Opinion ID: 2508417
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Criminal Stalking Statute and Case Law

Text: The criminal stalking statute, K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 21-3438, was enacted in 1992 and has been amended five times. See L. 1992, ch. 298, sec. 95; L. 1993, ch. 291, sec. 253; L. 1994, ch. 348, sec. 13; L. 1995, ch. 251, sec. 10; L. 2000, ch. 181, sec. 5; L. 2002, ch. 141, sec. 10. Relevant to this case, K.S.A. 1994 Supp. 21-3438 provided: (a) Stalking is an intentional and malicious following or course of conduct directed at a specific person when such following or course of conduct seriously alarms, annoys or harasses the person, and which serves no legitimate purpose. . . . . (d) For the purposes of this section, `course of conduct' means a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose and which would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the person. Constitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of `course of conduct.' (Emphasis added.) In Bryan, this court found a portion of the K.S.A. 1994 Supp. 21-3438 criminal stalking statute unconstitutionally vague because it used the terms alarms, annoys, and harasses without defining them or without including an objective standard with regard to a stalking offense based on a following. The Bryan court focused on the following element because the 1994 statute defined the course of conduct element in relation to an objective standard which would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress. 259 Kan. at 149-50. After comparing the 1994 statute to the 1992 version of the statute which incorporated an objective standard, the court explained the reasoning behind its decision: In the absence of an objective standard, the terms `annoys,' `alarms' and `harasses' subject the defendant to the particular sensibilities of the individual victim. Different persons have different sensibilities, and conduct which annoys or alarms one person may not annoy or alarm another. The victim may be of such a state of mind that conduct which would never annoy, alarm, or harass a reasonable person would seriously annoy, alarm, or harass this victim. In such a case, the defendant would be guilty of stalking, a felony offense, under the 1994 statute, even though a reasonable person in the same situation would not be alarmed, annoyed, or harassed by the defendant's conduct. Contrast this statutory language with language requiring that the following must be such that it would cause `a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress' or place such person in reasonable fear for such person's safety. At the very least, under this language the finder of fact would not be left with the subjective state of mind of the victim as the determining factor but instead would have an objective reasonable person standard by which to determine whether the defendant committed the crime. Similarly, just as the finder of fact would be provided with an objective standard, so too would anyone subject this law be provided with an objective standard to determine what conduct would constitute the crime of stalking. 259 Kan. at 154-55. In State v. Rucker, 267 Kan. 816, 987 P.2d 1080 (1999), the defendant argued that the 1995 version of the criminal stalking statute was unconstitutionally vague because it was unclear from the statute what constituted alarming, annoying, or harassing conduct. K.S.A. 21-3438 provided: (a) Stalking is an intentional, malicious and repeated following or harassment of another person and making a credible threat with the intent to place such person in reasonable fear for such person's safety. . . . . (d) For the purpose of this section: (1) `Course of conduct' means a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose and which would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the person. Constitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of `course of conduct.' (2) `Harassment' means a knowing and intentional course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, torments or terrorizes the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose. In conducting its analysis, this court quoted the Bryan court's favorable observations of the 1992 version of the statute: `The 1992 version of the Kansas stalking law incorporated an objective standard. As originally enacted, the statute prohibited the `willful, malicious and repeated following and harassment of another person.' L. 1992, ch. 298, § 95. The term `harassment' was defined as a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person which seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and which would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress and actually causes that type of distress in the victim. See L. 1992, ch. 298, § 95. Although the terms `alarms,' `annoys,' and `harasses' were used [in the 1992 version], they were defined by an objective standard in that the conduct must be such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress and actually cause such distress.' Rucker, 267 Kan. at 832 (quoting Bryan, 259 Kan. at 150). The Rucker court concluded that the 1995 version of 21-3438 resolved the vagueness problems found in Bryan by incorporating an objective standard and by defining the terms course of conduct, harassment, and credible threat. 267 Kan. at 832. In Whitesell, this court upheld the Rucker finding that 21-3438 was not unconstitutionally vague in the absence of any new substantive argument. Whitesell, 270 Kan. at 270.