Opinion ID: 2624235
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the District Court Err in Refusing to Consider the New Evidence Presented by the Perreiras in Support of their Motion for Reconsideration?

Text: On August 23, 2007, the district court entered its order granting PHH summary judgment against the Perreiras, and on October 1, 2007, it entered a partial judgment certified as final pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. On October 14, 2007, the Perreiras filed a Motion for Reconsideration and to Amend Judgment. They also filed three affidavits seeking to add new evidence to the record before the district court. The new evidence that the Perreiras wanted the district court to consider dealt with two issues raised by the Perreiras in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. First, the Perreiras argued that PHH was not a purchaser in good faith at the foreclosure sale under Idaho Code § 45-1508 because it knew that Anestos was deceased and did not provide notice of the sale to the personal representative of her estate. Idaho Code § 45-1506(3) required that notice of the foreclosure sale be given to the personal representative of the estate of Anestos. When opposing PHH's motion for summary judgment, the Perreiras had relied upon the copy of the order dismissing Anestos's bankruptcy that PHH had placed in the record. That order recited that the debtor was deceased. In granting PHH's motion for summary judgment, the district court held that there is no evidence that PHH was on notice, either actually or constructively, as to the death of Ms. Anestos nor could they have been aware of the appointment of a personal representative since that did not occur until May 2007. The copy of the order dismissing Anestos's bankruptcy that PHH had placed in the record did not include the certificate of service showing that PHH had been mailed a copy of the order on September 25, 2005. The new evidence that the Perreiras sought to provide the court in connection with their motion for reconsideration included a copy of that certificate of service. Second, the Perreiras argued that PHH was not the owner of the property based upon the Warranty Deed executed on February 10, 2003, by which Cendant purported to convey the property to Fannie Mae. The Perreiras had placed a copy of the first page of that deed in the record in opposition to PHH's motion for summary judgment, but they had neglected to include the second page which contained the legal description of the property. In its decision granting PHH's motion for summary judgment, the district court rejected the Perreiras' argument because the deed does not have an attached legal description and there is no showing as to how this instrument is related to the subject premises. In connection with their motion for reconsideration, the Perreiras sought to provide a copy of the second page which contained the legal description. The district court held that the new evidence could not be considered. In so holding it stated, When the judgment or order is final and appealable and not an interlocutory order the court in ruling on a motion for reconsideration may not consider new facts. Whether or not the district court erred in refusing to consider the new evidence depends upon what the Perreiras wanted the district court to reconsider. The trial court must consider new evidence that bears on the correctness of an interlocutory order if requested to do so by a timely motion under Rule 11(a)(2)(B) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of North Idaho, 118 Idaho 812, 823, 800 P.2d 1026, 1037 (1990). However, the trial court cannot consider new evidence when asked to reconsider a final judgment pursuant to a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e), id., or pursuant to a motion to amend findings of fact or conclusions of law under Rule 52(b), see Rae v. Bunce, 145 Idaho 798, 805, 186 P.3d 654, 661 (2008). The order granting PHH's motion for summary judgment was filed on August 23, 2007, and on October 1, 2007, the partial judgment was filed and certified as final pursuant to Rule 54(b). Because the order granting summary judgment was filed before the final judgment, it was an interlocutory order. Barmore v. Perrone, 145 Idaho 340, 343, 179 P.3d 303, 306 (2008). The Perreiras filed their motion for reconsideration on the fourteenth day after entry of the partial judgment. The motion was timely under Rule 11(a)(2)(B) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure for reconsidering an interlocutory order. [3] If the Perreiras' motion asked the district court to reconsider the order granting partial summary judgment, the court was required to consider the new evidence that was relevant to the summary judgment motion. Coeur d'Alene Mining Co., 118 Idaho at 823, 800 P.2d at 1037. The Perreiras entitled their motion as a Motion for Reconsideration and to Amend Judgment, and they cited both Rule 11(a)(2) and Rule 52(b) in support of their motion. With respect to Rule 11, they wrote, Pursuant to Rule 11(a)(2), a party making a motion for reconsideration is permitted to present new evidence. After arguing the significance of the new evidence, the Perreiras concluded by asking that the Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Quash and the Partial Summary Judgment should be amended because PHH was not a good faith purchaser for value and that Fannie Mae was the actual owner of the property. They referred to both the order granting summary judgment and the judgment. Therefore, the district court should have considered the new facts with respect to the motion to reconsider the order granting summary judgment. The right to present new facts in support of a motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order under Rule 11(a)(2)(B) is not lost by joining it with a motion to amend the findings of fact or conclusions of law under Rule 52(b). On appeal, however, the Perreiras do not argue that the district court erred in failing to consider the new facts in support of their motion for reconsideration under Rule 11(a)(2)(B). They now agree with the district court that they were not permitted to present new evidence in support of a motion for reconsideration of the order granting summary judgment once the final judgment was entered. On appeal they argue that the district court abused its discretion by certifying the partial judgment as final under Rule 54(b) because by doing so it allegedly prevented the Perreiras from presenting any new facts. According to the Perreiras, The District Court should not have certified the partial summary judgment as final until Perreira had an opportunity to provide the information that the Court believed was lacking. Since the Perreiras do not challenge on appeal the district court's erroneous refusal to consider the new evidence in connection with their motion for reconsideration, we will not consider that ruling. Rather, we will only consider the Perreiras' contention that the district court abused its discretion in certifying the partial judgment as final pursuant to Rule 54(b). The decision to grant or deny a 54(b) certificate rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge who is best able to evaluate the situation. Brinkmeyer v. Brinkmeyer, 135 Idaho 596, 599, 21 P.3d 918, 921 (2001). The Perreiras argue that the district court abused its discretion because, The District Court should not have certified the partial summary judgment as final until Perreira had an opportunity to provide the information that the Court believed was lacking. The Perreiras not only had an opportunity to present additional evidence to the district court, they did so. The district court simply erroneously refused to consider it. That error does not show an abuse of discretion in granting the Rule 54(b) certification. The Perreiras' argument on appeal is simply based upon their own misunderstanding of Rule 11(a)(2)(B). Their misunderstanding as to that Rule does not show that the district court abused its discretion in certifying the partial judgment as final. Therefore, based upon the argument presented by the Perreiras on appeal, the district court did not err in refusing to consider the new evidence they presented in support of their motion for reconsideration. Such evidence will not be considered when addressing the issues on appeal.