Opinion ID: 752071
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dismissal of Appellants' State Law Claims

Text: 46 The Marcus and Moss appellants claim, inter alia, (1) that AT & T has engaged in fraud and deceit by failing to disclose its policy of rounding up; 2 (2) that AT & T has negligently misrepresented its billing practices; (3) that AT & T has engaged in deceptive acts and practices in violation of New York's Consumer Protection Act, N.Y.Gen.Bus.L. §§ 349-350; (4) that AT & T was unjustly enriched by billing customers for unused time; and (5) that AT & T engaged in false advertising in violation of the Consumer Protection Act, N.Y.Gen.Bus.L. § 350. The district court dismissed all of these claims, holding that they were barred by the filed rate doctrine. We agree. 47 The filed rate doctrine, also known as the filed tariff doctrine, is derived from the tariff-filing requirements of the FCA, see 47 U.S.C. § 203(a), 3 and forbids a regulated entity to charge rates for its services other than those properly filed with the appropriate federal regulatory authority. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 577, 101 S.Ct. 2925, 2930, 69 L.Ed.2d 856 (1981) (Arkla). 48 The filed rate doctrine is motivated by two companion principles--(1) preventing carriers from engaging in price discrimination as between ratepayers (the nondiscrimination strand) and (2) preserving the exclusive role of federal agencies in approving rates for telecommunications services that are reasonable by keeping courts out of the rate-making process (the nonjusticiability strand), a function that the federal regulatory agencies are more competent to perform. Wegoland, 27 F.3d at 19; see also H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 954 F.2d 485, 488 (8th Cir.1992). 49 Application of the filed rate doctrine in any particular case is not determined by the culpability of the defendant's conduct or the possibility of inequitable results. See e.g., Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 129, 110 S.Ct. 2759, 2767, 111 L.Ed.2d 94 (1990) (federal agency has no authority to excuse shipper from paying filed rate even though carrier and shipper had privately negotiated contract for shipment at lower rate and agency found that allowing carrier to charge filed rate was an unreasonable practice); Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, 476 U.S. 409, 106 S.Ct. 1922, 90 L.Ed.2d 413 (1986) (filed rate doctrine bars damage action against motor carriers under antitrust laws even though carriers colluded to set artificially high filed rate); Arkla, 453 U.S. at 579-80, 101 S.Ct. at 2931-32 (filed rate doctrine bars breach of contract action by natural gas producers even though defendant-buyer failed to disclose its arrangement to buy gas from a third-party in violation of contract); Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156, 163, 43 S.Ct. 47, 49-50, 67 L.Ed. 183 (1922) (filed rate doctrine bars recovery for antitrust damages against carriers who colluded to set artificially high shipment rate); Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Maxwell, 237 U.S. 94, 98, 35 S.Ct. 494, 495-96, 59 L.Ed. 853 (1915) (filed rate doctrine allows plaintiff-carrier to charge defendant-traveller filed rate even though carrier had agreed to transport traveller at a lower rate); Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U.S. 56, 72, 28 S.Ct. 428, 431-32, 52 L.Ed. 681 (1908) (shipper is required to pay carrier filed rate even though it had contracted with carrier to pay lower rate); Sun City Taxpayers' Ass'n v. Citizens Utils. Co., 45 F.3d 58, 62 (2d Cir.1995) (damage action by consumer group against carrier is barred by filed rate doctrine despite carrier's fraud during rate-making process); Wegoland, 27 F.3d at 22 (same); H.J. Inc., 954 F.2d at 494 (same). Nor does the doctrine's application depend on the nature of the cause of action the plaintiff seeks to bring. See e.g., Square D, 476 U.S. at 412-13, 106 S.Ct. at 1924-25 (plaintiff seeking antitrust damages); Arkla, 453 U.S. at 573-75, 101 S.Ct. at 2928-29 (breach of contract); Keogh, 260 U.S. at 159-60, 43 S.Ct. at 48-49 (antitrust damages); Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 430, 27 S.Ct. 350, 351, 51 L.Ed. 553 (1907) (challenge to reasonableness of filed rate); Sun City, 45 F.3d at 60-61 (RICO); Wegoland Ltd. v. NYNEX Corp., 806 F.Supp. 1112, 1113 (S.D.N.Y.1992) (common law fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and RICO), aff'd 27 F.3d 17 (2d Cir.1994). Rather, the doctrine is applied strictly to prevent a plaintiff from bringing a cause of action even in the face of apparent inequities whenever either the nondiscrimination strand or the nonjusticiability strand underlying the doctrine is implicated by the cause of action the plaintiff seeks to pursue. See H.J. Inc., 954 F.2d at 489 ([T]he underlying conduct [of the defendant] does not control whether the filed rate doctrine applies. Rather, the focus for determining whether the filed rate doctrine applies is the impact the court's decision will have on agency procedures and rate determinations.). 50 Thus, [i]gnorance or misquotation of rates is not an excuse for paying or charging either less or more than the rate filed. This rule is undeniably strict, and it obviously may work hardship in some cases, but it embodies the policy which has been adopted by Congress in the regulation of interstate commerce in order to prevent unjust discrimination. Maxwell, 237 U.S. at 97, 35 S.Ct. at 495. 51 This rigid approach was deemed necessary to prevent carriers from intentionally misquoting rates to shippers as a means of offering them rebates or discounts. As the Commission itself found: [P]ast experience shows that billing clerks and other agents of carriers might easily become experts in the making of errors and mistakes in the quotation of rates to favored shippers, while other shippers, less fortunate in their relations with carriers and whose traffic is less important, would be compelled to pay the higher published rates. 52 Maislin, 497 U.S. at 127-28, 110 S.Ct. at 2766 (citations omitted). With the foregoing in mind, we consider each of appellants' state law claims in turn.
53 All appellants allege that AT & T's advertising and bills are false and misleading because they fail to disclose the rounding-up policy. They argue that but for AT & T's allegedly fraudulent practices, they would have switched carriers, or would have altered their behavior by speaking on the telephone in full minute increments, so as not to be billed for time that they did not use. On appeal, the Marcus appellants seek compensatory damages equal to the difference between AT & T's rate under the filed tariff and the best alternative rate under a competitor's filed tariff (the rate they would have paid had they switched), as well as punitive damages and an injunction forcing AT & T to provide notice of its billing practices. The Moss appellants do not appeal the dismissal of their claims for compensatory damages; they have limited their appeal to their claims for injunctive relief. We find that these claims are barred by the filed rate doctrine. 54 Although the Supreme Court has reserved the question of whether the filed rate doctrine would bar an action against a carrier that engaged in fraudulent conduct, see Arkla, 453 U.S. at 583 n. 13, 101 S.Ct. at 2933 n. 13, it has stated that [n]either the intentional nor accidental misstatement of the applicable published rate will bind the carrier or shipper. The lawful rate is that which the carrier must exact and that which the shipper must pay. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Carl, 227 U.S. 639, 653, 33 S.Ct. 391, 395, 57 L.Ed. 683 (1913); see also Keogh, 260 U.S. at 163, 43 S.Ct. at 49 (The rights as defined by the tariff cannot be varied or enlarged by either contract or tort of the carrier.); Armour Packing, 209 U.S. at 72, 28 S.Ct. at 431 (doctrine is applicable to every method of dealing by a carrier by which the forbidden result could be brought about). In the context of the Interstate Commerce Act, on which the FCA is modelled, see MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 229, 114 S.Ct. 2223, 2230-31, 129 L.Ed.2d 182 (1994), the Court noted that it has never held that a carrier's unreasonable practice justifies departure from the filed tariff schedule. Maislin, 497 U.S. at 129, 110 S.Ct. at 2767. Responding to an argument that the filed rate doctrine resulted in a windfall for the carrier, the Court stated: 55 we have never accepted the argument that such equities are relevant to the application of [the filed rate doctrine]. Indeed, strict adherence to the filed rate has never been justified on the ground that the carrier is equitably entitled to that rate, but rather that such adherence, despite its harsh consequences in some cases, is necessary to enforcement of the [Interstate Commerce] Act. 56 Id. at 131-32, 110 S.Ct. at 2769 (internal citations omitted). 57 In Wegoland, we held that the filed rate doctrine barred plaintiffs' class action for common law fraud against carriers who had provided the FCC with misleading information in order to gain the FCC's approval of the proposed filed rate. 27 F.3d at 20. We reasoned that, in calculating damages, the court would have to determine the reasonable rate absent the carriers' fraud, a task reserved by the FCA to the exclusive province of the FCC, stating: 58 If courts were licensed to enter this process under the guise of ferreting out fraud in the rate-making process, they would unduly subvert the regulatory agencies' authority and thereby undermine the stability of the system. For only by determining what would be a reasonable rate absent the fraud could a court determine the extent of the damages. And it is this judicial determination of a reasonable rate that the filed rate doctrine forbids. 59 Id. at 21. Accord Sun City, 45 F.3d at 62 (interpreting Wegoland); Taffet v. Southern Co., 967 F.2d 1483, 1494-95 (11th Cir.1992) (en banc) (filed rate doctrine applies despite defendant's fraudulent conduct); H.J. Inc., 954 F.2d at 491-92 (filed rate doctrine bars RICO claim for fraud on agency; rejecting suggestion that Arkla left open possibility of broad fraud exception to the filed rate doctrine); see also Marco Supply Co. v. AT & T Communications, Inc., 875 F.2d 434, 436 (4th Cir.1989) (per curiam) (filed rate doctrine barred willful misrepresentation claim); cf. Square D, 476 U.S. at 416-17, 106 S.Ct. at 1927 ([t]he rights as defined by the tariff cannot be varied or enlarged by ... tort of the carrier). 60 The Marcus appellants attempt to distinguish their claims from those held to be barred in Wegoland by asserting that their fraud claim rests on AT & T's failure to disclose, that is, fraud on the consumer, and not on fraud in the rate-making process. Whether this distinction alters our analysis depends on whether allowing the appellants to pursue their claims for compensatory damages or injunctive relief would undermine either of the two interests furthered by the filed rate doctrine--nondiscrimination and nonjusticiability. As the Appellate Division has recently concluded in a similar case challenging another carrier's rounding-up practice, [w]e find the distinction [between fraud on the agency and fraud on the consumer] to be one without a difference. Porr v. NYNEX Corp., 230 A.D.2d 564, 660 N.Y.S.2d 440, 446 (1997). A. Appellants' Claim for Damages 61 Turning first to the Marcus appellants' claims seeking compensatory damages for AT & T's allegedly fraudulent conduct, we agree with the district court that an award of damages would implicate the nondiscrimination and nonjusticiability strands of the filed rate doctrine, and that the doctrine therefore bars such claims. First, claims for compensatory relief undermine the congressional scheme of uniform rate regulation. Arkla, 453 U.S. at 579, 101 S.Ct. at 2927; see also Keogh, 260 U.S. at 163, 43 S.Ct. at 50 (Uniform treatment would not result, even if all sued, unless the highly improbable happened, and the several juries and courts gave to each the same measure of relief.). Plaintiffs who were able to prove their claims and recover damages would effectively receive a discounted rate for phone service over other AT & T customers. 62 [I]f the plaintiff[s] were allowed to collect damages because of their purported reliance upon [the carrier's] non-disclosure, they would have won for themselves a reduced rate for their local telephone service. Nonparty subscribers to the same service would of necessity pay a higher rate. Such a discriminatory result cannot be squared with the filed rate doctrine's mandate of equal rates for equal service. 63 Porr, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 446. Furthermore, 64 The duty to file rates with the Commission and the obligation to charge only those rates have always been considered essential to preventing price discrimination and stabilizing rates. 65 Maislin, 497 U.S. at 126, 110 S.Ct. at 2766 (internal citations omitted); see Keogh, 260 U.S. at 163, 43 S.Ct. at 49-50 (This stringent rule prevails, because otherwise the paramount purpose of Congress--prevention of unjust discrimination--might be defeated.). Thus, the nondiscrimination strand of the filed rate doctrine would be undermined by an award of compensatory damages. 66 Second, and just as important, an award of compensatory damages would violate the nonjusticiability strand of the doctrine. The Marcus appellants seek damages equal to the difference between AT & T's rate and the best alternative rate available under a competitor's tariff. They argue that this award would not violate the nonjusticiability strand because the court would not be required to determine a reasonable rate in order to grant relief. The Marcus appellants are correct that awarding these damages would not amount to judicial rate-making per se. However, we disagree with their claim that the nonjusticiability strand would not be implicated by such an award. The filed rate doctrine prevents more than judicial rate-setting; it precludes any judicial action which undermines agency rate-making authority. 67 In Sun City, we outlined three factors underlying the nonjusticiability strand of the filed rate doctrine: 68
69
70 (3) the interference of courts in the rate-making process would subvert the authority of rate-setting bodies and undermine the regulatory regime. 71 45 F.3d at 62 (citing Wegoland, 27 F.3d at 21). The FCC has approved AT & T's filed tariff whereby customers are billed in whole-minute increments. This tariff is by definition reasonable unless and until the FCC, as the legislatively appointed regulatory bod[y] [with] institutional competence, says otherwise. Sun City, 45 F.3d at 62. Yet the plaintiff class asks us to excuse them from paying this tariff. But plainly, such an order would subvert the authority of [the FCC] and undermine the regulatory regime. Id. In sum, we cannot award damages in this case without undermining the authority of the FCC, and therefore, the principle of nonjusticiability. 72 The Marcus appellants argue that the filed rate doctrine nonetheless should not bar their claims. First, they claim that the nondiscrimination strand of the filed rate doctrine is not implicated because their action is brought on behalf of all deceived consumers as a class. See Marcus Appellants' Brief at 35-36. We agree that the concerns for discrimination are substantially alleviated in [a] putative class action. Wegoland, 27 F.3d at 22. However, the Supreme Court has rejected the suggestion that the development of class actions, which might alleviate the ... concern about [nondiscrimination,] made the nondiscrimination principle inapplicable to a putative class action suit. Square D, 476 U.S. at 423, 106 S.Ct. at 1930. We may not depart from this precedent. Until the Supreme Court says otherwise, it seems that nondiscrimination concerns remain viable even in the context of a class action lawsuit. Cf. Wegoland, 27 F.3d at 21-22 (although class action mechanism alleviates concern for price discrimination, it does not address other concerns underlying filed rate doctrine including the important concerns of agency authority, justiciability, and institutional competence); Sun City, 45 F.3d at 62 (the filed rate doctrine applies whether or not the plaintiffs are suing for a class, and regardless of the plaintiff's motivations in maintaining the litigation) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 73 The Marcus appellants next urge us to modify the filed rate doctrine to allow nondisclosure claims, arguing that the doctrine is no longer necessary to avoid price discrimination in light of the increasing competition among long-distance service carriers. The Marcus appellants claim that while strict adherence to the filed rate may have prevented price discrimination and unfair practices while AT & T maintained a monopoly over long distance services, it frustrates those same goals now that there is greater competition in the market. See Marcus Appellants' Brief at 36-37. 74 In rejecting a similar argument to modify the filed rate doctrine in light of changed circumstances, the Supreme Court explained that while it had considerable sympathy to such arguments,  'such considerations address themselves to Congress, not to the courts.'  MCI v. AT & T, 512 U.S. at 234, 114 S.Ct. at 2233 (quoting Armour Packing, 209 U.S. at 82, 28 S.Ct. at 435); see also Square D, 476 U.S. at 424, 106 S.Ct. at 1930 ([T]he developments in the six decades since Keogh was decided are insufficient to overcome the strong presumption of continued validity that adheres in the judicial interpretation of a statute.). Like the Supreme Court, we too are sympathetic to the argument that, at least in the telecommunications industry, strict adherence to the filed rate doctrine is no longer required. But absent Congressional authorization or direction from the Supreme Court, we are in no position to modify the doctrine. 75 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court's dismissal of the Marcus appellants' fraud claims to the extent that they seek compensatory damages and other monetary relief. We add that the filed rate doctrine likewise bars all of the remaining state law claims for damages brought by the Marcus appellants, because any award of damages would, for identical reasons, implicate the nondiscrimination and nonjusticiability strands of the filed rate doctrine. B. Appellants' Claims for Injunctive Relief 76 We next examine the Marcus and Moss appellants' claims for injunctive relief based on the fraud purportedly committed by AT & T. Again, we must consider whether an award of injunctive relief would implicate the nondiscrimination or the nonjusticiability strand of the filed rate doctrine. If so, then the plaintiffs' claims are barred by the filed rate doctrine. 77 First, it appears that the injunctive relief requested by the appellants would not result in price discrimination since the plaintiffs would still pay the filed rate. The injunction, should plaintiffs establish the merits of their claims, would only require AT & T to publicly disclose its rounding-up practice beyond its disclosure in its filed rate; the filed rate would remain unchanged and no individual ratepayer would be excused from paying the filed rate. Thus, while a suit for damages is unavailable because it implicates the interest in preventing price discrimination, a suit for injunctive relief appears not to interfere with the nondiscrimination policy underlying the filed rate doctrine. See Gelb v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 813 F.Supp. 1022, 1033 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (claim of fraud against consumer for failure to disclose initial call fee on calling cards is not barred where plaintiff sought injunctive relief). 78 Second, in contrast to the Marcus appellants' claims for damages, allowing the appellants' claims for injunctive relief in this case would neither enmesh the court in the rate-making process nor undermine the regulatory authority of the FCC. Cf. Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290, 304-05, 96 S.Ct. 1978, 1987, 48 L.Ed.2d 643 (1976) (federal court need not await determination by federal regulatory agency as to whether failure to disclose was deceptive practice under federal tariff, reasoning that plaintiff makes no challenge to any provision in the tariff, and indeed there is no tariff provision ... applicable to disclosure practices and [t]he standards to be applied in an action for fraudulent misrepresentation are within the conventional competence of the courts); In re Long Distance Telecommunications Litig., 831 F.2d 627, 633 (6th Cir.1987) (state law fraud claims arising from carrier's failure to disclose its policy of charging for uncompleted calls do not require agency expertise for their treatment and are within the conventional experience of judges) (internal quotations omitted); Kellerman v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 112 Ill.2d 428, 98 Ill.Dec. 24, 32, 493 N.E.2d 1045, 1053 (1986) (state law fraudulent and deceptive advertising claims against carrier do not concern reasonableness of rates). An injunction would require only that AT & T publicize the tariff which it has already filed with the FCC, including its policy of rounding up to the next minute. The reasonableness of the rounding-up policy would remain a question for the regulating agency to resolve. 79 Thus, it appears that, if the appellants can establish the substance of their state and federal common law fraud claims, the filed rate doctrine would not bar them. However, we need not finally resolve that question because the appellants cannot prove the claim of fraud upon which their request for injunctive relief is premised. 80 In order to state a claim for fraud under federal or New York state common law a plaintiff must allege that the defendant made a material false representation, that the defendant knew of the falsity (scienter), that the defendant acted with intent to defraud, that the plaintiff reasonably relied on the false representation, and damages. See Pence v. United States, 316 U.S. 332, 338, 62 S.Ct. 1080, 1083-84, 86 L.Ed. 1510 (1942) (federal common law); Turtur v. Rothschild Registry Int'l., Inc., 26 F.3d 304, 310 (2d Cir.1994) (New York common law); Gershon v. Hertz Corp., 215 A.D.2d 202, 626 N.Y.S.2d 80, 81-82 (1995) (New York common law). 81 The appellants cannot demonstrate that they reasonably relied on any misrepresentations by AT & T. As a matter of law, it would not be reasonable for a consumer to harbor a belief about AT & T's billing practices that is inconsistent with the tariff AT & T has filed with the FCC. Central to the filed rate doctrine is the presumed knowledge doctrine. Under that doctrine, [t]he [customer's] knowledge of the lawful rate is conclusively presumed. Carl, 227 U.S. at 653, 33 S.Ct. at 395. Accord Maxwell, 237 U.S. at 97-98, 35 S.Ct. at 495-96; Marco Supply, 875 F.2d at 436. Unless knowledge of the filed rate were presumed as a matter of law, carriers could undermine the filed rate doctrine by intentionally quoting lower rates to favored customers. See Maislin, 497 U.S. at 127-28, 110 S.Ct. at 2766-67. Because the appellants are held to know the filed rate and thus AT & T's practice of rounding up, it would be unreasonable for them to rely on any price quotes to the contrary. 82 In all likelihood, the presumed knowledge doctrine is little more than legal myth when applied to today's long-distance telephone customers. However accurate the presumption may have been when applied to shippers and railway carriers in the earliest decades of this century, we doubt that it reflects current reality. We can easily imagine what results would be yielded by a survey that asked AT & T long-distance customers: When was the last time you checked the tariffs your long distance carrier has filed with the FCC? 4 However, the presumed knowledge doctrine is an integral part of the filed rate doctrine and, absent its reconsideration by Congress or the Supreme Court, we are bound by eighty years of caselaw to reaffirm it. See MCI v. AT & T, 512 U.S. at 234, 114 S.Ct. at 2233. Therefore, the district court properly dismissed the appellants' claims for injunctive relied based upon fraud. 83
84 As we held in Section III.B.1.a., supra, the appellants may not maintain any action for damages based on AT & T's rounding-up policy. We turn to whether appellants can establish a claim for injunctive relief based on negligent misrepresentation or deceptive acts. In order to establish their claim of negligent misrepresentation in a commercial context, appellants must demonstrate that AT & T failed to speak with care, that it owed the appellants a special duty of care when speaking, that AT & T was aware of the use to which the information would be put and supplied it for that purpose, that the appellants justifiably relied on the information, and that the appellant was damaged by his reliance. See Kimmell v. Schaefer, 89 N.Y.2d 257, 652 N.Y.S.2d 715, 718-19, 675 N.E.2d 450, 453-54 (1996); Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co., 615 F.2d 68, 82 (2d Cir.1980). 85 To state a claim under the New York deceptive acts statute, a plaintiff must allege a material deceptive act or practice directed to consumers that caused actual harm. See Oswego Laborers' Local 214 Pension Fund v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 85 N.Y.2d 20, 623 N.Y.S.2d 529, 532-33, 647 N.E.2d 741, 744-45 (1995); McGill v. General Motors Corp., 231 A.D.2d 449, 647 N.Y.S.2d 209, 210 (1996). An act is deceptive within the meaning of the New York statute only if it is likely to mislead a reasonable consumer. Oswego, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 533, 647 N.E.2d at 745; Gershon, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 81. 86 The district court properly dismissed appellants' claims for negligent misrepresentation and deceptive acts. To succeed under either claim, appellants would have to show that they reasonably relied on any statements made by AT & T. However, as we have explained, a reasonable consumer may not rely on any statements by AT & T that contradict the terms of its filed tariff (whether caused by carelessness or by an intent to defraud), because consumers are conclusively presumed to know the legal tariffs filed with the FCC. See Maislin, 497 U.S. at 127-28, 110 S.Ct. at 2766-67. In addition, both claims require proof of damages. As the district court concluded, [appellants] have suffered no legally cognizable damages because they paid the tariff rate. 938 F.Supp. at 1172. Accord Porr, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 447 (any 'harm' allegedly suffered by the plaintiff is illusory, because he has merely paid the filed tariff rate that he was required to pay.) (internal citations omitted). 87 Finally, appellants claim that AT & T's failure to disclose its rounding-up policy on customer bills prevents appellants from altering their behavior to lower their long-distance telephone charges is without merit. In essence, appellants argue that AT & T has the duty to inform its customers that by speaking in whole minute increments they are getting the most value for their money. However, AT & T has no such duty under New York law. See Gershon, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 81 (under deceptive act statute, defendant car rental company has no duty to disclose alternative rental arrangements at lower rates other than those customer had inquired about).
88 In order to succeed on their claim for unjust enrichment, the appellants must demonstrate that, in the absence of a contract, one party nonetheless possesses money under such circumstances that in equity and good conscience he ought not to retain it, and which ex ae quo et bono belongs to another. In re Chateaugay Corp., 10 F.3d 944, 957-58 (2d Cir.1993) (internal quotations omitted). The district court properly dismissed this claim as well. AT & T has charged only the filed rates that it is required by law to charge; it is not in possession of any money which, in equity and good conscience, properly belongs to appellants.
89 Next, we consider whether the appellants may seek injunctive relief based on a claim of false advertising. In order to establish a claim of false advertising under New York's General Business Law, appellants must demonstrate that AT & T's advertisements are misleading in a material respect ... [including] the extent to which the advertising fails to reveal [material] facts. N.Y.Gen.Bus.L. § 350-a(1) (McKinney 1988 & Supp.1996). Appellants claim that [AT & T's] use of various forms of media to advertise, call attention to, or give publicity to the sale of long distance telephone service, which was falsely represented by [AT & T's] failure to disclose that residential consumers are billed for calls by the minute rounded up to the next higher full minute, constitutes false advertising. Moss Appellants' Complaint p 29. In Porr, the Appellate Division of the New York State Supreme Court considered a similar false advertising claim. See 230 A.D.2d 564, 660 N.Y.S.2d 440. In that case, plaintiffs claimed that the advertisements of a local carrier were misleading in material respects because the advertisements failed to disclose the carrier's policy of rounding up phone charges to the next minute. Id., 660 N.Y.S.2d at 442. The court concluded that, under the false advertisement statute, [s]ince the defendants' tariffs were at all times a matter of public record and were in no way concealed, there is no underpinning for any cause of action for ... false advertising. Id., 660 N.Y.S.2d at 448. We agree with the Appellate Division's reasoning. In the instant case, AT & T's tariff is similarly a matter of public record, and is not concealed. The district court properly dismissed the appellants' claims for injunctive relief based on false advertising. 90 We note, finally, that we do not hold that AT & T could avoid the imposition of injunctive relief if it affirmatively misrepresented to consumers as a whole what its rates are; we hold only that in cases such as this one, where AT & T has complied with federal laws regarding rates, filed those rates, and charged only those rates, its failure to more actively publicize those rates is not a basis of liability for breach of warranty, fraud and deceit, negligent misrepresentation, deceptive acts or practices, unjust enrichment, or false advertisement.