Opinion ID: 1887522
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Board's Recommended Sanction Meets the Objectives of Attorney Discipline

Text: Respondent's misconduct is based upon a single episode in which she submitted for payment a voucher seeking compensation under the Criminal Justice Act for services, some of which she knew that she had not rendered. [8] In doing so, respondent violated four disciplinary rules, 1.5(a), 3.3(a)(1), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d). The conduct leading to these disciplinary violations is quite serious in itself, a factor for consideration in determining sanction. See Elgin, supra, 918 A.2d at 376. The Board has also found that respondent gave false testimony at the disciplinary hearing when she supported a voucher that she knew was not accurate, particularly her testimony concerning a jail visit which she had to know had not taken place. Failure to acknowledge the wrongful conduct is an appropriate factor for consideration in determining sanction. Id. In considering this additional factor, the Board has recommended a longer suspension than it had previously and determined that a fitness requirement is in order. Here, the Board states that it takes its cue from Cleaver-Bascombe I, where the Court stated: Where an attorney has deliberately falsified a voucher and sought compensation for work that he or she has not devoted to the case, that attorney's fitness to practice is called into serious question. This is especially true if the attorney has compounded his or her initial fraud by testifying falsely during the resulting disciplinary proceedings. 892 A.2d at 398; see also Cater, supra, 887 A.2d at 22. In making its sanction recommendation, the Board found substantial similarities between this case and In re Parshall, 878 A.2d 1253 (D.C.2005). In Parshall, this Court suspended an attorney for eighteen months for submitting a false status report to a court and attaching fabricated documents to support the report. The Board recommended, and the Court accepted its recommendation, for an eighteen-month suspension in light of the presence of several mitigating factors, including the absence of prior disciplinary problems, the attorney's expressed regrets for his actions, cooperation with Bar Counsel, voluntary participation in pro bono programs, and representation of indigents. Id. at 1254, 1254 n. 4. In Parshall, this Court found the length of the suspension to be within the range of sanctions this Court has imposed for similar misconduct. [9] Id. at 1255 (citations omitted). I agree with the Board that Parshall has persuasive similarities. The Board recommended a longer sanction because in Parshall, unlike here, the attorney expressed regret for the misconduct and cooperated with the Office of Bar Counsel. Respondent identifies some mitigating factors in her favor, including the absence of prior discipline or prejudice to her client. [T]he fact an attorney has had no prior disciplinary sanctions imposed in the past is `highly relevant and material' to the determination of appropriate sanction. Reback, supra, 513 A.2d at 231 (quoting In re Cope, 455 A.2d 1357, 1361 (D.C.1983)). While such factors are appropriate for consideration, see Elgin, supra, 918 A.2d at 376, respondent does not identify as many mitigating factors as the attorney in Parshall. There is also the aggravating factor of respondent's failure to acknowledge her misconduct. In light of her false testimony at the hearing concerning her voucher, the Board also recommends a longer suspension than in Parshall and a requirement of fitness before reinstatement. Under the circumstances, the Board's recommendation for a two-year suspension appears to be warranted. [10] Proof that an attorney has violated the disciplinary rules, thereby warranting a substantial period of suspension, is not necessarily sufficient to justify a fitness requirement. Cater, supra, 887 A.2d at 22. To justify imposition of a fitness requirement, there must be clear and convincing evidence in the record of the proceeding that calls into question respondent's fitness to practice law. Id. at 24. In making the recommendation for a fitness requirement in this case, the Board states that it takes its direction from the majority's opinion in Cleaver-Bascombe I. Here, the Board found by clear and convincing evidence that respondent submitted a voucher to the Court for services that she knew she had not rendered and aggravated her misconduct in doing so by testifying falsely about it at the disciplinary hearing. The Board's findings support its recommendation for a fitness requirement. [11] This requirement is directed toward assuring that [the attorney's] `resumption of the practice of law will not be detrimental to the integrity and standing of the Bar or to the administration of justice, or subversive to the public interest.' Cater, supra, 887 A.2d at 22 (citation omitted). [12] The Board has determined after careful consideration that a lengthy suspension with a fitness requirement will be sufficient to protect the public, the courts, and the integrity of the profession. [13] The Board's recommended sanction falls within the range of acceptable outcomes; therefore, we should adopt it. See Elgin, supra, 918 A.2d at 376.