Opinion ID: 196936
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Delayed Disclosures.

Text: 69 The appellants also complain that delays attributable to governmental foot-dragging unfairly hampered their ability to cross-examine witnesses. The centerpiece of this complaint is the appellants' insistence that, in addition to going very slowly in creating potentially discoverable materials, the prosecutors withheld extant materials, such as existing notes, under various pretexts, claiming that the notes comprised attorney work-product and that they did not contain substantially verbatim recitals of witnesses' statements. 70 The appellants' complaint is unproductive. Acting with commendable thoroughness, the district court reviewed all the prosecutors' notes and kindred materials in camera to determine which documents (or portions of documents) were producible under the Jencks Act. The government turned over what the court ordered it to produce at the time(s) when the court ordered production to be made. 71 In all events, we have held with a regularity bordering on the echolalic that delayed disclosure claims cannot succeed unless the aggrieved defendant demonstrates prejudice arising from the delay. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d at 1179 (citing cases); see also United States v. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754, 781 (1st Cir.1995), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 1322, 134 L.Ed.2d 474 (1996). In this context, demonstrating prejudice demands red meat and strong drink--but the appellants have served up much less hearty fare. They articulate how the delayed disclosures supposedly impeded their ability to cross-question witnesses largely by reference to two examples. Neither example is compelling. 72 First, the appellants suggest that they were unfairly surprised because, after Nardone's henchman, Michael Nelson, testified at trial that Fitzgerald alone had given Nardone a contract on the life of James Boyden III, they obtained the grand jury testimony of a subsequent witness (a law enforcement officer) which indicated that Nardone, in chatting with Nelson, implicated both Houlihan and Fitzgerald in ordering the hit. 19 The appellants claim that the inconsistency between the officer's grand jury testimony, on one hand, and Nelson's trial testimony, on the other hand, could have been exploited to discredit Nelson on cross-examination. We are skeptical; given that Nelson's statements during his pretrial interview, see supra note 19, and at trial were consistent, this tidbit would have been of dubious value for impeachment purposes. Moreover, while Nelson was still on the witness stand, the appellants had possession of other documents that revealed the same inconsistency. For these reasons, we are fully satisfied that any delay in the disclosure of the law enforcement officer's grand jury testimony did not affect the outcome of the trial. Consequently, the incident fails to prove the appellants' point. See, e.g., United States v. Devin, 918 F.2d 280, 290-91 (1st Cir.1990) (explaining that delayed disclosure of impeachment material does not warrant reversal if the material would not have altered the verdict). 73 The second vignette concerns a prosecutor's note to the effect that Nardone told Nelson that there were two reasons why Sargent had to be killed: first, because Houlihan felt that Sargent was a risk and could hurt [Houlihan] by talking; and second, as a showing of respect to the Murrays (a bookmaking group to whom Sargent was heavily indebted). Regarding the second reason, Nelson explained that Fitzgerald and Houlihan asked the Murrays to post $50,000 bail for Bobby Levallee, an organization stalwart, in exchange for having Sargent killed. Because the government did not reveal this note until after Nelson had completed his testimony, the appellants' thesis runs, they were unable to cross-examine him efficaciously. 74 This proffer, too, is wide of the mark. Under any circumstances, the note has only marginal evidentiary value in light of the extensive proof confirming Houlihan's desire to silence Sargent in order to keep him from telling the government what he knew--a desire that the note itself acknowledges. Even more important, the appellants had sufficient notice of the alternative gambling debts motive well before Nelson left the stand. Nelson himself testified on direct examination that Fitzgerald and Houlihan wanted Sargent killed for two reasons: because they believed that the police had coopted him and because they were concerned about all [Sargent's] gambling debts. And, moreover, the record indicates that the appellants had the rest of the prosecutors' notes (some of which discussed the alternative motivation) in hand before Nelson completed his testimony; indeed, Houlihan's counsel relied on those notes to elicit information on cross-examination about Sargent's gaming debts and his connection to the Murrays. Under these circumstances, no reversible error inhered. See, e.g., Saccoccia, 58 F.3d at 781 (finding no prejudice from delay when defense counsel obtained information in time to prepare cross-examination); United States v. Hodge-Balwing, 952 F.2d 607, 609 (1st Cir.1991) (finding no prejudice from late delivery of documents when the prosecutor's opening statement alerted the defense to the same information). 75 If more were needed--and we doubt that it is--the sockdolager is the district court's volunteered ruling that the appellants could recall Nelson during their case for further cross-examination on the basis of the information disclosed in the note. The appellants chose to let this opportunity pass. The rule is clear that a defendant's failure to recall a witness, despite permission to do so, undermines a claim of prejudice based on a disclosure that materialized after the witness finished testifying (but before the trial ended). See United States v. Arboleda, 929 F.2d 858, 864 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Dunn, 841 F.2d 1026, 1030 (10th Cir.1988). 76