Opinion ID: 196929
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Arroyo Sentence

Text: 29 For the first time, Arroyo contends that the district court violated U.S.S.G. § 6B1.1(c) by allowing him to plead guilty before it considered his presentence report (PSR). 5 As Arroyo concedes, however, the failure to raise this claim below mandates plain error review. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b); see also United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). 30 The flaw in Arroyo's position is that he offers no reason for equating acceptance of his guilty plea with the acceptance of a plea agreement under § 6B1.1(c). See United States v. Ewing, 957 F.2d 115, 118 (4th Cir.) (rejecting similar argument), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1210, 112 S.Ct. 3008, 120 L.Ed.2d 882 (1992). Arroyo entered a guilty plea on September 7, 1994, and, in accordance with Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(e)(2) (permitting district court to defer decision to accept or reject Rule 11(e)(1)(C) plea agreements), the district court announced that its acceptance of the plea agreement was conditioned upon its review of the PSR. See United States v. Johnson, 53 F.3d 831, 832-33 (7th Cir.1995) (finding, on similar facts, that defendant had not been sentenced at Rule 11 hearing). A PSR was submitted to the district court in timely fashion prior to sentencing on February 13, 1995. At the sentencing, the district court found that the agreed sentence was within the applicable guideline range, see U.S.S.G § 6B1.2(c)(1), accepted the plea agreement, see Ewing, 957 F.2d at 118, and imposed the sentence prescribed in the plea agreement. 31 Moreover, Arroyo has not squared his view of § 6B1.1(c) with Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(b)(3), which prohibits submission of a PSR until the defendant has pleaded or been found guilty, unless the defendant consents in writing. The overarching purpose served by the PSR is to assist the district court at sentencing. See U.S.S.G. § 6A1.1 & Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(b)(1) (requiring completed PSR before the sentence is imposed). Nor are we persuaded that the district court erred. But see Olano, 507 U.S. at 732-33, 113 S.Ct. at 1776-77 (appellant must establish error under Rule 52(b)). 6 32 Finally, we reject the frivolous argument that the indictment barred Arroyo from stipulating to the base offense level specified in the plea bargain. Arroyo pled guilty to conspiring to distribute not less than fifty grams of cocaine base, five kilograms of cocaine, and one kilogram of heroin. By its plain language, the indictment set no upper limit on drug quantity. See United States v. Lindia, 82 F.3d 1154, 1159 n. 3 (1st Cir.1996) (indictment alleging drug dealing in excess of 50 kilograms did not bar sentence based on quantity greater than 50 kilograms). Although Arroyo and several other appellants challenge the factual bases for the district court's drug quantity determinations as well, their stipulations to their base offense levels constitute admissions to the subsidiary drug quantities, see U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) (determining base offense level according to drug quantity). See Lindia, 82 F.3d at 1159-60, & 1160 n. 3 (suggesting that guilty plea might preclude drug quantity challenge). As the record otherwise discloses adequate factual support for the agreed-upon sentence, see Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(f) (accuracy of plea), and Arroyo's remaining arguments merit no discussion, we affirm the district court judgment against him. III