Opinion ID: 1476426
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: Acceptance of Guilt-Phase Verdict

Text: Defendant asserts that the trial court's explicit instruction to the penalty-phase jury that it must accept the determination that he murdered Rosenthal amounted to a directed verdict for the State on two of the aggravating factors. He claims that the instruction violated his right to have the penalty-phase jury informed of its duty to deliberate anew concerning any facts established by the verdict in the guilt-phase determination that the State relies on to prove an aggravating factor. State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1, 139, 586 A. 2d 85 (1991) ( Marshall I ), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 929, 113 S.Ct. 1306, 122 L.Ed. 2d 694 (1993). We find no error in the instructions, and conclude that the State is not required to reprove the capital murder in the penalty phase when the capital murder itself serves as an element of an alleged aggravating factor. During the penalty-phase trial, the State sought to prove three aggravating factors. It alleged that the defendant previously had been convicted of another murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(a); that the crime was committed for the purpose of escaping detection, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(f); and that the crime took place during the commission of, or in flight after, committing an enumerated felony, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(g). The State submitted robbery or burglary or both as the [ ]other offense committed by defendant under the 4(f) aggravating factor. Similarly, robbery or burglary constituted the underlying offense for the 4(g) aggravating factor. The trial court properly informed the jury that if you determine that more than one of these crimes was committed during the course of the murder, that is, both burglary and robbery, that still would constitute only one aggravating factor. The trial court instructed on several occasions that the penalty-phase jury was bound by the guilty verdict of the guilt-phase of the trial. During voir dire, it informed each panel of prospective jurors that the jury about to be selected will be bound by the verdict of that first jury. The function of the jurors about to be selected in this proceeding is to determine the appropriate punishment for the defendant.... The jury about to be selected is not to question or doubt the defendant's guilt in the murder of Yeda Sharon Dede Rosenthal, nor that he committed her murder by his own conduct. In its instruction at the beginning of the penalty phase, the court reminded the jury that it must accept the guilty finding of the jury in the guilt phase of the trial. The court's charge on the aggravating factors repeated this theme. Discussing the 4(g) aggravating factor, the court stated: The guilt phase jury has determined the defendant's guilt on the murder count. Although you have been instructed to accept its verdict, the guilt and sentencing phase[s] are considered separate proceedings. While you must accept the guilt jury's verdict of guilty of the murder of Yeda Sharon Dede Rosenthal, you must still consider all of the evidence presented in the penalty phase when considering whether or not there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt of this aggravating factor; that is, you must make a separate determination as to whether this murder was committed in connection with the robbery or burglary or both. The court instructed the jury that [t]he focus of this aggravating factor is the commission of a murder connected with the occurrence of certain crimes. In this particular case, the crimes are robbery and/or burglary. After defining the elements of the offense of burglary, it then proceeded to define the elements of robbery: A person is guilty of robbery if in the course of committing a theft he, A, knowingly inflicts bodily injury or uses force upon another, or, B, threatens another with or purposely puts her in fear of immediate bodily injury, or, C, commits or threatens immediately to commit any crime of the first or second degree. Murder is a crime of the first degree. The court then explained that under the third prong, the State was required to prove that the defendant committed or threatened immediately to commit the crime of murder of Ms. Rosenthal, a crime of the first degree, while in the course of committing the theft. Ultimately, the jury concluded that the State had proven each of the aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt and that each, by itself, outweighed beyond a reasonable doubt the mitigating factors found to exist. Defendant argues that the trial court's instructions violated Marshall I and Josephs and amounted to a directed verdict on the aggravating factors because they precluded penalty-phase consideration of all the elements of robbery, specifically those relating to the use or threat of force, bodily injury, or a crime of the first or second degree. In other words, he maintains that by instructing the jury that it had to accept the guilt-phase verdict of murder, the court thereby directed the penalty-phase jury to consider as established those elements of robbery just described. We acknowledge that the argument has some surface appeal; however, we conclude that, after closer inspection, it fails. In Marshall I, supra, we instructed trial courts to inform the penalty-phase jury of its duty to deliberate anew concerning any facts established by the verdict in the guilt-phase determination that the State relies on to prove an aggravating factor, and of its right to reach a different conclusion concerning such facts in the penalty phase. 123 N.J. at 139, 586 A. 2d 85. As we observed in Josephs, supra, this instruction allows the sentencing jury to consider anew the evidence supporting his convictions and to view it from a different perspective than that of the guilt-phase jury. 174 N.J. at 114, 803 A. 2d 1074. A jury properly instructed to deliberate anew upon the guilt-phase evidence may accord the aggravating factor less weight in the balancing process. Ibid. Defendant asks us to extend Marshall I and Josephs to require the penalty-phase to deliberate anew on the capital murder itself when the State relies on that murder to prove an aggravating factor. We decline to do so. Such a holding would conflict with defendant's right to a fair sentencing hearing and would distract the penalty-phase jury from its sole function of ... determin[ing] the appropriate sentence. Josephs, supra, 174 N.J. at 112, 803 A. 2d 1074. The guilt- and penalty-phase juries have fundamentally different responsibilities. The guilt-phase jury decides only whether defendant is guilty of the crimes charged and, if so, whether he is eligible for the death penalty. Biegenwald IV, supra, 126 N.J. at 44, 594 A. 2d 172. In contrast, the penalty-phase jury focuses on whether death is the appropriate punishment for the defendant, State v. Koedatich, 118 N.J. 513, 524, 572 A. 2d 622 (1990) ( Koedatich II ), and the evidence presented by the State need only be relevant to that issue and not to a defendant's guilt, Josephs, supra, 174 N.J. at 112, 803 A. 2d 1074. Accordingly, to protect the integrity of the deliberations from prejudice by evidence not relevant to the jury's specific task, evidence admissible in one phase of a bifurcated trial may not be admissible in the other. Fortin II, supra, 178 N.J. at 569, 843 A. 2d 974 (noting that evidence relevant only during guilt-phase was so inflammatory as to require empanelling of separate sentencing jury); Biegenwald IV, supra, 126 N.J. at 44, 594 A. 2d 172 (noting that prior murder convictions were relevant to determining defendant's sentence but not to his guilt). When evidence admissible in one phase of the trial would prejudice the rights of a defendant in the other phase, a trial court may empanel different juries for the guilt- and penalty-phase trials. See N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(1) (allowing trial court to empanel separate sentencing jury upon showing of good cause). The prejudicial evidence may pertain to either the guilt or sentencing of a defendant. For instance, if limiting instructions would inadequately protect a defendant's sentencing hearing from prejudicial guilt-phase evidence, trial courts must empanel a separate sentencing jury. State v. Moore, 113 N.J. 239, 277, 550 A. 2d 117 (1988). Similarly, in Biegenwald IV, supra, we recognized that the blinding impact of the prior-murder aggravating factor most likely will require a two-jury system for all capital cases in which the State seeks to prove that factor. 126 N.J. at 43-44, 594 A. 2d 172. To require the State to reprove the capital murder during the penalty phase would undermine a primary rationale for bifurcated trials: the exclusion of unduly prejudicial guilt-phase evidence from the sentencing trial. Although we have recognized that the sentencing jury considers the guilt-phase evidence from a different perspective than the guilt-phase jury and that such deliberation can seriously affect the weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors, Josephs, supra, 174 N.J. at 114, 803 A. 2d 1074, any additional benefit a defendant might derive from the sentencing jury's deliberation anew on the capital murder itself would be substantially outweighed by the potential for the guilt-phase evidence to prejudice those very deliberations. In weighing the benefits to be derived from the deliberation anew instruction against the irremediable prejudice that could result from the introduction of guilt-phase evidence of the capital murder itself at the penalty-phase trial, we conclude that the risks outweigh any potential advantages. But we emphasize the narrow scope of this holding. It is only when the capital murder serves as a component of an aggravating factor that trial courts need not instruct the jury to deliberate anew upon that murder. Of the offenses enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(g), only robbery and sexual assault require that the offense occur in conjunction with another crime. See N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2a(3) (defining as element of aggravated sexual assault that defendant commits assault during the commission, or attempted commission ... of robbery, kidnapping, homicide, aggravated assault on another, burglary, arson or criminal escape (emphasis added)); N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1a(3) (defining as element of robbery that defendant [c]ommits or threatens immediately to commit any crime of the first or second degree). We do not comment on other circumstances in which the State might seek to introduce evidence of the capital murder into the sentencing proceeding. Thus, although we reaffirm that trial courts should inform the sentencing jury of its responsibility to deliberate anew, consistent with Marshall I and Josephs, we conclude that trial courts need not instruct the jury to deliberate anew upon the capital murder itself when that murder constitutes part of the proofs of an alleged aggravating factor.