Opinion ID: 2552553
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Treating Death- and Life-Leaning Prospective Jurors Differently

Text: Defendant claims that the trial court violated the federal constitutional guaranties of due process of law, trial before an impartial jury, and equal protection of the laws by applying different standards in ruling on motions to excuse for cause jurors who seemed to favor the death penalty and those who seemed opposed to it. He maintains that the court applied different standards in determining whether the two groups of jurors were substantially impaired in their ability to follow the law and that it used different procedures in evaluating them. According to defendant, the trial court focused on whether the death penalty adherents were committed to following his instructions regarding aggravating and mitigating evidence and did not examine critically whether they could be fair on the issue of sentence, whereas with death penalty skeptics, the court did the reverse, not concerning itself with whether prospective jurors would commit to following its instructions, but examining critically whether they could be fair to the People. This differential inquiry, he maintains, raised the barrier for the death penalty skeptics to serve on the jury vis-ā-vis that faced by the death penalty adherents. Procedurally, defendant asserts, the court asked fewer questions of the prospective jurors the prosecution challenged for cause than of those defendant challenged, thereby rehabilitating death penalty adherents without attempting to rehabilitate skeptics. The contentions are without merit. As stated, the qualifications of [prospective] jurors challenged for cause are matters within the wide discretion of the trial court, seldom disturbed on appeal. ( People v. Jones (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1229, 1246, 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 468, 64 P.3d 762; see Uttecht v. Brown, supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___, 127 S.Ct. at p. 2224.) A trial court possessed] discretion to conduct oral voir dire as necessary and to allow attorney participation and questioning as appropriate. ( People v. Robinson (2006) 37 Cal.4th 592, 614, 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 760, 124 P.3d 363; see People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1215, 1250, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 838, 117 P.3d 544 [manner of conducting voir dire not basis for reversal unless it makes resulting trial fundamentally unfair].) No abuse of discretion occurred in the court's determination of the prospective jurors' qualifications to serve or its manner of conducting voir dire. We have reviewed the voir dire of each prospective juror to which defendant refers in this claim, namely five challenged by the defense (Deborah P., [5] Prospective Juror No. 10 of October 4, 1994, Prospective Jurors Nos. 3 and 10 of October 5, 1994, and John O.) and additional prospective jurors challenged by the prosecution (Veronica R. and Prospective Juror No. 10 of October 6, 1994). In assessing defendant's contention, we have also considered the trial court's treatment of four other prospective jurors, discussed above ( ante, 61 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 482-486, 161 P.3d at pp. 21-24), whom the prosecutor challenged. We see nothing suggesting the court applied different standards to the various jurors. Indeed, the court explained on the record that it was applying the same standards regardless of whether the prospective juror favored or opposed the death penalty. The bottom line in my mind, the court stated, is whether they will follow the law no matter what their leanings are or what their inclinations are. [ķ] If I am convinced after I hear everything they have said that they will follow the law, then I will deny the challenge. The court went on: If I have a doubt as to whether they will follow the law or think they won't, then I will grant the challenge, and that is what I have been ruling, basing the rulings on. The court also advised counsel that every time I have a doubt in my mind I'm going to resolve it in favor of the Defendant because he has got his life on the line and because I'm concerned about having to try this case over again. We first address the five prospective jurors in question whom the defense challenged. In each case, the trial court denied a motion to excuse the prospective juror for cause. (1) Deborah P. stated generally during her voir dire that she would be open-minded, follow the trial court's instructions, and, at any eventual penalty phase, listen to the presentation of evidence without prejudging defendant's deserved punishment. But she also stated initially that she would not consider evidence of parental neglect or abuse of defendant in childhood or his consumption of alcohol or drugs as mitigating evidence; she would base her decision solely on the circumstances of the crimes. Defense counsel then asked if Deborah P. would vote for the death penalty if it were proven that defendant had committed premeditated murder with special circumstances. The prosecutor objected to that question as calling for speculation. The trial court sustained the objection and proceeded to explain the bifurcated nature of a capital trial to Deborah P., asking whether at any eventual penalty phase she would consider all the evidence that the court directed her to evaluate. She answered that she would, and affirmed that view during further examination by defense counsel and the prosecutor. Deborah P. also stated that her best friend was murdered by her husband in 1987. She testified as a character witness for her deceased friend, in a case prosecuted by the prosecutor in defendant's case. She stated that because she knew nothing about defendant, neither the murder of her friend nor the prosecutor's involvement in that case would affect her ability to judge defendant fairly. Despite her connection with the decedent in that case, she had not followed the trial. In addition, less than three months before Deborah P.'s voir dire testimony, the father of her daughter (the two were never married) also was murdered. She considered him a friend. Her daughter had recovered from the experience. Deborah P. stated that despite a degree of similarity between the murder of her daughter's father and of O'Sullivan, who had a child, she could remain impartial in passing sentence on defendant if the trial reached that stage. She felt that the death penalty should be imposed only for certain types of murders, not all of them. She maintained that she had no opinion about the propriety of the death penalty. Defendant predicated his challenge for cause on an assertion that Deborah P. would be biased because her friend had been murdered and the prosecutor trying the case against defendant had prosecuted the murderer in the prior case. The trial court denied the challenge, stating that Deborah P. is indicating she is going to have some difficulties, but she feels she will deal with it and I'm going to take her word for it. (2) Defense counsel's voir dire of Prospective Juror No. 10 of October 4, 1994, revealed that she held unorthodox views about criminal procedure and the rights of criminal defendants but would subordinate those views to the law. In addition, the prospective juror declared that in her mind defendant was guilty of the murder of Kellie O'Sullivan, that the murder was senseless, and that to murder a mother of a child for no reason is especially depraved; hence she would be biased against defendant. She opined that the death penalty is morally right. She emphasized that although she would lean toward the death penalty if at the guilt phase defendant were shown to have committed premeditated murder and was death-eligible, she would not automatically impose the greater sentence under those circumstances. But she also stated that she would not find certain types of mitigating evidence helpful, though she would listen to its presentation. The trial court asked the prospective juror to clarify her views, and she explained that she would do more than merely listen to the presentation of mitigating evidence while simultaneously rejecting it out of hand, but would actively consider any such evidence in deciding sentence. The court asked her if she could be fair to both parties at any eventual penalty phase, and she said yes. The court denied defendant's challenge for cause, stating that initially he was dubious of the prospective juror's ability to be fair but had become satisfied that now she understand[s] what the law is and that she will follow the law.... Clearly the court found it necessary to ask the prospective juror questions to reach a decision about her, and doing so was not unfair to defendant. The court's conclusion regarding the juror's qualification to serve, moreover, is supported by the record. (3) Prospective Juror No. 3 of October 5, 1994, stated, in answer to defense counsel's questions, that she favored the death penalty for all premeditated murders regardless of the mitigating evidence of defendant's childhood difficulties. The prosecutor thereafter attempted to rehabilitate the prospective juror. In response to the prosecutor's voir dire, the prospective juror said, I feel that I am strongly in favor of the death penalty, but conceded that circumstances might conceivably exist that would sway her from imposing a death sentence. She would try to deliberate on sentence with an open mind. The trial court explained to this prospective juror that even the most horrendous murder imaginable would not automatically result in the death penalty under California law. It asked her whether she could weigh the evidence fairly. She replied, I have a strong opinion, and I have a lot of feelings about it, but I think I can be fair and weigh everything equally. In ruling against defendant's motion to excuse this prospective juror for cause, the trial court stated its conviction, which finds support in the record, that the prospective juror would follow the law and would set aside her personal views of the way the law ought to operate. Again, it is evident that the court found it necessary to ask the prospective juror questions to reach a decision about her, and doing so worked no unfairness to defendant. (4) Prospective Juror No. 10 of October 5, 1994, held views similar to those of Prospective Juror No. 3 of that same day, and the trial court explained that the law would require her to consider mitigating and aggravating evidence. In response to further questions by the parties, she said that she would try to do as the court instructed. We see nothing improper in the court's explaining the law to the prospective juror, nor in its failing to engage in a similar dialogue with other prospective jurors whose voir dire did not give rise to the same concerns as did that of this prospective juror. (5) John O. declared that after reading newspaper accounts he thought defendant was guilty of murdering O'Sullivan. He said I don't think I would give him a fair chance, if I was on the jury and I would not want me on the jury if it was me [in defendant's shoes]. Despite his personal feelings about defendant, however, John 0. agreed that criminal defendants should not be required to prove their innocence, that he would judge defendant based only on the evidence presented in court, and that if the prosecution presented insufficient evidence against defendant to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, he would find him not guilty. The trial court then asked for further assurances that John O. would judge the case based on the evidence that comes from that witness stand, and John O. replied that he could do so. Again, it is evident that the court found it necessary to question the prospective juror in order to reach a decision about his suitability to try the case, and doing so worked no unfairness to defendant. As to the jurors under consideration, we see neither abuse of discretion in the way the trial court conducted voir dire nor any disparity in the standards it used to evaluate the prospective jurors' suitability for service, and we will not disturb its rulings on appeal. We next address the two additional prospective jurors in question whom the prosecution challenged for cause and whom the trial court excused on that basis without asking any questions. (1) Veronica R. stated, in answer to a question by defense counsel, that she opposed the death penalty and that her feelings had grown stronger with the passage of time. She also stated, however, that she could follow the law rather than her own personal views. When the prosecutor questioned her, she reverted to her view that I don't feel it is my choice to take somebody's life. It is just the way I was brought up, my religion and background. She explained that God's law takes precedence over those of humankind and that a vote for the death penalty would be a violation of God's law. I am Catholic and I don't think we should take a life, she affirmed. Defense counsel attempted to rehabilitate Veronica R. She reaffirmed twice that I'm against the death penalty, but that a case might exist in which she could vote for the greater sentence if I ... just block out everything how I feel. That did not satisfy the court, which stated, I have just got to go by the entirety of the examination and demeanor of the [prospective] juror and call it, and this time I really don't think [she] can be fair and follow the law.... We see no impropriety in the trial court's conduct of voir dire of this prospective juror. It was obvious from Veronica R.'s voir dire that she was at least substantially impaired in her ability to follow the law and the court's instructions if the case reached a penalty phase â her religious scruples would take precedence over any secular rule. The court did not abuse its discretion either in the manner of conducting voir dire (i.e., failing to ask any questions of the prospective juror) or in its evaluation of the prospective juror's suitability for service, and we will not disturb its ruling on appeal. (2) Like Veronica R., Prospective Juror No. 10 of October 3, 1994, declared, in answer to a question by defense counsel, I'm against the death penalty. And like Veronica R., she also told defense counsel that she could follow the law rather than her own personal views. But then she reverted to her view that I'm against the death penalty and it would be difficult to impose it. She declared that she could not impose it in any case involving circumstances broadly similar: to those present in the case against defendant. Thereafter she changed course again and said she could follow the law and consider imposing the death penalty. In response to the prosecutor, the prospective juror clarified her statements to defense counsel and declared that she could not impose capital punishment. She had written on her juror questionnaire that one of two absolute moral precepts is not to take another's life, and at the time of voir dire she could consider the evidence at the penalty, phase for either one of those punishments but having done so could not agree to the death penalty no matter what the evidence was. The trial court found that she could not follow the law and granted the motion to excuse her. Again, we see no impropriety in the trial court's conduct of voir dire of this prospective juror. Plainly, this prospective juror was substantially impaired in her ability to follow the law and the court's instructions if the case reached a penalty phase â her moral opposition to the death penalty was close to absolute. The court did not abuse its discretion either in the manner of conducting voir dire (i.e., failing to ask any questions of the prospective juror) or in its evaluation of the prospective juror's suitability for service, and we will not disturb its ruling on appeal. The foregoing discussion disposes of defendant's claim that the trial court imposed a differing standard in evaluating prospective jurors' qualifications and treated each group differently. Defendant invokes People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 547, 891 P.2d 93, for the principle that trial courts should be evenhanded in their questions to prospective jurors during the `death-qualification' portion of the voir dire, and should inquire into the jurors' attitudes both for and against the death penalty to determine whether these views will impair their ability to serve as jurors. ( Id. at pp. 908-909, 39 Cal. Rptr.2d 547, 891 P.2d 93.) But the court followed the rule of Champion here. It evaluated each prospective juror individually and evenhandedly to reach a decision on the suitability of each for jury service. As noted, defendant contends that the trial court asked fewer questions of certain prospective jurors than of certain others, but in People v. Navarette (2003) 30 Cal.4th 458, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 89, 66 P.3d 1182, we rejected a similar claim, commenting that a numerical counting of questions ... is not sufficient to establish a constitutional violation in this context. ( Id. at p. 487, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 89, 66 P.3d 1182.) A reviewing court should not require a trial court's questioning of each prospective juror in the Witherspoon-Witt context ( Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841; Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776) to be similar in each case in which the court has questions, lest the court feel compelled to conduct a needlessly broad voir dire, receiving answers to questions it does not need to ask. Accordingly, defendant's claim lacks merit.