Opinion ID: 787590
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: introduction

Text: 208 On August 7, 2002, my colleagues filed an extensive majority opinion in this matter. I filed a partial dissent that was almost as long as the majority opinion. Although our opinions, subsequently vacated by my colleagues, were a clear and present danger to the forests of the nation, they failed to join issue in many ways. 209 My colleagues' opinion in the main adopted the stated purposes of the Vermont legislature and the opinions of its proponents as sufficient constitutional justifications for Act 64. My dissent was largely a detailed statutory analysis of Act 64, concluding that it limits or prohibits a vast range of ordinary political activities. The dissent also discussed the Act's pervasive ambiguities to be resolved through the often ad hoc discretionary decisions by those who must administer it and was critical of my colleagues for viewing the Act through the prism of what its proponents said about it instead of what the Act itself says. 210 Although my dissent has been substantially revised to address issues raised by my colleagues' decision to remand rather than reverse with regard to the expenditure limits issue, to elaborate in more detail the evidence that Act 64 is intended to protect incumbent legislators, and to provide a more particularized discussion of the evidence in the record, not much has changed since my colleagues vacated our earlier opinions. Their revised opinion does not discuss or even mention, to take only a few examples, the following concrete effects of Act 64: 211 (i) Act 64's limits on expenditures are so low that they are below the amount spent in the past by third-party candidates, see infra Part IV(b)(1)(C); 212 (ii) Act 64 limits a candidate who must run in both a primary and general election to the same expenditures as an opponent who runs only in the general election, see infra Parts III(b), IV(c); 213 (iii) a favorable press editorial after an interview with a candidate must be valued and treated as a contribution to, and expenditure by, the candidate's campaign subject to Act 64's limits, see infra Parts III(g), IV(d); 214 (iv) according to Vermont's Secretary of State, if a candidate provides a photo or written materials to a person who uses the photo or materials in a publication, the candidate must treat the cost of the publication as an expenditure by the candidate, see infra Parts III(g), IV(d); Appendix A; 215 (v) the draconian limits on the activities of autonomous local units of political parties resulting from Act 64's requirement that funding for all local activities, such as a town committee picnic, must be from a single statewide party bank account with the permission of the person who controls that account, see infra note 1, Part IV(a)(2), (e); 216 (vi) the need for campaign volunteers to keep records of every mile they drive to meetings, to campaign events, or on other campaign business over a two-year period, see infra Parts III(e), IV(a)(1); 217 (vii) the need of a campaign to treat the miles driven by volunteers as a campaign expenditure subject to Act 64's limits (and to keep records and report that mileage), and to prohibit further driving by volunteers whenever limited (by Act 64) campaign resources are needed for other activities or the expenditure limits have been reached, see infra Parts III(e), IV(a)(1); or 218 (viii) the restrictions on ordinary homeowners wanting to hold meet the candidates events (and again the need for a candidate's campaign to record and limit such events as campaign expenditures), see infra Part IV(a)(1). 219 My colleagues now remand Act 64's expenditure limits principally for an inquiry into whether the Vermont legislature considered somewhat higher limits as a less restrictive alternative. Even putting aside the Supreme Court's holding that expenditure limits are per se unconstitutional, see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45, 54, 57, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) ( per curiam ), that language used in Act 64 is unconstitutionally vague, 424 U.S. at 44, 80, 96 S.Ct. 612, see infra note 6, and the fact that, even under the standard applied by my colleagues, the levels of Act 64's limits are unconstitutionally low and clearly protective of incumbents, the remand is something of an oddity. First, it involves largely legal issues described by my colleagues as factual. Second, the issue should be whether less restrictive alternatives exist, not whether the Vermont legislature considered them. Third, the degree of an alternative's restrictiveness cannot be evaluated without knowing what is restrictive, and to what degree, about the law in question. However, the only discussion of Act 64's specific restrictions on political activity is found in this dissent. Fourth, a speech-supportive and constitutionally sound alternative—a combination of private and public financing with low contribution limits—is obviously available. In fact, Act 64 itself limits contributions to such small amounts—$400 for statewide candidates, $300 for Senate candidates, and $200 for House candidates—that there is no evidence showing that the possibility of improper influence on officeholders is at present anything but negligible. 220 I therefore respectfully continue to dissent as to the constitutionality of two aspects of Act 64. See 1997 Vermont Campaign Finance Reform Act (codified as Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 17, §§ 2801-2883) (Act 64). Those aspects are Act 64's limits on expenditures by candidates, including related expenditures by individual supporters and political parties, and its restrictions on fundraising and spending on party-building activities by state, county, and local committees of a political party. Id. §§ 2801(5), 2805a. Otherwise, based on Supreme Court precedent, I concur in the result reached by my colleagues.