Opinion ID: 1203248
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Argument to Jury

Text: (51) In her opening statement at the guilt phase, the prosecutor read the letter she had written to propose a plea bargain for Art Corona in exchange for his testimony. The letter stated the prosecutor's belief that Mr. Corona will testify completely and truthfully at any and all trials in this matter. Defendant argues the prosecutor thus improperly personally vouched for the credibility of her star witness. (See e.g., People v. Sully, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1235; People v. Gates (1983) 43 Cal.3d 1168, 1187 [240 Cal. Rptr. 666, 743 P.2d 301].) As he admitted on the record three days later, defendant did not object to this statement at the time it was made and did not request an admonition. Though he eventually objected to the evidence itself during the direct examination of Art Corona, his failure to object to the prosecutor's statement in a timely manner on the grounds sought to be raised on appeal bars the claim. This is not a situation in which an admonition could not have cured the harm. In any case, we do not think the jury would understand the remark as suggesting they should rely on the prosecutor's evaluation. (See People v. Benson, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 793 [reviewing court must determine how reasonable juror would understand remarks].) As counsel said later in objecting to the evidence of the letter itself, the comment in the opening statement went by so fast that even he missed it at that time. In any event, any misconduct was not prejudicial; the court and the prosecutor told the jury that the arguments of counsel are not evidence, and the matter of Corona's credibility was fully explored without any suggestion the jury should rely on the prosecutor's evaluation of his credibility. (52) In closing argument at the guilt phase, defendant claims the prosecutor committed misconduct in referring to defense witness Maxwell as a weasel, in suggesting Norelli was a perjurer, in saying that defendant's witness Granara had referred to a police report that had not been produced and that he was not following the script, in saying that defendant got caught in some lies, some doozies, and in saying that his witnesses were not strangers to the police department. These claims are meritless. The prosecutor is permitted to urge, in colorful terms, that defense witnesses are not entitled to credence, to comment on failure to produce logical evidence, to argue on the basis of inference from the evidence that a defense is fabricated, and to comment on the evidence of prior convictions attributable to defense witnesses. (See, e.g., People v. Szeto (1981) 29 Cal.3d 20, 34 [171 Cal. Rptr. 652, 623 P.2d 213]. People v. Adcox, supra, 47 Cal.3d at 237; People v. Terry (1962) 57 Cal.2d 538, 561-562 [21 Cal. Rptr. 185, 370 P.2d 985].) (53) Defendant claims the prosecutor referred in argument to matter outside the record, a practice that clearly is misconduct. ( People v. Benson, supra, 52 Cal.3d at pp. 794-795.) Her suggestion, that because jurors saw Darell Dorn and Terry Pinholster in the hallway together during trial they should assume that Pinholster told Dorn to correct a misstatement in his testimony, was improper. But the inference that the alibi defense was fabricated arose naturally from the inconsistencies between the witnesses' earlier statements and their trial testimony, and from their relationships with the defendants, so we see no possibility of prejudice. (54) The prosecutor argued the alibi was incredible because none of the witnesses who gave evidence in support of it had attempted to exonerate defendant with the police or prosecutor before the trial, despite their familiarity with the police department and the prosecution. Defendant claims the reference to the familiarity of the witnesses with the police department was a reference to matter outside the record, namely, that the witnesses all had criminal records. Defendant failed to object, and in any event we do not think the comment would be understood this way. The trial testimony showed that seven of the ten alibi witnesses had been in contact with the police before trial but failed to mention the alibi. The argument, that the trial testimony of a witness other than the defendant is less credible for being offered for the first time at trial, is a permissible comment on the state of the evidence. (See, e.g., People v. Szeto, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 34.) At worst, the argument used the underworld milieu of the witnesses to argue, somewhat unpersuasively in our opinion, that the witnesses' familiarity with the police department would lead them to present themselves to the police at the first possible moment to exonerate their arrested friend. (55) With respect to defendant's complaint about the prosecutor's argument accusing Brown's attorney of bad faith in claiming the prosecutor had coached Corona to say that Brown had plunged his knife into his victim up to the hilt, we see no possibility that this comment could have affected the jury with respect to defendant's case. (56) Defense counsel argued that if defendant had gotten to the police station first, he would have gotten the deal and Corona would have been prosecuted. The prosecutor rebutted this claim with the statement that this was wishful thinking and that the jury had heard why it was that Corona had gotten the deal. We see no impropriety in this rebuttal, based as it was on the record. Nor do we see impropriety in her rebuttal of the defendant's claim that there was a secret prosecutorial deal with Corona. The prosecutor was entitled to argue that if the defense thought there was such a deal, they could have called her, a logical witness, to the stand to examine her about it. (See People v. Bell, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 539 [proper to comment on failure to call logical witness].) (57) Defendant also complains of the following: Codefendant Brown's counsel, in closing argument, attacked Corona's credibility and emphasized the accomplice-corroboration rule. He told the jury if it ignored the instructions you are really no better than Scott Pinholster, you have no more regard for the law or rights of anybody else or for our system than Scott Pinholster. Defendant did not object. The prosecutor repeated Brown's argument, and said, To even mention your names in the same breath I find utterly an insult. There was no objection or request for admonition. In any case, we do not view the argument as an appeal to passion and prejudice, but as within the range of forceful language warranted by the evidence. (See, e.g., People v. Thornton (1974) 11 Cal.3d 738, 762-763 [114 Cal. Rptr. 467, 523 P.2d 267]; People v. Terry, supra, 57 Cal.2d at pp. 561-562.) (58) Near the end of her rebuttal, the prosecutor argued that only in America are defendants accorded trials even in the face of overwhelming evidence. She said: I've had rape trials where a man's been caught on top of a woman raping her and we are still in a trial. [ถ] And you've all heard about trials where someone confessed, but that confession was beaten out of them. [ถ] They are entitled to their trial and they have had it. It's time to put an end to this farce, ladies and gentlemen. It really, really is. Brown's counsel objected, and the objection was overruled. The sidebar conference was not reported, but at the conclusion of argument counsel repeated his objection and moved for a mistrial, and defendant's counsel joined. Brown's counsel argued that the prosecutor had made an improper appeal to passion and prejudice, had relied on matters outside the record in discussing other trials, and had suggested that the defendants did not deserve to have a trial. Any suggestion that when there is overwhelming evidence of guilt, it is a farce to provide a trial is obviously improper. It may be that the jury understood the comment, as respondent claims, only as referring to the alibi and diminished capacity defenses as farcical in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt. In any event, it is inconceivable that the improper comment was prejudicial. It must have been clear to the jury that the court, the prosecutor and all defense counsel litigated the matter very carefully, that in no sense was the proceeding a farce or sham, that the jurors were expected to take their responsibilities carefully, and that all parties anticipated that the jurors would apply the law to the facts in arriving at their verdict. In addition, the jurors were specifically instructed that the statements of counsel were not evidence, and that they were not to be swayed by passion or prejudice. They were instructed that all parties had a right to expect that you will conscientiously consider and weigh the evidence and apply the law of the case, and that you will reach a just verdict regardless of what the consequences of such verdict may be. We find no prejudicial misconduct.