Opinion ID: 692054
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Randy Newell's True Identity

Text: 120 The fact of Randy Newell's true identity, and the information as to his background, was not limited to Sergeant Gonzales' report. Detective Borunda testified he told one of the prosecutors some time before the end of the second trial that Randy Newell was Samuel J. Newell, and that he provided a rap sheet with Samuel J. Newell's record. 121 Although Detective Borunda testified he informed the prosecutors of this information, they denied ever learning of this fact or of ever obtaining a copy of a rap sheet for Samuel J. Newell, thereby creating a factual dispute in the record. If it was in fact true the prosecutors actually knew of Mr. Newell's real identity and nonetheless permitted him to testify under a false name, then this case would be governed by Napue, which held the prosecution may not knowingly fail to correct information it knows to be false. See Napue, 360 U.S. at 269, 79 S.Ct. at 1177. Under such circumstances, the nondisclosed evidence would be presumptively material unless the State demonstrates the nondisclosure was harmless error. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 104, 96 S.Ct. at 2398. 122 In this case, the state post-conviction court and the magistrate judge implicitly found Detective Borunda's testimony not credible because both courts concluded there was no evidence the prosecution had actual knowledge of Newell's true identity. We cannot say this finding of the district court is clearly erroneous because the evidence is susceptible to two permissible interpretations depending on the weight given to the testimony of the respective witnesses. See Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573-74, 105 S.Ct. at 1511-12; see also Exxon Corp. v. Gann, 21 F.3d 1002, 1005 (10th Cir.1994) (appellate court must uphold district court's factual findings as long as they are permissible in light of the evidence in the record). The only way these courts could have reached their conclusions would be to discredit Detective Borunda's testimony, and we do not second-guess such credibility determinations on appeal. See, e.g., Church v. Sullivan, 942 F.2d 1501, 1516 (10th Cir.1991) (we treat a state court finding regarding witness credibility as a finding of fact.); cf. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574-75, 105 S.Ct. at 1511-12 (emphasizing appellate courts owe heightened deference to trial court's credibility determinations under Rule 52(a)). 123 But while the factual determination that Detective Borunda did not convey this information to the prosecution avoids a Napue situation, it does not alter the fact that Detective Borunda, who himself was a member of the Albuquerque Police Department, knew of this false identity. Under prevailing principles governing Brady claims, this information, having been possessed by an investigative arm of the state that the prosecution knew was involved in investigating this case, is imputed to the prosecution under Brady. Accordingly, the prosecution is deemed to have known Randy Newell was actually Samuel J. Newell; whether they had actual knowledge of this fact is irrelevant. 43 124 In this respect, both the magistrate judge and the State manifested a misunderstanding of the applicable law. The magistrate judge repeatedly faulted Mr. Smith for failing to prove the prosecution's failure to disclose was done knowingly or intentionally. In so doing, however, we believe the magistrate judge placed an excessive burden on Mr. Smith because Buchanan and the discussion above hold exactly to the contrary, namely, that actual knowledge is not necessary to establish a Brady claim. The State, moreover, argues [c]ommon sense infers the prosecution's obligation to disclose information is limited to that information which is in the possession of the prosecution. The problem is the State interprets the italicized language too narrowly, contending possession means actual possession and that the prosecution is limited to the prosecuting attorneys and not law enforcement personnel. For reasons already expressed, both of these interpretations of law are inaccurate. 125 It follows that because the State is deemed to have had knowledge of Randy Newell's true identity, it is accountable for failing to disclose his prior record of convictions and his fugitive status, which were the subject of a specific Brady request by Mr. Smith's counsel and which the State properly concedes are subject to Brady disclosure. Once again, for the same reasons discussed earlier, we find this evidence to be material because its nondisclosure undermines our confidence in the verdict. The prior convictions serve as significant impeachment evidence of Mr. Newell, 44 as does the fact he was attempting to conceal his true identity. Furthermore, this evidence also supports Mr. Smith's defense that someone else, someone with at least as strong of a motive as that attributed to Mr. Smith, may have committed these crimes. 126 The record thus discloses a classic situation where the left hand did not know what the right hand was doing. It appears that the various investigative agencies involved in this case constructed a wall separating the Bernalillo County investigation of Mr. Smith from the Torrance County investigation of Mr. Newell. But this lack of communication and coordination among arms of the state cannot be, and is not, a defense to the prosecution's failure to disclose favorable, material information to the defendant when that failure to disclose amounts to denying a criminal defendant a fair trial. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108, 96 S.Ct. at 2399-2400. 127