Opinion ID: 2524049
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Plain Language of the Disconnection Statutes Reveals Clear Differences in the Criteria for Disconnection

Text: ¶ 17 A side-by-side comparison of the relevant provisions makes it clear that the statutes are different. After the 2003 amendments, the disconnection statute places the burden on petitioners to prove several things by a preponderance of the evidence. [18] They must show that disconnection is viable and required by justice and equity. [19] They must also show that the county where the disconnected land will be situated is capable [of providing], in a cost-effective manner and without materially increasing the county's costs, the services previously provided by the municipality. [20] In addition, the petitioners must prove that disconnection will not leave the municipality with an area within its boundaries for which ... burdens of providing municipal services would materially increase, or make it ... unfeasible for the municipality to continue to function as a municipality. [21] Finally, and crucially, the 2003 amendments require the petitioner to prove that the proposed disconnection will not ... leave or create one or more islands or peninsulas of unincorporated territory. [22] ¶ 18 We have previously noted that this last requirement operates as an absolute prohibition on disconnection when it would result in an island of unincorporated territory. In Bluffdale Mountain Homes, LC v. Bluffdale City , we stated, [c]learly, if the disconnection creates an island of unincorporated territory, the disconnection is impermissible. [23] We went on to explain that islands are disfavored because they lead to irregular city boundaries and because they inhibit the ability of the responsible county to provide services. [24] We drew on the clear prohibition of islands in the 2003 version of the statutes in order to determine whether, and when, peninsulas were similarly prohibited. [25] We concluded, some peninsulas are too much like an island and therefore are prohibited. [26] ¶ 19 Examining the statutory language again in the context of this case, it is clear that this provision is meant to prohibit islands of unincorporated territory. The statute plainly states that the petitioners bear the burden of proving that disconnection will not leave or create one or more islands ... of unincorporated territory. [27] As a result of the 2003 amendments, a petition for disconnection must be rejected if disconnection will result in an island. [28] ¶ 20 This conclusion is reinforced by examining the structure of this section of the statute. As mentioned, the petitioners are required to prove a number of things in order to obtain disconnection. When a petitioner seeks to persuade the court that the burdens on the municipality will not be increased, or that disconnection will not make it unfeasible for the municipality to continue operating, the court is compelled by statute to consider all relevant factors. [29] The statute then sets forth an illustrative list of factors that the legislature considered relevant to this determinationsuch as the effect on the community as a whole, water services, law enforcement, and other municipal services. [30] There are no similar factors that the legislature considered relevant to determining whether an island is created. [31] ¶ 21 More importantly, the statute makes this disparate treatment quite conspicuous. These three criteriathat disconnection will not increase the burdens on the municipality, that disconnection will not make unfeasible the municipality's continued existence, and that disconnection will not create an island are grouped together and set forth at Utah Code sections 10-2-502.7(3)(c)(i), -502.7(3)(c)(ii), and -502.7(3)(c)(iii). Yet, the section where the statute instructs the court to consider all relevant factors explicitly refers to the petitioners' burden to prove the criteria set forth in Subsections (3)(c)(i) and (ii). [32] In other words, all three of these criteria must be proved to support a petition for disconnection. But only for two of them does the statute require the court to undertake a multi-faceted inquiry into all relevant factors. [33] The creation of an island of unincorporated territory is not subject to this intricate analysis regarding costs. The disparate nature of this inquiry reinforces what is made clear by the plain language of the 2003 amendmentsif disconnection would lead to an island of unincorporated territory, the petition must be rejected. ¶ 22 This stands in stark contrast to the disconnection statute in effect in 2001. Where the 2003 version of the statute elevates the creation of an island to a dispositive element of a petitioner's claim, the version of the statute in effect in 2001 groups it together with all of the other factors the court must consider in assessing whether disconnection will increase the burdens borne by the municipality. [34] The 2001 statute required the court to determine whether or not disconnection will leave the municipality with a residual area within its boundaries for which the cost, requirements, or other burdens of municipal services would materially increase over previous years or for which it would become economically or practically unreasonable to administer as a municipality. [35] As discussed above, these two criteria persist in almost identical form after the 2003 amendments. Like the 2003 version of the statute, the 2001 statute requires the court to consider all relevant factors. [36] And the 2001 version contains an almost identical list of factors that the legislature considered relevant to this determination. In fact, the only difference in this list of illustrative factors is that, in assessing the burdens on the municipality, the 2001 statute requires the court to consider whether or not islands or unreasonably large or varied-shaped peninsular land masses result within or project into the boundaries of the municipality from which the territory is to be disconnected. [37] ¶ 23 This difference is crucial: after the 2003 amendments, the statute instructs the court to reject a petition if granting disconnection will result in an island of unincorporated territory; in 2001, the statute instructed the court to consider whether the creation of an island, along with factors like the effects on the city or community as a whole, materially burdened the municipality. [38] In other words, under the 2001 statute, the creation of an island was not an independently dispositive element of the petitioner's claim. As a legal matter, it was relevant only to the extent that it would add to a city's ongoing costs. ¶ 24 There is a clear difference between a statute that requires a court to consider this possibility, and a statute that simply prohibits disconnection where an island of unincorporated territory would be created. This difference lies at the crux of our determination in this case. When the Harveys petitioned for disconnection in 2001, the statute held open the possibility that an island might be created that would not materially increase the burdens of providing municipal services to the surrounding area. After the 2003 amendments, that possibility is completely foreclosed. Regardless of why the legislature chose to extinguish this possibility, it is clear that the 2003 amendments modified the criteria for disconnection.