Opinion ID: 901368
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Separate Cause of Action for Negligence

Text: [¶ 17.] Quick contends that [a]nother exception exists where the `in pari delicto' conduct is separable from the conduct for which it is being asserted as a defense. Thus, Quick argues that, even assuming he was in pari delicto with Burke on the fraud cause of action, that wrongful act does not carry over and cause a forfeiture of all other causes of action [i.e. negligence] that Quick and ZR Consulting, Inc. have against Burke. We disagree because, even if the causes of action were considered separately, Quick's damages on the negligence claim resulted from his wrongful conduct. Stated another way, because his own conduct was a proximate cause of his damages on both the fraud and negligence causes of action, both claims are barred. [¶ 18.] As previously noted, the doctrine of in pari delicto provides that one who has participated in wrongdoing may not recover damages resulting from the wrongdoing. See supra ¶ 8 (emphasis added). This means that Quick may not recover on either claim if his damages were proximately caused by his own conduct. Proximate cause, or legal cause, is a cause that produces a result in a natural and probable sequence and without which the result would not have occurred. Estate of Gaspar v. Vogt, Brown & Merry, 2003 SD 126, ¶ 6, 670 N.W.2d 918, 921. However, it is not necessary that a proximate cause is the only cause of a result, as [i]t may act in combination with other causes to produce a result. First Premier Bank v. Kolcraft Enterprises, Inc., 2004 SD 92, ¶ 62, 686 N.W.2d 430, 454 (citations omitted). Therefore, in applying the doctrine of in pari delicto: ... where one is engaged with another in the simultaneous [wrongful conduct]... he cannot recover damages for injuries inflicted upon him through the negligence of his joint wrongdoer unless the violation ... was not a contributing cause of the injuries.... Gaines, 167 S.E.2d at 368 (emphasis added). [¶ 19.] Quick cannot make that showing. Quick testified in his deposition that he made the settlement decision after Burns informed him of the consequences of his involvement in introducing the forged document. Thereafter, Quick indicated that he could not return to court and testify without ...either: A, telling the judge exactly what happened with this document, or, B, settling the case. And so, I mean, we went after settling the case. Thus, Quick is seeking damages that were caused by the settlement he authorized. And, because his own conduct was a contributing cause of that settlement, he may not recover. [¶ 20.] We conclude by pointing out that Quick had alternatives. Rather than engaging in obviously fraudulent conduct, his remedy was to refuse to participate in a forgery, or at the very least, to have disclosed the forgery to his new attorney so the evidence would not have been introduced at trial. If this non-fraudulent course of conduct ultimately resulted in the dismissal of his case for failure to name the real party in interest, Quick may then have proceeded against Burke for negligence. However, having chosen to participate in an obvious fraud, Quick is without a remedy against his joint fraudfeasor. [¶ 21.] Affirmed. [¶ 22.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and KONENKAMP and MEIERHENRY, Justices, and MILLER, Retired Justice, concur. [¶ 23.] MILLER, Retired Justice, sitting for SABERS, Justice, disqualified.