Opinion ID: 2116540
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 31

Heading: 1. Intent Required for Aiding and Abetting

Text: The aiding and abetting instruction, jury instruction No. 10, stated: To be guilty of the crime charged, it is not necessary that the State prove that the defendant himself committed the unlawful act or acts in question. Whoever aids, abets, or procures another to commit any offense may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal offender. If you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the unlawful act or acts in question were committed by another person who was: 1. Engaged by the defendant to commit the unlawful act or acts; or 2. Engaged with the defendant in a common, concerted unlawful act or acts; or 3. Incited or encouraged by defendant to commit the unlawful act or acts, then defendant is as guilty as if he himself committed the unlawful act or acts, and it is your duty to find the defendant guilty. Aiding and abetting involves some participation in the criminal act and must be evidenced by some word, act, or deed. No particular acts are necessary; nor is it necessary that any physical part in the commission of the crime is taken or that there was an express agreement therefor. Mere encouragement or assistance is sufficient. On the other hand, evidence of mere presence, acquiescence, or silence is not enough to sustain the State's burden of proving the defendant guilty. When a crime requires the existence of a particular intent, an alleged aider and abettor can be held criminally liable as a principal if it is shown that the aider and abettor knew that the perpetrator of the act possessed the required intent, or that the aider and abettor himself possessed the required intent. State v. Arnold, 253 Neb. 789, 572 N.W.2d 74 (1998). See, also, State v. Johnson, 236 Neb. 831, 464 N.W.2d 167 (1991). An aider and abettor can be convicted of any crime, even a greater offense than the principal, provided the conviction is supported by the evidence of the facts and the defendant's state of mind. State v. Ryan, 248 Neb. 405, 534 N.W.2d 766 (1995). Therefore, the jury instructions must instruct the jury that the aider and abettor either personally intended that the underlying felony be committed or aided another person whom the aider and abettor knew had such an intent. State v. Mantich, 249 Neb. 311, 543 N.W.2d 181 (1996). In a criminal trial, the court in its instructions must delineate for the jury each material element the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt to convict the defendant of the crime charged. State v. Williams, 247 Neb. 931, 531 N.W.2d 222 (1995). The State argues that the jury instructions, taken as a whole, properly instructed the jury as to an aider and abettor's required mental state. All the jury instructions must be read together, and if taken as a whole they correctly state the law, are not misleading, and adequately cover the issues supported by the pleadings and the evidence, there is no prejudicial error necessitating reversal. State v. Allen, 252 Neb. 187, 560 N.W.2d 829 (1997). The State relies on jury instruction No. 14, arguing that it correctly apprised the jury of the intent or knowledge required for aiding and abetting. Jury instruction No. 14 stated: The intent required by Instruction 8 is a material element of the crime charged against the defendant. Intent is a mental process and it therefore generally remains hidden within the mind where it is conceived. It is rarely if ever susceptible of proof by direct evidence. It may, however, be inferred from the words and acts of the defendant and from the facts and circumstances surrounding his conduct. But before that intent can be inferred from such circumstantial evidence alone, it must be of such character as to exclude every reasonable conclusion except that defendant had the required intent. It is for you to determine from all the facts and circumstances in evidence whether or not the defendant committed the acts complained of and whether at such time he had the criminal intent required by Instruction 8. If you have any reasonable doubt with respect to either, you must find the defendant not guilty. (Emphasis supplied.) In State v. Mantich, supra , we held that instructions Nos. 11 and 9 in that case, which were nearly identical to instructions Nos. 10 and 14, respectively, in the instant case, when read together, adequately stated the law and were not misleading. It is true that instruction No. 9 in State v. Mantich, 249 Neb. at 325, 543 N.W.2d at 192, included this additional language: Criminal intent is a material and necessary element of the crime of Murder in the First Degree in the commission of a felony as charged against the defendant. But the intent required is not an intent to kill [the victim] but is an intent to commit a robbery or kidnapping .... Although instruction No. 14 in the instant case did not contain this language, this language's meaning was conveyed to the jury in instruction No. 8, which is specifically referenced by instruction No. 14. Instruction No. 8, a first degree murder instruction set forth below, made it clear that the prosecution was required to prove that Lotter intended to commit burglary for Lotter to be found guilty of felony murder. See part 8.2, infra. Thus, there is no substantive difference between the instructions given in Mantich and those given in the instant case. Our holding in Mantich is dispositive, and we conclude that this assignment of error is without merit.