Opinion ID: 2612344
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Subsequent Action for Contribution

Text: The district court ruled in the subsequent declaratory judgment action for contribution by NFU against Frackelton that the jury's findings of percentage fault were binding on Frackelton. The court then entered summary judgment for NFU with a corresponding set-off of the amount which NFU paid Kerr above its pro rata share of 55% in the original negligence action (to which Frackelton was never a named party) where fault was allocated among Kerr (10%), Frackelton (35%), and San Miguel (55%). We cannot agree with the district court that Frackelton was bound in a separate declaratory judgment action by the jury's determination of negligence in a suit to which he was never joined as a party. As the court of appeals pointed out, the trial court's discretionary order of consolidation does not merge the consolidated suits into a single cause of action. 650 P.2d at 572. See C.R.C.P. 42. Additionally, Frackelton was never served with process in the Kerr v. San Miguel suit; nor did San Miguel ever attempt to implead Frackelton into that suit. Also, San Miguel did not counterclaim for contribution in the Frackelton v. San Miguel suit. In other words, neither San Miguel nor Kerr asserted in pleadings or otherwise that Frackelton might be liable for all or a portion of Kerr's damages. San Miguel considered a counterclaim against Frackelton, but dropped the claim prior to trial. In effect, the trial court reinstituted the counterclaim sua sponte when it instructed the jury to consider Frackelton's negligence and bound Frackelton to the jury's findings. In our view, Frackelton, as a non-party to the suit, could not be conclusively bound by the jury's determination of relative fault in a subsequent declaratory judgment action for contribution. See Young v. Steinberg, 53 N.J. 252, 250 A.2d 13 (1969). It is axiomatic that a person must have notice that a claim is being asserted against him. Frackelton's litigative approach to the Kerr lawsuit might have changed drastically if he knew that he was considered a party for the purposes of a subsequent contribution action. First, Frackelton believed he was suing only San Miguel and defending only against the defense of contributory negligence. Since Kerr had not sued Frackelton, nor had San Miguel impleaded him, Frackelton had no reason to contest Kerr's contributory negligence in hopes of reducing Kerr's recovery and enhancing his own. Second, Frackelton may have considered settling with Kerr if he knew that the jury's findings in the Kerr suit would be binding. Third, because Frackelton and Kerr were represented by the same attorneys, a conflict of interest arises if the plaintiffs are considered opposing parties in the same action because both parties would want to place a higher degree of fault on the other party. See, e.g., Code of Professional Responsibility D.R. 5-105 (1973). In our view, these considerations weigh heavily against considering Frackelton bound by the jury's findings. Issues of res judicata and collateral estoppel are also raised by the trial court's ruling. The declaratory judgment, in effect, enforces a judgment against someone not a party to the previous suit. Collateral estoppel cannot be applied to the disadvantage of a person who has not litigated the issue in question: Some litigantsthose who have never appeared in a prior actionmay not be collaterally estopped without litigating the issue. They have never had the chance to present their evidence and arguments on the claim. Due process prohibits estopping them despite one or more existing adjudications of the identical issue which stand squarely against their position. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 329, 91 S.Ct. 1434, 1443, 28 L.Ed.2d 788 (1971). See also Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal.2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942) (original party may be bound on some issues); 18 C. Wright, R. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure: Jurisdiction § 4464 (1981); McNichols, Judicial Elimination of Joint and Several Liability Because of Comparative NegligenceA Puzzling Choice, 32 Okla.L.Rev. 1, 34 (1979); Thode, Comparative Negligence, Contribution Among Tort-Feasors, and the Effect of a ReleaseA Triple Play by the Utah Legislature, 1973 Utah L.Rev. 405, 425; Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Comparative Fault Act 343-53 (1977). It is essential that parties should be adversaries among themselves before being bound by a judgment. Greenspan v. Green, 255 S.W.2d 917 (Tex.Civ.App.1953). [5] It was error for the trial court to bind Frackelton in a declaratory judgment action to the jury's findings of relative fault in the prior action to which he was not a party. See Eurich v. Alkire, 224 Kan. 236, 579 P.2d 1207 (1978) (non-party to a comparative negligence action should not be bound by a judgment even though his causal negligence may have been considered). Under the contribution act, a separate action for contribution may be brought in which all parties have the opportunity of litigating responsibility among themselves. Section 13-50.5-104(1). Of course, the issue of contribution can also be resolved in the initial action upon motion by the parties. Section 13-50.5-104(2). NFU has not asserted its rights to contribution from Frackelton and could not do so in a declaratory judgment action against non-parties to the prior suit. NFU stands in the shoes of San Miguel. San Miguel did not attempt to reduce Frackelton's recovery because of his involvement with Kerr. NFU cannot now reduce Frackelton's recovery by looking to issues resolved by the jury in the Kerr lawsuit.