Opinion ID: 2604071
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Federal and Other State Legislation

Text: The remedy language of section 12970 bears a close resemblance to section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) (29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq., § 160(c)) relating to unfair labor practices, which authorizes the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to issue a cease and desist order and require the violator to take such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this subchapter.... Federal courts have continually interpreted the NLRA as not allowing monetary remedies other than back pay. (See Edison Co. v. Labor Board, supra, 305 U.S. 197, 235-236 [83 L.Ed.2d 126, 143]; Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corporation (N.D.Cal. 1973) 368 F. Supp. 829, 837; see also Commodore Home, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 224 (dis. opn. of Richardson, J.).) Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, relating to employment discrimination, in section 706(g) similarly authorizes the trial court to order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay ..., or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate. (42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g).) This language, which was modeled after the NLRA ( Richerson v. Jones, supra, 551 F.2d 918, 927), also has been interpreted by the majority of federal courts as barring monetary remedies other than back pay ( Great American Fed. S. & L. Assn. v. Novotny (1979) 442 U.S. 366, 374-375 [60 L.Ed.2d 957, 965-966, 99 S.Ct. 2345]; see, e.g., Shah v. Mt. Zion Hospital & Medical Ctr. (9th Cir.1981) 642 F.2d 268, 272; Richerson v. Jones, supra, at pp. 926-927; Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corporation, supra, 368 F. Supp. 829, 836-838; Commodore Home, supra, at p. 225 and cases cited (dis. opn. of Richardson, J.)). Dyna-Med invokes the principle that the use of identical language in analogous statutes requires like interpretation. ( Belridge Farms v. Agriculture Labor Relations Bd. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 551, 557 [147 Cal. Rptr. 165, 580 P.2d 665].) Commission argues that the foregoing principle is inapposite because of the limiting reference in the NLRA to affirmative action and in title VII to equitable relief, as contrasted with section 12970's reference without modification to action. Commission points further to the differing purposes of the NLRA and the FEPA: the first exists to promote industrial peace and stability through collective bargaining and to create a cooperative atmosphere of recognition between labor and management ( Carey v. Westinghouse Corp. (1964) 375 U.S. 261, 271 [11 L.Ed.2d 320, 327-328, 84 S.Ct. 401]; N.L.R.B. v. Pincus Bros., Inc.-Maxwell (3rd Cir.1980) 620 F.2d 367, 372-373; Bloom v. N.L.R.B. (D.C. Cir.1979) 603 F.2d 1015, 1019), whereas the latter is designed to provide effective remedies to vindicate the individual's constitutional right to be free from employment discrimination and to eliminate discriminatory employment practices ( State Personnel Bd. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com., supra, 39 Cal.3d at 432). When first enacted, the FEPA, like the NLRA, combined the prosecutorial and adjudicative functions and provided only for administrative relief. [22] (Stats. 1959, ch. 121, § 1, pp. 1999-2005; see Commodore Home, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 218; cf. NLRA, § 10(b) & (c), 49 Stat. at pp. 453-454; Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin (1937) 301 U.S. 1, 24-25 [81 L.Ed. 893, 904-905, 57 S.Ct. 615]; Haleston Drug Stores v. National Labor Relations Bd., supra, 187 F.2d 418, 421.) The FEPA also contained the identical affirmative action language as the NLRA. (Stats. 1959, supra, at p. 2004; Commodore Home, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 224 (dis. opn. of Richardson, J.).) In 1969 the Legislature amended Labor Code section 1426 to delete the word affirmative. (Stats. 1969, ch. 526, § 1, p. 1142.) The legislative history suggests that this amendment was passed not to expand the power of the FEPC, but rather, to avoid confusion with the newly acquired meaning of affirmative action that was embraced in a 1967 amendment authorizing the FEPC to engage in affirmative actions with employers, employment agencies, and labor organizations. [23] (See former Lab. Code, §§ 1413, subd. (g), 1431, added by Stats. 1967, ch. 1506, §§ 1-2, pp. 3573-3574; see now §§ 12927, subd. (a), 12988 [concerning housing discrimination].) Both the Enrolled Bill Report of the Department of Industrial Relations and the Enrolled Bill Memorandum of the Governor's Legislative Secretary state that the aim of the amendment was to clear up any ambiguities ... between the two sections of the law. In other words, according to the report and memo,  Affirmative Action in AB 544 [the 1967 amendment] was a little broader than Affirmative Action in Section 1426 of the Labor Code [the remedies provision]. (Italics in original; see also Commodore Home, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 224 (dis. opn. of Richardson, J.).) Deletion of the word affirmative thus is not dispositive of the Legislature's intent concerning application to the commission of federal precedent. In Commodore Home, in the context of a civil action for punitive damages, we stated that differences between the federal laws and the FEHA  the NLRA provides no right of civil action and title VII provides only for judicial handling of federal discrimination claims  diminish the weight of the federal precedents. (32 Cal.3d at p. 217.) The NLRA, we observed, specifies remedies the board may impose, and the cases hold merely that its language prevents that agency from assessing compensatory or punitive damages. [¶] Contrastingly, title VII ... expressly describes remedies that courts may assess.... [¶] The FEHA, on the other hand, provides separate routes to resolution of claims; first, a complaint to the Department; second, if that agency fails to act, a private court action. The statute discusses remedies only in the first context; here we are concerned with those available in the second. Federal precedents do not address that problem. [Fn. omitted.] ( Ibid., italics added.) In the instant case, by contrast, the issue is the nature of administrative remedies  the only remedies provided by the NLRA and initially provided by the FEPA. In these circumstances federal precedent under the NLRA would seem to be apposite. Because the FEPA when first enacted had the identical language and procedure as the NLRA, it can reasonably be presumed that the Legislature intended the state agency to have the same powers  and only those powers  as its federal counterpart. (See Belridge Farms v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 557; cf. Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corporation, supra, 368 F. Supp. at p. 837 [interpreting title VII in light of NLRA].) This is true notwithstanding the differing intents of the two acts, particularly since the remedial portion of each is designed to protect an employee against discriminatory practices. [24] Although courts in other states are divided on the availability of compensatory damages under statutory schemes similar to the FEHA (see Annot. (1978) 85 A.L.R.3d 351, 356-357), we are unaware of any case upholding the award of punitive damages. Rather, the courts seem uniformly to hold that the authority of a state agency to assess exemplary damages must be express and will not be implied from a broad authority to implement the objectives of the fair employment statute. (E.g., Woods v. Midwest Conveyor Co., Inc. (1982) 231 Kan. 763 [648 P.2d 234, 244-245]; McDaniel v. Cory, supra, 631 P.2d 82, 86-89; Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Lysyj (1974) 38 Ohio St.2d 217 [67 Ohio Ops.2d 287, 313 N.E.2d 3, 6-7, 70 A.L.R.3d 1137]; see also High v. Sperry Corp. (S.D. Iowa 1984) 581 F. Supp. 1246, 1248; see Annot., supra, 85 A.L.R.3d at p. 357.)