Opinion ID: 2449383
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: INVASION OF McCALL'S RIGHT OF PRIVACY

Text: As part of his complaint, McCall alleged that the reporters invaded his privacy by concealing a tape recorder in Frazier's purse prior to her entering his office. In his amended complaint, McCall also attacked the newspaper article as being an invasion of privacy, in that it implies that the Plaintiff is an unethical and dishonest attorney practicing in Jefferson County and places [him] in a false light before the members of the general public.  (Emphasis added.) The trial court rejected both claims when it granted summary judgment. The court declared that the use of the recording device was not an invasion of the plaintiff's right of privacy and that McCall was not placed in a false light because the article was not false and did not constitute reckless behavior. In affirming the trial court, the Court of Appeals did not consider the false light ruling, but addressed only the problem of the use of the concealed tape recorder. Because we decide the issue on the basis of false light, we do not deem it necessary to discuss the other aspect of the right of privacy claim. The invasion of privacy as an actionable tort has been part of Kentucky law since 1909. [7] Subsequently, the development of this theory of law has grown at a modest pace. [8] The basis of the tort, while not subject to precise definition, may be best described as the right of every citizen to be let alone. Private individuals have the right to live their lives without unwarranted interference by the public about matters with which the public is not necessarily concerned. Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927). There are exceptions to this rather sweeping principle of law. The right of privacy does not prohibit: (1) any publication of a matter which is of public or general interest; (2) the publication of a matter which is a privileged communication according to libel and slander law; (3) statements which are oral; and (4) a publication which is true. Id. Kentucky has not specifically adopted the false light aspect of the tort. We believe that the principles enumerated in Foster Milburn Co. v. Chinn, supra at note 7, and Brents v. Morgan, supra, which set forth the bases and nature of the tort of invasion of privacy, would best be furthered by our adoption of the principles of that tort as enunciated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1976). The pertinent section reads: Sec. 652A. General Principle (1) One who invades the right of privacy of another is subject to liability for the resulting harm to the interests of the other. (2) The right of privacy is invaded by (a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another. . . ; or (b) appropriation of the other's name or likeness . . .; or (c) unreasonable publicity given to the other's private life . . ., or (d) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the public . . . . As we view this aspect of the appeal, the issue is whether the trial court erred in ruling that the Louisville Times article did not place McCall before the public in a false light. The two basic requirements to sustain such an action are: (1) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (2) the publisher had knowledge of, or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other was placed. Restatement (Second) of Torts, Sec. 652E (1976). [9] McCall's amended complaint alleged that the article implied to the public that he was an unethical and dishonest attorney and that such publicity placed him in a false light before the public. Our view as to the impact of the article has been expressed in the section of the opinion dealing with libel. The article clearly indicates that there was a probability that McCall was guilty of unethical conduct, and would be read by a lay person as having stated that he intended to fix a case or bribe a judge. We believe that the issue of false light should have been submitted to a jury. With respect to the constitutional restrictions on the tort of invasion of privacy, there is a substantial gray area. In Time v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 87 S.Ct. 534, 17 L.Ed.2d 456 (1967), the Supreme Court examined, for the first time, the effects of the First and Fourteenth Amendments on this tort. The Court held that a state law protecting privacy (whether statutory or judicial) no longer could permit recovery for injury to privacy upon proof of falsity alone, at least when the material published was of public interest and the injured party was a private individual. Recovery in such a situation was limited to those false publications which were made upon a showing of knowledge of the falsity of the statements or a reckless disregard as to the truth. The Court applied the malice standards of New York Times v. Sullivan to all privacy cases where matters of public interest were involved. The Court placed its emphasis on the nature of the subject matter, rather than on the status of the injured person. [10] After Hill , the Supreme Court rendered Gertz . It will be remembered that in Gertz the Supreme Court ruled that in defamation cases a private individual could recover damages for published untrue defamatory statements so long as there was no strict liability imposed. Whether Gertz will be used to modify Time v. Hill is only speculation. Until the Supreme Court has spoken, we must comply with the ruling in Hill , and recovery is predicated on the standards set out therein. In the event the Gertz rule is applied, we believe the desirable standard of fault is that of simple negligence which we have adopted in this opinion for libel cases. We have ruled in the past that if a publication deals with a matter of public interest or public concern, even if it invades a person's privacy, it is not subject to the tort of invasion of privacy. Sellers v. Henry, Ky., 329 S.W.2d 214 (1959); Brents v. Morgan, supra . Respondents argue, while not specifically mentioning false light, that the defense of public interest should be applicable to all invasion of privacy cases. We do not agree. It should, and is, available as a defense in all those cases where the published statements are true. However, it is not available in cases of the publication of false statements, especially where a private individual's right of privacy is involved. The damages which are recoverable for invasion of privacy are set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts, Sec. 652H (1976). They are follows: One who has established a cause of action for invasion of his privacy is entitled to recover damages for (a) the harm to his interest in privacy resulting from the invasion; (b) his mental distress proved to have been suffered if it is of a kind that normally results from such an invasion; (c) special damages of which the invasion is a legal cause. An action for defamation and an action for invasion of privacy (false light) are closely allied. An injured party may seek relief through both causes of action, arising out of the same publication, but he is limited to only one recovery. By way of summary, we believe that the Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment against McCall on his claim of invasion of privacy. The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the trial court are reversed, and the cause is remanded to the Jefferson Circuit Court with instructions to take action in conformity with this opinion. All concur. LUKOWSKY, J., files a separate opinion.