Opinion ID: 777130
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Challenge to Criminal History Calculation

Text: 27 In determining Mr. Evans's criminal history category, the District Court adopted the presentence report. In doing so, the Court assessed two guideline points under section 4A1.1(b), for a conviction with a sentence of imprisonment of at least sixty days. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4A1.1(b) (1998). It assessed sixteen guideline points under section 4A1.1(c), for convictions with sentences of imprisonment, excluding stays, of less than sixty days. However, because no more than four points may be added under section 4A1.1(c), the Court reduced the number of applicable points under that section from sixteen to four. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4A1.1(b) (1998). The Court then added two more guideline points after finding that Mr. Evans was on probation when he committed the instant offense. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4A1.1(d) (1998). With a total of eight guideline points, Mr. Evans was placed in criminal history category IV. 28 Mr. Evans raises a number of arguments. He argues, first, that the presentence report does not indicate that he was represented by an attorney for six of his convictions (all under section 4A1.1(c)). Second, citing section 4A1.2(c)(1), he argues that the Court inappropriately counted six driving convictions (all under section 4A1.1(c)) for which the terms of imprisonment, excluding stays, were less than thirty days. Third, citing section 4A1.2(a)(2), he argues that two convictions which involved concurrent sentences should have been treated as one conviction. Fourth, he argues that there was no evidence in the presentence report or elsewhere that he was on probation at the time of commission of the instant offenses, so imposition of two points under section 4A1.1(d) was error. Finally, he argues that the Court did its addition wrong, and that he should receive no more than six points in total. 29 Because no objection was raised in the District Court, our review is for plain error. Mr. Evans's first contention is without merit. Mr. Evans does not contend or present evidence that he was unrepresented in various prior convictions. He simply states that it has not been established that he was represented. For sentencing purposes, once the government has carried its initial burden of proving the fact of a conviction, it is the defendant's burden to show that the conviction was not valid. United States v. Early, 77 F.3d 242, 244-45 (8th Cir.1996). Mr. Evans has made no showing that his convictions were invalid. 30 Mr. Evans's second contention appears to have merit but not effect. Even if the six driving convictions are removed from the calculation under section 4A1.1(c), his total under that section would be reduced from sixteen to ten. He would still receive the maximum points allowable under that section, four. Therefore, we do not need to decide the issue, as any error would be harmless. 31 Mr. Evans's third contention is without merit. The two convictions at issue were for driving violations on June 30, 1990, and for driving violations on August 1, 1990. After each incident, Mr. Evans was arrested. Therefore, the two cases are not related for purposes of section 4A1.2, so as to be treated as one sentence. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4A1.2, cmt. n. 3 (1998) (Prior sentences are not considered related if they were for offenses that were separated by an intervening arrest ( i.e., the defendant is arrested for the first offense prior to committing the second offense).). 32 Regarding Mr. Evans's fourth contention, that he was not under probation at the time of commission of the current offenses, the government responds that Mr. Evans had received various stayed sentences, and he has not established that these stayed sentences were not a form of probation. The government cites no applicable case law for this proposition, however. Section 4A1.1(d) reads: Add 2 points if the defendant committed the instant offense while under any criminal justice sentence, including probation, parole, supervised release, imprisonment, work release, or escape status. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4A1.1(d) (1998). The application notes to the section indicate that a `criminal justice sentence' means a sentence countable under § 4A1.2 ... having a custodial or supervisory component, although active supervision is not required for this item to apply. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4A1.1(d) cmt. n. 4 (1998). Thus, although section 4A1.2(b)(2) states that `sentence of imprisonment' refers only to the portion [of a sentence] that was not suspended, the term criminal justice sentence is not so narrowly defined. In fact, the application note goes on to state that a term of unsupervised probation would be included within the definition. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4A1.1(d) cmt. n. 4 (1998). Therefore, if a stayed sentence is like a form of unsupervised probation, it should be subject to section 4A1.1(d). 33 We have found no published decision in our Circuit on this issue, but one unpublished decision draws this analogy. See United States v. Blodgett, 32 F.3d 571, 1994 WL 421756, at  (8th Cir. Aug.15, 1994) (finding section 4A1.1 enhancement appropriate for defendant under stayed sentence), cert denied, 514 U.S. 1042, 115 S.Ct. 1414, 131 L.Ed.2d 298 (1995). Other circuits have tended to agree. See United States v. Burke, 148 F.3d 832, 838 (7th Cir.) (holding that court supervision is criminal justice sentence), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1031, 119 S.Ct. 572, 142 L.Ed.2d 476 (1998); United States v. Norman, 129 F.3d 1393, 1401-02 (10th Cir.1997) (holding that judgment and sentence with special conditions imposed under Colorado law was criminal justice sentence); United States v. Damon, 127 F.3d 139, 147 (1st Cir.1997) (holding that defendant was under criminal justice sentence notwithstanding state court's temporary stay of execution of sentences for prior offenses). But see United States v. Kipp, 10 F.3d 1463, 1467 (9th Cir.1993) (holding that, under Colorado's deferred sentencing scheme, suspended sentence, standing alone without accompanying term of probation, is not criminal justice sentence because it lacks both custodial component and supervisory component). 34 The question remains whether any of the instant offenses were committed while Mr. Evans was under a stayed sentence. The application notes to section 4A1.1(d) indicate that the term instant offense is to be interpreted broadly, referring to any part of the instant offense (i.e., any relevant conduct). U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4A1.1(d) cmt. n. 4 (1998). Considering the length and breadth of the conspiracy in which Mr. Evans was involved, and given this broad definition of instant offense, Mr. Evans is almost certain to have engaged in relevant conduct during his various periods under stayed sentences. At the very least, on plain error review, he has the burden to establish that he did not engage in relevant conduct during those periods, something which he has failed to do. 35 In sum, we do not believe the District Court's assignment of these two criminal history points amounts to plain error resulting in a miscarriage of justice. See Fritz v. United States, 995 F.2d 136, 137 (8th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1075, 114 S.Ct. 887, 127 L.Ed.2d 81 (1994). We cannot conclude from the record before us that Mr. Evans's stayed sentences do not qualify as criminal justice sentences or that he did not engage in relevant conduct during those intervals. 36 The final contention that Mr. Evans raises concerns the calculation of his guideline points. The criminal history computation in the presentence report appears to indicate that Mr. Evans was given four points for his prior convictions and two points under section 4A1.1(d), which should yield a total of six points. A closer reading of the report reveals, however, that he actually received two points under section 4A1.1(b), four points under section 4A1.1(c), and then the two point enhancement under section 4A1.1(d). There was no error.