Opinion ID: 203882
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Liability for Criminal Conduct of Co-conspirators

Text: Gonzalez argues that the court's instruction on the liability of members of a conspiracy for substantive offenses committed by their co-conspirators (i.e., Pinkerton [8] liability) was confusing and would have caused the jury to believe that it could find liability for the criminal conduct of co-conspirators even without sufficient proof of the underlying offense. He claims that the confusion arose because the court first told the jury that it would explain the law regarding liability for the underlying substantive offense, but instead went on to describe the requirements for a conspiracy conviction. The court stated: In order to find that someone who's guilty of conspiracy to commit an offense is also guilty of the offense, the government has to prove five things ... Third, [the government] has to show that the offense was committed pursuant to the conspiracy. ... Now, I know it's a little bit confusing and you may be asking yourselves what's the difference between finding someone guilty under the aiding and abetting theory and finding someone guilty under the conspiracy theory. Although the two offenses are similar in some respects, there is a big difference between finding somebody guilty on what others have done based on the aiding and abetting theory as opposed to finding someone guilty of a substantive offense based on what co-conspirators have done. The difference is this: proof of aiding and abetting, as I told you earlier, requires evidence that the crime was actually committed by someone. The defendant can't be guilty of aiding and abetting an offense that was never committed, whereas, proof of a conspiracy does not require a showing that the unlawful act that was the object of the conspiracy was committed. (emphasis added). This instruction, Gonzalez contends, would lead the jury to believe that he could be found guilty of the substantive offense (Count II) without proof that the offense had been committed. The government counters that the court correctly stated the applicable law: that in order for the jury to find Pinkerton liability, the government had to prove five elements, one of which was that the offense was committed pursuant to the conspiracy. Moreover, the court had already given a lucid description of the five elements of liability, and said repeatedly (at least six times) that proof of all five was required to convict Gonzalez. Our review is for plain error. We agree with appellant that the court's statement that proof of a conspiracy does not require showing that the unlawful act that was the object of the conspiracy was committed was confusing. This statement is accurate only as to criminal liability for the offense of conspiracy, which is not what the court said it was discussing. Nevertheless, we reject appellant's claim of plain error under the circumstances. The Supreme Court has held that instructions that might be ambiguous in the abstract can be cured when read in conjunction with other instructions. Jones, 527 U.S. at 391, 119 S.Ct. 2090 (citations omitted); see also United States v. Nishnianidze, 342 F.3d 6, 16 (1st Cir.2003) (finding no plain error in instruction which incorrectly characterized the applicable standard as a subjective one but later clarified that the government bore the burden of proving that defendant's statement was objectively threatening). Despite the original ambiguity of the court's statement, the court cured the ambiguity by explicitly distinguishing in the next two sentences between liability for conspiracy and liability for the substantive underlying offense. The court stated: You can be guilty of conspiracy even though the act was not committed. Obviously, you can't be guilty of the act that was the object of the conspiracy unless the act was committed. Given this language, it is highly unlikely that the potential ambiguity cited by Gonzalez, when read in the context of an otherwise correct ... instruction, misled the jury. ... This is especially so given the clarifying instruction that immediately followed the passage to which [defendant] objects. United States v. Bailey, 405 F.3d 102, 110 (1st Cir.2005) (holding that an extraneous reference to liability for failure to act  a theory the government had not argued  in an otherwise comprehensive, seven-paragraph instruction on aiding and abetting was not plain error, particularly in light of subsequent clarification). Furthermore, in explaining to the jury that the defendant could be found liable for the substantive offense under one of the theories  as a principal, as an aider and abettor, or under a Pinkerton theory  the court eliminated any ambiguity in its earlier instructions by emphasizing the fact that a conviction based on a Pinkerton theory required the government to prove the five elements he had already set forth. (You could find him guilty of the 500 gram charge if he actually possessed the 500 grams with intent to distribute, or if he aided and abetted others in doing so, but you can't find him guilty on the basis that he is guilty of conspiracy unless you find that these five things have been shown.)