Opinion ID: 169475
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Speech Pursuant to Official Duties

Text: In Garcetti, the Supreme Court declined to articulate a formula for determining when a government employee speaks pursuant to his official duties. See 126 S.Ct. at 1961. However, cases interpreting Garcetti have made clear that speech relating to tasks within an employee's uncontested employment responsibilities is not protected from regulation. See, e.g., Casey, 473 F.3d at 1329 (noting that when the speech concerns a matter within the employee's portfolio it is made pursuant to her official duties); see also Wilburn v. Robinson, 480 F.3d 1140, 1151 (D.C.Cir.2007) (same). This may be true even though the speech concerns an unusual aspect of an employee's job that is not part of his everyday functions. See Battle v. Bd. of Regents, 468 F.3d 755, 761 n. 6 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). Indeed, we have stated that speech is made pursuant to official duties if it is generally consistent with the type of activities [the employee] was paid to do. Green, 472 F.3d at 801. An employee's official job description is not dispositive, however, because speech may be made pursuant to an employee's official duties even if it deals with activities that the employee is not expressly required to perform. The ultimate question is whether the employee speaks as a citizen or instead as a government employeean individual acting in his or her professional capacity. See Garcetti, 126 S.Ct. at 1960. Consequently, if an employee engages in speech during the course of performing an official duty and the speech reasonably contributes to or facilitates the employee's performance of the official duty, the speech is made pursuant to the employee's official duties. See Williams v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 480 F.3d 689, 693 (5th Cir.2007) (per curiam). [5] At the same time, not all speech that occurs at work is made pursuant to an employee's official duties. See Garcetti, 126 S.Ct. at 1959 (Employees in some cases may receive First Amendment protection for expressions made at work.). Nor is all speech about the subject matter of an employee's work necessarily made pursuant to the employee's official duties. Id. at 1959 (The First Amendment protects some expressions related to the speaker's job.). Instead, we must take a practical view of all the facts and circumstances surrounding the speech and the employment relationship. Id. at 1961 (The proper inquiry is a practical one.). Pursuant to their contracts, Plaintiffs were all hired as school teachers. By entering into the contracts, Plaintiffs agreed to support the philosophy and curriculum of the Academy without reservation. Aplt.App. at 1359. Plaintiffs also agreed that their duties and responsibilities would be consistent with the Charter Contract and Charter Application as approved by the District Board of Education. Id. Although the record indicates that Plaintiffs were encouraged to present their views to improve the Academy and did so in the form of complaints and grievances to the Board, we cannot deem such a generalized grievance policy to be an official duty without eviscerating Garcetti and the general constitutional principle that public employees do not surrender all their First Amendment rights by reason of their employment. Garcetti, 126 S.Ct. at 1957; see id. at 1961 (We reject . . . the suggestion that employers can restrict employees' rights by creating excessively broad job descriptions.). Nearly all of the matters Plaintiffs claim they discussed were made pursuant to their duties as teachers. [6] For example, Plaintiffs allege that they discussed the Academy's expectations regarding student behavior. Aplt.App. at 823. Ostensibly, as teachers, Plaintiffs were expected to regulate the behavior of their students. Likewise Plaintiffs discussed the Academy's curriculum and pedagogy. Id. at 822, 957. Of course, as teachers, Plaintiffs were paid to execute the Academy's curriculum and utilize an effective pedagogy. Plaintiffs also complained that the Academy should spend more money on instructional aids, furniture, and classroom computers. Id. at 903. These complaints were made pursuant to Plaintiffs' inherent duty as teachers to ensure they had adequate materials to educate their students. Consequently, statements regarding all of these and similar matters were made pursuant to Plaintiffs' official duties and could be freely regulated by the Academy. [7] Nevertheless, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the them, Plaintiffs' speech regarding some of the matters was not made pursuant to their official duties. These matters are: (1) the resignations of other teachers, (2) whether the Academy Code of Conduct could restrict Plaintiffs' freedom of speech, (3) staffing levels, (4) the Academy's spending on teacher salaries and bonuses, (5) criticisms of the school board, (6) the visibility of Dr. Marlatt and the Board at important events, (7) the lack of support, trust, feedback and communication with Dr. Marlatt, (8) Dr. Marlatt's restrictions on speech and association, (9) the treatment of parents by the Board, (10) Dr. Marlatt's favoritism, (11) whether the Academy charter would be renewed, and (12) the upcoming Board elections. As teachers, Plaintiffs had no supervisory responsibility and no duty to report with regard to any of the problems being discussed, nor does it appear that Plaintiffs' discussion of these matters occurred during the performance of their official duties because the discussions occurred after hours and outside of the Academy. Furthermore, the discussions included ordinary citizens and parents who were not employed by the Academy. Consequently, these twelve matters discussed by Plaintiffs pass the first step of the Garcetti/Pickering analysis.