Opinion ID: 4422276
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: N.F. from the home.” (Reply Br. 6.)

Text: Turning next to whether the Fishers “were in agreement” with the safety plan, the Fishers failed to cite a case that holds that consent cannot be inferred based on conduct, or that consent must be in writing. The OCDJFS Employees acknowledge that in best practice a safety plan should be in writing and signed by all parties, but argue that consent is not required to be “manifested in a particular way.” (Appellees Br. 26.) Because the Fishers provide no case law to refute this, it was not unreasonable, or a violation of clearly established law, for the OCDJFS Employees to believe that they could rely on verbal consent. -8- Case No. 18-4163, Fisher, et al. v. Gordon, et al. We next must determine if the Fishers’ statements, behaviors, and lack of objections, were enough for a reasonable official to conclude that the Fishers verbally consented to B.N.F.’s removal. See Andrews v. Hickman County, 700 F.3d 845, 856 (6th Cir. 2012) (explaining that the defendant is “entitled to qualified immunity from suit if it would be objectively reasonable for an officer faced with the same circumstances to conclude” his actions were “excused by consent”). We answer that question in the affirmative. After being given several options—Paul leaving the home, B.N.F. staying with a family member, or B.N.F. leaving the home—Darla repeatedly declared that Paul would not be leaving and then began to gather B.N.F.’s clothing. Paul also testified that “Darla had made the decision[,]” indicating that his wife had opted into the arrangement. (P. Fisher Dep., R. 42, PageID 594.) The Fishers refute the idea that choosing to have Paul stay amounted to consent. Indeed, the Fishers claim that although they may have acquiesced to B.N.F.’s removal, “such acquiescence does not constitute consent[.]” (Appellants Br. 28.) But no clearly established law supports their contention; if anything, our case law contradicts their argument. In Teets, we held that even if a parent feels coerced to consent to his or her child’s removal, “that fact alone is not enough to establish that [a] safety plan was involuntary.” 460 F. App’x at 503. Moreover, in Williams-Ash, we adopted the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit to hold that hearings are only “required for deprivations taken over objection,” regardless of whether the choices presented to parents are “inherently coercive.” 520 F.3d at 600 (emphasis added) (quoting Dupuy v. Samuels, 465 F.3d 757, 761–62 (7th Cir. 2006)). Thus, it was reasonable in these circumstances for a social worker to interpret Darla’s choice to have Paul stay as consent for B.N.F.’s removal. Ultimately, the statements made by the Fishers, in combination with their admitted lack of objection to B.N.F.’s removal, presented a scenario in which it was reasonable for the OCDJFS -9- Case No. 18-4163, Fisher, et al. v. Gordon, et al. Employees to infer consent. This is especially true in light of Paul’s sophistication and familiarity with child removal processes, as well as his rapport with both Gordon and Deputy Gandee, which would have presumably made Paul feel comfortable objecting. Although one can imagine that a less sophisticated plaintiff who is unfamiliar with OCDJFS might acquiesce to his or her child’s removal out of fear or confusion, this is not that case, as Paul had extensive expertise in OCDJFS’ processes. At base, there is “no[] doubt that the [Fishers], as any parents likely would, resented the safety plan from the beginning.” Williams-Ash, 520 F.3d at 601. But as we have held previously, “mere displeasure and frustration fail[] to negate [] consent.” Id. In the end, “[g]iven the lack of guidance in this area, we are hard pressed to say that a ‘reasonable social worker, facing the situation in the instant case, would have known that [her] conduct violated clearly established law.’” Barber, 809 F.3d at 847 (quoting Andrews, 700 F.3d at 861). Because no case clearly established that relying on the Fishers’ actions (and inaction) as evidence of consent was unlawful, the OCDJFS Employees are entitled to qualified immunity. See Arrington-Bey v. City of Bedford Heights, 858 F.3d 988, 992 (6th Cir. 2017). B. Violation of a Constitutional Right? We need not address this prong, for if a plaintiff cannot make both showings under the qualified immunity framework, “the [state officials] [are] entitled to qualified immunity.” Brown, 779 F.3d at 412 (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236).