Opinion ID: 1915715
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: instruction defining premeditation

Text: Weaver argues that the district court erred in the manner in which it instructed the jury on the definition of premeditation. Premeditation was defined in the instructions as a design formed to do something before it is done. The jury was instructed that the time needed for premeditation may be so short as to be instantaneous provided that the intent to act is formed before the act and not simultaneously with the act. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-302(3) (Reissue 1995) defines premeditation as a design formed to do something before it is done. Weaver is asking this court to overrule our decision in State v. McBride, 250 Neb. 636, 550 N.W.2d 659 (1996). McBride involved the direct appeal of a conviction for first degree murder wherein the appellant challenged a jury instruction defining premeditation. Premeditation was defined almost exactly as it was defined in the present case. The appellant argued that the nonstatutory language confused and misled the jury by blurring the distinctions between first degree murder, second degree murder, and manslaughter. We held that [t]he additional statement in the instruction given by the court merely stated a correct proposition of the law, and we found that the appellant was not prejudiced by the instruction. See id. at 664, 550 N.W.2d at 678. Unlike the appellant in McBride, who was convicted of first degree murder, Weaver was convicted of second degree murder. The jury found that Weaver acted without premeditation. Therefore, Weaver could not have been prejudiced by the instruction defining premeditation. Weaver has not shown that this instruction was prejudicial or otherwise adversely affected a substantial right. This assignment of error is without merit.