Opinion ID: 629163
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Process required

Text: 38 Because Black had a liberty interest in remaining in the general prison population, prison officials had to afford him due process in order to deprive him of that right. Hewitt makes it clear, however, that the procedural due process required before one may be deprived of a liberty interest is governed by federal constitutional law and not state law, and that minimal process is required for segregation in the prison context because prison officials must be accorded  'wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order....'  459 U.S. at 472, 103 S.Ct. at 872 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1877, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979)). Prison officials are obligated to engage only in an informal, nonadversary review of the information supporting respondent's administrative confinement, including whatever statement respondent wished to submit, within a reasonable time after confining him to administrative segregation. Id. 39 The Hewitt Court held that an inmate need only receive some notice of the charges against him and an opportunity to present his views either in writing or in person to the prison official, and a review by the decisionmaker of the charges and the available evidence. Id. at 476, 103 S.Ct. at 874. This process must occur within a reasonable time following an inmate's transfer, judged from the view of the insubstantial private interest of the inmate and the traditionally broad discretion of prison officials. Id. at 476 n. 8, 103 S.Ct. at 874 n. 8. However, administrative segregation may not be used as pretext for indefinite confinement of an inmate. Id. at 477 n. 9, 103 S.Ct. at 874 n. 9. Therefore, [p]rison officials must engage in some sort of periodic review of the confinement of such inmates. This review will not necessarily require that prison officials permit the submission of any additional evidence or statements. Id. Thus, although Hewitt involved segregation of an inmate for his role in a prison riot, the case holds that regardless of the reason for the segregation, inmates in segregation are entitled only to minimal procedural process, so long as that process is not pretextual. 40 In contrast to Hewitt where the Pennsylvania prison regulations apparently did not set out in detail what process must be given segregated inmates, here Kentucky's Corrections Policies and Procedures set out regulations in mandatory language governing the specific procedures prison officials are required to use in reviewing segregation decisions. However, Black did not have a liberty interest in these more stringent state-created procedures. There is no constitutional violation when state actors fail to meet their own regulations, so long as the minimum constitutional requirements have been met. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1493, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985) (adequacy of procedures is matter of federal constitutional law); Russell v. Coughlin, 910 F.2d 75, 78 n. 1 (2d Cir.1990) (procedures for confinement in segregation governed by federal law); Jackson v. Cain, 864 F.2d 1235, 1252 (5th Cir.1989) (violation of rules alone may be state law violations but not necessarily constitutional violations). Thus, while the prison's own internal regulations required the officials to provide Black with this state-created process, the constitution required only that the officials meet the Hewitt procedural requirements. Accordingly, Black was entitled to 1) an informal, nonadversary review of the information supporting his segregation within a reasonable time, 2) an opportunity to respond in writing or in person, and 3) periodic review of his confinement to assure that the confinement was not pretextual. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 472-77, 103 S.Ct. at 872-74. 41