Opinion ID: 773414
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: is there a gap in the phra limitations periods

Text: 36 We turn now to Burgh's PHRA claim. This involves an issue of state law, requiring us, as a federal court sitting in diversity on this claim, to apply state substantive law, statutory and decisional as interpreted by the highest court of the state. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78, 82 L. Ed. 1188, 58 S. Ct. 817 (1938); McKenna v. Pacific Rail Serv., 32 F.3d 820, 825 (3d Cir. 1994). In the absence of a reported decision on point by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, we must look to the decisions of the intermediate appellate courts for guidance. See McKenna, 32 F.3d at 825. In the absence of guidance from the state supreme court or any intermediate appellate courts, we must predict how the state supreme court would resolve this issue if it were before that court. See Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Resseguie, 980 F.2d 226, 229 (3d Cir. 1992). 37 In its opinion, the District Court conflated Title VII with the PHRA in applying the one-year period after filing the administrative complaint as the accrual of the time to file suit. The court held that the limitations period on the PHRA claim began running one year after Burgh had filed the administrative charge, on December 8, 1995, because at that point Burgh had exhausted his administrative remedies and could have brought his claim in court. The court held that this period for bringing a court action expired two years later. 5 38 Like Title VII, the PHRA establishes two limitations periods: first, the administrative charge must be filed by a complainant with the PHRC within 180 days of the alleged discrimination, see 43 Pa. C.S. 959(h); second, a court action must be filed within two years of the date that the PHRC gives the complainant notice of the closing of the administrative complaint. See 43 Pa. C.S. 962(c)(2). As in Title VII, these periods represent the complete legislative determination as to the appropriate timing provisions under the PHRA. There is no basis for a court, particularly a federal court sitting in diversity, to engraft any additional limitations periods as gap-fillers. There are no statutory gaps to be filled. 39 As we note in footnote 4, the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Raleigh v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 379 Pa. Super. 606, 550 A.2d 1013, 1014 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988), did apply the Pennsylvania two-year personal injury statute of limitations to bar plaintiff's claim. Raleigh, however, was decided in 1988, prior to the 1991 amendments to the PHRA that added the two-year limitations period from the dismissal of the administrative complaint now contained in 962(c)(2). Because Raleigh is inconsistent with 962(c) as amended, we will not follow it. We similarly decline to follow our dictum in Northview Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 227 F.3d 78, 90-91 (3d Cir. 2000), which cited Raleigh in stating that Pennsylvania's two-year personal injury limitations period applies to PHRA claims. Finally, we disapprove the District Court decisions in Onibokun v. Berks County Children and Youth Servs., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13454, Civ. No. 98-4402, 1999 WL 681697 (E.D. Pa. 1999) and Long v. Board of Educ. of City of Philadelphia, 812 F. Supp. 525, 534 (E.D. Pa. 1993), 6 both of which applied the two-year limitations period to PHRA claims, running from the date of the plaintiff's receipt of the right-to-sue letter. 40 Unlike Title VII, the PHRA limitations period for bringing suit, 962(c)(2), does not run from the date of receipt of the letter from the PHRC one year after filing, but from the date of notice that the PHRC closed the complaint. Moreover, the PHRC one-year letter does not automatically close the complaint and trigger 962(c)(2), as a review of the March 18, 1996, letter to Burgh illustrates. That letter provided that the Commission is continuing to process your case, and we will make every effort to resolve it as soon as possible. If we are not notified otherwise, we will assume that you want the Commission to continue handling your case. The PHRC informed Burgh that it would close his complaint only if he filed an action in court. Furthermore, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the PHRC ever closed Burgh's administrative charge. Thus, the 962(c)(2) two-year period never began to run on Burgh's state claim. 41 Nor under the PHRA was Burgh ever required to commence litigation. The District Court relied on the Pennsylvania Superior Court decision in Snyder v. Pennsylvania Ass'n of Sch. Retirees, 389 Pa. Super. 261, 566 A.2d 1235 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) and the Middle District of Pennsylvania decision in Rogers v. Mount Union Borough by Zook, 816 F. Supp. 308 (M.D. Pa. 1993), to conclude that Burgh could have brought suit on the one-year anniversary of the filing of the administrative claims and the limitations clock started on that date. In Snyder, 566 A.2d at 1242, the Superior Court held that a plaintiff could proceed into court, even absent the issuance of a right-to-sue notice, on a discrimination charge that had been brought before the PHRC and had remained there for at least one year. In Rogers, 816 F. Supp. at 316, the court cited Snyder for the proposition that the lack of issuance of a right-to-sue notice does not bar the civil action on the grounds of failure to exhaust. 42 Both cases are distinguishable. In both, the plaintiffs had gone to court without having received right-to-sue notices and, in both, the courts were addressing and rejecting the defendants' argument that the claims should be dismissed because the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Both courts held that the expiration of the one-year period in 962(c)(1) was sufficient exhaustion under the statute. These cases stand for the proposition that a PHRA plaintiff may, after one year, with or without a letter from the PHRC, forego the administrative process and bring his discrimination claim in court. 43 Neither case, however, stands for or supports the proposition that a plaintiff must do so on pain of losing that claim to a rigid statute of limitations. In fact, we can predict that a more appropriate view of Pennsylvania law would hold that a plaintiff should not be required to cut short the administrative process in favor of litigation. This prediction is supported by the legislative policy underlying the PHRA, as discussed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Clay, supra. The Supreme Court held that the state legislature intended that the PHRC would bring to bear particular expertise in handling discrimination cases. Clay, 559 A.2d at 919. The legislature sought to create an administrative scheme that would ensure maximum use of the PHRC's expertise in the area of unlawful discrimination. See id. at 920 (quoting Lukus, 419 A.2d at 455). The PHRC is granted exclusive jurisdiction for one year in order to carry out its expert function. See Clay, 559 A.2d at 920 (quoting Lukus, 419 A.2d at 455); see also Clay, 559 A.2d at 921 (holding that parties were restrained from judicial recourse for a period of one year after bringing an administrative charge). It follows that the policy underlying the PHRA, like the policy underlying Title VII, is to permit the administrative process to continue to completion and to allow the PHRC adequate time to resolve the case, rather than having the plaintiff cut short that process and resort to litigation. 44 We conclude, therefore, that the limitations period for Burgh to bring his PHRA action did not begin to run on the one-year anniversary of the filing of his PHRC claim. Because the PHRC never closed the administrative complaint, the limitations period on his PHRA claim never started. The state claim was timely filed and may go forward.