Opinion ID: 455772
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Other challenged instructions

Text: 30 Appellants also contend that the district court's charge relating to the definition of reasonable doubt constituted plain error necessitating a reversal of their convictions. 10 We begin by noting that attempts to explain the term 'reasonable doubt' do not usually result in making it any clearer to the minds of the jury. Smith v. Bordenkircher, 718 F.2d 1273, 1276 (4th Cir.1983), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 2355, 80 L.Ed.2d 828 (1984) (quoting Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140, 75 S.Ct. 127, 137, 99 L.Ed. 150 (1954) ). As a result, this court has repeatedly joined in the general condemnation of trial court attempts to define reasonable doubt in their jury instructions. United States v. Moss, 756 F.2d at 333. See also, e.g., Smith v. Bordenkircher, 718 F.2d at 1276; Whiteside v. Parke, 705 F.2d 869, 871 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 141, 78 L.Ed.2d 133 (1983); United States v. Martin-Trigona, 684 F.2d 485, 493 (7th Cir.1982); Dunn v. Perrin, 570 F.2d 21, 23 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910, 98 S.Ct. 3102, 57 L.Ed.2d 1141 (1978). Nevertheless, we have recognized that [m]ere attempts to define reasonable doubt do not ... constitute reversible error per se. Moss, supra, at 333. While we cannot endorse the district court's attempt to define reasonable doubt, we are satisfied that the instructions in this case were not plain error and do not require reversal of the appellants' convictions. In no way were the instructions misleading or confusing and, viewed in the context of the charge as a whole, correctly convey[ed] the concept of reasonable doubt. Id. Consequently, the challenged instructions regarding reasonable doubt are not sufficiently prejudical to warrant reversal. 31 In addition, appellants challenge the trial court's instruction that If a Defendant be proven guilty, say so; if not proved guilty, say so. We conclude that this instruction does not constitute plain error in light of the district court's ameliorating instruction squarely placing the burden on the government to prove the defendant guilty of the crimes charged beyond all reasonable doubt. Finally, we are convinced that the district court's instructions regarding attempt and aiding and abetting are both accurate and clear and do not constitute plain error requiring a reversal of the appellant's convictions.