Opinion ID: 6263713
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Judicial Overreaching

Text: Appellant did not raise the issue of judicial overreaching in his direct appeal; therefore, all but one of his complaints in this regard have been waived. The one issue in this category which is not waived involves after-discovered evidence. Because we have granted appellant’s motion for admission of that after-discovered evidence, we must address the merits of the issue appellant raises concerning the trial judge’s conduct at his first trial. As stated above, Commonwealth witness Darcy testified at the first trial about an alleged plot to kill appellant’s co-conspirator, Romano. Appellant’s first counsel was permitted to read the statements Darcy had made to the police. Those statements implicated that counsel, who withdrew as counsel in order to testify in the case. In order to permit appellant’s new counsel to prepare for trial, the judge ordered a mistrial. Subsequently, a new trial was scheduled. In our opinion holding that a new trial did not place appellant twice in jeopardy we stated that, “On February 23, 1976, [the trial judge] placed a statement in the record denying that he had any knowledge of Darcy’s statements to the police before trial.” Commonwealth v. Bolden, 472 Pa. 602, 637, 373 A.2d 90, 107 (1977) (footnote omitted). On November 29, 1984, the first trial judge was deposed for purposes of an action which appellant brought in the United States District Court. In that deposition the judge responded as follows: Q. When did you first learn of the information that there was a murder plot or conspiracy to murder a Commonwealth witness? A. Before the trial at which this all came out. Q. From whom did you learn that information? A. In a variety of ways, talking to Sam Rodgers, from the State Police, possibly from a newspaper reporter. The newspaper people knew about it. Q. Okay. A. I don’t know how much the file disclosed____ I don’t know at what time I picked up the various pieces of information, but when we went into the trial, I knew the matter was in the air____ Deposition of Charles G. Sweet at 45-46. Appellant urges from the above that we find that the judge lied at the time of the first trial and that he improperly permitted the first trial to begin knowing that appellant’s attorney would be placed in an untenable position. I do not believe we need make a determination regarding the first trial judge’s veracity. 8 The issue of judicial overreaching was addressed when we answered the double jeopardy question. At that time we stated, “Even if the trial judge was aware of Darcy’s allegation, we cannot say that his failure to order pre-trial discovery sua sponte constituted grossly improper conduct in light of Pa.R.Crim.P. 310[ 9 ] and the unique and troublesome situation presented to him at that time.” Bolden, 472 Pa. at 646, 373 A.2d at 111 (footnote added). Considering all of the record, including the after-discovered evidence, we still believe there was no judicial overreaching. If the mistrial was not caused by judicial overreaching, then the question of when the first trial judge became aware of Darcy’s allegations is not relevant in the present appeal.