Opinion ID: 6496730
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: order granting judgment as a matter of law

Text: ¶44 The district court granted judgment as a matter of law to SouthTowne because the court concluded that the evidence adduced at trial was legally insufficient to prove causation. Smith argues that the court erred in making this determination because it failed to consider all the causation-related evidence presented to the jury. SouthTowne defends the court‘s determination and, alternatively, argues that the district court should have granted its motion on the ground that Smith failed to establish the standard of care applicable to her negligence claim. ¶45 After considering all the evidence presented to the jury, we conclude that Smith provided legally sufficient evidence of both causation and the applicable standard of care. Accordingly, we reverse the district court‘s grant of judgment as a matter of law to SouthTowne on the basis of causation, but we affirm the court‘s rejection of SouthTowne‘s standard of care argument as an alternative reason to grant judgment in its favor on Smith‘s negligence claim. ¶46 Rule 50 permits a court to grant judgment as a matter of law only where ―the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party‖ on a claim or defense. UTAH R. CIV. P. 50(a)(1). In addressing a rule 50 motion, ―a trial court must look at the evidence and all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party.‖ Franklin v. Stevenson, 1999 UT 61, ¶ 6, 987 P.2d 22. And because this type of motion ―does not raise questions relating to the competency or admissibility of evidence,‖ courts must take the evidence ―as it existed at the close of the trial, and evidence admitted over objection cannot be excluded nor can evidence be included which was improperly rejected.‖ Id. ¶ 7 (citation omitted). In other words, ―[w]hether competent or incompetent, 14 Cite as: 2022 UT 29 Opinion of the Court all evidence submitted to the jury must be considered by the court.‖ Id. (citation omitted).
¶47 We first address the district court‘s conclusion that Smith failed to present legally sufficient evidence to prove the element of causation. Smith had to prove causation as an element of both her negligence and strict liability claims.12 ¶48 In ruling on SouthTowne‘s motion for judgment as a matter of law, the district court concluded that Smith had to prove four facts by a preponderance of the evidence in order to establish causation: that (1) carbon monoxide was actually produced under the hood of her car during the incident in question; (2) once the carbon monoxide was created, it had a pathway into the passenger compartment of Smith‘s car; (3) once it entered the passenger compartment, the carbon monoxide was sufficiently concentrated to cause Smith harm; and (4) the carbon monoxide actually caused Smith‘s injury. ¶49 The court found that Smith had provided sufficient evidence of the second and fourth facts it identified. But it __________________________________________________________ 12 To prove negligence, a plaintiff must show (1) a duty existed; (2) breach of that duty; (3) causation, which encompasses both cause-in-fact and proximate cause; and (4) damages. See Gerbich v. Numed Inc., 1999 UT 37, ¶ 14, 977 P.2d 1205; Raab v. Utah Ry. Co., 2009 UT 61, ¶¶ 22–23, 221 P.3d 219. In negligence actions, we employ a ―substantial factor‖ test to determine causation, see, e.g., Devine v. Cook, 279 P.2d 1073, 1080 (Utah 1955) (applying the substantial factor test in a negligence case), which rests on the ―principle that causation exists when the defendant‘s conduct is an important or significant contributor to the plaintiff‘s injuries,‖ Gardner v. Gardner, 2019 UT 61, ¶ 23, 452 P.3d 1134 (quoting Substantial-cause Test, BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY, (11th ed. 2019)). In a strict product liability suit, a plaintiff must prove three elements: ―(1) that the product was unreasonably dangerous due to a defect or defective condition, (2) that the defect existed at the time the product was sold, and (3) that the defective condition was a cause of the plaintiff‘s injuries.‖ Blank v. Garff Enters. Inc., 2021 UT App 6, ¶ 26 n.6, 482 P.3d 258 (citation omitted); see also UTAH CODE § 78B-6-703. Liability in these cases rests on the defective product itself, and not on any underlying negligence. Gudmundson v. Del Ozone, 2010 UT 33, ¶ 45, 232 P.3d 1059. 15 SMITH v. VOLKSWAGEN SOUTHTOWNE, INC. Opinion of the Court concluded that no evidence was adduced at trial showing that it was more probable than not that carbon monoxide was actually produced under the hood of Smith‘s car during her drive to Washington, or that the carbon monoxide was present in her passenger compartment in a sufficient quantity to have caused her injuries. ¶50 With regard to the specific facts identified by the district court as critical to determining causation, it is important to remember that a plaintiff‘s burden of proof relates to the required elements of each claim, not to individual facts. See, e.g., Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ¶ 10, 177 P.3d 600 (―Where the moving party would bear the burden of proof at trial, the movant must establish each element of his claim in order to show that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.‖). To be sure, certain facts are ―material‖ in that they are ―significant or essential to the issue . . . at hand‖ and may ―make[] a difference in the result to be reached in a given case.‖ Fact, BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). The role that material facts play in a motion for judgment as a matter of law is the same as in a motion for summary judgment: the moving party must show there were no genuine issues of material fact for the factfinder to weigh and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Nay v. Gen. Motors Corp., GMC Truck Div., 850 P.2d 1260, 1264 (Utah 1993) (explaining that ―both summary judgment and directed verdicts require that no questions of material fact exist and that the moving party be entitled to judgment as a matter of law‖). ¶51 A ―finding of causation cannot be predicated on mere speculation or conjecture.‖ Lindsay v. Gibbons & Reed, 497 P.2d 28, 31 (Utah 1972). For this reason, a plaintiff fails to provide legally sufficient evidence of causation ―unless there is evidence from which the inference may reasonably be drawn that the injury suffered was caused by the negligent act of the defendant.‖ Id. In other words, evidence of causation is insufficient if it leaves jurors to ―speculate as to possibilities.‖ Id. Instead, the evidence must allow ―reasonable minds‖ to ―make justifiable inferences‖ based on all the evidence—including direct, circumstantial, and expert evidence—that a defendant‘s negligence (in a negligence claim) or the defective condition (in a strict liability claim) caused the harm. Id. ¶52 We first address the district court‘s conclusion that Smith failed to prove it was more likely than not that that the leaking diesel fuel produced carbon monoxide when it came in contact 16 Cite as: 2022 UT 29 Opinion of the Court with hot spots in the Volkswagen‘s engine compartment. The court reasoned that this was ―a mixed issue of chemistry and automotive engineering.‖ And it concluded that Smith ―failed to call an expert (properly trained in the relevant discipline) to support that diesel fuel more likely than not was converted to [carbon monoxide] under the conditions that were present under the hood of her vehicle.‖ Rather, Leiss could testify only that it was possible for this to have happened. ¶53 As a threshold matter, we note that Smith did not have the burden to prove this particular fact by a preponderance of the evidence. See supra ¶ 50. But this fact was certainly material to proving causation. ¶54 And we agree with the district court that expert testimony was necessary on this point, because the question of whether diesel fuel leaking onto the Volkswagen‘s engine compartment could produce carbon monoxide required expertise beyond the knowledge of a layperson. And where jurors cannot, without unjustifiable speculation, resolve a dispute based on the facts of the case and their own experiences, expert testimony is required. See USA Power, LLC v. PacifiCorp, 2016 UT 20, ¶ 118, n.217, 372 P.3d 629 (explaining that ―expert testimony is generally required to establish complex questions of causation‖); but see Sheppard v. Geneva Rock, 2021 UT 31, ¶ 31, 493 P.3d 632 (noting, conversely, that expert testimony is ―not necessarily required‖ to prove causation ―when the causal connection is readily apparent using only ‗common knowledge‘‖ (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). ¶55 However, the need for expert testimony in a case neither diminishes the importance of non-expert evidence nor minimizes the jury‘s role as the factfinder. Rather, expert testimony is meant to supplement the jury‘s knowledge so that the jury may decide the case without resorting to ―mere speculation or conjecture.‖ Lindsay, 497 P.2d at 31. ¶56 Expert testimony that fails to take the case out of the realm of speculation or conjecture is insufficient on its own to sustain a plaintiff‘s burden of proof at trial. See, e.g., Fox v. Brigham Young Univ., 2007 UT App 406, ¶ 23, 176 P.3d 446 (holding that expert testimony was needed ―to prevent the fact-finder from resorting to speculation‖ where the medical factors at issue in the case were ―sufficiently complicated to be beyond the ordinary senses and common experience of a layperson‖). 17 SMITH v. VOLKSWAGEN SOUTHTOWNE, INC. Opinion of the Court ¶57 But such testimony may nevertheless provide a sufficient basis for a reasonable inference in combination with other evidence in the case. See, e.g., Okla. Nat. Gas Co. v. Kelly, 153 P.2d 1010, 1013 (Okla. 1944) (holding that expert testimony that an accident could have caused curvature of the spine, combined with evidence that no curvature of the spine existed prior to—but manifested shortly after—the accident and evidence that ―reasonably tended to exclude every other possible cause,‖ was sufficient); Ketcham v. Thomas, 283 S.W.2d 642, 649–50 (Mo. 1955) (stating that collision was a ―possible‖ cause of the plaintiff‘s constant menstrual bleeding, combined with evidence ―that immediately after the accident her condition changed to constant bleeding which could not be controlled, and that this constant bleeding was not common and was not a symptom . . . before the collision,‖ was sufficient to survive summary judgment on whether ―the accident was the cause of the constant bleeding‖); Ideal Food Prods. Co. v. Rupe, 261 P.2d 992, 993–94 (Ariz. 1953) (explaining that evidence was sufficient to support damages award where the plaintiff put forward expert testimony that her injury, which was diagnosed after the fall at issue, was ―caused by a fall or some injury;‖ there was ―no evidence of a prior trauma or injury that could have been the cause;‖ and the plaintiff testified ―to extreme pain after the accident and that prior to this fall she had never experienced any pain in and about her left hip‖); Rodrigues v. Georgia–Pacific Corp., 661 S.E.2d 141, 143–44 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that expert testimony ―unequivocally stated‖ that chlorine substantially contributed to the plaintiff‘s pneumonia but noting that ―even if the physician‘s testimony here were expressed only in terms of the chlorine being a ‗possible‘ cause of [the plaintiff‘s] injuries, other nonexpert evidence . . . supplemented that testimony . . . [and the plaintiff‘s] testi[mony] that although he was in apparent good health, he immediately became ill upon his exposure to the chlorine, which continuously worsened into the pneumonia he suffered when he presented at the emergency room‖ was sufficient to survive summary judgment). ¶58 Such is the case here. Smith identifies several sets of evidence that, taken together, permitted the jury to make a nonspeculative finding that the leaking diesel fuel produced carbon monoxide in Smith‘s engine compartment: (1) the expert testimony of Leiss; (2) the combined testimony of Mejia, the mechanic who worked on Smith‘s vehicle, Chemical Engineer Schumacher, and Mechanical Engineer Kuehn, (3) Chemical 18 Cite as: 2022 UT 29 Opinion of the Court Engineer Silcox‘s concession, when confronted with his deposition testimony at trial, that ―it‘s possible‖ for fuel leaking on an engine to produce carbon monoxide; and (4) Dr. Weaver‘s differential diagnosis that Smith suffered carbon monoxide poisoning on her trip to Washington. Smith also points to her own first-hand testimony about her drive to Washington and the symptoms she suffered during and after the drive, and the testimony of other fact witnesses who noticed a marked difference in Smith before and after her trip to Washington. ¶59 The district court found that the expert testimony of Leiss established only that it was possible that carbon monoxide could be created in Smith‘s engine compartment. Smith argues that some of Leiss‘s testimony was more conclusive than this, but we agree with the district court‘s view of the evidence as it relates to Leiss‘s testimony here. Based on a lab test, which monitored the production of carbon monoxide in an enclosed space, Leiss testified that carbon monoxide can be created when diesel fuel hits a surface heated to 344 degrees Fahrenheit. And he testified that parts of the engine—the turbocharger and the exhaust manifold—could reach between 500 and 700 degrees Fahrenheit, and that the turbocharger was in an area of the engine compartment that would not receive a lot of air flow. But because the laboratory test did not replicate the conditions of a vehicle traveling at highway speeds, the court concluded this evidence established only that it was ―possible‖ carbon monoxide was produced in Smith‘s engine compartment during her drive, but not that it was ―actually created.‖ And the court concluded this possibility was insufficient to sustain a finding of causation. ¶60 However, there was additional evidence before the jury that was relevant to whether carbon monoxide was produced in Smith‘s engine compartment. The jury also heard the recorded testimony of Mejia, who worked on Smith‘s car after the engine started smoking. Mejia explained that he found large quantities of diesel fuel on various parts of the engine, including near the engine‘s turbocharger and exhaust manifold—locations that Leiss testified could reach between 500 and 700 degrees Fahrenheit. ¶61 The jury also heard from three of SouthTowne‘s expert witnesses: Dr. Silcox, Schumacher, and Kuehn. Dr. Silcox testified that carbon monoxide can autogenerate at 469 degrees Fahrenheit in an enclosed space and at 869 degrees Fahrenheit on a flat surface. And on cross-examination, Dr. Silcox—albeit acknowledging his lack of expertise related to automotive 19 SMITH v. VOLKSWAGEN SOUTHTOWNE, INC. Opinion of the Court engines—conceded that his deposition testimony had acknowledged the possibility that parts of the engine could reach these temperatures. ¶62 Schumacher testified that he agreed with Dr. Silcox‘s testimony regarding the temperatures at which diesel fuel can produce carbon monoxide. And he further testified that diesel fuel on a surface heated to a minimum of 600 degrees Fahrenheit can produce carbon monoxide in excess of 300 ppm. Schumacher also testified that the surface of the engine‘s turbocharger can reach 470 to 480 degrees Fahrenheit. ¶63 Finally, Kuehn testified that after driving a similar model Volkswagen at ―full blast‖ for five minutes, the turbocharger in the car‘s engine reached 653 degrees Fahrenheit. ¶64 So from SouthTowne‘s three expert witnesses, the jury heard evidence that carbon monoxide can begin to be produced if diesel fuel contacts a surface heated to 469 degrees Fahrenheit in an enclosed space; that the engine‘s turbocharger could reach temperatures of 470 to 480 degrees Fahrenheit; that carbon monoxide can be produced at 300 ppm on a 600-plus-degree Fahrenheit surface; and that the turbocharger can reach up to 653 degrees Fahrenheit after five minutes at ―full blast‖ speeds. ¶65 In addition to the aforementioned expert witnesses, the jury also heard from a number of fact witnesses who testified about the circumstances surrounding the alleged carbon monoxide poisoning. For example, Smith testified that she drove the vehicle for approximately five hours while smelling noxious fumes and that upon stopping the vehicle, she observed smoke pouring from the engine compartment. She also testified that during her drive to Washington she exhibited symptoms that, according to her medical expert, were consistent with carbon monoxide poisoning. Additionally, a number of other individuals testified to having observed stark differences in Smith‘s health and behavior before and after her trip to Washington. ¶66 The jury also heard the expert testimony of Dr. Weaver. Dr. Weaver testified based on objective medical tests, such as an MRI scan of Smith‘s brain, that Smith had in fact been poisoned by carbon monoxide. And, after eliminating other potential causes and considering all the facts presented to him (including the facts listed above), Dr. Weaver opined that Smith had been poisoned by carbon monoxide while driving her Volkswagen from Utah to Washington in December 2011. 20 Cite as: 2022 UT 29 Opinion of the Court ¶67 As part of his testimony, Dr. Weaver explained that smoldering fuel provides a very inefficient form of oxidation, which produces much more carbon monoxide than burning fuel would. He also testified that carbon monoxide poisoning is much more dangerous at higher altitudes because of the lower amounts of oxygen in the air. And he testified, based on Smith‘s estimated exposure time of five hours, that her injuries could have been caused by a 100-ppm concentration of carbon monoxide, and even less if the duration of exposure had exceeded the estimated five hours. ¶68 When we consider this evidence in total, there was sufficient evidence before the jury to allow it to reasonably infer that the leaked and heated fuel in Smith‘s engine compartment produced carbon monoxide.13 In sum, there was evidence that diesel fuel can produce carbon monoxide when heated to 344 or 469 degrees Fahrenheit (depending on the expert) in an enclosed space, and that when heated to either 600 or 869 degrees Fahrenheit (likewise depending on the expert) on a flat surface in an unenclosed space, the fuel will produce carbon monoxide in excess of 300 ppm. Mejia, the mechanic, stated that there was diesel fuel on the turbocharger and exhaust manifold. Leiss testified that these parts of the engine can reach temperatures between 500 and 700 degrees Fahrenheit and that the turbocharger is in an area that receives little airflow. And Kuehn stated that the turbocharger could reach 653 degrees Fahrenheit after five minutes of high-velocity driving. This evidence provides a reasonable basis to conclude that fuel landed on the turbocharger and exhaust manifold and that these parts of the engine were heated to a temperature above 600 degrees Fahrenheit (thus creating conditions that could produce carbon monoxide in excess of 300 ppm). ¶69 Further, this conclusion is supported by other testimony, including that Smith experienced symptoms that are consistent with carbon monoxide poisoning; she observed smoke emanating from her engine compartment once she stopped her car; a medical expert found objective evidence that Smith had suffered carbon __________________________________________________________ 13 We note that in its response brief, SouthTowne addresses Smith‘s arguments regarding Leiss‘s causation testimony but makes no attempt to address the other sets of evidence discussed by Smith. 21 SMITH v. VOLKSWAGEN SOUTHTOWNE, INC. Opinion of the Court monoxide poisoning; people who knew Smith testified that her behavior dramatically changed after her trip to Washington; and, after eliminating other potential causes, the medical expert opined that the December 2011 incident was the cause of the carbon monoxide poisoning. ¶70 On this record, there was sufficient evidence before the jury to support a reasonable, non-speculative finding that carbon monoxide was produced in Smith‘s engine compartment. Accordingly, this issue could not be decided as a matter of law. This was a factual dispute properly left to the jury.14 ¶71 We next address the district court‘s conclusion that Smith was required to establish that it was more likely than not that a dose of carbon monoxide sufficient to poison her was present in her passenger compartment and that she failed to do so. As discussed above, Smith was not required to prove this fact by a preponderance of the evidence. Rather, she had the burden of proving the element of causation by a preponderance of the evidence. We agree with the district court that whether Smith was exposed to a harmful level of carbon monoxide was material to proving causation. But as we will explain, she did not necessarily have to prove causation by presenting direct expert testimony quantifying the concentration of carbon monoxide in her car. ¶72 Smith concedes that she did not provide any expert evidence of the carbon monoxide levels inside her passenger compartment during her drive to Washington. But she argues that such evidence is unnecessary based on our decision in Alder v. Bayer Corp., AGFA Div., 2002 UT 115, 61 P.3d 1068. SouthTowne argues that Alder does not apply here. ¶73 In that case, we held that to prove causation in toxic tort cases, it is not always necessary for plaintiffs to present expert testimony of the concentration or dosage of the alleged toxin to which they were exposed. Id. ¶¶ 79–83. We did not create a blanket rule that such evidence would never be necessary. But we held that where a plaintiff does not present evidence of a toxin‘s concentration during the time of alleged exposure, other relevant circumstantial evidence can be sufficient to take the fact of __________________________________________________________ 14 For these reasons, see infra ¶¶ 60–69, we disagree with PLAC‘s argument that ―Leiss‘s opinion . . . was an essential predicate in the chain of causation‖—without which the district court ―was right to find a failure of proof.‖ 22 Cite as: 2022 UT 29 Opinion of the Court causation out of the realm of speculation. Id. ¶¶ 82–83. These principles apply here. ¶74 In Alder, medical technicians brought a negligence action against the manufacturer of an x-ray processing machine, alleging that fumes from the machine caused harm. Id. ¶¶ 1–2, 19. To satisfy the causation element, the plaintiffs presented medical experts who testified, based on the factual circumstances that had been explained to them and on their diagnosis of the technicians, ―that there is a cause[-]and[-]effect connection, all things considered, between [plaintiffs‘] exposure in the workplace and [their] symptoms.‖ Id. ¶ 8 (citation omitted). ¶75 But because the technicians were ―unable to prove exposure to any chemicals, let alone levels known to cause known toxic effects,‖ the district court held that they were ―unable to prove causation‖ and granted summary judgment in the defendant‘s favor. Id. ¶ 67 (citation omitted). We reversed. Id. ¶ 83. ¶76 In reversing the district court‘s decision, we found persuasive a Fifth Circuit opinion stating that ―the law does not require plaintiffs to show the precise level of [toxin] to which they were exposed.‖ Id. ¶ 76 (referencing Curtis v. M&S Petrol., Inc., 174 F.3d 661 (5th Cir. 1999)). Rather, we explained all that is required is ―evidence from which a reasonable person could conclude that a defendant‘s emission has probably caused a particular plaintiff the kind of harm of which he or she complains before there can be a recovery.‖ Id. ¶ 73 (quoting Wright v. Willamette Indus., Inc., 91 F.3d 1105 (8th Cir. 1996)). ¶77 We also explained that [i]t is well established that causation ―may be proved by circumstantial evidence,‖ . . . and that ―[t]he causal relation between an injury and its later physical effects may be established by the direct opinion of a physician, by his deduction by the process of eliminating causes other than the traumatic agency, or by his opinion based upon a hypothetical question.‖ Id. ¶ 87 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Zuchowicz v. United States, 140 F.3d 381, 389 (2d Cir. 1998)). ¶78 As an example of the type of circumstantial evidence that can supplement an expert‘s opinion, we cited a case where causation was established through expert opinion based ―on the 23 SMITH v. VOLKSWAGEN SOUTHTOWNE, INC. Opinion of the Court temporal relationship between the [alleged breach] and the start of the disease and the differential etiology method of excluding other possible causes.‖ Alder, 2002 UT 115, ¶ 86 (quoting Zuchowicz, 140 F.3d at 385). ¶79 With these legal principles in mind, we concluded that the technicians had presented sufficient evidence that they were exposed to a harmful dose of chemicals to create a dispute of fact for the jury. Specifically, we noted that the x-ray machine used chemicals known to cause the technicians‘ symptoms and that the machine ―produced an exhaust stream at least potentially laced with chemicals.‖ Alder, 2002 UT 115, ¶ 70 (emphasis added). And we noted that the technicians‘ medical experts had testified, after eliminating other potential causes, that there was a reasonable medical probability that the technicians‘ exposure to the x-ray machine caused the symptoms. Id. ¶¶ 8, 71. Based on this evidence, we concluded that the plaintiff technicians had provided sufficient evidence to support their theory of causation, even though they had no direct evidence of the quantity of the chemicals to which they were exposed.15 See id. ¶ 87. __________________________________________________________ 15 In summarizing our decision in Alder, we offered a helpful insight to future courts dealing with complicated causation issues, which warrants repetition in full: Individuals routinely feel the effects of a wide array of common phenomena whose mechanisms remain unexplained by science, including, for example, the law of gravity, the nature of light, the source of personality, and the process of cell differentiation. If a bicyclist falls and breaks his arm, causation is assumed without argument because of the temporal relationship between the accident and the injury. The law does not object that no one measured the exact magnitude and angle of the forces applied to the bone. Courts do not exclude all testimony regarding the fall because the mechanism of gravity remains undiscovered. Legally, an observable sequence of condition → event → altered condition, has been found sufficient to establish causation even when the exact mechanism is unknown. Therefore, we hold that Technicians enjoy the same opportunity to prove that which they can, as do the victims of more prosaic injuries. (continued . . .) 24 Cite as: 2022 UT 29 Opinion of the Court ¶80 The district court in this case distinguished Alder on factual grounds. But the rationale of Alder applies here.16 That case holds that plaintiffs provide sufficient evidence of causation even where they do not have an expert who can quantify their level of toxic exposure, as long as the evidence that was presented provided a reliable basis from which the jury could reasonably infer that the alleged toxin was present and that it harmed the plaintiff. As we explained, because ―one who injures another takes him as he is,‖ a ―toxic level‖ of a chemical ―becomes any level that is harmful to the[] specific plaintiff[].‖ Id. ¶ 81 (citation omitted). ¶81 Based on the principles articulated in Alder and our other causation cases, we conclude the evidence at trial here was sufficient to permit the jury to find without speculation that Smith was exposed to a harmful dose of carbon monoxide during her drive. We first note that Smith did present some evidence of the level at which carbon monoxide generally becomes harmful, and some evidence of the concentration of carbon monoxide produced under her hood. According to Dr. Weaver, exposure to a 100-ppm concentration of carbon monoxide over a five–hour period could have caused Smith‘s carbon monoxide poisoning. And, as we explained above, the evidence supported a reasonable inference that the smoldering fuel could produce carbon monoxide at a concentration of about 300 ppm. As the district court recognized, Leiss testified that there was a pathway for this carbon monoxide to enter the passenger compartment of the vehicle. While this evidence could not account for certain variables and therefore could not quantify the concentration of carbon monoxide to which Smith was actually exposed in the passenger compartment of the vehicle, it did constitute some evidence of the possible amount of Smith‘s exposure. Alder v. Bayer Corp., AGFA Div., 2002 UT 115, ¶ 88, 61 P.3d 1068. 16 PLAC likewise argues that Alder is ―the exception, not the rule,‖ and that the exception carved out in that case should not apply here. But the overarching principles we articulated in Alder remain applicable to these facts. And it is the totality of evidence presented in this case—admittedly lacking precise quantification of the dose of carbon monoxide to which Smith was exposed— that supports a non-speculative finding of causation. 25 SMITH v. VOLKSWAGEN SOUTHTOWNE, INC. Opinion of the Court ¶82 Further, the harmful chemical at issue in this case— carbon monoxide—is ―known to cause‖ the symptoms Smith suffered. And there is ample circumstantial evidence that Smith suffered carbon monoxide poisoning during the drive. Smith testified that she experienced symptoms consistent with carbon monoxide poisoning during and after the drive; she and other fact witnesses testified to a significant change in her behavior immediately after the drive; and Dr. Weaver concluded, based on brain scans (among other things), that Smith had indeed experienced carbon monoxide poisoning. ¶83 Finally, as in Alder, in this case a medical expert testified that, after eliminating other potential causes, there was a reasonable medical probability that Smith‘s carbon monoxide poisoning was caused by the incident in question. Alder, 2002 UT 115, ¶ 8. ¶84 This evidence was sufficient to provide the jury with a reasonable basis to find that Smith was exposed to a harmful dose of carbon monoxide during her drive. See id. ¶ 80 (―[W]herever chemicals are part of the environment, victims‘ toxic symptoms are themselves evidence of harmful levels, at least as an issue of triable fact.‖); see also id. ¶ 87 (―[I]t is well established that causation ‗may be proved by circumstantial evidence,‘ . . . and that ‗[t]he causal relation between an injury and its later physical effects may be established by the direct opinion of a physician, by his deduction by the process of eliminating causes other than the traumatic agency, or by his opinion based upon a hypothetical question.‖ (alterations in original) (quoting Zuchowicz, 140 F.3d at 389). Indeed, this evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to find that the carbon monoxide produced by the leaking diesel fuel reached Smith and caused her to suffer carbon monoxide poisoning. And while SouthTowne argues that Leiss‘s evidence alone was not sufficient to establish this point, it does not address at all the remainder of the relevant evidence presented to the jury. ¶85 Under Alder, Smith was not required to prove the level of carbon monoxide to which she was exposed. To prove her theory of causation, Smith needed to adduce evidence that would permit the jury to find, without speculation or guesswork, that she was exposed to enough carbon monoxide to harm her. We conclude that she did so. ¶86 Accordingly, we conclude that Smith presented legally sufficient evidence of causation. And we reverse the grant of judgment as a matter of law to SouthTowne. 26 Cite as: 2022 UT 29 Opinion of the Court
¶87 On cross appeal, SouthTowne argues that an alternative basis for granting judgment in its favor is that Smith was required to present an expert who could opine on the standard of care applicable to a car dealership handling a vehicle recall, and she failed to do so. The district court rejected this argument, concluding that expert testimony on this issue was unnecessary and that, regardless, this argument was superfluous because ―even if the [c]ourt directed a verdict as to negligence, [Smith‘s strict liability] claim would still stand.‖ ¶88 We agree with the district court. The evidence before the jury, which included testimony from a Volkswagen service manager and a Volkswagen senior manager of product analysis, was sufficient to provide the jury with a reasonable basis to find that SouthTowne acted unreasonably in selling the recalled vehicle to Smith. And even if SouthTowne had prevailed on this argument it would still be liable for Smith‘s injuries based on strict liability. ¶89 ―To determine the relevant standard of care in negligence cases, the essential question is the care that a reasonable person would undertake in the defendant‘s circumstances.‖ Gables at Sterling Vill. Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Castlewood-Sterling Vill. I, LLC, 2018 UT 04, ¶ 57, 417 P.3d 95 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). This is generally a question of fact for the jury. See id. (―[B]ecause the essential question is the care that a reasonable person would undertake in the defendant‘s circumstances, we generally leave it to jurors—as ordinary persons representing a particular community—to make that judgment.‖ (citation omitted)). Therefore, in ordinary negligence cases, ―we ask a jury of reasonable people to draw upon their collective expertise to conclude how a reasonable person would have acted in [a given] circumstance.‖ Id. ¶90 But SouthTowne argues that the complicated procedures involved with a vehicle recall prevented the jury from reliably answering the standard-of-care question here without the aid of expert testimony. We have recognized that, in limited cases, expert testimony may be needed to establish a standard of care. See id. ¶ 58 (―Our case law recognizes a limited exception to this general rule.‖). But those types of cases tend to implicate scientific or technical matters ―not within the common knowledge of the lay juror,‖ id. ¶ 58 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted), or require the plaintiff to establish ―a particularized and 27 SMITH v. VOLKSWAGEN SOUTHTOWNE, INC. Opinion of the Court enhanced duty of care,‖ id. ¶ 56 (citation omitted). In other words, expert testimony is required only in cases where the average layperson lacks the technical or scientific knowledge to determine what a reasonable person would have done in the defendant‘s situation. See id. ¶ 59 (―[T]he need for expert testimony turns on the nature of the standard to be addressed by the jury. . . . Where the standard implicates scientific matters beyond the capacity of an ordinary juror . . . expert testimony may be required.‖ (citation omitted)). ¶91 In this case, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to determine how a reasonable person would have acted in response to the vehicle recall. The jury heard the testimony that Volkswagen Corporate issued a recall through a mandatory stopsale order for a number of listed vehicles. This order prohibited the dealership from selling, leasing, or trading any of the covered vehicles—identified by the vehicle‘s vehicle identification number (VIN)—until a certain fuel line was replaced. And a Volkswagen service manager testified that a dealership could use the VIN to identify the vehicles on its lot that were subject to the recall. Additionally, a Volkswagen senior officer testified that Smith should not have been sold the vehicle at issue in this case. This is enough evidence for the jury to decide the standard-of-care question in Smith‘s favor. ¶92 In addressing SouthTowne‘s argument below, the district court concluded that ―there was nothing to indicate that a recall standard of care expert was required‖ in this case. We agree. SouthTowne has failed to show that the jury needed the help of expert testimony to determine what a reasonable person should have done in response to a mandatory stop-sale order. ¶93 In essence, SouthTowne‘s argument on this point is that it did not breach a standard of care when it sold the vehicle because, under SouthTowne‘s interpretation of applicable federal statutes, regulations, and industry safety standards, Volkswagen‘s stopsale order did not apply to Smith‘s vehicle. But whether Volkswagen complied with applicable statutes or regulations is not an ultimate issue in this negligence case. ¶94 It is true, of course, that in some negligence cases a court may adopt a statute or regulation as a standard of care in addition to the typical reasonable-person standard. See, e.g., Colosimo v. Gateway Cmty. Church, 2018 UT 26, ¶ 44, 424 P.3d 866 (discussing the circumstances in which it is appropriate to adopt a statute as a standard of care in a negligence case). But the existence of a 28 Cite as: 2022 UT 29 Opinion of the Court relevant statute does not mean that a plaintiff is barred from proving negligence using the default reasonable-person standard. See generally id. (discussing plaintiff‘s negligence claim under the typical reasonable-person standard of care as well as under an alleged statutory standard of care). ¶95 So, notwithstanding the various laws that may have also governed SouthTowne‘s conduct in this case, the only standard-of-care evidence Smith needed to present was evidence that a reasonable person would not have sold the vehicle to Smith after receiving the mandatory stop-sale order. Smith presented this evidence. And although SouthTowne presented contrary evidence, Smith‘s evidence provided the jury with a reasonable basis to rule in Smith‘s favor on this point. ¶96 Accordingly, we conclude that the district court correctly rejected SouthTowne‘s argument regarding the standard of care. And this does not provide an alternative basis for affirming the order of judgment as a matter of law in its favor.