Opinion ID: 3152753
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jury Instruction on Specific Intent

Text: Morgan quarrels with the way the jury was instructed on the specific intent required for conviction. But he did not object to the instruction given, limiting our review to plain error. United States v. Davis, 750 F.3d 1186, 1191 (10th Cir. 2014). “Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), an appellate court may, in its discretion, correct an error not raised at trial only where the appellant demonstrates that (1) there is an error; (2) the error is clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute; (3) the error affected the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means it affected the outcome of the district court proceedings; and (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (quotations omitted). The relevant portion of the instruction governing the bribery charge required the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt: That the defendant solicited, demanded, accepted, or agreed to accept anything of value from another person; [and] That the defendant did so corruptly, that is, with the intent to be influenced in connection with some business, transaction, or series of transactions of the State of Oklahoma. Stringer) suggests just the opposite; it properly distinguished between the counts and defendants. To the extent Morgan is seeking review of the court’s denial of his motion for a severance of counts and defendants or its admission of co-conspirator hearsay, he is simply too late. See M.D. Mark, Inc. v. Kerr–McGee Corp., 565 F.3d 753, 768 n.7 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he general rule in this circuit is that a party waives issues and arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief.”). - 18 - (Morgan’s App’x, Vol. 1 at 179 (emphasis added).) The instruction further stated: “A person acts corruptly when that person acts with the understanding that something of value is to be offered or given to influence him in connection with his official duties.” (Id. at 180 (emphasis added).) It also provided: “[W]hen payments are accepted by a public official from a payor with the intent to obtain that official’s actions on an ‘as needed’ basis, so that when the opportunity presents itself that public official takes official action on the payor’s behalf in return for those payments, that constitutes bribery.” (Id. at 180-81 (emphasis added).) In his motion for new trial, Morgan argued the latter two instructions erroneously described the payor’s intent not the recipient’s and therefore improperly allowed the jury to convict him if it concluded merely that he had knowledge of Crosby’s corrupt intent, even absent any corrupt intent on his part. Stated differently, the jury may have based his conviction on Crosby’s corrupt intent, not his own. The trial court rejected this argument because Morgan’s arguments focused on very narrow portions or phrases of the instructions, rather than considering them as a whole.18 When properly considered, the 18 We read and evaluate jury instructions in their entirety to “determine whether the instructions, examined in the light of the record as a whole, fairly, adequately, and correctly state the governing law and provide the jury with an ample understanding of the applicable principles of law and factual issues confronting them.” United States v. Denny, 939 F.2d 1449, 1454 (10th Cir. 1991). Generally, “[f]aulty jury instructions require reversal when (1) we have substantial doubt whether the instructions, considered as a whole, properly guided the jury in its deliberations; and (2) when a deficient jury instruction is prejudicial.” Jones v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 674 F.3d 1187, 1198 (10th Cir. 2012). - 19 - instructions fairly and correctly stated the applicable law. But if the supplemental instructions were erroneous, the court concluded, the error did not “so seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings that the Court should grant a new trial.” (Morgan’s App’x, Vol. 2 at 533.) Morgan now reiterates the arguments made in the trial court, relying on a Second Circuit decision, United States v. Ford, 435 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2006). Ford was an officer of a state employees’ union that received federal funds. Id. at 206. The bribery charge against her alleged she accepted free media services for her reelection campaign and, in return, she steered overpriced union work to the media services provider. Id. Ford objected to the district court’s instruction, which stated in relevant part: “A person acts corruptly when the person acts with the understanding that something of value is to be offered or given to influence her in connection with her organizational duties.” Id. at 211 (quotations omitted). The appellate court reversed Ford’s conviction because the instruction “appear[ed] to have told the jury that the ‘corruptly’ requirement was fully satisfied by [Ford’s] knowledge of the donor’s intent and omitted any reference to [Ford’s] intent in accepting the thing of value . . . .” Id. Morgan’s situation is easily distinguished from Ford’s. Here the court told the jury it could not convict unless it found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Morgan demanded or accepted his retainer fees “with the intent to be influenced in connection - 20 - with some business, transaction, or series of transactions of the State of Oklahoma.”19 (Morgan’s App’x, Vol. 1 at 179 (emphasis added).) Although the supplementary language, standing alone, may have been ill-advised in this case, the instructions as a whole could not have misled or confused the jury regarding the government’s burden of proof. See United States v. Smith, 13 F.3d 1421, 1424 (10th Cir. 1994) (“Only where the reviewing court has substantial doubt that the jury was fairly guided will the judgment be disturbed.”) (quotations omitted). There was no error.