Opinion ID: 3012034
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: if the Grand Jury returns an indictment, Billy

Text: Wayne McKinnon will appear as a witness and testify truthfully in the prosecution of said indictment; (4) Billy Wayne McKinnon will be permitted to plead guilty to the crime of conspiracy to murder Maria Marshall. And it is understood and agreed by and between the parties that this crime does not fall within the purview of the so-called Graves Act; (5) the State of New Jersey will recommend that if the Court decides to impose a custodial sentence on Billy Wayne McKinnon, that said sentence not exceed five years and that there be no period of parole ineligibility; (6) the Ocean County Prosecutor’s office will recommend to the State Department of Corrections that any custodial sentence be served in the Clinton Institution for security purposes; (7) the Ocean County Prosecutor’s office will recommend in writing to the New Jersey State Parole Board that Billy Wayne McKinnon be granted parole at the earliest eligible date; (8) the State of New Jersey will immediately re-locate the family of Billy Wayne McKinnon for their protection to a safe location; and the Ocean County Prosecutor’s office and the New Jersey State Police will recommend and support their entry into the witness protection program. Witnesses whereof the parties to this agreement have affixed their signatures hereon this 15th day of December, 1984. Direct Testimony of Billy Wayne McKinnon, February 3, 1986, St. Ex. 13T at 100-03. 25 The agreement was signed by McKinnon, his attorneys, and the Ocean County Prosecutor. Id. at 103. During his cross-examination, Marshall’s counsel asked McKinnon about the witness protection program. Id. at 203-05. McKinnon admitted to having general knowledge about the program, but denied having specific knowledge of it, or whether or how his participation would take place. Id. Thompson’s counsel questioned McKinnon extensively about the plea agreement, eliciting from McKinnon that he had a very substantial motive to lie. Cross-Examination of Billy Wayne McKinnon, February 4, 2002, St. Ex. 14T at 135-36, 180. He also brought out that McKinnon understood the potential sentence for the crimes for which he was indicted -- murder and conspiracy to commit murder -- and how minimal his sentence was. Id . at 13840. In the course of the cross-examination, McKinnon admitted that if he had stated that he was the shooter, he would not have gotten the wonderful deal that he did, and that he had to say that he did not shoot Maria Marshall in order to reap the benefits of the acknowledged plea agreement. Id. at 144. McKinnon also acknowledged that in his testimony he had admitted to lying about some things, including his identity and the purpose of the money he received from Marshall. Id. at 145, 184-86, 192-95. McKinnon further conceded that under the terms of the plea agreement he would be allowed, following the trial, to plead to the second degree crime, and would not be charged with the murder, and that by securing the statement that the crime committed did not fall within the purview of the Graves Act, McKinnon avoided the three year mandatory imprisonment that was supposed to result when a gun was used in the commission of certain crimes, including murder. Id. at 164-66. He also admitted that the judge might not send him to jail at all, but that in any event the maximum sentence would be five years, with no period of parole ineligibility. Id. at 169-70. Thompson’s counsel also brought out the fact that the Clinton Institution is primarily a women’s prison, and that McKinnon would be assigned there to protect him from abuse by other inmates. Id. at 171-72. He also elicited McKinnon’s acknowledgement that, although not stated in the plea agreement, McKinnon was told that he would get 26 credit for the time already served in jail, and, since that time was more than the standard period of parole ineligibility, McKinnon would be immediately eligible for parole, and the prosecutor’s office would encourage the parole board to parole him immediately. Id. at 175-77. McKinnon also admitted that his family had been relocated pursuant to the terms of the agreement. Id. at 178. He denied having seen a recommendation supporting his entry into the witness protection program, but was questioned about some aspects of the program: Q. Now, as part of relocating your family under the Witness Protection Act has their moving expenses been paid by the federal government? A. No, sir. Q. Have any moneys been paid to support your family by the federal government under the Witness Protection Act? A. No, sir. Q. Has any money been paid to you, even one dollar, in way of services, rent, electric, heat, telephone, or anything else, under the Witness Protection Act? A. No. Q. Do you know--strike that. Were you told by your attorneys that such benefits were available to persons under the Witness Protection Act? A. No. Q. Did you have an understanding on your own, regardless of what your attorneys told you, that you might be eligible for certain payments in money or in kind -- A. I didn’t know -- Q. -- by reason of your admission to the Witness Protection Act? A. I didn’t know exactly what that entailed. 27 Q. Didn’t you inquire, since you were getting that as one of your concessions or assistance from the State? A. I haven’t been able to meet with the marshall and he has not contacted me in reference to that. Id. at 179-80. Counsel did not inquire as to whether the State had borne expenses on McKinnon’s behalf aside from the aegis of the federal witness protection program. During the remand hearing, the State produced a correspondence file that contained two letters from the Office of the County Prosecutor of Ocean County New Jersey to the Criminal Investigation Division of the New Jersey State Police. The first was dated February 4, 1985, a year to the day prior to McKinnon’s testimony on cross-examination. It detailed expenses of the investigation, and included the following paragraphs: In addition, we have been required to incur substantial expenses in transporting the family of Billy Wayne McKinnen [sic] to the State of New Jersey and providing security for them until such time as McKinnen [sic] is accepted in the federal witness protection program. Expenses incurred for transportation of the family to New Jersey, obtaining temporary housing, doctors bills, food, heat and utilities thus far are in the amount of $6921.10. We are requesting that the New Jersey State Police and/or the Garden State Parkway Authority reimburse this office for one-half of these expenses or $3,460.55. In addition to the already incurred expenses, we must anticipate further expenses prior to trial of this matter. These expenses consist of maintenance and housing for the family of the defendant/witness, Billy Wayne McKinnen [sic]. The expenses appear to be as follows: monthly rent $500; heat $75; telephone $50; food, clothing and miscellaneous $750; or a total of $1300 per month expenses. We are requesting a commitment from the New Jersey State Police and /or the Garden State Parkway Authority that they will pay 28 50% of these anticipated costs for the next several months. PCR Appeal, Defendant-Appellant Appendix, Vol. 20, Exhibit 36 at 2594a. The second letter was dated May 1, 1985, and stated in relevant part: The family of Billy Wayne McKinnon (a key state’s witness) has been relocated to New Jersey to assure their safety, in view of the violent propensities of other associates of McKinnon and co-defendant, Larry Thompson. We have thus far expended $9,456.45 to maintain this family while awaiting trial of the matter and will be faced with continuing costs approximately $1,000 per month until trial of the matter, which is scheduled for September 1985. Id. at 2596a.
Marshall claimed that the expense letters were evidence of additional favors received by McKinnon, and, as such, were Brady material that could have been used to impeach McKinnon’s credibility. The New Jersey Supreme Court considered the merits of the claim, despite noting that the letters were outside the scope of the remand hearing. Marshall I, 586 A.2d at 195. The Court rejected Marshall’s argument that the non-disclosure was material, in part because of the extent of the cross-examination on the terms of the plea agreement, and in part because the Court deemed the evidence merely cumulative. Id. at 195-96. The District Court agreed. See Marshall III, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 762. Under the AEDPA standard, we ask only whether the New Jersey Supreme Court reasonably applied Brady and its progeny in concluding that the non-disclosure was immaterial as a matter of law. We conclude that it did. There is no question that McKinnon was a critical witness to the prosecution, and that the information as to the benefits received by his family was favorable to the defense and could have been used in cross-examination. But there 29 is also no dispute that counsel’s cross-examination did disclose some special favors from the government, and did cause McKinnon to admit to lying on several occasions. In his testimony McKinnon portrayed himself as a man who was stringing Marshall along, intending to get from him as much money as possible to murder Maria Marshall, and then simply to walk away with the money. He testified that he had never intended to allow Maria Marshall to be killed, but that Thompson had confronted him, claiming that there was a contract on McKinnon’s life because of an unfinished job. According to McKinnon’s testimony, he thought Marshall had taken out the contract; it was on the basis of that conversation that McKinnon agreed to let Thompson murder Maria Marshall for him. McKinnon provided many details of the trips to Atlantic City that were independently corroborated by investigators, and that he could not have known had he not met with Marshall. Marshall complains that the information links Marshall to McKinnon, but not Marshall to the crime. We disagree. While Marshall admitted that he had hired McKinnon, he had offered only that he was trying to trace the missing winnings that he had given to Maria. Between McKinnon’s testimony and the corroborating evidence, the State was able to demonstrate that McKinnon had received much more than the value of the purportedly missing funds. Further, McKinnon’s testimony and the corroborating evidence established that McKinnon was in Atlantic City the day of Maria’s death, and that he received money from Marshall on that day. Both of those pieces of information were critical -- albeit circumstantial-- elements in challenging Marshall’s benign explanation for his association with McKinnon, and they provided a basis for inferring that Marshall’s motive for hiring McKinnon, paying him large sums of money, and meeting with him and paying him on the day of Maria’s death was, as McKinnon testified, to arrange for Maria’s murder. Marshall also claims that, since the evidence was not merely repetitive of what was before the jury, the New Jersey Supreme Court erred in concluding that it was cumulative. He cites to Perdomo, where we stated: 30 The district court did not apply the correct standard for measuring materiality at the sentencing hearing. The court reasoned that the undisclosed information was not material because the jury had ample opportunity to evaluate [the witness’s] credibility due to other damaging testimony that had been elicited concerning the government payments to [the witness] and his prior drug usage. Whether or not the jury has had an opportunity to consider other impeachment evidence is not the correct standard for determining materiality of undisclosed information. United States v. Perdomo, 929 F.2d 967, 972 (3d Cir. 1991). In Perdomo, the impeachment evidence of former convictions and a psychiatric examination was so compelling that we concluded, Seldom have appellate judges seen such persuasive evidence that the availability of information on a prior conviction could have made a difference. Id. Here the evidence tends to indicate a motivation for McKinnon to provide testimony, and to provide testimony that the State finds satisfactory. But those precise motivations were brought out graphically at trial; it was clear after cross-examination that McKinnon’s change of plea would not occur until after he had testified and that at his change of plea the State would withdraw the murder charge. Further, the jury was made aware that, pursuant to his plea agreement, McKinnon’s sentence would be no more than five years for this terrible murder; in practical terms this meant that he either would serve no more jail time, or would serve what little post-plea time he did in a women’s institution, a place that counsel implied offered McKinnon very favorable residential conditions. From the face of the plea agreement and the cross- examination, it was also clear that the prosecutor would assist McKinnon’s entry into the federal witness protection program. It could not help but be evident to the jury that McKinnon’s testifying to the satisfaction of the State was critical in determining McKinnon’s future. Indeed, the jury apparently found McKinnon’s testimony about Thompson incredible, since it acquitted him. Unlike in Perdomo, the ongoing support to McKinnon’s family would not provide an alternative or stronger incentive for his testimony. Marshall also cites to two cases that he argues demonstrate that the 31 evidence could not have been cumulative because it was not repetitive. We find those cases to be inapposite, because they were discussing the admissibility of evidence, not its materiality. See Elwood v. Pina, 815 F.2d 173, 178 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Ives, 609 F.2d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 1979).
Marshall further complains that it was unreasonable for the New Jersey Supreme Court, on appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief, to conclude that the prosecutor’s failure to disclose information about McKinnon’s possible cooperation with federal law enforcement agents was immaterial. App. Br. at 90. We note first that the New Jersey Supreme Court was skeptical about whether such information existed, and particularly whether it existed within the control of the prosecutorial team, reasoning only that if the information existed, it would have been immaterial. Marshall II, 690 A.2d at 38. The District Court characterized Marshall’s request to develop the limited information he has about the connection further as a fishing expedition. Marshall III, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 762. In order to agree with Marshall, we would need to hold the State accountable for knowledge possibly possessed by the F.B.I. or other federal agents. There is no indication in the record that the federal agents who might have possessed such information were working together with state agents investigating Maria Marshall’s death. Thus, such a holding would require a further expansion of Brady, possibly beyond what we would consider clearly established law even now, and certainly beyondclearly established law as of the time Marshall’s conviction became final.13 Thus, we decline to hold that there was _________________________________________________________________ 13. The controlling case in this area, Kyles , was not decided until 1995. In earlier cases, such as United States v. Antone, 603 F.2d 566 (5th Cir. 1979), federal and state authorities had pooled their efforts, such that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals deemed it appropriate to consider both part of a single prosecutorial team. Id . at 569-70. See also United States v. Perdomo, 929 F.2d 967, 970 (3d Cir. 1991) (following Antone). In contrast, where there was no pooling, even within a single jurisdictional 32 clearly established law requiring Brady disclosures in this situation; consequently, we do not reach the question whether the New Jersey Supreme Court’s determinations were reasonable.