Opinion ID: 1505643
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Effect of the Release Under Texas Law

Text: In McMillen v. Klingensmith, 467 S.W.2d 193 (Tex.1971), this court abolished the common law unity of release rule, under which a release of one joint tortfeasor fully discharged all remaining tortfeasors. We held that a release fully discharges only those tortfeasors that it names or otherwise specifically identifies. Id. at 196. In this case, the Duncan release purports to discharge any other corporations or persons whomsoever responsible for the death of James Parker. Cessna clearly falls within this general class of tortfeasors. The question, therefore, is whether the naming of a general class of tortfeasors constitutes specific identification of each member of the class. The courts confronting this question after McMillen have reached contrary results. In Bell v. First National Bank, 597 S.W.2d 521 (Tex.Civ.App.Dallas 1980, no writ), a car owner sued a bank for wrongful repossession after releasing the dealer who also participated in the repossession. The court held that the general reference in the release to all other persons, firms, or corporations ... in any way connected with [the tortious event] reflected a clear intent to specifically identify anyone incurring liability because of the repossession. Id. at 522. As a result, the release barred the suit against the bank. In Lloyd v. Ray, 606 S.W.2d 545, 547 (Tex.Civ.App.San Antonio 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.), however, the court held that a release of a malpractice claim against a physician and all other persons, firms, and corporations did not specifically identify, and therefore did not discharge, a second physician. Accord Duke v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 568 S.W.2d 470, 472 (Tex.Civ. App.Texarkana 1978, no writ). The court of appeals in this case held that the McMillen requirement of specific identification is not met unless the reference in the release is so particular that a stranger could readily identify the released party. 632 S.W.2d at 381. We agree. Accordingly, we approve Lloyd and Duke and disapprove Bell. We hold that under Texas law, the mere naming of a general class of tortfeasors in a release does not discharge the liability of each member of that class. A tortfeasor can claim the protection of a release only if the release refers to him by name or with such descriptive particularity that his identity or his connection with the tortious event is not in doubt. In this case, the release does not name Cessna, nor does it provide some specific description of Cessna. Since the reference to all corporations does not supply the descriptive particularity necessary to specifically identify Cessna, the release does not bar Duncan's action if Texas law applies to its construction.