Opinion ID: 1179842
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Requisite State of Mind

Text: Eastman contends that the prosecution did not offer sufficient evidence to prove that he physically abused Bautista with the requisite state of mind, i.e., intentionally, knowingly or recklessly. Eastman was charged with abusing a family or household member in violation of HRS § 709-906(1) (Supp.1994), which does not describe a culpable state of mind attendant to the prohibited acts. In such a case, the Hawai`i Penal Code (HPC) provides that [w]hen the state of mind required to establish an element of an offense is not specified by the law, that element is established if, with respect thereto, a person acts intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly. HRS § 702-204 (1993). Accordingly, the requisite state of mind for a violation of HRS § 709-906(1) is that of acting intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly. At first glance, the lack of any specified state of mind in HRS § 709-906(1) might mislead one to conclude that the offense was intended to be a strict or an absolute liability crime. However, HRS § 702-212(2) permits a penal statute to dispense with the state of mind requirement only insofar as a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability for such offense or with respect to any element plainly appears.  HRS § 702-212(2) (1993) (emphasis added). Absent statutory language expressly imposing absolute liability, the states of mind denominated in HRS § 702-204 will generally apply, because we will not lightly discern a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability. State v. Rushing, 62 Haw. 102, 105, 612 P.2d 103, 106 (1980). In addition, absolute or strict liability in the penal law is indefensible in principle if conviction results in the possibility of imprisonment and condemnation. Commentary to HRS § 702-212(2) (1993). Conviction for abusing a family or household member in violation of HRS § 709-906(1) results in the possibility of imprisonment, [6] and thus, from the wording of HRS § 709-906 as a whole, we do not find that a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability plainly appears. Nor is a negligent state of mind applicable under the express terms of HRS § 702-204. Negligence with respect to the element of an offense will not establish that element unless specifically so provided. Commentary to HRS § 702-204 (1993). Therefore, the prosecution must prove that a defendant acted intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly before he or she may be convicted of the offense proscribed in HRS § 709-906(1). The three alternative states of mind referred to as intentionally, knowingly or recklessly are in descending order of culpability, and proof of any one of them would satisfy the state of mind requirement for HRS § 709-906(1). Cf. Commentary to HRS § 702-208 (1993). Thus, the prosecution needs only to prove the lowest of the three alternative levels of culpability, i.e., recklessness, in order to satisfy the state of mind requirement for HRS § 709-906(1). HRS § 702-206(3) defines recklessly as follows: (a) A person acts recklessly with respect to his [or her] conduct when he [or she] consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the person's conduct is of the specified nature. (b) A person acts recklessly with respect to attendant circumstances when he [or she] consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such circumstances exist. (c) A person acts recklessly with respect to a result of his [or her] conduct when he [or she] consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his [or her] conduct will cause such a result. (d) A risk is substantial and unjustifiable within the meaning of this section if, considering the nature and purpose of the person's conduct and the circumstances known to him [or her], the disregard of the risk involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the same situation. HRS § 702-206(3) (1993). Furthermore, [w]hen the law provides that recklessness is sufficient to establish an element of an offense, that element also is established if, with respect thereto, a person acts intentionally or knowingly. HRS § 702-208 (1993). Although the prosecution did not introduce direct evidence showing Eastman's state of mind at the time when he physically abused Bautista, it is not necessary for the prosecution to introduce direct evidence of a defendant's state of mind in order to prove that the defendant acted intentionally, knowingly or recklessly. State v. Rushing, 62 Haw. at 106, 612 P.2d at 106-07 (affirming a conviction for welfare fraud although the prosecution had offered no direct evidence of the defendant's state of mind). Given the difficulty of proving the requisite state of mind by direct evidence in criminal cases, proof by circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising from circumstances surrounding the defendant's conduct is sufficient. State v. Batson, 73 Haw. at 254, 831 P.2d at 934 (holding that substantial circumstantial evidence supported a trial court's conclusion that a defendant had knowingly caused his son's death). The mind of an alleged offender may be read from his acts, conduct and inferences fairly drawn from all the circumstances. Id. Moreover, we have held that persons of ordinary intelligence would have a reasonable opportunity to know that causing physical injury by punching someone in the face would constitute physical abuse. State v. Kameenui, 69 Haw. 620, 623, 753 P.2d 1250, 1252 (1988). Absent a legal justification or excuse, a slap on the side of the head involves, at a minimum, a substantial and unjustifiable risk, i.e., a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the same situation. HRS § 702-206(3)(d) (1993). The same substantial evidence showing that Eastman slapped Bautista on the side of her head also supports a finding that, at a minimum, Eastman consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk of physically abusing Bautista. Therefore, the prosecution provided substantial evidence from which the trial court could infer that Eastman physically abused Bautista with the minimum requisite state of mind, i.e., recklessness, for a conviction under HRS § 709-906(1).