Opinion ID: 2463945
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Guilt and Penalty Phase Closing Arguments (Clayton's point 10)

Text: As his tenth point, Clayton contends that the trial court plainly erred by allowing the prosecutor to make a number of arguments during his guilt and penalty phase closing arguments.
During the state's closing argument at the guilt phase the prosecutor made reference to the testimony of defense expert Dr. Betty Back. Specifically, Clayton complains about the following statements: Well, he didn't plan in a socially acceptable manner. Well, I've never met a criminal who did. That is not only unlikely, it's preposterous. It's absolutely preposterous. Well, they don't have very good judgment. Well, as far as I'm concerned somebody who buys a Toyota doesn't have very good judgment because I don't like Toyotas. That doesn't mean there's anything wrong with their ability to reason. Folks, it's voodoo, that's all it is. It's an excuse.     Folks, not only could he discriminate, he did. And right now, at this moment, he continues and hopes that he can fool you. Don't be fooled. Prosecutors may also comment on the evidence and the credibility of witnesses, even to the point of belittling and/or discussing the improbability of specific testimony. State v. Clemons, 946 S.W.2d 206, 229 (Mo. banc 1997), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 416, 139 L.Ed.2d 318 (1997); see also State v. Weaver, 912 S.W.2d 499, 513 (Mo. banc 1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 856, 117 S.Ct. 153, 136 L.Ed.2d 98 (1996).
Clayton complains about statements made by the prosecutor during its penalty phase closing argument. Clayton contends that the prosecutor's penalty phase closing argument went outside the evidence by suggesting that Clayton went to Dixie Seal's home to commit other crimes, by referring to his own experience as a soldier, and by stating that death was the appropriate penalty. And certainly if he intended some ill toward anyone else, which well may have been his intent at Dixie Seal's drive after the argument he had with Martha Ball, that would have broken the law as well. During closing argument, a prosecutor is entitled to make reasonable inferences from the evidence. Clemons, 946 S.W.2d at 229. While the prosecutor's statements may have suggested that Clayton went to Dixie Seal's home to commit other crimes, the statement can reasonably be inferred from the evidence presented in the case. Clayton also contends that the prosecutor went outside the evidence by referring to his own experience of being a soldier. Me, having been a soldier, I guess I can imagine reasons why a person would kill. I don't understand killing a police officer. If you'll kill a police officer, you would kill anyone. That is a figure of authority. Taken in context, this statement was made by the prosecutor while encouraging the jury to assess the most severe penalty, the death penalty. Urging a jury to impose the most severe penalty is proper argument. Lyons, 951 S.W.2d at 596; Smith, 944 S.W.2d at 919. Clayton further contends that the prosecutor's penalty phase closing argument improperly personalized and denigrated the defense. In its penalty phase closing argument defense counsel stated, I ask you to impose a sentence of life, and not to impose a sentence of death simply because he's different or because he's defective. The prosecutor responded to this statement: Folks, what we're dealing with here is, yes, there is value in human life, and Christopher Castetter's life had value too, a great deal of value. And he did nothing wrong. A suggestion to you that there is something wrong with you issuing a death sentence where it is called for is preposterous. Again, it is proper for a prosecutor to seek and request the most severe penalty. See Lyons, 951 S.W.2d at 596; Smith, 944 S.W.2d at 919. It is also proper for a prosecutor to retaliate to statements made by defense counsel, even to the point of characterizing a defense theory as preposterous. See Clemons, 946 S.W.2d at 229; Parker, 886 S.W.2d at 922.
Lastly, Clayton contends that the prosecutor improperly criticized him for exercising his constitutional rights. You cannot be compared to Cecil Clayton. You have done nothing wrong. Look at all the legal niceties we have danced through to get to the point where you can make this decision. Those legal niceties were not available to Christopher Castetter because one man chose to play God. Again, the prosecutor's argument seeks to obtain the most severe punishment. See Lyons, 951 S.W.2d at 596; Smith, 944 S.W.2d at 919. The prosecutor's statement does not seek to punish movant for exercising his right to a trial by jury. Instead, the prosecutor's statement, read in context, highlights the nature and seriousness of the crime and movant's disregard for the law. State v. Hall, 955 S.W.2d 198, 209 (Mo. banc 1997), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 1375, 140 L.Ed.2d 523 (1998) ( citing Antwine v. State, 791 S.W.2d 403, 410 (Mo. banc 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1055, 111 S.Ct. 769, 112 L.Ed.2d 789 (1991)); see also Kreutzer, 928 S.W.2d at 875. Clayton has not established that any manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice resulted from the prosecutor's closing arguments as asserted in his points 3 and 10. Those points are denied.