Opinion ID: 2357354
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Trial Court Impermissibly Increased Hoile's Sentence

Text: Having determined that the 10 February 2006 hearing resulted in an increased sentence imposed on Hoile, we must determine whether the increase in that sentence was legal. Hoile presents three arguments for why it was not. First, Hoile contends that the factual findings made by the Circuit Court are insufficient to find that the sentence imposed at the April 2005 hearing violated Maryland Rule 4-345(e) and (f) and thus, was not an illegal sentence. Hoile, curiously, first argues that the facts as found by the Circuit Court are not sufficient to hold that the April 2005 proceeding violated Rule 4-345(e) and (f). Because we do not address the argument here, it is not necessary to recount it in detail. Essentially, Hoile contends that because the Circuit Court failed to make a specific finding that the State failed to take adequate steps to notify Palmer of the proceeding, the Circuit Court could not deem the April 2005 sentence illegal. If we were to address this argument and agree with Hoile, we likely would remand the case to the Circuit Court for such a factual determination. Instead, we hold that the Circuit Court illegally increased Hoile's sentence by granting the motion to vacate sentence, and shall reverse ultimately the Circuit Court. Second, Hoile contends that even if the Circuit Court failed to comply with Maryland Rule 4-345(e) and (f), the failure to notify the victim does not render the sentence of five years probation illegal. Finally, he contends in his reply brief that a court may not increase a defendant's sentence unless the original sentence is illegal. Here, the Victim and the State part ways with their responsive arguments. The State concedes that the modified sentence was not `illegal'. . . . Instead, the State contends that the failure to notify the Victim of the proceedings constitutes an irregularity, over which the Circuit Court retains revisory power under Maryland Rule 4-345(b). By contrast, Ms. Palmer maintains that the sentence imposed at the April 2005 hearing was illegal and may be corrected by the Circuit Court pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-345(a).
Maryland Rule 4-345(a) states that a court may correct an illegal sentence at any time. The correction of an illegal sentence may result in an increase over the erroneous sentence previously imposed on the defendant. State v. Griswold, 374 Md. 184, 821 A.2d 430 (2003) (holding that the trial court illegally reduced convictions on motion for reconsideration and reinstating convictions which effectively increased sentence); State v. Hannah, 307 Md. 390, 403, 514 A.2d 16, 22 (1986) (vacating, on the State's appeal, the sentence of probation before judgment and ordering trial court to impose mandatory minimum of five years in prison); State ex rel. Sonner v. Shearin, 272 Md. 502, 526, 325 A.2d 573, 586 (1974) (Upon the remand the trial judge shall delete the improper suspension of sentence so that the handgun violation will be for the mandatory term of five years.); Mateen v. Galley, 146 Md.App. 623, 649, 807 A.2d 708, 723 (2002) (holding that an illegal sentence may be corrected by the imposition of a legal sentence, even though the corrected sentence is longer than the original illegal sentence), reversed on other grounds, Mateen v. Saar, 376 Md. 385, 829 A.2d 1007 (2003). An illegal sentence is a sentence not permitted by law. Walczak v. State, 302 Md. 422, 427, 488 A.2d 949, 951 (1985). An illegal sentence properly is corrected only where there is some illegality in the sentence itself or where no sentence should have been imposed. Evans v. State, 382 Md. 248, 278, 855 A.2d 291, 309 (2004). Language in Evans stating that a sentence is illegal where no sentence should have been imposed is inapplicable to the context of the present case. The language in Evans does not make a sentence illegal merely because a required procedure was not followed prior to the court imposing the sentence. Evans cites three cases for the premise that a sentence is illegal if it is imposed where no sentence should have been imposed. In all three cases, no sentence should have been imposed at any proceeding in the case. See Ridgeway v. State, 369 Md. 165, 171, 797 A.2d 1287, 1290 (2002) (no sentence should have been imposed on the defendant for certain assault charges because the defendant was acquitted of those charges); Holmes v. State, 362 Md. 190, 195-96, 763 A.2d 737, 740 (2000) (sentence of probation with home detention as a condition of probation was illegal because the trial court lacked statutory authority to impose such a condition); Moosavi v. State, 355 Md. 651, 662, 736 A.2d 285, 291 (1999) (sentence was illegal because the defendant was convicted under an inapplicable statute). By contrast, the State and Palmer do not contend that the Circuit Court would be without authority to impose a sentence of probation at a hearing which fully complied with the requirements of Maryland Rule 4-345(e) and (f). Instead, they argue that the particular proceeding at which the sentence of probation was imposed on Hoile was deficient. Thus, the rule as stated in Evans is of no help to the State or Palmer. A sentence is not illegal where the illegality did not inhere in [the defendant's] sentence. Id. (quoting Kanaras, 357 Md. at 185, 742 A.2d at 517). The notion of an `illegal sentence' within the contemplation of the Walczak decision deals with substantive law, not procedural law. It has obvious reference to a sentence which is beyond the statutorily granted power of the judge to impose. It does not remotely suggest that a sentence, proper on its face, becomes an `illegal sentence' because of some arguable procedural flaw in the sentencing procedure. Wilkins, 393 Md. at 273, 900 A.2d at 768 (quoting Corcoran v. State, 67 Md.App. 252, 255 507 A.2d 200, 202 (1986)). Although there are significant differences between the current Maryland rule [4-345] and its federal counterpart [35(b)], Greco, 347 Md. at 434, 701 A.2d at 424, we have found federal precedent helpful in applying some aspects of the rule. In Wilkins, 393 Md. at 275, 900 A.2d at 769, and Randall Book Corp. v. State, 316 Md. 315, 321-22, 558 A.2d 715, 719 (1989), we discussed approvingly the Supreme Court's decision in Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 82 S.Ct. 468, 7 L.Ed.2d 417 (1962), in our analysis of what constitutes an illegal sentence. In Hill, the trial judge did not afford the defendant an opportunity to allocute prior to sentencing, in violation of the Federal Rules. On a later appeal, the defendant argued that the sentence imposed by the trial court was an illegal sentence. The Supreme Court disagreed, stating: But, as the Rule's language and history make clear, the narrow function of Rule 35 is to permit correction at any time of an illegal sentence, not to re-examine errors occurring at the trial or other proceedings prior to the imposition of sentence. The sentence in this case was not illegal. The punishment meted out was not in excess of that prescribed by the relevant statutes, multiple terms were not imposed for the same offense, nor were the terms of the sentence itself legally or constitutionally invalid in any other respect. Hill, 368 U.S. 424, 430, 82 S.Ct. 468, 472, 7 L.Ed.2d 417. As noted above, Hill has been discussed with approval in several reported Maryland appellate decisions. Although both are given rights at a sentencing proceeding, the law currently recognizes that a criminal defendant has a greater cognizable interest in the sentencing proceeding than does the victim of the crime. [25] If it is not an illegal sentence where the criminal defendant is sentenced and not afforded the required opportunity to speak on his own behalf, it is less able to be maintained that an illegal sentence results where the victim is denied the opportunity to speak. Palmer and the State do not allege that the sentence of probation imposed at the April 2005 hearing exceeded any statutorily prescribed limits or violated any substantive criminal law. The sentence is not illegal on its face, and accordingly, the sentence is not illegal.
The State argues that, although the April 2005 sentence is not illegal, the proceeding was marred by an irregularity. The State correctly points out that the court has revisory power over a sentence in case of fraud, mistake, or irregularity. Maryland Rule 4-345(b). The State's argument, however, suffers from a fundamental flaw. At least on the facts in the present case, [26] a court may not increase a sentence under Maryland Rule 4-345(b). In the context of judgments, it is well settled that an `irregularity' is `the doing or not doing of that, in the conduct of a suit at law, which, conformable to the practice of the court, ought or ought not to be done.' Gantt v. State, 99 Md.App. 100, 104, 635 A.2d 97, 99 (1994) (quoting Autobahn Motors, Inc. v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 321 Md. 558, 562, 583 A.2d 731, 733 (1991)). [I]rregularity, in the contemplation of the Rule, usually means irregularity of process or procedure . . . and not an error, which in legal parlance, generally connotes a departure from truth or accuracy of which a defendant had notice and could have challenged. Autobahn Motors, 321 Md. 558, 562-63, 583 A.2d 731, 733 (citing Weitz v. MacKenzie, 273 Md. 628, 631, 331 A.2d 291, 293 (1975)). We assume, for the sake of argument, that the failure of the State to notify Palmer (as found by the trial judge) and the failure of the trial court to inquire into notification in the first instance, constitutes an irregularity within the meaning of Rule 4-345(b). As we noted earlier, [t]o interpret rules of procedure, we use the same canons and principles of construction used to interpret statutes. Strazzella, 331 Md. at 274, 627 A.2d at 1057. We thus look to the plain meaning of the language employed in these rules and construe that language without forced or subtle interpretations designed to limit or extend its scope. Lee, 332 Md. at 658-59, 632 A.2d at 1185. Generally, it is only when the words of the rule are ambiguous that we must look toward other sources to glean the intent of the rule. In re Victor B., 336 Md. 85, 94, 646 A.2d 1012, 1016 (1994). Maryland Rule 4-345(b) states that [t]he court has revisory power over a sentence in case of fraud, mistake, or irregularity. While the statement of the Rule seems simple enough, there is ambiguity in determining the scope of the court's revisory power under this subsection. Maryland Rule 4-345(a), which permits a court to increase a sentence to correct an illegal sentence, does not use the term revisory power, utilizing instead the term correct. By contrast, Maryland Rule 4-345(e) uses the term revisory power, but lists the prohibition on increasing a sentence as an exception to that revisory power. Thus, we turn to the legislative history of the Rule to determine the remedial scope of the revisory power in Maryland Rule 4-345(b). Prior to 11 May 2004, Maryland Rule 4-345(b) stated: Modification or Reduction  Time For. The court has revisory power and control over a sentence upon a motion filed within 90 days after its imposition (1) in the District Court, if an appeal has not been perfected, and (2) in a circuit court, whether or not an appeal has been filed. Thereafter, the court has revisory power and control over the sentence in case of fraud, mistake, or irregularity, or as provided in section (e) [desertion and nonsupport cases] of this Rule. The court may not increase a sentence after the sentence has been imposed, except that it may correct an evident mistake in the announcement of a sentence if the correction is made on the record before the defendant leaves the courtroom following the sentencing proceeding. For the purposes relevant to our discussion here, current 4-345(b) and 4-345(e) were combined into one section. The Rule prior to 11 May 2004 made clear that a trial court could not increase a defendant's sentence unless the increase was to correct a mistake in the announcement of sentence before the defendant exited the courtroom. The Rules Committee Letter Report [27] and Reporter's Note accompanying the proposed rule change discussed the rationale of several of the proposed changes to Maryland Rule 4-345. Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Letter Report, Rule 4-345, 17 February 2004 available at http://www. courts.state.md.us/rules/reports/ courtletter-revisorypower.pdf. The removal of the prohibition of a court increasing a sentence was not among the changes discussed. Id. The Reporter's Note concluded, Other changes . . . are stylistic only. Id. Thus, it is clear that the penultimate drafters of the new Rule did not intend to eliminate the prohibition on increasing a sentence because of fraud, mistake, or irregularity. The distinction between Maryland Rule 4-345(a), under which a court may increase a sentence, and (b), under which a court may not, is highlighted by Ridgeway v. State, 369 Md. 165, 797 A.2d 1287 (2002), a case decided before the 2004 amendments to Maryland Rule 4-345. The Court of Appeals framed the issue in Ridgeway as [t]he dispute in this case, and the decisional issue before this Court, is whether the trial judge's correction of the petitioner's sentence was pursuant to subsection (a) or [then] subsection (b) of Rule 4-345. Ridgeway, 369 Md. at 170, 797 A.2d at 1289. The Court noted that the distinction between the two subsections was important because an illegal sentence may be corrected at any time, while correcting a mistake in a sentencing order that results in an increased sentence may only occur before the defendant leaves the courtroom following the sentencing proceedings. Ridgeway, 369 Md. at 170, 797 A.2d at 1290 (internal quotation omitted). Our conclusion is also supported by Judge Wilner's analysis of the Rule in his concurrence, in Lopez-Sanchez. Judge Wilner noted that [e]xcept when sentence review is sought by the defendant under [Criminal Procedure Article] §§ 8-101 through 8-109, or an appeal is taken by the State under [Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article] § 12-302 to correct the failure of a court to impose a sentence mandated by law, the sentence may not be increased after it is imposed. The revisory power of the court extends only to modifications that are clarifying in nature or that do not adversely affect the defendant. (Emphasis added). Lopez-Sanchez, 388 Md. at 248, 879 A.2d at 715 (Wilner, J., concurring).
Palmer argues that, were our judgment to direct reversal of the Circuit Court, the effect would be to deny her any possible remedy for a clear violation of her right to be notified of, and be heard at, the sentencing proceeding. She largely is correct. Many victims' rights seem effective only when exercised prior to sentencing and entering of a final judgment against or in favor of the defendant. Such a limitation is implied in Article 47's express prohibition on a court permitting a victim to stay a criminal justice proceeding. See also § 11-103(c). If a victim is not authorized to take an action to stay the entering of a judgment in a criminal case, the victim similarly is powerless to have that judgment reopened or vacated. It would be somewhat anomalous if the victim had the power to have a judgment vacated (essentially, undone) where the victim did not have the power to stay the entering of that same judgment. In Lodowski v. State, 302 Md. 691, 747, 490 A.2d 1228, 1256-57 (1985), vacated on other grounds, 475 U.S. 1078, 106 S.Ct. 1452, 89 L.Ed.2d 711 (1986), and again in Cianos, 338 Md. at 411-12, 659 A.2d at 294, we briefly discussed the legislative history of a proposal to permit a victim to seek invalidation of a defendant's sentence based on a violation of the victim's rights. Provisions invalidating the sentence clearly worried the legislators. A memorandum, evidently prepared by staff of the House Judiciary Committee, stated, `[t]he major practical problem of both bills . . . is the possibility of placing the defendant in jeopardy a second time during the sentencing hearing.' . . . The memorandum concluded that, `House Bill 70 would be acceptable, however, if [the] lines [invalidating the sentence] were deleted. The statute would have no teeth after such a deletion but it would provide the personal input toward which the statute is aimed.' Cianos, 338 Md. at 411-12, 659 A.2d at 294 (quoting Lodowski, 302 Md. at 747, 490 A.2d at 1256-57). The Legislature has addressed some of the limitations on victims' rights, such as expanding a victim's right to apply to appeal, following Lopez-Sanchez. The Legislature, however, in the 23 years since Lodowski and 13 years since Cianos, has not given much substance to the illusory nature of the enforcement of victims' rights. The General Assembly is presumed to be aware of this Court's interpretation of its enactments and, if such interpretation is not legislatively overturned, to have acquiesced in that interpretation. Williams v. State, 292 Md. 201, 210, 438 A.2d 1301, 1305 (1981). Although a victim now has more opportunity to participate in an appeal, there remains no effective tangible remedy for a victim to seek to un-do what already has been done in a criminal case. The rights, to seek invalidation of an otherwise legal sentence. The victims' rights provisions in Maryland law still lack adult teeth. Thus, the victim is left largely with extra-judicial remedies. Although the Legislature responded to the specific issue decided in Lopez-Sanchez, Judge Wilner's description of the lack of remedies afforded victims of crime who have been denied their statutory rights remains largely apt: Although disciplinary proceedings conceivably may be brought against a judge who wilfully violates clear statutory rights, there seems to be no efficient remedy for a victim . . . if a judge, whether in good or bad faith, denies the victim the rights the Legislature has conferred. Lopez-Sanchez v. State, 388 Md. 214, 231, 879 A.2d 695, 704 (2005) (Wilner, J., concurring). In the present case, there is absolutely no indication that the Circuit Court acted in bad faith. The Circuit Court, on hearing Palmer's motion to vacate, admitted the apparent oversight regarding notice and attempted to remedy the mistake, although the remedy selected was beyond the Circuit Court's reach. [28] Because Palmer's rights as a victim of crime were violated, we again shall fashion the only remedy of which we are legally capable. Palmer shall not be burdened with costs in this appeal, where her rights were violated through no fault of her own. [29] JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO VACATE THE SENTENCE OF THE REMAINDER OF FIFTEEN YEARS IMPOSED BY THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY AND REMAND TO THE CIRCUIT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO REINSTATE THE SENTENCE OF PROBATION IMPOSED ON 8 APRIL 2005 AND TO CONDUCT ANY FURTHER PROCEEDINGS DEEMED NECESSARY OR DESIRABLE THAT ARE NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION; COSTS TO BE PAID BY PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MARYLAND.