Opinion ID: 1378228
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: independent state grounds

Text: Defendant also challenges the constitutionality of the implied consent law on the basis that it is violative of article 1, section 9 of the Washington State Constitution. Article 1, section 9 reads: No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to give evidence against himself ... Defendant contends that this court should interpret our constitutional provision as being more protective than the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution, because our provision protects a person from giving evidence against one's own self whereas the federal provision merely prohibits compelling testimony. Certainly, this court is free to give a provision of our constitution an interpretation more protective of individual rights than the interpretation given a similar provision of the federal constitution and we have recently done so. State v. Fain, 94 Wn.2d 387, 617 P.2d 720 (1980); Federated Publications, Inc. v. Kurtz, 94 Wn.2d 51, 615 P.2d 440 (1980); Northend Cinema, Inc. v. Seattle, 90 Wn.2d 709, 714, 585 P.2d 1153, 1 A.L.R.4th 1284 (1978). However, in State v. Moore, 79 Wn.2d 51, 483 P.2d 630 (1971), this argument was presented and we chose not to interpret our constitutional provision differently. We decline to overrule Moore, which is stare decisis on this issue. In view of our holding that the DWI statute sets out alternate methods of committing one crime, and that none of the appellant's constitutional rights have been violated, we affirm the trial court. ROSELLINI, STAFFORD, DOLLIVER, HICKS, WILLIAMS, and DORE, JJ., concur. UTTER, J. (dissenting) I dissent. While the majority may apply this court's holding in State v. Arndt, 87 Wn.2d 374, 553 P.2d 1328 (1976) correctly, I feel the foundation upon which Arndt stands is unsuitable. A different analytical structure is needed for determining whether a court should require a jury to unanimously agree upon the elements that compose at least one of the alternative means by which a criminal offense can be committed. Applying this analysis to the case before us, I would require a jury to agree unanimously on at least one of the alternative theories by which a violation of RCW 46.61.502 might occur.