Opinion ID: 2814830
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Juror’s Remarks About Uncharged Misconduct

Text: After the trial, both sides presented affidavits from a single juror, Ms. Isabel Blea. In the affidavit submitted by Ms. Kupfer, Ms. Blea stated that another juror had said during deliberations that ! Armando Gutierrez and Associates were on the news, ! the matter involved a big scandal, ! there were other indictments connected to the Kupfers, and ! the case was big. 7 R., vol. I, at 432. Based on this affidavit, Ms. Kupfer asked for a hearing and moved for a mistrial. In response, the government submitted a second affidavit by Ms. Blea. Id. at 444. In this affidavit, she said that the other juror had twice made improper comments but had not made any additional statements in the presence of Ms. Blea. Based on the two affidavits, the district court declined the request for a hearing and denied the motion for a mistrial. Ms. Kupfer contends that the district court erred in both respects. We reject these contentions.
The threshold issue is whether the district court erred in declining to conduct a hearing. On this issue, we review the district court’s decision under the abuse-of-discretion standard. United States v. Davis, 60 F.3d 1479, 1483 (10th Cir. 1995). Applying this standard, we conclude that the district court acted within its discretion in declining to order a hearing. When extraneous information is injected into jury deliberations, we ordinarily require a hearing to ferret out what was said and how it might have resulted in prejudice. See United States v. Hornung, 848 F.2d 1040, 1045 (10th Cir. 1988) (“When a trial court is apprised of the fact that an extrinsic influence may have tainted the trial, the proper remedy is a hearing to determine the circumstances of the improper contact and the extent of the prejudice.”). But this requirement is not inflexible. See Davis, 60 F.3d at 1482-83 (“[W]hile a hearing might be prudent or otherwise appropriate, we have never held it was absolutely 8 mandatory.”). Thus, we have held that a district court can decline a hearing when it would not provide additional relevant information. See United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1186 (10th Cir. 1998) (stating that “on rare occasions it is within the district court’s discretion to refuse to hold a hearing” when there are extraneous influences on the jury and “it can clearly be established that a hearing would not be useful or necessary”). That holding applies here, for the district court implicitly concluded the hearing would not prove beneficial. 1 In district court, Ms. Kupfer did not (1) expressly request a hearing in her opening brief or (2) suggest any facts that could be developed in a hearing. Though she urged a need for an investigation into what had taken place, she acknowledged that “[w]here the fact of extraneous information ha[d] been established to the district court by way of affidavit, . . . a court [could] exercise its discretion and not hold an evidentiary hearing.” Appellant’s App., vol. I, at 1 The district court did not explicitly state this conclusion, but it is implicit in the ruling. The district court stated that the juror’s reference “to the state court case [had been] short and [had been] curtailed upon the juror being told to stop.” R., vol. I, at 460. Thus, the court distinguished an Eighth Circuit case recognizing the need for a hearing to determine how long the extraneous information had been available to the jury, whether it had been discussed, and whether it had been reasonably likely to affect the verdict. Id. (discussing United States v. Hall, 85 F.3d 367 (8th Cir. 1996)). 9 424-25. 2 Ms. Kupfer’s initial position supplied little reason to think a hearing would be useful. Even without a hearing, the court already had two affidavits from the same juror, stating precisely what had been said. With these affidavits, the district court could reasonably conclude that it had all of the material information that might have been ascertained in a hearing. See United States v. Davis, 60 F.3d 1479, 1482-84 (10th Cir. 1995) (upholding the denial of a hearing when the district court had an affidavit providing undisputed evidence that jurors had watched news reports of the trial in violation of the court’s admonition). In these circumstances, the court could reasonably conclude that a hearing would not have provided additional relevant information. 3 The remaining issue involved prejudice. To determine whether the extraneous influence was prejudicial, the district court had to analyze what had 2 Ms. Kupfer changed her approach in her reply brief. There she argued that the affidavits had not shown the number of jurors exposed to the extraneous information, when in the deliberations the extraneous information had been mentioned, whether a subset of jurors had discussed the extraneous information, and whether the other juror had responded candidly during voir dire. R., vol. I, at 453-54. But in the District of New Mexico, arguments omitted in the opening brief are generally considered waived. See Brubach v. Albuquerque, 893 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1237 n.6 (D. N.M. 2012) (“The Court declines to consider an argument raised for the first time in a reply.”). 3 The court also reasoned that the juror’s comments had not triggered a presumption of prejudice. R., vol. I, at 459. For the sake of argument, we can assume that this reasoning was incorrect. Apart from the absence of a presumption of prejudice, the court declined to conduct a hearing because it would not have provided additional relevant information. See p. 9 n.1, above. 10 been said and compare it to the information properly before the jury. United States v. Hornung, 848 F.2d 1040, 1045 (10th Cir. 1988). For this inquiry, however, the court might have been skeptical about the usefulness of a hearing. The district court already had two affidavits identifying the juror’s statements about the uncharged misconduct. See United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1186-88 (10th Cir. 1998) (upholding the denial of a hearing in part because the district court already knew from an alternate juror’s report who had made the statement, what had been said, and what the surrounding circumstances were). The court could not have known the impact of those statements, but that would have remained true even after a hearing. See United States v. Simpson, 950 F.2d 1519, 1521 (10th Cir. 1991) (stating that an evidentiary hearing would have been futile because Fed. R. Evid. 606(b) prohibited juror testimony on the effect of extraneous information in the jury’s deliberations). Thus, the court could reasonably conclude that a hearing would have added little useful information. In urging an abuse of discretion, Ms. Kupfer relies largely on Stouffer v. Trammell, 738 F.3d 1205 (10th Cir. 2013). In Stouffer, we held that the state trial court had abused its discretion by declining to order a mistrial (1) with undisputed evidence of jury tampering through nonverbal communication and (2) without any explanation about why the jury tampering would have been harmless. Stouffer, 738 F.3d at 1217, 1219 n.10. Though we regarded the trial court’s inadequate inquiry as an abuse of discretion, we did not suggest that a hearing would have 11 been necessary even if the court could reasonably conclude that it had all the material information about the nature and impact of the extraneous influence. Indeed, any such suggestion would have contradicted our existing precedents. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 60 F.3d 1479, 1483 (10th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he decision whether to grant or deny a hearing on a claim that a juror was improperly exposed to extraneous information is vested in the broad discretion of the district courts, and we will review the denial of a request for such a hearing only for an abuse of discretion.”). Under these precedents, the district court had the discretion to decide the motion for a mistrial without conducting a hearing.
The remaining issue is whether the district court erred in denying this motion. Our scrutiny is limited, for we can reverse only if the district court abused its discretion. United States v. Robertson, 473 F.3d 1289, 1294 (10th Cir. 2007). We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion. The court reasonably regarded the extraneous influence as harmless. The affidavits reflected two comments about other charges, describing the scandal and the case as big and referring to other indictments and news reports. See pp. 7-8, above. But the evidence against Ms. Kupfer on the tax charges was overwhelming. 12 For a conviction, the government had to convince the jury of three elements:

3. an affirmative act constituting evasion of the tax. United States v. Farr, 701 F.3d 1274, 1285 (10th Cir. 2012) (citing 26 U.S.C. § 7201). Ms. Kupfer essentially admitted the first and third elements in opening statements, conceding that she had failed to report substantial income on her tax returns. With this concession, Ms. Kupfer relied solely on a defense that she had not acted willfully. But the government’s evidence of willfulness was overwhelming, showing that Ms. Kupfer had failed to report over $790,000 in gross income, had personally deposited a check for $140,000 without reporting this income, and had obtained substantial experience in accounting and finance. In the face of that evidence, Ms. Kupfer defended on the ground that her failure to report over $790,000 in income was a mistake. In support of this argument, Ms. Kupfer offered evidence of her consensual participation in an informal audit. But the informal audit was based solely on the tax information provided voluntarily by the Kupfers, and there was no evidence suggesting that the auditors were aware of the unreported income. 13 Ms. Kupfer also offered evidence that she had relied on the services of a tax preparer. But Ms. Kupfer did not disclose the unreported income to the tax preparer, and the preparer’s engagement letter stated that ! the client bore the “responsibility to provide all of the information required for the preparation of complete and accurate returns,” and ! his services were not “designed to discover thefts or other irregularities should any exist.” Appellant’s App., vol. IV, at 658, 683. In these circumstances, the district court could reasonably conclude that the extraneous information would have been harmless. As a result, the court acted within its discretion in declining to grant a mistrial. See United States v. Hornung, 848 F.2d 1040, 1045-46 (10th Cir. 1988) (upholding the denial of a mistrial based on harmlessness because the evidence of guilt was overwhelming). IV. Calculation of the Offense Level for Sentencing The remaining issue involves the sentence. To impose the sentence, the district court started with the sentencing guidelines. In calculating the guideline range, the court increased the offense level based on § 3C1.1. This provision provides for an increase in the offense level if the defendant willfully obstructed the investigation. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. Ms. Kupfer challenges the application of § 3C1.1, and the government concedes error. We agree with the parties that the court erred in increasing the offense level. 14 We have held that § 3C1.1 does not apply when defendants simply tell investigators that they did not commit a crime. United States v. Urbanek, 930 F.2d 1512, 1515 (10th Cir. 1991). Ms. Kupfer did even less than that because her sin was one of omission rather than commission. She simply failed to speak up and disclose the unreported income as authorities investigated. Her failure to speak up cannot serve as the basis for an increase in the offense level under § 3C1.1. See United States v. Pelliere, 57 F.3d 936, 939 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating that “refusals to talk cannot serve as the basis for an obstruction of justice enhancement” under § 3C1.1). As a result, the district court should not have increased the offense level based on § 3C1.1. In light of the error, the government concedes that we should vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing. We agree.