Opinion ID: 551345
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The County Appeal--Liability

Text: 10 Plaintiffs filed this action in order to require the imposition of new district lines for the 1990 election of supervisors. The record shows without serious dispute that at the time of the decennial redistricting in 1981, it was not possible to draw a district map, with roughly equal population in each district, that contained a district with a majority of Hispanic voters. The district court found, however, that the County in 1981, as part of a course of conduct that began decades earlier, intentionally fragmented the Hispanic population among the various districts in order to dilute the effect of the Hispanic vote in future elections and preserve incumbencies of the Anglo members of the Board of Supervisors. The evidence in the record also shows that at the time that this action was filed it was possible to draw lines for five districts of roughly equal population size, as required by state law, with one single-member district having a majority of Hispanic voters. 11 The district court found the County liable for vote dilution on two separate theories. It found that the County had adopted and applied a redistricting plan that resulted in dilution of Hispanic voting power in violation of Section 2. It also found that the County, by establishing and maintaining the plan, had intentionally discriminated against Hispanics in violation of Section 2 and the Equal Protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 12 In this appeal, the County's threshold argument is that districts drawn in 1981 are lawful, regardless of any intentional or unintentional dilution of minority voting strength, because at the time they were drawn there could be no single-member district with a majority of minority voters. The County asks us to extract from the Supreme Court's leading decision in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986), and subsequent cases in this and other circuits, the principle that there can be no successful challenge to a districting system unless the minority challenging that system can show that it could, at the time of districting, constitute a voter majority in a single-member district. 13 In response to this position, the appellees argue that no majority requirement should be imposed where, as here, there has been intentional dilution of minority voting strength. The County thus also challenges the sufficiency of the district court's findings with regard to intent. 14 We hold that, to the extent that Gingles does require a majority showing, it does so only in a case where there has been no proof of intentional dilution of minority voting strength. We affirm the district court on the basis of its holding that the County engaged in intentional discrimination at the time the challenged districts were drawn.
15 In 1982, Congress amended Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1973, to provide minority groups a remedy for vote dilution without requiring a showing that the majority engaged in intentional discrimination. Congress set forth a non-exhaustive list of factors to guide courts in determining whether there had been a Section 2 violation. S.Rep. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I at 28-29, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1982, pp. 206-207. Congress indicated that in applying these factors, courts should engage in a searching practical evaluation of the 'past and present reality'  of the political system in question. Id. at 30, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1982, p. 208. Creation of this results test for discrimination under Section 2 did not affect the remedies under Section 2 for intentional discrimination. Id. at 27. 16 In Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986), the Supreme Court discussed the meaning of the new amendment. While noting the factors the Senate had set out as indicators of impermissible vote dilution, it stated that a court must look to the totality of the circumstances in considering a vote dilution claim. It also established three preconditions for liability under the amendment to Section 2 for claims based only on discriminatory effects: (1) geographical compactness of the minority group; (2) minority political cohesion; and (3) majority block voting. 478 U.S. at 50-51, 106 S.Ct. at 2766-67. 17 The Gingles requirements were articulated in a much different context than this case presents. Although the Gingles Court was aware of the history of discrimination against blacks, which was the minority there in question, the Court did not consider any claim that the disputed districting plan had been enacted deliberately to dilute the black vote. See 478 U.S. at 80, 106 S.Ct. at 2760-61. The claim at issue was that the multi-member districts that were being used, regardless of the intent with which they were created, had the effect of diluting the black vote. 478 U.S. at 39-41, 106 S.Ct. at 2781-82. Thus, the court instituted the possibility of majority requirement in a case in which it was asked to invalidate a political entity's choice of a multi-member district system, and impose a system of single-member districts, and was not asked to find that the multi-member scheme had been set up with a discriminatory purpose in mind. 2 An emphasis on showing a statistically significant disparate impact is typical of claims based on discriminatory effect as opposed to discriminatory intent. 18 In contrast, the district court in this case found that the County had adopted its current reapportionment plan at least in part with the intent to fragment the Hispanic population. See Findings at 44 No. 81. The court noted that continued fragmentation of the Hispanic population had been at least one goal of each redistricting since 1959. Thus, the plaintiffs' claim is not, as in Gingles, merely one alleging disparate impact of a seemingly neutral electoral scheme. Rather, it is one in which the plaintiffs have made out a claim of intentional dilution of their voting strength. 19 The County cites a number of cases in support of its argument that Gingles requires these plaintiffs to demonstrate that they could have constituted a majority in a single-member district as of 1981. None dealt with evidence of intentional discrimination. See, e.g., Romero v. City of Pomona, 883 F.2d 1418, 1422 (9th Cir.1989); McNeil v. Springfield Park, 851 F.2d 937 (7th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1031, 109 S.Ct. 1769, 104 L.Ed.2d 204 (1989); Skorepa v. City of Chula Vista, 723 F.Supp. 1384 (S.D.Cal.1989). 20 To impose the requirement the County urges would prevent any redress for districting which was deliberately designed to prevent minorities from electing representatives in future elections governed by that districting. This appears to us to be a result wholly contrary to Congress' intent in enacting Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and contrary to the equal protection principles embodied in the fourteenth amendment.
21 We therefore turn to the appellants' challenge to the district court's rulings with respect to the intent of the supervisors in 1981. The County contends that the district court did not make sufficient findings on intentional discrimination. Focusing on language in Finding 177, quoted supra in note 1, the County claims that the district court found only that the supervisors in 1981 intended to perpetuate their own incumbencies. This is a mistaken reading of what the district court found. Although the court noted that the Supervisors appear to have acted primarily on the political instinct of self-preservation, the court also found that they chose fragmentation of the Hispanic voting population as the avenue by which to achieve this self-preservation. Finding No. 181. The supervisors intended to create the very discriminatory result that occurred. That intent was coupled with the intent to preserve incumbencies, but the discrimination need not be the sole goal in order to be unlawful. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977). Accordingly, the findings of the district court are adequate to support its conclusion of intentional discrimination, and the detailed factual findings are more than amply supported by evidence in the record. 22 Even where there has been a showing of intentional discrimination, plaintiffs must show that they have been injured as a result. Although the showing of injury in cases involving discriminatory intent need not be as rigorous as in effects cases, some showing of injury must be made to assure that the district court can impose a meaningful remedy. 23 That intent must result, according to the Voting Rights Act, in the 24 political processes leading to nomination or election ... [not being] equally open to participation by members of a [protected] class ... in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. 25 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1973(b). This language is echoed in the intentional discrimination case of White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 93 S.Ct. 2332, 37 L.Ed.2d 314 (1973). There, in addition to intent, the Supreme Court required proof that the political processes leading to nomination and election were not equally open to participation by the group in question--that its members had less opportunity than did other residents in the district to participate in the political processes and to elect legislators of their choice. Id. at 766, 93 S.Ct. at 2339. See also Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149, 91 S.Ct. 1858, 1872, 29 L.Ed.2d 363 (1971). 26 Applying that standard to this case of intentional discrimination, we agree with the district court that the supervisors' intentional splitting of the Hispanic core resulted in a situation in which Hispanics had less opportunity than did other county residents to participate in the political process and to elect legislators of their choice. We conclude, therefore, that this intentional discrimination violated both the Voting Rights Act and the Equal Protection Clause.C. Laches 27 The County claims that, because four rounds of elections have occurred since the 1981 reapportionment plan was instituted, and because a regular reapportionment is scheduled to occur in 1991, the plaintiffs' claim for redistricting relief is barred on the ground of laches. It argues that substantial hardship will result from a redistricting now, when another regularly scheduled one is set to occur so closely on its heels. Furthermore, the County contends that the plaintiffs had no excuse for their delay in bringing suit. Therefore, it concludes, the suit should have been dismissed. 28 Although plaintiffs could have filed an action as early as 1981 in order to enhance their ability to influence the result in a district in which they were then still a minority, their failure to do so does not constitute laches. The record here shows that the injury they suffered at that time has been getting progressively worse, because each election has deprived Hispanics of more and more of the power accumulated through increased population. Because of the ongoing nature of the violation, plaintiffs' present claim ought not be barred by laches.