Opinion ID: 3014821
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Cancer, tumor, polyp, or disorder of the lymph

Text: gland(s) or breast(s)? j. Anemia, bleeding tendency, or any disorder of the blood? k. Arthritis, sciatica, gout, or any disorder of the muscles, bones, joints, spine, back, or neck? l. Chronic or unexplained fatigue, fever, or illness? m. Any allergies? n. Any disorders of the skin? o. Deformity, lameness or amputation? 25 muscles, bones, joints, spine, back, or neck). During a lengthy colloquy with Northwestern’s counsel during her deposition Babayan expressly admitted each of the following facts: • she sought treatment and care from five (5) physicians regarding knee and back pain on numerous occasions during the relevant ten- year time period listed on the application; • she underwent at least five (5) magnetic resonance imaging (“MRI”) tests on her knees and/or back, and she had an electromyogram (“EMG”) because of chronic back problems; • she was aware that these diagnostic tests revealed abnormalities in her knees and back; • she was aware that she was diagnosed with a bulging disc in her back; and • she received a cortisone injection in her knee to reduce constant pain. Furthermore, the record contains a verified complaint Babayan filed in state court following her slip-and-fall accident in which she alleged that, as a result of her accident, she “was caused to sustain serious personal injuries to her knee and hip and surrounding areas.” See Whiting v. Krassner, 391 F.3d 540, 543-44 (3d Cir. 2004) (“Judicial estoppel prevents parties from taking different positions on matters in litigation to gain advantage.”).18 In spite of these concessions, 18 Babayan’s deposition testimony in the state court matter, which contains a lengthy discussion of the injuries she suffered as a 26 Babayan answered “no” to Question 33.k. She testified in her deposition that the question was unclear,19 but that with her “new understanding” she agreed that her previous answers were “inaccurate.” In addition, although Babayan conceded that she did not read her responses on the final application, she admitted that she certified her answers were truthful and accurate. The fact that Babayan was hospitalized for one night for blood tests, received a prescription for pain relief as a result of a virus in January 2001, and missed six days of work with Bell’s Palsy within the six months prior to her application is irrelevant to the question of whether she was diagnosed with or treated for “arthritis, sciatica, gout, or any disorder of the muscles, bones, joints, spine, back, or neck.”20 Neither is it relevant that Gallina may have told Babayan not result of her accidents, is part of the record. 19 Babayan claims she thought the term “disorder” meant “disease,” and that she should have asked Gallina for clarification. 20 That information would have been relevant if, for example, Northwestern had challenged Babayan’s “no” answer to Question 33.b. That question asked whether the applicant had been treated for or diagnosed with “[d]izziness, loss of balance, headaches, seizures or convulsions, muscle weakness, tremor, paralysis, stroke, memory loss, or any disease of the brain or nervous system.” Babayan’s diagnosis of Bell’s Palsy arguably falls under the category of symptoms listed in Question 33.b, yet she failed to answer the question affirmatively. Babayan answered “yes” to Question 37, however, and stated that she missed some time at work due to a “virus which caused Bell’s Palsy.” Under those circumstances, there would have certainly been an issue of fact as to whether Babayan’s false answer to Question 33.b was made in bad faith when considered 27 to list the automobile accident on the application because it occurred far enough in the past.21 Information regarding the accident is not “incomplete” as to the issue of whether Babayan was treated for or diagnosed with any of the specific disorders listed in Question 33.k. Rather, like the answer at issue in Burkert, Babayan’s answer can be characterized as “frivolous” in the face of substantial evidence that she visited five different physicians on a number of occasions relating to problems with her knees and back, and that diagnostic tests confirmed that she had knee and back problems. On this information, the only reasonable inference a fact finder could draw is that Babayan answered “no” in bad faith or knowing that her answer was false. Babayan’s concept of “incompleteness” seems to be that if an applicant provides evidence of a certain medical problem, the applicant does not have to provide any other information in answering a question regarding a totally different type of medical problem in order to survive a motion for summary judgment. That argument is a non sequitur. For example, suppose Babayan, who checked “no” to a question asking whether she had “high blood pressure,” took a daily prescription to control her high blood pressure. Would the fact that she disclosed that she had Bell’s Palsy for six days over the past year be sufficient to support an inference that her answer to the blood pressure question was merely “incomplete” rather than knowingly false? Sound public policy counsels against embracing Babayan’s concept of “incompleteness.” See Orr v. Union Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 198 A.2d 431, 432-33 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1964) (holding that an answer describing only one of numerous injuries to a question asking in connection to her response to the subsequent question. 21 There is no support in the record for Babayan’s argument that she relied upon Gallina’s advice to answer Question 33.k. See section III.E, infra. 28 applicant to list “any” injuries was not a truthful answer to a question on an insurance application). In the face of incontrovertible documentary evidence that she was treated on numerous occasions for back and knee pain during the relevant time period, Babayan cannot defeat Northwestern’s motion for summary judgment by pointing to her disclosure of unrelated ailments. In this respect, the District Court did not err in finding that Babayan’s answer to Question 33.k was made in bad faith as a matter of law and in entering summary judgment in favor of Northwestern on counts one and two of Northwestern’s complaint.