Opinion ID: 2995647
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ill App.3d 590, 601 (1st Dist. 2000).

Text: Campania’s original answer denied breaching the contract on the grounds that Rooks failed to handle the case with reasonable care and skill. (Doc. No. 8 para. 3.) This denial, on its own terms, squarely placed at issue the question of whether Rooks fulfilled its contractual obligations, including its duty of care. Thus, the so-called affirmative defense raised in Campania’s amended answer was properly rejected as superfluous./4 DeSalle, 969 F.2d at 277-78; see also State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Riley, 199 F.R.D. 276, 279 (N.D. Ill. 2001). 2. Motion to file counterclaim and continue trial We next consider Campania’s claim that the district judge abused her discretion when refusing to allow Campania to file a counterclaim, extend discovery, and stay the case indefinitely pending the resolution of a separate lawsuit filed against Campania in Illinois state court. Because Campania filed the motion nine days after the deadline for discovery had passed--a deadline agreed to by the parties several months earlier--the district court denied the motion as untimely. Upon review of the court’s decision for an abuse of discretion, United States v. 1948 S. MLK Dr., 270 F.3d 1102, 1110 (7th Cir. 2001), we conclude that Campania failed to demonstrate any good cause that would justify its delay. In this case, the district court, acting upon a joint motion of the parties, entered a scheduling order barring any further discovery proceedings after January 22, 2001. Campania sought to reopen discovery after Mann initiated a lawsuit against Campania in Illinois state court on January 25, 2001. Campania tendered only the first two payments required under the settlement agreement but thereafter fell behind in its obligations; Mann’s lawsuit sought to recover the damages Campania owed him. In the proposed counterclaim filed in federal court, Campania sought reimbursement for these damages because it alleged that the Rooks law firm committed malpractice when it drafted an agreement making Campania--rather than CGI--the party liable for paying the settlement. Campania requested discovery into Rooks’s alleged malpractice. Campania also asked Judge Conlon to stay the federal case until such time as the pending state court action proceeded to a judgment purportedly establishing Campania’s full amount of liability. Based on the record before us, we are convinced that the trial court’s denial of Campania’s motion was proper. Courts have a legitimate interest in ensuring that parties abide by scheduling orders to ensure prompt and orderly litigation. 1948 S. MLK Dr., 270 F.3d at 1110. When a party fails to comply with a deadline imposed in a scheduling order, Rule 16(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the schedule shall not be modified except upon a showing of good cause and by leave of the district judge. Campania argues that it showed good cause for its delay, asserting that it could not have sued Rooks until Mann sued Campania to enforce the settlement agreement. This argument, however, is premised upon a misunderstanding of contract law. A party’s rights and duties under any contract--including a settlement agreement, Pohl v. UAL Inc., 213 F.3d 336, 338 (7th Cir. 2000)--accrue at the time of the contract’s formation rather than the date when one of the parties sues the other for damages. See, e.g., Casey v. Forest Health Sys., 291 Ill. App.3d 261 (1st Dist. 1997); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 322 (1990) (defining contract). Thus, Campania could have sought recovery from Rooks as early as September 1999, when Campania signed the settlement agreement that Rooks had prepared./5 Its two-year delay in bringing suit is unexplained in this record to our satisfaction. In addition, to the extent that Campania’s motion also requested the court to stay its case pending resolution of Mann’s later-filed state court lawsuit--a case to which Rooks was not even a party--the motion should have been summarily denied. Perrian, 958 F.2d at 195 (the burden to the judicial system can justify a denial of a motion to amend even if the amendment would cause no hardship at all to the opposing party). We encourage the district courts to use a firm hand when shepherding cases to trial, carefully and thoughtfully adhering to the deadlines established after consultation with the parties pursuant to Rule 16 and Rule 26(f) in order to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. Campania should not have removed this case to federal court if it wished to proceed in a leisurely fashion, and we cannot perceive any reversible error with the court’s treatment of Campania’s pre-trial motions. Bethany, 241 F.3d at 861; Perrian, 958 F.2d at 194-95. B. Breach of Contract The next issue we address is whether the district court erred when finding in favor of Rooks on its claim of breach of contract. Campania has waived any argument that Rooks failed to present sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that there was a written contract between Rooks and Campania, that Rooks substantially performed its obliga tions under the contract, or that the Rooks law firm’s fees and hours were reasonable./6 Campania’s sole argument is that the court should have concluded that Campania was not liable to Rooks because Campania was an agent for a disclosed principal--CGI. (Br. at 22.) Because Campania has raised a question of law (i.e., whether the trial judge should have taken account of principal-agency law when she analyzed the parties’ contract), we apply de novo review. Arnhold v. Ocean Atl. Woodland Corp., 284 F.3d 693, 699 (7th Cir. 2002). We hold that the court properly avoided venturing into the realm of agency law, for Campania failed to raise this issue in its pleadings. A party cannot obtain recovery or base its affirmative defense on legal theories that are not contained in the pleadings. See, e.g., Grain Traders Inc. v. Citibank, 160 F.3d 97, 105 (2d Cir. 1998) (declining to consider claim of assignment that was not raised in pleadings); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Moore, 783 F.2d 1326, 1327-28 (9th Cir.