Opinion ID: 2623194
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's finding that he killed McCullough and committed murder in the first degree, and its finding true the two special circumstance allegations and the allegation that he personally used a firearm. In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, the court must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence  that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value  such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578, 162 Cal.Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738.) The same standard of review applies when the evidence of guilt is circumstantial and to special circumstance allegations. ( People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 104-105, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 271, 82 P.3d 296.) We find the evidence sufficient to support all parts of the jury verdict. The evidence that defendant was the killer was ample. Defendant's thumbprints and fingerprints appeared on two car ownership documents found in the victim's car shortly after the killing. When arrested in Arizona, defendant possessed the victim's gun, which had been seen in the victim's house as recently as a day or so before the killing. Parts of a .22-caliber rifle that could have been the murder weapon and a .22-caliber bullet that could have been fired from the murder weapon were found on the Horning property. Shortly before the killing, defendant's father saw him firing a .22-caliber rifle. Evidence showed that defendant had worn shorts and a tank top similar to shorts found with the body parts and a tank top found inside the victim's house. Other evidence showed that twice during the summer before the killing, defendant had been driven to a spot near the victim's house. Defendant was familiar with the area where the body parts were found, and with dismembering animals the way the body was dismembered. Very close to the time of the killing, defendant abruptly left California without saying anything to his parents or sister even though, the day before the killing, he had arranged with his sister to fix her car a day or so after the killing. He then hid away in the mountains of Idaho as winter approached. He paid for groceries in Idaho with coins from a very heavy bag, an odd thing for a hiker to do. A large collection of coins was missing from the victim's house. The jury could reasonably infer that defendant lied in a number of respects to Detective Mayoya, including how he obtained the victim's gun and his denials of possessing or touching a .22-caliber gun and having been to the victim's house. A former fellow inmate testified that defendant had made statements indicating that he had killed a drug dealer in California. Defendant stresses that the ballistics evidence connecting the fatal bullet with the rifle parts and bullet found on the Horning property was inconclusive. He is correct, but the circumstance that one piece of evidence was itself inconclusive does not negate the rest of the evidence that shows that defendant was the killer. [7] The evidence also supported the first degree murder verdict. The court instructed the jury both on premeditated and deliberated first degree murder and on first degree felony murder. The evidence supported both theories. Evidence concerning motive, planning, and the manner of killing [is] pertinent to the determination of premeditation and deliberation, but these factors are not exclusive nor are they invariably determinative. ( People v. Silva (2001) 25 Cal.4th 345, 368, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 93, 21 P.3d 769.) The evidence showed that defendant tied the victim's hands with duct tape and blindfolded him before shooting him in the head a single time from within two inches. A jury could reasonably infer a motive  the desire to prevent anybody from identifying him. The evidence also shows planning. Defendant points out that the tape and bags in which the body parts were placed were apparently obtained from the victim's house and argues that this shows the killing was not preplanned. But premeditation can occur in a short time. ( People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 371, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432.) The jury could reasonably infer that defendant brought the murder weapon with him, which, together with the evidence that he bound and blindfolded the victim at the scene of the crime, shows planning activity. The manner of killing, a single bullet from close range into the brain of a bound and blindfolded  and hence, so the jury could reasonably infer, unresisting  victim, shows a calculated design to ensure death rather than an unconsidered explosion of violence. ( People v. Alcala (1984) 36 Cal.3d 604, 627, 205 Cal.Rptr. 775, 685 P.2d 1126.) All this is sufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation. The evidence also supported a finding of first degree felony murder. The jury could reasonably have found that defendant took at least the victim's gun and collection of coins from inside the house. Moreover, the evidence showed that the victim generally kept large sums of money in his house. Defendant had no job and needed money. This evidence suffices to permit a reasonable trier of fact to find that defendant entered the house with the intent to commit theft, i.e., that he committed burglary (§ 459), and that he killed the victim during the course of a robbery. Defendant correctly argues that robbery or burglary felony murder requires that the intent to steal be formed before the fatal blow is struck, i.e., that he had to have intended to steal before he fatally shot the victim. ( People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 629-630, 276 Cal.Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d 376.) He argues there was no evidence he had that intent at that time. However, when one kills another and takes substantial property from the victim, it is ordinarily reasonable to presume the killing was for purposes of robbery. ( People v. Turner (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 688, 268 Cal.Rptr. 706, 789 P.2d 887; accord, People v. Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 357, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432.) Murders are commonly committed to obtain money or other property. ( Hughes, supra, at p. 357, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432.) Here, the jury could reasonably find defendant went to the house to steal and killed while doing so. Defendant argues that the .22-caliber bullet casing at the murder scene was found just outside the house, suggesting he might have shot the victim outside before he first entered the house, i.e., before he actually committed the burglary. But for purposes of the felony-murder rule, it does not matter. A murder is of the first degree if `committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate' any of certain enumerated felonies, one of which is burglary. (§ 189.) Under this provision, a killing is committed in the perpetration of an enumerated felony if the killing and the felony `are parts of one continuous transaction.' ( People v. Hayes, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 631, 276 Cal.Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d 376.) Accordingly, defendant was guilty of murder in the perpetration of burglary ... if (1) defendant intended to commit the burglary when he killed [the victim], and (2) the killing and the burglary of [the victim's house] were part of one continuous transaction. ( Id. at p. 632, 276 Cal.Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d 376.) Thus, even if the jury found defendant had approached the victim's house with intent to commit burglary but killed the victim outside before consummating that burglary, it could still find him guilty of burglary felony murder. Defendant also argues that the victim might have invited him into the house. If so, that also makes no difference. One who enters a room or building with the intent to commit a felony is guilty of burglary even though permission to enter has been extended to him personally or as a member of the public. ( People v. Sears (1965) 62 Cal.2d 737, 746, 44 Cal. Rptr. 330, 401 P.2d 938.) A rational trier of fact could have found all the elements of felony murder. Defendant also argues the evidence was insufficient to support the burglary-murder and robbery-murder special-circumstance findings. To some extent, this argument duplicates his arguments regarding the first degree felony-murder rule. (See People v. Hayes, supra, 52 Cal.3d at pp. 631-632, 276 Cal.Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d 376.) Additionally, for the felony-murder special circumstance to apply, the felony must not have been merely incidental to the killing. ( People v. Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 105, 8 Cal. Rptr.3d 271, 82 P.3d 296.) As in Valdez, defendant argues there was insufficient evidence establishing that he killed the victim in order to advance the independent felonious purpose of robbery. ( Ibid. ) He points out that, while correcting the record, the Attorney General argued that he and Steven Horning had killed the victim in retaliation for the victim identifying the brother as the perpetrator of a burglary and robbery. However, even if we were to assume retaliation was one motive to kill (elsewhere in his brief defendant also argues that no evidence exists that he had any preexisting motive to kill), the evidence supporting a first degree felony-murder verdict identified above suffices to permit a reasonable trier of fact to find that the intent to steal was defendant's primary  or at least concurrent  motivation, and that he killed to facilitate the stealing. ( People v. Valdez, supra, at pp. 105-106, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 271, 82 P.3d 296; People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 557-558, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 802, 58 P.3d 931.) Defendant also argues the evidence was insufficient to support the personal-gun-use finding. In addition to arguing the evidence was insufficient to permit the jury to find he was the killer, he also suggests that he might have aided and abetted someone else who actually used the firearm. He notes that Detective Mayoya testified (on cross-examination) that he believed more than one person was involved in the crime. (Indeed, Steven Horning was originally charged in this case, but the case as to him was dismissed.) But Detective Mayoya's belief was not evidence that someone else was involved. No such evidence was presented in this trial. Moreover, defendant was seen firing what the jury could have reasonably found to have been the murder weapon shortly before the killing. He possessed a gun taken in the crime when arrested months later. Defendant's fellow inmate testified that defendant made statements that the jury could reasonably infer indicated he had killed the victim. Under all the circumstances, a rational trier of fact could find defendant personally used a handgun during the commission of the murder.