Opinion ID: 2444646
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Legality of the Detention

Text: § 37-215, T.C.A., as it existed at the time of the interrogation, and prior to the adoption of Ch. 745, Public Acts of 1976, read, in pertinent part, as follows: (a) A person taking a child into custody, shall directly with all reasonable speed: (1) release the child to his parents, guardian or other custodian upon their promise to bring the child before the court when requested by the court, unless his detention or shelter care is warranted or required under § 37-214; or (2) bring the child before the court or deliver him to a detention or shelter care facility designated by the court or to a medical facility if the child is believed to suffer from a serious physical condition or illness which requires prompt treatment. He shall promptly give notice thereof, together with a reason for taking the child into custody, to a parent, guardian, or other custodian and to the court. Any temporary detention or questioning of the child necessary to comply with this subsection shall conform to the procedures and conditions prescribed in this chapter and rules of court. These mandatory provisions of the law were ignored. Petitioner was neither released to his parents nor brought before the court nor delivered to a detention or shelter care facility designated by the court. In all respects he was detained in violation of Chapter 600, Public Acts of 1970, carried forward into our Code as § 37-201, T.C.A., et seq. What is the effect of this unlawful detention? § 37-227(b), T.C.A. provides the answer: A child charged with a delinquent act [an act designated as a crime, § 37-202] need not be a witness against or otherwise incriminate himself. An extra-judicial statement, if obtained in the course of violation of this chapter or which would be constitutionally inadmissible in a criminal proceeding, shall not be used against him. (Emphasis supplied). It is no answer to say, as does the majority, that he was tried as an adult and [i]t would be absurd to contend that any adult charged with a crime is entitled to the benefits of § 37-227(b). The detention of this petitioner occurred when he was a child. The subsequent transfer to the Criminal Court for trial as an adult does not alter this fact. Deliberate defiance of the applicable law following his apprehension operates to undermine the basic proceedings which resulted in his trial in the Criminal Court. In State v. Strickland, 532 S.W.2d 912, 917 (1976), we said: The statute requires juveniles to be taken before the court directly with all reasonable speed. The police did not comply with the requirement, and the confessions obtained in violation of that section may not be used against the juveniles. T.C.A. § 37-227(b). The Court of Appeals correctly held that the confessions were obtained in violation of T.C.A. Section 37-215(a) and were not admissible before the Juvenile Court or the Circuit Court. (Emphasis supplied.) 532 S.W.2d at 918. It is true that Strickland involved a transfer hearing in the Juvenile Court. This is of no consequence. The commandment of § 37-227(b), T.C.A., [a]n extra-judicial statement, if obtained in the course of violation of this chapter ... shall not be used against him is not susceptible to any erosive construction that would limit its sweep to procedures in the juvenile court, or that would allow its use for any purpose. Any such interpretation is inconsistent with the plain language of the statute and at variance with our holding in Strickland . Moreover, it affronts fundamental fairness  with or without the statute, and irrespective of Strickland , to take the statement of a sixteen-year-old boy, under these circumstances, and use it against him in a criminal proceeding even though by process of statutory metamorphosis he has somehow been transformed into a man. A boy continues to be a boy until he becomes a man. Here, we deal with a boy, and, in my judgment we are dealing with him unfairly.