Opinion ID: 2233300
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Heading: Modification of Support for College-Aged Child

Text: Dissolution decrees may be modified upon a substantial change in circumstances. Iowa Code § 598.21(8) (2003). To constitute a substantial change in circumstances, the changed conditions `must be material and substantial, not trivial, more or less permanent or continuous, not temporary, and must be such as were not within the knowledge or contemplation of the court when the decree was entered.' In re Marriage of Rolek, 555 N.W.2d 675, 679 (Iowa 1996) (quoting Mears v. Mears, 213 N.W.2d 511, 515 (Iowa 1973)). This is the longstanding general approach to the modification of provisions in a decree of dissolution of marriage, and it utilizes a fact-intensive analysis. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Jacobo, 526 N.W.2d 859, 864 (Iowa 1995) (A party who seeks a modification of a dissolution decree must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that there has been a substantial change in circumstances since the entry of the decree or its last modification. (citing In re Marriage of Lee, 486 N.W.2d 302, 304 (Iowa 1992); In re Marriage of Bergfeld, 465 N.W.2d 865, 870 (Iowa 1991))); Prandy v. Prandy, 241 Iowa 1050, 1053, 44 N.W.2d 379, 381 (1950) (The changing of a decree is only justified where it is shown that there has been a substantial change of circumstances and is done to adapt the decree to changed conditions of the parties. (citing Metzger v. Metzger, 224 Iowa 546, 278 N.W. 187 (1938); Barish v. Barish, 190 Iowa 493, 180 N.W. 724 (1920); Hart v. Hart, 239 Iowa 142, 30 N.W.2d 748 (1948); Smith v. Smith, 239 Iowa 896, 32 N.W.2d 662 (1948))). However, the legislature has at times altered this approach by describing specific circumstances that permit modification. See, e.g., Iowa Code § 598.21(8A) (If a parent awarded joint legal custody and physical care or sole legal custody is relocating the residence of the minor child to a location which is one hundred fifty miles or more from the residence of the minor child at the time that custody was awarded, the court may consider the relocation a substantial change in circumstances.); id. § 598.21(9) ([A] substantial change of circumstances exists when the court order for child support varies by ten percent or more from the amount which would be due pursuant to the most current child support guidelines established pursuant to subsection 4 or the obligor has access to a health benefit plan, the current order for support does not contain provisions for medical support, and the dependents are not covered by a health benefit plan provided by the obligee . . . .). Thus, it is necessary to consider any statutes that may provide authority for a court to modify a dissolution decree when a party seeks modification, including modification of child-support provisions for a college-aged child. Prior to July 1, 1997, Iowa did not have a specific statute to determine each parent's contributions to their children's college education. Instead, our legislature defined child support under section 598.1(6) to generally include support of a child between the ages of eighteen and twenty-two who was a fulltime college student. Id. § 598.21(6) (1995). This definition permitted the court to impose a child-support obligation on the noncustodial parent in the event the child pursued a postsecondary education as a fulltime student. In 1997, the legislature amended section 598.1(6) to remove the postsecondary-support clause from the definition of support, redefined support to terminate at age nineteen, and enacted a separate statute to provide for a postsecondary education subsidy by both parents. 1997 Iowa Acts ch. 175, §§ 185, 190; accord In re Marriage of Mullen-Funderburk, 696 N.W.2d at 609 (discussing the amendments). We considered the operation of the amended statute and subsidy provision in In re Marriage of Sojka, 611 N.W.2d 503 (Iowa 2000). In Sojka, a parent sought to use the postsecondary-education-subsidy statute to modify a pre-1997 decree that provided for continued monthly support for a college-aged child, as well as payment of a portion of the tuition, room and board, and other college expenses. Sojka, 611 N.W.2d at 504. We held the postsecondary-education-subsidy statute did not apply retroactively to permit modification of college-support provisions of a dissolution decree entered prior to the effective date of the statute. Id. at 505. However, in 2002, our legislature enacted section 598.21(5A)( e ) to specifically authorize courts to retroactively apply the postsecondary-education-subsidy statute to modify prior decrees that imposed a support obligation for college expenses. See 2002 Iowa Acts ch. 1018, § 17 (adding subparagraph ( e ), which provides, A support order, decree, or judgment entered or pending before July 1, 1997, that provides for support of a child for college, university, or community college expenses, may be modified in accordance with [section 598.21(5A)]. In recently commenting on the effect of this amendment, we stated, any decree providing for support of a child in college entered before July 1, 1997, is subject to modification. In re Marriage of Goodman, 690 N.W.2d 279, 283 (Iowa 2004) (citing Iowa Code § 598.21(5A)( e ) (2003)). In this case, the district court and the court of appeals rejected all of the grounds James raised to support a modification of the child-support provisions of the original decree, including the ground that the enactment of the postsecondary-education-subsidy statute and the subsequent declaration by the legislature that the statute applies to decrees entered prior to July 1, 1997, supported modification. Interpreting our recent holding in In re Marriage of Rosenfeld, 668 N.W.2d 840 (Iowa 2003), Bonnie claimed the postsecondary-education-subsidy statute did not apply to allow modification in this case because the original decree established the support obligation for Joel's college expenses. The district court and the court of appeals agreed with this interpretation. In Rosenfeld, we determined that the postsecondary-education statute applied to a modification action brought after July 1, 1997 to establish support for a college-aged child when the original pre-1997 decree did not establish any level of college-aged educational support. See Rosenfeld, 668 N.W.2d at 847 (Iowa Code section 598.21(5A) is nevertheless applicable because the court did not fix college expenses prior to the enactment of [section] 598.21(5A). (Citation and footnote omitted.)). Bonnie, however, interpreted Rosenfeld to mean that the flipside of our holding was also truethat the postsecondary-education-subsidy statute would not apply if the pre-1997 decree did set college-aged support. In accordance with this reasoning, Bonnie argued that James cannot use the postsecondary-education-subsidy statute to change the support provisions under the original decree in this case to reflect the provisions of the postsecondary-education-subsidy statute because the original decree in this case, unlike the decree in Rosenfeld, set the support obligation for James while Joel was in college. We think Bonnie's argument misreads Rosenfeld, and fails to properly apply the postsecondary-education-subsidy statute to permit modification of the child-support provisions of the decree in this case. In In re Marriage of MullenFunderburk, we explained that the postsecondary-education-subsidy statute applied in Rosenfeld because the original pre-1997 decree did not establish any level of college-aged educational support, and the issue was being decided for the first time after the enactment of the statute. In re Marriage of Mullen-Funderburk, 696 N.W.2d at 610-11 (citing In re Marriage of Rosenfeld, 668 N.W.2d at 848). In other words, subparagraph ( e ), providing for the retroactive application of the statute, was not implicated in Rosenfeld because the absence of a provision for college-aged support in the original decree made the action an original adjudication. Id. at 611. Thus, the postsecondary-education-subsidy statute applied to establish a subsidy. See id. (explaining that original adjudications of college-aged support should be based on both the facts and the law in existence when the determination is madei.e., section 598.21(5A), and do not require a substantial change in circumstances). However, the existence of a provision for college-aged educational support in an original decree does not mean by implication that the subsidy statute does not apply. This implication ignores the clear legislative intent to permit modification of prior decrees based on the subsequent change in the law. See Iowa Code § 598.21(5A)( e ) (A support order, decree, or judgment entered or pending before July 1, 1997, that provides for support of a child for college, university, or community college expenses may be modified in accordance with this subsection.). The result is that the postsecondary-education-subsidy statute, section 598.21(5A), applies whether or not the original decree provided for college-aged support. If it did, subsection (5A) applies by virtue of subparagraph ( e ). If it did not, subsection (5A) applies because college-aged support is an original adjudication. We recognize the language of the statute provides that the postsecondary education subsidy applies retroactively to modify decrees entered prior to July 1, 1997 that provided for support of a child for college expenses. Id. Thus, the subsidy statute can only be used to modify child-support provisions in decrees for college expenses. The original decree in this case did not specifically designate that the continued support after high school was for college expenses. However, we think the support provision was nevertheless the type of provision the legislature wanted to be covered under the retroactivity provision, subparagraph ( e ). Provisions in a divorce decree that extend a child-support obligation while the child is in college necessarily consider expenses associated with attending college. See id. § 598.21(4)( a ) (stating that child support is for the reasonable and necessary expenses of a child). This approach is also consistent with our pronouncement in In re Marriage of Goodman that the retroactivity provision applies to pre-July 1, 1997 decrees providing for support of a child in college. See In re Marriage of Goodman, 690 N.W.2d at 283. We therefore reverse the judgment of the district court insofar as it denied modification of child support by refusing to apply the postsecondary-education-subsidy statute, and remand the case to the district court to eliminate James's child-support obligation and to determine whether there is good cause to establish a postsecondary education subsidy for Joel under the law and the facts now in existence. See Iowa Code § 598.21F(1) (Supp.2005) (The court may order a postsecondary education subsidy if good cause is shown.); see also In re Marriage of Mullen-Funderburk, 696 N.W.2d at 611 (stating that determinations of postsecondary education subsidies should be based on both the facts and the law in existence when the determination is made). We recognize that the application of the postsecondary-education subsidy statute necessarily results in a termination of the prior support obligation. The legislature intended the standard under section 598.21(5A) and the new definition of support under section 598.1(9) to apply retroactively to pre-July 1, 1997 decrees. Thus, if the district court on remand finds no good cause to establish a college subsidy, the prior decree must nevertheless be modified to eliminate the existing child-support obligation under the decree. If the district court finds good cause for a subsidy, then the terms of the subsidy modify and replace the existing child-support provision of the decree. James has asked that the termination of his child-support obligation be made retroactive to August 21, 2004, three months after he served Bonnie with his original notice and petition for modification. See Iowa Code § 598.21(8) (stating child-support obligations may be retroactively modified only from three months after the date the notice of the petition for modification is served on the opposing party). We leave this issue to the district court on remand. We also leave it to the district court to determine any claim of reimbursement for support not given to Joel by Bonnie.