle. This is all that is legally required to survive a motion for a directed verdict, or as here a peremptory instruction. Id. Because there was legally sufficient credible evidence to submit to the jury, it was proper for the trial court to refuse the peremptory instruction. There is no merit to this assignment of error. ¶ 17. Wall also objected to Jury Instructions S-3 and S-4. Wall claims that the jury was improperly instructed since Jury Instruction S-3 included the phrase there must be sufficient facts to warrant a finding by the jury that Jerome Wall was aware of the presence and character of the Diazepam and Marijuana ... This Court's standard in reviewing jury instructions is to read all instructions together to determine whether the jury has been correctly instructed. Townsend, 681 So.2d at 509. As long as the instructions given to the jury as a whole fairly and adequately state the law and are supported by the evidence, reversal is inappropriate. Id. See also Sanders v. State, 313 So.2d 398, 401 (Miss.1975). Wall contends that there was no evidence to support the State's instruction that Wall was aware of the presence of marijuana in the vehicle and the instruction should have been denied. ¶ 18. The record shows that Wall was driving the vehicle. The officers ran the tag and found the vehicle to be registered to Wall which shows he had dominion and control over the vehicle. This is sufficient evidence to send the case to the jury and, thus, to support instruction S-3. Townsend, 681 So.2d at 509-10. There is no merit to this assignment of error. ¶ 19. Lastly, Wall claims it was error to give Jury Instruction S-4, a flight instruction. In Tran v. State, 681 So.2d 514 (Miss.1996), this Court held that flight instructions which indicate that flight may be considered as a circumstance of guilt or guilty knowledge are appropriate only where the flight is unexplained and is probative of guilt or guilty knowledge. Tran v. State, 681 So.2d 514, 519 (Miss.1996). In the case sub judice, Wall gives no explanation for his flight. Thus, the only question to be answered is whether the flight was probative. ¶ 20. The answer to this question is obviously yes. Wall and his companion were stopped in Wall's vehicle. The officers discovered contraband of two types in the vehicle. After the officers discovered the controlled substances, Wall fled from the scene. If Wall was innocent, threatened or afraid, this fact was not bought out to the jury. Consequently, his flight was probative of guilty knowledge. The two-prong test of Tran is met and, thus, the fight instruction was appropriate. There is no merit to this assignment of error.