Opinion ID: 6320088
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: analysis

Text: Otto’s argument on appeal is that the evidence was insufficient to support the district court’s determination that renewal of the protection order was justified by the likelihood of future harm. Both the underlying protection order and its renewal were issued as ex parte orders that were affirmed after show cause hearings in which both parties had the opportunity to present evidence and make arguments. Otto does not attack the renewal order on procedural grounds, and we express no opinion on the procedure followed here. In arguing that the court should not have renewed the protection order, Otto claims the incident on February 26, 2020, was a simple case of distracted driving. He also points out that he did not violate the protection order or commit any acts of abuse since the protection order was issued. This is our first occasion to address what findings are necessary to support the renewal of a domestic abuse protection order. 3 § 25-1912(3). 4 Id. - 103 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports GARRISON v. OTTO Cite as 311 Neb. 94 Under the Protection from Domestic Abuse Act, 5 “[a]ny victim of domestic abuse” may seek a domestic abuse protection order. 6 Subsection (1)(b) of § 42-924 provides that the “petition for a protection order shall state the events and dates or approximate dates of acts constituting the alleged domestic abuse, including the most recent and most severe incident or incidents.” [2,3] In the context of a court’s deciding whether to affirm or rescind the initial ex parte protection order, we have held that whether domestic abuse occurred is a threshold issue, and absent abuse as defined by § 42-903, a protection order may not remain in effect. 7 “Abuse” is statutorily defined as the occurrence of one or more of the following acts between family or household members: (1) attempting to cause or intentionally and knowingly causing bodily injury with or without a dangerous instrument; 8 (2) placing, by means of credible threat, another person in fear of bodily injury, 9 or (3) engaging in sexual contact or sexual penetration without consent as defined in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-318 (Cum. Supp. 2020). 10 Family or household members includes former spouses. 11 [4] We have also held, in the context of a court’s decision to affirm or rescind an initial ex parte protection order, that a finding that domestic abuse has occurred does not end a court’s inquiry. 12 In Maria A. on behalf of Leslie G. v. Oscar G., 13 5 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-901 et seq. (Reissue 2016 & Cum. Supp. 2020). 6 § 42-924. 7 See Robert M. on behalf of Bella O. v. Danielle O., supra note 2. See, also, § 42-924. 8 § 42-903(1)(a). 9 § 42-903(1)(b). 10 § 42-903(1)(c). 11 § 42-903(3). 12 See Maria A. on behalf of Leslie G. v. Oscar G., 301 Neb. 673, 919 N.W.2d 841 (2018). 13 See id. - 104 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports GARRISON v. OTTO Cite as 311 Neb. 94 we explained that the goal of domestic abuse protection orders is to protect victims of domestic abuse from further harm. Thus, the court must conduct a wider inquiry that weighs the likelihood of future harm to the petitioner in light of all the surrounding circumstances. 14 We noted that we have repeatedly analogized domestic abuse protection orders to injunctions, which sound in equity. 15 And injunctions are not meant to punish past actions but to prevent future mischief. 16 On a consideration of all the circumstances of each case, the court, before issuing an injunction, weighs the burdens the order will inflict against its benefits. 17 [5-7] We accordingly held that in considering whether to continue an ex parte domestic abuse protection order following a finding that domestic abuse has occurred, a court is not limited to considering only whether the ex parte order was proper, but may also consider a number of factors pertinent to the likelihood of future harm. 18 Those factors might include, but are not limited to, the remoteness, severity, nature, and frequency of past abuse; past or pending credible threats of harm; the psychological impact of domestic abuse; the potential impact on the parent-child relationship; and the nuances of household relationships. 19 With respect to the factor of remoteness, we have observed that the statutory scheme does not impose any limitation on the time during which a victim of domestic abuse may file a petition and affidavit seeking a protection order after the abuse. 20 14 See id. 15 See id. 16 Id. 17 See id. 18 Id. 19 Id. 20 See id. See, also, Sarah K. v. Jonathan K., 23 Neb. App. 471, 873 N.W.2d 428 (2015). - 105 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports GARRISON v. OTTO Cite as 311 Neb. 94 Under § 42-924(3), the protection order is generally effective for a period of 1 year, “unless dismissed or modified by the court prior to such date.” 21 But, under § 42-924(3)(b), any victim of domestic abuse may, within 45 days before expiration, file a petition and affidavit to renew a protection order. Section 42-924(3)(b)(ii) indicates that the petition for renewal shall state that “there has been no material change in relevant circumstances since entry of the order” and set forth “the reason for the requested renewal.” The renewed protection order is effective for 1 year. 22 [8] Thus, as opposed to the underlying petition and affidavit for the underlying order, in which petitioner “shall state the events and dates or approximate dates of acts constituting the alleged domestic abuse,” 23 the petition and affidavit for renewal must state “there has been no material change in rele­ vant circumstances since entry of the order” and “the reason for the requested renewal.” 24 The Protection from Domestic Abuse Act does not otherwise elaborate on what the district court must find in order to renew the protection order. However, the renewed protection order necessarily shares the same fundamental characteristics of the original protection order. The renewed protection order must, therefore, be supported by the same statutory and equitable considerations as an original order. [9,10] As “no material change in relevant circumstances” suggests, the requisite past act of domestic abuse is necessarily found in relation to the underlying protection order and is not to be relitigated simply because the petitioner seeks a renewal of the order. Principles of law of the case generally bar reconsideration of the same or similar issues at successive 21 § 42-925(5). 22 § 42-924(3)(iii). 23 § 42-924(1)(b). 24 § 42-924(3)(b)(ii). - 106 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports GARRISON v. OTTO Cite as 311 Neb. 94 stages of the same suit or prosecution. 25 There is nothing in the statutory scheme suggesting that a new act of abuse is a prerequisite for renewal of a domestic abuse protection order or that a petition for renewal gives the respondent an opportunity to relitigate the prior finding of abuse that was foundational to the underlying protection order. On the other hand, the statutory scheme can be read to suggest that an evidentiary hearing on the petition for renewal should be held unless the respondent fails to appear or indicates he or she does not contest the renewal. Section 42-924(3)(b) states that the protection order “may be renewed on the basis of the petitioner’s affidavit” when the petitioner seeks no modification of the order and either (1) the respondent has been properly served with notice of the petition for renewal and notice of hearing and fails to appear at the hearing or (2) the respondent indicates that he or she does not contest the renewal. The statute is silent as to the standard governing renewal if an evidentiary hearing is held. 26 [11,12] The purpose of that hearing is to receive evidence so that the court may reweigh the burdens the order will inflict against its benefits in light of all the relevant circumstances, including what has or has not changed since its issuance. A protection order upon renewal, just as at its inception, is oriented toward the future with the goal to protect victims of domestic abuse from further harm. 27 Here, the district court applied the standard from Maria A. on behalf of Leslie G. and reevaluated the likelihood of harm over the course of another year in which it would be in effect if the petition for renewal is granted. 28 Because the question of the likelihood of future harm and the relative equities of the case pertain to a different 25 See Tierney v. Tierney, 309 Neb. 310, 959 N.W.2d 556 (2021). 26 See § 42-924. 27 See Maria A. on behalf of Leslie G. v. Oscar G., supra note 12. 28 See id. - 107 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports GARRISON v. OTTO Cite as 311 Neb. 94 effective period of time, the court’s prior determinations of these matters were not law of the case. [13-16] In determining if a contested renewal of the protection order was justified in light of the likelihood of future harm, the court here considered factors similar to those applicable to the initial contested protection order. Relevant factors included, but were not limited to, the passage of time since the abuse that was found in relation to the original order and all the factors relating to the severity, nature, frequency, and impact of abuse. The court also considered any violations of the protection order and any new domestic abuse occurring during the period of the original protection order and the severity, nature, frequency, and impact of any violation of the protection order or additional abuse. Further, in determining the likelihood of future harm, the court considered evidence of the relationship of the parties as demonstrated by their behavior both before and since the issuance of the protection order and by their testimony at the hearing. Specifically, the district court correctly recognized as law of the case the abuse that supported the original protection order. In Otto’s prior appeal to this court from the initial order, he principally contested the court’s finding of abuse by claiming that on February 26, 2020, he had simply been driving slowly while distracted on his cell phone and with no intention of either hurting or scaring anyone. When we affirmed the lower court’s order, we implicitly rejected this argument. We will not revisit it here. The original incident on February 26 was serious and could have resulted in Garrison’s injury or death. That fact was properly weighed by the district court in considering Garrison’s petition for renewal. The court also properly considered the evidence of ongoing legal proceedings between Garrison and Otto stemming from their divorce, which were similar to the legal proceeding that spurred Otto’s vehicular attack. The district court, after the hearing on renewal, found that the continuing conflict between the parties had not improved during the effective period of - 108 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports GARRISON v. OTTO Cite as 311 Neb. 94 the original protection order. The court observed that Otto himself testified as to numerous confrontations and accused Garrison of trying to alienate him from his children, yet at the same time asserted future harm to be unlikely. The court did not find this reasoning to be sound. The court instead found credible Garrison’s averments and testimony that she still feared for her safety and the safety of everyone in her household. It found that renewal of the protection order for another year was necessary to prevent future harm. The court did not err in ultimately determining that renewal was justified. We observe that the cases from other jurisdictions Otto relies on in asserting the evidence was insufficient to support the 1-year renewal involve facts that are very different from the case at bar. In Vance v. Iowa Dist. Court for Floyd County, 29 the court reversed a 5-year extension of a civil no-contact order after noting the order did not involve domestic abuse, sexual harassment, or any violence, threat of violence, or the physical safety of any family member, and there was no evidence the respondent had failed to comply with it. In S.H. v. D.W., 30 the court held that a 2-year extension of a 2-year protective order against the former husband was unwarranted when it had originally been based on a singular uncontested act of assault occurring when the petitioner collected her belongings from the marital home while divorce proceedings were pending and the parties had since gone their separate ways. In contrast, the underlying abuse here was serious, it occurred relatively recently, the parties continue to experience serious conflict, and the renewal period is for only 1 year. Although our review of domestic abuse protection orders is de novo, we give deference to the circumstances that the trial judge heard and observed the witnesses and accepted one version of the 29 Vance v. Iowa Dist. Court for Floyd County, 907 N.W.2d 473 (Iowa 2018). 30 S.H. v. D.W., 139 N.E.3d 214 (Ind. 2020). - 109 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports GARRISON v. OTTO Cite as 311 Neb. 94 facts rather than another. 31 Giving deference to the fact that the district court heard and observed the witnesses and accepted one version of the facts rather than another, we find it did not err in determining that the likelihood of future harm justified a 1-year renewal of the domestic abuse protection order.