Opinion ID: 2633534
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Trial Court Erred Under Section 1424 in Denying the Recusal Motion

Text: We agree with the Court of Appeal that the close family relationship between longtime employees of the LACDA and defendant Vasquez created a conflict of interest and a consequential likelihood of unfair treatment that should have been avoided through recusal of the prosecutorial office. The assigned deputy district attorney admitted, both to defense counsel and at the first recusal motion hearing, that concerns about an appearance to the victim's family of favoritism by the LACDA's office had in part influenced her to reject the defense proposal for a bench trial before Judge Shapiro. This admission of an extrinsic influence over the prosecutor's discretionary decisionmaking showed both the conflict's existencei.e., that because of the family relationship there was a reasonable possibility that the DA's office may not exercise its discretionary function in an evenhanded mannerand that its severity required the LACDA be disqualifiedi.e., that the conflict was so grave as to render it unlikely that defendant will receive fair treatment during all portions of the criminal proceedings. ( People v. Conner (1983) 34 Cal.3d 141, 148, 193 Cal.Rptr. 148, 666 P.2d 5; see People v. Eubanks, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 594, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 200, 927 P.2d 310 ( Eubanks ).) As we explained at length in Eubanks, public prosecutors in California are required to exercise their discretionary functions, which are broad in scope and subject to only limited review, `with the highest degree of integrity and impartiality.' ( Eubanks, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 589, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 200, 927 P.2d 310, quoting People v. Superior Court ( Greer ) (1977) 19 Cal.3d 255, 267, 137 Cal.Rptr. 476, 561 P.2d 1164.) Impartiality, in this context, means not that the prosecutor is indifferent to the conviction or acquittal of the defendantthe prosecutor does not share in the neutrality expected of the judge and jurybut that the prosecutor is expected to exercise his or her discretionary functions in the interests of the People at large, and not under the influence or control of an interested individual. ( Eubanks, at p. 590, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 200, 927 P.2d 310.) The public prosecutor's proper interest `is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.' ( Id. at p. 589, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 200, 927 P.2d 310.) In section 1424, the Legislature established a substantive test for a motion to disqualify the district attorney: The motion may not be granted unless the evidence shows that a conflict of interest exists that would render it unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair trial. The statute demands a showing of a real, not merely apparent, potential for unfair treatment, and further requires that that potential rise to the level of a likelihood of unfairness. ( Eubanks, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 592, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 200, 927 P.2d 310.) Although the statute refers to a fair trial, we have recognized that many of the prosecutor's critical discretionary choices are made before or after trial and have hence interpreted section 1424 as requiring recusal on a showing of a conflict of interest `so grave as to render it unlikely that defendant will receive fair treatment during all portions of the criminal proceedings. ' ( Eubanks, at p. 593, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 200, 927 P.2d 310, quoting People v. Conner, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 148, 193 Cal.Rptr. 148, 666 P.2d 5.) On review of the trial court's denial of a recusal motion, [o]ur role is to determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the [trial court's factual] findings [citation], and, based on those findings, whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion. ( People v. Breaux (1991) 1 Cal.4th 281, 293-294, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 81, 821 P.2d 585; accord, Eubanks, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 594, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 200, 927 P.2d 310.) Here, the trial court found Deputy District Attorney Wilkinson had declined the defense offer of a bench trial before Judge Shapiro because of the problems attendant with his [Judge Shapiro's] past position, rather than because of who the defendant is, vis-à-vis his stepfather and his mother. This finding is not supported by substantial evidence. At the first recusal motion hearing, Vasquez's attorney represented to the court that Wilkinson had told him she was not interested in waiving a jury because she didn't want to do anything that could make it look like there had been any kind of favor toward Mr. Vasquez because of his father being ... in the District Attorney's office. Wilkinson did not contradict this aspect of defense counsel's account of their conversation. In describing her motives, she said she was concerned about possible criticism of Judge Shapiro should he rule for the defense, but continued, And, also, I wanted to insure that there was no appearance of impropriety on the part of our office in handling this. At the second hearing, defense counsel repeated his representation that Wilkinson had told him she decided not to do that [waive a jury] because she said it might have the appearance of an impropriety that they're giving Mr. Vasquez some kind of a break.... Again, Wilkinson did not deny she had made such a statement, stating only that she had put on the record before Judge Shapiro that in light of the judge's prior relationship with the office I felt that it will be best not to waive jury to him to avoid the appearance of impropriety and also I did not wish to put him in that position of making a decision and ultimately having his decision perhaps questioned. Before the trial court was thus defense counsel's uncontradicted representation that Deputy District Attorney Wilkinson had told counsel she was reluctant to waive a jury before Judge Shapiro because it could be seen as favoritism by the LACDA toward Vasquez motivated by his close family relationship with LACDA employees. While Wilkinson also cited concerns about possible criticism of Judge Shapiro, she confirmed that with the victim's family expressing the view that perhaps we were not pursuing things, she wanted to insure that there was no appearance of any impropriety on the part of our office in handling this. On this record, the trial court's apparent finding that Wilkinson was motivated only by the desire to prevent possible criticism of Judge Shapiro, and not also by an appearance of favoritism toward Vasquez by the LACDA, was unsupported by substantial evidence. Examining the trial court's decision to deny recusal in this factual light, we conclude the court abused its discretion. In most circumstances, the fact one or two employees of a large district attorney's office [2] have a personal interest in a case would not warrant disqualifying the entire office. (See Millsap v. Superior Court (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 196, 200-204, 82 Cal. Rptr.2d 733; Trujillo v. Superior Court (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 368, 370-373, 196 Cal.Rptr. 4.) But where the record on the recusal motion indicates that the conduct of any deputy district attorney assigned to the case, or of the office as a whole, would likely be influenced by the personal interest of the district attorney or an employee, the motion is properly granted. (See People v. Conner, supra, 34 Cal.3d at pp. 148-149, 193 Cal.Rptr. 148, 666 P.2d 5 [recusal of entire office proper where deputy district attorney witnessed the defendant's violent courthouse escape and assault on a deputy sheriff, a harrowing experience he discussed with coworkers]; People v. Choi (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 476, 480-483, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 922 [same where district attorney with indirect personal connection to charged murder continued to involve himself in the proceedings despite ethical wall established within his office].) In the present case, Deputy District Attorney Wilkinson had no personal interest in the case, but two other employees of the LACDA, Vasquez's mother and stepfather, did. That personal interest, by raising the concern that acceding to a defense request would be perceived by the victim's family as favoritism to Vasquez, influenced Wilkinson's decision not to accept a defense proposal for a bench trial. The admitted role Vasquez's family relationship with LACDA employees played in influencing the prosecutor's conduct of the case demonstrated a likelihood defendants would not be treated fairly by the LACDA at all stages of the criminal proceedings, requiring the office's recusal. ( Eubanks, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 593-594, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 200, 927 P.2d 310.) [3] Although defendant Fregoso did not have a family relationship to LACDA employees, we assume, without deciding, that the influence of Vasquez's family relationship on the prosecutor's decision not to waive a jury trial provided codefendant Fregoso with an equivalent justification to seek recusal of the LACDA. The Attorney General does not assert that on this record any basis exists to distinguish between defendants in this regard.