Opinion ID: 1649679
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court's dismissal of the simple assault count, as a finding of bad faith on the part of the state in the disappearance of the evidence was required to find a violation of mcgrone's due process right.

Text: ¶ 7. The seminal case on this subject is the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984). The Supreme Court found in Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 488-89, 104 S.Ct. 2528, that the State's duty to preserve evidence is limited to evidence that might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect's defense. To meet this standard of constitutional materiality ... evidence must both possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means. Trombetta dealt with the preservation of breath samples in DUI cases, and because the aforementioned standard was not met, and because [i]n failing to preserve breath samples for respondents, the officers here were acting `in good faith and in accord with their normal practice,' the Supreme Court reversed the grant of new trials and exclusion of the intoxilyzer results. Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 488, 104 S.Ct. 2528. ¶ 8. Trombetta has been cited on numerous occasions by this Court. See Banks v. State, 725 So.2d 711 (Miss.1997); Taylor v. State, 672 So.2d 1246 (Miss.1996); Tolbert v. State, 511 So.2d 1368 (Miss.1987). The standard that developed after Trombetta is that the evidence in question must meet the two-part test stated above, that (1) evidence must possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and (2) be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means. In addition, the prosecution's destruction of evidence must not have been in bad faith. Tolbert, 511 So.2d at 1372; see also Taylor, 672 So.2d at 1271 (citing Tolbert ). ¶ 9. The question of whether Trombetta actually mandated a finding of bad faith on the part of the State in such cases was no longer open to interpretation after the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 109 S.Ct. 333, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988). Youngblood dealt with a failure to refrigerate clothing worn by a victim of a sexual assault and to test the clothing for semen samples. In Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58, 109 S.Ct. 333, the U.S. Supreme Court stated: We therefore hold that unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law. The Youngblood rule was applied by this Court in Holland v. State, 587 So.2d 848, 869 (Miss.1991). ¶ 10. In this case the Court of Appeals relied on this Court's decision in Banks v. State to find that there was no requirement of finding of bad faith on the part of the State in the destruction of the evidence in question. Banks dealt with the destruction of a bologna sandwich which allegedly linked Banks to a murder by bite marks made in the sandwich. This Court found that Banks had met the two part test of Trombetta, and that a new trial was required because of the admission of the State's evidence concerning the sandwich. This Court made little mention of the State's bad faith or lack thereof except to note: Although Banks is entitled to no presumption since the trial court found (on substantial evidence) that there had been no showing of any intentional effort on the part of the State to deprive the defendant of a view of the sandwich, it nevertheless seems that the bologna sandwich was obviously significant to the defense. Banks, 725 So.2d at 715. ¶ 11. The Court of Appeals seemed to be making an argument to the effect that this Court, in Banks v. State , determined that this State's due process protections, in preservation of evidence cases, were broader that those announced by the U.S. Supreme Court. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals also made the following statement: In fact, this Court knows of no case authority or rationale that would deprive the lower court of its authority to find that the Trombetta standard of materiality is met because of the absence of bad faith. McGrone at ¶ 31. While bad faith may not be a prong of the two-part test for materiality under Trombetta, it is a requirement for a due process violation in a preservation of evidence case under Youngblood, Tolbert, Taylor, and the Court of Appeals decision in Trollinger v. State, 748 So.2d 167 (Miss.Ct.App.1999). We therefore clarify that the following is required in order to find a due process violation by the State in a preservation of evidence case: (1) the evidence in question must possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed; (2) the evidence must be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means; and (3) the prosecution's destruction of the evidence must have been in bad faith. ¶ 12. In this case the record shows that parts (1) and (2) of this test were met. The remaining question is whether the defendant can show bad faith on behalf of the prosecution. In this case it would have been shown through the testimony of the police officers who handled the clothing in question. Counsel for McGrone subpoenaed certain police officers for two separate hearings in this case, but the officers never appeared. The State may not, through the police officer's intentional actions, negate the only means the defendant has for proving a due process violation due to destruction of evidence under Trombetta and Youngblood. Because the police officer's actions made a determination by the circuit court on the issue of bad faith impossible, the judgment of the circuit court and the Court of Appeals will be affirmed.