Opinion ID: 2403739
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Public Accommodations

Text: [¶ 23] The parents claimed that the school officials discriminated against J.R. under the MHRA's public accommodations law. The MHRA declares that it is a civil right for every individual to have equal access to places of public accommodation without discrimination because of race, color, sex, physical or mental disability, religion, ancestry or national origin. 5 M.R.S.A. § 4591 (2002). It is unlawful for a place of public accommodation to discriminate on the basis of a disability. Id. § 4592(1). There is no dispute that the playground is a place of public accommodation. [¶ 24] Unlawful discrimination is defined in section 4592 to include the failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices or procedures, when modifications are necessary to afford the ... facilities... to individuals with disabilities. Id. § 4592(1)(B). Unlawful discrimination also includes the exclusion or denial by a public entity of a qualified individual with a disability, by reason of that disability, from services and activities or from being subjected to discrimination by any such entity. Id. § 4592(1)(E). [¶ 25] However, places of public accommodation are not required to allow a person to use its facilities when the person poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others. 5 M.R.S.A. § 4592. The term direct threat is defined as a significant risk to the health or safety of others that can not be eliminated by a modification of policies, practices or procedures or by the provision of auxiliary aids or services. Id. [¶ 26] The court found that J.R. posed a direct threat, that is, a significant risk to the health and safety of others on the playground, and, therefore, the school officials had not discriminated against him. The court further found that the suspension from the playground was not based on J.R.'s disability, but rather based on the school officials' legitimate need to obtain an assessment of the child and develop a plan for his safe and beneficial use of the facility. Because we affirm the decision on a different rationale than that of the court, we do not reach the question of whether the court erred in its conclusion that J.R.'s behavior met the statutory definition of direct threat, or in its determination that the school officials did not discriminate against J.R. on the basis of his disability. [¶ 27] J.R.'s service plan gave him the right to use the playground. [5] The court found that after J.R. began to use the playground, other students accused him of kneeing a student in the groin. On the playground, J.R. had used offensive or threatening language, thrown rocks, used playground equipment too roughly, been rude and disrespectful to supervisors, and swung on the tire swing too fast. The court found that the school officials were concerned with J.R.'s behavior on the playground and its effect on his and others' safety and educational development. The record supports these findings. [¶ 28] Because of the similarity between the MHRA and the federal Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213 (West 1995 & Pamph. 2005), we utilize federal cases interpreting the ADA when we interpret comparable provisions in the MHRA. Scott v. Androscoggin County Jail, 2004 ME 143, ¶ 16, 866 A.2d 88, 93. The direct threat provision in 5 M.R.S.A. § 4592, is also contained in the ADA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12182(b)(3) (1995), and is interpreted to mean that entities operating places of public accommodation that are concerned with the safety risks posed by a disabled individual must determine whether that individual constitutes a direct threat. Montalvo v. Radcliffe, 167 F.3d 873, 876-77 (4th Cir.1999). When making such a determination, a public accommodation entity must not base its calculus on stereotypes or generalizations about the effects of a disability but rather must make an individualized assessment, based on reasonable judgment that relies on current medical knowledge or on the best available objective evidence. Id. (quotation marks omitted). [¶ 29] The relevant factors that the entity providing the place of public accommodation must weigh and balance are the nature, duration, and severity of the risk and the probability that the potential injury will actually occur. Id. at 877 (quotation marks and alterations omitted). Under the ADA, when an entity providing a place of public accommodation identifies a disabled individual as posing significant risk to the health and safety of others, it must assess whether that risk can be eliminated by reasonable modifications of policies, practices or procedures. Id. (quotation marks omitted). Likewise, because the MHRA defines direct threat to mean a significant risk ... that can not be eliminated by a modification of policies, practices or procedures or by the provision of auxiliary aids or services, 5 M.R.S.A. § 4952, we interpret the MHRA to mean that the public accommodation entity must ascertain whether any modification to its policies, or whether providing any auxiliary services, will eliminate the significant risk that it has identified. [¶ 30] Here, the school officials perceived that J.R. posed a significant risk to himself and other students, and that some kind of modification to its policies and procedures or to J.R.'s service plan, may ameliorate such a risk. The court found that the school officials' safety concerns prompted it to temporarily suspend J.R.'s use of the playground only until a safe and effective behavioral plan could be developed for [J.R.] and the school's personnel. [¶ 31] The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that an entity providing a place of public accommodation was not liable for discrimination during an interim period in which it was requesting additional information. Doe v. Woodford County Bd. of Educ., 213 F.3d 921, 925 (6th Cir. 2000). In that case, the school had placed a student basketball player on hold status, preventing him from playing with the team, until the school could determine whether or not the fact that he was a hemophiliac and carried the hepatitis B virus made him a direct threat to others on the team. Id. at 923-24. The school requested his parents to provide medical information and when the furnished information appeared inadequate, it sought more information. Id. at 924. The ultimate determination of whether the student posed a direct threat was irrelevant; the school had not discriminated against him in the time period in which it held meetings and gathered medical information necessary to its determination of whether or not a direct threat existed that could not be eliminated by modification. Id. at 925-26. [¶ 32] Here, the school temporarily suspended J.R. to determine whether he posed a direct threat that could not be eliminated by modification. This temporary suspension appears to be an attempt to balance the need of protecting [other students] with [J.R.'s] rights not to be treated differently due to his disability. Id. at 926. As in Woodford County Board of Education, it was entirely reasonable for [the school officials] to be concerned and arguably [they] were obligated to be concerned with limiting risk of [injury] to others as well as limiting any injury that [the child] may suffer. Id. [¶ 33] The Falmouth school officials requested that J.R.'s parents consent to the FBA. The court found that the school officials' request for the behavioral assessment was reasonable and well-suited to the timely and effective return of [J.R.] to the playground. The court found that J.R.'s mother acknowledged that the school officials needed to understand his disability. The school officials requested the FBA in order to ascertain and implement modifications that would allow J.R. to resume use of the playground. The FBA would have enabled the school officials to make an individualized assessment, based on reasonable judgment that relies on current medical knowledge or ... objective evidence. Montalvo, 167 F.3d at 876-77 (quotation marks omitted). As the court found, the FBA itself would have required J.R.'s immediate return to the playground because in order to do the FBA, the assessors would have to observe J.R. in the playground environment. [¶ 34] Without the parental consent necessary for the FBA, the school officials were prevented from making the determination they are required to make under the law. The parents' refusal to consent to the FBA meant that the school officials were unable to determine whether J.R.'s behavior constituted a direct threat and if so, what modifications, if any, could eliminate it. The school officials did not unlawfully discriminate against J.R. by temporarily suspending him in order to make that determination. The entry is: Judgment affirmed.