Opinion ID: 793602
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Lundgren's Mental Condition

Text: 228
229 In his affidavit attached to Lundgren's habeas petition, Dr. Jeffrey L. Smalldon, a psychologist licensed in Ohio, diagnosed Lundgren's mental condition as follows: 230 [I]t is my opinion, within reasonable psychological certainty, that Mr. Lundgren suffers from both a severe character disorder and a psychotic disorder. Although I am unable to conclusively rule out the possibility of Paranoid Schizophrenia, in my opinion his psychotic condition is best described as either Delusional Disorder, Mixed Type (with grandiose and persecutory themes) or Psychotic Disorder Not Otherwise Specified. 231 (J.A. at 0118.) The specification Mixed Type applies when no one delusional theme predominates. DSM-IV-TR at 325. Accordingly, Dr. Smalldon's characterization of Lundgren's delusional disorder as Mixed Type presumably resulted from his identification both of grandiose themes, discussed above, and persecutory themes. DSM-IV-TR sets forth the following definition of Persecutory Type delusional disorder: 232 This subtype applies when the central theme of the delusion involves the person's belief that he or she is being conspired against, cheated, spied on, followed, poisoned or drugged, maliciously maligned, harassed, or obstructed in the pursuit of long-term goals. Small slights my be exaggerated and become the focus of a delusional system ... Individuals with persecutory delusions are often resentful and angry and may resort to violence against those they believe are hurting them. 233 Id. 234 At the time of Lundgren's trial, DSM-III-R established five diagnostic criteria for delusional disorder. 5 The first and essential feature of delusional disorder is the presence of a persistent, nonbizzare delusion of at least one month's duration that is not the product of another mental disorder. DSM-III-R at 199, 202. Distinguishing bizarre from nonbizarre delusions is not an exact science, especially in the context of religious delusions. See generally Robert L. Spitzer et al., supra (discussing three definitions of bizarre delusions). DSM-III-R, nonetheless, defines a bizarre delusion as [a] false belief that involves a phenomenon that the person's culture would regard as totally implausible. DSM-III-R at 395. Examples of bizarre religious delusions include the belief that, when swallowing, a person ingests parts of the Devil and the delusion of an elderly widow who believes that her body has been invaded by parasites; by traveling up and down her spinal column, they have created a magnetic current that causes rosary beads near her to rotate in a clockwise direction. Robert L. Spitzer et al., supra, at 881. On the other hand, nonbizarre delusions generally involve situations that occur in real life, such as being followed, poisoned, infected, loved at a distance, having a disease, [or] being deceived by one's spouse or lover. DSM-III-R at 202. A person incorrectly believing that he has a special message from a deity is an example of a nonbizarre religious delusion. See DSM-IV-TR at 325. 235 Lundgren's belief that God commanded him to kill the Avery family to purify the cult so that the members could see God is most likely a nonbizarre delusion and is dissimilar to the totally implausible beliefs characterizing bizarre religious delusions. I am a prophet of God, Lundgren claimed in his unsworn statement at the sentencing phase, I am even more than a prophet. (J.A. at 10894.) Dr. Smalldon summarized some of Lundgren's beliefs that could be considered grandiose delusions: 236 He has claimed to possess special powers, among them the ability to predict future events; the ability to sense the presence of people and events which are at a geographical remove from where he is; and the ability to trigger natural events such as earth tremors. He reportedly told his followers that he was present at Golgotha when Jesus Christ was crucified, and that in other ways as well he was able to transcend the restrictions of time. He claims to have experienced multiple visions where he has had illuminated for him certain aspects of his special mission on earth. 237 (J.A. at 0108.) Lundgren reportedly announced that, because of his faithfulness in killing the Averys, Jesus Christ gave Lundgren the title God of the whole Earth, made him divine and immortal so that he could not be pierced by bullets, knives, or any other objects, and made him the law. Pete Earley, Prophet of Death: The Mormon Blood-Atonement Killings 309 (1991); ( see also J.A. at 0105.). Moreover, Lundgren's belief that God instructed him to kill the Avery family was persistent in that it lasted more than one month. He received the revelation roughly six months before the murder, see Earley, supra, at 267, and apparently maintains to this day that God commanded the killings. 238 The second diagnostic criterion is that [a]uditory or visual hallucinations, if present, are not prominent [as defined in Schizophrenia, A(1)( b )]. DSM-III-R at 202. A hallucination is [a] sensory perception without external stimulation of the relevant sensory organ. Id. at 398. Religious delusions are less common in Schizophrenia than various other types of delusions, id. at 188, and [h]allucinations occurring in the course of an intensely shared religious experience generally have no pathological significance, id. at 398. A prominent hallucination occurs throughout the day for several days or several times a week for several weeks, each hallucinatory experience not being limited to a few brief moments. Id. at 194. The mental health experts assessing Lundgren did not indicate that he experienced hallucinations, and, in any event, any hallucinations in fact occurring were apparently too brief to be considered prominent. 239 Third, the individual's behavior is not obviously odd or bizarre apart from the delusions and their ramifications. Id. at 202. Accordingly, [i]mpairment in daily functioning is rare. Id. at 200. Lundgren's behavior did not appear to be obviously odd or bizarre apart from his religious beliefs and their ramifications. For example, he enjoyed watching movies and lifting weights. See (J.A. at 10970.); Cynthia Stalter Sassé & Peggy Murphy Widder, The Kirtland Massacre 45-46, 63-64 (1991). 240 Fourth, [i]f a Major Depressive or Manic Syndrome has been present during the delusional disturbance, the total duration of all episodes of the mood syndrome has been brief relative to the total duration of the delusional disturbance. DSM-III-R at 202. Both Major Depressive and Manic Syndrome are defined terms, neither of which appear to describe Lundgren. See id. at 217, 222; ( cf. J.A. at 0093 (He struck me [Dr. Smalldon] as neither depressed nor unusually anxious....).). 241 Fifth, the individual [h]as never met criterion A for Schizophrenia, and it cannot be established that an organic factor initiated and maintained the disturbance. DSM-III-R at 202. Lundgren does not appear to meet criterion A for Schizophrenia, and has not been diagnosed as schizophrenic. 6 See id. at 194-95. The term organic factor refers to a substance (e.g., cocaine) or a general medical condition (e.g., Alzheimer's disease). See id. at 119, 201; DSM-IV-TR at 324. The record does not show that Lundgren took drugs or had any such medical condition constituting an organic factor. ( See J.A. at 0111.) 242 As Dr. Smalldon indicated, Lundgren appears to satisfy all five criteria for delusional disorder. 243 Dr. Nancy Schmidtgoessling, also a licensed psychologist, similarly testified during the penalty phase that, through his odd religious views, Lundgren became more out of touch with reality, more caught up in revelations and his visions, and more grandiose. (J.A. at 10829.) She noted Lundgren's belief that he had special powers and could interpret biblical things in a way no one else could and that he really believed .... that it was right to kill these folks because he believed that God commanded him to do so. (J.A. at 10830, 10836.) She concluded that Lundgren suffered from a mixed personality disorder with the predominate features being narcissism, paranoia, and anti-social traits. (J.A. at 10834.) Although she did not believe that Lundgren was insane or had a mental disease or defect (J.A. at 10860.), insanity is ultimately a question for the jury, not expert witnesses, to decide. See State v. Thomas, 70 Ohio St.2d 79, 434 N.E.2d 1356, 1357 (1982). 244
245 Trial counsel in two situations with striking similarity to the instant case presented an insanity defense to the jury, as least in part, on the basis of the defendant's delusional disorder. In a rural Nebraska setting in the early 1980s, Michael Ryan formed and led a religious cult developed out of the teachings of a group called the Posse Comitatus. State v. Ryan, 233 Neb. 74, 444 N.W.2d 610, 617 (1989). Like Lundgren, Ryan stockpiled weapons in apocalyptic anticipation, practiced polygamy, and frequently talked to Yahweh. Id. at 618-19. In 1985, Ryan claimed that Yahweh ordered the appalling torture and death of one cult member who was lacking in faith so as to purify the farm before the immaculate birth of one of the cult member's children. Id. at 620-22; Ryan v. Clarke, 281 F.Supp.2d 1008, 1058 (D.Neb.2003), aff'd, 387 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 2526, 161 L.Ed.2d 1119 (2005). 246 At his trial in 1986, Ryan plead not guilty by reason of insanity. Ryan, 444 N.W.2d at 632. To bolster this defense, Ryan presented the testimony of a psychiatrist and a psychologist. The psychiatrist diagnosed Ryan as suffering from paranoid schizophrenia with auditory hallucinations, delusions, and psychosis. Ryan, 281 F.Supp.2d at 1059. At the penalty phase, the same psychiatrist further testified that Ryan was actively psychotic and clearly delusional. Ryan, 444 N.W.2d at 644. The defense's psychologist did not diagnose paranoid schizophrenia but instead concluded that Ryan suffered from a delusional disorder. Ryan, 281 F.Supp.2d at 1061 n. 10. The psychologist further stated that Ryan had a paranoid personality disorder and a paranoid disorder characterized by active delusional thinking. Id. at 1059. The state's psychiatrist disagreed with both of the defense's experts, concluding that Ryan was not mentally ill and exhibited no evidence of psychosis. Id. at 1060-61. Although the jury ultimately rejected the insanity defense, Ryan's counsel did present the issue to the jury. Ryan, 444 N.W.2d at 617. 247 Another strikingly similar situation arose out of two murders in Utah on July 24, 1984. Ron and Dan Lafferty, two Mormon fundamentalist brothers, joined a School of the Prophets where they received revelations from God and embraced the doctrine of plural marriage. State v. Lafferty, 20 P.3d 342, 351 (Utah 2001); Jon Krakauer, Under the Banner of Heaven 247, 260 (large print ed.2003). In the spring of 1984, Ron received a removal revelation ordering the deaths of his sister-in-law and her infant daughter, who, according to the revelation, had become obstacles in God's path. Lafferty, 20 P.3d at 352. Two years later, the Lafferty brothers fulfilled the revelation with murders so horrific they inspired Jon Krakauer's full-length book Under the Banner of Heaven. That same day, the brothers abandoned a plan to murder the local Mormon leader who had previously excommunicated Ron from the Mormon church. State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1241 (Utah 1988). 248 At his first trial in 1985, Ron refused to present the insanity defense because he believed the jury would interpret that defense as an admission of guilt. 7 Id. at 1250. He appealed the conviction and sentence in part on the ground that he was not competent to stand trial. Id. at 1242. While in prison awaiting his 1985 trial, Ron attempted to hang himself, apparently resulting in some organic brain damage due to oxygen deprivation. Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d 1546, 1552 (10th Cir.1991). At a competency hearing prior to his 1985 trial, medical examiners diagnosed him with two mental disorders: (1) an amnestic syndrome resulting from his suicide attempt, and (2) delusional disorder, also called a paranoid delusional system. Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1242-43; see also DSM-III-R at 199 (referring to delusional disorder as Delusional (Paranoid) Disorder and noting that this category was called Paranoid Disorder in DSM-III). Over two years before Lundgren's trial, the Utah Supreme Court summarized the examiners' findings of Ron's mental condition: 249 In describing the symptoms of the paranoid disorder, the examiners stated that Lafferty's pervasive religiosity, which had been noted during the November, 1984 evaluation, had since developed into a religious delusional system, that Lafferty was unable to determine the boundaries between himself and spiritual beings, that he was experiencing blurred ego boundaries, that he was suffering from a religious martyr complex, that his mind had created a paranoid pseudo-community involving the legal and social systems, that one of Lafferty's revelations was reflective of Messianic grandiosity, that Lafferty felt the hospital and the judicial system were agents of corrupt man-made law and were on trial before God, and that it was impossible for him to [understand] the inconsistency of his objecting to others infringing on his liberty [while he claimed] an entitlement from God to infringe on the liberty of others. 250 Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1242-43. In 1991, the Tenth Circuit granted Ron's habeas petition on the ground that the Utah court misapplied the competency standard in light of Ron's paranoid delusional system. Lafferty, 949 F.2d at 1556. 251 Ron was retried in 1996 and, after spending over a decade in prison, allowed his counsel to pursue the insanity defense. Lafferty, 20 P.3d at 363. The defense called a psychiatrist and a clinical and forensic psychologist who both testified that Ron suffered from a delusional disorder. Krakauer, supra, at 493-94. The state's experts offered a different analysis, concluding that Ron's extreme beliefs were not psychotic and, if anything, exhibited the symptoms of narcissistic personality disorder. Id. at 495-511. The jury again rejected the insanity defense, but, unlike Lundgren's case, the jury, not counsel, decided the issue of sanity. Lafferty, 20 P.3d at 355. 252 Counsel in other deific decree cases have also presented the insanity defense at least partly on the basis of the defendant's delusional disorder. See, e.g., People v. Coddington, 23 Cal.4th 529, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 528, 2 P.3d 1081, 1103, 1110-14 (2000), overruled on different grounds by Price v. Superior Court, 25 Cal.4th 1046, 108 Cal. Rptr.2d 409, 25 P.3d 618, 633 n. 13 (2001); State v. Hudson, No. 01C01-9508-CC-00270, 1999 WL 77844, at -4 (Tenn. Crim.App. Feb.19, 1999). 253 Therefore, in light of Dr. Smalldon's diagnosis, the psychiatric literature, and similar cases, the issues of whether Lundgren suffered from delusional disorder with grandiose themes and whether that condition constitutes a mental disease or defect should have been presented to the jury. 254