Opinion ID: 566319
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Determination of Criminal History Category.

Text: 38 The district court initially determined that Hernandez's criminal history category was IV. However, the district judge stated: 39 When a defendant with    [Hernandez's] history commits an offense whose surrounding circumstances, particularly when considered in relation to those past convictions, make it plain that he would be fairly sentenced as a career offender if those surrounding circumstances could be considered, it is entirely consistent with the structure of the Guidelines, including the career offender provisions, to depart upward, at least with respect to criminal history category, to that category specified by the Sentencing Commission for career offenders, category VI, without considering intervening category V. 40 This is not a matter of Hernandez having done almost enough to qualify as a career offender and therefore being treated as one based on a near miss. Rather, it is plain that when one considers what the Sentencing Commission itself determined in general to be relevant conduct, i.e., acts    committed    by the defendant or for which the defendant would be otherwise accountable, that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1), Hernandez, by employing a weapon in aid of drug trafficking, has done everything necessary to qualify as a career offender. It is reasonable to depart upward at least to apply the criminal history category of such an offender. 41 United States v. Hernandez, 753 F.Supp. 1191, 1199 (S.D.N.Y.1990) (citations omitted). 42 Under the guidelines, an individual sentenced as a career offender is automatically assigned a criminal history category of VI. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. In assigning Hernandez this category, the district judge made it clear that he was not attempting to sentence Hernandez as a career offender, but was instead relying on relevant conduct. However, while it is proper for a district court to consider some relevant conduct in determining a defendant's criminal history category, it may do so only with respect to the circumstances surrounding the defendant's prior convictions, and not with respect to the current offense. 43 Relevant conduct is discussed in § 1B1.3 of the guidelines, where a distinction is drawn between the relevant conduct that is applicable to offense conduct level (covered in Chapter Two) and adjustments to offense levels (covered in Chapter Three) on the one hand, and the relevant conduct that applies to criminal history and criminal livelihood (covered in Chapter Four), and the determination of the sentence (covered in Chapter Five) on the other hand. For offense conduct and adjustments, § 1B1.3(a)(1), in sweeping language directs that all acts and omissions committed or aided and abetted by the defendant may be considered, whereas for criminal history, criminal livelihood, and the determination of the sentence, the relevant conduct that may be considered is limited to the conduct and information specified in the respective [chapters of the] guidelines. § 1B1.3(b). From this it follows that the type of relevant conduct applicable in determining the criminal history category is sharply limited to those specific types of conduct that are specified in the particular guidelines sections. Section 1B1.3(a)(1) applies only to offense conduct and adjustments, and it was incorrect for the district court to rely on that section as authorization for its increase in Hernandez's criminal history category. 44 It is § 4A1.3 that articulates the conduct relevant for determining criminal history, and that section makes it clear that only prior conduct may be considered. See § 4A1.3(a)-(e). While the section allows the sentencing judge to consider a defendant's likelihood of recidivism, see § 4A1.3, comment. (backg'd.), this determination, too, should be decided on the basis of the defendant's prior conduct only. In short, current criminal conduct should not be used in determining a defendant's criminal history category; the history to be considered is prior conduct. See United States v. Cervantes, 878 F.2d 50, 53 (2d Cir.1989) (In calculating a defendant's criminal history category, the district court must determine which category best encompasses the defendant's prior history, and    use the corresponding sentencing range for that category to 'guide its departure.' ) (emphasis added); United States v. Sappe, 898 F.2d 878, 882 (2d Cir.1990) ([A]n upward departure may be warranted when the criminal history category significantly under-represents the seriousness of the defendant's criminal history.) 45 It may well be that under a correct analysis of Hernandez's prior criminal history, his criminal history category should be VI; however, the district court cannot properly reach that conclusion by considering, as it did, current, uncharged conduct; instead, it should weigh only Hernandez's prior criminal history. An upward departure in a defendant's criminal history category should only occur 46 [w]here    prior acts are similar to the offense of conviction and the criminal history category does not adequately reflect the seriousness of the defendant's past criminal conduct or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes, the sentencing judge may make a part 4A departure by selecting a sentencing range applicable to a defendant with a higher criminal history category. 47 United States v. Kim, 896 F.2d 678, 683 (2d Cir.1990) (citations omitted). 48 Because the district court erred in determining Hernandez's criminal history category based on current, uncharged conduct, there is no need to discuss whether the district court adequately stated the reasons for moving from category IV to category VI of criminal history. Because we are remanding for resentencing, however, we do address the issues that Hernandez raises regarding his offense level, in order to avoid reconsideration of those issues on any subsequent appeal, should there be one. 49