Opinion ID: 6110898
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Herring v. United States

Text: Although this case was decided before Davis , because of its factual similarity to the instant case and the State's urging this Court to adopt its rationale, we discuss it separately rather than as part of the evolution of the United States Supreme Court's development of the federal exclusionary rule. In Herring , the defendant traveled to the Coffee County, Alabama Sheriff's department to retrieve something from his impounded truck. Herring , 555 U.S. at 137 , 129 S.Ct. 695 . Being familiar with the defendant and his history with law enforcement, an investigator requested the county's warrant clerk to check for any outstanding warrants for Herring's arrest in either Coffee County or in neighboring Dale County. Id. Dale County's clerk reported an active arrest warrant for Herring. Id. The Coffee County clerk relayed the information to the investigator and then requested a faxed copy of the warrant from Dale County as confirmation. Id. Meanwhile, the investigator and a deputy followed Herring as he left the impound lot and pulled him over, subsequently arresting him. Id. A search incident to the arrest revealed illegal drugs in Herring's pocket as well as a handgun in his automobile, which, as a felon, he was not permitted to possess. Id. However, the Dale County warrant clerk had mistakenly reported an arrest warrant that had been recalled five months earlier. Id. at 137-38 , 129 S.Ct. 695 . The warrant clerk discovered the error when she looked through the files to retrieve a physical copy of the arrest warrant. Id. at 138 , 129 S.Ct. 695 . The Dale County Sheriff Department's computer records should have corresponded with actual arrest warrants; the office maintained both sets of records. Id. at 137-38 , 129 S.Ct. 695 . When the warrant clerk could not locate a physical copy of the warrant, she called a court clerk, who informed her that the warrant had been previously recalled. Id. at 138 , 129 S.Ct. 695 . Standard procedure in Dale County was that when warrant was recalled, either the court clerk's office or a judge's chambers would call the warrant clerk, who would then enter the information in the computer database and dispose of the physical copy. Id. However, the information about the recall of Herring's arrest warrant did not appear in the database. Id. As soon as the Dale County warrant clerk realized the mistake, she telephoned her counterpart in Coffee County to alert her, who then radioed the investigator to inform him of the misinformation. Id. Although the mistake was found within ten to fifteen minutes, the information was nonetheless too late; the investigator had already arrested Herring and seized the contraband. Id. At the suppression hearing, an officer testified that he had never had reason to question information about a Dale County warrant, and both warrant clerks testified that they could not remember a similar miscommunication ever happening during the course of their employment. Id. In the District Court for the Middle District of Alabama, Herring moved to  suppress the evidence against him on the ground that his initial arrest had been illegal because the warrant had been rescinded. Id. The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge's recommendation to deny the motion because the arresting officers had acted in a good-faith belief that the warrant was still outstanding. Thus, even if there were a Fourth Amendment violation, there was 'no reason to believe that application of the exclusionary rule here would deter the occurrence of any future mistakes.'  Id. at 138 , 129 S.Ct. 695 (quoting United States v. Herring , 451 F.Supp.2d 1290 (2005) ). The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Id. (citing United States v. Herring , 492 F.3d 1212 (2007) ). The Eleventh Circuit noted that Dale County's failure to update the computer database to reflect the recall of the arrest warrant amounted to negligence but that the negligence was neither reckless nor deliberate, a fact that the Herring Court considered crucial to [its] holding that this error is not enough by itself to require 'the extreme sanction of exclusion.'  Id. at 140, 129 S.Ct. 695 (quoting Leon , 468 U.S. at 916, 104 S.Ct. 3405 ). The Eleventh Circuit found that the officers were entirely innocent of any wrongdoing or carelessness and that even if the sheriff's department records were maintained by a law enforcement officer, the conduct in question [wa]s a negligent failure to act, not a deliberate or tactical choice to act. Id. at 138, 129 S.Ct. 695 (citation omitted). It further concluded that the benefit of suppressing the evidence would be marginal or nonexistent and, accordingly, applied the good-faith exception established in Leon . Id. at 139 , 129 S.Ct. 695 (citations omitted). The United States Supreme Court granted Herring's petition for certiorari to resolve a conflict among states because other jurisdictions have applied the exclusionary rule to evidence obtained through similar police errors. Id. (citing Hoay v. State , 348 Ark. 80 , 71 S.W.3d 573 , 577 (2002) ). The Herring Court began by reviewing and emphasizing the rationales and holdings of the prior Supreme Court precedent embodying the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Id. at 140-41 , 129 S.Ct. 695 . The Court continued,  '[T]he rule's costly toll upon truth-seeking and law enforcement objectives presents a high obstacle for those urging [its] application.'  Id. at 141 , 129 S.Ct. 695 (quoting Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott , 524 U.S. 357 , 364-65, 118 S.Ct. 2014 , 141 L.Ed.2d 344 (1998) ) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Havens , 446 U.S. 620 , 626-27, 100 S.Ct. 1912 , 64 L.Ed.2d 559 (1980) ; United States v. Payner , 447 U.S. 727 , 734, 100 S.Ct. 2439 , 65 L.Ed.2d 468 (1980). The extent to which the exclusionary rule is justified by these deterrence principles varies with the culpability of the law enforcement conduct ... [;] 'an assessment of the flagrancy of the police misconduct constitutes an important step in the calculus' of applying the exclusionary rule. Id. at 143, 129 S.Ct. 695 (quoting Leon , 468 U.S. at 911, 104 S.Ct. 3405 ). The Supreme Court explained that error that arises from nonrecurring and attenuated negligence is thus far removed from the core concerns that led us to adopt the rule in the first place. Id. at 144, 129 S.Ct. 695 . Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that when police mistakes are the result of negligence such as that described here, rather than systemic error or reckless disregard of constitutional requirements, any marginal deterrence does not 'pay its way' .... In such a case, the criminal should not 'go free because the constable has blundered.'  Id. at 147-48 , 129 S.Ct. 695 (internal citations omitted).