Opinion ID: 150603
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Lee's Statements Regarding His Prior Possession of Firearms

Text: Lee next argues that the District Court erred in admitting into evidence the statements he made to Kraus during their interview. Specifically, Kraus provided the following testimony at trial regarding those statements: Lee insisted he does not typically own or carry guns. However, he did state that he has access to a lot of guns and would use them against anyone who threatens him or his family. He stated that he shot at an individual named Pickles, who was well known as Ernest Harris, on multiple occasions. He went on to say that I arrested Pickles, which is true, in the past, with a firearm. And Mr. Lee claimed that on that night, that ... Pickles was arrested, that Pickles was actually on his way with that gun to kill Mr. Lee. He acknowledged that and said that there's a long time, ongoing violent feud between Mr. Lee's family and Pickles.... Lee continued to insist that he did not have any weapons in the car when I stopped him on June 27th, but he did compare that to a time when he stated that he fled from me before in the Hill District.... I do remember this. It would have been probably back in 2001 or 2002.... He further told me that if I would have caught him that night, I would have caught him with guns in the car, but, again, he continued to insist that he had no guns in the car on June 27th when I stopped him. (App. at 417-18.) In short, Lee admitted that he had access to guns, that he was willing to use guns, that he had shot at someone with whom he had an ongoing feud, that that person had tried to kill him, and that he had possessed a gun at an earlier time when Kraus tried to stop him. Lee attempted to exclude those statements as impermissible evidence under Rule 404(b), arguing that they do nothing but show a propensity for unlawful gun possession. The District Court denied that motion and held that the statements were admissible to prove intent, knowledge and/or the absence of mistake. Defendant has denied possession of the firearms in question here. ( Id. at 5.) On appeal, Lee again argues that his statements constitute impermissible propensity evidence under Rule 404(b). To the extent that our review of the district court's Rule 404(b) ruling requires us to interpret the rules of evidence our review is plenary, but, if the evidence could have been admissible in some circumstances, we would review the district court's decision to admit evidence ... for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Daraio, 445 F.3d 253, 259 (3d Cir.2006) (citation omitted). The Supreme Court has created a four-step test for the admissibility of evidence covered by Rule 404(b): (1) the evidence must have a proper purpose under Rule 404(b); (2) it must be relevant under Rule 402; (3) its probative value must outweigh its prejudicial effect under Rule 403; and (4) the court must charge the jury to consider the evidence only for the limited purpose for which it is admitted. United States v. Sampson, 980 F.2d 883, 886 (3d Cir.1992) (citing Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691-92, 108 S.Ct. 1496, 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988)). Only the first, third, and fourth steps are contested here, as it is undisputed that, under step two, Lee's statements are relevant. [18]
If the proffered evidence only goes to show character, or that the defendant had a propensity to commit the crime, it must be excluded. Where, however, the evidence also tends to prove some fact besides character, admissibility depends upon whether its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect. Id. at 887 (citing Gov't of V.I. v. Harris, 938 F.2d 401, 419 (3d Cir.1991)). If the government offers evidence of other wrongful acts, it must clearly articulate how that evidence fits into a chain of logical inferences, no link of which can be the inference that because the defendant committed ... [such an act] before, he therefore is more likely to have committed this one. Id. Nevertheless, Rule 404(b) is inclusive, not exclusive, and emphasizes admissibility. Id. at 886 (citation omitted). The government presents several arguments as to why Lee's statements are admissible under Rule 404(b). First, it says that Lee's statements are relevant [to] and admissible regarding the key issue[] of knowledge. (Appellee's Ans. Br. at 45.) Lee's trial, however, was not about whether he knew that he had a rifle in the back seat of his Jeep. There was no question of accident or mistake. Rather, Lee's defense was simply that there was no rifle in his Jeep and that the rifle recovered at the Apartments was not his. Thus, the trial was about weighing Kraus's credibility against Lee's, and, as Lee rightly notes, [i]t is inconceivable that if the jury believed [Kraus's] testimony it would have found that Lee acted by mistake. (Appellant's Op. Br. at 47.) The government presses the point, however, saying that knowledge is at issue because Lee did not admit possession of any firearm. It relies on our decision in United States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452 (3d Cir.2003), in which the defendant was convicted of conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute heroin. Id. at 455. There, we allowed the government to introduce into evidence the fact that the defendant had a prior felony drug conviction. We accepted the government's argument that, because it had to prove that Givan knew, prior to its discovery by the troopers, that a quantity of heroin was hidden in the back seat of the rental car and that it had to prove that Givan possessed the heroin with intent to distribute it, knowledge and intent were material and contested issues at trial. Id. at 460-61. Unlike in Givan, however, where the defendant denied knowing that there was heroin in the backseat of his rental car and that he intended to distribute it, Lee has not put knowledge at issue. Lee is not arguing that he did not know there was a rifle in his back seat. His argument is a straightforward denial that any gun was there. The government also argues that Lee put his knowledge at issue when his counsel told the jury, Yes, the police did find the rifle in the woods near where Mr. Lee abandoned his Jeep, but the evidence will show that he did not put it there. (App. at 334.) But the government's argument fails again. The quoted comment does not amount to a statement that Lee did not know the rifle was in his possession or near his vicinity; it was once more an out-and-out denial that he had anything to do with the gun. The government does far better with motive as a theory of admissibility. According to the government, the statements Lee made to Kraus reveal Lee's motive for possessing firearms because he admitted that he has no qualms about using such weapons against anyone who threatens him or his family, and he stated that he was in a violent feud with Ernest Pickles Harris. See App. at 216 (The defendant's statements regarding his motive for possessing firearms (to use them against anyone who would threaten Mr. Lee or his family, such as ... `Pickles', with whom he and his family have had a long standing feud) is certainly relevant to his motive to possess a firearm in this matter.). We agree with that assessment of the statements. Not only did Lee claim that, at some point in the past, Harris had planned to shoot him and he had shot at Harris, he also admitted that the feud he and his family had with Harris was ongoing. Moreover, Lee conceded that he has access to a lot of guns and would use them against anyone who threatens him or his family. ( Id. at 417.) Those statements reveal that Lee had reason to possess a weapon on the day in question. [19] We note that the final part of Lee's statements to Krausin which Lee admitted that he had possessed firearms on a prior occasion in 2000 or 2001 when Kraus stopped himdoes not, in isolation, speak to motive in the same way as Lee's statements about possessing guns to protect his family and about his ongoing feud with Harris's family. Based on the record, we cannot tell whether, as a factual matter, the statement about 2000 or 2001 was part and parcel of Lee's first two statements about protecting his family and his violent feud with Harris. Moreover, it is not clear to us whether, as a procedural matter, defense counsel, in argument before the District Court, treated Lee's statements as one single conversation, or whether defense counsel treated the statements as analytically distinct. While defense counsel did parse the statements in a motion in limine submitted to the District Court, in the briefing before us, no distinction was drawn between the various admissions. [20] ( See App. at 180.) Assuming that this last statement can, as a factual matter, be separated from Lee's first two statements, and assuming further that this last statement was argued separately to the District Court and so can be analyzed separately here, it was error to admit the third statement regarding Lee's 2000 or 2001 gun possession because that statement is not probative of motive (or any other permissible ground listed in 404(b)). Unlike the statements concerning the ongoing feud and his desire and capability to protect himself and his family with guns, his comment that he once had a gun years earlier does not, on its own, prove anything about a present motive to be armed. However, any error in admitting that third statement was harmless in the context of the overall admissions, because it was highly probable that the admission of Lee's final statement did not contribute to the conviction, especially considering the fact that the jury had just heard the previous two statements that spoke so directly to Lee's motive. [21] See United States v. Ali, 493 F.3d 387, 392 (3d Cir. 2007) ([T]he test for harmless error is whether it is highly probable that evidentiary error did not contribute to conviction. (citing Gov't of V.I. v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278, 283-84 (3d Cir.1976))); 2A FEDERAL PROCEDURE, LAWYER'S EDITION § 3:8444 (1981) ([F]ederal appellate courts are more willing to find harmless error in the area of evidentiary rulings than they are in other areas of procedure. (citing Julander v. Ford Motor Co., 488 F.2d 839, 843 (10th Cir.1973))). [22] In conclusion, the government presented a chain of logical inferences between Lee's prior weapons possession and the rifle charge that does not suggest a mere propensity to engage in weapons offenses. Sampson, 980 F.2d at 887. Lee's statements about possessing guns to protect his family and about his ongoing and violent feud with Harris's family are relevant to show his motive for possessing a rifle on the day in question. Thus, the evidence was offered for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b).
Given the relevance of Lee's statements, [23] we next determine under Huddleston whether, pursuant to Rule 403, the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the statements. 485 U.S. at 691, 108 S.Ct. 1496. Given the substantial deference owed to district courts in weighing evidence under Rule 403, combined with the highly probative value of the evidenceparticularly Lee's statements about his feud with Harris and what that revealed about Lee's motivethe District Court's decision to admit those statements was not arbitrary or irrational. See Univ. Rehab. Servs., 205 F.3d at 669 ([We] cannot reverse a District Court's conclusion under Federal Rule 403 unless such a conclusion is ... `arbitrary or irrational.' (citation omitted)). Indeed, the statements reveal Lee's motive to possess weapons on the day in question, which is highly probative in a case like this, in which the defendant has denied possession all together. [24]
Lastly, Huddleston requires us to ensure that the District Court charged the jury to consider the evidence only for the limited purpose for which it was admitted. 485 U.S. at 691-92, 108 S.Ct. 1496. The District Court gave a limiting instruction as follows: Now, you have heard evidence that the defendant ... made certain statements to Lieutenant Kraus about his past possession and use of firearms when he was arrested on July 12, 2005. This evidence was admitted for a limited purpose only. You may consider this evidence only for the purpose of deciding whether the defendant had the state of mind, knowledge, motive or intent necessary to commit the crime charged in the indictment, or did not commit the acts for which he is on trial by accident or mistake. Do not consider the evidence for any other purpose. Of course, it is for you to determine whether you believe this evidence, and if you do believe it, whether you accept it for the purpose offered. You may give it as much weight as you feel it deserved, but only for the limited purpose that I described to you. The defendant is not on trial for committing these other acts. You may not consider the evidence of these other acts as a substitute for proof that the defendant committed the crime charged. You may not consider this evidence as proof that the defendant has a bad character or any propensity to commit crimes. Specifically, you may not use this evidence to conclude that because the defendant may have committed the other acts, he must also have committed the act charged in the indictment. Remember, the defendant is on trial here only for possessing a firearm on the date in question, not for these other acts. Do not return a guilty verdict unless the government proves the crime charged in the indictment beyond a reasonable doubt. (App. at 595-97) (quoting THIRD CIRCUIT MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONSCRIMINAL § 4.29 (2009).) At the conclusion of the District Court's instructions to the jury, defense counsel asked the Court to repeat the limiting instruction, which it did. Now, for the first time, Lee challenges the adequacy of that instruction. Because he did not object at trial, any review of the instruction must be for plain error. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734-36, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993); see also United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 221 (3d Cir.2005) (A party generally may not assign error to a jury instruction if he fails to object before the jury retires or to `stat[e] distinctly the matter to which that party objects and the grounds of the objection.' (quoting Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 387, 119 S.Ct. 2090, 144 L.Ed.2d 370 (1999))). Lee has not shown any error in this regard, much less plain error. Though Lee argues that the District Court's instruction provided no guidance because it simply repeated the litany of permissible theories under Rule 404(b), the Court in fact did more than simply list the 404(b) grounds. The instruction properly informed the jury of the limited purpose for considering Lee's admissions about gun possession. [25] To the extent that Lee is now arguing that the jury could not have understood the instruction, we have rejected such sweeping and non-specific assertions before. See Givan, 320 F.3d at 462 ([I]t is a basic tenet ... that a jury is presumed to have followed the instructions the court gave it ... [and i]f we preclude the use of evidence admissible under Rule 404(b) because of a concern that jurors will not be able to follow the court's instructions regarding its use we will inevitably severely limit the scope of evidence permitted by that important rule.). Lee's statements about possessing guns to protect his family and about his feud with Harris therefore meet the guidelines for admissibility articulated in Huddleston. They were admissible for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b) as evidence of Lee's motive for possessing a weapon; they are undisputedly relevant under Rule 402; the District Court's finding under Rule 403 that the danger of unfair prejudicial effect did not substantially outweigh the probative value of the statements was not arbitrary and irrational; and the District Court twice charged the jury to consider the evidence only for the limited purpose for which it is admitted. [26] See Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 691-92, 108 S.Ct. 1496.