Opinion ID: 1152272
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: direct attack on the record

Text: It will be observed that in addition to his allegations tending to invalidate his waiver of indictment as it appears in the judicial record, the plaintiff also directly alleges the falsity of certain recitals in the judgment concerning events which transpired in open court. Among other matters he denies the solemn recital that after arraignment defendant answered `Guilty as Charged in Said Information.' This assertion of a right to introduce evidence for the purpose of directly contradicting a recital of fact in the judicial record for the purpose of showing a deprivation of constitutional right raises a different question. In Riddle v. Dyche, 262 US 333, 67 L ed 1009, the record of conviction showed that a jury of good and lawful men was duly impaneled, sworn and charged for the trial of the defendant who was convicted in the federal court. He then sought various remedies in an effort to prove that he was tried by a jury of eleven men only. Being unsuccessful he sued out a writ of habeas corpus which was denied and an appeal was taken to the United States Supreme Court. In an opinion by Justice Sutherland the traditional view concerning the right to contradict a judicial record was followed. The court first held that plaintiff's remedy was by writ of error which he had not followed and then said:    The writ of habeas corpus is not a proceeding in the original criminal prosecution, but an independent civil suit (Ex parte Tom Tong, 108 U.S. 556, 559, 27 L.ed. 826, 827, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 871), in which the record of the trial court is not open to collateral attack, but imports absolute verity.    Cases were cited in support. In Wall v. Hudspeth, 108 F2d 865, CCA Tenth, the contention in habeas corpus was that the plaintiff had not pleaded guilty to the charge contained in the indictment. The court cited Riddle v. Dyche, supra, 262 US 333, 67 L ed 1009, and said:    Furthermore, the record affirmatively discloses that the plea of guilty was to the charges contained in the indictment. The record is conclusive and not open to collateral impeachment in a proceeding of this kind. Again in Ossenfort v. Pulaski, 171 F2d 246, CCA Fifth, the plaintiff in habeas corpus alleged that he had been deprived of his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel. The court said:    Moreover, where, as here, the record of a criminal trial clearly supports a recitation in the judgment that defendant was adequately advised of his constitutional right to counsel, and nevertheless chose to waive such right, that judgment may not be impeached collaterally on habeas corpus by subsequent findings to the contrary, wholly inconsistent with the record. Citing cases. In United States v. Handy, 97 F Supp 930, the claim was that the trial in the state court had been dominated by mob influence. The case was brought to the federal court on habeas corpus. It was held that the sole inquiry which the federal court was permitted to make was whether the federal Constitution was contravened. The court examined the evidence and held against the plaintiff. The transcript of the criminal trial was before the federal court. The court said: Following the precepts of Johnson v. Zerbst, supra, 304 U.S. at page 465, 58 S.Ct. 1019; United States ex rel. Kennedy v. Burke, 3 Cir., 173 F.2d 544, we examined the facts looking through form and into the heart and substance of the petition, the record in the trial and appellate courts, including the transcript of the testimony of the trial proceeding. We accept as true all of the well pleaded allegations of the petition, however much they may tax credulity, except to the extent that they conflict with the record and the trial transcript itself.    ` Facts of record with regard to what occurred at a trial cannot be attacked on habeas corpus.' (Italics ours.) In Gutterman v. Hiatt, 65 F Supp 285, the plaintiff in habeas corpus contended that his plea of guilty was induced by duress and upon that issue the court heard testimony. However, the plaintiff also attempted to contradict the recital in the judicial record. He claimed that he had not been advised of his right to counsel. The court said: The petitioner's allegation that he was not advised of his right to counsel in the District Court for the Western District of North Carolina is answered by the minutes of the proceedings in the trial court in connection with the imposition of sentence, which specifically set forth: `May 11, 1943. The case is called and the defts. Maurice A. Gutterman and Marion Rappaport Gutterman are present without counsel and before entering a plea, are asked by the Court if they desire counsel and they state to the Court that they do not, whereupon they each enter plea of guilty.' Such record entries import verity and are not subject to impeachment in a habeas corpus proceeding.    In Braun v. United States, 16 F2d 118, CCA Ninth, the plaintiff in his petition for habeas corpus denied that he had entered a plea of guilty to the fourth count in the information against him. The court, by Judge Rudkin, said:    A record of conviction cannot be impeached in that way. If, as a matter of fact, the record on the criminal trial did not speak the truth, it was the duty of the appellant to apply to that court for its correction, and to prosecute a writ of error to this court, if his application was denied. Having failed to do this, he is now precluded from impeaching the record in a collateral proceeding, such as this.    (Italics ours.) In support of his opinion the court cited Riddle v. Dyche, supra. See also United States ex rel Grove v. Jackson, 16 F Supp 126; Smith v. Hiatt, 54 F Supp 481; Williams v. Huff, 146 F2d 867; Bardwell v. Hiatt, 50 F Supp 913; Hill v. United States ex rel Wampler, 298 US 460. 9. We hold, as a general rule, that recitals in the judicial record, showing what was said and done in the court, import absolute verity, and therefore cannot be collaterally attacked in habeas corpus. As indicated in Braun v. United States, supra, if the judicial record does not correctly state what occurred in court, the proper remedy is by motion to correct the record. State v. Fiester, 32 Or 254, 270, 50 P 561. We find support in the following cases: Heatherly v. Hadley, 4 Or 1; Schmid v. City of Portland, 83 Or 583, 163 P 1159; Capos v. Clatsop County, 144 Or 510, 25 P2d 903; Travelers Insurance Co. v. Staiger, 157 Or 143, 69 P2d 1069; Linn County v. Rozelle et al, 177 Or 245, 282, 162 P2d 150; State v. Lillie, supra, 172 Or 194, 139 P2d 576; Cochran v. Amrine, 153 Kan 777, 113 P2d 1048; Lewis v. State, 153 Miss 759, 121 So 493; Commonwealth ex rel Chambers v. Claudy, 171 Pa St 115, 90 A2d 383; Spencer v. Gomez, 114 Fla 688, 154 So 858; Willoughby v. Utecht, 223 Minn 572, 27 NW2d 779; Ex parte Connor, 16 Cal2d 701, 108 P2d 10; Commonwealth v. Ashe, 167 Pa Super 263, 74 A2d 769; State ex rel Waldrop v. Mayo, 125 Fla 442, 170 So 117; Cohen v. Portland Lodge No. 142 B.P.O.E., 140 F 774; See 39 CJS, Habeas Corpus, § 100 e, p 681. 10, 11. It must be conceded that there are decisions which support plaintiff's assertion of a right, not only to go behind the judicial record by extrinsic evidence, but also to directly contradict recitals of fact therein concerning events which occurred in court. In re Hazel, 80 Okl CR 66, 157 P2d 225; United States v. Thompson, 175 F2d 140. It must also be conceded that there are cases, most of them old, which tend to support the position of the attorney general in the pending case, when he asserts broadly that the recitals in a judgment cannot be attacked in habeas corpus by impeachment or contradiction, that is, either by going behind the record or by direct contradiction thereof. See Grieve v. Webb, 22 Wash2d 902, 158 P2d 73, and Ex parte Watkins, 28 US 193, 7 L ed 650. We reject both contentions and the authorities supporting them. Again, the books are full of pronouncements in general terms that when violation of constitutional right is asserted in habeas corpus the federal courts will examine into the very truth and substance of the causes of detention. And we find occasional statements such as this; We believe that the question of representation by counsel may be raised in a habeas corpus proceeding, even if inquiry into that question entails contradiction of the record. Curtis v. Hiatt, 161 F2d 621. The question is, what is meant by such language. We think the confusion in the judicial decisions upon this point comes from a lack of precise definition of the phrase, contradiction of the record. Obviously no recital in a judicial record constitutes a bar to the reception of proof that the sentencing court never in the first instance acquired jurisdiction of the person or subject-matter of the cause. Attacks of this type upon judgments of sister states challenging their jurisdiction in the narrow sense of that term, are familiar to the profession. Again, it is sometimes intimated that the reception of proof of events occurring outside of court and offered to show fraud, duress or the like in inducing a waiver amounts to contradiction of the record, and if the phrase be so defined, then we agree that the record may be so contradicted. Curtis v. Hiatt, supra, was such a case. Following the quoted portion of the opinion in that case, the court said, This precise question was considered in Williams v. Huff, 142 F2d 91. The opinion in the Huff case is clear and concise. The court held first, Facts of record with regard to what occurred at a trial cannot be attacked on habeas corpus. It held second, that the record did not show whether the waiver of constitutional right was competently and intelligently made and the cause was remanded with directions to the lower court to determine on testimony whether, in the light of his age, education, and information, and all other pertinent facts, he has sustained the burden of proving that his waiver was not competent and intelligent. We recognize that the writ of habeas corpus should be left sufficiently elastic so that a court may, in the exercise of proper jurisdiction, deal effectively with any and all forms of illegal restraint. Price v. Johnston, 334 US 266, 92 L ed 1356. We agree that the constitutional rights of convicted felons must be scrupulously observed, but there are other considerations which bear upon the limits which should be imposed upon inquiry of this sort. The integrity of the courts should not be subject to the attack of one who, presumptively at least, is a criminal. The vice inherent in a system which permits such an attack becomes intolerable when, as is constantly occurring, the attack upon the verity of judicial recitals of facts occurring in court is made after the lapse of years when the memory of officials is dimmed by a multitude of intervening events, and when only the convict makes assertions which impeach the integrity of the judge and the verity of the recitals made under his direction and which assertions too often tax credulity and suggest an origin post litem motam. 12. We accord respectful deference to the exercise of power by federal courts under the Fourteenth Amendment in revising the final judgments of state courts in habeas corpus proceedings. But we hold that the courts of the several states may rightfully claim for their judicial recitals the same immunity from direct contradiction which is asserted by the federal tribunals with regard to their records, hence our conclusion that recitals in a judicial record showing what was done in court import absolute verity and therefore cannot be collaterally attacked in habeas corpus. 13. The attempt of the plaintiff to establish that the recitals in the judicial record were false, fraudulent and malicious must fail. Our conclusion is not inconsistent with the provisions of OCLA, § 11-422 concerning the scope of the reply to the return. The right thus bestowed was not intended to extend to the direct contradiction of judicial recitals which import verity. The statute provides that a judgment of imprisonment in the penitentiary need only specify the duration of such confinement. OCLA, § 26-1214. The statute does not require that the judgment contain recitals concerning such matters as the waiver of grand jury or of jury trial and the like. See In re Application of Loundagin, supra, 129 Or 652, 278 P 950. Again, one may seek relief by habeas corpus from confinement which is pursuant only to a warrant issued by the county clerk and in the form prescribed in OCLA, § 26-1207, which recites only the fact of conviction and directs arrest of the defendant. The statutory authority to contradict any material fact set forth in the return refers to facts which must be included in the return. The authority to allege any fact to show that imprisonment is unlawful does not include the right to directly contradict judicial recitals which generally do appear in judgments of conviction and so also in returns to a writ of habeas corpus, but which are not required by statute so to appear. The federal statute on habeas corpus provides that the person detained may deny any of the facts set forth in the return or allege any other material facts. USCA, Tit 28, § 2243. Yet, the federal courts do not tolerate direct contradiction of judicial recitals of fact. 14. What has been said must not be taken as any indication that judgments of conviction should be limited in form to the bare requirements of the statute. We deem it the duty of a trial court to see to it that the journal entries fully and clearly set forth the proceedings, and it is desirable that similar recitals be made in the judgment itself. See State v. McDaniel, 70 Or 232, 140 P 993. 15-17. Although courts are reluctant to find that fundamental constitutional rights have been waived, it is nevertheless the rule that such rights may be waived. Schick v. United States, 195 US 65, 49 L ed 99. But the waiver to be valid must not be the product of duress or misrepresentation. It must be voluntary and must be understandingly made with knowledge by the party of his rights. In this connection the age, education, experience, mental capacity, the nature of the charge, whether complicated or simple, the possible defenses available and other relevant circumstances will be considered if the case be taken to a federal court and should be considered in the state court if conflicts and intolerable delays are to be avoided. Walker v. Johnston, 312 US 275, 85 L ed 830; Lee v. Mississippi, 323 US 742, 92 L ed 330; Hawk v. Olson, 326 US 271, 90 L ed 61; Johnson v. Zerbst, supra, 304 US 458, 82 L ed 1461; Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 US 437, 93 L ed 127. In view of the allegations of plaintiff's reply and of his alleged illiteracy as testified to by him, the court erred in refusing to consider the validity of the waiver of indictment. Plaintiff's second assignment of error reads as follows: The court erred in ruling that the question of whether or not the Appellant had made a plea of guilty could not be considered in this proceeding. If this assignment of error were to be construed as a mere denial of the judicial recital that the defendant in open court answered Guilty as Charged, we would hold it to be without merit. But the plaintiff explains his assignment by stating: In view of the fact that the question of whether or not the Appellant entered a plea of guilty rests on matters dehors the proceedings in the sentencing court   . Thus construed the assignment merits consideration. The constitution of Oregon requires that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to trial by an impartial jury. Constitution, Art I, § 11. The general rule concerning the requisites of a valid plea of guilty has been stated as follows: A plea of guilty should be entirely voluntary, by one competent to know the consequences, and should not be induced by fear, misapprehension, persuasion, promises, inadvertence, or ignorance. Accordingly, it will not bind the defendant where it is entered through intimidation, however slight; and a judgment is not properly entered on it where the court does not satisfy itself of the voluntary character of the plea. It has sometimes been held that it must be made a matter of record that the plea was voluntary and uninfluenced by fear. 14 Am Jur, Criminal Law, § 270. 18, 19. A plea of guilty is a judicial confession of guilt and comes within the established rule that the Constitution of the United States stands as a bar against the conviction of any person in an American court by means of a coerced confession. Sustar v. County Court for Marion County, 101 Or 657, 201 P 445; State v. Lewis, 113 Or 359, 230 P 543, 232 P 1013; Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 US 143, 88 L ed 1192; Poole v. Commonwealth, 301 Ky 531, 192 SW2d 490; Jenness v. State, 144 Me 40, 64 A2d 184; Kercheval v. United States, 274 US 220, 71 L ed 1009; Johnson v. Zerbst, supra, 304 US 458, 467, 82 L ed 1461, 1468, 58 S Ct 1019; Townsend v. Burke, 334 US 736, 92 L ed 1690. Other authorities cited under our discussion of the first assignment of error are relevant here. We conclude that plaintiff's reply presented issues of fact on which a hearing should have been held by the trial court relative to the validity of the plea of guilty. The third assignment of error reads as follows: The court erred in ruling that the question of whether or not the Appellant had been denied the right to appeal until after the time limited by law for filing a notice of appeal had expired could not be considered in this proceeding. The plaintiff's reply contains a direct allegation that after his sentence and for the ensuing 60 days (the period within which there is a statutory right of appeal) the defendant was confined in the penitentiary and was frustrated by official action in his efforts to appeal. In Cochran v. Kansas, 316 US 255, 86 L ed 1453, the plaintiff brought habeas corpus in the Supreme Court of Kansas in which state the Great Writ is recognized as affording a remedy to a person held in prison in violation of constitutional right. The plaintiff alleged that the officials of the penitentiary in the enforcement of prison rules had rendered it impossible for him to perfect an appeal. This allegation, as in the case at bar, was not denied. The state court denied the writ. On certiorari the United States Supreme Court held that if the allegations of the petition were true there would be a clear case of a violation of the equal protection clause of the federal Constitution. Since the state court had not determined the verity of the allegations, the cause was remanded for further proceedings. The same rule was announced and applied in the recent case of Dowd v. United States, 340 US 206, 95 L ed 215. In that case the plaintiff who had been convicted in an Indiana court in the year 1931 alleged that his efforts to appeal were frustrated by the warden of the penitentiary pursuant to prison rules. After the rule had been repealed, but also after the time for appeal had expired, he sought relief in the state courts, first by coram nobis in 1937 and then by habeas corpus in 1945. In 1946 he petitioned the Supreme Court of Indiana for a delayed appeal. All efforts were unsuccessful. Thereafter in the year 1948, being 17 years after his conviction, he brought habeas corpus in the United States District Court. It reached the Supreme Court in 1950 and in 1951 that court said, The Fourteenth Amendment precludes Indiana from keeping respondent imprisoned if it persists in depriving him of the type of appeal generally afforded those convicted of crime. The case was remanded to the state court with the suggestion that Indiana may find it possible to provide the appellate review to which respondent is entitled. Failing this he was to be discharged. These two cases establish the constitutional right of a prisoner to the type of appeal generally afforded. In both cases the prisoner had been convicted on a plea of not guilty and consequently the right of appeal included the right to a review of the record for the discovery of any errors committed at the trial whether or not they were violations of constitutional right. 20, 21. In the case at bar the plaintiff pleaded guilty. If the plea was understandingly and voluntarily made it amounted to a conclusive admission of all material allegations of the information. Sustar v. County Court for Marion County, supra, 101 Or 657, 201 P 445. Under these circumstances the right of appeal would be of a strictly limited nature. He could invoke the provisions of chapter 62, Oregon Laws of 1945 (OCLA, § 26-1304a) on the alleged ground that the sentence imposed an excessive, cruel or unsual punishment. Upon this ground we judicially know that he could not prevail. The penalty authorized by statute is imprisonment in the penitentiary for not less than one nor more than 10 years. The sentence imposed was imprisonment not to exceed three years. At the habeas corpus hearing the plaintiff admitted two previous convictions for felony. Since the habitual criminal act was not invoked the duration of punishment was within the sound discretion of the trial court. The sentence imposed could not have been either excessive, cruel or unusual under these circumstances. 22. It may be argued that under the decision in State v. Lewis, supra, the scope of appeal on a valid plea of guilty is somewhat broader than that authorized by the 1945 statute. Assuming this to be the case, the scope of appeal under that decision would be limited to certain questions of law. We have the information before us and find it sufficient in form. The only other questions of law are those which raise constitutional questions based on evidence dehors the record. These are the questions presented in the habeas corpus proceeding now pending and they will be examined by the trial court on remand. If any error of substance occurs in the decision of those questions the right of appeal may be invoked. The foregoing discussion has been upon the assumption that the plea of guilty was validly made. If upon remand it be ultimately found to have been involuntary or invalid for other reasons, then plaintiff will be entitled to discharge and will have no use for an appeal. It follows that under the peculiar facts of this case, the plaintiff is not entitled to raise the question concerning the alleged deprivation of his right to appeal from the original sentence of conviction. Such an appeal would avail him nothing and his rights are adequately protected in this case. It is therefore unnecessary for us to consider in this case whether one who has been denied a substantial right of appeal until after the statutory time has expired, is entitled to a delayed appeal. See Dowd v. United States, supra, and Cook v. State, 97 NE2d 625, holding that where an appeal has been frustrated by official action the court has inherent authority to extend the time to entertain the appeal for sufficient reasons shown. Plaintiff's fourth assignment of error is as follows: The court erred in ruling that the Appellant had waived his right to the assistance of legal counsel and in dismissing the proceeding on that ground at the close of the Appellant's case. 23-25. The judicial record of the convicting court contains no recital of any waiver by the defendant therein of the right to counsel, nor does it recite that defendant was advised of his rights in that respect. But however desirable such recitals, if conformable to the facts, would have been, the statute does not require them. We are not prepared to say that the trial court erred in the habeas corpus case when it ruled against the plaintiff's contention that he never understandingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. The court heard all of plaintiff's testimony upon that issue. It was met by the presumption that official duty has been performed and it is generally held that one who attempts to go behind the record fair on its face to invalidate a conviction assumes a heavy burden. However, since the trial court on remand must consider all of the circumstances in determining whether plaintiff validly waived indictment and validly pleaded guilty and since one of the circumstances on each of those issues is the fact that plaintiff was without the aid of counsel, the trial court will be directed to reconsider the entire question concerning the alleged denial of counsel. That issue must be decided in conformity with the constitutional mandate that In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right    to be heard by himself and counsel   . Oregon Constitution, Article I, § 11. While the right to counsel may be waived, the validity of the waiver, when challenged, is to be determined after a consideration of all of the relevant circumstances of the particular case, as indicated by the authorities already cited concerning the waiver of fundamental rights. The plaintiff complains of the refusal of the trial court to permit a withdrawal of the recorded plea of guilty. This contention will be considered by the trial court in connection with its decision on the issues raised by the second assignment of error. If the original plea of guilty was voluntarily and understandingly made, then the allowance of the petition for leave to withdraw the plea and enter a plea of not guilty rested in the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Lewis, supra, 113 Or 359, 230 P 543, 232 P 1013; State v. Wiley, 144 Or 251, 24 P2d 1030. If the original plea of guilty was not valid, the plaintiff should be discharged from custody. 26. The trial court heard only the testimony offered by the plaintiff upon the issue of the waiver of right to counsel. It is better practice in cases of this kind to hear both sides of the controversy. The impelling reason is that any procedure short of a full hearing leaves the case in such a posture that repeated subsequent applications for habeas corpus, raising identical questions, may be, and very often are, made in federal courts, where the case is again tried on its merits on the theory that a full hearing was not accorded in the state court. In House v. Mayo, 324 US 42, 89 L ed 739, the Supreme Court said: Since the petition for habeas corpus was denied without requiring the respondent to answer and without a hearing, we must assume that the petitioner's allegations are true.    27. A state court decision based on full hearing would receive in the federal court the weight to which it is entitled under the principles of comity. As said in House v. Mayo, supra:    where a state court has considered and adjudicated the merits of a petitioner's contentions, and this Court has either reviewed or declined to review the state court's decision, a federal court will not ordinarily re-examine upon writ of habeas corpus the questions thus adjudicated. See ex parte Hawk, supra (321 US 118, 88 L ed 575, 64 S Ct 448). 28. This disposes of all of the assignments of error. What we have said must not be taken as an expression of opinion upon the merits of the claims of the plaintiff who has the burden of proof. The trial court may consider all of the relevant circumstances. In weighing the testimony of the plaintiff it may consider whether there has been any unreasonable delay in the assertion of the matters on which he now relies, not for the purpose of holding that delay is any waiver of constitutional right, but for the purpose of determining the credibility and good faith of the plaintiff. 29. We have considered this case at length because of the importance and novelty, at least in this jurisdiction, of the issues presented. The recent flood of litigation flowing from behind prison walls renders it imperative that procedure in state courts be not only fair, but prompt and clearly defined if intolerable delay in the determination of fundamental rights is to be avoided. It must be small comfort for a convict, after long years of confinement in a penitentiary, to learn that the judgment of conviction was void. By the same token, any procedure which permits a convict to conduct protracted litigation in state and federal trial and appellate courts at enormous public expense, must raise grave questions as to the adequacy of the remedies provided in both judicial systems. The situation is complicated by the fact that judgments in habeas corpus are not generally considered res judicata on the issues determined. Waley v. Johnston, 316 US 101, 86 L ed 1302, 25 Am Jur, Habeas Corpus, § 156, p 250. The problem received consideration in Wade v. Mayo, 334 US 672, 92 L ed 1647, where it is pointed out that district court judges have used their power to upset the judgments of the highest state courts only sparingly and only in a negligible number of instances have convictions sustained by state courts been reversed. While this is of course true, the fact remains that the federal courts have been flooded with cases of this kind. The same high court pointed out that:    during the fiscal years of 1943, 1944 and 1945 there was an average of 451 habeas corpus petitions filed each year in federal district courts by prisoners serving state court sentences; of these petitions, an average of but 6 per year resulted in a reversal of the conviction and a release of the prisoner. The releases thus constituted only 1.3% of the total petitions filed.    Thus it appears that while the results have largely vindicated the judgments of the state courts, the expense and delay incident to the procedure cannot be ignored. 30, 31. A primary responsibility rests upon the trial judges of the convicting courts. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 US 103, 79 L ed 791. Extreme care must be exercised in each case to see to it that the accused understands the nature of the charge against him, the consequences of possible conviction, the rights which are his under the Constitution, and the nature and the effect of the waiver of any such rights, particularly when he appears without counsel. This duty should normally be performed in open court and the judicial record should accurately recite what was done, supported wherever possible by an official stenographic transcript of the proceedings on arraignment and at the time of any waiver or plea. If these duties be faithfully performed, the defendants will be fully protected in their rights and the necessity for the employment of the Great Writ will be reduced to a minimum. That writ should not be employed under our practice when relief can equally well be afforded by appeal. The cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings conformable to this opinion.