Opinion ID: 4543042
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Qualified-Immunity Standard

Text: Deputy Estep and Sheriff Jay successfully asserted qualified immunity against Hinkle’s § 1983 claims. We review de novo “the award of summary judgment based on qualified immunity.” Donahue v. Wihongi, 948 F.3d 1177, 1186 (10th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lindsey v. Hyler, 918 F.3d 1109, 1113 (10th Cir. 2019)). Qualified immunity insulates “officials from civil liability so long as their conduct ‘does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (per curiam) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). When “a defendant asserts a qualified immunity defense, the burden shifts to the plaintiff.” Estate of Ceballos v. Husk, 919 F.3d 1204, 1212–13 (10th Cir. 2019) (quoting Medina v. Cram, 252 F.3d 1124, 1128 (10th Cir. 2001)). To meet that 18 burden, a plaintiff must show “(1) that the defendant’s actions violated a federal constitutional or statutory right, and, if so, (2) that the right was clearly established at the time of the defendant’s unlawful conduct.” Donahue, 948 F.3d at 1186 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cillo v. City of Greenwood Vill., 739 F.3d 451, 460 (10th Cir. 2013)). Even though a plaintiff bears the burden of meeting these two prongs, a defendant moving for summary judgment “must [still] ‘show[] that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact.’” Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Estate of Booker v. Gomez, 745 F.3d 405, 411 (10th Cir. 2014)). And as always, when deciding whether summary judgment is proper, we “may not weigh evidence and must resolve genuine disputes of material fact in favor of the nonmoving party.” Stonecipher v. Valles, 759 F.3d 1134, 1141 (10th Cir. 2014) (citing Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656 (2014) (per curiam)). In Tolan, the Court emphasized “the importance of drawing inferences in favor of the nonmovant” for both prongs of the qualified-immunity analysis. 572 U.S. at 657. We can affirm the dismissal of Hinkle’s claims against Sheriff Jay and Deputy Estep under either prong or both. See Donahue, 948 F.3d at 1186 (quoting Doe v. Woodard, 912 F.3d 1278, 1289 (10th Cir. 2019), cert. denied sub nom. I.B. v. Woodard, 139 S. Ct. 2616 (2019)). Here, we rule that Hinkle has not met his summary-judgment burden to show a constitutional violation by Sheriff Jay or 19 Deputy Estep. And because we conclude that Hinkle has not met prong one, he cannot have met his burden under prong two.9 II. Hinkle’s Fourth Amendment False-Arrest Claim Hinkle raises three primary arguments to support his claim that Deputy Estep arrested him without probable cause. First, he claims that Deputy Estep falsely claimed in his arrest affidavit that Hinkle had admitted owning the trailer suspected of being stolen, and he argues that this admission was necessary for probable cause. Second, Hinkle claims that even if Deputy Estep had probable cause that Hinkle was involved with a stolen trailer, Deputy Estep would still have lacked probable cause to arrest, because Oklahoma law requires that the property be recently stolen. Third, Hinkle claims that Deputy Estep lacked probable cause to arrest because the statute of limitations had run on each of his charges. 9 Because the County is a governmental entity and not an individual, it is not entitled to the protections of qualified immunity. E.g., Owen v. City of Indep., 445 U.S. 622, 657 (1980) (“[M]unicipalities have no immunity from damages liability flowing from their constitutional violations . . . .”); Seifert v. Unified Gov’t of Wyandotte Cty., 779 F.3d 1141, 1159 (10th Cir. 2015) (“Only individuals, not governmental entities, can assert qualified immunity.” (citing Beedle v. Wilson, 422 F.3d 1059, 1069 (10th Cir. 2005)). Thus, we do not apply the qualified-immunity standard to Hinkle’s claims against the County. Rather, we will review de novo whether the County has shown the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact, “drawing all reasonable inferences and resolving all factual disputes in favor of [Hinkle].” Murphy v. City of Tulsa, 950 F.3d 641, 643 (10th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Yousuf v. Cohlmia, 741 F.3d 31, 37 (10th Cir. 2014)) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)) (applying the de novo standard of review when reviewing a district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the City of Tulsa on a plaintiff’s municipal-liability claim). 20
Probable cause is a concept “incapable of [a] precise definition or quantification into percentages.” Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)). But an officer must have probable cause to obtain a warrant— the Constitution states that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Probable cause also remains important outside of the warrant context, because “[a] warrantless arrest is permissible when an officer ‘has probable cause to believe that a person committed a crime.’” E.g., Cortez v. McCauley, 478 F.3d 1108, 1115 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Romero v. Fay, 45 F.3d 1472, 1476 (10th Cir. 1995)). In reviewing “whether an officer had probable cause for an arrest, we examine the events leading up to the arrest, and then decide whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to probable cause.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 586 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Pringle, 540 U.S. at 371). Such facts amount to probable cause “when [they] . . . are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed.” Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1116 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Valenzuela, 365 F.3d 892, 896 (10th Cir. 2004)). That belief must be anchored in a “substantial probability”—as opposed to “a bare suspicion”—that an offense took or 21 is taking place. Patel v. Hall, 849 F.3d 970, 981 (10th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Stonecipher, 759 F.3d at 1141). But probable cause “is not a high bar.” Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 338 (2014) (citations omitted). Officers need “only the kind of fair probability on which reasonable and prudent people, not legal technicians, act.” Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted) (quoting Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 244 (2013)). For that reason, in considering whether the government has shown probable cause to indict, grand juries need not hear the defendant’s side of an argument, id. (citing United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 51 (1992)), any crossexamination of the prosecution’s witnesses, id. (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 121–22 (1975)), or any exculpatory evidence, id. (citing Williams, 504 U.S. at 51)—a reasonably prudent person could find that the low bar of probable cause was met without technical analysis. Formulation of probable cause “does not require the fine resolution of conflicting evidence that a reasonable-doubt or even a preponderance standard demands, and credibility determinations are seldom crucial in deciding whether the evidence supports a reasonable belief in guilt.” Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 121 (citation omitted). An officer’s subjective state of mind is irrelevant to the probable-cause calculus because the crux of the inquiry is whether “the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the arrest].” Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 814 (1996)). 22 Temporally, we judge probable cause to arrest by what facts the officer knew at arrest. Id. at 152 (citing Pringle, 540 U.S. at 371); see also United States v. Neal, 500 F.2d 305, 309 (10th Cir. 1974). Information learned after developing probable cause but before an arrest can dissipate probable cause. E.g., United States v. Dalton, 918 F.3d 1117, 1128 (10th Cir. 2019) (“[N]ew information can dissipate probable cause.” (citing Harte v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 864 F.3d 1154, 1182 (10th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (opinion of Phillips, J.) (joined by Lucero, J.) (other citations omitted));10 United States v. Ortiz-Hernandez, 427 F.3d 567, 574 (9th Cir. 2005) (“A person may not be arrested, or must be released from arrest, if previously established probable cause has dissipated.”); Bigford v. Taylor, 834 F.2d 1213, 1218 (5th Cir. 1988) (“As a corollary, moreover, of the rule that the police may rely on the totality of facts available to them in establishing probable cause, they also may not disregard facts tending to dissipate probable cause.” (footnote and citations omitted)). And in reviewing the dissipation question, courts impute officers “with knowledge of any readily available exculpatory evidence that they unreasonably fail to ascertain.” Maresca v. Bernalillo Cty., 804 F.3d 1301, 1310 (10th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Though officers may not ignore evidence that would dissipate probable cause, not all new evidence does so. For instance, a soon-to-be arrestee’s bare proclamations 10 Whether reviewing a search or an arrest, the same probable-cause standard applies. See Stonecipher, 759 F.3d at 1141 (“Officers must have probable cause to initiate a search, arrest, and prosecution under the Fourth Amendment.”). 23 of innocence do not. Romero, 45 F.3d at 1480 (citations omitted) (“Once Defendants concluded that the initially discovered facts established probable cause, they were under no obligation to forego arresting Plaintiff or release him merely because he said he was innocent.”). Even “a plausible explanation” does not require “the officer to forego arrest pending further investigation if the facts as initially discovered provide probable cause.” Id. at 1480 n.6 (quoting Criss v. City of Kent, 867 F.2d 259, 263 (6th Cir. 1988)). In the comparable context of whether an arresting officer must release an already-detained suspect to avoid a false-imprisonment claim, the First Circuit has reasoned that “having once determined that there is probable cause to arrest, an officer should not be required to reassess his probable cause conclusion at every turn, whether faced with the discovery of some new evidence or a suspect’s self-exonerating explanation from the back of the squad car.” Thompson v. Olson, 798 F.2d 552, 556 (1st Cir. 1986). Instead, arresting officers must release a suspect only if the police discover that “the suspicion (probable cause) which forms the basis for the privilege to arrest is unfounded.” Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 134 cmt. f (Am. Law Inst. 1965)). B. Deputy Estep Had Probable Cause to Believe that Hinkle Was Involved in Crimes Connected to a Stolen Trailer. Applying this framework, we agree with the district court that, at the time of Hinkle’s warrantless arrest, Deputy Estep had probable cause that Hinkle had committed a crime. An objectively reasonable officer standing in Deputy Estep’s place would have plentiful information from reputable sources to support a 24 substantial probability that Hinkle had stolen, helped steal, helped conceal, or wrongfully received the trailer left on the Smiths’ property. As mentioned, Deputy Estep investigated for two weeks, obtaining incriminating information along the way from neutral, credible sources—the Smiths, the Carpenter’s Church pastor, the Anderson County Sheriff’s Office, and Palmetto Insurance. The reported VIN match alone furnished probable cause that the trailer was stolen. Further, Deputy Estep had probable cause to attribute that crime to Hinkle. Both the Smiths and the pastor named Hinkle and Keown as men who might have the trailer, and Keown first stated that Hinkle owned the trailer. When Deputy Estep told Hinkle of Keown’s statement, Hinkle did not protest, but just followed along by uttering “right.” Finally, after Deputy Estep later confronted Keown about his initial statement, Keown still described the trailer as a “family trailer.” And Hinkle was family—he was Keown’s son-in-law.11 These facts gave Deputy Estep probable cause to believe that Hinkle had committed a crime. Indeed, Hinkle was charged with “conspiring and agreeing with Vaughn Keown to” knowingly conceal stolen property. Appellant’s App. vol. 3 at 697. A criminal conspiracy takes two or more people, United States v. Keck, 643 F.3d 11 Keown’s changing story also would have given Deputy Estep reason to question Keown’s veracity. Cf. 1 McCormick on Evidence § 34 (8th ed. Jan. 2020 update) (“[T]he fact of the inconsistency gives the jury an insight into the witness’s state of mind; the inconsistency shows that the witness is either uncertain or untruthful. In either event, the inconsistency calls into question the witness’s believability.”). 25 789, 793 (10th Cir. 2011) (citing United States v. Evans, 970 F.2d 663, 668 (10th Cir. 1992)), and Deputy Estep had a reasonable basis to believe that Keown and Hinkle were coconspirators. They were family members, they both had attended the Carpenter’s Church in South Carolina, and they both were tied to the trailer by the Smiths and the pastor. Accordingly, we conclude that Deputy Estep had probable cause to believe that a crime was being committed and that Hinkle was one of the people committing the crime. C. Deputy Estep Had Probable Cause Even Without Hinkle’s Confirmation of Ownership, and That Probable Cause Never Dissipated. Hinkle asserts that “Estep . . . mischaracterize[d] Hinkle’s statement of ‘Right’ to be an affirmative statement of ownership.” Appellant’s Opening Br. 27. He also claims that because “John Larson” did not clarify whether he was asking Hinkle about a covered trailer or a flatbed trailer, Hinkle’s responding “right” was not a claim of ownership. Hinkle argues that “[w]ithout the ‘Right’ there is nothing indicating Hinkle had any possession of the trailer.” Id. at 31. We disagree. Even without Hinkle’s utterance of “right,” the reported match of VINs gave Deputy Estep probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed. And even without “right,” Deputy Estep still had probable cause to believe that Hinkle had committed that crime because the Smiths, the pastor, and Keown had connected him to the trailer. 26 Further, Hinkle’s later explanation that he had originally been referring to a different trailer—a flatbed one—did not dissipate probable cause. As discussed, even “a plausible explanation” does not oblige “the officer to forego arrest pending further investigation if the facts as initially discovered provide probable cause.” Romero, 45 F.3d at 1480 n.6 (quoting Criss, 867 F.2d at 263). Hinkle may have thought Deputy Estep was referring to a different trailer when Hinkle uttered “right,” but that would not diminish the other evidence Deputy Estep relied on in arresting Hinkle. D. Recently Stolen Property Is Not an Element of Any of Hinkle’s Charges. Next, Hinkle argues that Deputy Estep lacked probable cause to arrest him because his suspected crimes required that the trailer have been recently stolen. Further, Hinkle disputes that “Estep . . . objectively establish[ed] that Hinkle had knowledge the trailer in question was stolen.” Appellant’s Opening Br. 26–27 (citations omitted). He also claims that Deputy Estep made an unreasonable mistake of fact and that his mistake “cannot furnish probable cause.” Id. at 27 (citations omitted). We disagree. The Information charged Hinkle with knowingly concealing stolen property, in violation of title 21, section 1713 of the Oklahoma Statutes, conspiring to knowingly conceal stolen property, in violation of title 21, section 421 of the Oklahoma Statutes, and transporting stolen property into the state, in violation of title 21, section 1715 of the Oklahoma Statutes. We disagree with Hinkle that Deputy Estep would have lacked probable cause to arrest Hinkle for these crimes absent evidence that the 27 trailer had been recently stolen. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 1713A (West 2003), states that: Every person who buys or receives, in any manner, upon any consideration, any personal property of any value whatsoever that has been stolen, embezzled, obtained by false pretense or robbery, knowing or having reasonable cause to believe the same to have been stolen, embezzled, obtained by false pretense, or robbery, or who conceals, withholds, or aids in concealing or withholding such property from the owner, shall be guilty of a felony. This statute does not require that the property be recently stolen. If Hinkle had received the trailer, believing that Keown had stolen it,12 or if Hinkle had aided Keown in concealing the trailer, he would have violated section 1713A. In an attempt to write a recently-stolen element into the statute, Hinkle cites Jackson v. State, 508 P.2d 277, 279–80 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973), and Miller v. State, 481 P.2d 175, 178 (Okla. Crim. App. 1969), for the proposition that under section 1713A, “mere possession of property recently stolen alone is not sufficient to convict the possessor of knowingly concealing stolen property.” Appellant’s Opening Br. 26. 12 Because receiving or concealing stolen property are accessory crimes, many courts reason that “[a] person cannot be convicted of receiving stolen property where the evidence shows that he acted as a principal in the underlying larceny.” Charles E. Torcia, 3 Wharton’s Criminal Law § 440 (15th ed. Sept. 2019 update) (collecting cases). So if Hinkle stole the trailer himself, these accessory crimes may not be applicable. But if that were the case, Hinkle could be charged with the underlying larceny crime. Because “the probable cause inquiry is not restricted to a particular offense, but rather requires merely that officers had reason to believe that a crime— any crime—occurred,” United States v. Turner, 553 F.3d 1337, 1345 (10th Cir. 2009) (citing Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 153), we conclude that the ultimate probable-cause inquiry is not affected by whether Deputy Estep thought Hinkle or Keown stole the trailer. 28 That language comes from an aged13 jury instruction, for which Jackson and Miller reviewed challenges that it improperly placed the burden of producing evidence on defendants. Jackson, 508 P.2d at 280; Miller, 481 P.2d at 178. But neither case grafted a recently-stolen-property element into the statute. Nor will we. See tit. 21, § 1713A; see also Eslinger v. State, 734 P.2d 830, 832 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987) (“The essential elements of the crime of Knowingly Concealing Stolen Property are knowledge that the property was stolen and the act of concealing the property in some manner from the rightful owner.” (citation omitted)); Brewer v. State, 554 P.2d 18, 21 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976) (citations omitted) (listing the elements for receiving stolen property and concealing stolen property but omitting from both lists a requirement that the property be recently stolen). Hinkle also argues that Deputy Estep lacked probable cause that Hinkle knew the trailer was stolen. We agree with Hinkle that Deputy Estep needed to develop probable cause for each element of the offense. See Donahue, 948 F.3d at 1188 n.14 (“[A] court can ‘determin[e] whether an officer had probable cause to make an arrest for a violation of state law’ by ‘applying the Fourth Amendment standard’ to the ‘identif[ied] . . . elements of a crime, based on state law.’” (omission and second and 13 The current Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions do not include a recentlystolen element for the crime of receiving-stolen property. Vernon’s Okla. Forms 2d, OUJI-CR 5-111 (Nov. 2018 update) (emphasis removed). And why this language appeared in earlier jury instructions is unclear—the earlier versions of this statute did not include a recently-stolen-property element, either. See Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 1713A (1988) (referencing a historical note that quotes a pre-1961 version, which, like the current version, includes no recently-stolen-property element). 29 third alterations in original) (quoting Ivan E. Bodensteiner and Rosalie Berger Levinson, 1 State and Local Gov’t Civ. Rights Liab. § 1:11 (Nov. 2019 update))).14 But for the reasons mentioned, we conclude that Deputy Estep had probable cause that Hinkle knew that the trailer was stolen (even though it turned out that it was not). In this case, Deputy Estep relied on information he received from unbiased sources. That information led him to believe that Hinkle and his father-in-law had possessed the trailer. If that were true, Deputy Estep could reasonably have believed that Hinkle knew the trailer was stolen. And though the church and insurance 14 The majority position among our sister circuits is that an arrest is supported by probable cause only if the arresting officer has probable cause for every element of the offense. Williams v. City of Alexander, 772 F.3d 1307, 1312 (8th Cir. 2014) (“For probable cause to exist, there must be probable cause for all elements of the crime, including mens rea.” (citing Kuehl v. Burtis, 173 F.3d 646, 651 (8th Cir. 1999))); United States v. Joseph, 730 F.3d 336, 342 (3d Cir. 2013) (“To make an arrest based on probable cause, the arresting officer must have probable cause for each element of the offense.” (citing Wright v. City of Philadelphia, 409 F.3d 595, 602–03 (3d Cir. 2005))); Thacker v. City of Columbus, 328 F.3d 244, 256 (6th Cir. 2003) (“Thus, for probable cause to arrest Thacker to exist here, the officers would not have to have proof of each element of a domestic violence offense, but would have to believe that a probability existed that he committed the offense.”); see also Hall v. District of Columbia, 867 F.3d 138, 154 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“Probable cause to arrest requires at least some evidence supporting each element of the offense.”). But see Spiegel v. Cortese, 196 F.3d 717, 724 n.1 (7th Cir. 1999), as amended (Jan. 7, 2000) (stating that officers need not “establish probable cause as to each and every element of a crime before they are authorized to make an arrest”); Gasho v. United States, 39 F.3d 1420, 1428 (9th Cir. 1994) (announcing that officers must have probable cause of specific intent for specific-intent crimes but that they need not have probable cause for other elements (citing United States v. Thornton, 710 F.2d 513, 515 (9th Cir. 1983); Kennedy v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 702, 705 (9th Cir. 1989), overruled on other grounds by Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 872–73 (9th Cir. 1993))). 30 company later retracted their information as mistaken, Deputy Estep reasonably relied on it before the arrest. Thus, we conclude that Deputy Estep had probable cause to arrest Hinkle. E. Because the Charges Were for Continuing Crimes, the Statute of Limitations Had Not Run. Finally, Hinkle argues that a three-year statute of limitations applies to the suspected Oklahoma property and conspiracy crimes. See Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 152G (West 2003) (“In all other cases a prosecution for a public offense must be commenced within three (3) years after its commission.”). Because the Carpenter’s Church reported the trailer stolen in 2003, and he was arrested in 2013, Hinkle claims that the statute of limitations had run on each charge. Thus, Hinkle asserts that Deputy Estep had no probable cause to arrest him. Hinkle’s argument rests on the mistaken position that the statute of limitations began to run when the Carpenter’s Church reported the trailer as stolen. As a general rule, criminal statutes of limitations begin to run, at the earliest, when a wrongful act is completed, not when the victim later recounts the wrongful act to others. United States v. Rivera-Ventura, 72 F.3d 277, 281 (2d Cir. 1995) (“The limitations period will normally begin to run when a crime is ‘complete,’ thereby ‘encouraging law enforcement officials promptly to investigate suspected criminal activity.’” (citation omitted)); 22A C.J.S. Criminal Procedure and Rights of Accused § 596 (“[N]ormally a statute of limitation begins to run from the time the crime is complete . . . .”). 31 Courts, including the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, treat crimes such as receiving or concealing stolen property as continuing crimes, whose statutes of limitations do not commence until wrongful possession or concealment ends. See, e.g., United States v. Blizzard, 27 F.3d 100, 102 (4th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he nature of the offense of knowingly concealing and retaining stolen government property, nevertheless, convinces us that Congress intended for that offense to be a continuing one.”); People v. Owen, 649 N.W.2d 777, 780 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002) (“‘Conceal,’ in particular, clearly implies continuing conduct, because in concealing something, one is continually keeping it hidden from others.”); State v. Lawrence, 312 N.W.2d 251, 253 (Minn. 1981) (“We hold, therefore, that either concealing or possessing stolen goods is a continuing offense for the purpose of the statute of limitations.”); Hainey v. State, 740 P.2d 146, 149 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987) (“Concealing stolen property is a continuing offense.”).15 Because Hinkle was charged with continuing crimes, the statute of limitations did not commence until Deputy Estep seized the trailer on May 15 Hinkle also argues that he was subjected to an unreasonable continuing seizure under the Fourth Amendment because his arrest led to his having to post a bond and attend court proceedings. But because Deputy Estep had probable cause to arrest Hinkle, we need not decide whether these pretrial inconveniences amount to seizures unsupported by probable cause. Cf. Manuel v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911, 919 (2017) (explaining that if the original arrest was “without probable cause,” a plaintiff’s subsequent detention is “constitutionally unreasonable” because both the detention and the original arrest were “unsupported by probable cause”). Indeed, under our precedent, posting a bond and attending court proceedings may not even constitute seizures. See Becker v. Kroll, 494 F.3d 904, 915 (10th Cir. 2007) (declining to adopt Justice Ginsburg’s concurring approach in Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994), which suggested that the term seizure is broad enough to cover posting a bond or attending pretrial court proceedings). 32 10, 2013, terminating Hinkle’s alleged possession and concealment of the trailer. As a result, the three-year statute of limitations had not yet run when Deputy Estep arrested Hinkle on that day. So even if Deputy Estep had needed to consider the statute of limitations—a dubious proposition in and of itself, see Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 269 (3d Cir. 2007); Pickens v. Hollowell, 59 F.3d 1203, 1207–08 (11th Cir. 1995)—that would not have affected the probable-cause analysis. F. Because the False-Arrest Claim Against Deputy Estep Fails, Hinkle’s Derivative False-Arrest Claims Against Sheriff Jay and the County Fail. Hinkle claims that Sheriff Jay, as the County’s “final policy maker” and Deputy Estep’s supervisor, can be held liable for ratifying Hinkle’s false arrest. Appellant’s Opening Br. 19. To establish liability against a supervisor under § 1983, Hinkle must show “a deliberate, intentional act by the supervisor to violate constitutional rights.” Jenkins v. Wood, 81 F.3d 988, 995 (10th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Woodward v. City of Worland, 977 F.2d 1392, 1399 (10th Cir. 1992)). He may do so by showing that Sheriff Jay “personally directed the violation or had actual knowledge of the violation and acquiesced in its continuance.” Id. (citing Woodward, 977 F.2d at 1400). Because Deputy Estep committed no constitutional violation, Hinkle cannot show that Sheriff Jay directed Deputy Estep to commit a constitutional violation or that Sheriff Jay acquiesced in its continuation. Hinkle’s supervisory claim thus fails. As for the County, Hinkle admits that “municipal liability under Section 1983 requires in the first instance, under Monell v. Dep’t Soc. Servs, 436 U.S. 658, 692 33 (1978), that the municipality’s policy caused a constitutional violation.” Appellant’s Opening Br. 41. Hinkle has failed to show that the County, through Sheriff Jay, had adopted a policy sanctioning unlawful warrantless arrests. But even if he had done so, Hinkle’s Monell claim would fail because he was arrested with probable cause. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (“Congress did not intend municipalities to be held liable unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort.”).