Opinion ID: 2317073
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Freedom From Self-Incrimination

Text: We now address the Houles' argument that the Family Court violated the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution [6] and article 1, section 13, of the Rhode Island Constitution [7] by basing its finding of unfitness upon the Houles' refusal to accept reunification services. The Houles strenuously maintain that they did not participate in DCYF's case plans because doing so would have subjected them to potential criminal liability. Specifically, they argue that the initial case plan required Peter to admit to abusing former foster children and to accept services that were calculated to cause [the Houles] great legal discomfort. Moreover, the Houles urge that the trial justice effectively expropriated Peter's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by using his invocation of that privilege against him in the termination of parental rights proceeding. We do not agree. The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination may properly be invoked in a civil proceeding regardless of whether there is a pending criminal matter arising out of the same set of factual circumstances. Tona, Inc. v. Evans, 590 A.2d 873, 875 (R.I.1991). However, the privilege applies only when a party is `compelled to make a testimonial communication that is incriminating.' Id. In addition, `the Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify.' LaSalle Bank Lake View v. Seguban, 54 F.3d 387, 390 (7th Cir.1995). Rather, a party's silence should be considered in light of all the other evidence. Id. Here, the Houles argue that they were entitled, pursuant to the Fifth Amendment, to refuse all DCYF services aimed at reunification because their participation might have incriminated them. They also argue that the trial justice should not have drawn any negative inferences about their fitness as parents as a result of this blanket refusal. These arguments do not pass muster in light of our case law in this area. In Tona, we explained that there are limitations on the right to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege. Tona, Inc., 590 A.2d at 876. Specifically, we held that whether the privilege applies in a particular context must be determined by the court on a question-by-question basis. Id. Moreover, [t]he mere threat of criminal prosecution is insufficient to justify a blanket assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege. Id. Here, the Houles refused to participate in every case plan that DCYF prepared. They argue that Peter could not participate in counseling because any response could have been injurious. However, the issue of whether the Fifth Amendment privilege applied in this matter was not for the Houles to decide. Rather, it was for the Family Court to determine after conducting `a particularized inquiry, deciding, in connection with each specific area that the questioning party seeks to explore, whether or not the privilege is well-founded.' Tona, Inc., 590 A.2d at 876 (quoting S.E.C. v. First Financial Group of Texas, Inc., 659 F.2d 660, 668 (5th Cir.1981)). Moreover, there is no evidence in the record to suggest that the trial justice inferred, on the basis of Peter's nonparticipation in offender counseling alone, that the Houles were unfit parents. Rather, the trial justice drew upon an abundance of evidence, including Gregory's statements that he was abused by Virginia, the admissions of both parents that they no longer desired to reunite with Rosalie, Virginia's misconduct during visitation with the children, evaluations of the children by Marge Lederer [8] and Doctor John Parsons, [9] as well as both parents' hostility toward DCYF and their wholesale refusal to participate in any reunification services, even after Peter was acquitted of the sexual abuse charges. It was entirely proper for the trial justice to draw inferences based upon the Houles' refusal to participate in reunification, in light of all the other evidence that supported the court's finding. In addition, we recently decided a termination of parental rights appeal in which a father, who was found to be unfit, argued that the trial justice should not have considered his failure to partake of sexual offender counseling because he was, at the same time, defending himself against sexual misconduct charges in another case. In re Amber P., 877 A.2d 608 (R.I.2005). We disagreed, recognizing that a situation such as this can place a litigant such as respondent on the horns of a dilemma. However, that dilemma in no way should preclude the Family Court from carrying out its statutory duty of determining both parental fitness and what is in the best interest of a child. Id. at 616. Ultimately, we held that the trial justice was entitled to weigh    respondent's failure to submit to sex-offender counseling, in the court's consideration of DCYF's termination petition. Id. Likewise, in In re Alan W., 665 A.2d 877 (R.I.1995), we affirmed the termination of parental rights of a father who was charged by DCYF with sexually abusing his son. The father, who already was serving prison time for sexual assaults on other children, denied allegations that he abused his son. Id. On appeal, he argued that DCYF did not provide him with a fair opportunity to reunite with his child. Id. at 878. In affirming the Family Court's decision, we noted the trial justice's observation that the father had apparently concluded that it was not in his own best interests to admit to the abuse and begin therapy months earlier while awaiting trial. In doing so    the father put his own interests before those of his son, who had been in foster care for almost two years. Id. The purpose of a termination of parental rights proceeding is to determine whether the parent has manifested, despite the child's placement out of the home, the sense of responsibility, interest and affection essential to the reestablishment of parental care for the child. In re Armand, 433 A.2d 957, 961 (R.I.1981). From the inception of DCYF's involvement in this case, Peter and Virginia Houle have stonewalled virtually all attempts at reunification. They argue that any participation in DCYF case plans will subject them to criminal liability. Such a wholesale rejection of the services provided to them, while their children remained in DCYF custody for over two years, demonstrates that the Houles exalted their own interests over those of their children. The Houles have failed to evince the responsibility, interest, and affection that we deemed essential to the reestablishment of parental care. After reviewing the record and our case law in this area, we conclude that the trial justice did not infringe upon the Houles' right against self-incrimination.