Opinion ID: 1382112
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: American with Disabilities Act

Text: Price argues that it is obvious from the record as a whole that respondent would not have violated so many model rules `but for' a severe emotional impairment which is cognizable under the Americans with Disabilities Act. 42 U.S.C. Sections 121101-12213 and 12131  Title II of the Act covers disbarment proceedings. In Re Rose, 776 P.2d 765-56 (Cal.1989). According to Price, this is essentially what Section 25 of the Procedures of the Arkansas Supreme Court Regulating Professional Conduct of Attorneys at Law allows. The approach protects the public, punishes the disabled lawyer as much as one can do that in good conscience, but at the same time promotes the rehabilitation of an attorney who has fallen on hard times. First, at 49 Cal.3d 239, 260 Cal.Rptr. 856, 776 P.2d 765, which Price cites, is the case of In Re Laura Beth Lamb, decided August 7, 1989, which contains no mention of the Americans With Disabilities Act. Second, the ADA was not enacted until 1990, with the passage of Public Law No. 101-336. In In Re Lamb, the California court accepted a disbarment recommendation for an otherwise talented lawyer whose single act of misconduct was impersonating her husband as she took and passed his California bar exam. In the case at hand, Judge Lessenberry found that there was insufficient creditable evidence that the respondent was impaired to the extent that he was not capable of defending himself or that the violations of the Model Rules were caused by the respondent's depression. In Slaten v. State Bar of California, 46 Cal.3d 48, 249 Cal.Rptr. 289, 757 P.2d 1 (1988), a California court held that the attorney's alleged mental problems, even if they had been sufficiently established, would be entitled to little weight in mitigation of his numerous acts of misconduct. The purpose of disciplinary proceedings is the protection of the public and the need for protection is the same whether or not the attorney is mentally impaired. Further, in Florida Bar v. Clement, 662 So.2d 690 (Fla.1995), a Florida court held that the ADA did not prevent it from disbarring a disabled attorney who suffered from bipolar disorder and had been accused of misuse and misappropriation of client funds. The court in that case held that the ADA did not preclude disbarment because his conduct was not causally related to his disability and, even if it were, the attorney would not be protected under the ADA because he was not a `qualified' individual with a disability. In this case, the only proof Price offers in the record of a disability is his reference to a diagnosis of dysthymia, or dysthymic disorder, based on the information in a letter given to him by Kristen Agar, a licensed certified social worker who saw him for an assessment on two occasions. However, the letter also stated that there were other things that needed to be done before an actual diagnosis could be made. Therefore, Price did not establish a disability under the ADA.