Opinion ID: 793602
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Petitioner fails to show how any alleged errors by counsel prejudiced Petitioner

Text: 114 Even assuming, arguendo, that Petitioner is able to prove that it was error for counsel to fail to object to the above-referenced evidence, Petitioner has failed to show how 1) the failure to object to any of the enumerated instances amounts to a constitutional deprivation of counsel, and 2) how Petitioner was prejudiced by the admission— i.e., why this Court should find that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Petitioner is not entitled to a presumption of prejudice unless it can be said that his counsel fail[ed] meaningfully to oppose the prosecution's case. Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 179, 125 S.Ct. 551, 160 L.Ed.2d 565 (2004). 115 Petitioner presents no argument in support of the prejudice prong beyond Petitioner's conclusory assertions that the cumulative effect of the errors denied Petitioner his right to effective assistance of counsel. The evidence of Petitioner's guilt was overwhelming. Petitioner admitted to shooting the Averys. Accomplices testified against Petitioner and provided details of the crimes. Coroner's evidence corroborated the accomplices' testimony. Forensic evidence further corroborated the accomplices' accounts. In the penalty phase, Petitioner himself did not disclaim the acts, but merely asserted that his actions were not wrong because God's will directed them. In light of this overwhelming evidence, it is difficult to conclude that there exists a reasonable probability that but for the alleged errors, the result of either the guilt or penalty phases would have been different. 116 c. The Supreme Court of Ohio's decision was not an unreasonable application of federal law 117 Petitioner has preserved for review his allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel due to counsel's failure to object to the firearms evidence (subclaim (e)), the victims' clothing (subclaim (f)), and other acts evidence (subclaim (g)). 118 Petitioner argues that his trial counsel should have objected to the state's introduction of firearms evidence which was unconnected to the death of the Averys. Petitioner further contends that his trial counsel should have objected to the presentation of the Averys' putrified clothing in the courtroom. Finally, Petitioner argues that defense counsel should have objected to the testimony of an Officer Alvord that revealed that Petitioner had been under investigation for plans to assault the Kirtland Temple. 119 On direct review, the Ohio Court of Appeals found that the court did not commit plain error by allowing the firearms and ostensible other acts evidence into the trial, concluding that while the firearms (and presumably the testimony going to the planned assault) were of questionable relevance, Petitioner had failed to establish that but for the disputed evidence, the results of the guilt or penalty phases would have been otherwise. Lundgren, No. 90-L-15-140, 1993 WL 346444, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS, at -20. The Ohio Supreme Court agreed, summarily finding that Petitioner was not prejudiced by the admission of the evidence under the plain error standard. See Lundgren, 653 N.E.2d at 318. 120 Petitioner argues that his trial counsel should have objected to the prosecution's use, in court, of the Averys' clothing as visual exhibits of where bullets penetrated. The clothing, recovered from the buried bodies of the Averys, was accompanied by a pungently acrid smell. 121 Both the Ohio Court of Appeals and the Ohio Supreme Court failed to treat separately each evidentiary subclaim under Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel assignment of error. Instead, the courts concluded generally that even were Petitioner able to prove counsel erred in failing to proffer objections, Petitioner had failed to prove prejudice. See Lundgren, No. 90-L-15-140, 1998 WL 964592, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 4394, at -92; Lundgren, 653 N.E.2d at 324. In addition, the Ohio Supreme Court observed: 122 Lundgren's counsel vigorously and professionally defended his client in an unpopular cause. As a part of that strenuous defense, counsel could make tactical choices. Lundgren's trial strategy was to concede that he shot the Averys, but argue he did not deserve the death penalty, given his sincere religious motives. Under the facts, the decision not to object to issues raised in propositions of law five, six, seven, eight, nine, eleven, thirteen, fourteen, twenty-one, twenty-two, and twenty-three did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. 123 Lundgren, 653 N.E.2d at 324 (internal quotation and citation omitted). 124 The district court found the firearms evidence admissible as relevant to a finding of prior calculation and design and therefore concluded that counsel did not err in failing to object to their admission. In addition, the district court found that Agent Alvord's testimony revealing suspicion of Petitioner's plans to assault the Temple was admissible because it was admitted in the context of the agent's testimony tending to reveal that Petitioner was packed and ready to move and therefore had prior calculation and design to kill the Averys and then quit the area. Finally, the district court concluded that the clothes were properly admitted to show that their defects were consistent with the testimony as to the victims' gunshot wounds. 125 The Ohio Supreme Court's conclusion cannot be said to be either contrary to nor an unreasonable application of the Strickland test. The evidence against Petitioner going to guilt was undisputed, and the basic elements of the crime—the planning and execution of a family of five—are strong aggravating factors in and of themselves. Petitioner does not support in briefs to this Court how, without the above evidence, there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Petitioner's argument under these subclaims must fail. 5. Summary 126 Petitioner has procedurally defaulted his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel as premised on victim character evidence, the mention of Jonestown, the use of certainty language, the warrantless barn search, the wiretap, and prosecutorial misconduct. Without argument as to cause for his failure to bring these issues up on direct appeal, Petitioner cannot overcome this procedural default. 127 Petitioner's non-defaulted claims show no grounds for habeas relief premised on ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner's trial counsel had ample reason for not bringing an insanity defense and had performed a reasonable investigation into Petitioner's mental state and background. Moreover, the state court's determination that Petitioner failed to prove prejudice from the introduction of the victims' clothing, the firearms evidence, and Petitioner's Temple assault plans was not contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law.