Opinion ID: 887282
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Did the sentence violate Rardon's right to due process?

Text: ¶ 28 Rardon argues that his right to due process was violated when he received a harsher sentence than was issued in either of the prior proceedings. In support of this argument, Rardon suggests that he was penalized for twice exercising his right to appeal and prevailing both times. Upon this contention, Rardon asks this Court to infer that Judge Christopher acted vindictively in rendering the sentence, thus implicating his right to due process. ¶ 29 Rardon's third sentence is significantly shorter than either of his first two sentences. In the first proceeding, Judge Lympus imposed a sentence of sixty years and declared Rardon ineligible for parole for thirty-five years. Rardon I, ¶ 9. In the second proceeding, Judge Curtis imposed a sentence of fifty years and declared Rardon ineligible for parole for twenty-five years. Rardon II, ¶ 12. In the third proceeding, Judge Christopher imposed a sentence of thirty-seven years with no chance of parole. Thus, parole eligibility is the only sentencing component which is more harsh in Rardon's third sentence than in either of his first two. However, the change in the parole component of the sentence is offset by the reduction in the overall term of the sentence. ¶ 30 Although the third sentence guarantees that Rardon will serve more time than did either of the first two, the third sentence also guarantees that Rardon will not serve as much time as he could have served under either of the first two. Rardon will now serve exactly thirty-seven years, whereas he may have ultimately served sixty years under the first sentence or fifty years under the second sentence. When we consider the reduction in the overall term of Rardon's sentence, together with the difference in parole eligibility, we determine that the third sentence, in its entirety, is not more harsh than either of the first two sentences. In other words, the third sentence was not more harsh than either of the first two because it precluded the possibility of Rardon serving sixty or fifty years at MSP, a possibility that was present in the first and second sentences respectively. Thus, we do not accept the premise of Rardon's argument supporting his due process claim. As such, we hold that Rardon's right to due process was not implicated by the third sentence.