Opinion ID: 169483
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Claims for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Text: Alvarado and Flores also fail to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a tort that requires extreme conduct on the part of the defendant. Even if we assume KOB-TV was aware of the sealing order shielding Alvarado's and Flores's identities from the search warrants, we cannot conclude as a matter of law that KOB-TV's actions qualify for the type of conduct that could trigger liability under a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. New Mexico law follows the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 in defining the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress: One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm. The extreme and outrageous conduct must be so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Newberry v. Allied Stores, Inc., 108 N.M. 424, 773 P.2d 1231, 1239 (1989) (quotation omitted). According to the Restatement, the tort is actionable for reckless conduct, [10] defined as deliberate disregard of a high degree of probability that the emotional distress will follow, and also where he knows that such distress is certain, or substantially certain, to result from his conduct. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. i. As a threshold matter, the trial court should determine as a matter of law whether the conduct at issue reasonably may be regarded as so extreme and outrageous that it will permit recovery under the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Trujillo v. N. Rio Arriba Elec. Coop., 131 N.M. 607, 41 P.3d 333, 343 (2001) (quotation omitted). When reasonable persons may differ on that question, it is for the jury to decide, subject to the oversight of the court. Id. (quotation omitted). Courts regularly hold that upsetting but true news reports do not constitute conduct so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery. Specifically, a New Mexico court has stated that [a]s a general proposition, accurate publication of newsworthy events does not give rise to a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Andrews, 892 P.2d at 625. Other courts agree. See, e.g., Lowe v. Hearst Commc'ns, Inc., 414 F.Supp.2d 669, 676 (W.D.Tex.2006) (concluding that the [p]ublication of truthful, albeit embarrassing, information has again and again been determined not to constitute extreme and outrageous conduct); Conroy v. Kilzer, 789 F.Supp. 1457, 1468 (D.Minn.1992) (holding that statements that accuse a public official of misconduct are not as a matter of law . . . sufficiently extreme and outrageous); Munoz v. Am. Lawyer Media, L.P., 236 Ga.App. 462, 512 S.E.2d 347, 351 (1999) (concluding that the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress will not provide a remedy to a plaintiff when the news media truthfully reports an actual newsworthy event, even if the event was so insulting as naturally to humiliate, embarrass or frighten the plaintiff). [11] Although this rule of thumb is at least in part a reflection of First Amendment constraints on tort law, see, e.g., Howell v. N.Y. Post Co., 81 N.Y.2d 115, 596 N.Y.S.2d 350, 612 N.E.2d 699, 705 (1993), it also serves to help the court determine as a matter of law whether the complained-of publication is so extreme and outrageous, Trujillo, 41 P.3d at 343, as to give rise to liability. New Mexico courts generally have construed the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress narrowly in the context of press coverage. One New Mexico court concluded that there was no intentional infliction of emotional distress when a newspaper reported on the plaintiff's controversial land purchase, resulting in a zoning dispute that created title problems, and then published an article suggesting that the plaintiff, a local politician, might sue his own village over the zoning dispute. Andrews, 892 P.2d at 625. The Andrews court concluded that news coverage of zoning requests and politicians' statements could not be beyond all bounds of decency or utterly intolerable, and therefore could not form the basis of an emotional distress claim. Id. Likewise, the federal district court in New Mexico declined to allow a claim when Business Week magazine published an article referring to a former business leader's transsexual status. [T]he references to Plaintiff's transsexual status were highly relevant to the central inquiry of the article. In short, there is nothing extreme or outrageous about Defendants' conduct. Schuler v. McGraw-Hill Cos., 989 F.Supp. 1377, 1391 (D.N.M.1997), aff'd 145 F.3d 1346 (10th Cir.1998) (table). The mere broadcast of Alvarado's and Flores's identities and undercover status, as facts revealed in the course of accurate publication of newsworthy events, is not actionable as intentional infliction of emotional distress. Andrews, 892 P.2d at 625. But Alvarado and Flores argue that KOB-TV acted outrageously by broadcasting their names and the fact that they were undercover police officers repeatedly for four days even after being advised of their covert status, and possibly after learning of the risks of that publicity or the fact that a court had sealed documents relating to their undercover status. Alvarado and Flores contend that this conduct is actionable as intentional infliction of emotional distress, and argue that further discovery was warranted to ascertain whether KOB-TV knew of the court order sealing Alvarado's and Flores's names. But even if publishers are aware that their actions could result in third parties making threats to the individuals identified in the news, courts considering the issue generally find that publishing news under those circumstances is not conduct beyond all possible bounds of decency, atrocious, or utterly intolerable. The Sixth Circuit found a plaintiff could not create a jury question on the issue of intentional infliction of emotional distress when two reporters published photographs of an undercover officer, one of them captioned Know Your Enemies, accompanied by a news article decrying the activities of undercover narcs in the Ann Arbor area. Ross v. Burns, 612 F.2d 271, 272 (6th Cir.1980). Even though the court seemed skeptical of the article's newsworthiness, the court concluded that [w]e cannot believe that these acts fall within the meaning of `extreme and outrageous' conduct contemplated by the drafters of the Restatement. Id. at 274. In another example, the media revealed the identity of a foreign judge who was threatened by a Colombian drug cartel and had taken up a quiet residence in Detroit. A state court found that defendants' conduct was not so outrageous or extreme to establish liability in tort in light of the fact that plaintiffs used their own names and did not attempt to completely hide their identities while in Detroit. Duran v. The Detroit News, Inc., 200 Mich.App. 622, 504 N.W.2d 715, 720 (1993). It is true that courts sometimes need the benefit of additional discovery to decide whether the content and reasonableness of a defendant's alleged conduct falls within the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. See, e.g., Parnell v. Booth Newspapers, Inc., 572 F.Supp. 909, 920 (W.D.Mich.1983) (declining to grant summary judgment on an emotional distress claim against a newspaper that published photos of the plaintiff in news articles on prostitution, contrasting its decision with that in Ross where the ruling was on a motion for a judgment n.o.v.). However, we conclude that even if KOB-TV knew about the court order sealing Alvarado's and Flores's identities from the search warrants, KOB-TV's broadcasts would not have been so outrageous as to be actionable. Significantly, the order is not directed at the news media generally nor at KOB-TV specifically. [12] More importantly, Alvarado and Flores do not allege that KOB-TV knew of any actual or likely threats against the undercover agents. Instead, under the facts put forth by Alvarado and Flores, KOB-TV at most was aware only of the inherent risks involved with publicizing the names and pictures of undercover officers. That imputed knowledge hardly equates with recklessly or intentionally causing severe emotional distress. In short, the weight of authority suggests that accurate news reporting  even when it is likely to have an adverse impact on the subjects of the report  usually does not give rise to an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and Alvarado and Flores have alleged no facts that support an exception to the general rule. We affirm dismissal of this claim.