Opinion ID: 182780
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prior Bad Act

Text: Courtright’s first claim is that the district court erred when it admitted evidence of his prior sexual assault. We review a district court’s interpretation of the rules of evidence de novo and its decision to admit evidence for an abuse of discretion, United States v. Rogers, 587 F.3d 816, 819 (7th Cir. 2009), mindful that evidentiary errors do not require reversal if they were harmless, United States v. Taylor, 604 F.3d 1011, 1016 (7th Cir. 2010). The district court admitted the prior sexual assault pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 413. Rule 413 provides, in relevant part: In a criminal case in which the defendant is ac- cused of an offense of sexual assault, evidence of the defendant’s commission of another offense or offenses of sexual assault is admissible, and may 8 No. 09-2880 be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant. Fed. R. Evid. 413(a). In admitting the evidence, the district court interpreted the word “accused” broadly, holding that Rule 413 is triggered when a defendant has been verbally accused of sexual assault during the course of an investigation into a separate offense. Courtright takes issue with this interpretation of Rule 413, arguing that Rule 413 applies only when a party has been charged with an “offense of sexual assault” in the indictment. We do not agree with the district court’s reading of Rule 413. The district court’s interpretation was based on the fact that Rule 413 uses the word “accused” instead of “charged” to indicate when it is triggered. The government defends the district court’s reading by noting that, because the rule drafters use the word “charged” elsewhere, the use of the word “accused” in this instance should be given broader effect. We believe the government makes too much of this distinction—at the time Rule 413 was drafted (and today), the word “accused” was often used in a technical sense to describe someone who was charged with a crime. See Black’s Law Dictionary 22-23 (6th ed. 1990) (defining “accuse” as “to bring a formal charge against a person”); Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 14 (1986) (defining “accuse” as, among other things, “to charge with an offense judicially or by public process”). There is nothing in the text or committee notes of Rule 413 to indicate that the word “accused” was used in a broader fashion. No. 09-2880 9 We find additional support for this reading of Rule 413 in nearby Rule 412. Rule 412 permits the admission of a victim’s sexual behavior by the accused in certain limited circumstances. The committee notes to Rule 412 specify that, for this Rule, “accused” is meant in a broader, “non-technical sense,” and that there is “no requirement that there be a criminal charge pending against the person or even that the misconduct would constitute a criminal offense” before evidence of a victim’s sexual behavior can be admitted. Fed. R. Evid. 412 advisory committee’s note. Rule 413 provides no similar clarification for the use of the word “accused,” nor do the rest of the rules. We therefore conclude that Rule 413 uses the term “accused” in the more narrow, technical sense generally invoked throughout the federal rules.2 See 23 Charles Alan Wright & Michael W. Graham, Federal Practice and 2 The more difficult question is whether Courtright was indeed charged with an “offense of sexual assault.” Rule 413 defines “offense of sexual assault” quite expansively, stating that it includes a crime “that involved . . . contact, without consent, between any part of the defendant’s body or an object and the genitals or an anus of another person.” We can imagine an argument that Courtright’s charge of production of child pornography “involved” a sexual assault because S.J. initially reported that Courtright touched her vagina during the photo shoot. Cf. United States v. Julian, 427 F.3d 471, 486 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting the possible breadth of the “involved” language). But neither side made this argument, so we need not address it today. 10 No. 09-2880 Procedure § 5413, at 549-50 (Supp. 2010) (“Since [Rule 413] does not employ the language of Revised Rule 412, it seems reasonable to suppose that the words are used in the technical sense; that is, the evidence of other sexual crimes is only admissible against a criminal defendant and only if the crime charged is sexual assault.”). So we are left with the district court’s admission of evidence pursuant to an erroneous interpretation of Rule 413. “[A]n error of law is, by definition, an abuse of discretion.” Almonacid v. United States, 476 F.3d 518, 521 (7th Cir. 2007). But this error would be harmless, and no new trial would be necessary, if the evidence was admissible under another rule. United States v. Albiola, 624 F.3d 431, 437 (7th Cir. 2010). The government argues that the error was harmless because the evidence was also admissible pursuant to Rule 404(b). Evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b) if: (1) the evidence is directed toward establishing a matter in issue other than the defendant’s pro- pensity to commit the crime charged; (2) the evi- dence shows that the other act is similar enough and close enough in time to be relevant to the matter in issue; (3) the evidence is sufficient to support a jury finding that the defendant com- mitted the similar act; and (4) the evidence has probative value that is not substantially out- weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. United States v. Stotler, 591 F.3d 935, 941 (7th Cir. 2010). The government claims that the first prong is satisfied because the prior bad act evidence was admissible to No. 09-2880 11 prove Courtright’s intent, motive, or identity. We agree that the evidence was at least probative of Courtright’s motive. L. Miller’s testimony shows that, in the past, Courtright engaged in sexually explicit contact with an underage girl. This prior instance of sexual misconduct tends to establish a motive for the crime against S.J.: Courtright may have induced S.J. to take the pictures so that he could again achieve sexual gratification with a minor. See United States v. Sebolt, 460 F.3d 910, 917 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding that prior bad acts toward a young victim may show that a defendant has a sexual interest in that age group and therefore provide evidence of a motive to commit future sexually motivated crimes against children); United States v. Cunningham, 103 F.3d 553, 556 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Most people do not have a taste for sexually molesting children. As between two suspected molesters, then, only one of whom has a history of such molestation, the history establishes a motive that enables the two suspects to be distinguished.”). The government also claims that the second and third prongs are satisfied, and we agree. Admittedly, there was one distinction between the two crimes—in the first, Courtright actually sexual assaulted the victim during the course of the photo shoot, while in the second he only encouraged her to touch herself in an explicit manner while taking the photographs. But the two crimes are still similar in important respects. In both crimes, the perpetrator took time to develop a relationship with the victims, bought gifts for them, and engaged in sexually explicit acts with them under the auspices of pro- viding medical advice. In addition, although there was 12 No. 09-2880 a nine-year gap between the assault of L. Miller and the photo shoot with S.J., Courtright was incarcerated—and thus incapacitated—for a large part of that time. Finally, Courtright was found guilty by a jury of the prior bad act. The government finally argues that the last prong is satisfied because the district court found the evidence probative, analyzed it under Rule 403, and determined that any prejudice could be cured via a limiting instruction. But, as Courtright correctly points out, the trial court conducted a Rule 403 prejudice analysis on the premise that the evidence was being admitted under Rule 413. Rule 413 expressly allows the government to use prior bad acts to show that a defendant acted in conformity therewith—in other words, for propensity purposes. Accordingly, a Rule 413 prejudice analysis is limited and focuses on other sources of prejudice. Rogers, 587 F.3d at 823. Unlike a prejudice analysis for Rule 413, a Rule 404(b) prejudice determination also evaluates whether the evidence will be improperly used by the jury as proof of propensity. Id. The risk of a jury using the evidence for this purpose is particularly high where, as here, the prior bad act may establish an addiction to some- thing—like pyromania, drug use, or sexual gratification through the assault of minors—and thus a motive to commit that crime again. Cunningham, 103 F.3d at 556. Especially in sex crimes, motive and propensity often dovetail, and a court must be careful “about admitting under the rubric of motive evidence that the jury is No. 09-2880 13 likely to use instead as a basis for inferring the defendant’s propensity.” Id. at 557. The government does not address this propensity problem in its brief, and “we are not in the business of formulating arguments for the parties.” United States v. McClellan, 165 F.3d 535, 550 (7th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, the government’s Rule 404(b) argument is incomplete and waived. But even assuming the prior bad act evidence was not admissible, reversal is unnecessary if the error had no effect on the outcome of the trial. United States v. Conner, 583 F.3d 1011, 1025 (7th Cir. 2009). We are convinced that is the case here. Courtright’s status as a sex offender was already before the jury, and thus the likelihood that the prior bad act testimony from L. Miller had any effect on the jury is negligible. More importantly, the evidence of Courtright’s guilt was overwhelming. See United States v. Dennis, 497 F.3d 765, 769-70 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding harmless error when there was abundant evidence of the defendant’s guilt). The images of S.J., along with numerous other images of child pornography and data on the bank fraud scheme, were found on two computers at Courtright’s home. Courtright admitted that one of the computers was his, and only Courtright had access to the second. Courtright also stated to law enforcement that he had downloaded a number of the child pornography images found on his hard drives. Furthermore, S.J. testified that Courtright took the pictures of her, her father testified that Courtright asked about taking pictures of S.J., and Courtright’s cellmate testified that Courtright confessed to taking pictures of a young girl. Finally, Courtright called no witnesses and 14 No. 09-2880 offered no evidence of his innocence, lending further support to a finding of harmless error. See United States v. Taylor, 522 F.3d 731, 735 (7th Cir. 2008).