Opinion ID: 2335028
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of The Motion to Sever

Text: The second issue is whether the Superior Court erred in denying Winer's motion to sever the first degree arson charge from the criminal mischief charge. This Court reviews a decision on a motion to sever for abuse of discretion. [14] The denial of a motion to sever will not be disturbed unless [the] defendant demonstrates a `reasonable probability' that the joint trial caused `substantial injustice.' [15] For the reasons next discussed, we find that Winer has not sustained that burden. Superior Court Criminal Rule 8(a) permits the joinder of two or more offenses in the same indictment where those offenses are of the same or similar character or are based on the same act or transaction. . . . [16] Superior Court Criminal Rule 14 allows the trial court to sever offenses and hold separate trials if it appears that a defendant will be prejudiced by the joinder. [17] Winer argues that he was prejudiced by the joinder because there was a reasonable probability that the jury cumulated the evidence of the two separate crimes to find him guilty of the arson offense and/or to infer that he had a general criminal disposition. [18] Winer first claims that the two offenses were not of the same character or otherwise connected together, as Rule 8(a) required. We disagree. The offenses of damag[ing] a building by starting a fire [19] and of damaging tangible property consisting of wall trim and paint belonging to the State Fire Marshal or another person in an amount of less than $1,000, [20] are both Offenses Involving Property. Both are contained in the same subsection of the Delaware Criminal Code (Arson and Related Offenses). Therefore, those two offenses are of the same or similar character under Rule 8(a). Moreover, because Wagner testified that Winer was escorted directly from the scene of the fire to the State Fire Marshal's office where he was videotaped damaging the holding cell's walls, those two offenses were also connected together by temporal proximity. [21] Winer next claims that the two offenses should have been severed because, to prove that Winer was guilty of criminal mischief, the State would be free to introduce evidence that was otherwise not relevant to the arson charge, namely, the videotape showing Winer damaging the walls of the holding cell. Specifically, Winer takes issue with the trial court's ruling that there's a good probability that the incident itself may be admissible at trial for other reasons allowable under [D.R.E.] 404(b). That ruling, Winer argues, was incorrect because the videotape could not be used as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident with respect to the arson charge. [22] Winer did not object to the admission of the videotape on evidentiary or severance grounds. [23] Because the issue was not fairly presented to the trial court, it will not be entertained on this appeal. [24] Winer next contends that the presentation of that videotape to the jury was prejudicial because it permitted the jury to infer a general criminal disposition and find Winer guilty of arson where it would otherwise have found him not guilty. If in fact the jury had inferred a general criminal disposition on Winer's part because of the videotape evidence showing that he committed criminal mischief, it is likely that the jury would also have found him guilty as charged on the first degree arson offense. Instead, the jury convicted Winer of the lesser included offense of third degree arson. [25] That verdict diminishes the force of Winer's argument that the jury cumulated or otherwise improperly considered the evidence of criminal mischief to convict him of arson. Moreover, the prejudice, if any, was not significant, because the videotape presented to the jury was a shortened and redacted version of the two hour recording, and Winer never requested a jury instruction as to the permissible uses (by the jury) of the videotape. Finally, Winer claims that the joinder of the two offenses caused him substantial prejudice because it enabled the prosecution to make the following improper statement about Winer's character (based on the criminal mischief evidence) during closing argument: [Winer] wants you to believe he never lost his keys, [or that] he never said he lost his keys. This is the defendant who we have the tape for the criminal mischief piece of this evidence. That same man on that tape . . . sat up there and told you one story, [told] Deputy Wagner three stories, [and] is . . . asking you to believe that everyone else got it wrong [. . .] Remember on that tape [Winer] took the wall trim, he took the wallpaper up to the camera. That's the man who's asking you to believe[,] based on his four different stories in contrast to the one story that everyone else has told[,] that he's not guilty. Statements made by the prosecution during closing arguments without an objection from the defenseas occurred hereare reviewed for plain error. [26] Under that standard, the error complained of must be so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process. [27] Here, the prosecutor made reference to the evidence of the criminal mischief (the videotape showing Winer damaging property of the State Fire Marshal) to suggest that Winer was a dishonest person and that, as a result, the jury should not believe his account of the events. That reference might arguably have constituted plain error if Winer's credibility had not otherwise been adversely impacted, especiallyand significantly by his own conflicting statements to various persons at the scene of the fire. Given Winer's conflicting statements, the prosecutor's closing argument was not so prejudicial as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process. For these reasons, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Winer's motion to sever.