Opinion ID: 108017
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: relief for sullivan

Text: Because the majority opinion is highly elliptical as to (1) the circumstances surrounding Sullivan's expulsion from Little Hunting Park, (2) the relief Sullivan sought in the state court, and (3) the decision of the trial court, it is necessary for me to begin my analysis simply by stating the facts of these aspects of the case. A full examination of the record reveals, first, the necessity for a remand on the majority's own premises. It also makes apparent the majority's failure to provide any guidance as to the legal standards that should govern Sullivan's right to recovery on remand. An awareness of the complexity of the issues relevant to Sullivan's right to redress suggests further, I think, the appropriateness of a discretionary denial of review. 1. The Circumstances of Sullivan's Expulsion. After the Board of Little Hunting Park refused to approve the assignment of a membership share from Sullivan to Freeman, Sullivan attempted to convince the Board to reverse its decision. To this end, Sullivan first met with members of the Board, and protested their actions. He subsequently mobilized a campaign both by other members of the club and by persons in the community as a whole to force the Board to reconsider its decision. The means used in this campaign, as the brief for petitioner Sullivan acknowledges, [25] included phone calls to members of the Board, letters to local clergy, and the circulation among the members of Little Hunting Park of a petition that called for a meeting of the full membership to consider Dr. Freeman's case. On July 8 Sullivan received a letter from the Board which stated that it had determined that there was due cause to warrant a hearing in order to determine whether Sullivan should be expelled from Little Hunting Park, pursuant to its bylaws, for conduct inimicable to the Corporation members. This letter referred to Sullivan's non-acceptance of the Board's decision on the assignment of your membership to your tenant . . . along with the continued harassment of the board members as the basis for the Board's due cause determination. The Board subsequently provided a detailed specification of its charges against Sullivan, [26] and these included, inter alia, allegations that Sullivan had (a) instigated a campaign by which board members were harassed by unfriendly phone calls accusing them of bigotry; (b) used abusive language in a phone call to the president of the Board; (c) written letters to local clergy, including the minister of the church which employed the president of Little Hunting Park, accusing board members of participation in real moral evil; and (d) used violent and abusive language to members of Little Hunting Park who had refused to sign his petition. After the hearing on these charges, the Board expelled Sullivan and tendered to him the current market value of the two membership shares that he held. In response to these actions, Sullivan brought this suit in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County, Virginia, against Little Hunting Park and its Board seeking as relief (1) an order compelling Little Hunting Park to reinstate his membership; (2) monetary damages in the amount of $15,000; and (3) an injunction requiring the Board to approve the assignment to Freeman and forbidding the Board to use race as a factor in considering membership. The trial court, after hearing disputed evidence as to the reasons for Sullivan's expulsion, found for the defendants. It stated that the scope of its review of the Board's actions was limited because Little Hunting Park was a private and social club, and then went on to find that the Board had acted within the powers conferred on it by the By-Laws in expelling Sullivan, and that there was ample evidence to justify [the Board's] conclusion that the complainant's acts were inimicable to the Corporation's members and to the Corporation. 2. With this statement of the record in mind, several observations must be made about the majority's treatment of Sullivan's rights. First, in stating that Sullivan's expulsion [was] for the advocacy of Freeman's cause, the majority surely cannot be taken to have resolved disputed testimony, and decided the facts underlying Sullivan's expulsion. If these facts are relevant to Sullivan's remedial rights, as surely they must be, then a remand for detailed findings seems unavoidable under the majority's own premises. Second, the majority has not explained what legal standard should determine Sullivan's rights under § 1982. The majority simply states that Sullivan has standing to maintain this action under § 1982, without even acknowledging that some standard is essential for this case to be ultimately decided. One can imagine a variety of standards, each based on different legal conclusions as to the rights and duties created by § 1982, and each having very different remedial consequences. For example, does § 1982 give Sullivan a right to relief only for injuries resulting from Little Hunting Park's interference with his statutory duty to Freeman under § 1982? If so, what is Sullivan's duty to Freeman under § 1982? Unless § 1982 is read to impose a duty on Sullivan to protest Freeman's exclusion, he would be entitled to reinstatement under this standard only if the Board had expelled him for the simple act of assigning his share to Freeman. As an alternative, Sullivan might be thought to be entitled to relief from those injuries that flowed from the Board's violation of its duty to Freeman under § 1982. Such a standard might suggest that Sullivan is entitled to damages that resulted from Little Hunting Park's initial refusal to accept the assignment to Freeman but again not to reinstatement. Or does the Court think that § 1982 gives Sullivan a right to relief from injuries that result from his legitimate protest aimed at convincing the Board to accept Freeman? If so, what protest activities were legitimate here? Most extreme would be a standard that would give Sullivan relief from injuries that were the result of any actions he took to protest the Board's initial refusal, irrespective of Sullivan's means of protest. Only this standard would require reinstatement, irrespective of the disputed facts here. But this standard would mean that § 1982 gave Sullivan a right to regain his membership even if the Board has expelled him for using intemperate and abusive threats as a means of protesting Freeman's exclusion. [27]