Opinion ID: 1241125
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sufficiency of the affidavit in support of the search warrant.

Text: We note at the outset the somewhat deferential standard of appellate review used to test the sufficiency of affidavits in support of search warrants. Affidavits for search warrants should not be reviewed and tested in a hypertechnical manner. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965); State v. Oropeza, 97 Idaho 387, 545 P.2d 475 (1976). A magistrate's determination of probable cause should be accorded great deference by the appellate court. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969); State v. Oropeza, supra . Similarly, such affidavits should be tested by standards less rigorous than those governing the admissibility of evidence at trial. Spinelli v. United States, supra . Keeping the above standards of appellate scrutiny in mind, we turn now to the sufficiency of the affidavit in question. The affidavit, signed by Lt. Galland, was based primarily on two sources of information: a confidential informant and prior surveillances of the defendant conducted by law enforcement officers. The officers had observed Gomez making heroin deliveries in the Boise area on two separate occasions, thirty-nine and forty-five days prior to the issuance of the warrant. On the day before the warrant was issued, the confidential informant had told Lt. Galland that quantities of narcotics could be found at the Gomez residence. The defendant argues that the information provided by the confidential informant does not meet the two-pronged test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), further explicated in Spinelli v. United States, supra ,, and implemented by this Court in State v. Oropeza, supra , and State v. Alger, 100 Idaho 675, 603 P.2d 1009 (1979). The requirements of the test are as follows: Although an affidavit may be based on hearsay information and need not reflect the direct personal observations of the affiant, the magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed they were, and some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant ... was `credible' or his information `reliable'. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. at 114, 84 S.Ct. at 1514, 12 L.Ed.2d at 729 (citations omitted). [1] Regarding the informant's tip in the instant case, it is quite clear that the affidavit met the second prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test, the so-called veracity prong. The affidavit states that the confidential informant had proven reliable on no less than six previous occasions, and his information had directly led to the arrest and prosecution of at least five traffickers of narcotics. The affidavit amply demonstrates the informant's reliability. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960). We also note that [a] particularly strong showing on one prong may compensate for a weaker showing on the other. United States v. Smith, 598 F.2d 936, 939-40 (5th Cir.1979). However, the informant's tip does not meet the first prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test, dubbed the basis of knowledge prong. The affiant, Lt. Galland, states that the tipster informed him that Carlos Gomez had delivered a quantity of heroin through a third party to two subjects from the Burley, Idaho, area; one of those subjects being a female by the name of Janie Ramos and another male subject known as Pete Guzman. The affidavit does not indicate whether the confidential informant observed the delivery firsthand. [2] Nor does it indicate how it was known that the third party had acquired the heroin from Gomez. Not only does the affidavit raise the problematic aspect of hearsay, but also hearsay upon hearsay. See State v. Oropeza, supra . The state admits as much when it states in its brief: There is no indication in the affidavit ... as to whether the information provided by the confidential informant was based upon the informant's observation of Carlos Gomez delivering drugs to a third party who subsequently delivered them to Janie Ramos and Pete Guzman. Therefore, if the affidavit in question were based solely on the anonymous informant's tip, we would be compelled to hold the search warrant invalid. The tip, by itself, does not meet the Aguilar test, since it lacks the primary factual data required for the magistrate to evaluate the conclusional validity of the informant's statements. See Stanley v. State, 19 Md. App. 507, 313 A.2d 847, 861 (1974), cert. denied (1974). The state insists that this defect is not fatal to the affidavit, pointing out that probable cause here is based not only on the informant's tip, but also on the affiant's independent knowledge of defendant's recent narcotics trafficking as observed by other law enforcement officers. The state's argument is roughly based on the following language from Spinelli: If the tip is found inadequate under Aguilar, the other allegations which corroborate the information contained in the hearsay report should then be considered. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. at 415, 89 S.Ct. at 588, 21 L.Ed.2d at 643. As noted by Judge Friendly, writing for the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals, the effect of a defect in the informant's tip is diminished when the affidavit presents other independently incriminating information: [3] The lesson we draw from all this is that Aguilar applies with full rigor only when the search warrant or the arrest depends solely on the informer's tip. When a tip not meeting the Aguilar test has generated police investigation and this has developed sufficient corroboration or other ` probative indications of criminal activity along the lines suggested by the informant,' see Rebell, The Undisclosed Informant and the Fourth Amendment: A Search for Meaningful Standards, 81 Yale L.J. 703, 715-17 (1972), the tip, even though not qualifying under Aguilar, may be used to give such additional color as is needed to elevate the information acquired by police observation above the floor required for probable cause. United States v. Canieso, 470 F.2d 1224, 1231 (2d Cir.1972) (emphasis in text). In the instant case, the affidavit of Lt. Galland sets forth other probative indications of criminal activity. The affidavit alleges that on two separate occasions the defendant made deliveries of heroin while under surveillance by investigative officers. Police officers are presumed to be reliable sources of information. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965); State v. Alger, 100 Idaho 675, 603 P.2d 1009 (1979). The police officers personally observed criminal activity. Under these circumstances, the issue is not really whether these observations sufficiently corroborate the informant's tip, but rather whether the criminal activity previously observed by the police officers, supported by the Aguilar -defective informant's tip can support a magistrate's finding of probable cause. [4] See United States v. McNally, 473 F.2d 934, 939-40 (3rd Cir.1973) (while recognizing that the tip plus corroboration approach is fruitless where the informant's tip sets forth no detail capable of corroboration, the court nonetheless held that other independently suspect activity can together with defective tip establish probable cause). In a recent case, State v. Alger, supra , this Court recognized that direct observations made by police can be combined with an informant's tip to constitute probable cause, even though the police observation by itself would be insufficient. `[D]irect observations, insufficient unto themselves to establish probable cause, may nevertheless be added to trustworthy hearsay, which ... is also insufficient unto itself, so that the combination of incriminatory elements may establish the probable cause which neither alone quite demonstrates.' Moylan, Hearsay and Probable Cause: An Aguilar and Spinelli Primer, 25 Mercer L.Rev. 741, 778-79 (1974). State v. Alger, 100 Idaho at 678, 603 P.2d at 1112. Appellant maintains, however, that the prior police observations cannot support a finding of probable cause because such observations took place thirty-nine and forty-five days prior to the issuance of the search warrant. The defendant contends that this stale information fails to establish present probable cause. It is generally true that [a]n affidavit must provide facts sufficient to create probable cause for belief that the forbidden articles are within the place to be searched at the time the search warrant is requested. State v. Oropeza, 97 Idaho at 392, 545 P.2d at 480. Unfortunately, there exists no magical number of days within which information is fresh and after which the information becomes stale. The question must be resolved in light of the circumstances of each case. Id.; Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206, 53 S.Ct. 138, 77 L.Ed. 260 (1932); United States v. Hyde, 574 F.2d 856 (5th Cir.1978); State v. Ingram, 251 Or. 324, 445 P.2d 503 (1968). See generally Annot., 100 A.L.R.2d 524 (1965). An important factor in staleness analysis is the nature of the criminal conduct. If the affidavit recounts criminal activities of a protracted or continuous nature, a time delay in the sequence of events is of less significance. See United States v. Hyde, supra ; United States v. Johnson, 461 F.2d 285 (10th Cir.1972). Under appropriate circumstances, some courts have viewed drug trafficking as an inherently continuous activity. Johnson v. State, 14 Md. App. 721, 288 A.2d 622 (Md. App. 1972). In Johnson, the lapse of time was twenty-six days. As in the case at bench, there had been two prior observations of drug trafficking by law enforcement personnel. The Johnson court stated that the activities described in the affidavit seemed to suggest a continuing business in the distribution of narcotics. Id., 288 A.2d at 628. Cf. United States v. Harris, 482 F.2d 1115, 1119 (3rd Cir.1973) ([p]rotracted and continuous activity is inherent in a large-scale narcotics operation). In this case, we believe that the two prior heroin deliveries observed by law enforcement officers at least raise the inference that the defendant was engaged in the continuing business of distributing narcotics. It must also be noted that Lt. Galland used the present tense in describing the information provided by the confidential informant. [5] Use of the present tense, even by a confidential informant, lends support to a finding of present probable cause. See State v. Boudreaux, 304 So.2d 343 (La. 1974); State v. Clay, 7 Wash. App. 631, 501 P.2d 603 (1972). We specifically decline to hold whether the prior observations in this case would by themselves support a finding of probable cause. We hold only that such observations, when coupled with the informant's information that Gomez currently had in his possession and at his residence quantities of narcotics, raises this affidavit above the floor of probable cause. In so holding, we have taken into consideration the informant's impressive record as a source of reliable information in the past. We have also considered that, as previously observed, a strong veracity prong may strengthen other areas of weakness in the affidavit. Basically, the prior observations of the police officers suggest a protracted course of criminal activity on the part of the defendant, and the allegations of the confidential informant bring the activities of defendant current and place the evidence to be seized squarely in the defendant's residence. We therefore conclude, allowing due deference to the decision of the magistrate in this case, that the prior investigative observations of defendant's criminal activity, bolstered by the information supplied by a highly reliable informant, are sufficient to support a finding of probable cause.