Opinion ID: 198846
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Regulatory violations: Category 1

Text: 43 On appeal, defendants have grouped the thirteen broadcast statements for which they were found liable into four categories, groupings we shall follow in this opinion. The statements in Category 1 include Dateline's broadcast assertions of Kennedy's violation of federal regulations as to his hours and his logbook. Defendants contend that each of their statements was truthfully, or at least non-negligently, based on Kennedy's own admissions made before the broadcast. Hence, according to defendants, the statements could not justify the jury's finding of defamation. 44 In the first of the Category 1 statements, identified as statement (C), Dateline describes the portion of Kennedy's trip from Phoenix to Salinas, where he met the Dateline crew before proceeding to Reno: 45 (c)Kennedy started this trip in Maine and drove six days to Denver and on to Phoenix. After a drive that long, federal regulations required Kennedy to spend a day off the road, resting. Instead, ignoring the law, on his seventh day on the road, he's come straight to Salinas, California. [later] After driving west all the way across the country in seven days, Kennedy now has just six days to deliver his load back east from Salinas, California, to Boston . . .  [later] In fact, regulations required Kennedy to sleep before leaving Salinas, because he spent twelve hours loading. [later] So on his eighth day on the road, Kennedy heads out without any sleep at all. 46 Defendants insist that all of statement (C) was substantially accurate, having been based on Kennedy's own taped statements to Francis after he met the Dateline crew in California. 47 Statement (C) can be split into four parts. The first concerns the alleged illegality of Kennedy's driving from Phoenix to Salinas (with a stop in Wheeler Ridge, California, to sleep) without spending a day off the road. 49 C.F.R. 395.3(b)(2) (1994) sets forth the seventy-hour rule, in which a driver cannot drive after being on duty for seventy hours within an eight-day period. The relevant eight-day period revolves, such that each day, the driver subtracts from his or her total hours the on-duty hours accrued nine days previously. 48 The record cannot be said to establish definitively whether Kennedy in fact ignored the law, viz. violated the seventy-hour rule in driving to Salinas from Phoenix. Kennedy testified at trial that, upon redoing his logbook, he concluded that he had enough hours remaining to drive legally from Phoenix to Salinas without taking a day off. However, Kennedy's admissions, made in the recorded interviews prior to the airing of the Dateline program, support the broadcast statement. Plaintiffs have not proven fault, as required by Maine and federal constitutional law, if defendants' report was reasonably based upon information the plaintiffs gave them even if later the truth of the information becomes questionable. See Courtney v. Bassano, 733 A.2d 973, 976 (Me. 1999) (plaintiff not negligent for purposes of Maine defamation law because she had reasonable basis for her statements); see also Penobscot Indian Nation v. Key Bank of Maine, 112 F.3d 538, 559-61 (1st Cir. 1997). 49 Here, defendants' report was supported by a recorded interview with Kennedy, not included in the program, in which Kennedy told Francis that he did not have enough hours to get from Phoenix to Salinas. In addition, the following further exchange between Francis and Kennedy further supported the broadcast report: 50 Kennedy: So we'll say that I had eleven hours available. You know, Okay. So I have a seven-hour ride to get to the L.A. area or the produce area to get my produce. Well, when I get there I got sixty-seven or sixty-eight hours or something like that. Okay? We'll say -- but that night I don't pick up any hours cause it was the eighth day back home, you know, eight days back, I was off. So it's a zero, nothing comes off. 51 Francis: The next day at midnight zero again?Kennedy: Nothing comes off. And I still only have three hours available. What can I do? I gotta sit for two days to get enough hours to load to get started back home again. 52 Francis: What you did was what all drivers do? Right? 53 And what is that? You didn't sit for two days? 54 Kennedy: No. 55 Based upon the above exchange, defendants could have reasonably understood that when Kennedy reached Los Angeles he had already driven for sixty-seven or sixty-eight hours, and that since he still had approximately three hundred miles to go before reaching Salinas, he would necessarily have exceeded the seventy-hour maximum by the time he got to Salinas. 56 To be sure, Kennedy later testified at trial that he was not in fact legally required to take a day off after reaching Phoenix, as his further review indicated that he had enough hours to drive legally from Phoenix to Salinas. But this post-broadcast recapitulation does not establish that defendants were negligent in earlier accepting Kennedy's contrary admissions. Kennedy had conceded, in interviews taped before the broadcast, that he did not have enough hours and, absent reason to disbelieve that version, Dateline was entitled to rely on it. Plaintiffs point to no facts indicating that it was unreasonable for defendants to have credited Kennedy's admissions at the time of the broadcast; for example, Kennedy did not inform anyone before the broadcast that he had miscalculated the hours in his logbook, or of other circumstances showing that a seventy-hour-rule violation had not taken place. Plaintiffs have not, therefore, presented evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that defendants spoke negligently in this portion of statement (C). 8 57 The next controverted portion of statement (C) was that, After driving west all the way across the country in seven days, Kennedy now has just six days to deliver his load back east from Salinas, California, to Boston . . .  Plaintiff Kelly Veilleux, a driver-manager for her husband's company and Kennedy's supervisor at the time of the Dateline run, testified at trial without contradiction that the time allotted for Kennedy's return journey was, in fact, six days. It is hard to see, therefore, why Dateline's remark that he now has just six days . . . is untruthful. 58 Plaintiffs note that Kennedy testified at trial that he felt no pressure from the client (i.e. the shipper) to complete the trip within six days. However, Kennedy did not question that his employer had -- as Kelly Veilleux testified -- scheduled six days for the run. Moreover, saying that Kennedy had just six days for the return trip does not disparage Kennedy or portray him in a negative manner. A too-short deadline would primarily reflect upon whomever imposed the deadline, in this case his employer, who conceded allotting six days for the return trip. Thus, in Kennedy's case, the statement was not only supported by Kelly Veilleux's testimony, but failed to satisfy the requirement under Maine law that it tend . . . to harm the reputation of another [so] as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him. See Bakal, 583 A.2d at 1029. 59 Kennedy's employer, Ray Veilleux, was, to be sure, also one of the plaintiffs, and Dateline's statement might be seen as harming him. However, given Kelly Veilleux's uncontradicted testimony that six days had been scheduled for Kennedy's return trip, we think the record provides insufficient basis for a jury finding that the Dateline assertion was negligent or materially false as to Ray. Kennedy's testimony -- that he felt no pressure from the client to complete the eastward trip precisely within six days, i.e. by midnight on October 5, 1994, and that he could have received an extension of time from the client if he so requested -- did not controvert Kelly Veilleux's testimony that the employer had set a six-day return schedule. We see no material falsehood. See Masson, 501 U.S. at 517. 60 In the third portion of statement (C), Dateline stated, In fact, regulations required Kennedy to sleep before leaving Salinas, because he spent twelve hours loading. Kennedy testified at trial, without contradiction, that this statement was false in that he had spent only three hours loading his truck. Moreover, the relevant regulations only require that he take time off, not that he sleep. 61 The statement as to taking twelve loading hours was indeed unsupported, and no regulation has been called to our attention requiring drivers to sleep rather than, in specified circumstances, to take time off. However, the thrust of the statement -- that regulations prohibited Kennedy from driving when he left Salinas -- was amply supported by Kennedy's taped statements prior to the broadcast. Not only did Kennedy then indicate that he was in violation of the seventy-hour rule when he reached Salinas, but he also stated prior to the broadcast that leaving Salinas without a break, after having been up all day, was probably illegal. (Kennedy admitted that he did not sleep until reaching Reno, twenty-two hours after he last slept in Wheeler Ridge.) Given these admissions, which were not withdrawn before the broadcast, we do not believe that whatever inaccuracies existed were sufficiently material to establish defamation. See Masson, 501 U.S. at 517. 62 The final disputed portion of (C) immediately follows the assertion that regulations required Kennedy to sleep before leaving Salinas. It states: So on his eighth day on the road, Kennedy heads out without any sleep at all. Although conceding that Kennedy did not sleep in Salinas before heading out, plaintiffs point out that, before driving to Salinas, he had slept in Wheeler Ridge, and criticizes as false the assertion that Kennedy headed out without any sleep at all. But we think the most plausible interpretation of this statement is that Kennedy did not sleep in Salinas before heading out (a matter iterated in the preceding sentence) before departing on the eastbound journey with the Dateline crew. That construction fits with Kennedy's statement in an interview that was aired in the report: 63 Francis: But why didn't you take a snooze break before you left for California? 64 Kennedy: Never do. I, I get out of here . . . that's the way I've always done it for years -- I always get to Reno. 65 See Bakal, 583 A.2d at 1030 (defamation claim may not be based on interpretation of language in most negative way possible). In context, we think the statement was substantially true, hence not a sufficient basis for finding defamation. 66 We turn next to statement (M), another of the Category 1 statements upon which the jury found defamation liability. This also concerned Kennedy's violation of regulations relating to permissible on-duty hours: 67 (M) As you will see, incredibly, it will be his last sleep. As he often does, Kennedy will go from Chicago to Boston -- eleven hundred miles, a drive of over twenty hours -- with no sleep. 68 Plaintiffs contend that Kennedy's trial testimony that he napped in Ohio was evidence from which the jury could find statement (M) to be false. Regardless of whether statement (M) was literally true, however, the record indicates that Kennedy made taped admissions prior to the broadcast that fully supported it at that time. Defendants point to the following taped colloquy between Francis and Kennedy: 69 Francis: You, right now, it's almost midnight, 70 have been awake forty hours. 71 Kennedy: Yeah. 72 Francis: How d'you feel? Honest. 73 Kennedy: Well, I'm tired, but I'm not falling asleep. I'm not dozing or anything like that. I'm worn out, you know . . . . 74 Francis: . . . You think -- you're not fatigued. 75 Kennedy: No. Programmed. 76 Francis: You know that a lot of people listening to this are going to think you're BS-ing me -- that nobody can drive a big eighteen-wheeler like that for forty hours from Chicago to Boston and not be really wiped out. 77 Kennedy: [Laughing] I'm not bullshittin'. But I had to do it. To be here, right? . . . It's routine, that's all I can say, it's routine. 78 While Kennedy testified at trial that he had, in fact, napped for a couple of hours in Ohio, he did not make this point to Francis at the earlier interview when Francis stated that Kennedy had been awake forty hours. Moreover, Kennedy himself repeated that statement later, in a taped conversation with his girlfriend in Waterville, Maine: Fred says 'do you realize you've been up for forty-something hours?'. . . yeah, so what? I mean, I do it all the time. Defendants could reasonably rely, in the broadcast, on Kennedy's version as conveyed to them then. They cannot be held accountable for corrections to which Kennedy testified after the broadcast. 79 We turn next to statement (Q), which further alleged illegal conduct by Kennedy: 80 (Q) [Francis to Veilleux:] [Kennedy] didn't take the required time off. He made the log up as he went along so he would look legal. 81 As discussed above, the statement that Kennedy didn't take the required time off was supported by Kennedy's recorded pre-broadcast admissions; plaintiffs failed, therefore, to make the necessary showing of negligence. As to whether Kennedy made the log up as he went along so he would look legal, defendants based their contention on the following taped statements made prior to the broadcast: 82 Handel: So here we are, Sunday morning, just outside of Salt Lake City, Utah . . . and you're just sitting in your cab doing what? 83 Kennedy: Falsifying my log book. . . . I have to do it. You know, there's no way around it. I have to do it. 84 Kennedy also referred to his log book as a lie book in which he had to incriminat[e] [him]self . . . to make a living. Moreover, Kennedy indicated that he would create a log of a fictitious trip in order to conceal his admitted violation of the seventy-hour rule on the final leg of his journey: 85 Kennedy: Yeah. . . . Oh, I'll have to make out a little log book. 86 Francis: Oh, you'll do this whole fiction all over again? . . . 87 Kennedy: What I'll have to do is -- make a little log: Left home, took a load of berries, one to Middleboro, cold storage or something like that. 88 These statements provide ample support for Dateline's broadcast assertion that Kennedy falsified his logbook as he went along so he would look legal. Defamation liability cannot be premised on them. 89 Another challenged broadcast statement, statement (K), similarly concerns Dateline's portrayal of Kennedy's alleged failure to take off-duty time as required by law: 90 (K) Remember, Kennedy hasn't taken any time off since he left Maine eleven days ago. That's blatantly illegal [later] But he hasn't taken any time off since he began. That's against the law, and it now appears Kennedy's headed for trouble. 91 The truthfulness of this statement turns in part on the meaning of the phrase time off. A reasonable viewer would not necessarily understand the broadcast to mean that Kennedy had not slept for eleven days. The statement more plausibly indicates that Kennedy had not had taken any significant amount of time off-duty during the trip, or perhaps that he had driven every day since leaving Maine. 92 In describing the conduct as illegal, defendants could reasonably have relied on Kennedy's admissions of illegality described supra. Moreover, the statement hasn't taken any time off was vague and susceptible of more than one meaning. Defamation liability should not be premised on statements of such uncertain meaning. See Levinsky's, 127 F.3d at 129-30; see also McCullough v. Visiting Nurse Service of Southern Maine, Inc., 691 A.2d 1201, 1204 (Me. 1997) (visiting nurse, who had been fired, could not recover for defamation on basis of vague statement that she was unavailable to perform her assigned visits). 93 Plaintiffs complain that the voice-over statement was misleadingly accompanied by an inappropriate videotape of Kennedy pulled over on the side of the road, supposedly in nervous anticipation of an inspection station. The footage was, in fact, taped several days previously, in Salinas. Inaccurate reportage is not to be condoned and could well be defamatory if it otherwise met the necessary standards. Plaintiffs fail, however, to show how the use of the earlier taped scene effected any material change in the meaning conveyed by the statement. See Masson, 501 U.S. at 517. We conclude that plaintiffs did not present a jury question as to statement (K)'s falsity or defendants' negligence. 94 The next statement at issue, statement (A), purportedly summarizes the illegal activities practiced by Kennedy: 95 (A) Almost every time [Peter Kennedy] goes to work he breaks the law. 96 This statement is not expressly limited to the several days that Dateline filmed Kennedy; rather, it appears to characterize Kennedy's general driving practices. The question is whether defendants had sufficient evidence from which to make such a generalization, not limited to violations of regulations on the trip with Dateline. Could Dateline reasonably infer from what it observed and heard about Kennedy's activities that he likely broke the law almost every time [he] goes to work as part of his usual truck driving practices? 97 Several taped admissions allow reasonable inferences that Kennedy's regulatory violations were not isolated instances. Kennedy told Francis that he can't be reprogrammed, so I am breaking the law; that he does drive over the 10 hours; and that he never took a snooze break before departing California, even though this practice was probably illegal. Kennedy also admitted to Francis: 98 Kennedy: I know my limits . . . I can go sometimes -- fifteen hours, twelve hours, eighteen hours -- sometimes only four hours. 99 Francis: How about twenty hours, forty hours? You've done that too, right? 100 Kennedy: Oh, it has been done, oh yeah, yeah, many times. 101 With regard to falsifications in his log-book, Kennedy stated on camera no one would last doing it legally . . . it would be over for them. Moreover, Kennedy admitted in his trial testimony that the statement in the report that he was used to going over the ten-hour legal driving limit was true. 102 Kennedy argues that defendants possessed ample information, at the time they made the report, that Kennedy was normally a safe and law-abiding driver. Kennedy also testified that the Dateline trip was unusual, and that he violated regulations only because of delays imposed by Dateline. The above admissions, however, point to more frequent and regular violations. For Dateline to say these violations occurred almost every time [he] goes to work is not so far off the mark as to warrant finding that defendants negligently extrapolated from the information they possessed at the time they created the report. Reporters have leeway to draw reasonable conclusions from the information before them without incurring defamation liability. Cf. Courtney, 733 A.2d at 976; see also Penobscot Indian Nation, 112 F.3d at 559-61. We hold that plaintiffs did not meet their burden to establish the falsity of the comment and defendants' negligence in making it. 103 The next and final statement in Category 1 also concerns Kennedy's alleged law-breaking: 104 (B) Kennedy is angry that he has to sidestep federal rules just about every day he's on the job; so he allowed DATELINE cameras to record his journey. It will be a rare look at a pressure-packed run, with the law being broken all the way. 105 There is ample evidence in the record supporting the veracity of defendants' statement that Kennedy was angry about the regulations. In addition to the statements described above, Kennedy repeatedly expressed on camera his opposition to federal trucking regulations: 106 Kennedy: I'm against the system. I'm against their -- their rules and their regulations, and invasion of my privacy. And my constitutional rights are taken right away the minute I walk in the door of this cab. 107 Kennedy also referred to the hours-of-service and log-keeping requirements as communism and regulation-strangulation. Moreover, he stated to Handel that under the regulations, we'd be already a day late for where we're going with a load. The shelf life would be gone by two or three days by the time we ever got there legally . . . This exchange continued as follows: 108 Handel: So your beef is that in order to do your job, to earn a living, you got to do something that's in effect illegal, you got to falsify your log books? 109 Kennedy: Right, I do, yes. Or I'll just sit here and twiddle my thumbs, because I'm out -- I'm out of hours for the day . . . . 110 Given these and Kennedy's other statements, plaintiffs cannot justify the defamation verdict based upon defendants' statement that Kennedy was angry about government regulation. 111 Plaintiffs contend that defendants falsely drew a causal link between Kennedy's anger and his agreement to participate in the Dateline show, and that Kennedy in fact chose to participate in order to show the positive side of the trucking industry. Between the broadcast report and plaintiffs' own briefs, however, a number of motivations have been ascribed to Kennedy, and the motivation at issue in statement (B) appears as well-supported by the evidence as any. 9 In any event, the drawing of this connection did not cause plaintiffs to suffer injury beyond what would have otherwise occurred. See Masson, 501 U.S. at 516. In the absence of this specific statement, listeners might have logically concluded from Kennedy's comments in the broadcast itself that these stemmed from his anger at the regulatory system. 112 As to the reference in statement (B) to the law being broken all the way, this was similar to statement (A), supra. For the same reasons given in reference to (A), we conclude that a defamation claim cannot be sustained on that assertion. 113 (C) Risk and danger: Category 2 114 A second set of the thirteen statements upon which the jury premised its defamation verdict concern the risks flowing from Kennedy's behavior. Defendants contend that these statements are constitutionally protected because they are true or, alternatively, because they described Kennedy's driving routine with some rhetorical flourish, or added an opinion about the risks on the road. 115 This court said in Levinsky's that the First Amendment does not inoculate all opinions against the ravages of defamation suits. 127 F.3d at 127. A statement couched as an opinion that presents or implies the existence of facts that are capable of being proven true or false may be actionable. See id. (citing Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 18-19); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts 566 (1977) (A defamatory communication may consist of a statement in the form of an opinion, but a statement of this nature is actionable only if it implies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion.). 116 Nonetheless, opinions amounting to imaginative expression and rhetorical hyperbole are protected. See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20; Levinsky's, 127 F.3d at 127. Whether an opinion is protected hyperbole depends primarily upon whether a reasonable person would not interpret it as providing actual facts about the described individual. See Levinsky's, 127 F.3d at 131. We now turn to the statements at issue. 117 (E) In twenty-seven years of hard driving, Kennedy says he has racked up over three million miles -- sleeping less than he should, and gambling that his fatal fatigue number doesn't come up. 118 Kennedy testified that while it was true he has driven more than three million miles, the remainder of the statement was false. He complains that the tape was edited to give the impression that he admitted to sleeping less than he should and gambling with lives. Defendants contend that statement (C) is either true, being based on verifiable facts, or else is a protected expression of opinion and/or hyperbole. 119 We find the statement that Kennedy said he was sleeping less than he should to be non-actionable. Kennedy's admissions supra regarding lack of sleep and off-duty time undermine the required finding of negligence. We think there was a sufficient foundation for this assertion, especially given the vagueness of the term should. See id. at 129-30 (no defamation liability based on words that are highly subjective and susceptible of numerous interpretations). 120 Dateline's statement that [i]n twenty-seven years of hard driving, Kennedy [was] . . . gambling that his fatal fatigue number doesn't come up was, we think, a permissible summation of Dateline's evaluation of Kennedy's driving practices. See id. at 131. The expression was hyperbolic, but did not exceed what a journalist, presented with the information Dateline had about Kennedy, could reasonably report. See id. This narration was accompanied by film footage of Kennedy playing a slot machine at a rest stop. We think a reasonable observer would understand it to be a dramatic expression of Dateline's viewpoint that inadequate sleep among truck drivers, as exemplified by Kennedy, is widespread and dangerous. We do not believe that the First Amendment allows defamation liability to be premised on a statement such as (E). 121 (P) You met Peter Kennedy, a trucker who says he has to lie to inspectors to stay on the road . . . But this stay awake and on the road at all costs mentality has led to many accidents and deaths. 122 Plaintiffs contend that this statement inaccurately links Kennedy's lies to accidents and deaths, and leads viewers to believe that Kennedy personally caused mayhem on the road. Defendants argue that this interpretation is unreasonable and that the latter portion of the statement reflects its protected opinion about the dangers of violating regulations. 123 The reference to lies to inspectors, standing alone, is not defamatory, as it is amply supported by Kennedy's admissions, described supra, regarding false statements in his log book. We do not believe, furthermore, that a reasonable viewer would conclude that Dateline was accusing Kennedy of personally causing highway accidents and deaths. Rather, this stay awake and on the road at all costs mentality was said to have led to many accidents and deaths, presumably in the cases of other drivers. The program nowhere reported any accidents or deaths involving plaintiffs, nor did it accuse plaintiffs of being so responsible. 124 Insofar as Dateline was expressing its own opinion as to a supposed connection between the described mentality and accidents, that expression was constitutionally protected. Looking at the broadcast in its entirety, defendants' statement drew reasonable support from the information presented. Besides Kennedy's own admissions and conduct, there were supporting comments by an expert on sleep deprivation. 10 See Phantom Touring, Inc. v. Affiliated Publication, 953 F.2d 724, 730 (1st Cir. 1992) (newspaper piece not defamatory when considered in context of full disclosure of underlying facts, such that readers could draw different conclusions). We think that reasonable viewers would understand this statement, even if sensationally worded, to be one of viewpoint rather than fact. We conclude Category 2 with statement (O): 125 (O) In just under six days, he has slept only twenty-one hours, an average of three and a half hours a day . . . [Peter Kennedy] has broken the law, put himself and others at risk through dangerously long hours. 126 Plaintiffs do not contend on appeal that the tally of Kennedy's sleep in the first sentence of statement (O) is defamatory; nor do they dispute that Kennedy broke the law. 11 Rather, they contest the characterization of Kennedy as putting people at risk by driving long hours. Defendants reply that Statement (O) expresses Dateline's protected opinion that Kennedy's behavior was risky. 127 Again, defendants' statement as to the risk involved in Kennedy's activity is not provably false, and was supported by other information presented in the program from which such conclusions might rationally be drawn. As to the Dateline opinion itself -- that driving without much sleep, as Kennedy did, puts people at risk -- Dateline was entitled to express it. It was not a view that implied new and additional, or unsupported, facts about Kennedy. D. Inspection stations: Category 3 128 The next category of statements concern the inspection stations encountered by Kennedy on his eastbound journey with the Dateline crew. 129 (H) As Kennedy heads east through Utah, all the inspection stations on the trip east have been closed. He's escaped any scrutiny, and as far as he's concerned, none is needed. 130 Plaintiffs argue that this statement is defamatory insofar as it represents that Kennedy escaped any scrutiny. 12 Kennedy testified at trial that he did indeed go through inspection stations, while accompanied by the Dateline crew, in Utah and Wyoming. In a recorded interview, however, Kennedy engaged in this dialogue with Francis: 131 Francis: You've just come all the way across the country and you haven't been stopped once. What's your analysis of that? 132 Kennedy: Well it's the first time . . . Not usually stopped and checked on paperwork [?] but usually there's a scale open, but this time I came all the way across with not one scale open. 133 Kennedy also conceded at trial that his truck was not weighed and his logbooks were not inspected at any point in the trip. 134 In view of the above, it is difficult to fault defendants for stating that Kennedy escaped any scrutiny. It is, moreover, scarcely a statement that disparages plaintiffs. Whether all the inspection stations were closed so as to permit Kennedy to evade scrutiny was not under plaintiffs' control and does not reflect on them in a negative way. Hence, it fails to satisfy the requirement under Maine law that it tend . . . to harm the reputation of another [so] as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him. Bakal, 583 A.2d at 1029; see also McCullough, 691 A.2d at 1204 (no defamation liability where challenged statement was no more damaging to plaintiff's reputation than the truth would have been). 135 (L) Kennedy heads out to discover his fate. If they check his fuel and toll receipts carefully, they'll know he doctored his logbook. He'll be put off the road for a day or two and be late with his perishable load to Boston. Kennedy and his company will lose money, and maybe a customer. [later] Kennedy is about to go through the first open inspection station so far. Like other truckers, he's falsified his legal logbook . . . . 136 The video footage accompanying this voice-over showed Kennedy's truck approach what might have appeared to viewers to be an inspection station. 13 Plaintiffs contend, however, that the footage depicted a weigh station, not an inspection station. Moreover, they assert, at this point in the trip, Kennedy's fuel receipts were in accordance with his logbook and there had not yet been any tolls. 137 This visual deception does not, we think, rise to the level of defamation. The fact that the video footage was from a different portion of the trip and showed a weigh station, while perhaps contrived, is not a falsification material to plaintiffs' reputations. Showing footage that accurately depicted an inspection station would not, in these circumstances, have had any materially different effect on a reasonable viewer's perception of Kennedy. 138 To the extent that plaintiffs also contend that the voice-over was defamatory, they have not borne their burden of proof on the essential elements. As discussed supra, the portions of statement (L) relating to the lack of open inspection stations are not harmful to plaintiffs' reputations. Furthermore, the references to Kennedy's falsification of his logbook were supported, as discussed supra. As to the potential consequences for plaintiffs of an inspection, defendants reasonably relied on Kennedy's own statements, including the following exchange immediately after passing an inspection station in Iowa that closed just before Kennedy arrived: 139 Handel: So you were worried. You were really worried. 140 Kennedy: Yeah, 'cause it's just a hassle. You know, it's just -- they can shut you down there if they want to. I mean, they can -- and then I'm -- I've lost eight hours right there if I'm shut down. 141 When asked about these statements at trial, Kennedy responded, I don't know what I meant. Plaintiffs offer no evidence to suggest that defendants had any reason to doubt the accuracy of Kennedy's statements before the broadcast. In the absence of defendants' negligence, statement (L) does not support the defamation verdict. 142 (N) Finally, in Pennsylvania, an open inspection station. If Kennedy is caught and grounded now, the whole run will be a disaster. Kennedy and his company will lose money. He drives in cautiously. The inspector is nowhere to be seen, and so Kennedy heads right out the other side. 143 Plaintiffs do not challenge the pictorial accuracy of the footage accompanying statement (N). Insofar as this statement speaks of the risks inherent in being caught and grounded now, and the absence of an inspector, it is not much different than statement (L), hence was not defamatory for reasons already discussed supra. 144 Defamation liability cannot rest, moreover, upon the assertion and so Kennedy heads right out the other side. True, viewers could infer from this portion of statement (N) that Kennedy was relieved not to have to undergo an inspection. Defendants, however, had ample basis from Kennedy's admissions described supra to conclude that he was relieved. A reasonable viewer would not conclude that it was unlawful or wrong for Kennedy to head right out the other side. The inspector was absent, and so Kennedy drove away. The most that can be said is that, like much reporting of this type, the language has an ominous tone, perhaps suggesting guilt for unknown reasons. Here the only guilty party was the absent inspector, who was not a plaintiff. Statement (N) was not defamatory. E. Subsequent illegal trip: Category 4 145 The final statement at issue concerns Ray's assignment of an additional coast-to-coast run to Kennedy shortly after the trip with Dateline: 146 (R) Just forty-eight hours after getting home, Peter Kennedy was ordered illegally without rest to drive back out west. 147 Statement (R) appears reasonably based on a written statement by Kennedy dated December 19, 1994: 148 I was out of hours, so Ray told me to take a few days off, but Saturday (2 days later) he called me and said do me a favor. Can you leave Sunday for four drops . . . . I said yeah, I guess I can start a new log book to do this trip as I have no hours. I could not believe they would send me back out knowing that I had no hours left to drive. 149 Plaintiffs contend that this statement was controverted by Kennedy's trial testimony that he was not ordered to go on the run, but rather agreed to go as a favor to Ray. They also maintain that the trip was legal in that Kennedy had enough hours under the pertinent regulations and that he had sufficient rest in between the trips. Plaintiffs point to no persuasive evidence, however, that defendants' reliance on his December 19, 1994, statement was unreasonable. 14 150 Kennedy also testified that there were three full days between when he arrived home from the Dateline run and when he actually departed on the next trip. However, statement (R) does not convey that Kennedy actually departed on another trip forty-eight hours after arriving home, only that he was ordered to go; accordingly, this portion of the statement was not materially false, as plaintiffs contend. 151 In sum, none of the statements sent to the jury can support a finding of defamation under standards consistent with the federal constitution. We reverse the judgment in favor of plaintiffs on their defamation claim. Because there is no surviving portion of the defamation claim to remand to the district court, there is no need to address the issue raised by plaintiffs on cross-appeal, namely the required degree of proof as to the element of falsity. 15