Opinion ID: 2349535
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Weybosset Hill's Standing

Text: The city also alleged in its motion for judgment on partial findings, pursuant to Rule 52(c), that Weybosset Hill lacked standing to prosecute the appeals for tax years 1997 and 1998 because it did not own the property when such taxes were imposed. It further asserted that Weybosset Hill lacked standing to appeal the 1999 taxes, notwithstanding its purchase of the property on March 12, 1999, because the true and exact account that must be filed as a prerequisite to challenging a tax assessment was, in fact, filed by Blue Cross, its predecessor in title. The trial justice denied the city's Rule 52(c) motions in her written decision. The issue of whether a plaintiff has standing to bring a tax appeal is a mixed question of law and fact. Cummings v. Shorey, 761 A.2d 680, 684 (R.I.2000). A plaintiff has standing when the plaintiff alleges that the challenged action has caused him [or her] injury in fact, economic or otherwise. Id. (quoting Rhode Island Ophthalmological Society v. Cannon, 113 R.I. 16, 22, 317 A.2d 124, 128 (1974)). Standing is not determined by whether the injury is substantial or insubstantial, but only whether there is some injury as opposed to no injury. Id. We also have held that a taxpayer has standing if he or she has a personal stake beyond that shared by all other members of the public at large or the taxpayers of the town. Id. (quoting West Warwick School Committee v. Souliere, 626 A.2d 1280, 1284 (R.I.1993)). On appeal, the city argues that § 44-5-16 provides the exclusive remedy for relief from an illegal tax assessment. It further contends that, as municipalities possess only such power to tax as is authorized by the constitution or the Legislature, the laws concerning taxation are in derogation of common law and, therefore, must be construed strictly. Section 44-5-26(a) provides in pertinent part: Any person aggrieved on any ground whatsoever by any assessment of taxes against him or her in any city or town    may within ninety (90) days from the date of the first tax payment is due, file an appeal in the local office of tax assessment   . Thus, according to the city, Weybosset Hill was not an aggrieved party to challenge the assessments for tax years 1997 and 1998 because it was not responsible for paying any taxes imposed before it assumed ownership of the property. Further, the city asserts that there is no provision in the tax statutes that allows a tax appeal to be assigned, and in the absence of such a specific statutory provision, a taxpayer who already has filed an appeal has no right to assign his or her rights to another party. We reject the city's reasoning. Section 44-5-26 is a remedial statute and should be construed liberally to achieve effectuation of the relief it is meant to provide. deZahara v. Weiss, 516 A.2d 879, 880 (R.I.1986) (citing Ayers-Schaffner v. Solomon, 461 A.2d 396, 399 (R.I.1983)). Furthermore, [a]s with all revenue statutes, any doubt about the meaning or scope of § 44-5-26 must be resolved in favor of the taxpayer and against the taxing authority. deZahara, 516 A.2d at 880 (citing Norberg v. Feist, 495 A.2d 687, 689 (R.I.1985)). In its reply brief, the city acknowledges that it is not challenging Weybosset Hill's status as an aggrieved party with respect to the assessment of December 31, 1998, for tax year 1999. Even though Weybosset Hill did not take title to the property until March 12, 1999, it was the owner when the tax bills were issued in the summer of 1999, and it paid such taxes. We were confronted with a similar situation in deZahara. In deZahara, 516 A.2d at 879, the plaintiff purchased property in Newport on June 15, 1983. Newport began the process of revaluing the property before the plaintiff's purchase. Id. Shortly after purchasing the property, the plaintiff received a tax bill for the assessment on December 31, 1982, that was forwarded to her by the previous owner. Id. She then filed an appeal to reduce the 1982 assessment. Id. The tax assessor in deZahara, 516 A.2d at 879, similarly argued that the purchaser did not have standing under § 44-5-26 to pursue the appeal because she was not aggrieved within the meaning of the statute. Instead, the tax assessor argued that the previous owner was the proper party to bring the appeal, and the purchaser's remedy was to join the previous owner as an indispensable party plaintiff. deZahara, 516 A.2d at 879-80. We held that the plaintiff was an aggrieved party within the scope of § 44-5-26, and that she was the proper party to pursue the appeal. deZahara, 516 A.2d at 880. In reaching our holding, we refused to construe § 44-5-26 narrowly. We said, [t]o construe this section so narrowly as to mean that only the person owning a piece of property on a specific assessment date may seek relief would be absurd. deZahara, 516 A.2d at 880. Furthermore, we held that the plaintiff was the party against whom the taxes had been assessed: [s]ince the plaintiff is, in reality, the one against whom the taxes were imposed and from whom the taxes must be collected, she is the one against whom the taxes were `assessed' as is meant by § 44-5-26. deZahara, 516 A.2d at 880. Pursuant to our opinion in deZahara, the trial justice found that [Weybosset Hill] had standing to challenge the 1998 assessment [ i.e., for tax year 1999] in its own right. We agree. The present facts are similar to those we confronted in deZahara, and we affirm the trial justice's finding accordingly. Weybosset Hill's standing to challenge the assessments for tax years 1997 and 1998 flows from its status as successor-in-interest to Blue Cross. The city argues that the trial justice erred in finding that Weybosset Hill had standing to pursue Blue Cross's tax appeals for those years that Blue Cross owned the property because title 44 does not specifically provide for the assignment of tax appeals. Conversely, Weybosset Hill asserts that legal claims may be assigned if supported by adequate consideration, and that as assignee of Blue Cross' tax appeals it steps into the shoes of the assignor and can avail itself of the assignor's rights, no more and no less. The trial justice found, as a question of fact, that the assignment of the tax appeals for tax years 1997 and 1998 from Blue Cross to Weybosset Hill were valid. She further ruled that Weybosset Hill had claimed an injury in fact sufficient to establish itself as an aggrieved party under § 44-5-26. She also stated, [Weybosset Hill] arguably suffered a specific, concrete injury from the assessment process when it purchased, for good and valuable consideration, its predecessor's pending appeal, which had been denied by the [city], along with the property. The city bases its argument on the proposition that chapter 5 of title 44, which authorizes municipalities to levy a tax on its ratable property, is in derogation of the common law and therefore must be strictly construed. Thus, in the absence of a specific statutory provision in the tax title, a tax appellant has no right to assign his or her rights to another party. We reject, however, the city's contentions that the assignment is unenforceable, and that Weybosset Hill had no right to pursue any appeal based on tax assessments for which it had no responsibility to pay. Contrary to the city's assertions, we conclude that G.L.1956 § 9-2-8 applies to the assignments at issue here. Section 9-2-8 provides: Assignee of nonnegotiable chose in action.  The assignee of a nonnegotiable chose in action which has been assigned in writing may maintain an action thereon in his or her own name, but subject to all defenses and rights of counterclaim, recoupment, or setoff to which the defendant would have been entitled had the action been brought in the name of the assignor. The trial justice considered § 9-2-8 and ruled that it impliedly authorizes assignments like the subject one. We agree. Moreover, we are unpersuaded by the city's contention that the lack of a specific statute authorizing the assignment of tax appeals trumps the more general language of § 9-2-8. In Cerberus Partners, L.P. v. Gadsby & Hannah, 728 A.2d 1057, 1061 (R.I.1999) ( Cerberus ), we held that a legal malpractice claim, a claim sounding in tort, was assignable because it arose out of an earlier commercial loan transaction. Cerberus involved a suit by purchasers of commercial loans against two law firms that, while representing the original lenders, failed to perfect the lenders' security interests. Id. at 1057-59. We held that legal malpractice claims, transferred along with other assets and obligations to an assignee in a commercial transaction, are assignable   . Id. at 1061. There we acknowledged the distinction between market assignments involving purely economic transactions,    and freestanding malpractice personal injury claim assignments that necessarily involve and invoke the unique lawyer-client relationship   . Id. at 1060. The trial justice compared the assignment in this case to that in Cerberus and found them to be strikingly similar. She reasoned, [l]ike in Cerberus Partners, the transfer of the appeals in the present case appears to be a market assignment involving a finite, purely economic transaction. Moreover, the trial justice opined that any danger of establishing a commercial market in assessment appeals was remote because the assignee purchased property along with the pending appeals, not merely the hypothetical right to bring an appeal. We endorse the trial justice's reasoning and affirm her judgment. We add that the assignment not only was an essential component of the transaction, but also allowed Blue Cross to transfer all its interests related to the property to Weybosset Hill. This would seem to be the most appropriate outcome from a commercial point of view. After transferring its title to the property, a previous owner's incentive to prosecute the appeals vigorously might well be diminished. Also, the subsequent purchaser would be placed in an untenable position if it were required to oversee or otherwise monitor the previous owner to ensure that its interests were being adequately protected in the litigation.