Opinion ID: 1281880
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Statements to Secretary-Receptionist.

Text: The issue of when and to what extent communications made to agents and assistants of professional persons are protected by the evidentiary privileges is one with which many courts have wrestled. See, e.g., McCormick, Evidence §§ 91, 101 (3d ed 1984); Annot., 14 A.L.R.4th 594 (1982); Annot., 47 A.L.R.2d 742 (1956); Sobel, The Confidential Communication Element of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 4 Cardozo L.Rev. 649 (1983); Note, Evidence  Privileged Communications  Physician and Patient-Medical Assistants and Doctrine of Agency, 22 Marq.L.Rev. 211 (1938). OEC 504(1)(a) provides three separate categories of third persons to whom disclosures of confidential information are protected by the psychotherapist-patient privilege. The lead opinion in the Court of Appeals stated that the clause in OEC 504(1)(a) most applicable to the Dammasch State Hospital secretary-receptionist was the one which makes confidential those communications disclosed to [p]ersons present to further the interest of the patient in the consultation, examination or interview. The opinion concluded that, because Ms. Smith was not physically present during defendant's consultation with the psychiatrist, the statements to Ms. Smith were not confidential communications within the meaning of OEC 504(1)(a). We agree, however, with defendant and the dissent by Judge Richardson that the clause in OEC 504(1)(a) applicable to the secretary-receptionist is the one which renders confidential those communications to persons reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication. That clause contains no requirement that the person be present. Its meaning, however, is not precisely clear. The Legislative Commentary to OEC 504(1)(a) states: `Confidential communication' is defined in terms conformable to those of the lawyer-client privilege. Kirkpatrick, supra, at 156. The attorney-client privilege (OEC 503(1)(b)) contains the identical phrase, but the Legislative Commentary to it is unfortunately sparse. It states: The rule allows some disclosure beyond the immediate circle of lawyer and client and their representatives without impairing confidentiality, as a practical matter. Kirkpatrick, supra, at 141. Professor Kirkpatrick suggests stenographers and interpreters, as examples of persons reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication. Kirkpatrick, supra, at 147. Because the Legislative Commentary to OEC 504(1)(a) points to the identical language in the attorney-client privilege, we see no reason to construe these two phrases differently. Courts have held that where the help of an interpreter is necessary to enable the client to consult the lawyer, the interpreter's presence does not deprive the confidential communication of its privileged character. See, e.g., State v. Loponio, 85 N.J.L. 357, 88 A. 1045 (1913); Du Barre v. Linette, Peake 108, 170 Eng. Rep. 96 (NP 1791); McCormick, supra, at 218. Some courts have relied upon the analogy of an interpreter to apply the attorney-client privilege to an accountant employed by the lawyer to assist in the litigation. See, e.g., United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2nd Cir.1961); compare Himmelfarb v. United States, 175 F.2d 924 (9th Cir.1949). The Advisory Committee's Note to proposed FRE 503(a)(4) describes this clause as treating the status of employees who are used in the process of communicating, as distinguished from those who are parties to the communication. Disclosure to those reasonably necessary for transmitting the communication has readily been recognized as not destroying the privilege. Secretaries, clerks and interpreters fall within this category. 2 Weinstein & Berger, supra, at 503-30. McCormick states that the presence of agents, secretaries or clerks, as intermediaries, will be assumed not to militate against the confidential nature of the consultation. It is the way business is generally done and that is enough. McCormick, supra, at 218. Two things about this clause in OEC 504(1)(a) speak against a narrow view of those third persons who are included within the privilege. The first is the words reasonably necessary in the clause; the second is the Legislative Commentary to OEC 503 which says the rule allows disclosure beyond the immediate circle of professional and patient as a practical matter. We decline to limit the phrase to translators or persons who directly assist a patient to communicate with a psychotherapist, because such persons would be indispensably necessary to the transmission of the communication. As a practical matter, other persons, such as stenographers or office employees, may be reasonably necessary to the transmission of confidential communications. Limiting this clause to persons who are the medium of communication would not be consonant with the practical side of the day-to-day procedures of professionals who offer mental health services to the public. Few psychotherapists and, similarly, few doctors or lawyers answer their own telephones. Most rely upon secretaries, receptionists, answering services and other assistants to act as intermediaries between themselves and their patients. These intermediaries receive, transmit and record patient information, some of which may be confidential. The policy and purpose of the privilege, as well as the practical side of professional service delivery, requires that the privilege include those persons who gather, transmit or record confidential patient information, if acting at the direction of a psychotherapist. The secretary-receptionist in the instant case testified that she had access to confidential patient information. One of her jobs on the graveyard shift was to collect information from persons entering the state hospital as patients. She also was responsible for screening incoming telephone calls to the psychiatrist on duty. She testified that all incoming calls to the state hospital come through her switchboard, making it impossible for anyone to talk to a psychotherapist without being put through by her. She was not merely a switchboard operator, however, because she testified that she was instructed to obtain the caller's name and determine if he or she was a former patient and the reason for the call, before connecting the caller with the psychiatrist. When defendant called the state hospital, seeking professional services, he asked to speak to a doctor. Ms. Smith asked him what the problem was. A reasonable person in defendant's position could have believed he had to tell her his problem in order to get past her to talk to a doctor. In this circumstance, we believe that she was an assistant employed in the process of communication and thus was a person reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication, under OEC 504(1)(a). Defendant's statements to her are included within the scope of the psychotherapist-patient privilege. It was error to admit them at trial. [10]