Opinion ID: 2514530
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the district court establish the law of the case in its written opinion denying respondent's motion for summary judgment?

Text: In this case the district court issued a written order denying summary judgment on the issue of whether the Operating Agreement required Respondent to contribute a specific amount of real estate to the LLC. As noted above, the written order is problematic because the district court entered findings that directly contradict its conclusion. After stating the proper standard of review, the district court determined that the phrase certain real property in the Operating Agreement could be interpreted in more than one way, so it found the agreement ambiguous as a matter of law as to whether Respondent was required to contribute a specific amount of land to the LLC. We agree that the phrase certain real property as used in the Operating Agreement is ambiguous. It is clear that the ambiguity creates an issue of fact precluding summary judgment and that parol evidence is admissible to clarify an ambiguous contract. See Cannon v. Perry, 144 Idaho 728, 170 P.3d 393 (2007); Swanson v. Beco Const. Co., Inc., 145 Idaho 59, 175 P.3d 748 (2007); Howard v. Perry, 141 Idaho 139, 106 P.3d 465 (2005). Appellant seizes upon the language in the district court's opinion that the approximately 57 acres were destined to be used in the Brookside Development as resolving any ambiguity and argues that the jury should have been instructed that the parties intended that all 57 acres be contributed to the LLC. Appellant's argument, however, is flawed. Despite the poor choice of language used by the district court, it is obvious that the court did not intend to finally resolve the ambiguity in the Operating Agreement, or it would not have denied summary judgment and proceeded with a jury trial to determine the meaning of the ambiguous contract. Moreover, the district court did not have the authority to resolve the ambiguity, since it was not within the province of the district court to resolve factual issues in a motion for summary judgment. Whether the parties intended that all 57 acres be contributed to the LLC was a factual matter to be left for the jury to decide. During trial, Respondent argued that the Operating Agreement does not identify a specific amount of property that he was required to contribute. He relied upon the language in the Operating Agreement that capital contributions shall be contributed incrementally during the development of the development project as the members shall agree,  arguing that such language indicates that the real property was to be contributed in portions, thus permitting, but not requiring, Respondent to contribute the entire 57 acres. At trial, Appellant referred to the preliminary plat showing 57 acres in Brookside and called several witnesses to testify that from the beginning Brookside was intended to be comprised of the entire 57 acres. Since the decision of the district court did not establish the law of the case it would not have been appropriate to instruct the jury that the court had resolved that ambiguity. Indeed, such an instruction would have obviated the need for the jury trial. The jury heard the evidence, observed the witnesses, and rendered its decision based on the evidence, resolving the ambiguity in favor of the Respondent.