Opinion ID: 2355739
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Fees and Costs for Anderson's Abandoned Appeal

Text: Anderson argues that the water court erred in granting Sebesta and Pursell the attorney fees and costs that they incurred in defending his abandoned appeal of the denial of the Motion to Enforce. C.A.R. 38(d), the only rule directly applicable to attorney fees on appeal, states that [i]f the appellate court shall determine that an appeal is frivolous, it may award just damages and single or double costs to the appellee. C.A.R. 39.5 provides the procedure for this and states that [i]f attorney fees are otherwise recoverable for the particular appeal, the party claiming attorney fees shall specifically request them, and state the legal basis therefore, in the party's principal brief in the appellate court. In this case, however, Anderson never filed a brief and instead decided to abandon the appeal, dismissing it with prejudice. Sebesta and Pursell argue that, based on numerous prior cases, when a party has properly been awarded attorney fees prior to an appeal, it should also be awarded attorney fees for defending the appeal. See Mau v. E.P.H. Corp., 638 P.2d 777, 781 (Colo.1981); Martinez v. Steinbaum, 623 P.2d 49, 55 (Colo.1981); Kennedy v. King Soopers Inc., 148 P.3d 385, 390-91 (Colo.App.2006); Levy-Wegrzyn v. Ediger, 899 P.2d 230, 233 (Colo. App.1994). Anderson, on the other hand, cites cases holding that attorney fees under section 13-17-102 for an appeal are only appropriate if the appeal itself is frivolous. See Padilla v. Ghuman, 183 P.3d 653, 665 (Colo.App.2007); Front Range Home Enhancements, Inc. v. Stowell, 172 P.3d 973, 977 (Colo.App.2007). We need not opine as to which method we believe is correct or whether Anderson's abandoned appeal was or was not frivolous. Despite obtaining multiple extensions of time, Anderson never filed an opening brief. Rather, he asked us to dismiss his appeal with prejudice. Without a brief or arguments, there is no way for us to determine if the appeal was or was not frivolous. Similarly, there is no reason why Sebesta and Pursell should have incurred any attorney fees in defending Anderson's abandoned appeal because Anderson did just that, abandoned it, before filing an opening brief. Accordingly, we hold that Sebesta and Pursell are not entitled to attorney fees associated with Anderson's abandoned appeal.