Opinion ID: 552780
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: 14 In order to ascertain whether we have jurisdiction over Ludlum's appeals, we must analyze each separately. Appeal No. 90-3188 challenges the district court's order denying Ludlum's motion for withdrawal of reference of AI's adversary proceeding. The district court issued this order pursuant to its original jurisdiction. In such a situation, we cannot predicate our jurisdiction on the appeal provision that is generally applicable to bankruptcy cases, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 158(d). See Metro Transportation Co. v. North Star Reinsurance Co., 912 F.2d 672, 676 (3d Cir.1990); United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 857 F.2d 202, 204 (3d Cir.1988). Rather, the only avenue for appeal of such an order is our general jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291. 15 Section 1291 confers upon us jurisdiction over appeals from all final decisions of the district courts. A district court's decision is final and appealable for purposes of Sec. 1291 only when the decision 'ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.'  Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 108 S.Ct. 1133, 1136, 99 L.Ed.2d 296 (1988) (quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233, 65 S.Ct. 631, 634, 89 L.Ed. 911 (1945)). In the bankruptcy context, however, we apply a less rigorous standard of finality under Sec. 1291. See In re Pruitt, 910 F.2d 1160, 1165 (3d Cir.1990); In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d 1034, 1039 (3d Cir.1985). Nonetheless, our relaxed view of bankruptcy orders cannot impart appellate jurisdiction without some vestige of finality. Pruitt, 910 F.2d at 1166. It is well-settled that orders granting or denying motions for withdrawal of reference are not final. See e.g., id.; In re Powelson, 878 F.2d 976, 979 (7th Cir.1989); In re Kemble, 776 F.2d 802, 806 (9th Cir.1985). Therefore, despite our flexible view of finality, appeal No. 90-3188 is interlocutory and unreviewable under Sec. 1291.
16 Appeal No. 90-3218, by contrast, challenges an order of the bankruptcy court denying Ludlum's motion for transfer. This appeal was taken from an order of the district court dismissing for lack of jurisdiction Ludlum's appeal from the bankruptcy court's order. In this context, we must look to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 158(d) for jurisdiction. That section affords us jurisdiction over appeals from final orders entered by the district courts in their appellate capacity in bankruptcy cases. As under Sec. 1291, [w]e [also] have consistently recognized that finality [under Sec. 158(d) ] must be viewed pragmatically. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. McCune, 836 F.2d 153, 157 (3d Cir.1987); see also In re Taylor, 913 F.2d 102, 104 (3d Cir.1990) (In the bankruptcy context, finality is accorded a somewhat flexible, pragmatic definition.). However, [t]he application of this less stringent definition of finality in bankruptcy cases is not without limitation. In re Meyertech Corp., 831 F.2d 410, 414 (3d Cir.1987). 17 To determine whether the order appealed from is final, we must balanc[e] a general reluctance to expand traditional interpretations regarding finality and a desire to effectuate a practical termination of the matter before us. Id. The factors to consider in this balancing process include the impact of the disputed issue on the assets of the bankruptcy estate, the necessity for additional fact-finding on a remand, the preclusive effect of this court's decision on the merits of subsequent litigation, and the furtherance of judicial economy. Wheeling-Pittsburgh, 836 F.2d at 158 (citing Meyertech, 831 F.2d at 414). 18 Ludlum offers three reasons why the bankruptcy court's order denying its motion for transfer is final under Sec. 158(d). Ludlum claims, first, that judicial economy would be fostered by allowing an appeal at this stage of the proceedings. If AI's adversary action proceeds to verdict without a jury, and the bankruptcy court's denial of Ludlum's jury demand is thereafter reversed, that circumstance alone would constitute reversible error and would necessitate a new trial. See E.E.O.C. v. Corry Jamestown Corp., 719 F.2d 1219, 1225 (3d Cir.1983) ([D]enial of a trial by jury is reversible error unless a directed verdict would have been appropriate.). Ludlum argues, therefore, that immediate appellate review is appropriate because it will avoid the possibility of two trials. 19 Ludlum further contends that the bankruptcy court's order should be deemed final because it effectively disposes of Ludlum's constitutional right to a jury trial. In In re West Electronics, Inc., 852 F.2d 79 (3d Cir.1988), a creditor moved to lift the automatic stay on the basis of an alleged statutory right to terminate a contract with the debtor. The bankruptcy court was unpersuaded by the creditor's statutory argument and thus denied its motion to lift the stay. Because the bankruptcy court ... rejected the [creditor's] legal positions, we held that the court's order was final pursuant to Sec. 158(d). Id. at 82. The bankruptcy court in this case rejected, as a matter of law, Ludlum's seventh amendment right to a jury trial. As a result, Ludlum contends that the reasoning of West Electronics counsels that the bankruptcy court's order be considered final. 20 Ludlum asserts, finally, that the bankruptcy court's order is appealable because its right to a jury trial is purely a legal question that requires no additional factfinding. See Wheeling-Pittsburgh, 836 F.2d at 158 (the lack of a need for further factfinding listed as a reason for finding appellate jurisdiction). Interestingly, AI maintains that this factor cuts the other way. AI contends that we should not entertain an appeal at this time because our decision will not obviate the need for factfinding on remand. See Meyertech, 831 F.2d at 414. Although our case law offers authority for both arguments, the fact that Ludlum's appeal raises only a legal question, we think, militates in favor of finality in this instance. 3 21 In sum, we agree that the question presented is purely legal and that it might be pragmatically sound to hear Ludlum's appeal now and thereby remove the prospect of two trials. We nonetheless conclude that the bankruptcy court's order is not final under Sec. 158(d) for two reasons. First, the resolution of Ludlum's appeal--which, in a sense, simply raises a question of forum selection--will not affect the assets in AI's estate. This factor was accorded substantial weight by the Meyertech court in ascertaining whether the order appealed from was final. 831 F.2d at 414 (First and most important, ... our decision will undoubtedly impact the assets of the estate. (emphasis added)). Second and more fundamentally, however, we think that Ludlum's pending motion for judgment on the pleadings divests the bankruptcy court's order of its finality. 22 As noted above, Ludlum seeks to dismiss AI's adversary proceeding based on a release executed by AI in February of 1986. This release, Ludlum maintains, discharges it of all liability for claims arising under the November 1980 Agreement and relating to events occurring prior to February 19, 1986. Accordingly, Ludlum claims that AI's adversary proceeding is barred as a matter of law. If granted, Ludlum's motion to dismiss would eliminate the need for this appeal. In substance, therefore, Ludlum asks us to issue an advisory ruling that in the event it does not prevail on its motion to dismiss AI's action as a matter of law, it is then entitled to a jury trial on all disputed factual questions. 23 In light of the pendency of Ludlum's motion for judgment on the pleadings, we hold that the bankruptcy court's order is not final. We need not decide whether the orders would be appealable in the absence of such a pending motion, because the motion for judgment on the pleadings is potentially dispositive. Despite the flexible definition accorded finality in the bankruptcy context, we believe that the bankruptcy court's order denying Ludlum's motion for transfer cannot be final until the court disposes of Ludlum's motion for judgment on the pleadings.
24 Because the orders at issue implicate the constitutional right to trial by jury, Ludlum also asks us to construe its appeals as a petition for mandamus. There is ample authority for us to do just that. See Pruitt, 910 F.2d at 1167 ([W]e shall treat [creditor's] appeal as a request for a writ of mandamus....); Gold v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 723 F.2d 1068, 1074 (3d Cir.1983) ([F]rom time to time this Court has chosen to treat improper claims to an appeal as of right as petitions for mandamus....); Cheyney State College Faculty v. Hufstedler, 703 F.2d 732, 736 (3d Cir.1983) (A court may ... treat an attempted appeal ... as a petition for mandamus.). 25 The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1651(a), empowers us to issue writs of mandamus in aid of our jurisdiction. See United States v. Martinez-Zayas, 857 F.2d 122, 127 (3d Cir.1988). It is axiomatic, however, that the remedy of mandamus is a drastic one, to be invoked only in extraordinary situations. Allied Chemical Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 34, 101 S.Ct. 188, 189, 66 L.Ed.2d 193 (1980) (per curiam). Therefore,  '[t]he traditional use of the writ in aid of appellate jurisdiction both at common law and in the federal courts has been to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so.'  Mallard v. United States Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 109 S.Ct. 1814, 1822, 104 L.Ed.2d 318 (1989) (quoting Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 26, 63 S.Ct. 938, 941, 87 L.Ed. 1185 (1943)). 26 Despite courts' general reluctance to issue writs of mandamus, the Supreme Court has stated that it is the responsibility of the Federal Courts of Appeals to grant mandamus where necessary to protect the constitutional right to trial by jury. Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 472, 82 S.Ct. 894, 897, 8 L.Ed.2d 44 (1962). The plaintiff in Dairy Queen sought, among other things, money damages for defendant's alleged breach of a licensing contract. The district court refused to grant defendant's demand for a trial by jury, and the court of appeals denied defendant's request for mandamus. The Supreme Court, however, reversed, holding that because plaintiff's complaint involved a legal claim, defendant was entitled to a jury trial. More importantly for present purposes, the Court stated that [t]he Court of Appeals should have corrected the error of the district judge by granting the petition for mandamus. Id. at 479-80, 82 S.Ct. at 900-01. The Court wrote that the court of appeals' refusal to consider defendant's petition seemed inconsistent with protections already clearly recognized for the important constitutional right to trial by jury. Id. at 470, 82 S.Ct. at 896. See also Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 511, 79 S.Ct. 948, 957, 3 L.Ed.2d 988 (1959) ([T]he right to grant mandamus to require jury trial where it has been improperly denied is settled.). 27 Dairy Queen and Beacon Theatres have begotten an impressive progeny. In fact, this court, in Eldredge v. Gourley, 505 F.2d 769, 770 (3d Cir.1974) (per curiam), relying on both cases, noted that a writ of mandamus is an appropriate means of protecting the right to jury trial. See also Mondor v. United States Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 910 F.2d 585, 586 (9th Cir.1990) ([T]he wrongful denial of a jury trial is an appropriate basis for [mandamus] relief.); In re Vorpahl, 695 F.2d 318, 319 (8th Cir.1982) (The remedy of mandamus in determining the right to a jury trial is firmly settled.); In re Zweibon, 565 F.2d 742, 746 (D.C.Cir.1977) (per curiam) ([D]enial of a jury trial may be reviewed on a petition for a writ in the nature of mandamus.); Higgins v. Boeing Co., 526 F.2d 1004, 1006 (2d Cir.1975) (per curiam) (Our power to preserve the important right to trial by jury by mandamus is clear. (citation omitted)). 28 Further, the appropriateness of mandamus to protect the right to jury trial was addressed specifically in the bankruptcy context in In re Kaiser Steel Corp., 911 F.2d 380 (10th Cir.1990). The debtor in that case commenced an adversary action in bankruptcy court, and the defendants demanded a jury trial. After the bankruptcy court issued an order striking the defendants' jury demands, and the district court affirmed the order, defendants petitioned for writ of mandamus. The Tenth Circuit, relying in part on Dairy Queen, held that if the ... defendants are entitled to a jury trial ... the writ should issue. Id. at 388. 4 29 In view of the teachings of Dairy Queen, Kaiser Steel, and our prior decision in Eldredge, we acknowledge that the seventh amendment entitlement to a jury trial is a fundamental right that is generally protectible through mandamus. Yet, given our general hesitance to issue writs of mandamus, we think that the pendency of Ludlum's motion for judgment on the pleadings militates against our exercise of mandamus jurisdiction in this instance. As we emphasized above, Ludlum seeks, in essence, an advisory opinion from this court that in the event the bankruptcy court denies its motion for judgment on the pleadings, it is then entitled to a jury trial. We decline to pursue the extraordinary remedy of mandamus in order to issue such an advisory opinion.