Opinion ID: 1489448
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Zero Verdict for Pain and Suffering

Text: Appellants claim it was error for the trial court to deny their motion for a new trial on the issue of damages for pain and suffering. Appellants' motion, pursuant to CR 59.01(d), specifically challenged the validity of the jury's verdict of zero damages for Michael's pain and suffering. Appellants claim that uncontroverted evidence of Michael's pain from the surgery entitled them to an award for these damages. In response, Appellees argue that Appellants' evidence was inconclusive and that the jury verdict was justified by testimony at trial. It is well-established that appellate courts in this state review trial court rulings on a motion for new trial on grounds of inadequate damages under a clearly erroneous standard of review. See, e.g., Cooper v. Fultz, 812 S.W.2d 497 (Ky.1991). Our decision in Cooper amounts to a recognition that a proper ruling on a motion for new trial depends to a great extent upon factors which may not readily appear in an appellate record. Only if the appellate court concludes that the trial court's order was clearly erroneous may it reverse. Turfway Park Racing Ass'n v. Griffin, 834 S.W.2d 667, 669 (Ky.1992) (emphasis added). Accordingly, we treat the decision of a trial court on this issue with a great deal of deference. In addition, we recently rejected the notion that a jury verdict of zero for pain and suffering is inadequate as a matter of law in cases where a jury also awards damages for medical expenses. In Miller v. Swift, 42 S.W.3d 599 (Ky.2001), we held, [t]he law in Kentucky ... does not require a jury to award damages for pain and suffering in every case in which it awards medical expenses. Id. at 601. Relying heavily on Turfway Park , we reiterated that [o]ur review ... is limited to whether the trial court's denial of [the motion for retrial] was clearly erroneous. Id. Although not specifically argued in this case, we must also note that the general principle advanced in Miller  that a zero verdict for pain and suffering may sometimes be appropriate  is not constrained to the facts of that case. [2] Rather, that principle is broadly applicable to cases which claim this type of error. We note this only to confirm that our holding here reaffirms and does not expand or alter the principle set forth in Miller . Appellants claim that had Michael been properly diagnosed, his fractured wrist could have been treated with a cast and would not have required surgery. They argue that because this fact was uncontroverted at trial and because the surgical procedure was necessarily painful, the judge's denial of their motion for a new trial was clearly erroneous. Appellants cite Hazelwood v. Beauchamp, 766 S.W.2d 439 (Ky.App.1989), in support of this contention. In that case the Court of Appeals stated: While it is true that the jury did not have to believe [the plaintiff's] testimony regarding the pain he claims to have endured, it was not free to disregard the uncontroverted evidence of the nature of the accident itself and the medical procedures performed. Id. at 441. We would first point out that because Hazelwood is a case from the Court of Appeals, it is not binding on this Court. But the facts in Hazelwood are also markedly different from the facts in this case. In Hazelwood , the plaintiff sued his employer and a coworker after having his hand maimed in a mechanical hay bailer that he was attempting to repair. The jury concluded that his injury was, at least in part, the result of his coworker's negligence. Nevertheless, they awarded only nominal damages for pain and suffering. In contrast, Appellants in this case sued on a theory of medical malpractice; damages were not based directly on a physical injury, but resulted from a delay in the diagnosis and treatment of Michael's broken wrist. The nature of any pain and suffering damages that Michael could have rightfully claimed is fundamentally different than that discussed in Hazelwood . Additionally, despite Appellants' claim that the evidence of Michael's pain and suffering was uncontroverted, there were numerous instances where relevant testimony on the subject was either impeached or contradicted. In fact, we note substantial problems in three key areas of Appellants' proof of pain and suffering: (1) Michael's deposition and trial testimony, (2) Dr. Wyrick's testimony, and (3) Michael's medical records describing the surgical procedure and follow-up treatments. First, Michael's claim that he constantly suffered pain after the surgery was not corroborated by Dr. Wyrick's notes describing Michael's follow-up appointments. Remarkably, the notes, which detail several separate visits, do not include any indication that Michael was experiencing pain until after this lawsuit was initiated. In addition, Dr. Wyrick's notes directly contradicted Michael's testimony on this point, since they expressly observed that Michael denie[d] any pain at all on one occasion and was having no pain on another. Second, although Michael claimed that the pain in his arm following surgery prevented the normal use of this hand during his day-to-day activities, he admitted under cross examination that he had fully participated in two baseball seasons after the surgery. This fact was substantially confirmed in his medical records, which noted he had been playing baseball and could do pushups without any significant problems. Third, Dr. Wyrick testified that there would likely have been significant pain associated with treatment of Michael's fractured wrist regardless of the treatment option, either casting or surgery, that was used. He further testified that he could not predict any significant difference in pain between the two options. Finally, Michael's surgery was performed under general anesthesia, preventing or limiting the acute pain directly related to the procedure. There was substantial evidence for the jury to conclude that Appellants were not entitled to a damages award for pain and suffering.