Opinion ID: 1119859
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sequestered Questioning

Text: The court allowed the parties to question the prospective jurors individually regarding their attitudes towards the death penalty. (See Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1 [168 Cal. Rptr. 128, 616 P.2d 1301].) After a number of jurors had been so questioned, defense counsel asked permission also to ask the individual jurors about their attitudes regarding race. (Defendant is Black; one of the murder victims was White.) The trial court read the decision in Turner v. Murray (1986) 476 U.S. 28 [90 L.Ed.2d 27, 106 S.Ct. 1683], and then allowed such questions during the remainder of the individual voir dire. It denied defense counsel's request to recall each juror who had already been individually questioned. Instead, the court allowed defense counsel to ask pertinent questions during the general portion of the voir dire, and to question any prospective juror in private who so requested. (1) Relying on Turner v. Murray, supra, 476 U.S. 28, and Hovey v. Superior Court, supra, 28 Cal.3d 1, defendant contends the court erred in not allowing him to recall all previously questioned jurors in order to question them again in private. Neither decision supports defendant. In Hovey v. Superior Court, supra, 28 Cal.3d 1, we were concerned that repeated questioning of prospective jurors in open court regarding their attitudes on the death penalty would tend to unduly focus on the penalty phase of the proceeding, possibly causing the jurors to anticipate guilt. ( People v. Thompson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 134, 156 [266 Cal. Rptr. 309, 785 P.2d 857].) Therefore, to minimize the potentially prejudicial effects of exposing jurors to excessive pretrial discussion and questioning about the penalty phase ( People v. Douglas (1990) 50 Cal.3d 468, 522 [268 Cal. Rptr. 126, 788 P.2d 640]), we held that questioning of prospective jurors regarding the death penalty should be done individually and in sequestration. ( Hovey, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 80.) As we noted, Such a reduction in the pretrial emphasis on penalty should minimize the tendency of a death-qualified jury to presume guilt and expect conviction. ( Ibid. ) This sequestration rule was formulated in the unique context of death-qualifying the jury. We made clear in Hovey v. Superior Court, supra, 28 Cal.3d 1, that the rule does not extend beyond this narrow confine: The rule of sequestration announced today does not require a sequestered voir dire when venirepersons in capital cases are interrogated about those topics routinely discussed in selecting a jury for any criminal case. For example, the following questions may be asked without sequestering the prospective jurors: Do you know the judge, the lawyers, the defendant, the witnesses, or any of the prospective jurors in this case? Have you served on a jury before, and if so, in what kind of case? Have you or your close friends or relatives ever been employed by a law enforcement agency? Or been the victim of a crime, or a witness to a crime, or testified in a criminal case? When pertinent, questions may also be asked concerning the exposure of prospective jurors to pretrial publicity, and their attitude towards proposed defenses (e.g., insanity, diminished capacity, self-defense, or alibi), potentially controversial circumstances of the case (e.g., the race of the participants, the use of alcohol or drugs, or the presence of sexual activity), or important rules of law bearing on the trial (e.g., the defendant's right not to testify, presumption of innocence, truth beyond a reasonable doubt, or jury unanimity). However, if any of these questions in a specific case are relevant to the death-qualification of the panel or may tend to identify those prospective jurors whose views on capital punishment render them ineligible, then those particular questions should be answered individually and in sequestration. It is the duty of trial counsel to alert the court in advance of voir dire as to which of those general topics are likely to call forth answers bearing on the death-qualification of the jury. ( Hovey v. Superior Court, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 81, fn. 137, italics added.) In Turner v. Murray, supra, 476 U.S. at pages 36-37 [90 L.Ed.2d at pages 36-37], the high court held that a capital defendant accused of an interracial crime is entitled to have prospective jurors informed of the race of the victim and questioned on the issue of racial bias. The court also limited the scope of the holding: The rule we propose is minimally intrusive; as in other cases involving `special circumstances,' the trial judge retains discretion as to the form and number of questions on the subject, including the decision whether to question the venire individually or collectively. [Citation.] Also, a defendant cannot complain of a judge's failure to question the venire on racial prejudice unless the defendant has specifically requested such an inquiry. ( Id. at p. 37 [90 L.Ed.2d at p. 37], italics added.) In combination, Hovey v. Superior Court, supra, 28 Cal.3d 1, and Turner v. Murray, supra, 476 U.S. 28, thus hold only that the death-qualifying portion of voir dire must be held with individually sequestered jurors, and the defense must be allowed to question the jurors in some fashion on the issue of racial bias. [3] Neither rule was violated in this case. Defendant was allowed to question the prospective jurors about race. Hovey and Turner do not require the questioning be of individually sequestered jurors; they certainly do not require the recall of those jurors questioned before the defense brought the matter to the court's attention. The court did not abuse its discretion. (See also People v. Clark (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583, 596-597 [268 Cal. Rptr. 399, 789 P.2d 127] [no abuse of discretion in limiting questioning during the sequestered voir dire].)