Opinion ID: 2736107
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Garmon and Sears

Text: Garmon preemption deals specifically with when a labor matter must be brought before the NLRB, a complicated doctrine known as primary jurisdiction. See Golden State Transit Corp., 475 U.S. at 613 (“The Garmon rule is intended to preclude state interference with the National Labor Relations Board’s interpretation and active enforcement of the integrated scheme of regulation established by the NLRA.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Associated Builders & Contractors of S. Cal., Inc. v. Nunn, 356 F.3d 979, 987 (9th Cir. 2004). In this case, the Mall had “no right to invoke [the Board’s primary] jurisdiction,” and the Union—the party that could have brought the matter before the Board—failed to do so. Accordingly, Garmon preemption is not at issue here. Sears, 436 U.S. at 207. But Garmon’s principles of labor law preemption underlie Morton and its progeny, which, as discussed below, are important to our analysis in this case. In Garmon, a union picketed an employer to force the employer to sign a union-shop contract. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 237. The employer first sought to bring the matter before the NLRB, but the Board declined jurisdiction. Id. at 238. The employer then filed suit in California Superior Court, arguing that the union had committed a tort based on a state unfair labor practice law. The California court awarded damages to the employer, but the U.S. Supreme Court reversed. Id. The Court acknowledged that it was unclear whether the union’s conduct was protected under § 7 of the NLRA or prohibited under § 8. Id. at 245. The Court focused on whether the NLRB had primary jurisdiction to make that determination: “When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act, the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the 24 RETAIL PROP. TRUST V. UBCJA exclusive competence of the [NLRB] if the danger of state interference with National policy is to be averted.” Id. at 245. After Garmon, the focus of the NLRB’s primary jurisdiction is the potential for conflict with federal policy. Id. at 246 (“The governing consideration is that to allow the States to control activities that are potentially subject to federal regulation involves too great a danger of conflict with national labor policy.”). Although Garmon’s “arguably subject to” language suggested a broad preemption doctrine, the Court also reaffirmed that there were limits on federal preemption of state laws of general applicability. The Court emphasized two considerations, both rooted in federalism, that bear on those limits. First, in light of “the presuppositions of our embracing federal system, including the principle of diffusion of power not as a matter of doctrinaire localism but as a promoter of democracy,” the NLRA did not “withdraw[] from the States [ ] power to regulate where the activity regulated was a merely peripheral concern of the Labor Management Relations Act.” Id. at 243. Second, the States retained power to regulate “where the regulated conduct touched interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, we could not infer that Congress had deprived the States of the power to act.” Id. at 244. Such local interests included “violence and imminent threats to public order,” because “the compelling state interest, in the scheme of our federalism, in the maintenance of domestic peace is not overridden in the absence of clearly expressed congressional direction.” Id. at 247. The Court concluded there was “no such compelling state interest” present on the facts of Garmon. Id. at 248. RETAIL PROP. TRUST V. UBCJA 25 By contrast, in Sears, 436 U.S. at 180, the Court found deeply local interests to be at stake, such that Garmon preemption was inappropriate. The issue before the Court in Sears was whether the NLRA “deprives a state court of the power to entertain an action by an employer to enforce state trespass laws against picketing which is arguably—but not definitely—prohibited or protected by federal law.” Id. at 182. The case arose when a Sears store brought a state trespass action against a union after union members—angered that the store was employing non-union carpenters—refused to comply with Sears’ demand that the union cease its picketing activities on its property. Id. The state trial court granted a preliminary injunction, and the California Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding “that the Union’s continuing trespass fell within the longstanding exception for conduct which touched interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that pre-emption could not be inferred in the absence of clear evidence of congressional intent.” Id. at 183 (citing Garmon, 259 U.S. at 236). However, the California Supreme Court reversed, concluding that since the picketing was both arguably protected by § 7 of the NLRA and arguably prohibited by § 8, “state jurisdiction was pre-empted under the Garmon guidelines.” Id. at 184. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, noting that it had until then “not decided whether, or under what circumstances, a state court has power to enforce local trespass laws against a union’s peaceful picketing.” Id. The Court began with the observation that Sears had brought only a trespass claim. Sears had asserted “no claim that the picketing itself violated any state or federal law,” and the store “sought simply to remove the pickets from its 26 RETAIL PROP. TRUST V. UBCJA property . . . . Thus, as a matter of state law, the location of the picketing was illegal but the picketing itself was unobjectionable.” Id. at 185. The Court had allowed states “to enforce certain laws of general applicability even though aspects of the challenged conduct were arguably prohibited by § 8 of the NLRA,” including laws that fell within Garmon’s “local feeling and responsibility” exception. Id. at 195 (quoting Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244). It cited examples of claims that were not preempted by federal law, including: threats of violence, violence, libel, and intentional infliction of mental distress. Id. (collecting cases). It contrasted these cases with state laws, such as antitrust laws, that conflict with the LMRA when “brought to bear on precisely the same conduct” that is arguably prohibited by § 8. Id. at 194 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Reviewing the cases, the Court identified two relevant “factors which warranted a departure from the general pre-emption guidelines in the ‘local interest’ cases”: First, there was “a significant state interest in protecting the citizen from the challenged conduct,” and second, although “the challenged conduct occurred in the course of a labor dispute and an unfair labor practice charge could have been filed, the exercise of state jurisdiction over the tort claim entailed little risk of interference with the regulatory jurisdiction of the Labor Board.” Id. at 196. In the context of state laws touching on conduct that is arguably prohibited by the NLRA, the Court reduced these two factors to a single test: “The critical inquiry, therefore, is not whether the State is enforcing a law relating specifically to labor relations or one of general application but whether the controversy presented to the state court is identical to . . . or different from . . . that which could have been, but was not, presented to the Labor Board.” Id. at 197 (emphasis added). RETAIL PROP. TRUST V. UBCJA 27 Only if the controversy is identical to a claim that could have been presented to the Board would a state court’s exercise of jurisdiction involve “a risk of interference with the unfair labor practice jurisdiction of the Board.” Id. The Court concluded that in that case “the controversy which Sears might have presented to the Labor Board is not the same as the controversy presented to the state court.” Id. at 198. If Sears had filed a charge with the NLRB, “the federal issue would have been whether the picketing had a recognitional or work-reassignment objective; decision of that issue would have entailed relatively complex factual and legal determinations completely unrelated to the simple question whether a trespass had occurred.” Id. On the other hand, Sears’ state action “only challenged the location of the picketing; whether the picketing had an objective proscribed by federal law was irrelevant to the state claim.” Id. Therefore, the exercise of state jurisdiction of the trespass claim “would create no realistic risk of interference with the Labor Board’s primary jurisdiction to enforce the statutory prohibition against unfair labor practices.” Id. The “arguable illegality of the picketing” did not deprive state courts of jurisdiction “to enjoin its trespassory aspects.” Id. at 190.8 8 The Sears Court made the above observations with respect to the prong of the Garmon test addressing conduct arguably prohibited by the NLRA. It noted, however, that “[c]onsiderations of federal supremacy . . . are implicated to a greater extent when labor-related activity is protected than when it is prohibited.” Sears, 436 U.S. at 200. Such considerations were mitigated, on the facts of Sears, by the ability of the union to invoke the jurisdiction of the NLRB. Id. at 201. The Court concluded that the “[p]rimary-jurisdiction rationale does not provide a sufficient justification for pre-empting state jurisdiction over arguably protected conduct when the party who could have presented the protection issue to the Board has not done so and the other party to the dispute has no acceptable means of 28 RETAIL PROP. TRUST V. UBCJA