Opinion ID: 2682690
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Legal and Administrative Framework

Text: The U.S. Department of Labor oversees, in relevant part, two agencies devoted to workplace safety and worker health: OSHA and MSHA. OSHA administers the Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970 (the “OSH Act”) and regulates workplace safety and worker health unless Congress has conferred jurisdiction on another agency in an industry-specific statute. See 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(1). In this case, OSHA and the OSH Act govern Shamokin’s plant unless MSHA, administering the Mine Act, governs instead. The difference in jurisdiction results in a difference in oversight. MSHA’s regulatory framework is more specific and extensive than OSHA’s in regulating safety and health hazards associated with the handling of coal, particularly with final decision and order, entered on October 18, 2012, was not directed for review by the Mine Commission and by law became a final order of the Mine Commission on November 26, 2012. We review the Mine Commission’s legal conclusions de novo. See Reich v. D.M. Sabia Co., 90 F.3d 854, 860 (3d Cir. 1996). We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. See Mach Min., LLC v. Sec’y of Labor, Mine Safety & Health Admin., 728 F.3d 643, 659 (7th Cir. 2013); cf. Gunderson v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 601 F.3d 1013, 1021 (10th Cir. 2010) (reviewing evidentiary decisions of an ALJ of the Department of Labor’s Benefits Review Board under an abuse of discretion standard); R & B Transp., LLC v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Admin. Review Bd., 618 F.3d 37, 44 (1st Cir. 2010) (same as to decisions of an ALJ of the Department of Labor’s Administrative Review Board). 4 regard to workers’ exposure to respirable coal dust. Compare 30 C.F.R. Part 71 with 29 C.F.R. Part 1910, Subpart Z. Because of the dangers inherent in mining, Congress also gave the Secretary more rigorous enforcement mechanisms under the Mine Act than under the OSH Act. For example, the Mine Act, unlike the OSH Act, requires two inspections per year for surface mines, permits inspections to be conducted without a warrant, and in specified circumstances authorizes inspectors to issue orders requiring withdrawal of miners from the mine. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 813(a), 814(d), 814(e), 817(a); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 606 (1981); RNS Servs., Inc. v. Sec'y of Labor, Mine Safety & Health Admin. (MSHA), 115 F.3d 182, 187 (3d Cir. 1997). In order to determine whether MSHA and the Mine Act govern, we must decide whether the facility to be regulated is a “coal or other mine, the products of which enter commerce, or the operations or products of which affect commerce.” 30 U.S.C. § 803; see RNS Servs., Inc., 115 F.3d at 183. In relevant part, a “coal or other mine” under the Mine Act includes “lands, . . . facilities, equipment, machines, tools, or other property, . . . used in, or to be used in, . . . the work of preparing coal . . . and includes custom coal preparation facilities.” 30 U.S.C. § 802(h)(1)-(h)(2). We have found this provision to be “so expansively worded as to indicate an intention on the part of Congress to authorize the Secretary to assert jurisdiction over any lands integral to the process of preparing coal for its ultimate consumer.” RNS Servs., Inc., 115 F.3d at 186 (emphasis added). The Mine Act defines “the work of preparing the coal” as “the breaking, crushing, sizing, cleaning, washing, drying, mixing, storing, and loading of bituminous coal, lignite, or anthracite, and 5 such other work of preparing such coal as is usually done by the operator of the coal mine.” 30 U.S.C. § 802(i). We employ a “functional analysis” in assessing whether MSHA has jurisdiction, under which we give the “broadest possible scope to [M]ine Act coverage.” Pa. Elec. Co. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n (“Penelec”), 969 F.2d 1501, 1503 (3d Cir. 1992) (quotation marks omitted). What matters most is how the company uses the coal: Turning to the case law, in [Penelec], we held that “the delivery of raw coal to a coal processing facility is an activity within the Mine Act, but not the delivery of completely processed coal to the ultimate consumer.” 969 F.2d 1501 [at 1504] (citing Stroh v. Director, Office of Workers’ Comp. Progs., 810 F.2d 61, 64 (3d Cir. 1987)). See also Hanna v. Director, Office of Workers’ Comp. Progs., 860 F.2d 88, 92-93 (3d Cir.1988). In Stroh, we found that “shovel[ing coal] into [a] truck, and haul[ing] it to independently owned coal processing plants” was integral to the work of preparing the coal. [810 F.2d] at 62. We further noted that the loaded coal’s subsequent transportation over public roads did not alter its status as an activity that is part of the work of preparing the coal. Id. at 65. Penelec applied a functional analysis, wherein the propriety of Mine Act jurisdiction is determined by the nature of the functions that 6 occur at a site. That analysis has its roots in Wisor v. Director, Office of Workers’ Comp. Progs., 748 F.2d 176, 178 (3d Cir.1984), was applied in Stroh, 810 F.2d at 64, and has been adopted by the Fourth Circuit. See United Energy Servs., Inc. v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Admin., 35 F.3d 971, 975 (4th Cir. 1994). RNS Servs. Inc., 115 F.3d at 184.