Opinion ID: 1508892
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Liability of Individual Defendants

Text: Grine also asserts Dr. Ashton is liable personally for acts of bad faith, and that he would be responsible personally for any damages assessed. As such, Grine alleges a cause of action against Ashton personally and that the State is not involved. The remaining individual defendants are alleged to be liable based upon Ashton's actions. As stated above, State officials and employees do not enjoy the constitutional immunity accorded the state but have immunity granted by statute unless they are shown to have acted with malice outside the scope of their employment. Cross, supra . [A]n officer or employee who acts maliciously or outside the scope of his employment is not protected by § 19-10-305(a). (Citations omitted.) Newton v. Etoch, 332 Ark. 325, 965 S.W.2d 96 (1998). Intentional torts overcome the immunity extended to State officers and employees. Deitsch v. Tillery, 309 Ark. 401, 833 S.W.2d 760 (1992). Thus, in considering the complaint on a motion to dismiss, if the acts or omissions complained of are alleged to be malicious and outside the course and scope of employment, then the coffers of the State are not implicated, and the suit is not one against the State. Under these conditions, Article 5, section 20, of the Constitution is not implicated. Grine's complaint states only conclusions with no factual support against all defendants with the exception Dr. Ashton. Therefore, with respect to those defendants, we affirm their dismissal on the basis of their statutory immunity. In the absence of appellant's sole claim for equitable relief, chancery jurisdiction is lacking. As a general rule, equity jurisdiction exists only when the remedy at law is inadequate. Townsend v. Arkansas State Highway Comm'n, 326 Ark. 731, 933 S.W.2d 389 (1996); Bryant v. Picado, 338 Ark. 227, 996 S.W.2d 17 (1999). A review of Grine's complaint reveals equity jurisdiction is dependent upon his right to seek an injunction that the University suspend or reset the clock on its rule that doctorates be completed within seven years of a candidate's declaration of an intent to pursue a doctorate. We have already held that sovereign immunity bars the claim for injunctive relief against the State. The trial court acquires no jurisdiction when sovereign immunity is applicable. Brown, supra. Hence, once the equitable claim ceased, appellant essentially brought nothing but legal claims before the chancery court. Ordinarily, the equity clean-up doctrine would permit the chancery court to decide all other issues once it acquires jurisdiction for one equitable purpose. Burns v. First Nat'l Bank, 336, 336 Ark. 406, 985 S.W.2d 747 (1999). In the instant case, the court acquired no jurisdiction over any equitable claims because of the State's immunity. With no equitable jurisdiction ever acquired, the chancery court was wholly incompetent to grant the relief sought by appellant. Liles v. Liles, 289 Ark. 159, 711 S.W.2d 447 (1986). Therefore, appellant's remaining purely legal claims for damages against Dr. Ashton should have been dismissed without prejudice. We affirm.