Opinion ID: 1964385
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motions to Quash and Sever

Text: Defendant Belkner first contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash the indictment against him. Belkner alleges that the indictment is insufficient in that it charges him with more than one offense and he could not properly assess the charges against him. The indictment against Belkner precisely tracks the language of RSA 644:1 I(a). In addition it supplies underlying factual allegations so that Belkner was specifically apprised of his alleged offensive conduct. Belkner's confusion apparently arises out of language in the indictment relating to RSA 644:1 IV. RSA 644:1 IV raises the status of riot as defined by RSA 644:1 from a misdemeanor to a class B felony when personal injury or property damage results from the conduct. [1, 2] RSA 644:1 IV is not an offense separate from RSA 644:1 I, but rather is an aggravated status of that same offense. The indictment specified sufficient facts so that defendant was apprised that he was being indicted for riot as a class B felony. The indictment informed Belkner with sufficient definiteness to enable him to prepare a defense and therefore the court did not err in denying Belkner's motion to quash. State v. O'Neill, 105 N.H. 15, 191 A.2d 528 (1963); State v. Hoyt, 114 N.H. 256, 319 A.2d 286 (1974). The fact that defendant was charged in the conjunctive while the statute is phrased in the disjunctive does not invalidate the indictment. Only one offense, riot, was charged and judgment will bar any future trial of the defendant for riot. State v. Harlan, 116 N.H. 598, 364 A.2d 1254 (1976). Defendants Dunn and Laaman argue that the court erred in denying their motions to sever State v. Belkner from State v. Dunn and Laaman. The thrust of defendants' argument on this point is that Belkner's case involved physical injury to the prison steward while their cases did not involve infliction of physical injury. They allege that introduction of this evidence against Belkner was highly inflammatory to the jury and that their cases were unrelated to that of Belkner. [3] RSA 644:1 IV reads in pertinent part: Riot is a class B felony if, in the course of and as a result of the conduct, any person suffers physical injury. . . . This statement taken in conjunction with the language of RSA 644:1 I, the offense with which all three of the defendants were charged, makes it clear that Dunn and Laaman need not have personally engaged in the actual acts of physical violence to be prosecuted for a class B felony under RSA 644:1 IV. Therefore, as Dunn and Laaman correctly admitted at the hearing on their motions to sever, this evidence was also admissible against them as well as against Belkner. We, therefore, cannot see how the mere joinder of the Belkner case with that of Dunn and Laaman was prejudicial to them. Furthermore, all defendants were charged solely with violation of RSA 644:1 I(a) and for the most part the same witnesses were to be called for both cases. The charges all arose out of the same event and in the interest of efficiency it was proper for these cases to be consolidated. The court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motions to sever. State v. Chickering, 97 N.H. 368, 89 A.2d 206 (1952); ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Joinder and Severance § 2.3 (Approved Draft, 1968).