Opinion ID: 2341603
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Former RCW 71.09.030(5) Is Constitutional

Text: ¶ 26 Statutes are presumed to be constitutional and the party challenging a statute's constitutionality bears the burden of proving its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Thorne, 129 Wash.2d 736, 769-70, 921 P.2d 514 (1996). Additionally, wherever possible, it is the duty of this court to construe a statute so as to uphold its constitutionality. State v. Reyes, 104 Wash.2d 35, 41, 700 P.2d 1155 (1985). Having interpreted threat to mean an expression of intention to inflict harm or loss on another under the statute's plain meaning, we hold that former RCW 71.09.030(5), as defined by former RCW 71.09.020(10), is neither overbroad nor unconstitutionally vague.
¶ 27 Under the First Amendment, Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech. [9] U.S. CONST. amend. 1. A statute violates the First Amendment if it is overbroad; that is, if it prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292, 128 S.Ct. 1830, 170 L.Ed.2d 650 (2008). Former RCW 71.09.030(5) does not implicate First Amendment concerns and therefore cannot be overbroad under the First Amendment. ¶ 28 Former RCW 71.09.030(5) does not implicate First Amendment concerns because it does not criminalize or regulate speech. [10] It is part of a civil commitment statute. [11] We note that criminal statutes that merely use speech to establish the elements of a crime or to prove motive or intent do not implicate First Amendment concerns. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 113 S.Ct. 2194, 124 L.Ed.2d 436 (1993); State v. Halstien, 122 Wash.2d 109, 124-25, 857 P.2d 270 (1993). This civil statute allows the State to establish a recent overt act in a civil matter by evaluating an offender's threats in the context of his or her conduct, history, and mental condition. As the Court of Appeals stated: [C]hapter 71.09 RCW does not penalize threats to reoffend in a sexually violent manner, nor does it authorize civil commitment based on such threats alone. Rather, the statute's focus is on the impact of the sex offender's conduct on the community, i.e., present dangerousness, which is established by proof of a recent overt act. This requires more than showing a threat to reoffend; the State must also show that the offender's mental condition and history create a reasonable apprehension of such harm from an objective viewpoint. Thus, because the threats must be evaluated in the context of the offender's conduct, i.e., the offender's history and mental condition, the statute does not regulate pure speech. Rather, it allows the State to establish current dangerousness with proof of a threat that would create a reasonable apprehension of harm based on the sex offender's conduct. Danforth, 153 Wash.App. at 843-44, 223 P.3d 1241 (footnote omitted). ¶ 29 Unlike previous cases in which we analyzed whether a criminal statute's use of the word threat violated the First Amendment, chapter 71.09 RCW is not a criminal statute and does not implicate the First Amendment. E.g., State v. Schaler, 169 Wash.2d 274, 236 P.3d 858 (2010) (holding that felony harassment statute proscribes only true threats); State v. Kilburn, 151 Wash.2d 36, 43, 84 P.3d 1215, (2004) (same); J.M., 144 Wash.2d at 480, 28 P.3d 720 (same); State v. Williams, 144 Wash.2d 197, 208, 26 P.3d 890 (2001) (holding that misdemeanor harassment statute proscribes only true threats). We therefore need not reach a true threat analysis in this civil commitment.
¶ 30 A vagueness challenge to a statute not involving First Amendment rights is evaluated as applied to the challenger, using the facts of the particular case. City of Spokane v. Douglass, 115 Wash.2d 171, 182, 795 P.2d 693 (1990) (citing Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988)). The challenged law is tested for unconstitutional vagueness by inspecting the actual conduct of the party who challenges the ordinance and not by examining hypothetical situations at the periphery of the ordinance's scope. Douglass, 115 Wash.2d at 182-83, 795 P.2d 693. Applying these principles to the present case, Danforth must challenge that former RCW 71.09.030(5) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him. ¶ 31 Thus, Danforth must show either that (1) former RCW 71.09.020(10) does not define recent overt act with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct constitutes a recent overt act or (2) that former RCW 71.09.020(10) does not provide an ascertainable standard to protect against arbitrary enforcement. See Douglass, 115 Wash.2d at 178, 795 P.2d 693 (citing Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 49, 96 S.Ct. 243, 46 L.Ed.2d 185 (1975) (defining when a statute is void for vagueness under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment)); see also Boutilier v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 387 U.S. 118, 123, 87 S.Ct. 1563, 18 L.Ed.2d 661 (1967) (void for vagueness doctrine applies to both civil and criminal statutes).
¶ 32 To determine whether a challenged ordinance is sufficiently definite, the statutory language is afforded a sensible, meaningful, and practical interpretation. Douglass, 115 Wash.2d at 180, 795 P.2d 693. As the United States Supreme Court has said, this does not preclude the use of ordinary terms to express ideas which find adequate interpretation in common usage and understanding. The use of common experience as a glossary is necessary to meet the practical demands of legislation. Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 393, 52 S.Ct. 581, 76 L.Ed. 1167 (1932) (citations omitted). A statute is not unconstitutionally vague merely because a person cannot predict with precise certainty the exact point at which his or her actions may be classified as a recent overt act. See City of Seattle v. Eze, 111 Wash.2d 22, 26, 759 P.2d 366 (1988). ¶ 33 Here, the common and ordinary meaning of threat is an expression of intent to inflict loss or harm on another. This is a sensible, meaningful, and practical interpretation of the statute that is consistent with the legislature's intent to civilly commit sexually violent offenders before harm to another victim occurs. Former RCW 71.09.020(10) defines recent overt act with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct amounts to a recent overt act. [12]
¶ 34 The due process clause forbids statutes that contain no standards and allow police officers, judges, and juries to subjectively decide what conduct the statute proscribes or what conduct will comply with a statute in any given case. State v. Maciolek, 101 Wash.2d 259, 267, 676 P.2d 996 (1984). The statute must instead provide `minimal guidelines ... to guide law enforcement.' Douglass, 115 Wash.2d at 181, 795 P.2d 693 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Worrell, 111 Wash.2d 537, 544, 761 P.2d 56 (1988)). These determinations are not made in a vacuum, but rather, the question is whether [t]he terms are not inherently subjective in the context in which they are used. Worrell, 111 Wash.2d at 544, 761 P.2d 56 (emphasis added). Additionally, the mere fact that a statute may require some degree of subjective evaluation by a police officer to determine whether the statute applies does not mean the statute is unconstitutionally vague. Am. Dog Owners Ass'n v. City of Yakima, 113 Wash.2d 213, 216, 777 P.2d 1046 (1989). Under the due process clause, the enactment is unconstitutional only if it invites an inordinate amount of police discretion. Douglass, 115 Wash.2d at 181, 795 P.2d 693. ¶ 35 Former RCW 71.09.020(10) requires a person to consider an offender's acts and threats objectively in the context of his or her history and mental condition. It also requires that the acts and threats have either caused harm of a sexually violent nature or have created a reasonable apprehension of such harm in the mind of an objective person who knows of the offender's history and mental condition. Former RCW 71.09.020(10) thus provides guidelines to the prosecuting attorney and attorney general, who may file petitions for civil commitment, and does not allow them to consider threats in a vacuum. Although petitioning for civil commitment under RCW 71.09.030 is discretionary, former RCW 71.09.020(10) provides an ascertainable standard to protect against arbitrary enforcement of the involuntary civil commitment statute. ¶ 36 Finally, we again recognize that involuntary civil commitment is a substantial curtailment of individual liberty and therefore requires a showing that the offender is presently dangerous to justify commitment. In re Det. of Lewis, 163 Wash.2d 188, 193, 177 P.3d 708 (2008). We have already held that proof of a recent overt act satisfies this inquiry. Id. at 194, 177 P.3d 708 (citing In re Det. of Albrecht, 147 Wash.2d 1, 8, 51 P.3d 73 (2002); In re Pers. Restraint of Young, 122 Wash.2d 1, 41, 857 P.2d 989 (1993); In re Det. of Harris, 98 Wash.2d 276, 284, 654 P.2d 109 (1982)). The consideration of acts and threats that have either caused harm of a sexually violent nature or have created a reasonable apprehension of such harm in the mind of an objective person who knows of the history and mental condition of the person engaging in the act is consistent with our requirement that the State show the offender is presently dangerous and comports with due process. Cf. Lewis, 163 Wash.2d at 203, 177 P.3d 708 (Sanders, J., concurring).