Opinion ID: 1990740
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: standard of review

Text: This Court has adopted the standard announced by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), to determine when a defendant should be granted relief from a conviction because of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Tarvis v. Moran, 551 A.2d 699, 700 (R.I.1988); see also Brown v. State, 702 A.2d 1171, 1171 (R.I.1997) (mem.); Hughes v. State, 656 A.2d 971, 971-72 (R.I.1995). That standard employs a two-part test: (1) that the actions of counsel's performance must have been so deficient that he was not acting as counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and (2) that the deficient performance of counsel prejudiced the defense. Dowell v. Moran, 702 A.2d 1173, 1174 (R.I.1997) (mem.); McKenna v. State, 671 A.2d 804, 805 (R.I. 1996); Tarvis, 551 A.2d at 700-01. The applicant must overcome a strong presumption that counsel's performance was reasonable. Hughes, 656 A.2d at 972. The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. Tarvis, 551 A.2d at 700 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052). Furthermore, this Court will not overturn the trial justice's decision denying postconviction relief unless she overlooked or misconceived material evidence or the decision was clearly erroneous. McKenna, 671 A.2d at 806. It is against this backdrop that we analyze Lyons' appeal.