Opinion ID: 1561466
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Willie Griffin's Affidavit and Testimony

Text: Hurst next contends the trial court erred in summarily denying his third supplemental motion, claiming that a new trial should be granted because trial witness Willie Griffin recanted his trial testimony that Hurst confessed. Hurst also contends the postconviction court erred in denying his motion to perpetuate Griffin's testimony. We agree that the trial court erred in denying the motion to perpetuate testimony. Nevertheless, as we explain below, we conclude that relief is not warranted on this claim. Griffin testified at Hurst's jury trial that when he was in jail with Hurst in Escambia County after the Popeye's murder, Hurst told him, I did that swine, and `F' the rest of them. He testified that Hurst did not show any remorse for the crime. Referring to the murder victim, Griffin testified that Hurst told him they didn't get along in the first place, and she was like slow or something like that, like something was wrong with her mentally. Griffin admitted at trial that he tried unsuccessfully to get a visitation favor from the prosecutor and that he had also volunteered to testify against another inmate. [8] Postconviction counsel obtained a sworn affidavit in which Griffin stated that Hurst actually professed his innocence several times; that Griffin's testimony at trial that Hurst said, I did that swine was fabricated; and that when Hurst actually said, Fuck that swine, Griffin was not sure to whom Hurst was referring. The affidavit also averred that Griffin's testimony was entirely based on emotion, based on what I was told by the State and law enforcement. The trial court initially granted an evidentiary hearing on the claim, but postconviction counsel could not secure the attendance of Griffin, who was a federal prisoner at Fort Dix. Counsel's unsuccessful attempts to secure Griffin's appearance resulted in his advising the court that, due to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, only the prosecuting authority could obtain Griffin's presence in Florida. The State did not agree to assist in obtaining Griffin's presence, expressing concern about setting a precedent where the State is essentially responsible for assisting the defense to get their witness. Hurst then filed a sworn motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(j)(1) asking the court to perpetuate Griffin's testimony, with an alternative request to compel the State's assistance in obtaining Griffin's appearance. That motion was denied. Hurst then attempted to support his claim with the affidavit by Griffin, but the court concluded that the unauthenticated affidavit in which Griffin recanted part of his trial testimony would be inadmissible and denied the evidentiary hearing based on the fact that Griffin's attendance could not be secured. The court stated, Postconviction counsel is unable to obtain physical custody of the witness from federal custody. As such, this Court finds that the witness is unavailable to testify at an evidentiary hearing. The postconviction court also denied the written proffer containing the affidavit. Rule 3.190(j) applies to trials, not to postconviction proceedings where discovery is limited and substantial discretion is afforded the trial court, and [t]he decision whether to grant a motion to perpetuate testimony lies within the discretion of the trial court. Riechmann v. State, 966 So.2d 298, 310 (Fla.2007) (quoting Cherry v. State, 781 So.2d 1040, 1054 (Fla. 2000)). We found no abuse of discretion in denial of a motion to perpetuate testimony in Riechmann, where the motion was not under oath or accompanied by sworn affidavits and there was no assertion as to the exact location of the witness. In the present case, however, Hurst's sworn motion met the requirements of the rule and Griffin's exact location was stated in the motion. The court denied the motion to perpetuate testimony, citing the speculative nature of Defendant's pleadings and because the court was not convinced that Griffin could have been held accountable for his proposed deposition testimony. The court also agreed with the State that the State should not have to be responsible for retrieving Defendant's witnesses. After rejecting Hurst's requests for assistance in obtaining the testimony of Griffin, the court found Hurst had failed to present reliable admissible evidence that Griffin had recanted, thus denying the claim. Because Hurst's motion was in proper form and was relevant to his claim of newly discovered evidence, and because his counsel had no other way to secure Griffin's testimony, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to perpetuate Griffin's testimony. Nevertheless, we conclude that even if Griffin's testimony had been obtained and he had testified in accord with his affidavit, relief would not be warranted in this case. Because the affidavit is not a clear recantation of all Griffin's trial testimony, his partial recantation would not be newly discovered evidence of such a nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial, as required by Jones, 709 So.2d at 521. Nor does it appear that it would weaken[ ] the case against [the defendant] so as to give rise to a reasonable doubt as to his culpability. Id. at 526 (quoting Jones v. State, 678 So.2d 309, 315 (Fla. 1996)). Even without Griffin's testimony, ample evidence remained upon which the jury could find Hurst guilty, including his confession to Lee-Lee Smith, Hurst's fingerprints on the bank deposit slip, his possession of a large sum of money on the morning of the murder, and his disposal of large-size tennis shoes bearing indications of blood, along with his purchase of new tennis shoes on the morning of the murder. Thus, relief is denied on this claim.