Opinion ID: 2219951
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Involvement of DPTA Attorneys

Text: Defendant next contends that he was deprived of due process and fundamental fairness because the trial court disparaged the motives and conduct of attorneys for the State Appellate Defender Death Penalty Trial Assistance Unit, who were an integral part of the defense team representing Andrew Urdiales. Defendant states that the trial court's expressed animosity may indicate that the judge was not impartial. Defendant also argues: Once [the trial judge] appointed the Appellate Defender and Mr. Richards, the trial judge had no authority to preclude Mr. Richards from assigning his assistants to the case, or to strike Mr. Hanlon and Mr. Sincox from the entry of appearance. Moreover, defendant submits that the court excluded Sincox because the court objected to his demeanor and the court had no inherent authority to discipline Sincox in that manner. We begin this portion of our analysis with a review of the pertinent statutes. Section 10 of the State Appellate Defender Act prescribes the powers and duties of the State Appellate Defender (725 ILCS 105/10 (West 2004)), and applies to all attorneys employed by the Office of the State Appellate Defender (OSAD) (725 ILCS 105/2 (2) (West 2004)). The Act governs the circumstances under which the State Appellate Defender may be appointed to represent defendants in any given case ( Kirwan v. Welch, 133 Ill.2d 163, 164-65, 139 Ill.Dec. 836, 549 N.E.2d 348 (1989)), and the attorneys of that agency may represent defendants  only as the Act provides.  (Emphasis in original.) Kirwan v. Karns, 119 Ill.2d 431, 434, 116 Ill.Dec. 573, 519 N.E.2d 465 (1988); see also Alexander v. Pearson, 354 Ill.App.3d 643, 647, 290 Ill.Dec. 416, 821 N.E.2d 728 (2004). The State points out that the version of the State Appellate Defender Act in effect at the time of defendant's trial did not mandate that an attorney from OSAD be allowed to file his or her appearance as trial counsel in a death penalty case and participate in that capacity. Our reading of the statute in question indicates that it did not even authorize OSAD attorneys to act as trial counsel in capital cases, much less mandate that they be allowed to do so. See 725 ILCS 105/10(a), (c)(5) (West 2004) (The State Appellate Defender shall represent indigent persons on appeal    when appointed to do so by a court under a Supreme Court Rule or law of this State.    The Office of the State Appellate Defender shall not be appointed to serve as trial counsel in capital cases). In fact, a literal reading of the pertinent statute indicates it did not even authorize the assistance of attorneys from OSAD. Section 10(c)(5) of the applicable version of the Act stated in relevant part: (c) The State Appellate Defender may: (5) in cases in which a death sentence is an authorized disposition, provide trial counsel with the assistance of expert witnesses, investigators, and mitigation specialists from funds appropriated to the State Appellate Defender specifically for that purpose by the General Assembly. The Office of State Appellate Defender shall not be appointed to serve as trial counsel in capital cases. (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS 105/10(c)(5) (West 2004). Under a literal reading of the provision, the statute allowed the State Appellate Defender to provide only the assistance of expert witnesses, investigators, and mitigation specialists. Of course, with the passage of Public Act 94-340, effective January 1, 2006, the State Appellate Defender Act was amended to specifically allow the State Appellate Defender to provide trial counsel in capital cases with legal advice, in addition to the services previously authorized (725 ILCS 105/10(c)(5) (West Supp.2005)), and the Capital Crimes Litigation Act was amended to provide as follows: At the request of court appointed counsel [in capital cases], attorneys employed by the State Appellate Defender may enter an appearance for the limited purpose of assisting counsel appointed under this Section. 725 ILCS 124/5 (West Supp.2005). Although the amended versions of the State Appellate Defender Act and the Capital Crimes Litigation Act were not in effect at the time of his trial, defendant simply proceeds in his argument as if they were. He does not argue that those provisions apply retroactively; he does not advance reasons why they should apply retroactively; and he cites no relevant authority in that regard. Thus, defendant has forfeited any contention that the amended provisions apply. See People v. Mertz, 218 Ill.2d 1, 91, 299 Ill.Dec. 581, 842 N.E.2d 618 (2005) (defendant's failure to offer analysis and cite legal authority in support of retroactive application resulted in forfeiture of the issue). We thus examine defendant's contentions utilizing the statutes in effect at the time of defendant's trialthe provisions presumably known to the presiding trial judge. Those provisions did not, by their terms, authorize OSAD attorneys to serve as counsel in capital cases or provide legal advice to the attorneys actually serving as trial counsel. If they did, it would hardly seem necessary to amend section 10(c)(5) of the State Appellate Defender Act to specifically so state, and that is exactly what Public Act 94-340 did. See 725 ILCS 105/10(c)(5) (West Supp.2005) (adding the phrase legal advice). The version of the Act in effect at the time of trial, and the current version, both state that the State Appellate Defender shall not be appointed to serve as trial counsel in capital cases. Compare 725 ILCS 105/10(c)(5) (West 2004) with 725 ILCS 105/10(c)(5) (West Supp.2005). That provision is at once a prohibition directed to circuit courts and to the attorneys of OSAD. Trial courts are not to appoint attorneys of that agency to serve as trial counsel in capital cases, and attorneys of that agency are not statutorily authorized to serve in that capacity. The State Appellate Defender Act governs the circumstances in which the attorneys of that state agency are authorized to render their state-supported services. They are not free agents who can act as counsel when and where they see fit. That is not to say that the unauthorized actions of an OSAD attorney on behalf of a criminal defendant are a nullity. After all, the attorney who chooses to exceed his statutory authorization, and is allowed to do so by a trial court, is nonetheless a licensed attorney, and his actions will be judged by the standards applicable to any licensed attorney acting in that context. However, such an attorney has no right to interject himself, or herself, into the trial. Applying those principles to this case, it is clear that the trial court was not required to allow OSAD attorneys to participate as part of the defense team. In fact, the court should not have allowed Richards to participate. Defendant was fortunate to receive the able services of Richards, but he was not statutorily entitled to them. Because Sincox and Hanlon were not statutorily authorized to participate as defendant's attorneys in this case, and the trial judge was not required to allow them to do so, the judge did not err in striking their names from the entry of appearance filed by Richards. For the same reasonsand irrespective of the concerns actually expressed by the courtthere would have been no error in precluding Sincox from participating in the deposition of Dietz. However, the record indicates the court never denied defendant's motion for Sincox to participate in that deposition. Defendant's trial attorney, Elmore, appeared to agree with the court's statement that the defense motion was moot because Elmore and Skelton planned to travel to California for the deposition, and, in any event, defense counsel never obtained a ruling on the motion. A movant has the responsibility to obtain a ruling on his motion if he is to avoid forfeiture on appeal. People v. Redd, 173 Ill.2d 1, 35, 218 Ill.Dec. 861, 670 N.E.2d 583 (1996). Because defendant did not obtain a ruling, the issue is forfeited. The court's comments about Sincox's behavior in the courtroomthough apparently warrantedare irrelevant, given that Sincox did not, and could not, represent the defendant. We note that the court's remarks regarding the attorneys who actually represented the defendant were highly complimentary, and there was no hint of animosity or disparagement therein. None of the court's comments to or about the attorneys were made in the presence of the jury. We are compelled to comment on one remark the court made about attorneys Richards and Sincox. At one point, during a discussion of the contemplated deposition of Dr. Dietz in California, the trial court expressed concern that attorneys Sincox and Richards had an agenda far greater than the defendant's case. Later, in that same discussion, the trial judge specified the nature of his concern, focusing on attorney Sincox. Referring specifically to Sincox, whose possible participation in the anticipated deposition had been broached by attorney Skelton, the court stated: His conduct in this courtroom was most unprofessional. It is clear to me that he has an agenda far greater than Mr. Urdiales and he is motivated by that. And I am concerned that his conduct will be governed by that.    And if he goes far afield out there, we have got a mess on our hands in terms of, well, now the deposition wasn't completed. Clearly, although the court included attorney Richards in his initial remark, the comment was prompted by the suggestion that Sincox participate in the deposition of Dietz. We note that attorney Richards was otherwise treated with respect and consideration by the court in all of the pretrial proceedings in which he participated. We see no evidence of prejudice with respect to him. With respect to Sincox, the record suggests that the court may have had good reason to mistrust him and question his professionalism. In any event, placed in context, the judge's initial statement, and his subsequent expansive comments, appear to reflect the court's justifiable concern that the admittedly broader agenda of the DPTA might result in questioning far afield in areas not particularly pertinent to defendant's case, resulting in an unnecessary delay and docketing problems. We believe those were valid considerations. We note that allegations of judicial bias or prejudice must be viewed in context and should be evaluated in terms of the trial judge's specific reaction to the events taking place. People v. Jackson, 205 Ill.2d 247, 277, 275 Ill.Dec. 521, 793 N.E.2d 1 (2001). The fact that a judge displays displeasure or irritation with an attorney's behavior is not necessarily evidence of judicial bias against the defendant or his counsel. Jackson, 205 Ill.2d at 277, 275 Ill.Dec. 521, 793 N.E.2d 1. As noted, the report of proceedings reveals nothing in the way of judicial displeasure or irritation with Richards. Since Sincox was not allowed to serve as counsel for defendant, or represent him in any way, we need not consider the possible repercussions of the court's interaction with Sincox. In short, the court's conduct with respect to the DPTA attorneys did not deny defendant due process.