Opinion ID: 1293759
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Interpreting Article I, Section 9m of the Wisconsin Constitution

Text: [4] ¶ 13. The Wisconsin Constitution was amended in 1993 to include Article I, Section 9m. We have explained that the purpose of construing a constitutional amendment is to give effect to the intent of the framers and of the people who adopted it. State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶ 10, 264 Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 328 (quoting Kayden Indus., Inc. v. Murphy, 34 Wis. 2d 718, 729-30, 150 N.W.2d 447 (1967)). The question presented in the present case is whether the first sentence of Article I, Section 9m of the Wisconsin Constitution was intended as a statement of purpose that articulates the importance of recognizing crime victim rights, or whether it was intended to provide crime victims with an enforceable right that is self-executing. [5, 6] ¶ 14. Like statutes, constitutional provisions may include statements of purpose that use broad language. See State ex rel. Columbia Corp. v. Pacific Town Bd., 92 Wis. 2d 767, 772, 286 N.W.2d 130 (Ct. App. 1979). As with a statute's statement of purpose, a constitutional section's statement of purpose does not provide for an independent, enforceable claim, as it is not in itself substantive. See id. at 779 (citing Smith v. Brookfield, 272 Wis. 1, 7, 74 N.W.2d 770 (1956)). Such a statement of purpose is instead instructive of intent and guides implementation. See id. (citing Wisconsin's Envtl. Decade v. PSC, 69 Wis. 2d 1, 18, 230 N.W.2d 243 (1975)). [7, 8] ¶ 15. We have also explained that [a] constitutional provision is self-executing if no legislation is necessary to give effect to it, and if there is nothing to be done by the legislature to put it in operation. Kayden, 34 Wis. 2d at 731 (citation omitted). However, a statement of purpose, policy or principle is not self-executing. 16 Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 102 (1998) (explaining that a constitutional provision is not self-executing when it merely lays down general principles or a line of policy without supplying the means by which such policy or principles are to be effectuated). [9, 10] ¶ 16. To ascertain whether the first sentence of Article I, Section 9m of the Wisconsin Constitution was intended to serve as a statement of purpose or was intended to provide an enforceable, self-executing right requires constitutional interpretation. We examine three sources in interpreting a constitutional provision: the plain meaning of the words in the context used; the constitutional debates and the practices in existence at the time of the writing of the constitution; and the earliest interpretation of the provision by the legislature as manifested in the first law passed following adoption. Wisconsin Citizens Concerned for Cranes & Doves v. DNR, 2004 WI 40, ¶ 44, 270 Wis. 2d 318, 677 N.W.2d 612 (citations omitted); accord, e.g., Cole, 264 Wis. 2d 520, ¶ 10. We have broadly understood the second of these sources, the constitutional debates and practices in existence contemporaneous to the writing, to include the general history relating to a constitutional amendment, see State ex rel. Unnamed Person No. 1 v. State, 2003 WI 30, ¶¶ 27, 30-36, 260 Wis. 2d 653, 660 N.W.2d 260, as well as the legislative history of the amendment, see Cole, 264 Wis. 2d 520, ¶¶ 10, 36-41. [11] ¶ 17. Applying this analysis, we note first that the plain meaning of the first sentence of Article I, Section 9m of the Wisconsin Constitution in context indicates that it serves as a statement of purpose and does not create enforceable, self-executing rights. Article I, Section 9m of the Wisconsin Constitution provides: This state shall treat crime victims, as defined by law, with fairness, dignity and respect for their privacy. This state shall ensure that crime victims have all of the following privileges and protections as provided by law: timely disposition of the case; the opportunity to attend court proceedings unless the trial court finds sequestration is necessary to a fair trial for the defendant; reasonable protection from the accused throughout the criminal justice process; notification of court proceedings; the opportunity to confer with the prosecution; the opportunity to make a statement to the court at disposition; restitution; compensation; and information about the outcome of the case and the release of the accused. The legislature shall provide remedies for the violation of this section. Nothing in this section, or in any statute enacted pursuant to this section, shall limit any right of the accused which may be provided by law. The provision in question, This state shall treat crime victims, as defined by law, with fairness, dignity and respect for their privacy, opens the section. See id. It uses very broad terms to describe how the State must treat crime victims. See id. The subsequent sentence requires the State to ensure that crime victims have a number of privileges and protections, which are articulated in detail. See id. This structure, opening the section with broad indications of how crime victims should be treated, followed by a detailed list of privileges and protections to which victims are entitled, shows that the first sentence was intended to serve as a general guide or statement of policy regarding victims' rights, whereas the second sentence was intended to provide an outline of the specific rights that the State shall afford crime victims. See id. ¶ 18. Next, we examine the constitutional amendment's history. In an early attempt to secure the initial legislative approval needed to adopt a state constitutional victims' rights amendment, Senator Barbara Ulichny introduced 1989 Senate Joint Resolution 94. [4] With her drafting request to the Legislative Reference Bureau (LRB), Senator Ulichny attached two articles written by other states' attorneys general as background material for the drafter that provide some evidence of the legislature's intent. See Don Siegelman & Courtney W. Tarver, Victims' Rights in State Constitutions, 1 Emerging Issues in St. Const. L. 163 (1988); Ken Eikenberry, Victims of Crime/Victims of Justice, 34 Wayne L. Rev. 29 (1987); Legislative Reference Bureau Drafting Record for 1989 S.J.R. 94. ¶ 19. From this background material, we learn that 1989 Senate Joint Resolution 94 was introduced in the midst of a larger, nationwide movement to recognize the rights of crime victims, particularly through the amendment of state constitutions. Siegelman & Tarver, supra, at 163-64, 170-71. The materials note that crime victims were being treated insensitively and with a lack of consideration, even by well-meaning public agencies. See Siegelman & Tarver, supra, at 169; Eikenberry, supra, at 31-32. Moreover, it was believed that rights of crime victims needed to be addressed both out of a sense of fundamental fairness and justice to victims, see Siegelman & Tarver, supra, at 172; Eikenberry, supra, at 30, 32-33, as well as to enhance the effectiveness of the criminal justice system, because the cooperation of crime victims and witnesses was understood to be central to law enforcement, see Siegelman & Tarver, supra, at 169; Eikenberry, supra, at 31-32. Lois Haight Herrington, who chaired a presidential task force on victims of crime, explained that her task force concluded that: the treatment of crime victims in America was a national disgrace. Ignored, mistreated, or blamed, the innocent victims had been handled like photographs or fingerprintsmere evidence to be manipulated at the criminal justice system's convenience. By the end of the ordeal, many victims vowed that they would never again become embroiled in the system, and that they would tell their friends and loved ones to stay away from the courts. Just as a pebble dropped in a pool causes rippling all across the water, the mistreatment of victims spread resentment and distrust of the justice system throughout entire communities. We saw that this insensitivity toward victims was not only unjust, it was unwise. The criminal justice system is absolutely dependent upon the cooperation of crime victims to report and testify. Without their help, the system cannot hold criminals accountable and stem the tide of future crime. Eikenberry, supra, at 30 (emphasis added). ¶ 20. With this background established, we turn to the history of the actual language adopted. The legislature considered and rejected identical language for Article I, Section 9m of the Wisconsin Constitution in 1991 Assembly Joint Resolution 4 and 1989 Assembly Joint Resolution 138, both of which included a right to fairness and respect in a list of specifically enumerated rights: The rights of victims of crime shall be defined and protected by law and shall include: the right to be treated with fairness and respect for their dignity and privacy throughout the criminal justice process; the right to timely disposition of the case following arrest of the accused; the right to be reasonably protected from the accused throughout the criminal justice process; the right to notification of court proceedings; the right to attend trial and all other court proceedings that the accused has the right to attend; the right to confer with the prosecution; the right to make a statement to the court at sentencing; the right to restitution and compensation; and the right to information about the disposition of the case, including the conviction, sentence, imprisonment and release of the accused. 1991 A.J.R. 4 (emphasis added); 1989 A.J.R. 138 (emphasis added). The legislature rejected this language, deciding to remove the reference to fairness, dignity and respect from the list of enumerated rights and move it to a separate sentence. See Wis. Const. art. I, § 9m. We infer from that decision that the broad language of fairness, dignity and respect in the amendment's first sentence was intended to have a different significance than the language specifically articulating rights in the second sentence. ¶ 21. The statutory structure that was in place prior to the adoption of Article I, Section 9m of the Wisconsin Constitution provides evidence of the manner in which the amendment's first and second sentences were intended to differ in significance. The legislature had created Chapter 950, Rights of victims and witnesses of crimes, in 1980. Section 4, ch. 219, Laws of 1979. On its face, Article I, Section 9m of the Wisconsin Constitution appears to have adopted the structure of the pre-amendment codification of victims' rights. See 16 Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 90 (1998) (A constitutional provision must be presumed to have been framed and adopted in the light and understanding of ... existing laws and with reference to them.); 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 34 (1984) (Where a constitutional provision similar or identical to that contained in a ... statute ... is adopted, it is presumed that such provision was adopted with the construction previously placed on it.). Wisconsin Stat. § 950.01 (1991-92), entitled Legislative intent, read in language very similar to the first sentence of Article I, Section 9m of the Wisconsin Constitution: [T]he legislature declares its intent, in this chapter, to ensure that all victims ... of crime are treated with dignity, respect, courtesy and sensitivity. [5] Then, at Wis. Stat. § 950.04 (1991-92), entitled Basic bill of rights for victims and witnesses, specific rights of victims and witnesses were enumerated in detail, [6] as they are in the second sentence of Article I, Section 9m of the Wisconsin Constitution. ¶ 22. Not only is the structure of the constitutional amendment on its face parallel to the pre-existing codification, the Legislative Reference Bureau (LRB) [7] has explained that the constitutional amendment was adopted with the Chapter 950 provisions in mind. See Wisconsin Briefs, Constitutional Amendments and Advisory Referenda To Be Considered by Wisconsin Voters April 6, 1993, LRB-93-WB-4, at 3-4 (March 1993). A LRB publication regarding the amendment explained that advocates of the amendment believed it was necessary to give weight to the statutory language, id. at 3, and included a rationale for the amendment given by Eau Claire County Supervisor Gerald L. Wilkie in 1990 [8] that refers to the pre-existing codification of victim rights: Though we have a comprehensive set of victim rights, the real problem is that these laws carry little weight .... A constitutional amendment is important because it would permanently ensure the rights will be honored and it will give our courts a constitutional basis for recognizing the victim's interest. Id. at 4 (citation omitted). As Article I, Section 9m of the Wisconsin Constitution was adopted to give weight to Chapter 950 and parallels that statutory scheme's structure, our conclusion that the opening sentence of Article I, Section 9m of the Wisconsin Constitution was meant to be a statement of purpose, set apart from and then followed by the enumeration of the specific enforceable rights crime victims are afforded in the second sentence, is further reinforced. ¶ 23. We turn next to the legislature's earliest interpretation of Article I, Section 9m of the Wisconsin Constitution, as manifested in 1997 Wis. Act 181, the first significant law passed regarding the rights of crime victims following the amendment's adoption. With 1997 Wis. Act 181, the legislature retained the pre-amendment statutory structure of providing for rights in detail in a provision entitled Basic bill of rights for victims and witnesses. Wis. Stat. § 950.04. Further, 1997 Wis. Act 181 created a subsection at § 950.04(1v) entitled Rights of victims, which enumerated crime victim rights, none of which make reference to fairness, dignity or respect for privacy. See 1997 Wis. Act 181, § 65. Instead, the legislature retained the broad language referring to fairness and dignity in the provision entitled Legislative intent at Wis. Stat. § 950.01. ¶ 24. Moreover, subsequent to the adoption of 1997 Wis. Act 181, the LRB explained that Article I, Section 9m of the Wisconsin Constitution recognizes specified privileges and protections for crime victims and directs the legislature to provide remedies for violations of those rights. Legislative Briefs, Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses, LB-98-3, at 1 (May 1998). Thus, the amendment apparently was intended to require remedies, such as the private reprimand at issue in this case, only for violations of the privileges and protections enumerated in the second sentence of Article I, Section 9m of the Wisconsin Constitution. See id. The LRB further noted that 1997 Wis. Act 181 lists the rights of crime victims as protected by the Wisconsin Constitution and statutory law in Wis. Stat. § 950.04(1v), id., which, because § 950.04(1v) does not list rights of fairness, dignity or respect for privacy, further supports our conclusion. ¶ 25. The LRB's analysis of Engrossed 1997 Assembly Bill 342, [9] which created 1997 Wis. Act 181, also suggests that the legislature did not interpret Article I, Section 9m of the Wisconsin Constitution to provide a separate enforceable right to fairness, dignity and respect for privacy. The LRB's analysis lists the rights that the state constitution provides to crime victims, without including the right to fairness, dignity and respect for privacy in the list. See Legislative Reference Bureau Analysis of Engrossed 1997 A.B. 342. [12] ¶ 26. In sum, based on our examination of the plain meaning of Article I, Section 9m of the Wisconsin Constitution, which is affirmed by the history of and the legislature's earliest interpretation of that amendment, we conclude that the first sentence of Article I, Section 9m of the Wisconsin Constitution does not provide a self-executing right that the Board is empowered to enforce via private reprimand pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 950.09(2)(a). However, we recognize that crime victims, by virtue of the crimes they suffer, experience profound tragedy before they encounter the criminal justice system. While every act of insensitivity towards a crime victim may not constitute a violation of a right enforceable under § 950.09(2)(a), we believe that justice requires that all who are engaged in the prosecution of crimes make every effort to minimize further suffering by crime victims. Accordingly, we encourage officials within the criminal justice system, including prosecuting attorneys and their staffs, to establish effective lines of communication and good rapport with crime victims to the furthest extent possible. [13] ¶ 27. Moreover, this holding is not to be construed as rendering the first sentence of Article I, Section 9m of the Wisconsin Constitution without meaning or to minimize the importance of the rights of crime victims in this state. Rather, the first sentence of Article I, Section 9m of the Wisconsin Constitution is a constitutional mandate. It articulates this State's policy regarding the treatment of crime victims. It also functions to guide Wisconsin courts' interpretations of the state's constitutional and statutory provisions concerning the rights of crime victims.