Opinion ID: 722508
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jurors' Use of a Dictionary

Text: 41 In their affidavits, two jurors stated that during deliberations the forewoman looked up the word enterprise in a dictionary and read out the definition to persuade jurors to convict. According to juror Scott, the forewoman was trying to persuade fellow jurors on the continuing criminal enterprise count. The district court found this use of a dictionary to be not prejudicial because the term enterprise was legally significant only for the RICO counts, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(4), 1962, and the jury acquitted defendants of these charges. As to the CCE counts, the statute uses the term enterprise only in labelling the crime, not in identifying any of the criteria that must be satisfied to show the crime's commission. 21 U.S.C. § 848(c). The court therefore decided that jury consideration of a dictionary definition of that word does not implicate the dangers usually associated with this form of juror misconduct. 821 F.Supp. at 739. Appellants contend that because the jury could have looked up other words in the dictionary, and because the use of a dictionary definition of enterprise could have been prejudicial on the CCE counts despite its irrelevance to the necessary jury findings, the trial court should have recalled the jury for questioning. 42 Again we see no reason why a presumption of prejudice should be suitable for this sort of extraneous material, any more than it would be for media exposure. Cases from other circuits are mixed. The Eighth Circuit has declined to apply a Remmer presumption to jurors' use of extraneous material for resolution of a legal as opposed to a factual issue, United States v. Blumeyer, 62 F.3d 1013, 1016-17 (8th Cir.1995), a distinction that the court does not explain and that does not on its face seem convincing. The Sixth Circuit has applied concepts in accord with our general treatment of extraneous materials, saying that prejudice is not to be automatically inferred even if jurors in fact studied a dictionary definition. United States v. Gillespie, 61 F.3d 457, 460 (6th Cir.1995). On that court's view the trial court has extensive discretion to fashion its inquiry, and review is for abuse of discretion. Id. See also United States v. Duncan, 598 F.2d 839, 866 (4th Cir.1979) (same). While United States v. Martinez, 14 F.3d 543, 550 (11th Cir.1994), applied a Remmer presumption to jurors' use of a dictionary, the case involved intrusion of many other extraneous materials, which the court in fact found prejudicial. And in a civil case the Tenth Circuit spoke of its application of Remmer to any external information, but in fact the court delineated a range of factors to be considered in estimating the likelihood of prejudice. Mayhue v. St. Francis Hospital, 969 F.2d 919, 922-23 (10th Cir.1992). Cf. United States v. Console, 13 F.3d 641, 665-66 (3d Cir.1993) (purporting to apply Remmer presumption to erroneous definition originating in juror's sister). Obviously where the word is critical to a necessary determination, a finding of prejudice is likely. See, e.g., Marino v. Vasquez, 812 F.2d 499, 505-06 (9th Cir.1987) (presence of malice, which jurors looked up in the dictionary after thirty days' deliberation, was crucial to conviction); Mayhue, 969 F.2d at 924. 43 We see no need for further proliferation of categories, and think the alleged contamination is properly assessed in accordance with the standards outlined above for post-trial claims of media exposure--the burden is on defendant to show prejudice, which at the [319 U.S.App.D.C. 280] outset is to be done by examination of the alleged illicit exposure in the full context of the trial. Here the defendants have not gotten past the first step. They have not shown that the portion of the dictionary to which the jurors were exposed could, in its nature, have played a prejudicial role. The word looked up had no legal relevance to the findings necessary for the charges on which the jury convicted, and the defendants, despite their counsel's access to quite a few evidently regretful jurors, offer no reason to believe that the jury looked up other words. 44