Opinion ID: 3000920
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence of Involvement in Previous Drug Lick

Text: As part of his entrapment defense, Ingram claimed that Detective Martinez had targeted him unfairly and testified to that effect. Ingram testified that he had known Detective Martinez since 2001 and that Martinez was present when Ingram was arrested in connection with the present case. Ingram called Detective Martinez as a witness, asking him how he first came to know Ingram. During cross-examination, the government elicited testimony from Detective Martinez about a murder case arising from a drug lick in which both Emerson and Ingram were charged. While not mentioning Emerson and Ingram Nos. 05-3303 and 05-3336 9 by name, the government’s question referenced “two individuals who are in this courtroom” as being charged in connection with that murder case. The charges were dismissed when a key witness “passed away.” Ingram and Emerson both objected and moved for a mistrial based on this testimony. The district court overruled their objections and denied their motions, ruling that Ingram’s entrapment defense opened the door to this testimony because it was relevant to the issue of his predisposition to commit the crime charged but that such evidence was not admissible as to Emerson. We review the denial of a motion for a new trial for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Holt, 486 F.3d 997, 1001 (7th Cir. 2007). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person to show action in conformity therewith,” but may be admissible for “other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” Before such evidence is admitted: the court must determine whether (1) the evidence is directed toward establishing a matter in issue other than the defendant’s propensity to commit the crime charged, (2) the evidence shows that the other act is similar enough and close in time to be relevant to the matter in issue, (3) the evidence is sufficient to support a jury finding that the defendant committed the similar act, and (4) the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. United States v. Wilson, 31 F.3d 510, 514-15 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing cases). Rule 404(b) also allows the government to introduce evidence of other bad acts in order to show predisposition when the defendant raises an entrapment defense. See United States v. Higham, 98 F.3d 285, 292 (7th Cir. 1996). 10 Nos. 05-3303 and 05-3336 By asserting an entrapment defense, Ingram placed at issue his predisposition to participate in drug licks. See United States v. Theodosopoulos, 48 F.3d 1438, 1444 (7th Cir. 1995) (“The lack of predisposition is the principal element in the entrapment defense.”). In doing so, he opened the door to evidence of his prior involvement in drug licks and, specifically, the drug lick that resulted in a murder. See United States v. Swiatek, 819 F.2d 721, 728 (7th Cir. 1987) (“Evidence of other bad acts is also admissible to prove predisposition in an entrapment case, because in such a case the defendant’s predisposition to commit the charged crime is legitimately at issue.”). He first raised the issue of the earlier murder case on Detective Martinez’s direct examination, asking Detective Martinez about when he first came to know Emerson. The government followed-up that line of questioning on crossexamination, eliciting the revelation that the previous case was a murder arising from a drug lick. While such evidence was certainly prejudicial to Ingram and his entrapment defense, it was not unfairly so. And other than offering the mere assertion, Ingram has not shown that the district court abused its discretion in finding the evidence sufficient to support a jury finding that he had engaged in the earlier drug lick and murder. In contrast, evidence of the murder in connection with the drug lick was not admissible as to Emerson because he did not raise an entrapment defense, and the government concedes as much. We conclude, however, that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Emerson’s motion for mistrial because the error was harmless. “The test for harmless error is whether, in the mind of the average juror, the prosecution’s case would have been ‘significantly less persuasive’ had the improper evidence been excluded.” United States v. Owens, 424 F.3d 649, 656 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Eskridge, 164 F.3d 1042, 1044 (7th Cir. 1998)). Here, as discussed Nos. 05-3303 and 05-3336 11 above, the record contained ample evidence from which a rational fact-finder could convict Emerson of conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt. Emerson is seen and heard on videotape participating in the planning of the robbery. The jury also heard a recording of the telephone conversation between Ingram, Emerson, and Douglas in which Ingram informed Emerson that he could not participate in the robbery itself but would nonetheless receive some of the cocaine. Additionally, in its final instructions to the jury, the district court cautioned the jury that it was not to consider evidence of the charges brought and dismissed against Ingram (in connection with the murder) against Emerson at all. This instruction cured any prejudice caused by the reference to the “two individuals” in the courtroom involved in the previous drug lick, as juries are presumed to follow instructions. United States v. Jones, 248 F.3d 671, 676 (7th Cir. 2001). We conclude that a rational jury would have found Emerson guilty absent the error.