Opinion ID: 658097
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Timeliness of the Charge-Person Claims

Text: 19 All three plaintiffs claim that the appointment of Dupre as charge person of the printing area constituted discrimination against them in violation of Title VII. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants on Foster's charge-person claim in its April 4, 1991 decision and order, but denied summary judgment on Baker's and Lambert's claims, since they presented triable issues of fact. Although the discriminatory acts claimed by Baker and Lambert occurred more than 300 days before the plaintiffs filed their EEOC charge in October 1984 and ordinarily would be time-barred under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(e), see Gomes v. Avco Corp., 964 F.2d 1330, 1332-33 (2d Cir.1992), the court allowed the claims to proceed to trial to give plaintiffs an opportunity to prove that the charge-person discrimination was part of a continuing violation. See id. at 1333. After hearing evidence on the issue, the court ruled in its August 13, 1991 bench trial decision that plaintiffs had failed to prove the existence of a continuing violation. 20 Under the continuing violation exception to the Title VII limitations period, if a Title VII plaintiff files an EEOC charge that is timely as to any incident of discrimination in furtherance of an ongoing policy of discrimination, all claims of acts of discrimination under that policy will be timely even if they would be untimely standing alone. Cook v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 771 F.2d 635, 646 (2d Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1109, 106 S.Ct. 895, 88 L.Ed.2d 929 (1986). 21 The continuing violation exception applies to cases involving specific discriminatory policies or mechanisms such as discriminatory seniority lists, Cook, 771 F.2d at 646, or discriminatory employment tests, Association Against Discrimination in Employment, Inc. v. Bridgeport, 647 F.2d 256, 274-75 (2d Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 988, 102 S.Ct. 1611, 71 L.Ed.2d 847 (1982). However, multiple incidents of discrimination, even similar ones, that are not the result of a discriminatory policy or mechanism do not amount to a continuing violation. See Stoller v. Marsh, 682 F.2d 971, 975 (D.C.Cir.1982) (no continuing violation where a plaintiff does not allege an unlawful program of discrimination but merely alleges specific, perhaps unrelated instances of discrimination) (quoting Milton v. Weinberger, 645 F.2d 1070, 1076 (D.C.Cir.1981)), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1037, 103 S.Ct. 1427, 75 L.Ed.2d 787 (1983); Samuel v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, 771 F.Supp. 47, 49 (S.D.N.Y.1991). Since plaintiffs failed to produce evidence of any such policy or mechanism here, the charge-person claims were properly dismissed as time-barred.