Opinion ID: 2537354
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The UCLLA is the More Specific Statute

Text: In my view, the majority is correct in finding that the UCLLA and the borrowing statute are irreconcilable and the court must first ask whether the UCLLA is the more specific statute. The UCLLA and the borrowing statute both address the same class of cases. Consequently, section 2-4-205 requires us to determine whether the UCLLA is more specific than the borrowing statute. Since the General Assembly has not exhibited any manifest intent that the more general borrowing statute should prevail over the UCLLA, the UCLLA governs the filing of Jenkins' lawsuit. In drawing its conclusion that the two statutes address different classes of cases, the majority reasons that the statutes are defined by different terms. The borrowing statute assigns a limitations period based on where a case arose. In contrast, the [UCLLA] assigns a limitations period based on what substantive law applies to a case, along with the fairness doctrine operating in the escape clause. Maj. op. at 243. However, the plain wording of the UCLLA states that it applies when there is a conflict with the statute of limitations law of another state. Under section 13-82-103(2), C.R.S. (2008), the term state includes a foreign country. [1] So, too, the borrowing statute, section 13-80-110, provides that it applies to a cause of action arising in a foreign country. In differentiating the two statutes, the Majority focuses on the General Assembly's specific language. The UCLLA applies if the claim is substantively based on the law of another state, while the borrowing statute applies [i]f a cause of action arises in another state. Yet this language does not differentiate the two statutes. The UCLLA does consider whether a claim is substantively based on another state's law. § 13-82-104. The borrowing statute does the same thing; but, instead of using the words if a claim is substantively based, it considers whether a claim arises by the laws [of another state]. § 13-80-110 (If a cause of action arises in another state or territory or in a foreign country and, by the laws thereof . . . .) (emphasis added). Though the language of the two statutes is different, the meaning of those words is no different. Both consider the laws of foreign states in deciding what statute of limitations applies when a conflict arises. In footnote 3, the majority, noting concessions made by respondents' counsel, attempts to distinguish the terms of the two statutes by arguing that where the case arose and what substantive law applies are terms with different meanings. Maj. op. at 243 n. 3. Though this is correct, the majority frames the question incorrectly to conclude the two statutes have differing terms. Id. The terms may not be exact matches, but they are similar enough in that both statutes address conflicts of law situations generally, and more specifically, the conflicts of law question at issue here. Given these similar terms, the fairness provision defines the UCLLA as the more specific of the two statutes because it addresses the General Assembly's overarching fairness concerns by adding an element that is not present in the borrowing statute, thus providing an exception. See maj. op. at 242 (noting that similar terms are enough for one statute to function as an exception to another). Therefore, the two statutes do not use different factors to assign a limitations period as the majority suggests. Maj. op. at 243. In contrast to the UCLLA, the borrowing statute is more general in its language, simply adopting the limitations period of another state without considering fairness. § 13-80-110. Arguments can be made to portray each statute as more specific than the other, but the General Assembly's insertion of the fairness provision indicates that the UCLLA is the more specific statute. See maj. op. at 242. In my view, the borrowing statute could prevail only if the General Assembly's manifest intent demonstrated for the borrowing statute to do so. § 2-4-205. A review of the legislative history demonstrates no such manifest intent.