Opinion ID: 195693
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Adams' Request for an Evidentiary Hearing

Text: 53 Procedurally, the evidentiary hearing process was designed to address contested factual issues requiring cross-examination. 44 Fed.Reg. 32,885 (1979). As we stated earlier, following the EPA's issuance of a final permit, the relevant regulations allow a participant to request an adjudicatory hearing. The regulations have specific pleading requirements mandating that requests state each legal or factual question alleged to be at issue, and their relevance to the permit decision, together with a designation of the specific factual areas to be adjudicated and the hearing time estimated to be necessary for adjudication. 40 C.F.R. Sec. 124.74(b)(1). Additionally, the request shall contain [s]pecific references to the contested permit conditions, as well as suggested revised or alternative permit conditions ... which in the judgment of the requester, would be required to implement the purposes and policies of the CWA. 40 C.F.R. Sec. 124.74(c)(5). 54 Beyond satisfying these pleading requirements, 40 C.F.R. Sec. 124.75(a)(1) requires that requests for an evidentiary hearing set forth material issues of fact relevant to the issuance of the permit. The EPA has construed this regulation as an administrative summary judgment standard, and has required an applicant to present a genuine and material factual dispute in order to be entitled to an evidentiary hearing. We have recently upheld the EPA's construction of this regulation, finding that the regulations lawfully can be read to incorporate this binary test, featuring genuineness and materiality. Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority, 35 F.3d at 605. In applying this standard, we noted that Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 is the prototype for administrative summary judgment procedures, and the jurisprudence that has grown up around Rule 56 is, therefore, the most fertile source of information about administrative summary judgment. Id. at 15.
55 In order to determine what facts are material, we must look to the controlling substantive law. See, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ([o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.). Pursuant to the ODC regulations, the EPA is required to determine whether a discharge will cause unreasonable degradation of the marine environment. See 40 C.F.R. Sec. 125.123. 9 Alternatively, discharges in compliance with State water quality standards shall be presumed not to cause unreasonable degradation of the marine environment, for any specific pollutants or conditions specified in the variance or the standard. 40 C.F.R. Sec. 125.122(b). While this presumption is rebuttable, the EPA is entitled to rely upon it unless available data indicates that a discharge would in fact cause unreasonable degradation. 45 Fed.Reg. 65,945 (1980). 56 In this case, the State of New Hampshire certified that the degradation caused by the Seabrook plant was consistent with New Hampshire water quality standards. The EPA relied on New Hampshire's certification in issuing Seabrook's final permit.
57 In his evidentiary hearing request, Adams had the burden to point to evidence in the administrative record which would rebut the presumption that the discharge from the Seabrook plant would not cause unreasonable degradation. See, e.g., A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1037 (Fed.Cir.1992). In his request, Adams challenged the location and design of the outfall and the calculation of the dilution limits, and claimed that the permitted discharge would threaten human health and cause a significant shellfish closure zone. Adams did not point to any evidence in the record which indicated that New Hampshire erroneously granted its certification, or that the EPA could not rely on this certification because available data indicated that the discharge from the plant would, in fact, cause unreasonable degradation of the marine environment. We hold that the EPA did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in finding that each of Adams' challenges failed to present a genuine issue of material fact showing that the EPA was not entitled to rely on the regulatory presumption. 58 In what follows, we address Adams' specific contentions, showing why each individually is procedurally deficient. 10 59
60 In his request for an evidentiary hearing, Adams stated: 61 This outfall as designed is not in the best interests of the United States or the Town of Seabrook. If for no other reason the permit should be denied on this basis. It simply is not in anyone's interest to have the people of the United States swimming in sewerage water even if has been bleached so as to be invisible. 62 If there were any benefit to this outfall at all it would only be to the residents of Seabrook who would use the sewer and cared not about the Beach or the beach environment. There certainly would be no benefit to citizens of the rest of the United States, but on the contrary, anyone that used the beach would be more at risk to viral diseases or just the knowledge of swimming in filth is certainly no benefit and compared to the cleanliness that exists at the beach now, the depreciation of recreational value (as in 40 C.F.R. Secs. 125.121(3)) is not reasonable in relation to the small benefit to a few. 63 Adams also claimed that the EPA failed to consider alternative sites for this outfall. In response, the Regional Administrator denied Adams' request, explaining that Adams had failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding outfall location which justified an evidentiary hearing. The EAB did not then disturb this determination. 11 64 The Agency did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in denying Adams' request for an evidentiary hearing. Adams' evidentiary request is completely bereft of any references to facts in the record which would create a genuine issue that a discharge from the planned outfall location would cause unreasonable degradation of the marine environment, which would be sufficient to rebut the regulatory presumption. Rather, Adams offered a conclusory opinion that the outfall, as designed, was not in the best interest of Seabrook or the United States because it was not in anyone's interest to have people swimming in sewage. This is not sufficient to warrant a formal evidentiary hearing. 65 Adams also suggested that the EPA erred because, based on the planned outfall location, the depreciation of the recreational value was not reasonable in relation to the benefits, referring to 40 C.F.R. Sec. 125.121(e)(3). This regulation partially defines unreasonable degradation of the marine environment as the [l]oss of esthetic, recreational, scientific or economic values which is unreasonable in relation to the benefit derived from the discharge. Id. Adams' request for a hearing, however, simply tracked the language of the regulation and stated his ultimate conclusion that the depreciation of the recreational value was not reasonable in relation to the benefits. The only rationale Adams offered for this conclusion was the unsupported statement that there can be no benefit to anyone when people would be swimming in filth and subjected to a greater risk of viral diseases. Adams has completely failed to point to any evidence showing that the proposed discharge from the outfall would cause the loss of any recreational value, much less evidence that would indicate that there was a genuine factual dispute that such a loss would be unreasonable in relation to the benefits to be derived from the discharge. See 40 C.F.R. Sec. 125.121(e)(3). We agree with the EPA that Adams has not tendered any evidence which on its face creates a genuine issue of material fact showing that the EPA's reliance on the state certification was improper, and we believe that the EPA properly denied the requested hearing. See, e.g., Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Authority, 35 F.3d at 609-11. 66
67 Adams contends that the Agency should have granted his request for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether the EPA properly calculated the dilution limits of the effluent. A generous reading of Adams' evidentiary request indicates that he believed that the EPA improperly calculated dilution limits and, because of these improper calculations, the EPA failed properly to consider the effect of viruses on marine life and the viruses' indirect effect on humans. Additionally, Adams claimed that even if the EPA properly calculated the dilution limit, the Agency still failed to evaluate the effect of viruses. Adams stated that this was a direct violation of 40 C.F.R. Sec. 125.122(a)(6), which required the rescission of the entire permit. 68 The Regional Administrator denied Adams' request because he failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact. The EAB did not disturb this finding. 69 As a preliminary matter, as we have previously noted, the EPA relied on the New Hampshire state certification when it issued the Seabrook permit. When Seabrook applied for its permit, the New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services analyzed the draft permit to ensure that the permit effluent conditions were stringent enough to assure that the discharge would not violate state water quality standards, which were designed to protect public health and recreational activities in and on the water. See N.H.Code Admin.R. [N.H. Dept. of Environmental Services, Water Supply & Pollution Control Div.] Env-Ws 430.01 (1990) (stating that New Hampshire's water quality standards are intended to protect public health and welfare and provide for the protection and propagation of a balanced indigenous population of fish, shellfish, and other aquatic organisms and wildlife, and provide for such uses as recreational activities in and on the waters). The New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services then concluded that if the permit was modified to incorporate a maximum daily total coliform limit to be measured on a daily basis, state certification would be granted. According to the state certification, the mandated coliform limit was necessary because the affected water was used for the growing or taking of shellfish for human consumption. The EPA then incorporated the required coliform limits when it issued the final permit. 70 The EPA did not act arbitrarily or capriciously when it found that Adams failed to show why the EPA's reliance on New Hampshire's certification, which provided for coliform limits to protect the public's health, was inadequate. Adams failed to point to data in the record which established that the proposed discharge would cause unreasonable degradation of the marine environment, because the discharge would threaten human health through direct or indirect pathways, through the presence of viruses. See 40 C.F.R. Secs. 125.122(a)(6), 125.121(e)(2). Rather, Adams simply believed that the EPA should establish effluent limits for viruses as an alternative or additional measure to protect human health. The EPA pointed out, however, that New Hampshire regulates coliform bacteria as an indicator for the presence of human wastes, and this limit was designed to protect the designated uses of swimming, fishing, and other recreational purposes. Additionally, the Regional Administrator noted that: [i]t is EPA's judgment that attempting to establish a separate virus effluent limit here would be inadvisable due to, among other things, problems in detection relating to their small size, low concentrations, variety and instability in the presence of interfering solids, and limits on availability of identification methods. The EPA found, and we agree, that Adams did not point to any evidence from which a decisionmaker could find that the State of New Hampshire failed properly to evaluate the discharge's effect on human health because it did not require effluent limits for viruses. 71 To support his statement that the EPA improperly calculated dilution limits, Adams relied on a September 4, 1991 letter from Martin Dowgert, a Regional Shellfish Specialist with the FDA to Mr. Richard Roach of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the FDA letter), which was a part of the administrative record. 12 The FDA letter calls for the establishment of a larger safety zone closed for shellfishing around the proposed treatment plant outfall, and an area subject to conditional closure in the event of plant disinfection failure. To support his opinion that a larger safety zone needed to be created, Dowgert stated that based on the FDA's preliminary assessment, a shellfish closure zone would occur in an area represented by a 1000:1 dilution line, and this zone would be an area 4,000 feet from the outfall. Adams claimed that this reference was at odds with dilution limits used by the EPA, which Adams failed to specify. 13 72 The EPA did not construe Adams' reference to the FDA letter as raising a genuine issue of material fact regarding the dilution limits, noting that the FDA did not call for the NPDES permit to be denied, or for a revision of any term of the NPDES permit. We do not believe that this finding was arbitrary or capricious because Adams did not show how this alleged miscalculation was material to the permitting process. Subsequent to the FDA letter, New Hampshire issued its certification after evaluating the effects of the discharge and concluding that if its maximum coliform limits were incorporated, the discharge would satisfy state water quality criteria. The EPA then incorporated those limits, requiring that the Seabrook plant comply with them. Adams did not point to anything in the FDA letter which called into question New Hampshire's mandated coliform limits. Rather, Adams claimed that the EPA originally miscalculated dilution limits, but then failed to show what the effects of the alleged miscalculation were, or how the alleged miscalculation affected the New Hampshire certification process. 73
74 In his evidentiary request, Adams stated that the planned closure of a small area around the outfall to shellfishing was contrary to New Hampshire law, which provides that it is for the public good of the state to protect and preserve its submerged lands under tidal waters from despoliation. See RSA 482-A:1 (1993). 14 Beyond this alleged violation of state law, Adams argued that because New Hampshire has a very small and limited total area for shellfish beds ... a loss of a very small area is a significant net loss, which would therefore be unlawful under 40 C.F.R. Sec. 125.122(a)(7). 15 To support his contentions, Adams seemed to rely indirectly on the FDA letter, which suggested that the size of the closed safety zone should extend to an area 4,000 feet from the outfall. 75 The Regional Administrator denied Adams' request on the grounds that he only raised conclusory policy and legal issues, rather than specifying material factual disputes which were entitled to consideration in an evidentiary hearing. The EAB concurred. 76 We do not believe that the Agency acted arbitrarily or capriciously in denying Adams' request. Adams again has challenged the EPA's reliance on the New Hampshire certification, which was issued after New Hampshire determined that the state's water quality standards, which protect the commercial and recreational value of shellfishing, would not be contravened. See N.H.Code Admin.R. [N.H. Dept. of Environmental Services, Water Supply & Pollution Control Div.] Env-Ws 430.01 (1990). Adams' claim that the discharge as permitted is unlawful under RSA 482-A:1, represents a disagreement with the State of New Hampshire's ultimate legal conclusion that the discharge from the Seabrook plant would be lawful under specific provisions of New Hampshire's law. Adams failed to indicate what specific provision of law New Hampshire ignored or ill-considered. Adams also failed to point to any evidence showing that a provision of New Hampshire law was, in fact, violated. 77 Adams next argues that the shellfish closure zone would cause an unreasonable degradation of the marine environment under 40 C.F.R. Sec. 125.122(a)(7). To establish that this shellfish closure zone would constitute an unreasonable degradation, Adams would need to show that the closure zone produced a loss of recreational or economic values which was unreasonable in relation to the benefit derived from the discharge. 40 C.F.R. Sec. 125.121(e)(3). Adams attempted to show this by offering his conclusory opinion that because New Hampshire had a limited total area for shellfish beds, the closure of any area must be significant. Adams failed to point to any facts, however, which showed that the closure zone would cause a loss of any recreational or economic value, much less that such an alleged loss would be unreasonable in relation to associated benefits. 78 We do not believe that the FDA letter materially supported Adams' contention. The FDA letter stated that the shellfish closure zone needed to extend 4,000 feet from the outfall. The FDA letter, however, does not expressly state, or otherwise suggest, that such a closure zone would constitute an unreasonable degradation of the marine environment. See 40 C.F.R. Sec. 125.121. (e). The EPA did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in determining that Adams had failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact which justified an evidentiary hearing. 79 For the foregoing reasons, Adams petition is denied.