Opinion ID: 2227435
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Automatic Vote Death Penalty

Text: We next address defendant's contention that the trial court committed reversible error when it refused to ask prospective jurors whether they would automatically vote for the death penalty. This court has previously spoken to this very issue in another case and thus, that decision is controlling. In Morgan, defendant contended, as does defendant in this case, that he was denied an impartial jury when the trial court refused to ask potential jurors if they would automatically impose the death penalty if they found the defendant guilty. ( Morgan, 142 Ill.2d at 469, 154 Ill.Dec. 534, 568 N.E.2d 755.) Defendant in Morgan requested that the trial court ask prospective jurors: If you found Derrick Morgan guilty, would you automatically vote to impose the death penalty no matter what the facts are. The trial court denied the request. This court in Morgan, quoting People v. Brisbon (1985), 106 Ill.2d 342, 359, 88 Ill.Dec. 87, 478 N.E.2d 402, stated `there is no reverse- Witherspoon [ v. Illinois (1968), 391 U.S. 510, 20 L.Ed.2d 776, 88 S.Ct. 1770] rule that requires the trial court to life qualify a jury to exclude all jurors who believe that the death penalty should be imposed in every murder case.' ( Morgan, 142 Ill.2d at 469, 154 Ill.Dec. 534, 568 N.E.2d 755.) Further, this court noted that Morgan had not demonstrated, or even suggested, that any of the actual jurors on his jury were biased towards the death penalty. Morgan, 142 Ill.2d at 469, 154 Ill.Dec. 534, 568 N.E.2d 755, citing People v. Caballero (1984), 102 Ill.2d 23, 46, 79 Ill.Dec. 625, 464 N.E.2d 223. Defendant, in the instant case, argues that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Ross v. Oklahoma (1988), 487 U.S. 81, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 101 L.Ed.2d 80, requires the giving of the life-qualifying or reverse- Witherspoon question when sought by the defense in a capital case. In Ross, a prospective juror stated that he would automatically vote for the death penalty if the defendant were found guilty. The trial court refused to excuse the prospective juror for cause, and the defendant used a peremptory challenge to remove the prospective juror. ( Ross, 487 U.S. at 83-85, 108 S.Ct. at 2275-76, 101 L.Ed.2d at 86-87.) The Supreme Court found that although it was error not to excuse the prospective juror for cause, the death sentence need not be reversed, as there was no showing that any juror on defendant's jury was not impartial. Ross, 487 U.S. at 91, 108 S.Ct. at 2280, 101 L.Ed.2d at 92. This court, in Morgan, noted the decision in Ross and, under circumstances virtually identical to those in this case, rejected the contention defendant raises in this appeal, stating: In this case, the defendant's jury was selected from a fair cross-section of the community, each juror swore to uphold the law regardless of his or her personal feelings, and no juror expressed any views that would call his or her impartiality into question. Thus, as there was no showing that any actual juror on the defendant's jury was partial, the sentence is valid. ( Morgan, 142 Ill.2d at 470, 154 Ill.Dec. 534, 568 N.E.2d 755.) The decision in Morgan compels a similar holding in the case at bar. We do not, by our decision here, mean to imply that the reverse- Witherspoon  question is inappropriate. Indeed, given the type of scrutiny capital cases receive on review, one would think trial courts would go out of their way to afford a defendant every possible safeguard. The reverse- Witherspoon question may not be the only means of ensuring defendant an impartial jury, but it is certainly the most direct. The best way to ensure that a prospective juror would not automatically vote for the death penalty is to ask. Having said that, we reiterate our finding that no partiality was demonstrated in this case, and we adhere to our holding in Morgan.