Opinion ID: 1058602
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: amount of the verdict

Text: Crane asserts that the trial court erred in failing to set aside the verdict because it was excessive when compared to verdicts in similar cases and based on the facts of this case, it was the product of passion and prejudice. Citing our prior decisions in Chesapeake & O. Railway Co. v. Arrington, 126 Va. 194, 101 S.E. 415 (1919), and P. Lorillard Co. v. Clay, 127 Va. 734, 104 S.E. 384 (1920), Crane urges us to compare the verdict in this case to the verdicts rendered in other cases involving similar facts. Crane acknowledges that this Court has recently declined to engage in verdict comparison, but argues that the practice of comparing verdicts does not appear to be foreclosed in Virginia. In the two cases primarily relied upon by Crane the plaintiffs sought damages for the loss of a limb. In those cases, the Court looked to verdicts in other cases involving the same injury as one part of its determination whether the verdict in the case before it was excessive. Arrington, 126 Va. at 218, 101 S.E. at 423; P. Lorillard, 127 Va. at 756, 104 S.E. at 391. Since these two cases, however, this Court has routinely rejected the use of an average verdict rule in determining whether a verdict is excessive. As early as 1925, in Farris v. Norfolk and Western Railway Co., 141 Va. 622, 126 S.E. 673 (1925), we stated that the rule cannot be invoked where the injuries are internal, and have produced a condition of greatly impaired earning capacity, continuous pain and suffering, and a dislocated kidney that may or may not produce serious results. Id. at 626, 126 S.E. at 674. Subsequent cases did not use an average verdict rule where issues of pain and suffering were involved. Rather, this Court reviewed the facts and circumstances of each case to determine whether the verdict was excessive and the product of jury passion and prejudice or misapprehension of the case. See, e.g., National Fruit Product Co. v. Wagner, 185 Va. 38, 40-41, 37 S.E.2d 757, 758-59 (1946); Williams Paving Co. v. Kreidl, 200 Va. 196, 204, 104 S.E.2d 758, 764 (1958); Lilley v. Simmons, 200 Va. 791, 797, 108 S.E.2d 245, 249-50 (1959); Edmiston v. Kupsenel, 205 Va. 198, 203, 135 S.E.2d 777, 780-81 (1964); Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, 229 Va. 1, 48, 325 S.E.2d 713, 744-45 (1985) (relying on record to find that verdict bore no relationship to the loss actually sustained by the plaintiff and was excessive); Reel v. Ramirez, 243 Va. 463, 467, 416 S.E.2d 226, 228 (1992) (we examine the record . . . to determine if the trial judge abused his discretion in granting a remittitur on grounds that verdict was allegedly excessive); Norfolk Bev. Co. v. Cho, 259 Va. 348, 354-55, 525 S.E.2d 287, 290-91 (2000) (analyzing record to determine jury verdict was not excessive); Shepard v. Capitol Foundry of Virginia, Inc., 262 Va. 715, 720-21, 554 S.E.2d 72, 75 (2001) (analyzing excessiveness of verdict based on the record); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Wade, 265 Va. 383, 394-95, 579 S.E.2d 180, 186-87 (2003) (stating that verdict is excessive when it shocks the conscience of the court and creates impression that jury was improperly motivated or confused, and examining record to determine that verdict was not excessive as a matter of law). The average verdict rule was more recently rejected in Rose v. Jaques, 268 Va. 137, 597 S.E.2d 64 (2004). In that case, the defendants argued the verdict was excessive in light of other verdicts in similar cases. Declining to engage in a comparison, we applied an abuse of discretion standard, based upon the evidence in the record. Id. at 159-60, 597 S.E.2d at 77. See also Government Micro Resources, Inc. v. Jackson, 271 Va. 29, 48-49, 624 S.E.2d 63, 74 (2006). In sum, the average verdict rule is not probative of whether a verdict is excessive; rather that determination must be made based on the facts and circumstances of each case. In addition to urging us to consider verdicts in similar cases, Crane contends the jury verdict in this case was not related to the evidence presented. Crane points out that Garland Jones suffered a stroke in 2001, was diagnosed with mesothelioma in January 2005, and died six months later, in June 2005. According to Crane, these facts and the fact that jury's original award exceeded the damages requested, show that the jury was motivated by passion or prejudice. We find nothing in the record to support Crane's contention that the verdict was not the product of an impartial decision. At trial, the Estate produced evidence that medical expenses for Garland Jones totaled $394,857.01 and that his funeral expenses were $9,678.06. Also admitted was a statement written by Garland Jones in which he stated he was devastated to learn he had mesothelioma and described his illness as the bottom falling out from underneath him and a roller coaster ride. Ashley Higgenbotham, one of Garland Jones' children, testified that after Jones was diagnosed with mesothelioma, he was barely mobile and very depressed, which was uncharacteristic for him. Higgenbotham testified that her father's death in a nursing home was an absolute nightmare. Michael Jones, another of Garland Jones' children, testified that Garland Jones was in the best health of his life and even volunteered for Meals on Wheels after his 2001 stroke. Michael Jones also described how Garland Jones' physical and psychological state deteriorated after his diagnosis and until his death. The jury also heard evidence that Garland and Wanda Jones had been married for 41 years and were very loyal to one another and loved each other very much. Wanda Jones testified about the pain and sorrow she felt upon her husband's death. In addition, the jury heard evidence from Dr. G. Dastgir Qureshi, Garland Jones' physician, who testified about mesothelioma in general and about the progression of Garland Jones' disease. Dr. Qureshi testified about the chemotherapy performed on Garland Jones and fact that the chemotherapy eventually caused sepsis and acute renal failure. Dr. Qureshi also testified about several medical procedures undergone by Garland Jones, and described Garland Jones' severely impaired physical state at the time of his death. The jury was given the following instruction on damages, without objection from Crane: If you find for the plaintiff, your verdict shall be in such sum as will fully and fairly compensate such plaintiff for her damages. In determining damages to which she is entitled you shall include, but are not limited to, any of the following which you believe by the greater weight of the evidence: One, any pain and suffering of Garland Jones. Two, any damages for sorrow, mental anguish and solace, which may include loss of society, companionship, comfort, guidance, kindly offices and advice that is suffered by Wanda Jones as a result of the injury and death of Garland Jones. Three, compensation to Wanda Jones for the reasonably expected loss of the services, protection, care and assistance provided by Garland Jones. Four, expenses for care, treatment and hospitalization of Garland Jones that are incident to the injury resulting in his death. And five, reasonable funeral expenses of Garland Jones. Based on this instruction and the evidence presented at trial, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in determining that the verdict was not excessive and not so out of proportion to the injuries suffered as to suggest that it was not the product of a fair and impartial decision.