Opinion ID: 849259
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: appellate standards

Text: We review the JTC's decision and recommendation de novo. In re Mikesell, 396 Mich. 517, 520, 243 N.W.2d 86 (1976), citing In re Somers, 384 Mich. 320, 323, 182 N.W.2d 341 (1971). Thus, it is necessary to review the record in the present case in its entirety to determine whether respondent's public communications violated Canon 7(B)(1)(d). [5]
The language used in Canon 7(B)(1)(d) has its roots in defamation law. New York Times Co, supra . Thus, we examine defamation case law for guidance in analyzing whether a judicial candidate knowingly, or with reckless disregard, has used or participated in the use of any form of public communication that is false. As a preliminary matter, however, it is necessary to identify the applicable burden and standard of proof. At early common law, the defendant bore the burden of proving the truthfulness of an allegedly defamatory statement. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776, 106 S.Ct. 1558, 89 L.Ed.2d 783 (1986). However, this common-law rule came to be viewed as overly restrictive of free speech. A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual assertions-and to do so on pain of libel judgments virtually unlimited in amount-leads to a comparable self-censorship. Allowance of the defense of truth, with the burden of proving it on the defendant, does not mean that only false speech will be deterred.... Under such a rule, would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it is in fact true, because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so.... The rule thus dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate. [ New York Times, supra at 279, 84 S.Ct. 710.] Thus, the common-law rule requiring a defendant to prove the truthfulness of his statements was superseded by the constitutional rule (of the First Amendment) that the plaintiff, in a defamation action, must show the falsity of a statement. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc, supra at 776, 106 S.Ct. 1558; New York Times Co, supra at 279-280, 84 S.Ct. 710. Moreover, the plaintiff was required to show, by clear and convincing evidence, that the defendant acted with actual malice when he related the defamatory falsehood. See, e.g., Harte Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 686, 109 S.Ct. 2678, 105 L.Ed.2d 562 (1989); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 511, 104 S.Ct. 1949, 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984). Judges, as expositors of the Constitution, have a duty to independently decide whether the evidence in the record is sufficient to cross the constitutional threshold that bars the entry of any judgment that is not supported by clear and convincing proof of `actual malice'. Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc, supra at 686, 109 S.Ct. 2678, quoting Bose Corp, supra at 511, 104 S.Ct. 1949. In light of this, we are persuaded that, in cases involving a violation of Canon 7(B)(1)(d), the JTC, as the moving party, has the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that the communications in question are proscribed by the canon. Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that produce[s] in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established, evidence so clear, direct, and weighty and convincing as to enable [the factfinder] to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in issue. In re Martin, 450 Mich. 204, 227, 538 N.W.2d 399 (1995), quoting In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 407-408, 529 A.2d 434 (1987).